alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
###### Editorial Note on Part 4

#### Editorial Note:

Nomenclature changes to part 4 appear at 61 FR 19984, May 3, 1996.

#### § 4.161 Minimum monetary wages under contracts exceeding $2,500.

The standards established pursuant to the Act for minimum monetary wages to be paid by contractors and subcontractors under service contracts in excess of $2,500 to service employees engaged in performance of the contract or subcontract are required to be specified in the contract and in all subcontracts (see § 4.6). Pursuant to the statutory scheme provided by sections 2(a)(1) and 4(c) of the Act, every covered contract (and any bid specification therefor) which is in excess of $2,500 shall contain a provision specifying the minimum monetary wages to be paid the various classes of service employees engaged in the performance of the contract or any subcontract thereunder, as determined by the Secretary or his authorized representative in accordance with prevailing rates for such employees in the locality, or, where a collective bargaining agreement applied to the employees of a predecessor contractor in the same locality, in accordance with the rates for such employees provided for in such agreement, including prospective wage increases as provided in such agreement as a result of arm's-length negotiations. In no case may such wages be lower than the minimum wage specified under section 6(a)(1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended. (For a detailed discussion of the application of section 4(c) of the Act, see § 4.163.) If some or all of the determined wages in a contract fall below the level of the Fair Labor Standards Act minimum by reason of a change in that rate by amendment of the law, these rates become obsolete and the employer is obligated under section 2(b)(1) of the Service Contract Act to pay the minimum wage rate established by the amendment as of the date it becomes effective. A change in the Fair Labor Standards Act minimum by operation of law would also have the same effect on advertised specifications or negotiations for covered service contracts, i.e., it would make ineffective and would supplant any lower rate or rates included in such specifications or negotiations whether or not determined. However, unless affected by such a change in the Fair Labor Standards Act minimum wage, by contract changes necessitating the insertion of new wage provisions (see §§ 4.5(c) and 4.143-4.145) or by the requirements of section 4(c) of the Act (see § 4.163), the minimum monetary wage rate specified in the contract for each of the classes of service employees for which wage determinations have been made under section 2(a)(1) will continue to apply throughout the period of contract performance. No change in the obligation of the contractor or subcontractor with respect to minimum monetary wages will result from the mere fact that higher or lower wage rates may be determined to be prevailing for such employees in the locality after the award and before completion of the contract. Such wage determinations are effective for contracts not yet awarded, as provided in § 4.5(a).
Exhibit 32  CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002  In connection with the Quarterly Report of  Intelligent Living Corp.(the "Company") On  Form  10-QSB  for  the period  ended  November 30, 2007 as  filed  with the Securities  and Exchange  Commission on  the  date  hereof  (the "Report"),  I, Michael F. Holloran, Chief Executive Officer and Principal Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant  to 18 U.S.C.  section 1350, as adopted pursuant to section  906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of  2002,  that  to the  best  of my knowledge: (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d)  of the  Securities  Exchange  Act of 1934;  and (2)  The  information contained in  the  Report  fairly  presents,  in  all  material  respects,  the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.  /s/ Michael F. Holloran Michael F. Holloran Chief Executive Officer and Principal Financial Officer  January 20, 2008
#### § 2570.1 Scope of rules.

The rules of practice set forth in this part are applicable to “prohibited transaction penalty proceedings” (as defined in § 2570.2(o) of this part) under section 502(i) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. The rules of procedure for administrative hearings published by the Department's Office of Administrative Law Judges at part 18 of this title will apply to matters arising under ERISA section 502(i) except as modified by this section. These proceedings shall be conducted as expeditiously as possible, and the parties shall make every effort to avoid delay at each stage of the proceedings.
EXHIBIT 32

STATEMENT FURNISHED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, 18 U.S.C SECTION 1350

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Capitol Federal Financial (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2004, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), we, John B. Dicus, Chief Executive Officer of the Company and Neil F. M. McKay, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company as of the dates and for the periods presented in the financial statements included in such Report.







Date:   August 4, 2004                                    By:   /s/ John B. Dicus
                                                                                     John B. Dicus, President and 
                                                                                     Chief Executive Officer



Date:   August 4, 2004                                   By:   /s/ Neil F. M. McKay
                                                                                     Neil F.M. McKay, Executive Vice President
                                                                                     and Chief Financial Officer
`[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S.J. Res. 25 Referred in House (RFH)]







110th CONGRESS
  2nd Session
S. J. RES. 25


_______________________________________________________________________


                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            February 6, 2008

            Referred to the Committee on House Administration

_______________________________________________________________________

                            JOINT RESOLUTION


 
 Providing for the appointment of John W. McCarter as a citizen regent 
        of the Board of Regents of the Smithsonian Institution.

    Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 
States of America in Congress assembled, That, in accordance with 
section 5581 of the Revised Statutes (20 U.S.C. 43), the vacancy on the 
Board of Regents of the Smithsonian Institution, in the class other 
than Members of Congress, occurring because of the expiration of the 
term of Walter E. Massey of Georgia, is filled by the appointment of 
John W. McCarter of Illinois, for a term of 6 years, effective on the 
date of the enactment of this resolution.

            Passed the Senate February 4, 2008.

            Attest:

                                                NANCY ERICKSON,

                                                             Secretary.`
EXHIBIT 32



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C SECTION 1350

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Annual Report of Lescarden Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10KSB for the period ended May 31, 2009 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, William E. Luther, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350, as adopted pursuant to section 906 of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:



| |    |                                                                                                                        
| | -- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| | 1. | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13 (a) or 15 (d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and



| |    |                                                                                                                                                    
| | -- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| | 2. | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.



|                        |                                                    
|----------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------
|Date: September 9, 2009 |                                                    
|                        | /s/ William E. Luther                              
|                        | William E. Luther                                  
|                        | Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer
#### § 4003.7 Exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Except as provided in § 4003.22(b), a person aggrieved by an initial determination of PBGC covered by this part, other than an initial determination subject to reconsideration that is issued by a Department Director, has not exhausted his or her administrative remedies until he or she has filed a request for reconsideration under subpart C of this part or an appeal under subpart D of this part, whichever is applicable, and a decision granting or denying the relief requested has been issued.

[61 FR 34012, July 1, 1996, as amended at 85 FR 10283, 10284, Feb. 24, 2020]
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Ralph Santos, Appellant.

[700 NYS2d 33]

—Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Demakos, J.), rendered October 1, 1997, convicting him of murder in the second degree and criminal contempt in the first degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant has not preserved for appellate review his contention that the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury that testimony of his prior violent acts against the murder victim were admitted into evidence for only a limited purpose constituted reversible error *(see,*CPL 470.05 [2]; *People v Udzinski,*146 AD2d 245). The defendant never requested such a limiting instruction. In any event, the error was harmless in light of the overwhelming proof of guilt *(see, People v Crimmins,*36 NY2d 230; *People v Sanzo,*122 AD2d 817). The defendant stabbed his longtime companion, Eva Rosenthal, to death at 8 a.m., on an escalator ascending from a subway platform, in full view of several eyewitnesses. Furthermore, he gave the police a detailed statement which clearly excluded the defense of an accidental or unintentional stabbing.

The defendant’s sentence was not excessive *(see, People v Wilner,*109 AD2d 908; *People v Suitte,*90 AD2d 80). Friedmann, J. P., Florio, Schmidt and Smith, JJ., concur.
# Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas

July 28, 2017

No. 04

- 17

- 00421

- CR & 04

- 17

- 00422

- CR

John Gabriel GUAJARDO, Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas, Appellee

From the 399th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 20 14CR6729 & 2014CR9091 Honorable Frank J. Castro, Judge Presiding



### O R D E R

In the interest of the efficient administration of the court’s docket, we ORDER Appeal Nos. 04

- 17

- 00421

- CR and 04

- 17

- 00422

- CR consolidated. The parties must file motions, briefs, and other pleadings as if the appeals were one , but put both appeal numbers in the style of the

case. However, a record must be filed in each appeal

. T he record in each case will remain separate and, if supplementation of the record becomes necessary, the supplemental material must be filed in the appeal to which it applies. The cases must be argued together in one brief, as in a single appeal, and if oral argument is requested and granted, the entire case must be argued as a single appeal, with the total time limit for each party equal to t he ordinary time limit for a party in a single appeal. The court will dispose of both appeals in the same judgment, opinion, and mandate.

We order the clerk of this court to service copies of this order on all counsel, the district clerk, and the court r eporter.

_________________________________ Marialyn Barnard, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I ha ve hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said court on this 28th day of July, 2017

.___________________________________ Luz Estrada Chief Deputy Clerk
#### Elmer Finley JEFFERS, Appellant, v. Clarence T. GLADDEN, Warden, Oregon State Penitentiary, Appellee.

No. 21537.

United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.

May 22, 1967.

*60Charles O. Porter, Porter & Bach, Eugene, Or., for appellant.

Robert Y. Thornton, Atty. Gen., David H. Blunt, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salem, Or., for appellee.

Before BROWNING, DUNIWAY, and ELY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

The findings of the district court (which followed similar findings of the state court) that Jeffers knowingly and intentionally waived counsel and knowingly and voluntarily entered a plea of guilty are not clearly erroneous. No other question being raised on this appeal, the judgment is affirmed.
#### Commonwealth *versus*Henry Lindsey.

The breaking of a store in the night-time is an indictable offence by the statute of 1804, c. 142, § 6.

The defendant was indicted for breaking a *store*in the *nighttime,*and committing a larceny therein, against the form of the statute, &c.

After a conviction, he moved in arrest of judgment, on the ground that there was no statute provision for the [*154] offence * charged in the indictment; and *Storer,*in support of the motion, cited the case of *Commonwealth*vs. *M’Monagle.*(1)

(1)

1 *Mass. Rep.*517.

*Morton.*

The indictment in the case cited was upon the statute of 1784, c. 66. But the indictment in the case at bar is found upon the statute of 1804, c. 142, § 6, in which the word *store*is enumerated among other buildings.

The defendant took nothing by his motion.

ADDITIONAL NOTE.

*•*[See *Com*vs. Tuck, 20 *Pick.*356. — *Devoe*vs. *Com.*3 *Mete.*316. — F. H.J
#### § 35.14 Burden of proof.

The recipient has the burden of proving that an age distinction or other action falls within the exceptions outlined in §§ 35.12 and 35.13.
§ 458.68 Answer. ( a ) Within twenty (20) days from the service of the complaint the respondent shall file an answer thereto with the Chief Administrative Law Judge and shall serve a copy on all parties. The answer shall be signed by the respondent or his attorney or other agent or representative.
( b ) The answer ( 1 ) shall contain a statement of the facts which constitute the grounds of defense, and shall specifically admit, explain, or deny each of the allegations of the complaint unless the respondent is without knowledge, in which case the answer shall so state; or
( 2 ) shall state that the respondent admits all of the allegations in the complaint. Failure to file an answer to or plead specifically to any allegation in the complaint shall constitute an admission of such allegation.
[No. 27463-9-II.

Division Two.

November 1, 2002.]

#### The State of Washington, *Respondent,*v. Kevin Dean Kindle, *Appellant.*

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Pierce County, No. 00-1-05505-8, John A. McCarthy, J., entered May 18, 2001. *Affirmed*by unpublished opinion per Seinfeld, J., concurred in by Hunt, C. J., and Bridgewater, J.
#### § 3.8 Action by the Secretary of Labor upon applications.

The Secretary of Labor will decide whether or not the requested deduction is permissible under provisions of § 3.6; and will notify the applicant in writing of the decision.

[88 FR 57731, Aug. 23, 2023]
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 95-7091
YUSUF ABDUL AL-WAHHAB, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA; SUPREME COURT OFVIRGINIA; GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF VIRGINIA; GOVERNOR OF VIRGINIA; ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA; THE COUNCIL ON HUMANRIGHTS; BOARD OF EDUCATION, Director; DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Director; AUGUSTA CORRECTIONAL CENTER; L. W. SAUNDERS, Warden, Defendants - Appellees.

No. 95-7160
YUSUF ABDUL AL-WAHHAB, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA; SUPREME COURT OFVIRGINIA; GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF VIRGINIA; GOVERNOR OF VIRGINIA; ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA; THE COUNCIL ON HUMANRIGHTS; BOARD OF EDUCATION, Director; DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Director; AUGUSTA CORRECTIONAL CENTER; L. W. SAUNDERS, Warden, Defendants - Appellees.2Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond. James R. Spencer, District Judge. (CA-95-194-CV-3) Submitted: December 14, 1995 Decided: January 4, 1996 Before ERVIN, Chief Judge, and WIDENER and WILKINS, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Yusuf Abdul Al-Wahhab, Appellant Pro Se. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).

PER CURIAM: Appellant seeks to appeal the district court's orders denying relief on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) complaint and denying his motion for reconsideration. We have revi ewed the record and thedistrict court's opinions and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis and dismiss the appeals on the reas oning of the district court. Al-Wahhab v. Virginia , No. CA-95-194-CV-3 (E.D. Va. June 5, June 28 & July 20, 1995). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

## FILED August 17, 2005 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-50501 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus ALFREDO DIAZ-DE LEON, Defendant-Appellant.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. 3:04-CR-2308-ALL

-------------------- Before BENAVIDES, CLEMENT, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Appealing the Judgment in a Criminal Case, Alfredo Diaz-De Leon raises arguments that are foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres v. United States , 523 U.S. 224, 235 (1998), which held that a prior conviction is a sentencing factor under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) and not a separate criminal offense. The Government’s motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED, and the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Amendment to Offer Letter - Mark J. Schwartz



 Exhibit 10.6.2 
 

 
 Fabrinet (USA) 
 4104 – 24th Street, Suite 345

 San Francisco, CA 94114 
 Office: 925-934-2048 
 Fax: 815-333-3648 
 June 16, 2008 
 Mark Schwartz 
 [Home
Address] 
 Ref: Amendment to the offer letter agreement dated April 15, 2000 
 Dear Mark, 
 Effective today, the provision of your employment with Fabrinet USA, Inc. (“FUSA”) regarding
severance is modified as follows: 
 Employment with FUSA is on an at-will basis. Thus you are free to terminate your employment for any reason at any
time with our without prior notice. Similarly, FUSA can terminate the employment relationship with or without cause or notice. However, in the event your employment is terminated: 1) as a result of a change in control; or, 2) without good
cause, you will receive a severance equal to 12 months of your then present base salary, plus family medical coverage for the same period plus any earned bonus. 
 All other terms and conditions of your employment will remain the same as documented in your initial offer letter agreement dated April 15, 2000 and subsequent changes in salary, stock options, responsibilities and other allowances.

 Sincerely, 
  

	
	 /s/ Tom Mitchell

	
	Tom Mitchell
	Chairman & CEO
#### § 452.16 Offices which must be filled by election.

Section 401 of the Act identifies the types of labor organizations whose officers must be elected and prescribes minimum standards and procedures for the conduct of such elections. Under that section officers of national or international labor organizations (except federations of such organizations), local labor organizations, and intermediate bodies such as general committees, system boards, joint boards, joint councils, conferences, certain districts, district councils and similar organizations must be elected.[16]

###### Footnotes -
  452.16

[16] See § 452.23 for a discussion of the frequency with which the different types of labor organizations must conduct elections of officers. See part 451 of this chapter for the scope of the term “labor organization.”
#### § 2704.102 Applicability.

Section 2704.105(a) applies to adversary adjudications before the Commission pending or commenced on or after August 5, 1984. Section 2704.105(b) applies to adversary adjudications commenced on or after March 29, 1996.

[63 FR 63175, Nov. 12, 1998]
Gerard 

Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

July 20, 2015

No. 04-14-00301-CV

CITY OF SAN ANTONIO,

Appellant

v.

Gerard CORTES,

Appellee

From the 285th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2014-CI-05707

Honorable Laura Salinas, Judge Presiding

ORDER

Sitting: Karen Angelini, Justice

Marialyn Barnard, Justice

Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

Appellee Gerard Cortes’s Motion for Rehearing is DENIED.

_________________________________

Karen Angelini, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 20th day of July, 2015.

___________________________________

Keith E. Hottle

Clerk of Court