alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM LIFE
SCIENCES, INC. AND SUBSIDIARY FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AS OF MAY 31, 2000 AND FOR
THE YEAR THEN ENDED AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH LIFE
SCIENCES, INC. AND SUBSIDIARY ANNUAL REPORT ON FORM 10-KSB FOR THE YEAR ENDED
MAY 31, 2000.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1
<CURRENCY> U.S. DOLLARS

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAY-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JUN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               MAY-31-2000
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                      1
<CASH>                                          41,805
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  267,702
<ALLOWANCES>                                     5,000
<INVENTORY>                                    431,376
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               749,963
<PP&E>                                       1,181,764
<DEPRECIATION>                                 994,581
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               1,218,095
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          927,894
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       419,667
<OTHER-SE>                                    (129,466)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 1,218,095
<SALES>                                      1,475,766
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             1,475,766
<CGS>                                          647,025
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  647,025
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               779,421
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               1,342
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 47,978
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    47,978
<EPS-BASIC>                                        .01
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .01


</TABLE>
§ 1917.26 First aid and lifesaving facilities. ( a ) Employers shall instruct employees to report every injury, regardless of severity, to the employer.
( b ) A first aid kit shall be available at the terminal, and at least one person holding a valid first aid certificate shall be at the terminal when work is in progress.
( c ) *First aid kit.* First aid kits shall be weatherproof and shall contain individual sealed packages for each item that must be kept sterile. The contents of each kit shall be determined by a person certified in first aid and cognizant of the hazards found in marine cargo handling operations. The contents shall be checked at intervals that allow prompt replacement of expended items.
( d ) *Stretchers.* ( 1 ) There shall be available for each vessel being worked one Stokes basket stretcher, or its equivalent, permanently equipped with bridles for attaching to the hoisting gear.
( 2 ) Stretchers shall be kept close to vessels and shall be positioned to avoid damage to the stretcher.
( 3 ) A blanket or other suitable covering shall be available.
( 4 ) Stretchers shall have at least four sets of effective patient restraints in operable condition.
( 5 ) Lifting bridles shall be of adequate strength, capable of lifting 1,000 pounds (454 kg) with a safety factor of five, and shall be maintained in operable condition. Lifting bridles shall be provided for making vertical patient lifts at container berths. Stretchers for vertical lifts shall have foot plates.
( 6 ) Stretchers shall be maintained in operable condition. Struts and braces shall be inspected for damage. Wire mesh shall be secured and have no burrs. Damaged stretchers shall not be used until repaired.
( 7 ) Stretchers in permanent locations shall be mounted to prevent damage and shall be protected from the elements if located out-of-doors. If concealed from view, closures shall be marked to indicate the location of the life saving equipment.
( e ) Telephone or equivalent means of communication shall be readily available.
( f ) A U.S. Coast Guard approved 30-inch (76.2 cm) life ring, with at least 90 feet (27.43m) of line attached, shall be available at readily accessible points at each waterside work area where the employees' work exposes them to the hazard of drowning. Employees working on any bridge or structure leading to a detached vessel berthing installation shall wear U.S. Coast Guard approved personal flotation devices except where protected by railings, nets, or safety belts and lifelines. A readily available portable or permanent ladder giving access to the water shall also be provided within 200 feet (61 m) of such work areas.
[48 FR 30909, July 5, 1983, as amended at 62 FR 40197, July 25, 1997; 65 FR 40938, June 30, 2000]
§ 1690.305 Nondisclosure of proposed issuances. ( a ) In the interest of encouraging full interagency discussion of these matters and expediting the coordination process, the EEOC will not discuss the proposed issuances of other agencies at an open Commission meeting where disclosure of information would be likely to significantly frustrate implementation of a proposed agency action. The Commission will make this determination on a case by case basis.
( b ) Requests by the public for drafts of proposed issuances of another agency will be coordinated, in appropriate circumstances, with that agency and the person submitting the request shall be so notified. The decision made by that agency with respect to such proposed issuances will be honored by the Commission.
[45 FR 68361, Oct. 14, 1980, as amended at 45 FR 71799, Oct. 30, 1980]
#### Levy *vs.*Brooklyn Fire Insurance Company.

A *reference*will not be ordered in an action on a *policy of insurance,*where the defence charges a *fraud*on the part of the insured; a party in such case is entitled to a trial by a court and jury. !

This is an action on a *policy of insurance*against fire, tried at the New-York circuit in March, 1841, before the lion. Philo Gridley, one of the circuit judges. It appeared from the inventory of the plaintiff that the loss sustained by him was in furniture and glass-ware—some of the property being totally destroyed, and another portion of it being partially damaged. The judge suggested that the cause had better be referred. On which, an officer of the insurance company made an affidavit that the trial of the cause would require an examination of the plaintiff’s inventory, as well in respect to the goods, the amount thereof, the value of the portions totally destroyed and of the portions partially destroyed, as in respect to the correctness of the account of the loss exhibited by the plaintiff—and thus that the trial would require the examination of a long account. In answer to which, thq plaintiff made an affidavit that he was informed by the officers of the insurance company that their defence was two-fold: 1. That he had *fraudulently caused the conflagration*by which the property insured was injured; and 2. That in making up his statement of loss he had *fraudulently*over-estimated the amount of his loss, and thus had forfeited all claims upon the defendant., He further stated, that although the property destroyed or injured consisted of a variety of articles, differing in quality and value, yet his [ *688 ] *whole claim was founded upon one single occurrence, to wit, the injury done by fire; that bis counsel had offered, and he still was willing, to *refer the cause to ascertain the true amount of his loss,*provided the defendants would waive the defences of *fraud*in firing the premises and over-estimating the loss, both of which charges he pronounced utterly false,¡ and therefore *claimed*a trial by *jury.*The circuit judge referred the cause, notwithstanding the opposition of the plaintiff, who now moved to *vacate thé order of reference.*

*J. L. Wendell,*for the motion.

*525
      *R. W.*Peckham, contra.

The Chief Justice

said, that without attempting to lay down any general rule as to the reference of actions on policies of insurance, he was of opinion that in a case involving such serious charges as were here brought against the plaintiff, a party was entitled to the benefit of a trial before a court and jury, and that therefore he would direct the order for reference to be vacated.

Ordered accordingly.*

See 6 Wendell, 503: 19 Id. 22 and 110; and 1 Hall’s R. 560.
§ 37.94 What corrective or remedial actions may be imposed where, after a compliance review or complaint investigation, the Director finds a violation of the nondiscrimination and equal opportunity provisions of WIA or this part? ( a ) A Letter of Findings, Notice to Show Cause, or Initial Determination, issued under § 37.62 or §§ 37.63, 37.66 and 37.67, or § 37.91 respectively, must include the specific steps the grant applicant or recipient, as applicable, must take within a stated period of time in order to achieve voluntary compliance.
( b ) Such steps must include: ( 1 ) Actions to end and/or redress the violation of the nondiscrimination and equal opportunity provisions of WIA or this part;
( 2 ) Make whole relief where discrimination has been identified, including, as appropriate, back pay (which must not accrue from a date more than 2 years before the filing of the complaint or the initiation of a compliance review) or other monetary relief; hire or reinstatement; retroactive seniority; promotion; benefits or other services discriminatorily denied; and
( 3 ) Such other remedial or affirmative relief as the Director deems necessary, including but not limited to outreach, recruitment and training designed to ensure equal opportunity.
( c ) Monetary relief may not be paid from Federal funds.
##### 



Exhibit 32.1
 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. Section 1350
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 of the SARBANES-OXLEY ACT of 2002
  (1)
    
    The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
 (2)
    
    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of the Company as of the dates and for the
periods expressed in the Report.
   /s/ Michael J. Merriman, Jr.Michael J. Merriman, Jr.President and
Chief Executive Officer
(Principal Executive Officer)
#### § 36.540 Advertising.

A recipient shall not in any advertising related to employment indicate preference, limitation, specification, or discrimination based on sex unless sex is a bona fide occupational qualification for the particular job in question.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<CIK> 0001073363
<NAME> AEI INCOME & GROWTH FUND 23 LLC

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-2000
<CASH>                                         982,435
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   61,938
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             1,044,373
<PP&E>                                       4,226,794
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               5,271,167
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          223,847
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                   5,047,320
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 5,271,167
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               128,187
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   78,032
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 50,155
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             50,155
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    50,155
<EPS-BASIC>                                      10.95
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    10.95


</TABLE>
§ 2704.206 When an application may be filed. ( a ) An application may be filed whenever the applicant has prevailed in the underlying proceeding or in a significant and discrete substantive portion of that proceeding. An application may also be filed by a non-prevailing party when a demand by the Secretary is substantially in excess of the decision of the Commission and is unreasonable when compared with such decision. In no case may an application be filed later than 30 days after the Commission's final disposition of the underlying proceeding, or 30 days after issuance of a court judgment that is final and nonappealable in any Commission adjudication that has been appealed pursuant to section 106 of the Mine Act, 30 U.S.C. 816.
( b ) If review or reconsideration is sought or taken of a decision on the merits as to which an applicant has prevailed or has been subjected to a demand from the Secretary substantially in excess of the decision of the Commission and unreasonable when compared to that decision, proceedings for the award of fees shall be stayed pending final disposition of the underlying controversy.
( c ) For purposes of this part, final disposition before the Commission means the date on which a decision or order disposing of the merits of the proceeding or any other complete resolution of the proceeding, such as a settlement or voluntary dismissal, becomes final (pursuant to sections 105(d) and 113(d) of the Mine Act (30 U.S.C. 815(d) and 823(d)) and unappealable, both within the Commission and to the courts (pursuant to section 106(a) of the Mine Act (30 U.S.C. 816(a)).
[63 FR 63176, Nov. 12, 1998, as amended at 71 FR 44210, Aug. 4, 2006]
#### § 4302.2 Definitions.

The following terms are defined in § 4001.2 of this chapter: ERISA, multiemployer plan, and PBGC.
STATE OF DELAWAFfE 

DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES 

OFFICE OF THE 

SECRETARY 

AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL 

89 KINGS HIGHWAV 

DOVER, DELAWARE 19901 

PHONE: 

FAX: 

(302) 739-9000 

(302) 739-6242 

April 27, 20 II 

Mr. Shawn M. Garvin (3RAOO) 

Regional Administrator 

U. S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region III 

1650 Arch Street 

Philadelphia, PA 19103-2029 

Dear Mr. Garvin: 

I am pleased to submit the enclosed revision to the State of Delaware State 

Implementation Plan (SIP) for the Attainment and Maintenance of the 8-Hour Ozone National 

Ambient Air Quality Standard. This revision amends Regulation No. 1142 - SPECIFIC 

EMISSION CONTROL REQUIREMENTS by adding a new section, Section 2 - Control of 

Nitrogen Oxides Emissions from Industrial Boilers and Process Heaters at Petroleum Refineries; 

and Proposed State Implementation Plan (SIP) "Demonstration that Amendments to Section 2.0 

of7 DE Admin. Code 1142, 'Control of NOx Emissions from Industrial Boilers and Process 

Heaters at Petroleum Refineries'. Do Not Interfere with Any Applicable Requirements of the 

Clean Air act (CAA)". The effective date of this revision is April II, 2011. 

The requirements ofthe CAA Section II 0(a)(2)(A) have been met through the normal 

public hearing process established by the State of Delaware with proper notification (30 days) 

prior to the convening of the public hearing. A public hearing was held on February I, 20 II. 

Attachments A and B are copies of affidavits as proof of proper notification. It is the position of 

the State of Delaware that all minimum requirements set forth in the 1990 Clean Air Act 

Amendments have been met. 

We look forward to continuing the cooperative effort between Delaware and EPA in this 

important work. As always, feel free to contact me or Ali Mirzakhalili, Director, Division of Air 

Quality, (302) 739-9402, if you have any questions concerning the enclosed documents. 

a~~(._,..:_/ ·nP.O~ira "­

Secretary 

cc:	 Arnie Howell, EPA w/o encl. 

Diana Esher, EPA w/encl. 

Ali Mirzakhalili
§ 36.445 Marital or parental status. ( a ) *Status generally.* A recipient shall not apply any rule concerning a student's actual or potential parental, family, or marital status that treats students differently on the basis of sex.
( b ) *Pregnancy and related conditions.* ( 1 ) A recipient shall not discriminate against any student, or exclude any student from its education program or activity, including any class or extracurricular activity, on the basis of such student's pregnancy, childbirth, false pregnancy, termination of pregnancy, or recovery therefrom, unless the student requests voluntarily to participate in a separate portion of the program or activity of the recipient.
( 2 ) A recipient may require such a student to obtain the certification of a physician that the student is physically and emotionally able to continue participation as long as such a certification is required of all students for other physical or emotional conditions requiring the attention of a physician.
( 3 ) A recipient that operates a portion of its education program or activity separately for pregnant students, admittance to which is completely voluntary on the part of the student as provided in paragraph (b)(1) of this section, shall ensure that the separate portion is comparable to that offered to non-pregnant students.
( 4 ) Subject to § 36.235(d), a recipient shall treat pregnancy, childbirth, false pregnancy, termination of pregnancy and recovery therefrom in the same manner and under the same policies as any other temporary disability with respect to any medical or hospital benefit, service, plan, or policy that such recipient administers, operates, offers, or participates in with respect to students admitted to the recipient's educational program or activity.
( 5 ) In the case of a recipient that does not maintain a leave policy for its students, or in the case of a student who does not otherwise qualify for leave under such a policy, a recipient shall treat pregnancy, childbirth, false pregnancy, termination of pregnancy, and recovery therefrom as a justification for a leave of absence for as long a period of time as is deemed medically necessary by the student's physician, at the conclusion of which the student shall be reinstated to the status that she held when the leave began.
(November 30, 1999)

#### James Sichler et al., Appellants, v City of New York, Respondent.

[698 NYS2d 484]

—Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Salvador Collazo, J.), entered March 28, 1997, after a jury trial, in defendant’s favor, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

*130The evidence provided ample basis for the jury to conclude that defendant did not breach a statutory duty and was not otherwise liable for plaintiffs’ injury. Any error in charging the jury on comparative negligence in this action, brought pursuant to General Municipal Law § 205-e, was harmless *(see,*CPLR 2002), since the jury never reached the issue of comparative negligence. Concur — Ellerin, P. J., Williams, Lerner, Rubin and Saxe, JJ.
(80 South. 627)

#### BEVIS v. STATE.

(5 *Div. 292.)*

(Court of Appeals of Alabama.

Dec. 17, 1918.)

Criminal Law <&wkey;lO90(l) — Appeal—Bill of Exceptions.

Judgment of conviction will be affirmed; there being no bill of exceptions, the clerk’s certificate showing expiration of time to present it, and no error appearing in the record.

Appeal from Circuit *Court,*Chilton County; Leon McCord, Judge.

Alfred Bevis was convicted of murder in, the second degree, and he appeals.

Affirmed.

Emmett S. Thigpen, Atty. Gen., for the State.

SAMEORD, J.

The defendant was tried and convicted in the circuit court of Chilton county, under an indictment charging him with murder in the-second degree. He was convicted of manslaughter in the first degree, and sentenced to imprisonment in the penitentiary for a *term oí one year. From the*judgment of conviction he appeals.

There is no hill of exceptions in the record, and the certificate of the clerk shows that the time for presenting the same has expired.

We find no error in the record, and the judgment is affirmed.

Affirmed.
NO. 07-11-0305-CR

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AT AMARILLO

PANEL A

MAY 15, 2012

______________________________

RONALD COLEMAN, SR., APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

_________________________________

FROM THE 242ND DISTRICT COURT OF HALE COUNTY;

NO. B18708-1102; HONORABLE EDWARD LEE SELF, JUDGE

_______________________________

Before CAMPBELL and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ.

**DISSENTING OPINION**

	Appellant, Ronald Coleman, Sr., was charged by indictment with the third degree felony offense of tampering with physical evidence.[footnoteRef:1]  The indictment charged, in relevant part, that Appellant "did then and there, knowing that an investigation was in progress, *to-wit: a detention of the defendant,* intentionally or knowingly destroy a suspected controlled substance, to-wit: cocaine, with intent to impair its availability as evidence in the investigation."  (Emphasis added.) [1: See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 37.09(a)(1) (West 2011).] 

	Here, the majority does not reach the issue of the legality of Appellant's *detention*, because it concludes that the offense of tampering with physical evidence was completed "after the detention."  I fail to see how the question of Appellant's detention can be both an element of the offense and, at the same time, be an event occurring before the offense.  Because I would address the legality of Appellant's detention, I respectfully dissent.

							Patrick A. Pirtle

							      Justice

Do not publish.

2
#### Alina Kowalewski et al., Plaintiffs, v North General Hospital et al., Defendants, and Big Apple Wrecking and Construction Corporation, Respondent. North General Hospital, Third-Party Plaintiff, v Safeway Environmental Corporation, Third-Party Defendant-Appellant. Crow Construction Co./Becom Real, Inc., Second Third-Party Plaintiff, v Safeway Environmental Corporation, Second Third-Party Defendant-Appellant.

[698 NYS2d 682]

—Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Emily Goodman, J.), entered August 21, 1998, which, to the extent appealed from, denied the cross motion of third-party defendant Safeway Environmental Corporation for summary judgment dismissing defendant Big Apple Wrecking and Construction Corporation’s cross claim against it for contractual indemnification and granted Big Apple’s cross motion for partial summary judgment on its cross claim against Safeway for contractual indemnification to the extent of finding that Safeway, its agents or subcontractors are liable for plaintiffs injuries, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

The indemnification clause in dispute provides indemnity only to the extent of loss caused by the negligent acts of the *115subcontractor and/or its agents and is, therefore, enforceable under General Obligations Law § 5-322.1 (1) (see, *Itri Brick & Concrete Corp. v Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,*89 NY2d 786, 795, n 5).

Having failed to file a notice of appeal, Big Apple’s argument that the record demonstrates it was not negligent is not properly before this Court. Accordingly, the court’s conditional grant of summary judgment pending a finding as to the extent of Safeway’s responsibility for the loss was proper.

We have considered Safeway’s remaining arguments and find them to be unavailing. Concur — Ellerin, P. J., Rosenberger, Tom, Andrias and Buckley, JJ.