alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### § 36.550 Sex as a bona fide occupational qualification.

A recipient may take action otherwise prohibited by §§ 36.500 through 36.550 provided it is shown that sex is a bona fide occupational qualification for that action, such that consideration of sex with regard to such action is essential to successful operation of the employment function concerned. A recipient shall not take action pursuant to this section that is based upon alleged comparative employment characteristics or stereotyped characterizations of one or the other sex, or upon preference based on sex of the recipient, employees, students, or other persons, but nothing contained in this section shall prevent a recipient from considering an employee's sex in relation to employment in a locker room or toilet facility used only by members of one sex.
798 A.2d 160

#### CHARLESTOWN TOWNSHIP, Appellant, v. PENNSYLVANIA TURNPIKE COMMISSION, Appellee. Schuylkill Township, Intervenor. East Whiteland Township, Intervenor.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

April 10, 2002.

*ORDER*

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 10th day of April, 2002, we AFFIRM the Order of the Commonwealth Court.
#### Henry Helmuth, appellant, v. Louise Helmuth, respondent.

[Submitted March 26th, 1907.

Decided June 17th, 1907.]

On appeal from a decree of the court of chancery, advised by Vice-Chancellor Bergen.

*Messrs. Weller & Lichtenstein,*for the appellant.

*Mr. Harry W. Lange,*for the respondent.

Per Curiam.

The decree appealed from will be affirmed, for the reasons set forth in the opinion delivered by Vice-Chancellor Bergen in the court below.

*946
      *For*affirmance—The Chief-Justice, Fort, Hendrickson, Pitney, Swayze, Reed, Trenchard, Bogert, Vredenburgh, Green, Gray, Dill—12.

*For*reversal—Garrison, Vroom—2.
Motion Granted; Appeal Dismissed and Memorandum Opinion filed August 19 , 2014

.

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14

- 13

- 01131

- CV

LIQUIDATING MARKETIN G, LTD. F/K/A RAPID SETTLEMENTS, LTD , Appellant

V.

SETTLEMENT FUNDING, LLC D/B/A PEACHTREE SETTLEMENT FUNDING , Appellee

On Appeal from the 113th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 2006

- 23366A

MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is an appeal from a judgment signed November 19, 2013 . On August
12, 2014 , appellant filed a motion to dis miss the appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.1. The motion is granted.2 Accordingly, the appeal is ordered dismissed.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Justices McCally, Brown and Wise.
§ 1982.106 Objections to the findings and the preliminary order and requests for a hearing. ( a ) Any party who desires review, including judicial review, of the findings and preliminary order, or a respondent alleging that the complaint was frivolous or brought in bad faith who seeks an award of attorney fees under NTSSA, must file any objections and/or a request for a hearing on the record within 30 days of receipt of the findings and preliminary order pursuant to § 1982.105. The objections, request for a hearing, and/or request for attorney fees must be in writing and state whether the objections are to the findings, the preliminary order, and/or whether there should be an award of attorney fees. The date of the postmark, facsimile transmittal, or electronic transmittal is considered the date of filing; if the objection is filed in person, by hand-delivery or other means, the objection is filed upon receipt. Objections must be filed with the Chief Administrative Law Judge, U.S. Department of Labor, in accordance with 29 CFR part 18, and copies of the objections must be served at the same time on the other parties of record, the OSHA official who issued the findings and order, the Assistant Secretary, and the Associate Solicitor, Division of Fair Labor Standards, U.S. Department of Labor.
( b ) If a timely objection is filed, all provisions of the preliminary order will be stayed, except for the portion requiring preliminary reinstatement, which will not be automatically stayed. The portion of the preliminary order requiring reinstatement will be effective immediately upon the respondent's receipt of the findings and preliminary order, regardless of any objections to the order. The respondent may file a motion with the Office of Administrative Law Judges for a stay of the Assistant Secretary's preliminary order of reinstatement, which shall be granted only based on exceptional circumstances. If no timely objection is filed with respect to either the findings and/or the preliminary order, the findings or preliminary order will become the final decision of the Secretary, not subject to judicial review.
[80 FR 69132, Nov. 9, 2015, as amended at 86 FR 1790, Jan. 11, 2021]
§ 25.863 Flammable fluid fire protection. ( a ) In each area where flammable fluids or vapors might escape by leakage of a fluid system, there must be means to minimize the probability of ignition of the fluids and vapors, and the resultant hazards if ignition does occur.
( b ) Compliance with paragraph (a) of this section must be shown by analysis or tests, and the following factors must be considered: ( 1 ) Possible sources and paths of fluid leakage, and means of detecting leakage.
( 2 ) Flammability characteristics of fluids, including effects of any combustible or absorbing materials.
( 3 ) Possible ignition sources, including electrical faults, overheating of equipment, and malfunctioning of protective devices.
( 4 ) Means available for controlling or extinguishing a fire, such as stopping flow of fluids, shutting down equipment, fireproof containment, or use of extinguishing agents.
( 5 ) Ability of airplane components that are critical to safety of flight to withstand fire and heat.
( c ) If action by the flight crew is required to prevent or counteract a fluid fire (e.g., equipment shutdown or actuation of a fire extinguisher) quick acting means must be provided to alert the crew.
( d ) Each area where flammable fluids or vapors might escape by leakage of a fluid system must be identified and defined.
[Amdt. 25-23, 35 FR 5676, Apr. 8, 1970, as amended by Amdt. 25-46, 43 FR 50597, Oct. 30, 1978]
```

[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 988 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

110th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 S. 988

 To extend the termination date for the exemption of returning workers 
         from the numerical limitations for temporary workers.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             March 26, 2007

 Ms. Mikulski (for herself, Mr. Warner, Mr. Levin, Mr. Voinovich, Mr. 
Leahy, Mr. Lieberman, Mr. Gregg, Ms. Collins, Mr. Enzi, Ms. Snowe, Mr. 
   Sununu, Mr. Stevens, Mr. Kennedy, and Mr. Cardin) introduced the 
 following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on 
                             the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To extend the termination date for the exemption of returning workers 
         from the numerical limitations for temporary workers.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Save Our Small and Seasonal 
Businesses Act of 2007''.

SEC. 2. EXTENSION OF RETURNING WORKER EXEMPTION TO H-2B NUMERICAL 
              LIMITATION.

    (a) In General.--Section 214(g)(9)(A) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1184(g)(9)(A) is amended, by striking ``an 
alien who has already been counted toward the numerical limitation of 
paragraph (1)(B) during fiscal year 2004, 2005, or 2006 shall not again 
be counted toward such limitation during fiscal year 2007.'' and 
inserting ``an alien who has been present in the United States as an H-
2B nonimmigrant during any 1 of the 3 fiscal years immediately 
preceding the fiscal year of the approved start date of a petition for 
a nonimmigrant worker described in section 101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(b) shall 
not be counted toward such limitation for the fiscal year in which the 
petition is approved. Such alien shall be considered a returning 
worker.''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall be 
effective during the 5-year period beginning on October 1, 2007.
                                 <all>
```
1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

No. 113,267

LUKE GANNON, by his Next Friends and Guardians, et al.,

Appellees,

v. 

STATE OF KANSAS,

Appellant.

ORDER

The court notes Kansas Solicitor General Anthony Powell's entry of appearance as 

counsel for State of Kansas.

In Gannon v. State, 309 Kan. 1185, 443 P.3d 294 (2019) (Gannon VII), the court 

retained jurisdiction to ensure continued legislative compliance with the school funding 

requirements of article 6, § 6(b) of the Kansas Constitution as mandated in Gannon v. 

State, 308 Kan. 372, 420 P.3d 477 (2018) (Gannon VI). In 2019 House Substitute for 

Senate Bill 16 (S.B. 16), the Legislature scheduled a series of incremental increases to the 

base aid for student excellence (BASE) culminating in school year 2022-2023. The court 

retained jurisdiction to ensure the State's implementation of the phased-in financial 

solution in S.B. 16, which solution the court accepted in Gannon VI. 

The State now asks the court to issue the mandate, noting that the BASE increases 

have been implemented. The plaintiffs acknowledge the BASE increases and the 

Legislature's appropriation of funding for both school years 2023-2024 and 2024-2025 

using the approved formula, but they argue no one can know whether these amounts are 

sufficient. Given the court's stated purpose was to retain jurisdiction to ensure 

implementation of the phased-in amounts and that has occurred, a majority of the court 
2

grants the State's motion. The court directs the Clerk of the Appellate Courts to issue the 

mandate instanter.

Justice Rosen dissents. Given the legislative history of school funding, Justice 

Rosen would deny the State's motion and continue to withhold the mandate.

The court notes the plaintiffs' response to the State's motion and the State's reply 

thereto.

The court denies Kansas Governor Laura Kelly's application to file a brief amicus 

curiae under Supreme Court Rule 6.06 (2023 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 38). The court does not

currently permit the filing of a brief by an amicus curiae when, as here, the court has not 

invited the parties to submit briefs on a motion. See Supreme Court Rule 5.01 (2023 Kan. 

S. Ct. R. at 31) (generally governing appellate motions practice).

The court directs that this order be published in the official Kansas Reports.

STEGALL, J., not participating.

Dated this 6th day of February 2024.
#### GEORGE GOLDBERG AND MEYER GOLDBERG, COPARTNERS, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE TRADE NAME AND STYLE OF EMPIRE VAULT CO. v. THE UNITED STATES

[No. 45516.

Decided March 5, 1945]

*Mr. Louis Bloeh*for tbe plaintiffs.

*Mr. Henry*Weihofen, with whom was *Mr. Assistant Attorney General Francis M.*Shea, for the defendant.

*241Whaley, *Chief*Justice,

delivered the opinion of the court:

The plaintiffs entered into a contract with the defendant January 6, 1940, for the construction and delivery of six glass roof skylights. The skylights were for the installation in a garage being built under the Work Projects Administration for the Department of Sanitation of the City of New York.

*242The contract provided that the vendor (plaintiffs) should submit shop detail drawings for approval to the Work Projects Administration.

The contract further provided that plaintiffs’ skylights should “be constructed and fabricated in full accordance with the requirements of the New York Building Code, relating to this type of material.”

The plaintiffs duly submitted their detail shop drawings to the Work Projects Administration, who in turn submitted them to the Bureau of Architecture, Department of Public Works, New York City. This bureau disapproved them on the ground that the method of construction did not comply with the New York Building Code, in that the method did not have the approval of the Board of Standards and Appeals of New York City. It was explained to plaintiffs that it would be necessary for them to secure the requisite approval from the Board of Standards and Appeals.

Although being so informed the plaintiffs did not undertake to secure the approval of the Board of Standards and Appeals.

The record is somewhat obscure as to plaintiffs’ reason for not applying for the approval. Whatever the reason, there is none given that prevented plaintiffs from going ahead and making the application. Extension of time for delivery might have been asked for, although in this respect the plaintiffs were told that their time for delivery would be 20 instead of the agreed 45 days after approval of the drawings, a shortening of time for which there appears to have been no authority.

Plaintiffs claim that the defendant so constructed the roof as not to take plaintiffs’ style of skylight. But this is not material, as plaintiffs had only to comply with their own contract of construction and delivery, which did not include installation. The way in which the defendant constructed the roof was at its own risk.

The plaintiffs failed to perform their contract and after due notice the defendant secured the skylights from other sources, with the usual process of advertising and bidding. *243Thereby the defendant was subjected to an excess cost of $768.84 over plaintiffs’ contract.

We are of the opinion that plaintiffs cannot recover and that the defendant is entitled to recover $768.84 on its counterclaim.

It is so ordered.

Madden, *Judge;*Whitakee, *Judge;*and Littleton, Judge, concur.

Jones, Judge, took no part in the decision of this case.
EX-10.41



 Exhibit 10.41 

First Amendment to 

Combination Agreement 

This First Amendment to Combination Agreement (this “Amendment”) is entered into as of March 13, 2015 by Fenix Parts,
Inc., a Delaware corporation (“Fenix”), Larry Brown and Stephen Brown (each a “Shareholder” and together the “Shareholders”), and Jerry Brown, Ltd., a New York corporation d/b/a Jerry Brown’s
Auto Parts Center (the “Company”). 
 Whereas, the Parties have entered into a Combination Agreement dated as of
August 18, 2014 (the “Combination Agreement”); and 
 Whereas, the Parties desire to amend the Combination Agreement
as set forth herein, 
 It is agreed as follows: 
  

	 	1.	Capitalized terms without definition shall have the same meaning as given in the Combination Agreement. 

  

	 	2.	Section 9.1(a)(3) of the Combination Agreement shall be deleted and replaced in its entirety with the following: 

  

	 	(3)	Closing has not occurred by May 15, 2015 (the “Outside Date”) (other than as a result of Fenix’s breach of or failure to perform its obligations under this Agreement); 


 

	 	3.	3. Section 9.1(b)(3) of the Combination Agreement shall be deleted and replaced in its entirety with the following: 

  

	 	(3)	Closing has not occurred by May 15, 2015 (the “Outside Date”) (other than as a result of the Shareholders’ breach of or failure to perform their obligations under this Agreement);


  

	 	4.	The definitions of “Interim Balance Sheet” and “Interim Financial Statements” shall be modified to include the Company’s balance sheet and financial statements as of and for the period ended
December 31, 2014. 

  

	 	5.	Except as expressly amended by the terms of this Amendment, the Combination Agreement is in all respects ratified and confirmed. 


Signatures appear on the following page 

  
 1 








 In witness, the Parties have executed this Amendment. 

 

			
	Fenix Parts, Inc.
		
	By		 /s/ Kent Robertson

			Kent Robertson
			Chief Executive Officer
		
			 /s/ Larry Brown

			Larry Brown
		
			 /s/ Stephen Brown

			Stephen Brown
	  
 Jerry Brown, Ltd.

		
	By		 /s/ Larry Brown

	Name:		/s/ Larry Brown
	Title:		President


 Signature page to First Amendment to Combination Agreement 

  
 2
§ 37.85 Are there any other circumstances in which the Director will send a complaint to another authority? Yes. The Director refers complaints to other agencies in the following circumstances: ( a ) Where the complaint alleges discrimination based on age, and the complaint falls within the jurisdiction of the Age Discrimination Act of 1975, as amended, then the Director must refer the complaint, in accordance with the provisions of 45 CFR 90.43(c)(3).
( b ) Where the only allegation in the complaint is a charge of individual employment discrimination that is covered both by WIA or this part and by one or more of the laws listed below, then the complaint is a “joint complaint,” and the Director may refer it to the EEOC for investigation and conciliation under the procedures described in 29 CFR part 1640 or 1691, as appropriate. The relevant laws are: ( 1 ) Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2000e to 2000e-17);
( 2 ) The Equal Pay Act of 1963, as amended (29 U.S.C. 206(d));
( 3 ) The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1976, as amended (29 U.S.C. 621, *et seq.*); and
( 4 ) Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, as amended (42 U.S.C. 12101 *et seq.*).
( c ) Where the complaint alleges discrimination by an entity that operates a program or activity financially assisted by a Federal grantmaking agency other than the Department, but that participates as a partner in a One-Stop delivery system, the following procedures apply: ( 1 ) Where the complaint alleges discrimination on a basis that is prohibited both by Section 188 of WIA and by a civil rights law enforced by the Federal grantmaking agency, then CRC and the grantmaking agency have dual jurisdiction over the complaint, and the Director will refer the complaint to the grantmaking agency for processing. In such circumstances, the grantmaking agency's regulations will govern the processing of the complaint.
( 2 ) Where the complaint alleges discrimination on a basis that is prohibited by Section 188 of WIA, but not by any civil rights laws enforced by the Federal grantmaking agency, then CRC has sole jurisdiction over the complaint, and will retain the complaint and process it pursuant to this part. Such bases generally include religion, political affiliation or belief, citizenship, and/or participation in a WIA Title I-financially assisted program or activity.
( d ) Where the Director makes a referral under this section, he or she must notify the complainant and the respondent about the referral.
Exhibit 32



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Annual Report of Greens Worldwide Incorporated (the Company) on Form 10-QSB for the period ending September 30, 2004, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Connie S. Ross, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge and belief:



(1)

the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2)

the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.









/s/ Connie S. Ross



Connie S. Ross

Chief Executive Officer

November 15, 2004



A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.



Exhibit 32



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Annual Report of Greens Worldwide Incorporated (the Company) on Form 10-QSB for the period ending ending September 30, 2004, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Margaret M. Eardley, Acting Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge and belief:



(1)

the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2)

the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.









/s/ Margaret M. Eardley



Margaret M. Eardley

Acting Chief Financial Officer

November 15, 2004



A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### SCHOOL DISTRICT *NO.*3, TOWNSHIP 30, RANGE 14, SCOTT COUNTY, Respondent, v. J. R. YOUNG et al., Appellants.

St. Louis Court of Appeals,

February 6, 1912.

The opinion of the Springfield Court of Appeals in this case (152 Mo. App. 304) is adopted as the opinion of the court.

Appeal from Scott Cirenit *Court.*— Hon. *Henry C. Riley,*Judge.

Affirmed.

*J. R. Young*for appellants.

*James A. Finch*for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

The appeal in this case was prosecuted to this court, but was thereafter transferred by it to the Springfield Court of Appeals under the provisions of the act of the Legislature, approved June 12, 1909. [See Laws of Missouri, 1909, p. 396; see, also, Sec. 3939, R. S. 1909.] In due time the cause was disposed of by the Springfield Court of Appeals through an opinion prepared by Judge Gray of that court, as will appear by reference to School District No. 3, Scott County, v. J. R. Young et al., 152 Mo. App. 394, 133 S. W. 143. Subsequently, the Supreme Court declared the said legislative act, which purported to authorize the transfer of cases from this court to the Springfield Court, to be unconstitutional. The cause was thereafter transferred by the Springfield Court of Appeals to this court on the theory that the jurisdiction of the appeal continued to reside here and the proceedings had in the Springfield Court with reference thereto were *coram non judice.*

*527The case has been argued and submitted here and duly considered. Upon reading the record and considering the arguments, we are persuaded that the opinion of the Springfield Court, above referred to, properly disposes of the controversy, and it is adopted as the opinion of this court. For the reasons given in that opinion the judgment should be affirmed. It is so ordered.

All concur.