alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
§ 4050.305 Filing with PBGC. ( a ) *What to file.* The plan administrator of a subpart C plan must file with PBGC the information specified in the missing participants forms and instructions, and if the plan is a transferring plan, payment of— ( 1 ) The benefit transfer amount for the missing distributee;
( 2 ) If the benefit transfer amount is paid more than 90 days after the benefit determination date, interest on the benefit transfer amount computed at the missing participants interest rate for the period beginning on the 90th day after the benefit determination date and ending on the date the benefit transfer amount is paid to PBGC; and
( 3 ) Any fee provided for in the missing participants forms and instructions.
( b ) *When to file.* The plan administrator must file the information and payments referred to in paragraph (a) of this section in accordance with the missing participants forms and instructions.
( c ) *Place, method and date of filing; time periods.* ( 1 ) For rules about where to file, see § 4000.4 of this chapter.
( 2 ) For rules about permissible methods of filing with PBGC under this subpart, see subpart A of part 4000 of this chapter.
( 3 ) For rules about the date that a submission under this subpart was filed with PBGC, see subpart C of part 4000 of this chapter.
( 4 ) For rules about any time period for filing under this subpart, see subpart D of part 4000 of this chapter.
( d ) *Supplemental information.* Within 30 days after a written request by PBGC (or such other time as may be specified in the request), the plan administrator of a subpart C plan required to file under paragraph (a) of this section must file with PBGC supplemental information for any proper purpose under the missing participants program.
( e ) *Reliance.* As administrator of the missing participants program, PBGC will rely on determinations made and information reported by plan administrators in connection with the program.
#### BECK v BAILEY et

Ohio Appeals, 8th Dist, Cuyahoga Co

No 9492.

Decided April 15, 1929

John A Cline, Cleveland, for Beck.

Edward W Dissette, Cleveland, for Bailey, et.

*276VICKERY, PJ.

Now because this money was not paid within the year, it is claimed that the title to the real estate had been divested from the sons and became as though it was undisposed of property and descended to all the heirs of the testator in proper proportions.

We think a proper construction can be placed upon this language in the will that would be consistent with the intention of the testator, by construing this proviso to mean that the sums to be paid were to be a charge upon the estate, and that even though the sons did not succeed in actually paying it within the year, yet by paying it or offering to pay it within a reasonable time, the provisions of the will had been complied with and’ the title to the real estate' will be secure in the sons, and in that event the plaintiff in this action will not be entitled to maintain a partition suit. The plaintiff and those who have interest with him would only be entitled to recover the amount of their legacies together with interest" perhaps up to the time that it was tendered from the decease of the mother of these men. In other words, the intention of the testator is best served by holding that this proviso in the will, under the circumstances of this particular case, is complied with by making the legacies a charge upon the estate, rather than in diverting the title that is already vested in the two sons and making it pass as undisposed of property by last will. We think to hold any other way would be to do violence both to the interrtion of the testator and to the greater weight of authority upon this proposition.

We, therefore, are compelled to find in favor of the defendants, and a decree may be drawn accordingly.

Sullivan and Levine, JJ, concur.
#### Carmen Fountain, Respondent, v Ocean View II Associates, L.P., Appellant.

[701 NYS2d 68]

—In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (LaTorella, J.), dated May 28, 1998, which denied its motion to dismiss the plaintiffs complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5).

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the motion is granted, and the complaint is dismissed.

The plaintiffs accident occurred on April 3, 1994, and by *340April 4, 1994, she had. already retained an attorney. The present action was, however, not commenced until April 1, 1997, two days before the expiration of the Statute of Limitations, when the plaintiff filed a summons and complaint which named only one fictitious corporation, “ABC Corp”, as a defendant. Within 120 days thereafter, the plaintiff served an amended complaint in which the appellant Ocean View II Associates, L.P., was named as a defendant. The Supreme Court denied the appellant’s subsequent motion to dismiss, finding that the action had been properly commenced *(see, Luckern v Lyonsdale Energy Ltd. Partnership,*229 AD2d 249). We reverse.

In the *Luckern*case, the plaintiff was properly found to have named a fictitious party in the summons and complaint filed in order to commence the action *(see,*CPLR 1024). We have held that the naming of a fictitious party is allowed only when there is proof of *timely*efforts to identify the correct party *(see, Porter v Kingsbrook OB/GYN Assocs.,*209 AD2d 497). Here, the plaintiff’s efforts to identify the correct party cannot be considered timely when they were admittedly undertaken only on or about March 20, 1997, more than 2 years and 11 months after counsel had originally been retained, and shortly before the Statute of Limitations was to expire. That there was a change of attorneys in the interim is irrelevant. Even if subsequent counsel responded diligently in the face of a critical situation caused by prior counsel’s neglect, the fact remains that the plaintiff failed to make timely efforts to identify the correct defendant, and is thus precluded from relying on the provisions of CPLR 1024. Mangano, P. J., Bracken, S. Miller and Sullivan, JJ., concur.
<PAGE>

                                                                      Exhibit 24




                       CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS


We consent to the incorporation by reference in the registration statement of
Rymer Foods Inc. on Form S-8 (File No. 33-79346) and on Form S-2 (File No. 33-
86062) of our report which includes explanatory paragraphs regarding the
uncertainty of the Company's ability to continue as a going concern and the
Company's adoption of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 109,
"Accounting for Income Taxes", dated February 12, 1996, on our audits of the
consolidated financial statements and financial statement schedule of Rymer
Foods Inc. and subsidiaries as of October 28, 1995 and October 29, 1994 and for
the three years in the period ended October 28, 1995, which report is included
on page 18 in this Annual Report on Form 10-K.







Chicago, Illinois                            COOPERS & LYBRAND L.L.P.
February 12, 1996
## F IRST 

## D ISTRICT 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEAL 

## S TATE OF 

## F LORIDA

_____________________________
No. 1D 18

- 2502

_____________________________
J ESSE F RANKLIN H OLLEY , Appellant,

v.

S TATE OF F LORIDA , Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Santa Rosa County

. John F. Simon, Judge.

August 30, 2019

P ER C URIAM

.
A FFIRMED

.
L EWIS , B.L. T HOMAS , and R OBERTS , JJ., concur

.

_____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331

.

_____________________________2 Andy Thomas, Public Defender, Megan Lynne Long, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-mos
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>               DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                  JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                    JUN-30-2000
<CASH>                          0
<SECURITIES>                    0
<RECEIVABLES>                   0
<ALLOWANCES>                    0
<INVENTORY>                     0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                0
<PP&E>                          0
<DEPRECIATION>                  0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                  13
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>           27
<BONDS>                         0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>           0
<PREFERRED>                     0
<COMMON>                        4
<OTHER-SE>                      (71)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>    13
<SALES>                         15
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                15
<CGS>                           0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                   0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                39
<LOSS-PROVISION>                0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>              2
<INCOME-PRETAX>                 (26)
<INCOME-TAX>                    0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>             (26)
<DISCONTINUED>                  0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                 0
<CHANGES>                       0
<NET-INCOME>                    (26)
<EPS-BASIC>                   (.01)
<EPS-DILUTED>                   (.01)



</TABLE>
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 99.1





                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Quarterly Report of Tower Financial Corporation (the
"Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ending September 30, 2002 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I,
Donald F. Schenkel, Chairman of the Board, President and Chief Executive Officer
of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to
ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

    (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

    (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.


/s/ Donald F. Schenkel
    -----------------------------
Donald F. Schenkel
Chairman of the Board, President
and Chief Executive Officer
November 13, 2002
(77 South. 81)

#### Ex parte DEAN.

(7 Div. 520.)

(Court of Appeals of Alabama.

Oct. 3, 1917.)

1. Continuance <&wkey;3 — Court’s Failure to Dispose of Case During Term.

The court’s failure to dispose of the ease during the term operated as a continuance, under the general order of continuance.

2. Judgment <&wkey;272 — Entry After Term-Statute.

Under Acts 1915, p. 707, after the expiration of the term, the trial court was without authority to enter judgment, unless the term was prolonged by order for an adjourned term, and the court, having- adjourned for the term at which trial was had, was without authority to enter judgment without another trial.

Original petition for writ of mandamus by D. C. Dean.

Alternative writ denied, and petition dismissed.

W. B. Harrison, of Talladega, for appellant.

PER CURIAM.

[1] It appears from the petition that a trial of the issues between the parties in the ease of H. H. Howard v. D. C. Dean was entered upon before the circuit court of Talladega county on the 16th day of May, 1917, and at the conclusion of the evidence the court took the case under advisement, and failed to render judgment thereon on or before June 30, 1917. We concede the contention of the petitioner that the court was without authority to enter an order continuing the case after that date, yet the failure of the court to dispose of the case during the term operated as a continuance of the case, under the general order of continuance. Wright v. State, 12 Ala. App. 253, 67 South. 798.

[2] The spring term of the court ended by operation of law on the 30th day of June, 1917, and after the expiration of that time, the court was without authority to enter a judgment unless the term was prolonged by order for an adjourned term of the court. Acts 1915, p.'707. The circuit court of Talladega county, having adjourned for the term at which the trial was had, was without authority to enter judgment without another trial, and the writ of mandamus will not issue to compel the circuit court to do that which it has no authority to do.

The alternative writ prayed for is denied, and the petition dismissed.
```

[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S.J. Res. 36 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

110th CONGRESS
  2d Session
S. J. RES. 36

To provide replacement laboratory space for terrestrial research at the 
                Smithsonian Tropical Research Institute.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                              May 22, 2008

   Mr. Leahy (for himself, Mr. Cochran, and Mr. Dodd) introduced the 
 following joint resolution; which was read twice and referred to the 
                 Committee on Rules and Administration

_______________________________________________________________________

                            JOINT RESOLUTION

 
To provide replacement laboratory space for terrestrial research at the 
                Smithsonian Tropical Research Institute.

    Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 
States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. TERRESTRIAL RESEARCH PROGRAM.

    The Board of Regents of the Smithsonian Institution is authorized 
to plan, design, and construct laboratory space to accommodate the 
Smithsonian Tropical Research Institute's terrestrial research program 
in Gamboa, Panama.

SEC. 2. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

    There are authorized to be appropriated for the purposes described 
in section 1 $1,500,000 for fiscal year 2008, $3,000,000 for fiscal 
year 2009, and a total of $11,000,000 for all succeeding fiscal years.
                                 <all>
```
**Exhibit 31.1**

 

**Certification of CEO Pursuant to**

**Securities Exchange Act Rules 13a-14 and 15d-14**

**as Adopted Pursuant to**

**Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**

 

I, Dwain Brannon, the Chief Executive Officer, and Secretary of Horizon Holding Corporation, certify that: 

 

1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-KSB of Horizon Holding Corporation (“Horizon”); 

 

2. Based on my knowledge, this annual report does not contain any untruestatement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this annual report;

 

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and otherfinancial information included in this annual report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of Horizon as of, and for, the periods presented in this annual report; 

 

4. Horizon’s other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible forestablishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) and internal control over financial reporting (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f)) for Horizon and have:

 

(a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, orcaused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to Horizon is made known to us, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared; 

 

(b) [Omitted in reliance on SEC Release No. 33-8238; 34-47986 Section III.E.]; 

 

(c) Evaluated the effectiveness of Horizon’sdisclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and 

 

(d) Disclosed in this report any change in Horizon’s internal controlover financial reporting that occurred during our most recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, our internal control over financial reporting; and 

 

5. Horizon’s other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based onour most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to our auditors and the audit committee of our Board of Directors: 

 

(a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonablylikely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and 

 

(b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internal controlover financial reporting. 

 

Date: April 15, 2005
#### CLEVELAND RY CO v KUKUCZ

Ohio Supreme Court

No 21736.

Decided Dec. 18, 1929

Marshall, CJ., Kinkade, Matthias and Day, JJ., concur. Robinson, J., not participating.
(78 South. 320)

#### BILES v. STATE.

(8 Div. 530.)

(Court of Appeals of Alabama.

March 12, 1918.)

Criminal Law &wkey;1090(14) — Aureal and Error — Scope of Review.

In the absence of a bill of exceptions and the oral charge of the court, the appellate court cannot review the requested charges which were refused to defendant.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Madison County ; B. C. Brickell, Judge.

T. P. Biles was convicted of violating the prohibition law, and he appeals.

Affirmed.

Taylor & Watts, of Huntsville, for appellant. F. Loyd Tate, Atty. Gen., and Emmett S. Thigpen, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

BBICICEN, J.

The defendant was tried and convicted for the offense of violating the prohibition law. The prosecution was based upon an affidavit, to which no objection by demurrer or otherwise was interposed. This appeal is upon the record, and without a bill of exceptions.

The trial judge certifies that no bill of exceptions has been presented to him, and the time for filing same has expired. The record contains the given and refused charges, but the oral charge of the court is not set *405out. In the absence of a bill of exceptions and the oral charge »f the court, -this court cannot review the charges which were refused to the defendant. The record appears to be free-from error, and the judgment of the lower court is affirmed.

Affirmed.
.. 07/07/2015 10:47 Inthe Matter Of: 8472947498 FAA GLRC U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATJON OFFICE OF HEARINGSWASHINGTON, D.C. DOCKET NO. FAA,20l4-0119 SPIRIT A V!ONICS, LTD., )))) CASE NO. 2012-GL-07-0056 Respondent. RESPONSE TO RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO STRIKE The Agency responds tothe Respondent's Motion to Strike as follows: The Complainant apologizes tothe Respondent andtothe Administrative Law Judge forits PAGE 02/03 delay in fiUng its Response tothe Respondent's Motion for Dec.ision. Candidly, the reason the Complainant's counsel did not ask leave tofile the response or consult with Respondent's counsel was that counsel was not aware she had missed the deadline until the Motion to Strike was received via United States Postal Service on July6, 2015. By way of explanation and notto make excuses, Counsel was inthe middle ofa hearing when Motion was served and subsequently suffered a medical issue that kept her out ofthe office. I respectfully ask that the Agency not be punished for counsel's failure to appreciate the deadlines involved inthe response tothe Respondent's Motion and argue that the Respondent was not prejudiced, and. ask leave tofilethe Response to Respondent's Motion for Decision. Respectfully submitted., Jeffrey A. Klang Regional Counsel By:**~~lL~** 1 Kate BarberFederal Aviation Administration Office ofRegional Counsel, AGL-7B

2300 East Devon Avenue

Des Plaines,**Illinoi~** 60018 Facsimile: 847 .294.749807/07/2015 10:47 8472947498 FAA GLRC PAGE 03/03 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify thatI have, this date, served the foregoing Complainant's Response tothe Respondent's Motion for Decision, tothe following addresses as follows: One Copy (via facsimile): Hearing Docket Federal Aviation Administration 800 Independence Ave, S.W. Washington, D.C. 20591 Attn: Hearing Docket Clerk AGC-430-, Wilber Wright Building Suite 2W!OOO

Fax: 202-267-1293 One Copy (via facsimile): The Honorable J.E. Sullivan U.S. Administrative Law Judge Office of Hearings, M-20

U.S. Department of Transportation 1200 New Jersey Ave., S.E. (Ell-310) Washington, D.C. 20590 Fax: 202-366-7536 One Copy (and Regular Mail, facsimile): Jerry A. Eichenberger EICHENBERGER & ASSOCIATES 6037 Frantz Road, Suite 107 Dublin, Ohio 43017 614-798-1600/614-798-1620 (fax) Attorney for Respondent Dated: July 7, 2015 207/07/2015 10:47 8472947498 To: Hearing Docket company: Phone:Fax: (202) 267-1293 From: Kate Barber Title: FAA Attorney Date July 7, 2015 Pages w/cover:Message: FAA GLRC PAGE 01/03 Federal Aviation Administration Office ofthe Regional Counsel Great Lakes Region

2300 East Devon Des Plaines, IL 60018 Telephone. 847-294-7862 Fax No. 847-294-8293 E-mail: kate.barber@faa.govFacsimile
Filed 11/12/14 by Clerk of Supreme Court

IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

2014 ND 204

Cassondra Ann Ayala, Petitioner and Appellant

v.

State of North Dakota, Respondent and Appellee

No. 20140140

Appeal from the District Court of Ward County, North Central Judicial District, the Honorable Douglas L. Mattson, Judge.

AFFIRMED.

Per Curiam.

Thomas John Glass, 418 East Rosser Avenue, Suite 102, Bismarck, ND 58501, for petitioner and appellant; on brief.

Kelly Ann Dillon, Assistant State’s Attorney, Courthouse, P.O. Box 5005, Minot, ND 58702-5005, for respondent and appellee; on brief.

Ayala v. State

No. 20140140

Per Curiam.

[¶1]Cassondra Ann Ayala appeals a district court order granting the State’s motion for summary dismissal of Ayala’s application for postconviction relief.  Ayala argues the district court erred because she was entitled to an evidentiary hearing to challenge her conviction.  The State argues dismissal was proper because Ayala failed to respond with competent admissible evidence after the State made a motion for summary dismissal.  We affirm under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(7).  See Ude v. State, 2009 ND 71, ¶ 8, 764 N.W.2d 419 (explaining once petitioner is put on his proof, he must provide competent admissible evidence that raises an issue of material fact before he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing); Delvo v. State, 2010 ND 78, ¶ 13, 782 N.W.2d 72 (affirming the district court’s summary dismissal of Delvo’s application for postconviction relief because, after the State moved for summary judgment and Delvo was put to her burden of proof, she did not supplement her application); Dunn v. State, 2006 ND 26, ¶¶ 11-12, 709 N.W.2d 1 (affirming the district court’s summary dismissal of Dunn’s application for postconviction relief because, after the State moved for summary dismissal and Dunn was put to his burden of proof, he failed to appropriately respond).

[¶2]Gerald W. VandeWalle, C.J.

Daniel J. Crothers

Lisa Fair McEvers

Carol Ronning Kapsner

Dale V. Sandstrom
(80 South. 895)

#### MARECHAU v. STATE.

(1 Div. 291.)

(Court of Appeals of Alabama.

Nov. 26, 1918.)

Appeal from Circuit Court, Mobile County; Saffold Berney, Judge.

Arthur Marechau was convicted of a misdemeanor, and he appeals. Affirmed. P. Loyd Tate, Atty. Gen., for the State.

BRICKEN, J.

This appeal is on the record without a bill of exceptions, and the time for *701filing bill of exceptions > has expired. The defendant was tried and convicted in the circuit court of Mobile county for a misdemeanor, the trial being had by the court without a jury The proceedings as shown by the record appear regular and without error. The judgment is therefore affirmed. Affirmed.