alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
[Civ. No. 1767.

First Appellate District.

December 15, 1917.]

#### WILLIAM F. HERRON, Respondent, v. LEWIS S, GEAR, Appellant.

Promissory Note — Settlement of Action — Fraud—Sufficiency of Evidence.—Order denying motion to compel entry of satisfaction of judgment affirmed on authority of *Edwards et al.*v. *Gear et al., ante,*p. 602.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco denying a motion to compel the entry of satisfaction of a judgment. Daniel C. Deasy, Judge.

The facts are stated in the opinion in the case of *Le Roy M. Edwards et al.*v. *Leíais E. Gear et al., ante,*p. 602.

Edward R. Eliassen, and De Lanccy C. Smith, for Appellant.

Leroy M. Edwards, L. R. Weinmann, and William F. Herron, *in pro. per.,*for Respondent.

THE COURT.

This is an appeal from an order denying the defendant’s motion to compel the plaintiff to enter a satisfaction of the judgment originally entered in the court below and subsequently affirmed upon appeal to this court. *{Herron v*. *Gear,*26 Cal. App. 18, [145 Pac. 731].)

The motion in question was made after the *remittitur*in the case of *Herron*v. *Gear*went down from this court and during the trial of the case of *Le Roy M. Edwards et al.*v. *Lewis S. Gear et al.,*wherein judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and this day affirmed by this court. The trial of the latter case and the hearing of the motion now under consideration were heard jointly by the court below and the motion was submitted upon the evidence adduced at the trial of that case.

*811It is now insisted that the evidence thus adduced not only warranted, but should have compelled, the granting of the motion. In this behalf the argument of counsel for the defendant and appellant is identical with the argument made against the sufficiency of the evidence to warrant and support the judgment in the ease above referred to.

Our conclusion in that case was that the evidence amply supports the judgment, and that being so, the court below was justified upon the same evidence in denying the motion to compel the plaintiff to satisfy the judgment.

The order appealed from is affirmed.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-6217

In Re: DEJUAN ANDERKO WATKINS,

Petitioner.

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus.

(7:02-cr-00106-F; 7:05-cv-00019-F)

Submitted: April 20, 2007 Decided: April 30, 2007

Before GREGORY and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Dejuan Anderko Watkins, Petitioner Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Dejuan Anderko Watkins petitions for a writ of mandamus

claiming there was undue delay by the district court in disposing

of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000) motion. The Government filed a

response noting that the district court entered a judgment and

order denying the § 2255 motion. In light of the court’s action,

we deny as moot Watkins’ petition for a writ of mandamus. We

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions

are adequately presented in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid the decisional process. 

PETITION DENIED
Final Listing of Questionnaire Files for Steam Electric Rulemaking Record

Plant ID 09777

Removed 

from Public 

(Non-CBI) 

Docket1

Copyright 

Flag2

File Name Description

09777\09777_HardcopyLog.doc EPA log of hardcopy documents submitted

x 09777\09777_Part A.xls Plant submitted survey file

x 09777\09777_Part B.xls Plant submitted survey file

x 09777\09777_Part C.xls Plant submitted survey file

x 09777\09777_Part D.xls Plant submitted survey file

x 09777\09777_Part H.xls Plant submitted survey file

09777\Certification Statement Plant ID 09777.pdf Plant certification statement

09777\Supplemental Documents\09777_AES ShadyPoint-MAP-1.pdf Plant submitted supplemental files to the survey

x 09777\Supplemental Documents\09777_AES ShadyPoint-WB-1.pdf Plant submitted supplemental files to the survey

x 09777\09777_Checklist.xls EPA Technical Review Checklist Workbook

09777\09777_Completeness_Checklist.xls EPA Completeness Review Checklist

09777\09777_Cover Letter.pdf Plant submitted supplemental files to the survey

1

 Final reviewed survey responses are located in the Steam Electric Technical Questionnaire Database . 

2

 Copyright documents are available from the docket.
C OURT OF A PPEALS FOR THE

F IRST D ISTRICT OF T EXAS AT H OUSTON

O RDER

Appellate case name: Marcus Tyrone Grant v. The State of Texas

Appellate case number: 01

- 21

- 00340

- CR

Trial court case number: 20

- 12

- 17503

Trial court: 506th District Court of Waller County

Appellant ’ s Motion for Rehea rin g is denied.

All other pending motions, including Appellant ’ s Motion for Leave t o F ile Am ended

Argument and his Motion for Injunctive Relief

, are dismissed for lack of jurisdiction

.

It is so ORDERED.

Judge’s sig nature: Richard Hight ower

Acting for the Court

Date: November 4, 2021

Panel con sists of Justices Kelly, Hightower, and Farr is

.
§ 32.48 Post-termination proceedings. ( a ) An applicant or recipient adversely affected by an order suspending, terminating or refusing to grant or continue Federal financial assistance shall be restored to full eligibility to receive Federal financial assistance if it satisfies the terms and conditions of that order for such eligibility, brings itself into compliance with this part and satisfies the Assistant Secretary that it will fully comply with section 504 and this part.
( b ) Any applicant or recipient adversely affected by an order suspending, terminating or refusing to grant or continue Federal financial assistance may request the Assistant Secretary to restore fully its eligibility to receive Federal financial assistance. Any such request shall be supported by information showing that the applicant or recipient has met the requirements of subparagraph (a) of this paragraph. If the Assistant Secretary determines that those requirements have been satisfied, the applicant's or recipient's eligibility shall be restored.
( c ) If the Assistant Secretary denies any such request, the applicant or recipient may submit a written request for a hearing, specifying why it believes the Assistant Secretary to have been in error. It shall thereupon be given an expeditious hearing, with a decision on the record, in accordance with rules of procedure specified in this part. The applicant or recipient will be restored to such eligibility if it proves at such hearing that it satisfied the requirements of paragraph (a) of this section. While proceedings under this paragraph are pending, the sanctions imposed by the order suspending, terminating or refusing to grant or continue Federal financial assistance shall remain in effect.
#### SUMP v FAUVER

Ohio Appeals, 9th Dist, Lorain Co

No 523.

Decided April 30, 1930

John K. Nece, Elyria, for Sump.

A. H. West, Elyria, for Fauver.

*587FUNK, PJ.

The issue presented by the pleadings is clearly whether the dissolution agreement was as claimed by plaintiff, which is in substance that defendant agreed to take over all the assets of the partnership, pay all its debts, allow plaintiff all he had received on drawing account, and pay plaintiff the sum of $100 for his interest in the fixtures and equipment, separate and paart from the dissolution agreement, or whether it was ,as claimed by defendant, which is that defendant agreed only to dispose of their stock, fixtures and equipment, collect the accounts owing said partnership, pay its debts, and account to plaintiff for the balance, if any, and that said paper writing was given only as a memorandum for the purpose of showing the estimated value of plaintiff’s half interest in the fixtures and equipment as a basis of settlement, and was a part of and only one item of the whole agreement of dissolution.

The Issue thus being whether the dissolution agreement was as claimed by plaintiff or ,as claimed by defendant, it is apparent that the question of want of consideration is not in this case.

Under the pleadings, the burden was with plaintiff to prove that the dissolution agreement was as he claimed. Even if the paper writing could be said to be a promissory note, it would be only prima facie evidence of the debt and subject to explanation, so that, under the pleadings, the burden would be upon the plaintiff to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, the purpose for which it was given.

We therefore hold that the court erred in holding that the burden was upon the defendant “to show it (the paper writing) was without consideration,” and in requiring the defendant to first introduce his testimony and placing the burden upon him to prove the allegations of his pleadings, and that it was error for the court to direct a verdict for the plaintiff upon the testimony of the defendant without any testimony being offered to support the allegations of the plaintiff’s pleadings.

The judgment will therefore be reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings according to law.

Pardee, J., and Washburn, J., concur.
exv10w28






Exhibit 10.28




AMENDMENT AGREEMENT



AMENDMENT AGREEMENT (this “Amendment Agreement”), dated as of January 26, 2006 between
Deutsche Bank AG London (“DBAG”) and GCAM LLC (“Agent”). All capitalized terms used herein and not
otherwise defined shall have the respective meanings provided in the Foreign Exchange Prime
Brokerage Agreement referred to below.




W I T N E S S E T H:



WHEREAS, DBAG and Agent are parties to a Foreign Exchange Prime Brokerage Agreement dated as
of October 18, 2005 (as amended, supplemented or modified from time to time, the “FXPB Agreement”);



WHEREAS, DBAG and Agent wish to amend the FXPB Agreement as herein provided;



NOW, THEREFORE, it is agreed that:





	 	1.	 	Annex D of the FXPB Agreement shall be amended to include the following as a Fund
thereunder:
	 
	 	 	 	“Frontier Trading Company, LLC (Spread Basis”)
	 
	 	2.	 	This Amendment Agreement is limited as specified and shall not constitute a modification,
acceptance or waiver of any other provision of the FXPB Agreement.
	 
	 	3.	 	This Amendment Agreement may be executed in any number of counterparts and by the different
parties hereto on separate counterparts, each of which when executed and delivered shall be an
original, but all of which shall together constitute one and the same instrument.
A complete set of executed counterparts shall be lodged with DBAG and Agent.
	 
	 	4.	 	This Amendment Agreement and the rights and obligations of the parties hereunder shall be
construed in accordance with and governed by the law of England and Wales.
	 
	 	5.	 	This Amendment Agreement shall become effective on the date when DBAG and Agent shall have
signed a copy hereof (whether the same or different copies) and delivered (including by way of
facsimile transmission) the same to each other.




IN WITNESS WHEREOF, each of the parties hereto has caused a counterpart of this Amendment Agreement
to be duly executed and delivered as of the date first above written.




	 	 	 	 	 	 
	DEUTSCHE BANK AG LONDON

	 	GCAM, LLC
	 
	 	 
	By:

	/s/ John Moody	 	By: 	/s/ Thomas Quinn
	Name: John Moody

	 	Name: Thomas Quinn
	Title: Legal Counsel

	 	Title: Chief Operation Officer
	 
	 	 
	 
	 	 
	By: 
	[illegible]	 	 	 
	Name: [illegible]

	 	 
	Title: [illegible]

	 	 






1
(75 South. 269)

(5 Div. 260.)

#### POWELL v. STATE.

(Court of Appeals of Alabama.

April 17, 1917.)

Criminal Law &wkey;304(17) — Judicial Notioe —Official Regulations.

While Code 1907, § 758, confers upon the state live stock sanitary board power to enact necessary rules for governing the movement of live N stock that may be quarantined because affected with or exposed to.contagious diseases, or *64infested with the carriers of such diseases, and section 7083, as amended by Acts 1911, p. 613, denounces the violation of such rules as a misdemeanor, the courts will not take judicial notice of such rules and regulations, and an indictment for the violation of this clause of the statute, to charge an offense, must allege the existence of such a rule or regulation, and that the act charged against the defendant is in violation of such rule.

[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 712, 2951%.]

Appeal from Circuit .Court, Elmore County ; Leon McCord, Judge.

W. A. Powell was convicted of an offense, and he appeals.

Reversed and remanded.

Smoot & Mullins, of Wetumpka, for appellant. W. L. Martin, Atty. Gen., and Harwell G. Davis, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

BROWN, P. J.

There is nothing in the statutes of this state that requires persons owning or having the possession of cattle infected with or exposed to ticks to dip such cattle in “a standard arsenical solution” after notice. Curlee v. State, ante, p. 62, 75 South. 268.

While the statute (Code 1907, § 758), confers upon the state live stock sanitary board power to enact “such rules and regulations as they may deem necessary for governing the *movement, transportation,*or *disposition*of live stock that may be *quarantined** * * on account of being affected with, or exposed to,” contagious or communicable diseases, or, infested with the carriers of such diseases, and the statute (Code 1907, § 7083, as amended by Act approved April 22,1911 [Acts 1911, p. 613]) denounces the violation of such rules as a misdemeanor, the courts will not take judicial notice of such rules and regulations, and an indictment for the violation of this clause of the statute, to charge an offense, must allege the existence of such a rule or regulation, and that the act charged against the defendant is in violation of such rule. Curlee v. State, supra.

The indictment in this case will not support the judgment of conviction. Emmonds v. State, 87 Ala. 12, 6 South. 54; Butler v. State, 130 Ala. 127, 30 South. 338.
§ 1978.108 Role of Federal agencies. ( a ) ( 1 ) The complainant and the respondent will be parties in every proceeding. In any case in which the respondent objects to the findings or the preliminary order the Assistant Secretary ordinarily will be the prosecuting party. In any other cases, at the Assistant Secretary's discretion, the Assistant Secretary may participate as a party or participate as amicus curiae at any stage of the proceeding. This right to participate includes, but is not limited to, the right to petition for review of a decision of an ALJ, including a decision approving or rejecting a settlement agreement between the complainant and the respondent.
( 2 ) If the Assistant Secretary assumes the role of prosecuting party in accordance with paragraph (a)(1) of this section, he or she may, upon written notice to the ALJ or the Administrative Review Board, as the case may be, and the other parties, withdraw as the prosecuting party in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. If the Assistant Secretary withdraws, the complainant will become the prosecuting party and the ALJ or the Administrative Review Board, as the case may be, will issue appropriate orders to regulate the course of future proceedings.
( 3 ) Copies of documents in all cases shall be sent to the parties or, if they are represented by counsel, to the latter. In cases in which the Assistant Secretary is a party, copies of documents shall be sent to the Regional Solicitor's Office representing the Assistant Secretary.
( b ) The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, if interested in a proceeding, may participate as amicus curiae at any time in the proceeding, at its discretion. At the request of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, copies of all documents in a case must be sent to that agency, whether or not that agency is participating in the proceeding.
[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 100 (Tuesday, May 23, 2000)]
[Notices]
[Page 33421]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-12886]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

Federal Law Enforcement Training Center


Notice of Meeting

AGENCY: Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, Treasury.

ACTION: Notice of meeting.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Advisory Committee to the National Center for State and 
Local Law Enforcement Training at the Federal Law Enforcement Training 
Center will meet on June 7, 2000. The agenda for this meeting includes 
remarks by the Committee Co-Chairs, Karen Wehner, Deputy Assistant 
Secretary (LE), Department of the Treasury, and Mary Lou Leary, Acting 
Assistant Attorney General, Office of Justice Programs, Department of 
Justice; progress reports on initiatives and training programs; and 
presentations on collaborative programs presented by the National 
Center.

ADDRESSES: James J. Rowley Training Center, 9200 Powder Mill Road, 
Laurel, Maryland.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Hobart M. Henson, Director, National 
Center for State and Local Law Enforcement Training, Federal Law 
Enforcement Training Center, Glynco, GA 31524, 912-267-2322.

    Dated: May 17, 2000.
Hobart M. Henson,
Director, National Center for State and Local Law Enforcement Training.
[FR Doc. 00-12886 Filed 5-22-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4810-32-P
MKC - 2.28.2015 - Ex. 10(x)


EXHIBIT 10(x)




AMENDMENT NO. 1 TO THE 
MCCORMICK & COMPANY, INCORPORATED
2013 OMNIBUS INCENTIVE PLAN


WHEREAS, McCormick & Company, Incorporated (the “Company”) sponsors the 2013 Omnibus Incentive Plan, which was effective December 1, 2012 (the “Plan”);


WHEREAS, pursuant to Article IX of the Plan, the Board of Directors of the Company (the “Board”) may amend the Plan at any time; provided that, amendments to the Plan must be approved by the Company’s shareholders if and to the extent required by applicable law, or by the rules of the New York Stock Exchange; and provided further that the amendment proposed herein does not require such shareholder approval; 


WHEREAS, the Plan provides that all conditions and restrictions on the exercise of Awards shall be waived in the event of a change in control (as defined in the Plan) (“accelerated vesting”); and


WHEREAS, the Board wishes to amend the Plan to provide that accelerated vesting in the event of a change in control is a default rule and that an Award Agreement can provide otherwise;


WHEREAS, capitalized terms used in this Amendment but not defined herein shall have the meaning given to them in the Plan;


NOW, THEREFORE, effective March 25, 2015, the first sentence of paragraph A (“Change in Control”) of Article VII (“Change in Control; Acquisitions”) of the Plan is amended and restated in its entirety to read as follows:


In the event of a change in control, all conditions and restrictions on the exercise of all Awards (excluding stock options and Stock Appreciation Rights that are not “in the money”) then outstanding (including but not limited to vesting schedules requiring a specified period of service and performance goals requiring the satisfaction of specific performance criteria) shall be waived and such Awards shall become exercisable or payable immediately for the full amount of the Shares of Stock and/or any cash payment covered by such Awards, unless otherwise provided in an Award Agreement. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this Amendment No. 1 to the Plan has been executed on behalf of the Company this 25th day of March, 2015.






MCCORMICK & COMPANY, INCORPORATED


By:         /s/  Jeffery D. Schwartz    
                                                                          Name:     Jeffery D. Schwartz
                                                                            Title:     Vice President, General Counsel & Secretary
#### Goodhue Livingston, Respondent, *v.*City of New York, Appellant.

Argued March 24, 1937;

decided April 27, 1937.

*480
      *Paul Windels, Corporation Counsel (Seymour B. Quel*and *Paxton Blair*of counsel), for appellant.

*William F. Wund*and *Allen Moss*for respondent.

Judgment affirmed, with costs; no opinion.

Concur: Crane, Ch. J., Lehman, O’Brien, Hubbs, Loughran, Finch and Rippey, JJ.
#### § 401.4 Person.

*Person* includes one or more individuals, labor organizations, partnerships, associations, corporations, legal representatives, mutual companies, joint-stock companies, trusts, unincorporated organizations, trustees, trustees in cases under title 11 of the United States Code, or receivers.

[45 FR 70445, Oct. 24, 1980, as amended at 59 FR 15115, Mar. 31, 1994]
#### MARCHESE v TOWN OF SURFSIDE

Case No. 85-206 AP

Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Appellate Division, Dade County

February 9, 1987

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

Denis Dean, Dean & Hartman, P.A., for appellant.

Myles G. Cypen, Cypen, Cypen & Dribin, for appellee.

Before BARAD, GOLDMAN, FEDER, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT

MURRAY GOLDMAN, Judge.

This is an appeal by a police officer of the Town of Surfside from a decision of the Personnel Appeals Board, Town of Surfside, Florida, upholding a two day suspension of the officer.

*174A recital of the facts culminating in the suspension is unnecessary for our decision.

An administrative hearing was held on June 12, 1985 before the Personnel Appeals Board. Appellant was represented by counsel, Mr. Dean, and the Town of Surfside was represented by Mr. Stephen Cypen. The Board did not have its own attorney, nor did it have any legal advisor. Mr. Cypen had represented the Board on previous occasions.

Initially we wrote that there was substantial competent evidence to support the findings and decision of the Board.

The issues which concern this Court are whether Appellant received a fair hearing before the Court, and if not, whether this would constitute fundamental error.1

The hearing before the Board did not violate Appellant’s due process rights. *State ex rel. Vining v. Florida Real Estate Com’n,*281 So.2d 487 (Fla. 1973); *Mizell v. North Broward Hospital District,*175 So.2d 583 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965).

We must, however, points out the appearance of conflict to have the same attorney who has represented the Board act as the prosecuting attorney before the Board. As was noted in *Ford v. Bay County School Board,*246 So.2d 119 (Fla. 1st DCA 1970):

> “It is sufficient for us to point out that it would be in closer accord with traditional notions of justice and fair play for. a quasijudicial administrative board to designate one person to act as its legal adviser and different person to act as its prosecutor. . . .”

Since the due process rights of the Appellant were not violated, and there was substantial competent evidence to support the decision of the Board, the decision is affirmed.

1

 Appellant failed to raise the issue concerning the lack of a fair hearing on appeal. This Court, at oral argument, raised the issue for the first time and required supplemental briefs on the issue.