SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-2488-21 

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, 

Plaintiff-Respondent, 

v.

DANIEL C. EVERETT, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

_______________________

Submitted January 8, 2024 – Decided January 26, 2024 

Before Judges Sabatino and Marczyk. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Mercer County, Indictment No. 15-05-0629. 

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Monique D. Moyse, Designated Counsel, on

the brief). 

Angelo J. Onofri, Mercer County Prosecutor, attorney 

for respondent (Laura C. Sunyak, Assistant Prosecutor, 

of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-2488-21 

This is an appeal of the denial of a post-conviction relief ("PCR") petition 

without an evidentiary hearing. We affirm, substantially for the cogent reasons 

expressed in Judge Janetta D. Marbrey's written opinion of March 14, 2022. 

The tragic case arises out of a fatal accident in which a commercial dump 

truck driven by defendant Daniel C. Everett struck the victim's car at about 2:15 

p.m. on July 17, 2014. Defendant had caused three other motor vehicle 

collisions earlier that day, all minor and none of them fatal. The first collision 

occurred at 8:07 a.m.; the second at 11:45 a.m., and the third at 1:15 p.m. Police 

officers responded to two of those three earlier accidents, but they did not 

prevent defendant from resuming his driving. 

Before the fourth and final accident, defendant texted his wife and 

expressed concerns about the condition of his truck's brakes. His wife, 

meanwhile, raised concerns in their text exchange about his mental state. 

Although she did not tell him this until after the fatal collision, his wife had 

noticed that he had lapsed into a "fugue state" on two recent occasions. He also 

had been diagnosed with diabetes about two months earlier. 

Defendant was arrested after the fatal accident and taken to a hospital. A 

toxicology report detected no alcohol in his bloodstream and no controlled 

dangerous substances except for Xanax, which he said had been prescribed to 
3 A-2488-21 

him for a work-related injury. About nine months after the accident, defendant 

underwent a sleep study that diagnosed him with mild apnea. 

Defendant was charged by indictment with second-degree death by auto, 

N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5(a), a form of reckless manslaughter. He had no previous 

indictable convictions. 

Pursuant to a negotiated agreement, the State consented to have defendant 

sentenced one-degree lower, down to the third-degree range. The agreement 

specified a three-year maximum custodial term, subject to parole ineligibility 

mandated by the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2 ("NERA"). 

In June 2017, defendant pled guilty in accordance with the agreement. At 

the plea hearing, defendant admitted to the court that he had been reckless in 

continuing to drive after the first three accidents. During the hearing, 

defendant's attorney asked him several questions about his mental state leading 

up to the accidents, referencing his text messages with his wife and her past 

observations of his fugue state. Among other things, counsel showed that the 

texts reflected concerns by defendant and his wife before the accident that a low 

blood sugar level could have been affecting him. The trial court accepted 

defendant's guilty plea as knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The court also 

confirmed with defendant that he was satisfied with his attorney's services. 
4 A-2488-21 

The sentencing was delayed for over a year to enable defendant to undergo 

back surgery and address other health issues. He was eventually sentenced in 

October 2018. In arguing for leniency, defense counsel suggested to the court 

that defendant may have been suffering from chronic traumatic encephalopathy 

("CTE"). Consistent with the plea agreement, the court treated defendant as a 

third-degree offender and imposed a three-year NERA sentence. 

In November 2019, defendant timely filed the present PCR petition. He 

argues his plea counsel was constitutionally ineffective by failing to investigate 

his case sufficiently. In particular, he contends his counsel should have explored 

more deeply a potential medical explanation for his driving behavior. Defendant 

asserted his belief that "the combination of sleep apnea and [his] uncontrolled 

blood sugar was the cause of the [fatal] accident." He posits that had his counsel 

been more diligent, he would not have pled guilty and instead would have gone 

to trial. 

After hearing oral argument on the PCR petition, Judge Marbrey issued 

her nine-page written opinion rejecting defendant's contentions. The judge 

found that plea counsel's performance was not deficient. Among other things, 

she noted that during both the plea hearing and the sentencing, "counsel clearly 

addressed [defendant's] ongoing cognitive issues." The judge deemed 

defendant's claims that counsel was inattentive to his medical conditions as 
5 A-2488-21 

unsubstantiated "bald assertions." The judge found it reasonable to infer that 

counsel, who was clearly aware of his client's medical circumstances, 

strategically chose to pursue plea negotiations rather than risk advancing a 

medical defense at trial. The judge also highlighted defendant's admission that 

he knew his decision to keep driving after the first three accidents earlier the 

same day was reckless. 

On appeal, defendant presents this argument in his brief: 

POINT I 

MR. EVERETT IS ENTITLED TO AN 

EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON HIS CLAIM THAT 

HIS ATTORNEY RENDERED INEFFECTIVE 

ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY FAILING TO 

CONDUCT AN ADEQUATE PRETRIAL 

INVESTIGATION, CAUSING HIM TO PLEAD 

GUILTY WHEN HE OTHERWISE WOULD HAVE 

PROCEEDED TO TRIAL. 

In assessing this argument, we are guided by well-settled principles. A 

defendant seeking relief because of the alleged constitutionally ineffective 

assistance of counsel must demonstrate: (1) deficient performance by counsel, 

and (2) actual prejudice flowing from that performance. Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); see also State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 52 

(1987). In the context of a defense that culminated, as here, with a plea 

agreement, the defendant must show with "'reasonable probability'" that the 
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result would have been different had plea counsel taken a different course of 

action. Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 163 (2012) (quoting Strickland, 466

U.S. at 694). Our courts afford substantial deference in this regard to strategic 

decisions made by a trial attorney. State v. Arthur, 184 N.J. 307, 322-23 (2005). 

Applying these principles, we concur with Judge Marbrey's sound 

analysis. Defendant presents no expert reports substantiating his theory that his 

driving behavior on the day of the fatal crash was caused by a combination of 

diabetes, sleep apnea, and an uncontrolled blood sugar. Moreover, even if he 

tendered such an expert medical opinion, it would not have necessarily 

persuaded a jury to exonerate his conduct, particularly given his own admission 

that it was reckless to have continued driving after the first three accidents. We 

must also be mindful that defendant initially had been facing a second-degree 

sentencing exposure of up to ten years of imprisonment; the third-degree 

sentence of three years that his plea counsel favorably negotiated was a 

significant achievement. 

Because defendant failed to advance a prima facie case of ineffective 

assistance, no evidentiary hearing was warranted. State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 

451, 462-63 (1992). 

Affirmed.