alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
(79 South. 805)

#### LEE v. STATE.

(4 Div. 561.)

(Court of Appeals of Alabama.

June 29, 1918.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 8, 1918.)

1. Statutes @=>141(2)--Re-enactment — Setting Out at Length.

Acts 1915, p. 862, re-establishing county courts, is not violative of Const. § 45, providing that laws re-enacted, amended, or extended shall be set out at length.

2. Criminal Law @=655(5) — Trial—Announcement oe Judge.

Announcement by trial judge in open court during closing argument of state’s solicitor that further argument was unnecessary, as he would give general charge for state, which he correctly gave, was not error.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Barbour County; J. S. Williams, Judge.

T. J. Lee was convicted of practicing dentistry without a license, 'and he appeals.

Affirmed.

The facts were without dispute that defendant had practiced dentistry without a license, making charges therefor, and that he had not received a license from the State Board of Dental Examiners, nor was there such a license on file in the office of the judge of probate of Barbour county,

McDowell & McDowell, of Eufaula, for appellant. P. Loyd Tate, A tty. Gen., for the State.

SAMPORD, J.

[1 ] Two questions are presented for review. The first: Is the law re-establishing county courts (Acts 1915, p. 862) void as being enacted iu violation of section 45 of the Constitution? So far as this court is concerned, this question is settled adversely to appellant in the case of State ex rel. Garrett v. Torbert, 200 Ala. 663, 77 South. 37.

[2] Second. Both the state and defendant requested of the court in writing the giving of the general affirmative charge. After the opening argument by the solicitor and the argument by defendant’s counsel, the solicitor began his closing argument, whereupon the court told the solicitor iu the presence and hearing of the jury that further argument was unnecessary, as he would give the charge as requested iu writing by the state. To this statement of the court the defendant reserved an exception. The announcement by the Judge in open court that he would give the general charge for the state, which he correctly gave, .was not error.

There is no error in the record, and the judgment is affirmed.

Affirmed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1996
<CASH>                                      11,893,982
<SECURITIES>                                10,435,026
<RECEIVABLES>                               25,146,050
<ALLOWANCES>                                   627,000
<INVENTORY>                                    225,616
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            48,782,877
<PP&E>                                      17,299,319
<DEPRECIATION>                               9,750,090
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              64,969,947
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       29,423,855
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        46,115
<OTHER-SE>                                  30,814,438
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                64,969,947
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            95,570,436
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               66,120,153
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                            16,678,548
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                65,000
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             437,198
<INCOME-PRETAX>                             13,324,645
<INCOME-TAX>                                 5,487,000
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          7,837,645
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 7,837,645
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     1.53
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     1.53
        

</TABLE>
§ 2520.104-50 Short plan years, deferral of accountant's examination and report. ( a ) *Definition of “short plan year.”* For purposes of this section, a short plan year is a plan year, as defined in section 3(39) of the Act, of seven or fewer months' duration, which occurs in the event that: ( 1 ) A plan is established or commences operations;
( 2 ) A plan is merged or consolidated with another plan or plans;
( 3 ) A plan is terminated; or
( 4 ) The annual date on which the plan year begins is changed.
( b ) *Deferral of accountant's report.* A plan administrator is not required to include the report of an independent qualified public accountant in the annual report for the first of two consecutive plan years, one of which is a short plan year, provided that the following conditions are satisfied: ( 1 ) The annual report for the first of the two consecutive plan years shall include: ( i ) Financial statements and accompanying schedules prepared in conformity with the requirements of section 103(b) of the Act and regulations promulgated thereunder;
( ii ) An explanation why one of the two plan years is of seven or fewer months' duration; and
( iii ) A statement that the annual report for the immediately following plan year will include a report of an independent qualified public accountant with respect to the financial statements and accompanying schedules for both of the two plan years.
( 2 ) The annual report for the second of the two consecutive plan years shall include: ( i ) Financial statements and accompanying schedules prepared in conformity with section 103(b) of the Act and regulations promulgated thereunder with respect to both plan years;
( ii ) A report of an independent qualified public accountant with respect to the financial statements and accompanying schedules for both plan years; and
( iii ) A statement identifying any material differences between the unaudited financial information relating to, and contained in the annual report for, the first of the two consecutive plan years and the audited financial information relating to that plan year contained in the annual report for the immediately following plan year.
( c ) *Accountant's examination and report.* The examination by the accountant which serves as the basis for the portion of his report relating to the first of the two consecutive plan years may be conducted at the same time as the examination which serves as the basis for the portion of his report relating to the immediately following plan year. The report of the accountant shall be prepared in conformity with section 103(a)(3)(A) of the Act and regulations thereunder.
[46 FR 1265, Jan. 6, 1981]
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III Oplysninger

Forvaltningsorganet for Intelligent Energi

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OPSLAG AF STILLINGER

(2004/C 205 A/01)

Forvaltningsorganet for Intelligent Energi søger kandidater med henblik på besættelse af et antal stillinger. Oplysninger om stillingerne, organets opgaver og ansøgningsprocedure er offentliggjort på Forvaltningsorganet for Intelligent Energis websted: http://europa.eu.int/comm/energy/intelligent/index_en.html.

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§ 4000.53 May I use electronic media to satisfy PBGC's record retention requirements? *General requirements.* You may use electronic media to satisfy the record maintenance and retention requirements of this chapter if: ( a ) The electronic recordkeeping system has reasonable controls to ensure the integrity, accuracy, authenticity and reliability of the records kept in electronic form;
( b ) The electronic records are maintained in reasonable order and in a safe and accessible place, and in such manner as they may be readily inspected or examined (for example, the recordkeeping system should be capable of indexing, retaining, preserving, retrieving and reproducing the electronic records);
( c ) The electronic records are readily convertible into legible and readable paper copy as may be needed to satisfy reporting and disclosure requirements or any other obligation under section 101(f), section 303(k)(4), or Title IV of ERISA;
( d ) The electronic recordkeeping system is not subject, in whole or in part, to any agreement or restriction that would, directly or indirectly, compromise or limit a person's ability to comply with any reporting and disclosure requirement or any other obligation under section 101(f), section 303(k)(4), or Title IV of ERISA;
( e ) Adequate records management practices are established and implemented (for example, following procedures for labeling of electronically maintained or retained records, providing a secure storage environment, creating back-up electronic copies and selecting an off-site storage location, observing a quality assurance program evidenced by regular evaluations of the electronic recordkeeping system including periodic checks of electronically maintained or retained records; and retaining paper copies of records that cannot be clearly, accurately or completely transferred to an electronic recordkeeping system); and
( f ) All electronic records exhibit a high degree of legibility and readability when displayed on a video display terminal or other method of electronic transmission and when reproduced in paper form. The term “legibility” means the observer must be able to identify all letters and numerals positively and quickly to the exclusion of all other letters or numerals. The term “readability” means that the observer must be able to recognize a group of letters or numerals as words or complete numbers.
[68 FR 61347, Oct. 28, 2003, as amended at 80 FR 55002, Sept. 11, 2015]
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I Ανακοινώσεις

Επιτροπή

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Ισοτιμίες του ευρώ (1)

17 Σεπτεμβρίου 2004

(2004/C 233/01)

1 ευρώ= 

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(1)

Πηγή: Ισοτιμίες αναφοράς που δημοσιεύονται από την Ευρωπαϊκή Κεντρική Τράπεζα.

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Μη διατύπωση αντιρρήσεων σχετικά με κοινοποιηθείσα συγκέντρωση

(Υπόθεση αριθ. COMP/M.3537 — BBVA/BNL)

(2004/C 233/02)

(Κείμενο που παρουσιάζει ενδιαφέρον για τον ΕΟΧ)

Στις 20 Αυγούστου 2004, η Επιτροπή αποφάσισε να μη διατυπώσει αντιρρήσεις για την παραπάνω κοινοποιηθείσα συγκέντρωση και να την κηρύξει συμβατή με την κοινή αγορά. Η απόφαση βασίζεται στο άρθρο 6 παράγραφος 1 στοιχείο β) του κανονισμού (EΟΚ) αριθ. 4064/89 του Συμβουλίου. Το πλήρες κείμενο της απόφασης διατίθεται μόνο στην ιταλική γλώσσα και θα δημοσιευθεί μετά την απάλειψη τυχόν επιχειρηματικών απορρήτων που περιέχει. Θα διατίθεται:

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(81 South. 134)

#### LEVINE v. STATE.

(1 Div. 292.)

(Court of Appeals of Alabama.

Jan. 14, 1919.)

1. Witnesses <&wkey;349 — Cross-examination-Impeachment — Immaterial Pacts.

In a criminal prosecution, the court did not err in granting motion of solicitor to exclude testimony of a witness being cross-examined by defendant, to effect that she had hit her husband in the head with a bucket, a matter not connected with the case.

2. Criminal Law <&wkey;813 — Trial—Abstract Instructions.

A requested instruction, “I charge that there is a difference between a prima facie case and a conclusive case,” was properly refused as being abstract.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Mobile County; €. A. Grayson, Judge.

Frank J. Levine, alias, etc., was convicted of violating the prohibition law, and he appeals.

Affirmed.

C. W. Tompkins, of Mobile, for appellant.

F. Lloyd Tate, Atty. Gen. and Emmett S. Thigpen, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

SAMFORD, J.

The only exceptions reserved on the trial were, first, to the action of the court in granting the motion of the solicitor to exclude the testimony of the witness Cientat in reference to the witness striking witness’ husband with a bucket; and, second, to the refusal of the court to give at the request of defendant the following charge: “I charge you, there is a difference between a prima facie case and a conclusive case.”

[1] The witness Cientat, while being cross-examined by defendant’s counsel, stated that she had hit her husband in the head with a bucket when he had her in the gallery to choke her, but that it had nothing to do with this case, and was prior to the time when this prosecution was begun. This evidence was clearly immaterial, and was properly excluded.

[2] The statement in the charge requested, while true, was abstract.

There is no error apparent in the record, and the judgment is affirmed.

Affirmed.
#### William Beary, App’lt, *v.*John G. Hoster, Resp’t.

*(Supreme Court, General Term, Fifth Department,*

*Filed June 9, 1889.)*

1. Jury—Triar by—When cannot be denied.

Where both causes of action stated in a complaint are purely legal, and the only defense to the first is a general denial, the plaintiff has a constitutional right to a jury trial.

2. Equity—Framing of issues.

In an equity cause the framing of issues is not a right, hut rests in the discretion of the court.

Appeal from an order at the circuit striking the cause off the circuit calendar.

*J. Hannon,*for app’lt; *C. A. Hawley,*for resp’t.

Dwight, J.

The order seems to have been made on the ground that the defense being of an equitable nature, the* cause could not be tried by a jury. But both causes of action stated in the complaint were purely legal, and the only defense to the first was a general denial. Without examining the pleadings further it is manifest that upon this issue, at least, the plaintiff had the constitutional right to a trial by jury.

It is objected that the order is not appealable because it does not affect a substantial right. Of course it is not contended that the right of trial by jury is not a substantial right, but it is said that that right is not affected, because the plaintiff may still, if he desires it, have issues framed, and the questions of fact determined by a jury. The difficulty with this proposition, is that the framing of issues, in an equity cause, is not a right, but rests entirely in the dis*879cretion of the court. So that by the order in this case the plaintiff was deprived of his absolute right to a trial" by jury.

The order was therefore both erroneous and appealable, and should be reversed.

All concur.

Order reversed with ten dollars costs and disbursments.
STATE OF DELAWAFfE DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES

OFFICE OF THE

SECRETARY AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL

89 KINGS HIGHWAV DOVER, DELAWARE 19901 PHONE: FAX: (302) 739-9000 (302) 739-6242 April 27, 20II

Mr. Shawn M. Garvin (3RAOO) Regional Administrator U. S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region III 1650 Arch Street Philadelphia, PA 19103-2029

Dear Mr. Garvin:

I am pleased to submit the enclosed revision to the State ofDelaware State Implementation Plan (SIP) for the Attainment and Maintenance ofthe 8-Hour Ozone National Ambient Air Quality Standard. This revision amends Regulation No. 1142

- SPECIFIC EMISSION CONTROL REQUIREMENTS by adding a new section, Section 2 - Control of Nitrogen Oxides Emissionsfrom Industrial Boilers andProcess Heaters at Petroleum Refineries; and Proposed State Implementation Plan (SIP) "Demonstration that Amendments to Section 2.0 of7 DE Admin. Code 1142, 'Control ofNOx Emissions from Industrial Boilers and Process Heaters at Petroleum Refineries'. Do Not Interfere withAny Applicable Requirements ofthe Clean Air act (CAA)". The effective date ofthis revision is April II, 2011.

The requirements ofthe CAA Section II0(a)(2)(A) have been met through the normal public hearing process established by the State ofDelaware with proper notification (30 days) prior to the convening ofthe public hearing. A public hearing was held on February I, 20II. Attachments A and B are copies ofaffidavits as proofofproper notification. It is the position of the State ofDelaware that all minimum requirements set forth in the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments have been met.

We look forward to continuing the cooperative effort between Delaware and EPA in this important work. As always, feel free to contact me or Ali Mirzakhalili, Director, Division ofAir Quality, (302) 739-9402, ifyou have any questions concerningthe enclosed documents.

# a~**~(._,..:_/ ·nP.O~ira**  "­ Secretary

cc: Arnie Howell, EPA w/o encl. Diana Esher, EPA w/encl. Ali Mirzakhalili
EXHIBIT 99.2

                     STATEMENT OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER OF
                    IRT PROPERTY COMPANY, AS GENERAL PARTNER
                              OF IRT PARTNERS, L.P.
                       PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                   SEC. 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

     In  connection  with  the  Quarterly Report of IRT Partners, L.P. ("LP") on
Form  10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2002, as filed with the Securities
and  Exchange  Commission  on  the date hereof (the "Report"), I, James G. Levy,
Chief  Financial  Officer  of  the  Company, as general partner of IRT Partners,
L.P., do hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Sec.  906  of  The  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act  of  2002,  that:

3)     The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
of  the  Securities  Exchange  Act  of  1934;  and

4)     The  information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects,  the  financial  condition  and  results of operations of the Company.


/s/  James  G.  Levy
--------------------
IRT  Property  Company,  as  general  Partner
James  G.  Levy
Chief  Financial  Officer
November  12,  2002
# Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida Opinion filed January 25, 2023. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________ No. 3D21-2262 Lower Tribunal No. 18-20525

________________ 

### George Schell, et al., Appellants,
vs. 

### Universal North America Insurance Company, f/k/a Universal Insurance Company of North America, Appellee. An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Peter R. Lopez, Judge. Alexander Appellate Law P.A., and Samuel Alexander (DeLand), for appellants. Galloway, Johnson, Tompkins, Burr & Smith, PLC, and David T. Burr (Tampa), for appellee. Before LOGUE, LINDSEY and GORDO, JJ. PER CURIAM. Affirmed.
#### Commonwealth *versus*George Walton.

A prisoner indicted for a capital crime is entitled to be furnished with a list of the witnesses examined before the grand jury, but not of those which the counsel for the government purpose to examine at the trial.

A member of the legislature is entitled to be excused from serving on a jury while the legislature is in session.

Walton was indicted capitally for highway robbery. Cleveland, of counsel for the prisoner, stated that he had received from the prosecuting officer a list of the witnesses examined before the grand jury, but he moved that he might also be furnished with the names of those who were to be examined on the part of the government, on the trial. *Jilistín,*Attorney General, resisted the motion, so far as the claim was made as a matter of right. He remarked that, in general, a compliance with such a demand would be impracticable, inasmuch as the prosecuting officer must be governed by circumstances at the trial, in determining what witnesses he will examine, and he may omit to call some whom he purposed to examine, and introduce others whose testimony was supposed by him to be unnecessary or had not previously been made known to him. The *Court*said the prisoner was entitled to a list of the witnesses examined before the grand jury, *(Commonwealth*v. *Knapp,*9 Pick. 496,) but the practice had not gone beyond that; and it would be attended with inconvenience to require more.

Joshua Spear, who had been summoned as a juror, requested to be excused from serving, on the ground that he was a member of the legislature, which was now in session ; and the *Court*said that although this was not enumerated among the exemptions in the statute, yet that on general principles they thought it a sufficient reason for excusing the iuror.
# EUR-Lex - 32000D0345 - EN

Avis juridique important

*|*

# 32000D0345

**2000/345/EC: Commission Decision of 22 May 2000 setting the date on which dispatch from Portugal to Germany of certain products for the purpose of incineration may commence by virtue of Article 3(6) of Decision 98/653/EC (notified under document number C(2000) 1367) (Text with EEA relevance) **

*
Official Journal L 121 , 23/05/2000 P. 0009 - 0009 *

Commission Decision

of 22 May 2000

setting the date on which dispatch from Portugal to Germany of certain products for the purpose of incineration may commence by virtue of Article 3(6) of Decision 98/653/EC

(notified under document number C(2000) 1367)

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2000/345/EC)

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,

Having regard to Council Directive 89/662/EEC of 11 December 1989 concerning veterinary checks in intra-Community trade with a view to the completion of the internal market(1), as last amended by Directive 92/118/EEC(2),

Having regard to Commission Decision 98/653/EC of 18 November 1998 concerning emergency measures made necessary by the occurrence of bovine spongiform encephalopathy in Portugal(3), as last amended by Decision 2000/104/EC(4), and in particular Article 3(6) thereof,

Whereas:

(1) Article 3(6) of Decision 98/653/EC requires the Commission to set the date on which dispatch of products referred to in this Article may commence, after having carried out Community inspections and after having informed the Member States.

(2) An inspection carried out by the Commission services in Germany from 27 to 29 February 2000, in particular to assess the veterinary checks pursuant to Article 3 of and Annex I to Decision 98/653/EC have shown that the conditions are complied with satisfactorily,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The date referred to in Article 3(6) of Decision 98/653/EC shall be 22 May 2000 for dispatch to Germany of products referred to in this Article.

Article 2

This Decision is addressed to the Member States.

Done at Brussels, 22 May 2000.

For the Commission

David Byrne

Member of the Commission

(1) OJ L 395, 30.12.1989, p. 13.

(2) OJ L 62, 15.3.1993, p. 49.

(3) OJ L 311, 20.11.1998, p. 23.

(4) OJ L 29, 4.2.2000, p. 36.
#### § 2706.151 Program accessibility: New construction and alterations.

Each building or part of a building that is constructed or altered by, on behalf of, or for the use of the agency shall be designed, constructed, or altered so as to be readily accessible to and usable by handicapped persons. The definitions, requirements, and standards of the Architectural Barriers Act (42 U.S.C. 4151-4157), as established in 41 CFR 101-19.600 to 101-19.607, apply to buildings covered by this section.