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86–632 PDF 2014

THE CHARLESTON, WEST VIRGINIA, CHEMICAL 

SPILL 

(113–53) 

FIELD HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

TRANSPORTATION AND 

INFRASTRUCTURE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

FEBRUARY 10, 2014 (Charleston, West Virginia) 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

( 

Available online at: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/browse/ 

committee.action?chamber=house&committee=transportation 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania, Chairman 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee, 

Vice Chair 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

GARY G. MILLER, California 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

ERIC A. ‘‘RICK’’ CRAWFORD, Arkansas 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana 

BOB GIBBS, Ohio 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania 

RICHARD L. HANNA, New York 

DANIEL WEBSTER, Florida 

STEVE SOUTHERLAND, II, Florida 

JEFF DENHAM, California 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky 

STEVE DAINES, Montana 

TOM RICE, South Carolina 

MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma 

ROGER WILLIAMS, Texas 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RODNEY DAVIS, Illinois 

MARK SANFORD, South Carolina 

VACANCY 

NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

CORRINE BROWN, Florida 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts 

TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York 

MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

ANDRE ́ CARSON, Indiana 

JANICE HAHN, California 

RICHARD M. NOLAN, Minnesota 

ANN KIRKPATRICK, Arizona 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

SEAN PATRICK MALONEY, New York 

ELIZABETH H. ESTY, Connecticut 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

CHERI BUSTOS, Illinois 

(III) 

CONTENTS Page 

Summary of Subject Matter .................................................................................... iv 

TESTIMONY 

PANEL 1 

Hon. Joe Manchin III, a U.S. Senator from the State of West Virginia ............. 6 

PANEL 2 

Rafael Moure-Eraso, Chairperson, U.S Chemical Safety Board .......................... 9 

Mike Dorsey, chief, Homeland Security and Emergency Response, West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection ................................................ 9 

James A. Gianato, director, West Virginia Division of Homeland Security 

and Emergency Management .............................................................................. 9 

Letitia E. Tierney, M.D., J.D., commissioner, Bureau for Public Health, West 

Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, and State health 

officer ..................................................................................................................... 9 

Gordon Merry, director, Cabell County Office of Emergency Services ................ 9 

Dale A. Petry, director, Kanawha County Department of Homeland Security 

and Emergency Management .............................................................................. 9 

Jeffrey L. McIntyre, president, West Virginia American Water .......................... 9 

PREPARED STATEMENT SUBMITTED BY MEMBER OF CONGRESS 

Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV, a U.S. Senator from the State of West Virginia .. 47 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES 

Hon. Joe Manchin III .............................................................................................. 1

Rafael Moure-Eraso ................................................................................................. 50 

Mike Dorsey ............................................................................................................. 55 

James A. Gianato ..................................................................................................... 58 

Letitia E. Tierney, M.D., J.D. ................................................................................. 63 

Gordon Merry ........................................................................................................... 66 

Dale A. Petry ............................................................................................................ 69 

Jeffrey L. McIntyre .................................................................................................. 75 

SUBMISSION FOR THE RECORD 

Hon. Shelley Moore Capito, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of West Virginia, request to submit ‘‘Recommendations to Incorporate Public Health Components to Senate Bill 373,’’ by Rahul Gupta, M.D., M.P.H., 

F.A.C.P., executive director/health officer, Kanawha-Charleston Health Department, February 3, 2014 ................................................................................ 23 

ADDITIONS TO THE RECORD 

D. Michael Langford, national president, Utility Workers Union of America, 

AFL–CIO, comments for the record .................................................................... 83 

Maya Nye, spokesperson, People Concerned About Chemical Safety, comments for the record ............................................................................................. 92 

1 Hon. Joe Manchin III, a U.S. Senator from the State of West Virginia, 

did not submit a written statement for the record. 

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(1) 

THE CHARLESTON, WEST VIRGINIA, 

CHEMICAL SPILL 

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 10, 2014 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE, 

WASHINGTON, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 9:07 a.m., in Ceremonial 

Courtroom 4, Kanawha County Courthouse, Charleston, West Virginia, Hon. Bill Shuster (Chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Mr. SHUSTER. The committee will come to order. 

I want to welcome everybody here today to Charleston, West Virginia. Thanks for all coming out, especially our panel of witnesses 

today. 

Our first order of business is, I would like to ask unanimous consent that Senator Manchin be allowed to sit in the hearing today 

and participate in the questioning. 

Without objection, so ordered. 

Senator, welcome to the Committee on Transportation. 

Senator MANCHIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it 

very much. 

Mr. SHUSTER. We are pleased to welcome our distinguished witnesses today, starting with Rafael Moure-Eraso. I started off telling 

him I apologize, in case I butchered that. He is Chairperson of the 

U.S. Chemical Safety Board. 

Welcome. 

Mr. Michael Dorsey, chief of the Homeland Security and Emergency Response for West Virginia Department of Environmental 

Protection; Jimmy Gianato, director of West Virginia Division of 

Homeland Security and Emergency Management; Dr. Letitia 

Tierney, who is the commissioner of the Bureau of Public Health, 

West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, and 

State health officer; Gordon Merry, who is director from Cabell 

County—which I guess, Nick, that is in your district—Office of 

Emergency Services; Dale Petry, who is the director of the 

Kanawha County Department of Homeland Security and Emergency Management; and Jeff McIntyre, the president of West Virginia American Water. 

I want to thank, also, Mrs. Capito for requesting an important 

hearing and hosting the committee here in her hometown of 

Charleston. 

I also want to thank Ranking Member Rahall for working with 

us on this hearing and ensuring that we understand how important 

this issue is to him and his constituents as well. 

2 

And, again, I welcome Senator Manchin for being here today and 

participating. 

And also to Congressman Daniel Webster, a native of West Virginia, now representing a district in Orlando, Florida. Welcome 

home, Daniel. 

It is critically important for this committee to be here today to 

hear from the folks who have been on the ground since the spill 

occurred, and to gain an understanding of what has happened in 

this incident. 

I can only imagine how difficult it has been for the residents of 

this region over the last month. The uncertainty, the unanswered 

questions, must be overwhelming at times. 

As Americans, we all should feel safe to drink the water that 

comes out of our faucets. We should be able to take a shower without worrying about what is in the water. And we should have confidence that our Government leaders are doing everything in their 

power to ensure the safety of the water supply. And that is why 

we are here today. 

The past 4 weeks have, no doubt, been a roller coaster ride for 

everyone here in this region. I know that people are concerned, 

frustrated, and looking for answers. 

Representatives Capito and Rahall and Senator Manchin have 

made it very clear how important it is for us to be here on the 

ground to see and hear firsthand, to truly understand what is happening here. 

We are here to get firsthand accounts of what has happened, 

what went wrong, when went right, what needs to be improved. We 

need to focus our attention and work to find solutions for the future, to hear directly from those who were at the spill site when 

it first became clear what was happening, and to hear from those 

who have been working day and night since then to help clean up 

and protect those who live here. 

Again, I want to thank everyone who has taken their precious 

time to be here today. I want to, again, thank our witnesses for 

joining us. 

Before I go, as I had to explain to Senator Manchin, who is in 

the Senate, in the House, we have different rules. I pointed out in 

the House, we have a 5-minute rule, so I would ask for witnesses 

to keep your opening statements to 5 minutes. I am quick on the 

gavel. You will hear me tap first when you get over. But, again, 

to move things along, and to make sure everybody is heard, we 

want to make sure that we get through, so 5 minutes on the opening statements. 

Your full statements will be in the record. I know you have some 

lengthy pieces of information, which will be in the record. 

And again, to my colleagues, if they keep their opening statements to 5 minutes and then we will go into questioning. The questioning rounds will be 5 minutes. If we need more, we will certainly 

do more. 

With that, I would like to recognize the ranking member, Mr. Rahall, for a statement. 

Mr. RAHALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I join with my colleagues on this dais in welcoming you to West 

Virginia and thank you for taking the time to be with us today so 

3 

that we can be on the ground in the area where it is especially important that we hear from the families whose lives and livelihoods 

have been disrupted. 

Yesterday marked 1 month since the chemicals leaked from a 

storage tank at Freedom Industries into the Elk River. One solid 

month since the spill, yet still—and rightly so—there is a lingering 

worry among the people of this area. There is a lingering mistrust 

of what they hear. 

Some of that clearly stems from a lack of accurate information 

at the start, most of which can be traced directly to a financially 

troubled business with deteriorating facilities and critically lax 

safety standards. 

When State DEP officials arrived at the Freedom Industries site 

following a trail of strong licorice scent, workers there didn’t even 

know they had a leak. When workers were shown the pooling 

chemical and told to report the leak, they resisted. 

When they finally did report the leak, they claimed the chemical 

was not spilling into the river. Wrong. 

First responders, the water company, public health officials, all 

thought they were dealing with one chemical based on information 

obtained from the company—information that was wrong. 

Mr. Chairman, there were distressing blind spots and errors long 

before this spill. But on January 9, confronted with this disaster, 

a lot of people tried to do the right thing. A lot of people are still 

trying to do the right thing. Some of them are here with us today, 

and we will hear their testimony. 

They have been the target of criticism and anger. And, yet, they 

came here today to answer and re-answer and re-answer questions 

and take their lumps. 

I think it speaks volumes that the one entity that is not here 

today—is not here—the one empty seat we will have at that witness table, if there was room for that empty seat, belongs to the 

one entity at the epicenter of all of this, the one who totally blew 

it and then gave the bad information on which every effort to respond to the spill was built. 

Mr. Chairman, there is an odor emanating from Freedom Industries, and it is not licorice. We cannot legislate morality into the 

billionaire corporate boardrooms where shell game playing 

abounds. 

I share the worry and frustration that I see in the faces all 

around this room. I understand the shaken confidence. 

Were there mistakes made? Yes. Are there loopholes in the law 

that must be closed? Yes. 

As you have stated, Mr. Chairman, we are here to listen and 

learn and do all that we can to help prevent this type of crisis from 

recurring. 

I have chosen not to endorse legislative proposals yet, until after 

this hearing and hearing first directly from those at this hearing 

to ensure that our efforts in Congress are as thorough as possible, 

and that the Federal Government will not place demands from on 

high, but work with our State and local governments to ensure that 

any new laws work together to eliminate loopholes. 

4 

A cloud of suspicion and fear may be hanging over this region for 

some time. But, speaking as a West Virginian, I hope we can channel these energies into positive change for our State. 

Above all, the communities, businesses, and families deserve 

definite answers. People have a basic right to know, and Government has a fundamental obligation to inform the public whether or 

not their water supplies are safe. 

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, in a Congress that is so often divided, you have not let party differences stand between us and 

working to address the needs of the people we serve. I thank you, 

again, for your interest in the families in this area and for taking 

the time to be with us today. 

And I believe you have already done this, but if not, I would ask 

unanimous consent that the record be open for 30 days to allow 

people who want to submit their testimony to us will be made part 

of the record. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Without objection, so ordered. 

I now recognize Mrs. Capito. 

Mrs. CAPITO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for bringing 

the committee to my home county of Kanawha, and Charleston. I 

am pleased to be here with my colleagues. 

The chemical spill occurred just a few miles from where we sit, 

and it had a devastating effect on 300,000 people in a 9-county region. 

Small businesses were forced to close. A lot of folks went without 

paychecks. And residents went without potable water. 

Our community is angry, anxious, and we need answers to how 

the spill occurred, the health effects, and how we can help prevent 

it from happening again. That is what we are here today for. 

Last week, 14 schools in Kanawha County reported smelling the 

odor. Three of those the schools were closed as a result, and several 

illnesses were reported. Those events demonstrate that, a month 

after the spill, the effects still continue. 

I live in Charleston, and I use the water myself. Like everyone 

in this room and everyone in this community, we just want to have 

the confidence that the water coming out of our faucets is safe, and 

our families are safe as well. 

Many West Virginians lack that confidence today. I think ‘‘confidence’’ is going to be the word we are going to be hearing quite 

a bit. 

Unfortunately, we won’t be able to answer questions, as my fellow Member from West Virginia talked about, from one of the relevant parties today. The president of Freedom Industries was invited to appear before the committee. We gave them the opportunity to answer this committee’s questions, questions that residents across this community have also been asking, and to explain 

its many failures that have hurt so many families and businesses. 

Unfortunately, he chose not to be here today to answer for what 

his company has done. I find that extremely telling. 

If he were here today and had the courage to come, I would have 

asked him this: When did you learn that a chemical was leaking 

from a tank at your facility? Why did it take so long to report that 

spill? How did you not know for 12 days, or report, that a second 

5 

chemical was a part of the mixture? And do you accept any responsibility for the catastrophic harm you have caused our community? 

Their decision not to testify today compounds its gross misconduct, and it is an absolute affront to every person impacted by 

the spill. 

With that, I want to thank all the witnesses that are here today, 

not only for what they are doing today, but for what they have 

done over the past month. This will help us gain a better understanding on what happened on January 9. 

We need to learn from West Virginia and American Water when 

it learned of Freedom’s spill, how it made the decision to keep the 

water flowing, and why the company did not know in advance of 

the spill what types of chemicals were stored in tanks just upriver 

from the water intake. 

We need to learn from the local responders, and they did a wonderful job—and thank you so much—how they mobilized and what 

we can do to improve their situation. 

From the Division of Homeland Security, we need to know the 

current status of water testing in public facilities across the impacted area, and the State’s plan for targeted—I noticed this is a 

discussion of late—in-home testing around the region. 

Many citizens are concerned about the flushing protocols, and we 

need to know the successes and failures in cleaning up the water 

system. 

From the DEP, and we need to learn about the initial response 

to Freedom Industries’ site, the agency’s plan to inspect similar facilities, and the implementation of both State and Federal environmental laws. 

And from the Department of Health, we need to learn how testing protocols and safety standards were established, and make sure 

that people are provided with accurate and timely information. 

One of the scariest parts of this incident, I think, occurred on 

Thursday, when the CDC advised that pregnant women may wish 

to avoid the water until all traces of MCHM were removed after 

first announcing that a universally applicable safe standard had 

been reached. 

Senator Manchin and I wrote to the CDC asking for testing protocols and about the agency’s confidence in the health impact 

study, but their letter was severely lacking in the details that we 

needed. 

We invited the CDC to come here today. They declined that invitation, but they are working in an advisory role in assisting the 

State of West Virginia. We can learn from participation of State officials in settling the no-health-impact standards. 

Finally, from the Chemical Safety Board, we need to gain perspective on how this occurred, and how we can prevent it from happening again. 

To spur development of State programs, the State has done a 

great job, but I will be introducing the Ensuring Access to Clean 

Water Act when I return to Washington this evening. This bill requires the inspection of aboveground storage tanks like the one 

that leaked at Freedom Industries; creates standards for the oversight of chemical storage facilities; and ensures that water utilities 

6 

are given information about chemicals stored upstream, together 

with a plan on how to address emergency situations. 

The West Virginia Legislature is considering legislation to address this issue, and Senator Manchin has proposed legislation 

that is similar to the bill I will introduce tonight. 

I want to thank everyone for coming, and I look forward to your 

testimony, and also the opportunity to ask those questions that I 

mentioned. 

Thank you. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you. 

And now with that, Senator Manchin is recognized for 5 minutes. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. JOE MANCHIN III, A U.S. SENATOR FROM 

THE STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA 

Senator MANCHIN. Thank you, Chairman Shuster, and Ranking 

Member Rahall, Congresswoman Capito, and Congressman Webster for holding this hearing today to give it the national attention 

it deserves. 

I do understand the rules of the House, and I will more than 

abide by them. And I appreciate you having me as part of this. Bipartisan, bicameral—we need more of this. We really need do. And 

it sets a good example for all of us, so thank you. 

On January 9, as has been said, a month ago yesterday, thousands of gallons of crude MCHM leaked from a storage tank into 

the Elk River contaminating the drinking water of 300,000 West 

Virginians. In the immediate aftermath and the days since, I have 

been in continual contact with the CDC and the EPA, trying to assist and help the State. I know the State has been in contact with 

them also, and I appreciate that. We will be hearing your testimonies on that today also. 

The CDC has determined that the water is appropriate—and I 

say the word ‘‘appropriate’’—to drink. I am not sure of the definition of ‘‘appropriate,’’ but I am trying to get into that more, and I 

am sure you will be able to clear that up today also. 

They say levels are below the 1 ppm—and I know we have questions about that—benchmark. And then the nondetect level is supposed to be 10 ppb, which is 100 times more stringent than 1 ppm. 

I am using, I am personally using, we have a little townhouse 

here, I am personally using the water as I normally would use it. 

But I know a lot of don’t people feel that way. And I believe that 

the people, and I believe the State will accommodate them having 

the ability to have it tested. I believe that will all happen. I really 

do. 

And with that being said, in our State, we have always done 

hard work. We have worked hard. And we continue to work hard. 

We are hardworking people to produce the energy and chemicals 

that power this country. But that cannot come at the cost of access 

to safe and clean drinking water or to the safety and confidence of 

the people of West Virginia. 

We have always said, if you can’t do it right, don’t do it. If it is 

not safe, don’t do it. 

But with that, we think there is a balance between the environment and the economy that can be found, if we all have a desire 

to do that. 

7 

The spill should have never have happened. There is no excuse 

for it. It really shouldn’t have happened. And as Congress, it is our 

responsibility to do everything we can to keep it from happening 

again, not just in West Virginia, but anywhere in the United States 

of America. 

This is a wakeup call for this country. We were on the front end 

of this, but it is a wakeup call for the country. 

That is why I work with Senator Boxer, who is the chairman of 

the Environmental and Public Works Committee, to develop the 

Chemical Safety and Drinking Water Protection Act. It basically 

does things that we thought were already being done. We thought 

that all aboveground storage probably was being tested and 

checked, not knowing that there was no laws on the book—if it was 

not a hazmat material, that it didn’t have to be. 

And really, the EPA or the DEP didn’t have any authority or 

power to go into these areas and do the testing. And I talked to 

Speaker Boehner about that. He is committed to helping and working with us. And our colleagues on both sides of the aisle are committed to fixing this. So I am very appreciative of that. 

This bill sets minimum Federal standards that chemical facilities 

must meet, including construction and leak detection requirements, 

fail-safe containment standards, and the development of emergency 

response plans. Our bill also requires that companies meet financial responsibility requirements. Taxpayers should not be forced to 

pay for the monetary damages incurred from this incident or any 

other chemical spill. 

Additionally, companies must inform the State, the EPA, and 

local water systems of the chemicals they store. However, that information is helpful only if we have adequate health and safety 

data on these chemicals. 

That is why I am also cosponsoring and totally committed to the 

Chemical Safety Improvement Act, which would, for the first time 

in 42 years—think about this; 1976 is the last time we ever tried 

to find out what chemicals we are using and how it affects humans. 

There are 84,000 chemicals used by Americans every day in 

every form, and the extremely outdated Toxic Substance Control 

Act is 1976. It is unbelievable. 

Under the Chemical Safety Improvement Act, States should request and could request that EPA prioritize the testing of specific 

chemicals, including those held near waterways. Even if they are 

not a hazmat or determined to be a hazmat material, everybody in 

every State is responsible for identifying any possibility and also 

having the CDC and the EPA test at the highest levels as if they 

were toxic. 

And for the chemicals like MCHM, the overwhelming lack of 

health and safety data is one of the criteria for designating a chemical as high priority. 

The bottom line is that no West Virginian or American should 

have to worry about the contamination of their water supply from 

a chemical spill, and I will do everything, working with my colleagues, to enact legislation to protect safe drinking water. 

These two bills would go a long way in ensuring that every 

American has access to safe drinking water, and that if, God forbid, 

an incident like this occurs again, we have the tools to respond as 

8 

quickly and as effectively as possible. It is unconscionable to think 

that we did not know sooner than we did. 

And today I am asking all West Virginians, the EPA, the CDC, 

and West Virginia DEP, and all of us who are involved and could 

be involved and should be involved, to join me and my colleagues 

in pledging to make sure that we come out of this bigger and better. The water in West Virginia should be the cleanest and safest 

in America. 

I want to thank you, and that should be our goal today. Thank 

you. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you, Senator. 

And with that, I recognize Mr. Webster for an opening statement. 

Mr. WEBSTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for 

hosting this forum. I think it is very, very important for this area. 

I am from Orlando, Florida, now, but I am a fifth generation 

West Virginian. I was born here in Kanawha County close by, at 

St. Francis Hospital. I have a lot of relatives here. I ate dinner 

with five of them last night, two get their water from St. Albans 

and had no problem. Three did not, and they are concerned. They 

are still drinking bottled water, even though it is supposedly OK 

to not do that. They are just afraid. 

And I would imagine there are a lot of citizens out there who are 

afraid, so I appreciate this opportunity. 

My dad’s family was from Winfield. They moved there in 1862. 

My mom was from a place in Roane County called Rush Fork and 

Green Creek. I have no idea where that is, but it is somewhere. 

And both were longtime farmers. Both depended on the water here. 

It is an important commodity. It is the lifeblood of our community. And so I appreciate just the opportunity to be here and to 

have an opportunity to participate in this. 

This also, certainly, has nationwide implications, and there are 

some things here I hope we will learn to prevent this from happening in other places in the country. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you, Mr. Webster. 

Before I get to the witnesses, I might add that I am from Pennsylvania. My district is western Pennsylvania, parts of Greene 

County and Fayette County, which border West Virginia. And 

growing up in Bedford County, very close to the West Virginia border. So as I like to tell my colleagues, Mr. Rahall and Mrs. Capito, 

we are kissing cousins in western Pennsylvania to West Virginia. 

And good, hardy, hardworking people in western Pennsylvania and 

West Virginia. 

So again, I just wanted folks to know that I’m not from the other 

part of Pennsylvania—Philadelphia, as we call it. 

So with that, again, I encourage the witnesses to keep to 5 minutes, because I think the really important part of this is the questioning. Hopefully, we can have a couple rounds of that. 

And we will start to my left with Dr. Moure-Eraso. 

Before it is all over, I will get it down. 

Go ahead, Doctor. You are recognized. 

9 

TESTIMONY OF RAFAEL MOURE-ERASO, CHAIRPERSON, U.S 

CHEMICAL SAFETY BOARD; MIKE DORSEY, CHIEF, HOMELAND SECURITY AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE, WEST VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION; 

JAMES A. GIANATO, DIRECTOR, WEST VIRGINIA DIVISION OF 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT; 

LETITIA E. TIERNEY, M.D., J.D., COMMISSIONER, BUREAU 

FOR PUBLIC HEALTH, WEST VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF 

HEALTH AND HUMAN RESOURCES, AND STATE HEALTH OFFICER; GORDON MERRY, DIRECTOR, CABELL COUNTY OFFICE OF EMERGENCY SERVICES; DALE A. PETRY, DIRECTOR, 

KANAWHA COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT; AND JEFFREY L. MCINTYRE, PRESIDENT, WEST VIRGINIA AMERICAN WATER 

Mr. MOURE-ERASO. Thank you, Chairman Shuster, and Ranking 

Member Rahall, also Congressman Webster and Congresswoman 

Capito, and Senator Manchin. I am honored to be here. 

I am Rafael Moure-Eraso. I am the Chairperson of the U.S. 

Chemical Safety Board, or the CSB, from Washington, DC. 

There are a few things that people here in West Virginia will 

never take for granted again, common acts, such as using tap 

water to prepare dinner for your family or drawing a bath for your 

child, and everyday activities that quickly became impossible for 

approximately 300,000 people on January 9, 2014. 

It is clear to me, as Chairman of an independent Federal agency 

charged with investigating industrial chemical accidents, that urgent steps are required to significantly improve the safety of facilities that handle hazardous chemicals. The chemical sector is vital 

for our economy, yet potentially hazardous to those who live near 

the thousands of facilities that process or store these hazardous 

chemicals. 

The CSB has 41 employees, half of whom are professional accident investigators with highly technical skills. Currently, the CSB 

has a four-member team in the field investigating this particular 

accident. 

Heading the team and with me is the supervisory investigator, 

Johnnie Banks. And also with me today is Hillary Cohen, our communications director back there. 

First, I think, it is important to discuss the history that the CSB 

has had investigating accidents in the Kanawha Valley. This is our 

third deployment to a major chemical accident in the valley. 

In 2008, two workers were fatally injured at the Bayer 

CropScience chemical plant in Institute when a waste tank containing the highly toxic pesticide methomyl violently exploded. 

Then in 2010, three incidents occurred in a 33-hour period at the 

DuPont Belle facility. There was a release of highly toxic phosgene, 

exposing a veteran operator and resulting in his death 1 day later. 

Following the CSB’s investigation into these two places, Bayer 

and DuPont, the board recommended that the county, working with 

the State, establish a hazardous chemical release prevention program to enhance safety and optimize emergency response. 

The CSB recommended that the Health Department establish an 

industrial safety authority, paid for using fees assessed on the companies processing or handling potentially dangerous chemicals. 

10 

As an example, we cited the successful program in California’s 

Contra Costa County, which has an equally dense industrial chemical base. 

Although no regulatory program is 100 percent effective, in 

Contra Costa, the program has reported a dramatic decrease in serious incidents over the years without any adverse impact on employment or the business community. 

State and local authorities in West Virginia tell us that they considered our recommendation but due to a number of reasons, including funding, it has not been adopted. 

The CSB’s previous recommendations aim at empowering a Government agency to determine just what poses a high hazard. Perhaps qualified inspectors would have considered aging chemical 

storage tanks located just upstream from a public drinking water 

treatment plant to be potentially ‘‘highly hazardous’’ and worthy of 

a closer look. 

I am very encouraged by the recent efforts mentioned here of legislators, including Representative Capito and Senator Rockefeller 

and State Delegate Skinner, who are all seeking to have the CSB 

recommendations implemented to protect West Virginia residents 

and business. 

I thank you all, and let’s work together to get this done. 

All of us here today are all too aware of the recent events that 

occurred at Freedom Industries. A significant amount of the chemical that we are discussing, MCHM, containing also the propylene 

glycol phenyl ether as part of it, was released in the Elk River, and 

eventually reached the Kanawha River. 

Today, I am here to discuss some preliminary findings into the 

CSB’s ongoing investigation. 

In October 2013, at the request of the company, tank engineering 

and management consultants performed a review of the tank terminals located in Charleston and Nitro. The evaluation was conducted and approved by an American Petroleum Institute 653 and 

570 certified inspector, who also has credentials as a National Association of Corrosion Engineer. 

That review notes that the substances stored in tank 396 consisted of nonhazardous materials. And as we said before, this is a 

qualification. It is a legal statement. It doesn’t reflect the problem 

that we are seeing here in the ground. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Doctor, I am going to ask you wrap up. 

Mr. MOURE-ERASO. OK, yes. 

The CSB has determined that the secondary containment wall, 

which was composed of cinder blocks and surrounded tank 396, 

provided very little protection from a possible release. 

Moving forward, the CSB will closely examine tank 396. We plan 

to complete a thorough internal inspection of the tank to determine 

the tank thickness, and we will examine design, materials of construction, inspection practices, and State and Federal oversight. 

The team will also examine the response to the leak once it was 

discovered. And we will have information readily available for the 

public as the issue is developed. And we would like also to make 

recommendations about improvements to the Toxic Substances 

Control Act. 

11 

I would like to conclude by strongly commending Senator 

Manchin, Senator Rockefeller, and Senator Boxer for promptly introducing legislation aimed at safeguarding water supplies from 

chemical leaks. 

We are making recommendations of inherently safe—— 

Mr. SHUSTER. Doctor, we will include that all in the—— 

Mr. MOURE-ERASO. We will continue coming to this community 

to keep you informed of the progress of our investigation. 

Thank you. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you. Your full statement will be included in 

the record. And we will all have that. 

Mr. Dorsey, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. DORSEY. Thank you, Chairman Shuster, members of the 

committee, Senator Manchin. 

As one of the first State responders onsite, and as someone who 

is still involved in remediation of the site, I appreciate this opportunity to offer my perspective on the event, and offer a few 

thoughts on related issues. 

After the release was discovered by investigators from the Department of Environmental Protection’s Division of Air Quality, I 

was contacted by a supervisor and arrived at the site with a chemist from my staff at approximately—— 

Mr. SHUSTER. Mr. Dorsey, could you pull your mic closer to you? 

Mr. DORSEY. Certainly. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you. 

Mr. DORSEY. At this time, it was apparent that the MCHM, and 

as we later learned, propylene glycol phenyl ether, or PPH, was 

leaving the facility through a drain pipe that runs below the tank 

farm and leaking through a retaining wall that was part of the facility’s secondary containment. 

The drain pipe was leaking through a rusted bottom into an erosion ditch about 5 to 10 feet below the containment wall, and the 

material that was exiting through the wall was draining directly 

into a rubble-filled swale that is located where an old fire suppression intake had been located. 

Company officials had, by this time, placed an absorbent boom 

at the point where material was leaking through the wall. 

As we investigated the spill scene, we could see that the MCHM 

was entering the river from both on top of and below an ice shelf 

that extended approximately 10 feet from the shore into the river. 

After reviewing the Material Safety Data Sheet for the MCHM, 

a water company official stated that he thought the problem could 

be addressed by adding additional activated carbon to the water 

plant filters. 

I handed the investigation over to our enforcement group and left 

the scene at about 2:45 p.m. 

It was not until about 4:20 p.m. that I started receiving calls detailing the larger water contamination problem. Since that time, 

remediation efforts have continued at the site. 

Remediation activities at the site have included the installation 

of collection sumps in the tank area; interceptor trenches; and the 

aggressive management of offsite water, rainwater, and snowmelt. 

While these remediation efforts are ongoing and successful, a number of investigations are also taking place by State, Federal, and 

12 

private parties: The U.S Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation 

Board, the Federal prosecutor’s office, the Office of the West Virginia Attorney General, the bankruptcy plaintiffs, and others. 

These investigations are, by and large, necessary, but they also 

slow remediation efforts in the vicinity of the tank that spilled the 

material. It is hoped that within a week all of the investigations 

will have reached a point so the tank area will be possible. 

An interesting issue with MCHM and PPH is their relative lack 

of toxicity. The problems that the release caused are very real, and 

there is no doubt that the ‘‘do not use’’ order was the right thing 

to do. But there is relatively little data, because of the lack of toxicity, on the chemicals. 

In a world where deadly chemicals such as methyl isocyanate, 

dioxins, and others grab all the headlines, little thought is given 

to those less toxic, but ubiquitous, chemicals that can wreak havoc 

with our lives like these chemicals have. 

Neither of these chemicals is even considered to be hazardous 

materials by State or Federal laws. 

The Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976 is a Federal law that 

was designed to serve as a safety net for chemicals that were not 

regulated by other programs. Due to lack of support, it has never 

fulfilled its responsibilities. Potentially harmful chemicals are not 

receiving the review and study they were meant to have. 

Today, a bipartisan bill, the Chemical Safety Improvement Act, 

is struggling in the U.S. Congress. It is designed to address the 

shortcomings of TSCA and provide that safety net that is supposed 

to be provided by that law. The bill is not perfect. But it can be 

fixed, and it deserves to be fixed. 

Of more immediate interest are bills currently moving through 

Congress and the West Virginia Legislature that will provide for 

the regulation of aboveground storage tanks, much as underground 

storage tanks are regulated. I see this as a complementary effort 

to the bill mentioned above. 

Ensuring that aboveground storage tanks are structurally sound 

and have adequate secondary containment seems like simple common sense today. But before the Freedom Industries release, the 

general thought process was that if the material in a given tank 

wasn’t regulated by any of the multitude of State or Federal programs, it was probably harmless to both public health and the environment. The fallacy of that type of assumption is clear now. 

A positive note in this unfortunate episode has been the working 

relationships between various State and Federal agencies. In particular, the relationship between DEP and the Environmental Protection Agency has been one of mutual respect and cooperation. Decisions have been made cooperatively, allowing the State and Federal Governments to speak with one voice to the public, as well as 

the responsible party. 

The Freedom Industries release caused approximately 300,000 

people to be without water. People became ill. Pregnant women 

were advised not to drink the water. But it could have been much 

worse. There are far more toxic and equally unregulated chemicals 

in tanks throughout the country. 

Let this incident be a wakeup call for the entire Nation. 

Thank you. 

13 

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you, Mr. Dorsey. 

And with that, Mr. Gianato is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. GIANATO. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Congressman Rahall, Congresswoman Capito, Congressman Webster, and Senator 

Manchin. Thank you for the opportunity to be here this morning 

to speak with you. 

At approximately 4:50 p.m. on January 9, I received a call from 

the West Virginia Department Health and Human Resources Bureau of Threat Preparedness, advising that in 10 minutes there 

would be a call to discuss an imminent announcement by West Virginia American Water that they were going to issue a ‘‘do not use’’ 

order due to chemical contamination of their water treatment facility and system. 

As a result of our prior planning, we immediately knew that the 

loss of the water facility would impact a large number of hospitals, 

schools, nursing homes, residences, and businesses. The West Virginia American Water treatment facility and distribution system 

serves commercial and residential customers in a nine-county region. 

The interdependencies associated with this loss include hotels, 

restaurants, dairies, as well as farming facilities and many other 

industries that depend on potable water to operate safely. 

Governor Tomblin immediately declared a state of emergency for 

the nine counties impacted, and the State Emergency Operations 

Center was fully activated. 

Based on media and law enforcement reports, after the order was 

broadcast, citizens were rushing to stores to purchase water, and 

the stock was quickly being depleted. 

Governor Tomblin requested an emergency declaration from 

FEMA that was granted seeking support from the Federal Government. 

Over the next days and weeks, FEMA would provide over 456 

trailers of water, which is equivalent to over 8.6 million liters, and 

over 100,000 boxed meals, which were essential to supplement 

water purchased by the State and received from the numerous donors. 

The division requested the activation of the West Virginia National Guard 35th Civil Support Team. This team, which is a key 

resource to the State, is a full-time federally funded State asset 

specializing in weapons of mass destruction and chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear explosive response. The men and women 

of this unit have been deployed for this incident since the initial 

hours, and they continue to serve. 

Over the course of the event, six additional civil support teams 

from neighboring States have assisted. 

Initial testing was performed to screen to a Center for Disease 

Control threshold of 1 ppm of MCHM in drinking water. All areas 

of the system have been tested and cleared to that level. 

Twelve days into this event, Freedom advised DEP that an additional product, PPH, had been mixed with the MCHM and had 

leaked into the river as well. Little was known about PPH, and we 

immediately began conducting research to identify the manufacturer and make contact with them to obtain the most current inforVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:24 Aug 01, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\113\FULL\2-10-1~1\86632.TXT JEAN
14 

mation on this product to share with the CDC and the interagency 

team that was involved in water sampling. 

Upon learning that the second chemical PPH was in the MCHM 

that leaked, testing was done to check for PPH as well as MCHM 

in the water samples. In order to help us build on the 1 ppm testing that was done, and to create a higher level of confidence in the 

safety of the water, systematic testing was done to clear all zones 

at a laboratory nondetectable level of 10 ppb. 

The water distribution throughout this event has been a collective effort of multiple agencies at the Federal, State, and local levels. Local agencies and volunteer groups have distributed water to 

individual citizens who could not travel to distribution sites. 

As we continue to move forward, we must learn from this event. 

What happened in Charleston, West Virginia, could happen in any 

town or city in the United States that has a similar water system 

located in a similar geographic footprint. We must capture the 

many lessons learned, using them as a catalyst to continue to 

strengthen our infrastructure security and resiliency posture. 

We will use this event to more fully understand the interdependencies of our critical infrastructure, and to improve our State and 

local emergency response plans. 

I would be remiss if I did not recognize the numerous first responders at all levels that worked tirelessly on this response and 

continue to do so. I also want to thank the hardworking men and 

women of the Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management and all of the interagency partners that worked with us 

during this event and every event that we do. 

I also want to recognize the private sector partners who provided 

support to us and the many who donated water and supplies, as 

well as many volunteers who worked tirelessly throughout this 

month. 

I also feel it is important to recognize the Governor and his staff 

who worked diligently to support the agencies and the citizens of 

our State. He has already appointed an after-action review team to 

analyze our response and make recommendations for improvement. 

Our goal is to make sure that an event like this never happens 

again. But if it does, we will be better prepared to respond and to 

mitigate it. 

Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, I thank you for 

inviting me here this morning, and I will be glad to answer questions at the appropriate time. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you very much. 

And with that, Dr. Tierney is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Dr. TIERNEY. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Congressman Rahall, Congresswoman Capito, Congressman Webster, 

and Senator Manchin. 

I am Dr. Letitia Tierney. I am State health officer and commissioner of the Bureau for Public Health. I am both a physician and 

a lawyer, and I was born and raised here in West Virginia. 

And for Congressman Webster, I was born at the General Hospital here in Charleston. 

My undergraduate degree and my medical degree are both from 

West Virginia University. 

15 

I am honored to be here today to represent the hardworking men 

and women across the Bureau for Public Health who work daily on 

behalf of all West Virginians—from the healthiest to the most vulnerable of our population. 

As commissioner and State health officer, my focus is on community health, ensuring the safety and well-being of West Virginia’s 

population. And I very much appreciate the opportunity today to 

make a brief statement as to the Bureau for Public Health’s role 

during the events that first began on January 9, 2014. 

First, the mission of the Bureau for Public Health is to have 

healthy West Virginians in healthy communities and to shape the 

environments within which they can be safe and healthy. 

We rely on science and evidence-based medicine for virtually 

every decision we make. This belief has guided the Bureau for Public Health’s response. 

From the time West Virginia American Water issued the ‘‘do not 

use’’ advisory, the DHHR set up its Health and Medical Incident 

Command Unit at the Center for Threat Preparedness. Experts 

from across the Bureau for Public Health and from our partner 

networks were engaged in that command structure. 

Immediately, we began reaching out to local health departments, 

hospitals, schools, and long-term care facilities to quickly announce 

the discontinuation of all water use. 

The bureau’s Office of Epidemiology and Prevention Services 

spearheaded plans to put in motion health surveillance across the 

nine-county area. 

At the same time, we began collaborating with the West Virginia 

Poison Control Center, which served as an informational resource 

for concerned residents. It is led by a doctor of pharmacy with significant experience in toxicology who served as an immediate resource for health care providers and the public alike. They also 

helped us track patients and their conditions. 

The bureau’s Office of Environmental Health Services began 

overseeing an interagency team led by the National Guard in collecting water samples. The bureau’s director of infectious disease 

epidemiology reached out to the CDC to learn more about the 

chemical and to obtain guidance on a screening level for MCHM. 

The CDC’s toxicologists developed a very conservative screening 

level for the drinking water at 1 ppm. Therefore, the Bureau for 

Public Health, on the advice of the CDC, set the threshold for lifting water zones after 24 hours of results at 1 ppm or less. 

From the beginning, a valuable collaboration made up of all 

stakeholders at the local, State, and Federal level was created, allowing for the timely sharing of information in order to provide the 

best possible service to our citizens. 

The water has been repeatedly sampled and tested at multiple 

points across the affected region, using split samples to ensure testing results were consistent at multiple labs, including the bureau’s 

Office of Laboratory Services. 

Seven days into the response, and 2 days after the first zones 

had been reopened, the CDC issued a letter to the DHHR suggesting an advisory be issued to pregnant women to not drink the 

water until the MCHM results were at undetectable levels, out of 

an abundance of caution. 

16 

The Bureau for Public Health asked CDC to clarify their advisory. It was explained to us that all populations, including pregnant women, were included in the original assessment of the 

screening level at 1 ppm, and that the 1 ppm screening level was 

set at a very conservative level. 

However, the CDC explained that the advisory was precautionary and issued only out of an abundance of caution. 

Then nearly 2 weeks into the event, we were informed that Freedom Industries had reported to the DEP a second chemical, ‘‘PPH, 

stripped,’’ was also spilled into the river on January 9. This chemical was stored in the same tank and was estimated to be approximately 7 percent of the total volume. 

The intra-agency team went back and retested historic water 

samples. The CDC and their partners also rolled up their sleeves 

and went back to work to help us obtain critical data on PPH. 

This was complicated by Freedom, who initially provided us with 

the incorrect Material Safety Data Sheet, which resulted in a delay 

in obtaining the appropriate screening level from our Federal partners. 

Fortunately, virtually every sample retested for the PPH was at 

nondetectable levels. 

Today, the Bureau for Public Health continues to oversee water 

testing. However, the public confidence level in the water quality 

is still low. 

Moving forward, the Bureau for Public Health will continue to 

work on health and community assessments. Hospital surveillance 

began within 24 hours. And now, we are working with the CDC to 

initiate a community assessment study. This with the health surveillance we initiated within the first 24 hours of the event are the 

first steps. 

Once these data sets are fully assessed, we will be able to use 

a more reasoned approach to evaluate the best method for population surveillance for possible long-term effects. Rushing into a decision is not in the best interest of public health, and this is not 

something we want to get wrong. We want to make sure that our 

surveillance, whether it be research, a registry, or other method, 

will yield us the data we seek in a statistically significant and reliable manner. 

This is the heart of the mission of the Bureau for Public Health. 

It is what we do every day. We have been actively engaged in this 

event since day one, and for us, our job is really just beginning. 

Water is fundamental and impacts every part of West Virginia 

and everything we hold dear. 

So I thank you for your time. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you. 

And with that, Mr. Merry is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. MERRY. Thank you, Chairman, Congresswoman Capito, Congressmen Webster and Rahall, Senator Manchin. 

I am going to kind of give you the aspect of the responder. I 

mean, all this has been about the chemical itself, but the responders and what we did in Cabell County. 

The issue regarding the water that the customers initially got 

was they were restricted to the eastern portion of Cabell County. 

17 

For that reason, Culloden Volunteer Fire Department was asked 

for their assistance in being the water distribution site. 

That evening, the Huntington Area Food Bank was notified of 

the situation and a request made for bottled water. The food bank 

brought all of the bottled water and soft drinks they had on hand 

for distribution at the fire department. 

Cabell County Emergency Service brought a 400-gallon military 

water buffalo to the fire department. This provided the ability to 

fill containers brought by the public. 

The town of Milton, the mayor, Tom Canterbury, were notified, 

and a request made from the town of Milton water department to 

fill the water buffalo. It should be noted that the town of Milton 

water department supplied water to fill the water buffalo, as well 

as the West Virginia National Guard water buffaloes, during this 

situation—which Milton is on its own water system, so we were 

not. 

Myself and the sheriff of the county, I notified Sheriff McComas 

of the developing situation and discussed the potential of problems, 

panic at the fire department distribution site. Sheriff McComas immediately dispatched deputies to secure the water distribution site. 

Deputies remained at the distribution site for security until the site 

was closed. 

I contacted the county commission concerning the situation in response to that point. The commission gave myself the authorization 

to do whatever is needed to be done to ensure the residents of 

Cabell County and Culloden area had safe water. 

The State of West Virginia EOC stood up and communications 

were established between that entity and Cabell County. There 

was not a firm time as to the arrival of water from the State or 

FEMA resources. 

Due to the lack of available water in Cabell County and surrounding counties by private vendors, a decision was made to send 

two Cabell County EMS personnel to Louisa, Kentucky, to purchase bottled water and hand sanitizer. Since there was no estimated ETA on the emergency resources, a Cabell County Sheriff’s 

Department vehicle was loaded with water and hand sanitizer, and 

routed immediately to the Culloden Volunteer Fire Department. 

Myself and Sheriff McComas went to Eagle Distributing in West 

Huntington to explore the possibility of donation of canned water 

from Anheuser-Busch Companies. Representatives from Eagle were 

able to secure the contribution and an ETA would be Sunday morning, January 12. Eagle paid for the shipping costs, as well as provided staff and equipment to offload the 2,200 cases of canned 

water. 

Several attempts were made to contact representatives from 

West Virginia American Water with negative results. 

Bottled water and a military water buffalo were delivered by the 

West Virginia National Guard to Culloden fire department. These 

deliveries continued upon request during the duration of the situation. Myself and the sheriff drove two 5-ton trucks to Eagle Distributing to pick up 2,200 cases of canned water and deliver it to the 

Culloden fire department. 

18 

The Culloden fire department maintained a distribution site 

passing out bottled water as provided by the State of West Virginia, FEMA, and delivered by the West Virginia National Guard. 

This report in no way documents all of the things that were done 

to ensure that residents of eastern Cabell County had safe water 

rather than the process by which the distribution site and water 

were attained, while it would be impossible to mention all the people, entities, and resources that assisted in the situation. I will 

stop. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you, Mr. Merry. 

And with that, Mr. Petry is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. PETRY. I would first like to thank the distinguished members 

of the House of Representatives Committee on Transportation and 

Infrastructure for inviting me to speak this morning. I am appearing before the committee in my capacity as director of Kanawha 

County Department of Homeland Security and Emergency Management. 

My primary purpose for testifying today is to offer a quick 

timeline of events that occurred on January 9, as it relates to the 

chemical spill at Freedom Industries that ultimately resulted in a 

‘‘do not use’’ advisory being issued for customers of West Virginia 

American Water in Kanawha County and eight other counties. 

On January 9 at approximately 10 a.m., calls were received by 

Metro 911, reporting a chemical odor in the area of the I–77 and 

I–79 split. Metro 911 notified emergency responders of the call and 

C.W. Sigman, the deputy director and fire coordinator for Kanawha 

County Department of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, and fire department officials responded to the area of Route 

119 to Edens Fork to Mink Shoals and along Pennsylvania Avenue 

to look for a possibly leaking truck. 

While responding to these areas, emergency officials could smell 

a licorice smell in the air, but they couldn’t find the source. So 

within 30 minutes of the call, they returned to service. 

At approximately 10:30, Mr. Sigman returned to the Emergency 

Management Office and notified me of the smell in the air and described it as a licorice smell. I told him to check the old Pennzoil 

plant on Barlow Drive, as I was familiar with the plant being a 

possible source for other chemicals stored there. 

Mr. Sigman retrieved the Tier II data for the Etowah River Plant 

on Barlow Drive before going to the site. Upon arriving at Barlow 

Drive, Mr. Sigman found a Diversified Services truck leaving Barlow Drive. 

There had been previous complaints on this company in the St. 

Albans area, and he suspected that the truck could be the source 

of the smell. 

Mr. Sigman then continued to Freedom Industries, where he 

found two West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection 

Division of Air Quality personnel onsite. DEP officials reported to 

Mr. Sigman that they had received odor complaints at DEP, and 

they responded to the site. And there had been a small spill of 

crude MCHM, and they would talk to facility leaders regarding the 

matter. 

19 

Mr. Sigman provided DEP with a copy of the Tier II reports and 

MSDS for the chemical. Mr. Sigman then left the scene as DEP officials said they were handling the situation. 

At approximately 11:30 a.m., my staff issued a media release, 

stating there had been a leak of MCHM at the Freedom Industries 

site and DEP was on scene at that time. The media release described the product and its usage. 

At approximately 1:30, Mr. Sigman had then received a call from 

Mike Dorsey with DEP. Mr. Dorsey told him that the spill may be 

larger than originally thought, and it may have leaked into the 

river. 

Mr. Sigman, on his way back to Freedom Industries, checked the 

Elk River where it flows into the Kanawha for any indication of the 

spill. There were no smells or indications of any contaminates by 

looking. There were ice floes on the river that day, so it was hard 

to see much. 

At approximately 2 p.m., Grant Gunnoe, Charleston director of 

Homeland Security and Emergency Services, returned to the site of 

Freedom Industries with Mr. Sigman, and they met with DEP officials. 

DEP officials showed them efforts being made to contain the 

leak. Absorbent pads had been placed around the outside of the 

containment. 

A West Virginia American Water representative was onsite as 

well. The representative stated that they would put on extra carbon beds to capture any of the material at the water company 

plant. 

An official from Freedom Industries was onsite as well and identified himself as Dennis Farrell, president of Freedom Industries. 

We asked him how much of the material had leaked, and Mr. 

Farrell stated ‘‘not much’’ and that they would have to weigh the 

amounts removed from the tank already and deduct that from the 

inventory to determine the amount that had been leaked. 

Mr. Sigman and Mr. Gunnoe asked DEP officials if they needed 

any further assistance from Emergency Management and were told 

no. They further asked if any notification at the time needed to be 

made to the public and were also told no. Mr. Sigman and Mr. 

Gunnoe then returned to their respective offices. 

At 4:30 p.m., Mr. Sigman received a call from Anita Ray at the 

Kanawha-Charleston Health Department, stating that they were 

receiving calls of a licorice type taste in the drinking water. The 

health department was contacting the water company to report 

that information. 

Mr. Sigman then made county management aware of the situation and further contacted the West Virginia Division of Homeland 

Security and Emergency Management to make them aware of the 

situation. 

The commission president initiated a call with Dr. Gupta, the 

health official for the Kanawha-Charleston Health Department, to 

make him aware of the situation. 

On my way to 911, I authorized our staff to activate our EOC, 

so that we could have different levels of different agencies to help 

with the response. 

20 

Mr. Sigman from the MSDS report was able to determine that 

Eastman was the manufacturer of the chemical and facilitated a 

conference call with Eastman officials, West Virginia American 

Water, DHHR, and other emergency officials at 8 p.m. to discuss 

the chemical properties. 

Eastman reported to all officials that the product was relatively 

soluble and should wash through the system and was readily biodegradable, and odor and taste were the bigger issues. 

We immediately started asking for help through the West Virginia Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management 

for their resources. We did receive water and other resources 

through our E–Team that we use constantly within the State. 

And I, like my predecessors, have to thank all the volunteers 

that helped us in distributing all the water that they did, because 

we did have a lot of people helping us out to try to make sure the 

community had safe drinking water. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Petry. 

With that, Mr. McIntyre is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Rahall, Mrs. Capito, Mr. 

Webster, and Mr. Manchin, thank you for the opportunity to be 

here today. My name is Jeff McIntyre, and I am the president of 

West Virginia American Water. 

Our approximately 283 employees operate multiple systems and 

9 water treatment plants, providing water services to roughly onethird of the State’s population. 

As a steward of a water system that serves more than 300,000 

people in the Kanawha Valley, we take our responsibility of providing clean, safe water very seriously. It is our number one priority in every decision we make. 

On January 9, an undetermined amount of 4- 

methylcyclohexanemethanol leaked into the Elk River from an 

aboveground storage tank at a Freedom Industries facility located 

about 1.5 miles above our Kanawha Valley water treatment plant. 

We first learned of the Freedom Industries spill from the West 

Virginia Department of Environmental Protection. We then took 

immediate steps to gather more information about the chemical, 

augment our treatment processes in the Kanawha Valley plant, 

and begin consultations with Federal, State, and local public health 

officials. 

After our water quality team determined that the augmented 

treatment process was not fully removing the chemical, we reached 

a joint decision with the West Virginia Bureau for Public Health 

to issue a ‘‘do not use’’ order to all customers of our Kanawha Valley system for several critical reasons. 

In addition to loss of water for drinking, cooking, and bathing, 

a shutdown would have quickly resulted in the loss of basic sanitation capabilities for approximately 300,000 people. 

A shutdown would also have quickly resulted in a loss of fire protection in the nine counties that we serve. 

We had no way, at that time, to determine or estimate the duration of the chemical spill or resulting plume that would affect the 

water treatment plant. 

And shutting down the plant, losing the system, then restarting 

it, would have been a prolonged, difficult process, keeping cusVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:24 Aug 01, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\113\FULL\2-10-1~1\86632.TXT JEAN
21 

tomers out of water for any use for a substantially longer period 

of time than the actual period that the ‘‘do not use’’ order was in 

place. 

On January 10, the West Virginia Bureau for Public Health received guidance from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and confirmation from the U.S. EPA that a maximum level of 

1 ppm of MCHM would be protective of public health. 

Levels of MCHM in the river’s raw water and the plant’s treated 

water have been at less than the CDC designated ‘‘protective of 

public health’’ level, 1 ppm, since January 13. 

On January 15, based on additional guidance from the CDC, we 

issued another advisory for pregnant women to consider an alternative drinking water source until the chemical was at a nondetect 

level throughout the water distribution system. 

On January 18, following extensive, around-the-clock testing 

throughout the system, the last area under the ‘‘do not use’’ order 

was lifted. 

We will continue to flush the system and test water at designated locations, determined jointly by West Virginia American 

Water and the West Virginia Bureau for Public Health, until 

MCHM levels are nondetectable at all designated sampling locations throughout the distribution system. 

On January 21, fully 12 days after the MCHM spill, Freedom Industries informed the West Virginia Department of Environmental 

Protection of the presence of a second chemical in the spill, a proprietary mixture of glycol ethers known as PPH. 

Since this disclosure, a group of chemists, researchers, regulators, health organizations, and commercial laboratories collaborated in the development of a method of detection for PPH at the 

parts per billion level. Even at this minute detection level, only 2 

samples out of 300 samples that have been tested have shown any 

trace of PPH, and both of these samples were after all customers 

were already under the ‘‘do not use’’ order. 

I would like to underscore West Virginia American Water’s focus 

during the Freedom Industries chemical spill and aftermath. Safety 

is our number one priority. Continuous sampling, testing, and 

treatment is critical. Our present objective is no detectable MCHM 

in the distribution system water. 

We are partnering with local, State, and Federal officials. We 

strive to provide our customers with nothing less than clean, safe 

drinking water. 

West Virginia American Water has always supported laws and 

regulations that promote safe drinking water and has an outstanding record of compliance with these requirements. We are 

committed to working with State and Federal officials to protect 

the public health, to protect the public from threats to safe drinking water. 

I would like to give my sincere and heartfelt thanks to the West 

Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, the West 

Virginia Bureau for Public Health, and the West Virginia National 

Guard, as well as other agencies, companies, and subject matter experts, who were essential and capable partners in the wake of the 

Freedom Industries spill. 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before the committee. 

22 

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you, Mr. McIntyre. 

And I thank all of you. Again, I reassure you your full statements will be in the record for the committee. 

I also want to offer a statement, without objection, to the record 

by Senator Rockefeller, who submitted a statement. 

No objection, so ordered. 

It is in the record. 

Also, I understand that Senator Rockefeller’s State director 

Rocky Goodwin is here with us today. We welcome her today. And 

I know that Senator Rockefeller is monitoring the situation and the 

events very closely, so we appreciate that. 

With that, we will start the round of questions. I anticipate we 

will have a second round and a third round, if necessary. I am 

going to yield my first 5 minutes to Representative Capito to start 

the questioning. 

Mrs. CAPITO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank all of you. 

I would like to, before I begin my questioning, add to the record 

‘‘Recommendations to Incorporate Public Health Components to 

Senate Bill 373’’ by Dr. Gupta, who is the Charleston-Kanawha 

Health Department health officer. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Without objection, so ordered. 

[The information follows:] 

23 


Insert offset folio 8 here 86632.008
24 

Mrs. CAPITO. Thank you. 

The big question I hear, Mr. McIntyre, and it is very simple, you 

said safety is your number one priority: Is the water safe to drink? 

Mr. MCINTYRE. As a water company, we don’t set the safe standards. But we are in compliance with all the standards set by the 

health-based agencies, like the CDC, the West Virginia Bureau of 

Public Health, and we have been since the 13th of January. 

Yet, I recognize the customers’ fear associated with the smell of 

something in their water. So as a water purveyor, we continue to 

work until the smell is eradicated from the system. 

Mrs. CAPITO. Thank you for that answer. I would still like to 

hear it is safe, and I think that is what everybody wants, that one 

word. 

Dr. Tierney, is the water safe to drink? 

Dr. TIERNEY. That is, in a way, a difficult thing to say, because 

everybody has a different definition of ‘‘safe.’’ As I used the example before, some people think it is safe to jump off the bridge on 

Bridge Day. I don’t personally think that is safe. So everybody has 

a different definition. 

Am I confident in the science? I am as confident as I can be, 

given what we have. I believe the water, based on the standards 

we have, is usable for every purpose, and that includes drinking, 

bathing, and cooking. 

Mrs. CAPITO. So I guess the frustration I am feeling is that we 

can’t come to that specific term where everybody could have that 

assurance. 

I will note that you do have a giant thing of water in front of 

you, so I am assuming you are drinking that. 

Dr. TIERNEY. I am. I am sorry, that is not meant to be a statement. But it is from my home tap and the ice cubes from my home 

ice machine. And I have been drinking it. I didn’t think about that, 

but yes. 

Mrs. CAPITO. Let me ask you this, Mr. McIntyre. This is something that you and I actually talked about on the day I came out 

there. There was never any communication or any reporting to you 

as the purveyor of potable water in the area what is upstream from 

you. 

So you never knew or had any knowledge—I mean, you knew 

Freedom Industries was up there, but you didn’t have any—there 

is no requirement to have communication as to what is up there 

and how you could have had a quicker response to this, maybe? 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Well, I think the last part, let me address that 

first, because we had enough time and information to know that 

there was the spill and to respond. The information that would 

have been useful to us on what products were up there are really 

the aftermath in dealing with the customer and the residents’ fear 

of the water, because it has this odor to it. And even its MSDS 

sheet doesn’t refer much to its odorous nature in the drinking 

water system. 

We had enough time to augment our treatment plant, and we 

were treating this material throughout the event but determined 

that after 4 p.m. that some of the material made it through the 

treatment system. 

25 

Mrs. CAPITO. The testing protocols weren’t really in place though 

for at least 24 hours. I remember you working with the Guard to 

try to figure out how to detect for this. Wouldn’t it have been useful 

to have all this—you could have pulled it up on your computer. We 

could test right away. We know what we are looking for. We know 

how to prevent, to provide a quicker response. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Well, again, I challenge the ‘‘quicker response’’ 

part. I think having more information on all products above a 

water treatment plant is extremely helpful, extremely helpful. But 

we had enough information. We augmented the treatment plant, 

and we followed the standard protocols. ‘‘Do not use’’ is a protocol 

that the West Virginia Bureau of Public Health has in place for 

these situations. 

And I have said publicly, if we knew again what we know now 

about the materials and we had the same issue presented to us, we 

would have made the same decision, to continue running the treatment plant and put a ‘‘do not use’’ order. 

It is really having information after that, that would have been 

really helpful to help people understand the nature of the health 

hazards, the risks associated with this product, or apparently the 

lack of any of those health hazards. 

Mrs. CAPITO. All right, Mr. Petry, thank you for your all’s response in an emergency way, and the way you were able to disseminate water, both you and the other emergency response responders. 

You have had a lot of interaction with FEMA we have here in 

Kanawha County and across the State. Would you say that the response with FEMA in terms of helping you deliver was satisfactory, 

or would you have suggestions for them? 

Mr. PETRY. Well, we keep telling people to be prepared for 72 

hours at home, just in case a major emergency happens. 

Once an incident occurs, they have to stand up their own response and send us the resources that we request through the 

State. And FEMA did, in fact, send us a lot of water that we needed. 

It is obvious that it doesn’t get here quick enough for us, but 

they have procedures, I am sure, they have to go through. And we 

take it upon ourselves to use our local resources until they get 

here. 

But of course, I would like to see a quicker response. 

Mrs. CAPITO. OK, thank you. 

I have 20—oh, I have no more seconds, all right, thank you. 

Mr. SHUSTER. We will do a second round. 

And with that, Mr. Rahall is recognized. 

Mr. RAHALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gordon, let me begin by asking you a couple questions. You stated in your testimony that during the first 24 hours you had difficulty communicating with American Water. Is that accurate? 

Mr. MERRY. Yes. 

Mr. RAHALL. Did it improve after a time period? Did your communication improve? 

Mr. MERRY. No, sir. I never did get through to them. I never got 

an answer. I left messages and never did get a return phone call. 

26 

Mr. RAHALL. From where were you getting your information, 

then? 

Mr. MERRY. From Jimmy. 

Mr. RAHALL. From Homeland Security? OK, I think a lot of people were doing that. 

Let me ask, have you documented, Gordon, the final costs to the 

county of Cabell? 

Mr. MERRY. When we were in the very beginning, we spent 

around $2,000 for water and hand sanitizer. One of the things that 

we tell, we tell the people in the community to be ready for 48– 

72 hours. Local government is going to have to step up and also 

be ready in that same time period. Without the Huntington Area 

Food Bank, there would not have been water in the town of 

Culloden. 

Mr. RAHALL. Mr. McIntyre, let me ask you about the school situation here, a full month after the incident started, there have been 

reports of fumes in the schools. Are you helping? What are those 

fumes coming from, first of all? 

Mr. MCINTYRE. I don’t know, sir. I can’t answer that question. 

The National Guard has been the agency that has been actively involved in sampling the schools. And all I can tell you is the sampling results that I have seen before and after these events are at 

nondetect levels. But I can’t speak to those events. I don’t have any 

direct knowledge. 

Mr. RAHALL. Does anyone on the panel have knowledge of the 

fumes in the schools? Jimmy? 

Mr. GIANATO. Yes, Congressman, we have put together some National Guard and Bureau of Public Health and DEP strike teams 

that have responded to these calls from the schools concerning the 

fumes. 

As Mr. McIntyre said, we have gone in and tested the water immediately, going into the schools and then doing tests afterward. 

But all the water before any flushing or anything else was done 

came back at a nondetect level. 

There have been some issues with the schools in the cafeterias 

with their dishwashers, when the water has been heated up, that 

that odor seems to be greater at that point. 

But that is the only thing we have really seen as a potential 

cause. 

Mr. RAHALL. Have you been assisting them in their flushing efforts? 

Mr. GIANATO. The Guard has. The schools have—the schools are 

a little bit more complex than the average home to flush, in that 

a lot of the particularly newer schools have automated systems 

that control the flow of water, just like the faucets that you have 

to put your hands under to make run, so you can’t just go in and 

turn the faucet on and let it flush. So they are a little bit more 

complicated. 

But the school systems have brought plumbers in, and they have 

flushed their buildings. And in cases where we have had the 

thresholds above the 10 ppb, they have gone in and reflushed. And 

all the schools that are at less than the 10 ppb at this point. 

27 

Mr. RAHALL. What about individual homes that want to be tested? I know you can’t just go around testing everybody’s home. 

What is the process they go through? 

Mr. GIANATO. Some individuals are doing private testing on their 

own. The Governor’s office and the Bureau of Public Health are 

working on a plan. 

As you all know, this is not a very simple issue. It is very complex issue, particularly when you start looking at going into homes. 

So we want to make sure, and the Governor wants to make sure, 

whatever we do is very thoughtful and well laid out, so that when 

we do something, it is something that we can replicate down the 

road. 

Mr. RAHALL. Thank you. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you. 

With that, Mr. Webster is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. WEBSTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just have a couple 

questions. 

Is there any evidence that the chemical residue could adhere 

itself to iron pipes, copper pipes? Anyone know the answer to that? 

Dr. TIERNEY. It is a good question, and we have been looking at 

it. It relates to a chemical’s octanol water partition coefficient. It 

is a factor in science called a KOW, and it is a complex calculation 

based on the particular substance or chemical that is involved. 

We do know that if a KOW is high, it tends to be more sticky 

to substances. And if a KOW is low, it tends to be less likely to 

be sticky to substances. And fortunately, the MCHM has a low partition coefficient, and so we don’t anticipate it is going to be sticky. 

The EPA is looking at it right now, to make sure that the chemical doesn’t have any unique characteristics, which would cause it 

to act different than we expect. 

But the fact that when we have had consistently lower levels 

with the testing tends to suggest it is acting like we would expect 

it to act with that partition coefficient. But we don’t have an official 

answer from the EPA yet. 

Mr. WEBSTER. Is there a protocol for a residence or a commercial 

building on what to do to flush, before you begin using, like to flush 

out the water that maybe sat there for a couple days? Is there any 

protocol for that, or a checklist of some sort? 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Yes, sir. Working with the different health agencies, we created a flushing protocol for customers. But it is important to remind everyone that that protocol is based on helping 

homes ensure that they could get below the 1 ppm health protective limit. 

We were very clear at the time that we advised people to follow 

the flushing protocol, which our customer service center, if people 

call, if they haven’t flushed, I would certainly advise them to flush. 

We hear a number of customers haven’t. We have staff that can 

walk them through that process on the phone. It is on our Web 

site. It is a printed three-page brochure. 

There are essentially three basic steps to the flushing. You flush 

the hot water for 15 minutes, and then the cold water for 5 minutes, then outside taps for 5 minutes. And then you move to what 

we consider cleansing, which is changing any filters on your icemaker, dealing with automatic icemakers and that. 

28 

So again, that was to get below the protected health limit. And 

that has been very effective when used and followed. 

We also advised people, though, at that time, that the flushing 

was not to eliminate the odor, but to meet the protective health 

limit set by the CDC. And below that number, people would still 

be able to smell this product in their water. 

So that is the next phase that we moved into in the flushing and 

the nondetect, and we continue to work to eradicate it, so that no 

people can smell it in their water. 

I hope that answers your question. 

Mr. WEBSTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you. 

With that, Senator Manchin? 

Senator MANCHIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First of all, it is just unconscionable that Freedom Industries 

could not have known about the leak, did not report the leak, and 

did not know how much of the leak happened. It is unconscionable 

to me to believe that. 

So I am sure action will be taken for responsible parties there. 

And the answers we got afterwards were absolutely unacceptable. 

With that being said, I understand, my outrage and everyone 

else’s outrage should be that, of any unconscionable company out 

there doing that type of business. 

With that being said, Dr. Moure-Eraso, you with your impressive 

background, is the water safe? Would you drink the water and use 

the water? Would your children and grandchildren? 

If it is not safe, and you can’t say that, what do you want to see 

testing before you would consider it to be safe, if you can answer? 

Mr. MOURE-ERASO. Well, what I would say is that the value that 

was the trigger, the sampling and the trigger, the stopping the use 

of the water, is what is called a screening level, it is what the CDC 

says. The screening level is not necessarily a level that protects 

public health. 

Senator MANCHIN. But do you consider it to be safe? 

Mr. MOURE-ERASO. Well, I consider that the toxicology that exists for this chemical is so little, and the chemical is so little studied, that it is very hard to say what is the safe level. 

What we should be looking at is what are the levels of detection 

that we have, and try to use the water, as is happening here, when 

they are below the levels of detection. 

But I will look back to the level of detection that this is the 

screening level that was reported. 

Senator MANCHIN. So nobody is going to say it is safe. That is 

what I am hearing from everybody here. 

And that is the confusion that we have right now. 

With that being said, Mr. McIntyre, if you could tell me, there 

was no backup. You had single-sourced intake. Do you have any 

other of your plants around the country that you provide water to 

that only have single-source intake and no backup system that you 

can’t shut down the intake? Is anyone else as vulnerable as we are? 

Mr. MCINTYRE. I can tell you, Senator, that many water treatment plants around the country have a single intake for their 

water treatment plant. 

Senator MANCHIN. With those type of chemicals right next door? 

29 

Mr. MCINTYRE. It depends on where they are located as to what 

they have. But there are major river basins—— 

Senator MANCHIN. So you are saying—how about backup? You 

are saying the rest of your systems have no backup? 

Mr. MCINTYRE. I am not saying the rest of the systems. I don’t 

know that. We can get you that answer. 

Senator MANCHIN. Would you get us that information, please, for 

the record, because I would like to know. 

I can’t imagine why we wouldn’t have shut it down. That is common sense, that you shut down the system. But then you told me 

about the way it should have been done, because of the public safety and this and that. And I just can’t imagine that we couldn’t have 

shut that down, had the backup system until we could determine 

it. 

I know, at the time, they didn’t let you know and all this going 

on, but this makes no sense. 

If I could go right quickly to Mr. Gianato and Dr. Tierney, have 

you evaluated the other areas in West Virginia that people might 

be with their intake systems, where the water treatment plants 

that could be vulnerable right now? And have you taken any actions? 

Mr. GIANATO. Yes, sir. I can tell you what we have done. We 

have begun the process of mapping all the water intakes across the 

State and looking at the locations—— 

Senator MANCHIN. Have we identified, basically, and notified 

anybody that could be in harm’s way? 

Mr. GIANATO. Not at this point. We are still trying to—— 

Senator MANCHIN. You are still evaluating. 

Dr. Tierney? 

Dr. TIERNEY. We have maps that need to be updated, but we 

don’t have any authority to do something—— 

Senator MANCHIN. So the legislation right now—I am understanding EPA does not have the backing of any codification of any 

law that allows you to go and do anything that is nonhazmat. Is 

that correct? 

Dr. TIERNEY. You’ll have to ask EPA. 

Senator MANCHIN. Mike? I am sorry, Mr. Dorsey? 

Mr. DORSEY. It is all right, Senator. Well, the DEP. 

But that is correct, at least from the State—— 

Senator MANCHIN. But they are saying, why didn’t you do this? 

Why wouldn’t you have already been doing this? Why did we have 

a horrific situation like this? You follow me? 

People are starting to blame with everybody, but tell me why the 

DEP would not have been able to do what needed to be done? 

Mr. DORSEY. Well, the laws we do have aren’t designed to do 

what you are suggesting, Senator. We can look at people’s 

stormwater. We can look at any specific outfalls that they have. 

But we do not have the statutory or rule authority to go up and 

say, OK, I want to do a survey upstream here. 

Senator MANCHIN. Have you looked at the legislation that we 

have provided, the legislation I introduced on the Senate side, and 

I am sure our colleagues are introducing on the House side, to see 

if that would give you the adequate—— 

Mr. DORSEY. Yes, sir. That is a big help. 

30 

Mr. MOURE-ERASO. Senator, if I can comment? 

Senator MANCHIN. Doctor? 

Mr. MOURE-ERASO. You know, part of our lines of inquiry in our 

investigation are toward prevention. It is good that we are looking 

at the waterworks and where the water is coming from. But also, 

in our lines of inquiry, we are focusing on the siting of chemical 

storage tanks. And we believe that it is a very important issue, an 

issue that I define it as inherently safe actions. 

We have to be clear, after a mapping is done of the facilities for 

water, what are the chemical storage that are nearby and why do 

they need to be there if they are hazardous substances. And that 

will be an important step to take. 

Senator MANCHIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SHUSTER. We will do another round, if there are more questions. 

My first question is a followup with what Representative Capito 

and Senator Manchin asked. The panel sitting here, nobody is willing to say that the water is safe, categorically say it is safe. 

And I am not going to ask you again, because I think everybody 

is going to dance around the question. 

And I don’t know exactly why, but I suspect the main reason why 

is everybody is afraid they are going to get sued if something happens weeks from now and something enters the water and somebody is going to bring a lawsuit against somebody. So that is troubling to me that in our society, when we have the people that are 

supposed to protect us and the experts, nobody is willing to say it 

because they are afraid of a lawsuit. 

So that is a different topic for today, but it is about tort reform 

and making sure that our experts, that the people who are protecting society, are able to step up and say, with our technology, 

we ought to be able say the water is safe. 

And so I understand why you are hedging. 

Communications in this case, first, let me go to—you talked 

about, Senator Manchin asked why didn’t you shut down. Can you 

explain again why you didn’t shut down the system? 

I think you talked about it in your—— 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Certainly, thank you. And it is the number one 

question that we keep getting asked as the water purveyors. 

And people believe that you can just physically turn off and turn 

on a water plant. Unfortunately, that is not the reality. 

And it is a system that was severely stressed with the polar vortex temperatures that we had. And then the thaw that occurred 

after that, we had numerous pipe breaks. People were turning their 

water on to let it run so that their taps wouldn’t freeze. We encourage that, so that they don’t have a costly service line repair or replacement. 

But our system, on January 9, would not support any length of 

shutdown. In fact, if we had shut down the facility, we would have 

been out of water in areas within 15 minutes to 2 hours. 

That aside, we provide a critical service to the community, and 

I would like people to try to envision what it would be like to be 

in a community where there is no water in the pipes, and you have 

no sanitation. Where do you go to the bathroom? Hospitals, if there 

31 

is a fire in the hospital, how do you protect those patients? There 

are no sprinkler systems in buildings. It is a downtown area. 

What if someone started a fire? How do you address that? 

Those were all critical thought processes that we had to go 

through. 

And to extend, you can’t just turn it back on. Once you waited 

for the plume to pass, and we were 4 to 5 days before the river 

water was below the CDC standard, so when people talk about 

storage, I don’t believe storage would have helped, because you 

have to get the plant back on and you have to get it running. Now 

you have to introduce that water very carefully into a system that 

is full of air. 

And if you have ever seen your tap at home with air in it in the 

bathroom, when you turn it on, that explosive nature, there would 

have been pipe breaks all over the system that would have had to 

have been fixed, and then remedied, and then boil water, and move 

out and out and out. 

Conservatively, we believe that it would have been more than a 

month to turn the water system back on for all customers. We believe we made the right decision to protect this community. 

Mr. SHUSTER. A whole other health hazard you bring up, if you 

shut that system down, potentially. 

Would the staff turn the clock on for me? I need the discipline 

of the clock also. 

Communication, I think communication is absolutely critical in 

these events. I want to start first with Mr. Merry and Mr. Petry 

on the communication. 

You had said you weren’t able to communicate with the water 

company, but the Federal, the State, how is that communication? 

How did that work for you? 

Mr. MERRY. I had very good communications with the Office of 

Emergency Service. I had no problems. I never had one issue. 

Mr. PETRY. I, too, had good communications with the State Office 

of Emergency Services. But we have been in these situations before, with the chemical facilities in the area, and we found out that 

we were better off if we had somebody at the site. And we had my 

deputy go to the meetings and be a part of the committee that was 

at the water company, along with all the other people from the National Guard and other agencies. 

Mr. SHUSTER. And how did that information from the CDC flow 

down? Does that go through the State to you folks or to you directly? 

Mr. MOURE-ERASO. Chairman Shuster, if I might? 

Mr. SHUSTER. Yes. 

Mr. MOURE-ERASO. The issue of communications, it is an important one, and it talks about your original question that says there 

is the appearance that people are hedging when they say what is 

the safe level, if this is a safe level. 

But if you are going to give a scientific answer to this, you have 

to have scientific data in which you can base your statement of 

safety. 

And in this particular chemical, there are only two toxicological 

studies that were ever made. One is an acute single dose mortality 

32 

study and the other was a daily oral study, four groups of animals 

in each. I mean, this is the bare minimum that you do. 

And those types of studies are not designed to give us the answer 

of what is safe. That is one of the things that we are also contemplating in our investigation of this case, to look, what Senator 

Manchin is doing, to look at the Toxic Substance Control Act, and 

see why the people that basically put this chemical in commerce 

don’t provide the necessary toxicological data to tell us what is the 

level of toxicity that we should worry about. And that remains to 

be done. 

Mr. SHUSTER. And, Mr. McIntyre, Mr. Merry said he was unable 

to communicate with you folks. Can you talk a little bit about what 

was going on over there? Was there a reason that you didn’t communicate with them? Can you talk a little bit about the communication? 

Mr. MCINTYRE. To be honest, I didn’t know he was trying to communicate with us. I did not receive any calls. I am not sure who 

he was calling, but we had a whole interagency team at the water 

treatment plant, running day and night. So I can’t speak to who 

he called, but I find it very unfortunate, because I believe we have 

been extremely communicative with all the partners through this 

process. 

A lot of communications have been happening. I don’t know 

where this one fell apart. 

Mr. SHUSTER. In a situation like this, unfortunately, that happens now and then. 

But again, communication, that is something we need to learn 

from this, from the Federal level all the way down. And I think the 

folks, where the rubber meets the road, you guys, the county emergency responders, you need to have that communication all the way 

up the chain. 

A final question, Mr. Gianato, you mentioned about learning 

from other sites that are similar to West Virginia. Have you identified other places that are similar? As the committee goes forward, 

as we look at potential legislation, that we can look and say this 

is a very similar situation that occurred in this State or that State? 

Mr. GIANATO. What I meant to say in that is people need to learn 

from what we are doing here. And we need to look at being able 

to replicate and learn from the mistakes that we made, the things 

that we did right, and push that model all across the country. 

We are currently talking to FEMA and DHS about developing 

some things. As you know, there are some national security implications to this that need to be discussed in another forum. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Absolutely. 

With that, I am going to go for second round of questions. 

Mr. Rahall? 

Mr. RAHALL. Yes. Mr. Dorsey, let me ask you about the restoration of the site. 

Mr. DORSEY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. RAHALL. You mentioned, I think somewhere in the press, 

that it has been stalled because of the various investigations, including a criminal investigation going on. 

Has that restoration been restarted, or is it still on hold? 

33 

Mr. DORSEY. Congressman Rahall, we have never really stopped. 

We have been actively managing the site. But the area where the 

leak actually occurred is in the tank farm on top of the bench 

there. And the area where the leak occurred has been sort of offlimits. We put sumps in there. We put some interceptor trenches, 

et cetera, to collect the raw material that was coming out. And that 

has stopped. 

But it would surprise me if we didn’t, when we move these tanks, 

find additional pools of the material below that. Now that is not 

to say it is going to get off-site. 

Mr. McIntyre stated the water has been clean since January 13. 

I believe the intake side of that has been clean since January 11. 

So we have been very successful keeping the stuff on the site. 

But the Chemical Safety Board is up there investigating. The 

Federal prosecutor is investigating. There are several up there. 

And until they give the clearance—I am hoping that this week— 

we haven’t been able to move those tanks and see what we have 

right below them. 

Mr. MOURE-ERASO. Congressman Rahall? 

Mr. RAHALL. Yes? 

Mr. MOURE-ERASO. In the preliminary work that we have done, 

we have been able to examine the bottom of the tank. And I will 

ask our lead investigator, Mr. Banks, if he could show to you the 

photographs that we have of the actual failure of the bottom of the 

tank. We have it over here. 

Mr. RAHALL. You mentioned Mr. Banks. I met with him on his 

first day he was in State. He is no stranger to our State, either, 

having been here with your board in previous accidents. 

Mr. BANKS. Well, as you can see here, there are two holes that 

we photographed in the tank. One is about 19 cm, and one is about 

10 cm. And this is the object of our attempt to get this portion of 

the tank extracted and removed for forensic examination. 

We are working with our partners in the U.S. Attorney’s Office 

and the State to make sure that everybody understands that there 

is a protocol we have developed. We are working with a preeminent 

tank expert to make sure that these portions of the tank are removed in the prescribed manner. 

And I think we are close to doing that. The plaintiffs’ attorneys 

were out at the site this past Friday, and we are hoping to strike 

an arrangement where we can remove this. Once we remove this, 

the remediation can take place. 

This is the main area, but we want to make sure that we thoroughly document those other tanks that were also in similar service to determine if there was a failure mechanism in those tanks 

that could tell us why the tanks failed. 

Mr. RAHALL. Is that steel? 

Mr. BANKS. We think it is carbon steel, but we would want to 

determine that before we make any pronouncements on that. 

Mr. MOURE-ERASO. Yes, I would like to add that one line of investigation is to look at corrosion mechanisms. We are going to 

take samples of that tank and find out how the corrosion happened, and to try to make recommendations of what should be recommended to build the tanks. There are materials, there are alVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:24 Aug 01, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\113\FULL\2-10-1~1\86632.TXT JEAN
34 

loys, that are especially protective towards corrosion that we would 

like to recommend at the end. 

Mr. RAHALL. How long do you expect this process to take? 

Mr. BANKS. The actual removing of the sample, which is called 

a coupon, could be a day. But it is a matter of getting all of the 

other tanks mapped, and I think that could take maybe 2 to 3 

days. We have an expert that has recommended a company that 

can come in to do the work. 

Mr. RAHALL. I know we have discussed this before, and it has 

been mentioned in today’s testimony. Your recommendations from 

the last time you were in West Virginia 3 years ago, roughly, were 

not acted upon. I know those recommendations have been incorporated in various pieces of legislation my colleagues have introduce, recommendations that I fully support and hope to see them 

acted upon this time. 

Would you anticipate that that will be a basis upon which your 

recommendations will be based after this report is complete? 

I guess my question is, will you re-ask that those recommendations be made again? 

Mr. MOURE-ERASO. Well, I think we have a thorough opportunity 

to present the necessity of having that type of chemical spill protection, chemical release protection, that is the basis of past recommendations. And this, of course, is a case that definitely this applies to, to have a system to address and prevent chemical spills. 

Mr. RAHALL. OK, thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Mrs. Capito? 

Mrs. CAPITO. Thank you. 

Dr. Tierney, I would like to talk about the public health effects 

of what is going on here. 

First of all, just very briefly, if you could give me a snapshot of 

what you have seen. Is it rashes, or is it growing, or how many is 

it, approximately? 

The other question I have is on the ruling, the letter from the 

CDC about pregnant women. I mean, everybody that I talked to 

said, of course, that startled, really shook us. Young families have 

babies. They have formula they are making with the water. Why 

just pregnant women? What kind of judgment was made on that? 

And then maybe just briefly a little bit about what long-term lookout you would predict on this, on the public health aspect. 

Dr. TIERNEY. I am sorry, what was—— 

Mrs. CAPITO. The first one was, a real snapshot as to what you 

have seen. 

Dr. TIERNEY. Oh, what we have seen. 

Mrs. CAPITO. Yes. 

Dr. TIERNEY. Very fortunately, in our survey of the hospitals’ 

emergency rooms, it is been less than a half percent of the affected 

population presented, which thank God. 

Mrs. CAPITO. Yes. 

Dr. TIERNEY. And we have seen mostly nausea and vomiting, 

which was self-limited. 

Mrs. CAPITO. Is that from the odor or from drinking? 

Dr. TIERNEY. All of the above. 

Mrs. CAPITO. OK. 

35 

Dr. TIERNEY. And some rashes, also which resolved. 

So like I said, thank God, we don’t want anyone harmed from 

this. 

Mrs. CAPITO. And then the letter from the CDC? 

Dr. TIERNEY. Now, the letter from the CDC, I can tell you we 

were equally shocked, surprised, and worried when we got it. We 

kept pressing them for more clarification. And the letter is what it 

is. 

Mrs. CAPITO. Right. 

Dr. TIERNEY. I will tell you, I personally, on Saturday, which 

would have been the 11th of January, when we were discussing the 

screening level that they gave me, being a doctor, I specifically 

asked what about babies, what about breastfeeding, what about 

immunocompromised, what about pregnant women, what about? 

And they told me that they felt that the screening level, because 

of the safety factors that they factored into it, were protective of 

all those populations. 

So we were shocked, also, when they presented us with this. 

Mrs. CAPITO. And the last thing is, have you gotten to any kind 

of strategy for some sort of long-term—— 

Dr. TIERNEY. We are in the process of that. And like I said, it 

is not something that we want to get wrong. So we want to make 

sure that it is a reasoned approach. 

We are starting with our surveillance, looking back at it. And 

then we are going to do a CASPER study, which is a household 

surveillance study through the CDC. 

We are going to take that information, and then we are going to 

figure out what is going to give us the best information. 

Mrs. CAPITO. All right. 

Mr. Dorsey, there was a report early on that the tanks had never 

been inspected. And then, as Senator Manchin said, everybody was 

getting blamed for this. What I am hearing you say is that was not 

part of your legal authority. Am I correct in that? 

Mr. DORSEY. That is correct, Congresswoman Capito. Nothing 

that we would have done in our legal authority that has inspectors 

for the laws that are applicable up here would have detected that 

leak. 

Mrs. CAPITO. Had you had inspectors on the site at all previously? 

Mr. DORSEY. Yes. They are been inspectors onsite numerous 

times over the years. Our secretary reported initially, in the heat 

of the moment, when this thing first happened, that they hadn’t. 

But that was not the case. 

Now, I can’t tell you how many times they have been on there, 

but it was probably over a dozen for air complaints and other inspections up there. 

Mrs. CAPITO. OK. But your real job there was not to inspect the 

safety of the tank. It was to respond to complaints, odor complaints 

and such. Is that correct? 

Mr. DORSEY. That is correct. Yes, ma’am. 

Mrs. CAPITO. OK. There is another myth around—not myth, but 

concern with the flushing issue, in that everybody seems to be 

smelling it the most with the hot water. 

36 

And I can attest to that. In the shower, I can smell it. Although 

I didn’t this morning, I was happy to report. But brushing my teeth 

with the cold, I didn’t smell it. 

So is there some characteristic here with hot? Is it because—I 

mean, we are talking about sediments in our hot water tanks? Help 

us out with this. We are talking about it a lot. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Yes, and it is well known in the water industry 

that chemicals that have an odor to them, like geosmin or MIB, 

which are associated with the much cleaner water we have in the 

Great Lakes, decades ago, water treatment plants started seeing 

odors in their water, and that is why many of them have switched 

to the type of process that we have with carbon caps, activated carbon caps, on their treatment system. It is to deal with these odors. 

And they are more prominent in hot water. I think it is mostly 

in the shower, and it is because you are making it into more of a 

mist, and it has temperature. It is just like anything you cook. It 

smells more when it is hot than when it is cold. It is natural. 

Mrs. CAPITO. So that is not an unexpected result, with the hot 

water you would smell it more prominently? 

Mr. MCINTYRE. I would expect it fully. 

Mrs. CAPITO. OK. All right. 

Yes, Dr. Moure-Eraso, you mentioned in your testimony that a 

private inspector had been to the site to inspect the tanks in October of 2013. Now I don’t know what reason they had a contractor 

coming in. Since they are not here, we cannot ask them that question. But I am going to surmise, since it was sold at the end of the 

year, that that might have been one of the provisos of change of 

ownership. I don’t know that to be a fact, but that is kind of what 

hit me. 

You mentioned in there, in your report, you say that the tank 

and then ‘‘had been maintained to some structural adequacy, but 

not necessarily full compliance of API 653 or EPA standards.’’ 

Can you give us some detail on that? What does that mean? It 

was corroding? 

Mr. MOURE-ERASO. Let me answer first, and then I pass you to 

Mr. Banks. 

First of all, they did inspect in October 2013 the chemical tanks 

and terminals in Charleston and Nitro. But they didn’t address the 

tank that leaked, 396. 

Mrs. CAPITO. Oh, the specific tank was not—— 

Mr. MOURE-ERASO. It wasn’t addressed because it didn’t contain 

any hazardous substances as legally defined. 

Mrs. CAPITO. Oh, OK. 

Mr. MOURE-ERASO. But, you know, I wonder if you would like to 

ask details of API 653. 

Mr. BANKS. Well, there is a pretty rigorous standard that 653 

would hold the tanks to, if they were used in a certain service. 

Mrs. CAPITO. If it was toxic, is that what you—— 

Mr. BANKS. Yes, if it was toxic. And because this material is not 

considered toxic, it received a waiver for that type of scrutiny. 

Mrs. CAPITO. I see. 

Mr. BANKS. And so, moving forward, we are going to look at 

using 653 as the standard for evaluating this tank to make sure 

37 

that, if there were some failure, we will be able to determine that 

using that process. 

Mrs. CAPITO. Thank you. I just finally would say that this toxicity standard, we all realize that something that is nontoxic can 

bring you right to your knees. And I think that is probably what 

TSCA reform is all about, and I look forward to working on that. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SHUSTER. I recognize Senator Manchin. 

Senator MANCHIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I think this would be to Mr. Dorsey. You know, the credibility 

of Freedom, there is no credibility. They said first we thought it 

was a small leak. Then it was, like, I have heard 3 different things, 

3,000, 5,000, and 7,500. 

Do we know much how much actually leaked in the river? 

Mr. DORSEY. No, sir. I stopped reporting how much they were 

telling me was leaked after I got three different numbers. 

Senator MANCHIN. Why should we be relying on them for any information? 

Mr. DORSEY. Well, I am relying on the Chemical Safety Board. 

When the Chemical Safety Board tells me how much they think 

was leaked, that is what I am going to believe. 

Senator MANCHIN. OK. Next of all, was there no plan? I mean, 

when we knew there was a leak, why wouldn’t we have emptied 

those tanks immediately, before more leaked out? 

Mr. DORSEY. Well, we did. Even by the time I got there, they had 

a tanker hooked to that tank and were pumping the material out. 

It just takes X amount of time, depending on how much was in 

there, to get it emptied, to where no more will come out. 

Senator MANCHIN. You know, we are briefed, all of us are briefed 

on a regular basis about cybersecurity and how vulnerable our food 

supply, our water supply, our grid system, and what it can do to 

our lives in America. 

Seeing this as a wakeup call, do you think that this should be 

considered the same as the national disaster? 

The comparison would be this, Doctor, or whoever wants to 

chime in on this, the same as Hurricane Sandy. There is no State 

that can take care of this by themselves, and they are expecting 

the State, but we shouldn’t be looking at how much it costs and 

whether we can do the testing and whether we should—it just has 

to be done. 

So, Doctor, we are going to need people like yourself that will 

speak up and say this is a wakeup call to prevent a national disaster, and can we expect some help from the Federal Government? 

Mr. MOURE-ERASO. Yes, I think one way to deal with this is the 

bill you are proposing in the Senate. But what we have to see here 

is what is the cost of not acting. 

We are able to measure what it has cost the State of West Virginia to have this incident in terms of money lost and income lost 

and anguish to the people. To really address the storage of chemicals in tanks will be a small cost, compared with the other costs. 

Senator MANCHIN. Do you agree that we should have long-term 

monitoring in the valley here for the people in the affected areas, 

so that we know the effect this has on humans or no effect at all 

on humans? 

38 

Mr. MOURE-ERASO. Exactly. I think the Toxic Substance Control 

Act should address the toxicology—— 

Senator MANCHIN. We should expect the Federal Government to 

work with us on that? 

Mr. MOURE-ERASO. And that is the Federal Government, yes. 

Senator MANCHIN. OK, I do, too. I agree with you wholeheartedly 

on that. 

Dr. TIERNEY. I want to chime in, yes. 

Senator MANCHIN. And I know, Dr. Tierney, I know you are new 

to the job. I know you are on the frontline of defense right now, 

but with that being said, I have to say a few things here. 

Your analogy of being safe, and I know no one—I am understanding that not one of you up here are willing to say, unequivocally, it is safe. And I would assume that you would have to have 

0 ppb, ppt, no nothing, for you to use the word ‘‘safe.’’ I think that 

is where everyone is probably. 

I am using it normally. A lot of us are using it normally. I don’t 

think my water needs to be tested in my home. But if I had a 

young family, I think it would be a different scenario. So we are 

all in agreement. 

I would just say this about your analogy on the bridge. I have 

been to Bridge Day many times. I did not think it was safe. I think 

there were people who wanted to throw me off at times, but I didn’t 

think that I would do it voluntarily. 

With that being said, you understand they all sign a waiver. 

They sign a waiver of the danger, to hold nobody responsible. We 

shouldn’t have to sign a waiver to drink our water. 

Dr. TIERNEY. And I agree. I just, as a doctor, cannot countenance 

jumping off a bridge. 

Senator MANCHIN. Let me ask any of you, as we are starting to 

wrap this up, does the State right now, I would assume that they 

are looking at all types of testing, whoever would want a test, I am 

sure of that and I am very appreciative of that. And long term, you 

are all receptive to have long-term monitoring. And Dr. Gupta basically has been on the frontline and I think we have a lot of confidence. 

And I think everybody should be working together. If you want 

to comment on that, and if anybody wants to comment on something that you think would give the people in this valley some confidence that we are moving in the right direction, that anything 

and everything that possibly can be done is being done. 

So, Doctor? 

Dr. TIERNEY. I agree. We are going to need help from our Federal 

partners to establish these things. They are not done easily or inexpensively. 

Senator MANCHIN. You are accepting the testing and you are accepting monitoring also? 

Dr. TIERNEY. Absolutely. I think all of this needs to be done to 

restore confidence. 

Senator MANCHIN. Jeff, do you have anything on your situation, 

do you have any plans on putting in another intake? Do you have 

any plans on, basically, a backup system? 

39 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Senator, we have to look at all options following 

this event. We still have been dealing with this as an event working through it. There will be a time that we go through that. 

I think it is well known now that when that plant was constructed, some 40 years ago, there was an application for a second 

intake that was not approved. 

Senator MANCHIN. Jeff, I would say this, that everyone is upset 

about their water bill. You know that, right? 

Mr. MCINTYRE. I know they are. 

Senator MANCHIN. Can you at least give us a break? 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Senator, it is a great question. But our customers 

continue to use the water, whether they think it is appropriate—— 

Senator MANCHIN. Well, most of it has been used for flushing 

and everything else. The water bills are all spiked higher than they 

have ever been. They haven’t been able to use it. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Well, a number of people have let their water run 

it to protect it from freezing. We know that. We see that. 

We have given credits to small business and residential customers based on what was needed to be done in their homes, and 

it exceeds that amount, what they needed to do to have the water 

below the 1 ppm. 

And I can tell you, Senator, like you, you were at the plant, you 

drank the same finished water I drank that day. I have been drinking it since the order was lifted. My wife does. As a water company—— 

Senator MANCHIN. How are you sleeping? 

Mr. MCINTYRE. I am sleeping great. 

We have to follow what is given to us as health-based guidance. 

And that treatment plant, everything we do, we monitor for 100 

contaminants at various times throughout the year. We monitor for 

mercury. We monitor for arsenic. We monitor for pesticides. And if 

anyone thinks that every water treatment system has absolutely 

zero of all of these chemicals or compounds, they are mistaken. 

There are limits set. And as a water purveyor, we work within 

those limits. So that is the hesitation we have, because we only do 

what we are instructed to do in making water available to our customers. 

And again, through this whole event, through all of the sampling, there is less than 10 results that I am aware of that were 

above 1 ppm. But it is a fear-based issue, because people can smell 

it. And we recognize it. And that is what we are working to, eliminate that fear. 

Senator MANCHIN. Thank you. 

Mr. SHUSTER. I am going to let anyone know, it is not standard 

operating procedure in a hearing like this, but I think, because of 

the situation, in talking to Mr. Rahall and Mrs. Capito, to allow 

the public, if they want to make a comment, what we will do is we 

will—the public can submit anything they want for the record. We 

will take it. It is open for 30 days, as requested by Mr. Rahall. 

But I am going to ask a final couple questions, and we will take 

10 statements from the audience. We will let you talk for 1 minute. 

But if you care, if someone in the public wants to, if you line up 

over there, we will have a microphone. 

40 

But I guess we will take 10 folks. If you want to say something, 

we will give you 1 minute to say it. Then, of course, you can submit 

all you want for the record. 

So again, I have a couple questions here. 

First question is, when the facility operator discloses that there 

are chemicals present at a facility, under the Emergency Planning 

and Community Right to Know Act, that is the law, how is the information utilized, when you have that information, to prepare for 

and help prevent possible incidents? 

And I would like you folks from the county, if you could respond 

to that? How do you utilize that information? 

Mr. PETRY. Well, when we receive a call of some type of a leak 

or some type of odor complaint that we get quite often, we respond 

with our fire departments. My fire coordinator responds. 

Once we determine where the smell or origination of the leak 

may have happened, we do compile a list of all the Tier II reports 

that we have on file. Our KPPC, which is our LEPC in the county, 

our local planning committee, they as well as the State has a list 

of the chemicals that are stored at the facility. 

And as far as I know, the local responding fire department is 

supposed to have that information within their office also. 

So we try to get all the information that we have and take it 

with us to that area, so we will know as much about it as we can, 

so that we can, A, not put our people in harm’s way, and then, B, 

let the people in the area know if there is something they need to 

worry about. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Mr. Merry, similar? 

Mr. MERRY. I agree 100 percent. It is under SARA Title III. They 

must report to the local volunteer fire departments or fire departments, and also submit the Tier II reporting to the local LEPC. 

Mr. SHUSTER. And your first responders, do they get out to these 

sites? The priority sites that are out there, do they get out and visit 

them? Are they familiar with them? 

Mr. MERRY. We don’t have as many sites as Kanawha County. 

Fortunately, we don’t. 

Mr. PETRY. Well, our volunteer departments, as well as our professional fire departments, do preplanning. So they do try to get 

out in the areas, trying to see what they have to protect and protect us from. So I would say, yes, they do probably get out. 

Do they know right now how many and what all the different 

types of chemicals there are? No. But they do try to get out and 

preplan and talk with the presidents of the corporations to try to 

find out what their problems are. 

Mr. SHUSTER. And, Mr. Gianato, your department would be the 

department involved in that? 

Mr. GIANATO. Our department oversees the State Emergency Response Commission. We receive the Tier II reports from all over the 

State. 

Currently, I think we have about 9,000 facilities that file those 

reports to the State. 

The problem is that most of those facilities file paper reports, 

and they come in large volumes of paper, and there is no way— 

we have to literally manually enter each one of those documents. 

41 

We are currently looking at mandating electronic filing into a 

database, and we have been looking at that for some time. It is just 

like everything else. There is a cost associated with doing that, and 

then you have to make it available to people who don’t have access 

to an electronic means to file. So we are looking to work through 

that. 

Mr. SHUSTER. OK, thank you very much. 

I think that is all the questions. Anyone else have any? 

OK, so I see we have seven people in line. Again, Matt, hold the 

mic, because, as we found in Congress, if we surrender the mic to 

a Member of the House, or especially a Member of the Senate, we 

may never get it back. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. SHUSTER. So with that, again, this is not something we typically do, but again, with the urging of my colleagues up here, and 

I think it is such an important subject matter, that I will give you 

a minute—and again, you can submit all the documentation you 

want to. 

But again, we will give you a minute to make a public statement. 

So with that, introduce yourself, please, and where you are from, 

or who you are with. 

Ms. NYE. Thank you, Chairman Shuster. My name is Maya Nye. 

I am a spokesperson for People Concerned About Chemical Safety, 

but I grew up a mile away from the Institute chemical facility. My 

father worked for Union Carbide for his entire career. My mom 

worked there, and my stepfather worked there. I worked there 

while I was in college. 

Chemical incidents are, actually, they are anything but new to 

me, and much like water contamination is anything but new to the 

people of the coalfields of West Virginia and to the fracking fields 

of West Virginia. 

I have been through many chemical incidents in my life. And 

when this incident first happened, my dear friend called me panicked because she hadn’t heard about the leak until after it had already entered the drinking water supply, and she had just bathed 

her twin daughters in it. And she was worried about the immediate 

and long-term health effects of the chemical that she had just unknowingly exposed her children to. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Since we only have seven people up there, I am 

going to give everybody 2 minutes, but we are going to cut it off 

at seven. 

So you have another minute. Go ahead. 

Ms. NYE. We need peer-reviewed scientific evidence to measure 

the accuracy of flushing protocols. We need peer-reviewed scientific 

evidence to tell us what the long-term health effects will be. We 

need medical monitoring. We have needed it for the last 70 years 

in this valley. 

We need to continue water distribution until someone up here is 

willing to say that the water is safe. We are so glad to have the 

Chemical Safety Board back here. 

And while the water intake system should be high on the priority 

list for protective measures that we need to put in place, I believe 

that we are short-sighting ourselves if we stop there. I mean, I 

think we really need to insist that companies like Freedom invest 

42 

in updating their aging infrastructure in order to protect not only 

our water intakes, but to protect the workers, protect community 

members, and to protect a thriving local economy. 

We need to mandate the implementation of inherently safer technologies as well and reduce the stockpiles in order to minimize the 

terrorist threat that is posed by these facilities. 

And we need to take a good hard look at chemical safety from 

cradle to grave, so from community’s like mine that manufacture, 

through transportation, to the application, and to the waste disposal. We have to look at that chain. And if we don’t, we are really 

short-sighting ourselves. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you very much. 

Ms. NYE. Thank you. 

Mr. SHUSTER. You can submit it all for the record. 

The next person up. 

Again, we cut off the line with the last gentleman with the flannel shirt and the beard. He is our last one. But we are going to 

give everyone 2 minutes instead, so set the clock at 2. 

Can you introduce yourself? 

Ms. THOMPSON. Yes, my name is Janet J.T. Thompson, and I appreciate everything I have heard about what you plan to do in the 

future. And I can appreciate what you went through with Freedom. 

But my question is this, and we do need an answer now, we were 

told that the water, that if you smelled the water, the water was 

not safe. I had a little 10-year-old girl tell me the other day that 

the water stinks. She can smell the smell. They are probably about 

1,000 feet from the plant. They still smell it, and the water stinks 

when it comes out. 

So I think what we really want to know in order to restore the 

confidence is when will we stop smelling the water and when will 

we hear that the chemical leak is completely stopped. And that will 

assure us that it is not getting into the water. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you. Would someone care to answer? I 

think someone has talked a little bit about that. I can’t remember 

who. There is some smell but—— 

Mr. DORSEY. Mr. Chairman, if I may say one thing to start with. 

As everybody knows, the odor threshold on this is very, very low. 

Some of you may remember a week ago last Friday, we cut a 

pipe up there that was just laying on the bottom that no one knew 

about, and we had odor complaints a mile away from the site. And 

we took a sample of that material and it came back at 98 ppm, less 

than 100 ppm, people were smelling it a mile away. 

So it is very easy to smell, as everybody says. 

And I need to point out that when we do get to work removing 

the tanks, there will likely be odors again up there. That doesn’t 

mean it will be in the water. That means that we will have exposed 

some of it to the air, and it is going to smell. 

But I understand what the lady is talking about. You can smell 

it at extremely low levels. 

Mr. SHUSTER. But confirm that the leak has stopped. You are 

confident that the leak has—— 

Mr. DORSEY. Yes. 

Mr. SHUSTER. OK. 

Mr. McIntyre? 

43 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Let me talk to the drinking water and the odor 

in the drinking water again. We have tried to be as consistent as 

we can, but it is fact-based information. You can smell MCHM in 

the water below the protective health limit. Just because you can 

smell something doesn’t mean it is not safe. 

In fact, since the 17th, we have been out flushing and testing the 

system, and there has been no result that is close to the protective 

health limit since the 17th of January. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you. 

Next person? 

Thank you for the question. 

Please introduce yourself. 

Ms. DAVIS. Yes, my name is Sue Davis. I have lived in this valley 

for 71 years. And the chemicals have interrupted my life and my 

well-being again, as they have over the last 71 years. 

Mr. McIntyre, the money that you offer us won’t pay for the gas 

that I have used to get to the doctor. 

Also, why do you suppose all of our stores are always filled with 

every kind of drinking water possible? Jugs, small bottles. 

We simply don’t have that much confidence in your water system 

to begin with. So it is going to be a long time before you restore 

faith in it again, and you will never have mine. 

The lady from the poison control, I think she’s poison control. 

Mr. SHUSTER. We don’t have anyone here from the CDC. Dr. 

Tierney, the health officer. 

Ms. DAVIS. The doctor, yes. 

I appreciate your comments, but you are not considering the people who haven’t gone to the hospitals and the doctors. I went to one 

of your medical facilities. My cousin insisted that I go because I 

have been sick. And when I got there, I said, ‘‘My cousin made me 

come. I don’t know what you can do, but we thought maybe you 

might want some documentation or some numbers.’’ She said, ‘‘We 

are not interested in any numbers. We are not keeping any.’’ 

Congresswoman Capito, I didn’t care for the slip of tongue when 

you refer to the ‘‘myth’’ anymore than I referred to what you said 

on the TV about the shelves being stocked, and we can go out and 

buy the water. I thought that was poor taste, but I am glad that 

you apologized for that as well. 

That bothers me. It still bothers me. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you very much. Your time has run out here. 

We are going to get to the other folks. 

Ms. DAVIS. I would like to say one thing, if I might. 

Mr. SHUSTER. I will give you 10 seconds. Go ahead. 

Ms. DAVIS. OK, we are talking about the water in the pipes. 

When I came outside the other day, the water from the flooding in 

the yard was so bad with the licorice smell. This has been the last 

rain we had 2 or 3 days ago. And it has burned me so tremendously and caused my breathing to be so bad. Why should the 

water be on our land when it rains? 

And I did keep some of the water, if anybody is interested. I 

know it couldn’t be scientifically accepted, but I would like to know. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you very much for your comments. 

Next, please? 

44 

Ms. ROSSER. Hello, I am Angie Rosser, executive director of the 

West Virginia Rivers Coalition. 

And shortly after the spill, we worked with a team of independent science and policy experts to issue a report that looked out 

at the comprehensive failings on every level of Government, the information gaps, and recommended policy recommendations. I will 

make sure that is submitted as part of the written record. 

But I would urge this committee to look at two things. One was 

a statement that our DEP secretary has made in the press. And 

I noticed he is not here as a member of the panel to answer to this. 

But he said that this incident could have been prevented or minimized with the regulations we currently have in place; it just didn’t 

click with anyone that this was a concern. 

So I would like for the committee to ask him more on what he 

means about this, could have been prevented with the current regulations, and why it didn’t click as a concern, before we start rushing to legislate. 

The other thing we are concerned about is the Charleston intake, 

the Bureau of Public Health let us know that through their source 

water assessment report, we have 51 potential significant contaminant sources to this intake. Freedom Industries is one of them. 

We are wondering what about the other 50? This is not just 

about one leaky tank. It is not just about aboveground storage 

tanks that are a threat to our water supplies. So we need to take 

comprehensive look. 

In Huntington, there are 424 potential significant contaminant 

sources. So please, let’s not have a narrow view and just look at 

tanks, but look at all the threats to our water sources that we face 

in West Virginia and around the Nation. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you, and I feel confident, in talking with 

Senator Manchin and both Representatives Rahall and Capito, 

they are asking those types of questions right now that you have. 

Next, please introduce yourself? 

Mr. CARUTHERS. Yes, sir. I appreciate everybody’s interest here 

today. I have some observations, not blame. One of my observations 

is—my name is Jim Caruthers. I am the mayor of the town of Poca. 

And the flushing procedure, we are flushing our homes with contaminated water. All we are doing is bringing dirty water in and 

dumping it out. It is being flushed through the spigot. It is not 

being flushed through the mains. It is not being flushed through 

the hydrants. It is being flushed through the spigots, and an unusual number of breaks. 

And I think that people have a misconception. They think they 

are doing themselves a lot of good when they run the water 

through, but if we are still pulling dirty water in through the main 

system, the main system needs to be purged, then we purge the 

houses. 

Secondly, the beginning of this project was a cluster. I think everybody knows that. The notification was great by the media. The 

media did a great job. 

For those of us or those of you who sit with a beep-beep in your 

hand that are listening or watching a computer, a television, or a 

cell phone at all times, which I see through this group almost evVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:24 Aug 01, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00054 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\113\FULL\2-10-1~1\86632.TXT JEAN
45 

erybody does, but there are a few of us who go out and do things. 

We don’t know about it. 

These two counties just put in a fabulous system last year, an 

emergency siren system with a voice override. It could have been 

activated instantly, and everybody could have been told ‘‘do not use 

the water’’—the guy walking down the street, the kids playing in 

the yards. There are 21 of these spread throughout our counties. 

It wouldn’t have gotten everybody, but between this notification 

and the phone system and the media, I think a lot of people could 

have been tipped off early and not have potentially taken in some 

of these hazardous materials. 

I think, all in all, we are very lucky that we haven’t had major 

medical problems. 

I am a resident of Putnam County, and we used to use the Nitro 

water. You talk about smell. Whatever fish died upriver, we 

smelled it that night. It has come a long way. It is far better than 

it was, but it has a ways to go. 

But I do appreciate your turnout. Thank you. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Mayor. 

And the next gentlemen, please introduce yourself. 

Mr. GILPEN. James Gilpen, I live in Cross Lanes, West Virginia. 

First and most, Freedom Industries is not who I pay my water 

bill to. I pay my water bill to West Virginia American Water. They 

should have protected us in all results of anything. 

And first and most, I have worked in chemical plants. I have 

dealt with chemicals. There is a PPE standard that should have 

been done. Does anybody have a PPE standard that we should 

have had when we flushed our water? 

I have a spot on my leg that I got the first day I stepped in the 

water. I won’t shower or bathe in it right now. 

My question is, is what are we doing—not with the past and 

what we have done. I understand what happened in the past. What 

are we doing in the future? Why cannot one of you all stand up and 

say our water is drinkable? Why can’t you all say it is OK to bathe 

in our water and it won’t have long-term—— 

Mr. SHUSTER. I think that question has been asked and answered a couple times. 

Mr. GILPEN. But no one wants to answer that question. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Well, the experts have said that there are some 

concerns about there hasn’t been enough testing. As I pointed 

out—— 

Mr. GILPEN. Their biggest fear is a lawsuit. That is the number 

one thing. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Well, my concern is people are afraid there are 

going to be lawsuits. 

Mr. GILPEN. In West Virginia, I think if our government can’t 

supply us with good drinking water, then something needs to be 

done. 

Mr. SHUSTER. That is what we are holding this hearing here for 

today, to take it back to Washington. You have three very able and 

capable Representatives. 

Mr. GILPEN. And to bring it up, he asked if it was a major disaster? Yes, it is a major disaster. If our babies cannot drink water, 

and our elderly cannot drink water, and my mother, she’s on a resVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:24 Aug 01, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00055 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\113\FULL\2-10-1~1\86632.TXT JEAN
46 

pirator, and to purify the water in our homes, then what is there, 

Senator Manchin? 

Mr. SHUSTER. That is what we are trying to get to the bottom 

of. Thank you for your comments. 

The next gentlemen, would you please step to the mic? 

Mr. REYNOLDS. Yes, my name is Chuck Reynolds. I live in 

Fraziers Bottom, West Virginia. That is in Putnam County, 35 

miles to the west. 

And we were told to flush our water system. As instructed, I 

flushed the water system, and it still had the smell. 

I flushed it twice, and it was still there. 

And now my wife and I, of course, like everybody else, at water 

distribution centers, my wife has to go to the town of Hurricane, 

and both her parents are real elderly, and we have to get water off 

of them, because the town of Hurricane is smart enough to have 

their own water system. They are not hooked to West Virginia 

Water. 

And I am going to give you the standpoint from this: I am a 

maintenance person, OK? I worked for the State of West Virginia 

for 23 years, OK? And you get a chemical in a hot water tank, it 

is very hard to get it out. 

You are testing the cold water. You need to test the hot water. 

Not only that, the reason people were letting their water run is because they don’t want their pipes to freeze. They are not using the 

water. 

I am not drinking the water. My wife is not drinking the water. 

None of my neighbors trust the water. 

And you know, I don’t put all the blame on the water company. 

We need laws to enforce. We need to enforce these laws when you 

make them, and prosecute these people who are responsible for polluting our water and polluting our air. 

And the main thing, I was told by a very strong source, by one 

of the workers who worked for Freedom Industries, that he found 

a leak in a tank. Instead of reporting it, he was told to take a 

paintbrush and paint it. 

So that is what you are dealing with. 

Mr. SHUSTER. I am sure those investigations are going on. I 

thank you for your comments. Those kind of investigations, I am 

sure, will be investigated. 

Again, I want to thank everybody for participating, especially our 

witnesses today. Thank you very much for helping us understand 

and educating us on what has happened here. 

As mentioned, Mr. Rahall made the motion to keep the record 

open for 30 days. So anybody who wishes to submit testimony or 

information to the committee has 30 days to do that. 

And again, I am confident that you folks are represented by Senator Manchin, Senator Rockefeller, Representatives Rahall and 

Capito, four very able Representatives for the people of West Virginia. Your voice will be heard, not only in the committee, but in 

the Congress. 

So again, I thank everybody for being here. 

And with that, the committee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:10 a.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

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