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Strategic Studies Institute

and

U.S. Army War College Press

THE FUTURE OF THE ARAB GULF 

MONARCHIES

IN THE AGE OF UNCERTAINTIES

Mohammed El-Katiri

June 2013

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ISBN 1-58487-575-5
iii

FOREWORD

Upheavals in the Arab world over the last 2 years 

have altered the political and security landscape in the 

monarchies of the Arab Peninsula in an unprecedented 

way. Evolving political and social processes pose a 

new set of challenges to Arab Gulf rulers. Inspired 

by Arab revolts, citizens of the region are increasingly calling on their governments to broaden political participation and to be accountable, receptive, and 

responsive to their demands. 

In this monograph, Dr. El-Katiri argues that the 

changes that are sweeping across the Arab world are 

unlikely to leave the Arab Gulf monarchical regimes 

intact, and that the leaders of these states should initiate genuine and profound policy reforms toward 

greater political openness and inclusiveness, in order 

to avoid the scenarios of regime change experienced 

by other Arab countries during 2011. 

 

 DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

 Director

 Strategic Studies Institute and

 U.S. Army War College Press

v

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

MOHAMMED EL-KATIRI is a Senior Advisor at the 

United Kingdom’s (UK) Conflict Studies Research 

Centre (CSRC) and Senior Researcher at The Hague 

Institute for Global Justice. Before working for CSRC, 

Dr. El-Katiri was a Research Fellow at the UK Defence 

Academy, and later covered North Africa as a Political Risk Analyst at Eurasia Group. With more than 

10 years of regional experience, his research interests 

include political and economic security in North Africa and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, 

North African relations with the European Union, 

and security policies around the Mediterranean. 

Dr. El-Katiri has published numerous internal and external UK Defence Academy reports, including reference reports on national and regional security issues 

in the GCC and the Mediterranean. He is a frequent 

commentator in international media including the 

BBC, the Financial Times, and Al-Jazeera.

vii

SUMMARY

Seismic cultural and political shifts are under way 

in the Arab Gulf monarchies. The political upheavals and transitions that have swept through the Arab 

world over the last 2 years have not toppled the Arab 

Gulf rulers, but did not leave them untouched either. 

Rulers of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states 

face heightened internal and external challenges and 

uncertainties. Pro-democracy protests and calls are 

extending from Bahrain to other oil-rich countries of 

the Arabian Peninsula. The expectations of GCC citizens, particularly the educated youth, are increasingly 

moving from socio-economic demands to political 

ones. They are now not only asking for jobs or wage 

increases, but also for more political participation 

and accountability.

Chief among internal challenges is the resurgence 

in several GCC countries, particularly Bahrain and 

Saudi Arabia, of a decades-long sectarian rift between 

the Sunni regimes and their Shia subjects. The Gulf 

regimes’ already tense relations with Iran have worsened on the basis of alleged Iranian interference inflaming sectarian tensions in Bahrain and across the 

broader region. 

In this monograph, the author assesses the challenges facing the region’s rulers, and proposes meaningful political reform as a means of mitigating them.

1

THE FUTURE OF THE ARAB GULF 

MONARCHIES IN THE AGE 

OF UNCERTAINTIES

At first glance, the member states of the Gulf 

Cooperation Council (GCC),1

 with the exception of 

Bahrain, appear to have weathered the storm of the 

Arab uprisings with little visible disturbance. A closer 

look at the region, however, suggests that its perceived 

stability may very well be threatened in the longer 

term. This is because many of the region’s government policies that are intended to appease their local 

populations—specifically the expansionary budgets 

and generous welfare and employment packages of 

the past 24 months—are intrinsically short-term solutions to wider and longer term social, economic, and 

political grievances that characterize the GCC 

economies as a whole. 

In particular, GCC citizens expect long-term institutional reforms and more political freedom. Voices 

calling for more good governance, transparency, 

and an inclusive political system are increasing and 

spreading across the region. There are also concerns 

over the sustainability of many economic policies in 

the region, which raises the question of how sustainable current living standards will be.

The repercussions of the uprisings in several Arab 

countries in the Gulf region are multiple. They include 

the reviving of democratization demands, the potential of setting precedents of democratic models, and 

the weakening of Egypt as an important security partner. It would therefore be misleading to believe that 

the Arab Gulf monarchies will remain resilient indefinitely to the political awakening in several Arab countries. The GCC states also face various other regional 
2

and geopolitical challenges that further threaten the 

wider region’s stability. For this reason, the Gulf monarchies’ current equilibrium may well be of a shortterm nature.

INTRODUCTION

Political upheavals across North Africa and the 

Middle East in 2011-12 brought seismic shifts in the 

geopolitics of the Arab world and in the internal politics of the entire region. The GCC countries, with the 

notable exception of Bahrain, succeeded in largely 

avoiding mass protest movements as observed in 

many other parts of the Arab world. But the Gulf 

monarchies nevertheless did not remain unaffected; 

small protest movements appeared in Kuwait, Oman, 

and other GCC states and managed to create a nearpolitical crisis in Bahrain in early 2011. Many of the 

GCC states have since handed out generous welfare 

and employment packages—in many cases on top of 

already extremely generous welfare state functions—

in order to appease demands by the populace for a 

greater share in their countries’ wealth. 

But the GCC states constitute a mosaic of countries 

facing much underlying—and until now unresolved—

social, geopolitical, and economic conflict potential, 

including both domestic and external threats to their 

long-term stability. Internally, a combination of ethnic, political and economic factors is threatening the 

future of the political regimes in some GCC countries 

more than others. On the economic front, the region 

needs to create nonhydrocarbon sources of economic 

growth, which could translate into creating job opportunities for millions of young job-seekers across 

the GCC states. The influx of foreign labor over the 
3

economic boom years has contributed to the economic 

development and prosperity of the GCC countries, 

but many nationals continue to fail to match job requirements, while the disproportionate number of 

rootless foreigners has become a source of concern to 

the region’s small states. 

Sectarian tensions have been a concern to the GCC 

states for many decades. In recent months, accusations of an Iranian role in inciting sectarian tensions in 

several GCC states have been dominating headlines 

and public discussions across the GCC countries. Regardless of the accuracy of such accusations, the GCC 

Sunni regimes have increased their surveillance of 

the Shia population, while Bahrain’s Shiite majority 

made a determined statement early in 2011 regarding 

their expectations of future access to the micro-state’s 

wealth and political power. The media war is heightening tensions between Shia and Sunni populations 

in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia and affecting other GCC 

countries. These tensions, if not contained, could pose 

a threat to the social fabric and the region’s stability. 

Iran also remains the main external threat to the territorial integrity and interests of most GCC countries. 

Iranian-GCC tensions have had a long history, reaching back to the first two Gulf wars, and have arisen 

anew in recent years over a variety of issues including 

territorial disputes between the United Arab Emirates 

(UAE) and Iran, Qatar’s and Iran’s shared gas field 

in the offshore Gulf, and Iran’s ongoing conflict with 

the West over its nuclear program. In the event of a 

military confrontation between Western states and 

Iran, the GCC states, which share Iran’s main access 

route for its oil and natural gas exports, the Straits of 

Hormuz, would be exposed to significant disruptions 

of their main trade route regardless of whether they 

were involved in the conflict. 
4

Of the several distinct challenges that are facing 

this part of the Arab world, internal problems remain 

the most difficult. The people of the region are increasingly demanding a change in the current conservative 

political systems. For decades, GCC rulers escaped introducing substantial political and economic reforms 

that could reduce their broad political powers. 

Several initiatives have been announced by a number of GCC states at both national and regional levels 

to strengthen GCC security and resilience. For example, Saudi Arabia sees the establishment of a union 

among all the six members of the GCC as a strategic 

response to the growing assertiveness of Iran—a view 

that is not supported by all GCC members. 

This analysis aims to answer the key question on 

the future of the Arab Gulf Monarchies in the face of 

these increasing internal and external challenges and 

threats. It is based on several months of research, including in the region itself, and includes the valuable 

input of more than 20 interviews conducted with decisionmakers both within and outside the region. Given 

the socio-political differences that persist among the 

GCC countries, an in-depth discussion of each country’s domestic politics would be desirable; but in the 

light of space constraints, this monograph focuses on 

selected political issues that are common to the majority of GCC countries. However, the analysis will 

place more emphasis on Saudi Arabia given its size 

and influence in the region. What happens in Saudi 

Arabia matters in the rest of the GCC states, and undoubtedly, changes in Saudi Arabia are more likely 

to have repercussions on the rest of its GCC neighbors. The discussion will show that concerns about the 

future of the GCC monarchies are not an exaggeration. It would be misleading to believe that the Arab 
5

Gulf monarchies will remain resilient to the political 

awakening across Arab countries. To prevent a repetition of uprisings seen in early 2011 in Tunisia and 

Egypt, it is essential that GCC states adopt substantial 

political reforms. 

This monograph is divided into two main sections: 

the first covering internal challenges to GCC stability; 

and the second covering external challenges to the 

security and stability of the Arab Gulf countries overall. A conclusion reviews the potential impacts on 

U.S. interests. 

PRECARIOUS STABILITY AT HOME

Threats from within remain the main concern to 

the stability of GCC regimes. This is not a novelty 

in the region. Over recent decades, the most serious 

threats to regime stability and security have been internal. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 remains 

the only serious external threat to any GCC regime in 

recent history. 

The political upheavals of the last 2 years in the 

Arab world have introduced new challenges and 

brought dormant tensions to the fore. The list of 

threats to GCC regimes is wide-ranging, including 

factors affecting the cohesion of the social fabric of 

the GCC societies such as terrorism and demands for 

constitutional reform. 

Increasing Calls for Democratization. 

The GCC monarchies have not faced strong popular demands for democracy during their years of existence. Calls for democratization, at least in Saudi Arabia, have been on the agenda only for a limited circle 
6

of reformist elites. For the small rich countries, democracy has been an alien culture. For decades, the vast 

majority of GCC citizens were uninterested in their 

political systems or political participation in them. 

Only a tiny educated minority was involved in any 

kind of political activism. In countries such as Bahrain 

and Kuwait, where the political systems allowed limited formal political participation, a small number of 

young nationals showed interest in civic and political 

activities. But all this is now set to change. 

Economic, educational, and technological advances 

over the last decades have rapidly changed how GCC 

nationals see their rulers and the management of their 

public affairs. The internet and social media have allowed GCC nationals to access information and political analysis to an extent that has never been allowed 

by local media and academia. The spread of democratic concepts across the region over the last decade 

through education and access to information has fundamentally altered assumptions and preconceptions 

there. An increasing number of people, mainly youth, 

sees in democratic political systems the most appropriate forms of government. A survey conducted in 

March 2011 showed that 60 percent of the GCC youth 

who took part in the survey considered democracy to 

be their top priority.2

At the time of this writing, political freedoms remain restricted in the region. All GCC regimes ban 

political parties, with the result that there are none in 

any GCC countries, including in Kuwait, which has 

a political system that resembles most closely some 

features of Western democracy. Kuwait and Bahrain 

have held parliamentary elections, but have political 

associations rather than political parties. Both countries allow women to vote and stand in elections. 
7

Their parliaments have limited powers to oversee the 

executive body, which is dominated by members of 

the ruling family. Both parliaments possess blockade 

powers, but limited legislative power. 

Despite some differences that characterize the 

formal politics, there are several key commonalities 

among the Arab Gulf monarchies. A distinguishing 

feature is the lack of any check and balance control 

on the powers of the Gulf monarchs. Another distinguishing feature compared to other Arab countries, 

including the monarchies of Jordan and Morocco, is 

that the GCC sovereigns rule as a family. Their family 

members are appointed to key positions and benefit 

from many privileges. The result is an increased susceptibility to political volatility, with the risk of unpredictable successor regimes. Although the system 

of government practiced by Jamal Mubarak in Egypt 

differed from that of the GCC states, at the time of this 

writing, Egypt provides a case in point demonstrating 

the potential complications of regime change. 

The events of the Arab uprisings that started in 

December 2010 have revived demands for more inclusive and transparent politics in the GCC. “Days of 

Rage” were announced in almost every GCC country, 

emulating the calls to mass protests in North Africa. 

Bahrain and Oman are the countries that have seen 

large and continuous protests since early 2011. Bahrainis and Omanis, inspired by upheavals elsewhere, 

were the first to take to the streets to demand jobs, action against corruption, and other social and political 

reforms. In Bahrain, the political crisis was extremely 

complex, and political dialogue between the Sunni 

government and Shia’a opposition groups has so 

far failed to break the deadlock.3

 In Oman, political 

changes and promises by Sultan Qaboos following the 
8

2011 protests managed to calm the anger for a while, 

but without addressing the underlying problems:4 in 

2012, protests erupted again with demands for employment and political reform.5 In Saudi Arabia, the 

Saudi government used its official religious establishment to stop mass protests on March 11, 2011. Official 

religious scholars issued a fatwa denouncing protests. 

Imams from mosques across the main cities called on 

people not to destabilize the country.6 This Saudi strategy has contained the Sunni population, but Saudi 

Shia citizens continued to protest throughout the 

following 1 1/2 years. 

Saudi Arabia and other GCC states reacted by 

offering cash handouts and subsidies to their own 

citizens in order to restrain the transformation of 

economic malaise into a serious political crisis. King 

Abdullah of Saudi Arabia cut short his medical rehabilitation stay in Morocco and returned to Riyadh to 

announce a number of financial packages intended to 

contain the spread of protests across the country. In 

February 2011, 19 Royal Orders were announced, including a range of financial support measures such as 

unemployment benefits, increased wages, a program 

to build 500,000 housing units, and the writing-off of 

a series of loans. The total cost of all these social measures over the coming years is estimated to amount to 

U.S.$130 billion. The unemployment benefit is indicative of the generosity and cost of the measures taken: 

in an effort to appease the anger of its unemployed 

youth, the government now provides a year’s salary 

for job-seeking Saudi citizens.7

Other GCC states announced similar measures. 

Bahrain issued a one-off cash transfer of 1000 Bahraini 

Dinars (approximately U.S.$2,660) per family. Kuwait also gave its own citizens cash handouts of 1000 

Kuwaiti Dinars (U.S.$3,500).8
9

Buying legitimacy through public employment, 

grants, increase of wages, or any other rent distributive tool has proved temporarily effective in some 

countries, but is unsustainable in the long term, both 

financially and politically. The rich GCC countries still 

have a margin of time to keep using the same tactics, 

because there are abundant financial resources to be 

mobilized—with budget surpluses accumulated over 

the last few years, these states still have room for 

maneuver. But less prosperous Bahrain and Oman 

cannot continue with this approach at a similar scale 

to their neighbors. Their populations are aware of this 

fact, and this is a contributing factor to the continuing protests in these countries, notably absent in the 

richer states. 

But the Story Is Still Unfinished. 

The Gulf region has entered a new era. What 

started as the voicing of socio-economic grievances in 

GCC states has transformed into a growing political 

quest for liberties. Local activists are calling for political reforms in almost all countries across the region. 

In Saudi Arabia, different political groups (liberals, 

Islamists, and female groups) are now calling for deep 

political reforms and liberties. The upheavals across 

the Arab world have revived calls for a constitutional 

reform that would transform the Saudi Kingdom into 

a constitutional monarchy. The constitutional reformists, as they are known, are made up of academics, 

writers, businessmen, and other professionals of different ideological backgrounds ranging from liberals 

to pan-Arab nationalists including members of the Islamist Sahwa.9

 Their political reform agenda seeks to 

curtail the excessive powers held by the King and the 
10

royal court. The monarch, according to the Saudi Basic 

Law, has the power to nominate and dismiss ministers, as well as to dissolve the Consultative Council. 

He is also the head of the armed forces. Although 

King Abdullah has set economic and political reforms 

as priority since his ascent to the throne in 2005, little 

has changed in political terms. Political reforms were 

too slow and insubstantial to noticeably change the 

form of government. In one sense, these were cosmetic reforms, such as a cabinet reshuffle, a change of 

the head of religious police or the appointment of the 

first female in the state’s history as a deputy minister.10 The most recent reforms announced by the King, 

once again intended to undermine any mass build-up 

of political discontent, are symbolic but once again do 

not amount to major change: in March 2011, Saudi citizens were granted a right to elect half of the members 

of municipal councils. Later in the same year, King 

Abdullah granted women the right to participate in 

future municipal elections. 

There are many conservative forces that oppose 

meaningful reform in Saudi Arabia, just as they have 

done successfully in previous decades under the rule 

of late King Fahd. At the time when King Fahd introduced the first constitution in 1992, several groups 

voiced opposition for a range of different reasons. The 

conservative religious establishment saw in the constitution a challenge to the legal order that is based on 

the Quran. Another opposing group was made up of 

influential conservative princesses, who did not want 

to cede any political powers to other institutions. Their 

main concern was that the adoption of a constitution 

could set a precedent, and open the door for more substantial political concessions toward a participatory 

political system.11 King Fahd was against the organi-
11

zation of free elections in his country, saying that “our 

people’s character and way of life are different from 

the ways and traditions of the democratic world...

free elections are not suitable for our country.”12 These 

conservative forces are still shaping policy-making in 

the royal court. 

It is not only secular groups that are calling for representative politics; some Islamist groups and activists 

are now joining the call. The proponents of democracy 

in Saudi Arabia call for a change from the current political system based on patronage, where princes of 

the family of Al-Saud dominate key central, regional, 

and sectoral positions. More significantly, criticism of 

the current situation and calls for democratic reform 

are now coming from within the Al-Saud family itself. 

The old reformist princes are now demanding democratic reforms, and calling on Saudi leaders to initiate reforms to avoid the destiny of deposed leaders 

elsewhere in the Arab world. For instance, the current 

King’s brother, Prince Talal bin Abdel Aziz, urged the 

introduction of substantial political reforms to avoid 

mass uprisings among Saudis.13 Princess Basma bint 

Saud bin Abdul Aziz voiced criticism of the entourage 

of the King for exploiting the authoritarian political 

system to repress protestors.14 Turki Al-Hamad, a 

Saudi author and novelist, eloquently summarized the 

reform demands in a prologue to a newly published 

book, titled The Alternative Saudi: Features of the Fourth 

State, written by Ahmad Adnan, a Saudi journalist 

based in Beirut. He urged the ruling elite to reform 

in order to avoid being forced to change, adding that 

calls for reform are not a luxury demand, but rather 

a necessity.15

The current political situation in Bahrain is far more 

complex. The political tensions between the ruling 
12

elite and opposition Shia forces have reached a stalemate. Shia riots continue at the time of writing. The 

failure of political dialogue is a consequence of a lack 

of a united opposition front on the one hand, and of a 

divided ruling family on the other. A wide gap exists 

between opposition groups on the scope of ambition 

for the political reforms wanted for the country.16 The 

main opposition group, Alwefaq, is hoping to alter the 

ruling system by empowering the parliament. On the 

institutional front, Alwefaq demands a constitutional 

amendment that gives more powers to parliament to 

scrutinize all government policies. Some opposition 

groups have gone further, asking for the removal of 

the long-serving prime minister, Sheikh Khalifa AlKhalifa, as a key part of any political settlement. The 

Sheikh is considered by the Shia population to be a 

hardliner and an opponent of any political dialogue or 

concessions.17 Even more radical groups have called 

for a total change of the state system, from a monarchy 

to a republic. 

Even in the rich UAE, an opposition Islamist group, 

the Reform and Social Guidance Association (hereafter 

Al-Islah), has emerged to call for democratic reforms. 

In 2011, Al-Islah issued a petition to introduce more 

pro-democracy reforms. This group has asked for legislative powers to be assigned to the Federal National 

Council, and for voting rights to be given to all citizens. Alarmed by this political development, the UAE 

government reacted firmly and arrested several activists,18 primarily Islamists. In addition to their calls for 

the democratization of the system, these Islamists appear to espouse a social project centered on preserving 

local traditional and conservative culture. A growing 

number of Emiratis are unsatisfied with the indecent 

behavior of expatriate residents and tourists in public. 
13

In June 2012, the Federal National Council proposed 

a dress code law to the cabinet.19 But the authorities, 

particularly in Dubai, are concerned about the growth 

and spread of any moralization discourse within the 

country, as a trend of this kind would challenge the 

core of Dubai’s business model as a tourist and international business hub. Frequent media statements by 

Dubai police chief Dahi Khalfan reflects the anxiety 

among Dubai’s leadership about the rise of the Islamic 

political discourse. Meanwhile, a Dubai-based Emirati 

academic has noted that while these movements have 

surprised the leadership, they are unlikely to constitute any threat to the political system.20 In his view, 

given the lack of political activism combined with a 

general satisfaction with the socio-economic conditions among nationals, Al-Islah or any other opposition group will only achieve limited support.21

Fear of the Rise of Political Islam. 

The political transitions in Egypt and Tunisia have 

brought in new challenges for the GCC’s conservative 

regimes. They have changed the political landscape in 

the region by democratically bringing political Islam 

into power. The victory of the Muslim Brotherhood 

in Egypt, in particular, was perceived as an unwelcome development. The GCC rulers are alarmed by 

the potential influence of the Egyptian democratic 

experience on their own societies. The horrifying scenario for the GCC rulers is if the Egyptian government 

led by the Muslim Brotherhood decides to spread its 

influence regionally by empowering other Islamist 

groups. Abdulakhaleq Abdullah, an Emirati political 

scientist, notes that the GCC are part and parcel of the 

Arab world, and they cannot escape the influence of 
14

the revolutions and the political transitions that follow them.22 For instance, the UAE, as with other GCC 

countries, remain concerned about possible links between their local Islamist groups and other Islamists 

in power in Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt.

Such fears about a pan-Arab Islamist nexus or 

influence are not groundless. During a visit by the 

chairman of Al-Islah, Sultan bin Kaid al-Qassimi, to 

the Moroccan ruling Islamist Party of Justice and Development, Al-Qassimi stated that the aim of his visit 

was to learn from Morocco’s unique experience of Islamist government in the Arab region.23

Sectarian Frictions. 

Another internal source of political fragility in several GCC states is the Shia-Sunni split. Shia populations are an integral part of the GCC societies. With 

the exception of Bahrain, where Shi’ites account for 

almost 70 percent of the population, in the rest of the 

GCC states Shia constitutes an important minority. 

Despite their significant size and centuries of their 

existence in the region, most of the current Sunni 

regimes perceive Shi’ism as a threat to their political 

stability and to social cohesion. This has manifested in 

systematic discrimination against Shia citizens in most 

GCC countries by the state apparatuses; Shi’ites are 

often treated as “second-class” citizens. According to 

one study on the subject, Shia has not enjoyed proper 

representation in the civilian or military institutions in 

the majority of GCC countries. Even in countries that 

allowed the participation of Shia citizens in managing 

the state’s affairs, they have never breached the ceiling 

that separates them from the Sunni elite.24
15

There is a wide conviction that the Saudi government has a deliberate policy of discrimination against 

its Shia subjects. The Saudi authorities deny their 

Shia subjects the freedom to practice many of their 

religious ceremonies. Statements by Saudi Sunni clerics that overtly incite discrimination and intolerance 

against Shia are not prohibited or punished. A 2009 

report by Human Rights Watch listed a few examples 

of institutional discrimination against the Saudi Shia 

minority, including the dominance of Sunni tribunals 

over the only three Shia courts and the fact that Saudi 

schools only teach Sunni Islam to pupils.25

The fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq and the 

empowerment of Iraqi Shia politicians have brought 

new dynamics into the region, potentially no less important than the impact of Iran’s Islamic revolution 

in 1979. This change fundamentally altered the geopolitical environment, giving much room to Iranian 

influence in the Middle East, and the reemergence of 

Shi’ism across the Gulf and Levant regions. Iranian 

support of Shia factions in Iraq over recent years has 

only given weight to the already existing perception 

that Iran is extending its influence across the region. 

The concern for the GCC regimes is to once again face 

outbreaks of Shia revolts, similar to the ones experienced after the Iranian Islamic revolution. A study of 

political violence related to Shi’ism notes that “since 

the revolution of 1979, Shia politics and activism in 

Saudi Arabia has typically been characterized as inspired, influenced and even directed by Iran.”26 This 

accentuates a common perception among Sunnis in 

the region that Shia groups of the Gulf are Persians 

(Aajams) who retain allegiance to Iran. The reality is 

different; the majority of the GCC’s Shia populations 

are Arabs. 
16

The study cited above suggests that sectarian 

rivalry will lead to a deteriorating situation: 

In the coming years, Shias and Sunnis will compete 

over power, first in Iraq but ultimately across the 

entire region. Beyond Iraq, other countries (even as 

they embrace reform) have to cope with intensifying rivalries between Shias and Sunnis. The overall 

Sunni-Shia conflict will play a large role in defining 

the Middle East as a whole and shaping its relations 

with the outside world.27

It appears that GCC rulers are taking this danger 

entirely seriously. Saudi Arabia is leading Arab-Sunni 

governments in a war against a Shia “invasion” of 

the GCC and the rest of the Middle East. This stance 

chosen by Saudi Arabia is driven by both geopolitics 

and ideological factors. On the religious front, the AlSaud regime is committed to this policy as a result 

of the great influence of the official religious institutions on policy making. Given the important status of 

Wahhabism in the Saudi political system, anti-Shi’ism 

is built into the structure of political and religious 

authority and has become pervasive in cultural and 

social institutions. The Saudi education system, for 

example, has historically preached intolerance for 

religious views that diverge from core Wahhabi tenets. 

The continued alienation of Shia citizens within 

most GCC societies has structurally damaged the 

political legitimacy of the rulers and the social 

cohesion. The magnitude of this sectarian rift has been 

described eloquently: 

Shia-Sunni conflict . . . has been far more important 

in shaping the Middle East than many realize or acknowledge. And it has become deeply embedded in 
17

popular prejudice, as stereotypes of the plebeian Shias 

and their wrongheaded view of Islam have defined 

how many Sunnis have seen their kinsmen. In Lebanon, popular lore has held that Shias have tails; they 

reproduce too prolifically, are too loud in expressing their religiosity, and, given Lebanon’s debonair 

self-image, are ridiculed for their low-class, tasteless 

and vulgar ways. Despite the political popularity of 

Hezbollah, Shias face discrimination and are dismissed as provincial, uncouth, and unfit for their lofty 

pretention of representing Lebanon. In Saudi Arabia, it 

is said that Shia spit in their food—a slander no doubt 

meant to discourage even socialization over meals between Sunnis and Shias—and that shaking hands with 

a Shia is polluting, necessitating ablutions.28

The Sunni-Shia rifts are most acute now in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. This has been the case for both 

countries for decades; both have seen several bouts of 

religious upheaval since the Islamic revolution in Iran 

in 1979. The religious divide has become even more 

pronounced in the two countries over the last 1 1/2 

years, and the local authorities appear to be struggling 

to address it. By contrast, other GCC countries have 

adopted a conciliatory approach toward Shia groups. 

Succession Issues. 

Another threat to internal stability lies in the infighting within the ruling families for positions of influence in most GCC countries. Such confrontations 

are exacerbated by a lack of clear rules for successions, 

and the complete absence of strong democratic institutions. The succession in Saudi Arabia, for instance, 

remains uncertain, and this is perceived as a potential source of political instability by many observers. 

Recently, the death of two crown princes, Sultan and 
18

Nayef, in less than a year brought to the fore questions 

over the regime’s stability in the mid and long term.29 

The vagueness of the succession system introduced by 

King Abdullah in 2006 leaves the matter unresolved 

once the aging and unwell sons of King Abdul Aziz 

die. There are dozens of contenders among the grandsons for the throne, with the strong possibility of 

factional disputes.30

Even in other GCC countries that have clearer 

stipulations for selecting successors, political systems characterized by family rule precipitate political 

uncertainty. The competition for senior positions is 

fierce. A recent example to illustrate how confusing 

and risky the situation could be is the succession dispute in the Ras Al-Khaima Emirate of the UAE. When 

the late Sheikh Saqr Al-Qassimi died in October 2010, 

two of his sons, Khalid and Saud, contended for the 

throne with their competition causing a political crisis 

in the UAE as a whole.31

EXTERNAL THREATS TO GCC STABILITY

A Dangerous Neighbor: Mounting Tensions 

with Iran. 

Arab Gulf countries have several concerns about 

Iran. First, they suspect that Iran is directly supporting Shia minorities, which is considered as direct interference in their domestic affairs. Second, Iran has 

continually criticized the strong ties between some 

Arab governments and the United States. Iran is 

anxious about the U.S. presence in the region,32 and 

the presence of foreign forces in the Gulf region has 

consequently increased other states’ fears of Iran.33

Third, there are territorial disputes with several GCC 
19

members, and Gulf rulers remain concerned about expansionist intentions of the Iranian regime.

There is also a deeper and broader underlying 

source of animosity. Iran’s desire to become a regional 

power constitutes a source of fear to its immediate 

Arab neighbors and other world powers. According 

to a 2011 study: 

Iran believes that it ought to play a major role in world 

affairs and that, as the defender of the interests of all 

Muslims and the guardian of Iran’s national interests, 

it should be treated as a beacon for revolutionary Islam throughout the world. Finally . . . its leadership’s 

belief [is] that Iran is geographically optimally situated 

to become the dominant power in the Persian Gulf.34

The mistrust of Iran by GCC countries has deepened over the last decade. The U.S.-led war on Iraq 

in 2003 profoundly changed the regional balance of 

power: Iran emerged as the dominant force in the 

region following the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s 

regime. Since then, as mentioned earlier, the GCC 

countries have been alarmed over pro-Iran Shi’ites 

gaining power in post-war Iraq and threatening to extend Shia influence across the region. In fact, the rise 

of Shia in Iraq has encouraged other Shia minorities 

in the region to aspire to greater prominence in their 

respective countries. But it is important to note that 

the underlying enmity stretches back decades. The 

tensions between Iran and most GCC countries have 

historical, ideological, and geostrategic roots, which 

make their animosity a structural feature rather than a 

cyclical one that depends on the ascendancy of hardline political factions in the Iranian politics or the accession to power of a new Arab monarch.
20

The full complexities of the relationships between 

Iran and its Arab Gulf neighbors cannot be covered 

exhaustively in a monograph of this size, but a brief 

review can be given of some specific issues and how 

they are linked to the ongoing tensions in the region.35

Arab Gulf countries have perceived Iran as a threat 

since before their independence. The enshrined sense 

of superiority among Iranian nationalists since the 

time of the Shahs stokes this animosity. This sense of 

superiority, which contrasts with the relative modesty 

of Arab neighbors, is based on Persian glorification of 

their pre-Islamic era.36 The overthrow of Shah Reza 

Pahlavi in 1979 fundamentally altered the region’s 

geopolitical landscape for the Arab countries and 

other external Western powers. For the Arab countries, the change of regime brought a clerical system 

that was hostile to the Sunni regimes and monarchies 

of the Gulf region. For the United States, the Islamic 

revolution removed a key ally in the region. 

Iran’s territorial disputes with its Arab neighbors 

in the Gulf also go back to before the Islamic revolution. Iranian claims on Bahrain in particular date back 

to the British announcement of withdrawal from the 

Gulf region in 1968.37 Calls from leading Iranian political figures and public opinion formers, but not the 

government, to annex Bahrain have intensified over 

recent years. Iran’s opposition to any deep integration among Arab Gulf countries only reinforces these 

fears. In July 2007, Hossein Shariatmadari, the editor 

of Kayhan, a daily newspaper that is known to be close 

to conservative political circles, revived Iran’s claim 

to Bahrain. His comments sparked a diplomatic crisis 

in Bahrain.38 Again in 2009, Ali Akbar Nateq Nouri, 

a prominent politician and a member of Iran’s Expediency Council, alluded to such claims.39 The Iranian 
21

government has always distanced itself from such 

provocative statements and claims. In May 2012, 

Iran was alarmed by Riyadh-Manama talks over the 

potential establishment of a political union, and saw 

in this initiative a potential game-changer that could 

challenge its influence and leadership ambitions in 

the region. The Saudi announcement intensified a 

war of words between Iranian and GCC institutions. 

The Iranian parliament voiced its disapproval of the 

proposed closer political relationship, and the suggestion by Ali Larijani, speaker of the Iranian parliament, 

that if Bahrain should have any merger at all it should 

be with Iran provoked a strong Bahraini official reaction.40 Bahrain’s foreign ministry summoned the Iranian Chargé d’Affaires to complain against what they 

described as Iranian interference in Bahrain’s internal 

affairs. This is not the first time that Iranian claims on 

Bahrain have collided with a desire for political integration: Iran opposed Bahrain’s attempts to join the 

Trucial States Federation in the early 1970s, and then 

successfully opposed Bahrain’s accession to the UAE 

federation—in both cases because of the view that 

Bahrain is properly Iranian territory.41

The UAE have not relinquished their claims on 

three islands(Abu Musa and the Tunbs) that were annexed by Iran in 1971, following the British departure, 

and have continued to reassert their claim to them at 

United Nations (UN) meetings ever since. The Iranian 

argument is that these islands had belonged to Iran 

before falling into the hands of the Arab Sheikhs of Ras 

Al-Khaima and Sharjah with the help of Britain.42 The 

UAE government stance has not changed, maintaining a call on the Iranian authorities to either negotiate 

bilaterally or refer their dispute to the International 

Court of Justice. Iran is disinclined to negotiate over 

the sovereignty of the three islands. 
22

Maritime delimitation between Kuwait and Saudi 

Arabia also remains a pending issue. The disputed 

maritime territory is rich in hydrocarbon resources, 

which increases its geopolitical importance. The 

Arash, also known as al-Dorra, an offshore gas field 

shared between Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Iran, is 

believed to possess substantial reserves estimated at 

200 billion cubic meters. In addition to the potential 

natural resources, extending the territorial water of 

Iran means maximizing its powers as a coastal state 

in a vital sea passage, as vessels departing the region 

would have to report to the Iranian authorities. Iran 

would acquire more powers to apply its environmental laws and restrict the movement of external military 

forces. In recent months, the dispute over maritime 

space and the joint field resurfaced when Iran announced in January 2012 its intentions to unilaterally 

develop the al-Dorra field. Given the need to increase 

gas production, all three countries are keen to develop 

the joint-field as soon as possible. But the possibility of 

joint exploration and development depends first upon 

the demarcation of maritime borders and furthermore 

on the regional political situation.

For all these factors listed above, Arab GulfIranian relations have experienced many instances of 

tensions and hostilities over at least the last 5 decades. 

Not surprisingly, these tensions may intensify in the 

immediate future.

The Iranian Threat—Nuclear Issues and Blockade. 

Iran’s aspiration to develop a nuclear capability 

is an additional specific issue that adds to tensions in 

the region. Concerns about real Iranian nuclear plans 

have alarmed the GCC states and Western powers. 
23

Despite Iran’s continuous assertion that its aim is to 

develop civilian nuclear capability, GCC governments 

remain skeptical about its genuine goal. Iran’s obscure 

attitude on the nuclear issue only reinforces anxiety 

among the Arab countries and across the world. Official statements suggest that the GCC leaders have 

opted for a conciliatory approach on Iran’s nuclear 

issue. In December 2011, Dubai’s ruler and the UAE 

Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed Bin Rashid AlMaktoum, in an interview with CNN, played down 

fears over Iran’s plans to develop nuclear weapons. 

He said that Iran is a Muslim country, and “[W]e 

have lived next to each other for thousands and thousands of years. I don’t believe that Iran will develop a 

nuclear weapon.” Public opinion on the issue among 

GCC leaders is almost unanimous. Their core message 

is a desire to curtail Iran’s nuclear program in a peaceful way. They call on the international community to 

use dialogue and diplomacy, not military strikes, to 

handle the issue. Their views are well-presented in a 

GCC Secretariat General statement that followed the 

GCC Supreme Council meeting in 2009. The statement reiterates the aim of the GCC leaders to have a 

nuclear-free region, and further reads that: 

The Supreme Council hailed international efforts 

aimed at solving the Iranian nuclear crisis through 

diplomatic means, and expressed hope that all concerned sides would reach a political settlement that 

would eliminate the fears and doubts on the nature of 

this dossier, [and] bring about peace and stability in 

the region.43

However, although GCC officials are overtly less 

confrontational on the Iranian nuclear program compared to Israel and Western powers, they remain 
24

concerned about the repercussions of a nuclear Iran. 

The statements of semi-officials may be an indication of GCC countries’ private views on the issue. 

The Saudi Prince Turki Al-Faisal, who leads the King 

Faisal Centre for Research and Islamic Studies, has 

frequently commented on the issue since he left his 

post as Ambassador to Washington. In January 2012, 

Turki Al-Faisal warned the world that any failure to 

stop Iran from developing nuclear weapons could 

lead to a nuclear arms race in the Middle East, which 

would make a volatile region even worse. Given a 

nuclear Iran, countries like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iraq, 

and Algeria among others would prefer to possess 

their own nuclear capabilities as a deterrent against 

their neighbor.44 In 2008, Sami Al-Faraj, director of 

the Kuwait Centre for Strategy Studies and a former 

government advisor, expressed support for an Israeli 

attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities.45 A nuclear-armed 

Iran would have enduring ramifications for the stability of the GCC political regimes and balance of power 

in the entire Middle East. But support for the use of 

force against Iran by Western or Israeli forces on the 

part of actual GCC leaders is likely to be tempered by 

the likelihood of Iranian reprisals against U.S. military 

and other facilities in their own countries, with the 

strong likelihood of collateral damage. 

Another example that encapsulates the diplomatic 

dissimulation practiced by some GCC regimes toward 

Iran is a public statement by a senior UAE diplomat in 

2010 that provoked a row between Iran and the UAE. 

Youssed Al-Otaiba, the UAE Ambassador in Washington, was quoted in a conference suggesting that a 

preemptive military strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities 

would be cheaper than living with a nuclear Iran in 

the future. The UAE Foreign Ministry reacted imme-
25

diately asserting that the UAE government’s stance 

remains unchanged, supporting a peaceful solution to 

the Iran nuclear issue.46 With the nuclear question not 

featuring in talks between GCC countries and Iran, it 

would appear that the GCC leaders have left the issue 

to other members of the international community to 

deal with. 

Iran’s secrecy and lack of constructive engagement 

with the international community have failed to foster 

confidence over its intentions. A report by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 2011 raised 

concerns that undisclosed Iranian nuclear activities 

suggest that Iran is developing the technologies to 

acquire nuclear weapons.47 The report supported the 

widely-held view that Iran is deceiving the international community about its nuclear plans. 

Less dramatically, but potentially of equal significance, Iranian threats to disrupt free passage through 

the Strait of Hormuz have intensified over the last 

few years. With most of the region’s oil and liquified natural gas (LNG) exports passing through the 

Strait, the threats aim to pressure both the Arab Gulf 

countries, and the major economies that import their 

energy from the region. In fact, over one-third of all 

petroleum traded by sea globally passes through the 

Strait.48 Any blockade of the Strait of Hormuz would 

constitute a serious threat to the GCC economy and 

stability, not only because of oil exports, but because 

the region also depends on imports of food, and any 

obstruction of shipments could rapidly lead to severe 

food shortages and internal instability.
26

Iran—GCC Policy. 

The GCC countries have no unified foreign policy 

toward Iran, despite their common anxiety about the 

Iranian aspirations for regional hegemony. There are 

different foreign policy stances. Saudi Arabia has followed a confrontational policy toward Iran, at least 

since the 1979 Islamic revolutions, when the late Ayatollah Khomeini had been hostile toward the Saudi 

ruling family, publicly inciting Saudis to overthrow 

the Al-Saudi family. The hegemonic competition over 

influence in the Arab world is another explanation for 

Saudi Arabia’s confrontational stance; both countries 

have been engaged in proxy conflicts in Lebanon, 

Iraq, and currently Syria. Bahrain’s relationship with 

Iran suffers from enduring tensions as a result of the 

Iranian sovereignty claims on Bahrain. Relations were 

also further damaged by Iran’s continuing commentary on Bahrain’s Shia situation, which is perceived 

by the Bahraini regime as interference in its internal 

affairs. Other GCC small countries have opted for 

a pragmatic approach in their relations with Iran, 

with foreign policies driven by national interests 

rather than by any ideology or hegemonic ambitions. 

Unresolved territorial disputes have not stopped UAE 

and Qatar from maintaining good economic relations 

with Iran. 

Oman in particular follows a different approach in 

its relations with Iran, attaching great importance to 

stabilizing and strengthening ties. Positive relations 

between the two countries pre-date Iran’s 1979 revolution, with Sultan Qaboos expressing gratitude for 

the military support of Iran (along with Britain) during the Dhofar war in the mid-1970s.49 Oman’s foreign 

policy vis-à-vis Iran is driven by its national interests 
27

and by no means follows the stance of Saudi Arabia 

or any other powers. The fundamental assumptions 

driving this stance are that first, Oman does not share 

the hegemonic ambitions of Saudi Arabia, and second, 

Oman sees Iran as a natural security and economic 

partner because of its geographic proximity and economic size. The fact that both states are littoral countries to the Strait of Hormuz naturally gives rise to 

common interests in regional security cooperation. 

Over the years, both countries have invested in 

developing their relations in all sectors, and during a 

visit to Tehran in 2009, Sultan Qaboos signed a number of economic and security agreements. Iran is an 

important trade partner for Oman50—in 2011, Iran was 

the third largest importer of Omani exports.51 Bilateral 

relations extend into strategically significant spheres. 

Under an agreement signed in August 2012, Oman 

plans to import natural gas from Iran to meet its growing demand. The two countries hold regular military 

meetings and exercises, and Oman has committed to 

refuse to engage in military alliances against Iran. In 

February 2012, the Omani-Iranian Military Committee convened its tenth meeting to discuss regional 

security and cooperation.52 Another example of the 

healthy state of relations is the Oman Foreign Ministry handling consular issues for the closed Iranian 

embassy in London.53

It is important to note that these differences in 

foreign policy across the GCC toward Iran show a 

balance between tactical priorities and a desire to 

protect the region’s territorial integrity and long-term 

interests. A failure to back the Saudi approach in dealing with Iran may not be well received in Riyadh, 

but has not been a cause of any public rift, so far, 

among officials. 
28

GCC Stability: Implications for the United States.

The GCC’s geographic location, hydrocarbon, and 

financial wealth are and will remain of great strategic 

importance to U.S. interests and security. The GCC 

countries have abundant oil and natural gas reserves 

that are of great importance to U.S. economic prosperity and security. Continuing high oil prices for 

almost a decade now have allowed GCC states to accumulate in aggregate almost U.S.$1 trillion in foreign 

currency reserves. 

The United States has been the main guarantor 

of stability and security in the Gulf region since the 

early 1970s, following the withdrawal of the British 

from east of Suez. During this period, a number of 

GCC countries have established security cooperation 

agreements with the United States, leading to basing 

rights for Army and other U.S. military units. In addition to basing and transit, U.S. forces regularly carry 

out joint exercises with and offer training to GCC 

military forces. To counter the increasing challenges 

posed by Iran in the region, the U.S. Army is planning to strengthen its presence in Kuwait and deploy 

more ground forces there and potentially to other 

GCC member countries.54 These bilateral security ties 

between the region and the United States are to be the 

subject of a further monograph to be published by the 

Strategic Studies Institute in 2013. 

Undoubtedly, potential Iranian dominance in the 

region is a threat to U.S. national interests in the GCC 

area and the remainder of the Middle East. The current Iranian regime aspires to extend its influence both 

within the region and beyond. Iran’s threats emanate 

from its ideological beliefs, which not only contradict 
29

but also aim to undermine U.S. values and interests in 

the region and beyond. Iranian revolutionary clerics 

have openly asserted their objective of extending the 

Islamic revolution throughout the Middle East and 

North African region as well as to counter perceived 

American imperialism around the world. 

U.S. interests are best preserved by a balance between different power centers amongst GCC states 

and in the wider Middle East. A monopoly of excessive power by any one country would not be a 

desirable outcome. The rise of a sole regional power 

could risk the region’s stability and consequently U.S. 

national interests. The United States and Western allies should aim to prevent the fall of the region’s oil 

and gas reserves under the influence of any single 

hegemonic power. 

The two key benefits for the United States for 

peace and stability in the region are the security of 

energy supply and freedom of movement for the U.S. 

military. From an oil market perspective, the spare 

capacity of GCC major oil producers, Saudi Arabia, 

Kuwait, and Abu Dhabi, is critical for world oil supplies and prices. During the Libyan civil war in 2011, it 

was the increased output of three GCC countries that 

compensated for Libya’s disrupted production. The 

Strait of Hormuz is vital both for the GCC and for the 

world economy, with 90 percent of Middle Eastern oil 

and LNG exports passing through the Straits. Freedom of movement and an unchallenged presence in 

the region are key for a range of ongoing tasks for the 

U.S. Army and other services. Sudden regime change 

could occur in any GCC state due to internal political 

turmoil, and this could replace current regimes supportive of U.S. presence with a far less well-disposed 

environment. An unexpected shift in support from 
30

the GCC states could increase the cost of presence and 

potentially limit options for supply and transport in 

and out of the U.S. military’s theater of operations as 

logistical plans are forming for post-2014 withdrawal 

of U.S. combat troops from Afghanistan. In a worst 

case scenario, political instability leading to sudden 

regime change to an unfriendly or even hostile regime 

could cause severe disruption in U.S. plans for wide 

scale drawdown of U.S. troops and equipment, or 

even potentially pose a new and direct challenge to 

the U.S. military in the Gulf. 

U.S. policymakers should therefore consider the 

implications and options listed below for fostering 

continued stability in the region and preempting 

internal and international developments that could 

threaten the current balance of power. 

POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

There are several policy implications and recommendations that proceed from this analysis.

• The Arab Spring has brought fundamental 

changes to the GCC geostrategic landscape. 

The transformation is still unfolding, and the 

strategic consequences for GCC societies and 

regimes could be far reaching. This in turn has 

important implications for regional stability 

and hence for key U.S. interests in GCC states.

• Political volatility, including that caused by the 

Sunni-Shia divide, affects support for U.S. interests and presence in the region.

• The U.S. Army requires freedom of movement 

in the Gulf for a range of purposes, including logistical support to deployed forces, as 

a primary training and forward deployment 
31

hub, and to support withdrawal from Iraq 

and Afghanistan.

• The option of use of the GCC region for reverse 

transit from Afghanistan both before and after 

2014 is especially important for reducing reliance on the Northern Distribution Network 

(NDN), including for the withdrawal of sensitive cargoes, which it would be inappropriate 

to ship by ground transport through Central 

Asia and Russia. Loss of freedom of movement 

in the GCC area would render the withdrawal 

process hostage to political goodwill in NDN 

transit countries.

• In light of increased tensions and threats to the 

stability of the region, the U.S. Army should increase its training programs to strengthen and 

modernize the kinetic capabilities of the GCC 

militaries. These training undertakings are 

not one-sided; frequent contacts with GCC officers strengthen communication between U.S. 

and local Army forces. The U.S. Army could 

also share essential nonkinetic skills with their 

counterparts in the GCC countries, in particular 

to strengthen their capabilities in dealing with 

chemical, biological, and nuclear containments.

• Political change toward more participatory democracy and accountability in the region is an 

irreversible process. The GCC regimes should 

be encouraged to adopt substantial changes to 

their political systems as a whole, rather than 

limit themselves to topical or cosmetic changes 

for populist effect, in order to avoid the danger 

of mass upheavals and an uncontrolled transition of power that risks the arrival of an unpredictable successor regime unfriendly to U.S. 

interests and presence.
32

• Maintaining U.S. presence across the region is 

crucial not only to U.S. interests there, but also 

for the GCC states themselves. U.S. presence 

not only guarantees the security of GCC states 

against external threats such as Iran or other 

global emerging powers, but also provides 

each small GCC state with protection against 

Saudi hegemonic ambitions in the region. 

Shared U.S. and GCC interests in an enduring 

U.S. presence provides the United States not 

only with a range of strategic options for assuring U.S. interests in the region, but also with 

the additional benefit of flexibility and leverage 

in relations with individual GCC states in the 

interests of maintaining strategic balance and 

good relations.

CONCLUSION

As time passes, calls for participatory governance 

and greater transparency will increase and spread 

among broad segments of the GCC societies, including the small prosperous Gulf monarchies. There are 

a number of intertwined factors that serve as signposts toward this socio-political development. First, 

increased education and political awareness among 

the population—particularly the youth, the growing 

numbers of whom have attended Western universities, mainly in Anglo-Saxon societies, and thus have 

been exposed to the democratic values and institutions 

of Western societies. Although this does not mean that 

they will become militant for political change in their 

own societies immediately, this is knowledge and experience that will shape their thinking and political 

aspirations. Second, the wave of political transforma-
33

tion that is sweeping across the region has been far 

from unnoticed in the GCC societies. Once the political transitions in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya have crystallized into defined, institutionalized, and functioning models, the way will be shown for GCC states and 

societies to follow suit.

ENDNOTES

1. Formally the Cooperation Council for the Arab States 

of the Gulf (CCASG), comprised of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, 

Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. Jordan and Morocco are under 

consideration as potential members. 

2. ASDA’A Burson-Marsteller, “Third Annual ASDA’A 

Burson-Marsteller Arab Youth Survey,” March 15, 2011, available from www.arabyouthsurvey.com/2010/files/AYS2010_Top_10_

Findings_Top_5_Findings_2011.pdf. 

3. Jane Kinninmont, “Bahrain: Beyond the Impasse,” 

Chatham house, June 2012, available from www.chathamhouse.org/sites/

default/files/public/Research/Middle%20East/pr0612kinninmont.pdf. 

4. “Omanis Protest in Sign of Renewed Discontent,” Gulf 

News, July 2, 2012, available from gulfnews.com/news/gulf/oman/

omanis-protest-in-sign-of-renewed-discontent-1.1043396. 

5. “Oman: Waking up Too,” The Economist, June 23, 2012, 

available from www.economist.com/node/21557354. 

6. Madawi Al-Rasheed, “No Saudi Spring: Anatomy of a 

Failed Revolution,” Boston Review, March/April 2012, available 

from www.bostonreview.net/BR37.2/madawi_al-rasheed_arab_spring_

saudi_arabia.php. 

7. Ulrike Freitag, “Saudi Arabia: Buying Stability?” Muriel 

Asseburg, ed., Protest, Revolt, and Regime Change in the Arab World: 

Actors, Challenges, Implications, and Policy Options, SWP Research 

Paper, Berlin, Germany: German Institute of International and Security Affairs, February 2012, available from www.swp-berlin.org/

fileadmin/contents/products/research_papers/2012_RP06_ass.pdf. 
34

8. James Calderwood, “Kuwait Gives each Citizen DH 

13,000 and Free Food,” The National, January 18, 2011, available 

from www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/kuwait-gives-eachcitizen-dh13-000-and-free-food. 

9. Madawi Al-Rasheed, “Mashru’a Thadith al-hukm alsa’audi” (“Project of Reforming the Saudi Government”), 

Al-Mustakbal Al-Arabi Magazine, No. 368, October 2009, 

pp. 102-133. 

10. Ana Echague, “Saudi Arabia: Supply-Side Reform?” 

FRIDE, Policy Brief No. 15, July 2009. 

11. Rashed Aba-Namay, “The Recent Constitutional Reforms 

in Saudi Arabia,” The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 

Vol. 42, No. 2, April 1993, pp. 295-331.

12. Rashed Aba-Namay, “The New Saudi Representative Assembly,” Islamic Law and Society, Vol. 5, Issue 2, 1998, pp. 235-265.

13. Mourad Haroutunian, “Saudi Prince Says Protests May 

Move to the Kingdom, BBC Arabic Says,” Bloomberg, February 18, 

2011, available from www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-18/saudiprince-says-protests-may-move-to-kingdom-bbc-arabic-says.html. 

14. Cahal Milmo, “The Acton Princess Calling for Reform in 

Saudi Arabia,” The Independent, January 30, 2012, available from 

www.independent.co.uk/news/people/news/the-acton-princess-callingfor-reform-in-saudi-arabia-6284225.html.

15. Ahmad Adnan, “Adawla Al-sa’udiya: malamih al-dawla al-rabia’a” (“The Saudi State: Features of the Fourth State”), 

Beirut, Lebanon: Altanweer Press, 2012, pp. 10-16. 

16. Reza H. Akbari, “Bahrain’s Triangle of Conflict,” Foreign 

Policy, May 17, 2012, available from mideast.foreignpolicy.com/

posts/2012/05/17/bahrains_triangle_of_conflict. 

17. Roula Khalaf, “West Urged to Back Change in Bahrain,” The 

Financial Times, December 13, 2011, available from www.ft.com/cms/

s/0/45bef9d2-2595-11e1-9c76-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1kH189PLn. 
35

18. Angela Shah, “Emirates Step-up Efforts to Counter Dissent,” The New York Times, May 30, 2012, available from www.

nytimes.com/2012/05/31/world/middleeast/united-arab-emirates-stepup-efforts-to-counter-dissent.html. 

19. Jay B. Hilotin, “FNC Members Seek Penalties for Flouting 

Dress Code,” Gulf News, June 14, 2012, available from gulfnews.

com/news/gulf/uae/fnc-member-seeks-penalties-for-flouting-dresscode-1.1035715. 

20. An interview conducted by the author in London, UK, on 

July 10, 2012. 

21. Mohammed Aaz Al-Aarab, “Intikhabat al-majlis alwataniwa al-Islah al-siyasi fi al-imarat” (“Election in the National Council and Political Reform in the Emirates”), Al-Ahram 

Digital, November 2011, available from digital.ahram.org.eg/

articles.aspx?Serial=858878&eid=7887. 

22. Abdulkhaleq Abdullah, “Repercussions of the Arab 

Spring on GCC States,” Research Paper, Arab Centre for Research 

and Policy Studies, May 2012. 

23. Mohamed Laghrous, “Hiwarma’a Shaykh sultan al-kassimi, ra’isjam’iyat al-islahwa al-tawjih al-ijtima’I” (“Interview 

with Sheikh Sultan Al-Qassimi, Chairman of Reform and Social 

Guidance”), Attawhidwal-Islah Movement, available from alislah.

ma/2009-10-07-11-53-04/item/21727.html.

24.Vali Nasr, The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will 

Shape the Future, London, UK: W. W. Norton & Company, 2007, 

pp. 92-93. 

25. Human Rights Watch, “Denied Dignity: Systematic 

Discrimination and Hostility toward Saudi Shia Citizens,” 

September 2009, pp. 10-12.

26. Toby Jones, “Saudi Arabia” Assaf Moghadam, ed., Political Violence: Militancy and Political Violence in Shiism: Trends and 

Patterns, Florence, KY: Routledge, 2011, p. 136. 

27. Nasr, p. 24. 
36

28. Ibid., pp. 22-23. 

29. Abeer Allam, “Death Highlights Saudi Succession 

Problem,” The Financial Times, June 17, 2012, available from 

www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/c6dba82e-b86d-11e1-a2d6-00144feabdc0.

html#axzz25LNBb8ua. 

30. “The Saudi Succession: When Kings and Princes Grow 

Old,” The Economist, July 15, 2010, available from www.economist.

com/node/16588422. 

31. Simeon Kerr, “Rival in Ras al-Khaimah Throne Leaves 

Emirate,” The Financial Times, October 28, 2010, available from

www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/52ca6982-e2c4-11df-8a58-00144feabdc0.

html#axzz25LNBb8ua. 

32. Mahjoob Zweiri, “Arab-Iranian Relations: New Realities?” Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Mahjoob Zweiri, eds., Iran’s 

Foreign policy: From Khatami to Ahmadinejad, Reading, UK: Ithaca 

Press, 2008, pp. 116-117.

33. Mahboubeh Sadeghini, Security Arrangements in the 

Persian Gulf: With Special Reference to Iran’s Foreign Policy, Reading, 

UK: Ithaca Press, 2011, pp. 200-201.

34. Sadeghini, p. 203. 

35. Al-Saud, Faisal bin Salman, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf: 

Power Politics in Transition, London, UK: I. B. Tauris, 2004. 

36. Arshin Adib-Moghaddam, International Politics of the 

Persian Gulf: a Cultural Genealogy, Florence, KY: Routledge, 2006, 

pp. 16-17. 

37. Faisal Bin Slaman al-Saud, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the 

Gulf: Power Politics in Transition, London, UK: I. B. Tauris, 2004, 

pp. 32-33. 

38. Joseph A. Kechichian, “Iran has no Claim to Bahrain,” 

Gulf News, July 25, 2007, available from gulfnews.com/opinions/

columnists/iran-has-no-claim-to-bahrain-1.191112. 
37

39. Sherine Bahaa, “Is Bahrain Another Kuwait?” Al-Ahram 

Weekly, Issue No. 936, March 4, 2009, available from weekly.ahram.

org.eg/2009/936/re62.htm. 

40. Habib Toumi, “Bahrain Condemns Iran’s Interference 

in its Domestic Affairs,” Gulf News, May 16, 2012, available 

from gulfnews.com/news/gulf/bahrain/bahrain-condemns-iran-s-interference-in-its-domestic-affairs-1.1023774. 

41. Miriam Joyce, Ruling Shaikhs and Her Majesty’s Government, 

1960-1969: Britain’s Last Decade in the Gulf, the 1960s, London, UK: 

Frank Cass Publishers, 2003, pp. 117-119. 

42. Ahmad Jalinusi and Vahid Barari Arayee, “The Three 

Islands: (Abu Musa, The Greater & Lesser Tunb Islands) Integral 

Parts of Iran,” The Iranian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. XIX, 

No. 4, Fall 2007, pp. 1-23. 

43. Gulf Cooperation Council Secretariat General, “The 

Final Communique of the 30th Session,” December 14-15, 

2009, available from www.gcc-sg.org/eng/indexce7c.html?action=

Sec-Show&ID=303. 

44. Claire Ferris-Lay, “Saudi Prince Warns of Middle East 

Nuclear Arms Race,” Arabian Business, January 26, 2012, available 

from www.arabianbusiness.com/saudi-prince-warns-of-middle-eastnuclear-arms-race-442448.html. 

45. Associated Press, “Kuwait Analyst for Destruction of 

Iran N-Plant,” Saudi Gazette, March 10, 2008, available from

www.saudigazette.com.sa/index.cfm?method=home.regcon&

contentid=20080310295. 

46. Ian Black, “UAE Ambassador Backs Strikes on Iran’s 

Nuclear Sites,” The Guardian, July 7, 2010, available from www.

guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jul/07/uae-envoy-iran-nuclear-sites. 

47. Anthony H. Cordesman, “The New IAEA Report and 

Iran’s Evolving Nuclear and Missile Forces,” Washington, DC: 

Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 8, 2011, 

available from csis.org/files/publication/111108_irans_evolving_

nuclear_forces.pdf. 
38

48. “Strait of Hormuz” World Oil Transit Chokepoints, U.S. 

Energy Information Administration. December 30, 2011, available 

from www.eia.gov/countries/regions-topics.cfm?fips=WOTC#hormuz.

49. Al-Qabas, “Limadatanfaridu Oman bita’amulmaa Iran 

biKhilafi Shakikatiha?” (“Why Oman’s unique dealing with Iran 

is different from its Sisters?”), October 26, 2010, available from 

www.gulfsecurity.org/?p=4495. See also MERIP, “New Iranian 

Offensive in Oman,” MERIP Reports, No. 43, 1975, p. 23.

50. Mohamed Abdulla Mohamed, “Umanwa Iran Ba’ad 

Ziyarat Jalalat al-sultan” (“Oman and Iran After the Visit of His 

Majesty the Sultan”), Alwasat, No. 2530, August 10, 2009, available 

from www.alwasatnews.com/2530/news/read/208068/1.html. 

51. Central Bank of Oman, “Annual Report 2011,” June 2011, 

p. 98, available from www.cbo-oman.org/.

52. “Iran-Oman Military Committee Meeting Wraps up: 

Joint Drills in the Winter.,” Iran Daily, May 16, 2012, available 

from www.iran-daily.com/1391/2/27/MainPaper/4234/Page/2/Main

Paper_4234_2.pdf. 

53. Nasser Krimi, “Iran: Tehran and London Agree to Representation,” Bloomberg Businessweek, June 28, 2012, available from 

www.businessweek.com/ap/2012-06-28/iran-tehran-and-london-formalize-embassy-closures. 

54. Donna Cassata, “U.S. Plans Significant Military Presence 

in Kuwait,” The Washington Post, June 19, 2012, available from 

www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/jun/19/us-plans-significantmilitary-presence-kuwait/. 
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