alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### § 2200.69 Examination of witnesses.

Witnesses shall be examined orally under oath or affirmation. Opposing parties have the right to cross-examine any witness whose testimony is introduced by an adverse party. All parties shall have the right to cross-examine any witness called by the Judge pursuant to § 2200.67(j).
**Exhibit 23.1**

 

**CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM**

 

Wehave issued our report dated September 24, 2010, with respect to theconsolidated financial statements and schedule included in the Annual Report of Lannett Company, Inc. and Subsidiarieson Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2010. We herebyconsent to the incorporation by reference of said report in the RegistrationStatements of Lannett Company, Inc. and Subsidiaries on Forms S-3 (File No. 333-115746,effective May 21, 2004, and File No. 333-162318, effective October 2,2009) and on Forms S-8 (File No. 333-103235, effective February 14,2003, File No. 333-103236, effective February 14, 2003, and File No. 33-147410,effective November 15, 2007).

 

 
| /s/  Grant Thornton LLP     |   |
|-----------------------------|--------|
|                        |   |
|                        |   |
| Philadelphia,  Pennsylvania |   |
| September 24,  2010    |   |

 

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----

----

I Communications

Commission

----

Taux de change de l'euro (1)

19 août 2004

(2004/C 210/01)

1 euro= 

----

(1)

Source: taux de change de référence publié par la Banque centrale européenne.

----

----

Notification préalable d'une opération de concentration

(Affaire COMP/M.3551 — CD & R/CULLIGAN)

Cas susceptible d'être traité selon la procédure simplifiée

(2004/C 210/02)

(Texte présentant de l'intérêt pour l'EEE)

----

(1)JO L 24 du 29.1.2004, p. 1.

(2)JO C 217 du 29.7.2000, p. 32;

le règlement du Conseil (CEE) no 4064/89 a été remplacé par le règlement du Conseil (CE) no 139/2004.

----
§ 22.37 Initial decision. ( a ) The ALJ shall issue an initial decision based only on the record, which shall contain findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the amount of any penalties and assessments imposed.
( b ) The findings of fact shall include a finding on each of the following issues: ( 1 ) Whether the claims or statements identified in the complaint, or any portions thereof, violate § 22.3;
( 2 ) If the person is liable for penalties or assessments, the appropriate amount of any such penalties or assessments considering any mitigating or aggravating factors that he or she finds in the case, such as those described in § 22.31.
( c ) The ALJ shall promptly serve the initial decision on all parties within 90 days after the time for submission of post-hearing briefs and reply briefs (if permitted) has expired. The ALJ shall at the same time serve all parties with a statement describing the right of any defendant determined to be liable for a civil penalty or assessment to file a motion for reconsideration with the ALJ or a notice of appeal with the ARB. If the ALJ fails to meet the deadline contained in this paragraph, the ALJ shall notify the parties of the reason for the delay and shall set a new deadline.
( d ) Unless the initial decision of the ALJ is timely appealed to the ARB, or a motion for reconsideration of the initial decision is timely filed, the initial decision shall constitute the final decision of the authority head and shall be final and binding on the parties 30 days after it is issued by the ALJ.
[52 FR 48492, Dec. 22, 1987, as amended at 86 FR 1781, Jan. 11, 2021]
No. 17,140.

#### Price *v.*Gwin, Sheriff, et al.

Judgment.—A judgment is not binding upon one who was not a party to the action in which it was rendered.

Prom the Carroll Circuit Court.

*Guthrie & Bushnell*and *B.*P. *Davidson,*for appellant.

*Sellers & Uhl*and *J. JET. Gould,*for appellees.

McCabe, J.

The appellant sued the appellee to re*106strain him and others from proceeding to tear down and repair or rebuild the court house in White county, under the order of the White Circuit Court. The suit was begun in the White Circuit Court and the venue was changed to the Carroll Circuit Court. The complaint was in all respects exactly the same as that in the case of the *Board, etc.,*v. *Gwin, Sheriff,*136 Ind. 562 (22 L. R. A. 402), except that the plaintiff, appellant in this case, was the plaintiff as a tax payer of White county instead of the board of commissioners of White county. Appellees answered in three paragraphs. The first sets up and relies on the same orders of the White Circuit Court set forth in the complaint in the former case already mentioned; the second sets up as a former adjudication the judgment of the White Circuit Court in the case already mentioned before the same was reversed in this court. The third was a general denial. A demurrer for want of sufficient facts was overruled to the said first and second paragraphs.

The issues joined were tried by the court, resulting in a special finding of the facts on which the court stated conclusions of law against the plaintiff, the appellant, that he ought to take nothing by his suit.

The errors assigned call in question the rulings upon demurrer and the correctness of the conclusions of law.

The facts found are the same in all material respects as those set forth in the complaint and relate to and are the same transaction involved in the case of the *Board, etc.,*v. *Gwin, Sheriff, supra.*The law declared and laid down in that case is decisive of this except one point. There is one question involved in this case not involved or decided in that. That is the ruling on demurrer and the conclusion of law as to the former adjudication. That adjudication,being at *107that time unreversed, was binding and conclusive upon all the parties thereto, yet it was not binding or conclusive upon appellant because he was not a party to it. *Glenn*v. *State, ex rel.,*46 Ind. 368; *Bartlett*v. *Kochel,*88 Ind. 425; *State*v. *Page,*63 Ind. 209; *Faust*v. *Baumgartner,*113 Ind. 139; *Denney*v. *State, ex rel.,*42 N. E. Rep. 929 (31 L. R. A. 726).

Filed March 3, 1896.

It follows that the Carroll Circuit Court erred in ruling upon the demurrer and in its conclusions of law.

The judgment is therefore reversed, with instructions to the trial court to restate its conclusions of law in accordance with the law as laid down in the case of the *Board, etc.,*v. *Gwin, Sheriff, supra,*and to render judgment accordingly.
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of Energy

# AGENCY:

Department of Energy, Office of Science.

# ACTION:

Notice of renewal of the Basic Energy Sciences Advisory Committee.

# SUMMARY:

                        Pursuant to Section 14(a)(2)(A) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (Pub. L. 92-463), and in accordance with Title 41, Code of Federal Regulations, Section 102.3 65(a), and following consultation with the Committee Management Secretariat,                               ( print page 48148)                            General Services Administration, notice is hereby given that the Basic Energy Sciences Advisory Committee will be renewed for a two-year period beginning July 29, 2011. The Committee provides advice and recommendations to the Director, Office of Science concerning the Basic Energy Sciences program.                    

Additionally, the renewal of the Basic Energy Sciences Advisory Committee has been determined to be essential to the conduct of the Department's mission and to be in the public interest in connection with the performance of duties imposed upon the Department of Energy by law and agreement. The Committee will operate in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, and rules and regulations issued in implementation of that Act.

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Ms. Harriet Kung, Designated Federal Officer, by telephone at (301) 903-3081.

Issued at Washington, DC, on July 29, 2011.

Carol A. Matthews,

Committee Management Officer.

[FR Doc. 2011-20013 Filed 8-5-11; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6450-01-P
Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

Stephen J. Markman,
Chief Justice

Brian K. Zahr a Bridget M. McCormac k

David F. Viviano

Richard H. Bernstei n Kurtis T. Wilde r Elizabeth T. Clement,

J ustices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at t he direction of the Court.

March 21, 2018

a0314 

# Order

Clerk March 21, 2018

156088

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 15 6088 COA: 336811 Wayne CC: 14-004004-FC RONALD LEE FOSTER, Defendant-Appellant.

___________________ __________________/

On order of the Court, the app lication for leave to appeal the May 12, 2017 order of the Court of Appeals is considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.30 5(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we REMAND this case to the Wayne Circ uit Court for the appointment of new appellate counsel to represent the defendant as on direct appellate

review. See Halbert v Michigan , 545 US 605; 125 S Ct 2582 ; 162 L Ed 2d 552 (2005).

The record reflects that defenda nt’s appellate counsel did not file an application for leave to appeal, seek any other relief on the defendant’s behalf, or move to withdraw based on the attorney’s determination, after a thorough review of the tr ial record, that the appeal was wholly frivolous. Thus, through no fault of the defendant , he lost the right to seek leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals on direct review. On r emand, new appellate counsel, once appointed, may file an application for leave to a ppeal in the Court of Appeals for consideration under the standard for direct appeals , and/or any appropriate postconviction motions in the cir cuit court, within six months of the date of the circuit court’s order appointing counsel.

Costs are imposed against the attorney, Tracie Gittleman, in t he amount of $500, to be paid to the Clerk of this Court.

We do not retain jurisdiction.
EXHIBITS









EXHIBIT 99.1



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Quarterly Report of Elgrande.com, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ended November 30, 2002 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Michael F. Holloran, Chief Executive Officer and Principal Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350, as adopted pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge: (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.



/s/ Michael F. Holloran

Michael F. Holloran

Chief Executive Officer and Principal Financial Officer



January 20, 2003
#### Samuel A. MILLER, Appellant, v. Gilbert ROBINSON, Trustee, etc., Appellee.

No. 21246.

United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.

May 3, 1967.

*3Ernest R. Utley, Utley & Houck, Los Angeles, Cal., for appellant.

Richard R. Clements, William M. Barton, Sprague & Clements, Los Angeles, Cal., for appellee.

Before CHAMBERS and BARNES, Circuit Judges, and SMITH, District Judge.

PER CURIAM:

The order of the district court affirming the referee’s orders allowing an attorney’s fee of $7,500 against a bankrupt estate is affirmed.

The appellant requested a fee of $17,500. This court recognizes that time alone is not the only factor in setting fees where the lawyer has successfully brought the bankrupt estate through a difficult storm. Here much of the claimed amount would have to be justified in the result of disallowance of claims to the extent of about $650,000. Much of that figure rests in one claim. If the referee had allowed $17,500, we might approve it. We do not know. But he was in a far better position than we to appraise how valuable appellant Miller’s services were in reducing the asserted claims; that is, to know whether the accomplishment was an easy or difficult one. Certainly there was no extensive in-court litigation. We simply do not find clearly erroneous the determinations heretofore made.

There are no separate findings of fact or conclusions of law. They must be found within the corners of the two opinions by the referee. Appellant attacks them as insufficient. Although a little equivocal, the opinion does say that “a large portion of the services of counsel for the trustee were administrative.” Perhaps there was an error in saying there were no contested proceedings. But certainly there is absent any single item of protracted litigation. The referee accepts Miller’s time sheet, but expresses serious doubt about 80 hours extra not shown on the time sheet. We do not think it was necessary for the referee to find that the time was 70 hours, 150 hours, or some intermediate figure. We think the referee has really said that the time was not much more than 70 hours. But if it was 150 hours, the compensation was still $50.00 per hour.

If the referee had supplemented the attorney’s time sheet with his own knowledge or had been convinced by the showing before him that labor far beyond the time sheet was involved, then we might be in poor position to set an award aside. But when the referee questions what work one has done, one has greatly handicapped himself if he has no time sheet. And, in this field where one is in effect the attorney for many, some of whom are often captive “clients,” one should abide by the accepted rules and produce an adequate time sheet. If one does not one should not complain about the courts if he is disappointed.
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Exhibit 4.1


 


THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON


NEW YORK’S FIRST BANK-FOUNDED 1784 BY ALEXANDER HAMILTON


 


 


2 HANSON PLACE, 12TH
FLOOR, BROOKLYN, N.Y. 11217


 


 


 


April 14, 2015


 


Hennion & Walsh, Inc.


2001 Route 46, Waterview Plaza


Parsippany, New Jersey 07054


 


Smart Trust, Zacks GARP Composite 35 Trust,
Series 5


 


Dear Sirs:


The Bank of New York
Mellon is acting as trustee for Smart Trust, Zacks GARP Composite 35 Trust, Series 5 set forth above (the “Trust”).
We enclosed a list of the Securities to be deposited in the Trust on the date hereof. The prices indicated therein reflect our
evaluation of such Securities as of close of business on April 13, 2015, in accordance with the valuation method set forth in the
Trust Indenture and Agreement. We consent to the reference to The Bank of New York Mellon as the party performing the evaluations
of the Trust Securities in the Registration Statement (No. 333-202303) filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission with respect
to the registration of the sale of the Trust Units and to the filing of this consent as an exhibit thereto.


 


 


	 	Very truly yours,
	 	 
	 	/s/ GERARDO CIPRIANO
	 	Gerardo Cipriano
	 	Vice President
EXHIBIT
32




CERTIFICATIONS
PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,




AS
ADOPTED BY SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




In
connection with the Annual Report of North American Galvanizing & Coatings,
Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-K for the period ending December 31, 2007 as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Report”), each of the
undersigned hereby certifies in his or her capacity as an officer of the
Company, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted by § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that to his or her knowledge:




1.
            The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
and




2.
            The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents,in all material
      respects, the financial condition and the results of operations of the
      Company.











NORTH AMERICAN
      GALVANIZING & COATINGS, INC. (Registrant)
              
              
              /s/ Ronald J. Evans
              Ronald
      J. Evans
              President
      and Chief Executive Officer
              
              
              /s/ Beth B. Hood
              Beth
      B. Hood
              Vice
      President and Chief Financial Officer
              
              March
      7, 2008
#### McCRAY REFRIGERATOR SALES CORP v LOGAN

Ohio Appeals, 8th Dist, Cuyahoga Co

No 10608.

Decided May 5, 1930

Robins, Sogg & Woodle, Cleveland, for Sales Corp.

Raymond J. Logan, Cleveland, for Logan.

SULLIVAN, J.

It is urged that this was not a proper procedure. It does not appear from the transcript that defendant, Logan, got leave of court to become a party defendant or a party to the proceedings in any manner but this remission was waived because counsel in court proceeded to try the question as to the right of property by virtue of the pleading of the third party so-called. This raised the question as to the truth of the affidavit for the order of attachment and garnishment, because as a basis for the garnishment, to collect upon the judgment against Osborne, the monies attached necessarily must have been the property of Osborne. Therefore the question arose as to whether the money was Osborne’s or Logan’s and from the testimony in the case, and especially the exhibits, we find that by the status which existed prior to the garnishment and the date of the hearing, *412October 16, 1929, was that Osborne had parted, by assignment, with the money to Logan and that Logan had absolute ownership therein and consequently the statement in the affidavit for garnishment that the money belonged to Osborne, had no foundation in fact and consequently the attachment of the money had no merit in law.

The weight of the testimony is the vital issue after all. It appears by the record that when the third party claimant rested his case that then and thereupon plaintiff rested and thus, with the exception of the affidavit, there was nothing to contravert the statement as to ownership as testified to by Logan. It is a well settled proposition of law that where there is counter-testimony in a motion to dissolve an attachment, that in the absence of further testimony on the part of the party attaching, that the claim for attachment must fail. The reason for this is that the assertion of fact in the affidavit is mainly for the purpose of securing the attachment and not for the purpose of creating testimony as to any issue of fact that may arise thereon, unless additional testimony is offered.

The trial was in the nature of a hearing upon a motion to dissolve. At any rate the trial proceeded upon the theory that the issue was the ownership of the funds and upon that issue the court below found for claimant, Logan, and in this judgment of the lower court we unanimously concur.

Holding these views the judgment of the lower court is hereby affirmed.

Vickery, PJ., and Levine, J., concur.
Exhibit 32.1


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Merrill Lynch Preferred
Capital Trust VI (the "Trust") and Merrill Lynch Preferred Funding VI, L.P.
for the period ended March 31, 2006 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Marlene Debel,
Regular Trustee of the Trust, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
    of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
    respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Trust.





                              MERRILL LYNCH PREFERRED CAPITAL TRUST VI


                              By:  /s/ Marlene Debel
                                   ---------------------------------------------
                              Name:    Marlene Debel *
                              Title:   Regular Trustee









Dated: May 12, 2006
_____________________

* Marlene Debel functions as the equivalent of the Chief Executive Officer
  and Chief  Financial  Officer of the Trust for  purposes  of Section  906
  of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.