alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
###### Editorial Note on [Part 1926](/current/title-29/part-1926?toc=1)

#### Editorial Notes:

1. At [44 FR 8577](https://www.federalregister.gov/citation/44-FR-8577), Feb. 9, 1979, and corrected at [44 FR 20940](https://www.federalregister.gov/citation/44-FR-20940), Apr. 6, 1979, OSHA reprinted without change the entire text of [29 CFR part 1926](/on/2024-09-19/title-29/part-1926) together with certain General Industry Occupational Safety and Health Standards contained in [29 CFR part 1910](/on/2024-09-19/title-29/part-1910), which have been identified as also applicable to construction work. This republication developed a single set of OSHA regulations for both labor and management forces within the construction industry.

2. Nomenclature changes to part 1926 appear at [84 FR 21597](https://www.federalregister.gov/citation/84-FR-21597), May 14, 2019.

#### § 1926.1090 Equipment.

Note:

The requirements applicable to construction work under this section are identical to those set forth at [§ 1910.430 of this chapter](/on/2024-09-19/title-29/section-1910.430).

[[61 FR 31432](https://www.federalregister.gov/citation/61-FR-31432), June 20, 1996]
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```

[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 490 Referred in House (RFH)]

<DOC>

116th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                 S. 490

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           February 14, 2020

             Referred to the Committee on Natural Resources

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
    To designate a mountain ridge in the State of Montana as ``B-47 
                                Ridge''.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``B-47 Ridge Designation Act''.

SEC. 2. DESIGNATION OF B-47 RIDGE, MONTANA.

    (a) Designation.--
            (1) In general.--The unnamed mountain ridge located at 
        4514'40.89" N., 11043'38.75" W. that runs south and west of 
        Emigrant Peak in the Absaroka Range in the State of Montana, 
        which is the approximate site of a crash of a B-47, shall be 
        known and designated as ``B-47 Ridge''.
            (2) References.--Any reference in a law, map, regulation, 
        document, paper, or other record of the United States to the 
        ridge described in paragraph (1) shall be deemed to be a 
        reference to ``B-47 Ridge''.
    (b) Authorization for Plaque.--
            (1) In general.--The Secretary of Agriculture may authorize 
        the installation and maintenance of a plaque on B-47 Ridge 
        that--
                    (A) memorializes the 1962 crash of the B-47 
                aircraft at the site; and
                    (B) may include the names of the victims of the 
                crash.
            (2) Authorized terms and conditions.--The Secretary of 
        Agriculture may include any terms and conditions in the 
        authorization for a plaque under paragraph (1) that the 
        Secretary of Agriculture determines to be necessary.
            (3) Funding.--No Federal funds may be used to design, 
        procure, install, or maintain the plaque authorized under 
        paragraph (1).

            Passed the Senate February 12, 2020.

            Attest:

                                                JULIE E. ADAMS,

                                                             Secretary.
```
#### Morton SOBELL, Petitioner-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 507, Docket 31259.

United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit.

Argued June 15, 1967.

Decided June 26, 1967.

Marshall Perlin, New York City (William M. Kunstler and Arthur Kinoy, New York City, Malcolm Sharp, Albuquerque, N. M., Benjamin 0. Dreyfus, San Francisco, Cal., and Vern Countryman, Lexington, Mass., on the brief), for appellant.

Robert L. King, Special Asst. U. S. Atty., New York City (Robert M. Morgenthau, U. S. Atty. for Southern District of New York, Stephen F. Williams, Daniel R. Murdock and Michael W. Mitchell, Asst. U. S. Attys., on the brief), for appellee.

Before HAYS and FEINBERG, Circuit Judges, and McLEAN, District Judge.*

*

 Of the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.

PER CURIAM:

The order of the district court denying the petition without a hearing is affirmed on the opinion of Judge Weinfeld, 264 F.Supp. 579 (S.D.N.Y.1967).
Exhibit 32.1

     Certification of Chief Financial Officer under Section 1350


     In connection with the quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of
Visual Bible International, Inc. (the "Company")for the period
ending June 30, 2004, as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I hereby certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section
906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

1.   The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2.   The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
of the Company.



Date: August 24, 2004              /s/Maurice Colson


                                   Maurice Colson, Principal
                                   Financial Officer



     The foregoing certification accompanied the Quarterly Report on
Form 10QSB filing pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350.  It is being
reproduced herein for information only.  It is not being filed for
purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as
amended, and it is not to be incorporated by reference into any
filing of the Company, whether made before or after hereof,
regardless of any general incorporation language in such filing.  A
signed original of this written statement required by Section 906
has been provided to the Company and will be retained b y the
Company and furnished to the Securities Exchange Commission or its
staff upon request.
#### ESCALONA v STATE OF FLORIDA

Case No. 86 214 AC (County Court Case No. 80416, 7MW)

Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Appellate Division, Dade County

May 5, 1987

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

Robert I. Spiegelman for appellant.

Jim Smith, Attorney General, and Richard L. Kaplan, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

Before RIVKIND, HENDERSON, ROBINSON, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT

STEVEN D. ROBINSON, Judge.

In this non-jury trial, prior to the Judge’s decision that the appellant *159was guilty of careless driving and willfully fleeing a police officer, the state introduced into evidence, evidence of defendant’s prior driving record, clearly inadmissible under *Williams v. State,*110 So.2d 654 (Fla. 1959(. Such action on the part of a prosecutor is grounds for a new triál. *Robinson v. State,*487 So.2d 1040 (Fla. 1986). *Knight v. State,*316 So.2d 576 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975).

The State’s proffer of evidence under the particular circumstances of this case generated fundamental error. *Sherman v. State,*255 So.2d 263 (Fla. 1971). The defendant was not represented, as are most defendants in traffic court. The introduction of the prejudicial evidence was done so smoothly that even if an objection had been raised, irreversible damage would have already been done. *Wilson v. State,*294 So.2d 327 (Fla. 1974).

Reversed and remanded for a new trial.
#### Paul Kent *versus*Joseph Gerrish.

*Nov. 9th.*

In *case*for the continuance of an obstruction to a private way, it was *held,*that a judgment in favor of the defendant, on the general issue, in a former action between the parties for the same obstruction, although admissible in evidence, was not a bar to the action.

Br an agreed statement of facts, it appeared, that this was an action on the case for the continuance of an alleged obstruction of the plaintiff’s way ; that he had previously brought an action against the defendant for the same obstruction ; that such previous action was tried on the general issue ; and that the defendant recovered judgment, in November, 1837.

If the judgment in the former action was a bar to this action, the plaintiff was to become nonsuit; otherwise, this action was to go to trial.

*Saltonstall*and Choate, for the plaintiff,

to the point, that *565the former judgment, although admissible in evidence, was not conclusive, cited *Standish*v. Parker, *2*Pick. (2d ed.) 20, and note; S. *C.*3 Pick. 288; *Outram*v. *Morewood,*3 East, 364.

*Jan.*31st, 1837

*Gerrish*and *Lord,*for the defendant,

cited *Parker*v. *Thompson,*3 Pick. 429; *Stafford*v. *Clark, 2*Bingh. 377; *Heming*v. *Wilton,*5 Car. & Payne, 54; *Buffum*v. *Tilton,*17 Pick. 510; 1 Stark, on Evid. (5th Am. ed.) 221, 222, 223; *Bradford*v. *Bradford,*5 Connect. R. 127; *Vooght*v. *Winch,*2 Barn. & Ald. 662; *Strutt*v. *Bovingdon,*5 Esp. 59; *Johnson*v. *Long,*1 Salk. 10; Com. Dig. *Action, K*3; Ferrer’s case, 6 Co. R. 7.

Wilde J.

drew up the opinion of the Court. This was an action for the continuance of an obstruction to the plaintiff’s way, he having brought a former action against the defendant for the same obstruction in which he failed to recover. The defendant relies on the judgment in that case as a bar to this action. If the defendant had justified in the former action, and issue had been joined on his right to erect the obstruction, and had been found in his favor, the judgment would have been a bar to this action, according to the doctrine laid down in *Outram*v *Morewood,*3 East, 346. But the trial in the former action was on the general issue, and the judgment is evidence in this case, but is not conclusive. This was decided in the case of *Standish*v. *Parker, 2*Pick. 20, and 3 Pick. 288, after a full examination of the authorities, and we perceive no reason for questioning the authority or correctness of that decision. The case, therefore, is to stand for trial, according to the agreement of the parties
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>

<ARTICLE> 5
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THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM SEPTEMBER
30, 1999 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>

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<SECURITIES>                                   919,750
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<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             3,012,502
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<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             140,251
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (483,669)
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<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (1,815,223)
<EPS-BASIC>                                      (.01)
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</TABLE>
#### STATE ex THOMAS v THOMAS

Ohio Supreme Court

No 21938.

Decided Dec. 18, 1929

Kinkade, Robinson, Jones, Matthias, Day and Allen, JJ., concur.
§ 37.76 What are the required elements of a recipient's discrimination complaint processing procedures? ( a ) The procedures that a recipient adopts and publishes must provide that the recipient will issue a written Notice of Final Action on discrimination complaints within 90 days of the date on which the complaint is filed.
( b ) At a minimum, the procedures must include the following elements: ( 1 ) Initial, written notice to the complainant that contains the following information: ( i ) An acknowledgment that the recipient has received the complaint, and
( ii ) Notice that the complainant has the right to be represented in the complaint process;
( 2 ) A written statement of the issue(s), provided to the complainant, that includes the following information: ( i ) A list of the issues raised in the complaint, and
( ii ) For each such issue, a statement whether the recipient will accept the issue for investigation or reject the issue, and the reasons for each rejection;
( 3 ) A period for fact-finding or investigation of the circumstances underlying the complaint;
( 4 ) A period during which the recipient attempts to resolve the complaint. The methods available to resolve the complaint must include alternative dispute resolution (ADR), as described in paragraph (c) of this section
( 5 ) A written Notice of Final Action, provided to the complainant within 90 days of the date on which the complaint was filed, that contains the following information: ( i ) For each issue raised in the complaint, a statement of either: ( A ) The recipient's decision on the issue and an explanation of the reasons underlying the decision, or
( B ) A description of the way the parties resolved the issue; and
( ii ) Notice that the complainant has a right to file a complaint with CRC within 30 days of the date on which the Notice of Final Action is issued if he or she is dissatisfied with the recipient's final action on the complaint.
( c ) The procedures the recipient adopts must provide for alternative dispute resolution (ADR). The recipient's ADR procedures must provide that: ( 1 ) The choice whether to use ADR or the customary process rests with the complainant;
( 2 ) A party to any agreement reached under ADR may file a complaint with the Director in the event the agreement is breached. In such circumstances, the following rules will apply: ( i ) The non-breaching party may file a complaint with the Director within 30 days of the date on which the non-breaching party learns of the alleged breach;
( ii ) The Director must evaluate the circumstances to determine whether the agreement has been breached. If he or she determines that the agreement has been breached, the complainant may file a complaint with CRC based upon his/her original allegation(s), and the Director will waive the time deadline for filing such a complaint.
( 3 ) If the parties do not reach an agreement under ADR, the complainant may file a complaint with the Director as described in §§ 37.71 through 37.74.
#### Robert E. McMILLAN, Appellant, v. J. J. PARKER, Warden, U. S. Penitentiary, Lewisburg, Pa., Chairman, U. S. Board of Parole, Washington, D. C., and Mr. Faulkner, U. S. Probation Officer, Baltimore, Md.

No. 16046.

United States Court of Appeals Third Circuit.

Submitted May 23, 1967.

Decided June 6, 1967.

Robert L. McMillan, pro se.

Harry A. Nagle, Lewisburg, Pa., Bernard J. Brown, U. S. Atty., for appellees.

Before STALEY, Chief Judge, and KALODNER and FREEDMAN, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal from a denial of appellant’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Appellant was convicted of bank robbery and sentenced for a period of fifteen years on April 24, 1953. He was released on parole on March 31, 1962. He was free on parole for more than three and one-half years before he was arrested and recommitted for a parole violation. He maintains that he may not be detained beyond the original expiration date of his sentence;1 he contends that he must be given credit for the time he was on parole.

The district court properly concluded that the parole statute, 18 U.S.C. § 4205, prohibits the diminution of the time remaining to be served by the time the prisoner was on parole and that his constitutional claim was without merit.2 See Smith v. Blackwell, 367 F.2d 539 (C.A.5, 1966); Weathers v. Willingham, 356 F.2d 421 (C.A.10, 1966).

The judgment of the district court will be affirmed.

1

. There would appear to be a question of prematurity involved here, but the parties have not discussed it. The simplicity of the substantive issues renders unnecessary our consideration of that problem.

2

. The district court’s opinion has been published, 254 F.Supp. 365 (M.D.Pa., 1966).
#### SOBKA *v.*PRESTI.

Judgment — Consent Judgment — Negligence Action.

Grant of,summary judgment for defendant in negligence aetion for the reason that plaintiff had entered into and received satisfaction from a consent judgment in an aetion involving other parties, but involving the same injuries *held,*reversible error, since a consent judgment is essentially a settlement and it does not represent the full measure of satisfaction of a party’s cause of aetion.

References for Points in Headnotes

30A Am Jur, Judgments §§ 148, 154.

Appeal from Wayne; Burdick (Benjamin O.), J.

¡Submitted Division 1 June 2, 1966, at Lansing\

(Docket No. 1,527.)

Decided November 9, 1966.

Complaint by John Sobka, Jr., a minor, by his next friend, John Sobka, Sr., against Frank Presti, a minor, for damages sustained when he was hit *125in the head with a basketball thrown by defendant. Summary judgment for defendant. Plaintiff appeals.

Reversed.

*Leonard G. Jaques,*for plaintiff.

*Lacey do Jones (William Smith,*of counsel), for defendant.

J. H. G-ilijs, P. J.

The plaintiff, John Sobka, Jr., by his next friend, John Sobka, Sr., brought.this action for damages sustained when he was hit on the head with a basketball thrown by the defendant, Prank Prestí, a minor.

Defendant moved for summary judgment 1 on the grounds that plaintiff had entered into and received satisfaction from a consent judgment in an action involving other parties, but involving the same injuries. In the argument on the motion the following colloquy took place:

> ■ *'“Mr. Jaques*[attorney for plaintiff] : This is a consent judgment tantamount to a release and not a judicially derived and determined judgment..

> *“The Court:*This was a judgment. What’s the difference between a consent judgment and a judicially determined judgment?

> *“Mr. Jaques:*A'consent judgment does not have the same dignity as a judgment rendered by the court.

> *“The Court:*You mean if it is a consent judgment, it’s not a judgment that he can use as a defense? I deny that theory.”

The court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

' On this appeal the parties have devoted considerable time to a discussion on whether a motion for *126summary judgment or accelerated judgment 2 was the proper vehicle to bring the defendant’s claimed defense to the attention of the court. We needn’t discuss this problem. The judgment below must be reversed for a more basic reason.

A consent judgment is essentially a settlement and it does not represent the full measure of satisfaction of a party’s cause of action. See *Ortiz*v. *Travelers Insurance Company*(1966), 2 Mich App 548, 555.

Judgment reversed. Costs to appellant.

Fitzgerald and Quinn, JJ., concurred.

1

 See GCR 1963, 117.—Reporter.

2

 See GCR 1963, 116.—Reporter.