U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

61–036CC WASHINGTON : 2000

THE STATE OF SECURITY AT THE DEPARTMENT

OF ENERGY’S NUCLEAR WEAPON LABORATORIES

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON

OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

OCTOBER 26, 1999

Serial No. 106–103

Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce

(

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE

TOM BLILEY, Virginia, Chairman

W.J. ‘‘BILLY’’ TAUZIN, Louisiana

MICHAEL G. OXLEY, Ohio

MICHAEL BILIRAKIS, Florida

JOE BARTON, Texas

FRED UPTON, Michigan

CLIFF STEARNS, Florida

PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio

Vice Chairman

JAMES C. GREENWOOD, Pennsylvania

CHRISTOPHER COX, California

NATHAN DEAL, Georgia

STEVE LARGENT, Oklahoma

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina

BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California

ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky

GREG GANSKE, Iowa

CHARLIE NORWOOD, Georgia

TOM A. COBURN, Oklahoma

RICK LAZIO, New York

BARBARA CUBIN, Wyoming

JAMES E. ROGAN, California

JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois

HEATHER WILSON, New Mexico

JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona

CHARLES W. ‘‘CHIP’’ PICKERING,

Mississippi

VITO FOSSELLA, New York

ROY BLUNT, Missouri

ED BRYANT, Tennessee

ROBERT L. EHRLICH, Jr., Maryland

JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts

RALPH M. HALL, Texas

RICK BOUCHER, Virginia

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio

BART GORDON, Tennessee

PETER DEUTSCH, Florida

BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois

ANNA G. ESHOO, California

RON KLINK, Pennsylvania

BART STUPAK, Michigan

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York

THOMAS C. SAWYER, Ohio

ALBERT R. WYNN, Maryland

GENE GREEN, Texas

KAREN MCCARTHY, Missouri

TED STRICKLAND, Ohio

DIANA DEGETTE, Colorado

THOMAS M. BARRETT, Wisconsin

BILL LUTHER, Minnesota

LOIS CAPPS, California

JAMES E. DERDERIAN, Chief of Staff

JAMES D. BARNETTE, General Counsel

REID P.F. STUNTZ, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

FRED UPTON, Michigan, Chairman

JOE BARTON, Texas

CHRISTOPHER COX, California

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina

Vice Chairman

BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California

ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky

GREG GANSKE, Iowa

ROY BLUNT, Missouri

ED BRYANT, Tennessee

TOM BLILEY, Virginia,

(Ex Officio)

RON KLINK, Pennsylvania

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

BART STUPAK, Michigan

GENE GREEN, Texas

KAREN MCCARTHY, Missouri

TED STRICKLAND, Ohio

DIANA DEGETTE, Colorado

JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan,

(Ex Officio)

(II)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Testimony of:

Browne, John C., Director, Los Alamos National Laboratory ...................... 106

Curran, Edward J., Director, Office of Counterintelligence, U.S. Department of Energy .............................................................................................. 17

Habiger, Eugene E., Director, Office of Security and Emergency Operations, U.S. Department of Energy ............................................................. 12

Podonsky, Glenn S., Director, Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance, U.S. Department of Energy ...................................... 6

Robinson, C. Paul, President and Laboratories Director, Sandia National

Laboratories ................................................................................................... 50

Tarter, C. Bruce, Director, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory ........ 92

Turner, James, Manager, Oakland Operations Office, U.S. Department

of Energy ....................................................................................................... 101

Weigand, Gil, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Strategic Computing and Simulation, U.S. Department of Energy ............................................................ 97

Material submitted for the record by:

Angell, John C., Assistant Secretary, Congressional and Intergovernmental Affairs, Department of Energy:

Letter dated December 14, 1999, to Hon. Fred Upton, enclosing response for the record ............................................................................. 140

Letter dated June 16, 2000, to Hon. Fred Upton, enclosing response

for the record .......................................................................................... 212

Browne, John C., Director, Los Alamos National Laboratory, responses

for the record ................................................................................................. 168

Inlow, Rush O., Deputy Manager, Albuquerque Operations Office, Department of Energy:

Letter dated November 29, 1999, to Hon. Fred Upton .......................... 121

Letter dated December 13, 1999, to Hon. Fred Upton ........................... 126

Podonsky, Glenn S., Director, Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance, U.S. Department of Energy, responses for the

record ............................................................................................................. 187

Robinson, C. Paul, President and Laboratories Director, Sandia National

Laboratories, responses for the record ........................................................ 174

Tarter, C. Bruce, Director, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory,

letter dated December 13, 1999, to Hon. Fred Upton, enclosing response

for the record ................................................................................................. 129

Turner, James, Manager, Oakland Operations Office, U.S. Department

of Energy, responses for the record ............................................................. 162

(III)

(1)

THE STATE OF SECURITY AT THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY’S NUCLEAR WEAPON

LABORATORIES

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 26, 1999

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS,

Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room

2322, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Fred Upton (chairman)

presiding.

Members present: Representatives Upton, Cox, Burr, Bilbray,

Ganske, Bryant, Bliley, (ex officio), Stupak, and Green.

Also present: Representative Wilson.

Staff present: Tom DiLenge, majority counsel; Anthony Habib,

legislative clerk; and Edith Holleman, minority counsel.

Mr. UPTON. Good morning. We are here today to conduct what

will be our fourth public hearing this year to explore the critically

important, and very troubling, issue of lax security at our Nation’s

key nuclear weapons laboratories. We will hear today from the top

security advisors to Energy Secretary Bill Richardson, as well as

the directors of Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, and Sandia National Laboratories.

In particular, we will hear from the Department’s chief internal

inspector, Mr. Glenn Podonsky, whose team of inspectors recently

concluded inspections at Los Alamos and Sandia. Mr. Podonsky

previously testified before this subcommittee on his team’s inspection of Lawrence Livermore. Taken together, these three inspection

reports raise serious questions about the Department’s ability to effectively run a national security apparatus.

One of the most surprising, recurring findings in these reports is

the lack of effective policy guidance by the Department on security

matters. Given the fact that the Department has nearly 20 different security contractors or subcontractors at various sites across

the country, one would think that the DOE would set clear requirements to assure some degree of nationwide consistency and some

minimal level of security at each site. Yet the reality is far different.

For example, the Department has long required that the labs

take certain steps to ensure that foreign visitors or assignees and

not spies, and that their access to sensitive information is adequately restricted. Yet the Department’s guidance seemingly applies to only those foreign nationals physically located onsite. Thus,

2

in the case of Lawrence Livermore for example, this policy was not

applied to foreign nationals who had remote access to the lab’s

computers since they were not actually ‘‘onsite.’’

Of course, such a distinction makes little common sense—indeed,

remote access may raise greater security concerns than onsite access since it is more difficult to determine whether the individual

at the other end is, in fact, the authorized user. But it was not

until the recent inspection by Mr. Podonsky’s team that this practice was discovered and halted. The Department still has not addressed this question as a matter of policy, nor the related questions of how to deal with the other information sharing with offsite

foreign nationals, including video- and tele-conferences or e-mail.

Similarly, the Department has never had any policy that set minimum standards for computer password creation and use. Thus, the

labs have done their own thing—in some cases, passwords were not

used at all, while in other cases, passwords were common names

and only a few characters in length, and often were not changed

with any frequency. I find it hard to believe that this committee—

which does not engage in classified computing and does not possess

on its computer systems national security information—has a more

stringent password controls than our Nation’s nuclear weapon labs.

And the generally poor state of unclassified computer security at

these labs—what Mr. Podonsky calls their numerous potentially exploitable vulnerabilities—can also be traced back to the lack of any

detailed policy from the Department in this area. At two of the

labs, the inspection team found that the closed lab network could

be penetrated from the outside through the Internet, while all of

the labs suffered from general system weaknesses that permitted

users, once on the system, to move freely among data bases, gain

passwords, and access sensitive information without a need to

know. With literally hundreds of foreign nationals authorized on

these systems, including many from sensitive countries, the risk of

disclosure of sensitive nuclear information, business proprietary

data, or export-controlled materials is significant and certainly worrisome.

It is ironic that a Department and laboratory management that

prides itself in being on the cutting edge of research and technology

has fallen so far short in this high-tech area. Indeed, Lawrence

Livermore is supposed to be the Department’s computer technology

headquarters. It is clear that DOE policy in this area needs to be

brought into the 1990’s, and hopefully before we begin the next

decade and get even further behind.

We will hear today about how the Department is drafting policies

to deal with remote access, computer passwords, fire walls, and the

potential for unauthorized transfers or downloads of classified information, such as those allegedly performed by Wen Ho Lee. Yet,

with the exception of the remote access issue, these problems were

identified 5 years ago by both Mr. Podonsky’s office and the Office

of Safeguards and Securities. The response at the time, from both

the labs and the DOE hierarchy, was that computer security wasn’t

worth the cost and that they were willing to accept the risk. I am

pleased to see that the DOE management and the labs are now beginning to change their tune, but where is the accountability for

years of negligence that may have seriously compromised our naVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:33 Sep 11, 2000 Jkt 061036 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\HEARINGS\61036 pfrm03 PsN: 61036
3

tional security? Secretary Richardson boasts of recommending disciplinary action against a handful of lab employees for failing to

take seriously the Wen Ho Lee counterintelligence case. Yet no one

in the labs has been held accountable for the years of resistance

to implementing sound computer security policies.

This lack of accountability goes beyond the computer security

area. We will hear today about how Los Alamos has made much

progress over the last 6 months fixing a very troubling situation involving the protection of classified weapons parts—a problem that

was first identified by the Department inspectors more than 5

years ago. Despite directives from the Department and agreed-upon

action plans, Los Alamos failed to take any meaningful steps to

correct this situation, year after year, such that the situation was

essentially unchanged when the inspectors returned 3 years later

in 1997. Inspections in 1998 an 1999 revealed the same problems,

but this time the wave of bad publicity about lab security seems

to have prompted Los Alamos to begin corrective action to protect

classified weapons parts.

But did Los Alamos pay for its stubborn refusal to fix this problem? To the contrary—despite the significance of the long-standing

deficiencies, Los Alamos received excellent or similarly laudatory

security ratings in its annual contract performance appraisals, increasing the bonuses that its senior management received from the

U.S. taxpayers.

As I said before, unless we have a rigorous annual inspection

process that imposes real financial penalties on the labs for failing

to comply with DOE’s security requirements, I don’t believe we will

ever change the culture and achieve lasting security reform. The

recently-passed Defense Authorization Act provides a framework

for such action, but it will be up to the Department to take that

authorization seriously and begin implementing serious contract

and oversight reform.

I have already begun discussions with the chairman of the full

committee to perhaps allow a number of us to go out early next

year to visit some of the labs, and I look forward to the cooperation

by the Department to make sure that will go without a hitch.

With that, I will recognize Mr. Green from Texas.

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be brief.

Thank you for scheduling today’s hearing and keeping this issue

on the front burner, so to speak.

DOE has had problems for many years with regular, continued

oversight. Hopefully, our subcommittee and Congress will be able

to finally solve this decades-long problem. This committee is prepared to hear testimony from DOE about its plans to revamp and

improve the security at our nuclear weapons laboratories. This

time, I hope we will be able to see real progress on the security solutions at the Nation’s labs.

I especially look forward to the testimony of Mr. Podonsky,

whose inspection teams recently completed security evaluations at

both Los Alamos and Sandia National Labs. I appreciate all the

hard work by the inspection teams in analyzing the strengths and

weaknesses of the security in these labs. Our committee needs to

look for solutions to the loss of the classified information.

4

And, again, Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing.

And, again, I appreciate the continued effort because long before

we were in Congress, this was a problem. Maybe we can put this

to rest and have DOE do what we need to do to protect the classified information.

Mr. UPTON. Thank you, Mr. Green.

Mr. Cox.

Mr. COX. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I welcome our panel.

The issues that we are addressing today are issues that have

been before this committee during Republican and Democratic Congresses over a period of many years and that have been the subject

of examination by the executive branch in a variety of ways, also

over the last several years, including specifically the 1995 Galvin

task force report, a half dozen GAO reports, the report of the Select

Committee that I chaired, evaluations by the Intelligence Committees of the House and the Senate. The President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory this year, the PFIAB report, said the Department

of Energy has had a dysfunctional management structure and culture that only occasionally gave proper credence to the need for security and counterintelligence programs at the weapons labs. That

is a conclusion that I know, at least as of last year, Mr. Curran

shared because he shared that with our Select Committee.

Today, we are going to hear that DOE has finally gotten the message, that by the end of this year all of DOE’s nuclear weapons

labs will meet the highest security standards. Our concern, as you

might expect, given this track record, is how to distinguish between

these representations that everything is fine and those that we

have received in the past. Over the past 5 years DOE inspectors

have repeatedly identified these very same problems, but still nothing changed. Each negative report has been met with earnest announcements that finally decisive action will be taken and these

problems will be resolved.

It was after these years of nonresponsiveness, including throughout 11⁄2 terms of the Clinton administration itself, that President

Clinton issued his Presidential decision Directive PDD-61, which

ordered from the Presidential level counterintelligence measures at

the nuclear weapons laboratories.

Mr. Curran, who is before the committee today, made 46 recommendations to implement PDD-61. Today, nearly a year later, at

least 10 of those recommendations have not yet been implemented.

Furthermore, some of the recommendations are worded such that

the Secretary of Energy can claim implementation of a recommendation based on the issuance of an order in Washington, regardless of whether the changes were actually implemented at the

labs.

I appreciate this committee’s continuing attention to the protection of our scientific and military information. It is only through

sustained oversight and full implementation of the reform measures that you have all identified that we will be able to secure our

information in the future and perform our tasks as we are supposed to do.

I know that the history of this problem places a great burden on

you as individuals. It likewise puts us in the position, as Congress,

in the conduct of our oversight of Lucy, Charlie Brown and the faVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:33 Sep 11, 2000 Jkt 061036 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\HEARINGS\61036 pfrm03 PsN: 61036
5

mous football. We hope that this time what we’re hearing is the

truth, that—I know it has always been intended as the truth. It

was intended as true as spoken, but we hope this time there will

be change and follow-through, and by the end of this year, we will

be in the Promised Land.

And I appreciate the time for the opening statement, Mr. Chairman. I also apologize because, as you know, I have a bill on the

floor; my Internet tax bill is the second on the schedule, and it will

require me to be gone for about an hour of this hearing at some

undetermined time; but I am of course very interested in these subjects and will do what I can to keep up with it even when I am

not here.

Mr. UPTON. I appreciate that. I just hope that you call a recorded

vote because I want to be on record in support of your bill.

Mr. Burr?

Mr. BURR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I will be brief.

I welcome our witnesses today and also pledge to the committee

that Mr. Cox is right. We have a responsibility to follow up and to

make sure that the efforts by the Department of Energy are in fact

fulfilled. And for that reason, Mr. Chairman, I hope that this committee—subcommittee, full committee—will make an inspection of

all the facilities after the first of the year; and if in fact the subcommittee or the full committee won’t, I will promise our witnesses, I will.

I yield back.

Mr. UPTON. Dr. Ganske, would you care to make a public opening statement?

Mr. GANSKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman for holding the hearing,

and I look forward to the testimony.

Mr. UPTON. Okay. We had alerted members of the Energy and

Power Subcommittee that they would be welcome to sit in on the

committee and ask questions, and with that in mind, I will recognize Mrs. Wilson for an opening statement.

Mrs. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your willingness to allow me to sit in on your subcommittee today. As you

know, it is something of particular interest to me, both because of

the district that I represent and because of my service on the Select

Committee on Intelligence. I will be very interested to hear from

the witnesses about a number of things.

As all of you in the room know, there is a significant increase in

funding for cyber security in this year’s budget. I am interested to

see what the plans are for meeting that emerging threat even in

open, or in closed session, and how you are planning to implement

change. There are a number of new authorities that are given to

the Department of Energy in the Defense authorization bill and the

Intelligence authorization bill this year with respect to security and

safeguards. And what are your plans and where are we going from

here?

I am very interested to hear from the witnesses about that, and

that also relates to the establishment of a new nuclear security

agency, which came about precisely because of some of the problems that we are trying to oversee and investigate here. What is

the plan for the transition to that new nuclear security agency and

6

how are you going to integrate the need for continuing vigilance in

safeguards and security in that transition?

And I appreciate the willingness and the openness of the Chair

to allow me to participate. Thank you.

Mr. UPTON. Thank you.

We welcome as our first panel Mr. Glenn Podonsky, Director of

the Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance at

the Department of Energy; General Eugene Habiger, Director of

the Office of Security and Emergency Operations, also of the Department of Energy; Mr. Ed Curran, Director of the Office of Counterintelligence, Department of Energy.

As two of you have testified before, you know that it is a longstanding tradition of this subcommittee to take testimony under

oath. Do you have any objection to that?

Mr. CURRAN. No, sir.

Mr. PODONSKY. No, sir.

Mr. HABIGER. No, sir.

Mr. UPTON. We also allow under House rules and committee

rules you to have counsel available if you desire to have such. Do

you need or desire to have counsel?

Mr. CURRAN. No, sir.

Mr. UPTON. Stand and raise your right hands.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. UPTON. You are now under oath.

We actually have a new clock. The egg timer is going to the

Smithsonian. We will see if this really does work. Your entire testimony is certainly made a part of the record, and I will start this

over again. If you would limit your remarks to 5 minutes, that

would be terrific.

TESTIMONY OF GLENN S. PODONSKY, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF

INDEPENDENT OVERSIGHT AND PERFORMANCE ASSURANCE; EUGENE E. HABIGER, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SECURITY AND EMERGENCY OPERATIONS; AND EDWARD J.

CURRAN, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE,

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Mr. PODONSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to once again appear before this committee to discuss our

independent oversight activities at the DOE national weapons laboratories. As you stated, I am the Director of the Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance, which is responsible for providing the Secretary an independent, impartial view of

the effectiveness of safeguards and security, cyber security, and

emergency management policies and programs throughout the Department of Energy.

My testimony will include an update on our follow-up efforts at

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory as well as a summary of

our recent inspections at Los Alamos and Sandia National Laboratories.

Let me first cover Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. As

you may recall, we provided classified briefings to the members of

this committee on July 1 and July 20 of this year on the results

of our May inspection of safeguards and security programs at the

Lawrence Livermore National Lab. To summarize the results, we

7

noted several positive attributes at the laboratory, including security upgrades in the Superblock, which is the building complex at

Livermore where special nuclear material is used and stored.

We also noted effective implementation of many of the aspects of

the Secretary’s upgrades and initiatives in the area of computer security, which is now referred to as ‘‘cyber security’’ and which encompasses the measures designed to protect information on DOE

computer systems from unauthorized access from hackers who

might try and penetrate the computer networks over the Internet,

and from system users who could try and exploit vulnerabilities to

gain access to information for which they are not authorized.

However, there were weaknesses in protection of classified weapons parts. These are nonnuclear components of the nuclear weapons access controls at areas where classified weapons information

was used and stored, and unclassified cyber security which refers

to the cyber security measures designed to protect sensitive, but

unclassified, information such as unclassified research data and

medical records and the like.

Also, Livermore had not done sufficient performance testing to

demonstrate that the protective force could reliably perform its

mission.

We have scheduled a formal follow-up review at Livermore’s site

in December of this year. This review will include onsite reviews

of Livermore safeguards and security programs as well as extensive

scanning of the networks and penetration testing using techniques

that hackers would use. The review will also include a detailed assessment of progress on the Livermore corrective action plan, including actions taken by headquarters and the Oakland operations

office to support and verify the provisions of the Livermore corrective action plan.

Although the formal review has not yet taken place, we have

been closely monitoring the progress on the corrective action plan

and have provided comments on several occasions. In general, we

are satisfied that our findings are being addressed and that compensatory security measures have been put in place to provide additional security until final resolution of the identified issues.

As part of our ongoing follow-up efforts we have been particularly focusing on Livermore vulnerability assessments and performance testing of the protective force’s ability to respond effectively

to defeat a terrorist attack at the Superblock. We recognize that

Livermore faces some difficult situations as they try to improve

their performance testing program while still ensuring that tests

are conducted with the highest regard for safety. On several occasions, we have sent some of our inspectors out to Livermore to observe their planning efforts and performance tests and to provide

constructive independent oversight input.

Overall, we believe that Livermore has made improvements in

their security posture in the Superblock, and the performance testing efforts are more rigorous and realistic. While much work remains to be accomplished, Livermore has demonstrated a rigorous

approach to identifying and correcting weaknesses. If Livermore

fully implements their current plans for upgrading their security

posture and maintains the current attitude of continuous improvement, there is good reason to be optimistic that Livermore and the

8

safeguards and security program will be improved by the time of

our follow-up inspection.

At Sandia National Laboratories in New Mexico we found effective programs in the areas of material control and accountability,

protective force and physical security systems. Sandia has taken

several actions to upgrade security, such as repositioning protective

force members to provide tactical response, procuring armored vehicles with enhanced capabilities, adding barriers to protect the

protective force members at the material access area entrance, and

improving protective force training. While some weaknesses were

identified in the vulnerability assessment and performance test

arena, Sandia corrected the most significant issues promptly while

we were there.

Sandia also has generally adequate programs in the classified

cyber security arena where they are further making improvements.

Senior Sandia managers demonstrated their commitment to completing the enhancements identified in the Trilab nine-point

plan——

Your egg beater went off.

Mr. UPTON. I see that it did. I was wondering if it was going to

ding. But you may continue.

Mr. PODONSKY. [continuing] they identified in their Trilab ninepoint plan by allocating resources to achieve its provisions. Although programmatic strengths were noted at Sandia, there were

weaknesses again in the unclassified cyber security, protection of

classified parts, access controls in areas where classified matter is

used and stored, and control of foreign visitors and assignees. For

example, Sandia needs to strengthen the fire wall that protects the

sensitive unclassified network from the open network and the

Internet.

Because of these weaknesses, Sandia received an overall marginal rating. A marginal rating is the middle rating in our threetier rating system. The highest rating is satisfactory and the lowest

is unsatisfactory. A marginal rating indicates that prompt attention and timely improvement is needed, but does not imply that

special nuclear material or classified and sensitive information are

at immediate risk.

Sandia has submitted corrective action plans, as required, and

independent oversight has provided comments to ensure that the

issues are fully addressed. We plan a formal follow-up here, too, in

December that will assess the progress and the status of the program. As with all of our follow-ups, we will review the status of the

identified weak programs, perform extensive cyber security testing

and review the corrective action plan.

We performed our inspection at Los Alamos National Laboratory

in August. Los Alamos earned an overall satisfactory rating. They

have effectively addressed long-standing problems in the accountability of nuclear materials and made significant progress in addressing deficiencies in the protection of classified weapons parts.

Los Alamos made additional improvements in the protection of

classified weapons parts actually during our inspection. Los Alamos

had also added protective force personnel and implemented a rigorous program to control the use of desktop computer modems.

9

Classified cyber security programs were found to be adequate, and

Los Alamos is making progress also on the Trilab nine-point plan.

Additionally, Los Alamos has significantly reduced risks associated with weaknesses if unclassified cyber security systems by installing an effective fire wall configuration to prevent hackers from

gaining access to sensitive networks.

The most significant residual weakness was the ability of the unclassified cyber security program to protect against the insider

threat. A particular concern related to foreign nationals that were

permitted on the unclassified network which had numerous potentially exploitable weaknesses. During the inspection, Los Alamos

developed and began implementing an effective plan to address the

residual weaknesses, both short-term and long-term. Although significant progress has been made, there is still work to be done in

order to achieve the goal of fully satisfactory programs at all DOE

sites.

At the three national laboratories only Los Alamos receives and

earns an overall satisfactory rating; the other laboratories were

rated marginal. However, based on their corrective action plans, we

believe that Livermore and Sandia are on the right track to make

improvements needed to achieve the satisfactory rating. Although

Los Alamos earned an overall satisfactory as with the other sites

we plan to perform follow-up activities and continue to monitor

their progress.

If I might, Mr. Chairman, in looking at the weaknesses in DOE

safeguards and security for the last 15 years, it is important to

keep a sense of perspective. In general, protection of our most critical assets such as nuclear weapons components and special nuclear material has improved significantly since the 1980’s. While

problems are still evident, they are generally degradations in one

layer of a multilayered security system rather than the gaping

holes of the type frequently noted in the 1980’s.

In addition, inspections indicate that sites are complying with

the requirements for protecting classified documents, and classified

computer systems are generally well protected from hackers. While

the gaping holes have not reappeared, attention to security was

very much in decline during the mid-90’s, and some sites did not

adequately analyze the impact of the cuts in security personnel or

security measures before implementing those cuts.

In our reviews of the national laboratories, it is very clear that

laboratory management has heard the wakeup call from the Secretary and from the Congress. Safeguards and security is receiving

a high level of attention from senior management, and we are seeing some improvements that could not have been made without

management support and without Secretary Richardson’s direct involvement. For example, the establishment of an effective fire wall

and the consolidation of classified parts at Los Alamos were actions

that we had previously experienced resistance by Los Alamos line

managers because of the operational inconvenience. The need for

these actions had been identified on previous inspection reviews,

but were not implemented because safeguards and security was

given relatively low priority.

In the past year, however, we can report that senior management has increased emphasis on safeguards and security and many

10

important enhancements have been implemented in a way that

provides a better balance between safeguards and security and requirements and operational needs. One of the key elements of the

recent progress that we have seen is accountability. Secretary Richardson has sent the message that senior DOE and contract managers are accountable for safeguards and security. The Secretary

has stated that, ‘‘People are getting the message’’ and that ‘‘we’re

serious about protecting our national secrets.’’ The results of our

recent inspections demonstrate that the message has been heard

and that actions are being taken at all of our locations that we

have inspected.

In conclusion, it is clear that a positive trend has been established, but that a tremendous amount of work still remains to be

accomplished. We will not be satisfied as an oversight body until

all DOE sites achieve and maintain a fully satisfactory program.

However, it is encouraging to note that safeguards and security

programs at all three national weapons laboratories have received

high levels of management attention over the past year, and there

have been significant improvements.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Glenn S. Podonsky follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GLENN S. PODONSKY, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF INDEPENDENT

OVERSIGHT AND PERFORMANCE ASSURANCE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Thank you Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to once again appear before this committee to discuss our Independent Oversight activities at the DOE national weapons laboratories. I am the Director of the Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance, which is responsible for providing the Secretary

an independent, impartial view of the effectiveness of safeguards and security, cyber

security, and emergency management policies and programs throughout the Department of Energy.

This discussion will include an update on our follow-up efforts at the Lawrence

Livermore National Laboratory, as well as a summary of the results of our recent

inspections at the Los Alamos National Laboratory and Sandia National Laboratories.

Let me first cover the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. As you may

recall, we provided classified briefings to members of this committee on July 1st and

July 20th on the results of our May 1999 inspection of safeguards and security programs at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. To summarize the results,

we noted several positive attributes at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

including security upgrades in the Superblock (the building complex at Livermore

where special nuclear material is used and stored). We also noted effective implementation of many aspects of the Secretary’s upgrades and initiatives in the area

of computer security, which is now referred to as ‘‘cyber security’’ and which encompasses the measures designed to protect information on DOE computer systems

from unauthorized access from hackers who might try and penetrate computer networks over the Internet and from system users who could try and exploit

vulnerabilities to gain access to information for which they are not authorized. However, there were weaknesses in protection of classified weapons parts (non-nuclear

components of nuclear weapons), access controls at areas where classified weapons

information was used and stored, and unclassified cyber security (which refers to

the cyber security measures designed to protect sensitive but unclassified information, such as unclassified research data and medical records). Also, Livermore had

not done sufficient performance testing to demonstrate that the protective force

could reliably perform its mission.

We have scheduled a formal follow-up review of the Lawrence Livermore site in

December 1999. This review will include onsite reviews of Livermore safeguards and

security programs as well as extensive scanning of the networks and penetration

testing using techniques that hackers would use. The review will also include a detailed assessment of progress on the Livermore corrective action plan, including actions taken by Headquarters and the Oakland Operations Office to support and

verify the provisions of the Livermore corrective action plan. Although the formal

11

review has not yet taken place, we have been closely monitoring the progress on the

corrective action plan and have provided comments on several occasions. In general,

we are satisfied that our findings are being addressed and that compensatory security measures have been put in place to provide additional security until final resolution of the identified issues.

As part of our ongoing follow-up efforts, we have been particularly focusing on

Livermore vulnerability assessments and performance testing of the protective

force’s ability to respond effectively to defeat a terrorist attack at the Superblock.

We recognize that Livermore faces some difficult situations as they try to improve

their performance testing program, while still ensuring that tests are conducted

with the highest regard for safety. On several occasions, we have sent some of our

specialists to Livermore to observe their planning efforts and performance tests, and

to provide constructive Independent Oversight input.

Overall, we believe that Livermore has made improvements in their security posture in the Superblock and the performance testing efforts are more rigorous and

realistic. While much work remains to be accomplished, Livermore has demonstrated a rigorous approach to identifying and correcting weaknesses. If Livermore fully implements their current plans for upgrading the security posture and

maintains the current attitude of continuous improvement, there is good reason to

be optimistic that the Livermore safeguards and security program will be much improved by the time of our follow-up review in December.

At Sandia National Laboratories in New Mexico, we found effective programs

in the areas of material control and accountability, the protective force, and physical

security systems. Sandia has taken several actions to upgrade security, such as

repositioning protective force members to improve tactical response, procuring armored vehicles with enhanced capabilities, adding barriers to protect the protective

force members at the ‘‘material access area’’ entrance, and improving protective

force training. While some weaknesses were identified in the vulnerability assessment and performance test arena, Sandia corrected the most significant issue

promptly by adding the barriers at the material access area.

Sandia also had generally adequate programs in the classified cyber security

arena and were making further improvements. Senior Sandia managers demonstrated their commitment to completing the enhancements identified in the ‘‘TriLab nine point plan’’ by allocating resources to achieve its provisions.

Although programmatic strengths were noted at Sandia, there were weaknesses

in unclassified cyber security, protection of classified parts, access controls in areas

where classified matter is used and stored, and control of foreign visitors and assignees. For example, Sandia needs to strengthen the firewall that protects the sensitive unclassified network from the open network and the Internet. Because of

these weaknesses, Sandia received an overall ‘‘Marginal’’ rating. A Marginal rating

is the middle rating in OA’s three tier rating system, the highest rating is Satisfactory and the lowest is Unsatisfactory. A Marginal rating indicates that prompt attention and timely improvement is needed but does not imply that special nuclear

material or classified and sensitive information are at immediate risk.

Sandia has submitted their corrective action plans as required and Independent

Oversight has provided comments to ensure that the issues are fully addressed. We

plan a formal follow-up review in December that will assess the progress and status

of the program. As with all of our follow-up reviews, we will review the status of

all identified weak programs, perform extensive cyber security testing, and review

the corrective action plan provisions.

We performed our inspection of the Los Alamos National Laboratory in August

of 1999. Los Alamos earned an overall ‘‘Satisfactory’’ rating. Los Alamos had effectively addressed long-standing problems in the accountability of nuclear materials,

and made significant progress in addressing deficiencies in the protection of classified weapons parts. Los Alamos made additional improvements in the protection of

classified weapons parts during the inspection. Los Alamos had also added protective force personnel and implemented a rigorous program to control the use of desk

top computer modems. Classified cyber security programs were found to be adequate, and Los Alamos is making progress on the ‘‘Tri-Lab nine-point’’ plan. Additionally, Los Alamos has significantly reduced risks associated with weaknesses in

unclassified cyber security systems by installing an effective firewall configuration

to prevent hackers from gaining access to sensitive networks.

The most significant residual weakness was in the ability of the unclassified cyber

security program to protect against the insider threat. A particular concern related

to foreign nationals that were permitted on the unclassified network, which had numerous potentially exploitable weaknesses. During the inspection, Los Alamos developed and began implementing an effective plan to address the residual weaknesses both in the short term and long term.

12

Although significant progress has been made, there is still work to be done in

order to achieve the goal of fully satisfactory programs at all DOE sites. At the

three national weapons laboratories, only the Los Alamos National Laboratory was

assigned an overall Satisfactory rating. The other two laboratories were rated Marginal. However, based on their corrective action plans, we believe that Livermore

and Sandia are on track to make improvements needed to achieve a Satisfactory

rating. Although Los Alamos earned an overall ‘‘Satisfactory’’ rating, as with the

other sites, we plan to perform follow-up activities and continue to monitor their

progress in implementing their corrective action plan.

In looking at the weaknesses in DOE safeguards and security programs, it is important to keep a sense of perspective. In general, protection of our most critical assets, such as nuclear weapons components and special nuclear materials, has improved significantly since the 1980s. While problems are still evident, they are generally degradations in one layer of a multi-layered security system rather than gaping holes of the type frequently noted in the 1980s. In addition, inspections indicate

that sites are complying with requirements for protecting classified documents, and

classified computer systems are generally well protected from hackers. While the

gaping holes have not reappeared, attention to security was in decline during the

mid-1990s and some sites did not adequately analyze the impact of cuts in security

personnel or security measures before implementing those cuts.

In our reviews of the national weapons laboratories, it is very clear that laboratory management has heard the wake up call from the Secretary. Safeguards and

security is receiving a high level of attention from senior management and we are

seeing some improvements that could not have been made without management

support and Secretary Richardson’s involvement. For example, the establishment of

an effective firewall and the consolidation of classified parts at Los Alamos were actions that had previously been resisted by the Los Alamos line managers because

of the operational inconvenience. The need for these actions had been identified on

previous Independent Oversight reviews but were not implemented because safeguards and security was given relatively low priority. In the past year, however,

senior management has increased emphasis on safeguards and security and many

important enhancements have been implemented in a way that provides a better

balance between safeguards and security requirements and operational needs.

One of the key elements of the recent progress is increased accountability. Secretary Richardson has sent the message that senior DOE and contractor managers

are accountable for safeguards and security. This has been accomplished through

various measures; a few examples include:

• The reorganization of responsibilities at DOE Headquarters, which established

the Lead Program Secretarial Office as responsible and accountable for safeguards and security • The ‘‘zero tolerance policy’’ which establishes expectations for safeguards and security and accountability at all levels of line management from the first level

supervisor to the laboratory directors and to DOE operations office managers

and DOE program offices

The Secretary has stated [quote] ‘‘People are getting the message that we’re serious about protecting our nation’s secrets’’ [unquote]. The results of our recent inspections demonstrate that the message has been heard and that actions are being

taken to improve the safeguards and security posture at our national laboratories.

In conclusion, it is clear that a positive trend has been established but that much

work remains to be accomplished. We will not be satisfied until all DOE sites

achieve and maintain a fully satisfactory program and establish processes for ensuring continuous improvement. However, it is encouraging to note that safeguards and

security programs at all three national weapons laboratories have received high levels of management attention over the past year and there have been significant improvements.

Thank you again Mr. Chairman, we are now ready for your questions.

Mr. UPTON. General Habiger.

TESTIMONY OF EUGENE E. HABIGER

Mr. HABIGER. Mr. Chairman, it is my first opportunity to testify

before this committee.

Mr. UPTON. All of these butterflies flying all around.

Mr. HABIGER. As most of you are aware, Secretary Richardson

asked me to become the Department Security Director in June.

Since my arrival, I have visited all the Department’s major sites,

13

reviewed virtually all of our site protection plans, observed and

participated in segments of our protective force training at our central training facility, examined our newly implemented cyber security procedures at our national laboratories, talked to hundreds of

scientists and technicians and taken a DOE-administered polygraph. What I have found so far is this:

First, it is clearly obvious that the Department reacted appropriately to the wakeup call received this past year with the uncovering of internal security problems and the publication of both the

Cox and the Rudman reports.

Second, security throughout the Department is being administered responsibly and conscientiously by dedicated hard-working

professionals who are firmly committed to protecting the national

security assets which are entrusted to them.

Finally, although we do have security issues which we must and

will address, I found all sites that I have visited have the foundation to perform their security functions capably, given adequate resources.

But I also discovered some troubling issues. First and foremost,

it was apparent to me early on that the Department was extremely

close to losing the confidence and special trust of both the American people and the Congress with respect to our ability to perform

our security responsibilities.

Second, and equally as important, I discovered that over the

years the Department had lost its focus on security; and you said

it best in your opening remarks, sir, that we had a dysfunctional

organization. There was no office within the Department that had

ultimate accountability for the security requirements for which

DOE is responsible, nor was there any emphasis on individual accountability. By-products of this organizational dysfunction and

lack of focus included a deterioration of security awareness and

education, resulting in a failure to remind and educate our employees and contractors as to their personal security responsibilities

and accountabilities.

Finally, Congress, up to this point, has failed to fund the Department’s fiscal year 2000 full budget amendment in order to make

near- and long-term fixes. We have, Mr. Chairman, valid requirements in the area of cyber security to buy hardware encryption

equipment and to train our systems administrators. We need to

equip our protective forces with equipment to combat weapons of

mass destruction, and we need program direction funds to stand up

a viable foreign visitor access program, as well as an acceptable

plutonium, uranium, and special nuclear materials control and accountability program.

Simply stated, we have been given a mandate, but not the resources to accomplish that mandate. Though a series of comprehensive and sweeping initiatives by Secretary Richardson, the Department has, however, turned the corner, in my view, and has aggressively and dynamically changed the way it does its security business.

Soon after coming on board, I put into motion an aggressive fourphased security campaign. In Phase I, which was completed in August, I initiated visits to all major DOE sites. We established a

14

baseline from which to move forward. We found a number of things

that needed to be fixed quickly, and we did that very, very quickly.

Phase II, currently under way, I completed visits to the sites and

issued or am in the process of issuing policy addressing key issues

such as standardization of weapons for our protective forces, the requirement for our protective forces to keep a round in the chamber

of their weapons while on duty. We weren’t training the way we

would fight. We now have policies which we never had before,

which mandate the timely reporting of security incidents, the use

of warning banners on computer systems and badge validation procedures.

In the area of cyber security, the national laboratories have implemented numerous corrective actions. Key among them is a program to achieve physical incompatibility between removable media

formats within common laboratory work areas.

In Phase III, which will occur in January through March of next

year, most of the new policies to fix security problems will have

been implemented and I will revisit the field to establish the effectiveness of those policies.

When we reach Phase IV in April to September of next year, proposed fixes will be in place and our efforts turned toward minor adjustments as we maintain our security program.

Today, the Department of Energy is in a security environment

decidedly different from the one we faced a decade earlier. There

is a growing concern about a new breed of threats that confront the

Department and the Nation’s security structures. Terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and cyber attacks on information systems

have become ingrained in the global psyche and our Nation’s security consciousness. This is a significant challenge, Mr. Chairman,

but one that the Department of Energy is prepared to meet.

[The prepared statement of Eugene E. Habiger follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF EUGENE E. HABIGER, GENERAL, USAF (RETIRED), DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SECURITY AND EMERGENCY OPERATIONS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

I would like to thank the Chairman and Members of the Committee for the opportunity to speak with you today regarding the current status of security at the Department of Energy.

As most of you are aware, Secretary Richardson asked me to become the Department’s Security director in June. Since my arrival at the Department, I have visited

all of the Department’s major sites... Reviewed virtually all of our site security

plans... Observed and participated in segments of our protective force training at

our training facility in Albuquerque, New Mexico... Examined our newly implemented cyber security procedures at our national laboratories...Talked to hundreds

of scientists and technicians... And, taken a DOE-administered polygraph.

What I have found so far is this:

First, it is clearly obvious that the Department reacted appropriately to the ‘‘wake

up call’’ received this past year with the uncovering of internal security problems

and the publication of both the Cox and Rudman reports.

Second, security throughout the Department is being administered responsibly

and conscientiously by dedicated, hard working professionals who are firmly committed to protecting the critical national security assets which are entrusted to

them. The responsibilities of these individuals are demanding—yet, despite the obvious challenges, they continue to perform in an outstanding manner.

Finally, although we do have security issues which we must, and will, address,

I found all sites that I have visited have the foundation to perform their security

functions capably given adequate resources.

But I also discovered several troubling issues.

15

First and foremost, it was apparent to me early on that the Department was extremely close to losing the confidence and trust of both the American people and

the Congress with respect to our ability to perform our security responsibilities. The

enormous media coverage surrounding recent security related events coupled with

DOE’s historical track-record of security deficiencies added to this erosion of public

trust.

Secondly and equally as important, I discovered that over the years the Department had lost its focus on security. The Secretary on several occasions has referred

to the Department as being a group of fiefdoms within fiefdoms—and almost every

fiefdom had its own security responsibility and security budget. There was no office

within the Department who had ultimate accountability for the critical security requirements for which DOE is responsible nor was there any emphasis on individual

accountability. By-products of this organizational dysfunction and lack of focus included: a deterioration of security awareness and education resulting in a failure to

remind and educate our employees and contractors as to their personal security responsibilities and accountabilities... lack of attention to our cyber security practices

in a world of increased computer hacking and cyber terrorism... And, a gradual erosion of resources required to improve our capabilities to combat ever-changing terrorist and cyber-terrorist threats.

And finally, Congress has, up to this point, failed to fund the Department’s

FY2000 full budget amendment in order to make near and long-term fixes. We have

valid requirements in the area of cyber-security to buy hardware, encryption equipment and to train our system administrators. We need to equip our protective forces

to combat weapons of mass destruction . . . to fully arm the headquarters protective

forces and complete our headquarters security upgrades... And, we need program

direction funds to stand up a robust foreign visitor access program as well as an

acceptable plutonium, uranium and special nuclear materials control and accountability program and bring about our new organization. Simply stated, we have been

given a mandate but not the additional resources to accomplish that mandate.

Through a series of comprehensive and sweeping initiatives by Secretary Richardson, however, the Department has turned the corner and has aggressively and dynamically changed the way it does its security business.

In May of this year Secretary Richardson announced his Security Reform Package—the most sweeping reform of security programs in the Department’s history.

This comprehensive plan involved the creation of my office—the Office of Security

and Emergency Operations, and the elevation and revitalization of Mr. Glenn

Podonsky’s Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance. In the

words of Secretary Richardson, ‘‘this plan gives DOE the tools and authority we

need to detect security infractions, correct institutional problems and protect America’s nuclear secrets.’’ Glenn and I are working closely together to ensure an integrated approach to policy development and oversight.

The foundation of the Secretary’s security reform plan is his policy statement regarding security incidents and violations. In his statement, the Secretary established an expectation of personal accountability by DOE employees and contractors

for protecting DOE’s national security assets. The Secretary further established a

policy of zero tolerance for violations of security requirements that could place nuclear or other sensitive information at risk.

Another important step was to change the way the Department managed its security responsibilities. In this regard, the Secretary worked diligently to remove the

organizational barriers that had historically impeded the Department’s ability to effectively and efficiently implement a comprehensive security program within the Department.

Soon after coming on board I put in motion an aggressive, Four-Phased Security

Campaign. In Phase I, which was completed in August, I initiated visits to each of

the DOE sites in the field, and established a baseline from which to move forward.

Areas requiring immediate fixes were identified. During this period, a complex-wide

security stand-down was conducted to promote security awareness as an individual

responsibility. New policy was issued for foreign visitors who visit our facilities to

ensure that the tightest possible security procedures are followed.

In Phase II, currently underway, I completed visits to the sites and issued, or am

in the process of issuing, policy addressing key issues, such as: Standardized Weapons for Protective Forces, and the requirement for protective forces to keep a round

in the chamber of weapons carried while on duty. We now have policies which mandate the timely reporting of security incidents, the use of warning banners on computer systems, and badge validation procedures. We are developing an integrated

security awareness training curriculum. Two very similar personal security assurance programs will be combined into a single departmental Human Reliability Program to eliminate redundancy and streamline the administration process. In the

16

area of cyber-security, the National Laboratories have implemented numerous corrective actions. Key among these is a program to achieve physical incompatibility

between removable media formats within common laboratory work areas. We are

taking this sweeping action in an effort to prevent the intentional or inadvertent

transfer of classified information from classified to unclassified systems or to a

media format easily concealed and removed. In related efforts, the laboratories will

continue to search unclassified archives and to monitor outgoing e-mail messages

for classified content. We are also developing a comprehensive set of metrics to

make sure we are making continuous improvements.

Phase III will occur in January to March of 2000, at which time most new policies

to fix security will have been implemented. I will revisit the field to evaluate the

effectiveness of the policies and to define metrics to be used for future assessments.

At this stage, most of the major security concerns will be fixed and the focus turned

to improvements and enhancements.

When we reach Phase IV in April to September of 2000, proposed fixes will be

in place and our efforts turned toward adjustments, as we maintain our security

program. A critical activity here will be continuous feedback from the field, scheduled visits to the field, and regularly held meetings with representatives from all

sites to exchange lessons learned and best practices.

Successful implementation of our security responsibilities will also depend on a

focused and well-defined mission and management structure that addresses policy

and decision making, personnel and budget resources, planning and program execution. Therefore, we are reconstituting available resources into a robust, responsive,

and unified safeguards and security organization. This was the Secretary’s intent

when he announced his security reform initiative; and we are making real progress.

Our workforce—both Federal and contractor—is the most critical link in the chain

of protection of security interests. Consequently, we are instilling a sense of urgency

and corporate ownership among all Department of Energy employees and contractors, not just those that have security as part of their job descriptions. This is being

accomplished through renewed emphasis on a meaningful enforcement program that

holds individuals accountable should they violate their security responsibilities.

We are enhancing our efforts to ensure that employees are fully aware of their

own individual protection responsibilities. The granting of a security clearance carries with it a very serious obligation to protect the sensitive and critical assets entrusted to one’s care. We have mounted an aggressive and comprehensive security

education and awareness campaign to remind each and every individual of their obligations.

For those individuals whose primary duties relate to the protection of national security assets (that is, our security professionals), we are instituting a comprehensive

career development initiative that establishes a centrally managed competency

based promotion and assignments program designed to institute staffing uniformity

and enhanced operability throughout the complex. This program is an adaptation

of existing programs in place with other government agencies, the military and private industry. It represents what I believe to be a ‘‘best practice’’ in the area of career development.

Finally, recognizing our critical role in the national security community, we are

institutionalizing my office as the principal security coordinator for the Department

in developing inter- and intra-agency partnerships. In so doing we actively contribute to the protection of the Nation’s energy infrastructure and leverage technology and, as applicable, expertise into the international security community dealing with nuclear safeguards and security.

Today, the Department of Energy functions in a security environment decidedly

different from the one we faced a decade earlier. There is growing concern about

a new breed of threats that confront the Department and the Nation’s security

structures. Terrorism, Weapons of Mass Destruction and cyber attacks on information systems have become ingrained in the global psyche and in our nation’s security consciousness. These non-traditional, multi-directional threats are testing security resolve and capabilities as never before.

We cannot control or alter the threats to the security interests entrusted to our

care. What can be controlled, however, is our ability to plan and respond to threats

should they ever materialize. The changing security environment and other threats

over the past decade have fundamentally altered the Department’s security perspective and posture. This is a significant challenge, but one that the Department of Energy is prepared to meet.

Mr. UPTON. Thank you. Pretty close on the time as well.

Mr. Curran.

17

TESTIMONY OF EDWARD J. CURRAN

Mr. CURRAN. Good morning. Mr. Chairman, I am happy to be

here this morning to discuss the state of counterintelligence at the

Department of Energy. As you are aware, I have been the Director

of the Office of Counterintelligence at DOE since April 1, 1998. In

the 11⁄2 years since I have assumed this position, I believe DOE

has made significant progress toward developing an effective and

efficient program to protect DOE personnel and facilities, as well

as classified and sensitive unclassified information on foreign intelligence threats. This progress would not have been possible without

the strong support of Secretary Bill Richardson and the Congress.

Before I discuss the specific progress that has been made to date,

I would like to provide some background on the counterintelligence

at DOE.

PDD-61, captioned U.S. Department of Energy Counterintelligence Program, was signed by President Clinton on February 11,

1998. The PDD was the result of numerous General Accounting Office reviews, United States intelligence community assessments,

and a Federal Bureau of Investigation study directed by the Senate

Select Committee on Intelligence in April 1997. The PDD required

that I prepare a report for the Secretary of Energy 90 days after

my arrival to include an assessment of the current state of DOE’s

CI program, a strategic plan for achieving long-term goals and objectives of the PDD, and an action plan for near-term measures to

reduce the foreign intelligence threat to DOE laboratories.

To accomplish this effort, I pulled together a team of CI experts,

security professionals, and individuals with cyber expertise from

throughout the Intelligence Community. The resulting report, captioned Mapping the Future of the Department of Energy’s Counterintelligence Program, hereinafter referred to as the 90-Day Study,

identified many deficiencies in DOE’s CI program and further

verified that the program didn’t meet minimal standards.

The review was initiated on April 1, 1998, and concluded on July

1, 1998, when the 90-Day Study was submitted to the Secretary of

Energy, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Director of Central Intelligence and the Director of the FBI. The report

made 46 concrete recommendations to improve the effectiveness

and efficiency of the DOE CI program.

On November 13, 1998, Secretary Richardson approved virtually

all of the 46 recommendations identified in the 90-Day Study and

furnished DOE’s CI action plan to Mr. Sandy Berger, Assistant to

the President for National Security Affairs. In the Secretary’s CI

action plan, my office was directed to prepare a CI implementation

plan within 45 days of the issuance of the action plan. This OCI

implementation plan was delivered to the Office of Secretary on

February 3, 1999. In the implementation plan, we assigned individual offices primary and supporting responsibility for each recommendation. We have since prioritized the 46 recommendations

into three different tiers.

I would like to assure you that even while my office was preparing the CI implementation plan we were also in the process of

implementing many of the 90-Day Study’s recommendations. I am

pleased to inform you that, to date, approximately 75 percent of the

46 recommendations have been implemented. Furthermore, almost

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95 percent of the 24 Tier I recommendations have been implemented.

I would like to take a few minutes to identify some of these implementation successes and elaborate on many of the procedures

we have already put into place to address the deficiencies in DOE’s

CI program.

The most important part of developing a world-class CI program

is, of course, the resources. Historically, the DOE CI program has

been underfunded and skills mix of the employees has been insufficient to effectively execute a complex-wide CI mission. Currently,

the Department has over 110,000 cleared individuals placed in 50

laboratories and facilities, most of which are under separate contracts. These laboratories and facilities house most of the Nation’s

premier scientists’ research and development and the most sophisticated technology applications in the world. Yet when I came on

board in April, 1998 to head the Department’s CI efforts, DOE had

only seven full-time Federal employees at the headquarters dedicated to the CI mission and just a few untrained CI officers in the

field. Seven of these CI officers reported to their separate laboratories or facility management without any consolidated headquarters oversight or direction for their programs.

Today, I have a staff of 130 Federal, contractor, and Intelligence

Community CI professionals. I expect this number to increase to

156 by the end of this fiscal year. Next fiscal year, it is our goal

to hire a significant amount of CI-cyber experts and place them at

select DOE facilities. Importantly, at each of the five weapons laboratories, I have hired with the cooperation of all the lab directors

seasoned CI professionals, all of whom are retired FBI special

agents. These CI officers are no longer buried in the local bureaucracy. They have direct access to me and to the laboratory director

should they need to discuss a CI matter.

The DOE CI program began in 1988, and from its inception through 1996 the Department spent less than $3 million annually

on counterintelligence. In fiscal years 1997 and 1998, the Intelligence Committees approved a supplement for DOE’s CI budget

based on numerous GAO reports and their continued significant

concerns regarding visitors at the laboratories. This supplement

brought the total CI program funding to $6.6 million in 1997, and

$7.6 million in the 1998. Since my appointment in April of last

year, I have successfully increased DOE’s CI budget from $7.6 million to $15.6 for fiscal year 1999, and $39.2 million, which includes

$8 million for CI cyber initiatives, for this fiscal year.

This very tedious and exhaustive effort was accomplished with

exceptional support from Secretary Richardson and members of the

House Armed Services Committee and the House and Senate Select

Committees on Intelligence. Without their continued support and

push for adequate financing, none of the improvements to DOE’s

CI program, which I am about to describe, would have been possible.

Direct funding, along with headquarter’s OCI control and direction of funds to the laboratories and other DOE facilities is the cornerstone of the 90-Day Study, the CI action plan and the CI implementation plan and an overall effective CI program at DOE. Without this level of control, meaningful oversight is impossible. Direct

19

funding has helped us to have great control over allocation of resources to the priorities I have set for the CI program. I would like

to share with you these programmatic priorities and the efforts

OCI is undertaking to improve the DOE CI program.

First, I will highlight some of the very critical and necessary

changes in day-to-day operations of the CI effort at DOE headquarters. As a result of PDD-61, a new independent Office of Counterintelligence was created that reports directly to the Secretary of

Energy. As Director of OCI, the PDD gives me direct CI policy development, implementation and oversight responsibilities for all CI

activities throughout DOE. The Secretary signed a delegation order

confirming those responsibilities and delegating to me the appropriate authority to execute them. In addition to my direct reporting

and access to the Secretary on CI issues, on a regular biweekly

basis, I meet with Under Secretary Moniz and Deputy Secretary

Glauthier on CI issues or as need arises. Mr. Sanchez from the Office of Intelligence and I both participate in these meetings since

our offices work very, very closely together.

As a result of the 90-Day Study findings, I determined that the

optimal OCI organizational structure includes six distinct areas:

analysis, investigations, CI-cyber training, inspections, and a CI

evaluation board. Importantly, each of these programs must operate as a single, integrated program. None of them, taken in isolation, would constitute a viable CI program.

The analysis program is headed by an experienced analyst detailed from the FBI with over 8 years of specific analytical experience. Her deputy is a detailee from the FBI with analytical experience. They both are very familiar with DOE, since they participated in the FBI study of DOE directed by the Senate Select Committee, which I previously mentioned. They have six analysts currently working for them and are in the process of hiring several

more experienced analysts. We expect to place CI analysts at five

laboratories this fiscal year.

In my opinion, DOE has a wealth of information which has not

been analytically exploited in the past. The reports we have produced and will be producing are obviously of great importance to

DOE, but also to the Intelligence Community.

For example, a DOE CI analyst played an extremely important

role in the preparation of the first annual threat assessment prepared by the National Counterintelligence Center at the direction

of the DCI, published in November of last year. This report is required on an annual basis as a result of PDD-61.

OCI analysts are currently playing a critical role in the second

annual PDD-61-mandated threat assessment which should be published next month. These reports are a direct result of the President’s direction and represent meaningful impact to DOE that I

have not seen in the past. In my opinion, if it were not for the tenacious efforts by my DOE analysts in this annual effort, the reports

would have been far less meaningful than they are.

The analysis program has written and will continue to write foreign intelligence threat assessments resulting from DOE’s extensive interaction with DOE-sensitive countries. As the U.S. Government’s technical advisor to various bilateral and multilateral nonproliferation and arms control initiatives, DOE hosts hundreds of

20

sensitive country foreign nationals each year, and DOE officials are

frequent travelers to sensitive countries.

The analysis program is also in the midst of a study of potential

economic espionage at the laboratories. The laboratories engage in

cooperative research and development agreements, CRADAs, with

private industry. OCI wants to ensure that proprietary economic

information is being properly protected.

The projects I mentioned above are expensive, but the results

and benefits to DOE and the Intelligence Community will allow us

to detect and work toward neutralizing foreign intelligence activities directed at DOE. These products also provide our policymakers

with the information they need to make national policy decisions.

The investigations program is headed by another FBI supervisor,

currently on detail from the FBI, with over 20 years’ experience in

foreign counterintelligence. His primary responsibility is to ensure

that any instances in which classified information is being or may

have been compromised to an unauthorized party are reported to

the FBI. I will continue to staff this program with qualified and experienced investigators.

The CI cyber program is headed by an employee from the FBI’s

National Infrastructure Protection Center. The CI cyber program

director serves as OCI’s representative to DOE’s critical infrastructure protection task force. Her daily activities include interaction

with DOE headquarters and laboratory computer professionals, as

well as the NIPC. With the additional $8 million OCI received for

cyber programs in fiscal year 2000, we are implementing some of

the recommendations in the 90-Day Study.

One of the 90-Day Study’s recommendations was the development and implementation of a complex-wide strategy to address

the potential CI implications of e-mail. As mentioned before, the CI

program will significantly enhance the number of CI experts this

fiscal year in order to further develop field intrusion detection and

analysis abilities. CI cyber personnel require skills in both computer security and counterintelligence.

A DOE Federal employee heads our training program. The purpose of the training program is threefold: to formulate an in-house

program to train our own CI personnel, to provide professional

awareness briefings and debriefings for our scientists traveling to

sensitive countries, and to provide awareness briefings for the general DOE population who have an interface with foreigners so that

they become sensitive to CI-related issues. Professional training for

CI officers has been reoriented to focus on core skills necessary to

be an effective CI person.

I would like to provide some examples of our current outreach

and awareness training efforts to the DOE population. The OCI

currently has CI professionals assigned to DOE highly enriched

uranium transparency program. This person is responsible for all

related CI issues and team briefings and debriefings. He is accepted and trusted as a total team member and the members are willing to address sensitive CI issues with him. I have established the

same relationship with scientists and DOE employees associated

with the Materials Protection and Accounting Program, the largest

program within DOE dealing with the Russians, the Initiative for

Proliferation Prevention, the Nuclear Cities Initiative, and the

21

China Arms Control Exchange by assigning a CI officer to each

team. Assigning a CI officer to all such programs within DOE will

help us to achieve our goal of briefing and debriefing all personnel

traveling to sensitive countries. Our CI goal is not only to protect

technology, but the programs involving DOE personnel.

Inspections: We have established an internal inspection process

required by PDD-61. There are two teams available at any given

time to complete these inspections. One team is headed by a retired

FBI agent who was the former Assistant Director in charge of the

Washington field office and was previously the Deputy Director in

the FBI’s Inspection Division. The second team is headed by a

former Special Agent who retired from the FBI as the Special

Agent in charge of the Springfield office and was also an inspector

in the FBI’s Inspection Division. Both of these individuals have

over 25 years’ experience in the FBI and specifically in the CI

arena. The inspection teams are supported by experienced retired

FBI and law enforcement officers who are experts in gathering information and resolving complex cases. The teams have been augmented by senior retired personnel security experts from DOE,

along with retired laboratory scientists.

As of this date two inspections have taken place: Los Alamos National Laboratory and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. A

third inspection of Sandia National Laboratories is under way this

week. All DOE facilities are subject to CI inspection, and we have

scheduled 12 facilities for inspection next calendar year. The results of the first two inspections have been provided to me and Secretary Richardson.

In brief, these results show that significant improvements have

been made in the CI programs in these laboratories since PDD-61

was signed. I will provide summaries of these inspections to Congress in the annual report on counterintelligence and security practices at the national laboratories as mandated by the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2000. Any significant CI relevant events will be provided to you immediately.

The CI Evaluations Board: PDD-61 authorized the use of many

tools designed to reduce the threat to classified and sensitive information at DOE and its field activities. The polygraph was specifically cited as being one of the tools which OCI, in coordination with

the DOE Office of Security Affairs, may use to enhance the DOE

CI program. Research and analysis conducted for the 90-Day Study

all indicated that the polygraph was one tool that could be used to

enhance the effectiveness of the CI program.

OCI’s Counterintelligence Evaluation Board is responsible for implementing the DOE CI polygraph program. A senior OCI officer is

leading OCI’s CIEB. I must stress that the polygraph program is

only one of six elements of the DOE CI program; it cannot be considered in isolation. I do not believe that the polygraph is a CI panacea or an infallible CI tool. However, I do believe that the polygraph serves as a valuable deterrent to individuals who currently

have direct or indirect access to classified information and may be

contemplating espionage.

I also believe the polygraph serves as a constructive screening

device for individuals applying for positions requiring access to

classified and/or sensitive unclassified information. The polygraph

22

can also be used effectively as an exculpatory tool. The purpose of

the polygraph program is to protect U.S. national security by attempting to determine if anyone with access has engaged in espionage, sabotage or terrorism or has had unauthorized contact with

foreign nationals or disclosed classified information in an unauthorized manner.

I am extremely sensitive to the anxiety that the polygraph program has caused in the Department. I want to stress that we are

only going to be administering the polygraph and examinations to

a small percentage of DOE employees having access to the most

sensitive high-risk national security programs. These programs include Special Access Programs; Sensitive Compartmented Information, SCI; Personnel Security and Assurance Program, and the Personnel Assurance Program known as PAPS. The latter two programs involve DOE employees who are involved in the design of

nuclear weapons and those who have direct access to nuclear weapons.

OCI has made every effort to reach out to potentially affected

personnel to explain the polygraph. Technical briefings for employees of Sandia, Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos National Laboratories were held last month. In accordance with the rulemaking

process, OCI participated with General Habiger, Director of the Office of Security and Operations in public hearings. The public hearings were held at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in September 1999; Sandia National Laboratory on September 16; Los Alamos, September 17; and Washington, DC, here, September 22.

Additionally, as you are aware, I provided a briefing on the polygraph program to this subcommittee on October 4. We also briefed

the White House science advisor on the some program.

While DOE has approved a notice on the polygraph program, it

only applies to DOE Federal employees. We’re currently in the latter stages of an Office of Personnel Management-mandated rulemaking process to develop regulations for applying the program to

DOE contractors. DOE contractors constitute the majority of individuals in the aforementioned high-risk national security programs.

As DOE participates in the rulemaking process necessary to

apply to the polygraph program to DOE contractors, we have been

simultaneously administering the polygraph to DOE Federal employees and volunteering contract employees in OCI and the Office

of Environment, Safety and Health. Additionally, some high-level

Department officials, including the Secretary, Deputy Secretary

and Under Secretary have taken the polygraph. I was the first to

volunteer to take the polygraph last year. Overall, approximately

85 personnel have been administered and passed a CI-scope polygraph thus far.

To ensure quality control, the polygraph program is managed by

an individual that has been the quality control on polygraphs for

DOE since 1991. He is the Director of Quality Control for the

American Association of Police Polygraph Examiners and subcommittee chairman of the Quality Control Committee for the

American Polygraph Association.

The OCI polygraph program manager also served as the chief instructor at the Federal Polygraph School from 1985 to 1991 and in

Government Service Polygraph since 1974.

23

The current DOE Polygraph Program has four layers of quality

control. This is more than any other U.S. Government agency

which administers polygraph examinations.

Mr. UPTON. Mr. Curran, I have been very generous with the

time.

Mr. CURRAN. I know. I have one more page.

Our decisions about who is granted access to classified information must be made with the sole criteria of protecting U.S. national

security. The enhancement of the DOE Polygraph Program is not

without precedent, as our efforts are bringing the Department in

line with the rest of the intelligence community insofar as access

to high risk national security programs are concerned. I believe

that the Department’s commitment to the overall CI effort is embodied in its support for the Polygraph Program. OCI has received

strong support from the Secretary for this initiative, and with his

and your continued support we will continue to use the polygraph

as an important CI tool.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your patience.

[The prepared statement of Edward J. Curran follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF EDWARD J. CURRAN, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Good afternoon Mr. Chairman. I am happy to be here this afternoon to discuss

the state of counterintelligence (CI) at the Department of Energy (DOE). As you are

aware, I have been the Director of the Office of Counterintelligence (OCI) at DOE

since April 1, 1998. In the one and a half years since I assumed this position, I believe DOE has made significant progress toward developing an effective and efficient

program to protect DOE personnel and facilities, as well as classified and sensitive

unclassified information, from foreign intelligence threats. This progress would not

have been possible without the strong support of Energy Secretary Bill Richardson

and the Congress. Before I discuss the specific progress that has been made to date,

I would like to provide some background on counterintelligence at DOE.

BACKGROUND

Presidential Decision Directive/NSC 61 (PDD-61), U.S. Department of Energy

Counterintelligence Program, was signed by the President on February 11, 1998.

The PDD was the result of numerous General Accounting Office (GAO) reviews,

United States Intelligence Community assessments and a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) study directed by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI)

in April 1997. The PDD required that I prepare a report for the Secretary of Energy

90 days after my arrival to include an assessment of the current state of DOE’s CI

Program, a strategic plan for achieving the long-term goals and objectives of the

PDD, and an action plan for near-term measures to reduce the foreign intelligence

threat to the DOE laboratories. To accomplish this effort, I pulled together a team

of CI experts, security professionals, and individuals with cyber expertise from

throughout the Intelligence Community. The resulting report, Mapping the Future

of the Department of Energy’s Counterintelligence Program, hereinafter referred to

as the 90-Day Study, identified many deficiencies in DOE’s CI Program and further

verified that the Program did not meet minimal standards. The review was initiated

on April 1, 1998 and concluded on July 1, 1998 when the 90 Day Study was submitted to the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Defense, Attorney General, Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and Director, FBI. The report made 46 concrete

recommendations to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the DOE CI Program.

On November 13, 1998, Secretary of Energy Richardson approved virtually all of

the 46 recommendations identified in the 90-Day Study and furnished a DOE CI

Action Plan to Mr. Sandy Berger, Assistant to the President for National Security

Affairs. In the Secretary’s CI Action Plan, my Office was directed to prepare a CI

Implementation Plan within 45 days of the issuance of the Action Plan. This OCI

Implementation Plan was delivered to the Office of the Secretary on February 3,

1999. In the Implementation Plan we assigned individual offices primary and supVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:33 Sep 11, 2000 Jkt 061036 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 E:\HEARINGS\61036 pfrm03 PsN: 61036
24

porting responsibility for each recommendation. We have since prioritized the 46

recommendations into three tiers.

IMPLEMENTATION PLAN PROGRESS

I would like to assure you that even while my Office was preparing the CI Implementation Plan we were also in the process of implementing many of the 90-Day

Study’s recommendations. I am pleased to inform you that to date, approximately

75% of the 46 recommendations have been implemented. Furthermore, almost 95%

of the 24 most critical (‘‘Tier One’’), 60% of the Tier Two, and 50% of the Tier Three

recommendations have been implemented. I would like to take just a few minutes

to identify some of these implementation successes and elaborate on many of the

procedures we have already put into place to address the deficiencies in DOE’s CI

Program.

Resources

The most important part of developing a world-class CI Program is, of course, the

resources. Historically, the DOE CI Program has been underfunded and the skills

mix of the employees has been insufficient to effectively execute a complex-wide CI

mission. Currently, the Department has over 110,000 cleared individuals placed in

over 50 laboratories and facilities, most of which are under separate contracts.

These laboratories and facilities house most of the nation’s premiere scientists, research and development, and most sophisticated technology applications in the

world—yet when I came on board in April 1998 to head the Department’s CI effort,

DOE had only seven full time Federal employees at headquarters dedicated to the

CI mission, and just a few untrained CI Officers in the field. Each of these CI Officers reported to their separate laboratory or facility management without any consolidated headquarters oversight or direction for their programs.

Today I have a staff of 130 Federal, contractor, and Intelligence Community CI

professionals; I expect this number to increase to 156 by the end of this fiscal year.

Next fiscal year it is our goal to hire a significant amount of CI-Cyber experts and

place them at select DOE facilities. Importantly, at each of the five weapons laboratories, I have hired seasoned CI professionals, all of whom are retired FBI Special

Agents. These CI Officers are no longer buried in the local bureaucracy; they have

direct access to me and to the Laboratory Director should they need to discuss a

CI matter.

The DOE CI Program began in 1988 and from its inception through 1996, the Department spent less than $3.0M annually on CI. In Fiscal Years 1997 and 1998, the

Intelligence Committees approved a supplement for the DOE CI budget based on

the numerous GAO reports and their continued, significant concerns regarding visitors at the laboratories. This supplement brought the total CI Program funding up

to $6.6M in 1997 and $7.6M in 1998. Since my appointment in April of last year,

I successfully increased the DOE CI budget from $7.6M to $15.6M for Fiscal Year

1999 and $39.2M (which includes $8 million for CI-Cyber initiatives) for this fiscal

year. This very tedious and exhaustive effort was accomplished with the exceptional

support from Secretary Richardson and Members from the House Armed Services

Committee (HASC), and the SSCI. Without their continued support and push for

adequate financing, none of the improvements to DOE’s CI Program, which I am

about to describe would have been possible. Direct funding, along with headquarters OCI control and direction of funds to the laboratories and other

DOE facilities, is the cornerstone of the 90-Day Study, CI Action Plan, CI

Implementation Plan, and an overall effective CI Program at DOE. Without

this level of control, meaningful oversight is impossible. Direct funding has

helped us to have greater control over allocation of resources to the priorities I have

set for the CI Program. I would like to share with you these programmatic priorities

and the efforts OCI is undertaking to improve to the DOE CI Program.

PROGRAM OVERVIEW

First, I will highlight some of the very critical and necessary changes in day-today operations of the CI effort at DOE Headquarters. As the result of PDD-61, a

new and independent OCI was created that reports directly to the Secretary of Energy. As Director, OCI, the PDD gives me direct CI policy development, implementation and oversight responsibilities for all CI activities throughout DOE. The Secretary signed a Delegation Order confirming those responsibilities and delegating to

me the appropriate authority to execute them. In addition to my direct reporting

and access to the Secretary on CI issues, on a regular, bi-weekly basis, I meet with

Under Secretary Moniz or Deputy Secretary Glauthier on CI issues, or as the need

arises. Mr. Sanchez, Director of the DOE Office of Intelligence, and I both particiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:33 Sep 11, 2000 Jkt 061036 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 E:\HEARINGS\61036 pfrm03 PsN: 61036
25

pate in these meetings since our offices work very closely together. As the result

of the 90-Day Study findings, I determined the optimal OCI organizational structure

includes six distinct areas: Analysis, Investigations, CI- Cyber, Training, Inspections, and CI Evaluation Board. Importantly, each of these programs must operate

as a single, integrated program; none of them taken in isolation would constitute

a viable CI Program.

Analysis Program

The Analysis Program is headed by an experienced Analyst detailed from the FBI

with over eight years of specific analytical experience. Her Deputy is also a detailee

from the FBI with extensive analytical experience. They both are very familiar with

DOE since they participated in the FBI study of DOE directed by the SSCI which

I previously mentioned. They have six analysts currently working for them, and are

in the process of hiring several more experienced analysts. We expect to place CI

analysts at five laboratories this fiscal year. In my opinion DOE has a wealth of

information which has not been analytically exploited in the past. The reports we

have produced and will be producing are obviously of great importance to DOE but

also to the Intelligence Community.

For example:

• A DOE CI analyst played an extremely important role in the preparation of the

first annual threat assessment prepared by the National Counterintelligence

Center (NACIC) at the direction of the DCI, published on November 27, 1998.

This report is required on an annual basis as the result of PDD-61. OCI analysts are currently playing a critical role in the second annual PDD-61 mandated threat assessment which should be published next month. These reports

are a direct result of the President’s direction and represent meaningful intelligence produced by the Intelligence Community which directly impacts DOE.

In my opinion, if it were not for the tenacious efforts of my DOE analysts in

this annual effort, the reports would be far less meaningful than they are.

• The Analysis Program has written and will continue to write foreign intelligence

threat assessments resulting from DOE’s extensive interaction with DOE ‘‘sensitive countries.’’ As the U.S. Government’s technical advisor to various bilateral

and multilateral non-proliferation and arms control initiatives, DOE hosts hundreds of sensitive country foreign nationals each year, and DOE officials are frequent travelers to sensitive countries.

• The Analysis Program is also in the midst of a study of potential economic espionage at the laboratories. The laboratories engage in Cooperative Research and

Development Agreements (CRADAs) with private industry. OCI wants to ensure that proprietary economic information is being properly protected.

The projects I mentioned above are expensive but the results and benefits to DOE

and the Intelligence Community will allow us to detect and work toward neutralizing foreign intelligence activities being directed against DOE. These products also

provide our policymakers with the information they need to make national policy

decisions.

Investigations Program

The Investigations Program is headed by another FBI supervisor currently on detail from the FBI with over 23 years experience in Foreign Counterintelligence operations. His primary responsibility is to ensure that any instances in which classified

information is being or may have been compromised to an unauthorized party are

reported to the FBI. I will continue to staff this Program with qualified and experienced investigators.

CI-Cyber Program

The CI-Cyber Program is headed by an employee from the FBI’s National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC). The CI-Cyber Program Director serves as OCI’s

representative to DOE’s Critical Infrastructure Protection Task Force. Her daily activities include interaction with DOE headquarters and laboratory computer security professionals, as well as, the NIPC. With the additional $8 million OCI received

for Cyber Programs in Fiscal Year 2000, we are implementing some of the recommendations in the 90-Day Study. For example:

• One of the 90 Day Study’s recommendations was the development and implementation of a complex-wide strategy to address the potential CI implications of

email to foreign nations.

• As mentioned above, the CI-Cyber Program will significantly enhance the number

of CI- Cyber experts this fiscal year in order to further develop field intrusion

detection and analysis abilities. CI-Cyber personnel require skills in both computer security and CI.

26

Training Program

A DOE federal employee heads our Training Program. The purpose of the Training Program is three fold: 1) to formulate an in-house program to train our own CI

personnel; 2) to provide professional awareness briefings and debriefings for our scientists traveling to sensitive countries; and 3) to provide awareness briefings for the

general DOE population who have an interface with foreigners so they become sensitive to CI related issues. Professional training for CI Officers has been re-oriented

to focus on core skills necessary to be an effective CI Officer.

I would like to provide the following examples of our current outreach and awareness training efforts to the DOE population: The OCI currently has a CI professional assigned to the DOE High Enriched Uranium/Transparency Program. This

person is responsible for all related CI issues and team briefings and debriefings.

He is accepted and trusted as a total team member and the members are willing

to discuss sensitive CI issues with him. I have established that same relationship

with the scientists and DOE employees associated with the Materials Protection

Control and Accounting (MPC&A) Program (the largest program within DOE dealing with the Russians), the Initiative for Proliferation Prevention, the Nuclear Cities

Initiative, and the China Arms Control Exchange (CACE) by assigning a CI Officer

to each team. Assigning a CI Officer to all such programs within DOE will help us

to achieve our goal of briefing and debriefing all DOE personnel traveling to sensitive countries. Our CI goal is not only to protect technology, but also programs

involving DOE personnel.

Inspections

We have established an internal inspections process as required by PDD-61. There

are two teams available at any given time to complete these inspections. One team

is headed by a retired FBI agent who was the former Assistant Director in Charge

of the Washington Field Office and was previously the Deputy Director in the FBI’s

Inspection Division. The second team is headed by a former FBI agent who retired

from the FBI as the Special Agent in Charge of the Springfield office and was also

an Inspector in the FBI Inspection Division. Both these individuals have over 25

years experience in the FBI and specifically in the CI arena. The Inspection teams

are supported by experienced retired FBI and law enforcement officers who are experts in gathering information and resolving complex cases. The teams have been

augmented by a senior retired personnel security expert from DOE along with retired DOE laboratory scientists.

As of this date two inspections have taken place—Los Alamos National Laboratory and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. A third inspection—Sandia National Laboratories—is underway. All DOE facilities are subject to a CI inspection,

and we have scheduled 12 facilities for inspection next calendar year. The results

of the first two inspections have been provided to me and the Secretary Richardson.

In brief, these results show that significant improvements have been made in the

CI Programs at these laboratories since PDD-61 was signed. I will provide summaries of these inspections to Congress in the Annual Report on Counterintelligence

and Security Practices at the National Laboratories, as mandated by the National

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000. Any significant CI relevant events

will be provided to you immediately.

The CI Evaluations Board (CIEB)

PDD-61 authorized the use of many tools designed to reduce the threat to classified and sensitive information at DOE and its field activities. The polygraph was

specifically cited as being one of the tools which OCI, in coordination with the DOE

Office of Security Affairs, may use to enhance the DOE CI Program. Research and

analysis conducted for the 90 Day Study also indicated that the polygraph was one

tool that could be used to enhance the effectiveness of the CI Program.

OCI’s CIEB is responsible for implementing the DOE CI Polygraph Program. A

senior OCI officer is leading OCI’s CIEB. I must stress that the Polygraph Program

is only one of the six elements of the DOE CI Program; it cannot be considered in

isolation. I do not believe that the polygraph is a CI panacea or an infallible CI tool.

However, I believe that the polygraph serves as a valuable deterrent to individuals

who currently have direct or indirect access to classified information and may be

contemplating espionage. I also believe the polygraph serves as constructive screening device for individuals applying for positions requiring access to classified and/

or sensitive unclassified information. The polygraph also can be used effectively as

an exculpatory tool. The purpose of the Polygraph Program is to protect U.S. national security by attempting to determine if anyone with access has engaged in espionage, sabotage, terrorism, or had unauthorized contact with foreign nationals, or

disclosed classified information in an unauthorized manner.

27

I am extremely sensitive to the anxiety that the Polygraph Program has caused

in the Department. I want to stress that we are only going to be administering polygraph examinations to a small percentage of DOE employees having access to the

most sensitive ‘‘high risk’’ national security programs. These programs include: Special Access Programs (SAPS), Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI), Personnel Security and Assurance Program, (PSAPS), and Personnel Assurance Programs (PAPS). The latter two programs involve DOE employees who are involved

in the design of nuclear weapons and those who have direct access to these weapons. OCI has made every effort to reach out to potentially affected personnel to explain

the polygraph. Technical briefings for employees of Sandia, Lawrence Livermore,

and Los Alamos National Laboratories were held last month. In accordance with the

rulemaking process, OCI participated, with General Eugene Habiger, Director of the

Office of Security and Emergency Operations, in public hearings. The public hearings were held at:

• Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, September 14, 1999, • Sandia National Laboratories, September 16, 1999, • Los Alamos National Laboratory, September 17, 1999 and • Washington, D.C., September 22, 1999.

Additionally, as you are aware, I provided a briefing on the Polygraph Program

to this Subcommittee on October 4. We also briefed the White House Science Advisor this month.

While DOE has approved a Notice on the Polygraph Program, it only applies to

DOE Federal employees. We are currently in the latter stages of an Office of Personnel Management mandated ‘‘rulemaking’’ process to develop regulations for applying the program to DOE contractors. DOE contractors constitute the majority of

individuals in the aforementioned ‘‘high risk’’ national security programs.

As DOE participates in the rulemaking process necessary to apply the Polygraph

Program to DOE contractors, we have been simultaneously administering the polygraph to DOE Federal employees and volunteering contract employees in OCI and

the Office of Environment, Safety and Health. Additionally, some high-level Department officials, including the Secretary, Deputy Secretary and Under Secretary have

taken the polygraph. I was the first volunteer to take the polygraph. Overall, approximately 85 personnel have been administered and passed a CI-scope polygraph

thus far.

To ensure quality control, the Polygraph Program is managed by an individual

that has been the quality control on polygraphs for DOE since 1991. He is the Director of Quality Control for the American Association of Police Polygraph Examiners

(AAPP) and the Sub-Committee Chairman of the QC-Committee for the American

Polygraph Association (APA). The OCI Polygraph Program Manager also served as

the Chief Instructor at the Federal Polygraph School (DODPI) from 1985-1991 and

in Government Service Polygraph since 1974. The current DOE Polygraph Program

has four layers of quality control; this is more than any other U.S. Government

agency which administers polygraph examinations.

Our decisions about who is granted access to classified information must be made

with the sole criteria of protecting U.S. national security. The enhancement of the

DOE Polygraph Program is not without precedent, as our efforts are bringing the

Department in line with the rest of the Intelligence Community insofar as access

to ‘‘high risk’’ national security programs are concerned. I believe that the Department’s commitment to the overall CI effort is embodied in its support for the Polygraph Program. OCI has received strong support from the Secretary for this initiative, and with his and your continued support we will continue to use the polygraph

as an important CI tool.

I am very encouraged about the many initiatives we have begun and accomplishments achieved thus far. While there is work yet to do, I am pleased to say that

I have received absolute cooperation from all the senior DOE officials at the laboratories and headquarters. In addition to the senior management support from DOE

and the laboratories, I have received nothing but the utmost support and encouragement from Secretary Richardson, Director Freeh of the FBI and DCI Tenet. In addition to showing his support for the CI Program outside of DOE, Secretary Richardson has personally met with the Laboratory Directors and various DOE Assistant

Secretaries to reaffirm his support and endorsement of an aggressive CI Program

within DOE. This very vocal, personal commitment by Secretary Richardson to an

aggressive CI Program at DOE has been paramount to our success thus far. With

this continued level of support I am looking forward to appearing before you again

to proudly discuss a fully implemented DOE CI Program as mandated by PDD-61.

Mr. UPTON. Thank you very much.

28

I would just note for the record that all members’ statements on

both the Oversight Subcommittee as well as Energy and Power will

be made part of the record, and I noted that Chairman Bliley came

in at one point.

This point we will proceed with questions. I will be pretty strict

with this 5-minute rule on the clock. I know that Mr. Cox has already gone to the floor. His bill is on the floor. We have a number

of other subcommittees that are meeting as well, and we will start

with my questions.

I guess, Mr. Curran, noting your emphasis at the end particularly on polygraphs, there’s been a lot of discussion on this for some

time. I know you and I talked about it in my office last winter,

but—I guess it was in early spring—and where are we on the polygraph?

I noted that Secretary Richardson I think in a very visible way

took the polygraph himself to try and illustrate to employees at one

of the labs that it was nothing really to fear. There’s been a lot of

discussion. You talked about that this was a valuable deterrent,

only a small percentage of folks, in fact, would be polygraphed. But

it’s my understanding that so far no DOE employees, other than

the Secretary and yourself, but no scientists have been

polygraphed; is that correct?

Mr. CURRAN. That’s correct, sir. We have polygraphed over 95

Federal employees since the program started.

Mr. UPTON. Are these security people?

Mr. CURRAN. Mostly it is CI people. We required that if we’re

going to be asking other people to take a polygraph, not just for

that reason, because we have access to sensitive information, that

all our people will take a CI polygraph. We give an exception as

reciprocity for other employees who have received other types of

polygraph from the CIA, DOD. We accept that, but CI we do not.

We mandate that everybody in CI has to take it.

Mr. UPTON. At what point do you think sensitive folks in sensitive positions, in fact, may be asked to——

Mr. CURRAN. We are—as I said, we are in the final stages. We

meet almost daily. We could not legally polygraph contractors unless they volunteered to take that polygraph. We had to go through

this rulemaking process where you had the four public hearings.

We have concluded that. We have to now respond to the comments

in the public hearing which we are doing. Once that is done, then

it goes back to the Federal Register, and you have 30 days before

you can actually implement.

What we have been doing, because it is such a sensitive topic

within DOE, we have been going over each one of these programs

with the Secretary, the Deputy Secretary, and, basically, the rule

is that we are relying on these people who run these programs,

based on the criteria, to tell us who should be polygraphed. We

have that list.

Now, we are looking at it and re-examining it to determine are

we down to the core, the hard-core people that we want. We’re trying to minimize the impact as much as we can, but we still have

to address the national security concerns. So I would expect that

we would respond to the public hearings, then we have the 30 days

in November, and then after that we would start polys.

29

Mr. UPTON. So beginning?

Mr. CURRAN. December.

Mr. UPTON. December, okay.

Mr. Podonsky, in my opening statement and in your statement

as well, there was quite a bit of discussion with regard to the access, particularly from folks not onsite, through computers to information on those computers, the e-mail whatever. You indicated

with the Lawrence Livermore that you thought that there were

protections from unauthorized access. You indicated that there

were some weaknesses. You were expecting some penetration testing used by hackers. At what point do you expect that to happen?

December? Do you remember?

Mr. PODONSKY. Yes, sir. In December, as I mentioned, we’re

going back to all three laboratories. Our biggest concern in the

cyber security were the unclassified, and it was not so much from

the external penetrations but it was from people who had cleared

access from foreign nationals.

We didn’t have an issue with foreign nationals. Our issue was if

they were from sensitive countries, as we have stated in our classified report, and the potential that those individuals may or may

not have to go through the unclassified net into other areas in the

unclassified. We had no concern about the classified net. I want to

make that clear.

Mr. UPTON. So you feel that the firewall is sufficient on the classified with all of the labs that you looked at?

Mr. PODONSKY. With all three laboratories, we felt that the firewall was sufficient. There are improvements to be made in a couple

of the areas, but that would get into some classified area.

Mr. UPTON. Okay. I am watching the clock for me.

Sandia, you indicated, was marginal and it was the rating that

you gave them, prompt attention needed. Is that also with regard

to the access to unclassified material?

Mr. PODONSKY. To the unclassified.

Mr. UPTON. Why is it that if Lawrence was satisfactory, Lawrence Livermore, and Sandia was marginal, you couldn’t get those

same type of systems, encourage those same type of systems at

Sandia?

Mr. PODONSKY. Mr. Chairman, are you talking about the overall

rating?

Mr. UPTON. Yeah. Your overall rating. I presume—well, you tell

me—by giving a marginal rating at Sandia tells me that there’s

some obvious weaknesses there. Were some of those weaknesses in

regard to access to unclassified information through the computers?

Mr. PODONSKY. Relative to all three sites, Los Alamos receiving

overall satisfactory, the other two labs received overall marginals,

but all of them received less than satisfactory in the unclassified

cyber security because of weaknesses on the access of the internal

approved individuals. For example, there are different tiers of an

unclassified information. Some of it is sensitive, and we had the

concern in terms of what kind of administrative controls were on

at actually all three laboratories.

Mr. UPTON. I will follow up when we come up.

Mr. Stupak, do you want to go next?

Mr. STUPAK. Sure. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

30

I apologize for being late. I just got in from Michigan, dealing

with DOE no less.

Mr. Podonsky, if the laboratories can reach satisfactory rating

without more money, can you tell us why we should give them

more money? Either they’re satisfactory or they’re not. Or are you

just determined, as the General said that they have, and I am

quoting his testimony, foundation to perform their security functions capably given adequate resources? So do you really need the

money or are you playing off that statement?

Mr. PODONSKY. When we assign a rating that we believe that the

individual site earns, it’s based on their performance. A satisfactory

rating does not mean that everything is perfect. It does not mean

that there are not other management areas needing attention. Relative to resources or money, I would yield to the policy arm as well

as the lead PSOs as to what moneys they do or do not need. When

we look at it, we try to not look at programmatic needs. We look

at strictly how effective the policies are being implemented or not.

Mr. STUPAK. If you’re going to give a satisfactory rating, I don’t

say on appropriations, obviously, but I am sure the Congress would

be probably hard pressed to give more money to an agency that’s

doing satisfactory work, and if it’s satisfactory, how would you

make the case to the appropriators that you need more money?

Mr. PODONSKY. Well, specifically if we take Los Alamos, there

are many upgrades that are still needed regardless of the fact that

they have received a satisfactory rating. Satisfactory is not the penultimate that we walk away from and say everything is fine. In

the case of cyber security, unclassified, as I mentioned to the chairman, all three laboratories need extensive work in this area. So,

obviously, there would be funds necessary——

Mr. STUPAK. What was the last rating of Los Alamos?

Mr. PODONSKY. The last overall rating, it was just rated in August as satisfactory.

Mr. STUPAK. And let me take it one step further. The last time

we had a hearing here, it seemed to me we gave—there was a special line, $5.3 million I believe the number was—I am going off the

top of my head, so I may have the number wrong. That’s supposed

to be for security, but two-thirds of that money went for administrative costs and administrative travel. What guarantee do we have

that even if we gave you more on top of a satisfactory rating, that

it is really going to go to this security upgrade that you need?

Mr. PODONSKY. Well, one point of clarification that I need to

make, on the satisfactory rating, it may in fact also be because of

compensatory measures which are short-term fixes, not long-term.

So there are long-term fixes at all three of the sites. We add an

oversight element of the Department. We cannot give you the guarantees that the moneys are going to be used appropriately. All we

can do is report back on how effective the security is, and we report

it back to the Secretary and to the lead PSOs.

Mr. STUPAK. So you don’t oversee the security operations then?

Mr. PODONSKY. We oversee the security operations. We oversee

the security implementations of improvements, but we don’t oversee the security budget. That’s General Habiger.

31

Mr. STUPAK. Sure. Okay. So you’re the oversight. How much

pressure do you have as oversight to get these security measures

implemented in a timely, cost-effective manner?

Mr. PODONSKY. When the Secretary elevated our office to directly

report to him, our responsibility was to go out and kick every

stone, turn over every piece of information, find out where the

vulnerabilities or the strengths were. But, at the same time, the

Secretary encouraged us to work with the policy folks as well as

the lead PSOs to help find solutions. Our main thrust as we provide information to the Secretary and to the Congress is how effective the policies are being implemented. The pressures that we

have are strictly that the Secretary wants to make sure, as I am

sure the Congress is, that there are no security problems in the department.

Mr. STUPAK. Speaking of your oversight roll in that, you’re supposed to be independent of the rest of the security bureaucracy, are

you not?

Mr. PODONSKY. That is true.

Mr. STUPAK. And you’re supposed to be independent of General

Habiger, and you don’t report to him, do you?

Mr. PODONSKY. No, I do not.

Mr. STUPAK. Okay. Then who do report to?

Mr. PODONSKY. I report directly to the Secretary of Energy.

Mr. STUPAK. Okay. You’re supposed to be the outsider in this

whole thing to give your recommendations, right?

Mr. PODONSKY. We are supposed to give an unbiased, unfiltered,

independent look at how effective the Department is implementing

its policies, how effective its policy is and report that back to the

Secretary, report it to the lead PSOs. We’re the outside, independent, internal group.

Mr. STUPAK. Well, in the General’s statement, he says, and I am

quoting now, Glenn and I are working closely together to ensure

an integrated approach through policy development and oversight.

Well, you’re supposed to be doing oversight, not policy development, right?

Mr. PODONSKY. We do not develop policy.

Mr. STUPAK. Okay. Well, that statement would indicate an integrated approach to a policy development oversight, so I want to

make sure that you’re truly independent and that we’re developing

security with an independent look at it and not back into the culture of DOE which has neither been accountable nor accept responsibility for past breaches at DOE.

Mr. PODONSKY. I can’t answer for the General, but if you indulge

me——

Mr. STUPAK. Sure.

Mr. PODONSKY. One of the major changes that have occurred in

the last year, and I have been with the Department for 15 years,

is that the security infrastructure that the Secretary set up is

working together. In the last 15 years, it was not always so. For

example, we do not develop policy, but we evaluate the effectiveness of that policy. In previous years, we would inform the policy

people of our concerns about some of the unclear policies. Oftentimes, we had disputes and with no resolution.

32

What General Habiger, I believe, is inferring is that we now have

an infrastructure where when we provide information directly to

the General and his people. We’re seeing corrective actions. We’re

seeing an adult dialog, which has not been the norm of the Department.

Mr. STUPAK. From where we’re sitting, and it seems like maybe

too much of a cozy relationship in that I think—and I don’t speak

for all of the members—but I always thought your idea would be

to have General Habiger write policy and implement it and then

it was your job to see that it got done.

Mr. PODONSKY. That’s what we’re doing.

Mr. STUPAK. Okay. Just from the statements there it sort of

looked it’s not really what’s going on, maybe too close of a relationship. And I want to make sure that, you know, the General’s shop

is not determining how oversight should be done, but that really

should be on your side and be independent thereof.

Mr. PODONSKY. Just as an illustration, the General has a number of findings in our reports that he’s responsible and his office

is responsible for providing corrective actions to.

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you.

Mr. UPTON. Mr. Burr.

Mr. BURR. General, welcome. Glenn, good to have you here

again. Mr. Curran, also good to have you.

Mr. Curran, you mentioned polygraph 27 times. The General

mentioned it once. I don’t think Mr. Podonsky, unless I missed it,

mentioned it. Polygraph was one of, if not the biggest initiative

that the Secretary announced in his revelation that we had a problem. He conveyed not only this Congress, but to America that it

would start the next day. To date, 85 people, if your first statement

was correct, 95 if your second statement was correct, have been

given the polygraph. They are CI individuals. They are the Secretary, they are the General, and they are you. To date, no DOE

employed scientist have been given a polygraph; am I correct?

Mr. CURRAN. Correct.

Mr. BURR. Do you need further policy directives to have the jurisdiction to administer a polygraph to DOE employees?

Mr. CURRAN. Contractors?

Mr. BURR. DOE employees.

Mr. CURRAN. No.

Mr. BURR. You do for contractors?

Mr. CURRAN. I don’t need any further regulation for DOE Federal

employees, correct.

Mr. BURR. And are there Federal employees that you intend to

administer a polygraph to?

Mr. CURRAN. All Federal employees assigned to my office have

been polygraphed.

Mr. BURR. Is there anybody in the lab structure that is a Federal

employee?

Mr. CURRAN. That has not been polygraphed, no.

Mr. BURR. Have all the managers of those facilities that are

deemed DOE employees been polygraphed?

Mr. CURRAN. Some of them, not all of them.

Mr. BURR. Not all of them. Do you intend to polygraph the other

ones?

33

Mr. CURRAN. They would—they would come under the matrix to

be polygraphed.

Mr. BURR. But they have not been done yet?

Mr. CURRAN. Have not.

Mr. BURR. You also made the statement that we’re relying on the

individuals that run these programs to tell us who should be

polygraphed; is that correct?

Mr. CURRAN. That’s correct.

Mr. BURR. Are these the same individuals who have had the responsibility to oversee security at these facilities?

Mr. CURRAN. No. There’s a catchall there, also. The manager who

runs a specific SAP program or is required to provide me with a

list, based on the criteria that I give him, of who he thinks should

be polygraphed. I then have the option to disagree with the manager’s decision.

What we’re asking is to work this as a concerted effort at this

point, since these people know more about the SAPS and the

PSAPS than I do, but we have the authority to go back.

Mr. BURR. Do you agree that the intent to polygraph, as far as

the size of the population based upon where the Secretary originally made statements from than what it is today, has been reduced significantly?

Mr. CURRAN. No. The rulemaking process that we have just been

through covers all the areas that I identified in the PDD report.

That’s the total population.

Now, I have said right from the beginning I do not believe that

all those people involved in those programs need to be polygraphed.

That’s why we’re in this process now. For example, a SAP program

has different layers of access, Tier I to—one’s in administrative access; one’s a technical, which is the most critical; and one’s a security.

Now, in some SAPS, we may say everybody gets polygraphed. In

other SAPS, we might just say Tier III people get polygraphed.

That’s what we are looking for the program managers to help us

out with. But they’re not deciding what the criteria is. We are.

We’re working with them to do that.

Mr. BURR. Well, clearly, if program managers had their choice,

the answer would be none.

Mr. CURRAN. Excuse me, sir?

Mr. BURR. If the program managers had their choice, I think the

answer would be none.

Mr. CURRAN. I have been meeting with the Secretary and the

Under Secretary almost daily for the last 3 weeks. They have come

up with a number that is pretty close to what we had originally.

I can honestly tell you the program managers in these programs

have been very, very cooperative.

Mr. BURR. I wait curiously to see what your number is and to

go back and read the Secretary’s statements when he made it

about how many people he sought to be administered polygraphs.

General, I need to ask you a question, and I hope you will take

this in the spirit that I ask you. Who wrote your testimony?

Mr. HABIGER. Who wrote it?

Mr. BURR. Yes, sir.

Mr. HABIGER. I wrote 90 percent of it, sir.

34

Mr. BURR. Ninety percent of it. The part about the budget, did

you write that?

Mr. HABIGER. Yes, sir, I personally wrote it.

Mr. BURR. You personally wrote that.

Mr. Curran, have you ever been denied of any of the resources

you have requested?

Mr. CURRAN. No, I have not, sir.

Mr. BURR. Let me give you a description of what the Budget Committee said about the $35 million requested for DOE, which

was emergency money, I think either slightly before or upon your

arrival that I’m certainly not tagging to you. I won’t use the word,

but it’s four letters. It started with C-R and ended in A-P.

They asked for that request to go back and for there to actually

be specifics tied to it as far as what it was going to be used for.

Now, we’ve got one of the gentlemen who will testify in a minute,

Mr. Weigand. He’s the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Research

and Development. He says we have committed an abundance of resources to fix the problems and to date have reprioritized funding

within our existing budget.

Let me ask you, General, can this be reprogrammed and meet our needs? I think there’s currently $800 million that is devoted to

security. Or will the Congress have to appropriate new funds within DOE to meet this need?

Mr. HABIGER. Sir, let me make this very clear. When I took this

job, I asked the Secretary to do two things: No. 1, allow me to work

directly for him. Done. No. 2, I told him I couldn’t do the job without having absolute total control over the $800 million. We’re in

the process of doing that. We’re going to be working with the appropriations committees and authorization committees. For the fiscal year 2000 budget, we’re tagging the money. I have oversight

over security dollars in the fiscal year 2000 budget.

The fiscal year 2001 budget, which will be coming over to the

President in early February, the money will be broken out, stripped

out under a different appropriation, be titled security. I’ll be accountable. I’ll be responsible. We’re going to spend it in the right

place.

Mr. BURR. I feel very confident that your intentions are, in fact,

correct. One of the hesitancies of this committee has been I think

a thing that Mr. Podonsky and this committee share, that we have

been in the process a heck of a long time, and I hope in the next

5 minutes, Mr. Chairman, in the next round we will be able to ask

some more questions.

Mr. UPTON. We’ll do so.

Mrs. Wilson.

Mrs. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have a number of questions with respect to computer security,

and I don’t know, Mr. Curran, if you’re the correct one to address

these to. If not, these others chime in.

I understand that you have conducted security reviews at the national laboratories. What other DOE facilities have you conducted

cyber security audits on ?

Mr. CURRAN. That’s more a function——

Mr. PODONSKY. That would be more in our area, ma’am.

Mrs. WILSON. Okay.

35

Mr. PODONSKY. We just finished an inspection at Oak Ridge at

Y-12 facility.

Mrs. WILSON. Have you ever conducted an audit on DOE headquarters?

Mr. PODONSKY. We did, in 1991.

Mrs. WILSON. Have you conducted one within the last year, 2

years?

Mr. PODONSKY. No, ma’am, we have not.

Mrs. WILSON. Are there connections between the DOE headquarters or DOE Germantown computer systems and the national

laboratories, either through wide area networks, client servers or

anything?

Mr. PODONSKY. I believe there are.

I was just told, no, there is not.

Mrs. WILSON. There are no computer links between Germantown

or DOE headquarters and our national laboratories?

Mr. PODONSKY. There is communication links between, and it

varies. There’s classified networks——

Mr. Chairman, may I introduce the director of the Office of Cyber

Security?

Mr. UPTON. I think you should, and we probably need to give

him the oath, too. We will stop this clock here. I don’t know that

we’d be such good 2-minute coaches here, 2-minute drills, but if you

could state your name for the record.

Mr. PETERSON. My name is Brad Peterson.

[Witness sworn.]

Mr. UPTON. You may proceed in answering that question.

Mr. PETERSON. The headquarters network is linked between Forrestal and Germantown as part of one DOE headquarters network.

As far as a wide area network with other fields, as far as, you

know, linked into one network, no. There is, of course, Internet

connectivity. As far as on the classified side, there is a capability

to send classified e-mail back and forth over an ES net, but it goes

through NSA encryption as it leaves one site and would go through

encryption on the other side as it would come out.

Mrs. WILSON. Thank you.

Mr. Podonsky, obviously the question that I am getting at here

is the weakness of the computer system is only as strong as its

weakest link, which means checking the laboratories themselves.

That alone is probably insufficient for cyber security services, and

I wonder if you could tell me what your plans are for auditing of

DOE headquarter systems.

Mr. PODONSKY. Currently, Mr. Peterson, our office director, is

working with John Gilligan, who’s our CIO, in looking at the overall implications of what we are finding in the field and bringing it

back to the national look. For example, there were just—the unclassified computer security order is just being put out now. It’s

been an issue that we’ve had for quite some time.

Mrs. WILSON. Let me interrupt you here. When do you plan to

do an audit of DOE headquarters or Germantown’s systems or is

it just not on the schedule?

Mr. PODONSKY. No. It’s on the schedule for next year.

Mrs. WILSON. Thank you.

36

When you did your review of the national laboratories, were you

able to penetrate the classified systems from outside of the fence—

I mean, from offsite?

Mr. PETERSON. No, we weren’t, ma’am. Their systems are air

gapped, so you cannot actually gain access.

Mrs. WILSON. Were you able to penetrate the unclassified systems? And, if so, what kind?

Mr. PETERSON. We were able to penetrate the unclassified firewall at Sandia. However——

Mrs. WILSON. What kinds of systems? Was it personnel? Was it—

what kinds of systems were you able to penetrate?

Mr. PETERSON. We were able to gain access to different servers.

Our time we test is very limited, so we did not fully explore how

far we could migrate through the system. At Sandia——

Mrs. WILSON. Was it the personnel computer? Was it the telephone controller? What did you penetrate? Or if you can’t do it in

an unclassified forum, I understand.

Mr. PETERSON. It was a regular computer that might be sitting

on a researcher desk type of a thing so you can get some types of

files.

Mrs. WILSON. So you penetrated researchers’ computers at the

national laboratories?

Mr. PETERSON. That was—and, again, this is probably something

we should wait and go into at a different level to be able to answer

your question fully. It’s not appropriate in an unclassified environment.

Mrs. WILSON. Thank you.

I think we can probably answer this question in this forum. If

you hired the same hackers, Mr. Podonsky, or contracted with

them or conducted them to penetrate your computer on your desk

or my computer on my desk, do you think they could do it?

Mr. PODONSKY. I think, without worrying about damage to your

software or mine, yes, ma’am.

Mrs. WILSON. Thank you.

Mr. UPTON. Mr. Cox.

Mr. COX. Thank you. I have got a handful of notes from staff who

are trying to keep track of what was said. I apologize for my absence, and I also apologize if I cover any ground that’s already been

covered. I think I have a good idea of which topics were covered,

and I will try not to be repetitive.

Just as an overview, since you are all DOE employees, the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, as I mentioned in my

opening statement, said the Department of Energy ‘‘has had a dysfunctional management structure and culture that only occasionally gave proper credence to the need for rigorous security and

counterintelligence programs at the weapons labs.’’ That report, as

you know, was as of mid-year 1999. Does any of you disagree with

that? Anybody care to disagree with that?

That’s a pretty harsh assessment, and it is as of the middle of

this year. It gives rise to the question why, if we are looking for

something systemic here, did it take 20 years for the Department

of Energy to come up with a counterintelligence plan? And I guess,

Mr. Curran, since you have been tasked now with that——

Mr. CURRAN. If I can answer your question.

37

Mr. COX. We didn’t even have an Office of Counterintelligence

created by the direction of the Secretary, then Secretary Pen ̃a,

until 1998. Why did it take so long?

Mr. CURRAN. I can’t answer the whys to that, sir.

I think in my opening statement we confirmed exactly what you

did say. I mean, there was not any counterintelligence program

within DOE that even met minimal standards.

I am not a DOE employee. I am an FBI employee detailed to

DOE. Since my initial 90-day study and the implementation plan,

I can tell you that I have received outstanding cooperation from the

senior management in the three weapons labs. I don’t think we

could have made the progress that we have made without their cooperation. The CI inspection process looks at executive management and their role and participation in a CI program. And if we

don’t have that, the program’s not going to work. So I think we do

hold their feet to the fire on that. I know the Secretary does.

Mr. COX. I know that there’s been some discussion during the

members’ questioning of polygraphs, and so I’m going to be as brief

as I can because I don’t know exactly what was said, and I don’t

want to ask you the same questions over again.

But, Mr. Curran, in your testimony you said that the plan for

polygraphing is modelled on other intelligence agencies. Using the

CIA as an example, what’s your understanding of CIA’s policy?

Mr. CURRAN. As you know, Mr. Cox, I served for 3 years out at

the CIA, post Ames, and one of the problems I faced was the fact

that they had an exorbitant number of people who had failed the

CI polygraph. They went back after Ames and retrieved all the

charts in the hundreds. That’s what I was faced with when I got

there. Now, obviously you don’t have that many spies in the agency. There was something wrong with the program, in my opinion.

The counterespionage group that I ran at the CIA determined

that we need to revise the polygraph itself. CIA has a lifestyle polygraph, the general polygraph. What I was interested in only was

if the person was a spy or not. We were able to bring down the

focus of the polygraph. The more focused the polygraph is, the

more successful it is. The wider it is, the less useful it becomes.

And basically we came down to two questions. When we asked

a CI employee, have you ever passed on—have you ever had unauthorized disclosure of classified, they all flunk it. I mean, because

that’s their business. They are in that on a daily business.

But if you ask them, have you illegally passed classified information to a foreign agent? Do you know what I mean? We were able

to resolve—of the hundreds of cases we had, we resolved 85 percent

of those that we said, hey, this person may have other problems,

but the person is not a spy. They may have to pay their income

tax for the last 10 years, but that’s how we were able to get

through that.

Mr. COX. What you’re outlining is a distinction between the proper administration and use of this tool on the one hand and the universe of people to whom the test is applied. Particularly with respect to the latter, what do you understand CIA’s policy to be?

Mr. CURRAN. All employees of CIA get a lifestyle polygraph.

Mr. COX. Would that include a secretary?

Mr. CURRAN. Yes, all employees.

38

Mr. COX. So the night watchman?

Mr. CURRAN. Yes. I think it excludes the gardener. I am not

quite sure.

Mr. COX. Now at DOE, as of today, as we meet here, is there any

nuclear weapons scientist who has been polygraphed other than in

the course of a law enforcement investigation?

Mr. CURRAN. As far as I know, there has not been. Now, I think

there’s an area that we can go into that I don’t think we should

go into here where because of what that person can maybe do and

may have been polygraphed, but I think 99 percent, no.

Mr. COX. My red light is on. Is my time expired? That’s usually

what it means.

Mr. UPTON. I indicated earlier that we wouldn’t make very good

2-minute drill football coaches, unless you play for Notre Dame.

They had a little trouble at the beginning of the year.

We’ll start the second round of questions. Just for the record, too,

Mr. Peterson, if you could give your title.

Mr. PETERSON. Director of the Office of Cyber Security and Special Reviews within the Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance.

Mr. UPTON. Thank you.

Based on that, I don’t know if this question would be more directed to you or Mr. Podonsky. But, as I understand it, that in the

past the inspections in fact have found—even though there’s a firewall that’s been identified for access to classified information, in

fact, as I recall, some inspections showed that classified information was on unclassified systems. Isn’t that correct?

Mr. PODONSKY. The short answer to that is, yes, when we were

doing some penetration tests a year ago that we did find on the unclassified one or two documents that were deemed to be classified

by the Office of Classification.

Mr. UPTON. Has that been corrected? I know, I think in the Wen

Ho Lee case that was indicated that he perhaps wittingly or unwittingly had transferred many, many lines, thousand perhaps, of

classified on to the unclassified. Is that still—is that allowed? Is

that possible?

Mr. PODONSKY. We have not found that during this round of inspections.

Mr. UPTON. And you would agree that if that was still possible,

though, one could navigate and, in fact, get classified information

on that unclassified system; is that not correct?

Mr. PODONSKY. If that is still possible, that is correct.

Mr. UPTON. I understand that each of the labs permit foreign nationals from sensitive countries, whether it be Iran, Russia, to have

authorized user status on their unclassified systems, both onsite

and via remote dial up. Is that correct? And, if so, how many folks

would that be?

Mr. PETERSON. We would have to defer to the laboratories for the

specific numbers, but it’s our understanding that both Lawrence

Livermore and Los Alamos have individuals from sensitive countries, foreign nationals from sensitive countries with remote access,

including at Los Alamos one from Iran. At Sandia, to our understanding, there is no foreign nationals from sensitive countries

with remote dial up access.

39

Mr. UPTON. There are none at Sandia?

Mr. PETERSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. UPTON. Is that possible that’s going to happen at all three

labs? I mean, is that a goal and is it anticipated to happen soon?

Mr. PETERSON. I do not believe so, sir.

Mr. HABIGER. Mr. Chairman, if I may?

Mr. UPTON. Yes.

Mr. HABIGER. Podonsky discovered the problem at Los Alamos in

August. We have got policy that should have been out a week ago,

but because of some legal verbiage, we will have policy out within

the next 5 days that will greatly tighten this foreign access. And

I think with your experience with the Department of Energy you

could say this is unprecedented, to get policy out that quickly.

Mr. UPTON. Will it be prohibited with this new policy that will

be in place?

Mr. HABIGER. No, sir. We have gone to the labs. We got their inputs. There are certain treaty implications that give foreign scientists access into some of our systems.

Now, let me point out, we have to look at the different tiers of

access in terms of the national laboratories versus a Brookhaven

where we have medical research that’s going on. We have scientists

out there that need access to that kind of information, but the control and the approval will be at a very high level at the lab sites—

so that there be accountability, and the security plans for each of

these individuals—and there will be a security plan for each individual—will be brought to bear before that individual has access.

Mr. UPTON. What about access to some of these weapon parts

that are at these sites? How would you describe the protection of

those parts that might be, I don’t want to say lying around, but

stored at each of those sites. I don’t know who would have, Mr.

Podonsky.

Mr. PODONSKY. At all of the sites we had issue and concern

about classified matter, classified parts. What we have found is

that all the sites did take corrective action. For example, Los Alamos had over 105 different locations that are now down to 41 sites.

They needed to be inventoried. They needed to be put into smaller

storage areas so that they could be better protected. And if I am

not correct, I do believe that all three sites have taken corrective

actions, but we’ll have a better feel for that in December when we

go back to see how far they went.

But relative to what type of access, we didn’t see when we were

out there that other folks had access. We were concerned about the

potential of the vulnerability of the parts where they were stored.

Mr. UPTON. And what types of parts would they be that you

looked at 41 different sites within one site? I mean, you’re talking

about cruise missile—what type of parts are you——

Mr. PODONSKY. Well, it varied at the different sites. At Los Alamos, it was very nonnuclear weapon components, an array of

shapes. At one site earlier in 1998 there were cruise missiles, as

you started to mention, but that was put into locked storage.

Mr. UPTON. Mr. Stupak.

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Podonsky, where does your office go if the Department puts

its weapons facility into a new semiautonomous agency?

40

Mr. PODONSKY. That’s not clear, sir. As far as we know, we still

work for the Secretary, and if we fall into that nebulous area called

Secretary staff to oversee the new agency, but there is no clear indication where that would be. It’s my understanding in talking to

the Secretary that that would be his intent, is that we would be

the oversight arm for that new agency.

Mr. STUPAK. So you’d still see the weapons facilities operations

then.

Mr. PODONSKY. That’s our understanding, but right now the devil

is still in the details, and we haven’t seen all the details yet.

Mr. STUPAK. But that’s only if the Secretary’s plan is approved

as he’s laid out for us?

Mr. PODONSKY. That’s as much as I know.

Mr. STUPAK. Okay. What would happen if there is any oversight?

Mr. PODONSKY. My personal opinion is it’s kind of like the formation of the entire Federal Government, executive branch and legislative arm. It’s based upon oversight existing—and my belief is

that there’s always going to be a need for an independent arm to

just be a wake-up call, a reminder for the various elements in the

Department or the new agency.

Mr. STUPAK. One of the lab’s responsibilities is to protect special

nuclear material, isn’t it?

Mr. PODONSKY. I am sorry, sir?

Mr. STUPAK. One of your responsibilities is to protect special nuclear material.

Mr. PODONSKY. The Department’s responsibilities, yes.

Mr. STUPAK. One of the lab’s responsibilities?

Mr. PODONSKY. Yes.

Mr. STUPAK. We’re going to hear later today that one of the labs

has consistently met measurement inventory requirements for special nuclear material, but you told the staff a few weeks ago that

Livermore has not been able to do measurements for a long time.

Mr. Weigand has now said new procedures have been put in place

to, quote, inventory different system analysis, end of quote, and

that the reference material has just been acquired to measure uranium holdings. So has Livermore consistently met these measurements in inventory requirements?

Mr. PODONSKY. Not in the past, no, sir.

Mr. STUPAK. Where are they now then? Are they meeting it now?

Mr. PODONSKY. My understanding from my inspectors, yes, that

they are moving forward in their material control accountability

program. This is another area that General Habiger and his folks

are going to need to take a look at across the complex in terms of

the dealing of different materials that are difficult to measure.

Mr. STUPAK. Well, if they’re doing it now, how are they able to

measure it now? Is that because they have new equipment? Have

they done a reinventory?

Mr. PODONSKY. When we were out there, they had committed

that they were purchasing new equipment. My understanding is

that’s where they are moving toward. Again, I want to emphasize,

we’re going back out there in December to see the progress that

have been made.

Mr. HABIGER. Sir, if I may, one of the organizations that works

for me now, the New Brunswick laboratory, is responsible for getVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:33 Sep 11, 2000 Jkt 061036 PO 00000 Frm 00044 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HEARINGS\61036 pfrm03 PsN: 61036
41

ting some measuring isotopes out there. I was out at Lawrence

Livermore here about 2 months ago. They told me that they could

not go green, complete their material control and accountability by

the end of the year unless they got that measuring standard. We

pulled out all the stops, got the stuff there. It’s there. They are in

the process. They’ll be fixed by the end of the calendar year.

Mr. STUPAK. So what did they do before then if they didn’t have

the equipment to do it?

Mr. HABIGER. They were—I am talking about one specific item

that I was responsible for, but there’s—part of the problem, and I

am not going to go into a lengthy explanation, is that when you do

inventories, let us say you did an inventory in 1991, you used a set

of equipment. Then you did another inventory in 1995. Things

looked okay using the same set of equipment. Then you bought a

third set of equipment and higher technology, closer measurements. You have a delta in the amount of material. Then you have

to go mitigate, figure out did you actually lose some or is it just

the measuring standards. And that’s part of the issue that I am

most familiar with.

Mr. STUPAK. We don’t have an answer yet on that part. We’re

still trying to figure out what happened there then for the discrepancies in the numbers then?

Mr. HABIGER. Yes, sir. And we’re talking about very, very small

bits.

Mr. STUPAK. That would be small bits of like plutonium?

Mr. HABIGER. I cannot answer that for you, sir. I will have to get

back to you.

[The following was received for the record:]

The Department is confident that the discrepancies in inventory values at LLNL

are not caused by actual losses of nuclear material but, instead are caused by measurement errors. A known source of these errors is the inability to accurately measure these materials (Highly Enricher Uranium). In the past, LLNL’s inability to accurately measure portions of their inventory has been due to a lack of new measurement technologies and measurement standards. Recently, LLNL has acquired new

technologies and measurement standards for use in their measurements program.

With these new capabilities, LLNL and the responsible DOE offices have committed to performing all required measurements related to their nuclear material

inventory.

Mr. STUPAK. Okay.

Mr. Podonsky, do you believe that problems at the labs are particularly DOE’s fault because their directives were ambiguous or

completely lacking?

For example, Sandia brags that it has a world-renowned security

expert, but it didn’t know enough to set up the secure password

systems on its computers. So whose fault would that be, DOE’s or

the world-renowned lab?

Mr. PODONSKY. If you indulge me for a moment, I’d like to answer that. There’s a lot of fault in terms of the security posture of

this Department. Having spent 15 years inspecting and producing

over a hundred classified reports, I would tell you that many of

these issues, with the exception of the potential espionage—alleged

espionage case we have identified, it’s a matter of attitude and accountability. That’s both on the Federal side as well as the contractor, be they lab or be they M&O contractor.

42

We have seen cyclical periods in which the Department has focused on environment safety and health, security, back to security,

back to environment safety and health. What we are seeing now is

something starting to hopefully take hold, and that is that everybody has a responsibility, be it a safety or security responsibility.

There is no question that there’s expertise at the laboratory as well

as within the Department. None of these issues that we have seen

over time is, we call it, rocket science. A lot of responsibility rests

with everybody that’s involved in the Department, be they contractor or——

Mr. STUPAK. I don’t disagree, but, you know, I asked just a question on passwords, who really would have the responsibility there,

and we always seem to get back to the questions about, well, you

know, it’s the culture, there’s been no accountability, there’s been

no responsibility, but it keeps going on. So, when you’re going back

from environment to nuclear to whatever it might be, if it’s the

same old culture, we don’t break that cycle, it’s going to continue,

and we’re going to be back here a few more years later.

And when I asked the questions earlier about you and the General being cozy on your relationship of policy and implementation,

I wasn’t trying to do it in a negative light, but we’ve got to break

that cozy relationship if you’re really going to get some answers

here. And so like I just took a simple example like passwords on

the systems for the computers, who would responsible, DOE or the

labs themselves. I guess that’s what I’m trying to show, to break

this up here, so we get some responsibility, so we have some accountability so we can change this culture.

Mr. PODONSKY. What we have seen—and I wish to reiterate this

point—is that we have seen that the M&Os are taking the responsibility, the line in the Department is taking the responsibility, the

policy folks. And I also want to emphasize, working together is important. Because there is such fragmentation within the Department, that also calls for confusion of what policies were meant to

be implemented, what was expected, as well as what the expectations were for the various contractors.

Mr. UPTON. Okay.

Mr. STUPAK. I know my time is over. I appreciate it, Mr. Chairman, but I just—I even go back to the password. Someone has to

know they need a password. I mean, that’s pretty basic.

Mr. HABIGER. Mr. Chairman, if I could, 15 seconds.

Mr. UPTON. You got it.

Mr. HABIGER. Mr. Stupak, I am accountable—I’m responsible for

policy, and one of things we found, we didn’t have a policy for passwords. Within 10 days, we’ll have policy out in the field for passwords.

Mr. STUPAK. I wouldn’t think that these world-renowned labs

would need a policy that you have to have a password to get into

a computer. Good grief, the basic level in my office know that.

Mr. UPTON. Mr. Cox.

Mr. COX. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Podonsky, I’d like to just ask your help in understanding

some of your findings. There’s already been some Q and A about

classified parts. In your view, are the inventory problems fixed at

the labs?

43

Mr. PODONSKY. In our view, they are on their way to being fixed

at the labs.

Mr. COX. That’s different than they are fixed, I take it?

Mr. PODONSKY. Well, we would like to see—we would like to see

more, but we are pleased at the progress that has been made thus

far.

Mr. COX. So they’re better than in 1998 for example?

Mr. PODONSKY. Yes, absolutely.

Mr. COX. This cruise missile incident that the chairman mentioned was fall of 1998; is that right?

Mr. PODONSKY. That was in 1998, yes, sir.

Mr. COX. Now, I take it that the external aspect of the cruise

missile is not classified so that photographing it from the other side

of the chain link fence—where it was visible—would not have been

a breach of the classification?

Mr. PODONSKY. I’m not aware as to what parts of the missile

would or would not be classified.

Mr. COX. What can you tell us about that incident?

Mr. PODONSKY. One of my inspectors found a number of—number—3 or 4, I am not sure, I don’t recall which—of cruise missiles

that were being stored, and we felt that they were not in a secure

environment. If I’m not mistaken, they were stored outside—they

were stored inside a block building, but there was no protective

force that we could see during the inspection. Now, since then, all

these parts have been put into a secure environment.

Mr. COX. I take it the problem with classified parts is one that’s

gone on for a number of years?

Mr. PODONSKY. Yes, sir.

Mr. COX. If I understand your report correctly, you raised concerns about Los Alamos’ protection strategy in 1994?

Mr. PODONSKY. As far back as 1994, yes.

Mr. COX. In your 1997 report on Los Alamos, 3 years later, you

stated that the lab received clear direction from the Department

and its field office in 1995. Now, that 1995 direction would have

come a year after your 1994 report finding problems, that Los Alamos received clear direction again in 1996 to fix its problem with

classified parts protection, and that when you returned in 1997 you

found that the situation, ‘‘remains essentially unchanged since

1994.’’ So we’ve got 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 4 years where there’s

a clear signal going to Los Alamos to fix the problem, and in your

estimation, nothing happened; is that right?

Mr. PODONSKY. Yes, sir, that’s a correct characterization.

Mr. COX. Since you have been around this, do you know why that

would be?

Mr. PODONSKY. I can only give you my personal opinion, but relative to—relative to the focus at that time, I would defer that to

line defense programs and the laboratory to explain why that reoccurred.

Mr. COX. I take it that if you don’t have a good inventory system

for classified weapons parts, that creates an immediate problem because you don’t know when a piece has gone missing; is that right?

Mr. PODONSKY. You have a potential for that.

Mr. COX. And so when it then comes to questions of adequately

securing those parts, in other words, they’re not guarded properly,

44

we don’t know whether in consequence of this long-running problem, that at Los Alamos we have said recurred throughout 1994,

1995, 1996, 1997, whether or not something was stolen and we no

longer have it; is that right?

Mr. PODONSKY. You could infer that. We have no evidence that

anything was missing. We were concerned about the practice.

Mr. COX. But, of course, you don’t have an adequate inventory

either.

Mr. PODONSKY. No, they do not.

Mr. COX. Let me ask you about the Superblock. This is the area

at Livermore which we are most concerned about from a security

standpoint, I would take it, because that’s where we store our nuclear material. Now, your report tells us that we had a guard force

that I take it was adequate in 1995. Was it adequate in 1995?

Mr. PODONSKY. They started to go through some reductions. Adequate training, yes. Adequate numbers——

Mr. COX. From 1995 to 1997 your report says that guard force

got cut almost in half. Why did that happen?

Mr. PODONSKY. The Department was going through reductions in

attempts to save, save money.

Mr. COX. In your view, is that a good place to save money and

a good way to save it?

Mr. PODONSKY. It was never our view, no, sir.

Mr. COX. You describe the measures that have been taken to upgrade that security since you pointed out the deficiencies as temporary, pending permanent fixes. What is the nature of the temporary fix compared to the permanent fix that you expect?

Mr. PODONSKY. Without getting into classified because of the

open session, we are working to—we are following what they are

doing in terms of their testing. What’s of critical concern to us is

their ability to perform against various scenarios. They have, to

their credit, have increased the numbers of guards at the

Superblock. The next piece of it is going to be their ability to protect assets they are assigned to.

Mr. COX. Given that you have been around this block several

times, around the Superblock, given that you’ve had to write reports in successive years pointing out that nothing has changed,

when we hear that fixes are pending, that, for example, the accounting problems are not solved, parts of accounting problems are

not solved but they are on their way to being solved, that the temporary fix is in place for the nuclear material guard force, will be

made permanent, what can you tell Congress that will assure us

that this time it’s different?

Mr. PODONSKY. I have served through four Secretaries. I have reported to many congressional committees. It’s only in this last year

that I have seen a Secretary of Energy fully engaged and a Congress fully engaged to follow through on many of the issues that

we have identified over the years. So I and my people feel very confident, albeit somewhat guarded, that there’s so much attention

being paid that perhaps now we will finally get there. We know the

Secretary is committed. We know the Department is committed. I

know that my colleagues that report directly to the Secretary, such

as General Habiger, is committed. We haven’t seen that before.

45

Mr. COX. My time has expired I see, and I don’t want to test the

goodwill of the chairman.

My understanding is that you’re gone in a year; is that right?

Well, I’m sorry—I’m happy you’re not gone in a year. I would have

hated to be the one to bring you that news.

Mr. PODONSKY. I think I need to be resuscitated.

Mr. COX. No, no. It’s a problem of having things whispered to

you from staff. The staff were just pointing out that the Secretary

is going to be gone in a year, of course, or perhaps not, but we do

have changes of administration and changes of personnel which

leads to me what I hope will be a question that I will finally be

permitted, and that is, whether or not any of the three of you can

tell us that you are reasonably far along in narrowing a field of

candidates for the new administrator of the NNSA? Is that something that you are taking responsibility for, any of you?

Mr. PODONSKY. No, sir.

Mr. COX. You haven’t been asked for suggestions or to review

credentials or qualifications of people?

Mr. HABIGER. No, sir.

Mr. COX. Well, I think that concerns me a little bit. Oughtn’t you

to be consulted on such a thing? Don’t you have some expertise in

those areas?

Mr. HABIGER. If I could, sir, not necessarily. The Department of

Defense, as the commander-in-chief of one of our commands, I was

asked to make inputs on people that work directly for me, but my

colleagues at very high level, that was never an issue of discussion.

Mr. COX. All right. Well, I do certainly hope that this is progressing and that we don’t have the Secretary acting as the administrator.

I thank the chairman.

Mr. UPTON. Thank you.

I have two additional questions, and I want to make an announcement, in conferring with my colleagues. We are going to—

I’m going to ask—I have a couple of questions. Mr. Burr, who is

in the next room, is going to ask another round of questions—I

hope that’s not a vote that I hear—and then we are going to adjourn. We will finish then with this panel, be finished, and we will

start with Panel II at one o’clock.

Mr. Podonsky, at Sandia you found problems with access controls

in areas where classified matter was used and stored. Can you give

us just a couple of examples of that, help us with that?

Mr. PODONSKY. I am going to have to defer for a question in

terms of whether I would get into classified or not.

Mr. UPTON. Maybe if you could just submit that for the record.

And at this point, that gives me a good transition. All members will

be able to ask and submit written questions, and they will stay in

a classified state if you deem them to be, and we will put that in

there.

The last question that I have before I yield to Mr. Burr, what

troubles me as I look at these ratings, and you indicated that two

were satisfactory, one was marginal. Marginal to me is not satisfactory. I guess by definition it’s not.

I’d be interested to hear from each of the three of you with regard to what attention or what measures do you think we should

46

impose on the outside contractors when, in fact, that rating is not

satisfactory, is—in other words, when it’s not satisfactory or marginal? What additional pressures should we be able to see to bear

on those when that happens, Mr. Curran?

Mr. CURRAN. Sir, I can only speak for our inspection process. If

the inspection finds a CI program to be less than satisfactory, or

even if it is satisfactory, there are recommendations we make to

improve the system. If it’s less than satisfactory, but they still have

effective program, yet they’re not where we would like them to be,

we clearly state that, and we give them recommendations to fix it

and fix it immediately. We will go back in 6 months to see if they

fixed it. If they haven’t, then we need to make changes. We don’t

keep going back. I mean, you either fix the problems——

Mr. UPTON. Can you provide—you know, one of the things I indicated my opening statement was the fact that we are going to be

talking with Chairman Bliley about a bipartisan trip of members

to visit a couple of these labs probably early next year. Would it

be possible for us to see a list of the items——

Mr. CURRAN. Yes, absolutely.

Mr. UPTON. [continuing] by the labs in terms of what you found?

Mr. CURRAN. Some of these issues that we raised—for instance,

in Livermore, we found it had a satisfactory program. There are

issues that we say, you know, you need to do this better than you

have been doing it, and there’s other issues that they raised with

us.

For instance, we need our people, our CI people at the laboratory

to have access to security files, which they don’t have at this point.

General Habiger and I have been working on that, and that’s going

to be fixed. Our contractors, CI people at the labs, don’t have a personnel list of people who are involved in high-risk programs. They

need to know that for briefing, debriefing and whatever. We are

going to fix that.

So not all the recommendations pertain particularly to lab. What

we are looking for is to improve the overall DOE program as best

we can.

Now, these items are coming out that need our attention that we

have these Special Access Programs that are taking place in. The

CI people are not aware of what those are. We need to fix those

programs. But if a lab is less than satisfactory or marginal—if it

is marginal, we may have to make changes right on the spot. If it

is an effective program, but should be a lot better, then we will go

back there and fix it. It is one shot. We don’t just keep going back

and back until we run out of narrative here.

Mr. PODONSKY. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. UPTON. Mr. Podonsky. Mr. PODONSKY. One of the things that

we also look for—and there is a requirement as of August 31,

1999—after every one of our inspections, the facility, together with

the PSOs, needs to provide us with a corrective action plan for

comp measures and long-term corrective actions. And one thing

that has never happened before in the Department is, security findings and issues do not always result in corrective action plans that

got implemented.

Mr. UPTON. Does that corrective action plan include a time line

in terms of when it is going to be fixed?

47

Mr. PODONSKY. Yes, sir, it is supposed to include that.

Mr. UPTON. That would be interesting for us to see before a visit

to look, just since August 1999.

At this point I yield to the vice chairman, Mr. Burr.

Mr. BURR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me follow up on where

the chairman was, and that is with contractors because the contractors also go through an annual evaluation; and I think in hearings past, we have pointed out the discrepancies in what you found,

Mr. Podonsky, as it related to their security status and, in fact,

what the annual assessment of their job performance was. In some

cases, at the end, it was satisfactory. You came with marginal or

unsatisfactory, and at some point during the year, deficiencies were

noted.

In June, Secretary Richardson issued a memo that said DOE is

drafting a new contract clause that would place the labs’ annual

performance fee at risk.

General, what do you think about that proposal?

Mr. HABIGER. It is a great idea.

Mr. BURR. The contractors are not going to be too happy with

that.

Mr. HABIGER. This gets back, sir, to the accountability issue, in

terms of the contractors being accountable, as well as DOE employees being accountable.

We certainly got the University of California’s attention. Sitting

behind me as a spectator here is recently retired Air Force Colonel

Terry Owens, who was in charge of security and counterintelligence

for all of Europe. He is now the full-time Security Administrator

for the University of California. Before, they had a part-time individual who came in 3 or 4 days a month.

Mr. BURR. General, out of all the things that you told me, that

is one of the things that I hope is 100 percent accurate, because

one question that I asked yesterday in our briefing was, did the

University of California understand after their visit up here the seriousness with which we’re going to take this issue. And I hope, in

fact, that did get through to them and that your former colleague

is not there just for window-dressing alone.

Mr. HABIGER. I guarantee you, sir, he is not. I know him well.

He used to work for me.

Mr. BURR. Part of this requires a cultural change at the DOE because, in fact, when Mr. Podonsky goes into a facility, or Mr.

Curran, when there is a suggestion from the security side of our

inspection team that they had a deficiency, the contractor, as I understand it, cannot carry anything out until there is a policy directive from the Department of Energy.

You shake your head, General, but when there is a recommendation made—now, correct me if I am wrong, Mr. Podonsky—when

there is a recommendation made, the Department of Energy has to

then write the policy before the contractor——

Mr. PODONSKY. No, sir, first we don’t make recommendations.

We make findings and we issue findings that are tracked to see

what the corrective action is going to be. Our findings are based

on existing policy and performance.

I am not aware that the contractor does not take corrective action until there is a policy. It’s—it’s the lead PSOs that have the

48

responsibility to make sure that these things are being implemented and corrected.

Mr. BURR. Would I take for granted then that all the findings

that you found are currently being acted on and that none of the

findings are, in fact, idle?

Mr. PODONSKY. I wish that would be the case.

Mr. BURR. Then, of the findings that you have addressed, why

is there not action on 100 percent of them?

Mr. PODONSKY. I would ask you to ask that of the PSOs and the

laboratory, because what we tried—when we identify, it is a

simple——

Mr. BURR. I think at the last hearing—I think you were in attendance when the University of California and other people, as

well as the lab managers, testified, and I will look to our counsel

in case I misunderstood it—my understanding was that their reasoning was that they didn’t have the policy directive from the Department of Energy. I am told in certain cases, yes. I don’t know

that that gets us any further down this road. But what you’re saying is that where you have had a finding, 100 percent of them

haven’t been acted on and that we need to ask the contractors and

the labs why; is that correct?

Mr. PODONSKY. One hundred percent have not been acted on for

various reasons. Some may, in fact, be resources. What we were

talking about before, they may take compensatory measures, and

we are looking for long-term fixes.

Mr. BURR. Did your team send to DOE management findings

that DOE has not acted on?

Mr. PODONSKY. Yes.

Mr. BURR. And what percentage of your total findings would that

be?

Mr. PODONSKY. It is a low percentage today, but part of that—

and we understand the business of prioritizing those which are the

priority ones, but I must hasten to say that what we have seen

today in terms of response is a far better picture than what we’ve

seen in past years.

Some of it is resource requirements, be it money or manpower;

some of it is technology like in the cyber security arena. But I’m

not—my point, that I’m trying to answer your question to, is it’s

not always, as far as we are concerned, tied to a policy shortcoming; there may be other variables there. But, to date, since the

Secretary created this office in May of this year, most of the findings are being addressed, at least with compensatory measures.

Mr. BURR. Do we still have a policy of remote access to unclassified computers at the labs?

Mr. PODONSKY. I think General Habiger——

Mr. HABIGER. I addressed that while you were out of the room.

Mr. BURR. I apologize if I was out of the room.

Mr. HABIGER. No problem.

The problem was identified in August by Glenn. We have policy

that will be out late next week that greatly tightens up that shortcoming, that his people identified, Glenn’s people identified. They

will make—if we’re going to have people on that list of 25 countries

that are sensitive and the terrorist countries that will have access

to unclassified systems——

49

Mr. BURR. Is that a policy, then, that the contractor will administer?

Mr. HABIGER. You bet. And he will be accountable.

Mr. BURR. Tell me, was this not a road we were just down, a

finding, a policy?

Mr. HABIGER. Well, let me, if I could, sir—and I think this is an

important point because I got into this when I started getting

smart about how the Department operates, legally, the contractor

doesn’t have to comply unless there is a policy. But I can tell you

my relationships with the three national laboratory directors, and

I have a very close working relationship with them; every time I’ve

called them and talked to them about these kinds of issues, they’ve

taken immediate action.

Mr. BURR. General, I hope that—I assure you that I will and I

hope that you will go back and read the testimony of those individuals who testified in front of this subcommittee and how many

times they said, we can’t do it without the policy written by the Department of Energy. And I am sorry they’re not here to testify as

well.

Let me ask you, Mr. Podonsky, one last question. If we had a

weapon stored at one of these facilities—and I think it is safe to

say that we do—and somebody wanted access to that weapon,

would they steal the weapon or would they steal the blueprint of

the weapon, given that both had access that was as easy as the

other?

Mr. PODONSKY. I think the way I would answer that is that we

do not believe that nuclear material or weapons parts or components are at risk today. Our area that we are most concerned about

is the information security. So, your hypothetical situation, I would

say that they would be more attractive to go after the information

as opposed to the actual material.

Mr. BURR. Thank you. I thank all three of you.

I yield back.

Mr. UPTON. Thank you.

Mr. Cox, do you have any further questions?

Mr. COX. Actually, Mr. Chairman, I have a number of questions,

and I think if the panel would be willing to respond to the committee and follow up with written questions and answers we can

handle most of them that way. There are a number of details that

I think the committee ought to be very interested in, and so I

would prefer to follow up that way on these details.

They are not just details. Many of the things—I think we could

spend an hour talking about e-mail, because we are becalmed

there. I know we are doing a lot to try to change the status quo,

but in terms of results I think we’re sort of where we started. And

on and on.

There are a number of these issues that I think need to be covered. So if you are all willing, and if the committee is planning to

do this in any case, I will pursue my questions through that route.

Mr. UPTON. We have indicated that we will, in fact, be pursuing

that course.

Panel, thank you very much. We appreciate your time, your testimony, and we want very much to encourage your continued commitment to try and do your very best to make sure that all of these

50

secrets and facilities are, in fact, properly and adequately safeguarded.

Thank you very much. We will reconvene at 1 o’clock.

[Brief recess.]

Mr. UPTON. Okay. We are back. As you saw with the first panel,

we have a long tradition of taking testimony under oath. Do any

of you have objection to that?

We also, under both committee rules and House rules you are allowed to have counsel, do any of you wish or desire to have counsel?

If you would stand and raise your hands.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. UPTON. Thank you very much.

We will start with Dr. Robinson.

TESTIMONY OF C. PAUL ROBINSON, PRESIDENT AND LABORATORIES DIRECTOR, SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES;

JOHN C. BROWNE, DIRECTOR, LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY; C. BRUCE TARTER, DIRECTOR, LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL LABORATORY; GIL WEIGAND, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, STRATEGIC COMPUTING AND SIMULATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY; AND JAMES TURNER,

MANAGER, OAKLAND OPERATIONS OFFICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Mr. ROBINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think I, as well as

all my colleagues, will try and be somewhat careful in our remarks

today in an open session. In security matters, it is better to put any

sensitive questions that involve vulnerabilities into a closed session—I don’t know if that is possible—or else answer them for the

record.

We also make a practice, which I think is also common sense, of

not fully revealing the methods and practices that we put into use

in monitoring because we get a bigger deterrent force by those.

Sandia has indeed had a long history of R&D responsibility for

security technology, including the design of systems for nuclear

weapons storage, for transportation and for site security. We have

designed the site security for major military bases with high value

as well as for airport security.

We have also become, over the years, specialists in cyber security. Thus, I take that our laboratory, as well as all the members

of our staff, I believe, should have a higher obligation to be sensitive to security matters.

I would certainly like to clear up a problem in the last session

where it was suggested that Sandia does not have security passwords for its computers. That was not the case. A very narrow

question was raised in the I&E inspection about passwords, certainly not an across-the-board. Sandia has had a secure system of

three levels of access for its computers since 1989, and a full firewalled system between the restricted information and the open unclassified network. And we have always had a fully air-gapped system to our secure computers.

The sites that we operate do have distinct advantage, at least

our New Mexico site, our site in Kauai, Hawaii and in Tonopah,

Nevada. They are the equivalent of living in a gated community,

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though perhaps a little stronger. They are fully contained within

operating military bases. The principal site is completely within

the site of Kirtland Air Force Base, and we carry out a close relationship with the security forces of our laboratory and the Air

Force.

The DOE’s independent oversight office in their inspection and

evaluation in August of this year, in six of the areas, they declared

‘‘satisfactory,’’ three areas they declared ‘‘marginal’’ with problems

having been found in one area ‘‘unsatisfactory’’ and an overall of

‘‘marginal.’’ I would point out that in prior years, in 1994, 1996 and

1997 and other DOE inspections of our security, we were satisfactory in all of those.

In 1998, a partial inspection had been done and we were marginal in a couple of areas there. I believe the review was, in fact,

a useful review this time. And certainly a set of fresh eyes is always good to look at what’s going on and spot something that you,

operating every day, may not see, though I believe the biggest

change is, in fact, that threats are changing and have changed over

time. And we are not always as rapid to respond to those, and it

is a good wakeup call when we do find something that does need

to be fixed, and we have given high attention to fixing those.

We are trying to institute an approach to security that we found

is successful in other areas, and I would call it applying quality

methodologies in the security area. It is certainly not enough to try

and inspect out all the defects in security. You have got to build

the quality in as the foundation. That means getting every individual in the laboratory involved in their responsibility for security

and put most of your emphasis there, which is what we do. We try

to install an integrated security management system in a similar

way to which we have done it in the environmental safety and

health area with, I think, very high success.

I attached to my statement, which I assume you will accept for

the record, a much longer statement, a comment about polygraphs.

And, again, in the earlier session there was a statement that people hadn’t been polygraphed. At our laboratory just under 200 people have been polygraphed, not as a result of a DOE directive but

as part of other programs. The wish to extend polygraphs to a

much wider area has caused me to have to look a lot more carefully

at the underlying science of polygraphs if we are to, in fact, risk

the future of the laboratory on this.

I attached as an appendix to my statement a report done by a

number of my senior scientists which I commissioned to look at the

underlying basis of polygraphs. I was not pleased with their findings. I don’t think you will be either when you read as to the adequacy of polygraphs. If not applied carefully, we may in fact be

making things less safe because when you crank down the polygraph to try and get a smaller and smaller number of false

positives, you must at the same time open the doors to let real

deceptives get through. And in particular, when polygraphs such as

these are to be used to apply—to allow someone to be given a clearance in advance of a background investigation, I think you are putting in a risk that I would find unacceptable.

Finally, let me say I think we’ve got to, in the future, put more

attention on stopping the espionage problems in other routes than

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just looking at security. I think attacking it directly. First of all,

better background investigation—and I am pleased with the legislation that was just passed. I think our site will probably go up to

exclusively Qs, which is how we used to operate throughout most

of our history; and we will celebrate our 50th anniversary at end

of this month.

I also believe it’s appropriate with the level of security material

and the responsibility we are given that sting operations are an approach to directly attack security problems, as well as greater surveillance activities of laboratory activities.

With that, I’ll complete my oral statement.

[The prepared statement of C. Paul Robinson follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF C. PAUL ROBINSON, DIRECTOR, SANDIA NATIONAL

LABORATORIES

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I am Paul Robinson, director of Sandia National Laboratories.

Sandia National Laboratories is a multiprogram laboratory of the U.S. Department of Energy and one of three DOE laboratories with a research and development

responsibility for nuclear weapons. Sandia’s job is the design, development, and certification of nearly all of the non-nuclear subsystems of nuclear weapons. Our responsibilities include arming, fuzing, and firing systems; safety, security, and usecontrol systems; engineering support for production and dismantlement of nuclear

weapons; and surveillance and support of weapons in stockpile. We perform substantial work in programs closely related to nuclear weapons, such as nuclear intelligence, nonproliferation, and treaty verification technologies. As a multiprogram national laboratory, Sandia also performs research and development for DOE’s energy

offices, as well as work for other agencies when our unique capabilities can make

significant contributions.

As you know, the DOE Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance recently concluded a comprehensive inspection of safeguards and security at

Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico, and issued a report on August 23, 1999.

The inspection gave ‘‘satisfactory’’ ratings in six topical areas in security at Sandia,

‘‘marginal’’ ratings in three areas, and an ‘‘unsatisfactory’’ in one area, resulting in

an overall facility rating of ‘‘marginal.’’ The security areas receiving ‘‘marginal’’

rankings were

• Unclassified Visits and Assignments by Foreign Nationals, • Unclassified Cyber Security, and • Protection Program Management.

The area receiving the ‘‘unsatisfactory’’ rating was Classified Matter Protection

and Control. Our corrective action plan for addressing the findings and issues identified in the inspection is well under way.

A ‘‘marginal’’ facility rating is clearly unacceptable to Sandia, and we are committed to achieving a satisfactory evaluation at our next opportunity. However, I do

not believe this score necessarily indicates that security has deteriorated at our site.

Rather, I believe it reflects a new reality of higher threat levels than existed in the

past and more rigorous requirements to counter them.

Because the inspectors’ report is classified ‘‘SECRET,’’ we cannot discuss its specific findings in open session. Consequently, I will give a general overview of

Sandia’s security programs and the initiatives that we are taking to improve performance. If the committee wishes to discuss the details of the inspectors’ findings

and our plan for corrective actions, I will be happy to provide information in closed

session.

SANDIA IS COMMITTED TO EXCELLENCE IN SECURITY

The espionage threat against the DOE nuclear weapon laboratories is a matter

of great concern to me and my colleagues at Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore

national laboratories and at the Department of Energy. We are all taking vigorous

steps to address this threat in its various forms.

Sandia National Laboratories has always been managed by an industrial contractor. I believe our laboratory culture has been strongly influenced by its indusVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:33 Sep 11, 2000 Jkt 061036 PO 00000 Frm 00056 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 E:\HEARINGS\61036 pfrm03 PsN: 61036
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trial heritage, which began under the AT&T Bell Laboratories and continues today

with Lockheed Martin. That heritage includes a strong cultural commitment to security. I am pleased but not surprised that the inspectors noted a positive and cooperative attitude among Sandia managers with whom they worked during the inspection. Sandians care!

In a programmatic sense, Sandia is one of the nation’s top centers of expertise

in security. For decades, Sandia National Laboratories has been a leader in security

research for nuclear weapons, nuclear facilities, and nuclear materials. We have designed security systems for sensitive military installations and other facilities such

as airports, for example. For more than thirty years, we have worked closely with

the National Security Agency on nuclear control codes and hardware that implement the highest levels of code protection. We design and maintain the usecontrol

systems (including the hardware, software, and code management subsystems) that

ensure that the nation’s nuclear weapons can be used only with proper authorization. We also design and develop the equipment, facilities, and information systems

for secure transportation and storage of nuclear weapons. These systems are subjected to extensive testing to ensure that they are secure.

Sandia’s design engineers and scientists associated with the nuclear weapons program and related national security programs have a deep appreciation of the gravity

of their security responsibilities. And I can assure you that management at Sandia

is equally serious about security. It is a fact, however, that the technological challenges of information security have grown enormously in recent years. It is a tougher problem than it used to be. The recent attention given to security at the DOE

Defense Programs laboratories is salutary and will help us focus on the emerging

challenges of security in the cyber age.

SECURITY AS A CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION

Sandia National Laboratories is managed and operated by Sandia Corporation, a

subsidiary of Lockheed Martin Corporation. As an officer of Sandia Corporation, I

am well aware of my contractual responsibilities for security. Effective security is

not a choice, it is a requirement. The management contract for Sandia National

Laboratories is quite explicit in this regard:

The contractor shall conduct safeguards and security programs, including

counterintelligence, physical security, protection of government property and information; classification and declassification of information and materials; safeguards of nuclear materials control and accountability; foreign national program; computer security; and personnel security and access control for laboratory staff and visitors.

Moreover, several DOE directives relating to security are incorporated by reference into the contract:

• DOE Order 470.1, ‘‘Safeguards and Security Program’’ • DOE Order 471.1, ‘‘Identification and Protection of Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information’’

• DOE Order 471.2A, ‘‘Information Security Program and Manual for Classified

Matter Protection and Control’’

• DOE Order 472.1B, ‘‘Personnel Security Activities’’

• DOE Order 474.1-2, ‘‘Nuclear Materials Management and Safeguards System Reporting and Data Submission’’

• DOE Manual 475.1-1, ‘‘Identifying Classified Information’’

• DOE Order 1240.2B, ‘‘Unclassified Visits and Assignments by Foreign Nationals’’

• DOE Acquisition Regulation 952.204-70, ‘‘Classification/Declassification’’

Sandia Corporation’s prime contract with DOE is a performance-based contract.

Performance under the contract is determined through a laboratory appraisal system. DOE evaluates Sandia’s performance annually and issues the Sandia National

Laboratories Multiprogram Laboratory Appraisal Report. This performance appraisal is based on a jointly negotiated appraisal agreement that defines specific

performance objectives, performance measures, and performance expectations to be

evaluated each fiscal year.

I and the directors of Sandia Corporation are mindful that unsatisfactory performance will impact our annual laboratory appraisal and reflect on the reputation and

credibility of Lockheed Martin Corporation. Security performance is a part of each

corporate officer’s performance management plan. Thus, contractual motivations for

satisfactory security performance exist, and they are tangible to management.

TRENDS IN SECURITY DURING THE 1990’S

Protection philosophies were clearly affected by the end of the Cold War. Concerns

over espionage took a back seat to other worries, such as whether we could sustain

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the program and the stockpile and whether we could get sufficient resources to do

our work. There was a willingness to assume, perhaps, that the fall of the Soviet

Union signaled the beginning of a new era of global peace in which espionage would

not require the same level of concern.

The more relaxed attitude toward security was evident in certain policy changes.

Secretary O’Leary ordered an aggressive declassification review program early in

her tenure. In 1992 DOE relaxed the accountability requirements for controlled documents. The modified accountability program omitted requirements for unique document numbers and maintenance of accountability records for certain classes of documents, inventories, destruction certificates, written authorizations to reproduce, and

internal receipting. DOE also eliminated the requirement that all personnel with access to limited areas have a Q clearance, encouraging instead the use of the less

rigorous L clearance for employees without need-to-know.

The end of the Cold War also resulted in substantial budgetary reductions for the

DOE laboratories. From fiscal year 1992 through 1995, the Defense Programs budget dropped 25 percent in constant dollars. In response to criticism by Congress and

the Galvin Task Force (Secretary of Energy Advisory Board) that costs were too

high, Secretary O’Leary pledged to reduce costs at the nuclear weapon laboratories

by $1.7 billion over five years beginning with fiscal year 1995. In response, Sandia

committed to achieve $250 million in cost reductions. The bulk of the savings came

from reducing administrative support costs and overhead, such as processes for procurement and materials management, human resources, financial management, information systems, and facilities services including security. We reengineered our

corporate processes to streamline these activities and achieve efficiencies comparable to those in private industry.

Meeting the cost reduction targets for security during this time was very challenging. Even so, Sandia’s safeguards and security program continued to receive satisfactory ratings in external appraisals and assessments. We were complying with

the applicable directives for DOE security programs. We didn’t consider, however,

that such compliance might not be a reliable indicator of actual performance. In my

view, this was a logical flaw that lulled the DOE community into feeling good about

security when it should have felt rather uneasy. Yes, we complied with the DOE

directives without serious consideration as to whether our security programs were

truly effective with respect to the evolving threats. As a result, our security capabilities remained static while the threats advanced.

In 1998 DOE and the laboratories both began to realize that their security capabilities had not kept pace with the evolution of security threats. A review by the

DOE Albuquerque Operations Office that year, as well as our own internal assessment, identified areas where security capabilities and performance required improvement. We took immediate corrective actions (as we do whenever an inspection

indicates vulnerabilities), we tried to identify root causes, and we formulated an action plan to develop long-term solutions to the issues. I am pleased that the recent

comprehensive inspection of safeguards and security by the DOE Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance found that Sandia made significant

progress in correcting the deficiencies identified in last year’s special survey. Nevertheless, our goal is not merely to correct items identified by inspections, but to improve and sustain the capabilities and performance of our security programs.

OVERVIEW OF SECURITY PROGRAM MANAGEMENT AT SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES

We are implementing an approach to security management at Sandia that draws

from a successful strategy DOE adopted a few years ago for managing environmental, safety, and health programs. Sandia’s integrated safety management system

(ISMS) is designed to enable safe and compliant mission work performance, rather

than being focused on compliance alone. Integrated Safety Management is a DOEwide program that Sandia helped develop and which we wholeheartedly support.

The program has proved to be an effective and rational approach to sustaining excellence in safety performance over the long term. We are adopting a similar approach for security.

Sandia’s Integrated Safeguards and Security Management System (ISSMS)

Sandia is in the process of implementing—with DOE’s support and encouragement—an Integrated Safeguards and Security Management System (ISSMS) for all

its security responsibilities. The first principle of security management under

ISSMS is that line management is responsible for the protection of the assets entrusted to them: It is the realization by employees that security is not someone

else’s job, it is part of your own job. We can’t just bring in security experts and give

them the job; every single person bears responsibility.

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ISSMS will establish clear and unambiguous lines of authority and responsibility

for ensuring that secure operations are established and maintained at all organizational levels. It will ensure that personnel possess the experience, knowledge, skills,

and abilities necessary to discharge their security responsibilities. And it will provide a way to allocate resources efficiently to address security and operational

needs.

Our ISSMS methodology stresses the need to identify applicable security standards and requirements before work is performed. Administrative and engineering

controls to prevent and mitigate security risks are tailored to the work being performed and designed into work processes. ISSMS will measure security performance

in a way that will help us identify effective and ineffective practices. We will, of

course, comply with all applicable DOE directives for security; but the ISSMS program will go beyond compliance to measure, evaluate, and improve actual security

performance.

Funding for Internal Security Programs

Sandia National Laboratories and DOE spent about $43 million on internal secu- rity programs at Sandia in fiscal year 1999. Of that total, $37 million supported

general safeguards and security programs, such as control and accountability of special nuclear materials, physical security systems, classified matter protection and

control, protective force, and personnel security. Counterintelligence was funded at

$850,000 in FY1999; I expect the budget for counterintelligence (which is provided

directly from DOE headquarters) to increase substantially in FY2000. Total funding

for Sandia’s internal security programs in FY2000 is expected to be nearly $50 million.

Cyber security operations were funded at $2 million in FY1999 and were increased by 30 percent in FY2000. In addition, we invested $2.6 million for information security (InfoSec) improvements in FY1999 but discovered that much more is

needed to meet the challenges revealed in the Cox Report. The Integrated Security

Management Program of DOE’s Office of Defense Programs calls for investments of

approximately $100 million per laboratory in FY2000 and about $35 million per

year in subsequent years for cyber security. That level of investment is far beyond

what can be accommodated within the FY2000 budget.

Physical Security

Assets protection at Sandia encompasses a multitude of security interests ranging

from government property to special nuclear materials. Naturally, with such a broad

range of assets, there must be a graded approach to protection. The level of protection afforded a particular asset depends on the potential risk to national security,

program continuity, and the health and safety of employees and the public. Sandia’s

security program is based on risk management, which in this context requires that

higher risks get greater protection. This approach minimizes activities that add little protective value but increase program costs.

Physical security areas are established with appropriate levels of protection for

the nature, sensitivity, or classification of protected material or information:

• Property Protection Areas are security areas established for the protection of unclassified DOE property against damage, destruction, or theft.

• Limited Areas are security areas defined by physical barriers used for the protection of classified matter or special nuclear material, where protective personnel

or other internal controls can prevent access by unauthorized persons. Exclusion Areas may be established within limited areas where mere presence in the

area would result in access to classified matter.

• Protected Areas are established for the protection of special nuclear materials or

vital equipment. Material Access Areas are contained within Protected Areas

and have separately defined physical barriers constructed to provide sufficient

delay time to impede or deter unauthorized access. Vital Areas are areas located

within Protected Areas used for the protection of vital equipment.

• Restricted Access Areas are areas established to protect sensitive compartmented

information facilities, central alarm stations, secondary alarm stations, secure

communication centers, and automated information system centers.

Classified matter may not be stored or used in a facility until specific approval

has been granted by DOE, based upon review and acceptance of the facility security

plan and, if appropriate, an onsite survey. Control procedures are established to protect classified matter appropriately under all conditions: in use, storage, and transit.

Sandia’s laboratory facilities in New Mexico, and its testing facilities in Nevada

and Hawaii, are located on military installations, which provide significant additional security buffers. DOE limited areas are protected by physical barriers, access

control systems, and alarm systems. Sandia’s protective force patrols such areas

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during nonstandard hours and has the capability to respond immediately to intrusion. In addition, the protective force at Sandia’s major laboratory site on Kirtland

Air Force Base, New Mexico, can coordinate with U.S. Air Force security police if

necessary to respond to any major incident.

Personnel Security

The personnel security program at Sandia National Laboratories involves security

clearances, security awareness and education, special personnel security assurance

programs, and the foreign visits and assignments program. Personnel security is the

keystone of an integrated security program. All functional areas of security depend

on assuring that only people with the proper credentials have access to protected

information and materials, and that those people are fully trained and equipped

with the proper tools to carry out their security responsibilities.

Security Clearances—The first line of defense in personnel security is the requirement for security clearances. The vast majority of employees and resident contractors at Sandia National Laboratories today must obtain a U.S. government security

clearance as a condition of employment. A DOE Q clearance is required of the subset of employees who may have a need to access nuclear weapon design information

(secret and top secret restricted data). Most other employees must obtain the DOE

L clearance, which is approximately equivalent to the DoD SECRET clearance. The

DOE Q clearance requires a background investigation of the individual by an agency

independent of DOE and a reinvestigation every five years. An L clearance requires

only a national agency records check for violations of law or bad credit, and is repeated every ten years.

In addition to the requirement for a security clearance, the laboratories operate

under the DOE policy of ‘‘need-to-know.’’ This security principle requires that access

to classified matter ‘‘be limited to persons who possess appropriate access authorization and who require such access (need-to-know) in the performance of official duties’’ (DOE Manual 471.2-1A, Manual for Classified Matter Protection and Control).

A Q clearance alone does not provide access to nuclear weapons restricted data.

Until 1993, all employees and contractors were subject to a Q-level background

investigation. In 1993, DOE changed that policy: The laboratories were urged to

maximize the use of the less rigorous L clearances for employees whose job assignments did not require access to nuclear weapon restricted data. Consequently, thousands of individuals began to work and move about in the limited areas of the nuclear weapons laboratories without having been subject to the exhaustive background checks required for Q clearances.

I am pleased that the Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 requires Q

clearance background investigations for all personnel who work in or around locations where restricted data is present. The law also empowers the Federal Bureau

of Investigation to perform background investigations for special access programs

and personnel security and assurance programs. These requirements should significantly strengthen personnel security at the laboratories.

Security Education and Awareness—The principle objective of the Security Education and Awareness Program is to ensure that employees, consultants, and subcontractors are equipped to protect sensitive and classified information, classified

material, special nuclear material, and other government assets entrusted to them.

An equal objective of this program is to motivate and instill a high level of security

awareness in individuals concerning the protection of national security interests.

Four types of security briefings are conducted for our personnel. An initial security briefing is given to all new employees before they report to their job assignments. The purpose of this briefing is to inform both cleared and uncleared employees who will have access to security areas about their obligations to protect materials and information, and to educate them on local security procedures and access

control requirements. A general facility overview is also given which familiarizes

employees with their responsibilities in the protection of DOE interests.

A more comprehensive security briefing is provided to employees, consultants, and

subcontractors prior to granting access to classified information. The purpose of the

briefing is to inform individuals who have been granted a DOE security clearance

of their security responsibilities when working with sensitive and classified information.

Annual security refresher briefings are required of all employees, consultants, and

subcontractors possessing an active DOE clearance to reinforce information about

security policy and responsibilities. The annual briefings are presented using a variety of delivery methods, including an on-line option, department meetings, or seminars and workshops.

57

A termination security briefing is given to all Sandia and contract employees

when their security clearance is terminated, regardless of the reason. This briefing

informs individuals of their continuing security responsibility.

On June 21 and 22, 1999, at the direction of Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson,

Sandia (and the other DOE Defense Programs laboratories) suspended normal operations to conduct security immersion training for all employees. At Sandia, we reiterated long-standing DOE and laboratory security policies and briefed staff on the

Secretary’s zero-tolerance security policy. We placed special emphasis on the new

implementations in cyber security. The laboratory’s center directors were required

to prepare training plans for those two days covering security topics appropriate for

their work environments. Employees studied and discussed security policies and

procedures, and many issues and suggestions were raised for follow-up. Frank discussions were held on the issue of the laboratory’s culture and how it shapes attitudes toward security. In general, the two-day exercise was well received by our

staff. Feedback indicates that it was an interesting, stimulating, and businesslike

exercise.

I am aware that the House Committee on Science reported that 20 percent of the

population of the DOE Defense Programs laboratories did not participate in the security stand-down training in June. That statistic is grossly inaccurate for Sandia

National Laboratories. Ninety-three percent of our personnel completed the security

stand-down training on June 21 and 22. Of the seven percent who did not participate on those dates, five of those percentage points were for people who were on

previously scheduled vacations—not an unusual figure for late June (we insisted

that employees not take vacation on those dates if they had not already scheduled

it). Another one and one-half percent of the lab population were ill or excused for

legitimate personal reasons. Less than one percent of the lab population were in

work status on June 21 and 22 who did not take part in the security immersion

activities. Some of those people were on business travel that could not reasonably

be rescheduled. In addition, quite a few jobs—in our security and medical departments, for example—must be staffed at all times. However, all employees who

missed security training during the stand-down have been required to make it up.

Foreign Visits and Assignments Program—To ensure compliance with DOE regulations, Sandia conducted a self-assessment of its foreign visits and assignments

program prior to the recent safeguards and security audit. All the findings reported

in this topical area by the DOE Office of Independent Oversight and Performance

Assurance had been self-identified by Sandia. In addition, Sandia made several enhancements in its program in an effort to administer it more effectively:

• We increased the staff of the foreign visits and assignments program by 60 percent over the last year. • We improved and expanded our education and awareness programs in their coverage of the requirements for foreign visits and assignments. • We created a Foreign Interactions web page on Sandia’s intranet, which is used

as an information tool for the entire Sandia National Laboratories population

and especially for Sandia hosts of foreign national visitors. • Sandia’s executive management formalized and published discipline guidelines as

a mechanism for imposing consequences related to violations of foreign visits

and assignments rules and regulations.

Nearly all of the foreign nationals who come to Sandia National Laboratories visit

facilities that are outside the fence of the laboratories’ limited (secure) area. Such

facilities are called, in DOE jargon, ‘‘property protection areas’’ (PPAs). That terminology reflects the fact that no classified information or activities exist in those

areas and that government property, rather than classified information, are the

principal assets that require protection there. Ninety-eight percent of the uncleared

foreign nationals who came to Sandia National Laboratories during 1998 visited

property protection areas only. Nevertheless, we know that within that 98 percent,

some visitors could be information-gatherers for their governments. For that reason,

we brief Sandia employees on the risks and responsibilities of hosting foreign visitors. We require hosts to file a report after such visits to determine if any unusual

activity occurred.

The two-day security immersion stand-down in June raised employee awareness

of the policies and responsibilities with respect to hosting foreign national visitors

or assignees. As a direct result of that exercise, several employees came forward to

disclose previously unreported incidents during visits or assignments where security

procedures had not been followed. We are reviewing those incidents to determine

root causes and establish procedures to prevent recurrences. Security infractions

may be assessed against some individuals if warranted.

We recently implemented additional measures to strengthen our controls over foreign visits and assignments:

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• Sandia’s foreign national program integrates key program elements (foreign interactions, counterintelligence, computer security, operational security, classification, and export control) in the approval process for foreign visits and assignments. The Foreign Interactions Office is the focal point for such visits and coordinates the reviews and approvals with the key program elements.

• Visits by uncleared foreign nationals must now be approved by a vice president

of Sandia National Laboratories. The laboratory’s executive vice president or

president must approve visitors who are affiliated with sensitive countries. In

addition, all visits and assignments from countries on the State Department’s

‘‘Patterns of Global Terrorism 1998’’ list require prior approval by the Secretary

of Energy. These countries are Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan,

and Syria.

• Sandia requires indices checks for all visits and assignments by foreign nationals

who are citizens of or employed by a government or institution of a sensitive

country, and for all visits and assignments requiring access to limited (secure)

areas or involving sensitive unclassified subject matter. All indices checks are

coordinated through Sandia’s counterintelligence office. Any exception to this requirement must be approved by the laboratory director, and very few exceptions

have been granted.

• Anytime a Sandia employee hosts a meeting or conference off-site where foreign

nationals will be present (regardless of whether the meeting is held in Albuquerque, Livermore, or elsewhere in the world) the Sandia employee is responsible for going through the same formal approval process unless the event is

open to the general public (per DOE Policy 142.1, the formal approval process

does not apply to events open to the public).

• Foreign assignees (post-docs, limited-term employees, etc.) must be certified by

the host as possessing unique technical skills not readily available to the laboratory from U.S. nationals.

• Foreign nationals visiting for longer than one day receive a red badge with photo

and citizenship displayed.

• Badging of foreign nationals is centralized for consistency and better control.

• Foreign visitors and their hosts receive more extensive briefings on their responsibilities and obligations.

• A list of sensitive technologies recently developed by DOE is being used to help

evaluate the appropriateness of visit access and topics.

• All foreign visit and assignment activity for Sandia is tracked on Sandia’s own

database systems. In July 1999, Sandia implemented the Foreign National Request (FNR) system to track foreign visits and assignments. The application can

precisely identify, in real time, numbers of foreign nationals on-site, identities

of foreign nationals and hosts, technologies, security restrictions, and statistical

information used in managing foreign visit activity.

I must emphasize that foreign nationals are pervasive in the U.S. high-technology

sector. Many of the top graduate schools in science and technology in the United

States have majority populations of foreign students. U.S. companies have hired

vast numbers of foreign nationals with technical degrees into their ranks. Forty-five

percent of the visitors to Sandia National Laboratories who are affiliated with sensitive countries are from U.S. universities or U.S. companies. This exceeds even the

number of visitors who represent their countries for official activities related to

agreements in arms control, nonproliferation, and nuclear materials control (approximately 40 percent).

As you know, the FY2000 Defense Authorization Act imposes a moratorium on

foreign visits and assignments to the DOE Defense Programs laboratories by citizens of sensitive countries. This requirement may prevent the laboratories from collaborating with U.S. universities or companies on some projects where citizens of

sensitive countries are involved as students or faculty of universities, or as employees of U.S. companies. Consequently, we will work very hard to get our foreign visits

and assignments program certified by the DOE Office of Counterintelligence, the

Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Central Intelligence Agency, as required

by the law, as quickly as possible. We hope that those agencies will cooperate with

us to perform that requirement expeditiously.

Cyber Security

Sandia has long been recognized as a leader in network security. Our three-level

security structure, which has been in place since 1989 and fully deployed since 1995,

has been adopted by DOE as a model for DOE laboratories and plants through the

Tri-lab InfoSec Plan of April 1999. Sandia has stringent computer security procedures already in place, and we are improving our procedures based on our own reVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:33 Sep 11, 2000 Jkt 061036 PO 00000 Frm 00062 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 E:\HEARINGS\61036 pfrm03 PsN: 61036
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search and by adopting best practices from other DOE laboratories, industry, and

other government agencies.

However, we recognize that policy, personnel training, and technology must continually be improved to meet the escalating threats. Recent attempts at espionage

through cyber attacks highlight the necessity of very substantial action, and I appreciate the greater attention and support that cyber security is attracting. The

Task Force for Integrated Security Management, referred to as ‘‘ISecM,’’ is a joint

endeavor of the three nuclear weapon laboratories and DOE, in consultation with

DOE’s production plants and field offices. The task force has recommended an ambitious program for a major enhancement of cyber security as a system of policy, people, and technology.

We have been working closely with DOE’s chief information officer and the other

Defense Programs laboratories to identify best practices. Three of these deserve special mention: The TAP utility, developed at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, supports the critical second layer of our three-layer process for monitoring

email going to the unclassified internet for classified content. NADIR, developed by

Los Alamos National Laboratory for monitoring usage patterns to detect suspicious

behavior is another promising tool. StatePoint Plus software developed by Westinghouse is being implemented for security configuration management on our switched

network. Cooperation among the laboratories and DOE has been excellent.

Sandia’s classified network and computing environment has repeatedly earned

high marks for security during numerous audits. Unfortunately, it has not earned

high marks from the people who have to work in that environment for functionality

and ease of use. We recognize that we must enhance the functionality of our classified multi-site network environment to allow secure, effective, and facile collaboration among the laboratories and DOE for classified work.

Sandia has aggressively implemented the action plan developed as part of the TriLab Information Security (InfoSec) Nine-point Plan in April and the Secretary’s Six

Enhancements in June, 1999. We have completed 42 of the 46 actions called for in

our InfoSec action plan. Two more actions will be complete before the end of the

year. The remaining two are ‘‘red team’’ assessments that will be completed early

next year, as soon as these scarce personnel resources are available.

Let me summarize some of the important actions we have completed as part of

our InfoSec action plan:

• We have configured our unclassified restricted access networks at our sites in

New Mexico and California so that electronic mail flows through a single control

point. We are monitoring email messages to scan for classified content. So far,

we have found that less than one in 10,000 of the email messages from highrisk areas of the laboratory are of concern, and those have been at the confidential level.

• We are strengthening the need-to-know controls over information on classified

systems. For nuclear weapons data, we are improving the information infrastructure so that we can migrate from a set of physical islands of need-to-know

groups to a more auditable and controllable need-to-know network. This new architecture will guarantee password protection, provide automated need-to-know

controls, and record attempts to achieve access.

• We are reviewing and strengthening the need-to-know protection for sensitive unclassified information on our internal restricted-access networks.

• For authorized transfers of unclassified files from classified computers to unclassified computers, we are documenting approved transfer procedures that (1) require review of the material to be transferred by an authorized derivative classifier; (2) specify authorized transfer points and the required content for transfer

logs; and (3) enforce two-person control by Qcleared personnel, one of whom

must be current in the DOE Personnel Security Assurance Program (PSAP).

• We are exploring the feasibility of technical measures to prevent unauthorized

transfers of classified files. We are also exploring the potential of individualized

encryption codes for compartmentalized information.

• We are enhancing software protections on classified, secure email to provide redundant assurance that only the desired recipient has access to a classified

message and attachment.

• We will perform red-team assessments of our unclassified and classified networks

annually. Experts who are organizationally independent of the technical groups

that design, maintain, or administer the networks will perform the assessments.

• We are monitoring all three levels (open, restricted unclassified, classified) to detect intrusion attempts and to respond decisively to those attempts.

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• We have instituted a rigorous training program for our people who operate in the

classified environment to ensure that they follow proper procedures in this

quickly changing environment.

We are reviewing available U.S.-designed and built commercial products to augment the intrusion detection mechanisms on our networks. We employ user authentication, network intrusion, and vulnerability analysis software from industry, universities, and other government laboratories. Some years ago, Sandia implemented

its own firewall between its open and restricted networks because we were not satisfied with any of the commercial firewall software available at that time. We recently

identified a product from a domestic source that may provide a better firewall, and

we are testing it for possible installation on our network.

The most popular commercial firewalls are produced by foreign owned companies.

To mitigate the potential vulnerability of a nation-state attack through those foreign

interests, we are working to validate and implement a commercial firewall from a

U.S. vendor. A vendor has been selected and the firewall software has been acquired

and installed in a test system. In hopes of meeting the December date for the next

inspection, we are working through issues of reliability, vendor support, data-handling capacity, compatibility with our California site, and some apparent security

anomalies that must be understood. We are committed to prudence even if the date

for deployment has to be delayed.

We are pleased that our classified network received the satisfactory rating and

our unclassified policies, networks, and personnel practices received favorable comments. However, we take seriously the overall rating of marginal for the unclassified system. The inspectors from the Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance explained to us that the requirements for a rating of satisfactory

have been tightened in response to the escalating threat. The standard is being

raised faster than we have been able to respond. We are aggressively addressing

the five action items from the audit to correct deficiencies. I must emphasize, however, that the recommendations of the Defense Programs’ Task Force for Integrated

Security Management (ISecM) must be funded and implemented in order to robustly

address the escalating threat.

The cyber security threats encountered by DOE plague many agencies across the

government, including the Department of Defense and the National Aeronautics and

Space Administration. Unfortunately, the cyber security problem is very difficult

and very complex. It is fruitless to attack this problem on a site-by-site basis; we

need to address the problem in a systematic way for the complex as a whole.

The InfoSec Task Force recently published its report outlining an integrated system of policy, people, and technology for the nuclear weapon complex. In contrast

to the current site-specific planning and accreditation that makes the system only

as strong as its weakest link, the task force proposes integrated security at the system level for the nuclear weapons complex as a whole. Experts in computer science

and communications from all three defense programs laboratories and the nuclear

weapons production complex worked together to identify vulnerabilities and propose

and implement countermeasures in the plan. According to their report, an investment on the order of $100 million per DOE site and a continuing maintenance of

approximately $35 million per site to achieve very low levels of risk. Funds of that

magnitude cannot be provided from existing programs and will require additional

appropriation. The DOE Defense Programs Complex Information Security Action

Plan is available from the DOE Office of Defense Programs.

Counterintelligence

We are building a counterintelligence program at the laboratory that responds to

the President’s direction in PDD-61 and implements DOE’s Counterintelligence Implementation Plan. During 1998, Sandia’s counterintelligence office actively contributed to the design of the DOE Counterintelligence Implementation Plan, which resulted in revamping the counterintelligence program at the laboratories. We moved

Sandia’s counterintelligence office out of the safeguards and security organization

to a position with direct access to the laboratory director. We hired a 30-year veteran of the FBI to manage our counterintelligence program. The FBI is the lead

agency with cognizance and expertise in all national counterintelligence and espionage matters, and it is appropriate that the laboratories’ counterintelligence programs be staffed by individuals with that experience. Because of their professional

‘‘CI’’ background, they are knowledgeable of the FBI’s investigative methodology. At

the same time, because the counterintelligence personnel at the laboratories are

part of the laboratory community, they are in a position to earn the trust and confidence of the scientists and engineers that is so important to the job.

Counterintelligence activities are now funded directly from DOE headquarters.

The counterintelligence program at Sandia National Laboratories was funded at

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$850,000 in fiscal year 1999. We expect FY2000 funding to increase substantially.

The higher level of funding will permit us to support four counterintelligence officers, a counterintelligence research analyst, one or more technical experts in cyber

security, and additional support staff.

POLYGRAPH SCREENING

Many employees have expressed deep concern to Sandia’s executive management

and DOE about proposed polygraphy testing. In acknowledging the confusion and

anxiety on this issue, I asked a group of Sandia’s senior engineers and scientists

for their thoughts and inputs. The seniors reviewed the literature on polygraphy

and submitted a report summarizing expert opinion and expressing their own conclusions. Their report is attached as an appendix to this statement.

The report highlights several issues that as a laboratory director I find rather

troubling:

• Many experts in the field of psychology believe that polygraphy is not theoretically sound and that claims of high validity for the procedure cannot be sustained. (This information was derived from a survey of members of the Society

for Psychophysiological Research and Fellows of the American Psychological Association.)

• Studies performed by the Office of Technology Assessment and the Polygraphy Institute of the Department of Defense show that claims and estimates for the

rate of false results in polygraph testing vary greatly.

• Reports by the Office of Technology Assessment, the Polygraphy Institute of the

Department of Defense, and independent experts in polygraphy state that the

effectiveness of polygraphs as a screening tool has not been established and appears to be much less than their utility for specific-incident investigations.

• The Office of Technology Assessment and independent authorities state that polygraph tests can be beaten through learned countermeasures.

(Reference citations for these issues are in the report.)

These issues raise serious concerns for those of us who bear responsibility for the

long-term health and vitality of the laboratories and the success of the national security programs they serve. The Department of Energy must be very careful in how

it designs and conducts its polygraphy program. If the program is mishandled, the

resulting personnel problems could be very damaging to the laboratories and their

national security programs.

Notwithstanding the safeguards and protections that DOE intends to incorporate

into its regulations for the polygraphy program, significant issues remain for laboratory managers. One issue is the legitimacy and validity of the polygraphic process

itself. Laboratory directors will have difficulty persuading their employees to embrace a screening methodology that they know is not generally accepted by the psychology profession, that many polygraphy experts regard as unreliable for screening

applications, that is not amenable to objective measures of accuracy, that is prohibited by law in the private sector, and that can be fooled with learned countermeasures.

Thus, a major concern for the laboratories is what impact the polygraphy program

will have on our retention of personnel in sensitive programs. Will those programs

lose good people? Will they lose people with critical skills?

A related issue for laboratory directors is how the polygraphy requirement will

affect recruitment. It has already become more difficult for us during the last several years to attract top graduates in engineering and science. We must already

compete for those people with private corporations that can offer challenging technical work and more attractive packages of salary, benefits, stock options, and career advancement. If we will have to tell candidates that they may be subject to

a scientifically questionable polygraph exam every few years, I am sure that many

good people will be dissuaded from considering employment in the national laboratories. One study of polygraphy found that individuals with college degrees tend to

have higher rates of false positives. My fear is that within ten to twenty years of

a polygraphy program, we may not have the nation’s best and brightest scientists

and engineers looking after the reliability, safety, security, and control of nuclear

weapons.

Finally, I am worried that excessive confidence in polygraphy may divert attention and resources from essential security programs that are more productive. We

could put a lot of resources into a polygraph program for DOE and fail to aggressively improve the funding, staffing, and sophistication of our programs in cyber security, personnel security, security education and awareness, counterintelligence investigations, inter-agency coordination, and comprehensive periodic background reVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:33 Sep 11, 2000 Jkt 061036 PO 00000 Frm 00065 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 E:\HEARINGS\61036 pfrm03 PsN: 61036
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investigations. Polygraphy is probably the weakest tool in the security and counterintelligence toolbox, and we should not cherish unrealistic expectations for it.

In view of the many uncertainties surrounding polygraphy, I believe DOE must

proceed cautiously with a limited program that will be subject to reevaluation after

an appropriate time.

CONCLUSION

The escalating security threat against the DOE nuclear weapon laboratories is a

matter of great concern to me and my colleagues at Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, and the Department of Energy. The recent inspection of safeguards and security at Sandia National Laboratories by the DOE office of Independent Oversight

and Performance Assurance was a useful independent review and provided me with

insights that can only be seen with ‘‘fresh eyes.’’ It helped identify several ways in

which we can strengthen our security posture. We are taking vigorous steps to resolve all findings and issues identified by the inspection as quickly as possible. For

the long term, we are implementing an Integrated Safeguards and Security Management System which will help us achieve excellence in security performance on a consistent basis.

The unmistakable message of the recent inspection is that security must stay

ahead of the threats. The threats will always change as technology changes. Measures that were sufficient in the past no longer afford an adequate defense. Security

policies and systems must be designed for capability and performance against real,

current threats. Compliance is simply not enough.

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Mr. UPTON. Thank you very much.

Dr. Browne. By the way, as in the first panel, your entire statement will be made a part of the record. Thank you.

TESTIMONY OF JOHN C. BROWNE

Mr. BROWNE. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman. I am John Browne,

Director of Los Alamos National Lab, and I am pleased to have the

opportunity to provide your subcommittee with a statement on the

status of security programs at our laboratory. I have been Director

for not quite 2 years. And during that time, security has been one

of the main focus areas that I’ve identified for improvements at our

laboratory. It has been one of my top priorities.

The recent DOE audit confirmed that we’ve made significant

progress in upgrading our security programs during the last several years, but it’s clear to me that there’s still many improvements

that need to be made. As Dr. Robinson mentioned, security is integral to accomplishing our mission, and we recognize that the security threats that we face today are different from those during the

cold war. And as such, our responses have to be continuously improved to address the newly emerging threats.

To meet these threats, I have reorganized our security and counterintelligence programs and hired new leadership to provide us

with the best program possible. And I think I’m starting to see the

results of having both new programs and new people in place.

I want to point out just a few things that I think are very important. First, discuss personnel security since people are the heart of

anything related to security, whether it’s information or materials

control. And I think perhaps the most fundamental change in our

security posture during the last 2 years has been the increased

buy-in and involvement of our staff and our employees. Although

the employees have always taken security seriously, the new challenges that we face have been met with an increased commitment

at the laboratory.

To help the employees understand the threat and their responsibilities for security, we’ve significantly improved our employee security training and awareness program. Our management team

has communicated to all employees the expectations for improved

individual security responsibilities. We’ve had experts communicate

the nature of past and present threats. We have reiterated that

people will be held accountable for their actions, and we have

taken disciplinary action when appropriate.

In the area of access control to our site, we are implementing a

more stringent badging and control system. And this new system

ties together through a central computer network key information

such as citizenship, clearance level, clearance status, training needed to get into any given site, so that as an individual comes up to

an access point and they hand their badge to a guard, the guard

not only can see the badge, they can swipe it through and find out

what’s up to date on everything; and we think that’s going to be

an important capability that will improve our security.

During the early 1990’s, the number of Q clearances was reduced

for cost-cutting purposes, and this action led to an increase in the

number of people at the laboratory cleared at the lower L-cleared

level. This mix of clearance levels has led to additional administraVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:33 Sep 11, 2000 Jkt 061036 PO 00000 Frm 00090 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HEARINGS\61036 pfrm03 PsN: 61036
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tive controls required to restrict access of L-cleared people to secret

restricted data, which of course requires a Q clearance. In my opinion, this cost-saving measure actually lessened security during this

period; and we would like to see an increase, as Dr. Robinson also

pointed out, in the number of Q clearances for people who must

work in our facilities containing secret, restricted data. We think

this would definitely enhance security effectiveness.

In the 1998 annual report to the President on safeguards and security, inadequate protection of classified non-nuclear weapons

parts was identified as the single biggest information security problem at Los Alamos. We have made major improvements in protecting these classified items. The number of storage locations has

been reduced from 105 to 41 and will be reduced to 22 by the end

of this calendar year. We have added 25 additional protective force

personnel and the patrol frequency has been significantly increased.

Cyber security is the fastest changing security issue for the laboratory and the Nation. Our classified computers where our nuclear weapons work is done are totally separated from our unclassified systems. It is a true air gap that exists between the classified

and the unclassified. Classified networks have no connections to

the outside world except through a National Security Agency-approved encryption device.

The recent DOE audit found that our classified computer network was secure and fully compliant with DOE orders. The recent

DOE audit also tested our unclassified network fire walls that we

began installing in November 1998, almost a year ago. DOE inspectors could not penetrate these barriers from outside Los Alamos.

However, they did find areas that we must protect against the insider threat and we are taking corrective actions to close some of

those vulnerabilities.

With respect to the insider threat, I think this is probably the

biggest challenge we all face. We are now allowing no electronic

transfer of authorized unclassified information from our classified

systems to our unclassified systems. That’s been since the April security shutdown. We are doing 100 percent scanning of all outgoing

unclassified e-mail and our unclassified—the ‘‘yellow network,’’ as

we refer to it, which is fire walled, is being strengthened with even

stronger password protection, enhanced network scanning and

switching which allows people to only remain—have access to the

information they need.

Let me close by saying that we recognize that although the audit

this year came out very positive in the sense that we received a

‘‘satisfactory,’’ the opinion at our laboratory is that we want to continue to receive a ‘‘satisfactory’’ and that means making continual

improvements in how we approach security. It is a never-ending

game. You have to maintain yourself strong against new and

emerging threats.

I believe we have a solid foundation to build on. I feel strongly

now that I have the right people in place and they have the right

attitude and we can make this happen. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of John C. Browne follows:]

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN C. BROWNE, DIRECTOR, LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL

LABORATORY

INTRODUCTION

I am pleased to have this opportunity to provide your subcommittee a statement

on security programs at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL).

I would like to make three key points in my testimony today:

1. Security is a top priority at the Department of Energy and the Laboratory. When

I became Director two years ago, security was one of my focus areas for improvement. As such, I strengthened our security and counterintelligence activities by increasing employee training and awareness, hiring new leadership to

increase our effectiveness, and increasing institutional resources to fix problems.

2. We have made significant progress in upgrading our security programs during the

past two years. Secretary Richardson was particularly instrumental in focusing

attention to this important matter. Our security progress is documented in our

own self-assessments and was recently validated by a Department of Energy

(DOE) security audit. The Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance performed this audit.

3. There are still improvements to be made. The recent DOE security audit confirmed the results of our own self-assessment; there were no surprises. We aggressively pursued corrective actions before, and during, the audit. The University of California and Laboratory management is committed to implementing

corrective actions until all findings are addressed.

OVERVIEW

The Los Alamos National Laboratory mission is to ensure the safety and reliability of US nuclear weapons and to help reduce the threat of weapons of mass

destruction. In performance of this mission, we ensure the security of our people,

our information, and our nuclear materials. Security is integral to the success of our

mission. We recognize that the security threats we face today are different from

those during the cold war. As such, our response must be continuously improved to

address newly emerging threats.

Our Laboratory, located in a relatively remote part of northern New Mexico, occupies 43 square miles. This location presents both opportunities and challenges to security. We have 158 security areas where classified work is performed. These security areas contain over 6.5 million classified documents, 75,000 nonnuclear classified

weapon parts, over 2,000 classified computers, and 3 major nuclear facilities holding

several metric tons of special nuclear materials.

Our Security Approach

Los Alamos uses a layered methodology to protect classified documents and materials. With our security protection, one must overcome several barriers before obtaining access to classified matter. This methodology applies to our security programs for physical security, cyber security, information security, etc. An example of

this may be observed in special nuclear materials protection at our plutonium facility. The double fence surrounding this facility has a perimeter intrusion detection

system (the outer layer). The second layer is the well-trained, well-armed professional guard force patrolling the facility 24 hours a day. The third layer is the armored guard post controlling access. The fourth protective layer is alarmed vault

type rooms and safes within the plutonium facility.

Los Alamos has made enhancements in all these areas of security over the past

two years. Using the plutonium facilities as an example, our improvements include

the following:

• improved protective forces response plans for plutonium facilities—we now get

there faster with more firepower,

• state-of-the-art protective masks to counter chemical threats against protective

forces,

• portable explosive-detection equipment, and

• use of a special vehicle with built-in delay and denial technologies for intrasite

transport of nuclear material.

Our protective forces are capable of responding to the full spectrum of threats we

face. We provide an average 250 hours of intensive training per person per year

using a DOE-certified program. The results are exceptional. Over the past two

years, 98.5% of the protective force have passed the critical performance tests on

the first attempt. Performance is tested in areas of firearms, physical fitness,

handcuffing, and unarmed defense techniques.

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In August, the DOE’s Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance performed a comprehensive security audit. This audit inspected the five major

security areas: program management, information security, cyber security, nuclear

material control and accountability (MC&A), and personnel security. The DOE overall security rating for the Laboratory was Satisfactory, the highest possible rating.

More importantly, this audit confirms that our corrective actions are effective. General Habiger, the DOE’s ‘‘Security Czar,’’ commented on this audit while visiting

LANL on September 17, 1999. General Habiger stated: ‘‘Los Alamos just came

through an evaluation with an overall satisfactory, which is the highest rating you

can get, and this... was deemed the best evaluation in the history of Los Alamos.

That’s a phenomenal achievement.’’

We have structured this testimony to follow the categories used by DOE for their

audit. I will now discuss the actions we have taken which contributed to receiving

this overall Satisfactory rating.

PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

In April 1998, I reorganized all security functions into one division. At the same

time, we began implementing Presidential Decision Directive 61 and established an

independent counterintelligence program. I hired experienced professionals to lead

both organizations. A former United States Air Force security officer, a specialist

in running complex nuclear security organizations, leads the Security Division. The

Internal Security Office is responsible for our counterintelligence program. Leading

this office is a retired Federal Bureau of Investigation special agent with 30 years

of field and staff experience in counterintelligence. We have continued to add external expertise to staff of both organizations. Additionally, the University of California

strengthened its national laboratory security oversight by hiring a safeguards and

security manager. This professional is a former United States Air Force officer who

specialized in investigative programs involving computer security, personnel security, asset protection, anti-terrorism, and vulnerability assessment.

Since 1996, the Laboratory has been augmenting security funding by 10 percent

per year in our overhead budget to address new demands. We increased the annual

security budget from $44 M to $64 M. We increased the protective force by approximately 70 uniformed personnel, for a total of 390. Eight new armored vehicles were

purchased to replace antiquated vehicles, and $1.5 M was invested in a new radio

system that provides improved and flexible protective force communication.

Perhaps the most fundamental change in our security posture has been the increased buy-in and involvement on the part of our employees. Employees have always taken security seriously, but new challenges have been met with increased

commitment at the Laboratory. Direct involvement by our management team has

communicated to all employees the expectations for improved individual security responsibilities. We reiterated that people will be held accountable for their actions

and have taken disciplinary action when appropriate. Secretary Richardson ordered

two security immersion stand-downs this year. Both were very effective in increasing employee awareness of the changing threats and employee responsibilities for

security.

Additionally, Laboratory management continues to track and correct identified security issues. For tracking, management uses a comprehensive database system

called ‘‘The Red Book.’’ This book includes all findings and their status from every

self-assessment, DOE audit, and Government Accounting Office report, plus a variety of Presidential and Congressional commission reports.

INFORMATION SECURITY

In the 1998 [DOE] Annual Report to the President on Safeguards and Security,

inadequate protection of classified nonnuclear weapons parts was identified as the

single biggest information security issue at Los Alamos. Los Alamos has made major

improvements in protecting these classified items. Examples of our improvements

include the following:

• Storage locations have been reduced from 105 to 41. This number will be reduced

to only 22 locations by the end of this calendar year.

• Storage locations have been organized into security clusters. To protect these clusters, 25 additional protective force personnel were assigned to augment the existing forces.

In another area of information security, classified documents, Los Alamos was

judged to have effective document control and protection over the millions of classified documents maintained at the Laboratory. DOE security audits since 1994 have

validated this result. Equally important, our strategies for securing special access

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programs and intelligence information have been closely scrutinized in numerous inspections and determined to meet all requirements.

CYBER SECURITY

Cyber security is a critical element of the Laboratory’s overall security posture.

The Laboratory maintains classified and unclassified computer networks. The classified computers are totally separate from unclassified systems—a true air gap. The

classified networks have no connections to the outside world except through National Security Agency—approved encryption devices.

The following list highlights important accomplishments in Los Alamos’s cyber security:

• During the recent DOE audit of security, the classified computer network was determined to be secure and fully compliant with DOE orders.

• This audit also tested the unclassified network firewalls. DOE inspectors could

not penetrate these barriers from outside Los Alamos.

• Los Alamos fully participated in two security stand-downs directed by the Secretary of Energy this past spring. Extensive training on security and threat

awareness was provided to the employees and contractors.

• A nine-point Tri-Lab Action Plan to improve cyber security was written and an

implementation plan was approved. To date, Los Alamos has met all milestones.

• Controls to prevent any unauthorized classified-information transfer from classified to unclassified computer systems were strengthened, and an action plan for

technical prevention is in place.

• No electronic transfer of authorized unclassified information from classified systems to unclassified systems has been permitted since the security stand-down.

New controls, including a revised two-person information control policy, are in

process of development and approval.

• Scanning outgoing unclassified e-mail and computer files for possible classified information was initiated and is ongoing.

• A stronger and improved certification program was implemented for those foreign

nationals who require access to unclassified computer resources as part of their

job. These foreign nationals must meet stringent programmatic criteria before

access is granted. Their computer access is subject to additional monitoring and

management review.

Los Alamos continues to upgrade its cyber security to adapt to changing technology and meet continuously evolving threats.

MATERIAL CONTROL AND ACCOUNTABILITY (MC&A)

Our nuclear material control and accountability needed improvement in past

years. After taking corrective actions, we now have a great deal of confidence in our

inventory accuracy. More importantly, our control measures have been strong, and

we are equally confident that our material has been adequately safeguarded from

theft or diversion.

In the 1998 [DOE] Annual Report to the President on Safeguards and Security,

we received a Marginal rating in MC&A. The issue identified in that report questioned our ability to ensure that nuclear materials were in their authorized locations

and at stated quantities. Much of this issue dates back to old measurement practices tied to imprecision in previous generations of measurement equipment.

Through a comprehensive program involving new equipment and new procedures,

we have revised and rebuilt our MC&A program. Within the last two years, our

MC&A program has achieved a new level of performance that was rated by the most

recent audit team as ‘‘the best in the DOE complex.’’ Los Alamos has been a leader

in international safeguards technology for close to 30 years. We are proud of our

improved internal practices to meet the MC&A standards.

PERSONNEL SECURITY

People are the heart of information control. We have increased employee security

training and awareness. Additionally, we have improved our security procedures,

and we are tracking and correcting deficiencies. The positive results of our effort

were validated in the DOE audit. Clearance processing, human reliability programs,

and security badging were determined to be operating effectively, with no findings

identified.

Los Alamos continues to improve personnel security. For example, we are implementing a more stringent badging and access control system. This new system ties

together, through a central computer network, key information such as current

training status, citizenship, clearance level, and clearance status for each employee

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and visitor. This enhancement will improve our real-time ability to tie security-area

access to virtually all of the eligibility requirements for area entry. We also are installing electronic badge readers at all manned entry posts so that we have an electronic screening of each badge as well as a physical check. Our access controls also

include the most extensive use in the DOE complex of collateral biometrics checks

(hand-geometry readers) for access control. In addition, we have begun rebadging

the entire workforce to move to the new color-coded DOE badge that will allow employees and security officers to more readily identify a person’s clearance level.

During the early 1990s, there was a well-intended DOE objective to reduce the

number of Q clearances for cost-cutting purposes. This action led to an increase in

the number of people at the Laboratory cleared at the lower L level. This mix of

clearance levels has led to additional administrative controls to restrict access of Lcleared people to secret restricted data (which requires a Q clearance for access).

In my opinion, this cost savings measure has lessened security. We would like to

see an increase in the number of Q clearances for those people who must work in

our facilities containing secret restricted data. This change would enhance our security effectiveness.

FOREIGN VISITS AND ASSIGNMENTS

All foreign nationals visiting or on assignment to the Laboratory require prior

DOE or DOE-delegated approval. In March 1999, we implemented a new internal

policy that established a rigorous approval and verification process to support our

foreign national visits and assignments. Every visitor has a Laboratory host, who

is trained, briefed, and debriefed on the visit. The recent DOE audit verified this

process through performance testing and interviews. Additionally, the auditors attempted to infiltrate foreign national ‘‘actors’’ into our security areas on several occasions, using false badges, ruses, and intervention by ‘‘co-opted’’ senior managers—

the actors failed to gain access in every case. Strict access limitations are in place

and verified by our Operations Security staff.

AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

Despite our recent documented successes, we recognize further work is required

to maintain the appropriate level of security at the Laboratory. Significant examples

include the following:

• We will continue to expand and improve the comprehensiveness and quality of our

security-training program. Clearly, our employees are our first and best lines

of defense in meeting the tremendous challenge of safeguarding nuclear material and classified information. Training is the key through which we keep our

employees knowledgeable of and vigilant to security threats. We have a number

of initiatives underway, which are relevant and meaningful to our mission and

the security challenges we face.

• We will continue our efforts to protect against the insider threat to our cyber security. Our efforts will be coordinated with the IsecM Task Force, which is composed of representatives from the three nuclear weapons laboratories, the DOE

nuclear weapon production plants, and the DOE.

• We recently obtained release of funds from DOE for the first segment of our Nuclear Material Safeguards and Security Upgrades Project (NMSSUP), which is

intended to replace our aging security alarm system. We will work to ensure

this line-item construction project is accomplished within scope, schedule, and

budget. We have assigned one of our best project managers to this project, and

it receives regular review by my senior managers and me.

• We have added an effective firewall to protect our unclassified network. We will

continue to expand the vulnerability testing of these unclassified computer systems to ensure our systems are adequately protected from within the firewall

(the insider threat).

• We will reduce the use of temporary nuclear material access areas. Our older facilities require the occasional use of temporary material access areas. These

areas are created to utilize specialized equipment outside the normal special nuclear materials protective area. These temporary areas provide full protection

for the nuclear materials. However, they are more difficult to protect and require expensive compensatory measures. Minimizing the use of these areas and

obtaining newer secure facilities are the best solutions to this issue.

• We will continue to improve our internal Laboratory coordination between counterintelligence, security, and foreign visitor and assignment organizations.

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CLOSING REMARKS

I am very pleased that the recent DOE security audit recognized many improvements to the Los Alamos security programs. In those areas identified for further improvement, I want to assure you that we are committed to making those improvements. We are committed to continuous improvement of our security program, just

as we are with safety, facilities, project management, and other areas of business

and operations. We have a solid foundation to build on, we have a detailed plan for

the path forward, and most importantly, we have the right people, with the right

attitude, to make it happen. I would like to thank Secretary Richardson and other

DOE leaders for their support of our Laboratory’s efforts to improve security. With

the continued support of the administration and Congress, we will continue to

achieve established security goals.

Mr. UPTON. Thank you very much.

Dr. Tarter. Welcome back.

TESTIMONY OF C. BRUCE TARTER

Mr. TARTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me begin by saying,

in partial answer to a comment Mr. Podonsky made this morning,

we are responding to 100 percent of all of the findings which were

found in the OS&E inspection. Let me briefly comment on our response in the three areas that I’ve discussed before: physical security, computer security and then personnel security.

In the area of physical security, I think the three major areas in

which there were significant findings, I think the most important,

as alluded to earlier by, I believe, Congressman Cox, was essentially on the Superblock and the guarding of special nuclear material. And I think—as Mr. Podonsky said this morning, I think we

have done a number of things. We have done a very, very large

number of computer simulations to test all kinds of scenarios for

possible intrusion into that area. And I think those have—I think

exposed and allowed us to take measures to work on that facility.

I think we carried out a physical force-on-force exercise during

September, which again will have to be judged eventually by his

team, but I think we did it in concert with the Oakland operations

office, with the defense programs office in DOE, and I think,

learned a great deal; and I believe we were reasonably satisfied

with the results of that exercise.

The third piece, which I alluded to in my July response, we have

been adding special response team personnel and they basically go

through extensive training. The first new class I believe will graduate this December, and then the other classes will soon come on

line, which will bring us to full strength in terms of the special people to respond in those areas.

In terms of the materials control and accountability overall, we

have essentially completed, in our judgment, the work in all but

one area; and as was discussed this morning, that last area involved acquiring measurement capability, which we have basically

done this week, and we will begin to use that to take measurements on the inventories in this one area, which I don’t want to

go into further in an open hearing, but that will be well under way.

Finally, in the classified part of physical security we expect to

have all of our storage areas brought into the standard configurations by the end of the year, and we’re using special patrols to

guard that during the interim until we have done that.

In the area of computer security, I think our major activity both

in response to the Secretary’s 6-point plan and the 9-point plan,

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but also the findings, is to bring a very extensive new fire wall into

operation in the unclassified part of our systems. A second—and

that’s acquired, but it will take extensive work to separate into all

of its components; and that is where we’re putting much of our effort.

The other activity I would mention, in which all three of the laboratories are participating, and which I think Dr. Weigand could

comment on further, is that all of the labs and external experts in

computer security have basically spent a great deal of time trying

to assess all of the conceivable measures. And this is done in concert with things like the National Security Agency and the other

parts of the government which have to work at high levels of cyber

security; and I think we have carried out an extensive set of discussions and workshops with a number of recommendations for cyber

security in general, but I would rather let Dr. Weigand, or perhaps

Dr. Gilligan, comment on how those are going to be responded to

and how they will fit into the 6- and 9-point plans.

Let’s see. In terms of the foreign national access, which was

clearly a topic of significant discussion this morning, we have tightened the administrative controls along the lines General Habiger

indicated so that we have even more extensive—we have always

had an extensive review process for the foreign national access, but

we have added layers of additional review before any foreign national has access to the computer site.

Finally, I will just mention briefly in the area of personnel security, I think, as both Dr. Robinson and Dr. Browne have commented, that a significant issue for us has been the presence of L

clearances. I think we have asked again for Q clearances; I think

we’re pleased—we would like to have an all-Q site. In the first

proximation—in the interim, we have added a number of physical

barriers so that it is not—so that L-cleared people cannot simply

administratively and easily get into the Q areas as an interim

measure. But I think our preferred result is to have essentially a

Q-cleared facility inside a Q-cleared—basically inside the restricted

areas. I think we are—for all kinds of reasons we think that was

a vulnerability, and we think changing that will enhance the security of the site.

Finally, in response to another comment this morning, we have

used polygraphs. We have not done them as part of the new CI program, but they have been used historically as part of the investigative process, and so the tool has not been part of the systematic

thing, but has been part of the investigative process used with staff

members in the past.

And so I will leave that with that, and I will be happy to take

questions again from the staff.

[The prepared statement of C. Bruce Tarter follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF C. BRUCE TARTER, DIRECTOR, LAWRENCE LIVERMORE

NATIONAL LABORATORY, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am the Director of the Lawrence

Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). Our Laboratory was founded in 1952 as a

nuclear weapons laboratory, and national security continues to be our central mission. Livermore is a principal participant in the Department of Energy’s Stockpile

Stewardship Program, heavily involved in programs to prevent the proliferation of

weapons of mass destruction, and engaged in energy, environmental, and bioscience

R&D as well as industrial applications of our core technologies.

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Our National Security Mission and safeguards and security are inextricably

linked, and we take both of them very seriously. In my testimony to this committee

on July 20, 1999, I stated our commitment and described our efforts to provide increased confidence in the security of the Laboratory. I would like to report to you

today the substantial progress that has been made in addressing the issues resulting from the May 1999 inspection by the DOE Office of Security Evaluations (OSE).

In the area of protection of Special Nuclear Materials (SNM), we are well along

in executing an action plan to analyze, document, performance test, and enhance

the Laboratory’s comprehensive protection strategy. There have been several

progress reviews by DOE Defense Programs (DOE/DP) and the Oakland Operations

Office (DOE/OAK). Hundreds of simulations have been performed, and a force-onforce performance test against an outside adversary team has validated the protection strategy. In parallel with this effort, there have been numerous physical and

procedural upgrades and interim staffing increases. A new class of Special Response

trained officers will graduate in December and enhance our staffing.

In the area of Materials Control and Accountability (MC&A), we have demonstrated the ability to consistently meet SNM measurement and inventory requirements and resolve inventory differences in a timely manner. Specific concerns raised

by the OSE, ranging from statistical sampling procedures to verification of tamper

indicating devices, have been addressed. This past week LLNL took delivery of a

new certified calibration standard from DOE’s New Brunswick Laboratory that will

allow us to begin making certain specific accountability measurements.

We have also made improvements in the area of physical security and protection

of classified matter. Performance issues identified by OSE in several vault-type

rooms (VTRs) have been corrected, and two newly-hired alarm testers are conducting a detailed inspection of all vaults and VTRs at the Laboratory. Alarming

and other physical upgrades of non-compliant classified parts storage areas are

being aggressively pursued and will be completed by the end of the year. Over 100

non-GSA-approved repositories have been replaced, and we are in the process of replacing or relocating the remainder to VTRs. Physical barriers have been installed

in many Q-clearance-only areas to restrict accidental access by L-cleared personnel,

and a comprehensive cost and engineering study for completing the remainder is

nearing completion.

The Laboratory has taken many steps to improve cyber security. Computer access

by any foreign national must be approved through a rigorous review process. For

cases where dial-in access is allowed for foreign nationals, the access is routed

through a single terminal server running state-of-the-art network intrusion detection software. In addition, unclassified systems are being scanned for

vulnerabilities, and outgoing e-mail is being scanned for classified content. No

issues have arisen. Steps have also been taken to limit the physical possibility of

accidental transfer of information from a classified system to an unclassified system.

We have installed a firewall between the open and restricted partitions of the unclassified network and are beginning transition of servers to the appropriate partition. And finally, we are actively participating in the DOE/DP Integrated Security

Management (ISecM) initiative to further improve computer security.

In summary, much progress has been made in addressing the issues identified by

the DOE/OSE security evaluation, and we are well on our way to reaching the goals

we have set. I am committed to achieving an excellent Safeguards and Security Program at the Laboratory.

PROGRESS ON OSE FINDINGS

Protection Program Management

During the inspection in April, DOE/OSE (now DOE Office of Independent Oversight & Performance Assurance, DOE/OA) cited a concern that LLNL had not demonstrated assurance of the SNM Protection Strategy. Immediately, LLNL responded

with a ‘‘Path Forward’’ action plan to analyze, document, performance test, and enhance the Laboratory’s comprehensive protection strategy. With the support and

concurrence of DOE/OAK, DOE/DP and DOE/OA, LLNL has performed over 300 tabletop and computer modeling simulations of possible adversary scenarios. The results provided LLNL with the credible scenarios that were performance tested during the first two weeks of September. During the week of September 12, DOE/OAK

validated and DOE/DP verified the LLNL protection strategy through force-on-force

testing conducted with an outside adversary team. The validation and verification

testing was observed by representatives of DOE/OA and the Office of Security and

Emergency Operations (DOE/SO). General Habiger was present for part of the validation and verification exercise.

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LLNL will implement the new protective force posture in December 1999, when

a new group of Special Response Officers graduate from their SPO III Academy

training. In the interim, increased protective force personnel are staffing the facility

around the clock. Significant physical and procedural upgrades developed during the

Path Forward analysis and performance testing have been implemented, with other

upgrades on target for completion in February 2000.

Material Control and Accountability

LLNL has made great strides in achieving its commitment to the DOE Assistant

Secretary for Defense Programs to rectify all MC&A issues, including those cited in

the Annual Report to the President on Safeguards & Security and those of the DOE/

OSE inspection report. Of the seven issues, all but one has been closed and validated by DOE/OAK. In particular, LLNL’s MC&A team has demonstrated the ability to meet DOE’s requirements for SNM measurements and inventory monitoring.

The team has implemented procedures that are able to quantify and resolve inventory differences within a prescribed time frame and that process has been validated.

Other validated procedures include means for assuring that personnel removed from

the Personnel Assurance Program (PAP) and the Personnel Security Assurance Program (PSAP) are not permitted access to SNM, providing inventory confirmation of

in-process material, and verifying the integrity of tamper indicating devices. In addition we have developed an improved sampling plan, based on item attractiveness,

to be used to confirm inventory.

The Laboratory has now received shipment of certified measurement standards

from New Brunswick Laboratory for use in inventory and measurement accountability. These standards will enable LLNL to begin certain accountability measurements by the close of 1999.

Physical Security

The physical security program at LLNL was rated satisfactory; however, DOE/

OSE identified five areas of weakness. Two of the concerns were addressed through

modeling and performance tests as part of the Path Forward activity for Protection

Program Management. LLNL’s final protection strategy, which was validated by

DOE/OAK, mitigated those concerns. One of the remaining concerns was closed

through updated operational directives and was validated by DOE/OAK.

One of the remaining issues relates to the protection of classified matter and the

adequacy of sensor coverage and proper testing. LLNL has taken aggressive action

to address this concern. Two additional alarm testers have been hired and all alarm

testers have now completed formal physical security training through the DOE NonProliferation and National Security Institute. The VTRs that were questioned in the

OSE report have all been brought into compliance and there is an aggressive schedule to inspect and test all other VTRs and vaults at LLNL by the end of the calendar year.

The other remaining issue deals with the barrier delays for SNM laboratory doors.

The validated protection strategy uses the delay value of the existing doors and basically mitigates the need for doors with longer delay times. The existing doors are

not in compliance with the current DOE order. LLNL is developing a project plan,

including a cost/benefit analysis, for the replacement of the doors to meet the DOE

standard.

Classified Matter Protection and Control

In the area of the protection of classified matter, LLNL took immediate action to

mitigate the OSE’s concerns regarding the non-standard storage of classified parts.

We established a two-hour roving protective force patrol for the identified storage

areas and now are fully compliant with pertinent DOE Orders. In addition, LLNL

has completed a comprehensive self-assessment to assure that all facilities housing

non-standard storage of classified parts, including those identified during the OSE

inspection, are appropriately protected.

LLNL has initiated an aggressive upgrade program to bring all identified areas

of non-standard storage to either the VTR standard or to relocate the items to

vaults or VTRs by December 15, 1999. That program is well under way with alarm

and physical upgrades currently being installed and items being consolidated or destroyed.

LLNL has identified all the locations of non-GSA-approved repositories and a comprehensive plan to replace all non-GSA repositories not stored in VTRs has been initiated. The plan also includes bringing into operation a new identification method

that will permit the location of all repositories to be tracked in the LLNL property

management database and verified by protective force patrol checks. Over 100 new

repositories have been replaced to date, with additional containers on order. It is

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the goal of LLNL to either replace, relocate to VTRs, or provide off-hour checks of

all non-GSA repositories by December 31, 1999.

A DOE/OSE concern was raised about the procedures and barriers used in Limited areas where personnel with both L and Q clearances have access. A survey of

such areas is complete and a cost/benefit analysis is due on October 31, 1999. Options include the use of barriers and access control or requests for additional Q

clearances. Many programs at LLNL have already installed, or are in the process

of installing, physical barriers and access control to segregate L-cleared employees

from Q-only areas. LLNL does not have any L-cleared foreign national employees.

We have, however, implemented a policy to require any potential L-cleared foreign

nationals from elsewhere in the DOE complex to be escorted in general limited

areas. LLNL has implemented other actions to address the OSE concerns in the area of

protection of classified matter, including modification of the Laboratory’s Operations

Security plan to place added emphasis on the highly critical and sensitive topics.

Cyber Security

LLNL is actively participating in the ISecM initiative chartered by DOE/DP.

ISecM aims to achieve a comprehensive, integrated solution to improving security

in the DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex, particularly security against the ‘‘insider’’

threat. ISecM constitutes a major upgrade to security in the Nuclear Weapons Complex and will require several years with significant new funding to implement.

When implemented, ISecM will integrate security more fully and more transparently into classified computing across the Complex. In the long term, ISecM will

comprehensively address the concerns expressed by the OSE while broadly improving security in the Complex.

In the near term, LLNL has taken immediate actions to address OSE concerns.

LLNL has installed a state-of-the-art system to monitor all remote dial-in access by

foreign nationals. In addition, LLNL has strengthened its existing foreign national

approval process. We now require review and approval by the LLNL Chief Information Officer (CIO) and the LLNL Associate Director for National Security for cyber

access by any sensitive-country foreign national.

We are also vigorously addressing OA concerns related to LLNL’s implementation

of the Nine Point Action Plan:

—LLNL is applying Tamper Indicating Devices (seals) to classified computers to increase the assurance that users do not modify their computer systems to add

ways of transferring data.

—LLNL has instituted rigorous new procedures for the authorized transfer of unclassified files from classified systems.

—LLNL is scanning all its unclassified computer systems to determine whether or

not those systems have vulnerabilities.

—LLNL has procured new software that has the potential to significantly increase

the Laboratory’s ability to automatically scan e-mail for classified information.

—LLNL has installed a firewall between the open and restricted portions of the unclassified network and is beginning transition of servers to the appropriate partition. The firewall will be fully operational by March 1, 2000.

In addition, LLNL’s programs have re-evaluated the need-to-know boundaries pertaining to the information they handle and their personnel. Each LLNL program

area is restructuring its computer systems appropriately to enforce more stringent

need-to-know separations.

To guide computer security in the future, the Laboratory has created a Computer

Security Policy Board headed by the LLNL CIO to promulgate policy regarding computer security for the site.

CLOSING REMARKS

The security evaluation conducted by OSE noted many improvements to LLNL’s

security system while identifying areas for further improvement. We are carrying

out a comprehensive corrective action plan to address those areas, and much

progress has been made. I have committed the resources and set priorities to ensure

that this plan is executed. Many corrective action milestones have already been

achieved, and we are on schedule with the remainder. Most milestones are expected

to be achieved by the end of the year. DOE has evaluated and concurred in or validated much of our work to date. OA has noted LLNL’s strong commitment to action.

I appreciate the opportunity to provide an update to the Committee on the status

of security improvements at LLNL. I am confident that our Special Nuclear Material and sensitive and classified information are secure.

Mr. UPTON. Thank you very much.

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Dr. Weigand, welcome back.

TESTIMONY OF GIL WEIGAND

Mr. WEIGAND. Thank you, again. I would ask that my full text

be entered into the record, and then I will attempt to be extremely

brief and you can get on with the questioning.

I do appreciate the opportunity to appear before the committee

again. I want you to know that as I have indicated before I am

fully committed to strengthening the security posture at the laboratories and in defense programs, and doing so by the end of the calendar year. I hope to achieve a ‘‘satisfactory’’ rating on the report

that goes back over to the President.

You are fully aware that last year’s report that went to the President did not have a ‘‘satisfactory’’ rating, it had a ‘‘less than satisfactory’’; and as a result of that, the Assistant Secretary, along

with the cooperation of Deputy Assistant Secretaries like myself

have created a set of corrective action plans and reported those corrective action plans to Under Secretary Moniz in a memo we call

the ‘‘goalpost memo.’’

It is a classified memo in which we lay out the plan by which

we expect to achieve our ‘‘satisfactory’’ rating by the end of the

year. It was clearly based upon the information we had at the time

we drafted the memo.

I think why I am very confident that we are going to come to this

‘‘satisfactory’’ rating or very close is because the three things it

takes to make this happen are in place. One, there is a corrective

action plan. That corrective action plan two, has milestones, measurable; if not week-by-week, they are appropriate, and they are reported to my office on a regular schedule. And we can audit those

a bit.

And third and most important is that a corrective action plan

with milestones and clear objectives is one thing, but funding it is

the other. And this plan has been funded. I have letters from each

of the directors of the laboratories that they will fully fund those

corrective action plans.

I think on the positive side here, we have just recently gone

through a set of inspections by the independent office. Those inspections, as you have heard today from Mr. Podonsky, are showing very good progress, very good signs we had an overall satisfactory rating at one of the laboratories, Los Alamos, and we are very

proud of that progress.

One other thing I did want to mention here is that we aren’t just

leaving this to a goalposts memo that ends at the end of this December. Those are what I call the intermediate set of actions.

I have asked the laboratories to form a laboratory-industry task

force to create a plan for continuous improvement. The purpose of

the plan is to ensure that our security will be sustainable in the

long run and capable of adapting to the threat as it increases. And

I really want to emphasize that. This is not a game where the

threat lies dormant and lets you have some slack. This is a slippery

pole. As you climb and achieve new technological advances to overcome the current threats, those technologies are used against you

in the future to overcome the barriers you put up.

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So this is a slippery pole on which we have to constantly be

climbing. I am very interested in the continuous improvement.

I asked this task force to work jointly with myself and the Office

of the Chief Information Officer, Mr. Gilligan, who is here with us

today. If you wish to question him, I am sure he will be willing to

offer his viewpoints.

I also charged this task force to make cyber security within defense programs ‘‘best in class.’’ We would do as good as the rest of

the government and hopefully adapt what good ideas they use

throughout the government. But I insisted they take one additional

step, and that is that I wanted them to be very forefront on insider

espionage. I think that is a capability that the Department of Energy could contribute across the government. Given the concern of

this committee on insider espionage, I think that we need to step

up to that, and I ask the committee to do that.

To ensure objectivity in this task force, I established a leadership

team that was chaired by Bill Crowell, who is the Chief Executive

Officer of Cylink and the past Deputy Director of the National Security Agency. The majority of the leadership team was selected

from commercial enterprise, including Boeing, IBM and TRW who

have a very large enterprise in classified work for the Federal Government, IBM and TRW. The TRW representative was Bill

Studeman, Admiral Studeman, was the former Deputy Director of

the Central Intelligence Agency.

I stacked this committee in favor of the industry representatives

who knew the cyber security world from inside the government and

outside the government. They can outvote the labs at any given

time.

The task force proposed a long-term system-level approach to

cyber security and provides a basis for creating the 21st century

classified information system for defense programs that will continue to enhance the protection of our classified and sensitive nuclear weapons information, on ongoing and increasing threat.

We have a draft from them. We are evaluating that draft. We are

looking at options on how to implement and options on how to

fund. And, again, because this is a system-level approach that we

are taking here, it has many nuances to it, and we need to assess

them fully before we get back to the committee with what we think

we should be doing.

So, in conclusion, I just believe there has been significant

progress. I think you have a pretty good team in place right now.

I think we just need to move the ideas and the plans that we have

forward, and hopefully by the end of this year we will be reporting

back to you a ‘‘satisfactory’’ along with our report to the President

with a ‘‘satisfactory.’’

[The prepared statement of Gil Weigand follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GIL WEIGAND, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND SIMULATION, OFFICE OF DEFENSE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

INTRODUCTION:

Mr. Chairman, and distinguished members of the Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to testify on security issues. We, in Defense Programs, are fully committed

to ensuring that our laboratories and facilities enhance their safeguards and security protection postures and achieve a Satisfactory rating by the end of the calendar

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year. As line managers, we fully recognize that effective safeguards and security

protection is required in order to meet our National Security mission. APPROACH:

As documented in the most recent Annual Report to the President, several Defense Programs’ sites were rated less than Satisfactory. These ratings were based

on previous oversight reviews (surveys, assessments, inspections). On May 24, 1999,

the Assistant Secretary of Defense Programs set forth in a ‘‘Goal Post’’ memorandum to the Under Secretary, our get-well plan and approach to correct deficiencies by the end of the calendar year. The ‘‘Goal Post’’ memorandum was coordinated with Non-Proliferation and National Security and the Office of Independent

Oversight and Performance Assurance and accepted by the Under Secretary. It committed to ‘‘fix the problems’’ through immediate and interim actions and follow-on

corrective actions with associated milestones to be completed by the end of the calendar year. We have committed an abundance of resources to fix the problems and,

to date, have reprioritized funding within ourexisting budget. Finally, we are closely

tracking all Corrective Action Plans to assure milestones are being appropriately

met.

Also, there have been inspections completed at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratories, and Los Alamos National Laboratory subsequent to the Annual Report to the President. These inspections by the Office of

Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance focused on a review of safeguards and security programs with documented problems and evaluated the effectiveness of cyber security programs in both the classified and unclassified areas.

While work remains to be done, recent inspections have documented that significant

progress and improvements have been accomplished at all of the weapons laboratories in the safeguards and security, as well as cyber security areas.

As you are aware, the Department has recently been giving much attention to the

area of cyber security. This began with action plans to address the Secretary’s nine

points and six enhancements. Once the plans had been developed and implementation had begun, I asked the laboratories to create an Integrated Security Management (IsecM) Task Force. The task force was to prepare a plan for continuous improvement. The purpose of this plan is to ensure that our security will be sustainable in the long run and be capable of adapting to the threat as it increases. Specifically, I charged the task force with developing a plan that has been coordinated

with the Department’s Chief Information Officer to make the cyber security within

Defense Programs the best in class and preeminence against the insider threat. To

ensure objectivity, I established a leadership team for the task force that was

chaired by Bill Crowell, Chief Executive Officer of Cylink and past Deputy Director

of the National Security Agency. The majority of the leadership team was selected

from commercial enterprises, including Boeing, IBM and TRW, the TRW representative being Bill Studeman, former Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

The task force has proposed a long-term system-level approach to cyber security.

It provides the basis for creating a 21st Century classified information system for

Defense Programs that will continue to enhance the protection of our classified and

sensitive nuclear weapons information in the face of ongoing increases in the threat.

The task force completed the plan in September and is currently refining the associated cost estimate. The plan has been submitted to the Department and is currently

being reviewed. I hope for a decision on further action soon.

I will now provide a brief summary of specific actions taken and planned to correct weaknesses in safeguards and security at the DP laboratories by the end of the

calendar year.

LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL LABORATORY (LLNL):

All worst case adversary paths and scenarios have been reassessed to include rerunning of all computer modeling and performance tests to validate the protection

posture at the ‘‘Superbloc’’ (where SNM is processed/stored). There has been an increase in protective force manning at the Superbloc and additional physical security

upgrades have been put in place. New and enhanced procedures have been put in

place and validated by Oakland Operations Office to address weaknesses in the material control and accountability area (addresses Tamper Indicating Device integrity,

Inventory Differences Analysis, Inventory Sampling Plans based upon attractiveness

of SNM, and acquiring reference materials for measurement of uranium holdings).

In the area of Classified Matter Protection, LLNL has established two-hour patrols

during off hours, holidays, and weekends of classified matter/parts pending the matter/parts being relocated to vaults or alarm system upgrades completed by December

15, 1999. All vault type room alarm coverage is being assessed with corrections by

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December 31, 1999; those identified during the inspection have already been corrected. Also, additional alarm testers have been hired and trained. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory is in the process of consolidating its classified holdings

destroying unnecessary classified materials. In addition, over 100 GSA approved repositories have been received with additional on order.

In the area of unclassified cyber security, LANL is scanning E-mail to detect classified information that has been accidentally or deliberately placed in an unclassified message. Across the Lab vulnerability assessment scans are being conducted.

Also, the Computer Security Organization has instituted ‘‘spot checks’’ to assure the

vulnerability scans are being completed and to further assure that significant

vulnerabilities uncovered by the scans are corrected. Finally, foreign nationals are

not permitted access to a Limited Area unless under escort. In addition, intrusion

detection is in place to monitor off site foreign national access to LLNL’s open terminal server.

SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES (SNL)

SNL has taken several immediate actions to improve security including restaffing

a protective force tower position, creating an additional elevated protective force response position, and adding physical barriers at the material access portals to protect the protective force members. Additional physical security enhancements have

included securing tamper switches on alarm cabinets and the implementation of

metal detector procedures to detect items in shoes. In the area of materials control

and accountability, SNL has updated its physical inventory and tamper-indicating

procedures as well as ensuring that existing measurement plans reflect the procedure of always measuring 100% of Category I nuclear material holdings. In the area

of classified matter protection, SNL has increased the frequency of protective force

patrols of buildings containing classified parts and has placed a Security Police Officer in one building containing Secret Restricted Data parts during non-operational

hours to perform a full perimeter walk-around. All classified containers, including

space savers, have been made accessible to the protective force and SNL will provide

a plan to DOE by December 23, 1999, for the approved standard storage of classified

materials either in GSA safes, vaults, or vault-type rooms. Also, deficiencies in the

SNL security infraction/inquiry program are being addressed with the recent addition of 3 staff members to the Security Incident Management Program Team with

the elimination of the backlog of security inquiries/investigations to zero by December 23, 1999.

In the area of unclassified cyber security, SNL is moving forward aggressively to

implement the Secretary’s six further enhancements to cyber security . Also, SNL

now has in place a formal process requiring SNL Vice Presidential approval for any

foreign national access to the unclassified Sandia Restricted Network (SRN). They

have also applied tamper-indicating solutions to unused ports of classified computers collocated with unclassified computers and implemented the NT secure model

on the SRN servers with deployment to individualized computers by December 23,

1999. They will also correct all significant vulnerabilities on the Sandia Open Network (SON) and SRN computers as an interim measure and implement the automated NT server model with monitoring on the SON plus servers by December 23,

1999. Finally, SNL plans to implement the UNIX SECURE Model on SRN and SON

by September 29, 2000.

LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY (LANL):

The LANL protection program was rated in the February 1999 Annual Report to

the President as Marginal with all topical areas also rated as Marginal. However,

the August 1999 comprehensive inspection of LANL resulted in an overall SATISFACTORY rating. This represents the commitment of senior line management to

address the actions needed to correct past deficiencies and weaknesses. LANL has

effectively addressed long-standing problems in the accountability of nuclear materials and has made significant progress in addressing deficiencies in the protection

of classified weapons matter/parts. There have been significant physical security upgrades put in place and the protective force response has been robustly improved

and performance tested. Aging security systems are being addressed by a line item

construction program. LANL will be down from 105 buildings containing classified

parts to 22 buildings within 8 building clusters with 8 dedicated patrols by December 31, 1999. In the area of material control and accountability, LANL is using current limit of error inventory difference data for inventory calculations and will review all nuclear material characterized as not amenable to measurement and revise,

as appropriate, their plan by November 30, 1999. The inspection team characterized

the LANL materials control and accountability program as the best in DOE.

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In the area of unclassified cyber security, LANL has strengthened its policy on

foreign national access to their unclassified network and by November 1, 1999, will

assure that all systems accredited to process classified material employ tamper indicating seals on unused ports. They will also have finished by November 1, 1999 the

strengthening of their pass word protection and implementation of a scanning process and on-going performance-based testing. LANL hasalready begun implementation of switched networks (65% completed on red, 40% on yellow networks- all to

be completed by FY-2000).

CLOSING:

As you can see, significant progress has been, and continues to be, made. We are

prepared to brief the Committee in more detail on the specific actions underway to

meet ‘‘goal post’’ commitments and to correct weaknesses noted by the recent inspections. Mr. Bill Hensley is available to provide these briefings.

In closing, I want to again express Defense Programs’ continuing line management commitment to improving our Laboratory and facility protection programs and

obtaining Satisfactory protection programs by the end of the calendar year.

Mr. UPTON. Thank you very much.Dr. Turner?

TESTIMONY OF JAMES TURNER

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a short statement.

I am pleased to return to give you a status report on our efforts

to address safeguards and security findings at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. I am the manager of the DOE Oakland

Operations Office. Our role in security consists of two parts: First,

we provide Federal oversight of the laboratory through the presence of Federal personnel on the site and in the facilities. These

Federal staff, one, perform spot checks on activities; two, conduct

focused reviews and issue findings where appropriate; three, validate that corrective actions are complete and effective; and four,

maintain a constant presence in key facilities to understand what

is being done and to offer suggestions for improvement.

Second, I am the DOE contracting officer for the contract with

the University of California for the management and operation of

the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. In addition to administering the terms of the contract, we work with headquarters

to develop performance measures and to assess the laboratory’s

performance annually.

When we were here in July, a corrective action plan had been

agreed by the parties in the field and headquarters, several upgrades and improvements were under way, and Livermore was

working cooperatively with Sandia and Los Alamos in areas of common interest, such as cyber security. At that time, Livermore was

meeting all time lines and milestones in the corrective action plan.

To date much more work has been completed and the laboratory

is still on track with the agreed schedule.

Some examples of specific actions taken are: increasing the numbers of protective service officers within the Superblock where plutonium, enriched uranium and classified parts are stored; successful completion of performance tests to demonstrate the capability

to protect Superblock assets in scenarios consistent with the design

basis threat; successful completion of bimonthly inventories of special nuclear material to address previous deficiencies in nuclear

materials controls and accountability; the acquisition of measurement standards for precision measurements of quantities of nuclear

material—this was accelerated through the assistance of General

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Habiger; increasing the number of sensors and alarms in open storage areas to protect classified parts; and implementing the Trilab

cyber security plan for classified and unclassified computers.

In summary, the laboratory is still on track to complete the steps

necessary to have the safeguards and security rating assessed by

Mr. Podonsky’s office changed from the current ‘‘marginal’’ to ‘‘satisfactory,’’ that is, to have the laboratory ‘‘green’’ by the end of the

calendar year. This is a commitment I made to Secretary Richardson. Dr. Tarter made a similar commitment. In my view, we’re

working hard, working well and working together to implement

this commitment.

In addition, for fiscal year 2000, the performance evaluation

points allocated to security in the contract have been increased

such that they are now equal in weight to safety.

The final point I want to make is that we’re committed to continue the pressure and the momentum to improve security against

the current threat, new, emerging threats and evolving threats

such as those in the cyber security area. I agree with Mr. Podonsky

that security is an attitude. It is a responsibility that all of us who

deal with national security and economic security matters accept

when we take such positions. To be most effective, security and

safety should be an integral part of the work needed to accomplish

the program mission.

Thank you, sir.

Mr. UPTON. Thank you very much.

As we did with the first panel, members will be allowed to ask

questions for about 5 minutes. And we will rotate between sides

and probably have one or two rounds of questions.

First of all, I appreciate all of you for—those of you who testified

before, certainly—coming back. And our subcommittee has had a

long history, whether it be Republican or Democrat, in trying to

identify abuse, going after it and then making sure that it’s corrected. And I do believe that we are on the right track to correct

it. I just want to make sure that we are on a fast enough track to

make sure that secrets in the future will not be allowed to be given

away.

And I guess, with that in mind, I have a couple of questions. No.

1, Dr. Robinson, you indicated and so did Mr. Tarter, background

checks, polygraph checks have been taken—wait, maybe you didn’t

say so, Dr. Tarter, but Dr. Robinson, you indicated that polygraph

tests had been taken from a number of DOE employees more than

just the CI folks?

Mr. ROBINSON. These are laboratory employees who are involved

in special compartmented programs. And to participate in those

programs, agreeing to be available for polygraph was a part of the

condition for joining those programs. I’m giving you the statistics

on the actual number of folks who were involved in such programs,

who have been called on and have been polygraphed.

Mr. UPTON. Dr. Tarter, you indicated that you wanted more Qcleared folks as compared to L, which I assume is a lower clearance?

Mr. TARTER. Yes.

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Mr. UPTON. But Q-cleared folks don’t have the background check,

do they? Or don’t they? Do they—what is the difference between an

L and a Q other than the M-N-O-P.

Mr. TARTER. Perhaps Rich Mortensen ought to come up——

Mr. UPTON. What level of degree is different for a Q than an L?

Mr. TARTER. Rush?

Mr. INLOW. I am Rush Inlow, Deputy Manager, Albuquerque Operations. A Q is a full field investigation currently done by the Office of Personnel Management in most cases. It also includes a

records check and a statement from the applicant, filling out a

questionnaire that deals with both background and lifestyle issues.

An L is merely a records check and a statement submitted by the

applicant.

Mr. UPTON. Now, these clearances are only for U.S. Government

employees; is that correct?

Mr. TARTER. No, U.S. citizens who are——

Mr. UPTON. U.S. citizens that are participating at the labs or employed at the labs?

Mr. ROBINSON. There are a few exceptions of foreign people who

have obtained clearances. We have a UK employee working in a

limited cleared area with a Q clearance.

Mr. UPTON. What percentage of foreign nationals that would

have access to unclassified information, what type of clearance, if

any, would those individuals have?

Mr. INLOW. None.

Mr. ROBINSON. They would have none.

Mr. UPTON. And they do have access; is that not right?

Mr. ROBINSON. No.

Mr. UPTON. Not even to unclassified?

Mr. TURNER. Unclassified, yes.

Mr. UPTON. But not classified?

Mr. TURNER. Correct.

Mr. UPTON. Is that 100 percent guaranteed?

Mr. ROBINSON. To the best of our abilities, yes.

Mr. UPTON. Dr. Weigand, you mentioned a goalposts memo. I

don’t know whether I asked our staff if we had a copy and we may

have one in my—though I’m not sure. I’ve not seen it, though we

may have it. One of the things that I indicated in my opening

statement was that I think a number of members may be interested in going to see for themselves a number of the labs, probably

come January when Congress is in recess and it will not interfere

with our votes here.

Do you know whether the goalposts memo has been shared with

our committee staff?

Mr. WEIGAND. Mr. Chairman, your staff has the memo and we

would be glad to supply another copy.

Mr. UPTON. One of the things that I would ask is that before we

embark on such an adventure, going to these three labs, I wonder

if it would be possible for you to come up and give a briefing to

those members who might be interested and go through the goalposts memo and look at the recommendations and look at the time

lines that you suggested. And as you indicated in your testimony,

the milestones that are there are on a regular schedule and you believe that they are fully funded, but I wonder if we might get a reVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:33 Sep 11, 2000 Jkt 061036 PO 00000 Frm 00107 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HEARINGS\61036 pfrm03 PsN: 61036
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port at that time, in January maybe, in a private meeting of those

members to see how the labs in fact are doing with regard to the

suggestions that you offered, to make sure that in fact we are

achieving the milestones and the direction that you thought was

wise?

Mr. WEIGAND. Sir, so I’m really committed, let me commit myself

to do the following: Since it’s on the record—I just got through

looking at the cyber security, the nine points and so forth corrective

action plans; and I asked for an informal audit by some of my staff

to do that. And I get reports back of different things that we see

happening and we are responding to some of those. I will be perfectly willing and happy to again have my staff informally meet

with the laboratories and find out exactly where they stand on

these corrective action plans.

To my knowledge, they are on time and sort of on schedule, but

there are always little concerns here and there that come up, and

I’ll be glad to share that with your staff before you go out.

Mr. UPTON. Thank you.

Mr. Stupak.

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Browne, you became director of Los Alamos lab in 1997; did

you not?

Mr. BROWNE. That’s correct. November.

Mr. STUPAK. I had a couple of questions about the Wen Ho Lee

investigation, and I would like to ask you, since you’re here today,

when were you first briefed about this investigation?

Mr. BROWNE. It was about 2 weeks after I became Director.

Mr. STUPAK. Give me a month. Do you know a month?

Mr. BROWNE. I believe it was November 1997.

Mr. STUPAK. When did you first become aware that the FBI concluded that it had finished its investigation and Wen Ho Lee’s

clearance should be lifted?

Mr. BROWNE. If you’re referring to the remarks that have been

reported in the paper by FBI Director Freeh—is that what you’re

referring to?

Mr. STUPAK. Yes.

Mr. BROWNE. I think I read about those in The Washington Post

sometime in like April 1999. I was never directly informed of those.

Mr. STUPAK. No one ever told you?

Mr. BROWNE. No.

Mr. STUPAK. So that was April 1999?

Mr. BROWNE. 1999, whenever that story came out.

Mr. STUPAK. Any idea why you weren’t told by the FBI? Did they

make attempts to contact you before the stories appeared or anything?

Mr. BROWNE. I certainly had meetings with the people in the

local FBI office, but they never raised that issue with me directly.

We certainly discussed—the ongoing investigation is the way it was

presented to me; it was not present as if there was a change in the

status of that case.

Mr. STUPAK. So you knew about the ongoing investigation and

the next thing you knew is what Director Freeh had said in the

newspaper; correct?

Mr. BROWNE. Correct.

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Mr. STUPAK. Okay. Did the FBI—they were requesting a search

warrant for Dr. Lee’s computer, but they were told that DOE’s policy was not too clear, or was not clear about expectations of privacy

of lab employees that might have access on a government computer?

Mr. BROWNE. No, it was—my understanding of this is that there

was a ruling by the FBI counsel about the adequacy of the approval, that all of our employees signed a waiver, basically, when

they became employees, and it was part of our security updates

that you signed, saying that ‘‘I know that my computer is subject

to search by the government, it is government property,’’ et cetera.

My understanding was that when the FBI and the Department

of Justice counsel looked at it, they thought that was not adequate

unless every day when you signed onto the computer a banner appeared that reminded you of that every day.

Mr. STUPAK. So the FBI made that determination? It wasn’t you

or your administration personnel there telling the FBI they could

not grant access to the computer without a search warrant?

Mr. BROWNE. That’s right.

Mr. STUPAK. Did your policies require the FBI to get a search

warrant for this?

Mr. BROWNE. No, no.

Mr. STUPAK. Okay.

You said that the FBI—you knew the FBI was doing the investigation, and they were sort of advising you. Were you or any of

your people involved—personally involved with this issue, whether

it is getting the search warrant or directing the FBI? Or assisting

the FBI; I won’t say directing.

Mr. BROWNE. When the FBI opens a case, they were responsible

for the conduct of that case, and we certainly supported them in

all their requests that they made with respect to the investigation.

So our people had to help them with access to certain information

regarding the individual; and any attempts they were trying to

make, they kept us informed about as well. We were in complete

communication with both them and the Department of Energy

throughout this whole period.

Mr. STUPAK. This was a pretty high-profile case going on, especially as the news stories started to break. Were you personally involved in some of the decisions being made and things like this?

Mr. BROWNE. Up until December 1998, I would say that it was

a low-profile case. And it became much more of a high-profile case

after December 1998, when we started to obtain our own information in the Department and the FBI obtained more information

about the security violations that this individual committed.

Mr. STUPAK. You said that was about December 1998, but if my

memory serves me correctly, by then it had taken on a pretty—it

had become a high-profile case; even—if my memory serves me correctly, I think even the President was briefed on this by December

1998.

When—were you just sort of out of the loop on this one?

Mr. BROWNE. No, we were not out of the loop. In December 1998,

the individual actually passed the polygraph examination and

there was a determination at that point to—although he had

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move him from his position into a totally isolated part of the laboratory, which we did immediately. And there was a determination

at first that it looked like he passed and the case would be basically terminated against the individual.

After a subsequent review of the information, it was determined

that he was deceptive on the polygraph and then that led to a

much deeper set of investigations.

But we were totally part of the entire interaction. Our counterintelligence people were involved. It was not like we were out of

the loop.

Mr. STUPAK. I guess for a case to get where the President is

briefed on it, that has got to be pretty high-profile, and yet I get

the impression that you were still giving it low profile until December 1998.

Mr. BROWNE. There was not much evidence up to December 1998

that the FBI was not in a position to prosecute any case, and of

course they still have not moved that far against the individual.

But the evidence, to my understanding, that I was aware of at that

point, they did not have sufficient evidence up until December 1998

to do anything except consider it an ongoing investigation.

Mr. STUPAK. When the President was initially briefed before December 1998, were you or any of your personnel involved in that

briefing?

Mr. BROWNE. No.

Mr. STUPAK. Did you prepare any briefing documents for the

President or anything?

Mr. BROWNE. No.

Mr. STUPAK. Do you think the lab director should play a role in

these investigations?

Mr. BROWNE. I think we—in retrospect, I think we should have

had more information provided to us during that period. For example, as I stated, if the information that Director Freeh provided to

the Department of Energy had been available, it might have

changed some of our viewpoints.

Mr. STUPAK. How much responsibility do you think Los Alamos

lab personnel, who handled these requests for computer access and

delayed in lifting Dr. Lee’s clearance, how much responsibility

should you have in that or your personnel?

Mr. BROWNE. We are not responsible for removing the clearance.

The Department of Energy’s responsible. We can recommend that

to the Department of Energy.

Mr. STUPAK. Did you in this case?

Mr. BROWNE. Yes, we did.

Mr. STUPAK. When?

Mr. BROWNE. It was in January 1999.

Mr. STUPAK. On this investigation, did you have a single source

person who worked for you, that worked with the FBI and DOE on

this?

Mr. BROWNE. That’s correct.

Mr. STUPAK. Who was your point person on that?

Mr. BROWNE. It was an individual named Mr. Terry Craig.

Mr. STUPAK. Okay. Thanks.

No further questions at this time.

Mr. UPTON. Thank you.

107

I’d like to ask Dr. Robinson and Dr. Browne and Dr. Tarter,

there was a memo, I guess that DOE was considering. I don’t know

if they actually drafted it or not, but it was a new contract clause

that indicated—would place the lab’s annual performance fee at

risk if they failed to achieve a satisfactory rating in evaluation of

their performance under the security plans.

What is your reaction to that? Is that something that you all

could support? Would you agree to forfeit some of the bonus if, in

fact, you didn’t achieve that type of rating? What is your reaction

to that?

Mr. ROBINSON. I think, as a matter of anything, we would make

a contract, we would want things to be spelled out as to what the

obligations are that you are to meet. We have never favored openended contracts, but certainly when reasonable conditions are

spelled out, we agree to take those obligations that would be perfectly acceptable. We do that in some other areas.

Mr. UPTON. Dr. Browne?

Mr. BROWNE. Well, our responsibilities for security certainly are

at the top priority, along with protection of the health, safety, and

environment. In addition, we have a responsibility at all three labs

for certifying the safety and reliability of the stockpile each year.

So I would think any one of those is paramount to what the government should be evaluating, how well we are doing our job. If

any one of those fails badly, then I think one has to have measures

in place to ask what caused the failure.

If it is true failure versus something being not quite appropriate,

if you see what I am driving at—‘‘marginal’’ versus totally ‘‘unsatisfactory,’’ I think ‘‘marginal’’ many times has deficiencies, and a deficiency doesn’t necessarily mean you are failing.

Mr. UPTON. That’s right. But you would support some degree of

accountability using these bonuses?

Mr. BROWNE. I think it should be graded according to your performance. If you had a graded metric that said, if you are totally

‘‘unsatisfactory,’’ that you risk a certain amount of your fee versus

if you’re ‘‘marginal’’ you risk less, and perhaps if you’re ‘‘satisfactory,’’ you get a positive indicator on your fee.

Mr. UPTON. Dr. Tarter?

Mr. TARTER. I think my response is very similar to Dr. Browne’s.

I think there were several responsibilities for each laboratory.

I think safety is an extremely high responsibility. I think security is at the very top of the list; I think certifying the stockpile.

And I think, however you decide to apportion those in grading the

laboratories, I think those need to have extremely high weight.

And then I think you need to assess in each case the reasons for

it, whether they are institutional, whether they are individual, but

I think they need to have a way to make a very strong statement

a laboratory or the institution does not perform at a satisfactory

level in one of those really major areas.

Mr. UPTON. Would all three of you agree that the goalposts, I

don’t want to say ‘‘scenario,’’ but the goalposts memo and work that

is being done and laid out has been a very constructive way to

meet the ultimate goal of achieving full security within the labs?

And have you cooperated fully with regard to that?

108

Mr. TARTER. Let me just start at the other end with the microphone.

I think—one of the things I think we have asked for very much,

and I think—particularly in view of the fact that requirements,

particularly in the cyber area, do change very rapidly, I think the

goalposts approach and the milestones have a lot of good things.

But many of them put you on a plan, you know, how well you are

doing as you move along the plan, but also the goal line doesn’t

shift. And then the next year, you may reevaluate the exact form

of the goal line by technology changes and requirements change.

But I think having that each time has been a very, very good

thing.

Mr. UPTON. Dr. Browne?

Mr. BROWNE. I would agree with that. I think there’s one other

point that I think we are all pushing for, having security viewed

in an integrated sense with our business much like we’ve done with

safety, so that from the top down to the person, you know, on the

lowest level of the laboratory out handling the material sees the

whole picture of security integrated with their responsibilities for

doing their job. That’s how it works for safety.

The goalposts memo is a way to help us get there. The way I see

it, it’s a very focused opportunity for us to really fix things and

then move into this more integrated security management approach.

Mr. UPTON. Dr. Robinson?

Mr. ROBINSON. Yes, as I said in my statement, only doing inspections is not a sufficient route to really get security to the level it

needs to be. You have got to take a process to build in the security

in all that is done, or you just continue finding things, fixing and

finding those.

Preventive activities to try and maintain the security at a higher

level is the direction we want to go.

But I think it has been a useful exercise. We do push back if we

disagree with particular findings; but others, we say, yes, we see

there’s a problem, and any time we find a problem in security, you

can count on us both to be concerned and to fix it.

Mr. UPTON. Dr. Weigand, you indicated in your testimony that

you thought that there were adequate levels of funding throughout

this year, I presume you mean calendar year, though maybe it was

fiscal, but calendar year to achieve the goals in the goalposts exercise.

Where are we for funding to make sure that that same type of

process is continued next year?

Mr. WEIGAND. To achieve the goalposts, I did receive a memo

from each one of the directors. It does go across a fiscal year boundary, so——

Mr. UPTON. So it goes into the end of September of next year?

Mr. WEIGAND. I expect their commitment to find the dollars to

meet that, meet that level of activity that achieves a ‘‘satisfactory.’’

I will caveat this with one thing, though. My tenure in this position has come during a period of time in which we’re trying to work

a very challenging nuclear deterrence problem—maintain the safety, reliability, and performance of the nuclear stockpile without nuclear testing. It also is coming under a period of time in which we

109

have seen several things, like our safety program getting sort of on

track, that had been off track; our construction programs getting

on track, some of which have been off track; and security getting

on track after being off track.

And one of the decisions I made was that I really needed to have

a solid infrastructure to build a national program that would serve

the deterrence issue. The plant has to be open, the facilities have

to be open, they have to be safe, they have to be reliable, they have

to be guarded appropriately.

The secrets need to be protected because shutdowns caused by

lab lapses in security costs the program grievously. A 2-week shutdown of the system is not a 2-week shutdown. It is 2 weeks of

downtime on the computers, another couple of weeks bringing them

back up, another couple of weeks getting them loaded with the appropriate data and the researchers back on them. That is very costly to the program.

So I have asked these gentlemen to take the money out of the

program because I need the infrastructure. If we continue to do it

only on that basis, if we are not allowed to step back and say, what

is the impact now of finding that we have increased requirements

in security and so forth, we could do harm to the program. And I

would not like to see that.

I don’t believe we’ve done harm to the program at this point in

time.

Mr. UPTON. Mr. Stupak.

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Robinson, the chairman was asking some questions about the

goalposts memo, and you said some of the things you do and ‘‘others we push back.’’ what do you mean by ‘‘push back’’?

Mr. ROBINSON. You, this morning, made a reference about passwords for security and that you would have expected a laboratory

like Sandia have to have passwords on security. Indeed, sir, we do;

we always have. The narrow finding was a question of whether or

not our unclassified—I stress our unclassified; neither our restricted information network nor or third network, our security networks were in question, but our unclassified network. Their investigators had been able to penetrate and find some passwords that

appeared to be easily broken, not that we did not have a password

system in place.

It’s those kinds of things that we try and dig into and use a lot

more care in the description of; and if we think a finding is not appropriate, we say they’re not appropriate. In the cyber security

area there is still room for doubt as to what can be done.

Mr. STUPAK. What do you mean by ‘‘push back’’ then? You just

don’t do it?

Mr. ROBINSON. No, we debate with them about what is appropriate.

For example, Sandia was the first laboratory to have a fire wall.

Our colleagues at Los Alamos had installed a new fire wall and

they suggested our fire wall should be changed to be as good as

theirs. We said we would not unless we could find a U.S.-built fire

wall. And that’s the kind of debate I would call ‘‘push back.’’

Mr. STUPAK. How long did it take——

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Mr. ROBINSON. In the last 2 months we have been able to find

and develop a supplier on our own of a fire wall.

Mr. STUPAK. You don’t have a fire wall yet?

Mr. ROBINSON. Of course, we have had a fire wall.

Mr. STUPAK. For how long?

Mr. ROBINSON. We have had a fire wall for 10 years. We have

changed it three times in that period. The latest change that was

proposed, we pushed back against making another change until we

could get a U.S.-built fire wall. And that’s the kind of push-back

activity——

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Weigand, is that accurate?

Mr. WEIGAND. I don’t disagree with what Dr. Robinson is saying.

I can’t speak for him, but there are a number of things that we negotiate on.

I would like to see us only negotiate on time. We don’t negotiate

on policy with the laboratories. The policy is very clear. It is sometimes the implementation of the policy that is not. And I don’t

want to get to wild examples, but in certain select areas, passwords

may not have been on every single system at one given time. This

may have been a small section of a restricted area.

But the policy is very clear on passwords today and the policy is

very clear on understanding how we implement passwords, and I

think the laboratories are implementing the policy.

Mr. STUPAK. I think today the policy is very clear on passwords,

but it hasn’t been in the past.

Mr. WEIGAND. That may very well be true. I can’t comment too

extensively on the policy of the past.

Mr. STUPAK. Dr. Robinson, other than passwords, is there anything else you would push back?

Mr. ROBINSON. There is one other set of discussions and this involves a particular type of storage repository for classified data,

and here there was a difference between two parts of the Department of Energy over what was acceptable and what was not acceptable. And those, we suggest, need to be resolved before we can act

on them as to what is an acceptable repository and what is not.

Mr. STUPAK. Ms. Stone, I know you do a lot of these investigations for Mr. Podonsky. Would you agree with that on passwords

and on the storage classification and unclassification?

Ms. STONE. What specifically are you asking me about, the pushback?

Mr. STUPAK. The push-back.

Ms. STONE. Sometimes we do encounter push-back during our inspections. From an inspection perspective, it is important that we

collect the information and validate the facts. Our validation process is very rigorous where we sit down with points of contact—let’s

say we were inspecting one of the laboratories, it would be the laboratory representatives, the operations office representatives, and

sometimes even Dr. Weigand’s folks from defense programs would

be out observing an inspection activity.

But it’s important for us to be able to present our case and show

the facts. And then whether there is push-back or not, provided we

are correct on our facts, we move forward with that finding.

Mr. STUPAK. After you present your case, do they ever refuse to

carry out the recommendation?

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Ms. STONE. We have not, during the period of time since we have

worked for the Secretary, had the case where they have said——

Mr. STUPAK. Right, prior to that time. This is all new that the

Secretary put in prior to that?

Ms. STONE. Before we worked for the Secretary, beginning in

May of this year, many times. There were times where—for example, the classified parts finding that we talked a lot about this

morning was one that had not been resolved.

Mr. STUPAK. Okay. Well, let me ask all of you then, do you think

the directives by the Secretary, Secretary Richardson, reviewed by

Mr. Podonsky, and the integrated security management system set

up by Mr. Weigand have improved security at your labs, Dr. Robinson?

Mr. ROBINSON. I believe they have, yes.

Mr. STUPAK. How about you, Dr. Tarter.

Mr. TARTER. Yes.

Mr. STUPAK. Dr. Browne?

Mr. BROWNE. Yes.

Mr. STUPAK. Would it be fair to say, based upon past history,

that these steps were long overdue at the weapons laboratory?

Mr. ROBINSON. I would prefer to say that security has had highs

and lows over time, as I believe any human activity does. A lot of

it is change in focus. I believe during the nineties, as I said in my

written statement, the focus was not on security in the early part

of the nineties following the cold war. It was very much on will

there still be a nuclear weapons program? What will we be able to

afford as the budget was reduced in half?

Those activities came higher and, yes, there were some lapses in

focus on security during that time. So we are not always at 100

percent, though certainly our desire is to be there.

Mr. STUPAK. So it is fair to say, then, these steps were probably

overdue then, right? No?

Mr. ROBINSON. I certainly am not opposed to them at all.

Mr. STUPAK. Okay. Ms. Stone, do you think they were overdue,

the steps integrated by Secretary Richardson? I mean, you do the

investigations, right?

Ms. STONE. Yes.

Mr. STUPAK. Okay. Dr. Browne, did you and the University of

California favor the creation of the new Nuclear Security Administration within the Department of Energy?

Mr. BROWNE. We did not take a position on it. Since we are a

contractor to the government, our opinion was that that would be

decided and we would abide by the law.

Mr. STUPAK. Well, did anyone from the University of California

ever contact Members of Congress about this reorganization?

Mr. BROWNE. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. STUPAK. No? No. Under this new agency, there will be no

independent oversight of laboratory security or health and safety in

environmental programs. Mr. Podonsky’s group won’t be looking at

your security; nor will General Habiger. Mr. Weigand won’t have

any authority to make changes or run his integrated security management group.

Nothing this committee has ever seen indicates that the laboratories will be responsive on any of these issues regarding the

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strong and continuing oversight from DOE. Even then the labs

have managed to avoid making changes until forced to do so by

some crisis.

Who do you think will play this role in this new agency of enforcing to make sure that changes are being made?

Mr. BROWNE. I think we don’t know how this is going to be implemented yet. We haven’t seen an implementation plan.

I believe, if my two colleagues would probably not disagree with

this, our expectation is that there would continue to be independent oversight. We don’t see that as a problem. We think that

Mr. Podonsky’s function is a very valuable function for both us and

the government.

Mr. ROBINSON. I would respond that there is a much larger history that we haven’t discussed of steps the laboratories take to improve security, safety, all of our work, without being forced to do

so. But I think there has been no decision as to how oversight

would be done by the new agency. At least it hasn’t been communicated to me.

Mr. STUPAK. Can you provide us those things you have done

without oversight as far as security and safety? I would really be

interested in seeing that.

Mr. ROBINSON. How many would you like? It is likely to be a

very large volume.

Mr. STUPAK. Well, I can go all the way back to 1978 and start

bringing in documentation when Mr. Dingell chaired the Commerce

Committee about all the pressure we had to put on the labs to try

to tighten security. Even during the heightened investigation we

have here, there were letters from Democrats and Republicans on

both sides of this, trying to ask and trying to get you to just do

what the GAO would recommend, and they weren’t done. I don’t

know if there was a pushback attitude or whatever happened, but

it just never happened. And then we have this major incident here

in the last year. And quite frankly, when we sit on this side of the

bench, we don’t know who to trust to do anything on their own, if

the labs are going to do it properly.

There is this culture out there and there is no accountability and

responsibility and we are very concerned about it. So I would be

happy to see your list and I will be happy to provide mine.

Mr. UPTON. Thank you. Mr. Cox.

Mr. COX. Thank you.

Earlier I asked our DOE witnesses whether they wanted to register an objection to what the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board said.

They described DOE as a place with ‘‘a dysfunctional management structure and a culture that only occasionally gave proper

credence to the need for rigorous security and counterintelligence

programs at the weapons labs.’’

Does anybody on this panel want to register a disagreement with

that statement? Dr. Robinson?

Mr. ROBINSON. I think there have been serious problems in the

Department of Energy management. We have communicated those

to past Secretaries. Basically, when everyone is in charge no one

is in charge, and there was not an effective structure within the

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Department to bring differences of opinion within the Department

itself to resolution.

And sitting where we were as laboratories, we seem to be blowing with the winds of dispute between different parts of the Department on any given day.

I believe that is consistent with the studies of the Galvin report

and not out of step with the report of the Rudman Commission.

Mr. COX. The Rudman Commission, the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, also described the laboratories as possessing science at its best and security at its worst.

Does anybody want to register an objection to that characterization? That was, in fact, as you know, on the cover of their report.

Mr. TARTER. I think we could have a long discussion about aspects of that. I think—I think there are—as you have heard, I

think there are a number of security issues. I think—some of the

serious ones, I think, are still being, as the Rudman report captured, the actual magnitude of some of the possible security losses

are still trying to be understood.

I think the part I would disagree with, to the degree a single

phrase captures it, I do not think, and I said that before this committee previously, that the vast majority of laboratory employees—

and I can’t give you a number of whether it is 95 percent or 99 percent of those who had access to national security data—I do not

think—I think that personal security with which they guarded the

information they had, I think they always considered one of their

highest responsibilities. And so I think to the degree it captured a

system characterization, we could debate that. To the degree it captured the opinion and perspective of the employees, I do not think

it was an accurate characterization of how employees felt about

guarding the security of the information they had.

Mr. COX. So you would prefer that we took this as a failure of

management rather than of the employees?

Mr. TARTER. Yes, sir.

Mr. COX. I think we have the right witnesses.

Mr. BROWNE. I would agree with that, Mr. Cox, because the people—remember, the ones that were being colored with this same

brush are the people that created the information that we are protecting. If anyone is going to really want to protect it, it is the people who create it. That was a real blow to them that they were

being accused essentially of not caring about the information that

they had devoted their lives to creating to help our country. That

was really very damaging to morale.

Mr. COX. Now, on the preceding panel, Mr. Podonsky described

to us the continuing problems at the laboratories with the protection of classified weapons parts.

He mentioned that at Los Alamos he brought this to the attention of the laboratory in 1994; that Los Alamos received clear direction to fix this problem again in 1995 from both the Department

of Energy and its field office in that year; again in 1996; and that

in 1997, when he, Mr. Podonsky returned to review the progress

that had been made on fixing security problems with classified

weapons parts, he found that the situation, quote, remains essentially unchanged since 1994.

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Why are we here today with these same problems, hearing that

now the problem is going to be fixed?

Mr. BROWNE. Well, the problem is fixed today.

Mr. COX. The previous panel, as you were here and listened to,

said it was not fixed.

Mr. BROWNE. Mr. Podonsky said it is fixed. We got a satisfactory

in the protection of our classified parts at Los Alamos.

Mr. COX. Well, when I asked him that question this morning, he

said that in particular where it came to the inventory of parts, that

it was on the way to being fixed but it was not fixed.

Mr. BROWNE. I believe we did receive a satisfactory rating on the

protection of classified parts.

Mr. COX. You were here for that testimony, were you not?

Mr. BROWNE. Yes.

Mr. COX. Am I not correct that that is what Mr. Podonsky told

me this morning under oath?

Mr. BROWNE. I don’t remember the details of what he said.

Maybe Ms. Stone could clarify that statement. But I thought when

he was talking about classified parts at Los Alamos that it was a

progress in the past. We made significant improvements and were

judged by the most recent audit to be satisfactory. That doesn’t

mean there aren’t areas for improvement. I certainly agree that

there are areas for improvement.

Mr. COX. Let’s let the record speak for itself on the respective

representations of Dr. Browne as the head of the lab and Mr.

Podonsky as the inspector.

Mr. BROWNE. Okay.

Ms. STONE. May I interrupt?

Mr. COX. Sure.

Ms. STONE. I work for Glenn Podonsky. Just to clarify Glenn’s

point on this, one of the things that we have to remember about

these fixes to these problems is that many of the sites are implementing what they call compensatory measures. The compensatory

measures are normally a very resource-intensive and very highcost, short-term fix, kind of a Band-Aid that’s put on things while

you work to a longer-term solution for the problem.

I think we are getting into somewhat of a difference in terminology where, yes, we found the program to be satisfactory but

there still remains some things to be done before those longer-term

items are actually fully implemented.

Mr. BROWNE. The longer-term items would require line item construction of vaults and vaulted rooms, and those that are

multiyear-type of activities. In the meantime, we have increased

the number of protective forces by about 25 percent, and we have

increased the time frequency of patrols to make sure this material

is guarded appropriately. It is behind a fence and it is locked in

buildings. It is just not vaulted buildings like you would prefer to

have for such parts.

Mr. COX. So stipulating, if we might, to the essential accuracy of

what Ms. Stone has just told us, and if that bridges the gap between Mr. Podonsky and yourself——

Mr. BROWNE. Correct.

Mr. COX. [continuing] as to where we are today in October 1999,

why did it take until now, inasmuch as this iterative process had

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Mr. Podonsky personally going back to Los Alamos between 1994

and 1997 on an annual basis and finding nothing happened?

Mr. BROWNE. Although I wasn’t in charge until——

Mr. COX. I know you have only been there 2 years.

Mr. BROWNE. Let me tell you what I know about the period;

what I understand, what I have been told, is there were within the

Department disagreements about how best to fix this.

Mr. Podonsky is an oversight function. He makes excellent recommendations on how to improve things. Those resources that

have to be applied to the problem sometimes—and I think this was

in this case a discussion within the Department about how best to

solve this problem. Now, you might ask the question, why didn’t

Los Alamos just go out and fix it? Because we have been asked

that question many times during this hearing. And when you are

talking about millions of dollars of commitment of resources, we

really believe it is important for a contractor like ourselves to have

some direct guidance from the government to spend that level of

resources.

We are talking about $2.5 million or $3 million a year just in incremental costs for the protective forces. So during that time period

it is my understanding that there was a lack of agreement on how

best to fix the problems that were identified by Mr. Podonsky.

Mr. COX. Dr. Robinson, you look as if you want to respond also.

Mr. ROBINSON. The characterization of security at its worst is a

broad statement and covers a lot of areas. I would not agree that

all of our security would fit such a categorization.

I am confident some of the areas of our security are, at its best,

not only best in DOE but against any other part of the government.

And so I think you have to be careful to dissect exactly what is

being discussed. With the area of these investigations, our philosophy in security has always been a layered set of protections; that

if one area fails, you now have additional areas that would serve

as protection and you are trying to stack them up so that you never

get a case of all systems failing.

And when we are judged, the things that are reported are problems in a particular layer, not a failure of all of the layers, and

that’s very important to focus on.

Mr. COX. Dr. Tarter, I wonder if I might ask you about the earlier testimony that we had from Mr. Podonsky concerning the reduction almost by half in the guard force at Superblock.

Mr. TARTER. Right. If I need to get precise dates, I either would

like to do them for the record or from the people in back of me,

and Dr. Turner might wish to comment on this also, but during a

period in the nineties, and again I am not going to be—let me go

ahead and do the statement and then——

Mr. COX. Well, at least according to Mr. Podonsky, from 1995——

Mr. TARTER. That’s correct.

Mr. COX. [continuing] to 1997, the guard force for——

Mr. TARTER. Was reduced.

Mr. COX. [continuing] for Superblock was reduced by almost half?

Mr. TARTER. Let me give the general sense and then perhaps

the—one of the things we did with the agreement at the time, at

least of the Department of Energy operations offices, was to use

local law enforcement as a surge force to handle much of the speVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:33 Sep 11, 2000 Jkt 061036 PO 00000 Frm 00119 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HEARINGS\61036 pfrm03 PsN: 61036
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cial response team actions, and that was driven by the fact that we

thought we could do the job and we reached an agreement to do

the job at a reduced cost by bringing in, in our particular area, the

Alameda County Sheriff’s Department who were trained with us to

do the response.

So we believed that that was the appropriate way to meet the

threat, as we understood it, to the Superblock at that time.

We also, I think, and again I need more details from the people

in direct charge, but I think we kept the security high at the

Superblock and we balanced the area with people in the local law

enforcement, again in a surge capacity in the case of an incident.

Much of the addition has been—recently has been that, in fact,

it was viewed as no longer an adequate response set of measures

and therefore we began some time ago to rehire our own special response team personnel to make them always there onsite. Dr.

Turner.

Mr. COX. Is that because the threat has changed between now

and 1997?

Mr. TURNER. Could I just add, I think it is because the Department strategy has changed. The point is that in the 1995/1996

timeframe, the Department’s strategy was containment. And so in

that, using the available forces onsite, as well as the local law enforcement, we were able to accomplish that mission.

Then the strategy changed to recapture recovery. And so we had

to—so that—you know, what was sufficient for a containment

strategy was now not sufficient for the new strategy of recapture

recovery.

Subsequently, the strategy has now changed to denial, which

again has, you know—as the strategy changes, then your force

structure, your composition, how they are deployed, your time

lines, all of those things change.

So the laboratory has been working, you know, to accommodate

those changes and bringing on—now they have brought on significant numbers of new guards. There is going to be another class

that’s going to be completed in December.

I think the point—you know, that’s—you are only getting half

the story when you get the raw numbers. Those raw numbers——

Mr. COX. Just to make sure that we all understand on the panel,

if you go from containment to recapture to denial, you are steadily

increasing your security; is that right?

Mr. TURNER. Absolutely.

Mr. COX. So what you are saying is that our standards in 1999

are higher than our standards were in 1997?

Mr. TURNER. Absolutely. So that the numbers of people——

Mr. COX. Why is that? Is that because the real world threat is

different in 1999 than it was in 1997? What we are talking about

at Superblock is protecting the actual nuclear materials, right?

Mr. TURNER. Yes.

Mr. COX. So this is the most significant security function you

have got?

Mr. TURNER. Yes.

Mr. COX. Do we think that the nuclear materials are subject to

different levels of threat in 1999 than they were in 1997?

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Mr. TURNER. Well, frankly, you know, we don’t participate directly in developing the design basis threat.

Mr. COX. All right. So somebody around here, we don’t know

who, is changing their assessment of just how much security we

need for the nuclear weapons material and it was higher in 1995

than it was in 1997 and now it is higher in 1999 than it was in

1997.

Mr. TURNER. Okay. It was higher in 1997 than it was in 1995,

and it is higher again in 1999.

Mr. COX. No, no, no, no, that’s not what we heard this morning.

What we heard was that between 1995 and 1997, we actually reduced significantly the guard force.

Mr. TURNER. Because the strategy then was containment.

Mr. COX. I understand. We had a different strategy, but we also

had less security.

Mr. TURNER. We had—we had adequate security to meet that

strategy, to meet that threat. And then as the threat and the

strategy——

Mr. COX. The threat is a constant?

Mr. TURNER. No, the threat is not a constant.

Mr. TARTER. Let me give you an example, sir.

Mr. COX. I invited somebody to tell me that the threat was different in 1997 than 1999. Was the threat different in 1997 than

1999?

Mr. ROBINSON. Yes.

Mr. COX. Why?

Mr. ROBINSON. But we need to give you a classified answer.

Mr. COX. All right. Let’s do it.

Mr. UPTON. We have to vote on it.

Mr. COX. Didn’t we vote earlier that we could now go on to classified?

Mr. UPTON. We did not have 10 members here so we did not do

that.

Mr. COX. I see.

Mr. UPTON. We could get it in writing.

Mr. TARTER. This is not—the direct answer to your question, as

Paul said, we would have to do that in a closed session. But I think

General Habiger this morning mentioned an issue which he perceived to be a changing threat for the future, which we have not

yet——

Mr. COX. I understand that.

Mr. TARTER. But the chemical and biological issues, I think, are

new and whether we put personnel in place to train personnel in

those responses, I think, is an ongoing issue, and that is a change.

Mr. TURNER. I think, too, I think it is important to recognize that

in security you have an adversary that grows stronger every day,

and so your capability cannot just be static.

Mr. COX. Well, that’s why I am particularly interested in the

diminution, the reduction in the force between 1995 and 1997. The

guard force was cut by almost half.

Ms. Stone, do you want to comment on this?

Ms. STONE. The design basis threat is a classified document, but

is reassessed on an annual basis. From an independent oversight

perspective, we see the changes in the strategy really being driven

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by the changes in material inside those areas as opposed—relying

more significantly than the changes to the threat.

Yes, there have been some changes in the threat from year to

year, but our perspective is that it is the actual, you know, either

movement of material from one site to another that really drive

those significant changes in strategy.

Mr. COX. Now, when I asked Mr. Podonsky earlier in the day

whether he thought that it was wise to make the changes between

1995 and 1997 that were made, he said, no, he didn’t think it was

wise at all.

Is that your sense as well?

Ms. STONE. Yes.

Mr. COX. And why?

Ms. STONE. To be able to put that much reliance on local law enforcement that really has a limited understanding of DOE, that has

a limited amount of abilities, is really expecting a lot of these people that do not have responsibility for the material themselves.

Mr. COX. But now what we saw in the foreign launch situation

was that the Department of Defense, not the Department of Energy, decided to rely upon rent-a-cops, as it happened, private security guards that were hired not by the Department of Defense but

by the private commercial satellite manufacturers, who told us in

our congressional investigations that security was—one of them

said security was ninth on our list of priorities.

So we had Pinkerton guards providing what turned out to be

wholly inadequate coverage of our national security mission, and

here we are relying upon the Alameda County Sheriff’s Department

compensate for the diminution in the guard force after 1995.

Isn’t that essentially what we are talking about?

Ms. STONE. Right. It wasn’t solely relying on the Alameda County Sheriff’s Department; it was supplemented by. So there were

still some number.

Mr. COX. Did the sheriff’s department move people over to the

labs?

Ms. STONE. No.

Mr. TURNER. No, but they were——

Mr. COX. How long would it take them to get there?

Mr. MORTENSEN. May I answer that?

Mr. COX. Let me ask Ms. Stone.

Ms. STONE. It took more time than I think folks imagined for

them to get there, or had hoped for them to get there, and that’s

probably all I should really say in this forum.

Mr. COX. All right. Well, I do think we need to get answers in

another setting.

Dr. Turner.

Mr. TURNER. Could I just add, how this unfolded was that there

was some concern about whether the—first of all, this is a swat

team from the Alameda County Sheriff’s so this isn’t just any old—

I mean, these aren’t traffic cops or people behind a desk. And there

was some concern about whether they could meet the time lines or

not. And so what was agreed to by Defense Programs, by the field

and by headquarters, was that we would run some performance

tests back in the 1997 timeframe and we would live by the results

of those tests.

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As a result of those performance tests, it was agreed that as—

you know, with the new strategy and with the response times that

the swat team could answer, that it was not adequate; and we

moved immediately to, again, abide by the commitment to—to

abide by those results and move immediately to hire more guards.

Mr. COX. All right. I think the lights are off altogether, so I don’t

know whether I have a green light or a red light or an amber light,

but I am getting the sense that I am stretching the limits of goodwill here from the chairman to continue asking questions.

What I asked the earlier panel is whether or not they would be

willing to provide responses to the committee’s follow-up questions,

and I hope that we will be able to do that as well, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. UPTON. We will.

Mr. COX. Let me just say in conclusion—because we have had a

chance in other fora to, most of us, to talk about these issues before—that I think you are right as leaders of your organizations to

parse out the responsibilities of management on the one hand and

the employees of the labs on the other hand.

I don’t think there is any question at all that we have the best

and the brightest at our labs. We want to keep recruiting them and

we want to continue to retain them. And I think everybody in Congress, on both sides of the aisle, counts themselves as fans of the

laboratories and their important national security and other national missions.

So what we are trying to do here is necessarily accomplish our

security objective at the same time as we try to keep people happy

in the organization, because security is a central function, if not

the central function of our national laboratories.

It is unfortunate that over a period of so many years, these questions have not only gone unaddressed but in some cases have proliferated, and we have more problems rather than fewer; and it is

especially unfortunate that as you sit here today and tell us that

things are going to be okay, and we have every reason to believe

you and we want to believe you, that we have a track record of people telling us in the past that things were going to be okay when

they turned out not to be.

So there’s a credibility problem for the Department of Energy

and derivatively for the laboratories that we have to deal with. And

I think that to the extent that management takes this on its own

shoulders and says that, maybe in Dr. Browne’s case, ‘‘I wasn’t

there but it is still my responsibility,’’ but for everybody else here,

‘‘We were there and things should not have been run this way and

we are going to change it because it is unacceptable,’’ I think that

will give us a high level of confidence.

We know that you need to be defensive about attacks on the laboratories’ integrity, but Congress isn’t interested in attacking the

integrity of the laboratories. We are interested in ensuring that

there is security at the laboratories. And I think when we listen

to Ed Curran or when we hear General Habiger tell us this morning that you all received an appropriate wake-up call this past year

with the uncovering of internal security problems in the publication

of both the Cox and Rudman reports, and when he says that your

Department of Energy has an historical track record of security deficiencies, for that purpose the labs have to own up to the fact that

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you are all part of the Department of Energy, too. And I understand that if we reorganize the Department of Energy and get security as a central focus, an exclusive focus in a new NNSA, that

that might make your jobs easier and make your life better and

that the dysfunction within DOE itself, external to the labs, has

made your jobs unnecessarily difficult in the past.

It is also true, though, that you are very important national leaders and so we look to you folks to fix these problems directly, even

if DOE is actually in your way, as has obviously been the case

many times in the past.

So we are on your side. We are trying to make sure the job gets

done, because it hasn’t been done in the past, and we certainly

hope we are not back here again next year.

Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. UPTON. Thank you, Mr. Cox.

I want to say we appreciate your work, particularly as co-chair

with Mr. Dicks, on bringing this to light. This is not an easy topic,

and for most of us it doesn’t involve things in our own district. We

don’t have a background in this.

Mr. Stupak, I know, does have a law enforcement background,

but this is new ground for a lot of us, and we appreciate your testimony. We appreciate your commitment. We want to make sure, absolutely sure, that the comfort level that all of us on this committee

have is that your job—that you have not only the sufficient resources but you are doing the necessary job to make sure that

these labs are run well and they are secure, and we appreciate the

members that were here present. We will probably send some questions on to you for you to respond to.

We also appreciate the staff that have walked us through a number of questions and have done their homework. This is an issue

that is not going to go away and we want to make sure, though

the horse may be out of the barn in some cases, we want to make

sure that that door is locked and it will not happen again.

For that reason, I think the chances are pretty likely that we will

see a delegation from this subcommittee visit some of your labs

early next year, and we appreciate the assistance and constructive

views that you have had and look forward to that as the days unfold.

So with that, this hearing is adjourned. Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 2:40 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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