United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Argued December 6, 2021 

Decided August 1, 2022 

Before 

KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge 

DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge 

THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge

No. 21-2349 

SEIDU IDDRISSU and ROBIN SANDERS, 

 Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v. 

ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS, Secretary of U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security, et 

al.,

 Defendants-Appellees.

 Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of Illinois, 

Eastern Division. 

No. 1:19-CV-04391 

Charles R. Norgle, 

Judge. 

O R D E R 

Seidu Iddrissu, a citizen of Ghana, is married to Robin Sanders, an American 

citizen. Sanders petitioned to have Iddrissu recognized as her immediate relative 

spouse, which would entitle him to lawful permanent residency in this nation. But the 

immigration authorities concluded that Sanders’s petition must be denied because 

Iddrissu had previously sought to evade the immigration laws by entering into a 

fraudulent marriage. The couple challenged that determination in federal district court, 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION 

To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. APP. P. 32.1 
No. 21-2349 Page 2 

but the district court dismissed, ruling that under our precedents the couple had not 

stated even a plausible claim for relief. We agree and affirm. 

I 

Seidu Iddrissu is a citizen of Ghana who seeks permanent residency in the 

United States through his marriage to an American citizen. To that end, Iddrissu’s 

American wife, Robin Sanders, filed an I-130 immediate relative visa petition on his 

behalf in late 2013. This petition, if granted, would cause Iddrissu to be recognized as 

one of Sanders’s immediate family members, see 8 U.S.C. § 1154(b), entitling him to 

lawful permanent residency, see 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i). 

Three years later, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) 

issued a Notice of Intent to Deny Sanders’s petition. The NOID indicated that Sanders’s 

petition was to be denied by reason of the so-called marriage bar codified at 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1154(c), which precludes lawful permanent residency for any non-citizen who has 

previously sought immediate relative status as the spouse of an American citizen “by 

reason of a marriage ... [found] to have been entered into for the purpose of evading the 

immigration laws.” 

As it turns out, Iddrissu had previously been married to another American 

citizen, a woman named Shirlanda Sivels, from 2004 to 2013. Just as Sanders would later 

do, Sivels had filed an I-130 petition on Iddrissu’s behalf following their 2004 marriage.

But in 2006 Sivels withdrew that petition and, in doing so, apparently admitted that her 

marriage to Iddrissu had been a sham meant to evade the immigration laws. According 

to the NOID, Sivels admitted under oath that: (1) her marriage to Iddrissu was for the 

purpose of his staying in the United States permanently; (2) she had entered into it in 

exchange for financial support from Iddrissu; and (3) the two had never lived together.

The NOID explained that these statements supported application of the marriage bar, 

but that the couple was entitled by the agency’s regulations to rebut this information 

within 30 days.

In pursuit of that rebuttal opportunity, the couple requested a written copy of 

Sivels’s admissions, which the NOID had merely summarized. But USCIS never 

provided that copy. So Sanders and Iddrissu instead challenged USCIS’s marriage bar 

determination by submitting a notarized statement from Sivels, Iddrissu’s ex-wife.
No. 21-2349 Page 3 

Sivels’s notarized statement attested to the bona fide nature of her marriage to 

Iddrissu, stating that: (1) she and Iddrissu were married and lived together for six years; 

(2) the marriage was based on mutual love and affection; (3) they had established a life 

together; (4) Sivels and Iddrissu often argued over small things; (5) Sivels had accused 

Iddrissu of infidelity; and (6) they had both decided to end the relationship. 

USCIS was unconvinced. In February 2017, it issued a written decision denying 

Sanders’s I-130 petition under the marriage bar, concluding that Sivels’s admissions of 

fraud constituted the substantial and probative evidence necessary to deem the 

marriage bar applicable. Although USCIS’s decision acknowledged Sivels’s notarized 

statement, it found that statement insufficient to rebut her earlier admissions. USCIS’s 

decision also added a few more details about Sivels’s admissions of fraud, including 

that they were made freely and voluntarily and that they were witnessed by two 

immigration officers and by her attorney. 

Sanders sought review of USCIS’s decision with the Board of Immigration 

Appeals, which dismissed, agreeing that Sanders’s petition was precluded by the 

marriage bar. Like USCIS, the Board found that Sivels’s statements attesting to the 

legitimacy of her marriage to Iddrissu failed to overcome her earlier statements to the 

contrary. It noted, too, that Sivels’s submissions of a joint lease and joint bank account 

in support of her I-130 petition on Iddrissu’s behalf did nothing to undercut her 

admissions of fraud. The Board’s dismissal also offered further details on those 

admissions, including that Sivels had acknowledged meeting Iddrissu through a friend 

and described their marriage as “a favor for help.”

From there, Sanders and Iddrissu filed a joint lawsuit challenging the denial of 

Sanders’s petition in federal district court.1 They faulted the agency in two respects. 

First, they contended that the agency’s decision was so unreasoned as to be arbitrary 

and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act. Second, they argued that the 

agency had committed reversible procedural error by failing to provide them with a 

copy of Sivels’s earlier statements calling their marriage a sham.

1 Iddrissu participates as a plaintiff in this lawsuit under 5 U.S.C. § 702, which 

authorizes any person “adversely affected ... by agency action,” to seek review of the 

agency’s decision in federal court. For ease of reference, we at times refer to the couple 

solely by Iddrissu’s name. 
No. 21-2349 Page 4 

The agency responded by moving to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. In response to the couple’s argument that 

its decision was unreasoned, the agency insisted: (1) that its decision was adequately 

explained and supported by record evidence; and (2) that Sanders and Iddrissu merely 

sought reweighing of the evidence, which the district court lacked authority to do. As 

for the couple’s procedural argument, the agency maintained that the NOID’s summary 

of Sivels’s statements had satisfied the relevant notice requirements.

The district court agreed. It concluded that the agency’s decision was not 

arbitrary or capricious because it had been adequately supported by record evidence 

and was reasonably explained. It likewise concluded that our precedents rendered the 

agency’s summary of Sivels’s admissions adequate as a matter of law. Because these 

conclusions meant that Sanders and Iddrissu had failed to state a plausible claim for 

relief, the district court granted the motion to dismiss. The couple then timely appealed. 

II 

Before us, Iddrissu presses the same two arguments raised in the district court: 

that the agency’s decision was arbitrary and capricious in violation of the 

Administrative Procedure Act, and that the failure to provide a copy of Sivels’s 

statements was reversible procedural error. We consider each argument in turn, 

assessing de novo whether the motion to dismiss was properly granted, Proft v. Raoul, 

944 F.3d 686, 690 (7th Cir. 2019), because the couple failed to “state a claim to relief that 

is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation and quotation 

omitted). 

A 

Iddrissu insists that the agency’s decision fell short of the Administrative 

Procedure Act’s requirements. We review agency determinations with great deference, 

see FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 513 (2009), and we cannot substitute 

our judgment for that of the agency, see Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2571 

(2019). But we remain authorized by the Administrative Procedure Act to set aside those 

decisions that are—among other things—arbitrary, capricious, or not supported by 

substantial evidence, see 5 U.S.C. § 706(2), meaning such evidence as “a reasonable 

mind would find adequate to support [the challenged] conclusion,” Ghaly v. INS, 48 

F.3d 1426, 1431 (7th Cir. 1995). The arbitrary and capricious standard requires an agency 

to do its homework; decisions that overlook relevant record evidence or lack a 
No. 21-2349 Page 5 

satisfactory explanation don’t pass muster. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm 

Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). Iddrissu thinks this is one such decision. 

We think otherwise. Agencies must satisfactorily explain their decisions, but that 

requires only that “the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned.” Id. (citation 

omitted). USCIS (and the Board in dismissing) articulated exactly what evidence it 

thought justified applying the marriage bar: Sivels’s admission, under oath, that her 

marriage to Iddrissu was a sham. The agency’s path is crystal clear, not merely 

discernable. 

Iddrissu insists that the agency gave short shrift to Sivels’s notarized statement, 

overlooking any evidence that contradicted its initial view on the applicability of the 

marriage bar. He specifically faults USCIS for not discussing Sivels’s statements in its 

written decision: her assertions that her marriage to Iddrissu was based on mutual love 

and affection, that they lived together, and that the relationship broke down under 

accusations of infidelity.

But USCIS had no duty to go line-by-line through Sivels’s statement in issuing its 

decision. Vergara-Molina v. INS, 956 F.2d 682, 685 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting that an agency 

“need not ... write an exegesis on every contention”) (citation omitted). And the Board, 

in dismissing Sanders’s petition for review, did in fact consider those specific assertions. 

It just found them unpersuasive and insufficient to rebut Sivels’s earlier admission of 

fraud.

Iddrissu says this was just a conclusion, devoid of explanation. But what more 

could the Board have said? It had two contradictory statements from Sivels, and it was 

entitled to credit one over the other. See, e.g., Fliger v. Nielsen, 743 F. App’x 684, 688 (7th 

Cir. 2018) (“It was reasonable for the agency to discount [the prior spouse’s] attempt to 

recant his sworn statement. Courts tend to be suspicious of attempts to retract sworn 

testimony after it produces some unfavorable result.”). And the Board offered further 

explanation, observing that Sivels’s notarized statement lacked any documentary 

support, weakening its evidentiary value. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(a)(1)(i)(B)(5) (“Affidavits 

should be supported, if possible, by one or more types of documentary 

evidence ... .”). What’s more, the Board noted (correctly) that Sivels’s notarized 

statement did not directly rebut her earlier admissions, nor even discuss them. Cf. 

Fliger, 743 F. App’x at 689 (upholding application of marriage bar where petitioners 

provided evidence of an affectionate marriage but that evidence did not directly rebut 
No. 21-2349 Page 6 

earlier admission that the marriage was entered into for immigration purposes). The 

Board considered all the evidence that it must and adequately explained its decision. 

B 

Iddrissu next contends that USCIS committed a reversible procedural error when 

it failed to provide him with a written copy of Sivels’s initial statements. By its own 

regulations, USCIS needed to inform Iddrissu of any “derogatory” information 

unknown to him which underpinned the denial of the I-130 petition, and to provide 

him with an opportunity to rebut that information. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(16)(i). Iddrissu’s 

view is that he was denied that opportunity by USCIS’s refusal to provide a written 

copy of Sivels’s statements.

But USCIS provided Iddrissu with all the information that he needed. It told him 

that Sivels had admitted to the prior fraudulent marriage. And it offered details, 

including Sivels’s statements that: (1) she had met Iddrissu through a friend; (2) she had 

entered into the marriage in exchange for Iddrissu’s promises of financial help with her 

children; (3) the couple had never lived together while married; and (4) Sivels had 

contacted Iddrissu only when needing help or a favor.

Iddrissu dislikes that he learned certain details regarding Sivels’s statements—

including that they were made in front of two immigration officers and her attorney—

only upon the Board’s dismissal of the petition for review. But all that the regulations 

require is the disclosure of derogatory information, and there’s nothing inherently 

derogatory about a statement being made in front of government officials and an 

attorney. It was Sivels’s allegations of fraud that were derogatory, not the circumstances 

under which they were made, and the NOID gave Iddrissu full notice of those. To be 

sure, details about Sivels’s statements were provided only in summary form. But a 

summary provided Iddrissu all the opportunity he needed for rebuttal in this case. His 

attempted (albeit unsuccessful) rebuttal with the later notarized statement from Sivels 

shows as much. Beyond that, any qualms we might have about the proffered summary 

don’t warrant reversal if harmless, see Sahara Coal Co. v. Off. of Workers Comp. Programs, 

U.S. Depʹt of Lab., 946 F.2d 554, 558 (7th Cir. 1991), and Iddrissu makes no meaningful 

argument that he would have been better able to rebut the agency’s determination had 

he received written copies of Sivels’s statements.
No. 21-2349 Page 7 

Because the agency adequately explained itself and gave Iddrissu the required 

opportunity to rebut its marriage bar determination, we AFFIRM the district court’s 

dismissal for failure to state a claim.