alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
§ 1984.114 District court jurisdiction of retaliation complaints. ( a ) The complainant may bring an action at law or equity for de novo review in the appropriate district court of the United States, which will have jurisdiction over such an action without regard to the amount in controversy, either: ( 1 ) Within 90 days after receiving a written determination under § 1984.105(a) provided that there has been no final decision of the Secretary; or
( 2 ) If there has been no final decision of the Secretary within 210 days of the filing of the complaint.
( 3 ) At the request of either party, the action shall be tried by the court with a jury.
( b ) A proceeding under paragraph (a) of this section shall be governed by the same legal burdens of proof specified in § 1984.109. The court shall have jurisdiction to grant all relief necessary to make the employee whole, including injunctive relief and compensatory damages, including: ( 1 ) Reinstatement with the same seniority status that the employee would have had, but for the discharge or retaliation;
( 2 ) The amount of back pay, with interest; and
( 3 ) Compensation for any special damages sustained as a result of the discharge or retaliation, including litigation costs, expert witness fees, and reasonable attorney fees.
( c ) Within seven days after filing a complaint in federal court, a complainant must file with the Assistant Secretary, the ALJ, or the ARB, depending on where the proceeding is pending, a copy of the file-stamped complaint. In all cases, a copy of the complaint also must be served on the OSHA official who issued the findings and/or preliminary order, the Assistant Secretary, and the Associate Solicitor, Division of Fair Labor Standards, U.S. Department of Labor.
#### STATE ex HARTFORD FIRE INS CO v WEYGANDT

Ohio Supreme Court

No 22258.

Decided Nov 19, 1930

Marshall, CJ, Kinkade, Robinson, Matthias, Day and Allen, JJ, concur.
#### § 4022.103 Who will get benefits if I die when payments for future periods under a certain-and-continuous or similar annuity are owed upon my death?

If you die at a time when payments are owed for future periods under a form of annuity promising that, regardless of a participant's death, there will be annuity payments for a certain period of time (e.g., a certain-and-continuous annuity) or until a certain amount is paid (e.g., a cash-refund annuity or installment-refund annuity), and there is no surviving beneficiary designated to receive such payments, we will pay the remaining payments to the person determined under the rules in § 4022.93.
#### § 4041A.1 Purpose and scope.

The purpose of this part is to establish rules for notifying the PBGC of the termination of a multiemployer plan and rules for the administration of multiemployer plans that have terminated by mass withdrawal. Subpart B prescribes the contents of and procedures for filing a Notice of Termination for a multiemployer plan. Subpart C prescribes basic duties of plan sponsors of mass-withdrawal-terminated plans. (Other duties are prescribed in part 4281 of this chapter.) Subpart D contains procedures for closing out sufficient plans. This part applies to terminated multiemployer plans covered by title IV of ERISA but, in the case of subparts C and D, only to plans terminated by mass withdrawal under section 4041A(a)(2) of ERISA (including plans created by partition pursuant to section 4233 of ERISA).
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
REGISTRANT'S FORM 10-Q QUARTERLY REPORT UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1934 AND IS
QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JAN-31-2001
<PERIOD-START>                             FEB-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               APR-30-2000
<CASH>                                      85,270,270
<SECURITIES>                                25,789,033
<RECEIVABLES>                               15,678,117
<ALLOWANCES>                                 1,208,367
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                           128,658,561
<PP&E>                                       5,107,339
<DEPRECIATION>                               2,652,293
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             155,245,705
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       30,253,082
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        39,276
<OTHER-SE>                                 119,356,261
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>               155,245,705
<SALES>                                     11,613,020
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            21,155,291
<CGS>                                          463,604
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               14,713,967
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              8,222,348
<INCOME-TAX>                                 3,510,709
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          4,711,639
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 4,711,639
<EPS-BASIC>                                       0.12
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.12


</TABLE>
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PHILLIP SANDS, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF 

CORRECTIONS AND 

REHABILITATION; et al., 

Defendants-Appellees. 

No. 16-15100 

D.C. No. 1:15-cv-01140-RRB 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Ralph R. Beistline, District Judge, Presiding**

Submitted March 8, 2017***

Before: LEAVY, W. FLETCHER, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.

California state prisoner Phillip Sands appeals pro se from the district court’s 

judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging Eighth Amendment 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The Honorable Ralph R. Beistline, United States District Judge for the 

District of Alaska, sitting by designation.

*** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

MAR 17 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 16-15100 

excessive force claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review 

de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000); Barren v. 

Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (order). We affirm. 

The district court properly dismissed Sands’ action because the California 

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, as a state agency, is immune from 

suit under the Eleventh Amendment, see Brown v. California Dep’t of Corr., 554 

F.3d 747, 752 (9th Cir. 2009), and Sands failed to allege facts sufficient to show 

that defendants Swift and Marsh personally participated in the alleged 

constitutional violations, see Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(setting forth requirements for establishing supervisory liability under § 1983); 

Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934-35 (9th Cir. 2002) (“In order for a person 

acting under color of state law to be liable under section 1983 there must be a 

showing of personal participation in the alleged rights deprivation . . . .”).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Sands’

complaint without leave to amend because amendment would be futile. See 

Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(standard of review).

We do not consider facts, documents, and declarations presented for the first 

time on appeal. See United States v. Elias, 921 F.2d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 1990) 
3 16-15100 

(“Documents or facts not presented to the district court are not part of the record on 

appeal.”).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued 

in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.
#### § 452.93 Retired members.

The right of retirees to vote may be restricted to the extent provided by the constitution and bylaws of the labor organization.
#### § 2509.75-3 Interpretive bulletin relating to investments by employee benefit plans in securities of registered investment companies.

On March 12, 1975, the Department of Labor issued an interpretive bulletin, ERISA IB 75-3, with regard to its interpretation of section 3(21)(B) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. That section provides that an investment by an employee benefit plan in securities issued by an investment company registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940 shall not by itself cause the investment company, its investment adviser or principal underwriter to be deemed to be a fiduciary or party in interest “except insofar as such investment company or its investment adviser or principal underwriter acts in connection with an employee benefit plan covering employees of the investment company, the investment adviser, or its principal underwriter.”

The Department of Labor interprets this section as an elaboration of the principle set forth in section 401(b)(1) of the Act and ERISA IB 75-2 (issued February 6, 1975) that the assets of an investment company shall not be deemed to be assets of a plan solely by reason of an investment by such plan in the shares of such investment company. Consistent with this principle, the Department of Labor interprets this section to mean that a person who is connected with an investment company, such as the investment company itself, its investment adviser or its principal underwriter, is not to be deemed to be a fiduciary of or party in interest with respect to a plan solely because the plan has invested in the investment company's shares.

This principle applies, for example, to a plan covering employees of an investment adviser to an investment company where the plan invests in the securities of the investment company. In such a case the investment company or its principal underwriter is not to be deemed to be a fiduciary of or party in interest with respect to the plan solely because of such investment.

On the other hand, the exception clause in section 3(21) emphasizes that if an investment company, its investment adviser or its principal underwriter is a fiduciary or party in interest for a reason other than the investment in the securities of the investment company, such a person remains a party in interest or fiduciary. Thus, in the preceding example, since an employer is a party in interest, the investment adviser remains a party in interest with respect to a plan covering its employees.

The Department of Labor emphasized that an investment adviser, principal underwriter or investment company which is a fiduciary by virtue of section 3(21)(A) of the Act is subject to the fiduciary responsibility provisions of part 4 of title I of the Act, including those relating to fiduciary duties under section 404.

[40 FR 31599, July 28, 1975. Redesignated at 41 FR 1906, Jan. 13, 1976]
#### TOLEDO, BOWLING GREEN & SOUTHERN TRAC CO v WOOD CO MUTUAL FIRE INS CO

Ohio Appeals, 6th Dist, Wood Co

No. 458.

Decided November 12, 1929

Messrs. E. V. Popp and E. P. Riegle, Bowling Green, for Traction Company.

Messrs. S. W. Bowman and Edward M. Fries, Bowling Green, for Fire Ins Co.

*8LLOYD, J.

Although not the proper way to prove the property claimed to have been destroyed, we do not think the admission of these exhibits jor that purpose was prejudicial error, especially in view of the fact that counsel made no objection thereto on that ground, either at the trial or in argument or brief. The only objection made by counsel to these exhibits was that thereby the appraisers’ valuation of the property was improperly presented as evidence to the jury; nor, since no evidence was offered by the interurban company as to the value of the property, and other witnesses testified with respect thereto, was their admission prejudicial error in this respect. But, if proper exceptions had been saved, the admissibility of exhibit “L”, because of the signed report of the committee of the insurance company as to the origin of the fire might be most seriously questioned and be considered as prejudicial error. The record shows that when the exhibits were first offered the court said “All the exhibits may be offered”, to which attorneys for the interurban commny replied “Save exceptions”. Later the court said: “Exhibits from A to are admitted” and again attorneys for the interurban company said “Save exceptions”. Other than this no objection was made or exception taken to the admission of these exhibits in evidence. As will be observed, there were a number of exhibits offered at the trial by defendants in error, all of which, except “B” and “L”, were properly received, and to none of which objection was made, and since some of the exhibits so offered and received in evidence were properly admissible, a general and all-inclusive exception such as was taken in this instance could not avail as a basis for error in receiving in evidence the two exhibits in question.

The evidence was in conflict as. to the origin of the fire, several witnesses for each of the parties having testified with respect thereto, and the verdict and judgment can not be disturbed as being against the weight of the evidence.

We observe that the record discloses that the insurance company paid Meeker the amount of the insurance on May 26, 1928, and computing the interest on the .amount claimed in the petition from that date to April 8, 1929, the amount is less than the sum awarded the insurance company by the verdict, and we think this to be true also of the verdict and judgment in favor pf Meeker.

These judgments should therefore be modified in this respect and as modified will be affirmed.

Williams and Richards, JJ., concur.
Colleen,

AEPCO is requesting clarification from EPA based on its letter to AEPCO dated August 6, 2012. Please 

find AEPCO’s questions below.

1. Annual Reports – What type of annual reports is EPA looking for – Arizona Corporation 

Commission Filings, Financials or our Companies Annual Report?

2. Internal projections as to future performance – Can EPA please clarify what this is referring to? 

Financial forecasts, load forecasts?

3. Other internal records that document available equity and debt for AEPCO’s operations. –

Again clarification requested as to what other documents EPA might be considering in this 

request. Balance Sheet, most Recent Financial Statement?

Thank you in advance for your attention to this request.

Michelle Freeark

From: Colleen McKaughan [mailto:McKaughan.Colleen@epamail.epa.gov] 

Sent: Monday, August 06, 2012 8:54 PM

To: Michelle Freeark

Cc: Deborah Jordan; Thomas Webb; Francisco Donez

Subject: Letter Requesting Additional Information on AEPCO

Hi, Michele,

Here is an electronic copy of the letter that I mentioned last week. A hard copy follows. We consulted with 

Headquarters on the information that would be useful to our analysis. I know you are already gathering 

information so part of this list may already be completed. Let me know if you have questions/concerns.

Colleen 520-498-0118 

Ceciley Wilder

----- Original Message -----

From: Ceciley Wilder

Sent: 08/06/2012 06:02 PM PDT

To: Deborah Jordan; Colleen McKaughan

Subject: Freeark Ltr

(See attached file: Freeark_Aug 6.pdf)

RE: Letter Requesting Additional Information on AEPCO

Michelle Freeark 

to:

Colleen McKaughan

08/14/2012 09:54 PM

Cc:

'Deborah Jordan', Thomas Webb, Francisco Donez

Hide Details 

From: Michelle Freeark <mfreeark@ssw.coop>

To: Colleen McKaughan/R9/USEPA/US@EPA, 

Cc: 'Deborah Jordan' <DeborahSJordan11@comcast.net>, Thomas 

Webb/R9/USEPA/US@EPA, Francisco Donez/R9/USEPA/US@EPA

Page 1 of 2

file:///C:/Users/fdonez.AA/AppData/Local/Temp/notes5524D1/~web1482.htm 8/20/2012
Ceciley Elizabeth Wilder

Air Division

75 Hawthorne Street

San Francisco, CA 94105

415-947-4143

Page 2 of 2

file:///C:/Users/fdonez.AA/AppData/Local/Temp/notes5524D1/~web1482.htm 8/20/2012
[if !vml]>[endif]>

[if !vml]>[endif]>

You have reached the FederalDepository Library Program Electronic Collection (FDLP/EC) Archive. Thisarchive assures ongoing access to publications in the FDLP/EC. Access topublications in the archive is available through GPO's suite of cataloging andlocator services, including the Catalog of U.S. Government Publications(CGP).  Archived copies of publications are retrieved in the event thatpublications are no longer available from the original publishing agency site. 
**Title:****North Dakota�s forest resourcesin...**
 
2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009
2010 | 2011 | 2012
 
SuDoc Number:A 13.163/34:
Item Number:0084-N-34 (online)
CGP systemNumber:000936214
 
March 28, 2018
#### GUSTAFSON v JOHNSON etc

Ohio Appeals, 8th Dist, Cuyahoga Co

No 10576.

Decided Feb 17, 1930

A. P. Gustafson and P. K. Fulton, both of Cleveland, for Gustafson.

Grossman & Grossman, Cleveland, for Johnson, etc.

LEVINE, J.

Various assignments of error are set forth. We entertain grave doubt as to the legality or justice of permitting Gustafson to charge the corporation the sum of $100.00 for services rendered to Goldberg and Wexler. It can harly be thought that these services rendered to Goldberg that these services rendered to Goldberg and Wexler were services rendered to the corporation.

We would be unwilling to disturb the trial court’s judgment except for one reason, that there was in our opinion, and adjudication by the referee in bankruptcy of the subject matter involved in this case. The trustee filed an application in bankruptcy court for a summary order to compel Gustafson to pay the $100.00. The trustee adjudicated the same by refusing the application. There was a clear way open to the trustee in bankruptcy, namely, to take exceptions to the ruling of the referee in bankruptcy and to prosecute error from such ruling.

We are not concerned with any private conversation had between counsel and the referee in bankruptcy as to the reason for the refusal of the application. His refusal of the application was a judicial determination of the question now before us and remains undisturbed until there was a modification or reversal by proper authority.

Holding these views, the judgment of the municipal court is ordered reversed and final judgment ordered for plaintiff in error.

Vickery, PJ., and Sullivan, J., concur.
#### § 405.7 Relation of section 8(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, to the reporting requirements of § 405.2.

While nothing contained in section 203 of the Act shall be construed as an amendment to, or modification of the rights protected by section 8(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, activities protected by such section of the said Act are not for that reason exempted from the reporting requirements of section 203(a) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 and § 405.2, and, if otherwise subject to such reporting requirements, are required to be reported if they have been engaged in during the course of the reporting fiscal year. However, the information required to be reported in Question 8C of Form LM-10 does not include matters protected by section 8(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, because the definition in section 203(g) of the term “interfere with, restrain, or coerce”, which is used in Question 8C does not cover such matters.

[42 FR 59070, Nov. 15, 1977, as amended at 81 FR 16020, Mar. 24, 2016; 83 FR 33842, July 18, 2018]
NEERWINEIRINKUSEIN

to demonstrate that an impediment external to the defense prevented him from filing a timely petition. See Hathaway v. State, 119 Nev. 248, 252, 71 P.3d 503, 506 (2003). Appellant's arguments relating to his movement to different facilities and law library access were not supported by specific facts warranting relief. See Hargrove v. State, 100 Nev. 498, 686 P.2d 222 (1984). Appellant's claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel were themselves procedurally barred and cannot provide good cause for the delay. See Hathaway, 119 Nev. at 252, 71 P.3d at 506. To the extent that appellant claimed that a fundamental miscarriage of justice—actual innocence—should overcome his procedural defects, appellant did not demonstrate actual innocence because he failed to show that "it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of. . . new evidence." Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 559 (1998) (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995)); see also Pellegrini v. State, 117 Nev. 860, 887, 34 P.3d 519, 537 (2001); Mazzan v. Warden, 112 Nev. 838, 842, 921 P.2d 920, 922 (1996). Accordingly, we

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.

J.

J. 

## 1_,01 Douglas

Saitta

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA

(0) 1947A 2

### cc: Hon. Brent T. Adams, District Judge Phillip Bryon Ashdown Attorney General/Carson City Washoe County District Attorney Washoe District Court Clerk

SUPREME COURT

OF NEVADA
(0) 1947A 

### 3
## In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth

No. 02

- 22

- 00355

- CV

I N THE I NTEREST OF E.K. AND P.K.,

C HILDREN §

§

§

§ On Appeal from the 325th District

Court

of Tarrant County ( 32 5

- 679575

- 20 )

March 2 , 2023

Memorandum Opinion by Justice

Bassel

JUDGMENT

This court has considered the record on appeal in this case and holds that there

was no error in the trial court’s judgment. It is ordered that the judgment of the trial

cou r t i s affirmed.

SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

By /s/ Dabney Bassel

Justice Dabney Bassel
#### § 2580.412-29 Exemption.

An exemption from the bonding requirements of subsections 13 (a) and (b) of the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act is granted whereby savings and loan associations (including building and loan associations, cooperative banks and homestead associations) specified in § 2580.412-30 are not required to comply with subsections 13 (a) and (b) of the Act, with respect to welfare and pension benefit plans covered by the Act for the benefit of their own employees, where such a savings and loan association is the administrator of such plans.

[32 FR 6840, May 4, 1967. Redesignated at 50 FR 26706, June 28, 1985]
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 13.1

                CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

     In connection with the annual report on Form 20-F of Amdocs Limited (the
"Company") for the period ended September 30, 2007 as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), the undersigned, Dov
Baharav, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, hereby certifies, pursuant to
18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that to the best of his knowledge and belief:

     (1) the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.

Dated: December 3, 2007

/s/ DOV BAHARAV
----------------------------------------
Chief Executive Officer
Amdocs Management Limited