1 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ JAMES RODGERS; SHERYLL RODGERS, individually and as Husband and Wife; CHRISTOPHER EVANS; JILL EVANS, individually and as Husband and Wife, Plaintiffs - Appellants,

v. BEECHCRAFT CORPORATION, f/k/a Hawker Beechcraft Corporation, a Kansas corporation; HAWKER BEECHCRAFT GLOBAL CUSTOMER SUPPORT, LLC, f/k/a Hawker Beechcraft Services, Inc., a Kansas limited liability company, Defendants - Appellees. No. 17-5045 (D.C. No. 4:15-CV -00129-CVE-PJC) (N.D. Okla.)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before MATHESON , McHUGH , and EID , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ On March 17, 2013, James Rodger s and Christopher Evans were pa ssengers on a Beech Premier 390 jet airplane, f lying from Tulsa, Oklahoma to South Bend, Indiana.

* This order and judgment is not b inding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata , and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent w ith Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### December 13, 2018
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 During the flight, both engines of the plane were inadvertently shut down. The plane crashed on landing, killing the pilot, Wesley Caves, and a thir d passenger, Steve Davis. Mr. Rodgers and Mr. Evans were injured. Mr. Rodgers and Mr. Evans and t heir spouses sued Beechcraft Co rporation, the plane’s manufacturer, and Hawke r Beechcraft Global Customer Sup port, LLC, the plane’s repair and maintenan ce provider. Plain tiffs alleged ne gligence claims against Beechcraft and Hawker, and produc ts liability claims against Be echcraft. 1 Their complaint alleged that (1) the p ilot was unable to restart the engines because the plane’s electrical distribution bus syst em was defective; (2) the plane ’s alternate landing gear system was defectively designed and failed to deploy; and (3) t he aircraft flight manual contained faulty instructions fo r restarting the electrical gen erator following a dual engine shutdown. This appeal challenges two key rulings. First, the district c ourt limited the testimony of four of Plaintiffs’ e xperts and excluded supplemen tation of their experts’ reports. Second, with this eviden ce excluded, the district cou rt granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment becaus e Plaintiffs had presented in sufficient evidence to support their claims. Exercisi ng jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

1 In this opinion, we refer to Appellants as “Plaintiffs” in ref erence to the district court proceedings, as “Appellant s” in reference to these appell ate proceedings, or as “Mr. Rodgers and Mr. Evans.” We refe r to Appellees as “Defendants” in reference to the district court proceedings, “Appe llees” in reference to these a ppellate proceedings, or as “Beechcraft and Hawker.”3 I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background 2 1. The Parties James Rodgers and Christopher E vans were passengers on the plan e. They survived the crash but suffere d injuries. Their spouses, Shery ll Rodgers and Jill Evans, sued for loss of consortium. Beechcraft, a Kansas corporation with its principal place of bu siness in Kansas, manufactures and sells commercia l aviation aircraft. [App. 462 3.] Hawker, a Kansas limited liability company, provide s aviation inspection and mai ntenance service. 3
2. The Plane Beechcraft designed and, in 2008 , manufactured the Beechcraft Premier 1A Model 390, RB-226 (“RB-226”), a two-engine aircraft. 4 [App. 2786.] The Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) issued a standard airworthiness certific ate for the plane. [ Id. ] The plane had recorded457.5 hours in total flight time when it crashed.

2 In our review of the district c ourt’s summary judgment, we pre sent the facts and view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving parties, here the Plaintiffs. See Wolf v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. , 50 F.3d 793, 796 (10th Cir. 1995).

3 Beechcraft and Hawker were merg ed into Textron Aviation Inc. e ffective January 1, 2017. Textron Inc. is Textron Aviation Inc.’s paren t company. See Aplee Br. at i; Aplt. Br. Errata (Nov. 9, 2017).

4 We use “Model 390” as shorthand for the Beechcraft Premier 1A Model 390. We use “RB-226” to refer to the sp ecific Model 390 aircraft tha t crashed in this case.4 a. Electrical System The RB-226 has two engine-drive n generators that supply electr icity throughout the aircraft. The plane is desi gned to fly with only one engin e. An engine may be restarted through engine start and ignition switches powered by the pilot’s essential bus, which is part of the electrica l load distribution system. 5 [App. at 4625-26.] For emergencies, the plane relie s on a main battery and a stan dby battery to provide power. When the engines shut down, the generators also turn off, and the power

5 Appellants provided in their A ppendix an excerpt from a deposi tion of Beechcraft electrical engineer R odney Allen Voth, defining the word “bus”: Q: Could you describe for the lad ies and gentlemen of the jury what a ‘bus’ is? A: It’s a – a electrical tie poi nt that feeds circuit breakers – it’s – it’s a branch – it’s a branch circuit off of the power distribution network that’s – the buses are named fo r the – either their type or ope ration or how they’re fed by the var ious power sources. They’re distributed through the airplane to the various panels that hav e circuit breakers and relays. App. at 209. The “essential bus ” is one of these “branches.” Id. Appellees defined “essential bus” in a motion to limit expert testimony as follow s: A “bus” is a branch circuit off o f the power distribution netwo rk, which supplies power to designat ed components of the airplane. Using buses, the electrical powe r load is divided in a balanced fashion, and backup systems can b e powered from a different cir cuit than the main systems, providi ng redundancy. The pilot’s essen tial bus is one such bus, and it supp lies electrical power to a numb er of essential components on the Pre mier. The co-pilot’s essential bus supplies electrical power to othe r essential components, again providing for balanced power sup ply and effective backup system s. App. at 707 (citations omitted).5 supply in the plane switches from the generators to the main ba ttery. [App. at 2295, 2381, 2424-25.] The plane has a s witch that toggles between “O n” for the main battery and “Standby” for the standby battery. Durin g normal flight op erations, the battery switch remains in the “On” pos ition. The battery switch must b e set to “On” for the generators to power the plane. When the plane uses battery powe r, many non-essential component s in the plane are shut off to conserve energy for landing, including the cock pit voice recorder (“CVR”). [App. at 2296, 2439.] C ertain features continue to f unction. For example, a pilot can still receive communica tions from the airport control tower, and the plane’s transponder continues to “ping” with its location. [App. at 24 35.] b. Alternate landing gear The main landing gear of the pla ne is designed to operate even when the electrical generators are not functioning be cause the battery provides eno ugh power to lower the gear. [App. at 2246-47.] The pla ne also has an alternate land ing gear that can be deployed without electri cal power. [App. at 2294

. ] The alternate landing gear is engaged by pulling a red, T-shaped handle marked “PULL” that sits under the pilot’s “yoke” or control column. 6 App. at 1563.

6 A yoke is a “type of pilot[’]s cont rol column in which the ail erons are controlled by rotating a device on top of the column to the left or right. ” Yoke , Dictionary of Aeronautical English 536 (1999) . An “aileron” is a “horizontal control surface hinged to the mainplane (wing) which provi des movement around the longitu dinal axis of the aeroplane . . . .” Aileron , id. at 10.6 When Beechcraft inspected the RB-226 before it was sold, the p lane’s alternate landing gear handle had a maximu m pull-force—the force needed t o deploy the landing gear—of 53.7 pounds. [App. at 2700.] The Maintenance Manual f or RB 226 specified a procedure for testing the handle and also stated that the maxim um pull-force to pass inspection was 64 pounds. [App. at 2477.] The alternate landing gear was due for an inspection at 600 flight hours, w hich had not yet been reached when the crash occurred. [App. at 4630.] Beechcraft had ne ver previously reported that a pilot was unable to lock the landing gear in place using th e alternate la nding gear on aModel 390. [App. at 4630.]

c. Manuals The RB-226 was equipped with thr ee manuals: an Airplane Fligh t Manual (“AFM”), a Pilot’s Operating Manual (“POM”), and a model-specif ic Maintenance Manual. [App. at 2290, 2339, 2476. ] The FAA approved the AFM, which provided required information for pilotin g under federal requirements. [App. at 2339.] See 14 C.F.R. Part 23. The AFM had a c hecklist to restart the engine when it shut down (“Engine Shutdown or Failure in F light”) and also had a checkli st for what to do when both electrical generators failed (“Dual Generator Failure”). [App. at 2343, 2345.] d. Previous servicing In 2009, Beechcraft issued Ser vice Bulletin 24-3868, which req uired changes to the RB-226’s circuit breaker pan el to fix the hydraulic shutoff valve. [App. at 2244.] Hawker performed this repair on the plane in this case using a kit (Kit No. 390-3622- 0003) assembled by Beechcraft. [ Id. ] During the repair, Haw ker had to remove and7 reattach a service wire from the circuit breaker on the pilot’s essential bus. [App. at 2428.] The kit required that a s crew used to reattach the wire be tightened to six to nine pounds of torque. The last scheduled inspection o f the plane occurred in 2012. [App. 2787.]
3. The Flight

a. Generally On March 17, 2013, Pilot Caves was flying the RB-226 from Tuls a, Oklahoma to South Bend, Indiana. Mr. Davis s at to his right in the front p assenger seat. Mr. Rodgers and Mr. Evans were back-seat p assengers. Mr. Davis had a pilot ’s license but was not licensed to fly jets. His last r ecorded flight h ad been in 200 8. Pilot Caves was licensed to fly the plane and had passed federally mandated training for that purpose. [App. at 3116.] b. Mr. Davis pilots On their descent toward the Sou th Bend airport, Mr. Caves allo wed Mr. Davis to pilot the aircraft by operating the throttles. [ App. at 2309-2 335.] While Mr. Davis was at the helm, the aircraft’s overspeed warning signal sounded twice , alerting the pilot to slow down. [App. at 2317, 2 327.] As recorded o n the CVR, Mr. Caves directed Mr. Davis to pull back on the throttle to reduc e the aircraft’s speed and co mmented that Mr. Davis was inexperienced flying this type o f aircraft. [App. at 2316-35.] Mr. Davis responded that he was “uncomfortable” and hesita ted about how to pull back the throttle. Id. at 2318. Mr. Davis then pulled back on the throttle, but instead of onl y slowing the plane, he pulled the throttle lever int o the “Cutoff” position, inadve rtently shuttin g down both8 engines. Id. at 2334-35; see also id . at 1567, 1644. At this poi nt, numerous systems in the plane began to shut down and Mr. Caves said, “Uh-oh. . . . we are dead stick.” Id. at 2335.

c. The crash The CVR eventually cut off becaus e the plane was running on ba ttery. Mr. Caves restarted one of the engines, but he did not reset the electric al generator associated with the engine, so the plane continue d to operate on battery power. [ Id. at 4626.] The parties dispute which of the checklists from the AFM for restarting the engines was the correct one to use in this em ergency. They also d ispute whether or not Mr. Caves followed either checklist. Various warni ng and caution lights flashed a t intervals after initially blacking out. [App. at 2449-50.] Through communication with ai r traffic control in South Bend, Mr. Caves was able to pilot the plane to the a irport. He attempted to land, but air traffic control waved him off because his main landing gear had not b een extended. I nstead, only the “nose” or the front landing gear had exte nded. A plane cannot safely lan d in this configuration. App. at 2215. Mr. Caves pulled the plane up, c ircled around the airport, and attempted a second landing. But again the main la nding gear was not extended. [A pp. at 1567.] It is unknown what Mr. Caves did to try to extend the landing gear be tween the first and second landing attempts. On the second landing attempt, the ai rcraft touched down on the runway and began to bounce . Mr. Caves tried to bring the p lane back up into the air, at which point it entered a “ nose low, rolling descent into a n earby residential9 community.” App. at 2215 (Nati onal Transportation Safety Board report on the crash). Mr. Caves and Mr. Davis died of b lunt force injuries in the cra sh. Mr. Rodgers and Mr. Evans sustained injuries. [ App. at 2221-22, 2227.] d. The aftermath In the accident wreckage, the ba ttery switch was found to be i n “Standby” position. The parties dispute wh ether the impact of the crash affected the switch position. [App. at 2221.] The handle for the alternate landing gear was found partially pulled out (an inch and a half) and bent toward the instrument panel. [App. at 222 1.] It is unknown what pull-force Mr. Caves use d when he pulled ou t the handle before the accident. Chris Evans testified that at one point during the flight, the plane’s display screen went black and lights and indicat ors flashed in the cockpit. [ App. at 3319-20.]

e. Information from a previous flight Two weeks before the crash, Rick Frie was a passenger on the R B-226 with Pilot Caves on a flight from Tulsa to Memphis. During a thunderstorm , Mr. Frie said that several displays on the plane f lickered or blacked out. [App. at 2637-2638.] * * * * We will present additional factua l background below as it pert ains to each issue.
B. Procedural Background Complaint Plaintiffs sued Beechcraft and Ha wker in 2015. Their products liability claims for manufacturing and de sign defects against Beechcraft and their n egligence claims against10 Beechcraft and Hawker concern: (1) the plane’s electrical syst em; (2) the alternate landing gear; and (3) the Premier 390’s Airplane Flight Manual and certain repair kit instructions. We summarize below the Plaintiffs’ claims.

a. Electrical system i. Manufacturing defect Plaintiffs alleged that a manuf acturing defect in the plane an d in replacement part 390-3622-0003 caused electrical failures in the aircraft. They also alleged the first defect was present in 2008 upon initial sale of the plane and the seco nd was present upon the plane’s leaving Beechcraft’s cont rol (through its agent Hawker) after servicing in compliance with Bulle tin RSB 24-3868. They asserted the electr ical system was therefore defective and failed to provide the pilot with reliab le control of engine power or the plane’s instruments. ii. Design defect Plaintiffs alleged improper desi gn of the plane’s electrical s ystem, making the aircraft unsafe and leading to Plaintiffs’ injuries. 7 iii. Negligence Plaintiffs alleged that Beechcraf t was negligent in its manufa cture, inspection, and assembly of the plane’s electrica l system and in its lack of ad equate supervision, training,

7 Appellants also appear to allege a “failure to warn” products liability theory of defect in their appellate briefi ng, but this theory was not in the operative complaint and is distinct from their neg ligence claim based o n failure to warn.11 and maintenance instructions f or those involved in the repair a nd service of the electrical system. They also alleged Beec hcraft was negligent in failing to warn owners, users, and servicers of defects. They fina lly alleged that Beechcraft was negligent through its agent, Hawker, for problems caused by the faulty in-warranty installat ion of the service kit in
2009. Plaintiffs alleged that Hawker w as negligent in creating flaws in the electrical system when it serviced the plane in 2009. b. Alternate landing gear i. Manufacturing defect Plaintiffs alleged a manufacturi ng defect in the alternate lan ding gear, claiming that it did not comply with repr esentations Beechcraft made to the FAA to obtain its “type certificate.” Second Am. Compl. at 6. 8 ii. Design defect Plaintiffs alleged defective de sign of the alternate landing g ear extension system. 9

8 “A type certification represen ts the FAA’s finding that, based upon the manufacturer’s representations to the FAA, a particular design ‘meets the regulations and minimum standards prescribed und er’ the [Federal Aviation] Act. ” Aplt. App. at 3753 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 44704(a)(1)). “ Type certificates are requi red for all aircraft designs before those designs can be manufactured.” Id.

9 As with the electrical system, i t appears Plaintiffs in their appellate briefing allege a failure-to-warn produc ts liability defect with regard to the alternate landing gear, a theory not in the operative co mplaint, and distinct from a ne gligence claim based on failure to warn.12 iii. Negligence Plaintiffs alleged Beechcraft wa s negligent in its manufacture , inspection, and assembly of the alternate landi ng gear. They also appeared to allege that Beechcraft was negligent in its lack o f adequate supervision, training, and co mmunication of maintenance instructions to thos e involved in se rvice of the al ternate landing gear. 10 Plaintiffs further alleged that Beechcraft negligently failed t o warn owners, users, or servicers of alternate landing ge ar defects and negligently des igned the alternate landing gear. Plaintiffs similarly allege d that Hawker was negligent i n failing to inspect or assess the condition of the alternate landing gear.

c. Aircraft flight manual and repair kit instructions i. Design defect Plaintiffs alleged “improper des ign” of the Airplane Flight Ma nual based on insufficient guidance for restarti ng the electrical generators and for deploying the alternate landing gear in emergencies. 11 They also alleged that the repair kit instructions were defective because they pres cribed a faulty method of repai r. ii. Negligence Plaintiffs alleged that Beechcr aft “negligently designed” the AFM, resulting in inadequate instructions to restar t the generators and to deploy the alternate landing gear.

10 The operative complaint seems t o allege that its failure-to-co mmunicate-withservicers claim applies both to t he electrical system and the a lternate landing gear.

11 Plaintiffs seem to argue on appe al a failure-to-warn products liability claim regarding the flight manual, but this theory was not in the ope rative complaint.13 Plaintiffs also allege that B eechcraft was neglig ent in its pre paration of repair kit instructions.
* * * * In light of the combination of parties, claims, and subjects o f the claims, we provide the following chart s ummarizing the complaint:

Electrical

System Alternate Landing Gear Flight Manual and Repair KitCLAIMS Manufacturing Defect Beechcraft Beechcraft
Design Defect Beechcraft Beechcraft Beechcraft

Negligence Beechcraft Hawker Beechcraft Hawker Beechcraft Hawker

District Court Rulings on Expert Testimony The Defendants moved to exclude the proposed testimony of the Plaintiffs’ four expert witnesses—John Bloomfield , Donald Sommer, Frank Graham, and Michael Haider. The motion was based on the expert reports produced in discovery and depositions of the experts. In response, the Plaintiffs submit ted additional affidavits from each of their experts. The Defenda nts moved to exclude these s upplemental affidavits. The district court referred the mo tions to a magistrate judge, who held a hearing and then prepared a report and recommenda tion (“R & R”) for each motion. [App. at 3949-77, 3991.] Both sides objected in p art to the magistrate’s R & R.14 Ruling on the motions, the district court limited the testimon y of three of Plaintiffs’ experts because th ey were not properly qualified or did not have an adequate basis for their opinions. It ex cluded the fourth expert altoge ther because he did not sufficiently prepare his expert rep ort. The court struck the s upplemental affidavits as either improper or untimely supplementation. Rodgers v. Beechcraft Corp. , No. 15-CV0129-CVE-PJC, 2017 WL 465474, at *5 (N.D. O kla. Feb. 3, 2017) ( “ Rodgers MIL ”); 12 Rodgers v. Beechcraft Corp. , No. 15-CV-0129-CVE-PJC, 2017 WL 979100 at *7 (N.D. Okla. Mar. 14, 2017) (“ Rodgers Haider ”). District Court Ruling on Summary Judgment The Defendants also moved for su mmary judgment. In light of t he excluded expert evidence, the district c ourt granted the motion, holding there was no genuine issue of material fact that would allo w a reasonable jury to find in favor of the Plaintiffs on any of their theories of produc ts liability or negligence.
II. DISCUSSION The district court did not a buse its discretion when it limite d Plaintiffs’ expert evidence and refused to accept th eir supplemental affidavits. And given the exclusion of expert testimony, summary judgment was properly granted to the Defendants. Plaintiffs - Appellants appeal t he district court’s orders (1) excluding the supplemental expert affidavits; (2) limiting or e xcluding exper t testimony; and (3) granting summary judgment to Defendants.

12 “MIL” stands for motion in limine.15 A. Limitation of Expert Testimony
1. Standard of Review We review for abuse of discreti on the striking of a supplement al expert report. See, e.g. , Kemin Foods, L.C. v. Pigmentos Ve getales del Centro S.A. de C.V. , 464 F.3d 1339, 1350 (Fed . Cir. 2006); Henderson v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. , 412 F. App’x 74, 80 (10th Cir. 2011 ) (unpublished) (striking of supplemental exp ert evidence as untimely reviewed for abuse of discretion). When an appellant challenges a di strict court’s decision to exc lude expert testimony, we review de novo whether the court performed its ga tekeeping function and whether it used the proper leg al standard. We review for abuse of discretion whether the court applied the standard correctly. Gen. Elec. v. Joiner , 522 U.S. 136, 141-42 (1997) (holding abuse of discretion is t he standard to review district court rulings excluding expert evidence); Norris v. Baxter Healthcare Corp. , 397 F.3d 878, 883 (10th Cir. 2005); Dodge v. Cotter Corp ., 328 F.3d 1212, 12 23 (10th Cir. 2003). The Appellants here d o not question whether the distric t court exercised its gatekeepi ng function or used the proper legal standard, so our revi ew is limited to whether the court abused its discretion in limiting their experts’ testi mony. In that regard, we will find error only if the decision was “‘arbitrary, capricious, whi msical or manifestly unreasonab le,’ or ‘we are convinced that the [tribunal] made a clear error of judgment or exceeded the bounds of permissible choice in the circumstances.’” United States v. Nacchio , 555 F.3d 1234, 1241 (10th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (quoting Dodge , 328 F.3d at 1223).16 Legal Background

a. Supplementation of expert testimony Federal Rule of Civil Procedu re 26(a)(2)(B)(i) requires disclo sure of an expert’s report, which “must contain . . . a complete statement of all o pinions the witness will express and the basis and reasons for them.” Courts may set a time by which the parties must submit their expert repor ts. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(D). “Rule 26(a) expert reports . . . are intended not only to identify the expert witn ess, but also ‘to set forth the substance of the direct examination’ . . . [and are] necessary to allow the opposing party ‘a reasonable opportunity to p repare for effectiv e cross examin ation and perhaps arrange for expert testimony from other witnesses.’” Jacobsen v. Deseret Book Co. , 287 F.3d 936, 953 (10th Cir. 2002) (quo ting Fed. R. Civ . P. 26(a)(2) adv isory committee’s note to 1993 amendment). Parties have a continuing obliga tion to supplement these report s “in a timely manner” if the parties later lear n the information initially pr ovided is in complete or incorrect. Fed. R. Civ . P. 26(a)(2)(E) & 26(e). Supplementati on must occur “by the time the party’s pretrial disclosu res under Rule 26(a)(3) are due.” Fed. R. Civ . P. 26(e)(2). 13 If, however, an expert disclosu re is “intended solely to contra dict or rebut evidence on the same subject matter identified by another party under Rule 26(a )(2)(B) or (C),” that

13 Rule 26(a)(3), in turn, specifies that “[u]nless the court ord ers otherwise, [pretrial] disclosures must be m ade at least 30 days before tri al.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3)(B).17 disclosure is due within 30 days a fter the other party’s disclo sure. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(D)(ii). Under Federal Rule of Civil Pr ocedure 37(c), a district court can allow evidence violating Rule 26(a), but only “if the violation is justified o r harmless.” Jacobsen , 287 F.3d at 952. “A district court need not make explicit findings concerning the existence of a substantial justification or t he harmlessness of a failure.” Woodworker’s Supply, Inc. v. Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co. , 170 F.3d 985, 993 (10th Cir. 1999). In determining whether a Rule 26(a) violation was jus tified or harmless, courts weigh the following factors: “(1) the prejudice or surprise to the party against whom the testimo ny is offered; (2) the ability of the party to cure the p rejudice; (3) the extent to w hich introducing such testimony would disrupt the tria l; and (4) the moving party’s b ad faith or willfulness.”
Id. “‘The determination of whethe r a Rule 26(a) violation is just ified or harmless is entrusted to the broad discre tion of the district court.’” Id. (quoting Mid–Am. Tablewares, Inc. v. Mogi Trading Co. , 100 F.3d 1353, 136 3 (7th Cir. 1996)). Additionally, evaluation of supplemental expert testimony is s ubject to the same standards as the evaluation of e xpert testimony, which we descr ibe below. b. Expert testimony Federal Rule of Evi dence 702 states: A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, ex perience, or education may testify in the formof an opinion or otherwise if : (a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the tri er of fact to understand the evidence or to determin e a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;18 (c) the testimony is the produc t of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably app lied the principles and methods to the facts of the case. Fed. R. Evid. 702. Rul e 702 imposes a gatekeeping function on district courts to ensure expert testimony is admitted onl y if (1) the expert is qualifie d and the testimony would be helpful to the trier of fact, (2) t he testimony is based on suf ficient facts or data, (3) it is further based on reliable prin ciples and methods, and (4) the e xpert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts and data. See Kumho Tire Co., v. Carmichael , 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. , 509 U.S. 579, 589, 597 (1993). The district court in thi s case relied on one or more of these grounds to limit the testimony of each of the Appellant s’ experts. We briefly revie w these requirements. Qualified – The first step is to determine whether the expert is qualified to testify. Bitler v. A.O. Smith Corp ., 400 F.3d 1227, 1232- 33 (10th Cir. 2005). D istrict courts ha ve broad discretion to determine whether a proposed expert may tes tify. United States v. Nichols , 169 F.3d 1255, 1265 (10th Ci r. 1999). An expert must possess “such skill, experience or knowledge in that particular field as to make it appear that his opinion would rest on substantial founda tion and would tend to aid the trier of fact in his search for truth.” LifeWise Master Funding v. Telebank, 374 F.3d 917, 928 (10th Cir. 2004) (quoting Graham v. Wyeth Labs., 906 F.2d 1399, 1408 (10th Cir. 199 0)). An expert who “possesses knowledge as to a gene ral field” but “lacks specific knowledge does not necessarily assist the jury.” City of Hobbs v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 162 F.3d 576, 587 (10th Cir. 1998).19 Proposed expert testimony must the refore “fall within the reaso nable confines of [the witness’s] expertise.” Conroy v. Vilsack, 707 F.3d 1163, 11 69 (10th Cir. 2013) (quotations omitted). The propo nent of expert testimony bears the burden of showing the expert is qualified. Ralston v. Smith & Nephew Richards, Inc. , 275 F.3d 965, 970 n.4 (10th Cir. 2001) (uphol ding the district court’s determination that a board-certified orthopedic surgeon was not qualif ied to testify about intramedu llary nailing because she was not familiar with that surgical technique). For example, in Conroy , the plaintiff alleging sex discrimination failed to show that her proposed expert had suffi cient expertise in “the parti cular field of sex stereotyping” because she had not researched or published on th e topic and because her business degree and human resour ce work did not provide the nee ded expertise. 707 F.3d at 1168-69 (quota tions omitted). In Milne v. USA Cycling, Inc. , 575 F.3d 1120, 1133-34 (10th Cir. 2009), we held a propo sed expert was not qualified t o testify about organizing and supervising mountain bike r races because his expertise was in paved road races. In Kinser v. Gehl Co. , we held that plaintiff’s exper t, who had a bach elor’s degree in mechanical engineering and a doctorate in industrial engineerin g, was nonetheless not qualified to testify about altern ate designs for a bay haler, a n agricultural device, because he had “no practical experience i n mechanical design.” 184 F.3 d 1259, 1271 (10th Cir. 1999), abrogated on other grounds by Weisgram v. Marley Co. , 528 U.S. 440 (2000). Sufficient facts or data – Th e Supreme Court’s decision in General Electric v.
Joiner offers a good illustration of the requirement that expert test imony must be based on sufficient facts or data. The Court held that the district court did not abuse its20 discretion in rejecting expert o pinions that plaintiff’s exposu re to toxins caused his lung cancer because the opinions were b ased on animal studies that c ould not be extrapolated to humans. 522 U.S. at 144-46. Opinion evidence ne ed not be admitted when it “is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert. A court may conclude that there is simply too great an anal ytical gap between the data an d the opinion proffered.”
Id. at 146. Federal Rule 703 complements R ule 702(c). It provides that “fa cts or data in the case that the expert has been awa re of or personally observed” may be the basis for the expert’s opinion and need not b e admissible “[i]f experts in th e particular field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or data in forming an o pinion on the subject.” Fed. R. Evid. 703. Reliable principles and methods reliably applied – The reliabi lity determination calls for a “preliminary assess ment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically v alid and of whether that reaso ning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.” Daubert , 509 U.S. at 592- 93. Although many factors may bear on whethe r expert testimony is based on s ound methods and principles, the Daubert Court offered five non-exclusive considerations: whether the theory or technique h as (1) been or can be tested, (2) been pee r-reviewed, (3) a known or potential error rate, (4) standards controlling the technique’s operation, and (5) been generally accepted by the scientific community. See 509 U.S. at 593-94. “[D]istrict courts applying Daubert have broad discretion to consi der a variety of other factors.”21 Hollander v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp. , 289 F.3d 1193, 1205 (10th Cir. 2002). As the Court said in Kumho Tire , [W]e can neither rule out, nor r ule in, for all cases and for a ll time the applicability of th e factors mentioned in Daubert , nor can we now do so for subs ets of cases categorized by category of expert or by kind of evidence . Too much depends on the particular circumstances o f the particular case at issue

. 526 U.S. at 150. “The focus, of course, must be solely on princi ples and method ology, not on the conclusions that they generate.” Daubert , 509 U.S. at 595. “The plaintiff need not prove that the expert is undisputably correct . . . . Instead, the p laintiff must show that the method employed by the expert i n reaching the conclusion is sci entifically sound and that the opinion is based on facts whic h sufficiently satisfy Rule 7 02’s reliability requirements.” Mitchell v. Gencorp Inc. , 165 F.3d 778, 781 ( 10th Cir. 1999); see Bitler , 400 F.3d at 1233. Even if the m ethodology is so und, reliabilit y must also be assessed by the reasonableness of applying it to the facts and by the valid ity of how conclusions are drawn from the data. See Kumho Tire , 526 U.S. at 153-54; Hendrix v. Evenflo Co. , 609 F.3d 1183, 1195 ( 11th Cir. 2010).
Review of the District Court’s Ru lings on Appellants’ Four Expe rts

a. Limitation of Mr. Bloomfield’s testimony i. Additional background Mr. Bloomfield has a degree in i ndustrial and systems engineer ing from the Georgia Institute of Technology . He describes himself as an ex pert in “avionics, aircraft electrical systems, aircraft elect rical distribution, avionics integration,” and “all22 electro/mechanical systems and hy dro/mechanical systems and sub -systems.” App. at
1842. 1) Original report and deposition Mr. Bloomfield’s original Rul e 26(a) report outlined his propo sed testimony on defects in the plane’s electrica l system and the alternate land ing gear. Defendants also deposed Mr. Bloomfield about his proposed testimony. [App. at 406-30.] a) Electrical System – loose screw and voltage problems Mr. Bloomfield opined that a loo se screw in the pilot’s essent ial bus caused intermittent electrical failure, w hich in turn damaged the plan e’s electrical system from voltage spikes or variation . [App. at 227-52, 410, 416, 418, 1 851.] He testified in his deposition that the screw came l oose when Hawker negligently pe rformed service on the plane by disconnecting the bus from the wrong end. [App. at 24 30.] He further testified that Hawker followed the repair k it’s defective instructions th at were negligently written by Beechcraft. [ Id. ] Mr. Bloomfield based his opinions partly on his examination of the aircraft wreckage and analysis of some of t he plane’s electronic compone nts that were removed from the plane in the days af ter the crash. [App. at 1851.] H e found a loose screw connecting a feed wire to the pilot-side electrical bus. [App. at 1851.] He thought there were overall tightness problems with screws connecting wires an d bus bars to circuit breakers. [App. at 1870.] He sa id that “because of that poor quality we had one come loose that was critical.” App. at 3335; see also App. at 3337.23 Mr. Bloomfield originally sugge sted in his report that the loo se screw had been loose since manufacture and thus constituted a manufacturing de fect. [App. at 410, 1892.] He opined that this manuf acturing defect resulted in el ectrical failures that “ultimately caused the crash.” App. at 1844. He later changedhis view to opine that Hawker negligently loosened the screw during its repair service when it followed the faulty service kit (which in turn referenced the aircraft’s Mai ntenance Manual). [App. at 410-11, 2429.] He explained that problems with screws connecti ng wires and bus bars to circuit breakers make electric connections unreliable and inter mittent. [ See, e.g. , App. at 419, 1871.] He said loose elect rical connections cause voltage spikes, which in turn would damage the pla ne’s systems. [App. at 414, 1872, 1889.] For example, with an electrical failure, indicators show ing the pilot when landing g ear was down and locked would not function, and electri cal failure from the pilot side bus could drain the battery and indirectly cause the CVR to cut out. [App. at 422-23.] Mr. Bloomfield provided literatu re on voltage spikes but did n ot do his own testing regarding voltage spike s and variation. [App. at 281-3 15, 413-14.] He stated in his deposition, “I don’t have ev idence that there were voltage spikes, but I know a hundred percent that there were voltage spikes”; “I know they h ad to”; “I will guarantee you there are . . . .” App. at 414 . He did not, in his origin al report or deposition, offer an opinion on the adequacy of the p lane’s voltage suppression (“su rge protector”) system, App. at 414-15, and contended tha t a surge protector would not provide evidence of a voltage spike because it “doesn’t get damaged by the voltage sp ike.” Id. at 415.24 b) Alternate landing gear – excessive pull-force and lack of an indicator Mr. Bloomfield identified two de fects in the alternate landing gear: (1) an excessive pull-force requirement in the handle, and (2) the lac k of indicators showing when the alternate landing ge ar was properly deployed. Mr. Bloomfield opined that the a lternate landing gear’s extens ion system was defectively designed because the force needed to pull the handl e out manually was greater than the design speci fication. [App. at 1883-84.] He based this testimony on testing, described in more deta il below, that he and Mr. Sommer conducted on the pull-force required to deploy th e alternate landing gear in thr ee other Beech “Model 390” planes. App. at 1883. Mr. Bloomfi eld hypothesized that accumu lation of debris in the wheel well caused the pull-force to become excessive in the alt ernate landing gear of the crashed plane. [App. at 1888.] H e did not provi de evidence th at debris had in fact accumulated in the RB-226’s wheel well. Mr. Bloomfield opined that indic ators showing when the alterna te landing gear is locked did not work during electrical failure, so a pilot could not know whether the gear was properly down. [App. at 1884 .] He also pointed to problem s with the pull-handle for the alternate landing gear bec ause the handle had no indica tion on it how far it should be pulled out. [App. at 1886.] H e proposed an alternate desig n method for the landing gear system to alert the pilot whether the landing gear was dow n and locked even in the case of an electrical failure . [App. at 1887.] Mr. Bloomfielddid not state whether his25 alternate design is found elsewhe re in the industry and did not opine as to the feasibility of such a design on the plane in question. c) AFM Mr. Bloomfield additionally conte nded that the AFM was defecti ve for not adequately explaining how to use the pull-handle and deploy the alternate landing gear. [App. at 1893.]
2 ) Supplemental affidavit In response to the Defendants’ Daubert motions to exclude his testimony, Mr. Bloomfield prepared a suppleme ntal affidavit reiterating some o f his previous opinions, altering others, and adding new ones. [App. at 2842-2955.] He clarified that he would no longer testify that the loose screw he found had been loose at the time of the plane’s manufacture. [App. at 2855-2857.] He also opined that the pla ne’s voltage suppressors were not equipped to handle the voltage spikes caused by the in termittent electrical distribution problems caused by loose screws. [App. at. 2849.] The supplemental affidavit also attempted to rebu t various arguments made in Def endants’ Daubert motion. Mr. Bloomfield’s affidavit incl uded a 96-page attachment of evi dentiary materials. [App. at 2860-2955.] ii

. District court rulings 1) Supplemental affidavit The district court followed th e magistrate judge’s recommendat ion and excluded Mr. Bloomfield’s supplemental a ffidavit, determining the affida vit was (a) improper supplementation and (b ) untimely rebuttal.26 a) Improper supplementation The court determined that (1) “[t ]o the extent that the affidav it simply restates Bloomfield’s opinions, the affi davit is essentially irrelevant and the Court will review Bloomfield’s expert report and deposition testimony in ruling o n defendants’ Daubert motion”; and (2) “Bloomfield’s a ffidavit goes beyond simply re- packaging his original report[,] and he clearly states a new opinion as to the suffici ency of the aircraft’s voltage suppression system. In addition , he expands on his opinion as to the adequacy of the instructions for installation of a repair kit.” Rodgers MIL , 2017 WL 465474 at *5. The district court found the su pplemental affidavit unacceptab le because Mr. Bloomfield “makes no attemp t in his affidavit to show that he has learned of new evidence since the drafting of his original report that would r ender his original report incomplete or inaccurate.” Id. b) Untimely rebuttal The court additionally said that Mr. Bloomfield “is seeking to rebut arguments made in defendants’ Daubert motion, and he does not claim to be correcting any inaccuracy or omission in his original report.” Id. This rebuttal effort was out of time because, “[u]nder Fed . R. Civ. P. 26(2)(D )(ii), a rebuttal opin ion must be provided within 30 days of the other party’s disclosure.” Id. Mr. Bloomfield’s supplemental affidavit attached and responded to a repo rt from Robert Winn, one of the Defendants’ experts. [ Id. ] Because Mr. Winn’s report had been provided to plaintiffs on May 6, 2016, the latest a rebuttal to this disclo sure could have been filed was June 5, 2016. Mr. Bloomfield’s affidavit was not filed until July of 2016. [ Id. ]27 2) Limiting testimony – electrical system The magistrate judge recommended that Defendants’ motion to ex clude Mr. Bloomfield’s testimony shouldbe granted in part and denied in part. The R & R recommended that, because he did no testing or calculations, Mr . Bloomfield should be prohibited from opining that a loose electrical connection caus ed voltage spikes and an intermittent electrical supply . The district court agreed. Rodgers MIL , 2017 WL 465474 at *4. It reasoned that Mr. Bloomfield did not follow a reliab le methodology as required under Rule 702 and Daubert . He did not do his own testing, nor did he describe established scientific princip les in his original report. Plaintiffs argued that there was circumstantial evidence to sup port Mr. Bloomberg’s opinions in that two passengers from different time s, Mr. Evans on the accident flight and Mr. Frie on an earlier flight, had observed electrical malfunctions in the plane’s systems. But the co urt rejected this argument beca use Mr. Bloomfield did not mention these observations in hi s report or deposition testimon y. The district court refused to exc lude that Mr. Bloomfield found a loose screw in the wreckage, finding an adequate factual basis for this testim ony. The court noted, however, that the loose screw evid ence might have a relevance p roblem because Mr. Bloomfield could not opine that it caused voltage changes or el ectrical failures on the plane. [ Id. at *7.] 3) Limiting testimony – alternate landing gear The magistrate judge recommende d excluding Mr. Bloomfield’s te stimony that defects in the plane’s alternat e landing gear caused the accide nt because Mr. Bloomfield28 lacked relevant experience in air craft design and because he of fered no evidence there was debris in the wheel well. The district court agreed. It e xplained that Mr. Bloomfield h ad no relevant experience and that he had not t ested the alleged improvement h e had proposed. As to debris in the wheel well increasing the pull-force, the court s aid Mr. Bloomfield could not testify to a hypothetical cause unsupported by evidence. [ Id. at *7.] 4) Limiting testimony – AFM The magistrate judge recommende d excluding Mr. Bloomfield’s te stimony concerning deficiencies with the AFM’s instructions on how to u se the alternate landing gear. The R & R cited Mr. Bloomfi eld’s lack of experience flyi ng jets like the RB-226, his admission at his deposition th at he was not a “piloting exp ert”, and his lack of experience in drafting instruction manuals. Id. at *7. The district court agreed and excluded Mr. Bloomfield’s testim ony on the manual’s alleged def ects. [App. at 4514.] iii. Analysis 1) Supplemental affidavit The district court did not abus e its discretion when it refuse d to consider Mr. Bloomfield’s supplemental affidavit. Appellants argue that the distri ct court abused its discretion when it struck Mr. Bloomfield’s supplemental affida vit. They maintain that (1) th e affidavit emphasized what had already been presented i n the previous report; and (2) any further elaboration was in rebuttal to the Appellees ’ motion to exclude expert evid ence. Aplt. Br. at 5 (“The affidavits highlighted the releva nt opinions that were previous ly disclosed, and further29 explained the basis for these opinions in response to challenge s by Defendants that there were gaps in the expert’s chai n of reasoning.”). On the rebutt al point, Appellants further argue that the district court did not properly interpret Federa l Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(D)(ii). They contend th at the pretrial disclosure dea dline of September 12, 2016, should be seen as a “court order” that overrode Rule 26’s 30-day rebuttal deadline (“Absent a stipulation or court o rder, the disclosures must be made . . . within 30 days after the other party’s disclos ures”), and the supplemental aff idavits were submitted before that date. Id. at 6. We reject both arguments. a) Improper supplementation Highlighting previous testimony is not proper supplementation under Rule 26(e). Appellants do not cite legal sup port to permit this type of sup plementation. Rule 26(e) states that a party “must supplem ent or correct its disclosure . . . in a timely manner if the party learns that in some materi al respect the disclosure or re sponse is incomplete or incorrect, and if the additional o r corrective information has not otherwise been made known to the other parties during the discovery process or in w riting.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(1)(A). Highlight ing parts of previously disclosed opinio ns does not serve any of these purposes. See Minebea Co. v. Pabst , 231 F.R.D. 3, 6 (D.D.C. 2005) (“[Rule 26(e)] permits supplemental reports onl y for the narrow purpose of cor recting inaccuracies or adding information that was not a vailable at the time of the in itial report.”) (quotations omitted); Richardson v. Korson , 905 F. Supp. 2d 193, 199 (D .D.C. 2012) (“[Rule 26(e)] does not grant a license to supp lement a previously filed exper t report because a party wants to.” (quotations omitted)); see also S.E.C. v. Nacchio , No. 05-cv-00480-MSK-30 CBS, 2008 WL 4587240 , at *3 n.3 (D. Colo. O ct. 15, 2008) (“To c onstrue supplementation to apply whenev er a party wants to bolster or s ubmit additional expert opinions would [wreak] havoc in docket control and amount to un limited expert opinion preparation.”). Previously propos ed opinions sho uld stand on t heir own and do not need further emphasis. Furthermore, Mr. Bloomfield’s a ffidavit did not simply emphasi ze or highlight previous opinions but instead a ttempted to add new opinions. T he affidavit added a novel argument about the plane ’s voltage suppressors. It also attached 96 pages of evidentiary materials. On appe al, Appellants do not adequately explain why Mr. Bloomfield could not have made th ese arguments or included thes e materials in his original report. Their general c ontention that his theories ev olved as he gained access to more information is insufficient without pointing to specific i nformation that he did not possess when he prepared the initial report. Rather than addin g to an “incomplete” report, he added a new theory tha t could have been included ear lier. b ) Untimely rebuttal Appellants’ argument concerning rebuttal lacks merit. They con cede that at least part of Mr. Bloomfield’s supplemen tal affidavit was “in respons e to challenges by Defendants.” Aplt. Br. at 5. The affidavit attaches a report from defense expert Mr. Winn that was provided to Plai ntiffs on May 6, 2016. Appellant s do not contest the district court’s ruling that the response to Mr. Winn constitut es rebuttal. They filed Mr. Bloomfield’s supplemental affidavit in July 2016.31 Under Federal Rule of Civil Pr ocedure 26(a)(2)(D), Plaintiffs h ad 30 days to respond to Mr. Winn’s supplement al report “[a]bsent a stipulati on or a court order.” The district court’s general pretrial disclosure deadline of Septem ber 12, 2016, in its Amended Scheduling Order, App. at 1361, did not qualify as a “c ourt order” overriding the 30-day window to rebut Defe ndant’s disclosure. Instead, co urts analyze what a scheduling (or “case ma nagement”) order on disclosures says (or does not say) about rebuttal testimony to find a rele vant “court order” for Rule 26 (a)(2)(D) purposes. If nothing in the scheduling or cas e management order speaks to re buttal, then 26(a)(2)(D)’s 30-day rule applies. 14 Accordingly, the 30-day rule applied to Mr. Bloomfield’s rebuttal in his su pplemental affidavit, and it was untimely, coming over 30 days after May 6, 2016. The district court had the disc retion to allow an untimely aff idavit if doing so would not prejudice or harm the Defendants and if the Plaintiff s were acting in good faith. Jacobsen , 287 F.3d at 953. Appellants do not explain why the acceptanc e of Mr. Bloomfield’s supplement would not prejudice or harm the Defenda nts. The district court

14 See, e.g. , Teledyne Instruments, Inc. v. Cairns , No. 6:12-CV-854 -ORL-28, 2013 WL 5781274, at *17 (M.D . Fla. Oct. 25, 2013) (“The [Case Manage ment Order’s] failure to set a deadline fo r the disclosure of rebuttal expert witness reports does not mean that rebuttal expert witness reports a re not permitted. It simply m eans that rebuttal expert witness reports must be submitted within the period set forth i n Rule 26(a)(2)(D)(ii). This is the prevailing rule in [t he Eleventh] [C] ircuit and thr oughout the country.” (citation omitted)) (collecting cases); Lincoln Elec. Co. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. , No. 1:11CV2253, 2013 WL 12131876, at *1 (N.D. Ohi o June 26, 2013) ( “It appears that courts in [the Sixth] Circuit ha ve uniformly concluded that whe n, as here, a scheduling order does not address rebuttal reports, Rule 26(a)(2)(D)’s 30- day rule applies.”).32 did not abuse its discretion by c oncluding that the affidavits would be prejudicial to the Defendants. 2) Limitation of Mr. Bl oomfield’s testimony The district court did not a buse its discretion when it limite d Mr. Bloomfield’s testimony.

a ) Electrical system First, Appellants argue that Mr. B loomfield should be allowed to testify about a link between the loose screw and the intermittent electricity o utages because he addressed the underlying scientific princ iples in his report and depositi on. Aplt. Br. 12-13 (citing App. 247-50, 281-327). They conc ede Mr. Bloomfield did not tes t electrical system failures or voltage fluctuations b ut argue that experts do not need to test to re-prove established principles. Id. Second, Appellants argue the district court erred when it igno red Mr. Frie’s and Mr. Evans’s observations of flicke ring panels on the plane. Th ey contend that, contrary to the district court’s understa nding, Mr. Bloomfield discussed Mr. Evans’s eyewitness testimony of lights flickering i n his report, and he “reviewed” all NTSB materials, including Mr. Evans’s witness st atement. And although Mr. Frie was deposed after Mr. Bloomfield’s report and depositio n, Mr. Bloomfield was “aware o f [Mr. Frie’s] experience in the aircraft.” Id. at 13. Appellants allege that the district court did not read Mr. Bloomfield’s “entire deposition.” Id. Neither of these arguments shows that the district court abused its discretion.33 b ) Sufficient facts and reliable methods Appellants are correct that tes ting is not always required to establish a factual basis for an expert opinion. 15 But an expert must still sh ow under Rule 702 that his opinion is based on sufficient fa cts or data and on reliable pr inciples and methods. The district court has wide discreti on to determine whether these s tandards have been satisfied. Goebel v. Denver & Ri o Grande W.R.R. Co. , 346 F.3d 987, 990 (10th Cir. 2003) (“The trial court’s broad discretion applies both in deci ding how to assess an expert’s reliability, including wh at procedures to utilize in m aking that assessment, as well as in making the ultimate de termination of reliability.”). The court’s analysis here was not arbitrary or capricious or manifestly unreasonable. See Nacchio , 555 F.3d at 1241. It correctly pointed out t hat Mr. Bloomfield did not use established scientific principles to link the electric intermittency and voltage spike s to the facts of this case.

15 See, for instance, our discussi on of the relative necessity of testing in expert testimony in Bitler , 400 F.3d at 1235-36: When an expert proposes a theo ry that modifies otherwise well-established knowledge about regularly occurring phenomenon, such as the norma l ignition temperature of wood, we would expect the impor tance of testing as a factor in determining reliability to be at its highest. Here, by contrast, plaintiffs’ experts prop ose a theory about how the accident occurred given the kno wn science of copper sulfide particulate contamination as a cause of propane gas leaks. What distinguishes the present case is that the need for testin g is not at its highest because th e reliability of the science of copper sulfide contamination is not in dispute, and thus the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the presence of a screen did not alter the reliability of the fundamental science.34 Having examined Mr. Bloomfield’ s report and his deposition, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discre tion by excluding Mr. Bloomfield’ s testimony under Rule
702. Despite Mr. Bloomfield’s observa tions of the wire connected to the loose screw 16 and other nearby components of the loose connection, 17 his thermal study of the type of putty found on the head of the screw, 18 and his random testing of the torque of other screws from the wreckage, 19 the district court determined in its gatekeeper role that he nonetheless failed to develop su fficient facts or data, or esta blish that he applied a reliable methodology, to support his theor y of electric intermittency an d voltage surges, and that

16 In Mr. Bloomfield’s report, he sa id that the color of the “fee d wire”—which the loose screw connected to the essential bus—was “blue/purple,” “ the classic sign of continuous overheating.” App. at 1851.

17 Mr. Bloomfield pointed to darken ing in a nearby circuit breake r shell enclosure as evidence that the loose scre w connection was generating heat . [App. at 1856.] He additionally reported that his ex amination of marks on a lock w asher from the aircraft versus those on an exemplar washe r was further evidence of a lo ose connection. App. at 1859. Mr. Bloomfield also noted t hat breakers and buses throug hout the aircraft were inconsistent in their use of was hers or of specific screw and w asher types. [App. at 820.]

18 Mr. Bloomfield observe d “charcoalized torque putty” on the hea d of the connector screw, and said it show ed heat exposure caused by the loose electrical connection. App. at 1855 (quota tions omitted). He opined furt her that the loose screw connection generated heat that tr aveled across a copper bus bar , heating other screw heads and changing their putty ’s color. [App. at 1856.] In su pport of his torque putty claims, he presented a “thermal s tudy” in which h e exposed torq ue putty to various temperatures and durations to s how how the putty changed color under such conditions. [App. at 1858.]

19 Mr. Bloomfield randomly tested the torque of 14 screws from th e wreckage connecting wires and bus bars to circuit breakers and found tha t half of them were tightened to less than “factory specification[]” of 6 to 9 inch pounds. App. at 1870.35 he failed to show how the technica l articles he cited applied t o the accident in this case. We discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s analy sis. Mr. Bloomfield’s theory of elect ric intermittency was that the loose connection of the service/feed wire for the e ssential bus on the pilot side c ircuit breaker, combined with the intense vibration of the pla ne, caused “downstream electric al problems” affecting “all the systems, devices and apparatu ses that depend on electrical power from the service/feed.” App. at 1871. The plane’s vibrations and the l oose connection caused such rapid intermittencies of pow er (“several hundred times a s econd”) that voltage spikes of 40 to 100 volts could have occurred. App. at 1873. Once the spikes occurred, “[t]he entire electrical system o f the aircraft and all the ele ctrical systems, devices and apparatuses now ‘see’ and experi ence erratic voltages surge[sic ] through the system causing functional unreliability.” Id. According to the district cour t, Mr. Bloomfield was unable to show that his visual inspection of discolorations in the feed wire, torque putty, an d circuit breaker, and his associated tests of temperature and torque putty constituted a reliable methodology under Rule 702. Given the “analytical gap” the district court found between Mr. Bloomfield’s opinions and a scientifically re liable foundation for them, it did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony. See Gen. Elec., 522 U.S. at 146 (A court does not abuse its discretion when it excludes an e xpert opinion “connected to exi sting data only by the ipse dixit of the expert. A court may concl ude that there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered.”).36 c ) Flickering panel observations Appellants complain that the district court did not consider M r. Bloomfield’s reliance on Mr. Frie’s and Mr. Ev ans’s observation of flickerin g panels on the aircraft. But the court was correct that M r. Bloomfield did not cite this information in his report as evidence of electrical intermitte ncy. The original report’s br ief mention of Mr. Evans’s observation about light-flickeri ng concerned whether the batter y switch was in the “On” as opposed to “Standby” position and was not used to address in termittency. App. at
255-56. Appellants cite a brief snipp et of Mr. Bloomfield’s deposition to argue that he was “aware” of Mr. Frie’s observation of panel light s blinking on a nd off during turbulence on an earlier flight, Aplt. Br. at 13, but this excerpt was not part of the district court record and, again, was not cited in Mr. Bloomfield’s report. E ven if the excerpt from the deposition had been before the di strict court, it would not hel p the Appellants. Mr. Bloomfield said he heard about Mr. Frie’s testimony only second -hand from Plaintiffs’ counsel, and he could not name a ny panel light that reportedly blinked on Mr. Frie’s previous flight. App. at 2434. He simply argued that “none of them are supposed to blink on and off, none of them. A nd the fact they did, fits in to the fact that this connection was loose at that time . . . .” Id. Finally, Appellants fail to show how this information could se rve as a reliable basis for Mr. Bloomfield’s opinion s, an essential prerequisite under Rule 702.37 iv. Alternate landing gear Appellants argue that Mr. Bloomfi eld should be allowed to test ify about a design defect in the alternate landing g ear because he “is trained andexperienced in electromechanical systems engine ering” and, given the straightf orward nature of the gear’s manual handle, “there wa s nothing unique about the Premi er [alternate landing gear] system to take it outside t he realm of Bloomfield’s exper ience in electromechanical systems engineering.” Aplt . Br. at 14-15. Appellants also cla im the district court abused its discretion when it cited M r. Bloomfield’s lack of experienc e in alternate design. His “personal knowledge and experi ence qualify him to render opinio ns on the [alternate landing gear] system” and “[p]la intiffs are not required to pro ve alternate designs.” Id. at 15. The district court did not abus e its discretion in excluding M r. Bloomfield’s testimony on a design defect in the alternate landing gear. Ev en if Mr. Bloomfield “is trained and experienced in electromechanical systems engineerin g,” Aplt. Br. at 14, and even if the alternate landing g ear is not particularly advanced from an engineering standpoint, id., Mr. Bloomfield has never designe d landing gear. The district court acted within its discretion to find th at lack of experience disqualif ied Mr. Bloomfield as an expert on the issue. See, e.g. , Alfred v. Caterpillar, Inc., 262 F.3d 1083, 1088 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding it was not an abuse of d iscretion for a district court to exclude an expert’s testimony evaluating a paver if he had never evaluated a paver prior to the litigation).38 v. AFM As to the district court’s excl usion of Mr. Bloomfield’s testi mony on the AFM, the Appellants merely note disagreem ent: “This was error, but the court agreed that Sommer can testify to this defect.” A plt. Br. at 15. Even if Appella nts had fully argued the point in their briefing, they would fail. For the same reasons descr ibed above regarding the alternate landing gear, the distr ict court did not abuse its di scretion in excluding Mr. Bloomfield’s testimony on the alle ged defect in the AFM given t hat he had never drafted an aircraft instruction manual. See Alfred , 262 F.3d at 1088. b. Limitation of Mr. Sommer’s testimony 20 i. Additional background Donald Sommer graduated from th e University of Michigan with a B.S. in Engineering. [App. at 826.] He completed graduate work in ins trumentation and testing systems. [ Id. ] The FAA has certified him as a n airline transport pilot, com mercial pilot, flight instructor, ground instructor, and mechanic. [Id. ] He has logged more than 16,000 hours of flight time. [App. at 8 27.] He is currently the pres ident and owner of Aeroscope, Inc., which performs accident reconstruction and ana lysis following plane crashes. [App. at 826.] Mr. So mmer is a membe r of the Aircraf t Owners and Pilots Association; the International So ciety of Air Safety Investigat ors; the Missouri Board for Architects, Professional Engineer s, Professional Land Surveyors and Landscape

20 Plaintiffs used two Mr. Sommers as experts, [App. at 791, 831] but only Donald Sommer’s proposed testimony is at issue here.39 Architects; and the National Asso ciation of Flight Instructors. [App. at 827.] His resume states that he specializes in “ai rcraft accident reconstruction [,] in-flight and stationary instrumentation systems and tes ting[,] mechanical and hydraulic systems[,] aircraft performance[,] aircraft and engi ne design and operation [,] fai lure analysis[,] interpretation of FAA regulatio ns[,] pilot reactions[,] and pil ot training.” App. at 828 (capitalization altered).
1 ) Original report and deposition Mr. Sommer’s expert report and de position testimony overlapped with Mr. Bloomfield’s. [ See, e.g., App. at 819-21 (summarizing M r. Bloomfield’s findings with regard to the electrical syste m).] Mr. Sommer stated in his re port, citing to Mr. Bloomfield, that defects in the p lane’s electrical distribution system led to overheating and interruption of critical air craft systems. [App. at 823-24 , 819-21; see also App. at 854 (deposition stating he does not disagree with Mr. Bloomfiel d on anything).] He further opined that a design de fect in the alternate landing ge ar prevented it from properly deploying during Mr. Caves’s att empted landing. [App. at 823-2 4.] He contended that Beechcraft failed to warn pilots of the significant pull-force required to operate the alternate landing gear and that Hawker failed to fix the proble m. [App. at 824.] Mr. Sommer also claimed Beechcra ft and Hawker were negligent i n failing to diagnose and repair alleged defe cts in the plane’s electrical s ystem and alternate landing gear, arguing that the defects ex isted since the time of manufa cture and “each time it left Beechcraft’s control during warra nty work.” App. at 824. He c riticized the flight manual in his deposition, opining that t he AFM should indicate how far to pull the lever to40 deploy the landing gea r, or “there should be a marker on the ha ndle that tells you how far you have to pull it.” App. at 875. Finally, Mr . Sommer commen ted on Mr. Caves’s licensing and training and opined that he acted as a “prudent a nd reasonable pilot” under the circumstances. App. at 823. Mr. Sommer based his opinions on his examination of the aircra ft wreckage [App. at 802, 855], previous maintenan ce history [App. at 816], liste ning to the CVR [App. at 861], reviewing witness statemen ts, and testing the alternate l anding gear with Mr. Bloomfield on other Model 390 planes. [App. at 825.] Mr. Sommer’s pull-testing, condu cted with Mr. Bloomfield and ot hers, measured the force necessary to deploy t he alternate landing gear on thr ee exemplar Model 390 aircraft. [App. at 821.] He repor ted that substantially more force was required to lock each alternate landing gear than th e Maintenance Manual describ ed, which is 64 lbs. [ Id. ] In exemplar aircraft one, the m easured pull-force to deploy the landing gear was 120 lbs.; for exemplar two, 100 lbs.; and for exemplar three, 1 18 lbs. [App. at 821.] He said that their testing followed International Civil Aviation O rganization guidelines and was consistent with the United States Air Force Guide to Mishap Investigation, the United States Navy Handbook for Aircraft Accident Investigation , the NTSB Major Investigation Manual, the Transpo rt Safety Board of Canada Inve stigations Manual, and the University of Southern Calif ornia Manual of Aircraft Accide nt Investigation. App. at
822-23.41 2 ) Supplemental affidavit Following the Defendants’ Daubert motion to exclude Mr. Sommer’s report, he prepared a supplemental affida vit. It discussed the landing ge ar issues in considerably greater depth than his original report, including the testing d escribed above and further testing on an exemplar “T” handle to argue for the accuracy and repeatability of his previous pull mechanism findi ngs. App. at 3046. In the new re port, Mr. Sommer claimed that he is qualified to offer an opinion on alternate p roduct design based on his background. He also said he was qualified to opine on the adeq uacy of the AFM (which he had referenced in the origin al report but had not critiqued) . [App. at 3000-3023.] ii. District court rulings 1) Supplemental affidavit The magistrate judge recommended to the district court that Mr . Sommer’s supplemental affidavit be exclu ded under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26. The district court agreed, stating th ere was no viable basis for ac cepting the report. Rodgers
MIL , 2017 WL 465474 at *8-*11. If the supplemental affidavit simp ly restated previous information from the original report, it was not needed. If it went into further depth than the original report or discussed new testing, the Plaintiffs sh owed no reason why that information could not have been included in the original report . And if it attempted to refute Defendants’ Daubert motion, that was not an appr opriate reason to supplement expert disclosures. Id. at *9.42 2) Limiting testimony – alternate landing gear 21 The magistrate judge recomme nded that Mr. Sommer’s testimony o n alternate landing gear design defects shoul d be excluded, and the distric t court agreed based on lack of qualifications. Rodgers MIL , 2017 WL 465474 at *9. It explained that Mr. Sommer has no aircraft design ex perience and that he works prim arily as a consultant offering litigation opin ions to plaintiffs in plane crash cases . His expert report did not explain how he applied his knowl edge of engineering principles to the case at hand. The district court said, “Sommer simp ly conducted testing to establ ish the pull force necessary to lock the alternate landing gear in exemplar aircra ft, but he did not conduct any analysis to identi[f]y a spec ific design defect in the alte rnate landing gear . . . .” Id. 3) Allowing testimony – flight manual The magistrate judge recommende d that Mr. Sommer’s proposed te stimony on the AFM’s inadequacy regarding the alternate landing gear should be allowed, and the district court agreed. It state d that Mr. Sommer disclosed his opinions on the AFM during his deposition, and Defend ants thus had an opportunity t o cross-examine Mr.

21 Although Mr. Sommer offered an opi nion on the aircraft’s elect rical system malfunctions in his expert report , he stated in his deposition that any opinion he had on the electrical system was based o n Mr. Bloomfield’s analysis an d conclusions. He therefore consistently deferred to Mr. Bloomfield on the topic. See, e.g. , App. at 855 (questions about Hawker servicing and removing the supply wire “not my charge”); App. at 862 (“I didn’t do an electrica l load analysis. That was [Mr .] Bloomfield’s job.”); App. at 864 (relationship be tween previous servici ng on the aircraft and electrical systems problems was “a Bloomfield issue ”); App. at 868 (questions abou t arcing and torque putty melting are questions for M r. Bloomfield). The district court did not comment upon Mr. Sommer’s elect rical opinion in its o rder, and Appellan ts do not appeal its omission. We therefore need not address it here.43 Sommer on the issue. It limited the scope of Mr. Sommer’s test imony on the AFM to what he said in his deposition. [ Id. at *10.] 4) Allowing testimony – pull-force testing The magistrate judge recommende d that Mr. Sommer be allowed to testify about his and Mr. Bloomfield’s pull-fo rce testing, and the district c ourt agreed. Even though Defendants contended that Mr. So mmer and Mr. Bloomfield did not conduct a proper test in accordance with the M aintenance Manual, the court said that point goes to the weight rather than the admi ssibility of the pull-fo rce testing evidenc e. The court said Mr. Sommer established an acceptable factual foundation for the rel iability of his methodology. [ Rodgers MIL , 2017 WL 465474 at *10.] 5) Limiting testimony - Mr. Caves’s piloting The magistrate judge recommended excluding Mr. Sommer’s opinio n on Mr. Caves’s piloting. The district court held that Mr. Sommer coul d testify about Mr. Caves’s licensing and certificati on qualifications but could no t offer any assessment of Mr. Caves’s piloting in general o r during the flight leading to the accident. According to the court, Mr. Sommer ignored si gnificant evidence that conflic ted with his opinion— namely, that “[Mr.] Caves allowed a non-pilot to operate the ai rcraft and that [Mr.] Caves had problems in his training w ith ‘switchology’ and following c hecklists”—and did minimal investigation into Mr. C aves’s actual training, history , and possible errors. Id. at *10.44 iii. Analysis 1) Supplemental affidavit The district court did not abus e its discretion in refusing to accept Mr. Sommer’s supplemental affidavit. Mr. Somme r’s affidavit elaborated on l anding gear issues from his previous report; claimed that he was qualified to offer opi nions on the product design alternatives and the flight manua l based on his training; and d escribed further testing done on the T-handle of an exempl ar to confirm his previous alt ernate landing gear pull-testing results. The district court did not abus e its discretion when it reject ed the supplemental affidavit on the bases that Ap pellants did not explain why any of the information could not have been included in Mr. So mmer’s original report; the sup plement introduced new arguments and material; and the supplemental report’s new argum ents did not fill a gap or a previously incomplete cla im or discussion in the original report. The district court still had discretion to allow the supplement, but it did not ab use its discretion by excluding it. Appellants do not explain how allowing the suppl emental affidavit would not have harmed or prej udiced the Defendants. 2) Limiting Mr. Sommer’s testimony The district court did not a buse its discretion in limiting th e testimony of Mr.
Sommer. a) Alternate landing gear Appellants argue the district c ourt should have allowed Mr. So mmer to testify about a design defect in the pl ane’s alternate landing gear. A plt. Br. at 16-17. They45 contend the court “misappli[ed ] Oklahoma law, which follows the consumer expectation test to determine if products are defective.” Id. at 16. And Mr. Somme r, having flown 16,000 hours, is the consummate “ consumer” of Beechcraft’s plan e, and “certainly has the experience to offer opinions on this topic.” Id. Appellants also argue that Mr. Sommer’s pull-force testing sho wed that the alternate landing gear was unrea sonably dangerous because it sh owed the Model 390 alternate landing gea r required unexpectedly large pull-force. Because this testing pointed to a design flaw, Appellants contend, Mr. Sommer should be allowed to testify as to a design defect and need not , contrary to the district court ’s ruling, identify a precise flaw in the alternate landing gear. Id. at 16-17. Appellants’ argument that Mr. S ommer qualifies as an expert on a design defect in the alternate landing gear becau se he is an experienced “consum er” of the “product” misses the mark. The “consumer e xpectation test” is used to de termine dangerousness in the products liability context, not to establish an expert’s cr edentials on a design defect in a consumer product. See, e.g. , Gaines-Tabb v. ICI Explosives, USA, Inc. , 160 F.3d 613, 624 (10th Cir. 1998) (“[o]nly when a defect in the product rend ers it less safe than expected by the ordinary consum er will the manufacturer be held responsible.” (quoting Lamke v. Futorian Corp. , 709 P.2d 684, 686 (Okla. 198 5)) (applying Okla homa law)). The district court did not abus e its discretion in excluding M r. Sommer from testifying that the pull-force te sting supported a design flaw opinion because there was no evidence that abnormal pull-force was present in the plane that crashed. Mr. Sommer’s pull-force testing itself, which has not been excluded, permits the inference that the46 alternate landing gears on Beechcr aft’s Model 390 planes need apull-force in excess of the 64 lbs. specified by the Ma intenance Manual. But that evid ence does not show a specific design flaw. See, e.g ., Burton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. , 181 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1261 (D. Kan. 200 2) (“[T]here must be a specific claim co ncerning what aspect of the design was defective for a p laintiff to prevail on a strict liability design defect claim.” (quotations omitted)) (analyzing Kansas law). As the district court noted, t he Plaintiffs relied on the test ing of other models to infer there was a “flaw” in the a ircraft that crashed: “Sommer simply conducted testing to establish the pull-force nece ssary to lock the alternate lan ding gear in exemplar aircraft, but he did not conduct a ny analysis to identi[f]y a s pecific design defect in the alternate landing gear in the subj ect aircraft, and there is no analysis in his report that would support the existence of a design defect.” Rodgers MIL , 2017 WL 465474, at *9. Moreover, in each of Mr. Sommer’s t ests, the alternate landing gear deployed [App. at 821-22.]. The district court acte d within its discretion to li mit the testimony. b) Mr. Caves’s piloting Appellants argue that Mr. Somme r should be allowed to testify a s to Mr. Caves’s piloting performance. They cont end, “[U]nder Oklahoma law, the re is a presumption that the product user would heed a proper and ade quate warning. Thi s principle, in conjunction with the known defec ts in the aircraft (the ALG, AF M, and electrical system), lead to the reasonable in ference that Caves took the n ecessary steps as trained, but was unable to safely land due to defects in the aircraft.” Aplt. Br. at 17-18 (citation47 omitted). Mr. Sommer should have b een able to “reason[] to the best inference” in this

manner. Id. at 18. The district court did not abus e its discretion in excluding Mr . Sommer’s testimony on Mr. Caves’s piloti ng ability. It found that Mr. S ommer ignored significant contrary evidence on Mr. Caves ’s conduct and abilities, such as his decision to allow Mr. Davis to take over the controls and evidence from Mr. Caves’s t raining that he had problems with “switchology” and following checklists. Rodgers MIL , 2017 WL 465474, at *10. See, e.g. , Norris , 397 F.3d at 884 (district court did not abuse gatekeeping rol e when it found expert “completely ignored or disco unted without explanation . . . many epidemiological studies” reachi ng an opposite conclusion from e xpert’s proffered opinion). The court also said Mr. Sommer’s evaluation of Mr. Caves was ba sed on superficial research. Indeed, in reaching his opi nion that Mr. Caves was “trained, qualified, experienced and capable of performing the subject mi ssion,” Mr. Sommer did not conduct independent research i nto Mr. Caves’s training or s peak with anyone who trained him. App. at 858-59. The court did not abuse its disc retion by excluding testimony on this subject. See, e.g. , Alfred , 262 F.3d at 1086 (no abuse of discretion for district court to exclude testi mony because it was, among other things, “backed by very little work.” (quotation omitted)). Appellants’ argument that Mr. So mmer should be allowed to “rea son[] to the best inference” on Mr. Caves’s piloti ng performance is not persuasiv e. The argument is that Mr. Sommer could draw a “reasonabl e inference” that the pilot “ took the necessary steps48 as trained, but was unable to s afely land due to defects in the aircraft.” Aplt. Br. at 17-18. But this approach is not based on “scientific, technical, or ot herwise specialized knowledge”; would not “help the t rier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;” is not “based on “sufficient facts or data”; and is not “the product of reliable principle and methods.” Fed. R. Evid. 702.

c. Limitation of Mr. Graham’s testimony Appellants do not make a specifi c argument against the exclusi on of Mr. Graham’s supplemental affidavit or against the limitation of Mr . Graham’s testimony. They instead refer this court to their “previously submitted br iefs,” i.e., those submitted to the district court. Aplt. B r. at 18. Their arguments about Mr. Graham are inadequately briefed and thus waived. See Tenth Circuit Rule 28.3 (“Incorporating by reference portions of [district] court or a gency briefs or pleadings is d isapproved and does not satisfy the requirements of Fed . R. App. P. 28(a) and (b).”); United States v. Patterson , 713 F.3d 1237, 12 50 (10th Cir. 2013). d. Limitation of Mr. Ha ider’s testimony i. Additional background Mr. Haider earned his B.S. in ae rospace engineering from the U nited States Military Academy at West Point a nd a master’s degree from Webst er University. [App. at 1085, 4314.] He is a gradua te of the U.S. Naval Test Pilot School and has logged nearly 7,000 hours of f light time, including experience with th e 390 model. Rodgers
Haider , 2017 WL 979100, at *3.49 1) Original report Mr. Haider proposed in his repor t and at his deposition to tes tify generally about Mr. Caves’s training and Beechcr aft’s failure to warn about def ects in the plane. He opined that Mr. Caves used an acc eptable method of pilot traini ng to get certified on the Model 390 and that Mr. Caves wou ld have been tra ined on how to use the alternate landing gear. Mr. Caves would not , however, be expected to kno w how to restart both engines in the air. Mr. Haider s tated that Mr. Caves was a “re asonably prudent pilot” and that pilot error was not a contri buting cause of the crash. He also said that a pilot should be able to rely on the functiona lity of an aircraft as designed ; that the engines should have restarted unless there was a defect in the electrical system; a nd that the aircraft experienced intermittent electrical failures. Mr. Haider furth er opined that Beechcraft failed to warn pilots of the signi ficant pull-force needed to d eploy the alternate landing gear; that the landing gear was defectively designed; and that Hawker had occasion to correct the defects in the elect rical system and landing gear b ut failed to do so. [ Id. ] Regarding intermittenc y problems in the pla ne’s electrical sys tems, Mr. Haider said “any pilot at any level in t his situation would do anythin g they could to get that generator back online because tha t would have sol ved a whole ba sketful of problems that he had at that point in time. A nd obviously, the generator, fo r some unknown reason to me, did not come online.” App . at 1099. Mr. Haider agreed wit h Plaintiffs’ attorney that “[w]hen it comes to specifically describing any electrical prob lems on the plane,” he was “going to defer to Mr. Bl oomfield.” App. at 1112; see also id. at 1109 (referring50 questions about which previous p art failures in the plane can b e explained by intermittency problems to Mr. Bloomfield). At his deposition, Mr. Haider ack nowledged that he was not the author of his report and that Plaintiffs’ atto rney, Mr. Stoops, wrote it. Ap p. at 1084. When asked about Mr. Caves’s tra ining, Mr. Haider said he did not do any i ndependent research on the precise circumstances of Mr. Caves’s flight education and s aid that he was unaware of evidence suggesting Mr. Caves had trouble following checklis ts. App. at 1090-91. As to his basis for stating in his re port that Mr. Caves had learn ed the proper procedures required for an emergency situation like the one that occurred, Mr. Haider responded that these are matters “any school would cover.” App. at 1092. When asked about alleged defects in the design and servicing o f the alternate landing gear, Mr. Haider testified that he had not read anythin g about previous testing done on the alternat e landing gear a nd did not know the positio n of the pull-handle amid the wreckage. [App. at 1101-02.] As to his basis for a design or maintenance failure in the alternate landing gear, Mr. H aider said, “My basis for that is that the handle was pulled, and – I assume the handle was pulled, and the main gear didn’t come down.” App. at 1101. He con ceded the opinion in his report that Beech craft failed to warn users of excess pull-force needed on the T-handle was based on what a n attorney told him about Mr. Bloomfield’s and Mr. S ommer’s pull-testing experiment . App. at 1103.
2 ) Supplemental affidavit Mr. Haider also filed a suppleme ntal affidavit in response to Defendants’ Daubert motion to exclude his testimony.51 ii. District court rulings Although the magistrate judge recommended limiting Mr. Haider’ s testimony only in part, the district court de cided to exclude his testimony al together, finding that he did not sufficiently “prepare” his ow n report and thus ran afoul of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26. Rodgers Haider , 2017 WL 979100, at *7. The district court, employing a “totality of the circumstances ” analysis, Rodgers
Haider at *5, noted that (1) Mr. Haider d id not compose even a first draft of the report; (2) others indisputably wrote t he report; (3) the drafting was done at the last minute, (4) the report included opinions ou tside Mr. Haider’s expertise; (5 ) Mr. Haider’s billing records showed very little time sp ent reviewing materials befor e the report was submitted; and (6) Mr. Haider admitte d he “reviewed” but did no t “read” the materials.
Id. at *7. The court said that eve n if Mr. Haider could rely heavi ly on his personal experience for his testimony, he still would have needed to ana lyze the materials to opine credibly on subjects like the i ntermittent electrical failure o r the reasonableness of Mr. Caves’s actions during the emer gency. The court noted, referen cing the Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 26, that although in some cases attorne ys may help experts draft a report, Mr. Haider was not a good candidate for such dr afting assistance considering he is well-educated and could “put together a draft report stating his substantive opinions.” Rodgers Haider at *6. The district court also rejected Mr. Haider’s supplemental aff idavit because there was no allowable testimony to supplement.52 iii. Analysis The district court did not abus e its discretion in excluding M r. Haider’s testimony. In their briefing on this issue, A ppellants rehash many of thei r previous arguments to the district court, which remain unpersuasive. Appellants argue the district court misinterpreted Rule 26(a): “The comment does

not say that counsel is only permitted to assist those expert s who are unable to prepare th e report themselves. As long as th e substance of the report refl ects the testimony to be given by the expert, it complies with Rule 26.” Aplt. Br. at 1 9. Appellants insist that the opinions in the report were Mr. Haider’s own. As to Mr. Haider’s cursory review of the case materials, Appel lants argue that “Haider’s opinions predominately required him to draw on his kn owledge and experience flying the Premier, and how it should respond under specified c onditions ( e.g. , loss of generator power, loss of nor mal landing gear system).” Id . As far as the specifics of this case were concerned, “[t]he new material Haider reviewed included the NTSB data (i.e., NTSB factual report & witness st atements, CVR and ATC transcrip ts/recordings). He reviewed the relevant data, form ed his opinions, then communica ted them to counsel for memorialization. There is no pr oof that Haider lacked sufficie nt factual information about the crash to form his opinions.” Id. at 21 (citation omitted). Appellants insist that the rushed nature of the repor t’s composition under deadline pr essure should not disfavor Mr. Haider’s testimony. Notwithstanding these arguments , the district court properly r ead and applied Rule 26(a) to require substantial participation from Mr. Haider in d rafting his report. The53 court did not rely solely on P laintiffs’ admission that Mr. Hai der did not actually write his own report. It considered the tot ality of the circumstances un derlying the preparation of the report and reasonably analy zed the facts. Mr. Haider’s pro posed testimony must be premised on the facts of this cas e, not just his general knowle dge. See Norris , 397 F.3d at 884 n.2 (“[E]vidence must ha ve a valid scientific connection to the disputed facts in the case.” (citing Daubert , 509 U.S. at 591)). We agree with the district court that Mr. Haider cannot reliably opine on el ectric intermittency in this specific plane during the emergency or about M r. Caves’s piloting ski ll without meaningfu l analysis of the materials pertinent to the case. See, e.g. , Alfred , 262 F.3d at 1086 (no abuse of discretion for district court to exclude t estimony because it was, among o ther things, “backed by very little work.” (quotation omitted)). Appellants’ contentio n that Mr. Haider “reviewed the relevant data” is unavaili ng because it is clear from Mr. H aider’s billing records and his deposition that “reviewed” does not mean “read,” much less analyzed. Nor does Mr. Haider’s deposition testimony suffice to cure the se deficiencies. As noted above, Mr. Haider deferred on all electricity-related que stions to Mr. Bloomfield. To that extent, Mr. Haider’s tes timony is unnecessary and not the proper basis for an additional expert. Nor was his reliance at his deposition on a lawyer’s summary of another expert’s pull-testing su fficient for his failure to war n opinion. And his contention that the alternate landing gear s uffered from a design defect w as based solely on his assertion that it did not deploy. 22

22 Even if certain parts of Mr. Hai der’s deposition did not have these problems, his lack of an expert report (being pr operly excluded) would be ano ther ground for excluding54 The district court did not abus e its discretion in excluding M r. Haider’s testimony. We also affirm exclusion of his s upplemental affidavit because no allowable testimony remained to supplement. 23
B. Summary Judgment We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Be echcraft and Hawker because the Plaintiffs lack ed adequate expert evidence t o support their claims.
1. Legal Background

a. Summary judgment and standard of review “We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de nov o, applying the same legal standard as the district court.” Twigg v. Hawker Beechcraft Corp ., 659 F.3d 987, 997 (10th Cir. 2011). “The c ourt shall grant summary judg ment if the movant

him as an expert. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B)(“Unle ss otherwise stipulated or ord ered by the court, this disclosure m ust be accompanied by a written report—prepared and signed by the witness—if the witn ess is one retained or special ly employed to provide expert testimony in the case o r one whose duties as the party’s employee regularly involve giving expert testimony.” ) There are limited exception s to this rule, such as for busy practicing physicians, Watson v. United States , 485 F.3d 1100, 1107 (10th Cir. 2007), but Mr. Haider would not qualify for this exception.

23 Appellants also contend that the y were not given sufficient ch ance to explain the nuances of their experts’ opinions to the district court becaus e there was no evidentiary hearing, no additional evidentia ry submissions were allowed, an d the magistrate judge did not schedule enough time for Daubert oral arguments. Also, they argue the magistrate judge required the p arties at one point to put their expert arguments in summary form. We reject these general argum ents. As is apparent from the re cord, both parties received ample time and space to p resent their arguments regard ing experts and both the magistrate and district judge con sidered the entirety of the pa rties’ submissions, not simply the summaries.55 shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “In appl ying this standard, we view the evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Twigg , 659 F.3d at 997. “A fa ct is material if, under the governing law, it could have an effect on the outcome of the lawsuit. A dispute over a material fact is genuine if a rational jury could find i n favor of the nonmoving party on the evidence presented.” Smothers v. Solvay Chems., Inc. , 740 F.3d 530, 538 (10th Cir. 2014) (quotations omitted). The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden to prod uce evidence in support of its claims. Kannady v. City of Kiowa , 590 F.3d 1161, 11 69 (10th Ci r. 2010). If the movant does so, t he burden shifts to the party opposing summary judgment to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact. Id. We view evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. McBeth v. Himes , 598 F.3d 708, 715 (10th Cir. 2010). “On an appeal from summary judgment, we exam ine the record and all reasonable inferences that might be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, without maki ng credibility determinations or weighing the evidence.” Hernandez v. Valley View Hosp. Ass’n , 684 F.3d 950, 953 n.2 (10th Cir. 2012) (quotations omitted).56 b. Products liability Under Oklahoma prod ucts liability law, 24 a plaintiff suing a retailer or supplier under a strict liability theory mu st prove (1) that the product caused plaintiff’s injury; (2) that the defect existed in th e product at the time of sale or at the time it left the retailer’s possession and control; and (3) that the defect made the product unreasonably dangerous. See Kirkland v. Gen. Motors Corp. , 521 P.2d 1353, 1363 (Okla. 1974); see also Rohrbaugh v. Celotex Corp. , 53 F.3d 1181, 1183 (10t h Cir. 1995) (applying Oklahoma law). In Kansas, the standard is very similar. See Jenkins v. Amchem Prods.,
Inc. , 886 P.2d 869, 886 (Kan. 1994) (“[T]he plaintiff, to present a prima facie strict [products] liability case, must produce proof of three elements : (1) the injury resulted from a condition of the product; (2) the condition was an unrea sonably dangerous one; and (3) the condition existed at the time it left the defendant ’s control.” (quotations omitted)). “The alleged defect may be the result of a problem in the prod uct’s design or manufacture, or it may be the resu lt of inadequate warnings reg arding use of the product.” Holt v. Deere & Co. , 24 F.3d 1289, 1292 (10th Cir. 1994) (applying Oklahoma law); see also Mayberry v. Ak ron Rubber Mach. Corp. , 483 F. Supp. 4 07, 411-12 (N.D.

24 The parties initially disputed whe ther Oklahoma or Kansas law was the relevant governing law for Plaintiffs’ c laims. [App. at 4634.] The dis trict court deferred a decision on the matter, noting th at nothing turned on a distinc tion between the two bodies of law. [ Id. at 4634-37.] In this appeal, b oth parties acknowledge that th ere is no relevant substantive difference in the states’ laws for the pur pose of their arguments.57 Okla. 1979) (applying Oklahoma law). In other words, a product s liability claim can be made for a manufacturing def ect or a design defect. A product is unreasonably danger ous when it is “dangerous to a n extent beyond that which would be contemplatedby the ordinary consumer who p urchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteri stics.” Kirkland , 521 P.2d at 1362-63 (quoting and ad opting standard of proof from Re statement (Second) of Torts § 402A cmt. g); see also Jensen , 886 P.2d at 872 (Kansa s case using consumer expectations test). i. Manufacturing defects A product is defective in manuf acture if it “deviates in some material way from its design or performance standards . The issue is whether the prod uct was rendered unsafe by an error in the manufacturing process.” Wheeler v. HO Sports Inc. , 232 F.3d 754, 757 (10th Cir. 2000) (quotations omitted). Errors in the process are often established by showing that a product, as prod uced, did not conform with the m anufacturer’s specifications. Oja v. Howmedica, Inc., 111 F.3d 782, 792 (1 0th Cir. 1997) (applying Colorado law). ii. Design defects A product is defective in desig n if something about that desig n “renders it less safe than expected by the ordinary consumer.” Lamke v. Futorian Corp. , 709 P.2d 684, 686 (Okla. 1985). “[T]he fact that it is possible to make a produc t more safe does not render its design defective.” Wheeler , 232 F.3d at 758 (quotations omitted).58 c. Negligence Claims for negligent manufacture or design are treated the sam e as other negligence claims in Oklahoma. A negligence claim requires pla intiffs to prove (1) defendants owed plaintiffs a dut y; (2) there was a breach of th at duty; and (3) that the breach caused plaintiffs’ injuries. Dirickson v. Mings , 910 P.2d 1015, 1018 (Okla. 1996). An entity charged with repairing a vehicle may be sued under a theory of n egligent repair. See, e.g. , Delbrel v. Doenges Bros. Ford , 913 P.2d 1318, 1322 (Okla. 1996) (“[O]ne who is paid to repair a c ar owes a duty of care to both the owner of the car and to the general public to assure tha t the repair is properly perfor med or the owner is warned of its dangerous condition, where the dangerous condition is di scoverable in the exercise of ordinary care.”).
2. Additional Background – Distric t Court Proceeding s on Summary J udgment The district court granted Defe ndants’ motion fo r summary judgm ent. It held that: (1) Plaintiffs could not show a g enuine issue of material fact that the plane’s electrical sy stem was defective or that a loose screw caused any electrical problems that contributed to the accident and thus could not proceed on any electrical system products liability or negligence claim; (2) Plaintiffs could not proceed with their manufacturer’s products liability claim aga inst Beechcraft based on a defect in the alternate landing gear because undisputed evidence established the defect did not exist when the plane left control of the manufacturer; nor could Plaintiffs show a genuine issu e of material fact that the plane’s alternate landing ge ar had a design defect; (3) Plaintiffs could not proceed with their alternate landing gear negligence claims again st Beechcraft and Hawker59 because they could not s how a defect with the manufacture or design of the alternate landing gear or that a defect proximately c aused the accident; and (4) Plaintiffs could not show a g enuine issue of material fact that the flight manual was de fective and thus could not proceed on any manual-bas ed products liability or negligence claim. App. at 4637-52.

a. Electrical system

– products liability, negligence The district court found that Plaintiffs’ manufacturer’s produ cts liability claim against Beechcraft failed becaus e Mr. Bloomfield acknowledged t he loose screw was not loose at the time of manufactu re but rather after servicing. [ App. at 4507.] The Plaintiffs therefore could not establish an essential element of manufactu rer’s products liability— that the defect existed when it left the manufacturer. [App. a t 4639.] As for the negligence claims again st Beechcraft and Hawker, the district court said the Plaintiffs had not shown a g enuine issue of material fact r egarding causation, an essential element o f a negligence claim. [A pp. at 4641-42.] M r. Davis’s shutting down the engines triggered the loss of power. There was, according to the district court, “no evidence of a voltage spike or i ntermittent power supply before this event.” App. at 4639. The Plaintiffs’ intermittent power and voltage spike cau sation theory relied on Mr. Bloomfield’s proposed testimony linking the loose screw to the power, but that testimony was excluded. Mr. Frie’s and Mr. E vans’s observations about a flickering power display were not enough to create a genui ne dispute as to causation wit hout any expert testimony. [ Id. at 4640-42.]60 b. Alternate landing gear

– products liability The district court held that the manufacturer products liabili ty claim failed because the undisputed evidence showed t hat Beechcraft tested the plane before it was sold and that the measured pull-force of t he handle to deploy the altern ate landing gear—53.7 pounds—was within the manufactu rer’s specifications. [App. at 4644.] The district court also rejected the design defect products li ability claim against Beechcraft because Plaintiffs pro duced no supporting evidence. Mr. Bloomfield’s theory about debris in the landing gea r causing higher pull-forces was excluded as hypothetical. [App. at 4644-45.] Mr. Bloomfiel d’s and Mr. Sommer’s design de fect opinions were similarly excluded because neith er had experience in aircraft p roduct design. [App. at 4645.] The court also noted tha t, even if Mr. Bloomfield’s and Mr. Sommer’s design arguments were admitted, Plainti ffs lacked evidence of causatio n: “Plaintiffs have the burden of proof to establish cau sation, and they must have at l east some evidence tending to show that there is a dispute as to whether Caves made anothe r attempt to pull out the alternate landing gear handle be fore his second landing attempt . It is just as likely that Caves did nothing with the alte rnate landing gear handle before his second landing attempt, and a jury would not b e permitted to speculate as to w hat actions Caves took.” App. at 4646.

c. Alternate landing gear

– negligence Plaintiffs alleged that Beechcraf t was negligent in manufactur ing an aircraft that required excessive pull-force to deploy the alternate landing g ear. This argument was based on the tests of three exemplar aircraft finding the alter nate landing gears required61 between 100 and 120 p ounds of pull-force instead of the maximum 64 pounds stated in the Maintenance Manu al. [App. at 4643-44.] The district court stated that “the mere fact that the pull-fo rce in plaintiffs’ experts’ test results exceeded 6 4 pounds does not by itself sho w that the aircraft was defective or that excessive pu ll-force caused the landing gear not to deploy.” App. at 4647. It further stated that “Plai ntiffs have offered no evide nce comparing the maximum pull-force stated in the mainte nance manual for the Premier 390 to other types of aircraft, nor have plaintiffs provided aframe of reference for how diffi cult it is use the alternate landing gear handle if the pull force exceeds 64 pounds.” Id. at 4646-47. In contrast, the court said, “It i s undisputed that plaintiffs’ experts were able to pull out the alternate landing g ear handle and lock the landing gear into place on each exemplar aircraft and that Beech craft had received no complaint s or reports of problems using the alternate landing gear.” Id. at 4647. It also noted the re was no evidence that “Caves received any training conc erning the use of the alternat e landing gear.” Id. For these reasons, the court held tha t “plaintiffs’ evidence concer ning the pull force needed to use the alternate landing gear d oes not independently give rise to genuine dispute that the allegedly excessive pull fo rce caused the accident.” Id. d. Flight manual

– products liability, negligence The district court held there was no evidence creating a genuin e issue of material fact that a defect in the AFM on how to restart the generators was the proximate cause of the accident.62 Plaintiffs argued that the AFM ’s procedure for restarting elec trical generators was incorrect and would not have wor ked had Mr. Caves followed it. But the district court pointed out this theory was bas ed entirely on the proposed test imony of Mr. Haider, which was excluded. [App. at 4648 -49.] Apart from Mr. Haider’ s testimony, the court said some evidence tended to sho w that the method recommended i n the AFM for restarting an electrical generat or—moving the generator switch from “Reset” to “On”—is not always sufficient and that s ometimes it is necessary to cyc le the switch in a slightly different way. [App. at 4649-51.] But, as th e court explained , this point, based on one instance during a test on an exe mplar aircraft by the Defendant s [App. at 1436], does not mean that all units are defectiv e or support an inference that there was a fleet-wide problem with the switch. With out Mr. Haider’s testimony, Plain tiffs did not have expert evidence that the AFM containe d incorrect instructions for rest arting a generator following an engine sh utdown mid-flight. [ Id. at 4650.] And, the district court said, even if a defect could be shown, Plaintiffs cannot establish that er roneous instructions in the manual were the proximate cause of the accident. [ Id. at 4649-51.]
3. Analysis We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Be echcraft and Hawker. Each claim fails at leas t on the element of causation. Given the expert testimony exclusions affirmed above , Appellants either have no expert to testify to causation or no evidence to prove causation.63 a. Electrical system i. Manufacturing or design defects Appellants have no admissible e xpert testimony linking the loo se screw to electric intermittency or voltage issues. They thus cannot show causati on for a products liability claim based on electrical system defects. Although the distric t court allowed Mr. Bloomfield’s testimony about find ing a loose screw, it excluded his testimony connecting the loose screw to electric bus problems. [App. at 4639-40.] Appellants contend that Mr. Frie’s and Mr. Evans’s statements about seeing flickering display panels create a material dispute as to wheth er a defective electrical system caused the accident. [Ap lt. Br. at 25.] But evidence f rom Mr. Frie and Mr. Evans does not adequately establish th at intermittency or voltage spi kes from a defective electric system caused the acci dent. In the context of a compl icated aircraft electrical system, Plaintiffs need ed expert testimony to prove causation. See James River Ins. Co. v. Rapid Funding, LLC , 658 F.3d 1207, 12 14 (10th Cir. 2011) (lay witness may not “express an opinion as to matte rs which are beyond the realm of common experience and which require the special skill and knowledge o f an expert witn ess.” (quotations omitted)). ii. Negligence Appellants’ complaint alleged th at Appellees breached their du ty to exercise reasonable care in their assembly and inspection of the aircraf t, as evidenced by the electrical failures contributing to the crash. Because Appella nts, following the exclusion of Mr. Bloomfield’s testimony, lack expert evidence to why the plane’s electrical systems64 were deficient, Appellants canno t succeed on a claim for neglig ence in assembling and inspecting that system. Without expert testimony on electrical failure, they cannot prove causation on their negligence claim. b. Alternate landing gear i. Manufacturing defect Appellants’ manufacturing defect claim regarding the alternate landing gear fails because it is undisputed that th e RB-226’s gear deployed within an allowable force range upon testing after production. The alleged alternate landing g ear handle defect thus did not exist at the time of sale or at the time it left Beechcraft ’s possession and control. Accordingly, Appellants cannot sa tisfy a required element of a manufacturing defect claim. See Kirkland , 521 P.2d at 1363. 25 ii. Design defect All of Appellants’ expert testimony on alleged design defects in the alternate landing gear was excluded, so th ere is no basis on which to est ablish design flaw. Mr. Bloomfield’s and Mr. Sommer’s tes ting on the pull-force require d for the alternate landing gear in the three other M odel 390s remains admissible e vidence. But their testing

25 Appellants present a new argumen t on appeal that a manufacturi ng defect claim regarding the alternate landing gear remains possible under a “ guaranteed to degrade” theory, wherein the product was designed in such a way to becom e more dangerous with use over time. Aplt. Br. at 40. B ecause this argument was not made before the district court, we do not consider it. See Carney v. Okla. Dep’t of Pub. Safety , 875 F.3d 1347, 1351 (10th Cir. 2017) (“We will only consider arguments not rai sed below in the most unusual circumstances.” (quota tions omitted)). Even if it were considered, Appellants present no evidence of degradatio n in the RB-226’s alternate la nding gear on the day of the crash.65 did not address the plane that w as involved in the crash, and there is no expert evidence on what precisely is the defect in the alternate landing gear. The district court properly excluded the debris-in-the-whee l-well theory because it was onl y hypothetical and without any evidentia ry basis. [App. at 4 642.] Moreover, Plai ntiffs have no expert evidence on how an alleged desi gn flaw caused the accident. iii. Negligence Appellants’ complaint contends t hat Beechcraft breached its du ty to exercise reasonable care in the design a nd assembly of the alternate lan ding gear. We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the Defendants on the negligence claim regarding the alternate landing g ear because Appellants have no evidence to satisfy causation. Mr. Bloomfield’s and Mr. Sommer’s tests on the handles of othe r aircrafts purportedly showed that the pull -force required to deploy the a lternate landing gear on the Model 390 was considerably h igher than the specified maximu m in the Maintenance Manual, at least in the three aircraft tested. This testing ma y support an inference that the force required to deploy the a lternate landing gear in the plan e that crashed also was higher than the manual’s limit at the time of the accident, but Appellants have not provided evidence of causati on. Although the alternate landing gear handle in the plane was pulled out only about an inch in the wreckage, the record l acks evidence that the alternate landing gear failed to l ock due to excessive pull-for ce. And in all three of the experts’ tests, they were able to deploy the landing gear despi te the increased pull-force.66 Appellants also argue that Mr. C aves did not hav e sufficient in formation from either the AFM, the handle itsel f, or the plane’s controls to k now how far to pull the handle. [Aplt. Br. at 31-32.] But Mr. Bloomfield’s and Mr. So mmer’s testing did not address the information that was available concerning the alter nate landing gear. They were instead measuring required pull-force. Appellants therefo re have no expert testimony linking insufficient in formation about how far to pul l the handle with causation of the crash. 26 Because Appellants failed to mar shal evidence on an essential element of a negligence claim, summary judgm ent was appropriately granted to Appellees. The negligence claims against Haw ker also do not survive summar y judgment because Appellants have not produ ced evidence to show that fail ure to inspect the landing gear caused the accident.

c. AFM and repair kit instructions i. Design 1) Checklists to restart engines Appellants’ AFM claims based on an inadequate checklist fail b ecause Appellants have offered no evidence to pro ve causation. Although Appellan ts contend there was some evidence that may have su ggested that a checklist for rest arting an engine did not always work [App. at 1436], they decided not to include it in t he record on appeal, so we

26 Even if we construe Appellants’ a rgument concerning “guarantee d to degrade” landing gear as concerning causation, this argument was not mad e before the district court and we decline to considered it here. See Tele-Communications, Inc. v. Comm’r of I.R.S. , 104 F.3d 1229, 1232 (10th Ci r. 1997) (“Generally, an appellat e court will not consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal.”).67 do not consider it here. [ See Doc. 10536488; Doc. 10537103 .] Without this evidence and without the opinion of Mr. Hai der, Appellants have no basis for their AFM checklist argument. 27 2) Alternate landing gear directions in the AFM Appellants also have not shown a genuine factual dispute to sa ve their claim that the alternate landing gear direc tions were defective. Although the manual did not state how far to pull the handle or how to know when the alternate ge ar has been dropped and locked, the Appellants have no ex pert testimony on manual desig n defects or how the manual’s alleged shortcomi ngs caused the accident. 3) Repair kit instructions Appellants presented no eviden ce for a defect claim against Be echcraft’s repair kit instructions for servicing the ai rcraft. The instructions prov ide for the required amount of torque in the relevant screws. B ecause their theory is that a defective repair kit was responsible for electrical failure in the plane, all of Appella nt’s repair kit products liability claims require expert tes timony on the electrical sys tem defects (intermittency and voltage spikes). T hey have no expert evidence to support t his theory.

27 Even if there were a basis to a rgue the checklist was defectiv e, Appellants would still need to show that M r. Caves tried to follow the che cklist and that defects in the checklist caused the accide nt. They have not done so. The y instead say that under Oklahoma law, a consumer of a pro duct would heed an adequate wa rning. [Aplt. Br. at 35.] A checklist is not a warni ng. It provides instructions t o follow in case of emergency. Appellants have prese nted no evidence that Mr. Cave s’s attempt to follow these instructions caused the accident.68 ii. Negligence Appellants’ negligence claims b ased on a defective manual or r epair instructions fail at summary judgment because t hey have not provided evidenc e on causation. We do not know which checklist, if a ny, Mr. Caves relied on. Nor is there evidence that Mr. Caves failed to pull out the alternate landing gear handle far enough because the flight manual did not provide guidance. Finally, A ppellants’ negligen ce claim based on repair kit instructions fails because, w ithout any expert testimony re maining on electrical system defects, they do not have evidence to show causation.
III. CONCLUSION We affirm the district court’s judgment, which includes the lim itations on expert testimony and the grant of summary judgment to Defendants Beech craft and Hawker. Entered for the Court

Scott M. Matheson, Jr. Circuit Judge