62008 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 194 / Thursday, October 7, 2010 / Proposed Rules 

Pilatus Aircraft Ltd. Pilatus PC–6 Service 

Bulletin No. 57–005, REV No. 1, dated 

November 19, 2007; Pilatus Aircraft Ltd. 

Pilatus PC–6 Service Bulletin No. 57–005, 

dated August 30, 2007; Pilatus Aircraft Ltd. 

Pilatus PC–6 Service Bulletin No. 57–004, 

dated April 16, 2007; and Chapter 57–00–02 

of Pilatus Aircraft Ltd. Pilatus PC–6 Aircraft 

Maintenance Manual, dated November 30, 

2008, for related information. 

Issued in Kansas City, Missouri, on 

September 30, 2010. 

John Colomy, 

Acting Manager, Small Airplane Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2010–25289 Filed 10–6–10; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 139 

[Docket No. FAA–2010–0997; Notice No. 10– 

14] 

RIN 2120–AJ38 

Safety Management System for 

Certificated Airports 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking 

(NPRM). 

SUMMARY: This action would require 

each certificate holder to establish a 

safety management system (SMS) for its 

entire airfield environment (including 

movement and non-movement areas) to 

improve safety at airports hosting air 

carrier operations. An SMS is a 

formalized approach to managing safety 

by developing an organization-wide 

safety policy, developing formal 

methods of identifying hazards, 

analyzing and mitigating risk, 

developing methods for ensuring 

continuous safety improvement, and 

creating organization-wide safety 

promotion strategies. When 

systematically applied in an SMS, these 

activities provide a set of decisionmaking tools that airport management 

can use to improve safety. This proposal 

would require a certificate holder to 

submit an implementation plan and 

implement an SMS within timeframes 

commensurate with its class of Airport 

Operating Certificate (AOC). 

DATES: Send your comments on or 

before January 5, 2011. 

ADDRESSES: You may send comments 

identified by Docket Number FAA– 

2010–0997 using any of the following 

methods: 

• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to 

http://www.regulations.gov and follow 

the online instructions for sending your 

comments electronically. 

• Mail: Send Comments to Docket 

Operations, M–30; U.S. Department of 

Transportation, 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue, SE., West Building Ground 

Floor, Room W12–140, West Building 

Ground Floor, Washington, DC 20590– 

0001. 

• Hand Delivery: Take comments to 

Docket Operations in Room W12–140 of 

the West Building Ground Floor at 1200 

New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, 

DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday 

through Friday, except Federal holidays. 

• Fax: (202) 493–2251. 

For more information on the rulemaking 

process, see the SUPPLEMENTARY

INFORMATION section of this document. 

Privacy: We will post all comments 

we receive, without change, to http:// 

www.regulations.gov, including any 

personal information you provide. 

Using the search function of our docket 

web site, anyone can find and read the 

comments received into any of our 

dockets, including the name of the 

individual sending the comment (or 

signing the comment for an association, 

business, labor union, etc.). You may 

review DOT’s complete Privacy Act 

Statement in the Federal Register 

published on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 

19477–78) or you may visit http:// 

DocketsInfo.dot.gov. 

Docket: To read background 

documents or comments received, go to 

http://www.regulations.gov at any time 

and follow the online instructions for 

accessing the docket or go to Docket 

Operations in Room W12–140 of the 

West Building Ground Floor at 1200 

New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, 

DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday 

through Friday, except Federal holidays. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For 

technical questions concerning this 

proposed rule, contact Keri Spencer, 

Office of Airports Safety and Standards, 

Airports Safety and Operations 

Division, Federal Aviation 

Administration, 800 Independence 

Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591; 

telephone (202) 267–8972; fax (202) 

493–1416; e-mail keri.spencer@faa.gov. 

For legal questions, contact Robert 

Hawks, Office of the Chief Counsel, 

Regulations Division, Federal Aviation 

Administration, 800 Independence 

Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591; 

telephone (202) 267–7143; fax (202) 

267–7971; e-mail: rob.hawks@faa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Later in 

this preamble under the Additional 

Information section, we discuss how 

you can comment on this proposal and 

how we will handle your comments. 

Included in this discussion is related 

information about the docket, privacy, 

and the handling of proprietary or 

confidential business information. We 

also discuss how you can get a copy of 

this proposal and related rulemaking 

documents. 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

The FAA’s authority to issue rules 

regarding aviation safety is found in 

Title 49 of the United States Code. 

Subtitle I, section 106 describes the 

authority of the FAA Administrator. 

Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs, 

describes in more detail the scope of the 

agency’s authority. 

The FAA is issuing this rulemaking 

under the authority described in subtitle 

VII, part A, subpart III, section 44706, 

‘‘Airport operating certificates.’’ Under 

that section, Congress charges the FAA 

with issuing airport operating 

certificates that contain terms that the 

Administrator finds necessary to ensure 

safety in air transportation. This 

proposed rule is within the scope of that 

authority because it requires all holders 

of an airport operating certificate to 

develop, implement, and maintain an 

SMS. The development and 

implementation of an SMS ensures 

safety in air transportation by assisting 

airports in proactively identifying and 

mitigating safety hazards. 

Background 

The FAA is committed to 

continuously improving safety in air 

transportation. As the demand for air 

transportation increases, the impacts of 

additional air traffic and surface 

operations, changes in air traffic 

procedures, and airport construction 

can heighten the risks of aircraft 

operations. While the FAA’s use of 

prescriptive regulations and technical 

operating standards has been effective, 

such regulations may leave gaps best 

addressed through improved 

management practices. As the certificate 

holder best understands its own 

operating environment, it is in the best 

position to address many of its own 

safety issues. While the FAA would still 

conduct regular inspections, SMS’s 

proactive emphasis on hazard 

identification and mitigation, and on 

communication of safety issues, 

provides certificate holders robust tools 

to improve safety. 

The International Civil Aviation 

Organization (ICAO) defines SMS as a 

‘‘systematic approach to managing 

safety, including the necessary 

organizational structures, 

accountabilities, policies, and 


jdjones on DSK8KYBLC1PROD with PROPOSALS-1
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 194 / Thursday, October 7, 2010 / Proposed Rules 62009 

1See ICAO, Safety Management Manual, at 6.5.3 

ICAO Doc. 9859–AN/474 (2nd ed. 2009). 

2NTSB Accident Report AAR–07/01, ‘‘Crash of 

Pinnacle Airlines Flight 3701 Bombardier CL–600– 

2B19, N8396A, Jefferson City, Missouri, October 14, 

2004,’’ at 53 (Jan. 9, 2007) . 

3 Id. at 61. 

4 Id. at 75; see also NTSB Safety Recommendation 

Letter (Jan. 23, 2007) (NTSB Recommendation A– 

07–10). 

5NTSB Accident Report AAR–09/01, ‘‘In-flight 

Fire, Emergency Descent and Crash in a Residential 

Area Cessna 310R, N501N, Sanford, Florida, July 

10, 2007,’’ at iv (Jan. 28, 2009). 

6 Id. at 19. 

7 Id. at 25; see also NTSB Safety Recommendation 

Letter (Feb. 18, 2009) (NTSB Recommendation A– 

09–16). 

procedures.’’ 1 In 2001, ICAO adopted a 

standard in Annex 14 that all member 

states establish SMS requirements for 

airport operators. The FAA supports 

conformity of U.S. aviation safety 

regulations with ICAO standards and 

recommended practices. The agency 

intends to meet the intent of the ICAO 

standard in a way that complements 

existing airport safety regulations in 14 

CFR part 139. Additional information 

regarding these amendments, as well as 

ICAO’s guidance on establishing an 

SMS framework, may be found at http:// 

www.icao.int/anb/safetymanagement/. 

Safety Management System 

Components 

An SMS provides an organization’s 

management with a set of decisionmaking tools that can be used to plan, 

organize, direct, and control its business 

activities in a manner that enhances 

safety and ensures compliance with 

regulatory standards. These tools are 

similar to those management already 

uses to make production or operations 

decisions. An SMS has four key 

components: Safety Policy, Safety Risk 

Management (SRM), Safety Assurance, 

and Safety Promotion. Definitions of 

these are as follows and further detailed 

in the proposal discussion. 

Safety Policy. Safety Policy provides 

the foundation or framework for the 

SMS. It outlines the methods and tools 

for achieving desired safety outcomes. 

Safety Policy also details management’s 

responsibility and accountability for 

safety. 

Safety Risk Management (SRM). As a 

core activity of SMS, SRM uses a set of 

standard processes to proactively 

identify hazards, analyze and assess 

potential risks, and design appropriate 

risk mitigation strategies. 

Safety Assurance. Safety Assurance is 

a set of processes that monitor the 

organization’s performance in meeting 

its current safety standards and 

objectives as well as contribute to 

continuous safety improvement. Safety 

Assurance processes include 

information acquisition, analysis, 

system assessment, and development of 

preventive or corrective actions for 

nonconformance. 

Safety Promotion. Safety Promotion 

includes processes and procedures used 

to create an environment where safety 

objectives can be achieved. Safety 

promotion is essential to create an 

organization’s positive safety culture. 

Safety culture is characterized by 

knowledge and understanding of an 

organization’s SMS, effective 

communications, competency in job 

responsibilities, ongoing training, and 

information sharing. Safety Promotion 

elements include training programs, 

communication of critical safety issues, 

and confidential reporting systems. 

National Transportation Safety Board 

Recommendations 

The National Transportation Safety 

Board (NTSB) first recommended safety 

management systems for the maritime 

industry in 1997. Since then, a number 

of NTSB investigations have cited 

organizational factors contributing to 

accidents and have recommended SMS 

as a way to prevent future accidents and 

improve safety. The NTSB first offered 

an SMS recommendation to the FAA 

after its investigation of the October 14, 

2004, accident of Pinnacle Airlines 

Flight 3701. 

Pinnacle Airlines Flight 3701 was on 

a repositioning flight between Little 

Rock National Airport and MinneapolisSt. Paul International Airport when both 

engines flamed out after a pilot-induced 

aerodynamic stall. The pilots were 

unable to regain control, and the aircraft 

crashed in a residential area south of 

Jefferson City, Missouri. The NTSB’s 

investigation revealed ‘‘the accident was 

the result of poorly performing pilots 

who intentionally deviated from 

standard operating procedures and basic 

airmanship.’’ 2 The NTSB further stated 

‘‘operators have the responsibility for a 

flight crew’s cockpit discipline and 

adherence to standard operating 

procedures’’ and offered an SMS as a 

means to help air carriers ensure safety.3

The NTSB formally recommended the 

FAA ‘‘require all 14 CFR part 121 

operators establish Safety Management 

System programs.’’ 4

Three years after the Pinnacle Airlines 

accident, the NTSB investigated the inflight fire, emergency descent, and crash 

of a Cessna 310R in Sanford, Florida, 

and issued another SMS 

recommendation. The NTSB determined 

the probable causes of the accident 

‘‘were the actions and decisions by 

NASCAR’s corporate aviation division’s 

management and maintenance 

personnel to allow the accident airplane 

to be released for flight with a known 

and unresolved discrepancy, and the 

accident pilots’ decision to operate the 

airplane with that known 

discrepancy.’’ 5 As in the Pinnacle 

Airlines accident, the NASCAR pilot 

and aviation organization failed to 

follow standard operating procedures 

(SOPs). The NTSB stated ‘‘an effective 

SMS program formalizes a company’s 

SOPs and establishes methods for 

ensuring that those SOPs are 

followed.’’ 6 The NTSB recommended 

the FAA ‘‘develop a safety alert for 

operators encouraging all 14 CFR part 

91 business operators to adopt SMS 

programs that include sound risk 

management practices.’’ 7

While the NTSB has not formally 

recommended the FAA require an SMS 

for certificated airports, the FAA has 

concluded those same organizational 

factors apply to all regulated sectors of 

the aviation industry. Airports operate 

in similar environments as air carriers 

and business flight operators where 

adherence to standard operating 

procedures, proactive identification, 

mitigation of hazards and risks, and 

effective communications are crucial to 

continued operational safety. 

Accordingly, certificated airports could 

realize similar SMS benefits as an 

aircraft operator. The FAA envisions an 

SMS would provide an airport with an 

added layer of safety to help reduce the 

number of near-misses, incidents, and 

accidents. An SMS also would ensure 

that all levels of airport management 

understand safety implications of 

airfield operations. 

FAA SMS Pilot Studies and Research 

Projects 

The FAA initiated a number of 

collaborative efforts studying SMS 

application at U.S. certificated airports. 

These efforts included developing 

advisory guidance, researching airport 

SMS recommended practices, and 

conducting airport pilot studies. 

Advisory Circulars and Research 

Studies 

The FAA, on February 28, 2007, 

issued Advisory Circular (AC) 150/ 

5200–37, Introduction to Safety 

Management Systems for Airport 

Operators. This AC provides an 

introduction to SMS and general 

guidelines for an airport SMS. While 

compliance with this AC is voluntary, 

numerous airports have used it in 

implementing their SMS. 


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62010 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 194 / Thursday, October 7, 2010 / Proposed Rules 

8The Transportation Research Board (TRB) 

manages ACRP. 

9For definitions of classes of AOCs, see 14 CFR 

139.5. 

The Airports Cooperative Research 

Program (ACRP) 8 approved two projects 

to prepare guidance on airport SMS. In 

September 2007, MITRE Corporation 

published the first report, SMS for 

Airports Volume 1: Overview. This 

report describes SMS benefits, ICAO 

requirements, and SMS application at 

U.S. airports. The second project, 

ACRP’s SMS for Airports Volume 2: 

Guidebook, was completed in October 

2009 and provides practical guidance on 

development and implementation of an 

airport SMS. 

Pilot Studies 

Beginning in April 2007, the FAA 

conducted a pilot study to evaluate SMS 

development at certificated airports of 

varying size and complexity. The study 

also compared current part 139 

requirements and typical SMS 

requirements. 

The first round of pilot studies 

included over 20 airports. The FAA 

later established a second round of pilot 

studies on SMS development at smaller 

airports with a Class II, III, or IV AOC.9

All participating airports conducted a 

gap analysis or benchmark study 

examining differences between their 

FAA-approved Airport Certification 

Manual (ACM), part 139 requirements, 

and a typical airport SMS. Using these 

results, the participating airports then 

developed a separate SMS Manual and 

Implementation Plan using AC 150/ 

5200–37 and the FAA Airport SMS Pilot 

Study Participant’s Guide. While pilot 

study airports were not required to 

implement an SMS, many chose to do 

so. As a result of these pilot studies, 

participating airports and the FAA made 

some key findings. 

First, the FAA concluded that 

compliance with part 139 is essential to 

ensuring a safe and standardized airport 

system. However, part 139 compliance 

does not by itself sufficiently address 

the risk management, assurance, 

reporting, safety data management, 

communications, or training needs of 

modern airports. The FAA further 

concluded an SMS can help an airport 

achieve performance-based systems 

safety. 

The gap analyses revealed that aspects 

of part 139 can serve as building blocks 

for an SMS. For example, at least one 

pilot study airport recognized its 

existing part 139 compliance program 

incorporated some SMS concepts. 

Additionally, the majority of 

participating airports have an 

organizational safety policy statement, 

but these statements may be informal or 

inadequate or focus on employee rather 

than on operational safety. The gap 

analysis also uncovered that less formal 

safety policies are often not effectively 

communicated to employees. 

The majority of pilot study airports 

indicated an existing organizational 

structure to manage safety (such as a 

standing safety committee), but there is 

rarely one person with overall 

responsibility and authority for 

operational safety. Several airports 

admitted to relatively inactive safety 

committees. Second, several airports 

indicated they have safety risk 

management programs or policies in 

place (e.g., part 139 self-inspection 

program), but most described their 

hazard identification processes as 

reactive rather than proactive. These 

airports concluded their existing 

programs could be improved to meet the 

intent of the SMS SRM. While § 139.327 

requires an airport to identify hazards or 

discrepancies during its self inspection, 

this requirement does not realize the 

potential of safety management through 

identifying and recording all safety 

hazards, conducting risk assessments, 

and developing mitigation strategies. 

Some airports indicated they did not 

have adequate accident or incident 

reporting procedures. Still others with 

reporting procedures indicated the 

procedures lacked solid analytical 

techniques to identify airport hazards 

and uncover underlying safety issues. 

Third, almost all pilot study airports 

indicated compliance with part 139 

through some auditing system. 

However, most of these airports also 

indicated the audits are not carried out 

systematically to determine whether the 

airport is meeting safety goals and 

objectives. Few certificated airports 

indicated formal procedures to 

systematically review safety-related 

data. All pilot study airports have 

record-keeping and retrieval systems in 

place, but each indicated room for 

improvement. Improved systems would 

allow for trend and other data analysis 

to proactively identify operational 

hazards and potentially prevent future 

incidents or accidents. 

Finally, almost all pilot study airports 

indicated they currently conduct safety 

training, but some indicated there is no 

organizational approach to safety 

training. Several airports indicated their 

informal safety communications do not 

properly disseminate information (such 

as risk management data) throughout 

the organization or to other 

stakeholders. In general, the airports 

acknowledged more formalized training 

and communications programs, such as 

those required under Safety Promotion, 

would be beneficial. 

Benefits 

The FAA has determined that an SMS 

requirement would improve safety at 

part 139 certificated airports. The FAA 

reached this conclusion based on 

detailed study of ICAO’s Annex 14 

requirements, review of NTSB’s 

recommendations, and the airport SMS 

pilot studies. Airports should realize 

benefits from increased communication, 

training, and reporting. Some airports 

may realize financial benefits through 

reduced insurance costs associated with 

proactive hazard identification and 

safety risk analysis. 

A properly functioning airport SMS 

would help an airport ensure: 

• Individuals are trained on the safety 

implications of working on the airside 

of the airport; 

• Proactive hazard identification and 

analysis systems are in place; 

• Data analysis, tracking, and 

reporting systems are available for trend 

analysis and to gain lessons learned; 

and 

• Timely communication of safety 

issues to all stakeholders. 

The FAA envisions an airport’s SMS 

would uncover previously unknown 

hazards and risks, providing an airport 

the opportunity to proactively mitigate 

risk. Over time, these efforts should 

prevent accidents and incidents, thereby 

reducing the direct and indirect costs 

and risks of airport operations. 

Several airports have seen benefits by 

voluntarily implementing SMS or 

applying SMS principles in their 

operations. For example, a large 

international airport holding a Class I 

AOC reduced insurance costs after 

implementing SMS principles. A 

smaller domestic airport holding a Class 

IV AOC has seen a major improvement 

in operational safety after implementing 

its SMS. 

Discussion of the Proposal 

The FAA proposes to require all 

certificate holders develop and 

implement an SMS for the movement 

and non-movement areas of the airport 

(i.e., airfield and ramp). The FAA 

proposes to add subpart E to part 139, 

which would include: 

(1) A new § 139.401 that would 

require all holders of an AOC to have an 

approved airport SMS; 

(2) a new § 139.402 that would 

prescribe the components of an airport 

SMS; and 

(3) a new § 139.403 that would 

prescribe the implementation 

requirements for an airport SMS. 


jdjones on DSK8KYBLC1PROD with PROPOSALS-1
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 194 / Thursday, October 7, 2010 / Proposed Rules 62011 

10See ICAO, Safety Management Manual, at 8.4.5 

& 8.4.6 ICAO Doc. 9859–AN/474 (2nd ed. 2009). 

The proposal also would add to 

§ 139.5 the following definitions: 

Accountable executive; Airport safety 

management system; Hazard; Nonmovement area; Risk; Risk analysis; Risk 

mitigation; Safety assurance; Safety 

policy; Safety promotion; and Safety 

risk management (SRM). 

Many of the definitions are from 

existing international standards and 

FAA guidance materials. These 

definitions are applicable to the 

following discussion. 

Regulation of the Non-Movement Area 

Under this proposal, an airport would 

implement its SMS throughout the 

airport environment, including the 

movement and non-movement areas 

(including runways, taxiways, run-up 

areas, ramps, apron areas, and onairport fuel farms). The FAA 

acknowledges the proposal extends the 

scope of part 139 by including the nonmovement areas, but the FAA has 

concluded that ensuring safety in air 

transportation requires that an SMS 

applies to any place that affects safety 

during aircraft operations. 

Many pilot study airports concluded 

it was difficult to apply SMS concepts 

to only the movement area because 

aircraft and airport airside personnel 

routinely flow between movement and 

non-movement areas. The airports also 

found a large number of safety incidents 

occur in the non-movement area and 

believe applying SMS to this area may 

reduce that number. 

The FAA does not intend to require 

airports to extend their SMS to the 

landside environment such as terminal 

areas. Nevertheless, an airport may 

voluntarily expand its SMS to all airside 

and landside environments. 

Flexibility 

The FAA envisions an SMS as an 

adaptable and scalable system. An 

organization can develop an SMS to 

meet its unique operating environment. 

For those reasons, this proposal would 

allow an airport the maximum amount 

of flexibility to develop and achieve its 

safety goals. Accordingly, the FAA 

would prescribe only the general 

framework of an SMS. 

The FAA learned through the pilot 

studies there are circumstances when a 

certificate holder may want flexibility in 

maintaining SMS documentation. For 

example, some airport operators manage 

multiple airports (have multiple AOCs), 

and some may want to expand SMS 

beyond the FAA-regulated areas (such 

as for landside or terminal operations.) 

In allowing maximum flexibility, a 

certificate holder may maintain a 

separate SMS Manual in addition to the 

ACM or may maintain SMS 

documentation directly in the ACM. If 

a certificate holder develops a separate 

manual, it would cross-reference the 

SMS requirements in its FAA-approved 

ACM. Accordingly, the FAA proposes 

amending § 139.203 to require the FAAapproved ACM contain the policies and 

procedures for development, 

implementation, operation, and 

maintenance of the certificate holder’s 

SMS. The FAA also proposes to amend 

§ 139.103 to require two copies of the 

SMS manual, or SMS portion of the 

ACM, accompany an AOC application. 

Minimum Elements of SMS 

In a new § 139.402, the FAA would 

require each airport SMS include the 

four SMS components: Safety Policy, 

SRM, Safety Assurance, and Safety 

Promotion. These components are 

equivalent to ICAO’s SMS pillars. To 

support each of these components, the 

FAA proposes a certificate holder 

implement a number of elements. 

Together the components and elements 

provide the general framework for an 

organization-wide safety management 

approach to airport operations. To make 

these components and elements 

effective, a certificate holder would 

develop processes and procedures 

appropriate to the airport’s operating 

environment. The FAA understands that 

a certificate holder could comply with 

these requirements through a variety of 

means. The FAA intends these proposed 

requirements to be scalable to the size 

and complexity of the certificate holder. 

The FAA invites comments on how the 

FAA could clarify or improve the 

scalability of this proposal. 

The FAA envisions a certificate 

holder using an operational SMS to: 

• Actively engage airport 

management in airfield safety; 

• Ensure formal documentation of 

hazards and analytical processes are 

used to analyze, assess, and mitigate 

risks; 

• Proactively look for safety issues 

through analysis and use of lessons 

learned; and 

• Train individuals accessing the 

airside environment on SMS and 

operational safety. 

The following details SMS components 

and elements as specifically applied to 

a part 139 airport certificate holder. 

Safety Policy 

This proposal would require a 

certificate holder to establish a safety 

policy that: 

• Identifies the accountable 

executive; 

• Identifies and communicates the 

safety organizational structure; 

• Identifies the lines of safety 

responsibility and accountability; 

• Establishes and maintains a safety 

policy statement; 

• Ensures the safety policy statement 

is available to all employees; 

• Establishes and maintains safety 

objectives; and 

• Establishes and maintains an 

acceptable level of safety for the 

organization. 

This proposal would require an 

airport to identify an accountable 

executive. The FAA understands that 

airport operations and organizational 

structures vary widely. Accordingly, the 

FAA would not prescribe a particular 

job title. Nevertheless, the accountable 

executive must be a high-level manager 

who can influence safety-related 

decisions and has authority to approve 

operational decisions and changes 

because an effective SMS requires highlevel management involvement in safety 

decisionmaking. Accordingly, the FAA 

proposes the international standard 

definition for an accountable executive 

(i.e., requiring the accountable executive 

to be an individual with ultimate 

responsibility and accountability, full 

control of the human and financial 

resources required to maintain the SMS, 

and final authority over operations and 

safety issues).10 The FAA acknowledges 

it may be difficult for U.S. airports to 

identify an accountable executive 

meeting that international standard, but 

it believes an acceptable accountable 

executive would be the highest 

approving authority at the airport for 

operational decisions and changes. The 

FAA invites comments concerning the 

definition of accountable executive for 

certificated airports. 

Additionally, we would require a 

certificate holder to identify its safety 

organizational structure and 

management responsibility and 

accountability for safety issues. The 

importance to identifying who in airport 

management is responsible for safety 

ensures resources are allocated to 

balance safety and service. For example, 

an airport would identify each manager 

accountable for safety and that 

manager’s responsibilities under the 

airport SMS. Each airport employee 

should know who is the contact point 

for a particular safety issue. An airport 

would decide how managers’ safety 

responsibilities and accountabilities are 

communicated. It could use an 

organizational chart or other means that 

identify lines of communication and 

decisionmaking. In some organizations, 

with multiple departments responsible 


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62012 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 194 / Thursday, October 7, 2010 / Proposed Rules 

for part 139 compliance, an airport may 

have multiple line managers responsible 

for the safety of different airport areas 

(e.g., an operations manager for airfield 

operational safety issues or a 

maintenance manager for maintenance 

safety issues). The safety organizational 

structure should allow every employee 

to understand how safety issues 

progress through the organization. This 

safety organizational structure also 

would ensure that senior management is 

aware of the daily activities of these 

departments and has an active role in 

airport safety. 

Currently, § 139.203 requires 

certificated airports to have lines of 

succession of airport operator 

responsibility. These lines may provide 

a foundation for establishing the 

airport’s accountable executive and 

delineation of responsibility for SMS 

functions. 

This proposal would require a 

certificate holder’s safety policy 

statement be included in SMS 

documentation. The ‘‘accountable 

executive’’ would issue this statement 

because management’s commitment to 

safety should be expressed formally. 

The safety policy statement would 

outline the methods and processes used 

to achieve desired safety outcomes. The 

statement typically would contain the 

following: 

• A commitment by senior 

management to implement SMS; 

• A commitment to continual safety 

improvement; 

• The encouragement for employees 

to report safety issues without fear of 

reprisal; 

• A commitment to provide the 

necessary safety resources; and 

• A commitment to make safety the 

highest priority. 

Some airports may be able to adapt a 

safety policy statement from existing 

policy statements. Others may 

supplement existing policies that focus 

on occupational safety issues (for 

example, the airport strives to have zero 

employee injuries). Other airports may 

have informal safety objectives that 

could be formalized into a safety policy 

statement. 

Finally, this proposal would require 

an airport to establish safety objectives 

relevant to its operating environment. 

These objectives should improve overall 

airport safety. Some examples of safety 

objectives may include a reduction in 

the amount of Foreign Object Debris 

(FOD) related damage, a reduction in 

the number of Vehicle/Pedestrian 

Deviations (VPDs), timely issuance of 

airfield condition Notices to Airmen 

(NOTAMs), and continued conformance 

with part 139 requirements. Setting 

these objectives and metrics would aid 

the airport, stakeholders, and the FAA 

in verifying achievement or progress 

towards an airport’s improvement of 

safety. 

Safety Risk Management (SRM) 

This proposal would require a 

certificate holder to establish an SRM 

process to identify hazards and their 

associated risks within the airport’s 

operations. Under SRM, the airport 

would be required to: 

• Identify safety hazards; 

• Ensure that mitigations are 

implemented where appropriate to 

maintain an acceptable level of safety; 

• Provide for regular assessment of 

safety level achieved; 

• Aim to make continuous 

improvement to the airport’s overall 

level of safety; and 

• Establish and maintain a process for 

formally documenting identified 

hazards, their associated analyses, and 

management’s acceptance of the 

associated risks. 

A comprehensive SMS using SRM 

would provide management a tool for 

identification of hazards and risks and 

prioritization of their resolution. While 

each certificate holder’s SRM processes 

may be unique to the airport’s 

operations and organizational structure, 

the FAA would require it to incorporate 

SRM’s five steps: 

(1) Describing the system; 

(2) Identifying the hazards; 

(3) Analyzing the risk associated with 

those hazards; 

(4) Assessing the risk associated with 

those hazards; and 

(5) Mitigating the risk of identified 

hazards when necessary. 

This proposal would require a 

certificate holder to use SRM processes 

to analyze risk associated with hazards 

discovered during daily operations and 

for changes to operations. Changes in 

airport operations could introduce new 

hazards into the airfield environment, 

such as adding new tenants or air 

carriers at the airport. These could be 

discovered, tracked, and mitigated using 

an existing or newly-created hazards 

tracking system. However, some system 

descriptions set the boundaries for 

hazard identification by considering the 

operating environment in which 

hazards are identified. Operational 

changes may overlap with SRM 

requirements under the FAA Air Traffic 

Organization’s SMS. Examples of these 

changes include runway extensions or 

the construction of new taxiways. In 

these cases, the FAA expects that the 

certificate holder would participate in 

the FAA’s risk analysis instead of 

performing an independent risk analysis 

under its SMS. 

The first step of SRM is describing the 

system. This step entails describing the 

operating environment in which the 

hazards will be identified. System 

description serves as the boundaries for 

hazard identification. For airports, 

operational, procedural, conditional, or 

physical characteristics are included in 

the system description. A system 

description could answer the following 

questions: 

• Are there visual or instrument 

meteorological conditions; 

• Is it a time of low or high peak 

traffic; 

• Are there closed or open runways; 

or 

• Is the airfield under construction or 

normal operations? 

The second step of SRM identifies 

hazards in a systematic way based on 

the system described in the first step. 

All possible sources of system failure 

should be considered. Depending on the 

nature and size of the system under 

consideration, these should include: 

• Equipment (for example, 

construction equipment on a movement 

surface), the operating environment (for 

example, weather conditions, season, 

time of day); 

• Human factors (for example, shift 

work); 

• Operational procedures (for 

example, staffing levels); 

• Maintenance procedures (for 

example, nightly movement area 

inspections by airport electricians); and 

• External services (for example, 

ramp traffic by fixed-base operator 

(FBO) or law enforcement vehicles). 

A certificate holder should implement 

hazard identification processes and 

procedures that reflect its management 

structure and complexity. There are 

many ways to accomplish this hazard 

identification, but all must use the 

following four elements: 

(1) Operational expertise; 

(2) Training in SMS (and, if possible, 

hazard analysis techniques); 

(3) A simple, but well-defined, hazard 

analysis tool; and 

(4) Adequate documentation of the 

process. 

Many airports already have hazard 

identification processes in place to 

ensure part 139 compliance. For 

example, part 139 currently requires an 

airport operator to conduct a daily 

inspection, unless otherwise stated in 

the FAA-approved ACM. 

A certificate holder could use hazard 

reports obtained through the airport’s 

safety reporting system, which is 

detailed later in this discussion. The 

airport also would keep track of 


jdjones on DSK8KYBLC1PROD with PROPOSALS-1
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11See ICAO, Safety Management Manual, at 6.5.3 

ICAO Doc. 9859–AN/474 (2nd ed. 2009); see also 

FAA Advisory Circular 150/5200–37, Introduction 

to Safety Management System for Airport Operators 

(Feb. 28, 2007). 

incidents and accidents occurring in the 

airport’s movement and non-movement 

areas to identify potential operational 

hazards. Many airports already track 

incidents and accidents in the 

movement area. 

One of the most important aspects of 

hazard identification is systematically 

documenting and tracking potential 

hazards. This documented data allows 

meaningful analysis of operational 

safety-related trends on the airfield and 

of overall airport system safety. 

After identifying hazards, a certificate 

holder would complete the third step of 

SRM, hazard analysis. For each hazard, 

the certificate holder would consider 

the worst credible outcome (harm), 

which is the most unfavorable 

consequence that is realistically 

possible, based on the system described. 

For the worst credible outcome, the 

certificate holder would determine the 

likelihood and severity of that outcome 

using quantitative or qualitative 

methods. 

A certificate holder would define its 

levels of likelihood and severity. ICAO 

and the FAA have developed sample 

definitions and levels of likelihood and 

severity for use in categorizing 

hazards.11 An example is a five-point 

table for severity and likelihood. The 

categorization of severity includes 

definitions for catastrophic, hazardous, 

major, minor, or negligible. The 

categorization of likelihood includes 

definitions for frequent, occasional, 

remote, improbable, and extremely 

improbable. A certificate holder should 

develop tables commensurate with its 

operational needs and complexity. For 

example, a less complex airport with 

few operations may find it effective to 

have fewer levels of gradation. However, 

a larger airport with a variety of 

operations may require a five-point or 

larger table to be most effective. Based 

on these definitions, a likelihood and 

severity of occurrence is selected for 

each hazard. 

The fourth step of SRM, risk 

assessment, uses the likelihood and 

severity assessed in step three, and 

compares it to the organization’s 

acceptable levels of safety risk. 

One of the easiest techniques for 

comparison is through the use of a 

predictive risk matrix. A predictive risk 

matrix (like figure 1) graphically depicts 

the various levels of severity and 

likelihood as they relate to the levels of 

risk (for example, low, medium, or 

high). On a typical risk matrix, severity 

and likelihood are placed on opposing 

axes (i.e., x- and y-axis on a grid). For 

example, a higher severity would be 

plotted further to the right on the x-axis, 

and a higher likelihood would be 

plotted further up the y-axis. The 

severity and likelihood assessed during 

the third step of SRM can then be 

plotted on the risk matrix grid for each 

of the hazards assessed. 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 


jdjones on DSK8KYBLC1PROD with PROPOSALS-1
62014 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 194 / Thursday, October 7, 2010 / Proposed Rules 

The other feature of a predictive risk 

matrix is its depiction of the certificate 

holder’s acceptable level of safety risk, 

in other words the highest level of safety 

risk it will accept in its operational 

environment. Typically, the risk matrix 

depicts three levels of risk: low, 

medium, and high. A high risk generally 

would be unacceptable. A medium risk 

may be acceptable provided mitigations 

are in place and verified before 

operations can continue. A low risk may 

be acceptable without additional 

mitigation. 

When a hazard’s likelihood and 

severity are plotted on the risk matrix, 

the certificate holder can see whether 

the hazard’s safety risk is acceptable to 


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Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 194 / Thursday, October 7, 2010 / Proposed Rules 62015 

the organization. Generally, as the 

likelihood and severity increase, the risk 

increases. Each certificate holder would 

determine its acceptable level of risk 

and other levels of risk when 

establishing its predictive risk matrix. 

For example, a hazard with an assessed 

likelihood of frequent and severity of 

catastrophic usually would be plotted in 

the high risk portion of the matrix. A 

hazard with an assessed likelihood of 

extremely improbable and assessed 

severity of minor usually would be 

plotted in the low risk portion of the 

matrix. These levels of risk would be 

based on the certificate holder’s 

acceptable level of risk and may vary 

from airport to airport. 

Under the fourth step of SRM, a 

certificate holder would plot the 

likelihood and severity of each hazard 

assessed during the third step on its 

predictive risk matrix. The certificate 

holder would see the level of risk for 

each hazard and could determine 

whether that level of risk is acceptable. 

The certificate holder would use this 

information to determine whether it 

must mitigate those risks. Ultimately, 

the certificate holder would formally 

accept the risk or approve the mitigation 

plan as required by its SMS. 

In the final step of SRM, mitigation of 

risk, the certificate holder would take 

steps to reduce the risk of the hazard to 

an acceptable level for any hazard 

determined in the fourth step to present 

an unacceptable risk. These efforts may 

include removing the hazard or 

implementing alternative strategies to 

reduce the hazard’s risks. Additionally, 

a certificate holder could mitigate the 

risk of a hazard if that risk is acceptable 

but could be reduced with mitigation. If 

a hazard has no associated risk or a low 

risk, an airport may not have to proceed 

with this step of SRM for the hazard. 

If step five is required, the certificate 

holder would monitor the mitigations 

put in place to ensure that they actually 

decrease the level of risk to an 

acceptable level. A certificate holder 

could use the hazard reporting system, 

which is discussed later, to track 

identified hazards and their mitigations 

deployed under SRM. 

Under an SMS, a certificate holder 

would document each of the SRM steps 

including the identified hazards, the 

risk analysis and assessment, any 

proposed mitigations, and 

management’s acceptance of risk. These 

records can be kept either electronically 

or in paper-format. This documentation 

ensures safety-related decisions are 

consistent with safety policies and goals 

and provides historical information that 

can be used to make future safetyrelated decisions. 

This proposal would require a 

certificate holder to retain these 

documents and records for the longer of 

either 36 consecutive calendar months 

after the risk analysis of identified 

hazards or 12 consecutive calendar 

months after implementing mitigation 

measures. The timelines associated with 

the retention of those documents ensure 

they are kept for a time period that 

provides the airport historical data to 

conduct meaningful analysis under 

SRM, to review during Safety Assurance 

activities, and for the FAA to review for 

compliance during inspections. These 

record retention requirements are 

consistent with other retention 

requirements under part 139. While 

these are minimum retention 

requirements, certificate holders may 

retain their documents for longer time 

periods. 

A Practical Example of SRM 

The airport in this example has one 

runway and conducts daily selfinspections according to its FAAapproved ACM. An operations agent 

conducting the airport’s daily selfinspection finds foreign object debris 

(FOD) of substantial size and weight at 

a taxiway-runway intersection adjacent 

to an uncontrolled ramp. The operations 

agent removes the FOD and notes it on 

the inspection checklist. During a 

routine review of airport inspections, 

the operations manager notices that 

FOD has been collected at this same 

taxiway-runway intersection during 

multiple inspections. Under the 

airport’s SRM process, such an event 

and trend triggers a formal SRM 

analysis. 

The operations manager, who has 

sufficient training and understands the 

airport’s SMS and operating 

environment, conducts the analysis. 

Using SRM documentation procedures 

and templates, the manager carefully 

describes the system. At this particular 

airport, the airport is approved for lowvisibility operations which occur 

twenty-five percent of the calendar year. 

The manager then identifies all 

hazards associated with the FOD. The 

manager identifies FOD damage to 

aircraft and/or ingestion into aircraft 

engines as potential hazards based on 

the system description. 

The manager considers the worst 

credible outcome of FOD damage and 

FOD ingestion into aircraft engines 

based on the location of the FOD in the 

airport environment. Using the selfinspection records, the manager 

discerns the FOD usually is found closer 

to the runway than to the taxiway and 

in some instances on the runway 

between the centerline and edge lines. 

Additionally, the weight and location of 

the FOD could present a danger to 

aircraft traversing the runway or 

taxiway. The manager determines that 

the worst credible outcome could result 

in loss of control of the aircraft, an 

aborted take-off, and/or an aircraft 

accident. 

Using the likelihood and severity 

definitions provided as part of the 

airport’s SMS, the manager’s knowledge 

of the airport environment, and outside 

resources (such as industry research or 

other documents with relevant 

quantitative statistical analysis), the 

manager assesses the likelihood and 

severity of the hazard. In this case, the 

manager determines the severity of such 

a hazard could be catastrophic (such as 

an aircraft accident with fatalities or 

serious injuries), and the likelihood is 

improbable. Referring to the airport’s 

risk matrix, the manager plots the 

assessed likelihood and severity, and 

the hazard falls within the high risk 

portion of the matrix. According to the 

airport’s SMS, the manager must take 

some sort of action to mitigate the 

occurrence of FOD in this taxiwayrunway intersection. 

The operations manager has identified 

numerous risk mitigation strategies. The 

manager could increase the number of 

targeted inspections for the area. The 

manager could conduct further analysis 

to determine the root-cause of the FOD, 

which could result from a lack of 

training, improper maintenance, or 

other factors that may be mitigated over 

time. The manager also could 

communicate with tenants who operate 

in the area to warn them of the FOD 

hazard. 

In this case, the manager chooses all 

three mitigation strategies with targeted 

inspections implemented immediately. 

Over time, the manager will investigate 

root cause, will update the airport’s 

FOD prevention training, and will 

communicate the FOD hazard to 

tenants. 

The manager completes the five SRM 

steps and documents the processes and 

determinations on the appropriate 

templates following the airport’s SRM 

guidelines. Finally, the manager adds an 

entry to the hazard reporting system to 

follow up in two weeks to review the 

self-inspection and targeted inspection 

reports to verify whether mitigations are 

working. 

Safety Assurance 

This proposal would require a 

certificate holder to ensure safety risk 

mitigations developed through the 

airport’s SRM process are adequate, and 

the airport’s SMS is functioning 

effectively. The key outcome of safety 


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62016 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 194 / Thursday, October 7, 2010 / Proposed Rules 

12See ICAO, Safety Management Manual, at 9.6.4 

ICAO Doc. 9859–AN/474 (2nd ed. 2009). 

assurance is continuous improvement of 

the airport’s operational safety. The 

proposal would require the certificate 

holder to: 

• Develop and implement a means for 

monitoring safety performance; 

• Establish and maintain a hazard 

reporting system that provides a means 

for reporter confidentiality; and 

• Develop and implement a process 

for reporting pertinent safety 

information and data to the accountable 

executive on a regular basis. 

Safety performance monitoring and 

measurement is one way an 

organization can verify its SMS’s 

effectiveness. ICAO also offers a variety 

of safety performance monitoring and 

measurement methods including hazard 

reports, safety studies, safety reviews, 

audits, safety surveys, and internal 

safety investigations.12 While some 

certificate holders may not find added 

value in implementing or using all of 

these information sources, a certificate 

holder may benefit from using an 

internal audit or assessment to monitor 

performance. Documents created under 

the airport’s SMS should be reviewed 

periodically to verify whether the 

airport’s SMS processes and procedures 

are being followed, whether trends exist 

that have not been identified, and 

whether SRM mitigations are being 

implemented and are effective. The 

certificate holder would determine 

whether this review is completed by 

airport personnel or by a third party. 

The proposal also would require a 

certificate holder to establish and 

maintain a hazard reporting system. A 

certificate holder’s SRM processes and 

hazard identification procedures likely 

would not catch all potential airfield 

hazards. Some hazards may be 

identified by other employees, airfield 

tenants, or pilots. Therefore, an airport’s 

SRM would include a system for hazard 

reporting. A certificate holder may 

develop the best system for its operating 

environment, whether a call-in line, a 

web-based system, or a drop box. The 

certificate holder would train all 

employees on the existence of the 

system and how a report flows through 

the system to management. 

The FAA proposes that airports 

develop a confidential hazard reporting 

system. ICAO’s SMS model envisions a 

non-punitive reporting system. Based on 

information obtained during the pilot 

studies, a U.S. airport may be unable to 

prevent punishment of non-airport 

employees (for example, tenant 

employees). Therefore, the FAA has 

concluded that requiring a confidential 

hazard reporting system will protect the 

reporter’s identity and achieve the goal 

of protection from reprisal. 

For some airports, the required data 

tracking, data reporting, and assessment 

programs already exist in other formats. 

Many airports have functional 

occupational safety programs in place 

with reporting, inspection, and training 

requirements. An airport can use these 

programs to build its operational SMS. 

The FAA envisions an airport using 

safety assurance to enhance the airport’s 

ability to spot trends and identify safety 

issues before they result in a near-miss, 

incident, or accident. An example of 

safety assurance may involve the 

performance of the airport in reducing 

the number of runway incursions. 

Effective safety assurance processes 

would require review and investigation 

of previous incidents and accidents as 

well as analysis of current policies, 

procedures, training, and equipment for 

potential weaknesses. In addition, the 

safety assurance process would review 

the efficacy of previously implemented 

safety strategies to ensure they are 

functioning as predicted and have not 

introduced any new systemic risks. 

Safety assurance also prescribes data 

collection and analytical methods that 

help a certificate holder transition from 

a reactive approach to a more predictive 

approach to aviation safety. In this 

example, failure analysis can be used to 

anticipate future failures before they 

occur. Therefore, Safety Assurance 

provides management tools and data to 

ensure that the SMS is properly 

functioning and that mitigations 

developed through SRM processes are 

having their intended effect. 

Safety Promotion 

This proposal would require a 

certificate holder to establish processes 

and procedures to foster a safety culture. 

These processes and procedures include 

providing formal safety training to all 

employees with access to the airfield, 

and developing and maintaining formal 

means for communicating important 

safety information. 

As previously stated, part 139 

currently prescribes numerous training 

and communications requirements that 

can be used in developing an SMS. 

Under an SMS, these requirements 

would be enhanced and extended to 

more individuals operating on the 

airport because everyone has a role in 

promoting safety. For example, instead 

of training just those airport employees 

on part 139 technical requirements 

(such as airfield driver training), an 

airport would ensure that all employees 

with access to the movement and nonmovement areas receive training on 

operational safety and on the airport’s 

SMS. 

The FAA proposes the SMS training 

requirement would apply to airport 

employees based on information 

obtained during the pilot studies. 

However, the FAA believes greater 

benefits may be achieved if that training 

requirement were applied to all 

individuals with access to the 

movement and non-movement areas, 

and it is considering that broader SMS 

training requirement. The FAA invites 

comments concerning the practical and 

economic implications of applying the 

training requirements to all individuals 

accessing the movement and nonmovement area. 

The FAA also believes that through 

the safety promotion component of 

SMS, an airport’s management will 

promote the growth of a positive safety 

culture through: 

• Publication of senior management’s 

stated commitment to safety to all 

employees; 

• Visible demonstration of 

management’s commitment to the SMS; 

• Communication of the safety 

responsibilities for the airport’s 

personnel specific to their function 

within the airport; 

• Clear and regular communication of 

safety policy, goals, objectives, 

standards, and performance to all 

employees of the organization; 

• A confidential and effective 

employee reporting and feedback 

system; 

• Use of a safety information system 

that provides an accessible efficient 

means to retrieve information; and 

• Allocation of resources essential to 

implement and maintain the SMS. 

An airport could demonstrate its 

commitment to safety promotion in 

several ways. An airport could allocate 

sufficient resources for the initial and 

recurrent training of its staff. Likewise, 

an airport could communicate the 

results of risk analysis and mitigations 

for reported hazards. Any training 

records created as part of the certificate 

holder’s safety promotion processes and 

procedures would be retained and 

available for inspection for 24 

consecutive calendar months. This 

retention period is consistent with that 

for other training records under existing 

§ 139.301. The FAA proposes that any 

other communications created as part of 

safety promotion would be retained for 

12 consecutive calendar months. 

As previously discussed, the FAA 

recognizes that certificate holders may 

have systems and processes in place 

that partially meet the proposed SMS 

requirements. The FAA believes these 

systems and processes can easily be 


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incorporated into an SMS and does not 

intend duplicative burdens. The FAA 

requests comments on systems and 

processes currently in use that would 

not be compatible with the proposed 

requirements. The FAA also requests 

comments specifically identifying how 

the FAA could clarify or improve the 

incorporation of existing systems and 

processes into an SMS. 

Proposed Implementation Plan 

Requirements 

The FAA proposes to require all 

certificate holders and applicants for an 

AOC to submit an implementation plan 

that accurately describes how the 

airport will meet the requirements of 

Subpart E and provides timeframes for 

implementing the various SMS 

components and elements within the 

airport’s organization and operations. 

While the FAA is not requiring an 

airport to conduct a gap analysis before 

implementing an SMS, this 

implementation plan would require a 

certificate holder to proactively review 

its current organizational framework 

and determine how it conforms to 

airport SMS requirements. This 

proposal also would require a certificate 

holder to establish target dates for 

meeting the requirements of Subpart E 

well before compliance with Subpart E 

would be required. Further, the 

implementation plan must determine an 

overall SMS implementation timeline as 

well as dates for completion of updates 

to the ACM and, where applicable, the 

SMS Manual. 

The proposal takes a two-pronged 

approach to implementation based on 

the scale of operations at the certificated 

airport and provides ample time for 

airports to conform to the SMS 

requirement. The FAA learned during 

the first pilot study that many larger 

airports were able to complete their gap 

analysis and develop the SMS Manual 

and Implementation Plan within six 

months. However, during the second 

pilot study with smaller certificated 

airports, many airports were not able to 

successfully complete their gap analysis 

and manual within that timeframe. 

Based on this experience, the FAA has 

determined that six months is adequate 

time for Class I airports to develop a 

plan of how the airport will develop and 

implement an SMS. Similarly, the FAA 

has determined that nine months is 

adequate time for Class II, III, and IV 

airports to develop an implementation 

plan. These implementation plans 

should detail the steps the airport will 

take to develop an SMS taking into 

account the unique operating 

environment of the airport. Based on 

projections from the pilot study airports, 

the FAA has determined that the 

implementation process should be 

completed within 18 months for a Class 

I airport and within 24 months for a 

Class II, III, and IV airport. 

Based on findings from the pilot 

study, the FAA has determined that all 

components of an SMS are interrelated 

and must be implemented at the same 

time for an SMS to be effective. The 

FAA requests comments on the 

proposed implementation requirements 

and timeframes. If you believe the FAA 

should adopt a phased-in approach for 

the SMS components, please provide 

specific recommendations for how the 

requirements could be phased in and 

analysis of the effect on implementation 

costs and corresponding postponement 

of safety benefits. 

The FAA also proposes to remove 

paragraph (c) of § 139.101 because the 

implementation schedule for submitting 

a new Airport Certification Manual 

(ACM) under that section is no longer 

applicable. 

Further, the FAA intends to publish 

any accompanying Advisory Circulars 

prior to the final rule and widely 

communicate the requirements to 

airports through the various industry 

organizations and FAA airport 

conferences. 

FAA’s Role and Oversight 

An SMS is not a substitute for 

compliance with FAA regulations or 

FAA oversight activities. Rather, an 

SMS would ensure compliance with 

safety-related statutory and regulatory 

requirements. An SMS enhances the 

FAA’s ability to understand the safety of 

airport operations throughout the year, 

and not just when an FAA inspector is 

physically on the airfield. 

During an airport’s periodic 

inspection, the FAA envisions an 

inspector reviewing the certificate 

holder’s ACM to ensure that the SMS 

requirements are clearly identified and 

detailed in the ACM or referenced SMS 

Manual. The inspector would verify 

through airport records, interviews, and 

other means that the SMS is being 

communicated, training is being 

provided, and senior management is 

actively engaged in the management and 

oversight of the SMS. The FAA intends 

this review as an evaluation of whether 

a certificate holder’s SMS is functioning 

as it is intended to function rather than 

as a means for us to second guess a 

certificate holder’s decisions. However, 

if during the course of an inspection, 

these processes are determined to have 

failed in discovering discrepancies with 

part 139 or have created new 

discrepancies, the FAA would take 

appropriate action to ensure the airport 

corrects these non-compliant 

conditions. 

The following examples detail 

possible inspector activity, but this 

proposal does not limit any FAA 

inspection authority. An FAA inspector 

may review safety meeting minutes and 

sign-in sheets to verify whether 

members of the airport’s management 

team are regularly attending. 

Additionally, an FAA inspector may 

request to see SRM documentation to 

determine whether acceptance of a 

given risk is being performed by the 

appropriate level of management. An 

inspector may also verify whether 

mitigations are being implemented, 

which is a clear indicator of the 

effectiveness of the airport’s SRM and 

safety assurance components. As for 

verification of safety promotion, the 

inspector may review training records, 

training curricula, and the methods of 

communicating critical safety 

information throughout the airport 

organization and to key stakeholders. 

If a certificate holder decided to 

extend the umbrella of its SMS to 

landside operations beyond the scope of 

this proposal, the FAA’s oversight and 

inspection authority would extend only 

to those areas envisioned by this 

proposal. 

The FAA has determined that an SMS 

is a valuable set of tools for improving 

safety at airports. However, an SMS 

does not replace part 139 requirements. 

An SMS would serve as an 

enhancement to those technical 

standards already required under part 

139, and the FAA will continue to 

inspect according to part 139 standards. 

Additionally, the FAA will promulgate 

prescriptive regulations as appropriate. 

Safety management systems for the 

aviation industry are still developing. 

However, the FAA believes now is the 

time to begin developing and 

implementing SMS requirements 

because of their benefits to aviation 

safety. The FAA recognizes that future 

rulemaking may be required to capture 

safety developments, connect to related 

regulations, and avoid duplication of 

SMS requirements for various industry 

sectors. 

The FAA is considering rulemaking 

that would establish SMS requirements 

for other segments of the aviation 

industry. The FAA requests comments 

on the interaction between this 

proposed rule and potential future 

rulemakings. The FAA also requests 

comments on which portions of this 

proposed rule should be adopted for any 

potential SMS requirements. Finally, 

the FAA requests comments on whether 

there are other issues or principles not 


jdjones on DSK8KYBLC1PROD with PROPOSALS-1
62018 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 194 / Thursday, October 7, 2010 / Proposed Rules 

included in this proposal that the FAA 

should consider in issuing a final rule. 

Rulemaking Analyses and Notices 

Paperwork Reduction Act 

This proposal contains a revision of a 

currently approved collection of 

information (OMB–2120–0675) subject 

to review by the Office of Management 

and Budget (OMB) under the Paperwork 

Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 

3507(d)). The title, description, and 

number of respondents, frequency of the 

collection, and estimate of the annual 

total reporting and recordkeeping 

burden are shown below. 

Title: Safety Management System for 

Certificated Airports. 

Summary: The FAA proposes to 

revise current part 139 to require 

certificated airports to establish a safety 

management system (SMS). An SMS is 

a formalized approach to managing 

safety that includes an organizationwide safety policy, formal methods of 

identifying potential hazards, formal 

methods for analyzing and mitigating 

potential hazards, and an organizationwide emphasis on promoting a safety 

culture. 

Use of: Each airport would be able to 

develop its SMS based on its own 

unique operating environment. Because 

airport management can tailor its 

system, the FAA expects an SMS 

comprised of four key components: 

Safety Policy, Safety Risk Management, 

Safety Assurance, and Safety Promotion. 

An airport would establish and 

maintain records that document Safety 

Risk Management processes; report 

pertinent safety information and data on 

a regular basis; record training by each 

individual that includes, at a minimum, 

a description and date of training 

received; and, set forth an 

implementation plan. 

The following information lists 

estimated initial and annual hours 

respondents would need to comply with 

the proposed part 139 SMS reporting 

and recordkeeping and cost 

requirements: 

Proposed part 139 

section Description Initial burden hours 

Annual burden 

hours 

139.203 ..................... Airport Safety Management Documentation and Implementation Plan ........................... 784,552 ........................

139.301 ..................... Records: to include the hazard reporting system, the records database, training 

records, promotional material.

........................ 21,847 

SMS Document (Initial Burden) 

562 currently certificated airports × 

1,396 hours per airport to document an 

airport’s SMS and implementation plan 

= 784,552 total hours. 

Record Keeping (Annual) 

5 minutes to update training records 

per employee × 72,800 estimated 

employees for all 562 airports = 6,067 

hours per year, 

30 minutes to record a potential 

hazard × an estimated 1 potential hazard 

per week = 13,676 hours per year. 

1 hour to create promotional material 

per airport: promotional material 

estimated to be distributed quarterly = 

4 hours × 562 airports = 2,104 hours per 

year. 

 hours (update training records)

 13,676 hours (re

6 067, cord potential hazards)

+ hours (create promotional 2 104 , material)

21,847 hours per year. 

Estimated total initial SMS cost 

burden: $10,983,728. 

Estimated total SMS document 

burden: 784,552 hrs. 

Clerical Labor (784,552 hrs. × $14 per 

hr). 

Total Labor Costs: $10,983,728. 

Estimated total annual recordkeeping 

cost burden: $305,858. 

Estimated total annual recordkeeping 

burden: 21,847 hrs. 

Clerical Labor (21,847 hrs. × $14 per 

hr). 

Total Labor Costs: $305,858. 

Individuals and organizations may 

submit comments on the information 

collection requirement by January 5, 

2011, to the address listed in the 

ADDRESSES section of this document. 

International Compatibility 

In keeping with the U.S. obligations 

under the Convention on International 

Civil Aviation, it is FAA policy to 

conform to International Civil Aviation 

Organization (ICAO) Standards and 

Recommended Practices to the 

maximum extent practicable. The FAA 

has reviewed the corresponding ICAO 

Standards and Recommended Practices 

and has identified no differences with 

these proposed regulations. 

Regulatory Evaluation, Regulatory 

Flexibility Determination, International 

Trade Impact Assessment, and 

Unfunded Mandates Assessment 

Changes to Federal regulations must 

undergo several economic analyses. 

First, Executive Order 12866 directs that 

each Federal agency shall propose or 

adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned 

determination that the benefits of the 

intended regulation justify its costs. 

Second, the Regulatory Flexibility Act 

of 1980 (Pub. L. 96–354) requires 

agencies to analyze the economic 

impact of regulatory changes on small 

entities. Third, the Trade Agreements 

Act (Pub. L. 96–39) prohibits agencies 

from setting standards that create 

unnecessary obstacles to the foreign 

commerce of the United States. In 

developing U.S. standards, this Trade 

Act requires agencies to consider 

international standards and, where 

appropriate, that they be the basis of 

U.S. standards. Fourth, the Unfunded 

Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 

104–4) requires agencies to prepare a 

written assessment of the costs, benefits, 

and other effects of proposed or final 

rules that include a Federal mandate 

likely to result in the expenditure by 

State, local, or tribal governments, in the 

aggregate, or by the private sector, of 

$100 million or more annually (adjusted 

for inflation with base year of 1995). 

This portion of the preamble 

summarizes the FAA’s analysis of the 

economic impacts of this proposed rule. 

We suggest readers seeking greater 

detail read the full regulatory 

evaluation, a copy of which we have 

placed in the docket for this rulemaking. 

In conducting these analyses, FAA 

has determined that this proposed rule: 

(1) Has benefits that justify its costs; (2) 

is an not an economically ‘‘significant 

regulatory action’’ but is a ‘‘significant 

regulatory action’’ for other reasons as 

defined in section 3(f) of Executive 

Order 12866; (3) is ‘‘significant’’ as 

defined in DOT’s Regulatory Policies 

and Procedures; (4) would not have a 

significant economic impact on a 

substantial number of small entities; (5) 

would not create unnecessary obstacles 

to the foreign commerce of the United 

States; and (6) would not impose an 

unfunded mandate on state, local, or 

tribal governments, or on the private 

sector by exceeding the threshold 

identified above. These analyses are 

summarized below. 

Total Benefits and Costs of This Rule 

This notice of proposed rulemaking 

would require certificated airports to 

establish a safety management system 

(SMS). An SMS is a formalized 


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approach to managing safety, which 

includes an organization-wide safety 

policy, formal methods of identifying 

potential hazards, formal methods for 

analyzing and mitigating potential 

hazards, and an organization-wide 

emphasis on promoting a safety culture. 

An SMS for airports is comprised of 

four key components: Safety Policy, 

Safety Risk Management (SRM), Safety 

Assurance, and Safety Promotion. These 

components would help airports 

effectively integrate the formal risk 

control procedures into normal 

operational practices thus improving 

safety at airports throughout the United 

States air transportation system that 

host air carrier operations. 

The estimated cost of this proposed 

rule is $ 248 million ($172 million in 

present value) with potential estimated 

benefits ranging from $ $170,341,000 

($104,498,600 present value) up to 

$255,512,000 ($161,441,600 present 

value). Accounting for the funded 

survey sample bias, scalability of SMS 

and qualitative benefits, the FAA 

expects that overall the proposed rule 

would have benefits greater than costs. 

Who is potentially affected by this rule? 

• Part 139 Certificated Airports. 

Assumptions 

• All costs and benefits are presented 

in 2009 dollars. 

• All costs and benefits are estimated 

over a 10-year period from 2012 through 

2021. 

• The present value discount rate of 

7 percent is applied as required by the 

Office of Management and Budget. 

Benefits of This Rule 

The objective of SMS is to proactively 

manage safety, to identify potential 

hazards or risks and implement 

measures to mitigate those risks. In that 

respect, the FAA envisions airports 

being able to use all of the components 

of SMS to enhance the airport’s ability 

to spot trends, and identify safety issues 

before they result in a near-miss, 

incident, or accident. Over the 10-year 

period of analysis, the potential benefits 

of potentially averted accidents range 

from $170 to $256 million. 

The FAA also suspects that there are 

many benefits of SMS, which were 

unable to be quantified. For example, 

one of the smaller pilot study airports 

used their Safety Risk Management 

(SRM), or formal process, to identify 

and manage a hazard. The airport 

identified that loosely controlled 

passenger traffic was accessing the ramp 

area. Although, no passenger to date had 

been injured on the ramp, the airport 

had experienced ‘‘close-calls’’. In 

completing their hazard and risk 

analysis, the airport determined that the 

lack of current control presented an 

unacceptable high risk for the 

organization. The airport immediately 

took action to identify feasible 

mitigation strategies including 

dedicated passenger walkways, 

notification of passengers on airport 

procedures prior to ramp access, and 

tasking of additional staff to ramp areas 

for increased control and oversight of 

passenger traffic during peakoperations. Moreover, the FAA believes 

that the benefits of SMS, over the 10- 

year period of analysis, are much greater 

than what is currently quantified. 

Costs of This Rule 

The rule if enacted would require 

certificated U.S. airports to establish a 

safety management system (SMS) based 

on the four components: Safety Policy, 

Safety Risk Management (SRM), Safety 

Assurance, and Safety Promotion. These 

components include costs to document 

an airport’s SMS and implementation 

plan, new staff, new equipment and 

materials, and training. The costs vary 

based on the size of the airport. In total 

this proposed rule is estimated to cost 

airports $248 million over 10 years. 

Regulatory Flexibility Determination 

The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 

(Pub. L. 96–354) (RFA) establishes ‘‘as a 

principle of regulatory issuance that 

agencies shall endeavor, consistent with 

the objectives of the rule and of 

applicable statutes, to fit regulatory and 

informational requirements to the scale 

of the businesses, organizations, and 

governmental jurisdictions subject to 

regulation. To achieve this principle, 

agencies are required to solicit and 

consider flexible regulatory proposals 

and to explain the rationale for their 

actions to assure that such proposals are 

given serious consideration.’’ The RFA 

covers a wide-range of small entities, 

including small businesses, not-forprofit organizations, and small 

governmental jurisdictions. 

Agencies must perform a review to 

determine whether a rule will have a 

significant economic impact on a 

substantial number of small entities. If 

the agency determines that it will, the 

agency must prepare a regulatory 

flexibility analysis as described in the 

RFA. However, if an agency determines 

that a rule is not expected to have a 

significant economic impact on a 

substantial number of small entities, 

section 605(b) of the RFA provides that 

the head of the agency may so certify 

and a regulatory flexibility analysis is 

not required. The certification must 

include a statement providing the 

factual basis for this determination, and 

the reasoning should be clear. 

The proposed rule will affect all part 

139 airports. Under this rule airports 

would be required to establish a safety 

management system to proactively 

manage safety at the airport. A 

substantial number of part 139 airports 

will meet the Small Business 

Administration definition of a small 

entity, which includes small 

governmental jurisdictions as 

governments of cities, counties, towns, 

townships, villages, school districts, or 

special districts with populations of less 

than 50,000. The requirements of the 

rule are scalable by airport. They have 

the ability to choose low cost options. 

Moreover, many smaller airports expect 

little to no added cost, given the size of 

their operations. These airports have 

fewer operations and employees which 

are associated with a lower number of 

reportable incidents, and with fewer 

incidents these airports can choose 

inexpensive options. Options, such as 

an EXCEL or ACCESS for data tracking, 

a suggestion box for the hazard 

reporting system, and easy to create 

memorabilia for promotional material 

are compliance examples reported by 

many of these airports. The cost of these 

items is minimal at roughly $300 per 

airport. Small airports also have the 

option of hiring new staff, but the FAA 

expects that given the size of these 

airports no additional staff will be 

needed to meet the requirements of this 

rule. Thus while there are a substantial 

number of small entities, the rule would 

not create a significant economic impact 

to these airports. 

Therefore, the FAA certifies this 

proposed rule, if promulgated, would 

not have a significant impact on a 

substantial number of small entities. 

The FAA solicits comments regarding 

this determination. Specifically, the 

FAA requests comments on whether the 

proposed rule creates any specific 

compliance costs unique to small 

entities. Please provide detailed 

economic analysis to support any cost 

claims. The FAA also invites comments 

regarding other small entity concerns 

with respect to the proposed rule. 

International Trade Impact Assessment 

The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 

(Pub. L. 96–39), as amended by the 

Uruguay Round Agreements Act (Pub. 

L. 103–465), prohibits Federal agencies 

from establishing standards or engaging 

in related activities that create 

unnecessary obstacles to the foreign 

commerce of the United States. 

Pursuant to these Acts, the 

establishment of standards is not 

considered an unnecessary obstacle to 


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the foreign commerce of the United 

States, so long as the standard has a 

legitimate domestic objective, such the 

protection of safety, and does not 

operate in a manner that excludes 

imports that meet this objective. The 

statute also requires consideration of 

international standards and, where 

appropriate, that they be the basis for 

U.S. standards. The FAA has assessed 

the potential effect of this proposed rule 

and determined that it will have only a 

domestic impact and therefore would 

not create unnecessary obstacles to the 

foreign commerce of the United States. 

Unfunded Mandates Assessment 

Title II of the Unfunded Mandates 

Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104–4) 

requires each Federal agency to prepare 

a written statement assessing the effects 

of any Federal mandate in a proposed or 

final agency rule that may result in an 

expenditure of $100 million or more (in 

1995 dollars) in any one year by State, 

local, and tribal governments, in the 

aggregate, or by the private sector; such 

a mandate is deemed to be a ‘‘significant 

regulatory action.’’ The FAA currently 

uses an inflation-adjusted value of 

$143.1 million in lieu of $100 million. 

This proposed rule does not contain 

such a mandate; therefore, the 

requirements of Title II of the Act do not 

apply. 

Executive Order 13132, Federalism 

The FAA has analyzed the proposal 

under the principles and criteria of 

Executive Order 13132, Federalism. 

Most airports subject to this proposal 

are owned, operated, or regulated by a 

local government body (such as a city or 

council government), which, in turn, is 

incorporated by or as part of a State. 

Some airports are operated directly by a 

State. This proposal would have low 

costs of compliance compared with the 

resources available to airports, and it 

would not alter the relationship 

between certificate holders and the FAA 

as established by law. 

Accordingly, the FAA has determined 

that this action would not have a 

substantial direct effect on the States, on 

the relationship between the national 

Government and the States, or on the 

distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. Therefore, the 

FAA has determined that this 

rulemaking does not have federalism 

implications. The FAA will mail a copy 

of the NPRM to each state government 

specifically inviting comment. 

Environmental Analysis 

FAA Order 1050.1E defines FAA 

actions that are categorically excluded 

from preparation of an environmental 

assessment or environmental impact 

statement under the National 

Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in the 

absence of extraordinary circumstances. 

The FAA has determined this proposed 

rulemaking action qualifies for the 

categorical exclusion identified in 

Chapter 3, paragraph 312d and involves 

no extraordinary circumstances. 

Regulations That Significantly Affect 

Energy Supply, Distribution, or Use 

The FAA has analyzed this NPRM 

under Executive Order 13211, Actions 

Concerning Regulations that 

Significantly Affect Energy Supply, 

Distribution, or Use (May 18, 2001). We 

have determined that it is not a 

‘‘significant energy action’’ under the 

executive order because it is not likely 

to have a significant adverse effect on 

the supply, distribution, or use of 

energy. 

Additional Information 

Comments Invited 

The FAA invites interested persons to 

participate in this rulemaking by 

submitting written comments, data, or 

views. We also invite comments relating 

to the economic, environmental, energy, 

or federalism impacts that might result 

from adopting the proposals in this 

document. The most helpful comments 

reference a specific portion of the 

proposal, explain the reason for any 

recommended change, and include 

supporting data. To ensure the docket 

does not contain duplicate comments, 

please send only one copy of written 

comments, or if you are filing comments 

electronically, please submit your 

comments only one time. 

We will file in the docket all 

comments we receive, as well as a 

report summarizing each substantive 

public contact with FAA personnel 

concerning this proposed rulemaking. 

Before acting on this proposal, we will 

consider all comments we receive on or 

before the closing date for comments. 

We will consider comments filed after 

the comment period has closed if it is 

possible to do so without incurring 

expense or delay. We may change this 

proposal in light of the comments we 

receive. 

Throughout the proposal discussion, 

the FAA specifically identifies specific 

issues related to SMS and guiding 

principles associated with SMS on 

which it seeks specific comment. These 

specific questions are enumerated here 

to facilitate comment. Please include the 

question number in your responses to 

the following questions: 

1. Are there interactions between this 

proposal and potential future 

rulemakings involving SMS issues? To 

what extent should the proposal here 

take into account the possibility of 

future rulemakings on similar topics? 

Would it be better to wait for experience 

under any final rule in this proceeding 

before judging whether it can or should 

serve as a precedent for any other SMS 

requirements? 

2. Are there other principles that the 

FAA should consider in crafting a final 

rule on airport SMS that are not 

embodied in this proposal? 

3. To what extent will the regulatory 

burdens proposed by the proposed rule 

flow through to persons or businesses 

other than the ones included in the 

economic analysis? If such flow-through 

exists, will it increase total societal 

costs, and if so, by how much? If costs 

do flow through to others, are costs 

correspondingly reduced to persons 

‘‘upstream’’? Please provide detailed 

economic analysis to support any claims 

of increased costs or cost-offsets, rather 

than mere assertions. 

4. The FAA intends for this and any 

future SMS rules to be fully scalable, 

based on the size and complexity of the 

organization implementing SMS. Do 

commenters have suggestions for how 

the FAA could clarify or improve the 

scalability of this proposal? Please 

provide detailed suggestions to expand 

implementation flexibility within the 

proposal. 

5. Would the cost-effectiveness of the 

rule be improved if the requirements are 

phased in? Which specific provisions 

should be phased in? Please provide 

specific recommendations for a phase-in 

period, including analysis of the effect 

on costs to industry and the 

corresponding postponement of safety 

benefits. 

6. What should the FAA specifically 

consider when defining ‘‘accountable 

executive’’ to adequately address the 

unique operating environment of 

certificated airports? 

7. Should the FAA consider 

expanding the SMS training 

requirements to all individuals (rather 

than just airport employees) accessing 

the movement and non-movement 

areas? What are the specific practical 

and economic implications of such a 

requirement? 

Proprietary or Confidential Business 

Information 

Do not file in the docket information 

that you consider to be proprietary or 

confidential business information. Send 

or deliver this information directly to 

the person identified in the FOR FURTHER

INFORMATION CONTACT section of this 


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document. You must mark the 

information that you consider 

proprietary or confidential. If you send 

the information on a disk or CD–ROM, 

mark the outside of the disk or CD–ROM 

and also identify electronically within 

the disk or CD–ROM the specific 

information that is proprietary or 

confidential. 

Under 14 CFR 11.35(b), when we are 

aware of proprietary information filed 

with a comment, we do not place it in 

the docket. We hold it in a separate file 

to which the public does not have 

access, and we place a note in the 

docket that we have received it. If we 

receive a request to examine or copy 

this information, we treat it as any other 

request under the Freedom of 

Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552). We 

process such a request under the DOT 

procedures found in 49 CFR part 7. 

Availability of Rulemaking Documents 

You can get an electronic copy using 

the Internet by— 

(1) Searching the Federal 

eRulemaking Portal (http:// 

www.regulations.gov); 

(2) Visiting the FAA’s Regulations and 

Policies Web page at http:// 

www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/; or 

(3) Accessing the Government Printing 

Office’s Web page at http:// 

www.gpoaccess.gov/fr/index.html. 

You can also get a copy by sending a 

request to the Federal Aviation 

Administration, Office of Rulemaking, 

ARM–1, 800 Independence Avenue, 

SW., Washington, DC 20591, or by 

calling (202) 267–9680. Make sure to 

identify the docket number or notice 

number of this rulemaking. 

You may access all documents the 

FAA considered in developing this 

proposed rule, including economic 

analyses and technical reports, from the 

internet through the Federal 

eRulemaking Portal referenced in 

paragraph (1). 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 139 

Air carriers, Airports, Aviation safety, 

Reporting and recordkeeping 

requirements. 

The Proposed Amendment 

In consideration of the foregoing, the 

Federal Aviation Administration 

proposes to amend chapter I of Title 14, 

Code of Federal Regulations as follows: 

PART 139—CERTIFICATION OF 

AIRPORTS 

1. The authority citation for part 139 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701– 

44702, 44709, 44719. 

2. Amend § 139.5 by adding the 

definitions of Accountable executive, 

Airport Safety Management System 

(SMS), Hazard, Non-movement area, 

Risk, Risk analysis, Risk mitigation, 

Safety assurance, Safety policy, Safety 

promotion, and Safety risk management 

in alphabetical order to read as follows: 

§ 139.5 Definitions. 

Accountable executive means a single, 

identifiable person who, irrespective of 

other functions, has ultimate 

responsibility and accountability, on 

behalf of the certificate holder, for the 

implementation and maintenance of the 

Airport Safety Management System. The 

Accountable Executive has full control 

of the human and financial resources 

required to implement and maintain the 

Airport Safety Management System. The 

Accountable Executive has final 

authority over operations conducted 

under the Airport’s Operating Certificate 

and has final responsibility for all safety 

issues. 

* * * * * 

Airport Safety Management System 

(SMS) means an integrated collection of 

processes and procedures that ensures a 

formalized and proactive approach to 

system safety through risk management. 

* * * * * 

Hazard means any existing or 

potential condition that can lead to 

injury, illness, death, or damage to or 

loss of a system, equipment, or property. 

* * * * * 

Non-movement area means the area, 

other than that described as the 

movement area, used for the loading, 

unloading, parking, and movement of 

aircraft on the airside of the airport 

(including without limitation ramps, 

apron areas, and on-airport fuel farms). 

* * * * * 

Risk means the composite of 

predicted severity and likelihood of the 

worst credible outcome (harm) of a 

hazard. 

Risk analysis means the process 

whereby a hazard is characterized for its 

likelihood and the severity of its effect 

or harm. Risk analysis can be either a 

quantitative or qualitative analysis; 

however, the inability to quantify or the 

lack of historical data on a particular 

hazard does not preclude the need for 

analysis. 

Risk mitigation means any action 

taken to reduce the risk of a hazard’s 

effect. 

* * * * * 

Safety assurance means the process 

management functions that evaluate the 

continued effectiveness of implemented 

risk mitigation strategies; support the 

identification of new hazards; and 

function to systematically provide 

confidence that an organization meets or 

exceeds its safety objectives through 

continuous improvement. 

Safety policy means the statement and 

documentation adopted by a certificate 

holder defining its commitment to 

safety and overall safety vision. 

Safety promotion means the 

combination of safety culture, training, 

and communication activities that 

support the implementation and 

operation of an SMS. 

Safety risk management means a 

formal process within an SMS 

composed of describing the system, 

identifying the hazards, analyzing, 

assessing, and mitigating the risk. 

* * * * * 

§ 139.101 [Amended] 

3. Amend § 139.101 by removing 

paragraph (c). 

4. Amend § 139.103 by revising 

paragraph (b) to read as follows: 

§ 139.103 Application for certificate. 

* * * * * 

(b) Submit with the application, two 

copies of an Airport Certification 

Manual, Safety Management System 

Implementation Plan (as required by 

§ 139.103(b)), and Safety Management 

System Manual (where applicable) 

prepared in accordance with subparts C 

and E of this part. 

5. Amend § 139.203 by redesignating 

paragraph (b)(29) as (b)(30) and adding 

a new paragraph (b)(29) to read as 

follows: 

§ 139.203 Contents of Airport Certification 

Manual. 

* * * * * 

(b) * * * 


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REQUIRED AIRPORT CERTIFICATION MANUAL ELEMENTS

Manual elements 

Airport certificate class 

Class I Class II Class III Class IV 

*******

29. Policies and procedures for the development, implementation, operation, and maintenance of the Airport’s Safety Management System, as required under subpart E of this 

part ........................................................................................................................................ X X X X 

* * * * * * * 

6. Amend § 139.301 by revising 

paragraph (b)(1) and adding new 

paragraphs (b)(9) and (b)(10) to read as 

follows: 

§ 139.301 Records. 

* * * * * 

(b) * * * 

(1) Personnel training. Twenty-four 

consecutive calendar months for 

personnel training records, as required 

under §§ 139.303, 139.327, and 139.402. 

* * * * * 

(9) Safety risk management 

documentation. Thirty-six consecutive 

calendar months or twelve consecutive 

calendar months, as required under 

§ 139.402(b). 

(10) Safety communications. Twelve 

consecutive calendar months for safety 

communications, as required under 

§ 139.402(d). 

* * * * * 

7. Add subpart E to part 139 to read 

as follows: 

Subpart E—Airport Safety Management 

System 

Sec. 

139.401 General requirements. 

139.402 Components of Airport Safety 

Management System. 

139.403 Airport Safety Management System 

implementation. 

Subpart E—Airport Safety 

Management System 

§ 139.401 General requirements. 

(a) Each certificate holder, or 

applicant for an Airport Operating 

Certificate, must develop and maintain 

an Airport Safety Management System 

that is approved by the Administrator. 

(b) The scope of an Airport Safety 

Management System must encompass 

aircraft operation in the movement area, 

aircraft operation in the non-movement 

area, and other airport operations 

addressed in this part. 

(c) Each required certificate holder 

must describe its compliance with the 

requirements identified in § 139.402 

either: 

(1) Within a separate section of the 

certificate holder’s Airport Certification 

Manual titled Airport Safety 

Management System; or 

(2) Within a separate Airport Safety 

Management System Manual. If the 

certificate holder chooses to use a 

separate Airport Safety Management 

System Manual, the Airport 

Certification Manual must incorporate 

by reference Airport Safety Management 

System Manual. 

(d) FAA Advisory Circulars contain 

methods and procedures for the 

development of an Airport Safety 

Management System. 

§ 139.402 Components of Airport Safety 

Management System. 

An approved Airport Safety 

Management System must include: 

(a) Safety Policy. A Safety Policy that, 

at a minimum: 

(1) Identifies the accountable 

executive. 

(2) Establishes and maintains a safety 

policy statement signed by the 

accountable executive. 

(3) Ensures the safety policy statement 

is available to all employees and 

tenants. 

(4) Identifies and communicates the 

safety organizational structure. 

(5) Describes management 

responsibility and accountability for 

safety issues. 

(6) Establishes and maintains safety 

objectives and the certificate holder’s 

acceptable level of safety. 

(7) Defines methods, processes, and 

organizational structure necessary to 

meet safety objectives. 

(b) Safety Risk Management. Safety 

Risk Management processes and 

procedures for identifying hazards and 

their associated risks within airport 

operations and for changes to those 

operations covered by this part that at 

a minimum: 

(1) Establish a system for identifying 

safety hazard. 

(2) Establish a systematic process to 

analyze hazards and their associated 

risks by: 

(i) Describing the system; 

(ii) Identifying hazards; 

(iii) Analyzing the risk of identified 

hazards and/or proposed mitigations; 

(iv) Assessing the level of risk 

associated with identified hazards; and 

(v) Mitigating the risks of identified 

hazards, when appropriate. 

(3) Provide for regular assessment to 

ensure that safety objectives identified 

under paragraph (a)(6) of this section are 

being met. 

(4) Establish and maintain records 

that document the certificate holder’s 

Safety Risk Management processes. 

(i) The records shall provide a means 

for airport management’s acceptance of 

assessed risks and mitigations. 

(ii) Records associated with the 

certificate holder’s Safety Risk 

Management processes must be retained 

for the longer of: 

(A) Thirty-six consecutive calendar 

months after the risk analysis of 

identified hazards under paragraph 

(b)(2)(iv) of this section has been 

completed; or 

(B) Twelve consecutive calendar 

months after mitigations required under 

paragraph (b)(2)(v) of this section have 

been implemented. 

(c) Safety Assurance. Safety 

Assurance processes and procedures to 

ensure mitigations developed through 

the certificate holder’s Safety Risk 

Management processes and procedures 

are adequate, and the Airport’s Safety 

Management System is functioning 

effectively and meeting the safety 

objectives established under paragraph 

(a)(6) of this section. Those processes 

and procedures must, at a minimum: 

(1) Provide a means for monitoring 

safety performance. 

(2) Establish and maintain a hazard 

reporting system that provides a means 

for reporter confidentiality. 

(3) Report pertinent safety 

information and data on a regular basis 

to the accountable executive. Reportable 

data includes without limitation: 

(i) Performance with safety objectives 

established under paragraph (a)(6) of 

this section; 

(ii) Safety critical information 

distributed in accordance with 

paragraph (d)(2)(ii) of this section; 

(iii) Status of ongoing mitigations 

required under the Airport’s Safety Risk 


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1 131 FERC ¶ 61,253 (2010). 

Management processes as described 

under paragraph (b)(2)(v) of this section; 

and 

(iv) Status of a certificate holder’s 

schedule for implementing the Airport 

Safety Management System as described 

under paragraph (b)(2) of this section. 

(d) Safety Promotion. Safety 

Promotion processes and procedures to 

foster an airport operating environment 

that encourages safety. Those processes 

and procedures must, at a minimum: 

(1) Provide formal safety training to 

each employee and tenant with access 

to airport areas regulated under this part 

that is appropriate to the individual’s 

role. 

(2) Maintain a record of all training by 

each individual under this section that 

includes, at a minimum, a description 

and date of training received. Such 

records must be retained for 24 

consecutive calendar months after 

completion of training. 

(3) Develop and maintain formal 

means for communicating important 

safety information that, at a minimum: 

(i) Ensures that all personnel are 

aware of the SMS and their safety roles 

and responsibilities; 

(ii) Conveys critical safety 

information; 

(iii) Provides feedback to reporters 

using the airport’s hazard reporting 

system required under § paragraph (c)(2) 

of this section; and 

(iv) Disseminates safety lessons 

learned to relevant personnel or other 

stakeholders. 

(4) Maintain records of 

communications required under this 

section for 12 consecutive calendar 

months. 

§ 139.403 Airport Safety Management 

System implementation. 

(a) Each certificate holder required to 

develop and maintain an Airport Safety 

Management System under this subpart 

must submit an implementation plan on 

or before: 

(1) [6 months after effective date of 

final rule] for Class I airports. 

(2) [9 months after effective date of 

final rule] for Class II, III, and IV 

airports. 

(b) An implementation plan must 

provide: 

(1) A proposal on how the certificate 

holder will meet the requirements 

prescribed in this subpart; and 

(2) A schedule for implementing SMS 

components and elements prescribed in 

§ 139.402. 

(d) Each certificate holder must 

submit its amended Airport 

Certification Manual and Airport Safety 

Management System Manual, if 

applicable, to the FAA for approval in 

accordance with its implementation 

plan but not later than: 

(1) [18 months after effective date of 

final rule] for Class I airports. 

(2) [24 months after effective date of 

final rule] for Class II, III, and IV 

airports. 

Issued in Washington, DC, on September 

30, 2010. 

Michael J. O’Donnell, 

Director, Office of Airport Safety and 

Standards. 

[FR Doc. 2010–25338 Filed 10–6–10; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

Federal Energy Regulatory 

Commission 

18 CFR Part 35 

[Docket No. RM10–23–000] 

Transmission Planning and Cost 

Allocation by Transmission Owning 

and Operating Public Utilities 

September 29, 2010. 

AGENCY: Federal Energy Regulatory 

Commission, DOE. 

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking; 

request for reply comments. 

SUMMARY: On June 17, 2010, the 

Commission issued a Notice of 

proposed rulemaking (75 FR 37884) 

proposing to amend the transmission 

planning and cost allocation 

requirements established in Order No. 

890 to ensure that Commissionjurisdictional services are provided on a 

basis that is just, reasonable and not 

unduly discriminatory or preferential. 

With respect to transmission planning, 

the proposed rule would provide that 

local and regional transmission 

planning processes account for 

transmission needs driven by public 

policy requirements established by state 

or federal laws or regulations; improve 

coordination between neighboring 

transmission planning regions with 

respect to interregional facilities; and 

remove from Commission-approved 

tariffs or agreements a right of first 

refusal created by those documents that 

provides an incumbent transmission 

provider with an undue advantage over 

a nonincumbent transmission 

developer. Neither incumbent nor 

nonincumbent transmission facility 

developers should, as a result of a 

Commission-approved tariff or 

agreement, receive different treatment in 

a regional transmission planning 

process. Further, both should share 

similar benefits and obligations 

commensurate with that participation, 

including the right, consistent with state 

or local laws or regulations, to construct 

and own a facility that it sponsors in a 

regional transmission planning process 

and that is selected for inclusion in the 

regional transmission plan. With respect 

to cost allocation, the proposed rule 

would establish a closer link between 

transmission planning processes and 

cost allocation and would require cost 

allocation methods for intraregional and 

interregional transmission facilities to 

satisfy newly established cost allocation 

principles. The Commission is 

providing interested persons an 

opportunity to file reply comments on 

the proposed rule. 

DATES: Reply comments to the proposed 

rule published June 30, 2010 (75 FR 

37884) are due November 12, 2010. 

ADDRESSES: You may submit reply 

comments, identified by Docket No. 

RM10–23–000, by any of the following 

methods: 

• Agency Web Site: http:// 

www.ferc.gov. Documents created 

electronically using word processing 

software should be filed in native 

applications or print-to-PDF format and 

not in a scanned format. 

• Mail/Hand Delivery: Commenters 

unable to file comments electronically 

must mail or hand deliver an original 

and 14 copies of their comments to: 

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 

Office of the Secretary, 888 First Street, 

NE., Washington, DC 20426. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Russell Profozich (Technical 

Information), Office of Energy Policy 

and Innovation, Federal Energy 

Regulatory Commission, 888 First 

Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426. 

Telephone: (202) 502–6478, E-mail: 

russell.profozich@ferc.gov. 

John Cohen (Legal Information), 

Office of the General Counsel, Federal 

Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 

First Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426, 

Telephone: (202) 502–8705, E-mail: 

john.cohen@ferc.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Notice Establishing Reply Comment 

Period 

On September 28, 2010, Western 

Independent Transmission Group filed a 

motion to establish a period for filing 

reply comments to the Commission’s 

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking issued 

June 17, 2010, in the above-docketed 

proceeding.1

The period for filing initial comments 

in this proceeding ran through 

September 29, 2010. Upon 


jdjones on DSK8KYBLC1PROD with PROPOSALS-1