alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Maria Guzman, Respondent, v Paul Michael Management et al., Appellants.

[698 NYS2d 719]

—In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Doyle, J.), entered October 27, 1998, which denied their motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d).

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the motion is granted, and the complaint is dismissed.

The Supreme Court erred in denying the defendants’ motion *509for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d). The affirmed medical reports of the physicians who examined the plaintiff on behalf of the defendants were sufficient to establish a prima facie case that the plaintiff did not sustain such serious injury as a result of the underlying collision (see, *Gaddy v Eyler,*79 NY2d 955). The burden therefore shifted to the plaintiff to come forward with sufficient evidence that she had sustained a serious injury (see, *Licari v Elliott,*57 NY2d 230; *Lopez v Senatore,*65 NY2d 1017).

Contrary to the conclusion of the Supreme Court, the plaintiffs evidence submitted in opposition to the defendants’ motion was insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether she sustained a serious injury. First, the court improperly considered the unaffirmed report of the plaintiffs examining neurologist, as it was not submitted in admissible form *(see, Grasso v Angerami,*79 NY2d 813, 814). Moreover, although the plaintiff submitted evidence that she suffered from a herniated disc and bulging discs, such injuries do not, in and of themselves, constitute serious injury *(see, Noble v Ackerman,*252 AD2d 392, 394; *cf., Puma v Player,*233 AD2d 308). Rather, the plaintiff was required “to provide objective evidence of the extent or degree of the alleged physical limitations resulting from the injuries and their duration” *(Noble v Ackerman, supra,*at 394). The affidavit of the plaintiffs treating chiropractor was insufficient for that purpose, as it was based upon an examination conducted in October 1995, almost three years before the defendants’ summary judgment motion *(see, Schultz v Von Voight,*216 AD2d 451, 452, *affd*86 NY2d 865; *Beckett v Conte,*176 AD2d 774; *Philpotts v Petrovic,*160 AD2d 856, 857). The plaintiff submitted no other medical evidence connecting her herniated disc or bulging discs to any limitation of motion *(see, Merisca v Alford,*243 AD2d 613; *Delaney v Rafferty,*241 AD2d 537),, and the plaintiffs subjective complaints of pain, as contained in her affidavit, were insufficient for this purpose *(see, Lincoln v Johnson, 225*AD2d 593; *Orr v Miner,*220 AD2d 567, 568). S. Miller, J. P., Thompson, Krausman, Florio and Schmidt, JJ., concur.
#### § 38.71 Right to representation.

Both the complainant and the respondent have the right to be represented by an attorney or other individual of their choice.
#### § 37.93 What happens if the Director finds that a violation has taken place, and the recipient fails or refuses to take the corrective action listed in the Initial Determination?

Under such circumstances, the Department must take the actions described in § 37.99 of this part.
§ 1915.93 Motor vehicle safety equipment, operation and maintenance. ( a ) *Application.* ( 1 ) This section applies to any motor vehicle used to transport employees, materials, or property at worksites engaged in shipyard employment. This section does not apply to motor vehicle operation on public streets and highways.
( 2 ) The requirements of this section apply to employer-provided motor vehicles. The requirements of paragraphs (b)(2), (b)(4), and (c)(2) of this section also apply to employee-provided motor vehicles.
( 3 ) Only the requirements of paragraphs (b)(1) through (b)(3) apply to powered industrial trucks, as defined in § 1910.178. The maintenance, inspection, operation, and training requirements in 29 CFR 1910.178 continue to apply to powered industrial trucks used for shipyard employment.
( b ) *Motor vehicle safety equipment.* ( 1 ) The employer shall ensure that each motor vehicle acquired or initially used after August 1, 2011 is equipped with a safety belt for each employee operating or riding in the motor vehicle. This requirement does not apply to any motor vehicle that was not equipped with safety belts at the time of manufacture.
( 2 ) The employer shall ensure that each employee uses a safety belt, securely and tightly fastened, at all times while operating or riding in a motor vehicle.
( 3 ) The employer shall ensure that vehicle safety equipment is not removed from any employer-provided vehicle. The employer shall replace safety equipment that is removed.
( 4 ) The employer shall ensure that each motor vehicle used to transport an employee has firmly secured seats for each employee being transported and that all employees being transported are using such seats.
( c ) *Motor vehicle maintenance and operation.* ( 1 ) The employer shall ensure that each motor vehicle is maintained in a serviceable and safe operating condition, and removed from service if it is not in such condition.
( 2 ) The employer shall ensure that, before a motor vehicle is operated, any tools and materials being transported are secured if their movements may create a hazard for employees.
( 3 ) The employer shall implement measures to ensure that motor vehicle operators are able to see, and avoid harming, pedestrians and bicyclists at shipyards. Measures that employers may implement to comply with this requirement include: ( i ) Establishing dedicated travel lanes for motor vehicles, bicyclists, and pedestrians;
( ii ) Installing crosswalks and traffic control devices such as stop signs, mirrors at blind spots, or physical barriers to separate travel lanes;
( iii ) Establishing appropriate speed limits for all motor vehicles;
( iv ) Establishing “no drive” times to allow for safe movement of pedestrians;
( v ) Providing reflective vests or other gear so pedestrians and bicyclists are clearly visible to motor vehicle operators;
( vi ) Ensuring that bicycles have reflectors, lights, or other equipment to maximize visibility of the bicyclist; or
( vii ) Other measures that the employer can demonstrate are as effective in protecting pedestrians and bicyclists as those measures specified in paragraphs (c)(3)(i) through (c)(3)(vi) of this section.
EXHIBIT 32.2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                   SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


      In connection with the Quarterly Report of Lite King Corporation (the
"Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ended December 31, 2004 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), the
undersigned, in the capacities and on the date indicated below, hereby certifies
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to his knowledge:

      1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operation of the
Company.


Date: March 15, 2006                   By:     /s/ David L. Norris
                                               ------------------------------
                                       Name:   David L. Norris
                                       Title:  Chief Financial Officer

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other
document authentications, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature
that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written
statement required by Section 906, has been provided to Lite King Corporation
and will be retained by Lite King Corporation and furnished to the Securities
and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.




                                  EXHIBIT 32.2
§ 2550.403b-1 Exemptions from trust requirement. ( a ) *Statutory exemptions.* The requirements of section 403(a) of the Act and section 403a-1 shall not apply— ( 1 ) To any assets of a plan which consist of insurance contracts or policies issued by an insurance company qualified to do business in a State;
( 2 ) To any assets of such an insurance company or any assets of a plan which are held by such an insurance company;
( 3 ) To a plan— ( i ) Some or all of the participants of which are employees described in section 401(c)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954; or
( ii ) Which consists of one or more individual retirement accounts described in section 408 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. To the extent that such plan's assets are held in one or more custodial accounts which qualify under section 401(f) or 408(h) of such Code, whichever is applicable;
( 4 ) To a contract established and maintained under section 403(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to the extent that the assets of the contract are held in one or more custodial accounts pursuant to section 403(b)(7) of such Code.
( 5 ) To any plan, fund or program under which an employer, all of whose stock is directly or indirectly owned by employees, former employees or their beneficiaries, proposes through an unfunded arrangement to compensate retired employees for benefits which were forfeited by such employees under a pension plan maintained by a former employer prior to the date such pension plan became subject to the Act.
[47 FR 21247, May 18, 1982]
DENIED and Opinion Filed June 9, 2022

In The 

### Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05
- 22
- 00275
- CV IN RE NORMAN JOSEPH LANDRY , Relator Original Proceeding from the 380th Judicial District Court

Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 380
- 00932
- 2022 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Osborne, Partida

- Kipness, and Smith

Opinion by Justice Smith Norman Joseph Landry petitions for a writ of mandamus to compel the trial court to grant him a personal recognizance bond pending appea l. We deny relief. Relator’s petition does not comply with the rules of appellate procedure in that it is not properly certified and is not supported by a record of certified or sworn documents. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 52.3(j), 52.3(k)(1)(A), 52.7(a)(1); In re Butler , 270 S.W.3d 757, 758

– 59 (Tex. App.

— Dallas 2008, orig. proceeding); see also T EX
. C IV
. P RAC
. & R EM
. C ODE A NN
. § 132.001 (describing process to authenticate documents as sworn copies). Thus, relator has not carried his burden to show he is entitled t o mandamus relief. See Butler , 270 S.W.3d at 75 9.– 2

–

Moreover, the relief that appellant seeks, to be released under a personal bond on his own recognizance, involves the exercise of judicial discretion and is thus not a proper subject for mandamus relief. See State ex rel. Young v . Sixth Judicial Dist.
Cour t of Appeals at Texarkana , 236 S.W.3d 207, 210 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (no mandamus relief absent showing relator has no adequate remedy at law and what relator seeks to compel is ministerial act not involving disc retionary or judicial decision); Ex parte G omez , 624 S.W.3d 573, 578 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (trial court exercises discretion in setting bond and determination reviewed for abuse of discretion). We deny relator’s petition. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 52.8(a).

220275f.p05 /Craig Smith/ CRAIG SMITH JUSTICE
#### STATE OF FLORIDA v NEWMAN

Case No. 85-195 AC (County Court Case No. E8085, 6MK)

Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Appellate Division, Dade County

March 6, 1987

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

Jim Smith, Attorney General, for appellant.

Richard A. Darr for appellee.

Before TENDRICH, KAYE, GREENBAUM, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT

PER CURIAM.

The granting of the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss was error. Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(d) provides:

> “A motion to dismiss under paragraph (c)(4) of this rule shall be *149denied if the State files a traverse which with specificity denied under oath the material fact or facts alleged in the motion to dismiss.”

See *State v. Lewis,*463 So.2d 561 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985).

Reversed.
----

Prior notification of a concentration

(Case COMP/M.3602 — JABIL/PHILIPS CONSUMER ELECTRONICS POLAND)

Candidate case for simplified procedure

(2004/C 261/05)

(Text with EEA relevance)

----

(1)OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1.

(2)  Available on DG COMP website:

http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/legislation/consultation/simplified_tru.pdf.

----
#### JUNKER v STATE OF FLORIDA

Case No. 87-21 AC

Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County

August 17, 1989

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

John George, for appellant.

Carolyn McCann, Assistant State Attorney, for appellee.

OPINION OF THE COURT

ROBERT TYSON, JR., Circuit Judge.

THIS CAUSE comes before the Court upon appeal of an order entered by the trial court denying the Appellant, Frederick Junker, a Petition for a Writ of Coram Nobis. For the reasons stated below, the trial court’s order is affirmed.

In the trial court, the appellant appealed from the denial of a writ of coram nobis. After formal hearing held on February 27, 1989 the writ was denied. Said denial is the subject of this appeal.

At the trial court level, the appellant plead guilty to driving while intoxicated and was then placed on probation. Thereafter the defendant *28was charged with a violation of probation and proceeded to attack the legality of the change of plea. A plea colloquy pursuant to *Fla. Rule of Crim Pro. 3.172*must be conducted under certain guidelines. The attack of the plea was first addressed by a 3.850 motion but was then treated as a writ of coram nobis at the appellant’s request.

The function of a writ of coram nobis is to correct errors of fact not law. These facts must be of such a vital nature that had they been known to the trial court, they conclusively would have prevented the entry of the judgment. *Hallman v State,*371 So.2d 482 (Fla. 1979).

Clearly, the appellant herein is complaining of errors of law rather than errors of fact which are the proper subject of inquiry under a writ of coram nobis. As such, the trial court was correct in denying the appellant’s writ as an improper vehicle for relief.

It is observed by this Court that a 3.850 motion is the proper vehicle to utilize in attacking appellant’s conviction by the trial court. The Supreme Court stated in *Richardson v State,*14 FLW 318 (Fla. 1989) that the 3.850 motion has in fact supplanted the writ of coram nobis.

This Court recognizes that a 3.850 motion may not have been available to the appellant at the time he filed because the appellant was not “in custody” as is required. However, since then, a person under probation is now considered to be in custody. See, *Boleya v State,*508 So.2d 457 (Fla. 1DCA 1987). This Court however declines to treat the instant case as an appeal from the denial of a 3.850 motion for post conviction relief where the Appellant expressly abandoned that motion in the trial court.

Based on the foregoing the trial court’s order denying the writ of coram nobis is hereby affirmed. The case is to be returned to the trial court level for any further proceedings.

Accordingly, it is hereby,

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Order denying the Writ of Coram Nobis is, AFFIRMED.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at the Broward County COurthouse, 201 Southeast Sixth Street, Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301, this 17th day of August, 1989.
#### MARGOLIS v A. J. SIDE MORTGAGE & TRUST CO.

Case No. 86-262 AP

Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Appellate Division, Dade County

December 31, 1986

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

Ann Mason Parker for appellant.

Robert C. Toland for appellee.

Before ROBINSON, KAYE, MASTOS, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT

THEODORE G. MASTOS, Judge.

Appellant, Gwen Margolis, seeks reversal and remand of the order of Final Judgment entered in the County Court finding the alleged lease between A. J. Side Mortgage and Trust Company and the former owner/landlord to be valid and binding against the new landlord notwithstanding the fact that the lessee is permitted under the terms of the said lease the unilateral right to cancel at will.

*1371 *Williston on Contracts*§ 105 (3d ed. 1957) succinctly states the applicable law as follows:

> “An agreement wherein one party reserves the right to cancel at his pleasure *cannot*create a contract . . . [however,] *even a slight restriction*of the right of cancellation as constituting such legal detriment as *will satisfy the requirement of sufficient consideration;*for example, where the reservation of right to cancel is for cause, or by written notice, or after a definite period of notice; or upon the occurrence of some extrinsic event or is based on some objective standard.” (Emphasis added.)

The subject lease in this case states in pertinent part:

> “Lessee can cancel at any time making lease null and void.”

Without a question, this language affords a tenant the unconditional, unfettered right to cancel at his own pleasure, whim or caprice — without any restrictions which might constitute “consideration” to the “old” or the “new” landlord.

Notwithstanding the above mentioned portion of the lease in question, the trial judge below found:

> “. . . as a matter of law, that the subject business lease agreement, for the initial term of one (1) year is valid, binding, is supported by good and valuable consideration and is therefore enforceable.”

In this conclusion, we feel that the trial court judge erred as a matter of law. We hold that the lease in question was “void ab initio” as illusory and lacking in mutuality of obligation. See: *Pick Kwik Food Stores, Inc. v. Tenser,*407 So.2d 216 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981), *pet. for rev. denied,*415 So.2d 1361 (Fla. 1982); *E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Claiborne-Reno Co.,*64 F. 2d 224 (8th Cir. 1933); *Miami Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Orange Crush Co., 296*F. Supp. 994 (D.N.D. 1950); *Allington Towers North, Inc. v. Rubin,*400 So.2d 86 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); 1 *Williston on Contracts*(3d ed. 1957) § 104, at 401; *Burger Chef Systems, Inc. v. Burger Chef of Florida,*317 So.2d 795 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975); *Restatement (Second) of Contracts,*§ 77, Illustration 2 1981; *Lauren, Inc. v. Marc & Melfa, Inc.,*446 So.2d 1138 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984).

Accordingly, the order of Final Judgment is hereby reversed and remanded with directions to proceed consistent herewith.
110TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. CON. RES. 62

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

1 Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives 

2 concurring), That in the enrollment of H.R. 660, an Act 

3 to amend title 18, United States Code, to protect judges, 

4 prosecutors, witnesses, victims, and their family members, 

5 and for other purposes, the Clerk of the House of Rep6 resentatives shall strike section 502 of the Act and insert 

7 the following:

8 ‘‘SEC. 502. MAGISTRATE JUDGES LIFE INSURANCE. 

9 ‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 604(a)(5) of title 28, 

10 United States Code, is amended by inserting after ‘hold of11 fice during good behavior’, the following: ‘magistrate judges 

12 appointed under section 631 of this title,’. 

13 ‘‘(b) CONSTRUCTION.—For purposes of construing and 

14 applying chapter 87 of title 5, United States Code, includ15 ing any adjustment of insurance rates by regulation or oth16 erwise, the following categories of judicial officers shall be 

17 deemed to be judges of the United States as described under 

18 section 8701 of title 5, United States Code: 
2

•SCON 62 ES 

1 ‘‘(1) Magistrate judges appointed under section 

2 631 of title 28, United States Code. 

3 ‘‘(2) Magistrate judges retired under section 377 

4 of title 28, United States Code. 

5 ‘‘(c) EFFECTIVE DATE.—Subsection (b) and the 

6 amendment made by subsection (a) shall apply with respect 

7 to any payment made on or after the first day of the first 

8 applicable pay period beginning on or after the date of en9 actment of this Act.’’.

Passed the Senate December 19 (legislative day, December 18), 2007. 

Attest:

Secretary. 

110TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. CON. RES. 62

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

To correct the enrollment of H.R. 660.
<PAGE> 1

                               EXHIBIT 21

                       SUBSIDIARIES OF THE COMPANY

<TABLE>

<S>                                           <C>
Name                                          Where Incorporated
----                                          ------------------
Alumatherm Heat Treating Company, L.L.C.      Delaware
Fabriform Metal Brazing, Inc.                 California
Houston Heat Treating Company                 Texas
Impind, Inc.                                  Delaware
Industrial Steel Treating Co.                 California
Merrell Enterprises, Inc.                     California
Metal-Lab of Wisconsin, Inc.                  Wisconsin
Quality Heat-Treat, Inc.                      Texas
Ticorm, Inc.                                  California
Lindberg de Mexico                            Mexico

</TABLE>
**Exhibit32.2**

 

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. §1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

 

I, Gary W. Nielson, certify,pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant toSection 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of myknowledge the Quarterly Report of Cornerstone Realty Fund, LLC on Form 10-Q forthe quarter ended September 30, 2003 fully complies with the requirementsof Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and thatinformation contained in such Form 10-Q fairly presents in all materialrespects the financial condition and results of operations of CornerstoneRealty Fund, LLC.

 
|                              | /s/  GARY W. NIELSON                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Date:  November 7, 2003 | Gary  W. Nielson   Chief Financial Officer (Principal Financial  Officer) of Cornerstone Ventures, Inc., the  Manager of Cornerstone Industrial Properties,   LLC, the Managing Member of Cornerstone   Realty Fund, LLC |

 

----
I 

110TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. CON. RES. 71 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MARCH 14, 2008 

Referred to the Committee on House Administration 

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 

Authorizing the use of the rotunda of the Capitol for the 

presentation of the Congressional Gold Medal to Michael 

Ellis DeBakey, M.D. 

1 Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives 

2 concurring), 

3 SECTION 1. USE OF THE ROTUNDA OF THE CAPITOL FOR 

4 THE PRESENTATION OF THE CONGRES5 SIONAL GOLD MEDAL. 

6 The rotunda of the United States Capitol is author7 ized to be used on April 23, 2008, for the presentation 

8 of the Congressional Gold Medal to Michael Ellis 

9 DeBakey, M.D.. Physical preparations for the conduct of 

10 the ceremony shall be carried out in accordance with such 


wwoods2 on PRODPC68 with BILLS
2 

SCON 71 RFH 

1 conditions as may be prescribed by the Architect of the 

2 Capitol. 

Passed the Senate March 14 (legislative day, March 

13), 2008. 

Attest: NANCY ERICKSON, 

Secretary. 


wwoods2 on PRODPC68 with BILLS