alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### TEACHOUT CO v AIKENS et

Ohio Appeals, 8th Dist, Cuyahoga Co

No. 10092.

Decided November 11, 1929

Mr. W. H. Gillie, Cleveland, for Teachout Co.

Messrs. Miles E. Evans and Fred H. Zuck, Cleveland, for Aikens et.

MIDDLETON, 'P. J. & MAUCK, J. (4th Dist) sitting

*16MAUCK, J.

The property owners relied upon this instrument as a waiver of the plaintiff’s right to ,a lien and paid out the contract price to the contractors. The plaintiff now claims somewhat vaguely (Record p. 78) that it meant by the letter to waive conditioned on the payment of its bills.

Tousley testifies:

> “I told them that if they would pay the bills at the 10th of each month, everything ' that was delivered the previous month would be. paid by the 10th, that that would automatically release and I could give them a final at that .time.”

' In other words,' the plaintiff claims it Was not to take a lien unless its bills were unpaid. The answer to this is that no one takes a lien if bills are paid and the claim of the plaintiff is virtually that it meant nothing at all by its letter. This will not do. The property owners' had. a right to rely on the plaintiff’s promise expressed in the first sentence of the letter. They had a right to assume that the second sentence meant that since the plaintiff would have no lien it would expect bills to be paid by the 10th of the month ensuing delivery and in default would pursue its legal rights, i. e., either to suspend further delivery or sue the contractors or both.

The property owners having relied upon the waiver and having had a right to do so and having paid out to the contractors all the money owing on the contract, the plaintiff is estopped from enforcing the lien asserted by it.

Middleton, P. J., concurs.
**Exhibit
      32.2**





**STATEMENT
      FURNISHED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE**


**SARBANES-OXLEY
      ACT OF 2002, 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350**





In
      connection with the Quarterly Report of Horizon Bancorporation, Inc. (the
“Company”) on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2008, as
      filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
“Report”), I, Kathleen M. Jepson, Senior Vice President and Chief Financial
      Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
      pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





1)
            The
                Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
                of
                the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
                and





2)
            The
                information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
                respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
                Company
                as of the dates and for the periods presented in the financial statements
                included in such Report.




/s/Kathleen
      M. Jepson


Senior
      Vice President and Chief Financial Officer


November
      14, 2008
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of Health and Human Services

###### Food and Drug Administration 

          - [FDA 225-00-2000] 

# AGENCY:

Food and Drug Administration, HHS. 

# ACTION:

Notice. 

# SUMMARY:

The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is providing notice of a memorandum of understanding (MOU) between FDA and the Food Safety and Inspection Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture (FSIS). The purpose of the agreement is to establish the working relationship to be followed by FDA and FSIS in responding to requests for the sanctioning of the use of food ingredients and sources of radiation subject to regulation by FDA and intended for use in the production of meat and meat food products. 

# DATES:

The agreement became effective January 31, 2000. 

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Arletta M. Beloian, Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition (HFS-206), Food and Drug Administration, 200 C St. SW., Washington, DC 20204, 202-418-3082. 

# SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

                    In accordance with 21 CFR 20.108(c), which states that all written agreements and MOU's between FDA and others shall be published in the                     **Federal Register**                    , the agency is publishing notice of this MOU.                 

Dated: May 16, 2000. 

William K. Hubbard, 

Senior Associate Commissioner for Policy, Planning, and Legislation. 

The MOU is set forth in its entirety as follows: 
      ( print page 33331)          ( print page 33332)          ( print page 33333)          ( print page 33334)    

BILLING CODE 4160-01-F

[FR Doc. 00-12853 Filed 5-22-00; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4160-01-C
signpathexh107.htm


Exhibit 10.7










Amendment III


to the Agreement for the Manufacturing of a Liposomal Formulation







 







between







SignPath Pharma, Inc. (“SIGNPATH”)




1375 California RD, Quakertown, PA  18951, USA







and







Polymun Scientific Immunbiologische Forschung GmbH ("POLYMUN'')




Donaustr. 99, 3400 Klostemeuburg, Austria












Pursuant to §11.6 of the Agreement between SIGNPATH and POLYMUN from 6th of September 2007, which stipulates that “Modifications/amendments to or extensions of this Agreement are only valid if in writing and signed for and on behalf of both parties.", SIGNPATH and POLYMUN hereby acknowledge the following Amendment to the Agreement:









Adaptation of Annex 3 with additional production of GMP batches, replacing Part 3 of the scope of work of the Agreement, plus additional stability study:








	
Part

	
Description

	
Time

	
Price


	
3

	
This part includes the manufacture of one additional GMP-compliant batch of liposomes containing approximately 115 g of Ingredient according to specifications for clinical application.  The maximal final volume per batch is 18 liters.  SIGNPATH will supply the GMP-compliant Ingredient and lipids or alternatively cover the costs of Ingredient and lipids procured by POLYMUN.  Sterile filling of the GMP-compliant batch in aliquots of 20 ml to a maximum of several hundred 20 ml glass vials will be performed at POLYMUN.  Primary packaging material (glass vials, stoppers and caps) will be provided by SIGNPATH or alternatively sourced by POLYMUN and reimbursed by SIGNPATH.  For higher numbers of vials, a subcontractor will be organized by POLYMUN in agreement with SIGNPATH and such additional costs paid by SIGNPATH.

	
10 weeks (not including stability study)

	
€ 90.000


	
Additional tasks that might be ordered by SIGNPATH


	
Set-up for one stability program

	
--

	
€10.000


	
Stability time point per temperature

	
--

	
€  3.500







 




  





  











  






 


Payment schedule:







Part 3:


 


•        50% of the costs for Part 3 upon ordering of such additional GMP-compliant batch


 


•        50% of the costs for Part 3 of Annex 2 upon availability of the individual GMP-compliant batch.


 


Additional tasks:


 



       •          100% of the costs for the additional task upon stability study start or on availability of test results per stability time point, respectively









Not included:


 


•        Shipping costs


 


•        Costs for external laboratories (e.g.particulate matter, residual ethanol, endotoxin, sterility)













	
For SIGNPATH:

	
For POLYMUN:

	  
	  	  	  
	  	  	  
	
/s/ Laurence Helson     Aug. 22, 2012

	
/s/ Dietmar Katinger     23.08.2012


	
(Signature/date)

	
(Signature/date)

	  
	  	  	  
	
Laurence Helson, MD, CEO

	
Dr. Dietmar

	
Katinger, CEO
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 03-6594

EDWARD HAROLD SAUNDERS, JR., Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA; RICHARD W. RIDDLE, in his individual and official capacity as an agent of the State of North Carolina; JANICE FAULKNER; ANGELA RIVERS, Controlled Substance Enforcement Officer, in her individual and official capacity as an agent of the State of North Carolina; MURIEL K. OFFERMAN, Secretary of Department of Revenue, Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. W. Earl Britt, Senior District Judge. (CA-99-47-5-BR) Submitted: August 28, 2003 Decided: October 6, 2003 Before WILLIAMS, MICHAEL, and KING, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Edward Harold Saunders, Jr., Appellant Pro Se. Michael David Youth, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NORTH CAROLINA, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellees.2 Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).

PER CURIAM: Edward Harold Saunders, Jr., appeals the district court’s order accepting in part the recommendation of the magistrate judge and denying relief on his complaint filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm substantially on the reasoning of the district court. See Saunders v. North Carolina , No. CA-99-47-5-BR (E.D.N.C. Mar. 17, 2003). With regard to Saunders’ due process claim, our review of the record leads us to conclude that no constitutional violation occurred. See Saucier v. Katz , 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001) (“If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.”). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
§ 2520.104a-8 Requirement to furnish documents to the Secretary of Labor on request. ( a ) *In general.* ( 1 ) Under section 104(a)(6) of the Act, the administrator of an employee benefit plan subject to the provisions of part 1 of title I of the Act is required to furnish to the Secretary, upon request, any documents relating to the employee benefit plan. For purposes of section 104(a)(6) of the Act, the administrator of an employee benefit plan shall furnish to the Secretary, upon service of a written request, a copy of: ( i ) The latest updated summary plan description (including any summaries of material modifications to the plan or changes in the information required to be included in the summary plan description); and
( ii ) Any other document described in section 104(b)(4) of the Act with respect to which a participant or beneficiary has requested, in writing, a copy from the plan administrator and which the administrator has failed or refused to furnish to the participant or beneficiary.
( 2 ) *Multiple requests for document(s).* Multiple requests under this section for the same or similar document or documents shall be considered separate requests for purposes of § 2560.502c-6(a).
( b ) For purposes of this section, a participant or beneficiary will include any individual who is: ( 1 ) A participant or beneficiary within the meaning of ERISA sections 3(7) and 3(8), respectively;
( 2 ) An alternate payee under a qualified domestic relations order (see ERISA section 206(d)(3)(K)) or prospective alternate payee (spouses, former spouses, children or other dependents);
( 3 ) A qualified beneficiary under COBRA (see ERISA section 607(3)) or prospective qualified beneficiary (spouse or dependent child);
( 4 ) An alternate recipient under a qualified medical child support order (see ERISA section 609(a)(2)(C)) or a prospective alternate recipient; or
( 5 ) A representative of any of the foregoing.
( c ) *Service of request.* Requests under this section shall be served in accordance with § 2560.502c-6(i).
( d ) *Furnishing documents.* A document shall be deemed to be furnished to the Secretary on the date the document is received by the Department of Labor at the address specified in the request; or, if a document is delivered by certified mail, the date on which the document is mailed to the Department of Labor at the address specified in the request.
[67 FR 784, Jan. 7, 2002]
#### Eugene A. Perkins, Respondent, *v.*Guaranty Trust Company of New York, Defendant, and Idonah S. Perkins, Appellant.

Submitted September 27, 1937 ;

decided October 5, 1937.

Motion for reargument granted to the extent of the third counterclaim not previously presented to this court. (See 274 N. Y. 250.)
§ 2570.96 Scope of discovery. For 502(c)(5) civil penalty proceedings, this section shall apply in lieu of 29 CFR 18.14. ( a ) A party may file a motion to conduct discovery with the administrative law judge. The motion for discovery shall be granted by the administrative law judge only upon a showing of good cause. In order to establish “good cause” for the purposes of this section, a party must show that the discovery requested relates to a genuine issue as to a material fact that is relevant to the proceeding. The order of the administrative law judge shall expressly limit the scope and terms of discovery to that for which “good cause” has been shown, as provided in this paragraph.
( b ) A party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise discoverable under paragraph (a) of this section and prepared in anticipation of or for the hearing by or for another party's representative (including his or her attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials or information in the preparation of his or her case and that he or she is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials or information by other means. In ordering discovery of such materials when the required showing has been made, the administrative law judge shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the proceeding.
#### STATE OF FLORIDA v THOMAS

Case No. 86-219 AC (County Court Case No. 27907 BK)

Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Appellate Division, Dade County

May 28, 1987

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

Jim Smith, Attorney General, and Terry L. Rutherford, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant.

Bruce Lehr for appellee.

Before TENDRICH, KAYE, MASTOS, JJ.

*164OPINION OF THE COURT

THEODORE MASTOS, Judge.

The State of Florida appeals from the trial court’s granting of a Motion to Suppress the breath test results in a D.U.I. prosecution. We find error with both reasons given by the trial court and, accordingly, reverse and remand for proceedings not inconsistent herewith.

The trial court suppressed the breath test results, first, on the ground the the State failed to preserve a breath sample for the Defendant to analyze, finding such was a violation of equal protection where it was county policy to preserve a sample for defendants to analyze. This was error in that there is no constitutional or statutory requirement that the State preserve breath samples for defendants to analyze. Equal protection is satisfied so long as government does not exercise its powers in an irrational or arbitrary manner. The record in this case lacks any showing that the State acted arbitrarily or capriciously. Here, where the chemist was forced to use the third sample in order a valid reading, we fail to find an equal protection violation. See *Houser v. State,*474 So.2d 1194 (Fla. 1985); *Hodel v. Indiana,*452 U.S. 314, 101 S.Ct. 2376, 69 L.Ed.2d 40 (1981).

The second reason given by the trial court in support of its order suppressing the breath test results was that the police should have informed the Defendant of his statutory right under section 316.1932(l)(f)(3), Florida Statutes (1985), to have an independent test administered to determine the presence of alcohol. This was, also, in error in that there is no statutory requirement that the police inform the Defendant of his right to have an independent test administered. Further, section 316.1932( l)(f)(3) specifically provides that the Defendant’s inability to have an independent test administered “shall not preclude the admissibility in evidence” of the test taken by the police. See Section 316.1932(l)(f)(3), Florida Statutes (1985); *Sambrine v. State,*386 So.2d 546 (Fla. 1980); *State v. Young,*483 So.2d 31 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985); *State v. Gunn,*408 So.2d 647 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982).

Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
#### NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Petitioner, v. DAL-TEX OPTICAL COMPANY, Inc., Respondent.

No. 23826.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

June 8, 1967.

Marcel Mallet-Prevost, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Harold B. Shore, Herman M. Levy, Attys., Arnold Ordman, Gen. Counsel, Dominick L. Manoli, Associate Gen. Counsel, N.L.R.B., Washington, D. C., for petitioner.

Emil Corenbleth, Dallas, Tex., for respondent.

Ruth Weyand, Irving Abramson, Washing, D. C., Leonard Greenwald, New York City, for Intervenor International Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers.

Before BELL, GODBOLD, and DYER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

The question presented in this matter is whether there is substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole to support the findings and conclusions of the Board. We hold that the evidence warrants the findings that respondent violated Section 8(a) (1) of the Act, 29 U.S.C.A. Section 158(a) (1), through interrogation of an employee concerning union activity, surveillance of a union meeting, instituting changes in working *444conditions, and threats of reprisal against employees because of union activity. The evidence is also ample to support the findings that the discharges of employees Smith, Hicks, Cross, Darland, Kleinberg and Fuentes were motivated by antiunion purposes and were thus in violation of Section 8(a) (3) and (1) of the Act. 29 U.S.C.A. Section 158(a) (1), (3).

The order of the Board is thus due to be, and it will be

Enforced.
#### § 404.8 Publication of reports required by this part.

Inspection and examination of any report or other document filed as required by this part, and the furnishing by the Office of Labor-Management Standards of copies thereof to any person requesting them, shall be governed by part 70 of this title.

[35 FR 2990, Feb. 13, 1970]
(74 South. 1007)

#### WAITS v. STATE.

(6 Div. 223.)

(Court of Appeals of Alabama.

March 23, 1917.)

Appeal from Criminal Court, Jefferson County; Wm. E. Fort, Judge.

W. L. Martin, Atty. Gen., for the State.

BROWN, P. J.

After a careful examination of the record, we find nothing of which the defendant can complain, or that warrants discussion. Affirmed.
Exhibit 32.02

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Serena Software, Inc. (the Company) for the fiscal quarter ended
October 31, 2010, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Robert I. Pender, Jr., Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted
pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



|(1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
|--- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|(2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company at the dates and for
the periods presented.
|--- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



By:

/s/    ROBERT I. PENDER, JR.Robert I. Pender, Jr.Senior Vice President, Finance And Administration, Chief Financial Officer (Principal Financial And
Accounting Officer)


Date: December 9, 2010

A signed original of this written statement required
by Section 906 has been provided to Serena Software, Inc. and will be retained by Serena Software, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

This Certification is not deemed filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission and is not to be incorporated by reference into any
filing of the registrant under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (whether made before or after the date of the Form 10-Q), irrespective of any general incorporation language contained in
such filing.
No. 17,467.

#### Brown *v.*The State.

Supreme Court *Practice.*— Motion *for New Trial Not in Record.*— Ques*tion.*— Where a motion for a new trial is not set out in the record, no question can be raised on appeal as to anything contained therein.

From the St. Joseph Circuit Court.

*A. Wilhelm*and. *Q. Q. Feldman,*for appellant.

*W. A. Kelcham,*Attorney-General, 0. *Cunningham, SH. Spooner*and *M. Moores,*for State.

Jordan, J.

— The appellant was convicted in the trial court, upon a charge of petit larceny, and sentenced to be imprisoned in the State prison, etc. From that judgment he prosecutes his appeal to this court, and has assigned for errors:

1st. That the court erred in overruling his motion to poll the jury.

2d. That the court erred in overruling his objections to the acceptance of the verdict in the absence of the jury.

3d. In overruling his motion to be discharged from custody.

4th. In overruling a motion for a new trial.

5th. That the court erred in reassembling the jury for the purpose of having the appellant poll the same after they had been discharged.

In the condition that the record comes to us, we can not consider any of the errors assigned. While it is true that it appears from the record, that a motion for a new trial was filed, however the motion is not set out, and hence we are not apprised of what reasons, if any, were stated therein. There is no bill of exceptions in the *375record, and in no' legitimate manner are the errors complained oí by the appellant presented to this court for a determination on their merits. It is firmly settled by repeated decisions of this court, that all presumptions here are in favor of the trial court, and in order to exclude these, a litigant, who prosecutes an appeal from a judgment below, must bring before us a record so made up, as to clearly show the rulings of the lower court, by which he is aggrieved, and make it affirmatively appear that such rulings or decisions were harmful to appellant. This rule of appellate procedure is supported by numerous cases of this court. See *McClure*v. *State,*116 Ind. 169, and cases there cited. *Shugart*v. *Miles,*125 Ind. 445, and cases there cited.

Filed Feb. 5, 1895.

It is also well established that where an alleged error, occurring at the trial, is not made a ground of a motion for a new trial, it will not be considered on appeal. *Doe*v. *Herr,*8 Ind. 23; *Conner*v. *Town of Marion,*112 Ind. 517, and cases there cited.

The judgment is affirmed, at the cost of appellant.

All concur except Howard, J., who was absent.