Understanding 

Shuangxue

The PLAAF’s Learning 

Organization Initiative
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Understanding Shuangxue

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Understanding Shuangxue

As the People’s Liberation Army PLA continues to undergo a wide range 

of institutional and equipment changes, it garners much attention from think 

tanks, academics, and other militaries from around the world. While the 

organizational and technological changes of the PLA are certainly important 

and merit study, one aspect that often is overlooked is the ‘softer’ side, the 

people who actually operate that equipment, and occupy the positions that 

make up the organizations. 

This study focuses on how the PLA Air Force is attempting to better 

educate their people, promote learning, and thereby improve their combat 

effectiveness, the ultimate goal of any military. While many western nations’ 

militaries have a long history of multi-faceted education and learning built 

into their personnel systems, the PLA, like many other communist-modeled 

militaries, has tended to focus on military training, vice education, limited to 

an individual’s specific position at the time, and left the ‘education’ portion 

to focus solely on political education in support of the Party. This appears to 

be slowing changing. With the introduction of the Shuangxue, aka double 

learning, model, the PLA is attempting to incorporate training and education 

across different levels and specialties. Inevitably this attempt to change not 

just a system, but a mindset, will have successes and failures, but it appears to 

have garnered enough momentum and senior level support to persist into the 

foreseeable future. This study seeks to explain the origins of Shuangxue, provide 

examples and insights as to how it is being applied through the force, and set a 

baseline against which the future may be judged.

Dr. Brendan S. Mulvaney

Director, China Aerospace Studies Institute

Preface
2 Chinese Aerospace Studies Institute
Understanding Shuangxue

The PLA is currently engaged in an ambitious modernization program that 

includes significant improvements to its equipment, reforms to training and 

educational practices, and wide sweeping reorganization. However, this process 

has exposed a wide gap between desired and current capabilities. “Shuangxue”, 

the topic of this study, is a learning initiative promoted by senior PLA Air Force 

leadership in response to these challenges. By encouraging individual learning and 

team learning activities, the PLAAF hopes to foster a lifelong learning culture 

within the service that will not only help it address current capability deficiencies 

but also adapt to future changes.

Key Findings

• Xi Jinping’s “Strong Military Dream” (强军梦) directive in 2012 greatly 

accelerated the PLA’s modernization.1 Subsequent changes in equipment, 

training and organizational structure pose serious challenges for PLAAF 

personnel at all levels. Many individuals report experiencing “ability panic”— 

fear of knowing the inadequacy of ones’ skills.

• Shuangxue, the full title is “Create Learning Flight Groups, Strive to Be 

Learning Aviators”, was created by a frontline unit in 2011 to address 

serious deficiencies in military knowledge and skills.2 Beginning in 2014, 

the PLAAF leadership promoted Shuangxue across the Air Force to create a 

learning culture in the service that encourages individual learning and team 

learning activities in operational units and work units to help active-duty 

personnel at all levels address deficiencies and better adapt to changes. 

3

Understanding Shuangxue:

The PLAAF’s Learning 

Organization Initiative
Chinese Aerospace Studies Institute

• Shuangxue is not a systematic training program. More analogous to a Chinese 

mass movement or political campaign, its goal is to foster a learning culture, 

and change military personnel’s mindset. Shuangxue has its roots in the 

learning organization philosophy which advocates lifelong learning beyond 

the traditional classroom setting. Implemented ad hoc at the unit level, 

these activities take place outside of the military academic institutions and 

rely on individuals and teams taking initiatives with minimum centralized 

supervision. All units determine their own study methods according to their 

missions and capabilities. Only general guidance is given: that learning 

activities should focus on equipment, combat methods, system-of-systems, 

and the heroic traditions of the Chinese military.3

• Reports in Kongjun Bao and other PLA media indicate that Shuangxuerelated activities are being carried out at all unit levels from the grassroots (

基层) to the Air Force headquarters. Examination of Shuangxue activities 

reveals a common theme: PLA personnel identify an area of weakness or a 

research topic and decide on a plan of study. Time is set aside for individual 

or group study. When possible, experts are invited into the units to give 

lectures or demonstrations. Evaluation of these learning activities include 

giving reports, taking tests, publishing research papers, or through actual 

combat training.

• While assessing the progress and success of this initiative is difficult in 

the short term, it is noteworthy for its high-level support and widespread 

adoption. The PLAAF sees “learning power” as a key part of its service 

identity and prevailing intellectually as the cornerstone of fighting and 

winning wars and becoming a “Strategic Air Force” (战略空军).4 In February 

2018, CMC Chairman Xi Jinping emphasized the importance of lifelong 

learning beyond the academy or specific training programs.5 It is likely that 

the PLAAF leadership will continue or rebrand the program and make the 

PLAAF a force devoted to continuous self-improvement. 

4
Understanding Shuangxue

On 29 February 2016, the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) held 

a ceremony to announce the service’s institutional reorganization (体制改革).6

Then-Commander of the Air Force, General Ma Xiaotian (马晓天), announced 

the Central Military Commission’s (CMC) order reorganizing the PLAAF 

Headquarters. In his speech, Ma called on the Air Force to resolutely carry out 

CMC Chairman Xi Jinping’s reform and military strengthening strategy, to 

understand the necessity of the reform, and to clearly assess the necessary steps to 

achieve the goal of being able to fight and win. Ma highlighted the fact that “The 

process of institutional reform...is also a process of remolding people’s thinking, 

upgrading people’s capabilities and qualities, and reshaping the pattern of work.”7

To accomplish these goals, he argued “We should keep a strong sense of crisis and 

feel an ‘ability panic’ (本领恐慌).”8

Originally coined by Mao Zedong (毛泽东) in 1938, this latter phrase, which 

means the “fear of knowing the inadequacy of ones skills,” has become emblematic 

of a shared sentiment among PLAAF personnel since its strategic transformation 

picked up pace after the 18th Party Congress in 2012.9 To combat “ability panic” 

and “make sure that all comrades are comprehensively and perfectly capable as 

required”, Ma emphasized the importance of carrying out Shuangxue “double 

learning” (双学) activities—self- and team-learning activities meant to improve 

combat proficiency.10 Originally titled “Create Learning Flight Groups, Strive to 

Be Learning Aviators” (“创建学习型飞行大队, 争当学习型飞行人员”), Shuangxue, 

as adopted throughout the PLAAF, is shorthand for the lengthy original title.11, i

i Note that it is distinct from the similarly-named but entirely separate “Double Bachelors” degree 

(shuangxuewei or shuangxueji; 双学位/双学籍).

5

Introduction
Chinese Aerospace Studies Institute

In contrast to other aspects of education and training in the military, 

Shuangxue is not a systematic training program, which the shorthand of the 

title appears to suggest. The key to understanding the nature of the Shuangxue 

initiative lies in the key word in the full title- “learning” (学习型) as an adjective, 

which has its roots in the learning organization or learning society concept that 

advocates lifelong learning beyond the traditional classroom setting. 

Originating in the 1970s in the West and flourishing in the 1990s largely in 

the business sector, the learning organization philosophy argues that traditional 

educational institutions cannot keep up with the constant changes in the modern 

world and that decentralized, learning activities beyond the classroom that facilitate 

the ability of lifelong learning of individuals can help organizations stay current. It 

envisioned an organization with its personnel “skilled at creating, acquiring, and 

transferring knowledge,” therefore it “would be able to adapt to the unpredictable 

more quickly than their competitors could.”12 For that to happen, organizations 

need to “tap people’s commitment and capacity to learn at all levels.”13 

This concept became popular in China after then-President Jiang Zemin 

proposed “establishing a lifelong learning system and building a learning society” 

during an APEC meeting in May 2001.14 Jiang saw the concept as a way of helping 

China more rapidly modernize and achieving its economic development goals. 

In 2003, the Communist Party of China (CCP) announced plans to transform 

itself into a “Learning Party” (学习型政党).15 The CCP, therefore, has a tradition 

of viewing “continuous learning” as a means for unlocking rapid organizational 

change, both for achieving economic goals or in the PLA’s case, acquiring necessary 

technical knowledge to adapt to the requirements of a modern military. 

Consistent with the learning organization philosophy, the PLAAF’s 

Shuangxue initiative aimed to create a learning culture in the service that 

encourages individual learning and team learning activities in operational units 

and work units to help active-duty personnel at all levels address deficiencies and 

better adapt to changes. In other words, these activities take place outside of the 

military academic institutions and rely on individuals and teams taking initiatives 

with minimum centralized supervision. 

As the title suggests, in its infant stage, Shuangxue was limited in scope and 

applied primarily to aviation units. However, as sweeping changes in training, 

equipment, and organizational structure have made greater and greater demands 

of PLAAF personnel, the initiative gained prominence in the intervening years 

as a major driver of efforts to improve skills and capabilities across the force. In 

its current form, Shuangxue activities have become a key component of unit-level 

6
Understanding Shuangxue

“on-the-job education and training.”ii Reports in Kongjun Bao and other PLA 

press indicate that Shuangxue-related activities are being carried out from the 

grassroots level to the Air Force headquarters.

Organization and Sources

This report explores the origins of Shuangxue, and then analyzes the reasons 

why the PLAAF has taken a learning activity that was initially only promoted by 

a single unit and made it a force-wide priority. It explores the connection between 

“ability panic” and Shuangxue to explain how it fits into the PLAAF’s larger 

modernization effort. And then finally examines examples of Shuangxue activities 

to provide the reader with a greater context to understand this wide-reaching 

and nebulous learning initiative and concludes with an assessment of Shuangxue’s 

impact on these units. 

This paper relies on open source Chinese media information between 2011 

and 2017. Specific sources include the PLA’s official newspaper PLA Daily 

( Jiefangjun Bao; 解放军报), PLA Daily Online (81.cn), the PLAAF’s newspaper 

Air Force News (Kongjun Bao; 空军报), and Air Force News Online (kj.81.cn). 

Origins of Shuangxue

In November 2011, the PLAAF conducted the largest, most competitive and 

most realistic opposition-force air battle competition assessment it had held until 

that point known as Golden Helmet (金头盔).16 A battalion leader-grade flight 

group (飞行大队) subordinate to one of the air regiments of the former Shenyang 

Military Region Air Force’s (MRAF) 1st Air Division, which is well-known 

for its combat performance during the Korean War, was eliminated on the first 

day.iii A comprehensive review of the competition that included subject matter 

experts on electronic warfare and radar revealed that the pilots were clueless 

about how to operate effectively in a complex electromagnetic environment that 

included widespread jamming. Pilots were also found to be ignorant of important 

developments in modern avionics, PLAAF (Red Force) tactics, and enemy (Blue 

Force) tactics. Other elements were also found to be lacking in technical skills 

ii The unit-level “on-the-job education and training,” combined with military academic institutions and 

military professional education, make up the three components of the “Triad” New Type Military Talent 

Cultivation System (三位一体新型军事人才培养体系). See “关于聚焦实战、瞄准一流,建设高素质新型飞行人员队伍的意见,” 

Kongjun Bao, 6 July 2017, 3. Of note, the PLA defines “military professional education” as “education outside 

of academic institutions.” See “划重点!军事职业教育与你我息息相关,” Xinhuanet, 1 March 2018, www.xinhuanet.

com/mil/2018-03/01/c_129819877.htm.

iii This division shot down 16 UN aircraft. Mao Zedong personally wrote a citation for the unit, praising 

their valor. See Li Jianwen (李建文) and Wang Jun (王军), “空军航空兵第一师某飞行大队瞄准强军目标推动飞行员素质转型狠

抓学习能力续写打赢传奇,” PLA Daily, 22 November 2013, http://kj.81.cn/content/2013-11/22/content_5660075.

htm.

7
Chinese Aerospace Studies Institute

and basic job knowledge. Out of dozens of aircraft maintenance personnel, not a 

single one was familiar with electronic countermeasures.17 

The air division’s Party Committee decided that it was necessary to begin 

taking action at the unit level. The conclusion it reached, after multiple debriefings 

on the root cause of its failure, was that its personnel had insufficient capabilities 

to learn, research and grow along with the technological advances. It decided to 

adopt an aggressive learning initiative for pilots and flight groups. The resulting 

initiative, titled “Create Learning Flight Groups, Strive to Be Learning Aviators,” 

formed the basis of Shuangxue.18, iv This division’s Shuangxue initiative was built 

around the idea that “learning power is combat power” (学习力就是战斗力) and 

a five-part study framework that created systems for objectives, content, methods, 

support and evaluation, as well as a digital database to share materials and ideas.19

Under this learning initiative, the division’s subordinate regiment set up 

learning small groups that deliberately included personnel from different billets. 

For example, pilot Meng Xiangli (孟祥礼), regiment chief of staff Li Tong (李通), 

and aircraft maintenance group engine expert Le Zhonghua (乐中华) were in the 

same group. Meng revealed that his group made time for Shuangxue activities, 

“no matter whether we had regular flight training or a major mission, we all 

committed to ‘study ten minutes before regular flight prep, and discuss for an 

hour after the flight debriefing,’ constantly studying and reflecting to improve 

the quality of our training.”20 Additionally, pilots were expected to attend lectures 

from subject-matter experts on topics related to informationized equipment and 

their employment to help devise strategies to deal with new technologies and 

tactics. The same article revealed that more than 100 similar lectures were taught 

at this division. 

According to this division’s leadership, the Shuangxue learning initiative 

had an immediate result. In 2013, the 1st Air Division took first place in the 

same competition and received four out of the seven Golden Helmet pilot 

awards.21 Shuangxue is regarded as the cornerstone of their success in this rapid 

improvement. 

iv Note: In the PLAAF, the term feixingyuan (飞行员) can be translated as “pilot” in any type of aircraft or 

“aviators,” which refers to all personnel on an aircraft, such as a bomber or transport.

8
Understanding Shuangxue 9

Initially a learning activity promoted by a single unit, Shuangxue was later 

promoted by the Air Force Party Committee to aviation units and the three 

newly-created flight colleges in September 2013.22 According to Air Force 

Party Committee senior leadership, the Air Force must regard learning power 

as an important component of the Air Force’s strategic capabilities. At the 2014 

Military Training Conference, General Ma Xiaotian, then-commander of the 

Air Force, made it clear that Shuangxue should be used by the entire PLAAF.23

Ma explained the three key considerations behind this drive, CMC Chairman Xi 

Jinping’s requirement to build a strong armed forces; and the prominent problems 

that came to light during the Air Force’s transformation process; Shuangxue 

activities came out of front-line unit’s attempts to address their existing problems 

and have shown concrete results.

Ma’s remarks in 2014 demonstrated that the PLAAF had recognized that 

the 1st Air Division’s challenges were not unique within the Air Force. Although 

the PLA’s modernization has been underway for at least two decades, Xi Jinping’s 

ascension to the position of General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party 

and the Chairman of the CMC at the 18th Party Congress in late 2012 put the 

PLA’s modernization into overdrive. 

In March 2013, during a meeting with the representatives from the PLA at 

the 12th National People’s Congress, Xi made clear that the Party’s goal in regards 

to the military in the new era is to “build the people’s forces into world-class 

forces that obey the Party’s command, can fight and win, and maintain excellent 

conduct.”24

“Ability Panic” and Shuangxue:

From a Single Unit Initiative to 

Widespread Adoption
Chinese Aerospace Studies Institute

In order to “fight and win” in future combat, Xi called for actual-combat 

training to be conducted across the PLA on a regular basis and pushed through 

sweeping reforms to its organizational structure.v In January 2016, the PLA began 

“above-the-neck” (脖子以上) ,i.e. above the corps level, reforms that created a new 

command structure.vi February 2017 saw the beginning of dramatic “neck-andbelow” (脖子以下), i.e. corps and below, reforms that largely affected individual 

units.vii At the same time, new aircraft and new equipment were commissioned 

into service at an accelerated pace.

These sweeping changes, which touched every corner of the Air Force and 

every level of personnel, helped further expose a number of major deficiencies in 

combat capabilities and uncover the previous unknown unknowns, contributing 

to the “ability panic.” 

There are three major challenges the PLAAF personnel face and provides 

examples of “ability panic” and Shuangxue’s utility in addressing these challenges. 

Challenge 1: New Equipment 

The rapid introduction of new equipment starting in the late 1990s posed a 

problem as technology outstripped the pace at which aviators and other weapon 

system operators can become familiarized with it. Perhaps the best illustration of 

this issue is that China is attempting to go from an air force dominated by 2ndgeneration aircraft ( J-7, J-8) to 3rd- and 4th- generation aircraft ( J-20, J-31) in 

less than a generation of pilots.viii On 31 July 2017, a large military parade was 

held at Zhurihe (朱日和), Inner Mongolia, to celebrate the 90th anniversary of 

the founding of the PLA. A special report in Kongjun Bao noted the “explosive 

development” (“井喷式”发展) of the PLAAF’s weapons and equipment to include 

three J-20s, a new aerial refueling formation of HU-6/H-6DU tankers and J-10C 

and J-16 fighters, HQ-9B and HQ-22 surface-to-air missile (SAM) weapon 

systems, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) i.e. drones.25

This can be daunting both in terms of new equipment but also capabilities. 

One comment that appears frequently across all of the PLAAF’s branches is 

that “new equipment does not automatically mean greater combat capability”, 

equipment must be matched with skill and understanding of how to use it.26

Personnel with many years of experience operating one type of equipment can 

v Actual-Combat (实战) is the term used by the PLA to differentiate between previous scripted exercises 

that had little relation to a real combat situation.

vi The PLA uses “above-the-neck” to refer to the organizational reform at anything above the corps level, 

e.g. TC services, TC HQ, CMC, etc.

vii The PLA uses “neck-and-below” to refer to the organizational reform at the corps-level and below.

viii Note that the United States and China refer to generations of aircraft differently.

10
Understanding Shuangxue

experience the “ability panic” when forced to quickly learn whole new schools of 

tactics and technical capabilities. 

One pilot named Liu Jun (刘俊) noted that while 3rd-generation aircraft, 

e.g. J-10, “..are easy to fly, but being able to fly is not the same as being able to 

fight.”27 Another pilot who was transitioning to a 3rd-generation aircraft noted 

that there are “thousands of data points [on displays in newer aircraft], almost a 

hundred times more [information].”28 Another article revealed that a husbandand-wife team that both served in the PLA Air Force, Sun Hongwei (孙宏伟) and 

Liu Yanhui (刘艳慧), who had spent 10 years at a former Beijing MRAF’s SAM 

regiment stationed in Inner Mongolia would be reassigned to a unit with a type 

of weapon three generations more advanced than the one they had been using.29 

Aircraft maintenance personnel faced similar challenges. The PLAAF’s 

slow phase-out of antiquated jet trainers, such the JL-8 and JL-9, has further 

exacerbated this problem.ix For example, one article reported that a Southern 

Theater Command Air Force (TCAF) air brigade’s leaders noticed some officers 

and enlisted personnel were having a hard time transitioning to a type of 3rdgeneration aircraft.30 Some of the backbone personnel had flown or maintained 

a 2nd-generation aircraft for a long time, and they were held back by habits and 

practices formed during that time. 

A separate article mentioned that, when a group of new-type bomber aircraft 

(新型轰炸机) was commissioned into service in an Eastern TCAF air regiment, 

the unit experienced problems due to the aircraft maintenance personnel 

having trouble adopting the new mindset that was needed to maintain a newgeneration aircraft. For example, some maintenance personnel equated the idea of 

maintenance with “scrubbing everything clean and making it look shiny.”31

While many of these problems are being uncovered and resolved due to a new 

mindset being applied to daily tasks, other more systematic problems only became 

clear after units increasingly engaged in actual-combat training that seriously 

challenge PLAAF units’ capabilities.

Challenge 2: Actual-Combat Training

The PLA has placed more emphasis on realistic training since 2012. At the 

18th Party Congress, Xi Jinping called for actual-combat training to be conducted 

across the PLA (向全军发出“大力开展实战化训练”). This followed the late 2011 

introduction of the Air Force’s Golden Helmet (金头盔) competition, which was 

the first of the Air Force’s “Four Key Training Brands,” including Red Sword (红

剑), Blue Shield (蓝盾), and Golden Dart (金飞镖).32

ix The author is grateful to Andreas Rupprecht for this point.

11
Chinese Aerospace Studies Institute

PLA Air Force 

Actual-Combat Training Four Key Training Brands 

(实战化训练四大品牌) x

Red Sword Exercise (红剑) Campaign-level System-of-Systems Confrontation

Blue Shield Exercise and Golden Shield Competition 

(蓝盾 and 金盾)

Air Defense Opposition-Force

Golden Helmet Competition (金头盔) Fighter Jet and Ground Attack Aircraft Air-to-air 

Opposition-Force

Golden Dart Competition (金飞镖) Penetration and Ground Attack

x

These exercises have had a real impact in exposing areas for improvement. 

In one early exercise, likely Red Sword, a radar unit controller was unable 

to distinguish between friendly and opposition aircraft. The equipment was 

functioning correctly, but this individual’s training was not up to the task.33

In another instance, a Western TCAF SAM brigade that had gradually 

introduced new equipment since September 2016 encountered major difficulties 

due to lack of familiarity with the new equipment.34 During an exercise, likely 

Blue Shield, the brigade leaders discovered that some staff officers did not fully 

consider the performance parameters and characteristics of the new equipment. 

The staff officers simply used older and similar operational plans when operating 

new equipment, causing “inexact analysis of air situations, slow calculation of data 

on targets, mixed tactical plotting, and a series of other issues”.35

In addition to major training missions, the PLAAF has emphasized 

normalization of actual-combat training, posing challenges for units which in the 

past preferred to avoid more risky or difficult training subjects. A Central TCAF 

SAM battalion, for example, failed to deploy electronic counter measures (ECM) 

equipment during training exercises until after the new training directives in 2012 

due to fears of complicating training and lack of familiarity with the equipment.36

Similarly, an Eastern TCAF SAM brigade, for example, had previously deliberately 

turned off equipment during training to maintain a low-malfunction rate. In 

another instance, a Western TCAF SAM brigade’s battalion reported that it used 

to treat nighttime training as a mere formality (走过场).37

When these units were forced to reevaluate their training standards and 

incorporate more elements that better resembled duties they would carry out in a 

real conflict, they were met with many previous unknown unknowns. For instance, 

a rescue drill taken place in an Eastern TCAF unit revealed that an emergency 

response team was only capable of using a vehicle disguised as an aircraft, and was 

x For a more comprehensive examination of these training brands, see: Jana Allen and Kenneth Allen, “The 

PLA Air Force’s Four Key Training Brands, CASI, 31 May, 2018, https://www.airuniversity.af.mil/CASI/Display/Article/1536348/pla-air-forces-four-key-training-brands/.

12
Understanding Shuangxue

caught off guard when asked to conduct a drill using a real aircraft.38 The medical 

team’s first-aid setup did not match the aircraft type; the pilot suffered a second 

injury when the medical team tried to get them out of the cabin; the firefighting 

subunit sprayed water all over the aircraft, ignoring the danger of fuel leaking from 

the aircraft. These individual examples are illustrative of the large deficiencies in 

the PLAAF’s training across all branches. 

Challenge 3: Organizational Reforms

The PLA’s “above-the-neck” reform, which abolished its seven MR Air Force 

(MRAF) Headquarters and created five TCAF Headquarters, was initiated in 

February 2016. The second stage of the reform, the neck-and-below reform 

which was initiated in February 2017, involved units at the corps-level and below. 

Concerning the PLAAF, several additional corps deputy leader-grade bases 

(基地) were created from existing command posts, as well as the former Jinan 

MRAF and Lanzhou MRAF Headquarters. Many units were abolished, merged, 

upgraded, downgraded, and/or resubordinated. As a result, the aviation branch’s 

fighter and ground attack aircraft organizational structure has been shifted from 

a Command Post-Air Division structure to a Base-Brigade structure.xi The chart 

below shows the shift in organizations from air divisions (left) to air brigades 

(right). 

xi For a detailed examination of the PLA Air Force’s transition to a brigade structure, see Laurence “Sid” 

Trevethan, “Brigadization” of the PLA Air Force, CASI, 31 May, 2018, https://www.airuniversity.af.mil/CASI/

Display/Article/1536338/brigadization-of-the-pla-air-force/.

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Chinese Aerospace Studies Institute

At the heart of the “neck-and-below” reform was the new base-brigade 

structure (基地-旅体制) which integrates battle, training, management and support 

(战训管保), and is considered essential to the development of system-of-systems 

operational capabilities (体系作战能力).39, xii Training and unit management have 

both seen dramatic shifts, reflecting this priority. 

Together, these reforms had extensive and far-reaching consequences.xiii

During the reorganization, many personnel were reassigned, repositioned across 

branches, assuming billets without any previous experience. Old methods are 

being discarded, requiring personnel at all levels to familiarize themselves with 

completely new systems. This affected units at a range of organizational levels, 

and the following analysis gives examples starting at the headquarters-level down 

to battalion. 

One article revealed the impact of the reform in the Air Force Headquarters 

Staff Department. After the reorganization, many staff officers went from being 

experts in one field to becoming a beginner in a different field. Wang Chenguang 

(王晨光), a former ECM staff officer (电抗参谋) who had worked at the Staff 

Department for more than 10 years, became an ECM and radar staff officer 

(电雷参谋). He revealed that this new title brought with it significantly more 

responsibilities. He told reporters that changes in job functions and work 

patterns made him feel a “ability panic.”40 Wang Yaokang (王耀康), a former Staff 

Department’s Military Training Department’s staff officer in charge of academic 

institutions training was assigned to oversee academic institutions recruitment 

and National Defense Student (国防生) program training. With so much to learn, 

Wang commented that he felt like he was an elementary school student again.41 

Tan Shengfang (谭胜芳), a staff officer from an Eastern TCAF air brigade’s 

Staff Department’s Operations and Training Office, explained that the basebrigade command structure allowed the brigade level to organize training 

independently. In turn, it also demanded training organization personnel be 

proficient in not just executing specific duties, but also in formulating flight plans 

and organizing tactical subjects training.42

xii In 2005 the PLA was directed to conduct systematic and detailed research to support implementation of 

“system-of-systems operations,” envisioned as bringing advanced combat capability by linking PLA units to 

sensors and to each other through an integrated command information system. This requires the PLA to adopt 

a much more sophisticated approach to communications, and involves much greater volumes of information being passed between different echelons. See Kevin McCauley, “PLA System-of -Systems Operations 

Enabling Joint Operations”, The Jamestown Foundation https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/

System-of-Systems-Enabling-Joint-Operations.pdf?x87069 January 2017.

xiii Setting aside the strategic considerations for the stages of the reforms, the analysis here focuses on personnel changes, and particularly changes in individual’s job functions that resulted in “ability panic.”

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Understanding Shuangxue

Under the older system, regiment-level units relied on their associated division 

for guidance. A Kongjun Bao article reported that aviators and staff officers of a 

Southern TCAF air regiment had virtually zero command experience.43 After the 

reform, some former regiment officers assumed billets in brigades, resulting in an 

experience gap. Ma Dengyun (马登云), a navigation staff officer of an Eastern 

TCAF air brigade, who was previously assigned as a regimental navigation 

staff officer, said that, in the past, his job was simply to pass flight route data to 

commanders, but that now his duties included assisting commanders in decisionmaking and providing tactical guidance to aircraft in training.44 Ma admitted to 

frequently experiencing panic due to his lack of abilities. 

Lower levels have been similarly “bootstrapped” and given greater responsibility. 

Battalions, which in the past were considered grassroots units, now need to take 

initiative and improve management and command skills. An Eastern TCAF 

SAM battalion’s Party Committee realized that, under the new structure, there 

were many more units under the base and the brigade, and battalions were often 

several hundred kilometers away from brigade headquarters, making it difficult 

for brigade headquarters to oversee every issue at the grassroots level.45 This 

required the battalion Party Committee to take the initiative and play its role as a 

“forward command post” (前沿指挥所) to the fullest. Battalions were also required 

to improve their ability to rapidly redeploy. Wang Jun (王军), commander of a 

battalion under an airborne brigade, stated that, in the future, battalions would 

have a very high mobilization rate, whether in Theater Command joint exercises 

or in regular training, and therefore battalion Party Committees must be capable 

of giving commands.46 The clear implication here is that this has not been the case 

in the past.

The changes also extend to new types of equipment being introduced, 

including incompatible or dissimilar types. For example, airfield stations that once 

supported transport aircraft may now be assigned combat aircraft, and personnel 

from antiaircraft artillery (AAA) units are now assigned to units that field 

surface-to-air missiles and radar. Meanwhile, many AAA units are disappearing. 

Multiple articles reported former AAA troops experiencing “ability panic” after 

being charged with brand new tasks.47 The training for these different types of 

equipment is often incompatible or has little overlap, requiring them to essentially 

start from scratch in their training. 

In addition, the lack of emphasis in training for technical backbone personnel 

resulted in a serious deficit of technically-competent and trained military personnel. 

Multiple articles from Kongjun Bao highlighted this issue. For example, the leaders 

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Chinese Aerospace Studies Institute

of a Southern TCAF SAM brigade pointed out that a combination of an overlylong training cycle for specialty technicians and frequent personnel turnover 

resulted in a shortage of these personnel.48 In another instance, a Northern TCAF 

airfield station noted that, when support backbone personnel were on leave, the 

unit frequently found itself short-staffed.49 During the “neck-and-below” reform, 

with some skilled noncommissioned officers (NCOs) leaving the service, a Western 

TCAF airfield station struggled to fix vehicle breakdowns.50 Sometimes persistent 

problems even affected training and support. In any organization, training and 

retaining such a force takes time and investment. In the United States, a civilian 

work force serves as a partial solution to this problem. But until very recently, 

the Chinese military had not even begun to recruit adequate numbers of these 

personnel, or train them to a sufficiently high standard.

“To Prevail in Future Combat, One Must First Prevail Intellectually”51

The examples above show that, due to broad changes in organizational 

structure, equipment, and training, personnel across the PLAAF are confronting 

the gap between their current abilities and what are needed to “fight and win (能

打胜仗).”52

To strengthen the PLA’s education system, the Third Plenary Session of the 

18th CPC Central Committee made an important decision to deepen the reform 

of military academic institutions and improve the PLA military personnel’s 

“‘Triad’ New-Type Military Personnel Cultivation System” (三位一体新型军事

人才培养体系) consisting of military academic institutions education, military 

professional education, and unit on-the-job education and training.53 As the 

PLAAF continued to explore ways to recruit and train high quality personnel, 

it also recognized the need to leverage the resources at hand to address these 

pressing issues.

The chart below illustrates the “cultivation” cycle for PLA personnel and how 

Shuangxue fits into the system.

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Understanding Shuangxue

“Triad” New-Type Military Personnel Cultivation System

Military academic institutions education encompasses cadet academic 

education, officer’s professional education, and NCO education. It follows 

admission procedures and standard curriculums, and provides comprehensive and 

systematic education programs. However, it also has its limitations. A 28 February 

2017 PLA Daily article described Xi Jinping’s recommendations for improving 

the “Triad” New-Type Military Personnel Cultivation System.”54 According to 

Xi, a focus on academic institutional education to the neglect of more practical 

training has led to an imbalance in their skills and insufficient numbers of 

competent personnel. He believes that on-the-job training has the most direct 

effect in helping individual personnel improve. He also noted that the concept of 

lifelong learning beyond the academy or specific training program is not currently 

a universal part of the Chinese military mindset.

As military academic institutions are not accessible to all active-duty personnel, 

the PLA is committed to building a platform for military professional education 

to expand educational options for the rest of the force. There are different schools 

of thought regarding military professional education in China, but according to 

the prevailing view, military professional education refers to internet-enabled 

learning platforms that are open to all military personnel in service. In theory, 

military professional education should be able to provide all PLAAF personnel, 

officers and enlisted personnel alike, with training opportunities as envisioned in 

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the cultivation system, yet a PLA Daily article indicates that the program is still 

under development and will be operational in 2019.55, xiv

While the PLAAF continues to develop its military professional education 

programs and recruit better-qualified personnel into academic institutions, the 

PLAAF leadership saw Shuangxue as a workaround of the traditional educational 

system to help the PLAAF personnel cope with the rapid changes that are occurring 

organizationally and technologically. The flexible and decentralized nature of 

Shuangxue means that it could take place outside of traditional classrooms and 

be applied to all PLAAF personnel regardless of their billets, grades, and ranks. 

At the 2014 PLAAF Annual Military Training Meeting held from 11 to 12 

January, Ma Xiaotian made it clear that Shuangxue should be used by the entire 

PLA.56 He called on the Air Force to make effective use of Shuangxue to conduct 

research on weapons and equipment and master the skills of operating and using 

the equipment, to learn about the opponents and create new combat methods, to 

conduct research on the employment of system-of-systems (体系), and to study 

political theory and foster a mindset that aims at winning in combat. In short, 

Shuangxue should stress “equipment (装备), combat methods (战法), system-ofsystems (系统), and the heroic traditions of the Chinese military (军魂),”57 Ma 

also emphasized that Shuangxue activities should be mainly aimed at meeting job 

requirements. 

The Shuangxue initiative also fits into the PLAAF’s broader objectives. In 

April 2014, CMC Chairman Xi Jinping charged the PLAAF with becoming a 

“strategic air force” (战略性空军).58 To accomplish this, the Air Force’s leadership 

wanted to harness a key part of the PLAAF’s service identity: studiousness (好

学). The PLAAF sees prevailing intellectually as the cornerstone of fighting and 

winning wars and becoming a strategic Air Force. It saw Shuangxue activities as a 

way to change military personnel’s mindset, unleash potential human capital and 

drive outcomes. By emphasizing Shuangxue, the Air Force sent a message to all 

who are feeling inadequate that acknowledging the problem is good and is the 

first step toward making improvement. It encourages units to find that limit, feel 

the “ability panic” and work to overcome it. In May 2017, the PLAAF held the 

“Air Force Concentrated Training for Principal Officers at the Division, Brigade 

and Regiment levels” (2017年空军师旅团主官集训), an event labeled “a largescale, high-level Shuangxue activity.”59 “How far is the PLAAF from being able 

to fight and win fights?” was a question raised during the training.60 Participants 

recognized that the ultimate success of its force building could only be proven 

xiv It is worth noting that the PLA’s military professional education differs from professional military education (PME) in the United States.

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Understanding Shuangxue

on the battle field, yet they reached a consensus that the PLAAF must strive 

to answer that question in daily practices, especially through various platforms 

including the PLAAF’s four key training brands and Shuangxue activities.

How is Shuangxue being implemented?

According to Ma, all units should determine their own study methods based 

on their tasks and capabilities.61 Ma emphasized the importance of being practical 

about these activities and focusing on crucial and difficult issues. Since Shuangxue 

is aimed at improving individual job skills, each person’s study activities must 

be closely related to their specific job proficiency requirements. He encouraged 

learning as a team and through exchanges with brother units or outside 

organizations. He concluded his speech by calling on all PLAAF personnel to 

“treat continuous learning as a job requirement, a practical need, a spiritual pursuit, 

and a way of life.”62

On the one hand, the flexibility of Shuangxue made it possible to be conducted 

in all units. As the PLAAF leadership only provided general guidance on how to 

conduct the activities, each unit is free to design activities on their own that could 

address its unique challenges. As noted previously, the Shuangxue initiative is 

consistent with the learning organization philosophy and is aimed at creating 

a learning culture in the service that encourages individual learning and team 

learning activities that take place outside of the military academic institutions 

and rely on individuals and teams taking initiatives with minimum centralized 

supervision. On the other hand, this means that Shuangxue lacks formal, unified 

guidelines regarding content, timelines for achieving results or even setting the 

length for courses of study. 

Available information on Shuangxue is fragmented, but examination of 

Shuangxue activities in media reports reveals one common theme: discover 

an area of weakness or a research topic, preferably in Ma’s four categories 

(equipment, combat methods, system-of-systems, and heroic traditions of the 

Chinese military) then establish a study plan. Set aside time to study individually 

or as a unit. For example, several units set aside Monday or Thursday evenings as 

Shuangxue night school, but this is by no means universal. When possible, experts 

are invited into the units to give lectures or demonstrations. Evaluation of these 

learning activities include giving reports, taking tests, or through actual combat 

training. Many reports emphasized the benefit from preparing to brief others. 

It is also worth noting that Shuangxue has seen several updates and expansions. 

Updated versions include “study, research and combat” (学, 研, 战) activities, “let’s 

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talk about actual combat training” (实战化训练规律大家谈), and “learn about the 

opponent, conduct research on the opponent, and defeat the opponent” (学习对

手, 研究对手, 战胜对手).63

A review of articles translated by CASI found 56 reports about units holding 

Shuangxue activities in the 2017 edition of Kongjun Bao. Further breakdown 

of these units by branch and organization type reveals that each of the branches 

(Aviation, SAM, RADAR, Airborne)xvhas held at least one Shuangxue activity 

over the course of that year.xvi

A number of examples drawn from PLA and PLAAF open source media 

reports are included below to provide the reader with context as to the nature of 

Shuangxue activities. It should be noted that in many cases the content or length 

of these activities is unknown. 

PLAAF Headquarters 

An April 2017 article in Kongjun Bao provided a detailed overview of 

Shuangxue activities in the PLAAF Headquarters Staff Department (空军参谋

部) and is worth reviewing at length.64 The article noted that since 2016, Air Force 

Staff Department has been actively exploring more effective ways of organizing 

the Shuangxue activity in keeping with the new structure and the new missions. 

It promoted research and discussions on a fixed topic each month to help staff 

xv While Anti-Aircraft Artillery is still believed to be an active branch, it is currently in the process of being 

reorganized into Air Defense units and is not mentioned separately in Kongjun Bao.

xvi Shuangxue activities frequently take place over a course of weeks or months.

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Understanding Shuangxue

officers to adopt new mindsets and upgrade capabilities. Each second-level 

functional bureau (业务局) would pick a key research topic each month. There 

were no specific rules on how these activities should be carried out. Bureaus were 

encouraged to hold an all-personnel discussion, as well as to invite outside experts. 

The topic being discussed at the time of the reporter’s tour of the department was 

the Air Force’s plans for airfield systems (空军机场体系建设).

The Staff Department also set up staff officer symposiums. In March 2017, 

two aviators coming from front-line units separately told the audience about the 

performance characteristics of the advanced combat aircraft and personal feelings 

in using the equipment, and briefed the audience on the training conditions of 

their units, the latest tactical concepts, and their thoughts and suggestions about 

shaping combat capabilities as quickly as possible with the new equipment. 

When commenting on Shuangxue activities for combat duty staff personnel 

at the command post of the Air Force Headquarters, Hu Debiao (胡德彪), 

commander of the Air Force Headquarters Command Post (空军指挥所所长), 

told the reporter: “The biggest hindrance to on-duty staff personnel’s training 

is that they cannot persist in getting involved in regular training.”65 From the 

beginning of the Shuangxue activity, they formulated a specific study and training 

plan for operation on-duty personnel, guaranteeing the training time and the 

personnel’s participation.

According to Ning Jiangtao (宁江涛), director of the Air Force Command 

Post’s General Affairs Division (空军指挥所综合处处长), staff personnel took 

turns giving a lecture every day, “imparting knowledge of their own specialties 

in the simplest and clearest form to all others”. Behind each lecture-giving staff 

officer, there is a support team, whose members work together to study the 

relevant subject, and help the lecturer prepare the lesson. At the same time, they 

also improve their work capabilities. 

According to staff personnel’s own assessments, the program is having a positive 

impact. While reporting on Shuangxue activities in the PLAAF Headquarters 

Staff Department, the reporters noted that Shuangxue has resulted in prompting 

the staff personnel to update thoughts, change mindsets, and establish a clear-cut 

orientation of focusing on actual operations, as well as studying and defeating 

the enemy.66 Gan Xuewu (甘学武), staff officer in the ECM and Radar Bureau 

(电雷局), told the reporter that, to prepare the lesson on the operational use 

of a type of radar, he systematically studied the operational effects, equipment 

support, and work regularities of the radar.67 According to him, the knowledge he 

learned through preparing the lesson was more valuable than his appearance on 

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the lecture podium. Many staff officers told the reporter: In the past, on-duty staff 

officers of various subunits were used to viewing things from the perspectives of 

their own specialties, and all felt that the work they were responsible for was the 

most important.68 Through Shuangxue activities, personnel helped, instructed, and 

learned from each other. This deepened their mutual understanding and promoted 

the integration of their work knowledge.

Aviation Units

In the Golden Helmet 2016 opposition-force air combat competition 

assessment (金头盔2016对抗空战竞赛考核), a Central TCAF air regiment came 

in second place and two young pilots from this regiment took home the Golden 

Helmet award.69 This was considered a great breakthrough for this regiment, which 

in October 2014 suffered its third defeat in the same competition assessment. 

This regiment attributed this success to the implementation of Shuangxue 

activities, which included lectures given by outside experts, visits to brother units, 

and enhanced research on weapons and equipment through a problem-tackling 

small group made up of aircrew members, aircraft maintenance personnel, and 

civilian experts. This regiment emphasized that through these learning activities, 

personnel became accustomed to arguments and debates over issues large and 

small, and they would not rest until a satisfactory solution were found. In August 

2016, this regiment arranged a rest and recuperation vacation for pilots and family 

members. One day during breakfast, a casual chat led to a heated debate regarding 

some air combat data. As they were close to a research institute, regiment leaders 

proposed a visit to the institute to find out the answers. The reporters concluded 

that because all personnel were committed to learning, this regiment was able to 

make the breakthrough in 2016.

Other aviation unit examples in the Kongjun Bao reveal that in units 

transitioning to a new type/variant of aircraft, Shuangxue was often used to 

supplement theoretic training and transition training. In the Central TCAF, 

one air brigade transitioning from J-7 to the J-10B was able to complete all its 

tasks within six months.70 They used Shuangxue group studying activities to gain 

a deeper understanding of air-to-air missiles, air-to-ground attacks, electronic 

warfare, free air combat and other subjects. The aviators and ground crew all 

together made 42 presentations of their study to the other groups to help speed 

up their familiarization with the new techniques and equipment. 

A similar success story involved an Eastern TCAF air regiment whose 

commander Yang Deshan (杨德山), a special-grade pilot, sorted through all the 

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Understanding Shuangxue

difficult issues arising from combat-readiness training and formed several keyproblems-tackling small groups to conduct research on these topics.71 He also led 

the efforts in compiling the regiment’s self-published “Shuangxue Journal”, in 

which he collected articles his unit’s research on equipment maintenance, combat 

methods and special situation management. These efforts paid off. In less than a 

year’s time, more than 10 aircrews in this regiment all completed the transition. 

They also made breakthroughs in the areas of ECM, datalinks, and photoelectric 

equipment.

Shuangxue has also been used to improve language study in aviation units. 

With the PLAAF participating in more and more international training, as well 

as during confrontation flights, it is important that Chinese aviators be able to 

communicate at least basic commands in other languages. An air [transport] 

regiment under the former Chengdu MRAF, now part of the Western TCAF, 

devoted half an hour every day until the aviators were able to give basic commands 

in English.72

System-of-Systems Operations and Joint Operations

Shuangxue has been adopted to promote the general understanding of 

complex theories and subjects, such as system-of-systems operations and joint 

operations. Notable examples in Konjgjun Bao include the following.

In July 2014, despite being occupied with the summer’s busy training session, 

the Beijing MRAF sent close to 1,000 principal officers at corps-, division-, 

regiment-, battalion- and company-level units (五级主官) to participate in a 

Shuangxue inter-branch training event.73, xvii The goal of the event was to increase 

communication and knowledge about other branches and break down the 

knowledge gap between, for example, fighter pilots and SAM troops. During the 

training, each branch gave an overview of its recent development, then answered 

questions from other branches. The audience was interested in the answers to 

questions such as “how do SAM units receive early-warning information and does 

it meet the demands of future warfare,” “how to evade radar during penetration 

and attack operations,” “what could SAM units teach radar units about camouflage 

and protection and battlefield survival.” The Beijing MRAF also sent regimentlevel and above principal officers to aviation, SAM and radar units to observe 

first-hand the operations of weapons and equipment, and the way combat is 

xvii Since 2013, the Air Force had held multiple service-wide training events for principal officers at the 

Corps-, Division-, Regiment-, Battalion- and Company- level units (五级主官) to promote understanding of 

the Party’s directives and hold discussions on key issues. See Qin Chao (秦超), Zhang Li (张力), “空军连续3年组

织五级主官培训3.6万人次参加在‘生动的重复’中培养强军带头人”, PLA Daily, 17 May 2015, http://military.people.com.

cn/n/2015/0517/c172467-27011635.html.

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organized. One of the participants, Kuang Qiang (匡强), a regiment flight group 

commander, revealed that he had the opportunity to talk with a SAM unit division 

commander to find out how they were able to successfully lock on to his aircraft in 

a penetration and attack drill. 

To further improve command officers’ (指挥军官) understanding of joint 

operations, joint campaigns and system-of-systems operations (体系作战), in 

2016 the Central TCAF created a list of 100 recommended and required books.74

As a drafter of the plan at the Central TC remarked, “[sometimes] lopsided stress 

is laid on hardware, and inadequate attention is paid to software...” The books 

are meant to make sure that commanders have an adequate understanding of the 

‘software’ component, especially joint operations. 

Support Capabilities 

Multiple reports noted support units making effective use of Shuangxue 

activities to build up a reserve of technical backbone personnel and improve 

support capabilities. 

Multiple articles noticed a shortage of technical backbone personnel in units. 

One of the solutions adopted by multiple units was to train NCOs across billets 

to ensure that they have could take on tasks when necessary. These NCOs were 

called “[the one with] one specialty and multiple skills.” Shuangxue is used to 

speed up the process of training. One good example concerned how an airfield 

station subordinated under a Western TCAF base’s air brigade utilized Shuangxue 

and cross-billet training to transform the support model.75 For a long time, when 

aviation units were deployed to other locations for training, airfield stations had 

to pack up everything and move with aviation units to provide support. In 2015, 

this airfield station was selected by the PLAAF as a pioneer unit to development 

and test the aviation unit’s zero-escort support model (航空兵部队零伴随保障试

点建设单位). In order to reduce the number of support personnel under the new 

support model, this airfield station focused on training “one-specialty, multiple 

capabilities” (一专多能) support personnel by switching billets. Over the years, 

whenever possible, this airfield station arranged relevant personnel to receive 

training at other airfield stations and academic institutions. In 2016 alone, it sent 

more than 300 personnel to various training institutions. The article reported that 

this initiative is seeing great results. By May 2017, this airfield station was capable 

of supporting all types of aircraft in this brigade.

A 2014 article reported that, by promoting Shuangxue activities, a Nanjing 

MRAF air regiment developed self-sustaining support capabilities.76 Previously, 

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Understanding Shuangxue

in many cases, maintenance units relied on technical personnel from aircraft 

factories to provide key support. However, in May 2014, all three of this regiment’s 

subunits, which were on field deployments, encountered technical difficulties at 

the same time and requested help from the factories. After a delay kept these 

factory maintenance staff from arriving, one of the subunits failed to complete 

its mission on time.xviii This regiment’s Party Committee instituted change by 

first conducting surveys and assessments to get a general sense of the areas of 

weakness. It then combed through records of maintenance issues for the past ten 

years. As a result, it implemented as system where “backbone personnel”, including 

experienced NCOs and officers, taught lessons. It held discussions on eliminating 

malfunctions, where experts offered advice and insight into tough challenges. It 

also invited factory experts to give lectures. In addition, it required approval from 

maintenance group commanders before maintenance personnel could ask for help 

from the factory, forcing them to improve their skills. 

Equipment Research

Shuangxue also provides a route for new ideas and research, especially in 

regards to new equipment employment, to enter the broader PLAAF hierarchy 

from the bottom up. Two examples are worth noting:

While deployed in a remote part of the Gobi desert, a Central TCAF radar 

brigade’s chief of staff made a careful study of combat techniques and tactics. His 

study of defense radar intelligence systems was passed to higher echelon and even 

won an All-Military Award for excellence.77

When describing how actual-combat training could aid equipment research, 

Zhang Youshun (张友顺), a technical office assistant in an Eastern TCAF SAM 

brigade revealed that, before the 18th Party Congress, most research was conducted 

at the researchers’ desks, without much communication between researchers and 

the grassroots units.78 This made a stark contrast with the present, when there 

were significantly more training and deployment opportunities, which energized 

him and motivated him to utilize the “Shuangxue platform” (双学平台) to extend 

his research beyond his area of focus, previously just focusing on guided missile 

command and control, into missile large systems. As a direct result of that, in June 

2017, while on an exercise mission, Zhang and his team helped eliminate a power 

outage for his battalion.

xviii Note this is pre-reform so the article, which refers to “南空航空” in this case is understood to mean the 

Nanjing Military Region.

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The examples provided above are primarily PLAAF personnel self-assessments 

and are given in the context of interviews mean to promote a positive view of the 

Shuangxue initiative and of the PLAAF’s ability to overcome obstacles. 

The trumpeted success of Shuangxue in PLA media does not present a holistic 

or clear picture about that the status of PLAAF, whether there is resistance to the 

program, or how representative its successes are. Additionally, given Shuangxue’s 

emphasis on transforming the PLAAF into a learning organization, it is worth 

noting that these initiatives have struggled to measure their own success. As an 

article in the Harvard Business Review’s March 2008 issue pointed out, “the ideal 

of the learning organization has not yet been realized...”79 Many of these initiatives 

failed or had mixed results because they offered “paeans to a better world rather 

than concrete prescriptions.” Moreover, “managers had no way of assessing how 

their teams’ learning was contributing to the organization as a whole... Without 

[standards for evaluation], companies could declare victory prematurely or claim 

progress without delving into the particulars or comparing themselves accurately 

with others.” 

Since at least 2014 the PLAAF has held annual meetings to award “model” 

Shuangxue practitioners and units across the service as a way of encouraging 

participation; however, it is unlikely that the PLAAF is applying metrics to 

scientifically assess the results of Shuangxue activities.80, xix Two separate articles 

in the 3 March 2017 Kongjun Bao featured two “model” Shuangxue practitioners 

in 2016: Chen Zhide (陈志德), a deputy commander of a Southern TCAF’s air 

xix There is currently insufficient evidence to conclude one way or the other whether the PLAAF is using 

metrics to scientifically assess the results of Shuangxue activities. However, more information may be available 

in the future.

26

Assessment of Shuangxue
Understanding Shuangxue

regiment, and Wang Weizhen (王伟振), commander of the 2nd Flight Group of 

an airborne unit’s air transport regiment. Chen spearheaded efforts to organize 

integration between research topic groups and brother units, such as naval fleets 

and ECM regiments, and was noted for his meticulous notes reviewing the results 

of training exercises.81 Wang received commendation from the Air Force for his 

creation of Shuangxue activities in his unit. He noticed issues arising from his 

units’ transition to a new aircraft and created a detailed study plan to help his 

aviators become more familiar with the details of the new aircraft.82 In both 

cases, the officers exhibited strong initiative in starring learning and researching 

activities that addressed the pressing needs of their units.

Additionally, since Shuangxue activities are, ultimately, an investment in 

education, it is also difficult to assess their contribution to the development of 

combat capabilities in the near term. Education represents a long-term investment, 

and the skills being learned can only be tested on the battlefield; however, we 

cannot underestimate the cumulative effect of such an investment. 

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Thus far, it appears that the PLAAF is testing a wide variety of Shuangxue 

activities at different organizational levels. Shuangxue clearly has support within 

the top leadership of the PLAAF. Reports in Kongjun Bao and other PLA media 

indicate that Shuangxue-related activities are being carried out from the grassroots 

level to the Air Force headquarters. Shuangxue is forcing a cultural change within 

the PLAAF. The fact that the PLA is consciously attempting to resolve decadesold deficiencies in its training and has achieved successes in some cases is notable 

and should be carefully monitored. 

Given the fact that Shuangxue was promoted by Ma Xiaotian during his term 

as the PLAAF commander, it is possible that under the new PLAAF leadership, 

the Shuangxue initiative will be rebranded or slowly phased-out; however, as 

China overhauls its military professional education programs and given Xi 

Jinping’s support for continuing lifelong learning, elements of Shuangxue are 

likely to be incorporated into the PLA’s military professional education and the 

PLAAF leadership will stay committed to making the Air Force a service devoted 

to continuous self-improvement. 

Conclusion

28
Understanding Shuangxue

Endnotes

1 “习近平:坚持富国和强军相统一努力建设巩固国防和强大军队,” Xinhua, 12 December 2012, http://cpc.people.com.

cn/n/2012/1212/c64094-19877056.html.

2 Meng Pu (孟璞) and Li Baoxing (李宝星), “学习力对接战斗力,” China Air Force (《中国空军》), 14 May 2015, 

http://kj.81.cn/content/2015-05/14/content_6490288.htm.

3 Xu Tongxuan (徐同宣), “深入开展双学活动切实打牢训练基础扎实推进空军部队战斗力建设持续发展,” Kongjun Bao (《空

军报》), 14 January 2014, 1.

4 Guo Hongbo (郭洪波), Gao Jie (高杰), Li Guowen (李国文), and Li Jianwen (李建文), “鹏飞万里向空天- 空军部队

奋力投身改革强军加快推进战略转型述评,” 81.cn, 4 May 2017, http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2017-05/04/

content_176409.htm

5 Jun Xunxuan (钧训轩), “着力健全三位一体新型军事人才培养体系,” 81.cn, 28 February 2018, http://www.81.cn/

jfjbmap/content/2018-02/28/content_200585.htm.

6 Xu Tongxuan (徐同宣) and Xu Yi (许毅), “坚决贯彻习主席改革强军战略- 努力打造新型’四铁’机关,” Kongjun Bao, 29 

February 2016, 1.

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid.

9 “本领恐慌背后的历史,” 6 September 2013, ifeng.com, http://news.ifeng.com/history/zhongguojindaishi/special/benlingkonghuang/.

10 Xu Tongxuan (徐同宣) and Xu Yi (许毅), “坚决贯彻习主席改革强军战略.”

11 Meng Pu (孟璞) and Li Baoxing (李宝星), “学习力对接战斗力.”

12 David A. Garvin, Amy C. Edmondson, and Francesca Gino, “Is Yours a Learning Organization?” 

Harvard Business Review, March 2008, https://hbr.org/2008/03/is-yours-a-learning-organization

13 Peter M. Senge, The Fifth Discipline: The Art & Practice of The Learning Organization, (New York: 

Currency Doubleday, 1990), 14.

14 “江泽民: 加强人力资源能力建设共促亚太地区发展繁荣,” May 15, 2001, http://www.people.com.cn/GB/jinji/31/179/20010515/465404.html

15 Liu Jianmei (刘建美), “学习型政党,” http://dangshi.people.com.cn/GB/221024/221027/14906908.html 

[Accessed 15 April 2018]

16 Meng Pu (孟璞) and Li Baoxing (李宝星), “学习力对接战斗力.”

17 Zhang Kejin (张科进), Zhang Li (张力), and Wang Jun (王军), “蓝天对决冲击波——空军航空兵某师加速信息化

转型的调查与思考,” PLA Daily (《解放军报》), 12 March 2014, http://kj.81.cn/content/2014-03/12/content_5807076.htm.

29
Chinese Aerospace Studies Institute

18 Meng Pu (孟璞) and Li Baoxing (李宝星), “学习力对接战斗力.”

19 Meng Qingbao (孟庆宝), “地面学得精, 上天打得赢,” 81.cn, 9 July 2014, http://kj.81.cn/content/2014-07/09/

content_6040579.htm

20 Ibid.

21 Zhang Kejin (张科进), Zhang Li (张力), and Wang Jun (王军), “蓝天对决冲击波.”

22 Ibid.

23 Xu Tongxuan (徐同宣), “深入开展双学活动.”

24 “习近平: 听党指挥是强军之魂确保部队绝对忠诚纯洁可靠”, cpcnews.com, 6 August 2015, http://cpc.people.com.cn/

xuexi/n/2015/0806/c385474-27418614.html.

25 Xu Yi (许毅) and Zhang Lei (张雷), “沙场阅兵, 人民空军奋飞展雄姿-空军部队参加庆祝中国人民解放军建军90周年阅兵综

述,” Kongjun Bao, 1 August 2017, 3.

26 Wang Xiaofei (王晓飞), “横戈马上练在朝夕,” Kongjun Bao, 19 July 2017, 2.

27 Su Xiao (苏啸) and Fan Yishu (范以书), “用头脑去飞行,” China Air Force, 14 May 2015, http://kj.81.cn/

content/2015-05/14/content_6488722.htm.

28 Ibid.

29 Luo Liang (罗亮) and Liu Xu (刘旭), “十年并蒂共成长,” Kongjun Bao, 22 March 2017, 4.

30 Li Yixuan (李艺轩) and Wei Jinxin (魏金鑫), “思维刷新助力转型升级,” Kongjun Bao, 21 June 2017, 1.

31 Mou Xingguang (牟星光) and Zhang Haishen (张海深), “奋飞雁阵最前端,” Kongjun Bao, 19 May 2017, 4.

32 Su Yincheng (苏银成), “中国空军实战化训练迈出铿锵步伐,” People’s Daily, 7 May 2017, http://paper.people.com.

cn/rmrb/html/2017-05/07/nw.D110000renmrb_20170507_1-06.htm.

33 Li Jianwen (李建文) and Liu Jinyang (刘锦洋), “享誉空天战场的’四大品牌’训练都是啥”, 81.cn, 20 May 2017, 

http://www.81.cn/jmywyl/2017-05/20/content_7610295.htm.

34 Gu Duo’er (古朵尔), “能力转型紧跟装备更新-西部战区空军地导某旅结合新装特点强训指挥参谋队伍,” Kongjun Bao, 25 

April 2017, 2.

35 Ibid.

36 Gan Huan (甘欢), “激情, 源自紧贴实战-中部战区地导某营某连连长邢超自述,” Kongjun Bao, 17 April 2017, 1.

37 Huang Bo (黄博), “夜训标准, 向实战化看齐-西部战区空军地导某旅立足实战提高训练标准,” Kongjun Bao, 6 June 2017, 2.

38 Ye Mingfeng (叶明风) and Zhang Haishen (张海深), “脚本’变脸’验真功- 东部战区空军某场站开展实战化特情处置演练

见闻,” Kongjun Bao, 24 July 2017, 2.

39 Zeng Ke (曾科) and Yang Wenhui (阳文辉), “南部战区空军某基地组织联合指挥训练- 中军帐里常淬火,” Kongjun Bao, 

5 July 2017, 3.

40 Wang Jianfei (王剑飞) and Bai Xianlin (白先林), “研战强能献良策- 空军参谋部机关深入推进’双学’活动纪实,” 

Kongjun Bao, 25 April 2017, 1.

41 Ibid.

42 Lu Hui (卢辉) and Ding Yibo (丁义波), “新体制组训独立飞,” Kongjun Bao, 24 July 2017, 3

43 Xu Jialiang (徐佳亮) and Fan Yishu (范以书), “打通’最先一公里’,” Kongjun Bao, 24 March 2017, 3.

44 Lu Hui (卢辉) and Ding Yibo (丁义波), “新体制组训独立飞.”

45 Chen Tao (陈涛), “改革潮头, 打造过硬’前沿指挥所’ – 东部战区空军地导某营党委适应新体制新职能新使命发挥自身作用纪实,” 

Kongjun Bao, 13 June 2017, 4.

46 Qi Yongqiang (戚勇强), Liu Zhixin (刘治鑫), and Jiang Long (蒋龙), “直面新使命, 营党委如何担当有为,” 

Kongjun Bao, 13 June 2017, 4.

47 Zhang Wei (张伟) and Shi Qiang (师强), “新起点上新四营,” Kongjun Bao, 21 April 2017, 2.

48 Hou Jun (侯俊), “集训向战促人才能战,” Kongjun Bao, 17 May 2017, 2.

30
Understanding Shuangxue

49 Fu Jianshu (符建树), Xu Yin (许寅), and Fang Leilei (房磊磊), “专注务打仗, 强能为打赢-北部战区空军某场站深入推进‘

一专多能’大练兵活动纪实,” Kongjun Bao, 8 June 2017, 2.

50 Li Shengshou (李生寿) and Chen Kui (陈奎), “组织补差强能训练,” Kongjun Bao, 15 February 2017, 2.

51 Lin Wenbin (林文斌), “这样的’?’问得好,” 81.cn, 8 January 2015, http://kj.81.cn/content/2015-01/08/content_6301544.htm.

52 “习近平: 听党指挥是强军之魂确保部队绝对忠诚纯洁可靠”, People’s Daily Online (人民网), 6 August 2015, http://cpc.

people.com.cn/xuexi/n/2015/0806/c385474-27418614.html.

53 “中共中央关于全面深化改革若干重大问题的决定,” gov.cn, 15 November 2013, http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2013-

11/15/content_2528179.htm.

54 Jun Xunxuan (钧训轩), “着力健全三位一体新型军事人才培养体系.”

55 Ni Hai (倪海), Xu You (徐有), and Li Xiaoliang (李晓亮), “划重点! 军事职业教育与你我息息相关”, PLA Daily, 

1 March 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/mil/2018-03/01/c_129819877.htm.

56 Xu Tongxuan (徐同宣), “深入开展双学活动...”

57 Ibid.

58 Chen Jie (陈杰), “习近平在空军机关调研”, Xinhuanet, 14 April 2014, http://www.xinhuanet.com/photo/2014-04/14/c_126389555.htm.

59 “一流战略空军, 召唤逐梦空天竞风流– 写在2017年空军师旅团主官集训总结之际,” Kongjun Bao, 2 June 2017, 1.

60 Ibid.

61 Xu Tongxuan (徐同宣), “深入开展双学活动...”

62 Ibid.

63 “一流战略空军, 召唤逐梦空天竞风流– 写在2017年空军师旅团主官集训总结之际.”

64 Wang Jianfei (王剑飞) and Bai Xianlin (白先林), “研战强能献良策.”

65 Ibid.

66 Ibid.

67 Ibid.

68 Ibid.

69 Zhang Yingfei (张鹰飞), Shao Lei (邵蕾), and Fu Zhen (付震), “实招斩获金头盔– 从中部战区空军航空兵某团参加对

抗空战竞赛考核看实战化训练之变,” Kongjun Bao, 20 January 2017, 2.

70 Zhang Lei (张雷) and Li Nan (李囡), “二代机直接跨越改装歼-10B, ‘中原雄鹰’换羽新生展翅沙场”, kj.81.cn, 31 July 

2017, http://kj.81.cn/content/2017-07/31/content_7697568.htm.

71 Mou Xingguang (牟星光) and Zhang Haishen (张海深), “奋飞雁阵最前端.”

72 Xu Bianchun (徐边春), “‘双学’贯穿训练全过程成空航空兵某团飞行员具备双语指挥能”, China Air Force, 18 April 2017, 

http://kj.81.cn/content/2014-04/18/content_5869830.htm.

73 Xiong Weiwei (熊伟威), Liu Quan (刘泉), Yang Danpu (杨丹谱), and Hou Ningning (侯宁宁), “兵种纵横谈促‘

双学’纵深发展闻思录之一打开学习的边界”, kj.81.cn, 26 August 2014, http://kj.81.cn/content/2014-08/26/content_6112012.htm.

74 Li Guomeng (李国猛) and Zhang Lei (张雷), “中部战区空军’百部书单’列入训练计划,” 81.cn, 29 March 2016, 

http://www.81.cn/jmywyl/2016-03/29/content_6980894.htm.

75 Cao Chuanbiao (曹传彪), Wang Li (王莉), and Zhou Xiaojuan (周晓娟), “零伴随, 为空战提速– 西部战区空军基地航

空兵某队紧贴实战精确保障的探索与实践,” Kongjun Bao, 31 May 2017, 2.

76 Qian Renyuan (钱人源) and Yan Binsong (颜丙松), “南空航空兵某团机务系统紧盯任务需求拓展‘双学’内容”, kj.81.cn, 

23 October 2014, http://kj.81.cn/content/2014-10/23/content_6192481.htm.

77 Bai Jingzhong (白靖中) and Hu Yonghua (胡勇华), “改变从观念开始– 记中部战区空军雷达某旅参谋长吴三宏,” 

Kongjun Bao, 7 April 2017, 3.

78 Teng Teng (滕腾), “向战研装更有作为– 东部战区空军地导某旅技术科助理员张友顺自述,” Kongjun Bao, 25 July 2017, 1.

31
Chinese Aerospace Studies Institute

79 David A. Garvin, Amy C. Edmondson, and Francesca Gino, “Is Yours a Learning Organization?”

80 Xu Tongxuan (徐同宣), “深入开展双学活动...”

81 Liao Shikuan (廖诗宽) and Liu Hongyuan (刘鸿源), “闻鸡起’武’研练急– 记南部战区空军航空兵某团副团长陈志德,” 

Kongjun Bao, 3 March 2017, 1.

82 Guo Zheng (郭峥), Yu Yi (余毅), and Huang Yongguo (黄永国), “战场不负善学人– 记空降兵某航运团飞行二大队大队

长王伟振,” Kongjun Bao, 3 March 2017, 1.

32