Opinion filed May 7, 2015

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals 

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No. 11-14-00308-CV

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IN THE INTEREST OF S.P. AND H.P., CHILDREN

On Appeal from the 318th District Court

Midland County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. FM 56,186

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

The trial court entered an order in which it terminated the parental rights of

the mother and father of S.P. and H.P. The mother appeals and, in a single issue on 

appeal, challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the 

finding that termination of her parental rights is in the best interest of the children.

We affirm.

I. Termination

Termination of parental rights must be supported by clear and convincing 

evidence. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001 (West 2014). To determine on appeal
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if the evidence is legally sufficient in a parental termination case, we review all of 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding and determine whether a 

rational trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding 

was true. In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005). To determine if the 

evidence is factually sufficient, we give due deference to the finding and determine 

whether, on the entire record, a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or 

conviction about the truth of the allegations against the parent. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 

17, 25–26 (Tex. 2002).

To terminate parental rights, it must be shown by clear and convincing 

evidence that the parent has committed one of the acts listed in 

Section 161.001(1)(A)–(T) and that termination is in the best interest of the child. 

FAM. § 161.001. In this case, the trial court found that the mother committed two of 

the acts listed in Section 161.001(1). The trial court found that the mother had 

knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the children to remain in conditions or 

surroundings that endangered their physical or emotional well-being and that the 

mother had engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the children with persons who 

engaged in conduct that endangered the children’s physical or emotional well-being. 

See id. § 161.001(1)(D), (E). The mother does not challenge the sufficiency of the 

evidence to support either of these findings. The trial court also found that 

termination was in the children’s best interest, a finding that is challenged by the 

mother. See id. § 161.001(2).

II. Analysis: Best Interest

The question before us is whether the best interest finding is supported by 

legally and factually sufficient evidence. With respect to the best interest of a child, 

no unique set of factors need be proved. In re C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d 261, 266 (Tex. 

App.—Eastland 2010, pet. denied). But courts may use the non-exhaustive Holley

factors to shape their analysis. Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 
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1976). These include, but are not limited to, (1) the desires of the child, (2) the 

emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the future, (3) the emotional 

and physical danger to the child now and in the future, (4) the parental abilities of 

the individuals seeking custody, (5) the programs available to assist these individuals 

to promote the best interest of the child, (6) the plans for the child by these 

individuals or by the agency seeking custody, (7) the stability of the home or 

proposed placement, (8) the acts or omissions of the parent that may indicate that 

the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one, and (9) any excuse for the 

acts or omissions of the parent. Id. Additionally, evidence that proves one or more 

statutory grounds for termination may also constitute evidence illustrating that 

termination is in the child’s best interest. C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d at 266.

The record shows that the removal in this case stemmed from an injury to H.P. 

that occurred on June 24, 2013, when he was less than nine months old. A detective 

with the Midland Police Department responded to a call of an unconscious child at 

an apartment. The child was taken to the emergency room, and the detective talked 

to the mother at the hospital. The mother was the only adult present when H.P. was 

injured. H.P.’s sister, S.P., who was not yet two years old, may also have been 

present. The mother said that H.P. was jumping on a futon, that she heard a noise, 

and that she turned around and saw H.P. hit his head on the futon, which was metal.

When the detective informed the mother that her story was not consistent with the 

severe injury sustained by H.P., the mother told the detective that she “shook the 

child one time hard” that day. The mother later denied that she had shaken H.P. and 

told her counselor that the doctors “made all this up.” At the time of the hearing on 

termination, a felony criminal case was pending against the mother. Consequently, 

when the mother was called to testify, she invoked her Fifth Amendment right and 

did not answer any questions regarding H.P.’s injury.
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While in the mother’s care, H.P. suffered a subdural hematoma that required 

surgery to evacuate blood and place a shunt for drainage. A significant amount of 

force was required for the type of injury suffered by H.P. A medical doctor who 

specialized in child-abuse pediatrics testified that the mother’s story was not 

believable. According to the doctor, the type of injury suffered by H.P. could have 

been caused by shaking him, and he would have become symptomatic immediately. 

H.P.’s symptoms as the hospital included seizures, loss of consciousness, subdural 

hemorrhage, and retinal hemorrhage. The doctor testified that retinal hemorrhage is 

associated with a head injury caused by being crushed or shaken. The type of severe 

injury suffered by H.P. can lead to future developmental delays, cerebral palsy, and 

paralysis.

The Department of Family and Protective Services removed the children after 

H.P. was injured. While in the Department’s care, it was discovered that S.P. had a 

genetic disorder and was autistic. Both children were placed in a licensed 

therapeutic foster home and were doing well there. At the time of trial, S.P. was

almost three years old and spoke no words. S.P. screamed and made squealing 

noises, which seemed to bother H.P. While in foster care, S.P. and H.P. have 

received therapy and have been treated by specialists—care that they were not 

receiving while with their parents. For six months after his injury, H.P. did not have 

much use of his left side. He was also developmentally delayed, but he no longer 

suffered from seizures.

The Department’s goal for the children was termination of the parents’ rights 

and adoption by a non-relative. The current foster parents had agreed to keep the 

children and help transition them to an adoptive home. The licensed professional 

counselor who counseled the mother had “a big concern” about returning the 

children to the mother. The Department’s caseworker testified that the mother 

lacked the necessary skills to parent the children, who are both special needs 
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children. The mother refused to take her medications and lacked a support system. 

Furthermore, H.P. was severely injured while in his mother’s care. The CASA 

volunteer recommended that the parental rights of both parents be terminated. She 

noted the parents’ unstable housing, the mother’s refusal to take her medication, the 

special needs of the children, and the need for stability as reasons for her 

recommendation. The children expressed no vocal desires.

Based upon the evidence in the record and the Holley factors, we cannot hold 

that the trial court’s best interest finding is not supported by clear and convincing 

evidence; the trial court could reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction 

that it would be in the best interest of both children for the mother’s parental rights

to be terminated. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72. The evidence is legally and 

factually sufficient to support the best interest finding. We overrule the mother’s

sole issue.

III. This Court’s Ruling

We affirm the trial court’s order of termination.

MIKE WILLSON

JUSTICE

May 7, 2015

Panel consists of: Wright, C.J.,

Willson, J., and Bailey, J.