alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
§ 1989.106 Objections to the findings and the preliminary order and requests for a hearing. ( a ) Any party who desires review, including judicial review, of the findings and/or preliminary order, or a respondent alleging that the complaint was frivolous or brought in bad faith who seeks an award of attorney fees under TFA, must file any objections and/or a request for a hearing on the record within 30 days of receipt of the findings and preliminary order pursuant to § 1989.105. The objections and request for hearing and/or request for attorney fees must be in writing and must state whether the objections are to the findings, the preliminary order, or both, and/or whether there should be an award of attorney fees. The date of the postmark, facsimile transmittal, or electronic transmittal is considered the date of filing; if the objection is filed in person, by hand delivery, or other means, the objection is filed upon receipt. Objections must be filed with the Chief Administrative Law Judge, U.S. Department of Labor, in accordance with 29 CFR part 18, and copies of the objections must be served at the same time on the other parties of record, the OSHA official who issued the findings and order, the Assistant Secretary, and the Associate Solicitor, Division of Fair Labor Standards, U.S. Department of Labor. OSHA and the Associate Solicitor for Fair Labor Standards may specify the means, including electronic means, for serving then with copies of the objections.
( b ) If a timely objection is filed, all provisions of the preliminary order will be stayed, except for the portion requiring preliminary reinstatement, which will not be automatically stayed. The portion of the preliminary order requiring reinstatement will be effective immediately upon the respondent's receipt of the findings and preliminary order, regardless of any objections to the order. The respondent may file a motion with the Office of Administrative Law Judges for a stay of the Assistant Secretary's preliminary order of reinstatement, which shall be granted only based on exceptional circumstances. If no timely objection is filed with respect to either the findings or the preliminary order, the findings and/or the preliminary order will become the final decision of the Secretary, not subject to judicial review.
#### CENTER FOR AUTO SAFETY, et al. v. Lee M. THOMAS, Administrator, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, et al.

No. 85-1515.

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

Feb. 6, 1987.

Before WALD, Chief Judge, and ROBINSON, MIKVA, EDWARDS, *303GINSBURG, BORK, STARR, SILBERMAN, BUCKLEY, WILLIAMS and GINSBURG, Circuit Judges.

ORDER

PER CURIAM.

The suggestion for rehearing *en banc*of intervenors General Motors Corporation and Automobile Importers of America, Inc. has been circulated to the full Court. The taking of a vote was requested. Thereafter, a majority of the judges of the Court in regular active service voted in favor of the suggestion. Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is

ORDERED, by the Court *en banc,*that the suggestion is granted and this matter will be reheard by the Court sitting *en banc,*and it is

FURTHER ORDERED, by the Court *en banc,*that the opinion and judgment of December 2, 1986, 806 F.2d 1071 be, and the same hereby are, vacated.

A future order will govern further proceedings.
[No. 28706-4-II.

Division Two.

November 8, 2002.]

#### Dawn Irish, *Respondent,*v. Amedeo Nappi, *Appellant.*

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Thurston County, No. 00-2-30011-2, Paula Casey, J., entered April 26, 2002. *Affirmed*by unpublished opinion per Houghton, J., concurred in by Quinn-Brintnall, A.C.J., and Armstrong, J.
----

|                  | /s/ TERRY G. ROUSSEL                                                                                                                                                                                             |   |
|-----------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|
| Date: August 10, 2009 | Terry G. RousselChief Executive Officer (Principal Executive Officer) ofCornerstone Ventures, Inc., Managing Member ofCornerstone Industrial Properties, LLC, the Managing Member ofCornerstone Realty Fund, LLC |   |
|                  |                                                                                                                                                                                                             |   |
|                  |                                                                                                                                                                                                             |   |
|                  | /s/ SHARON C. KAISER                                                                                                                                                                                             |   |
| Date: August 10, 2009 | Sharon C. KaiserChief Financial Officer (Principal Financial Officer) ofCornerstone Ventures, Inc., Managing Member ofCornerstone Industrial Properties, LLC, the Managing Member ofCornerstone Realty Fund, LLC |   |

----
CERTIFICATION OF
                      TREASURER AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER


      Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss.1350, the undersigned, Samir N. Masri, who is the
Treasurer and Chief Financial Officer of Lincoln International Corporation (the
"Company"), hereby certifies that the Company's Annual Report on Form 10-KSB for
the year ended July 31, 2004, (the "Report") fully complies with the
requirements of ss.13(a) or ss.15(d) as applicable, of the Securities Act of
1934 and that the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.



                                /s/ SAMIR N. MASRI
                                --------------------------
                                Name:  Samir N. Masri
                                Title:  Treasurer and Chief Financial Officer
                                Date:  October 29, 2004
[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 100 (Tuesday, May 23, 2000)]
[Notices]
[Page 33324]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-12942]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION


Agency Information Collection Activities: Submission for OMB 
Review; Comment Request

AGENCY: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).

ACTION: Notice of information collection to be submitted to OMB for 
review and approval under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: In accordance with requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act 
of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.), the FDIC hereby gives notice that it 
plans to submit to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) a request 
for OMB review and approval of the information collection system 
described below.
    Type of Review: Renewal of a currently approved collection.
    Title: Securities of Insured Nonmember Banks.
    OMB Number: 3064-0030.
    Form Number: F-7, F-8, F-8A.
    Annual Burden:

Estimated annual number of respondents: 2,952.
Estimated time per response: 0.635 hours.
Average annual burden hours: 1,875 hours.

    Expiration Date of OMB Clearance: July 31, 2000.
    OMB Reviewer: Alexander T. Hunt, (202) 395-7860, Office of 
Management and Budget, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, 
Washington, DC 20503.
    FDIC Contact: Tamara R. Manly, (202) 898-7453, Office of the 
Executive Secretary, Room F-4058, Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, 550 17th Street NW, Washington, DC 20429.
    Comments: Comments on this collection of information are welcome 
and should be submitted on or before June 22, 2000 to both the OMB 
reviewer and the FDIC contact listed above.

ADDRESSES: Information about this submission, including copies of the 
proposed collection of information, may be obtained by calling or 
writing the FDIC contact listed above.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The information is collected from FDIC-
supervised banks and from officers, directors and shareholders subject 
to the securities registration requirements of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, as amended. The information is considered necessary for 
actual and potential investors making investment decisions concerning 
securities issued by reporting banks.

    Dated: May 18, 2000.

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
Robert E. Feldman,
Executive Secretary.
[FR Doc. 00-12942 Filed 5-22-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6714-01-P
#### § 2570.87 Revision of assessment.

If, based on the procedures described in § 2570.84, 2570.85, or 2570.86, the assessed penalty amount is revised, the person being assessed will receive a revised notice of assessment and will be obligated to pay the revised assessed penalty within the relevant 60 day payment period (as determined by the applicable procedure in § 2570.84, 2570.85, or 2570.86), and, if necessary, any excess penalty payment will be refunded as soon as administratively feasible. The revised notice of assessment will revoke any previously issued notice of assessment with regard to the transaction in question and will become a final order (within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. 704) the later of the first day following the 60 day payment period or the date of its service on the person being assessed, pursuant to the service procedures described in § 2570.83(b).
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Gary W. McRobbie, Appellant.

[699 NYS2d 625]

—Judgment *881unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him of attempted burglary in the second degree (Penal Law §§ 110.00, 140.25) in satisfaction of a superior court information, defendant contends that he is entitled to specific performance of the original plea agreement. Defendant pleaded guilty based on County Court’s promise to sentence him to shock probation. On the date scheduled for sentencing, the court stated that, based on the presentence report, it could not impose that sentence and offered defendant the opportunity to withdraw his plea. The request by defendant for an adjournment to consider his options was granted.

At sentencing the court indicated that the sentence would be 1 to 3 years’ incarceration and reiterated that defendant could withdraw his plea. Defendant chose not to do so. Later that day the court brought the parties back to court and stated that, because the offense to which defendant had pleaded guilty was a violent offense, the minimum sentence was required to be half the maximum. Again the court gave defendant an opportunity to withdraw the plea. Defendant declined, stating that he was exposed to a longer sentence if he went to trial. His attorney stated that, if defendant withdrew his plea, the prosecutor had stated that he would file a superseding indictment charging defendant with the original offense, burglary in the second degree. The court agreed that the prosecutor could do that.

Defendant’s contention is without merit. Defendant was afforded the opportunity to withdraw his plea at least three times and declined that option after consulting with his attorney *(see, People v Schultz,*73 NY2d 757, 758; *People v Selikoff,*35 NY2d 227, 240, *cert denied*419 US 1122). Defendant contends that specific performance is required because the prosecutor could file a superseding indictment and thus vacatur of the plea would not return defendant to his preplea position *(see generally, People v Schultz, supra,*at 758; *People v McConnell,*49 NY2d 340, 346-348). We note that a prosecutor may file a superseding indictment at any time before entry of a plea of guilty *(see,*CPL 200.80). Finally, the sentence is not unduly harsh or severe. (Appeal from Judgment of Wayne County Court, Sirkin, J. — Attempted Burglary, 2nd Degree.) Present— Pine, J. P., Lawton, Hayes, Wisner and Scudder, JJ.
<PAGE>

EXHIBIT 32.2

CERTIFICATION BY CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

         In connection with the Quarterly Report of Davel Communications, Inc.
(the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2003,
as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
"Report"), the undersigned, in the capacities and on the date indicated below,
hereby certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that: (1) the Report fully
complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934; and (2) the information contained in the Report fairly
presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of
operations of the Company.

Date: November 14, 2003              /s/ Donald L. Paliwoda
                                     -------------------------------
                                     Donald L. Paliwoda, Chief Financial Officer

                                       33
§ 1986.105 Issuance of findings and preliminary orders. ( a ) After considering all the relevant information collected during the investigation, the Assistant Secretary will issue, within 60 days of the filing of the complaint, written findings as to whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the respondent retaliated against the complainant in violation of SPA. ( 1 ) If the Assistant Secretary concludes that there is reasonable cause to believe that a violation has occurred, the Assistant Secretary will accompany the findings with a preliminary order providing relief. Such order will require, where appropriate: Affirmative action to abate the violation; reinstatement of the complainant to his or her former position, with the same compensation, terms, conditions and privileges of the complainant's employment; payment of compensatory damages (back pay with interest and compensation for any special damages sustained as a result of the retaliation, including any litigation costs, expert witness fees, and reasonable attorney fees which the complainant has incurred). Interest on back pay will be calculated using the interest rate applicable to underpayment of taxes under 26 U.S.C. 6621 and will be compounded daily. The preliminary order may also require the respondent to pay punitive damages of up to $250,000.
( 2 ) If the Assistant Secretary concludes that a violation has not occurred, the Assistant Secretary will notify the parties of that finding.
( b ) The findings and, where appropriate, the preliminary order will be sent by means that allow OSHA to confirm delivery to all parties of record (and each party's legal counsel if the party is represented by counsel). The findings and, where appropriate, the preliminary order will inform the parties of the right to object to the findings and/or the order and to request a hearing. The findings and, where appropriate, the preliminary order also will give the address of the Chief Administrative Law Judge, U.S. Department of Labor, or appropriate information regarding filing objections electronically with the Office of Administrative Law Judges. At the same time, the Assistant Secretary will file with the Chief Administrative Law Judge a copy of the original complaint and a copy of the findings and/or order.
( c ) The findings and the preliminary order will be effective 30 days after receipt by the respondent (or the respondent's legal counsel if the respondent is represented by counsel), or on the compliance date set forth in the preliminary order, whichever is later, unless an objection and request for a hearing have been timely filed as provided at § 1986.106. However, the portion of any preliminary order requiring reinstatement will be effective immediately upon the respondent's receipt of the findings and the preliminary order, regardless of any objections to the findings and/or the order.
[81 FR 63409, Sept. 15, 2016, as amended at 86 FR 1793, Jan. 11, 2021]
§ 4062.10 Method and date of filing; where to file. ( a ) *Method of filing.* The PBGC applies the rules in subpart A of part 4000 of this chapter to determine permissible methods of filing with the PBGC under this part. Payment of liability must be clearly designated as such and include the name of the plan.
( b ) *Filing date.* The PBGC applies the rules in subpart C of part 4000 of this chapter to determine the date that a submission under this part was filed with the PBGC.
( c ) *Where to file.* See § 4000.4 of this chapter for information on where to file.
[68 FR 61354, Oct. 28, 2003. Redesignated at 71 FR 34822, June 16, 2006]
#### SOUTHEAST SERVICES, INC. v HOCHSTADT

Case No. 84-283 AP (County Court Case No. 78-4034CC05)

Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Appellate Division, Dade County

May 11, 1987

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

Alfonso J. Perez and Cynthia I. Chiefa, Britton, Cohen, Cassel, Haufman & Schantz, P.A., for appellant.

Brad I. Schandler for appellee.

Ann Mason Parker (precluded) and Phyllis Harte, appellant attorneys.

Before HENDERSON, SALMON, ROBINSON, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT

PER CURIAM.

The Appellant originally brought this action to collect approximately *161$2,100 from the Appellee. The Appellant was successful in the trial court; however this court reversed the original judgment with instructions to enter judgment in accordance with our opinion. We perceived this opinion to require that the trial court reduce the amount awarded in the original judgment to those charges which accrued through April 21, 1977.1 All other aspects of the judgment (which included a ruling against the Appellee upon his counterclaim) were affirmed.

What this court’s mandate required was entry of final judgment in favor of Appellant for those charges which accrued through April 21, 1977, plus appropriate interest, attorney’s fees and costs.2

The order which is before us for review did not do that, but, instead, awarded attorney’s fees to two attorneys who were associates in firms that at some stage of the proceedings represented Appellee.3 The order appealed states that the court retains jurisdiction for the purposes of entering further judgments and orders with regard to the claim of Appellant against Appellee. That is precisely what our previous mandate required; no more. Accordingly, we reverse the award of attorney’s fees contained in the order before us for review, with directions to enter judgment for the amount due to the Appellant from Appellee through April 21, 1977 plus interest and such costs and attorney’s fees, if any, that the court finds appropriate.

Reversed and remanded with instructions.

1

 From the record now before us this sum appears to be $615.42 ($829.65 less $214.23 paid on account).

2

 We note that the judgment appealed originally contained a reservation of jurisdiction to consider attorney’s fees and costs.

3

 Hochstadt is appelle by virtue of Fla. R. App. P. 9.020(f)(2). In addition, he filed a notice of appeal to contend that the award of fees should be made to him instead of the attorneys. Because of our ruling, that claim is moot.
Order entered April 15, 2022

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-21-00838-CV

CHERYL YOUNG, Appellant

V.

DALLAS COUNTY, Appellee

On Appeal from the 44th Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. TX-19-01116

ORDER

Before the Court is appellant’s April 13, 2022 motion for an extension of 

time to file her corrected brief. We GRANT the motion. We ORDER the 

corrected brief tendered to this Court by appellant on April 5, 2022 filed as of the 

date of this order.

/s/ ROBERT D. BURNS, III

CHIEF JUSTICE
§ 4003.61 Action by a single Appeals Board member. ( a ) *Authority to act.* Notwithstanding any other provision of this part, any member of the Appeals Board has the authority to take any action that the Appeals Board could take with respect to a routine appeal as defined in paragraph (b) of this section.
( b ) *Routine appeal defined.* For purposes of this section, a routine appeal is any appeal that does not raise a significant issue of law or a precedent-setting issue. This would generally include any appeal that— ( 1 ) Is outside the jurisdiction of the Appeals Board (for example, an appeal challenging the plan's termination date);
( 2 ) Is filed by a person other than an aggrieved person or an aggrieved person's authorized representative;
( 3 ) Is untimely and presents no grounds for waiver or extension of the time limit for filing the appeal, or only grounds that are clearly without merit;
( 4 ) Presents grounds that clearly warrant or clearly do not warrant the relief requested;
( 5 ) Presents only factual issues that are not reasonably expected to affect other appeals (for example, the participant's date of birth or date of hire); or
( 6 ) Presents only issues that are controlled by settled principles of existing law, including Appeals Board precedent (for example, an issue of plan interpretation that has been resolved by the Appeals Board in a decision on an appeal by another participant in the same plan).
[67 FR 47695, July 22, 2002]
§ 2.11 General principles. The following general principles will be observed in granting or denying requests for permission to cover hearings audiovisually: ( a ) Notice and comment and on-the-record rule making proceedings may involve administrative hearings. If such administrative hearings are held, we encourage their audiovisual coverage.
( b ) Audiovisual coverage shall be excluded in adjudicatory proceedings involving the rights or status of individuals (including those of small corporations likely to be indistinguishable in the public mind from one or a few individuals) in which an individual's past culpable conduct or other aspect of personal life is a primary subject of adjudication, and where the person in question objects to coverage.
( c ) Certain proceedings involve balancing of conflicting values in order to determine whether audiovisual coverage should be allowed. Where audiovisual coverage is restricted, the reasons for the restriction shall be stated in the record.
§ 37.25 What are the responsibilities of an Equal Opportunity Officer? An Equal Opportunity Officer is responsible for coordinating a recipient's obligations under this part. Those responsibilities include, but are not limited to: ( a ) Serving as the recipient's liaison with CRC;
( b ) Monitoring and investigating the recipient's activities, and the activities of the entities that receive WIA Title I funds from the recipient, to make sure that the recipient and its subrecipients are not violating their nondiscrimination and equal opportunity obligations under WIA Title I and this part;
( c ) Reviewing the recipient's written policies to make sure that those policies are nondiscriminatory;
( d ) Developing and publishing the recipient's procedures for processing discrimination complaints under §§ 37.76 through 37.79, and making sure that those procedures are followed;
( e ) Reporting directly to the appropriate official (including, but not limited to, the State WIA Director, Governor's WIA Liaison, Job Corps Center Director, SESA Administrator, or LWIA grant recipient) about equal opportunity matters;
( f ) Undergoing training (at the recipient's expense) to maintain competency, if the Director requires him or her, and/or his or her staff, to do so; and
( g ) If applicable, overseeing the development and implementation of the recipient's Methods of Administration under § 37.54.