GEOLOGICAL SURVEY CIRCULAR 729 

Earthquake PredictionOpportunity to Avert Disaster 

A conference on earthquake warning and response held in 

San Francisco, California, on November ? , 1975 

Contributions from: 

City of San Francisco, Director of Emergency Services 

National Science Foundation, Research Applications Directorate 

State of California 

Office of Emergency Services 

Seismic Safety Commission 

U.S. Department of the Interior 

Assistant Secretary for Energy and Minerals 

Geologic;al Survey 

University of California at Los Angeles, Department of Sociology 

Earthquake PredictionOpportunity to Avert Disaster 

A conference on earthquake warning and response held in 

San Francisco, California, on November 7, 1975 

GEOLOGICAL SURVEY C I R C U L A R 729 

Contributions from: 

City of San Francisco, Director of Emergency Services 

National Science Foundation, Research Applications Directorate 

State of California 

Office of Emergency Services 

Seismic Safety Commission 

U.S. Department of the Interior 

Assistant Secretary for Energy and Minerals 

Geological Survey 

University of California at Los Angeles, Department of Sociology 

1976 
United States Department of the Interior 

CECIL D. ANDRUS, Secretary 

Geological Survey 

W. A. Radlinski, Acting Director 

Library of Congress catalog-card No. 76-600005 

First printing 1976 

Second printing 1976 

Third printing 1978 

Free on application to Branch of Distribution, U.S. Geological Survey 

1200 South Eads Street, Arlington, Va. 22202 
Foreword 

The past several years have witnessed rapid progress toward a capability to forecast the time, place, and size of impending earthquakes. 

Advances in understanding of earthquake occurrence-together with an 

ever-growing number of observations of earthquake premonitory signals 

in the United States, the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, 

Japan, and elsewhere-suggest that the scientific prediction of potentially 

destructive earthquakes is an attainable goal. 

The U.S. Geological Survey has supported a major research effort into 

earthquake prediction as part of its Earthquake Hazard Reduction Program. Theoretical and experimental studies of earthquake mechanisms and 

possible geophysical precursors are being carried out, in large measure 

with the cooperation of university scientists through a grants and contracts 

program. Seismically active zones in many parts of the United States are 

being monitored by seismograph networks. Crustal-strain accumulation in 

the Western United States is being investigated through a variety of geodetic techniques. In central California, the U.S. Geological Survey is con-

-ducting an ongoing eart}!quake-prediction experiment using dense arrays 

of various geophysical sensors astride a highly seismic part of the San 

Andreas fault. 

Although operational earthquake-prediction systems are not likely to 

be deployed for a number of years, the prediction capability is achieving 

significant progress. It must be anticipated that predictions of some potentially damaging earthquakes will be forthcoming during the present 

research and development stage. Consequently, serious consideration of 

how predictions will be used by society should accompany the research. 

Procedures for evaluating the scientific data and issuing predictions must 

be established, and the responsibilities of Federal, State, and local agencies with respect to disaster warning must be agreed upon. It is important 

to anticipate public reaction to a prediction and to evaluate the possible 

responses that can be taken to reduce loss of life, injury, and property 

damage. Earth and social scientists, engineers, and public officials all have 

vital roles to play in determining how society will use earthquake 

predictions. 

With these factors in mind, the Assistant Secretary of the Interior 

for Energy and Minerals convened a conference on earthquake warning 

and response on November 7, 1975, in San Francisco, California. Federal, 

III 
State, and local officials responsible for disaster response were invited, 

together with representatives from the business and labor communities. 

The purpose of the meeting was to review the status of and prospects for 

earthquake prediction in the United States, to present for consideration 

a proposed Federal plan for issuance of earthquake predictions, and to 

consider the public policy implications of earthquake forecasts. The ramifications of these issues were explored in a panel discussion that followed 

the briefing. It is expected that the concepts and viewpoints presented at 

the conference will help stimulate development of plans and procedures 

for effectively utilizing earthquake predictions to save lives and reduce 

property damage. 

IV 

V. E. McKELVEY 

DIRECTOR 
CONTENTS 

Page 

ForelVord ---------------------------------------------------------------- III 

Welcoming remarkst by EdlVard P. Joyce, Director of Emergency Services, City of 

San Francisco -------------------------------------------------------- 1 

Earthquake forecasting: An opportunity, by Jack W. Carlson, Assistant Secretary 

of the Interior for Energy and Minerals -------------------------------- 2 

Role of State government in earthquake lVarning, by Charles Manfred, Director, 

Office of Emergency Services, State of California ------------------------ 4 

The 1status of earthquake prediction, by Robert M. Hamilton, Chief, Office of 

Earthquake Studies, U.S. Geological Survey ---------..,.------------------ 6 

A Federal plan for the issuance of earthquake predictions and lVarnings, by V. E. 

McKelvey, Director, U.S. Geological Survey ------------------------------ 10 

Possible loss-reduction actions following an earthquake prediction, by Charles C. 

Thiel, Research Applications Directorate, National Science Foundation ------ 13 

Social, economic, and political implications of earthquake prediction, by Ralph H. 

Turner, Department of Sociology, University of California at Los Angeles -- 17 

Earthquake prediction j,s the beginning of problems-not the anslVer, by Karl 

V. Steinbrugge, Chairman, Seismic Safety Commission, State of California__ 20 

Earthquake lVarning and response-A panel discussion ----------------------- 22 

ILLUSTRATION 

Page 

FIGURE 1. Diagram sholVing proposed flolV of information for earthquake prediction and lVarning ------------------------------------------ 11 

TABLES 

Page 

TABLE 1. Population and property at high earthquake risk in the Western 

United States ---------------------------------------------- 13 

2. Engineering responses to an earthquake prediction ---------------- 15 

v 

EARTHQUAKE PREDICTION-OPPORTUNITY TO AVERT DISASTER 

Welcoming Remarks 

By Edward P. Joyce, 

Director of Emergency Services, City of San Francisco 

It is a great privilege for me to welcome you to the great city of San 

Francisco on behalf of Mayor Joseph L. Alioto. 

For many years as Director of Emergency Services for San Francisco, 

my concern has been to develop a viable response to earthquake disaster. 

Thanks to meaningful assistance from the State Office of Emergency 

Services, the Federal Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, and the Federal 

Disaster Assistance Administration, we have an earthquake response plan 

that has been approved unanimously by our Emergency Planning Committee and our Disaster Council here in San Francisco. 

Of course, this plan has been directed to mitigation of the effects that 

a major earthquake can pose after the fact. I am, therefore, most anxious 

to hear the status of earthquake prediction in the United States because the 

reality of earthquake prediction will require a whole new approach to 

emergency planning. It appears to me that the public policy implications 

of earthquake predictions are somewhat similar to those for tsunami 

warnings, although the implications of the latter are of a much lesser 

degree. At least for tsunamis, we have developed experience with regard 

to reaction by political jurisdictions that have been in receipt of warnings 

over many years. I hope that when earthquake predictions are a reality, 

there will be a shared responsibility by Federal, State, and local officials 

in prediction announcements and in the actions to be taken. 

I am, of course, also interested in hearing about other factors relating 

to predictions, such as length of advance warning time, reliability of data, 

ability to predict magnitudes within acceptable limits, likelihood of evacuation and guarantees for property left behind, and other important socioeconomic and political implications of earthquake forecasting. 

On behalf of Mayor Alioto, I wish you a most enjoyable stay in San 

Francisco and hope that your participation in this conference is as 

profitable to you as I know it will be to me. 

1 
EARTHQUAKE PREDICTION-OPPORTUNITY TO AVERT DISASTER 

Earthquake Forecasting: An Opportunity 

By Jack W. Carlson, 

Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Energy and Minerals 

It is appropriate that we meet today in San Francisco. Since 1906, the 

name San Francisco has been associated, rightly or wrongly, with the 

terrible destruction that an earthquake can bring upon an urbanized 

society. Furthermore, our scientists tell us that major damaging earthquakes will continue to strike the San Francisco region in the years ahead. 

However, to single out San Francisco as "the city that waits to die" 

is both unfair and inaccurate. San Francisco is only one of a number of 

urban areas that face a significant threat from earthquakes. Damaging 

quakes have hit and will continue to strike the Los Angeles region, California, Seattle, Wash., and Anchorage, Alaska. Salt Lake City, Utah, 

although it has not yet experienced a major destructive shock, lies astride 

a large and active fault system that someday will produce a potentially 

devastating magnitude-6 or -7 quake. Scientists caution us that some important cities in the Eastern United States, including Memphis, Tenn., 

Charleston, S.C., and Boston, Mass., also are exposed to major damage 

from future earthquakes. In fact, 15 percent of the U.S. populationmore than 31 million Americans-reside in Seismic Risk Zone 3, the zone 

of greatest earthquake danger. Thus, the earthquake threat is of national 

concern. 

If a 1906-sized event hits any of our major cities, potential losses could 

be as high as tens of thousands dead, hundreds of thousands seriously injured, and property damage measured in the tens of billions of dollars. A 

catastrophe of this scale would seriously affect the economy of the whole 

country, yet it is an event that most earthquake scientists expect to occur 

sooner or later. Even moderate-sized earthquakes bring death and destruction to urban areas, as we learned at San Fernando, Calif., in 1971. And 

earthquakes of this size occur relatively frequently, for example, striking 

California on the average of once every 6 years. 

Our earthquake-prone cities do not have to "wait to die." Increasingly, 

the earthquake threat is being recognized and dealt with at all levels of 

government. Government and the private sector are following several 

mutually supportive paths that can reduce the effects of earthquakes: landuse planning, earthquake-resistant engineering, and emergency-preparedness actions. Areas of potential earthquake hazards are being mapped and 

evaluated so that planners can site future construction away from the most 

dangerous ground within earthquake-prone regions. The frequency and 

2 
level of earthquake shaking are being assessed for areas subject to damaging earthquakes, and the data derived are providing the basis for building 

codes and for earthquake-resistant design of structures by engineers and 

architects. Research into the mechanisms of earthquake occurrence and 

possible premonitory signals of impending quakes is being intensified. 

Earthquake prediction and its practical application are our subjects today. 

Within the past 3 years, seismologists and geophysicists in government laboratories and the universities have made remarkable progress toward an astounding goal: the ability to forecast reliably the place, the 

time, and the size of future earthquakes. The scientific progress has been 

truly remarkable because just a decade ago, prediction was considered to 

be only remotely possible. Today, many scientists are confident that potentially damaging earthquakes can be predicted from precursory changes in 

the Earth's crust, provided that systems of geophysical instruments are 

deployed. 

Earthquake forecasting will give us an opportunity to help alleviate 

the ravages of earthquakes by a number of possible actions in anticipation 

of a destructive event. Emergency service groups can plan and coordinate 

their responses to the potential disaster. Hazardous structures can be 

evacuated. The water level behind large dams can be lowered to reduce 

their susceptibility to earthquake-induced failure. Supplies and materials 

for postearthquake relief and reconstruction can be stockpiled. Critical 

facilities such as nuclear reactors and pipelines can be shut down temporarily. The public can be informed of what measures individual households 

could take to reduce the effects of an earthquake. 

Actions such as these, taken in advance of a large earthquake, could 

substantially reduce the casualties and damage that might otherwise occur. 

Society, however, must prepare itself fully to derive the greatest 

benefit from knowing when and where an earthquake will occur. It is important to evaluate the various possible actions that might follow an earthquake prediction and to assess the impact on all segments of the community. Earth scientists, engineers, sociologists, economists, and public 

officials all have a role to play in deciding how to best use the capability 

to forecast earthquakes. 

Handled in the proper way, earthquake prediction can be a great 

blessing to mankind. Our purpose in this conference is to bring you up to 

date on the prospects for prediction in the United States and the possible 

implications to society, and to have you consider how earthquake predictions and warnings ought to be disseminated and how an effective public 

response to prediction should be marshalled. 

3 
EARTHQUAKE PREDICTION-OPPORTUNITY TO AVERT DISASTER 

Role of State Government in Earthquake Warning 

By Charles Manfred, 

Director, Office of Emergency Services, State of California 

State government has a responsibility, which it shares with city and 

county governments, to be prepared to mitigate the effects of earthquakes 

that threaten life, property, and the resources of California. 

The California Emergency Services Act confers emergency powers on 

chief executives of the State, including the Governor, chairmen of county 

boards of supervisors, and city mayors, in order to meet that responsibility. 

We have an excellent State Emergency Plan, which serves as a basis for 

the conduct of emergency operations by all jurisdictions throughout the 

State, and we have established a Seismic Safety Commission which has just 

begun to initiate programs to reduce earthquake hazards in our State. 

Damaging earthquakes have been and will continue to be part of 

California's natural environment. California's experience with earthquakes 

has taught us that measures can be taken to preserve life and property 

during and after an earthquake, that our buildings can be made earthquake 

resistant, and that appropriate actions by individual citizens can prevent 

loss of life. Local governments that maintain realistic plans and trained 

emergency staffs capable of providing the facilities, information, and resources needed by their chief executive for the direction and control of 

emergency operations do an effective job in the postearthquake environment, caring for distressed people and restoring and maintaining essential 

services. 

The California State government is monitoring the development of 

earthquake-forecasting techniques and is preparing to modify our emergency-preparedness efforts in the light of new scientific information that 

might become available. 

The Office of Emergency Services has established two advisory committees to deal with problems related to the development of earthquakeprediction technology. One is composed of eminent scientists qualified to 

evaluate the credibility of earthquake predictions; the other is composed 

of members representing social, economic, and government disciplines 

qualified to make recommendations on State government response to earthquake prediction. 

In addition, we are cooperating with two research projects being conducted in this area by the University of Colorado and the California Institute of Technology. 

4 
The California Emergency Council will consider and discuss the publicpolicy implications of earthquake prediction at its next meeting on December 10, 1975. The California Legislature Assembly Committee on Finance, 

Insurance, and Commerce will hold a 1-day hearing on the subject of insurance aspects of earthquake prediction on Wednesday, December 17, 1975. 

The technology to predict earthquakes is in the research and development stage--there can be no doubt about that-but questions need to be 

answered about these research activities and their eventual effects: 

• How rapid is the development of earthquake-prediction technology? 

e How reliable is the technology? 

• Will the Federal Government be able to establish an operational earthquake-prediction system comparable to the Tsunami Warning Service? If so, when? 

• How are earthquake predictions to be communicated to the public? 

e Will the cost of the social and economic dislocations resulting from the 

prediction of the time, location, and magnitude be greater than the 

cost of the physical destruction during and after the earthquake? In 

this regard, which is the more acceptable risk? 

e How will people and their government organizations respond to earthquake predictions? How should they respond? 

In California, we not only have the problem of what to do once an 

operational earthquake-prediction system is established, but we have the 

more immediate problem of dealing with new information about seismic 

activity in our State-information that has resulted from the various 

studies and research projects seeking answers to the questions posed above. 

These difficult questions demand carefully considered responsible answers from scientists and public officials. Perhaps this conference will 

provide some of them. 

5 
EARTHQUAKE PREDICTION-OPPORTUNITY TO AVERT DISASTER 

The Status of Earthquake Prediction 

By Robert M. Hamilton, 

Chief, Office of Earthquake Studies, U.S. Geological Survey 

The September 1, 1975, issue of "Time" 

magazine focused national attention on the 

rapid progress that has been made in recent 

years toward earthquake prediction. The 

"Time" cover story accurately reflects the mood 

of optimism that currently pervades the scientific community. It also highlights the many 

scientific problems that remain to be solved before, and the many socioeconomic problems that 

must be dealt with after, earthquake prediction 

becomes a reality. The main purpose of this 

meeting is to call attention to the nature of the 

problems and to initiate a national dialogue 

leading to their resolution. My contribution to 

this conference will be to assess the status of 

earthquake prediction and to consider the outlook for the future. 

One of the reasons for the current optimism 

about prediction is that some very startling 

news has been received in recent months from 

the People's Republic of China. A strong earthquake, measuring about 7.3 on the Richter scale, 

took place there in February 1975. Apparently 

the shock was predicted, and actions were taken that saved many lives-perhaps tens of 

thousands. 

The prediction was made by a gradual refining, or homing in, on the place, time, and magnitude of the upcoming shock by using a variety of techniques. As early as 1970, the area 

of Liaoning Province in northeast China, where 

the shock took place, was identified as an area 

of possible risk, apparently on the basis of longterm variations in seismicity. This concern was 

reaffirmed in June 1974 when the State Seismological Bureau called for increased vigilance in 

the area. This warning was based on a combi6 

nation of observations, including migrations of 

seismic activity, tilting of the ground surface, 

changes in the water level in wells, changes in 

electric currents in the ground, and strange 

animal behavior. These observations prompted 

the Chinese to move more seismographs and 

tiltmeters into the area. On December 20, 1974, 

the local government was warned to expect a 

large earthquake. Apparently this warning resulted in a false alarm on the part of local officials, and people slept outside in the snow for 

2 days. In mid-January 1975, the State Seismological Bureau met again, concluded that an 

earthquake was imminent, and on January 28, 

the villages were warned to be prepared. Extra 

seismographs were set up. On February 1, 

anomalous earthquake activity began, which 

was interpreted as foreshocks, and it increased 

markedly on February 3. At 2 pm on February 

4, people were told to expect a major quake 

within 2 days. Shops were shut in the town of 

Yingkow, and general evacuation of buildings 

was ordered in Yingkow and Haicheng Counties. The quake came at 7 :36 pm that evening. 

This all sounds like the fantasy of a sciencefiction writer. If the reports we have received 

accurately describe the events that transpired, 

then the Chinese achievement represents a milestone in the quest for earthquake prediction. 

Earthquake prediction has long been a lively 

topic of after-dinner conversation, a proclaimed 

capability of mystics and soothsayers, and an 

elusive goal of scientists. The fascination with 

earthquakes derives mainly from their mysterious nature and their awesome power-the ability to level cities within seconds. 
Historical accounts are rich with reports of 

strange events before earthquakes : dogs howling, strange lights in the night sky, weird 

sounds, withdrawal of the sea from a harbor, 

and so on. The significance of these reports has 

been discounted in many cases, but many of the 

observations have been sufficiently good to keep 

alive the hope that earthquakes can be 

predicted. 

Many of the reports of earthquake precursors 

have come from Japan. A particularly impressive anomaly was observed for the magnitude-7.5 

earthquake that caused heavy damage in the 

city of Niigata in 1964. Level surveys and a 

tide-gage station revealed anomalous land uplift starting 10 years. before the shock. Reports 

such as this one led Japan in 1965 to establish 

a formal program to predict earthquakes. 

A serious attempt to predict earthquakes is 

also underway in the Soviet Union. Near the 

village of Garm, in the seismically active Republic of Tadzhikistan, scientists have been 

working on prediction for more than 25 years. 

The fruit of these labors was revealed in the 

late 1960's; some results were truly electrifying. The Soviet scientists reported that prior to 

some earthquakes, the speed with which vibrations or waves travel through rocks deep in the 

Earth showed a distinctive variation. Until 

then, seismic-wave velocity was thought to be 

constant. This startling finding opened a new 

realm of scientific investigation. Incidentally, 

American scientists are now working at Garm 

with the Soviet scientists under a long-term program of scientific exchange. The activities of 

this exchange program were reported to President Ford October 31, 1975, by Russell Train, 

head of the Environmental Protection Agency, 

and Academician Israel of the Soviet Union. 

Variation in seismic-wave velocity was but 

one of a variety of phenomena reported from 

the Soviet Union as earthquake precursors. 

Radon gas in well water increased anomalously 

before an earthquake at Tashkent in 1966. Electrical resistivity of the Earth behaved unusually before earthquakes near Garm and in Kamchatka. Migration of centers of seismic activity 

and reorientation of earthquake-causing rock 

stress were also observed. Taken together, these 

findings presented an impressive case that 

earthquakes indeed have precursors. 

These observations have an explanation. It is 

widely believed that earthquakes are caused by 

7 

a gradual buildup of stress in rock to the point 

at which the rock can no longer withstand the 

forces, and it fails suddenly along a preexisting 

plane of weakness, or a ~ault. This, of course, 

takes place on a large scale in the Earth, the 

larger earthquakes involving areas of hundreds 

of square miles. The stresses are created by 

large plates of the Earth's crust scraping past 

each other or colliding in a process called by a 

variety of names : continental drift, sea-floor 

spreading, or plate tectonics. 

The failure process can be simulated in the 

laboratory by squeezing a rock specimen only 

inches across. As the stress builds up and the 

rock nears failure, tiny cracks form that actually cause the rock to expand in volume. Laboratory measurements show variations in seismicwave velocity, electrical resistivity, and other 

properties of a rock undergoing such expansion 

that are similar to the anomalies observed before earthquakes. 

American results have by and large confirmed the Soviet findings. In hindsight, it appears that the magnitude-6.5 earthquake near 

San Fernando, Calif., in 1971 was preceded by 

a velocity anomaly, as was a smaller shock of 

magnitude 5.0 in central California in 1972. In 

the Adirondack Mountains region of New York 

State, a small earthquake was successfully forecast on this basis in 1973. A resistivity anomaly 

preceded a magnitude-3.9 earthquake in central 

California in 1973. 

The most encouraging new results in the 

United States came in November 1974 for a 

magnitude-5.2 earthquake that struck on 

Thanksgiving Day near Hollister, Calif. Just 

south of Hollister, the Geological Survey operates a dense network of instrumentation in 

an experimental earthquake-prediction system. 

Strong precursors to the shock were observed 

in the Earth's magnetic field-the first such 

anomaly recorded-and in the tilting of the 

land surface. At a lower level of certainty, 

anomalies were also observed in the length of 

survey lines. Such a variety of precursory phenomena had not been previously observed for a 

single earthquake. 

Thus, by 197 4, the Soviet Union, Japan, and 

the United States had taken on earthquake prediction as a national goal and had convincingly 

established that earthquakes have precursors. 

At that time, the Chinese effort was virtually 

unknown to us, but word reached the West that 
a major prediction program was underway. The 

opportunity to find out about it came when 

former President Nixon's visit there led to an 

exchange of earthquake specialists. The Chinese 

came to the United States in spring 197 4. They 

gave little information on their program, saying 

that they were here to learn of our activities, 

but they dropped enough hints about their own 

program to alert American scientists that they 

had some surprises in store when the U.S. delegation, of which I was a member, visited China 

in October 197 4. 

What we found was a well-organized, largescale effort of research specifically aimed at 

earthquake prediction. The program began soon 

after two very destructive earthquakes hit 

Hopeh Province of China in 1966. China's leaders, including Premier Chou En-lai, visited the 

stricken area and proclaimed that a serious effort would be undertaken to reduce the dreadful 

impact that earthquakes have had on the Chinese people. More than 800,000 people were 

killed in 1556 from a shock near Sian, in central 

China, and about 180,000 were killed in 1920 

near Kansu .. 

The biggest surprise we found in China was 

that roughly 10,000 people, including several 

hundred scientists, were working very hard to 

predict earthquakes, using a wide variety of 

instrumentation that includes some of the best 

in use anywhere in the world today. Virtually 

every technique that has ever been suggested 

as a basis for prediction is being studied to some 

degree. Many precursors have been observed, 

ranging from reports of unusual animal behavior to well-documented anomalies recorded 

on the finest instruments. About 10 earthquakes 

have been successfully predicted, and warnings 

have been issued, but the Chinese readily acknowledge that many predictions. have not been 

successful. 

The Chinese success in predicting the Liaoning earthquake signals that the age of earthquake prediction may be upon us. The laboratory studies show that earthquake precursors 

should exist, and the many field observations 

seem to confirm that they are observable. The 

big questions now are whether all earthquakes 

have precursors-and whether these precursors 

are sufficiently regular or uniform in nature to 

be reliable as predictors. These questions can 

be answered only through continued studies. 

The one area in the United States that has a 

comprehensive prediction system, mentioned 

before with regard to the Thanksgiving Day 

earthquake, is in central California astride the 

San Andreas fault south of the town of Hollister. This area was chosen for intensive study 

by the Geological Survey because of its high 

seismicity. The instrumentation system used 

there is very much in the experimental phase of 

development, but at the same time it is a prototype of what could be installed elsewhere in the 

future. 

8 

As is the case with most new technological 

developments, progress can be a mixed blessing. 

Earthquake predictions undoubtedly can save 

lives, as has already been demonstrated in 

China, but in the finely balanced socioeconomic 

structure of the United States, a prediction can 

also cause serious problems; much of our discussion today will focus on these problems. One 

can imagine, among other things, that prediction of a shock near a major city could lead to 

a drop in tourism, nonrenewal of earthquake 

insurance policies, fleeing of the area by the 

panic stricken, and convergence on the area by 

the thrill seekers. Failure of the earthquake to 

occur could result in recriminations, lawsuits, 

and loss of confidence in the scientists who made 

the prediction. Unlike a hurricane that veered 

off course, there would be no way to convince 

people that they had had a near miss. The fallout of legal, political, social, and economic problems could be serious. 

Predictions, however, have the potential to 

provide enormous benefits. Tens of thoU.sands of 

lives were saved in 1971 because the lower Van 

Norman Reservoir was lowered before the 

earthquake struck at San Fernando, Calif., and 

caused near-collapse of the dam. Although the 

action was based on general concern for the 

dam, rather than on an earthquake prediction, 

the lesson is clear. Many critical facilities are 

of necessity sited in regions that will experience 

strong earthquakes. A warning could avert serious consequences from damage to pipelines, 

storage tanks, and nuclear reactors. 

Much remains to be accomplished before 

earthquake prediction becomes as useful as 

weather forecasting. Nevertheless, hopes are 

high that progress will be rapid. The greatest 

need is for additional observations of earth-
quake precursors. Observations are needed from 

a variety of geologic settings to assure that each 

area will not be a special case. The current level 

of effort will permit progress toward meeting 

these needs ; however, it does not provide for 

establishment of any prototype earthquakeprediction system. As a result, the transition to 

a reliable prediction capability will not be very 

9 

rapid. Even in the areas that are now under 

study, the development phase for prediction 

may stretch over the next decade. In the meantime, we can expect to see many scientific predictions based on only fragmentary data, and 

we must develop a system for reporting these 

predictions and for responding to them 

effectively. 
EARTHQUAKE PREDICTION-OPPORTUNITY TO AVERT DISASTER 

A Federal Plan for the Issuance of Earthquake Predictions 

and Warnings 

By V. E. McKelvey, 

Director, U.S. Geological Survey 

As Dr. Hamilton showed, we are now entering an age when scientific instruments are detecting signals that can be interpreted to 

forecast earthquake occurrence. We have not 

advanced to the stage of full-scale deployment 

of earthquake-prediction systems. In fact, we 

now have in operation only an experimental 

system covering a small area of central California. However, advance indications of a coming earthquake can be detected on fairly inexpensive instruments that would give a scientific 

basis for making a prediction. 

With the increased deployment of geophysical sensors the number of scientifically based 

predictions is increasing. Scientists recognize 

that the data are difficult to interpret at this 

stage, but nevertheless it is clear that the observations must be reported to the public, and the 

best interpretation possible must be attempted. 

Developing a plan to issue predictions may appear to be premature when the capability is not 

really operational, but the impact that a prediction can have requires that even the most 

fragmentary data be processed in a careful and 

responsible manner. 

The plan we are presenting today is tentative 

and is intended as a basis for discussion. We 

expect it to change as a result of this meeting, 

and we also expect it to evolve as progress is 

made in prediction research and as experience 

is gained in issuing predictions. 

Before I discuss the plan, I would like to call 

your attention to a very important point, namely, the difference between a prediction and a 

warning. A prediction, as we are using the term 

here, is a forecast that an earthquake will occur 

at a certain time and place and will have a certain magnitude capable of causing certain kinds 

of effects. A warning is a recommendation or an 

order to take some defensive action, such as to 

reduce the water level in a reservoir or to evacuate a building. As you will see in the plan, the 

U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) has the responsibility for issuing a predicition, but State and 

local officials have the responsibility for issuing 

a warning. The plan deals with formulating 

the prediction and transmitting it to the local 

officials for issuance of a warning to the public. 

The steps in this plan are shown in figure 1. 

The starting point is with the scientists who are 

receiving data from field instruments and interpreting them. This is also the starting point of 

contact with the public, for it is our policy that 

the raw data be made available to the public. 

The scientific interpretation of data will be 

reported through talks at scientific meetings, 

publications, and information releases. Care 

will be taken, however, to distinguish between 

an individual scientist's interpretation of data 

and the interpretation of his data and other 

relevant data by his peers that might result in 

a USGS prediction. 

Peer review will be provided by the USGS 

Earthquake Prediction Council composed of 5 to 

10 USGS scientists and scientists from outside 

the USGS whose experience covers all aspects 

of earthquake-prediction technology. The purpose of this review is to assure the public that, 

in the judgment of scientific experts, the basis 

for the prediction is sound. The role of the 

10 
EARTHQUAKE PREDICTION AND WARNING 

Proposed Information Flow 

FIGURE 1.-Proposed Federal plan for the issuance of earthquake predictions and warnings. It provides for continual public release of scientific data but ensures that there are firm bases for an official prediction. In the 

plan, the Geological Survey has the responsibility for issuing a prediction (statement that an earthquake will 

occur), whereas State and local officials have the responsibility for iSISuing a warning (recommendation or 

order to take defensive action). 

11 
Council is to review all relevant data and to 

report its conclusions. The report need not be a 

consensus report, and it might not agree with 

the conclusion of the scientist presenting the 

data. He, of course, could continue to argue his 

case, but he must make clear that his is not a 

USGS position. 

The report of the Earthquake Prediction 

Council would go to USGS headquarters, where 

a decision would be made whether and how to 

issue a prediction. If the case is not sufficiently 

strong, a decision could be made to issue an 

advisory notice, stating, for example, that possible precursors have been detected in a certain 

area and that that area is under intensive study. 

The nature of the headquarters action would be 

tailored to the particular situation. 

The statement issued by the USGS headquarters would be communicated to the Governor of the State potentially affected, to Federal agencies with responsibilities for disaster 

preparedness and response, for example, the 

Federal Disaster Assistance Administration 

and the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, 

and to the public. This does not necessarily 

mean that the public would be notified simultaneously with the others, but any delay should 

be short. It may be judged that the negative 

impact of a prediction could be lessened if responsibile State and Federal officials received 

prior notice. A strong case can be made that a 

warning should be issued with a prediction, so 

that the public is not left without any recommendation for appropriate action. 

Upon receipt of a prediction, we anticipate 

that the Governor's office would refer the prediction to the State office concerned with disaster response, and the Governor may choose to 

call together his own group of experts to evaluate the evidence for the prediction. In California, for example, the prediction would probably 

be referred to the Office of Emergency Services 

( OES) and then to the Governor's/OES Earthquake Prediction Review Group. USGS scientists would certainly be available for discussion 

with State personnel, as indicated on the chart 

by the dashed line. 

The Governor's decision about the prediction 

would be transmitted to local officials and a 

warning issued. USGS personnel would be 

available for consultation at every stage of this 

process. The procedures adopted will surely 

vary from State to State, so I will let clarification of this part of the chart develop from our 

discussions today. 

The prediction going to the headquarters of 

other Federal agencies would be transmitted to 

their regional offices, where coordination would 

be effected with State personnel. 

Scientists not funded by the USGS who find 

evidence of an earthquake precursor are not 

specifically considered in this plan. We believe, 

however, that given the mechanisms I have described, other scientists would be willing to 

enter the system, by discussing their data with 

either the USGS Earthquake Prediction Council 

or the State Earthquake Prediction Review 

Group. In either way, the findings would be 

evaluated as a basis for issuing a prediction. 

Perhaps this is sufficient discussion of the 

plan on my part. As I mentioned earlier, this is 

only a proposal, and we are here to receive your 

suggestions for improvements. We want a procedure that assures responsible, open, and credible treatment of earthquake-prediction information. We realize that the transition to the 

age of earthquake prediction will be difficult, 

but a carefully developed prediction and warning plan can ease the difficulties and yield great 

savings in both life and property. 

12 
EARTHQUAKE PREDICTION-OPPORTUNITY TO AVERT DISASTER 

Possible Loss-Reduction Actions Following an Earthquake 

Prediction 

By Charles C. Thiel, 

Research Applications Directorate, National Science Foundation 

Dr. Hamilton has given us a review of the 

technical aspects of earthquake prediction, and 

Dr. McKelvey has detailed a proposed plan 

whereby a prediction will be evaluated and disseminated. I propose to discuss what can be 

done-what mitigating public and private actions can be taken in anticipation of the event 

-when a prediction is of such scientific validity 

that it constitutes an official warning. Whether 

one agrees with the proposition that earthquake 

prediction is good (as I do) or not (and there 

is some dispute) is really a moot point. There 

are going to be predictions, some scientifically 

based and others from seers and fortunetellers. 

It will be the responsibility of the public official, 

the engineer, the applied scientist, and the 

entrepreneur to take the information that an 

earthquake will occur and turn this into public 

and private policies and actions that allow the 

individual and the community to reduce the net 

impact of the earthquake in terms of loss of 

life, injury, economic cost, and social disruption. 

A natural tendency is to think in terms of 

earthquakes posing a major risk only to the 

Western States. Without delving into the specifics, 70 million people in 39 States live in 

regions of major and moderate earthquake risk. 

This conference is directed at the representatives of the nine Western States at principal 

risk, each having a major vulnerability to loss 

of life and property destruction. 

I have summarized the extent of the vulnerability of these States in the West by listing in 

table 1 the population residing in major- and 

moderate-damage-potential zones and the projected State property values. Although California clearly has the largest number of people 

at risk, each of the other States have large parts 

of their population exposed. There is some likelihood that earthquakes will be predicted in the 

future in each of these States. 

It would be nice if, in dealing with earthquake 

prediction, we could merely decide to leave the 

area, wait for the earthquake to take place, and 

TABLE 1.-Population and property at high earthquake risk in the Western United States 

State 

Alaska ------------------- California ---------------- Hawaii -------------------

Idaho -------------------- Montana ------------------ Nevada ------------------- Utah --------------------- Washington --------------- Wyoming -----------------

Population (thousands, 1970) 

Major risk Moderate risk 

270 

17,317 

63 

200 

142 

189 

972 

2,169 

5 

13 

25 

2,636 

39 

513 

313 

300 

48 

1,240 

19 

State's 

property 

value 

(billion 

dollars, 

1980 est.) 

2.9 

292.1 

19.2 

8.1 

7.0 

8.2 

9.0 

46.4 

7.4 
then go back and pick up the pieces. Unfortunately, this is impractical. As an example, if 

the 1906 San Francisco earthquake were to recur in the year 2000, it could cause about $20 

billion in damage, 9,000 deaths, and 400,000 

injuries. Even so, this does not represent the 

destruction of the Bay area-it represents the 

loss of less than 25 percent of the value of structures in the region. The damage would be widely distributed, and those persons in San Jose 

could not seek refuge in Oakland, San Francisco, or even Marin County. I could just as well 

show you similar losses for Seattle, Salt Lake 

City, or Los Angeles. Obviously we cannot count 

on mass evacuation as a means of protecting the 

public when the population of the area affected 

is large; we must seek other means to protect 

life and property. We cannot run away from the 

problem, 

An earthquake can cause damage in several 

ways. First, I want you to understand that it is. 

not the fault rupture but the shaking of the 

ground that causes most of the damage. Extensive ground shaking can cause the disruption of 

a building's contents and its collapse, the collapse of a dam, the rupture of a pipeline, and 

many other types of structural damage. Ground 

shaking can cause soils to lose their capacity to 

support buildings, causing them to fail. The 

damage can be from secondary sources-the 

ruptured dam can cause downstream inundation, toxic chemicals can be released from an 

industrial facility, or a falling parapet can 

strike a pedestrian. Old unreinforced buildings 

are generally the most vulnerable to collapse, 

and there are lots of them, even in Los Angeles 

and San Francisco where a long-term attempt 

has been made to build earthquake-resistant 

structures. Finally there is fire. Conflagration 

can be a companion to earthquakes, and the resulting devastation can be nearly total. 

Given that an earthquake is going to take 

place, a variety of actions and procedures can 

be undertaken to reduce its direct impacts and 

hasten the restoration of the community. 

We can evacuate hazardous buildings or sites. 

We can reinforce or replace structures that will 

not perform adequately. Note this last word. 

"adequately," because we want a hospital t~ 

remain operational but may not care if a shed 

collapses. We can remove the contents of a 

structure so that they will not be damaged. We 

can change the pattern of use of a facility or 

area-for instance, not use a theater, or move 

a clinic to a "better" building. We can activate 

emergency-preparedness plans and distribute 

emergency materials. We can review insurance 

options. We can adopt tax policies that benefit 

owners who upgrade their facilities. Finally, we 

can provide for the relief of the victims andrehabilitation of the community. This list is far 

from complete. It is meant to show that many 

methods are available to decrease earthquake 

impacts. 

The actual nature of the specific response to 

an earthquake prediction will be determined by 

the size of the predicted earthquake, how long 

until the event is to take place, the time of year, 

and whether the earthquake will occur in an 

urban, suburban, or rural region. It will also 

depend on the technical and managerial skills 

of the resident population and its economic and 

material capabilities. Generally, the longer the 

period of forewarning, the more the community 

will be able to do to decrease the impact on the 

community. As a caution, please remember that, 

in most cases, it is unrealistic to expend more 

than can be expected in losses. We must always 

be careful to balance social and economic costs 

and resultant benefits in reduced human suffering and property damage. 

From an engineering point of view, there 

seem to be four basic time spans that should be 

discussed when considering the types of specific 

actions to be taken. These are 3, 30, 300, and 

3,000 days. Table 2 lists a group of actions that 

could be initiated according to the various 

stated lead times. I have assumed that we are 

dealing with an urban event of major magnitude, and have distinguished the actions that 

could be taken in the time allowed to protect 

buildings, their contents, lifeline facilities (for 

example, bridges, communications, water, and 

hospitals), and special structures (for example, 

dams, nuclear reactors, and pipelines). If the 

prediction is a few days in advance, say three, 

the options are limited to the somewhat obvious. 

We can evacuate previously identified hazardous buildings and selectively remove contents. 

Special facilities such as reactors can be closed 

down. Petroleum pipelines can be emptied and 

shut down. We can deploy emergency materials 

and identify staging areas. Use of mass-assembly buildings such as theaters and schools can 

be restricted. 

14 
TABLE 2.-Engineering responses to an earthqt«tke prediction 

LEAD TIME BUILDINGS CONTENTS LIFELINES SPECIAL 

STRUCTURES 

3 Days Evacuate previously Remove selected Deploy emergency Shut down reactors, 

identified hazards contents materials petroleum products 

pipelines 

30 Days Inspect and identify Selectiv-ely harden Shift hospital Draw down reservoirs, 

potential hazards (brace and patients; alter remove toxic rna- strengthen) use of facilities terials 

contents 

Selectively rein- Develop response Replace hazardous 

force capability storage 

300 Days 

Revise building codes and land-use Remove hazardous 

dams from Service 

3,000 Days 

regulations: enforce condemnation 

and reinforcement 

When there is a 30-day warning period, building inspections can be performed to identify 

hazardous buildings and conditions. In most 

cases there will be neither the professional expertise, skilled labor, or materials available to 

reinforce hazardous buildings in this short time. 

Reservoirs can be emptied within this time but 

not much faster. Hospital patients and prisoners can be moved to facilities beyond the area 

to be affected. Clinics, emergency communications, and emergency response and relief personnel and materials can be moved to less vulnerable sites. Some toxic, incendiary, and explosive materials can be removed from industrial facilities to places where they pose no 

major hazards. 

Only when the period of warning is of the 

order of 300 days is it realistic to expect that 

substantial numbers of structures can be upgraded to reduce their vulnerability. During 

this period an earthquake-prediction response 

plan can be formulated. Unfortunately it is unlikely that such a plan, which responds to more 

than obvious opportunities, can be formulated 

and put into operation in a much shorter time. 

Beyond these time periods, in the 3,000-day 

or about 10-year range, the potential to reduce 

the vulnerability of the community is great. 

Building codes can be adopted and enforced that 

protect the occupants from unacceptable risks 

of injury. Land-use policies can be adopted that 

decrease the density of occupations in hazardous landslide areas or filled areas that are likely to be subject to soil failure. These procedures, 

although useful and obvious, are not the ones 

that will yield the greatest benefit. For the next 

decades the earthquake vulnerability of virtually all this Nation's cities will be dominated by 

those older structures now standing that cannot be expected to withstand a major shake. The 

biggest challenge to the public official is to develop economically and politically realistic procedures and policies for the condemnation of 

substandard structures, and for their reinforcement, replacement, or abandonment. I wish to 

call to your attention that these are the same 

major policies and procedures that we in the 

engineering profession urge you to take when 

a specific earthquake has not been predicted 

but can be expected to occur in the not-toodistant future. 

It is logical to ask what the potential impact 

of all these adjustments during the warning 

period might be. When the period is but a few 

days, the major benefit will be in the saving of 

lives. Property damage will be essentially unchanged. When 30-days warning is available, 

the damage might be reduced by 20 percent. In 

300 days, we might be capable of reducing impacts by 40 percent, and in 10 years, the reduction could be 60 percent or more. These reductions do not consider economic costs incurred in 

improving physical performance and presume 

that all available technology is applied. 

I would be remiss in my professional responsibilities if I did not point out to all of you that 

many of the procedures that an engineer or 

architect might use to design or reinforce a 

structure economically are yet to be formulated. 

The same lack of clear-cut procedure is even 

more true for public-policy matters. Just as a 

substantial effort must be expended to achieve 

earthquake prediction, there must be a significant companion research, development, and 

educational program in the engineering, economic, and social sciences. They must all be 

pursued together. 

15 
In summary, I wish to highlight a few of the 

public-policy problems, or should I say challenges, that will present themselves : 

1. Within the built environment, a particular 

building or piece of land may be within 

the jurisdiction of any of a large number 

of groups, often having overlapping responsibilities. The point is that the control 

of the physical structures in a community 

is vested in a vast maze of generally unknown groups. 

2. You must start to plan now how you will 

respond to a prediction, and formulate 

the basic plans and procedures that you 

intend to pursue while there is time to 

rationally contemplate objectives, rather 

16 

than be forced to respond to the need for 

immediate action. 

3. During the warning period you will have to 

mobilize trained personnel and materials 

and protect the public from unscrupulous. 

practitioners pretending to possess capability in the professions dealing with 

earthquakes. 

4. The public will need information on how 

they can protect themselves and their 

property. It is logical to assume that they 

will look to government officials for this 

information. 

5. Finally, there will be the problems of equity. 

We must formulate and carry out public 

programs that do not overly benefit some 

at the expense of others. 
EARTHQUAKE PREDICTION-OPPORTUNITY TO AVERT DISASTER 

Social, Economic, and Political lm·plications o,f Earthquake 

Prediction 

By Ralph H. Turner, 

Department of Sociology, University of California at Los Angeles 

My remarks are based chiefly on a new · report, "Earthquake Prediction and Public 

Policy," prepared by the Panel on the Public 

Policy Implications of Earthquake Prediction, 

National Academy of Sciences. This report is 

available directly from the National Academy 

of Sciences, Washington, D.C.1 

In exploring· public-policy implications of 

earthquake prediction, the National Academy 

of Sciences panel assumed that prediction is 

inescapably at hand, that it will be fallible 

throughout the foreseeable future, that we shall 

have the benefit of warning times ranging from 

weeks to years, and that we shall be plagued 

initially with a fairly extended prediction-time 

window. Lacking experience in the prediction 

of potentially destructive earthquakes, we must 

be tentative in everything we say. As far as 

possible, our analysis and recommendations are 

based upon research findings from the study of 

other kinds of public disaster and disaster 

warning, and upon established principles in 

the behavioral sciences. 

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 

Earthquake prediction will have its disadvantages as well as its advantages. Under the 

worst combination of inaccurate prediction and 

an ill-conceived public response, the prediction 

and quake might even be more costly than an 

unpredicted quake would have been. However, it 

was the considered judgment of our panel that 

earthquake prediction can be a means for sub1 Copies of the .report, "Earthquake Prediction and Public Policy," can be ordered from the National Academy of Sciences, Printing and Publishing Office, 2101 Constitution Avenue, Washington, D.C. 20418, for $6.60 each. 

stantially reducing the losses from earthquakes 

if appropriate social, economic, engineering, 

and legal actions are taken prior to the quake. 

Even in case of a false alarm, some of the costs 

of a well-planned hazard reduction program 

will contribute to the seismic safety of the 

community. 

There is danger that preoccupation with the 

costs and difficulties in launching a constructive 

response may lead public officials to lose sight 

of the greatest potential benefit from earthquake prediction, which is the saving of human 

lives. Good fortune has kept the loss of life 

down in recent United States earthquakes, but 

the toll in case of new earthquakes in San 

Francisco and Los Angeles could run as high 

as 8,000 and 20,000 lives, respectively, according to recent estimates. The saving consideration is that earthquakes-unlike hurricanes, 

tornadoes, and floods-kill few people directly. 

People die from the collapse of manmade structures, such as buildings, bridges, and dams ; 

from fires ignited when gas and powerlines 

rupture; and sometimes from tsunamis and 

landslides. If people are protected from fire and 

collapsing structures, and evacuated short distances from low-lying coastal areas, very few 

lives need be lost in even a strong earthquake. 

A complete program to save lives and minimize property loss and disruption on the basis 

of an earthquake prediction will include four 

kinds of tasks : 

1. Authenticating and issuing predictions and 

warnings; 

17 
2. Readying emergency services to deal with 

the situation after the quake has occurred; 

3. Implementing a hazard reduction program 

to minimize loss and disruption when the 

quake occurs; and 

4. Dealing with potentially counterproductive 

consequences of prediction. 

I shall take up these tasks, in turn. 

ISSUING PREDICTIONS AND WARNINGS 

Many scientists and community leaders are 

fearful concerning the release of uncertain and 

imprecise predictions, citing the prospect that 

a false alarm might diminish response to a later 

valid prediction, that mass panic might result, 

and that essential business and political activity 

might be disrupted. Actually the usual interval 

of years between serious earthquakes in United 

States localities is too great to sustain a "crying 

wolf" effect, and we have abundant evidence 

from studies of public response to disaster 

warnings that ma~s panic is mostly a figment of 

the imagination. Even a careful reading of reports on the famous 1938 "War of the Worlds" 

broadcast fails to confirm that any great number of people actually took to the highways or 

engaged in other extreme actions. Studies repeatedly show that denial of danger and efforts 

to continue with life as usual, rather than mass 

panic, are the prevalent responses to warnings 

of imminent disaster. 

The justifiable fear of economic and political 

turmoil must be balanced by two considerations. 

If news of a prediction is initially suppressed 

but property values drop when the prediction is 

eventually released, persons with inside information stand to gain unfairly at the expense of 

persons who are not informed. As the recent 

incident in Kawasaki, Japan, confirms, suppressed information inevitably leaks out, and 

the ensuing confrontations weaken the credibility of scientists and public officials responsible for withholding information. Only the 

prompt release of all predictions can forestall 

these undesirable developments. 

Predictions should be prepared, assessed, and 

issued to the public by scientists, promptly and 

without respect to policy considerations. Public 

officials must then exercise their discretion in 

issuing warnings when they judge that the 

situation warrants action and are prepared to 

launch an appropriate community response. A 

panel of scientists should be established on a 

standby basis to assist public officials in evaluating predictions. The responsibilities of local, 

State, and Federal officials for issuing warnings 

should be clarified at once through meetings of 

concerned parties. Both predictions and warnings must be constantly revised, and public 

officials must have the benefit of a constant flow 

of information about the beliefs, attitudes, and 

actions of the public in response to a warning. 

READYING EMERGENCY SERVICES 

Earthquake prediction creates new opportunities to place both public and private emergency services in readiness to perform their 

postdisaster tasks of rescue, relief, and rehabilitation. Emergency plans should now be revised 

accordingly. Long-term standby civilian organization is not recommended, because activities 

soon lose their meaning in the absence of imminent threat. Citizen invo,vement in emergency 

preparations after a warning has been issued, 

however, should be a useful way of imparting 

a realistic understanding of the nature of prediction and the problems of preparing for an 

earthquake to a wide spectrum of community 

representatives. 

IMPLEMENTING A HAZARD REDUCTION 

PROGRAM 

Because of Mr. Thiel's informative review of 

hazard reduction measures, our comments here 

can be limited to a few broad conclusions. First, 

large-scale evacuation will usually be neither 

practical nor necessary. Second, the prospect 

of substantially reducing earthquake hazard 

will be greatest when the prediction response 

builds on a continuing program of hazard reduction. Where standards for earthquakeresistant construction are already strictly enforced, where some continuing identification of 

safe and unsafe structures is maintained, and 

where land-use management has systematically 

taken seismic risk into account, the response to 

earthquake prediction will be largely a selective 

acceleration of existing programs. 

Third, long periods of advance warning and 

the central importance of land-use planning 

and structural design and maintenance programs require a different allocation of authority 

than we find in most emergency planning. Departments of planning, building, and safety, 

engineering and public works, and the like must 

be given as central a role as police and civil 

defense agencies in responding to earthquake 

prediction. 

18 
Fourth, depending upon the period of advance warning and other considerations, the 

ability of the local communities and the region 

to bear a substantial part of the cost of hazard 

reduction measures will vary. Careful advance 

planning and some Federal assistance will be 

essential. 

Finally, because we lack exact precedents 

and analogies, all phases of earthquake prediction and response will be plagued initially by 

legal uncertainties. These uncertainties must 

be clarified and legal obstacles to needed actions 

must be overcome as quickly as possible, with 

new legislation when necessary. 

DEALING WITH COUNTERPRODUCTIVE 

CONSEQUENCES 

Although most inhabitants of a prediction 

area will attempt to continue life as usual, regional and national business and financial 

establishments will likely consider limiting 

mortgages, insurance, and investment in the 

threatened area. Combined with a possible net 

outmigration and reduced tourist trade, these 

conditions could provoke rising unemployment, 

falling property values, and reduced tax revenue. The panel recommends that upon issuance 

of an earthquake warning, a joint governmental and private-sector commission be established to monitor the economy in the threatened 

area to insure early detection of changes and 

to make recommendations to government, business, and labor organizations as needed. Representatives of insurance and investment 

organizations should play an integral part in 

the commission's work. 

Proposals will be made in some quarters to 

respond to the warning by encouraging an 

orderly outflow of capital and population, but 

political realities and the long-term view will 

favor sustaining the community. Two strategies may be important in pursuing the latter 

objective. First, many of the short-term costs 

during the prediction period can be handled as 

investments in the postquake development of 

the community, if appropriate planning is 

undertaken. Second, steps should be taken now 

to gain acceptance for a policy that much of the 

outside financial assistance normally available 

to a community from public and private 

sources should be made available as needed for 

hazard reduction measures taken in response 

to the authenticated prediction of a potentially 

destructive earthquake. As the fate of the local 

economy will be largely determined by decisions 

made outside the local area, it is essential that 

national support for the threatened community 

begin when the warning is first issued and not 

be delayed until the earthquake has struck. 

In these brief remarks I could only touch on 

a few of the problems explored and recommendations offered in the panel's report. I believe the full report merits your careful attention, not for any final answers, but as a start;. 

ing point in meeting the challenge of earthquake prediction. The new-found opportunity 

to save thousands of human lives is the reward 

for dealing effectively with this challenge. 

19 
EARTHQUAKE PREDICTION-OPPORTUNITY TO AVERT DIASTER 

Earthquake Prediction is the Beginning 

of Problems-Not the Answer 

By Karl V. Steinbrugge, 

Chairman, Seismic Safety Commission, State of California 

San Francisco's Chinatown area typifies the problems associated with 

the prediction of damaging earthquakes in California, and no realistic 

answers yet exist to help us deal with such problems. 

A great many of the older unreinforced brick and similar buildings 

in Chinatown are potential collapse hazards in the event of a major earthquake. From such collapses, we can expect large life losses. The narrow 

congested streets and resulting debris and fires will make evacuation, 

search and rescue, and fire suppression difficult. 

When a disastrous earthquake is predicted, critical public-policy 

questions will demand answers. Should the seriously deficient buildings be 

immediately strengthened? If so, who pays if the owner cannot? If buildings are closed, where do the residents go and who supports them? 

Unemployment? Taxes? Rents? Loss of business? Real estate values? 

Realistic answers to the foregoing must include historic, cultural, and 

economic considerations in addition to the obvious life-safety problems. 

Clearly, an earthquake prediction is the beginning of many real problems 

and not the answer for many public and private organizations and citizens. 

The policy questions involved in such negative consequences of earthquake 

prediction are of vital concern to California's newly created Seismic 

Safety Commission. 

Concern for these problems is not new. In 1968, a Commissioner 

wrote: 

"Suppose, for example, that the public were told that there was a 

50-50 chance of a destructive earthquake occurring within three years of 

the announcement. What might be the response? In many cases, maj,or 

industrial and commercial construction would probably be postponed until 

after the anticipated event, or relocated elsewhere, thus resulting in a 

major dislocation for large segments of the local economy. Painting and 

other maintenance work on dwellings, as well as other buildings, would 

probably be postponed until after the predicted earthquake, if possible. In 

many instances, inventories subject to damage would be reduced or 

relocated elsewhere, in anticipation of the earthquake." 

The State Office of Emergency Services (OES) already has taken 

steps to deal with problems posed by earthquake prediction in its areas of 

responsibility. OES has established a scientific advisory panel to advise 

20 
it on the credibility of earthquake predictions and a committee on State 

government preparedness to strengthen the response posture of several 

State agencies. 

Now that prediction is seemingly imminent, solutions to these problems are mandatory. Practically speaking, what then can the commission 

do? 

Its first role is to examine in detail the problems to be faced by the 

public, including the human aspects (such as safety, evacuation, temporary 

housing) and the financial aspects (such as unemployment, insurance, 

mortgage loans, property damage, and taxes) to see where adequate 

assistance may not be available. On the basis of its findings, the commission's actions may be: 

1. To see that local, State, and Federal agencies are not letting the problems go by default by ensuring that the problems are addressed by 

the responsible agencies, recommending executive actions to the 

Governor, advocating necessary changes in Federal laws and programs, and other measures. 

2. To recommend needed legislation to inaugurate new and expand existing programs to minimize the negative effects of prediction. 

The Seismic Safety Commission is headquartered in Sacramento. It 

is directly responsible to the Legislature and to the Governor for seismic 

safety policy in California. The commission includes in its membership 

scientists and engineers, planners, and local governmental policymakers. 

The members were appointed in June 1975 as a result of recommendations 

by the Legislature's Joint Committee on Seismic Safety and the Governor's 

Earthquake Council. It has replaced both bodies. The Seismic Safety 

Commission is now beginning to take decisive actions to continue the work 

of minimizing earthquake hazards in the State. 

21 
EARTHQUAKE PREDICTION-OPPORTUNITY TO AVERT DI,ASTER 

Earthquake Warning and Response-A Panel D~iscussion 

Moderator: 

Jack W. Carlson, Assistant Secretary for 

Energy and Minerals, United States Department of the Interior 

Panelists: 

Richard Courter, Department of Emergency Services, State of Washington 

Charles R. Ford, Assistant Vice President, 

Home Office Research Department, Fireman's Fund American Insurance Companies 

Robert J. Gregory, Director, Civil Defense 

and Disaster Agency, State of Nevada 

Robert M. Hamilton, Chief, Office of Earthquake Studies, U.S. Geological Survey 

Edward P. Joyce, Director of Emergency 

Services, City of San Francisco, California 

James S. Lee, President, State Building 

and Construction Trades Council of 

California 

Charles Manfred, Director, Office of Emergency Services, State of California 

Dale Marr, Business Manager, International Union of Operating Engineers 

-Local No.3 

V. E. McKelvey, Director, U.S. Geological 

Survey 

Donald T. McMillan, Director, Utah Geological and Mineralogical Survey, State 

of Utah 

Terry Nidiffer, Alaska Disaster Office, 

State of Alaska 

Honorable John H. Reading, Mayor of 

Oakland, California 

Major General Valentine A. Siefermann, 

The Adjutant General and Director of 

Civil Defense, State of Hawaii 

Karl V. Steinbrugge, Chairman, Seismic 

Safety Commission, State of California 

Robert Stevens, Federal Disaster Assistance Administration 

Honorable George Sullivan, Mayor of 

Anchorage, Alaska 

Charles C. Thiel, Research Applications 

Directorate, National Science Foundation 

Professor Ralph H. Turner, Department of 

Sociology, University of California at 

Los Angeles 

Darrell Waller, Staff of Adjutant General 

of Idaho 

Seymour Wengrovitz, Defense Civil Preparedness Agency 

MR. CARLSON : I propose to go back to our 

keynote speaker, Charles Manfred, and refer 

to the questions that he raised, because these 

seem to encapsulate the main problems. So let 

me start off with those questions and see if we 

tend to agree with the person who presented 

the paper as to the dimensions of the problem 

in each area. 

First, how rapid is the development of earthquake prediction technology? I gather from the 

comments presented by Mr. Hamilton that the 

full development will take a long period of time. 

However, there has been rather rapid advance 

during just the last 2 or 3 years. Also, that it is 

clearly worth trying to predict, and clearly 

worth passing on predictions to the public and 

private sector. 

Are there any members of the panel who feel 

they would like to discuss this aspect? 

MAYOR SULLIVAN: Do I understand from 

your comments that the Chinese are much, 

much further ahead than we are in predicting? 

And if so, when do we catch up, if possible? 

MR. HAMILTON: The Chinese are ahead in the 

sense that they have already issued earthquake 

predictions and have taken action that has 

saved lives. 

22 
They readily concede that they have made 

many mistakes in their predictions. They have 

issued warnings for earthquakes that did not 

come. It seems that the Chinese are not as concerned about this as I think we would be in the 

United States. 

MR. CARLSON : Were the benefits comme:nsurate with the fact that they had at least one 

false alarm? 

MR. HAMILTON : The benefits appear to outweigh the adverse effects because tens of 

thousands of lives were saved. That is just my 

opinion. We don't have any details from China. 

MR. CARLSON : Mayor Sullivan? 

MAYOR SULLIVAN: I just have one follow-up 

question. About 2 weeks ago, on the car radio,. 

driving to work, I heard a statement, from 

either A.P. or U.P.I., that I think could have 

come from your office, about a prediction for 

an earthquake in the Cordova area of Alaska. 

I searched very carefully in the newspapers 

the next 2 or 3 days, and there was nothing in 

the papers about this. Are you familiar with 

this? 

MR. HAMILTON : No, I am not. As far as I 

know, we have no predictions that are pending. 

MR. CARLSON : Mayor Reading of Oakland? 

MAYOR READING : Yes. Maybe I can pose the 

question in a little different way. What is the 

state of the art in terms of your ability to 

predict? How long will it be before you estimate 

you will be able to predict? 

Putting it another way, how long will it be 

before I can expect to get a call from the 

Governor saying "there is going to be a major 

earthquake in Oakland in 3 days?" 

MR. CARLSON : That goes to the second question brought up by our keynote speaker-how 

accurate is the technology? 

MR. HAMILTON : We are in a very difficult 

situation. We have instrumentation deployed in 

the San Francisco Bay region that could provide a basis for predictions. So, it would be conceivable that within the next year we could 

acquire some data that might lead us to believe 

that there would be an earthquake in this area. 

Now, the big problem is that we do not have 

any experience with having made predictions 

in the area. We mainly have seismographs in 

this area. We don't have many of the other 

types of instrumentation that would support 

seismic evidence. 

So, in answer to your question, it would be 

conceivable that within the next year we might 

have evidence that we feel we should pass 

along. We would have to admit that that evidence was fragmentary. 

MAYOR READING: So, it's a question of the 

degree of accuracy. Are you talking about a 10 

percent degree of accuracy, or a 50 percent 

degree of accuracy? Can you predict in that 

way? 

MR. CARLSON: There are two questions in 

that. One is you may not have the best equipment existing in the Oakland area, and that 

is the first problem. You may just be dealing 

with half of the necessary equipment. And if 

you have all of the equipment, your predictive 

efficiency may be higher. 

The second is: If you have optimal equipment 

available, what is the probability of a prediction? Maybe you can respond to the latter question instead of the former one? 

MR. HAMILTON : I think the ability to assign 

a percentage, or a judgment of reliability to a 

prediction, will have to come from experience. 

The Earth is a very complicated system. If 

we move into a new area with new instrumentation, we cannot be sure, until we have observed at least one or two earthquakes, that we 

really know that the same prediction techniques 

are going to work there that work elsewhere. 

I should point out that even in the central 

California area, south of Hollister, we have 

only observed several earthquakes of magnitude 

5, and so far no magnitude 6's. So, we really 

haven't been able to test fully our ideas in that 

area. 

Reliability, at the outset, will be very difficult 

to assess. As an example, before the Thanksgiving Day earthquake, we saw a magnetic 

anomaly, the first observed so far in central 

California. Now, the next time we see a large 

magnetic anomaly in central California, we will 

be inclined to think there is another earthquake 

coming. If it occurs, the reliability of magnetic 

anomalies for prediction will go up. This is very 

much an empirical approach. 

MAYOR READING: What was the lead time on 

that magnetic anomaly in central California? 

MR. HAMILTON : It was a matter of weeks. 

MAYOR READING: So, it would be in the 30-

day category? 

MR. HAMILTON : That's right. 

23 
MR. CARLSON : I think to summarize, we're 

not anywhere near the reliability of weathe·r 

forecasting, and we all know the reliability 

there. 

But, the key thing is that it is better than a 

table of random numbers. And the fact that 

you can start identifying earthquakes with 

some probability of success, even though it 

tends to be low until we develop the confidence, 

makes it worthwhile doing. 

MAYOR READING: Well, you know, I think 

there is a responsibility, as pointed out here, 

for the public officials to pass on this information if they get it. It would .seem to me necessary to do this in order to maintain the credibility of not only the people who are making 

the forecasting, but also the officials, and also 

to inform the people themselves so we can 

determine what they're going to do, based on 

that information. It would be helpful if a public 

official could say: "There is a 10 percent chance 

that there may be an earthquake in the next 30 

days." It would be better if you could give an 

idea of the reliability of the prediction. 

MR. CARLSON : Yes. I think that you should do 

that like weather forecasting, giving the probability as opposed to whether it's going to 

happen or not happen. And I agree with you 

regarding the information. 

Mr. Thiel? 

MR. THIEL : There is an assumption in your 

question that the predictions are going to be 

issued to you through the Governor's office, or 

through some political process. I think that is 

an assumption that is not warranted. 

MAYOR READING: That is what the information flow chart shows. 

MR. McKELVEY: It is a proposal. 

MR. THIEL : That is only for predictions coming out of the USGS system. 

A number of the predictions that were referred to by Mr. Hamilton were not made by 

USGS scientists. One was m.ade in the State of 

New York by scientists at Columbia University. 

The post-prediction of the San Fernando earthquake was made by Caltech scientists. And 

right at your own doorstep, there is a large 

university, operated by non-USGS funds, engaged in earthquake prediction activity. 

So, it is likely that predictions would be 

issued from non-USGS sources that are not subject to the Federal Government's program for 

evaluating and disseminating predictions arising from its own staff. 

MAYOR READING: Well, what are your lines 

of communication and coordination with these 

other facilities? 

MR. CARLSON : Before we get to that, may we 

just make sure we have completely explored 

the reliability aspect and the .state of the art? 

MR. COURTER : Yes. Let me clarify the question. Are we talking about an earthquake prediction reliability for only those kinds of earthquakes that have some kind of surface breakage 

or visibility? 

In the Puget Sound area, through a study of 

the USGS, we found that most of the earthquake activity is deeply seated and results 

chiefly in ground shaking. And because of the 

large amount of water in our area, there are 

many areas of weak soil. We would, therefore, 

be vulnerable to ground shaking. Now, are you 

also including this kind of earthquake in your 

predictions, and how reliable are they? It is 

hard to build up an awareness by public officials 

if they can't see any visible cracks in the surface of the Earth. 

MR. HAMILTON : The idea is to include all 

earthquakes that could cause damage, and not 

limit it to those that could cause surface faulting. Incidentally, the study in the Puget Sound 

area is funded by the USGS, although it is done 

by University of Washington scientists. 

GENERAL SIEFERMANN: Speaking of predictions of volcanic eruptions rather than earthquakes, I think that Drs. Tilling and Lockwood 

of the Geological Survey's Hawaiian Volcano 

Observatory have done a remarkable job predicting the last one almost to a T. Their forecasting is such that we pretty much believe 

them. There was an earthquake associated with 

that eruption, but it was localized. And there 

was one just a few days ago at Mauna Loa. So, 

we are expecting an earthquake and eruption 

within 2 weeks to 2 years. 

We think we can pretty well determine where 

the eruptions would occur, that there would be 

minor damage, and what control we would 

have. We are even making studies to determine 

what action we would take to divert a lava flow. 

Predictions, I feel, in the case of Hawaii, as 

far as eruptions are concerned, have come a 

long way. 

24 
MAYOR SULLIVAN: Do I get the understanding that some universities are predicting earthquakes? 

MR. HAMILTON : The science writer for the 

Los Angeles Times pointed out recently that 

there have been 21;2 successful earthquake predictions in the United States, and one failure. 

The two successes belong to the universities; 

a half success belongs to the Geological Survey, 

mainly because its prediction was made informally; and the failure belongs to the Geological Survey. 

MR. CARLSON: As Mr. Thiel brought out, 

there is no attempt at fragmentation in the 

scientific community. If the community remains 

together, we can make sure we have no pluralism of predictions. 

MR. THIEL: There also are private individuals who are issuing predictions. 

MAYOR SULLIVAN: Mr. Hamilton and Mr. 

McKelvey were speaking of deployment of instrumentation in California. Are the systems 

going to be nationwide, or is it just going to 

protect California? 

MR. CARLSON: Can you give us an idea, so 

everybody will know, what kind of initial costs 

and operating costs would be required for a 

city like Anchorage, or a city like San Francisco, so people will have an idea of the range? 

MR. HAMILTON : Well, we prepared a proposal for developing what we could call a prototype earthquake-prediction system in the two 

most active seismic areas of California, that is, 

the central California area and the San Jacinto 

fault area. The purpose of the two prototype 

systems would be to confirm our present findings with respect to earthquake precursors and 

try to show whether it is justified to expand 

that system further, and then, if things work 

out, also to expand that system into the two 

major urban areas of Los Angeles and San 

Francisco. We estimate we can do that on a 

budget of about $5 million a year. 

In Alaska there are more difficult operational 

problems, so the costs would be higher. But I 

think that gives us a feeling for the kind of 

money that is involved. 

Now I would like to say again, at this point 

we are still in the experimental phase, and I 

don't think we know just exactly what we 

would recommend for large-scale deployment. 

We still have to do quite a lot of research before 

we would recommend that instrumentation be 

deployed on a really large scale. 

MR. CARLSON : You're talking about a pinpointed area like Anchorage, or Reno, or Salt 

Lake City. You may be talking about $2 million 

for the capital investment and about $1 million 

for operating. Then, for larger areas such as 

Los Angeles and San Francisco, would you go 

up to a higher figure? 

MR. HAMILTON : You have to approach prediction on a regional basis. You can't approach 

it on a pinpointed basis, because the volume of 

rock that is involved in storing the stresses of 

the earthquake extends over hundreds of miles, 

and you have to cover that whole area in order 

to recognize the precursor signals. 

Part of the evidence as to the size of earthquakes, we think, will be the size of the area 

involved in the premonitory signals. So, a prediction system must be established on a regional basis. 

I think for southern Alaska, we are talking 

about something like $10 million. 

MR. CARLSON : For the whole region? 

MR. HAMILTON : Yes, including Anchorage. 

MR. CARLSON : But, it's not entirely a lump 

sum. You can talk about a closer net, or more 

instrumentation and less instrumentation. So 

it is not an ali-or-nothing type of investment, 

is it? 

MR. HAMILTON : That's right. 

MR. CARLSON : Does that answer your question, Mayor Reading? 

MAYOR READING: Can you tell us what is the 

status of instrumentation in San Francisco, 

Oakland, and along the San Andreas fault? 

MR. HAMILTON : The main instrumentation 

that now exists in the San Francisco Bay area 

is a network of seismograph stations. The additional instrumentation that could be installed 

would be tiltmeters, magnetometers, and sensors for monitoring the electrical resistivity of 

the ground. 

At the present time, such a blend of instrumentation exists only in the region south of 

Hollister, in what we call the experimental 

system. In addition, in the Bay region we carry 

on what are called trilateration surveys, which 

are surveys to detect changes in the length of 

lines to look for horizontal deformations in the 

Earth. But the main type of instrumentation in 

the Bay region is the seismograph network. 

25 
MR. CARLSON: We do not have funds in our 

budget to go ahead and instrument San Francisco, Los Angeles, Anchorage, or other communities at this time. In fact, I was hopeful 

that this conference would help us to see if we 

should move in that direction. 

MR. GREGORY: Mr. Secretary, I have a question of Mr. Hamilton. 

This instrumentation that is in the Hayward 

and San Andreas fault area, would Reno be in 

a region that such instrumentation covers? 

MR. HAMILTON : No, although the University 

of Nevada operates some instruments in the 

Reno area. We are operating networks of 

seismographs in a number of areas in the 

United States. If I may briefly list those regions, 

we are operating a network of seismograph 

stations in the Puget Sound region through. the 

University of Washington; there is a network 

in southern Alaska (partially concerned with 

environmental monitoring for the Trans-Alaska 

pipeline); in western Nevada through the University of Nevada at Reno; in Salt Lake City 

through the University of Utah; in southern 

Missouri through the University of St. Louis; 

and we are beginning to fund some work in the 

Northeastern United States. 

MR. WENGROVITZ: Mr. Hamilton, you have 

stated that your instrumentation was placed in 

a somewhat large geographic area. What I am 

wondering about ·is the ability to be able to 

predict exactly where an earthquake is liable 

to occur with respect to a smaller sized area. 

For example, if you're talking about an area 

that extended from Los Angeles to San Francisco, would you be able to say that both areas 

are likely to be subjected to an earthquake, or 

can you be more precise than that and say the 

Oakland area would be subject to it, but not 

the Los Angeles area, and perhaps not San 

Francisco? 

MR. HAMILTON : We anticipate that the predictions would be specific as to the area involved. So, it would not be a general prediction 

for the whole State of California. However, a 

magnitude-S earthquake could have precursory 

signals that extend over a fairly large area. 

MR. MANFRED : I just have one more point. 

What are the prospects of increasing, in money 

and time, these research activities in the next 

couple of years to change the rate of progress? 

Would the prediction capability develop faster? 

What are the prospects? 

MR. CARLSON : Obviously, there are several 

options as to how fast we can proceed. It will 

be important to us, from the Federal viewpoint, 

to gain some insight from you as to what would 

be appropriate. It also requires an assessment 

of the benefits we can expect from this new 

technology. 

Let me see if I can summarize. Although we 

have seen fairly rapid advances in recent years, 

we believe that the development of a prediction 

technology will continue for many more yearsthat it isn't going to be attained overnight. 

However, I judge from the suggestions in the 

presentations we've heard at this conference 

that it is worthwhile pursuing. And, if we do 

pursue prediction, we must consider its utilization aspects, which I would like to talk about 

now. That is, how does a State government, a 

local government, or the private sector use this 

information when it is available? I would like 

to consider the outline that Mr. McKelvey proposed for the flow of predictions from the scientific community to the public. It is obvious that 

some sort of process for handling predictions 

would have to be established. 

Let me turn this topic over to Mr. McKelvey. 

MR. McKELVEY: Could I just say something 

with respect to Mr. Thiel's point regarding the 

earthquake-prediction flow chart? 

We talked about the Geological Survey predictions and the way in which they would be 

handled. But as I mentioned during my talk, 

I think it's likely-if we are successful in setting up the system I've described with the 

Earthquake Prediction Council as the review 

mechanism, and if the States are successful in 

setting up a similar kind of mechanism, such as 

California has already done-that the responsible scientists in the academic community will 

want to enter that system. They will want to 

have their predictions understood and reviewed. 

So, I think that would follow if we set up the 

kind of system that we're talking about. 

MAYOR READING: I would like to comment on 

that. I think it's imperative that you get cooperation and coordination. We know about 

other reporting agencies and what has been 

brought out here very emphatically today is 

that there is a multitude of problems attached 

to any announcements of this sort, and that 

there ought to be an orderly plan for the distribution of that information. If you have someone who holds a press conference and all of a 

26 
sudden announces publicly that next week he 

thinks there is going to be an earthquake, then 

it completely disrupts the orderly government 

process. 

MR. CARLSON : I think the essence of your 

statement, Mayor Reading, is that first, we have 

. freedom of speech. Obviously, anybody can 

speak on any topic they wish. However, it may 

be useful to identify an agency, so that if somebody does have information, they know where 

they can take it. And that agency would put the 

data into a system of screening and verification 

so the people may judge how reliable that prediction may be. 

MAYOR READING: Well, it seems to me that 

the responsibility is one that belongs in the 

Federal Government, for example, in the Geological Survey, or with someone who can go to 

these various agencies and say, "Look, are you 

willing to cooperate with us and to run through 

the normal screening processes if you have such 

a prediction?" 

MR. CARLSON: In terms of the Federal family, the Geological Survey would be the appropriate place. But you're talking also about 

academic communities that are not under the 

jurisdiction of the Federal Government. You 

would want to have some sort of comprehensive 

policy that would enable the Federal Government to process information from other 

sources. 

I do think it is important to be careful how 

this information flows, and to have responsible 

people who provide moderation to statements 

that might come out of the blue. 

MAYOR READING: That is the point I am trying to make, it should go through an appropriate channel. 

MR. McKELVEY: At the present time we don't 

have the authority to require one. We don't 

have the system established fully, either. But I 

would think that if we do have the Earthquake 

Prediction Council that I've described set up 

and operating, it would be entirely within its 

purview, if it learns of a prediction that is 

being developed, to invite the person to submit 

his data. And the State Council could act 

similarly. 

MAYOR READING: I fully understand that you 

don't have the authority to direct a person to 

do that. But I think that you could develop a 

plan-which you've done--and then persuade 

the scientific community that it's to their best 

27 

interest as well as everyone else's that they go 

through approved channels. 

MR. McKELVEY: Scientists are going to feel 

that responsibility. 

PROFESSOR TURNER: I think we have come to 

this crucial problem: We are tempted to solve 

our problems by restricting the flow of information. The moment we start doing that, we 

create all sorts of complications which tend to 

make a bad situation worse. And I think we 

must distinguish between the matters of releasing predictions, authenticating predictions, and 

issuing warnings. These are three different 

things. 

Now, I understand that the proposal presented by Mr. McKelvey has to do very largely 

with the authentication of predictions and with 

steps toward issuing warnings. 

But just think what is involved in trying to 

prevent people who think they have evidence 

that there is going to be an earthquake from 

making a public statement. Is that going to include astrologers, or are you only going to 

restrict legitimate scientists? 

You simply have an absolutely unmanageable 

and uncontrollable situation if you start trying 

to prevent people who, for whatever reason, 

honestly believe that they have evidence, from 

releasing that information. 

And, in any case, I would like to remind you 

again that information leaks out. The longer 

we hold it back, the longer we try to deliberate 

over whether to release it or not, the greater 

the certainty that the press will get it and it 

will come out. Then the people who are trying 

to be responsible about it will be embarrassed. 

It is a much better alternative to have the 

information come out independently and then 

simply say: Well, we don't know whether this 

information is valid yet. But we are giving it 

serious consideration. 

Everything we know about public reaction 

indicates that when people have confidence that 

the scientists and the officials are seriously considering a question, they don't force precipitate 

action; it's when they think that something is 

hidden that then they start to force precipitate 

action. 

MR. CARLSON : I think you can see that tlfe 

precursors don't start the night before an 

earthquake. There is a buildup of suggestive 

data that permits people to say, "Can we interpret it this way or not?" 
It's not like something that develops overnight and is hidden from view-indications 

tend to build up over time. So, we do have time 

to formulate plans. 

An earthquake-prediction review system can 

be built around what Mr. McKelvey has said. 

Perhaps the geophysical information will flow 

through those channels for weeks or months 

while people develop an actual prediction, and 

have some confidence to give a warning, together with the costs and benefits associated 

with it. 

MR. MARR : This is related to a situation we 

had recently at Oroville, California. I happened 

to be in Utah for a meeting the night of the 

earthquake, and you wouldn't believe the number of phone calls I received. People were just 

staggered with the idea of an earthquake, because there was a likelihood that the Oroville 

dam would be affected. And knowing the volume of water behind that dam, if someone had 

said that the dam might fail, there could have 

been a real panic of people trying to get out of 

the way. 

It amazed me how many of our members who 

work near Oroville traced me down and asked 

wha.t to do. There could have been a really 

chaotic situation. 

So, when officials are handling predictions, 

there has got to be careful analysis of who is 

going to be issuing statements. 

MR. CARLSON: I'm wondering if Mr. McMillan would like to add to that, because of your 

familiarity with your part of the country? 

MR. McMILLAN : We, of course, are also on 

the watch. Salt Lake City lies astride the 

Wasatch fault and is in a potentially active 

earthquake zone. But you can't ignore the fact 

that in 150 years of settlement in the Salt Lake 

Valley, there has not been a destructive earthquake. 

What I would like to ask Mr. Hamilton is: 

Whether or not there are long-range predictors-or if he thinks there will be long-range 

predictors-that might give a lead time of 1 or 

2 or 3 years, during which time instrumentation 

can be increased so that the imminence of a 

potential shock can then be predicted in time 

intervals of 30 days and on down to a 10-day 

or 48-hour prediction? 

MR. HAMILTON : There is evidence that the 

bigger the earthquake the longer the lead time 

in terms of when the signals first begin. 

In Japan, before the earthquake in 1964, the 

first changes in sea level occurred about 10 

years before the earthquake. Similarly, for the 

earthquake that occurred in Tashkent in the 

Soviet Union about 10 years ago, changes in 

radon gas had increased in well water about 10 

years ahead. 

So, for the big earthquakes, there is evidence 

to indicate that there may be very long lead 

time-on the order of perhaps as much as 10 

years. 

We would expect that, as you pick up signals 

that indicate that something may be developing, 

you would move additional instrumentation into 

the area to confirm the early results and to 

sharpen the prediction. 

There have been several occasions in the last 

few years where we, in our studies, have picked 

up something that looked suggestive of an 

anomaly. We followed up with additional instrumentation. But in all cases, the anomaly 

was not confirmed. 

MR. MCMILLAN: And wouldn't this be an 

avenue worth ·pursuing in order to bring the 

art of earthquake prediction into a widespread 

area, and yet control the rather high cost of 

closely spaced instrumentation? 

Mr. HAMILTON: Yes. That would be the 

approach. But, I should point out that you have 

to have at least a partial network of instrumentation. 

In the Salt Lake City area, we have a rather 

sparse network of seismograph stations, but 

no other type of instrumentation. The University of Utah has some instrumentation, but it's 

not adequate to constitute a prediction system, 

even of a sparse nature. But you're right. Probably the best approach is to gradually upgrade 

the instrumentation, and then when you identify a problem, to intensify the efforts. 

MR. THIEL: Mr. McMillan, you made a statement that I can't agree with. There have been 

a number of damaging earthquakes in the Salt 

Lake City area since the time it has beeri occupied by European man. There have been no 

great earthquakes, but please note that a great 

earthquake, in terms of damage and intensity, 

in the Salt Lake area, does not have to be the 

giant titanic process that takes place on the 

West Coast. The seismic resistance of the structures in the Salt Lake area does not match that 

of the principal West Coast areas. Therefore, a 

28 
smaller shake can cause the same intensity of 

damage. 

MR. MCMILLAN : You're right. I had no intention of downgrading the potential dangers. For 

instance, the Pocatello Valley earthquake of 

last March 29th [1975], had it occurred in Salt 

Lake City, would have caused major destruction. It was a stronger shock than that which 

destroyed the City of Managua, Nicaragua, a 

few years ago. We are well aware of that. 

And, you're right. There have been shocks 

which did cause damage in Salt Lake City. I 

didn't mean to say that there haven't been. But 

what I did mean is that there has not been, 

during that period of time, a major destructive 

earthquake in the immediate Salt Lake City 

area. 

MR. CARLSON : I gather from our discussion, 

we are agreeing with the general approach to 

earthquake warning that has been outlined in 

Mr. McKelvey's proposal. Even though it is 

rather general, the process provides for verification and for identifying who is the responsible person. That is something we all support. 

We would frown on trying to hide the information from the news media. There would have to 

be a responsible release of information as that 

information is gathered over a period of time. 

That moves us to Mr. Manfred's comments 

on how our earthquake predictions could be 

communicated to the public. The question we 

have yet to talk about is: How do we release 

this to the public? 

Now, we have made some mention of the extent that this might be on a probabilistic basis: 

"We expect an earthquake of magnitude three 

to five on the Richter scale in the next 90 days 

in such and such an area. The probability of 

this occurring is 10-20 percent, or 40-50 percent, or some range of probability." 

Are there comments on how we would release 

information to the public, no matter who is 

doing it, whether it's the scientific community 

or a public body. 

And of course, the release has to be tied to 

what you are going to do about the problem. 

What is the government to do, and the people 

who provide the goods and the services? So, 

you would have to accompany a warning with 

what steps are expected to be taken. May we 

talk about that for a minute? 

GENERAL SIEFERMANN : With regard to prediction of volcanic eruptions in Hawaii, the 

scientific community contacts the Governor, and 

the Governor makes the determination to release the information. It then falls on my office, 

which handles the emergency and civil defense, 

to disseminate the information to the public and 

to direct the action they would take and to 

coordinate the action we would take. This seems 

to work really well. 

MR McKELVEY: I wonder if I could ask for a 

reaction to the idea that an authenticated prediction-and with reference to the system that 

we've proposed, predictions having been authenticated and released by the Geological Survey-ought to go to the State Governor before 

it goes to the general public, so that a warning 

and prediction reaches the public at the same 

time? So that the public is not given a prediction without also being given something from 

the State and local authorities as to the defe11-

sive reactions that they can take? 

GENERAL SIEFERMANN: I think it should go 

to the Governor so the flow of information can 

be controlled. You get more factual information 

disseminated to the public. 

MAYOR READING: In view of what you have 

told us here, I think it is important that there is 

a body that authenticates a prediction. I also 

think it important that the prediction go 

through the Governor and the local officials so 

that when it is announced you also can relate 

the precautionary measures the public can take. 

MR. CARLSON : Then, you will need to have 

the interpretation following rather quickly, if 

not simultaneously, the announcement of 

what could happen. And, the elected officials of 

the State and Federal Governments are the ones 

whom we normally trust in our society to carry 

out that function. So I think you're generally 

saying that you favor this approach. 

MAYOR READING: Absolutely. 

MR. COURTER: Not only that, but I think it's 

also very important that the prediction be presented in language that can be easily understood, not only by the public officials at the 

State and local level of government, but also by 

the citizenry who is going to receive this kind 

of information. 

Often times, we get information that can be 

misinterpreted. If we are going to receive a 

prediction, it should be stated in understandable 

terms, and it should be given with a suggested 

action or alternatives so that we really have 

29 
something to evaluate at the State and local 

government levels. 

MR. CARLSON : Possible responses were outlined in the paper presented by Mr. Thiel: If 

you have 3 days, there are some things you do; 

with 30 days, you do other things; and with 

3,000 days, you can respond in other ways. 

MR. MANFRED : I think we have to be very 

realistic about it. There are no secrets; we have 

a free and open society. 

I do think that the Survey should establish a 

council to authenticate predictions. You should 

make a special effort to see that responsible 

officials in the area of concern are notified. But, 

chances are that the responsible officials and 

the public are going to be notified at just about 

the same time. Emergency service organizations have to begin to give this some thought 

and come up with plans and procedures early 

in the prediction stage: What are we going to 

do if the Survey tells us an earthquake is 

imminent? 

MR. CARLSON : It is going to be important for 

society to know that there is a responsible group 

that can provide an authoritative appraisal of 

what is being talked about. 

MR. STEINBRUGGE: I certainly agree with the 

ideas expressed in the proposed plan. I would 

like, however, to ask a question. 

Is there mechanism so we don't have two 

groups developing diverse answers? Let us say 

that university seismologists make a prediction 

and it's in the gray zone, which we all feel may 

well be the case. Would this prediction be reviewed by the USGS? 

I am concerned that there may be substantial 

differences in the interpretation of the scientific data. We must be sure that we aren't faced 

with the USGS stating that a prediction is 

probably true, while some other credible institution states that it is probably not true, or 

vice versa. I think this can be a disaster in 

itself. 

MR. CARLSON : Well, I think the key thing is : 

We want to make sure there is a responsible 

body somewhere to verify a prediction. 

MR. STEINBRUGGE: 'I am not critical of the 

proposed plan. I only see a problem which 

might arise. I find no fault with what has been 

proposed. But I would like to see the plan 

structured in such a way that a scientific consensus might develop with regard to a prediction. 

MR. CARLSON: Mr. McKelvey? 

MR. McKELVEY: The situation that Mr. Steinbrugge is anticipating is one we can expect 

from time to time. The situation in which the 

significance of evidence is not agreed to by all 

specialists in the area is not an unusual one in 

scientific matters at all. And indeed, it does 

pose an additional complexity in the problem. 

But, as I indicated, we would expect that an 

Earthquake Prediction Council in the Surveyand I think this would be probably the case in 

State organizations also-would from time to 

time issue conclusions that are not agreed to by 

all members. This may be such that we would 

evaluate the situation as one of greater uncertainty. Those facts would have to be presented 

to the State and to the general public, and additional emphasis would have to be placed on the 

investigative process to try to narrow the range 

of uncertainty. 

We are not facing a problem with easy solu~ 

tions here. And we can expect to have to cope 

with difficulties of many kinds. This is only one 

of them. 

MR. CARLSON : Let me throw into our deliberations some of the final points that Mr. Manfred gave us earlier. Will the social and economic costs resulting from prediction exceed 

the cost of the earthquake destruction? In this 

regard, which is the more acceptable risk? And 

how will the people and their government organizations respond to earthquake predictions? 

Let's consider these points in our discussion. 

MR. THIEL : I've a two-part question. There 

are going to be a number of panel meetings by 

committees on procedures. How would procedures apply to the Federal level; and are these 

prediction meetings going to be open to the 

public and will they include a participation 

phase? 

First, I would like to ask Dr. Turner whether 

the prediction review meetings should be open 

to the public. And secondly, I would like to ask 

Mr. Carlson whether they will be open to the 

public. 

MR. CARLSON : Professor Turner? 

PROFESSOR TURNER : Well, that is a loaded 

question. I have to answer it as from a personal 

viewpoint, as this is not something that was 

discussed in the National Academy of Sciences 

panel, and therefore I can't shift the responsibility to anybody else for the answer. 

30 
I think technical questions and policy discussions are two different things. 

Technical questions have to be answered on 

technical grounds. Any time political considerations and policy considerations enter into the 

determination of a technical matter, we're in 

trouble. 

Now, I think the point is that when you open 

up a technical discussion to the public, you invite the intrusion of political policy considerations. So, I would say that insofar as a panel or 

group is involved in the technical evaluation of 

evidence to determine whether there is going 

to be an earthquake or not, it should be a closed 

meeting of technical people. 

The question of policy is another type of 

question. But I would make that distinction. 

MR. CARLSON: Within the Federal Government there is a Freedom of Information Act, 

and anybody can demand access to that kind of 

information, and we would be obligated to provide it. In fact, frankly speaking, I see no reason to withhold the technical information, for 

it is going to be building up over a time. It is 

going to be available. The interpretations will 

come more slowly. 

On the policy side, I'm sure that the important policy is set prior to the occurrence of the 

event. What we will do depends on given circumstances. If you have a 3,000-day lead time, 

then obviously, policy decisions will develop 

over a long period of time. There may be some 

brainstorming going on that wouldn't necessarily be public. But, I certainly think that the 

technical data would be generally available to 

the public. And we have made a point of making 

sure that the scientific findings of the Federal 

Government are separate, as much as possible, 

from the policy side. 

PROFESSOR TURNER : Let me just make sure 

my answer is clear. It is the deliberations of 

the technical body which should be private. But 

once the technical body reaches some sort of 

conclusion, then all that information should be 

public and none of it should be withheld. There 

should be no censoring or withholding of the 

technical information, because the scientist 

must not decide what is good for the public to 

know and what is not good for them to know. 

MR. CARLSON : Science is too important to 

society to be left to scientists; is that what you 

are saying? 

GENERAL SIEFERMANN : During the last event 

that we had in Hawaii, we responded on a local 

government level just about as you stated. We 

had a consultation with the scientific community. Then, it was the local government that 

issued the information. 

We are now working with the scientific community and the Geological Survey to set up the 

basic procedures whereby we can get together 

and almost immediately develop the information necessary so that it can be disseminated to 

the public. 

Being an optimist, I think that more information is always more useful than less information. There may be occasions when that isn't 

true, but I would hypothesize that most of us 

feel it is worthwhile taking action as opposed 

to not doing so. We would have to look at it on 

a case-by-case basis to see. 

MAYOR READING: Mr. Chairman, I have a 

question of Mr. Manfred. It's pointed out here 

that when the dissemination of the prediction 

is made-and as far as I'm concerned that 

would only come from my office after it has 

gone through the review board-we should 

have a response plan that we would start to 

implement. And that plan would be announced 

to the public. 

Now, it seems to me that it's rather impractical, and a duplication of effort, if every local 

municipality developed their own plan. It seems 

the more realistic approach to this would be 

for the [California] Office of Emergency Services to develop model emergency plans for the 

use of the counties and cities in the area of a 

prediction. 

MR. MANFRED: Yes. You can be sure that our 

Governmental Response Committee, meeting in 

Oakland, is identifying the problems, and we 

will be developing a plan in California. 

I mentioned in my talk that California is 

fortunate in terms of our emergency organizations, and particularly our planning. Our plan 

is based on the consignment of shared responsibilities in a mutual manner. We work closely 

with the cities and counties in the State, and 

will continue to do so to meet this problem. 

MR. CARLSON : Let me pose two additional 

questions. And I'm wondering if I could call 

upon Charles Ford, of the insurance industry, 

and also Mr. Dale Marr, to suggest: (1) how 

the public at large, as opposed to the governmental sector, would tend to react towards 

31 
earthquake predictions; and (2) the benefits 

that may be associated with prediction from the 

perspective of the insurance industry. 

And after we hear from these two gentlemen, 

I would like the rest of us to be thinking of the 

important next steps that we should consider 

after this meeting is over. Do you feel that we 

should move in the direction of improving the 

prediction capability, of authenticating the predictions, of having a warning system tied to it? 

MR. FORD : Let me say first that these are personal observations not related to any organization. 

I think we must look at insurance response in 

two parts. The insurance mechanism deals with 

fortuitous events. In our private organizations, 

we have earthquake insurance available at rea,.. 

sonable cost. This has been substantiated by 

Mr. George Bernstein, then Federal Insurance 

Administrator, before the Congress, and by Mr. 

Lawrence Baker, then California Chief Deputy 

Insurance Commissioner, who addressed the 

same subject before the Senate Investigating 

Committee on the San Fernando earthquake. 

There is earthquake insurance and it is available. The problem is that it is not generally 

purchased. We would like to see earthquake 

insurance more broadly purchased, but this 

can't be done without a willing buyer. 

Insurance is something that is bought for a 

price-the premium-for a contractual expenditure under circumstances of fortuitous 

loss for a specified amount of indemnity. Does 

prediction based on precursors remove the 

earthquake event from the fortuitous and does 

the event become an actuality at that time? If 

it does, then the purchase of insurance after 

a prediction, as when any loss is imminent, is 

not a proper involvement for the insurance 

mechanism. 

No one would expect to place insurance on a 

burning building nor would they expect a life 

insurance company to insure the man in a hospital bed who has been advised by his doctor 

that he is terminal. To require the certain loss 

rather than the fortuitous unexpected loss 

would put a cost burden on the insurancebuying public which would be unthinkable and 

an economic disaster. 

The problem then is to get people to buy 

earthquake insurance on a long-range basis. If 

a person has purchased and holds a policy, the 

company will stay with it and respond. Witness 

these circumstances drawn from our experience 

when Hurricane Betsy lay off the coast of 

Louisiana. It sat for 3 days and then directed 

itself at the coast at New Orleans. The insurance industry did a lot of fingernail biting and 

waited for the roof to fall in. 

MR. CARLSON : Did you sell a lot of insurance 

the day before? 

MR. FORD: No. We stayed with the contractual 

obligations that we had and those prudent 

people who had insurance. 

I think we have a necessity of getting broad 

acceptance of earthquake insurance coverages. 

What means this may take-in what way it 

can be done-I don't know. 

After the San Fernando earthquake, anumber of companies ran full-page ads in the "Los 

Angeles Times" advertising earthquake insurance, and cutting the price. They didn't get 

their bait back. The new premium didn't offset 

the cost of the advertisements. 

We have a lot of thinking to do with regard 

to capacity should insurance become required 

or generally accepted. Then you are talking 

about loss potential in the Los Angeles area 

on dwelling property alone which could amount 

to $3 billion dollars. Plus another $5 billion 

for nondwelling property. Certainly there is 

no insurance mechanism in the world that 

could take care of this magnitude of loss. 

At the present moment, earthquake insurance 

is available. We must find some way of getting 

more people to buy it, whether it be mandated 

or whatever means. At some point, more capital 

will be required than is presently available. 

At the present moment, we are insuring 

earthquake loss, we are anxious to provide it, 

but people won't buy it. 

MR. SULLIVAN: Let me respond to the issue of 

rates. Are you speaking only for the State of 

California, or are you speaking about the 50 

States? 

MR. FORD: I'm speaking generally. 

MR. SULLIVAN: In Anchorage, we operate 

our own port. The question is, we have a 

tremendously hard time trying to get earthquake coverage on the port facility, even partial 

coverage. The rates on it are another question. 

They are extremely high rates. 

MR. FORD : What is reasonable in the Port 

of Alaska [Anchorage], I don't know. 

I know that the Golden Gate Bridge Authority had trouble filling their insurance require32 
ments a few years ago. There was not capacity 

in the world market to give them enough 

policy limit to cover the appreciated value of 

that bridge. There was no problem when it was 

built, at the level of costs at that time. But with 

the escalation of inflation and everything else, 

they ran out of market. 

MR. CARLSON: Mr. Dale Marr? 

MR. MARR: Well, Mr. Chairman, the people 

I represent are pretty practical people. 

The question that Dr. Turner raises is the one 

that I think is the key as to how the general 

public, at least the public that we represent 

(some 37,000 members), will react. The problem is: who do you believe and how do you keep 

the issue out of politics? 

We have a prime example of that right here 

in California today in the nuclear-energy hearings that are going on in Sacramento. If we 

have the same thing for earthquake prediction, 

the public is going to take a very jaundiced look 

at it, I'm afraid. 

We are seeing some world-renowned scientists say that nuclear energy is the only way 

to go, but we also have other equally wellknown scientists disputing that. 

And so, the public is saying, "Who's paying 

who to say what." 

It is not fair to the scientists, but unfortunately this is what I'm hearing out in the field. 

I just don't know how you can prevent this, 

because scientists have to discuss things. How 

do you get the public to understand that the 

experts are going to disagree on many subjects 

for a long time to come? 

Now, look at Crescent City. When the people 

there were told to evacuate because a tidal wave 

was coming, they didn't get out. And the wave 

was something that could be tracked and was 

estimated to be only a few hours away. People 

just didn't believe it was going to happen. Look 

at Hilo-it has been wiped out several times 

in the last century or two by tidal waves, and 

people move right back in again, and they say, 

"It isn't going to happen again." 

How do you get the general public to really 

believe the scientists? And when the scientists 

get into arguments in the press among themselves, I think it further confuses the general 

public, which doesn't have a scientific background. 

MR. LEE: Mr. Secretary, I want to ask one 

question. 

I am the president of the State Building 

and Construction Trades Council of California, 

representing 350,000 members. 

Now, when you take into consideration the 

members, plus their families, we are talking 

about a line of communication that we possess 

in this State with a million people. My question 

is : How can organized labor and, in particular 

the building trades, help? What part can we 

play in participating fully in an earthquake 

warning program, particularly as far as disseminating information to the membership is 

concerned? 

MR. CARLSON: That's a good question. And 

in fact, that could be an item we can consider 

in terms of follow-up from these deliberations 

today. 

Let· me go around the table for any recommendations you'd like to make on the question 

I posed earlier. And if you don't have any 

particular recommendations at this time, and 

you would like to share some with us later, we 

would appreciate a note. 

I will start with Bob Stevens: 

MR. STEVENS: I don't think I have any recommendations that haven't already been made, 

except to say that we certainly endorse all 

speed in the direction we seem to be headed. 

And I think it's critical that we have this as 

fast as reasonably prudent in order to accomplish our goals. 

MR. CARLSON: Mr. McMillan? 

MR. McMILLAN : We find, in the Salt Lake 

region, there is very little interest in earthquake insurance as demonstrated by the fact 

that the people simply don't buy it. I would 

be interested in pursuing the insurance angle. 

MR. CARLSON : Mayor Reading? 

MAYOR READING: We are in the stage of 

developing some hazard analysis of our own, 

and we are also interested in the insurance 

phase. 

MR. CARLSON: Mr. Wengrovitz? 

MR. WENGROVITZ: Yes. I have two points. The 

first is reemphasizing the statements made by 

Mr. Manfred and Mayor Reading, pertaining to 

the development of emergency operation plans, 

not only at the State level, but also at the local 

level for those communities that are involved. 

And secondly, you have got a promotional 

job to do. You've got a selling job to do in the 

sense of convincing the community that earthquake prediction and warning is valid, is accep33 
table, and is accurate. That message has to 

be conveyed to the public. Until then, until you 

get the message across, you will not get any 

follow-up action. 

MR. CARLSON : Thank you. 

Mr. Nidiffer? 

MR. NIDIFFER: Well, it seems apparent the 

funding in this direction will be limited for the 

next few years. 

It seems to be appropriate that the dollars 

available should be put into the first predictable event and that a pilot program be developed that could be transferred to another 

locality. That would be my recommendation, 

rather than each community or each State 

spending a tremendous amount of time and 

effort without the benefit of the sensors and 

the prediction ability. 

MR. CARLSON: Mr. Courter? 

MR. COURTER: Agreeing with that, I would 

also emphasize that urban planning or land-use 

planning efforts be included in our endeavor. 

In addition to that, I think we should address 

the code enforcement and building construction standards aspects. 

MR. CARLSON : General Siefermann? 

GENERAL SIEFERMANN: I don't have anything further to say, except I would like to make 

a statement with regard to the ones that have 

been made-about people moving back into 

Hilo. There was a land-use program for redevelopment of the city of Hilo that resulted 

in siting an entirely different government and 

commercial complex away from the area affected by the last tsunami. So actually, we did have 

proper land-use development there. 

MAYOR SULLIVAN: Following the 1964 earthquake in Alaska, we did upgrade substantially 

our building codes by working with the architects and engineers in Alaska and from out of 

State, too. 

And secondly, we are working very closely 

with the Governor's Office of Preparedness and 

have a very active program of our own in the 

community. 

MR. GREGORY : I would urge the Federal 

Government to establish a line of communication and coordination with all academic and 

private agencies that are involved with earthquake prediction systems to try to eliminate 

predictions going out inadvertently and sporadically and instead to have them all come 

through one central office, the Governor's office 

of the State involved. 

Also, I would encourage the Federal Government to provide the responsible agency within 

the community information which the agency 

could use to educate the public as to the validity 

and feasibility of earthquake predictions. 

For I think once the public is educated, you'll 

get a better response from them. 

MR.CARLSON: Is there anything additional 

that you would like to add? Mr. McKelvey? 

MR. McKELVEY: I would only add this: An 

invitation to all of you, including the audience, 

to send us additional thoughts that you may 

have. We would welcome them. 

PROFESSOR TURNER: Two quick points. 

I think we must very quickly establish a 

policy of treating the issuance of earthquake 

warnings as emergencies for legislative purposes, and that we should examine current legislation from this point of view. 

We will certainly have to make some additions to the Relief Act of 1974, and/or other 

legislation, to make available in the community 

as soon as there is a warning, some of the types 

of assistance that would become available to 

them after the earthquake is over. 

And the other point is to emphasize that most 

disaster emergency plans focus on the police 

and other emergency agencies. This is quite 

appropriate when you're speaking of, say, a 

warning of a few days. But if it is a relatively 

longer period of warning that is involved, the 

major activity will have to do with land-use 

planning, building improvements, and so on. So 

most emergency plans need to be modified to 

put the planning departments, building construction departments, and so on, centrally into 

the plans. 

MR. CARLSON: Thank you, Professor. Mr. 

Joyce? 

MR. JOYCE : I would like to second the statement of Professor Turner. The physical crisis 

in the cities and the counties, to my mind, requires a great deal more funding to be coming 

forth from both the Federal and State Governments for emergency preparedness. We should 

not wait until such time that predictions are 

available. Because it's too late then. This funding must be looked at, the plans must be prepared, and it must come together before, and 

not something that comes after, the prediction. 

34 
MR. CARLSON : Last but not least, Mr. Manfred? 

MR. MANFRED: Well, as I indicated in my 

opening remarks, I think we can judge the 

policy in California by our actions. 

We will continue to monitor the development 

of the technology. We are in the process of 

modifying our emergency-preparedness plan 

and programs, and we are going to keep the 

lines of communication open with the Federal 

Government and will pass on any information 

we get to the cities and counties. 

We'll work together, Mayor Reading, on that 

model plan. 

MR. CARLSON : Well, ladies and gentlemen, I 

think we've had a full morning. I learned a lot 

from the formal reports and from our discussions. 

Obviously, we will not solve all of our problems today. This conference is just one of many 

steps in the direction of utilizing a new technology that will permit the forecasting of destructive earthquakes. 

We have considered the questions Mr. Manfred raised : 

How rapid is the development of earthquake 

predictions and how reliable are they? They 

35 

apparently will be of sufficient value to justify 

continued research. 

Will the Federal Government be able to establish an earthquake-prediction system? This 

will depend on further research progress and 

additional funding. 

And how are earthquake predictions to be 

communicated to the public? I think we can 

move in the direction proposed, including an 

authentication system for the prediction of 

earthquakes. 

How will the people in the Government organizations respond to earthquake predictions? 

That is reflected, in part, in what we have discussed today. 

Judging from your comments here, I think 

that it is incumbent, on each of us, from various 

levels of government and the private sector, to 

give additional consideration to these questions. 

The bottom line is : Are the benefits of prediction worth the cost of additional steps in the 

public policy area? I think most of us here are 

saying, "Yes!" We will have to proceed with 

these additional steps, and we would appreciate 

your help in defining what they should be. 

We have greatly appreciated your participa.. 

tion in this conference. I certainly felt it was 

worthwhile and I look forward to the next occasion to meet with you.