### FI LED U.S. COURT O F APP EALS ELEVENTH CIRCUIT A ugu st 5, 20 05 THO MAS K. KAH N CL ERK

Honora ble Arthur L . Alarc on, United States Circuit J udg e for the Ninth Circuit, sitt ing * by desig nation. [PUBLIS H]

IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ N o. 05- 1015 0

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ D. C. Docket N o. 04-00007 -CR- HL -7 UNITED STAT ES OF AMERIC A, Pl ai nt iff -Ap pe ll ee, ve rs us ROBERT B. ELLIS, JR ., Defen da nt -Ap pe ll an t.

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ Appeal f rom the United State s District Court fo r the Mi ddl e D istri ct

of G eo rg ia

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ (A ug us t 5, 200 5) Be fo re T JO FL A T , P RY O R and A L A RC O N , Ci rc uit Jud ge s. * TJO FL AT , C ircuit Judg e:2

O n Ju ly 21, 200 5, w e va cate d th e de fe ndant’ s se nte nc e, r em an de d th e ca se fo r re se nte nc ing pur suant t o U nit ed S tate s v. Bo oke r, 543 U . S. __, 125 S . Ct . 738 , 160 L . E d. 2d 6 21 ( 2005 ), and a dm itt ed the de fe ndant t o ba il on the c ondi tio ns o n wh i ch h e w as ad m i t t edp ri o r t o s en t en ci n g . Un i t edSt at es v . El l i s , 2 0 0 5 WL 1705 008 (11t h Cir. July

21, 2005). W e now explain the basis of that order. D ef en dant R obe rt

B. E lli s, Jr . , is the f

orm er D istri ct A tto rn ey f or the A la pahaJud ic ia l C ir cu it in G eo rg ia . O n Apr il 14, 200 4, E lli s w as ind ic te d inthe U nit ed S tate s D istri ct

Co urt f or the Mi ddl e D istri ct

of G eo rg ia , on thr ee c ount s of ci vil r igh ts v iol at ion s, 18 U . S. C. § 24 2, and o ne c ount of w itn es s tam

pe ri ng, 18 U . S. C. § 15 12( b) (3 ). T he ind ic tm en t a lle ge d th at on thr ee dif

fe re nt o cc as ion s be tw ee n Ju ly

200 3 and F eb ru ar

y 200 4, w hil e ac tin g un de r co lor of law , E lli s deprived Jod y

Manning, a defe ndant in a then-pending crim inal case in his judicial ci rc uit , of he r due pr oc es s r igh t t o bo dil y int eg ri ty —tw ic e by

“ ca usi ng h er to engage in sexual acts, re sultin g in bo dily injury to her,” and once by

touchin g her br ea sts . T he ind ic tm en t f urthe r al le ge d th at

E lli s “ co rr

upt ly pe rs ua de [d ] and en ga ge [d ] in m isl ea din g c ondu ct tow ar d Jo dy

Manni ng b y

te lli ng [ he r] that he w oul d pr ef

er that sh e not

ta lk t o [ the F BI ] , w iththe int en t t o hi nde r or pr ev en t” the FB I’ s in ve sti ga tio n of

him . O n M ay

25, 200 4, asup er se din g in dic tm en t a dde d a sin gle c ount

of m ak ing af

al se state m en t t o af

ed er al a ge nt, 18 U . S. C. § 10 01,T h e s u p er s ed i n g i n d i ct m en tal s o am en d edtwo o f t h e o ri gi n al co un t s t o al l ege 1 specific ally

that Ellis caused Manningto eng ag e in sexual acts “by using f orce ag ainst her.” These c hang es re sponded to a motion to dismi ss filed by Ellis, in which he contende d that the co rr es p o n d i n g co un t s i nth e o ri gi n al i n d i ct m en td i d n o ts t at e o ff

en s es b ec au s e t h ey

d i d n o tal l ege that his sex ual contac t with Manning w as either forc ible or not consensua l. A second superse ding indictment, f iled on J une 23, 2004, included no significant substantive re visions.

3 w hic h a lle ge d th at

on F eb ru ar

y 24, 200 4, w he n a ske d by an F BI a ge nt whe the r he ha d e ve r ha d se x w ithaw om anw ithpa st o r pe ndi ng c ri m ina l c harg es in his jud ic ia l ci rcu it , Elli s fa ls el y an swe red , “

No.” 1 A lth oughE lli s m ai nta ine d th at his r el at ion shi p w ithManni ng w as pur el y co nse nsua l, on Augus t 31 , 200 4, he ple d gu ilty to m ak ing af

al se state m en t t o th e FB I in v iol at ionof

18 U . S. C. § 10 01. I n e xc hange , the G ove rn m en t di sm iss ed the rem aining charges against hi m . The base offense level f or the offense to which Ellis pled guiltywa s six, U. S. S. G. § 2B1.1, and Ellis’ s crim inal histo ry category w as I , y ie ldi ng a

gui de lin e range of

0- 6 m onths’ im

pr iso nm en t. A t the se nte nc ing hearing, howe ver, the district court departed upward nine offe nse levels und er guid eline section 5K2.7, which provides that “ [i] f the defe ndant’s conduct resulted in a sig nif ic an t di sr upt ionof agov er nm en ta l f unc tio n, the c ourt m ay

inc re as e the se nte nc e ab ove the auth or iz ed gui de lin e range to re fl ec t the na tur e an d e xte nt o f the dis ru pti on and the im

portanc e of

the gov er

nm en ta l f unc tio n. ” T he ba sis f

or the departure w as the court’ s determ ination that “ a local court postpon ed pr ose cu tin g c ri m ina l c as es in or de r to a sse ss the im pa ct and r ep er cu ssi ons an dEllis’s offense level wa s also incre ased two le vels for obstruc tion of justice, U.S.S.G. § 2 3C1.1, based on the c onduct alleg ed in the witness tamper ing a ccount of the orig inal and superse ding indictments, but this increa se wa s offset by a two-le vel dec rea se for

acc eptanc e of responsibility , U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a). 4 ram if ic at ion s of

[ E lli s’ s] c ondu ct

and a ct s, ” an d th at

“ the int eg ri ty

of the A la paha Judicial Circuit dist rict attorney ’ s office and the public perception of the crim inal ju s t i ce s yst em wer e a d v er s el y af fe ct ed .” Wit h a t o t al o ff

en s e l ev el o f 1 5 , El l i s ’s gui de lin e range inc re as ed to 18- 24 m onths’ im

pr iso nm en t, and the c ourt i m pose d a se nte nc e of

e igh te enm onths. A s of our Jul y 21 o rd er , E lli s ha d se rv ed sli ght ly 2 m or e than e igh t m onths o f that se nte nc e. E lli s’ s a ppe al c ha lle nge d on ly

the upw ar d de part

ur e unde r se ct ion5K2. 7. T he e rr or in the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s r ea soni ng i s c le ar : E lli s’ s f al se state m en t t o the FBI did no t actually

disrupt anygovernm ental function. A n upward departure unde r se ct ion5K2. 7 is not “ or din ar ily

. . . j ust if ie d” w he n, a s he re , “ the of fe nse of convictio n is an offense such as bribery or obstruction of j ustice” because “ in such ca se s in te rf

er en ce w ithagov er

nm en ta l f unc tio n is inh er en t i n th e of fe nse , and unl es s th e ci rc um stanc es are unu sua l the gui de lin es w ill r ef le ct the appr opr iate puni shm ent for such interfer ence. ” U .S .S .G . § 5K2.7. The Governm ent concedes that E lli s di d no t di sr

upt the F BI ’ s in ve sti ga tio n inthe le as t— ind ee d, the a ge nts knew that E llis was ly ing when they question ed him

—but it argues that an up ward5

departure is appropriate beca use Ellis’ s false statem ent disrupt ed the local crim inal doc ke t and unde rm ine d th e publ ic pe rc ep tio n of the c ri m ina l j ust ic e sy ste m in general and the integrity

of his office in particular . In other wor ds, the collatera l co nse que nc es of

E lli s’ s f al se state m en t c onst itute unu sua l c ir cum stanc es j ust if y ing an upward departure. Whil e the G ove rn m en t’ s th eo ry is pla usi ble a s age ne ra l m atte r, it br eaks down onthe f

ac ts o f thi s c as e, f

or it is cl ear fr om

the r ec or d th at

any de lay in the dis posi tio n of

c ri m ina l c as es in E lli s’ s c ir cu it an d any dis gr ac e E lli s br ough t t o hi s office or the crim inal justice sy stem are the result of E llis’s c ondu ct towar d Manni ng—

w he the r co nse nte d to or

not —and h is s ubse que nt i ndi ctm en t, not his fa lse state m en t. T o be sur e, the re w as c re dib le te sti m ony sup portin g bo th s orts o f

“ disrupt ion of a governm ental function,” but the onlyrea sonable inference is that the se dis ru

pti ons w er e ca

use d by the a lle gatio ns o f se xua l m isc ondu ct in the Apr il 14 in di ct m en t. T he loc al c ourt “post

pone d pr ose cu tin g c ri m ina l c as es in or de r to a sse ss the im pa ct and r ep er cu ssi ons an d r am if ic at ion s of

[ E lli s’ s] c ondu ct

and a ct s” a s so on as the Apr il 14 i ndi ctm en t, w hic h di d no t e ve n in cl ude the f al se state m en t c ount , be cam e publ ic . T hus, E lli s’ s f al se state m en t w as log ic al ly ir re le vant t o th is

“ dis ru pti on” ; i nde ed , onc e E lli s w as ind ic te d, it did not m atte r w ha t he sa id,For example, at the sentenc ing he aring , the interim district attorney who was a

ppointed 3 to replac e Ellis testified that “a lot of pe ople [he] m et . . . would make joke s like . . . how many g ir lf ri e nd s you

g ot, or wh o a ll a re you sle e pin gwi th. ” B ut t

he re is n o e vid e nc e or

re a so n to believe that Ellis’s false statement fur ther unde rmined re spect for the district attorney ’s offic e or the c ri min a l ju sti c e sy ste m. 6 w he the r he ple d gu ilty

or sto od tri al , or

e ve n whe the r he w as ult im at el y a cquitte d. T he sam e is tru e w ithr es pe ct to the int eg ri ty

and p ubl ic pe rc ep tio n of the dis tr ic t atto rn ey ’ s of

fi ce and the c ri m ina l j ust ic e sy ste m . T he c au se of thi s lo ss i n publ ic confidence w as clear ly Ellis’ s indictm ent and sub sequent adm issio n to what w as , a t be st, ac onse nsua l se xua l r el at ion shi p w ithac ri m ina l de fe ndant i n ac as e pendin g in his j udicial circuit. I t defies com m on sense, as w ell as the testim ony at the se nte nc ing he ar ing , to sugg es t tha t the inc re m en ta l harm , if any , c au se d by

his fa lse state m en t w as m or e than de m ini m is. 3 The G overnm ent’ s argum ent relies prim arily on two cases. A t oral ar gum en t, the G ove rn m en t sa id tha t Unit ed S tate s v. Ma glu ta , 198 F . 3d 1 265 (1 1th Cir. 1999 ), wa s its “ best case. ” T he relevant portion of that opi nion , how ever, wa s subs equently

vacated, 203 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2000), and vacated opinio ns “ are of fi ci al ly gon e. T he y

have no l eg al e ff

ec t wha te ve r. T he y

are voi d. [ T he y

have no] rem aining force and cannot be consid ered to express the viewof this Court.” Uni te d S ta te s v . Sig m a In t’l, In c., 30 0 F .3d12 78 , 12 80 (11 th Cir . 20 02 ). Ac cordingly , w e do not address Maglut a.7

T he G ove rn m en t’ s se co nd c as e is Unit ed S tate s v. G unby , 112 F . 3d 1 493 ( 1 1 th C i r . 1 9 9 7 ) . I nGu nb y, t h e C h i e f M a g i s tr at e J u d g e f

o r B a l dw i nC o u n ty, G eo rg ia , e m

be zz le d m or e than $4 00, 000 in f ili ng f ee s pa id i nto his c ourt and eventually

pled guil ty

to m ail fra

ud and tax fraud counts stem m ing from

that sc he m e. I d. a t 14 96- 98. I n a ff irm ing an up w ar d de part

ur e unde r se ct ion5K2. 7, w e re as one d th at

“ [i ] f G unby ’ s f

ra udul en t sc he m es c au se d th e pe opl e of Ba ldw in Co un ty to d ou btth e im

pa rti al it y of t he m ag is tra te co ur t, t he n Gu nb y . . . sig nif ic an tly dis ru pte d agov er

nm en ta l f unc tio n, ” an d “ [t ] he dis tr ic t c ourt di d no t ab use it s di sc re tio n inc onc lud ing that gu ide lin e se ct ion5K2. 7 e nc om pa sse s th is loss o f confidence in governm ent.” Id. at 1502-03 . Thus, the “ loss o f confidence in g ove rn m en t” in G unby w as a ct ua lly a ttr ibu ta ble to the f

ra ud t o whic h Gunby pled gui lty . He re, in contrast, any disrupti on was ca

used byEllis’ s m iscondu ct to wardMan ni ng an d t he res ul ti ng in di ct m en t, n otEll is ’s fal se st at em en t. A cc or din gly , G unby

doe s no t su

ppor t the G ove rn m en t’ s po sit ion . Po st- Bo oke r, w e co nti nue to re vie wthe dis tr ic t c ourt’ s a ppl ic at ionof

the G uid el ine s j ust

a s w e did

pr e- Bo oke r: “ T he dis tr ic t c ourt’ s inte rp re tatio n of the sentencing g uidelin es is subject to de novo review on appeal, while its fa ctual fi ndi ngs m

ust be a cc ep te d un le ss c le ar ly e rr one ous. ” U nit ed

S tate s v. Jor di, __ F. 3d _ _, 200 5 W L 179 8055 ( 11th C ir . Aug. 1, 200 5) ( quot ing U nit ed S tate s v.Simi larly , section 5K2.0(a ) provides that “[t] he sente ncingcourt may depar t from the 4 applicable guideline ra

ng e if . . . ther e exists an ag g ravating or mitigatingcirc umstance . . . of a kin d, or to a de g re e , n ot a de qu ate ly

take n into c on sid e ratio n b y the Se nte nc ingCommis sio n in fo rm ulatin gthe guid e lin e s. ” U. S.S. G. § 5 K2 .0 (a )( 1) (e mph a sis a dd e d) . T he a pp lic atio n n ote s to section 5K2.0, in turn, def ine “c ircumstance ” to “include [] , as appr opriate, a n offe nder c ha ra c te ri sti c or

any oth e r o ff e ns e fa c tor .” U. S.S. G. § 5 K2 .0 a pp lic atio n n ote 1 ( e mph a sis a dd e d) . “ [T]he re fo re , u

pw ard de pa rt ur e s a re a llo we d f

or a c ts o f m isc on du c t no t r e su lti ngin conviction, as longas those ac ts, whether or not releva

nt conduct in the sec tion 1B1.3 sense , re late me anin g fu lly

to t he of fe ns e of c onvic tio n. ” Un ite d St ate s v . A mir a ult , 2 24 F .3 d 9 , 1 2 ( 1s t Cir. 2000) (empha sis added); a ccor d United States v. Nea l, 249 F.3d 1251, 1259-1260 ( 10th Cir. 2001). Thus, eve n though se ction 5K2.7 re fer s to “signif icant disruption of a g overnme ntal fu nc tio n” that r e su lts fr om “ the de fe nd ant’ s c on du c t,” it mus t be un de rs too d to e nc omp a ss o nly that c on du c t th at “ re late [s] me anin g fu lly to t he of fe ns e of c onvic tio n, ” ra

the r t ha n a ny “ c on du c t” the def endant may

be cha rg ed with. 8 Pom pey , 17 F. 3d 35 1, 353 (11th Cir. 1994)). As w e explain above, the district co urt c le ar ly

e rr ed if it f ound that E lli s’ s f

al se state m en t c au se d any sig nif ic an t dis ru pti on o f a gove rn m en ta l f unc tio n. T he re fo re , the de part ur e cannot

be su st ai ne d o n t ha t ra ti on al e. A lte rn at ive ly , if

the dis tr ic t c ourt be lie ve d th at it c oul d c onsi de r the dis ru pti ve e ff ec ts o f E lli s’ s in dic tm en t and c ondu ct tow ar d M annin g, the n it m isinterpreted the guid eline and erre d as a m atter of law. Adeparture under guid eline subpart 5K2 m ay be based on “ conduct un derly ing a charge dism issed as part of a plea

agree m ent,” but on ly

to the extent necessary

“ to reflec t the actual seriousness of the offe nse.” U. S. S. G. § 5K2.21 (e m phasis add ed). T hat is, such 4 co nduc t pr ovi de s aba sis f or de part ur e onl y if it she ds f urthe r lig ht o n th e tr

ue nature of the offe nse of conviction . An upwar d departure based on Ellis’ s conduct9

tow ar d M annin g and h is s ubse que nt i ndi ctm en t w oul d do nothin g to r ef le ct the

“ actual seriousness” of the offense to w hich he pled gu ilty ; rather, it would reflec t the seriousness of unproven allegation s that, at lea st for sentencing purpo ses, are not m eanin gf

ull y r el at ed to his f al se state m en t t o th e FB I. A cc or din gly , any co llate ra l c onse que nc es of the se a lle ga tio ns c annot , a s am atte r of law , f orm the ba sis of an up w ar d de part

ur e unde r se ct ion5K2. 7. In sum , r egardless of its precise r ationale, the district court com m itted reversible er

ror by enhancing Ellis’ s sentence under guidelin e section 5K2.7. By our Jul y 21 o rd er , the de fe ndant’ s se nte nc e ha s be enva cate d and the c as e re m an de d f

or r es en te nc ing pur suant t o U nit ed S tate s v. Bo oke r, 543 U . S. __, 125 S. Ct . 738 , 160 L . E d. 2d 6 21 ( 2005 ). O n r em an d, “ [t ] he dis tr ic t c ourt[ ] , w hil e not boun d to appl y

the G uid el ine s, m

ust c onsu lt tho se G uid el ine s and t ak e the m int o ac co unt w he n se nte nc ing . ” I d. a t __ , 125 S . Ct . a t 76 7. “ [B ] ec au se tr ue co ns ul ta ti on can no t b e b as edon an erro ne ou s u nd ers ta nd in g o f th e Gui de li ne s,” U nit ed S tate s v. Cr aw fo rd , 407 F . 3d 1 174, 118 3 ( 11th C ir . 200 5) , the dis tr ic t m ust be ginby c al cu latin g an a dvi sor

y gui de lin e range that do es not inc lud e a se ct ion 5K2.7 e nhancem ent. T he district m ay then “ tailor the sentence in light o f other statut or y c onc er ns a s w el l. ” Bo oke r, 543 U . S. a t __ , 125 S . Ct . a t 75 7.