COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SERVICES ET AL. v.

TRAVIS ZARNETSKI

(AC 38685)

Lavine, Mullins and Mihalakos, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintff Commissioner of Social Services appealed to the trial court

from the decision of a family support magistrate dismissing the plaintiff’s

petition for child support, which was filed on behalf of the minor child’s

mother, B. In the petition, the plaintiff alleged that child support services

were being provided to the minor child and that the defendant, Z, was

the child’s acknowledged father. The magistrate dismissed the support

petition for failure to provide a copy of the acknowledgment of paternity

signed by Z, which was executed at a hospital in Massachusetts where

the child was born. Neither B nor Z contested the issue of paternity,

and the plaintiff presented evidence of paternity through a Massachusetts birth certificate and the testimony of both B and Z, but was unable

to produce a copy of the acknowledgment of paternity. The trial court

rendered judgment affirming the magistrate’s decision dismissing the

support petition, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held

that the trial court improperly affirmed the magistrate’s order dismissing

the support petition: the plaintiff was not required, pursuant to the

relevant statutory (§§ 46b-172 and 46b-215) provisions, to produce the

Massachusetts acknowledgement of paternity in order to allow the magistrate to proceed on the support petition, as the procedure for a hearing

on a support petition merely requires that the acknowledged father be

served with a summons, which does not need to be accompanied by a

copy of the acknowledgment, it is not necessary forthe acknowledgment

to be filed for it to be valid, and an out-of-state acknowledgment is

given the same full faith and credit as one executed in Connecticut,

and, therefore, the trial court acted in contravention of the plain and

unambiguous language of §§ 46b-172 and 46b-215 when it found that

the magistrate properly dismissed the support petition for the failure

to provide a copy of the Massachusetts acknowledgment; moreover, for

the magistrate and the trial court to require the petitioner to submit an

acknowledgment of paternity when paternity was not at issue was in

contravention of the public policy of ensuring that a minor child receive

the support to which he or she is entitled without unnecessary difficulty,

as Z did not deny his relation to the child and provided testimony that

he was the child’s father and that he had signed the acknowledgment,

the child’s birth certificate supported Z’s testimony by listing him as

the father, and B further corroborated that Z was the father of the child,

all of which was sufficient for the magistrate to proceed on the support

petition and to enter an order for child support.

Argued April 26—officially released August 22, 2017

Procedural History

Petition forfinancial and medical support and maintenance, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial

district of Litchfield and referred to the family support

magistrate, Jed N. Schulman; order of dismissal; thereafter, the named plaintiff filed a petition to appeal to

the trial court, Hon. Elizabeth A. Gallagher, judge trial

referee; judgment dismissing the petition and affirming

the decision of the family support magistrate; subsequently, the court denied the named plaintiff’s motion

to reargue, and the named plaintiff appealed to this

court; thereafter, the court denied the named plaintiff’s

motion for an articulation. Reversed; judgment

directed.
Steven L. Samalot, assistant attorney general, with

whom were Sean Kehoe, assistant attorney general, and,

on the brief, George Jepsen, attorney general, and

Rochelle Homelson, assistant attorney general, for the

appellant (named plaintiff).
Opinion

MIHALAKOS, J. The plaintiff, the Commissioner of

Social Services, appeals from the judgment rendered

by the trial court affirming the order of the Family

Support Magistrate (magistrate) dismissing the plaintiff’s support petition for failure to provide a copy of

the acknowledgment of paternity. The plaintiff claims

that the trial court erred in affirming the order of the

magistrate because the plaintiff was not required to

provide a copy of the acknowledgment of paternity for

the magistrate to proceed on the support petition. We

agree with the plaintiff and, accordingly, reverse the

judgment of the trial court.

The record discloses the following relevant facts and

procedural history. On November 21, 2014, the plaintiff,1

acting on behalf of Christine Bassett2 and pursuant to

General Statutes §§ 46b-215,3 17b-745,4 and/or 46b-172,5

initiated an action for child support by filing a support

petition with the Family Support Magistrate Division.

Attached to the petition was a verified statement of

facts that alleged, inter alia,that the plaintiff was providing child support services to a minor child and that

the defendant, Travis Zarnetski, was the acknowledged

father of the child.6

In support of the allegation that the

defendant was the acknowledged father, the plaintiff

appended to its petition a copy of the child’s Massachusetts birth certificate, which listed Bassett as the mother

and the defendant as the father.

On January 12, 2015, the case proceeded before the

magistrate. The defendant appeared and testified that,

at the time of the child’s birth, he admitted that he was

the father by signing an acknowledgment of paternity.

This occurred at a hospital in Massachusetts, where

the child was born. The defendant also testified that

he placed his name on the child’s birth certificate.

The magistrate determined that it needed a copy of

the Massachusetts acknowledgment, which neither the

plaintiff nor the defendant had. Accordingly, the magistrate directed the plaintiff to obtain a copy of the Massachusetts acknowledgment and stated that failure to do

so may result in the dismissal of the support petition.

On April 13, 2015, the plaintiff appeared again before

the magistrate. The plaintiff informed the magistrate

that the Department of Social Services (department)

was unable to obtain a copy of the Massachusetts

acknowledgment. An employee of the department testified that she had attempted to obtain a copy, but that

the Commonwealth of Massachusetts required a $40

fee, and the department would not pay the fee. The

department contacted local child support offices in

Massachusetts and inquired whether they had a copy

of the acknowledgment on file, but none of the offices

had such a copy. Bassett, however, testified that the

defendant had signed the acknowledgment of paternity
in her presence and that he never rescinded the

acknowledgment.

The plaintiff requested that the magistrate proceed

on the support petition despite the plaintiff’s inability to

provide a copy of the acknowledgment because neither

Bassett nor the defendant were contesting the issue of

paternity, and the plaintiff had presented evidence of

paternity through the Massachusetts birth certificate

and the testimony of both the defendant and Bassett.

The magistrate, however, determined that it still

required the Massachusetts acknowledgment and,

accordingly, dismissed the support petition without

prejudice.

On April 27, 2015, the plaintiff appealed the magistrate’s order to the Superior Court pursuant to General

Statutes § 46b-231 (n),7 claiming that the magistrate’s

dismissal of the support petition was an error of law.

In its November 9, 2015 memorandum of decision, the

trial court held that the magistrate did not err when it

required that the Massachusetts acknowledgment of

paternity be entered into evidence before proceeding

with the support petition because the acknowledgment

had been signed in another state. Accordingly, the trial

court dismissed the appeal. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court’s

judgment affirming the magistrate’s order dismissing

the support petition was an error of law. Specifically,

the plaintiff argues that neither of the relevant statutes,

§§ 46b-172 and 46b-215, require a copy of the acknowledgment of paternity to be produced when paternity is

not at issue, and when the defendant, the putative

father, testifies that he signed the acknowledgment and

caused his name to be placed on the birth certificate.

Moreover, the plaintiff claims that the trial court’s decision is in contravention of the legislative intent and

strong state policy to ensure that minor children receive

the support to which they are entitled. We agree with

the plaintiff.

We first set forth our standard of review. The plaintiff’s claim presents a matter of statutory construction,

which is a question of law. ‘‘The interpretation of a

statute, as well as its applicability to a given set of facts

and circumstances, involves a question of law and our

review, therefore, is plenary.’’ Commissioner of Social

Services v. Smith, 265 Conn. 723, 734, 830 A.2d 228

(2003).

‘‘The principles that govern statutory construction

are well established. When construing a statute, [o]ur

fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to

the apparent intent of the legislature. . . . In other

words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner,

the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the

facts of [the] case, including the question of whether
the language actually does apply. . . . In seeking to

determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z directs

us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its

relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such

text and considering such relationship, the meaning of

such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield

absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of

the meaning of the statute shall not be considered. . . .

When a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we also

look for interpretive guidance to the legislative history

and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the

legislative policy is was designed to implement, and to

its relationship to existing legislation and common law

principles governing the same general subject matter

. . . .’’ Ventura v. East Haven, 170 Conn. App. 388,

404–405, 154 A.3d 1020, cert. granted on other grounds,

325 Conn. 905, 156 A.3d 537 (2017).

‘‘[Our Supreme Court] previously [has] concluded

that the statutory scheme regarding child support

enforcement evinces a strong state policy of ensuring

that minor children receive the support to which they

are entitled. . . . Moreover, this scheme also demonstrates unequivocally the legislature’s position that this

support should be provided, to the extent possible, by

the parents of minor children.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Commissioner of Social

Services v. Smith, supra, 265 Conn. 735.

Against this background, we conclude that the relevant statutory provisions do not require the plaintiff to

produce the Massachusetts acknowledgment of paternity in order for the magistrate to proceed on the support petition. Pursuant to § 46b-172 (a) (1), ‘‘a written

acknowledgement of paternity executed and sworn by

the putative father of the child . . . shall have the same

force and effect as a judgment of the Superior Court.

It shall be considered a legal finding of paternity without

requiring or permitting judicial ratification, and shall

be binding on the person executing the same whether

such person is an adult or a minor, subject to subdivision (2) of this subsection. Such acknowledgment shall

not be binding unless, priorto the signing of any affirmation or acknowledgment of paternity, the mother and

the putative father are given oral and written notice of

the alternatives to, the legal consequences of, and the

rights and responsibilities that arise from signing such

affirmation or acknowledgment.’’

Also relevant to this appeal are two other subsections

of § 46b-172. ‘‘An acknowledgment of paternity signed

in any other state according to its procedures shall be

given full faith and credit by this state. General Statues

§ 46b-172 (a) (H). Additionally, subsection (c) (1) of

that statute provides in relevant part: ‘‘At any time after

the signing of any acknowledgment of paternity, upon

the application of any interested party, the court or any

judge thereof or any family support magistrate in IV-D
support cases and in matters brought under sections

46b-301 to 46b-425, inclusive, shall cause a summons

. . . to be issued, requiring the acknowledged father

to appear in court at a time and place as determined

by the clerk . . . to show cause why the court or the

family support magistrate . . . should not enter judgment for support of the child . . . .’’

Nowhere in the pertinent language of § 46b-172 is a

plaintiff required to provide either the magistrate or

the trial court with a copy of an acknowledgment of

paternity in order for a support petition to proceed.

Indeed, the procedure for a hearing on a support petition merely requires that the acknowledged father be

served with a summons to appear in court, and such

summons need not be accompanied by a copy of the

acknowledgment. Moreover, the acknowledgment need

not be filed in order to be valid.8 The requirements do

not change for an out-of-state acknowledgment; pursuant to § 46b-172, an out-of-state acknowledgment is to

be given the same full faith and credit as an acknowledgment executed in Connecticut. Had the legislature

intended to require out-of-state acknowledgments to be

submitted to the magistrate in order for them to be

given the same full faith and credit as a Connecticut

acknowledgment, it could have added such a provision.

Accordingly, we conclude that, in finding that the magistrate properly dismissed the support petition on the

basis that a copy of the Massachusetts acknowledgment

was required, the trial court acted in contravention to

the plain and unambiguous language of § 46b-172.

Turning now to § 46b-215, subsection (a) (1) provides: ‘‘The Superior Court or a family support magistrate may make and enforce orders for payment of

support against any person who neglects or refuses to

furnish necessary support to such person’s spouse or

a child underthe age of eighteen or as otherwise provide

in this subsection, according to such person’s ability

to furnish such support, notwithstanding the provisions

of section 46b-37. If such child is unmarried and a fulltime high school student, such support shall continue

according to the parents’ respective abilities, if such

child is in need of support, until such child completes

the twelfth grade or attains the age of nineteen, whichever occurs first.’’ Moreover, § 46b-215 (a) (4) provides

that ‘‘[f]or purposes of this section, the term ‘child’

shall include one born out of wedlock whose father has

acknowledged in writing paternity of such child or has

been adjudged the father by a court of competent jurisdiction . . . .’’

Section 46b-215 (a) (4) creates a duty for parents,

married or otherwise, to support their children. An individual who has a child out of wedlock may be subject

to this duty if he acknowledged paternity in writing.

The statute, however, does not explicitly or implicitly

require that the written acknowledgment be submitted
as evidence in order for a magistrate to proceed on a

support petition. Had the legislature intended such, it

would have incorporated into the language of the statute a requirement that the acknowledgment must be

submitted. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court

acted in contravention to the plain and unambiguous

language of § 46b-215 when it found that the magistrate

properly dismissed the support petition forthe failure to

provide a copy of the Massachusetts acknowledgment.

In addition, for the magistrate and trial court to

require the plaintiff to submit an acknowledgment of

paternity when paternity was not at issue is in contravention to our public policy of ensuring that a minor

child receive the support to which he or she is entitled

without unnecessary difficulty. The defendant did not

deny his relation to the child. Indeed, the defendant

testified not only to signing the acknowledgment, but

also to being the father of the child. Moreover, the

evidence did not contradict these admissions. Rather,

the birth certificate supported the defendant’s testimony by listing him as the child’s father.9 Furthermore,

Bassett’s testimony corroborated that of the defendant,

as she also testified that the defendant was the father

of and had acknowledged the child. Such testimony

coupled with the child’s birth certificate should have

been sufficient for the magistrate to proceed on the

support petition and to enter an order for child support.

See Colbert v. Carr, 140 Conn. App. 229, 238, 57 A.3d

878 (paternity not at issue because established by defendant’s own admission at time of child’s birth and trial

court heard no evidence to suggest defendant was

unwilling or unable to sign acknowledgment of paternity), cert. denied, 308 Conn. 926, 64 A.3d 333 (2013).

The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded

with direction to render judgment for the plaintiff, to

reverse the decision of the magistrate and to remand

the case to the magistrate for a hearing on the amount

of child support to be ordered.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 The plaintiff acted and continues to act through the Department of Social

Services—Bureau of Child Support Enforcement.

2 Although Christie Bassett is also a plaintiff in this action, we refer in

this opinion to the Commissioner of Social Services as the plaintiff and to

Bassett by name.

3 General Statutes § 46b-215 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘(1) . . . A

family support magistrate may make and enforce orders for payment of

support against any person who neglects or refuses to furnish necessary

support to such person’s . . . child under the age of eighteen . . . .

‘‘(3) Proceedings to obtain orders of support under this section shall be

commenced by the service on the liable person . . . of a verified petition,

with summons and order, of the husband or wife, child or any relative . . .

or in IV-D support cases, as defined in subdivision (13) of subsection (b)

of section 46b-231, the Commissioner of Social Services.’’

General Statutes § 46b-231 (b) (13) provides in relevant part: ‘‘ ‘IV-D support cases’ means cases in which the [Bureau of Child Support Enforcement

within the Department of Social Services] is providing child support enforcement services . . . .’’

4 General Statutes § 17b-745 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a)(1) The Superior

Court or a family support magistrate may make and enforce orders for
payment of support . . . in IV-D support cases, to the state acting by and

through the [Bureau of Child Support Enforcement within the Department

of Social Services], directed to the husband or wife, and if the . . . person

is under the age of eighteen years . . . to any parent of any . . . person

being supported by the state . . . . ’’

5 General Statutes § 46b-172 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) (1) . . . A

written acknowledgment of paternity executed and sworn to by the putative

father of the child when accompanied by (A) an attested waiver of the right

to a blood test, the right to a trial and the right to an attorney, and (B) a

written affirmation of paternity executed and sworn to by the mother of

the child . . . shall have the same force and effect as a judgment of the

Superior Court. It shall be considered a legal finding of paternity without

requiring or permitting judicial ratification, and shall be binding on the

person executing the same whether such person is an adult or a minor,

subject to subdivision (2) of this subsection. . . .

‘‘(c) (1) At any time after the signing of any acknowledgment of paternity,

upon the application of any interested party, the court or any judge thereof

or any family support magistrate in IV-D support cases and in matters

brought under sections 46b-301 to 46b-425, inclusive, shall cause a summons,

signed by such judge or family support magistrate, by the clerk of the court

or by a commissioner of the Superior Court, to be issued, requiring the

acknowledged father to appear in court at a time and place as determined

by the clerk but not more than ninety days afterthe issuance of the summons,

to show cause why the court or the family support magistrate assigned to

the judicial district in IV-D support cases should not enter judgment for

support of the child by payment of a periodic sum until the child attains

the age of eighteen years or as otherwise provided in this subsection,together

with provision for reimbursement for past-due support based upon ability

to pay in accordance with the provisions of section 17a–90 or 17b-81, subsection (b) of section 17b-179 or 17b-223, 46b-129 or 46b-130, a provision for

health coverage of the child as required by section 46b-215, and reasonable

expense of the action under this subsection. . . .’’

Section 46b-172 (c) was amended in 2015 by Public Acts, No. 15-71, § 85.

For convenience, we refer herein to the current revision of the statute.

6 The word ‘‘acknowledged’’ in paternity and child support proceedings

refers to a written acknowledgment of paternity executed and sworn to

pursuant to § 46b-172. See General Statutes § 7-36 (11) (‘‘ ‘[a]cknowledgment

of paternity’ means to legally acknowledge paternity of a child pursuant to

section 46b-172’’).

7 General Statutes § 46b-231 (n) provides in relevant part: ‘‘A person who

is aggrieved by a final decision of a family support magistrate is entitled to

judicial review by way of appeal under this section. . . .

‘‘(6) The appeal shall be conducted by the Superior Court without a

jury . . . .

‘‘(7) The Superior Court may affirm the decision of the family support

magistrate or remand the case for further proceedings. The Superior Court

may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant

have been prejudiced . . . .’’

8

It is also noteworthy that General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) § 46b-172

(a) provided in relevant part: ‘‘the written acknowledgement of paternity

executed and sworn to by the putative father of the child when accompanied

by . . . a written affirmation of paternity executed and sworn by the mother

of the child and filed with Superior Court for the judicial district in which

the mother of the child of the putative father resides shall have the same

force and effect of that court . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) When that statute

was amended by No. 99-193, § 7, of the 1999 Public Acts, the filing requirement was removed.

9 We find it noteworthy that Massachusetts law requires that, when a child

is born out of wedlock, paternity must be established before the father may

place his name on the child’s birth certificate. Specifically, pursuant to Mass.

Gen. Laws c. 46, § 1 (2016), ‘‘[i]n the record of birth of a child born to

parents not married to each other, the name of and other facts relating to

the father shall not be recorded except as provided in section 2 of chapter

209C where paternity has been acknowledged or adjudicated under the

laws of the commonwealth or under the law of any other jurisdiction.’’

(Emphasis added.)