(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2014 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

HENDERSON v. UNITED STATES 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 

No. 13–1487. Argued February 24, 2015—Decided May 18, 2015 

After being charged with the felony offense of distributing marijuana, 

petitioner Tony Henderson was required as a condition of his bail to 

turn over firearms that he lawfully owned. Henderson ultimately

pleaded guilty, and, as a felon, was prohibited under 18 U. S. C. 

§922(g) from possessing his (or any other) firearms. Henderson 

therefore asked the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which had custody of his firearms, to transfer them to his friend. But the agency 

refused to do so. Henderson then filed a motion in federal district 

court seeking to transfer his firearms, but the court denied the motion on the ground that Henderson’s requested transfer would give

him constructive possession of the firearms in violation of §922(g). 

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. 

Held: A court-ordered transfer of a felon’s lawfully owned firearms from 

Government custody to a third party is not barred by §922(g) if the

court is satisfied that the recipient will not give the felon control over 

the firearms, so that he could either use them or direct their use. 

Federal courts have equitable authority to order law enforcement to 

return property obtained during the course of a criminal proceeding 

to its rightful owner. Section 922(g), however, bars a court from ordering guns returned to a felon-owner like Henderson, because that 

would place the owner in violation of the law. And because §922(g)

bans constructive as well as actual possession, it also prevents a 

court from ordering the transfer of a felon’s guns to someone willing 

to give the felon access to them or to accede to the felon’s instructions

about their future use. 

The Government goes further, arguing that §922(g) prevents all 

transfers to a third party, no matter how independent of the felon’s

influence, unless that recipient is a licensed firearms dealer or other 
 

2 HENDERSON v. UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

third party who will sell the guns on the open market. But that view 

conflates possession, which §922(g) prohibits, with an owner’s right 

merely to alienate his property, which it does not. After all, the Government’s reading of §922(g) would prohibit a felon from disposing of 

his firearms even when he would lack any control over and thus not 

possess them before, during, or after the disposition. That reading

would also extend §922(g)’s scope far beyond its purpose; preventing

a felon like Henderson from disposing of his firearms, even in ways 

that guarantee he never uses them again, does nothing to advance 

the statute’s goal of keeping firearms away from felons. Finally, the

Government’s insistence that a felon cannot select a third-party recipient over whom he exercises no influence fits poorly with its concession that a felon may select a firearms dealer or third party to sell

his guns. The Government’s reading of §922(g) is thus overbroad. 

Accordingly, a court may approve the transfer of a felon’s guns consistently with §922(g) if, but only if, the recipient will not grant the 

felon control over those weapons. One way to ensure that result is to 

order that the guns be turned over to a firearms dealer, himself independent of the felon’s control, for subsequent sale on the open market. But that is not the only option; a court, with proper assurances 

from the recipient, may also grant a felon’s request to transfer his

guns to a person who expects to maintain custody of them. Either 

way, once a court is satisfied that the transferee will not allow the

felon to exert any influence over the firearms, the court has equitable

power to accommodate the felon’s transfer request. Pp. 3–8. 

555 Fed. Appx. 851, vacated and remanded. 

KAGAN, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. 
 

 

_________________ 

_________________ 

 

Cite as: 575 U. S. ____ (2015) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 13–1487 

TONY HENDERSON, PETITIONER v.
 

UNITED STATES
 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
 

[May 18, 2015] 

JUSTICE KAGAN delivered the opinion of the Court. 

Government agencies sometimes come into possession of 

firearms lawfully owned by individuals facing serious 

criminal charges. If convicted, such a person cannot recover his guns because a federal statute, 18 U. S. C.

§922(g), prohibits any felon from possessing firearms. In 

this case, we consider what §922(g) allows a court to do

when a felon instead seeks the transfer of his guns to 

either a firearms dealer (for future sale on the open market) or some other third party. We hold that §922(g) does

not bar such a transfer unless it would allow the felon to 

later control the guns, so that he could either use them or 

direct their use. 

I 

The Federal Government charged petitioner Tony Henderson, then a U. S. Border Patrol agent, with the felony 

offense of distributing marijuana. See 21 U. S. C. 

§§841(a)(1), (b)(1)(D). A Magistrate Judge required that

Henderson surrender all his firearms as a condition of his 

release on bail. Henderson complied, and the Federal

Bureau of Investigation (FBI) took custody of the guns. 
 

 

2 HENDERSON v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

Soon afterward, Henderson pleaded guilty to the distribution charge; as a result of that conviction, §922(g) prevents

him from legally repossessing his firearms. 

Following his release from prison, Henderson asked the

FBI to transfer the guns to Robert Rosier, a friend who 

had agreed to purchase them for an unspecified price. The 

FBI denied the request. In a letter to Henderson, it explained that “the release of the firearms to [Rosier] would 

place you in violation of [§922(g)], as it would amount to 

constructive possession” of the guns. App. 121.

Henderson then returned to the court that had handled 

his criminal case to seek release of his firearms. Invoking

the court’s equitable powers, Henderson asked for an

order directing the FBI to transfer the guns either to his

wife or to Rosier. The District Court denied the motion, 

concluding (as the FBI had) that Henderson could not

“transfer the firearms or receive money from their sale”

without “constructive[ly] possessi[ng]” them in violation of 

§922(g). No. 3:06–cr–211 (MD Fla., Aug. 8, 2012), App. to

Pet. for Cert. 5a–6a, 12a. The Court of Appeals for the 

Eleventh Circuit affirmed on the same ground, reasoning 

that granting Henderson’s motion would amount to giving

a felon “constructive possession” of his firearms. 555 Fed. 

Appx. 851, 853 (2014) (per curiam).1 

—————— 

1The Court of Appeals added that Henderson’s “equitable argument

rings hollow” because a convicted felon has “unclean hands to demand 

return [or transfer] of his firearms.” 555 Fed. Appx., at 854. That view 

is wrong, as all parties now agree. See Brief for Petitioner 35–39; Brief 

for United States 31, n. 8; Tr. of Oral Arg. 33, 42. The unclean hands 

doctrine proscribes equitable relief when, but only when, an individual’s misconduct has “immediate and necessary relation to the equity

that he seeks.” Keystone Driller Co. v. General Excavator Co., 290 U. S. 

240, 245 (1933). The doctrine might apply, for example, if a felon

requests the return or transfer of property used in furtherance of his

offense. See, e.g., United States v. Kaczynski, 551 F. 3d 1120, 1129– 

1130 (CA9 2009) (holding that the Unabomber had unclean hands to 

request the return of bomb-making materials). But Henderson’s felony 
Cite as: 575 U. S. ____ (2015) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

We granted certiorari, 574 U. S. ___ (2014), to resolve a 

circuit split over whether, as the courts below held, 

§922(g) categorically prohibits a court from approving a

convicted felon’s request to transfer his firearms to another person.2 We now vacate the decision below. 

II 

A federal court has equitable authority, even after a

criminal proceeding has ended, to order a law enforcement

agency to turn over property it has obtained during the

case to the rightful owner or his designee. See, e.g., 

United States v. Martinez, 241 F. 3d 1329, 1330–1331 (CA11

2001) (citing numerous appellate decisions to that effect); 

Tr. of Oral Arg. 41 (Solicitor General agreeing). Congress,

however, may cabin that power in various ways. As relevant here, §922(g) makes it unlawful for any person convicted of a felony to “possess in or affecting commerce[ ] 

any firearm or ammunition.” That provision prevents a

court from instructing an agency to return guns in its

custody to a felon-owner like Henderson, because that 

would place him in violation of the law. The question here

is how §922(g) affects a court’s authority to instead direct

the transfer of such firearms to a third party.

Section 922(g) proscribes possession alone, but covers

possession in every form. By its terms, §922(g) does not

prohibit a felon from owning firearms. Rather, it interferes with a single incident of ownership—one of the proverbial sticks in the bundle of property rights—by pre-

—————— 

conviction had nothing to do with his firearms, so the unclean hands 

rule has no role to play here. 2Compare 555 Fed. Appx. 851, 853–854 (CA11 2014) (per curiam)

(case below) (holding that §922(g) bars any transfer); United States v. 

Felici, 208 F. 3d 667, 670 (CA8 2000) (same), with United States v. 

Zaleski, 686 F. 3d 90, 92–94 (CA2 2012) (holding that §922(g) permits 

some transfers); United States v. Miller, 588 F. 3d 418, 419–420 (CA7 

2009) (same). 
 

4 HENDERSON v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

venting the felon from knowingly possessing his (or another person’s) guns. But that stick is a thick one, encompassing what the criminal law recognizes as “actual” and

“constructive” possession alike. 2A K. O’Malley, J. Grenig,

& W. Lee, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, Criminal §39.12, p. 55 (6th ed. 2009) (hereinafter O’Malley); see 

National Safe Deposit Co. v. Stead, 232 U. S. 58, 67 (1914)

(noting that in “legal terminology” the word “possession” is

“interchangeably used to describe” both the actual and the 

constructive kinds). Actual possession exists when a

person has direct physical control over a thing. See 

Black’s Law Dictionary 1047 (5th ed. 1979) (hereinafter 

Black’s); 2A O’Malley §39.12, at 55. Constructive possession is established when a person, though lacking such 

physical custody, still has the power and intent to exercise

control over the object. See Black’s 1047; 2A O’Malley 

§39.12, at 55. Section 922(g) thus prevents a felon not 

only from holding his firearms himself but also from maintaining control over those guns in the hands of others. 

That means, as all parties agree, that §922(g) prevents a

court from ordering the sale or other transfer of a felon’s

guns to someone willing to give the felon access to them or

to accede to the felon’s instructions about their future use. 

See Brief for United States 23; Reply Brief 12. In such a 

case, the felon would have control over the guns, even 

while another person kept physical custody. The idea of 

constructive possession is designed to preclude just that

result, “allow[ing] the law to reach beyond puppets to

puppeteers.” United States v. Al-Rekabi, 454 F. 3d 1113, 

1118 (CA10 2006). A felon cannot evade the strictures of 

§922(g) by arranging a sham transfer that leaves him in

effective control of his guns. And because that is so, a 

court may no more approve such a transfer than order the 

return of the firearms to the felon himself. 

The Government argues that §922(g) prohibits still 

more—that it bars a felon, except in one circumstance, 
Cite as: 575 U. S. ____ (2015) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

from transferring his firearms to another person, no matter how independent of the felon’s influence. According to

the Government, a felon “exercises his right to control” his 

firearms, and thus violates §922(g)’s broad ban on possession, merely by “select[ing] the[ir] first recipient,” because

that choice “determine[s] who [will] (and who [will] not) 

next have access to the firearms.” Brief for United States 

24. And that remains so even if a felon never retakes 

physical custody of the guns and needs a court order to

approve and effectuate the proposed transfer. The felon 

(so says the Government) still exerts enough sway over the

guns’ disposition to “have constructive possession” of 

them. Id., at 25. The only time that is not true, the Government claims, is when a felon asks the court to transfer 

the guns to a licensed dealer or other party who will sell

the guns for him on the open market. See id., at 20–22; 

Tr. of Oral Arg. 18–21. Because the felon then does not 

control the firearms’ final destination, the Government 

avers, he does not constructively possess them and a court

may approve the transfer. See ibid. 

But the Government’s theory wrongly conflates the right

to possess a gun with another incident of ownership,

which §922(g) does not affect: the right merely to sell or

otherwise dispose of that item. Cf. Andrus v. Allard, 444 

U. S. 51, 65–66 (1979) (distinguishing between entitlements to possess and sell property). Consider the scenario 

that the Government claims would violate §922(g). The 

felon has nothing to do with his guns before, during, or 

after the transaction in question, except to nominate their

recipient. Prior to the transfer, the guns sit in an evidence

vault, under the sole custody of law enforcement officers. 

Assuming the court approves the proposed recipient, FBI

agents handle the firearms’ physical conveyance, without 

the felon’s participation. Afterward, the purchaser or 

other custodian denies the felon any access to or influence

over the guns; the recipient alone decides where to store 
 

 

6 HENDERSON v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

them, when to loan them out, how to use them, and so on. 

In short, the arrangement serves only to divest the felon of

his firearms—and even that much depends on a court’s 

approving the designee’s fitness and ordering the transfer 

to go forward. Such a felon exercises not a possessory 

interest (whether directly or through another), but instead 

a naked right of alienation—the capacity to sell or transfer

his guns, unaccompanied by any control over them.3 

The Government’s view of what counts as “possession” 

would also extend §922(g)’s scope far beyond its purpose. 

Congress enacted that ban to keep firearms away from

felons like Henderson, for fear that they would use those 

guns irresponsibly. See Small v. United States, 544 U. S. 

385, 393 (2005). Yet on the Government’s construction, 

§922(g) would prevent Henderson from disposing of his 

firearms even in ways that guarantee he never uses them 

again, solely because he played a part in selecting their 

—————— 

3The Government calls our attention to several cases in which courts 

have found constructive possession of firearms based on evidence that a

felon negotiated and arranged a sale of guns while using a third party 

to make the physical handoff to the buyer. See, e.g., United States v. 

Nungaray, 697 F. 3d 1114, 1116–1119 (CA9 2012); United States v. 

Virciglio, 441 F. 2d 1295, 1297–1298 (CA5 1971). But the facts in the 

cited cases bear no similarity to those here. In each, the defendantfelon controlled the guns’ movement both before and during the transaction at issue (and even was present at the delivery site). As the 

Government explains, the felon could “make a gun appear” at the time

and place of his choosing and decide what would happen to it once it got

there. Tr. of Oral Arg. 27. Indeed, he could have chosen to take the 

firearms for himself or direct them to someone under his influence. The 

felon’s management of the sale thus exemplified, and served as evidence of, his broader command over the guns’ location and use—the

very hallmark of possession. But as just explained, that kind of control 

is absent when a felon can do no more than nominate an independent 

recipient for firearms in a federal agency’s custody. The decisions the 

Government invokes thus have no bearing on this case; nor does our

decision here, which addresses only §922(g)’s application to courtsupervised transfers of guns, prevent the Government from bringing 

charges under §922(g) in cases resembling those cited. 
Cite as: 575 U. S. ____ (2015) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

transferee. He could not, for example, place those guns in 

a secure trust for distribution to his children after his 

death. He could not sell them to someone halfway around 

the world. He could not even donate them to a law enforcement agency. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 22. Results of that 

kind would do nothing to advance §922(g)’s purpose. 

Finally, the Government’s expansive idea of constructive

possession fits poorly with its concession that a felon in

Henderson’s position may select a firearms dealer or other 

third party to sell his guns and give him the proceeds. 

After all, the felon chooses the guns’ “first recipient” in

that case too, deciding who “next ha[s] access to the firearms.” Brief for United States 24; see supra, at 5. If (as

the Government argues) that is all it takes to exercise 

control over and thus constructively possess an item, then

(contrary to the Government’s view) the felon would violate §922(g) merely by selecting a dealer to sell his guns.

To be sure, that person will predictably convey the firearms to someone whom the felon does not know and cannot control: That is why the Government, as a practical 

matter, has no worries about the transfer. See Tr. of Oral 

Arg. 19–21. But that fact merely demonstrates how the

Government’s view of §922(g) errs in its focus in a case

like this one. What matters here is not whether a felon 

plays a role in deciding where his firearms should go next:

That test would logically prohibit a transfer even when

the chosen recipient will later sell the guns to someone 

else. What matters instead is whether the felon will have 

the ability to use or direct the use of his firearms after 

the transfer. That is what gives the felon constructive 

possession.

Accordingly, a court facing a motion like Henderson’s 

may approve the transfer of guns consistently with §922(g)

if, but only if, that disposition prevents the felon from 

later exercising control over those weapons, so that he

could either use them or tell someone else how to do so. 
 

8 HENDERSON v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

One way to ensure that result, as the Government notes, 

is to order that the guns be turned over to a firearms 

dealer, himself independent of the felon’s control, for

subsequent sale on the open market. See, e.g., United 

States v. Zaleski, 686 F. 3d 90, 92–94 (CA2 2012). Indeed, 

we can see no reason, absent exceptional circumstances, to 

disapprove a felon’s motion for such a sale, whether or not 

he has picked the vendor. That option, however, is not the 

only one available under §922(g). A court may also grant 

a felon’s request to transfer his guns to a person who

expects to maintain custody of them, so long as the recipient will not allow the felon to exert any influence over 

their use. In considering such a motion, the court may

properly seek certain assurances: for example, it may ask 

the proposed transferee to promise to keep the guns away 

from the felon, and to acknowledge that allowing him to 

use them would aid and abet a §922(g) violation. See id., 

at 94; United States v. Miller, 588 F. 3d 418, 420 (CA7 

2009). Even such a pledge, of course, might fail to provide 

an adequate safeguard, and a court should then disapprove the transfer. See, e.g., State v. Fadness, 363 Mont. 

322, 341–342, 268 P. 3d 17, 30 (2012) (upholding a trial 

court’s finding that the assurances given by a felon’s parents were not credible). But when a court is satisfied that 

a felon will not retain control over his guns, §922(g) does 

not apply, and the court has equitable power to accommodate the felon’s request.

Neither of the courts below assessed Henderson’s motion for a transfer of his firearms in accord with these 

principles. We therefore vacate the judgment of the Court 

of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion. 

It is so ordered.