alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, *v.*Star Metal Smelting and Refining Company, Inc., Appellant.

Argued May 26, 1937;

decided June 11, 1937.

*618
      *Nathan Silverman*for appellant.

*Paul Windels, Corporation Counsel (Paxton Blair*and *Charles E. Ramsgate*of counsel), for respondent.

Judgment affirmed; no opinion.

Concur: Crane, Ch. J., Lehman, O’Brien, Htjbbs, Loughran, Finch and Rippey, JJ.
§ 4000.24 What if I mail my submission or issuance using the U.S. Postal Service? ( a ) *In general.* Your filing or issuance date is the date you mail your submission or issuance using the U.S. Postal Service if you meet the requirements of paragraph (b) of this section, and you mail it by the last scheduled collection of the day. If you mail it later than that, or if there is no scheduled collection that day, your filing or issuance date is the date of the next scheduled collection. If you do not meet the requirements of paragraph (b), your filing or issuance date is the date of receipt at the proper address.
( b ) *Requirements for “send date.”* Your submission or issuance must meet the applicable postal requirements, be properly addressed, and you must use First-Class Mail (or a U.S. Postal Service mail class that is at least the equivalent of First-Class Mail, such as Priority Mail or Express Mail). However, if you are filing an advance notice of reportable event or a Form 200 (notice of certain missed contributions), see § 4000.23(b); these filings are always treated as filed when received.
( c ) *Presumptions.* We make the following presumptions— ( 1 ) *U.S. Postal Service postmark.* If you meet the requirements of paragraph (b) of this section and your submission or issuance has a legible U.S. Postal Service postmark, we presume that the postmark date is the filing or issuance date. However, you may prove an earlier date under paragraph (a) of this section.
( 2 ) *Private meter postmark.* If you meet the requirements of paragraph (b) of this section and your submission or issuance has a legible postmark made by a private postage meter (but no legible U.S. Postal Service postmark) and arrives at the proper address by the time reasonably expected, we presume that the metered postmark date is your filing or issuance date. However, you may prove an earlier date under paragraph (a) of this section.
( d ) *Examples.* ( 1 ) You mail your issuance using the U.S. Postal Service and meet the requirements of paragraph (b) of this section. You deposit your issuance in a mailbox at 4 p.m. on Friday, March 15 and the next scheduled collection at that mailbox is 5 p.m. that day. Your issuance date is March 15. If on the other hand you deposit it at 6 p.m. and the next collection at that mailbox is not until Monday, March 18, your issuance date is March 18.
( 2 ) You mail your submission using the U.S. Postal Service and meet the requirements of paragraph (b) of this section. You deposit your submission in the mailbox at 4 p.m. on Friday, March 15, and the next scheduled collection at that mailbox is 5 p.m. that day. If your submission does not show a March 15 postmark, then you may prove to us that you mailed your submission by the last scheduled collection on March 15.
#### Andre Cantave and Others, Infants, by Their Mother and Natural Guardian, Pauline Aitcheson, Respondents, v Charles Peterson, Appellant, et al., Defendant.

[698 NYS2d 721]

—In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendant Charles Peterson appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Taylor, J.), entered June 16, 1998, which denied his motion pursuant to CPLR 3025 (b) for leave to amend his answer to add counterclaims.

Ordered that the order is modified by deleting the provision thereof denying the motion in its entirety and substituting therefor a provision granting the motion to the extent of granting the defendant Charles Peterson leave to amend his answer to assert counterclaims for contribution against the plaintiff mother based upon allegations that she painted the plaintiffs’ apartment and failed to seek prompt medical attention for the infant plaintiffs, and otherwise denying the motion; as so modified the order is affirmed, with costs to the appellant.

The plaintiff Pauline Aitcheson (hereinafter the mother) commenced this action, individually and on behalf of her infant children, to recover damages for personal injuries sustained when her children contracted lead poisoning, allegedly as the result of exposure to and inhalation and ingestion of lead-based paint and lead-based dust in the apartment in which they resided, and which was owned by the appellant Charles Peterson.

*493The appellant sought leave to amend his answer to assert counterclaims alleging, *inter alia,*that the conduct of the mother in painting her own apartment and in failing to seek prompt medical attention for her allegedly lead-poisoned children, was the sole and/or contributing cause of the alleged injuries. The Supreme Court denied the motion in its entirety finding that, in effect, since all of the proposed counterclaims sounded in negligent supervision of the children, they failed to allege any legally-cognizable claim against the mother. We disagree.

To the extent that the proposed counterclaims allege that any injuries were caused solely or in part by the mother’s having painted the apartment herself and by her having failed to promptly seek medical attention for the children, they do not sound in negligent parental supervision and, if proven, those allegations could result in a finding of comparative negligence on the part of the mother. Therefore, the motion should have been granted to that extent *(see, Alharb v Sayegh,*199 AD2d 229). As to the remaining allegations of the proposed counterclaims, the motion was properly denied since the appellant seeks to assert claims that are either based upon the nonactionable claim of negligent parental supervision *(see, Holodook v Spencer,*36 NY2d 35; *Navaro v Ieraci,*214 AD2d 713), or are otherwise patently without merit *(see, Juarez v Wavecrest Mgt. Team,*88 NY2d 628; *Morales v Felice Props. Corp.,*221 AD2d 181, 182). Santucci, J. P., Sullivan, Florio and Schmidt, JJ., concur.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 07-4952
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. ROBERT WILLIAM COIT, III, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Beckley. Thomas E. Johnston, District Judge. (5:04-cr-00129) Submitted: March 26, 2008 Decided: July 21, 2008 Before MOTZ, GREGORY, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Troy N. Giatras, THE GIATRAS LAW FIRM, PLLC, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. Charles T. Miller, United States Attorney, John L. File, Assistant United States Attorney, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.- 2 - PER CURIAM: Robert William Coit, III, appeals the district court’s judgment revoking his supervised release and sentencing him to fourteen months of imprisonment to be followed by twenty-two months of supervised release. Coit argues that the district court erred in revoking his supervised release because it did not give sufficient weight to family and employment considerations pursuant to 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553 (West 2000 & Supp. 2007). Finding no error, we affirm. We review a district court’s order imposing a sentence after revocation of supervised release for abuse of discretion. United States v. Davis , 53 F.3d 638, 642-43 (4th Cir. 1995). The district court abuses its discretion when it fails or refuses to exercise its discretion or when its exercise of discretion is flawed by an erroneous legal or factual premise. SeeJames v. Jacobson , 6 F.3d 233, 239 (4th Cir. 1993). The district court need only find a violation of a condition of supervised release by a preponderance of the evidence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (2000). Other than statements about his family and his employment potential, none of Coit’s arguments was presented to the district court during the revocation hearing. We therefore review Coit’s assertions of error for plain error. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); United States v. Olano , 507 U.S. 725, 731-32 (1993); United States v. Carr , 303 F.3d 539, 543 (4th Cir. 2002). Our review of- 3 - the record leads us to conclude that the district court did not err or otherwise abuse its discretion in revoking Coit’s supervised release. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
<PAGE>   1
                                                               EXHIBIT 10.22(c)



                          AMENDMENT NUMBER TWO TO THE
                     LITTON INDUSTRIES, INC., SUPPLEMENTAL
                           EXECUTIVE RETIREMENT PLAN



WHEREAS, pursuant to Subsection 11.1(a) of the Litton Industries, Inc.,
Supplemental Executive Retirement Plan (the "Supplemental Plan"), the Board of
Directors of Litton Industries, Inc. (the "Board") has the authority to amend
the Supplemental Plan;

WHEREAS, the Board has passed a resolution that the proper officers of Litton
Industries, Inc. ("Litton") be authorized to amend the Supplemental Plan to base
the calculation of retirement benefits on the award date, as opposed to the
payment date, of any incentive compensation awarded to a participant in the
Supplemental Plan;

NOW, THEREFORE, the Supplemental Plan is hereby amended as follows:

Subsection 2.3(b) of the Supplemental shall be deleted in its entirety and the
following new Subsection 2.3(b) inserted therefor:

"(b)  With respect to participants in the Supplemental Plan who retire after
September 18, 1997, "Incentive compensation payments," for purposes of
determining Average Earnings of an Active Participant, shall be the amount of
the single largest award to an Active Participant under the Litton Industries,
Inc., Performance Award Plan (or a similar plan) in each of three periods of
twelve consecutive months selected under Section 2.3(a) above."

This Amendment Number Two to the Supplemental Plan shall be effective as of
September 18, 1997.



                                        By: /s/ TIMOTHY G. PAULSON
                                           ------------------------
                                                Timothy G. Paulson

                                    Attest: /s/ JEANETTE M. THOMAS
                                           ------------------------
                                                Jeanette M. Thomas
§ 37.22 How must covenants be used in connection with this part? ( a ) Where WIA Title I financial assistance is provided in the form of a transfer of real property, structures, or improvements on real property or structures, or interests in real property or structures, the instrument effecting or recording the transfer must contain a covenant assuring nondiscrimination and equal opportunity for the period described in § 37.21.
( b ) Where no Federal transfer of real property or interest therein from the Federal Government is involved, but real property or an interest therein is acquired or improved under a program of WIA Title I financial assistance, the recipient must include the covenant described in paragraph (a) of this section in the instrument effecting or recording any subsequent transfer of such property.
( c ) When the property is obtained from the Federal Government, the covenant described in paragraph (a) of this section also may include a condition coupled with a right of reverter to the Department in the event of a breach of the covenant.
Equal Opportunity Officers
**Exhibit 32.1**

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

Inconnection with the Quarterly Report of The Boyds Collection, Ltd. (the “Company”)on Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2005 as filedwith the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”),I, Jan L. Murley, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify pursuant to18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

1)     The Report fully complies with therequirements of section 13 (a) or 15 (d) of the Securities ExchangeAct of 1934; and

2)     The information contained in the Reportfairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and resultsof operations of the Company.

*A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906,or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting thesignature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of thiswritten statement required by Section 906, has been provided to The BoydsCollection, Ltd. and will be retained by The Boyds Collection, Ltd. andfurnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.*
| /s/ Jan L. Murley        |   |
|--------------------------|--------|
| Jan L. Murley            |   |
| Chief Executive  Officer |   |
| June 8,  2006       |   |

 

----
#### ROYAL AMERICAN MANAGEMENT, INC. v KEITH

Case No. 86-3337-CC-12-C

County Court, Volusia County

November 5, 1986

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

James T. Nunn for plaintiff.

Rose M. Levering for defendant.

OPINION OF THE COURT

NORTON JOSEPHSON, County Judge.

THIS CAUSE came on to be heard for trial to evict the tenant because of repeated violations of the lease agreement and the noncompliance with the terms of the lease, in particular, repeated nonpayment of rent, repeated non-payment of rent when due.

*96The defendant is in possession under a written lease the term of which is for one year commencing on June 1, 1986. However, defendant has been in possession since 1984 on previous leases.

At all times during her tenancy, defendant was late in the payment of her rent, requiring the plaintiff to send out repeated three (3) day notices but which the defendant cured by paying the late rent and which the plaintiff accepted notwithstanding a history of late payments, the plaintiff renewed the lease with the defendant on June 1, 1986. Again, the defendant was late in her payments when finally the plaintiff gave the defendant a ten (10) day notice on September 12, terminating the lease for repeated non-payment of rent and repeated non-payment of rent when due.

The defendant has raised the defense of waiver.

It is clear that a “pattern of late payments” normally prevents eviction. (See *Grose v. Hill,*428 So.2d 862, Fla. 1st DCA 1983).

Where a landlord or vendor habitually accepts late payments, waives as to future payments strict compliance with the time payments of the contract or the lease. The vendor or lessor, in order to enforce the strict compliance with the contract or lease, must give notice that he will require such compliance before he declares a forfeiture on the grounds that payment was late. (See *Park Forest Blackman v. Smith,*316 N.W. 2d 442).

It is obvious in the case at bar that the plaintiff waived strict compliance by accepting late payments on previous leases and the present lease. However, the plaintiff by instituting this suit has now given the defendant notice that it will require strict compliance in the future. Any further late payments by the defendant which will require the plaintiff to give the defendant a three (3) day notice under Florida Statutes will resurrect plaintiff’s claim of non-compliance without a waiver even though plaintiff accepts rent after the three (3) day notice; it is therefore,

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the complaint herein, be and the same, is hereby dismissed with prejudice, and it is further,

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Clerk of the COurt shall pay to the plaintiff out of the registry of the Court all rents paid into it by the defendant, less statutory costs.

DONE, ORDERED AND ADJUDGED in Chambers at Daytona Beach, Volusia County, Florida this 5th day of November, 1986.
## F IRST 

## D ISTRICT 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEAL 

## S TATE OF 

## F LORIDA

_____________________________
No. 1D 17

- 4588

_____________________________
R OBERT B RYAN L UKE , Appellant,

v.

S TATE OF F LORIDA , Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County

. Steven B. Whittington , Judge

. November 19, 2018

P ER C URIAM

.
A FFIRMED

.
R AY , K ELSEY , and J AY , JJ., concur

.

_____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331

.

_____________________________2 Robert Bryan Luke, pro se
, Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Anne C. Conley, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee
, for Appellee.
Exhibit 32.01

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

The certification set forth below is being submitted in connection with this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Serena Software, Inc. for the fiscal quarter ended October 31, 2007 (the Report) for the purpose of complying with Rule
13a-14(b) or Rule 15d-14(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act) and Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United States Code.

I, Jeremy Burton, Chief Executive Officer of Serena Software, Inc. certify that, to my knowledge:



|(1) | the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Exchange Act; and
|--- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|(2) | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Serena Software, Inc. at the dates and for
the periods indicated.
|--- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



By:

/s/    JEREMY BURTONJeremy Burton President and Chief
ExecutiveOfficer And Director


Date: December 17, 2007

This Certification is not deemed filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission and is not to be incorporated by reference into any filing of the registrant under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, or the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (whether made before or after the date of the Form 10-Q), irrespective of any general incorporation language contained in such filing.
#### § 37.13 Who is responsible for providing interpretations of this part?

The Director will make any rulings under, or interpretations of, the nondiscrimination and equal opportunity provisions of WIA or this part.
United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit ____________

No. 23-30825

____________

Kentrell Parker, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly 

situated; Farrell Sampier, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly 

situated; Reginald George; John Tonubbee, on behalf of 

themselves and all others similarly situated; Otto Barrera, on behalf of 

themselves and all others similarly situated; Clyde Carter, on behalf of 

themselves and all others similarly situated; Edward Giovanni, on behalf 

of themselves and all others similarly situated; Ricky D. Davis, on behalf of 

themselves and all others similarly situated; Lionel Tolbert, on behalf of 

themselves and all others similarly situated; Rufus White, on behalf of 

themselves and all others similarly situated; Shannon Hurd; Alton 

Adams; Ian Cazenave; Edward Washington; Alton 

Batiste, 

Plaintiffs—Appellees,

versus

Tim Hooper, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary, in his official capacity; 

Ashli Oliveaux, Assistant Warden for Health Services, in her official 

capacity; James M. LeBlanc, Secretary of the Louisiana Department of 

Public Safety and Corrections, in his official capacity; Randy Lavespere, 

Medical Doctor; Stacye Falgout; Paul Toce; Bill Hawkins; 

Cynthia Park, ACNP; The Louisiana Department of 

Public Safety and Corrections, 

Defendants—Appellants.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

March 6, 2024

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Case: 23-30825 Document: 156 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/06/2024
2

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Middle District of Louisiana

USDC No. 3:15-CV-318

______________________________

ORDER

Before Jones, Haynes, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:

It is ORDERED that the Remedial Order entered by the 

district court on November 6, 2023, is STAYED pending further 

order of this court. Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 426 (2009). In 

deciding to stay the Remedial Order, the panel expresses no 

opinion on the underlying merits of the case.

Case: 23-30825 Document: 156 Page: 2 Date Filed: 03/06/2024
(78 South. 306)

#### BELMONT v. STATE.

(7 Div. 527.)

(Court of Appeals of Alabama.

March 12, 1918.)

Criminal Law <&wkey;1131(5) — Appeal and Error-Dismissal op Appeal.

Where the accused escapes jail and becomes a fugitive from justice after he appeals, his appeal will be dismissed.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Calhoun County; Hugh D. Merrill, Judge.

Reginald Belmont was convicted of assault with intent to rape, and he appeals.

Appeal dismissed.

P. P. Wharton and S. W. Tate, both of Anniston, for appellant. F. Loyd Tate, Atty. Gen., and Emmett S. Thigpen, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

SAMFORD, J.

Since the submission of this cause, it being made to appear by the affidavit of A. H. Borden, sheriff of Calhoun county, in whose custody the appellant was, that the appellantJ has escaped jail and is now a fugitive from justice, the appeal in this case is dismissed.

Appeal dismissed.
#### § 35.34 Effect of agreements on enforcement effort.

An agreement reached pursuant to either § 35.32(c) or § 35.33(a) shall have no effect on the operation of any other enforcement effort of DOL, such as compliance reviews and investigations of other complaints, including those against the recipient.