IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-30251

PAUL HOLDEN, ET AL., 

Plaintiffs,

v.

U.S. UNITED OCEAN SERVICES, L.L.C., ET AL., 

Defendants

U.S. UNITED OCEAN SERVICES, L.L.C., 

Third Party Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ST. PAUL FIRE AND MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY, 

Third Party Defendant-Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 2:09-CV-3670

Before DeMOSS, OWEN, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

August 19, 2014

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 

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U.S. United Ocean Services, L.L.C. (“United”) appeals the district court’s 

grant of summary judgment to St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company 

(“St. Paul”) in this insurance coverage dispute. For the reasons set forth below, 

we AFFIRM.

United entered into a General Services Agreement (“GSA”) with Buck 

Kreihs Company, Inc. (“Buck Kreihs”) under which Buck Kreihs would perform 

ship-repair work for United.1 The GSA contained an indemnity provision in

which Buck Kreihs agreed to indemnify United for all liabilities arising out of 

or related in any way to the work or services performed by Buck Kreihs for 

United or to Buck Kreihs’s presence on United’s property. The indemnity 

agreement applied even if the liability at issue was partially caused by United’s 

fault or negligence; however, it did not apply to liability caused solely by 

United’s fault or negligence. The GSA also required Buck Kreihs to procure a 

general liability policy and to name United as an additional insured under that 

policy.

St. Paul issued a general marine liability policy in which Buck Kreihs is 

the “Named Insured.” The policy also provides that an additional insured is 

defined as “any . . . organization whom the Named Insured is required to add 

as an additional insured” under a written contract. It is undisputed that 

United is an additional insured under the policy.

Paul Holden, an employee of Buck Kreihs, was injured while preparing 

to remove a gangway that led from a dock at a Buck Kreihs’s facility to the M/V 

BARGE BARBARA VAUGHT, a barge owned and operated by United. 

Pertinent here, Holden and his wife sued United, which made a demand upon 

1 The policy was originally procured by TECO Ocean Shipping, Inc. (“TECO”). After 

the policy was procured but before Paul Holden was injured, TECO changed its corporate 

structure and also changed its name to U.S. United Ocean Services, L.L.C. For the sake of 

clarity, this opinion refers both to U.S. United Ocean Services, L.L.C. and to its predecessorin-interest TECO as “United.”

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St. Paul for indemnity, defense, and coverage as an additional insured. After 

initially proffering a defense, St. Paul denied coverage under the policy’s 

Watercraft Exclusion, described below. United and the Holdens settled, 

leaving only this third-party suit to determine whether St. Paul owes coverage. 

The district court granted summary judgment to St. Paul, and United timely 

appealed.

“We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same 

standards as the district court.” Johnson v. Seacor Marine Corp., 404 F.3d 871, 

874 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing Taita Chem. Co., Ltd. v. Westlake Styrene Corp., 246 

F.3d 377, 385 (5th Cir. 2001)). “Summary judgment is appropriate when the 

record discloses that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the 

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Travelers Lloyds Ins. Co. 

v. Pac. Emp’rs Ins. Co., 602 F.3d 677, 681 (5th Cir. 2010); see also FED. R. CIV.

P. 56(a). “Any reasonable inferences are to be drawn in favor of the non-moving 

party.” First Am. Bank v. First Am. Transp. Title Ins. Co., 585 F.3d 833, 837 

(5th Cir. 2009) (citing Robinson v. Orient Marine Co., Ltd., 505 F.3d 364, 366 

(5th Cir. 2007)). “Because the interpretation of an insurance policy is a 

question of law, we review the district court’s determination de novo.” First 

Am. Bank, 585 F.3d at 837 (citing Principal Health Care of La., Inc. v. Lewer 

Agency, Inc., 38 F.3d 240, 242 (5th Cir. 1994); Bonin v. Westport Ins. Corp., 930 

So. 2d 906, 910 (La. 2006)).

Under Louisiana law, an insurance policy “is construed as a whole and 

each provision in the policy must be interpreted in light of the other provisions 

so that each is given meaning.” Peterson v. Schimek, 729 So. 2d 1024, 1029 

(La. 1999). A policy “should not be interpreted in an unreasonable or strained 

manner under the guise of contractual interpretation to enlarge or to restrict 

its provisions beyond what is reasonably contemplated by unambiguous 

terms.” Id. Once the insurer proves the applicability of an exclusion from 

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coverage, the insured bears the burden of proving that a claim comes within 

an exception to the exclusion. See Martco Ltd. P’ship v. Wellons, Inc., 588 F.3d 

864, 883 (5th Cir. 2009); Vidrine v. LaFleur, 979 So. 2d 609, 612 (La. Ct. App. 

3d Cir. 2008). 

We discern two possible ways in which there could be coverage for the 

Holden settlement: (1) if Buck Kreihs were liable via its indemnity, then 

United would sue Buck Kreihs which in turn would seek coverage from St. Paul 

as the named insured; or (2) if the Holdens’ claims against United were covered 

by the policy pursuant to United’s status as an additional insured under the 

policy—the policy thereby insuring United directly for its own liability. For 

different reasons, neither of these approaches results in reversal in United’s 

favor.

The first option can be dispatched relatively quickly. The parties agree 

and we conclude that section 905(b) of the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ 

Compensation Act voids Buck Kreihs’s agreement to indemnify United. See 33 

U.S.C. § 905(b). The general insuring clause of the policy extends coverage 

only to those obligations that the insured “shall become legally obligated to 

pay.” Since Buck Kreihs cannot, as a matter of law, be “legally obligated to 

pay” the Holdens’ claims against United, the policy’s coverage provision does 

not encompass Buck Kreihs’s attempted assumption of liability as to these 

claims. In other words, St. Paul can assert Buck Kreihs’s defense to liability 

to United in this scenario. The insured-contract exception to the Watercraft 

Exclusion is of no effect under this scenario because Buck Kreihs is not “legally 

obligated to pay” United in the first instance. An exception to an exclusion 

cannot create coverage that does not otherwise exist. See Colum. Cas. Co. v. 

Ga. & Fla. RailNet Inc., 542 F.3d 106, 112 (5th Cir. 2008); Carrier v. Reliance 

Ins. Co., 759 So. 2d 37, 40 (La. 2000). United does not dispute this analysis.

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Instead, United argues that it is entitled to coverage because it is an 

additional insured. For its part, St. Paul concedes that United is an additional 

insured but contends that the Watercraft Exclusion applies: 

SECTION II: GENERAL LIABILITY COVERAGES

Coverage A: Bodily Injury and Property Damage

* * *

2. Exclusions:

* * *

This insurance does not apply to:

* * *

(5) Watercraft

“Bodily injury” or “property damage” arising out 

of the ownership or operation of any watercraft:

(a) Owned by an insured;

(b) Chartered, leased, rented, or loaned to an 

insured.

This exclusion does not apply to:

* * *

(c) Liability assumed under an “insured 

contract”, but only that portion of the “insured 

contract” under which the “Named Insured” 

assumes the tort liability of another party for 

“bodily injury” or “property damage” to a third 

person or organization. Tort liability means a 

liability that would be imposed by law in the 

absence of any contract or agreement.

In turn, United does not rebut the applicability of the Watercraft 

Exclusion2 but posits that the exception in subpart (c) above removes the effect 

of the exclusion. This contention is the crux of the parties’ dispute. 

2 The watercraft exclusion states that it applies to “‘[b]odily injury’ or ‘property 

damage’ arising out of the ownership or operation of any watercraft . . . [o]wned by an 

insured.” In a footnote, United mentions that testimony in the record creates an issue of fact 

as to whether the exclusion was meant to apply only to watercraft owned by Buck Kreihs, 

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According to its plain language, the exception only applies to that 

liability that the named insured (Buck Kreihs) assumed under an insured 

contract. The exception does not apply in this case because United does not 

seek coverage as an injured claimant against Buck Kreihs as insured under 

the policy for “[l]iability assumed under an ‘insured contract’”; rather, United

seeks coverage as an additional insured directly under the policy for its own 

liability to the Holdens. Put differently, the exclusion plainly states that it only 

applies to a specific type of liability, which United is not subject to and is not 

seeking coverage for under the policy. Additionally, United is not the named 

insured, and the plain language of the exception states that it applies to 

liability that “the ‘Named Insured’ assumes.”3

United’s argument fails because it conflates the two means by which the 

policy could potentially apply to the Holdens’ claims against United. It thus 

assumes that the exception to the Watercraft Exclusion is triggered when an 

the named insured. United has waived this issue by inadequately briefing it and relegating 

it to a footnote. See Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v. Gov’t of Turkm., 345 F.3d 347, 356 n.7 (5th Cir. 

2003). Even so, the exclusion unambiguously refers to watercraft owned by an insured—not 

simply the named insured—and there is no dispute that United is an insured under the policy 

and that it owned the watercraft at issue. The testimony that United refers to cannot be used 

to create an ambiguity where none exists in the policy. See Shocklee v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. 

Co., 369 F.3d 437, 440 (5th Cir. 2004).

3 The language of the insured-contract exception to the Watercraft Exclusion thus 

demonstrates that it was designed to protect the named insured against liability that it 

assumed under an insured contract. It was not designed to provide watercraft coverage to 

an additional insured. In this regard, the dissenting opinion recognizes that, if the GSA’s 

indemnity provision was enforceable, the exception would serve to insure Buck Kreihs for the 

liability that it assumed on behalf of United. We do not suggest that the unenforceability of 

the GSA’s indemnity provision changes the meaning of the insured-contract exception. 

Instead, it precludes the exact type of liability to which the exception applies. As stated 

above, because Buck Kreihs is not subject to liability assumed under the GSA, the policy does 

not apply to such liability in the first instance: it only applies to obligations that the insured 

“shall become legally obligated to pay.” Conversely, while United is an additional insured 

under the policy and may be legally obligated to pay the Holdens’ claims, the insured-contract 

exception does not apply to United’s liability to the Holdens because United is not the named 

insured and is not subject to “[l]iability assumed under an ‘insured contract.’”

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insured contract is present between the named insured and an additional 

insured. Reading the policy in this manner, however, overlooks the structure 

of the policy and the operative language in the exception that makes it clear 

that it only “appl[ies] to . . . . [l]iability assumed under an ‘insured contract.’” 

For this same reason, the cases United cites are inapposite. They deal with 

the question whether the unenforceability of an indemnity provision prevents 

a party from being an additional insured. See Gilbane Bldg. Co. v. Admiral 

Ins. Co., 664 F.3d 589, 594–96 (5th Cir. 2011); Mid-Continent Cas. Co. v. Swift 

Energy Co., 206 F.3d 487, 492–95 (5th Cir. 2000); Voisin v. O.D.E.C.O. Drilling 

Co., 744 F.2d 1174, 1176–79 (5th Cir. 1984).4 This is not an issue in dispute in 

this case; the parties agree that United is an additional insured under the 

policy. Understanding that United is an additional insured, the issue remains 

whether the insured-contract exception to the Watercraft Exclusion applies. 

Since United in its role as an additional insured does not seek coverage for 

liability assumed under an insured contract by the named insured, United has 

not met its burden of showing that the exception to the Watercraft Exclusion 

applies. See Martco, 588 F.3d at 883.

4 In Gilbane and Swift we faced the issue of whether a party “qualifie[d] as an 

additional insured” under an insurance policy, which turned on whether coverage was 

“required by written contract or written agreement that is an ‘insured contract.’” Gilbane,

664 F.3d at 594; see also Swift, 206 F.3d at 491–92. This issue ultimately required deciding 

whether an unenforceable indemnity agreement constituted an “insured contract.” We held 

that that question “turns not on enforceability, but on whether [the named insured] agreed 

to ‘assume the tort liability of another party.’” Gilbane, 664 F.3d at 596 (emphasis in 

original). This holding—that an unenforceable agreement to assume liability constitutes an 

insured contract—does not resolve the separate issue faced here of whether an exception to 

an exclusion for “[l]iability assumed under an ‘insured contract’” encompasses an additional 

insured’s direct demand under a policy for its own liability. 

Similarly, Voisin resolved the distinct question, not at issue in this case, of whether 

an additional insured provision is invalidated by section 905(b) of the Longshore and Harbor 

Workers’ Compensation Act. See 744 F.2d at 1177.

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While “equivocal provisions seeking to narrow an insurer’s obligation are 

strictly construed against the insurer,” this rule of strict construction applies 

only if the language of the exclusion is ambiguous. Henry v. S. La. Sugars 

Coop., 957 So. 2d 1275, 1278 (La. 2007) (quoting Bonin, 930 So. 2d at 911). We 

may not “strain to find such ambiguities, if, in so doing, [we] defeat probable 

intentions of the parties. This is so even when the result is an apparently 

harsh consequence to the insured.” Sharp v. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp., 858 

F.2d 1042, 1045 (5th Cir. 1988) (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted). Here, the Watercraft Exclusion unambiguously applies and its 

insured-contract exception plainly does not encompass the liability at issue. 

We may not strain to find otherwise. Accordingly, as the district court 

concluded, the Watercraft Exclusion excludes from coverage the Holdens’ 

claims against United. Therefore, we AFFIRM.

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PRISCILLA R. OWEN, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

All agree that U.S. United Ocean Services, L.L.C. (United) is an 

additional insured under the general marine liability policy issued by St. Paul 

Fire & Marine Insurance Company (St. Paul). Because the majority opinion 

concludes that the Watercraft Exclusion denies coverage to United, I 

respectfully dissent. 

United is an additional insured under the policy that Buck Kreihs 

obtained from St. Paul. The majority opinion holds, however, that the policy=s 

Watercraft Exclusion excludes the claims that the Holdens asserted against 

United. I respectfully disagree.

The policy contains a ABlanket Additional Insured Endorsement@ which 

amended the policy Ato include as an additional insured . . . any person or 

organization whom the Named Insured is required to add as an additional 

insured of this policy under . . . [a] written contract.@ St. Paul agrees that 

United was an additional insured under this endorsement. St. Paul also agrees 

that United was insured under the ABodily Injury and Property Damage@

section of the policy, which provides that A[t]he Company will pay on behalf of 

the Insured all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay 

as damages because of : >Bodily Injury= >Property Damage= to which this 

insurance applies.@ United was legally obligated to pay the Holdens. The only 

argument St. Paul asserts with regard to United=s status as an additional 

insured is that the Watercraft Exclusion excludes coverage.

The Watercraft Exclusion provides:

SECTION II: GENERAL LIABILITY COVERAGES

Coverage A: Bodily Injury and Property Damage

* * *

2. Exclusions:

* * *

This insurance does not apply to:

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* * *

(5) Watercraft

ABodily injury@ or Aproperty damage@ arising out of the 

ownership or operation of any watercraft:

(a) Owned by an insured;

(b) Chartered, leased, rented, or loaned to an insured.

This exclusion does not apply to:

 * * *

(c) Liability assumed under an Ainsured contract@, but only 

that portion of the Ainsured contract@ under which the 

ANamed Insured@ assumes the tort liability of another 

party for Abodily injury@ or Aproperty damage@ to a third 

person or organization. Tort liability means a liability 

that would be imposed by law in the absence of any 

contract or agreement.

Whether the Watercraft Exclusion applies turns on the interpretation of 

the exception to the exclusion. The question is whether United=s liability to 

the Holdens was ALiability assumed under . . . that portion of the >insured 

contract= under which the ANamed Insured@ [Buck Kreihs] assumes the tort 

liability of another party [United].@ The district court reasoned that because 

Buck Kreihs=s assumption of United=s liability was void under the LHWCA, 

ABuck Kreihs has not assumed the tort liability of [United] concerning Holden=s 

alleged injuries.@ That reasoning is contrary to decisions of our court.

In Mid-Continent Casualty Co. v. Swift Energy Co.,1 Air Equipment, a 

contractor, agreed to indemnify Swift, the operator of an oil drilling site. This 

indemnity agreement was alleged to be unenforceable under the Texas Oilfield 

1 206 F.3d 487, 490 (5th Cir. 2000).

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Anti-Indemnity Act.2 An insurer, Mid-Continent, had issued a policy to Air 

Equipment and argued that Swift was not entitled to coverage. One of the 

arguments Mid-Continent made was that the agreement between Air 

Equipment and Swift was not an Ainsured contract@ under the policy.3 MidContinent contended that Aif the indemnity provisions of the [agreement 

between Air Equipment and Swift] are unenforceable, Mid-Continent never 

actually assumed Swift=s liabilities@ and therefore, the indemnity agreement 

would not qualify as an insured contract.4 St. Paul=s argument in the present 

case that Buck Kreihs never assumed United=s liabilities is indistinguishable. 

We rejected the argument in Swift, concluding that even were the indemnity 

agreement invalid under the Texas law, it qualified as an Ainsured contract.@5

In Gilbane Building Co. v. Admiral Insurance Co.,10 this court also 

examined policy language similar to that contained in St. Paul=s policy. In 

Gilbane, a general contractor (Gilbane) entered into an agreement with a 

subcontractor (Empire Steel) under which Empire Steel agreed to indemnify 

2 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. '' 127.001-.007.

3 Swift, 206 F.3d at 492; see also id. (explaining that the policy in question defined 

Ainsured contract@ to include, A>That part of any contract or agreement pertaining to your 

business . . . under which you [Air Equipment] assume the tort liability of another party to 

pay for >bodily injury= or >property damage= to a third person or organization.=@) (alterations 

in original).

4 Id. at 493.

5 Id. (AIn light of the rule that ambiguous policy language is interpreted to find 

coverage . . ., the lack of relevant precedent and the existence of strong opposing arguments 

appear to dispose of Mid-Continent=s argument that the MSA is not an >insured contract,=

even if we grant the assumption that the MSA=s indemnity provisions are invalid under the 

TOAIA.@).

10 664 F.3d 589 (5th Cir. 2011). 

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Gilbane and to add Gilbane as an additional insured under its commercial 

general liability policy.11 When an employee of Empire Steel was injured, he 

sued Gilbane, and Gilbane sought coverage as an additional insured from 

Empire Steel=s insurer.12 The policy Aprovide[d] coverage to additional 

insureds . . . so long as Empire Steel had previously assumed the liability of 

the potential additional insured in a written contract.@13 The policy provided 

that a party was an additional insured if coverage was required by an Ainsured 

contract,@ and the policy defined an Ainsured contract@ as one in which Athe 

named insured assume[d] the tort liability of the additional insured.@14 In 

addressing whether Gilbane qualified as an additional insured, we were 

required to determine whether Empire Steel assumed the tort liability of 

Gilbane.15

The insurer argued that there was no assumption of liability because the 

indemnity provision in the contract between Empire Steel and Gilbane was 

unenforceable under Texas law.16 We held that the question was not whether 

the assumption of liability was enforceable but rather whether Empire Steel 

had agreed to assume Gilbane=s tort liability.17 Because Empire Steel had 

11 Gilbane, 664 F.3d at 592-93.

12 Id. at 592.

13 Id. at 593. 

14 Id. at 594 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

15 Id. at 594-95. 

16 Id. at 595. 

17 Id. at 596.

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agreed not only to indemnify Gilbane but also to secure insurance on behalf of 

Gilbane, we held that Empire Steel had agreed to assume Gilbane=s tort 

liability.18 Gilbane therefore qualified as an additional insured.19 

The majority opinion=s attempt to distinguish Gilbane and Swift is 

unpersuasive. Although the majority opinion says that it is relying on ANamed 

Insured@ language in the exception to the Watercraft Exclusion, the majority 

opinion is in reality giving effect to arguments regarding the meaning of an 

Ainsured contract@ and the assumption by a named insured of the tort liability 

of additional insureds that we rejected in Gilbane and Swift. The majority 

opinion states that because the policy uses the term ANamed Insured,@ the 

exception to the Watercraft Exclusion limits its scope to claims made by Buck 

Kreihs under the policy and thus the exception cannot apply to United. This 

entirely ignores the language in the exception to the Watercraft Exclusion 

regarding the Named Insured=s assumption of the tort liability of another 

party, in this case United, for bodily injury.

Buck Kreihs assumed the liability of United under an Ainsured contract.@ 

It was United=s tort liability to those such as the Holdens that the insurance 

policy=s additional insured provisions were drafted to cover. The exception to 

the Watercraft Exclusion was designed to make clear that the Watercraft 

Exclusion did not negate coverage for an additional insured. The exception to 

the Watercraft Exclusion focuses on A[l]iability assumed under an >insured 

18 Id. (AEmpire Steel contracted not only to indemnify Gilbane, but also to secure 

insurance on its behalf; by doing so, it agreed to assume Gilbane=s tort liability. That 

provision is not rendered void by the indemnity provision, even if it is unenforceable.@).

19 Id.

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contract=, but only that portion of the >insured contract= under which the 

>Named Insured= assumes the tort liability of another party for >bodily injury=

or >property damage= to a third person or organization.@ The Aportion of the 

>insured contract= under which the >Named Insured= [Buck Kreihs] assume[d] 

the tort liability of another party@ was the portion of the indemnity agreement 

under which Buck Kreihs assumed the liability of United to Buck Kreihs=s 

employees. It is that A[l]iability,@ namely, United=s liability that Buck Kreihs, 

the Named Insured, assumed, and to which the exception to the exclusion 

applies. The fact that Buck Kreihs=s assumption of liability is unenforceable 

does not mean that the exception to the exclusion ceases to apply to United=s

liability.

The meaning of the policy is clear when the indemnity obligations of the 

Named Insured are enforceable. The Watercraft Exclusion in the policy 

excludes A>bodily injury= . . . arising out of the ownership or operation of any 

watercraft . . . [o]wned by an insured.@ Paul Holden=s bodily injury arose out 

of the ownership or operation of a watercraft owned by United, Aan insured@

under the policy. If the policy said nothing further, United=s liability for 

Holden=s injuries would be excluded. However, there is an exception to this 

exclusion. The Watercraft Exclusion does not apply to A[l]iability assumed 

under an >insured contract=, but only that portion of the >insured contract=

under which the >Named Insured= assumes the tort liability of another party 

for >bodily injury= or >property damage= to a third person or organization.@ The 

Named Insured, Buck Kreihs, assumed the additional insured=s (United=s) 

liability under the portion of the indemnity agreement in which Buck Kreihs 

assumed United=s tort liability to Buck Kreihs=s employees. Therefore, if the 

indemnity agreement were enforceable, United=s liabilityC which was 

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A[>l]iability assumed under an >insured contract=@ by the Named InsuredC

would not be excluded by the Watercraft Exclusion. It is the liability of 

Aanother party,@ including the liability of an additional insured, not Buck 

Kreihs=s own tort liability, that is excepted from the Watercraft Exclusion. The 

majority opinion=s reasoning fails to comprehend this. The fact that the Named 

Insured=s assumption of an additional insured=s liability is unenforceable does 

not change the meaning of the exception to the Watercraft Exclusion. The 

majority opinion fails to give meaning to the precise terms of the policy.

Had St. Paul wanted to condition application of the insured-contract 

exception on the validity of the assumption of liability by the Named Insured, 

it could have explicitly said so in the policy.20 Construing the policy in favor of 

coverage for United is consistent with Louisiana contract law, which provides 

that A[e]xclusionary provisions in insurance contracts are strictly construed 

against the insurer, and any ambiguity is construed in favor of the insured.@21 

As to policy exclusions under Louisiana law, A[t]he insurer has the burden of 

proving that a loss comes within a policy exclusion.@22

Under Louisiana law, A[w]hen the words of a contract are clear and 

explicit and lead to no absurd consequences, no further interpretation may be 

20 See LeBlanc v. Global Marine Drilling Co., 193 F.3d 873, 875 (5th Cir. 1999) (AIf the 

parties had determined to condition . . . assured status upon the legal enforceability of the 

indemnity agreement, they very easily could have done so.@).

21 Garcia v. St. Bernard Parish Sch. Bd., 576 So. 2d 975, 976 (La. 1991) (citing Capital 

Bank & Trust v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc=y, 542 So. 2d 494 (La. 1989); Albritton v. 

Fireman=s Fund Ins. Co., 70 So. 2d 111 (La. 1953)). 

22 La. Maint. Servs., Inc. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd=s of London, 616 So. 2d 

1250, 1252 (La. 1993) (citing Capital Bank, 542 So. 2d at 494; Lado v. First Nat=l Life Ins. 

Co., 162 So. 579 (La. 1935)). 

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made in search of the parties= intent.@23 The majority opinion=s interpretation 

of the exception adds a limitation that is not supported by the language of the 

exception. The Watercraft Exclusion should not apply, and United=s claims 

should be covered under the policy. 

* * *

For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. I would reverse the 

judgment of the district court. 

23 LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2046 (2008). 

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