[Cite as Falah v. Falah, 2017-Ohio-1087.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

 )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF MEDINA ) 

JAMILA FALAH 

 Appellee 

 v. 

GHAZI FALAH 

 Appellant 

C.A. No. 15CA0039-M 

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT 

ENTERED IN THE 

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

COUNTY OF MEDINA, OHIO 

CASE No. 14 DR 0051 

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY 

Dated: March 27, 2017 

 

CARR, Presiding Judge. 

{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Ghazi Falah (“Husband”), appeals from the judgment of the 

Medina County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division. This Court affirms in 

part, reverses in part, and remands for further proceedings. 

I. 

{¶2} Husband and Plaintiff-Appellee, Jamila Falah (“Wife”) married in Israel in 

August 1981 and had four children during the course of their marriage, three of whom are now 

adults and one of whom is deceased. Husband is a tenured university professor who taught in 

multiple countries over the years while Wife remained alongside him and raised their four 

children. The family ultimately settled in Wadsworth in 2001, but both Husband and Wife 

continued to travel internationally to visit family and friends. 

{¶3} In August 2013, one or both of the parties decided to divorce, and they both 

prepared their Wadsworth home for sale. Both parties remained at the marital residence until 
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October 2013, when Wife went on a trip to Israel. Husband then followed Wife to Israel and, in 

December 2013, filed for a divorce in the Sharia Court. Wife initially refused service, but 

ultimately secured an attorney in Israel, participated in the proceedings, and received a deferred 

dowry. While the Israeli proceedings were still pending, however, Wife also returned to the 

United States and filed a complaint for divorce in Medina. Following her return, Wife continued 

to reside in the marital residence until it sold in July 2014. 

{¶4} Husband responded to Wife’s complaint in Medina by filing a motion to dismiss 

for lack of jurisdiction. He argued both that Wife had abandoned her Ohio domicile when she 

left for Israel and the court had to cede jurisdiction to Israel, where he had filed for divorce. 

Before the court could hold a hearing on Husband’s motion, the Sharia Court issued a decision, 

approving a divorce for the parties under Israeli law. Husband then filed a supplement to his 

motion to dismiss, notifying the court of the divorce in Israel. In August 2014, while this matter 

was still pending, Husband remarried in Israel. 

{¶5} A magistrate held a hearing on a Husband’s motion to dismiss in December 2014 

and later denied it. The trial court adopted the magistrate’s decision, and scheduled the matter 

for a final divorce hearing. The final hearing took place before the trial judge in March 2015. In 

its final judgment entry, the court purportedly gave comity to the parties’ Israeli divorce 

decision, but it also granted a decree of divorce and set forth orders for the division of their 

assets and the allocation of their debt. Additionally, it ordered Husband to pay Wife permanent 

spousal support in the amount of $2,750 per month. 

{¶6} Husband now appeals from the trial court’s judgment and raises five assignments 

of error for our review. 
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II. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I 

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO 

DISMISS THE PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT DUE TO LACK OF 

JURISDICTION. 

{¶7} In his first assignment of error, Husband argues that the trial court erred by not 

dismissing Wife’s complaint. Specifically, he argues that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear 

this matter because Wife was not a resident of Ohio for at least six months before she filed her 

divorce complaint. We do not agree. 

{¶8} Generally, “[a] motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction raises 

questions of law that we review de novo.” Jackson v. Ohio Dept. of Edn., 9th Dist. Summit No. 

27686, 2016-Ohio-2818, ¶ 9. In determining subject matter jurisdiction, however, a court “is not 

confined to the allegations of the complaint, and [] may consider material pertinent to such 

inquiry without converting the motion into one for summary judgment.” (Alterations sic.) 

(Internal quotations and citations omitted.) Romano Constr., L.L.C. v. B.G.C., L.L.C., 9th Dist. 

Summit No. 26469, 2013-Ohio-681, ¶ 6. “‘If the disposition of the motion was [] based on the 

trial court’s resolution of disputed factual issues, our standard of review is that applicable to any 

other determination founded upon a trial court’s resolution of disputed factual issues, i.e., 

whether the trial court had before it competent and credible evidence to support its 

determination.’” Smith v. White, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25622, 2014-Ohio-130, ¶ 25, quoting 

Horine v. Vineyard Community Church, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-060097, 2006-Ohio-6620, ¶ 6. 

{¶9} “R.C. 3105.03 creates a strict test of residency * * *.” Barth v. Barth, 113 Ohio 

St.3d 27, 2007-Ohio-973, paragraph one of the syllabus. “Under R.C. 3105.03, a trial court has 

subject matter jurisdiction to hear a divorce action if the plaintiff has been an Ohio resident for at 
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least six months immediately before the complaint was filed, no matter where the marriage took 

place or the cause of the divorce occurred.” Nain v. Nain, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 93CA005669, 

1994 WL 411690, *1 (Aug. 3, 1994). The word “‘resident’ [as used in R.C. 3105.03] * * * 

‘means one who possesses a domiciliary residence, a residence accompanied by an intention to 

make the state of Ohio a permanent home.’” (Emphasis omitted.) Barth at ¶ 12, quoting 

Coleman v. Coleman, 32 Ohio St.2d 155, 162 (1972). “A person can have but one domicile at 

any given time.” Redmon v. Redmon, 9th Dist. Summit No. 9844, 1981 WL 3863, *2 (Feb. 18, 

1981). 

“When a person’s legal residence is once fixed, * * * it requires both fact and 

intention to change it. In other words, to effect a change of domicile from one 

locality, country, or state to another, there must be an actual abandonment of the 

first domicile, coupled with an intention not to return to it, and there must be a 

new domicile acquired by actual residence in another place, with the intention of 

making the last acquired residence a permanent home.” 

Id., quoting In re Hutson’s Estate, 165 Ohio St. 115, 119 (1956). “Thus, a person can have 

multiple residences, but can have only one domicile.” Schill v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 141 Ohio 

St.3d 382, 2014-Ohio-4527, ¶ 25. 

{¶10} There is no dispute that Wife filed her complaint for divorce against Husband on 

February 3, 2014. According to Husband, the court lacked jurisdiction over Wife’s complaint 

because she left Ohio on October 1, 2013, with the intention to relocate. He argues that Wife’s 

“actions establish an actual physical relocation and an intention to establish a residence outside 

of Ohio.” Because Wife intentionally abandoned her Ohio domicile four months before filing 

for divorce, Husband argues, she could not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement for residency set 

forth in R.C. 3105.03. Thus, he argues that the court erred when it denied his motion to dismiss. 

{¶11} A magistrate conducted a hearing on Husband’s motion to dismiss Wife’s 

complaint, and both Wife and Husband testified at the hearing. There was testimony that the 
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parties moved multiple times throughout their marriage until 2001, when they settled in 

Wadsworth and Husband secured permanent employment as a university professor. In August 

2013, either one or both of the parties decided to divorce and prepared their marital home for 

sale. Both parties testified that they placed their home on the market and sold a sizeable amount 

of their furnishings in August or September 2013. 

{¶12} Wife testified that she left Ohio on October 1, 2013, and traveled to Toronto 

because she and Husband were not getting along. Wife remained in Toronto for a single day 

before flying to Israel. She denied that she either had a residence in Toronto or had any intention 

to move there. She testified that she took, at most, two suitcases with her when she left Ohio. 

Meanwhile, she placed possessions from the marital home in storage in Akron. Wife testified 

that it was common for her to travel internationally on occasion to visit family and friends, but 

that she always intended to return to Ohio and maintain her residence here. She testified that her 

youngest son was currently attending college in Akron and that she intended to stay close to him. 

Wife indicated that, when she left Ohio, she maintained the bank account that she had in 

Wadsworth and left behind her personal belongings as well as her car. 

{¶13} According to Wife, Husband repeatedly told her that she would have to move to 

Toronto after their divorce because she could obtain welfare there and he did not intend to pay 

her any money. She testified that, when she returned from her trip to Israel on January 10, 2014, 

she had to stay in Toronto for several days because Husband had her car, refused to come get 

her, and indicated that she was not welcome at their home. After a few days, Wife rented a car 

and returned to the marital residence, where she resided until it sold in July 2014. Wife testified 

that she then moved to Akron to live with her son. She stated that, had someone inquired about 
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her permanent address six months before she filed for divorce, she would have given them her 

address in Wadsworth. 

{¶14} Husband testified that Wife obtained her college degree in August 2013 and, 

before that, repeatedly said she wanted to move to Toronto after her graduation. Husband stated 

that Wife was “very clear” about her intention to move and that she informed their real estate 

agent of her intention when the parties placed their home on the market. He testified that their 

family owned a condominium in Toronto and that one of their sons currently resided there. 

According to Husband, the parties sold the majority of their home furnishings in August or 

September 2013 and their insurance company even went so far as to contact him in December 

2013 because the company believed their home in Wadsworth to be vacant. Husband 

acknowledged, however, that Wife continued to stay at the marital residence following her return 

from Israel. He further acknowledged that, while he resided in Wadsworth from 2001 until the 

time of the divorce, he too occasionally traveled to Israel. 

{¶15} Following the hearing on Husband’s motion, the magistrate issued an order 

denying the motion and determining that Wife was a resident of Ohio for at least six months 

before she filed her complaint. The trial court then adopted the magistrate’s decision and issued 

a journal entry, denying Husband’s motion. We would note that Husband never filed objections 

to the magistrate’s decision on his motion to dismiss and that, ordinarily, his failure to do so 

would result in his having forfeited his right to challenge the court’s adoption of the magistrate’s 

decision. See Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iv). Because subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived and 

may be raised at any time, however, we nonetheless address Husband’s argument on its merits. 

See Greater Temple Christian Church v. Higgins, 9th Dist. Summit No. 23022, 2006-Ohio-3284, 

¶ 16, quoting Freeland v. Pfeiffer, 87 Ohio App.3d 55, 58 (9th Dist.1993). 
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{¶16} The trial court determined that Husband had failed to set forth sufficient evidence 

that, before filing for divorce, Wife had abandoned her Ohio domicile with no intention to return 

to it. The court noted that Wife denied having any intention to permanently leave Ohio and that 

she maintained connections here, such as placing possessions in storage in Akron and continuing 

to reside at the marital residence upon her return from Israel. The court determined that both 

parties regularly traveled internationally throughout the course of the marriage. It concluded that 

an extended visit to a foreign country was an insufficient basis upon which to conclude that Wife 

was no longer domiciled in Ohio. 

{¶17} Having reviewed the record, we must conclude that the trial court’s decision is 

based on competent, credible evidence. See Smith, 2014-Ohio-130, at ¶ 25, quoting Horine, 

2006-Ohio-6620, at ¶ 6. Although Wife left Ohio at the beginning of October 2013 and did not 

return for three months, there was evidence that she placed possessions in storage in Akron, 

maintained her local bank account in Wadsworth, left her car in Wadsworth, and brought, at 

most, two suitcases with her. There also was evidence that it was not uncommon for both parties 

to travel internationally during the course of the marriage. When Wife returned from Israel, she 

continued to reside at the marital residence until it sold some seven months later. Wife and 

Husband lived at that same address for over 12 years before Wife filed her complaint for divorce. 

Moreover, Wife specifically testified that she had no intention of permanently leaving Ohio, in 

part because she wanted to stay close to her youngest son. To the extent that her testimony 

conflicted with Husband’s regarding her intention to move, the trial court was in the best position 

to listen to their respective testimony and assess their credibility. See Young v. Young, 9th Dist. 

Wayne No. 16AP0016, 2017-Ohio-238, ¶ 21, quoting Bey v. Bey, 3d Dist. Mercer No. 10-08-12, 

2009-Ohio-300, ¶ 15. Husband failed to show that Wife actually established another domicile or 
8 

 

that she intended to permanently abandon her domicile in Ohio. See Redmon, 1981 WL 3863, at 

*2, quoting In re Hutson’s Estate, 165 Ohio St. at 119. Consequently, the trial court did not err 

by denying his motion to dismiss. Husband’s first assignment of error is overruled. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II 

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EXERCISING ITS JURISDICTION OVER 

THE PARTIES WHERE THE COURT RECOGNIZED THE ISRAELI 

COURT’S JURISDICTION, DEFERRED DIVISION OF ISRAELI REAL 

PROPERTY TO THE ISRAELI COURT AND GRANTED COMITY TO THE 

ISRAELI DIVORCE DECREE. 

{¶18} In his second assignment of error, Husband argues that the court erred when it 

exercised its jurisdiction over the parties, despite granting comity to the divorce they obtained in 

Israel during the pendency of these proceedings. He argues that, once the court decided to give 

effect to the Sharia Court’s decision, it should have dismissed the matter instead of addressing 

issues of spousal support, asset distribution, and debt division. We do not agree that the court 

erred by exercising its jurisdiction over the parties. 

{¶19} “Comity * * * refers to an Ohio court’s recogni[tion of] a foreign decree[] [as] a 

matter of courtesy rather than of right.” State ex rel. Lee v. Trumbull County Probate Court, 83 

Ohio St.3d 369, 374 (1998). 

States are empowered, if they freely elect to do so, to recognize the validity of 

certain judicial decrees of foreign governments when they are found by the state 

of the forum to be valid under the law of the foreign state and when such 

recognition is harmonious with the public policy of the forum state. Thus, in the 

interest of comity, an Ohio court will recognize a foreign decree as a matter of 

courtesy. 

(Internal citations omitted.) Mustafa v. Elfadli, 5th Dist. Delaware No. 12 CAF 08 0058, 2013-

Ohio-1644, ¶ 18. “‘This principle is frequently applied in divorce cases; a decree of divorce 

granted in one country by a court having jurisdiction to do so will be given full force and effect 

in another country by comity, not only as a decree determining status, but also with respect to an 
9 

 

award of alimony * * *.’” Kalia v. Kalia, 151 Ohio App.3d 145, 2002-Ohio-7160, ¶ 37 (11th 

Dist.), quoting Litvaitis v. Litvaitis, 162 Conn. 540, 544-545 (1972). 

{¶20} As noted, Husband filed for divorce in Israel before these proceedings began and, 

during the course of these proceedings, the Sharia Court issued a decision, purporting to grant 

the parties a divorce. The decision from the Sharia Court did not divide any of the parties’ 

property or personal belongings, but found that they were entitled to a divorce due to the 

irreconcilable “discord and dispute” that had arisen between them. The decision also ordered 

Husband to pay Wife her “deferred dowry which is registered in the marriage contract mainly 

hundred thousand old Shakel indexed to the cost of living as from the date of conduct the 

contract on July 1, 1981 until the complete performance.” There is no dispute that Wife 

ultimately accepted the payment of her dowry from Husband. Additionally, there is no dispute 

that the dowry Husband was ordered to pay, when converted to dollars, amounted to $37,250. 

{¶21} Although the trial court looked to the Sharia Court’s establishment of the term of 

the parties’ marriage, it also entered a judgment in favor of Wife, finding that she was entitled to 

a divorce on the grounds of incompatibility. Additionally, it found Wife’s dowry award to be a 

form of spousal support and afforded Husband a $37,250 credit toward spousal support based on 

his payment of the dowry. The court determined, however, that the lump sum payment did not 

prohibit a further award of spousal support. Consequently, it went on to apply the factors set 

forth in R.C. 3105.18(C)(1) to determine whether an award of spousal support would be 

reasonable and appropriate under the circumstances. 
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{¶22} The court ultimately awarded Wife $2,750 per month in spousal support from the 

date of the termination of the marriage with an offset1

 for the $37,250 that Husband had already 

paid. It also divided the parties’ remaining assets and liabilities, including their vehicles, 

Husband’s interest in an academic journal, Husband’s retirement accounts, the parties’ remaining 

personal belongings, their outstanding loans, their medical bills, and their attorney fees. The 

only potentially marital asset that the court did not divide was three parcels of real estate in 

Israel. The court decided to relinquish jurisdiction over those properties to Israel because it was 

concerned about the enforceability of its orders in Israel and, during trial, “the parties agreed that 

they would invoke the jurisdiction of an Israeli civil family court to determine their rights and 

interests in that real estate.” 

{¶23} Husband asserts that the trial court erred by exercising its jurisdiction over the 

parties because, once it gave comity to the Sharia Court’s decision, it should have declined to 

address any additional issues. The record reflects, however, that the trial court did not give “full 

force and effect” to the Sharia Court’s decision. See Kalia, 2002-Ohio-7160, at ¶ 37, quoting 

Litvaitis, 162 Conn. at 544-545. While the court spoke in terms of “comity,” it merely used the 

Sharia Court’s decision as additional evidence that the parties had decided to terminate their 

marriage and that Husband had already paid Wife a certain sum of money as a result of that 

decision (i.e., her dowry). The court independently (1) granted Wife a divorce on the grounds of 

incompatibility, (2) divided the parties’ assets and debts, and (3) fashioned a spousal support 

order. Thus, the court entered judgment independently of the Sharia Court’s decision.2

 

 

1

 The court created an offset by: (1) not assessing Husband any arrearages for spousal support 

due between August 5, 2014, and April 5, 2015; and (2) reducing his payments after the latter 

date by $500 per month for a period of 31 months. 

2 We note that, had the court actually given comity to the Sharia Court’s decision, its decision 

would have been in error. At the final divorce hearing, both parties testified that the Sharia 
11 

 

Moreover, as previously explained, it had jurisdiction over Wife’s complaint. The parties 

resided in Medina County for more than 12 years before Wife filed her complaint, and, as a 

resident of the State of Ohio for more than six month’s duration, she was entitled to invoke the 

jurisdiction of the court in Ohio. See R.C. 3105.03. Because the court properly exercised its 

jurisdiction over the parties, Husband’s second assignment of error is overruled. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III 

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO AWARD APPELLANT 

CREDIT FOR SPOUSAL SUPPORT PAID UNDER THE TEMPORARY 

ORDER OF THE COURT. 

{¶24} In his third assignment of error, Husband argues that the trial court erred when it 

did not award him credit for the spousal support payments he made under the court’s temporary 

orders. Upon review, we remand this matter to the trial court for further consideration. 

{¶25} “Generally, we review trial court’s determinations in domestic relations cases for 

an abuse of discretion.” Manos v. Manos, 9th Dist. Summit No. 27335, 2015-Ohio-2932, ¶ 26. 

An abuse of discretion implies that the trial court was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable 

in its ruling. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). 

 

Court is separate from the civil courts in Israel. Wife described the Sharia Court as offering a 

religious divorce akin to an annulment rather than a civil divorce. Meanwhile, Husband testified 

that, following an order from the Sharia Court, it would be necessary for him to obtain a 

certificate from the Israel Ministry of Interior, which was a civil court. No such certificate was 

ever entered into evidence. The record only contains a copy of the Sharia Court’s decision, 

which is in Arabic, and a purported translation of that decision. It is entirely unclear from the 

record what legal effect, if any, the Sharia Court decision has. Accordingly, absent additional 

information, it would have been error for the trial court to give full force and effect to the 

decision under the principles of comity. See Mustafa, 2013-Ohio-1644, at ¶ 18 (full faith and 

credit may be given when foreign decree “found by the state of the forum to be valid under the 

law of the foreign state and when such recognition is harmonious with the public policy of the 

forum state”). Because the court entered judgment independently of the Sharia Court, however, 

its error would have been harmless. See Civ.R. 61.
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{¶26} Wife moved for temporary spousal support on February 3, 2014, the same date 

that she filed her complaint for divorce. Due to a number of setbacks and scheduling delays, 

however, the magistrate did not issue a temporary support order until November 6, 2014. On 

that date, the magistrate ordered Husband to pay Wife temporary support in the amount of 

$3,500 per month plus processing, retroactive to February 3, 2014. The magistrate afforded 

Husband a credit on his arrearages due to his having paid Wife’s dowry and the continuing 

expenses for the marital residence. There was evidence that, between December 2014 and April 

2015 (when the court issued its final judgment entry), Wife received at least three temporary 

support payments from Husband.3

 

{¶27} In issuing its final judgment entry, the trial court sua sponte reconsidered the 

magistrate’s temporary support order. See Davis v. Davis, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 10CA0018, 

2011-Ohio-2322, ¶ 9, quoting Kelm v. Kelm, 93 Ohio App.3d 686, 689 (10th Dist.1984) (“‘[A] 

temporary [spousal] support order[] is provisional in nature, subject to modification at any time,’ 

prior to final judgment.”). The court ultimately assigned Husband all of the marital debt that the 

parties had incurred in the United States, so, “[i]n consideration of [that] decision,” it vacated the 

magistrate’s temporary support order and the credit that the magistrate had afforded Husband. 

The court determined that Wife was entitled to spousal support, effective from the date of its 

final judgment entry. The court applied a $37,250 credit towards Husband’s permanent spousal 

support obligation, representing the sum he paid on Wife’s dowry. 

{¶28} Although the court awarded Husband a spousal support credit for his payment of 

Wife’s dowry, it does not appear that the court considered whether to award him a credit for the 

 

3

 At the March 2, 2015 divorce hearing, Wife testified that she had not yet received her support 

payment for March. Presumably, she later received an additional payment for March before the 

court issued its final judgment entry in April. 
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temporary spousal support that he paid. The court vacated the magistrate’s temporary spousal 

support order, but, at that point in time, Husband had already paid Wife over $10,500 in 

temporary support. The court neglected to address those payments. In light of the fact that the 

court vacated the temporary support order, we must conclude that it acted unreasonably in failing 

to address the temporary support that Husband had already paid. See Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d at 

219. Consequently, we must remand this matter for the court to address the temporary support 

Husband paid in light of its decision to vacate the order for temporary support. See generally 

Syverson v. Syverson, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 09CA009527, 2009-Ohio-6701, ¶ 24. Husband’s 

third assignment of error is sustained on that basis.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR IV 

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION 

FOR THE COURT TO ORDER EACH PARTY TO PAY THEIR OWN 

MEDICAL BILLS. 

{¶29} In his fourth assignment of error, Husband argues that the trial court abused its 

discretion when it ordered each of the parties to pay their own medical bills. Specifically, he 

argues that it was inequitable for the court to order him to pay 87% of the parties’ medical debt 

when that debt was incurred before the de facto termination date of the parties’ marriage. We 

disagree. 

{¶30} A domestic relations court enjoys broad discretion in making “an equitable 

distribution of the parties’ assets and liabilities.” Prohaska v. Prohaska, 9th Dist. Medina No. 

2946-M, 2000 WL 530359, *8 (May 3, 2000). Consequently, we apply an abuse of discretion 

standard of review when presented with a challenge to the court’s division of marital debt. 

Polacheck v. Polacheck, 9th Dist. Summit Nos. 26551, 26552, 2013-Ohio-5788, ¶ 7. An abuse 

of discretion implies that the trial court was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable in its 
14 

 

ruling. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d at 219. When applying the abuse of discretion standard, a 

reviewing court may not simply substitute its own judgment for that of the trial court. Pons v. 

Ohio Stat Med. Bd., 66 Ohio St.3d 619, 621 (1993). 

{¶31} “[T]his Court * * * has typically held that marital debt is subject to allocation as 

part of the property distribution and that debt allocation is guided by the same equitable factors 

contained in R.C. 3105.171.” Polacheck at ¶ 18. Those factors are: 

(1) The duration of the marriage; 

(2) The assets and liabilities of the spouses; 

(3) The desirability of awarding the family home, or the right to reside in the 

family home for reasonable periods of time, to the spouse with custody of the 

children of the marriage; 

(4) The liquidity of the property to be distributed; 

(5) The economic desirability of retaining intact an asset or an interest in an asset; 

(6) The tax consequences of the property division upon the respective awards to 

be made to each spouse; 

(7) The costs of sale, if it is necessary that an asset be sold to effectuate an 

equitable distribution of property; 

(8) Any division or disbursement of property made in a separation agreement that 

was voluntarily entered into by the spouses; 

(9) Any retirement benefits of the spouses, excluding the social security benefits 

of a spouse except as may be relevant for purposes of dividing a public pension; 

(10) Any other factor that the court expressly finds to be relevant and equitable. 

R.C. 3105.171(F)(1)-(10). 

{¶32} In making an equitable distribution of the parties’ assets and liabilities, the trial 

court here determined that the parties had been married for over 32 years and their children were 

either grown or deceased. The court determined that the parties had already sold their marital 

residence and had evenly divided the $5,751.99 in proceeds from that sale. The court found that 
15 

 

Husband was a tenured university professor with a base salary of $96,918 who had “enjoyed 

significant international professional opportunities” during the course of the marriage while Wife 

raised the parties’ children and never pursued employment outside the home. With regard to the 

parties’ outstanding debts, the court found that: (1) they had $27,884.78 in outstanding marital 

debt from the United States; (2) Husband had claimed $45,551 in outstanding debt from Israel 

and Bulgaria; (3) Wife had claimed several additional debts representing loans from family 

members; (4) Wife had $1,349 in outstanding medical bills; (5) Husband had $9,078 in 

outstanding medical bills; and (6) both parties owed fees to their attorneys. 

{¶33} The trial court ultimately assigned the entire $27,884.78 debt that the parties had 

incurred in the United States to Husband, but, “[i]n consideration of [that] decision,” vacated his 

temporary spousal support obligation. The court refused to consider Husband’s $45,551 debt 

from Israel and Bulgaria to be marital debt because there was evidence that he had incurred that 

debt by borrowing money (1) to pay Wife’s dowry, (2) to obtain a car for himself in Israel, and 

(3) to “set up what he hopes will be his new life [in Israel].” The court noted that Husband had 

remarried shortly after obtaining his divorce in Israel and there was no evidence that the debt he 

incurred there was marital. Consequently, it found Husband solely responsible for those debts. 

The court likewise found Wife solely responsible for the additional debts she claimed to owe to 

family members. Additionally, it found both parties responsible for their own attorney fees and 

medical bills. With respect to Husband’s medical bills, there was evidence that he incurred them 

when he had a major heart attack and ensuing complications in Israel, beginning in June 2014. 

The court wrote: “As none of the [medical] expenses appear to have been incurred while the 

parties were together and were, in fact, incurred in different countries on separate continents, 

each party shall be responsible for his or her own unreimbursed medical expenses * * *.” 
16 

 

{¶34} Husband submits that all of the parties’ medical bills were marital debt, so it was 

inequitable for the court to order him to pay $9,078 in medical bills while Wife only had to pay 

$1,349. He argues that it is irrelevant where the bills were incurred because the parties incurred 

them before the de facto termination date of the marriage. He argues that the court abused its 

discretion by not treating the medical bills as a single debt to be evenly split between the parties; 

particularly when the court had allocated “significant other debt” to him. 

{¶35} Upon review, Husband has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion by 

ordering both parties to pay their own medical bills. The evidence was that the parties had a 

long-term marriage, Husband had a yearly salary of almost $100,000, and Wife had no 

employment history or prospects. See R.C. 3105.171(F)(1)-(2). The court, in its sound 

discretion, could have determined that Husband was far more capable of satisfying the debts at 

issue. Notably, the parties did not have a significant amount of assets remaining such that Wife 

could rely upon them to offset any outstanding debts. See R.C. 3105.171(F)(2), (4). Even so, the 

court did not require Husband to pay all of the parties’ debts. It ordered Wife to pay her own 

medical bills, her own attorney fees, and the additional amounts that she claimed were loans 

from family members. The fact that the trial court referred to the parties having incurred their 

medical bills in separate countries is insufficient to demonstrate that it failed to equitably divide 

their debt in accordance with the factors set forth in R.C. 3105.171. Under the circumstances, 

Husband has not shown that the court’s decision to order each party to pay their own medical 

bills was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. See Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d at 219. 

Consequently, his fourth assignment of error is overruled. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR V 
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THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING FINAL SPOUSAL SUPPORT 

OF $2,750.00 PER MONTH IN LIGHT OF THE SIGNIFICANT DISPARITY 

IN THE DEBTS AND EXPENSES OF THE PARTIES. 

{¶36} In his fifth assignment of error, Husband argues that the trial court abused its 

discretion when it awarded Wife spousal support in the amount of $2,750 per month. We do not 

agree. 

{¶37} “In divorce * * * proceedings, * * * the court of common pleas may award 

reasonable spousal support to either party.” R.C. 3105.18(B). Absent a challenge to a particular 

factual finding of the trial court, this Court “‘reviews a spousal support award under an abuse of 

discretion standard.’” Sayoc v. Sayoc, 9th Dist. Summit No. 27624, 2016-Ohio-1199, ¶ 6, 

quoting Hirt v. Hirt, 9th Dist. Medina No. 03CA0110-M, 2004-Ohio-4318, ¶ 8. An abuse of 

discretion implies that a trial court was unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable in its 

judgment. Blakemore at 219. When applying the abuse of discretion standard, a reviewing court 

may not simply substitute its own judgment for that of the trial court. Pons, 66 Ohio St.3d at 

621. 

{¶38} “‘In determining whether spousal support is appropriate and reasonable,’ the court 

shall consider the factors listed in [R.C.] 3105.18(C)(1)[(a)-(n)].” Organ v. Organ, 9th Dist. 

Summit No. 26904, 2014-Ohio-3474, ¶ 6, quoting R.C. 3105.18(C)(1). Those factors are as 

follows: 

(a) The income of the parties, from all sources * * *; 

(b) The relative earning abilities of the parties; 

(c) The ages and the physical, mental, and emotional conditions of the parties; 

(d) The retirement benefits of the parties; 

(e) The duration of the marriage; 
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(f) The extent to which it would be inappropriate for a party, because that party 

will be custodian of a minor child of the marriage, to seek employment outside 

the home; 

(g) The standard of living of the parties established during the marriage; 

(h) The relative extent of education of the parties; 

(i) The relative assets and liabilities of the parties, including but not limited to any 

court-ordered payments by the parties; 

(j) The contribution of each party to the education, training, or earning ability of 

the other party * * *; 

(k) The time and expense necessary for the spouse who is seeking spousal support 

to acquire education, training, or job experience so that the spouse will be 

qualified to obtain appropriate employment, provided the education, training, or 

job experience, and employment is, in fact, sought; 

(l) The tax consequences, for each party, of an award of spousal support; 

(m) The lost income production capacity of either party that resulted from that 

party’s marital responsibilities; 

(n) Any other factor that the court expressly finds to be relevant and equitable. 

R.C. 3105.18(C)(1)(a)-(n). “Need is not a basis for an award of spousal support; rather, the court 

must consider the factors set forth in R.C. 3105.18(C)(1) and determine within its sound 

discretion whether spousal support is appropriate.” Sigman v. Sigman, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 

11CA0012, 2012-Ohio-5433, ¶ 12. 

{¶39} Husband argues that the court abused its discretion in its spousal support 

determination because it did not fully consider the parties’ “relative assets and liabilities” under 

R.C. 3105.18(C)(1)(i). He notes that the court allocated the vast majority of the parties’ debt to 

him and failed to take into account the fact that he also would have a car and housing payment 

while Wife would not. Husband avers that the court limited its analysis under R.C. 

3105.18(C)(1)(i) to a discussion of the parties’ assets, rather than their liabilities. Given the 
19 

 

disparity in the allocation of the parties’ debt, Husband argues, it was unreasonable for the court 

to order spousal support in the amount of $2,750 per month. 

{¶40} Husband is correct that, in discussing R.C. 3105.18(C)(1)(i), the trial court only 

referred to the parties’ assets and not to their liabilities. The record reflects, however, that the 

court specifically considered the parties’ “sizeable debts” when discussing their standard of 

living. See R.C. 3105.18(C)(1)(g). Husband has not shown that, simply because the court did 

not discuss the parties’ liabilities specifically within the context of R.C. 3105.18(C)(1)(i), it 

failed to consider those liabilities when deciding whether spousal support would be appropriate 

and reasonable under these circumstances. See Organ, 2014-Ohio-3474, at ¶ 6, quoting R.C. 

3105.18(C)(1). 

{¶41} In determining whether to award spousal support, the trial court conducted an 

exhaustive analysis of the factors set forth in R.C. 3105.18(C)(1). It found that the parties had a 

long-term marriage, both had recently experienced health issues, and Husband was 62 years of 

age while Wife was 53 years of age. See R.C. 3105.18(C)(1)(c), (e). The court found that 

Husband had a Ph.D. and was a tenured university professor with a base salary of $96,918 while 

Wife had only recently obtained an undergraduate degree in art and had never worked outside 

the home. See R.C. 3105.18(C)(1)(a), (h). The court noted that Wife had maintained the 

household and raised the parties’ children while Husband accepted teaching positions in multiple 

countries throughout the course of the marriage. See R.C. 3105.18(C)(1)(j), (m). It found that, 

until recently, Wife never had the opportunity to pursue an education or her own career, due to 

her marital responsibilities. See R.C. 3105.18(C)(1)(m). The court evenly split Husband’s 

significant retirement assets such that Wife would receive one half of the marital portion of those 

benefits when Husband retired. See R.C. 3105.18(C)(1)(d). The court noted that the parties had 
20 

 

already split the proceeds from their marital home and that, while they owned real property in 

Israel, they had a sizeable amount of debt. See R.C. 3105.18(C)(1)(i). The court considered, as 

an additional factor, the fact that Husband had already paid Wife $37,250 in conjunction with the 

divorce the parties purportedly obtained in Israel. See R.C. 3105.18(C)(1)(n). In fashioning its 

spousal support order, the court specifically afforded Husband a credit for the $37,250 that he 

had already paid. 

{¶42} In light of the foregoing findings, Husband has not shown that the court’s spousal 

support determination was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. See Blakemore, 5 Ohio 

St.3d at 219. Although Wife did not have a car payment at the time of the divorce hearing, the 

car that the court awarded her was over 12 years old, had been involved in an accident, and, 

according to Wife, had a value of $750. Moreover, while Wife did not have a house payment at 

the time of the divorce hearing, she lived with her youngest son and testified that she had used 

her entire dowry to contribute to their purchase of a foreclosed home that still needed many 

repairs before it was habitable. Thus, even if Wife did not have a car or house payment at the 

time of the divorce, one could reasonably conclude that she would incur expenses related to 

those items in the near future. 

{¶43} The record reflects that the parties were married for over 32 years. During that 

time, Wife sacrificed an education and career to support Husband in his educational and 

professional pursuits. Given their ages, career paths, and the disparities in their incomes and 

earning abilities, the trial court reasonably could have determined that Wife was entitled to 

spousal support, despite having allocated a larger portion of the debt to Husband. Husband’s 

argument that the court abused its discretion in awarding Wife spousal support in the amount of 

$2,750 per month lacks merit. His fifth assignment of error is overruled. 
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III. 

{¶44} Husband’s third assignment of error is sustained. His remaining assignments of 

error are overruled. The judgment of the Medina County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic 

Relations Division, is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and the cause is remanded for further 

proceedings. 

Judgment affirmed in part, 

reversed in part, 

and cause remanded. 

 

 There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

 We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common 

Pleas, County of Medina, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy 

of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27. 

 Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of 

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the 

period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is 

instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the 

mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. 

 Costs taxed equally to both parties. 

 

 DONNA J. CARR 

 FOR THE COURT 
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HENSAL, J. 

SCHAFER, J. 

CONCUR. 

APPEARANCES: 

JAMES R. RANFTL, Attorney at Law, for Appellant. 

JAMILA FALAH, pro se, Appellee.