J-S21002-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: I.T.

APPEAL OF: R.T., JR., NATURAL 

FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1824 WDA 2019

Appeal from the Order Dated December 5, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Bedford County Orphans' Court at 

No(s): AD 22 FOR 2018

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., DUBOW, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED APRIL 24, 2020

R.T., Jr. (Father) appeals from the trial court’s decree involuntarily 

terminating his parental rights to his minor child, I.T. (born March 2016)

(“Child”). Counsel has also filed a petition to withdraw on appeal, pursuant to 

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). After careful review, we affirm 

and grant counsel’s petition to withdraw.

Father and L.A. (“Mother”), who were never married, are the parents of 

Child. Child has resided with Mother since birth; Father lived with them for 

the first six weeks of Child’s life. N.T. Termination Hearing, 5/17/19, at 10, 

11. Due to his history of drug and alcohol abuse, Father was always 

supervised when with Child and was never left alone with her, even when he 

lived with Mother and Child. Id. at 12. After Father moved out of the family 

residence, Mother filed a complaint in the Orphans’ Court seeking custody of 

Child. On June 6, 2016, the court granted Mother legal and primary physical 
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custody and granted Father weekly supervised visits. See Trial Court Order, 

6/6/16, at ¶ 3. Mother testified that Father’s visits with Child were “sporadic” 

and often facilitated by her driving 30 miles to pick him up. N.T. Termination 

Hearing, 5/17/19, at 14. Father often smelled of alcohol during his visits, 

which Mother preferred to hold in public places due to Father’s “ability to 

become antagonistic” with her. Id. at 14, 16. 

On January 24, 2017, the court entered a protection from abuse (“PFA”) 

order against Father following an incident during a visit at Mother’s residence 

in which Father was verbally abusive, slammed his body into Mother while she 

was holding Child, and refused to leave until instructed to do so by a state 

trooper. Id. at 60-62. On the same date, the court entered an order in the 

parties’ custody matter scheduling a review hearing for April 2017, granting 

Mother legal and primary physical custody of Child, and allowing Father two 

hours of visitation per week, to be supervised by Mother’s parents. See Trial 

Court Order, 1/24/17, at ¶¶ 1-4. The court also directed Father to abstain 

from alcohol for a period of 24 hours prior to any visit with Child. Id. at ¶ 5. 

On April 24, 2017, the court held a custody review hearing, at which 

Father failed to appear. At that hearing, maternal grandmother testified that 

Father smelled of alcohol at several visits and, during one of those visits, was 

significantly impaired. N.T. Custody Review Hearing, 4/24/17, at 8-19. After 

hearing that testimony, the court suspended Father’s partial custody rights, 

effective immediately. Thereafter, Father never had, nor attempted to have, 

any contact with Child. N.T. Termination Hearing, 5/17/19, at 67-69. Mother
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filed a petition to terminate Father’s parental rights on December 17, 2018. 

See 23 Pa.C.S. § 2512(a)(1). The court held hearings on the petition on May 

17, 2019 and December 5, 2019. Child was represented by Carol Ann Rose, 

Esquire, who acted as both counsel and guardian ad litem.

1 At the termination 

hearing, Mother testified that there is no bond between Father and Child and 

that Child “wouldn’t even be able to pick him out of a line[-]up to even know 

who he is.” N.T. Termination Hearing, 5/17/19, at 75. Mother further testified 

that Child has a close bond with her step-father, whom she refers to as “Daddy 

[J.],” and that he intends to adopt Child. Id. at 77-78, 85. 

On December 5, 2019, the court entered the instant decree terminating 

Father’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2511(a)(1) and (b) of the 

Adoption Act.2 Father filed a timely notice of appeal. Counsel has filed an 

Anders brief and petition to withdraw.

In her Anders brief, counsel raises the following issue for our 

consideration:

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1 At the termination hearing on May 17, 2019, the Orphans’ Court concluded, 

after questioning Attorney Rose, that there was no conflict between Child’s 

legal and best interests. See N.T. Termination Hearing, 5/17/19, at 8. 

Accordingly, the Orphans’ Court determined—and counsel for the parties 

agreed—that it was unnecessary to appoint separate counsel to represent 

Child’s legal interests. As a result, Attorney Rose served in the dual role as 

Child’s guardian ad litem and legal counsel. See In re T.S., 192 A.3d 1080

(Pa. 2018) (reaffirming ability of attorney/guardian ad litem to serve dual role 

representing child’s non-conflicting best interests and legal interests).

2 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2938. 
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Whether the trial court committed reversible error when it ruled 

that . . . Father’s parental rights be terminated?

Anders Brief, at 7.

Before reaching the merits of Father’s appeal, we must first address 

counsel’s petition to withdraw. To withdraw under Anders, counsel must:

(1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that, after 

making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel has 

determined that the appeal would be frivolous; (2) furnish a copy 

of the [Anders] brief to the [appellant]; and (3) advise the 

[appellant] that he or she has the right to retain private counsel 

or raise additional arguments that the [appellant] deems worthy 

of the court’s attention.

Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030, 1032 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en 

banc), citing Commonwealth v. Lilley, 978 A.2d 995, 997 (Pa. Super. 2009). 

With respect to the third requirement of Anders, that counsel inform the 

appellant of his or her rights in light of counsel’s withdrawal, this Court has 

held that counsel must “attach to [his or her] petition to withdraw a copy of 

the letter sent to their client advising him or her of their rights.” 

Commonwealth v. Millisock, 873 A.2d 748, 752 (Pa. Super. 2005). 

An Anders brief must also comply with the following requirements:

(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with 

citations to the record;

(2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably 

supports the appeal;

(3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and

(4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is 

frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, 

controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the 

conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.
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Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349, 361 (Pa. 2009). Finally, this 

Court must “conduct an independent review of the record to discern if there 

any additional, non-frivolous issues overlooked by counsel.” Commonwealth 

v. Flowers, 113 A.3d 1246, 1250 (Pa. Super. 2015) (footnote omitted).

Instantly, Father’s counsel filed a petition to withdraw, certifying that 

she reviewed the record and determined that Father’s appeal is frivolous. 

Counsel also filed a brief, which includes a summary of the history and facts 

of the case, the issue Father wished to raise, and counsel’s assessment of why 

that issue is wholly frivolous, with citations to relevant legal authority. 

Counsel has also provided Father with a copy of the brief and a letter advising 

him of his right to retain new counsel or raise additional issues pro se.

3

 

Accordingly, we find that counsel has substantially complied with the 

requirements of Anders and Santiago, and, thus, may review the issue 

raised by counsel and also conduct our independent review of the record.

Our standard of review in termination of parental rights cases is wellsettled:

The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases 

requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate 

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law 

or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse 

of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial 

court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because 

the record would support a different result. We have previously 

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3 Father has not raised any additional arguments on appeal.
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emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand 

observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted).

As discussed above, Mother testified extensively at the termination 

hearing as to Father’s lack of contact with Child, his substance abuse issues, 

and his verbal and physical abuse towards Mother. Both Mother and maternal 

grandmother testified as to the substantial efforts they made to facilitate 

Father’s visits with Child; maternal grandmother testified that she “bent over 

backwards” to accommodate Father’s schedule. N.T. Termination Hearing, 

12/5/19, at 61. Mother testified that Father’s substance abuse issues were 

long-standing and that there were numerous occasions on which he was 

intoxicated during his visits with Child. N.T Termination Hearing, 5/17/19, at 

14 (“Often times he’d still smell of booze, but this was something with me 

knowing him three years, this is how he was. He was always going to smell 

like booze when I saw him.”). Father denied that his alcohol consumption was 

a problem, testifying as follows:

Q: Was alcohol a big factor in the breakup of your relationship 

[with Mother]?

A: Yes.

Q: Was it because—do you think you were drinking too much? 

Or do you think that it was her believing you were drinking too 

much?

A: It was her belief.

. . .
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Q: Did [Mother] explain to you why she was opposed to you 

having any alone time with your daughter—

A: Yeah—

Q: —or overnights with your daughter?

A: Because of my—she was afraid that I would drink, be drinking, 

around her.

Q: Okay. Well you would know better than anybody during that 

time period in 2016, were you able to control drinking and [be] 

able to not drink when your daughter was with you?

A: Yeah. I would not drink if my daughter was in my presence.

Q: Okay. So you disagree that you were drunk around the baby.

A: Yeah. I wasn’t drunk around the baby, no. 

. . .

Q: Okay, but you weren’t—you’re saying you didn’t show up for 

a single visit intoxicated?

A: No, I drank the night before but I would not drink that same 

day. 

. . .

Q: Did you ever show up at [maternal grandparents’] house 

intoxicated?

A: No.

N.T. Termination Hearing, 12/5/19, at 80-81, 89-90, 93.

Child has not seen Father since he failed to appear for the April 24, 2017 

custody hearing at which his supervised partial custody was suspended. 

Father never petitioned the court to modify that order to restore his 

visitation—he testified he did not do so because he had transportation issues, 

a suspended license, and was in jail for a period of time. Id. at 111. Father 

testified that he texted Mother to inquire about Child, but Mother failed to 
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respond. Id. at 114-15. Mother testified that Father has not asked to see 

Child since the PFA order expired in January 2018. N.T. Termination Hearing, 

5/17/19, at 69. 

Child currently lives with Mother, Mother’s husband, J.L., and his 

daughter, C.L., who was 5 at the time of the May 2019 hearing. Mother 

testified that Child has a “very loving” bond with J.L., who is “reliable” and a 

“very stable father figure.” Id. at 77. Mother characterizes Child’s 

relationship with J.L. as the “true father/daughter relationship that [she] had 

hoped for” for Child. Id. J.L. testified that it was his intention to adopt Child, 

who refers to him as “Daddy.” N.T. Termination Hearing, 12/5/19, at 66, 70. 

J.L. testified that he loves Child “with all [his] heart” and “in [his] heart and 

in [his] mind . . . believe[s] she is [his] daughter.” Id. at 70. 

At the conclusion of the termination hearing, the court asked Attorney 

Rose, legal counsel and guardian ad litem for Child, for her recommendation. 

ATTORNEY ROSE: [] As guardian ad litem, as to [Child’s] best 

interest, she has no recollection of her biological father. She truly 

does consider [J.L.] as her father figure. When I ask her 

specifically as to does she call anyone by Dad or Daddy, she 

specifically said at that time she did, it was Daddy [J.]. . . . I 

think in her best interest, I think the biological father[’s] rights 

should be terminated.

As legal counsel, she was very specific as to what her wishes were. 

She wants to live with her Mommy and her Daddy [J.]. She was 

very specific, she did not want to live with anyone else. She 

wanted to make sure that [C.L.] was there and that’s who she 

wanted to live with. And with those wishes, I believe there would 

be no conflict between the guardian ad litem and legal counsel. 

And again, the biological father should—rights should be 

terminated. 
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Id. at 145-46. 

After hearing all the testimony as well as the recommendation of 

Attorney Rose, the trial court concluded that it was undisputed that Father 

performed no parental duties after April 2017 and, in fact, did not perform any 

significant parental duties after his separation from Mother when Child was six 

weeks old. Id. at 160-61. The court found that Mother had not impeded 

Father’s ability to maintain contact with Child, id. at 161-62, and that, prior 

to the suspension of his visitation in April 2017, Father had been “under the 

influence [during certain visits to the extent] that it would impair his ability to 

perform parental duties.” Id. at 164. The court also noted Father’s failure to 

avail himself of the courts in an effort to regain visitation rights to Child. Id.

at 165-67. In sum, the court credited Mother’s testimony over that of Father 

and concluded that Father had failed to perform parental duties “well in excess 

of the time period” required under section 2511(a)(1). Id. at 165.

Similarly, the court cited the testimony by Attorney Rose that Child has 

“no real knowledge or understanding of her . . . biological father” and an 

“extremely strong bond” with J.L., her proposed adoptive father. Id. at 168. 

The court concluded that “the child needs a parent in her life” and “can’t wait 

forever for that father to show up.” Id. Because J.L. is ready and willing to 

assume that role, the court found that it was in Child’s best interests to 

terminate Father’s parental rights pursuant to section 2511(b). 

After careful review of the record, we find there is ample, clear and 

convincing evidence to support the trial court’s factual findings. T.S.M., 
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supra. Moreover, the court’s conclusions are not a result of an error of law 

or an abuse of discretion. Id. Father has, for all intents and purposes, never 

served in a parental capacity for Child and Child would likely not recognize 

him if she saw him. Conversely, J.L. has consistently provided Child with love 

and stability for nearly her entire life and she considers him to be her father. 

J.L. is ready, willing and able to assume the parental responsibilities that 

Father has abdicated. “A child’s life simply cannot be put on hold in the hope 

that the parent will summon the ability to handle the responsibilities of 

parenting.” Adoption of C.J.P., 114 A.3d 1046, 1054 (Pa. Super. 2015) 

(citation omitted). Accordingly, we find that the record amply supports the 

trial court’s findings that termination was proper pursuant to section 

2511(a)(1) where Father “has evidenced a settled purpose [for at least six 

months preceding the filing of the termination petition] of relinquishing [his] 

parental claim to [Child].” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1).

Additionally, Attorney Rose testified that terminating Father’s rights is

in Child’s best interests and that Child expressed a clear preference to live 

with Mother, J.L., and C.L. Accordingly, we find that the court properly found 

clear and convincing evidence for termination under section 2511(b). See In 

re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 513 (Pa. Super. 2006) (“The court 

cannot and will not subordinate indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and 

stability to a parent’s claims of progress and hope for the future.”).

Finally, our independent examination of the record indicates that there 

are no other non-frivolous claims that can be raised. Flowers, supra. 
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Accordingly, we conclude Father’s appeal is frivolous and grant counsel’s 

motion to withdraw.

Decree affirmed. Petition to withdraw granted. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/24/2020