alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
§ 2570.113 Parties, how designated. For 502(c)(6) civil penalty proceedings, this section shall apply in lieu of § 18.10 of this title. ( a ) The term “party” wherever used in this subpart shall include any natural person, corporation, employee benefit plan, association, firm, partnership, trustee, receiver, agency, public or private organization, or government agency. A party against whom a civil penalty is sought shall be designated as “respondent”. The Department shall be designated as the “complainant”.
( b ) Other persons or organizations shall be permitted to participate as parties only if the administrative law judge finds that the final decision could directly and adversely affect them or the class they represent, that they may contribute materially to the disposition of the proceedings and their interest is not adequately represented by existing parties, and that in the discretion of the administrative law judge the participation of such persons or organizations would be appropriate.
( c ) A person or organization not named as a respondent wishing to participate as a party under this section shall submit a petition to the administrative law judge within fifteen (15) days after the person or organization has knowledge of or should have known about the proceeding. The petition shall be filed with the administrative law judge and served on each person or organization who has been made a party at the time of filing. Such petition shall concisely state: ( 1 ) Petitioner's interest in the proceeding;
( 2 ) How his or her participation as a party will contribute materially to the disposition of the proceeding;
( 3 ) Who will appear for petitioner;
( 4 ) The issues on which petitioner wishes to participate; and
( 5 ) Whether petitioner intends to present witnesses.
( d ) Objections to the petition may be filed by a party within fifteen (15) days of the filing of the petition. If objections to the petition are filed, the administrative law judge shall then determine whether petitioner has the requisite interest to be a party in the proceedings, as defined in paragraph (b) of this section, and shall permit or deny participation accordingly. Where petitions to participate as parties are made by individuals or groups with common interests, the administrative law judge may request all such petitioners to designate a single representative, or he or she may recognize one or more of such petitioners. The administrative law judge shall give each such petitioner, as well as the parties, written notice of the decision on his or her petition. For each petition granted, the administrative law judge shall provide a brief statement of the basis of the decision. If the petition is denied, he or she shall briefly state the grounds for denial and shall then treat the petition as a request for participation as amicus curiae.
(78 South. 417)

#### SMITHERMAN v. STATE.

(6 Div. 406.)

(Court of Appeals of Alabama.

April 2, 1918.)

Criminal Law <&wkey;1129(l) — Assignments op Error — Necessity.

Appeal from order of court in criminal case on motion to retax costs prosecuted under Code 1907, § 3684, as amended by Act March 4, 1911 (Laws 1911. p. 90), is not within the purview of section 6264, requiring the court to search the record for errors without assignment, and an assignment of error on the record is essential to present question for review.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Jefferson County; H. P. Heflin, Judge.

J. A. Smitherman was tried for a crime. From an order of the court on motion to re-tax costs, both parties appeal.

Affirmed.

John P. Abbott, of Birmingham, for appellant. F. Loyd Tate, Atty. Gen., and W. S. Welch, Sol., of Bessemer, for the State.

BROWN, P. J.

This is an appeal from the order of the court on motion to retax costs prosecuted under the provision of section 8684 of the Code of 1907, as amended by act approved March 4, 1911. The motion was in part granted and in part overruled, and from the order both parties appeal.

From the foregoing, it is clear that the ap-, peals are not prosecuted under the provisions of chapter 162 of the Criminal Code, and are not within the purview of section 6264, which. ■»njoins upon the court the duty of searching the record for errors without assignments being made upon the record. In this case no assignments of error are made on the record, and the appellant Smitherman does not even submit brief or argument in support of his appeal.

We cannot consider the questions sought to be presented by these appeals without disregarding the uniform holding in this state that, except upon an appeal from a judgment of conviction in a criminal case, an assignment of error on the record is essential to present questions for review. Williams v. State, 117 Ala. 199. 23 South. 42; Perry v. State, 1 Ala. App. 253, 55 South. 1035; State v. Dodd, 9 Ala. App. 65, 64 South. 169; Stadt v. City of Birmingham, 14 Ala. App. 667, 70 South. 973; Dreyfus v. City of Montgomery, 4 Ala. App. 270, 58 South. 730; Williams v. State, 130 Ala. 107, 30 South. 484; Pugh v. Hardman, 151 Ala. 248. 44 South. 389; Hunter v. L. & N. R. R., 150 Ala. 594, 43 South. 802, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 848.

Affirmed.
```

[113th Congress Public Law 145]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

[[Page 128 STAT. 1753]]

Public Law 113-145
113th Congress

                            Joint Resolution

 
   Making an emergency supplemental appropriation for the fiscal year 
  ending September 30, 2014, to provide funding to Israel for the Iron 
Dome defense system to counter short-range rocket threats. <<NOTE: Aug. 
                      4, 2014 -  [H.J. Res. 76]>> 

    Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 
States of America in Congress assembled, <<NOTE: Emergency Supplemental 
Appropriations Resolution, 2014.>> That the following sum is 
appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise 
appropriated, for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2014, and for 
other purposes, namely:

                          DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

                               PROCUREMENT

                        Procurement, Defense-wide

    For an additional amount for ``Procurement, Defense-Wide'', 
$225,000,000, to remain available until September 30, 2015, which shall 
be for the Secretary of Defense to provide to the Government of Israel 
for the procurement of the Iron Dome defense system to counter short-
range rocket threats:  Provided, That such funds shall be transferred 
immediately only through an exchange of letters to address emergent 
operations in support of Operation Protective Edge, notwithstanding 
section 3.1.3.2.1 of the U.S.-Israel Iron Dome Procurement Agreement:  
Provided further, That nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to 
apply to previously appropriated funds for the procurement of Iron Dome: 
 Provided further, That such amount is designated by the Congress as an 
emergency requirement pursuant to section 251(b)(2)(A)(i) of the 
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985.
    This joint resolution may be cited as the ``Emergency Supplemental 
Appropriations Resolution, 2014''.

    Approved August 4, 2014.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY--H.J. Res. 76:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD:
                                                        Vol. 159 (2013):
                                    Oct. 11, considered and passed 
                                        House.
                                                        Vol. 160 (2014):
                                    Aug. 1, considered and passed 
                                        Senate, amended. House concurred 
                                        in Senate amendments.

                                  <all>
```
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Daniel A. Millis, Appellant.

[697 NYS2d 757]

—Mercure, J. P.

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Schuyler County (Buckley, J.), rendered March 5, 1998, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crime of attempted sodomy in the first degree.

Defendant was charged with the crimes of sodomy in the first degree, sodomy in the third degree, sexual abuse in the first degree, endangering the welfare of a child and unlawfully dealing with a child as a result of his contact with a 15-year-old boy. After undergoing two court-ordered psychiatric examinations, defendant entered a guilty plea to a reduced charge of attempted sodomy in the first degree in full satisfaction of the indictment with the understanding that he would be sentenced as a second violent felony offender to a seven-year determinate prison sentence. Sentenced in accordance with the plea agreement, defendant appeals.

We affirm. Initially, defendant’s failure to move to withdraw his guilty plea or to vacate the judgment of conviction precludes our review of his challenge to the voluntariness of his plea and the effectiveness of the assistance provided by his counsel *(see, People v Faulkner,*259 AD2d 905, *lv denied*93 NY2d 924; *People v Smith,*248 AD2d 891, *lv denied*92 NY2d 906). Nevertheless, were we to consider defendant’s claims, we would find them to be without merit.

The psychiatric reports available to County Court when defendant entered his plea indicate that although defendant suffered from depression and a variety of other psychiatric conditions, these problems did not impair his capacity to understand the proceedings against him or to cooperate in his defense *(see, People v Hanna,*236 AD2d 742, *lv denied*89 NY2d 1094). Moreover, County Court’s failure to ascertain whether defendant was taking medication at the time of the plea does not provide a basis for its invalidation in view of defendant’s unequivocal assertion that he fully understood the ramifications of his plea as explained by his counsel and County Court, that his plea *582was knowingly entered, and that he was factually guilty of the offense *(see, People v Davis,*250 AD2d 939; *People v Thompkins,*233 AD2d 759). Finally, considering the record as a whole and defendant’s acknowledgement during the plea allocution that he was satisfied with counsel’s services, we are not persuaded that defendant received ineffective representation *(see, People v Tuper,*256 AD2d 636).

Peters, Spain, Carpinello and Graffieo, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
§ 1921.16 Decision and order of the Director. ( a ) Upon the basis of and after due consideration of the whole record, the Assistant Secretary shall render his decision, which shall adopt, modify, or set aside the findings, conclusions, and order contained in the decision of the hearing examiner, and shall include a statement of the reasons or bases for the action taken. With respect to the findings of fact, the Assistant Secretary shall upset only those findings that are clearly erroneous. Copies of the decision and order shall be served upon the parties.
( b ) When a final order of the Assistant Secretary issued pursuant to § 1921.13(c) or paragraph (a) of this section has been in force for 2 years or more, a party may file with the Assistant Secretary a petition for modification or vacation of the order. Such petition must be in writing, and must be based upon satisfactory compliance with the order during the 24 months immediately preceding the filing thereof and upon such changes in conditions and circumstances as to demonstrate, if established, that a continuation of the order in full force and effect is no longer required to assure satisfactory compliance with the regulations under the order. Such changes in conditions and circumstances as are relied upon must be expressly set forth together with the reasons why petitioner believes relief is justified and the precise nature of the relief sought. The petition may be supported by affidavits as to matters of fact.
( c ) If, after such investigation as the Assistant Secretary deems appropriate, in his judgment sufficient cause has been shown to justify the relief requested, he will enter an order granting relief. If in his judgment, sufficient cause has not been shown he shall so notify petitioner, who may then in writing request a hearing. Upon receipt of such request the Assistant Secretary will refer the petition with its supporting documents and the request to the Chief Hearing Examiner who will assign the matter for a hearing to be held on not less than 10 days notice at a time and place to be set by the hearing examiner. The Deputy Solicitor of Labor may file a pleading and otherwise appear in opposition to the petition. The hearing will be subject to all of the provisions of §§ 1921.9 through 1921.22.
[31 FR 11144, Aug. 23, 1966]
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of Transportation

###### Federal Aviation Administration

          - 14 CFR Parts 91, 93, 121 and 135
          - [Docket No. FAA-1999-5926; Amendment Nos. 91-263, 93-80, 121-274 and 135-75]
          - RIN 2120-AG74

# AGENCY:

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

# ACTION:

Final rule; correction. 

# SUMMARY:

                        This document contains a correction to the final rule, published in the                         **Federal Register**                         on April 4, 2000 (65 FR 17736). That final rule amends special operating rules and airspace for those persons operating aircraft in the area designated as the Grand Canyon National Park Special Flight Rules Area (SFRA). That rule assists the National Park Service in fulfilling the statutory mandate of substantial restoration of the natural quiet and experience of the park.                    

# DATES:

This correction is effective December 1, 2000. 

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Kevin C. Willis, (202) 267-8741.

## Correction of Publication

                        In final rule FR Doc. 00-7950, beginning on page 17736 in the                         **Federal Register**                         issue of April 4, 2000, make the following correction:                     

1. On page 17736, in column 1, in the heading section, beginning on line 4, correct “Amendment No. 93-80” to read “Amendment Nos. 91-263, 93-80, 121-274 and 135-75”.

Issued in Washington, DC on May 15, 2000.

Donald P. Byrne,

Assistant Chief Counsel, Regulations Division.

[FR Doc. 00-12819  Filed 5-24-00; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910-13-M
NO. 07-05-0017-CR

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AT AMARILLO

PANEL C

MARCH 3, 2005

______________________________

MISTY BELITZ,

Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, 

Appellee

_________________________________

FROM THE COUNTY COURT OF DEAF SMITH COUNTY;

NO. 04-0396; HON. TOM SIMONS, PRESIDING

_______________________________

ON MOTION TO DISMISS

__________________________________

Before JOHNSON, C.J., and QUINN and REAVIS, JJ.

Appellant Misty Belitz, by and through her attorney, has filed a motion to dismiss this

appeal because she no longer desires to prosecute it. Without passing on the merits of the

case, we grant the motion to dismiss pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure

42.1(a)(2) and dismiss the appeal. Having dismissed the appeal at appellant’s request, no

motion for rehearing will be entertained, and our mandate will issue forthwith.

Brian Quinn

 Justice

Do not publish.
## ELECTRONIC RECORD 

# 3 5"7-/5"
COA# 01-13-00775-CR 

### Raleigh Jordan v.The State of 

### STYLE: Texas COA DISPOSITION: AFFIRM 

## OFFENSE: 37.l(Tamp Gov't Records) COUNTY: Harris TRIAL COURT: 209th District Court DATE: 03/10/2015 Publish: NO TC CASE #: 1329597



### IN THE COURTOF CRIMINALAPPEALS 

# 35*-/? 357-AT STYLE: Raleigh Jordan v. The State ofTexas 

# JPP£LL4NT\*> Petition FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW IN CCA IS: 

# Rf?fV5^ 

# mMu^ DATE: JUDGE: CCA#: 

### CCA Disposition: DATE: JUDGE: SIGNED: PUBLISH:

REHEARING IN CCA IS: JUDGE: ^_^_ PC: DNP:

MOTION FOR

ELECTRONIC RECORD
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                                   5

<S>                                                  <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                        3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                                    DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-END>                                         MAR-31-2000
<CASH>                                               2,442
<SECURITIES>                                         0
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<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     4,794
<PP&E>                                               62,480
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<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                       66,778
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                4,794
<BONDS>                                              0
<COMMON>                                             9,040
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<SALES>                                              0
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<CGS>                                                0
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<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
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<INCOME-PRETAX>                                      (34,695)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                         (34,695)
<EPS-BASIC>                                          0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0




</TABLE>
#### THE STERLING SUPPLY CORPORATION v. THE UNITED STATES

[No. 46024.

Decided March 5, 1945]

*Mr. Richard 8. Doyle*for the plaintiff. *Messrs. Blair <& Korner*and *Mr. Stanley Worth*were on the brief.

*Mr. Grover C.*Sherrod, with whom was *Mr. Assistant Attorney General Francis M.*Shea, for the defendant.

*283Opinion

per Curiam:

The foregoing findings of fact show that the Government received goods from the plaintiff under a contract which fixed the price of the goods at $10,174.20 but has paid the plaintiff only $275.34. The plaintiff is therefore entitled to recover the balance of $9,989.86.

It is so ordered.
#### KINGSLEY v YOCOM

Ohio Appeals, 3rd Dist, Marion Co

No. 713.

Decided November 21, 1929

Messrs. Wiedeman, Patton & Wiedeman, Marion, for Kingsley. '

Mr. Louis E. Myers, Marion, for Yocom.

CROW, J.

Section 5838 GC, is in these words:

> “When a Dog May Be Killed; Owner Liable for Damages. — A dog that chases, worries, injures or kills a sheep, lamb, goat, kid, domestic fowl, domestic animal or person, can be killed at any time or place; and, if in attempting to kill such dog running at large a person wounds it, he shah not be liable to prosecution under the penal laws which punish cruelty to animals. The owner or harborer of such dog shall be liable to a person damaged for the injury done.”

That statute was construed by the Supreme Court of our state in the case of Kleybolte v. Buffon, 89 OS. 61.

Mindful as we are, of the general rulé in Ohio, that the owner of premises owes to a trespasser thereon, no duty excepting the avoidance of wilful injury, that portion of the language we have quoted, which asserts that the liability is imposed regardless of the conduct of the keeper of a dog, precludes application of the rule which ordinarily exempts a keeper of premises from liability to a trespasser where there has been no intentional injury.

In the case of Lisk Admr., v. Horn, 109 OS. 519, the Supreme Court reiterates the doctrine of the Kleybolte case supra.

The absoluteness of the liability which *117such a statute creates, was earlier announced by our Supreme Court when a statute similar in substance though not in form, provided liability of a keeper of a dog, for injuries to sheep, the case being that of Job. v. Harlan, 13 OS. 485, where the opinion at page 492, says:

> “The liability of the owner is declared in express terms, and without any qualification.”

These three cases we have referred to, are in line with the text in 3 Corpus Juris, page 101, as well as with the reasoning in the case of Whittet v. Bertsch, 97 Atlantic Reporter, 18.

Plaintiff in error is therefore clearly entitled to have the judgment of the court of common pleas reversed, and that of the municipal court affirmed, and such will be the judgment of this court.

Before Judges Hughes, Justice and Crow.
[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 100 (Tuesday, May 23, 2000)]
[Notices]
[Pages 33330-33334]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-12853]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

Food and Drug Administration

[FDA 225-00-2000]


Memorandum of Understanding Between the Food and Drug 
Administration, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, and the 
Food Safety and Inspection Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, 
Regarding the Listing or Approval of Food Ingredients and Sources of 
Radiation Used in the Production of Meat and Poultry Products

AGENCY: Food and Drug Administration, HHS.

ACTION: Notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is providing notice of 
a memorandum of understanding (MOU) between FDA and the Food Safety and 
Inspection Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture (FSIS). The purpose 
of the agreement is to establish the working relationship to be 
followed by FDA and FSIS in responding to requests for the sanctioning 
of the use of food ingredients and sources of radiation subject to 
regulation by FDA and intended for use in the production of meat and 
meat food products.

DATES: The agreement became effective January 31, 2000.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Arletta M. Beloian, Center for Food 
Safety and Applied Nutrition (HFS-206), Food and Drug Administration, 
200 C St. SW., Washington, DC 20204, 202-418-3082.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: In accordance with 21 CFR 20.108(c), which 
states that all written agreements and MOU's between FDA and others 
shall be published in the Federal Register, the agency is publishing 
notice of this MOU.

    Dated: May 16, 2000.
William K. Hubbard,
Senior Associate Commissioner for Policy, Planning, and Legislation.
    The MOU is set forth in its entirety as follows:
BILLING CODE 4160-01-F

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[FR Doc. 00-12853 Filed 5-22-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4160-01-C