IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

Assigned on Briefs September 8, 2021

WILLIAM SCOTT HUNLEY v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Madison County

No. C-20-35 Roy B. Morgan, Jr., Judge

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No. W2020-01695-CCA-R3-PC

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The petitioner, William Scott Hunley, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, 

arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of 

counsel at trial and on appeal. After our review of the record, briefs, and applicable law, 

we affirm the denial of the petition. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

J. ROSS DYER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER

and CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN, JJ., joined.

M. Todd Ridley, Assistant Public Defender, Tennessee District Public Defenders 

Conference (on appeal) and Jeremy Brent Epperson, District Public Defender, and Mitchell 

A. Raines, Assistant Public Defender (at post-conviction hearing), for the appellant, 

William Scott Hunley.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Ronald L. Coleman, Assistant 

Attorney General; Jody S. Pickens, District Attorney General; and Al Earls, Assistant 

District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

Facts and Procedural History

On direct appeal, this Court summarized the facts surrounding the petitioner’s 

convictions for possession of methamphetamine with intent to sell, possession of 

methamphetamine with intent to deliver, simple possession of marijuana, and possession 

of drug paraphernalia, as follows:

09/21/2021
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On the evening of July 22, 2016, officers with the Madison County 

Narcotics Unit were conducting surveillance of a hotel in Jackson. The 

officers had received a tip that methamphetamine was being manufactured 

and sold out of two hotel rooms. The officers watched as the [petitioner] and 

his minor son pulled into the parking lot and approached one of the rooms. 

Sergeant Samuel Gilley and Lieutenant Chris Long approached the 

[petitioner] and explained they had been notified that methamphetamine was 

being manufactured and sold out of the room he was about to enter. The 

[petitioner] agreed to allow the officers to search his room and told the 

officers that there might be marijuana in the room. Sergeant Gilley testified 

that the [petitioner] gave written consent to the search of his hotel room, and 

the written consent form was entered into evidence.

Sergeant Gilley testified that he searched the room while Lieutenant 

Long talked to the [petitioner]. Sergeant Gilley found a small glass jar 

containing marijuana in close proximity to a desk. He also found a piece of 

brown paper with names and numbers written on it, which was “consistent 

with what I would call a drug ledger.” He testified based on his experience 

the ledger is “a perfect indication” of someone selling drugs rather than using 

drugs. At that point, Sergeant Gilley asked the [petitioner] for permission to 

search his truck. According to both Sergeant Gilley and Lieutenant Long, the 

[petitioner] consented to the search.

Sergeant Gilley found a potato chip bag in a pocket located on the 

back of the front passenger’s seat. There were two plastic bags inside the 

potato chip bag. One bag contained 3.55 grams of methamphetamine, and 

the other bag contained 8.92 grams of marijuana. Sergeant Gilley also found 

a set of digital scales. When Sergeant Gilley confronted the [petitioner] about 

what he had found, the [petitioner] began begging the officers to not take him 

to jail. Sergeant Gilley testified that the [petitioner] offered to aid in other 

narcotics investigations. Sergeant Gilley and Lieutenant Long decided not to 

arrest the [petitioner] because they believed he could assist in other 

investigations. Sergeant Gilley further testified that at the time of the search 

the [petitioner] did not seem to be under the influence of any narcotic. On 

cross-examination, both Lieutenant Long and Sergeant Gilley admitted that 

they had not observed the [petitioner] selling methamphetamine.

The [petitioner] also testified during the trial. He admitted that he had 

methamphetamine and marijuana in his truck, but claimed that he had 

intended to use it himself. He testified that he has been using 
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methamphetamine for approximately sixteen years. He testified that neither 

Lieutenant Long nor Sergeant Gilley ever asked him if he was selling 

methamphetamine. The [petitioner] disputed consenting to the search of his 

truck. According to the [petitioner], he only agreed to let the officers search 

his truck after they threatened to call the Department of Children Services to 

remove his son if he did not allow the officers to search his truck. 

Additionally, the [petitioner] claimed that the ledger was not his and that it 

was not in his handwriting.

The State recalled Sergeant Gilley as a witness. Sergeant Gilley 

testified that he asked the [petitioner] if he was selling methamphetamine and 

the [petitioner] responded that “he wasn’t doing nothing big.”

State v. William Scott Hunley, No. W2018-00648-CCA-R3-CD, 2019 WL 951404, at *1-

2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 26, 2019), perm. app. denied (Tenn. June 21, 2019).

Following the denial of his direct appeal, the petitioner filed a timely pro se petition 

for post-conviction relief, arguing, in part, trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object

to Sergeant Gilley’s statement about the petitioner’s connections to the “drug world” or 

request a mistrial following Lieutenant Long’s testimony regarding the petitioner’s prior 

“drug dealing.” Counsel was appointed, and an evidentiary hearing was held on December 

7, 2020, during which the petitioner and trial counsel testified. Although the petitioner 

asserted numerous claims in his petition, we will summarize only the evidentiary hearing 

testimony relevant to his claim on appeal.

The petitioner testified that he retained trial counsel to represent him on the current 

charges. In the nine months prior to trial, the petitioner and trial counsel met four times at 

the jail, where they reviewed discovery and discussed trial strategies. 

During the trial, both Sergeant Gilley and Lieutenant Long testified regarding their 

familiarity with the petitioner’s “past drug dealings.” Although trial counsel failed to 

object to Sergeant Gilley’s statement, he did object to Lieutenant Long’s testimony. 

However, “by that time it [was] already embedded in the jury’s mind that [the petitioner 

had] a past drug history.” Although the trial court gave the jury a curative instruction, the 

petitioner testified that trial counsel should have objected to both statements and requested 

a mistrial. On cross-examination, the petitioner agreed that he testified at trial that the 

marijuana and methamphetamine were his but denied that he was selling them. 

Trial counsel testified that he was retained to represent the petitioner on several drug 

charges. He met with the petitioner at the jail and reviewed discovery with him. Because 

the petitioner admitted to possessing the marijuana and methamphetamine, the defense 
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strategy was to argue the drugs were for personal use. Prior to trial, the State presented a 

“reasonable offer” which trial counsel encouraged the petitioner to take. However, the 

petitioner rejected the offer and proceeded to trial. 

Regarding Sergeant Gilley and Lieutenant Long’s testimony that they were familiar 

with the petitioner, trial counsel could not recall why he did not object to Sergeant Gilley’s 

statement. Later, when Lieutenant Long made a similar statement, trial counsel objected. 

The trial court sustained the objection and gave the jury a curative instruction. Trial 

counsel believed that “Lieutenant Long may have taken advantage of [the fact that trial 

counsel did not object to Sergeant Gilley’s testimony],” which made trial counsel “realize 

[he] should have objected when Sergeant Gilley did it, and [he] knew that [he] had made a 

mistake in that regard.” On cross-examination, trial counsel agreed the statements about 

the petitioner’s criminal past were damaging because they could have prejudiced the jury.

After its review of the evidence presented, the post-conviction court denied relief, 

and this timely appeal followed.

Analysis

On appeal, the petitioner argues trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object or 

request a mistrial following Sergeant Gilley and Lieutenant Long’s testimony about the 

petitioner’s criminal past. The petitioner also argues the post-conviction court failed to 

make the required findings in its order denying post-conviction relief. The State contends 

the post-conviction court properly denied the petition. 

I. Post-Conviction Court’s Findings

The petitioner contends the post-conviction court failed to make specific findings 

of fact and conclusions of law regarding trial counsel’s failure to request a mistrial. 

Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-111(b) provides as follows:

(b) Upon the final disposition of every petition, the court shall enter a 

final order, and except where proceedings for delayed appeal are allowed, 

shall set forth in the order or a written memorandum of the case all grounds 

presented, and shall state the findings of fact and conclusions of law with 

regard to each such ground.

Although this requirement is mandatory, “the failure of the trial judge to abide by the 

requirement does not always mandate a reversal of the trial court’s judgment.” State v. 

Swanson, 680 S.W.2d 487, 489 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1984) (citing Brown v. State, 445 

S.W.2d 669 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1969)). The purpose of the statute is to facilitate appellate 
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review of the post-conviction court’s decision. Therefore, a remand is not required when 

the record is otherwise adequate for review, even if the trial court failed to comply with the 

rule. Id. 

In the present case, the post-conviction court failed to address the petitioner’s claim 

that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a mistrial following Lieutenant 

Long’s testimony. However, because this Court is able to review the record of the 

petitioner’s trial, the transcript of the evidentiary hearing, and the post-conviction court’s 

findings, we conclude the record is adequate for our review of the substantive issues. 

II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

The petitioner bears the burden of proving his post-conviction factual allegations by 

clear and convincing evidence. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-110(f). The findings of fact 

established at a post-conviction evidentiary hearing are conclusive on appeal unless the 

evidence preponderates against them. Tidwell v. State, 922 S.W.2d 497, 500 (Tenn. 1996). 

This Court will not reweigh or reevaluate evidence of purely factual issues. Henley v. 

State, 960 S.W.2d 572, 578 (Tenn. 1997). However, appellate review of a trial court’s 

application of the law to the facts is de novo, with no presumption of correctness. See Ruff 

v. State, 978 S.W.2d 95, 96 (Tenn. 1998). The issue of ineffective assistance of counsel 

presents mixed questions of fact and law. Fields v. State, 40 S.W.3d 450, 458 (Tenn. 2001). 

Thus, this Court reviews the petitioner’s post-conviction allegations de novo, affording a 

presumption of correctness only to the post-conviction court’s findings of fact. Id.; Burns 

v. State, 6 S.W.3d 453, 461 (Tenn. 1999).

To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner must show 

both that counsel’s performance was deficient and that counsel’s deficient performance 

prejudiced the outcome of the proceedings. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 

(1984); State v. Taylor, 968 S.W.2d 900, 905 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) (noting that the 

standard for determining ineffective assistance of counsel applied in federal cases is also 

applied in Tennessee). The Strickland standard is a two-prong test:

First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was 

deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that 

counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by 

the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient 

performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel’s 

errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose 

result is reliable.
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466 U.S. at 687. In order for a post-conviction petitioner to succeed, both prongs of the 

Strickland test must be satisfied. Id. Thus, courts are not required to even “address both 

components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.” Id.; see 

also Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363, 370 (Tenn. 1996) (stating that “a failure to prove 

either deficiency or prejudice provides a sufficient basis to deny relief on the ineffective 

assistance claim”).

A petitioner proves a deficiency by showing “counsel’s acts or omissions were so 

serious as to fall below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing 

professional norms.” Goad, 938 S.W.2d at 369 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688; Baxter 

v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975)). The prejudice prong of the Strickland test is 

satisfied when the petitioner shows there is a reasonable probability, or “a probability 

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome,” that “but for counsel’s unprofessional 

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

694. However, “[b]ecause of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court 

must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of 

reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption 

that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial 

strategy.’” Id. at 689 (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)).

During Sergeant Gilley’s trial testimony, the following statement was made:

[The petitioner] is one of our, what we like to call, frequently advised of 

suspects. You know, we have multiple sources, people on the street. In the 

drug world, we would get information on him. 

The defendant did not make a contemporaneous objection to Sergeant Gilley’s statement. 

Later, during his trial testimony, Lieutenant Long made the following statement:

I recognized [the petitioner]. I’ve known [the petitioner] for years, all the 

way back to elementary school days. Also over the years working in Metro 

Narcotics unit, had lots of intel on [the petitioner] and dealings with him off 

and on about his drug dealing.

Trial counsel objected, and a bench conference was held, during which the trial court 

noted that trial counsel had not objected to Sergeant Gilley’s statement. The trial court

offered to give the jury a curative instruction and asked trial counsel if there were any other 

curative actions he wanted the trial court to take. Trial counsel stated that the curative 

instruction “should take care of it,” and the trial court instructed the jury “not to consider 

any reference made as evidence to the claim of prior drug dealings of [the petitioner].”
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The petitioner argues these statements were evidence of prior bad acts under 

Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b) and should not have been admissible. However, 

regardless of the admissibility of the testimony, the petitioner has not shown that he 

suffered any prejudice. Although trial counsel failed to object to Sergeant Gilley’s 

testimony and failed to request a mistrial following Lieutenant Long’s testimony, the 

petitioner must, in order to show prejudice, establish that such relief would have been 

granted. See Vaughn v. State, 202 S.W.3d 106, 120 (Tenn. 2006).

The decision of whether to grant a mistrial is within the sound discretion of the trial 

court. State v. McKinney, 929 S.W.2d 404, 405 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). Normally, a 

mistrial should be declared only in the event that a manifest necessity requires such action. 

State v. Millbrooks, 819 S.W.2d 441, 443 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991). “In other words, a 

mistrial is an appropriate remedy when a trial cannot continue, or a miscarriage of justice 

would result if it did.” State v. Land, 34 S.W.3d 516, 527 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000). The 

burden to show the necessity for a mistrial falls upon the party seeking the mistrial. Id. 

This Court will not disturb the trial court’s decision unless there is an abuse of discretion. 

State v. Adkins, 786 S.W.2d 642, 644 (Tenn. 1990). In evaluating whether the trial court 

abused its discretion, we may consider: “(1) whether the State elicited the testimony, (2) 

whether the trial court gave a curative instruction, and (3) the relative strength or weakness 

of the State’s proof.” State v. Welcome, 280 S.W.3d 215, 222 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2007). 

In applying these factors to the present case, we first note, while the statements 

occurred during the State’s direct examination, they were not responsive to the State’s 

questions. Secondly, the trial court gave the jury a curative instruction following 

Lieutenant Long’s statement, and trial counsel agreed the instruction “should take care of 

it.” We presume the jury followed the instruction. State v. Robinson, 146 S.W.3d 469, 

494 (Tenn. 2004). Finally, the case against the petitioner was overwhelming. Officers 

recovered 3.55 grams of methamphetamine and 8.92 grams of marijuana from the 

petitioner’s truck. As this Court noted on direct appeal, “[i]t is undisputed that the 

methamphetamine found in the truck belonged to the [petitioner].” William Scott Hunley, 

2019 WL 951404 at *2. In the petitioner’s hotel room, officers discovered a ledger 

containing names and amounts, and, when Sergeant Gilley asked the petitioner if he was 

selling drugs, the petitioner responded that “he wasn’t doing nothing big.” Id. The 

petitioner has not established a reasonable probability that, had trial counsel objected to 

Sergeant Gilley’s statement or requested a mistrial following Lieutenant Long’s statement, 

the outcome of the trial would have been different.

Moreover, the petitioner testified at the trial and admitted to possessing the 

methamphetamine and marijuana found in the hotel room and truck. He also admitted to 

using drugs for the past sixteen years and went into detail about his daily usage. Although 

trial counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing that he “knew that [he] had made a mistake” 
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by not objecting to Sergeant Gilley’s statement, a defendant is not entitled to perfect 

representation. Denton v. State, 945 S.W.2d 793, 796 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). Even if 

we were to conclude that trial counsel’s representation fell below the constitutional 

standard, the petitioner has failed to demonstrate he was prejudiced by the alleged 

ineffective representation. Accordingly, he is not entitled to relief on this issue. 

Conclusion

Based upon the foregoing authorities and reasoning, the judgment of the postconviction court is affirmed. 

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 J. ROSS DYER, JUDGE