III 

110TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. CON. RES. 7 

Expressing the sense of Congress on Iraq. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JANUARY 31, 2007 

Mr. WARNER (for himself, Mr. NELSON of Nebraska, Ms. COLLINS, Mr. 

LEVIN, and Ms. SNOWE) submitted the following concurrent resolution; 

which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations 

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 

Expressing the sense of Congress on Iraq. 

Whereas we respect the Constitutional authorities given a 

President in article II, section 2, which states that ‘‘The 

President shall be commander in chief of the Army and 

Navy of the United States’’; it is not the intent of this 

resolution to question or contravene such authority, but 

to accept the offer to Congress made by the President on 

January 10, 2007, that, ‘‘if members have improvements 

that can be made, we will make them. If circumstances 

change, we will adjust’’; 

Whereas the United States strategy and operations in Iraq 

can only be sustained and achieved with support from the 

American people and with a level of bipartisanship; 

Whereas over 137,000 American military personnel are currently serving in Iraq, like thousands of others since 

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March 2003, with the bravery and professionalism consistent with the finest traditions of the United States 

Armed Forces, and are deserving of the support of all 

Americans, which they have strongly; 

Whereas many American service personnel have lost their 

lives, and many more have been wounded, in Iraq, and 

the American people will always honor their sacrifices 

and honor their families; 

Whereas the U.S. Army and Marine Corps, including their 

Reserve and National Guard organizations, together with 

components of the other branches of the military, are 

under enormous strain from multiple, extended deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan; 

Whereas these deployments, and those that will follow, will 

have lasting impacts on the future recruiting, retention 

and readiness of our Nation’s all volunteer force; 

Whereas in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, the Congress stated that ‘‘calendar year 

2006 should be a period of significant transition to full 

sovereignty, with Iraqi security forces taking the lead for 

the security of a free and sovereign Iraq’’; 

Whereas United Nations Security Council Resolution 1723, 

approved November 28, 2006, ‘‘determin[ed] that the situation in Iraq continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security’’; 

Whereas Iraq is experiencing a deteriorating and ever-widening problem of sectarian and intra-sectarian violence 

based upon political distrust and cultural differences between some Sunni and Shia Muslims; 

Whereas Iraqis must reach political settlements in order to 

achieve reconciliation, and the failure of the Iraqis to 

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reach such settlements to support a truly unified government greatly contributes to the increasing violence in 

Iraq; 

Whereas the responsibility for Iraq’s internal security and 

halting sectarian violence must rest primarily with the 

Government of Iraq and Iraqi Security Forces; 

Whereas U.S. Central Command Commander General John 

Abizaid testified to Congress on November 15, 2006, ‘‘I 

met with every divisional commander, General Casey, the 

Corps Commander, [and] General Dempsey. We all 

talked together. And I said, in your professional opinion, 

if we were to bring in more American troops now, does 

it add considerably to our ability to achieve success in 

Iraq? And they all said no. And the reason is, because 

we want the Iraqis to do more. It’s easy for the Iraqis 

to rely upon us to do this work. I believe that more 

American forces prevent the Iraqis from doing more, 

from taking more responsibility for their own future’’; 

Whereas Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki stated on November 27, 2006, that ‘‘The crisis is political, and the 

ones who can stop the cycle of aggravation and bloodletting of innocents are the politicians’’; 

Whereas there is growing evidence that Iraqi public sentiment 

opposes the continued U.S. troop presence in Iraq, much 

less increasing the troop level; 

Whereas, in the fall of 2006, leaders in the Administration 

and Congress, as well as recognized experts in the private 

sector, began to express concern that the situation in 

Iraq was deteriorating and required a change in strategy; 

and, as a consequence, the Administration began an inmstockstill on PROD1PC62 with BILLS

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tensive, comprehensive review by all components of the 

Executive Branch to devise a new strategy; 

Whereas, in December 2006, the bipartisan Iraq Study 

Group issued a valuable report, suggesting a comprehensive strategy that includes ‘‘new and enhanced diplomatic 

and political efforts in Iraq and the region, and a change 

in the primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq that will enable the United States to begin to move its combat forces 

out of Iraq responsibly’’; 

Whereas, on January 10, 2007, following consultations with 

the Iraqi Prime Minister, the President announced a new 

strategy (hereinafter referred to as the ‘‘plan’’), which 

consists of three basic elements: diplomatic, economic, 

and military; the central component of the military element is an augmentation of the present level of the U.S. 

military forces through additional deployments of approximately 21,500 U.S. military troops to Iraq; 

Whereas, on January 10, 2007, the President said that the 

‘‘Iraqi government will appoint a military commander 

and two deputy commanders for their capital’’ and that 

U.S. forces will ‘‘be embedded in their formations’’; and 

in subsequent testimony before the Armed Services Committee on January 25, 2007, by the retired former Vice 

Chief of the Army it was learned that there will also be 

a comparable U.S. command in Baghdad, and that this 

dual chain of command may be problematic because ‘‘the 

Iraqis are going to be able to move their forces around 

at times where we will disagree with that movement’’, 

and called for clarification; 

Whereas this proposed level of troop augmentation far exceeds the expectations of many of us as to the reinforcements that would be necessary to implement the various 

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options for a new strategy, and led many members of 

Congress to express outright opposition to augmenting 

our troops by 21,500; 

Whereas the Government of Iraq has promised repeatedly to 

assume a greater share of security responsibilities, disband militias, consider Constitutional amendments and 

enact laws to reconcile sectarian differences, and improve 

the quality of essential services for the Iraqi people; yet, 

despite those promises, little has been achieved; 

Whereas the President said on January 10, 2007, that ‘‘I’ve 

made it clear to the Prime Minister and Iraq’s other 

leaders that America’s commitment is not open-ended’’ so 

as to dispel the contrary impression that exists; and 

Whereas the recommendations in this resolution should not 

be interpreted as precipitating any immediate reduction 

in, or withdrawal of, the present level of forces: Now, 

therefore, be it— 

1 Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives 

2 concurring), That it is the sense of Congress that— 

3 (1) the Senate disagrees with the ‘‘plan’’ to 

4 augment our forces by 21,500, and urges the Presi5 dent instead to consider all options and alternatives 

6 for achieving the strategic goals set forth below; 

7 (2) the Senate believes the United States should 

8 continue vigorous operations in Anbar province, spe9 cifically for the purpose of combating an insurgency, 

10 including elements associated with the Al Qaeda 

11 movement, and denying terrorists a safe haven; 

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1 (3) the Senate believes a failed state in Iraq 

2 would present a threat to regional and world peace, 

3 and the long-term security interests of the United 

4 States are best served by an Iraq that can sustain, 

5 govern, and defend itself, and serve as an ally in the 

6 war against extremists; 

7 (4) the Congress should not take any action 

8 that will endanger United States military forces in 

9 the field, including the elimination or reduction of 

10 funds for troops in the field, as such an action with 

11 respect to funding would undermine their safety or 

12 harm their effectiveness in pursuing their assigned 

13 missions; 

14 (5) the primary objective of the overall U.S. 

15 strategy in Iraq should be to encourage Iraqi leaders 

16 to make political compromises that will foster rec17 onciliation and strengthen the unity government, ul18 timately leading to improvements in the security sit19 uation; 

20 (6) the military part of this strategy should 

21 focus on maintaining the territorial integrity of Iraq, 

22 denying international terrorists a safe haven, con23 ducting counterterrorism operations, promoting re24 gional stability, supporting Iraqi efforts to bring 

25 greater security to Baghdad, and training and 

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1 equipping Iraqi forces to take full responsibility for 

2 their own security; 

3 (7) United States military operations should, as 

4 much as possible, be confined to these goals, and 

5 should charge the Iraqi military with the primary 

6 mission of combating sectarian violence; 

7 (8) the military Rules of Engagement for this 

8 plan should reflect this delineation of responsibil9 ities, and the Secretary of Defense and the Chair10 man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should clarify the 

11 command and control arrangements in Baghdad; 

12 (9) the United States Government should trans13 fer to the Iraqi military, in an expeditious manner, 

14 such equipment as is necessary; 

15 (10) the United States Government should en16 gage selected nations in the Middle East to develop 

17 a regional, internationally sponsored peace-and-rec18 onciliation process for Iraq; 

19 (11) the Administration should provide regular 

20 updates to the Congress, produced by the Com21 mander of United States Central Command and his 

22 subordinate commanders, about the progress or lack 

23 of progress the Iraqis are making toward this end; 

24 and 

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1 (12) our overall military, diplomatic, and eco2 nomic strategy should not be regarded as an ‘‘open3 ended’’ or unconditional commitment, but rather as 

4 a new strategy that hereafter should be conditioned 

5 upon the Iraqi government’s meeting benchmarks 

6 that must be delineated in writing and agreed to by 

7 the Iraqi Prime Minister. Such benchmarks should 

8 include, but not be limited to, the deployment of 

9 that number of additional Iraqi security forces as 

10 specified in the plan in Baghdad, ensuring equitable 

11 distribution of the resources of the Government of 

12 Iraq without regard to the sect or ethnicity of recipi13 ents, enacting and implementing legislation to en14 sure that the oil resources of Iraq benefit Sunni 

15 Arabs, Shia Arabs, Kurds, and other Iraqi citizens 

16 in an equitable manner, and the authority of Iraqi 

17 commanders to make tactical and operational deci18 sions without political intervention. 

Æ 

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