IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

George Rahsaan Brooks, :

Appellant :

:

v. :

:

Office of the District Attorney :

and District Attorney, : No. 12 C.D. 2016

Stephen A. Zappala : Submitted: May 13, 2016

BEFORE: HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY 

JUDGE COVEY FILED: September 14, 2016

George Rahsaan Brooks (Brooks) appeals from the Allegheny County 

Common Pleas Court’s (trial court) August 6, 2015 order dismissing his pro se 

complaint against the Allegheny County (County) District Attorney’s Office and 

District Attorney Stephen A. Zappala (Zappala) (collectively, Defendants) 

(Complaint) as frivolous. Brooks presents two issues for this Court’s review: (1) 

whether the trial court erred by circumventing Section 1405(b) of The County Code 

(Code);

1

and (2) whether the trial court erred by declaring that Brooks’ Complaint 

was frivolous. After review, we affirm.

On September 30, 1975, Brooks was arrested.2 Brooks further alleges in 

the Complaint that on October 1, 1975, Detective Robert Spozarski (Detective 

 

1 Act of August 9, 1955, P.L. 323, as amended, 16 P.S. § 1405(b).

2 According to the Complaint the arrest was “for an offense that had nothing to do with the 

instant case.” Complaint ¶ 8. In his Complaint, Brooks essentially asserts that the prosecutors 

arrested him on September 30, 1975 for the assault and robbery of Michael Miller and are 
2

Spozarski) arrested Brooks for the assault and robbery of Michael Miller (Miller).3 

According to the Complaint, Brooks was arraigned, but not for robbery or assault, nor 

was he placed in the county jail for such charges. See Complaint ¶ 10. Brooks 

further avers that Detectives Spozarski, Charles Lenz (Lenz), Pharris Hutton 

(Hutton), Robert McKay (McKay), Frank Amity (Amity) and Joseph G. Stotlrmyer

(Stotlrmyer) questioned him on several occasions at police headquarters about 

“Freddy” and about identifying “Freddy” from a photo array, but Brooks refused,

stating he would not talk without a warrant or court order. Complaint ¶ 11. Brooks 

alleges that the detectives told him they knew he was in the hospital with Miller and 

Freddy and, thus, wanted him to identify Freddy by full name and photo. See 

Complaint ¶ 11. Brooks also asserts in the Complaint that he was subpoenaed for 

Miller’s November 18, 1975 Coroner’s Inquest. Complaint ¶ 14. Brooks avers that 

the sole purpose for subpoenaing him was for Miller’s family to see him, thereby

allowing them to identify him in future court proceedings. See Complaint ¶ 14. 

On September 17, 1980, Brooks was sentenced to life imprisonment.4 

“Since then [Brooks] has filed several unsuccessful [Post Conviction Relief Act5

(]PCRA[)] Petitions.”6 Trial Ct. Op. at 1. According to the Complaint, Brooks sent 

Zappala several letters claiming his innocence and asking Zappala to review the 

 

fabricating the October 1, 1975 date of arrest. In his brief, Brooks asserts that September 30, 1975 

was the date the detectives testified before the Grand Jury. See Brooks’ Br. at 9. 

3

It appears Brooks is using the term assault rather than the charge of murder. See infra note 

4.

4

See Trial Ct. Op. at 1. The record does not indicate on what charges he was sentenced, 

although Defendants’ brief states that Brooks was convicted of robbery and murder in 1980. See 

Defendants’ Br. at 2. However, the United States District Court in Brooks v. Zimmerman, 712 

F.Supp. 496 (W.D. Pa. 1999), confirms that Brooks was indeed convicted of robbery and murder of 

the second degree for the robbery and death of Miller. “It is well settled that this Court may take 

judicial notice of pleadings and judgments in other proceedings where appropriate.” Lycoming 

Cnty. v. Pa. Labor Relations Bd., 943 A.2d 333, 335 n.8 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007). 

5

42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.

6

There is no verification of this statement in the record, although Defendants’ brief 

references 11 previous PCRA petitions. See Defendants’ Br. at 3. 
3

record. See Complaint ¶ 16. Those requests were denied. See Complaint ¶ 16. 

Thereafter, Brooks asked the Pennsylvania Innocence Project to request materials 

from Zappala on his behalf, but those requests were also denied. See Complaint ¶ 16. 

On January 26, 2015, Brooks filed a Misconduct Complaint against 

prior-County District Attorney Dugan (Dugan) and Assistant District Attorney 

Edward Fagan (ADA Fagan) for conspiring with the County Coroner’s Office. 

However, the Misconduct Complaint was returned due to Brooks’ failure to provide 

his criminal docket number and to include a formal petition or motion. See 

Complaint, Ex. C, C-1. In response, on July 15, 2015, Brooks filed the Complaint 

“request[ing] that [D]efendants be prosecuted by the Commonwealth, charging 

[D]efendants with willful and gross negligence in the execution of the duties of their 

office[.]” Complaint ¶ 48. In conjunction with the Complaint, Brooks filed a Petition 

for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. On August 6, 2015, the trial court 

dismissed the Complaint as frivolous, and the In Forma Pauperis request was 

dismissed as moot. Brooks appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. By order 

filed January 6, 2016, the case was transferred to this Court.7

Brooks first argues that the trial court erred by circumventing Section 

1405 of the Code, entitled Misconduct of district attorney. Initially, Section 102 of 

the Code specifies that the Code “does not apply to counties of the first, second A, or 

second classes.” 16 P.S. § 102. Allegheny County is a second class county. See 

DeFazio v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of Allegheny Cnty., 756 A.2d 1103 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2000). Thus, Section 1405(b) of the Code does not apply to Zappala.

 

7

“Our scope of review is limited to determining whether constitutional rights have been 

violated, whether the trial court abused its discretion, or whether the trial court committed an error 

of law.” Lichtman v. Glazer, 111 A.3d 1225, 1227 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015).
4

Notwithstanding, Section 1405(b) of the Code provides:

Upon complaint in writing, verified by oath or affirmation 

of the party aggrieved, made to the court in which any 

district attorney shall prosecute the pleas of the 

Commonwealth, charging such district attorney with wilful 

and gross negligence in the execution of the duties of his 

office, the court shall cause notice of such complaint to 

be given to the district attorney and of the time fixed by 

the court for the hearing of the same. If upon such 

hearing the court shall be of opinion that there is probable 

cause for the complaint, they shall hand over or commit the 

district attorney to answer the same in due course of law. If 

the court shall be of opinion that there is no probable cause 

for such complaint, they shall dismiss the same, with 

reasonable costs to be assessed by the court.

16 P.S. § 1405(b) (emphasis added). However,

it is well established that liability for any true crime, where 

an offense carries with it a jail sentence, must be based 

exclusively upon personal causation; imposition of liability 

pursuant to a respondeat superior theory is impermissible 

and unconstitutional. . . . Section 1405 [of the Code] does 

not provide for guilt on the basis of vicarious liability, 

[because] it provides for imprisonment not exceeding one 

year[.]

Leventry v. Tulowitski, 804 A.2d 1281, 1284-85 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002) (bold emphasis 

added).

In the instant case, the only parties named in the Complaint’s caption are 

the District Attorney’s Office and Zappala. Notwithstanding, Brooks alleges in the 

Complaint’s body that ADA Fagan and Assistant District Attorney Peter Dixon 

(ADA Dixon) are also parties, thereby implying that the District Attorney’s Office 

and Zappala are liable based on ADA Fagan’s and ADA Dixon’s actions. See 
5

Complaint ¶¶ 5, 6. Indeed, there are only two Complaint allegations that reference 

Zappala.

8

 

“Because Section 1405 [of the Code] does not provide for guilt on the 

basis of vicarious liability, . . . [Brooks] could not establish probable cause based on 

[the District Attorney’s Office’s9] supervision of [ADAs Fagan and Dixon].” 

Leventry, 804 A.2d at 1285. Under the circumstances, the trial court did not 

circumvent Section 1405(b) of the Code by dismissing the Complaint without a 

probable cause hearing.

Brooks next contends that the trial court erred when it determined that

Brooks’ Complaint was frivolous. We disagree. Pennsylvania Rule of Civil 

Procedure No. 240(j)(1) provides in pertinent part:

If, simultaneous with the commencement of an action or 

proceeding or the taking of an appeal, a party has filed a 

petition for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, the court 

prior to acting upon the petition may dismiss the action, 

proceeding or appeal if the allegation of poverty is untrue or 

if it is satisfied that the action, proceeding or appeal is 

frivolous.

Note: A frivolous action or proceeding has been 

defined as one that ‘lacks an arguable basis either in 

law or in fact.’ Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 

[326] . . . (1989).

Pa.R.C.P. No. 240(j)(1). 

Here, Brooks claims that his Complaint avers that he is a victim of a 

criminal conspiracy among city detectives, district attorneys and the coroner’s office 

to punish and penalize him for refusing to cooperate with city detectives and district 

attorneys. He maintains that they willfully framed him. He further claims that 

 

8 Both allegations, which will be discussed more fully herein, aver that Zappala did not 

respond to Brooks’ letters. See Complaint ¶¶ 16, 33.

9 Clearly, Zappala, although a named party, cannot be vicariously liable because he was not 

the County District Attorney at the time of the ADAs’ service.
6

Zappala was made aware of this manifest injustice when both Brooks and the 

Pennsylvania Innocence Project informed Zappala that he possessed evidence, to 

which Brooks was entitled, but which Zappala’s predecessors refused to disclose in 

an effort to conceal the criminal conspiracy, police/coroner misconduct and 

miscarriage of justice. Brooks also contends that his Complaint declares that Zappala 

ignored the evidence, refused to cooperate, and failed to turn over 

exculpatory/mitigating evidence and to investigate. Thus, Brooks argues that his

Complaint is not frivolous because its averments establish an arguable basis in law 

and fact that Zappala’s actions amount to willful, gross negligence of office in

violation of Section 1405(a) of the Code.

Section 1405(a) of the Code provides:

If any district attorney shall wilfully and corruptly demand, 

take or receive any other fee or reward than such as is 

prescribed by law for any official duties required by law to 

be executed by him in any criminal proceeding, or if such 

district attorney shall be guilty of wilful and gross 

negligence in the execution of the duties of his office, he 

shall be guilty of a misdemeanor in office, and, on 

conviction thereof, be sentenced to pay a fine not exceeding 

one thousand dollars and to undergo imprisonment not 

exceeding one year, and his office shall be declared vacant.

16 P.S. § 1405(a) (emphasis added). Only two of Brooks’ 48 allegations in the 

Complaint concern Zappala:

16. [Brooks] sent several letters to [Zappala] informing him 

[as] to what had occurred and explaining to him [Brooks’] 

innocence. [Brooks] requested of [Zappala] to review the 

record and would clearly discover [sic] that [Brooks] is a 

victim of a conspiracy and manifest injustice. [Zappala] 

willfully ignored [Brooks’] letters and his duty as the 

District Attorney. Brooks also asked the Pennsylvania 

Innocence Project who is reviewing his case to request 
7

these materials from [Zappala] and their [sic] request was 

denied. (See Exhibit ‘B’).[10]

. . . . 

33. [Zappala] is continuing the conspiracy and willful gross 

negligence. [Brooks] wrote him six times explaining to him 

that he is a victim of a police, coroner, district attorney 

conspiracy, that he was wrongfully convicted and actually 

innocent of the crime [for which] he was convicted. He 

[asked] [Zappala] to look at the probable cause affidavit, 

arrest warrant, grand jury transcript, coroner hearing, voir 

dire and sentencing transcript and the affidavit [Exhibit ‘A’] 

of Attorney Michael J. Healey.[11] When [Brooks] got no 

response from [Zappala], he sent him several more letters

explaining to him that the particulars he asked him to 

review, were never turned over to him. [Brooks] then

[asked] [Zappala] if he would furnish him with all or some 

of the particulars because he had the P[ennsylvania] 

Innocence Project investigating his innocence evidence. 

[Zappala] ignored [Brooks] again. [Brooks] then asked the 

P[ennsylvania] Innocence Project to ask[] [Zappala] for said 

particulars but [Zappala] would give them no help. [Exhibit 

‘B’] [Zappala] is not at liberty to keep in place willful 

and gross negligence started and put in place by his 

predecessors. It is as much his duty to refrain or to keep 

in place improper actions calculated or started by his 

predecessors that produced a wrongful conviction as it is 

for him to use every legitimate means to bring about a 

just result or to undo a manifest injustice.

Complaint ¶¶ 16, 33 (emphasis added). Viewing the Complaint’s allegations as true, 

we hold that Zappala ignoring Brooks’ letters does not permit an arguable basis in 

law or fact that Zappala was willfully or grossly negligent in the execution of the 

 

10 Complaint Exhibit B is a letter from the Pennsylvania Innocence Project to Brooks 

concerning its representation of Brooks. It contains the following relevant sentence: “I still have 

not received any word back from Michael Healey, and the [County] District Attorney’s Office was 

unhelpful.” Complaint Ex. B at 1.

11 The Affidavit of Michael J. Healey essentially states that Brooks’ attorney received the 

Coroner’s Inquest Transcript from Brooks, but the transcript was not included in the record received 

from the trial court. Further, Healey maintains in his Affidavit that the jury voir dire transcript was 

not a part of the trial court record. See Complaint Ex. A.
8

duties of his office. Those allegations, in and of themselves, establish nothing more 

than that Zappala did not respond to Brooks’ review request letters. Because the 

Complaint contains no arguable basis in law or fact, the trial court did not err by 

declaring that Brooks’ Complaint was frivolous.

Based on the foregoing, the trial court’s order is affirmed.

___________________________

ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

Judge McCullough did not participate in the decision in this case.
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

George Rahsaan Brooks, :

Appellant :

:

v. :

:

Office of the District Attorney :

and District Attorney, : No. 12 C.D. 2016

Stephen A. Zappala :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 14th day of September, 2016, the Allegheny County 

Common Pleas Court’s August 6, 2015 order is affirmed.

___________________________

ANNE E. COVEY, Judge