inss.dodlive.mil SF No. 285 1 

Dating from Bashar al-Asad’s first suppression of mass demonstrations in 

April 2011, the war in Syria is now 3 years old, has killed more than 

130,000 Syrians, and displaced nine million Syrians, two million as refugees into neighboring countries.1

 Foreign intervention has increasingly shaped the 

course of the fighting and will continue to have substantial regional consequences. 

The complexity of this bitter, nominally internal struggle has dampened American 

enthusiasm for joining the fray or even paying much attention to Syria, notwithstanding the chemical weapon attacks on Gouta, east of Damascus, last August, 

which captured the attention of the American people, media, and policy community. 

With an international taboo broken and a Presidential redline crossed, public debate 

spiked in August–September 2013 over U.S. interests in Syria and the limits on what 

we will do to secure them. Debate did not result in a consensus for action.

The public remains broadly skeptical on a more forceful role as a result of 

arguments that have focused on the costs of substantive action.2 Some opposition 

has been driven by resource constraints and some by isolationist principles. Other 

opponents of action of any kind are concerned about precedents that would be 

set by intervention, and historical analogies that should be heeded in deciding 

whether to intervene at all. Resources, principles, and precedents are all important 

enough to deserve rigorous examination. Unfortunately, the national dialogue so 

far has not done those topics justice, but has been dominated conversely by assumptions, comparisons with other recent conflicts, and outright misconceptions.

This paper critically analyzes the most common arguments against substantive U.S. involvement in the Syrian crisis and generally finds them wanting. Some 

commentators have relied on misleading or inaccurate historical analogies to describe the current policy challenge. Others have been inaccurate in describing the 

main players in the Syrian conflict and the range of options available to American decisionmakers. Most dangerously, proponents of remaining aloof to the crisis 

have ignored the costs of continued inaction in human and geopolitical terms. In 

The Flawed Strategic

Debate on Syria

by Richard Outzen

Strategic Forum

National Defense University

About the Author

Colonel Richard Outzen, USA, is a 

Senior Military Fellow in the Center 

for Strategic Research, Institute for 

National Strategic Studies, at the 

National Defense University.

Key Points

◆ Opponents of forceful U.S. action 

in Syria have warned of dire 

consequences, but have generally 

failed to address the costs of 

inaction. The results of episodic and 

ambivalent action are also dire.

◆ Those arguing against robust 

assistance to the opposition have 

used Afghanistan and other 

historical analogies to support 

their positions, but the arguments 

frequently employ faulty history 

and faulty reasoning.

◆ There are options for coherent, 

effective action with regional 

support in pursuit of limited, 

achievable goals.

January 2014

Cent

e

r for Strategic ReS

EARCH
2 SF No. 285 inss.dodlive.mil

short, policy analysts owe the American public a better 

strategic debate than the one they have received so far.

Poor Assumptions

There is much to criticize over the past 2 years of 

U.S. Syria policy, which has largely consisted of strong 

rhetoric followed by irresolute action. The U.S. response 

to the Gouta attack provided the most striking example 

of mismatched words and deeds: public and media outrage prompted stern condemnations and threats of force, 

leading in turn to a round of Russian-brokered diplomacy, culminating in an agreement that removed the 

threat of American military action in exchange for the 

gradual removal of Asad’s chemical arsenal.3 The net effect of the deal was to confirm American indifference 

to Asad’s Iranian-sponsored war for regime survival, as 

long as he did not use chemical weapons. Some might 

argue that the United States had an interest in not being 

forced to act by a single act that energized public opinion 

and in that sense gained a small victory through inaction 

after Gouta. That meager gain did little or nothing to 

serve other possible U.S. interests in Syria, though, such 

as limiting Iranian influence, punishing a war criminal, 

supporting democratic change, or empowering the nonextremist Syrian opposition.

Failing to look at our broader interests has been a 

key failing of U.S. policymaking on Syria to date. So far 

the debate has focused on the costs of action while ignoring the costs of continued inaction. We need to ask 

the right questions: who is winning and losing what 

through our current toleration of the status quo? What 

might we hope to achieve by means of military force in 

concert with other strategic tools, and at what cost? How 

will our rivals and our friends view our actions or inaction? The higher level strategic dialogue that U.S. national interest requires can begin by clearing away the 

many misconceptions characterizing the debate to date 

and then providing a framework for strategically significant issues involved. Once we pare the Syrian crisis to a 

fundamental proposition about American influence and 

interest, we can come to grips with the glaring gap in 

U.S. strategy and policymaking that has rendered the 

United States impotent with respect to Syria and served 

our interests poorly.

The question of whether the United States should 

“get involved” in Syria presupposes that we are not already involved. In fact we have been involved for some 

time, just not in a strategically coherent or decisive manner. We have been involved through pronouncements 

of our leaders, through public and private bolstering of 

Israel, Turkey, and Jordan, through our encouragement 

of the Syrian National Coalition and Supreme Military 

Command, and through our training of elements of the 

Free Syrian Army (FSA).4

 For the most part, our actions 

have fallen short of our words; promised military aid has 

been slow in delivery while the Turks and other potential 

participants in military action have grown impatient with 

the slow formulation of a clear U.S. position.5 Our forces 

may not be involved in Syria, but our reputation certainly 

is. Failing to act decisively or effectively after speaking 

pointedly does not serve U.S. interests in any clear manner. John Mearsheimer, for example, may be right in 

asserting that the human and economic costs of direct, 

massive intervention in places such as Syria (or Iraq and 

Afghanistan) are not worth the possible benefits to our 

regional or strategic interests. He is certainly right that 

the United States should eschew “social engineering” 

in every dangerous place in the world. He is certainly 

wrong, though, in describing a world in which essential 

choices boil down to intervention (“global domination”) 

or isolation (“hands off ”).6

 There are numerous options 

for providing limited assistance or vigorously supporting the efforts of regional allies that would create U.S. 

influence on the ground without demanding massive or 

open-ended commitment. As things stand, the world has 

increasingly come to doubt American interest and commitment in international affairs, and this serves to undermine both the leadership role the United States has 

exercised for over 70 years and some of the achievements 

made possible by that leadership.7

Another wrong assumption is that because Syria 

is in a civil war—a war primarily between two Syrian 
inss.dodlive.mil SF No. 285 3 

sides—the United States has no significant stake in the 

outcome.8 Civil wars seldom remain strictly national affairs for long. In fact, they frequently become a means for 

regional powers to punish a competitor, gain clients, or 

exercise other forms of geopolitical influence. The Spanish Civil War in the 1930s started out as a civil war, but 

soon became a testing ground for Nazi Germany and 

Fascist Italy to try out doctrine, equipment, and personnel. It also became a rallying point for international 

leftists who entered the fray under Soviet sponsorship 

in a variety of volunteer units.9 The Korean War, Vietnam War, and wars in Iraq and Afghanistan all straddled 

the categories of civil war with two opposed, domestic 

sides, and international aggression or proxy war. The basis for intervention in Somalia in 1992 was refugee flows 

that the United Nations Security Council evaluated as 

a threat to international peace and security; the scale of 

refugee flight from Syria has been even greater.10 The deciding factor for intervention has never been whether a 

war can be described as “civil,” but rather whether the 

stakes of the conflict had direct bearing on U.S. national 

interests and even vital national interests. Syria, too, is a 

civil war, but it is also more than that.

The internal dimension of the Syrian civil war has 

roots in the 20th century; it is by no means an endemic, 

perpetual, or irreconcilable conflict. In fact, AlawiteSunni hatred in Syria is largely an unfortunate artifact of 

two historically recent phenomena: the French colonial 

policy of divide-and-rule in the 1920s, and 1960s-era 

Ba’ath Party politics. It is true that the majority Sunni 

community traditionally has seen Alawites and other 

minorities as “imperfect Arabs” or even apostates, and 

has reserved the leading political role for its own majority community.11 This chauvinism represents little change 

from the Sunni attitude during several centuries of Ottoman rule and did not previously precipitate large-scale 

bloodshed or intercommunal warfare.12

Political marginalization of the Sunnis began in earnest with the French practice of forming security detachments from the minority communities, which were then 

used to suppress uprisings in Sunni communities.13 This 

policy generated a cycle of privilege and resentment, a process cemented once Bashar al-Asad’s father Hafez seized 

control in 1970. Alawites came to dominate or monopolize 

most state economic, political, and military institutions.14

Subsequently, Asad created a brutal, dictatorial, and highly 

personalized regime that foreclosed the possibility of significant sectarian reconciliation.15 There are no grounds 

to conclude that the majority Sunni community, whose 

grievances derive from the appropriation of privilege and 

political control by a coalition of minority communities, 

would remain radicalized or violently anti-Alawite under 

less authoritarian political and economic conditions than 

those imposed by the French or the Asads. To the contrary, a post-Asad Syria better tethered to the surrounding political and economic communities would open up 

new routes for resolving disputes and social competition.16

Unfortunately, it is also probably true that the longer this 

conflict drags on, the more deeply entrenched ethnic and 

sectarian divisions could become.

Viewed from another perspective, the current conflict 

in Syria is not really about Asad or his Sunni Syrian antagonists. The external dimension of the conflict represents 

a series of geopolitical gambits by Asad’s sponsors, all inimical to U.S. values and interests.17 Russia seeks to retain 

naval access via its base at Tartus on the Mediterranean and 

preserve its most lucrative arms customer. Moreover, Russia wants to frustrate the U.S. policy of leveraging political 

change in the Arab Middle East to undercut authoritarian regimes and promote democratic development. China 

is not so closely linked to Asad’s regime as Russia, but it 

certainly shares the strategic goal of constraining U.S. ability to dictate norms of behavior internationally or regionally.18 Iran, meanwhile, has committed weapons, money, and 

manpower to preserve Asad’s hold on power. It provides this 

assistance because Syria is a “confrontation state” refusing to 

make peace with Israel and supporting terrorists targeting 

Israel and the West. Its support for Asad also aligns with the 

interests of its Lebanese proxy, Hizballah, which continues 

to threaten Israel and U.S. interests in the region.

The countries aligned with us over Syria, such as 

Turkey, the Gulf Arab states, and Jordan, also have their 
4 SF No. 285 inss.dodlive.mil

own geopolitical agendas, but in most cases, these are 

not inimical to our own. Turkey wants Asad gone, but 

it also wants to maintain Syrian territorial integrity and 

ensure democratic rights for Syria’s majority Sunni population—outcomes the United States also wants. Other 

probable Turkish motives include an oil pipeline through 

Syria to Turkey, prevention of a breakaway Kurdish region in Syria, and enhanced credentials as a regional 

power.19 Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, sees an opportunity to weaken Iran’s regional client network and 

help the United States blunt Russia’s regional access. It 

also wants to avoid repeating its mistake during Yemen’s 

civil war in the 1960s when it failed to support its proxy 

as well as its Egyptian rivals did and as a result lost influence over events in Yemen for decades.20

The anti-Asad front has generally remained steadfast but has waited in vain for the United States to throw 

more of its weight behind the drive to topple the leader. 

In contrast, Asad’s geopolitical backers—Russia, Iran, 

and Hizballah—have provided massive quantities of 

money, equipment, and men to Asad. The tide of the war 

has turned in the past half year not because Asad has 

become more attractive to his people, and not because 

his forces have become dramatically more effective—but 

because foreign patrons have provided equipment, training, and military advice in a more sustained and committed manner than Asad’s opponents.21 To ignore this 

geopolitical dimension in the public debate is to misunderstand and miscalculate U.S. stakes.

Setting the Wrong Precedents

The war in Syria today can and should be seen as a 

war to determine the nature of the regional system over 

the next decade or longer. The way the United States defines and defends its interests will set expectations and 

shape alliances; if the Nation appears irresolute, allies 

and enemies alike could ignore U.S. power altogether. 

Israel and Saudi Arabia, for instance, may take U.S. inactivity against the Iranian proxy regime in Damascus as 

evidence of U.S. untrustworthiness against the Iranian 

nuclear threat, and may take the matter into their own 

hands.22 In fact, British and Israeli newspapers reported 

planning efforts between the two countries to prepare 

a coordinated strike against Iranian nuclear facilities in 

the event of continued U.S. inaction—planning that presumably continued or accelerated after U.S.-Iran nuclear 

negotiations in Geneva bore fruit in November 2013.23

Turkey is also involved in a geopolitical struggle 

with Tehran, a struggle playing out in Syria, Iraq, and 

Central Asia.24 Turkey has much at stake in Syria and 

is vulnerable to destabilizing Iranian activity there for 

several reasons. First, Syria’s volatile north affects Turkey’s south through demography and ideological ties 

between insurgent groups on both sides of the border. 

Second, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has fully 

staked his credibility on Asad’s overthrow. Third, Turkey 

has become both a base and a target for the opposed 

sides in the Syrian war. Fourth, the struggle for primacy 

among Kurdish factions in the region has increasingly 

become a personal struggle between Massoud Barzani 

and Abdullah Ocalan; the growing influence of Ocalanaligned Kurds in Syria’s northeast threatens both Barzani 

and the Turks. The outcome in Syria will condition the 

U.S.-Turkish relationship for at least as long as the wars 

in Iraq did, which is to say for several decades.25 Failure 

to articulate and implement clear American strategies in 

Syria can damage the stability of both Turkey and Iraq. 

Turkey’s political class may decide that accommodation 

with Russia, Iran, and their proxies is more predictable, 

and therefore preferable, to waiting for the United States 

to back possible alternatives in the region. 

Asad’s apparent ability to employ chemical weapons 

and escape significant, concerted international response 

likely emboldened him. He has broken the taboo against 

using such weapons, remained in power, and been treated 

with sovereign respect by the international community.26

The Russian-brokered deal for Asad to allow inspection 

and destruction of some of Syria’s chemical weapons neither punishes past nor prevents future employment. In 

fact, it dignifies and legitimizes Asad’s regime. There are 

many countries that might contemplate their own chemical 

or nuclear deterrent in the Middle East, especially if they 
inss.dodlive.mil SF No. 285 5 

believe there is no real system to oppose their acquisition 

or use: Turkey and Saudi Arabia are prime examples. There 

is the previously mentioned demonstrative effect on Israel, 

which has been given reason to doubt American will to 

stop a nuclear Iran and is therefore more likely to contemplate unilateral action.27 Finally, the narrow American 

focus on chemical weapons violations shows a troubling 

ambivalence about the other forms of atrocity and oppression rampant in Syria, and an aloofness that compares 

poorly with the resolute Iranian and Russian positions.

Faulty Historical Analogies

Some observers oppose robust action in Syria by citing our experience in Afghanistan. The standard assertion is that Syria’s social complexity and fractured state 

structure recall Afghanistan, and that Washington has 

neither the time, the patience, nor the resources to see 

through a fight under such conditions.28 According to 

this view, such complexity in Afghanistan in the 1980s 

led us to aid an overwhelmingly jihadist resistance movement (the mujahideen) on the advice of Saudi Arabia 

and Pakistan, without really understanding who they 

were. Once they took control, they lashed out against 

us—more or less predictably—since they were extremists to begin with and we accepted them as allies against 

the Soviets only due to a utilitarian Cold War logic that 

would come back to haunt us years later. This characterization of Afghanistan and U.S. policy there provides the 

backdrop for objections against forceful action in Syria 

today, and in complex struggles across the globe more 

generally. The analogy relies on lore and speculation more 

than fact, however—it amounts to a historical myth.29

In addition, this version of reality overstates similarities between Afghanistan and Syria on two counts. First, it 

exaggerates jihadist domination of the Syrian opposition. 

The opposition’s main umbrella organizations—the Syrian 

National Coalition at the political level and the FSA at 

the operational level—are internationalist and moderate 

in outlook. It appears that a significant number of frontline fighting units are drawn from jihadist elements, but 

no one can precisely quantify proportions, and it would be 

wild speculation to say that a majority or even a significant 

minority of the fighters are jihadist. The Washington Institute’s Aaron Zelin estimates foreign fighters in the Syrian opposition between 5,000 and 10,000; even if they are 

monolithically jihadist, this is a minority in an opposition 

that numbers nearer 100,000.30 Ken Sofer and Juliana Sofroth have conducted a focused study of the composition 

and internal dynamics of the opposition forces in Syria 

and concluded that moderates constitute by far the majority of the total force.31 Reports that claim jihadi domination without a similar body of substantiating data should 

be treated with appropriate skepticism.

The jihadist groups are not the only game in town, 

not by a long shot. An umbrella organization for coordination of opposition military efforts, the Supreme Military Command (SMC), was formed over a year ago and 

has exercised varying degrees of control over the forces 

in the field. Since December 2012, four types of forces 

have operated under varying degrees of SMC control: 

the Free Syrian Army, Syrian Liberation Front, Syrian 

Islamic Front, and various independent brigades and regional commands. The table summarizes the nature of 

the groups and their estimated numbers.32

A fifth group, the al Qaeda–affiliated al-Nusra 

Front, operates outside the SMC framework. These 

data, which should be taken as orders of magnitude 

rather than absolutes, suggest that the Syrian opposition is not monolithic or static and can be engaged 

and influenced. Even if the al-Nusra Front figures have 

grown significantly in the past year—or even doubled—

nowhere near a majority of the rebels come from the 

jihadist camp. There are signs, moreover, that the more 

moderate Islamist groups have begun a coordinated 

campaign to crush the al Qaeda–linked Islamic State 

of Iraq and the Levant and removed the jihadist taint 

from the global image of the Syrian resistance.33 The 

SMC provides a mechanism to channel U.S. assistance 

to the opposition and to influence the course of events 

on the ground should such an approach ever be tried.

The greatest risk of radicalization, ironically, may 

be the prospect that Western indifference and failure to 
6 SF No. 285 inss.dodlive.mil

aid moderates lead to the dissolution of moderate rebel 

groups and drive the most determined Asad opponents 

to join the more radical groups. The current disregard 

of moderate forces evokes the Carter administration’s 

failure to embrace Anastasio Somoza Debayle’s nonCommunist opposition in Nicaragua in 1979 before the 

triumph of the Sandinistas became a foregone conclusion. Ignoring warnings from Venezuelan President Carlos Andres Perez that “hands off ” meant handing victory 

off to more radical forces, Carter dithered. The result was 

a decade of Communist rule in Nicaragua, the devastation of the country in continued civil war, and the IranContra scandal in the United States.34

Empowering the SMC begins with unifying the 

flow of resources to the various rebel groups. As Sofer 

and Sofroth put it:

The competition for limited resources within the Syrian 

Opposition Coalition and the SMC—exacerbated by 

informal funding streams and factionalism—poses the 

most immediate risk to the effort to create a cohesive, 

national Syrian opposition that could immediately 

step in and fill the ensuing security vacuum if 

and when the Assad regime falls. . . . [I]ncreased 

materiel support and lethal aid to the rebels should be 

contingent on better organization by the opposition 

in order to limit the potential for a proliferation 

of weapons. Without a stronger mechanism by the 

SMC to distribute supplies and arms, it is unlikely 

that directly arming the opposition will contribute 

significantly to the anti-Assad effort. But failing to 

provide the Syrian Opposition Coalition and the 

SMC with any financial and materiel support will 

eliminate what little leverage they currently possess 

over the transition efforts.35

As much as it would be a mistake to ignore the role 

of radical groups in the fighting, it would be an even bigger mistake to use their presence as a reason to stop supporting the moderates who remain in the field. The SMC 

represents a channel through which U.S. and Western 

resources can be assured of reaching groups with both 

operational effectiveness and reasonable political oversight. Perhaps most importantly, the SMC provides a 

potential national-level institution for control of armed 

groups if the Asad institutions collapse altogether.

The second reason Afghanistan-Syria analogies fail 

is that they rest on a false memory—that the United 

States gave weapons to radicals to fight Soviet troops, but 

the radicals targeted us as well. A typical account states, 

Group Description Estimated Force Size

Supreme Military Command (SMC) Umbrella organization N/A

Free Syrian Army (FSA) Ideologically moderate; comprised 

of many small local groups; fully 

integrated within SMC

50,000

Syrian Liberation Front Moderate Islamists; supported by 

Saudi Arabia; partially integrated/

closely coordinated with SMC

37,000

Syrian Islamic Front Conservative Salafists; funded 

by wealthy private Arab donors; 

nationalist; cooperates with SMC

13,000

Independents Nine separate “brigade alliances”; 

outside FSA but coordinated with it

15,000+

Al-Nusra Front Syrian and foreign jihadist fighters; 

some local cooperation with SMC 

subunits, increasing friction and 

fighting between the two

6,000

Syria’s Major Actors
inss.dodlive.mil SF No. 285 7 

“It originated with the [Central Intelligence Agency’s] 

decision in the 1980s to arm the Muslim jihadists opposing the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan—the 

same jihadis, including Osama bin Laden, who morphed 

into al Qaeda. With the Soviets driven out, bin Laden 

used Afghanistan as a haven from which to plan and 

carry out the 9/11 attacks.”36

What happened in Afghanistan during the 1980s 

and 1990s was, of course, more complicated than what the 

sound bites now commonly call “blowback.” The Soviets 

withdrew as a result of war fatigue and a sustained campaign by a broad coalition of Afghan mujahideen groups 

that were by no means uniformly jihadist and anti-Western. 

The regime the Soviets left in place survived for 3 years, falling in 1991. In fact, Osama bin Laden and his nascent organization were insignificant players during the 1980s. Only 

when the mujahideen fell into division and disarray after 

1991, and civil governance in effect collapsed, did the extremist Taliban and their al Qaeda allies become the dominant political and military force in the country. A modicum 

of continued U.S. aid and advice might have prevented the 

ascendance of the radicals. So the problem was not that 

our ill-advised proxy turned on us; it was rather that we 

got what we wanted (Soviet withdrawal), stopped paying 

much attention, and looked on passively while radical forces 

gradually seized control. There is real concern that Syria can 

become “Jihadistan” à la Afghanistan 1990s, but we must 

remember that it was not our support but the factionalism 

fueled by its discontinuation that brought the Taliban to 

power.37 As Ahmed Rashid succinctly put it:

After providing billions of dollars’ worth of arms 

and ammunition to the Mujahideen, the USA 

began to walk away from the Afghan issue after 

Soviet troops completed their withdrawal in 1989. 

That walk became a run in 1992 after the fall of 

Kabul. Washington allowed its allies in the region, 

Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, free rein to sort out 

the ensuing Afghan civil war. . . . Washington’s 

policy . . . was stymied by the lack of a strategic 

framework. The USA dealt with issues as they came 

up, in a haphazard, piecemeal fashion, rather than 

applying a coherent, strategic vision.38

The idea that more direct or vigorous U.S. support 

to the anti-Asad opposition necessarily strengthens the 

jihadists therefore deserves closer scrutiny. Most of what 

we know about jihadist groups comes from the fringes of 

violent conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Caucasus, and 

the Arabian Peninsula—countries and regions undergoing the chaos of regime change, occupation, and civil 

war. Jihadism has been a response to particular stimuli in 

those places, usually a combination of external pressure 

and internal decline that leaves populations willing to 

tolerate or unable to restrain gangs of radical or nihilistic 

entrepreneurs of violence. Jihadism becomes a mobilization tool for resistance to the external stimulus; it is a 

code for resistance and protest rather than for rule.39

Middle Eastern history is replete with examples of 

groups that have drawn upon radical ideology to resist 

expropriation, depose despots, or seize power. Once the 

political question at hand was settled, more traditional 

patterns of rule and state behavior emerged.40 In fact, it 

is the inconclusive, indeterminate nature of the current 

struggle in Syria that imbues jihadist groups with their 

appeal to potential jihadists and their tactical value to the 

opposition. The decay of existing Syrian institutions and 

the alienation of Syria from international institutions 

and norms only exacerbate the vulnerability of Syrian 

communities to manipulation or attack by such groups. 

If the U.S. goal is not to empower jihadists, remaining 

aloof from the conflict is the wrong choice. Helping the 

post-Asad Syrian regime from its formative stages will 

help the process of cobbling together a ruling coalition 

from an ethnically and politically diverse polity, and rebuilding the norms of responsible state behavior.

Iran, for its part, is leaving nothing to chance in Syria—

it has consolidated an impressive level of control over the 

state and economy that Asad presides over. Iran announced 

$4.6 billion in credit arrangements for oil and supplies during 2013, and indicated willingness to continue such support in the future. Iran, Russia, and China together have 
8 SF No. 285 inss.dodlive.mil

supported the Syrian economy at a pace of over $500 million per month during the fighting, and facilitated financial transactions to frustrate Western economic sanctions.41

Iranian trainers have provided conventional and irregular 

military training to Asad loyalists and have been a driving 

force behind the creation of a 50,000 strong pro-Asad militia, the Shabiha. Iranian scientists have reportedly helped 

Asad with his chemical weapons program, while the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps has trained and assisted 

counterinsurgency efforts. Former Syrian officials state that 

“Syria is occupied by the Iranian regime. The person who 

runs the country is not Bashar al-Assad but [Quds Force 

commander] Qasem Soleimani.”42 As a Hizballah-linked 

Lebanese analyst assesses, “This counts as a victory for the 

group of Iran, Syria, Iraq and Hezbollah against the group 

backed by the United States.”43

The genuine and quite troubling parallel between the 

U.S. historical record in Afghanistan and the current situation in Syria is the inherent instability of the U.S. commitment. The strategically salient point is not whether the 

groups we supported contained some radical elements, but 

rather that by supporting them tepidly or temporarily, we 

incurred culpability and future risk without maintaining 

control. In the words of former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad, “We stopped paying attention. 

This was a bad decision. Instability and war in Afghanistan 

provided fertile ground for terrorist groups to train and 

hide.”44 Ultimately, Afghanistan’s dysfunctional internal dynamics generated new threats to U.S. interests across the 

spectrum from terrorism and international crime to human 

rights and cultural vandalism. Having picked a side, then 

proceeding to step aside, served us poorly.

Other equally inapt historical analogies have been 

used to argue against deepening U.S. involvement in 

Syria. Some point to regime change in Iraq and Libya 

as examples of the perils of intervention. Some argue 

that robust support to Asad’s opposition would lead to 

massive direct intervention and a high bill in American 

lives and treasure.45 This ignores the main difference between Syria and Iraq: Syrians already are fighting in large 

numbers to overthrow their dictator, so there is no call 

for U.S. or other international troops to do that work 

for them. Foreign forces and advisors are, on the other 

hand, fighting against the Syrian opposition on behalf 

of Asad.46 In fact, Iran and Hizballah have developed a 

kind of foreign legion, including Iraqis, local Syrians, and 

Shia from Gulf countries to fight under their leadership 

in regional conflicts. Finally, the memory of Iraq is still 

fresh; neither political nor military leadership in Washington will sign up for a massive ground campaign. This 

does not mean that there are no options other than fully 

abstaining from action or invading and occupying as we 

did in Iraq. We are not limited to the binary options of 

all-out war or no use of military means at all; the historical effectiveness of limited military force used to deter or 

punish certain types of actions has a defensible record.47

Libya also is fresh in the public memory, and also a 

poor fit for the situation in Syria. As Juan Cole and Libyan scholar Husam Dughman have argued, the Libyan 

context was simpler than Syria’s today.48 That complexity 

can be used to argue against inaction, however, as well 

as it can be used to argue against action. The protracted 

nature of the fighting and the absence of pressure against 

Asad from world powers have helped sustain and sharpen the sectarian dimension of the conflict. Only when 

Sunnis believe they can achieve majority rule without 

slaughtering the minorities, and only when the Alawites 

and other minorities see guarantees against their slaughter should the opposition win, will a possibility for a negotiated solution emerge. Until then, Syria is more likely 

to look like Lebanon over the decades of civil war than it 

is to look like the overthrow of Muammar Qadhafi.

More Misconceptions

Misconceptions, errors, and gaps in addition to 

the faulty assumptions and analogies cited above have 

marked the debate over the U.S. role in Syria. One such 

error has been the conflation of al Qaeda with the Syrian opposition due to the fact that the Islamist al-Nusra 

Front has affiliated itself with al Qaeda’s Iraqi branch to 

become the “Islamic State of Iraq and Syria.” To be fair, 

the Syrian opposition political and military umbrella 
inss.dodlive.mil SF No. 285 9 

groups, the Syrian National Coalition (SNC) and the 

SMC, could not keep al-Nusra out of Syria even if the 

country wanted to do so; it would be a useless fight 

as long as Asad remains in power. For now, al-Nusra 

fights effectively and shares the same enemies with the 

broader opposition movement. Those umbrella groups 

clearly have a political identity and postwar vision that 

have little to do with the al Qaeda or al-Nusra ideological program. As the leaders of the SNC and FSA, Ahmet al-Jarba and Salim Idris, respectively, jointly wrote 

in the Washington Post, “Dithering by the world’s most 

powerful states empowers not only the vicious Assad 

regime but also the extremist agenda of the al-Qaedastyle terrorists seeping into Syria from the east. They are 

fighting not only Assad but, more important, also those 

who oppose Assad.”49

The recent breach between SNC and FSA should be 

seen for what it is, a tension created by the failure of the 

SNC to parlay diplomatic recognition into additional 

resources. That incapacity should be a spur to Western 

action, not another reason for delaying. In the meantime, 

jihadists continue to work aggressively against more 

moderate forces, including assassinating secular rebel 

leaders, driving out their units, and seizing areas they had 

taken from the regime.50

Another misconception is the idea that the only vital U.S. interest that could warrant substantial intervention is an imminent attack or threat of attack by Syria 

against the United States or Israel. The National Security Strategy of 2010 suggests otherwise. The document 

identifies values and international order as key interests of the United States, right alongside security and 

prosperity. It also argues unambiguously that “for those 

who seek to advance their aims by inducing terror and 

slaughtering innocents, we say to you now that our spirit is stronger and cannot be broken—you cannot outlast 

us, and we will defeat you.”51 The historical American 

willingness to act decisively in support of values as well 

as narrow security interests has built and preserves the 

moral authority required to build and lead coalitions. 

Arguments over “redlines” laid down by the President 

are missing the point. It is not a single remark that determines that the United States is vested in the international order and affected by wholesale violations of 

international norms we help set, promote, and preserve. 

We are the leading power in the international order, 

and we justify that leadership based on value arguments 

as well as hard interests. This implies a moral commitment to act. We need not react on an identical scale to 

every violation of our security or values interests, but 

must recognize that avoiding substantive action risks 

our ability to galvanize collective action when the direct 

threat to our interests is higher. We ignore the world’s 

expectation for coherent, galvanizing American action 

at our own peril.52

Inaction has its price. One can measure the cost in 

relationships, the balance of power, and changes to the 

strategic context. Turkey, host to nearly half a million 

Syrian refugees, has incurred significant financial expense, suffered car bombings along the border with Syria, 

and has seen its domestic politics roiled and embittered 

over the continuing crisis.53 Jordan has more than a million Syrian refugees alongside its own population of six 

million and has seen a variety of social, financial, and security problems grow in size accordingly.54 Lebanon has 

increasingly become a second front in Syria’s war since 

Hizballah broadened its support to Asad to include combat troops, and the polarizing effect on Lebanese politics 

has been unsettling.55 The specter of renewed Lebanese 

civil war as an extension of Syria’s own war grows as the 

latter festers.56 Israel’s senior leadership remains concerned that Syria may attack Israel with conventional 

or chemical rockets should Asad sense the military or 

diplomatic fields shifting against him. The threat represents a subtle coercive power Asad has achieved in the 

region, a troubling precedent.57 Another hidden cost of 

continued U.S. inaction or mixed messages on Syria is 

a possible loss of influence over Israel’s approach to the 

Iranian nuclear program. Israel may well conclude that 

the United States lacks the nerve or political will to bring 

a rogue regime to account over weapons of mass destruction, which could remove American influence over the 
10 SF No. 285 inss.dodlive.mil

timing and scope of a potential Israeli strike against the 

Iranian nuclear program altogether.

Vigorous but Limited Intervention?

It is not too late to reassess the costs and benefits of 

more robust action on Syria—and to instill more analytical 

rigor into both the public and closed-door debates on options. Rejection of those options last fall may have emboldened Asad and disheartened the nonjihadist opposition, but 

it did not decisively swing the war in Asad’s favor. In fact, in 

2014 we may see the opposition emerge more unified and 

resolute than during the past 6 months; in what may be an 

early sign of this, the FSA and Islamic Front have carried 

out combined attacks on the foreign jihadists of the Islamic 

State of Iraq and the Levant in early January.58 The United 

States can play a constructive role in forcing Asad to the 

table, but only if the opposition and its regional supporters 

have more than token or rhetorical U.S. backing.

It is not a priori irresponsible to intervene or not intervene in a given crisis, but it is irresponsible to do either of 

these things in a confused or ineffective way.59 Policymakers 

and commentators have not been asking the right questions 

about U.S. Syria strategy in public debate so far. Beyond 

the headlines and sound bites about jihadists and chemical weapons, we find a fairly simple proposition. Does the 

United States have a wider range of policy options to effectively influence the outcome in Syria than doing nothing or 

invading? Can it employ these options without empowering the worst elements of the opposition, without involving 

U.S. ground troops, and without widening the war? The first 

element (effectiveness) depends upon proper scoping of the 

desired effect and proper resourcing of the option. We do 

have options that are measurable and technically feasible—

such as empowering the non-jihadist opposition through 

arms and funding, or enforcing a no-fly zone over Syria’s 

borders with Turkey and Jordan. The second element (nonempowerment) can be addressed by ensuring that a strike is 

tied to increased diplomatic and material aid to Asad’s opposition in Syria, assisted by neighboring regimes working 

with them. By empowering the extant non-jihadist opposition, rather than studiously ignoring the problem, can assure 

no al Qaeda affiliates or other terror groups will inherit the 

mantle of rule once it passes from Asad. The third element 

(no ground troops) is entirely within our power because we 

decide the level of our commitment. On the final element 

(widening conflict), it may be true that substantive U.S. action against Asad may agitate Russia, but the likely result of 

that will be pressure from Russia on Asad to cut a deal, not 

for Russia to come to his aid militarily. The United States 

should prepare for regional terror attacks in retribution, but 

that holds true whether or not we increase pressure on Asad. 

The political strains in neighboring states demonstrate that 

the risk of a widening crisis is present and potentially worse 

should we continue to do nothing than in the case of more 

forceful action. Unfortunately, we have seen neither a coherent proposal publicly articulated nor comparative analysis of 

the costs of action and inaction.

Asad and his patrons in Tehran and Moscow currently 

have the dominant position in shaping the outcome of the 

Syrian war. The moderate opposition has sufficient field 

fighting presence to contest Sunni regions and enough diplomatic presence to participate in international conferences. 

Without help, though, they will continue to dwindle in size 

and cede the initiative to more radical groups. Our allies in 

the region seek to frustrate or reverse Iran’s growing power 

in the region, but will soon despair of concerted or coherent 

support from the United States. As we abstain, we do nothing to shorten the Syrian war or make its outcome more 

palatable, but we do ensure that the Syrian regime of 2015 

and beyond will not count us among its benefactors.

Niccolò Machiavelli wrote, “A prince must imitate the 

fox and the lion, for the lion cannot protect himself from 

traps, and the fox cannot defend himself from wolves. One 

must therefore be a fox to recognize traps, and a lion to 

frighten wolves.”60 American strategic debate in recent 

months has focused only on how to be the fox while our 

long-term interests lie at the mercy of the wolves. Our 

strategic leaders and institutions owe it to the public and 

the national interest to do all possible to avoid prolongation of the slow-rolling disaster in Syria. A reasoned and 

well-informed debate should lead either to forceful action against Asad and his sponsors or to scaling back 
inss.dodlive.mil SF No. 285 11 

our demands and expectations as we negotiate terms for 

Asad to stay in power and learn to live with the results. 

Prudence dictates that we conduct this strategic debate a 

second time, this time with greater rigor—especially given 

the very real possibility that Syria will not fulfill its chemical weapons obligations under the agreement reached in 

late 2013. For as Machiavelli further noted, “irresolute 

princes, in order to escape present dangers, follow that 

neutral way most times, and most times come to ruin.”61

Notes 1 The anti-Assad Syrian Observatory for Human Rights keeps 

the most systematic casualty count and is available at <http://syriahr.

com/index.php?option=com_news&nid=13274&Itemid=2&task=dis

playnews#.UtRpCrFOnct>. The United Nations High Commissioner 

for Refugees (UNHCR) tracker is available at <http://data.unhcr.org/

syrianrefugees/regional.php>. The higher number on total displaced 

persons comes from “Treading Water on Syria,” The New York Times, 

January 12, 2014, available at <www.nytimes.com/2014/01/13/opinion/treading-water-on-syria.html?partner=rssnyt&emc=rss&_r=0>.

2 Scott Clement, “Most in U.S. Oppose Syria Strike, Post-ABC 

Poll Finds,” The Washington Post, September 3, 2013.

3 Anne Gearan and Scott Wilson, “U.S., Russia Reach Agreement on Seizure of Syrian Chemical Arsenal,” The Washington Post, 

September 9, 2014.

4 For U.S. forces training Syrian rebels in Jordan, see Jennifer 

Griffin, “US training Syrian opposition forces in Jordan for months, 

sources say,” Foxnews.com, March 25, 2013, available at <www.

foxnews.com/politics/2013/03/25/us-training-syrian-oppositionforces-in-jordan-for-months-sources-say/>. For U.S. support to the 

Syrian National Coalition, see Anne Gearan and Karen Deyoung, 

“U.S. embracing new Syrian opposition group,” The Washington Post, 

December 10, 2012; and Matt Spetalnick and Erika Solomon, “U.S. 

to Increase Support to Syrian Rebels,” Reuters, June 14, 2013, available at <http://in.reuters.com/article/2013/06/14/syria-crisis-scenarios-idINDEE95D01620130614>.

5 Keith Wagstaff, “Are Obama and Turkey’s Erdogan United 

on Syria?” TheWeek.com, May 16, 2013, available at <http://theweek.

com/article/index/244358/are-obama-and-turkeys-erdogan-unitedon-syria>.

6 John Mearsheimer, “America Unhinged,” The National Interest, 

January 2, 2014, available at <http://nationalinterest.org/print/article/

america-unhinged-9639>. 

7 The trend toward skepticism about U.S. willingness to do “the 

right thing” in international affairs comes from polling data, including 

the latest Pew International Global Indicators Survey. See Willam 

Wan, “Global Attitudes Reflect Shifting U.S.-China Power Balance, 

Survey Concludes,” Washington Times, July 18, 2013.

8 Doug Bandow, Time for Congress to Decide on War in Syria

(Washington, DC: The Cato Institute, September 4, 2013).

9 Ernest R. Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, The Encyclopedia of 

Military History, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1986), 1033. 

Soviet support for the Republic included liquidating its opponents on 

the Left, perhaps more than helping defeat the Fascists.

10 According to UNHCR officials, the war in Syria has created 

nearly two and a half million international refugees to date, with the 

number projected to climb to four million by the end of 2014. An 

additional five million Syrians have fled their homes for other parts 

of Syria, for a total of over nine million affected in a population of 23 

million (nearly 40 percent). By comparison, in 1993 roughly 20 percent of the Somali population of eight million either fled abroad or to 

other parts of Somalia to escape fighting and famine. See UNHCR, 

“Syria Regional Refugee Response,” January 14, 2014, available at 

<data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php>; and Somalia Human 

Rights Practices 1993 (Washington, DC: Department of State, January 

31, 1994), 1, available at <http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/democracy/1993_hrp_report/93hrp_report_africa/Somalia.html>.

11 Nikolaos Van Dam, The Struggle for Power in Syria (New York: 

I.B. Tauris, 1996), 17.

12 During the several centuries of Ottoman rule over Syria, benign ignorance or prejudiced toleration of the Alawites was the norm. 

The major exception was Sultan Selim’s slaughter of Anatolian Alevis 

during his 1514 war with the Shia rulers of the Safavid Empire. See 

Ira M. Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies (Cambridge: Cambridge 

University Press, 1988), 329; and Patrick Kinross, The Ottoman Centuries (New York: Morrow, 1977), 167.

13 Van Dam, 4.

14 Lapidus, 653–655.

15 Itamar Rabinovich, Syria Under the Ba’ath, 1963–66: The 

Army-Party Symbiosis ( Jerusalem: Israeli Universities Press, 1972), 

217.

16 Volker Perthes, The Political Economy of Syria Under Asad (New 

York: I.B. Tauris, 1997), 260–262.

17 Holly Yan, “Syrian Allies: Why Russia, Iran, and China Are 

Standing by the Regime,” CNN.com, August 29, 2013.

18 Harry Kazianis, “America’s Airsea Battle vs China’s A2/AD: 

Who Wins?” TheDiplomat.com, July 19, 2013. It is possible to read 

deeper and more long-term motives into the Chinese diplomatic alliances with Russia and Iran in the face of U.S. activist foreign policy. 

See Max Boot, “China’s Stealth War on the U.S.,” Los Angeles Times, 

July 20, 2005.

19 Ceylan Ozbudak, “Why Does Turkey Support Intervention in 

Syria?” TheLibertyBeacon.com, September 5, 2013.

20 Fahad Nazer, “Saudi Arabi’s Proxy Wars,” The New York Times, 

September 20, 2013.

21 Suleiman al-Khalidi, “Iran, Hezbollah increasing support for 

Assad: Britain,” Reuters, May 22, 2013.

22 Jeffrey Heller and Angus McDowall, “Insight: As Obama 

blinks on Syria, Israel, Saudis make common cause,” Reuters, September 2, 2013.

23 Uzi Mahnaimi, “Two Old Foes Unite Against Iran,” The 

Sunday Times (London), November 17, 2013.

24 Mahir Zeynalov, “Rivalry over Syria, Iraq widens rift between 

Turkey, Iran,” December 18, 2011, available at <www.todayszaman.

com/news-266002-rivalry-over-syria-iraq-widens-rift-betweenturkey-and-iran.html>.

25 In Iraq, the Turks declined to join the U.S.-led coalition in 

2003 and thereby avoided significant cost and blowback. In Syria, they 

have been marching in the same direction, sometimes alongside and 

sometimes in advance of the Obama administration’s evolving policy. 

The economic and political costs have been correspondingly higher. 

See Hugh Pope, “Turkey’s Tangled Syria Policy,” Combating Terrorism Center, August 27, 2013.

26 Walter Russell Mead, “Kerry-Lavrov Bottom Line: Assad 

Has Gassed But He Will Not Go,” September 14, 2013, available at 

<http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2013/09/14/kerrylavrov-bottom-line-assad-has-gassed-but-he-will-not-go/>.
12 SF No. 285 inss.dodlive.mil

27 Avi Isacharoff, “Obama Shows Netanyahu That Israel Truly is 

Alone,” The Times of Israel, September 1, 2013, available at <www.timesofisrael.com/obama-shows-netanyahu-that-israel-is-truly-alone/>.

28 Michael Shank, “How Arming Syrian Rebels Will Backfire 

(See Libya, Afghanistan),” HuffingtonPost.com, August 1, 2013.

29 Former British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook and others have perpetuated this myth based on limited and circumstantial 

information. For scholarly debunking of the myth, see Olivier Roy, 

Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah (New York: Columbia 

University Press, 2004), 291–292; and Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 

2004), 57–58.

30 Aron Lund, “Who are the foreign fighters in Syria?” Syria in 

Crisis, December 5, 2013, available at <http://carnegieendowment.

org/syriaincrisis/?fa=53811>.

31 Ken Sofer and Juliana Shafroth, “The Structure and Organization 

of the Syrian Opposition,” Center for American Progress, May 14, 2013.

32 Ibid.

33 Nicholas Blanford, “What Syrian Rebel Infighting Means for 

Assad,” Christian Science Monitor, January 13, 2014.

34 James Chace, “Dithering in Nicaragua,” The New York Review 

of Books, July 20, 1989.

35 Sofer and Shafroth.

36 John Farmer, “Blowback—U.S. Must Be Careful Intervening 

in Egypt, Syria,” New Jersey Star-Ledger, August 25, 2013.

37 Yaakov Lappin, “Is Syria Turning into the Afghanistan Next 

Door?” Jerusalem Post, April 11, 2013.

38 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 

175–176.

39 Benjamin R. Barber, Jihad vs. McWorld (New York: Random 

House, 1995), xvi, xxii.

40 P.J. Stewart, Unfolding Islam (Reading, UK: Garnett Publishing, 2008), 235–238.

41 Michael Peel, “Iran, Russia and China Prop up Assad 

Economy,” Financial Times, June 27, 2013.

42 Karim Sadjapour, “Iran’s Unwavering Support to Assad’s 

Regime,” Carnegie Endowment for Peace, August 27, 2013, available 

at <http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/08/27/iran-s-unwaveringsupport-to-assad-s-syria/gkh4>.

43 Liz Sly, “Iran Emerging as Victor in Syrian Conflict,” The 

Washington Post, June 11, 2013.

44 Seth G. Jones, In the Graveyard of Empires (New York: Norton, 

2009), 51.

45 “Even Limited U.S. Attack on Syria Is a Mistake,” Walla Walla 

Union-Bulletin, September 4, 2013.

46 Zeyna Karam and Sarah el-Deeb, “Hizballah Says It Will 

Keep Fighting in Syria,” Associated Press, June 14, 2013, available at <http://news.yahoo.com/hezbollah-says-keep-fightingsyria-202618541.html>. See also Matthew Leavitt and Aaron Zelin, 

“Hizballah’s Gambit in Syria,” Combatting Terrorism Center at West 

Point, August 27, 2013, available at <www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/hizballahs-gambit-in-syria>.

47 Nicholas Kristof, “That Threat Worked,” The New York Times, 

September 12, 2013, 31.

48 Husam Dughman, “Why Syria’s Revolution Is Not Like 

Libya’s,” August 16, 2012, available at <www.juancole.com/2012/08/

why-syrias-revolution-is-not-like-libyas-dughman.html>.

49 Salim Idris and Ahmet al-Jarba, “We Need the U.S. to Act,” 

The Washington Post, September 10, 2013, 19.

50 Abdulrahim Raja, “At Odds in Their Common Cause,” Los 

Angeles Times, September 12, 2013, 1.

51 National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: The White 

House, May 2010), 17.

52 John Ikenberry, “The Future of the Liberal World Order: 

Internationalism After America,” Foreign Affairs 90, no. 3 (May/June 

2011), 56–58.

53 Lauren Bohn, “Syrian Refugees Flood Into Turkish Border 

Towns, Straining Resources and Tempers,” NBCNews.com, September 

8, 2013.

54 Margaret Evans, “Syrian Refugees Creating Pressure in 

Jordan’s Cities,” September 9, 2013, available at <www.cbc.ca/news/

world/story/2013/09/09/f-vp-evans-syria-refugees-jordan.html>.

55 North Atlantic Treaty Organization Allied Command Operations Civil-Military Fusion Centre (CFC), Blowback: The Unintended 

Consequences of Hezbollah’s Role in Syria (Norfolk, VA: CFC, September 

2013), 10.

56 “Syrian War Worsens Lebanon’s Malaise,” International Institute for Strategic Studies Strategic Comments 19, no. 25 (September 

4, 2013).

57 “Netanyahu vows fierce retaliation if Syria attacks,” The Jordan 

Times, August 27, 2013, available at <http://jordantimes.com/netanyahu-vows-fierce-retaliation-if-syria-attacks>.

58 Roy Gutman, “Al Qaida fighters pushed from much of northern Syria, but fighting still rages,” McClatchy News Service, January 

5, 2014, available at <www.fresnobee.com/2014/01/05/3699096/alqaida-fighters-pushed-from.html>.

59 Gordon Lubold, “Is Anyone in Charge of U.S. Syria Policy?” 

Foreign Policy, June 20, 2013, available at <www.foreignpolicy.com/

articles/2013/06/20/who_is_in_charge_of_us_syria_policy>.

60 Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. Harvey Mansfield 

(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 69.

61 Ibid., 90.

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