alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**Exhibit 23.2**

**Consent of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm**

The Board of Directors

K-V Pharmaceutical Company: 

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the registration statements (Nos. 33-44927, 333-00199, 333-48252, and 333-85516) on Form S-8 and the registration statements (Nos. 333-87402 and333-106294) on Form S-3 of K-V Pharmaceutical Company (the Company) of our report dated March 25, 2010, except as to note 23, which is as of June 10, 2011 with respect to the consolidated statements of operations, comprehensive loss,shareholders’ equity (deficit), and cash flows of K-V Pharmaceutical Company and subsidiaries for the year ended March 31, 2009, and the related financial statement schedule for the year then ended, which report appears in theMarch 31, 2011 Annual report on Form 10-K of the Company. 

Our report dated March 25, 2010, except as to note23, which is as of June 10, 2011, on the consolidated financial statements contains an explanatory paragraph that states the Company has suspended the shipment of all products manufactured by the Company and must comply with a consent decreewith the FDA before approved products can be reintroduced to the market. Significant negative impacts on operating results and cash flows from these actions including the potential inability of the Company to raise capital; suspension ofmanufacturing; significant uncertainties related to litigation and governmental inquiries; and debt covenant violations raise substantial doubt about the Company’s ability to continue as a going concern. The consolidated financial statementsand financial statement schedule do not include any adjustments that might result from the outcome of that uncertainty. 

/s/ KPMG LLP

St. Louis, Missouri 

June 10,2011
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of The Boyds Collection, Ltd. (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ended
September 30, 2004 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Joseph E. Macharsky, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify pursuant to 18
U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature
that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to The Boyds Collection, Ltd. and will be retained by The
Boyds Collection, Ltd. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

|/s/JOSEPH E. MACHARSKYJoseph E. Macharsky
Chief Financial Officer
November 15, 2004 |  | 
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |  | 

---



QuickLinks
§ 1977.12 Exercise of any right afforded by the Act. ( a ) In addition to protecting employees who file complaints, institute proceedings, or testify in proceedings under or related to the Act, section 11(c) also protects employees from discrimination occurring because of the exercise “of any right afforded by this Act.” Certain rights are explicitly provided in the Act; for example, there is a right to participate as a party in enforcement proceedings (section 10). Certain other rights exist by necessary implication. For example, employees may request information from the Occupational Safety and Health Administration; such requests would constitute the exercise of a right afforded by the Act. Likewise, employees interviewed by agents of the Secretary in the course of inspections or investigations could not subsequently be discriminated against because of their cooperation.
( b ) ( 1 ) On the other hand, review of the Act and examination of the legislative history discloses that, as a general matter, there is no right afforded by the Act which would entitle employees to walk off the job because of potential unsafe conditions at the workplace. Hazardous conditions which may be violative of the Act will ordinarily be corrected by the employer, once brought to his attention. If corrections are not accomplished, or if there is dispute about the existence of a hazard, the employee will normally have opportunity to request inspection of the workplace pursuant to section 8(f) of the Act, or to seek the assistance of other public agencies which have responsibility in the field of safety and health. Under such circumstances, therefore, an employer would not ordinarily be in violation of section 11(c) by taking action to discipline an employee for refusing to perform normal job activities because of alleged safety or health hazards.
( 2 ) However, occasions might arise when an employee is confronted with a choice between not performing assigned tasks or subjecting himself to serious injury or death arising from a hazardous condition at the workplace. If the employee, with no reasonable alternative, refuses in good faith to expose himself to the dangerous condition, he would be protected against subsequent discrimination. The condition causing the employee's apprehension of death or injury must be of such a nature that a reasonable person, under the circumstances then confronting the employee, would conclude that there is a real danger of death or serious injury and that there is insufficient time, due to the urgency of the situation, to eliminate the danger through resort to regular statutory enforcement channels. In addition, in such circumstances, the employee, where possible, must also have sought from his employer, and been unable to obtain, a correction of the dangerous condition.
[38 FR 2681, Jan. 29, 1973, as amended at 38 FR 4577, Feb. 16, 1973]
(77 South. 1004)

#### RICHARDSON v. STATE.

(6 Div. 381.)

(Court of Appeals of Alabama.

Feb. 5, 1918.)

Appeal from Circuit Court, Jefferson County; Wm. E. Port, Judge. Ella Richardson was convicted of violating the prohibition law, and she appeals.

Affirmed.

P. Loyd Tate, Atty. Gen., for the State.

_ SAMPORD, J.

There is no bill of excep_ tions, and we find no error in the record. The judgment of the lower court is affirmed. Affirmed.
§ 4050.304 Diligent search. ( a ) *Search requirement.* For each distributee of a subpart C plan who is described in § 4050.303(b), the plan administrator must, within the time frame described in paragraph (d) of this section, have diligently searched for each distributee of the plan whose location the plan administrator does not know with reasonable certainty upon close out, using one of the following two methods: ( 1 ) For any distributee, regardless of the size of the distributee's benefit, the commercial locator service method described in paragraph (b) of this section; or
( 2 ) For a distributee whose normal retirement benefit is not more than $50 per month, the records search method described in paragraph (c) of this section.
( b ) *Commercial locator service method* — ( 1 ) *In general.* Using the commercial locator service method means paying a commercial locator service to search for information to locate a distributee.
( 2 ) *Meaning of “commercial locator service.”* For purposes of this section, a commercial locator service is a business that holds itself out as a finder of lost persons for compensation using information from a database maintained by a consumer reporting agency (as defined in 15 U.S.C. 1681a(f)).
( c ) *Records search method* — ( 1 ) *In general.* Using the records search method means searching for information to locate a distributee by doing all of the following to the extent reasonably feasible and affordable: ( i ) Searching the records of the plan for information to locate the distributee.
( ii ) Searching the records of the plan's contributing sponsor that is the most recent employer of the distributee for information to locate the distributee.
( iii ) Searching the records of each retirement or welfare plan of the plan's contributing sponsor in which the distributee was a participant for information to locate the distributee.
( iv ) Contacting each beneficiary of the distributee identified from the records referred to in paragraphs (c)(1)(i), (ii), and (iii) of this section for information to locate the distributee.
( v ) Using an internet search method for which no fee is charged, such as a search engine, a network database, a public record database (such as those for licenses, mortgages, and real estate taxes) or a “social media” website.
( 2 ) *Limits on method.* For purposes of this section— ( i ) Searching is not feasible to the extent that, as a practical matter, it is thwarted by legal or practical lack of access to records, and
( ii ) Searching is not affordable to the extent that the cost of searching (including the value of labor) is more than a reasonable fraction of the benefit of the distributee being searched for. In no event would searching need to be pursued beyond the point where the cost equals the value of the benefit.
( d ) *Time frame.* A search for a distributee under this section must have been made within nine months before a filing is made under § 4050.305 identifying the distributee as a missing distributee.
```

[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. Con. Res. 20 Agreed to Senate (ATS)]

110th CONGRESS
  1st Session
S. CON. RES. 20

  Expressing the sense of Congress that no funds should be cut off or 
    reduced for American troops in the field which would result in 
 undermining their safety or their ability to complete their assigned 
                               missions.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             March 15, 2007

 Mr. Gregg (for himself, Mr. Lott, Mr. Shelby, Mr. Craig, Mr. Cornyn, 
 Mr. Stevens, Mr. Chambliss, Mr. Allard, Mr. Graham, Mr. Roberts, Mr. 
Coburn, Mr. Martinez, Mr. Isakson, Mr. Coleman, Mr. DeMint, Mr. Thune, 
and Mr. Sessions) submitted the following concurrent resolution; which 
                      was considered and agreed to

_______________________________________________________________________

                         CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

 
  Expressing the sense of Congress that no funds should be cut off or 
    reduced for American troops in the field which would result in 
 undermining their safety or their ability to complete their assigned 
                               missions.

Whereas under article II, section 2, of the Constitution of the United States, 
        the President is the ``commander in chief of the Army and Navy of the 
        United States'', and in such capacity the President has the command of 
        the Armed Forces, including the authority to deploy troops and direct 
        military campaigns during wartime;
Whereas under article I, section 8, of the Constitution of the United States, 
        Congress has the power of the purse specifically as it relates to the 
        Armed Forces, and in such capacity Congress has the responsibility to 
        fully and adequately provide funding for United States military forces, 
        especially when they are at war and are defending the Nation; and
Whereas when United States military forces are in harm's way and are protecting 
        our country, Congress and the Nation should give them all the support 
        they need in order to maintain their safety and accomplish their 
        assigned missions, including the equipment, logistics, and funding 
        necessary to ensure their safety and effectiveness, and such support is 
        the responsibility of both the Executive Branch and the Legislative 
        Branch of Government: Now, therefore, be it
    Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), 
That it is the sense of Congress that Congress should not take any 
action that will endanger United States military forces in the field, 
including the elimination or reduction of funds for troops in the 
field, as such action with respect to funding would undermine their 
safety or harm their effectiveness in pursuing their assigned missions.
                                 <all>
```
(77 South. 1005)

#### WILSON v. FINCH.

(6 Div. 386.)

(Court of Appeals of Alabama.

Dec. 18, 1917.)

Appeal from Circuit Court, Jefferson County; C. W. Ferguson, Judge.

Spier Whittaker, of Birmingham, for appellant. W. M. Woodall, of Birmingham,' for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed on certificate.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                                  <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                        6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                               DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                                  JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                    JUN-30-1999
<CASH>                                              484,285
<SECURITIES>                                              0
<RECEIVABLES>                                       143,031
<ALLOWANCES>                                              0
<INVENTORY>                                          38,200
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                    666,790
<PP&E>                                              104,143
<DEPRECIATION>                                       (6,070)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                      845,931
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                22,271
<BONDS>                                                   0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                     0
<PREFERRED>                                               0
<COMMON>                                             10,000
<OTHER-SE>                                        2,334,667
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                        845,931
<SALES>                                             444,003
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                    444,003
<CGS>                                              (128,011)
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                      (128,011)
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                   (542,745)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                          0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                        0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                    (226,753)
<INCOME-TAX>                                       (226,753)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                (226,753)
<DISCONTINUED>                                            0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                           0
<CHANGES>                                                 0
<NET-INCOME>                                       (226,753)
<EPS-BASIC>                                           (0.33)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                         (0.33)



</TABLE>
Exhibit 32.1  Section 1350 Certification





In connection with the Quarterly Report of Citizens First Corporation (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2010, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report") I, M. Todd Kanipe, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:





(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





By:
/s/M. Todd KanipeM. Todd KanipePresident and Chief Executive OfficerDate:
July 30, 2010





This certification is being furnished as required by Rule 13a-14(b) under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”) and Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United States Code, and shall not be deemed ‘filed” for purposes of Section 18 of the Exchange Act or otherwise subject to the liability of that section.  This certification shall not be deemed to be incorporated by reference into any filing under the Securities Act of 1933 or the Exchange Act or otherwise subject to the liability of that section.
#### STATE ex ASHCRAFT v ASHCRAFT et

Ohio Appeals, 4th Dist, Athens Co

Decided March 25, 1930

M. D. Hughes, Athens, for State ex.

Emmett Keenan, Athens, for Ashcraft et.

BY THE COURT

It is argued in this court that inasmuch as the Probate Court gave the custody of the child to its father there was no power in that court to provide for the infant visiting its maternal grandparents. The question argued, however, is not before us. That question could only be raised by the father. The father is not complaining of, and so far as the court is advised is satisfied with, the judgment. In fact, he was not a party to that proceeding and would not seem to be bound by that judgment. That case only involved the respective rights of the two sets of grandparents and as between them it can not, in the absence of a bill of exceptions, be said to be erroneous.

The judgment of the Common Pleas is reversed and the judgment of the Probate Court is affirmed.

Middleton, PJ, Mauck and Blosser, JJ, concur.
Exhibit 10.9

Director Fee Arrangements for Fiscal Year 2005

 

Each independent director of Capitol Federal Financial (the "Company") receives an annual retainer, paid monthly, of $20,000 for his or her service on the Board of Directors of Capitol Federal Savings Bank (the "Bank") and $20,000 for his or her service on the Company's Board of Directors ($40,000 in total). No additional fees are paid for attending Board or Board committee meetings of either the Bank or the Company. 

John C. Dicus, Chairman of the Board, and John B. Dicus, President and Chief Executive Officer, non-independent directors, are each paid $24,000.
<PAGE>

                                                                    Exhibit 32.1
                                    a21, Inc
                        One Embarcadero Center, Suite 500
                         San Francisco, California 94111
                                 (415) 284-2121



                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In  connection  with the quarterly  report of a21, Inc. (the  "Company") on Form
10-QSB for the  quarter  ended June 30,  2003 as filed with the  Securities  and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"),  I, Haim Ariav, President
of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant
to Section. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

1) The Report fully complies with the  requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2) The  information  contained in the Report  fairly  presents,  in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.


/s/ Haim Ariav
-------------------------------
Haim Ariav, President
(Principal Executive Officer)



                                       21
#### Charles W. Fowler, Resp’t, v. John W. Holmes, App’lt.

*(City Court of Brooklyn,*

*General Term,*

*Filed January 28, 1889.)*

Master and servant—Liability of master for act of servant— When question for the jury.

The testimony tended to show that defendant was proprietor of a theatre; that one Wynnett, one of his company, was collecting tickets for him, and attending to those who -wanted to exchange seat tickets, and while so engaged, was approached by plaintiff with a request to exchange certain tickets; that upon plaintiff’s refusal to get into line and await his turn, Wynnett assaulted him. *Held,*that there was sufficient evidence to submit the question to the jury, whether IV ynnett was a servant of defendant, and, while acting within the scope of his employment, committed the assault, and that a non-suit was properly denied.

*John A. Anderson,<*for resp’t; *William M. Benedict,*for app’lt.

Van Wyck, J.

The question presented on this appeal is whether Wynnett was the servant of the defendant, and while engaged in his master’s business, and acting within the scope of his employment, assaulted the plaintiff.

There is testimony tending to show that defendant was proprietor of the theatre in this city, known as the Standard Museum, and was personally in charge of the same on the night in question, and that he employed a traveling theatrical troupe to play for him, paying them therefor one-half the gross receipts, and that W ynnett, one of this company, was collecting the tickets for the proprietor, and attending to those who wanted to exchange seat tickets for other seat tickets, and that, while so engaged, this Wynnett was approached by plaintiff with a request to exchange the tickets for himself and his wife for tickets for other seats, and that Wynnett ordered plaintiff to get in line and take his turn, and that his refusal to do so resulted in some words, and then in an assault by Wynnett upon plaintiff.

We think there was sufficient evidence-to submit this question to the jury, and that a non-suit was properly denied. Ro*unds*v. *Del., Lack, and W.R. Co.,*64 N. Y., 129.

The defendant also claims that the verdict in favor of plaintiff was against the weight of evidence. Technically speaking, perhaps, this question is not before us, for no motion for new trial on that ground was made. Assuming that it is regularly before us, we see no reason, on the evidence, to disturb the verdict on that ground. This covers the only questions «raised by the appellant’s points.

In our opinion, the judgment and order appealed from should be affirmed, with costs.

Clement, Ch. J., concurs.
#### MASSIE v STATE

Ohio Appeals, 4th Dist, Lawrence Co

Decided November 12, 1929

Mr. A. J. Layne, Ironton, for Massie.

Mr. Lee D. Andrews, Ironton, for State.

BY THE COURT

It is claimed' that there is a substantial difference between giving information as to “where” intoxicating liquor may be obtained and giving information of “how” it may be obtained. In this connection it is argued that the act of 1919 (108 O. L. Pt. 1, 400) made it an offense to give information where liquors may be obtained and that that act failed of affirmation on referendum and the present statute subsequently passed omitted the word where from the statute. The rejected statute, however, differed radically from the present. By section 25 of that act it was proposed to penalize one who gave

> “any information how such prohibited . liquors may be obtained or where such liquors are”.

By that act, therefore, one was penalized who gave information where liquors were whether they could be obtained or not. As before pointed out, the present section denounces the giving of inform*24ation as to how intoxicating liquor may be obtained. While it would not be an offense to merely inform one where intoxicating liquors are it is clear that if one is informed as to where liquor may be obtained he is informed of how .liquor may be obtained. The affidavit consequently stated an offense.

The evidence tended to show that the accused gave information relating to the place where liquor might be obtained and the person from whom it could be had. The case can not be reversed as against the weight of the testimony.

Other questions of a minor character are raised regarding the admission of testimony. One of these is that the person who was given the information was. permitted to testify as to what was said and done in the absence of the accused when pursuant to the information he actually bought intoxicating liquor. This testimony was competent because it showed that the information was true.

The question was made in the trial court that if the accused were guilty of the offense charged he was guilty of a third offense and that the court was without power to try him as of a second offense. The .accused was charged as of a second offense only, and the mere fact that it was actually a third offense did not make it a third offense in law and thereby constitute el felony entitling the accused to trial by jury.

There is no error in the record and the judgment is affirmed.

Middleton, PJ., and Mauck and Blosser, JJ., concur.