This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A14-0626

State of Minnesota, 

Respondent, 

vs. 

Jason Wade Hostutler, 

Appellant.

Filed February 2, 2015

Affirmed

Bjorkman, Judge

Rice County District Court

File No. 66-CR-13-1839

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and 

Paul Beaumaster, Rice County Attorney, Terence Swihart, Assistant County Attorney, 

Faribault, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Kathryn J. Lockwood, Assistant 

Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant) 

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and 

Connolly, Judge. 
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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

BJORKMAN, Judge

Appellant challenges the denial of his presentence motion to withdraw his guilty 

plea based on the victim’s recantation. We affirm. 

FACTS

On July 19, 2013, M.G. arrived at the Northfield Hospital alleging that her exboyfriend, appellant Jason Wade Hostutler, had been choking and beating her for the past 

few days. Officer Mark Kohn spoke with M.G. at the hospital and noticed redness 

around her neck and left shoulder and a handprint-shaped bruise on her right bicep. M.G. 

also had bruising and a cut near her right elbow, which she attributed to Hostutler striking 

her with a broom handle. 

Respondent State of Minnesota charged Hostutler with domestic assault by 

strangulation and misdemeanor domestic assault. In late August, Hostutler pleaded guilty 

to domestic assault by strangulation. In exchange, the state dismissed the misdemeanor 

charge and agreed to recommend a stayed sentence. In early October, M.G. recanted her 

statements against Hostutler in an affidavit. M.G. explained that she fabricated her 

allegations because Hostutler had once falsely accused her of assaulting him with a knife 

and she “wanted him to go away.” 

Prior to sentencing, Hostutler moved to withdraw his guilty plea based on M.G.’s 

affidavit. The district court denied the motion, concluding that Hostutler provided a 

sufficient factual basis for his guilty plea at his plea hearing and that nothing indicated his 
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plea was “not fair and not just.” The district court subsequently imposed the agreed-upon 

sentence. Hostutler appeals.

D E C I S I O N

The decision to allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing is 

left to the discretion of the district court, and will only be reversed “in the rare case in 

which the appellate court can fairly conclude that the [district] court abused its 

discretion.” Kim v. State, 434 N.W.2d 263, 266 (Minn. 1989). A defendant is permitted 

to withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing “if it is fair and just to do so.” Minn. R. 

Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 2.1 When ruling on a presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea, 

the district court must consider the reasons advanced by the defendant, as well as whether 

granting the motion would prejudice the prosecution. Id. Underlying the “fair and just” 

standard is “the notion that giving a defendant an absolute right to withdraw a plea before 

sentence would undermine the integrity of the plea-taking process.” Kim, 434 N.W.2d at 

266.

Hostutler argues that he should be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea because 

M.G. recanted the allegations underlying the assault offense. Recantation by a 

complaining witness does not compel a district court to allow a defendant to withdraw his 

guilty plea. State v. Tuttle, 504 N.W.2d 252, 256-57 (Minn. App. 1993). Rather, the 

court must be “reasonably certain that the recantation is genuine” before granting such a 

motion. State v. Risken, 331 N.W.2d 489, 490 (Minn. 1983). “Courts tend to view 

 

1 Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1, allows a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea at any 

time to “correct a manifest injustice.” On appeal, Hostutler does not contend that 

withdrawal is warranted under the manifest-injustice standard. 
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recanted testimony with suspicion because of the possibility that it was obtained through 

coercion.” State v. Caldwell, 322 N.W.2d 574, 585 n.7 (Minn. 1982). 

The district court acknowledged that resolution of Hostutler’s motion required it to 

weigh two conflicting sworn statements: Hostutler’s testimony at his plea hearing and 

M.G.’s recantation in an affidavit. While the district court did not make an explicit 

credibility determination regarding M.G.’s recantation, by framing the issue as a choice 

between two conflicting versions of events, the denial of Hostutler’s motion implies that 

the district court did not find M.G.’s recantation to be genuine. We defer to a district 

court’s credibility findings. Vangsness v. Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d 468, 473 (Minn. App. 

2000). 

Moreover, the record supports the district court’s implicit credibility determination

and establishes a factual basis for Hostutler’s guilty plea. First, M.G.’s injuries, including 

bruising, redness around her neck and left shoulder, and cuts are consistent with her 

original allegations. Second, M.G.’s statements to Officer Kohn at the hospital 

immediately following the incident are consistent with her injuries. Finally, Hostutler’s 

testimony at the plea hearing is consistent with M.G.’s statement that he choked her. 

Hostutler stated “we were arguing, and we got in a little wrestling match at the top of the 

stairs, and we went rolling down the stairs, and when we got to the bottom of the stairs, I 

was on top of her with my arm on her neck.” He also admitted that he then wrapped his 

left arm around M.G.’s neck, squeezing to the point that she struggled to breathe. 

Hostutler nonetheless argues that plea withdrawal is warranted because M.G.’s 

affidavit is inherently reliable because it constitutes a statement against interest and M.G. 
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had a strong motive to fabricate. We are not persuaded. M.G.’s affidavit does admit to 

lying to law enforcement about the assault, but the risk of prosecution was likely 

minimal. The recognized possibility that a complaining witness might falsely recant 

statements due to coercion also undercuts the argument that the statement is inherently 

reliable. See Caldwell, 322 N.W.2d at 585 n.7. 

And the acrimonious relationship between Hostutler and M.G. arguably provides 

both with the motivation to fabricate. M.G.’s affidavit asserts that she accused Hostutler 

because he had previously lied about her attacking him, and she “wanted him to go 

away.” Hostutler’s past allegation could provide a motive for M.G. to lie. But as the 

state points out, Hostutler similarly recanted his allegation against M.G., and he could 

have used this to persuade her to do the same when the roles of accuser and accused were 

reversed. Such competing theories demonstrate that Hostutler’s previous recantation 

could plausibly lend support to either party’s argument. 

In sum, evidence in the record, combined with Hostutler’s own testimony, 

provided sufficient grounds for the district court to find that M.G.’s recantation was not 

genuine and that there is a sufficient factual basis for his plea. Accordingly, we conclude

the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Hostutler’s motion to 

withdraw his guilty plea. 

Affirmed.