alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
C OURT OF A PPEALS FOR THE

F IRST D ISTRICT OF T EXAS AT H OUSTON



### O RDER

Appellate case name: In re Hoa Hao Buddhist Congregational Church Texas Chapter and

Dung Anh Nguyen

, Relator s

A ppellate case number: 01

- 1 4

- 0 0 0 5 9

- CV

Trial court case number: 1035611

Trial court: County Civil Court at Law No. 4 of Harris County

On January 2 1 , 201 4 , relator s

, Hoa Hao Buddhist Congregational Church Texas Chapter

and Dung Anh Nguyen, filed a petition for writ of mandamus and a motion for emergency

temporary relief

. Relators ’ motion for emergency temporary relief is granted . The trial court’s

January 15, 2014 order requiring relators to “comply fully with the Petitioner’s discovery

dema nds, as initially served on November 14, 2013” is stayed. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P . 52.10( b ). The

stay is effective until disposition of relators ’ petition for writ of mandamus or further order of

this Court.

The Court further requests a response to the petition for writ of mandamus from the real

party in interest , S arah Huynh . The response, if any, is due no later than Friday, February 21,

2014

.

It is so ORDERED.

Judge’s signature: /s/ Jim Sharp

 Acting individually  Acting for the Court

Date: January 22, 2014
Order entered April 8, 2013

In The 

## Court of Appeals **Fifth District of Texas at Dallas**
No. 05
- 12
- 01 485
- CR No. 05
- 12
- 01486
- CR No. 05
- 12
- 01487
- CR
LOUIS HANCOCK DAITCH , Appellant
V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the Criminal District Cou rt No. 3 Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No s . F 04
- 44009
- J, F11
- 45639
- J, F11
- 45640
- J 

### O RDER
The Court ORDERS the trial court to make findings of fact regarding whether appellant has been deprived of the reporter’s record because of ineffective coun sel, indigence, or for any other reason.

• The trial court shall first determine whether appellant desires to prosecute the appeal s . If the trial court determines that appellant does not desire to prosecute this appeal s , it shall make a finding to that effe ct.

• If the trial court determines that appellant desires to prosecute the appeal s , it shall next determine whether appellant is indigent and entitled to proceed without payment of costs for the reporter’s record. If appellant is entitled to proceed witho ut payment of costs, the trial court shall make a finding to that effect. Moreover, if appellant is indigent, the trial court is ORDERED to take such measures as may be necessary to assure effective representation, which may include appointment of new cou nsel. If the trial court findsappellant is not indigent, it shall determine whether retained counsel has abandoned the appeal s .

• The trial court shall next determine: (1) the name and address of each court reporter who recorded the proceedings in this c ause; (2) the court reporter’s explanation for the delay in filing the reporter’s record; and (3) the earliest date by which the reporter’s record can be filed.

We ORDER the trial court to transmit a supplemental record, containing the written findings o f fact, any supporting documentation, and any orders, to this Court within THIRTY DAYS of the date of this order.
The appeal s are ABATED to allow the trial court to comply with this order. The appeals shall be reinstated thirty days from the date of th is order or when the supplemental record is received, whichever is earlier.

/s/ CAROLYN WRIGHT CHIEF JUSTICE
FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________

No. 1D17-3587

_____________________________

NATHANIEL RAHEEM CHAPMAN,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County.

Steven B. Whittington, Judge.

October 23, 2018

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

ROBERTS, MAKAR, and BILBREY, JJ., concur.

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

_____________________________
2

Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Steven L. Seliger, Assistant 

Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
§ 1471.425 When do I check to see if a person is excluded or disqualified? As an agency official, you must check to see if a person is excluded or disqualified before you— ( a ) Enter into a primary tier covered transaction;
( b ) Approve a principal in a primary tier covered transaction;
( c ) Approve a lower tier participant if agency approval of the lower tier participant is required; or
( d ) Approve a principal in connection with a lower tier transaction if agency approval of the principal is required.
1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

AB RAHAM PORTNOV , ) ) P laintiff , ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 20-1611 (UNA) ) ) U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE et al ., ) ) Defendant s. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION
T his matter is before the Court on its initial review of plaintiff’s pro se complaint and application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis . The Court will grant the application and dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (requiring the court to dismiss an action “at any time” it determines that subject matter jurisdiction is wanting). “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power authorized by Constitution and sta tute,” and it is “presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am ., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (citations omitted). A party seeking relief in the district court must at least plead facts that bring the suit within the court’s jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Failure to plead such facts warrants dismissal of the action. The complaint is unclear , but it seems to seek review of decisions rendered by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the U nited States Court of Federal Claims , or 6 /2 9/20202 some sort of intervention in proceedings that are or were b efore those courts

. See Compl. at 3 (“ I am asking the Court to finish my six years fighting for truth by scheduling the tria l with jury. ”) This federal district court lacks jurisdiction to review another court’s decisions and order it to take any action

. See United States v. Choi , 818 F. Supp. 2d 79, 85 (D.D.C. 2011) (district courts “generally lack[] appellate jurisdiction over other judicial bodies, and cannot exercise appellate mandamus over other courts.”) (citing Lewis v. Green , 629 F. Supp. 546, 553 (D.D.C. 1986)); accord At chison v. U.S. Dist. Courts , 240 F. Supp. 3d 121, 126, n.6 (D.D.C. 2017) (“It is a well

- established principle that a district court can neither review the decisions of its sister court nor compel it to act.”)

. Moreover, it is axiomatic that a lower feder al cou rt has no authority over

an appellate court

. In re Marin , 956 F.2d 339, 340 (D.C. Cir. 1992 ) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Therefore, this case will be dismissed . A separate order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion

.

SIGNED: EMMET G. SULLIVAN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE DATE: June 29 , 2020
§ 22.9 Answer. ( a ) The defendant may request a hearing by filing an answer with the reviewing official within 30 days of service of the complaint. An answer shall be deemed to be a request for hearing.
( b ) In the answer, the defendant— ( 1 ) Shall admit or deny each of the allegations of liability made in the complaint;
( 2 ) Shall state any defense on which the defendant intends to rely;
( 3 ) May state any reasons why the defendant contends that the penalties and assessments should be less than the statutory maximum; and
( 4 ) Shall state the name, address, and telephone number of the person authorized by the defendant to act as defendant's representative, if any.
( c ) If the defendant is unable to file an answer meeting the requirements of paragraph (b) of this section within the time provided, the defendant may, before the expiration of 30 days from service of the complaint, file with the reviewing official a general answer denying liability and requesting a hearing, and a request for an extension of time within which to file an answer meeting the requirements of paragraph (b) of this section. The reviewing official shall file promptly with the ALJ the complaint, the general answer denying liability, and the request for an extension of time as provided in § 22.11. For good cause shown, the ALJ may grant the defendant up to 30 additional days within which to file an answer meeting the requirements of paragraph (b) of this section.
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JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

(Second Chamber)

of 16 September 2004

in Case C-227/01: Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Spain (1)

(Failure of a Member State to fulfil obligations - Directive 85/337/EEC - Assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment - Incorrect implementation - Project for a Valencia-Tarragona railway line, Las Palmas-Oropesa section)

(2004/C 273/01)

Language of the case: Spanish

In Case C-227/01: action under Article 226 EC for failure to fulfil obligations, brought on 7 June 2001, Commission of the European Communities (Agent: G. Valero Jordana) v Kingdom of Spain (Agents: S. Ortiz Vaamonde) — the Court (Second Chamber), composed of: C.W.A. Timmermans, President of the Chamber, C. Gulmann, J.N. Cunha Rodrigues, R. Schintgen (Rapporteur) and F. Macken, Judges; L. Poiares Maduro, Advocate General; M. Múgica Arzamendi, Principal Administrator, for the Registrar, has given a judgment on 16 September 2004, in which it:

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(1) OJ C 212 of 28.7.2001.

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```

[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S.J. Res. 41 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

110th CONGRESS
  2d Session
S. J. RES. 41

 Approving the renewal of import restrictions contained in the Burmese 
                   Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             June 12, 2008

Mr. McConnell (for himself, Mrs. Feinstein, Mr. McCain, Mr. Biden, Mr. 
Allard, Mr. Bennett, Mr. Bunning, Mr. Burr, Ms. Cantwell, Mrs. Clinton, 
   Mr. Coleman, Mrs. Dole, Mr. Durbin, Mr. Ensign, Mr. Feingold, Mr. 
  Isakson, Mr. Leahy, Mr. Martinez, Mr. Menendez, Ms. Murkowski, Mr. 
Smith, Ms. Snowe, Mr. Sununu, Mr. Whitehouse, Mr. Wyden, Mr. Bingaman, 
  and Mr. Brown) introduced the following joint resolution; which was 
          read twice and referred to the Committee on Finance

_______________________________________________________________________

                            JOINT RESOLUTION

 
 Approving the renewal of import restrictions contained in the Burmese 
                   Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003.

    Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 
States of America in Congress assembled, That Congress approves the 
renewal of the import restrictions contained in section 3(a)(1) of the 
Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003.
                                 <all>
```
#### KUELLMER v KUELLMER, et

Ohio Appeals, 8th Dist, Cuyahoga Co

No 9984.

Decided June 3, 1929

J. C. Logue, Esq., Cleveland, for plaintiff.

A. H. Martin, Esq., Cleveland, for defendants.

*490VICKERY, PJ.

Now assuming that the evidence upon this question is true, that he did accept this option, it seems to be the claim of counsel for the defendant Ward that this made him the owner of the property. We do not understand that any acceptance of an option has such drastic effect as to transfer the title to the property. It simply gives the acceptor of the option a right to comply with the terms of it, in order to have the property transferred to him. It surely does not give him the right to keep this property as his without performing or without offering to perform the terms that are on his side to be performed.

If we understand the contention of counsel for the defendant Ward, it is that he having accepted this option became the owner of the property and he having invested certain money, the amount of which is uncertain, he was. entitled to get this money ,all back on an accounting; and so he asked for specific performance of. this contract without tendering or offering to tender, but admitting frankly in court that he could not at this time; and judging from the evidence, he has never been in a nosition prior hereto to perform or carry out the terms on his part to be performed under this contract; and yet, he claims that, although he occupied this property between four and five years and received all the proceeds from the rooms that were rented out to his customers, — and the amount of the proceeds of those rooms was largely increased by reason of the added facilities by the addition of many rooms to the hotel, — I say, he has received all this money and has not paid the water rent, not paid the taxes, not paid the insurance, has not paid the owners, in other words, for the use of this property for a long period of time.

Now he was to rent this property at $125 a month and that together with the $1600 that they admit that one of these co-parceners paid into this property in re-fixing it, together with the accumulation of the taxes which he was to pay if he was the owner of this property and the water rent and the insurance, would more than eat up any equity that he might have in this property even if the proof was clear that he put in any large sum of money.

We think that the plaintiffs are entitled to the return of this property. We do not think that the defendant has shown any equities in his favor that would overbalance the amount that he should have paid for the use of this property. In other words, we think that the decree of the court below was proper in ah respects and we will enter the same decree in this court.

Decree for plaintiffs, order see journal.

Sullivan and Levine, JJ, concur.
§ 4044.1 Purpose and scope. This part implements section 4044 of ERISA, which contains rules for allocating a plan's assets when the plan terminates. These rules have been in effect since September 2, 1974, the date of enactment of ERISA. This part applies to any single-employer plan covered by title IV of ERISA that submits a notice of intent to terminate, or for which PBGC commences an action to terminate the plan under section 4042 of ERISA. ( a ) *Subpart A.* Sections 4044.1 through 4044.4 set forth general rules for applying §§ 4044.10 through 4044.17. Sections 4044.10 through 4044.17 interpret the rules and describe procedures for allocating plan assets to priority categories 1 through 6.
( b ) *Subpart B.* The purpose of subpart B is to establish the method of determining the value of benefits and assets under terminating single-employer pension plans covered by title IV of ERISA. This valuation is needed for both plans trusteed under title IV and plans which are not trusteed. For the former, the valuation is needed to allocate plan assets in accordance with subpart A of this part and to determine the amount of any plan asset insufficiency. For the latter, the valuation is needed to allocate assets in accordance with subpart A and to distribute the assets in accordance with subpart B of part 4041 of this chapter. ( 1 ) Section 4044.41 sets forth the general provisions of subpart B and applies to all terminating single-employer plans. Sections 4044.51 through 4044.58 prescribe the benefit valuation rules for plans that are placed into trusteeship by PBGC, including (in §§ 4044.55 through 4044.58) the rules and procedures a plan administrator shall follow to determine the expected retirement age (XRA) for a plan participant entitled to early retirement benefits for whom the annuity starting date is not known as of the valuation date. This applies to all trusteed plans which have such early retirement benefits. The plan administrator shall determine an XRA under § 4044.55, § 4044.56 or § 4044.57, as appropriate, for each active participant or participant with a deferred vested benefit who is entitled to an early retirement benefit and who as of the valuation date has not selected an annuity starting date.
( 2 ) Sections 4044.71 through 4044.75 prescribe the benefit valuation rules for calculating the value of a benefit to be paid a participant or beneficiary under a terminating pension plan that is distributing assets where the plan has not been placed into trusteeship by PBGC.
[61 FR 34059, July 1, 1996, as amended at 76 FR 34605, June 14, 2011; 89 FR 48300, June 6, 2024]
UN PUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 17
- 7523

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,

v. JOSE HIPOLITO CRUZ DIAZ, a/k/a Pirana , Defendant

- Appellant

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland , at Greenbelt

. Deborah K. Chasanow , Senior District Judge. ( 8:05

- cr - 00393

- DKC

- 9; 8:14

- cv - 01725

- DKC )

Submitted : February 22 , 2018 Decided: February 27, 2018

Before TRAXLER and DUNCAN , Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by un published per curiam opinion

. Jose Hipolito Cruz Diaz, Appellant Pro Se. Chan Park, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenbelt, Mar yland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Jose Hipolito Cruz Diaz seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (2012). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). Wh en the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller

- El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336

- 38 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion
states a deba table claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack , 529 U.S. at 484

- 85. We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Diaz has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the
app eal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED
[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 99 (Monday, May 22, 2000)]
[Notices]
[Page 32128]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-12772]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

Employment and Training Administration

[TA-W-34,244 Riddle, Oregon; TA-W-34,244A Coos Bay, Oregon]


Cominco Ltd., Cominco American, Inc. Glenbrook Operations 
(Formerly Glenbrook Nickel Company); Amended Certification Regarding 
Eligibility To Apply for Worker Adjustment Assistance

    In accordance with section 223 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 
2273) the Department of Labor issued a Certification of Eligibility to 
Apply for Worker Adjustment Assistance on February 25, 1998, applicable 
to workers of Glenbrook Nickel Company, Riddle, Oregon. The notice was 
published in the Federal Register on March 23, 1998 (63 FR 13879). The 
certification was amended March 20, 1998 to include another 
manufacturing facility of the subject firm. The notice was published in 
the Federal Register on March 31, 1998 (63 FR 15441).
    At the request of the State agency, the Department reviewed the 
certification for workers of the subject firm. The workers were engaged 
in the production of ferronickel. New information received from the 
company shows that Cominco Ltd and Cominco American are the owners of 
the Glenbrook properties. In 1998, Glenbrook Nickel Company became 
known as Cominco Ltd., Cominco American,--Glenbrook Operations. 
Information also shows that workers separated from employment at 
Glenbrook Nickel Company had their wages reported under a separate 
unemployment insurance (UI) tax account for Cominco Ltd., Cominco 
American,--Glenbrook Operations.
    Accordingly, the Department is amending the certification to 
properly reflect this matter.
    The amended notice applicable to TA-W-34,244 and TA-W-344,244A are 
hereby issued as follows:

    All workers of Cominco Ltd., Cominco American,--Glenbrook 
Operations (Formerly Glenbrook Nickel Company), Riddle, Oregon and 
Coos Bay, Oregon who became totally or partially separated from 
employment on or after January 30, 1997 through February 25, 2000 
are eligible to apply for adjustment assistance under section 223 of 
the Trade Act of 1974.

    Signed at Washington, DC this 12th day of May, 2000.
Grant D. Beale,
Program Manager, Division of Trade Adjustment Assistance.
[FR Doc. 00-12772 Filed 5-19-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4510-30-M
**Exhibit 32.1**

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

In connection withthe Quarterly Report of The Boyds Collection, Ltd. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Qfor the period ended June 30, 2004 as filed with the Securities andExchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Jan L. Murley, ChiefExecutive Officer of the Company, certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,that:

1)     The Reportfully complies with the requirements of section 13 (a) or 15 (d) ofthe Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2)     Theinformation contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

*A signed original of this written statement requiredby Section 906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging, orotherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within theelectronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, hasbeen provided to The Boyds Collection, Ltd. and will be retained by The BoydsCollection, Ltd. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or itsstaff upon request.*
| /s/ Jan L. Murley |   |
|-----------------------------|--------|
| Jan L. Murley               |   |
| *Chief  Executive Officer*  |   |
| August 16,  2004       |   |

 

1

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Election of the President of the Court of First Instance

(2004/C 251/21)

On 8 September 2004 the Court of First Instance, in accordance with Article 7 of the Rules of Procedure, elected Judge Bo Vesterdorf as President for the period from 8 September 2004 to 31 August 2007.

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