Bradley E. Heard v. County Council of Prince George’s, et al., No. 1877, Sept. Term 2021. 

Opinion filed on December 29, 2022, by Wells, C.J.

ZONING – ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW – JURISDICTION

When determining who may exercise authority over a decision involving local land use 

development, we analyze the relevant local planning and zoning provisions. In a District 

Overlay Zone, the Prince George’s County zoning ordinance provisions indicate that the 

Planning Board exercises original jurisdiction over detailed site plan applications while the 

District Council exercises appellate jurisdiction over such applications.

ZONING - STANDING – AGGRIEVEMENT – PROXIMITY

A protestant is specially aggrieved when the party is farther away than an adjoining, 

confronting, or nearby property owner, but still close enough to the site to be considered 

almost prima facie aggrieved, and offers “plus factors” supporting injury. When standing 

is at issue in a land use action, proximity is the most important factor to be considered. 

While there is no bright line rule for exactly how close a property must be in order to show 

special aggrievement, generally, protestants must demonstrate that they live no more than 

1,000 feet from the subject property and offer “plus factors” such as their lay opinion of 

decreasing property values and increasing traffic. In this case, Mr. Heard presented land 

records showing that he is the record owner of property that is 990 feet from the subject 

property and his belief that the proposed development would diminish his property value, 

increase traffic, and create unsafe conditions. Because Mr. Heard has demonstrated that he 

is specially aggrieved by the proposed development, we hold that he has standing in this 

land use matter.

ZONING – GENERAL AND MASTER PLANS – NON-BINDING ON 

SUBSEQUENT AMENDMENTS

General plans and master plans are generally viewed as non-binding advisory 

recommendations, unless a relevant ordinance or regulation makes compliance with the 

plan recommendations mandatory. Although Prince George’s County’s zoning ordinances 

require a preliminary plan to conform to the county’s general plan and applicable master 

plan, no such provision exists for a detailed site plan. Instead, the Prince George’s County 

Planning Board may apply alternative development standards from the development 

district standards so long as the alternative standards will benefit the development and will 

not substantially impair the implementation of the area master plan or sector plan. The 

County gives the Planning Board some discretion at this stage because the detailed site 
plan process is a method of moderating design guidelines so as to allow for greater variety 

of development, while still achieving the goals of the guidelines.

ZONING – ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW – SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

Our review is limited to determining if there is substantial evidence in the record as a 

whole to support the agency’s findings and conclusions, and to determine if the 

administrative decision is premised upon an erroneous conclusion of law. A conclusion 

by the planning body satisfies the substantial evidence test if a reasonable mind might 

accept as adequate the evidence supporting it. Here, the District Council did not err in 

concluding that there was substantial evidence in the record to support the Planning 

Board’s finding and approval of the DSP Amendment.
Circuit Court for Prince George’s County

Case No. CAL 20-18901

REPORTED

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF MARYLAND*

No. 1877

September Term, 2021

______________________________________

BRADLEY E. HEARD

v.

COUNTY COUNCIL OF PRINCE 

GEORGE’S COUNTY, ET AL.

.

______________________________________

Wells, C.J.,

Nazarian,

Ripken,

JJ.

______________________________________

Opinion by Wells, C.J.

______________________________________

Filed: December 29, 2022

* At the November 8, 2022 general election, the voters of Maryland ratified a constitutional 

amendment changing the name of the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland to the 

Appellate Court of Maryland. The name change took effect on December 14, 2022.
This appeal arises from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, 

affirming the decision of the Prince George’s County Council, sitting as the District 

Council (“District Council”), which affirmed the Prince George’s County Planning 

Board’s (“Planning Board” or “Board”) approval of an Amended Detailed Site Plan (the 

“DSP Amendment”). The DSP Amendment is for a mixed-use residential and commercial 

development on property located at 6301 Central Avenue, Capitol Heights—across from 

the Addison Road Metro Station. The appellant, Bradley E. Heard (“Mr. Heard”) lives 

about 1,000 feet from the subject property and opposes the project. Appellees are the 

District Council and 6301 Central Avenue, LLC (the “Applicant”)—the developer and 

applicant to the DSP.1 Mr. Heard and Appellees raise several issues, which we have 

rephrased and consolidated:

1. Do Mr. Heard and the District Council have standing to participate in 

this appeal? 

2. Did the District Council err when it concluded that the Planning Board 

was legally correct in treating the General Plan and applicable Master 

Plan as advisory documents rather than binding regulations in 

connection with the DSP Amendment? 

1 As discussed more below, the Planning Board approved the original detailed site plan 

(DSP-06001) for a mixed-use development on the property in 2006. The first amendment 

to this plan (DSP-06001-01) was approved by the Planning Board and revised, in part, by 

the District Council in 2006, 2007 and 2008. Mr. Heard unsuccessfully challenged the first 

amendment in circuit court and subsequently in this Court in 2011. (CSA-REG-1306-

2011). Mr. Heard also unsuccessfully challenged the Planning Board’s recent approval of 

the Applicant’s Preliminary Plan of Subdivision (Subdivision No. 4-05068) in circuit court 

(CAL20-14095) and subsequently in this Court (CSA-REG-1563-2021). The second 

amendment was withdrawn and is not relevant to this appeal. The third amendment to the 

original detailed site plan (DSP-06001-03) is the subject of this appeal.
2

3. Did the District Council err when it concluded that there was 

substantial evidence in the record to support the Planning Board’s 

findings and approval of the DSP Amendment? 

4. Did the District Council err when it concluded that the Planning Board 

was legally correct when it declined to condition approval of the DSP 

Amendment on offsite and site-adjacent improvements relating to 

bikeways, trails, and roadways?

5. Did the District Council err when it concluded that the Planning 

Board’s findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence and 

untainted by legal impropriety? 

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Property and Proposed Development

Since 2006, the Applicant has been working towards building a mixed-use, 

residential and commercial development in the southwest quadrant of the intersection of 

MD 214 (Central Avenue) and Addison Road, with frontage on Zelma Avenue, directly 

across from the Addison Road Metro Station. The 2.98-acre property has three distinct 

parcels: Parcel A, Parcel 87 and Lot 5, Block B. Each of the prior DSP applications the 

Planning Board considered for this development proposed a mixed-use building on Lot A, 

parking on Parcel 87, and empty space on Lot 5 for future development. Mr. Heard lives 

at 415 Zelma Avenue, roughly 1,000 feet from the site. 

B. How Property is Developed in General and in Prince George’s County

“There are two broad categories of land use control: zoning and planning (which 

includes subdivision regulation).” County Council of Prince George’s County v. FCW 

Justice, Inc. (“FCW Justice”), 238 Md. App. 641, 649 (2018) (citing County Council of 
3

Prince George’s County v. Zimmer Development Co. (“Zimmer”), 444 Md. 490, 505 

(2015)). Zoning is “the process of setting aside disconnected tracts of land varying in shape 

and dimensions, and dedicating them to particular uses designed in some degree to serve 

the interests of the whole territory affected by the plan.” Maryland Overpak Corp. v. Mayor 

And City Council of Baltimore, 395 Md. 16, 48 (2006). Typically, parcels must be used in 

compliance with their zoning. Zimmer, 444 Md. at 505. 

Planning involves “the development of a community, not only with respect to the 

uses of lands and buildings, but also with respect to streets, parks, civic beauty, industrial 

and commercial undertakings, residential developments and such other matters affecting 

the public convenience[.]” Id. at 505-06 (quoting 1 E.C. Yokley, Zoning Law and Practice 

§ 1-2 (4th ed. 1978)). “Because planning and zoning complement each other and serve 

certain common objectives, [] some implementation and enforcement procedures may have 

both planning and zoning aims.” Id. at 506 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

The property at issue in this case (the “subject property”) is within the Prince 

George’s County portion of the Maryland-Washington Regional District, as recognized in 

the Maryland-Washington Regional District Act (the “RDA”), now codified in Division II 

of the Land Use Article of the Maryland Code. Zimmer, 444 Md. 490, 523 (2015). “The 

RDA regulates planning and zoning within the Regional District, which includes most of 

Prince George’s and Montgomery Counties.” Id. at 524. However, the RDA delegates the 

State’s zoning and planning authority for the areas of Prince George’s County within the 

Regional District to Prince George’s County. Id. at 524-25. Thus, the RDA and the Prince 

George’s County Code (“PGCC”) govern the regulation of the subject property. 
4

Specifically, the RDA allocates planning and zoning authority in Prince George’s 

County between four distinct authorities: the Maryland-National Park and Planning 

Commission (the “Commission”), the Prince George’s County Planning Board, the Prince 

George’s County Council (referred to as the “District Council” when exercising its 

authority under the RDA), and the Prince George’s County Board of Appeals. The 

Commission deals with regional planning functions, while the Planning Boards in Prince 

George’s and Montgomery counties focus on local zoning and planning functions. See Md. 

Code Ann., Land Use (“LU”) § 20-202.

In Prince George’s County, before a developer builds on a site, there are regulations, 

ordinances, and development standards that affect the property and that the Planning Board 

must consider prior to approving any development plans. “Plans are developed to guide the 

implementation of land use controls and zoning in a rational way that is beneficial to the 

public.” Zimmer, 444 Md. at 520. In the Maryland-Washington Regional District, two types 

of plans are required: a “general plan” and “area master plans.” Id. at 521. A general plan 

is “‘more than a detailed zoning map and should apply to a substantial area, be the product 

of long study, and control land use consistent with the public interest. An important 

characteristic of a general plan is that it be well thought out and give consideration to the 

common needs of the particular area.’” Maryland-Nat. Capital Park and Planning Comm’n 

v. Greater Baden-Aquasco Citizens Ass’n., 412 Md. 73, 85 (2009) (quoting Yokley, supra

§ 5-2). The current general plan for Prince George’s County is The Maryland-National 

Capital Park and Planning Commission, PLAN PRINCE GEORGE’s 2035 APPROVED 

GENERAL PLAN (May 2014) (the “General Plan”). 
5

Master plans “govern a specific, smaller portion of the County and are often more 

detailed in their recommendations than the countywide General Plan as to that same area.” 

Greater Baden-Aquasco Citizens Ass’n, 412 Md. at 89 (quoting Garner v. Archers Glen 

Partners, 405 Md. 43, 48 n.5 (2008) (brackets omitted)). “Proposals for land use contained 

in a plan constitute a non-binding advisory recommendation, unless a relevant ordinance 

or regulation, or specific zoning, subdivision, or other land use approval, make compliance 

with the plan recommendations mandatory.” Zimmer, 444 Md. at 522. The applicable 

master plan for the subject property is the 2010 Approved Subregion 4 Master Plan 

(“Master Plan” or “applicable Master Plan”).

The subject property is also in a Development District Overlay (“D-D-O”) zoning 

district, which is intended to ensure that development in a designated district meets the 

goals established in a Master Plan, Master Plan Amendment or Sector Plan. PGCC § 27-

548.19. D-D-O zoning districts may be designated for town centers, Metro areas, 

commercial corridors, employment centers, revitalization areas, historic areas and other 

special areas as identified in approved plans. PGCC § 27-548.19. Importantly, D-D-O 

zoning districts set development standards for the properties they affect. PGCC § 27-

548.20. 

If a site must be subdivided from a larger property, the developer must file a 

Preliminary Plan of Subdivision. PGCC § 24-105.2In Prince George’s County, preliminary 

2 Prince George’s County, MD., Mun. Code § 24-105, the version of the code in 

effect at the time of the public hearing when the Planning Board considered Applicant’s 

DSP Amendment. See Layton v. Howard Cnty. Bd. Of Appeals, 399 Md. 36, 922 A.2d 576, 
6

plans are necessary to determine the adequacy of public facilities serving a proposed 

subdivision, and to establish conformance with the County’s Subdivision Ordinance. 

PGCC § 24-122.01. Preliminary plans often propose a general scheme of development—

demonstrating the location of the property, existing topography, and the proposed layout 

of roads, structures, utilities, open spaces, and storm water management. Transportation, 

recreational facilities, and other public facilities serving the proposed subdivision are 

evaluated for adequacy during the Preliminary Plan stage. Before the Planning Board may 

approve a Preliminary Plan, it must determine that the Preliminary Plan conforms to the 

Master Plan. PGCC § 24-104.

Once the Planning Board has approved a Preliminary Plan, a developer must provide 

a Detailed Site Plan (“DSP”) to the Planning Board in order to obtain a building permit. 

PGCC § 27-285(a). The Planning Board evaluates a DSP to establish compliance with the 

County’s Zoning Ordinance. Urban design elements, organization and location of proposed 

uses, and landscaping issues are assessed at this stage. PGCC § 27-283. In a District 

Overlay zone, DSPs are reviewed for compliance with Development District Standards by 

the District Council, in a Sectional Map Amendment, or in a later amendment of adopted 

standards. PGCC § 27-548.19. 

The Planning Board can choose to approve modified or alternative Development 

Standards during a DSP evaluation. PGCC § 27-281. The Planning Board may only 

approve a DSP with alternate Development Standards after a finding that the proposed 

593 (2007) (“In land use and zoning cases, the law shall be applied as it is in effect at the 

time of argument.”).
7

standard would benefit the development of the Development Overlay District and will not 

substantially impair implementation of the Master Plan, Master Plan Amendment, or Sector 

Plan. PGCC § 27-548.25(c). If the Planning Board approves a modification, it must state 

in its findings that the modification or departure conforms to all applicable Development 

Standards. PGCC § 27-548.25(e).

Before approving a DSP, the Planning Board must find that “the plan represents a 

reasonable alternative for satisfying the site design guidelines, without requiring 

unreasonable costs and without detracting substantially from the utility of the proposed 

development for its intended use.” PGCC § 27-285(b). See FCW Justice, Inc., 238 Md. 

App. at 658 (“As the Court explained in Zimmer, the detailed site plan process ‘is a method 

of moderating design guidelines so as to allow for greater variety of development, while 

still achieving the goals of the guidelines.’ 444 Md. at 562-63[.]”). Every DSP 

application—amendment or otherwise—is considered on its own individual merits by the 

Planning Board and an approved plan will supersede all previous DSP approvals. PGCC § 

27-289(b). 

C. The History of Development on the Property

The Master Plan for the subject property recommends mixed-use commercial and 

medium-high density residential land use. The subject property is located within the R-55 

(One-Family Detached Residential) (Lot 5) and C-S-C (Commercial Shopping Center) 

(Parcel A and Parcel 87) zones. It is subject to the Addison Road Metro Town Center 

Development District Overlay Zone (“District Overlay”), which has Development 

Standards (or “Standards”) that must be applied when planning a development. The 
8

property is also subject to the 2000 Addison Road Metro Town Center and Vicinity Sector 

Plan (“ARM Sector Plan”), 2014 Approved General Plan (Plan 2035) (“General Plan”), 

and the 2010 Approved Subregion 4 Master Plan. 

On February 9, 2006, the Planning Board approved a Preliminary Plan of 

Subdivision (PGCPB Resolution No. 06-37) for Parcel A, where the Applicant proposed 

to build a mixed-use building. On September 21, 2006, the Planning Board approved DSP06001 (PGCPB Resolution No. 06-217) for a mixed-use development on Parcel A 

consisting of 170 multifamily units and 22,696 square feet of commercial uses in an eightstory building. On May 15, 2007, the District Council elected to review the Board’s 

approval of DSP-06001, and affirmed the Planning Board’s decision, subject to certain 

conditions. On June 2, 2008, the District Council approved a revised condition in DSP06001 requiring the undergrounding of all on-site utilities. 

On September 25, 2008, the Planning Board approved Preliminary Plan 4-08019 

(PGCPB Resolution No. 08-124) for Parcel 87, where the Applicant proposed building a 

parking garage. 

On April 8, 2010, the Applicant submitted DSP-06001-01, which the Planning 

Board approved (PGCPB Resolution No. 10-50). DSP-06001-01 proposed a mixed-use 

development, including 171 multifamily units, 37,170 square feet of office space, a 32,820 

square foot public library, 15,890 square feet of retail space, all on Parcel A, and a fourstory parking garage on Lot 87. 
9

On December 18, 2019, Applicant requested the Planning Board reconsider 

Condition 17.b3 of Preliminary Plan of Subdivision No. 4-05068.4 The Board granted 

Applicant’s request for reconsideration. Mr. Heard filed a petition for judicial review in 

circuit court, which affirmed the Planning Board’s decision. Mr. Heard appealed that 

judgment to this Court, which also affirmed. 

On March 26, 2020, the Technical Staff5(“Staff”) of the Planning Board reviewed 

the proposed third amendment to the DSP (the subject of this appeal) for its compliance 

with the requirements contained in the ARM Sector Plan, zoning ordinances, Preliminary 

Plans, previously approved DSPs, Development District Overlay, and other applicable 

ordinances. Staff issued a 32-page report6recommending approval of the DSP 

Amendment, subject to certain conditions. In its report, Staff recommended that the 

Planning Board approve some of the Applicant’s requests for modifications from the 

requirements including increasing the setback from MD 214 and Addison Road, as well as 

decreasing the number of residential parking space requirements. Staff stated that the 

proposed building-mounted, pole-mounted, and other accent lighting, such as bollards, 

sconces, and other architectural lighting throughout the site met zoning requirements but 

3 Prohibited any left-hand turns into and from Parcel A. 

4 Approved by the Planning Board on February 9, 2006 (PGCPB Resolution No. 

06-37) for Parcel A, on which the mixed-use building is proposed, subject to 18 conditions. 

5

“Technical Staff” refers to the Planning Board Staff.

6 Following an application for a detailed site plan, the Planning Board Staff reviews 

the detailed site plan for the subject property and submits a report with recommendations 

to the Planning Board for its review. 
10

noted that the details of the proposed lighting should be included, along with their location, 

in the DSP. Staff also recommended that the Planning Board approve Applicant’s request 

for an approximately 50 percent reduction (140 parking spaces) in required residential 

parking spaces, noting that the layout of proposed on-site parking is broken into multiple 

locations. Additionally, Staff recommended raised crosswalks at all drive aisle 

intersections and all pedestrian crossings within the site, revised architectural elevations to 

remove the below-grade parking, a surface parking lot on Lot 5 of Parcel B, a 12-foot-wide 

sidewalk along the MD 214 frontage of the property, and five-foot-wide sidewalks along 

Zelma Avenue. Regarding the referral comments on the trails, the Staff noted that these 

improvements cannot be conditioned in the DSP Amendment because the trail is located 

within the right-of-way of MD 214 and is under the jurisdiction of the Maryland State 

Highway Administration. 

On April 9, 2020, the Planning Board held a public hearing (the “Planning Board 

Hearing” or the “Hearing”), where it reviewed exhibits and heard testimony from Mr. 

Heard, Planning Board Staff, and counsel for Applicant. Specifically, parties discussed the 

building’s setback, the surface parking lot on Parcel 87, undergrounding of utilities, safe 

pedestrian crossings, roadway improvements around the property, and the applicable 

regulations for the Planning Board’s approval, among other things. 

At the end of the hearing, the Planning Board voted to approve the DSP 

Amendment, 3:2. As approved, the DSP Amendment proposed a mixed-use building, 

consisting of 193 multifamily dwelling units and 11,000 square feet of commercial retail 

space on Parcel A and a surface parking lot on Lot 87. It modified the prior DSP by 
11

eliminating a three-bedroom unit and thirty-one two-bedroom units and replacing them 

with an additional forty-four one-bedroom units and ten studio apartments. It also replaced 

the previously approved parking garage on Lot 87 with a surface parking lot divided by 

landed medians and proposed fewer resident parking spaces than required by PGCC at the 

time. Finally, the DSP Amendment proposed modifications to the Development Standards 

set out in the Development District Overlay, including an increased set-back from the right 

of way line and permission to only provide crosswalk markings at intersections. 

On April 30, 2020, the Planning Board issued a 33-page Resolution (PGCPB No. 

2020-59) (the “Board’s decision”), considering the requirements of the ARM Sector Plan, 

zoning ordinances, Preliminary Plans, previously approved DSPs for the property, 

Development District Standards, and other ordinances, as well as the Staff’s Report, and 

the arguments presented at the Planning Board Hearing. The Planning Board’s decision, 

containing findings of fact and conclusions of law, ultimately approved the DSP 

Amendment, subject to certain conditions including the undergrounding of on-site utilities, 

specifications for site lighting, raised crosswalks at intersections and pedestrian crossings 

within the site, the construction of sidewalks on MD 214 and Zelma Avenue frontage of 

the property, and other items. 
12

On June 2, 2020, Mr. Heard appealed the Planning Board’s decision to the District 

Council, pursuant to LU § 25-210(a)(2)7and PGCC § 27-290(a).8 On October 26, 2020, 

District Council issued its final decision affirming the Planning Board’s decision to 

approve the DSP Amendment. In its decision, District Council explained its standard of 

review: 

When reviewing an appeal of a decision from Planning Board to approve a 

DSP application, Council may disapprove the Board’s decision if the 

decision was not supported by substantial evidence of record, is arbitrary or 

capricious, or otherwise illegal. Cnty. Council of Prince George’s Cnty. v. 

Zimmer Dev. Co., 444 Md. 490, 120 A.3d 677 (2015).9

7 LU § 25-210. Site plan review—District council

Authorized; appeal

(a)(1) Subject to subsection (b) of this section, the district council may review a 

final decision of the county planning board to approve or disapprove a detailed site 

plan.

(2) A party of record may appeal to the district council a final decision by the county 

planning board to approve or disapprove a site plan.

8 PGCC Sec. 27-290. - Appeal of Planning Board’s decision.

(a)The Planning Board’s decision on a Detailed Site Plan may be appealed to the 

District Council upon petition by any person of record. The petition shall specify 

the error which is claimed to have been committed by the Planning Board and shall 

also specify those portions of the record relied upon to support the error alleged. 

The petition shall be filed with the Clerk of the Council within thirty (30) days after 

the date of the notice of the Planning Board’s decision. The District Council may 

vote to review the Planning Board’s decision on its own motion within thirty (30) 

days after the date of the notice. A copy of the petition shall be sent by the submitter 

to all persons of record (by regular mail), and a certificate of service shall 

accompany the submission to the Clerk.

9 Alternatively, Council may affirm, reverse, modify or remand the application to 

the Planning Board. If the Council fails to act within the specified time, the Planning

Board’s decision is automatically affirmed. PGCC § 27-290(d).
13

District Council then addressed all fifteen issues raised by Mr. Heard on appeal of the 

Planning Board’s decision including many of the questions presented in this appeal. After 

a thorough review of the record, District Council found that the Planning Board’s approval 

of the DSP Amendment was supported by substantial evidence in the record, and was not 

arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise illegal, and affirmed the Planning Board’s decision. 

On November 23, 2020, pursuant to LU § 22-407,10 and Md. Code Ann., State 

Gov’t (“SG”), § 10-222(a),11 Mr. Heard filed a petition in the Circuit Court for Prince 

10

(a)(1) Judicial review of any final decision of the district council, including an 

individual map amendment or a sectional map amendment, may be requested by 

any person or entity that is aggrieved by the decision of the district council and is:

(i) a municipal corporation, governed special taxing district, or person in the 

county;

(ii) a civic or homeowners association representing property owners affected 

by the final decision;

(iii) the owner of the property that is the subject of the decision; or

(iv) the applicant.

(f)(1) A final judgment of the circuit court may be appealed to the [Appellate Court 

of Maryland] by:

(i) the district council;

(ii) the applicant; or

(iii) any aggrieved party to the circuit court proceedings.

(2) Each member of the district council is entitled to vote on whether the district 

council shall appeal to the [Appellate Court of Maryland], regardless of whether the 

member participated in the hearing on the matter or in the decision.

11

(a)(1) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a party who is aggrieved 

by the final decision in a contested case is entitled to judicial review of the decision 

as provided in this section.

(2) An agency, including an agency that has delegated a contested case to the Office, 

is entitled to judicial review of a decision as provided in this section if the agency 

was a party before the agency or the Office.
14

George’s County for judicial review of District Council’s decision affirming the Planning 

Board’s decision approving the DSP Amendment. On December 23, 2020, District Council 

filed a response to Mr. Heard’s Petition (“Response”) stating its intent to participate in Mr. 

Heard’s petition for judicial review.12

On February 3, 2021, Appellees filed a joint motion to dismiss Mr. Heard’s petition 

on the basis that he lacked standing to challenge the District Council’s decision 

(“Appellees’ Joint Motion to Dismiss”). On February 22, 2021, Mr. Heard filed a 

memorandum in opposition to Appellees’ Joint Motion to Dismiss, as well as his own 

motion to strike District Council’s Response to his Petition (“Appellant’s Motion to 

Strike”) pursuant to Md. Rule 7-204(a).13 Although the circuit court considered these 

motions, it did not rule explicitly on them.14

12 District Council’s Response did not state under what authority it was responding. 

However, Md. Rule 7-204, titled “Response to Petition” provides:

(a) Who May File; Contents. Any person, including the agency, who is entitled by 

law to be a party and who wishes to participate as a party shall file a response to 

the petition. The response shall state the intent to participate in the action for 

judicial review. No other allegations are necessary. 

(c) Time for Filing Response; Service. A response shall be filed within 30 days after 

the date the agency mails notice of the filing of the petition unless the court shortens 

or extends the time. The response need be served only on the petitioner, and shall 

be served in the manner prescribed by Rule 1-321.

(Emphasis added).

13 See footnote 12. 

14 The parties agree that this Court should deem the motions to have been denied.

See Mathis v. Hargrove, 166 Md. App. 286, 302 (2005) (“We begin by accepting 

appellants’ premise that the circuit court’s reservation of its ruling on the motion for 

summary judgment effectively operated to deny the motion.”). 
15

The circuit court did, however, conduct a hearing on the merits of Mr. Heard’s 

petition for judicial review and entered an order on January 5, 2022 (“Order” or 

“Judgment”) affirming District Council’s decision affirming the Planning Board’s decision 

to approve the DSP Amendment, and denying Mr. Heard’s petition. Specifically, the circuit 

court ruled that the Planning Board: applied the correct development standards and 

received substantial evidence to approve the DSP Amendment; did not err in refusing to 

condition approval of the DSP Amendment on offsite bikeway, trail, and roadway 

improvements; and made the requisite findings regarding the DSP Amendment. Mr. Heard 

filed his timely notice of appeal from this Order on January 26, 2022, and Applicant filed 

its timely cross-appeal on January 31, 2022.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“When we review the final decision of an administrative agency, [ . . . ] we look 

through the circuit court’s [ . . . ] decisions, although applying the same standards of review, 

and evaluate the decision of the agency.” People’s Counsel for Balt. Cnty. v. Loyola 

College, 406 Md. 54, 66-67 (2008). The issue here is whether the Planning Board or the 

District Council made the “final decision.” Mr. Heard argues that the final decision is the 

Planning Board’s decision because it has original jurisdiction over the approval of detailed 

site plans, while District Council only has appellate jurisdiction. Appellee, however, 

contends that District Council ultimately has original jurisdiction over such approvals. 

This Court’s reasoning in City of Hyattsville v. Prince George’s Cnty. Council is 

instructive on this issue. 254 Md. App. 1 (2022). That case involved a District Council 

decision to approve an application to rezone part of the parcel and change the list of allowed 
16

uses to permit townhouses for a property, as is the case here, in a development district 

overlay zone. Id. at 35, 38. In deciding that changing permitted uses in a D-D-O zone 

implicated the District Council’s original jurisdiction, Judge Arthur analyzed the pertinent 

provisions of Prince George’s zoning ordinance to determine whether “these provisions 

treat the District Council as the primary and final decision-maker on a request to change 

the underlying zone or allowed uses for a property in the development district.” Id. at 36. 

We answered that question in the affirmative. Id. 

In the present case, the relevant County zoning ordinance provisions include:

PGCC § 27-548.22(a), which states that 

The uses allowed on property in a Development District Overlay Zone shall 

be the same as those allowed in the underlying zone in which the property is 

classified, except as modified by Development District Standards approved 

by the District Council.

PGCC § 27-548.23(b), which provides that 

Development District Standards may modify density regulations only to meet 

the goals of the Development District and the purposes of the D-D-O Zone. 

Development District Standards may not permit density in excess of the

maximum permitted in the underlying zone.

PGCC § 27-548.23(e), which states:

The Master Plan, Master Plan Amendment, or Sector Plan[15] may specify the 

location and size of proposed roads and transit facilities. 

15 Although master plans must be approved by the Planning Board, they become 

effective only when approved by the District Council. See LU § 21-216; PGGC § 27-

646(c). Sector plans are “detailed plans for the development of a portion of one or more 

master planning areas.” PGCC § 27-107(a)(206.2). Sector plans are widely used in both 

Montgomery and Prince George’s Counties and are approved by the relevant District 

Council. See Pringle v. Montgomery Cnty. Planning Board, 212 Md. App. 478, 480–81 

(2013).
17

PGCC § 27-548.25, which states in relevant part:

(a) Prior to issuance of any grading permit for undeveloped property or 

any building permit in a Development District, a Detailed Site Plan for 

individual development shall be approved by the Planning Board . . . . 

(b) In approving the Detailed Site Plan, the Planning Board shall find 

that the site plan meets applicable Development District Standards. 

(c) If the applicant so requests, the Planning Board may apply 

development standards which differ from the Development District Standards, 

most recently approved or amended by the District Council, unless the 

Sectional Map Amendment text specifically provides otherwise. . . .

(Emphasis added).

In enacting PGCC § 27-548.22 and § 27-548.23, the District Council drew a clear 

distinction between changes to uses permitted in a D-D-O district, maximum density in the 

district, and the location of and size of road and transit facilities in a D-D-O district. Section 

27-548.23 is explicit that as to all of these matters, the “District Council [is] the primary 

and final decision-maker on a request” to amend permitted uses, maximum permitted 

density, and the relocation of streets and transit facilities. City of Hyattsville, 254 Md. App. 

at 36. In contrast, when the District Council enacted § 27-548.25, it made it clear that it is 

the role of the Planning Board to review and approve detailed site plans. 

None of the parties assert that the text of Sectional Map Amendment restricted the 

Planning Board’s authority under § 27-548.25(c). Thus, these provisions indicate that the 

Planning Board exercises original jurisdiction over detailed site plan applications and that 

the District Council’s review of such decisions is appellate in nature. 
18

Exercising appellate jurisdiction, “the District Council may reverse a decision by 

the Board only if that decision is ‘not authorized by law, is not supported by substantial 

evidence of record, or is arbitrary or capricious.’” FCW Justice, 238 Md. App. at 674-75 

(quoting Zimmer, 444 Md. at 573). As the Supreme Court of Maryland (at the time called 

the Court of Appeals of Maryland)16 explained in Zimmer, the appropriate standard of 

review of an administrative agency’s action is analogous to that used by courts in judicial 

review:

Judicial review of administrative agency action based on factual findings, 

and the application of law to those factual findings, is limited to determining 

if there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the 

agency’s findings and conclusions, and to determine if the administrative 

decision is based on an erroneous conclusion of law. The reviewing court 

may not substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency. Rather, 

the court must affirm the agency decision if there is sufficient evidence such 

that a reasoning mind reasonably could have reached the factual conclusion 

the agency reached.

Zimmer, 444 Md. at 573 (quotation marks and citations omitted).

Further, because the Planning Board has discretion to approve or disapprove 

detailed site plans, see PGCC §§ 27-281(a)(1) and 27-285(b), its decisions regarding 

detailed site plan applications receive even more deference. FCW Justice, 238 Md. App. at 

675. 

16 At the November 8, 2022 general election, the voters of Maryland ratified a 

constitutional amendment changing the name of the Court of Appeals of Maryland to the 

Supreme Court of Maryland. The name change took effect on December 14, 2022. See, 

also, Md. Rule 1-101.1(a) (“From and after December 14, 2022, any reference in these 

Rules or, in any proceedings before any court of the Maryland Judiciary, any reference in 

any statute, ordinance, or regulation applicable in Maryland to the Court of Appeals of 

Maryland shall be deemed to refer to the Supreme Court of Maryland....”).
19

Agency decisions receive an even more deferential review regarding matters 

that are committed to the agency’s discretion and expertise. In such 

situations, courts may only reverse an agency decision if it is arbitrary and 

capricious. Logically, the courts owe a higher level of deference to functions 

specifically committed to the agency’s discretion than they do to an agency’s 

legal conclusions or factual findings.

Zimmer, 444 Md. at 573-74 (quotation marks and citations omitted). 

DISCUSSION

I. Mr. Heard Has Standing to Participate in This Appeal.

A. Parties’ Contentions

Before we address the merits of this appeal, we must first address whether Mr. Heard 

and District Council have standing. Appellees argue that this case should have been 

dismissed by the circuit court because Mr. Heard does not have standing. Appellees 

contend that Mr. Heard is not prima facie, specially, or directly aggrieved by the District 

Council’s final decision essentially because he lives more than 1,000 feet from the 

proposed development. Mr. Heard responds that the circuit court was correct in 

determining that he had standing because he in fact does live within 1,000 feet of the 

subject property and has sufficiently alleged special aggrievements arising out of the 

proposed development. 

Further, Mr. Heard argues that the circuit court erred in failing to dismiss the District 

Council as an interested party. Specifically, Mr. Heard asserts that because the District 

Council reviewed the Planning Board’s decision in its quasi-judicial capacity, it therefore 

“had no cognizable legal interest or stake in the outcome of Applicant’s proposed 

development.” In response, District Council contends that it was acting as an administrative 
20

agency and, under LU § 22-407, District Council is legally entitled to seek a further right 

of appeal from a circuit court’s final judgment so long as the Council participated in the 

proceedings below. Moreover, District Council argues that Mr. Heard relies on the 

McKinney-Peco doctrine, which is inapplicable here, and, has since been abrogated.17

B. Analysis

Land Use § 22-407(a) authorizes the judicial review of land use decisions by the 

District Council. When the circuit court entered its judgment, § 22-407(a) read in pertinent 

part: 

(a)(1) Judicial review of any final decision of the district council, including 

an individual map amendment or a sectional map amendment, may be 

requested by any person or entity that is aggrieved by the decision of the 

district council and is:

(i) a municipal corporation, governed special taxing district, or person 

in the county;

(ii) a civic or homeowners association representing property owners 

affected by the final decision; 

(iii) the owner of the property that is the subject of the decision; or

17 The view that cases like Zoning Appeals Bd. v. McKinney, 174 Md. 551 (1938) 

and Md. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Peco, Inc., 234 Md. 200 (1964) stood for the proposition that 

an agency may not seek appellate review of a circuit court decision when the circuit court 

overruled the agency’s final administrative decision upon judicial review. See MarylandNational Capital Park & Planning Comm’n v. Anderson, 395 Md. 172, 202 (Harrell, J., 

dissenting). Although this doctrine has not been expressly overruled, more recent case law 

indicates that “when the agency’s decision does or can have significance in terms of the 

agency’s broader responsibilities, the limitations of McKinney are not applicable. In such 

a case, the agency must be free to intervene in judicial review actions and contest in the 

appellate courts judgments that may hamper it from effectively implementing the policies 

ordained by the Legislature.” Calvert Cnty. Planning Comm’n v. Howlin Realty Mgmt., 

Inc., 364 Md. 301, 319 (2001).
21

(iv) the applicant.

Mr. Heard is a resident of Prince George’s County and owns property there. 

Regarding standing in land use cases in Maryland, two conditions must be met: “(1) 

[the person or entity] must have been a party to the proceeding before the Board, and (2) 

[the person or entity] must be aggrieved by the decision of the Board.” Bryniarski v. 

Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Appeals, 247 Md. 137, 143 (1967), partially abrogated by 

statute, Md. Code (1982, 2013 Repl. Vol.), § 5-204(f) of the Environment Article, as stated 

in Patuxent Riverkeeper v. Md. Dep’t of Env’t, 422 Md. 294, 298 (2011). There is no 

dispute that Mr. Heard was a party to the proceeding before the Planning Board, so we turn 

to whether he is “aggrieved.”

Generally, a party is deemed aggrieved if the party can demonstrate that the decision 

will adversely affect the party’s interest in a personal and specific manner, not shared by 

the general public. See Ray v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 430 Md. 74, 81 (2013); 

Bryniarski, 247 Md. at 144. There are three ways a party may prove standing: (1) 

proximity; (2) special aggrievement; or (3) direct and specific harm. See Ray, 430 Md. at 

85-86. “A protestant is prima facie aggrieved when his proximity makes him an adjoining, 

confronting, or nearby property owner.” Id. at 85. A protestant is specially aggrieved when 

the party is farther away than an adjoining, confronting, or nearby property owner, but “still 

close enough to the site” to be considered “almost prima facie aggrieved, and offers ‘plus 

factors’ supporting injury.” Id. Finally, a protestant who is far removed from the subject 

property may still have standing if the party can show “his personal or property rights are 

specially and adversely affected by the board’s action.” Id. at 85-86. 
22

Where standing is at issue in a land use action, “proximity is the most important 

factor to be considered.” Id. at 82-83. While there is “no bright-line rule for exactly how 

close a property must be in order to show special aggrievement[,]” generally, a protestant 

must demonstrate that they live no more than 1,000 feet from the subject property and offer 

“plus factors” such as “an owner’s lay opinion of decreasing property values and increasing 

traffic[.]” Id. at 83-85, 91-92. As explained by the Court in Ray:

Although there is no bright-line rule for who qualifies as “almost” 

prima facie aggrieved, we have found no cases, in which a person living over 

2000 feet away, has been considered specially aggrieved. Rather, [. . .] this 

category has been found applicable only with respect to protestants who lived 

200 to 1000 feet away from the subject property. See Habliston, 258 Md. at 

352, 354-55, 265 A.2d at 885-87 (protestants held specially aggrieved when 

200 to 500 feet from site; owner testified regarding decrease in value); 

Chatham, 252 Md. at 579-80, 584, 251 A.2d at 2, 4 (protestants with 

proximity of 1000 feet, within the same subdivision who could see site of 

zoning change were specially aggrieved).

On the contrary, protestants who lived more than 1000 feet from the 

rezoning site have repeatedly been denied standing. See Shore Acres, 251 

Md. at 312, 317-18, 247 A.2d at 403, 406 (not specially aggrieved when 3760 

feet and out of sight of subject property); White, 251 Md. at 64, 246 A.2d at 

250-51 (not specially aggrieved when 0.5 miles from site, even though 

asserting an increase in traffic, increase in use of water system, and 

overcrowded schools); DuBay, 240 Md. at 182-84, 185-86, 213 A.2d at 488-

90 (three protestants—1500 feet, 0.4 miles, and 0.9 miles—who were 

separated by beltway or could not see site, not specially aggrieved); Marcus, 

235 Md. at 537-38, 541, 201 A.2d at 778-79, 781 (protestant living 0.75 miles 

away who could not see subject property denied standing); 25th Street, 137 

Md. App. at 86, 89, 767 A.2d at 920, 922 (protestant two blocks west and 

three blocks north, without sight of, or sound from, subject property, denied 

standing).

Id. at 91-92. 

In this case, Mr. Heard is the record owner of the property at 415 Zelma Avenue, a 

60-feet-wide lot, described in the deed as “Lot numbered Thirty-four (34) and adjoining or 
23

South 20 feet by full depth of Lot numbered Thirty-three (33)[.]” See Plat Book RNR 2, 

Plat 34; Deed Book 30028, pp. 173-76. The subject property owned by Applicant includes 

the property at 212 Zelma Avenue, more particularly described as Lot 5, Block B, of King’s 

Seat Pleasant Section 2 subdivision. See Plat Book WWW 16, Plat 61. The eastern 

boundary of King’s Seat Pleasant Section 2 subdivision is 1,327.74 feet long. The southern 

boundary of Lot 5, Block B, of King’s Seat Pleasant Section 2 subdivision is 277.74 feet 

from the northeastern limit of that subdivision. The northern boundary of Mr. Heard’s 

property—the midway point of Lot 33—is 60 feet from the southern boundary of King’s 

Seat Pleasant subdivision. Based on land records, the distance between Mr. Heard’s 

property and the subject property is 990 feet (1,327.74 – 277.74 – 60 = 990 feet).

Additionally, Mr. Heard has alleged “plus factors,” specifically his lay opinion that 

Applicant’s proposed development of the subject property will likely diminish his property 

values, increase traffic, and create unsafe conditions. 

As for Mr. Heard’s potential standing here, the Court’s decision in Chatham Corp. 

v. Beltram, 252 Md. 578 (1969) is instructive. In Chatham, two homeowners opposed the 

Board of Howard County’s approval of a decision reclassifying a residential zoning district 

to permit apartments. Id. at 579-80. Both homeowners testified that their property was 

approximately 1,000 feet from the subject property and that they believed the rezoning 

would depreciate the value of their property. Id. at 580. In light of this testimony, the Court 

held that the homeowners were specially aggrieved. Id. 

Because Mr. Heard has presented sufficient evidence supporting the fact that he 

owns property within 1,000 feet of the subject property and has alleged “plus factors,” he 
24

has demonstrated special aggrievement and therefore has standing to seek judicial review 

in this matter.

As for Mr. Heard’s argument that the circuit court erred in failing to dismiss the 

District Council as an interested party, we decline his and District Council’s invitation to 

address the issue of District Council’s standing because the property owner is also a party

in the judicial review action. See, e.g., State Ctr. LLC v. Lexington Charles Ltd. P’ship, 

438 Md. 451, 550 (2014); Fraternal Ord. of Police Lodge 35 v. Montgomery County, 436 

Md. 1, 13 n.13 (2013); Garner v. Archers Glen Partners, Inc., 405 Md. 43, 54-55 (2008) 

(declining to address whether the Prince George’s County Planning Board may participate 

as a party in a judicial review of its decision approving a Preliminary Plan for a residential 

development where issue was not preserved and it was conceded that the developer had 

standing to appeal). In Garner, the Court explained:

It “is a settled principle of Maryland law that, ‘where there exists a 

party having standing to bring an action ... we shall not ordinarily inquire as 

to whether another party on the same side also has standing.’” Sugarloaf 

Citizens’ Ass’n v. Dep’t of Env’t, 344 Md. 271, 297, 686 A.2d 605, 618 

(1996) (quoting People’s Counsel v. Crown Dev. Corp., 328 Md. 303, 317, 

614 A.2d 553, 559–60 (1992)); Dorsey, 375 Md. at 67 n. 1, 825 A.2d at 392–

93 n. 1; Md. Ass’n of Health Maint. Orgs. v. Health Servs. Cost Review 

Comm’n, 356 Md. 581, 589–90, 741 A.2d 483, 487 (1999); Coalition for 

Open Doors v. Annapolis Lodge No. 622, Benevolent & Protective Order of 

Elks, 333 Md. 359, 371, 635 A.2d 412, 417 (1994); County Council v. Md. 

Reclamation, 328 Md. 229, 232 n. 1, 614 A.2d 78, 80 n. 1 (1992); Bd. of 

Supervisors of Elections of Anne Arundel County v. Smallwood, 327 Md. 

220, 233 n. 7, 608 A.2d 1222, 1228 n. 7 (1992); Bd. of License Comm’rs for 

Montgomery County v. Haberlin, 320 Md. 399, 404, 578 A.2d 215, 217 

(1990); Montgomery County v. Bd. of Supervisors of Elections for 

Montgomery County, 311 Md. 512, 517 n. 3, 536 A.2d 641, 643 n. 3 

(1988); State’s Attorney of Balt. v. City of Balt., 274 Md. 597, 602, 337 A.2d 

92, 96 (1975). Our traditional reluctance to address issues of standing not 

necessary to the outcome of a case is highlighted in Sugarloaf Citizens Ass’n 
25

v. Northeast Maryland Waste Disposal Authority, 323 Md. 641, 650 n. 6, 594 

A.2d 1115, 1119 n. 6 (1991). There we declined to address a possible 

standing issue because it was unnecessary, noting “[i]n light of our decision 

on the merits, we need not and do not reach any issue of standing.”

 * * *

[W]e ordinarily do not decide issues of standing where it is undisputed that 

one party on each side of the litigation has standing. Thus, we decline 

Petitioner’s invitation to address the issue of standing where unnecessary to 

do so in order to decide the outcome of the case.

Id.

In this case, it is undisputed that Applicant, the current subject property owner and 

developer, and applicant of the DSP Amendment, who participated in the judicial review 

below, has standing in this appeal. Therefore, because addressing the issue of District 

Council’s standing is unnecessary to deciding the outcome of this case, we decline to 

address the issue. 

II. District Council Did Not Err When It Concluded that the Planning 

Board Was Legally Correct in Treating the General Plan and Applicable 

Master Plan as Advisory Documents Rather than Binding Regulations 

in Connection with the DSP Amendment. 

A. Parties’ Contentions

Mr. Heard asserts that the Planning Board erred as a matter of law by failing to 

consider the recommendations of the General Plan or Subregion 4 Master Plan, or by 

viewing these plans as merely advisory and not binding on the DSP Amendment. District 

Council and Applicant counter that approval of a DSP does not require conformance to the 

applicable Master Plan or the General Plan. 

B. Analysis
26

We review the administrative agency’s legal conclusions with less deference than 

its factual findings, “and may reverse those decisions where the legal conclusions reached 

by that body are based on erroneous interpretation or application of zoning statutes,

regulations, and ordinances relevant and applicable to the property that is the subject of the 

dispute.” Greater Baden-Aquasco Citizens Ass’n, 412 Md. at 84. However, even with 

respect to certain legal issues, “an administrative agency’s interpretation and application 

of the statute which the agency administers should ordinarily be given considerable weight 

by reviewing courts. Furthermore, the expertise of the agency in its own field should be 

respected.” Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Shea, 415 Md. 1, 14-15 (2010) (quoting Motor Vehicle 

Admin. v. Delawater, 403 Md. 243, 256-57 (2008) (quoting Aviation Admin. v. Noland, 

386 Md. 556, 571-72 (2005))). 

As discussed in Zimmer, general plans contain “at a minimum, recommendations 

for development in the respective county and supporting analysis[.]” 444 Md. at 521. 

“[A]rea master plans” apply to certain local areas and typically govern “specific, smaller 

portions of a county and are usually more detailed than general plans overlapping the same 

area.” Id. at 521-22. A “sector plan” is a detailed plan for the development of a portion of 

a master planning area. It is defined as:

A comprehensive plan for the physical development of a portion of 

one or more planning areas, showing in detail such planning features as type, 

density and intensity of land uses, pedestrian traffic features, public facilities 

(parking structures, public open space, rapid transit station, community 

service provisions, and the like), and relationship of the various uses to 

transportation, services, and amenities within the area of the sector plan and, 

where appropriate, to other areas. The sector plan may include maps, 

graphics, and text and is designated as the sector plan for the area which it 

encompasses.
27

PGCC § 27-107(a)(206.2).

Review of this application is subject to three plans: (1) the Addison Road Metro 

Town Center and Vicinity Sector Plan (ARM Sector Plan); (2) the 2010 Approved 

Subregion 4 Master Plan (Master Plan); and (3) the 2014 Approved General Plan (Plan 

2035) (General Plan). “[C]omprehensive plans [like the General Plan here] which are the 

result of work done by planning commissions and adopted by ultimate zoning bodies, are 

advisory in nature and have no force of law absent statutes or local ordinances linking 

planning and zoning.” Friends of Frederick County v. Town of New Market, 224 Md. App. 

185, 199 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted); Zimmer, 444 Md. at 522 (“Proposals 

for land use contained in a plan constitute a non-binding advisory recommendation, unless 

a relevant ordinance or regulation, or specific zoning, subdivision, or other land use 

approval, make compliance with the plan recommendations mandatory.”); Greater BadenAquasco Citizens Ass’n, 412 Md. at 98 (noting that Master Plans are generally viewed “as 

non-binding advisory recommendations, unless a governing statute or ordinance clearly 

elevates them to the status of a regulatory device.”) 

Thus, we turn to the PGCC to see if it makes conformity with the Master Plan, ARM 

Sector Plan, and General Plan mandatory for DSP approval. PGCC § 27-281(b)(1)(A) 

states that one of the general purposes of detailed site plans is to provide for development 

“in accordance with the principles for the orderly, planned, efficient and economical 

development contained in the General Plan, Master Plan, or other approved plan[.]”. 

However, under the Planning Board procedures, “[r]equired findings,” “[t]he Planning 
28

Board may approve a Detailed Site Plan if it finds that the plan represents a reasonable 

alternative for satisfying the site design guidelines, without requiring unreasonable costs 

and without detracting substantially from the utility of the proposed development for its 

intended use.” PGCC § 27-285(b)(1)(A).

Mr. Heard argues that PGCC § 27-281(b)(1)(A) transforms the Master Plan into a 

binding regulation on the DSP Amendment. For this proposition, Mr. Heard relies on 

Greater Baden-Aquasco Citizens Ass’n, in which the Supreme Court of Maryland 

considered “whether the [Prince George’s County] Planning Board, at the least, must 

consider the General Plan’s numeric growth objective when determining whether to 

approve or reject a preliminary subdivision plan.” 412 Md. at 97. The Court held that the 

Planning Board should have considered the General Plan’s numeric residential growth 

objective. Id. at 110. As the Court noted, the Master Plan stated that it was intended to be 

“in accordance” with the General Plan. Id. at 107. Thus, the Court reasoned that: 

[t]he Planning Board, in determining whether a preliminary subdivision plan 

conforms to the Master Plan, either must offer some analysis of how the 

preliminary subdivision plan under consideration may impact the long-term 

growth objective established in the General Plan or explain why such an 

analysis or conclusion is not required[] . . . What the Board cannot do, 

however, is ignore entirely a patently relevant element of the Plan.

Id. 

Although a court typically accords deference to the administrative body’s 

interpretation of regulations routinely before it, the Court found that the Planning Board 

did not even consider a relevant and applicable provision of the Master Plan, as required 

by County regulations. Greater Baden-Aquasco Citizens Ass’n, 412 Md. at 109. Instead, 
29

the Board simply determined “that the application was ‘not inconsistent with’” the General 

Plan’s policies. Id. The Court considered this “a broad conclusory statement[,]” 

unsupported by the facts in the record and therefore, “not entitled to deferential review.” 

Id.

However, Appellees respond that Mr. Heard’s reliance on Greater Baden-Aquasco 

Citizens Ass’n is misguided because that case involved the approval of a preliminary 

subdivision plan, not a detailed site plan. See id. at 97. Recently, this Court considered 

whether the District Council or the Planning Board exercises original jurisdiction over a 

detailed site plan approval required by the Board as a condition of preliminary site plan 

approval. FCW Justice, 238 Md. App. at 668. In FCW Justice, we explained the detailed 

site plan review process and requirements:

The legislative premise of the detailed site plan review process is that 

“regulation of land development through fixed standards can result in 

monotonous design and lower quality development, [therefore] certain types 

of land development are best regulated by a combination of development 

standards and a discretionary review....” PGCC § 27-281. 

* * *

Before deciding to approve a detailed site plan, the Planning Board 

must find that “the plan represents a reasonable alternative for satisfying the 

site design guidelines, without requiring unreasonable costs and without 

detracting substantially from the utility of the proposed development for its 

intended use.” PGCC § 27-285(b). As the Court explained in Zimmer, the 

detailed site plan process “is a method of moderating design guidelines so 

as to allow for greater variety of development, while still achieving the goals 

of the guidelines.” 444 Md. at 562-63[.]
30

Id. at 656-58 (emphasis added). Thus, Appellees conclude, although a preliminary plan

must conform to the applicable Master Plan and General Plan, PGCC § 24-121,18 the 

County Council, when adopting the County Code, determined that conformity to the 

General Plan and applicable Master Plan would not be re-tested at the DSP stage. 

Relatedly, Mr. Heard argues that under PGCC § 27-548.25(c),19 although the 

Planning Board is allowed to consider alternative development standards from the ARM 

Sector Plan when requested by the Applicant, such proposals cannot “substantially impair 

implementation of the Master Plan, Master Plan Amendment, or Sector Plan.” But, as 

discussed above, Appellees counter that under PGCC § 27-285(b) and this Court’s 

18 “(a) The Planning Board shall require that proposed subdivisions conform to the 

following:

(5) The preliminary plan and final plat shall conform to the area master plan, 

including maps and text, unless the Planning Board finds that events have 

occurred to render the relevant recommendations within the comprehensive 

plan no longer appropriate, is no longer applicable, or the District Council 

has not imposed the recommended zoning. Notwithstanding any other 

requirement of this Section, a proposed preliminary plan or final plat of 

subdivision may be designed to conform with the land use policy 

recommendations for centers, as approved within current County general 

plan. In such cases, the Planning Board may approve a preliminary plan 

application as may be designed to conform with the land use policy 

recommendations for centers, as duly approved within the current General 

Plan.”

19

“If the applicant so requests, the Planning Board may apply development 

standards which differ from the Development District Standards, most recently approved 

or amended by the District Council, unless the Sectional Map Amendment text specifically 

provides otherwise. The Planning Board shall find that the alternate Development District 

Standards will benefit the development and the Development District and will not 

substantially impair implementation of the Master Plan, Master Plan Amendment, or Sector 

Plan.”
31

discussion in FCW Justice, conformity to the General Plan and Master Plan is not required 

for DSP approval. 

Furthermore, the Planning Board’s decision reviewed the DSP Amendment for 

compliance with the Preliminary Plans for Parcel A and Parcel 87.20 Since preliminary 

plans must conform to the General and applicable Master Plan, it stands to reason that 

inherent in the evaluation of a detailed site plan’s compliance with its preliminary plan 

requirements, is the consideration of the General and applicable Master Plan. In other 

words, since conformity with the General and applicable Master Plan is tested at the 

Preliminary Planning stage, it does not need to be tested for such conformity again at the 

DSP stage.

This planning procedure was clarified at the Planning Board Hearing by District 

Council’s Principal Counsel, David Warner: 

MADAM CHAIR: Are you, let me make sure I’m clear on that. I want to 

make sure I’m clear on that, Mr. Wright [sic]. Are you saying they’re not 

controlling, for instance, Plan 2035 is the General Plan, we all know the 

General Plan is a policy document. It serves as a guide for future 

development. It does not, they do have value and it does not mean that we 

can just willy-nilly ignore it up to the extent, but each plan that’s approved 

thereafter, the Sector Plans, the Master Plans, the Sector Plans and then these 

other individual applications are refinements. 

20 At the Planning Board Hearing, Ms. Conner, with the Subdivision and Zoning 

section of the Commission, explained that there was no preliminary plan of subdivision for 

Lot 5, Block B because there was no development proposed on the lot at that time. Further, 

Ms. Conner explained that under the previous DSP, the Applicant had agreed to re-record 

the plats for the three parcels pursuant to PGCC § 24-108(a)(3) (“A final plat may be filed 

with the Planning Director and treated as a minor final plat for which no preliminary plan 

is required in the following instances: . . . The sale or exchange of land between adjoining 

property owners to adjust common boundary lines or consolidate lots, provided that in no 

case shall additional lots be created and that all properties are the subject of a record plat.”). 
32

MR. WARNER: Yes, so, yes absolutely. They are incredibly valuable 

documents and they guide planning, absolutely. However, and we refer to 

them in the Staff Report to help us inform or to help staff inform their 

decision making as you know any other kind of outside document we refer 

to whether it’s new urbanism or some other kind of, you know, I don’t know 

that we’ve adopted any new urbanism specifically. But we do rely on other 

documents that the county and the Planning Board have adopted to inform 

our review. 

[MR. WARNER]: But as far as determining whether a Detailed Site Plan 

can be approved, we look to what the Zoning Ordinance provides and 

requires. And the Zoning Ordinance does not require compliance with 

General Plan 2035 or the Subregion 4 Plan in order to approve this DSP.

(emphasis added). Each plan approved after the General Plan is a “refinement” of the prior 

plan. From that, it follows that a development proposal which complies with the applicable 

sector plan also complies with the relevant master plan. The District Council’s arguments 

are persuasive. The District Council did not err when it concluded that the Planning Board 

was legally correct in treating the General and Master Plan as advisory rather than binding 

documents at the DSP stage. 

III. The District Council Did Not Err When It Concluded that there Was 

Substantial Evidence in the Record to Support the Planning Board’s 

Findings and Approval of the DSP Amendment.

A. Parties’ Contentions

Mr. Heard contends that the Planning Board abused its discretion, and acted 

arbitrarily and capriciously, despite the evidence adduced in the record and the 

requirements of the applicable plans, by approving the DSP Amendment. Specifically, Mr. 

Heard argues that the Planning Board abused its discretion by approving a large surface 

parking lot on Parcel 87, approving an alternative standard that would allow Applicant to 

increase the building setback from the street, failing to require Applicant to provide safe 
33

pedestrian crossings, permitting Applicant to delay construction of sidewalks, failing to 

require Applicant to provide sufficient streetlighting, and failing to require Applicant to 

provide for the undergrounding of utilities. 

Appellees counter that the Planning Board’s decision to grant the requested 

modifications to the Development Standards is supported by substantial evidence in the 

record. 

B. Analysis

The Planning Board may approve a DSP as long as it finds that the plan represents 

a reasonable alternative for satisfying the site design guidelines (as outlined in PGCC § 27-

274), without requiring unreasonable costs or substantially detracting from the utility of 

the proposed development. PGCC § 27-285(b)(1). In order to approve the DSP, the 

Planning Board must find that the site plan satisfies applicable Development District 

Standards. PGCC § 27-548.25(b). If the applicant requests development standards that 

differ from those in the Development District Overlay, the Planning Board may apply the 

alternate development standards so long as the Planning Board finds that the alternate 

standards will benefit the development and not substantially impair implementation of the 

Master Plan, Master Plan Amendment, or Sector Plan. PGCC § 27-548.25(c). 

“Our review is ‘limited to determining if there is substantial evidence in the record 

as a whole to support the agency’s findings and conclusions, and to determine if the 

administrative decision is premised upon an erroneous conclusion of law.’” Greater 

Baden-Aquasco Citizens Ass’n, 412 Md. at 84 (quoting United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. 

People’s Counsel for Balt. Cnty., 336 Md. 569, 576 (1994)). “A conclusion by [the 
34

planning body] satisfies the substantial evidence test ‘if a reasonable mind might accept as 

adequate’ the evidence supporting it.” Id.

1. Surface Parking Lot on Parcel 87

Mr. Heard argues that the Planning Board erred or abused its discretion by 

approving a 0.9-acre surface area parking lot on Parcel 87. Development District Standard 

S2 provides: “[s]ingle, large surface parking lots are not permitted. Instead, parking shall 

be provided in smaller defined areas separated by planted medians.” But, Mr. Heard 

ignores the fact that the proposed surface parking lot features several land planted medians, 

as shown on the plans and demonstrated at the Planning Board Hearing. It would be 

reasonable for the Planning Board to conclude that these medians break up the parking lot 

into “smaller defined areas separated by land planted medians.” Additionally, with respect 

to Mr. Heard’s argument that Applicant should have negotiated for shared parking with the 

Metro parking garage across the street from the site, Applicant explained at the Hearing 

before the Board that County Code requires Applicant to have those spaces “in perpetuity 

if they’re provided offsite[,]” and “WMATA wouldn’t necessarily give us a long term lease 

or anything that would satisfy that legal obligation.” Thus, there is substantial evidence in 

the record to support the Planning Board’s finding that the DSP Amendment regarding 

parking complies with Development Standard S2.

2. Increased Setback and Teaser Parking

Next, Mr. Heard argues that the Planning Board abused its discretion when it 

approved Applicant’s proposal for an increased setback from MD 214 and Addison Road, 

as well as ten surface parking spaces between the eastern building façade and Addison 
35

Road South. Specifically, Mr. Heard argues that the increased setback breaks from the 

Development District Standards. Development District Standard S3(C) states: “[a] front 

build-to line between 10 and 15 feet from the right-of-way line shall be established for 

office, retail/commercial and institutional buildings which front onto MD 214 and Addison 

Road.” Additionally, Mr. Heard argues that the particular development breaks from the 

new urbanist principles, such as continuous building edges and consistent setbacks, as 

reflected in the Development District Standards’ goal for the building site and setback 

standards: “[t]o provide a consistent setback close to the right-of-way line or street edge 

without an attached row or block of commercial buildings. Setbacks should maintain a 

continuous building edge to define the public zone of the street.” Finally, Mr. Heard 

contends that Applicant’s “purported justification” for “teaser parking,” which he 

concludes is “solely for the use and benefit of automobile drivers,” is inconsistent with the 

Sector Plan’s transit and pedestrian-oriented goals. 

Yet, the Planning Board received substantial evidence justifying its approval of the 

modification to the setback requirement. On December 18, 2019, prior to Mr. Bishop’s 

Staff Report, Mr. Omar A. Karim, President of Banneker Ventures (Applicant/Developer 

of the subject development), responded to Mr. Bishop’s comment about the setback 

standards. Mr. Karim explained that a larger setback would be appropriate, in part, to avoid 

the WMATA underground metro tunnel zone of influence. “Constructing a building closer 

or over the WMATA zone of influence will greatly increase the construction of the project, 

which will increase the financial risks to the project making it less likely for the developer 

to be able to secure the type of funding needed to construct the project.” At the Hearing, 
36

Mr. Karim explained to the Planning Board that in Prince George’s County, retail rent will 

average $1.50 to $2.50 per square foot, but that would increase to $3.50 to $5.00 a square 

foot for retail built in the zone of influence, which is cost-prohibitive. Mr. Karim testified 

that building in the zone of influence could add at least $5 million in costs to the Project. 

Additionally, the Chair of the Planning Board, Ms. Hewlett, commented that “new 

urbanism doesn’t necessarily mean that [a 10-15 foot setback] is the only way to have the 

setback, that it’s got to be uniform.” 

The Planning Board also heard testimony from Ms. Stephanie Farrell, an architect 

with Torti Gallas Partners (an architecture and planning firm), who clarified that “[i]t is not 

that you cannot create a new urbanist active pedestrian mixed-use environment and have 

surface parking.” She explained that teaser parking would “make it easy or clear to 

vehicular patrons that there is parking[,]” which “helps make the retail successful and does 

not, I think, detract from the ability to make it an urban mixed-use building.” Ultimately, 

the Planning Board found that given the site constraints combined with the possibility of 

future development on Parcel 87, that the setback amendment would benefit the proposed 

development without substantially impairing implementation of the ARM Sector plan. 

Thus, the Planning Board’s approval of the amendment to the setback standards was based 

on substantial evidence in the record. 

3. Sidewalks 

Next, Mr. Heard argues that the Planning Board erred or abused its discretion by 

allowing Applicant to delay the construction of eight-foot-wide sidewalks and five-footwide planting strips along the adjacent Addison Road South rights-of-way and 12-foot-
37

wide hiker/biker trail along MD 214. On the DSP Amendment, Applicant noted that it 

proposed to delay construction of these sidewalks until the completion of improvements to 

MD 214 by another developer. Mr. Heard argues that without these sidewalks, the Central 

Avenue frontage of the subject property is not pedestrian-friendly and unsafe. 

ARM Development District Standard P2(C) provides that “[s]idewalks shall be set 

back from the curb on MD 214 and Addison Road to provide a safe and comfortable 

walking environment. Sidewalks should be made of concrete paving or better, be a 

minimum of five-feet in width, and should provide a five-foot-wide grass strip for the 

planting of shade trees...”. While these Standards require the implementation of the eightfoot-wide sidewalks and five-foot-wide planting strips and the hiker/biker trail, they do not 

specify a time for implementation. Applicant indicated it will implement the sidewalk 

improvements after another developer makes improvements at the intersection of MD 214 

and Addison Road. Applicant argues that the nature and scope of these improvements are 

such that any sidewalk or planning strip implemented prior to these improvements would 

be affected. Further, the Planning Board determined that it made more sense for Applicant 

to construct the sidewalks after the road is improved because the road improvements are 

“subject to the jurisdiction of other agencies” and therefore, requiring Applicant to 

construct the sidewalks before the MD 214 and Addison Road improvements would be 

inefficient and wasteful. For example, if Applicant’s sidewalks were constructed before

nearby road improvements were made, those sidewalks would be damaged or destroyed by 

subsequent improvements. Thus, we conclude that there was substantial evidence in the 
38

record to support the Planning Board’s finding that the delayed construction of the 

sidewalks was a reasonable alternative from the Development Standards. 

4. Lighting

Next, Mr. Heard argues that the Planning Board erred or abused its discretion by 

approving the DSP Amendment without ornamental pole-mounted streetlights along the 

adjacent MD 214, Addison Road South, and Zelma Avenue rights-of-way. 

Development District Standard P5, which concerns lighting in the subject area, 

requires that “[a]t the time of the first site plan in Metro West or Addison South, a 

consistent type of ornamental pole and luminaire shall be selected in consultation with 

DPW&T.” (emphasis in original). However, there are no development standards requiring 

an applicant to implement a specific type of ornamental pole-mounted streetlight along offsite, adjacent rights-of-way at the subject site. As discussed more later on in this opinion, 

the Planning Board does not have the authority to condition approval for the DSP 

Amendment on off-site improvements by Applicant. The Planning Board addressed this 

issue at the Hearing, explaining that many of the improvements Mr. Heard seeks, including 

the lighting, “[are] outside of the property that they are subject to the jurisdiction of other 

agencies.”

However, the Planning Board did have the authority to condition approval of the 

DSP Amendment on Applicant providing more information about its proposed on-site 

lighting, which it did. At the hearing, Ms. Farrell testified that “[t]here is a combination of 

bollards at the plazas and the residential entrance that are created off of Central and then [] 

in the parking lot it would be larger pole lighting . . . and building mounted lighting as 
39

well.” She added that this lighting would be decorative, and that Applicant would add 

lighting to “any additional walkways that are created inside the right of way.” Thus, there 

is substantial evidence in the record to support the Planning Board’s finding that Applicant 

complied with Standard P5. 

5. Underground Utilities

Finally, Mr. Heard contends that the Planning Board erred or abused its discretion 

by approving the DSP Amendment, which failed to show the placement underground of all 

existing and proposed utilities along the adjacent MD 214, Addison Road South, and Zelma 

Avenue rights-of-way. 

Development District Standard P6 requires “future development in the town center 

shall place all utilities underground.” Although the DSP Amendment does not show the 

undergrounding of utilities along the adjacent rights-of-way, Condition 1.c of the 

Resolution requires Applicant to: “[r]evise the site plan to show all on-site utility lines and 

facilities, for utilities that serve the subject property and the proposed project, as being 

placed underground.” Accordingly, the Planning Board has already required what Mr. 

Heard is seeking. Therefore, we conclude that the District Council did not err when it 

concluded that there was substantial evidence in the record to support the Planning Board’s 

findings and approval of the DSP Amendment.

IV. The District Council Did Not Err When It Concluded that the Planning 

Board Was Legally Correct in Declining to Condition Approval of the 

DSP Amendment on Offsite and Site-Adjacent Improvements Relating 

to Bikeways, Trails, and Roadways. 

A. Parties’ Contentions
40

Mr. Heard argues that the Planning Board erred as a matter of law because it refused 

to condition approval of the DSP Amendment on offsite and site-adjacent improvements 

relating to bikeways, trails, and roadways, such as connecting Zelma Avenue with MD 214 

and adding pedestrian crossing at Addison Road and Zelma Avenue. 

Appellees respond that the Planning Board is only empowered to condition approval 

of the DSP Amendment on roadway improvements at the time of subdivision pursuant to 

Md. Code Ann., Land Use, §§ 23-104(c), 23-103(a). Additionally, Appellees contend that 

the proposed trails and bike paths cannot be a condition of the DSP Amendment because 

the right-of-way is under the jurisdiction of the Maryland State Highway Administration. 

B. Analysis

Mr. Heard contends that the Planning Board failed to make necessary improvements 

to the rights-of-way adjacent to its property to connect Zelma Avenue to MD 214, and to 

provide safe crossings across MD 214, MD 332, and Addison Road South. To support his 

argument, Mr. Heard relies on Development Standard P1, which provides in relevant part:

F. Intersections should employ “safe-crosses.” This treatment enhances pedestrian 

safety by expanding the sidewalk area in the unused portion of the on-street 

parking lane adjacent to the intersection. []

G. Zelma Avenue shall remain and connect into the road network.

H. Old Central Avenue shall be removed from Rollins Avenue eastward. Rollins 

Avenue shall be extended north to East Capitol Street to facilitate traffic 

movement to MD 214 both east and westbound. New development shall 

accommodate the proposed closing of Old Central Avenue and not become an 

obstacle to future planned roads.
41

However, the Planning Board rejected this argument because it is only empowered 

to make the exactions Mr. Heard seeks at the subdivision—not DSP—stage. Land Use 

Article § 23-104(b) provides in relevant part:

(c)(1) [. . .], the subdivision regulations may include provisions for: 

(ii) the coordination of roads within the subdivision with:

1. existing planned or platted roads;

2. features of the regional district;

3. that county’s general plan; or

4. a transportation plan adopted by the Commission as part of that county’s 

general plan.

Further, under LU § 23-103(a), land dedication for roads occurs at the time of the 

“subdivision plat,” i.e., a Preliminary Plan. 

(a) [...] [I]n connection with the approval of a subdivision plat, the 

appropriate county planning board may require a dedication of land for:

(1) an interior subdivision road;

(2) a road that abuts the subdivision for the purpose of creating a new road 

as part of the plan of subdivision to provide for traffic access to another 

subdivision road; and

(3) the widening of an existing or public road that abuts the subdivision for 

the purpose of providing additional right-of-way adequate to serve additional 

traffic that will be generated by the subdivision.

Moreover, the authority to regulate roadway and other off-site improvements is not 

included in the purposes for which the local law may regulate. See LU § 22-104. 

At the hearing, the Planning Board considered Mr. Heard’s request for off-site 

improvements. Initially, the Board asked its Principal Counsel, Mr. Warner, whether Mr. 

Heard’s requested conditions could be included in the DSP Amendment, but the Board 
42

ultimately determined Mr. Heard’s requests were not within the purview of the DSP 

approval.

MADAM CHAIR: Well one of the things that might be the adjacent 

roadways that need to be made into full intersections. Because I don’t know 

that we have the ability to do that.

MR. WARNER: [T]he improvements to roadways are something that is 

analyzed at the time of Preliminary Plan of Subdivision and what is required 

in terms of those improvements is decided at that time. The issues that you’re 

looking at now are more design related when they come to things like parking 

and lighting and those kinds of issues. 

MADAM CHAIR: But even to make the roadways full intersections that 

would come from the Public Works and Transportation or State Highway 

Administration. 

MR. WARNER: Well many of the design improvements that [Appellant] 

addressed such as when are the sidewalks going to be built, why isn’t the 

lighting being put in. Yes, a lot of those are subject, they’re outside of the 

property that they are subject to the jurisdiction of other agencies.

As Mr. Warner explained, while the Planning Board may have had the authority to 

condition approval of the Preliminary Plan application on these off-site roadway 

improvements, it did not have such authority at the time of DSP.

Regarding Mr. Heard’s proposed trails and bike paths, in its decision, the Planning 

Board adopted a memorandum, in which the Transportation Planning Section reviewed the 

DSP Amendment for conformance with the 2009 Approved Countywide Master Plan of 

Transportation and the conditions of prior approvals. That memorandum acknowledged 

that the planned bike lanes will be constructed along Addison Road and MD 214, but that 

these improvements cannot be conditioned with the DSP Amendment because “the trail is 

located within the right-of-way of MD 214 and is under the jurisdiction of the Maryland 
43

State Highway Administration (SHA) [...].” The Board’s Decision also adopted a 

memorandum, in which SHA indicated that this application was not required to construct 

the improvements on MD 214. 

We conclude that the District Council did not err when it determined that the 

Planning Board was legally correct when it declined to condition approval of the DSP 

Amendment on Mr. Heard’s suggested offsite and site-adjacent improvements relating to 

bikeways, trails, and roadways. 

V. The District Council Did Not Err When It Concluded that the Planning 

Board’s Findings of Fact Were Supported by Substantial Evidence and 

Untainted by Legal Impropriety.

A. Parties’ Contentions

Mr. Heard argues that the Planning Board erred by not specifically addressing or 

ruling on any of his proposed findings of fact, but instead, simply adopting the Planning 

Staff’s Report. Additionally, Mr. Heard contends the Board erred by relying on the District 

Council’s “ultra vires” modifications of DSP 06001-01. 

Appellees respond that the Planning Board was not required to address Mr. Heard’s 

proposed findings or rule on each fact that he proposed, the Board simply could adopt the 

findings of the Planning Staff Report. Additionally, Appellees argue that the Board did not 

improperly rely on any findings made by the District Council’s review of DSP 06001-01 

when it approved the DSP Amendment. 

B. Analysis

We begin with the observation that “there is no requirement that the Board must set 

out in its findings of fact a discussion of all of the evidence.” Ocean Hideaway Condo. 
44

Ass’n v. Boardwalk Plaza Venture, 68 Md. App. 650, 661 (1986) (involving an appeal of 

a zoning decision made by the Ocean City Board of Zoning Appeals to permit construction 

of a seventeen-story building). Furthermore, a Planning Board may rely on a Staff Report 

as long as it “is thorough, well conceived, and contains adequate findings of fact.” Greater 

Baden-Aquasco Citizens Ass’n, 412 Md. 73, 110 (2009) (noting that a Planning Board’s 

“rote repetition” of the Technical Staff Report does not necessarily indicate a lack of 

meaningful fact-finding). 

Here, the record includes a thorough Staff Report, which reviewed the DSP 

Amendment for compliance with the ARM Sector Plan, zoning ordinances, Preliminary 

Plans, prior DSPs, and Development District Standards. Based on its findings, the Report 

recommended that the Planning Board approve the DSP Amendment subject to certain 

conditions, and also recommended that the Board approve some of the Applicant’s 

modification requests, such as an increased setback and decreased residential parking space 

requirements, among other items discussed above. The record also includes a long 

transcript from the Planning Board Hearing, where Mr. Heard was able to present his 

arguments to the Board and examine Planning Board staff and Applicant witnesses 

regarding his proposed findings of fact. In its over-thirty-page Decision, the Planning 

Board addressed all of the relevant criteria: compliance with the Development Standards 

and requests to make modifications, zoning ordinances, Preliminary Plans, previously 

approved DSPs, and other requirements. The Board’s decision also addressed the Hearing, 

discussing the evidence and specific issues presented. Considering all this information, the 

Planning Board made its Decision: 
45

After considering the entire record including presentations of M-NCPPC 

staff, the Technical Staff Report, the case presented by the applicant, all 

testimony and submitted documentation, and applicable law, the Planning 

Board determines the application meets the requirements of law and 

approves the DSP application pursuant to the findings contained in this 

Resolution embodying the Board’s final decision. 

Finally, Mr. Heard contends that the Planning Board improperly relied on 

previously approved DSPs for this site. When considering approval of an amendment to a 

DSP, the Board must make the same findings as it would when considering approval of the 

original DSP. PGCC § 27-289(b). That, in fact, is what the Planning Board did here, as 

discussed above. The fact that the Board noted that the previously approved DSPs were 

relevant because they addressed many of the same factors at issue in this DSP Amendment, 

does not mean the Board did not consider this DSP Amendment anew. Notwithstanding 

this argument, as Appellees point out, Mr. Heard appealed the District Council’s review of 

DSP 06001-01 and did not prevail in the circuit court or in his prior appeal to this Court. 

See Heard v. Prince George’s Cnty. Council, et al., No. 1306, September Term 2011 

(Decided: April 16, 2014). Because Mr. Heard failed to raise this issue during that appeal, 

he is barred from doing so now. Loveday v. State, 296 Md. 226, 229 (1983) (“Once this 

Court has ruled upon a question properly presented on an appeal, or, if the ruling be 

contrary to a question that could have been raised and argued in that appeal on the then 

state of the record, as aforesaid, such a ruling becomes the ‘law of the case’ and is binding 

on the litigants and courts alike[.]”) (quoting Fid.-Balt. Nat. Bank & Tr. Co. v. John 

Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 217 Md. 367, 372 (1958)). Accordingly, we conclude that the 
46

District Council did not err when it determined that the Planning Board’s findings of fact 

were supported by substantial evidence and were untainted by legal impropriety.

JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT 

FOR PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY 

AFFIRMED. APPELLANT TO PAY THE 

COSTS.