Summary of the recommendations

At the January meeting, Dr. Dreyfus listed several important short-term goals the

OCRWM program had set for itself. These include "returning the emphasis" of the repository

program to science and site characterization, "institutionalizing stakeholder interaction," and

proposing a new funding mechanism to increase monies going to the OCRWM program; Dr.

Dreyfus said that, once the future budget profile of the program had been determined,

program activities would be "recast to use those resources efficiently." In light of these

program goals, the Board would like to make the following recommendations.

1. The Board repeats the recommendation it made in its Special Report in March

1993: an independent review of the OCRWM’s management and organizational structure

should be initiated as soon as possible. The problems created by OCRWM’s large and

unwieldy organizational structure, as well as by previous management decisions, should be

addressed sooner, rather than later. The Board believes that this review can and should be

undertaken without slowing the momentum of important site-characterization activities

currently under way at Yucca Mountain.

Now that the Secretary has requested the creation of a special fund to give the

OCRWM increased access to revenues coming into the Nuclear Waste Fund, an independent

review is needed more than ever. This is because relatively too little funding has been going

to the direct costs of the scientific research and engineering activities essential to

characterizing the Yucca Mountain site. Based on its four-year review of the program, the

Board believes that simply increasing the program’s funding will not ensure that adequate

funds will be allocated to the most important site-characterization activities or to other

critical research. Simply increasing funding also will not ensure that the program will meet

its current schedule deadlines. The Board believes that a timely, independent review of the

OCRWM’s management and organizational structure will provide an excellent basis for the

needed reshaping of the program, regardless of future funding scenarios.

2. The Board believes that it is vital to maintain the momentum of current sitecharacterization efforts and recommends that, whether the program budget remains level or is

increased, program management should ensure sufficient and reliable funding for site

characterization and performance assessment, which is critical for integrating the program.

During the past three years, the OCRWM has cited a lack of funds as the reason for

postponing or slowing critical site-characterization activities, including underground

excavation and surface-based testing, as well as research in other important areas. At the

same time, however, the number of people working on the program has continued to grow.

Program managers need to place a greater emphasis on a number of critical activities,

including underground excavation, surface-based testing and mapping, thermal testing, and

waste package development. At the very least, sufficient monies should be guaranteed for

those activities that will facilitate the identification as soon as possible of any obvious

features that would disqualify the site.

JEC126Va 2
3. The Board recommends that the OCRWM build on the Secretary’s new public

involvement initiative by expanding current efforts to integrate the views of the various

stakeholders into the civilian radioactive waste management program during the decisionmaking process — not afterward. Because both the lay and the scientific communities have

important roles to play in the evolution of this program, the Board hopes that the OCRWM’s

recent stakeholder workshops are only the first in a series of constructive interactions with

OCRWM stakeholders. Furthermore, the Board encourages the DOE to establish a long-term

framework for constructive interaction with OCRWM stakeholders on important high-level

waste management issues.

The following discusses these three recommendations in more detail.

Recommendation 1: Independent Program Review Needed Now More Than Ever

As it did in its March 1993 Special Report, the Board recommends that an

independent review of the entire OCRWM’s management and organizational structure be

undertaken as soon as possible.

1 The Board believes that the large number of program

personnel, the many organizations involved in the U.S. program, and the diffuse nature of its

organizational structure will continue to create very difficult challenges for program managers

and adversely affect the technical program.

The U.S. civilian radioactive waste management program is proving difficult to

manage. It currently employs approximately 2,790 people spread among a dozen major and

almost two-dozen minor contractors, several national laboratories, various government

agencies, and others.2 The program’s organizational structure is multilayered, program

entities are geographically dispersed, and responsibility for decision making is spread among

too many managers. The result is a lack of overall program integration. This contributes to

major inefficiencies, which, in turn, affect every aspect of the technical and scientific program

and hinder the integration of the program’s different scientific and engineering components.

Finally, OCRWM management historically has devoted such significant resources to overhead

and infrastructure that relatively limited funding has remained for important science and sitecharacterization activities.3

1Others (U.S. Representatives Philip Sharp and Richard Lehman in August 1993, and the

General Accounting Office in May 1993) have made similar recommendations.

2January 27, 1994. Memo to the Board from the DOE’s Office of External Relations, Office of

Civilian Radioactive Waste Management. The numbers, which include contractors and

approximately 250 federal DOE employees, reflect the number of people working on the OCRWM

program as of the first quarter of fiscal year 1994.

3NWTRB. 1993. Special Report to Congress and the Secretary of Energy. March 1993. Or,

most recently, for example, at the Board’s July 1993 meeting the OCRWM attributed its under

use of outside expert judgment in a performance assessment study to a lack of sufficient funds.

JEC126Va 3
In the past, the Board has questioned the technical basis for a number of management

decisions. For example, at the Yucca Mountain site-characterization project office in Nevada,

decisions often do not reflect standard practice in the underground construction industry. The

cost-plus award-fee contracts being used encourage neither competition nor innovation.4 The

Board also believes that the OCRWM is overdesigning the underground exploratory studies

facility planned for Yucca Mountain. The excavation of the exploratory facility could be

accomplished more quickly and at less cost if the surface and subsurface support facilities and

utilities were reduced in scale and simplified.5 The Board believes that decisions like these

could continue to divert funds from important site-characterization and related research

activities, no matter what the OCRWM’s budget.6

Recently, the Secretary asked Congress to create a "special funding mechanism" that

would provide the OCRWM with increased access to monies flowing into the Nuclear Waste

Fund.7 Given this request, the review recommended by the Board in its March 1993 Special

Report takes on even greater significance. Although the Board believes that the OCRWM

must direct more funding to site characterization, simply increasing OCRWM’s budget will

not ensure that adequate funds will be allocated to the most important site-characterization

activities or to other critical research and testing; nor will it ensure that the current program

schedule is met.8 And simply increasing the program’s budget will not solve the OCRWM’s

significant organizational and management problems, which continue to affect the technical

program.

The Board believes that, in addition to helping address the OCRWM’s management

and organizational problems, an independent management review of the entire OCRWM

program would provide program managers with a framework that would allow, for example,

(1) better integration of the science and engineering in the program,

4Questions about the efficiency of the DOE’s award-fee contracts also have been raised by

DOE Assistant Secretary Thomas P. Grumbly . (See Energy Daily, Monday, July 19, 1993.)

5NWTRB. 1993. Underground Exploration and Testing at Yucca Mountain. Report to

Congress and the Secretary of Energy. October 1993. (See discussion beginning page 13.)

6The Board hopes that the constructive organizational changes being made at the Yucca

Mountain project in tandem with the financial and management review of the Yucca Mountain

project announced by the Secretary on January 27, 1994, will address some of these problems.

7When asked by the Office of Management and Budget to comment on the funding

mechanism, the Board chose to defer comment to those more competent in such matters.

8A number of important activities must take place before repository operations, currently

scheduled for 2010, can begin. For example, repository construction should begin around 2001.

But before that happens, for example, the DOE must (1) complete the underground exploratory

facility (the main portal-to-portal tunnel is not scheduled to begin before August 1994); (2)

initiate and secure data from long-term in-situ thermal testing, which is not scheduled to begin

until 1997; (3) submit a final environmental impact statement.

JEC126Va 4
(2) more informed judgments about opportunities for reducing the duplication of efforts by

multiple contractors, and (3) a restructuring of the program while maintaining the continuity

of scientific and technical activities.

Unfortunately, such a broad-based review of the entire OCRWM has neither been

initiated, nor, to the best of our knowledge, been planned. As already mentioned, the

Secretary has announced a financial and management review of the Yucca Mountain project,

and this limited review could play an important initial role in an overall review of the

OCRWM program. However, neither this limited review, nor the recently completed selective

compilation of comments by parties interested in the repository development program,9

would substitute for the kind of independent review called for last year in the Board’s Special

Report.

The Board suggests that the Secretary of Energy appoint a small, independent group of

internationally recognized experts with extensive experience in managing large, complex

programs and in system acquisition to conduct this review. Although necessary, knowledge

in the nuclear waste management field alone would be insufficient to carry out the review.

Given these kinds of experts, such a review should not take long, nor require a large staff.

The review can and should be conducted concurrently with ongoing site-characterization

activities.

Recommendation 2: Maintain the Momentum of Site-Characterization Activities

In the past, the Board questioned continual delays in site characterization. Now that

excavation activities at the Yucca Mountain site have finally begun, it is crucial that the

momentum of these activities be maintained.

In previous reports and in its Special Report, the Board expressed concern about the

OCRWM’s decision to devote such significant resources to overhead and infrastructure that

relatively limited funding remains for site-characterization activities. The OCRWM has cited

a lack of funds as the reason for postponing or slowing some critical activities, such as

underground excavation and surface-based drilling and testing. The Board also recommended

in several reports against reducing the funding to support development of a long-lived waste

package.10 While these important scientific and engineering activities were being either

9Thurber, James A. Draft Report on Published Works and Comments Regarding the Office of

Civilian Radioactive Waste Management Program, 1989-1993. December 13, 1993.

10In its Fourth Report (1991), the Board recommended that engineered barrier development

and testing be funded continuously and at a level sufficient to evaluate its contribution to longterm predictions of repository behavior. In its response to that recommendation (in the Fifth

Report) the DOE indicated its agreement with this recommendation but explained that budget

constraints were responsible for the constricted development of engineered barriers. The Board

was recently encouraged to see small increases in funding going to research in this area. Waste

package design is a critical area, especially in light of recent emphasis by the DOE on the

development of a multipurpose canister.

JEC126Va 5
postponed or slowed, however, the number of contract employees working on the program

continued to grow. For example, since July 1991 the number of contract employees working

full time on the program has increased 34 percent to a total of 2,540 in December 1993.11

In addition, substantial resources are being committed to the construction of a complex

underground exploratory facility with a very large main tunnel, a large and complex core test

area, and surface and subsurface facilities and utilities that exceed the actual requirements of

the current excavation plan.12

Given these kinds of management decisions, the Board believes that, no matter what

OCRWM’s future budget, delays in the scientific investigations at the site easily could

continue. For example, if underground excavation is delayed or slowed (a real possibility)

during fiscal year 1995, the underground exploration needed for identifying any obvious

features that could disqualify the site also will be delayed. And initiation of the underground

in-situ thermal testing needed to support decisions about repository and waste package design

and about repository licensing likewise will be delayed. This is critical because in-situ

thermal testing may take a decade or more to complete.13

To ensure that the momentum of activities currently under way at Yucca Mountain

continues — whether the budget remains level or is increased — funds must be allocated in

such a way as to ensure sufficient and reliable support for site-characterization and iterative

performance assessment, which is essential for focusing the technical program. Program

managers need to place a greater emphasis on a number of critical activities, including

underground excavation, surface-based testing and mapping, thermal testing, and waste

package development. Determining whether or not Yucca Mountain is suitable for locating a

permanent high-level waste repository is probably the program’s most important short-term

goal, and its high priority should be reflected in the allocation of the program’s funds.

Recommendation 3: Expand Efforts to Integrate Stakeholder Views

The continuing involvement of stakeholders and other members of the interested

public is critical to the progress of the OCRWM’s program. The Board has seen — in the

U.S. program and in programs in the seven other countries it has visited — that public

perceptions about the potential risks associated with nuclear power and the waste it generates

must be addressed. Without substantial public involvement, the goal of siting a permanent

repository could be even more difficult to achieve, no matter what the sophistication and

depth of the technical and scientific program.

11In July 1991, there were 1,890 contract employees working on the program, in addition to

approximately 250 federal DOE people. These numbers are available from the OCRWM on a

quarterly basis.

12NWTRB. 1993. Underground Exploration and Testing at Yucca Mountain. A Report to

Congress and the Secretary of Energy. October 1993.

13NWTRB. 1993. Special Report to Congress and the Secretary of Energy. March 1993.

JEC126Va 6
At the January Board meeting, Dr. Dreyfus was asked to comment on the findings of a

task force report commissioned by the previous Secretary of Energy, which determined that a

"widespread lack of trust in the DOE" exists, "specifically in the waste management office’s

activities."14 The report suggests that some of this distrust stems from the DOE’s historical

exclusion of potential stakeholders from the decision-making process. Dr. Dreyfus responded

that one of the Secretary’s major goals is to create an environment of openness and

interaction with program stakeholders. Indeed, the Secretary already has initiated a new

public involvement policy.15

The Board supports the DOE’s efforts to broaden the public’s participation in the

decision-making process and recommends that the OCRWM build on the Secretary’s initiative

by expanding current efforts to integrate the views of the various stakeholders into the

civilian radioactive waste management program as it evolves. The Board believes the views

of the interested public must be integrated into the program while key decisions are being

made — not afterward. Both the lay and the scientific communities have important roles to

play in the evolution of this program. We hope that recent stakeholder workshops16 are

only the beginning of an ongoing series of constructive OCRWM-stakeholder interactions.

The Board also encourages the Secretary to consider establishing a long-term framework for

constructive interaction on high-level waste issues with OCRWM stakeholders similar to the

Environmental Protection Agency’s recently completed year-long superfund study.17

In conclusion, the Board recognizes that OCRWM’s new program managers are facing

a wide variety of significant challenges. The Board also understands that the

recommendations it is making will not be easily implemented; there are no quick fixes for

this complex program. With that said, however, the Board strongly believes that, no matter

what future funding trends may be, these recommendations should be implemented to achieve

an efficient and cost-effective program. We hope that the

14Earning Public Trust and Confidence: Requisites for Managing Radioactive Waste. 1993.

Final Report of the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board Task Force on Radioactive Waste

Management. November 1993.

15On December 17, 1993, the Department of Energy released for public comment a draft of

its new public involvement policy.

16The OCRWM has held four stakeholder workshops in recent months on general issues, the

multipurpose canister, and on the waste management system.

17In June 1993, the DOE participated in a Keystone-led effort to hammer out consensus on

high-level waste. Unfortunately, the effort died after the first meeting. Recently, a similar effort

was undertaken by the EPA to look at ways of revamping procedures to clean up hazardous

waste dumps across the United States. The results of this year-long study of the superfund

program by environmentalists, industry leaders, Indian tribal leaders, and others included

consensus on a number of issues and several wide-ranging recommendations for program

improvement.

JEC126Va 8