alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF INCOME AND CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS AND IS
QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JAN-28-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-30-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               JAN-28-1998
<CASH>                                             257
<SECURITIES>                                       241
<RECEIVABLES>                                      441
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                      6,367
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 7,476
<PP&E>                                          10,131
<DEPRECIATION>                                   4,659
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  13,558
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            3,274
<BONDS>                                          1,725
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                              981
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           489
<OTHER-SE>                                       4,945
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    13,558
<SALES>                                         32,183
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                32,183
<CGS>                                           25,152
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   25,152
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
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<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 363
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                    418
<INCOME-TAX>                                       120
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                249
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
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<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                       249
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.51)
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</TABLE>
<PAGE>

                                                                  EXHIBIT 32.2
                                                                  ------------

                           CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                            18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                            AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                 SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Annual Report of K-V Pharmaceutical Company (the
"Company") on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended March 31, 2008, as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"),
I, Ronald J. Kanterman, Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of the
Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     (1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
          material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
          of the Company.




Date:      June 25, 2008                    /s/  Ronald J. Kanterman
      --------------------           -------------------------------------------
                                                Ronald J. Kanterman
                                     Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
                                           (Principal Financial Officer)
#### In the Matter of the Liquidation of the General Indemnity Corporation of America. Superintendent of Insurance of the State of New York, as Liquidator, Respondent; Industrial Commissioner of the State of New York, Appellant.

Argued October 5, 1937;

decided October 19, 1937.

*618
      *John J. Bennett, Jr., Attorney-General (Paul Balsam, Henry Epstein*and *Joseph A. McLaughlin*of counsel), for appellant.

*Irvin Waldman*and *Alfred G. Bennett*for respondent.

Order affirmed, without costs; no opinion.

Concur: Crane, Ch. J., Lehman, O’Brien, Htibbs, Loughran and Finch, JJ. Dissenting: Rippey, J.
#### STATE OF FLORIDA v WRIGHT

Case No. 87-030 AC (County Court Case No. 65937MW)

Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Appellate Division, Dade County

November 17, 1987

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, for appellant.

Robert E. Craig for appellee.

Before NADLER, FEDER, SHAPIRO, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT

PER CURIAM.

The Defendant, (Appellee herein) was arrested on January 10, 1986 *159on several charges including Driving Under the Influence. At arraignment, Defense Counsel advised the Court that he would be out of town and requested trial be set during April. Defense Counsel stated: “I waive Speedies here and now, Judge, and I’ll file a written waiver letter”. Accordingly, the Court set the trial after April 1st. Defendant filed neither a written waiver nor a request for Continuance.

In May 1987, the Defendant filed a Motion to Discharge under the provisions of Speedy Trial, Fla. R. Crim. Pro. Sec. 3.191(a)(1). The Court dismissed the D.U.I. charges. This appeal followed.

The State argues that Defendant clearly and unequivocally waived Speedy Trial Right. The Defendant/Appellee argues that the wording used by Defense Counsel at arraignment should be interpreted as an “offer” to waive the right.

Defense Counsel’s statement clearly and unequivocally waived the Defendant’s right to Speedy Trial. A continuance which is properly chargeable to the defense renders the statutory time period for bringing Defendant to trial inapplicable. Fla. Rules Crim. P. 3.191(a)(1). *Butterworth v. Fluellen,*389 So.2d 968 (Fla. 1980).

Further, under the Standards set forth in *Barker v. Wingo,*407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182 (1972), the Defendant has not suffered any actual or presumptive prejudice. The length of time between the date Defendant committed the offense and the date the Motion was heard is less than nine months.

The entering of the Motion to Discharge by the lower Court is hereby reversed with instructions to reinstate charges in accordance with this Opinion.
# JilDp MarylandDepartmentof Planning RichardEberhart Hall Martin 0 Mallry Secretary Governor Anthony G. Brown Matthew

## J. Power LJ. Governor D¢uty Secretary February 17,2009

Ms. Deborah Rabin Regulations Coordinator, Air & Radiation Management Administration Maryland Department ofthe Environment Suite 730 1800 Washington Boulevard Baltimore, MD 21230 STATE CLEARINGHOUSE REVIEW PROCESS

State Application Identifier: MD20090213-0127 Project Description: Proposed Amendments to Regulations ofState Implementation Plan involving: Wood Boilers and Adhesives and Sealants: Public Hearing on March 18, 2009 Project Location: Maryland Clearinghouse Contact: Bob Rosenbush Dear Ms. Rabin: Thank you for submitting your project for intergovernmental review. Participation in the Maryland Intergovernmental Review and Coordination (MIRe) process helps ensure project consistency with plans, programs, and objectives ofState agencies and local governments. Notice ofyour application is being provided to State and local public officials through the 

### Intergovernmental Monitor, which is a weekly Internet publication identifying projects received by the State Clearinghouse for Intergovernmental Assistance. This document may be viewed at http://www.mdp.state.md.us/CLHOUSE/monitorfy04.htm. The project has been assigned a unique State Application Identifier that should be used on all documents and correspondence. One form is enclosed with this letter. The "Project Status Form" should be completed and returned after you receive notice that your project was approved or disapproved. All MIRC requirements have been met in accordance with Code ofMaryland Regulations (COMAR 14.24.04) and this concludes the review process for the above referenced project. If you need assistance or have questions, contact the State Clearinghouse staff person noted above at 4 I0-767-4490 or through e-mail atbrosenbush@mdp.state.md.us
. Thank you for your cooperation with the MIRe process. Sincerely, 

# 'Wt0 C.

# /~l}v1V1/ Linda C. Janey, J.D., Assistant Secretary for Clearinghouse and Communications LCJ:BR Enclosures cc: Kathleen Blinebury - EPA 09-0/27_NMNEWdoc

301 WestPreston Street

- Suite 1101

- Baltimore, Maryland 21201-2305 Telephone: 410.767.4500

- Fax: 410.767.4480

- TollFree: 1.877.767.6272 - Tl'Y Users: Maryland Rtl,!! Internet: www.MDP.state.md.us
§ 21.117 Documentation of informed consent. ( a ) Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this section, informed consent shall be documented by the use of a written informed consent form approved by the IRB and signed (including in an electronic format) by the subject or the subject's legally authorized representative. A written copy shall be given to the person signing the informed consent form.
( b ) Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this section, the informed consent form may be either of the following: ( 1 ) A written informed consent form that meets the requirements of § 21.116. The investigator shall give either the subject or the subject's legally authorized representative adequate opportunity to read the informed consent form before it is signed; alternatively, this form may be read to the subject or the subject's legally authorized representative.
( 2 ) A short form written informed consent form stating that the elements of informed consent required by § 21.116 have been presented orally to the subject or the subject's legally authorized representative, and that the key information required by § 21.116(a)(5)(i) was presented first to the subject, before other information, if any, was provided. The IRB shall approve a written summary of what is to be said to the subject or the legally authorized representative. When this method is used, there shall be a witness to the oral presentation. Only the short form itself is to be signed by the subject or the subject's legally authorized representative. However, the witness shall sign both the short form and a copy of the summary, and the person actually obtaining consent shall sign a copy of the summary. A copy of the summary shall be given to the subject or the subject's legally authorized representative, in addition to a copy of the short form.
( c ) ( 1 ) An IRB may waive the requirement for the investigator to obtain a signed informed consent form for some or all subjects if it finds any of the following: ( i ) That the only record linking the subject and the research would be the informed consent form and the principal risk would be potential harm resulting from a breach of confidentiality. Each subject (or legally authorized representative) will be asked whether the subject wants documentation linking the subject with the research, and the subject's wishes will govern;
( ii ) That the research presents no more than minimal risk of harm to subjects and involves no procedures for which written consent is normally required outside of the research context; or
( iii ) If the subjects or legally authorized representatives are members of a distinct cultural group or community in which signing forms is not the norm, that the research presents no more than minimal risk of harm to subjects and provided there is an appropriate alternative mechanism for documenting that informed consent was obtained.
( 2 ) In cases in which the documentation requirement is waived, the IRB may require the investigator to provide subjects or legally authorized representatives with a written statement regarding the research.
(Approved by the Office of Management and Budget under Control Number 0990-0260)
CROWELL & MORING LLP

1001 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20004 , 2595 TELEPHONE: (202) 624,2500 FACSIMILE: (202) 628-51 16 ZUCKERT, SCOUTT & RASENBERGER, L.L.P. 888 SEVENTEENTH STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 -3939 TELEPHONE: (202) 298-8660 FACSIMILE : (202) 342-0683 October 31, 2014
VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL
Mr. Paul L. Gretch Director Office of International Aviation U.S. Department of Transportation Room W86-316 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE Washington, DC 20590

Re: United/Avianca — Notice of Additional Codesharing (Dockets DOT-OST-2011-0163 and DOT-OST-2011-0164)
Dear Mr. Gretch:
United l and Avianca hereby notify the Department of the display of Avianca's "AV*" designator code on flights operated by United between Denver and Mexico City, Mexico beginning on or after 30 days from the date of this letter. 2 United and Avianca hold the requisite underlying authority to codeshare on this route. 3 In addition, these services are fully consistent with the Open Skies Agreement between the U.S. and Colombia and the U.S.-Mexico Air Transport Services Agreement, as amended. Respectfully submitted,
CROWELL & MORING LLP
Gerald F. Murphy gmurphYgcrowell. com
Counsel for United Air Lines, Inc.
cc: Bob Finamore; Brian Hedberg ZUCKERT, SCOUTT & RASENBERGER, L.L.P.
a

, 2 " t

, ;e "Yi/i

. David M. Endersbee Jonathon H. Foglia dmendersbeegzsrlaw.com : hf ~ ogliagzsrlaw.com
Counsel for Aerovias del Continente Americano S.A. Avianca

Common names are used for airlines. ` Under this arrangement, Mexico City will serve as a transit point for Avianca traffic moving between the United States and Colombia, and these codesharing services will not be available to Avianca passengers originating at or destined for Mexico City.

3 See Order 2013-4-11 (reissuing United/Continental authorities in the name of"United Airlines, Inc."); and Notice of Action Taken dated Oct. 28, 2011 in Dockets DOT-OST2011-0163 and DOT-OST-2011-0164 (United/Avianca).SERVICE LIST

robert.wirick@aa.com anita.mosnerghklaw.com howard.kasskaa.com jennifer.nowakghklaw.com bob.kneisley@wnco.com mrollergrollerbauer.com msinick ,ssd.com thomas.tinjzgsuncountry.com a oe

~ &ggh-airlaw.com dkirsteinkyklaw.com robert.cohnkhoganlovells.com j,young&yklaw.com patrick.rizzi@hoganlovells.com matwoodn,cozen.com jhillkcooley.com mlbengegzsrlaw.com perkmannkcooley.com barbara.russellgvirginamerica.com sascha.vanderbellenn,delta.com william.stallingskusdoj.gov chris.walker(c

~ ,delta.com dwight.moore(austranscom.mil nssnarksna.fedex.com i ohn. s.duncanna.faa. izov sllunsford@fedex.com
```

[115th Congress Public Law 201]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

[[Page 132 STAT. 1528]]

Public Law 115-201
115th Congress

                                 An Act

 
To authorize the expansion of an existing hydroelectric project, and for 
         other purposes. <<NOTE: July 20, 2018 -  [H.R. 220]>> 

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. TERROR LAKE HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT UPPER HIDDEN BASIN 
                              DIVERSION AUTHORIZATION.

    (a) Definitions.--In this section:
            (1) Commission.--The term ``Commission'' means the Federal 
        Energy Regulatory Commission.
            (2) Terror lake hydroelectric project.--The term ``Terror 
        Lake Hydroelectric Project'' means the project identified in 
        section 1325 of the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation 
        Act (16 U.S.C. 3212), and which is Federal Energy Regulatory 
        Commission project number 2743.
            (3) Upper hidden basin diversion expansion.--The term 
        ``Upper Hidden Basin Diversion Expansion'' means the expansion 
        of the Terror Lake Hydroelectric Project as generally described 
        in Exhibit E to the Upper Hidden Basin Grant Application dated 
        July 2, 2014, and submitted to the Alaska Energy Authority 
        Renewable Energy Fund Round VIII by Kodiak Electric Association, 
        Inc.

    (b) Authorization.--The licensee for the Terror Lake Hydroelectric 
Project may occupy not more than 20 acres of Federal land to construct, 
operate, and maintain the Upper Hidden Basin Diversion Expansion without 
further authorization of the Secretary of the Interior or under the 
Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (16 U.S.C. 3101 et 
seq.).
    (c) Savings Clause.--The Upper Hidden Basin Diversion Expansion 
shall be subject to appropriate terms and conditions included in an 
amendment to a license issued by the Commission pursuant to the Federal 
Power Act (16 U.S.C. 791a et seq.), including section 4(e) of that Act 
(16 U.S.C. 797(e)), following an

[[Page 132 STAT. 1529]]

environmental review by the Commission under the National Environmental 
Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.).

    Approved July 20, 2018.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY--H.R. 220 (S. 214):
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

HOUSE REPORTS: No. 115-154 (Comm. on Natural Resources).
SENATE REPORTS: No. 115-105 (Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources) 
accompanying S. 214.
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD:
                                                        Vol. 163 (2017):
                                    June 27, considered and passed 
                                        House.
                                                        Vol. 164 (2018):
                                    June 28, considered and passed 
                                        Senate.

                                  <all>
```
795 A.2d 388

#### COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, v. Respondent Richard Joseph COSNEK, Petitioner.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

April 25, 2002.

*264
      *ORDER*

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 25th day of April, 2002, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is hereby granted, limited to the following issue:

Can the Commonwealth certify an interlocutory appeal from a pretrial ruling that denied its motion in limine to exclude certain defense evidence?
§ 1610.34 Procedure in the event of a demand for production or disclosure. ( a ) Whenever a demand is made upon an employee or former employee of the Commission for the production of material or the disclosure of information described in § 1610.30, he shall immediately notify the Legal Counsel. If possible, the Legal Counsel shall be notified before the employee or former employee concerned replies to or appears before the court or other authority.
( b ) If response to the demand is required before instructions from the Legal Counsel are received, an attorney designated for that purpose by the Commission shall appear with the employee or former employee upon whom the demand has been made, and shall furnish the court or other authority with a copy of the regulations contained in this part and inform the court or other authority that the demand has been or is being, as the case may be, referred for prompt consideration by the Legal Counsel. The court or other authority shall be requested respectfully to stay the demand pending receipt of the requested instructions from the Legal Counsel.
[32 FR 16261, Nov. 29, 1967, as amended at 47 FR 46275, Oct. 18, 1982; 63 FR 1342, Jan. 9, 1998]
EXHIBIT 32

STATEMENT FURNISHED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Capitol Federal Financial (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended December 31, 2004, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), we, John B. Dicus, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, and Neil F. M. McKay, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company as of the dates and for the periods presented in the financial statements included in such Report.







Date:   February 4, 2005                                    By:   /s/ John B. Dicus
                                                                                     John B. Dicus, President and 
                                                                                     Chief Executive Officer



Date:   February 4, 2005                                   By:   /s/ Neil F. M. McKay
                                                                                     Neil F.M. McKay, Executive Vice President
                                                                                     and Chief Financial Officer
#### Diane Grieco, Appellant, v Nassau County Police Department et al., Respondents.

[698 NYS2d 261]

—In an action, *inter alia,*to recover damages for false arrest and malicious prosecution, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Phelan, J.), entered June 30, 1998, as granted those branches of the defendants’ respective motions which were to dismiss her causes of action to recover damages for false arrest and malicious prosecution.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, *263with one bill of costs to the respondents appearing separately and filing separate briefs.

Contrary to the plaintiff’s contentions, there was probable cause for her arrest. The existence of probable cause bars the plaintiff’s causes of action to recover damages for malicious prosecution and false arrest *(see, Broughton v State of New York,*37 NY2d 451, *cert denied sub nom. Schanbarger v Kellogg,*423 US 929). Accordingly, those causes of action were properly dismissed. Friedmann, J. P., Krausman, Florio and Smith, JJ., concur.
§ 4022.95 Examples. The following examples show how the rules in §§ 4022.91 through 4022.94 apply. For examples on how these rules apply in the case of a certain-and-continuous annuity, see § 4022.104. At the time of his death, Charlie was receiving payments under a joint-and-survivor annuity. Charlie designated Ellen to receive survivor benefits under his joint-and-survivor annuity. We underpaid Charlie for periods before his death. At the time of his death, we owed Charlie a back payment to reimburse him for those underpayments. ( a ) *Example 1: where surviving beneficiary is alive at participant's death.* Ellen survived Charlie. As explained in § 4022.91(b), because Ellen is entitled to survivor benefits under the joint-and-survivor annuity, we would pay Ellen the back payment.
( b ) *Example 2: where surviving beneficiary predeceases participant.* Ellen died before Charlie. As explained in §§ 4022.91(b) and 4022.93, because benefits do not continue after Charlie's death under the joint-and-survivor annuity, we would pay the back payment to the person(s) Charlie designated to receive any payments we might owe him at the time of his death. If Charlie did not designate anyone to receive those payments or his designee died before him, we would pay the back payment to the person(s) surviving Charlie in the following order: spouse, children, parents, estate and next of kin.