No. 2--06--0106 filed: 11/16/06

______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE AP PE LLATE COU RT OF ILLIN OIS SECOND DI STRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ ROY KINN, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of Wi nn eb ag o C ou nt y. Plaintiff -Appella nt, )

) v. ) No. 05--MR--100 ) PRAIRIE FARMS/MULLER PI NEHURST, ) Honorab le

) Ronald L. Pirrello, Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge , Pres idin g.

______________________________________________________________________________ JUSTICE McLA REN delive

red the o pinion of t

he court : Plaintiff, Roy Kinn, and defe ndant, Prairie Farms/Muller Pinehurst, agre ed to settle plaintif f's
wo rke rs' compensation claim. After plaintiff discovered that a medica l bill remained unpaid, he sued defendant in the circuit court

of Wi nneba go Cou nty to res cind t he set tlem ent agre ement . Pla inti ff's amended complaint alleged unilateral mistake, mutual mistake, and fraud. The trial court dismissed the complaint, holding that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the first two claims and that plaintiff had notadequately

pleaded the third. Plaintiff appeals, contending that the trial cour t had jurisdiction to set as id e a workers' compensation settlement on the g rounds of unilateral mistake and mutual mistake a nd that his

complain t suffici ently

pleaded fraud. We

affirm. The following facts are taken from the a mended complaint. Plaintiff worked for defendant
as a truck driver. He developed carpal tunnel sy

ndrome and filed a

worker s' compe

nsation c laim.No. 2--06--0106

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While the cl aim wa s pend ing, plaintiff regularly submitted his medical bills to def endant, w hich paid them through its workers' compensation insurer. OnNovember 13, 2003, an arbitrator approved a w orkers' compensation settlement agree ment. The

agree ment provides in pe

rtinent pa rt as foll ows: "Issuesexist between the parties as to whether petitioner has incurred injuries to the degree alleged and whether or not such injuries are compensab le, an d this settl ement is ma de to amicably settle al l issues. T

his settl ement includes liability for tempora ry total compensation and all medic al, surgical, an

d hospital expenses, past or f

uture, f or all of w

hich peti tio ner expressly assumes responsibility ." The ag reemen t also pro vides: "The employ

er has has no t X paid all medical bills. List unpaid bills in the space below." Below that line is typed " See terms." Sometime later, plaintiff discovered that a bill for $2,021.05 from Rehabilitation Associates of Illi noi s (R ANI) had not be en paid. On March 2 3, 2005, pl aintiff f iled thisaction to rescind the settleme nt. The amended complaint alleged unilateral mistake, mutual mistake, and f raud. The trial court dismissed the counts based on mistake on the ground that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to rescind a worke rs' com pensation settleme

nt for tha t r eas on. It dismissed the third count on the ground that plain

tiff did no t adequa

tely plead fr aud. Plain

tiff timel y a ppeals. Plaintiff first contends that the trial court erred by holding that it lacked subj ect matter jurisdiction to rescind a workers' compensation settlement ag reement on the grounds of unilatera l mistake and

mutual mistake. Section 2--619(a)(1) of theCode of Civil Procedure (the Code) (735No. 2--06--0106

-3-

IL CS 5/2--619(a)(1) (West 2004)) provides that an action may be dismissedon the ground that the court lacks subject

matter jurisdiction. Where a complaint is dismissed pursuant to section 2--619, the questions on appeal are whether a genuine issue of material fact exists and whether the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Gray v. Na tional Restoration Systems, I nc. , 354 Ill. App. 3d 345, 3 54-5 5 (20 04). We review de novo an order dismissing an action pursuant to section 2--619. Gray , 354 Ill. App. 3d at 355. Defendant

responds that the Wor

kers' C ompensat

ion Act (t he Act) (820 I

LCS 305 /1 et seq. (West 2004)) st rictly limits the c ircuit co

urts' power

to revie w worker s' compe nsation se ttlements
. Defendant

argues that because plaintiff did not seek r eview of the settlement within 20 day s, as the Act provides, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to rescind the agreement except on the ground of fraud. We agree. Ge ne ra ll y, the I llinois Work ers' Co mpensation Commission (the Commi ssion) is the exclusive forum for adjudicating disputes arising out of work-related injuries. Section 19(f) of the Act provides that a "decision of the Commission acti ng within its powers, according to the provisions of paragraph (e) of this Section shall, in the absence of fraud, be conclus ive unl ess reviewed as in this paragraph hereinafte r provided." 820 IL CS 305/19(f) (West 2004). Section 19(f)(1) provides

that a pr oceedin g for r eview mus t be comme

nced with in 20 day s after t he party seekingreview received the Commission's decision. 820 I LCS 305/19(f)(1) (West 2004). A settlement

contract approved by

the Commission has the same legal effect as a Commission award, and an approved

settlement becomes final after 20 day s if neither party

seeks review. Alvarado v. Industr ial C omm'n , 216 Ill. 2d 547, 555 (2005).No. 2--06--0106

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A circuit court reviewing a worke rs' compensation award exercises spec ial statutory jurisdiction, and a pla

intiff mus t comply

with the statutory prer

equisites for

the circuit court to have subject matter jurisdiction. Jone s v. Indu stri al Com m'n , 188 Il l. 2d 314, 3 20 (1999) ; Bracy v. Industri al Comm 'n , 338 Ill. App. 3d 285, 286 (2003); see also Bellevi lle Toy ota, I nc. v. Toy

ota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. , 199 Ill. 2d 325 (2002) (subject matter jurisdiction in administrative review procee dings may be limited by statute). I

n Boalbe y v. Industr ial C omm'n , 66 Ill. 2d 217, 220 (1977), the court he ld that fa

iling to c omply

with the 20-day limit deprived the c ircuit court of jurisdiction to review a workers' compe nsation award. Here, the arbitrator a pproved the settlement on November 13, 2003. Neither party

sought review within 20 day s, and the settlement therefore became a final order of the Commission. The circuit court thus lacked the power to revie w the sett lement, u nless there was fraud. Plaintiff makes severa

l arguments in att

empting to avoid th

is conclusion. He first contends that appella te court s have in f

act exer cised the ir equita

ble powe rs to rescind

worker s' compensation settleme nts on the bas is of mista

ke. Howe

ver, the only casehe cites for this proposition, Cameron
v. Bogusz , 305 I ll. App. 3d 267 (1999 ), is inap

posite. That case

did not invo lve a wor

kers'
c o mpensationsettlement approved by the Commission, but a workers' compensation lien that the employer had fi led in the employee' s legal malpractice action ag ainst his former attorney s. Cameron , 305 Ill. App. 3d

at 269-70. Thus, Cameron does not support the contention that circ uit or app ellate courts may resc ind

workers' compensation settlements when no review is sought within 20 days after final ap proval. Plaintiff next contends that the limitations on circuit court review in section 19 of the Act do notapply to approv ed settle

ments. Pla

intiff contends, in

essence , that thisprovision applies only

toNo. 2--06--0106

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Commission decision s followin g conte sted hea

rings. Pl aintif

f po ints out that the 20-day review provision of section 19(f) s pecific ally

refer s to subsection (e). That se ction, in turn, governs "hear ings" before the Commission. Plaintiff argues that, because the par ties settled the matter, no hearing was held and, acc ordingly, subsec tion (f) does not apply. We disag ree. As noted, an approved settlement becomes a decision of the Commission. The above-cited
cases refer to the sub

ject matt er ju

risdiction of a circuit court to review a Commission decision, making no di stin ction betwe en a dec isio n rend ered fo llow ing a co ntest ed hear ing anda decision render ed pursua nt to a sett

lement ag reemen t. Moreover, statutes should be constr ued in a manner that avoi ds absurd , unreas onable, u njust,
or inconven ient resu lts. In re Mary Ann P. , 202 I ll. 2d 393, 4 06 (2002) . Construin g the sta tute as plaintiff sugge sts would in

deed lea d to absur d and unju st results . Accor ding toplaintiff, a decision rendered following a contested hearing is strictly subject to section 19( f)'s 20-day review require ment, wh il e a se tt le me nt ag re em en t i s n ot . A cc or di ng ly, either p arty could pet ition a cir cuit court to setaside a s ettlemen

t agre ement man

y y ears la ter. I t would be absurd to hold that a decision following a contes ted hear ing is bin ding on the partie s but a set tlement- -the expr

ess p urpose of whichis to terminate the controve rsy amicably --i s not. One

of the Act's prima

ry purposes is to compen sate claimants as early and as thoroughly

as possible for income lost due to job-rel ate d injuries. Board

of Educa tion of the

City of Chi cago v. Industr ial C omm'n , 93 Ill. 2d 1, 14 (1982). Ac co rd in gl y, the Act

expressly encoura

ges settlement of claims. 820 IL CS 305/16a(A) (West 2004); Alvarado , 216 Ill. 2d at 560. This purpose would be c omple tely defea ted if a settlement could be challenged

by either par

ty at any time. Aninjured worker

who settled his claim and spent the money to supporthis family

would fa ce fina ncial ru inif the employer a

ttempted to rescind the agreementNo. 2--06--0106

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by alleging that it was mistaken about some underly ing fact. Even if the ch allen ge were
unsucce ssful, the

employ ee could be face d with lar

ge leg al fees

in defen ding the settleme nt. Citing Marsh v. Illinois Racing Boa rd , 179 Ill. 2d 488 (1997), plaintiff arg ues that rescinding
a contract is an equitable power of the circuit court that the legislature may not abridge, but p laint iff's reliance on Marsh

is misplaced. "Equitable powers" ge nerally re fers to a co urt's authority to awar d
a particular remedy

in a case properly

before it, rather than

to the court's subject matter jurisdiction. In Marsh , for example, the issue was whether the circuit court had the autho rity to s tay the agen cy's decision. The su preme c ourt h eld th at thi s was p art of the co urt's " 'inherent' equitable power" that the legislature could not

abridge. Marsh , 179 Ill . 2d at 495, q uoti ng Ardt v. Illinois Department of Professional Regulation , 154 I ll. 2d 138, 1 46 (1992) . There was no que stion that t

h e p laintiff

in Marsh had prop erly

invoked the circu

it court's jurisdiction. See Marsh , 179 Ill. 2d at 490. Marsh does not stand for the pro position tha t a circuit c ourt may

exercise its equita ble powe rs where its jurisdiction has not been properly invoked. Plai ntiff 's second major contention is that the trial court erred by dismissing the count of h is complaint alleging fraud. A complaint should be dismissed under section 2--615 of the Code (735 IL CS 5/2--615 (West 2004 )) for f ailure to state a c ause of a

ction only when it cl early

appears that
no set of facts could be proved under the pleading s that would entitle the plaintiff to relief. Ogle v. Fuiten , 102 Ill. 2d 356, 3 60-61 (198 4); Capitol I ndemnity Corp. v. Ste

wart Smith

Inte rmediar ies, Inc. , 229 Ill. App. 3d 119, 123 (1992). We review de novo the dismissal of a comp laint purs uant to section 2--615. Borowiec v. Gateway 2000, Inc. , 331 Ill. App. 3d 842, 846 (2002). Plai ntiff 's argume nt appar ently goes a s follows. Plaintiff

diligen tly s ubmitted a

ll his medical bills to d efe ndant for pay ment. At no time did defendant tell plaintiff that any unpaid bills wereNo. 2--06--0106

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disputed fo r a ny r easo n. The settlement agreement does not specific ally list any bills as unpaid. Therefore, according to plai nt iff, because plaintiff "had diligently submitted the bill to the De fendant/employer

for payme

nt in this claim which was not disputed on this matter of medical bills, [plaintiff] reasonably relied on De fendant's omission of the unpaid bill in the Medical Expenses section as a representation that the bill had been or would be pa id by Defenda

nt." The parties disagree about the exact nature of plaintiff's claim. Defendant contends that the claim shou

ld be analy zed as one

for fra udulent in

ducemen t, while pl aintiff i

nsists that the c laim is
one for fraudulent misrepresentation. The distinction is immaterial here. I n either case, plaintiff had to allege that defendant made a sta tement of material fact that it knew or believed to be fa lse, intending that plain

tiff rel y on it, and tha

t he did so t

o his detriment. See Ro ad si de Au to Bo dy, Inc. v. Miller , 285 Ill. App. 3d 105, 113 (1996). Plai ntiff 's fraud count fails on the f irst e lement: plaintiff simply has failed to alleg e that defendant knowingly made

a false statement of material fact. Plaintiff insists that defendant fraudul ently

misrepresented that it had pai d the RANI bill. Howe

ver, the settleme nt, which is attached to the com

plaint and control s over any c ontrary a llegations in the body of

the complaint ( Bajwa v. Metropolitan Life I

nsurance Co. , 208 I ll. 2d 414, 4 31-32 (20 04)), cl e arly states that all medical bills have not b een paid . It f urther s tates tha

t plaintif f express ly a ssumes lia

bility for paying all medical expenses, past or future. We simply f ail to see how express statements that all the medical bi ll s h ad no t b ee n p ai d a nd th at pa yme nt of th e b il ls wa s p la in ti ff

's re sp on si bi li ty a m ount to a misrepresentation that the bill in question had been paid. By no amount of tortured logic can an express repre sentationthat all bi lls have not been pa id be turned in

to an implic it repre sentation that all bi lls have b een pa id. If plaintiff thought that theNo. 2--06--0106

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failure to list any

specific bills as unp aid mean

t that def endant w as implici

tly p romising to pay them, the confusion should have been cleared up by t

he "ter ms" porti on of the a

greement. I

n the spac e to listbill s that had not been paid appears the ty pewritten phrase "See terms." The "terms" section states that all medical bills are plai n tiff's r esponsibi lity . Thus, de fendant can in no way

be said to have repres ented tha

t it intende d to pay

any additiona

l m edical bills. As de fendant points out, it cannot be accused

of fraud simply beca

use plaintiff did not read the agreement. Thus, the tr ial court properl y di smissed the

fraud c ount. The judgment of the circuit court of Winnebago County is affirmed. Affirmed. HUTCHINSON and O' MALLEY, JJ., concur.