### NUM BER 13-09- 0056 3-CV 

## COURT OF A PP EA LS T H I R T E E N T H D I S T R I C T O F T E X AS C OR P U S C H R I S T I -E D I N B U R G
PA TR ICIA M . JOH NSO N, A pp ellan t,
v. WA YNE VEN TL ING, A pp ellee.
On ap pe al f rom th e 9 4th D istrict Co urt of N ue ces Co un ty , T exas .


## M EMO RA NDUM OPI NI ON ON REHE A RI NG B efo re C h ie f Ju st ic e Va ld eza n d J u st ic es Y añ eza n d G arza M em o ra n d u m Op in io n o n R eh ea rin g b y J u st ic e Ga rza W e g ra nt t he moti on for re hear ing fil ed by appel lan t, Patr ic ia M. Jo hnson , v acat e and w it hdraw our prev iou s memorand um opi nio n and jud g ment dated Jul y 15, 2010, and is sue the fol low ing i n i ts pla ce. In th is appe al, Joh nson ch allenges the t rial cou rt’s denial of her mo tion to enforce cont ractua l alimo ny provisi ons agreed to by app ellee, W ayne Ven tling. By two is s u e s, Johns on c ontends : (1 ) that the t ri al cour t er re d in deter mini ng that the c ontract ual al imony prov is ion s were unenforceabl e; an d ( 2) thatsh e i s e nti tl ed to a j u d gm e n t of $142, 500,
re present ing the amount of al imony all eg ed to be due from Vent li ng , as w ell as i nterestandT h e p a rti e s ’ s i g n a tu re s o n th e fi n a l d e c re e a p p e a re d a t t h e c o n c l u s i o n o f th e d o c u m e n t u n d e rn e a th 1 th e fo l l o w i n g s ta te m e n t: “A P P R O V E D A N D C O N S E N T E D T O A S T O B O T H F O R M A N D S U B S T A N C E .” 2 attor ney ’s fees. W e rev erse and remand. I. B A CKGRO UND This ca se involv es a thi rt een- y ear rom a n ti c re lat ion shi p w hic h dev olv ed i nto a fifteen-y ear

se ri es of leg al li ais ons. J ohnso n and Ventl ing co habi ted from 1982 to 19 95. Fol low ing the adv ic e of his attor ney that a common- law marr iag e ex is ted and that a formal decree reg ardin g proper ty di v is ion w as in hi s best int erest , Ve ntl ing fil ed for divorce. The par ti es cons ented to the t er ms of the divorce and a “F ina l Dec re e of Di v orce” w as entered on Apr il 13, 1995. T h e d e cre e st ated that “t he rela ti onshi p betw een [Ventl ing ] and [ J o h n s o n ] is d is s o lve d ” a n d p ro vid e d fo r t h e d is p o s it io n o f t h e p a rt ie s ’ c o m m u n it y p ro p e rt y, inc lud ing a lump sum pay ment to be made from Ventl ing to Johns on in the amount o f $25 ,53 7. T he decre e, w hich w as signed by the t rial cou rt a s w ell as both parties an d the ir atto rneys, f urthe r stated as follows:

1 Al imony It is the m utu al desire of the pa rties to provide a co ntinu ing measu re of suppor

t for [Jo hnson ] after

the dis sol uti on of the re lat ion shi p betw een t he par ti es. Thes e s uppor

t pay ments under

tak en by [Ve ntl ing ] are i ntended to q ual ify as co ntract ual al imony as that ter m is defined in secti on 71( a) of the Inter nal R ev enue C ode of 1986 (“ the C ode” ), as amended, and are i ntended to be i ncl udabl e i n the g ro ss i ncome of [Johns on] under se cti on 71( a) of the Code and ded uctible by[ V e n t li n g] und er section 215 (a) of the Cod e. All prov is ion s o f this ar

ti cl e w il l be inter preted in a manner co nsi ste nt w it h tha t int enti on. Con tract ual Obl ig ati ons T his alimo ny obligation und ert aken by[Ven tling] is cont ractua l in nature and is not an obl ig ati on i mposed by order or dec re e of cour

t. Terms, C ondi ti ons, and Con ti ng enci es Amount. [Ventl ing ] w il l pay to [Jo hnson ] $2, 500.00 per month as and fo r a li m o n y.

. . . . T erm. The paymen ts w ill be fo r eighty- four ( 84) m ont hs w ith the last3

pay ment bei ng M arch 1, 20 02.

. . . . Default a nd Acce leration

. [ Ven tling] a grees tha t time is of th e esse nce in the p ay ment of

t h e per iod ical imony

pay ments. I f defaul t i s made by [Vent li ng ] i n the prompt pay ment of any per iod icamounts due under the ter ms of t his ag re ement and suc h default cont inu es for a per iod of more than 60 days, the e nti re remaini ng al imony obl ig ati on of [Ventl ing ], at the o pti on of [Johns on], shal l then be ac cel erated and shal l become immedi atel y due and payabl e, t og ether

w it h an amount suffici ent to reimburse [Jo hnson ] for any tax and/ or penal ty resul ti ng from s uch default by [Ve ntl ing ].

. . . . Clarifying Orders W ithou t af

fe c t in g the f inality of

this Decree of

Div orce, th is Court expressly

reserv es the rig ht to make orders nece ssaryto clarif y and enforce thi s d ecree. In O ct ober

of 1995, Johns on fil ed a moti on for enforc ement, cont endi ng that Ventl ing fail ed to deliv er cert ain community

proper ty to her as prov ide d i n the dec re e. In
re spons e, V entl ing fil ed a cross -mot ion for e nforce ment. The par ti es settl ed th is di sput e. Johns on th en f il ed a sec ond motion for enforcementin September of 1997, al leg ing that Ventl ing had (1 ) faile d to make the $25,537 lump sum pa y ment as req uired by the decree, and (2 ) faile d to make the las t three al imony pay ments. J ohnso n s oug ht ac cel erati on of the e nti re al imon y a m o u n t as prov ide d i n the dec re e. In respon se to t his se cond enforcem entm otion , Ven tling raised a novel defense , arguing tha t the parties ha d in fact
nev er been marr ied

. Con tendi ng thatJo hnson had decei v ed him i nto b eli ev ing thatthey
w ere i n a c ommon -law mar ri ag e, V entl ing as ked the t ri al cour t t o: (1 ) v acat e the 1995 decree; ( 2) resc ind the par ti es’ ag re ement “ on th e g ro unds of mist ake, acci dent, fraud, lac hes, l imi tati ons, and failu re of cons ide ra ti on” ; and ( 3) “ non- sui t” hi s d iv orce action. Al thoug h more than two y ears had pass ed si nce the tr ial cour t’ s entr y of t he final dec re e, Ventl ing as ser

ted t hat t he tr ial courtretai ned plenar y pow er to v acat e the dec re e bec ause,
as s um i ng t he p ar

ti es w ere ne v er

a ctu al l y ma r r i ed , th e de c ree me rel y s ta te d th e pa rti es’ ri g hts as to thei r joi ntl y -o w ned proper ty and w as not a final jud g ment c omplet ely di spos ingJohn son t est i f i ed t hat she was r ecei v i ng m i l i t ary w i dow’ s ben ef i t s f r om a pr i orm ar r i age, and t hat 2 th o s e b e n e f its w o u l d t e r m i n a te ifs h e r e m a r r ie d . S h e s tip u la te d to th e la c k o fa m a r r ia g e in o r d e rto a v o id f eder al pr osecut i on f or col l ect i ng t hose benef i t s t hr ougho ut her t hi r t een- y ear cohabi t at i on wi t h V ent l i ng. Johnson v. Ventling , 13 2 S

. W

. 3d 17 3, 17 5 (T ex
. A pp
. –C orp us C hri s t i 20 04 , no pe t

. ).

A fte r th e J u l y 2 5 , 2 0 0 1 ju d g m e n t, th e tri a l c o u rt e n te re d th e fo l l o w i n g fi n d i n g s o f f a c t: 3 N owher e i n t he o r dero f A pri l 13, 199 5, oranyot heror der , j udgm ent , ordecr ee b ef or e or si nce, di d t he T r i al C our t f i nd t he par t i es t o be m ar r i ed. I n f act , subse quent l y , byj udi ci al st i pul at i on a nd f i ndi ng b y t he T r i al C our t , i t w as r esol v ed t hat [ t he p ar t i es] wer e no t and had nev erbee n m ar r i ed. I n t he a bsence ofa m ar r i age, t her e was n o com m uni t y pr oper t y est at e, o r e x i s te n c e o f a s p o u s a l re l a ti o n s h i p
. . . 4 of his di v orce act ion

. See Tex. Prop. & Cas . Ins. Guar . Ass’ n v. De Los Sa ntos , 47 S.W .3d 584, 587 ( Tex . Ap p.–C or pus Chr is ti 2001, no pet.) (“A jud g ment w hic h s ettl es all the leg al iss u e s a n d righ ts be twe e n th e pa rt ie s is f in a l a n d a p p e a la b le .” ) (ci ti n g Hi nde v . H inde , 701 S.W .2d 637 , 639 (Tex. 1985 ) ( per curiam )). Johns on l ater

mov ed for summar

y j udg ment on her

enforc ement mot ion . In arg uin g the mot io n before the t ri al cour t, Johns on’ s a ttor ney

announ ced that the p arti es had sti pul ated that they w ere, in fact, nev er marr ied

. Vent li ng st ipu lat ed th at he , i n fact, had 2 not made the pay ments as re q uired by the 1995 de cree. The tr ial co urt t hen den ied Johns on’ s mot ion for s ummary j udg ment, g ra nted Ventl ing ’s req uestto “n on- sui t” the divorce acti on, and author iz ed Johnso n to amend her p lea din g s. Jo hnson di d s o, al leg ing that the p arti es w ere i nv olv ed i n a “ domest icpar tnershi p” for t hir

teen y ears and aski ng the tr ial co urt t o enforc e the communi ty proper ty di spos it ion as prov ide d i n the 1995 decree. Fol low ing v ar iou s c onti nuanc es and del ay s, the p arti es re tur ned t o the tr ial co urt for a hear ing on M arch 16, 2 001. At that ti me, Ven tlin g reit erated his pos it ion thatJo hnson had f raud ulen tly

induce d him into be liev ing that the y w ere m arried an d t h a t, bu t for this ind ucement , he w oul d nothav e ag re ed to the ter ms of t he 1995 decree. In an order date d Jul y 25, 2001, the tr ial courtconcl uded that “t he agreed judg ment remai ns int er loc utor y ,”
v acat ed th e 1995 decree “ pursuantto the C our t’ s c onti nui ng pl enar

y pow er ,” and dism issed th e case by app rov ing Ven tling’s “non -suit” of the divorce action

. Th e trial court
a lso award e d at to rn e y’s fe e s t o Ve n tl in g. 3T he T r i al C our t and [ Vent l i ng] wer e of t he o pi ni on and concl usi on on Apr i l 13, 199 5, t hat t he pur pose oft hat hea r i ng was gr ant i ng unt o t he par t i es a di v or ce, and t er m i nat i ng t hei rm ar i t al st at us. T he Cour t and [ Vent l i ng] woul d no t di scov erunt i l aft erApr i l 13, 199 5, t hat [ Johnson ] d e n i e d th e e x i s te n c e o f a m a rr i a g e re l a ti o n s h i p
. . . T he c ou r t f ur t he rp r on ou nc ed t he f ol l ow i ng c on cl us i on s of l aw : A decr ee o rcour t or derwhi ch i ncl udes a pr ov i si on f ort he p ay m ent of al i m ony , ev en cont r act ual al i m ony , suff er s fr om a f ai l ur e ofconsi der at i on i fi n f act t he p ar t i es ar e no t and w e re n e v e r m a rr i e d

. . . A m oneyj udgm ent t o eq ual i z e, orm ade i nci dentt o eff ect i ng a j ust and r i ght di v i s i on of com m uni t y pr oper t y , i s a l egal nul l i t y and a l egal fi ct i on, w hen i n f act t he p ar t i es wer e ne v er m a rr i e d a n d th u s , a s a m a tte r o fla w , t h e re c a n b e n o c o m m u n i typ ro p e rty e s ta te

. A j udgm ent upo n such gr ounds f ai l s f orwant of consi der at i on. 5 Johns on appe ale d thi s j udg ment, and we c oncl uded t hat t he tri al cour t l ack ed jur is dicti on to v acat e the 1995 decree. Johns on v . Ve ntl ing , 1 3 2 S

. W

. 3 d 1 7 3 , 1 7 9 (T e x. App.–C or pus Chr is ti 2004, no p et.)

. Al thoug h the par ti es ag re e d t h a t theyw ere nev er
marr ied , we nev erthel ess hel d tha t t he 1995 dec re e “w as a f ina l divorce judg ment and not interlocu tory at th e time the trial court signed th e 20 01 jud gmen t.” Id. at 178. Bec ause the decree was a final j udg ment, the t ri al cour t’ s p len ar

y j ur is dicti on to v acate t he dec re e
e x p i re d t h i rty d a y s a ft e r i t w a s s i g n e d

. Id. ; see T EX
. R. C IV
. P. 329b( d)

. W e furt her conclu ded that“the de cree con taine d f indings suf f icient to estab lish the jurisdiction al basis for a v alid judgme nt,” an d t h e re fo re , “ the decree is not v oid an d ma y not be collaterally atta cked. ” Johns on , 1 3 2 S. W .3 d at17 8 (cit in g Reiss v. Reiss , 1 1 8 S

. W

. 3 d 4 3 9 , 4 4 3 (T e x. 2003) ( “I n g eneral, as l ong as the cour t ent er ing a j udg ment has j ur is dicti on of the par ti es and t he s ubj ectmatte r and does not act ou tsi de i ts capac ity as a c our

t, the j udg ment i s n ot
v oid .” ); Toles v. Toles , 1 1 3 S

. W .3d 899 , 914 (Tex. App. –Dallas 20 03, pet. den ied)). Beca use the t ri al cour

t had no j ur is dicti on to sign the 2001 j udg ment v acat ing the 1995 decree, we di smi ss ed th e appea l for want o f jur is dicti on. Id. at 179. Johns on the n i n st ituted proceed ing s i n Iowa, w here Vent li ng resi ded, seek ing to domest ic ate t he 1995 dec re e and enforc e the ali mony prov is ion s in that sta te. In an order dated Janua ry

30, 2007, the I ow a c our t al lowed enforcementof the $ 25,537 lump sum proper ty di v is ion pay ment butdi sal lowed enforcementof th e c ontract ual al imonyT h e J u n e 1 6 , 2 0 0 9 ju d g m e n t w a s a t le a s t t h e th ir d f in a l j u d g m e n t r e n d e r e d b y th e tr ia l c o u r t in th is 4 case. Aft era hear i ng o n Jan uar y 16, 200 9, t he t r i al cour t r ender ed i t s or i gi nal j udgm ent on M ar ch 11 , 200 9 gr ant i ng Jo hnson’ s m ot i on fo r e nfor cem ent and awar di ng t o Joh nson: ( 1) $30 6, 375, r epr esent i ng t he out st andi ng a l i m onybal ance and accr ued i nt er est ; ( 2) $61 , 121. 20, r epr esent i ng d am ag es foradv er se t ax consequ ences and accr ued i nt er est ; ( 3) $60 , 863. 46, r epr esent i ng t he l um p sum pr oper t y set t l em ent pay m ent and accr ued i nt er est ; and ( 4) $76, 620. 38 i n at t or ney ’ s f ees, $9, 070. 23 i n cour t cost s, $7, 500 i n at t or ney ’ s f ees i n t he e v ent of

an appea l t o t hi s cour t and $5, 000 i n at t or ney ’ s f ees i n t he e v ent of an appea l t o t he T exas Sup rem e Cour t

. O n Apr i l 13, 200 9, t he t r i al cour t r ender ed a n am ended f i nal j udgm ent ( 1) om i t t i ng t he i nt er est on t he o ut st andi ng a l i m ony , ( 2) om i t t i ng t he d am ages f oradve r se t ax con sequen ces, and ( 3) awar di ng a r educed am ountof at t or ney ’ s f ees. Fi nal l y , aft era second hear i ng o n Jun e 9, 200 9, t he t r i al cour t v acat ed th e tw o p re v i o u s ju d g m e n ts a n d re n d e re d i ts ju d g m e n t d e n y i n g J o h n s o n ’ s m o tio n f o r e n fo rc e m e n t i n i ts e n tir e ty. 6 prov is ion s, noti ng thatthe obl ig ati ons ex press ed th erein di d notco nst it ute a “ jud g ment” enforc eabl e i n Iowa. Johns on th en retur ned t o Tex as in an effort t o s ecure s uch a judgme nt. Sp ecif ically , John son so ught a judgm entfor the to t a l a m o u nt of Vent ling’s ali mony obl ig ati ons, ac cel erated acc ordin g to the ter ms of t he decree, as w ell as damag es for adv erse tax

co nseq uence s and attor ney ’s fees. In res ponse , Ventl ing agai n as ser ted defense s of

f raud , accide nt, m istake, estop pel, illegality , res judicata , statu te of limitation s, failu re of c onsi derati on, and sta tute of fra uds. On June 16, 2 009, the t ri al cour t rendered judgme n tin fa v or of

Vent ling, denying all relief requested byJohn son. The trial court 4
s u b s e qu e n t ly e n t e re d t h e fo ll o win g f in d in gs o f fa cta n d co n c lu s io n s o f la w: Fi nd in gs of

F act 1

. O n A p ri l 1 3 , 1 9 9 5 , t h e T ri a l Co u rtsi gn e d a f in a l j u d gm e n tin t h e a b o ve enti tl ed and numbered c ause; 2. The final j udg ment i ncl uded a separate prov is ion thatW ay ne Ven tl ing pay Pat ri ci a M . J ohnso n s pousa l ali mony in the amount of $2,500.0 0 per m ont h for a term of 84 m ont hs; 3. On Se pte mb er 26, 1 997 , Patricia Joh nson f iled a Mot io n t o Enforce the jud g ment, all eg ing a failu re by W ay ne Ven tl ing to pay money due her i n the Apr il 13, 1995 j udg m e nt, and a failu re to make s pousa l alimo ny payme nts; 4. An An sw er to the enforcem entsuit w as f iled by W ayne Ven tling, in w hic h aff ir mati v e defenses w ere rais ed; 5. No jur

y w as demanded b y

ei ther par ty , and al l matters o f factand of law w ere s ubmitted t o the Tri al Cou rtfor resol uti on. 6. The al imony

prov is ion of the fin al decree of di v orce si g ned Ap ri l 13, 2005, as sta ted i n the dec re e on pag e 7, w as int ended t o q ual ify asV e n tlin g m o v e d th is C o u r t to d is m is s t h e a p p e a l f o rw a n t o fju r is d ic tio n , c o n te n d in g th a t J o h n s o n ’s 5 n o ti c e o f a p p e a l w a s u n ti m e l y
. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 2 6 .1 ( s ta tin g th a t a n o tic e o fa p p e a l m u s t b e f ile d w ith in th ir ty d a ys a fte rth e ju d g m e n t is s ig n e d , o rw ith in n in e ty d a ys a fte rth e ju d g m e n t is s ig n e d ifa n y p a r ty t im e ly f i l es a m ot i on t o m odi fy t he j udgm ent )

. Jo hnson f i l ed h ernot i ce ofappeal on Sept em ber14, 2009, whi ch was ni net y day s aft ert he j udgm ent was si gned. Accor di ng t o Joh nson, t he n ot i ce was t i m el y beca use sh e ha d f i l ed a m ot i on t o v acat e t he j udgm ent on Jul y 21, 200 9, t her ebyext endi ng t he d eadl i ne f orfi l i ng a not i ce of a p p e a l

. See id. V e n tlin g a r g u e d th a t J o h n s o n ’s m o tio n to v a c a te w a s its e lfu n tim e ly a n d th a t it t h e r e f o r e d id n o t s e rv e to e x te n d th e d e a d l i n e
. See T EX

. R. C IV

. P. 329b( g) (st at i ng t hat a m ot i on t o m odi fy a j udgm ent m ust be f i l ed wi t hi n t hi r t y day s af t ert he j udgm ent i s si gned)

. H owev er , al t hough John son’ s m ot i on t o v acat e was f i l e st am ped byt he Di st r i ct C l er k as hav i ng b een r ecei v ed o n Jul y 21, 200 9— m or e t han t hi r t y day s aft ert he j udgm ent was si gned— t he m ot i on was act ual l y m ai l ed b y John son t o t he t r i al cour t m anage ron Jul y 15, 200 9. W e d e n ie d V e n tlin g ’s m o tio n to d is m is s th e a p p e a l b e c a u s e J o h n s o n ’s m o tio n to v a c a te , h a v in g b e e n m a ile d t o t he t r i al cour t m an ag er w i t hi n t hi r t y day s f ol l owi ng t he si gni ng o ft he j udgm ent , was suff i ci ent und ert he a p p l i c a b l e r u l e s to e x te n d th e d e a d l i n e f o r fil i n g a n o ti c e o f a p p e a l

. See T EX

. R. C IV

. P. 5 ( “ I fanydocu m ent i s sentt o t he p r opercl er k

. . . and i s deposi t ed i n t he m ai l on orbef or e t he l ast dayf orf i l i ng sa m e, t he sa m e, i f r ec ei ved by t he cl erk no t m ore tha n t en da y s t ard i l y , sh al l be fi l ed by t he cl erk an d b e d ee m ed t i m el y fi l ed

. ”) ; St okes v. Aberdeen I ns. C o. , 9 1 7 S .W .2 d 2 6 7 , 2 6 8 (T e x . 1 9 9 6 ) (“ F o r p u rp o s e s o f d e te rm i n i n g w h e th e r a p a rty 7 cont ra ctu al ali mony

as thatter m w as defined i n s ect ion 71( a) of the Inter nal R ev enue C ode of 1986. Co ncl usi on s o f Law 7. T e xas Fam ily Code Chap ter 9 provides tha t a party af fecte d b y a decree of di v orce prov idi ng for a di v is ion of proper ty “ as prov ide d by Cha pter 7" may req uestenforc ement of tha t dec re e. 8. Cha pter

7 of the Tex as Fami ly

Code all ows a tri al cour t, in a dec re e of div orce, to order a divi sion of the est ate of

the pa rties. 9. As the [ si c] Patr ic ia M. Johns on has openl y confess ed th at t he par ti es w ere nev er

mar ri ed, a nd w ere nev er di v orced, w hatev er

prop e rty or proper ty r ig hts w hic h may

hav e been acq uired or acc umulat ed by or b e twe e n t h e m p ri o r t o A p ri l 1 3 , 1 9 9 5 , wa s n o tco m m u n it y p ro p e rt y. 10. On the d ate t his court’s f inal judgme nt w as signed in this case, April 13, 1 995, a tr ial cour

t jud g ment or cour

t order j udi ci all y

i mposi ng the payme nt of

spou sal alimo ny w as v oid be cause alimon y , as def ined in 26 U nit ed St ates C ode 71, req uires the ex is tenc e of a marr iag e. The provisi ons wi thin th e 19 95 Decree p ertain ing to alimon y are the refore not e nforce abl e. 11. Patr ic ia Johns on’ s motion s to enforce the D ecree and her req uestfor jud g ment on the b ala nce she a lle ges is due for al imony pay ments under the Dec re e mustbe d eni ed. 12. Patr ic ia Johns on’ s D ecl a ra t o r y J u d g me n t

Act i o n se eki ng a de cl arati on that she is enti tl ed to al imony under the 1995 D ecree mus t be deni ed. 13. Patr ic ia Johns on’ s c lai ms for attor ney s fees are deni ed. 14. Patr ic ia Johns on’ s c lai m for pos t j udg ment i nteresti s d eni ed. This appeal foll ow ed. 5f i l es a docum ent t i m el y ( t her eby est abl i shi ng appel l at e deadl i nes) , we hol d t hat m ai l i ng t he docum ent t o t he

pr opercour t add r ess i s conditional l y ef f ecti ve a s m a ilin g it to th e p r o p e r c o u r t c le r k ’s a d d r e s s .” ( E m p h a s is in ori gi na l ))

.

J o h n s o n d o e s n o t c h a l l e n g e t h e t r ia l c o u rt’ s ju d g m e n t a s i t re l a te s to th e l u m p s u m p ro p e rty 6 set t l em ent pay m ent ort he d am ages f oradv er se t ax con sequen ces as pr ov i ded i n t he 1 995 decr ee.

I n hi s bri ef o n a pp ea l , V en t l i ng no t es co rr ec t l y t ha t “[ f] i nd i ng s of fac t i n a ca s e t ri ed t o t he co urt ha ve 7 t he s am e f orc e an d di gn i t y as a j ury ’ s verd i c t up on qu es t i on s
. ” A n d e rs o n v . C i ty o f S e v e n P o in ts , 806 S. W

. 2d 7 9 1 , 7 9 4 (T e x . 1 9 9 1 ); Va ll e y D ia g n o s tic C lin i c , P .A . v . D o u g h e rty , 287 S. W

. 3d 1 51, 155 ( T ex. App. –C or pus C h r is ti 2 0 0 9 , n o p e t. ) . H o w e v e r , o n ly th e tr ia l c o u r t’s c o n c l u s i o n s o fla w — n o t its f in d in g s o ff a c t— a r e in di sput e he r e. 8 II. D I S CUS S I ON On ap peal , J ohnso n arg ues by two i ss ues that the t ri al cour t er re d i n deny ing her
mo tion to enforce the co n t ra c t ual alim ony prov isions of the 19 95 d ecree
. By her f irst 6 is sue, Jo hnson cl aims thatthe tr ial co urt er re d bec ause: ( 1) our dec is ion i n 2 0 0 4 i s the “l aw of the c ase” and cont ra dicts the t ri al cour t’ s ru li ng ; ( 2) Vent li ng ’s aff ir mati v e defenses to J ohnso n’s enforc ement acti on amount ed to an i mpermi ss ibl e c oll a te ra l attac k o n the 1995 de cree; ( 3) any

“ ir re g ula ri ty ” in the 1 995 dec re e “ re g ardin g the p a rt ie s’ pl eaded common l aw

mar it al sta tus woul d at most make the judg ment v oid abl e” and therefore no t
v uln er a b l e t o c o l l a t e ra l a tt a c k ; a n d ( 4 ) t h e t r i a l c o u rt“ h a d a d u ty t o e x e rc i s e i t s i nherent pow er to enforc e the ter ms” of the d ecree. By her se cond is sue, Jo hnson arg ues that, becau se the c ontractual ali mony prov is ion s a re i n fact enforc eabl e, s he i s e nti tl ed to a judgme nt of

$14 2,5 00, represen ting th e pa y me nts du e f rom Ve ntling, as w ell as interest and atto rney’s fees. 1. St and ard o f Rev iew On ap peal , a tr ial co urt’ s c oncl usi ons of law are rev iewed de nov o and w il l be
re ve rs e d o n ly i f

t h e y a re e rro n e o u s a s a m a tt e r o f la w. Vi

ll agom ez v. R ockwood 7 Spe cialties, In c. , 210 S.W .3d 7 20, 727, 728 (Tex . App.–C or pus Chr is ti 2006, pet. deni ed) (ci ti n g Sta ble En ergy, L. P. v. New berry, 999 S.W .2d 5 38, 547 ( Tex . Ap p.–Aus ti n 1999, pet. deni ed) ; Hof

lan d v . F ir em an’ s Fund Ins. C o. , 907 S.W .2d 5 97, 5 99 ( Tex . Ap p.–C or pus Christi 1995 , no wr it)). W e w ill uph old the trial court’s conclusio ns up on a ny legal theo ryT he T exas Fam i l y C ode exp l i ci t l y al l ows par t i es t o a di v or ce pr oceedi ng t o en t eri nt o a wr i t t en 8 a g re e m e n t c o n c e rn i n g s p o u s a l m a i n te n a n c e
. See T EX

. F AM

. C OD E A NN

. § 7. 006( a) ( Ver non 2006)

. Under t hat st at ut e, i ft he co ur t f i nds t hat t he t er m s of such a wr i t t en a gr eem ent ar e “j ust and r i ght , ” t hose t er m s t hen b e c o m e b i n d i n g o n th e c o u rt. I d. § 7. 006( b)

. T he decr ee at i ssue her e does not expl i ci t l y st at e whet hert he tr ia l c o u r t f o u n d th e te r m s o f th e p a r tie s ’ a lim o n y a g r e e m e n t to b e “ j u s t a n d r ig h t” ; h o w e v e r , th e tr ia l c o u r t’s si gnat ur e on t he d ecr ee st r ongl y i ndi cat es t hat i t app r ov ed o ft he t er m s cont ai ned t her ei n. 9 suppo rt ed bythe ev ide nce. BM C Soft ware Bel g., N. V. v

. M ar chand , 83 S.W .3d 7 89, 7 94 (Tex . 200 2) ; W

aggoner v. Mor ro w , 932 S.W .2d 6 27, 6 31 ( Tex . Ap p.–Hous ton [ 1stD is t.] 199 6, no w rit). 2. A pp licab le L aw Unl ik e oth er

forms of spous al maint enanc e, contract ual alimony is not v oid as bei ng in v iol ati on of st ate p ubl icpol icy
. Birdwell v. Birdwe ll , 8 1 9 S

. W

. 2 d 2 2 3 , 2 2 5 -2 7 (T e x. App.–F ort W orth 1991, pet. deni ed) ; see Fran cis v. Fr ancis , 4 1 2 S

. W

. 2 d 2 9 , 3 2 -3 3 (T e x. 196 7) (holding thatp e rman entalimon y contravene s the pu blic policyof the sta te). 8 Inste a d , “an assum ed o bligation for spou sal supp ort is properly chara cteriz ed a s a cont ractua l dut y having ‘w hat ever legal force the law of cont racts w ill giv e to it.’” W ool am
v. Tus si ng , 54 S. W .3 d 4 4 2 , 44 7 (T e x. Ap p .– Co rp u s Ch ris ti 20 0 1 , n o pe t. ) (qu o ti n g Francis , 412 S. W .2d a t 31)

. W hen an ag re ement for the pay ment of al imony i s e x ecut e d bythe partie s and incorpora ted into the judgmen t of div orce, it is binding on th e p a rt ies and is int er preted under

g eneral cont ra ct law

. Schwar tz v. Schwart

z , 2 4 7 S

. W

. 3 d 8 0 4 , 8 0 6 (T e x. A p p
. – Da lla s 2 0 0 8 , n o pe t. ) (ci ti n g O’ Benar v. O’ Benar , 410 S.W .2d 214 , 217 (Te x . Ci v. A p p
. – D a l l a s 1 9 6 8 , w r i td i sm’ d) ; V ic kers v. Vickers , 5 5 3 S

. W

. 2 d 7 6 8 , 7 6 9 -7 0 (T e x. Ci v. App.–B eaumont 1977, no w ri t) ; Pol lar d v . Steffen s , 161 Tex . 594 , 602 , 343 S.W .2d 2 34, 239 (1961 )). Furthe r, a party’s s ig n a t u re app rov ing the cont ent s of an agreed div orce decree has been found to be a bin din g attes tati on of t hat par ty ’s ag re ement t o c ontract ual suppo rtprov is ion s, ev en i n the abs ence of a sepa ra te w ri tten su p p o rt ag re ement. See Rou ss eau v

. R ouss eau Sp re cher

, 843 S.W .2d 300, 30 1 ( Tex . Ap p.–H oust on [1 4th D is t.] 199 2, no w rit) (requi re m e n tt hatagreeme nt for contra ctua l alimon y mustbe in w riting is satisf ied if

div orce de cree spe cif ies term s of agreeme nt an d pa rties sign divorce decree);10

Ma ck ey v. Ma ck

ey, 721 S.W .2d 575, 579 ( Tex . Ap p.–C or pus Chr is ti 1986, no w ri t) (reje cti ng the arg ument t hat a par ty ’s approv al of the form and c ontentof an ag re ed divorce decree was merel y co nsentto entr

y of the d ecree a n d n o t e xec uti on of the cont ra ct)

. “As w it h any

othe r cont ra ct, abs ent c onsen t of the par ti es, the prov is ion s o f the agreem entw ill not be m odif ied or set asid e except for f raud , accide nt or mu tua l mistake of fact.” Schwar

tz , 2 4 7 S. W .3 d 80 4 (cit in g Boyd v. Boyd , 5 4 5 S

. W

. 2 d 5 2 0 , 5 2 3 (T e x. Ci v. App .–Hou ston [1st Dist.] 19 76, no w rit))

. In g eneral, a j udg ment rendered by co nsenthas the sa m e fo rce as a j udg ment entered after

protract ed li ti g ati on, ex cept “t o the extent that the c onsen t ex cus es er ro r and ope rates to end all controversy between th e pa rties.” Birdwell , 819 S.W .2d at 22 6 ( ci ti ng Mc Cr ay v. Mc Cr

ay, 584 S.W .2d 2 79 ( Tex . 197 9) ; W agn er v. W

arna sch , 156 T ex . 334, 295 S.W .2d 8 90, 8 92 ( 1956) ). “ Thus, in su it s to enforc e ag re ed j udg ments, par ti es maynot
ra is e c ontract ual defenses bec ause suc h defenses co nst it ute i mpe rmiss ibl e c oll ateral atta cks on the prior judgmen ts.” Id. at22 6 -2 7 (quo ti n g Ex par te G or ena , 595 S.W .2d 8 41, 8 4 4 ( Te x . 197 9) ); see Che ss v. Chess , 627 S.W .2d 5 13, 5 16 ( Tex . Ap p.–C or pus Chr is ti 198 2, no w rit). 3. A nal ysis W e ag re e i n par

t w it h J ohnso n’s arg ument t hat o ur 2004 opi nio n i s t he “ law of the
cas e ” a n d c o n tradi cts the jud g ment on appeal

. Und er the “l aw of the c ase” doctr ine , q uest ion s o f law

decide d on appeal to a c our t of l astresor

t w il l g ov er n the ca se throug hout it s s u b se que n t st a g es. Lor amM ain t. of Way, Inc. v. Iann i , 2 1 0 S

. W

. 3 d 5 9 3 , 5 9 6 (T e x. 2 0 0 6 ) (ci ti n g Hudso n v. W akef ield , 711 S.W .2d 6 28, 6 30 ( Tex . 198 6) ). By nar ro w ing the is sues i n s ucc ess iv e s tag es of the li ti g ati on, the doctr ine i s i ntended to achi ev e uni formity of deci si on as w ell as j udi cia l e co n omyand eff ic ien cy
. Br is coe v. Goodm an C or p. , 102 S.W .3d 7 14, 7 16 ( Tex . 200 3)

. As noted, in 2004 w e concl uded t hat t he 1995 dec re e w as
a f inal divorce jud gmen t, is “no t v oid,” an d “ma y not be collaterally atta cked. ” Johns on , 13211

S. W .3 d at17 8 (cit in g Putegn at v . Pu tegnat , 706 S.W .2d 7 02, 7 03- 04 ( Tex . Ap p.–C or pus Chr is ti 1986, no w ri t) ( “I t i s w ell est abl is hed in Tex as that a divorce jud g ment, unappeal ed, and reg ula r on it s face, is not subj ect to a col lat eral attac k in a subs eq uent sui t.” ))

. The la w of the c ase doct ri ne precl ude s u s from recons ide ri ng thes e i ss ues. See i d. J ohnso n cont ends that, bec ause of this , t he tr ial co urt was co m p e lled to enforce the c ontract ual ali mony prov is ion s c ontai ned i n the 1995 decree. In respon se, Vent li ng se ts forth sev eral arg uments

. Fi rs t, he c lai ms t hat t he cont ra ctu al ali mony prov is ion s w ere “ not p art of the decree” and “e x press ly not par t of any judgme nt,” citing th e l a n gu a ge in th e de cree stat ing that the alimon y obligation “is cont ractu al i n na tu re an d i s no t an ob l i g at i on i mp os ed by orde r or de c ree of c ou rt. ” W e dis ag re e. It is tr ue that the a li mony obl ig ati on i s c ontract ual i n nat ure; t he c our t di d not hav e the auth or ity

to impos e ali mony obl ig ati ons w it hout the p arti es’ co nsent

. See Francis , 412 S.W .2d at 32-33. H owev er, the alimon y terms were set forth en tirely w ithin th e orde r,
w hich w as en titled “Final D ecree of Div orce” and w hich was signed by the trial court as w ell as the pa rt i e s a n d t h e i r a tt o r n e y s
. T h e fa ctt h a tt h e d e c re e s t a t e d t h a tt h e a l imony ob l i g at i on i s n ot“ i mp os ed b y o rde r o r d ec ree o f c ou rt” do es n ota l te r t he fact th att he t er ms
w ere ag re ed to by

the par ti es and app ro v ed by

the t ria l co urt, as ev ide nced by i ts si g nature. Beca use the contract ual alimony terms w ere i ncor porated int o the j udg ment of divorce, they

are bi ndi ng on t he par

ti es. Schwar

tz , 2 4 7 S. W .3 d at80 6 (cit in g O’ Benar , 410 S.W .2d a t 217 ; Vickers , 553 S.W .2d a t 769 -7 0; Pollard , 161 Tex . at602, 343 S.W .2d a t 239 ). Ventl ing as ser

ts further that “t he non- ex is tenc e of a marr iag e prev ents a pa rty from fili ng a m o ti on to enforc e [c ontract ual al imony] bec ause there i s n o di v is ion of a mar it al esta te to enforce.” How ever, Ven tling doe s not direct us to any aut hority supportin g this poi nt ot her

than the tr ial co urt’ s 2 001 c oncl usi on of l aw —w hic h i tse lf did not ci te an y supp orting ca s e l a w o r sta tute —statin g tha t “[a] de cree or court ord er w hich includ es aVent l i ng’ s aff i r m at i v e def enses t o enf or cem ent of t he al i m onypr ov i si ons— i ncl udi ng h i s cl ai m t hat 9 he was def r auded byJohn son i nt o ag r eei ng t o a di v or ce— ar e l i k ewi se un av ai l abl e t o hi m i n t he i nst ant p ro c e e d i n g
. In s te a d , t h e s e d e fe n s e s m a y o n l y b e ra i s e d b y p e tit io n fo r b i l l o f re v i e w
. See T EX

. R. C IV

. P. 329b( f ) ( “ O n exp i r at i on o ft he t i m e wi t hi n whi ch t he t r i al cour t has pl enar y power , a j udgm ent cann ot be set as i de by t he t ri al co urt ex c ep t by bi l l of revi ew for su ffi c i en t ca us e, fi l ed w i t hi n t he t i m e a l l ow ed by l aw
. . . . ”) ; s ee als o W em bl eyI nv
. C o. v
. H errera , 1 1 S

. W

. 3d 92 4, 92 6-2 7 (T ex
. 19 99 ); I n re D

. S. , 76 S. W

. 3d 5 12, 518 ( T ex. A pp. –H oust on [ 14t h D i st

. ] 2002, no pet

. ) ( ci t i ng M id d le to n v . M u rff , 689 S. W

. 2d 212, 213 ( T ex. 198 5) (“ A ft er t he t i m e fo r an a pp ea l ex pi res , a b i l l o f revi ew i s t he ex c l us i ve rem ed y t o va c ate t he j ud gm en t or a pr ov i si on t her eof , ev en i fi t coul d be shown t o be v oi d. ” ) )

. W e no t e, m or eov er , t hat Vent l i ng’ s 199 7 an d 20 08 p l e a d i n g s c a n n o t b e c o n s tru e d a s p e ti ti o n s fo r b i l l o f re v i e w b e c a u s e th e y d o n o t a l l e g e a l l o f t h e e le m e n ts n e c e s s a ry to o b ta i n s u c h re l i e f. S ee M ow bra y v. A v ery , 76 S. W

. 3d 6 63, 682 ( T ex. App. –C or pus Chr i st i 200 2, pet

. den i ed) ( ci t i ng A l ex an de r v. H ag ed orn , 1 4 8 T e x . 5 6 5 , 5 6 8 -6 9 , 2 2 6 S .W .2 d 9 9 6 , 9 9 8 (1 9 5 0 )) (n o ti n g th a t, i n or dert o st at e a cl ai m fo ra bi l l ofre v i ew, a pet i t i onerm ust al l ege ( 1) a m er i t or i ous def ense t o t he ca use o f act i on su ppor t i ng t he j udgm ent ( 2) whi ch he was pr ev ent ed f r om m aki ng b y t he f r aud, acci dentorwr ongf ul ac t of t he op po s i ng pa rt y , (3) un m i x ed w i t h a ny fau l t or ne gl i ge nc e o f hi s ow n). 12 prov is ion for t he pay ment of al im o n y, ev en c ontract ual al imony , s uffers from a fail ure of
cons ide ra ti on i f in factthe par ti es are notand nev er

w ere mar ri ed.” Ev en i f w e w ere to adopt thi s p ro posi ti on of l aw —for w hic h w e f ind no p ersuas iv e aut hor ity —our 2004 opi nio n compel s t he c oncl usi on th at c ontract ual defenses , s uch a s fa i l ure of cons ide ra ti on, a re now
unav ail abl e to Ventl ing bec ause the i nst ant p ro ceedi ng i s a col lat eral attac k o n the 1995 decree. See Johnso n , 132 S.W .3d a t 178 -7 9 ( “W e hol d tha t Ve ntl ing ’s ch a ll eng e to the enforc eabi li ty

of the d ecree i n thi s p roce e din g amounte d to an i mpermi ss ibl e c oll ateral attac k.” ); Birdwell , 819 S.W .2d at 226-27 ( “[ I]n sui ts to enforce ag re ed judg ments, par ti es
ma y not raise con tractu al defense s beca us e s u ch de fense s constitu te imp ermissible col lat eral atta ck s on the pr ior judg ments. ”)

. W e note also that the n ow-s ti pul ated lac k o f 9 a “ mari tal es tate” has no b ear ing on t he i ss ue of con tract ual al imony , w h ich , if aw arded, is n o t p a rtof

th e “ju stan d righ t” di visio n of th e m a rit a l e st a te in a d ivor ce pro ce e d in g. Finally , the fact th at bo th pa rties now claim th at th ey were never married is immater ial

. Ventl ing ’s or ig ina l peti ti on for div orce ass erted t hat t he par ti es “h av e a
c om mo n l aw

ma r r i ag e” a nd t he f i na l dec ree di s s ol v ed t ha t pu r po rte d ma r r i ag e un de r t er ms
cons ented to by both par ti es w it h adv ic e of c ounse l. Both par ti es si g ned the fin al decree, ack now led g ing thatthey “ approv ed and cons ented to ” th e ter ms “ as to bo th for m and subs tanc e.” N eit her

par ty ap p e a le d the dec re e, w hic h w as a final di v orce jud g ment. Johns on , 132 S.W .3d at 178, 179. R eg ardle ss of w hether the par ti es now deny thatthey13

w ere ev er marr ied , the 1995 decree cl ear ly impl ied that they w ere and t hat a co mmon-l aw
marr iag e w as the “ re lat ion shi p” between t hem thatw as bei ng ter minat ed. W e c oncl ude t hat the tri al cour t erred in den y ing Jo hnson ’s moti on for enforc ement beca use th e con tractu al alimo ny provisi ons co nta ined in the 199 5 decre e are en forcea ble and t he dec re e i s n ot v oid

. Johns on’ s i ss ues are s ust ain ed. III
. C ONCL US I ON W e reverse the judgme nt an d rem and the cau se to the t rial cou rt to grantJohn son’s moti on for enforc ement and to aw ard her : (1 ) $142,50 0 i n unpai d c ontract ual al imony ; ( 2) appropr iat e preju dg ment i nterest , see John son & Higgins of Tex., Inc. v. Ken neco Energy, Inc. , 962 S.W .2d 507, 528 (Tex . 1998) ( per mitt ing the aw ard of preju dg ment i nterestbas ed on g eneral pr inc ipl es of eq uity ); ( 3) reason abl e att or ney ’s fees; and ( 4) co sts of cour t.

_________

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______ DORI CONTRERAS GARZA J u s t i c e Del iv ered and filed the 21stday of Oct ober , 201 0.