1

15-1842 

United States v. Mumuni

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER 

FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF 

APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY 

ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX 

OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION ASUMMARY ORDER@). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY 

ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for 

2 the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States 

3 Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 

24th 4 day of June, two thousand sixteen. 

5 

6 PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS, 

7 GUIDO CALABRESI, 

8 REENA RAGGI, 

9 Circuit Judges. 

10 

11 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X 

12 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

13 Appellee, 

14 

15 -v.- 15-1842 

16 

17 JIBRILLA MUMUNI, 

18 Defendant-Appellant. 

19 

20 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X 

21 

22 FOR APPELLANT: MARK S. DeMARCO, Bronx, NY. 

23 

24 FOR APPELLEE: BRENDAN F. QUIGLEY (Rahul Mukhi, 

25 Anna M. Skotko, on the brief), 

26 Assistant United States Attorney, 

27 for Preet Bharara, United States 
2

1 Attorney for the Southern District 

2 of New York, New York, NY. 

3 

4 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court 

5 for the Southern District of New York (McMahon, J.). 

6 

7 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 

8 DECREED that the judgment of the district court be AFFIRMED. 

9 

10 Jibrilla Mumuni appeals from the judgment of the United 

11 States District Court for the Southern District of New York 

12 (McMahon, J.) convicting him of conspiracy to distribute and 

13 possess with intent to distribute a kilogram or more of heroin. 

14 Mumuni was sentenced principally to 71 months’ imprisonment. 

15 Mumuni challenges: (i) the jury instructions, (ii) the 

16 sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction, and 

17 (iii) the reasonableness of his sentence. We assume the 

18 parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural 

19 history, and the issues presented for review. 

20 1. A defendant seeking vacatur based on an erroneous jury 

21 instruction must demonstrate both error and prejudice. United 

22 States v. Quinones, 511 F.3d 289, 313 (2d Cir. 2007). We review 

23 de novo challenges to jury instructions and we will reverse 

24 “only where the charge, viewed as a whole, either failed to 

25 inform the jury adequately of the law or misled the jury about 

26 the correct legal rule.” Id. at 314 (internal citation and 

27 quotation marks omitted). 

28 In United States v. Gaines, 457 F.3d 238 (2d Cir. 2006), 

29 and United States v. Brutus, 505 F.3d 80 (2d Cir. 2007), we held 

30 that a district court cannot instruct a jury that a defendant’s 

31 interest in the outcome of the case creates a motive to testify 

32 falsely. Brutus, 505 F.3d at 87; Gaines, 457 F.3d at 247. We 

33 further held that a district court could, however, charge jurors 

34 that a testifying criminal defendant does not assume any burden 

35 of proof and they should evaluate the testimony of a testifying 

36 defendant just as they would any interested witness. Brutus, 

37 505 F.3d at 88 n.7; Gaines, 457 F.3d at 249 n.9. 

38 Mumuni asserts that the district court erroneously charged 

39 the jury to evaluate his testimony like that of any other witness 
3

1 who had an interest in the outcome of the case. The district 

2 court’s charge closely adhered to the charge we explicitly 

3 approved in Gaines and Brutus. It informed the jurors that they 

4 should treat Mumuni’s testimony just as they would that of any 

5 interested witness, and that Mumuni took on no burden of proof 

6 by testifying. Critically, the district court did not instruct 

7 the jury that Mumuni, as an interested witness, had a motive 

8 to testify falsely. Accordingly, the challenged jury 

9 instruction was not erroneous. 

10 2. A defendant challenging the sufficiency of the 

11 evidence underlying his conviction at trial “bears a heavy 

12 burden” because our standard of review is “exceedingly 

13 deferential”: we “must view the evidence in the light most 

14 favorable to the government, crediting every inference that 

15 could have been drawn in the government’s favor,” and will 

16 uphold the judgment if “any rational trier of fact could have 

17 found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 

18 doubt.” United States v. Coplan, 703 F.3d 46, 62 (2d Cir. 2012) 

19 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 

20 The evidence presented at trial supports Mumuni’s 

21 conviction of conspiracy to distribute over a kilogram of 

22 heroin. An accomplice testified that Mumuni sold him heroin 

23 on two occasions, each of which was recorded and photographed 

24 by law enforcement agents, and Mumuni had extensive contacts 

25 with others involved in the drug trafficking conspiracy. We 

26 will not disturb the jury’s finding on grounds that the 

27 cooperator was not credible, United States v. Glenn, 312 F.3d 

28 58, 64 (2d Cir. 2002), or that Mumuni and his co-defendant were 

29 acquitted on other counts, United States v. Acosta, 17 F.3d 538, 

30 546 (2d Cir. 1994). 

31 3. We review a sentence for procedural reasonableness 

32 under a “deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. 

33 United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). That means a district 

34 court’s application of the Sentencing Guidelines is reviewed 

35 de novo and its factual findings are reviewed for clear error. 

36 United States v. Cossey, 632 F.3d 82, 86 (2d Cir. 2011). A 

37 sentence is procedurally unreasonable if the district court 

38 “fails to calculate (or improperly calculates) the Sentencing 

39 Guidelines range, treats the Sentencing Guidelines as 
4

1 mandatory, fails to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selects a 

2 sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or fails adequately 

3 to explain the chosen sentence.” United States v. Aldeen, 792 

4 F.3d 247, 251 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Chu, 714 

5 F.3d 742, 746 (2d Cir. 2013)). 

6 Mumuni fails to demonstrate any procedural error. In 

7 calculating Mumumi’s sentencing guidelines, the district court 

8 applied a two-point enhancement for obstruction of justice 

9 because it determined that Mumuni willfully had perjured 

10 himself at trial with respect to a material matter. This 

11 finding, which is not clearly erroneous, is a sufficient basis 

12 for applying the obstruction of justice enhancement. United 

13 States v. Salim, 549 F.3d 67, 73 (2d Cir. 2008). 

14 Accordingly, and finding no merit in Mumuni’s other 

15 arguments, we hereby AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. 

16 FOR THE COURT: 

17 CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK