alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<PAGE>

                                    EXHIBIT 10.4

                                 PROMISSORY NOTE

$11,000                                                        February 20, 2002

For value received, the undersigned, Coinless Systems, Inc. ("the Promisor"),
promises to pay upon demand to the order of Dennis W. and/or Janice Sorenson
("the Payee") located at 1124 Sable Mist Court, Las Vegas, NV 89144 (or at such
other place as the Payee may designate in writing) the sum of $11,000.00 with
interest from February 20, 2002 on the unpaid principal at a rate of 8.5%
interest per annum.

All payments on this Note shall be applied first in payment of accrued interest
and any remainder in payment of principal.

The Promisor reserves the right to prepay this Note (in whole or in part) prior
to the due date with no prepayment penalty.

If any payment obligation under this Note is not paid when demanded, the
Promisor promises to pay all costs of collection, including reasonable attorney
fees, whether or not a lawsuit is commenced as part of the collection process.

If any of the following events of default occur, this Note shall become due
immediately, without demand or notice:

1)     the failure of the Promisor to pay the principal and any accrued interest
       in full upon demand;

2)     the filing of bankruptcy proceedings involving the Promisor as a Debtor;

3)     the application for appointment of a receiver for the Promisor;

4)     the making of a general assignment for the benefit of the Promisor's
       creditors;

5)     the insolvency of the Promisor; or

6)     the misrepresentation by the Promisor to the Payee for the purpose of
       obtaining or extending credit; or

7)     the sale or merger of Corporation.

                                       30





<PAGE>

If any or more of the provisions of this Note are determined to be
unenforceable, in whole or in part, for any reason, the remaining provisions
shall remain fully operative.

All payments of principal and interest on this Note shall be paid in the legal
currency of the United States. Promisor waives presentment of payment, protest,
and notice of protest and nonpayment on this Note.

No renewal or extension of this Note, delay in enforcing any right of the Payee
under this Note, or assignment by Payee of this Note shall affect the liability
of the Promisor. All rights of the Payee under this Note are cumulative and may
be exercised concurrently or consecutively at the Payee's option.

Payee may, at their option, convert this note into Common Stock of CSI, as per
Resolution of the Board of Directors, dated February 4, 2000.

This Note shall be construed in accordance with the laws of the State of Nevada.

Signed this 20th day of February 2002 in Las Vegas, Nevada.

PROMISOR
Coinless Systems, Inc.

By:   /S/  DARRYL D. DORSETT
    ----------------------------
       Darryl D. Dorsett
       Chief Financial Officer

                                       31
1999 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

11-26-1999

Medical Protective v Watkins

Precedential or Non-Precedential:

Docket 98-7515

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1999

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 1999 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.

Recommended Citation

"Medical Protective v Watkins" (1999). 1999 Decisions. Paper 311.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1999/311
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

 No. 98-7515 

 Medical Protective Co. v. Watkins 

 

 The following modifications have been made to the Court's 

Opinion issued on 11/26/99, to the above-entitled appeal and 

will appear as part of the final version of the opinion: 

 

 Please notify the publisher of our request to make a correction to 

the above 

 opinion by replacing the word Walski's with the word Walskis' on 

page seven (7), 

 line 2. 

 

 

 Very truly yours, 

 /s/ P. Douglas Sisk, 

 Clerk 

Dated: November 29, 1999
§ 4002.8 Emergency procedures. ( a ) An emergency exists if a quorum of the Corporation's Board cannot readily be assembled or act through written contact because of the declaration of a government-wide emergency. These emergency procedures must remain in effect during the emergency and upon the termination of the emergency will cease to be operative unless and until another emergency occurs. The emergency procedures operate in conjunction with the PBGC Continuity of Operations Plan (“COOP Plan”) of the current year, and any government-wide COOP protocols in effect.
( b ) During an emergency, the business of the PBGC must continue to be managed in accordance with its COOP Plan. The functions of the Board of Directors must be carried out by those Members of the Board of Directors in office at the time the emergency arises, or by persons designated by the agencies' COOP plans to act in place of the Board Members, who are available to act during the emergency. If no such persons are available, then the authority of the Board must be transferred to the Board Representatives who are available. If no Board Representatives are available, then the Director of the Corporation must perform essential Board functions.
( c ) During an emergency, meetings of the Board may be called by any available Member of the Board. The notice thereof must specify the time and place of the meeting. To the extent possible, notice must be given in accordance with these bylaws. Notice must be given to those Board Members whom it is feasible to reach at the time of the emergency, and notice may be given at a time less than 24 hours before the meeting if deemed necessary by the person giving notice.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<CIK> 0000060150
<NAME> DRYER
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             APR-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1997
<CASH>                                           1,941
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                      242
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0
<PP&E>                                               0
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                   7,051
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           400
<OTHER-SE>                                       5,747
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                     7,051
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                   184
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                   270
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                   (86)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                               (86)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                      (86)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.02)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.02)
        

</TABLE>
IIA 

110TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. J. RES. 25 

Providing for the appointment of John W. McCarter as a citizen regent 

of the Board of Regents of the Smithsonian Institution. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

NOVEMBER 16, 2007 

Mr. LEAHY (for himself, Mr. COCHRAN, and Mr. DODD) introduced the following joint resolution; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration 

JOINT RESOLUTION 

Providing for the appointment of John W. McCarter as a 

citizen regent of the Board of Regents of the Smithsonian Institution. 

1 Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives

2 of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 That, in accordance with section 5581 of the Revised Stat4 utes (20 U.S.C. 43), the vacancy on the Board of Regents 

5 of the Smithsonian Institution, in the class other than 

6 Members of Congress, occurring because of the expiration 

7 of the term of Walter E. Massey of Georgia, is filled by 

8 the appointment of John W. McCarter of Illinois, for a 


bajohnson on PROD1PC69 with BILLS
2 

•SJ 25 IS 

1 term of 6 years, effective on the date of the enactment 

2 of this resolution. 

Æ 


bajohnson on PROD1PC69 with BILLS
#### CAMP v STATE

Ohio Appeals, 4th Dist, Vinton Co

Decided October 6, 1930

Louis M. Day, Chillicothe, for Camp.

C. O. Chapman, Prosecuting Attorney, McArthur, for State.

BY THE COURT

Clinton Camp in this proceeding seeks to reverse a judgment of conviction for manufacturing intoxicating liquor.

The first error suggested is that the state failed to prove any venue of the offense charged. This suggestion is not well taken. The sheriff testified that he saw the accused on the Tarr Farm in Clinton Township, Vinton County, Ohio, on the 13th day of November and that he was then in the door of a building where a still or stills were being operated. It was thus clearly proven that whiskey was being manufactured in Vinton County at the time in question and in a building in which the .accused was found. Other testimony tends to show that all of the things testified to were on the Tarr Farm. There was no evidence of any Tarr Farm except the one in Vinton County to which the sheriff had testified. Venue was consequently proven.

The second complaint runs to the fact that the state did not put in evidence all *688of *the*exhibits that it might have used; that is to say, that the state showed certain parts 'of a still or stills but did not exhibit the entire apparatus that its evidence tended to show was being employed at the time and place in question. The claim is then made that the state had no right to prove that a still w,as in operation unless it introduced all of the component parts of the still as exhibits. There is nothing in this contention. The state is not bound to offer in evidence a pistol in order to prove that a homicide was committed by that pistol. The evidence in this case, without objection, showed that a still was in operation and the state was under no obligation to offer the still or any part of it if it did not so desire. The charge of the court to the jury in this respect was entirely correct.

Finally it is argued that the evidence of the guilt of the accused was not clear. It was for the jury to determine whether the guilt of the accused was shown beyond a reasonable doubt and we have no inclination to disturb its finding. That liquor w,as being manufactured is undisputed. That the accused was the only person present is likewise undisputed, and that he was actually testing the proof of the whiskey being distilled is testified to by witnesses for the state. This would have been sufficient to have warranted a conviction. In addition to that, the evidence shows that the accused when arrested stated to one of the arresting officers that he had formerly had a job elsewhere and continued: “I came down here and got to messing up with this liquor business. See where I am at.” It is difficult to see how any other verdict could have been rendered except that reached by the trial jury.

Middleton, PJ, Mauck and Blosser, JJ, concur.
(77 South. 1005)

#### TALBOT et al. v. STATE.

(4 Div. 533.)

(Court of Appeals of Alabama.

Feb. 5, 1918.)

Appeal from Circuit Court, Pike County; A. B. Foster, Judge.

F. Loyd Tate, Atty. Gen., for the State.

SAMFORD, J.

Appeal dismissed on motion of Attorney General.
----

----

I Mitteilungen

Kommission

----

Euro-Wechselkurs (1)

23. September 2004

(2004/C 237/01)

1 Euro= 

----

(1)

Quelle: Von der Europäischen Zentralbank veröffentlichter Referenz-Wechselkurs.

----

----

Vorherige Anmeldung eines Zusammenschlusses

(Sache COMP/M.3502 — ACCOR/CLUB MÉDITERRANÉE)

Für das vereinfachte Verfahren in Frage kommender Fall

(2004/C 237/02)

(Text von Bedeutung für den EWR)

----

(1)ABl. L 24 vom 29.1.2004, S. 1.

(2)  Zu finden auf der Internetseite der Generaldirektion Wettbewerb:

http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/legislation/consultation/simplified_tru.pdf.

----

----

Vorherige Anmeldung eines Zusammenschlusses

(Sache COMP/M.3550 — Midewa/Stadtwerke Halle/Fernwasser Sachsen-Anhalt)

(2004/C 237/03)

(Text von Bedeutung für den EWR)

----

(1)ABl. L 24 vom 29.1.2004, S. 1.

----

----

Auszug aus Entscheidungen der Gemeinschaft über die Zulassung von Arzneimitteln vom 15. August bis 15. September 2004

(Veröffentlichung gemäß Artikel 12 bzw. Artikel 34 der Verordnung (EWG) Nr. 2309/93 des Rates (1))

(2004/C 237/04)

—   Erteilung einer Zulassung (Artikel 12 der Verordnung (EWG) Nr. 2309/93): Versagung

—   Änderung einer Zulassung (Artikel 12 der Verordnung (EWG) Nr. 2309/93): Annahme

—   Erteilung einer Zulassung (Artikel 34 der Verordnung (EWG) Nr. 2309/93): Annahme

—   Änderung einer Zulassung (Artikel 34 der Verordnung (EWG) Nr. 2309/93): Annahme

----

(1)ABl. L 214 vom 24.8.1993, S. 1.

----
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA No. DA 21
- 0030 STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee,

v. CORENA MARIE MOUNTAIN CHEIF ,

Defendant and Appellant,

**ORDER** Upon consideration of Appellant’s unopposed motion for extension of time, and good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is granted an extension of time to and including September 29 , 2022 , within which to prepare, file, and serve Appellant’s opening brief on appeal. No further extensions will be granted.

Electronically signed by: Mike McGrath Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

August 23 2022

08/23/2022

Case Number: DA 21-0030
§ 4022.5 Determination of nonforfeitable benefits. ( a ) A guaranteed benefit payable to a surviving beneficiary is not considered to be forfeitable solely because the plan provides that the benefit will cease upon the remarriage of such beneficiary or his attaining a specified age. However, the PBGC will observe the provisions of the plan relating to the effect of such remarriage or attainment of such specified age on the surviving beneficiary's eligibility to continue to receive benefit payments.
( b ) Any other provision in a plan that the right to a benefit in pay status will cease or be suspended upon the occurrence of any specified condition does not automatically make that benefit forfeitable. In each such case the PBGC will determine whether the benefit is forfeitable.
( c ) A benefit guaranteed under § 4022.6 shall not be considered forfeitable solely because the plan provides that upon recovery of the participant the benefit will cease.
#### § 4219.19 Method and date of issuance; computation of time.

The PBGC applies the rules in subpart B of part 4000 of this chapter to determine permissible methods of issuance under this subpart. The PBGC applies the rules in subpart C of part 4000 of this chapter to determine the date that an issuance under this subpart was provided. The PBGC applies the rules in subpart D of part 4000 of this chapter to compute any time period for issuances to third parties under this subpart.

[68 FR 61356, Oct. 28, 2003]
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 03-6672

In Re: WAYMARE BILLUPS,

Petitioner.

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus.

Submitted: May 15, 2003 Decided: May 29, 2003

Before LUTTIG and KING, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Waymare Billups, Petitioner Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Waymare Billups has filed a petition for a writ of mandamus

seeking review of his sentences. Mandamus relief is available only

when the petitioner has a clear right to the relief sought. See In

re First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 860 F.2d 135, 138 (4th Cir. 1988).

Mandamus may not be used as a substitute for appeal. In re United

Steelworkers, 595 F.2d 958, 960 (4th Cir. 1979). Further, mandamus

relief is only available when there are no other means by which the

relief sought could be granted. In re Beard, 811 F.2d 818, 826

(4th Cir. 1987).

The relief sought by Billups is not available by way of

mandamus. Accordingly, although we grant Billups’ motion to proceed

in forma pauperis, we deny the petition for a writ of mandamus. We

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions

are adequately presented in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

PETITION DENIED
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR
. R. 47.5.4.

### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-70004
CARLOS MANUEL AYESTAS, also known as Dennis Zelaya Corea, Petitioner-Appellant v. RICK THALER, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS DIVISION, Respondent-Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. 4:09-CV-2999
Before DAVIS, SMITH, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * IT IS ORDERED that the petition for rehearing is DENIED. Petitioner has also moved that this court vacate its prior opinion and remand to the district court for consideration of his previously made claim of ineffective assistance of state habeas counsel in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012). This court recently addressed Martinez’s applicability in Texas. See Ibarra v. Thaler, No. 11-70031, United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit 

### F I L E D July 11, 2012 Lyle W. Cayce ClerkNo. 11-70004

2 2012 WL 2620520, at *4 (5th Cir. June 28, 2012). We held that, because Texas does not mandate ineffective assistance claims to be brought first in habeas proceedings, Martinez does not apply in Texas. I d. Accordingly, we DENY the motion.
```

[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 966 Enrolled Bill (ENR)]

        S.966

                       One Hundred Tenth Congress

                                 of the

                        United States of America

                          AT THE FIRST SESSION

          Begun and held at the City of Washington on Thursday,
            the fourth day of January, two thousand and seven

                                 An Act

 
 To enable the Department of State to respond to a critical shortage of 
         passport processing personnel, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Passport Backlog Reduction Act of 
2007''.

SEC. 2. REEMPLOYMENT OF FOREIGN SERVICE ANNUITANTS.

    Section 824(g) of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22 U.S.C. 
4064(g)) is amended--
        (1) in paragraph (1)--
            (A) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``; or'' and inserting 
        a semicolon;
            (B) in subparagraph (B), by striking the period at the end 
        and inserting ``; or''; and
            (C) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph--
            ``(C)(i) to provide assistance to consular posts with a 
        substantial backlog of visa applications; or
            ``(ii) to provide assistance to meet the demand resulting 
        from the passport and travel document requirements set forth in 
        section 7209(b) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
        Prevention Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-458; 8 U.S.C. 1185 
        note), including assistance related to the investigation of 
        fraud in connection with an application for a passport.''; and
        (2) in paragraph (2)--
            (A) by striking ``The authority'' and inserting ``(A) The 
        authority''; and
            (B) by adding at the end the following new subparagraphs:
            ``(B) The authority of the Secretary to waive the 
        application of subsections (a) through (d) for an annuitant 
        pursuant to subparagraph (C)(i) of paragraph (1) shall 
        terminate on September 30, 2008.
            ``(C) The authority of the Secretary to waive the 
        application of subsections (a) through (d) for an annuitant 
        pursuant to subparagraph (C)(ii) of paragraph (1) shall 
        terminate on September 30, 2009.''.

                               Speaker of the House of Representatives.

                            Vice President of the United States and    
                                               President of the Senate.
```
#### CLEVELAND TRUST CO v OHIO TAX COMM et

Ohio Appeals, 8th Dist, Cuyahoga Co

No 9624.

Decided November 19, 1928

Messrs. Snyder, Henry, Thomsen, Ford & Seagrave, Cleveland, for Cleveland Trust Co.

Carlton S. Dargusch, Esq., Columbus, for Ohio Tax Comm et.

*61Opinion by

VICKERY, J.

SULLIVAN, P. J., concurs.
(75 South. 1006)

#### MASON et al. v. WEATHERLY.

(6 Div. 229.)

(Court of Appeals of Alabama.

May 8, 1917.)

Appeal from Circuit Court, Jefferson County; B. C. Crow, Judge.

Alex Birch, of Birmingham, for appellee.

SAMFORD, J.

Affirmed on certificate.
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 17-60061

Summary Calendar 

SAMUEL D. KELKER, 

Petitioner-Appellant 

v. 

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, 

Respondent-Appellee 

Appeal from a Decision of the 

United States Tax Court

T.C. No. 15061-14

Before REAVLEY, PRADO, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

The order of the Tax Court is affirmed because all of the procedures have 

been followed to sustain the notice of determination and the collection due 

process hearing. The taxpayer Petitioner has had full opportunity to present 

any objection or evidence on his behalf. The Commissioner was entitled then 

to move for summary judgment by the Tax Court. 

 AFFIRMED. 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

August 10, 2017

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 17-60061 Document: 00514111236 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/10/2017