85168 Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 227 / Friday, November 25, 2016 / Proposed Rules 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2015–3657; Directorate 

Identifier 2012–SW–069–AD] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Airbus 

Helicopters (Previously Eurocopter 

France) Helicopters 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Proposed rule; withdrawal. 

SUMMARY: The FAA is withdrawing a 

notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM). 

The NPRM proposed to supersede 

airworthiness directive (AD) 2007–25– 

08 for Eurocopter France (now Airbus 

Helicopters) Model SA–365N1, AS– 

365N2, AS 365 N3, SA–366G1, EC 155B, 

and EC155B1 helicopters. The proposed 

actions were intended to prevent 

damage to the tail gearbox (TGB) control 

shaft and rod assembly bearing resulting 

in end play, loss of tail rotor pitch 

control, and subsequent loss of control 

of the helicopter. Since we issued the 

NPRM, we have received reports of new 

occurrences of loss of yaw control due 

to failure of the control rod bearing and 

determined that different actions at 

shorter time intervals are necessary to 

correct the unsafe condition. 

Accordingly, we withdraw the proposed 

rule. 

DATES: As of November 25, 2016, the 

proposed rule to amend 14 CFR part 39 

published September 2, 2015 (80 FR 

53024) is withdrawn. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

David Hatfield, Aviation Safety 

Engineer, Safety Management Group, 

Rotorcraft Directorate, FAA, 10101 

Hillwood Pkwy., Fort Worth, TX 76177; 

telephone (817) 222–5116; email 

david.hatfield@faa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On August 

21, 2015, the FAA issued an NPRM that 

proposed to amend 14 CFR part 39 to 

remove AD 2007–25–08 (72 FR 69604, 

December 10, 2007) and add a new AD 

for Airbus Helicopters (previously 

Eurocopter France) Model SA 365N1, 

AS–365N2, AS 365 N3, SA–366G1, EC 

155B, and EC155B1 helicopters. The 

NPRM published in the Federal 

Register on September 2, 2015 (80 FR 

53024). The NPRM proposed to require, 

at specified intervals, checking the TGB 

oil level and inspecting the TGB 

magnetic plug for chips at specified 

intervals. The NPRM also proposed 

replacing the TGB guide bushes, 

inspecting the bearing of the TGB 

control shaft and rod assembly for M50 

type particles, and performing 

measurements of play in the TGB 

control shaft and rod assembly. Finally, 

after replacing the guide bush, the 

NPRM proposed repetitively performing 

measurements for play in the TGB 

control shaft and rod assembly. The 

NPRM did not apply to helicopters with 

TGB part number (P/N) 365A33–6005– 

09 installed, which Airbus Helicopters 

refers to as Modification 07 65B63. At 

the time the NPRM was published, we 

had received new reports of loss of yaw 

control due to failure of the control rod 

bearing. The proposed actions were 

intended to prevent damage to the 

bearing resulting in end play, loss of tail 

rotor pitch control, and subsequent loss 

of control of the helicopter. 

Actions Since the NPRM Was Issued 

Since we issued the NPRM (80 FR 

53024, September 2, 2015), EASA 

issued Emergency AD No. 2016–0097–E, 

dated May 23, 2016, which was 

subsequently revised by AD No. 2016– 

0097R1, dated May 25, 2016, to correct 

a paragraph reference. EASA AD No. 

2016–0097R1 advises that a technical 

investigation of an AS 365 N3 accident 

revealed a damaged TGB bearing. EASA 

further states that the affected control 

rod had been repetitively inspected as 

required by a previous AD, EASA AD 

No. 2012–0170R2, dated June 20, 2014, 

and that the investigation is still 

ongoing to determine the root cause of 

the damage and why the damage was 

not discovered during the inspections. 

EASA AD No. 2016–0097R1 requires 

repetitive inspections of the TGB oil 

level and magnetic chip detector. EASA 

AD No. 2016–0097R1 also requires 

replacing bearing P/N 704A33–651–093 

or P/N 704A33–651–104 with an 

improved bearing P/N 704A33–651–245 

or 704A33–651–246, which is 

terminating action for the repetitive 

inspections of the magnetic chip 

detector but not of the oil level. The 

EASA AD also describes an alternative 

repetitive inspection for play that would 

defer replacing the bearing for an 

additional 110 hours time-in-service. 

In light of this latest information, we 

are issuing a separate action to 

supersede AD 2007–25–08 (72 FR 

69604, December 10, 2007) with 

immediately effective requirements. 

Accordingly, we are withdrawing the 

NPRM. 

Comments 

After our NPRM (80 FR 53024, 

September 2, 2015) was published, we 

received two comments from one 

commenter. 

Request 

Airbus Helicopters requested that the 

applicability be changed to exclude 

helicopters with MOD 07 65B63 (which 

installs TGB P/N 365A33 6005–09) 

instead of those with TGB 

P/N 365A33 6005–09. When asked for 

additional information to support this 

comment, Airbus Helicopters stated that 

by excluding only helicopters with TGB 

P/N 365A33 6005–09, the NPRM would 

apply to helicopters with a new (future) 

TGB P/N that would not be subject to 

the unsafe condition. If instead the 

NPRM were to exclude helicopters with 

MOD 07 65B63, it would also exclude 

future TGB P/Ns. MOD 07 65B63 would 

be required before any future MOD that 

may install a new part-numbered TGB. 

We agree with the commenter’s 

concern. However, because we are 

withdrawing the NPRM and issuing a 

separate action with different corrective 

requirements, the commenter’s request 

is no longer necessary. 

Airbus Helicopters also requested that 

the compliance intervals for performing 

the measurements for play include the 

longer interval allowed for helicopters 

with MOD 07 65B57. 

We agree that the longer inspection 

intervals are acceptable for helicopters 

with MOD 07 65B57. However, because 

we are withdrawing the NPRM and 

issuing a separate action with different 

corrective requirements, the 

commenter’s request is no longer 

necessary. 

Withdrawal of the NPRM constitutes 

only such action and does not preclude 

the agency from issuing another notice 

in the future nor does it commit the 

agency to any course of action in the 

future. 

Since this action only withdraws an 

NPRM, it is neither a proposed nor a 

final rule; therefore, it is not covered 

under Executive Order 12866, the 

Regulatory Flexibility Act, or DOT 

Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 

FR 11034, February 26, 1979). 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Incorporation by reference, 

Safety. 

The Withdrawal 

Accordingly, the notice of proposed 

rulemaking, Docket No. FAA–2015– 

3657; Directorate Identifier 2012–SW– 

069–AD, published in the Federal 

Register on September 2, 2015 (80 FR 

53024), is withdrawn. 


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Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 227 / Friday, November 25, 2016 / Proposed Rules 85169 

Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on November 

2, 2016. 

Lance T. Gant, 

Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate, Aircraft 

Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2016–27639 Filed 11–23–16; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2016–9386; Directorate 

Identifier 2016–NM–056–AD] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Airbus 

Defense and Space S.A. (Formerly 

Known as Construcciones 

Aeronauticas, S.A.) Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking 

(NPRM). 

SUMMARY: We propose to adopt a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for all 

Airbus Defense and Space S.A. Model 

CN–235, CN 235–100, CN 235–200, and 

CN 235–300 airplanes, and Model C– 

295 airplanes. This proposed AD was 

prompted by leakage of a motorized 

cross-feed fuel valve. This proposed AD 

would require an inspection of the 

affected fuel valves and, depending on 

findings, applicable corrective action(s). 

We are proposing this AD to detect and 

correct leaks in a motorized cross-feed 

fuel valve, which could lead to failure 

of the fuel valve and consequent 

improper fuel system functioning or, in 

case of the presence of an ignition 

source, an airplane fire. 

DATES: We must receive comments on 

this proposed AD by January 9, 2017. 

ADDRESSES: You may send comments, 

using the procedures found in 14 CFR 

11.43 and 11.45, by any of the following 

methods: 

• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to 

http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the 

instructions for submitting comments. 

• Fax: 202–493–2251. 

• Mail: U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Docket Operations, M– 

30, West Building Ground Floor, Room 

W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., 

Washington, DC 20590. 

• Hand Delivery: Deliver to Mail 

address above between 9 a.m. and 5 

p.m., Monday through Friday, except 

Federal holidays. 

For service information identified in 

this NPRM, contact Airbus Defense and 

Space, Services/Engineering Support, 

Avenida de Arago ́n 404, 28022 Madrid, 

Spain; fax +34 91 585 31 27; email 

MTA.TechnicalService@airbus.com. 

You may view this service information 

at the FAA, Transport Airplane 

Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., 

Renton, WA. For information on the 

availability of this material at the FAA, 

call 425–227–1221. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the Internet at http://

www.regulations.gov by searching for 

and locating Docket No. FAA–2016– 

9386; or in person at the Docket 

Management Facility between 9 a.m. 

and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, 

except Federal holidays. The AD docket 

contains this proposed AD, the 

regulatory evaluation, any comments 

received, and other information. The 

street address for the Docket Operations 

office (telephone 800–647–5527) is in 

the ADDRESSES section. Comments will 

be available in the AD docket shortly 

after receipt. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Shahram Daneshmandi, Aerospace 

Engineer, International Branch, ANM– 

116, Transport Airplane Directorate, 

FAA, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, 

WA 98057–3356; telephone 425–227– 

1112; fax 425–227–1149. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Comments Invited 

We invite you to send any written 

relevant data, views, or arguments about 

this proposed AD. Send your comments 

to an address listed under the 

ADDRESSES section. Include ‘‘Docket No. 

FAA–2016–9386; Directorate Identifier 

2016–NM–056–AD’’ at the beginning of 

your comments. We specifically invite 

comments on the overall regulatory, 

economic, environmental, and energy 

aspects of this proposed AD. We will 

consider all comments received by the 

closing date and may amend this 

proposed AD based on those comments. 

We will post all comments we 

receive, without change, to http://

www.regulations.gov, including any 

personal information you provide. We 

will also post a report summarizing each 

substantive verbal contact we receive 

about this proposed AD. 

Discussion 

The European Aviation Safety Agency 

(EASA), which is the Technical Agent 

for the Member States of the European 

Union, has issued Airworthiness 

Directive 2016–0071, dated April 11, 

2016 (referred to after this as the 

Mandatory Continuing Airworthiness 

Information, or ‘‘the MCAI’’), to correct 

an unsafe condition for all Airbus 

Defense and Space S.A. Model CN–235, 

CN–235–100, CN–235–200, and CN– 

235–300 airplanes, and Model C–295 

airplanes. The MCAI states: 

Leakage of a motorised cross-feed fuel 

valve Part Number (P/N) 7923227F was 

reported on a CN–235–100M aeroplane. The 

leakage was observed through the valve 

electrical connectors and detected during 

accomplishment of a functional check in 

accordance with the CN–235 aeroplane 

Maintenance Review Board Report (MRB– 

PV01M), task 28.007. Identical motorised fuel 

valves are installed on CN–235 and C–295 

aeroplanes, corresponding to civil type 

design, as cross-feed, shut-off and defueling 

valves, as applicable to aeroplane model and 

configuration. 

This condition, if not detected and 

corrected, could lead to failure of a motorised 

fuel valve and consequent improper fuel 

system functioning or, in case of the presence 

of an ignition source, possibly resulting in an 

aeroplane fire. 

To address this potentially unsafe 

condition, Airbus Defense & Space (D&S) 

issued Alert Operators Transmission (AOT)– 

CN235–28–0001 and AOT–C295–28–0001 to 

provide inspection instructions. 

For the reasons described above, this 

[EASA] AD requires an inspection of the 

affected motorised fuel valves and, 

depending on findings, accomplishment of 

applicable corrective action(s) [(valve 

replacement)]. 

You may examine the MCAI in the 

AD docket on the Internet at http://

www.regulations.gov by searching for 

and locating Docket No. FAA–2016– 

9386. 

Related Service Information Under 1 

CFR Part 51 

Airbus Defense and Space S.A. has 

issued AOT–CN235–28–0001, dated 

February 19, 2016; and AOT–C295–28– 

0001, dated February 19, 2016. The 

service information describes 

procedures for inspecting and replacing 

the motorized fuel valves. The service 

information also describes procedures 

for reporting inspection findings. These 

documents are distinct since they apply 

to different airplane models. This 

service information is reasonably 

available because the interested parties 

have access to it through their normal 

course of business or by the means 

identified in the ADDRESSES section. 

FAA’s Determination and Requirements 

of This Proposed AD 

This product has been approved by 

the aviation authority of another 

country, and is approved for operation 

in the United States. Pursuant to our 

bilateral agreement with the State of 

Design Authority, we have been notified 

of the unsafe condition described in the 

MCAI and service information 

referenced above. We are proposing this 


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