U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

32–514PDF WASHINGTON : 2018

EXAMINING THE UNDERLYING SCIENCE 

AND IMPACTS OF GLIDER TRUCK REGULATIONS 

JOINT HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT & 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND 

TECHNOLOGY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

SEPTEMBER 13, 2018 

Serial No. 115–73 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://science.house.gov 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY 

HON. LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas, Chair 

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois 

BILL POSEY, Florida 

THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky 

RANDY K. WEBER, Texas 

STEPHEN KNIGHT, California 

BRIAN BABIN, Texas 

BARBARA COMSTOCK, Virginia 

RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana 

GARY PALMER, Alabama 

DANIEL WEBSTER, Florida 

ANDY BIGGS, Arizona 

ROGER W. MARSHALL, Kansas 

NEAL P. DUNN, Florida 

CLAY HIGGINS, Louisiana 

RALPH NORMAN, South Carolina 

DEBBIE LESKO, Arizona 

MICHAEL CLOUD, Texas 

TROY BALDERSON, Ohio 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

SUZANNE BONAMICI, Oregon 

AMI BERA, California 

ELIZABETH H. ESTY, Connecticut 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

DONALD S. BEYER, JR., Virginia 

JACKY ROSEN, Nevada 

CONOR LAMB, Pennsylvania 

JERRY MCNERNEY, California 

ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado 

PAUL TONKO, New York 

BILL FOSTER, Illinois 

MARK TAKANO, California 

COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii 

CHARLIE CRIST, Florida 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT

HON. ANDY BIGGS, Arizona, Chair 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

BILL POSEY, Florida 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

RANDY K. WEBER, Texas 

BRIAN BABIN, Texas 

GARY PALMER, Alabama 

CLAY HIGGINS, Louisiana 

RALPH NORMAN, South Carolina 

DEBBIE LESKO, Arizona 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

SUZANNE BONAMICI, Oregon, Ranking 

Member 

COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii 

CHARLIE CRIST, Florida 

CONOR LAMB, Pennsylvania 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT

RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, LOUISIANA, Chair 

BILL POSEY, Florida 

THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky 

ROGER W. MARSHALL, Kansas 

CLAY HIGGINS, Louisiana 

RALPH NORMAN, South Carolina 

TROY BALDERSON, Ohio 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

DONALD S. BEYER, JR., Virginia, Ranking 

Member 

JERRY MCNERNEY, California 

ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

September 13, 2018 

Page 

Witness List ............................................................................................................. 2 

Hearing Charter ...................................................................................................... 3 

Opening Statements 

Statement by Representative Andy Biggs, Chairman, Subcommittee on Environment, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of 

Representatives .................................................................................................... 4 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 6 

Statement by Representative Suzanne Bonamic, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Environment, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, 

U.S. House of Representatives ............................................................................ 8 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 10 

Statement by Representative Ralph Lee Abraham, Chairman, Subcommittee 

on Oversight, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House 

of Representatives ................................................................................................ 12 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 14 

Statement by Representative Donald S. Beyer, Jr., Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Oversight, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, 

U.S. House of Representatives ............................................................................ 16 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 19 

Written Statement by Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson, Ranking Member, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ........................................................................................................... 21 

Witnesses: 

Ms. Linda Tsang, Legislative Attorney, Congressional Research Service 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 24 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 26 

Mr. Collin Long, Director of Government Affairs, Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 36 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 38 

Dr. Paul J. Miller, Deputy Director & Chief Scientist, Northeast States for 

Coordinated Air Use Management 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 44 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 46 

Dr. Richard B. Belzer, Independent Consultant in Regulation, Risk, Economics & Information Quality 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 58 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 60 

Discussion ................................................................................................................. 73 

Appendix I: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions 

Dr. Paul J. Miller, Deputy Director & Chief Scientist, Northeast States for 

Coordinated Air Use Management ..................................................................... 148 
Page

IV 

Appendix II: Additional Material for the Record 

Document submitted by Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson, Ranking 

Member, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of 

Representatives .................................................................................................... 152 
(1) 

EXAMINING THE UNDERLYING SCIENCE 

AND IMPACTS OF GLIDER TRUCK 

REGULATIONS 

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 13, 2018 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT, COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY, Washington, D.C. 

The Subcommittees met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in Room 

2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Andy Biggs 

[Chairman of the Subcommittee on Environment] presiding. 
2 

LAMAR S. SMJTH, Texas 

CHAIRMAN 

Q:ongrrss of the tinitEd ~tatcs 

!louse of 'Rcprcscntatinrn COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY 

2321 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE: BUILDING 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6301 

12021 225-6371 www.sc;ence house gov 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

RANKING MEMBER 

Examining the Underlying Science and Impacts of Glider 

Truck Regulations 

Thursday, September 13, 2018 

10:00 a.m. 

2318 Rayburn House Office Building 

Witnesses 

Ms. Linda Tsang, Legislative Attorney, Congressional Research Service 

Mr. Collin Long, Director of Government Affairs, Owner-Operator Independent 

Drivers Association 

Dr. Paul J. Miller, Deputy Director & Chief Scientist, Northeast States for 

Coordinated Air Use Management 

Dr. Richard B. Belzer, Independent Consultant in Regulation, Risk, Economics & 

Information Quality 
3 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY 

HEARING CHARTER 

September 13,2018 

TO: Members, Subcommittee on Envirornnent, Subcommittee on Oversight 

FROM: Majority Staff, Committee on Science, Space, and Teclrno1ogy 

SUBJECT: Joint Subcommittee Hearing: Examining the Underlying Science and Impacts of 

Glider Truck Regulations 

The Subcommittees on Envirornnent and Oversight will hold a hearing titled Examining 

the Underlying Science and Impacts of Glider Truck Regulations, on Thursday, September 13, 

2018 at 10:00 a.m. in Room 2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building. 

Hearing Purpose: 

The purpose of the hearing is to review the EPA's work on glider trucks. Specifically, 

the Committee will examine the effects of regulatory proposals on the glider truck industry as 

well as the study of glider truck emissions conducted by EPA's National Vehicle and Fuel 

Emissions Laboratory in Ann Arbor, Michigan during 2017. 

Witness List 

• Ms. Linda Tsang, Legislative Attorney, Congressional Research Service 

• Mr. Collin Long, Director ofGovemment Affairs, Owner-Operator Independent Drivers 

Association 

• Dr. Paul J. Miller, Deputy Director & Chief Scientist, Northeast States for Coordinated 

Air Use Management 

• Dr. Richard B. Belzer, Independent Consultant in Regulation, Risk, Economics & 

Information Quality 

Staff Contact 

For questions related to the hearing, please contact Ben Traynham or Travis Voyles of 

the Majority Staff at 202-225-6371. 
4 

Chairman BIGGS. Good morning. Welcome to today’s joint subcommittee hearing titled ‘‘Examining the Underlying Science and 

Impact of Glider Truck Regulations.’’ Today, we will learn about 

glider trucks and the lack of sound science underlying the regulations in this industry. 

For those who may not be familiar, a glider truck is a vehicle 

comprised of a newly constructed chassis, frame, and cab combined 

with a remanufactured engine and transmission system from an 

older vehicle, broadly speaking. In October 2016, Obama’s EPA and 

the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration issued a rule 

requiring glider vehicles to meet the emissions standards for the 

year in which the vehicle is assembled, rather than the year in 

which the engine was manufactured. 

Recognizing that this rule, which was slated to take full effect in 

January 2018, would have devastated the emerging glider kit industry, the Trump Administration wisely pursued corrective action. 

In August of 2017, then EPA Administrator Pruitt stated an intention to repeal the 2016 glider rule, which EPA officially proposed 

on November 16, 2017. 

Four days later, on November 20, 2017, the National Vehicle and 

Fuel Emissions Laboratory (NVFEL) quietly published a study on 

gliders without notifying EPA leadership. It turns out that Volvo, 

which had previously supported efforts to increase glider regulations, began secretly working with the NVFEL in September of 

2017 to conduct this study. This study itself surprised me that it 

was a very small-end study in that there were only two vehicles 

studied. 

In July of this year, Members of this Committee sent a letter to 

Acting Administrator Andrew Wheeler asking for documents relating to this study. Materials obtained by the Committee clearly 

show that Volvo, a regulated entity, initiated conversations with 

EPA employees in the NVFEL in an apparent effort to shape the 

outcome of the study by specifying test articles to use and laying 

out the schedule on which the test program should be conducted. 

The NVFEL only consulted with Volvo and failed to reach out to 

glider manufacturers for the study. Furthermore, the NVFEL 

based its results on a small and inadequate sample size, only testing two glider trucks that were provided indeed by Volvo. These 

facts call into question the integrity of the study. 

The other disturbing fact about the NVFEL study is the timing 

and manner in which it was performed. Completing this study in 

November 2017, more than a year after the original rule became 

final and just two weeks before the public hearing on the proposed 

repeal of that 2016 rule, is highly suspect. Not informing anybody 

in EPA leadership about the study before, during, or after it was 

completed is also concerning. These circumstances demonstrate 

that there was no scientific foundation for the 2016 rule in the first 

place and indicates a clear intent to undermine the current Administration’s policy. 

Accordingly, it is clear that the 2016 glider rule was politically 

driven. It makes no sense to require that gliders comply with 

standards of the year these trucks are assembled. It only serves to 

hurt small business and help large truck manufacturers. 
5 

It also discourages the development of innovative technology that 

help small businesses compete. Gliders salvage older-model engines 

to create a truck that is affordable, reliable, and safe. Instead of 

throwing out older vehicle parts and creating more industrial 

waste, gliders allow old parts to be updated, recycled, and reused. 

To disregard the benefits of such innovation is an affront to hardworking Americans who rely on these trucks to make a living. 

Now is not the time to prevent creativity that could help sustain 

the trucking industry and our economy. Gliders allow for such innovation. Gliders reduce maintenance expenses, have better fuel efficiency, and cost about 25 percent less than a new truck. These 

benefits and cost savings allow small companies to allocate funds 

elsewhere, such as increasing salaries and hiring more drivers. 

The science that underlies our regulations and policy should be 

unbiased and should consider all applicable parameters. This 

means doing the research and hearing from those who understand 

the industry the best. If the 2016 rule is not repealed, then we are 

setting a precedent for issuing harmful regulations without any 

proper scientific foundation. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today to learn more 

about this important issue. 

[The prepared statement of Chairman Biggs follows:] 
6 

For Immediate Release 

September 13,2018 

Media Contacts: Heather Vaughan, Bridget Dunn 

(202} 225-6371 

Statement by Chairman Andy Biggs (R-Ariz.) 

Examining the Underlying Science and Impacts of Glider Truck Regulations 

Chairman Biggs: Good morning and welcome to today's joint subcommittee hearing 

entitled "Examining the Underlying Science and Impacts of Glider Truck Regulations." Today, 

we will learn about glider trucks and the lack of sound science underlying the regulations in 

this industry. 

For those who may not be familiar, a glider truck is a vehicle comprised of a newly 

constructed chassis, frame, and cab combined with a remanufactured engine and 

transmission system from an older vehicle. In October 2016, Obama's EPA and the National 

Highway Traffic Safety Administration issued a rule requiring glider vehicles to meet the 

emissions standards for the year in which the vehicle is assembled, rather than the year in 

which the engine was manufactured. 

Recognizing that this rule, which was slated to take full effect in January 2018, would have 

devastated the emerging glider kit industry, the Trump administration wisely pursued 

corrective action. In August of 2017, then-EPA Administrator Pruitt stated an intention to 

repeal the 2016 glider rule, which EPA officially proposed on November 16, 2017. 

Four days later, on November 20, 2017, the National Vehicle and Fuel Emissions Laboratory 

(NVFEL) quietly published a study on gliders without notifying EPA leadership. It turns out that 

Volvo, which had previously supported efforts to increase glider regulations. began secretly 

working with the NVFEL in September of 2017 to conduct this study. 

In July of this year, members of this committee sent a letter to Acting Administrator Andrew 

Wheeler asking for documents relating to this NVFEL study. Materials obtained by the 

Committee clearly show that Volvo, a regulated entity, initiated conversations with EPA 

employees in the NVFEL in an apparent effort to shape the outcome of the study by 

specifying test articles to use and laying out the schedule on which the test program should 

be conducted. 

The NVFEL only consulted with Volvo and failed to reach out to glider manufacturers for the 

study. Furthermore, the NVFEL based its results on a small and inadequate sample size, only 

testing two glider trucks that were provided by Volvo. These facts call into question the 

integrity of the study. 
7 

The other disturbing fact about the NVFEL study is the timing and manner in which it was 

performed. Completing this study in November 2017, more than a year after the original rule 

became final and just two weeks before the public hearing on the proposed repeal of that 

2016 rule, is highly suspect. Not informing anybody in EPA leadership about the study before, 

during, or after it was completed is also concerning. These circumstances demonstrate that 

there was no scientific foundation for the 2016 rule in the first place, and it demonstrates a 

clear intent to undermine the current administration's policy. 

Accordingly, it is clear that the 2016 glider rule was politically driven. It makes no sense to 

require that gliders comply with standards of the year these trucks are assembled. It only 

serves to hurt small business and help large truck manufacturers. 

It also discourages the development of innovative technology that help small businesses 

compete. Gliders salvage older model engines to create a truck that is affordable, reliable, 

and safe. Instead of throwing out older vehicle parts and creating more industrial waste, 

gliders allow old parts to be updated, recycled, and reused. To disregard the benefits of 

such innovation is an affront to hard working Americans who rely on these trucks to make a 

living. 

Now is not the time to prevent creativity that could help sustain the trucking industry and our 

economy. Gliders allow for such innovation. Gliders reduce maintenance expenses, have 

better fuel efficiency, and cost about 25% less than a new truck. These benefits and cost 

savings allow small companies to allocate funds elsewhere, such as increasing salaries and 

hiring more drivers. 

The science that underlies our regulations and policy should be unbiased and should 

consider all applicable parameters. This means doing the research and hearing from those 

who understand the industry the best. If the 2016 rule is not repealed, then we are setting a 

precedent for issuing harmful regulations without any proper scientific foundation. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today to learn more about this important issue. 

### 
8 

Chairman BIGGS. And I now recognize the Ranking Member of 

the Environment Subcommittee, Ms. Bonamici, for an opening 

statement. 

Ms. BONAMICI. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank 

you to our witnesses. 

The negative effects of air pollution on respiratory health are 

well-documented. Exposure to criteria pollutants such as particulate matter and nitrogen oxides, or NOx, can lead to the exacerbation of respiratory diseases, including asthma, that can have devastating effects, especially on children and the elderly. 

The Environmental Protection Agency has found that more than 

half of the NOx emissions inventory in the United States are from 

the transportation sector, which is why standards limiting criteria 

pollutant emissions from heavy-duty trucks is key to fulfilling the 

EPA’s mission of protecting public health and the environment. 

Commonsense regulations like the phase 2 rule for greenhouse gas 

emissions standards for heavy-duty vehicles exemplify what happens when the Federal Government works collaboratively with regulated industries to create standards that are economically achievable, technically feasible, and protective of public health, something 

that some members of the Majority seem to suggest is impossible. 

I expect that some of today’s witnesses will argue that glider 

manufacturers have the right to petition the EPA to reopen the 

phase 2 rule provisions relating to gliders, which they do, but it 

should be noted that no glider manufacturer brought challenges in 

court following the publication of the final phase 2 rule in 2016. Instead, they waited to lobby an industry-friendly Administration to 

repeal the glider provisions to benefit their bottom line at the cost 

of public health. 

Some glider manufacturers claim that using a rebuilt engine and 

a glider vehicle can save on the greenhouse emissions produced in 

the steelmaking process, but make no mistake, these one-time 

emissions savings are insignificant compared with the total lifetime 

emissions from glider engines without emission controls. 

The EPA has estimated that restricting the use of high-polluting 

engines in 10,000 glider vehicles over the lifetime of those vehicles 

would prevent the emission of up to 400,000 tons of NOx and 6,800 

tons of particulate matter and prevent up to 1,600 premature 

deaths. The fact that so much pollution and so many premature 

deaths can be traced directly to the manufacture and sale of glider 

trucks without modern-day emission controls is revealing. Allowing 

this level of unchecked pollution on our roadways undercuts the 

progress made in cleaning up diesel engines in the past and is 

quite frankly irresponsible, especially when we have a solution 

available to us: using engines that meet current emissions stand 

standards in glider trucks. 

Also, we are nearly two years into this Administration and once 

again we find ourselves at a hearing that’s attacking an existing 

EPA rule and study without a witness from the EPA to explain and 

defend it, but I submit that there is no reason to doubt the glider 

emissions study from the EPA’s National Vehicle and Fuel Emissions Laboratory in Ann Arbor, Michigan. The Majority only seeks 

to highlight it because the results are at odds with the glider emis-
9 

sions studies—study from Tennessee Tech University that was 

used to justify the proposed repeal of the glider rule. 

It is very important to note that the Tennessee Tech study is currently undergoing an internal research misconduct investigation. In 

fact, the Principal Investigator of the Tennessee Tech study has not 

only removed his name from the study but also returned his portion of the funding he received from Fitzgerald Glider Kits to conduct it. It is unclear why the Majority has shown no interest in this 

study, although it may be because they know that they may not 

like what they find. 

Colleagues, this hearing should not distract us from the main 

issue at hand. Repealing glider truck provisions based on one questionable industry-funded study would have severe consequences for 

public health. It is also important to note that the effects of repealing these provisions go beyond public health with many members 

of the trucking industry standing alongside environmental and 

public health groups in opposition to the proposed repeal. 

There are many opportunities for legitimate oversight within the 

jurisdiction of this committee, yet my colleagues across the aisle 

seem determined to prop up special interest groups most often at 

the expense of public health. Today’s hearing on glider truck regulations is another example. Even though Chairman Smith and 

some of his colleagues have made accusations of collusion between 

the EPA and Volvo, no representatives from either the EPA or 

Volvo were invited as witnesses today. 

I also want to note that, when preparing for this hearing, Minority staff reached out to the EPA to receive a briefing on the agency’s glider emissions study under discussion today. The EPA told 

the staff that the request would not be granted. We are being 

throttled from conducting legitimate oversight not only by the Majority but also by this Administration. 

I look forward to hearing the testimony from Dr. Paul Miller, 

who can address legitimate concerns surrounding the proposed repeal of these glider provisions and describe the real-world consequences for States and the public if the production and sale of 

glider trucks without modern emissions controls are allowed to proliferate unchecked. 

And with that, I yield back the balance of my time. Thank you, 

Mr. Chair. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Bonamici follows:] 
10 

OPENING STATEMENT 

Ranking Member Suzanne Bonamici (D-OR) 

of the Subcommittee on Environment 

House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology 

Subcommittee on Environment 

Subcommittee on Oversight 

"Examining the Underlying Science and Impacts of Glider Truck Regulations" 

September 13,2018 

Thank you Mr. Chairman. The negative effects of air pollution on respiratory health are well 

documented. Exposure to criteria pollutants such as particulate matter and nitrogen oxides, or 

NOx, can lead to the exacerbation of respiratory diseases, including asthma, that can have 

devastating effects on children and the elderly. The Environmental Protection Agency has found 

that more than half of the total NOx emissions inventory in the U.S. are from the transportation 

sector, which is why standards limiting criteria pollutant emissions from heavy-duty trucks is key 

to fulfilling the EPA's mission of protecting public health and the environment. 

Commonsense regulations, like the Phase 2 Rule for greenhouse gas emissions standards for 

heavy-duty vehicles, exemplify what happens when the federal government works 

collaboratively with regulated industries to create standards that are economically achievable, 

technically feasible, and protective of public health; something that some Members of the 

Majority seem to suggest is impossible. 

I expect that some of today' s witnesses will argue that glider manufacturers have the right to 

petition the EPA to re-open the Phase 2 Rule provisions relating to gliders, which they do. But it 

should be noted that no glider manufacturers brought challenges in court following the 

publication of the final Phase 2 Rule in 2016. Instead, they waited to lobby an industry-friendly 

Administration to repeal the glider provisions to benefit their qottom line - at the cost of public 

health. 

Some glider manufacturers claim that using a rebuilt engine in a glider vehicle can save on the 

greenhouse emissions produced in the steelmaking process. But make no mistake, these one-time 

emissions 'savings' are insignificant compared with the total lifetime emissions from glider 

engines without emissions controls. The EPA has estimated that restricting the use of high 

polluting engines in I 0,000 glider vehicles over the lifetime of those vehicles would prevent the 

emissions of more than 400,000 tons ofNOx and 6,800 tons of particulate matter and prevent up 

to 1,600 premature deaths. 

The fact that so much pollution and so many premature deaths can be traced directly to the 

manufacture and sale of glider trucks without modern-day emissions controls is revealing. 

Allowing this level of unchecked pollution on our roadways undercuts the progress made in 

cleaning up diesel engines in the past and is, quite frankly, irresponsible, especially when we 

have the solution available to us: using engines that meet current emissions standards in glider 

trucks. 
11 

Also, we are nearly two years into this Administration and once again we find ourselves at a 

hearing attacking an existing EPA rule and study without a witness from the EPA to explain and 

defend it. But I submit that there is no reason to doubt the glider emissions study from the EPA's 

National Vehicle and Fuel Emissions Laboratory in Ann Arbor, Michigan. The Majority only 

seeks to highlight it because the results are at odds with a glider emissions study from Tennessee 

Tech University that was used to justify the proposed repeal of the glider rule. It's important to 

note that the Tennessee Tech study is currently undergoing an internal research misconduct 

investigation. In fact, the Principal Investigator of the Tennessee Tech study has not only 

removed his name from the study, but also returned his portion of the funding he received from 

Fitzgerald Glider Kits to conduct it. It is unclear why the Majority has shown absolutely no 

interest in this study, although it may be because they know that they may not like what they 

find. 

Colleagues; this hearing should not distract us from the main issue at hand: repealing glider truck 

provisions based on one questionable industry-funded study would have severe consequences for 

public health. It is also important to note that the effects of repealing these provisions go beyond 

public health, with many members of the trucking industry standing alongside environmental and 

public health groups in opposition to the proposed repeal. 

There are many opportunities for legitimate oversight within the jurisdiction of this Committee, 

and yet my colleagues across the aisle seem determined to prop up special interest groups, most 

often at the expense of public health. Today' s hearing on glider truck regulations is just another 

example. Even though Chairman Smith and some of his colleagues have made accusations of 

collusion between the EPA and Volvo, no representatives from either the EPA or Volvo were 

invited as witnesses today. 

I also want to note that when preparing for this hearing, Minority staff reached out to the EPA to 

receive a briefing on the Agency's glider emissions study under discussion today, but the EPA 

told the staff that the request would not be granted. We are being throttled from conducting 

legitimate oversight not only by the Majority, but also by this Administration. 

I look forward to hearing testimony from Dr. Paul Miller, who can address the legitimate 

concerns surrounding the proposed repeal of these glider provisions, and describe the real-world 

consequences for states and the public if the production and sale of glider trucks without modem 

emissions controls are allowed to proliferate unchecked. And with that I yield back the balance 

of my time. 
12 

Chairman BIGGS. Thank you. 

I now recognize the Chair of the Oversight Subcommittee, Dr. 

Abraham, for an opening statement. 

Mr. ABRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And good morning, and 

welcome to today’s hearing. The Chairman’s already defined what 

a glider kit is, and it does cost 25 percent than a brand new rig. 

So really the purpose of today’s hearing is twofold. We will examine the economic effects of the Obama Administration’s greenhouse 

gas emissions regulation which, among other things, proposed a 

cap production of glider trucks. We will also address the integrity 

of a study on glider truck emissions conducted by the EPA’s National Vehicle and Fuel Emissions Laboratory (NVFEL) in Ann 

Arbor, Michigan. Documents provided through FOIA and committee requests raise serious questions about the impartiality of 

the 2017 EPA study. 

Historically, the Science Committee has worked hard to ensure 

that when regulations are necessary, they are based on sound 

science. Under Chairman Smith, the Committee has also worked to 

level the playing field and ensure that the EPA treats all parties 

fairly. In the case of glider trucks, there are red flags surrounding 

the NVFEL study. 

The Committee obtained emails showing that one particular 

manufacturer had an inside track to EPA and, in fact, provided the 

glider trucks—trucks they did not manufacture—to EPA for testing. And I’ll get into the details of the EPA study with my questions further in the hearing. But from the outset the conflict of interest raises questions about the study’s credibility. 

Relying on a flawed study in this case is particularly alarming 

since the proposed regulation will have dire consequences for the 

glider truck industry. Thousands of independent truckers—all 

smart businesses—across America rely on glider trucks as an affordable option for their trucking operation. In my district alone 

there are 883 independent truckers, many of whom drive gliders. 

For me, this is a jobs issue. We should not allow the heavy hand 

of the Federal Government to come down and crush an entire industry, especially absent a rock-solid scientific reason for doing so, 

which appears to be lacking in this case. In addition to the individual truckers, the manufacturers of glider kits would be put out 

of business, killing even more jobs. 

At the request of many of my colleagues, the EPA Inspector General has agreed to review the propriety of the study, and we look 

forward to the results of his review. We have joining us witnesses 

today that are experts on regulatory law. I look forward to hearing 

from that testimony. 

And I want to briefly address the regulatory steps EPA has 

taken in this instance and assure everyone that, contrary to the 

picture painted by the media in the headlines such as, quote, ‘‘Scott 

Pruitt Gave Dirty Glider Trucks a Gift on his Last Day at EPA,’’ 

unquote, or, quote, ‘‘Super Polluting Trucks Receive Loophole on 

Pruitt’s Last Day,’’ unquote, EPA does not appear to have done 

anything out of the ordinary in this case. According to the administration law experts, agencies routinely take the similar steps EPA 

took with regard to glider trucks. Agencies have broad discretion 

about which regulations to enforce. 
13 

What actually was out of the ordinary was the Obama Administration’s failure to conduct a study on glider truck emissions prior 

to proposing the phase 2 greenhouse gas rule. More work needs to 

be done to understand the impact of gliders on the environment. 

Many experts argue that using remanufactured parts over the lifetime of the trucks actually has a positive environmental impact. 

I look forward to hearing our witnesses’ opinions on the environmental issue. More work is needed in this area. We cannot simply 

rely on EPA’s studies in this instance. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Abraham follows:] 
14 

·:· ~~!~S1, SPACE, & TECHNOLOGY 

For Immediate Release 

September 13,2018 

Media Contacts: Heather Vaughan, Bridget Dunn 

(202) 225-6371 

Statement by Chairman Ralph Abraham (R-La.) 

Examining the Underlying Science and Impacts of Glider Truck Regulations 

Chairman Abraham: Good morning and welcome to today's joint Environment and 

Oversight Subcommittee hearing about glider trucks. also referred to as glider kits. A glider kit 

is a tractor chassis frame, front axle, cab, and brakes, assembled with a remanufactured 

engine, transmission, and rear axle. According to media reports and industry experts, gliders 

cost 25% less than a brand new rig. 

The purpose of today's hearing is twofold. We will examine the economic effects of an 

Obama Administration greenhouse gas emissions regulation which. among other things, 

proposed to cap production of glider trucks. We will also address the integrity of a study on 

glider truck emissions conducted by the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) National 

Vehicle and Fuel Emissions Laboratory (NVFEL) in Ann Arbor, Michigan. Documents provided 

through FOIA and Committee requests raise serious questions about the impartiality of the 

2017 EPA study. 

Historically, the Science Committee has worked hard to ensure that when regulations are 

necessary, they are based on sound science. Under Chairman Smith. the Committee has 

also worked to level the playing field and ensure that EPA treats all parties fairly. In the case 

of glider trucks, there are red flags surrounding the NVFEL study. 

The Committee obtained emails showing that one particular manufacturer had an inside 

track to EPA and. in fact, provided the glider trucks - trucks they did not manufacture - to 

EPA for testing. I will get into the details of the EPA study more during my questions, but from 

the outset this conflict of interest raises questions about the study's credibility. 

Relying on a flawed study in this case is particularly alarming since the proposed regulation 

will have dire consequences for the glider truck industry. Thousands of independent truckers 

-all small businesses- across America rely on glider trucks as an affordable option for their 

trucking operation. In my district alone there are 883 independent truckers. rnany of whom 

drive gliders. For me, this is a jobs issue. We should not allow the heavy hand of the federal 

government to come down and crush an entire industry, especially absent a rock solid 

scientific reason for doing so. which appears to be lacking in this case. 

In addition to the individual truckers. the manufacturers of glider kits would be put out of 

business - killing even more jobs. 
15 

At the request of many of my colleagues, the EPA Inspector General has agreed to review 

the propriety of the study and we look forward to the results of his review. We have joining us 

as witnesses today experts on regulatory law. !look forward to hearing their testimony. 

I want to briefly address the regulatory steps EPA has taken in this instance and assure 

everyone that contrary to the picture painted by the media in headlines, such as "Scott 

Pruitt Gave Dirty Glider Trucks a Gift on his Last Day at EPA," or "'Super Polluting Trucks 

Receive Loophole on Pruitt's Last Day"- EPA does not appear to have done anything out of 

the ordinary in this case. According to administrative law experts, agencies routinely take the 

similar steps EPA took with regard to glider trucks. Agencies have broad discretion about 

what regulations to enforce. 

What actually was out of the ordinary was the Obama Administration's failure to conduct a 

study on glider truck emissions prior to proposing the Phase Two greenhouse gas rule. More 

work needs to be done to understand the impact of gliders on the environment. Many 

experts argue that using remanufactured parts over the lifetime of the truck actually has a 

positive environmental impact. !look forward to hearing our witnesses' opinions on the 

environmental issue. More work is needed in this area -we cannot simply rely on EPA's study 

in this instance. 

Thank you again to our witnesses and audience for being with us today. I yield back. 

### 
16 

Mr. ABRAHAM. And I yield my remaining time to Mr. Posey. 

Mr. POSEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

In 2016, the Chinese-owned Volvo Trucks and its affiliates—— 

Chairman BIGGS. Your microphone, please? 

Mr. POSEY. In 2016, the Chinese-owned Volvo Trucks and its affiliates lobbied the EPA to secure a cap and prohibition on glider 

trucks in the phase 2 rule. The previous Administration’s EPA 

never tested or studied gliders before finalizing the rule. This 

would eliminate the business operations of several American-owned 

glider assemblies. 

In 2017, the Administration sought to roll back this burdensome 

cap and prohibition regulation. After EPA put forth a notice of intent to revisit phase 2 rule regulated by glider trucks, Volvo contacted career employees at EPA’s National Vehicle Fuel Emissions 

Laboratory to propose the idea of studying gliders. 

Incredibly, foreign-owned Volvo told the National Vehicle Fuel 

Emissions Laboratory how and when they would like the testing 

performed against the American industry. It paid for and procured 

the gliders to be tested. They told the laboratory what was ideal 

from a testing perspective and wanted to create an emissions test 

that would show gliders to be super-polluting. For example, one of 

the trucks applied by Volvo had its engine check light illuminated 

and the other had an entire chamber full of oil in the harness. 

Furthermore, the agency used a biodiesel fuel instead of the 

mandated ultralow sulfur diesel fuel according to the EPA. Ultralow sulfur diesel eliminates up to 95 percent of all emissions. This 

test was performed unbeknownst to the Administrator’s knowledge. 

Gliders serve America’s small businesses, transportation fleets, 

family farms and ranches, and independent owner operations. Foreign-owned Volvo has put out a narrative that gliders are a 

threat—— 

Chairman BIGGS. The gentleman’s time is expired. 

Mr. POSEY. —to the environment. However, the hypocritical 

Volvo operates an entire plant in Sweden that remanufactures diesel truck engines. They even tout the environmental benefits of 

these engines. Volvo cannot have it both ways. They’re either a 

threat to the environment—— 

Chairman BIGGS. The gentleman’s—— 

Mr. POSEY. —or a net benefit. 

Chairman BIGGS. —time is expired. 

Mr. POSEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BIGGS. Sorry. Thank you. 

The Chair recognizes the distinguished Chairman of the Oversight Subcommittee—or, excuse me, Ranking Member, sorry, Ranking Member—let’s get that right—of the Oversight Subcommittee, 

Mr. Beyer, for an opening statement. 

Mr. BEYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much. And thank 

you, Chairman Abraham. Thank you, Chairman Biggs. 

You know, the Majority may portray this issue as one of big business versus small business since independent glider manufacturers 

constitute the main opposition to these glider regulations. I am a 

small-business person myself, so I’m sympathetic to the challenges 

that small businesses face. 
17 

But for the sake of transparency, Volvo Cars, I have been a Volvo 

dealer since 1974. We own three Volvo dealerships. It’s a complete 

distinct entity from Volvo Group, which sells the trucks and the 

construction equipment. They split off in 1999, so I’m not involved 

at all. 

By the way, Volvo Cars is owned by the Chinese. It was owned 

by Ford Motor Company for a number of years, which is why so 

many Fords look like Volvo chassis, but they sold Volvo Cars to the 

Chinese. The Volvo Trucks, not a Chinese company. It is a Swedish 

company. It is foreign-owned, but it’s not Chinese. 

By the way, they are made in Dublin, Virginia, so one of the 

major manufacturers in my State. Very few of them are imported. 

They’re mostly made here in the United States. 

Our clean air, the public health should not be jeopardized in 

order to protect any business, large or small. Glider trucks are new 

trucks powered by remanufactured heavily polluting engines that 

are not up to today’s standards. And former EPA Administrator 

Pruitt’s attempts to repeal the glider regulations would endanger 

the public health in significant and well-documented ways, and 

that’s why the American Lung Association, the American Medical 

Association, many other health associations all oppose the Pruitt 

EPA attempts to repeal the glider regulations. 

And though companies like Fitzgerald Glider Kits may describe 

themselves as a small business, they really have an outsized influence on this debate. They held a rally for candidate Donald Trump. 

They met with former EPA Administrator Pruitt. They generated 

multiple Congressional letters. 

The Majority’s chosen to focus solely on discrediting one glider 

emissions study performed at EPA’s National Vehicle Fuel Emissions Laboratory, but as my colleague Ms. Bonamici has said, the 

Majority did not invite an EPA witness today, and the EPA even 

refused to brief the Minority staff when it was asked. So EPA’s refusal leaves us in the dark about the very issues at the center of 

this proposed repeal, including a questionable Tennessee Tech University study that was funded by Fitzgerald Glider Kits, which 

Pruitt EPA relied on in its efforts to repeal the glider regulations. 

So you have essentially the fox guarding the hen house. 

In January 2018, the study’s Principal Investigator was so concerned about his integrity that he removed his name, he returned 

the $70,000 that Fitzgerald paid. In February 2018, the President 

of Tennessee Tech wrote to the EPA informing that the study was 

undergoing an internal scientific misconduct review and requesting 

that the EPA not use or even reference the study until the conclusion of that investigation. 

In May of 2018, the EPA’s Science Advisory Board authorized a 

review of the Pruitt glider rule, reporting that the supporting 

science lacks transparency regarding the source of and basis for 

data and failed to take into account its own study that demonstrated significantly higher vehicle emissions from gliders than 

from trucks. And the Office of Management and Budget has reportedly told the EPA that Pruitt’s proposed glider repeal rule is incomplete because it lacks a regulatory impact analysis. 

But today, the Majority’s likely to focus on the rulemaking procedures as opposed to public health. Fortunately, we have Dr. Miller, 
18 

Deputy Director and Chief Scientist of the Northeast States for Coordinated Air Use Management is here today to help us understand 

the environmental and health consequences of unregulated glider 

production. 

We hold this hearing as Hurricane Florence is bearing down on 

the Carolinas. In the past year we’ve seen extreme weather events 

from huge forest fires in California that we recognized on the 

House Floor yesterday, a massive hurricane in Puerto Rico, and 

devastated communities nationwide. And evidence shows overwhelmingly that climate change has intensified these extreme 

weather events, leading to evermore destruction, and I really hope 

that one day this committee can explore the scientific evidence behind such events rather than ignoring the facts. 

I’m one of I believe six automobile dealers in the U.S. House I 

think. I’m the only certified automobile mechanic in the U.S. Congress. And as I’ve come to understand the glider rule, I wondered 

what if I took a new Volvo body or Subaru body or Mazda body and 

put an old pre-engine control engine into it? It would be a lot 

cheaper. It would be a lot more affordable for a lot of people, but 

the impact—what if every new car dealer and manufacturer just 

simply retrofit old pre-emissions controlled engines into the new 

bodies they had today? That’s exactly what we’re dealing with with 

the glider issue. It’s a way of completely undercutting all the 

progress we’ve made in clean air from automobile emissions, and 

I hope that we will resist it. 

Thank you, and I yield back. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Beyer follows:] 
19 

OPENING STATEMENT 

Ranking Member Donald S. Beyer (D-VA) 

of the Subcommittee on Oversight 

House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology 

Subcommittee on Environment 

Subcommittee on Oversight 

"Examining the Underlying Science and Impacts of Glider Truck Regulations" 

September 13, 2018 

Thank you, Chairman Abraham and Chairman Biggs. 

The Majority may portray this issue as one of big business vs. small business, since independent 

glider manufacturers constitute the main opposition to glider regulations. I own a small familyrun business myself, so I am sympathetic to the challenges that small businesses face. For the 

sake of transparency, Volvo Cars - of which my family owns a dealership bas been a distinct 

entity from the Volvo Group, which sells trucks and construction equipment, since 1999. My 

family's business is not involved with Volvo Group, or its trucks. 

But our clean air, and the public health should not be jeopardized in order to protect any 

business, large or small. Glider trucks are new trucks powered by re-manufactured, heavily 

polluting engines that are not up to today's standards. Former EPA Administrator Pruitt's 

attempt to repeal the glider regulations would endanger the public health in significant and welldocumented ways. That is exactly why the American Lung Association, American Medical 

Association, and other health organizations all opposed the Pruitt EPA attempts to repeal glider 

regulations. 

Though companies like Fitzgerald Glider Kits, the largest manufacturer of glider trucks, may 

describe themselves as a small business, they have had outsized influence on this political 

debate. They held a rally for then-candidate Donald Trump, met with former EPA Administrator 

Pruitt, and have generated multiple Congressional letters. 

The Majority bas chosen to focus solely on discrediting one glider emissions study performed at 

the EPA's National Vehicle and Fuel Emissions Laboratory. However, the Majority has not 

invited an EPA witness today to address the allegations they have made about that study- and, 

the EPA refused to even brief Minority staff on it when asked. 

EPA's refusal leaves us in the dark about issues at the very center of this proposed repeal, 

including: 

• A questionable Tennessee Tech University study that was funded by Fitzgerald Glider 

Kits, which the Pruitt EPA has relied upon in its efforts to repeal the glider regulations. In 

January 2018, the study's Principal Investigator was so concerned about its integrity that 

he removed his name and returned his portion of the $70,000 that Fitzgerald paid. In 

February 2018, the President of Tennessee Tech wrote to EPA informing them that the 
20 

study was undergoing an internal scientific misconduct review, and requesting that EPA 

not use or even reference the study until conclusion of the investigation. 

• In May 2018, the EPA's Science Advisory Board authorized a review of the Pruitt glider 

rule, writing that the supporting science "lacks transparency regarding the sources of and 

basis for data" and failed to take into account its own study that demonstrated 

significantly higher vehicle emissions from gliders than from new trucks. 

• The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has reportedly told the EPA that Pruitt's 

proposed glider repeal rule is incomplete because it lacks a Regulatory Impact Analysis. 

Today, the Majority is likely to focus on these rulemaking procedures as opposed to public 

health. Fortunately, Dr. Paul Miller, Deputy Director and Chief Scientist of the Northeast States 

for Coordinated Air Use Management is here today to help us understand the environmental and 

health consequences of unregulated glider truck production. Dr. Miller, thank you for being here. 

We also hold this hearing- on extremely polluting trucks as Hurricane Florence is barreling 

down on the Carolinas. In the past year, we have seen extreme weather events, from huge forest 

fires in California to a massive hurricane in Puerto Rico, devastate communities nationwide. 

Evidence shows that Climate Change has intensified these extreme weather events leading to 

more destruction. I hope that this Committee can one day explore the scientific evidence behind 

such events rather than ignoring the facts. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 
21 

[The prepared statement of Ranking Member Johnson follows:] 

OPENING STATEMENT 

Ranking Member Eddie Bernice Johnson (D-TX) 

House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology 

Subcommittee on Environment 

Subcommittee on Oversight 

"Examining the Underlying Science and Impacts of Glider Truck Regulations" 

September 13, 2018 

Thank you, Mr. Chailman. 

The Majority called this hearing today to discuss the issue of glider truck regulations. 

Administrations from both parties have recognized the importance of reducing emissions from 

heavy-duty trucks and have worked diligently to do so. Thanks to the efforts of former Presidents 

Clinton, Bush, and Obama, the air we breathe every day has gotten cleaner and healthier over the 

last twenty-five years. 

However, a decade after stricter emissions limits from heavy-duty trucks were put in place, a 

cottage industry popped up whereby certain companies began to sell glider vehicles that could 

skirt these stricter emissions standards by capitalizing on a loophole in the original rule. 

In 2015, the Obama Administration moved to close this loophole by requiring glider vehicles to 

meet the same emissions standards as new freight trucks. In November 2017, former EPA 

Administrator Scott Pruitt released a proposed rule to exempt glider trucks from the Obama-era 

regulations. 

Some members of our Majority, and certain members of the glider industry, claim that gliders 

emit fewer pollutants than new trucks. If that were true, they would not have lobbied EPA to 

undo the rule regulating glider trucks. We know that glider trucks, often furnished with 1990sera engines manufactured prior to the advent of modern day vehicle emissions technologies, are 

dirtier for the air we breathe and more dangerous to our health than new trucks. Credible 

scientists understand this and have documented it multiple times. 

In response to this glider controversy, and at the request of members of the House 

Appropriations Committee, EPA's vehicle testing lab based in Ann Arbor, Michigan published a 

study in November 2017 showing that glider trucks emit far more pollutants than new truck 

models. Some in the Majority want the public to believe that this EPA lab engaged in a secretive 

partnership with representatives of the trucking industry to color the outcomes of this objective 

and accurate study. I suspect the Majority will present e-mails at today's hearing in an attempt to 

paint a picture of some sort of illicit or inappropriate activity between them, although in 

actuality, the facts run counter to the narrative that the glider industry seeks to put forth. 

Instead, we should be focusing our attention on the scientific misconduct inquiry currently 

pending at Tennessee Technological University regarding a summary docnment that the EPA 

relied upon to justify the repeal of the glider provisions. In February of this year, the President of 

Tennessee Tech wrote a letter to then-Administrator Pruitt requesting that the EPA withhold any 
22 

use or reference to this study until the University completes its investigation. I will add that the 

study's Principal Investigator withdrew his name from this study and returned funding he had 

received to conduct it to Fitzgerald Glider Kits, the company that funded the study and one of the 

largest manufacturers of glider kits in the nation. 

While I am disappointed that, yet again, the Majority has not sought testimony from EPA to 

explain its actions, I am pleased to see Dr. Paul Miller, a scientist and lawyer who has decades of 

experience working in air quality research and policy, testify before us again this morning. He's 

joining us today from the Northeast States for Coordinated Air Use Management, where he 

provides technical and policy coordination among the air quality agencies of eight northeastern 

states. Welcome, Dr. Miller, and I look forward to hearing your testimony. 

As we examine EPA's proposed repeal of the glider rule, let's remember one essential fact. The 

Environmental Protection Agency was created to protect public health and the environment. I am 

skeptical that repealing the glider rule with achieve either goal. 

Thank you. I yield back the remainder of my time. 
23 

Chairman BIGGS. Thank you, Mr. Beyer. 

I want to recognize we have a new Member of this Committee, 

and so I welcome Representative Troy Balderson. He’s not sure 

whether to say thank you or not. He’s kind of—I don’t blame you. 

Mr. BALDERSON. Thank you, Chairman. And thank you, everyone. 

Chairman BIGGS. We’re glad to have you as a member of the 

Science Committee. Representative Balderson represents Ohio’s 

12th District and was sworn into the House last week. He’s a 

former farmer and businessman. Representative Balderson also 

served as a member of the Ohio State Senate and the State House 

of Representatives before joining us here in the House of Representatives. And I hope all of you will join me in welcoming Troy. 

We look forward to working with you. 

Mr. BALDERSON. Thank you very much, Chairman. 

[Applause.] 

Chairman BIGGS. Before I introduce our witnesses, I note that 

Mr. Todd Spencer, the President of Owner-Operator Independent 

Drivers Association, was scheduled to be on our panel today but 

had to withdraw at the last minute to attend to a family matter 

in Missouri. Thankfully, Mr. Collin Long from the Owner-Operator 

Independent Drivers Association was able to be here in his place. 

Thank you, Mr. Long, for your quick accommodation. We wish the 

best to Mr. Spencer. 

Now, I’m going to introduce our witnesses. Our first witness 

today is Ms. Linda Tsang. She’s a Legislative Attorney for the Congressional Research Service and has been in that role since 2016. 

Ms. Tsang previously worked at the EPA as a Rule Manager Environmental Engineer from 2000 to 2004. She became the Director of 

Climate and Air Quality at the American Forest and Paper Association and was in that position from 2013 to 2016. 

She holds a bachelor’s degree from Massachusetts Institute of 

Technology in environmental engineering and a juris doctor from 

the Vermont Law School. Thank you for joining us today. 

Our second witness is Mr. Collin Long, Director of Government 

Affairs at the Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association. 

Mr. Long previously worked for Congressman Charles Dent in a 

variety of roles from 2005 to 2012 and went to work for the Portland Cement Association from 2012 to 2016. His bachelor’s degree 

is from Syracuse University. 

Our next witness is Dr. Paul J. Miller, Deputy Director and 

Chief Scientist at the Northeast States for Coordinated Air Use 

Management. He previously worked at NESCAUM from 1995 to 

1999 as a Senior Science and Policy Advisor. Dr. Miller then went 

to the Commission on Environment Cooperation as an Air Quality 

Program Coordinator from 1999 to 2005. 

Dr. Miller holds a bachelor’s degree in chemistry from Purdue 

University, a doctorate in chemical physics from Yale, and a J.D. 

from Stanford University. Glad to have you with us, Dr. Miller. 

Our final witness is Dr. Richard Belzer, an independent consultant in the regulation, risk, economics, and information quality sector. Dr. Belzer worked as a staff economist at the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs within the U.S. Office of Management 

and Budget from 1988 to 1998. He was also a visiting professor of 
24 

public policy at Washington University in St. Louis before consulting. 

He received a master’s degree in agricultural economics from UC 

Davis in 1980. Dr. Belzer also received a master’s in public policy 

from the Harvard Kennedy School in 1982 and his doctorate in 

public policy from Harvard University in 1989. 

I now recognize Ms. Tsang for five minutes to present her testimony. 

TESTIMONY OF MS. LINDA TSANG, 

LEGISLATIVE ATTORNEY, 

CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 

Ms. TSANG. Thank you. Good morning, Chairman Biggs, Chairman Abraham, Ranking Member Bonamici, Ranking Member 

Beyer, and Members of the Subcommittees. My name is Linda 

Tsang. I’m a Legislative Attorney in the American Law Division of 

the Congressional Research Service. Thank you for inviting me this 

morning to testify on behalf of CRS. I will be addressing the rulemaking process EPA used to adopt the emissions standards for 

glider vehicles, engines, and kits and the process EPA is using to 

repeal them. 

While there may be a number of legal, policy, and science questions related to these rulemakings, my testimony this morning focuses on the legal requirements related to the rulemaking process. 

While the Administrative Procedure Act generally governs agency 

rulemaking, Congress established procedures in section 307(d) of 

the Clean Air Act that apply to the regulation of new motor vehicle 

emissions. These procedures require EPA, among other things, to 

provide public notice and comment on the proposed rule. EPA must 

also describe the basis and purpose of the rule, factual data, legal 

interpretations, policy considerations, and other supporting information. The final rule must also respond to significant comments 

and identify any changes to the rule since the proposal. 

Operating under these specific rulemaking requirements, in 

2016, EPA and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, known commonly as NHTSA, jointly published the second 

phase of greenhouse gas emissions and fuel efficiency standards for 

medium and heavy-duty trucks and engines. In addition to setting 

greenhouse gas emissions standards in the phase 2 rule, EPA finalized requirements for glider kits, engines, and vehicles. EPA defines a glider kit as a chassis for tractor-trailer with a frame, front 

axle, interior and exterior cab, and brakes. It becomes a glider vehicle when an engine, transmission, and rear axle are added. 

Beyond the Clean Air Act rulemaking requirements, EPA must 

comply with various statutes and executive orders on rulemaking. 

For example, to comply with Executive Order 12866, which addresses the Administration’s review of agency regulations, EPA and 

NHTSA developed a regulatory impact analysis and submitted proposed and final versions of the rule to the White House’s Office of 

Management and Budget for review. EPA also submitted its proposed repeal of the glider provisions to OMB and has not yet submitted the final rule for review. 

In addition, EPA and NHTSA reviewed impacts of the phase 2 

rule to small businesses to comply with the Small Business Regu-
25 

latory Enforcement Fairness Act. In the final phase 2 rule, the 

agencies implemented some of the Small Business Advocacy Review Panel’s recommendations to reduce the regulatory burdens on 

small businesses, including glider vehicle assemblers. For the proposed repeal of the glider provisions, the EPA Administrator certified the repeal would not have a significant economic impact on 

small entities because it is a deregulatory action. 

EPA must also provide a notice of its proposed rules to its 

Science Advisory Board. Congress directed EPA to establish the 

SAB to provide scientific advice to the agency and to certain congressional committees, including this one. For the phase 2 rule, the 

SAB concluded that the underlying science for the rule did not 

merit further review. For the proposed repeal of the glider provisions, the SAB decided this past July to review the science supporting the proposed repeal, including review of the emission rates 

related to glider vehicles. 

To conclude, the Clean Air Act provides detailed procedures that 

apply to both the phase 2 rule and EPA’s proposed repeal of the 

glider provisions in that rule. In addition, EPA must also comply 

with the various statutes and executive orders related to rulemaking. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify, and I’ll be happy to answer any questions at the appropriate time. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Tsang follows:] 
26 

~ Congressional Research Service 

, " Informing the legislative debate since 1914 

TESTIMONY 

Statement of 

Linda Tsang 

Legislative Attorney 

Before 

Committee on Science, Space, and Technology 

Subcommittees on Oversight & Environment 

U.S. House of Representatives 

Hearing on 

"Examining the Underlying Science and 

Impacts of Glider Truck Regulations" 

September 13,2018 

CRS TESTIMONY 

Congressional Research Service 

7-5700 

www.crs.gov 

Prepared for Congress--------------------------
27 

Congressional Research Service 

Chairman Abraham, Chairman Biggs, Ranking Member Beyer, Ranking Member Bonamici, and 

Members of the Subcommittees: 

My name is Linda Tsang. I am a Legislative Attorney in the American Law Division of the Congressional 

Research Service (CRS). Thank you for inviting me to testify regarding the U.S. Environmental 

Protection Agency's (EPA's) emission requirements for glider vehicles, glider engines, and glider kits. 

My testimony will address the rulemaking process EPA used to adopt emission standards for gliders 

pursuant to its rule, Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Fuel Efficiency Standards for Medium- and HeavyDuty Engines and Vehicles-Phase 2 (Phase 2 Rule) and to propose to repeal them (Proposed Repeal). 

My testimony will address the specific procedural requirements for rulemaking under the Clean Air Act 

(CAA). It will not address the substantive requirements, legal arguments, policy considerations, or 

scientific data relating to the Phase 2 Rule or the Proposed Repeal. 

As discussed in more detail below, Congress established procedures in Section 307(d) of the CAA that 

govern EPA's promulgation or revision of new motor vehicle or engine emission regulations. In addition 

to the CAA requirements, EPA must also comply with various rulemaking requirements imposed by 

statutes and executive orders. 

Recent Clean Air Act Rulemakings Related to Glider Kits, Engines, and 

Vehicles 

Section 202(a) of the CAA directs EPA to establish standards for air pollutant emissions from new motor 

vehicles and engines that "cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to 

endanger public health or welfare."' On October 25, 2016, EPA and the National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration (NHTSA) jointly published the second phase of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and 

fuel efficiency standards for medium- and heavy-duty vehicles and engines. 2 The Phase 2 Rule set 

emission standards for most commercial long-haul tractor-trailers, vocational vehicles, and heavy-duty 

pickup trucks and vans, and provided for their phase-in between model year (MY) 2018 and MY 2027.3 

As part of the Phase 2 Rule, EPA regulated glider kit, glider engine, and glider vehicle emissions. 4 EPA 

defined a glider kit as a chassis for a tractor-trailer with a frame, front axle, interior and exterior cab, and 

brakes. It becomes a glider vehicle when an engine, transmission, and rear axle are added. 5 The final 

manufacturer of the glider vehicle (i.e., the entity that assembles the parts) is typically not the original 

manufacturer of the glider kit.6 NHTSA did not include glider vehicles under its Phase 2 fuel efficiency 

standards. 7 

1 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(l). 

2 Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Fuel Efficiency Standards for Medium- and Heavy-Duty Engines and Vehicles--Phase 2; Final 

Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. 73,478 (Oct. 25, 2016) [hereinafter Phase 2 Rule]. For additional information on the Phase 2 Rules, see CRS 

In Focus IFI 0927, Phase 2 Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Fuel Efficiency Standards for Medium- and Heavy-Duty Engines and 

Vehicles, by Richard K. Lattanzio. The Phase 2 Rule expands on the Phase 1 Rule issued in 2011 for model year 2014 through 

2018 motor vehicles. Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards and Fuel Efticiency Standards for Medium- and Heavy-Duty Engines 

and Vehicles; Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 57,106 (Sept. 15. 2011). 

3 Phase 2 Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. 73,478 (Oct. 25, 2016) 

4 81 Fed. Reg. at 73,941-46. 

5 ld. at 73,512-13. 

6 ld. 

7 [d_ at 73,526 n.l30. 

CRS TESTIMONY 

Prepared for Congress--------------------------------
28 

Congressional Research Service 

Petitions for Reconsideration of the Glider Provisions 

After EPA issued the Phase 2 Rule, representatives of the glider vehicle assembler industry submitted a 

joint petition pursuant to CAA Section 307(d)(7)(B) requesting that EPA reconsider the glider vehicle, 

glider engine, and glider kit regulations. 8 The petitioners argued, among other things, that CAA Section 

202(a) does not authorize EPA to regulate glider kits, vehicles, or engines because glider vehicles are not 

"new motor vehicles," glider engines are not "new motor vehicle engines," and glider kits are not selfpropelled "motor vehicles" under the CAA.9 The petitioners also argued that the Phase 2 Rule glider 

regulations relied on "unsupported assumptions" regarding glider vehicle emissions. 10 

EPA responded to the glider industry joint petition, stating that it "raises significant questions regarding 

the EPA's authority under the CAA to regulate gliders as well as the soundness of the EPA's technical 

analysis used to support the requirements." 11 Based on the petition, EPA decided to revisit the Phase 2 

Rule glider regulationsY 

Proposed Repeal of the Glider Provisions 

On November 16, 2017, EPA proposed to repeal the Phase 2 Rule emission standards and regulations for 

heavy-duty glider vehicles, engines, and kits. 13 In the Proposed Repeal, EPA determined that its previous 

statutory interpretation of its authority over glider engines, vehicles, and kits was "incorrect" and "not the 

best reading" of the CAA. 14 EPA proposed to interpret the CAA definitions of "new motor vehicles" and 

"new motor vehicle engines" to exclude glider vehicles and engines, respectively. Consistent with this 

interpretation of the scope of"new motor vehicle," EPA further proposed that it has no authority to treat 

glider kits as "incomplete" motor vehicles under CAA Section 202(a). 

Rulemaking Procedures Under the Clean Air Act 

While the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) generally governs agency rulemaking procedures, 15 

Congress established procedures under CAA Section 307(d) to govern EPA's promulgation of specific 

CAA regulations, including regulations for new motor vehicles or engines under Section 202(a). 16 These 

8 See, e.g., Petition from Tommy C. Fitzgerald, President, Fitzgerald Glider Kits, LLC et al. to E. Scott Pruitt, Admin., EPA (July 

10, 2017), https:llwww.epa.gov/sites/production/files/20 17 -07/documents/hd-ghg-frfitzgerald-recons-petition-20 17-07-1 O.pdf 

[hereinafter Petition]. Other petitions for reconsideration and EPA's responses to the petitions are available at 

https://www.epa.gov/regulations-emissions-vehicles-and-engineslpetitions-reconsideration-phase-2-ghg-emissions-and-fuel. 

Under Section 307(d)(7)(B), EPA must convene a reconsideration proceeding if the objection could not have been raised during 

the public comment period for the proposed rule. and the EPA Administrator concludes that the objection is centrally relevant to 

the rule./d. EPA must "provide the same procedural rights as would have been afforded had the infonnation been available at the 

time the rule was proposed.'' !d. 

9 Petition at 3-4. 

10 Id.at4. 

11 Letter from E. Scott Pruitt, Admin., EPA, to Tommy C. Fitzgerald, President, Fitzgerald Glider Kits, LLC (Aug. 17, 2017), 

https:l/www.epa.gov/siteslproduction/filesl2017-08/documentslhd-ghg-phase2-fitzgerald-gliders-ltr-2017-08-17.pdf. 

12Jd. 

13 Repeal of Emission Requirements for Glider Vehicles, Glider Engines, and Glider Kits; Proposed Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 53,442 

(Nov. 16. 2017) [hereinafter Proposed Repeal]. 

14 !d. at 53,444-45. 

15 5 U.S.C. § 551(1). The APA broadly defines agency as "each of authority of the Government of the United states ... ," but 

specifically exempts certain entities including ""Congress'' and the "courts of the United States." /d. The APA also governs 

agency adjudications. See id. §§ 555-57. 

16 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)( l )(K). In addition to new motor vehicle regulations. Section 307(d) procedures apply to the promulgation 

or revision of specific CAA standards and requirements listed in Section 307(d)(l ). ld. § 7607(d)(l ). Section 307 penn its judicial 

CRS TESTIMONY 

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29 

Congressional Research Service 

procedures require EPA, among other things, to establish a public rulemaking docket, publish a notice of 

the proposed rulemaking (NOPR) in the Federal Register, allow at least 30 days for public comment, and 

provide an opportunity for a public hearing. 17 In the Federal Register NOPR, EPA must provide a 

statement (known as the preamble) that describes the basis and purpose of the proposed rule, factual data 

supporting it, methodology used to obtain and analyze the data, legal interpretations and policy 

considerations, and other supporting information. 18 During the rulemaking, EPA must also consider all 

public comments it receives and other relevant information. 19 After considering public comments on the 

proposed rule, EPA must publish the final rule in the Federal Register with a new preamble responding to 

"significant" comments and identifying any changes to the rule since its proposal. 20 

CAA Section 307(d) rulemaking procedures governed EPA's promulgation of the Phase 2 Rule glider 

provisions." For the Phase 2 Rule, EPA took the following rulemaking actions:" 

EPA and NHTSA established dockets, Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2014-0827 and 

NHTSA-2014-0132, respectively, which are accessible at www.regulations.govY 

EPA and NHTSA published a joint proposed Phase 2 Rule in the Federal Register on July 

13, 2015.24 

EPA and NHTSA provided a public comment period from July 13,2015 to October 1, 

201525 and held two public hearings on the proposed Phase 2 Rule. 26 

EPA provided a statement of basis and purpose for the proposed Phase 2 Rule, including 

data, legal interpretations, policy considerations, and other information supporting, 

among other things, the proposed requirements for glider kits, engines, and vehicles. 27 

Because EPA issued the glider provisions pursuant to its authority under the CAA, 

NHSTA did not participate in promulgating those provisions. 28 

review of procedures used to promulgate a final rule if the procedural objectionS were raised during the public comment period. 

!d. § 7607(d)(7)(B). If the procedural objection was impracticable to raise during the public comment (but within the time 

specified for judicial review) and centrally relevant to the outcome ofthe rule, EPA must convene a proceeding for 

reconsideration of the rule and provide the same procedural rights as would have been afforded had the information been 

available at the time the rule was proposed. !d. 

17 !d. at§ 7607(d)(2)-(5) 

"!d. at§ 7607(d)(3). 

19 ld. at§ 7607(d)(4). 

2o Id. at§ 7607(d)(3), (6)(B). 

21 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(I)(K). EPA procedures used for the Phase 2 Rule were not judicially challenged. Other substantive 

provisions related to tractor-trailers were challenged in court. Truck Trailer Mfr. Ass'n v. EPA. Nos. 16-1430 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 22, 

2016). 

22 This list of rulemaking actions is not a complete Jist of all rulemaking actions associated with the Phase 2 Rule. Documents 

related to the Phase 2 Rule rulemaking are provided in the two docket•. Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2014-0827 and 

NHTSA-2014-0132, which can accessed at www.regulations.gov. 

23 Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Fuel Efficiency Standards for Medium- and Heavy-Duty Engines and Vehicles--Phase 2~ 

Proposed Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 40,138 (July 13, 2015) [hereinafter Proposed Phase 2 Rule]. 

24Jd. 

25 See Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Fuel Efficiency Standards for Medium- and Heavy-Duty Engines and Vehicles-Phase 2; 

Extension of Comment Period, 80 Fed. Reg. 53,756 (Sept 8, 2015) (extending the comment period for the proposed rule from 

September 17,2015 to October 1, 2015). 

26 See Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Fuel Efficiency Standards for Medium- and Heavy-Duty Engines and Vehicles-Phase 2; 

Public Hearings, 80 Fed. Reg. 44,863 (July 28, 2015) (scheduling public hearings on August 2 and 18, 2015). 

27 Proposed Phase 2 Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 40,138, 40,329,40,527-30 (July 13, 2015). 

28 Phase 2 Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. 73,478,73,526 n.J30 (Oct25, 2016). 
30 

Congressional Research Service 

EPA posted supporting documents and public comments relating to its proposed glider 

provisions to the docket. 29 

• EPA and NHTSA published the final Phase 2 Rule, which included a statement of basis 

and responses to significant comments, in the Federal Register on October 25,2016.30 In 

the statement of basis, EPA responded to comments related to the glider provisions." 

CAA Section 307(d) requires EPA to follow the same procedures that it uses to promulgate rules to revise 

them. 32 Consequently, to remove the glider provisions from the Phase 2 Rule,33 EPA had to comply with 

CAA Section 307(d) rulemaking procedures. For the Proposed Repeal, EPA took the following 

rulemaking actions: 34 

• EPA used the existing Phase 2 Rule docket, Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2014-0827, 

which is accessible at www. regulations.gov, for the Proposed Repeal. 35 

EPA published the Proposed Repeal in the Federal Register on November 16, 2017.36 

• EPA provided a public comment period from November 16,2017 to January 5, 2018 and 

held a public hearing on the Proposed Repeal on December 4, 2017.37 

EPA provided a statement of basis and purpose of the Proposed Repeal, including legal 

interpretations and other supporting information. 38 

EPA posted public comments and supporting documents related to the Proposed Repeal 

to the docket. 39 

Among the public comments and supporting documents on the docket, EPA posted a 

report issued by the EPA National Vehicle & Fuel Emissions Laboratory, entitled 

"Chassis Dynamometer Testing of Two Recent Model Year Heavy-Duty On-Highway 

Diesel Glider Vehicles," dated November 20, 2017, which reported the results of 

"emissions testing of a 2016 model year (MY) Peterbilt 389 sleeper cab tractor and a 

2017 MY Peterbilt 579 sleeper cab tractor that were produced as glider vehicles.'"'0 

29 See, e.g., Memorandum from David Choi. Office ofTransp. & Air Quality, EPA, Emissions Modeling Files/or Glider Analysis 

(July 28, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D~EPA-HQ-OAR-2014-0827-2232 (posting emission modeling files 

used to estimate impacts of gliders for the Phase 2 Rule). 

30 Phase 2 Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. 73,478 (Oct. 25, 2016). 

31 !d. at 73,526. 

32 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(l)(K). 

33 82 Fed. Reg. at 53,448-49. Because EPA issued the glider provisions pursuant to its authority under the CAA, NHSTA did not 

participate in the ruJemaking repealing those provisions. 

34 This list of rulemaking actions is not a complete list of all ru1emaking actions associated with the Proposed Repeal. Documents 

related to the Proposed Repeal rulemaking are provided in Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2014-0827, which can accessed at 

www .regulations.gov. 

35 Proposed Repeal, 82 Fed. Reg. 53,442 (Nov. 16, 2017). 

36 /d. 

37 /d. 

38 !d. at 53,442-48. 

39 See Public Submission folder in Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2014-0827, 

https://www.regulations.gov/docketBrowser?rpp~25&so=DESC&slrcommentDueDate&p~O&dcFPS&D~EPA-HQ-OAR2014-0827. 

40 EPA NATIONAL VEHICLE & FUEL EMISSIONS LABORATORY, CHASSIS DYNAMOMETER TESTil<G OF Two RECENT MODEL YEAR 

HEAVY-DtiTY 0N-HIGHWA Y DIESEL GLIDER VEHICLES (Nov. 20, 2017), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=EPA-HQOAR-20!4-0827-2417. 
31 

Congressional Research Service 

As of the date of this testimony, EPA has not issued a final rule on the Proposed Repeal. 

Statutory and Executive Order Requirements for Rulemakings 

Beyond the CAA Section 307(d) rulemaking requirements, EPA must comply with various statutes and 

executive orders on rulemaking. This section highlights several rulemaking requirements that may apply 

to the Phase 2 Rule and the Proposed Repeal, and identifies some of the actions that EPA took pursuant to 

these requirements.'1 

Executive Order 12866 

Executive Order (E.O.) 12866 provides the White House with an opportunity to review and clear 

proposed regulatory actions offederal agencies42 E.O. 12866 requires federal agencies to submit 

"significant" regulatory actions at both the proposed and final rule stages to the Office of Information and 

Regulatory Affairs (O!RA) in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for review. 43 E.O. 12866 

defines a "significant regulatory action," in part, as having an "annual effect on the economy of$100 

million or more or adversely affect[ing] in a material way the economy, a sector of the economy, 

productivity, competition, jobs, the environment, public health or safety, or State, local, or tribal 

governments or communities."44 An agency is prohibited, "except to the extent required by law," from 

issuing a rule while OIRA review is pending. 45 In addition, E.O. 12866 directs agencies to perform a costbenefit analysis for regulatory actions determined to be "economically significant" and "adopt a 

regulation only upon a reasoned determination that the benefits" of the rule 'justify its costs.''46 Failure of 

an agency to comply with E.O. 12866 is not subject to judicial review.'' 

For the Phase 2 Rule, EPA and NHTSA determined that the rulemaking was an "economically 

significant" regulatory action and submitted the rule on June 3, 2016 to OMB for review pursuant to E.O. 

12866.'8 The agencies prepared an analysis of the potential costs and benefits associated with this action 

and posted the analysis, the "Regulatory Impact Analysis-Heavy-Duty GHG and Fuel Efficiency 

Standards" to the Phase 2 Rule docket.'9 OMB completed its review of the final Phase 2 Rule on August 

16,201650 

41 This section does not address all executive orders or other statutory requirements related to the Phase 2 Rule or the Proposed 

Repeal. For additional information regarding executive orders and statutes affecting the federal rulcmaking process, see CRS 

Report R41546, A Brief Overview of Rulemaking and Judicial Review, by Todd Garvey, CRS Report RL32240, The Federal 

Rulemaking Process: An Overview, coordinated by Maeve P. Carey, and CRS Report RL32397, Federal Rulemaking: The Role 

of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, coordinated by Maeve P. Carey. 

42 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12866,58 Fed. Reg. 51735 (Oct. 4, 1993). 

43 Exec. Order No. 12866 §§ 3, 6. 

44 !d. at § 2{f). A "signiticant regulatory action" is also defined as any regulatory action that is likely to result in a rule that may 

create a serious inconsistency or interfere with an action taken or planned by another agency; materially alter the budgetary 

impact of entitlements, grants, user fees, or loan programs; or raise novel legal or policy issues. /d. 

45 !d. at§ 8. 

"!d. at§ 1(b). 

47 !d. at§ 10. 

48 Information regarding OMB's review of the Phase 2 Rule is available on the OMB website at 

https:/lwww .reginfo.gov/publicldoleoDetails?rrid~ 126415 and https:llwww.reginfo.gov/pub1icldoleoDetails?rrid= 125029. 

49 EPA & NHTSA, GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND FUEL EFFICIENCY STANDARDS FOR MEDit;M- AND HEAVY-DUTY ENGINES 

AND VEHICLES- PHASE 2 REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS (Aug. 16, 2016), 

https:llnepis.cpa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi/P 1 OOP7NS.PDF?Docke)""'P1 OOP7NS.PDF. 

50 Information regarding OMB's review of the Phase 2 Rule is available on the OMB website at 

https:/lwww .reginfo.govlpublicldo/eoDetai1s?rrid= 126415 and https:llwww.reginfo.gov/publicldoleoDetails?rrid= 125029. 

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For the Proposed Repeal, EPA determined that the repeal was a "significant regulatory action" under E.O. 

12866 and submitted a draft oftbe Proposed Repeal to OMB for review on October 20,2017. 51 OMB 

comments on the draft Proposed Repeal and EPA's responses to those comments are posted in the 

docket. 52 OMB concluded its review on the Proposed Repeal on November 8, 2017, determining that it 

was "consistent" with OMB recommendations. 5

3 Based on a search ofthe docket, EPA did not appear to 

publish a regulatory impact analysis with the Proposed Repeal. 5

4 According to OMB's regulatory review 

information, EPA has not submitted a final glider repeal rule to OMB for review. 55 

Rulemaking Requirements Concerning Small Businesses 

Federal agencies must also review rulemaking impacts on small businesses. The Regulatory Flexibility 

Act (RFA) generally requires an agency to prepare a regulatory flexibility analysis of any rule subject to 

notice and comment rulemaking requirements under the APA or any other statute unless the agency 

certifies tbat the rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small 

entities. 56 EPA and NHSTA determined that the Phase 2 Rule could potentially have a significant 

economic impact on small entities. 57 Specifically, the agencies identified glider vehicle assemblers as one 

of the four categories of directly regulated small businesses that could be impacted. 58 

In addition to preparing a regulatory flexibility analysis, Section 609(b) of the RFA, as amended by the 

Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA), directs specific federal agencies, 

including EPA, to conduct additional outreach to small entities that may be affected by a rule. 59 Pursuant 

to the SBREFA requirements, EPA convened a Small Business Advocacy Review Panel (Panel) to obtain 

advice and recommendations from representatives of the small entities that potentially would be subject to 

the Phase 2 Rule's requirements.60 The preamble to the final Phase 2 Rule summarizes the Panel's 

recommendations and EPA's changes to the Phase 2 Rule based on those recommendations.61 

51 The status of the OMB review of the Proposed Repeal is available on the OMB website at 

https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eoDetails?rrid~l27648. 

52 See, e.g., Email from Chad Whiteman, Senior Policy Analyst, OIRA, OMB to Benjamin Hengst, EPA (Oct 24,2017, 10:16 

EDT), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=EP A-HQ-OAR-20 14-0827-2406. 

53 Information on the OMB review of the Proposed Repeal is available on the OMB website at 

https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eoDetails?rrid~l27648. 

54 Several news outlets reported that OMB requested that EPA perform a regulatory impact analysis for the final repeal. See, e.g., 

Dawn Reeves, EPA's Planned Glider Truck Repeal Appears 'Stuck' Absent Political Pressure, INSIDE EPA (June 12, 2018), 

https://insideepa.com/daily-news/epas-planned-glider-truck-repeal-appcars-stuck-abscnt-political-pressure; Michael Bastasch, 

SOURCES: EPA's Effort To Save An Industry From Obama Regulations Is Being Held Up By Bureaucratic Delays, THE DAILY 

CALLER (May 2, 2018), http://dai1ycaller.com/2018/05/02/epa-obama-era-regulation-repeal-glider-kits/. Based on publicly 

available information, it does not appear that OMB has issued a public request regarding a regulatory impact analysis for the 

Proposed Repeal. 

55 The status of the OMB review of the Proposed Repeal is available on the OMB website at 

https:/ /www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eoDetails?rrid= 127648. 

56 See generally 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-612. For additional information on RFA, see CRS Report RL32240, The Federal Rulemaking 

Process: An Overview, coordinated by Maeve P. Carey. 

57 Phase 2 Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. 73,478,73,526 (Oct. 25, 2016). 

58. !d. The agencies explained that "vehicles produced by installing a used engine into a new chassis are commonly referred to as 

'gliders,' 'glider kits,' or 'glider vehicles."' ld. 

"5 U.S.C. § 609(b), (d). 

"'Id. 

61 See id. (discussing certain regulatory flexibilities included in the final rule to minimize impacts to glider vehicle assemblers 

and other small entities). See also SMALL BUSINESS ADVOCACY REVIEW PANEL ON EPA'S PLANNED PROPOSED RULE GREENHOUSE 

GAS EMJSSIONS AND fUEL EFFICIENCY STANDARDS FOR MEDIUM~ AND HEA VY~DUTY ENGINES AND VEHICLES: PHASE 2 (Jan. 15, 

20 15), https:/ /www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/20 15-08/documents/report-sbarpanel_ heavydutyengines2.pdf (detailing the 
33 

Congressional Research Service 

In the Proposed Glider Repeal, the EPA Administrator certified that repeal would not have "a significant 

economic impact on a substantial number of small entities" under the SBREFA.62 An agency may certizy 

that a rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities if the rule 

relieves a regulatory burden, has no net burden, or otherwise has a positive economic effect on the small 

entities subject to the rule.63 Because small glider manufacturers would be able to produce glider vehicles 

without meeting Phase 2 Rule motor vehicle emission standards, EPA concluded that the Proposed Repeal 

would have no adverse regulatory impact for any directly regulated small entities.64 

EPA Science Advisory Board Review 

As part of the rulemaking process, EPA must provide notice of its proposed rules to its Science Advisory 

Board (SAB)."5 Congress direct~d EPA to establish the SAB to provide scientific advice to EPA and 

specific congressional committees."' The Environmental Research, Development, and Demonstration 

Authorization Act of 1978 requires EPA to provide the SAB with its proposed regulations and supporting 

scientific and technical information.67 While the SAB may advise the EPA Administrator on the adequacy 

of the scientific and technical basis of the proposed action, it may not impose requirements on EPA.68 

EPA provided the proposed Phase 2 Rule to the SAB on June 11, 2014."9 According to EPA, the SAB 

discussed its working group's recommendations on the proposed rule and agreed that no further SAB 

consideration of the rule or its supporting science was merited. 70 

For the Proposed Repeal, the SAB decided to review the "adequacy of the supporting science" of the 

proposal on June 21, 2018. 71 The SAB noted key questions that merit review, including: 

"What are the emission rates of glider trucks for GHGs, nitrogen oxides, particulate 

matter, and other pollutants of concern? What are the key sources of variability and 

uncertainty in these rates? 

• How do these emission rates compare to those of conventionally manufactured trucks that 

are: (a) new; and (b) used at prices comparable to the purchase price of a 'new' glider 

truck? What are key sources of variability and uncertainty in the comparisons? 

What is the range of possible market penetration of glider trucks into the on road heavy 

duty vehicle stock? What is the effect of glider truck penetration into the market on fleet 

review and recommendations of Small Business Advocacy Review Panel on the Phase 2 Rule). 

62 Proposed Repeal, 82 Fed. Reg. 53,442, 53,448 (Nov. 16, 2017). 

63 5 u.s.c. § 605(b). 

64 82 Fed. Reg. at 53,448. 

"42 U.S.C. § 4365(c). 

"See id. § 4365(a) (requiring EPA to establish a "Science Advisory Board which shall provide such scientific advice as may be 

requested by the Administrator, the Committee on Environment and Public Works of the United States Senate, or the Committee 

on Science, Space. and Technology, on Energy and Commerce, or on Public Works and Transportation of the House of 

Representatives"). 

67 !d.; Environmental Research, Development, and Demonstration Authorization Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-155, 91 Stat. 1257 

(1978). 

68 42 U.S.C. § 4365(c). 

69 Phase 2 Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. 73,478,73,969 (Oct. 25, 2016). 

70 !d. 

71 Letter from Michael Honeycutt, Chair, Science Advisory Board to E. Scott Pruitt, Admin., EPA (June 21, 2018), 

https:/lyosemite.epa.gov/sab/sabproduct.nsf/O/E7CB I 0891 C8CAD8F852582B3006EF AF7 /$File/EP A-SAB-18-002+.pdf. 

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Congressional Research Service 

level emissions at national, regional, and local scales in the near-term and long-term, 

compared to the status quo? 

• What are implications of changes in emissions in the near-term and long-term from the 

penetration of glider trucks regarding GHG emissions, air quality, air quality attainment, 

and human health, compared to the status quo?"72 

The SAB indicated that the review may begin with existing EPA documents, such as EPA's "November 

20, 2017 test report in which emissions of gliders and conventionally manufactured trucks were 

compared, and focus on areas where updates are needed."73 The SAB did not indicate a time line for its 

review. 

Conclusion 

CAA Section 307(d) provides detailed procedures that EPA must follow to promulgate, revise, or repeal 

certain CAA regulations. These procedures apply to the Phase 2 Rule and the Proposed Glider Repeal. In 

addition to CAA rulemaking requirements, EPA must also comply with various statutes and executive 

orders relating to rulemaking. 

12 ld. at3. 

73 !d.; see a/so EPA NATIONAL VEHICLE & FVEL EMISSIONS LABORATORY, CHASSIS DYNAM0\1ETER TESTING OF TWO RECENT 

MODEL YEAR HEAVY-DUTY ON-HIGHWAY DIESEL GLIDER VEHICLES (Nov. 20, 2017), 

https:/lwww.regulations.gov/document?D~EP A-HQ-OAR-20 14-0827-2417. 

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Congressional Research Service 

Appendix. Biography of Linda Tsang 

Linda Tsang is a Legislative Attorney in the American Law Division of the Congressional Research 

Service (CRS). She works on legal issues related to environmental, energy, climate change, 

administrative, and constitutional law. Before joining CRS in 2016, she served as the Director of Climate 

and Air Quality at the American Forest & Paper Association from 2013-2016; an attorney at Beveridge & 

Diamond, P.C. from 2008-2013, focused on statutory and regulatory issues under the Clean Air Act; and 

as an environmental engineer at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region I from 2000-2005, 

managing Safe Drinking Water Act regulations. She previously served as a project manager for the 

Environmental Defense Fund's corporate partnership program from 1997-2000. She earned her J.D. from 

Vermont Law School and her B.S. in Environmental Engineering from the Massachusetts Institute of 

Technology. She is a member of the District of Columbia bar. 

CRS TESTIMONY 

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36 

Chairman BIGGS. Thank you so much. 

And now I recognize Mr. Long for five minutes to present his testimony. 

TESTIMONY OF MR. COLLIN LONG, 

DIRECTOR OF GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS, 

OWNER-OPERATOR INDEPENDENT DRIVERS ASSOCIATION 

Mr. LONG. Chairman Biggs and Abraham, Ranking Member 

Bonamici and Beyer, and Members of the Committee, thank you for 

providing me the opportunity to testify today. As you heard, my 

name is Collin Long. I’m the Director of Government affairs for the 

Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association, which you may 

have heard is called OOIDA. OOIDA represents more than 160,000 

small-business truckers across the United States. That comprises 

about 96 percent of the trucking industry. 

OOIDA members have experienced firsthand how federal policy 

changes can dramatically reshape our industry. Unfortunately, 

these policies always place the heaviest burden on the men and 

women who own small businesses and rarely benefit their operations in terms of safety or economics. Too often, Washington pursues regulations with little regard for the practical implications or 

understanding of how they will affect our members. The current 

discussion surrounding glider kits perfectly encapsulates this problem. 

Since 2002, federal emission reduction standards have increased 

the cost of new trucks 50 and $70,000. As a result, purchasing a 

new vehicle has become prohibitively expensive for small-business 

owners. One of the ways our members can manage their costs 

while operating at a high level of efficiency is through the purchase 

of glider kits, which, as you’ve heard, are about 25 percent less expensive. 

A driver’s livelihood depends upon a reliable vehicle that rarely 

breaks down and can handle the demands of long-haul trucking. 

Unfortunately, our members who have purchased new trucks with 

the latest emission reduction technology have found them to be incredibly unreliable. If a truck becomes a liability by routinely being 

inoperable, the owner must absorb the cost of lost productivity 

while also paying for the necessary repairs. 

Because of emissions requirements, today’s new trucks also utilize complicated and expensive technology, which requires the expertise of specialized technicians with proprietary machinery who 

are only found at authorized dealerships. Before repairs even 

begin, owner-operators typically have to pay hundreds of dollars 

just to have the problem diagnosed. For some, the task of even 

finding an authorized dealer can be challenging and expensive. 

Drivers typically purchase glider kits with remanufactured engines 

because it allows them to diagnose and repair mechanical issues 

without the need for a technician or specialized equipment. 

A glider kit’s reliability extends beyond routine maintenance, 

though, as fuel efficiency is either closely matched or in some cases 

exceeds a new truck’s. This is because gliders are specifically designed to achieve the best per-miles—excuse me the best miles-pergallon performance possible. The average long-haul trucker will 

drive anywhere between 100 and 120,000 miles a year, meaning 
37 

any improvement to a vehicle’s performance can have a significant 

impact on overall fuel consumption. On average, each of our members purchase over 19,000 gallons of fuel per year. An increase in 

fuel efficiency by just one mile per gallon would save almost 3,000 

gallons of diesel per truck. 

While others will debate the environmental impacts associated 

with emission reductions, we think it’s important to consider how 

the use of glider kits affects our industry’s consumption of fossil 

fuels. A substantial increase in glider kit appeal has developed 

among OOIDA members in recent years. In a 2018 survey of 

owner-operators, 14 percent of respondents who plan to purchase 

a commercial motor vehicle in the next several years favor glider 

kits, while only 12 percent indicated they would buy an entirely 

new truck. These figures illustrate a dramatic growth in the glider 

kit market, as in 2003, just three percent of our members indicated 

a preference for gliders. 

Chairman Biggs and Chairman Abraham, thank you again for 

the opportunity to testify today. I hope I’ve been able to give you 

a new perspective on why glider kits are so important to smallbusiness truckers. In my written testimony, I’ve included the story 

of an OOIDA member who made the decision to purchase glider 

kits as a means to save his business. These stories are common 

among our members but are too often lost in this debate or disregarded as anecdotal. 

OOIDA appreciates the opportunity to explain why our members 

support the EPA’s proposal to reconsider the emission requirement 

for glider kits. Exempting these vehicles from phase 2 regulations 

will continue to provide small-business truckers with affordable, reliable, and efficient options when purchasing new or used trucks. 

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Long follows:] 
38 

Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association 

National Headquarters: 1 NW OOIDA Drive, Grain Valley, MO 64029 

Tel: (816) 229-5791 Fax: (816) 427-4468 

Washington Office: 1100 New Jersey Ave. SE, Washington, DC 20003 

Tel: (202) 347-2007 Fax: (202) 347-2008 

Testimony of Collin Long 

Director of Government Affairs 

Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association (OOIDA) 

before the 

United States House of Representatives Committee on Science, Space and Technology -

Subcommittee on the Environment and Subcommittee on Oversight 

"Examining the Underlying Science and Impacts of Glider Truck Regulations" 

September 131

h, 2018 

Chairmen Biggs and Abraham, Ranking Members Bonamici and Beyer, and Members of the 

Committee, thank you for providing me the opportunity to testify today. My name is Collin 

Long and I am the Director of Government Affairs for the Owner-Operator Independent Drivers 

Association (OOIDA). OOIDA represents more than 160,000 small business truckers across the 

United States. As the largest national association devoted exclusively to promoting the interests 

of owner-operators and professional drivers, OOIDA advocates for policies that protect the 

viability of small-business motor carriers, which comprise roughly 96% of the trucking industry. 

Because our members make their livings behind the wheel, we also advocate for improved road 

safety and greater responsibility among all highway users. 

OOIDA members have experienced firsthand how changes to federal trucking policies can 

dramatically reshape our industry. These policies always place the heaviest burden on smallbusiness truckers and rarely benefit their operations in regards to safety or economics. Too 

often, Washington pursues regulations with little regard for their practical implications or 

understanding of how they will affect hundreds of thousands of small businesses. I welcome the 

opportunity to testify today because the current discussion surrounding refurbished trucks, 

known as glider kits, perfectly encapsulates this decades-old problem. 

Since 2002, federal emission reduction standards have increased the cost of new trucks between 

$50,000 and $70,000 as additional environmental components and systems have become 

mandatory. As a result, purchasing a new truck has become prohibitively expensive for small 

businesses, with owner-operators finding it more and more difficult to remain competitive 

because of such excessive federal regulations. One of the ways small-business truckers can 

manage their costs while operating at a high level of efficiency is the through the purchase of 

glider kits. While others will debate the scientific merits of the internal study of the 

Environment Protection Agency (EPA) and whether the vehicles are a threat to our environment, 

I am grateful for the opportunity to explain why gliders are becoming an increasingly popular 

business decision for owner-operators. 
39 

What is a Glider Kit? 

A "glider kit" is a group of new, assembled truck or tractor parts that typically includes a chassis 

frame, front axle, cab, and brakes. The truck-buyer combines a remanufactured powertrain 

(engine and transmission) with the newer parts in the glider kit, producing a fully operational 

vehicle. Glider kits have been a staple in our industry for decades, favored for their 

dependability and consistent performance records. 

Cost Efficiency 

Small trucking businesses safely transport millions of tons of cargo each year. Despite playing 

such a critical role in our strengthening economy, many owner-operators struggle to be 

competitive and remain solvent. Unfortunately, the cost of operating a small trucking business 

escalates every year as the government has mandated more environmental regulations, safety 

standards, screening and licensing requirements and fees. Because of these compounding costs, 

owner-operators are extremely sensitive to any cost increases that do not improve their efficiency 

or enhance highway safety. 

Glider kits are appealing to our members because they are at least 25 percent less expensive than 

new commercial motor vehicles. These savings translate to tens of thousands of dollars when 

you consider the cost of a new truck can approach $250,000. Unlike large, corporate motor 

carriers, who typically purchase new trucks in bulk and enjoy reduced prices, single truck 

operators have little to no leverage in negotiating prices when purchasing new vehicles. 

Operating on the slimmest of margins, owner-operators have turned to glider kits as a means to 

remain competitive and solvent. These cost savings allow the industry's safest drivers to remain 

viable and stay on the road. 

One reason why glider kits overall upfront cost are less is because of a statutory safe harbor 

passed by Congress related to the first sales tax on heavy-duty trucks since the truck has already 

been taxed once. Under federal law, a 12 percent tax applies to the first retail sale of, among 

other things, heavy-duty trucks and highway tractors. 

For decades, disputes arose over how substantial repairs to a previously taxed truck or tractor had 

to be for the vehicle to become taxable again. Congress resolved the issue in the 1980s by 

adopting a bright-line math test: if the cost of repairs does not exceed 75 percent of the retail 

price of a comparable new truck or tractor, then the repaired vehicle cannot be taxed a second 

time. The language was codified in 1997 as section 4052(f) of the Internal Revenue Code. After 

the creation of the safe harbor but before its codification, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 

issued Revenue Ruling 91-27, 1991-1 C.B. 192, and specifically adopted Congress's safe harbor. 

The ruling confirmed, among other things, that the restoration of a used tractor where one "uses a 

glider kit to repair the vehicle" will not give rise to a second excise tax if"the cost of the 

restoration of the worn tractor did not exceed 75 percent of the price of a comparable new 

vehicle." 

Reliability 
40 

A professional driver's livelihood depends upon a reliable truck that rarely breaks down and can 

handle the demands of long-haul trucking. If a truck becomes a liability by routinely being 

inoperable, the owner must absorb the cost of lost productivity, while paying for the necessary 

repairs. 

Today's new trucks utilize increasingly complicated and expensive technology, which requires 

the expertise of specialized technicians with proprietary machinery, who are only found at that 

truck manufacturers' authorized dealerships. Before repairs even commence, owner-operators 

typically have to pay hundreds of dollars just to get these technicians to diagnose the problem. 

For drivers based in remote areas, the task of even finding an authorized dealer can be 

challenging and expensive. 

Our members who do not operate gliders consistently complain that what would have otherwise 

been a routine fix for a driver familiar with their engine now consumes countless working hours 

and costs potentially thousands of dollars. In fact, drivers typically purchase glider kits with 

remanufactured engines similar to their previously owned trucks because it allows them to more 

easily diagnose and repair any mechanical issues without the need for a dealer technician or 

specialized equipment. When it comes to minor repairs and maintenance for their truck, 73 

percent of our members prefer to do the work themselves. 

A glider kit's reliability extends beyond routine maintenance, as fuel efficiency is either closely 

matched, or in some cases, exceeds a new truck's. Glider kits do not utilize unproductive 

mechanisms to eliminate remaining soot in a diesel engine. Rather, they are designed to achieve 

the best miles per gallon (mpg) performance possible. Because an owner-operators largest 

expense is fuel, the maximized efficiency of a glider kit provides significant financial benefits. 

Additional Benefits 

When you consider that the average long-haul trucker will drive anywhere between 100,000 and 

120,000 miles in a year, any improvements to a vehicle's fuel mileage performance can have a 

significant impact on overall fuel consumption. Our members who operate glider kits have 

generally reported better fuel economy rates than those driving newer vehicles. While others 

will debate the environmental impacts associated with emissions reductions, it is important to 

consider how the use of glider kits affects our industry's consumption of fossil fuels. The 

average truck driver purchases approximately 19,500 gallons of fuel per year. An increase in 

fuel efficiency by just l mpg would save almost 3,000 gallons of fuel. It is also important to 

remember that as vehicles using refurbished equipment, glider kits recycle millions of pounds of 

steel each year. 

Real World Experience 

I'd like to share with you the experience of an OOIDA member named Loren Hunt, who was 

able to remain in business after replacing new trucks with refurbished glider kits. Loren's family 

has been operating LHT Enterprises since the early 1960s, when his father started the business in 

Bois D'Arc, Mo. 
41 

Loren has purchased dozens of dependable trucks over the years but started to experience 

performance and reliability issues once the EPA's 2007 and 2010 heavy-duty truck standards 

were implemented. When the 2007 standards were first launched, manufacturers began using 

diesel particulate filters (DPF) in a truck's exhaust filters to trap unburned particulates. The DPF 

systems needed to regenerate (regen) at regular intervals, meaning the truck had to run at high 

revolutions per minute (rpm) for about 25 minutes in order for the DPF to burn out the trapped 

particulates. This process meant that LHT Enterprises' drivers would have to pull off the road 

and sit idling, wasting fuel and time, to allow the DPF to regen. Further, the DPF would need to 

be cleaned every 30,000 to 40,000 miles and replaced at 100,000 miles, with a cost between 

$3,500 and $5,000. The DPF also required additional sensors and wiring. The system's 

inclusion in the engine meant that fuel economy dipped 15 to 20 percent. 

The DPF system's cost and inefficiencies foreshadowed looming problems with the 2010 heavyduty truck standards when engines that once relied upon sound mechanical build and assembly 

were replaced by engines that relied more on integrated computer systems, increased technology 

and proprietary programming- all at a dramatically increased cost of ownership and operation. 

New emissions systems, like a diesel exhaust fluid injection, required urea injection and 

incorporated dangerous high-temperature burners (1,300 degrees Fahrenheit) to burn 

particulates. These systems have been blamed for numerous truck fires as a result of the high 

temperatures required to operate. Additionally, the newer trucks continue to sacrifice fuel 

efficiency in order to achieve maximum-burned particulates, while utilizing more toxic and 

caustic fluids, like urea, than older engines. Due to the higher cost and complexity associated 

with these engines, Loren encountered overwhelming maintenance costs- nearly $35,000 in a 

10-month span in 2014- for just three new trucks. To make matters worse, these trucks were 

not generating any revenue while routinely down for repair. 

With their new trucks faltering, Loren's business diminished and he had to decide whether to 

utilize alternative vehicles, or terminate his operations altogether. LHT Enterprises decided 

purchasing glider kits was the best business decision because they would reduce maintenance 

and operation costs, while minimizing non-productive time. The sticker price of the glider kits 

saved the company over $20,000 alone. Meanwhile, Loren saw the gliders outperform the newer 

trucks by 1 rnpg, which means thousands of dollars saved on fuel over the course of a year. 

Maintenance costs decreased due to the glider kits' simple build and proven assembly. LHT 

Enterprises is so pleased with the performance of its glider kits that they hope to maintain a fleet 

of the vehicles indefinitely. 

Loren's experience mirrors that of countless other owner-operators whose businesses have 

remained viable through the purchase of glider kits. Because of the availability of glider kits in 

today's marketplace, small businesses are no longer faced with the decision to cease operations 

or blindly purchase a used truck with no guarantee of its performance or reliability. LHT 

Enterprises continues to safely operate and grow because of the availability of gliders. Stories 

like these must be considered when bureaucrats develop new regulations that will threaten the 

viability of small businesses. 

Growing Popularity 
42 

A substantial increase in glider kit ownership and appeal has developed among OOIDA in recent 

years. In a 2018 survey of owner-operators, 14 percent of respondents who planned to purchase 

a commercial motor vehicle in the next several years favored glider kits, while only 12 percent 

indicated they would buy an entirely new truck. These figures illustrate a dramatic growth in the 

glider kit market, as just 3 percent of 2003 respondents indicated a preference for the vehicles. 

This trend will likely continue as the cost and burden of new truck ownership soars and owneroperators more closely evaluate their operating expenses when acquiring new vehicles. 

Conclusion 

Chairman Biggs and Chairman Abraham, thank you again for the opportunity to testifY today. 

hope I've been able to give you a new perspective on why OOIDA supports the EPA's proposal 

to reconsider the emission requirements for glider vehicles, glider engines and gilder kits. 

Exempting these vehicles from Phase 2 regulations will continue to provide our members 

affordable and reliable options when purchasing new or used trucks. While glider kits provide 

appealing cost savings for drivers, they are also reliable, efficient, and meet all of the required 

safety standards necessary for operation. We encourage Members of Congress to join us in 

supporting the agency's efforts to repeal this harmful regulation. In addition to this testimony, I 

also submit OOIDA's comments to the Phase 2 rule reconsideration docket, which was 

submitted to the EPA earlier this year. 

I look forward to hearing my fellow panelists' testimony and answering your questions. 
43 

Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association 

National Headquarters: 1 NW OOIDA Drive, Graln Valley, MO 64029 

Tel: (816) 229-5791 Fax: (816) 427-4468 

Washington Office: 1100 New Jersey Ave. SE, Washington, DC 20003 

Tel: (202) 347-2007 Fax: (202) 347-2008 

Collin Long, Director of Government Affairs 

Collin Long is the Director of Govermnent Affairs for the Owner-Operator Independent Drivers 

Association. He joined the Association in 2016 and is responsible for advancing the legislative 

and regulatory agenda of small trucking businesses in Washington, DC. 

Collin is originally from Allentown, Pa., and graduated from Syracuse University with a B.A. in 

international relations. 

He began his career in Washington in 2005 as a transportation staffer for U.S. Representative 

Charlie Dent, R-Pa. He subsequently served as senior director of government affairs for the 

Portland Cement Association, representing America's cement manufacturers on Capitol Hill. 

During his time in D.C., Collin has worked on a variety of transportation issues. 
44 

Chairman BIGGS. Thank you. 

I now recognize Dr. Miller for five minutes for his testimony. 

TESTIMONY OF DR. PAUL J. MILLER, 

DEPUTY DIRECTOR & CHIEF SCIENTIST, 

NORTHEAST STATES FOR COORDINATED AIR USE 

MANAGEMENT 

Dr. MILLER. Good morning. I thank the Chairs and the Ranking 

Members and all the Members of these Subcommittees for providing NESCAUM with the opportunity today to offer the following 

comments on the science and impacts of glider kits on air quality. 

NESCAUM, by way of introduction, the Northeast States for Coordinated Air Use Management, is a nonprofit regional association 

of State air pollution control agencies in Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, 

and Vermont. And we provide at NESCAUM policy and technical 

support to our State members for their air quality and climate programs. 

Our member State agencies have the primary responsibility for 

developing strategies that will attain and maintain air quality that 

is protective of public health and the environment for their citizens 

and those living downwind in out-of-state areas. NESCAUM and 

our member States strongly oppose a repeal of emission requirements for glider kit trucks because of the very serious harm to air 

quality and public health that will occur if this loophole is reopened. 

At its core, absolving new glider vehicles from complying with 

current engine standards is inconsistent with the Clean Air Act’s 

primary purpose to protect and enhance the quality of the Nation’s 

air resources so as to promote public health and welfare. 

With over 42 million people in the Northeast, the New York City 

metro region, and beyond, we still continue to have episodes of poor 

air quality both for ground-level ozone, which nitrogen oxides or 

NOx are primary contributors, and particulate matter. And during 

severe events, the extent of this can extend over 200,000 square 

miles across the Eastern United States. Local and regional sources 

contribute to this problem. 

Diesel exhaust is a major source of particulate matter, nitrogen 

oxides contribute to this, and it is responsible tens of thousands of 

premature deaths, hospital admissions, and lost work and school 

days in the United States annually. Diesel particulate matter in exhaust has been linked to increased cancer and noncancer health 

risks. Based on the science EPA considers diesel exhaust a likely 

human carcinogen when inhaled. The California Air Resources 

Board lists it as a known carcinogen, as does the International 

Agency for Research on Cancer, an arm of the World Health Organization. Peer-reviewed studies continue to strengthen the case 

that exposure to particular matter at levels below current health 

standards is damaging of public health. 

In its 2016 phase 2 rulemaking, EPA correctly recognized that 

while glider kits can have legitimate uses as powertrain—sources 

of powertrain engines, salvaged from wrecked vehicles, they have 

increasingly been marketed as so-called pre-emission engines, in 

other words, engines that don’t meet current standards. We agree 
45 

with EPA’s original analysis and its more recent 2017 glider kit 

emissions testing showing the distinction between glider kits using 

2002 and earlier engines versus engines meeting current emissions 

standards. 

EPA estimates for glider vehicles to meet the same NOx and 

P.M. emission limits with current engine standards would reduce 

190,000 tons per year of NOx and 5,000 tons per year of P.M. emissions in 2025. That would grow to 319,000 tons per year of NOx 

and 8,500 tons per year of particulate matter in 2040. The reason 

this is important to our states is because of NOx emissions, we continue to violate the ozone standards. NOx emissions are the primary precursor pollutant to ozone. Ozone is not directly emitted. 

And on-road highway diesel vehicles are about 25 percent of our 

NOx emissions inventory causing our ozone problem. 

We cannot address our ozone problem without addressing glider 

kits. Five thousand glider kits are the equivalent NOx emissions of 

about 200,000 new vehicles meeting current engine standards, so 

a relatively small portion of those engines, those kits contribute 

disproportionately to our problems. 

With regards to the testing, we believe that EPA’s approach is 

consistent with our own State approaches. They used an accredited 

testing lab. They followed a standard regulatory drive cycle. They 

provided data sets with transparent analysis. They maintained rigorous quality assurance and quality control, and they did the test 

in triplicate. 

Comparing this—and working, by the way, with industry on 

these testing programs is standard procedure with our States. It’s 

something that I think should be encouraged, and we certainly 

don’t see a problem with that. So this is not at odds with what Assistant Administrator William Wehrum described in the letter to 

this committee. 

Contrast to Tennessee Tech, an uncredited facility owned by a 

glider manufacturer, did not use a regulatory cycle—test cycle, did 

not repeat test runs, did not report the actual data, so it’s a subjective analysis. It’s a visual inspection of a probe that’s used by mechanics, not by our States in using the comparative certification, 

and no NOx emissions data were presented, so we have no idea actually of what the true results were. 

So with that, I conclude my statement, and I am happy to take 

questions at the appropriate time. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Miller follows:] 
46 

NESCAUM 

Comments from the Northeast States for Coordinated Air Use Management 

Presented by Paul J. Miller, Ph.D. 

Deputy Director & Chief Scientist 

Before the House Committee on Science, Space and Technology 

Subcommittee on Oversight and Subcommittee on Environment 

"Examining the Underlying Science and Impacts of Glider Truck Regulations" 

September 13, 2018 

Major Points 

NESCAUM member state agencies have the primary responsibility for developing 

strategies that will attain and maintain air quality that is protective of public health and 

the environment for their state citizens and for those living in downwind out-of-state 

areas. 

• NESCAUM and our member state agencies strongly oppose a repeal of emission 

requirements for glider kit trucks because of the very serious harm to air quality and 

public health that will occur if this loophole is re-opened. 

NESCAUM and its member state agencies agree with EPA's original glider vehicle 

analysis finding that glider vehicles constitute an unacceptably large source of excess 

nitrogen oxides (NOx) and particulate matter (PM) emissions having significant adverse 

impacts on air quality and public health. 

Assuming an annual sales volume of 5,000 to I 0,000 glider trucks, requiring the vehicles 

to meet current engine emission standards would avoid 350 to 1,600 premature deaths 

over the operating life of the vehicles, with monetized health benefits ranging from $1.5 

billion to $11.0 billion. 

EPA's glider vehicle emissions testing presented in its 2017 report is fully consistent with 

state practices, including working collaboratively with an engine or vehicle manufacturer 

in a testing program. 

Glider vehicles with pre-2001 engines have 20 to 40 times higher NOx and PM emissions 

than a fully compliant modem truck. Just 5,000 glider vehicles with pre-2001 engines 

would approach the entire NOx and PM emissions from a typical year's production of 

250,000 fully compliant new heavy-duty trucks. 

Failing to hold glider vehicles to modem pollution standards will burden the states, who 

will be required to offset the excess emissions at potentially much higher costs for 

decades to come. 

The plain language of the Clean Air Act unambiguously requires EPA to regulate glider 

vehicles and glider vehicle engines as new motor vehicles. 

Typical older engines used with glider vehicles lack the electronic capacity to run many 

modem safety features found in modem emission-compliant trucks. 
47 

NESCAUM 

Comments from the Northeast States for Coordinated Air Use Management 

Presented by Paul J. Miller, Ph.D. 

Deputy Director & Chief Scientist 

Before the House Committee on Science, Space and Technology 

Subcommittee on Oversight and Subcommittee on Environment 

on 

Examining the Underlying Science and Impacts of Glider Truck Regulations 

September 13, 2018 

Good morning. My name is Paul Miller, and I am Deputy Director and Chief Scientist with the 

Northeast States for Coordinated Air Use Management (NESCAUM). I thank the Chairs and 

Ranking Members, and all the members of the Subcommittees for providing NESCAUM with 

the opportunity today to offer the following comments on the science and impacts of glider kits 

on air quality. 

NESCAUM is a non-profit regional association of state air pollution control agencies in 

Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and 

Vermont. NESCAUM provides policy and technical support to our state member agencies in 

furtherance of their air quality and climate programs. Our member state agencies have the 

primary responsibility for developing strategies that will attain and maintain air quality that is 

protective of public health and the environment for their state citizens and for those living in 

downwind out-of-state areas. 

NESCAUM and our member states strongly oppose a repeal of emission requirements for glider 

kit trucks because of the very serious harm to air quality and public health that will occur if this 

loophole is re-opened. At its core, absolving new glider vehicles from complying with current 

engine standards is inconsistent with the Clean Air Act's primary purpose "to protect and 

enhance the quality of the Nation's air resources so as to promote the public health and 

welfare."' 

Continuing Air Quality Problems in the Northeast 

The NESCAUM region, home to over 42 million people, is subject to episodes of poor air 

quality resulting from ground-level ozone and fine particle pollution. During severe events, the 

scale of the problem can extend beyond NESCAUM's borders and include over 200,000 square 

miles across the eastern United States. Local and regional sources as well as air pollution 

transported hundreds of miles from distant sources outside the region contribute to elevated 

ozone and fine particle concentrations in the region. 

I 42 C.F.R. §740l(b)(l) (1990). 
48 

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September 13, 2018 

Diesel exhaust is a major source of particulate matter (PM) and nitrogen oxides (NOx), which 

are responsible for tens of thousands of premature deaths, hospital admissions, and lost work and 

school days in the U.S. annually. Exposure to diesel PM has been linked to increased cancer and 

non-cancer health risks. EPA considers diesel exhaust a likely human carcinogen via inhalation. 2 

The California Air Resources Board (CARB) has listed diesel exhaust as a chemical known to 

cause cancer and has developed quantitative factors for estimating cancer risk from exposures. 3 

In June 2012, the International Agency for Research on Cancer, which is part of the World 

Health Organization, classified diesel exhaust as a known human carcinogen (Group 1) based on 

an increased risk for lung cancer.4 Short-term exposures may cause lung irritation and 

exacerbation of asthma or allergies, while chronic exposures may result in lung cancer or lung 

damage. 5 Recent peer-reviewed research continues to strengthen the growing body of scientific 

evidence that acute and chronic adverse health impacts, including premature mortality, occur 

from exposure to PM levels below current federal health standards. 6

•

7 

Glider Vehicle Emissions 

In its 2016 Phase 2 rulemaking, EPA correctly recognized that while gliders have a legitimate 

use in those rare cases where a powertrain can be salvaged from a wrecked vehicle, they have 

increasingly been marketed and sold to new truck buyers as a way to avoid nitrogen oxides 

(NOx) and PM control requirements ("pre-emission" engines). 8 We agree with EPA's original 

analysis, and with its more recent 2017 glider kit emissions testing, which found that these trucks 

constitute an unacceptably large source of excess NOx and PM emissions having significant 

adverse impacts on air quality and public health. 

EPA estimates that requiring glider vehicles to meet the same NOx and PM emission limits with 

current engine standards will lead to reductions of 190,000 tons per year (tpy) ofNOx and 5,000 

tpy of PM emissions in 2025.9 The reductions grow larger in 2040, with 319,000 tpy ofNOx 

2 EPA. Integrated Risk Information System (IRIS): Diesel engine e-<haust, p. 11 (February 28, 2003). Available at 

https://cfuub.epa.gov/ncea/iris/iris documentsldocuments/subst/0642 summary.pdf. 3 California Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment. Technical 

Support Document for Cancer Potency Factors. 2009. Available at https:/ioehha.ca.gov/air/crnr/technical-supportdocument -cancer -potency-factors-2009. 4 International Agency for Research on Cancer, World Health Organization. IARC: Diesel Engine Exhaust 

Carcinogenic (Press Release No. 213). June 12, 2012. Available at https://www.iarc.fr/enlmediacentre/pr/2012/pdfs/pr2 13 E.pdf. 5 EPA. Health Assessment Document for Diesel Engine Exhaust (EP N600/8-90/057F). Prepared by the National 

Center for Environmental Assessment, Washington, DC, for the Office of Transportation and Air Quality. 2002. 6 Di, Q., et a/., Association of short-term e"Cposure to air pollution with mortality in older adults. JAMA 318.24 

(2017): 2446-2456. DOI: 10.1001/jama.2017.17923. 7 Di, Q., eta/., Air pollution and mortality in the Medicare population. New England Journal of Medicine 376.26 

(2017): 2513-2522. DOI: 10.1056/NEJMoa1702747. 8 See, e.g., "About Fitzgerald Glider Kits" marketing glider kits with "pre-emission Detroit, Cummins, and 

Caterpillar engine options." At https://www.fitzgeraldgliderkits.com/about-fitzgerald/ (accessed September 10, 

2018). 

9 U.S. EPA and NHTSA, Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Fuel Efficiency Standards for Medium- and Heavy-Duty 

Engines and Vehicles- Phase 2, Response to Comments for Joint Rulemaking, p. 1962, Table A-1 (August 2016). 
49 

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and 8,500 tpy ofPM. 10 The extent of emission reductions applied to a sales volume of 5,000 to 

10,000 MY2017 glider trucks will avoid 350 to 1,600 premature deaths over the operating life of 

the vehicles, with monetized health benefits ranging from $1.5 billion to $11.0 billion. 11 

Glider Vehicle Emissions Testing 

EPA's glider testing presented in its 2017 report 12 is fully consistent with state practices in 

obtaining vehicles for testing, using accredited testing laboratories, adhering to regulatory drive 

cycle test protocols, providing data sets and transparent analysis, maintaining rigorous quality 

assurance and quality control, repeating test runs, and working collaboratively with an engine or 

vehicle manufacturer in a testing program. This is not at odds with the EPA's National Vehicle 

and Fuel Emissions Laboratory approach in testing glider kits as described in EPA Assistant 

Administrator William Wehrum's letter to the full Committee on August 21,2018. 

We contrast this to a glider emissions testing report by a team at Tennessee Tech University and 

submitted to EPA by glider manufacturers in support of reinstating the glider kit loophole. 13 

That emissions testing was performed at an unaccredited facility owned by a glider 

manufacturer, did not use a standard regulatory drive cycle test procedure, and did not include 

supporting data and analysis (e.g., a sample probe filter "was visually inspected" without 

quantification as a subjective test for ascertaining emissions performance, and no NOx emissions 

data were presented). 14 

Glider Vehicles and Nitrogen Oxides (NOx) 

NOx emissions are of special concern to the Northeast states. NOx is the most egregious 

contributor to regional ozone concentrations, an important precursor to fme particulate matter 

formation, and a contributor to multiple other enviromnental problems such as acid rain and 

eutrophication of coastal bays and estuaries (Table I). 

10 U.S. EPA and NIITSA, Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Fuel Efficiency Standards for Medium- and Heavy-Duty 

Engines and Vehicles- Phase 2, Response to Comments for Joint Rulemaking, p. 1962, Table A-2 (August 2016). 11 U.S, EPA and NIITSA, Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Fuel Efficiency Standards for Medium- and Heavy-Duty 

Engines and Vehicles- Phase 2, Response to Comments for Joint Rulemaking, p. 1965 (August 2016). 12 U.S. EPA, Chassis Dynamometer Testing of Two Recent Model Year Heavy-Duty On-Highway Diesel Glider 

Vehicles, National Vehicle & Fuel Emissions Laboratory, Ann Arbor, MI (November 20, 2017). 13 Petition for Reconsideration of Application of the Final Rule Entitled "Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Fuel 

Efficiency Standards for Medium- and Heavy-Duty Engines and Vehicles-Phase 2 Final Rule" to Gliders, 

submitted to the U.S. EPA by Fitzgerald Glider Kits, LLC, Harrison Truck Centers, Inc., and Indiana Phoenix, Inc., 

July 10, 2017, Exhibit I. 14 US EPA Memorandum: Teleconference with Tennessee Tech University Regarding Glider Test Report 

Summarized in June 2017 Letter; Tennessee Tech University- Summary of Heavy Duty Truck Study and 

Evaluation of the Phase II Heavy Duty Truck Rule, November 13, 2017 

(https:/ /www .regulations.gov/document?D= EPA-HQ-OAR-20 14-0827-2416). 
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Examining the Underlying Science and Impacts of Glider Truck Regulations 

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Table 1. Adverse public health and environmental Impacts o fNO xm . h N h t e ort east 

Ozone and • Reduces lung function, aggravates asthma and other chronic lung 

PM2.5 diseases 

• Can cause permanent lung damage from repeated exposures 

• Contributes to premature death 

Acid Deposition • Damages forests 

• Damages aquatic ecosystems, e.g., Adirondacks and Great Northern 

Woods 

• Erodes mamnade structures 

Coastal Marine • Depletes oxygen in the water, which suffocates fish and other aquatic 

Eutrophication life in bays.and estuaries, e.g., Chesapeake Bay, Narragansett Bay, and 

Long Island Sound 

Visibility • Contributes to regional haze that mars vistas and views in urban and 

Impairment wilderness areas 

Based on recent historical monitoring data, large parts of the Northeast region violate the 

recently strengthened 0.070 ppm 8-hour average ozone national ambient air quality standard 

(NAAQS). In addition, the CT-NJ-NY region continues to violate the 2008 0.075 ppm ozone 

NAAQS and remains at risk of failing to maintain the 1997 0.08 ppm 8-hour NAAQS. Air 

quality monitoring data in recent years no longer show a declining trend in peak ozone 

concentrations in this region. And in early July of this year, the New York City metropolitan 

region saw a 1-hour ozone average of0.143 ppm, a peak level not seen in this area in over 10 

years. 

As shown in Figure 1, NOx pollution within the New York City metropolitan area is readily 

visible from satellite observations of the polluted air column over the Mid-Atlantic and Northeast 

u.s. 
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Examining the Underlying Science and Impacts of Glider Tmck Regulations 

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Figure 1. 2011-2016 week day nitrogen dioxide column concentrations observed by 

NASA's Ozone Monitoring Instrument (OMI). Nitrogen dioxide is a component of NOx. 

Figure 2 shows that on-road diesel vehicles, which include heavy duty vehicles (HDV), are the 

largest source of estimated NOx emissions in this region. And this likely understates the impact 

of highway trucks, as the diesel HDV truck emission estimates do not account for glider 

vehicles, which are not included in the mobile source emission model used to develop the 

inventories. 
52 

Examining the Underlying Science and Impacts of Glider Truck Regulations 

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Figure 2. On-road diesel vehicles are the largest NOx source sector in Northeast/MidAtlantic (DC to Maine) 

Source: Ozone Transport Commission 

According to EPA, glider vehicles with pre-2001 engines have 20 to 40 times higher NOx and 

PM emissions than a fully compliant modem truck. As shown in Figure 3, production of just 

5,000 glider vehicles with pre-2001 engines would approach the entire NOx and PM emissions 

from a typical year's production of250,000 fully compliant new heavy-duty trucks (Class 8). 15 

This will forego achieving the significant public health and environmental benefits from the 

greater than 90% reduction in NOx and PM reductions from current emissions-compliant onroad heavy duty trucks. 16 

15 U.S. EPA, Frequently Asked Questions about Heavy-Duty "Glider Vehicles" and "Glider Kits," EPA-420-F-15-

904 (July 2015). 16 66 Fed. Reg. 5002, Control of Air Pollution from New Motor Vehicles: Heavy-Duty Engine and Vehicle Standards 

and Highway Diesel Fuel Sulji1r Control Requirements, (January 18, 2001). We note that the ability to achieve the 

deep reductions in PM emissions is made technically feasible through lowering the sulfur content of diesel. The 

predominant impact of lower sulfur diesel on PM emissions is to enable the use of advanced diesel particulate 

controls (much as removing lead from gasoline was needed to enable the use of effective catalytic converters with 

gasoline vehicles). While lowering diesel sulfur content was necessary to enable more advanced controls, it should 

be recognized that only a very small amount of direct PM reductions comes from reducing diesel sulfur content 

alone (i.e., reductions in direct sulfate emissions, while large on a percentage basis, are small on a total PM mass 

basis). 66 Fed. Reg. at 5031, Fig. II.D-2. 
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Figure 3. Comparison of NOx and PM emissions from increased glider vehicle production 

NOx and PM emissions 

Hamstringing the states' ability to protect public health at lower cost 

The EPA's failure to meet statutory deadlines in designating nonattainment areas under the 

Clean Air Act and its persistent failure to fully address interstate ozone transport have been 

detrimental to the states' interests in protecting public health. Re-opening this large loophole to 

allow the unconstrained production and sale of highway trucks lacking modern pollution controls 

will greatly increase emissions in our region and across the country. Failing to hold glider 

vehicles to modern pollution standards also will burden the states, who will be required to offset 

the excess emissions at potentially much higher costs for decades to come. Table 2 compares 

historical NOx control costs at the state and national levels with estimated control costs of a 

glider vehicle equipped with an engine meeting current emission standards. The glider vehicle 

control cost is estimated at about $670 per ton ofNOx reduced, which falls well below the other 

measures in Table 2. 
54 

Examining the Underlying Science and Impacts of Glider Tmck Regulations 

NESCAUM 

Page8 

September 13. 2018 

Table 2. Comparison of glider vehicle NOx control cost effectiveness (bottom row) to other 

state and national NOx control m•,asnres. 

*Based on EPA RIA. Tier 2 Motor Vehicle Standards and Gasoline Sulfur, Dec. 1999, Table VI-8, 

uncredited, NOx tons only. 

**Based on 0.89 cents/gal EPA estimate and NESCAUM projected 2017 NOx reductions from 

gasoline on-road vehicles. 

***Based on EPA RIA, HDV engine and diesel fuel standards, Dec. 2000, p. V -7 (NOx tons only 

from Table VI.C-1) using variable and operating costs of control technology. Low sulfur fuel cost 

assumed same for gliders. 

An additional consideration is that U.S. companies are thriving as they have become leaders in 

many of the advanced emission reducing technologies that will continue to be in demand around 

the world for years to come. A preferential exemption for glider engines and vehicles from these 

long-established modem emission standards puts these companies at a competitive disadvantage, 

thus undercutting businesses employing hundreds of thousands of workers across the U.S. 

Furthermore, the proposed rulemaking portends a 'race to the bottom' if more truck 

manufacturers are drawn into glider production, leading to even greater harmful impacts to air 

quality and public health. 

Glider vehicles are new motor vehicles under the Clean Air Act (CAA) 

The plain language of the CAA unambiguously requires EPA to regulate glider vehicles and 

engines in glider vehicles as new motor vehicles. The Act requires EPA to establish and revise 

emission standards for any air pollutant from any class of"new motor vehicles or new motor 

vehicle engines." 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(l). The CAA specifies that a motor vehicle is "new" up to 

the point when its title is "transferred to an ultimate purchaser." 42 U.S.C. § 7550(3). "Ultimate 

purchaser" is, in turn, defined as "the first person who in good faith purchases such new motor 

vehicle or new engine for purposes other than resale." 42 U.S.C. § 7550(5). 
55 

Examining the Underlying Science and Impacts of Glider Trnck Regulations 

NESCAUM 

Page9 

September 13, 2018 

To re-state, it is the passage of title to the "ultimate purchaser," not the status of the engine or 

other vehicle components, that establishes glider vehicles as "new motor vehicles" under the 

CAA. A glider vehicle clearly fits the definition of"new motor vehicle" because the ultimate 

purchaser is the first to take title to the vehicle. There is no "ultimate purchaser" prior to this 

point who previously held title to the glider vehicle. Under these definitions, glider vehicles and 

glider vehicle engines-like all other classes of vehicles and engines-are "new" until purchased 

by a consumer to be put into use. Accordingly, section 202(a)(l) mandates that EPA regulate 

their emissions. 

This plain language of the CAA also specifies that "new motor vehicle engine" can mean either 

"an engine in a new motor vehicle" or "a motor vehicle engine the equitable or legal title to 

which has never been transferred to the ultimate purchaser." 42 U.S.C. § 7550(3). To have any 

independent meaning, the term "engine in a new motor vehicle" must be understood to 

encompass used and rebuilt engines in new motor vehicles, i.e., engines that have, at some point 

in the past, been purchased by a person to be used "for purposes other than resale." 42 U.S.C. § 

7550(3) & (5). 

This plain language interpretation of Section 202 in its statutory context comports with the 

purpose of the CAA generally and with the more specific purpose of Section 202. 42 U.S. C.§§ 

7401 (b) & (c) & 752l(a)(3). Section 202 is targeted at new motor vehicles and engines that 

"cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public 

health or welfare." 42 U.S.C. § 752l(a)(l). Congress intended these emissions to decline 

substantially, over time, under EPA's regulation, providing that emissions standards for new 

motor vehicles and engines may only be revised in ways that "require reduction of emissions 

from the standard that was previously applicable." 42 U.S.C. § 752l(b)(l)(C). Unsurprisingly, 

the CAA reflects Congress's particular concern with emissions from heavy-duty trucks and 

engines. With respect to them, Congress mandated that EPA's emissions standards "reflect the 

greatest degree of emission reduction achievable through the application of technology which the 

Administrator determines will be available for the model year to which such standards apply." 

42 U.S.C. § 7521. 

A contrary interpretation would undermine the purpose of the CAA to protect air quality and 

promote the public health and welfare, by in effect, creating a loophole for the use of previously 

owned engines in new truck bodies as substitutes for new, compliant vehicles, even when that 

would vastly increase pollution. It seems rather implausible that in drafting the CAA, Congress 

intended for the single emissions sector of heavy-duty trucks built from glider kits to be the only 

mobile emissions source that was completely exempt from federal regulation. 

Safety concerns 

It is important to note that the typical older engines used with glider vehicles lack the electronic 

capacity to run many modem safety features found in modern emission-compliant trucks. Key 

safety features typically lacking in "pre-emission" glider vehicles include electronic stability 

control (rollover prevention), adaptive cruise (speed) control, and lane departure warnings 
56 

Examining the Underlying Science and Impacts of Glider Truck Regulations 

NESCAUM 

Page 10 

September 13. 2018 

(collision avoidance). 17 Pre-2000 engines, among the most popular in glider vehicles, are 

exempt from maintaining electronic log books ( e-logs) that would provide real-time logging of 

driving hours and rest times. 18 Without this feature, drivers may operate for longer periods than 

allowed, resulting in greater driver fatigue on the roads. 

Conclusion 

Our states have long supported and relied upon strong- and smart- federal regulation to ensure 

that harmful air emissions are gradually reduced over time. Within this cooperative framework, 

cleaner on-road heavy duty vehicles are vital to our states' efforts to attain and maintain air 

quality standards. 

In sum, there is no way to understand the dramatic increase in sales of glider kits with old, dirty 

("pre-emission") engines except as a concerted effort to circumvent critical public health 

protections. Exempting glider vehicles from modem emissions standards urmecessarily exposes 

the nation's citizens to elevated emissions of harmful pollutants, and it unfairly penalizes the 

many businesses in our states and across the country that operate in compliance with modem 

emission standards. 

17 Testimony to EPA by Robert Nuss, Nuss Truck & Equipment, Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2014-0827-4307 

(Dec. 4, 2017), accessed at https:i/www.regulations.gov/document?D=EPA-HO-OAR-2014-0827-4307 on 

September 11, 2018. 18 Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, FAQs on ELD Rule, 

https:l/www.fmcsa.dot.gov/fag/if-vehicle-registration-commercial-motor-vehicle-reflects-model-year-2000-ornewer-b-O, accessed on September 11, 2018. 
57 

NESCAUM 

Speaker's Bio 

Paul J. Miller, Deputy Director & Chief Scientist 

NESCAUM 

Dr. Paul J. Miller is Deputy Director and Chief Scientist of the Northeast States for Coordinated 

Air Use Management (NESCAUM) in Boston, Massachusetts where he provides technical and 

policy coordination among the air quality agencies of eight northeastern states. Dr. Miller 

returned to NESCAUM in January 2006 after previously heing with NESCAUM from 1995-

1999 as Senior Science and Policy Advisor. He has contributed to state efforts on ozone 

transport, acid rain, regional haze, and other air issues. 

From 1999-2005, Dr. Miller was the Air Quality Program Coordinator with the Commission for 

Enviromnental Cooperation (CEC) in Montreal, Quebec. The CEC is a trinational 

intergovernmental agency created by Canada, Mexico and the United States to promote 

enviromnental cooperation among the three NAFTA trading partners. 

Dr. Miller has been a Senior Fellow at Princeton University's Center for Energy and 

Enviromnental Studies. Previous to Princeton, he was Senior Energy Fellow at theW. Alton 

Jones Foundation in Charlottesville, Virginia. He also was a National Research Council 

Associate at the Joint Institute for Laboratory Astrophysics, University of Colorado and the 

National Institute of Standards and Technology, in Boulder, Colorado. 

Dr. Miller has a B.S. in Chemistry from Purdue, a Ph.D. in chemical physics from Yale, and a 

law degree from Stanford. 
58 

Chairman BIGGS. Thanks, Dr. Miller. 

I now recognize Dr. Belzer for five minutes to present his testimony. 

TESTIMONY OF DR. RICHARD B. BELZER, 

INDEPENDENT CONSULTANT IN REGULATION, 

RISK, ECONOMICS & INFORMATION QUALITY 

Dr. BELZER. Good morning. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to testify concerning work I conducted in May 

for Fitzgerald Glider Kits. This is a strawman regulatory impact 

analysis for EPA’s regulation rescinding the glider provisions in 

what is being called the phase 2 greenhouse gas rule. 

That work is my own work product. I performed it from start to 

finish in about two weeks. Fitzgerald did not have the right to approve it, and it is published as a working paper on my website. 

And I had to perform this because, normally, when we look to the 

regulatory impact analysis for the phase 2 rule to find the benefits 

and costs of rescinding a provision, one cannot do that, however, 

because the phase 2 rule regulatory impact analysis is significantly 

incomplete. 

So I have four key points to make, and you’ll see it on the next 

slide there. 

[Slide.] 

Dr. BELZER. There are significant errors in EPA’s analysis. They came up with $238 billion in present value net social benefits. They 

committed several errors, two I will mention. First, they assume 

that companies that buy trucks are unable to rationally account for 

fuel economy in their purchase decisions. This is an astounding 

claim. Fuel is the largest cost of operating a heavy-duty truck. Second, EPA estimated that the phase 2 rule would send $66 billion in U.S. wealth to other countries, and they counted these 

wealth transfers as benefits to Americans. This is an elementary 

violation of accepted practice in benefit-cost analysis. When you 

take these two errors out alone, you end up with $26 billion in net 

present value costs for the phase 2 rule. This is shown on that slide 

in front of you. 

EPA also did not analyze incremental benefits and costs of banning gliders. Go on to the next slide, please. 

[Slide.] 

Dr. BELZER. The regulatory impact analysis is 1,100 pages long. 

That’s more than two reams of paper. In that, there is no analysis 

of the benefits and costs of essentially banning gliders from the 

heavy-duty truck market. 

So what do you do? Well, you go to the preamble to the 2016 

rule, and there you will see that EPA reports an estimate for the 

benefits of it. The preamble is almost 800 pages long. This part, 

surrounded by yellow highlighter, is the total sum of their analysis 

of the benefits of regulating gliders. 

So they didn’t show their work, and since they didn’t show their 

work, nobody outside of EPA can actually replicate it. To obtain 

their estimate, though, they also seem to have assumed that every 

glider removed from the market is a new truck sold. That makes 

no sense. Those who would purchase gliders can buy a new truck. 

They could buy a used truck from a secondary market, or they 
59 

could retain an existing truck in service longer than its planned 

lifetime. 

Let’s assume that new trucks have fewer emissions, lower emissions than gliders. But it’s likely that used trucks and old trucks 

retained in service have higher emissions, so the question is what 

is the net change in emissions? And the net change in emissions 

from banning gliders could well be positive and not the $6–14 billion that the EPA claims. 

Now, my analysis shows how to estimate the environmental benefits and costs. Go to the next slide, please. 

[Slide.] 

Dr. BELZER. And I don’t have any data to estimate these net benefits or costs because EPA didn’t collect the data prior to regulating 

gliders. But I can tell you what the condition would be, and that’s 

how you would go about it. What you’re looking for are emissions 

for all four types of vehicles, and you weight them by their environmental impacts, and from that, you try to estimate what proportion 

of gliders would be replaced by new trucks. Policymakers can look 

at that and decide is that reasonable or is that not? 

It requires good data, objective data. Obtaining good emissions 

data is challenging because it’s really easy to get bad data. You can 

tweak the emissions test or you can even more easily, select trucks 

likely to test the way you want them to. But it’s important to have 

a sample that’s large enough to extrapolate to the market, and I 

don’t know how large that sample would have to be, but I do know 

that two is not the optimal sample size. 

I do know that it could be done better, and I think the right way 

to go about this is actually to collaborate on a test protocol, do the 

test together so that everybody is in agreement that the tests are 

performed correctly and honestly. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Belzer follows:] 
60 

Testimony of 

Richard B. Belzer 

before the 

U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Science, Space, and Technology 

Subcommittee on Environment 

and 

Subcommittee on Oversight 

Hearing: 

"Examining the Underlying Science and Impacts of Glider Truck Regulations" 

September 13, 2018 

Richard B. Belzer, Ph.D. 

Regulation, Risk, Economics & Information Quality 

Strategy & Analysis Consulting 

rbbelzer@post.harvord.edu /703.780.1850 I www.rbbelzer.com 
61 

Good morning Chairmen Biggs and Abraham, Ranking Members Bonamici and Beyer, 

and Members of the Subcommittees: 

I appreciate the opportunity to testify today concerning work I conducted in May for 

Fitzgerald Glider Kits, LLC. It is a strawman Regulatory Impact Analysis for EPA's regulation 

rescinding the glider provisions in the joint EPA and NHTSA regulation titled "Greenhouse Gas 

Emissions and Fuel Efficiency Standards for Medium- and Heavy-Duty Engines and VehiclesPhase 2."1 For parsimony I will refer to this as the "Phase 2 Rule." 

This work product is my own; I performed it from start to finish in about two weeks; and 

Fitzgerald did not have the right to approve it. It is published as a working paper on my 

website.2 

I performed the strawman RIA to inform decision-makers and the public about what 

needed to be done to prepare quantitative estimates of benefits and costs. Normally, one 

would look to the RIA for the Phase 2 Rule for these estimates, 3 but as I will explain in a 

moment, that is a dead end. 

I have four key points to make, summarized on Slide 2. 

1. EPA's RIA for the 2016 heavy-duty truck GHG regulation has material errors. 

1 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration. 2016a. "Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Fuel Efficiency Standards for Mediumand Heavy-Duty Engines and Vehicles-Phase 2; Final Rule." Federal Register, 81(206), 73478-

74274. 

2 Belzer, Richard B. 2018. "Regulatory Impact Analysis for Repeal of Emission 

Requirements for Glider Vehicles, Glider Engines, and Glider Kits," Mount Vernon VA, May 15. 

Available at http://bit.ly/2oTz4ES. 

3 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration. 2016b. "Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Fuel Efficiency Standards for Mediumand Heavy-Duty Engines and Vehicles; Phase 2; Regulatory Impact Analysis," Washington DC: 

USEPA/NHTSA, August. 

Richard B. Belzer, Ph.D. 

Regulation, Risk, Economics & Information Quality 

Strategy & Analysis Consulting 

rbbelzer@post.harvard.edu /703.780.1850 I www.rbbelzer.com 
62 

3 

To obtain its estimate of $238 billion in present value net social benefits, EPA had to 

commit several material errors. I will mention just two. 

First, EPA assumed that companies that buy trucks are unable to rationally account for 

fuel economy in their purchase decisions. This is an astounding claim. Fuel is the largest cost of 

operating a heavy-duty truck- higher than driver labor, and higher than lease payments on the 

truck itself. When truck buyers make mistakes, the market punishes them ruthlessly. Even more 

remarkable is EPA's extraordinary confidence that it knows better than truck buyers, despite 

the fact that the Agency suffers no consequences at all when it makes mistakes. This 

assumption yielded $170 billion in imaginary present value benefits. 

Second, EPA estimated the Phase 2 Rule would send $66 billion in U.S. wealth to other 

countries and counted these wealth transfers as benefits to Americans. This is an elementary 

violation of accepted practice in benefit-cost analysis. 

When these two errors are removed, the Phase 2 Rule has $26 billion in net present 

value costs. This is shown on Slide 3. 

2. EPA did not analyze the incremental benefits and costs of banning gliders from the 

heavv-duty truck market. 

The RIA for the Phase 2 Rule is 1,115 pages long. There are hundreds of references, 

which if printed could yield a stack of paper several feet tall. But in that 1,115-page RIA, there is 

no analysis of the incremental benefits and costs of banning gliders. 

In the preamble to the Phase 2 Rule, EPA claims that the glider ban yields incremental 

benefits of $6-16 billion per year, as shown on Slide 4. EPA did not show its work, however, so 

no one outside the Agency can reproduce these results. This is a clear violation of longestablished information quality guidelines. 4 

4 Office of Management and Budget. 2002. "Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the 

Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity of Information Disseminated by Federal Agencies; 

Notice; Republication." Federal Register, 67(36), 8452-60; U.S. Environmental Protection 

Agency. 2002. "Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and 

Integrity of Information Disseminated by the Environmental Protection Agency." (EPA/260r-02-

008). 

Richard B. Belzer, Ph.D. 

Regulation, Risk, Economics & Information Quality 

Strategy & Analysis Consulting 

rbbelzer@post.harvard.edu •:•IJJ703. 780.1850 
63 

4 

3. EPA appears to have incorrectly assumed that gliders are perfect substitutes for new 

trucks. 

To obtain the $6-16 billion per year benefit estimate in the preamble, EPA needed to 

know what glider purchasers would do once gliders were banned. It appears that EPA assumed 

that every glider removed from the market would be replaced by a new heavy-duty truck, as 

shown on the left side of Slide 5. This makes no sense. 

Those who would have purchased gliders, but under the Phase 2 Rule cannot do so, 

have three options, not one, as shown on the right side of Slide 5: 

• Buy a new truck. 

• Buy a used truck on the secondary market. 

• Retain an existing truck in service beyond its planned lifetime. 

Let's assume that new trucks have lower emissions than gliders. But it's likely that used 

trucks and existing trucks retained in service have higher emissions than gliders. So, banning 

gliders could result in a net increase in environmental damage, not $6-16 billion per year in 

emission reductions. 

4. My strawman RIA shows how to estimate the environmental benefits or costs from 

gliders. 

I developed formulas for determining the minimum proportion of gliders that must be 

replaced by new trucks for environmental benefits to be greater than zero. These formulas are 

shown on Slide 6. If policy-makers believe that the actual proportion is likely to be less than Pn, 

then the net environmental benefits of banning gliders will be negative. And even if net 

environmental benefits are positive, it does not follow that net social benefits are greater than 

zero. We have not begun to consider the opportunity costs of banning gliders, which EPA did 

not estimate, and which are likely to be substantial. 

Estimating these equations requires, among other things, objective data on greenhouse 

gas and pollutant emissions from gliders, new trucks, used trucks, and existing trucks retained 

in service beyond their planned lifetimes. Obtaining good emissions data is challenging, 

because it's easy to get bad data- by tweaking emissions tests, for example, or even more 

easily, by selecting trucks likely to test the way you want them to. The right way to go about 

this is to establish a test protocol that everyone agrees to in advance, and jointly conduct the 

tests to ensure that everyone agrees that the protocol was strictly followed. 

Finally, it is important to have samples large enough to extrapolate to the market. I 

don't know how big these samples must be, but I do know that sampling a couple trucks isn't 

Richard B. Belzer, Ph.D. 

Regulation, Risk, Economics & Information Quality 

Strategy & Analysis Consulting 

rbbelzer@post.harvard.edu •:•lll703.780.1850 
64 

5 

enough. There are statistical methods that can be used to determine minimum sample sizes, 

and the test protocol should take account of this knowledge. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I welcome any questions that you may have 

pertaining to my work. 

Richard B. Belzer, Ph.D. 

Regulation, Risk, Economics & Information Quality 

Strategy & Analysis Consulting 

rbbelzer@post.harvard.edu •!•f11703. 780.1850 
65 

Draft Strawman Regulatory Impact Analysis 

for Repeal of Emission Requirements for Glider 

Vehicles, Glider Engines, and Glider Kits 

9110118 

Richard B. Belzer, Ph.D. 

House Science Committee 

September 13, 2018 

Regulation, Risk, Economics and Information Quality • Strategy and Analysis 

www.rbbelzer.com • rbbelzer@post.harvard.edu 

Slide 1 
66 

Key points 

1. EPA's RIA for the 2016 heavy-duty truck GHG 

regulation has material errors. 

2. EPA did not analyze the incremental benefits and 

costs of banning gliders from the heavy-duty truck 

market. 

3. EPA appears to have incorrectly assumed that 

gliders are perfect substitutes for new trucks. 

4. My strawman RIA shows how to estimate the 

environmental benefits or costs from gliders. 

9/10/18 Regulation, Risk, Economics and Information Quality • Strategy and Analysis 

www.rbbelzer.com • rbbelzer@post.harvard.edu 

Slide2 
67 

1. EPA's RIA for the 2016 heavy-duty truck GHG 

regulation has material errors. 

Fuel savings f(om l:n.1yer lrr<3Jlqnatlty 

Climate bertefits 

Less speculative fuel savings 

REVISED NET BENEFITS 

$238 

-$170 

-$94 

-$26 

9/10/18 Regulation, Risk, Economics and Information Quality • Strategy and Analysis 

www.rbbelzer.com • rbbelzer@post.harvard.edu 

$66 

Slide 3 
68 

2. EPA did not analyze the incremental benefits and 

costs of banning gliders from the heavy-duty truck 

market. 

1. Regulatory Impact Analysis 

a. 1 , 115 pages, plus secondary documents 

b. No incremental analysis of glider ban 

2. Preamble to 2016 Final Rule 

9/10/18 

a. Ban said to yield incremental benefits of $6-16 billion/yr 

(2013$) (81 FR 73943), but analysis is not disclosed 

b. No incremental opportunity costs (e.g., diminished 

reliability, highway safety risks, lost producers' and 

consumers' surplus, forced capital retirement) 

c. 'No significant impact on small entities' (81 FR 73962) 

Regulation, Risk, Economics and Information Quality • Strategy and Analysis 

www.rbbelzer.com • rbbelzer@post.harvard.edu 

Slide4 
69 

3. EPA appears to have incorrectly assumed that 

gliders are perfect substitutes for new trucks. 

9110118 

Fig. 1: Buyer Behavior if Glider Market is Prohibited 

Regulation. Risk. Economics and Information Quality • Strategy and Analysis 

www rhhP-17Pr rnm • rhhPI7Prfmnnc::.t h::lrv~rrl Prh E 

SlideS 
70 

4. My strawman RIA shows how to estimate the 

environmental benefits or costs from gliders. 

For GHG Emissions For Pollutant Emissions 

G9 -Gu 

Pn = Gn-Gu' 

where 

Gn = GHGs from new trucks 

G0 = GHGs from gliders 

Gu = GHGs from used/existing trucks 

Pn = %gliders supplanted by new trucks 

Notes 

_ Eg-Eu 

Pn- En-Eu' 

where 

En = pollutants from new trucks 

E0 = pollutants from gliders 

Eu =pollutants from usedfexistingtrucks 

Pn = %gliders supplanted by new trucks 

L Assumes emissions from used trucks retained in service are identicaL 

2. Gliders provide net benefits if subsititution of new trucks for gliders is less than Pw 

3. Pn approaches zero as the difference in emission between new and used trucks approaches zero. 

4. Opportunity costs (i.e, benefits foregone) must be deducted from environmental benefits 

to obtain net social benefits. 

9/10/18 Regulation, Risk, Economics and Information Quality • Strategy and Analysis 

www.rbbelzer.com • rbbelzer@post.harvard.edu 

SlideS 
71 

Questions? 

Richard B. Belzer 

rbbelzer@post.harvard.edu 

(703) 780-1850 

9/10/18 Regulation, Risk, Economics and Information Quality • Strategy and Analysis 

www.rbbelzer.com • rbbelzer@post.harvard.edu 

Slide 7 
72 

Belzer, Richard 

Independent consultant 

Since 2001, Dr. Richard Belzer has been an independent consultant in regulation, risk, economics 

and information quality. Previously he was a visiting professor of public policy at Washington 

University in St. Louis and staff economist in the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in 

the Office of Management and Budget. He received his Ph.D. in public policy from Harvard 

University (1989), Master's in Public Policy (MPP) from the John F. Kennedy School of 

Government (now Harvard Kennedy School) (1982), and MS and BS degrees in agricultural 

economics from the University of California at Davis (1979, 1980). Current original research 

areas include the measurement and estimation of Type I and Type II errors in the identification, 

placement, and discipline of children with disabilities; the analysis of benefits and costs from 

banning glider vehicles from the heavy-duty truck market; the development of statutorily 

appropriate measures of economic feasibility under the Safe Drinking Water Act; the analysis of 

variability in pulmonary function testing; the development of objective economic indicators to 

identify adverse human health effects; the improved use of human health risk assessments as 

inputs to benefit-cost analysis; the analysis of environmental justice ranking schemes; the 

analysis of patent law and examination practices; the estimation of potential cost reductions to 

state Medicaid programs from the substitution of electronic for tobacco cigarettes; and the 

economic value of subjective quality information in U.S. wine markets. Recent consulting 

projects have included a benefit-cost analysis of rescinding the ban on gliders from the heavyduty truck market; reviews of California's proposed drinking water standards for hexavalent 

chromium and 1, 2, 3-trichloropropane; and the critique of predicted human health impacts and 

monetized risks attributable to air emissions from new facilities designed to achieve federal 

regulatory standards. Dr. Belzer is a regular contributor to scholarly professions through journal 

peer review and service to professional societies. He was elected Treasurer of the Society for 

Risk Analysis (1998, 2000) and elected Secretary-Treasurer of the Society for Benefit-Cost 

Analysis (2008, 2010). He earned multiple awards for exemplary performance at OMB, given the 

SRA's Distinguished Service Award (2003), and named a Fellow of the Cecil and Ida Green Center 

for the Study of Science and Society (1995). He has not received any grants from EPA, any other 

government agency, or any private entity. He has conducted independent research on behalf of 

clients or through self-funding; some projects are jointly funded. His clients since 2015 include: 

Fitzgerald Glider Kits LLC, the American Chemistry Council, the California Manufacturing 

Technology Association, the R Street Institute, and Exxon Mobil Biomedical Sciences, Inc. 
73 

Chairman BIGGS. Thank you. I thank all the witnesses for their 

testimony today and again for being with us, and now it’s time for 

questions and I recognize myself for five minutes. 

And I just want to clarify some points made by the minority I 

disagree with about the Tennessee Tech study. This hearing is not 

relying on the Tennessee Tech study quite frankly, and you’ll notice 

that none of us mentioned that except for on the other side. We’re 

not here to discuss that study or offer it as proof of gliders being 

environmentally friendly. We’re here to examine the EPA study for 

which we have documents showing undue influence from Volvo. 

Furthermore, when then-Administrator Pruitt relied upon Tennessee Tech study, it was the only glider study in existence because 

EPA had not completed its study yet, let alone informed the EPA 

leadership that a study was in progress. The mere fact that there 

are two studies now at odds with one another, in addition to questionable practices that indicate bias, illustrates the need for more 

in-depth examination of this issue, and that’s what I think we are 

trying to get at today, the need for more in-depth analysis. 

I want to go to Mr. Long first. Can you please elaborate on some 

of the issues facing the trucking industry today as far as workforce 

shortage, business expenses—as far as those are concerned? 

Mr. LONG. Sure, I’d love to. We contend there is no shortage of 

drivers, but you’ve all been hearing there is. There’s a turnover 

problem because a lot of folks are unable to remain in the business. 

And this is a typical reason why. Right now, as I mentioned, our 

testimony includes a story of a gentleman who owns a small business that’s been in his family since the 1960s, and he was faced 

with the problem of whether or not to purchase new glider kits to 

remain in business or to exit the trucking industry altogether, and 

that was because he had purchased some new trucks with all the 

environmental technology included, and they were so unreliable 

that they were costing them tens of thousands of dollars a year and 

not only in repairs, in lost productivity because they spent so much 

time in the shop getting worked on. So he came up with the decision to purchase gliders as an alternative because they were much 

more reliable, and he was capable of maintaining the better on his 

own. 

So I would say regulation as a whole is driving a lot of our members out of the industry. In this case, it’s costs driving them out 

of the industry. Certainly every regulation comes with a cost, but 

in this one, it’s taking away a reliable alternative option for them 

to purchase a new truck. 

Chairman BIGGS. Thank you. Now, Dr. Belzer, I want to get to 

your brief but very informative testimony. What—I mean, you’ve 

suggested that there be more collaboration on the study. I was surprised that it was what I would call an extreme small-end study. 

What could have been done differently to produce more transparency and eliminate what I view as bias? I mean, every time you 

have a study, if you’re conducting the scientific method the way I 

was taught, you want to eliminate bias as much as possible. How 

would we do that here? 

Dr. BELZER. Well, I should first say I’m not an engineer, so I 

would hesitate to attempt to devise the protocol, but what needs to 

be done is a protocol needs to be agreed upon by EPA and the var-
74 

ious different stakeholders in industry. There should be a way of 

agreeing on how to do this properly, and that would include all the 

different elements of the test, and it doesn’t sound like there’s a 

great deal of controversy about what those should be. It would also 

include a sample size and a procedure for selecting trucks for the 

sampling. Remember what you’re doing is you’re extrapolating to 

an entire industry from a very small sample. The opportunity for 

error, never mind bias, but opportunity for error is just very great, 

and a sample of two doesn’t do it, no matter how well the two were 

collected or assembled. A sample of a dozen may not be enough. I’m 

not an expert in sampling theory and how to good about that. 

But I think that if they collaborate on the technology for the test, 

they collaborate on doing the test, they look over each other’s 

shoulders, that’s the way to get it done and make sure everybody’s 

happy with it. Then you can go forward with it and use it for policy 

purposes. 

Chairman BIGGS. Thank you. I’m going to conclude my time and 

recognize the Ranking Member of the Environment Subcommittee, 

Ms. Bonamici, for five minutes. 

Ms. BONAMICI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Some of today’s witnesses have argued that the EPA’s deregulatory action on gliders should not require a Regulatory Impact Analysis, and several Members of the Majority actually made a similar 

argument in a recent letter to the OMB. But I’d like to bring to 

their attention a 2017 White House memorandum that states, 

‘‘Agencies must continue to assess and consider both the benefits 

and costs of regulatory actions, including deregulatory actions.’’ So 

I’d like to request unanimous consent to enter this memo into the 

record. 

Mr. ABRAHAM. [Presiding.] Without objection. 

[The information follows:] 
75 

M-17-21 

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT 

OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET 

WASHINGfON, D"C. 20503 

April 5, 2017 

MEMORANDUM FOR: REGULATORY POLICY OFFICERS AT EXECUTIVE 

DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES AND MANAGING 

AND EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS OF CERTAIN AGENCIES 

FROM: 

SUBJECT: 

I. Introduction 

AND COMMISSIONS \ 

Dominic J. Mancin~ Acting Administrator '" ~' Office oflnfonnation and Regulatory Affilirs (J'ryy\,..-~~ 

Guklance Implementing Executive Order 13771, Titled "Reducing 

Regulatbn and Controlling Regulatory Costs" 

This guiiance, in the rorm of Questbns and Answers (Q&As), addresses the requirements of 

Executive Order (EO) 13771, titled "Reducing Regulatbn and Controlling Regulatory Costs." It 

applies to Fiscal Years (FY) 2017 and beyond. This guiiance supplements the Office of 

Management and Budget (OMB) interim guiiance issued on February 2, 2017, titled "Interim 

Guidance Implementing Section 2 of the EO of January 30,2017, Titled 'Reducing Regulation 

and Controlling Regulatory Costs."' While OMB's Office oflnfonnation and Regulatory Affilirs 

(OIRA) believes this guiiance largely treats the subjects covered in the February 2, 2017 interim 

guiiance in a consistent rmnner, where these two merrmanda are in conflict, this guiiance 

supersedes the previous guiiance. It refiects OIRA's consi.leratbrr of the comments received in 

response to the February 2, 2017, interim guiiance. Comments sent by members of the publi; are 

available on Regulatbns.gov in docket ID OMB-2017-0002. 

II. General Requirements 

The guiiance explains, for putposes of implementing Sectbn 2, the rolbwing requirement~: 

• "Unless prohibited by law, whenever an executive department or agency ... publicly 

proposes fur notice and comment or otherwise promulgates a new regulation, it shall 

i.lentify at least two existing regulations to be repealed." Sec. 2(a). 

• "For fiscal year 2017 ... the heads of all agencies are directed that the total incremental 

cost of an new regulatioJJS, including repealed regulations, to be finalized this year shall be 

no greater than zero, unless otherwise required by law or consistent with advice provi.led in 

writing by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget .... "Sec. 2(b). 

• "In furtherance of the requirement of subsection (a) of this sectbn; any new incremental 

costs associated with new regulations shall, to the extent permitted by law, be oflSet by the 

elimination of existing costs associated with at least two prior regulatioJJS." Sec. 2(c). 
76 

In genera~ executive departments or agencies {"agencies') may comply with those requirements 

by issuing two EO 13771 deregulatory actions (described below) fOr each EO 13771 regulatory 

actvn (described below). The incremental costs associated with EO 13771 regulatory actions 

must be fully ofiSet by the savings of EO 13771 deregulatory actions. 

In addition, agencies planning to issue one or more EO 13771 regulatory actions on or befOre 

September 30,2017, shoukl fOr each such EO 13771 regulatory action: 

• IdentifY two existing regulatory actions the agency plans to eliminate or propose fOr 

elimination on or befOre September 30, 2017 in a reasonable period of time befOre the 

agency issues the EO 13 771 regulatory action; and 

• Fully ofiSet the total incremental cost of such EO 13771 regulatory action as of September 

30,2017. 

Guidance on the requirements of Section 3{a) is forthcoming. 

Beginning with FY 2018, Section 3{d) requires the Director ofOMB to identify to agencies a 

total amount of incremental costs {or"regulatory cap" as stated in Section 2) ror an EO 13771 

deregulatory and EO 13 771 regulatory actions finalized during the fiscal year. The total 

incremental cost imposed by each agency shoukl not exceed the agency's allowance ror that 

fiscal year, unless required by law or approved by the Director. The total incremental cost 

allowance may be an increase or reduction in total regulatory cost, and will be inf.brmed by 

agencies' draft submissions ror the Regulatory Plan. 

Please consult with OIRA if you have any particular questions regarding the applicability or 

interpretatiln of EO 13771 not addressed in these Q&As. 

Agencies shoukl continue to comply with an applicable laws and requirements. In addition, 

EO 12866 remains the primary governing EO regarding regulatory planning and review. 

Accordingly, among other requirements, except where prolnbited by law, agencies must continue 

to assess and consider both the benefits and costs of regulatory actions, including deregulatory 

actilns, when making regulatory decisvns, and issue regulatilns only upon a reasoned 

determination that benefits justny costs. 

III. Definitions 

This section provides definitions ror terms used in this guidance. The definitilns shoukl not 

necessarily be applied to other sections of EO 13 771 that this guidance does not cover, and do 

not replace definitions used in other EOs or statutes. 

2 
77 

Ql. What is an "agency"? 

A: An ''agency," unless otherwise indicated, means any authority of the United States that is an 

"agency" under 44 U.S.C. 3502(1), other than those considered to be independent regulatory 

agencies, as defined in 44 U.S.C. 3502(5). A cabinet department is considered a single 

agency fur purposes of EO 13771 compliance. 

Q2. Whatisan "£013771 regulatoryaction"? 

A: An "EO 13771 regulatory actim" is: 

(i) A significant regulatory actim as defined in Section 3(f) of EO 12866 that has been 

finalized and that imposes total costs greater than zero; or 

(ii) A significant guidance docwnent (e.g., significant interpretive guidance) reviewed by 

OIRA under the procedures of EO 12866 that has been finalized and that imposes 

total costs greater than zero. 

For example, EO 13771 regulatory actions include negotiated rulemakings that are 

significant as defined in Section 3(f) of EO 12866, that have been finalized, and that impose 

total costs greater than zero. 

Q3. What is a "significant guidance document"? 

A: As defined in OMB's Final Bulletin (Or Agency Good Guidance Practices, a "significant 

guidance document'' is a guidance document disseminated to regulated entities or the general 

public that Jrny reasonably be antK:ipated to: 

(i) Lead to an annual etrect on the economy of$100 million ortrore or adversely affect 

in a Jrnterial way the economy, a sector of the economy, productivity, competition, 

jobs, the environment, public heahh or safety, or State, loca~ or tribal govennnents or 

communities; 

( ii) Create a serious inconsistency or otherwise interfere with an action taken or planned 

by another agency; 

(iii)Materially aher the budgetary impact of entitlements, grants, user rees, or loan 

programs or the rights and obligations of recipients thereof; or 

(iv)Raise novel legal or policy issues arising out of legal Jrnndates, the President's 

priorities, or the principles set furth in EO 12866, as further amended. 

A significant guidance document does not include legal advisory opinions tor internal 

Executive Branch use and not for release (such as Department ofJustice Offi:e of Legal 

Counsel opinions); brieJS arrl other positions taken by agencies in investigations, 

pre-litigation, litigation, or other enfOrcement proceedings; speeches; editorials; media 

interviews; press materials; Congressional correspondence; guidance documents that pertain 

to a military or foreign a.ffuirs function of the United States (other than guidance on 

procurement or the import or export of non-defense articles and services); grant solicitations; 

3 
78 

warning letters; case or investigatory letters responding to complaints involving met-specific 

detenninations; purely internal agency policies guidance documents that pertain to the use, 

operation or control of a government fucility; internal guidance documents directed solely to 

other Federal agencies; and any other category of significant guidance documents exempted 

by an agency in consultation and concurrence with the OIRA Administrator. In the list above, 

"internal" policies and guidance documents do not include those that materially affuct an 

agency's interactions with non-Federal entities, even if nominally directed only to agency 

personnel For example, an internal directive to field staff on how to implement a regulatory 

requirement could be a significant guidance document if it satisfied any of (i) through (iv) 

above. 

If they satisfY the de:finition above, modifications to existing guidance and interpretative 

documents would be considered significant guidance documents. 

Q4. What is an "EO 13771 deregulatory action"? 

A: An ''EO 13 771 deregulatory action'' is an action that bas been finalized and bas total costs 

less than zero. An EO 13771 deregulatory action qualifies as both: (1) one of the actions used 

to satisfY the provision to repeal or revise at least two existing regulations fur each regulation 

issued, and (2) a cost savings fur purposes of the total incremental cost allowance. EO 13771 

deregulatory actions are not limited to those defined as significant under EO 12866 or 

OMB's Final Bulletin on Good Guidance Practices. 

An EO 13771 deregulatory action may be issued in the furm of an action in a wide range of 

categories of actions, including, but not limited to: 

• Infurma~ forma~ and negotiated rulemaking; 

• Guidance and interpretative documents; 

• Some actions related to international regulatory cooperation; and 

• Infurmation collection requests that repeal or streamline recordkeeping, reporting, or 

disclosure requirements. 

Significant proposed rules issued befure noon on Jannary 20, 2017, that are fOrmally 

withdrawn by notice ii:t the Federal Register and removed from the Unified Agenda of 

RegJJlatory and DereWJlatory Actions may qualify as repeal actions, but do not qualify for 

cost savings. 

Please consult with OIRA regarding other actions your agency believes should qualify as an 

EO 13771 deregulatory action 

Q5. What does "offset" mean? 

A: The term "oflSet" means at least two EO 13 771 deregulatory actions have been taken per 

EO 13 771 regulatory action and that the incremental cost of the EO l3 771 regulatory action 

bas been appropriately counterbalanced by incremental cost savings from EO 13771 

deregulatory actions, consistcut with the agency's total incremental cost allowance. 

4 
79 

Q6. What is a "statutorily or judiciaily required" rulemaking? 

A: A statutorily required rulemaking is one fur whK:h Congress has provided by statute an 

explicit requirement and explicit timeframe fur rulernaking. For example, a statute fuat states, 

an ageiJCy "shall issue nutrition labeling requirements within 10 years" of the statute's 

enactment date would be considered a statutorily required rule. 

A judicially required rulemaking is one fur whK:h there is a judicially established binding 

deadline fur rulernaking, including deadlines established by settlement agreement or consent 

decree. 

AgeiJCies should consult with OIRA to determine whether a rule fulls within the definition of 

a statutorily or judicially required rulemaking. 

Q 7. What is a rule issued with respect to a "national security function" of the United 

States? 

A: For the purposes ofEO 13771, a regulation issued with respect to a national security fuiJCtion 

is a regulation fuat satisfies the two fuHowing requirements: 

(1) The benefit-cost analysis demonstrates fuat the regulation is anticipated to improve 

national security as its primary direct benefit; and 

(2) (A) For regulations the ageiJCy consilers legislative rules: OIRA and the ageiJCy agree 

the regulation qualifies for a "good cause" exception under 5 U.S.C. 553(b )(3)(B); or 

(B) For other regulations (including significant guidance) the ageiJCy and OIRA agree 

that applying the requirements of EO 13771 to the regulation woukl be impracticable 

or contrary to public interest. 

Q8. What is "total incremental cost"? 

A: The term "total incremental cosf' means the sum of an costs from EO 13771 regulatory 

actions minus the cost savings from EO 13771 deregulatory actions. 

IV. Scope Questions 

Q9. Which new regulations as defined in EO 13 771 must be offset? 

A: AgeiJCies are required to of!Set EO 13771 regulatory actions issued after noon on 

January 20,2017. This includes those EO 13771 regulatory actions fuat are rules finalizing a 

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (or in certain instaiJCes an interim final rule; see Question 11 

for a further discussion) issued before noon on January 20, 2017. 

AgeiJCies shoukl use the existing significance detennination process outlined in EO 12866 

for determining whether an action is an EO 13771 regulatory action AgeiJCies shoukl not 

assume fuat actions fuat appear, or have appeared, in the Unified Agenda of Regulatory and 

5 
80 

Deregulatory Actions as nonsignificant have been detennined by OIRA to be nonsignificant. 

Agencies should obtain an affirmative significance detennination from OIRA before 

publishing regulatory actions. 

Ql 0. How are interim and direct final rules treated? 

A: In general, signi.fi;ant interim and direct final rules must be of!Set. However, a significant 

interim final rule or direct :final rule may qualify fur an exemption with respect to the timing 

fur identifying and issuing the EO 13771 deregulatory actions. 

Qll. How are significant rules that finalize interim final rules (IFR) treated? 

A: If the final rule neither increases nor decreases the cost of the IFR, then the action does not 

need to be of!Set nor does it qualify as an EO 13771 deregulatory action. If the final rule 

inchxles changes that increase the cost of the IFR, then the :final rule must be of!Set 

(however, if the final rule imposes only de minimis costs relative to the IFR, the final rule 

may qualify for an exemption). If the final rule reduces the cost of the IFR, then the rule and 

the cost savings relative to the IFR may qualify as an EO 13 771 deregulatory action. 

QJ2. Must agencies identify EO 13771 deregulatory actions for significant advance notices 

of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM)? 

A: No. With respect to rulemaking, the requirements of EO 13771 do not apply to pre-notice of 

proposed rulemaking activities such as ANPRMs. 

Ql3. How are regulatory actions that implement Federal spending programs or establish 

fees and penalties treated? 

A: In general, Federal spending regulatory actions that cause only income trans furs between 

taxpayers and program beneficiaries (e.g., regulations associated with Pen grants and 

Medicare spending) are considered ''transfer rules" and are not covered by EO 13 771. 

Additionally, an action that establishes a new fee or changes the existing tee fur a service, 

without imposing any new costs, does not need to be of!Set; nor does an action that 

establishes new penalties or fines or changes those already in existence. 

However, in some cases, such regulatory actions may impose requirements apart from 

transfers, or transfers may distort markets causing inefficiencies. In those cases, the actions 

would need to be of!Set to the extent they impose more than de minimis costs. Examples of 

ancillary requirements that may require of!Sets include new reporting or recordkeeping 

requirements or new conditions, other than user tees, fur receiving a grant, a loan, or a 

permit. Analogously, if an action reduces the stringency of requirements or conditions fur 

transfer recipients or permit holders, the action may qualify as an EO 13771 deregulatory 

action. Also, an action that causes transfers that, fur example, induce moral hazard or other 

inefficient behavior may need to be of!Set and an action that reduces such transfers may 

qualify as an EO 13 771 deregulatory action. 

6 
81 

Please comult with OIRA on these actiom, especially with regards to potential distortionary 

costs due to transfers. See OMB Circular A-4 fur a discussion of the distinction between 

tramfcrs and costs generally. 

Q14. How are activities treated that are associated with regulatory cooperation or 

international standards? 

A: Regulatory activities associated with regulatory cooperation with fureign goveflllrents that 

reduce costs to entities or individuals within the United States, including at the border, or 

otherwise lower the cost of regulatiom on the United States economy, rrny qualify as 

EO 13 771 deregulatory actions. Activities associated with standard-setting that reduce costs 

to entities or individuals within the United States rrny also qualify as EO 13771 deregulatory 

actions. However, agency actiom to hannonize with the standards of an international body or 

fureign goveflllrent that increase costs on United States entities or individuals rrny need to 

be oflSet. OIRA recognizes such hannonization could also lead to operating effi:iencies fur 

businesses that agencies rrny be able to capture in their analysis of the benefits and costs of 

EO 13771 actions. 

Agencies should comult OIRA on how to treat specific regulatory activities related to 

regulatory cooperation or international standard-setting. 

Q15. Do regulatory actions overturned by subsequently enacted laws qualifY for savings? 

A: Generally, yes. OIRA considers Acts of Congress that overturn final regulatory actiom, such 

as disapprovals of rules under the Congressional Review Act, to operate in a similar rrnnner 

as agency EO 13 771 deregulatory actiom. 

Q16. Do regulatory actions that are vacated or remanded by a court qualifY as EO 13771 

deregulatory actions? 

A: If a regulatory action issued befure noon on January 20, 2017, is vacated by a judicial order 

for which all appeals have been resolved, OIRA will comider on a case-by-case basis 

whether the regulatory action being vacated qualifies as an EO 13771 deregulatory action 

If an EO 13 771 regulatory action was issued on or after noon on January 20, 2017, any 

judicial order for which all appeals have been resolved vacating the regulatory action, and 

any related subsequent agency action (such as a withdrawal of a vacated regulation from the 

Code of Federal Regulations in order to comply with the order), will not qualifY as an 

EO 13771 deregulatory action Any EO 13771 deregulatory actions used to of!Set a vacated 

EO 13 771 regulatory action, however, would be available to oflSet other EO 13 771 

regulatory actbns (after accotmting fur any sunk costs incurred in complying with the 

vacated actbn). 

If a court permits a regulatory action to rerrnin in effect after a judicial rerrnnd fur further 

agency proceedings, such as through rerrnnd without vacatur, the rerrnnded action rerrnins in 

effuct. 1herefure, there is no action at the time ofrerrnnd that could qualifY as an EO 13771 

7 
82 

deregulatory action In the same way that an agency complies with EO 12866 when issuing a 

subsequent agency action to revise a remanded regulatory action, an agency will similarly 

need to comply with EO 13 771. A subsequent agency action may qualifY as an EO 13 771 

deregulatory action if the subsequent agency action is deregulatory in nature, or may need to 

be ofiSet if the action is a significant regulatory action that is final and that imposes costs 

(i.e., an EO 13771 regulatory action). 

Agencies should notiJY OlRA of any judicial decisions that atrect regulatory acfuns subject 

to EO 13771. 

Q17. What happens if an EO 13771 deregulatory action is remanded or vacated by a court? 

A: As in the answer to the previous question, OlRA recognizes the inherent case-by-case nature 

of the issues raised by the potential remand or vacatur of an EO 13771 deregulatory action 

For example, such decisiollS may happen years after a rule is finalized, and may atrect 

compliance with both the cost allowances and the repeal provisions established pursuant to 

EO 13771. The agency should contact OlRA to determine how a remand or vacatur of an 

EO 13771 deregulatory acfun atrects the agency's obligations under EO 13771. 

Q18. Does EO 13 771 apply to significant regulatory actions in which the law prohibits the 

consideration of costs in determining a statutorily required standard? 

A: Because EO 13 771 applies only to the extent pennitted by law, agencies are still required to 

comply with their statutory obligations. Accordiogly, if a statute prohibits collSiderafun of 

cost in taking a particular regulatory action, EO 13771 does not change the agency's 

obligations under that statute. However, agencies will generally be required to ofiSet the 

costs of such regulatory actions through other deregulatory actiollS taken pursuant to statutes 

that do not prohibit consideration of costs. Because each agency's obligations will ditrer 

dependiog on the particular statutory language at issue, these issues nrust be addressed on a 

case-by-case basis. 

Please consult with OlRA regardiog questions about particular statutory language and its 

relationship to EO 13 771. 

Q19. How do the requirements of EO 13 771 apply to significant regulatory actions issued by 

one agency that do not have the force and effect of law until adopted, with or without 

change, by another agency? 

A: Because the agency authorities that establish such sequential or otherwise overlapping 

regulatory responsibilities differ by program, these actiollS will need to be handled on a 

case-by-case basis. However, agencies in these circumstances should always work together 

to avoid double-counting costs and cost saviogs; they should also work together as closely as 

possible when developing regulatory approaches fbr such programs. In cases where one 

agency's action does not qualifY as an EO 13771 regulatory action because it is not a 

significant regulatory action under EO 12866, associated acfuns by other agencies may still 

be covered by EO 13771. 

8 
83 

Q20. Does EO 13771 apply to regulatory actions of independent regulatory agencies? 

A: No. EO 13771 applies only to those agencies that meet the definition of"agency" in this 

guidance. Nevertheless, independent regulatozy agencies are encouraged to identifY existing 

regulations that, if repealed or revised, would achieve cost savings that would fully of!Set the 

costs of significant regulatory actions while continuing to meet the agency's statutozy 

obligations. 

V. Accounting Questions 

Q21. How should costs and cost savings be measured? 

A: Except where noted in other portions of this guidance, costs should be estimated using the 

methods and concepts appearing in OMB Circular A-4. There are several types of impacts 

that, under OMB Circular A-4, could be reasonably categorized as either benefits or costs, 

with the only diffurence being the sign (positive or negative) on the estimates. In most cases 

where there is ambiguity in the categorization of impacts, agencies should confurm to the 

accounting conventions they have fOllowed in past analyses. For example, if medical cost 

savings due to safuty regulations have historically been categorized as benefits rather than 

reduced costs, they should continue to be categorized as benefits fur EO 13771 regulatory 

actions. Identif'ying cost savings, such as fuel savings associated with energy efficiency 

investments, as benefits is a conn:non accounting convention fullowed in OIRA's reports to 

Congress on the benefits and costs of Federal regulations. 

Cost savings estimates fur EO 13771 deregulatory actions should fullow the same 

conventions, but in reverse. Only those impacts that have been traditionally estimated as 

costs when taking a regulatory action should be counted as cost savings when taking an 

EO 13771 deregulatory action. For example, the medical cost savings described above as 

historically being counted as benefits when regulating should not then be counted as 

"negative cost savings" when deregulating. 

An agency that has used different accounting conventions across diffurent past analyses 

should consult with OIRA regarding the categorization of ambiguous impacts. In general, 

when fuced with ambiguity, 0 IRA will attempt to achieve greater consistency in the 

categorization of similar types of costs and benefits across diffurent agencies. 

OIRA notes that rules that cause an increase in the resources used by Federal agencies to 

accomplish their programmatic goals may need to be of!Set, and rules that reduce the real 

resources used by Federal agencies to accomplish their goals may qualify as EO 13771 

deregulatory actions. These types of impacts have long been considered regulatozy costs 

under OMB Circular A-4, and are a component of the costs OIRA includes in its reports to 

Congress on the benefits and costs of Federal regulations. 

For EO 13771 deregulatozy actions that revise or repeal recently issued rules, agencies 

generally should not estimate cost savings that exceed the costs previously projected fur the 

9 
84 

relevant requirements, unless credible new evidence show that cost~ were previously 

underestimated. On the other hand, a less recent regulatory impact analysis (RIA) may need 

revisi:Jn to reflect, among other things, the met that only costs occurring after the effective 

date of the regulatory repeal should be the basis tOr the cost savings estimate (i.e., agencies 

should not cotmt sunk costs). Where an agency believes it can significantly improve upon a 

pmr cost estimate, especially a recent one, through methodobgical enhancements, the 

agency should first discuss those methodobgies with OIRA. 

Q22. How should cost savings be determined for regulatory actions that expand 

consumption and/or production options? 

A: For regulatory acti:Jns that expand consutq)fun and/or producfun options-sometimes 

referred to as "enabling" regulatory acti:Jns or regulati:Jns-cost savings should include the 

full opporttmity costs of the previously fOrgone activities. Opportunity cost in this context 

would equal the swn of conswner and producer surplus, minus any fixed costs. See 

OMB Circular A-4 tOr a more detailed discussi:Jn of these concepts. 

Generally, "one-time'' regulatory acti:Jns (i.e., those actions that are not pemdic in nature) 

that expand consutq)ti:Jn and/or producti:Jn opti:Jns would qualify as EO 13771 deregulatory 

acfuns. 

1bere may be situati:Jns where this approach for determining the cost ofiSets generated by an 

enabling regulatory acfun is inappropriate. For instance, this approach may not be 

appropriate in certain circwnstances where, if an agency were to mil to issue a regulatory 

acti:Jn, a significant existing and ongoing economic activity would be prohibited. See 

Qnestiln 26. Cost ofiSets for such regulatory acfuns will be determined on a case-by-case 

basis. 

Please consuh with OIRA on an such non-routine regulations. 

Q23. How does Executive Order 13771 apply to routine hunting andjishi11g regulatory 

actions? 

A. Routine htmting and fishing regulatory acti:Jns that establish annual harvest limits are not 

required to be ofiSet, and are not eligible to be used as cost savings. This includes migratory 

bird htmting liameworks under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act and fishery management plans 

and amendments under the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conscrvati:Jn and Management Act. 

This exemption does not apply to regulatory actions that affuct hunting and fishing activity 

that are not routine regulatory acti:Jns. 

Q24. What ba.~e year should age11cies use? 

A: Agencies shoukl adjust an estimates to 2016 dollars using the GDP deflator, as released on 

March 30, 2017, tmtil further guiiance is provided by OIRA. 

10 
85 

Q15. How should agencies calculate cost and cost savings for the purpose of EO 13771 

accounting? 

A: Agencies should calculate the present value (as of 2016) of costs for EO 13771 regulatory 

actions and cost savings for EO 13 771 deregulatory actions over the fuR duration of the 

expected effucts of the actions using both 7 percent and 3 percent end-of-period discount 

rates. 

Q16. In determining costs and cost savings under EO 13771, how should regulatory 

baselines be determined? 

A: For the most part, agencies shoukl fulklw the guidance about regulatory baselines provided in 

OMB Circular A-4. However, there can be uncertainty, whi:h is recognized in OMB Circular 

A-4, regarding how best to capture the directive to assess impacts against the state of the 

world in the absence of the regulation Provided below are two cases in whi:h this 

uncertainty, or other challenges arising in the context of OMB Circular A-4, have often been 

addressed by perfOrming analyses with multiple baselines. In each of these cases, OIRA has 

also provided guidance about how to detennine costs or cost savings fur the purposes of 

EO 13771: 

(1) When a regulatory action finalizes an interim final rule (IFR), agencies are typically 

encouraged to present two sets of estimates: the overall regulatory impacts and the 

incremental impacts relative to the IFR. For purposes of detennining costs or 

available cost savings under EO 13771, agencies finalizing an IFR should include 

only the incremental impacts of the final rule, relative to the IFR. 

(2) There are multiple Federal programs and policies-such as discharge general 

pennitting under the Clean Water Act or Medicare quality perfunnance trackingthat are updated or renewed at regular intervals via rulemaking. Because these 

updates reliably occur, an assessmeut of the incremental changes between the 

previous and updated programs is often much more infOrmative than a comparison of 

the updated programs against hypothetical discontinuance. Ahhough 

multiple-baseline analysis is likely to continue to be encouraged in such cases for 

analysis conducted under EO 12866, fur purposes of EO 13771, costs or cost savings 

shoukl be detennined by the incremental changes between previous and updated 

programs. For example, if an agency is statutorily or judicially required to issue a 

regulation every five years to pennit or prohibit an activity, and the agency previously 

issued a regulation to address the requirement, the appropriate baseline to use fur 

estimating the costs or cost savings of the new regulation under EO 13 771 is likely 

the existiog regulation (or interim operating conditions if there is temporarily no 

regulation in effuct). 

Please consuh with OIRA if you have questions regarding the appropriate baseline upon 

whi:h to calculate costs or cost savings. 

11 
86 

Q27. How should agencies treat unquantijied costs and cost savings? 

A: As stated in OMB Circular A-4, agencies should use their best effurts to monetize the effucts 

of both regulatory actkms and deregulatory actions and, in some cases, significant guidance 

documents. Depending on the likely magnitude of the effucts, such effurts may include 

conducting or sponsoring studies to develop monetized estimates. In proposed/draft 

regulatory acfuns expected to lead to EO 13771 regulatory acfuns or EO 13771 deregulatory 

acfuns agencies shoukl, at a minimum, clearly identifY any non-monetized costs or cost 

savings, explain the key reason(s) why monetization is not possible, discuss any infurmation 

the agency has that is relevant to estimating such costs, and request infurmation from the 

public to monetize such costs at the final stage. 

The weight assigned to unquantified effucts will depend on their significance and degree of 

certainty, and will be handled on a case-by-case basis. See OMB Circular A-4 fur more 

infurmation on unquantifted costs. 

Q28. How should agencies treat EO 13771 regulatory actions and EO 13771 deregulatory 

actions published by multiple agencies? 

A: These will be handled on a case-by-case basis. Agencies should consult OIRA as early as 

possible to determine the appropriate treatment of the action. 

Q29. Can agencies "bank" cost savings and deregulatory actions? 

A: Yes. Agencies may bank both EO 13771 deregulatory acfuns and the associated cost savings 

fur use in the same or a subsequent fiscal year towards EO 13771 's requirement to identify at 

least two existing regulations to be repealed (unless prohibited by Jaw) and, separately, to 

comply with the total incremental cost allowance. Surplus EO 13 771 deregulatory acfuns 

and cost savings do not expire at the end of a fiscal year and can be used in subsequent fiscal 

years. 

For example, if an agency issues fuur EO 13771 deregulatory actions, the agency may apply 

them to up to two subsequent EO 13771 regulatory acfuns, including those occurring in a 

future fiscal year. Regardless, at the end of each fiscal year, an agency must be able to 

identify, and should have finalized, twice as many EO 13 771 deregulatory actions as 

EO 13 771 regulatory actions. 

Similarly, if an agency issues two EO 13771 deregulatory actions with total cost savings of 

$200 million to offilet the cost of an EO 13771 regulatory action with a cost of$150 million, 

the agency may bank the surplus cost savings of $50 million to offilet the cost of another 

EO 13771 regulatory action, regardless of when the latter action is issued. See Questions 24 

and 25 fur accounting conventions that allow fur appropriate comparison of costs and cost 

saviogs experienced at diffurent time periods. 

12 
87 

Q30. Can EO 13771 deregulatory actions (and associated cost savings) be transferred within 

an agency? 

A: Yes. The requirements of EO 13771 apply agency-wide. An EO 13771 deregulatory action 

issued by a component in one agency can be used to o ffi;et an EO 13 771 regulatory action 

issued by a diffurent component in that same agency. 

Q31. Can EO 13771 deregulatory actions (and associated cost savings) be transferred 

between agencies? 

A: An agency that is not able to ideiJ.tifY sufficient EO 13771 deregulatory actions fur an 

EO 13771 regulatory action it intends to issue may submit a written request to the Director of 

OMB to assess whether the transfur of EO 13771 deregulatory action credits (after 

consultation with the supplying agency) would be appropriate befure submitting the 

EO 13771 regulatory action to OMB fur review under EO 12866. However, if the transfer is 

not appropriate, the agency must ideiJ.tifY adequate of!Sets absent an exemption 

VI. Process Questions 

Q31. How does EO 13771 affect the consideration of regulatory benefits or other 

requirements under EO 11866? 

A: EO 13771 does not change the requirements of EO 12866, which remains the primary 

governing EO regarding regulatory review and planning. In particular, EO 13771 has no 

effuct on the cousideration of benefits in infurming any regulatory decisions. For an 

EO 13771 regulatory actious and EO 13771 deregulatory actions, except where prohibited by 

law, agencies must contioue to assess and consider both benefits and costs and comply with 

all existing requirements and guidance, including bnt not limited to those in EO 12866 and 

OMB Circular A-4. 

Q33. Which EO 13771 regulatory actions might qualifY for a full or partial exemption from 

EO 13771 requirements? 

A: The fulbwing categories of EO 13771 regulatory actious may qualify for a ron or partial 

exemption from EO 13771 's requirements: 1) expressly exempt actious; 2) emergency 

actions; 3) statutorily or judicially required actions; and 4) de minimis actions. These 

categories are not exhaustive. For any EO 13771 regulatory action an agency believes 

qualifies fur an exemption under any of the circumstances provided below, agencies should 

submit exemption requests to OIRA prior to submitting the action to OMB fur review under 

EO 12866 or prior to publication of the EO 13771 regulatory action if it was not subject to 

EO 12866 review. 

• Expressly exempt -EO 13771 expressly exempts regulations issued with respect to a 

military, national security (see Question 7 above), or fureign affitirs function, and 

regulations related to agency organization, management, or personnel These actions 

qualify fur a ron exemption See 5 USC 553. 

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88 

• Emergencies -EO 13771 regulatory actions addressing emergencies such as critical 

health, safuty, financia~ non-exempt national security matters, or fur some other 

compelling reason, may qualify fur an exemption. In most cases, exemptions for such 

rules will be granted with respect to the timing of required of!Sets, allowing the 

agency to address the emergency befure identifying and issuing EO 13771 

deregulatory actions. Agencies will generally still be required to of!Set such actions. 

If necessary, the costs of such actions, and the requirement to identify fur repeal at 

least two existing regulations, will be moved to the subsequent fiscal year fur 

purposes of detennining EO 13771 compliance. 

• Statutorily or judicially required -EO 13771 does not prevent agencies from issuing 

regulatory actions in order to comply with an imminent statutory or judicial deadline, 

even if they are not able to satisfY EO 13 771 's requirements by the tit:oo of issuance. 

However, agencies will be required to of!Set any such EO 13771 regulatory actions as 

soon as practicable thereafter. In addition, this .flexibility may not apply to 

discretionary provisions attached to EO 13771 regulatory actions required to comply 

with statutory or judicial deadlines. 

• De minimis - EO 13 771 regulatory actions with de minimis costs may qualify fur an 

exemption. For example, if OIRA designates a proposed rule as significant tmder 

EO 12866 because it raises novel legal or policy issues, and the agency estimates the 

action would have present value costs of $50,000 spread over a large rn:nnber of 

persons and/or entities, OIRA may exempt the action from some or all of the 

requirements ofEO 13771. 

Q34. Is a significant final regulatory action exempt from the requirements of EO 13771 if 

the action was designated not significant at a prior stage? 

A: Generally, no. Any regulatory action that is i:lentified as significant at the final rule stage that 

imposes total costs greater than zero would need to be of!Set to comply with EO 13771, 

regardless of the detennination in an earlier phase. Therefure, the agency should consult 

OIRA as soon as possible if it believes an action that was not determined to be significant at 

the draft or proposed rule stage may now be detennined to be significant, perhaps due to 

substantive issues i:lentified through public comment or further agency analysis. 

Q35. How should agencies prioritize existing requirements to repeal or revise? 

A: Agencies should fullow the requirements in EO 13 777 fur prioritizing existing requirements 

to repeal or revise. EO 13777 establishes Regulatory Refurm Task Forces in agencies, and 

directs those task furces to evaluate existing regulations and make recommendations to the 

agency head regarding their repea~ replacement, or modif!Cation, consistent with applicable 

Jaw. EO 13 777 directs each Regulatory Refurm Task Force to identify regulations that: 

• Eliminate jobs, or inhibit job creation; 

• Are outdated, unnecessary, or ineffuctive; 

• Impose costs that exceed benefits; 

• Create a serious inconsistency or otherwise interfure with regulatory refurm initiatives 

and policies; 

14 
89 

• Are inconsistent with the requirements of section 515 of the Treasury and General 

Government Appropriations Act, 2001 (44 U.S.C. 3516 note), or the guidance issued 

plmluant to that provision, in particular those regulations that rely in whole or in part 

on data, infurmatbn, or methods that are not publicly available or that are 

insufficiently transparent to meet the standard fur reproducibility; or 

• Derive from or implement EOs or other Presidential directives that have been 

subsequently rescinded or substantially modified. 

EO 13777 further directs each Regulatory Refurm Task Force to seek input and other 

assistance, as permitted by law, from entities significantly affected by Federal regulations, 

including State, loca~ and tribal governments, small businesses, consumers, 

non-govermnental organizatbns, · and trade associatbns. Input from such public engagement 

may be used to prnritize recommendations to repeal or revise. 

Finally, where the costs of an EO 13771 regulatory action will be incurred entirely or to a 

large degree by a certain sector or geographic area, the agency should prnritize EO 13771 

deregulatory acoons that affuct the same sector or geographic area, to the extent feasible and 

permitted by law. 

Q36. Can regulatory and deregulatory actions be bundled in the same action? 

A: Yes, under certain circUIIJStances. Many acoons submitted to OIRA fur review under 

EO 12866 consist of logically coilnected changes to multiple but related secoons of the Code 

ofFederal Regulations. For example, a rule exempting some categories ofregulated entities 

from compliance with a prevbusly issued regulation may also require eligible entities to 

submit additional documentation to demonstrate eligibility fur the exempoon In these cases, 

it may be legitimate and appropriate to plmlue such changes through a single "bundled" 

acoon, and this guidance is not meant to materially change agency decision making in this 

area. Where an agency combines such provisbns, the cost impact (the diffurence between 

costs imposed and cost savings, per Quesoon 21) of such rules will generally determine 

whether such acoons are EO 13771 regulatory acoons that need to be oflSet, or EO 13771 

deregulatory acoons. Agencies, however, should avoid artificially bundling provisions that 

are not logically connected in a single regulatory actiln OIRA may determine that the 

regulatory and deregulatory portilns of the rule should be considered separately fur purposes 

ofEO 13771 compliance. 

Agencies should consult with 0 IRA when considering bundling regulatory and deregulatory 

acoons. 

Q37. When and how should agencies identifY EO 13771 deregulatory actions? 

A: The agency's Unified Agenda of Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions shoukl reflect 

compliance with the requirements of EO 13 771, .and should include, to the extent practicable, 

EO 13771 deregulatory actbns that, when combined with EO 13771 deregulatory acoons 

that are not regulatbns (such as Paperwork Reductbn Act infOrmation collection refurms), 

are sufficient to oflSet those actions appearing in the Agenda that are or are expected to result 

15 
90 

in EO 13771 regulatory actions. At a minimum, the agency should identify all EO 13771 

deregulatory actions, along with cost savings estimates, by the time it submits to 0 MB fur 

review under EO 12866 fue corresponding EO 13 771 regulatory action In the rare event that 

an agency is unable to identifY sufli;ient EO 13771 deregulatory actions, OIRA will address 

such a situation on a case-by-case basis. 

While each Federal Register ootice shouki identifY whether the regulation is an EO 13771 

regulatory action, fuere is no need to discuss specific ofiSetting EO 13 771 deregulatory 

actions within the same Federal Register entry. Additionally, ofiSetting fue costs of 

regulatory actions to comply with the requirements of EO 13771 shouki oot serve as the basis 

or rationale, in whole or in part, fur issuing an EO 13771 deregulatory action 

Q38. When must identified EO 13771 deregulatory actions be finalized? 

A: To the extent practicable, agencies should issue EO 13771 deregulatory actions befure or 

concurrently with the EO 13771 regulatory actions fuey are intended to ofiSet. By fue end of 

each fiscal year, including any carryover from previous fiscal years, agencies should have: 

(1) issued at least twice the number of EO 13771 deregulatory actions as EO 13771 

regulatory actions; and (2) appropmtely ofiSet the cost of all final EO 13 771 regulatory 

actions issued. The ofiSet shculd be consistent with fueir respective total incremental cost 

allowance fur future fiscal years, and agencies are expected to maintain compliance, to the 

extent practicable, throughout the year. These requirements exclude fuose EO 13771 

regulatory actions issued during the year fur which either law prohibits compliance with 

EO 13771 or the agency received an exemption from OIRA. When an agency receives a 

partial exemption from OIRA (e.g., with respect to the timing of EO 13771 deregulatory 

actions), the requirements shoukl be addressed as soon as practicable. Agencies should plan 

in advance and leave sufficient time, if necessary, fur OIRA to complete its review under 

EO 12866 or fue Paperwork Reduction Act, and fur agencies to publish in the Federal 

Register any EO 13771 deregulatory actions needed to comply with EO 13771 befure fue end 

of each fiscal year. 

Q39. What happens if an agency is not in foil compliance with the requirements of EO 

13771 at the end of a fiscal year? 

A: If; by the end of a fiscal year, an agency does oot finalize at least twk:e as many EO 13771 

deregulatory actions as EO 13 771 regulatory actions issued during the fiscal year, or has not 

met its total incremental cost allowance fur that fiscal year, the agency must, within 30 days 

of the end of the fiscal year, submit fur fue OMB Director's approva~ a plan fur coming into 

full compliance with EO 13771 that addresses each of the following: 

(1) The reasons fur, and magnitude o~ non-compliance; 

(2) How and when the agency will come into full compliance; and 

(3) Any other relevant infurmation requested by the Director. 

This excrudes EO 13771 regulatory actions that are exempt or where compliance with 

EO l3 771 is prohibited by law. 

16 
91 

0 MB may recommend that an agency take additional steps to achieve compliance, such as 

publishing a notice in the Federal Register requesting ideas from the public on EO 13771 

deregulatory actions to pursue. OMB may also request that agencies post plans approved by 

the Director. 

This guidance is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or 

proceduraL enforceable at Jaw or in equity by any party against the United States, its 

departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person 

17 
92 

Ms. BONAMICI. We also must recognize the consequences of deregulation. In fact in August the Regulatory Impact Analysis for 

the Trump Administration’s rollback of the Clean Power Plan, 

which is also known as the Affordable Clean Energy Rule, was released to the public with a shocking conclusion. In fact, a New York 

Times headline says it all: ‘‘Cost of new EPA coal rules up to 1,400 

more deaths a year.’’ These estimates were from the EPA’s own 

technical analysis. I request unanimous consent to enter this article into the record. 

Mr. ABRAHAM. Without objection. 

[The information follows:] 
93 

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Cost of New E.P.A. Coal Rules: 

Up to 1,400 More Deaths a Year 

By Lisa Friedman 

Aug. 21, 2018 

Want climate news in your inbox? Sign up for our Climate Fwd: newsletter. 

WASHINGTON- The Trump administration has hailed its overhaul of federal pollution 

restrictions on coal-burning power plants as creating new jobs, eliminating burdensome 

government regulations and ending what President Trump has long described as a "war on 

coal!' 

The administration's own analysis, however, revealed on Thesday that the new rules could also 

lead to as many as 1,400 premature deaths annually by 2030 from an increase in the extremely 

fine particulate matter that is linked to heart and lung disease, up to 15,000 new cases of upper 

respiratory problems, a rise in bronchitis, and tens of thousands of missed school days. 

Officials at the Environmental Protection Agency, which crafted the regulation, said that other 

rules governing pollution could be used to reduce those numbers. 

"We love clean, beautiful West Virginia coal;' Mr. Trump sald at a political rally Thesday 

evening in West Virginia, the heart of American coal country. "And you know, that's 

indestructible stuff. In times of war, in times of conflict, you can blow up those windmills, they 

fall down real quick. You can blow up pipelines, they go like this;• he said, making a hand 

gesture. "You can do a lot of things to those solar panels, but you know what you can't hurt? 

Coal:' 

Nevertheless, Thesday's release of the rule along with hundreds of pages of technical analysis 

for the first time acknowledged that the rollback of the pollution controls would also reverse 

the expected health gains from the tougher regulations. 

A similar analysis by the E.P.A. of the existing rules, which were adopted by the Obama 

administration, calculated that they would prevent between 1,500 and 3,600 premature deaths 

per year by 2030, and would reduce the number of school days missed by 180,000 annually. 

9112/2018, 1:38PM 
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The Trump administration proposal, called the Affordable Clean Energy rule, would replace the 

stricter Obama-era regulations that were designed to fight global warming by forcing utilities 

to switch to greener power sources, but which Mr. Trump, the coal industry and electrical 

utilities have criticized as overly restrictive. 

But the supporting documents show that the E.P.A. expects it to allow far more pollutants into 

the atmosphere than the regulation it would supersede, the Clean Power Plan. 

The Trump administration has made deregulation a centerpiece of its political strategy, and the 

E.P.A. has led the charge. The proposed weakening of the rules on coal-burning plants follows a 

plan to let cars emit more pollution. Transportation and, the power sector are the two largest 

contributors of carbon emissions. 

The data detailing the health effects of the coal-plant rules is the product of a longstanding 

E.P.A. requirement that new regulatory proposals go through a rigorous assessment. But as the 

agency works to roll back regulations on industry, it has also taken steps to sharply restrict the 

way it uses data to assess its own proposals. 

Critics say that these changes could make it more difficult to perform calculations like the one 

that the E.P .A. made public on Tuesday. As a result, the costs and benefits of sweeping new 

rules like these would be harder to assess. 

The numbers in both the analysis of the Clean Power Plan and its likely successor, the 

Affordable Clean Energy rule, are derived from an intricate three-part modeling system that 

the E.P.A. has used for decades to calculate the benefits and drawbacks of pollution regulation. 

The premature mortality numbers used in those models draw from a landmark Harvard 

University study, known as Six Cities, that definitively linked air pollution to premature deaths. 

Ultimately that study formed the backbone of the kind of federal air pollution regulations now 

being weakened. Today, however, the Six Cities study itself is under attack at the E.P.A. 

The agency is considering a separate rule that would restrict the use of any study for which the 

raw, underlying data cannot be made public for review. The argument for the rule is that the 

research work isn't sufficiently transparent if the data behind it isn't available for analysis. 

But scientists overwhelmingly oppose the move, pointing out that participants in long-term 

health studies typically agree to take part only if their personal health information won't be 

made public. 

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If the E.P.A. finalizes that rule, it would restrict the use of one of the main pieces of research 

that ties pollution to premature death, potentially maldng it easier for future E.P.A. 

assessments of health impact to assign a lower premature death rate by instead using other 

research. 

"What it would do is change the understanding of the benefits, or in this case the dis benefits, of 

a particular rule-making;' said Paul Billings, senior vice president for public policy at the 

American Lung Association. "It would exclude that important piece of Information." 

The E.P.A.'s analysis of the new Trump administration plan does include premature death 

calculations based on studies that are considered less comprehensive than the Six Cities study. 

Those analyses start at the possibility of an extra eight to 25 deaths a year under Mr. Trump's 

climate plan. 

The E.P.A. didn't respond to questions about its proposal to limit the scientific research used in 

its assessment. 

At its heart, the administration's Affordable Clean Energy rule will give individual states vast 

authority to set more modest goals and to regulate emissions from coal plants as they see fit. 

Critics assailed it on Thesday as a shortsighted effort that could set back the effort to tame 

global warming. 

"The Trump administration sees political value in this rollback, but our health and the 

economic promise of clean energy is at stake," former Vice President AI Gore said in a 

statement. 

Trump administration officials say the Clean Power Plan, in its effort to reduce carbon 

emissions, illegally tried to force electric utilities to use greener energy sources. The new plan, 

they said, would achieve many of the benefits sought by the Obama administration but in a way 

that is legal and allows states greater flexibility. 

"However much people may want E.P.A. to regulate power grids, however much people may 

want E.P.A. to demand that renewables be built instead of coal plants, we do not have that 

authority;' said William J. Wehrum, the E.P.A.'s air chief, on Thesday. 

A former coal industry attorney, Mr. Wehrum said that the agency had the authority only to 

"regulate emissions from things that emit" and not try to direct the broader direction of energy 

development. 

9/12/2018, 1:38PM 
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Andrew R. Wheeler, the E.P.A:s acting administrator, said on Tuesday: "We are proposing a 

better plan. It respects the rule of law and will enable states to build affordable, clean, reliable 

energy portfolios." 

The administration's proposai lays out severai possible pathways that individual states might 

use for regulating coal-fired power plants, and what the consequences would be for pollution 

and human health in each case. In the scenario the E.P.A. has pegged as the most likely to 

occur, the health effects would be significant. 

It is in that scenario where the E.P.A. estimates its plan will see between 470 and 1,400 

premature deaths annually by 2030 because of increased rates of microscopic airborne 

particulates known as PM 2.5, which are dangerous because of their link to heart and lung 

disease as well as their ability to trigger chronic problems like asthma and bronchitis. 

The Trump administration analysis also found that its plan would see 48,000 new cases of what 

it described as "exacerbated asthma," and at least 21,000 new missed days of school annually 

by 2030 because of an increase of pollutants in the atmosphere. 

Mr. Wehrum acknowledged Tuesday that there would be "collateral effects" on traditional 

pollutants compared to what the Clean Power Plan might have achieved. But, he said, "We 

have abundant legal authority to deal with those other pollutants directly, and we have 

aggressive programs in place that directly target emissions of those pollutants." 

For more climate and environment news. follow @NYTCiimate on Twitter. 

A version of this article appears in print on Aug. 22, 2018, on Page A1 of the New York edition with the headlim;. Cost of E.P.A.'s Pollution Rules: Up to 1.400 

More Deaths a Year 

READ 773 COMMENTS 

9/12/2018, 1:38 Pivf 
97 

Ms. BONAMICI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The pollutants, including carbon dioxide, nitrogen oxides, and 

particulate matter, are similar to those that would increase should 

glider regulations be rolled back. 

Mr. Long, my uncle was a long-haul truck driver and, like Representative Beyer said, he’s a small-business owner. We hear those 

concerns. We want to make sure that this committee can work on 

addressing those concerns without jeopardizing public health and 

the environment. 

Also, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Posey suggested that the EPA lab testing was somehow compromised because a check engine light was 

on one of the glider vehicles when it arrived at the facility. However, the EPA report fully acknowledges this and details that it 

was a result of oil in a connector—a connector of oil temperature 

sensor, and that was cleaned, reinstalled, and repaired prior to the 

testing. The issue did not reappear for the remainder of the testing, 

so implications that the study was compromised because of this are 

therefore demonstrably false. And I’d like to enter that EPA report 

into the record. 

Mr. ABRAHAM. Without objection. 

[The information follows:] 
98 

Chassis Dynamometer Testing of Two Recent 

Model Year Heavy-Duty On-Highway Diesel 

Glider Vehicles 

November 20, 2017 

National Vehicle & Fuel Emissions Laboratory 

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 

Ann Arbor, Michigan 
99 

Table of Contents 

I. Executive Summary ................................................................................................................. 3 

2. Test Program ........................................................................................................................... 4 

2.1 Glider Vehicle Descriptions ............................................................................................. 4 

2.1.1 Glider#! Vehicle Description .................................................................................. 4 

2.1.2 Glider#2 Vehicle Description .................................................................................. 5 

2.2 Road Load Coefficients .................................................................................................... 5 

2.3 Test Fuel ........................................................................................................................... 6 

2.4 Test Cycles ....................................................................................................................... 6 

2.5 Vehicle Test Site and Emission Measurements ............................................................. II 

3. Emissions Results .................................................................................................................. 13 

3.1 Criteria Pollutants ........................................................................................................... 13 

3.2 Particulate Matter (PM) .................................................................................................. 14 

3.3 Conversion of Distance Specific Emissions to Engine Work Specific Emissions ........ 16 

3.4 Simulated HD Federal Test Procedure and Supplemental Emission Test Results ........ 18 

4. Comparison to other HD Vehicle Emission Performance ..................................................... 20 

5. Appendix A ........................................................................................................................... 28 

6. Appendix 8 ............................................................................................................................ 33 

7. Appendix C ............................................................................................................................ 36 

2 
100 

1. Executive Summary 

This report summarizes the results from emissions testing of a 20 16 model year (MY) 

Peterbilt 389 sleeper cab tractor and a 2017 MY Peterbilt 579 sleeper cab tractor that were 

produced as glider vehicles (i.e., a vehicle with a new chassis and a used powertrain). In 

addition, these glider test results are compared to equivalent tests of conventionally 

manufactured 2014 and 2015 MY tractors. 

The glider vehicles tested include one of the more popular engine and vehicle 

configurations currently being produced as glider vehicles. These results are useful in evaluating 

the emission impacts of glider vehicles, and the observations made in this report are consistent 

with the expected emissions performance of heavy-duty highway diesel engines manufactured in 

the 1998-2002 time frame. 

The criteria pollutant emissions (NOx, PM, HC, CO) from the 2016 MY Peterbilt 389 

and 2017 Peterbilt 579 glider vehicles were consistently higher than those of the conventionally 

manufactured 2014 and 2015 tractors. The extent to which this occurred depended on the 

pollutant and the test cycle. 

• Under highway cruise conditions, NOx emissions from the Peterbilt 389 and Peterbilt 

579 glider vehicles were approximately 43 times as high, and PM emissions were 

approximately 55 times as high as the conventionally manufactured 2014 and 2015 

MY tractors. 

• Under transient operations, absolute NOx and PM emissions were higher for the 

Peterbilt 389 and Peterbilt 579 glider vehicles on all duty cycles. On a relative basis, 

the glider vehicle NOx emissions were 4-5 times higher, and PM emissions were 50-

450 times higher than the conventionally manufactured 2014 and 2015 MY tractors. 

• HC and CO emissions for the Peterbilt 389 and Peterbilt 579 glider vehicles were also 

significantly higher than the conventionally manufactured 2014 and 2015 MY tractors 

on a relative basis. However, on an absolute basis, they appear to be less of a concern 

than the NOx and PM emissions. 

• C02 emissions from the Peterbilt 389 and Peterbilt 579 glider vehicles were lower 

than the conventionally manufactured vehicles when measured on the chassis 

dynamometer without taking into account the differences in the aerodynamic drag 

between the vehicles. 

3 
101 

Ms. BONAMICI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Miller, thank you for your testimony. What is your assessment of the claim that Regulatory Impact Analyses are not necessary for deregulatory actions? And based on your expertise, what 

might a Regulatory Impact Analysis demonstrate for the proposed 

rollback of glider regulations? 

Dr. MILLER. I guess you noted OMB guidance—I think OMB circular A–4 in addition requires that regulatory and deregulatory actions all go through a regulatory impact assessment. And I think 

in this case, based on the number of excess emissions from glider 

vehicles with pre-controlled engines, especially the most popular 

pre-2002 engines, you’re talking about potential implications of up 

to 1,600 avoided premature deaths, and the costs of that is about 

$11 billion. When associated with the excess emissions of about 

5,000 glider trucks, if you do the math, that’s a foregone health 

benefit of about $1.1 million per truck. And that’s what a regulatory impact assessment of rolling back this loophole repeal would 

show. 

I would also like to state very quickly in this context of only two 

trucks, California also did roadside monitoring entered into the 

rulemaking docket that’s very consistent with the EPA dynamometer tests in the lab, and so there is backing for that as well. 

And I’d also like to emphasize the physical implausibility of an 

engine with no emission controls being as clean as an engine with 

modern emission controls. It defies physical explanation. The comment that sulfate emissions are reduced by 98 percent is technically true but irrelevant. Sulfate emissions—primary sulfate 

emissions out of a diesel engine are only a few percent of total particulate emissions. Most of it is carbon-based with toxic metals, 

organics. Sulfate is only a small part. The reason for lower—— 

Ms. BONAMICI. Dr. Miller, I want to get one more—I don’t want 

to interrupt, but I want—— 

Dr. MILLER. Sorry. 

Ms. BONAMICI. —interrupt, but I want to get one more—— 

Dr. MILLER. All right. Sorry. 

Ms. BONAMICI. —question in the remaining time. I noticed in 

your impressive bio that you have not only a science background 

but a law degree, so I wanted to ask you, the proposed EPA rule 

published in November of 2017 justified a repeal on restrictions on 

glider vehicle production by claiming that glider vehicles and engines do not constitute new motor vehicles or engines according to 

the Clean Air Act. What’s your response to that? 

Dr. MILLER. I think it defies the purpose of the Clean Air Act. 

It’s going through a legal contortion interpretation to undermine 

the general purpose Congress set out in the beginning of the Clean 

Air Act that it is to protect the Nation’s air resources and protect 

public health and environment. You really have to go through contortions looking at, for example, a 1958 consumer protection information law to try to get around the—you know, if it looks like a 

duck and it quacks like a duck, it’s probably a duck. These are new 

engines. These are new vehicles—with old engines, excuse me, installed, and they are meant to circumvent the post-2010 emission 

standards. They’re advertised as pre-emissions, and it’s the huge 

portion of our emissions inventory. 
102 

If these emissions are out there, our own local businesses are 

going to incur costs at two, maybe three, maybe four, maybe greater times to compensate for those emissions that we’re going to have 

to reduce, so those are additional costs we have to deal with. 

Ms. BONAMICI. Thank you. I see my time is expired. I yield back. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ABRAHAM. Thank you. I recognize myself for five minutes. 

I’m a physician by trade, and I was taught very early in medical 

school when you review a scientific article to look at the author, 

whether there’s bias or not, and look at the sample size. And I 

think in this particular EPA study there’s certainly a credibility 

issue as far as size and possible bias. 

Dr. Belzer, I’ll ask you. In my testimony I’ve got 800 independent 

and small-business truckers who, you know, their business, their 

livelihood depends on these trucks. What’s the estimated price difference between a glider and a new truck? That’s for you, Dr. 

Belzer. 

Dr. BELZER. It’s my understanding that it is 25 to 30 percent. It 

was a quarter to a third less expensive for a glider than a new 

truck, and therefore, a new truck would be about 40 percent more 

expensive than a glider. 

Mr. ABRAHAM. So if the EPA imposes these regulations that 

eliminate the cost-competitive option like these glider kits, is it safe 

to assume that the price for new trucks would go up? 

Dr. BELZER. I don’t know. I think that it might. I think that it 

depends on the proportion of sales involved. I suspect that the 

number of glider buyers who would go to buy new trucks is very 

small and that they would tend toward buying used trucks or rehabilitating their existing ones. I don’t think that the numbers of 

gliders is very large compared to the total number of heavy-duty 

class eight trucks being sold, so it’s possible that the price could 

go up, but it’s hard to tell how much that would be. I think the 

likely effect is elsewhere. 

Mr. ABRAHAM. Okay. And the likelihood of a glider owner having 

to go buy a new truck or actually buying a new truck is probably 

not significant? 

Dr. BELZER. Well, that is the key question. I believe that what 

EPA did in its paragraph of analysis is it assumed that that’s exactly what they would do and they would do nothing else. Now to 

be clear, I can’t tell what they did because they don’t disclose their 

model, but it is consistent with the estimated emissions, the reported emissions that are being bandied about, that they’ve taken 

the 5,000 or 10,000 gliders and replaced them with brand-new 

trucks. That would not happen in the market. 

Mr. ABRAHAM. Okay. Mr. Long, in your testimony you mentioned 

the growing popularity of glider trucks and how they play a great 

role in keeping the market stable and competitive. How does that 

EPA Phase 2 regulations on the glider industry impact the availability and affordability of truck equipment? 

Mr. LONG. I’m not sure we’ve really seen an impact yet, but it’s 

certainly going to affect how our drivers view decisions down the 

road on what to purchase, which they quite frankly have to face 

continuously. I mean, a truck can go south pretty quickly, and 

they’ll be forced to purchase a new vehicle. The problem is most of 
103 

our members can no longer afford new vehicles because of all the 

equipment that are associated with emissions reductions, technology that have been placed on them by the government. 

So also touching on what Ranking Member Bonamici had to say 

is that a lot of these members are forced to drive their current 

trucks into the ground before they even consider replacing them. 

These aren’t necessarily any cleaner than a glider kit, which they 

can at least specify with better aerodynamics, better fuel efficiency, 

so it really isn’t—the choice for our members is whether or not they 

continue with their current truck and try and get every mile out 

of it, whether they buy a new—excuse me, a used truck or whether 

they purchase a glider kit because they simply can’t afford new 

trucks at this point. 

Mr. ABRAHAM. Thank you. Ms. Tsang, in the case of glider 

trucks, the EPA under the Obama Administration did conduct a 

regulatory impact analysis before proposing the phase 2 greenhouse gas rules. However, this RIA lacked any thorough analysis 

on the glider provisions. Is it unusual that the EPA did not engage 

in a full analysis? 

Ms. TSANG. Thank you, Chairman. I can generally speak to the 

regulatory impact analysis process that EPA used. There was some 

justification in terms of why they were looking at certain modeling 

data for the glider kits, but beyond that, I can look further into 

that after the hearing. 

Mr. ABRAHAM. Okay. Is there any regulatory impact analysis on 

all aspects of a regulation required or are agencies required to follow the analysis? 

Ms. TSANG. In terms of wheather there are OMB procedures on 

how to conduct the regulatory impact analysis? 

Mr. ABRAHAM. Okay. Let’s continue that then. In the normal 

course, is it fair to say that agencies issuing rules that affect an 

entire industry would do such an analysis prior to proposing the 

rule? 

Ms. TSANG. Under Executive Order 12866, significant economic 

regulations are required to go through a cost-benefit analysis if it 

significantly affects the economy over $100 million, and there are 

other criteria as well. So if the agency considers a regulation a significant regulation, it must go through this cost-benefit analysis. 

Mr. ABRAHAM. Okay. Thank you. I’m out of time. 

Mr. Crist, you’re recognized. 

Mr. CRIST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to our witnesses for being here today. 

It seems to me that if the EPA moves forward with a repeal of 

glider regulations, that will effectively turn over the decision to 

how to treat gliders to the States. As I’m sure you know, California 

has already approved glider regulations that align with the 2016 

standards. There also seems to be a lot more awareness now than 

there was a few years ago of the health impact of gliders. Given 

this, and as a former Governor, I could see several States following 

in California’s footsteps. 

Dr. Miller, I’d be curious. Can you please comment on whether 

you think my interpretation of the situation is accurate? Could 

States start regulating glider vehicles on their own if there is no 

federal standard in place? 
104 

Dr. MILLER. Thank you. I will speculate. If—which I think is unlikely—but if it is determined EPA does not have statutory authority on the Clean Air Act to regulate glider kits, then States would 

not be preempted from regulating glider kits on their own. Based 

on the air pollution problem we have in the Northeast and presumably other States have similar problems elsewhere, I can say our 

States will look very, very closely at, at least banning glider kits 

with pre-2010 engines, and I would hope the glider kit manufacturers tell potential buyers that their trucks may not be allowed in 

those States. 

So yeah, I think it’s going to have an implication because we 

have to deal with these trucks. We have to deal with new trucks, 

too, meeting new standards. We don’t think they’re going to be 

clean enough for us, so it’s not just glider kits. It’s everything 

heavy-duty on the road, and we’ve got to deal with that or we’re 

not going to achieve our standards in public health protection. 

Mr. CRIST. What do you think would be a tipping point for States 

to decide to write their own regulations? 

Dr. MILLER. Well, allowing the unlimited production of pre-2010 

glider kit engines or glider kit vehicles with those engines, yeah. 

Mr. CRIST. What challenges might arise if different States have 

different policies on glider vehicles? 

Dr. MILLER. As I mentioned earlier, you’re going to have a problem with interstate trucking trying to go from one place to another 

where they may not be allowed to go through a particular State 

and have to go around it. 

Mr. CRIST. Dr. Miller, in your testimony you mentioned that the 

older engines typically used higher glider vehicles lack certain safety features such as electronic stability control and lane departure 

warnings. Can you elaborate on what these safety features are and 

how a driver and the public may be affected by the lack of these 

safety features? 

Dr. MILLER. Yes, so the most popular glider kit engines, the pre2010 engines, do not have the electronic capacity to run a number 

of modern electric safety features. That includes things like electronic stability control to prevent rollover, the adaptive cruise control to limit excess speed, and lane departure warnings to prevent 

collisions. So those are features that modern engines, current engines have the capacity to support but the older pre-2002 engines 

do not. 

Mr. CRIST. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, I yield back my 

time. 

Mr. ABRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Crist. 

Mr. Posey, you’re recognized. 

Mr. POSEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

This hearing was called because of a possible complicity between 

Volvo and career employees at the National Vehicle Fuel Emissions 

Laboratory to create a faulty if not fraudulent emissions study of 

gliders to eliminate competition from some small American manufacturers. Despite the other side’s attempt to make this an issue 

about whether gliders are good or gliders are bad or whether 

they’re hurting the environment or whether they’re helping the environment, this hearing is about an agency’s violation of the public 

trust, and that’s what we’re here to try and rein in. 
105 

And so, Dr. Miller, the Northeast States for Coordinated Air Use 

Management advocacy group, is it affiliated with other advocacy 

groups, lobbying associations, trade associations or think tanks? 

Dr. MILLER. Affiliated in a legal sense, no. 

Mr. POSEY. Okay. In a nonlegal sense? 

Dr. MILLER. We work with other groups that are common interest with the States— 

Mr. POSEY. Okay. 

Dr. MILLER. —and their interest to protect public health, yes, we 

do. 

Mr. POSEY. Have they ever been asked by advocacy groups, lobbying associations, trade associations, think tanks, or whatever to 

offer positions in an attempt to influence lawmakers or regulators? 

Dr. MILLER. We have been asked from time to time for those 

things, and we check with our States. If they’re consistent with 

their own State interests—we take all comers. I would assume if 

a constituent asked you something, you would look at it the same 

way. 

Mr. POSEY. Okay. Does it ever act in response to your request to 

influence lawmakers or regulators on behalf of those requesting assistance? 

Dr. MILLER. On behalf of—you mean the entity asking 

NESCAUM— 

Mr. POSEY. Yes. Yes. 

Dr. MILLER. —on their behalf? 

Mr. POSEY. Yes. 

Dr. MILLER. We do not ask on others’ behalf. It has to make 

sense for our States. We get asked, but we have to run it through 

our own States. If it’s consistent with our own State goals, then we 

own it. 

Mr. POSEY. Okay. Well, I’d like to introduce an email into the 

record from December 8, 2017, from Dr. Miller to Michael Myers 

concerning the glider repeal rulemaking. Are you familiar with 

this, sir? 

Dr. MILLER. Yes, I am. 

Mr. POSEY. Who is Mr. Miller—or Mr. Myers? 

Dr. MILLER. Mr. Myers is an Assistant Attorney General for the 

State of New York. 

Mr. POSEY. Okay. In this email you write, ‘‘We’ve been asked by 

EDF if NESCAUM could submit a comment deadline extension request to EPA. EDF thinks a request from a State organization 

might be better received at EPA than one from an environmental 

group.’’ How do you interpret that request? 

Dr. MILLER. I’m flattered. Here is a national environmental 

group that a number of people obviously think have a lot of influence, and on this particular issue, they think we as a regional 

State association and our States might actually have more influence than they do. 

Mr. POSEY. Okay. What does EDF stand for? 

Dr. MILLER. Environmental Defense Fund. 

Mr. POSEY. Okay. Dr. Belzer, I have an email uncovered under 

the Freedom of Information Act that shows possible collusion between Volvo and the EPA on initiating a glider test particularly. 
106 

Have you seen the email before you related to Steve Berry from 

Volvo Trucks to Bill Charmley and Angela Cullen of the EPA? 

Dr. BELZER. It’s not before me, and I don’t believe that I’ve seen 

that. 

Mr. POSEY. Okay. 

Dr. BELZER. Maybe I have, but it’s not before me and I can’t tell. 

Mr. POSEY. Okay. I was going to ask you some real good questions about that. All right. Well, I’m going to have to skip those 

questions. 

Mr. Chairman, I’d like to include this article for the record. The 

article touts Volvo’s efforts ‘‘as good as new, and the process has 

less impact on the environment’’ in remanufactured engines in 

Flen, Sweden. 

[The information follows:] 
107 

EPA-H0-2018-002121 Production Set #2 

To: Charmley, Wllllam[charmley.wllllam@epa.gov) 

From: Cullen, Angela 

Sent: Wed 9/6/2017 6:49:48 PM 

Subjecl: RE: Steve's voice-mall on possible tractor test program 

Bill, 

Just FYI, we talked today. Weare targeting to test two glider vehicles beginning9/18. TATD is 

in the loop with this testing. We can discuss more details when you are back in the office. 

Angela 

From: Charmley, William 

Sent: Tuesday, September 05,2017 4:47PM 

To: Berry Steve <steve.berry@volvo.com>; Cullen, Angela <cullen.angela@epa.gov> 

Cc: Moulis, Charles <moulis.cbarles@epa.gov> 

Subject: Steve's voice-mail on possible tractor test program 

Dear Steve, 

Thank you for your voice-mail today. I was in the office this past Friday, but we had some 

major T.T. issues at the Ann Arbor office this'past Friday. I know you mentioned a Friday voice· 

mail today, but so far I have not been able to listen to that/find it. 

Your message today indicated you wanted to talk ASAP about the opportunity for a test program 

on heavy-duty tractors at the EPA Ann Arbor laboratory, where Volvo would provide the test 

articles- perhaps one glider and one recent model year Volvo tractor. 

I am very interested in pursuing this opportunity. I am on travel Wednesday and TI1ursday of 

this week. Can you follow-up directly with Angela Cullen on this topic on Wednesday? 

ED_001620_00001434·00001 
108 

EPA·HQ-2018·002121 Producllon Set #2 

Best regards, 

Bill 

E0_001620_00001434·00002 
109 

Production 

altacllmenls on a D 13 engine for a Volvo truck 

in lhe Volvo Group, and also 

Volvo Penta, among otilers, 

Lars Ftimskog, plant manager of tile Volvo Parts Plant in Flett, Sweden 

Outside !he low buildings at the Volvo Parts Plant in Flen, Sweden, rows of 

are waiting under blue plastic before allowed to come in to the 

warmth. All !hal are Volvo dealers in 

are sent here, are one of 40 Volvo 

customers and the longest to remanufacture. 

"It takes around 57 hours from the moment the 

has been tested and Lars 

is brought into the 

plant manager in 

until it 

The remanufacturing process with The entire is taken 

the paris that cannot be r<>r•blm.,,rJ are sent for recycling, while !he parts !hat 

can be remanufactured are sent for and blasting. Once the moisture, oil 

residue and paint have move on to !he machining department 
110 

1\ co-ordinate measummenl machine is usod to cileel< the vnlvo !lousing 1/w/ controls the oil 

pressuro in o lJ 12 ongine. 

(~ngine. 

Here, many surfaces on 

blocks are sanded and 

such 

with 

cmnkshMI. This is one of/he many 

-as:soJnfJ,ie(J onco again moke 

heads, crankshafts and 

""''''''"'""and care. 

"All the come hem for a mason. Howover, as we don't know how an 

has been usee!, it's impmtan! to make sum !hal thoro are no uneven surfaces," says 

l<arlsson, a cylindtH head renovator. 

Like many of !lis colleagues, he knows a amount about 

Remanufacturing requires top-class skills. !he in Flen, different truck 

engine variants are remanufactured for Volvo 

"Most of the that arrive here are between and nine years However, 

we sometimes receive from 1970sl We make sure thai also take very 

good of them," adds 

During tile journey through the plant, 

When the time comes for 

produced modeL 

component is in several 

has to pass the same tests as a 

"A reconditioned engine carries the same warranty conditions as Genuine Volvo Parts 

and has the same quanty, and " says Lars 

A crankshaft for a D12 ongine is waiting to be sanded. During remanufacturing, it is imp01tant 

that evety irrogularily is removed and swfacos are made smooth. 

In addition to all the parts 

are made in accordance with 

means that the 

with new ones, 

latest each specific model. 

Flon are as good as new at the every least 

"We make sure that from fuel access to software, is optimised, The 

customers who choose to a remanufactured get a better product at 

a much lower price and, at !he same time, they mal~e an enviromnental contribution," 

says Lars Farnskog. 
111 

any 

is c/wckod to onsuro il cfoos not have 

gmenlirthL 

"Wo krww that tlw world's natural resources are limited and !hat tho 

matoria!s is rising. /\t the samo lime, our customers am up 

our products to be sustainable and re-usable," he says. 

of raw 

demand for 

To enable cores like transmissions and 

that they are prepared for this at !he 

collaborates closely will! product 

to be remamtfactured, it is important 

stage. For this reason, the plant in Flen 

and contributes input to at an 

early stage. 

"Preparing products for a second life represents enormous value for the company, 

our customers and the environment," says Lars 

products for 

the our customers and the 

Lars l'ilmskog 

Plant manager, Flen 

In total, Volvo Trucks offers 40 exchange pmts, including everything from fillers and pumps to 

transmissions and engines. 

40 -The number of Volvo parts Volvo Trucks offers everything from 

filters and pumps to transmissions and engines. 

85%- The reduction in energy consumption when a truck engine is remanufactured 

compared with new production. 

80%- The reduction in raw material consumption when a truck Elll£Jine is 

remanufactured compared with new production. 

90% -~ The level of recycling in an old truck engine. 

57- The average number of hours it takes to remanufacture a truck engine. 

150-·200 The number of different Volvo Trucks engine variants that are 

remanufactured. 
112 

21 0 - The number of employees. 

27,000 m•- The total area of the plant. 
113 

Mr. POSEY. And now, Dr. Belzer, Volvo trucks is a leading opponent to glider trucks, and they have said in their public comments 

that gliders are unclean and proclaim that the environmental harm 

that could result from the repeal of the phase 2 glider provisions 

is inexcusable. Can gliders be environmentally friendly in Sweden 

but here in the United States not environmentally friendly? 

Dr. BELZER. I would certainly agree that the statements do appear to be contradictory. I think that the right way to go about this 

is simply to recognize that if gliders are no longer available, there 

will be alternatives, and the alternatives are new trucks, used 

trucks, and retaining existing trucks in service a longer time. The 

latter two are probably going to have higher emissions than gliders, and so we don’t know the net change in emissions from banning gliders, and unfortunately, the EPA approach to assume away 

those other ways of complying—is a problem. Now, EPA had the 

authority to regulate all rebuilt engines instead of regulating gliders, but it chose not to do that. 

Mr. POSEY. Okay. Thank you, sir. I see my time is up. I yield 

back. 

Mr. ABRAHAM. Mr. McNerney. 

Mr. MCNERNEY. Well, I thank the Chairman, and again, I thank 

the panelists for testifying this morning. 

Some glider proponents have claimed that the Volvo truck group 

colluded with EPA’s Michigan lab to initiate a study on glider emissions. They also claim that the EPA lab officials never notified the 

EPA’s headquarters staff about these tests. These claims are demonstrably false, and I will show—in fact, EPA initiated a glider 

emission study as a response to a House Appropriations Committee 

report. And in July 2017 staff at EPA’s lab informed EPA’s leadership in Washington that they would begin scoping a glider test program. 

I’d like to enter these emails into the record, the first of which 

began on July 27, 2017, before the email that was submitted by 

Mr. Posey, showing that the House Appropriations Committee report urging EPA to conduct the study. 

Mr. ABRAHAM. Without objection. 

[The information follows:] 
114 

EPA-HQ-2018-002121 

To: Grundler, Christopher{grundler.chrlstopher@epa.gov] 

Cc: 

From: 

Lewis, Josh[Lewls.Josh@epa.gov]; Hengst Benjaniln[Hengst.Ben)amln@epa.gov] 

Dunham, Sarah 

Sent 

Subject 

Thur 7/27/2017 12:43:56 PM 

RE: Gliders in House Approps Report. 

Thanks-.:.was this in the FY18 committee report? 

From: Gnundler, Christopher 

Sent: Thursday, July 27, 2017 7:26AM 

To: Dunham, Sarah <Dunham.Sarah@epa.gov> 

Co: Lewis, Josh <Lewis.Josh@epa.gov>; Hengst, Benjamin <Hengst.Benjamin@epa.gov> 

Subject: Gliders in House Approps Report. 

Sarah--

Copied below is language from the House Appropriation Committee report urging epa to 

conduct a study of giider kit emissions impacts. 

We will start scoping out a test progurm at the lab regarding what such a test progurm could look 

like. 

Thanks 

Chris 

Gilder Kits.-The Committee notes that the Phase 2 rule for Me- dium and Heavy-Duty Engines 

and Vehicles is generally supported by the tnuckingjndustry. However, under the Phase 2mle, 

the Agency defined a glider kit as a new motm· vehicle for the pU1poses of regulation. The 

Committee recognizes that glider kits typically do not incorporate new engines; therefore, 

classifying a glider kit as a new motor vehicle 1-aises a number ofvalld concerns. The Committee 

ED_00162D_OD007297-00001 
115 

EPA-HQ-2018.002121 

also understands the intent of the provisions in the Phase 2 mle is to promote the removal of 

older, dirtier engines from the vehicle fleet in order to make air quality improvements. This is a 

policy that the Committee has s1rongly supported over a number of years albeit in a nonregulatory maoner through the use of grants to encourage engine retrofits. The Committee urges 

EPA to study the emissions impact of remanufactored engines used in glider kits, compared to 

new engines, and issue a repott to the Committee when available. 

Sent from my iPhone 

ED_001620_00007297-00002 
116 

EPA-HQ-2018-D02121 

To: Cullen, Angelatcullen.angela@epa.gov] 

Cc: 

From: 

Moulis, Charles{moulis.charles@epa.gov]; Charmley, William[charmley.wllliam@epa.gov] 

Berry Steve 

Sent: Wed 916/201711:48:58AM 

Subject RE: Steve's voice-mall on possible tractor test program 

Hi Angela 

Looks like we'll be able to provide at least one glider, more if you have time to test. A Volvo test 

article as well, if you don't already have "modern product" data for comparative pmposes. 

Two good places to start: 

I) Test program: UDDS? Chassis dyno operation atRMC points? GHG 55/65/ARB 

transient? 

2) . Scheduling: Soonest you can test? How long should we plan for each truck to be in Ann 

Arbor?· 

I can be available for a discussion before 9, betv<reen 10 and 12, and betv<reen 2 and 5. (All 

Eastern times). I'll try to tie in Jeff Marley as well. 

Steve 

From: Charmley, William {mallto:charmley.wllliam@epa.gov] 

Sent: Tuesday, September 05, 2017 4:47PM 

To: Berry steve; Cullen, Angela 

Cc: Moulls, Charles 

Subject: Steve's voice-mail on possible tractor test program 

Dear Steve, 

Thank you for your voice-mail today. I was in the office this past Friday, hut we had some 

ED_001620_00001637-00001 
117 

EPA-HQ-2018-002121 

major I.T. issues at the Ann Arbor office tl1is past Ftiday. I know you mentioned a Friday voicemail today, but so far I have not been able to listen to tbat/flnd it. 

Your message today iudicated you wanted to talk ASAP about the opportunity for a test program 

on heayY-dnty tractors at the EPA Ann Arbor laboratory, where Volvo would provide the test 

articles -perhaps one glider and one recent model year Volvo tractor. 

I am very interested in pursoing this opportuoity. I am on travel Wednesday and Thursday of 

this week. Can you follow-up directly with Angela Cullen on this topic on Wednesday? 

Best regards, 

Bill 

This email message and any attachments tnay oontalh confidentlallnfor'matlon and may be privileged. Jfyou are not the Intended 

recipient or otherwise not authorized to receive this message, you are prohibited 1o use, copy, disclose or take any acUon based on 

this email or any Information contained herein. If you are not !he intended recipient, please advise the sender Immediately by 

replying to this email and permanently delete this message and any attachments from your system, 

ED _001620_00001637-00002 
118 

Mr. MCNERNEY. Thank you. I also would like to submit for the 

record an article showing that the California’s Air Resources Board 

condemned the EPA’s move to allow high-polluting older trucks on 

the road. In fact, this report shows that one old dirty engine with 

a glider test kit is equal in emissions to 450 new trucks. I’d like 

to submit this for the record. 

Mr. ABRAHAM. Without objection. 

[The information follows:] 
119 

9/11 '2018 California's top air agency strongly condemns EPA's move to allow high-polluting. o!der trucks on roads 

California's top air agency strongly condemns EPA's move 

to allow high-polluting, older trucks on roads 

'l,, ww2.arb.ca.gov/news/ca!ifornias:-top~air-agency-strong!y-condemns~epas-move-aHow-high-polluting-o!der-truckNoads 

SACRAMENTO- Decades of clean air progress stand to be reversed if the U.S. EPA opts to repeal 

its rule on limiting production of "glider kits," said Steve Cliff, Deputy Executive Officer of the 

California Air Resources Board, testifying at a public hearing today at EPA headquarters in 

Washington D.C. 

A 'glider kit' is a new truck chassis and cab that includes a refurbished diesel engine and power 

train. In almost every case, these kits include much older so-called 'pre-emission' engines from 10, 

15 and up to 20 years ago. These engines evade current diesel-powered truck tailpipe standards. As 

a result, compared to current clean trucks, they emit massive amounts of smog-forming pollution 

and toxic carcinogenic soot, directly impacting public health. 

"If you enjoy driving behind a truck belching clouds of black carcinogenic smoke, you can thank EPA 

for putting many more of them on the roads, rather than cleaner modern models," said CARB Chair 

Mary D. Nichols. "This illegal effort by EPA will open the floodgates to allow unlimited numbers of 

old and dirty trucks to pour onto our streets and highways masquerading as brand new clean 

trucks." 

Full Testimony 

Glider-kit truck at a recent CARB inspection 

station 

The requirements for glider kits, set to go into 

effect in January 2018, were developed during 

three years of close coordination between CARB 

and the EPA. The current EPA Administrator- who 

was not part of that process- now seeks to repeal 

the requirements, effectively eliminating any cap 

on the number of kits that can be manufactured 

within a given time frame. 

Glider kits are legitimately used when compliant 

trucks are damaged leaving the chassis unusable 

but the engine intact. But recently some 

manufacturers have been abusing the glider 

provisions to build vehicles with no emission 

controls, and market them as new trucks. 

Currently, some 10,000 'glider kits' are sold each 

year, about one out of 20 heavy-duty (Class 7 and 

8) tractor trucks sold. This is a vastly greater 

113 
120 

9/11/2018 California's top air agency strongly condemns EPA's move to allow h(_gh-pol!uting. older trucks on roads 

number than just a decade ago. Repealing the current caps on glider kit production would 

essentially allow an unfettered number of older, dirty engines onto the market. These trucks lack 

filters that trap toxic diesel soot and also lack controls that limit smog-forming nitrogen oxides. 

Based on U.S. EPA's own testing this year, glider vehicle levels of NOx (oxides of nitrogen, a 

precursor to smog) were 4 to 40 times higher than those of modern trucks. Levels of diesel 

particulate matter (a toxic air contaminant linked to cancer and a host of respiratory and cardiac ills 

including asthma) were 50-450 times higher. CARS's own analysis confirms these figures. 

According to Cliff, repealing the rule and allowing unlimited numbers of glider kits on the road will 

damage public health. CARB analysis determined that a single pre-emission engine in a new glider 

kit puts out the equivalent of up to 450 modern trucks (with engines from 2010 or later). 

Emissions from one dirty engine + glider = emissions from 450 dean trucks 

one dirty engine 

+glider kit 

--

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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 

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~~ ......... ~~..~. ................................. ~ ... ~~~ __ ... _._... ... _i..Jo.t. 

In fact, these glider kit trucks are so dirty that if they made up less than 7 percent of all mediumand heavy,duty trucks in California the pollution they emit would completely offset the clean-air 

benefits of California's current efforts to clean up the state's diesel trucks and buses. This puts 

Californians at risk, and would make it impossible for California to meet our federally mandated air 

quality standards. 

Cliff also noted that allowing unlimited numbers of dirty glider kit trucks destroys the current 

regulatory level playing field for diesel truck manufacturers. "It has been a major undertaking ·on the 

part of U.S. manufacturers to integrate complex emission controls into their heavy-duty diesel 

engines," he said in his testimony. "[They] have made significant financial investments and have 

structured their future product plans taking these investments and emission control commitments 

into account." 

?I~ 
121 

California's top air agency strongly condemns EPA's move to allow high-polluting, older trucks on roads 

Cliff added that "if EPA continues to shirk its duty to protect the public's health and welfare and our 

nation's air quality ... [it] would put engine manufacturers that have invested significant resources to 

comply with current emission standards at a competitive disadvantage." 

Since 2000, California has led the nation and the world in developing strong programs to reduce air 

pollution from all diesel sources including ships, trucks, buses and passenger vehicles. Specifically, 

California's Truck and Bus Regulation calls for all heavy-duty trucks to have 2010 or newer engines 

in place by 2023. 

Cliff urged EPA representatives to listen to public health advocates, air quality agency 

representatives and manufacturers present at the hearing, united in their opposition to the glider 

rule repeal. He also reminded the EPA representatives to follow through on its mandate to protect 

the environment and its "duty to protect air quality and the health of Americans." 

https://www.prlntfriendly.com/p/g/jGZCLc 3/3 
122 

Mr. MCNERNEY. Dr. Miller, you’ve read the EPA’s report on glider emissions. Can you please tell us whether you saw any red flags 

in reading that report, and why do you think this report is important and valuable? 

Dr. MILLER. Yes, I’ve read the report, and I also, prior to this 

hearing checked with my own states and other states outside my 

region on their own practices, and everything in that report is consistent with State testing practices that our own membership does 

and elsewhere, the use of accredited facilities, the use of standard 

test cycles. 

The protocols exist. We don’t need to reinvent them. The certification protocols exist. They were followed. They were clearly presented in the report. All the data collected were clearly presented 

in the report. They actually did fix that—the malfunction indicator 

light before they tested. They indicated that they did that. They 

showed the data both with the light on, testing without the light. 

It was all transparent. The analysis is transparent. It’s all numerical. It was done under test cycles that reflect actual real-world 

driving conditions including load pulling. This is all standard stuff. 

There’s nothing in there that I can see that just smacks of Jerryrigging the results. 

Mr. MCNERNEY. And do you believe that—the CARB’s claim that 

one dirty truck with the kit is equal to 450 clean trucks in emissions? 

Dr. MILLER. I will hedge on that in the sense that it’s one truck. 

I do agree that, based on their measurement, that one truck had 

the emissions of 450 new trucks. Depending on other trucks they’ll 

be all over the place. I do think, based on the testing, that in general one can say it’s about an order of magnitude higher. In that 

case it’s two orders of magnitude higher. I don’t know if that’s an 

outlier, but I’m pretty confident it’s at least an order of magnitude 

across the board. 

Mr. MCNERNEY. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. ABRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. McNerney. 

Dr. Marshall? 

Mr. MARSHALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First of all, I’ll start with Mr. Long and say I’m grateful. We 

have I guess 1,300 drivers in my district. Kansas maybe the second-, third-most number of highway miles in the country. I represent the largest ag-producing district in the country. The one 

thing that my ag producers can do for sure is get our commodities 

to market cheaper than any competitors out there, and your industry is a big, big part of that. So I’m grateful for the business that 

they do do. My first job was loading cattle trucks. I was 15 years 

of age working at a sale barn and worked with a lot of your members as well. 

In that industry right now, one of the biggest challenges that 

they’re facing, these small owners, the small companies, Mr. Long? 

Yes. 

Mr. LONG. I would say one of the biggest challenges is indeed 

overregulation, and a lot of it is caused by larger entities kind of 

forcing their will through the government, whether it be regulatory 

or legislative, to require more mandates and more safety devices 

that aren’t actually improving safety. There’s a laundry list of 
123 

issues that we’re currently fighting to prevent that would simply 

increase costs for our members and burdens for our members rather than promote highway safety, improve their economics, or improve their efficiency. So this is just another example we think of 

smaller members—or, excuse me, smaller businesses getting lost in 

the discussion and just allowing a government entity and a large 

corporation to kind of dictate the discussion and ultimately the outcome when our members are going to bear the largest burden, 

whether it be cost or potentially even running them out of business. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Maybe you talk about electronic logging devices 

a second, how they’re impacting you, especially the live animal 

hauling industry. 

Mr. LONG. Sure. Only a fraction of our members are involved in 

the livestock industry, and we appreciate the relief that they’ve 

been getting from Congress or that they will soon be getting from 

Congress. The ELD issue has been another example of large corporate motor carriers convincing unfortunately you and your colleagues—maybe not all of you here at the table today because it 

did happen back in 2012—that ELDs were a safety device, and our 

members contend that they certainly are not—they just track their 

hours. They don’t promote safety at all. So that’s an example of a 

$2 billion mandate that has been kind of forced upon our industry 

by larger corporate motor carriers in an effort to diminish our efficiency and increase our costs. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Okay. Thank you. I’ll go to Dr. Belzer. 

Dr. Belzer, I’m a physician, and as I try to review EPA research, 

I really have a hard time following it. And I would say that if we 

practice medical research the way the EPA does, we wouldn’t be 

making some of the great advances that I’m seeing. 

When they did their analysis, an average trucker 100,000 miles 

a year, about six miles to the gallon, and from what I understand, 

these gliders have about a 25 percent better gas mileage. Is that 

accurate? And that’s about 4,200 gallons a year of savings of fuel, 

less fuel being burned, which certainly would mean less pollution. 

Did they take that into account in their calculations? I couldn’t follow that. 

Dr. BELZER. Well, I certainly couldn’t either because I don’t think 

the analysis is actually there. The regulatory impact analysis does 

not have that inside it. It has two or three paragraphs describing 

these glider provisions but does not have the analysis. There is the 

paragraph in the preamble to the final rule that contains the sum 

total of what EPA has disclosed with regard to its analysis, so I’m 

afraid that’s all we have to go on. Everything else to me is just 

hearsay. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Also wanted to mention we had a new EPA pathway for sorghum oil to be turned into biodiesel. Would that have 

any impact on an EPA analysis of this situation if it was coming 

from sorghum oil rather than the traditional fuels? 

Dr. BELZER. Yes, I have no information or expertise on that, and 

I keep out of things in which I don’t have expertise. I do recall, 

though, that the apparent comparison for gliders is based on the 

emissions standards as of roughly 2001, but a very large EPA rule 

on mandating ultralow sulfur diesel that was promulgated after 
124 

those engines were made, so I would like to know whether the EPA 

estimate takes account of the emission reduction from the ultralow 

sulfur fuel rule, which had substantial benefits according to the 

EPA when they regulated it. That would be useful to know what 

the actual emissions are and to compare them with the fuel that 

is actually in use. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Thank you, Dr. Belzer. I yield back. 

Mr. ABRAHAM. Thank you, Dr. Marshall. 

Mr. Palmer? 

Mr. PALMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Continuing on that 

theme by Congressman Marshall, Dr. Belzer, in your testimony you 

discussed a range of consumer responses to no longer being able to 

purchase gliders. Can you elaborate a little bit more about those 

potential consumer responses and how the phase 2 rule, even if it 

was hypothetically based on valid scientific studies—which I think 

there’s been substantial doubt raised about that—would be counterproductive to what the regulators hoped to achieve in the first 

place? 

Dr. BELZER. Well, a common phenomenon with regulations that 

make major changes in, let’s say, tailpipe emissions standards is 

that they do have effects on the market, and so there will often be 

what’s called a pre-buy. The regulations will go into effect in a few 

years, and during that period of time, those who would be interested in purchasing trucks later will purchase them sooner in order 

to get in under the wire and do that. So we can predict that. I believe in EPA’s phase 1 greenhouse gas rule they took that into account. For some reason they didn’t do that this time. But that is 

a known phenomenon. 

I’ve seen articles in the press suggesting that there are long 

waits now for vehicles, for heavy-duty trucks. Some of that is driven by the economy, but part of it is a predictable response to the 

high cost of the phase 2 standards. You should expect a lot of truck 

sales to occur prior to that in order to beat that. That happens normally. It happens in trucks; it happens in automobiles as well. It’s 

a normal phenomenon. And that’s why the Clean Air Act has—it 

has a provision in it requiring that the effective date for new standards to be delayed a few years so that manufacturers can catch up 

and be prepared to accommodate that. 

Mr. PALMER. What I find interesting about a lot of this in listening to the questions from my colleagues on the other side of the 

aisle bringing up these various problems from emissions is that, 

since 1980, our economy’s expanded by probably close to 500 percent. Vehicle miles have gone up 98 percent. Population’s up over 

30 percent. The energy consumption’s up over 30 percent. Emissions are down by over 50 percent. 

And a lot of the discussion here is around like asthma rates. 

Asthma rates are at record levels even though the air quality is 

substantially improved. So I think that, you know, the typical scare 

tactics from the left on these things that completely misses the real 

problem, a lot of it has to do with living conditions, household conditions. But I know that doesn’t matter to a lot of people, the facts 

don’t, so let me go on and ask Mr. Long a question. 
125 

You know, in my district I have over 360 owner-operators. You 

made a statement that I’d like for you to elaborate on. You said 

there’s not a shortage of drivers. That’s not been our experience. 

Mr. LONG. Sure. If you look at the driver turnover rate among 

large motor carriers, it’s above 90 percent a year, so essentially 

they’re almost having two drivers per position in the course of a 

year. We think that’s the actual problem, that they’re turning 

through drivers at an exceptional rate. We think steps can be 

taken by Congress to ensure that our career is one that is appealing and one that is sustainable rather than one where a young 

driver enters with no hope of making an actual career out of it because he doesn’t make the money, he works in difficult conditions, 

and no one’s really working to address either of those. 

So we think that rate could certainly come down among smaller 

fleets. The turnover rate is typically much lower. Drivers get paid 

better. They have more uniform schedules. They’re home with their 

families more. And those are all steps that can be taken on a national level to certainly address the turnover problem. 

Mr. PALMER. The turnover problem, though, how does that impact the individual driver in terms of the more cost that gets added 

by regulations and particularly how it impacts with the glider rule? 

Mr. LONG. Sure. Well, this is an example of an area where our 

members are being priced out of the industry. And let’s keep in 

mind that our members owner-operators are the safest on the road 

by far. 

Mr. PALMER. Can you put that in context to the bottom line, you 

know, their take-home pay versus expense? 

Mr. LONG. Yes, a lot of what we’ve been talking about in purchasing new trucks is—well, our members can save 25 percent on 

glider kits. That’s not necessarily the discussion simply because 

they can’t afford the new trucks. They’re not really saving anything 

if they can’t afford it in the first place. So for them glider is an affordable option and also improves their MPGs and it improves their 

reliability. 

So as far as bottom lines are concerned, our members run on the 

slimmest of margins, so expecting them to be capable of purchasing 

a new truck, it’s just not realistic. 

Mr. PALMER. Mr. Chair, my time is expired. I will make a comment to you, though. You and I have talked about this issue of air 

quality and asthma—— 

Mr. ABRAHAM. Yes. 

Mr. PALMER. —and even CDC and others have indicated this 

length that has occasionally tried to be—they try to make, for instance, in a hearing like this is missing the mark, and I appreciate 

your indulgence. I yield back. 

Mr. ABRAHAM. All right. Mr. McNerney, you have another—— 

Dr. MILLER. Excuse me. Could I clarify—I’m sorry—that comment on asthma? 

Mr. ABRAHAM. Yes, sir. 

Dr. MILLER. This is a common misperception I hear quite a bit. 

Nothing in these comments or my comments or in the—what I say 

as the basis of the EPA rules are based on air pollution causing 

asthma as a disease. Whatever causes asthma, I don’t know. I’m 

not the expert. But the problem with the air pollution—and it is 
126 

correct, as you’re saying, the increase in asthma rates. The problem 

with air pollution is that it exacerbates asthma attacks in people 

who already have asthma for whatever reason. 

Mr. PALMER. I appreciate the gentleman making that clarification. I wasn’t directing the comment to you. It was a comment 

made by one of my colleagues. But the fact of the matter is is that 

the problem with asthma has increased substantially even though 

air quality has improved remarkably. And you’re right; we don’t 

know the cause of asthma, and that’s one of the conclusions that 

came out of a CDC report. But I thank the gentleman for his clarification. 

Mr. ABRAHAM. Mr. McNerney? 

Mr. MCNERNEY. Well, thank you. I appreciate the Chairman for 

allowing me another round of questions. It’s quite remarkable that 

the Majority is questioning the, ‘‘scientific integrity and validity,’’ 

of the EPA’s glider emissions study that was conducted at a nationally accredited laboratory while ignoring the study conducted by 

the Tennessee Tech University that formed the basis for the EPA’s 

proposed repeal of the glider rule. 

Now, let me review a few facts. The Tennessee Tech study was 

funded by Fitzgerald Glider Kits and conducted in an unaccredited 

Fitzgerald laboratory. The study concluded that the remanufactured engines performed better or even on par or better than conventional engines emitting fewer hazardous chemicals. According to 

the Interim Dean of Tennessee Tech’s College of Engineering, no 

credentialed engineering faculty members oversaw the testing, 

verified the data or calculations, or even wrote or reviewed the 

final report submitted to Fitzgerald. The Interim Dean also said 

the conclusion of the testing were sent to Representative Diane 

Black, including a, ‘‘far-fetched scientifically implausible claim that 

manufactured truck engines met or exceeded the performance of 

modern pollution controlled engines with regard to emissions.’’ 

The Principal Investigator of the study removed his name from 

the study, returned his portion of the Fitzgerald funding, and filed 

a scientific misconduct claimant with the university. Aside from the 

flawed testing, protocols, and unsupported conclusions, he was disappointed that the study had been used for political purposes and 

wrote, ‘‘The misuse of results to support political opinions is a dangerous precedent that should worry all university employees.’’ No 

final report has been issued, and the data from the study has not 

been publicly released. The General Counsel at Fitzgerald Glider 

Kits has argued that the data in the study are protected from disclosure by the university. 

Finally, the President of the Tennessee Tech wrote to the EPA, 

to Representative Black, and Fitzgerald telling them all that they 

should not reference the study in any way until the university’s scientific misconduct investigation is complete. I would like to submit 

documents supporting my—what I’ve just said to the Majority for 

the record. 

Mr. ABRAHAM. Without objection. 

[The information follows:] 
127 

June i:S,2017 

The Honora~Ie b,iane 91ack 

!131 Longworth HOB 

WashiJ!gtoll, DC. 205is 

Qfft~e· of the Pre~ident 

. T':Ellilliiss:EE Ti:clr 

Ref\!~ellce:TennesseeTt;ch Uniyersity- Sunimlu:y of Heavy Duty .Truck Study and Evil)uation (){the Phase H Heavy Duty Tllick Rule · 

Congr~SAJIIIl.BJack: 

f:!1)Jl! ~~P\,effi~r~Q!§- ~qyem~et2016~ the. T~n,n(lss~ Tech!Wl)Jgical Up.ivt!r§it:Y D!;pa$t~nt ()f('.ivil 

arid.Enyiroi!Jli¢1'ltalf:l1gil).<#il).g tTenne~see Tech").cond~cted#Je fit:st phas.e ofiits~s~;jrchon ih.e envirQ!uil~lltaJ 11l1d t;con~>,!!l!c imjiact ofthe}Jr~erihouse (]a~ Ernlfslons 1111d f~el ~fiiclellcy Siandards 

for Me!cliiun- ai:tdHeavy-buty Engines and Vehicles- Phase 2 rule.(''Pha5~2Rule').:pub!i~jlt;d 

OctoQe(i5, 2016 .. The K~Y area~ ofr~S~I!J'C~ were to .o) Cornp!l!e G}lder Kit compli\ll),C¢ Mtll the 

Ph~e 21~ule; (2) ~~norm hig~l¢vef environmentaUootprint 11110 eC()nomic stu~y ()f?'E¥ • nt!Ullifa~tur\ngys: as$ern~ly ofre.in!lnJlfactured components (Gii!:ler K:its); alld (3)Ev!I!Jlate jndustzy 

op(imi.zafi<ll). P:Ia.ns ~o ad4re~s future environmental regulations including but not limited io produ~tion 

ve~Jicle§, cofuponent *SSI;(inbly, ,and :f~t~IJify compliance. . 

To ciirl;y put tli~ <mViEown<mtal·footprint cornponent()fthe research, '!"ennessee Tecjl \¢Steil thirteen 

h!l'avy'dii(Y \f:llck§ <>n a. comrn()n ch~tssis dyiliunorneter ~t. a coliimtiq :Site: eight truck$ were · 

r~rnaiill~~~rt;~ engil\el\ ~n? five ~ere Ol:;M ''certified:' engities;<!ll' \'{ith Io~ !llii~ag~~Ptf::: These 

B,~e Llne~eUil1¢.f.9~e!Jesl,l!t$ :wer¢ d51i1P!eted bY testi'l~ <?t~IY o!}t; ~li?§r ~ifffil\!1\i'f~t~Jill:e~~s · P:WQqc( . QJ;ty!~s pr\)dil£t). Eachyehi¢1ewliS ~v;tluare~ f()r fiieletJicJency; ~wboJtil\otll>)dde 

(CO),<P ... ·. •. . . . ~ MaiJe~ (~@ ~miss!ons li1J4 nitrogen oxide <N<N,. J'l!e result~ of!heettiiss.it)i:is.test ~ere cornpllf.elJwith t4e ~~J()EP.I\'emissjqil8st~ndllfds f<Jr HDVs, Q.u,r r.est;ai'ch shq\Vl!(j,that opiimi:~;edand rem;t,nufac~r,ed ;20()2-2007 engines and (')EM ''certifie.d" eilg!nesperform¢d :equally as 

\V¢!lll!ld.in some in~tances ouVperformed the OEM engines. (see also Appenaix A for more det11iled 

test results). 

Tennessee Tech I Sox 5007 Cookeville, TN 38505 I 931·372·3241 1 F:.931~37~·6331 t·www.tntech~edu(p_re$ldent 
128 

Congressman Black 

June 15, 2017 

While none of the vehicles met the NO, standard, a glider remanufactured engine achieved the best 

result of any engine tested (see Appendix A). Further, our research showed that remanufactured and 

OEM engines experience parallel decline in emissions efficiency with increased mileage. Contrary to 

the assertion in the Phase 2 Rule, it is our estimate that the glider kit HD V s would emit less than 12% 

of the total NO, and PM emissions, not 50%, for all Class 8 HDVs. Should the Phase 2 glider cap be 

fully implemented on January 1, 2018, there is little doubt that consumers utilizing glider vehicles, due 

to economic considerations, will delay purchasing new equipment and consequently, slow the 

reduction of engine emissions nationwide. In this regard, the Phase 2 rule is counter-productive to its 

stated intent. 

In addition to equal or lower emissions, glider kits have a smaller carbon footprint than OEM vehicles 

due to fuel efficiency and recycling of materials. Comparisons between 2016 glider kit vehicles and 

new EPA compliant vehicles for fuel efficiency reflect that glider kits are 20% more efficient on fuel 

consumption. Glider vehicles also reuse engines and other components in the remanufacturing 

process, resulting in the reuse of approximately 4,000 pounds of cast steel. The engine assembly alone 

accounts for approximately 3,000 pounds of recycled cast steel. Thus, the well-documented 

environmental impact of casting steel, including the significant NOx emissions, is avoided by reusing 

cast steel components in glider vehicles. Consequently, given the superior fuel efficiency and the 

reuse of cast steel, glider vehicles have a lower carbon footprint than OEMs. None of these facts were 

considered in the development of the Phase 2 rule. 

From an economic standpoint, Tennessee Tech examined the impact of the Phase 2 Rule sales cap of 

300 units for glider kits would have on the State of Tennessee. The 300 unit sales cap represents 9% 

of Fitzgerald's current sales. It is estimated that a 91% reduction in output by Fitzgerald would result 

in a direct loss of approximately 947 jobs and a loss of approximately $512 million of economic output 

in the State of Tennessee alone. This impact takes into account the direct and indirect economic 

impact, including expenditures on labor, operations and maintenance as well as changes in the supply 

chain throughout the state. Additionally, on a broader scale, the economic impact of the Phase 2 Rule 

coUld easily exceed $1 billion nationwide due to thousands of pennanent job losses and supply chain 

interruption and reduction. The Phase 2 Rule failed to sufficiently evaluate and consider these 

impacts. 

Finally, this phase of the research shows that trucking companies that utilize glider kit HDVs in their 

fleets are vigilant in maintenance and elect to optimize their fleets to maximum efficiency throughout 

the life span of the vehicle. Further, glider kit assemblers facilitate research and development for 

OEM's by conducting innovative research for fuel additives, emission devices, tire and wheel 

combinations in small production runs and are currently testing components, light weight drive 

systems, alternative fuel mixtures, autonomous drive systems, light weight body materials, and 

intelligent transportation systems. As a general statement, our observation is glider assemblers are in 

tune with industry needs and cutting edge innovation. 

2 
129 

Congressman Black 

June 15,2017 

Tennessee Tech will continue to evaluate HDV engines during Phase II of the research in 2017. Such 

effort will be conducted in conjunction with the Oak Ridge National LaQ- Fuel Engines & Emissions 

Research Center. The goals of the next phase include development of engineering and manufacturing 

solutions that exceed EPA emission standards, a focused research, development, and testing plan for 

NO, emissions, and to continue testing to demonstrate continuous improvement of emissions from 

remanufactured heavy-duty engines. 

(~ Philip B. Oldham 

President 

Thomas Brewer 

Associate Vice President 

Center for Intelligent Mobility 

3 
130 

APPENDIX A: Testing Results from Tennessee Tech Phase 1 Heavy Duty 

Vehicle Study 

Engine Type CO (g/HP * hr) PM (2010 standard= 15.5) 

- Detroit Diesel ReMan 0.290 BTD 

DD15 

Caterpillar ReMan 0.212 BTD 

CT13 -·~· 

Detroit Diesel ReMan 1.553 BTD 

Series 60 

Detroit Diesel ReMan 1.959 BTD 

Series 60 

Detroit Diesel ReMan 0.015 BTD 

Series 60 -· ··-

Detroit Diesel ReMan 0.317 BTD 

Series 60 

Detroit Diesel ReMan 0.483 BTD 

Series 60 

Detroit Diesel ReMan 0.467 BTD 

Series 60 

Detroit Diesel OEM 0.491 BTD 

DD15 

Detroit Diesel OEM 1.169 BTD 

DDIS 

Detroit Diesel OEM 0.556 BTD 

DDIS 

Detroit Diesel OEM 0.098 BTD 

DDI5 

Detroit Diesel OEM 1.558 BTD 

DDI5 

*BTD-below threshold detectJOn pomt 

•• NO, (g!HP • HP)(20 I 0 standard = 0 .2); All tested engines were higher than the standard and ranged from a low of 0.44 

to a high of 6.45. The lowest tested NOx was a Fitzgerald- Reman Detroit Diesel DD 15 using proprietary Fitzgerald 

engine design and set up. That same engine also tested at the 0.290 Co rate. 

4 
131 

Office of the President 

February 19,2018 

The Honorable Diane Black 

1131 Longworth HOB 

Washington, DC 20515 

TENNESSEE TECH 

Reference: Tennessee Tech University- Summary of Heavy Duty Truck Study and Evaluation 

of the Phase II Heavy Duty Truck Rule 

Congressman Black: 

Please be advised that regarding the "Environmental & Economic Study of Glider Kit 

Assemblers" report, knowledgeable experts within the University have questioned the 

methodology and accuracy of the report. Therefore, Tennessee Tech University is actively 

pursuing a peer review of the report and supporting data to assure its validity. The University 

also is investigating·an allegation of research misconduct related to the study. We request that 

you withhold any use or reference to said study pending the conclusion of our internal 

investigations. 

We sincerely regret any inconvenience this imposes, but our aim is to ensure the absolute 

integrity and objectivity of any scholarly product of Tennessee Tech. We anticipate a timely and 

thorough review following which we will inform you of the outcome. Thank you for your 

assistance and patience as we work through the concerns raised. 

Philip B. Oldham 

PBO/ds 

Tennessee Tech I Box 5007 Cookeville,TN 38505 I 931-372-3241 I F:931-372-6332 1 www.tntech.edutpresident 
132 

Office of the President 

February 19,2018 

Honorable Scott Pruitt 

USEPA Headquarters 

William Jefferson Clinton Building 

1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W. 

Mail Code: llOIA 

Washington, DC 20460 

TENNESSEE TECH 

Reference: Tennessee Tech University- Summary of Heavy Duty Truck Study and Evaluation 

of the Phase II Heavy Duty Truck Rule 

Mr. Pruitt: 

Please be advised that regarding the "Environmental & Economic Study of Glider Kit 

Assemblers" report, knowledgeable experts within the University have questioned the 

methodology and accuracy of the report. Therefore, Tennessee Tech University is actively 

pursuing a peer review of the report and supporting data to assure its validity. The University 

also is investigating an allegation of research misconduct related to the study. We request that 

you withhold any use or reference to said study pending the conclusion of our internal 

investigations. 

We sincerely regret any inconvenience this imposes, but our aim is to ensure the absolute 

integrity and objectivity of any scholarly product of Tennessee Tech. We anticipate a timely and 

thorough review following which we will inform you of the outcome. Thank you for your 

assistance and patience as we work through the concerns raised. 

~ Philip B. Oldham 

PBO/ds 

Tennessee Tech I Box 5007 CookeviUe, TN 38505 I 931-372-3241 I F: 931-372-6332 1 www.trrtech.edU/president 
133 

Office of the President 

February 19,2018 

Mr. Tommy C. Fitzgerald 

Fitzgerald Glider Kits 

575 Technology Dr. 

Sparta, 1N 38583 

TENNESSEE TECH 

Reference: Tennessee Tech University- Summary of Heavy Duty Truck Study and Evaluation 

of the Phase II Heavy Duty Truck Rule 

Mr. Fitzgerald: 

Please be advised that regarding the "Environmental & Economic Study of Glider Kit 

Assemblers" report, knowledgeable experts within the University have questioned the 

methodology and accuracy of the report. Therefore, Tennessee Tech University is actively 

pursuing a peer review of the report and supporting data to assure its validity. The University 

also is investigating an allegation of research misconduct related to the study. We request that 

you withhold any use or reference to said study pending the conclusion of our internal 

investigations. 

We sincerely regret any inconvenience this imposes, but our aim is to ensure the absolute 

integrity and objectivity of any scholarly product of Tennessee Tech. We anticipate a timely and 

thorough review following which we will inform you of the outcome. Thank you for your 

assistance and patience as we work through the concerns raised. 

f~ Philip B. Oldham 

PBO/ds 

Tennessee "ll!ch I Box 5007 Cookeville, TN 38505 1 931·372·3241 1 F: 931-372·6332 1 www.tntech.edu/presldent 
134 

~~~ 

qZGERALD 

February 26, 2018 

YIA CERTIFIED MAIL 

VIA ELECIRQNIC MAIL 

Philip B. Oldham 

President 

Tennessee Tech University 

1 William L. Jones Dr 

Cookeville, Tennessee 38505 

poldham@lntech.edu 

Kae Carpenter 

University Counsel 

Tennessee Tech University 

1 William L. Jones Dr 

Cookeville, Tennessee 38505 

kcarpenter@tntech.edu 

Joseph M. DePew 

(Vli)881·3B93(p) 

(V31)21fl.6975(f) 

i4epew@fitzgeroldlrurksoles.com 

Re: Demand for Preservation of Documents Related to Glider Emissions Study 

and Fitzgerald Glider Kits 

Dear President Oldham and Ms. Carpenter: 

As you no doubt are aware, in 2016 Fitzgerald Glider Kits ("FGK") approached Tennessee Tech 

University ("TTU") with the idea of sponsoring research related to a U.S. Environmental 

Protection Agency rule entitled "Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Fuel Efficiency Standards for 

Medium- and Heavy-Duty Engines and Vehicles-Phase 2." TTU accepted FGK' s proposal. The 

research, which began in or around June 2016 and was conducted by several individuals who are 

copied on this letter, involved testing emissions from FGK-rebuilt engines and new OEM engines 

and performing an economic impact study related to FGK's business (the "Study"). The first phase 

of the Study was completed in late 2016, and the second phase was completed in late 2017. 

The Study is protected from disclosure under Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-7-120(b). TTU officials have 

represented publicly and privately that the Study has not been disclosed. Nevertheless, certain 

members of the TTU faculty and administration have publicly called into question the accuracy 

and validity of the Study. Some of those individuals are copied on this Jetter. I fit is true that TTU 

has complied with Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-7-120(b) (and we currently have no reason to believe 

otherwise), it must also be true that most of the members of the faculty and administration who 

have casted doubt on the Study have not actually reviewed it. 

filzgerold Glider Kits I 575 Tethnofogy Drive I Sporto, Tennessee 38583 
135 

February 26,2018 

Page2 

The Study is now the subject of an internal "misconduct in research" investigation. In a 

February 19, 2018letter addressed to Tommy C. Fitzgerald, President Oldham instructed FGK to 

"withhold any use or reference to said study pending the conclusion of [TTU's] internal 

investigations." As the Study's sponsor, FGK is faced with one of two possibilities: 

(1) the Study, which FGK did not take part in, is flawed or involved some sort of 

misconduct; or 

(2) the Study is valid, and the criticism of the Study is unfounded. 

FGK has no reason to believe that the Study is in any way inaccurate or invalid. To be sure, we 

do not have engineers or scientists on staff and we lack the ability to perform the type of research 

that the Study called for. TTU represented to FGK that the university was fully capable of 

conducting the Study, and our funding of the Study was predicated on those representations. 

We were surprised to learn that the principal investigator (PI) of the Study, Dr. Benjamin Mohr, 

the Chair of TTU's Civil and Environmental Engineering Department, was the research 

misconduct complainant. We also understand that Dr. Mohr is now claiming that his involvement 

in the Study was minimal. That the PI assigned to the Study is attempting to distance himself from 

the Study is conceming.1 TTU represented to FGK not only that it was capable of conducting the 

Study, but also that a PI would be involved in the Study. 

FGK expected, like any other sponsor of funded research would reasonably expect, properly 

conducted research and findings that it could rely on. We did not expect to receive work product 

that some have characterized as "flawed and shoddy" or "farfetched and scientifically 

implausible," and we certainly did not expect to be defamed by faculty members and 

administrators from the very institution that conducted the research. These faculty members and 

administrators have attacked the Study for the ostensible purpose of protecting TTU's reputation. 

We appreciate that there may be other motivations. Whatever the intent, these public statements 

have damaged the business and reputation ofFGK and the Fitzgerald family. 

We hereby demand that TTU preserve all documents in its possession, custody or control, whether 

in paper or electronic form, which relate to the Study or FGK. Such documents would include, 

but would not be limited to, documents tending to show that the Study is flawed, shoddy, 

inaccurate, untruthful or scientifically implausible. If it is determined that the Study is any one of 

those things; then TTU's conduct during the course of the Study, as opposed to the statements of 

certain faculty members and administrators, will have been the cause of the damage to FGK and 

the Fitzgerald family. 

1 As the sponsor of the Study, FGK reviewed some ofTTU's files related to the Study as part of 

TTU's effort to respond to a public records request. Those files reflect several instances where 

Dr. Mohr gave written approvals and received funded research payments through the end of2017, 

when the Study was completed. 
136 

February 26,2018 

Page3 

If you have any questions, please call me at (931) 881-3893. 

cc: Tommy C. Fitzgerald, Fitzgerald Glider Kits (via e-mail) 

Thomas Brewer, Associate Vice President, Strategic Research Initiatives, 

Tennessee Tech University (via e-mail) 

Mark Davis, Academic Support Associate, Civil & Environmental Engineering, 

Tennessee Tech University (via e-mail) 

Darrell Hoy, Ph.D., Interim Dean, College of Engineering, 

Tennessee Tech University (via e-mail) 

Christy Killman, Faculty Senate President, Tennessee Tech University (via e-mail) 

Karen Lykins, Chief Communication Officer, Tennessee Tech University (via e-mail) 

Benjamin Mohr, Ph.D., Chair & Associate Professor, Civil & Environmental 

Engineering, Tennessee Tech University (via e-mail) 

Andrew Smith, Professor, English Department, Tennessee Tech University (via e-mail) 

Bharat Soni, Ph.D., Vice President for Research & Economic Development, 

Tennessee Tech University (via e-mail) 
137 

MEMORANDUM 

TO: Christy Killman, President TTU Faculty Senate 

FROM: 

DATE: 

SUBJECT: 

Melissa Geist, Faculty Representative, TTU Board of Trustees 

julia Gruber, President, AAUP 

Darrell Hoy, Interim Dean, College of Engineering ~ 

02/16/2018 

Request for Your Groups to Continue to Urge President Oldham to Publically 

Suspend TTU Support for the Results of the Fitzgerald Study and Letter to 

Congresswoman Dianne Black 

On behalf of the College of Engineering, I would like to request your assistance, as elected 

representatives of the TTU faculty, to continue to urge President Oldham to immediately 

and publically suspend TTU support of the results of the Fitzgerald testing, and withdraw 

the letter sent to Congressman Dianne Black on june 15, 2017, which contained assertions 

based on the aforementioned testing. The suspension of this support and withdraw! of the 

letter would be temporary, pending the results of the internal and external investigation. 

By not publically suspending the support for the Fitzgerald testing and the letter to 

Congressman Black, pending the results of the investigations, the University is effectively 

remaining in support of these studies by their non-response. This lack of a public response 

has, and is continuing to do significant damage to the reputation of this Institution and in 

particular, the College of Engineering. 

I contend that the evidence placed into the public arena and public docket of the EPA by 

both Fitzgerald and TTU themselves, cast sufficient doubt that the burden of proof is now 

on President Oldham to show why the administration continues to lend its tacit support to 

the Fitzgerald testing and his letter to Dianne Black. 

Furthermore, as clearly revealed in the questioning of Associate Vice-President Tom 

Brewer and Vice-President Bharat Soni during the Faculty Senate meeting on jan 29, 2018 

(minutes available on the faculty Senate website) that no qualified. credentialed 

engineering faculty member (1) oversaw the testing, (2) verified the data or calculations of 

the graduate student, (3) wrote or reviewed the final report submitted to Fitzgerald, or (4) 

Tennessee Tech 1 Box 5041 1 1010 Peachtree Avenue I Cookeville. TN 38505 1 931-372-3172 I F: 931-372-6172 1 

tntoch.edu 
138 

wrote or reviewed the letter submitted to Dianne Black with the farfetched, scientifically 

implausible claim, that remanufactured truck engines met or exceeded the performance of 

modern, pollution-controlled engines with regards to emissions. 

Since no qualified, credentialed engineer was involved, the work performed is by definition 

not a scientific research study and therefore afforded the protections offered by TTU Policy 

780 "Misconduct in Research". Furthermore, there is no policy that prevents the President 

from putting the University's support of this testing on hold, pending the results of an 

official investigation. 

The damage already done and continuing to be done to the reputation of the University is 

significant, and as an institution, we cannot afford to wait weeks and months until these 

investigations are completed. The recent article on the front page of the New York Times 

(published on 15 February 2018) referred to the "engineering experts" on the Fitzgerald 

study. The study was, of course, not conducted by engineering experts at all, yet the 

damage to our College has already been done. 

Since I did not start in my current position until August, 2017, after the Fitzgerald testing 

had been completed and the letter had been sent to Dianne Black, I first learned about this 

issue via a Nov. 10, 2017 article in the Washington Post. As more negative press and 

questions began arising in the national and local media, I became increasingly concerned as 

I learned more about the details of the testing and claims that had been made in the letter. 

On Dec. 22, 2018, in a cellphone conversation with President Oldham, I mentioned the fact 

that several faculty in the College had raised concerns in this regard. In a follow-up phone 

call the next day to his Chief of Staff, Lee Wray, I further emphasized that I did not believe 

that the University could defend this study. On Jan. 23, 2018, myself and Associate Dean 

Vahid Motevalli met with Lee Wray and Karen Lykins (Director of the Office of 

Communications & Marketing. During this meeting, we expressed our grave concerns 

about the Fitzgerald project, including the devastating five-page critique of the "flawed TTU 

study" that appeared in the public docket of the EPA by the Environmental Defense Fund 

(EPA-HQ-OAR-2014-0827) on January 5, 2018. I concluded the meeting by urging (almost 

begging) that the Administration immediately suspend support for the project, pending an 

internal investigation. In a follow-up meeting, with Chief of Staff Lee Wray on Jan. 26,2018, 

he confirmed that he had delivered the message to the President, the President had 

considered my input, but that they also had other input supporting the study. On the 

following Monday, jan. 29,2018 the members of the Faculty Senate from the College of 

Engineering proposed a draft resolution to the Senate, which after modification, became 

the Faculty Senate Resolution that was approved by a vote of 33 to 1, and was sent to the 

President on Tuesday, Jan. 30, 2018. Item 2 in this Resolution stated: "Issue a letter, signed 

by the President, withdrawing all Tennessee Tech support from the study, pending the results of 

the aforementioned investigation". In his response, the President declined to issue such a letter, 

and based on his email yesterday, Feb. 15, 2018, addressed to "Faculty/Staff', he is maintaining 

that position. 

I realize this memo and the facts that I have brought to light may be a "professional suicide" with 

regard to my position as Interim Dean. However, if that is what it takes to help force a more 

Tennessee Tech I Box 5041 I 1010 Peachtree Avenue I Cookeville. TN 38505 I 931-372-3172 I F: 931-372-6172 1 

tntech.edu 
139 

active response from the University and stop the damage to the College, I do it willingly and 

without hesitation. 

Tennessee Tech I Box 5041 I 1010 Peachtree Avenue I Cookeville. TN 38505 1 931-372-3172 1 F: 931-372-6172 1 

tntech.edu 
140 

Civil and Environmental Engineering TI!NN.ESSEII Tli:CH 

TO: Dr. Philip Oldham, President 

FROM: Dr. Benjamin Mohr. Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering 

DATE: Janimry 25. 2018 

SUBJECT; Withdrawal as Prlnclpullnvcstigator 

Eflective immediately, 1 withdraw as the Principal Investigator of tlw current research project funded by l'ltzgerald, along 

with any implicit support qf statements that. have been ptiblicly released by lhe univ~rsiiy. While my role has been largely 

administrative, t can no longer be a.'lSociated in any way with this research project. l had no role in (rtor prior knowledge 

ot) the dissemination of results vJn letter by yourself and Mr. Tom Brewer, and subsequently included ln an EPA petition. 

I have verbally expressed my displeasure regarding the matter ta Mr. Brewer and the conflict oflmerest this has created. I 

indicated that this would likely lead to "bad press" and is not consistCllt with the typical release of information for 

industry-sponsored projects. All this time, I have been reassured tlJat the univ!m!ity was W\lrking on a plan to combat the 

negative publicity and feedback. However, 1 can no longer sit back and wait for a respOilse, which I may or •nay not agree 

with. 

In addition. a graduate student has been caught in the middle of this diletitma. In early January. 1 (along with Mother 

member oft he graduate student's commiNee) met with Mr. Brewer and stated that we do not Sllpport the student writing a 

thesis. A change !rom a thesis to non-thesis was largely due to our concerns over placing .our names on whnt Would 

ultimately become a public document. As such, concerns over the hanilllng of data and the subsequent release have been 

made known over the past few months. 

Jlacl< to the beginninll-M'It~$!\l'ile~,.P-Lln.slgnlng..the.pl'll]®t..Jiroposn~~\!l¢wed,.but-4il!-ilo~\J.'i11-~ 

understanding that the lnteilt of the project was to pertbrm mli!l.l.Y-Il comparisons of emissions from two ola.'lSeS of die8el 

engines (havlnghad previously conducted researchr~ga(diryg .NO,, SO,, and other environmental confarrilrtants). Other 

~ortions of the project (e.g., legal )ssues am:! ecpnomic analysis) were subcomracted to other units within Tennessee 'fech. 

The emissions !lata were never Intended to be used as absolutes, nor directly couipareil to EPA standards. Any subsequent 

imalyses regarding engine modifications, or similar, wo11l.d then be conduct,eu by quruilie<l individuals in engine 

performance, Upon conclusion of the project, perhaps a peer-reviewed journal article would h11Ve been submiUed. This is 

ultimately nul nQw .tho results were used. 

Furthermore, I was not given the opporlutlity to review my research reports prior to their submis;ion to the Industry 

sponsor. While I am listed ns the PI ut the top of the Phase I res~nrch report, I did not contribul,e nor review the report 

prior !o dissemio~tion. In a<klition. on the Phase llruporl, I am nol listed as 1'1, instej!d Mr. Brewer is listed as PI (see 

attached). Again, I was not given the opportunity to conuilent on this report. While I do not necessarily refute the reports. 

f do m1t believe the conclusions drawn ai'Q objective or support statements made in the aforementioned leftcr nnd included 

in the RPI\ petition. In my opinion. this violate.• uny and all ucademic and research principles, p(l.~sibly including 

Tennesse¢ Te¢11 Polk~ 780. 

I hove done my best throughout my academic career to support the University to the best of my ability; however, lam un 

academic and have no Interest in the political role this project has played. The reputulion of the College ()j' Engineering 

and 111ysclf have been damaged by Ollf unwilling involv~ment in a political fight. While I have .taith that the daia collected 

is valid, I he results have been ml~represented and improperly hnndled. A• such, t am withdrllwing a• PI and ! encourage 

the univerJ;ily ro wlthdmw its public statements until !further irtlormution can be gathered. 

Tonnaao® Toch I BOJ< 5015 I dookeviUe, TN 38505 I 931·372·3454 f F: 931-372·623\lltntocb.edulo .. 
141 

Ohril an4. :IDn,m~n,:m,en,tal I" Engin~ering 

TIUIUitESUiil TECH 

tO: Dr. l:lhatat Soni, Office of Research and Economic Development 

FRO!\>i: D1'. Benjamin Mohr, Department of Civ.il atlct EQviromnental Engineering 

nATE: Jamwy 27. 20 t 8 

SUBJJ;:C"'': Violation of'l'ennessee Tech Policy.780 Mis~onduct in Re.~earcll 

I' of! owing my prlorletter dated Jnnun•'Y :ZS, 20181111!1 sli•\t to President Old!lam, as requested, this letter serves as n f0nl1al 

alle~atio.n ofreseatch llliscoaduct ag4iqs1 Mr. Tom Brewer purs~ant Tonnc~e Tech Policy 780. TIW research mi$~onduct 

is huegards to. the Fitzgerald ()ltMr J<hs lndust.,:Y sponsored project.] regret that !his sltLU\tion has elevate<! to this point, 

but it docs not appear thin the university i~ poised to shli\1 the damog<> caus'ed by these action~. 

When 1 agreed~~>PI.ln slgiilng the project prbpos;~l.(which l reviewed, but did not writ~), the intent 9flhe project w~ to 

p~rform ~. ~omparisons ot" cmis~ion.• from two classes .of diesel engines (having had pr;;.vio~sly conducted research 

regarding NO., SO,, and other environmental contaminants). This. wM to ·be a.~ lnwstigatlon guiding future 

research outside the scope of!h~ original proposal. Other portions ofthe project(e.g., 1ega11ssues and economic aual~sis) 

were subconttac!ed to other units whhin 1ennes5tlll Tech. Tlte ~missions data were never .intended as absolutes, nor 

directly compnrnhl~.to EPA su.mdards. Any subseqQent analyses regarding 1mglne modllications, or similar, would thenbe 

conducted by qualilied individuals in engine p{>rformance, Upon conclusion of the project, perhaps l\ peer•revlew~ 

journal arlicle woulq have been submitted: ll.egardl~s, It )Vas my Intent that obj~ctive results would be submitted to the 

industry spon~or according to Mcepted practice. HoWever. !)tis is ultimately .not what happened. 

Per ltl)' let!Qr 011 January 2S, 20 I&, l have withd1·awn as the l'lincipnl 111vestil),ator (Pf) llf the res.ear~h pr\lject, along witlt 

any fmplicll support ofstatements th~t have been pu(>llcly releas~d \';y the university. l had nQ role in (nor p(ior kn();vlcdge 

ol) the dissclliin~tlon of results vi~ letter dated June 15. 2017 to Conj,>reSsman Diane Bhlck nnd $lgned by President 

Oldham ahd Mr. Brewer, I did not become aware tll'thislc!ter until. appmximately Novem\:>er 1., 2017.1 do. not il{lree wltl1 

stalements made.in this letter. The letter includes lalslficat1on by omi~sl<ins of scope, methodolo!JY, and non-supporting 

data (e.g,. NOJ .. For exnmplo, the tenor states "' ... resoorch shnwcd that optimized and remanufaetured 2002-2007 engines 

nnd OEJvf certifl~d engioes performed equally as weB ~nd In some instanc~s out-performed the OEM engines.'' Wltlle the 

data showil d.o appear.to support this claim, NO, results were completely omittell (i.e., falsification by omission). Lastly, 

ll)e intcnl of tlw j>rojem W!is devei .to drawn direct c~m!lllrii!o•ts to BPA emissions, wh\ch the 'le[!er specltiC<~Ily stQtcs 

''[!]he results orth~ emlssiojl~ test we~ compared with tho 26t0 Bl'A emission~ standlli'Qs ... "liS we)i as ln. Tttblu !, ·•Nb,: 

None ilr the vehfclcs met .the standard:' This is •wt shnply a difrer~nce of opinion in the interpretation of results; ihls is a 

vlo!ati.on of research principles by misreprcscotins {standard versus noJHtandatd. preliminary testing) and wilhholding 

data. I haq y~rb~!ly expressed Illy di~pleliS\11'~ te!i~rdlug the ma~tet to Mr. Brewer and the co~fliot of interest this has 

created, I [ndlcaled U1at this would likely lead to ''had press" ·and is llot consistent with the typical. tele~s~ of infollnalion 

for lndustry·spt>nsored projocts. l should have withdrawn from this project earlier: yet, I have been reassured oh multiple 

~ccasioi1s that llw university was working ori a plan to combat the negative publicity and feedback, either l).y elariOcatlon 

of Intent and score or retraction ut explicit suppo1t. For example, In response to an email inquiry~ I forwardetl the email .to 

M•-. .Brewer on 11/13120\7, ;vhich Dr. Soni ultim~My lorwatded to Katen Lykins with lhe statement, " ... Karen will 

handle this request .. [ ... J Katen will take cl\re of that and follow-up." I do not take accusatiorts against upper 

Ddmlnist.ralors lightly but wa$ unsure of appropriate options, until the publication or Polley 7$0 on ,lnnuary l, 2018. 

Additionally, I can no longer sit back and wait lor a response, which by all accounts, I may not agree with. The longer the 

walt, lhe more damage occurs, 

Tennoilsao To•h I Box 5015 I Coo~evllle, TN 38505 I 931-372·3454 I F: 93H72-6239 I tnto•h.odule .. 
142 

Mr. MCNERNEY. Dr. Miller, I’m not a scientist—or I am a scientist. I forget sometimes. That’s the scientific method. But would 

you trust the conclusions of a study like that? 

Dr. MILLER. Let’s just say if I was putting myself in the shoes 

of the State in an enforcement case and I had to go to court with 

that kind of study as proof, I’d be looking for a way to get out. You 

know, I kind of call it like the alien experiment. They took a probe, 

they stuck it in a smokestack, and they looked at it and they said, 

gosh, it’s just as clean as a modern engine. That just doesn’t pass 

muster. 

Mr. MCNERNEY. Well, Dr. Miller, do you have any response to 

the fact that this study has been pivotal to the efforts by Fitzgerald 

Glider Kits, the glider industry, and the Trump Administration’s 

EPA in trying to justify the rationale for repealing the glider provisions that limit productions of glider vehicles? 

Dr. MILLER. Well, you know, it certainly made it into EPA’s proposal. They cited it when proposing to reinstate the glider kit loophole. And it certainly made the press, so, yes, it got attention. 

We’re talking about it today. 

Mr. MCNERNEY. We are. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. ABRAHAM. Thank you. Dr. Babin? 

Mr. BABIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it. I appreciate all you witnesses. 

I do have several questions here. I’d like to start with Mr. Long. 

In your experience with the trucking industry, how do you think 

gliders promote recycling and the smart use of fossil fuels? 

Mr. LONG. Sure, thanks. Let me say thank you for your interest 

in small-business trucking issues. It’s really greatly appreciated. 

Mr. BABIN. Yes, sir. Proud to do it. 

Mr. LONG. Yes, we’ve seen rates that gliders can recycle millions 

of pounds of steel each year. Our members who use them report 

that they’ve saved a mile per gallon, as much as a mile per gallon 

on fuel efficiency, which, over the course of a year, can translate 

to 3,000 gallons of diesel fuel. These are all issues that I think 

have gotten a little bit lost in the conversation about the overall 

public health impacts. 

But another one that I want to touch on is something that no 

one’s really addressed at all and that’s the taking owner-operators 

off the road, pricing them out of the industry is taking the most 

experienced and safe drivers off the road. They’re going to be replaced with young, inexperienced drivers who are certainly not 

going to be operating as safely, and you will probably see crash 

rates go up. So I think that’s another public health consideration 

people need to take into account when talking about this. It’s a 

much bigger picture than simply an EPA study and a Tennessee 

Tech study. 

Mr. BABIN. Yes. Okay. Thank you. And then one more. Your 

story about Loren Hunt really resonated with me. It’s a great example of innovation and the American dream, and I wanted to ask 

you. Is Loren’s experience unique or do others in the trucking business experience similar challenges that he did? 

Mr. LONG. Loren’s story came to us a while ago. Since we started 

telling our members that we would be participating in this event 
143 

and since we’ve been getting more engaged in the glider issue in 

general, we’ve been getting more and more stories like his. 

Mr. BABIN. Yes. 

Mr. LONG. We’ve had members just this week send us their cost 

estimates for refurbishing or repairing new trucks with the new 

technology and they let us know that it costs tens of thousands of 

dollars, but they’re also unable to make any money off that truck 

because it’s been in the garage so long. So we’ve been getting a 

slow stream of stories about this, and I anticipate because of today 

we’ll probably be getting even more. 

Mr. BABIN. Okay. All right. Thank you very much, Mr. Long. 

Mr. LONG. Sure. Thank you. 

Mr. BABIN. I appreciate it. Now, following that up about recycling, Dr. Belzer, what type of data or information was excluded in 

the EPA’s phase 2 regulatory impact analysis that should have 

been considered to ensure its reliability when used to influence policy and regulations? 

Dr. BELZER. Well, in this context, EPA has guidance on the conduct of regulatory impact analyses just like OMB does. EPA’s guidance directs the components of the agency to conduct a proper analysis of the incremental costs and benefits of every, you know, material provision of a rule. That’s been in EPA’s own guidance for a 

decade or two. They didn’t follow that in this case, so what you 

have in the 1,100-page analysis you just don’t have anything there. 

And I can’t tell you why that’s true. It’s a provision that’s a significant one. If it were not a significant one, we would not be talking 

about it. But it wasn’t subjected to analysis that we would normally expect. 

If I had been working in the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in 2016, I would have advised the Administrator to 

return the rule because the analysis was significantly incomplete. 

They know how to do it correctly. There’s no mystery about that. 

These are not complicated analytic questions. 

Mr. BABIN. Okay. And then lastly, in your strawman RIA you 

state that as a result of the phase 2 final rule, the glider industry 

would be destroyed and employment losses are highly plausible. 

Can you give us an idea of how many American jobs will be lost 

as a result of this rule? 

Dr. BELZER. Actually, I think that’s difficult to do, and there are 

problems with counting job losses in a regulatory impact analysis. 

That is a complicated matter in economics and one that—the way 

to go about this is actually to count them—try to estimate them 

separately, not to count them as benefits and costs or one or the 

other. It is difficult to do because you don’t know to what extent 

the people working in the glider manufacturing business, where 

they would go. That has to be estimated to see what happens to 

them. In a full employment economy, they would go elsewhere. 

Mr. BABIN. Right. 

Dr. BELZER. In a less-than-full employment economy, we don’t 

know what’s going to happen to them. And many of these jobs are 

located in rural areas where the alternatives may not be as rich 

as they are, let’s say, in New England. 

Mr. BABIN. Well, thank you very much. I appreciate it. And I 

yield back, Mr. Chairman. 
144 

Mr. ABRAHAM. Thank you, Dr. Babin. 

Mr. Weber? 

Mr. WEBER. And I don’t know where to start. Don’t start? Okay. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. At least I’m not a scientist. I’m just 

saying. 

I have a hypothetical scenario, which I want each of you all to 

answer yes or no to. It’s a question that’s pretty simple. Let’s say 

a cell phone company wants to test which phone produces data 

faster, an Apple iPhone or a Samsung Galaxy. Samsung reaches 

out to the phone company and says we can help you figure out 

which one’s faster. Samsung will supply you with two iPhones and 

two Galaxies. We suggest you process this particular data and complete the test within this time frame. 

The cell phone company, without contacting Apple, okay, conducts the test in accordance with Samsung’s suggestions, finding, 

surprise of all surprises, that the Samsung is 10 times faster. The 

cell phone company then markets to you, the consumer, that the 

Samsung Galaxy is hereby declared 10 times faster than the Apple 

iPhone according to that study. If you were made aware of the circumstances of that cell phone study, would you trust that cell company’s marketing statement that the Samsung was 10 times faster 

than the iPhone? Ms.—is it Tsang? 

Ms. TSANG. Yes, Congressman. 

Mr. WEBER. Would you trust that study? 

Ms. TSANG. I can only speak to the legal requirements related to 

the rulemaking unfortunately. 

Mr. WEBER. Are you also a scientist? 

Ms. TSANG. I am, not. 

Mr. WEBER. I am just kidding. No. So Mr. Long? 

Mr. LONG. No. 

Mr. WEBER. Dr. Miller? 

Dr. MILLER. On your assumption that that’s what EPA did, I 

would say no, that would be wrong. 

Mr. WEBER. All right. 

Dr. MILLER. EPA did not do that. 

Mr. WEBER. Do you carry an iPhone or a Samsung? 

Dr. MILLER. I’ve done both. Actually, I do have both. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. Dr. Belzer? 

Dr. BELZER. I tend to distrust all marketing, so I would treat this 

claim the same way I’d treat all other claims. 

Mr. WEBER. You say you can or can’t? 

Dr. BELZER. I would distrust all of it. 

Mr. WEBER. All marketing? 

Dr. BELZER. All marketing claims—— 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. 

Dr. BELZER. —in the same way that I often have a skeptical regard to preambles of regulation—— 

Mr. WEBER. So that means your wife tells you what to buy. 

Dr. BELZER. No, not on technology. 

Mr. WEBER. No? Okay. I’m just checking. Well, look, it seems 

very interesting to me. We’ve got older—by the way, Mr. Long, 

you’d be interested in this. I owned an air-conditioning company for 

35 years, sold it a year ago. We dealt with the EPA on refrigerant 

requirements and all kinds of stuff, had trucks and the whole nine 
145 

yards. Some friends of mine at church got me into the hotshot business. I ran a trucking company for a short time until I ran for the 

Texas Legislature, and then I couldn’t keep building it. So I’ve been 

down those roads. I’ve been TxDOT’ed, USDOT’ed, and everything 

else, so I have trucking industry experience. Does this set a precedent where no older engines are able to be used for anything, antique cars? Are we afraid of that? What do you think, Mr. Long? 

Mr. LONG. No, because drivers will just continue to use their current engines or they’ll buy used trucks with older engines as well. 

Mr. WEBER. Well, sure. Shouldn’t we really be reluctant to 

change what small-business owners are allowed to do—of which I 

was one of—allowed to do without knowing that we for sure have 

enough reliable information/studies? Shouldn’t we really be reluctant to change that? 

Mr. LONG. Absolutely, and I think our members would say that 

accounts for all trucking policies, not just this one. 

Mr. WEBER. Dr. Miller, would you agree that we absolutely need 

enough concise concrete evidence before we change this? 

Dr. MILLER. I think we have it. And to your earlier question 

about do you think it affects antique car owners? No, it doesn’t. 

Those are old cars. There’s no question about that. We’re talking 

about—— 

Mr. WEBER. But they use old engines. 

Dr. MILLER. Old cars with old engines. 

Mr. WEBER. And these are old engines that go in new trucks. 

And if you read—— 

Dr. MILLER. Right, but those are the first certificates of ownership, titles transferred for those gliders. You don’t have that with 

an antique car. It wouldn’t be covered. 

Mr. WEBER. Well, if you read what the EPA was claiming—and, 

by the way, I was on the Environmental Reg Committee there in 

Texas before I got demoted to Congress, and Gary Palmer was 

right. We don’t know what causes asthma, but we have reduced our 

NOx and greenhouse gases a lot, and we have an increase in asthma. So are we maybe too worried without that proof I’m talking 

about? 

So what is it—how many more studies should we go through? 

Does that include an economic impact study in your opinion, Dr. 

Miller? Should we have an economic impact study? I know you all 

talked about it’s hard or maybe Dr. Belzer said it’s hard to make 

that calculation. But before we interrupt that business practice, 

shouldn’t we have a study in that regard as well? 

Dr. MILLER. I would assert that we have that information. We 

have the cost of essentially post-2010 engine emissions control, and 

that’s from 2000. 

Mr. WEBER. Yes. 

Dr. MILLER. We have that cost, which is essentially what presumably one could use as a basis for a cost of—to the glider industry. It’s about $670 per engine. People may think that’s low, so double it, triplet, you know, say it’s about $2,000. That’s fine because 

if you’re interested in small businesses, if we allowed that amount 

of emissions from glider kits that could be controlled for less than 

$2,000, in my region we’re already controlling small businesses 

that start at $2,000 per ton of—— 
146 

Mr. WEBER. Where’s your region? 

Dr. MILLER. It’s the Northeast, so we’re talking New York, New 

Jersey—— 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. 

Dr. MILLER. —and apparently the rich folks of New England— 

I don’t know. So—— 

Mr. WEBER. I notice you’re not wearing a bowtie and he is. 

Dr. MILLER. I’m actually from Texas—— 

Mr. WEBER. I got you. 

Dr. MILLER. But putting that aside, these are cost savings, I will 

say, for folks who are using pre-emission control. I don’t disagree 

with that. They’re simpler engines. They’re dirtier engines, they’re 

simpler engines, they’re easier to maintain, but those cost savings 

aren’t absolute. Those are cost shifts. They are cost shifts to public 

health impacts. You talk about the incidence of asthma going up 

but pollution going down. I take that as there are more people with 

asthma, so it’s more important to address the pollution that’s affecting those people. So I take that as even more of a reason to 

move forward. 

On the small-business side, we’re already controlling or asking 

small businesses in our region to control at costs well above what 

it looks like it would cost to bring glider kits up to modern pollution standards. That’s going to have impacts on people’s jobs. We 

have to meet these standards to protect public health. 

Mr. WEBER. Well, we’re going to disagree about that. 

Mr. Chairman, I’m well over my time, so thank you very much 

for your indulgence. 

Mr. ABRAHAM. You’re welcome. 

I thank the witnesses for their valuable testimonies and Members for their questions. 

The record will remain open for two weeks for additional comments and written questions from Members. This hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:45 a.m., the Subcommittees were adjourned. 
(147) 

Appendix I 

ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS
148 

ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

Responses by Dr. Paul J. Miller 
149 

2. You noted that absent federal regulation, it was possible that more states would take 

steps to protect public health by regulating the operation of glider trucks on their 

roads, including possibly banning glider kits with pre-2010 engines. 

a. Please describe the implications you would expect to see ifindividnal states 

were to ban glider trucks from operating on their roads. 

If EPA does not have the authority to regulate glider kits as "new" vehicles under the Clean Air 

Act (a view I do not share), then states would not be pre-empted by federal law from regulating 

them. Because a number of states, including California and many in the Northeast Corridor, 

continue to violate national air quality standards, and on-road diesel trucks emit a significant 

portion of air pollutants contributing to those problems, a number of these states could seek to 

address excess pollution from glider trucks not meeting modern engine emission limits (e.g., pre201 0 engines without selective catalytic reduction controls and diesel particulate filters). If a 

number of states seek to limit the operation of the dirtiest glider kits on their roads, I would 

expect the pollution load from these vehicles with "pre-emission" engines to be concentrated in 

states where no such limits exist. It may also be possible that owners/operators of these types of 

glider trucks will be unable to access or deliver loads in states banning their use, or to transit 

through such states in delivering their loads elsewhere. 

b. Please share any other measures states might consider to protect the public 

health of its citizens from glider vehicles. 

Assuming states are not pre-empted from regulating glider kits as "used" vehicles, multiple 

regulatory options may be pursued apart from a ban of glider kits with "pre-emission" engines. 

This could include differing emission standards across jurisdictions not equivalent to 20 I 0 or 

later engine standards, or control of one type of pollutant and not another (e.g., requiring diesel 

particulate filters for fine particulates, but not selective catalytic reduction for nitrogen oxides). 

Ultimately, states and local authorities could pursue multiple approaches giving rise to numerous 

varying regulatory requirements across the country. 

Where bans that apply equally to both intra- and inter-state trucks are considered, the state would 

need to consider its interest in protecting its citizens from harmful air pollution emitted by 

gliders in relation to the regulation's impacts on interstate commerce. However, I would not 

expect states to ban all glider kits, but instead to narrowly focus on glider trucks with "preemission" (i.e., uncontrolled) diesel engines. Glider trucks having installed engines meeting 

current emission standards (2010 and later engines) would continue to operate. As the majority 

of trucks in interstate commerce today are not gliders with pre-2010 engines, the overall 

potential impact of a targeted glider ban on the movement of goods in interstate commerce 

would not be clearly excessive in relation to the substantial public health harm created by their 

much higher emissions. 

Page 2 of2 

(151) 

Appendix II 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FOR THE RECORD
152 

LETTER SUBMITTED BY RANKING MEMBER JOHNSON

LAMAR S, SMITH, Texas 

CHAIRMAN 

September 26, 2018 

Q:ongress of the tinitcd ~rates 

!1:\ousc of 'Rcprcscntatiurn 

COMMITIEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY 

2321 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515--6301 

(202) 225-6371 www.sdence.house.gov 

Inspector General Arthur A. Elkins Jr. 

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 

Office of Inspector General 

Washington, D.C. 20460 

Dear Inspector General Elkins: 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

RANKING MEMBER 

We are writing to you with serious concerns about the factual basis for a notice of proposed 

rulemaking entitled "Repeal of Emission Requirements for Glider Vehicles, Glider Engines, and 

Glider Kits, " published in the Federal Register by former EPA Administrator Scott Pruitt on 

November 16,2017. 1 As part of this proposed repeal, EPA cited a "Petition for Reconsideration 

of Application of the Final Rule Entitled 'Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Fuel Efficiency 

Standards for Medium-and Heavy-Duty Engines and Vehicles-Phase 2 Final Rule' to Gliders," 

that was received from Fitzgerald Glider Kits, LLC, Harrison Truck Centers, Inc., and Indiana 

Phoenix, Inc. on July 10, 2017.2 The petitioners cited a Fitzgerald-funded study conducted by 

Tennessee Technological University (TTU) that they claimed had determined glider engines 

performed on par with or better than conventional engines. The petition included, as an 

attachment, a letter from Philip B. Oldham, President offfiJ, and Thomas Brewer, Associate 

Vice President for Strategic Research Initiatives and Executive Director of the Tennessee Center 

for Intelligent Mobility (TCIM) at TTU, to Representative Diane Black summarizing the results 

of that study.3 In August 2017, TTU held a press conference announcing the launch of the TCIM, 

described as a public-private partnership housed at the Fitzgerald Technology Complex.4 Then 

1 "Repeal of Emission Requirements for Glider Vehicles, Glider Engines, and Glider Kits," ACTION: Proposed 

rule. AGENCY: Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). federal Register I Vol. 82, No. 220 I November 16, 2017 

I Proposed Rules, accessed here: ht!os:llwww .gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/fR-20 l7-11-l6/odfi'20 l7-24884.pdf 2 "Petition for Reconsideration of Application of the final Rule Entitled 'Greenhouse Gas Emissions and fuel 

Efficiency Standards for Medium-and Heavy-Duty Engines and Vehicles-Phase 2 final Rule' to Gliders," Tommy 

C. fitzgerald, President, Fitzgerald Glider Kits, LLC, Dustin Petersen, Shareholder, Harrison Truck Centers, Inc., 

and Dane Keener, General Manager, Indiana Phoenix, Inc., July 10,2017, accessed here: 

https:/lwww .epa.gov/sites/production/files/20 I 7 -071documents/hd-ghg-IT-fitzgerald-recons-oetition-20 17-07 ·I O.pdf 3 Letter from Philip B. Oldham, President of Tennessee Technological University (TTU) and Thomas Brewer, 

Associate Vice President of the Center for Intelligent Mobility (TCJM) to Representative Diane Black, Reference: 

Tennessee Tech University- Summary of Heavy Duty Truck Study and Evaluation of the Phase II Heavy Duty 

Truck Rule, June 15, 2017, (See Exhibit l, page 9), accessed here: httos:l/www.epa.oov/siteslproduction/files/2017-

07/documents/hd-ghg-fr-fitzgerald-recons-petition-20 17-07-10 pdf 4 "Tennessee Tech, TCAT Livingston, Fitzgerald companies announce new partnership," Tennessee Tech News, 

Tennessee Technological University, August 7, 2017, accessed here: www.tntech.edu/newslreleasesltennessee-tech. 

teat-livingston -fitzgerald-companies-announce-new-partnership 

1 
153 

EPA Administrator Scott Pruitt met with the owners of Fitzgerald Glider Kits in May 2017 and 

cited the TTU study in the agency's November 2017 notice of proposed rulemaking. 5 

Actions by EPA's leadership, particularly those that may endanger the environment and the 

public's health, must be based on scientific facts, not false, misleading or deceptive data. 

According to the EPA's own study, glider vehicles can emit 43 times more nitrogen oxides 

(NOx) and 55 times more particulate matter (PM) than conventionally manufactured trucks.6 

Exposure to these chemicals has also been shown to increase the likelihood of developing lung 

cancer, chronic lung disease, heart disease, as well as exacerbating severe asthma attacks and 

causing premature deaths. Despite conclusions suggesting that glider vehicles emitted similar 

levels of pollutants as conventional vehicles, it now seems clear from an abundance of publicly 

available information that the TTU glider study, used by EPA to help justify its proposed glider 

repeal rule, cannot be trusted. 

We urge you to investigate both the scientific basis for the study's conclusions and the efforts 

taken to use this questionable study by Fitzgerald Glider Kits, individuals at Tennessee Tech 

University, and senior officials at the EPA as a justification for repealing the glider rule. By any 

objective assessment the testing measures used and the conclusions reached in the TTU study 

should warrant extreme scrutiny and skepticism. 

Among the many questionable aspects that have already been publicly disclosed about the ITO 

glider study: 

The TTU glider study was not independent. Fitzgerald Glider Kits, the largest glider kit 

manufacturer in the United States, paid $70,000 to Tennessee Tech to conduct the study which 

was completed in June 2017.7 In August 2017, TTU and Fitzgerald announced a public-private 

partnership to develop the Tennessee Tech Center for Intelligent Mobility (TCIM), which was 

supposed to be completed in 2018 and housed at the Fitzgerald Industrial Park. 8 One of the TTU 

faculty members involved in the glider testing is a TTU Motorsports Faculty Advisor.9 The 

5 See: "Who Is the E.P.A. Administrator Scott Pruitt Meeting With? A Detailed Schedule," New York Times, 

October 3, 2017, page 267, accessed here: https://www.nvtimes.eom/interactive/20!7/l0/03/us/politics/documentPruitt-Sked-and-McCarthy-Sked.html and "Repeal of Emission Requirements for Glider Vehicles. Glider Engines, 

and Glider Kits." ACTION: Proposed rule. AGENCY: Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Federal Register I 

Vol. 82, No. 220 I November 16, 2017 I Proposed Rules, accessed here: https:l/www.gpo.govlfdsys/pkg!FR-20 17-

11-16/pdf/20 17-24884.pdf 6 "Chassis Dynamometer Testing of Two Recent Model Year Heavy-Duty On-Highway Diesel Glider Vehicles," 

National Vehicle & Fuel Emissions Laboratory (NVFEL), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Ann Arbor, 

Michigan, November 20, 2017, accessed here: httD:IIwww.documentcloud.org/documents/4608504-EPA-ChassisDynamometer-Testing-a f. Two-Recent.htm 1 7 Tennessee Technological University. Annual Report 2015-2016, Office of Research, (page 42, PI - Benjamin 

Mohr, "Environmental & Economic Study of Glider Kit Assemblers," Fitzgerald Glider Kits, $70,056.00), 

accessed here: https:l/www.tntech.edu/assets/userfileslresourcefilesfl384711476976572 20 15-

16%20Annuai%20Report FINAL.pdf 8 See: Laura Militana. "Tennessee Tech Center for Intelligent Mobility announced," Herald-Citizen, August 7, 2017, 

accessed here: http://herald-citizen.com/stories/tennessee-tech-center-for-intelligent-mobility-announced,22605 and 

"Tennessee Tech, TCAT Livingston, Fitzgerald companies announce new partnership," Tennessee Tech News, 

Tennessee Technological University, August 7, 2017, accessed here: www.tntech.edu/news/releases/tennessee-tech.-

tcat-livingston,-fitzgerald-companies-announce-new-partnership 

9 See Linkedln page of Mark Davis, Academic Support Associate at Tennessee Technological, former TTU 

Motorsports Faculty Advisor and current Academic Support Associate for the TTU Motorsports program, accessed 

2 
154 

former TTU graduate student who conducted the testing for the glider study is now the Executive 

Director of the TTU Motorsports team. 10 Fitzgerald Glider Kits (FGK) and Fitzgerald Collision 

& Repair (FCR) are among the two dozen sponsors ofTTU Motorsports. 11 The TTU glider study 

was paid for by FGK and the tests were conducted in a FCR facility. The multiple relationships 

between Tennessee Tech and Fitzgerald pose financial conflicts-of-interest that raise serious 

questions about the independence of the TTU Fitzgerald-funded glider study. 

The TTU glider study was not conducted in an accredited laboratory. The TTU glider study 

was conducted at an unaccredited FCR facility in the town of Rickman, Tennessee. It is unclear 

why TTU chose to conduct the glider testing at a Fitzgerald-owned facility when they had a 

Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Department of Energy's Oak Ridge National 

Laboratory's (ORNL's) Fuels, Engines, and Emissions Research Center (FEERC). 12 

No credentialed scientist or engineer oversaw the glider study. Dr. Darrell Hoy, the TTU 

Interim Dean of the College of Engineering blasted the multiple flaws with the TTU study in a 

February 2018 memorandum sent to the President of the TfU Faculty Senate. The memo 

highlighted the fact that "no gualified, credentialed engineering faculty member (I) oversaw the 

testing, (2) verified the data or calculations of the graduate student [who conducted the testing] 

[or] (3) wrote or reviewed the final report submitted to Fitzgerald .... " 13 [Emphasis in the 

original]. Although Dr. Benjamin Mohr was listed as the Principal Investigator (PI) of the study, 

he largely played an administrative role. Mark Davis, who provided support for the study is 

listed as an "Academic Support Associate" at TTU and according to his Linkedin page his 

highest academic credential is a high school diploma, with no formal science education listed. 14 

Thomas Brewer, the Associate Vice President for Strategic Research Initiatives at TTU, who 

essentially ran the glider study, said that he attended all of the glider tests. He was hired by TTU 

to act as a liaison between the tmiversity and the automotive industry and Brewer told TTU 

Faculty that he was personally responsible for bringing the Fitzgerald glider study request to 

Tennessee Tech. 15 Prior to joining TTU, Brewer was President of the Tennessee Automotive 

here: https://www.linkedin.com/inltnetalbydesign! and "Tennessee Tech Motorsports team roster set for 2018-

2019," Tennessee Tech News, Tennessee Technological University, September 7, 2018, accessed here: 

https://www .tntech.edu/news/releases/tennessee-tech-motorsports-team-roster-set-for-2018-20 19 

"See Linkedln page of Justin Swafford, Executive Director at TTU Motorsports, accessed here: 

https://www.linkedin.com/inliustin-swafford-2a5abb80/ 

11 Tennessee Tech Motorsports, "Thank you to our Sponsors!" page, accessed here: 

http://www.ttumotorsports.com/index.html 

"See: Fitzgerald Collision and Repair (FCG) Freightliner Facility, accessed here: 

https://fitzgeraldcollision.com/freightliner-facility/, EPA MEMORANDUM, Subject: EPA Teleconference with 

Tennessee Tech University Regarding Glider Test Report, November 1 3, 2017, accessed here: 

https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=EPA-HO-OAR-20 14-0827-2416 and Fuels, Engines, and Emissions 

Research Center (FEERC), Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), accessed here: 

https:l/www,ornl.gov/ntrc/research-areas/fuels-engines-emissions. 

13 MEMORANDUM, From: Darrell Hoy, Interim Dean, College of Engineering, To: Christy Killman, President 

TTU Faculty Senate, Metissa Geist, Faculty Representative, TTU Board of Trustees and Julia Gruber, President, 

AAUP [TTU Chapter], SUBJECT: "Request for Your Groups to Continue to Urge President Oldhanm to Publically 

Suspend TTU Supp01t for the Results of the Fitzgerald Study and Letter to Congresswoman Dianne Black," Feb. 16, 

2018, accessed here (p.217): https:l/www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/02115/us/politicsll5reg-doc.html 14 See the Linkedln page of Mark Davis, accessed here: https://www.linkedin.cotnlin/metalbydesign! and his TTU 

faculty information, accessed here: https://www.tntech.edu/engineeringldepartments/cee/facultystaff/ 

"TTU Faculty Senate Business Meeting, January 29,2018, accessed here: 

www.tntech.edu/assets/usennedia/facultxsenate/minutes-and-notes-20 17-20 18/Fac Sen 2018-1-29 min B .pdf 

3 
155 

Manufacturers Association (TAMA). 16 Mr. Brewer has a B.S. degree in Business Administration 

and no scientific credentials. 17 

A graduate student analyzed the glider test data at a Fitzgerald facility. A first-year TTU 

graduate engineering student analyzed the test data collected for the glider study. 18 The student 

and Mark Davis, who provided support for the testing, were both officials on the Fitzgeraldsponsored TIU Motorsports team at the time of the tests and today. The former graduate student 

is now the Executive Director of the TTU Motorsports team. 

The Fitzgerald facility where the glider trucl<s were tested did not have suitable testing 

equipment. The Fitzgerald facility where the glider trucks were tested did not have proper 

equipment to test the glider engines for emissions of particulate matter (PM). TIU faculty 

involved in the testing told the EPA that they "visually inspected" the engine exhaust in an 

attempt to determine how much particulate matter was emitted. 19 Mr. Brewer told the TIU 

Senate that they used a hand-held device normally used for field tests to check for particulate 

matter (PM) and that he believes that this was completely appropriate.20 However, a 

memorandum on the Fitzgerald glider study from six TTU faculty noted that the summary of the 

TTU glider study submitted by Mr. Brewer included: (1) no details on the specifics of the test 

vehicles; (2) no information on test cycles, tests conditions, test loads, and test fuels; (3) no 

information on the testing facilities; (4) no information on emission tests protocols; and (5) no 

meaningful data on the pollutants of interest, raising serious issues about the quality of the study. 

The Memo also mentioned that "TTU did not measure PM levels." and that the "tests were 

performed without the pmticipation of qualified TTU researchers.'m . 

16 See Tom Ballard, "Tom Brewer bringing automotive industry expertise to Tennessee Tech," Teknovation.biz, 

Undated, accessed here: http://www.teknovation.biz/20 14/11/20/tom-brewer-bringing-automotive-industryexpertise-tennessee-tech/ and Linkedln page for Tom Brewer, accessed here: https://www.linkedin.com/inlthomasbrewer-4a499516/ 

17 TTU Faculty Senate Business Meeting, January 29,2018, accessed here: 

www.tntech.edu/assetslusermedia/facultysenatelminutes-and-notes-20 17-2018/Fac Sen 2018-1-29 min B .pdf 

"See Linkedln page of Justin Swafford, accessed here: https://www.linkedin.com/in/justin-swafford-2a5abb80/ and 

TTU Faculty Senate Business Meeting, January 29, 2018, accessed here: 

https://www.tntech.edu/assetslusennedia/facultysenate/minutes-and-notes-20 17-20 18/Fac Sen 2018-1-

29 min B .pdf 19 EPA MEMORANDUM, Subject: EPA Teleconference with Tennessee Tech University Regarding Glider Test 

Report, November 13, 2017, accessed here: https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=EPA-HO-OAR-20 14-0827-

2416 

20 TTU Faculty Senate Business Meeting, January 29,2018, accessed here: 

https://www.tntech.edu/assets/usemledia/facultysenate/minutes-and-notes-20 I 7-20 18fFac Sen 2018-1-

29 min B .pdf 21 MEMORANDUM, To: Christy Killman, President of the 'lTU Faculty Senate, From: Corinne Darvennes, 

Professor, Department of Mechanical Engineering, Ahmed EISawy, Chairman, Depattment of Manufacturing and 

Engineering Technology, et. al., RE: Fitzgerald Glider Study, Febntary 5, 2018, accessed here: 

https://www .tntech.edu/assets/usennedia/facultysenate/minutes-and-notes-2017-

2018/Fitzgerald Glider Study Memo 2-5-2018.pdf 

4 
156 

The testing results appear nonsensical and defy logic. The Memorandum to the President of 

the TTU Faculty Senate from Darrell Hoy, the TTU Interim Dean of the College of Engineering, 

said the glider study's summary results included the "farfetched, scientifically implausible 

claim, that remanufactured truck engines met or exceeded tlze performance of modern, 

pollution-controlled engines witlt regards to emissions. "22 [Emphasis added]. 

The summary of the study falsified and omitted critical data. Dr. Mohr, the Principal 

Investigator (PI) of the TTU glider study, is Chairman ofTTU's Department of Civil & 

Environmental Engineering.23 Dr. Mohr filed a scientific research misconduct complaint with 

TTU, in which he said the letter sent to Rep. Diane Black from TTU President Oldham and Mr. 

Brewer summarizing the glider study's results "includes falsification by omissions of scope, 

methodology, and non-supporting data."24 

The PI removed his name from the study because of ethical concerns. In a letter to TTU 

President Oldham on January 25, 2018, PI Dr. Mohr withdrew his name from association with 

the TTU glider study funded by Fitzgerald. He wrote that "I do not believe the conclusions 

drawn are objective or support statements made" in either the letter to Rep. Diane Black or 

included in the petition to the EPA to repeal the glider mle from Fitzgerald Glider Kits.25 

The PI returned his funding to Fitzgerald Glider Kits because of ethical concerns. The 

glider study's PI, Dr. Benjamin Mohr, returned his portion ($12,494.93) of the $70,000 

Fitzgerald paid TTU to conduct the glider study. "Significant time was spent researching 

environmental and emissions related literature, as well as communicating with project staff," 

wrote Dr. Mohr. "However, despite devoting appropriate time to this testing project, ethically 

and morally I cannot retain the previous summer salary associated with this project."26 

The PI filed a scientific research misconduct complaint with TTU. In his official scientific 

misconduct complaint filed with the university, Dr. Mohr wrote that, "The misuse of results to 

support political opinions is a dangerous precedent that should worry all university 

employees."27 It is important to note that this summary of the test results that Dr. Mohr and other 

22 Memorandum from DatTell Hoy, Interim Dean, College of Engineering, Tennessee Technological University to 

Christy Killman, President TTU Faculty Senate, et. al., RE: Fitzgerald Glider Study, February 16, 2018, accessed 

here (p.218): https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/20 18/02/15/us/politics/15reg-doc.html 23 Benjamin Mohr, Ph.D., Chair, Civil & Environmental Engineering, Tennessee Technological University, accessed 

here: https://www.tntech.edu/engineering!departments/cee/facultvstaff/benjamin-mohr 24 Letter from Dr. Benjamin Mohr, Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering to Dr, Bharat Soni, Office 

of Research and Economic Development, SUBJECT: Violation of Tennessee Tech Policy 780 Misconduct in 

Research, January 27,2018, accessed here: https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4378485-CombattingPollution-in-Diesel-Trucks-and-the.html#documentlp260 

25 Letter from Dr. Benjamin Mohr, Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering to Dr. Philip Oldham, 

President, Tennessee Technological University, January 25,2018, accessed here: 

www.documentcloud.org/documents/4378485-Combatting-Pollution-in-Diesel-Trucks-andthe.html#documentlp259/a426413 

26 Letter to Dr. Leslie Crickenberger, Human Resources, Tennessee Technological University from Dr. Benjamin 

Mohr, Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Tennessee Technological University, SUBJECT: 

Reimbursement of Summer Salary, February 2, 2018. 21 Letter from Dr. Benjamin Mohr, Depattment of Civil and Environmental Engineering to Dr. Bharat Soni, Office 

of Research and Economic Development, SUBJECT: Violation of Tennessee Tech Policy 780 Misconduct in 

5 
157 

TTU faculty have criticized is the same data used by the EPA in its notice of proposed 

rulemaking regarding the repeal of the glider rule.28 

Tennessee Tech warned EPA not to reference the flawed study. In February 2018, the 

President of TTU wrote to then EPA Administrator Scott Pruitt informing him that TTU experts 

had "questioned the methodology and accuracy of the [glider] report" and asked the Agency to 

"withhold any use or reference to said study pending the conclusion of our internal 

investigations."29 Similar letters were sent to Rep. Black and Fitzgerald Glider Kits, which 

continues to defend the scientific conclusions of the TTU glider study. 

Tennessee Tech has failed to make its scientific misconduct review public. According to the 

summary of a February 19, 2018, TTU Faculty Senate meeting Dr. Sharon Hue, Associate 

Provost and Professor of Structural Engineering in the College of Engineering is serving as the 

Research Integrity Officer for the glider study misconduct investigation.30 The summary of that 

meeting makes clear that according to the university's own policy a review should be completed 

within 60 days or 120 days if a full investigation is necessary. It has now been more than200 

days since that meeting occurred, and Te1111essee Tech has not released any information 

regarding the status of the scientific misconduct complaint filed by Dr. Benjamin Mohr.31 

Fitzgerald has sought to block TTU from releasing the full study and its test data. Although 

TTU temporarily suspended all activity with Fitzgerald, the General Counsel for Fitzgerald 

Glider Kits wrote to the President ofTe1111essee Tech in February 2018 and argued that the 

Fitzgerald funded glider study and any of its related test results were "protected from disclosure" 

under Tennessee law regarding the confidentiality of research records and materials, including 

"sponsored research" conducted at public universities.32 

Research, January 27,2018. accessed here: www.documentcloud.org/documents14378485-Combatting-Pollution-inDiesel-Trucks-and-the.htm l#document!p260 28 "Repeal of Emission Requirements for Glider Vehicles, Glider Engines, and Glider Kits." ACTION: Proposed 

rule. AGENCY: Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Federal Register I Vol. 82, No. 220 I November 16, 2017 

I Proposed Rules, accessed here: https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg!FR-20 1 7-11-16/pdf/20 17-24884.pdf 29 Letter from Philip B. Oldham. President, Tennessee Technological University to EPA Administrator Scott Pruitt, 

Reference: Tennessee Tech University- Summary of Heavy Duty Truck Study and Evaluation of the Phase !I 

Heavy Duty Tmck Rule," February 19, 2018, accessed here: 

https://apos. wash in gtonpost.com/g!documents/national/tennessee-tech-presidents-letter-disavowing-the-un iversitys-

~lider-truck-study/2782/; Similar letters were also sent to Rep. Diane Black and Fitzgerald Glider Kits. 30 See Dr. Sharon Huo information, accessed here: httos:l/www.tntech.edu/engineering/departmentslcee/facultystaft7 31 "TTU Faculty Senate Meeting with the [TTU] President," p. 3. Fitzgerald Glider Kits Issue, February 19, 2018, 

Tennessee Technological University, accessed here: https://www.tntech.edu/asscts/usermedialfacultysenatelminutesand-notes-2017-20!8/Fac SEn 2018-2-19 notes P .pdf 32 See: TTU Faculty Senate Business Meeting, February 5, 2018, accessed here: 

www.tntech.edu/assets/usermedia/facultysenatelminutes-and-notes-2017-20 18/Fac Sen 2018-2-5 min B .pdf 

and letter to Phlip B. Oldham, President, Tennessee Tech University and Kae Carpenter, University Counsel, 

Tennessee Tech University from Joseph M. DePew, General Counsel, Fitzgerald Glider Kits, February 26, 2018, 

accessed here: https://www .nytimes.com/interactive/20 18/02/15/us/politics/15reg-doc.html and 2014 Tennessee 

Code, Title 49- Education, Chapter 7- Postsecondary and Higher Education Generally, Part 1 -Miscellaneous 

Provisions,§ 49-7-120- Confidentiality of research records and materials, Universal Citation: TN Code§ 49-7-120 

(20 14), accessed here: ]illm_:.i/lawjustia.com/codes/tennesseel20 14/title-491chapter-7/part-1/section-49-7-120 

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158 

Æ 

The EPA used the flawed TTU study to help justify its proposed repeal of the glider rule. 

Due to a ruling by the DC Circuit Court of Appeals, the EPA's efforts to repeal the glider rule 

have been put on hold33 However, Acting EPA Administrator Andrew Wheeler issued a memo 

that directed the EPA's Office of Air and Radiation "to move as expeditiously as possible on a 

regulatory revision" regarding the repeal of the glider rule.34 As noted above, the specific 

reference to the Tennessee Tech glider study in EPA's proposed repeal of the glider rule 

warrants a careful and complete examination. Reversing or revising EPA policies that put the 

public's health in harm's way should be based on valid scientific evidence not political favors for 

specific industries. 

The proposed repeal of the glider rule is a serious and important issue that may impact the health 

and safety of the public in significant and harmful ways. Given the many issues identified above, 

we do not believe EPA can rely on the TTU study to justify the repeal of the glider rule. We ask 

your office to prioritize an investigation into the TTU glider study, particularly how and why it 

was used by EPA in its proposed rulemaking on the glider truck repeal ntle. 

If your staff has any questions or would like to discuss this request in more detail please have 

them contact Douglas Pasternak on our Minority staff at (202) 226-8892. 

Thank you for your attention to this important matter. 

Sincerely yours, 

Eddie Bernice Johnso 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Science, Space & Technology 

E--:~~~a':::~ ~{~~~ber Subcommittee on Environment 

IJ::!f2.~l Ranking Member 

ff·~;;;:~ 

~erney Subcommittee on Oversight 

33 Timothy Cama, "Court blocks EPA policy against enforcing truck pollution rule," The Hill, July I 8, 2018, 

accessed here: http;//thehill.com/policvlenergy-environment/397687-court-blocks-epa-nolicy-aoainst-enforcingtruck-pollution-rule 

"EPA Memorandum, "Withdrawal of Conditional No Action Assurance Regarding Small Manufacturers of Glider 

Vehicles," July 26, 2018. https://www.epa.gov/sites/productionlfiles/20 18-

07/documents/memo re withdrawal of conditional naa regarding small manufacturers of glider vehicles 07- 26-20 18.pdf 

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