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The Honorable Richard H. Kyle, United States District Judge

for the District of Minnesota.

___________

No. 95-2504

___________

United States of America, *

 *

Appellee, *

 *

v. * Appeal from the United States

 * District Court for the

Frank Orlando Hogan, also known * District of Minnesota.

as David Harris, *

 * [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellant. *

___________

 Submitted: January 2, 1996

 Filed: January 8, 1996 ___________

Before BOWMAN, BEAM, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges. ___________

PER CURIAM.

Frank Orlando Hogan appeals the 188-month sentence imposed by

the District Court1 after he pleaded guilty to violating 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(a)(1) (1994) by aiding and abetting the possession of cocaine

base with intent to distribute. We affirm.

Acting on a tip from a confidential informant, St. Paul police

officers stopped a vehicle being driven by Stanley Huff, in which

Hogan was the sole passenger. The police recovered almost 500

grams of crack cocaine--84.99 grams in the snow by the passenger

side of the car and 410.86 grams in fifteen separate packages in a

duffel bag in the trunk. The police also found a loaded semiautomatic handgun on the driver's side floorboard. 
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During a post-arrest interview, Hogan denied any involvement

with the crack found in the car, but said his fingerprints might be

found on the gun. Hogan later informed the probation officer who

prepared his presentence report (PSR) that he came to Minnesota

from California, where he had met Huff, to help Huff distribute the

crack. Hogan's PSR contained a recommendation for a two-level

dangerous-weapon enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) (1994).

Hogan objected, contending there was no objective evidence that he

knew the gun was present in the car. In support, Hogan relied on

United States v. Cochran, 14 F.3d 1128, 1133 (6th Cir. 1994)

(requiring objective evidence that defendant passenger knew weapon

found under driver's seat was present in car, or at least knew it

was reasonably probable that co-conspirator driver would be armed).

The District Court found that Hogan possessed the gun, based on his

proximity to it and his statement about his fingerprints, and

overruled his objection.

The Guidelines provide for a two-level enhancement if the

defendant possessed a firearm. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1). The

government must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it

was not "clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with"

Hogan's criminal activity, see U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, comment. (n.3.).

See also United States v. Hammer, 3 F.3d 266, 272 (8th Cir. 1993)

(discussing burden of proof), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1121 (1994).

We review for clear error the District Court's finding that Hogan

possessed the gun. See United States v. Richmond, 37 F.3d 418, 419

(8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1163 (1995).

The gun was found in close proximity to a large amount of

crack, which Hogan admitted he was going to help Huff distribute.

Hogan's admission that his fingerprints may have been on the gun

supports an inference that he was aware of the gun's existence.

Moreover, Hogan admitted he was aware of Huff's drug activities,

and firearms are tools of the drug trade. Thus, we reject Hogan's

contention that it was not reasonably foreseeable to him that Huff
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would possess the gun in furtherance of their criminal activity.

See United States v. Turpin, 920 F.2d 1377, 1386-87 (8th Cir. 1990)

(gun's location in car from which drugs were sold supported

conclusion that gun was connected to offense), cert. denied, 499

U.S. 953 (1991). The facts in this case distinguish it from

Cochran, 14 F.3d at 1129-30, 1132-33, where the defendant

accompanied his cousin on a trip by car to buy drugs and was

unaware that his cousin's wife had hidden a gun under the driver's

seat of the car. We conclude the District Court did not clearly

err in finding that Hogan possessed the gun.

Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court is affirmed.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.