U.S. Marines in the Gulf War, 1990–1991 Westermeyer

HISTORY DIVISION U.S. MARINE CORPS QUANTICO, VA

LIBERATING KUWAIT
Cover: Marines of Task Force Shepherd roll

into Kuwait International Airport in light armored vehicles after the defeat of Iraqi forces.

At right is a CH-53 Sea Stallion helicopter.

Photo by TSgt David McLeod
U.S. Marines in the Gulf War,

1990–1991

Liberating Kuwait

by

Paul W. Westermeyer

HISTORY DIVISION

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

QUANTICO, VA 

2014
Related History Division Publications 

U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990–1991: 

Anthology and Annotated Bibliography

U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990–1991: With the I Marine

Expeditionary Force in Desert Shield and Desert Storm

U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990–1991: With the 1st Marine Division

in Desert Shield and Desert Storm

U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990–1991: With the 2d Marine Division

in Desert Shield and Desert Storm

Humanitarian Operations in Northern Iraq, 1991: With Marines

in Operation Provide Comfort

U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990–1991: Marine Communications

in Desert Shield and Desert Storm

U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990–1991: With Marine Forces Afloat

in Desert Shield and Desert Storm

U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990–1991: Combat Service Support

in Desert Shield and Desert Storm

U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990–1991: The 3d Marine Aircraft Wing

in Desert Shield and Desert Storm

U.S. Marines in Battle: Al-Khafji, 28 January–1 February 1991
Foreword.............................................................................................................................vii

Preface.................................................................................................................................ix

Chapter 1 Background to a Flashpoint...............................................................................1

A Brief History of Iraq................................................................................................1

A Brief History of Kuwait...........................................................................................6

A Brief History of U.S. Persian Gulf Policy...............................................................6

The Iran-Iraq War .....................................................................................................10

The Tanker War........................................................................................................14

Chapter 2 Kuwait Invaded ...............................................................................................19

The Decision to Invade Kuwait...............................................................................19

The Plan to Invade Kuwait ......................................................................................21

The Invasion of Kuwait............................................................................................24

Marines in the Iraqi and Kuwaiti Embassies...........................................................25

The World’s Response..............................................................................................29

The American Military Response.............................................................................31

Chapter 3 Desert Shield ...................................................................................................35

Marines and Maritime Prepositioning......................................................................36

7th Marine Expeditionary Brigade...........................................................................37

Marines Afloat...........................................................................................................40

A Line in the Sand: Planning to Defend Saudi Arabia ...........................................45

Meeting of Cultures: Marines and Saudis ................................................................48

Chapter 4 Preparing for War ............................................................................................55

Imminent Thunder and Amphibious Operations ...................................................55

Happy Holidays from Saudi Arabia.........................................................................58

Building an Offensive Capability.............................................................................60

Iraq’s Defenses..........................................................................................................64

Planning a Storm ......................................................................................................68

Trading Desert Rats for Tigers .................................................................................72

Chapter 5 The Air War......................................................................................................77

Marine Air in the Assault..........................................................................................77

17 January: The First Night ......................................................................................77

18 January: The Scuds..............................................................................................82

19 to 27 January........................................................................................................83

Contents

iii
iv

Marines and the Air Tasking Order .........................................................................87

28 to 31 January........................................................................................................89

Chapter 6 Preludes to al-Khafji.........................................................................................93

Building Kibrit ..........................................................................................................93

Sea Soldier IV............................................................................................................93

Artillery Raids and Reconnaissance Patrols.............................................................95

Iraq’s al-Khafji Plan...................................................................................................96

Saudi-Marine Relations...........................................................................................101

Ra’s al-Khafji ...........................................................................................................101

Coalition Dispositions.............................................................................................102

27 to 28 January......................................................................................................105

Warnings..................................................................................................................106

29 January ...............................................................................................................106

Outposts..................................................................................................................108

Operation Desert Sting...........................................................................................110

Chapter 7 The Battle of al-Khafji ....................................................................................111

Night, 29–30 January ..............................................................................................111

30 January ...............................................................................................................123

31 January ...............................................................................................................129

Considerations ........................................................................................................132

Chapter 8 The Final Preparations...................................................................................135

Two Breaches and Shattered Amphibious Dreams..............................................135

The “Miracle Well” of Khanjar................................................................................139

Artillery Raids, Skirmishes, and Patrols .................................................................141

Marine Air Prepares the Battlefield........................................................................143

Harriers Afloat.........................................................................................................149

Fratricide Issues ......................................................................................................150

Feints and Deceptions............................................................................................150

The Battles of 19–23 February ...............................................................................154

Chapter 9 Breaking the Saddam Line .............................................................................163

24 February.............................................................................................................163

25 February.............................................................................................................178

Chapter 10 Liberating Kuwait.........................................................................................189

26 February.............................................................................................................189

27 February.............................................................................................................200

Chapter 11 Standing Down after Victory........................................................................209

Cease-Fire................................................................................................................209
v

Al-Wafrah Forest and Faylakah Island...................................................................211

Leaving the Desert..................................................................................................213

A Triumphant Return..............................................................................................218

Postwar Iraq: Operations Provide Comfort, Northern Watch,

and Southern Watch ...............................................................................................219

Reflections...............................................................................................................221

Notes.................................................................................................................................225

Appendix A Command and Staff List ...............................................................................241

Appendix B Selected Terms and Abbreviations from Operations Desert Shield/

Desert Storm....................................................................................................................251

Appendix C Chronology of Significant Events.................................................................257

Appendix D Navy Cross and Unit Citations.....................................................................265

Appendix E Aircraft Types, Distribution, and Call Signs ................................................269

Appendix F Marine Corps Uniforms in the Gulf War......................................................271

Appendix G Military Map Symbols...................................................................................279

Appendix H Brief on Iraqi Forces ....................................................................................281

Appendix I List of Reviewers ...........................................................................................293

Index.................................................................................................................................295

In August 1990, Iraqi military forces invaded the neighboring nation of Kuwait. The invasion was part of

an expansionist foreign policy that Saddam Hussein had established a decade earlier when he invaded

post-revolution Iran. The Iraqi invasion of Iran failed, degenerating into nearly a decade-long war of attrition,

but Kuwait was an easier target. Kuwait had financed the Iran-Iraq War for Iraq but refused to forgive the

debt, and Iraq accused Kuwait of stealing oil from the Rumaylah oil field. Much smaller than Iran in terms

of population and geography, Kuwait had focused its foreign and defense policies on negotiation and compromise rather than military force; inevitably, the large Iraqi army quickly overwhelmed the small Kuwaiti

armed forces. 

Inside Kuwait, Iraqi troops began wholesale pillaging as security forces acted to remove all those loyal

to the Kuwaiti royal family. Iraq declared that Kuwait was now a province of Iraq, thus eliminating its debt

and adding Kuwait’s extensive oil fields to its own. Saddam stationed conscript infantry divisions in Kuwait

and began building extensive defenses along the Kuwaiti-Saudi border.

While Saddam calculated the military balance between Iraq and Kuwait correctly, he underestimated

the willingness of the world community, especially the United States and Great Britain, to intervene on

Kuwait’s behalf. His invasion set the stage for a military confrontation that was larger in scope than any

similar circumstance since World War II. Under President George H. W. Bush, the United States assembled

a global Coalition of concerned nations, first to defend Saudi Arabia against further Iraqi aggression, then

to eject the Iraqi military from Kuwait. Early in this Gulf War, American military commanders designated

the operation to protect Saudi Arabia as “Desert Shield,” and the successive operation to free Kuwait as

“Desert Storm.” These military operations were massive undertakings, and they highlighted the paradigm

shift from superpowers in precarious equilibrium during the Cold War to American global hegemony in

the 1990s.

For the U.S. Marine Corps, the Gulf War was a test of its ability to perform quickly, under pressure, as

advertised. A Marine expeditionary force was deployed rapidly and then reinforced, while two Marine expeditionary brigades were also deployed as the Marine Corps continued to support its peacetime commitments. Despite long months of tedium in the desert as the crisis played out, the Marines performed their

duties with skill and élan, achieving a remarkable victory against the Iraqi Army in Kuwait and proving the

Corps’ strategic concepts, most especially the value of the Maritime Prepositioning Force. The impact of

the war on American defense policy and the confidence the Gulf War’s success gave to the Marine Corps

continue to impact today’s national security debates. 

The author, Mr. Paul W. Westermeyer, joined the Histories Branch as a historian in 2005. Mr. Westermeyer

is the author of U.S. Marines in Battle: Al-Khafji, published by Marine Corps History Division in 2008. He

holds a bachelor’s degree in history and a master’s degree in military history from the Ohio State University. 

Dr. Charles P. Neimeyer

Director of Marine Corps History 

Foreword

vii

It was apparent very early that the Persian Gulf deployments of 1990 were of great historical significance

to the Marine Corps, and in accordance with its mission, what was then the Marine Corps History and Museums Division began collecting and preserving evidence of the events for use by later historians. Command

chronologies, oral histories, official records, and lessons learned reports were preserved in the Marine

Corps Archives, providing the foundation for this official history of Marines in the Gulf War. 

During the war, the History and Museums Division deployed five field historians to cover the conflict:

Colonels Charles J. Quilter II and H. Avery Chenoweth and Lieutenant Colonels Charles H. Cureton, Dennis

P. Mroczkowski, and Ronald J. Brown. In addition to collecting photographs, artifacts, and historically significant documents, they conducted a large number of oral history interviews with Marines deployed to

the Gulf. These interviews form the core of the Gulf War oral history collection and are now stored in the

Audio-Visual Information Repository of the General Alfred M. Gray Marine Corps Research Center, located

in Quantico, Virginia. Without their work, this history would have been a pallid affair.

Following the conflict, the History and Museums Division produced eight monographs in the U.S. Marines

in the Persian Gulf, 1990–1991 series. This excellent first pass at the history of Marines in the Gulf War provided the foundation for the current work.

I was assigned this project in 2006, shortly after joining the Marine Corps History Division. Writing such

a history is a massive undertaking that required surveying the Marine Corps Archives (both the command

chronologies and the extensive Southwest Asia collection) as well as the substantial secondary literature

on the conflict. Several hundred oral histories had been preserved, but there were still noticeable gaps that

could only be filled by new oral history interviews. In order to provide a fuller understanding of events,

Iraqi sources had to be surveyed and translated as well. 

This history could not have been published without the professional efforts of the History Division staff.

I would like to thank the director of Marine Corps History, Dr. Charles P. Neimeyer; the chief historian of

the Marine Corps, Mr. Charles D. Melson; and senior historian Mr. Charles R. Smith for their comments, advice, and support. Colleagues Dr. Nathan S. Lowrey, Dr. Nicholas J. Schlosser, and Ms. Annette D. Amerman

provided unflagging professional advice and support. Dr. Thomas M. Baughn and Major David W. Kummer

of Histories Branch supplied excellent editorial guidance.

Lieutenant Colonel David A. Benhoff and Chief Warrant Officer-4 Timothy S. McWilliams from the Field

History Branch provided support and recommendations. Dr. Fred Allison and Mr. Anthony R. Taglianetti of

our Oral History Branch were both essential to this project’s success.

Our Editing and Design Branch, ably led by Ms. Angela J. Anderson, played an instrumental role in

transforming the manuscript into a finished product. Ms. Jeanette L. Riffe coordinated the distribution and

receipt of review drafts; Ms. Wanda J. Renfrow proofread the text; and Mr. Shawn H. Vreeland adeptly

edited the manuscript and oversaw the production process. Maps, layout, and design were skillfully provided by Mr. W. Stephen Hill. Editorial interns Gabrielle Guillen and Elizabeth Dillard supplied necessary

proofreading and fact-checking support. 

The research for this project would have been impossible without the indefatigable aid and support of

Dr. James A. Ginther at the Marine Corps Archives, as well as Mr. Danny A. Crawford, Mr. Robert V. Aquilina,

Ms. Lena M. Kaljot, Ms. Kara R. Newcomer, and Ms. Beth L. Crumley of our Historical Reference Branch. 

Many of the Iraqi documents used as sources for this project were translated by Ali al Saadee; the project

could not have been completed without his excellent work. The finished manuscript also benefited from

the aid and advice of Dr. David B. Crist, Mr. David J. Morris, Dr. Kevin L. Osterloh, Dr. Amin Tarzi, and Dr.

Kevin M. Woods. 

History Division interns Borislav V. Chernev, Alexander N. Hinman, Charles M. Kassir, Nicholas J. Ross,

Evan Sills, Paul R. Zimmerman, and Brian Sperling provided invaluable research assistance and badly

needed clerical and computer support.

A draft of this work was reviewed and commented on by Major General John H. Admire, General Walter

E. Boomer, Brigadier General James A. Brabham Jr., Brigadier General Thomas V. Draude, General Carlton

Preface

ix
W. Fulford, Colonel James A. Fulks, Colonel Richard W. Hodory, Major General Harry W. Jenkins Jr., General

Charles C. Krulak, Lieutenant General John E. Rhodes, and General Michael J. Williams.

As with all of my historical endeavors, I am indebted to my doctoral advisor, Dr. John F. Guilmartin,

whose advice and familiarity with the conflict were invaluable. 

With a project of this size, it is impossible to recall all of those who made it possible and to whom I owe

a debt of gratitude. My sincere apologies to anyone I might have inadvertently omitted.

Finally, although this work would not have been possible without the aid of so many, any errors or

omissions are my own, and I take full responsibility for them. 

x
Background to a Flashpoint

u CHAPTER 1u

On 2 August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait,

sparking the largest armed confrontation in

decades as the United States and a Coalition of Western democracies and Arab states demanded that Iraq remove its forces from Kuwait

and return to the preinvasion status quo. It was the

largest armed conflict to involve the United States

since the Vietnam War, and the U.S. Marine Corps

was intimately involved with the conflict even before it began. 

The 1990–91 Gulf War symbolically marked the

end of the Cold War, a period of tense bipolar struggles between symmetrical nuclear opponents. It inaugurated a period of asymmetrical struggles

between Islamic and Western civilizations; even the

events not directly related to the Gulf War occurred

under the umbrella of American conventional military dominance that the war established. The Gulf

War also established the context for several significant events of the 1990s and 2000s: the breakup of

Communist Bloc Yugoslavia, the terrorist attacks on

11 September 2001, and the liberation of Iraq in

2003. In a similar fashion, the invasion of Kuwait

and the subsequent liberation of Kuwait by Coalition forces occurred within the larger framework of

Middle Eastern history.

A Brief History of Iraq

Mesopotamia, the region that generally corresponds

to present-day Iraq, is often called the “cradle of

civilization” because cities sprouted along the twin

rivers of the Tigris and Euphrates before they developed anywhere else. Beginning with the Sumerians in the fourth millennium BC, then proceeding

through the Assyrians, Babylonians, and Persians,

Mesopotamia was the original center of civilization

in the ancient Mediterranean world and within

these earliest urban centers we find the oldest written law code yet uncovered alongside the roots of

four of the world’s major religions: Christianity, Judaism, Islam, and Zoroastrianism.1

Over time the centers of civilization shifted to

both the west and the east, empires arose, and the

fertile lands of Mesopotamia became a prize for foreign empires. By the beginning of the Roman Empire, the Tigris and Euphrates region was firmly

established as a border region between the Roman

Empire and the Parthian Empire (later replaced by

the Sassanid Persian Empire). Control of the cities

along the Twin Rivers often passed back and forth

between these empires, but from 227 AD until 634

AD Mesopotamia was under the control of the Sassanid Empire.

In the seventh century AD, the prophet Muhammad began spreading his new religion, Islam,

among the tribes of Arabia. Muhammad founded

Islam on the same Abrahamic tradition as Judaism

and Christianity, but he was equally influenced by

the tribal culture of the nomadic Arabs. By the time

of Muhammad’s death in 632, the tribes and cities

of the Arabian Peninsula were predominantly Islamic. These were impressive gains for a young religion, but Muhammad’s last message—“Muslims

should fight all men until they say, ‘There is no god

but God’”—foreshadowed the future militaristic,

meteoric growth of Islam.2

His successor (the first caliph) Abu Bakr

launched the campaigns now labeled the “Arab

Conquest” against the Sassanid and Byzantine Empires (the Byzantines were the successors to the

Roman Empire in the eastern Mediterranean). Abu

Bakr’s first two successors, Umar ibn al-Khattab and

Uthman ibn Affan, successfully continued these

campaigns. The Sassanians were decisively defeated

in 637 at the Battle of al-Qadisiyah, opening the

Tigris-Euphrates River valley to Islamic control. By

the end of Uthman’s reign as caliph, Muhammad’s

movement controlled the Arabian Peninsula, Egypt,

the Tigris-Euphrates region all the way to the Armenian highlands, and the coastal lands between

Egypt and Anatolia.3

Uthman’s death in 656 led to the great schism in

Islam between the Shia and Sunni. The larger Sunni

movement coalesced from those who supported

Muawiyah ibn Abi Sufyan, founder of the Umayyad

Caliphate, while the Shia sect formed from those

who supported Muhammad’s cousin and son-inlaw, Ali ibn Abi Talib. The Shiites lost both of the

civil wars (661 and 680–92) that followed the split.

During the second civil war, Ali ibn Abi Talib’s son,

al-Husayn, and his family were murdered, thus

eliminating Muhammad’s line. The Shia remained

strong among the Persians of Iran and among some

Arab tribes of the Tigris-Euphrates region, but the

Umayyad Dynasty and the Sunni had secured the

caliphate.4

1
The Abbasids overthrew the last of Umayyad Dynasty in 750, establishing the Abbasid Caliphate.

The Persians aided the Abbasids in their revolt, and

the second Abbasid caliph, Abu Ja’far al-Mansur,

founded Baghdad in 762, moving the capital of the

caliphate from Damascus. The Abbasid Caliphate

was a golden age for Baghdad and Iraq, as the region was the center of the Islamic Empire during

the height of its scientific and cultural achievements.

The Abbasids suffered reversals and setbacks on the

periphery of their empire, but it was not until the

Mongols sacked Baghdad in 1258 that the Abbasid

Caliphate finally ended.5

Hulagu Khan, the Mongol leader who decimated

Baghdad, formed a pyramid from the skulls of the

intellectual and religious leaders of the city. The region’s urban culture was effectively destroyed by

the following century of rule by the Mongols;

henceforth, Iraq would be dominated by its rural

tribal culture. In 1509 the Shia Safavids conquered

Iraq, beginning a period in which the Shia Persian

and Sunni Ottoman empires would struggle for control of the region. Mesopotamia was again a border

region caught between competing empires with different religious faiths. The conflict between the two

empires exacerbated the differences between the

2 Liberating Kuwait

Adapted from a Central Intelligence Agency map by Marine Corps History Division
Background to a Flashpoint 3

Reprinted from Mrs. Stuart Menzies, Sir Stanley Maude and Other Memories (London: Herbert Jenkins, 1920), p. 48

LtGen Sir Frederick Stanley Maude leads the British Army into Baghdad in March 1917. British influence in Iraq dates

from the First World War, when the British drove Turkey, one of the Central Powers, from Iraq.

Shia and Sunni, who suffered or prospered as the

pendulum of success swung between the two foes.

The Sunni Ottomans gained control of the province

in 1638, and Iraq formed three provinces (Mosul,

Baghdad, and Basrah) of the Ottoman Empire until

1916. Throughout most of the seventeenth and

eighteenth centuries, however, various local rulers

dominated the region, and much of it was Ottoman

in name only. This period of pseudo-independence

encouraged ethnic and religious factionalism that

would remain an issue, especially with the Kurds

of northern Iraq.

In 1831, floods and plagues enabled the Ottomans to reassert their authority over Iraq, and in

1869 an Ottoman governor, Midhat Pasha, attempted to centralize and reform the government

and economy of Iraq. Roads and schools were built,

and Iraq began to develop a small core of native

intellectuals and nationalists. The majority of these

early Iraqi thinkers were Sunni, as the Sunnis enjoyed significant advantages in educational and economic opportunity throughout the Ottoman period. 

Like most of the Ottoman Empire at the dawn of

the twentieth century, Iraq was ready for change.

The nascent Young Turk movement’s reforms had

given the subject peoples a taste for independence

and some experience in government but had excluded them from power. Turkish reforms were

slow and strongly flavored with Turkish nationalism, and the Turks failed to fully stabilize the Iraqi

provinces, which remained focused on insular local

communities.

World War I

The Ottoman Turks favored the Germans during the

opening decade of the twentieth century, and the

Germans built rail lines throughout the Ottoman

Empire, including lines connecting Baghdad and

Basrah in 1902. When the First World War broke

out, Ottoman neutrality was not expected to last,

and the Turks soon entered the war on the side of

Germany and the Ottomans’ traditional European

foes, the Austro-Hungarian Empire. British forces

from India soon invaded southern Iraq, occupying

the southern cities in 1915. The war in Iraq was

considered a sideshow by the Allies and the Turks,

but with the exception of the loss of al-Kut in 1916,

the Allies were generally successful there. In 1918,
To facilitate the passage of Lend Lease supplies through Iraq and Iran to Russia, relatively small American logistics units

served in Iraq after the United States entered World War II. The U.S. Army produced a guidebook for these servicemen

that included Arab words and phrases, as well as pointed out cultural differences and provided instructions on how to

avoid committing social blunders.

Reprinted from Instructions for American Servicemen in Iraq during World War II (U.S. Army, 1943)

when the war finally ended, the British occupied

nearly all of present-day Iraq. 

The British gained the support of Iraqi nationalists during the war by promising to end foreign rule

over Iraq. The Paris Peace Conference awarded Iraq

to the British as a League of Nations mandate, and

the Iraqis saw this as a betrayal. Heavy-handed

British administration of Iraq worsened the situation, and Iraq rebelled against the British in 1920.

In Iraq, this rebellion is called ‘Ath Thawra al

Iraqiyya al Kubra (the Great Iraqi Revolution), and

it has become the watershed event of modern Iraqi

history. The British suppressed the revolt using

troops from India and the Royal Air Force, but the

revolt convinced them to prepare Iraq as soon as

possible for self-governance. 

The British Empire

Following the revolt, the British created a throne for

Iraq (there had never been an Iraqi monarchy) and

placed Prince Faisal of the Hashemite family of

Mecca on it. Faisal was one of the leaders of the

Arab forces that aided the British against the Turks

in the war. He had been proclaimed king of Syria

in 1920 by Syrian nationalists, but the French were

given Syria as a mandate and removed him from

power. The British felt that Faisal was strong

enough to be king but only with British support.6

More important than the establishment of Faisal

as king was the establishment of a constitutional

monarchy with democratically elected representatives. Iraq would seldom, if ever, hold completely

legitimate elections in the twentieth century, but the

basic legitimacy of elected government was established. Despite their minority population status, the

Sunnis continued to hold the positions of power in

Iraq, in large part because of their higher levels of

education.

Finally, failing to establish an independent Kurdistan in the face of Turkish opposition, the British

added Kurdish areas to Iraq, thereby increasing

Iraq’s already considerable number of minority

communities. This was to have serious consequences for Iraq later in the century as the Kurds

revolted against the Iraqi government several times,

first in the early 1930s; then throughout the 1960s

and 1970s; and yet again in 1991, in the aftermath

of the Gulf War.

In 1932, Iraq was declared a sovereign state. A

25-year treaty with Great Britain, which granted the

British concessions on oil in exchange for British

aid, remained as a “colonial vestige,” but the new

kingdom entered the League of Nations. Prince

Faisal died unexpectedly in 1933 and was replaced

by his son, Ghazi, an Arab nationalist. A weak ruler,

Ghazi legitimized Iraqi’s first military coup in 1936

before dying in a car accident in 1939. He was succeeded by an infant son, but the real power rested

in the hands of Amir Abd al-Ilah, the regent and an

Iraqi—as opposed to Arab—nationalist. 

4 Liberating Kuwait
Background to a Flashpoint 5

The Baath Party

The Baath (Renaissance) Party is a secularparty of Arab nationalists and socialists that

first formed in Syria and then spread to Iraq. Essentially a fascist organization devoted to panArabism, the Baath Parties of Syria and Iraq

soon split, though they paid occasional lip service to the idea of Baathist unity. In the 1960s

and 1970s, the party was popular as it seemed

to cross sectarian lines and served as an alternative to the traditional Arab leaders who

seemed impotent against Israel. Once in power,

the fascist nature of the party became more pronounced, and it quickly became a totalitarian

organization devoted to maintaining the dominance of its leaders.

Iraqi State Television

President Saddam Hussein ruled Iraq as a totalitarian

dictator from 1979 to 2003. His régime was marked

by violent conflict with internal and external enemies;

he was finally removed from power by an Americanled international Coalition in 2003.

The regent and the prime minister, Nuri as Said,

supported Britain, but when Rashid Ali succeeded

Nuri in 1940 as prime minister, the situation quickly

changed. Rashid Ali was also an Iraqi nationalist,

but he was very anti-British and his policies favored

Nazi Germany. When the regent opposed him,

Rashid Ali led another successful military coup and

established an extremely nationalistic government

in 1941. The British responded by occupying Iraq,

forcing Rashid and his supporters to flee the country. They then reestablished the monarchy, but it

was now a tainted institution that Iraqi nationalists

rejected following the shame of this second British

occupation.7

Rise of the Baathists

Like the rest of the Arab world, Iraq reacted forcefully to the 1948 creation of Israel. Thousands of

Iraqi soldiers were sent to aid in destroying the

fledgling nation, but they were poorly trained and

equipped and contributed little to the Arab effort.

Vigilante justice against Iraq’s Jewish community led

the vast majority of that wealthy minority to flee

Iraq. Economic suffering, tribal and social changes,

and foreign policy miscues all increased Iraqi discontent with the monarchy throughout the 1950s.

In 1958, this finally boiled over and the monarchy

was overthrown by a military coup inspired by

Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Arab nationalism movement,

which resulted in the deaths of the king, Faisal II;

his former regent, Abd al-Ilah; and the prime minister, Nuri as Said.8

The coup resulted in Abd al-Karim Qasim coming to power in Iraq. Qasim was unusual in Iraqi

politics—he was of mixed Shia-Sunni background,

and he had strong ties to Iraqi communists. Qasim

was strongly supported by the urban poor of Iraq,

but he was forced to balance the nationalists, the

communists, and other power groups against each

other in order to stay in power. Despite this he suffered several coups and assassination attempts, the

most famous being the failed assassination in 1959

conducted by Iraq’s future dictator, Saddam Hussein.9

Three events during Qasim’s regime foreboded

ominously for Iraq’s future. First, despite their

strong initial support, the Kurds revolted against his

increasing despotism in 1961. Second, he increased

tensions with Iran over the Shatt al-Arab waterway

(this is formed by the confluence of the Euphrates

and Tigris Rivers and drains to the Persian Gulf). Finally, also in 1961, he claimed Kuwait as part of

Iraq, alienating the West and most of Iraq’s fellow

Arab states.10

In 1963, the nationalist Baath Party overthrew

Qasim, but the Iraqi branch of the party was small

and disorganized. Its leader, Ali Salih as Saadi, held

power for less than a year before Abd as Salaam

Arif overthrew him and took control. Arif filled his

government with supporters of Egypt’s charismatic

pan-Arabian leader, Gamal Abdel Nasser, and flirted

with joining Nasser’s United Arab Republic. Arif

died in a 1966 helicopter crash, but his brother Abd

ar Rahman Arif succeeded him.11

There was an attempt to reassert civilian control

over the government with the appointment of Abd
ar Rahman Bazzaz as prime minister in 1965. Bazzaz worked to curtail the military’s influence and

negotiate an end to the ongoing Kurdish insurrection, but the military forced him to resign after only

a year in office. Rahman Arif continued to try and

juggle competing interests to stay in power, but he

was overthrown by a military coup in 1968.12

The coup was carried out by two army officers,

Abd as Razzaq and Ibrahim ad Daud, but they

lacked a strong organization and the Baath Party

quickly took control. Reorganized in the wake of

their earlier failure, the Sunni Arabs from the city of

Tikrit, joined by close tribal and family ties, had

begun to dominate the party. The Baathists immediately began to purge Iraq of those who might oppose them. The senior Baathist leader was Ahmad

Hasan al-Bakr of Tikrit, but he was merely first

among equals in the senior leadership of the party.

Throughout the 1970s Saddam Hussein gained

power and prestige as Bakr’s authority waned, and

in 1979 Bakr resigned as president of Iraq and Saddam took his place.13

Saddam cemented his hold on Iraq with an extraordinarily brazen exhibition of power politics.

Just days after Bakr resigned as president, during a

televised meeting of the Baathist council, a Shia

member publically confessed to being part of a conspiracy with Syria against Iraq and named others involved in the plot. Most of the accused were in the

hall during the confession and were immediately

arrested, and within days a series of show trials had

led to 22 executions and the imprisonment of 33

other accused conspirators.14

Under the Baathists, Iraq’s problems continued

as tensions with Iran increased over the Shatt alArab and the Shah’s suspicions of Iraq’s socialist

government. Also, the Kurdish insurrection continued despite more attempts to negotiate or force an

end to the fighting. By 1976, however, massive Iraqi

offensives and forced relocations had forced the insurrection into a temporary quiescence.15

A Brief History of Kuwait

Kuwait was formed from two former Ottoman

provinces, al-Jarah and al-Ahmadi, but the future

trading city was established in the eighteenth century by the Arab Utbi tribes. In 1752, these tribes selected the al-Sabah family as the emirs of Kuwait.

The city of Kuwait became an important trading

port, though the city and its surrounding provinces

remained technically a part of the Ottoman Empire.16

In 1899, the al-Sabah sheikhs accepted status as

a British protectorate and remained a de facto territory of the British Empire until 1961. The British

fixed the modern boundary between Kuwait and

Iraq in 1913, but neither the Ottoman Turks nor the

Iraqis ever accepted this boundary. Turkish opposition was a moot point following the Central Powers defeat in 1918, but the boundary remained an

ever-present issue between Iraqi and Kuwait

throughout the twentieth century.

In 1958, when the Iraqi monarchy was overthrown, Abd al-Karim Qasim rejected the Britishdrawn boundary, and when Kuwait gained

independence from Great Britain in 1961 Iraq attempted to assert its claim over the emirate. Though

Kuwait was not invaded, British and Arab troops arrived quickly to defend the small, economically important state. Iraqi attempts to redress the perceived

injustice of the British-mandated border continued;

in 1973, Iraqi troops briefly occupied a Kuwaiti border post before withdrawing under international

pressure.17

Kuwait was an extraordinarily prosperous country in the twentieth century because it supported a

relatively small population on top of rich oil holdings. The al-Sabah sheikhs increased the health care,

education, and living standards of the sheikhdom’s

population while maintaining the state’s relatively

conservative monarchy. In addition, they used their

funds to support the regional powers they deemed

most likely to act in Kuwait’s best interests.18

A Brief History of U.S. Persian Gulf Policy

Official American involvement in the Middle East

was sporadic prior to World War II and primarily

limited to the occasional port visits by U.S. naval

vessels. Americans were seen by the region’s inhabitants as a sort of Englishman with similar interests

but less power. During the war itself, the United

States used the Middle East primarily as a highway

to send supplies to China and Burma to the east

and to the Soviet Union to the north. The British

campaign to pacify Iraq occurred prior to American

entry into the war, and the Americans followed

Britain’s lead in the region. The only notable event

was the Tehran Conference of 1943, the first of the

three conferences where President Franklin D. Roosevelt met with Prime Minister Winston Churchill of

Great Britain and Premier Joseph Stalin of the Soviet

Union.19

In the late 1940s and early 1950s, the United

States shifted from an oil-exporting to an oil-importing economy as the postwar economic boom drove

up demand for petroleum. This economic shift

forced American politicians to pay closer attention

6 Liberating Kuwait
Background to a Flashpoint 7

to the Middle East, where large oil reserves and

strong regional ethnic and religious tensions were

conspiring to produce a devil’s brew of instability.

At first, the United States remained content to follow

the lead of the region’s traditional colonial powers,

France and Great Britain, but this reticence came to

an end in 1956 when President Dwight D. Eisenhower effectively vetoed the seizure of the Suez

Canal by France, Israel, and Great Britain. Following

this, Great Britain and France withdrew from the

Middle East as major powers and have not attempted any intervention in the region since then

without U.S. support and leadership.20

The United States found itself increasingly involved in the Mediterranean, and the U.S. Navy’s,

Sixth Fleet became an increasingly important force,

shifting the Mediterranean from a “British” to an

“American” sea and establishing a strong American

presence on the western shores of the Middle East.

Turkey’s admission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) further strengthened the western

flank, despite the constant Arab-Israeli conflicts, the

Lebanese Civil War, and Egypt’s political turmoil. At

the same time, the British withdrawal from east of

the Suez left a power vacuum in that region by

1971. The United States responded to this void with

an increase in its own forces in the Indian Ocean

and Persian Gulf, but these forces remained relatively small. From 1968–73, U.S. naval vessels spent

significantly less time in the Indian Ocean than their

Soviet Navy rivals.21

During the Cold War, the United States’ prime

concern in the Middle East was countering the influence of the Soviet Union. The region was generally seen as less important to American interests

than Europe or Asia, and direct American involvement was to be avoided if possible. The solution

was an alliance, the Central Treaty Organization.

Originally comprising Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, Turkey,

Great Britain, and the United States, it was never as

firm or as formal as NATO. It did conduct some

joint military exercises and provided a framework

for defense against possible Soviet aggression in the

region, however. This organization suffered its first

blow in 1959 when Iraq withdrew from the alliance.

Much later, Iran left in 1979 following the Iranian

Revolution, and the Central Treaty Organization essentially collapsed at that point.22

Nixon and the Twin Pillars Policy

When President Richard M. Nixon took office in

1969, American foreign policy was understandably

focused on the war in Vietnam. In that contentious

period, one area of agreement was the idea that the

United States had too many foreign entanglements.

This general consensus was crystallized as the

Nixon Doctrine in the president’s 1970 State of the

Union address. Henceforth, defending other nations

would not be “exclusively or primarily an American

undertaking.”23

Putting this doctrine into practice meant finding

other nations able to act as stabilizing influences in

the various regions of the world. In the Middle East,

the Nixon administration settled on the Twin Pillars

policy, in which the “twin pillars” of Iran and Saudi

Arabia would serve as the sources of stability in the

region. On the surface, the two nations had a great

deal in common. Both were Islamic monarchies

with massive oil reserves and a history of friendship

with the United States. In reality there were significant tensions between the two. Iran was predominantly Shiite and Persian, while Saudi Arabia was

Sunni and Arab. Undeterred, the United States

stepped up support for both nations during the

1970s with increased military and civilian aid. 

Iran made use of this U.S. support in order to increase its role as a regional power. The Shah of

Iran, Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, doubled his

arms imports in 1974, and then doubled them again

in 1976, thereby threatening Iraq, which attempted

to respond in kind. Rather than accepting U.S.

hegemony in the region, the Shah appeared determined to become the dominant regional power. Of

course, the Shah proved an unstable partner when

the 1979 revolution in Iran overthrew him and further entangled the United States in Middle Eastern

politics.24

In contrast, Saudi Arabia focused its aid package

on infrastructure, dramatically increasing the capacity of its roads, ports, and airfields. Though

Saudi Arabia spent nearly as much on defense as

Iran, the size of its armed forces did not significantly increase. Instead, the United States increased

the modernization efforts it had been making with

the Saudi military for decades. The overall effect

of the Saudi expenditures was to increase the ability of the Saudis to accept foreign aid while preventing Saudi Arabia from becoming a major

regional military power. Of course, Saudi Arabia’s

economic, cultural, and religious importance in the

Middle East remained strong.25

The Carter Doctrine

When President James E. “Jimmy” Carter Jr. assumed office in 1977, the comparative weaknesses

of the United States in the Persian Gulf region had
Official U.S. Marine Corps photo 

Gen Paul X. Kelley was appointed the first commander of

the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) on 4 February 1980. An active proponent of the RDJTF, Gen Kelly

was instrumental in its eventual transformation into U.S.

Central Command. He became 28th Commandant of the

Marine Corps on 1 July 1983.

sidered the Middle East vital to its national interests

and would respond to any attempts to control the

region by military force if necessary. The Carter

Doctrine was expanded in 1981 with the Reagan

Corollary, which stated the United States could

allow no hostile group or nation to control Saudi

Arabia.27

The Iranian hostage crisis demonstrated quite

clearly that, despite the Carter Doctrine, the United

States was relatively powerless in the Persian Gulf

region. The attempt to rescue the hostages in April

1980 was a spectacular failure. Even before this

tragedy, the Carter administration recognized that

the United States needed a more credible military

response capability in the Middle East, and in March

1980 had established the Rapid Deployment Joint

Task Force. This concept was criticized almost immediately as being too weak, too impractical, or as

needless interference in Middle Eastern affairs.28

Because the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force

was tasked with military intervention in a region devoid of American military bases, significant Marine

Corps involvement in its development was inevitable. Many in Congress believed the Marine

Corps was already such a force. Moreover, the Department of Defense’s concentration on parrying

the Soviets had left the Marine Corps struggling to

show its utility in a defense of Western Europe. Marine Corps involvement in the Middle East presented the Corps with an opportunity to emphasize

its utility in a Cold War context as part of the

broader defense of regions that were peripheral yet

critical to NATO’s defense of Europe, much like the

Marine Corps’ assumption of a mission to defend

Norway in the 1980s.29

The Commandant of the Marine Corps at the

time, General Robert H. Barrow, felt that the Marine

Corps should be at the heart of the Rapid Deployment Force despite the great difficulties involved in

fighting in the region. This idea dovetailed with Secretary of Defense Harold Brown’s* idea for the Maritime Prepositioning Ships program, and the Joint

Chiefs of Staff decided that command of the Rapid

Deployment Joint Task Force would rotate between

the Marine Corps and the Army.30

The first commander of the Rapid Deployment

Joint Task Force was General Paul X. Kelly, an officer with extensive experience on joint staffs and

one of the Marine Corps’ rising stars. The organization did not have permanently assigned forces; in-

*

Dr. Harold Brown served as secretary of defense for President

Carter from 1977–81.

been emphasized by the 1973 oil embargo and the

relatively large Soviet naval deployments in the region. In addition, Israel’s military strength was in

some doubt following the unexpectedly strong Arab

showing in the 1973 Yom Kippur War.26

The danger of the Twin Pillars policy became apparent in 1979 when the Shah of Iran was forced

to abdicate to revolutionary Islamic forces. In November of that year, those same forces invaded the

American embassy compound in Tehran and forced

the crisis that set the dominant tone for American

foreign policy through the end of the century all

over the world, but most especially in the Middle

East. Another portentous event in 1979 was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Condemned immediately by the United States, the invasion seemed to

pave the way for a Soviet move into the Middle

East, especially when considered in tandem with

the large presence in the Indian Ocean and Persian

Gulf that the Soviet Navy then maintained. 

President Carter responded to these events in his

1980 State of the Union address with the Carter

Doctrine, which declared that the United States con8 Liberating Kuwait
Background to a Flashpoint 9

United States Central Command

The U.S. Central Command was the first large, geographically unified command activated since the

Korean War. It grew organically out of the Rapid

Deployment Joint Task Force, being established in

the same headquarters building on McDill Air Force

Base in Tampa, Florida, that Kelley’s command had

occupied. The same forces were allocated to the

new command, although later additional forces

were added and all of the new command’s forces

were modernized throughout the 1980s.33

Lieutenant General Robert C. Kingston, USA, was

the second commander of the Rapid Deployment

Joint Task Force and the first commander in chief

of U.S. Central Command. General Kingston’s new

regional command faced the difficulties that might

be expected from a major reorganization of the U.S.

military; in particular, neither U.S. European Command nor U.S. Pacific Command were eager to help

the new organization made up of zones formerly in

their areas of responsibility. It would take years for

Central Command to be fully accepted as a joint

command; Lieutenant General Kingston’s promotion in November 1985 to four-star general was one

step in this process. It established that the commander of Central Command would hold the same

rank as the commanders of Pacific Command, European Command, Atlantic Command, and Southern Command.34

There was an understanding between the Army

and the Marine Corps that command of the Rapid

Deployment Joint Task Force would alternate between the two services, but the Joint Chiefs of Staff

had subsequently decided that none of the joint

commands should be officially or unofficially designated for specific services. General Kelley, former

commander of the task force, was now Commandant of the Marine Corps, and he was determined

that the Corps would not miss this first opportunity

for one of its generals to hold a unified command.

General Kelley fought for a Marine for the job, and

as a result General George B. Crist took command

of Central Command in November 1985.35

According to General Crist, Central Command

headquarters was “covered with [General] Kingston’s blood” because the first Central Command

commander had to struggle with so many entrenched interest groups to get the command up

and running. Despite the struggles, General

Kingston successfully established the staff and building for Central Command, but when General Crist

took command he felt it was still “a [Rapid Deploy-

*

The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 was the most far-reaching

restructuring of the Department of Defense since it was established by the National Security Act of 1947. The act made many

changes, but the most wide-ranging included establishing the

chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the president’s chief military advisor and streamlining the chain of command from the

president through the secretary of defense, to the commanders

of the various regional, united combatant commands. One of the

act’s primary goals was to encourage the services to act in a

more “joint” manner.

stead, it was designed to draw on forces earmarked

by various commands in the event of a major crisis

in the Middle East, especially an invasion by the Soviet Union. The ambiguous notional assignment of

forces was typical of joint organizations before the

restructuring of the Goldwater-Nichols Department

of Defense Reorganization Act in 1986.*

Kelley’s task force was responsible for a truly

vast area: Afghanistan, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt,

Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq, Kenya, Kuwait, Oman, Pakistan,

the People’s Republic of Yemen (South Yemen),

Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, United Arab

Emirates, and the Yemen Arab Republic (North

Yemen). But the notional force structure was “so

dependent upon non-existent airlift and sealift capabilities that the RDF [Rapid Deployment Force]

was neither rapid, deployable nor a force.” Despite

the criticism and difficulties, General Kelley saw

great value in the Rapid Deployment Force concept:

“The unique characteristic of the [Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force] is that, for the first time I can

recall, in peacetime we are pulling together the capabilities of all four services into one harmonized

fighting machine with a permanent command and

control headquarters.”31

Kelley’s conception of the Rapid Deployment

Force would anticipate many of the reforms of the

Goldwater-Nichols Act and provide the president

with flexibility in the use of military force: “As I envision the [Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force], we

will present the National Command Authority with

a full range of options for any given crisis. Rather

than going through the last-minute agony of what

forces are available and who will command them,

we will have done all the proper planning and force

sizing beforehand. The National Command Authority can then rapidly deploy the correct force package before the crisis gets out of hand.” In the end,

it was obvious that a joint command was really

needed for the region, as General Kelley recommended. The Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force

was deactivated on 31 December 1982, and the U.S.

Central Command was activated on 1 January

1983.32
Official U.S. Marine Corps photo

Gen George B. Crist was the first Marine appointed to

head a unified command: U.S. Central Command. He

commanded the Tanker War against Iran in the late

1980s and established the regional relationships and

planning foundation that allowed Central Command to

successfully intervene in the Gulf War. 

by Kelley’s task force but continued by Central

Command. Conducted in the deserts of California

and Nevada, they provided an excellent rehearsal

for the upcoming crisis in the Iraqi desert. Moreover, the Bright Star exercises conducted in Egypt

since 1981 provided valuable experience in cooperating with Arab governments in the Middle East.38

The Iran-Iraq War

Shortly after consolidating his power in Iraq, Saddam Hussein ordered an invasion of Iran. He intended to take advantage of perceived Iranian

instability following the 1979 revolution and the political isolation resulting from Iran’s concurrent

seizure of the American embassy in November of

that year. On 22 September 1980, Iraq launched a

series of air strikes against Iran, all self-consciously

modeled on Israel’s successful air strikes against the

Egyptian Air Force at the start of the 1967 Six-Day

War. Iraq’s air force executed the attacks ineptly,

however, and as a result the attacks were a failure.

The very next day, the Iranian Air Force was able

to launch strikes against Iraq and its invading

columns.39

On 23 September 1980, Iraq invaded Iran,

launching an offensive to take Khuzestan, push the

border to the Zagros Mountains, and secure the

Shatt al-Arab. The Iraqi ground offensive was not

much more effective than the previous day’s air

strike, however. The Iraqis advanced very slowly,

and only one of the targeted cities was captured—

Khorramshahr on 24 October. Around the other

cities the slow speed of the Iraqi attack allowed the

Iranians to regroup and reinforce so that the Iraqi

attack ground to halt. Attempting to put a good face

on its failed offensive, Iraq offered terms to Iran,

but the offer was ignored.40

In January 1981, the Iranians began their counterattack. One of the first battles was an armored

clash between the Iranian 16th Armored Division*

and the Iraqi 6thArmored Division and the 10th Republican Guard Armored Brigade at Susangerd.

The Iranians employed approximately 300 M60A1

Patton and FV4201 Chieftain Mark V main battle

tanks and lost approximately 200. The Iraqis, with

*

The Marine Corps History Division’s accepted style is to italicize

enemy military formations within the text in order to aid the

reader in differentiating them from American and allied units. Although Iran was the enemy during the Tanker War, which was a

subconflict of the Iran-Iraq War, italicizing Iranian units in this

chapter and then italicizing Iraqi units in subsequent chapters is

needlessly confusing. Therefore, Iraqi units are italicized throughout this work, and Iranian units are not. 

ment Joint Task Force] wrapped in a unified command label” that “had never come to grips with the

new area responsibilities.” It remained focused too

narrowly on its Cold War function and was “a retirement home, losing more people through retirement”

than through permanent change of station orders.36

General Crist felt that the new command had to

“have stature and credibility, and get a unified strategy, for the whole region, both peace and war.”

This meant establishing relationships with each of

the nations within its area of responsibility despite

the Department of State’s suspicion of the new

command. To accomplish this, Crist sent his staff

on many trips to the Middle East, working directly

with those in charge, because he knew that in the

Middle East “rank or position meant absolutely

nothing: it’s man-to-man, a personal thing. If they

like you, you can do almost anything. If they don’t

like you, forget it: you’re not going anywhere.” The

strong relationships that Central Command formed

in the Middle East, especially in Saudi Arabia, were

very valuable during the crisis to come.37

The biannual Gallant Eagle exercises were begun

10 Liberating Kuwait
Background to a Flashpoint 11

From Marine Corps Intelligence Activity, Cultural Intelligence for Military Operations: Iran (CD-ROM)

Iranian armor suffered badly in the initial battles of the Iran-Iraq War.

positions were backed up by massive concentrations of artillery and extensive roads so that reinforcements and supplies could be quickly and

easily shifted along the front. The Iraqis also began

to employ larger and larger amounts of chemical

weapons against Iranian attacks.43

The linear nature of these defenses also made it

easier to control the Iraqi military, whose junior

leaders remained startlingly incompetent. Moreover,

defending Iraq itself was better supported by the

troops than invading Iran, and Iraqi élan increased

substantially, even among those troops drafted from

the majority Shia population. With its own regular

army greatly depleted, thus forced to rely increasingly on mass attacks alone rather than the combination of mass attacks backed by regular army

forces with which it had initially been successful,

Iran was unable to break through these tougher

Iraqi defenses. Iraq in turn could still make no

headway against the Iranians, resulting in a bloody

stalemate on the ground from 1982 until 1986.44

The Iranian threat forced Saddam to reform military leadership as well. Like most totalitarian

regimes, military advancement in Iraq had been

predicated more on loyalty to Saddam Hussein and

the Baath Party than on professional competence.

Iraqi failures in the initial invasion of Iran highlighted the weaknesses involved and posed a threat

to Saddam’s hold on power in Iraq. Saddam began

approximately 350 T-72, T-62, and T-55 tanks, lost

around 100, despite the advantages of hull-down

positions surrounding the Iranians on three sides

along a single, narrow road.41

With this initial defeat, Iran’s counterattacks—utilizing mass attacks by newly recruited but poorly

trained and equipped religious volunteers backed

by the regular Iranian army—were increasingly successful throughout 1981 and into 1982. In May 1982,

Iran regained Khorramshahr and had essentially regained all of the territory lost to Iraq in the fall of

1980. Iran proceeded to invade Iraq in turn, pushing into southern Iraq and threatening the southern

town of Basrah. During the first battle of Basrah in

July 1982, Iraq finally stopped the Iranian offensive

through excellent combat engineering and massive

firepower.42

Iran’s military successes shook the Iraqi military

and the political leadership; this led directly to a series of military reforms, some immediate, others

long term. In the aftermath of this first Iranian offensive, the Iraqis quickly realized that the only effective responses they possessed to Iran’s mass

attacks were massive fortifications and overwhelming firepower. As a result, Iraqi engineers became

very good at building extensive fixed fortifications.

These took the form of massive minefields and extensive barbed wire entanglements before high

earthen berms designed as fighting positions. These
Defense Imagery DN-SC-87-06413

The USS Stark (FFG 31) listing to port after being struck by an Iraqi-launched Exocet missile during the Iran-Iraq War. 

*

Kari is not an acronym; the system was named by spelling the

French word for Iraq, “Irak,” backward.

The Iranian Air Force performed somewhat better, in part because Iraqi targets were significantly

closer to their air bases, but they were handicapped

by the American arms embargo, which left them unable to get spare parts or proper technicians to repair

their American-built aircraft. The Iraqis attempted to

end the standstill by attacks against Iranian population centers in what was called the “War of the

Cities,” but again the distance to Tehran blocked the

Iraqi effort as it was beyond the range of the Iraqi

SS-1/R-17 Scud-B surface-to-surface missiles.47

Iraq responded to its aerial impotence in three

different ways. It hired the French to develop the

Kari* integrated air defense command and control

system, a system which came on line in 1986. The

Iraqis also attempted to acquire longer range surface-to-surface missiles, but were unable to purchase these and were forced to begin to develop a

long-range missile themselves by altering the Scuds

they already possessed. Finally, like the Iranians,

they shifted the attacks to oil production and transportation facilities.48

Like most Iraqi bombing efforts, attacks on Iranian refineries and pipelines were ineffective. Iraq

also attempted to effectively blockade Iran’s oil

ports by firing on tankers entering or exiting these

ports with Aérospatiale AM38 and AM39 Exocet

the reforms by dismissing or executing 200–300 officers who had failed in various ways during the

early years of the war while promoting those who

did well. Former officers dismissed during the political purges were brought back, and the Republican Guard—the elite troops who reported directly

to Saddam—was opened to new members based

on ability rather than political loyalty. Finally, Saddam began promoting or leaving successful officers

in place, rather than rotating them to prevent their

building blocs of support. One officer who benefited from these policies was Salah Aboud Mahmoud, commander of the Iraqi III Corps and the

Marines’ primary opponent in the Gulf War.45

Like the ground war, the air war was also mired

in stalemate. The Iraqi Air Force, including their numerous helicopters, did not perform well supporting

the ground forces. In addition, Iraqi fighters did not

aggressively engage Iranian aircraft and thus failed

to achieve air superiority. In the early days of the

conflict, the Iraqis conducted numerous air strikes

against various strategic targets with little effect,

dropping few bombs with great inaccuracy. Iraq’s

own air defenses were just as inadequate. On 7 June

1981, the Israeli Air Force destroyed the Iraqi nuclear

reactor at Osirak, and Iraqi air defenses inflicted no

losses on the Israeli aircraft. Iranian aircraft found it

nearly as easy to make their own strikes against Iraqi

targets, though the damage from those strikes was

far less.46

12 Liberating Kuwait
Background to a Flashpoint 13

As the Iran-Iraq War dragged on, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) became the predominant military

force in Iran. The IRGC was formed from the urban guerrillas who unseated the Shah in 1979. The IRGC recruited and

trained the Basij volunteers who conducted the human wave frontal attacks on Iraqi positions. 

From Marine Corps Intelligence Activity, Cultural Intelligence for Military Operations: Iran (CD-ROM)

tinued through March, with Iranian assaults and

Iraqi counterattacks all failing, though the Iranians

managed to get through five of the six Iraqi defensive lines. The end of this massive battle represented the end of Iran’s offensive capabilities on the

ground.50

With Iran’s offensive capabilities depleted, the

Iraqis planned a series of large, yet limited offensives

designed to force the Iranians to accept peace terms.

In April 1988, the Iraqis launched their first offensive

since 1980 to drive the Iranians off the al-Faw Peninsula. In addition to the Republican Guard and the

VII Corps, the Iraqi generals employed the 26th

Naval Infantry Brigade in an amphibious flanking

attack. The Iraqis secured the peninsula in less than

48 hours of intense fighting following a massive

bombardment. Beginning in May 1988, the Iraqis

launched a series of four offensives. Each assault was

carefully planned and meticulously rehearsed, and

the attacks were preceded by massive artillery bombardments, including copious use of chemical

weapons. Another significant factor was that the

Iraqis outnumbered the Iranians by as much as 10

to 1 at the location of each attack. These offensives

were very successful; Iraq destroyed much of Iran’s

remaining combat power in the Iranian province of

anti-ship missiles. The Exocet proved ineffective at

destroying the massive tankers, and Iraq’s aircraft

lacked the range to cover all of Iran’s ports. Iraq’s

target identification methods were also poor, culminating in the unintentional launch of two Exocet

missiles against the USS Stark (FFG 31) in May 1987.

In the attack, 37 sailors died and 21 more were

wounded, but the Stark did not sink. Iraq apologized for the incident, and Saddam took it as a sign

of weakness when the United States responded

with only a diplomatic note. Regardless, Iraq’s attempts to close Iranian ports through airpower decreased.49

In February 1986, the Iranians made another attempt to break the deadlock, launching an amphibious assault across the Shatt al-Arab onto the al-Faw

Peninsula. This amphibious assault managed to

flank the Basrah defenses, and the Iraqis responded

with increasing desperate counterattacks, including

chemical weapons. The Iranian advance was

stopped, but the Iraqi counterattacks failed to destroy the al-Faw salient. The Iranians launched their

last serious offensive, the second battle of Basrah,

in January 1987. This was a massive battle, with a

combined total of at least a quarter of a million men

contending for the small river city. The battle con-
Reprinted from Edward J. Marolda and Robert J. Schneller Jr., Shield and Sword: The United States Navy and the Persian Gulf War

(Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, Department of the Navy, 1998), p. 34 

Khuzestan along Iraq’s southeastern border, but it

did not push to take large swaths of Iranian territory.51

Iraq’s ground offensives in 1988 were matched

by a renewal of the so-called War of the Cities, utilizing Scud surface-to-surface missiles the Iraqis had

reengineered in order to dramatically increase their

range. Over the next several months, Iraq launched

over 200 missiles against a variety of civilian targets

in Iran, bringing the Iran-Iraq War home to parts of

Iran that had not previously experienced the war

directly. Iran’s response was weak because it now

lacked the number of missiles required to retaliate

fully against Iraq.52

The Tanker War

As noted earlier, the Iraqis responded to the stalemate of the early 1980s by striking at Iran’s oil industry through air strikes on oil production facilities

and ships. These attacks were not effective, but Iran

retaliated against shipping heading for Iraqi ports

with its own relatively ineffective attacks. As the

stalemate lengthened, the intensity of the war over

each nation’s oil lifeline increased, although neither

state could effectively strike at the other. Iraq’s air

force lacked the capability to effectively strike the

distant Iranian targets, yet much of Iraq’s oil flowed

through pipelines out of Iran’s reach or passed

through nonbelligerent Kuwait and sailed through

the Persian Gulf in neutral tankers. Kuwait and

other Gulf states provided extensive financial support to Iraq’s war effort and provided neutral ports

for war material bound for Iraq.53

Throughout 1986 Iranian attacks on Kuwaiti vessels increased, and the Iranians took the al-Faw

Peninsula. The Kuwaitis responded in December

1986 by asking the United States if some Kuwaiti

tankers could be reflagged as American vessels and

escorted safely through the Persian Gulf by the U.S.

Navy. In February 1987 the Iranians installed HY-2

Hai Ying “Silkworm” antiship missiles along the Strait

of Hormuz, and in March President Ronald W. Rea14 Liberating Kuwait
Background to a Flashpoint 15

Photo by PO3 Henry Cleveland, USN. Defense Imagery DN-SC-87-12584

Naval contact mines aboard the captured Iranian

minelayer, Iran Ajr. Iran used mines extensively in the

Iran-Iraq War. Iraq employed the same tactic during the

Gulf War.

run by a theater combatant command under a Marine commander in chief.55

The first Marine unit to deploy for Operation

Earnest Will was Detachment 2 from the 24th Marine

Amphibious Unit on board the USS Guadalcanal

(LPH 7); the detachment consisted of a composite

helicopter squadron, a force reconnaissance platoon, and supporting attachments, as well as an infantry company that was off-loaded on Diego Garcia

before deploying to the Gulf. Detachment 2 was replaced in November 1987 by Contingency Marine

Air-Ground Task Force 1-88 on board the USS Okinawa (LPH 3); this task force comprised a composite helicopter squadron and an infantry company

with supporting attachments. Contingency Marine

Air-Ground Task Force 1-88 was in turn replaced in

February 1988 by Contingency Marine Air-Ground

Task Force 2-88 from the USS Trenton (LPD 14). It

consisted of a composite helicopter squadron and

an infantry company—Company B, 1st Battalion, 2d

Marines—the same company left in Diego Garcia by

Detachment 2 the previous year. Contingency Marine Air-Ground Task Force 2-88 was relieved by

Contingency Marine Air-Ground Task Force 3-88 in

June 1988.56

In order to better protect the northern sea lanes

near Farsi Island, two barges (the Hercules and

Wimbrown VII) were leased and used as semimobile

bases from which special operations helicopters and

patrol boats could counter the Iranian small craft

threatening shipping and oil platforms in the northern Persian Gulf. Each of these bases embarked a

small Marine security force from the rotating Marine

air-ground task forces, in addition to U.S. Army and

U.S. Navy special operations forces. The barges and

their patrol craft were soon successful. On 21 September, Marines provided cover and support as U.S.

special operations forces captured the Iranian vessel

Iran Ajr engaged in clandestine mining in the Gulf.

And on 8 October, the Marines provided the same

support and cover as U.S. forces engaged four Iranian speedboats near Farsi Island.57

Operation Earnest Will continued throughout

1988 with U.S. Navy vessels escorting tanker convoys through the Gulf as other forces secured the

passage from Iranian or Iraqi mines, air strikes, and

missiles. For the Marines, the routine involved long

days standing watch on the barges or the various

Navy amphibious vessels on which they were deployed; Marine helicopter crews also flew patrols,

transferred supplies, and escorted convoys while

conducting visual searches for mines. Some 127 escort missions were completed during the operation,

gan decided to go forward with the reflagging operation. However, this was not publically announced

until May, soon after the Iraqi attack on the USS

Stark.

54

In July 1987, the United States began the reflagging operation, which was designated Operation

Earnest Will and later known as the Tanker War; it

had an inauspicious start with one of the reflagged

tankers, the Bridgetown, hitting an Iranian mine.

The United States responded by rushing military

forces to the theater. The threat to neutral shipping

in the Persian Gulf was quite varied; it came from

Iraqi aircraft, Iranian aircraft, Iranian mines, Iranian

motor boats, Iranian surface-to-surface missiles, and

Iranian naval vessels. The United States countered

these diverse threats with an equally diverse combination of forces, including naval surface action

groups, contingency Marine air-ground task forces,

and special operations forces. In August, these

forces were designated Joint Task Force Middle East

under Rear Admiral Dennis M. Brooks, USN, under

General Crist’s U.S. Central Command. Operation

Earnest Will would be Central Command’s first

combat operation, and the first combat operation
Defense Imagery DN-ST-89-01414

An aerial view of the Dutch heavy lift ship Mighty Servant II transporting the guided missile frigate USS Samuel B. Roberts

(FFG 58). The frigate was damaged when it struck an Iranian mine while on patrol in the Persian Gulf.

Photo by Cpl John Hyp. Defense Imagery DM-SN-93-00987

The main building of the Iranian Sassan oil platform burns after being hit by a BGM-71 tube-launched, optically tracked,

wire-guided (TOW) missile fired from a Marine AH-1 Cobra helicopter as part of Operation Praying Mantis.

securing the sea lanes through the Persian Gulf for

all the nonbelligerents along its coast during the vicious regional conflict. Despite the routine, the danger was real: on 12 February 1988, the Iraqis again

mistakenly attacked a U.S. vessel, the USS Chandler

(DDG 996), but this time the attack missed.58

On 14 April 1988, the frigate USS Samuel B.

Roberts (FFG 58) found itself amidst several Iranian

mines off the Qatar Peninsula. While attempting to

avoid these mines, the ship struck an unobserved

mine and suffered extensive damage below the waterline; 10 sailors were wounded. Over the next 10

days, eight more Iranian mines were discovered,

and President Reagan ordered General Crist to retaliate. Two Iranian oil platforms, Sassan and Sirri,

were to be destroyed, and an Iranian naval vessel

16 Liberating Kuwait
Background to a Flashpoint 17

http://www.imam-khomeini.com

Ayatollah Khomeini was the Supreme Leader of Iran from

the 1979 revolution until his death in 1989. Upon accepting the end of the Iran-Iraq War, he said, “We must choose

one of two alternatives—either martyrdom or victory,

which we both regard as victory. . . . Happy are the disabled, the prisoners of war and those missing in action and

the great families of the martyrs. And how unhappy I am

because I have survived and have drunk the poisonous

chalice of accepting the resolution, and feel ashamed in

front of the greatness and sacrifices of this great nation.”

Operation Earnest Will’s closing act was a tragedy,

and the final nudge toward peace that the Iran-Iraq

War needed. On 3 July 1988, the cruiser USS Vincennes (CG 49) shot down Iran Air Flight 655, a civilian

Airbus A300B2 passenger aircraft. All 290 passengers

on board the flight were killed. The crew of the Vincennes mistakenly believed that they were firing on

an Iranian Grumman F-14 Tomcat. Despite U.S. assurances that the attack on the civilian airliner was a

tragic error, the Iranian government appears to have

believed it was intentional, part of a pattern that included successful Iraqi land offensives, the increased

intensity of the War of the Cities, and the destruction

of much of the Iranian navy in Operation Praying

Mantis. On 18 July 1988, the Iranians accepted a

United Nations cease-fire resolution, ending the IranIraq War and the Tanker War.62

was targeted. The retaliation strikes were named

Operation Praying Mantis. 

On 18 April 1988, Operation Praying Mantis

began with U.S. Navy destroyers opening fire on

the Sassan platform after repeated warnings to the

Iranian crew to evacuate. The Iranians returned fire

ineffectively but were suppressed, and they fled the

platform. Marines of Company B, 1st Battalion, 2d

Marines, and force reconnaissance boarded and secured the platform. After searching the platform, the

Marines evacuated, and the platform was destroyed

by explosive charges. Other U.S. Navy vessels bombarded and destroyed the Sirri oil platform.59

As the Iranian oil platforms burned, the U.S.

Navy began its largest surface warfare action since

World War II. The Iranian frigates Sabalan and Sahand stayed away from the battle at first, but Iranian speedboats attacked several neutral ships

traversing the Gulf. U.S. Navy aircraft responded,

sinking one speedboat and damaging several others. The Iranian Combattante II fast-attack ship

Joshan unsuccessfully attacked U.S. naval vessels

with a guided missile and was itself sunk in response. The Iranian frigate Sahand sortied out soon

after and fired on U.S. Navy aircraft. Grumman A6E Intruders and the destroyer USS Joseph Strauss

(DDG 16) returned fire. The Sahand was stopped

dead in the water and then sunk by an explosion

when her magazines blew. Her sister ship, Sabalan,

sailed out into the Strait of Hormuz and engaged

American aircraft as well. A-6 Intruders from the

USS Enterprise (CVN 65) bombed the Sabalan,

which had a reputation for targeting the crew quarters of neutral merchantmen with concentrated machine-gun fire, leaving the Iranian frigate dead in

the water and clearly taking on water. Iranian tugboats were allowed to tow her back to port.60

Operation Praying Mantis was not without cost

for the United States, however. A Bell AH-1T Sea

Cobra from Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron

167, flown by Captain Stephen C. Leslie and Captain

Kenneth W. Hill, crashed during the afternoon

while avoiding Iranian antiaircraft defenses. Both

pilots perished in the crash and were awarded the

Distinguished Flying Cross posthumously. Despite

this loss, Operation Praying Mantis was a success,

its impact magnified by the simultaneous successful

Iraqi land offensive on the al-Faw Peninsula. As described above, Iraqi offensives continued through

the spring and into the summer, as did the War of

the Cities. From the Iranian perspective, the Iraqi

offensives and the American naval operations appeared coordinated.61
Iraq ended the Iran-Iraq War in a seemingly

strong position. Iran had been defeated after eight

grueling years, and the Iraqi military was considered

a powerful regional threat. Under Saddam Hussein’s

leadership, the Iraqis looked forward to increased

18 Liberating Kuwait

leadership within the Arab and Islamic worlds as

well as to economic growth. Iraq’s considerable foreign debt and hostility toward the Western powers

as well as Saddam’s ambitions and paranoia now set

the stage for the next large Persian Gulf conflict.63
19

Kuwait Invaded

u CHAPTER 2u

The Decision to Invade Kuwait

The image of strength and influence that Iraq

projected after the Iran-Iraq War masked a

hollow reality. Perceived as the victor of the

conflict, Iraq nonetheless faced a battered economy,

a war-weary populace expecting to experience the

benefits and rewards of peace, and a massive

amount of foreign debt. The Saddam regime responded to these difficulties by retaining its massive

conscript army (thereby staving off a surge in unemployment), planning further improvements to the

nation’s infrastructure, and attempting to increase

oil production.1

During the Iran-Iraq War, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,

and the Gulf states supported Iraq politically and financially against Iran, primarily with loans. Iran was

a traditional foe of the Arab states, and the fundamentalist revolution of the ayatollahs against the

Shah threatened these monarchical Arab states.

When the war ended, Saudi Arabia forgave most of

the loans and signed a nonaggression pact with Iraq

in March 1989, but the Kuwaitis were unwilling to

forgive their loans without first coming to a permanent agreement with Iraq about border claims.2

Yet, the immediate cause of Iraq’s financial crisis

in 1990 was not the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq War,

but a plunge in the price of oil. Saddam counted

on oil to remain at $21 a barrel, the price in January

1990, but within a few months the price dropped

to $11 a barrel. This drop in oil prices was an economic disaster for Iraq, and the cause of the drop

was at least partly the unwillingness of Kuwait and

the United Arab Emirates to stick to their assigned

Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries

(OPEC) quotas. At a meeting held in May 1990, in

front of the emir of Kuwait, Saddam described this

as a “war against Iraq.”3

Iraq’s continuing quest to build viable weapons

of mass destruction was also coming under increased international scrutiny, and several events

indicated the program’s progress was not as secret

as the Iraqis might have hoped. In March 1990,

Canadian weapons designer Gerald V. Bull was assassinated, an event seemingly out of the pages of

a bad espionage thriller. Bull was designing an extreme long-range, multistage artillery piece for the

Iraqis, and the Iraqis believed he had been killed

by the Israelis. A conspiracy was perceived when

parts for his weapon en route to Iraq were seized

by the British. The Iraqis believed a repeat of the

Israeli strike on Osirak was probable, and Iraq

threatened to use chemical weapons against Israel

in the event of such an attack.4

Further destabilizing the Middle East was the collapse of the Soviet Bloc. The fall of the Berlin Wall

in November 1989 highlighted the Soviet Union’s

decreasing prestige and power. Conflict in the Middle East had been moderated by the larger Cold War

conflict—as the various factions played the United

States and the Soviet Union against each other, they

were in turn held back from aggressive actions that

might lead to a more general conflict. But the increasingly obvious weakness of the Soviets following their retreat from Afghanistan, the uprisings in

eastern Europe, and the toppling of the wall convinced Soviet clients such as Saddam that they

could no longer be trusted to counterbalance the

Americans and the Israelis.5

Saddam’s outsized view of the role in history that

he and Iraq were to play is well established in

records captured after the 2003 invasion. He imagined Iraq as the leader of a grand Arabic nation that

would grow to rival, and eventually conquer, the

various states that in his view oppressed the Arab

peoples. As Kevin M. Woods noted in The Mother

of All Battles, “In Saddam’s view, unification of the

Arab peoples, followed by the destruction of Israel

and the expulsion of the ‘colonial’ powers from

Arab lands was the predestined course of development for any Arab superpower of the future.” This

narrative of historical destiny was the bedrock of

Saddam’s political decisions, modified only by his

own belief that he was the Arab leader destined to

bring this to fruition.6

Saddam’s view of Iraq’s central role in history led

directly to the other cornerstone of his historical narrative: a conspiracy between the United States and

Israel to keep the Arab states generally weak and

divided, and to destroy Iraq specifically. The IranContra scandal in the United States, Kuwait’s decision to overproduce oil, Israel’s attack on Osirak,

and the mysterious murder of Gerald Bull all added

to his belief that the United States was determined

to whittle away Iraq’s power and influence. American concerns over Iraqi human rights abuses were

“allegations that are designed solely for one aim

which is to defame Iraq and dilute the efficacy of
U.S. Ambassador April C. Glaspie and Iraqi President Saddam Hussein meet on 25 July 1990. This meeting was intended

by Saddam to pave the way diplomatically for the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. 

Reprinted from Kevin M. Woods, The Mother of All Battles, p. 49

our victory.” The United States had taken over the

role of colonial oppressor that was previously held

by the Ottomans and then the British; consequently,

Saddam believed American meddling was at the root

of all of Iraq’s failures and tribulations.7

Saddam Hussein was prepared for a confrontation with the United States prior to the invasion of

Kuwait, as evidenced by his comments to Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat in April 1990:

We are ready for it. We will fight America,

and, with God’s will, we will defeat it and kick

it out of the whole region. Because it is not

about the fight itself; we know that America

has a larger air force than us . . . has more

rockets than us, but I think that when the

Arab people see real action of war, when it is

real and not only talk, they will fight America

everywhere. So we have to get ready to fight

America; we are ready to fight when they do;

when they strike, we strike.8

Saddam’s speech to Arafat may have been primarily political theater, but it also illustrates how a

belief in an American conspiracy against Iraq was

central to Saddam’s worldview. Moreover, it shows

how Saddam intended to resist this conspiracy as

the means to unify the Arabs under his own leadership. In keeping with his background, Saddam intended to be ruthless: “When it comes to the region

of the Middle East, we want to know where each

American individual is, even those who come to do

business. . . . This is the battle, so let us resist, and

when we resist, let us be beasts.”9

In the same meeting Saddam expressed a desire

to use suicide bomb tactics against the United States:

We mean all the things we say. Perhaps we

cannot reach Washington, but we can send a

strapped person [a suicide bomber] to Washington. Our rockets cannot reach Washington,

but I swear to God that if it could reach Washington, we would hit Washington. . . . We can

send a lot of people. Move them. Move a

strapped [person] on to Washington and retaliate just [like] the old days. This is the thing.

[A man] strapped with a bomb and throws

himself on Bush’s car. . . . Let us prepare ourselves on this level.10

Belligerent phrases aside, Iraq’s president was

convinced the United States would not fight, in part

20 Liberating Kuwait
because of the muted response to the Iraqi Exocet

missile attack on the USS Stark in 1987 but also due

to the American withdrawal from Lebanon following the Beirut bombing. Moreover, even if the

United States desired military confrontation, the Soviet Union would intervene to prevent it, despite its

reduced global influence. 

If an attack did occur, Saddam was reportedly

convinced that his massive military could inflict sufficient losses on the Americans to force them to

abandon the struggle. He considered the 1975 withdrawal from Vietnam indicative of America’s lack of

resolve. The United States suffered over 58,000

dead in the Vietnam War; in comparison Iraq had

lost 51,000 in a single battle with the Iranians on

the al-Faw Peninsula in 1986. He believed then, as

he stated after the war, “America is not in the prime

of youth. America is in the last stage of elderliness

and the beginning of the first stage of old age.”11

Iraq had survived the long, eight-year slaughter of

the “Khadisya Saddam,” as the Iraqis termed the IranIraq War, and Saddam believed that the conflict over

Kuwait, if it came to blows, would follow a similar

pattern. Airpower would be relatively ineffective; the

main conflict would be a set piece battle as American

forces impotently tried to breach the defenses built

along the Kuwaiti-Saudi border. American losses

would be severe; the American people would demand an end to the bloodshed; and the American

government would then negotiate a peace. In the aftermath Iraq would become the undisputed regional

power, while American and Western influence in the

Middle East would suffer a near fatal blow.12

Convinced that the United States and Israel were

engaged in a conspiracy against Iraq, and that they

were using Kuwait as one of their tools in this conspiracy, Saddam had apparently decided by July

1990 to invade and annex Kuwait. While military

preparations for the invasion were underway, Saddam laid the diplomatic groundwork as well.

On 25 July 1990, Saddam unexpectedly met with

April C. Glaspie, the U.S. ambassador to Iraq.

Though Glaspie had been ambassador for two

years, this was the first time Saddam had personally

met with her; the meeting was arranged quickly and

obviously stage managed (at one point, Saddam’s

interpreters burst into tears as Saddam described

Iraq’s poor financial state). Saddam repeated his

claims that Kuwait was waging economic war

against Iraq, and implied that the United States was

behind this, but promised that nothing would occur

until after a meeting with Kuwait arranged by

Egyptian leader Hosni Mubarak.13

The promised meeting with Kuwait occurred on

31 July 1990 in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Iraq’s demands were extreme: “$2.4 billion in compensation

for the disputed Ramalia [Rumaylah] oil field; $12

billion for Kuwait’s role in depressing oil prices in

general; forgiveness of Iraq’s $10 billion war debt;

and a long-term lease on Bubiyan Island.” When

the Kuwaitis refused these demands, the Iraqi response was ominous. Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri, Iraq’s

representative, told Kuwait’s Crown Prince Sheikh

Saad al-Abdullah as Salim that “you are driving me

to kill you.”14

The Plan to Invade Kuwait

The Iraqi military in the summer of 1990 appeared

large and powerful. It boasted roughly 1 million

troops; 5,000-plus main battle tanks; 3,500 or more

artillery tubes; an estimated 6,000 armored personnel

carriers; 600 or so surface-to-air missile launchers;

some 500 aircraft; 500 helicopters; and 44 naval vessels. As the apparent victor of the eight-year-long

Iran-Iraq War, many observers assumed that the Iraqi

Army was battle tested and experienced, an impression the Saddam regime worked to maintain. The

war forced the regime to promote officers more

often for military competence than political loyalty,

and there was a corresponding increase in professionalism and effectiveness. In fact, however, the

Iraqi military was exhausted, its morale was questionable, and its training insufficient. The invasion of

Kuwait would highlight the strengths and the weaknesses of the Iraqi military to the astute observer.15

Saddam Hussein continued to view the regular

Iraqi Army with suspicion, so the Republican

Guard had received the lion’s share of the training

and equipment. The Republican Guard was thus

entrusted with the invasion of Kuwait, and planning

was limited to its highest officers. Senior regular

army officers were not even informed of the offensive until mere hours before it was launched.

Throughout July 1990, the Iraqi Directorate of General Military Intelligence provided the Republican

Guard commanders with reports on Kuwait, its

armed forces, and its political leadership. The same

reports indicated that Kuwait was likely to look for

international support against an invasion and that

the United States would help Kuwait.16

In mid-July, the Republican Guard forces chosen

for the invasion began moving south in preparation

for the assault. The units’ officers were informed of

the upcoming mission at this time, although regular

military commanders continued to be kept in the

dark.17

Kuwait Invaded 21
Brigadier General Ra’ad Hamdani, commanding

general of the 17th Armored Brigade of the Republican Guard’s Hammurabi Armored Division, later

said that “speed was the most important factor to

achieving surprise and surprise was the most important factor in achieving mission success.” The

Republican Guard planned to seize needed food

and supplies en route in order to achieve the required speed. There was also a desire to keep

Kuwaiti casualties, especially civilians, to a minimum, and so in a departure from the Iraqi military’s

usual style, the invasion of Iraq was conducted

without artillery support. The lack of artillery in

Iraq’s military buildup of late July was noted by

American intelligence and introduced some doubt

about Iraqi intentions.20

The Iraqi Air Force conducted several reconnaissance missions over Kuwait in late July, producing

photographs that, in conjunction with commercial

Reprinted from Kevin M. Woods, The Mother of All Battles, p. 68

In July 1990, the Iraqi Air Force conducted several reconnaissance flights over Kuwait. In this photograph, military

objectives in Kuwait City are noted. Reprinted from Kevin M. Woods, The Mother of All Battles, p. 85

This Iraqi aerial reconnaissance photograph from July

1990 clearly shows Kuwait International Airport, the

major roads leading to and from it, and the shore south

of Kuwait City. The airport was a major Iraqi objective.

Despite the Iraqi security precautions, its preparations were not unnoticed. As early as 21 July,

American intelligence began to detect signs of the

impending Iraqi attack on Kuwait. As the days

passed, American staff officers at U.S. Central Command were astounded to see Iraq virtually mirroring

the moves predicted in a training exercise, Internal

Look 90. That exercise tested Central Command’s

Operations Plan 1002-90, the plan to defend the

Arabian Peninsula from an Iraqi attack.18

On 31 July, the Republican Guard division and

brigade commanders were informed that 2 August

would be the date of the attack. The Iraqi plan for

the invasion of Kuwait called for the Republican

Guard to invade in four columns, one from the

west and three from the north. Kuwait City and the

various civilian and military airports were the initial

targets, followed by a sweep to the southern coast.

Large helicopterborne commando raids would secure the Mutla Ridge choke point ahead of the advance and a raid on the palace would secure the

Kuwaiti royal family.19

22 Liberating Kuwait
face-to-air missiles were intended to accomplish

this.21

The smallest of the Iraqi military services was the

navy, but Kuwait’s coastal nature and extensive port

facilities required a relatively robust naval component to the invasion plan. The commander of the

Iraqi Navy, Staff Rear Admiral Gha’ib Hassan, was

not informed of the invasion until a mere 36 hours

tourist maps, allowed the Republican Guard to locate its assigned targets. Once the attack was underway, the air force’s mission was to establish air

superiority, allowing the helicopterborne commando raids to proceed safely and to prevent the

Kuwaiti Air Force from interfering with the invasion. Strikes on Kuwait’s air bases and Raytheon

Hawk (Homing All the Way Killer) MIM-23B surAdapted from a Central Intelligence Agency map by Marine Corps History Division

Kuwait Invaded 23
tial objectives. The most important of these was

Mutla Ridge, a natural barrier that the Kuwaitis intended to defend with two brigades, the 6th Mechanized Brigade and the 35th Armored Brigade. The

17th Armored Brigade, Hammurabi Armored Division, arrived at Mutla Ridge at 0600 and blasted

through a small force from the 6th Mechanized

Brigade. They then engaged two forces from the

35th Armored Brigade in succession as they passed

through Mutla Pass and descended on Kuwait City.

By 0830, the Hammurabi Armored Division’s lead

elements were enmeshed in a traffic jam in Kuwait

City as civilian traffic clogged the streets. In addition, fuel ran short and commanders commandeered additional fuel from civilian Kuwaiti filling

stations in order to reach their final objectives on

the Gulf.28

The Nebuchadnezzar Division secured its portions of Kuwait City by late afternoon on 2 August

as well, but the Medina Armored Division ran into

stiffer opposition from the Kuwaiti Air Force and

the Kuwaiti Army as it tried to complete its mission

of sealing the southern border.29

Colonel Salem Masoud Saad al-Sorour commanded Kuwait’s 35th Armored Brigade, and his

brigade placed itself at the Atraf road junction defending the Ali al-Salem Air Base and the roads into

Kuwait City where they acted as the primary opposition to the Medina Armored Division. Throughout

the day they fought a hard holding action against

the Iraqi forces, stopping their tanks and forcing the

Iraqis to make swarming attacks with their accompanying infantry. The brigade’s stand had little

hope, however. Colonel Salem later noted, “We

were running short of ammunition, by three o’clock

all the commanders notified me that their ammunition would be finished if we were to continue fighting and we had no means of replenishing our

supplies.” Colonel Salem requested air and artillery

support, but none was available. Ordered to act on

his own discretion, Salem took his brigade south to

the border with Saudi Arabia, crossing over on the

morning of 3 August after recovering as much of

their equipment as they could from the brigade’s

barracks.30

Captain Martin N. Stanton, an American Army officer stationed in Saudi Arabia and trapped in

Kuwait by the invasion, observed the Iraqi attack

and was unimpressed by the Republican Guard.

They lacked professionalism, in his view. Observing

the odd placement of an artillery battery, he determined that “shade was the primary consideration;

they put their battery where the men could get out

before it was to be launched. He quickly composed

a plan splitting Iraq’s missile boat flotilla into two

task forces, each carrying elements of the 440th

Naval Infantry Brigade. The first task force was to

sail south and seize Kuwait’s naval base at Ras alQulayah. The second was then to seize Faylakah Island.22

The Invasion of Kuwait

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait began shortly after

midnight on 2 August 1990 when the Republican

Guard began seizing Kuwaiti border forts in preparation for the invasion. The invasion proper was set

to begin at 0400.23

The Iraqi Air Force’s initial strikes on Kuwait were

delayed by poor weather over Iraqi airfields, and the

first air strikes did not hit Kuwaiti airfields until 0625.

As a result, the Kuwaiti Air Force’s McDonnell Douglas A-4 Skyhawks were able to launch attacks

against the advancing columns of the Republican

Guard with effects that angered Republican Guard

officers long after the battle had ended.24

The Iraqi Air Force also failed to secure air superiority for the helicopterborne commando missions that began the assault on Kuwait. Iraq’s

helicopter pilots were not trained in night or large

formation flying, but with less than six-hours notice,

96 helicopters were ordered to fly elements of two

Republican Guard commando brigades against two

primary targets: the Kuwaiti royal family and the

critical road junction at Mutla Ridge.25

Taking off in the early morning darkness of 2 August, the result was a predictable catastrophe. At

least 40 of the helicopters were lost—20 most likely

were downed by the Kuwaiti Air Force and Hawk

surface-to-air missile batteries, but another 20 or so

crashed into power lines or each other, sometimes

while trying to avoid Kuwaiti missiles.26

The commando missions had little apparent success after landing. The 3d Republican Guard Special Forces Brigade did not seem to have any

appreciable impact on Kuwaiti forces rushing to

hold Mutla Ridge. The 16th Republican Guard Special Forces Brigade was landed at the royal palace

and other sites in downtown Kuwait City but failed

to capture the emir or any politically significant

members of his family. They did manage to kill the

emir’s younger brother, Sheik Fahd al-Ahmed alSabah, as he defended the palace alongside the

palace guard.27

After the Kuwaiti border forts were seized

quickly and according to schedule, the Republican

Guard columns moved quickly, driving for their ini24 Liberating Kuwait
Iraqi flag over their prize. Over the next week the

Iraqi Navy occupied the remaining Kuwaiti naval

installations and the various small islands and oil

platforms, and secured the captured Kuwaiti naval

vessels.35

Faced with stiff Kuwaiti resistance, the Medina

Armored Division did not reach al-Ahmadi until 3

August. Hit and run attacks by Kuwaiti forces operating in the southern desert would continue for two

more days, but from this point Iraq completely controlled Kuwait. With their nation overrun, a significant proportion of Kuwait’s military retreated across

the border into Saudi Arabia in order to continue

the fight against the Iraqi aggression. In the Iraqi

invasion of Kuwait, the Republican Guard divisions

suffered 100 or so casualties each in addition to the

Iraqi Air Force and Navy casualties, but this was a

practically bloodless operation by the standards of

the Iran-Iraq War.36

Marines in the Iraqi and Kuwaiti Embassies

The first U.S. Marines involved in the Gulf War were

the guards from the Marine Security Guard Battalion

assigned to the embassies in Baghdad and Kuwait

City. Ambassador April Glaspie had returned to the

United States on 31 July, leaving Deputy Chief of

Mission Joseph C. Wilson IV as the senior American

official in the Baghdad embassy. The Baghdad

Marines* stood security posts and destroyed classified documents during the early days of the crisis;

they also helped collect Americans stranded in Iraq

by the invasion.37

Of the Marines, Wilson later said:

Their role was to protect classified material

from falling into the hands of potential intruders and did not normally extend to protecting

embassy personnel, except as directed by the

chief of mission in the event of a riot or attack. I had already issued orders to the

Marines that they were not to use their

weapons to resist unless they felt their lives

were threatened. I would have forbidden use

of weapons even then, but the Marine Corps

standard operating procedure was that they

*

According to the Marine Security Guard Battalion (State Department) command chronology from January through December

1990 (on file at Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA), the following Marines were serving in the Baghdad security detachment in

August 1990: SSgt G. E. Cudjoe (detachment commander); Sgt P.

A. Lewis (assistant detachment commander); and Sgt H. L. Jones

and Cpls P. C. Carver, T. D. Larson, and V. D. McMullan (security

guards).

of the sun. I had only to look at the artillerymen

clustered around the trees to see that. Forget tactical

considerations; these guys were going to be comfortable if they had to sit outside in the heat all day.”

He noted, “About the only thing the Iraqis seemed

to be enthusiastic about was looting. They broke

into food stores and at first took water, bread,

meats, and fresh fruit; the latter seemed to be a particular favorite.”31

The Iraqi Air Force struck Kuwaiti airfields again

at 1220 and 1600, but the Kuwaiti Air Force continued to operate with some success by taking off

from neighboring highways. The al-Jaber Air Base,

according to Republican Guard officers, maintained

Kuwaiti aircraft operations until the Republican

Guard arrived there to shut the base down.32

The first of the two Iraqi naval forces, consisting

of two missile boats carrying 160 troopers of the

440th Naval Infantry Brigade, sailed at 2330 on 1

August, rendezvousing at the al-Bakr tanker platform in the northern Persian Gulf. This took longer

than expected, pushing the assault on Kuwait’s Ras

al-Qulayah Naval Base until after daybreak. The

vessels had numerous mechanical difficulties, and

according to their commander, Naval Colonel Muzahim Mustafa, only overcame them due to “Russian

experts on board for the purpose of training the

crews.”33

The two missile boats encountered a pair of

Kuwaiti patrol boats as they neared al-Qulayah. Neither Iraqi missile boat had working weapons, and

the Kuwaiti boats fired effectively, damaging the

bridge of one of the boats, which subsequently ran

aground and was unable to continue with the mission. Despite the setback Colonel Mustafa continued the amphibious assault with the remaining

missile boat, landing the 75 men left to him at Ras

al-Qulayah Naval Base. The naval infantry secured

the base against confused Kuwaiti resistance; by

0830 on 2 August, the base was secured. The second Iraqi naval force was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Saed Jalio and arrived off its target,

Faylakah Island, late in the day on 2 August. The

island was bombarded for six hours by the Iraqi

boats, and the naval infantry subsequently landed

in rubber boats. The Iraqi troops scoured the island

but encountered no significant resistance, declaring

the island secure at 1900 on 3 August.34

Early in the morning on 3 August the Republican

Guard arrived at Ras al-Qulayah, a day later than

expected and apparently unaware the base was

held by Iraqi naval infantry. A friendly fire incident

was avoided when the naval infantry raised the

Kuwait Invaded 25
must always have the option to use their

weapons in self-defense. My rationale was

that if a breach of embassy security were to

take place as a result of an extremely determined demonstration, the use of force by the

one Marine normally on duty would be of limited effectiveness and would only further enrage the survivors of any armed confrontation.

Our chances of survival would be better if we

were taken hostage than if an enraged crowd

fought to avenge fallen comrades.

Wilson felt that once the vast majority of the classified material had been destroyed, there was little

reason for the Marines to remain. But “it was all but

impossible to convince these young patriots, whose

Adapted from a Central Intelligence Agency map by Marine Corps History Division

26 Liberating Kuwait
stranded within Kuwait City began to come in. Sergeant Paul G. Rodriguez later reported, “One of the

calls I took was from a woman who was staying in

a hotel in Kuwait City. She reported to me that something hit the ground in the cemetery which was next

to the hotel. I asked her to describe it and all she

could say was that it made a small cloud of dust. She

reported a second impact and by then I knew they

were mortars coming down range.” In addition to

their other duties, the Marines notified U.S. Army

Major John F. Feeley Jr., an officer from U.S. Central

Command in Kuwait, to brief the ambassador on the

invasion, and they worked closely with Feeley to report on Iraqi movements within Kuwait.40

The primary duty of the Marines was the destruction of classified material; the task was complicated

because the burn barrels were outside the embassy

walls, and the civilian personnel would not leave

the embassy to enter the chaos of Kuwait City on 2

August. Staff Sergeant J. B. Smith, the detachment

commander, and two of his Marines carried out the

destruction of the classified information. Smith recalled, “One Marine covered the other two. Post 1

also had a camera mounted on the outside of the

wall to help with the monitoring of possible dangers to the Marines outside. The use of the burn

barrels lasted approximately two hours.” It took a

*

According to the Marine Security Guard Battalion (State Department) command chronology, the following Marines were serving

in the Kuwait guard detachment in August 1990: SSgt J. B. Smith

(detachment commander); Sgt Gerald W. Andre (assistant detachment commander); and Sgts Mark T. Ward, David K. Hudson, and Paul G. Rodriguez and Cpl Mark E. Royer (security

guards).

Reprinted from Kevin M. Woods, The Mother of All Battles, p. 95

U.S. Chargé d'Affaires Joseph C. Wilson IV meets with Saddam Hussein on 6 August 1990. A career diplomat, Wilson

led the U.S. State Department and embassy personnel remaining in Iraq until Saddam released the foreign hostages in

December 1990.

loyalty to the mission was paramount, that their

services were no longer required and they could

leave. So long as any American official was in Baghdad, they wanted to stay to defend him.”38

The decision to evacuate most of the families and

nonessential embassy personnel provided his solution. Wilson ordered the Marines to accompany the

first evacuation convoy from Baghdad across the

western Iraqi desert to Jordan. The convoy crossed

the desert to Jordan on 21 August with minimal

problems, and the Baghdad Marines subsequently

returned to the Marine Security Guard Battalion at

Marine Corps Base Quantico on 23 August.39

The Marines of the Kuwaiti embassy* experienced

a longer odyssey. In the early morning hours of 2

August, word of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait reached

the embassy. At 0520, the Marines were called to

duty, and within 10 minutes they were all armed and

at their posts. Small-arms fire could be heard in the

distance, and calls from frightened Americans

Kuwait Invaded 27
after action report that “this was vital information

that CentCom [Central Command] relied upon for

its intelligence on Iraqi forces that were heading

south to the Kuwait/Saudi Arabian border along

[the] Arabian Gulf Road, which passes between the

embassy and the Persian Gulf.”45

On 7 August, the Marines were ordered out of

their uniforms and into civilian clothing, and on 8

August garbled orders had them mistakenly destroy

their weaponry. Both events had a demoralizing effect, but the Marines were permitted back into uniform on 10 August and they acquired some pistols

from various sources to replace the destroyed

weapons. 

Staff Sergeant Smith summarized the Marine embassy guards’ time in Kuwait during the invasion in

the following manner:

The embassy walls were never breeched while

Marines of the Kuwait embassy security detachment form

a color guard in July 1990. From left to right, then-Cpl

Paul G. Rodriguez, Sgt Gerald W. Andre, then-Cpl David

K. Hudson, and Cpl Mark E. Royer. These Marines escorted embassy personnel and civilians from Kuwait following the invasion but were then trapped in Iraq until

December 1990.

Photo courtesy of Sgt Gerald. W. Andre and the

Marine Embassy Guard Association

total of six hours for all of the classified material to

be properly destroyed (material not burned was

shredded and disintegrated); when the burning was

complete, the Marines returned to defensive positions around the embassy.41

The violence of the invasion raged around the

embassy all day on 2 August. Iraqi tanks fired on

buildings near the embassy, and Sergeant Rodriquez

reported that

Kuwait National Guard forces still stood their

ground outside the compound. Some firefights

broke out the back gate with the Kuwaiti

forces taking cover behind their vehicle barriers. Iraqi forces were stopping cars and taking

them for “joy” rides. Once the Kuwaitis found

out at the back gate, they began to check all

the cars going by. The back gate local guards

reported that the Kuwaitis found two Iraqi

troops in a car and pulled them out and reported that they were going to take the Iraqis

away from the embassy area. So the report we

got later was that the Kuwaitis took them

somewhere else and shot them.42

The chaos continued on the second day; a

burned-out Kuwaiti tank stood at the back gate, and

Americans stranded and scattered throughout the

city called the embassy for aid and advice. With little sleep, the Marines stood watches and responded

to occasional alerts concerning potential Iraqi attacks on the compound. Rumors of these attacks

swept through the disorganized city. On 4 August,

approximately 50 Iraqi soldiers were dropped off

behind the embassy by trucks. The Kuwaiti National Guard troops that had been positioned

around the embassy had disappeared.43

Major Feeley later remembered that the Iraqis

were expected to assault the embassy on the fourth

night after the invasion: “And so we were all set up,

as the Marines said, to rock ‘n’ roll. We hadn’t had

any sleep, and we pretty much thought that the majority of the military folks weren’t going to make it

through the night.” The Marines were expected to

defend the embassy with small arms and tear gas

while the civilians were barricaded behind a steel

door. In the end, however, the Iraqis never attacked

the compound.44

Throughout their remaining time in Kuwait, the

Marines continued to man defensive positions and

otherwise assist the embassy staff by finding Americans lost in the city and relaying intelligence reports on Iraqi activities through Major Feeley to U.S.

Central Command. Staff Sergeant Smith noted in his

28 Liberating Kuwait
the Detachment was in Kuwait. The embassy

itself did take fire from small arms into the

buildings on the compound including the

Chancery and the Marine House. Tank and artillery rounds also were fired over the embassy

compound; two tank rounds hit a building adjacent to the compound. The Marines were still

in defensive positions during the firing of

these rounds, except on occasions during the

second through sixth days [when they had] to

locate civilians that were off the compound

taking refuge and escort them to safe buildings

on the compound. SSgt J. B. Smith, Sgt Paul

G. Rodriguez, and Cpl Mark E. Royer were involved in these actions.46

On 23 August 1990, the U.S. ambassador to

Kuwait ordered the Marines to escort a convoy of

all nonessential embassy personnel and other civilians from Kuwait City to Baghdad. The Iraqis would

not permit the embassy personnel to drive south

into Saudi Arabia. The 30-vehicle convoy departed

Kuwait City with the Marines spread among the

convoy in an attempt to keep all the vehicles together.47

Travel was slow, with a great deal of traffic, and

a serious accident occurred just outside Kuwait City:

In one vehicle an elderly woman was thrown

under the front seat; her hip was broken and

she received lacerations on the face and leg.

The other two elderly occupants of the vehicle

received facial bruises and lacerations. [Sergeant

David K.] Hudson, upon seeing this, proceeded

to the accident site and performed first aid on

the elderly woman with the broken hip. He

proceeded to help her by talking to her and

administering to her medical needs. The tail

vehicle was used to transport her back to a

hospital in Kuwait, and Sgt Hudson accompanied her back to the hospital. She was admitted and Sgt Hudson then proceeded to return

to the convoy at the Kuwait/Iraq border. The

decision and initiative of Sgt Hudson to accompany the woman back to the hospital took

great courage and sacrifice because of the possibility of not being able to return to the convoy or quite possibly loss of life.48

In the early morning hours of 24 August, the

convoy reached Baghdad and discovered that they

would not be able to depart Iraq from Baghdad as

intended. The Marines from Kuwait assumed Marine Security Guard duties at the Baghdad embassy

but “were not permitted to use mace, handcuffs, [or]

ammunition . . . all of which were to be secured in

a safe.” The Marines were handicapped by this policy until the arrival of a State Department inspector,

James J. “Jim” Blystone, in Baghdad. Blystone recommended the Marines take up their proper security duties, and on 1 October they assumed these

duties, conducting security sweeps in addition to

standing post.49

Life in Baghdad settled into a routine for the

Marines, despite the uncertainty and tension. Iraqi

soldiers were stationed near the embassy, and Iraqi

secret police followed the Marines whenever they

left the embassy, but no incidents occurred. The

Marines performed their assigned duties, conducted

physical training and security drills, and watched

the unfolding Kuwait crisis from Baghdad throughout the fall of 1990.

Finally, in early December, Saddam Hussein decided that no further benefit could be gained from

holding the foreign hostages he had taken. On 9

December, the Marines were relieved of their duties

at the Baghdad embassy and returned to the United

States via Germany.50

The World’s Response

The international response to Iraq’s invasion of

Kuwait was overwhelmingly negative. On the day

of the invasion, the United Nations (UN) Security

Council passed Resolution 660, which condemned

the invasion and called for Iraq to immediately

withdraw all of its forces from Kuwait. Providing

convincing evidence that the Cold War was well

and truly over, the United States and the Soviet

Union issued a joint statement condemning the invasion.51

The United States took the lead early, alarmed at

the prospect of Iraq controlling such a large percentage of Middle Eastern oil reserves, as well as

the blatant violation of international norms in place

since the close of World War II. Both Kuwaiti and

Iraqi overseas assets were frozen, and extensive

diplomacy to isolate Iraq from potential allies was

begun. Great Britain and France supported the

United States in diplomatic efforts to reverse the

conquest; British Prime Minister Margaret H.

Thatcher met with President George H. W. Bush

urging that Iraq’s action be reversed, by military

means if necessary, and that no compromise be accepted.52

The Arab world was shattered by the Iraqi invasion; no Arab state had invaded another in modern

history. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states were diKuwait Invaded 29
rectly threatened by Iraq’s aggression (Iran is a Persian, not an Arab, state). Militarily these states were

no more prepared for conflict than Kuwait had

been, and they shared similar political and economic systems with Iraq’s victim. Iraq remained a

Baathist state, and Saddam’s political rhetoric over

the previous two years had combined increasingly

strident calls for opposition to Israel with denunciations of the oil-rich Gulf states’ economic policies. 

Egypt and Syria shared Baathist histories with

Iraq, as well as some of Iraq’s hostility toward the

oil-rich Gulf states. Nevertheless, the Egyptians had

been viciously denounced by Saddam following the

Camp David Accords and the resulting truce with

Israel, and they had helped broker the 31 July meeting at Jeddah, which appeared in retrospect to have

been merely an Iraqi ploy. Moreover, Syria and Iraq

had a long history of antipathy that simmered just

below the boiling point for most of the two nations’

modern history. Iraq, Syria, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia

were the top contenders for leadership of the Arab

world, and none of the four were inclined to see

any of the others succeed on a scale as large as the

Iraqi conquest of Kuwait.

On 6 August, the UN Security Council passed

Resolution 661, an economic embargo of Iraq. That

same fateful day, American and Saudi Arabian discussions resulted in the Saudis agreeing to a deployment of American military forces to defend

Saudi Arabia against the perceived Iraqi threat. The

remarkable international Coalition that would eventually coalesce to drive Iraq from Kuwait was now

taking shape.

Iraq responded to the outrage and admonishments of the international community with defiance. On 7 August, Saddam declared that Iraq had

deposed Kuwait’s monarchy and that Kuwait was

now a republic. On 10 August, the Arab League met

in Cairo to debate Iraq’s invasion. After an acrimonious meeting, 12 of the 20 states voted for Iraq to

withdraw from Kuwait and to allow the al-Sabah

monarchy to return. They also called for troops to

defend Saudi Arabia from Iraq. Iraq in turn linked

its invasion of Kuwait to a resolution of the Arab

world’s open sore, Israel and Palestine. 

Many of Iraq’s diplomatic and military strategies

throughout the crisis would turn on Saddam’s understanding of the Arab world. By invading Kuwait,

he believed, Iraq was not making an opportunistic

land grab, but rather striking at the Middle Eastern

status quo. Saddam argued that most Arab governments were corrupt remnants from the Age of Imperialism and that while he worked for the favor of

Arab popular opinion, the opposition of the Arab

governments was expected. “Any state that takes us

further and brings our enemies closer to their evil

goals,” he asserted, “we must refuse, even if our

blood reaches our chest.”53

Iraq had begun making conciliatory diplomatic

overtures to Iran prior to the invasion of Kuwait.

Following the invasion Saddam offered to give up

all of Iraq’s gains from its minor victory in 1988, securing Iraq from Iranian interference in the unfolding crisis. Iran responded cautiously to Iraq’s

proposals during the early weeks of the situation,

and despite the hesitation of some of Iraq’s senior

leaders, Saddam continued to pursue a conciliatory

policy toward Iran throughout the crisis.54

Iraq’s most brutal method of shaping international reaction involved the use of hostages. Thousands of foreigners were trapped in Kuwait and

Iraq by the invasion. The Iraqis refused to allow

most of them to depart the country; they were collected in hotels in Baghdad and released on a country-by-country basis only after delegations from

individual states arrived and provided proper “respect” to the Iraqi government. The goal was to buy

time and build a community of nations committed

Defense Imagery DN-SC-89-05558

George H. W. Bush fought as a Navy pilot in World War

II and served as the director of the Central Intelligence

Agency prior to becoming President Ronald W. Reagan’s

vice president in 1980. He was elected the 41st president

in 1988. President Bush assembled and led the largest international Coalition since World War II in opposition to

Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait. 

30 Liberating Kuwait
to “peace” who were willing to allow Iraq to retain

Kuwait. Hundreds of male hostages were even

spread among strategic targets throughout Iraq to

deter bombing of those sites.55

Though the hostages dominated news reports

and much of the diplomatic maneuvering throughout the fall of 1990, in the end Saddam apparently

decided that they were not going to help him

achieve his goals. He announced their impending

release on 6 December, and they had all departed

Iraq by mid-December. 

On 28 August, Saddam formally annexed Kuwait

as Iraq’s 19th province, thus “restoring the branch

to the tree.” There would be a great deal of talk and

discussion over the next five months, but Iraq refused to withdraw, attempting instead to split the

international community and subvert the Coalition

opposing its invasion. Iraqi intransigence and the

international community’s refusal to allow Iraq to

benefit from its aggression drove events toward a

military conclusion. As diplomacy continued over

the coming months, the United States built up the

forces required for the impending confrontation. 

The American Military Response

At the time, the Iraqi Army was commonly judged

to be the fourth-largest military force in the world,

and it was considered battle-hardened by the nearly

decade-long Iran-Iraq War. The invasion of Kuwait

had been extremely swift, and surprisingly effective;

the problems the Iraqi military encountered were

not widely known. In fact, events would prove the

Iraqi military was largely a hollow shell, with demoralized, poorly trained troops greatly outnumbering the better-trained and better-equipped

Republican Guard units. But in August 1990, this

was not obvious, and Iraq’s historical willingness to

use poison gas against its enemies increased the

threat it represented.

In contrast, the American military in 1990 was

relatively untested. The 1970s had been the nadir

of American military effectiveness, with drug use

and racial conflict reportedly common among

American servicemembers. The military had an

abundance of advanced weaponry, and service personnel had undergone a decade-long revitalization,

but neither the equipment nor the troops had been

tested in combat on a large scale. 

The fiasco of the rescue attempt during the Iranian hostage crisis and the failure of the Marine deployment to Lebanon in the 1980s added to the

specter of defeat lingering from the American experience in Vietnam, but there were some small-scale

Defense Imagery HD-SC-00-02946

Secretary of Defense Richard B. “Dick” Cheney gave military leaders great leeway in conducting the Gulf War. He

later served as vice president under President George W.

Bush.

conflicts that offered a glimpse of American capabilities. The invasion of Grenada in 1983, the invasion of Panama in 1989, and the air conflicts with

Libya in the mid-1980s had all been successful operations despite some setbacks. Events would prove

that the American military of the 1990s was the besttrained, best-equipped, and most professional large

military in the world at that time, but those events

were in the future as American military commanders

considered how to make President Bush’s promise

that Iraq’s aggression would not stand a military reality. 

The American military was operating under a

new organizational plan following the GoldwaterNichols Act of 1986. Prior to the act, the chain of

command had flowed from the president through

the service secretaries down to the service chiefs

and on to the individual services. Interservice rivalry was built directly into the system. A direct response to the perceived failures in the system

demonstrated during the Iran hostage crisis, the

Kuwait Invaded 31
“Powell Doctrine,” which might fairly be described

as the military philosophy that underpinned the

American military effort in the Gulf War. In theory,

the doctrine set very high standards for the use of

American military force, requiring massive domestic

and international support for any military intervention and specifying a massive expenditure of military might to overwhelm any resistance.*

The direct military commander, and the man

who came to represent the Gulf War to the American public, was General H. Norman Schwarzkopf

Jr., USA. In addition to his service during the Vietnam War, Schwarzkopf had been the senior Army

officer for Operation Urgent Fury, the 1983 invasion

of Grenada. In late 1988, he replaced General

George Crist as the commander of U.S. Central

Command. 

The end of the Iran-Iraq War had led Central

Command to reconsider likely threats in its theater,

and under General Schwarzkopf this resulted in Internal Look, Central Command’s annual training exercise, examining the problem of defending the

region from an aggressive Iraq in 1990. As already

*

In practice, Michael R. Gordon and LtGen Bernard E. Trainor

assert in The Generals’ War that Gen Powell insisted on extremely high force estimates in an attempt to dissuade the president from any military intervention over Kuwait.

act’s most relevant changes impacted the chain of

command.

The new system created a chain of command

that ran through the secretary of defense to the

chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (now designated as the president’s chief military advisor) to

the geographic joint combatant commands (Pacific

Command, European Command, Southern Command, and Central Command). The service chiefs

were effectively removed from the chain of command; they were now “force providers” tasked with

training, supplying, and supporting the forces dispatched to the geographic commands in order to

fight the war. The Gulf War was the first test of this

new system in a major conflict.

Three large personalities held the top positions

under the president for the Persian Gulf conflict.

Secretary of Defense Richard B. “Dick” Cheney was

the senior civilian leader. A former congressman

and the White House chief of staff under President

Gerald R. Ford, Cheney was a strong proponent of

the use of force to reverse the Iraqi invasion. He

worked closely with General Colin L. Powell, USA,

chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

Like most of the senior military officers involved

in the Gulf War, General Powell was heavily influenced by his experiences in the Vietnam War. He

was the developer of what has been dubbed the

Army

Central Command

(ARCENT)

Navy

Central Command

(NAVCENT)

Air Force

Central Command

(AFCENT)

Commander in Chief

U.S. Central Command

Chairman

of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Secretary

of

Defense

President

of the

United States

Other Combat Commands

EUCOM, PACOM, etc.

Marine Corps

Central Command

(MARCENT)

The Chain of Command as Defined by the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986

32 Liberating Kuwait
Marine Force Manual 1 (FMFM1), Warfighting, perhaps the most well-known Marine Corps manual

published since the earlier Small Wars Manual. 

The senior Marine operational commander for

the Gulf War, Lieutenant General Walter E. Boomer,

had recently been assigned as the commanding general of both U.S. Marine Forces Central Command

and I Marine Expeditionary Force. General Boomer

was a Vietnam War veteran like his fellow Gulf War

commanders and was the commanding general of

the 4th Marine Division, the Marine Corps Reserve

command, in New Orleans, Louisiana, prior to his

Gulf War command. 

General Boomer and his family were traveling in

two cars from New Orleans, his previous duty station, to Camp Pendleton, California, when he heard

the news of Iraq’s invasion on 2 August. In a 2006

interview, he recounted the day’s events: 

We were somewhere in west Texas, when I

heard on the radio that Kuwait had been invaded. When we reached our planned destiDefense Imagery DA-SC-91-07109

The first African American chairman of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff, Army Gen Colin L. Powell’s two tours in Vietnam

shaped his views on military affairs and the subsequent

“Powell Doctrine.” Powell later served as secretary of state

for President George W. Bush. 

Defense Imagery DA-SC-91-04130

Gen H. Norman Schwarzkopf Jr., USA, commanded U.S.

Central Command during the Gulf War. After the war,

Gen Walter E. Boomer recalled that there was a “tremendous amount of trust” on the part of Gen Schwarzkopf,

who “always felt that he didn’t have to worry about us . . .

he knew that part of his campaign, that part of his theater

mentioned, this produced an odd sense of déjà vu was okay.”

in Central Command planners during the summer of

1990 as Iraq’s actions mirrored the conditions established in the exercise. Secretary of Defense Cheney

took General Schwarzkopf with him to brief King

Fahd bin Abdul Aziz al-Saud in the 6 August meeting

that led to Saudi Arabia agreeing to allow American

forces to deploy to the Desert Kingdom to defend it

against Iraq. Suitably modified, the plan Schwarzkopf

put into play for building up forces in Saudi Arabia

was essentially the plan from Internal Look 90. 

Removed from the operational chain of command

by Goldwater-Nichols, the Commandant of the Marine Corps in 1990 was General Alfred M. Gray Jr.

As Commandant, General Gray had aggressively

continued the reform efforts of the 1980s and added

new training initiatives of his own. He preferred to

be seen in combat fatigues and promoted a combat

culture in the Marine Corps that made him popular

with junior officers and enlisted men. He was also

determined to create an intellectual culture in the

Marine Corps by expanding officer and noncommissioned officer training and in 1989 publishing Fleet

Kuwait Invaded 33
34 Liberating Kuwait

Defense Imagery DM-SC-95-00050

As Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen Alfred M. Gray

reformed and revitalized Marine training. Gen Gray

fought in the Korean and Vietnam Wars and served as

Commandant during the Gulf War.

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo

Then-LtGen Walter E. Boomer commanded U.S. Marine

Forces Central Command as well as the I Marine Expeditionary Force. LtGen Boomer served two tours in Vietnam

prior to his Gulf War command. 

nation that night, I asked Sandi [his wife] if

she had been listening to the radio or the

news, and she said, no they had been talking.

She asked, “What happened?” I said, “Iraq invaded Kuwait.” Having been a Marine wife for

a while she looked at me and said, “What

does that mean?” I said, “Well, I don’t know

but it probably doesn’t bode well in that the

I Marine Expeditionary Force will probably be

involved,” and it obviously was.56
35

Desert Shield

u CHAPTER 3u

MV PFC DeWayne T. Williams (AK 3009), part of Maritime Prepositioning Ship Squadron Three, unloads AAV-7 amphibious assault vehicles. The Prepositioning Program allowed the Marines to quickly build up combat power in Saudi

Arabia. 

Photo by PO2 (SW) Joe Bartlett, USN. Defense Imagery DN-ST-91-11215

I

n the late twentieth century, it became increasingly difficult for the Marine Corps to live up to

its World War I recruiting poster slogan “First to

Fight.” Modern aircraft and midair refueling techniques enabled U.S. Army light infantry forces, instead of Marine forces, to deploy with unheard of

speed anywhere in the world where friendly

airstrips awaited them, and Saudi Arabia’s airfields

had been improved for precisely this situation. 

The first land-based aerial unit to arrive in Saudi

Arabia was the 1st Tactical Fighter Wing of the U.S.

Air Force, which deployed from Langley, Virginia,

on 8 August 1990. On 9 August, they began conducting combat air patrols. The first American

ground troops to arrive in Saudi Arabia were the

men of the 2d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division; this

was the duty “ready” brigade of the division. They

began deploying to Saudi Arabia by air on 8 August,

and the brigade was fully deployed on 14 August.

The rest of the 82d Airborne Division was fully deployed to Saudi Arabia on 24 August. The U.S. Navy

already had the Joint Task Force Middle East on station in the Persian Gulf. This task force consisted of

the guided missile cruiser USS England (CG 22); the

destroyer USS David R. Ray (DD 971); the frigates

USS Vandegrift (FFG 48), USS Reid (FFG 30), USS

Taylor (FFG 50), USS Robert G. Bradley (FFG 49),

and USS Barbey (FF 1088); and the command ship

USS La Salle (AGF 3). In addition, carrier task forces

built around the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN

69) and USS Independence (CV 62) were within

striking range.1

These formidable forces might not have been

able to stop a determined Iraqi armored assault into

Saudi Arabia, however. The 82d Airborne’s brigades

were light infantry units with little in the way of

supporting arms, and their mission was initially limited to defending the Saudi airfields and acting as a

“trip-wire” force should Iraq invade the Desert Kingdom. The Marines were not the first forces to deploy to Saudi Arabia, but their deployment provided

the muscle needed to make Operation Desert Shield
*

In August 1990, then-LtGen Hoar was deputy chief of staff for

plans, policies, and operations at Headquarters Marine Corps. As

a major general, he served as chief of staff, U.S. Central Command, from 1988 to 1990, and he later succeeded Gen

Schwarzkopf as commander in chief of Central Command in August 1991. 

Department of Defense photo (USMC) P2272-90-11

Marines from 7th Marine Expeditionary Brigade headquarters at Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center in Twentynine Palms, California, board buses en route to Desert Shield in August 1990. After flying to Saudi Arabia, the Marines

of this brigade met ships of Maritime Prepositioning Ship Squadron Two, which carried their heavy equipment. 

a reality. Moving combat power rapidly ashore has

long been a Marine capability, but Marine power in

the Gulf War was not projected by amphibious assault. Instead, it was projected through a new program, Maritime Prepositioning.2

Marines and Maritime Prepositioning

The Gulf War would be the largest deployment of

Marines since the Vietnam War. It challenged the entire warfighting establishment of the Marine Corps—

aviation, ground, and logistics—and forced a

generation of Marines to put two decades of planning and training to the test. The Corps would see

many of its tactical and operational philosophies justified under combat conditions. The Military Sealift

Command’s Prepositioning Program proved its

worth, enabling Marines to be the first combinedarms task force in Saudi Arabia.

Prepositioning ships are civilian crewed vessels

with a squadron staff of U.S. Navy personnel, and

the vessels supporting the Marines are named after

Marine Corps Medal of Honor recipients. Maritime

Prepositioning Ship Squadron One usually serves

the Mediterranean Sea and eastern Atlantic Ocean;

Squadron Three usually serves the western Pacific;

and Squadron Two is normally based at Diego Garcia and covers the Indian Ocean and Middle East.

Squadrons Two and Three deployed in support of

Operation Desert Shield, with Squadron Two deploying from Diego Garcia on 8 August.

There was some controversy over the relatively

late departure of the squadron. After the war, Generals Alfred Gray and Joseph P. Hoar* both argued

that the prepositioning ships should have been deployed sooner, allowing the Marine brigade to deploy more quickly after the Saudis agreed to accept

American forces to aid their defense. Though the

ships were discussed at high levels prior to 7 August, they were not ordered to sail.3

General Hoar later said, “It’s an important lesson

for us as Marines that when a crisis begins that we,

and our Navy partners, do not have to wait until

36 Liberating Kuwait
the same day that aviation and ground forces are

loaded into a theater; that naval ships, MPS [Maritime Prepositioning Ships], can be moved before

the decision is made. And it is a very prudent decision, in our belief, to move those forces earlier so

they are available to the National Command when

the time comes. We believe that we would have

been better positioned to have operated had those

ships been moved, say, on the second or third day

of August.”6

7th Marine Expeditionary Brigade

Marines of the 7th Marine Expeditionary Brigade,

commanded by Major General John I. Hopkins, arrived in Saudi Arabia in mid-August, where they

joined with the equipment from Maritime Prepositioning Ship Squadron Two.7

General Hoar later noted:

The 7th Marine Expeditionary Brigade was the

first ground element that had tanks and armored personnel carriers. It was the first element that was capable of meeting the threat

that existed in Kuwait. But it was more than

that; it was an air-ground team as we all

know, that had fixed wing, rotary wing . . .

had an air-ground task force headquarters. It

had its full suite of logistics for 30 days, so it

was self-sustaining for 30 days. . . . Marine

forces were arriving not only with that combat

Birth of the Maritime Prepositioning Ship Squadrons

I

n 1979, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown put

the Prepositioning Program into place. General

Robert H. Barrow, 27th Commandant of the Marine Corps, later recalled how Dr. Brown first

brought the concept up to him:

I think it was at an Armed Forces Policy

Council meeting. That would be on Monday

morning at eleven o’clock. Harold Brown

said to me, “Bob, could I see you for a

minute?” I’ve already described Hal Brown.

I like him very much, but he’s not given to

small talk so I knew it was something apart.

He got me aside, and he said, and I’m paraphrasing obviously, “Do Marines always

have to storm a shore?” Isn’t that a strange

question? He’s not given to such small talk.

I read a lot into it. 

So, I fired back. I said, “No, sir. They

surely do not. An amphibious operation is

but a means to an end. Marines do most of

their fighting after they have gotten ashore.

Getting ashore—we want that to be as little

fighting as we can possibly make it, but

knowing that you cannot always expect to

go for some undefended place, somebody

has to know how to do it, and we call that

amphibious warfare, but it’s a mean to an

end. So, to answer your question, no, sir,

we don’t.”

He said, “In other words, Marines, if you

had their equipment aboard some other

kind of ship that could be brought into a

port or somehow moved over to the shore

in an environment that was not threatening,

the Marines would do that, do you think?” I

said, “We would do that extremely well because it still has a maritime character about

it, and we’re accustomed to having one foot

on the beach and one foot in the sea.” He

said, “Well, that’s very interesting.”4

The Prepositioning Program was a response to

a perceived weakness in America’s strategic posture; the Iran hostage crisis put a spotlight on

America’s inability to project power into the Persian Gulf region, despite the region’s relative importance. In Europe and the Pacific, the United

States maintained large bases on the territory of

allies, but this was neither practical nor feasible

in the Middle East (see chapter 1). 

The new program was tied into the creation

of the Rapid Joint Deployment Task Force. The

Prepositioning Program put all of the equipment

for a Marine expeditionary brigade as well as

enough supplies for the brigade to fight for 30

days on a squadron of purpose-built vessels of

the U.S. Military Sealift Command. The personnel

and personal equipment of the brigade would

be deployed by the Military Airlift Command to

the region where it could rendezvous with a

Maritime Prepositioning Ship Squadron. The concept required a friendly host nation with welldeveloped airfields and ports; a great deal of aid

was given to the various Gulf states and Saudi

Arabia to build up the infrastructure required to

support a rapid military deployment in the region if required.5

Desert Shield 37
M60A1 tanks from the 1st Tank Battalion fire rounds on 11 September 1990 as the battalion conducts live-fire training

during Operation Desert Shield in Saudi Arabia. Finding time and space to conduct needed training on ranges was

difficult throughout the deployment.

Defense Imagery DM-SN-92-01310

power, ready to be put into operation, but in

addition to that brought [their] logistics as

well.8

The 7th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, like all

Marine air-ground task forces, was a tripartite formation, with a ground, air, and logistics component.

Logistical support for the brigade was provided by

Colonel Alexander W. Powell’s Brigade Service Support Group 7, comprising Combat Service Support

Detachments 71, 72, and 73. The ground component was the 7th Marines (Reinforced) under the

command of Colonel Carlton W. Fulford Jr. This regimental combat team contained four infantry battalions (1st Battalion, 7th Marines; 2d Battalion, 7th

Marines; 3d Battalion, 9th Marines; and 1st Battalion, 5th Marines); the 3d Light Armored Infantry

Battalion; the 3d Amphibious Assault Battalion; the

3d Tank Battalion; and artillery of the 3d Battalion,

11th Marines (Reinforced), as well as other, smaller

associated units. The 7th Marines was well trained

in desert warfare; it served as part of the garrison

of the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center at

Twentynine Palms in the Mojave Desert of southern

California.9

The aviation combat element was Marine Aircraft

Group 70, commanded by Colonel Manfred A. Rietsch. This composite air group included fixedwing, helicopter, and air-defense missile squadrons

in addition to its supporting units. Fixed-wing aircraft included McDonnell Douglas F/A-18A and F/A18C Hornets in Marine Fighter Attack Squadrons

314, 235, 333, and 451. A-6E Intruders came with

Marine All-Weather Attack Squadron 224. McDonnell Douglas AV-8B Harrier IIs from Marine Attack

Squadrons 311 and 542 rounded out the complement of strike aircraft. Helicopter transport was provided by Boeing Vertol CH-46E Sea Knight

medium-lift helicopters of Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 161 and Sikorsky CH-53D Sea Stallion

and CH-53E Super Stallion heavy-lift helicopters of

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadrons 462, 465, and

466. Bell-Textron AH-1W Super Cobras and UH-1N

Iroquois (more commonly known as “Hueys”) were

provided by Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadrons

367 and 369.10

The brigade deployed very quickly; the first

Marines debarked from their military airlift flights in

Saudi Arabia on 14 August. After the long transoceanic

air flight, arrival in Saudi Arabia was memorable for

most Marines. Sergeant James I. Mabus of Marine Aircraft Control Group 38 described “the back hatch of

the plane opening . . . and the hot air shooting into

38 Liberating Kuwait
Photo courtesy of Maj Thomas P. Simon

Warehouses provided temporary billeting for Marines newly arrived in Saudi Arabia during the early days of Operation

Desert Shield. These quarters were hot and uncomfortable, and consequently most Marines were glad when they deployed

to defensive positions in the desert. 

the aircraft, stifling with the strong scent of jet

fumes. Someone in the plane said, ‘This might not

be hell, but we can see it from here.’ . . . It took a

while for the mind to accept . . . that you are now

in a truly foreign place that remains this hot all day

long.”11

General Hopkins’s brigade was the first to use

the Maritime Prepositioning Ship Squadrons as intended. Three of the ships of Maritime Prepositioning Ship Squadron Two were present at Diego

Garcia when the order to move arrived: MV Cpl

Louis J. Hauge Jr. (T-AK 3000), MV 1stLt Alexander

Bonnyman Jr. (T-AK 3003), and MV PFC James Anderson Jr. (T-AK 3002). These three set sail at once

for al-Jubayl, Saudi Arabia, which they reached on

15 August. MV Pvt Harry Fisher (T-AK 3004) was

rerouted to Florida for scheduled maintenance

when the call came; it changed course for Saudi

Arabia as well, arriving on 24 August. MV PFC

William B. Baugh (T-AK 3001) was already in

Florida undergoing scheduled maintenance; it departed Florida and arrived in Saudi Arabia on 5 September. In addition the aircraft maintenance ship

USNS Curtiss (T-AVB 4) deployed to support Marine

Aircraft Group 70, but unexpected engine problems

en route delayed the Curtiss and it did not arrive in

Saudi Arabia until 30 September.12

Conditions in al-Jubayl remained harsh for the

Marines of the brigade. Billeting was limited to four

warehouses with inadequate sanitation facilities,

and the Saudis were reluctant to allow the Marines

the spaces needed for ranges and training—all of

the large caliber weapons coming out of storage on

the ships needed to be bore-sighted before deploying to the field. The Saudis were uncomfortable

with the large American military force descending

on their nation and strove to minimize the impact

by restricting training areas and troop movements

as much as possible. 

Unloading proceeded briskly, but it was not a

flawless process. In some cases the proper maintenance had not been performed regularly on the

equipment stored on the ships, and some spare

parts or required tools were missing as well. The

Iraqi Army in Kuwait was only 150 or so miles from

al-Jubayl along the coast road, and aside from light

Saudi units stationed at the border, al-Jubayl was

undefended until the 7th Marine Expeditionary

Brigade unloaded its heavy equipment. In order to

present a credible deterrent, combat units arrived

prior to logistics units, and this further slowed unloading and distribution of equipment. In the initial

rush to get their units ready for combat and deployed to the field, many employed the traditional

Marine Corps art of scrounging, creating a somewhat chaotic situation. 

Desert Shield 39
a significant portion of Saudi Arabia was gone. 

The maritime prepositioning system had worked

as designed. The only apparent flaw in the system

involved the deployment of aviation assets. General

Hopkins later said, 

The fixed-wing was stalled at MCAS [Marine

Corps Air Station] Beaufort [South Carolina]

and at MCAS Cherry Point [North Carolina].

The Air Force didn’t give us the tankers that

we needed to get across the Atlantic. That was

my biggest concern, because basically the

concept calls for us to be combat ready in

about ten days. We were ready on the ground,

with the MEB [Marine expeditionary brigade]

declared combat ready on 25 August; but the

F/A-18s didn’t arrive until around the 23rd,

because they were delayed. The Air Force

was moving its own aircraft, and that’s one of

the weaknesses of the MPF [Maritime Prepositioning Force] concept—it’s not tied together

at the Joint Chiefs of Staff level.15

Marines Afloat

The 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) deployed on a scheduled cruise of

the western Pacific Ocean in June 1990. These

“WestPac” cruises were an annual six-month deployment that rotated between West Coast Marine

units; the deployed units served as the landing force

of the U.S. Seventh Fleet. The expeditionary unit

was commanded by Colonel John E. Rhodes. It

comprised Battalion Landing Team 1/4, Marine

Medium Helicopter Squadron (Composite) 164, and

Marine Expeditionary Unit Service Support Group

13. These Marines were embarked on the ships of

Amphibious Squadron 5, an amphibious ready

group that included USS Okinawa (LPH 3), USS

Ogden (LPD 5), USS Fort McHenry (LSD 43), USS

Cayuga (LST 1186), and USS Durham (LKA 114).

The cruise was planned for six months, but the deployment was extended by the crisis in the Gulf by

nearly four months. As a consequence, the Marines

began calling themselves the “Raiders of the Lost

ARG* [amphibious ready group].”16

The 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit was designated “Special Operations Capable.” Prior to getting

underway, the unit went through a training cycle

designed to prepare it to conduct different types of

special operations that might be encountered dur-

*

A humorous play on the title of the popular 1981 movie Raiders

of the Lost Ark.

The Marines of Regimental Combat Team 7 were

eager to leave the deplorable conditions of the

warehouses. Major Michael F. Applegate of the 3d

Assault Amphibian Battalion’s opinion was held by

many: “The time we spent in those warehouses was

the worst experience of my life. At least in the

desert you can move around, and you have the

morning and evening breezes.” General Hopkins’s

efforts with the Saudis eventually paid off, and the

brigade’s ground combat forces began deploying to

defensive positions north of al-Jubayl.13

General Hopkins later described his initial defensive plan:

There were only about three or four defensible pieces of terrain between the Kuwaiti border and [al-]Jubayl. I went up to Manifa Bay,

which is about 70 miles south of the Kuwaiti

border. We decided to screen there with the

light armored vehicles, and then Colonel [later

Brigadier General Carlton W.] Fulford could

deploy the mechanized units and the greater

part of the Regimental Combat Team by the

cement factory, which was 40 miles north of

Jubayl and 27 miles or so south of Manifa Bay,

where there was some relief in the desert. It

was the best defensible terrain and Fulford

deployed his Regimental Combat Team there.

That was our concept. We would screen as

far forward as possible, delay and attrit the

Iraqis with airpower, then defend in a main

battle area along what became known as “cement [factory] ridge.” The Iraqis had two possible attack routes. We thought they’d either

come down the coast or use a route a little bit

to the west, but both these routes come together at a junction near the cement factory.

If they kept coming, we had drawn a line in

the sand by the cement factory. We were

going to stay there.14

The performance of the Iraqi military in the

Iran-Iraq War (see chapter 1) and its later performance against light armored vehicles of the Marines

and Saudis backed by strong air support in the

Battle of al-Khafji (see chapters 6 and 7) indicate

that the soldiers of the 82d Airborne might have

been more than a speed bump, although the Air

Force initially did not have the assets or munitions

in theater to support the paratroopers as thoroughly as the Marines and Saudis were supported

during al-Khafji. But certainly once the 7th Marine

Expeditionary Brigade was in position on 25 August, Iraq’s window of opportunity for conquering

40 Liberating Kuwait
Photo courtesy of LtCol Marshall K. Snyder

Amphibious Squadron 5 underway in the Persian Gulf. This squadron carried the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) on the USS Fort McHenry (LSD 43), USS Durham (LKA 114), USS Cayuga (LST 1186), USS

Ogden (LPD 5), and USS Okinawa (LPH 3).

throughout August 1990. The focus of the brigade

abruptly shifted on 10 August when it was ordered

to the Persian Gulf, forcing units that had trained

for operations in Norway to turn in their cold

weather gear for desert warfare garb.19

The ground combat element of Jenkins’s brigade

was Regimental Landing Team 2, commanded by

Colonel Thomas A. Hobbs. Major units of the regimental combat team included 1st Battalion, 2d

Marines; 3d Battalion, 2d Marines; 1st Battalion, 10th

Marines (Reinforced); Companies B and D, 2d Light

Armored Infantry Battalion; Company A, 2d Assault

Amphibian Battalion; and Company A, 2d Tank Battalion.

The logistics element was Brigade Service Support Group 4, commanded by Colonel James J.

Doyle Jr., and it included the 2d Military Police

Company, 2d Medical Battalion, 2d Dental Battalion, 2d Maintenance Battalion, 2d Supply Battalion,

8th Communications Battalion, 8th Motor Transport

Battalion, 8th Engineer Support Battalion, and 2d

Landing Support Battalion.

The 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade aviation

combat element was Marine Aircraft Group 40,

commanded by Colonel Glenn F. Burgess. Because

the group was deploying on board amphibious

warfare vessels, the only fixed-wing aircraft in the

group were the Harriers of Marine Attack Squadron

331. Marine Medium Helicopter Squadrons 263 and

365 brought Sea Knights; Marine Heavy Helicopter

Squadron 461 was equipped with Super Stallions;

*

These predeployment training programs were the Marine reaction to the creation in the 1980s of the joint U.S. Special Operations Command that included Army, Navy, and Air Force special

operations forces. The Marine Corps did not join Special Operation Command until 2006.

ing its deployment.* These special operations included recovering lost aircraft, rescuing hostages,

evacuating civilians from hostile environments, and

training local forces.17

The 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) began its cruise of the western

Pacific with a training exercise in the Philippines in

July 1990. An earthquake on the island of Luzon on

16 July led to a disaster relief operation that lasted

through the end of the month. A scheduled port

visit to Hong Kong followed in August, but the

“Raiders of the Lost ARG” were then ordered to the

Persian Gulf, arriving in the region on 7 September.18

In August 1990, the 4th Marine Expeditionary

Brigade was commanded by Major General Harry

W. Jenkins Jr., and the brigade was preparing to

train with NATO forces in two exercises, Teamwork

and Bold Guard 90, in northern Europe. Stationed

on the East Coast, primarily at Camp Lejeune, North

Carolina, the brigade was traditionally oriented toward Europe and Africa. In addition to preparing

for the upcoming exercises, the brigade kept an eye

on civil war–torn Liberia, where the 22d Marine Expeditionary Unit was conducting a noncombatant

evacuation and defending the U.S. embassy

Desert Shield 41
Photo by Capt Rick Mullen. Defense Imagery DM-ST-91-05871

Marines and sailors on board the amphibious transport dock USS Raleigh (LPD 1) watch as their ship and the amphibious

assault ship USS Okinawa (LPH 3) conduct underway replenishment operations with the fleet oiler USNS Andrew J. Higgins (T-AO 190). The Marine amphibious forces spent most of the Gulf War at sea, deploying in August 1990 and returning to the United States in the spring of 1991.

and Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 269

flew Sea Cobras and Hueys.20

The brigade was embarked on the ships of the

U.S. Navy’s Amphibious Group 2, commanded by

Rear Admiral John B. LaPlante, USN. The vessels

were divided into three transit groups: Transit

Group 1 consisted of USS Shreveport (LPD 12), USS

Trenton (LPD 14), USS Portland (LSD 37), and USS

Gunston Hall (LSD 44). Transit Group 2 comprised

USS Nassau (LHA 4), USS Raleigh (LPD 1), USS

Pensacola (LSD 38), and USS Saginaw (LST 1188).

Transit Group 3 included USS Iwo Jima (LPH 2),

USS Guam (LPH 9), USS Manitowoc (LST 1180),

and USS LaMoure County (LST 1194). In addition,

Military Sealift Command supported the brigade

with a squadron that included USNS Wright (T-AVB

3), MV Cape Domingo (T-AKR 5053), and MV

Strong Texan (T-AK 9670). Three additional vessels

were leased for the duration of the deployment;

these nonnaval vessels were MV Bassro Polar, MV

Pheasant, and MV Aurora T.

21

The 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade was intended to deploy on two dozen amphibious warfare

vessels, but only a dozen were available in time for

the brigade’s deployment. As a result, some of the

brigade’s assault equipment and supplies were

loaded on board the Military Sealift Command vessels. The brigade loaded the available shipping at

Morehead City and Wilmington, North Carolina. The

dispersed loading sites and rushed embarkation created confusion that required the brigade’s shipping

to reorganize and reload in al-Jubayl in November

1990. Transit Group 1 departed on 17 August; Transit Group 2 departed on 20 August; and Transit

Group 3 departed on 21 August, each passing

across the Atlantic and Mediterranean and through

the Suez Canal to the Persian Gulf.22

Amphibious Group 2 arrived in the Gulf in early

September, with the transit groups arriving in the

same order they had departed, on 3 September, 6

September, and 9 September, respectively. The

brigade’s Military Sealift Command vessels arrived

from mid-September through mid-October. Because

they were not present when these vessels were

loaded, the brigade’s logistics officers had to physically board each vessel and then find and record

the location of all their cargo in person.23

Following Navy–Marine Corps amphibious doc42 Liberating Kuwait
Army

Central Command

(ARCENT)

LtGen Yeosock

Navy

Central Command

(NAVCENT)

VAdm Mauz

Air Force

Central Command

(AFCENT)

Gen Horner

Commander in Chief

U.S. Central Command

Gen Schwarzkopf

13th Marine

Expeditionary Unit

(Special Operations

Capable)

(13th MEU [SOC])

4th Marine

Expeditionary

Brigade

(4th MEB)

Amphibious

Squadron 5

(PhibRon 5)

Amphibious

Group 2

(PhibGru 2)

Landing Force

(TG 150.8)

MGen Jenkins

Amphibious

Task Force

(TG 150.6)

RAdm LaPlante

Marine Corps

Central Command

(MARCENT)

LtGen Boomer

I Marine

Expeditionary Force

(I MEF)

LtGen Boomer

1st Marine Division

(1st MarDiv)

3d Marine

Aircraft Wing

(3d MAW)

1st Force Service

Support Group

(1st FSSG)

Command Relationships in Desert Shield,August to December 1990

trine, the 4th Marine Expeditionary Force and 13th

Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) fell under the control of U.S. Naval Forces

Central Command, rather than under Lieutenant

General Walter Boomer’s Marine Forces Central

Command. Through December 1990 Vice Admiral

Henry H. Mauz Jr. commanded Central Command’s

naval forces. Amphibious Group 2 and Amphibious

Squadron 5 formed the Amphibious Task Force (TG

150.6), commanded by Rear Admiral LaPlante, and

the two Marine expeditionary forces formed the

Landing Force (TG 150.8), commanded by Major

General Jenkins.24

The Marine expeditionary forces in the Amphibious Task Force were intended as a theater reserve,

and their employment was controlled directly by

General Schwarzkopf. During Desert Shield, they

were prepared to reinforce the troops defending

Saudi Arabia if needed, or to launch amphibious assaults or raids against the enemy’s rear if the Iraqis

attacked Saudi Arabia. Their presence was also intended to divert Iraqi forces toward defending the

coast, thus reducing the number of troops faced inland.25

Admiral Mauz saw the terminal end of the Persian Gulf as particularly inhospitable for naval

forces, with Iran a constant danger on the flank of

any naval force passing through the Strait of Hormuz and up the Gulf to Kuwait. Admiral Mauz later

declared: “I wanted to see an amphibious landing

as much as anybody. . . . [T]he trouble was, there

was no good place to do a landing.” Mauz believed

that Desert Shield would shape interservice competition in the post-Soviet world and that the Army

and Air Force were looking to replace their NATO

missions with traditional Navy/Marine Corps expeditionary missions; therefore, he wanted the naval

forces to have an impact on the conflict. Despite

this, he made “insistent and repeated” requests to

General Schwarzkopf to halve the number of amDesert Shield 43
tions in a desert environment. To rectify these problems, a series of amphibious exercises were planned

in the friendly nation of Oman. There would be four

of these exercises, each dubbed “Sea Soldier.” Sea

Soldiers I and II took place in October and early November, respectively. In addition to practicing amphibious landings, the exercises gave the Marines a

chance to conduct maintenance that could not be

completed on ship and rearrange the loading of the

amphibious vessels to better suit the staff’s planning.

The 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit worked with

the brigade in these exercises as well, highlighting

the unity of the amphibious task force.28

Maintaining and training large amphibious

forces at sea is not without risk, however. On 8 October, two UH-1N helicopters operating from the

USS Okinawa collided during a training flight. Both

aircraft from Marine Light Attack Helicopter

Squadron 267, attached to the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit’s air element, were lost along with

their Marines: Captains William D. Cronin Jr., Gary

S. Dillon, Kevin R. Dolvin, and William J. Hurley;

Sergeants Kenneth T. Keller and John R. Kilkus;

Corporal Timothy W. Romei; and Lance Corporal

Thomas R. Adams.29

Photo by Richard L. Oasen. Defense Imagery DN-SC-92-07251

VAdm Henry H. Mauz Jr. commanded U.S. Naval Forces

Central Command from the start of the Persian Gulf crisis

through December 1990.

Defense Imagery DN-ST-91-4032

MajGen Harry W. Jenkins Jr. (left), landing force commander, and RAdm John B. LaPlante, USN, amphibious

task force commander throughout the deployment to the

Persian Gulf, during Exercise Sea Soldier.

phibious ships in the area. Mauz’s belief that amphibious operations were not practical in the Gulf

likely led General Jenkins to conclude that the commander of U.S. Naval Forces Central Command “displayed little interest in developing a naval campaign

that went beyond the level of presence.”26

General Schwarzkopf repeatedly denied Admiral

Mauz’s request to reduce the amount of amphibious

shipping under his command because the Marines

afloat were already being used as a threat and a

feint against the Iraqis, who could never rule out

the possibility of an amphibious assault. General

Jenkins and his staff prepared various amphibious

options for the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade

and the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special

Operations Capable), both separately and in tandem. These options included landings behind an

Iraqi thrust into Saudi Arabia as well as reinforcement of the American and allied forces defending

Saudi Arabia. Because the shoreline of the Gulf was

relatively unsuited for amphibious operations, the

reinforcement mission was considered most likely.27

The hasty departure of General Jenkins’s troops

and their previous training for exercises in Norway

left the brigade ill prepared for amphibious opera44 Liberating Kuwait
of both Marine Forces Central Command and I Marine Expeditionary Force, Marines continued to deploy to the Gulf and to solidify the defenses of Saudi

Arabia. The 1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade deployed to Saudi Arabia by air and met the ships of

Maritime Prepositioning Ship Squadron Three at alJubayl. The brigade did not operate independently

when it arrived in Saudi Arabia, however. Instead,

it combined with the 7th Marine Expeditionary

Brigade upon arrival, as planned, forming the I Marine Expeditionary Force, the primary combat arm

of Marine Forces Central Command.33

I Marine Expeditionary Force officially took over

as the controlling Marine air-ground task force in

Saudi Arabia on 3 September. The staff of the 7th

Marine Expeditionary Brigade was combined with

incoming staff to form the new headquarters, and

Major General John Hopkins became the deputy

commander, I Marine Expeditionary Force. Major

General Jeremiah W. Pearson III was the deputy

commander, Marine Forces Central Command. He

remained in Riyadh at Central Command headquarters, serving as the senior Marine on staff there and

coordinating with the other services. 

The ground combat element of the I Marine Expeditionary Force during this initial phase of Operation Desert Shield was the 1st Marine Division,

commanded by Major General James M. Myatt. The

division’s regiments were initially the 7th Marines,

led by Colonel Carlton Fulford; 3d Marines, commanded by Colonel John H. Admire; and 11th

Marines, led by Colonel Patrick G. Howard. In addition, the division had the 3d Tank Battalion, 3d

Assault Amphibian Battalion, 1st Combat Engineer

Battalion, 1st Tank Battalion, 1st Reconnaissance

Battalion, and the 1st Light Armored Infantry Battalion. Because the division deployed in waves, several of its regimental units were comprised of

battalions from different regiments. This lack of unit

coherence extended to the company level for some

of the attached battalions. Lieutenant Colonel Clifford O. Myers III of the 1st Light Armored Infantry

Battalion responded to having companies from

multiple battalions by designating the light armored

infantry force as Task Force Shepherd; later this

practice would spread to the entire division.34

The I Marine Expeditionary Force air combat element was the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing; it initially

comprised three air groups and their supporting logistics and air defense units. Colonel Manfred Rietsch commanded Marine Aircraft Group 11, which

controlled most of the fixed-wing squadrons of the

wing at Shaikh Isa Air Base and Bahrain Interna-

*

Roll-on/roll-off ships are designed to carry wheeled cargo such

as trucks, automobiles, or railroad cars that are driven on and

off the ship.

Three of the ships assigned to the brigade’s Military Sealift Command support squadron were

leased vessels with foreign flags, and they were unable to be employed in a combat zone. With the

prepositioning ships now emptied of gear, two vessels from Maritime Prepositioning Ship Squadron

Two—the PFC William Baugh Jr. and the 1stLt Alex

Bonnyman Jr.—were assigned to the brigade’s support squadron instead. Throughout October and

November, the three leased vessels—the Bassro

Polar, Pheasant, and Aurora T—were off-loaded in

al-Jubayl, and their cargos were combat loaded

onto the two roll-on/roll-off* prepositioning ships.

Major General Jenkins explained, “This was the first

time that [Maritime Prepositioning] ships had ever

been combat loaded to support a general landing

plan for the amphibious force.”30

While the amphibious forces trained and reorganized themselves, they also had a more active

maritime mission to prosecute against Iraq. UN Security Council Resolution 661 established an embargo on exports from Iraq and Kuwait, as well as

on imports of most cargo except medical supplies

and food. The U.S. Navy took the lead in an international naval effort to enforce this embargo, but

the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) was tasked, per doctrine, with providing a maritime special purpose force for

conducting opposed boarding operations against

underway vessels. The USS Ogden detached to conduct these operations with a heliborne force from

1st Force Reconnaissance Company and a Naval

Special Warfare Command (Sea, Air, and Land

[SEAL]) detachment.31

The first interdiction occurred on 13 October

against the Iraqi vessel Al-Mutanabbi, and the next on

22 October against the Al Sahil Al Arabi. On 28 October, the 13th Marine Expeditionary Force’s maritime

special purpose force made its last interdiction against

the Amuriya, an Iraqi vessel that refused to stop despite warning shots fired by U.S. and Australian

frigates and low-level passes by U.S. Navy aircraft. The

successful boarding party insertion finally persuaded

the vessel to stop and allow an inspection. None of

the boarding actions resulted in any casualties.32

A Line in the Sand:

Planning to Defend Saudi Arabia

With Lieutenant General Walter Boomer at the helm

Desert Shield 45
tional Airport. These squadrons included F/A-18

Hornets, A-6E Intruders, Grumman EA-6B Prowlers,

and Lockheed KC-130 Hercules. Eventually the

group would total 10 squadrons. Colonel John R.

Bioty Jr. commanded Marine Aircraft Group 13 at

King Abdul Aziz airfield. Colonel Bioty commanded

the rest of the wing’s fixed-winged squadrons, flying AV-8B Harrier IIs and North American OV-10

Broncos. By the end of Desert Storm, Bioty’s group

comprised four Harrier squadrons and two Bronco

squadrons. Colonel Larry T. Garrett commanded

Marine Aircraft Group 16 with its rotary-wing

squadrons based at the al-Jubayl Naval Air Facility.

His seven squadrons flew CH-46E Sea Knights, CH53D Sea Stallions, CH-53E Super Stallions, AH-1W

Super Cobras, and UH-1N Hueys. Later Garrett’s

group would expand their operations to Ras al-Ghar

and Manifah Bay.35

The 1st Force Service Support Group was commanded by Brigadier General James A. Brabham Jr.

and provided the logistics element of I Marine Expeditionary Force. When the two brigades were

46 Liberating Kuwait

Adapted from a Central Intelligence Agency map by Marine Corps History Division
*

By the end of the 1990s, the Marine Corps had abandoned the

surveillance, reconnaissance, and intelligence group concept.

for 37,500 people; set up mess halls that fed 100,000

people; maintained 400 kilometers of road; and laid

out two airstrips, in addition to myriad smaller

tasks. The close cooperation of Captain Johnson’s

Seabees and the Marines of the 1st Force Service

Support Group continued the long tradition of Marine and Seabee cooperation and comradeship, as

well as the important doctrine of Navy support for

Marine Corps operations.38

General Boomer also received tactical command

over an allied contingent, the British Army’s 7th Armored Brigade, the famed “Desert Rats” of the

North African campaign of World War II. Commanded by Brigadier Patrick Anthony John Cordingley, this brigade provided a boost to the Marine

tank battalions with 170 FV4030/4 Challenger I

main battle tanks. The 1st Force Service Support

Group provided logistics for the British brigade,

which formed an additional maneuver element for

the Marine defense sector.

On the ground, Saudi Arabia was defended from

a possible Iraqi invasion in September and October

1990 by the I Marine Expeditionary Force; the XVIII

Airborne Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General

Gary E. Luck, USA; and Saudi Arabian and allied

forces. The Arab forces, which were arranged along

the frontier, acted as a buffer and trip wire against

any Iraqi movement south, but the primary defense

of the Desert Kingdom lay with the American forces.

The U.S. Army’s primary troop contribution to the defense of Saudi Arabia—the XVIII Airborne Corps—

consisted of the 82d Airborne Division, the 101st

Airborne Division (Air Assault), the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), and the 1st Cavalry Division. 

There were three potential avenues of approach

for an Iraqi force invading Saudi Arabia. One route

lay out of Iraq and Kuwait along the Wadi al-Batin

(a “wadi” is the Arabic term for a shallow desert depression, often a dry river- or streambed) and directly across the desert to Riyadh. The next route

passed from Kuwait and down the “Tapline Road”

(so named because it followed a pipeline) across

the desert to the Gulf, and the third route lay along

the coastal highway south from Kuwait. The Tapline Road and coastal highway routes formed what

was commonly referred to as the “Triangle,” whose

southern point was near Abu Hadriyah and whose

two northern points were near an-Nuayriyah and

Manifah Bay, respectively. Both Marine and Army

planners saw the Triangle as the key region for the

defense of Saudi Arabia.

The Army’s plan for defending Saudi Arabia called

for the 101st Airborne to screen to the west, while

combined, General Brabham, a veteran of service

in the Middle East who had been working in Saudi

Arabia preparing for the Marines’ arrival since early

August, organized the support group into a direct

support group, a general support group, and a

headquarters and services group. Colonel Alexander W. Powell, the former commanding officer of

Brigade Support Group 7, commanded the direct

support group, which was charged with sustaining

the 1st Marine Division and the 3d Marine Aircraft

Wing. Colonel Thomas E. Hampton commanded

the general support group, which provided general

support to I Marine Expeditionary Force. The Headquarters and Support Group was commanded by

Lieutenant Colonel Henry T. Hayden. Among other

duties, it coordinated port security.36

In addition to the three large units, I Marine Expeditionary Force controlled several smaller units,

including the 1st Radio Battalion commanded by

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas A. Flaherty and the 1st

Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence

Group commanded by Colonel Michael V. Brock.

Colonel Brock’s group was a new organization,

adopted in the late 1980s and based on concepts

developed during the Vietnam War; it served as a

regimental-sized umbrella organization that brought

together previously independent intelligence collection and analysis organizations that served the

expeditionary force.* During the course of the Gulf

War deployment, the group would double in size

as new units arrived from the United States, including the Marine all-source fusion center, fleet imagery intelligence unit, and topographic platoon as

well as communications battalions, remotely piloted

vehicle companies, air and naval gunfire companies, an intelligence company, and force reconnaissance companies.37

When I Marine Expeditionary Force began deploying its forces to Saudi Arabia, the need for the

naval mobile construction battalions, better known

as “Seabees,” to reinforce the engineers of the 1st

Force Service Support Group was apparent, and the

commander of Naval Construction Battalions, U.S.

Pacific Fleet, ordered four battalions to Saudi Arabia

for this purpose. Captain Michael R. Johnson, USN,

commanded this force, which ultimately became

the 3d Naval Construction Regiment. From August

1990 until June 1991, the regiment completed 6 million square feet of aircraft parking; built 9.9 million

square yards of ammunition storage; erected camps

Desert Shield 47
could destroy them. Lacking the Army’s vehicular

mobility and high numbers of armored vehicles, the

Marines intended to hold just south of the tip of the

Triangle, at what was called “Cement Factory Ridge”

(the same piece of high ground that 7th Marines

had initially defended in August). This was considerably removed from where the Army intended to

engage the Iraqis, and the Marines worried that the

Iraqis passing down the Tapline Road might flank

them. This caused some tension between the Marine and Army tactical commanders, though in the

actual event the Iraqis did not invade and the defensive plans were thus never tested.40

Meeting of Cultures: Marines and Saudis

The United States began providing the Kingdom of

Saudi Arabia with military assistance in the 1940s,

and as the decades passed the relationship grew.

The United States assisted the kingdom as a bulwark first against communism and secular ethnic

the 24th Infantry Division covered the central desert

region and I Marine Expeditionary Force covered the

eastern region around the port of al-Jubayl. The 1st

Cavalry Division was established behind the 24th Infantry Division; the Marines prepared to launch a

counterattack; and the 82d Airborne was deployed

around Dharhan, ad-Dammam, and Abqaiq in order

to secure the rear areas from commando and terrorists attacks. The Army intended to engage Iraqi

forces early with its attack helicopters and armored

forces while conducting a mobile defense.39

Primarily concerned with the coastal highway

route, the Marine plan, in contrast, called for utilizing the terrain to hinder and disperse the Iraqi

forces as they drove south. The highway was bordered by sabkhas or salt marshes; by mining the

highway, blowing up highway culverts, and destroying gas stations, the Marines hoped to channel

the Iraqis off the road and into these desert sand

traps where close air support and naval gunfire

Adapted from a Central Intelligence Agency map by Marine Corps History Division

48 Liberating Kuwait
Arab nationalist movements, and later against radical Islamic movements. In addition, a strong, stable

Saudi Arabia was seen as the key to preventing a

general war in the Middle East. For the House of

Saud (as the royal family is known), the close relationship and military assistance of the United States

acted as a counter to Saudi Arabia’s more powerful

neighbors Iraq and Egypt, as well as an aid in the

suppression of internal rebellious movements.41

As the decades passed, however, and hostility

against the United States increased in the broader Islamic world, American military assistance became

nearly as much of a liability as it was an asset. This paradox was neatly summarized by leading Egyptian journalist Mohamed Heikal: “The first responsibility of a

Saudi monarch is to keep intimate relations with Washington, and the second is to do all he can to hide it.”42

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait produced a near catastrophe in foreign relations for the Saudis, because it was clear they could not stop any Iraqi

encroachment into their territory without American

aid, yet that aid would have to be very public. The

intimate relationship between the United States and

Saudi Arabia had long been an open secret, but

now it would truly be exposed. The presence of a

massive “infidel” army on Saudi soil, home to

Mecca and Medina, the two holiest cities in Islam

(and forbidden to nonbelievers), was a potential

public relations disaster. On the other hand, Saddam had invaded Kuwait, a fellow Arab country

that had materially aided Iraq in its war against Iran.

Moreover, Saddam’s own Baathist Party was an

avowedly secular organization devoted in part to

ethnic Arab nationalism. Both of these facts helped

Saudi Arabia maintain its image in the Islamic world

while accepting American aid. But the situation required constant, careful manipulation. There were

many tensions between the Saudis, who naturally

wished Coalition forces would disrupt Saudi life as

little as possible, and the Coalition forces, who

often felt unappreciated by the Saudis they were ostensibly in the desert to protect. 

General Schwarzkopf took steps as soon as

American forces began to arrive in the Saudi Arabia

to mitigate the impact of hundreds of thousands of

Americans pouring into the Desert Kingdom. Alcohol and pornography were forbidden to American

forces deploying to the region, and chaplains were

renamed “morale officers.” In some areas, however,

Saudi beliefs had to bend to American mores, especially in regard to American servicewomen.

Women were firmly integrated into the American

armed forces, and it was difficult if not impossible

to deploy without them, regardless of the Saudi dislike for women in roles the Saudis perceived as

masculine. This led to one of the few issues the

Marines had with Saudi customs when a Saudi commander complained about a televised broadcast of

Adapted from a 1991 Ministry of Defence (United Kingdom) map by Marine Corps History Division

Desert Shield 49
mand] General Order Number One: prohibits drinking in Saudi Arabia. It turned out to be the greatest

thing that’s ever happened. I’ve been in a combat

situation where alcohol was allowed and one in

which it wasn’t allowed and I will tell you, it’s better

when there is no alcohol. It’s just better. So many

fewer problems. Disciplinary problems. It’s hard to

keep it out. Marines want to drink, as did I, but we

didn’t and it was a great thing.”45

Saudi military forces were divided into two distinct services. The Ministry of Defense and Aviation

consisted of the regular Saudi ground and aviation

forces, whose mission was to protect the kingdom

from external threats. The Saudi aviation forces were

folded, along with other Coalition air forces, into the

air campaign, but the Royal Saudi Land Forces or

Saudi Army operated separately as nine brigades.46

The Ministry of Defense and Aviation units were

supplemented by the Saudi Arabian National

Guard, comprising two mechanized brigades. Ostensibly, the Saudi Arabian National Guard was intended to reinforce the Ministry of Defense and

Aviation forces in the event of a war, but in reality

its primary role was to protect the royal family from

internal rebellion. Staffed with personnel loyal to

the House of Saud specifically through family and

tribal ties, the Saudi Arabian National Guard was

descended from the Ikhwan,* a Wahhabite tribal

militia that formed the main body of Ibn Saud’s

forces during World War I. The government employed the Saudi National Guard to protect the holy

cities of Mecca and Medina and to counter the regular armed forces in the event of an attempted

coup. It received the lion’s share of training and

equipment that was available to Saudi forces, although it did not possess tanks.47

Overall, the Saudi National Guard was favored

over the Ministry of Aviation and Defense; the royal

family kept the two forces separated; and neither

force trained with the other. Nevertheless, oil-rich

Saudi Arabia did not lack resources, and both services were lavishly equipped with modern military

hardware. Despite the massive amounts spent on

modernization, many Saudi soldiers lacked professional standards or competence, and the officer

corps granted the noncommissioned officers neither

authority nor responsibility.

Reprinted from Eliot A. Cohen et al., eds., Gulf War Air Power

Survey, vol. IV, Weapons, Tactics, and Training and Space Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993)

Iraq worked hard to drive a wedge between Saudi Arabia

and the United States throughout the Gulf crisis. This cartoon from an Iraqi propaganda pamphlet highlights the

thrust of their argument. Drunken American soldiers (one

wearing a Star of David around his neck) and two scantily clad females cavort in front of an oil well, while a corpulent King Fahd says, “Our holy things, our land, and

our honor are in safe hands.” American military policies

in Saudi Arabia were designed to prevent incidents that

might validate this propaganda.

*

Named after the Arabic term for “brotherhood,” the Ikhwan became known as the White Army because they wore traditional

white robes instead of military uniforms. Wahhabism, the dominant form of Islam in Saudi Arabia, aims to purify Sunni Islam

of any practices that deviate from the teachings of Muhammad

and his compatriots.

a touch football game between Navy and Marine

women in shorts and T-shirts while male Marines

were watching.43

Once in the kingdom, liberty was severely curtailed, and most Marine units lived a monastic desert

life for most of the deployment. Captain Michael J.

McCusker, commander of Company I, 3d Battalion, 3d

Marines, later said, “We never had an air-conditioned

place like people saw on TV in the States. We were

not authorized to go to town. That p——d a lot of us

off because people in the States thought we were seeing civilians. We were stuck in the desert, nowhere

near a town. We didn’t even have electricity. It was

all flashlights and candles and chem[ical] lights.”44

Although unpopular with the troops, some of the

restrictions had very positive effects. General

Boomer later recalled, “CENTCOM [Central Com50 Liberating Kuwait
Royal Saudi

Land Force

(RSLF)

Royal Saudi

Naval Force

(RSNF)

Royal Saudi

Air Force

(RSAF)

Joint Chief

of Staff

(JCS)

Ministry of Defense

and Aviation

(MODA)

Ministry of

Interior

(MOI)

Saudi Arabian

National Guard

(SANG)

King

Royal Saudi

Air Defense Force

(RSADF)

Saudi Defense Force Organization

In 1990–91, direct American military assistance to

Saudi Arabia centered around two organizations. Officially, there was the U.S. Department of Defense’s

Office of Program Manager for the Modernization

of the Saudi National Guard, which assigned American officers as advisors to the Saudi National Guard.

In addition, the Vinnell Corporation provided the

Saudi National Guard with military contract advisors,

most of whom were American veterans of the Vietnam War. In both cases, the personnel assigned to

train the Saudi National Guard prior to the invasion

of Kuwait fought with the National Guard forces,

greatly increasing their effectiveness. The military

advisors and Vinnell contractors worked closely together in supporting the Saudi National Guard.48

Since neither Saudi Arabia nor the United States

was willing to have its forces under the other’s command, a joint structure was set up. Joint Forces

Command, a parallel organization of Central Command, was composed of most of the Arab contingents and was led by Saudi General Khaled bin

Sultan. A nephew of King Fahd, he was a graduate

of the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, and the

Air War College at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. In 1986, after 25 years in the armed forces of

his country, General Khaled was appointed commander of the Royal Saudi Air Defense Forces. 

Originally the Arab forces were organized into

the Eastern Area Command stationed along the

northern border, but eventually the command was

further subdivided into Joint Forces Command–

North and Joint Forces Command–East. Joint Forces

Command–North, although dominated by two

Egyptian divisions, also contained Saudi Arabian

Ministry of Defense and Aviation, Kuwaiti, and Syrian brigades. It controlled the territory from the

“elbow” at al-Manaqish to the Kuwait-Iraq border.

Saudi National Guard units and Ministry of Defense

and Aviation forces, as well as Kuwaiti forces and a

Qatari mechanized brigade, made up Joint Forces

Command–East. It controlled the territory from the

eastern border of the al-Wafrah oil fields to the Persian Gulf coast, including al-Khafji and the surrounding territory. The assignment of Saudi National

Guard units under the command of General Khaled

was out of the ordinary and indicated how seriously

the House of Saud took the crisis. The placement

of the subcommands was due to Arab pride, which

dictated that they hold positions in the front line to

ensure theirs would be the first blood shed.49

Although well-equipped and provided with professional military advisors, the Saudi forces were

still not up to Western military standards. Islamic

holidays, daily prayers, and familial obligations dramatically decreased the amount of training. The

troops generally averaged an eighth-grade education, and there was no noncommissioned officer

corps. The officers were often well educated, and

most spoke at least some English, but they were

discouraged from independent thought or action

until given a battalion-level command. They faced

tremendous pressure to keep their superiors happy.

Desert Shield 51
East units, as the primary focus of his liaison effort. As Colonel John Admire, commanding officer

of the 3d Marines, remarked:

We were the only U.S. combat force located

on the eastern coast [of Saudi Arabia]. Now

the significance of that of course is that we

continued to train with Coalition forces. We

were the division’s primary instrument from

October-November-December and through

January of training with the Saudis and training with the Qatari forces.52

Colonel Admire assigned Captain Molofsky, an officer with previous experience in the Middle East who

had served with the UN on the Sinai Peninsula, as the

Marine liaison officer to the Saudi National Guard.53

In addition to liaison and training work, the air

and naval gunfire company fulfilled its doctrinal

role and attached fire control teams to the 2d

Brigade, Saudi Arabian National Guard. Major General Myatt later recalled:

What was really interesting was we got a lot

of pushback, because at that point there was

a bit of interservice rivalry and the Special

Forces folks were looking for a mission, and

they said, “It’s our mission to be training indigenous forces[.]” They would resist us training the 2nd SANG [Saudi Arabian National

Guard] and I just simply ignored it, and I told

General Boomer that, “We have got to give

them the confidence that we can do it.” Because what the Special Forces role is, is to

train them to use their own gear, not to interface with our gear and our capabilities. It

caused a little bit of heartburn, and wasn’t the

only thing to cause heartburn in the alliance,

but I did it.54

The Marines began working with the nascent

Royal Saudi Marines* in September. A U.S. Marine

training team was attached to them, and the 3d

Marines shared some of their facilities and training ranges as they prepared to move to the Cement Factory line. The Saudis taught classes on

desert tactics, desert survival, and desert navigation, while the Marines taught weapons, leadership, and equipment maintenance. One benefit

of the training was the enhanced contact between

Saudi Arabian officers and their men. General

Draude explained, “When you got into the techDefense Imagery DA-ST-92-08034

Gen Khaled bin Sultan bin Saud, a prince of the Saudi

royal family, was the Joint Forces commander and Gen

Schwarzkopf’s opposite number. Joint Forces Command

was composed of the Coalition’s Islamic forces from Saudi

Arabia, Egypt, Syria, and other states. 

*

The Royal Saudi Marines today comprise two battalions within

the Royal Saudi Navy and are based at Ras al-Ghar.

As Captain Joseph Molofsky, 3d Marines liaison officer to the 2d Brigade of the Saudi Arabian National

Guard, noted: “It’s all make or break. You displease

your senior and you’re done forever. You make him

happy and he sends you on vacation to Europe, literally.” Saudi forces were untested in 1991, having

last seen action in the 1920s. Because of these factors, there was serious concern about how well they

would perform in battle.50

In October, when it became clear that the 1st

Marine Division would be fighting beside Saudi

forces, the division’s commander, Major General

James Myatt, ordered his assistant division commander, Brigadier General Thomas V. Draude, to

take primary responsibility for liaison duties.51

Brigadier General Draude used 3d Marines, the

Marine unit nearest to Joint Forces Command–

52 Liberating Kuwait
Members of the Saudi Arabian National Guard pose in their V-150 armored personnel carrier. 

Photo courtesy of Capt Joseph Molofsky

nical description, you needed someone who

spoke Arabic and we just simply couldn’t strip

away what few Arabic speakers that we had. So

the Saudi officer, who in most cases spoke English, became the guy who was translating, and

therefore his status in the eyes of his men was

raised considerably.”55

In December, General Draude described the

training as successful up to that point, noting that 

we found, as always, our best ambassador

is a U.S. Marine. It’s something that we kind

of take for granted and I started thinking

about it and came to the conclusion that in

the Marine Corps, we deploy. I mean, you

don’t stay around home for very long if

you’re going to be in the Marine Corps. You

go overseas. If you go overseas you’re going

to have contact with folks from another

country. That, of course, usually means the

military. . . . We just have an experience

base of working with soldiers of other countries. It’s not a big deal for us to come up to

a soldier of a different nation, different color

skin, different language, different everything, and out comes the poncho, his

weapon is on the poncho, your weapon is

on the poncho, disassemble and you show

me yours, I’ll show you mine, and without

any translation needed, without any interpreter needed. It’s just two soldiers who will

work together very well. A U.S. Marine is

also guileless: what you see is what you get.

Our Marines will share whatever they have

with another soldier. You can’t train someone to be that way. I mean he just is or he

isn’t, and that basic goodness—without trying to bring tears to your eyes—that basic

goodness of a Marine comes through and it

Desert Shield 53
make us different and it makes us better in

this regard of working with soldiers of other

countries. I’m absolutely convinced of it and

have told the Commandant so and the State

Department folks and others just how good

of an ambassador a U.S. Marine is.56

54 Liberating Kuwait
Preparing for War

u CHAPTER 4u

unit departed the Persian Gulf region and sailed for

Subic Bay in the Philippines, with orders to rearm

and train, preparing to possibly return to the Gulf

at a later date. The departure of Colonel John

Rhodes’s Marines left the 4th Marine Expeditionary

Brigade as the sole amphibious landing force available in the Persian Gulf region. 

Operation Imminent Thunder was conducted

from 15 to 21 November 1990. Conducted by Central Command at General Schwarzkopf’s orders,

this training exercise was conducted in order to

test the plan for defending Saudi Arabia and to determine what issues would arise from the large

joint/combined* force working together in the

Desert Kingdom. It was a five-phase operation that

focused on air and amphibious exercises paired

with tests of command, control, and communications. The exercise also served to strengthen General Walter Boomer’s I Marine Expeditionary Force

staff. Although Marine expeditionary forces were

an established part of Marine Corps doctrine, there

was little expectation that they would be employed. The Marine expeditionary units deployed

annually to the Mediterranean and the Pacific, and

the Marine expeditionary brigades exercised regularly, but few expected the Corps to deploy an expeditionary force outside a major war. Operation

Imminent Thunder provided an opportunity for

the Marine expeditionary force staff to practice

controlling the battle in a joint/combined environment.2

The exercise’s amphibious landings were originally planned for Ras al-Mishab, but its proximity

to the Kuwaiti border and the possibility of unintentional conflict with Iraqi forces led to General

Schwarzkopf shifting the exercise south, to Ras alGhar. The new site was much more accessible to

the media, which was eager for any new footage

as the confrontation continued into its third month.

Marine amphibious capabilities received great deal

*

In retrospect, it seems unlikely that Iraq intended to invade

Saudi Arabia, but the secretive and unpredictable nature of Saddam Hussein’s government prevented that contingency from

being ruled out at the time.

*

In American military parlance, joint operations are conducted

by two or more services (Navy-Army, Air Force-Marine Corps,

etc.), while combined operations are conducted by American

forces in conjunction with allied foreign military forces. Operation Desert Shield, conducted by forces from all U.S. Armed Services as well as the military forces of several other nations

(including Saudi Arabia, Great Britain, France, etc.), was therefore a joint/combined operation.

Throughout the fall of 1990, diplomacy continued as the Coalition focused on convincing Iraq to release the hostages it had taken

during the invasion and to withdraw from Kuwait.

Iraq veered between defiance and attempts to end

the crisis but focused on splitting the Coalition by

applying diplomatic pressure to its traditional ally,

the Soviet Union, and its greatest trading partner,

France. But Iraq’s understanding of the changed international situation in the wake of glasnost was

consistently wrong. France remained a reasonably

firm member of the Coalition, sending troops and

aircraft to the fight. Russia attempted to broker multiple peace deals, but Iraq’s intransigence and the

firmness of the Coalition’s position that Iraq must

depart Kuwait without preconditions precluded

each of them, making a military conflict seem more

likely each week.1

Despite the threat of a Coalition military intervention, Iraq refused to withdraw from Kuwait. Saddam was convinced that the United States could

neither maintain the Coalition nor intervene militarily in a meaningful way. A military struggle to free

Kuwait thus became inevitable.

Operation Desert Shield was a success at the beginning of November. Sufficient military force was

in the Persian Gulf to prevent an Iraqi attempt to

take Saudi Arabia or the Gulf states.* Now the political decision over whether or not the Coalition

would attempt to forcibly eject Iraq from Kuwait

had to be made. On 8 November 1990, President

Bush indicated this would happen when he announced the American military force in the Gulf

would nearly double in size. Thereafter, U.S. Central

Command proceeded to reinforce the troops in the

Gulf and began serious planning for an offensive

to evict Iraq from Kuwait. 

Imminent Thunder 

and Amphibious Operations

The 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) had been deployed since June

1990, when it had departed on its scheduled cruise

of the Pacific. On 4 November, the expeditionary

55
Defense Imagery DF-ST-92-07534

Marines of 2d Marine Division move out on a mission after disembarking from a Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron

263 CH-46E Sea Knight helicopter in Saudi Arabia during Exercise Imminent Thunder, which was part of Operation

Desert Shield.

Defense Imagery DN-ST-92-07370

During Exercise Sea Soldier III in the Persian Gulf, the bow ramp of a utility landing craft from the amphibious assault

ship USS Nassau (LHA 4) descends as troops and vehicles prepare to hit the beach in support of Operation Desert Shield. 

of press attention as a result, and the Amphibious

Task Force commander, Rear Admiral John LaPlante, later described it as “beating our chest for

the press.” Ironically, most of the amphibious landings were canceled because of dangerous seas, but

the extensive air and communication operations

were a success.3

The exercise also marked the end of one of the

earlier Marine air innovations. In response to the

difficulties involved in defending Saudi Arabia from

56 Liberating Kuwait
Marine Corps Art Collection

Call Waiting by Col H. Avery Chenoweth, head of the I Marine Expeditionary Force combat art team during the Gulf

War. The painting depicts patient Marines at one of many telephone facilities set up near U.S. compounds during Operation Desert Shield.

an Iraqi attack in the early days of Operation Desert

Shield, Marine planners had developed Task Force

Cunningham. They designed it as a task-organized,

aviation-only task force that would stop Iraqi

ground maneuver forces with concentrated fire

from the air, covering the withdrawal of Saudi and

Marine forces along the coastal highway. UH-1N

Huey and AH-1W Super Cobra helicopters would

operate alongside OV-10D Bronco and AV-8B Harrier fixed-wing aircraft in the task force. The intent

was for this task force to cover the western flank of

the Marines. Marine commanders viewed the concept with some skepticism; they were worried that

Marine air assets could be used up in this manner.

Brigadier General Granville R. Amos, assistant wing

commander of the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing during

the Gulf War, summed it up succinctly: “If you shoot

your wad at one time, you don’t really have anything to follow-up.” In November, it was concluded

that the general support of the divisions precluded

the ability of the wing to maintain a separate,

massed task force, but Task Force Cunningham influenced staff concepts of massed aerial forces

throughout the planning for Operation Desert

Storm.4

From 8 to 18 December, another amphibious

landing exercise was conducted: Sea Soldier III.

This brigade-sized exercise included helicopter and

surface landings at night, and ended with the Marine Forces afloat conducting much needed maintenance and logistics operations ashore.5

The UN-sanctioned embargo of Iraq and Kuwait

continued throughout November and December.

After the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit departed,

the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade was tasked

with providing a heliborne maritime special purpose force for conducting opposed boarding operations against underway vessels. USS Trenton

detached to conduct these operations with force reconnaissance Marines and a Navy SEAL detachment

Preparing for War 57
Jay Leno performs a stand-up routine for the Marines in the desert during a holiday USO tour. The unusual environment

notwithstanding, Marines remember he was quite funny.

Photo courtesy of Maj Thomas P. Simon

comprising the boarding force. After forming in late

October, the special maritime force practiced boarding operations throughout November.6

In late December, the 4th Marine Expeditionary

Brigade’s boarding force conducted its first maritime

interdiction, the most complicated interdiction undertaken during the crisis. The Iraqi vessel Ibn

Khaldoon was known as the “Peace Ship” and was

intended as direct challenge to the UN embargo. It

sailed from Tripoli, Libya, with female peace activists, children, and journalists from a variety of

countries on board, and the vessel’s cargo was

listed as milk and medicine. In accordance with the

UN embargo, the Ibn Khaldoon was interdicted on

26 December. The Marines and sailors of the boarding force subdued the ship’s crew with minimal

force; one Swedish peace activist who suffered a

heart attack during the boarding was saved by the

Trenton’s medical personnel. The swift, professional interdiction denied Iraq a propaganda victory. The final Marine boarding operation of Desert

Shield came on 30 December when the brigade’s

boarding force took an Iraqi tanker, the Ain Zallah,

again with minimal force.7

Happy Holidays from Saudi Arabia

The president’s 8 November announcement that

American forces in the Persian Gulf would be reinforced in anticipation of liberating Kuwait led to a

series of visits by senior civilian and military leadership throughout the month. These culminated in

the Thanksgiving visit of President Bush and his

wife, First Lady Barbara P. Bush, accompanied by

several senators and congressmen as well as Army

General Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff. On 22 November the president and his wife

enjoyed Thanksgiving dinner with the Marines, and

the president gave a speech warning Iraq again that

it must withdraw from Kuwait. On 23 November

the presidential couple visited with Marines and

sailors on board the USS Nassau.

8

Marines celebrated the Marine Corps birthday on

10 November with cake and food; the customary

toasts were given using nonalcoholic beverages.

Many Marines later recalled this birthday celebration

in a war zone as one of the most memorable of their

careers. Thanksgiving was celebrated in a similar

manner, although the presidential visit dominated the

holiday. Christmas was very sparse as preparations

for the upcoming offensive kept all the Marines in

the Gulf occupied, and Christmas religious observances were muted in deference to Saudi sensibilities.

Despite these conditions, Marines were showered

with packages from the Red Cross as well as myriad

parcels from home addressed to “any Marine.” In fact

they received so many of these packages that carrying them was difficult.9

Officers and noncommissioned officers worked

hard to maintain troop morale during the holidays.

Captain Michael J. McCusker of Company I, 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, later described one of his own

efforts: 

58 Liberating Kuwait
Photo by Sgt Jeff Wright. Defense Imagery DF-ST-92-07519

Entertainer Bob Hope performs for military personnel at the USO Christmas tour during Operation Desert Shield.

It was something to keep their minds off of

being so far away and to make some sort of

Christmas there in the desert, and it worked.

The Marines use to give me s——t about it:

“Gee, sir, this Christmas tree is so ugly that we

are going to burn it.” But it gave them something to look at, and I think it did what I

wanted it to do. We decorated it with engineering tape and tinsel and little Christmas ornaments that school kids made and sent to us.

I took chem. [chemical] lights and hung them

on the tree on Christmas Eve and made a big

cross on top. It was round like a big bush. It

was five or six feet tall, and the camels used

to come and chew on it and we had to shoo

them away. It served its purpose.10

Despite the best efforts of the officers and noncommissioned officers, however, it was inevitable

that Christmas 1990 would have a melancholy tinge

to it for Marines in the Gulf. Most were convinced

that they would be liberating Kuwait by force soon,

and this expectation of combat was never far from

the troops’ minds.11

As it has since 1941, the United Service Organizations (USO) sent tours of performers to the war

zone in order to entertain the troops in the Gulf

during the crisis of November and December. The

headliner of the tours was the venerable Bob Hope,

who entertained American troops in a war zone for

the final time in his storied career. Other entertainers included comedians Steve Martin and Jay Leno;

all three visited with Marines both ashore and afloat.

In 1990, CBS ran a popular sitcom called Major

Dad that centered on the life of a Marine major and

his family. The star of the series, Gerald McRaney

(and his wife, actress Delta Burke), also visited

Marines in the Persian Gulf on USO tours, even as

his character on the series lamented not being assigned to the Gulf.12

Brigadier General Thomas Draude recalled Bob

Hope’s visit with the Marines on 26 December:

Bob and Delores Hope arrived to entertain

the Marines of the First Marine Division. I was

assigned as the escort officer and was

amazed how this couple hopped on and off

our helicopter at the various stops. His

daughter was concerned about tiring him, so

the last show, to one of the assault elements

going into Kuwait, was cancelled by her. I

asked if we could at least let him fly over so

the Marines would see his helicopter—she

agreed. I then asked if we could land so he

could see what their living conditions were—

she reluctantly agreed. I then asked if she

would allow him to take a jeep ride to see

where the troops were waiting—she was not

pleased with me at this point, but gave her

OK. When Bob Hope saw the stage and all

Preparing for War 59
the thousand or so Marines, it was “showtime!”

He proceeded to put on a show with Delores, who was a great singer (she was one of

the few women the Saudis would allow in

country—Gladys Knight and the Pips remained outside the country). Also joining

them were [baseball player] Johnny Bench

and [country music singer] Aaron Tippin. It

was a performance I'll never forget!

When it was over, there was a mass movement forward by the Marines to thank Bob

and Delores for coming. One of the most

moving sights was Delores hugging Marine

after Marine, as if she was a surrogate mother,

as Bob shook hands—and also hugged.

Bob and Delores became my heroes that

day—and remain so ever since.13

Building an Offensive Capability

On 18 November 1990, the 2d Marine Division was

ordered to join I Marine Expeditionary Force in the

Persian Gulf. Commanded by Major General William

M. Keys, the 2d Marine Division had not deployed

overseas as a division since the Second World War.

It had already contributed the majority of the ground

combat element to the 4th Marine Expeditionary

Brigade and was also committed to providing two

battalions to maintain Marine expeditionary units in

the Mediterranean. As a result, the regimental combat teams of the 2d Marine Division had a somewhat

patchwork quality, with each containing battalions

from various regiments. The division’s major units

were the 6th Marines, commanded by Colonel

Lawrence H. Livingston; the 8th Marines, led by

Colonel Larry S. Schmidt; and the 10th Marines, commanded by Colonel Leslie M. Palm. Additionally, the

A Marine Christmas

Marines responded to the holidays withcharacteristic “grunt” humor, as this carol

composed in theater illustrates.

The Twelve Months of Exile

(Heard on Armed Forces Radio “Oasis Station 99.9”

on the Desert Shield Network on Christmas Eve

1990) 

In our 12th month of exile,

My jarhead gave to me:

A 12 month extension, 

11 months of waiting,

10 cans of near beer, 

9,000 sandbags,

8 days in gas masks, 

7 gallons of water,

6 miles of cammie netting, 

5 MREs [meals, ready to eat],

4 weeks of guard duty,

3 hours of sleep,

2 pairs of cammies, 

and a camel burger in a plastic bag.14

The vehicle cargo ship SS Maj Stephen W. Pless (T-AK 3007) of Maritime Prepositioning Ship Squadron One offloads

equipment for the 2d Marine Division during Operation Desert Shield.

Photo by SSgt J. R. Ruark. Defense Imagery DM-ST-92-00102

60 Liberating Kuwait
division included the 2d Light Armored Infantry Battalion, 2d Tank Battalion, 8th Tank Battalion, 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion, 2d Combat Engineer

Battalion, and 2d Reconnaissance Battalion.15

Much of the division’s equipment was brought

by Maritime Prepositioning Ship Squadron One, and

the squadron’s arrival in Saudi Arabia on 13 December was much less chaotic than the August and September debarking. The squadron’s four vessels, SS

Sgt Matej Kocak (T-AK 3005), SS PFC Eugene A.

Obregon (T-AK 3006), SS Maj Stephen W. Pless (TAK 3007), and MV 2dLt John P. Bobo (T-AK 3008),

were unloaded in 10 days.16

The 2d Marine Division headquarters was established on 14 December in Saudi Arabia, and the first

division order was issued on 25 December. From

this point the division moved its units forward and

prepared for offensive operations, although the last

of the division’s units, 2d Tank Battalion, did not

complete unloading its equipment and moving forward until 17 January.17

There was never any doubt that the 2d Marine

Division would deploy and fight as a separate division, but the organization of the air and support

legs of the I Marine Expeditionary Force was less

certain. For the air element, there was some disagreement between Headquarters Marine Corps

and the Marine commanders in the Gulf over

whether the 2d Marine Aircraft Wing should deploy

as a separate unit or send its subordinate groups

and squadrons to reinforce the 3d Marine Aircraft

Wing in place in Saudi Arabia. Major General Royal

N. Moore Jr., the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing’s commander, felt that “it is cleaner, [with] less overhead,

to place the additional squadrons under existing

groups. . . . More importantly, the operational lines

are simpler, which translates to a more responsive

aviation combat element.” In the end, General

Moore’s view prevailed.18

The result was that additional squadrons were

added to Marine Aircraft Groups 11, 13, and 16.

These additional squadrons were drawn from the

1st, 2d, and 4th Marine Aircraft Wings on both the

East and the West Coasts. A second helicopter

group, Colonel Michael J. Williams’s Marine Aircraft

Group 26, also deployed to the Gulf. Its seven

squadrons of CH-46E Sea Knights, CH-53D Sea Stallions, Sikorsky RH-53D Sea Stallions, CH-53E Super

Stallions, AH-1J Sea Cobras, and UH-1N Hueys were

drawn from the 2d Marine Aircraft Wing and the 4th

Marine Aircraft Wing.19

The combat service support leg of the I Marine

Defense Imagery DM-ST-91-11626

M1A1 Abrams tanks of the 2d Tank Battalion in the desert. The arrival of the 2d Marine Division and its Abrams tanks

greatly increased the firepower available to LtGen Walter Boomer. 

Preparing for War 61
Expeditionary Force had a similar problem. Supporting two Marine divisions and two wings worth

of Marine aircraft required the resources of two

force service support groups, but General Boomer

wanted the unity of command that one force service

support group provided. Brigadier General James

Brabham, commanding general of the 1st Force

Service Support Group, and Brigadier General

Charles C. Krulak, commanding general of the 2d

Force Service Support Group, reached a solution

that provided for both issues. Brigadier General

Krulak deployed his unit deployed to the Gulf as

the Direct Support Command. Direct Support Command was further divided into Direct Support

Group 1, commanded by Colonel Alexander W.

Powell, and Direct Support Group 2, commanded

by Colonel Thomas P. Donnelly Jr. Brigadier General Brabham commanded the General Support

Command, divided into Colonel Paul A. Pankey’s

General Support Group 1 and Colonel Thomas E.

Hampton’s General Support Group 2. Captain

Michael R. Johnson, USN, continued to command

the 3d Naval Construction Regiment. By doctrine,

combat service support units provide rear area security, but General Boomer wanted those Marines

focused on supporting the combat units and provided the reservists of Colonel George E. Germann’s

24th Marines to provide rear area security instead.20

In practice, the 2d Force Service Support Group’s

headquarters operated the Direct Support Command, and the 1st Force Service Support Group’s

headquarters continued to operate the General Support Command, but their subordinate units were

mixed and matched to best support their differing

missions. Direct Support Command received the

tactical motor transport, engineers, and landing support assets as well as Direct Support Group 1, while

the General Support Command contained the supply, maintenance, and service units and ran the Marine services at the ports. By the end of December,

General Krulak had selected Kibrit, Saudi Arabia, as

the site of the forward combat support area for the

offensive to liberate Kuwait, and construction on

the new base had begun.21

In October 1990, the 5th Marine Expeditionary

Brigade, commanded by Brigadier General Peter J.

Rowe, was told to prepare to ship to the Persian

Gulf in order to replace the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade. President Bush’s early November

announcement that U.S. forces in the Gulf would

be dramatically reinforced shifted that mission from

replacement to reinforcement. Brigadier General

Rowe’s brigade was normally the designated seadeployment brigade of the I Marine Expeditionary

Force (just as the 7th Marine Expeditionary Brigade

was designated as the Maritime Prepositioning

Force brigade), but many of the units that would

normally be called on to fill out the brigade had al3d MAW 1st MarDiv 2d MarDiv

I MEF

1st FSSG

MAG 11 1st Marines 6th Marines GSC

MAG 13 3d Marines 8th Marines DSC

MAG 26 7th Marines

MWSG 37 11th Marines

MAG 16 4th Marines 10th Marines

I Marine Expeditionary Force in Desert Shield/Desert Storm

62 Liberating Kuwait
ready been gutted when filling out the forces deploying for Desert Shield. As a result, the brigade’s

elements all had large numbers of reservists operating alongside their active-duty Marines.22

The brigade’s ground combat element was

Colonel Randolph A. Gangle’s Regimental Landing

Team 5 comprised of the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines;

3d Battalion, 5th Marines; the 3d Battalion, 1st

Marines; the 2d Battalion, 11th Marines (Reinforced); Company B, 1st Reconnaissance Battalion

(Reinforced); Company A, 4th Tank Battalion (Reinforced); Company A, 4th Assault Amphibian Battalion (Reinforced); and Company D, 1st Light

Armored Infantry Battalion (Reinforced).23

Colonel Randall L. West commanded Marine Aircraft Group 50, which made up the air element of

the brigade. His squadrons included Marine Medium

Helicopter Squadron (Composite) 268, Marine

Medium Helicopter Squadron 265, Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 169, and Marine Reserve

Attack Helicopter Squadron 773.24

Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. Lupton commanded

Brigade Service Support Group 5, the combat service support element of the brigade. Although designated a brigade support group, this was really

only a reinforced Marine expeditionary unit service

support group. The brigade lacked many of its required logistics assets, and while this was not an

issue while at sea, the brigade would have difficulty

sustaining itself once it deployed ashore.25

Rear Admiral Stephen S. Clarey’s Amphibious

Group 3 was designated to carry the 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade to the Gulf, but initially it included only nine amphibious vessels, far less than

the two dozen required for a brigade. More vessels

were added after high-level conferences so that

when the brigade departed on 1 December, Amphibious Group 3 comprised the amphibious assault ships USS Tarawa (LHA 1), USS Tripoli (LPH

10), USS New Orleans (LPH 11), USS Denver (LPD

9), USS Juneau (LPD 10), USS Mobile (LKA 115),

USS Vancouver (LPD 2), USS Anchorage (LSD 36),

USS Barbour County (LST 1195), USS Frederick

(LST 1184), USS Mount Vernon (LSD 39), USS Germantown (LSD 42), and USS Peoria (LST 1183). In

addition, Maritime Sealift Command provided SS

Flickertail State (T-ACS 5) and SS Cape Girardeau

(T-AK 2039) to carry sustainment supplies.26

Defense Imagery DN-ST-91-06603

A bow view of the amphibious assault ship USS New Orleans (LPH 11) underway. During the Gulf War, the New Orleans

served in Amphibious Group 3, carrying the 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade. After the war, she became the flagship

of Amphibious Squadron 1, carrying the 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit, which broke from the rest of the brigade to

conduct its scheduled Pacific cruise. 

Preparing for War 63
peditionary Brigade. Over 99 percent of the Marines

recalled to active duty responded to the call and entered hurried training and orientation courses prior

to deployment; they then deployed and served with

enthusiasm, despite early administrative issues that

left many reservists facing temporary financial hardship at the beginning of their tours. The Reserve

Marines proved the value of the Reserve program,

and Colonel Gangle of the 5th Marines spoke for

many when he reported that after a few weeks’ time

he could not tell the regulars from the reservists.30

Iraq’s Defenses

Throughout the fall of 1990, Iraq responded to the

international condemnation of its invasion of

Kuwait with bluster and counterclaims. Saddam

Hussein believed that Iraq could outlast the UN

sanctions imposed on it in the wake of the invasion

and that the Coalition of Western and Arab states

that opposed him would inevitably break part.

Nonetheless, Iraq prepared for the confrontation to

turn violent and readied its defense in Iraq and

Kuwait. In that event, Iraq expected a prolonged

“prewar bombardment” by Coalition air forces,

which Saddam expected to endure successfully

based on his Iran-Iraq War experience, followed by

a Coalition assault into Kuwait.31

As noted in chapter 1, the Israeli air strike on the

Osirak in 1981 inspired Iraq to upgrade its air defenses, centered on the French-made Kari integrated air defense command and control system

activated in 1986. This system organized four of

Iraq’s five air defense sectors (the fifth was Kuwait),

consisting of over 7,000 pieces of air defense artillery and over 100 surface-to-air missile batteries.

Iraq’s surface-to-air missiles were, like most Iraqi

weapons, primarily supplied by the Soviet Union.

Iraqi surface-to-air guided missiles included the S75 Dvina (SA-2 Guideline*

), Isayev S-125 Neva/Pechora (SA-3 Goa), 2K12 Kub (SA-6 Gainful), 9K33

Osa (SA-8 Gecko), 9K31 Strela-1 (SA-9 Gaskin), and

9K35 Strela-10 (SA-13 Gopher). The French-made

Roland was Iraq’s only non-Soviet surface-to-air

guided missile. Iraq’s air defense artillery included

many diverse types, but the most dangerous was

the ZSU-23-4 Shilka self-propelled, radar-guided antiaircraft weapon system. Iraq also fielded thousands of portable, shoulder-fired surface-to-air

missiles, all 9K32 Strela-2s (SA-7 Grails) and 9K34

Strela-3s (SA-14 Gremlins). Despite this quantita-

*

The names in parentheses for these missiles are their NATO reporting names.

Colonel Robert J. Garner’s 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit was originally intended to replace the

13th Marine Expeditionary Unit in the Gulf, but its

units formed the core of General Rowe’s brigade instead. Loading and organization were designed so

that Colonel Garner could break his unit out from the

brigade and operate independently if required, however. It comprised Battalion Landing Team 3/1, Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron (Composite) 268,

and Marine Expeditionary Unit Service Support Group

11 and was embarked on Amphibious Squadron 1,

commanded by Captain Michael D. Barker, USN. The

vessels earmarked for Captain Barker’s squadron

were the New Orleans, Denver, Germantown, Peoria,

and Mobile. In the event, 11th Marine Expeditionary

Unit and Amphibious Squadron 1 did not break off

from the brigade until March, after hostilities in the

Gulf were over.27

The 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade set sail on

board Amphibious Group 3 from the West Coast on

1 December. The group traveled west to Hawaii

and then to the Philippines on its way to the Persian

Gulf, conducting extensive training on board to

make up for the training precluded by the hurried

departure. The 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit was

ordered to return to the Gulf from the Philippines

in company with the brigade, rendezvousing at sea,

and the two amphibious forces joined Central Command’s forces in the Arabian Sea on 14 January

1991.28

As the landing force of Naval Forces Central Command, the two Marine expeditionary brigades and a

Marine expeditionary unit formed a very large amphibious force. Major General Harry Jenkins, the senior Marine afloat, suggested to General Alfred Gray

that the forces be formally designated as the IV Marine Expeditionary Force, with an appropriate staff

deployed. General Gray approved the idea, but the

war was over before this change could be made.29

The Marine Corps was not required to activate

any of its Reserves for the Desert Shield deployment,

aside from a few individual billets filled voluntarily.

But the president’s 8 November reinforcement order

required a Reserve call up that would eventually

number 30,000 reservists. Of these, over 11,000

would serve in the Persian Gulf region. As noted

above, most of these reservists were activated with

their units, and these companies, battalions, and

squadrons were assigned to Marine air-ground task

forces as needed. One regiment, the 24th Marines,

deployed as well. Other reservists were assigned individually to fill out units already deployed or

preparing to deploy, especially in the 5th Marine Ex64 Liberating Kuwait
stating that only a 34-aircraft strike had

a chance of disrupting the operations

of an American aircraft carrier and that

“the loss of 34 advanced ground attack

planes to disrupt one aircraft carrier

out of [the] nine carriers mobilized by

the enemy in the region was ineffective.” Hence, Iraqi Air Force plans

were more focused on preserving itself than on winning the impending

conflict.33

Iraq’s navy was small even with the

addition of captured Kuwaiti vessels,

containing around a dozen missile

boats, some minelayers, and small

craft. Naval defense plans focused on

mine warfare, intending to deny the

Coalition the ability to operate close to

the coast of Kuwait as well as making

the Persian Gulf itself a danger to

Coalition vessels. Iraq deployed over

1,300 naval mines during the conflict.

The Iraqi Navy also intended to use oil

as a naval weapon, employing intentional oil spills from shore facilities, oil

platforms, and tankers. The 440th

Naval Infantry Brigade garrisoned

Faylakah Island, and Iraq’s navy also

occupied several of the smaller islands

and oil platforms, but the navy’s plans

focused on evacuating these positions

(as well as the Kuwaiti naval ports it

occupied) if attacked. Notably, Iraqi naval defense

plans indicate no specific plan for the missile

boats.34

Saddam Hussein and the senior Iraqi leadership

expected that the offensive to liberate Kuwait would

be much like the combat experienced in the IranIraq War—a slow, bloody battle of attrition along

fixed lines with neither side able to gain a true advantage. Such a battle was to Iraq’s advantage, since

Saddam believed mass Coalition casualties would

splinter public opinion and the Coalition itself. Iraq’s

plans for conducting the ground war were based on

these assumptions. 

In November, Iraq’s Directorate of General Military Intelligence sent a series of reports to the Iraqi

military forces in the Kuwaiti theater detailing expected Coalition invasion routes and operational intentions. The report was remarkably prescient. The

authors expected that “the enemy will use the indirect approach to achieve a rapid decision and avoid

a large number of losses. This approach [rests] on

*

See chapter 2.

**See chapter 1.

Reprinted from Kevin M. Woods, The Mother of All Battles, p. 139

This sketch map, created by Iraq’s III Corps headquarters in August 1990,

indicates the routes the Iraqis expected a Coalition offensive into Kuwait to

follow. This plan is remarkably close to the “one corps” plan described in

this chapter. 

tively impressive antiaircraft defense network, the

Iraqis expected that they would have to suffer a

prolonged aerial bombardment by the Coalition that

would best be met by endurance, deception, and

bunkered defenses.32

In theory the Iraqi Air Force could field over 700

aircraft and more than 500 helicopters, but the skill

and effectiveness of its crews were questionable, as

their performance during the invasion of Kuwait indicated.* An Iraqi aircraft had managed to inflict serious harm on the USS Stark during the Iran-Iraq

War,** however, so the possibility of a “lucky shot”

from an Iraqi aircraft inflicting a mass casualty event

could not be discounted. The Iraqi Air Force

planned strikes against Coalition ground forces,

naval vessels, and Saudi oil terminals. A study was

conducted on how to defeat an American aircraft

carrier. The study’s conclusions were pessimistic,

Preparing for War 65
*

Iraq created many new infantry divisions during the fall of 1990

and assigned them to Kuwait. Some of these divisions may have

only existed on paper, and they are therefore difficult to track.

the VII Corps). The mobile formations of the IV

Corps included the 1st Mechanized, the 6th Armored, and the 10th Armored Divisions. These too

employed T-55/54 and T-62 main battle tanks. The

corps controlled five to seven infantry divisions, entrenched along the border.37

Iraqi engineers became very good at building extensive fixed fortifications during the Iran-Iraq War.

These took the form of massive minefields and extensive barbed-wire entanglements before highearthen berms designed as fighting positions and

backed up by concentrations of artillery. Expecting

air attacks, the Iraqis concealed their positions and

placed large numbers of decoys to draw attacks

away from their functional equipment and to increase the apparent strength of the units defending

Kuwait. Inside the III Corps fortifications that the

Marines faced, “Decoy tanks and camouflaged nets

were deployed as a cover up. Destroyed vehicles

were used so that no tank would be withdrawn unless a decoy tank was placed in the same position.

And no cannons were pulled away unless a decoy

one was placed in that same position.” Junkyards

and tank boneyards in Kuwait and Iraq were ransacked for the appropriate inoperable vehicles,

equipment, and dummy parts.38

The original deployment massed the troops in

the front areas, but in November orders were given

to shift to a defense in depth. General Salah Aboud

Mahmoud later explained the reasoning behind the

change: “We had to consider the possibility that the

enemy could be airdropping Marines. So we had to

dedicate part of our resources to carry out that mission or we could face an airdrop deep against our

bases. Thus, some of our formations would not deploy unless there was a grave necessity to do so.”39

The Iraqis did not limit their plans to conventional operations; in any case it is clear that Saddam

saw his defense as a bluff that would convince the

West not to challenge Iraq’s actions for fear of massive casualties. Inflicting large numbers of casualties

was a primary means of accomplishing these goals,

and Saddam pursued unconventional means of

doing this. For example, he spoke often in public

and private about guerilla and terrorist operations

against Coalition forces both in the theater and

without. None of these plans appears to have come

to fruition—very few terrorists attacks were

launched outside of Iraq, despite threats to do so—

but they represented Saddam’s strategy of bluff and

blackmail.40

More dangerous were Saddam’s SS-1 Scud-B alHussein surface-to-surface medium range missiles

exploitation of intense aerial strikes and a rapid advancement on primary axes to threaten as many of

our troops as possible by attacking from unexpected

directions and carrying out deep penetrations that

target headquarters and road intersections.” The report also showed that the Iraqis were keenly aware

of American amphibious capabilities: “The enemy

will conduct naval landing operations simultaneously with land and air operations to isolate as many

troops as possible and support land operations from

the sea with heavy artillery fire.” Comparing the expected avenues of approach to Central Command’s

initial, “one corps” plan for liberating Kuwait (described below), Iraqi intelligence was remarkably

accurate.35

The Republican Guard departed Kuwait on 7

September and established itself in southern Iraq

near Basrah as a mobile theater strategic reserve. The

guard’s commander, Lieutenant General Ayyad Fateeh al-Rawi, ordered his troops to disperse in order

to blunt the expected Coalition air attacks while hoping to remain ready to conduct a swift counterattack

against the expected Coalition assault.36

Iraq’s Regular Army was left to confront the

Coalition forces directly and defend Kuwait. As in

the Iran-Iraq War, the Iraqi Army assigned its corps

to geographic locations. Individual divisions and

separate brigades were assigned to these corps but

could be shifted between the corps if required; each

corps controlled several armored and mechanized

divisions supporting a larger number of entrenched

infantry divisions. 

During the Gulf War, the Marines primarily faced

the Iraqi III Corps and IV Corps. The III Corps, commanded by Major General Salah Aboud Mahmoud,

held southeast Kuwait from the coast to the elbow

of the Saudi-Kuwaiti border, including Kuwait City

proper. The III Corps was one of Iraq’s better formations, with several successes in the Iran-Iraq War

to its credit. Its primary fighting power came from

the 5th Mechanized Division and the 3d Armored

Division. Both of these divisions employed T-55/54

and T-62 main battle tanks. The III Corps also controlled 9 to 16 infantry divisions.* These infantry divisions were arrayed along the border and the

coastline. The IV Corps, commanded by Major General Yaiyd Khalel Zaki, defended the southwest portion of Iraq, from the elbow to the Wadi al-Batin

basin (from there, southern Iraq was defended by

66 Liberating Kuwait
Vehicle Type Armament Crew Top

Speed Weight

M1A1

•1 x 120mm

smooth-bored gun

•1 x 7.62mm

coaxial machine gun

•Antiaircraft

commander’s

cupola: 12.7mm

machine gun

•Antiaircraft loader’s

hatch: 7.62mm

machine gun

4 66.7

km/h

57,154

kg

M60

•1 x 105mm

M68 rifled gun

•1 x 7.62mm

coaxial machine gun

•Antiaircraft:

1 x 12.7mm

machine gun

4 48.7

km/h

52,617

kg

AAV-7

•Carries 25 Marines

•Mk 19 40mm

automatic grenade

launcher or

M2HB .50-caliber

machine gun

3 32

km/h

26,399

kg

LAV

•2 x 7.62mm

machine gun and

25mm main gun

•Carries 4 troops or

TOW-2 ATGM or

81mm M252 mortar

4 to 7 100

km/h

11,612

kg

Iraq’s nuclear program had not yet developed a

weapon, though it was further along than anyone

knew at the time. The Scud missiles, however, had

been used to some effect during the Iran-Iraq War

and offered Iraq a way to appear strong and to

strike back, despite the Coalition’s expected control

of the air.41

Although Iraq did not expect to win a convenU.S. Marine Corps Armored Vehicles

and his chemical weapon arsenal. Less obviously,

but still a worry, were his biological and nuclear

weapons programs. Saddam’s use of chemical

weapons during the Iran-Iraq War indicated he was

capable of using them again, and in fact Iraqi

records show that preparations were made to use

these weapons again during the Gulf War (the

records do not explain why they were not used).

Preparing for War 67
Reprinted from U.S. Army Intelligence Agency, How They Fight: Desert Shield Order of Battle Handbook (1990)

Diagram of an Iraqi company subsection of a triangular strongpoint. 

tional war over Kuwait, it ended the year reasonably confident that its plans and defenses would

lead to a negotiated settlement and that it could prevail against the untested American military forces

and unstable Coalition facing them. Saddam declared to his staff in November 1990 that “as long

as our blood is less, as long as our breath lasts

longer, and at the end we can make our enemy feel

incompetent.” He was certain that it would be a

long war, and that a long war would play to Iraq’s

strengths and the United States’ weaknesses.42

Planning a Storm

Planning for an offensive against Iraq actually began

in August. In the immediate aftermath of the invasion of Kuwait, General Schwarzkopf asked the Air

68 Liberating Kuwait
priorities, subordinating all of a theater’s airpower

to a single commander. After the war General

Horner succinctly explained the concept in the following way: “The ATO [air tasking order] is the

JFACC [joint forces air component commander].”45

The history of the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing’s operations in the Gulf War aptly summed up the Air

Force position:

Given the appropriate resources and wide latitude from political leaders, Air Force leaders

argued that an air campaign focusing on

strategic targets could break the enemy’s will

and compel him to surrender or desist without

the U.S. having to resort to a costly and possibly unpopular ground campaign. This form

of nearly unrestricted air warfare against deep

or strategic targets demanded that ground officers who favored using airpower primarily

against tactical targets be kept at arms’ length.

To ensure that the air commander in a joint

operation possessed the authority to direct or

redirect strikes across the length and breadth

of the theater in pursuit of campaign objectives, Air Force doctrine also demanded that

airspace not be ceded or parceled out to other

services or allies.46

In contrast, the Marine doctrine was focused on

close air support for the Marine ground forces; air

and ground were combined in the same team, the

Marine air-ground task force. Rather than a daily,

planned sortie list, the Marines emphasized flexibility and rapid response to the ground commander’s

needs and a geographic organization similar to the

Vietnam-era “route packages” (which the Air Force

vociferously rejected). Marines felt that under the

Air Force theaterwide system response times to

close air support requests would increase dramatically. Although Goldwater-Nichols established the

basic authority of the joint forces air component

commander, the 1986 Omnibus Agreement for

Command and Control of Marine Tactical Aviation

in Sustained Operations Ashore stated that the Marine commander would maintain operational control of his organic air assets.47

In September, the Solomon-like solution was that

all of the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing’s Intruders and

Prowlers would be devoted to “JFACC mission,”

while half of the sorties flown by the Hornets

would be similarly tasked. The Marines’ Harriers

and all of their helicopters would be retained entirely for Marine directed missions. General Boomer

later said, “It made no sense to me to not allow the

*

For the most part, the Air Force is disinterested in helicopter

operations.

Force to provide a plan for an air campaign against

Iraq because this was the only offensive option that

could be employed if the president wanted to strike

Iraq immediately. Central Command’s staff was

busy with the complicated business of deploying

forces to Saudi Arabia and forming plans to defend

the Desert Kingdom. The job of creating this campaign plan was given to Colonel John A. Warden

III, USAF, then the Air Force’s deputy director of

warfighting concepts and head of its “Project

Checkmate” wargaming office in the Pentagon.

Colonel Warden developed a “ring” targeting model

that he believed could defeat an opponent through

airpower alone. He quickly developed an air campaign dubbed “Instant Thunder” that was presented

to General Schwarzkopf and the U.S. Air Forces

Central Command commander, Lieutenant General

Charles A. Horner, in mid-August in Riyadh. Unlike

Colonel Warden, neither General Schwarzkopf nor

General Horner believed the air campaign alone

could defeat Iraq.43

After hearing Colonel Warden’s briefing on the

Instant Thunder campaign, General Horner appointed Brigadier General Buster C. Glosson as director of campaign plans for Air Forces Central

Command, a department often referred to as the

“Black Hole” due to its extreme secrecy. General

Glosson took the original Instant Thunder campaign plan and reworked it into the plan that was

eventually used against Iraq. Colonel Warden returned to the United States, but one of his deputies,

Lieutenant Colonel David A. Deptula, USAF, became a key member of the Black Hole. Although

the plan was adjusted to better fit local conditions

and made more practical, Warden’s guiding principles and targeting priorities heavily influenced the

final version of the Gulf War air offensive plan.44

Once the early, Wild West days of Operation

Desert Shield were over, Marine and Air Force air

combat doctrines began to clash. The Air Force had

pushed through its concept of a joint forces air component commander in the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols

Act. This joint air commander would control all

fixed-wing* air assets in the command; during the

Gulf War General Horner held this position. Under

Air Force doctrine he would control these forces

through the air tasking order, a daily document that

was intended to contain all of the fixed-winged sorties planned for each day. The intention was to allocate aerial resources according to theaterwide

Preparing for War 69
Photo by MSgt Jose Lopez Jr. Defense Imagery DF-ST-92-07542

Civilian and military decision makers during a conference for Operation Desert Shield. Bottom row, from left: Paul D.

Wolfowitz, under secretary of defense for policy; Gen Colin L. Powell, USA, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Richard

B. Cheney, secretary of defense; Gen H. Norman Schwarzkopf, USA, commander in chief, U.S. Central Command; LtGen

Calvin A. H. Waller, USA, deputy commander, U.S. Central Command; and MajGen Robert B. Johnston, chief of staff,

U.S. Central Command. Back row, from left: LtGen Walter E. Boomer, commander, Marine Forces Central Command/I

Marine Expeditionary Force; LtGen Charles A. Horner, commander, Air Forces Central Command/Ninth Air Force;

LtGen John J. Yeosock, USA, commander, Army Forces Central Command/Third Army; VAdm Stanley Arthur, Commander, Seventh Fleet; and Col Jesse Johnson, Special Operations Command Central.

Marine air wing to be used by the joint commander

to help prosecute the campaign. That’s what our

doctrine says will happen. Marines always tended

to wrap around the axle here, in my view. Some

felt no one could task Marine air except the Marine

commander. I don’t think that’s true and I don’t

think it’s wise.” In contrast, a later Air Force study

concluded the agreement was acceptable “in the interest of harmony,” primarily because the Air Force

had enough resources in the theater that it could

afford to be generous.48

Planning for the ground war began in September

when General Schwarzkopf assembled a small team

of Army officers on his staff in Riyadh—all of whom

were graduates of the Army’s School of Advanced

Military Studies—and charged them with planning

*

A reference to a mystical military order in the popular Star Wars

movie franchise.

for a ground offensive to liberate Kuwait. Led by

Lieutenant Colonel Joseph H. “Joe” Purvis, this team

kept its work secret and self-contained; it was officially called the Special Plans Group but was

known informally as the “Jedi Knights.”* Initially

charged with creating a plan based on the forces

earmarked for Operation Desert Shield, the Jedi

Knights provided a one corps plan that called for

Coalition forces to advance into Kuwait from the

elbow to the Wadi al-Batin while Navy and Marine

forces staged an amphibious feint on the coast. Neither the Jedi Knights nor General Schwarzkopf liked

this plan, and it can be seen how closely it mirrored

the approach routes that Iraqi intelligence antici70 Liberating Kuwait
Adapted from a Central Intelligence Agency map by Marine Corps History Division

Kuwait is a small state, and there are limited avenues of advance into the nation from Saudi Arabia. The “one corps

plan” depicted here is remarkably close to the Iraqi map of expected Coalition offensives seen earlier. 

pated, as noted above. Nonetheless, Marine Major

General Robert B. Johnston, the Central Command

chief of staff, and Lieutenant Colonel Purvis briefed

the Joint Chiefs on this plan on 10 October and the

president on 11 October.49

General Boomer and his staff were surprised to

discover that an Army cell was developing plans for

a ground offensive to liberate Kuwait. The Jedi

Knights had no Marine members, and General

Boomer was not informed that the planning cell

Preparing for War 71
ior commanders received a briefing on the Iraqi military from retired Lieutenant General Bernard E.

Trainor (see appendix G). He had retired from the

Marine Corps in 1985 after a career that included

combat service in Korea and Vietnam, and then he

went on to become a war correspondent for the New

York Times. Lieutenant General Trainor went to Iraq

in the winter of 1987–88 to report on the Iran-Iraq

War, and his status as a retired senior officer convinced the Iraqis to grant him unusual access to the

front lines and their operational units. His briefing

focused on his direct observations of the Iraqi military’s capabilities. Most of the briefing proved prescient, especially when he predicted that the number

of Iraqi prisoners would be “enormous.”54 

General Trainor’s lecture was useful, but for Marine planners the primary question was how many

breeches to create in the Iraqi fortifications. The

ideal solution would have been to create a breech

for each division, allowing for a broader advance,

but the Corps lacked the required amounts of engineering equipment to force two breeches through

the minefields and obstacles. Instead, the 1st Marine

Division would breach the Iraqi defenses, while the

2d Marine Division followed. After the fortifications

were passed, the 2d Marine Division would pass

through General Myatt’s Marines and advance to the

al-Jahra road crossing while the 1st Marine Division

continued on to Kuwait International Airport. The

4th and 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigades remained afloat in the Persian Gulf on board the ships

of U.S. Navy amphibious ready groups, providing

a seaborne threat in order to tie up Iraq resources

along the shoreline as well as a strategic reserve for

Central Command.55

Trading Desert Rats for Tigers

Throughout Operation Desert Shield, the I Marine

Expeditionary Force was paired with the initial

British contribution to the ground forces, Brigadier

Patrick Cordingley’s 7th Armored Brigade, the famous Desert Rats. This brigade’s tanks provided

General Boomer with an armored punch that complemented the 1st Marine Division’s traditionally

high percentage of infantry. The Marines and the

British troops trained together for months, and

built a great deal of camaraderie. When the assault

on Kuwait happened, General Boomer was counting on the British tanks to help counter the large

Iraqi armored formations in Kuwait. 

Not everyone was happy with the British forces

being linked to the Marines, however. The Jedi

Knight planners thought the British tanks should

even existed. More disturbing, the plan called for

using the Marines in a manner similar to an Army

corps, rather than in a way consistent with Marine

Corps doctrine. General Boomer quickly formed a

team on his own staff and instructed them to work

closely with the Army staff as the new plans were

developed. Colonel James D. Majchrzak was the I

Marine Expeditionary Force plans officer; he later

summarized the mission as follows: 

When directed by U.S. CinCCent [commander,

U.S. Central Command], U.S. MarCent [U.S.

Marine Forces Central Command] conducts

U.S. CentCom [Central Command] supporting

attack to fix and destroy Iraqi operational reserves in southeastern Kuwait to preclude

their employment against USCentCom main attack in the west; isolate Kuwait City for EPAC

[Eastern Province Area Command]/multinational MOUT [military operations in urban terrain] operations. Be prepared to continue the

attack north to support USCentCom offensive

operations.50

President Bush’s announcement on 8 November

shifted the planning paradigms as the U.S. Army’s

heavy VII Corps deployed from Europe to Saudi Arabia in order to increase the forces available to liberate Kuwait. The unpopular one corps plan was

consequently abandoned, and Lieutenant Colonel

Purvis’s Jedi Knights now produced a two corps plan

that called for a wide, westward sweep of the Army’s

XVIII Airborne Corps as the mechanized divisions of

the VII Corps swept through southern Iraq toward

Basrah and smashed the Republican Guard.

51

General Schwarzkopf chose the Marines to evict

the Iraqis from Kuwait proper, fighting with Arab

members of the Coalition on either side. On the

Marines’ west flank, the Saudi Arabians, Egyptians,

and Syrians formed Joint Forces Command–North,

while on the east flank the Saudi Arabians of Joint

Forces Command–East advanced along the coast.52

The Jedi Knight two corps plan originally had

the Marines executing a “fixing” attack, holding

Iraqi forces in place as the two Army corps enveloped them on the left. But the Marine plan called

for evicting the Iraqis from Kuwait directly. General

Boomer later said, “There was never any doubt in

my mind that that’s what we were going to do. We

weren’t going to play around with them on the border in some sort of fixing attack; we were going to

retake Kuwait, and General Schwarzkopf didn’t

have a problem with that.”53

On 10 December, General Boomer’s staff and sen72 Liberating Kuwait
be devoted to the “left hook” that would face the

Republican Guard rather than the “holding attack”

that they intended the Marines to perform. Lieutenant General Sir Peter Edgar de la Cour de la Billière, commander in chief of British forces in the

Persian Gulf, agreed with them.

General de la Billière believed that the British

forces—which were being reinforced for the attack, forming the British 1st Armored Division—

should be employed to the west as the Jedi

Knights wished. He had three reasons for this.

First, he felt the terrain was “not at all suitable for

the far-ranging fire-and-manoeuvre [maneuver] tactics in which they specialized” because there were

“far too many man-made obstacles—principally oil

installations.”56

Beyond not allowing the British tankers to fully

utilize their training, he didn’t think supporting the

Marine attack would fully showcase the British

Challenger main battle tank’s capabilities for foreign sales. As he put it in his memoir of the Gulf

War, “We must at least be given a chance to show

what our armour could do in an environment

which suited it.”57

Casualties were the third and largest worry for

General de la Billiére. He believed that the Marines

were “exceptionally gung ho” and that they would

suffer casualties as high as 17 percent in attacking

Kuwait, in part because he believed the Marine

commanders were eager to use the war to illustrate

the Corps’ value and avoid budget cuts. In the end,

de la Billiére said, “I did not believe that we should

Adapted from a Central Intelligence Agency map by Marine Corps History Division

Preparing for War 73
A British soldier from the Queen’s Dragoon Guards shows a Marine from 7th Platoon, 1st Force Reconnaissance Company, how to operate a British L1A1 rifle as they take part in weapons training during Operation Desert Shield. 

Photo by SSgt J. R. Ruark. Defense Imagery DM-ST-91-11998

commit the main British effort at the point where

the heaviest casualties were expected.”58

On 24 December, the British armored division

was transferred from the Marines to U.S. Army

Forces Central Command and shifted to the west.

During the liberation of Kuwait, this division acted

as part of the great western sweep through the

desert toward Basrah and the Republican Guard.

As General Boomer explained later, he was not

surprised when word came that the British were

leaving the I Marine Expeditionary Force:

This move did not occur overnight. General

Schwarzkopf talked to me about it and confided that he was getting a lot of pressure to

move the Brits. He intimated he was getting

pressure even from London. I think we both

knew that it was inevitably going to happen.

So, between the two of us it was no real surprise when it occurred, just extreme disappointment on my part and I think on his.59

Moreover, General Boomer felt that de la

Billiére had made a mistake:

I think General Cordingley knew that if he

stayed with us, the British forces would have

been spotlighted in the world press. They

would have taken part in the liberation of

Kuwait. I was going to give them a hell of a

lot of credit because they were so important

to us, and I knew the kind of job they were

going to do. As it were, who knows the

British were even there. Does anybody? I

mean they got lost.60

General Schwarzkopf ordered Lieutenant Gen74 Liberating Kuwait
eral John J. Yeosock, the Army Central Command’s

commanding general, to send the Marines a replacement for the British 1st Armored Division that

was a “like force.” General Yeosock sent the 1st

(Tiger) Brigade, 2d Armored Division, commanded

by Colonel John B. Sylvester. General Boomer later

noted that trading a division for a brigade was

hardly trading like for like, but the Tiger Brigade

was “a very professional brigade led by a very professional leader” and that “when they understood

what an important, critical role we had for them,

using them as an Army brigade should be used,

they just fell right in and did a terrific job.” Colonel

Sylvester and his brigade joined the Marines on 10

January 1991 and were assigned to General Keys’s

2d Marine Division.61

General Boomer thought that the loss of the

British forces helped spark the minor controversy

that accompanied the December visit to the Gulf by

the Commandant, General Gray. This was General

Gray’s third, and final, visit to the war zone. He received a briefing on I Marine Expeditionary Force’s

then-current one breech plan for the assault on

Kuwait, but he was reportedly not happy with the

plan. He felt that the Marine amphibious forces were

not being properly employed, and he blamed this,

*

MajGen Jeremiah W. Pearson III held this position until 17 January, when MajGen Norman E. Ehlert took over the position.

along with the loss of the British

forces, in part on General Boomer

wearing “two hats” as commanding

general of I Marine Expeditionary

Force and commander of Marine

Forces Central Command. He believed

that the Marines were not well represented in Schwarzkopf’s headquarters

in Riyadh. In contrast, Boomer felt that

he and his Marines were well represented in Central Command’s headquarters by his deputy commander at

Marine Forces Central Command.* Beyond that, Boomer also felt “there was

a tremendous amount of trust, in my

view, on the part of General

Schwarzkopf for the Marines and our

capability.”62

In December, General Gray asked

General Schwarzkopf about splitting

the two commands, leaving General

Boomer in command of the field

forces while another general would

be placed over General Boomer in

command of Marine Forces Central

Command. General Schwarzkopf did

not want another senior officer inserted into Central Command, however, especially

since he and General Boomer had a good working

relationship. At General Boomer’s suggestion, Major

General John J. Sheehan joined the amphibious

forces as commander, U.S. Forces Central Command (Forward) in January. General Sheehan acted

as liaison with Vice Admiral Stanley A. Arthur and

helped General Jenkins’s amphibious forces get the

command planning guidance they desired.63

General Gray made no more trips to the Persian

Gulf, but the idea of an umbrella command for the

Marines in the region apparently did not completely die. The Corps’ History and Museums Division produced a “point paper” on 30 January

1991 that commented on the historical precedent

for designating “the present Marine Corps organization in Southwest Asia” as the I Marine Expeditionary Corps. The paper points out that both

historically and by Marine Corps order these expeditionary corps were designed for situations that

required more combat power than was normally

available to a Marine expeditionary force. The

point paper’s recommendation was never put into 

Photo by Maj Andres Ortegon, USA. U.S. Army

John B. Sylvester (shown here as a lieutenant general) commanded the 1st

(Tiger) Brigade, 2d Armored Division, as an Army colonel during the Gulf

War. His brigade was attached to the 2d Marine Division for the liberation

of Kuwait.

Preparing for War 75
76 Liberating Kuwait

effect, and there is no record of who requested it.64

Commenting on these command politics after

the war, General Boomer stated that “all of this

wasted my time and mental energy and did absolutely nothing to help I MEF [I Marine Expeditionary Force] defeat the Iraqis.”65
77

The Air War

u CHAPTER 5u

pleasantly surprised to find the launch proceeding

as planned. In his memoir Hornets Over Kuwait,

Captain Jay A. Stout expressed the basic views of

most pilots eager to prove their hard-earned skills:

“Most of us were not eager to kill. To destroy, yes.

But as far as killing the individual, or the masses of

individuals, was concerned, we were not bloodthirsty. But we knew we would kill—without hesitation. It was the nature of the beast.”3

17 January: The First Night

Operation Desert Storm began with a task force of

Army and special operations helicopters destroying

Iraq’s early warning radar sites. Not long after that,

Photo by SSgt Scott Stewart, USAF. Defense Imagery DF-ST-92-07396

U.S. Marine Corps F/A-18 Hornet strike-fighter aircraft

from Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 212. These capable

aircraft split their missions between strategic targets chosen by the air component commander and tactical targets

selected by Marine commanders. 

Marine Air in the Assault

There was a flurry of last-minute diplomatic

activity in the days leading up to the 15 January 1991 deadline for Iraq’s voluntary evacuation of Kuwait that was established by the UN

Security Council on 29 November 1990. On 12 January, the U.S. Congress voted President Bush the

authority to militarily eject Iraq from Kuwait if the

UN deadline was ignored. Despite last-minute attempts by the Soviet Union to negotiate a settlement, Iraq’s ultimate refusal to withdraw prevented

any peaceful solution to the crisis.1

On 17 January 1991, Operation Desert Storm

began with massive air strikes throughout Iraq and

Kuwait. Although the operation had an expected

ground component, U.S. Air Force strategists who

believed that bombing alone could compel Iraq to

relinquish Kuwait drove the first phases. As a result,

the primary focus of the campaign was on achieving air superiority (accomplished the first evening),

suppressing air defenses, striking strategic (especially leadership and communications) targets inside

Iraq, and annihilating Iraq’s elite Republican Guard

centered in southern Iraq. Only after the first three

objectives were accomplished did the Air Force

plan to shift to hitting Iraqi forces in Kuwait proper.

All of the strikes for the first three days of the assault

were planned out in an air tasking order that was

700 pages long. To make up for the relative lack of

targeting in Kuwait proper, the 3d Marine Aircraft

Wing used its AV8-Bs, and the F/A-18 sorties that

were not promised to the joint air commander, to

hit targets deemed important by General Boomer.

The primary targets in Kuwait for the first weeks of

the air war were the air defense and artillery

weapons, both of which were present in large

quantities.2

During the air campaign, Marine aviation conducted hundreds of sorties against Iraqi positions in

Kuwait and Iraq. Aircrews of the 3d Marine Aircraft

Wing struck Iraqi command and control centers, antiaircraft defenses, and strategic targets deep inside

Iraq, as well as later performing traditional reconnaissance, battlefield interdiction, and close air support missions in Kuwait.

Some of the pilots had given up hope that the

attack would be launched, believing that some

compromise or deal would be made, and they were
ered the black void below us. It seemed that

every Iraqi who could put his finger on a trigger had pressed down and wouldn’t let go.

Most of the airbursts were below us, but some

were going off near us as well. We soon lost

count of the numbers of small white dots of

fast moving light that continually arched over

our canopies. They were surface-to-air missiles

fired blindly in the hope that one would hit

something. We could also see the small blue

flames that our escorts’ high-speed anti-radiation missiles let out as they went streaming by

us to seek out the enemy radars. Several miles

from the target, I pushed the nose of my aircraft down into a 30-degree dive as “Condor,”

my bombardier/navigator, picked out his aim

point on the radar. Passing 13,000 feet I started

our recovery to make time on target 0409 and

banked hard left as I felt the aircraft suddenly

get 6,000 pounds lighter when all three of our

bombs were released. . . . I saw two bright

blue flames, which highlighted one of our escort fighters as he lit afterburners and began to

climb away. The target below was engulfed in

flames and secondary explosions.8

The first strike was a success, despite its complicated nature, and all of the aircraft returned

safely with a great deal of damage done to the targets. After the war, the lead bombardier/navigator,

Captain David W. Deist of Marine All-Weather Attack Squadron 224, was awarded the Distinguished

Flying Cross for having “conceived, planned,

briefed, and led a 48 plane strike package” that was

“confronted by a formidable array of enemy antiaircraft artillery, surface-to-air missiles, and air to

air threats. . . . In the face of intense enemy defensive fires, [he] successfully prosecuted the target,

[and] his attack severely damaged the storage facilities used to support the missiles.”9

Later in the day, Marine F/A-18s led by Major

Robert E. Schmidle, the executive officer of Marine

Fighter Attack Squadron 333, flew a large strike

against the Basrah oil refinery. Like Captain Deist,

Major Schmidle received the Distinguished Flying

Cross for the successful attack.10

On the same day that the largest Marine air strike

since the Vietnam War was flying into Iraq, another

Marine was also making history. Captain Charles J.

Magill, an exchange pilot flying with the Air Force’s

58th Tactical Fighter Squadron, 33d Tactical Fighter

Wing, scored what is still the most recent Marine

air-to-air combat victory. Magill, call sign “Zerex

*

BGen Hamdani was the commander of the 17th Armored

Brigade, Hammurabi Armored Division, of the Republican

Guard.

the first wave of aircraft and cruise missiles struck at

targets all across Iraq. Over 100 General Dynamics

BGM-109 Tomahawk cruise missiles were fired from

U.S. Navy surface vessels and submarines at large

radar installations and communications centers. The

Tomahawk missiles and Lockheed F-117A Nighthawk

bombers struck air defense targets, the Baath Party

headquarters, the Iraqi Ministry of Defense, strategic

weapons targets such as Scud missile storage, and

infrastructure targets like electrical power generating

plants. One of the most famous images of the air assault on that first day came from a BBC reporter in

Baghdad who saw “a 20-foot Tomahawk glide quietly down a deserted street for several blocks, then

turn left and explode into a building.”4

Conventional Coalition aircraft flew in waves

against Iraq as well; they were met by a disorganized but vigorous Iraqi air defense that lit up the

sky with tracers and surface-to-air missiles. Most

Iraqi officers found out about the air strikes in the

same manner as Brigadier General Ra’ad Hamdani

of the Republican Guard,

* who was informed of

the Coalition air strikes by a soldier shouting,

“The planes are above us! The planes are above

us!”5

Aircraft for the first Marine air strike of the war

took off at 0400. In this strike, Marine Aircraft Group

11 sent 48 aircraft against Scud missile support facilities at Tallil and Qurnah, as well as against a power

plant at an-Nasiriyah and surface-to-air missile sites

at Shaibah Air Base. The strike’s F/A-18 Hornets and

A-6E Intruders were supported by EA-6B Prowlers

and KC-130 Hercules as the strike force flew north

under radio silence alongside Air Force McDonnell

Douglas “Wild Weasel” F-4G Phantom IIs and British

Royal Air Force Panavia Tornado GR.1s.6

Some of the Hornets and the Wild Weasels fired

AGM-88 high-speed antiradiation missiles at Iraq air

defense radars (over half of the antiradiation missiles fired by Marines in the Gulf War were fired in

the first day of the war). The strike force crossed

into Iraqi territory in the face of impressive, if inaccurate, antiaircraft fire.7

Lieutenant Colonel Waldo B. Cummings Jr., of

Marine All-Weather Attack Squadron 533, later described the mission:

As we penetrated Iraqi airspace, I looked down

and saw the biggest light show I had ever seen.

Continuous lines of red and orange tracers cov78 Liberating Kuwait
Sparrow radar-guided missiles at the MiGs, destroying them both. Captain Magill was thus the first Marine pilot to score a kill since the Vietnam War.11

The first day of the air war highlighted Marines’

fears about the unresponsiveness of the air tasking

order. Heavily focused on striking strategic targets

U.S. Marine Corps Aircraft for the Gulf War

71,” was flying a McDonnell Douglas F-15C Eagle

all-weather air-superiority fighter when he and his

wingman, Captain Rhory R. Draeger, USAF, locked

their radars on a pair of Iraqi Mikoyan MiG-29 “Fulcrum” air-superiority fighters flying at an altitude of

around 1,500 feet. The two F-15 pilots fired AIM-7

Aircraft Type Armament Crew Top

Speed Range

Bell AH-1T

Sea Cobra

Bell AH-1W

Super Cobra

•TOW, Hellfire

Sidewinder,

and Sidearm

missiles

•2.75- and 5-

inch rockets

•20mm gun

2 152 to

189

knots

311 to

317

nautical

miles

Grumman

A-6E

Intruder

•18.000-lb

payload

•Assorted

rockets

missiles, and

bombs

2 563

knots

2,819

nautical

miles

McDonnell

Douglas

AV-8B

Harrier II

•25mm

cannon

•13,200-lb

payload

•Assorted

rockets

missiles, and

bombs

1 584

knots

1,200

nautical

miles

McDonnell

Douglas

F/A-18

Hornet

•20mm

Gatling gun

•13,700-lb

payload

•Assorted

rockets

missiles, and

bombs

1 795 to

1,034

knots

1,800

nautical

miles

North

American

Rockwell

OV-10

Bronco

•4 x M60

machine

guns

•Assorted

rockets

missiles, and

bombs

2 250

knots

1,114

nautical

miles

The Air War 79
80 Liberating Kuwait

launched four aircraft on the Harrier’s first close air

support mission of the war, led by Major Richard C.

Branch of Marine Attack Squadron 311. The forward

air controllers in the OV-10 observed artillery tubes

tumbling through the air following the Harrier

strike.12

From this point onward, Colonel Bioty said that

the Harriers turned southern Kuwait into a “Harrier

hunting ground.” Lieutenant Colonel Richard M.

Barry of the 1st Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and

Intelligence Group and his detachment of Marine

and allied troops at a border outpost north of alKhafji benefited from the quick Harrier response as

they were being shelled later that day. Harriers

promptly answered their calls for close air support

and soon destroyed the Iraqi battery.13

In a later letter, Lieutenant Colonel Barry credited

the Harriers with saving his outpost:

On 17 January 1991, hostilities commenced

and Iraqi artillery began firing on my command post at the desalination plant (grids

TM475572). I was outside friendly artillery

range and thus began looking for air support.

The enemy had a 152mm self-propelled batU.S. Marine Corps AV-8B Harrier II attack aircraft from Marine Attack Squadron 513 fly in formation. Harriers were

restricted to missions in direct support of the Marine mission and destroyed many targets in Kuwait. 

Photo by SSgt Scott Stewart, USAF. Defense Imagery DF-ST-92-07395

deep inside Iraq, and controlling all of the Marines’

EA-6 aircraft due to the joint air agreement from September, the Air Force did not allocate any electronic

warfare aircraft to support the Marines’ planned AV8B missions along the Saudi-Kuwaiti border. The

planned missions targeted the Iraqi artillery and

rocket batteries that had the range required to target

Coalition ground forces. Rather than going into

Kuwait, Marine Aircraft Group 13’s Harriers stood

ready on alert on the strip at their forward airbase,

King Abdul Aziz airfield in Saudi Arabia, loaded with

munitions for close air support missions.

The Iraqi artillery units along the Saudi-Kuwaiti

border were undeterred by their relatively low priority on the Air Force targeting lists and responded

to the launching of the air campaign by shelling alKhafji and the Coalition forces inside the evacuated

Saudi town. The town’s oil refinery and desalination

plant were both hit and caught fire. An OV-10

Bronco from Marine Observation Squadron 1 spotted the Iraqi artillery after dawn, and Colonel John

Bioty, commanding officer of the Marine Aircraft

Group 13, recalled: “General Moore called . . . ‘We

have an OV-10 reporting Iraqi shelling in the alKhafji area. . . . Launch the ready Harriers.’” Bioty
*

The NATO reporting name for this missile system is the SA-8

Gecko.

Photo by Don S. Montgomery. Defense Imagery DD-ST-91-11904

Ground crews painted a small bomb for each mission flown on the side of U.S. aircraft, and at the end of the war they

painted the total number of missions flown inside the larger bomb outline. The 31 mission markings on the nose of this

Marine All-Weather Attack Squadron 533 A-6E Intruder at the end of the war demonstrate the intense effort Marine air

put into preparing the way for the ground advance.

racy. Several hundred antiaircraft artillery

rounds were fired at the Harriers, but they

continued to press the attack, expending all

ordnance and firing their internal guns. The

battery was completely destroyed as I could

see pieces of artillery flying backwards into

the air. Later, we look 11 prisoners—they

were bleeding from the ears and noses, indicating their battery had been wiped out by

airplanes. All their guns were destroyed and

the commander had been killed.

. . . Not only was it a superlative display of

airmanship and bombing accuracy, but [it] took

a lot of plain “old guts” as the fire was intense.

I feel compelled to chase this one down as

they saved my group of 34 combined forces

personnel from further bombardment, as we

already had sustained 21⁄2 hours of the same

and enemy accuracy improving.14

The Harriers were not the only close air support

asset employed along the Kuwaiti border; AH-1W

Super Cobras also responded to calls for support

tery at grids (TM445632) and was firing flat

trajectory into my position with effect. At approximately 0930, two [Fairchild Republic] A10s were diverted by the Air Force Airborne

Command and Control Center to support me.

The A-10s checked in and indicated a cloud

cover and a briefed SA-8 [9K33 Osa surfaceto-air missile system*

] threat were causing

them to return to base. Essentially, they left

me and my force without any support.

Next, four Harriers checked in and were

“looking for work.” I identified the target and

indicated that they were firing and to look for

the smoke. The Harriers attacked the target

with extreme bravery and aggressiveness,

dropping 12 to 16 250-pound bombs, setting

off all stored ammunition. They repeatedly attacked the battery coming straight from the

top dropping one bomb at a time for accuThe Air War 81
from the Marines in the border outposts, though

there was some problem with radio frequencies that

reduced their effectiveness in at least one instance.15

Back at the airfields, the tempo of operations

began to increase as incessant Scud alerts sent the

overworked ground crews into their bulky, awkward (and single use) chemical warfare protective

gear. Continuing through the night, these alerts

made it impossible for the air and ground crews to

get the required sleep. “I finally ordered the loud

speakers to be disconnected in the sleeping areas,”

said Colonel Manfred A. Rietsch, commander of Marine Aircraft Group 11.16

18 January: The Scuds

On the second night of the war, Marine Hornets and

Intruders continued to strike targets listed on the

three-day, preplanned air tasking order that Central

Command’s Air Force planning cell (aka the Black

Hole) had created for the first phase of the air campaign. They attacked Tallil Airfield and Republican

Guard units in southern Iraq. Iraq’s air defenses

continued to produce impressive amounts of fire,

both surface-to-air missiles and antiaircraft artillery

fire. In his memoir, Captain Stout of Marine Fighter

Attack Squadron 451 described the surface-to-air

missiles: “What we saw was a brilliant flash at

launch, and then a brilliant bluish white or yellow

streak as the missile climbed toward us. The most

terrifying moments followed rocket motor burnout

when, unsure of whether I was being tracked or

not, I scrunched down in the cockpit and waited

for the SAM [surface-to-air missile] to hit. Or miss.

Some of the missiles would self-detonate after a certain period. The explosions looked just like giant,

cheap, molten bursts from a roman candle.”17

Captain Stout was flying an F/A-18 in a strike

against a power plant in southern Iraq, a complicated mission much like the previous night’s strikes.

It was his first combat mission. “About forty miles

out as we approached the coast near Bubiyan Island,” he recalled, “the airspace in front of us was

filled with an incredible barrage of SAMs and AAA

[antiaircraft artillery]. It was much more intense than

anything I thought the Iraqis could manage.” The

sky was also crowded with Coalition aircraft attacking their targets: “We were all using the ‘Big sky, little airplane’ maxim to keep us from running in to

each other. The scene around me was terrifying. I

could see the flash of bombs from under the clouds

below, as jets from other flights hit their targets.”

But their training prevailed, and the pilots continued

their mission: “For just an instant I felt indignant.

These guys were shooting at me. . . . I honestly had

my feelings hurt. I was really a pretty nice guy, not

the sort of person you’d want to kill. . . . Approaching my release point I mashed down on the red

bomb pickle button . . . then selected full afterburner and started climbing. . . . Looking back I got

some satisfaction in seeing the flash from my bombs

as they exploded below the thin layer of clouds.”18

On 18 January, Iraq began firing Scud-B al-Hussein surface-to-surface medium range missiles

against Israel and Saudi Arabia. The first eight missiles were launched at Tel Aviv and Haifa, as

planned. The Scuds were very inaccurate and did

not have the political impact that Saddam had

hoped (he expected the Scuds would tear the Coalition apart), but the missile force operated with great

efficiency. As Kevin Woods later described, “The

missile force quickly settled into a routine of confirming target guidance with Saddam, cycling

launch vehicles through missile storage and fueling

locations, establishing a secure firing position, and

finally launching.”19

The political and military consequences of the

Scud attack forced Central Command to begin what

was called the “Great Scud Hunt.” Although the

hunt was largely unsuccessful, it diverted large

numbers of aircraft and reconnaissance resources

away from Kuwait and into the western Iraqi desert.

In particular, the hunt required the use of the two

prototype Grumman E-8C Joint Surveillance Target

Attack Radar System (Joint STARS) aircraft. The E8C had arrived in Saudi Arabia after Christmas and

was a new, untested battlefield technology. Central

Command used this new technology to track mobile Scud launchers in the western desert, although

originally it was designed to track large-scale troop

movements such as those that would precede a

major offensive.20

In Kuwait, Marine Harriers were joined in attacks

on Iraqi artillery and rocket batteries by Air Force

Fairchild Republic A-10 Thunderbolt IIs (more commonly referred to as “Warthogs”). Along the border,

Cobras from Marine Light Attack Helicopter

Squadron 369 responded to calls for close air support

from the reconnaissance teams stationed in the observation posts and destroyed Iraqi mortars under intense antiaircraft and artillery fire. Captain Steven G.

Springer and First Lieutenant Gregory D. Anderson

were each awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross

for leading the destruction of the Iraqi positions after

the original lead helicopter lost the use of its radios.21

At 0910 on 18 January, the first Marine aircraft of

the conflict was shot down. Flying their second

82 Liberating Kuwait
Photograph courtesy of BGen Granville Amos

The OV-10 Bronco’s last combat service with the Marine Corps was in the Gulf War. Two Bronco squadrons deployed to

the Gulf, and each squadron had one of its aircraft shot down during the conflict.

combat mission of the war in an OV-10 Bronco over

Kuwait, Lieutenant Colonel Clifford M. Acree, squadron

commander of Marine Observation Squadron 2, and

his aerial observer, Chief Warrant Officer-4 Guy L.

Hunter Jr., were looking for Iraqi artillery when they

spotted a rocket launcher battery. As they banked

above the Iraqis, Colonel Acree saw “a horrifying

sight: glinting metal followed by an incredibly fast

gray-white vapor trail snaking toward us. A heatseeking surface-to-air missile had locked on to our

aircraft and was tracking us. The missile, pointed

right at my face, was coming fast to blow us out of

the sky. With less than 6,000 feet of altitude, I had

no more than a second warning to dodge the missile

streaking toward us. . . . It’s the same feeling you

get in a car crash when you’ve hit the brakes hard

and so has the other guy. You know the impact is

coming all the same.”22

Initially, the aircrew was believed to have been

killed. As Colonel Bioty remembered, “We did not

know that they were alive until we saw them on

TV. . . . [The aircraft going down] was really a

shocker and that squadron took a real significant

hard swallow, . . . because there was a lot of leadership and experience in that airplane and here it

got hit on the second day of the war.” Acree and

Hunter were captured by the Iraqis, the first of five

Marines eventually taken prisoner. Like the others

they would be beaten, mistreated, and used as

human shields until after the war.23

19 to 27 January 

The third day of the air campaign, 19 January,

marked the end of the preplanned, initial air tasking

order. The 3d Marine Aircraft Wing flew two successful major missions to complete the preplanned

missions: one against bridges at Basrah and the

other against Republican Guard units. Other Hornets and Intruders joined the wing’s Harriers in attacking Iraqi units in Kuwait, continuing to

concentrate on artillery.24

Now Marine air began to focus more heavily on

targets in Kuwait of concern to the Marines, steadily

flying fewer joint missions each day. Each morning

Major General Royal Moore held a 0600 breakfast

meeting with the four Marines who commanded

The Air War 83
84 Liberating Kuwait

Data culled from A Statistical Compendium and Chronology—Gulf War Air Power Survey, vol. 5 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government

Printing Office, 1993), pp. 260–268

Air Interdiction (AI): missions to delay, divert, disrupt, or destroy the enemy’s military potential beyond the fire support

coordination line. Close Air Support (CAS): missions requested by a ground commander for support of, and close to,

friendly ground forces. Offensive Counter Air (OCA): missions to destroy or neutralize enemy air power. In the Gulf War

these included, for Marines, air-to-surface attacks on enemy airfields and attacks to destroy or disrupt enemy surface-toair defenses or integrated air defense systems. A sortie is an individual aircraft mission from takeoff to landing.

watches in the wing’s tactical air control center: assistant wing commander Brigadier General Granville

Amos, chief of staff Colonel William A. Forney,

Colonel William D. Can Jr., and Colonel Melvin W.

DeMars Jr. General Amos later recalled, “We would

meet every morning at seven to kind of go through

the day’s evolution. Then, at 1300 we would meet

with the plans side of G-3 [operations division] to

look at the next 12-, 24-, 48-, 72-hour plan, and that

is where General Moore made his input into changing . . . the frag[mentary order] process.”25

As can be seen on the chart detailing Marine

Corps sorties from 17 January to 28 January, the

number of sorties dipped dramatically on 20 and 21

January, when poor weather forced the cancellation

of many missions. Intruders from the all-weather attack squadrons did manage to launch, however,

striking Iraqi multiple rocket launchers that were

firing toward Mishab.26

As the weather improved, the number of sorties

increased exponentially, and the targets of the

Marines continued to shift. Fewer Marine strikes

were launched against power plants or airfields (the

“offensive counter air” sorties on the chart), and a

larger percentage of Marine strikes were aimed at

interdiction. In some cases, this meant strikes on

bridges or Republican Guard units, but it also

meant strikes on Iraqi units in Kuwait. Air Force A10 Warthogs and General Dynamics F-16 Fighting

Falcons also launched strikes at Iraqi units inside

Kuwait proper. Close air support missions were

flown in small numbers as Marine Harriers and helicopters supported the Marines manning the observation posts along the border.27

There were some internal difficulties with command and control for Marine air, specifically a struggle for control between the wing’s tactical air control

center and the direct air support center located with

Daily Marine Corps Sorties by Mission, 1/17/91 to 1/28/91
An F/A-18C Hornet strike-fighter aircraft of Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 232 taxis on the runway before takeoff for

a mission in support of Operation Desert Storm.

Photo by Sgt Jeff Wright. Defense Imagery DA-ST-92-07701

the I Marine Expeditionary Force headquarters in

Safaniya. As Colonel Manfred Rietsch later explained, “The DASC [direct air support center] wasn’t

used in its doctrinal role. . . . The MEF [Marine expeditionary force] absorbed the DASC and it became

almost a competition between the TACC [tactical air

control center] and the DASC as to who was going

to control airplanes and the flow of airplanes. . . .

They [the DASC] attempted to control airplanes

where their job was really coordination, not control,

and a couple of times they actually put some airplanes into some situations that they shouldn’t have

been. Telling them to go after some ridiculous target

in a dangerous situation. It didn’t work the way it

was intended.” By the end of the first two weeks of

combat, the conflict had been resolved.28

The Marine air campaign continued steadily after

the bad weather of 20 and 21 January, and the war

began to become routine. Colonel Donald A. Beaufait, executive officer of Marine Aircraft Group 11,

described typical missions for F/A-18 Hornet pilots

flying into Iraq: 

The very first ones obviously took a lot of detailed planning because we had, first of all, to

gather the intelligence on where the defenses

were. We always wanted to avoid them as

much as possible; if we couldn’t avoid them

we would come up with a detailed plan to

suppress them and then we’d have a strike

leader who would coordinate all of the suppression efforts along with the detailed bomb

aim points for each of the airplanes on a

strategic target. Then they’d sit down probably

three hours before the mission and then start

briefing it so they could brief the overall concept of how it’s going to work, with an intelligence brief and that type of thing. 

Then each of the elements whether they

were the strike airplanes or the suppression

airplanes or the combat air patrol elements

would then break down further and brief their

section or their element, division, on what the

plan was. And then pretty much everyone

would go out and we’d get started up and take

off. They’d have a tanker plan, they would go

and refuel. We had huge numbers of airplanes,

both Marine Corps and Air Force tankers, KC10s [McDonnell Douglas KC-10 Extenders] and

The Air War 85
86 Liberating Kuwait

This Kuwaiti police post, which was opposite Observation Post 4, was occupied by Iraqi forces. It was destroyed by Marine

Harrier attack aircraft on 27 January 1991.

Photo courtesy of MGySgt Gregory L. Gillispie

those types of airplanes, KC-135s [Boeing KC135 Stratotankers], C-130s. Refuel the airplanes

prior to going across the border into either

Iraq or into Kuwait so they had a full combat

load of fuel. Then execute the mission, come

back out, and normally there would be another tanker waiting as soon as we got back

into Saudi Arabian airspace to be able to refuel

airplanes in case we had any combat damage.

We’d also have an element of airplanes which

would be designated as a rescue combat air

patrol in order if we had to pick up some pilots that were downed somewhere along the

mission. Then we’d land, we had hot refueling

pits that were set up with fuelling stations at

Shaikh Isa [Bahrain]. Come back and refuel the

airplanes and then they’d go back, park the

jets, go through maintenance control, and

come back and have a major debrief with the

intelligence on what happened.29

Lieutenant Colonel William R. Jones commanded

Marine Attack Squadron 231, an AV-8B squadron

operating out of King Abdul Aziz airfield in Saudi

Arabia. In an interview, he described a typical mission in Kuwait during this period:

A lot of the delivery was roll-in at 18/20,000

feet; get your nose on the target; use the angle

rate bombing system, which is a magnified TV

camera in the nose so you could lock on to a

dot with the TV camera and then call the TV

display in the cockpit and you could look at it

and see is that a shadow or is that a truck. . . .

We’re dropping at 550 [knots] in a 45 to 60 degree dive and of course the sensation in the

cockpit once you got even past 45, but certainly at 60, you feel like you’re actually kind

of coming out of your seat. You do and you’re

still at 1.0G. That’s what the meter tells you on

the airplane, but it sure doesn’t feel that way.
There’s no reason to be pressing the attack. There’s

no reason to get down and expose you or your aircraft to damage.” He added that “this part of the

war really was mechanical and it was basically go

in high and find the target, take it out, go home,

come back and do it again.”33

A more direct warning of the dangers of routine

came in the form of two friendly fire incidents. On

23 January, an Air Force A-10 strafed Marines at Observation Post 6; luckily there were no casualties.

On 24 January, a convoy of 1st Force Reconnaissance Company driving near Observation Post 2 on

the Saudi-Kuwaiti border was repeatedly strafed by

an Air Force A-10. Two vehicles were damaged,

and a Marine and a sailor were wounded. General

Walter Boomer responded to this incident—the first

involving casualties—by shifting the fire support coordination line several thousand meters farther into

Kuwait and placing Marine liaison officers with the

Air Force’s A-10 squadrons.34

Also on 24 January, the only known Iraqi offensive air sorties of the war occurred when a pair of

Iraqi Dassault Mirage F-1s attacked the Saudi oil terminal of Ras Tanura. They were targeted by Marine

MIM-23 medium-range surface-to-air missiles but

were both shot down by a Saudi Arabian F-15C’s

AIM-9 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles.35

Multiple strikes were launched by Marine aircraft

against the Iraqi III Corps’ headquarters. Captain

Stout flew in one on 24 January that left the place

“in a shambles.” On 25 January, Marine aircraft destroyed the Ahmadi ammunition storage facility; the

resulting smoke pillar rose to 30,000 feet. A later

strike against III Corps headquarters was postponed

after the Iraqis began pumping oil into the Persian

Gulf. The strike was diverted to destroying the

pumps at the refinery in an attempt to slow the flow

of the oil.36

As part of Saddam’s plan to try and preserve his

forces and endure the air assault, on 26 January he

ordered the Iraqi Air Force to start fleeing to Iran,

where the aircraft might sit out the war unharmed

by Coalition attacks. Many Iraqi aircraft made the

dash over the coming weeks, but neither aircraft

nor crews returned to Iraq after the war in significant numbers.37

Marines and the Air Tasking Order

Under the pressure of combat, the differences between Air Force and Marine Corps air doctrine

began to strain the agreement reached in September. As noted in chapter 4, the Air Force used its

control of the air tasking order to control targeting

You feel like you’re just barely hanging in

there, coming straight down. It seems like

straight down. You pickle off your bombs and

then pull off. . . . You’re at 550 knots at 60 degrees nose down so the pull off is really just:

“Ugh, how low am I going to go on this bottom out!?” Of course that’s when you start worrying about getting back up above 10,000 feet

and getting the flares off on the climb out so

they don’t catch you with a cheap shot on the

way out.30

Iraq’s broadest response to the air campaign was

to “hunker down” and simply outlast the onslaught,

preserving what it could for after the campaign

rather than attempting to defeat Coalition air power.

On 21 January, Saddam ordered his air defenses to

“maintain the weapons and equipment and to cut

down on the use of ammunition.” Saddam had determined that “the enemy is planning to shorten the

battle, which we planned to prolong, the opposite

of their expectation. Therefore, according to our

calculations, the most important requirements of the

long war are to conserve everything.”31

In Kuwait, the common Iraqi soldier was unsure

what to believe. Aside from the border artillery units

and the air defense sites, there had been relatively

few strikes on Iraqi targets in Kuwait proper. There

were rumors about the Coalition’s air attacks but

few facts, and rumor ran rampant in a military that

treated official news as suspect. One young Iraqi

soldier serving in the III Corps kept a diary that was

found abandoned after the war. His entry for the

fourth day of the campaign illustrates the uncertainty the bombing of Iraq was producing in the

soldiers in Kuwait:

One says they have destroyed Baghdad and

demolished it and another says there is no

water, electricity or telephone lines. Some of

them turn the world black in your eyes. Others come to pacify you saying nothing has

happened there—they have only bombed the

military installations. Others say they have

bombed the civilian buildings. You don’t

know who to believe and who is lying. All

news [reports] are hallucinations. They are all

lying. The truth is lost.32

The missions were increasingly familiar and that

familiarity was also a danger. Colonel Jones described how he warned his Harrier pilots to stay focused and avoid flying too aggressively as the air

war continued: “There’re no bad guys in the wire.

The Air War 87
88 Liberating Kuwait

postponed or denied. For example, General

Boomer’s staff tried multiple times to get the headquarters of the Iraqi III Corps on the “JFACC”* targeting list, but it never made passed muster as a

“strategic” target. Instead, the Marines targeted it

with the sorties withheld from the joint forces air

component commander by the September agreement. Because the first three days were dominated

by JFACC sorties (aside from Harrier close air support missions for Marines under fire), the Iraqi corps

headquarters was not targeted for days.39

Another issue lay with the daily air tasking order

itself, which was several hundred pages long each

day. It overwhelmed the communication facilities

of the Marine (and Navy) units that needed it, diReprinted from Edward J. Marolda and Robert J. Schneller Jr., Shield and Sword: The United States Navy and the Persian Gulf War

(Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, Department of the Navy, 1998), p. 239

“Kill boxes” allowed the Coalition aircraft to hunt in predesignated regions in search of targets of opportunity.

*

JFACC (pronounced “Jay-Fack”) is short for “Joint Forces Air

Component Commander.” It was used as slang in the Marine

headquarters to designate targets and sorties that were generated

by Air Force Gen Horner’s staff, rather than those generated by

the Marine staff. 

priorities, thus attempting to control the use of all

air power in the region. The Air Force saw no

problems with this approach and felt the Marine

worries were groundless. Air Force Lieutenant

Colonel Deptula explained this way: “Their [the

Marines’] concern is so dogmatic that we want to

take their air away from them, and that’s not true.

. . . If they get into a major ground battle, or a

ground battle period, we’re not going to hold that

air away from them. That’s the way they act, and

that’s why they kept their AV-8s, which is fine. We

had enough F-16s to compensate.”38

Despite the Air Force’s confidence, there were

problems during the Gulf War in targeting priorities;

the Air Force invariably gave a higher priority to targets inside Iraq itself, or to air defense targets. And

those sorties that were not aimed at Air Force priority targets were distributed to the Army corps as

well as to General Boomer’s Marines. This led to

targets that directly targeted Marine priorities getting
was originally listed as missing in action and was presumed killed.43

Also on 28 January, Marine F/A-18s of Marine Aircraft Group 11 participated in a strike at a rocket fuel

factory near Baghdad, the deepest penetration into

Iraq by Marine aircraft during the Gulf War. The factory was heavily damaged, and none of the Hornets

were damaged on the mission.44

Marines continued to hunt for III Corps headquarters, which they believed had been split between a permanent and a mobile headquarters. On

29 January, General Boomer was informed that an

Iraqi prisoner of war claimed the headquarters was

located at a racetrack. Marine intelligence officers

in the 1st Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence Group combined this and other collected information with reports from the Kuwaiti resistance,

and they determined that the site of the headquarters was on a former military base in southern

Kuwait and that a meeting for Iraqi officers was

scheduled there for the evening of 31 January.45

The resulting air strike illustrates the way the

Marines worked around the strictures of the air tasking order. Two A-6Es from Marine Aircraft Group 11

were taken from a cancelled JFACC mission and directed to strike the small building identified. They hit

it with two laser-guided GBU-10 2,000-pound bombs,

demolishing the target. The Marines believed they

had killed General Salah Aboud Mahmoud, the III

Corps commander, but this was not the case.* It is difficult to determine what exactly this strike hit; Iraqi

sources do not describe any direct attacks on General

Salah Aboud, but he did later say, concerning his

headquarters in this period, that it “consisted of a

small shelter and of a building that belonged to

Kuwait’s Army. . . . It was badly damaged because

the enemy had started attacking it daily. . . . There

were many big impact craters from the bombs

dropped at the entrance of the shelter. For the entrance, we had to provide signs from these roads to

our entrance to avoid any unexploded ordnance.”46

As January came to a close, the 3d Marine Aircraft

Wing had done considerable damage to the Iraqi military, but most of the damage had been done to

strategic targets. Inside Kuwait itself there had been

relatively few strikes, as the following chart indicates.

verted other message traffic, and clogged the system. It was drawn up by General Horner’s staff,

which was dominated by Air Force officers (calling

into question the so-called joint nature of his command), and it followed Air Force doctrine. Each

day’s tasking was planned days in advance, and

Marines and sailors both felt the system would be

unresponsive to the fast-paced changes the air campaign would require. The Navy was unhappy with

the way the Air Force dominated the process, with

Vice Admiral Stanley Arthur, General Boomer’s

Navy counterpart, remarking after the war that

“we’ve had many examples of . . . fleeting moments

of opportunity, without being able to get back to

them. We had an enemy that crumbled on us this

time, but if we had an enemy that was very tough

and a lot smarter, we can’t let those little windows

of opportunity ever disappear.”40

In an interview from March 1991, Colonel Rietsch expressed the views of many Marines on the

air tasking order:

We were able to do our job in spite of the ATO

[air tasking order] process and that’s really

true. From the Air Force point of view this

thing will probably come out as a big success—the ATO—because they are going to say

“yes it worked.” Well, my answer: it worked—

we did our job in spite of it. It was not flexible,

[and] most days we got the ATO after the ATO

day had already started. I mean we were

launching airplanes before we got the ATO.41

The 3d Marine Aircraft Wing responded to the air

tasking order’s flaws by “opting out.” The Marines

stuffed the order with planned sorties, then cancelled

or diverted them as needed on the day in question.

This gave General Moore the flexibility he needed

to respond to General Boomer’s priorities in preparing the Kuwaiti battlefield for the liberation.42

28 to 31 January

On 28 January, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing lost its second aircraft when Captain Michael C. Berryman’s

Harrier was shot down by an infrared surface-to-air

missile. Flying with Marine Attack Squadron 311,

Berryman was leading his section as they were diverted to an Iraqi rocket battery when he was hit. He

ejected safely but was captured by the Iraqis, joining

Acree and Hunter as the third Marine aviator captured in the war. Like them, he would be tortured

and mistreated by the Iraqis. Unlike Acree and

Hunter, the Iraqis did not publicly acknowledge

Berryman was their prisoner until after the war. He

The Air War 89

*

It is strongly suggested on pages 51–52 in Col Charles Quilter

II’s monograph U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990–1991:

With the I Marine Expeditionary Force in Desert Shield and

Desert Storm that Gen Salah Aboud died in this strike. This is incorrect; the general was later present at the Safwan cease-fire

talks and spoke often to the Iraqi War College in the mid-1990s. 
90 Liberating Kuwait

for why this can’t happen. . . . Time is getting

short. Every sunlit day that we have we must

take maximum advantage of it. Every asset

must be up. I am concerned that we don’t

have enough sorties today. . . . Our planning

and our system should be such that their

every pilot should fly today. . . . If they are

not, it’s our fault; it’s our fault, pure and simple. That monkey’s on our back, guys, and

the backs of the other staffs; the wing staff

and the division staff. None of you are going

through that wire; none of you are going

through that breach system. I sense that if you

were, then you wouldn’t be accepting some

of these “nos.”47

That is not to say that Coalition air power was

not impacting those Iraqi units, however. It is true

that the Iraqi entrenchments and decoys had been

somewhat effective in minimizing damage, and very

few of the Iraqi armored vehicles had been damaged or destroyed in the attacks. But vehicle readiThe end of the initial phase of the air campaign and

3d Marine Aircraft Wing’s decision to increasingly opt

out of the air tasking order process resulted in an increase in missions into Kuwait from 24 January onward, with a sharp spike occurring on 31 January

when Coalition aircraft caught a large convoy of Iraqi

forces north of al-Khafji. Nonetheless, it would be fair

to say that that Iraqi forces in Kuwait, in particular

the III Corps and IV Corps, who were defending the

area through which the Marines would be advancing,

had not yet suffered a prolonged, broad, intensive air

bombardment. 

At the 28 January daily staff briefing, General

Boomer expressed his frustration with the air campaign in Kuwait proper:

I don’t know how to address this very well

because if you don’t feel it in your bones, it’s

very hard for me to get the point across. But

we are in a full-court press now for everything

to be working, all of our assets to be utilized,

and you can’t accept any bull s–––t reasons

Data culled from A Statistical Compendium and Chronology—Gulf War Air Power Survey, vol. 5 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government

Printing Office, 1993), pp. 466–467

This chart shows the number of strikes by Coalition aircraft carried out each day against Iraqi forces in Kill Boxes AF6,

AG6, AH6, AF5, AG5, AH5, AG4, and AH4. These kill boxes contained the Iraqi forces most likely to engage Marine

ground forces. A strike is defined as a weapon employed by a single aircraft against a target. Aircraft often made multiple

strikes on each sortie. 

Total Strikes in Kuwait, 1/17/91 to 2/1/91
ness was now a major issue for the Iraqis, mostly

because the increase in Coalition flights from 24

January onward combined with the steady presence

of Coalition aircraft over Kuwait kept the Iraqis hiding in their bunkers rather than performing needed

maintenance. Iraqi supply vehicles were no longer

able to move, so ammunition, food, and water were

also beginning to become issues for the Iraqis. Iraqi

commanders attributed this to the Coalition aircraft

“flying continuously over our forces [just] beyond

75mm antiaircraft artillery range” rather than just

“dropping bombs and leaving.” General Salah

Aboud ascribed these difficulties to the destruction

of his corps’ air defense command headquarters.48

The Iraqis responded by employing innovative

supply solutions such as slaughtering local cattle for

food or collecting camels as an alternative method

of supply transport. Vehicle maintenance, never an

Iraqi strong suit, was shifted to the hours of darkness. Nevertheless, little could be done for the unit

most heavily targeted during January, the III Corps’

artillery, which was “experiencing trouble with

The Air War 91

Marine Corps Art Collection

Fly Over by Col H. Avery Chenoweth

some of [its] artillery pieces due to [over]use or because [it] had been bombed.”49

One measure of the success of the campaign in

Kuwait is that after the war, Iraqi War College studies focused heavily on defeating or avoiding air attacks. Burning oil fires, deception, decoys, and

dispersal were all techniques that were tried in

Kuwait and that the Iraqis would later perfect in the

decade of tense peace following the war.50

The success of the air campaign was also apparent on a more individual level. After the first week

of bombing, the aforementioned anonymous Iraqi

soldier made the following entry in his diary: “I

haven’t slept a wink and I don’t know anything

about my family. No news about them for seventeen days. I don’t know if they are safe and I don’t

know about my brother Hussain who is in the

Alexandria Institute or about my brother Abbas who

is in the Air Force Supply and Transportation Unit.

I pray to God that they may be safe.”51

Despite the Scud distraction and the focus on

strategic rather than operational targets, the air cam-
paign had an obvious and significant impact on

Iraqi forces inside Kuwait. It isolated units from the

national command authority; degraded troop morale;

and made even simple movements difficult, often requiring days of detailed planning for routine operations. With its diplomatic options exhausted, and

enduring the effects of an air campaign much

longer than anticipated, Iraq began planning a large

spoiling attack centered on the Saudi town of alKhafji on 29 January 1991. Now known as the Battle

of al-Khafji, it was the first major ground combat action of the Gulf War.

92 Liberating Kuwait
Preludes to al-Khafji

u CHAPTER 6u

An aerial view of some of the facilities at the Marine Corps combat service support area in Kibrit in late February 1991.

Kibrit was intended originally as the primary logistics support for the liberation of Kuwait.

Photo by SSgt George. Defense Imagery DM-SN-93-02252

Building Kibrit

Brigadier General Charles Krulak, commanding general of Direct Support Command, hadchosen Kibrit as the location of Combat Service Support Area 1 on 17 December. From this forward supply point, the command was to supply the

logistics needs of two Marine divisions in the assault. The location was chosen as the best geographic location to support the original one breech

attack plan. Approximately 50 kilometers south of

the Kuwaiti border, Kibrit was out of range of Iraqi

artillery but close enough to support the assault, and

its topography concealed the camp’s silhouette.1

Commanded by Captain Brian J. Hearnsberger,

Company B, 8th Engineer Support Battalion, arrived

at Kibrit and began construction on 27 December.

This engineer battalion ended December 1990 as

the closest Marine unit to Iraqi forces as they provided their own security and worked on the massive complex.2

On 4 January, Company C, 1st Battalion, 3d

Marines, arrived at Kibrit and began to provide security so that the engineers could focus on constructing the complex rapidly. The 7th Engineer

Support Battalion arrived on 6 January to reinforce

its sister battalion. Major Steven M. Zimmeck later

recorded that, when construction was completed

on 15 January, the 8th Engineer Support Battalion

and the 7th Engineer Support Battalion had “built a

73-cell ammunition support point, improved the

3,000-foot air strip, established a 1.8-million-gallon

fuel dump, stored 500,000 gallons of water, dug in

two field hospitals, and surrounded the entire complex with a blast berm.” The complex sprawled

over 40 kilometers as a defense against Iraqi air or

artillery attack.3

On 6 January, Seabees of Captain Michael R.

Johnson’s 3d Naval Construction Regiment arrived

at Kibrit. They attempted to build a new well, restored a 1,200-foot-deep well already in place, and

began maintaining heavily used desert road between Kibrit and Mishab.4

Sea Soldier IV

Although the air campaign had already begun, most

93
94 Liberating Kuwait

of the Marines serving on board the amphibious

task force spent the end of January participating in

Sea Soldier IV, the last amphibious exercise conducted for the Gulf War. Both the 4th and 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigades participated in this

huge exercise, marking it as the largest Marine amphibious exercise since 1964.6

The sea is dangerous, even when one is merely

practicing to go in harm’s way, and flying military

aircraft is an inherently dangerous occupation as

well. This was made clear even before the exercise

officially began. On 22 January, an AV-8B of Marine

Attack Squadron 331 was lost, and its pilot, Captain

Manuel Rivera Jr., was killed in the crash. Captain

Rivera was making a night landing on the USS Nassau, using an instrument approach. Three miles

from the ship, his Harrier suddenly dived into the

beach and exploded.7

Despite this ominous beginning, the two-brigade

amphibious landing was a success. Three battalions

of the landing force were lifted ashore by the

brigade’s helicopter squadrons, training to handle

I

n January 1991, the U.S. Navy and Marine

Corps demonstrated the flexibility and versatility of naval forces by undertaking Operation

Eastern Exit—the evacuation of the U.S. embassy in Mogadishu, Somalia—in the midst of

the preparations for Operation Desert Storm

during the Gulf War.

The ongoing Somalian civil war created an

unsafe situation in the capital of Mogadishu as

order crumbled and various militias began fighting openly throughout the city. The U.S. ambassador’s request to evacuate the embassy was

approved on 2 January 1991. The Navy and Marine amphibious forces in the Persian Gulf, who

were preparing to help liberate Kuwait, were

given this task.

Colonel James Doyle Jr., commanding officer

of Brigade Service Support Group 4, was appointed the Marine commander of the evacuation, and Captain Alan B. Moser, USN,

commander of Amphibious Squadron 6, was

appointed commander of the amphibious task

force. Both the USS Guam and USS Trenton

sailed immediately south with elements of the

4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade on board to

conduct the evacuation.

On 4 January, the U.S. ambassador reported the

embassy was under siege by looters, and that night

Marine helicopters flew 450 miles (being refueled

twice en route by Marine C-130s) and landed a security detail of Navy SEALS and Marines from Company C, 1st Battalion, 2d Marines. They evacuated

61 civilians and returned to the amphibious task

force. The next night, while the Marines provided

perimeter security, the helicopters evacuated over

200 more civilians. By the morning of 6 January

1991, less than four days after receiving the order,

the evacuation was complete. Two hundred eightyAn African Distraction: Operation Eastern Exit

one civilians from 31 countries, including Great

Britain, Germany, Kenya, Kuwait, Nigeria, Oman,

the Soviet Union, Sudan, Turkey, and the United

Arab Emirates, were evacuated (the wife of the

Nigerian ambassador gave birth on board the USS

Guam en route to Oman, increasing the number of

evacuees to 282).

Thanking the sailors and Marines for the swift,

efficient evacuation, the U.S. ambassador said,

“Few of us would have been alive today if we had

been outside your reach. . . . We will take a part

of each of you with us for the rest of our lives.”5

Adapted from a Central Intelligence Agency map by Marine Corps

History Division
prisoners of war occurred, and the brigades underwent a week of desert training and equipment

maintenance before conducting a tactical withdrawal exercise from the beach back to the ships.

For most of the Marines in the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, floating in the North Arabian Sea

since early September, this would be the highlight

of their monotonous Desert Shield and Desert

Storm deployment.8

Artillery Raids and Reconnaissance Patrols

Very early on 17 January, Major General Salah

Aboud Mahmoud of III Corps received orders to

begin the preplanned sabotage of the oil fields at

al-Wafrah and al-Burqan. He was also ordered to

begin artillery strikes against Coalition forces south

of the border, the shelling of al-Khafji in particular.

The Marines responded to the shelling with air

strikes, and it was several days before the fires in

the oil fields grew to the point that they were noticeable. Neither tactic spurred the ground combat

the Iraqis sought.9

On 20 January, the commander of III Corps was

ordered to send troops to raid across the border in

order to “capture as many prisoners as they can.”

The goal of these raids was to “force the enemy to

engage in a major ground battle [where we hope]

that the enemy will suffer great losses.” None of

these raids captured any Americans, and they certainly did not have the intended impact. In fact,

many appear to have led to Iraqis surrendering to

the Americans. The largest such operation detected

by the Marines occurred on the night of 22 January,

and while unsuccessful it appears to have been

cleverly planned and executed with more enthusiasm than the Iraqi forces usually displayed.10

Marine intelligence received word that a “mass

defection” of a company of Iraqi soldiers would

occur near Observation Post 6 on the night of 22

January. The 1st Reconnaissance Battalion had a

team holding the post who prepared to receive the

prisoners, and the 1st Light Armored Infantry battalion prepared a “tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel” force of trucks, High Mobility Multipurpose

Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs, better known as

“humvees”), and General Dynamics LAV-25 light armored vehicles to extract the prisoners or aid the

outpost as needed. Near midnight, the Marines at

the post received small-arms fire and rocket-propelled grenades instead of Iraqi defectors. They temporarily evacuated the position with the aid of the

LAV-25 force. After the evacuation, the Iraqis shelled

the empty outpost and fired some illumination

rounds. There were no Marine losses in the action,

and in the morning they reoccupied Observation

Post 6.11

After the air war against Iraq began, I Marine Expeditionary Force began a series of artillery raids

An AAV-7A1 amphibious assault vehicle is driven off a utility landing craft from the amphibious assault ship USS Nassau

(LHA 4) in an amphibious beach assault exercise. Sea Soldier IV was the last amphibious exercise conducted by 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade during the Gulf War. 

Photo by PO1 Ken Mark O’Connell, USN. Defense Imagery DM-ST-92-06923

Preludes to al-Khafji 95
96 Liberating Kuwait

inaccurate. Marine artillery fired on three different

targets, and Intruders and Hornets bombed and

rocketed the Iraqi positions as well. While the artillery retired as planned, B Company destroyed an

Iraqi vehicle on the Kuwaiti side of the border

berm. Unfortunately, this raid was not without casualties. Two of the light armored vehicles of Company B collided as the company left the area. Three

Marines were killed in the crash: Staff Sergeant

Michael R. Connor Sr. and Lance Corporals Arthur

O. Garza and Michael A. Noline.15

The 2d Marine Division conducted its first combat action of the conflict with an artillery raid on

the night of 27–28 January. Security for this raid was

provided by 2d Light Armored Infantry Battalion,

and the raid was conducted by Battery Q and Battery R of the 5th Battalion, 10th Marines. The 5th

Battalion’s commander, Lieutenant Colonel Andrew

F. Mazzara, was the raid force commander. In support of the raid was Battery A, 92d Field Artillery

Regiment of the U.S. Army, commanded by Captain

Edward L. Hughes, USA. This multiple-launch

rocket system battery was prepared to conduct

counterbattery fire against Iraqi artillery fire. In the

event, there was no return fire from the Iraqis. Battery Q, armed with M109A1 155mm self-propelled

howitzers, fired 72 rounds, and Battery R, armed

with M110A2 8-inch self-propelled howitzers, fired

36 rounds on their targets: a vehicle park and a logistics site. Then the raid force returned to its staging area.16

On the night of 28–29 January, Task Force Shepherd, made up of companies from the 1st Light Armored Infantry Battalion and the 3d Light Armored

Infantry Battalion, conducted a raid on the Kuwaiti

police station at Umm Hujul, across the border from

Observation Post 4. The light armored vehicles of

Company A, 1st Light Armored Infantry Battalion,

fired their 25mm cannon and Emerson 901A1 TOW

2 (tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided) antitank guided missiles at the police post. There was

no Iraqi return fire, so the two batteries from 5th Battalion, 11th Marines, that had been assigned to conduct counterbattery fire withdrew without firing.17

Iraq’s al-Khafji Plan

With its diplomatic options exhausted, and enduring the effects of an air campaign much longer than

anticipated, Iraq determined to launch a large spoiling attack centered on the Saudi town of al-Khafji.

This attack signaled the beginning of the Battle of

al-Khafji, the first major ground combat of the Gulf

War.18

*

The F/A-18D was a two-seat version of the F/A-18. It was often

used to perform coordination duties or to act as an airborne forward air controller.

against Iraqi forces in Kuwait. The raids served multiple purposes. First, they were aimed at specific

Iraqi artillery forces; second, they were designed to

confuse and bewilder the Iraqis by making the ultimate Marine breaching points unclear; and third,

they permitted Marine air to strike against the Iraqi

artillery (considered Iraq’s most dangerous conventional asset), which inevitably replied with counterbattery fire.

Each raid followed the same basic pattern, with

some variations. A Marine artillery battery would

advance to the border and fire a carefully planned

barrage. As soon as the shells cleared the barrels,

they would limber the artillery pieces and drive

away. Within minutes, the firing location would be

empty desert. When Iraqi artillery attempted counterbattery fire, it would fall on the abandoned position, and then waiting Marine aircraft would pounce

on the revealed Iraqi artillery and destroy it.12

The composition of the raid forces followed a

pattern as well. The ground element consisted of a

battery or two of artillery with a small security force

and a company of light armored vehicles from one

of the light armored infantry battalions. The 3d Marine Aircraft Wing would provide an aviation element: this usually comprised an OV-10 Bronco

acting as an airborne forward air controller, a McDonnell Douglas F/A-18D Hornet* and two A-6E Intruders to strike the enemy artillery sites, an

F/A-18D and two F/A-18s to suppress enemy air defenses, and an EA-6B Prowler to provide electronic

countermeasures support.13

The first artillery raid (unprotected by a light armored infantry force) occurred on the night of 21

January and was fired from a location just north of

al-Khafji against Iraqi artillery positions north of the

border. The 1st Battalion, 12th Marines, part of Task

Force Taro, launched the raid using two of its batteries of M198 155mm howitzers. The hope was to

find an Iraqi rocket system, but none fired. Instead,

80 rounds of dual-purpose improved conventional

munitions were fired at suspected Iraqi artillery positions, and Marine aircraft bombed the positions as

well.14

The next raid was on 26 January near the elbow

of the Saudi-Kuwaiti border at al-Jathathil. It was

conducted by Batteries Q and S of 5th Battalion,

11th Marines, and screened by Company B, 1st

Light Armored Infantry Battalion. The Iraqis attempted to counterbattery fire this time, but it was
Official U.S. Marine Corps photo

Marines of Task Force Shepherd plan their next operation. In addition to screening duties, the light armored infantry

battalions also provided security for the Marine batteries conducting artillery raids on Iraqi forces in Kuwait.

men. But for all this great power, they hesitate

to attack the Iraqi field forces because they realize how well the Iraqi forces can defend

against a ground attack. And, they know already, the military genius of Iraq’s leader, Saddam Hussein.19

The Iraqis believed they understood American

intentions: “Like we say, they intend to destroy our

Marine Corps Art Collection

Artillery Mission by Sgt Charles G. Grow 

Saddam expected the air campaign to last a

week and then be followed by the ground war,

what he claimed would be the “Mother of All Battles,” which would produce the desired massive

American casualties. Instead, the bombing showed

no sign of stopping and was inflicting serious damage on the Iraqi forces without any corresponding

ability to produce the desired Coalition casualties.

In the Iraqi view, something needed to be done in

order to goad the United States into the planned

Kuwaiti “meat grinder.”

An Iraqi War College study completed after the

war highlighted the Iraqi understanding of the situation in late January 1991:

In military practice, there are principles. One

of the important principles is that the attack

is the best defense. In the Mother of Battles

this principle is particularly important, because the enemy of Iraq and the Arab nation

has deployed a large number of airplanes,

rockets and modern equipment, from which

it seems they are prepared for a total war.

They deployed the most modern equipment

for their field forces, which consist of the

armies of 28 nations totaling half a million

Preludes to al-Khafji 97
98 Liberating Kuwait

Harmony Document Folder ISGP-2003-00038521

An Iraqi Air Force reconnaissance aircraft photographed the Saudi port of al-Khafji in mid-August 1990. Al-Khafji’s oil

refinery is visible in the upper left of the photograph.

forces and the infrastructure of our country through

the air attack, by airplanes and long-range missiles.

And they want to avoid the losses of a ground war

as much as they can.” Moreover, they claimed,

“George Bush will not be able to handle the heavy

responsibility of heavy casualties in front of Congress and public opinion.” In this case, the Iraqis

understood American intentions, although they underestimated American resolve, and they gravely

overestimated the ability of the Iraqi military to inflict losses on the attacking Coalition forces.20

The al-Khafji operation was intended to spark

the ground battle of the “Mother of All Battles,”

which Saddam felt was the prerequisite for his

eventual victory. It was intended as a provoking

raid that would draw the Americans into a hasty

and massive military response and result in significant American casualties. Despite his deficient military acumen, he correctly identified that the center

of gravity in the Coalition war effort was the willingness of the American people to suffer casualties,

and he designed his operational plans to strike directly at that willpower. 

Saddam chose al-Khafji as the target of the attack

for several reasons. The Iraqi War College analysis

noted that the town had two harbors: one designed

specifically for exporting oil, and the other believed

by the Iraqis to be a base for Coalition forces. In

Saddam’s view, an Iraqi force occupying the town

would be able to threaten Coalition naval forces in

the Gulf. Al-Khafji was also within range of Iraqi

supporting artillery in Kuwait. The attack also

would force the Saudis to respond; Saddam knew

they could not permit him to hold any part of their

kingdom for long. It seemed likely that the attack

would force the Coalition into the bloody ground

war that Saddam desperately wanted.21

The operational plan for implementing Iraq’s

strategic goal was relatively straightforward. Five

Iraqi infantry divisions defended the Saudi-Kuwaiti

border from the coast to the elbow: from east to

west, they were the 18th Infantry, 8th Infantry,

29th Infantry, 14th Infantry, and 7th Infantry Divisions. These commands would not take part in

the offensive; instead they would continue to defend the fortifications along the border. These border fortifications, called the “Saddam Line” by U.S.

forces, consisted of a belt of minefields, antitank
Part of the Iraqi plan for the Battle of al-Khafji, as shown in an official Iraqi history of the battle. This sketch indicates

that 6th Armored Brigade’s attack on Observation Post 4 at the “heel” of the Kuwaiti–Saudi border was not intended as

the main Iraqi effort. 

Harmony Document Folder ISGQ-2003-00054592

obstacles, and triangular brigade strongpoints. Iraqi

engineers had designed and constructed the belt

based on lessons learned in their 10-year war with

Iran. 

The actual raid forces would be drawn from the

3d Armored and 5th Mechanized Divisions of III

Corps, under General Salah Aboud Mahmoud, and

the 1st Mechanized Division of IV Corps, under

Major General Yaiyd Khalel Zaki. Major General

Salah Aboud had overall command of the operation;

III Corps, considered one of the better organizations

in the Iraqi Army, had successfully conducted similar

operations during the Iran-Iraq War, as well as performed successfully while defending the Iraqi city

of Basrah.22

The armored battalions of these divisions were

equipped with a combination of T-54/55 and T-62

main battle tanks, while their mechanized infantry

battalions were equipped with BMP-1 armored personnel carriers supported by BRDM-2 scout vehicles. Their divisional artillery was lavishly equipped

with various models of 152mm and 155mm howitzers.23

The plan called for the 1st Mechanized Division

to pass through the lines of the 7th and 14th Infantry Divisions between the border’s “heel” just

south of Umm Hajul and the elbow at al-Manaqish.

This maneuver was intended to protect the flank of

Brigadier General Hussan Zedin’s 3d Armored Division as it traversed the al-Wafrah oil fields and the

lines of the 8th and 29th Infantry Divisions. The 3d

Armored Division would then take up a blocking

position to the west of al-Khafji. Al-Khafji itself was

the target of the 5th Mechanized Division, which

was to seize and fortify the town. Once the 5th

Mechanized Division had secured al-Khafji, the 1st

Mechanized and 3d Armored Divisions would withdraw back into Kuwait. In theory, after the Coalition

ground response was provoked, the 5th Mechanized Division would retire from al-Khafji and move

safely behind the massive fortifications along the

Saudi-Kuwaiti border. The attack was set to be

launched at 2000 on 29 January 1991, and al-Khafji

was to be occupied by 0100 on 30 January. 24

General Salah Aboud ordered that the forces be

“dug in” and “hidden underground” by the morning

of 30 January. He provided some insightful tactical

advice as well: “I emphasized the use, and the imPreludes to al-Khafji 99
100 Liberating Kuwait

Iraqi Armored Vehicles

Vehicle Type Armament Crew Top

Speed Weight

T-54/55

•1 x 100mm D10T2S

gun w/43 rounds

•1 x 7.62mm SMGT

coaxial machine gun

w/3,500 rounds

•1 x 12.7mm DShK

or NSVT antiaircraft

w/500 rounds

4 50

km/h

36,000

kg

T-62

•1 x 115mm 2A20

gun w/40 rounds

•1 x 7.62mm PKT

coaxial machine gun

w/2,500 rounds

4 45.5

km/h

40,000

kg

T-72

•1 x 125mm 2A46

gun w/45 rounds and

6 ATGW

•1 x 7.62mm PKT

coaxial machine gun

w/2,000 rounds

3 60

km/h

44.500

kg

BMP-1

•1 x 73mm 2A28 low

velocity gun w/40

rounds

•1 x 7.62mm PKT

coaxial machine gun

w/2,000 rounds

•5 x Sagger ATGM

3 to 8 65

km/h

13,500

kg

BMP-2

•1 x 30mm 2A42 gun

w/500 rounds

•1 x 7.62mm PKT

coaxial machine gun

w/2,000 rounds

•1 x 30mm AG-17

grenade launcher

w/350 rounds

•1 x AT5 launcher

w/4 rounds

3 to 7 65

km/h

14,300

kg

BRDM-2

•1 x 14.5mm KPVT

w/500 rounds

•1 x 7.62mm PKT

coaxial machine gun

w/2,000 rounds

4 100

km/h

N/A
unit nearest to Joint Forces Command–East units, as

the primary focus of his liaison effort.28

Colonel Admire assigned Captain Joseph Molofsky, an officer with previous experience in the Middle East, as the 3d Marines liaison officer to the 2d

Brigade, Saudi Arabian National Guard. From the

beginning, there was tension between the Marines

and the Saudis. “The Marines felt that they needed

to get their own eyes on [things],” Captain Molofsky

explained. “They couldn’t trust the Saudis. The

Saudis were insulted that the Marines didn’t trust

them.” This situation was exacerbated in January

1991 when 3d Marines was given the duty of protecting the town and airfield of Mishab. Previously

Mishab had been part of Joint Force Command–

East’s area of operations; placing it within the Marine area of operations, especially as the United

States began to use the airfield, implied a lack of

faith in Saudi military capabilities on the part of Marine commanders.29

In addition to the U.S. Army advisors and Special

Forces teams assigned to the Saudi forces, commanders attached air-naval gunfire liaison teams to

coordinate Marine air and artillery support for the

Saudis. Specifically, 1st Air-Naval Gunfire Liaison

Company (1st ANGLICO) was attached to Joint

Forces Command–East, and in turn the company

assigned supporting arms liaison teams to Saudi

brigades and fire control teams to Saudi battalions.

These teams worked closely with their Saudi counterparts, developing excellent working relationships.30

On the eve of the battle of al-Khafji, American

and Saudi forces had worked and trained together

for five months. There was some unease between

the two forces, but both sides had made a concerted effort to overcome it. The Iraqi invasion

would put those efforts to the test.

Ra’s al-Khafji

The Saudi coastal town of Ra’s al-Khafji, more commonly known as al-Khafji, lies approximately seven

miles south of the Saudi-Kuwaiti border. Before the

war, the primary industries in the town were oil and

tourism, but now it was essentially deserted. Saudi

General Khaled bin Sultan had ordered the town

evacuated in August because it was too close to the

Kuwait border to be properly defended. North of

the town there was a water desalination plant, and

to the south there was an oil refinery, a pier, and a

small airstrip. Southeast, beyond the town’s outskirts, was a Saudi Arabian National Guard compound.31

portance of shoulder fired anti-aircraft weapons in

ambush in the front and flanks of the fortified positions. And I emphasized how the snipers should

be active and effective against the helicopters of the

enemy.” He instructed his men to light tire fires because the smoke would confuse the infrared sensors of the Coalition forces. Finally, he ordered his

troops “to be economic with the ammunition which

is in the tanks and the carriers. Because the enemy

air will be focused on the battle territory, especially

the transportation, so movement will be very limited.” However limited Saddam’s understanding of

the battle was, at least one of his generals anticipated the difficulties the Iraqis would face trying to

maneuver against overwhelming Coalition air superiority.25

The capture of American personnel was a high

priority. Saddam had determined from the American prisoner of war experience during the Vietnam

War and the Iranian hostage crisis that the United

States was vulnerable to hostage taking. This led

him to hold many westerners hostage early in the

Gulf crisis, but he released them in December 1990

to little obvious advantage. Nevertheless, he felt that

American soldiers would still be excellent bargaining chips in the confrontation. An Iraqi prisoner

from the battle later told American interrogators:

“The sole purpose of the raid on al-Khafji was to

capture Coalition personnel. The loss of all Iraqi

equipment and personnel involved in the raid was

of no importance as long as POWs [prisoners of

war] were captured.”26

When giving orders for the attack to his corps

commanders, Saddam summed up Iraqi goals in

this way: the “enemy in front of us, if he faces this

time our willingness to cause severe damage to

him, he won’t be able to handle it. He will be destroyed and the news will be heard. And all the

chairs of the enemy governments will shake.” For

Iraq, the Battle of al-Khafji was not intended as a

skirmish; it was intended to win the war by destroying the Coalition’s will to fight. At the heart of the

Coalition was the alliance between the United States

and Saudi Arabia.27

Saudi-Marine Relations

As mentioned in chapter 3, 1st Marine Division

commander Major General James Myatt ordered his

assistant division commander, Brigadier General

Thomas Draude, to take primary responsibility for

liaison duties with the Saudi Arabian military.

Brigadier General Draude in turn used 3d Marines

(commanded by Colonel John Admire), the Marine

Preludes to al-Khafji 101
102 Liberating Kuwait

*

Most works on the Battle of Khafji list the observation posts

slightly differently from east to west: OP-8, OP-7, OP-1, OP-2,

OP-4, OP-5, and OP-6. Two important primary sources—the

command chronology of the 2d Light Armored Infantry Battalion

and the after action report of 1st ANGLICO/1st Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence Group—both make clear that the

order should be the one given in the text. 

**The 1st Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence Group

was a unit responsible for coordinating intelligence gathering

operations, and was subordinate to the I Marine Expeditionary

Force rather than the 1st Marine Division. Its primary headquarters was with the I Marine Expeditionary Force headquarters, but

it maintained a forward headquarters in al-Khafji.

***The 1st Marine Division’s 1st Light Armored Infantry Battalion

was actually a composite organization with companies from two

separate light armored infantry battalions. To encourage a sense

of identity in the ad hoc battalion, it was designated Task Force

Shepherd. 

cial Forces soldiers, and Marine reconnaissance teams manned these

posts in order to gather intelligence

on Iraqi forces in Kuwait. Placed at

10 to 20 kilometer intervals, Observation Post 8 was set on the coast;

Observation Post 7 was farther to

the west; and Observation Posts 1,

2, 4, 5, and 6 followed the border

until the elbow was reached at alJathathil.*

Nearest to the coast, the Marine

Corps’ 1st Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence Group controlled Observation Posts 2, 7, and

8.** The coastal highway ran between Observation Post 7 and Observation Post 8, which gave those

two posts overlapping oversight of

the most likely route into al-Khafji.

In addition to the special operations

teams, air-naval gunfire supporting

arms liaison teams also occupied

these observation posts. The 1st Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence Group had a headquarters at

the desalination plant located to the

north of al-Khafji. The 1st ANGLICO,

attached to Joint Forces Command–

East, was a subordinate unit of the

1st Surveillance, Reconnaissance,

and Intelligence Group, which coordinated closely in and around al-Khafji with the various units in the Kuwaiti border area.33

Task Force Shepherd*** of the 1st Marine Division

had companies on a screening mission near Observation Post 4 (Company D), Observation Post 5

Ra’s al-Khafji was particularly difficult to defend

because the town lay to the north of extensive

sabkhas (salt marshes). As Captain Molofsky explained, “A sabkha is a patch of desert that has

some kind of underlying moisture that causes a

thin, mudlike crust to develop on the top, which

cracks in the heat, but it’s easily penetrated by a vehicle and very soft underneath—you get stuck in it

in a huge way.” The sabkhas served to channel traffic onto the coastal highway, especially the heavy

vehicles needed to support the logistics of large military forces.32

Coalition Dispositions

Covering deployed Coalition forces were a series of

observation posts strung out along the KuwaitiSaudi border. Each post was situated near a Saudi

border fort, described by virtually every eyewitness

as a “Beau Geste* fort.” U.S. Navy SEALs, Army SpeMap by W. Stephen Hill

*

Beau Geste is a 1939 film starring Gary Cooper as a French legionnaire stationed at a fort in the Sahara Desert.
mately 3 kilometers behind the border, while the

main Saudi defensive positions were approximately

20 kilometers behind the screen.35

The I Marine Expeditionary Force’s area of operations at this time was shaped somewhat like a

fat “L.” The leg of the “L” extended along the bend

of the Saudi-Kuwaiti border from al-Jathathil to just

east of the oil fields at al-Wafrah, and the foot of

the “L” extended south of Joint Forces Command–

East’s area of operations to Mishab and the airfield.

Mishab and the surrounding area were held by

Task Force Taro, built around the 3d Marines. The

pillar of the “L” was held by Task Force Shepherd

and the 2d Light Armored Infantry Battalion, which

stretched along the border in a light armored

screen. Behind this screen was the massive Marine

logistical base at Kibrit, which Lieutenant General

Boomer, commander of I Marine Expeditionary

Force, decided to place forward of the main Marine

combat forces in order to speed the eventual attack

into Kuwait. Kibrit was relatively vulnerable, and

during the Iraqi attack on al-Khafji Brigadier General Krulak, commander of the Direct Support Command and the Kibrit logistics base, would quickly

call for armored forces to establish positions north

of the base. There is little indication, however, that

the Iraqis were ever aware of the base, or its importance to future Marine operations in the region.36

Colonel Admire’s 3d Marines was responsible for

the defense of Mishab. In January, he began to run

Photo courtesy of Capt Charles G. Grow

Saudi soldiers move through the evacuated border city of al-Khafji. Although the city’s architecture was relatively monotonous, it offered civilized amenities and was a popular stop for Coalition commanders and journalists. 

(Company B), and Observation Post 6 (Company

C). Only Observation Post 4 had a Marine reconnaissance platoon in place when the Iraqi attack occurred on 29 January. The 2d Marine Division’s 2d

Light Armored Infantry Battalion established a similar screen to the east directly in front of the alWafrah oil fields and Observation Post 1, between

Task Force Shepherd and the Joint Forces Command–East area of operations along the coast.34

Under the command of Major General Sultan ‘Adi

al-Mutairi, Joint Forces Command–East was further

divided into task forces. Abu Bakr Task Force was

responsible for al-Khafji and the surrounding desert;

it comprised the 2d Saudi Arabian National Guard

Brigade and an attached Qatari armored battalion.

The 2d Saudi Arabian National Guard Brigade’s 5th

Battalion established a screen north of al-Khafji and

west of the coastal highway, behind Observation

Post 7. Tariq Task Force, comprising the nascent

Saudi Arabian Marines as well as a battalion of Moroccan infantry, was along the coast south of alKhafji. Further west was Othman Task Force, built

around the 8th Mechanized Brigade of the Ministry

of Defense and Aviation. A battalion of the 8th

Brigade served as a screening force behind Observation Posts 2 and 7. In addition, further west in

Joint Forces Command–East’s area of operation was

Omar Task Force, built around the 10th Mechanized

Brigade of the Ministry of Defense and Aviation,

with a battalion serving as a screen behind the border. The Saudi mechanized screens were approxiPreludes to al-Khafji 103
104 Liberating Kuwait

reconnaissance training missions into the town of

al-Khafji. Teams from the 3d Platoon, Company A,

3d Reconnaissance Battalion, then attached to Task

Force Taro, would infiltrate the city by vehicle, usually humvees, establish an observation post, and

then leave a day or so later. Unfortunately, these

missions were not coordinated with the Coalition

forces in al-Khafji. This would have a dramatic impact during the Iraqi invasion, as Captain Molofsky

later noted: “I was unaware, [1st ANGLICO’s Captain James R.] Braden was unaware, and the Saudis

were unaware, that the Marines had reconnaissance

teams up in al-Khafji.”37

Other Marine operations would lead to the

Coalition’s success at al-Khafji, however. In response to the difficulties involved in defending

Saudi Arabia from an Iraqi attack in the early days

of Operation Desert Shield, Marine planners had

developed Task Force Cunningham. They designed

it as a task-organized, aviation-only task force that

would stop Iraqi ground maneuver forces with concentrated fire from the air, covering the withdrawal

of Saudi and Marine forces along the coastal highway. Huey and Super Cobra helicopters would operate alongside Bronco and Harrier fixed-wing

aircraft in the task force. Joint Forces Command–

East liked the plan, and it would serve as the model

for air support during the battle.38

Adapted from a 1991 Ministry of Defence (United Kingdom) map by Marine Corps History Division
The crew of a Marine LAV-25 scans the desert. The LAV-25 was the backbone of the light armored infantry battalions,

an untried concept prior to the Battle of al-Khafji. These battalions were used in a cavalry role, providing a screen in

front of the main body of the I Marine Expeditionary Force.

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo

27 to 28 January

Despite the danger of Coalition air attacks, Saddam

Hussein journeyed from Baghdad to the southern

Iraqi city of Basrah on the morning of 27 January,

where he met with two of his senior Iraqi officers

in Kuwait, General Aeeid Khlel Zaki, commander

of IV Corps, and General Salah Aboud Mahmoud,

commander of III Corps. Among others at the meeting was the Iraqi minister of defense; the chief of

staff; their deputies; other members of the general

staff; and Colonel Aboud Haneed Mahoud, commander of Saddam’s bodyguard.39

Basrah’s infrastructure was in ruins. “It was apparent on the road, which had big holes from the

bombs and some destroyed military vehicles on

both sides of the road,” General Salah Aboud remembered. “In al-Basra region all the damage was

clear and we noticed it on the bridge, railroads, on

the roads, on the facilities. . . . And the streets were

very dark, compared to before the war, when they

were glowing.” At the military headquarters, there

was no power, and small candles dimly lit the

rooms. General Salah Aboud did not realize that he

was to meet Saddam until he “saw the faces of the

special guards.”40

At the meeting, the Iraqi president presented the

plan for the attack on al-Khafji and then gave his officers some words of inspiration. As General Hashem

Sultan later recalled, Saddam began by discussing

Iraqi military successes in the Iran-Iraq War. He said

that success had come from Iraqi willpower, despite

Iran’s advantages in personnel and material. Then

he discussed the Coalition air campaign against “our

factories, cities, and roads.” The air attacks had already lasted two weeks, he explained, because the

Coalition did not have as much willpower as the Iranians and was afraid to fight a ground war against

Iraq.41

He then told his officers that by inflicting casualties on the Coalition they would win the war and

save the lives of thousands of Iraqi citizens. Waiting

was not to Iraq’s advantage, Saddam insisted, they

must do something now, implying that Iraq could

not survive the continuous air bombardment. He

concluded with an old Iraqi proverb: “In order to

be ready to fight the fox, you must prepare to fight

the lion.”42

Preludes to al-Khafji 105
General Salah Aboud, given command of the alKhafji mission, informed Saddam that he would

present him with the city as a present on the morning of 30 January. The meeting then broke up and

the Iraqi president returned to Baghdad, surviving

an attack by two U.S. Air Force F-16 Falcons. Ironically, the Air Force did not realize they had hit Saddam’s convoy until after the war.43

General Salah Aboud returned to Kuwait and

met with his division and brigade commanders at

the 5th Mechanized Division’s headquarters, then

at the oil facility of al-Maqwa. He instructed his

commanders in tactics for countering Coalition airpower and ordered them to dig in quickly after

reaching their objectives. He then passed on Saddam’s inspirational words and told them of his

promise to make Saddam a present of al-Khafji on

the morning of 30 January. Finally, he approved IV

Corps’ request for artillery fire against the sector opposite the 7th and 14th Infantry Divisions. The Iraqi

forces then began to move into position for the upcoming battle.44

Warnings

The Coalition did have some indications that the

Iraqis were planning something. One of the E-8C

surveillance aircraft reported large-scale Iraqi vehicle movements on the night of 22 January and

again on 25 January. These were only preliminary

Iraqi maneuvers, but the aircraft also noted the

Iraqi movement on the night of 28 January, which

was the direct preparation for the upcoming offensive.45

All three of the observation posts manned by airnaval gunfire liaison Marines (Observation Posts 2,

7, and 8) reported unusually heavy Iraqi activity on

the nights of 27 and 28 January. In addition, according to one account, “Sporadic Iraqi rocket and artillery fires were directed at the city of al-Khafji, the

forward Saudi defensive belt, and the border observation posts, often with illumination rounds mixed

in.” On the night of 27 January, Marines at Observation Post 7 called in a strike on Iraqi “mechanized

reconnaissance forces” moving in front of their position, reporting two Iraqi armored personnel carriers destroyed as a result. Some Marine officers

considered the Iraqi movements to be a response

to the Marine artillery raids that had taken place on

21 and 26 January.46

On the night of 28 January, the reported Iraqi

mechanized movements coincided with another

Marine artillery raid. The teams at the desalination

plant north of al-Khafji and at Observation Post 8

each called for air strikes on Iraqi forces they observed, but the artillery raid just to the west had the

priority for air support. By 0315 on the 29th, the artillery raid had concluded and air support was again

available to the observation post teams. At Observation Post 7, the air-naval gunfire supporting-arms

liaison team under Captain John C. Bley II called in

a flight of A-10 attack aircraft on a column of Iraqi

armored vehicles moving west across its front toward the al-Wafrah oil field. The Iraqi column suffered heavy damage; Bley’s team reported nearly a

dozen vehicles destroyed. The team observed Iraqi

soldiers trying to recover vehicles at sunrise. The

team at Observation Post 2 also observed a large

Iraqi force moving from east to west, which Coalition airpower engaged. All three observation posts

heard the movement of the Iraqi vehicles for the

rest of the night.47

One Coalition officer who realized at the time

that the Iraqis were preparing for an offensive was

Lieutenant Colonel Richard Barry, commander of

the forward headquarters of the 1st Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence Group. He closely

monitored Iraqi radio traffic during the air strikes

on 28 January and decided that “the Iraqis put probably 150 sappers out there to try and clear that road.

[I] sensed they really wanted it opened. They were

obviously using that road as some sort of interior

line like at Gettysburg.” The information was passed

on to higher headquarters. Lieutenant Colonel Barry

was right; the air attacks against the 3d Armored

Division as it tried to pass through the Iraqi minefields of al-Wafrah paralyzed much of the division,

and General Salah Aboud spent much of 29 January

trying to fix the scheduling problems these attacks

caused. When the division’s attacks finally did fall

on Observation Post 4 and Observation Post 1, they

would be far weaker as a result.48

Despite Lieutenant Colonel Barry’s warning that

“this is it . . . the Iraqis want Khafji,” Central Command thought the possibility of an Iraqi ground attack remote as attention was focused on the air

campaign and the expected ground offensive to liberate Kuwait.49

29 January

On the morning of 29 January, General Salah

Aboud inspected the assembly areas of the 5th

Mechanized Division and found fewer vehicles

moving than he expected, many being broken

down alongside the road. He also found that the division’s deception operations were working well,

and he saw no sign that Coalition forces knew of

106 Liberating Kuwait
Photo courtesy of MGySgt Gregory L. Gillispie

The arches into the Saudi city of al-Khafji proclaim, “The municipality and residents of Khafji welcome the honorable

visitor.” Because the city was within range of Iraqi artillery in Kuwait, it was ordered evacuated on 18 August 1990.

its movements. He believed this was because “the

order was given to take cover under the smoke

clouds of the burning oil, and also the tanks, the

armored personnel carriers, and the support

weapons’ vehicles were all deployed under the

trees of al-Thal and were hard to see.”50

Things were going worse with the 3d Armored

Division, especially with the division’s 6th Armored

Brigade, which was commanded by Colonel Ibdil

Raziq Mahmoud. The brigade had been pounded

by Coalition aircraft the night before, and it had lost

at least two tanks. “On the morning of 29 January,

the enemy started screaming and shouting after we

completed deploying our forces in the desert area;

although the enemy had their reconnaissance technologies they were not able to notice our forces,”

recalled Brigadier General Hussan Zedin, commander of the 3d Armored Division. He added:

“[Coalition aircraft] started to attack our troops during the daylight, in their concealed locations. They

tried to affect our morale and cause damage in

order to make us too weak to execute the mission.”51

The air attacks led General Salah Aboud to conclude that the Coalition had discovered his brigade,

and he expected it would face stiff resistance at its

objectives. He told the 3d Armored Division commander, Brigadier General Hussan Zedin, that the

6th Armored Brigade could expect to face “tanks,

anti-tank weapons, and armored cars.” He ordered

the brigade to employ “a reconnaissance assault a

suitable distance ahead of the main convoy to get

information about the strength of the resistance of

the enemy.”52

General Salah Aboud was wrong, however.

Aside from Lieutenant Colonel Barry at 1st Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence Group, the

Coalition was not expecting an Iraqi attack, missing

much of the Iraqi movement and interpreting the

movement that it did observe as either training exercises or reactions to the Marine artillery raids. On

the morning of 29 January, the Iraqi III Corps and

IV Corps had moved to their assembly areas successfully. Coalition airpower had already inflicted

significant losses, but those losses resulted from

routine strikes in Kuwait and chance attacks against

Iraqi forces caught moving in the open. The bulk

of the Coalition’s air effort remained focused elsewhere.

At al-Khafji the various special operations and

Preludes to al-Khafji 107
108 Liberating Kuwait

The Saudi border fort at Observation Post 4 was known as “OP Hamma” to some Marines. This painting by Sgt Charles

G. Grow depicts the fort and the burning oil fields at al-Wafrah following a Coalition bombing raid on 24 January

1991. 

Marine Corps Art Collection

reconnaissance forces occupying the city were proceeding with what had become their normal day.

For the air-naval gunfire liaison Marines, this meant

routine relief of the forward positions. Captain Douglas R. Kleinsmith’s supporting arms liaison team

relieved Captain Bley and his team at Observation

Post 7 in the early morning, and Bley’s team returned to the group headquarters at the water desalination plant north of al-Khafji.

Less routine, but not surprising, was the capture

of three Iraqi soldiers by Marines at Observation

Post 8. All three were in clean uniforms and appeared to be in good health, despite two weeks of

Coalition air strikes. Lieutenant Kurtis E. Lang, commander of the air-naval gunfire team at the post,

thought they were forward observers; the Iraqis carried maps that detailed Iraqi and some Coalition positions, including Observation Post 8. A U.S. Navy

SEAL unit took charge of the prisoners and sent

them to the rear. Approximately 30 minutes after

the team captured the prisoners, the Iraqis fired a

single tank shell at the position, causing no

damage.53

Along the coastal highway there were also indications of increased Iraqi activity. At Observation

Post 7, Captain Kleinsmith reported Iraqi artillery

six to eight kilometers in front of his position, while

at Observation Post 8 Lieutenant Lang reported

heavy vehicle noises. At 2000, as evening fell, Captain Kleinsmith directed a successful A-6 Intruder

attack on the two Iraqi artillery positions, eliminating at least one of the sites.54

Outposts

Observation Post 4 was a two-story Saudi police

post known as Markaz al-Zabr. To the north, along

the border, ran a large berm approximately 15 feet

high. The fort protected one of the few openings in

the embankment. On 29 January, Observation Post

4 was the only post this far west that was manned;
Photo courtesy of MGySgt Gregory L. Gillispie

Maj Keith R. Kelly (on right), executive officer, 1st Reconnaissance Battalion, and then-SSgt Gregory L. Gillispie, platoon

sergeant, 2d Platoon, Company A, 1st Reconnaissance Battalion, pose at the southern end of the platoon’s position on

the berm at Observation Post 4. One of the platoon’s bunkers can be seen to the right.

Ross stationed the platoon’s vehicles—four humvees

and a 6x6 5-ton truck—behind a U-shaped berm approximately 500 meters to the rear of the observation post. In the event of a serious Iraqi attack, the

plan was for the platoon to withdraw to the Ushaped berm, mount up, and move to the rear while

calling in air strikes on the Iraqis.57

Captain Roger L. Pollard’s Company D, 3d Light

Armored Infantry Battalion, was attached to the 1st

Light Armored Infantry Battalion, which was designated Task Force Shepherd. It had 19 LAV-25 light

armored vehicles divided into two platoons and a

company headquarters element.* Each LAV-25 was

armed with an M242 Bushmaster 25mm cannon and

carried a four-man infantry fireteam. A section of

seven General Dynamics LAV-AT antitank light armored vehicles from 1st Light Armored Infantry Battalion’s Headquarters Company was attached to

Pollard’s company. Each LAV-AT was equipped

with a 901A1 TOW 2 antitank guided missile

*

Standard light armored infantry company organization was three

platoons and a headquarters element, but Company D had only

four assigned officers. To compensate for the lack of officers,

Capt Pollard organized the company into two platoons and

trained the company to operate as two elements.

it was held by 2d Platoon, Company A, 1st Reconnaissance Battalion, and a company of light armored vehicles.55

The reconnaissance platoon had originally been

Deep Reconnaissance Platoon, Company C, 3d Reconnaissance Battalion, based on Okinawa. Comprised of volunteers, it had shipped out to the

Middle East in the initial rush to get Marines to

Saudi Arabia in September 1990. With its parent battalion remaining on Okinawa, the platoon was absorbed into 1st Reconnaissance Battalion.56

Nearly two weeks before, the platoon, led by

First Lieutenant Steven A. Ross, was assigned to Observation Post 4. Working as a platoon was a welcome change, since it had been previously assigned

to various observation posts in smaller groups

alongside other Marine reconnaissance and Army

Special Forces teams. Supplies were running low,

however, and the platoon was to be relieved on 30

January. Lieutenant Ross had dispersed his men

along the berm, divided into three teams along a

500-meter front. Armed with M16 rifles, M249 squad

automatic weapons, M60 machine guns, and M136

AT4 antitank weapons, the Marines were not

equipped to stop a major Iraqi assault. Lieutenant

Preludes to al-Khafji 109
With a Cobra attack helicopter hovering protectively nearby, a Marine from Company A, Battalion Landing Team 1/4,

takes cover behind an abandoned Iraqi fighting position on Umm al-Maradim during Operation Desert Sting. Despite

prepared fighting positions and large amounts of ammunition, the Iraqis had deserted the island prior to the Marine

landing on 29 January 1991. 

Photo courtesy of LtGen John E. Rhodes

launcher and a thermal imaging system, and was

manned by a crew of four. They were the company’s primary antitank asset.58

At 1200, Company D was ordered to move to

Observation Post 4 and act as a screen for the

evening. Captain Pollard conducted a reconnaissance and established his company and its attached

LAV-AT section northwest of Observation Post 4 at

around 1500. He created his fire plan, used a global

positioning satellite device to precisely note his

unit’s locations, and met with Lieutenant Ross. The

liaison with Lieutenant Ross was incomplete, as

Captain Pollard did not know that 2d Platoon had

its own vehicles. This oversight would lead to misunderstandings during the engagement.59

Operation Desert Sting

During the Gulf War of 1991, the Navy–Marine Corps

team was charged with creating a credible amphibious feint in the Persian Gulf, drawing Iraqi forces

away from the Iraq–Kuwait–Saudi Arabia frontier.

When the Allied air attacks against Iraq began on 17

January 1991, the seaborne feint needed reinforcement in order to remain credible. Amphibious raids

were one method of reinforcing that threat.60

On 23 January 1991, Captain Thomas L. McClelland, USN, commanding Amphibious Squadron 5,

and Colonel John Rhodes, commander of the 13th

Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable), were ordered to plan for an amphibious raid

on several Iraqi-held Kuwaiti islands; this raid was

code named Operation Desert Sting. Iraqis on one

of the targeted islands, Qaruh, surrendered on 25

January to the USS Curts (FFG 38). On 26 January,

the Iraqis garrison on another of the targeted islands,

Umm al-Maradim, created a sign indicating they

wished to surrender to U.S. Navy reconnaissance aircraft that photographed the island. The plan for Operation Desert Sting was modified accordingly.

Heavily supported by Navy aircraft, Company A,

Battalion Landing Team 1/4 (Reinforced), landed on

the north end of Umm al-Maradim Island at noon

on 29 January. They encountered no enemy fire or

other resistance and found the island had been deserted by its garrison. The Marines captured or destroyed a large quantity of small arms, machine

guns, and mortars as well as several Iraqi antiaircraft

guns and missiles. After three hours on the island

the raid force departed, leaving a Kuwaiti flag raised

over the island and the words “Free Kuwait” and

“USMC” on several of the buildings.

Meanwhile, the Iraqis dispatched 15 fast patrol

boats from Ras al-Qulayah, apparently intending to

land commandos at al-Khafji in support of the Iraqi

5th Mechanized Division, but Allied commanders

misinterpreted the movement as an attempt to retake Umm al-Maradim. Despite this, the Iraqi boats

were intercepted by Royal Air Force SEPECAT GR1A Jaguar fixed-wing aircraft and Royal Navy Westland HMA.8 Lynx helicopters from HMS Brazen

(F91), Cardiff (D108), and Gloucester (D96). Other

Coalition aircraft then continued the attack, destroying or severely damaging all of the Iraqi vessels and

landing forces.

110 Liberating Kuwait
The Battle of al-Khafji

u CHAPTER 7u

Night, 29–30 January

At the Observation Posts

The first serious ground combat in the Battle

of al-Khafji occurred at Observation Post 4,

which was manned by 2d Platoon, Company

A, 1st Reconnaissance Battalion, and Company D,

3d Light Armored Infantry Battalion. The Iraqi 6th

Armored Brigade of the 3d Armored Division was

assigned to strike through the gap in the berm,

drawing attention away from the movement of the

5th Mechanized Division to the east. As General

Salah Aboud Mahmoud later recalled, “The 6th Armored Brigade was ordered to move forward from

the heights above the al-Zabr [Observation Post 4]

and they crossed the line at eight o’clock at night.

And at nine o’clock and thirty minutes they encountered enemy resistance at al-Zabr, in Saudi Arabia.”1

At 2000, Lieutenant Steven Ross, commanding

the reconnaissance platoon, heard the clank of

treads and then observed Iraqi armored vehicles adAdapted from a 1991 Ministry of Defence (United Kingdom) map by Marine Corps History Division

111
112 Liberating Kuwait

Two LAV-ATs from 1st Light Armored Infantry Battalion drive across the Saudi desert. The LAV-AT provided the heavy

firepower of the battalion with its antitank missiles.

Marine Corps History Division Field History files

vancing through his night-vision device; it was a sizable force. He attempted to contact his outlying

teams as well as Company D and the reconnaissance battalion headquarters by radio but got no response. Since contact earlier was no problem, there

was a strong presumption that the reconnaissance

platoon’s radios were being jammed. Using runners,

Lieutenant Ross alerted his platoon and continued

trying to get through and inform higher headquarters and Company D of the oncoming Iraqi force.

Finally, at 2030, he made radio contact and informed Company D that a large mass of Iraqi vehicles, tanks, and armored personnel carriers was

advancing on Observation Post 4. Captain Roger

Pollard, Company D’s commander, informed Task

Force Shepherd and prepared his company to face

the threat.2

At the observation post, there appeared to be

some confusion within Ross’s platoon. Rather than

simply retreating to the U-shaped berm as planned,

one of the teams opened fire on the oncoming Iraqi

armor with machine guns and antitank weapons. At

the ranges involved, there was very little chance

that the Marines would do any damage to the Iraqi

vehicles with their light antitank weapons. However, the fire startled the oncoming Iraqis, who

slowed or stopped as they heard the ping of machine gun fire on their tank hulls. In response to

the reconnaissance platoon’s fire, the Iraqis began

to fire back. Their fire was random and inaccurate,

but the volume was impressive. At the same time,

Iraqi communications jamming appeared to have

stopped, and Lieutenant Ross was able to reestablish radio contact with all three of his teams. He

promptly ordered everyone to fall back to the Ushaped berm as previously arranged.3

To cover the reconnaissance platoon’s withdrawal, Captain Roger Pollard led his 2d Platoon’s

light armored vehicles forward, along with half of

the LAV-ATs. The plan was for 2d Platoon to advance in line to aid the reconnaissance platoon.”

The LAV-ATs had to stop when they fired, in order

to provide cover for the advancing LAV-ATs and

LAV-25s, half of the LAV-ATs would stop ready to

fire while the others advanced a short way. The second group would then stop and cover the first

group as they advanced, and so on. During the advance, after receiving permission, one of the LAVATs fired its antitank missile on what it believed to

be an Iraqi tank. Instead, the missile hit “Green

Two,” one of its fellows, a few hundred yards to its

front.4

The missile penetrated the rear hatch of the armored vehicle and detonated the 16 missiles stored

in the rear compartment, completely destroying it

in a huge fireball and killing its crew of four. “It
Photo by LtCol Charles H. Cureton

During the fight at Observation Post 4, LAV-AT “Green Two” was struck in the rear by an antitank missile fired by one

of its fellow LAVs, causing the armored vehicle’s magazine of 16 missiles to detonate with catastrophic results. Four

Marines were lost with the vehicle: Cpl Ismael Cotto Jr., PFC Scott A. Schroeder, LCpl David T. Snyder, and LCpl Daniel

B. Walker. 

came through the bottom, right troop hatch on this

one,” First Lieutenant David Kendall of Company D

later said. It “hit all the other missiles, I guess, and

it was all a spontaneous detonation. There were no

secondary explosions. Nothing. This whole thing

just went up.”5

There was confusion at this point, with some

Company D Marines believing the vehicle had been

destroyed by Iraqi tank fire and others not certain

the vehicle had actually been destroyed. The explosion obliterated it so completely that there was not

enough wreckage left to register on night vision devices. The crew did not respond to radio calls, but

it was common for a radio to cease working. The

fate of the LAV-AT would not be confirmed until the

next morning.6

Captain Pollard and his 2d Platoon continued forward, leaving the LAV-ATs behind. He was finally

informed that Ross’s platoon had sufficient vehicles

to withdraw. Pollard’s platoon halted and began firing on the Iraqi vehicles with their 25mm guns. The

reconnaissance platoon had observed the incident,

and Lieutenant Ross was convinced that Company

D would soon fire on his troops by mistake as well.

He ordered the platoon to mount their vehicles and

withdrew from the battlefield. 

After Ross’s platoon had completed its withdrawal, Company D’s 1st Platoon shifted south of

the 2d Platoon in order to support 2d Platoon’s fire

against the Iraqi forces advancing on the now-abandoned observation post. Pollard’s company then

backed away from the border but continued to engage the Iraqi armor with missile and 25mm cannon

fire. Although the fire had little hope of damaging

the Iraqi vehicles at the ranges involved, it served

to disorient the Iraqi tanks, which stopped and buttoned up as the rounds ricocheted off their armor.

The fire was also useful for marking Iraqi vehicles

for incoming aircraft. Lieutenant Scott P. Williams

(the company’s executive officer) and Corporal Russell T. Zawalick acted as forward air controllers for

a series of air strikes against the Iraqi forces utilizing

this method of marking enemy positions.7

The battle at the observation post was now

under control as Coalition air support arrived in

large numbers. “At that point, everything was going

pretty well.” Lieutenant Kendall later noted, “We

started getting the air [support] in. It was hitting the

tanks down there, and we were just marking for the

air by firing our main guns at the tanks and they

were following the tracer rounds to them and hitting them with the air.” Hearing reports of some

Iraqi tanks attempting to cross the berm farther

south, Captain Pollard withdrew the company approximately 5,000 meters from the observation

post.8

The Battle of al-Khafji 113
114 Liberating Kuwait

Photo by TSgt Rose Reynolds, USAF. Defense Imagery DF-ST-92-07825

An Air Force A-10A Warthog patrols over the desert during the Gulf War. The aircraft carried AGM 65 Maverick air-toground missiles and was one of the primary providers of close air support during the Battle of al-Khafji.

Photo courtesy of Sgt Mark S. McDonnell

An American flag flies from the burned-out hulk of “Red Two,” which was destroyed by a malfunctioning air-to-surface

antitank missile during the fight at Observation Post 4. Seven Marines were lost with the vehicle: LCpl Frank C. Allen,

Cpl Stephen E. Bentzlin, LCpl Thomas A. Jenkins, LCpl Michael E. Linderman Jr., LCpl James H. Lumpkins, Sgt Garett A.

Mongrella, and LCpl Dion J. Stephenson.

A section of Air Force A-10s now arrived over

the battlefield. Corporal Zawalick was controlling

air support with live ammunition for the first time,

but under Lieutenant Williams’s guidance, he directed the incoming aircraft to their targets. The A10s were finding it difficult to identify the Iraqis,

however. After two failed attempts, one of the

Warthogs dropped a flare that landed next to “Red

Two,” one of the company’s LAV-25s. Corporal Zawalick informed the A-10 the flare had marked a

friendly position and directed him toward the

enemy from the flare. Meanwhile, a rifleman
jumped from “Red Two” to bury the flare, but as he

did the A-10 fired an AGM 65 Maverick air-toground missile that struck the LAV-25, destroying it

and killing all of the crew that remained inside except the driver, who was ejected from the vehicle.

An investigation conducted by I Marine Expeditionary Force after the battle determined that the

most likely cause of the incident was a malfunction

by the Maverick missile.9

Again there was confusion as Pollard tried to determine if “Red Two” had been destroyed by friendly

or enemy fire. “That’s the first time, the first time I

got scared,” he later remembered. “I didn’t know

what had happened. I didn’t know where the bad

guys were.” There was some worry that the Iraqis

had penetrated the berm and succeeded in outflanking the company. As a result, Pollard reorganized the

company into a screen line and pulled it back slowly.

“The Marines, of that company, as the whole battalion, were calm,” said the commander of Task

Force Shepherd, Lieutenant Colonel Clifford O.

Myers III. “All of my conversations with Captain Pollard . . . were extremely calm and in total control.

Even after the Maverick hit ’em.”10

Despite the calm demeanor that Lieutenant

Colonel Myers observed, Pollard’s company had

lost one vehicle to fire from its own air support and

another was missing. With massive amounts of air

support moving to the border, and other companies

ready and able to move into contact, Lieutenant

Colonel Myers ordered Company D to withdraw to

the west and link up with Task Force Shepherd’s

Company A, commanded by Captain Michael A.

Shupp. Company D accomplished the maneuver

shortly after midnight on the 30th. The remaining

six LAV-ATs were transferred to Company A, and

Company D was reorganized and resupplied behind Shupp’s company, which moved forward to

screen Observation Post 4.11

The Iraqi perspective on the battle’s outcome at

the observation post differed considerably from the

American view. “Now this small [enemy] force consisted of armored vehicles equipped with a large

number of the anti-tank weapons and the brigade informed us they had destroyed a number of tanks,

stopping the brigade convoy,” General Salah Aboud

recalled. “So, I ordered those fighting the enemy, to

stop the enemy forces and let the brigade pass this

Map by W. Stephen Hill

The Battle of al-Khafji 115
116 Liberating Kuwait

Supported by air, the Marines of a light armored

vehicle company and a reconnaissance platoon had

stopped the attack of an Iraqi armored brigade in

its tracks. The two Marine units suffered 11 casualties, none of which was from enemy fire. The

Marines at Observation Post 4 had not experienced

combat before the attack on 29 January.

While the fight at Observation Post 4 was taking

place, a brigade of the 5th Mechanized Division attempted to cross into Saudi Arabia through the

berm near Observation Post 1, then screened by

Company A, 2d Light Armored Infantry Battalion,

commanded by Captain Dennis M. Greene. At

2115, members of the company observed “60–100

BMPs [armored personnel carriers] . . . moving

south with arty [artillery].”* The company called in

air support, reporting that AV-8s and A-10s engaged

the Iraqi forces. Members of the company then observed a 29-vehicle column of Iraqi armor arriving

Photo courtesy of MGySgt Gregory L. Gillispie

The remains of two of the 6th Armored Brigade’s T-62 tanks destroyed on the night of 29 January 1991 lie abandoned

on the sand in front of Observation Post 4. The Iraqis suffered severe matériel and equipment losses during the four-day

Battle of al-Khafji.

*

“Mohammad al-Qasim” was the honorific name for the Iraqi 5th

Mechanized Division.

*

Most sources confuse Observation Post 1 and Observation Post

2, but according to both the 2d Light Armored Infantry Battalion’s command chronology and the 1st ANGLICO’s after action

report, Observation Post 1 was in 2d Light Armored Infantry Battalion’s area of operations and Observation Post 2 was in the

Joint Forces Command–East area of operations. Most likely, this

confusion resulted from the use of two conflicting methods of

numbering the border observation posts. Originally U.S. Army

Special Forces teams numbered the observation posts as they

occupied them in chronological sequence rather than in geographic sequence. The Marines later attempted to regularize the

observation post designations, but the new system did not stick

and only served to confuse the issue.

resistance to the east, and to move toward the

brigade target without stopping. [The] 6th Armored

Brigade moved deep into Saudi Arabia and the small

resisting force was rolled over and the brigade caused

a large amount of damage.” There is no evidence that

the flanking movement General Salah Aboud described penetrated more than a few hundred meters

into Saudi Arabia, and the 3d Armored Division’s

commander did not mention it. Salah Aboud continued, “Although, our troops continued by moving toward the targets, we faced a very strong ground

resistance at al-Zabr supported by the Air Force and

helicopters from the enemy.” As Brigadier General

Hussan Zedin reported: “At 8 o’clock on 29 January,

we executed our duty and we stayed in the area until

the forces of Mohammad al-Qasim* completed their

duty and mission to occupy al-Khafji.”12

Whether or not they entered into Saudi Arabia,

the 6th Armored Brigade had accomplished its primary mission. “All the airplanes of the enemy were

over the brigade convoy and attacking the area,”

General Salah Aboud explained. “The brigade had

succeeded in capturing completely the attention of

the enemy. And the enemy didn’t observe any

movement of our troops to occupy al-Khafji so at

midnight, I instructed the 3d Armored Division to

order the 6th Armored Brigade to go back toward

al-Wafra and their original positions.”13
A Marine LAV-AT is positioned behind the sand berm that separated Saudi Arabia from Kuwait. Built to control the

wanderings of nomadic Bedouin tribesmen, the berm offered a convenient demarcation of the border between Saudi

Arabia and Kuwait. Observation Post 5 can be seen in the background.

Photo courtesy of Cpl Kenneth J. Lieuwen (www.1ofthefew.com)

at the berm. At 2320, Corporal Edmund W. Willis

III knocked out one of the Iraqi T-62 tanks with an

antitank missile.14

Greene’s company continued to act as forward

air controllers for strikes on the Iraqi forces moving

across the berm throughout the evening. It received

a significant amount of airpower—five A-6s, two F16s, two A-10s, and eight AV-8s—and reported 11

destroyed vehicles. Corporal Willis fired another

missile at 0157, hitting the same T-62 as the Iraqis

attempted to move it to the rear. At around the

same time, the Iraqis halted their attack and retreated back into Kuwait.15

Further north, Company C, 1st Light Armored Infantry Battalion, established a screen between Observation Post 5 and Observation Post 6. Commanded

by Captain Thomas R. Protzeller, this company had

a section of LAV-ATs attached, making it similar to

Pollard’s company at Observation Post 4. But unlike

Company D, it had a section of General Dynamics

LAV-Ms (a light armored vehicle variant armed with

an M252 81mm mortar) attached. Originally,

Protzeller’s company screen line centered on Observation Post 5, but early on the evening of 29 January the company had fired its mortars at suspected

Iraqi forward observers. As a result, Major Jeffrey

A. Powers, Task Force Shepherd’s operations officer, ordered the company to withdraw from the

berm in order to forestall any retaliatory Iraqi artillery fire.16

Protzeller’s company observed the fighting taking place to the south around Observation Post 4

but did not take part in the fight until around 1030

when it was ordered to occupy Observation Post 5

as a blocking force. Shortly thereafter, the company

was informed that approximately 70 enemy vehicles

were moving toward Observation Post 6, and it was

ordered to block that position. Traveling along the

berm, Protzeller’s company advanced north cautiously; each platoon took turns covering the other.

As it advanced, the company fired antitank missiles

at a group of Iraqi vehicles it spotted on the Saudi

side of the berm. Once the company reached Observation Post 6, at around 0100, it settled in and

called air strikes on the Iraqi infantry who had occupied the post and on their vehicles that had retreated back to the Kuwaiti side of the berm. In the

morning, many of the demoralized Iraqi soldiers

surrendered with little fuss, others having apparently withdrawn.17

The 2d Light Armored Infantry Battalion’s fight

at Observation Post 1 and Company C of the 1st

Light Armored Infantry Battalion’s fight at Observation Post 6 both ended early on the morning on 30

January, but the enemy made one last gasp at Observation Post 4 just after the sun rose at 0720.

There, Task Force Shepherd’s Company A, under

Captain Shupp, called in air strikes from Air Force

A-10s and Marine Corps F/A-18s. The air attack

smashed this final Iraqi advance at the outpost.18

At dawn, Company A established a screen on the

berm while Company D recovered its dead and secured Iraqi prisoners. The morning light fully revealed the destruction caused in the previous

evening’s fight. Pollard’s company and its attached

LAV-AT section had lost 11 Marines and two vehiThe Battle of al-Khafji 117
118 Liberating Kuwait

Photo courtesy of Cpl Kenneth J. Lieuwen (www.1ofthefew.com)

Iraqi prisoners of war huddle near a fire to keep warm, while Marines of Task Force Shepherd examine the prisoners’

weapons: an AK-74, RPK-74, two pistols, and two grenades. Although some prisoners were captured by Marine and

Saudi forces during the Battle of al-Khafji, they did not surrender in the vast numbers captured during the later advance

into Kuwait.

cles in the five-hour battle at Observation Post 4,

but it destroyed approximately 22 Iraqi tanks and

armored personnel carriers as well as killed scores

of Iraqi soldiers. When the recovery effort was complete, Company A withdrew and Company D

reestablished its position at Observation Post 4,

which it was to hold for another 10 days.19

Assault on al-Khafji 

At Observation Post 2, Captain David W. Landersman and his air-naval gunfire team heard a large

number of vehicles approaching their position.

Keenly aware of the fight at Observation Post 4 to

their west, the team requested air support but abandoned the outpost before the air support could be

diverted from the fight at the western observation

post. Meanwhile, Iraqi artillery began firing on Captain Douglas Kleinsmith and his team at Observation Post 7, as well as south along the coast road.

The two teams reported the artillery fire was a combination of illumination and high explosive

rounds.20

As Captain Kleinsmith’s team was being shelled

by the Iraqis, a mechanized Iraqi force attacked Observation Post 8 and Lieutenant Kurtis Lang’s team

with “intense direct machine gun, recoilless rifle,

and tank main gun fire.” Three different groups

were stationed at Observation Post 8: Lang’s fire

control team, a Navy SEAL detachment, and a team

from 3d Force Reconnaissance Company. They all

began taking heavy fire: “after numerous illumination rounds, pop-up flares, and mortar rounds[,] Fire

Control Team 9 [FCT], south of OP-8 [Observation

Post 8], was overrun by APCs [armored personnel

carriers] with the SEALs from OP-8 retreating just in

front of the enemy APCs.” Despite the heavy fire,

all three teams managed to evade the Iraqi assault

and fell back without suffering casualties. The SEAL

and reconnaissance teams pulled back to al-Mishab,

and Lieutenant Lang’s team joined 1st Surveillance,

Reconnaissance, and Intelligence Group at the desalination plant.21

Three Saudi battalions had formed a screen

along the Kuwaiti border in Joint Forces Command–

East’s area of operations. Their orders, according to

General Khaled bin Sultan, were clear: “to observe

the movement of Iraqi troops and report the approach of hostile columns. They were not to engage

the enemy or risk being taken prisoner. I did not

want to give Saddam a propaganda victory. If the
Iraqis crossed the border, they were to rejoin our

main force further south.”22

The 5th Mechanized Battalion of the 2d Saudi

Arabian National Guard Brigade, commanded by

Lieutenant Colonel Naif, had responsibility for the

coast road and the surrounding area. The road itself

was not covered; the vehicle assigned to it was

repositioned closer to the rest of the unit, and the

battalion was not in communication with the various

American forces station in al-Khafji and the border

observation posts. As the battalion advanced down

the coast road, it came under enemy artillery fire

and pulled back before the Iraqi advance without

offering any resistance. Two battalions from the 8th

and 10th Saudi Arabian National Guard Brigades,

screening further inland, executed similar movements. Unopposed by ground forces, the Iraqi 15th

Mechanized Brigade drove south into al-Khafji, although it was struck by a U.S. Air Force Lockheed

AC-130 Spectre gunship and Marine AH-1W Super

Cobras.23

“As the APCs overran the forward position tank

main gun and mortar rounds began impacting in

the area of the desalinization plant that SALT 5 [Supporting Arms Liaison Team 5] and SRIG [surveillance, reconnaissance, and intelligence group]

forward occupied,” Captain James R. Braden of 1st

ANGLICO explained, “SRIG forward ordered all

teams in the city to pull out and head for the ‘safehouse’ in al-Khafji. A hasty meeting was held just

south of the desalinization plant between FCT 9

[Fire Control Team 9] and SALT 5 to conduct a head

count and confirm the rendezvous at the safehouse

in the southern part of the city of al-Khafji.”24

Lieutenant Colonel Richard Barry’s group and

Lieutenant Lang’s team withdrew from the desalination plant to the southern outskirts of al-Khafji

and established an observation post in a water

tower, but the advancing 15th Mechanized Brigade

forced the units to withdraw again. Barry’s group

headed south to al-Mishab, while Lieutenant Lang’s

team rejoined other 1st ANGLICO teams with the

Qatari mechanized brigade.25

Stationed on the east side of al-Khafji, near the

beach, was a unit of Saudi Marines. Designed to

emulate U.S. Marines, this newly formed Saudi force

lacked equipment, and their American Marine advisors had not yet joined them. As Captain Joseph

Molofsky later explained, they were “camped out—

basically functioning at very low ebb.” Joint Forces

Command–East ordered the unit to withdraw just

after midnight to al-Mishab, and they took no further part in the Battle of al-Khafji.26

At this point in the battle, some bitterness arose

on the part of the Saudis concerning the amount of

air support being allocated to Joint Forces Command–

East forces. In the face of the Iraqi advance, Major

General Sultan ‘Adi al-Mutairi “repeatedly called on

the U.S. Marine Corps for air strikes to stop them.”

As General Khaled later recounted: “He was in close

touch with the Marines because they shared a sector.

They had trained together and an American liaison

officer was attached to his headquarters. But in spite

of his pleas, no air strikes had taken place. Coalition

aircraft had not moved.” The resentment can be attributed in part to poor communications. Shortly after

midnight, General Sultan had called for air strikes

against the 15th Mechanized Brigade as it drove

south to al-Khafji. He claimed “that there had been

no air attack,” when in fact an attack had taken place

against the Iraqi column. But primarily the Saudi impatience arose from differing priorities. The Americans viewed the Iraqi occupation of al-Khafji as a

minor inconvenience that would soon be rectified,

but for the Saudi kingdom it was an assault on their

own sacred soil.27

Saudi impatience could explain the perception

of lack of air support, as well as inexperience in

modern air-ground cooperation that the battle required. However, the Marines working alongside

Joint Forces Command–East also supported the

Saudi belief. As Captain James Braden later wrote,

“Little air support was available to the [Joint Forces

Command–East] forces as the priority of effort was

with the Marines to the west in repulsing the attack

of the Iraqi 1st Mechanized Division and elements

of the 3d Armored Division. The Marine fight had

preceded the JFCE [Joint Forces Command–East]

fight by a couple of hours and would remain the

focus of effort throughout the night.”28

The fight at Observation Post 4 attracted the attention of Coalition aircraft right away. A later Air

Force study found that “Marine and Air Force CAS

[close air support] began to arrive in front of OP-4

[Observation Post 4] by 2130 local time. By 2300,

three AC-130 gunships, two F-15Es, two . . . F-16Cs,

and four A-10s had joined the battle at OP-4.” Despite the rapid response to the fighting at Observation Post 4, all sources agree that the tactical air

control center did not respond promptly to the initial Iraqi attacks. By most accounts, it was not until

Air Force Brigadier General Buster Glosson, the director of campaign plans, entered the center on a

routine check of current operations that someone

thought to wake up Lieutenant General Charles

Horner, the Joint Force Air Component ComThe Battle of al-Khafji 119
120 Liberating Kuwait

Photo by TSgt Rose Reynolds, USAF. Defense Imagery DF-ST-92-06956

During exercises prior to the beginning of the war, Marines rush to load antitank missiles onto an AH-1W Cobra of Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 369. The Cobras provided extensive close air support during the Battle of al-Khafji,

both at the observation post battles and in the town proper.

mander. Prior to that time, although the 3d Marine

Aircraft Wing had responded to Marine calls for air

support with alacrity, the tactical air control center

remained focused on the evening’s strikes into Iraq.

Once awakened, General Horner realized that this

was a major Iraqi offensive, and a wonderful opportunity to strike at Iraqi forces while they were

on the move and vulnerable. He refocused the

Coalition air effort into Kuwait accordingly.29

Much of the Marine air support for al-Khafji fell

on the Cobras of Marine Light Attack Helicopter

Squadron 369, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel

Michael M. Kurth, and Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 367, commanded by Lieutenant

Colonel Terry J. Frerker. Because the arrangement

with Joint Forces Air Component Command left Marine helicopters totally in support of the Marine airground task force, the Cobras were able to respond

rapidly to the Iraqi offensive. Two sections, comprising eight AH-1W Super Cobras, responded to

initial calls from the air-naval gunfire liaison

Marines, ensuring that the Iraqi advance into alKhafji was not unopposed. Not long after 0100 on

the 30th, a flight of four Cobras from Kurth’s

squadron, led by Major Michael L. Steele, engaged

in a gun duel with six Iraqi armored personnel carriers on the coast road, reportedly pitting the helicopters’ M197 20mm Gatling-type guns and 2.75mm

rockets against the armored personnel carriers’

73mm main guns.30

A flight of two AH-1Ws from Frerker’s squadron,

led by Major Gary D. Shaw, had an even more hairraising experience. Launching from al-Mishab to

provide air support at Observation Post 4, they

found themselves circling and waiting for a forward

air controller to provide them with targets. Eager to

support the Marines on the ground, they overstayed

their fuel limits and attempted to reach the logistics

base at Kibrit, only to find themselves flying over

an Iraqi armored column that fired on them. They

then attempted to divert back to al-Mishab, but their

navigation equipment malfunctioned and they

landed instead at the al-Khafji oil refinery. This was

a stroke of luck. They refueled their aircraft from

the refinery’s supplies as the Iraqis marched into

the city. The unidentified fuel worked well and they

were able to return to base.31

A third flight of Cobras, led by Captain Randall

W. Hammond, destroyed four T-62 tanks. When

nine Iraqi soldiers waved white flags and indicated

they wished to surrender, they used their helicopters to “round ’em up like cattle” until Marines on

the ground could secure the prisoners. Iraqi artillery

fire forced the section to withdraw, but not before

one Cobra destroyed a final T-62 with a wire-guided

missile. The explosion caused “its turret to flip up-
Then-Capt Douglas R. Kleinsmith poses with his air-ground liaison team. Capt Kleinsmith is on the left, and to the right

are Cpl John D. Calhoun, Cpl Steve F. Foss, and Cpl Edward E. Simons Jr. On the night of 29–30 January 1991, Kleinsmith’s team was cut off from Coalition forces by the Iraqi advance. They evaded the enemy by maneuvering through

the sabkhas (salt marshes) and returned to Coalition lines.

Photo courtesy of LtCol Douglas R. Kleinsmith

side down and land on the open hole like a tiddlywinks,” Captain Hammond later recalled.32

A little after noon on the 29th, the Iraqis also dispatched 15 fast patrol boats from Ras al-Qulayah,

as a U.S. Marine raiding force was taking Umm alMaradim Island. Apparently intending to land commandos at al-Khafji in support of 5th Mechanized

Division, the Iraqi boats were intercepted by Royal

Air Force GR-1A Jaguars aircraft and Royal Navy

HMA.8 Lynx helicopters from HMS Brazen, Cardiff,

and Gloucester. Other Coalition aircraft then continued the attack, destroying or severely damaging all

of the Iraqi vessels and landing forces.33

At Observation Post 7, Captain Kleinsmith continued to call for fire while forming a defensive perimeter with the U.S. Army Special Forces and Marine 3d

Force Reconnaissance teams. An OV-10 Bronco arrived over the battlefield and worked with Captain

Kleinsmith as the airborne forward air controller. He

found it difficult to control air strikes because the location of friendly forces was unclear. Looking north

of the border, Captain Kleinsmith directed an Intruder section and a Harrier section in a strike against

Iraqi artillery positions while a flight of Cobras circled above. He thought the Cobras would prevent

his team from being overrun as Observation Post 8

had been, and he was “trusting that their sheer intimidation would keep the enemy away from his position.” But as the Cobras circled overhead, the

soldiers and Marines listened as Iraqi vehicles moved

in the darkness around their position.34

Captain Kleinsmith had been kept informed as

the other air-naval gunfire teams withdrew through

al-Khafji. When the Cobras circling above his position were forced to return to base because of low

fuel, Kleinsmith and the leaders of the other two

teams at Observation Post 7 decided there was little

reason to remain in place. The Special Forces team

had two escape and evasion routes planned: one

east to the coastal highway and then south to alKhafji; the other traveling west to Observation Post

2 and then south across the desert. Both routes appeared to be cut off by Iraqi forces, so Captain

Kleinsmith led the teams’ humvees south, directly

into the sabkhas. He hoped the heavier Iraqi armor

would not follow them into the salt marsh.35

The teams departed at 0230 as Iraqi artillery fire

briefly pursued them. They suffered no casualties

in the withdrawal. Kleinsmith’s group remained in

radio contact with the OV-10, which was now free

The Battle of al-Khafji 121
122 Liberating Kuwait

In particular, the 15th Mechanized and 26th

Mechanized Brigades of the 5th Mechanized Division passed through Ragawa at 2000. At this point,

the Iraqi artillery began firing flares that the mechanized brigades could use to navigate through the

desert. While moving into position, the Iraqis observed the withdrawal of Coalition forces from the

border observation posts. Although the Iraqi mechanized forces had difficulties in the sabkhas, they

reached their objectives on time. A convoy from the

22d Mechanized Brigade met no resistance at the

Saudi border stations, and its arrival along the beach

completed the encirclement of al-Khafji. The 26th

Mechanized Brigade, encountering no resistance,

returned to its positions in Kuwait after its role of

defending the western flank of the 15th Mechanized Brigade was complete.38

General Salah Aboud kept his promise, delivering the city of al-Khafji at 0200 on the 30th as a

present to Saddam Hussein. The supporting attacks

had all run into heavy resistance and been stopped

with high loss of life, but al-Khafji was in Iraqi

hands. Now the Iraqis had to decide how long they

needed to hold the city in order to accomplish their

objective of provoking a major ground war. 

The Iraqi Army chief of staff then contacted General Salah Aboud and asked for his predictions and

recommendations. The general replied that “when

Cpl Charles H. Ingraham’s reconnaissance team used this building in al-Khafji throughout the battle as their observation

post. Although the team was not discovered by the Iraqis, the building was hit by fire from Iraqis and Saudis during the

night engagements, as well as by shrapnel from American air and artillery strikes.

Photo courtesy of Cpl Charles H. Ingraham III

to call in air strikes around the observation post.

Driving south it discovered “the remnants of the

SANG [Saudi Arabian National Guard] screening

force camps, complete with boiling tea on the fires

just outside their tents.” At approximately 0330,

Kleinsmith ordered a halt, worried that the teams

might come under friendly fire if they attempted to

join up with a Saudi unit in the darkness. They remained deep in the salt marshes until daybreak.36

The Iraqi View of the Assault

At 1800 on 29 January, General Salah Aboud Mahmoud shifted from his main headquarters to his mobile headquarters so that he could better control the

upcoming battle. Despite Coalition air attacks, the

Iraqi offensive was progressing according to plan

as night fell on the 29th. At 2000, the various

brigades of the 5th Mechanized, 1st Mechanized,

and 3d Armored Divisions crossed their lines of departure and began the attack. As General Salah

Aboud later observed, “The troops faced some difficulties executing these missions. The territory of

one mission faced the road, which was hard for all

the mechanized equipments to use, and for that reason, this mechanized brigade didn’t have another

choice, except to occupy their targets by walking.

Still, all the troops reached the targets on time. And

this actually deceived the enemy.”37
the enemy discovers the size of my force, he will

focus his air effort on it,” but that “the time we have

until morning will not be enough to pull back from

al-Khafji.” General Salah Aboud recommended that

his troops pull back the next night, the evening of

the 30–31 January, “after this great victory we

achieved without any damage.” He noted, “The first

night was passed without any specific operations

from the enemy side.”39

Although the Iraqis occupied al-Khafji, they were

not alone. The 3d Marines had a pair of reconnaissance teams in the city on 29 January; they had not

left with the air-naval gunfire and special operations

forces. They were in contact with their platoon commander, Captain Daniel K. Baczkowski, at 3d Marines’

headquarters, who had informed the 3d Marines’ commander, Colonel John Admire, of the teams’ locations.

Colonel Admire ordered the teams to remain in

place.40

Corporal Lawrence M. Lentz commanded a

seven-man team comprising Corporals Scott A.

Uskoski and Scott A. Wagner; Lance Corporals Marcus C. Slavenas, Alan L. Cooper Jr., and Jude A.

Woodarek; and Hospital Corpsman Carlos Dayrit.

Corporal Charles H. Ingraham III commanded a sixman team consisting of Corporal Jeffery D. Brown;

Lance Corporals Harold S. Boling, David S. McNamee, and Patrick A. Sterling; and Hospital Corpsman First Class Kevin Callahan. The teams were

part of 3d Platoon, Company A, 3d Reconnaissance

Battalion. Company A had been attached to 1st Reconnaissance Battalion for Operations Desert Shield

and Desert Storm.41

The intent of the 3d Marines’ staff was that these

teams, hidden within the town, would provide a

valuable view of the city during a counterattack.

However, their presence impacted the Coalition in

some negative ways as well. Captain Molofsky later

explained that it impacted the “ability to conduct

the counterattack, because we [were] not even sure

where they [were] at.” He also said, “They didn’t

even have restricted fire areas around them. Well,

maybe they did, maybe they didn’t. But that wasn’t

translated to us, so that when we want[ed] to do

this counterattack and want[ed]to prep it with artillery, we [didn’t] know where the Recon[naissance]

teams [were].”42

The teams were not aware of these issues. They

carefully prepared their observation posts, set out

claymore mines in case the Iraqis discovered their

position, and attempted to call artillery fire and air

strikes on the Iraqi forces they observed. They were

not always successful—artillery support was sometimes refused because the teams did not know

where Saudi or air-naval gunfire units were, and air

support was still being sent primarily to the fight at

Observation Post 4.43

30 January

By the morning of the 30th, the fierce battles of

the night before had ended. It became clear that

the Iraqis had halted, and while the fighting had

been intense for those at the front, for the I Marine

Expeditionary Force staff the Iraqi offensive left a

feeling of bemusement. At the morning briefing on

30 January, General Boomer observed: “Other than

our losses, I am not unhappy with last night. It

proceeded as it should. . . . My only concern is

that we get something out to kill [the Iraqi force]

before it gets back up into Kuwait.” “I believe that

my feeling,” he said later, “was that if they’re trying

that now, they’re going to play right into our

hands. . . . Then as it became clear that they were

trying to do something of significance we began

to react. I think by that point the MEF [Marine expeditionary force] staff was at the point where it

could handle this kind of thing without it being

some huge crisis.”44

General Khaled had a less sanguine view of the

invasion. The Saudis understood how easily Saddam could turn even a battlefield disaster into a

propaganda victory. They simply could not accept

the loss of Saudi territory, even for a short while.

When he received the news of the attack, Khaled

“felt a great deal of anxiety.” This was compounded

because King Fahd ibn Abdul Aziz of Saudi Arabia

was often in contact with him. Recalling this time,

General Khaled later wrote: “King Fahd wanted

quick results, and rightly so. He wanted the enemy

force expelled at once. He wished to deny Saddam

the chance of showing the world that he could invade Saudi Arabia and get away with it. He telephoned me a number of times, calling for action.”

Faced with such pressure, General Khaled did not

consider al-Khafji a minor skirmish.45

As dawn broke in the sabkha west of al-Khafji,

Captain Kleinsmith’s small caravan spotted unidentified tanks in the distance. His men mounted up

and proceeded south to Saudi Arabian lines. At this

point, the Special Forces and 3d Force Reconnaissance teams departed for al-Mishab, while Captain

Kleinsmith and his Marines moved to the 2d Saudi

Arabian National Guard Brigade headquarters, joining the main body of 1st ANGLICO.46

Meanwhile, other 1st ANGLICO teams were

spread among the Saudi and Qatari forces that were

The Battle of al-Khafji 123
preparing to retake the city and push the Iraqis

back into Kuwait. Captain Mark S. Gentil’s Supporting Arms Liaison Team 5, First Lieutenant Bruce D.

McIlvried’s Fire Control Team 13, and First Lieutenant Kurtis Lang’s Fire Control Team 9 were assigned to the Qatari Brigade, commanded by

Lieutenant Colonel Ali Saeed. Each of the fire control teams joined with one of the brigade’s battalions, while the supporting arms liaison team acted

as the fire support coordinator. Each battalion had

a company of AMX-30 main battle tanks attached

as well.47

Captain James Braden’s Supporting Liaison Team

6 was attached to Colonel Turki al-Firmi’s 2d Saudi

Arabian National Guard Brigade. Captain Braden’s

team acted as a central clearinghouse for all supporting fire and allowed Colonel Turki to use the

Marine communications net to keep track of his battalions. Fire Control Team 12, commanded by Captain John C. Bley II, was assigned to the 8th

Battalion, 2d Saudi National Guard Brigade, along

with Captain Mark V. Dillard’s team from Supporting Arms Liaison Team 2. Dillard’s team originally

was assigned to a Moroccan unit south of al-Mishab

but was called forward to assist in the battle.48

Responsible for the defense of al-Khafji and the

coastal region, Saudi Major General Sultan’s initial

plan of action was to cut off the Iraqi forces in alKhafji and convince them to surrender. His intention was to avoid a potentially costly battle within

124 Liberating Kuwait

Adapted from a 1991 Ministry of Defence (United Kingdom) map by Marine Corps History Division
The Saudi National Guard battalions that liberated al-Khafji from the Iraqis employed Cadillac Gage V-150 Commando

light armored vehicles, some of which were equipped with an M220 launcher for the BGM-71 TOW antitank missile.

Defense Imagery DF-ST-91-04523

the city. To this end, he dispatched the 5th Battalion, 2d Saudi Arabian National Guard Brigade,

north of al-Khafji as a blocking force, supported by

a company from the 8th Ministry of Defense and

Aviation Brigade, equipped with M60 tanks. He

placed the Qatari Brigade, supported by the 7th Battalion, 2d Saudi Arabian National Guard Brigade, in

positions to block the road south from al-Khafji.49

Once established just south of the city, the Qatari

Brigade began to engage targets of opportunity

within the city. A platoon of Iraqi T-55 tanks

emerged and engaged the Qatari AMX-30s, resulting

in the destruction of three T-55s and the capture of

a fourth. Iraqi prisoners revealed that there was

close to an enemy “brigade in the city and another

brigade was to join it.” In response, General Sultan

bolstered the northern blocking force by committing the balance of the 8th Ministry of Defense and

Aviation Brigade’s armored battalion. The southern

force was reinforced with the 8th Battalion, 2d

Saudi Arabian National Guard, in addition to M113

armored personnel carriers equipped with antitank

missile launchers from the 8th Ministry of Aviation

and Defense Brigade.50

At 1152 on 30 January, 1st Battalion, 12th

Marines—the Marine artillery battalion assigned to

support the Saudi attack on al-Khafji—reported it

had already expended 136 rounds of dual-purpose

improved conventional munitions and 8 rounds of

high explosive munitions. The Cobra attack helicopters of Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadrons

367 continued to support the Marines along the

frontier and in al-Khafji. For the same period the

squadron reported one tank, seven armored personnel carriers, one jeep, and one truck destroyed.51

At noon, Colonel Turki al-Firmi met with Colonel

Admire. Colonel Turki was in command of the

Saudi force specifically tasked with retaking alKhafji. Captain Braden, the 1st ANGLICO officer assigned to Colonel Turki’s brigade, observed the

meeting. Colonel Admire told Colonel Turki that

Marine reconnaissance teams were still in al-Khafji

and briefed him on the 3d Marine plan to remove

them from the city. Captain Braden recalled that

“Col Turki stated that the city was his and that he

had a tasking from ‘Riyadh’ to rescue the Marine

Recon teams. . . . Col Turki asked if the Marines

lacked trust in the Saudi abilities to perform their

mission of defending their sector? The question of

sector defense seemed moot at this point as the

Iraqis were in control of al-Khafji, but the matter of

trust between Coalition partners was in question.”

Admire agreed and offered support.52

Battery C (and later Battery A), 1st Battalion,

12th Marines, provided artillery fire, and a combined antiarmor team from 3d Marines moved to

the gas station four kilometers south of al-Khafji.

Despite Saudi desires to fight the battle on their

own, Marine air-naval gunfire liaison teams provided critical communications to the Saudis and coThe Battle of al-Khafji 125
ordinated artillery and air. In addition, U.S. Army

advisors from the Office of Program Manager for

Modernization of the Saudi Arabian National Guard

and civilian advisors from the Vinnell Corporation

fought throughout the battle alongside their assigned Saudi units.53

Colonel Admire said that acting as the supporting

force was “one of the most difficult decisions I’ve

ever had to make.” The decision to have the Saudis

lead the attack to free al-Khafji shaped the rest of

the battle. Marines would observe and aid their

Coalition partners, but the Saudis and Qataris did

the heavy fighting from this point on.54

As plans were being made to liberate al-Khafji,

another strange event in the battle occurred. Two

U.S. Army tractor-trailer heavy equipment transporters from the 233d Transportation Company

drove into the city. The drivers were lost, unaware

that they were in al-Khafji and that an Iraqi offensive had occurred. One of the reconnaissance teams

watched in horror as the two tractor trailers drove

into town, only to be met by a hail of fire from the

Iraqis. The first of the two trucks was disabled and

crashed, Iraqi fire having wounded its driver and

assistant driver as well as disabling the steering. The

second truck performed “the fastest U-turn in history, like he was a VW bug” and fled. The Iraqis

quickly overwhelmed and captured the two

wounded soldiers, Specialist David Lockett and

Specialist Melissa Rathbun-Nealy, whom they

quickly transported back to Kuwait. Specialist Rathbun-Nealy was the first American female soldier

captured since World War II. The two were not

freed until after the war.55

Soon after the Army trucks disappeared into alKhafji, Major Craig S. Huddleston was informed of

their disappearance. On Colonel Admire’s orders,

3d Battalion, 3d Marines, established an outpost,

Checkpoint 67, south of the city to coordinate with

the Saudis. Major Huddleston, the battalion’s executive officer, was given command of the outpost.

He quickly formed a patrol to enter the town and

recover the two soldiers; every one of the 128

Marines at the outpost volunteered to go, but he

only took about 30 Marines. Huddleston mounted

the patrol in humvees, including antitank missile

and heavy machine-gun vehicles, and headed for

the city.56

Al-Khafji was still in a state of confusion. As the

patrol raced into the town, they encountered some

Iraqis but had no major firefights. The Marines

found the disabled tractor-trailer, but not the missing soldiers despite shouts of “U.S. Marines, U.S.

Marines!” There was a short engagement with Iraqi

armored personnel carriers, against which Major

Huddleston directed a pair of Cobras. The patrol

also found a destroyed Qatari AMX-30 tank and its

dead crew. Disappointed, the Marines returned to

the outpost. “We wanted to get them [the missing

soldiers] pretty bad,” Major Huddleston later said.57

Journalists, who were prevented by the prevailing press system and Saudi prohibitions from observing the battle in al-Khafji, began to congregate

at Checkpoint 67. Several spoke with Major Huddleston and others from the patrol, which led to a

misunderstanding. The Coalition explained in press

conferences that Saudi and Qatari forces were freeing al-Khafji, but the journalists who spoke with

Major Huddleston mistook his brief patrol for a

major Marine assault. They concluded the Marines

were doing the major fighting at al-Khafji, but the

Coalition was giving credit for the battle to the

Saudis for political reasons. This myth was to persist; the belief that the military had lied to the press

concerning al-Khafji would continue to sour military-media relations long after the Gulf War ended.58

Meanwhile, General Khaled arrived at the Joint

Forces Command–East headquarters south of alKhafji. He was agitated because King Fahd was

pressuring him to liberate the city as quickly as possible. He also was upset about what he considered

a lack of promised air support from the Marine

Corps. He contacted General Horner: “I told him I

wanted air support as well as strikes by B-52s to

break up Iraqi concentrations and prevent reinforcements reaching al-Khafji, even if it meant diverting air assets from the air campaign against

strategic targets inside Iraq. Minimize raids on

strategic targets and maximize them at al-Khafji, I

urged him.”59

General Horner saw the developing battle as an

opportunity to inflict maximum losses on the Iraqis,

but he did not consider the Boeing B-52 Stratofortress to be the proper weapon to use in this situation. He told General Khaled the same thing he

routinely told ground commanders: “Don’t tell me

how to do the job. Tell me what you want done.”60

Unsatisfied, General Khaled phoned Brigadier

General Ahmad al-Sudairy, Saudi Director of Air

Operations, an hour after he spoke to General

Horner. “Forget about the Joint Forces. If the U.S.

Air Force or the Marines don’t come at once, I want

you to take our air assets out of the Coalition and

send them all to me! I need the [Panavia] Tornados,

the [Northrop] F-5s, everything you’ve got!” A few

moments later the air assets General Horner had al126 Liberating Kuwait
tanks fired on their Saudi allies, although quick action by Captains Dillard and Gentil ended the fire

before any casualties were taken. Still, the undisciplined fire and scattered assault was suspected to

have caused two Saudi deaths.66

Lieutenant Colonel Michael Taylor was the U.S.

Army advisor to the 7th Battalion, and he aided

Lieutenant Colonel Matar throughout the battle.

Throughout the night Saudi and Qatari soldiers

fought against the Iraqi forces, suffering fire so

heavy that Taylor, a Vietnam War veteran, described

it as “flabbergasting.” But the Saudis and Qataris did

not hesitate to return fire, as Captain Molofsky

noted: “Qatari tanks came back up the road and

were shooting up from behind and, at one point,

the volume of fire got so heavy that we all got out

of the truck and took cover in a ditch and you

know the Saudis were shooting TOW [antitank] missiles up in the air. Once they started shooting, they

were shooting. I mean everybody was shooting at

the max rate.”67

Photo courtesy of Capt Charles G. Grow

The water tower in southern al-Khafji was heavily damaged during the battle. It was a favorite target for both

Iraqi and Saudi troops and was strafed at least once by

U.S. Marine Cobra helicopters.

ready designated for al-Khafji began to arrive. General Khaled was convinced his threat had worked,

and as General Boomer later said, “Ultimately, it

was our air support that turned the tide for them.”61

In addition to his distress over the lack of air

support, the two Marine teams in the city also presented General Khaled with a problem. “I was extremely worried that Schwarzkopf might use

American troops, either U.S. Marines in an amphibious attack or a heliborne U.S. Army unit, to free

my town in my sector. The shame would have been

difficult to bear.” Consequently, he ordered General

Sultan’s plan to talk the Iraqis into surrendering be

abandoned and an immediate assault be launched

against the city.62

Saudi Counterattack

Given orders from General Khaled to attack at

once, General Sultan passed the order to Colonel

Turki, who in turn assigned the task of assaulting

al-Khafji to Lieutenant Colonel Hamid Matar’s 7th

Battalion, 2d Saudi Arabian National Guard Brigade,

supported by two Qatari tank companies.63

Captain Molofsky, the 3d Marines’ liaison officer,

observed the Saudi preparations for battle: “Matar’s

battalion [was] just really lined up on the road, you

know—out into the desert a little bit, into Checkpoint

67. It’s a beehive. . . . And Matar’s orders are to attack. And, that’s it, you know—nothing else. Attack.”

Matar’s battalion had received the order to attack at

1600, but it was not in position until 2000. Captain

Molofsky recalled that Matar was “really nervous;

smoking cigarettes, pacing back and forth.”64

There was a 15-minute preparatory fire by 1st Battalion, 12th Marines, and then the 7th Battalion literally charged forward against al-Khafji. “Out of

nowhere, vehicles start[ed] up and people start[ed]

driving forward,” remembered Captain Molofsky,

who joined the 7th Battalion for the attack. The Saudi

battalion drove straight up the middle of the road, but

the Qatari tanks pulled to the side as the force approached al-Khafji. As the first couple of Saudi vehicles entered under the arches of the city, “The whole

place lights up,” Molofsky recollected. “I mean a

whole lot of directed fire, straight down the road . . .

just a firestorm of tracers, and tank main guns. And I

notice a [Cadillac Gage] V-150 [Commando armored

car] blow up, or it looked like it blew up, about 30

meters off to the side of the road.”65

The Saudi attack was disorganized and undisciplined; they expended massive amounts of ammunition as they fired wildly into the city, as 1st

ANGLICO reported afterward. At one point, Qatari

The Battle of al-Khafji 127
128 Liberating Kuwait

Marines of 1st Battalion, 12th Marines, prepare an M198 155mm howitzer to fire. The battalion fired numerous missions

in support of Saudi and U.S. Marine forces during the Battle of al-Khafji.

Marine Corps History Division Field History files

Despite their efforts, the 7th Battalion was not

able to retake al-Khafji, nor was it able to relieve

the reconnaissance teams still trapped within the

city. Captain Molofsky later recalled the engagement’s surreal conclusion: “We pulled back into defilade in a small depression, just south of the city,

and they [the Saudis] got out of the vehicles and

they put their cloaks on, built fires and brewed up

coffee, and then they prayed. I think my sense then

was that the team couldn’t have been much different than if they were riding with [T. E.] Lawrence

except that they were [using] mechanized vehicles

instead of horses. Really extraordinary.”68

North of al-Khafji

At nightfall, Lieutenant Colonel Naif’s 5th Battalion,

2d Saudi Arabian National Guard Brigade, moved

into position to block Iraqi movement in and out

of al-Khafji from the north. This battalion was soon

reinforced by a battalion of the 8th Ministry of Defense and Aviation Brigade, companies of which

drifted north throughout the night. Iraqi forces attempted several times to reinforce al-Khafji, but

Coalition air support was now available in copious

amounts, and the air-naval gunfire teams attached

to the 5th Battalion were able to call F/A-18s, AV8s, and A-10s down on the Iraqi forces, inflicting a

large number of casualties and forcing an even

larger number of Iraqi troops to surrender to the

Saudis. The Saudis claimed 5 Iraqi vehicles destroyed, 6 captured, and 116 prisoners taken.69

The engagements were not without problems.

The lack of joint training between the Saudi Arabian

National Guard and Ministry of Defense and Aviation forces led the 8th Ministry of Defense and Aviation Battalion’s commander to fear that the two

Saudi forces might fire on each other, so in the

morning he pulled back to refuel and rearm. This

kept the Saudis from completely sealing al-Khafji at

the end of the first night of battle, allowing a few

Iraqi units to escape back into Kuwait.70

Coalition airpower was now focused on the alKhafji area, taking advantage of the Iraqi offensive

to strike at the forces that had previously remained

hidden. E-8C Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar

System (JSTARS) aircraft were used to track Iraqi

movements in Kuwait. “The new JSTARS system

proved a vital asset in beating back the Iraqi attacks,” an Air Force study noted. “An airborne radar

that could monitor enemy vehicle traffic at night

with impressive clarity, JSTARS was an indispensable element in ensuring the efficient and effective
use of Coalition aircraft.” The tactical air control

center was focusing aircraft on al-Khafji and interdiction missions in southern Kuwait.71

But the success of the air interdiction was not

without loss. A U.S. Air Force AC-130, call sign

“Spirit Zero Three,” remained over its targets as the

sun came up despite the policy that AC-130s only

be employed at night. An Iraqi surface-to-air missile

struck the aircraft, killing its 14-man crew.72

The massive effort had an effect on the Iraqi

forces. General Salah Aboud had already begun requesting permission to withdraw. Although the offensive was termed “The Mother of All Battles” by

Saddam, General Salah radioed that “the mother

was killing her children.”73

31 January

Early in the morning on 31 January, Batteries A and

C, 1st Battalion, 12th Marines, attached to the 3d

Marines, fired an improved conventional munitions

mission into al-Khafji under the control of the Marine reconnaissance teams inside the town. Corporals Charles H. Ingraham III and Lawrence M. Lentz,

the reconnaissance team leaders, requested the artillery strike on a large Iraqi column between their

positions at 0645. Initially clearance was denied by

the 3d Marines’ fire support control center, but the

mission was approved at 0701. At 0705, Batteries A

and C responded to the call for fire. At 0740, 1st

Battalion, 12th Marines, was told by the fire support

Adapted from a 1991 Ministry of Defence (United Kingdom) map by Marine Corps History Division

The Battle of al-Khafji 129
130 Liberating Kuwait

clearing al-Khafji buildings. By this point in the battle the Saudis had lost 7 V-150 armored cars, 50

wounded, and 18 dead. The clearing operation continued throughout the night. “Saudi urban operations were different than what Americans practice,”

Captain Braden later noted. “Instead of room-byroom clearing, they simply occupy a block and if

they take fire they target with TOWs and heavy machine guns until resistance stops and then move to

the next building of street. As a result of these techniques, there were numerous pockets of Iraqis left

in the city that would be killed or captured over the

next few days.”79

In the north, 5th Battalion, 2d Saudi National

Guard, and its attached air-naval gunfire teams

under Captain Kleinsmith and First Lieutenant Paul

B. Deckert stopped Iraqi units trying to reinforce

their forces in al-Khafji. At Observation Post 7, a

battery of Iraqi self-propelled howitzers had taken

up position, supported by infantry and armored

personnel carriers. A division of four Cobras destroyed the battery under Captain Kleinsmith’s direction, but their arrival coincided with the

destruction by enemy fire of two Saudi armored

Operating in their doctrinal role as part of the Marine airground task force, AV-8B Harriers provided needed close

air support during the Battle of al-Khafji.

Marine Corps History Division Field History files

control center that all future fire missions had to be

approved by the air-naval gunfire teams attached to

the Saudi forces.74

The barrage was a success from the perspective

of the Marines inside al-Khafji, because it landed a

solid blow against the Iraqis and essentially eliminated the Iraqi column. It was placed dangerously

close to their positions, however, and Corporal Jeffery D. Brown received a wound from the shrapnel.75

The fire came as a shock to the 1st ANGLICO

teams maneuvering outside the city alongside the

Saudis and Qataris, because Colonel Turki and

Colonel Admire had agreed that all fire would be

coordinated through the supporting arms liaison

teams. Lieutenant Colonel William C. Grubb Jr., the

1st ANGLICO commander, went to the 3d Marines’

combat operations center and fixed the fire support

coordination problem, which led to the order that

all fire missions be approved by the air-naval gunfire teams. Despite these attempts to avoid firing on

Coalition forces, the Qataris claimed one of their

AMX-30s was disabled by Marine artillery fire, although this was not confirmed.76

Meanwhile, the 7th Battalion, 2d Saudi Arabian

National Guard Brigade, was preparing another attempt to storm al-Khafji and relieve the reconnaissance teams. This time, the attack was more

carefully prepared, with artillery support from both

Saudi and Marine artillery units and extensive Marine close air support coordinated by the teams

working alongside the Saudi Arabian National Guard

units. Despite the air and artillery support, the Iraqis

still put up a fierce fight, destroying three Saudi V150 armored cars. “Tank main gun, recoilless rifle,

TOW [antitank missile], and small arms fire came

thick and furious,” 1st ANGLICO later reported. “The

Saudis and Qataris charged through the streets firing

at everything and anything and in every direction.”77

The battle raged through the southern half of alKhafji, while Marine AV-8B Harriers and AH-1W

Super Cobras provided direct support to the Saudi

and Qatari troops. Air-naval gunfire teams directed

the Cobras in a strafing run against the town’s water

tower, and Harriers destroyed Iraqi vehicles at the

major road intersection in that quarter of the city.

The Marine reconnaissance teams took advantage

of the confusion of this assault to withdraw safely

from al-Khafji, one on foot, the other in humvees

that had sat inside a courtyard, undetected by the

Iraqis since the first hours of the battle.78

In the afternoon, the 7th Battalion withdrew to

rest and resupply, and the 8th Battalion, 2d Saudi

Arabian National Guard Brigade, took its place
After a slow start, Coalition air forces claimed hundreds of tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery tubes destroyed during the five days that

al-Khafji remained the main effort. An Air Force postwar study highlighted the effect of the air attacks:

“Pilots described the frantic maneuverings of surviving Iraqi vehicles as visually equivalent to the results

of ‘turning on the light in a cockroach-infested apartPhoto courtesy of Cpl Charles H. Ingraham III

Cpl Jeffery D. Brown of 3d Platoon, Company A, 3d Reconnaissance Battalion, stands in one of his team’s humvees.

The humvee’s tires were punctured and its windshield shattered by shrapnel from a Marine artillery barrage called in

on Iraqi forces near the reconnaissance teams’ positions. Cpl Brown was wounded by the same artillery strike.

cars and an ambulance. Convinced that they had

suffered friendly fire, the Saudis withdrew, leaving

Captain Kleinsmith and his team to stabilize the line

with air support. When the immediate Iraqi threats

were removed, Kleinsmith’s team rejoined the 5th

Battalion.80

As the ground fight for al-Khafji drew to a close,

the air effort continued to devastate the Iraqi forces.

The Battle of al-Khafji 131
132 Liberating Kuwait

Marine Corps Art Collection 

Marines of 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, search al-Khafji for Iraqi stragglers and examine the battle damage as depicted

in the painting Cleaning up Khafji by Sgt Charles G. Grow.

ment.’” The report added that “perhaps the most revealing comment of all came from a member of the

Iraqi 5th Mechanized Division who had fought in the

Iran-Iraq War. This veteran soldier stated that Coalition airpower imposed more damage on his brigade

in half an hour than it had sustained in eight years

of fighting against the Iranians.”81

The next morning, 1 February, Saudi units advanced all the way through al-Khafji, encountering

only light resistance. They cleared the city of remaining Iraqi troops, although solitary holdouts

would surface to surrender over the next few days,

and established a defensive position north of the

city. The Battle of al-Khafji had ended.82

Considerations

Every battle has losses. During the Battle of alKhafji, 25 Americans lost their lives: 11 Marines and

14 airmen. Three Marines were wounded and two

soldiers were captured by the Iraqis. One LAV-25,

one LAV-AT, and one AC-130 gunship were destroyed. The Saudis suffered 18 killed and 50

wounded. Ten of their armored cars and two tanks

were destroyed. After the war, the Iraqis claimed to

have destroyed 4 helicopters, 30 tanks, and 58 armored personnel carriers, as well as to have captured 13 prisoners. They listed their losses as 71

dead, 148 wounded, and 702 missing, as well as

186 vehicles destroyed, but their actual losses were

likely higher. In the immediate vicinity of al-Khafji

alone, 1st ANGLICO reported 90 vehicles destroyed,

at least 300 Iraqi soldiers killed, and 680 captured.

By most accounts, the 6th Brigade, 3d Armored Division, was badly mauled and the 15th, 20th, and

26th Brigades of the 5th Mechanized Division were

nearly destroyed.83

The Battle of al-Khafji had some immediate consequences. The deaths that occurred in the early

morning hours of 30 January, when an Air Force A10 fired a missile into a Marine LAV-25, were one

of several similar events during January. As a result,

General Boomer ordered an investigation to determine what measures could be taken to prevent future casualties. The investigation team’s report was

completed prior to the invasion of Kuwait and its

recommendations implemented. 
A Qatari AMX-30 tank leads two Saudi V-150 Commando armored cars, the first of which is an antitank variant, into

al-Khafji through the town arches. The arches were the focal point of each Saudi counterattack into the city.

Illustration used with permission of Jody Harmon (www.jodyharmon.com)

Otherwise, Marines, Saudis, and Iraqis all took

differing views of the battle. Marines generally took

away an increased confidence in techniques and

doctrines, as well as a clearer idea of the enemy

they would face. Lieutenant Colonel Myers felt that

the screening forces along the border had exceeded

expectations and that the battle “proved the concept, philosophically” of the light armored vehicle.

Captain Braden saw al-Khafji as proof of the value

and importance of the air-naval gunfire liaison company (ANGLICO), and long after the battle ended

he was using al-Khafji as an example to argue

against its disbandment. “Without ANGLICO, it is

difficult to envision another successful Battle of alKhafji,” he wrote.84

Marines also gained confidence in their Saudi

allies. Colonel Admire, for one, now felt there

was “no doubt in the Marine Corps force’s mind

that when the time would come to in fact attack

into Kuwait, the Saudis and the Qataris and the

Coalition forces would be with us. Absolutely no

doubt.” Captain Molofsky agreed because “when

push came to shove, without any real plan, any

real direction, those Saudi soldiers obeyed their

The Battle of al-Khafji 133
orders and went forward. And, they did so

courageously.”85

General Boomer saw al-Khafji as further proof

that the Iraqi military was a hollow force: “We knew

they weren’t motivated even by the time al-Khafji

occurred, and it confirmed it. We were beginning

to pick up POWs who said, ‘I don’t want any part

of this deal. I am down here getting the heck

pounded out of me every day, food and water are

short. Why am I here?’ In essence they were saying,

‘I don’t want to die here, in this conflict.’ We were

getting enough of that so that I really came to believe that there was a significant morale problem

on the other side.” But for Captain Molofsky, the

view at the tactical level was somewhat different:

“My opinion was that if that’s what it was gonna

take to get started in the recovery of a small town

like al-Khafji, that we were gonna be involved in a

prolonged and bloody struggle.”86

For their part, the U.S. Air Force saw the Battle

of al-Khafji as proof of the importance of airpower,

claiming “the Battle of Khafji was preeminently an

airpower victory.” Close air support and battlefield

interdiction had isolated the battlefield and inflicted

great destruction on the Iraqis. The result was a

“devastating defeat” for the Iraqi military and “airpower was the decisive element.”87

General Khaled bin Sultan explained that although the battle was an important victory for the

Saudis, had it gone badly, “the blow to our morale

would have been severe. But victory changed the

mood of our soldiers to an amazing degree. They

had been given a chance to prove themselves and

had done so splendidly. . . . Our forces were now

equal partners with our allies, ready to play a full

role in any future battle.”88

Perhaps the most surprising conclusion concerning the Battle of al-Khafji came from the Iraqis. Iraqi

postwar studies present al-Khafji as a victory whose

techniques and procedures should be emulated to

ensure future success. The Iraqis were able to plan

and launch a major offensive despite the Coalition’s

airpower advantage. They succeeded in capturing

al-Khafji and held it for two days against an enemy

force superior in technology and numbers. As General Salah Aboud concluded, “The al-Khafji conflict

is on the list of the bright conflicts in Iraqi army history. . . . One of the thousands recorded in the Iraqi

Army history for the new generations.”89

In the end, everyone but the dead and wounded

won the Battle of al-Khafji. Although the battle did

not accomplish any of the Iraqi objectives, it presented enough of an appearance of success that

Saddam was able to claim a credible propaganda

victory. After the war, the Iraqis were convinced the

battle had somehow influenced the Coalition’s decision to end the war after evicting the Iraqis from

Kuwait, but before removing Saddam Hussein from

power. 

The Saudis faced an invasion of their territory

and defeated it. Although Coalition airpower undoubtedly played a key role in the defeat of the

Iraqi offensive, it was the courageous Saudi ground

troops, along with their American advisors, who actually ejected the Iraqis from Saudi soil. Al-Khafji

has entered Saudi military history as a great victory. 

For the Americans, al-Khafji was won almost by

accident. American forces proved so superior that

it did not completely register at the time that a

major Iraqi offensive had occurred. As a result, U.S.

Central Command planners did not expect the

Iraqis to collapse as quickly as they did in the February invasion of Kuwait and Iraq.90

At al-Khafji, all of the Marine deaths were caused

by U.S. fire, but that should not detract from their

sacrifice, or from the bravery of the Marines who

survived the battle through luck and training. Endorsing the final report on the Marines killed by the

A-10’s missile on 30 January, General Boomer

stated: “The technological marvels that helped the

Coalition forces defeat Iraq sometimes fail, and with

disastrous results. . . . Marines, heroes in my heart,

lost their lives while repelling an enemy force. They

were good Marines.”91

134 Liberating Kuwait
The Final Preparations

u CHAPTER 8u

The division commanders and their staff officers gather for a sand table exercise. MajGen William M. Keys (2d Marine

Division) and MajGen James M. Myatt (1st Marine Division) observed the training, after which MajGen Keys advocated

changing the I Marine Expeditionary Force plan from a single- to a two-division breach to avoid congestion and gain

greater freedom of maneuver for his division.

Department of Defense photo (USMC) 0787 24 91

Two Breaches and

Shattered Amphibious Dreams

At the start of February, the Marine plan for

liberating Kuwait was not popular among

the Marine commanders who would have to

execute it. The plan called for both Marine divisions

to pass in column through one breach in the Iraqi

fortifications, a difficult and time-consuming operation. After the war was underway, the Marines in

the amphibious task force would land at Ash

Shu‘aybah and seize the port in order to establish a

logistics base for the I Marine Expeditionary Force’s

advance. Lieutenant General Walter Boomer later

recalled, “I do have to admit that the single breach

wasn’t brilliant. It was just pure power. I wasn’t that

happy with it but we spent hours around the sand

table trying to think this thing through. I think at

the time it was the best concept that we had.”1

Major General William Keys, commander of the

2d Marine Division, was even less happy with the

plan. It called for his division to pass through the

1st Marine Division after the breach was forced, a

maneuver that had not gone well in the first rehearsals and seemed unlikely to go smoothly in

combat. Moreover, the addition of the U.S. Army’s

Tiger Brigade, 2d Armored Division, to his command had provided him with more organic engineering equipment, which combined with additional

equipment acquired from Israel convinced General

Keys that he possessed the equipment required to

conduct a second breach.2

Later General Keys recalled the dangers of the

two breach plan:

It was rather radical. It called for moving the

2d [Marine] Division another 80 miles to the

northwest and breaching right through one of

the Iraqi oil fields. The field we picked was

supposedly one of the worst, because of

135
136 Liberating Kuwait

Marine Corps History Division

This sketch depicts the extensive beach defenses the Iraqis placed along the Kuwaiti coastline in anticipation of an amphibious landing.

heavy concentrations of hydrogen gas. But we

had two or three Kuwaiti resistance fighters

with us, and one—who had worked in that

field—said that we could probably get

through it. If things got too bad, we could always use our gas masks. They were not the

most effective filtering devices for hydrogen,

but they would do in a crunch.3

General Boomer visited 2d Marine Division on 1

February and was briefed on the suggested plan

change. By coincidence, Brigadier General Charles

Krulak visited the headquarters while he was touring nearby Direct Support Command units, and he

attended the short talk. General Boomer and General Keys had worked together before, and General

Boomer trusted Keys’s judgment. Boomer later recalled: “There [was] no time left for discussion. I

think my exact words were, ‘Bill, you sure you can

do the breach?’ He said, ‘I can do the breach.’ I said,

‘Fine, we’ll change the plan.’”4

General Krulak was consulted on the feasibility

of creating another logistics base the size of Kibrit

on such short notice. He told General Boomer he

could do so, but needed to start as soon as possible.

Boomer ordered the two commands to begin planning for the second breach but put off making the

final decision for a few more days.5

General Boomer later explained why he decided

to make such a major change to the plan so close

to the start of the ground war:

There was considerable risk in changing the

plan late, but I felt the risk was worth taking,

or I wouldn’t have taken it. I thought we had

a much stronger plan with a two division attack than we did with a one division attack

with the other division following in trace. We

could move much faster, we had that much

more ground covered, we were going to kill

that many more Iraqis. I had to have faith that

we could get the equipment moved. I think
CH-46 Sea Knights operating at the I Marine Expeditionary Force forward command post at Khanjar combat service

support area in February 1991. The construction of the logistics base, expeditionary airfield, and command post in less

than a month allowed Gen Boomer to launch both Marine divisions at the Iraqi defenses simultaneously.

Photo courtesy of Capt Paul E. Bowen

that comes from more than just faith; I think

that’s where experience comes into play. As I

weighed that in my head, I thought this is an

almost impossible job, but I really believe

these Marines can do it, that Krulak and his

guys can do this.6

The day after General Keys asked for the two division breach, on 2 February, General Boomer flew

out to the USS Blue Ridge (LCC 19) for a conference

with General Norman Schwarzkopf and Vice Admiral Stanley Arthur concerning amphibious operations, especially the planned landing at Ash Shu‘aybah.

At the conference, it was clear the Navy was not ready

to conduct any large amphibious operations, in

large part because of the large number of mines the

Iraqis had deployed to Kuwaiti waters. General

Schwarzkopf was not enthusiastic either, since he

was informed during the meeting that the amphibious operation and subsequent coastal fighting

would probably involve massive destruction to

Kuwait’s most densely populated areas. He remarked that he was “not going to destroy Kuwait

in order to save it.” Asked if he required the landing, General Boomer said no, with the caveat that

the amphibious deception and mine clearing continue and that the amphibious forces continue planning so the option would remain available if

needed.7

One final piece of the Marine portion of Operation Desert Storm was still needed. The shift of the

Marine assault west left a large gap in the line between the 1st Marine Division and the Saudi Arabians of Joint Forces Command–East directly across

from the al-Wafrah oil field. General Boomer covered this gap prior to the liberation with Task Force

Troy, a deception operation described later in this

chapter. In addition he requested on 5 February that

one of the Marine brigades afloat come ashore after

the ground war began and fall under his operational

command in order to serve as a reserve and to

block that gap in the unlikely event that the Iraqis

managed to identify and exploit it. Originally this

mission was given to 4th Marine Expeditionary

Brigade, but that unit was tasked with various amphibious raids and deceptions (most of which did

not get approved in the end), so Brigadier General

Peter Rowe’s 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade received the mission instead.8

On 6 February, General Boomer gave the final

approval of the two division breach plan, ordering

General Krulak to begin constructing the new combat service support area that would be needed to

support the attack. At his daily staff briefing, General Boomer closed with the following remarks:

We had a good meeting today. We wrapped

up our plan. I think we will probably want to

The Final Preparations 137
138 Liberating Kuwait

Adapted from a 1991 Ministry of Defence (United Kingdom) map by Marine Corps History Division
Marine Corps Art Collection

The Terminator by Sgt Charles G. Grow. An LVS (Logistics Vehicle System) pulling a trailer with a D7 bulldozer aboard.

Marine logistics and engineer units, as well as Navy construction units, worked around the clock to prepare for the liberation of Kuwait. 

for possible locations for the new combat service

support area. The team returned with three possible

locations; Brigadier General Krulak selected a location closest to the border yet outside Iraqi artillery

range. It was designated Combat Service Support

Area 2 and named “Khanjar” after the daggers worn

by Saudi Arabian men. General Krulak ordered

plans and preparations made so that when the decision was finalized just before noon on 6 February,

at a Marine commanders’ conference at Ras alSafaniyah on the Persian Gulf, Krulak’s units were

able to set out immediately to begin construction.10

Over the next two weeks, Marines of the 7th

Engineer Support Battalion and 8th Engineer Support Battalion constructed a second massive logistics base in the middle of a near featureless desert

at Khanjar. They built 151 ammunition cells, berms,

roads, working spaces, billeting areas, water and

bulk fuel storage areas, a field hospital, an airstrip

for C-130 Hercules aircraft, and 24 miles of blast

wall. The entire Khanjar complex extended over

11,280 acres. Set even farther from Ras al-Mishab

than Kibrit’s Combat Service Support Area 1, Khan-

*

“Saudi Motors” was the nickname given to the many civilian

commercial vehicles provided by the Saudis to help move supplies to the forward staging areas. 

have one more MAPEX [map exercise] to decision point it and so forth, go through it in

detail. Two-division breach, one breach just

to the west of the [al-]Wafrah oil field, the

other up a little higher. 1st Div [1st Marine Division] on the right, 2d Div [2d Marine Division] on the left. Relatively uncomplicated.

Should go well. Long pole in the tent remains

logistics, as has been the case for every force

in this theater. Interestingly enough, Gen

[James] Brabham’s Saudi Motors* will help us

carry the day. We are on the right track, totally

confident we will accomplish that mission.9

The “Miracle Well” of Khanjar

On 3 February, Brigadier General Krulak sent a team

headed by Colonel Gary S. McKissock 30 kilometers

northwest of al-Qaarah, Saudi Arabia, to an area labeled “gravel plain” on the Marine maps, to scout

The Final Preparations 139
140 Liberating Kuwait

Defense Imagery DM-SN-93-01700

A crewman passes a 155mm projectile into a Battery R, 5th Battalion, 11th Marines, M-109A1 self-propelled howitzer

during training before the war. This battery participated in several artillery raids after Operation Desert Storm began.

jar was designed to hold enough food, fuel, ammunition, and water for the two divisions to fight

for 15 days.11

Khanjar’s most glaring weakness was the lack of

water, and Navy Commander John R. Doyle’s Naval

Mobil Construction Battalion 40 began digging wells

on 10 February without any success. On 14 February, Captain Peter M. Ramey discovered a pipe and

valve above the ground northwest of Khanjar; it

produced water that was very hard on filters but

useable nonetheless. Called “the miracle well” by

General Krulak, it produced 100,000 gallons of

water a day.

Next to Khanjar, an expeditionary airfield was

built for the helicopter squadrons of Marine Aircraft

Group 26. Operations from the airfield, named

“Lonesome Dove,” began on 20 February and were

delayed in part to reduce the maintenance required

by operating from the high sand environment of the

new field. In addition to 9,000 feet of matting for

the helicopters, a helicopter tactical air command

center was established at Lonesome Dove to coordinate operations in the forthcoming offensive.12

Much later, General Krulak described the accomplishments of the Khanjar logistics complex in the

following way: “When you look at Kibrit and how

massive Kibrit was and then compare it to Khanjar,

Khanjar was far bigger. Khanjar had a field hospital

with 14 operating rooms. It was the third largest

hospital in the Navy hospital system: Bethesda, San

Diego, Khanjar. It had an airstrip. The forward ammunition supply point itself covered almost 800

acres. Now, think about that. That’s just the ammo

dump. The entire complex was over 11,000 acres.

It was monstrous.”13

Equally remarkable was the effort to shift supplies from Kibrit to Khanjar, and to keep both supplied throughout the campaign. Lieutenant Colonel

Larry D. Waters’s 6th Motor Transport Battalion

formed and operated the required line haul capability, establishing a convoy of civilian and military

trucks that was soon dubbed the “Baghdad Express.” Brigadier General James Brabham elaborated on the difficulties confronted by this convoy:

“They faced the challenge of operating leased,

aged 18-wheel commercial trucks from various

manufacturers. The principal operators of many of

these vehicles were expatriate laborers from many
different countries. Every truck that was sent north

to supply Kibrit and Khanjar was also manned by

at least one military member of the battalion. In

order to supply Khanjar with the stated requirement, approximately 100 truckloads per day were

dispatched north by the [6th Motor Transport] Battalion. The length of the trip required establishment of transfer sites to replace drivers and rest

them for the next leg of the trip. The trucks rolled

24 hours a day. It was a magnificent effort that provided the foundation of supply support for the [I

Marine Expeditionary] Force.”14

Artillery Raids, Skirmishes, and Patrols

In the wake of the Battle of al-Khafji, raids and skirmishes along the Kuwaiti–Saudi Arabian border increased in number and intensity in a crescendo

leading up to the anticipated liberation of Kuwait.

The artillery raids served the same purposes they

did prior to al-Khafji—they confused and bewildered the Iraqis concerning the breaching points,

and they reduced the Iraqi artillery, still considered

Iraq’s most dangerous conventional asset despite its

poor showing during Khafji. Raids by reconnaissance and light armored infantry units were focused

more on acquiring prisoners. All of these raids took

place well within the fire support coordination line,

inside airspace controlled by I Marine Expeditionary

Force. Unfortunately, this did not prevent friendly

fire incidents between Coalition aircraft and Marines

on the ground.15

From 30 January to 1 February, elements of Task

Force Shepherd and 5th Battalion, 11th Marines,

near Observation Post 6 conducted various artillery

missions. On the evening of 30 January, they closed

a gap in the berm by firing field artillery scatterable

mines. The next night, an artillery barrage in support of Task Force Shepherd was credited with destroying two or three Iraqi tanks.16

The next raid, on the evening of 1–2 February,

was aimed at Iraqi electronic warfare units at the

Umm Gudair oil field. It was conducted by S Battery

of the 5th Battalion, 11th Marines, which was

equipped with the M109A3 155mm self-propelled

howitzer, and Battery T, equipped with the M110A2

8-inch self-propelled howitzer, with Task Force Shepherd again providing security. Lieutenant Colonel

James L. Sachtleben, 5th Battalion’s commander, later

commented:

I was a little concerned about the M110A2 as

a raiding piece. Its slower rate of fire and

longer emplacement times meant the battery

would be in position longer and thus at a

greater risk from counterfire. However, the

larger payload of the 8-inch as compared to

the 155mm DPICM [dual-purpose improved

conventional munitions] meant the battery

could fire fewer rounds and achieve equal or

greater effects. Also, by this time, we [had]

started to question the Iraqi counterfire capability. We had taken mortar rounds on the first

raid, but there was no evidence the Iraqis

could find us with anything other than forward observers in frontline infantry units who

could spot our muzzle flashes. We trusted the

EA-6Bs to handle the Iraqi ground surveillance and counterbattery radars, and they obviously did. But why were the Iraqis so

ineffective with the sound-ranging systems

that were supposed to be so good? We

weren’t sure, but our confidence was growing. We decided to fight the urge to stay and

shoot all night and continued to “shoot and

scoot.” The real ground war was still days

away, and we couldn’t afford to risk assets

needed later.17

Unfortunately, as the raid force retired south it

was mistaken for an Iraqi column by a Marine Corps

A-6E Intruder, call sign “Blaze 65.” The Intruder’s

crew believed they were still flying over Iraq and

bombed the artillery convoy several times. Lance

Corporal Eliseo C. Felix was killed, and three

Marines—Staff Sergeant Michael V. Almanza and

Corporals Michael D. Sanders and Rick A. Ramirez—

were wounded. One of Battery S’s M109A3 howitzers was damaged as well.18

On 4 February, 5th Battalion, 11th Marines, and

Task Force Shepherd conducted another artillery

raid; executed without any American casualties, this

raid targeted Iraqi multiple rocket launcher batteries. The Iraqis responded with counterbattery fire

and were in turn struck by F-18 Hornets flying close

air support for the raid.19

From 3 February to 9 February, American battleships fired their 16-inch guns in support of U.S.

Marines ashore as the USS Missouri (BB 63) and

USS Wisconsin (BB 64) moved inshore to fire naval

gunfire missions into Kuwait. Starting with the Missouri, the battleships rotated the fire support duties,

and Wisconsin began firing on 6 February. Spotting

was conducted by OV-10s, Marine fire control

teams, and the battleships’ own unmanned aerial

vehicles. The massive shells struck Iraqi artillery batteries, bunkers, communications sites, patrol boats,

The Final Preparations 141
142 Liberating Kuwait

A Pioneer remotely piloted vehicle (RPV) is catapulted from a launching rail set up atop an M-814 5-ton cargo truck.

The RPV was first used by the Marines extensively during the Gulf War.

Defense Imagery DN-SC-91-05049

missile batteries, and radar sites. This continual

bombardment by naval gunfire destroyed Iraqi

forces that threatened the Marine and Saudi lines,

but it also reinforced the threat of an amphibious

attack on Kuwait.20

The month of February saw a small but steady

stream of Iraqi soldiers crossing the border to surrender. They were usually taken into custody by

Marines in the light armored infantry and reconnaissance teams that patrolled the border. The night of

6 February provides a typical example, as described

the next morning in the daily briefing General

Boomer received: “Last night LAVs [light armored vehicles] operating in OP-6 [Observation Post 6] saw

some activity. They had some loudspeaker teams

with them—they have been attached as part of that

task force up there. They ran the preprogrammed

surrender tape that was pre-recorded, and two people came forward across the berm and said they

were hungry and wanted to surrender, and so they

took their arms away from them and gave them

MREs [meals, ready-to-eat].” The Marines transported

these prisoners to the rear, conducted short interrogations, and eventually handed them over to U.S.

Army control. The relatively small numbers of prisoners in this period were far easier to handle than

the masses that would come later, but they indicated

the poor morale of the Iraqi Army in Kuwait.21

On the evenings of 8 and 9 February, Task Force

Shepherd and 5th Battalion, 11th Marines, with supporting Marine Corps air, conducted two more successful artillery raids along the border. They

believed that the raids “destroyed numerous vehicles in target area,” but it is difficult to determine

how successful they were because the Iraqis deployed many decoys in Kuwait.22

From 10 to 12 February, Captain Rory E. Talkington’s Company A, 1st Reconnaissance Battalion,

conducted a raid on Markaz as Sur. The location

was unoccupied but the raid force captured equipment, documents, and ordnance from the facility.23

On the evening of 11 February, elements of 3d

Battalion, 12th Marines, and 5th Battalion, 11th

Marines, supported by Task Force Shepherd, conducted an “illumination” raid. Illumination rounds

were fired over suspected Iraqi antiaircraft artillery

sites, hoping to goad them into opening fire, thus

revealing them to waiting F/A-18 Hornets. In this

case, the Iraqis did not take the bait, and the antiaircraft artillery remained silent.24

Not to be left out, 2d Marine Division’s 3d Battalion, 10th Marines, conducted an artillery raid on the
Photo by PO1 Scott Allen, USN. Defense Imagery DN-ST-91-00562

F/A-18 Hornets of Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 451 and Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 333 line an airfield in

Saudi Arabia. Both squadrons were active in Operation Desert Storm, conducting strikes against targets in Iraq and

Kuwait.

morning of 12 February, targeting two suspected

Iraqi command posts and two artillery positions.

After this raid, the focus shifted from artillery ambushes and prisoner snatches to concentrated preparation of the battlefield as the divisions readied

themselves to breach the vaunted Saddam Line.25

Marine Air Prepares the Battlefield

The Battle of al-Khafji had presented Marine air

with a cornucopia of targets that lasted for several

days after al-Khafji itself was liberated as Iraqi forces

struggled to return to Kuwait and relative safety.

The impact of the air assault on Iraqi morale is

vividly illustrated in the 1 February diary of the unknown Iraqi soldier: “I haven’t found enough time

to write. So much, so much passes away. The winds

of war pass, years of our lives pass; the lives of

young people have gone for no return. Iraq attacked al-Khafji (Saudi land) and the fighting is still

going on. They are bombing our sites using planes

and machine guns. There is no peace or liveliness

in this world. I am dead. We were born dead.”26

As despairing as that entry sounds, three days

later the same young Iraqi conscript wrote an entry

indicating that the news of American bombing in

Iraq could counter the drop in morale caused by

the Kuwait bombardment. After admitting to listening to the Voice of America and the British Broadcasting Corporation on his radio despite his belief

that they were designed to undermine his morale,

the diarist snarled, “I hate those polytheists. I wish

I could drink their blood those infidels. My hatred

increased since they bombed civilians and buildings

where my family is living nearby. Because I know

nothing of my family my grudge against them is bigger. I wish they started their ground war, whatever

the consequences might be. Anyway, I am waiting

for this hour to happen every day. Whether I like it

or not it is bound to happen so we’ll see. God supports the oppressed.”27

The diary was not discovered until after the war

ended, of course, and while there were numerous

indications through intercepted communications

and prisoner of war interrogations that Iraqi morale

was extremely low, it was difficult for Marine commanders to judge the effectiveness of the bombing

campaign, largely because the Corps lacked dedicated reconnaissance aircraft. Ironically, since the

Marine Corps’ retired the last of its McDonnell Douglas RF-4B Phantom photo and radar reconnaissance aircraft in August 1990, it was forced to

depend on Air Force, Navy, and other assets instead, and these rarely produced the required bomb

damage assessment photos quickly enough for the

Marines trying to determine if follow-up attacks

were needed. 

The Final Preparations 143
144 Liberating Kuwait

Air Interdiction (AI): missions to delay, divert, disrupt, or destroy the enemy’s military potential beyond the fire support

coordination line (FSCL). Close Air Support (CAS): missions requested by a ground commander for support of, and close

to, friendly ground forces. Offensive Counter Air (OCA): missions to destroy or neutralize enemy air power. In the Gulf

War these included, for Marines, air-to-surface attacks on enemy airfields and attacks to destroy or disrupt enemy surface-to-air defenses or integrated air defense systems (IADS). A sortie is an individual aircraft mission from take off to

landing.

Data culled from A Statistical Compendium and Chronology—Gulf War Air Power Survey, vol. 5 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government

Printing Office, 1993), pp. 260–268

Colonel Manfred Rietsch commented on how the

lack of reconnaissance impacted the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing’s efficiency during the war:

Old imagery, poor quality—we were lucky to

get even that. Getting up to date imagery or

something of good quality was the exception—I mean the big exception—because it

only happened a few times. We were asked

to go attack targets where all we had was a

LAT/LONG [latitude/longitude]—pull something off a map. The way the system should

work—all that stuff should be fed to you. It

didn’t work that way. One of two things happened. Either the higher headquarters [had]

up-to date imagery which identified the location of a valuable target and we didn’t receive

the same imageries, so therefore we couldn’t

tell what the target was, or else they based a

mission on outdated imagery and so when we

went to that place the thing that had been

there and was the designated target was no

longer there. Consequently, we ended up [flying] many, many sorties where we went

where we couldn’t identify a target that they

thought might have been there or the target

had moved and the people who made the decision to send us to the inset target were

based on that two week old, three week old,

two month old imagery of a tank battalion, for

example, that very well might have clanked

away and gone somewhere else.28

Marines attempted to fill this gap with their own

Pioneer remotely piloted vehicles and OV-1O

Bronco observation aircraft, but neither was a satisDaily Marine Corps Sorties by Mission, 1/17/91 to 2/28/91
Data culled from A Statistical Compendium and Chronology—Gulf War Air Power Survey, vol. 5 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government

Printing Office, 1993), pp. 466–467

This chart shows the number of strikes by Coalition aircraft carried out each day against Iraqi forces in Kill Boxes AF6,

AG6, AH6, AF5, AG5, AH5, AG4, and AH4. These kill boxes contained the Iraqi forces most likely to engage Marine

ground forces. A strike is defined as a weapon employed by a single aircraft against a target. An aircraft often made

multiple strikes on each sortie. A map of the kill boxes over Kuwait and southern Iraq appears in chapter 5.

factory replacement for the RF-4B. Eventually, the

lack was partially made up by fast-moving forward

air controllers in two-seat F/A-18D Hornets from

Marine All-Weather Fighter Attack Squadron 121,

which ended its initial operational workup early

and deployed to the Gulf. The problem was never

fully solved, however, and fortunately the conditions of the Gulf War prevented the issue from becoming critical.29

The string of tragic and deadly accidents and

friendly fire incidents continued in the first few days

of February. On the morning of 2 February, as described above, a Marine A-6E killed one Marine and

wounded three others. That evening, at 1840 local

time, Marine Attack Helicopter Squadron 775 lost

two of its pilots, Major Eugene T. McCarthy and

Captain Jonathan R. Edwards, when the Bell AH-1J

Sea Cobra they were flying crashed in the Saudi

Arabian desert while escorting an emergency medical evacuation mission. The next night, 3 February,

one of Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron

369’s UH-1Ns crashed, killing the entire crew: Captains David R. Herr Jr. and James K. Thorp, and Corporals Kurt H. Benz and Albert G. Haddad Jr.30

Throughout February, the percentage of missions

flown directly in support of General Boomer’s

forces increased, and he was able to establish targeting priorities within his area of operations according to Marine Corps doctrine rather than being

forced to watch his targets go untargeted by Joint

Total Strikes in Kuwait, 2/2/91 to 2/28/91

The Final Preparations 145
146 Liberating Kuwait

Force Air Command missions. Targets were classified by category. Category One was nuclear, biological, and chemical targets; in Kuwait these were

primarily artillery sites capable of firing chemical

shells. Category Two was indirect fire weapons, artillery, and rockets. Category Three was command

posts, and Category Four was armor, mechanized

infantry, and infantry units. As the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing’s Gulf War history noted, “This gave

some guidance to a flight leader who had arrived

at his assigned target only to find nothing but sand

at that grid coordinate. He then became an armed

reconnaissance in a large kill box.”31

The main concern remained the III Corps’ numerous artillery batteries. Towed artillery was the

most numerous and difficult to destroy, and it was

even more difficult to confirm that it had been destroyed since inoperable and irreparable artillery

tubes often looked completely unscathed on bomb

damage assessment photographs. Marine aviators

met the challenge with area-effect bombs that they

hoped would catch the Iraqi ammunition stocks as

well as the artillery proper.

General Boomer’s worries about Iraqi artillery

were poignantly described in a briefing that he gave

to Marine Aircraft Group 13’s pilots in the days before the ground campaign commenced, as recalled

by its commander, Colonel John Bioty: 

General Boomer led it off by saying, “I want

to tell you a story which is not really a story,

because it is true, but in the form of a story. I

woke up at two or three o’clock in the morning . . . shaking[,] soaking wet . . . from a terrible bad dream where two divisions on line

[were] attempting to go through two breaches

. . . [were] being bogged down in the minefields and extensive obstacle belts . . . and in

the middle of all that somewhere between

eleven hundred and fourteen hundred artillery

tubes were raining a fiery death and destruction.” Then he said, “My Marines are dying.”

He put his hands behind his back . . . walked

back and forth on the stage in silence, which

seemed to be [an] eternity, and he turns around

and says, “Go get the artillery!” It was about

8:30, 9:00 at night. I had guys who wanted to

go man airplanes and go get artillery!32

Throughout February, the number of strikes by

Coalition aircraft in the Marine area of operations

hovered around 300 per day, spiking near 500 on occasion (the drop below 200 on 17 February was due

to poor weather over Kuwait). Prior to al-Khafji, the

number of strikes in the Kuwaiti zone never reached

200 in one day; hence, it is fair to say the Iraqi forces

in Kuwait received far more attention from Coalition

airpower in February than they had in January. 

Many Marine sorties over Kuwait were controlled

by F/A-18Ds acting as forward air controllers. These

two-seat Hornets would linger over Kuwait in 30-

minute shifts at high altitudes and search for targets

on the Marine targeting list. They were escorted by

a single-seat Hornet armed with antiradar missiles

and sometimes additional bombs. When a flight entered their zone, the F/A-18Ds would direct the

strike aircraft at the targets as needed. This system

worked extremely well, but it was degraded after

17 February, when the Iraqis started burning

Kuwait’s oil installations. The smoke from the oil

fires severely curtailed visibility from the altitudes

at which the F/A-18Ds had been operating.33

On 9 February, an F/A-18 from Marine Fighter

Attack Squadron 451 was damaged, the first Marine

F/A-18 to suffer combat damage. While attacking

an Iraqi SA-2 surface-to-air missile site, the Hornet

was struck by what was believed to be an SA-16 infrared surface-to-air missile. The missile hit one of

the Hornet’s fuselage-mounted AIM-7 Sparrow missiles, causing the rocket motor of the Sparrow to

catch fire. The pilot then jettisoned the damaged

missile over the Persian Gulf before landing at

Shaikh Isa. The Hornet was repaired and flying

again the next day.34

A more serious incident occurred that afternoon,

when Captain Russell A. C. Sanborn’s AV-8B Harrier

II was shot down by an infrared surface-to-air missile. Part of Marine Attack Squadron 231, Sanborn

was attacking Iraqi positions as directed by an F/A18D forward air controller when he was hit. His

parachute was spotted by the forward air controller,

and Sanborn was taken prisoner by the Iraqis.35

Captain Sanborn was the fourth Marine aviator

captured to date by the Iraqis. Like the others, he

was badly mistreated, beaten, refused medical care,

and otherwise harassed until his release after the

war had ended.36

Lieutenant Colonel William R. Jones, Sanborn’s

squadron commander, later recalled: 

He was a very popular, respected officer. He

worked in Maintenance at the time that I recall. His call sign was “Bart” as in Bart Simpson [of the cartoon series The Simpsons] on

TV. . . . I was preflighting an airplane; he’d

been only shot down like three or four days.

On the side of an AV-8 by the exhaust nozzle
Marines load AGM-88A high-speed antiradiation missiles under the wings of an F/A-18A Hornet of Marine Fighter

Attack Squadron 451 during Operation Desert Storm. 

Photo by Sgt Jeff Wright. Defense Imagery DA-ST- 92-07699

it’s always kind of dark and greasy from the

exhaust, and one of the plane captains had

written with his finger, “Bring home the Bartman,” on the side of that. . . . It really got to

some of the officers who were real close to

him. . . . I did write a letter—I didn’t keep a

copy of it—to both Linda as well as Russell’s

parents trying to be as upbeat as I could without claiming false hope. I just said that I

thought he’d be ok. That’s the only one that

we had, the only aircraft we lost.37

On 12 February, a Marine Attack Squadron 542

Harrier was damaged by antiaircraft artillery fire, but

it returned to its field safely. The same day, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing aircraft struck and destroyed two

Iraqi airliners at Kuwait International Airport that

were believed to be transportation for a high-level

meeting that took place in Kuwait.38

Also on 12 February, General Schwarzkopf told

the Joint Forces Air Commander that “effective immediately, the emphasis of combat operations must

shift to preparing the battlefield for a ground offensive.” A tragedy in Baghdad on the night of 13–14

February also contributed to the increase in strikes

against Kuwait proper. On that night, two U.S. Air

Force F-117s struck the al-Firdos command and

control bunker in Baghdad. Unbeknownst to American targeteers, hundreds of Iraqi civilians had been

permitted to shelter in the military bunker; many of

them were killed or wounded in the attack. The

tragedy was a public relations black eye for the

Coalition, and strikes against downtown Baghdad

were reduced thereafter.39

As the air strikes against Iraqi forces in Kuwait

intensified, Iraq’s Scud campaign shifted to targets

inside Saudi Arabia. A catastrophe was avoided by

luck on 16 February when a Scud fired on al-Jubayl

landed within a few hundred yards of the pier,

which was loaded with a mountain of ammunition.

Eight vessels were docked at the pier, including the

USS Tarawa, a Polish hospital ship, and the aviation

logistics support ships SS Wright (T-AVB 3) and SS

Curtiss (T-AVB 4).40

On 20 February, just four days before the ground

war began, General Charles Horner approved

“armed reconnaissance” missions on the air tasking

order rather than limiting that document to specific

targets approved by Joint Forces Air Command.

This adjustment allowed the Marines to finally bypass the Air Force targeting office and follow the

doctrine in which Marine ground commanders controlled which targets Marine air would strike based

on the priorities of the ground commanders. From

this point forward, the Marine air-ground task force

The Final Preparations 147
148 Liberating Kuwait

Photo courtesy of Capt Paul E. Bowen

This reinforced concrete aircraft bunker at al-Jaber Air Base in southern Kuwait shows the sort of damage inflicted by

the air campaign prior to the ground offensive. The airfield was a major Iraqi administrative/command and control

center and one of the Marines’ first objectives after the penetration of the two obstacle belts.

was functioning doctrinally without interference

from higher, joint headquarters. 

The shift coincided with a significant increase in

the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing’s already considerable

aggressiveness in attacking targets in front of the divisions. Four Marine aircraft were damaged while attacking targets in Kuwait on 21 February. An A-6E

Intruder of Marine Attack Squadron 224 was struck

by Iraqi antiaircraft artillery fire, and two F/A-18s of

Marine Fighter Attack Squadrons 314 and 333 were

struck by Iraqi infrared surface-to-air missiles. All

three aircraft returned safely to their respective airfields; the A-6E pilot was not even aware he had

been hit until after landing. The fourth aircraft was

an F/A-18D from Marine All-Weather Fighter Attack

Squadron 121, the first Marine F/A-18D hit by Iraqi

fire. Flying below 5,000 feet, the Hornet was struck

in the right engine exhaust by an infrared surfaceto-air missile. The weapon systems operator, Captain

John M. Scanlan, later said, “It felt like hitting an unexpected pothole in the road.” The pilot shut the engine down as a precaution, and the aircraft returned

safely to Shaikh Isa on the remaining engine.41

The final day of air operations before the assault

on the Saddam Line was a tragic day for the air campaign. Captain James N. Wilburn III of Marine Attack

Squadron 542 was bombing targets in central Kuwait

under the direction of an F/A-18D when his AV-8B

was struck by an infrared surface-to-air missile and

shot down. Captain Wilburn’s body was later recovered; he was the first 3d Marine Aircraft Wing pilot

killed by enemy action during the Gulf War.42

Two more close calls had happy endings. A Harrier from Marine Attack Squadron 311 was damaged

by Iraqi antiaircraft artillery, and a Hornet from Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 451 was hit by an infrared surface-to-air missile, but both aircraft and

aircrews survived.43

Despite its difficulties and tragedies, the Marine

air assault on the Iraqi forces in Kuwait on the eve

of the ground campaign was a considerable success, as viewed by those in the best position to

judge it. Major “Imad B.” was the commander of the

159th Field Artillery Battalion, 7th Infantry Division, one of the III Corps units placed directly in the

way of the main Marine advance into Kuwait. He

was captured during the campaign and questioned

about his view of the conflict on 2 March:
Air Boss by Col H. Avery Chenoweth. This painting captures the drama of flight operations on board the USS Nassau.

The Navy “air boss” looks on as a Marine air controller talks an AV-8B Harrier onto the flight deck. The “Bumblebees”

of Marine Attack Squadron 331 launched the first ever fixed-wing combat strikes from the deck of an amphibious assault

ship on 20 February 1991. 

Marine Corps Art Collection

Q: How many of your soldiers were killed

by the air war?

A: To be honest, for the amount of ordinance that was dropped, not very many. Only

one soldier was killed and two were

wounded. The soldier that was killed did not

die as a result of a direct hit but because the

vibrations of the bomb caused a bunker to

cave in on top of him.

Q: So, then you feel that the aerial bombardment was ineffective?

A: Oh no, just the opposite, it was extremely effective. The planes hit only vehicles

and equipment. Even my personal vehicle, a

“Waz,” was hit. They hit everything. I explained to my soldiers they should not fear

the Americans. If the Americans wanted to kill

us, I said, we would already be dead. The

Americans just wanted to take away our ability to fight.44

When considering prisoner interrogations, the

reader must keep in mind that the prisoner of war

has great incentive to tell the questioner what they

think he or she wishes to hear, even when the interrogation is conducted in a friendly manner without any overt or subjective coercion. But this

artillery officer’s view was matched by numerous

Iraqi reports of the air campaign in internal discussions conducted after the war and captured following Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003. To provide

one specific example, an officer of the IV Corps recalled that “the enemy never stopped bothering us

day and night by all types of aircraft . . . high speed

jets, slow flying jets, precision bombers, and [other]

combat jets. The weapons that really frustrated us

and harmed us were the slow-flying aircraft and the

Marine types. Sometimes they spent the whole day

suspended over our heads to the extent that our

ears had gotten used to their buzzing sounds.”45

Harriers Afloat

On 20 February 1991, the amphibious assault ship

USS Nassau launched four AV-8B Harriers of Marine

Attack Squadron 331, call sign “Magic,” just before

dawn. This flight was the first combat strike by

The Final Preparations 149
150 Liberating Kuwait

to drop their bombs, and I worried about itchy fingers on triggers, combatants eager to be involved

in the shoot-out.”47

The seven members of the tiger team* investigated five instances of fratricide and submitted their

report on 10 February. According to the report, the

incidents were caused by three issues: “(1) a lack

of situation awareness by commanders, aircrew,

and controllers, (2) the lack of a battlefield system

for identification of friend and foe (IFF), and (3) the

lack of visually defined cues on the night battlefield

by which pilots could orient themselves.” The team

made numerous recommendations for reducing the

risk of air-to-ground fratricide incidents, concluding

that if followed, its recommendations “were made

on the basis of their being simple, practical, and

timely, using resources already available. Many

only require a higher degree of discipline and rigor.

All are made with a view to not only preventing

fratricide incidents now, but on a battlefield that

will be fast moving and constantly changing. Finally, the efficacy of close air support will actually

improve.”48

Nearly all of the team’s recommendations were

put into practice, and additional measures were

taken as well (stationing Marine liaison officers on

board the Air Force airborne command and control

centers was one of the more successful measures).

Despite these efforts, there were several more fratricide incidents after the team’s report; unfortunately, the modern battlefield’s complexity made

such events nearly inevitable. 

Feints and Deceptions

Many observers at the time believed the Marines

were planning to advance into the teeth of formidable Iraqi defenses. Events later proved this was

not quite the case, but serious efforts were made

prior to the offensive to convince the Iraqis that resistance was futile while also confusing them as to

the location, direction, and intention of the upcoming assault. 

Convincing the Iraqis to quit was the mission of

the psychological warfare campaign. This was a

theaterwide campaign that used radio broadcasts,

propaganda leaflets, and loudspeaker broadcasts

along the border to encourage Iraqi soldiers that

*

The team’s members were Col Gene D. Hendrickson (infantry,

logistics), Col Charles J. Quilter II (I MEF historian, aviator), Mr.

Carroll D. Childers (civilian science advisor), LtCol Duncan H.

Burgess (artillery, air observer), LtCol Robert S. Cohen (infantry),

LtCol John F. Goodman (aviator), and Maj Robert T. McCarty (logistics).

fixed-wing aircraft from the flight deck of an amphibious assault ship and was directed at Iraqi antiaircraft batteries and surface-to-air missile sites at

Az Zwar on the western end of Faylakah Island.

Bad weather diverted the flight, however, and they

instead hit targets near Iraq’s Umm Qasr Naval Base

on the Iraq-Kuwait border. The strike was successful, despite Iraqi opposition, including at least one

surface-to-air missile launched at the four Harriers.46

The Nassau carried the 19 Harriers of Marine Attack Squadron 331, nicknamed the “Bumblebees,”

rather than its normal mix of Harriers and helicopters in order to provide dedicated fixed-wing air

support for the Marine forces floating in the Gulf as

an amphibious threat during Operation Desert

Storm. This use of the Nassau was not without controversy, as the relatively short range of the Harriers

required the Nassau to move closer to shore, where

mines might have been a danger. In addition, the

Nassau’s munitions storage was limited to approximately three days of strikes.

Despite these issues, the Nassau and Marine Attack Squadron 331 launched 242 combat strikes and

expended 300 tons of ordnance against Iraqi targets

from 20 and 27 February 1991. The strikes hit Iraqi

defensive positions, antiaircraft batteries, artillery,

and armor throughout Kuwait despite bad weather

and thick clouds of smoke from oil wells the Iraqis

had set on fire. On 26 February, the Iraqi retreat

shifted the squadron’s targets to the fleeing Iraqi

columns, especially around al-Jahrah in Kuwait.

On 27 February, while engaged in strikes against

these Iraqi convoys, Captain Reginald C. Underwood was killed when his AV-8B was struck by a

surface-to-air missile. Captain Underwood’s aircraft

was the only one of the “Bumblebees” lost to

enemy action during this first combat deployment

of Harriers on board a U.S. Navy amphibious assault ship. 

Fratricide Issues

On 3 February, General Boomer ordered the formation of a “tiger team” to investigate the multiple

instances of Marines being fired on and sometimes

killed or wounded by other American forces in the

first weeks of the war. Marines were acutely aware

that all of the Marines killed in the Battle of al-Khafji

were killed by American forces. Sergeant Gregory

J. “Greg” Michaels of Company A, 1st Light Armored

Infantry Battalion, spoke for many Marines when

he said, “For the rest of Desert Storm, I didn’t worry

so much about the enemy: I worried about the

friendlies. I worried about buzzing aircraft intending
they should surrender to the Coalition. One of the

more interesting leaflet operations was combined

with B-52 Stratofortress raids. The day before a raid

was to take place, leaflets specific to the division

being targeted were dropped. They were illustrated

with a B-52 dropping bombs on one side and this

text in Arabic on the other:

The [Iraqi] 7th Infantry Division will be bombed

tomorrow. The bombing will be heavy. If you

want to save yourself leave your location and

do not allow anyone to stop you. Save yourself

and head toward the Saudi border. You will be

welcomed as a brother.

The raid was then conducted on the division

named, and the day following the B-52 raid, leaflets

with the following message in Arabic were dropped

on the division:

We have already informed you of our promise

to bomb the 7th Inf. Div. We kept our promise

and bombed them yesterday. Beware. We will

repeat this tomorrow. . . . Now the choice is

yours. Either stay and face death or accept the

invitation of the joint forces to protect your

lives.

Other leaflet drops were made along the Kuwaiti

coast, reinforcing the idea that an amphibious operation was coming; one particularly striking example depicted a Marine as a wave coming from the

Marine Corps History Division files

These propaganda leaflets were dropped on Iraqi units before and after B-52 raids. The front of the leaflet is the top

image, and the blue text was printed on the back; these

leaflets were dropped the day before the attack. The same

leaflet was dropped the day after the attack, but the green

text (bottom image) replaced the blue text on the back. 

Marine Corps History Division files

This propaganda leaflet dramatically illustrated the threat

of a Marine amphibious landing to Iraqi forces in Kuwait.

The Final Preparations 151
152 Liberating Kuwait

Reprinted from Edward J. Marolda and Robert J. Schneller Jr., Shield and Sword: The United States Navy and the Persian Gulf War

(Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, Department of the Navy, 1998), p. 248
sea with a bloody K-Bar fighting knife, supported

by air and sea forces. The importance General

Boomer placed on these efforts can be seen in a

comment during the daily I Marine Expeditionary

Force staff briefing on 11 February: “And in special

staff status reports, sir, we have the following from

your psyops [psychological operations] officer. The

1.5 million leaflets that you requested were

dropped in southern Kuwait yesterday; 100 percent

of the public address systems are on the border

doing operations in one or other of the divisions,

and have been for the past three days, and the

Kuwaiti linguists have now been distributed down

to the divisions, sir.”49

Although General Schwarzkopf had vetoed a

major amphibious invasion, an amphibious feint remained an important part of the Coalition’s plan, in

order to draw attention away from both the Marine

thrust into central Kuwait and the Army’s wide,

sweeping flanking movement to the west. As noted

above, the American battleships conducted naval

gunfire support missions along the coast throughout

February, and Coalition minelayers began clearing

lanes through the Iraqi minefields on 16 February.50

The U.S. Navy’s fear of Iraqi mines and lack of

confidence in its ability to fully clear the minefields

proved well founded. On 17 February, USS Tripoli

was disabled after it hit a mine. Tripoli had been

pressed into service as the platform for the Sikorsky

MH-53E Sea Dragon helicopters of the Navy’s Helicopter Mine Countermeasures Squadron 14 during

minesweeping operations and was ironically engaged in this service when it struck a mine. Later

the same day, USS Princeton (CG 59) was also

struck by a mine. Fortunately, neither vessel suffered fatalities from the mine attacks.51

After the war, the commander of the Iraqi Navy

declared that “these [Iraqi] mines proved [their]

lethality and effectiveness. . . . They caused havoc

within the enemy force.” He continued, “During the

epic Mother of All Battles, this weapon [mines] was

utilized effectively and successfully to disrupt the

allies’ plans in launching any operation from the

sea.” His view was shared by the U.S. Navy Central

Command commander, Vice Admiral Stanley Arthur,

who later stated, “Iraq successfully delayed and

might have prevented an amphibious assault on

Kuwait’s assailable flank, protected a large part of

its force from the effects of naval gunfire, and severely hampered surface operations in the northern

Arabian Gulf, all through the use of naval mines.”52

As the Navy’s minesweeping operations began

on 18 February, General Boomer gave control of 2d

Marine Division’s former area along the border in

front of the al-Wafrah Forest to Task Force Troy, a

battalion-sized deception force commanded by the

1st Marine Division’s assistant commander, Brigadier

General Thomas Draude. After the war, General

Draude described Task Force Troy’s mission: 

[The 2d Marine Division originally was] located to the east of us, so one of the first aspects for Task Force Troy was to replicate the

2d Marine Division over to the east of our location to make the bad guys think that they’re

still there as the division pulls out behind us

and gets over to the west of us in preparation

for the breach. 

So I had the Seabees, God bless them, and

made some dummy artillery pieces, tanks, and

so forth. And as the units of 2d Division came

out at night, that’s when the dummy pieces

go in so that the trails would be there, all the

things that would be associated with that particular kind of unit. We also had helicopters. I

asked them, whenever they’re flying anywhere in the vicinity of where the 2d Division

had been located, just drop down, as if making a liaison, making a pick up and so that

from the other side of the border, you’re

watching all the stuff that used to happen with

the 2d Division, and now it seems the same

kind of business as usual. We really felt good

that we were able to pull that off and again

to replicate the division of over 20,000 with

only 200.53

In addition to decoys and helicopter operations,

Task Force Troy attempted to replicate the noise

that a Marine division could be expected to make.

An Army psychological warfare unit supplied tapes

of M-60 Patton tanks that were played along the

border. According to General Draude, these recordings had a dramatic effect: “The first night that those

tank noises ran, these guys [Iraqis] went ballistic—

‘Tank attack! Tank attack! Pull over.’ You know, of

course, nothing happened. Second night—‘Tank attack! Tank attack!’ After about two weeks of tank

noises—ho hum. And then one night they heard

tank noises, but they weren’t recordings.”54

Task Force Troy’s deception campaign was augmented by artillery raids along the border as well.

On the night of 19 February, Battery E, 2d Battalion,

12th Marines, fired over 100 rounds on bunkers and

an observation tower near Observation Post 3. Fog

led to a delay so that the raid did not occur until just

after 0600, but the raid was considered very successThe Final Preparations 153
154 Liberating Kuwait

Marine Corps Art Collection

Fire Mission by Sgt Charles G. Grow. An M198 155mm howitzer of Battery E, 2d Battalion, 12th Marines, fires against

Iraqi forces in late February 1991.

ful, as there were numerous secondary explosions

on the target compound. Battery E conducted a second raid later in the day on 20 February, destroying

two more sets of buildings with 70 high-explosive

rounds between 1600 and 1700.55

On 22 February, the last of the combined artillery/air raids was conducted by Battery E and

Task Force Troy. Over 100 rounds were fired on

four targets, destroying vehicles and buildings.56

These deceptions appear to have had some impact, but at least some in the Iraqi high command

were skeptical. A “foreign source” passed information

to the Iraqi Directorate of General Military Intelligence that an amphibious landing would occur north

of Kuwait City, supported by an American armor

feint through the Wadi al-Batin (at the Iraq-KuwaitSaudi border). If the amphibious landing failed, “A

direct assault by infantry into the teeth of the Iraqi

defense south of Kuwait City near al-Wafra[h] would

occur.” Despite this information, and despite the evidence Iraq had of American plans for an amphibious

operation, Lieutenant General Sabir Abd al-Aziz (director of Iraq’s military intelligence) was not convinced. He felt the Coalition would not risk the heavy

casualties an amphibious operation would entail.57

It is not clear that these doubts were ever communicated to the Iraqi III and IV Corps commanders. Many of the III Corps divisions remained in

defensive positions dug in along the coast, and sand

tables captured in Kuwait after the war showed

how extensively the Iraqis planned to defend

against an amphibious assault. But even if they had

seen through the deception efforts, the Coalition air

campaign would have made shifting forces on a

large scale nearly impossible. 

The Battles of 19–23 February

From 19 to 23 February, the 1st and 2d Marine Divisions moved up to the berm along the KuwaitiSaudi border and cut through it, and then they

moved into Kuwait and prepared for the offensive

against Iraqi forces there. First Marine Division’s

Task Force Taro, commanded by Colonel John Admire and built around his 3d Marines, took up positions on the eastern flank of the division’s breach

to protect the flank of the division during the infil-
Adapted from a 1991 Ministry of Defence (United Kingdom) map by Marine Corps History Division

The Final Preparations 155
156 Liberating Kuwait

Marines from Company E, 2d Battalion, 10th Marines, dig in their howitzer on 23 February 1991 as they prepare to

support the assault on the Iraqi defenses. 

Photo by GySgt C. Archuleta. Official U.S. Marine Corps photo

tration. Task Force Grizzly, commanded by Colonel

James A. Fulks, advanced across the berm and established its blocking position to the north of the

breach to protect that flank of the division during

the assault. Each of these regimental combat teams

was primarily foot mobile and needed to advance

early in order to reach their assigned positions. 

On 21 February, teams of Lieutenant Colonel

Michael L. Rapp’s 1st Reconnaissance Battalion

could not find a route through the minefields for

Task Force Grizzly’s infiltration. Artillery fired in

support of the reconnaissance effort drew return

fire from Iraqi artillery, which landed short of the

Marines’ positions. For most Marines this Iraqi

shelling of the assembly areas was their first time

under fire. Years afterward Lance Corporal Anthony

Swofford of Surveillance and Target Acquisition Platoon, 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, published a florid,

impressionistic account of the experience: 

The first few rounds land within fifteen feet

of the fighting hole Johnny Rotten and I are

digging. Johnny is the first to yell Incoming,

and we crouch in our half-dug hole. The

rounds explode beautifully, and the desert

opens like a flower, a flower of sand. As the

rounds impact, they make a sound of exhalation, as though air is being forced out of the

earth. Sand from the explosion rains into our

hole. Because we’d been deep in the labor of

digging our fighting hole, and the chance of

an enemy attack seemed remote and even impossible, our flak jackets, helmets, weapons,

and gas masks are stacked in an orderly fashion a few feet behind our position. . . . Then

I crawl on my belly to our gear, and as delicately as possible, I throw it all to Johnny and

I crawl backward to the safety of our halfhole, and we don and clear our gas masks.

More rounds impact, and these explosions too

look quite beautiful and make it sound as

though the earth is being beaten, as though

air is being forced out of the earth’s lungs, and

I begin to weep inside my gas mask, not because of fear, though certainly I’m afraid of

one of those rounds landing closer or even on

top of me, but because I’m finally in combat,

my combat action has commenced.58

At the more northerly breach, 2d Marine Division

sent teams from Lieutenant Colonel Scott W. McKenzie’s 2d Reconnaissance Battalion across the berm to

scout its breaches as well. For four days, the teams

reported on Iraqi movements and scouted minefields

without incident, but early in the morning on 20 February, one of the teams was apparently spotted by

the Iraqis and threatened by a mechanized infantry

platoon. Company B, 2d Light Armored Infantry Battalion, extracted the reconnaissance team while Harriers and Marine artillery struck the Iraqis. The rest

of Lieutenant Colonel McKenzie’s teams completed

their missions, under trying conditions, and all had

returned safely by 22 February.59

On 21 February, Lieutenant Colonel Keith T. Holcomb’s 2d Light Armored Infantry Battalion crossed

the berm and began attacking Iraqi positions to the
north of 2d Marine Division’s intended breach site.

Within an hour the battalion began taking Iraqi artillery and mortar fire. Two Marines from a 3d Marine Aircraft Wing low-altitude air-defense team

attached to the battalion proved to be some of the

luckiest Marines in the Persian Gulf when their

humvee was destroyed by a direct hit from an Iraqi

mortar. The official monograph on the 2d Marine

Division in the Gulf War documented this incident:

“The round impacted in the rear of the vehicle, the

force of the explosion pushing the occupants, Lance

Corporal Robert M. Grady and Lance Corporal

William B. Noland, across the hood, from which

they rolled onto the sand. Although the vehicle was

destroyed, both Marines were unhurt, emerging

from the wreck literally without a scratch. Apparently their personal gear and other equipment, piled

behind them, absorbed the effects of the blast. After

returning to the division CP [command post] and

briefing [Major] General [William] Keys, their only

request was for another vehicle so they could return

to the fight.”60

For two days, the battalion aggressively moved

in front of the Iraqi positions. Their success in convincing the Iraqis they were about to undergo a

major attack can be seen in comments made after

the war by Iraqi commanders:

On the 21st a group of enemy tanks . . . an

estimated size of one battalion moved toward

our covering troops in front of the battalion

at the al-Manaqish region [center of Kuwait

border] and attacked the covering troops

using their [Coalition] artillery supported by

missiles [and] armored vehicles . . . clashing

with our troops . . . leading to heavy maneuvering and concluding [with] some of the

enemy tanks and [armored vehicles] withdrawing. [At] 1500 [hours] the vehicles returned for the second time and tried to attack

two different locations. . . . [The] enemy was

unable to remove the covering troops because

of our missiles [free rocket over ground and

multiple rocket launcher] and our reserve

armor retaliation. . . . The enemy was unable

to defeat the covering troops and the [7th Infantry Division]. . . . The army commander

called to present his appreciation to the soldiers for their resistance, and he gave a [commemorative] gun to each soldier.61

Captain Kenneth W. Amidon, commander of

Company C, 2d Light Armored Infantry Battalion,

was awarded the Silver Star for his conduct and

leadership during these actions. As described in his

award citation, Captain Amidon “aggressively and

skillfully maneuvered his Company through heavy

artillery, mortar, rocket, and tank fire to seize an

enemy battalion position and secure a lodgment in

face of an enemy brigade. Over the next two days,

his calm, fearless leadership, and expert employment of forces and supporting arms enabled the

Marines of his company to hold their critical flank

position despite sustained, heavy indirect fire and

repeated attempts by numerically superior tank and

infantry forces to dislodge them. On G-l [23 February], concerned that the deception was losing its effect, Captain Amidon launched a determined and

well-coordinated assault to gain a commanding

view of the enemy’s defenses. Despite incoming artillery, mortar, tank, and antitank fires, he moved to

and occupied a highly exposed position for over

four hours to coordinate combined arms attacks on

the targets he uncovered.”62

The success of Captain Amidon and his fellow

light armored infantry company commanders was

in large part due to the support they received from

the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, despite the poor visibility and hazardous flying conditions created by

the smoke from the many oil fires Iraq had set in

Kuwait. The Iraqi antiaircraft defenses were far from

supine as well, as Captain Troy A. Ward and First

Lieutenant Kevin G. Mechler of Marine Observation

Squadron 2 discovered during the eight hours they

flew in support of the battalion in an OV-10 Bronco.

Both Captain Troy and Lieutenant Mechler received

the Distinguished Flying Cross because they 

conducted two flights totaling 8.1 hours. . . .

During the first flight, [they] simultaneously supported two companies from 2d Light Armored

Infantry Battalion by engaging revetted

enemy tanks and troops in trenches with

close air support and adjusting artillery fire.

During the process of controlling a section of

Marine AV-8B Harriers, [they] successfully

avoided two SA-6 surface-to-air missiles.

[They] remained in the battle and despite the

constant threat of antiaircraft artillery and surface to air missiles, controlled a section of

F/A-18 Hornets on an enemy trench line

which resulted in the destruction of an Iraqi

tank. On another flight later that evening,

using the forward looking infrared radar,

[they] located twelve vehicles despite severe

smoke from fire trenches and burning oil

wells.63

The Final Preparations 157
158 Liberating Kuwait

Then the enemy returned with heavy armor

toward the 14th [Infantry] Division. . . . At

1300 the enemy was forced to stop one kilometer in front of the [Iraqi] covering troops.

On the same day, the enemy troops, using

armor, managed to go forward toward the

covering troops for the 29th [Infantry] Division. The enemy was forced to step backward

after we launched twelve missiles. These missiles were successful in forcing half the enemy

unit to withdraw and the other half to stop.

The enemy’s attacks and air raids became

rapid on this day.65

Concerning Iraqi reports that the Coalition offensive had already begun, General Boomer told General Schwarzkopf “that was our 2d LAI Bn [2d Light

Armored Infantry Battalion]. If they think that’s the

war, they better pray it never starts. We will see.” The

intensity and success of the light armored infantry is

vividly illustrated in the report General Boomer was

given on 22 February at the daily briefing:

Highlight of the day was in the 2d Div [2d Marine Division] sector, where besides scaring

the s——t out of Saddam Hussein, 2d LAI [2d

Light Armored Infantry Battalion] aggressively

engaged, all morning, a series of enemy positions along this general line here. Aggressive

prosecution of tanks throughout the morning

led to engaging tanks at 0910 with direct fire

weapons, engaging tanks with arty [artillery]

and air at 0930. The bottom line—and this engagement petered out right around noon, but

the bottom line on the engagement is over the

course of the 24 hours of operations, some 87

confirmed EPWs [enemy prisoners of war],

with more inbound that the Div[ision] did not

wish to take credit for until they finished

counting, but they are confident the total will

be over 100. Seven T-62s destroyed by fire

with TOWs [antitank missiles], 11 T-62s destroyed with air, 15 vehicles destroyed by direct and indirect fire, and 80 to 90 dead Iraqis

counted in the trench lines that were cleared

by 2d LAI.66

On 23 February, Task Force Taro infiltrated to its

line of departure on 1st Marine Division’s southeastern flank. The task force was led by 2d Battalion,

3d Marines, which suffered a tragedy during the

march when a grenade accidently exploded, killing

one Marine, Private First Class Adam T. Hoage, and

wounding another. Private First Class Hoage “disMarine Corps Art Collection

Harriers Fire the Trenches by Col H. Avery Chenoweth.

AV-8B Harriers from Marine Aircraft Group 13 drop napalm to “fire” oil-filled trenches in Kuwait.

Shortly after midnight on 22 February, Task Force

Grizzly advanced to the first minefield and moved

into hidden positions in front of the Iraqi lines.

Throughout the day they engaged the Iraqis with

81mm mortars, MK19 grenade launchers, machine

guns, antitank missiles, artillery, and air strikes. The

Iraqi return fire was ineffectual, and Colonel Fulks,

the task force commander, withdrew his Marines to

less-exposed positions in the afternoon. Unfortunately, a poorly coordinated friendly air strike prevented another attempt to discover a lane for the

task force through the minefields.64

Iraqi commanders continued to believe that the

light armored infantry attacks, reconnaissance excursions, and infantry probes along the berm were

major Marine assaults that they were fending off. On

22 February, for instance, the Iraqis believed that

the enemy managed to move forward toward

the 26th [Infantry] Division using heavy

forces. The enemy tried to [defeat the division], but the enemy was forced to withdraw

behind the border [with Saudi Arabia]. . . .
Three Marines climb the side of a berm as they move forward into attack positions during Operation Desert Storm. 

Photo by Cpl R. J. Engbrecht. Defense Imagery DM-ST-91-11218

mounted from a transport truck. One of his grenades

caught on the vehicle and the safety pin came out.

Knowing what happened and the hopelessness of

his situation, PFC Hoage stepped away from his

group. The resulting explosion killed him and

wounded another Marine.” The movement was

slowed while the casualties were evacuated, and

then the battalion continued its mission.67

On the northwestern flank, Task Force Grizzly

also advanced to its flanking position. Throughout

23 February, Task Force Grizzly cleared several

Iraqi bunkers and destroyed some Iraqi tanks as it

searched for an infiltration route, preparing its way

as it advanced into Kuwait with numerous artillery

barrages and air strikes. Members of the defending

29th Infantry Division began to surrender to Task

Force Grizzly, and that afternoon this provided the

break that led to the required infiltration route

when Marines searching for the way observed the

routes taken by the surrendering Iraqis.68

The Iraqis continued firing sporadic artillery

strikes against Task Force Grizzly, but these were

ineffective. The Marines’ own artillery missions

were more successful, and Iraqi soldiers continued

to surrender as the Marines prepped to breach the

first minefield. By midnight, Task Force Grizzly had

done just that, breaching the virtually undefended

first minefield and occupying its assigned blocking

position on the division’s left flank.69

Colonel Charles J. Quilter II described the advance:

Fulks now ordered the commander of 3rd

Battalion, 7th Marines, Lieutenant Colonel

[Timothy J.] Hannigan, to infiltrate the mine

belt by force on the night before G-Day. Hannigan’s first problem was resolved by Iraqis

who began walking through the minefield to

surrender. The new enemy prisoners of war

now obligingly marked the lane with chemical

lights provided by the Marines. Then to the

dismay of Fulks and Hannigan, a second unreported mine belt was discovered. This had

evidently been emplaced to discourage retreating by the Iraqi defenders.

This second difficulty was resolved in traditional Marine fashion: Staff Sergeant [Charles

T.] Restifo of the Engineer Platoon took his

bayonet and probed for mines quietly in the

darkness, marking a footpath as he went. Two

companies passed through the second minefield by 0200 of G-Day [24 February] via Restifo’s path, which was soon enlarged to allow

passage of the artillery of 5th Battalion, 11th

Marines.70

Staff Sergeant Restifo was awarded the Silver Star

for his work in preparing the breach. According to

Restifo’s official award citation, “In broad daylight,

The Final Preparations 159
160 Liberating Kuwait

Photo courtesy of MGySgt Gregory L. Gillispie

On 23 February 1991, Iraqi artillery shells the positions of 2d Platoon, Company A, 1st Reconnaissance Battalion, near

Observation Post 4. The shelling was ineffective.

with enemy positions less than 100 meters away,

he identified two enemy soldiers attempting to surrender. Completely disregarding his own safety,

Staff Sergeant Restifo, with two other Marines, ran

across the uncleared minefield and captured the

enemy soldiers. Unnerved by this bold act, an entire

enemy company defending the minefield surrendered. He bravely supervised the detonation of 15

to 20 anti-tank mines and completed the clearing of

three lanes through the minefield.”71

Another of the remarkable actions taken by a Marine during the liberation occurred in these minefields,

when Corporal Gregory R. Stricklin, Company G, 2d

Battalion, 7th Marines, found himself in an unmarked

section of the minefields. Corporal Stricklin believed

the antitank mines were rigged to go off with the

weight of a tank, and he was far less than that. He

then “without hesitation, personally pulled a 300

pound ammunition cart through an unmarked minefield along a very narrow path. He negotiated the

route, heavily laden with anti-tank and anti-personnel

mines, by using the anti-tank mines as stepping

stones. Returning to his section, Corporal Stricklin

guided a second cart through the minefield.”72

As the artillery of the 1st Marine Division established itself in its firing positions prior to the ground

assault on the evening of 23 February, Captain

Phillip Thompson of 1st Battalion, 12th Marines,

was an eyewitness to another tragic case of Marines

killing other Marines:

That’s when I heard a shriek overhead, like

the sound of a huge bedsheet being ripped,

followed by the “tremendous explosion.” At

the same time, an enormous concussion

slammed into the canvas, slapping my legs

and nearly knocking me off balance. Without

thinking, I dove outside toward my shallow

hole, dragging [Private First Class Kyle]

Schneider with me. We landed heavily in the

bottom, confused and frightened. When I

looked up, I saw a huge ball of fire about 50

yards behind my vehicle. Our Q-36 counter

battery radar was completely engulfed in

flames, along with the humvee next to it.

I swiveled my head around, thinking for

some reason that we must be under attack

from tanks. The thought didn’t make sense,

but it’s all my mind would register. It sounded

just like tank fire. I heard Marines screaming

near the burning radar and saw silhouettes

dashing around the flames.73

What Thompson heard was not tank fire. A Marine EA-6B Prowler had launched an AGM-88 missile at an Iraqi antiaircraft radar unit when the Iraqi

radar was turned off. The already fired missile apparently honed in on the Marines’ Q-36 AN/TPO

counterbattery radar instead and destroyed it. Corporal Timothy W. Collins was wounded, and Corporal Aaron A. Pack was killed in the incident.74

In Kuwait, Iraqi forces intensified the “Tariq
Photo courtesy of Maj Thomas P. Simon

This Q-36 counterbattery radar was mistakenly hit by an AGM-88 HARM missile fired by a Marine EA-6B Prowler on

23 February 1991. Cpl Aaron A. Pack lost his life, and Cpl Timothy W. Collins was wounded in the incident. 

Marine Corps Art Collection

G-1, Task Force “Ripper” CP Group by Col H. Avery Chenoweth. On 23 February 1991, the day before the Coalition offensive, the command element of Task Force Ripper makes final preparations for the assault.

The Final Preparations 161
Project,” their plan to use oil fires as a weapon and

shield against the Coalition forces. The sky above

Kuwait was darkened by over 140 burning oil

wells as well as blazing oil-filled trenches along

the Saddam Line. The commander of the III Corps

reported that the entire 29th Infantry Division had

been captured by the allies and requested permission from Baghdad to withdraw. The Iraqi chief of

staff, Lieutenant General Husayn Rashid Muhammad, denied the request.75

The Marines of the I Marine Expeditionary

Force were poised to begin the liberation of

Kuwait as ordered as 23 February came to a close.

They were perched on the edges of the Iraqi defenses and had already established dominance on

the battlefield. 

General Boomer’s Message

On 23 February, Lieutenant General Walter Boomer sent the following message to all members ofthe I Marine Expeditionary Force:

Message to members of

I Marine Expeditionary Force, 23 Feb 91

Lieutenant General Walter E. Boomer, USMC

After months of preparation, we are on the eve of the liberation of Kuwait, a small, peaceful country

that was brutally attacked and subsequently pillaged by Iraq. Now we will attack into Kuwait, not to

conquer, but to drive out the invaders and restore the country to its citizens. In so doing, you not

only return a nation to its people, but you will destroy the war machine of a ruthless dictator, who

fully intended to control this part of the world, thereby endangering many other nations, including

our own.

We will succeed in our mission because we are well-trained and well equipped; because we are

U.S. Marines, Sailors, Soldiers, and Airmen; and because our cause is just. Your children and grandchildren will read about your victory in the years to come and appreciate your sacrifice and courage.

America will watch her sons and daughters and draw strength from your success.

May the spirit of your Marine forefathers ride with you and may God give you the strength to accomplish your mission.

Semper Fi,

Boomer

162 Liberating Kuwait
24 February

On 24 February, the Coalition launched a

ground offensive to free Kuwait and destroy the Iraqi Army and the Republican

Guard. The Coalition forces were organized into

five major maneuver commands. On the far western

flank was the XVIII Airborne Corps, commanded

by Lieutenant General Gary Luck, USA, and consisting of the 82d Airborne Division, the 101st Airborne

Division (Air Assault), the 24th Infantry Division

(Mechanized), and the French 6th Light Armored

Division. Deployed next was the VII Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General Frederick M. Franks

Jr., USA, and containing the 1st Infantry Division

(Mechanized), the 1st Cavalry Division (Armored),

the 1st and 3d Armored Divisions, and the British

1st Armored Division. Next, opposite western

Kuwait, was Joint Forces Command–North, made

up of divisions from Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia.

Then came I Marine Expeditionary Force, and finally on the coast was Joint Forces Command–East.1

The XVIII Airborne Corps began the offensive

when the French 6th Light Armored Division

dashed across the border at 0100 to seize As Salam,

Iraq, while the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)

moved toward an-Nasiriyah, establishing a screen

to the north of the major Coalition operations. Late

in the day, the VII Corps began its own advance

against the Iraqi forces in southeastern Iraq while

its British 1st Armored Division began an assault on

the Iraqi minefields on the Wadi al-Batin, the avenue of approach on the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border that

the Iraqis expected the allies to follow.2

Breaching the Line

with the 1st Marine Division

Beginning on the evening of 23 February, Colonel

James Fulks’s Task Force Grizzly* infiltrated the first

Breaking the Saddam Line

u CHAPTER 9u

Iraqi minefield on foot, beginning a long, slow foot

march to its position flanking the main division

breach. This slow advance on foot was taxing for

the Marines who conducted it throughout the night.

Sergeant Charles G. Grow, a combat artist attached

to 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, later described the

event: “We marched through the cold, damp

evening. When we’d stop we were like frothy

horses and the chill night air would have its way

with us. After donning our chem[ical] gear we

marched ’til sweaty in the warmth of the day. Now

as evening sets in we’ll shiver again and await our

next mission.”3

More than discomfort, the Marines found once

again that they were in more danger from each

other than they were from their Iraqi foes. Just after

dawn on 24 February, Task Force Grizzly engaged

a small group of Iraqi armored columns that fled

the scene. Shortly afterward, Task Force Ripper,

preparing to breach the minefields to the south and

having just seen Iraqi vehicles depart the area,

opened fired on the logistics vehicles of Task Force

Grizzly’s 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, which was leading the task force’s advance.4

Lance Corporal Anthony Swofford of Surveillance and Target Acquisition Platoon, 2d Battalion,

7th Marines, observed the incident: “Rounds pass

directly over our heads while I retrieve my spotter’s

scope from my ruck[sack]. As they pass over, it’s as

though all sound and time and space in their path

are sucked into the rounds. A five-ton truck blows

one hundred yards behind us. Its water buffalo also

blows, into a large bloom of five hundred gallons

of water. And another five-ton takes a hit.”5

Writing years later, Swofford described the feelings engendered in the Marines being fired on by

fellow Marines, as another Marine tries to stop the

shelling by using the radio:

And Johnny continues to scream at the man, and

I hear in his voice astonishment and rage, because of all the things that Johnny believes in,

the superiority of the sniper and the importance

of the small unit, first he believes in the Marine

Corps and that the Marine Corps takes care of its

own, as in doesn’t kill its own, and even though

he knows different, just like the rest of us he’s

never experienced the horribly sublime reality of

Marine Corps tanks shooting at you and hitting

*

1st Marine Division’s regimental combat teams were very heterogeneous due to the hurried, ad hoc nature of the deployment

during Operation Desert Shield. To increase unit identity, they

were designated task forces and assigned names rather than

being known by regiment. Task Force Grizzly was typical of

these task forces. It was commanded by Col Fulks, whose 4th

Marines provided the regimental command group. None of 4th

Marines’ battalions were in the task force, however. Instead, the

three infantry battalions were 2d and 3d Battalions, 7th Marines,

and the 1st Battalion, 25th Marines. 

163
164 Liberating Kuwait

your very own supply convoy, and strangely

enough, hearing the loud, screeching friendly

fire rounds rip overhead, the rounds pulling all

time and space with them, is more mysterious

and thrilling and terrifying than taking the fire

from the enemy, because the enemy fire made

sense but the friendly fire makes no sense.6

Swofford goes on to say that “word is that only

two men died and six were injured at the hands of

the trigger-happy and blind tankers. I don’t believe

this, because the damage is extreme.” In fact one

Marine, Lance Corporal Christian J. Porter, was

killed and three Marines were wounded in the attack. Sergeant Gordon T. Gregory was awarded the

Silver Star for “exposing himself numerous times to

tank and artillery fire while moving his Marines into

defilade positions” during the attack.7

Task Force Grizzly continued its advance after

the tragic incident and reached its assigned blocking position, Hill 191, at 0730. The position was occupied, and the task force spent the rest of the day

taking a “steady stream” of Iraqi prisoners and sending artillery barrages against various Iraqi units.

Some Iraqi mortar fire came in (and was met by artillery fire), but the task force primarily rested and

U.S. Army

prepared to take al-Jaber Air Base the next day, as

planned.8

Task Force Taro,* commanded by Colonel John

Admire, encountered extremely light resistance during its infiltration of the Iraqi minefields. Taro called

in four artillery strikes on various small Iraqi forces

the first day and took many prisoners, but otherwise

the advance was “anticlimactic.” In addition, Taro’s

attached engineer units constructed an additional

lane through the minefield breach to reduce congestion and speed the prisoners’ movement to the rear.9

At 0400 on 24 February, while Task Forces Grizzly and Taro were conducting the infiltrations on

the left and right flanks of the division, Major General James Myatt, the 1st Marine Division commander, ordered Colonel Carlton Fulford’s Task

Force Ripper** to begin the division assault. Lieutenant Colonel Charles H. Cureton witnessed the

*

Task Force Taro was the only homogenous unit of the 1st Marine Division task forces; it consisted of the 3d Marines’ 1st, 2d,

and 3d Battalions. 

**Task Force Ripper was built around Col Fulford’s 7th Marines.

Its battalions included 1st Battalion, 7th Marines; 1st Battalion,

5th Marines; 1st Combat Engineer Battalion; and the 3d Tank

Battalion. As one of the two “mechanized” task forces, its infantry battalions were mounted in assault amphibious vehicles.
breaching operations and later described them in

detail. 

Each obstacle clearing detachment used similar equipment and techniques. On order from

the officer commanding the detachment, an

M60A1 tank equipped with a track-width mine

plow (TWMP) moved to the edge of the minefield and fired a MK58 single-shot line charge

(MCLC) from a trailer towed behind the tank.

Attempts to remotely detonate this type of line

charge invariably failed and a combat engineer

then left the comparative safety of an accompanying AAV [amphibious assault vehicle] and

manually primed the charge. When subsequently detonated, the resulting blast normally

cleared a path some distance into the minefield. The combat engineer repeated the

process until they reached the other side. In

some instances, the MK58 single-shot line

charge failed completely and an AAV with the

newer MK154 three-shot line charge came forward. This happened with “Team Tank,” 1st

Battalion, 7th Marines. The AAV simply moved

behind the tank, fired the line charge over the

tank, then detonated the charge either remotely or manually—normally the latter as

both the MK58 and MK154 remote detonating

systems proved unreliable. Once through a

lane with the line charge the track-width mine

plow-equipped tank plunged forward to clear

and thus proof the lanes against loose or

deeply buried mines.10

Although there was some malfunctioning mine

clearing equipment, the process went essentially according to plan, and all but one of the four initial

lanes were quickly cleared. The fourth took somewhat longer because a mine disabled an assault amphibious vehicle engaged in clearing the minefield.

After clearing the minefields, Lieutenant Colonel

James N. Mattis’s 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, shifted

to the eastern flank, while Lieutenant Colonel

Christopher Cortez’s 1st Battalion, 5th Marines,

shifted to the western flank and Lieutenant Colonel

Alphonso B. Diggs Jr.’s 3d Tank Battalion led the

Night Firefight by Sgt Charles G. Grow. Marines of Company E, 2d Battalion, 7th Marines (part of Task Force Grizzly),

engage in a firefight with Iraqi defenders on 24 February 1991. 

Marine Corps Art Collection

Breaking the Saddam Line 165
166 Liberating Kuwait

Photo courtesy of MGySgt Gregory L. Gillispie

An Iraqi minefield with an unexploded line charge. The Iraqis did not maintain the minefields very well after they were

laid, and the wind uncovered many mines.

way up the center. The advance continued fairly

easily; many Iraqis were surrendering to the advancing Marines of Task Force Ripper until shortly

before 0900 when Iraqi artillery began to fall upon

surrendering Iraqi soldiers. General Thomas Draude

later recalled hearing this described on the radio:

“I’ll never forget this voice, the Marine’s voice; it

was just outraged and shocked, ‘I can’t believe

they’re doing this. What kind of officers are these?

They fire on their own troops.’ I guess that gave us

further reinforcement, ‘God these guys are really

desperate, if that’s what they’ve got to do in order

to hold people in position.’ I think that along with

the fact that things were going well, that meant

maybe things are going to go too well.” The Iraqi

artillery spotter’s position was located in a tower,

and an AH-1W helicopter destroyed it with a missile

shot, after which Iraqi artillery fire became noticeably less effective.11

Shortly before noon, Task Force Ripper began its

assault on the second band of minefields, led by

Lieutenant Colonel Mattis’s battalion, which had rejoined the center after Task Force Papa Bear moved

to the eastern flank of the advancing mechanized

forces. Unlike the first obstacle belt, the Iraqis tried

to oppose this breach. While some Iraqi units continued to fight, other Iraqis attempted to surrender

in ever increasing numbers. Gunnery Sergeant Paul

S. Cochran of the 3d Tank Battalion noted in his

journal that “POWs [prisoners of war] started appearing from everywhere. A total of approx[imately] 300

to 350 were credited to 2nd Plt [platoon], because

the[y] surrendered to our t[an]ks in our sector. POWs

were blowing us kisses, waving American flags and

ask[ing] for food and water.” The combination of determined defenders and masses of surrendering soldiers created a great deal of confusion.12

Task Force Ripper’s combat engineers had three

lanes open through the second obstacle belt by

1215, and Mattis’s battalion and Diggs’s 3d Tank

Battalion started passing through to begin their assault on the Iraqi fortifications. Mattis attempted to

control the burgeoning numbers of prisoners by establishing a temporary holding point, but Lieutenant

Colonel Cureton later noted that “the effort proved

futile. Within minutes the situation worsened. The

loss of one lane forced the diversion of traffic to the

single open lane, [lane] 3. Then, as the mechanized

columns converged, the absence of the division

breach control party, which had not yet been able

to get to the second obstacle belt, compounded an

already difficult situation. Because there was no one

there controlling traffic the lane became a jumble

of prisoners with their Marine guards going in one
Adapted from a 1991 Ministry of Defence (United Kingdom) map by Marine Corps History Division

Breaking the Saddam Line 167
168 Liberating Kuwait

Photo by TSgt Perry Heimer, USAF. Defense Imagery DF-ST-92-08042

Darkening the sky with smoke, oil wells burn out of control over the al-Wafrah Forest after being set ablaze by retreating

Iraqi forces.

direction colliding with the press of supply vehicles

and the LAVs [light armored vehicles] of Task Force

Shepherd attempting to go in the opposite direction. Inevitably, the lane got congested and movement completely halted.”13

Lieutenant Colonel Mattis uncluttered the lane by

ordering his men not to stop for surrendering Iraqi

soldiers but to press forward instead. He ordered the

battalion logistics vehicles to stage their vehicles and

take charge of the prisoners as the battalion advanced. Once through the lanes, he sent a combined

antiarmor team forward. After a brief skirmish with

some Iraqi armor, and after clearing some bunkers

that turned out to be empty, the battalion began an

assault on an area known as the “Emir’s Farm” due

to the trees and buildings in the area. Supported by

Cobras and artillery fire support, Mattis’s Marines

cleared the bunkers and fighting positions around

the Emir’s Farm and destroyed the Iraqi armored vehicles in the area. Once the assault was complete,

Mattis’s battalion was positioned to support the

planned task force assault on al-Jaber airfield, which

had been designated “MEF Objective A.”14

While 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, assaulted the

Emir’s Farm, Diggs’s 3d Tank Battalion advanced

along the center of the task force’s front. It engaged

in a series of small skirmishes, which resulted in 11

destroyed Iraqi tanks and over 100 prisoners before

Diggs halted the unit and oriented his battalion to the

west in preparation for the assault on al-Jaber.

Cortez’s 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, passed through

the lanes in the second obstacle belt after Diggs’s and

Mattis’s battalions, and shifted to the west to cover

the task force’s left flank. It fought a skirmish with

Iraqi armor and collected over 500 prisoners as it positioned itself for the westward assault on al-Jaber.15

Artillery batteries from the 11th Marines had been

firing on al-Jaber for hours while Colonel Fulford’s

command positioned itself for the assault, finally

ceasing the barrage at 1600. The assault was

launched at 1630 and by 1800 the airfield was cut

off. The attack was extremely successful—the Iraqis

surrendered in large numbers with only sporadic,

ineffectual attempts to continue the fight. But the

atmosphere became surreal, as noted in the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines’ command chronology: “All

hands were awestruck by the ominous pall of

smoke emanating from over 50 wellhead fires in the
Photo by SSgt J. R. Ruark. Defense Imagery DM-ST-92-00047

One of 3d Tank Battalion’s M60A1 main battle tanks fitted with reactive armor. This battalion provided the armored

punch to Task Force Ripper.

Task Force Shepherd,* commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Clifford Myers, started the liberation

of Kuwait with only two of its four line companies.

Company C was attached to Task Force Taro, and

Company D was attached to Task Force Ripper.

Myers’s task force passed through the first obstacle

belt without opposition, and Company C returned

to it due to Task Force Taro’s own lack of opposition. Task Force Shepherd was stymied by the traffic jam that developed at the second obstacle belt’s

cleared lanes, but it bypassed that by driving

through the minefield in the recent tracks of Iraqi

vehicles.18

Task Force Shepherd’s command chronology

narrative describes its advance after the second obstacle belt to a screen position northwest of Task

Force Ripper:

En route to its proposed screening position,

Task Force Shepherd, now consisting of Companies A, B, and C, skirts the western boundary of the al-Burqan Oil Fields, and due to the

hundreds of burning oil wells, encounters a

surrealistic battlefield where visibility at 1500

was down to 50 to 100 meters. As Shepherd

continued to lead the [1st Marine] Division’s

advance into Kuwait, progress was slowed by

*

2dLt Gonsalves is describing the commands given in order to

bring the tank’s main gun to fire on the enemy. “Gunner” alerts

the gunner that a command is being given. “SABOT” is the type

of ammunition to be used, an antitank round. 

*

LtCol Myers’s Task Force Shepherd was built around the 1st

Light Armored Infantry Battalion headquarters company with its

line companies drawn from both the 1st and 3d Light Armored

Infantry Battalions. 

al-Burqan Oilfield. Commanders whose senses

were sharply focused found that the rumbling from

the burning [wellheads] played tricks on their hearing, sounding almost like columns of armored vehicles approaching our right flank.”16

It was clear that no organized Iraqi force remained at al-Jaber, and Task Force Ripper reoriented itself to the northeast in preparation for the

second day’s advance, settling into position for a

very dark night beneath a sky filled with black

smoke. Small engagements with isolated Iraqi soldiers and tanks continued through the night. Second Lieutenant James D. Gonsalves of Company C,

3d Tank Battalion, later described one such event,

which was fairly typical of all of the Marines armored encounters on the first day: 

We had pulled up to our 2nd day’s objective

and were awaiting further orders. The smoke

clouds from the burning oil wells were closing in fast, reducing visibility to less than 1,500

meters. All of a sudden my loader, Lance Corporal Rodrigues, yelled: “We got a T-62 out

there—Look!” “Gunner! SABOT! Tank! Range

1100 meters!”* The first explosion was small

but then its ammo started cooking off. I

counted 14 secondary explosions.17

Breaking the Saddam Line 169
170 Liberating Kuwait

belt and prepare a safe landing zone for helicopterborne Task Force X-Ray.20

Shortly after 1500, Colonel Hodory ordered 3d

Battalion, 9th Marines, to assault the second minefield and obstacle belt, as well as trenches occupied

by the Iraqi 22d Brigade, 5th Mechanized Division.

The Iraqis vigorously opposed the assault with

armor, artillery, and mortars. During the breaching

operation, Lance Corporal Kasey A. Krock 

distinguished himself by twice braving enemy

direct and in-direct fire in order to successfully complete his mission. When a line

charge fired from his MK 154 [mine clearance

launcher] failed to detonate, he quickly gathered together the required equipment and

proceeded outside to manually detonate the

defective charge. After successfully doing so

Lance Corporal Krock re-entered the MK 154.

The second line charge shot into the breach

also malfunctioned and again Lance Corporal

Krock instantly exited the vehicle to manually

prime it. This time, however, as the line

charge did not lie exactly in line as the previous shot, he had to navigate through over 20

meters of live minefield in order to successfully prime the charge. After the detonation

of the second line charge, the breach was

complete and the assault element was able to

*

Task Force Papa Bear was built around Col Hodory’s 1st

Marines. Its battalions included 1st Battalion, 1st Marines; 3d Battalion, 9th Marines; and the 1st Tank Battalion. As one of the

two “mechanized” task forces, its infantry battalions were

mounted in amphibious assault vehicles.

Photo by Sgt Roberts. Marine Corps History Division Reference Branch photo files

Marine light armored vehicles pass through lanes cleaned in the Iraqi minefields on 24 February 1991.

not only the poor visibility, but by the multitude of surrendering Iraqi soldiers. Literally

thousands of Iraqis emerged, at times begging

for food. The surrendering Iraqis were told to

continue to march south with their hands in

the air. . . . Any abandoned Iraqi vehicles

were either destroyed in place or bypassed.

Though the advance was extremely slow at

times, Task Force Shepherd effectively established the screen line.19

Colonel Richard W. Hodory’s Task Force Papa

Bear* began the first day of the assault as the division reserve, supporting Task Force Ripper’s main

attack and conducting breaches of the two Iraqi

obstacle belts. At 0900, Hodory’s engineers began

to clear the first obstacle belt, which was unopposed, and within an hour the task force’s first

troops had passed through the obstacle belt and

were proceeding to the second belt. Preparations

for the second obstacle belt began, and by 1200,

despite sporadic Iraqi artillery fire, Task Force Papa

Bear was prepared to breach the second obstacle
The 1st Marine Division’s extensive training paid off during the assault on the Iraqi minefields and obstacles. 

Marine Corps History Division Reference Branch photo files 

successfully assault through the lane and defeat the defenders.

For his actions, Lance Corporal Krock received the

Silver Star.21

When 10 Marines clearing bunkers and rounding

up prisoners were wounded by Iraqi mortar

rounds, Hospitalman Anthony M. Martin, a U.S.

Navy corpsman serving with the 3d Battalion, 9th

Marines, carried three Marines to safety through

heavy mortar fire and came to the aid of six others.

Like Lance Corporal Krock, Hospitalman Martin received the Silver Star for his actions. 

Lieutenant Colonel Michael H. Smith’s 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, continued advancing while the casualties were evacuated to the battalion aid station.

Marine Harriers and Cobras supported the battalion’s

advance as it cleared the Iraqi positions that had opposed its advance, and hundreds of Iraqi soldiers

began surrendering to the battalion. In two separate

incidents, M60 tanks were damaged by mines, temporarily closing lanes, but Lieutenant Colonel Michael

M. Kephart’s 1st Tank Battalion passed through the

lanes, followed by Lieutenant Colonel Michael O. Fallon’s 1st Battalion, 1st Marines. Minor engagements

with Iraqi tanks and armored personnel carriers

were easily defeated by the task force or the omnipresent Cobras of 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, and

hundreds of Iraqi soldiers continued to surrender.

All three battalions of Task Force Papa Bear took

up positions for the night on the edge of the alBurqan oil field.22

Field historian Lieutenant Colonel Cureton provided a vivid description of the situation as night

closed on the 1st Marine Division:

The assault battalions spent the next few hours

sweeping their areas and making final dispositions in a landscape littered with enemy

bunkers, revetted positions, and wrecked

tanks, personnel carriers, and vehicles of all

types. Behind the task force, between the two

obstacle belts, moved support units of the 1st

Marine Division as they took up night defensive positions in the gathering darkness. To the

north the burning wells belched great columns

of flame and smoke. The entire al-Burqan Oilfield seemed to be on fire and no one knew

what enemy force might be lurking there, if

indeed any Iraqis remained in the oilfield at

all. Light from burning wells overpowered

thermal sights and smoke obscured the area.23

Breaking the Saddam Line 171
172 Liberating Kuwait

protective posture. The heavy, charcoal-lined suits

would be worn for most of the rest of the liberation

of Kuwait by the Marines of both divisions; fortunately

for the Marines, the weather remained cool. There is

no documentary evidence that any Iraqi chemical

weapons were used in Kuwait.25

Direct Support Command’s 8th Support Engineer

Battalion supported the division’s breaching efforts

by attaching a company to Task Force Breach Alpha.

Staff Sergeant Daniel A. Kur of that company was

awarded the Silver Star because he 

gallantly led his team in the removal of enemy

mines, while under intermittent mortar fire and

wearing chemical protective over garments[.]

Staff Sergeant Kur courageously extracted

enemy mines by hand, carried the mines out

of the minefield, and guided traffic to keep the

assault force moving. Without regard for his

personal safety, he bravely guided an armored

D7-G dozer through the minefield during conditions of reduced visibility. When the dozer

was hit and disabled by an Iraqi anti-tank

mine, Staff Sergeant Kur was knocked to the

ground. Immediately, he shook off the blast,

checked the operator’s condition, and continued clearing the land of’ mines.26

Such actions were not unique among the engineers clearing lanes through the minefields while

suffering Iraqi mortar and artillery fire. Gunnery Sergeant Mart J. Culp, the noncommissioned officer in

charge of a demolitions team, was kept busy with

unexploded mines all morning. As the recommendation to award Culp a Bronze Star recounts, “Time

and again he entered the minefields, supervising

*

Battery A, 92d Field Artillery, was a multiple-launch rocket-system

battery attached to the Tiger Brigade, 2d Armored Division, commanded by Col John Sylvester. The Tiger Brigade fought under

the operational control of 2d Marine Division, as explained in

chapter 4.

**6th Marines comprised 1st Battalion, 6th Marines; 3d Battalion,

6th Marines; and 2d Battalion, 2d Marines. 

***Task Force Breach Alpha comprised Company B, 2d Combat

Engineer Battalion; Company D, 4th Combat Engineer Battalion;

Provisional General Support Company, 4th Assault Amphibian

Battalion; and Detachment, 4th Tank Battalion. 

Photo by GySgt C. Archuleta. Defense Imagery DM-SC-92-03653

An M270 Multiple Launch Rocket System and an M88 armored recovery vehicle of the Tiger Brigade in Kuwait. 

Breaching the Line

with the 2d Marine Division

Major General William M. Keys’s 2d Marine Division

and the U.S. Army’s attached 1st (Tiger) Brigade, 2d

Armored Division, began their advance into Kuwait

with an extensive bombardment of Iraqi artillery by

the 10th Marines and the multiple rocket launchers

of the Army’s Battery A, 92d Field Artillery.* At 0530,

Colonel Lawrence H. Livingston’s 6th Marines,** reinforced for the breach by the 1st Battalion, 8th

Marines, began its assault by advancing rapidly to

the two minefields and wire obstacles that 2d Marine Division faced.24

Attached to the regiment was Task Force Breach

Alpha,*** which began clearing the minefields at

0600. The process was just as difficult and fraught

with malfunction as it was earlier in the morning

for 1st Marine Division, and the engineers performing the dangerous work took similar risks to secure

the breaches. 

During the breaching process, one of the division’s

XM93 Fox chemical reconnaissance vehicles reported

a possible chemical weapon, and all of the Marines in

the two divisions went to the highest mission-oriented
An M60A1 main battle tank equipped with reactive armor and mine-clearing rollers and plows stands by at the head

of a column of AAV-7 amphibious assault vehicles as the 2d Marine Division prepares to enter Kuwait. 

Photo by SSgt Masters. Defense Imagery DM-ST-91-11590

the setting of demolitions charges and personally

activating the fuzes.”27

The lanes cleared through the minefields were

identified by color (red, blue, or green) and by

number. In the green lanes, Lieutenant Colonel

Bruce A. Gombar’s 1st Battalion, 8th Marines, saw

some of the heaviest fighting experienced during

2d Marine Division’s breach. Several vehicles were

disabled by mines, and many of the line charges intended to clear the fields failed to explode. Two

demolition team Marines, Corporal George J. Morgan and Lance Corporal Gerald Randolph, entered

the minefields to fix this: “They set new fuses to unexploded line charges, ignited them, and raced

back through the minefields with only seconds to

spare before the charges exploded.” Lieutenant

Colonel John D. Winchester, commanding officer of

the 2d Combat Engineer Battalion, believed that the

minefield at the green lanes was laid more competently than the fields through which the red and

blue lanes passed.28

Once through the first minefield, Gombar’s battalion fought against small, scattered groups of Iraqi

soldiers. Corporal Robert L. Novak, a squad leader

for Combined Anti-Armor Team II, Weapons Company, 1st Battalion, 8th Marines, showed how efficient the Marines were in quickly overwhelming

Iraqi opposition. As documented in his Silver Star

citation, Novak was part of “the lead element of the

battalion as it continued its attack north of the initial Iraqi defensive belt. As lead elements of the platoon encountered small-arms fire, Corporal Novak,

acting through his own initiative, directed his squad

into firing positions and personally acquired targets. Within minutes, he destroyed an enemy tank,

two armored personnel carriers, and a towed artillery piece that was in the process of displacing.”29

Lieutenant Colonel Dennis P. Mroczkowski, the

field historian attached to the 2d Marine Division,

later described one of the small firefights the battalion engaged in as it cleared the obstacle belt:

Company A had the mission of guarding the

battalion’s flank in this area; accordingly, the

3d Platoon was ordered to secure a building,

surrounded by a chain-link fence, located 800

meters to the east. The platoon was mounted

in assault amphibious vehicles. As they came

within 300 meters of the building, Iraqi soldiers inside it opened fire with rocket-propelled grenades. The platoon dismounted,

and under cover of the vehicles’ .50-caliber

Breaking the Saddam Line 173
174 Liberating Kuwait

Defense Imagery DM-ST-91-11583

Marine artillerymen from the 2d Marine Division fire their M198 155mm howitzer in support of the opening of the

ground offensive to free Kuwait during Operation Desert Storm. 

machineguns, attacked through volleys of

grenades. Within 100 meters of the building,

the platoon was pinned down by automatic

weapons fire. The 3d Squad was ordered to

attack the building while the rest of the platoon laid down covering fires. In open view

of the Iraqis and under fire, Sergeant William

J. Warren, leader of the 3d Squad, stood up

and moved among his fire teams, giving orders and encouraging his men. He maneuvered his teams to within 20 meters of the

building, and then led an assault through a

hole in the fence. As the squad entered the

building, the shaken Iraqi troops fled from it,

seeking escape across the desert.30

Soon all of the assault battalions were facing

similar skirmishes as the obstacle belt was pierced.

Lieutenant Colonel Mroczkowski noted that 

these early actions set the precedent for the

next three days of the war. As elements of the

division moved forward or approached objectives, they would encounter enemy resistance. But through rapid fire and maneuver,

the Iraqis were overwhelmed. By outflanking

them constantly, destroying their heavy weapons

with air and artillery fire, the division gave the

Iraqis the choice of surrendering or dying where

they stood. Thousands of them chose the former.31

All of 6th Marines’ battalions proceeded through

their objectives throughout the morning. By noon,

they had advanced far enough for the division’s armored and mechanized forces to begin moving

through the breach. The 2d Tank Battalion had

passed through by 1250; by 1600, the Tiger Brigade

was passing through the lanes in force. The division

halted its forward movement with the arrival of sunset. Most of Major General Keys’s combat power had

advanced through the minefields and was securing

the breach head. On the left, Colonel John Sylvester’s

Tiger Brigade was preparing for the next northward

advance. The 6th Marines held the center, and Lieutenant Colonel Cesare Cardi’s 2d Tank Battalion held

the left, which rested on the isolated, reportedly

abandoned but not yet cleared al-Jaber Air Base,

also known as “MEF Objective A.” It was 1st Marine Division’s task to seize and clear al-Jaber, so
The battleship USS Wisconsin (BB 64) fires a round from one of its 16-inch guns at Iraqi targets in Kuwait. In the first

days of the ground war, the battleships—directed by Marine ANGLICO teams—often fired in support of the Saudi troops

advancing along the coastal highway.

Defense Imagery DN-SC-92-08659

Major General Keys contacted 1st Marine Division’s

Task Force Grizzly to ensure the flank was secure

and merely screened that flank with a companysized, humvee-mounted task force.32

The day’s fighting cost the 2d Marine Division

14 casualties. Two of these casualties were deaths:

Corporal Phillip J. Jones, 3d Battalion, 10th Marines,

was killed when the breech mechanism of a howitzer misfired; the other death was a soldier from

the Tiger Brigade. The 8th Tank Battalion’s command chronology described the soldier’s death in

the following way: “Shortly after nightfall, a U.S.

Army HMMWV [humvee] with three soldiers in it

wandered into a nearby minefield and ran into an

anti-personnel mine. . . . One soldier, the driver,

was fatally injured and died shortly after the mine

detonation. The gunner was injured and was medevaced [medically evacuated] from the battalion’s

Alpha Command area. The lieutenant, riding in the

front seat, had minor injuries. . . . The death of the

soldier weighed heavily on the battalion personnel

involved in the rescue.” Twelve Marines and soldiers were wounded during the day’s advance.

Many Iraqis had been killed, but far more had surrendered, and the division had achieved all of its

objectives for the first day of fighting.33

With Joint Forces Command–East

and the Marines Afloat

As the Marines of the I Marine Expeditionary Force

advanced through the defenses at the center of the

Saudi-Kuwait border, Marines of 1st ANGLICO, 2d

ANGLICO, and force reconnaissance supported the

Saudi Arabian forces of Joint Forces Command–East

as they advanced into Kuwait along the coastal

highway. 

Joint Forces Command–East, commanded by

Major General Sultan ‘Adi al-Mutairi, was organized

into four task forces; three of these (Abu Bakr, Othman, and Omar) were named after the first three

caliphs. The fourth, Tariq, was named for the Muslim conqueror of Spain. Abu Bakr Task Force comprised the 2d Saudi Arabian National Guard Brigade

and an attached Qatari armored battalion. Othman

Task Force was built around the 8th Mechanized

Brigade of the Ministry of Defense and Aviation,

Breaking the Saddam Line 175
176 Liberating Kuwait

Photo by GySgt C. Archuleta. Marine Corps History Division Reference Branch photo files

Cobra helicopters escort vehicles of 2d Battalion, 10th Marines, through a minefield breech. Cobra pilots closely supported

the Marines on the ground during the advance through the Iraqi minefields.

with Bahraini and Kuwaiti infantry companies attached. Omar Task Force was built around the 10th

Mechanized Brigade of the Ministry of Defense and

Aviation and included an Omani infantry battalion.

Tariq Task Force comprised two battalions of Saudi

Arabian marines as well as Moroccan and Senegalese infantry battalions.34

The Saudi forces met no significant resistance,

but they received extensive support from the two

U.S. battleships firing at targets along the coast. Admiral Stanley Arthur used the battleships to continue

the amphibious feint because they were strongly associated with an amphibious assault. After the war

he remarked, “All I had to do was start moving the

battleships . . . and then line General Jenkins and

his fine Marines and our amphibs [amphibious

ships] up behind them, and there was no doubt in

anybody’s mind that we were coming.”35

Most of the battleships’ 16-inch naval gunfire was

directed at preplanned targets, but some spectacular

direct support was also provided. On the first day,

this came to the aid of the Joint Forces Command–

East troops and Captain Douglas Kleinsmith of the

1st ANGLICO: 

The Saudi battalion commander, a colonel,

looked at him [Kleinsmith] incredulously.

“You can call in the battleships?” he asked.

“Yea[h],” answered Captain Kleinsmith, “That’s

why we’re here.” Kleinsmith contacted Wisconsin and the battleship opened fire. The

captain heard the muted roar of her 16-inch

guns through his radio. The 43 seconds required for the first shell to reach its target

seemed an eternity. Kleinsmith was beginning

to wonder if he had transmitted the wrong coordinates when projectiles began to fall precisely where he wanted them. The Saudi

marines stared in amazement as the 2,700

pound shells lifted whole houses into the air.

“You can do this anytime?” asked the Saudi

battalion commander. Kleinsmith replied in

the affirmative. “Ah,” exclaimed the colonel,

“we can win now.”36

The battleship support was somewhat irrelevant,

however, because the Saudi advance encountered

almost no resistance on the first day as it advanced

into Kuwait and captured thousands of Iraqi prisoners. 

Also on 24 February, the 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade began moving ashore in order to fill

the gap between the I Marine Expeditionary Force

and Joint Forces Command–East. The brigade’s 3d

Battalion, 1st Marines, was helilifted directly to the

south of the al-Wafrah oil field on the Saudi-Kuwaiti

border, where it established a blocking position.

Meanwhile, the rest of Colonel Randolph A. Gangle’s Regimental Landing Team 5 began landing at

the port of al-Mishab. 

Air Operations

On 24 February, the Marine air-ground task force

concept was operating according to Marine doc-
An F/A-18 Hornet of Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 314 during the Gulf War.

Marine Corps History Division Reference Branch photo files

trine, as the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing’s Harriers, Hornets, and Cobras provided close air support to the

1st and 2d Marine Divisions during the assault. This

support was primarily focused on the artillery. The

1st Marine Division commander, General James

Myatt, explained after the war that “between 0600

and 1400 on that first day, we had 42 instances of

incoming artillery. . . . We were able to use our artillery to attack 24 of the 42 targets. The remainder

were attacked by Marine AV-8B aircraft within a few

minutes of the artillery fire being detected. I am

very proud of that air-ground coordination.”37

Even with the close air support calls, most Marine aircraft ended up shifting north to fly battlefield

air interdiction missions during the busy first day of

the war, and the Iraqi air defenses were not entirely

supine. At 1010 Major Robert M. Knutzen and First

Lieutenant Scott M. Quinlan of Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 314 were flying their F/A-18s north

after attacking targets west of Kuwait City when

they were each hit by Iraqi infrared guided surfaceto-air missiles. Although each jet lost one engine,

both aircraft returned safely to base and were successfully repaired.38

Not all of the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing’s operations were successful on 24 February, however.

Task Force Troy was intended to land an infantry

battalion on the right flank of the 1st Marine Division after it had passed through the obstacle belts.

Task Force Papa Bear was to secure Landing Zone

Sandy for the assault. A “one wave” assault was

planned, utilizing over 50 CH-46 and CH-53 helicopters from Marine Aircraft Group 16. The helicopters were commanded by Marine Helicopter

Squadron 165’s commander, Lieutenant Colonel

Marvin D. “Sam” Hall. His helicopters were to carry

132 troops and 40 vehicles from the 1st Battalion,

3d Marines, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel

Michael V. Maloney. Because the crews were not

trained for, or the helicopters equipped for, a night

assault, the task force was scheduled to launch prior

to 1645.39

In the event, the mission was ordered at 1740,

and a dust cloud rose up in the launch area, causing

a CH-46 to roll over, though all on board escaped

severe injury. After takeoff, the task force reached

the landing zone at 1800, finding “a battlefield active

with burning wells, burning enemy tanks, machinegun and antiaircraft fire, and Marine vehicles that

milled about without any apparent sense of direction.” The decision was made to abort the operation,

and Task Force Troy made a confused, dangerous

return to the Lonesome Dove airfield. Lieutenant

Colonel Michael J. Aguilar, executive officer of Marine Aircraft Group 16 would later state: “The mission was never planned to be run as a night NVG

[night-vision goggle] assault. The requirements to

execute had not been met. In fact the aircrews were

not qualified to do a night NVG assault. Only because of individual aviator skills did we avoid mulBreaking the Saddam Line 177
178 Liberating Kuwait

Marines of the 1st Marine Division board CH-46 helicopters. The blowing dust and poor visibility highlight the difficulties

helicopters encountered in the desert.

Photo by LtCol Charles H. Cureton

tiple mid-air collisions, and I am not exaggerating

that at all. Oh, there were a lot of people that came

back with religion [after that mission].”40

In the morning on 24 February, Saddam Hussein

noted at a command meeting that “the enemy continues to drown in his own blood and shame in

front of our [frontline] units. . . . Despite all that took

place, our faithful men were able to drive out the

first surprise attack. . . . Generally, our units are in

the best shape possible under this kind [of attack].

The enemy’s attack has failed completely.” The III

Corps commander, Major General Salah Aboud

Mahmoud, was better informed of events in Kuwait,

but none of the Iraqi leaders appear to have realized how badly the first day of the Coalition attack

had gone for the Iraqi forces. Even General Salah

Aboud later noted that “in spite of the enemy’s huge

penetration to many locations . . . I made sure that

the enemy’s troops suffered the most casualties.”41

25 February 

On 25 February, the XVIII Airborne Corps’ 24th Infantry Division advanced toward the Euphrates valley while the rest of the corps continued to screen

to the north and west of the Coalition advance. The

VII Corps continued its advance into southeastern

Iraq as it drove across the desert toward the Republican Guard. As it advanced, the VII Corps destroyed the divisions of the VII Corps charged with

defending the Iraqi western flank as they were encountered.42

The Battle of Burqan

During the afternoon and evening of 24 February,

General Salah Aboud revised his plan for a counterattack against the advancing Marines. The plan

called for a pincer attack, with the 7th Infantry Division attacking from the north into the 2d Marine

Division’s area of operations while the 5th Mechanized Division attacked in the southwest, out of the

al-Burqan oil field, with al-Jaber airfield as its objective. The 8th Infantry and 3d Armored Divisions

would reestablish defensive lines behind the counterattack. The Iraqis began moving long before

dawn on 25 February, slowed by extremely poor

visibility in the smoke-filled night.43

Shortly after 0100, General Myatt was convinced

from captured Iraqi maps, prisoner interviews, and

radio intercepts that an Iraqi counterattack was imminent and that this attack could come “out of the

fire” of the al-Burqan oil field. At this time, Task

Force Shepherd was screening Task Forces Ripper

and Papa Bear along the al-Burqan flank, but General Myatt’s forward division headquarters was set

up right next to the oil fields, with only Company

C, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, as a security force.
Adapted from a 1991 Ministry of Defence (United Kingdom) map by Marine Corps History Division

Breaking the Saddam Line 179
180 Liberating Kuwait

Photo courtesy of Capt Paul E. Bowen

Aerial view of a Marine force, comprising five M60A1 tanks and four AAV-7 amtracs plus HMMV support vehicles, advancing near al-Burqan oil field in Kuwait.

Company B of Task Force Shepherd was detached

to reinforce the division headquarters. Captain

Eddie S. Ray, Company B’s commander, was disappointed and felt this new mission would leave his

company out of the action on 25 February.44

The first Iraqi attacks came in the early dawn

hours, as Task Force Shepherd’s Company D and

Task Force Ripper’s 3d Tank Battalion engaged in

an hour-long firefight with Iraqi armor and infantry.

Five to 10 Iraqi tanks were destroyed before this

first Iraqi assault was fended off. Staff Sergeant

Joseph A. LeGarde was a section leader in the antitank company of the 3d Tank Battalion for this engagement. His Silver Star award citation describes

his actions in the assault: “Early that morning, Staff

Sergeant LeGarde moved his section forward of the

battalion in response to a message indicating that

enemy tanks were approaching. Positioning himself

well forward, he identified two platoons of Iraqi

tanks and one platoon of armored personnel carriers rapidly closing. Staff Sergeant LeGarde quickly

directed his squads into their primary firing positions and without regard for his own safety, delivered suppressive fire from a heavy machinegun.

From an exposed position, he maintained firm control over his squads and directed the identification,

isolation, and destruction of five Iraqi tanks and one

armored personnel carrier.”45

While Task Force Ripper was fending off the initial thrust of the southwest pincer, the 2d Marine

Division was destroying the north pincer of the Iraqi

attack. This action was called the “Reveille Counterattack” by some. During the event, the armored

columns of the Iraqi 7th Infantry and 3d Armored

Divisions were met around 0620 by 1st Battalion,

8th Marines, and the attached Company B, 4th Tank

Battalion. 

Lance Corporal Chris A. Sweeney, then serving

as an antitank missile gunner with Weapons Company, 1st Battalion, 8th Marines, was awarded the

Silver Star for his actions in the fight. When the Iraqi

assault began, Lance Corporal Sweeney “positioned

his vehicle and within minutes destroyed two Iraqi

tanks that were rapidly approaching the battalion’s

flank. Without regard for his own safety while

under heavy small-arms and tank main gun fire,

Lance Corporal Sweeney remained dangerously exposed for more than eleven seconds as he engaged

and destroyed an enemy armored personnel carrier.

Realizing his position had become untenable, he directed his vehicle into an abandoned enemy revetment and engaged and destroyed a third enemy

tank. As the battalion continued its attack, Lance

Corporal Sweeney observed several enemy tanks in

hull-defilade positions in prepared revetments. Recognizing the imminent threat to the battalion, he
A Marine Corps M1A1 Abrams main battle tank equipped with a mine-clearing plow passes a truck in an abandoned

Iraqi position. Marine tankers were very successful with the Abrams in the first Marine Corps combat service of the new

tank.

Photo by SSgt Masters. Defense Imagery DM-ST-91-11623

quickly went into action destroying three enemy

tanks with lightning speed.”46

Company B, 4th Tank Battalion—a reserve unit—

was equipped just before they departed for the Gulf

with M1A1 Abrams main battle tanks. According to

Colonel Charles Quilter, “The company [Company

B] was stopped near the division boundary line

about five miles north of the al-Jaber Airfield shortly

before dawn at 0555 on the second day. The tankers

were now surprised to hear, then see in their night

vision devices, a formation of T-72s—Iraq’s most

formidable main battle tank—coming through a position of what turned out to be another formation

of T-55 tanks that were dug into revetments. . . . In

an action that lasted only a few minutes, the company destroyed or stopped 34 of 35 enemy tanks.”47

At 0730, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, began to

move into the oil fields. Visibility was reduced to

200 meters or less, and the battalion moved forward

very slowly. Then from 0750 to 0820, the 11th

Marines fired massed, multibattalion artillery barrages on the suspected locations of the Iraqi 22d

Brigade, 5th Mechanized Division, and 15th

Brigade, 3d Armored Division.

48

Meanwhile, as Task Force Papa Bear prepared

for the day’s actions, one of the war’s more unique

events occurred at its command post: 

At 0800 Colonel Hodory and his staff were still

briefing late arriving commanders when a T55 tank and three Type-63 armored personnel

carriers emerged from the fog and halted

about 50 meters from where Colonel Hodory

stood. The tank sat motionless with its gun

perfectly sighted on Hodory’s command vehicles. It never fired. Instead, the brigade commander came forward and surrendered to the

astonished Marines. When questioned, he revealed that his force made up part of the 22d

Brigade, 5th Mechanized Division assigned to

attack the American right flank. When questioned further, he explained that he no longer

wished to fight nor did the group accompanying him. However, he could not speak for

those behind him in the fog.49

The Iraqi colonel’s brigade started attacking the

command post even as Colonel Hodory was accepting the colonel’s surrender. The task force operations officer, Major John H. Turner, recalled that “we

had main gun rounds, machine gun tracers and

even 5.56mm fire (from India 3/9 [3d Battalion, 9th

Marines]) coming through the CP [command post].

I remember hitting the deck for the first time during

the war and I saw tracers going through the CP

from east to west at knee height.” The headquarters

Breaking the Saddam Line 181
182 Liberating Kuwait

Photo by LtCol Charles H. Cureton

Task Force Papa Bear’s armored vehicles on 23 February, staging for the ground assault. During the Battle of Burqan,

this task force’s M60A1 tanks smashed an Iraqi armored brigade’s counterattack. 

Photo by LtCol Charles H. Cureton

An M60A1 of Task Force Papa Bear sits before a burning oil well. This photograph was taken in the afternoon, at approximately 1500.

element fought off the Iraqi attack. Two Marines,

Corporal Bryan K. Zickefoose and Lance Corporal

Michael S. Kilpatrick, both with 3d Battalion, 9th

Marines, were instrumental in driving off this Iraqi

counterattack. To achieve this, they employed AT4 antitank rockets to destroy an Iraqi armored personnel carrier, and both were awarded the Silver

Star for their actions.50

Informed by Colonel Hodory of the Iraqi counterattack, Task Force Papa Bear’s 1st Tank Battalion—with Company I of the 3d Battalion, 9th

Marines, attached—engaged the Iraqi brigade in a

classic armored clash and destroyed at least 18 Iraqi

armored vehicles. This engagement continued for

the next three hours.51

Inside the oil field, the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines,

encountered the 15th Mechanized Infantry Brigade,

3d Armored Division, at 0915. During the ensuing

struggle, the battalion captured large numbers of

Iraqi prisoners and destroyed multiple Iraqi armored

vehicles.52

Despite events on the ground, the senior Iraqi

commanders felt these initial attacks were successful. After the war, General Salah Aboud Mahmoud
Photo by Sgt Roberts. Marine Corps History Division Reference Branch photo files

Marine Cobra attack helicopters fly above light armored vehicles. Cobras and light armored vehicles worked together

closely during the Battle of Burqan, driving off three different Iraqi attacks on the division headquarters.

recalled, “This action caused the enemy to withdraw from [the] battleground as our tanks were firing at the enemy tanks across the minefield while

it was advancing to stop whatever was left of the

penetration.”53

At 0930, the first of the day’s multiple Iraqi attacks on the 1st Marine Division’s forward headquarters began:

The first hint that something was amiss occurred soon after Company B arrived. Commanded by Captain Eddie S. Ray, the company

had just gotten into position when one of its

LAVs suddenly fired into the fog. That caught

everyone’s attention. There had been no radio

communication and a quick check showed the

firing to have been the result of an accidental

discharge. However, no sooner did the company commander complete his investigation

than 100 Iraqi soldiers appeared wanting to surrender. Spooked by the 25mm gun fire, their

arrival at a location already swept the previous

day raised questions about what might be developing further out in the fog and smoke. At

first, Marines around the command post could

only hear the low sound and rumble of moving

tanks and vehicles. Then, the smoke and fog

suddenly lifted to reveal an attacking force consisting of five T-55s, 33 armored personnel carriers, and some dismounted infantry.54

This attack led Second Lieutenant Thomas O.

O’Connor, a platoon commander with Company C,

1st Battalion, 1st Marines, to sweep a tree line to establish security when “the five man team led by Second Lieutenant O’Connor came under an Iraqi

mechanized attack, supported by dismounted infantry. Leading his team forward in the face of a numerically superior enemy, Second Lieutenant

O’Connor positioned them in an unoccupied

enemy bunker, where they were pinned down by

accurate mortar, rocket-propelled grenades, heavy

machinegun and 73mm fire. Sensing the grave situation facing his team and with total disregard for

his own welfare, Second Lieutenant O’Connor maneuvered through intense enemy fire to a position

on the enemy’s flank, firing light antiarmor

weapons and AT-4 Rockets . . . at the lead enemy

elements, thus drawing fire onto himself and relieving his team.”55

After an hour of fierce fighting, this first attack

on the division command post was driven off.

Breaking the Saddam Line 183
184 Liberating Kuwait

serve unit from Richmond, Virginia, attached

to the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines), spotted

two enemy multiple rocket launchers preparing to fire on Marine positions. He thought

they were tanks but his gun commander, Sergeant Thomas Stark, IV, looked closer and

confirmed that they were rocket launchers.

After quickly swinging their guns on the vehicles and taking direct aim at point-blank

range, the artillerymen put both launchers out

of action with a combination of automatic

weapons and direct fire from their M198

155mm howitzers.58

By 1100, 1st Tank Battalion controlled the battlefield. Remnants of the Iraqi force soon surrendered or withdrew north through the burning wells.

In a fight lasting three hours, the battalion had successfully stopped an attack by two Iraqi Brigades

(the 501st Brigade, 8th Infantry Division, and the

22d Brigade, 5th Mechanized Division). Fifty Iraqi

tanks were disabled, 25 armored personnel carriers

were destroyed, and 300 prisoners taken. There

were no Marine casualties.

The third and final Iraqi attack was also launched

against the 1st Marine Division headquarters. During this assault, “General Draude raised the side of

the headquarters tent to provide command element

staff with a panoramic view of the battlefield as

Iraqi tanks and personnel carriers came under fire.”

This attack was again repulsed by the command

post’s security force, and in this final attack Iraqi

losses were at least 2 tanks, 27 armored personnel

carriers, and 300-plus captured soldiers. Captain

The dark, overcast sky and burning oil wells beyond this

Marine humvee illustrate the surreal conditions Marines

faced during the Battle of Burqan on the morning of 25

February. 

Photo by LtCol Charles H. Cureton 

Photo courtesy of MGySgt Gregory L. Gillispie

Marines of 2d Platoon, Company A, 1st Reconnaissance

Battalion, examine a captured Iraqi T-62 at al-Jaber airfield on 25 February 1991.

Meanwhile, Task Force Papa Bear was continuing

its destruction of the 22d Brigade, 5th Mechanized

Division. As the smoke began to clear, 3d Marine

Aircraft Wing Cobras were able to make a more direct contribution to the fight. Corporal Bryan R.

Freeman of the 1st Tank Battalion was awarded the

Silver Star for his efforts in finding and designating

targets for the Cobras.56

Only 15 minutes after the first attack had been

repulsed, the Iraqis attacking the division command

post had reorganized and launched a second attack.

Captain Eddie Ray’s Company B of Task Force Shepherd and Company C, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, responded with a heavy dose of firepower that again

drove the Iraqis away.57

In the meantime, the division’s artillery was shifting to prepare for the next part of the offensive and

was encountering its own Iraqi forces. 

In the late morning as Battery A, 1st Battalion,

11th Marines, and the battalion command post

moved to a new firing position, they came

under automatic weapons fire from a group

of Iraqi vehicles positioned to the northeast

of them. The battery commander immediately

ordered one gun into a hasty firing position

to engage the enemy force with direct fire. It

destroyed one vehicle and dispersed the remainder. An hour later, Sergeant Shawn Toney

of Battery H, 3d Battalion, 14th Marines (a re-
Marine Corps History Division Reference Branch photo files

An amtrac from the 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion attached to 2d Battalion, 4th Marines, advances through

Kuwait with the 2d Marine Division. 

adjust the advance of the division’s right flank

to encompass the oilfield.62

The division ended the day prepared to advance

on a broad front against Kuwait International Airport, but poor visibility and blowing smoke prevented air support for a night attack and reduced

the ground forces’ visibility considerably as well.

The division settled in to wait for the dawn. 

Taking the Ice Cube Tray

After destroying the north pincer of the Iraqi counterattack in the morning, General Keys’s 2d Marine

Division continued the process of preparing for its

northward advance. He placed his three maneuver

elements on line, with the Tiger Brigade on the left

(with an unguarded flank, since the Egyptian, Syrian,

and Saudi Arabia forces of Joint Forces Command–

North advanced very slowly), the 6th Marines in the

center, and the 8th Marines on the right. The 2d

Light Armored Battalion screened the right flank between the two divisions. 

At 1315, 2d Marine Division started its attack

north toward the “Ice Cube Tray” and the “Ice

Cube” (built-up areas named after the way they appeared on maps). The Marines and soldiers of the

division fought skirmishes all the way north:

A platoon of tanks from Company C, 8th Tank

Battalion was attached to Company C, 1st Battalion, 6th Marines. This platoon’s experiences

were representative of the actions across the

division’s front on this day. Commanded by

Chief Warrant Officer-2 Charles D. Paxton, the

tanks encountered several Iraqi tanks and armored personnel carriers soon after crossing

the line. The platoon quickly destroyed seven

Ray was awarded the Navy Cross for his aggressive,

skillful defense of the division headquarters,* one

of only two awarded to Marines in the Gulf War.59

General Salah Aboud recalled that the Americans

needed a heavy air raid just to “retain their positions.” He believed it was “a heavy battle . . . [with]

both sides suffering many casualties including armored vehicles and tanks.”60

As Task Forces Papa Bear and Ripper reoriented

themselves to continue the offensive after the Iraqi

counterattack, Task Force X-Ray, whose helicopter

insertion was postponed from the previous day,

launched and inserted without incident. Task Force

X-Ray landed just south of the second obstacle, and

its ground element was then attached to Task Force

Papa Bear. By 1830, Task Force X-Ray had moved

through the second obstacle belt and was in its

blocking position guarding the division’s right flank.

At 1600, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, reached its

designated limit of advance, having destroyed 43

Iraqi vehicles and captured over 500 Iraqi soldiers

during its advance. Three Marines of the battalion

were wounded in the surreal fighting inside the

burning oil fields. The Battle of Burqan was over,

and the 1st Marine Division was prepared to continue the advance to Kuwait City.

Task Force Grizzly had been given the task of

clearing al-Jaber airfield, but the darkness and various logistical issues slowed its passage through the

second obstacle belt and its relief of 1st Battalion,

7th Marines. By 1600, however, the task force was

prepared to begin its assault on the airfield, and at

1722, artillery barrages were launched against the

airfield’s defenses. The Iraqi 449th Artillery Brigade

replied with one of the most accurate Iraqi artillery

barrages of the war, in which 12 Marines were

wounded and Lance Corporal Brian L. Lane from

3d Battalion, 7th Marines, was killed. Despite this

setback Task Force Grizzly pressed the attack into

the airfield, encountered minimal resistance inside

the perimeter wire, and by 2100 had cleared most

of the field, with just a few buildings remaining.61

The Iraqi counterattack had impacted the 1st Marine division’s plans:

Instead of bypassing the al-Burqan Oilfield as

originally decided—scientists said the burning

wells produced toxins that made the area uninhabitable, thus it was seen as a barrier—the

Iraqi attack proved that a large unit could operate and survive there. General Myatt had to

Breaking the Saddam Line 185

*

See appendix D for the complete citation.
186 Liberating Kuwait

Gen Boomer’s mobile I Marine Expeditionary Force command post near Khanjar, Saudi Arabia. 

Photo courtesy of Capt Paul E. Bowen

tanks and four of the APCs [armored personnel

carriers], all the while continuing the momentum of the attack. When smoke and fog reduced visibility to only 200 meters, enemy

targets had to be engaged at close range. Nevertheless, Chief Warrant Officer Paxton continued to press his platoon forward, destroying

another six tanks and two ZSU 23-4 antiaircraft

guns before consolidating his own defense for

the night.63

By sunset, or what passed for sunset in the oilsmoke-filled, burning Kuwaiti oil fields, 2d Marine

Division had reached Phase Line Horse and was prepared for its planned assault on the Mutla Ridge and

al-Jahwarh the next day. As with the 1st Marine Division, the 2d Marine Division faced a very, very dark

night. Many Iraqis continued to surrender en masse

to the Marines, but there were some unexpected firefights. Corporal Robert Novak found himself in such

a fight, much like that he faced the previous day. His

platoon was “screening forward of the battalion

when it encountered, at close range, six enemy armored personnel carriers. He directed his squad to

firing positions and then began employing his own

weapon, quickly destroying three enemy armored

personnel carriers.” He was awarded the Silver Star

for his continual calm leadership and actions under

fire.64

As the 1st and 2d Marine Divisions fought through

the Iraqi defenses on 25 February, Lieutenant General Walter Boomer left the I Marine Expeditionary

Force (Forward) headquarters in a mobile command

post built around two command-variant light armored vehicles and comprised of 48 Marines and

one news reporter, Molly Moore of the Washington

Post. After passing through the lanes in the minefields, General Boomer’s mobile command post

linked up with 2d Marine Division. Boomer’s convoy

had a scare shortly after 2200 that evening, southwest

of the Ice Cube Tray, when it was suddenly surrounded by Iraqi soldiers trying to surrender.65

Molly Moore later described the scene: “On the

second night of the war, the command convoy was

suddenly surrounded by armed Iraqis. Confused radiomen screamed warnings about ‘dismounted infantry!’ Some Iraqis appeared ready to surrender;

others remained prone behind sand berms with rifles pointed toward the convoy. It turned out that

the Iraqis were indeed surrendering, but the convoy

was immobilized for three hours while the Marines

rounded them up.”66

General Boomer’s convoy continued on through

the night, but it was a nerve-wracking advance:
Photo by Sgt Charles G. Grow. Defense Imagery DM-SD-00-01223 

A Marine Corps OV-10A Bronco at King Abdul Aziz airfield, with AV-8B Harriers in the background. Two Broncos were

shot down during the Gulf War. 

When the convoy finally began to move

again, the inky darkness created by the thick

layers of oily smoke forced traffic directors

carrying faint red flashlights to physically walk

the hulking armored vehicles and trucks

through fields of mines and unexploded

bombs.

The movements became so treacherous

that the convoy finally pulled into a small

campsite that had been cleared of explosives.

As armed Humvees formed a safety circle

around a small patch of sand, their drivers

warned us not to step beyond the ring because of the mine dangers, Marines began setting up a makeshift radio command center.

Forbidden to use any light except dim red filters because of fear of discovery by enemy

troops, the young Marines worked by feel in

virtual blindness.67

Air Operations

In the predawn hours of 25 February, 13th Marine

Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable)

conducted a helicopter feint in the Ash Shu‘aybah

area, attempting to convince the Iraqis that an amphibious landing was occurring there. The flight included six CH-46Es, two AH-lWs, one CH-53E, and

one UH-1N; the helicopters flew in low and deliberately “popped up” to be detected by Iraqi radar

at 0449 before returning safely to USS Okinawa.

Combined with the battleships’ naval gunfire, the

operation appeared to be a success.68

Hampered by the weather and the smoke from

the burning oil fields, the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing

nonetheless pushed its support of the Marines on

the ground, delivering close air support when called

on. Two aircraft were lost during this push to support the ground troops. One of these was a downed

AV-8B piloted by Captain John S. Walsh of Marine

Attack Squadron 542. One of two Harriers attacking

a column of Iraqi tanks, Captain Walsh was struck

by a heat-seeking surface-to-air missile in his right

rear jet nozzle. “It was a big bang. All my warning

lights came on, and the airplane began burning

pretty good,” he recalled later. Walsh flew to alJaber Air Base to try an emergency landing, but his

controls froze and the aircraft rolled. He ejected

successfully and was recovered by Task Force Ripper, and he was even able to rejoin his squadron

that evening.69

The other aircraft loss was less fortunate. Major

Joseph J. Small III and Captain David M. Spellacy

of Marine Observation Squadron 1 were flying an

OV-10A Bronco when it was struck by an infrared

surface-to-air missile. Captain Spellacy was killed,

and Major Small was captured. The Iraqis believed

this was a major intelligence coup; General Salah

Aboud later recalled that “we downed an enemy

helicopter that had two pilots. One of them died inside the chopper and the other one was brought [to

us] at the airport. The surviving pilot was carrying

on him the [American] plan of the attack.” Major

Small was beaten by the Iraqis and sent to Baghdad.

The “plan of attack” was apparently the aircraft’s

flight map. Major Small later recalled that “the

biggest grandest lie I think I’ve ever told in my enBreaking the Saddam Line 187
tire life” was the source for the Iraqi belief that they

had acquired the American battle plan.70

With the Joint Forces Command–East

As the Marines of I Marine Expeditionary Force

fought the Battle of Burqan inland, the Marines

from the air-naval gunfire liaison companies continued to fight alongside the Saudi Arabians and

other Coalition Muslim partners with Joint Forces

Command–East. Most of the Iraqi forces surrendered quickly along the coast, but there were still

pockets of resistance, and the minefields that the

Iraqis laid remained a danger whether the defenders fired or not. In one instance, the minefields and

a rare active Iraqi defense demonstrated what might

have been if the entire Saddam Line had been held

by determined defenders.

Captain David W. Landersman was a fire control

officer with a supporting arms liaison team attached

to the Saudi Arabian 10th Mechanized Brigade. On

25 February, during the brigade’s advance, Landersman was with the brigade’s artillery battalion when

he discovered that “[the Saudi officers] had placed

an entire artillery battalion on line, in the most

beautiful parade sequence you could possibly imagine, 1,500 meters from the objective, in the middle

of a minefield.” The Iraqis began to fire on the battalion with direct and indirect fire, but Landersman

“took command and began removal of all personnel

and equipment to a new position. Without regard

for his own safety, Captain Landersman repeatedly

exposed himself to enemy fire, coolly reorganized

the battalion and moved them out of the minefield.

As this process was complete, the trail elements

came under attack by several Iraqi tanks. Captain

Landersman realizing the gravity of the situation,

again exposed himself by boarding an abandoned

howitzer and fired on the attackers. He personally

destroyed the lead tank, disabled at least one other,

and forced the enemy to withdraw.”71

Captain Landersman was awarded the Silver Star

for his actions in the minefield, but that was not his

most personal fight that day. That fight came later

when he and his team were forced to clear some

Iraqi trenches, after the minefield incident:

I caught something out of the corner of my

eye, so I look back in the trench and there is

to my left, 10 meters, maybe, down at the end

of the trench, this Iraqi first lieutenant with an

AK-47 [assault rifle] at low port. . . . I thought,

if I just get my hand on my 9-millimeter pistol,

I’m going to own this guy. And just about the

time my hand reached, he came up to a high

port. So we had a very short exchange. I

started shooting and then two Iraqi soldiers

sort of stick their heads up, and I’m shooting,

and I’m going, two in the chest, one in the

head, two in the chest, one in the head, and

the guy’s not moving. I’m just like, why did

we go to 9 millimeter? That’s exactly what I

said. And I saw one guy stand up and I rolled

to one side of the trench and I shot, and he

went immediately down. And then the other

guy is standing there and he kind of shot

across the side of the trench. . . . This guy shot

across in front of me and I rolled over, shot

him. I got two shots out before he went down

and then I went back and I thought, “I’m

about ready to go black.” My slide locks, I pull

out the magazine, put another magazine in

and keep shooting, and I’m starting to walk

forward. And it’s at that point where [my staff

sergeant] reaches across and touches me on

the shoulder and said, “Jesus, Skipper, I think

you got him.”72

After a long day of fighting, it was obvious even

to the Iraqi high command that Iraq’s defense of

Kuwait had failed:

By the afternoon of the 25th, remnants of the

III Corps fell back into Kuwait City and, according to its commander, “organized a plan

to fight from the city’s border and from inside

the city in cooperation with the Gulf Operations Command.” At this point in the battle for

Kuwait, the III Corps commander reported to

Baghdad that the 7th, 14th, and 29th [Infantry] Divisions were combat ineffective. He

ordered his remaining divisions to re-establish

a defensive line close to Kuwait City. However, before any significant movement occurred, the III Corps commander received a

broken message that Saddam had ordered all

remaining units to withdraw toward al-Basra

“to cover the border [area] so we can distribute our divisions within the [Iraqi] cities.”73

188 Liberating Kuwait
Liberating Kuwait

u CHAPTER 10u

Light armored vehicles from Task Force Shepherd move forward during a break in the generally poor visibility that characterized 26 February 1991. The vehicles are approaching the power lines southwest of Kuwait International Airport.

Marine Corps History Division Reference Branch photo files

26 February

On the far right of the Coalition forces, the

XVIII Airborne Corps pushed forward to

the Euphrates valley, led by the U.S. Army’s

24th Infantry Division (Mechanized). The 24th Division fought against the heaviest resistance it faced

during the war but overcame the Iraqis. Farther

east, the VII Corps completed the destruction of the

Iraqi VII Corps, capturing its headquarters and massive logistics bases. In the afternoon, the U.S.

Army’s 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment, at the tip of

the VII Corps’ advance, contacted the 12th Armored Division and the Republican Guard’s

Tawakalna Division. In a four-hour engagement

later named the Battle of 73 Easting, the cavalry regiment destroyed the units facing it. To the south,

the British 1st Armored Division began a series of

running battles against the 48th Infantry and 52d

Armored Divisions as they advanced up the Wadi

al-Batin.1

Surrounding Kuwait International Airport

On the morning of 26 February, the 1st Marine Division advanced northwards, with Task Force Ripper on the left, Task Force Papa Bear in the center,

and Task Force Shepherd passing through the oil

fields on the division’s right. The 11th Marines’ artillery battalions followed the mechanized task

forces in trace, prepared to provide artillery support

as required. Task Force Grizzly continued clearing

al-Jaber, a process slowed by the numerous pieces

of unexploded aerial ordnance found around the

airfield.

Task Force Ripper advanced rapidly northward.

Moving across a landscape covered in destroyed or

abandoned Iraqi fighting vehicles, it was difficult to

tell them apart from the crewed enemy tanks that

appeared occasionally and were quickly destroyed

in a small skirmish. The task force came up with an

ingenious system to determine which type of vehicle was which: 

In Task Force Ripper, 3d Tank Battalion tested

Iraqi vehicles with long-range machine gun

fire to see if the enemy responded. If it did, a

tank round or TOW [tube-launched, optically

tracked, wire-guided] missile followed and

dispatched the Iraqi vehicle. The infantry battalions led with their scout detachments,

which used TOW thermal sights to determine

whether the enemy vehicle gave a “hot” or a

“cold” signature. If the Iraqi vehicle or tank

had its systems turned on and registered “hot”

as a result, they engaged it. The frequent firefights interrupted the rapid advance with numerous stops and starts.2

Lieutenant Colonel James Mattis’s 1st Battalion,

189
190 Liberating Kuwait

Adapted from a 1991 Ministry of Defence (United Kingdom) map by Marine Corps History Division
ceased. Moments after the indirect fires

stopped, darkness once again engulfed the

day as clouds of black smoke rolled over the

Battalion around 1510. “Gas, Gas, Gas” was

called over Battalion TAC I seconds after Task

Force Ripper reported gas at their position.

[The] 1/7 Marines calmly donned and cleared

their masks while the NBC [nuclear, chemical,

biological] Officer, Chief Warrant Officer Larry

Snyder, once again went to work and tested

our area for contamination. After negative

readings were observed, the “all clear” call

was given by Lieutenant Colonel Mattis, and

the Battalion prepared to continue its attack.3

The sporadic Iraqi resistance and the terrain

slowed the battalion’s advance but did not halt it,

and Mattis’s unit cleared the quarries and had positioned itself to take the airfield on order by the end

of the day.4

Task Force Papa Bear began an hour later than

Task Force Ripper but passed through a similar

landscape of destroyed and abandoned Iraqi armor

interspersed with crowds of surrendering Iraqi soldiers and pockets of Iraqi resistance. Task Force

Papa Bear responded to the problem of stationary

Iraqi armor that may or may not be playing possum

much as Task Force Ripper did, although 1st Tank

Battalion did use thermite grenades on some abandoned Iraqi tanks.5

By 1300, both mechanized task forces were

preparing to march north, but they expected the

second half of the advance to be more vigorously

defended then the first half. Major General James

Myatt met with the task force commanders to issue

new orders, and by 1600 the task forces were on

the move again. 

Task Force Ripper ran into problems very

quickly when Mattis’s battalion encountered three

bands of wire obstacles and minefields. A hasty

breech had to be accomplished, which was made

more difficult by the increasing smoke and a rising

sandstorm. Eventually the position was forced, and

the task force assumed a blocking position to the

northwest of the airport. Visibility was so poor that

Kuwait City, on the other side of the highway, was

not visible to the Marines of Task Force Ripper. 

Task Force Papa Bear’s assault on the right ran

into similar issues. Skirting the northern portion of

al-Burqan oil field, the task force traveled in two

columns. The near-zero visibility and sandstorm

hindered the task force’s advance and “slowed its

movement to a crawl around the wells, pipelines,

Marine Corps Art Collection

“Ripper” in MOPP-4 by Col H. Avery Chenoweth. This

painting highlights the encumbering nature of the chemical protective suits worn by Marines in response to the

gas alert. There were four levels of mission-oriented protective posture or “MOPP”; MOPP-4 was the highest. 

7th Marines, found its way blocked by a pair of

large quarries that did not appear on the maps.

They turned out to house small bands of Iraqi soldiers who continued to fight, slowing the battalion

as it tried to speed to the airport. The battalion

slowed even more when a false gas warning sent

the Marines scrambling for their gas masks and

chemical protection suits:

Upon reaching the LOA [line of advance] the

Battalion stopped to await further orders from

Task Force Ripper. Sporadic small arms fire

was taken by CAAT 2 [combined antiarmor

team 2] from a small built up area 600 meters

northwest of the Battalion. The “Chicken

Force,” as one Marine called it, was immediately engaged with .50[-]cal[iber machine

guns], MK-19 [grenade launchers] and LAAWs

[light antiarmor weapons]. Additionally, 60mm

and 81mm mortars as well as “danger close”

artillery fires were brought to bear on the

enemy. The sporadic enemy small arms fire

Liberating Kuwait 191
192 Liberating Kuwait

Photo by LtCol Charles H. Cureton

Task Force Papa Bear on the morning of 26 February, preparing for a third day of battle.

Photo by LCpl R. Price. Defense Imagery DM-SN-93-02272

AAV-7 amphibious assault vehicles of the 1st Marine Division advance toward Kuwait City on 26 February 1991. An

AH-1 Sea Cobra helicopter can be seen flying in the background.

and the occasional oil lakes.” After passing the field

and breeching two wire obstacle belts, the task

force found itself facing a defensive position before

the airfield. The Iraqi 20th Infantry Regiment, 3d

Armored Division, had a complex of bunkers, armored personnel carriers, and tanks, but like most

Iraqi soldiers during the advance, the majority of

the defenders chose to surrender. At 2300, the task

force had cut through the perimeter fence of the

airport and established a small toehold in the airfield’s perimeter.6

By 2100, the 1st Tank Battalion was in its position for the evening, on the airfield’s perimeter road

on the right flank of the task force. Meanwhile, Task

Force Papa Bear’s engineering detachment was establishing a night position about half a mile south

of the road. A shift in the wind cleared visibility

considerably, and shortly before 2200, Iraqis on the
Marine Corps Art Collection

Last Tank Battle, Kuwait Airport by Col H. Avery Chenoweth. The 1st Marine Division’s firefight outside the airport on

the night of 26 February presented a surreal, flaming landscape and involved some of the last armored actions fought

by Marines in the Gulf War. 

airport highway to the north opened fire with

rocket-propelled grenades, mortars, and machine

guns on the combat engineers’ positions. The combat engineers and their attached tanks and amphibious assault vehicles quickly fired back. During the

firefight, one of the assault amphibians pivoted to

bring its weapons to bear. Lance Corporal John E.

Waldron of Company A, 7th Engineer Support Battalion, was too close to the assault amphibian and

was caught in the tracks; he died instantly. Captain

John M. Allison, the combat engineer detachment’s

deputy commander, was shot in the face during the

firefight.7

Lieutenant Colonel Charles Cureton, 1st Marine

Division’s field historian, was present for this fight

and later wrote a detailed description of the event.

It was much like the scattered firefights that took

place across the division on the night of 26–27

February: 

Once Captain Allison finished placing the vehicles, the engineer task force commander,

Major Joseph I. Musca, held a leader’s brief in

his AAV [amphibious assault vehicle] to establish radio procedures, the watch schedule, the

enemy situation, and other relevant items.

When the meeting ended 20 minutes later

Major Musca discovered that a sudden shift in

wind direction not only improved visibility,

but also enabled the flames from nearby wells

to illuminate every vehicle in the task force,

except for the three tanks.

Allison felt good about being able to see

again, but the unit’s exposed situation troubled him as he walked the perimeter a few

minutes later, checking positions. Tempering

uneasiness with the knowledge that fighting

was virtually over, he cut across the circle of

AAVs. Suddenly, a series of explosions from

mortar fire, instantly followed by RPG [rocket

propelled grenade] and heavy machine-gun

Liberating Kuwait 193
194 Liberating Kuwait

In Flank Threat by Col H. Avery Chenoweth, Marines have sprung into action from a light armored vehicle to secure the

flank as enemy are spotted. The terrain is littered with knocked-out enemy vehicles.

Marine Corps Art Collection

fire, poured in on him. The next few minutes

passed in a blur. He noticed that the enemy

fire was coming from the airport highway to

the north, while it was the AAVs and tank

nearest the Iraqis returning fire. As an AAV

next to Captain Allison pivoted to bring its

gun to bear he saw a combat engineer get

caught under its tracks. Fearing that the Marine was dead, Captain Allison ran to get assistance. He had gone only a few feet when a

sledgehammer blow across his face knocked

him down. Dazed and bleeding from a machine gun round through the face, Allison

crawled to the dubious shelter of one of the

obstacle clearing detachment AAVs. There, he

removed his bulky chemical suit and ran to

the command vehicle where he hoped to get

medical attention for the combat engineer,

and now for himself.

Inside the command AAV, Major Musca had

already started coordinating return fire. Concerned over the proximity of adjacent Marine

units, Musca held his tanks in checkfire. Sitting in darkness, the three M60A1s had been

ignored by the attackers and their commanders used their night sights to track Iraqi movement and acquire targets. Of the three, Musca

cleared only “Phambo 07” to fire. In almost

the same moment that Captain Allison was

wounded, Corporal Duchoa Pham, the tank

commander, destroyed an armored personnel

carrier with two well-aimed shots. Corporal

Pham explained, “I meant to hit the target

with HE [high explosive] but was so excited

that I forgot [and fired SABOT (an antitank

round)]. The first round went right through

the vehicle without damaging it. The second

round must have hit something sensitive because the whole vehicle exploded with a

flash.”8

The firefight continued in intensity as these Iraqis

put up a tougher fight than most, continuing the

firefight even after one of their armored personnel

carriers was destroyed. The survivors finally fled

after another 15 minutes of intense fire.9

Task Force Shepherd advanced through the east

side of the al-Burqan oil fields, destroying Iraqi

forces sporadically along the way but encountering

relatively light resistance. By 1700, the light armored

infantry had passed by the east side of the airport

and established itself near the Kuwaiti racetrack. By

1830, it had established contact with Kuwaiti resistance fighters who reported the city largely empty

of Iraqi troops. At 2230, Major General Myatt ordered Task Force Shepherd to take Kuwait International Airport. By 2300, the light armored vehicles

of the light armored infantry were advancing on the

airport from the east.10

Task Force Taro encountered the same lack of

visibility, difficult terrain, and large number of surrendering Iraqis as the other Marine task forces.
Photo by SSgt J. L. Roberts. Defense Imagery 0338-18-9

M1A1 Abrams tanks of the 2d Marine Division sit menacingly in the desert. With the Army’s Tiger Brigade and a Marine

armored battalion attached to each of its two regimental combat teams, it was one of the most armored divisions in

Marine Corps history.

Colonel John Admire later explained, “We had procured sufficient transport, especially by aggressively

ferrying our units forward unit by unit, that we continued our attack and advance without interruption.

. . . General Myatt personally radioed me and ordered us to halt for the evening while the division

repositioned units for the final assault into Kuwait

City the next day. We halted on the general’s orders,

however, [and] immediately began preparations

throughout the night for continuing the attack the

next morning.”11

Mutla Ridge

Major General Keys recognized that the Iraqis were

now trying to flee Kuwait rather than trying to defend it, and he resolved to take advantage of the

flight to destroy all the Iraqi military power that his

division could as the Iraqis left the relative safety of

bunkers and revetments. The 6th Marines advanced

to the main highway interchange out of Kuwait City

and established a blocking position, fighting some

small skirmishes along the way. The 8th Marines

was ordered to take an Iraqi barracks to the northeast and defend against any Iraqi counterattack out

of Kuwait City.

In August, Iraqi Republican Guard tanks had

raced to take Mutla Ridge to the west of the capital

and seal the fate of Kuwait. Now the U.S. Army’s

1st (Tiger) Brigade, 2d Armored Division, was racing to the same position from the opposite direction

in order to seal the fate of the Iraqi army. A U.S.

Army history of the Gulf War notes, “By occupying

the ridge, the brigade could seal a major crossroads

and slam the door on Iraqi columns escaping north

to Baghdad.”12

The brigade began its race for Mutla Ridge at

1200 with the 3d Battalion, 67th Armor, in the lead,

destroying Iraqi armor and fighting positions along

the way. Shortly after the war, Colonel John

Sylvester described the Tiger Brigade’s attack on

Mutla Ridge to a field historian:

At noon we did attack, and at that point I did

not concern myself with maintaining a good

length with the 6th [Marine] Regiment on my

flank. I trusted the boundary and I went as

fast as I could go to get them up there. And

that attack, in time, turned into, on occasion,

45 and 50 mile an hour tank assaults across

the desert. My two lead battalions breached

the initial points on their initial objectives simultaneously, and there was an awful lot of

armor at that point fleeing Kuwait City. There

were many, many kills of tanks and BTRs

[Russian armored personnel carriers] and

other types of personnel carriers that were

moving around the six-ring road and on various roads, the al-Salami Road that went past

Ali al-Salem airfield. There was an awful lot

of equipment moving. As they moved in they

were rapidly killing everything that they could

see. 

And my instructions at that time changed.

I told them to kill every mechanical piece of

equipment that they saw—whether it was a

Liberating Kuwait 195
196 Liberating Kuwait

A pair of Tiger Brigade M1A1 Abrams main battle tanks and an M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle near al-Jahra

after the Operation Desert Storm cease-fire. 

Photo by SSgt J. R. Ruark. Defense Imagery DM-SC-93-05269

tank, a truck, a howitzer, or a bicycle—to take

it out with direct fire. All enemy dismounted

soldiers, unless they were engaging, were to

be bypassed and waived on to the rear and to

go as fast as they could move. And there were

literally thousands of enemy soldiers marching

to the rear, running to the rear and attempting

to stop vehicles. And we didn’t stop. We just

waived them on. And I’m sure they were bewildered by all of that. . . . But of course they

were a dispirited enemy. They were broken.

They had no further intent to fight.13

As the brigade neared its objective, it came upon

a final position that had to be taken: the al-Mutla

police post. Colonel Sylvester described the fight for

the police station:

That particular battalion then accomplished

the hardest physical fight of this conflict. The

police post itself was manned, the building

was manned with about 40 soldiers, all determined to hold the building. The high ground

immediately to the north and east was dominated by enemy infantry and armor. There

was a lot of enemy armor that had caused a

bypass around the great huge traffic jam that

was caused by the Air Force bombing, on

what we called “Death Road” up there where

there were in fact three or four thousand

dead, dying vehicles, and many, many hundreds of dead and wounded Iraqis. And that

was indeed a scene from hell, particularly at

night. They were moving vehicles in there. As

the tanks engaged and killed them, of course

they flared and burned. There were a number

of burning vehicles already. The building was

immediately behind a number of burning vehicles. The building had to be cleared by dismounted troops. They had to move in and

around the burning and exploding vehicles.

And there was an awful lot of very heroic stuff

going on by some soldiers in that particular

operation. They had to control that high

ground.14

Lieutenant Colonel Dennis Mroczkowski, the 2d

Marine Division’s field historian, recounted the results of the attack: “At this time, Company C crossed

the road to clear the police station. The fighting

here had to be done room by room; when it was

over, 40 Iraqis had been killed or made prisoner.

But it was here that the Tiger Brigade suffered its

own second loss. While assisting in positioning the

command post, the battalion’s master gunner, Sergeant First Class Harold R. Witzke, was shot by a

sniper and died while awaiting evacuation.”15

After two days of creeping through minefields,
Photo by PO1 Olson, USN. Defense Imagery DN-ST-91-06878

A Super Cobra from Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 269 lands on the flight deck of the amphibious assault

ship USS Nassau. The squadron flew many missions during Operation Desert Storm, culminating with providing close

air support to the Marine offensive in Kuwait.

oil fields, obstacle belts, and crowds of Iraqi soldiers

trying to surrender, the brigade had finally gotten

the opportunity to advance at speed against the

enemy. Holding Mutla Ridge, the highest point in

Kuwait, they dominated the routes out of Kuwait

and could fire on Iraqi military forces withdrawing

from the city. The result did not disappoint, as the

official Army history recounts: “They could see hundreds of burning and exploding vehicles, including

civilian automobiles, buses, and trucks. Hundreds

more raced west out of Kuwait City to unknowingly

join the deadly traffic jam. Here and there, knots of

drivers, Iraqi soldiers, and refugees fled into the

desert because of the inferno of bombs, rockets,

and tank fire. These lucky ones managed to escape

and join the ranks of the growing army of prisoners.”16

Late on the night of 26–27 February, at the I Marine Expeditionary Force mobile command post, located with the 2d Marine Division, a humorous

incident ended the day of battle and was later recounted by Molly Moore: “[Lieutenant General Walter] Boomer was awakened by a frustrated voice

outside his tent: “It’s the [expletive] president. He’s

trying to reach the [expletive] CG [commanding

general] and we can’t get a [expletive] connection!”

“As smart as these kids are,” Boomer said later,

“sometimes you’d think they know only one

word.”17

Air Operations

On 25 February, General Boomer asked Admiral

Stanley Arthur to transfer the amphibious landing

force’s AH-1W Super Cobra attack helicopters to 3d

Marine Aircraft Wing. The smoky, night-like conditions of the battlefield made this difficult, but the

AH-1W’s AGM-114 Hellfire air-to-surface missiles

and laser range-finders were perfect for this environment. Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron

269 transferred six Super Cobras ashore. They flew

22 combat missions from the Lonesome Dove expeditionary airfield.18

The smoke made close air support missions extremely difficult as the Marine divisions marched on

Kuwait International Airport and Mutla Ridge, respectively. As a result, Marine air concentrated on

the highways leading out of Kuwait, which were

clear of the smoke and choked with targets. Misnamed the “Highway of Death” (there was much

equipment destruction, but relatively little loss of

Iraqi life on the road), these roads were filled with

the Iraqi military forces fleeing Kuwait, many of

whom were taking their loot with them.19

Colonel Sylvester of the Tiger Brigade, which

Liberating Kuwait 197
198 Liberating Kuwait

order to see, occasionally flying UNDER power

lines, until he located 1st Battalion, 5th Marines,

and then shortly, 3d Tank Battalion and 1st Battalion, 7th Marines. He then returned to his informal landing zone, wheedled fuel out of

some nearby Marine tanker trucks, and then led

his wingman back through the obscuration

where they delivered Hellfire missiles, rockets,

and 20mm rounds against tanks, armored vehicles, and bunkers.21

Lieutenant Colonel Kurth flew for 10 hours on 26

February, repeating this process over and over

again, ensuring that the Marines on the ground had

the required air support.22

Another aerial operation took place on 26 February, when the air component of the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, Marine Aircraft Group 40,

launched an aerial feint. Similar in concept to the feint

launched on 25 February but larger in size, this operation was directed at Bubiyan Island. The Marines

sent 10 CH-46s, 4 CH-53s, and 3 AH-1s on the mission. Flying low over the ocean in extremely poor flying conditions, the entire flight was made using

night-vision goggles. Just before dawn the helicopters

rose suddenly in the air to simulate a helicopter assault and fired tracers from their .50-caliber machine

guns to attract Iraqi attention. The Iraqis responded

with a heavy volume of antiaircraft fire, much of it

tracers as well, and with a large number of flares.

Thus illuminated, they were attacked by a flight of

Navy A-6E Intruders flying as part of the mission.23

At the same time, Marine Light Attack Helicopter

Squadron 269 attacked Az Zwar on Faylakah Island

with a flight of six UH-1Ns. The six Hueys strafed *

See appendix D for the complete citation.

prevented the remaining Iraqis in Kuwait City from

passing down the highway on 26 February, described what was discovered there:

Vehicles kept coming into it, and it became

like a stopped up sink—things kept piling up

and piling up and piling up. And ultimately

there were literally thousands of vehicles in

there, fully half of which were enemy combat

vehicles and half of which were looted and

stolen. Everything from school buses to ambulances, to brand new automobiles. Every single vehicle stuffed with the loot of the city.

Jewelry and furniture and clothes and people’s

personal belongings, and you name it and it

was there. Along with, in every vehicle that I

saw, military paraphernalia. And all the vehicles were hot-wired. Even the ambulances

were full of loot and booty. And it was very

obvious that what was stopped at that particular point was the literal theft of the city.20

Despite the difficulties, Marine aviators made

heroic efforts to provide air support to the Marines

on the ground. Commanding Marine Light Attack

Helicopter Squadron 369, Lieutenant Colonel

Michael M. Kurth was awarded the Navy Cross for

his efforts on 26 February.* He led four of his

squadron’s Cobras north to the recently captured

al-Jaber airfield, where they landed and awaited his

solo scouting mission:

Soon the smoke became so dense, [Kurth] was

forced to fly only a few feet off the ground in

Photo by SSgt J. R. Ruark. Defense Imagery DM-ST-92-00048

A Marine Corps Cobra helicopter in flight during the Gulf War. 
Marine Corps History Division Reference Branch photo files

Marines guard Iraqi prisoners of war during the Gulf War. The sheer number of surrendering Iraqi soldiers presented

tactical and logistical challenges to the Marines, but they were a strong indication of how unpopular the war was with

the Iraqi people. 

the target with rockets and machine guns before returning to their base, the USS Nassau.

24

Iraqi Prisoners of War

The thousands of Iraqi soldiers the Marines had

taken prisoner in the first two days of fighting continued to be a problem. These prisoners of war had

to be provided with food and water, searched for

weapons, interrogated, and transported to the rear

areas safely. Central Command had planned for the

prisoners to be given to the Army for processing,

but the numbers were far higher than expected, and

the process became a large strain on the logistics

system that the Direct Support Command was using

to pump food, water, fuel, and ammunition through

the lanes cut in the obstacles and minefields to the

two Marine divisions. 

On 26 February, 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade’s

3d Battalion, 1st Marines, was attached to 2d Marine

Division to aid in processing the thousands of prisoners the division had taken during the northward

advance. The battalion was helilifted to the area

known as the Ice Cube Tray and spent the next two

days processing the starving, thirsty Iraqi prisoners.25

The Direct Service Command trucked the prisoners out of Kuwait to temporary holding pens; a temporary holding pen was constructed at Khanjar, the

combat service support area, when the overcrowding

problem became apparent. Drivers and transportation

were then scrounged up by the Direct Service Command’s assistant chief of staff for operations, Lieutenant Colonel John A. O’Donovan, who gathered

volunteers from the support troops, including women

Marines, to act as drivers and guards. Small convoys

then began driving north to the minefields and returning with loads of Iraqi prisoners. By the end of

the day on 26 February, Khanjar’s newly constructed

prisoner compound held 6,000 prisoners transported

from the 2d Marine Division’s area of operations. 

Another 8,000 prisoners were transported to the

pens constructed at Kibrit, although the sheer numbers had begun to overwhelm the resources there.

To make matters worse, high winds blew over the

mess tent, interrupting food distribution and sparking

a near riot among the prisoners. In addition, the

Iraqis ignored the latrines and slit trenches built for

them and instead relieved themselves along the fence

line. Despite these problems, the Marines persevered,

calming the prisoners and transporting them southward as quickly as possible to the Army’s facilities.26

Entering Kuwait City

The Joint Forces Command–East broke through the

Iraqi defenses in the late afternoon and rushed forward to Kuwait City, along with the Force Reconnaissance teams attached to them. Colonel Charles

Quilter, the I Marine Expeditionary Force field historian, noted that “the way to the American Embassy seemed clear, and in accordance with the

combined operations plan, one team, under First

Lieutenant Brian G. Knowles, made a dash for it in

conjunction with Saudi teams headed for their own

embassy nearby. At last light, the team entered the

compound where Knowles found a tattered American flag still flying.”27

Edward J. Marolda and Robert J. Schneller Jr., historians writing for the Naval Historical Center after

the war, describe Lieutenant Knowles’s action as

dereliction of duty. Quoting the 1st Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence Group’s after action

report, they state, “Force Recon Team Piglet 2-1 ordered to assume fire support responsibilities for 2/8.

Liberating Kuwait 199
200 Liberating Kuwait

Marines of Task Force Shepherd roll into Kuwait International Airport in light armored vehicles after the defeat of Iraqi

forces. At right is a CH-53 Sea Stallion helicopter.

Photo by TSgt David McLeod, USAF. Defense Imagery DF-ST-92-08209

They abandon their posts and begin a series of

grandstand plays to race for the embassy. Fortunately none are killed by friendly fire.” It is unclear

if the “2/8” unit referred to in the report is a Marine

or Saudi Arabian battalion. The sources are unclear

on whether or not Knowles was justified in taking

the embassy, but it is clear that a Special Operations

Central Command SEAL and Army Special Forces

team had originally been given the mission of securing the embassy. Although the Marines had already secured the embassy, the special operations

teams proceeded to conduct the mission as if it

were an unsecured location.28

Asked about the controversy 20 years after the

fact, General Boomer said, “There actually was a

Marine reconnaissance lieutenant who sort of on

his own went up and took the embassy, and I was

prepared to chew his a–––s out when I finally got

my hands on him, but I couldn’t bring myself to do

it. I couldn’t. What are you going to say? Here’s this

lieutenant that’s come up the coast and the embassy

is a special place. So, he took charge and occupied

it. He didn’t have to fight for it.”29

27 February

On 27 February, the XVIII Airborne Corps turned

east, crossing the Euphrates River valley and advancing to the Tigris River. Led by the 24th Infantry

Division, the corps advanced on the Iraqi city of

Basrah, destroying hundreds of Iraqi tanks and armored personnel carriers along its advance and

capturing two Iraqi military airfields. The VII Corps

continued its advance east toward Safwan and

Umm Qasr and against the Republican Guard. The

VII Corps destroyed the Guard’s Tawakalna, Medina, and Adnan Divisions as well as the 12th and

10th Armored Divisions. The British 1st Armored

Division completed the destruction of the 52d Armored Division.

30

Taking Kuwait International Airport

Task Force Shepherd arrived at the airport over

three hours after departing and began its assault at

0430. There was some minor resistance, and many

mines were discovered. Since the Iraqis were

clearly defeated, the task force commander elected

to wait until morning to continue the advance. At

0615, at the break of dawn, Task Force Shepherd

resumed its attack. It was joined at 0800 by Task

Force Taro’s 2d Battalion, 3d Marines, which helped

clear the airfield building and captured 80 Iraqis

lurking about the airfield. 
Marine Corps Art Collection

Kuwait International Airport by LtCol Keith A. McConnell. A commercial airliner destroyed by a Marine airstrike earlier

in the war sits near the control tower of Kuwait International Airport. The smoke from the burning oilfields can be seen

in the background.

With the morning, the Marines surrounding the

airport gradually realized that offensive operations

were ending and only mopping up remained. The

1st Battalion, 7th Marines’ command chronology describes the sunrise:

As the sun rose Kuwait City stood amazingly

in front of the battalion. Because of restricted

visibility the day prior, many of the Marines

didn’t fully comprehend just how close we

were. . . . Blowing horns and random shots

could be heard throughout our position as jubilant Kuwaitis waved Kuwaiti, British, and

American flags in celebration of their liberation. Great pride was written across the faces

of our sailors and Marines. Remarkably we

made it with no deaths and only minor injuries. . . . [Our battalion] found itself in a

strange position as several EPWs [enemy prisoners of war] turned themselves in to us so

they would not be killed by Kuwaiti Resistance Forces. We were now protecting the

Iraqis.

Some, however, did not want our protection. As Company A 1/7 [1st Battalion, 7th

Marines], our detached infantry company with

Tiger 3, was conducting a sweep in zone, they

came across four wounded Iraqis. While Cpl

Kerry Lee was searching one of them, the Iraqi

lunged at Cpl Lee and was instantly killed by

the Marine standing cover for him.31

Major General Myatt established his command

post at the airport at 0900, and the 1st Marine Division spent the rest of the day securing its areas from

loose ordnance and policing up Iraqi stragglers. It

awaited word of what would happen next: an advance on Baghdad or a cease-fire.

While the 1st Marine Division was securing the

airport, the 2d Marine Division was finally making

contact with the Egyptian and Syrian forces of Joint

Forces Command–North. In the dawn hours, these

Coalition forces passed north of the division and

moved into Kuwait City to secure it.

The 2d Marine Division spent the day securing

its positions as well, but the sweeps took on a more

tragic note when a massive secondary explosion occurred in an Iraqi tank being destroyed by combat

Liberating Kuwait 201
202 Liberating Kuwait

Iraqi soldiers surrendering to the 2d Light Armored Infantry Battalion of the 2d Marine Division in Kuwait. 

Photo by Sgt J. L. Roberts. Marine Corps History Division Reference Branch photo files

engineers. The explosions wounded one Marine and

took the life of Sergeant James D. Hawthorne of the

2d Tank Battalion as he assisted the engineers.32

Molly Moore, a reporter for the Washington Post

who traveled with the I Marine Expeditionary

Force, described some of the 2d Marine Division’s

captures: “In contrast to the Iraqi front lines, the

bunkers of troops stationed farther north and

nearer Kuwait City were stuffed amply with sacks

of potatoes and rice and other foodstuffs. One Marine said he entered an Iraqi bunker and saw a

plump roast in a pan near a stove, indicating the

cook fled minutes before he planned to start dinner. In some areas, entire prefabricated houses had

been buried, complete with indoor toilets, showers,

kitchens, and potted plants.”33

Air Operations

Early on 27 February, an AV-8B from Marine Attack

Squadron 331, flying from the USS Nassau, was the

last Marine aircraft downed by hostile fire in the

Gulf War. Captain Reginald C. “Woody” Underwood’s aircraft was hit by an infrared surface-to-air

missile as he flew an air interdiction mission against

Iraqi forces retreating north along the so-called

Highway of Death. Captain Underwood did not survive the crash, but his body was later recovered.34

In an article written after the war, Major Ben D.

Hancock, a pilot who witnessed the event, described how Captain Underwood was lost:

We were at 8,000 feet, doing over 480 knots,

and I started a hard left turn away from the

highway as I strained to keep my eyes on the

target. We rolled out heading southeast, and I

was about to roll in when Mystic yelled

“Break! Break! Flares!” It was every man for

himself as there was no time to ask questions.

I strained under the G forces and looked

around frantically as multiple SAMs [surfaceto-air missiles] were in the air. At least two

were streaking toward Woody [Captain Underwood] and one hit him in the left exhaust nozzle of his jet engine, right below the wing. He

yelled “I’m hit! I’m hit!” and pulled up into the

clouds trailing black smoke. The missiles had

been launched from our 7 o’clock and were

on us in seconds. Mystic had one SAM chasing

him as he disappeared from sight into the

clouds. I reversed my turn and came back trying to find Woody. The heat-seeking missile

chasing Mystic couldn’t track him through the

clouds, and he radioed to Woody to turn his

jet to the southeast. Woody’s last transmission

was, “I can’t control it!” For what seemed like
Photo by PO1 Scott Allen, USN. Defense Imagery DN-SC-91-00632

Flight deck crewmen on board the USS Nassau refuel two Marine Corps AV-8B Harriers as a third Harrier comes in to

land. The Nassau ended its historic combat deployment as a “Harrier Carrier” on a tragic note when Capt Reginald C.

Underwood was killed in action.

an eternity but was probably only about 20

seconds, Peewee and I were looking northwest when we saw Woody’s jet impact the

ground in one huge, orange fireball. It was like

watching a slow motion movie, only this was

the real thing. We never saw a parachute.35

Throughout the day on 27 February, the Iraqi retreat along the northern highway turned from a rout

to pure chaos as Air Force, Navy, and Marine attack

aircraft continued the destruction they had begun

along that route on 26 February. Long after the war,

an A-6E pilot, Lieutenant Colonel Michael B. Parkyn,

described the highway to a historian: “It’s incredible,

hellish, red, orange glow off the fires . . . a ribbon

or road, cars and vehicles on both sides, on fire, you

could see movement, people scattering. Oil well

smoke created overcast, you dropped all your

bombs then climbed above the clouds heading

home. It was clear, cool and quiet; behind you the

clouds were glowing red.”36

After the war, the Coalition air forces received

some criticism for the Highway of Death in the

media. General Walter E. Boomer described it as he

saw it:

We didn’t talk about the “Highway of Death,”

but that was misportrayed by the media.

There were a couple of pretty horrible

scenes, but in the scheme of things, [they

were] relatively unimportant. A couple of

buses that had escaping Iraqi soldiers were

hit, and they were burned. Most of them

were smart enough as they saw vehicle after

vehicle stopping in front of them, and the

line behind them becoming miles and miles

long, and our aircraft methodically picking

them off, to get the hell out, and they did.

They ran over into the marsh and made their

way up the coast to get out of Kuwait. We

were stopped at about that time, so they did

escape. 

I was actually on that highway when the

Iraqi truck engines were still running. They

were so anxious to get out; they slammed on

the brakes, put it in neutral, didn’t shut the

engine off and ran. The event got blown up

in the media and it caused undo concern

about us piling on. The question that I saw

raised was that, you wanted them to leave

Kuwait and they were trying their best and

you were killing them as they were leaving.

Well, not quite right. They were escaping with

Liberating Kuwait 203
204 Liberating Kuwait

their vehicles and their weapons. They were

fair game. It wasn’t the duck shoot that it was

portrayed to be.38

As long as the fleeing Iraqis did so in their military vehicles with their weapons, they certainly remained valid targets, and the Marines of the 3d

Marine Aircraft Wing, along with their Air Force and

Navy comrades, continued to visit destruction upon

the fleeing columns throughout 27 February. 

The War of Logistics Never Ends . . . 

Even as Iraqi resistance in Kuwait crumbled, the

Marines of the 1st Force Service Support Group

and its subordinate Direct Support Command continued to rush supplies forward to the Marines in

the field and to truck Iraqi prisoners of war back

to the waiting Army compounds. Although the war

was winding down, driving through the gaps in

the obstacle belts and north through Kuwait remained dangerous. Mines and bypassed Iraqi solColonel Quilter, the I Marine Expeditionary

Force historian, described the record-breaking

achievement of the commander of Marine Aircraft

Group 11 on 27 February:

Colonel Manfred A. Rietsch, 49, is commanding officer of the Marines’ larger fighter/attack unit, Marine Aircraft Group 11, which

arrived at its base in Bahrain in mid-August.

The colorful flyer, who retains the faint accents of his German birth and the call sign

“Fokker,” was already something a legend in

Marine aviation, having flown 653 combat

missions in Vietnam. During this war he flew

another 66 missions in F/A-18 Hornets.

On the night of 26–27 February, the Iraqis

began their frantic retreat from Kuwait. The

A-6E Intruders of his group detected huge

numbers of vehicles streaming north which

they attacked, helping to bottle up the Iraqis.

Rietsch now increased the surge of his sorties; MAG-11 [Marine Aircraft Group 11] flew

298 missions that day alone.

He himself took off mid-morning in a two

seat F/A-I8D of Marine All-Weather Fighter

Attack Squadron 121 with his Weapons System Operator, Major [William C.] Macak, on

a Fast Forward Air Controller mission. Bad

weather and smoke from burning oilfields

were obscuring the choked escape route

when the crew found a convoy of about 40

transporters carrying tanks and armored personnel carriers making their way along a parallel dirt track to the west. Sixteen of his

Hornets were inbound, but now he had to

stop the convoy from getting underneath a

thick band of oil smoke which would hide

them from visual attack.

He fired a white phosphorous rocket

ahead of the lead truck. The drivers, knowing an attack was imminent, piled out of the

vehicles. After a few minutes, when no attack was forthcoming, they got back into the

trucks and started up. Rietsch repeated the

process with the same result. After the convoy started up a last time, he strafed the lead

vehicles, which began to burn. This time the

Iraqis got the message. Now short on fuel,

he handed over control to Major [Kenneth]

Bode, who directed the Marine Hornets in

an attack pilot’s dream mission: halted tanks

and APCs [armored personnel carriers]. Rietsch returned from his last mission. It was

his 719th.37

Marine Pilot Flies 719 Combat Missions

diers kept the logistics soldiers alert on their missions.

The Iraqi prisoners were docile and happy to be

out of the war for the most part, but they could be

unruly in some situations. One such event occurred

when Lieutenant Colonel Thomas S. Woodson,

commander of the 8th Motor Transport Battalion,

dispatched a 70-truck Logistics Vehicle System* convoy from Khanjar in Saudi Arabia to Kuwait on 26

February to help bring prisoners out of Kuwait. The

convoy had gotten lost in the night and wisely

waited until dawn before continuing its mission;

then it loaded approximately 2,000 Iraqi prisoners

onto the beds of its vehicles and headed back to

Khanjar. Along the way, the convoy met Brigadier

General Charles Krulak, and he directed it to Kibrit

*

The Logistics Vehicle System is the Marine Corps’ heavy tactical

vehicle system. These vehicles are eight-wheel drive and are designed modularly; each can be customized to pull a particular

type of load. These trucks came into use in 1985 and can pull

up to 22 tons.
Photo courtesy of BGen Granville Amos

The “Highway of Death” photographed in March 1991. This was the road to the west of Kuwait City where retreating

Iraqi troops and vehicles were concentrated during their retreat.

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo

Iraqi prisoners of war being transported to holding facilities in Saudi Arabia on returning Logistics Vehicle Systems of

the Direct Support Command’s 8th Motor Transport Battalion. 

Liberating Kuwait 205
206 Liberating Kuwait

Photo by SSgt J. R. Ruark. Defense Imagery DM-SC-93-05230

This Iraqi sand table was found in a school gymnasium in Kuwait City. The marked Iraqi positions corresponded to

their defense plans and indicated how successful the Marines’ amphibious deception was at distracting Iraqi attention

from the Saudi-Kuwaiti frontier.

instead of Khanjar to save time. At Khanjar, Lieutenant Colonel Woodson was informed of the destination change, and he

dispatched his battalion’s executive officer,

Major Robert L. Songer, to find the convoy. As

Songer neared Kibrit, he noticed that the road

was mysteriously covered with thousands of

empty milk containers. At CSSD-91 [Combat

Service Support Detachment 91], Songer

found the convoy and discovered the answer

to the riddle of the empty milk cartons. As the

convoy carrying the Iraqis approached Kibrit,

it stopped to allow the Iraqis to relieve themselves. A passing truck carrying milk cartons

slowed down to look at the Iraqis who leaped

onto the milk truck and raided its cargo. The

convoy drivers quickly restored order and

loaded the Iraqis back on the LVSs [vehicles

from the Logistics Vehicle System], but not before the thirsty prisoners consumed most of

the milk on the truck.39

Combat Service Support Detachment 91, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Linden L. Sparrow,

operated the Marines’ prisoner of war holding facility at Kibrit. Reinforced by a medical detachment

and a company of Marine Reserve Military Police,

they handled the prisoners until they could be

turned over to the U.S. Army. According to

Brigadier General James Brabham, “They carried

out their duties under the stress of overwhelming

numbers of enemy prisoners of war, threats of

enemy incursion, and an initially unknown length

of time before rearward movement would reduce

the numbers in the camp.”40

The I Marine Expeditionary Force took approximately 22,308 Iraqi soldiers prisoner during the

four day campaign to liberate Kuwait. All of these

soldiers were fed, watered, sheltered, and provided with required medical care as they were

moved out of the war zone and into Saudi Arabia.

There, the Marines turned them over to U.S. Army

Central Command’s 800th Military Police Brigade.

The last of the Marines’ prisoners of war were
A CH-46 Sea Knight flying over Kuwait City following the city’s liberation.

Photo courtesy of BGen Granville Amos

turned over to the military police brigade on 6

March.41

Kuwait Liberated

The Egyptians and Syrians of Joint Forces Command–

North and the Saudi Arabians of Joint Forces Command–East met in the middle of Kuwait City, near the

city’s water towers. Organized Iraqi resistance was

over, and the people of Kuwait came out into the

streets to celebrate. General Boomer led a party into

the city and to the American embassy, and along the

way the crowds of Kuwaitis thanked the Marines and

shouted “Allahu Akbar!” (God is great). Many Kuwaitis

fired firearms into the air in celebration. The Marines

found the contrast with the recent desert battles jarring, contrasting the jubilant civilian population and

relative greenery of the city with the harsh desert

conditions.42

Molly Moore, the reporter with General Boomer’s

mobile command post, later described the scene:

“The curbs were alive with gleeful young girls wearing skirts fashioned from green-white-red-and-black

Kuwaiti flags, sobbing women in black robes and

young men flashing victory signs and pumping

clenched fists. They waved flags and tossed candy

and shouted thanks. The rooftops of buildings blossomed with teenagers and children waving flags and

banners. Robed women streamed out of doorways

and flailed their arms through windows.”43

The American embassy was relatively intact; it had

been deserted for months but not vandalized. One

of the more interesting finds was in a school near

the embassy; in the school’s gymnasium the Iraqis

had constructed a large sand table detailing the defenses they had placed around Kuwait City, complete with toy artillery pieces, Lego blocks, and small

signs identifying Iraqi units. The sand table was very

clear evidence of the success of the amphibious deception in diverting Iraqi forces to the coast.44

The I Marine Expeditionary Force held Mutla

Ridge and the Kuwait International Airport, controlling entry to and egress from Kuwait City. The subLiberating Kuwait 207
urbs of the city were ringed by Marines, and all the

ground campaign’s objectives had been achieved.

Fighting continued in the north of Kuwait, where

Marine aircraft continued attacking retreating Iraqi

columns through the night, and in southern Iraq,

where the Army continued to destroy divisions of

the Republican Guard, but on 27 February the primary Marine Corps contribution to Operation

Desert Storm came to a successful conclusion.

During the four-day campaign, General Boomer’s

forces destroyed the Iraqi III Corps commanded by

Major General Salah Aboud Mahmoud and much of

the IV Corps commanded by Major General Yaiyd

Khalel Zaki. The I Marine Expeditionary Force estimated that it inflicted the following losses on the

Iraqis: 460 tanks destroyed; 600 tanks captured; 218

armored personnel carriers destroyed; 390 armored

personnel carriers captured; 432 artillery pieces destroyed; 5 free rocket over ground missile sites destroyed; and 1,510 Iraqi soldiers killed (as mentioned

above, an estimated 22,308 Iraqis were captured).45

During the evening of 27 February, as the

ground war came to a close, General Norman

Schwarzkopf, commander in chief, U.S. Central

Command, presented the famous “Mother of All

Briefings” on live television, describing how the

Coalition forces had routed the Iraqi Army. Concerning the Marine efforts in Kuwait, General

Schwarzkopf stated:

I can’t say enough about the two Marine divisions. If I used words like brilliant, it would

really be an underdescription of the absolutely superb job that they did in breaching

the so-called impenetrable barrier. It was a

classic, absolutely classic, military breaching

of a very, very tough minefield, barbed wire,

fire trenches-type barrier. They went through

the first barrier like it was water. They went

across into the second barrier line, even

though they were under artillery fire at the

time—they continued to open up that breach.

Then they brought both divisions streaming

through that breach. Absolutely superb operation, a textbook, and I think it will be studied

for many, many years to come as the way to

do it.46

208 Liberating Kuwait
Standing Down after Victory

u CHAPTER 11u

Damaged Iraqi Tank by Sgt Charles G. Grow. An Iraqi tank sits destroyed in its revetment.

Marine Corps Art Collection

Cease-Fire

Most Marines first heard of the cease-fire

around 0500 on 28 February, when President George H. W. Bush’s announcement

was broadcast on the BBC. Shortly thereafter, I Marine Expeditionary Force transmitted the following

message: “Cease all offensive operations effective

280500Z 0800C. Remain in current positions and assume defensive posture. Wartime rules of engagement remain in effect. Be prepared to resume

offensive operations. Forces are allowed to defend

themselves.” For most of the Marines, the cease-fire

was not a surprise because their objectives had

been taken the day before; the question was, what

would happen next? Would the Marines be expected to turn north and support the Army in a

drive to Baghdad, or would the war end?1

Colonel William Jones was the commander of

Marine Attack Squadron 231 at the time. Long after

the war, he described the first few days of the

cease-fire and how he started working with his men

on the transition from war to peace: 

I talked to my officers, saying we’ve got to

keep everybody busy. We’ve got to worry

about postcombat coping. I’ve got notes that

I made to myself about talking to them about

how they’ve got to transition from what

they’ve been doing to going back to the way

that things were. By that I mean I tried to do

more of a fatherly kind of discussion if you

will, and that is to say, “Look, you have to reconcile a lot of things that have been going on

here. I mean between your own ears you’ve

got to reconcile this stuff. Combat is a very

personal experience. But at the same time

you’re only one cog in this huge machine, and

it really is rather mechanical and somewhere

in there you have to deal with that.” I said,

209
210 Liberating Kuwait

Kuwaiti civilians and Coalition troops celebrate the liberation of Kuwait. 

Photo by CWO-2 Ed Bailey, USNR. Defense Imagery DN-SC-91-06903

“You also have to deal with the fact that

you’ve been killing people. And the ready

room or bar comeback—it was saying something flippant like, “Well I’m just really good

at killing people.” That won’t work when your

favorite aunt or niece asks you this question

over a breakfast table sometime in the next

two years because you will not see the question coming. Out of the blue Aunt Susie is

going to say, “Did you really kill people in

Kuwait?” And you better think this through

because what works in a ready room or

among your friends or over a beer ain’t going

to work with Aunt Susie. You’ve got to deal

with it.2

When the cease-fire was declared, it was clear to

the Marines in Kuwait that the Iraqi resistance

around Kuwait City was over. Some Marines rested

after three days of swift movement and hard work;

others examined the fighting positions taken from

the Iraqis. Captain Phillip Thompson of 1st Battalion, 12th Marines, and his unit were emplaced near

Kuwait International Airport; their position had

been seized from an Iraqi tank battalion. In his

memoir, he described the Iraqi unit’s equipment

and the end of the war:

I was not impressed with the bunkers or the

tanks. The tanks that were still in one piece

probably couldn’t have made it to the city—

which we could see from our position—on

their own power. The tracks were coated in

rust, the insides were filthy, and none looked

like they had seen a drop of grease in months.

The crews never stood a chance.

While we meandered through the wreckage, somebody near the FDC [fire direction

control] began shouting. We trotted back just

in time to hear a Marine yell “The war’s over!”

A dozen lusty cheers went up. I stopped in

my tracks and said a silent prayer.3

Many Marines with access to transportation tried

to get into Kuwait City to see the liberation celebrations and the aftermath of the war. Captain Thompson took half a dozen Marines in his humvee into

the city. He recalled, “We felt like conquering heroes, but we didn’t know how to play the part.” He

also recounted how the Marines were shocked by

the extent of the looting: “We drove through the

looted, destroyed city blocks, viewing the Iraqis’

handiwork. All the pity I had felt for the prisoners

we’d taken days before now turned to utter rage.

Everything had been sacked. Expensive cars lay
Marine Corps History Division Reference Branch photo files

Marines of Company D prepare to enter a residential area on Faylakah Island, Kuwait, on 3 March 1991. The Marines

secured the island without resistance from its Iraqi garrison. 

crippled on the roadside, their wheels torn off,

doors missing, glass shattered. Stores had been

completely emptied. I walked, in shock, past a shoe

store that held nothing but a seven-foot pile of

empty shoeboxes. Oddly enough—and in a revealing statement on the attackers—the bookstore next

door was left largely untouched, its rows of textbooks still neatly aligned on the shelves.”4

Other Marines tried the same thing. First Lieutenant

Sean T. Coughlin of Marine Wing Support Group 37

acquired a humvee and drove with two other Marines

from King Abdul Aziz Naval Base to Kuwait City and

back again. The entire trip took seven hours each

way, with the Marines driving past journalists and

Arab forces on the roads. Inside Kuwait City they

found similar scenes of destruction and jubilation.5

Captain Thompson recorded a vivid description

of what the Marines found in Kuwait City and how

it helped many of them put their labors in the desert

into perspective:

The spectacle before us was the reason we

had come to this country. Huge Kuwaiti flags

draped out nearly every apartment building

and welcomed us in the gentle breeze. All the

anger and frustration of the previous six

months began melting away in the hundreds

of smiles I now saw.

“Thank you for saving our country!”

“We love U.S. Marines!”

“We love USA!”

We heard it over and over. I could only

smile and nod. I was afraid to speak. Somewhere along the line, someone gave me a

ragged, soot-covered Kuwaiti flag, which I still

have.6

The battlefield was littered with unexploded ordinance; mines; destroyed Iraqi vehicles; and, sadly,

many Iraqi dead. The explosive ordinance disposal

teams and engineers were soon busy working to

defuse or safely detonate the live ordinance, while

the 1st Force Service Support Group graves registration teams worked to handle the Iraqi dead properly. Information on the Iraqi dead was recorded,

and the bodies were transferred to Saudi Arabian

authorities, who ensured that proper Islamic burials

were provided. There were fewer Iraqi dead than

might be expected, as vast numbers had surrendered and even more had fled back to Iraq.7

Al-Wafrah Forest and Faylakah Island

Although a cease-fire had been declared, not all

Iraqi units abided by it (nor were all aware of it, as

Iraqi communications were sporadic). On 2 March,

Standing Down after Victory 211
212 Liberating Kuwait

Col John E. Rhodes, commanding officer of the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable), walks out

to accept the surrender of the Iraqi 440th Naval Infantry Brigade from BGen Abbud Gambar Hasen Almiki on Faylakah

Island.

Marine Corps History Division Reference Branch photo files

the 17th Brigade of the Republican Guard’s Hammurabi Division opened fire on the U.S. Army’s

24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) just west of

Basrah and was mauled in return. Along with occasional small-arms fire and poor communications

between Iraqi units—some of which did not know

of the cease-fire—clearing operations remained

dangerous even beyond the myriad bits of unexploded ordinance and mines scattered about the

battlefield. 

The 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade was given

the task of clearing the bypassed regions of the alWafrah Forest as it transited from Kuwait back to

al-Mishab to rejoin its amphibious squadron. It

began to clear al-Wafrah on 1 March. The process

was slow and methodical, and it began with helicopters flying over the forest, their loudspeakers

announcing the cease-fire and calling on the Iraqis

to surrender. During the clearing, the brigade came

under sporadic fire from isolated pockets of Iraqi

soldiers, and each time the Marines responded in

kind and called in Cobra air strikes. One Marine

was wounded by an Iraqi booby trap on the morning of 3 March, the last day of the forest clearing

operation, but none of the Iraqis in the forest surrendered. On 4 March, the brigade’s infantry battalions traveled south via helilift and ground

convoy, returning to the ships of Amphibious

Group 3.8

Also on 3 March, the 13th Marine Expeditionary

Unit (Special Operations Capable) cleared the other

major piece of Kuwaiti territory still held by Iraqi

troops, Faylakah Island. It was held by the Iraqi

440th Naval Infantry Brigade, comprising just over

1,400 troops. On 2 March, two UH-lNs from Marine

Light Helicopter Squadron 767 flew over Faylakah,

broadcasting the surrender message on loudspeakers to the Iraqi troops. They were not fired on. The

next morning, helicopters flying over the island saw

white flags, and the Iraqis gathered in a communications compound. The Marine assault element

landed at 0800 and began securing the island.

Colonel John Rhodes, commander of the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit, accepted the surrender of

Brigadier General Abbud Gambar Hasen Almiki, the

Iraqi commander, at a formal ceremony at 1430.9

The Iraqi naval troops were evacuated from the

island via helicopter to the USS Ogden. They were

searched for weapons, provided with food, and

screened for medical care. Meanwhile, Marine intelligence officers examined the defenses on Faylakah, which had been bombed repeatedly during

the aerial campaign. The Iraqis had suffered no serious casualties from these raids; they abandoned
Photo by Sgt Jose D. Trejo. Defense Imagery DA-ST-92-08032

Army Gen H. Norman Schwarzkopf (at left), commander in chief of U.S. Central Command, and LtGen Khalid bin Sultan bin Abdul Aziz, commander of Joint Forces in Saudi Arabia, sit across the table from an interpreter and (from left

to right) Iraqi LtGens Muhammad Abdez Rahman Al-Dagitistani, Sabin Abdel-Aziz Al Douri, and Salah Aboud Mahmoud during cease-fire talks at Safwan, Iraq.

their firing positions during each attack. On 5

March, the last of the Iraqis were transferred ashore

to the Army’s military police, joining the rest of the

enemy prisoners of war.10

On 3 March, General Norman Schwarzkopf and

General Khaled bin Sultan met with Sultan Hashim

Ahmad, deputy chief of staff of the Iraqi Ministry of

Defense, and Lieutenant General Salah Aboud Mahmoud, commander of the destroyed III Corps, at

Safwan, Iraq, in order to formalize the cease-fire. In

the short meeting they dictated the terms of ceasefire to the Iraqis, thus officially ending the major

combat period of the Gulf War. During the talks,

the Iraqis requested and received permission to fly

helicopters over their own territory, the only concession they were granted.11

Leaving the Desert

The formal cease-fire agreement made it clear that

the United States was not going to continue to Baghdad and started the troops in the Persian Gulf thinking about when they could return to the United

States. Moving hundreds of thousands of troops and

their equipment to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf’s waters had taken months, and returning those troops

and supplies would take months as well. The equipment and supplies needed to be returned in good

condition to avoid waste, and the territories of Saudi

Arabia and Kuwait needed to be left in the condition

in which they existed prior to the war, as much as

possible. Additionally, although the cease-fire was

signed, no formal peace agreement was reached,

and Iraq remained a threat to peace and stability in

the region after the war, albeit a greatly reduced

one. Iraq’s ability to sow discord was reduced by

the conflict, but this left a power vacuum in the region that could easily be filled by nations such as

Iran or Syria. It was apparent even as the cease-fire

was signed that an American presence in the region

would be required for the foreseeable future. 

The primary consideration in the withdrawal was

that the Marines maintain combat readiness while

departing the area of operations, returning as “deployable air-ground task forces.” Marines would

generally return to the United States with the same

units with which they deployed to Southwest Asia.

The priority would be “first in/first out” according

to units. The initial I Marine Expeditionary Force

units to depart the Gulf were those that deployed

with the 7th Marine Expeditionary Brigade in AuStanding Down after Victory 213
214 Liberating Kuwait

A pile of captured Iraqi arms in Kuwait City. The Iraqis left weapons and equipment of all descriptions littering the battlefield.

Photo by Col John Shotwell. Marine Corps History Division Reference Branch photo files

gust; they began returning to the States on 8

March.12

General Walter Boomer established the basic priorities and guidelines for the retrograde movement

in the first days after the cease-fire, warning his staff

on 1 March that the “most dangerous part of the

campaign, as it turns out, may still be ahead of us.

That is moving all this stuff out without getting anybody hurt.” With the threat of war apparently

ended, there was a real worry that Marines would

lose focus, resulting in deadly accidents. Many hazardous tasks were required for the withdrawal—ammunition needed to be properly stored, for instance,

and large, dangerous equipment needed to be operated—and these jobs required focus.13

Additionally, there was concern about the massive pile of weapons abandoned by the Iraqis in

Kuwait. Marines were not permitted to bring back

firearms, grenades, or other potentially dangerous

war souvenirs. As for other types of souvenirs, General Boomer instructed that “as far as I’m concerned,

what the troops find on the battlefield in terms of

hats, belt buckles, that kind of thing they should be

allowed to take home, and they are going to do it.

They ought to have something to show their grandchildren in a few years.” Field historians working

for the Marine Corps History and Museums Division

chose pieces of captured Iraqi equipment for later

museum exhibits, and major units were permitted

to bring back a limited number of trophies (such as

field guns and armor) for display at their command

post.14

Another duty that needed to be accomplished before all the Marines involved returned to the States

was convening the various awards boards to recognize those Marines who had performed exceptionally well during the conflict. General Boomer had

specific guidance for the awards boards: “One of

the things that I saw coming out of Vietnam that

continued to disgust me, and has for the last 25

years, is the fact that most of our young Marines,

time and time again, got screwed while senior offi-
Photo by PO1 Joe Gawlowicz, USN. Defense Imagery DN-ST-92-00829

An HY-2 Silkworm antiship missile left behind by retreating Iraqi troops sits on a flatbed trailer as captured equipment

and ordnance are prepared for shipment following the Gulf War.

cers got awards. I promise you that will not happen,

and those of you sitting on these awards boards pay

attention to the youngsters, and if I catch you

downgrading what a commander has recommended for a lance corporal in terms of heroic

award, I’ll disband the board and start again.” In the

event, 2 Navy Crosses, 15 Silver Stars, 22 Distinguished Flying Crosses, and 523 Bronze Stars as

well as thousands of other awards were presented

to Marines for meritorious actions during the Gulf

War.15

While the withdrawal was taking place, the Marine Corps instituted a major effort to preserve the

institutional lessons learned from the Gulf War. The

Marine Corps Combat Development Command deployed a large battle assessment team under

Colonel Clifford L. Stanley to gather postcombat

data and interviews. This data was collated, analyzed, and published through the Marine Corps Lessons Learned System; it was eventually deposited

in the General Alfred M. Gray Marine Corps Research Center’s Southwest Asia Archive in Quantico,

Virginia.16

On 5 March, General Boomer reestablished the I

Marine Expeditionary Force headquarters in alJubayl, Saudi Arabia, and reunited the separate

command posts that had run the liberation. The

combat replacement regiment was dissolved on 21

March, and on 26 March the first Marines from the

expeditionary force’s headquarters began to return

to the United States. General Boomer and most of

his staff departed on 16 April. On 21 April, a new

Marine command was instituted for the region: Marine Forces, Southwest Asia. Major General Norman

E. Ehlert, former deputy commander of U.S. Marine

Forces Central Command, was the first commander

of this new organization. 

The Marine forces afloat, which fell under the

control of U.S. Naval Forces Central Command,

were already embarked for the most part and could

depart Southwest Asia relatively quickly. The 13th

Marine Expeditionary Force (Special Operations Capable) was the first to depart, leaving the Persian

Gulf proper on 11 March. The unit sailed back to

San Diego, California, making stops in the Philippines and Hawaii before arriving on 16 April. The

4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade was the next amphibious landing force to leave the Gulf, departing

on 4 March. Returning to the United States in two

transit groups, the brigade returned via the Suez

Canal and the Mediterranean. The groups reached

the States and unloaded from 17 to 19 April.17

When the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade departed the region, Brigadier General Peter Rowe’s

5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade became Central

Command’s landing force and its strategic reserve

Standing Down after Victory 215
216 Liberating Kuwait

Aircraft Losses due to Enemy Action in the 1990–91 Gulf War

Dates: 1991 Aircraft Type Squadron Cause Result

18 January OV-10 VMO-2 surface-to-air missile aircraft lost, pilot and observer captured

28 January AV-8B VMA-311 surface-to-air missile aircraft lost, pilot captured

9 February F/A-18 VMFA-451 surface-to-air missile aircraft damaged

9 February AV-8B VMA-231 surface-to-air missile aircraft lost, pilot captured

12 February AV-8B VMA-542 antiaircraft artillery aircraft damaged

21 February F/A-18 VMFA-314 surface-to-air missile aircraft damaged

21 February F/A-18 VMFA-121 surface-to-air missile aircraft damaged

21 February A-6E VMA-224 antiaircraft artillery aircraft damaged

21 February F/A-18 VMFA-333 surface-to-air missile aircraft damaged

23 February F/A-18 VMFA-451 surface-to-air missile aircraft damaged

23 February AV-8B VMA-542 surface-to-air missile aircraft lost, pilot killed in action

23 February AV-8B VMA-311 antiaircraft artillery aircraft damaged

24 February F/A-18 VMFA-314 surface-to-air missile aircraft damaged

24 February F/A-18 VMFA-314 surface-to-air missile aircraft damaged

25 February OV-10 VMO-1 surface-to-air missile aircraft lost, pilot captured, observer killed

in action

25 February AV-8B VMA-542 surface-to-air missile aircraft lost, pilot parachuted to friendly hands

27 February AV-8B VMA-331 surface-to-air missile aircraft lost, pilot killed in action

as well. It faced two difficulties right away. First, the

USS Tripoli was badly damaged and unavailable

due to the mine it struck on 17 February. Second,

USS New Orleans had replaced the Tripoli with the

mine countermeasures force and was still involved

in mine clearing operations, and thus unavailable.

Amphibious Group 3 had lacked sufficient shipping

space from the beginning, and losing both of these

large amphibious vessels made reloading the

brigade difficult. The brigade nonetheless began reloading after its stint ashore, and by 10 March the

entire brigade, aside from those units awaiting the

return of the New Orleans, was reembarked.18

On 17 March, Colonel Robert Garner’s 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) separated from the 5th Marine Expeditionary

Force and departed the Gulf. As originally intended,

it comprised Battalion Landing Team 3/1, Marine

Medium Helicopter Squadron (Composite) 268, and

Marine Expeditionary Unit Service Support Group

11 and was embarked on Amphibious Squadron 1,

commanded by Captain Michael Barker, USN. Captain Barker’s squadron included the USS New Orleans (finally returned from mine-clearing duties),

USS Denver, USS Germantown, USS Peoria, and

USS Mobile. Colonel Garner and Captain Barker’s

force remained in the Gulf as Central Command’s

afloat reserve until July, training with local forces

and planning contingency operations for the unrest

in Ethiopia (these never came to pass, as the

Ethiopian crisis stabilized).19

On 7 May, the 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade

and Amphibious Group 3 departed the Persian Gulf

on their homeward journey. It was not a direct journey, however. In April, Cyclone Marian had devastated Bangladesh, and the brigade and amphibious

group were ordered to undertake a humanitarian

relief effort. On 17 May, the force arrived off

Bangladesh and began relief operations. After two

weeks of successful operations, their mission ended
Photo by Sgt Rodney Jones. Defense Imagery DF-ST-92-08163

LtCol Clifford M. Acree clasps his young daughter as former American POWs are greeted by their families on arrival at

Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland, on 10 March 1991.

on 29 May when the ships departed Bangladesh

and continued back to the United States. The

brigade finally completed its deployment when it

disembarked in San Diego on 29 June.20

As the Marines in the amphibious task forces

were sailing home, the Marines who had deployed

via airlift and Maritime Prepositioning Ships were

reloading those squadrons and preparing to return

home as well. The 1st Marine Division returned to

Saudi Arabia from Kuwait on 5–6 March, and the division’s first units into Saudi Arabia began redeploying home right away. By the end of March, over half

of the division had returned, and the entire division

was back in the United States by 24 April.21

The 3d Marine Aircraft Wing nearly ended the

war with a tragedy when two Marine F/A-18 Hornets collided while conducting air-to-air combat

training on 8 March. The pilots, both from Marine

Fighter Attack Squadron 212, parachuted to safety

following the collision. No Marine F/A-18s had been

lost to Iraqi antiaircraft gunnery or missiles in six

weeks of air combat; now two were lost in a training accident only a week after the war ended.

Squadrons from the wing began returning to the

United States during the spring: eight left in March,

several others in April, and the final two squadrons

of the wing departed on 17 May.22

The 2d Marine Division remained in Kuwait, establishing a forward defense as the Kuwaiti and

Coalition forces began the extensive effort required

to clean and reconstruct Kuwait. The Tiger Brigade

separated from the division on 23 March, and the

division, minus the 8th Marines, returned to Saudi

Arabia on 30 March. The 8th Marines remained in

Kuwait providing an American presence until midMay, when the last of the 2d Marine Division’s

troops returned to the United States.23

The 1st Force Service Support Group’s job before leaving Southwest Asia was just as large, and

just as critical, as its job had been when arriving.

Three squadrons of Maritime Prepositioning Ships

had to be reloaded, and reloaded so that their

stores and equipment would be in excellent shape

if they were called on for another emergency. Large

amounts of unused stores and equipment had to be

safely and economically returned to the United

States. For example, when the conflict ended, over

60 percent of the Marine Corps’ ammunition stocks

were in the Persian Gulf region. Cleaning and

restoring the equipment was a major effort, and the

Standing Down after Victory 217
218 Liberating Kuwait

Passing before the Lincoln Memorial, a Marine waves to the crowd from his vehicle as he participates in a parade in

Washington, DC, held in honor of the troops returning from the Gulf War.

Photo by CWO-2 Ed Bailey, USNR. Defense Imagery DN-ST-92-00329

wartime practices of some Marine units did not

make it easier. 

The Direct Support Command spent the first half

of March searching for and retrieving Marine Corps

equipment left on the battlefield. Much of this was

maritime prepositioning equipment apparently

abandoned by units returning to the United States.

General Charles Krulak was incensed at this waste,

referring to it as “the biggest disgrace of the war”

and “a Marine Corps shame.”24

On 17 March, the Direct Support Command

stood down, and the 2d Force Service Support

Group stood up, continuing the work of the remaining combat service support units in Southwest Asia.

Throughout the rest of March, April, and May, the

group continued moving supplies, cleaning equipment, and loading ships. On 23 June, General Krulak departed the region, along with the bulk of 2d

Force Service Support Group. Marine Forces, Southwest Asia finally stood down on 10 October, and

the last Marines deployed for the Gulf War departed

the region.25

A Triumphant Return

Five Marines were captured by the Iraqis in the Gulf

War: Lieutenant Colonel Clifford Acree, Chief Warrant Officer-4 Guy Hunter, Major Joseph Small, Captain Russell Sanborn, and Captain Michael Berryman. All were aircrewmen belonging to 3d Marine

Aircraft Wing squadrons. They spent varying

amounts of time in Iraqi custody, but all were

treated with brutality and contempt for the accepted, proper treatment of prisoners of war. The

return of Coalition prisoners of war was one of

General Schwarzkopf’s priorities at the Safwan

cease-fire talks, and the Iraqis readily agreed to it.

The five Marine prisoners of war were returned to

the United States and reunited with their families on

10 March. 

At home, Marines who participated in Desert

Shield and Desert Storm were shocked at the enthusiastic welcome they received in the States, not

just from their loved ones but from the nation as a

whole. There were many parades and celebrations

around the country. On 8 June, East Coast Marines

participated in a victory parade on the National Mall

in Washington, DC, and there were numerous parades on 4 July in which the Independence Day

holiday celebrations merged with gratitude for those

who had returned from the Gulf. Returning as

whole units, beside the Marines with whom they

fought, created a very different homecoming for the

Gulf War veterans than that experienced a generation earlier by veterans of the Vietnam War. 
Photo by PO2 Milton R. Savage, USN. Defense Imagery DN-ST-92-09843

During Operation Provide Comfort, a Navy corpsman with Marine Expeditionary Unit Service Support Group 24 provides

medical services to a Kurdish boy in a medical clinic in northern Iraq.

Postwar Iraq: Operations Provide Comfort,

Northern Watch, and Southern Watch

Yet the end of combat operations in the Kuwaiti

theater of operations did not end the armed confrontation between the United States and Saddam

Hussein’s Iraqi government. Marines remained involved with the ongoing confrontation over the

next 12 years. Throughout the war, the Coalition

had expressed the desire that Iraqis overthrow Saddam’s government, encouraging the Iraqi military

in particular to overthrow their president. In the aftermath of the Coalition’s destruction of the Iraqi

military, the government’s foes attempted to do just

that. On 1 March, an uprising began in Basrah that

was apparently begun by soldiers who had fled

from the Coalition in Kuwait, and it soon spread to

most of the southern cities dominated by the Shia.

On 4 March, another uprising began in the north

among the Kurds, beginning in the town of Rania

and soon spreading throughout Iraqi Kurdistan.26

In keeping with his belief that the United States

had been maneuvering to destroy Iraq (or, even

worse, to bring about his downfall) throughout the

1980s, Saddam Hussein believed that these uprisings were planned by America. In fact, he believed

that they were the intended “next step” following

the Coalition military operations that liberated

Kuwait. As he told his senior military officers in

April, “The entire siege that happened, the air bombardment until the land attack began, they were all

methods used to create the appropriate environment for the operation [uprising] to take place.”27

Faced with insurrection in 14 of Iraq’s 18

provinces, the Republican Guard and the Iraqi military (which remained predominantly loyal to Saddam) responded fiercely and effectively. They had

been ineffective in the face of Coalition military

power, but smashing poorly armed civilian uprisings was an Iraqi military specialty in 1991. Artillery

was used widely and indiscriminately to smash the

rebels, and helicopters were also operated on a

widespread scale. Many believed that this use was

why the Iraqis had insisted on obtaining the right

to fly helicopters within Iraq in the Safwan Accords.

By 15 March, the Iraqi military had essentially

crushed the nascent rebellion of the Shia in southern Iraq, often in full view of the U.S. Army’s VII

Standing Down after Victory 219
220 Liberating Kuwait

Painted with graffiti by Coalition troops, an Iraqi T-55 main battle tank lies amidst other destroyed vehicles along the

highway between Kuwait City and Basrah, Iraq.

Photo by TSgt Joe Coleman, USAF. Defense Imagery, DF-ST-92-08469

Corps, which occupied much of this area until May

1991. The United States was reluctant to become involved, but when Iraqi military forces turned north

and began to roll back Kurdish forces in late March

and early April, international pressure to intervene

began to grow. The pressure grew greater as it became apparent that a humanitarian disaster was imminent in the northern Iraq refugee camps.28

On 5 April, UN Security Council Resolution 688

was passed, calling for Iraq to end the repression

of its people. President Bush determined that the

United States would join in the international effort

to bring aid to the hundreds of thousands of

refugees believed to be in danger of starvation in

northern Iraq. On 10 April, the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable), which

was deployed to the Mediterranean under U.S. European Command, was ordered to join Combined

Task Force Provide Comfort on 16 April. The expeditionary unit entered northern Iraq on 20 April.29

The 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable), the main Marine unit for Operation Provide Comfort, was commanded by Colonel

James L. Jones Jr. Its ground combat element was

Battalion Landing Team 2/8; the air element was a

composite squadron formed from Marine Medium

Helicopter Squadron 264; and logistics were handled by Marine Expeditionary Unit Service Support

Group 24. Beyond Colonel Jones’s command, many

other Marines served with the combined task force.

Brigadier General Anthony C. Zinni served as both

deputy commanding general and chief of staff. In

addition, the Contingency Marine Air-Ground Task

Force 1-91 and detachments from the 2d Remotely

Piloted Vehicle Company and the 4th Civil Affairs

Group served in the combined task force. Fire control teams from the 2d ANGLICO served alongside

the allied British, French, Spanish, and Italian NATO

units that were also stationed in northern Iraq.

The Iraqi military chose not to respond to Operation Provide Comfort with military force, and after

several months of providing security and supplies

to the refugees, the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit

departed Iraq on 15 July 1991. Operation Provide

Comfort then entered its second phase, which focused on aerial responses to Iraqi military aggression against Kurdish areas. This second phase in

turn transformed in January 1997 into Operation

Northern Watch. The Marine Corps committed detachments of KC-130 Hercules aerial refuelers and

EA-6B Prowler electronic warfare aircraft to the support of Operation Northern Watch, which continued

until Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003. 

In the south, Joint Task Force Southwest Asia
Defense Imagery DN-ST-91-08410

Barbed wire, mines, and other obstacles were erected along the shoreline during the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait to prevent or slow attacks by sea.

was established under U.S. Central Command in

August 1992 to enforce a no-fly zone over southern

Iraq, which also lasted until Operation Iraqi Freedom began in 2003. Marine aircraft from land bases

and aircraft carriers flew often in support of Operation Southern Watch. 

In 1998, Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 312—

commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Stephen M.

Pomeroy and flying off the USS Enterprise (CVN 65)—

flew strike missions into Iraq as part of Operation

Desert Fox, a four-day bombing campaign conducted

by the United States and Great Britain in response to

Iraq’s defiance of the United Nation’s resolutions.30

Reflections

Liberating Kuwait from the Iraqi forces occupying

it was not a victory free from cost. During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, 383 American

servicemembers lost their lives in the theater of war.

Of those, 68 were Marines: 44 non-battle-related

deaths and 24 battle-related deaths. A further 92

Marines were wounded in action. Five Marines, as

mentioned above, were captured and repatriated

following the conflict.31

There are no reliable estimates of Iraqi losses

during the campaign. Iraqi records are unclear, for

example, on exactly how many Iraqi troops were

in Kuwait when the liberation began. Most estimates indicate that 20–30 percent of each Iraqi division had deserted or been given leave prior to the

invasion; it is thus very difficult to determine how

many Iraqis were slain in the fighting. Tens of thousands of Iraqis surrendered to Coalition forces, and

thousands, perhaps tens of thousands, were slain

resisting the liberation. And, of course, Iraqi casualties in the invasion of Kuwait are unclear, though

they were not heavy. Saddam believed that if he

could achieve a ratio of one American slain for

every four Iraqis slain, he would win the war. He

does not seem to have achieved that ratio, but he

believed he won the war anyway.32

Indeed, Saddam was convinced that he won the

Gulf War, that the tenacity and stubborn defense of

Iraqi forces under fire persuaded the Americans to end

the conflict earlier then they intended. As Kevin

Woods notes in his examination of the Iraq side of the

conflict, The Mother of All Battles, Saddam declared

that 

I am very sure the criminal Bush did not exStanding Down after Victory 221
pedite the cease-fire until he realized that our

armor was [resisting]. . . . He probably said to

himself, “It is very apparent that he [Saddam]

is going to cause us damage.” He worried that

the so-called victory would take an unfavorable turn; therefore he rushed alone, before

the [UN] Security Council discussed the situation with him and decided on a cease-fire, in

order for him to control the cease-fire situation.33

Saddam’s primary criteria for victory was that he

end the conflict alive and in command of Iraq. He

began the war as a response to what he saw as an

American conspiracy to destroy Saddam Hussein,

and he saw no meaningful distinction between Iraq

and himself. After the war, the Iraqi military undertook a series of studies and conferences devoted to

learning the lessons of the Gulf War, lessons they

put to immediate practical use against the ongoing

Northern and Southern Watch air campaigns.34

The U.S. Army saw the Gulf War as a vindication

of the training methods and doctrine developed in

response to the crisis it experienced in the immediate

aftermath of the Vietnam War. For the U.S. Navy, the

war emphasized its ability to project power but highlighted its relative isolation from the post–GoldwaterNichols joint command environment. For the U.S. Air

Force, the Gulf War was the culmination of its fervent

belief in airpower’s ability to win wars.35

For their part, Marines began evaluating the Gulf

War’s impact on international relations, military affairs, and interservice politics even before it ended.

Brigadier General Granville Amos, assistant commander of the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, had some

prophetic words and an admonition for those historical writers who would inevitably follow this

war: “We are going to discuss it for years. Books

are going to be written. The Marines . . . will selfflagellate and point fingers. . . . But I think that

we’ve got to be careful of, as we are writing things

down, that we don’t lose sight of what our mission

was and the fact that we did it.” His warning was

echoed by Marine Aircraft Group 13 commander

Colonel John Bioty, who later stated, “Things

worked better over there than we made them out

to be back here. The real war was fought when we

started to write the books about Desert Storm.”36

Looking back at the conflict, the Marine commanders felt the role of the amphibious deception

needed to be emphasized. Major General James

Myatt, commander of the 1st Marine Division, recalled: “I think what we can’t dismiss is the level of

effort put into the defenses along the beaches by

the Iraqis. . . . Probably 40% to 50% of the Iraqi artillery pieces were pointed to the east in defense of

this perceived real threat—an attack from the Gulf.

There were literally hundreds of antiaircraft weapon

systems laid in a direct-fire mode from Saudi Arabia

all the way up way above Kuwait City to defend

against the amphibious threat. . . . I think it [the amphibious feint] saved a lot of Marine lives.”37

Major General William Keys, commander of the

2d Marine Division, believed that the Marines erred

in overestimating the Iraqis: 

I guess that our biggest overall intelligence

shortcoming was in building Saddam Hussein

and his forces into a monster that just wasn’t

there. Going into the battle, this made us

more gun-shy than we should have been.

Certainly, the Iraqis had more equipment and

capability than any force we’ve ever faced.

But the fighting spirit just was not there. The

individual foot-soldiers were badly abused by

their leaders—not necessarily their military

leaders, but their government—and low

morale was the result. I think their senior military leaders knew what they were doing.

After we seized Kuwait City, we uncovered

several sand tables depicting their defenses

that were incredibly detailed. They were fully

prepared for us. They had thousands of

weapons and millions of rounds of small-arms

and tank ammunition—so they could have

put up one hell of a fight if they had wanted

to. Their defensive areas were well organized,

and had they chosen to put their hearts into

it, we would have had a real fight on our

hands.

He concluded that “I guess it all boils down to

the fact that the individual Iraqi soldier did not

measure up to, say, the North Vietnamese soldier.

The Iraqis were not ready to die for what they believed in—whatever that was. And that’s it in a nutshell.”38

Lieutenant General Walter Boomer noted particularly the important role that the relatively new light

armored vehicle battalions had in the war:

The LAVs [light armored vehicles] performed

extremely well, in some cases very courageously. A lesson that I learned as far as LAVs

is concerned is that you’ve got to stress to

them that they need to be careful about what

they take on. Part of the problem is that

222 Liberating Kuwait
Photo by LtCol Charles H. Cureton

A herd of camels continues across the desert, ignoring the military preparations around them during Operation Desert

Shield. 

you’ve got Marines manning them, and they

don’t think anything can defeat them. They

can’t go up against armor and they need to

be really careful when they do. So, I think it’s

just a matter of talking to them about their

mission what you expect of them and what

you don’t expect of them. In our case, it all

turned out okay but on a couple of occasions

I think it could have gotten a little dicey for

them. It’s hard for me to fault Marines for

being aggressive. So, you’ve just got to be

careful. But, conceptually it worked well and

the vehicle served us well.39

Brigadier General James Brabham, commander

of the 1st Force Service Support Group, noted that

logistically the Corps had sent two-thirds of its combat power overseas, fought a war, and returned

successfully. He continued: “But the equipment is

now back, and it’s ready to go, although residual

cleanup efforts continue. Training has resumed at

our bases, and we have no significant holes in our

readiness or our capability to deploy again, when

called. When you consider the hard, round-theclock use that much of the equipment got for eight

months, including combat, that’s pretty phenomenal. And there are a lot of wonderful people out

there in the logistics system who made that happen.”40

Lieutenant General Boomer felt that despite the

needed process of institutional self-criticism, “the

campaign was successful, and I wouldn’t do things

much differently.” He attributed that success to his

junior Marines:

The young lance corporal would take a look,

see something 75 or 100 meters out in front

that needed to be done, and go out and do it

without being told. As I read through award

citations from Desert Shield and Desert Storm,

this theme reappears, time and time again.

That aggressive spirit comes from being welltrained, and confident in your professional

knowledge. It is young Marines with that aggressive spirit who take their divisions ahead.

When you say that the division is moving forward, you are really saying that thousands of

Marines are forging ahead as individuals and

in small units. They are the real heroes of any

battle. You can have the best battle plan in

the world, but without the right people to execute that plan it is no more than a pipe

Standing Down after Victory 223
dream. It’s the well-trained Marine who turns

that plan into reality.41

The combined defense of Saudi Arabia and liberation of Kuwait was one of the most successful

Marine operations in the twentieth century. One

dead Marine is too many, but boldness, superior

training, and superior technology made Desert

Storm the least costly operation of its scale in Marine Corps history. It did not end conflict with Iraq,

however: Marines returned to Kuwait several times

in the following decade, and Saddam Hussein was

not removed from power until 2003 by Operation

Iraqi Freedom. Nevertheless, the Gulf War victory,

while incomplete, still stands as a victory, one in

which the Marine Corps played a significant part.

224 Liberating Kuwait
Notes

CHAPTER 1

Background to a Flashpoint

1. This section is based on material from Albert

Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples (Cambridge:

Belknap Press, 2002), hereafter Hourani, Arab Peoples; John L. Esposito, ed., The Oxford History of

Islam (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), hereafter Esposito, History of Islam; Helen C. Metz, ed.,

Iraq: A Country Study (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1990); Phebe Marr, The Modern

History of Iraq, 2d ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview

Press, 2004), hereafter Marr, History of Iraq. 

2. Hourani, Arab Peoples, p. 19.

3. Esposito, History of Islam, p. 12.

4. Ibid., pp. 14–18; Hourani, Arab Peoples, pp. 36–

40.

5. Esposito, History of Islam, pp. 24–61; Hourani,

Arab Peoples, pp. 32–59, 83–85.

6. This section is based on material from Marr, History of Iraq, pp. 21–60.

7. Ibid., pp. 53–60.

8. Ibid., pp. 61–176.

9. Ibid., p. 92.

10. Ibid., pp. 107–110.

11. Ibid., pp. 113–130.

12. Ibid., pp. 131–134.

13. Ibid., pp. 134–176.

14. Ibid., pp. 178–180.

15. Ibid., pp. 152–158.

16. Hourani, Arab Peoples, pp. 253, 280–281, 408–

458; Helen C. Metz, ed., Persian Gulf States: A

Country Study (Washington, DC: Department of the

Army, 1994), hereafter Metz, Persian Gulf States;

Richard Schofield, Kuwait and Iraq: Historical

Claims and Territorial Disputes (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1994).

17. Marr, History of Iraq, pp. 110–111; Metz, Persian

Gulf States.

18. Metz, Persian Gulf States.

19. This section is based on material from Lawrence

R. Benson and Jay E. Hines, The United States Military in North Africa and Southwest Asia Since

World War II (MacDill Air Force Base, FL: United

States Central Command, History Office, 1988), p.

1, hereafter Benson and Hines, Since World War II;

Michael A. Palmer, On Course to Desert Storm: The

United States Navy and the Persian Gulf (Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, 1992), pp. 3–18,

hereafter Palmer, On Course; Michael A. Palmer,

Guardians of the Gulf (New York: Free Press, 1992),

hereafter Palmer, Guardians; Jay E. Hines, “Confronting Continuing Challenges: A Brief History of

U.S. Central Command,” paper presented to the 2d

International Conference of Saint Leo College’s Center for Inter-American Studies, March 1997, hereafter

Hines, “Challenges.” 

20. Benson and Hines, Since World War II, pp. 1–2;

Palmer, On Course, pp. 19–40, 61–65.

21. Palmer, On Course, pp. 66–80.

22. Benson and Hines, Since World War II, pp. 19–

21.

23. Palmer, On Course, pp. 75–88.

24. Ibid., pp. 76–79.

25. Ibid., pp. 80–81; Bruce R. Nardulli, “Dance of

Swords: U.S. Military Assistance to Saudi Arabia,

1942–1964” (PhD dissertation, The Ohio State University, 2002), hereafter Nardulli, “Dance of

Swords.”

26. Palmer, On Course, pp. 89–100.

27. Ibid., p. 108.

28. Ibid., pp. 101–105; Dr. E. Asa Bates, “The Rapid

Deployment Force—Fact or Fiction,” RUSI Journal,

Jun81, pp. 23–33; Gen P. X. Kelley, “Progress in the

RDJTF,” Marine Corps Gazette, Jun81, pp. 38–44;

John Clementson, “Mission Imperative: The Rapid

Deployment Joint Task Force,” Armed Forces, Jul83,

pp. 260–265, and Aug83, pp. 304–308.

29. Gen Robert H. Barrow intvw with BGen Edwin

H. Simmons, 17Dec91 (MCHC, Quantico, VA), hereafter Barrow intvw; Allan R. Millett and Jack Shulimson, Commandants of the Marine Corps (Annapolis:

Naval Institute Press, 2004), pp. 451–455, hereafter

Millett and Shulimson, Commandants; Allan R. Millett, Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States

Marine Corps (New York: The Free Press, 1991), pp.

607–635.

30. Barrow intvw; Millett and Shulimson, Commandants, pp. 451–455.

31. P. X. Kelley, A Discussion of the Rapid Deployment Force (Washington, DC: American Enterprise

Institute, 1980), pp. 3–4, hereafter Kelley, Rapid;

Palmer, Guardians, p. 114.

32. Palmer, On Course, pp. 105–106; Kelley, Rapid,

p. 6.

33. Benson and Hines, Since World War II, pp. 39–

43; Jay E. Hines, “From Desert One to Southern

Watch: The Evolution of U.S. Central Command,”

225
Joint Forces Quarterly, Spring 2000, pp. 44–48, hereafter Hines, “Evolution.”

34. Benson and Hines, Since World War II, p. 43;

Hines, “Evolution,” p. 44.

35. Gen George B Crist intvw with Benis M. Frank,

9–10Jan89 (MCHC Quantico, VA), hereafter Crist

intvw 9–10Jan89.

36. Crist intvw 9–10Jan89; Hines, “Evolution,” p. 44.

37. Crist intvw 9–10Jan89; Hines, “Evolution,” p. 44.

38. Benson and Hines, Since World War II, p. 47;

Robert C. Kingston, “The United States Central Command,” Defense ’84, Apr84, pp. 4–9; Hines, “Challenges.”

39. This section is based on material from Kenneth

M. Pollack, Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness

1948–1991 (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 2002), pp. 182–235, hereafter Pollack,

Arabs at War; Kevin M. Woods, The Mother of All

Battles (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2008), pp.

36–40, hereafter Woods, Mother; Marr, History of

Iraq, pp. 181–214; Stephen C. Pelletiere, The IranIraq War: Chaos in a Vacuum (New York: Praeger,

1992), hereafter Pelletiere, Chaos; Stephen C. Pelletiere, Douglas V. Johnson II, and Leif R. Rosenberger, Iraqi Power and U.S. Security in the Middle

East (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, 1990), hereafter Pelletiere et al., Iraqi

Power; Efraim Karsh, The Iran-Iraq War,1980–1988

(Oxford: Osprey, 2002), hereafter Karsh, Iran-Iraq;

Dilip Hiro, The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Military

Conflict (New York: London: Routledge, 1991).

40. Pollack, Arabs at War, pp. 182–235; Marr, History of Iraq, pp. 181–216.

41. Pollack, Arabs at War, pp. 182–235; Marr, History of Iraq, pp. 181–216.

42. Pollack, Arabs at War, pp. 182–235; Marr, History of Iraq, pp. 181–216.

43. Pollack, Arabs at War, pp. 182–235; Marr, History of Iraq, pp. 181–216; Michael Knights, Cradle

of Conflict (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2005),

p. 5, hereafter Knights, Cradle.

44. Pollack, Arabs at War, pp. 182–235; Marr, History of Iraq, pp. 181–216.

45. Pollack, Arabs at War, pp. 182–235; Marr, History of Iraq, pp. 181–216.

46. Maj Ronald E. Bergquist, The Role of Airpower

in the Iran-Iraq War (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL:

Air University Press, 1988); Tom Cooper and Farzad

Bishop, The Iran–Iraq War in the Air 1980–1988

(Atglen, PA: Schiffer Publishing, 2003); Pollack,

Arabs at War, pp. 182–235; Marr, History of Iraq, pp.

181–216.

47. Bergquist, Airpower; Pollack, Arabs at War, pp.

182–235; Marr, History of Iraq, pp. 181–216.

48. Bergquist, Airpower; Pollack, Arabs at War, pp.

182–235; Marr, History of Iraq, pp. 181–216; Knights,

Cradle, pp. 25–27.

49. Bergquist, Airpower; Pollack, Arabs at War, pp.

182–235; Marr, History of Iraq, pp. 181–216; Woods,

Mother; Kevin M. Woods, et al., Iraqi Perspectives

Project: A View of Operation Iraqi Freedom from

Saddam’s Senior Leadership (Norfolk, VA: Joint Center for Operational Analysis, n.d.), p. 15, hereafter

Woods et al., Iraqi Perspectives.

50. Pollack, Arabs at War, pp. 182–235; Marr, History of Iraq, pp. 181–216.

51. Pollack, Arabs at War, pp. 182–235; Marr, History of Iraq, pp. 181–216.

52. Pollack, Arabs at War, pp. 182–235; Marr, History of Iraq, pp. 181–216; Karsh, Iran-Iraq, pp. 57–

58; Pelletiere et al., Iraqi Power, pp. 24–25. 

53. This section is based on material from Palmer,

On Course; Palmer, Guardians; Hines, “Challenges”; David B. Crist, “Before Desert Storm:

Marines in the Persian Gulf and the Beginning of

U.S. Central Command,” Fortitudine 29, no. 4

(2003): pp. 9–12, hereafter Crist, “Before Desert

Storm”; David B. Crist, “Joint Special Operations in

Support of Earnest Will,” Joint Forces Quarterly, Autumn/Winter 2001–2002, pp. 15–22, hereafter Crist,

“Joint Special Operations”; Danny J. Crawford, “Historical Overview of Marines in the Persian Gulf Region” (Washington, DC: Hist&MusDiv, HQMC,

Aug91); Stephen Andrew Kelley, “Better Lucky than

Good: Operation Earnest Will as Gunboat Diplomacy” (MA thesis, Naval Postgraduate School,

2007), hereafter Kelley, “Better Lucky”; John Partin,

ed., United States Special Operations Command History (Tampa, FL: USSOCOM History and Research

Office, 1998), hereafter Partin, Special Operations;

Edward J. Marolda and Robert J. Schneller Jr., Shield

and Sword: The United States Navy and the Persian

Gulf War (Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center,

1998), pp. 3–43, hereafter Marolda and Schneller,

Shield and Sword. 

54. Palmer, On Course, pp. 112–119.

55. Ibid., p. 124.

56. David B. Crist, “A Low Intensity Conflict at Sea:

U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1987–1988” (ms,

MCHD, Quantico, VA, 2000), hereafter Crist, “Low

Intensity.”

57. Crist, “Joint Special Operations,” pp. 15–22.

58. Ibid., pp. 15–22; Palmer, On Course, pp. 127,

130–132. 

59. Palmer, On Course, pp. 142–146; Kelley, “Better

Lucky.”

226 Liberating Kuwait
60. Palmer, On Course, pp. 142–146; Kelley, “Better

Lucky.”

61. Palmer, On Course, pp. 142–146; Kelley, “Better

Lucky”; Crist, “Before Desert Storm.”

62. Pollack, Arabs at War, pp. 228–229; Palmer, On

Course; Kelley, “Better Lucky”; Crist, “Before Desert

Storm.”

63. Woods, Mother, pp. 31–43; Pollack, Arabs at

War, pp. 232–235; Marr, History of Iraq, pp. 212–215.

CHAPTER 2

Kuwait Invaded

1. This section is based predominantly on material

from Woods, Mother, pp. 31–59; Pollack, Arabs at

War, pp. 232–235; Marr, History of Iraq, pp. 217–

227; Knights, Cradle, pp. 3–12; Peter Vine and Paula

Casey, Kuwait: A Nation’s Story (London: Immel

Publishing, 1992), pp. 133–149, hereafter Vine and

Casey, Kuwait; John Levins, Days of Fear: The Inside

Story of the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait (Dubai: Motivate Publishing, 1997), pp. 22–50, hereafter Levins,

Days of Fear; Michael R. Gordon and LtGen Bernard

E. Trainor, The Generals’ War (Boston: Little, Brown

and Company, 1995), pp. 4–30, hereafter Gordon

and Trainor, Generals’ War; Marolda and Schneller,

Shield and Sword, pp. 43–59; BGen Robert H. Scales

Jr., et al., Certain Victory: The U.S. Army in the Gulf

War (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Staff,

United States Army, 1993), pp. 39–69, hereafter

Scales et al., Certain Victory; Richard W. Stewart,

War in the Persian Gulf: Operations Desert Shield

and Desert Storm, August 1990–March 1991 (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History,

2010), pp. 1–10, hereafter Stewart, Persian Gulf.

2. Marr, History of Iraq, pp. 217–22; Woods, Mother,

pp. 31–59.

3. Marr, History of Iraq, p. 22.

4. Ibid., pp. 221–223; Woods, Mother, p. 72.

5. Marr, History of Iraq, p. 223; Woods, Mother, p. 41.

6. Woods, Mother, pp. 31–36. 

7. Ibid., pp. 31–59; Marr, History of Iraq, pp. 218–225;

quote from Barzan Ibrahim al-Tikriti ltr to Saddam

Hussein 4Sept1989 (ISGZ-2004-00147), hereafter alTikriti ltr.

8. Woods et al., Iraqi Perspectives, p. 6.

9. Woods, Mother, p. 51; Saddam Hussein mtg

w/Yasser Arafat, 19Apr1990 (ISGQ-2003-M0006048),

hereafter Arafat mtg.

10. Woods, Mother, p. 51; Arafat mtg.

11. Woods et al., Iraqi Perspectives, pp. 15–16, 20.

12. Ibid., p. 95.

13. Woods, Mother, p. 49; Marr, History of Iraq, p.

227; Gordon and Trainor, Generals’ War, pp. 20–23.

14. Woods, Mother, p. 77; Marr, History of Iraq, p.

227–228; mentioned in Saddam Hussein mtg

w/president of Yemen, 4Aug1990 (ISGQ-2003-

00044897), hereafter Yemen mtg.

15. Woods, Mother, pp. 60–62; Pollack, Arabs at

War, pp. 182–235.

16. Woods, Mother, p. 62; Saddam mtg w/Baath officials, 17Nov1991 (ISGQ-2003-M0005371); “Role of

the General Military Intelligence Directorate in Um

Al-Ma’arik Battle and in Controlling Riots,”

15Jul2001 (ISGP-2003-00033136), hereafter “Role of

the GMID.”

17. Woods, Mother, pp. 62–64.

18. Knights, Cradle, p. 7; Woods, Mother, p. 63;

Charles E. Allen, “Warning and Iraq’s Invasion of

Kuwait: A Retrospective Look,” Defense Intelligence

Journal, 1998; Marolda and Schneller, Shield and

Sword, pp. 42–43.

19. Woods, Mother, pp. 62–67; “Military Seminar on

the Republican Guard during the Invasion of

Kuwait, ca. 1993” (ISGQ-2003-M0006038).

20. Woods, Mother, pp. 62–67.

21. Ibid., pp. 70–73; “Role of the GMID”; Aerial Photograph of Kuwait City (ISGP-2003-00038232); Aerial

Photograph of Saudi Arabian Naval Base (ISGP2003-00037981); aerial photograph of Kuwaiti Desalinization Plant (ISGP-2003-00038524 ); “Role of

the Air Force and Air Defense in the Mother of All

Battles,” 5Oct1991 (ISGP-2003-00031468).

22. Woods, Mother, pp. 72–73; “5th Scientific Seminar on the Strategic Role of Umm al-Ma’arik Battle,”

Al-Bakir University for Military Studies, 15May1992

(ISGQ-2003-M0006198), hereafter al-Bakir seminar.

23. Woods, Mother, p. 78.

24. Ibid., pp. 78–81.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid., p. 81.

27. Ibid., pp. 80–81; Vine and Casey, Kuwait, p.

140.

28. Woods, Mother, pp. 81–88.

29. Ibid., p. 88.

30. Vine and Casey, Kuwait, pp. 134–137.

31. Martin Stanton, Road to Baghdad (New York:

Ballantine Books, 2003), pp. 47–71, quotes from pp.

52 and 54, hereafter Stanton, Road to Baghdad.

32. Woods, Mother, pp. 78–81.

33. Ibid., pp. 73–78; al-Bakir seminar; Robert O.

Freeman, “Moscow and the Iraqi Invasion of

Kuwait,” The Middle East after Iraq’s Invasion of

Kuwait (Gainesville: University Press of Florida,

1993), pp. 88–90.

34. Woods, Mother, pp. 73–78.

35. Ibid.

Notes 227
36. Ibid., pp. 87–88.

37. Marine Security Guard (MSG) Bn rpt to HQ

USMC, “Sequence of Events in Kuwait and Baghdad,” 27Aug1990 (MSG Bn S-3 Archives, Quantico,

VA), hereafter MSG Bn, “Sequence of Events”; MSG

Bn ComdC, Jan–Dec90 (Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA), hereafter MSG Bn ComdC; Leo J. Daugherty III, The Marine Corps and the State Department:

Enduring Partners in United States Foreign Policy,

1798–2007 (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2009), hereafter Daugherty, Enduring Partners; Joseph Wilson,

The Politics of Truth (New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, 2004), pp. 106–174, hereafter Wilson, Politics;

U.S. News & World Report staff, Triumph Without

Victory: The History of the Persian Gulf War (New

York: Random House, 1992), pp. 7–90, hereafter U.S.

News, Without Victory.

38. Wilson, Politics, p. 130.

39. Ibid.; Daugherty, Enduring Partners; MSG Bn,

“Sequence of Events”; MSG Bn ComdC.

40. Without Victory, p. 7; MSG Bn ComdC; Daugherty, Enduring Partners; Sgt Paul G. Rodriguez, AAR

for Iraq’s Invasion of Kuwait (MSG Bn S-3 Archives,

Quantico, VA), hereafter Sgt Rodriguez, AAR; SSgt J.

B. Smith, AAR for MSGDET, Kuwait, 2Aug90 to

11Dec90 (MSG Bn S-3 Archives, Quantico, VA),

hereafter SSgt Smith, AAR.

41. SSgt Smith, AAR.

42. Sgt Rodriguez, AAR; the account of the alleged

Kuwaiti murder of two Iraqi soldiers is also reported

by Maj Feeley in U.S. News, Without Victory, p. 13.

43. Sgt Rodriguez, AAR.

44. U.S. News, Without Victory, p. 78.

45. SSgt Smith, AAR.

46. Ibid.

47. Ibid.; MSG Bn, “Sequence of Events”; MSG Bn

ComdC.

48. SSgt Smith, AAR.

49. Ibid.; Sgt Rodriguez, AAR.

50. SSgt Smith, AAR; MSG Bn, “Sequence of Events”;

MSG Bn ComdC; Daugherty, Enduring Partners.

51. This section is based primarily on material from

Woods, Mother, pp. 103–118; Marr, History of Iraq,

pp. 229–235; Gordon and Trainor, Generals’ War,

pp. 31–53; Marolda and Schneller, Shield and

Sword, pp. 54–57.

52. Gordon and Trainor, Generals’ War, pp. 36–37.

53. Woods, Mother, pp. 104–105; Saddam Hussein

discussing right of Iraq in Kuwait, 1990 (Harmony

document folder ISGP-2003 10151576). 

54. Ibid., pp. 105–106.

55. Ibid., pp. 106–108.

56. LtGen Walter E. Boomer intvw with author,

27Jul06 (MCHC, Quantico, VA), hereafter Boomer

intvw.

CHAPTER 3

Desert Shield

1. Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian

Gulf War: Final Report to Congress (Department of

Defense: Washington, DC: 1992), p. 38, hereafter Department of Defense, Final Report; Scales et al., Certain Victory, pp. 49–51; Frank N. Schubert and

Theresa L. Kraus, eds., The Whirlwind War The

United States Army in Operations Desert Shield and

Desert Storm (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of

Military History, 1995), pp. 52–53, hereafter Schubert

and Kraus, Whirlwind War; Marolda and Schneller,

Shield and Sword, pp. 61–65.

2. Gordon and Trainor, Generals’ War.

3. Barrow intvw.

4. Marolda and Schneller, Shield and Sword, pp. 63–

64; Gordon and Trainor, Generals’ War, pp. 49–51;

LtGen Joseph P. Hoar, lecture at Marine Corps Historical Center, Washington, DC: 1Apr91 (Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA), hereafter Hoar lecture.

5. Ibid.

6. Gordon and Trainor, Generals’ War, p. 50; Hoar

lecture.

7. This section based on material from the relevant

Marine command chronologies archived at the Gray

Research Center, Quantico, VA, as well as Maj Steven

M. Zimmeck, U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990–

1991: Combat Service Support in Desert Shield and

Desert Storm (Washington, DC: Hist&MusDiv, HQMC,

1999), hereafter Zimmeck, Combat Service Support;

LtCol Charles H. Cureton, U.S. Marines in the Persian

Gulf, 1990–1991: With the 1st Marine Division in

Desert Shield and Desert Storm (Washington, DC:

Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, 1993), hereafter Cureton, 1st

Marine Division; LtCol Leroy D. Stearns, U.S. Marines

in the Persian Gulf, 1990–1991: With the 3d Marine

Aircraft Wing in Desert Shield and Desert Storm

(Washington, DC: Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, 1999), hereafter Stearns, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing; Col Charles

J. Quilter II, U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990–

1991: With the I Marine Expeditionary Force in

Desert Shield and Desert Storm (Washington, DC:

Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, 1993), hereafter Quilter, I Marine Expeditionary Force.

8. Hoar lecture.

9. 7th Marines ComdC, Jul–Sep90 (Gray Research

Center, Quantico, VA); Col Verle E. Ludwig, U.S.

Marines at Twentynine Palms, California (Washington, DC: Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, 1989); Zimmeck,

Combat Service Support, pp. 3–4, 215.

228 Liberating Kuwait
10. Stearns, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, pp. 5–15.

11. H&HS-38 ComdC, Jan91 (Gray Research Center,

Quantico, VA).

12. Zimmeck, Combat Service Support, p. 7; Marolda

and Schneller, Shield and Sword, pp. 63–65; MALS16 ComdC, 4 Aug–3 Sept 1990 (Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA).

13. Maj Mike F. Applegate intvws with LtCol Charles

H. Cureton, 6 and 13Dec90 (MCHC Quantico, VA),

hereafter Applegate intvws; Cureton, 1st Marine Division, p. 3; Quilter, I Marine Expeditionary Force,

pp. 7–8.

14. MajGen John I. Hopkins, “This Was No Drill”, U.S.

Naval Institute Proceedings, Nov91, reprinted in Maj

Charles D. Melson, Evelyn A. Englander, and Capt

David A. Dawson, eds., U.S. Marines in the Persian

Gulf, 1990–1991: Anthology and Annotated Bibliography (Washington, DC: Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, 1992),

p. 25, hereafter Melson et al., Anthology.

15. Ibid. 

16. This section based on material from the relevant

Marine command chronologies archived at the Gray

Research Center, Quantico, VA, as well as LtCol

Ronald J. Brown, U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf,

1990–1991: With Marine Forces Afloat in Desert

Shield and Desert Storm (Washington, DC: Hist&

MusDiv, HQMC, 1998), hereafter Brown, Marine

Forces Afloat; Melson et al., Anthology; Marolda and

Schneller, Shield and Sword; 13th MEU (SOC)

ComdC, Jul–Dec90 (Gray Research Center, Quantico,

VA), hereafter 13th MEU (SOC) ComdC.

17. Brown, Marine Forces Afloat, p. 12.

18. 13th MEU (SOC) ComdC; Brown, Marine Forces

Afloat, pp. 15–16.

19. 4th MEB ComdC, Aug90 (Gray Research Center,

Quantico, VA); Brown, Marine Forces Afloat, pp. 16–

22; Operation Sharp Edge, the Liberian evacuations

conducted 1990–1991, is described fully in Majs

James G. Antal and R. John Vanden Berghe, On

Mamba Station: U.S. Marines in West Africa, 1990–

2003 (Washington, DC: Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, 2004). 

20. 4th MEB ComdC, Aug90.

21. Brown, Marine Forces Afloat, pp. 22–23, 230; 4th

MEB ComdC, Aug90.

22. Brown, Marine Forces Afloat, pp. 21–25, 28; 4th

MEB ComdC, Aug90.

23. Brown, Marine Forces Afloat, pp. 30–33; 4th MEB

ComdC, Aug90.

24. Brown, Marine Forces Afloat, pp. 34–36, 42;

Marolda and Schneller, Shield and Sword, p. 84.

25. ComUSNavCent, OpOrd 1-90, “Desert Shield Amphibious Operations” (msg 311200Z Aug 90); Brown,

Marine Forces Afloat, pp. 41–45.

26. Brown, Marine Forces Afloat, pp. 42–43; Marolda

and Schneller, Shield and Sword, pp. 117–118;

Bernard C. Trainor, “Amphibious Operations in the

Gulf War,” Marine Corps Gazette, Aug94, p. 56.

27. 4th MEB AAR (Gray Research Center, Quantico,

VA); Brown, Marine Forces Afloat, pp. 42–43;

Marolda and Schneller, Shield and Sword, pp. 117–

118.

28. Brown, Marine Forces Afloat, pp. 46–50; 13th

MEU (SOC) ComdC, Oct90; 4th MEB ComdC, Oct90

(Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA).

29. Brown, Marine Forces Afloat, p. 48; 13th MEU

(SOC) ComdC, Oct90.

30. Brown, Marine Forces Afloat, pp. 54–59; MajGen

Harry W. Jenkins, Comments on draft ms, 24Feb2012

(MCHC, Quantico, VA).

31. 13th MEU (SOC) ComdC; Marolda and Schneller,

Shield and Sword, pp. 83–96; Brown, Marine Forces

Afloat, pp. 59–61.

32. Brown, Marine Forces Afloat, pp. 61–62.

33. This section based on material from the relevant

Marine command chronologies archived at the Gray

Research Center, Quantico, VA, as well as Zimmeck,

Combat Service Support; Cureton, 1st Marine Division; Stearns, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing; Quilter, I Marine Expeditionary Force; Melson et al., Anthology;

Marolda and Schneller, Shield and Sword.

34. Cureton, 1st Marine Division, pp. 6–15; 1st MarDiv ComdC, Aug–Dec90 and Jan–Feb91 (Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA).

35. Stearns, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, pp. 44–45, 55.

36. Zimmeck, Combat Service Support, pp. 35–37; 1st

FSSG ComdC, 3–30Sep90 (Gray Research Center,

Quantico, VA).

37. Thomas E. Leard, “Marine Corps Intelligence for

War as it Really Is” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 1991), pp. 52–57; Quilter, I Marine Expeditionary Force, pp. 17–18; 1st SRIG SAR to I MEF,

10Jun91.

38. CO Naval Construction Battalions, U.S. Pacific

Fleet, ltr to CNO, Subj: Naval Construction Force Support of Operation Desert Shield\Desert Storm, dtd 23

Jan92, hereafter “Naval Construction Force Support.”

39. Scales et al., Certain Victory, pp. 90–97; Gordon

and Trainor, Generals’ War, pp. 66–70.

40. Scales et al., Certain Victory, pp. 90–97; Gordon

and Trainor, Generals’ War, pp. 66–70; Cureton, 1st

Marine Division, pp. 21–22.

41. Nardulli, “Dance of Swords.”

42. Mohamed Heikal, Illusions of Triumph (New

York: HarperCollins, 1992).

43. Quilter, I Marine Expeditionary Force, pp. 6, 27–

28.

Notes 229
230 Liberating Kuwait

44. Otto J. Lehrack, America’s Battalion: Marines in

the First Gulf War (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama

Press, 2005), pp. 36–37, hereafter Lehrack, America’s

Battalion.

45. Boomer intvw.

46. Anthony H. Cordesman, Saudi Arabia, (Boulder:

Westview Press, 1997), p. 122, hereafter Cordesman,

Saudi Arabia; LtCol Peter J. Palmer, “Battle of Khafji:

A Gulf State Perspective” (paper, Marine Corps University, u.d.), hereafter Palmer, “Gulf State.”

47. Cordesman, Saudi Arabia, p. 137; Palmer, “Gulf

State”; Stanton, Road to Baghdad.

48. Palmer, “Gulf State”; Stanton, Road to Baghdad,

pp. 14–18; LtCol James R. Braden, “The Battle of

Khafji: A Coalition Air Ground Task Force Victory”

(paper, USMC Command and Staff College, 1999),

pp. 5, 23, 29–30, hereafter Braden, “Khafji.”

49. Gen Khaled bin Sultan with Patrick Seale, Desert

Warrior: A Personal View of the Gulf War by the Joint

Forces Commander (New York: HarperCollins, 1995),

hereafter Khaled, Desert Warrior.

50. Col Joseph Molofsky intvws with author, 30Jun06

and 16Aug06 (MCHC, Quantico, VA), hereafter Molofsky intvw, 30Jun06, or Molofsky intvw, 16Aug06;

Stanton, Road to Baghdad, pp. 23–25.

51. BGen Thomas V. Draude intvw with author and

Dr. Fred Allison, 21Jun06 (MCHC, Quantico, VA),

hereafter Draude intvw, 21Jun06.

52.. Col John A. Admire intvw, CD 10234 (Grey Research Center, Quantico, VA), hereafter Admire

intvw.

53. Molofsky intvws, 30Jun06 and 16Aug06; Braden,

“Khafji,” p. 8.

54. Lehrack, America’s Battalion, pp. 55–56.

55. BGen Thomas V. Draude intvw with LtCol Charles

H. Cureton, 29Dec90 (MCHC, Quantico, VA), hereafter Draude intvw, 29Dec90; 1st MarDiv ComdC,

Oct90; Admire intvw; Cureton, 1st Marine Division,

pp. 21–24; Transcripts, I MEF Daily Staff Briefings,

Sept–Nov90 (MCHC, Quantico, VA).

56. Draude intvw, 29Dec90.

CHAPTER 4

Preparing for War

1. Woods, Mother, pp. 103–117.

2. I MEF ComdC, Nov90; BGen Paul K. Van Riper,

“Observations During Operation Desert Storm,”

Marine Corps Gazette, Jun91, pp. 54–61; Quilter, I

Marine Expeditionary Force, pp. 24–27.

3. Stenographer’s transcript of I MEF morning briefing, 19–21Nov90; 4th MEB ComdC, Nov90; Brown,

Marine Forces Afloat, pp. 64–69; Marolda and

Schneller, Shield and Sword, p. 150.

4. Braden, “Khafji,” p. 8; Stearns, 3d Marine Aircraft

Wing, pp. 60–63, 72–75.

5. Brown, Marine Forces Afloat, pp. 69–70.

6. 4th MEB ComdC, Nov90; 4th MEB ComdC,

Dec90; Marolda and Schneller, Shield and Sword,

pp. 83–96; Brown, Marine Forces Afloat, pp. 62–64.

7. 4th MEB ComdC, Dec90; Marolda and Schneller,

Shield and Sword, pp. 151–152; Brown, Marine

Forces Afloat, pp. 62–64.

8. 4th MEB ComdC, Nov90; I MEF ComdC, Nov90;

Quilter, I Marine Expeditionary Force, p. 30;

Marolda and Schneller, Shield and Sword, p. 161.

9. Lehrack, America’s Battalion, pp. 49–54; Marolda

and Schneller, Shield and Sword, pp. 160–161.

10. Lehrack, America’s Battalion, p. 52.

11. Henry Allen, “Saudi Christmas: the Marines Banter

and Brave the Cold,” Washington Post, 26Dec1990,

reprinted in Melson et al., Anthology, pp. 43–45;

Lehrack, America’s Battalion, pp. 49–54.

12. Stenographer’s transcript of I MEF morning

briefing, 17Dec90; Marolda and Schneller, Shield

and Sword, p. 163.

13. BGen Thomas V. Draude, comments on draft

ms, 12Jan12 (MCHC, Quantico, VA).

14. Author(s) uncertain, I MEF ComdC Jan–Feb91.

15. 2d MarDiv ComdC, Jul–Dec90; LtCol Dennis P.

Mroczkowski, U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf,

1990–1991: With the 2d Marine Division in Desert

Shield and Desert Storm (Washington, DC: Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, 1993), pp. 3–7, hereafter Mroczkowski,

2d Marine Division.

16. Zimmeck, Combat Service Support, p. 75.

17. 2d MarDiv ComdC, Jan–Apr91; Mroczkowski,

2d Marine Division, pp. 10–11.

18. CG 3d MAW msg to CMC, Subj: Third MAW Reinforcement List, 0317 l4ZDec90; Stearns, 3d Marine

Aircraft Wing, pp. 64–67.

19. 3d MAW ComdC, Jan–Feb91; Stearns, 3d Marine

Aircraft Wing, pp. 67–71.

20. 1st FSSG ComdC, Dec90–Feb91; DSC ComdC

Dec90–Feb91; Zimmeck, Combat Service Support,

pp. 63–67.

21. DSC ComdC Dec90–Feb91; Zimmeck, Combat

Service Support, pp. 77–80.

22. 5th MEB ComdC Jul–Dec90; Brown, Marine

Forces Afloat, pp. 73–76.

23. 5th MEB ComdC Jul–Dec90.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.; Brown, Marine Forces Afloat, p. 78.

26. Brown, Marine Forces Afloat, pp. 96–97; LtCol

Darrell L. Stewart, MCRC PAM-92-0001, “Amphibious Operations in Southwest Asia” (MCCDC, Quantico, VA, 1992).
27. 11th MEU ComdC Jan–Jun91; Brown, Marine

Forces Afloat, p. 76.

28. Brown, Marine Forces Afloat, pp. 98–103;

Marolda and Schneller, Shield and Sword, pp. 121–

122.

29. Brown, Marine Forces Afloat, pp. 106–107.

30. Ibid., pp. 74–76; Quilter, I Marine Expeditionary

Force, pp. 21–23, 72; BGen Edwin H. Simmons,

“Getting Marines To the Gulf,” U.S. Naval Institute

Proceedings, May 1991 reprinted in Melson et al.,

Anthology, pp. 13–14.

31. Woods, Mother, pp. 124–162.

32. Ibid., pp. 130–134, 144–149; Knights, Cradle, pp.

25–27; A Statistical Compendium and Chronology—

Gulf War Air Power Survey, vol. 5 (Washington, DC:

U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), pp. 18–19,

hereafter GWAPS, Statistics; Weapons, Tactics, and

Training and Space Operations—Gulf War Air

Power Survey, vol. 4 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), pp. 10–17, hereafter

GWAPS, Weapons.

33. Woods, Mother, pp. 144–149; GWAPS, Statistics,

pp. 18–19; GWAPS, Weapons, pp. 17–29.

34. Woods, Mother, pp. 134–137; Marolda and

Schneller, Shield and Sword, pp. 67–69.

35. Woods, Mother, pp. 139–141; 3d Armored Division, Maneuver Plan no. 3, 29Nov1990 (FM8625).

36. Woods, Mother, pp. 142–143.

37. “Iraqi Divisions & Independent Brigades,”

24Feb1991, History Division Reference Files (MCHC,

Quantico, VA); Woods, Mother, p. 204.

38. Pollack, Arabs at War, pp. 182–235; Woods,

Mother, p. 141; Iraqi III Corps commander discusses

the Gulf War (ISGQ-2003-M0003323).

39. Woods, Mother, pp. 139–140; Iraqi III Corps

commander discusses the Gulf War (ISGQ-2003-

M0003323).

40. Woods, Mother, pp. 156–159.

41. Ibid., pp. 149–156; Norman Cigar, Saddam Hussein’s Nuclear Vision: An Atomic Shield and Sword

for Conquest (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2011).

42. Woods, Mother, pp. 159–163.

43. Diane T. Putney, Airpower Advantage: Planning

the Gulf War Air Campaign 1989–1991 (Washington, DC: Air Force History and Museums Program,

2004), pp. 34–59, hereafter Putney, Airpower Advantage; Williamson Murray, Air War in the Persian

Gulf (Baltimore: Nautical and Aviation, 1995), pp.

7–44, hereafter Murray, Air War; Gordon and

Trainor, Generals’ War, pp. 75–101.

44. Gordon and Trainor, Generals’ War, pp. 75–101;

Putney, Airpower Advantage, pp. 34–59.

45. Richard G. Davis, On Target: Organizing and

Executing the Strategic Air Campaign against Iraq

(Washington, DC: Air Force History and Museums

Program, 2002), p. 37, hereafter Davis, On Target;

Putney, Airpower Advantage, pp. 119–178.

46. Stearns, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, p. 46.

47. Ibid., pp. 46–47.

48. Ibid., pp. 46–49; Boomer intvw; Davis, On Target, pp. 97–98.

49. Scales et al., Certain Victory, pp. 108–133; Gordon and Trainor, Generals’ War, pp. 123–141.

50. Quilter, I Marine Expeditionary Force, pp. 20–21.

51. Scales et al., Certain Victory, pp. 108–133; Quilter, I Marine Expeditionary Force, pp. 37–39.

52. Scales et al., Certain Victory, pp. 108–133; Quilter, I Marine Expeditionary Force, pp. 37–39.

53. Scales et al., Certain Victory, pp. 108–133;

Boomer intvw.

54. LtGen Bernard E. Trainor, “Brief on Iraqi

Forces,” 10Dec1990.

55. Quilter, I Marine Expeditionary Force, pp. 37–39.

56. Sir Peter de la Billière, Storm Command: A Personal Account of the Gulf War (Abu Dhabi: Motivate

Publishing, 1992), p. 88, hereafter de la Billière,

Storm Command.

57. Ibid., p. 89; Gordon and Trainor, Generals’ War,

pp. 166–168; Boomer intvw.

58. de la Billière, Storm Command, pp. 89–90.

59. Boomer intvw.

60. Ibid.

61. Ibid.

62. Ibid.; Gordon and Trainor, Generals’ War, pp.

175–177.

63. Boomer intvw; Brown, Marine Forces Afloat, p.

115.

64. Danny J. Crawford, “Activation of a Marine Expeditionary Corps for Operation Desert Storm,”

30Jan1991, History Division Reference Files (MCHC,

Quantico, VA).

65. Boomer intvw; Brown, Marine Forces Afloat, p.

115.

CHAPTER 5

The Air War

1. This section based on material from Murray, Air

War; Gordon and Trainor, Generals’ War; Woods,

Mother; Stearns, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing; Davis, On

Target; GWAPS, Statistics; Stenographer’s transcript

of I MEF morning briefings, Jan91; Quilter, I Marine

Expeditionary Force; Putney, Airpower Advantage;

Marolda and Schneller, Shield and Sword.

2. Stearns, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, pp. 104–105.

3. Jay A. Stout, Hornets over Kuwait (Annapolis: MD:

Notes 231
Naval Institute Press, 1997), p. 69, hereafter Stout,

Hornets; Stearns, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, p. 106.

4. Jon Stewart, “US Arsenal’s ‘Smart Weapons’ Passing Combat Tests in Gulf,” San Francisco Chronicle,

19Jan1991; Marvin Pokrant, Desert Storm at Sea:

What the Navy Really Did (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999), pp. 10–13.

5. Woods, Mother, p. 181.

6. Stearns, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, p. 106; VMA224 ComdC, 1–31Jan91 (Gray Research Center,

Quantico,VA), hereafter VMA–224 Comd C; Quilter,

I Marine Expeditionary Force, p. 49.

7. Stearns, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, p. 106; VMA224 ComdC, 1–31Jan91; Quilter, I Marine Expeditionary Force, p. 49.

8. LtCol W. Beanan Cummings Jr., “Around the

World to the Storm,” Marine Corps Gazette, May92,

p. 58.

9. Capt David W. Deist award citation (Ref MCHC,

Quantico, VA).

10. VMFA-333 ComdC, Jan91 (Gray Research Center,

Quantico, VA), hereafter VMFA-333 ComdC.

11. GWAPS, Statistics, p. 653; SSgt Robert M. Sexton,

USAF, “Marine Aviator Scores Aerial Victory,”

Marines, May93, pp. 5–7; Davis, On Target, pp. 200–

201.

12. Col John R. Bioty intvw, 15May95, hereafter Bioty

intvw; Stearns, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, pp. 104–

105; Lon Nordeen, “The Marines AV-8B Gulf Deployment,” AFM Magazine, Feb92, pp. 42–43; LtCol

Richard M. Barry, “In Praise of Close Air Support,”

Marine Corps Gazette, May92, p. 56; Stenographer’s

transcript of I MEF morning briefings, 17Jan91. 

13. Bioty intvw; LtCol Richard M. Barry, “In Praise

of Close Air Support,” Marine Corps Gazette, May92,

p. 56, hereafter Barry, “In Praise.”

14. Barry, “In Praise.”

15. Stenographer’s transcript of I MEF morning briefings, 17Jan91.

16. Stearns, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, pp. 107–108;

Stout, Hornets, pp. 72–73.

17. Stout, Hornets, pp. 80–81.

18. Ibid., p. 75–83.

19. Woods, Mother, pp. 241–242; GWAPS, Statistics,

p. 161.

20. Northrop Grumman, “Joint Stars Data Analysis:

The Battle of Khafji” (paper, USAF Studies and

Analysis Agency, 1997), p. 18; James Titus, “The Battle of Khafji: An Overview and Preliminary Analysis”

(Maxwell AFB, AL: School of Advanced Airpower

Studies, 1996), p. 7.

21. Stearns, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, pp. 110–111.

22. Table 204 Desert Storm Coalition Aircraft Attrition

found in GWAPS, Statistics, pp. 642–649; Cynthia B.

Acree with Col Clifford M. Acree, The Gulf between

Us: Love and Terror in Desert Storm (Washington,

DC: Brassey’s, 2000), pp. 5–6, hereafter Acree et al.,

Gulf between; Stearns, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, p.

111.

23. Stearns, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, p. 111. For an

extended, in-depth description of Col Acree’s captivity, see Acree et al., Gulf between Us.

24. Stearns, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, pp. 111–112.

25. Ibid., p. 109; BGen Granville R. Amos intvw,

5Mar91 (MCHC, Quantico, VA).

26. Stearns, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, p. 114.

27. Ibid., p. 112–118; GWAPS, Statistics, pp. 469–511.

28. Stearns, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, pp. 109–110;

Col Manfred A. Rietsch BAT intvw, Mar91 (MCHC,

Quantico, VA), hereafter Rietsch intvw. 

29. Col Donald A. Beaufait intvw with Alexander

Hinman, 8Jul08 (MCHC, Quantico, VA).

30. Col William R. Jones intvw with Dr. Fred Alison,

8Mar02 (location unknown), hereafter Jones intvw.

31. Woods, Mother, p. 185. 

32. Dr. Youssef Abdul-Moati, A Diary of an Iraqi Soldier (Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait,

1992), pp. 13–14, hereafter Abdul-Moati, A Diary.

33. Jones intvw.

34. I MEF, “Tiger Team Anti-Fratricide Report,”

10Feb1991; Stenographer’s transcript of I MEF briefing, 23Jan90.

35. Woods, Mother, pp. 189–191; Stearns, 3d Marine

Aircraft Wing, p. 118.

36. Stenographer’s transcript of I MEF briefing, 21–

26Jan90; Stearns, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, p. 118;

Stout, Hornets, pp. 97–103.

37. Woods, Mother, pp. 192–193.

38. Putney, Airpower Advantage, p. 175.

39. Stenographer’s transcript of I MEF briefings,

Jan90.

40. Marolda and Schneller, Shield and Sword, pp.

182–192.

41. Rietsch intvw. 

42. Stearns, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, pp. 120–121.

43. Ibid., p. 119; Table 204 Desert Storm Coalition

Aircraft Attrition found in GWAPS, Statistics, pp. 642–

649.

44. VMFA-333 ComdC; VMFA-235 ComdC, Jan91

(Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA).

45. Quilter, I Marine Expeditionary Force, pp. 51–52;

Stenographer’s transcript of I MEF briefing, 29Jan90.

46. Quilter, I Marine Expeditionary Force, pp. 51–52;

Captured Iraqi War College Study, Al-Khafji Conflict

(ISGQ-2003-00046031), hereafter Iraqi War College

Study.

232 Liberating Kuwait
47. Stenographer’s transcript of I MEF morning

briefings, 28Jan91.

48. Woods, Mother, pp. 22–23; Iraqi War College

Study.

49. Woods, Mother, pp. 22–23.

50. Iraqi War College Study.

51. Abdul-Moati, A Diary, p. 14.

CHAPTER 6

Preludes to al-Khafji

1. DSC ComdC, Dec90–Feb91; Zimmeck, Combat

Service Support, pp. 77–80.

2. Zimmeck, Combat Service Support, p. 80.

3. Ibid., pp. 84–85.

4. Ibid., pp. 85–86.

5. Adam B. Siegel, “An American Entebbe,” U.S.

Naval Institute Proceedings, May92, p.100. For a

more thorough description of Operation Eastern

Exit, see Brown, Marine Forces Afloat, pp. 80–94.

6. Ibid., pp. 107–109.

7. Table 204 Desert Storm Coalition Aircraft Attrition

found in GWAPS, Statistics, pp. 642–649; VMA-331

ComdC, Jan–May1991 (Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA); Maj Ben D. Hancock, “The Day The Magic

Died,” Marine Corps Gazette, May95, pp. 73–81.

8. Brown, Marine Forces Afloat, pp. 107–109.

9. Woods, Mother, pp. 180–184.

10. Ibid., p. 185.

11. Stenographer’s transcript of I MEF morning

briefing, 22Jan90; 1st LAI ComdC, Jan–Feb1991

(Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA), hereafter 1st

LAI ComdC.

12. LtCol James L. Sachtleben, “Artillery Raids in Southwestern Kuwait,” reprinted in Melson et al., Anthology,

pp. 173–182, hereafter Sachtleben, “Artillery Raids.”

13. Stearns, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, p. 122; Cureton, 1st Marine Division, pp. 26–28; Sachtleben, “Artillery Raids.”

14. 11th Marines ComdC, Jan–Feb1991 (Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA); Stenographer’s transcript of I MEF morning briefing, 21Jan90.

15. 1st LAI ComdC; Stenographer’s transcript of I

MEF morning briefing, 26Jan90; Sachtleben, “Artillery Raids.”

16. Stenographer’s transcript of I MEF morning

briefing, 28Jan90; Mroczkowski, 2d Marine Division, p. 12.

17. Sachtleben, “Artillery Raids”; 1st LAI ComdC;

Stenographer’s transcript of I MEF morning briefing,

29Jan90.

18. This section based on material from LtCol James

R. Braden, “The Battle of Khafji: A Coalition Air

Ground Task Force Victory” (paper, USMC Command and Staff College, 1999), pp. 11–12, hereafter

Braden, “Khafji”; see also Murray, Air War; Gordon

and Trainor, Generals’ War; Woods, Mother; Paul W.

Westermeyer, U.S. Marines in Battle: Al-Khafji, 28

January–1 February 1991 (Washington, DC: Marine

Corps History Division, 2008), hereafter Westermeyer, Al-Khafji; Woods, et al., Iraqi Perspectives;

Iraqi War College Study; Pollack, Arabs at War.

19. Iraqi War College Study.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid., p. 96.

22. Edgar O’Ballance, The Gulf War (New York:

Brassey’s, 1988), summary of discussion on pp. 94,

143–145, 164–166, 173–174, 194; Gordon and Trainor,

Generals’ War, pp. 268–269; Palmer, “Gulf State.”

23. How They Fight: Desert Shield Order of Battle

Handbook, AIA-DS-2-90 (1990); Department of Defense, Iraq Country Handbook, DOD-2600-642794

(1994).

24. Iraqi War College Study; Captured Iraqi Training

Pamphlet, Battle of al-Khafji (ISGQ-2003-00054592),

hereafter Iraqi Training Pamphlet.

25. Iraqi War College Study, pp. 104–105.

26. Air War College Study, “EPW Interviews”

(Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Force Historical Research

Agency); Palmer, “Gulf State.”

27. Iraqi War College Study, p. 101.

28. Draude intvw, 21Jun06.

29. Molofsky intvws, 30Jun06, 16Aug06; Braden,

“Khafji,” pp. 8–9.

30. Ibid., pp. 6–7.

31. Titus, “Khafji,” p. 9; Gordon and Trainor, Generals’ War, pp. 268–269. 

32. Molofsky intvw, 16Aug06.

33. 1st Air-Naval Gunfire Liaison Company/1st Surveillance, Reconnaissance, Intelligence Group After

Action Report for the Battle of Khafji, 29Jan91–

1Feb91 (MCHC, Quantico VA), hereafter ANGLICO

AAR.

34. LtCol Clifford O. Myers intvw by LtCol Charles

H. Cureton, 8Mar91 (MCHC, Quantico, VA), hereafter Myers intvw.

35. Khaled, Desert Warrior; Braden, pp. 7–8; Palmer,

“Gultate.”

36. Zimmeck, Combat Service Support, p. 108.

37. Molofsky intvw, 16Aug06.

38. Braden, “Khafji,” p. 8.

39. Iraqi War College Study, p. 97.

40. Ibid., pp. 99–101.

41. Ibid., p. 98.

42. Ibid., p. 99.

43. Ibid., p. 103; Gordon and Trainor, Generals’

War, p. 269.

Notes 233
44. Iraqi War College Study, pp. 104–107.

45. Titus, “Khafji,” p. 7.

46. Braden, “Khafji,” p. 13.

47. Ibid., pp. 13–14; ANGLICO AAR. 

48. David J. Morris, Storm on the Horizon (New

York: Free Press, 2004), p. 145, hereafter Morris,

Storm; Iraqi War College Study.

49. Morris, Storm, p. 145.

50. Iraqi War College Study, pp. 108–109.

51. Ibid., pp. 144–146.

52. Ibid., pp. 108–109.

53. Braden, “Khafji,” p. 14.

54. Ibid.; ANGLICO AAR. 

55. Morris, Storm, pp. 31–32.

56. Ibid., Ch. 1.

57. Ibid., pp. 3, 31–34.

58. Morris, Storm, p. 50; Roger Pollard, “The Battle

for Op-4: Start of the Ground War,” Marine Corps

Gazette, Mar92, hereafter Pollard, “Op-4”; Myers

intvw; 1st LAI ComdC.

59. Pollard, “Op-4”; Myers intvw; 1st LAI ComdC.

60. Operation Desert Sting is described in great

detail in Brown, Marine Forces Afloat, pp. 139–

143.

CHAPTER 7

The Battle of al-Khafji

1. Iraqi War College Study, pp. 120–125.

2. Morris, Storm, pp. 1–6; Pollard, “Op-4”; Myers

intvw.

3. Morris, Storm, pp. 66–68, 68–73.

4. Pollard, “Op-4.”

5. Ibid.; 1stLt David Kendall intvw, 7Feb91 (Gray

Research Center, Quantico, VA), hereafter Kendall

intvw.

6. Pollard, “Op-4.”

7. Ibid.; Capt Roger L. Pollard intvw with LtCol

Charles H. Cureton, CD# 10441 (Gray Research

Center, Quantico, VA), hereafter Pollard intvw.

8. Kendall intvw.

9. Pollard, “Op-4”; 1st LAI ComdC; Fratricide: Investigation into USAF Attack on Marine LAV, SWA-0062,

Seq. No. 01980 (MCLLS, Quantico, VA), hereafter

Fratricide Investigation.

10. Pollard intvw; Myers intvw.

11. Pollard, “Op-4”; Pollard intvw; Myers intvw.

12. Iraqi War College Study, pp. 120–125, 144–146.

13. Ibid., pp. 120–125.

14. 2d LAI ComdC, Jan–Feb91 (Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA).

15. Ibid.; Titus, “Khafji,” p. 12; Mroczkowski, 2d

Marine Division, pp. 20–23; Gordon and Trainor,

Generals’ War, pp. 274–275.

16. Morris, Storm, pp. 114–118.

17. Titus, “Khafji,” p. 12; Gordon and Trainor, Generals’ War, p. 275; Morris, Storm, pp. 119–125.

18. Titus, “Khafji,” p. 12.

19. Pollard, “Op-4”; 1st LAI ComdC.

20. ANGLICO AAR; Braden, “Khafji,” p. 15.

21. ANGLICO AAR; Braden, “Khafji,” p. 14.

22. Khaled, Desert Warrior, p. 366.

23. Palmer, “Gulf State”; Titus, “Khafji,” p. 13; Gordon and Trainor, Generals’ War, pp. 279–286;

Khaled, Desert Warrior, pp. 381–387; Rick Atkinson,

Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War

(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1993), pp. 208–213,

hereafter Atkinson, Crusade.

24. Braden, “Khafji,” p. 14.

25. ANGLICO AAR.

26. Molofsky intvw, 16Aug06; Khaled, Desert Warrior, p. 368.

27. Khaled, Desert Warrior, pp. 365, 368.

28. Braden, “Khafji,” p. 15.

29. Titus, “Khafji,” p. 11; Gordon and Trainor, Generals’ War, pp. 273, 278.

30. HMLA-367 ComdC, Jan91, and HMLA-369

ComdC, Jan91 (Gray Research Center, Quantico,

VA); Stearns, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, pp. 124–125.

31. Morris, Storm, p. 150–158.

32. Clifton A. Barnes, “In Every Clime and Place,”

Leatherneck, Aug91, pp. 16–20.

33. Titus, “Khafji,” p. 10; Friedman, pp. 160, 197–

198; Gordon and Trainor, Generals’ War, pp. 268–

269; Marolda and Schneller, Shield and Sword, pp.

227–229.

34. ANGLICO AAR; Braden, “Khafji,” p. 15.

35. ANGLICO AAR; Braden, “Khafji,” p. 15. 

36. ANGLICO AAR; Braden, “Khafji,” p. 15.

37. Iraqi War College Study, p. 111.

38. Ibid., pp. 120–125, 147–148.

39. Ibid., pp. 125–126.

40. Morris, Storm, pp. 166–169.

41. 1st Recon ComdC, Jan–Mar91, and 3d Recon

ComdC, Jan–Feb91 (Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA).

42. Molofsky intvw, 30Jun06.

43. Morris, Storm, pp. 159–166.

44. I Marine Expeditionary Force Commander’s

Morning Briefing, 30Jan91; Boomer intvw.

45. Khaled, Desert Warrior, pp. 364, 376.

46. ANGLICO AAR.

47. Ibid.

48. Ibid.

49. Braden, “Khafji,” p. 16; ANGLICO AAR.

50. ANGLICO AAR; Braden, “Khafji,” pp. 16–17.

51. 1/12 ComdC, Jan–Feb91 (Gray Research Center,

234 Liberating Kuwait
Quantico, VA), hereafter 1/12 ComdC; HMLA-367

ComdC, Jan91 (Gray Research Center, Quantico,

VA).

52. Braden, “Khafji,” pp. 19–20.

53. Ibid.

54. Admire intvw.

55. Morris, Storm, pp. 193–196.

56. Ibid., pp. 196–197.

57. R. R. Keene, “In Every Clime and Place,” Leatherneck, Mar91, pp. 22–27; Morris, Storm, pp. 196–

198; Lehrack, America’s Battalion, pp. 128–131.

58. David H. Mould, “Press Pools and Military-Media

Relations in the Gulf War: A Case Study of the Battle

of Khafji, January 1991,” Historical Journal of Film,

Radio & Television, Jun96, p. 133.

59. Khaled, Desert Warrior, p. 374.

60. Gordon and Trainor, Generals’ War, pp. 279.

61. Khaled, Desert Warrior, p. 374; Boomer intvw.

62. Khaled, Desert Warrior, p. 378.

63. Braden, “Khafji,” p. 20; Khaled, Desert Warrior,

pp. 362–390; LtCol Martin N. Stanton, “The Saudi

Arabian National Guard Motorized Brigades,”

Armor, Mar–Apr96, pp. 6–11.

64. Molofsky intvw, 16Aug06.

65. Ibid.

66. ANGLICO AAR.

67. Stanton, Road to Baghdad, pp. 261–262; Molofsky intvw, 16Aug06.

68. Stanton, Road to Baghdad, pp. 262–264; Braden,

“Khafji,” pp. 20–22; Molofsky intvw, 30Jun06.

69. Braden, “Khafji,” pp. 22–23; Stanton, Road to

Baghdad, p. 266.

70. Palmer, “Gulf State.”

71. Titus, “Khafji,” pp. 13–14.

72. Titus, “Khafji,” pp. 17–20; Gordon and Trainor,

Generals’ War, p. 284. The most detailed secondary

account of the downing of this AC-130 is in Atkinson’s Crusade, p. 210.

73. Gordon and Trainor, Generals’ War, pp. 283,

285–87.

74. Morris, Storm, p. 253; ANGLICO AAR; 1/12

ComdC.

75. Morris, Storm, pp. 253–258.

76. ANGLICO AAR; Braden, “Khafji,” p. 17.

77. Braden, “Khafji,” pp. 22–23; ANGLICO AAR.

78. Morris, Storm, pp. 258–266.

79. Braden, “Khafji,” pp. 23–24.

80. ANGLICO AAR.

81. Titus, “Khafji,” pp. 17–20; Gen Salah Aboud

Mahmoud’s comments and the references to Iraqi

radio communications are taken from Gordon and

Trainor, Generals’ War, pp. 283, 285–87; the “cockroach” analogy appears in H. Norman Schwarzkopf,

It Doesn’t Take a Hero (New York: Linda Grey, Bantam, 1992), p. 429.

82. ANGLICO AAR.

83. Iraqi Training Pamphlet; ANGLICO AAR.

84. Myers intvw; Braden, “Khafji,” p. 32.

85. Admire intvw; Molofsky intvw, 30Jun06.

86. Boomer intvw; Molofsky intvw, 16Aug06.

87. Titus, “Khafji”; Barry D. Watts, et al., “Effects and

Effectiveness,” Operations and Effects and Effectiveness, vol. II of The Gulf War Air Power Survey, Eliot

A. Cohen, et al., eds. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 240.

88. Khaled, Desert Warrior, p. 390.

89. Iraqi War College Study, p. 97.

90. Gordon and Trainor, Generals’ War, p. 288.

91. Fratricide Investigation.

CHAPTER 8

The Final Preparations

1. Boomer intvw.

2. Mroczkowski, 2d Marine Division, pp. 23–25;

“Rolling With the 2d Marine Division: Interview with

Lieutenant General William M. Keys, USMC,” reprinted

in Melson et al., Anthology, pp. 146–155, hereafter

Keys, “Rolling with the 2d.”

3. Keys, “Rolling with the 2d.”

4. Boomer intvw.

5. BGen Charles C. Krulak intvw with Dr. David B.

Crist, 17Oct00 (MCHC, Quantico, VA), hereafter Krulak intvw; Keys, “Rolling with the 2d”; Mroczkowski,

2d Marine Division, pp. 25–26; Zimmeck, Combat

Service Support, pp. 115–116.

6. Boomer intvw.

7. Brown, Marine Forces Afloat, pp. 130–133;

Marolda and Schneller, Shield and Sword, p. 254.

8. Brown, Marine Forces Afloat, pp. 162–163.

9. Stenographer’s transcript of I MEF briefing,

6Feb91.

10. Zimmeck, Combat Service Support, pp. 116–117.

11. Ibid., pp. 117–118.

12. Stearns, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, p. 145.

13. Krulak intvw.

14. LtGen James A. Brabham, comments on draft

ms, 16Jan2012 (MCHC, Quantico, VA), hereafter

Brabham comments; Zimmeck, Combat Service

Support, pp. 120–124.

15. Sachtleben, “Artillery Raids”; Stearns, 3d Marine

Aircraft Wing, p. 122; Cureton, 1st Marine Division,

pp. 26–28; Mroczkowski, 2d Marine Division, p. 12.

16. 1st MarDiv ComdC, Jan–Feb1991 (Gray Research

Center, Quantico, VA), hereafter 1st MarDiv ComdC;

5/11 ComdC, Jan–Feb1991 (Gray Research Center,

Quantico, VA), hereafter 5/11 ComdC.

Notes 235
17. Sachtleben, “Artillery Raids”; 5/11 ComdC.

18. I MEF to USCINCCENT “Friendly Fire Incident Report,” 13Aug1991 (Box 26, Southwest Asia Archive,

Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA), hereafter I MEF,

“Friendly Fire”; Fratricide—Aircraft Incidents and Marine Air Command and Control Issues (Box 61, Southwest Asia Archive, Gray Research Center, Quantico,

VA), hereafter Fratricide—Aircraft Incidents; 5/11

ComdC; 1st MarDiv ComdC.

19. 1st LAI ComdC; 1st MarDiv ComdC.

20. Stenographer’s transcripts of I MEF briefings, 6–

9Feb91; Marolda and Schneller, Shield and Sword,

pp. 256–257.

21. Stenographer’s transcript of I MEF briefing,

7Feb91.

22. 1st MarDiv ComdC; 1st LAI ComdC; Stenographer’s transcript of I MEF briefing, 9Feb91.

23. 1st Recon ComdC, Jan–Mar1991 (Gray Research

Center, Quantico, VA); Stenographer’s transcripts of

I MEF briefings, 10–12Feb91.

24. Stenographer’s transcripts of I MEF briefings, 9–

11Feb91; 1st MarDiv ComdC; 11th Marines ComdC,

Jan–Feb1991 (Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA),

hereafter 11th Marines ComdC.

25. 2d MarDiv ComdC, Jan–Apr1991 (Gray Research

Center, Quantico, VA), hereafter 2d MarDiv ComdC;

Stenographer’s transcript of I MEF briefing,

12Feb91.

26. Abdul-Moati, A Diary, p. 14.

27. Ibid., p. 15.

28. Stearns, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, pp. 130–131;

Col Manfred A. Rietsch BAT intvw, Mar91 (MCHC,

Quantico, VA).

29. Quilter, I Marine Expeditionary Force, pp. 52–

54.

30. Stearns, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, pp. 150, 192;

HMLA 369 ComdC, Feb1991 (Gray Research Center,

Quantico, VA); HMA 775 ComdC, Feb1991 (Gray

Research Center, Quantico, VA).

31. Stearns, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, p. 132.

32. Col John R. Bioty Jr. intvw with Maj John T.

Quinn II, 16May96 (MCHC, Quantico, VA); Stearns,

3d Marine Aircraft Wing, pp. 139–140.

33. Stearns, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, pp. 134–136.

34. Table 204, Desert Storm Coalition Aircraft Attrition, found in GWAPS, Statistics, pp. 642–649, hereafter Table 204; Stearns, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing,

p. 133.

35. Table 204; Stearns, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, p.

133.

36. Paula Chin, “Home After 26 Days in Iraqi Hands,

Pilot Russell Sanborn Celebrates His Freedom and

Counts His Blessings,” People, 01Apr91.

37. Col William R. Jones intvw with Fred Alison,

8Mar02 (location unknown).

38. Table 204; Stenographer’s transcript of I MEF

briefing, 12Feb91.

39. Marolda and Schneller, Shield and Sword, pp.

246–247; GWAPS, Chronology, p. 212.

40. Stenographer’s transcript of I MEF briefing

17Feb91; Adam B. Sigel, “Missile Defense at the Waterfront: Implications of the SCUD Missile Attack on

Al Jubayl Port, 15–16 February 1991,” Defense & Security Analysis 19, no. 1, 2003, pp. 15, 17–18; Marolda

and Schneller, Shield and Sword, p. 197.

41. Table 204; LtCol John Scanlan intvw with Fred

Allison, 26Oct06 (Gray Research Center, Quantico,

VA); Col Stephen F. Mugg intvw with Fred Allison,

17May10 (Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA);

Capt R. A. Padilla, “F/A-18Ds Go to War,” U.S. Naval

Institute Proceedings, Aug91, p. 40; Stearns, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, p. 150.

42. Table 204; Stearns, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, pp.

144–145.

43. Table 204; Stearns, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, pp.

144–145.

44. I MEF “Excerpts from a Conversation with an

Iraqi: Major, (Fathi) Imad B, Commander 159th Field

Artillery Battalion, 7th Division, 3rd Corps, Concerning His Point of View on the War,” 2Mar91.

45. Woods, Mother, p. 202.

46. Brown, Marine Forces Afloat, pp. 144–149.

47. G. J. Michaels, Tip Of The Spear: U.S. Marine

Light Armor in the Gulf (Annapolis: Naval Institute

Press, 1998), p. 155.

48. Stearns, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, pp. 126–128;

Quilter, I Marine Expeditionary Force, pp. 63–64;

Tiger Team Anti-Fratricide Report, 10Feb91 (Box 61,

Southwest Asia Archive, Gray Research Center,

Quantico, VA).

49. Stenographer’s transcript of I MEF briefing,

12Feb91.

50. Marolda and Schneller, Shield and Sword, pp.

247–268; Brown, Marine Forces Afloat, pp. 149–154.

51. Ibid.

52. Woods, Mother, p. 134; Marolda and Schneller,

Shield and Sword, pp. 247–268; Brown, Marine

Forces Afloat, pp. 149–154.

53. Draude intvw; 1st MarDiv ComdC.

54. Draude intvw.

55. 11th Marines ComdC; 1st MarDiv ComdC;

Stenographer’s transcript of I MEF briefing, 20Feb91.

56. 1st MarDiv ComdC; Stenographer’s transcript of

I MEF briefing, 21Feb91; 11th Marines ComdC.

57. Woods, Mother, pp. 198–199.

58. Anthony Swofford, Jarhead: A Marine’s Chronicle

236 Liberating Kuwait
of the Gulf War and Other Battles (New York: Scribner, 2003), pp. 189–190, hereafter Swofford, Jarhead.

59. 2d MarDiv ComdC; Mroczkowski, 2d Marine

Division, pp. 31–33; 2d LAI ComdC, Jan–Mar1991

(Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA).

60. Mroczkowski, 2d Marine Division, p. 34.

61. Woods, Mother, p. 209.

62. Capt Kenneth W. Amidon Silver Star award citation (MCHC, Quantico, VA). 

63. Capt Troy A. Ward Distinguished Flying Cross

award citation (MCHC, Quantico, VA); 1stLt Kevin

G. Mechler Distinguished Flying Cross award citation (MCHC, Quantico, VA).

64. 4th Marines ComdC, Jan–Mar1991 (Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA), hereafter 4th Marines

ComdC; 3/7 ComdC, Jan–Mar1991 (Gray Research

Center, Quantico, VA); 2/7 ComdC, Jan–Mar1991

(Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA).

65. Woods, Mother, p. 210.

66. Stenographer’s transcript of I MEF briefing,

22Feb91; Quilter, I Marine Expeditionary Force, p. 75.

67. Cureton, 1st Marine Division, p. 61.

68. 1st MarDiv ComdC; Stenographer’s transcripts

of I MEF briefings, 22–23Feb91; Cureton, 1st Marine

Division, pp. 58–61.

69. 4th Marines ComdC; 3/7 ComdC, Jan–Mar1991

(Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA); 2/7 ComdC,

Jan–Mar1991 (Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA).

70. Col Charles J. Quilter II, “Anecdotes from the

Ground Campaign,” I MEF ComdC, Jan–Feb1991,

hereafter Quilter, “Anecdotes.”

71. SSgt Charles T. Restifo Silver Star award citation

(MCHC, Quantico, VA).

72. Draude intvw; Cpl Gregory R. Stricklin Silver

Star award citation (MCHC, Quantico, VA).

73. Phillip Thompson, Into the Storm: A U.S. Marine

in the Persian Gulf War (Jefferson, NC: McFarland

& Company, 2001), pp. 160–163, hereafter Thompson, Into the Storm.

74. I MEF, “Friendly Fire”; Fratricide—Aircraft Incidents; 1/12 ComdC, Jan–Feb1991 (Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA); Maj Richard Danchak, “Friendly

Radars + Friendly Missiles = Fratricide” (Marine Corps

Command and Staff College, Quantico, VA 1993).

75. Woods, Mother, pp. 210–212.

CHAPTER 9

Breaking the Saddam Line

1. This section is based primarily on the relevant

unit command chronologies and the following

works: Quilter, I Marine Expeditionary Force, pp.

73–90; Cureton, 1st Marine Division, pp. 58–89;

Mroczkowski, 2d Marine Division, pp. 39–58; Zimmeck, Combat Service Support, pp. 142–149; Stearns,

3d Marine Aircraft Wing, pp. 151–152; Brown, Marine Forces Afloat, pp. 137–170; Woods, Mother, pp.

211–249; Marolda and Schneller, Shield and Sword,

pp. 279–306; Stewart, War in the Persian Gulf, pp.

35–44.

2. Stewart, War in the Persian Gulf, p. 35–44.

3. 1st MarDiv ComdC; Cureton, 1st Marine Division,

pp. 68–69.

4. 1st MarDiv ComdC; Cureton, 1st Marine Division,

p. 70.

5. Swofford, Jarhead. 

6. Ibid., p. 219.

7. I MEF “Friendly Fire”; Cureton, 1st Marine Division, p. 70; Swofford, Jarhead, p. 219; Sgt Gordon

T. Gregory Silver Star award citation (MCHC, Quantico, VA); 4th Marines ComdC.

8. 1st MarDiv ComdC; Cureton, 1st Marine Division,

p. 71.

9. 1st MarDiv ComdC; Cureton, 1st Marine Division,

p. 72.

10. 1st MarDiv ComdC; Cureton, 1st Marine Division, pp. 74–75.

11. Draude intvw; Cureton, 1st Marine Division, pp.

75–76.

12. 1st MarDiv ComdC; Cureton, 1st Marine Division, pp. 72, 76–77.

13. 1st MarDiv ComdC; Cureton, 1st Marine Division, pp. 77–78.

14. 1st MarDiv ComdC; Cureton, 1st Marine Division, pp. 78–80.

15. 1st MarDiv ComdC; Cureton, 1st Marine Division, pp. 78–80.

16. 1/7 ComdC, Jan–Feb1991 (Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA), hereafter 1/7 ComdC.

17. 1st MarDiv ComdC; Cureton, 1st Marine Division, p. 82.

18. 1st MarDiv ComdC; Cureton, 1st Marine Division, p. 83; 1st LAI ComdC.

19. 1st LAI ComdC.

20. 1st MarDiv ComdC; Cureton, 1st Marine Division, pp. 84–85.

21. LCpl Kasey A. Krock Silver Star award citation

(MCHC, Quantico, VA).

22. 1st Marines ComdC; Cureton, 1st Marine Division, pp. 85–87.

23. 1st MarDiv ComdC; Cureton, 1st Marine Division, p. 87.

24. 2d MarDiv ComdC; Mroczkowski, 2d Marine

Division, p. 44.

25. 2d MarDiv ComdC; Mroczkowski, 2d Marine

Division, p. 45; Quilter, I Marine Expeditionary

Force, pp. 86–87.

Notes 237
26. SSgt Daniel A. Kur Silver Star award citation

(MCHC, Quantico, VA).

27. Mroczkowski, 2d Marine Division, p. 45.

28. Ibid., p. 46.

29. Cpl Robert L. Novak Silver Star award citation

(MCHC, Quantico, VA).

30. Mroczkowski, 2d Marine Division, pp. 46–47.

31. Ibid., p. 48.

32. Ibid., pp. 48–51.

33. 8th Tank ComdC, Nov–Mar1991 (Gray Research

Center, Quantico, VA); Mroczkowski, 2d Marine Division, p. 51.

34. Khaled, Desert Warrior, pp. 391–99; Col David

W. Landersman intvw with author, 27Jul08 (MCHC,

Quantico, VA).

35. Marolda and Schneller, Shield and Sword, pp.

279, 288–289.

36. Ibid., p. 288.

37. MajGen James M. Myatt, “The 1st Marine Division in the Attack,” reprinted in Melson et al., Anthology; Stearns, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, pp.

151–152.

38. GWAPS, Statistics, pp. 642–649; Stearns, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, p. 152.

39. Stearns, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, pp. 152–154.

40. Cureton, 1st Marine Division, pp. 88–89; Stearns,

3d Marine Aircraft Wing, p. 155.

41. Woods, Mother, pp. 220–225. 

42. This section is based primarily on the relevant

unit command chronologies and the following

works: Quilter, I Marine Expeditionary Force, pp.

91–102; Cureton, 1st Marine Division, pp. 90–102;

Mroczkowski, 2d Marine Division, pp. 39–58; Zimmeck, Combat Service Support, pp. 150–158;

Stearns, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, pp. 152–161;

Brown, Marine Forces Afloat, pp. 137–179; Woods,

Mother, pp. 211–249; Marolda and Schneller, Shield

and Sword, pp. 279–306; Stewart, War in the Persian Gulf, pp. 44–49.

43. Woods, Mother, p. 225.

44. Cureton, 1st Marine Division, p. 90.

45. Ibid., p. 91; SSgt Joseph A. LeGarde Silver Star

award citation (MCHC, Quantico, VA).

46. LCpl Chris A. Sweeney Silver Star award citation

(MCHC, Quantico, VA).

47. Quilter, “Anecdotes.” 

48. Cureton, 1st Marine Division, p. 91.

49. Ibid., p. 92.

50. Cpl Bryan K. Zickefoose and LCpl Michael S.

Kilpatrick Silver Star award citations (MCHC, Quantico, VA); Cureton, 1st Marine Division, p. 92.

51. Cureton, 1st Marine Division, p. 93.

52. Ibid., pp. 94–95.

53. Woods, Mother, p. 226.

54. Cureton, 1st Marine Division, p. 95.

55. 2dLt Thomas O. O’Connor Silver Star award citation (MCHC, Quantico, VA).

56. Cureton, 1st Marine Division, pp. 94–95; Cpl

Bryan R. Freeman Silver Star award citation (MCHC,

Quantico, VA).

57. Cureton, 1st Marine Division, p. 96.

58. Ibid., pp. 99–100.

59. Ibid., p. 96.

60. Woods, Mother, p. 226.

61. Cureton, 1st Marine Division, p. 97.

62. Ibid., p. 101.

63. Mroczkowski, 2d Marine Division, pp. 55–56.

64. Cpl Robert L. Novak Silver Star award citation

(MCHC, Quantico, VA).

65. Quilter, I Marine Expeditionary Force, pp. 93,

95.

66. Molly Moore, “Storming the Desert with the

Generals,” reprinted in Melson et al., Anthology,

hereafter Moore, “Storming.”

67. Ibid.

68. Brown, Marine Forces Afloat, pp. 155–156.

69. Quilter, “Anecdotes”; Table 204; Stearns, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, p. 161.

70. Table 204; Woods, Mother, p. 227; Joseph Hanneman, “Eye of the Storm,” Perspective, vol. 3, no.

1 (Spring 2003), p. 6.

71. Capt David W. Landersman Silver Star award citation (MCHC, Quantico, VA); Col David W. Landersman intvw with author, 27Jul08 (MCHC, Quantico,

VA), hereafter Landersman intvw.

72. Landersman intvw.

73. Woods, Mother, p. 227.

CHAPTER 10

Liberating Kuwait

1. This section is based primarily on the relevant

unit command chronologies and the following

works: Quilter, I Marine Expeditionary Force, pp.

103–106; Cureton, 1st Marine Division, pp. 103–117;

Mroczkowski, 2d Marine Division, pp. 59–71; Zimmeck, Combat Service Support, pp. 159–167;

Stearns, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, pp. 162–165;

Brown, Marine Forces Afloat, pp. 137–170; Woods,

Mother, pp. 211–249; Marolda and Schneller, Shield

and Sword, pp. 279–306; Stewart, War in the Persian Gulf, pp. 49–63.

2. Cureton, 1st Marine Division, p. 103.

3. 1/7 ComdC.

4. Ibid.

5. Col Richard W. Hodory, comments on draft ms,

15Feb12 (MCHC, Quantico, VA).

238 Liberating Kuwait
6. Cureton, 1st Marine Division, p. 112.

7. Ibid., pp. 115–116.

8. Ibid., pp. 115–116.

9. Ibid., pp. 115–116.

10. Ibid., pp. 115–117.

11. MajGen John H. Admire, comments on draft ms,

1Jan12 (MCHC, Quantico, VA).

12. Stewart, War in the Persian Gulf, p. 55.

13. Col John B. Sylvester, USA, intvw with LtCol

Charles H. Cureton, 7Mar91 (MCHC, Quantico, VA),

hereafter Sylvester intvw.

14. Ibid.

15. Mroczkowski, 2d Marine Division, p. 65.

16. Stewart, War in the Persian Gulf, p. 56.

17. Moore, “Storming.” 

18. Brown, Marine Forces Afloat, pp. 155–156.

19. Stearns, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, p. 163. 

20. Sylvester intvw.

21. Quilter, “Anecdotes.”

22. Stearns, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, pp. 163–164.

23. Brown, Marine Forces Afloat, pp. 156–157.

24. Ibid., pp. 156–157.

25. Ibid., p. 173.

26. Stearns, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, pp. 166–168.

27. Quilter, I Marine Expeditionary Force, p. 103.

28. Marolda and Schneller, Shield and Sword, p.

300; United States Special Operations Command

History: 15th Anniversary (Tampa, FL: USSOCOM

History and Research Office, 2002), p. 44.

29. Boomer intvw.

30. This section is based primarily on the relevant

unit command chronologies and the following

works: Quilter, I Marine Expeditionary Force, pp.

103–106; Cureton, 1st Marine Division, pp. 118–120;

Mroczkowski, 2d Marine Division, pp. 59–71; Zimmeck, Combat Service Support, pp. 168–172;

Stearns, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, pp. 166–167;

Brown, Marine Forces Afloat, pp. 137–179; Woods,

Mother, pp. 211–249; Marolda and Schneller, Shield

and Sword, pp. 279–306; Stewart, War in the Persian

Gulf, pp. 49–63.

31. 1/7 ComdC.

32. 2d MarDiv ComdC; Mroczkowski, 2d Marine

Division, p. 66.

33. Molly Moore, “Porous Minefields, Dispirited

Troops and a Dog Named Pow,” reprinted in Melson et al., Anthology, pp. 95–100.

34. Table 204.

35. Maj Ben D. Hancock, “The Day the Magic Died,”

Marine Corps Gazette, May95, p. 73.

36. LtCol Michael B. Parkyn intvw with Fred Allison,

16Jun10, (Oral HistColl, Gray Research Center,

Quantico, VA).

37. Quilter, “Anecdotes.”

38. Boomer intvw.

39. Zimmeck, Combat Service Support, p. 172.

40. Brabham comments.

41. Quilter, I Marine Expeditionary Force, pp. 106–

107.

42. Moore, “Storming.”

43. Molly Moore, A Woman at War (New York:

Macmillan Publishing, 1993), pp. 294–295.

44. Ibid., pp. 297–298.

45. I MEF ComdC, Jan–Feb1991 (Gray Research

Center, Quantico, VA).

46. Gen H. Norman Schwarzkopf, “CENTCOM

News Briefing,” reprinted in Melson et al., Anthology, p. 53.

CHAPTER 11

Standing Down after Victory

1. Stearns, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, p. 167.

2. Col William R. Jones intvw with Dr. Fred Allison,

8Mar02 (location unknown).

3. Thompson, Into the Storm, pp. 175–176.

4. Ibid., pp. 176–177.

5. Sean T. Coughlin, Storming the Desert: A Marine

Lieutenant’s Day-by-Day Chronicle of the Persian

Gulf War (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 1996), pp. 90–

96.

6. Thompson, Into the Storm, pp. 177–178.

7. Quilter, I Marine Expeditionary Force, pp. 106–

104.

8. Brown, Marine Forces Afloat, pp. 173–180.

9. 13th MEU (SOC) ComdC, Mar91; Brown, Marine

Forces Afloat, pp. 157–160.

10. 13th MEU (SOC) ComdC, Mar91; MSSG 13

ComdC, Feb–Mar91; Brown, Marine Forces Afloat,

pp. 160–162.

11. H. Norman Schwarzkopf with Peter Petre, It

Doesn’t Take a Hero (New York: Bantam, 1992), pp.

88–489.

12. Stenographer’s transcripts of I MEF briefings, 1–

3Mar91; Quilter, I Marine Expeditionary Force, pp.

107–112.

13. Stenographer’s transcripts of I MEF briefings, 1–

3Mar91; Quilter, I Marine Expeditionary Force, pp.

107–112.

14. Stenographer’s transcripts of I MEF briefings,

3Mar91.

15. Ibid.; Herbert Edwards Jr., “Awards during Desert

Shield/Storm,” email to author, 4Nov11.

16. Quilter, I Marine Expeditionary Force, p. 11.

17. Brown, Marine Forces Afloat, pp. 180–182.

18. 5th MEB ComdC, July90–Jun91; Brown, Marine

Forces Afloat, pp. 180–182.

Notes 239
240 Liberating Kuwait

19. 11th MEU ComdC, Jan–Jun91; Brown, Marine

Forces Afloat, pp. 186–188.

20. For an in-depth history of the Bangladesh humanitarian intervention, see Charles R. Smith, U.S.

Marines in Humanitarian Operations: Angels from

the Sea: Relief Operations in Bangladesh, 1991

(Washington, DC: Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, 1995).

21. Cureton, 1st Marine Division, p. 121.

22. Jay A. Stout, Hornets over Kuwait (Annapolis:

Naval Institute Press, 1997), pp. 225–256; Quilter, I

Marine Expeditionary Force, pp. 110–111.

23. Mroczkowski, 2d Marine Division, pp. 70–72.

24. Zimmeck, Combat Service Support, p. 182; Gen

Charles C. Krulak, comments on draft ms, 5Feb12

(MCHC, Quantico, VA).

25. Zimmeck, Combat Service Support, pp. 176–190.

26. Woods, Mother, pp. 246–250; for the uprisings, see

Eric Goldstein and Andrew Whitley, Endless Torment:

The 1991 Uprising in Iraq and Its Aftermath (New

York: Human Rights Watch, 1992); for the history of

Iraq following the Gulf War, including the uprisings,

see Marr, History of Iraq; for the history of conflict between the United States and Iraq from 1991 through

the 2003 invasion of Iraq, see Knights, Cradle.

27. Woods, Mother, p. 248.

28. Knights, Cradle, pp. 119–124.

29. For an in-depth examination of Marine operations in support of Operation Provide Comfort, see

LtCol Ronald J. Brown, Humanitarian Operations

in Northern Iraq, 1991: With Marines in Operation

Provide Comfort (Washington, DC: Hist&MusDiv,

HQMC, U.S. Marine Corps, 1995).

30. Dr. Fred Allison, unpub ms, author’s files (Gray

Research Center, Quantico, VA).

31. U.S. Congressional Research Service, American

War and Military Operations Casualties: Lists and

Statistics, 26 February 2010, p. 12.

32. Woods, Mother, p. 26.

33. Ibid., p. 240.

34. The best coverage of the Iraqi military in the

Gulf and the subsequent years leading to Operation

Iraqi Freedom in 2003 can be found in the works

of Kevin Woods and Michael Knights. Specifically,

see Knights, Cradle; Woods, Mother; and Woods et

al., Iraqi Perspectives.

35. For the U.S. Army’s take on the conflict, see

Scales, Certain Victory. The U.S. Navy has covered

its Gulf War experience very well in Marolda and

Schneller, Shield and Sword. The U.S. Air Force is

covered in-depth in the massive, five volume Gulf

War Air Power Survey (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), but the Air Force’s

own view of the war is found in Putney, Airpower

Advantage, and Davis, On Target.

36. BGen Granville R. Amos intvw, 5Mar91; Stearns,

3d Marine Aircraft Wing, p. 171.

37. “The 1st Marine Division in the Attack: Interview

with Major General J. M. Myatt, USMC,” reprinted

in Melson et al., Anthology, p. 145. 

38. “Rolling With the 2d Marine Division: Interview

with Lieutenant General William M. Keys, USMC,”

reprinted in Melson et al., Anthology, p. 155. 

39. Boomer intvw.

40. “Training, Education Were the Keys: Interview

with Brigadier General James A. Brabham, USMC,”

reprinted in Melson et al., Anthology, p. 40.

41. “Special Trust and Confidence Among the TrailBreakers: Interview with Lieutenant General Walter

E. Boomer, USMC,” reprinted in Melson et al., Anthology, p. 94.
241

Command and Staff List

u APPENDIX Au

U.S. Marine Forces Central Command

I Marine Expeditionary Force

Commanding General, I Marine LtGen Walter E. Boomer

Expeditionary Force, and Commander, 

U.S. Marine Forces Central Command

Deputy Commanding General, MajGen John I. Hopkins (to 7Jan91)

I Marine Expeditionary Force MajGen Richard D. Hearney (from 8Jan91)

Commanding General, I Marine MajGen John I. Hopkins

Expeditionary Force (Rear)

Deputy Commander, MajGen Jeremiah W. Pearson III (to 17Jan91)

U.S. Marine Forces Central Command MajGen Norman E. Ehlert (from 18Jan91)

Commander, U.S. Marine Forces MajGen John J. Sheehan 

Central Command (Forward)

Chief of Staff Col Eric E. Hastings

G-1 Col Alice B. Marshall (to 7Oct90)

Col Robert K. Redlin (from 8Oct90)

G-2 LtCol Bruce E. Brunn (to 24Dec91)

Col Forest L. Lucy (from 25Dec90)

G-3 Col Charles M. Lohman (to 13Dec90)

Col Billy C. Steed (from 14Dec90)

G-4 Col Raymond A. List

G-6 Col Robert G. Hill

Command Element

Headquarters and Service Company Maj Gary R. Ing

I Marine Expeditionary Force (-) (Reinforced)

1st Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Col Michael V. Brock

Intelligence Group (-) (Reinforced)

1st Radio Battalion (-) (Reinforced) LtCol Thomas A. Flaherty

3d Naval Construction Regiment Capt Michael R. Johnson, USN

1st Marine Division

Commanding Officer MajGen James M. Myatt

Assistant Division Commander BGen Thomas V. Draude
242 Liberating Kuwait

Chief of Staff Col John F. Stennick

G-1 LtCol William MacGhee (to 6Oct90)

Col Joseph R. Holzbauer (from 7Oct90)

G-2 LtCol Joseph Waldron (to 1Dec90)

LtCol John D. Counselman (from 2Dec90)

G-3 Col James A. Fulks (to 21Jan91)

LtCol Jerome D. Humble (from 22Jan91)

G-4 Col Jasper C. Lilly Jr.

G-6 LtCol Rodney N. Smith

Division Sergeant Major SgtMaj Charles W. Chamberlain

Headquarters Battalion (-) LtCol Michael L. Rapp (to 31Dec90)

LtCol James P. O’Donnell (from 1Jan91)

1st Marines (-) (Reinforced) Col Richard W. Hodory

(Task Force Papa Bear)

1st Battalion, 1st Marines LtCol Michael O. Fallon

3d Battalion, 9th Marines LtCol Larry W. Wright (to 28Dec90)

LtCol Michael H. Smith (from 31Dec90)

1st Tank Battalion LtCol Michael M. Kephart

3d Marines (-) (Reinforced) Col John H. Admire 

(Task Force Taro)

1st Battalion, 3d Marines LtCol Michael V. Maloney

2d Battalion, 3d Marines LtCol Robert W. Blose Jr.

3d Battalion, 3d Marines LtCol John C. Garrett

4th Marines (-) (Reinforced) Col Ross A. Brown (to 21Jan91) 

(Task Force Grizzly) Col James A. Fulks (from 22Jan91)

2d Battalion, 7th Marines LtCol Roger J. Mauer

3d Battalion, 7th Marines LtCol Timothy J. Hannigan

1st Battalion, 25th Marines LtCol Stephen M. McCartney

7th Marines (-) (Reinforced) Col Carlton W. Fulford Jr.

(Task Force Ripper)

1st Battalion, 7th Marines LtCol James N. Mattis

1st Battalion, 5th Marines LtCol Christopher Cortez

1st Combat Engineer Battalion LtCol Frank L. Kebelman III

3d Tank Battalion LtCol Alphonso B. Diggs Jr.

11th Marines (-) (Reinforced) Col Patrick G. Howard

1st Battalion, 11th Marines LtCol John B. Sollis

3d Battalion, 11th Marines LtCol Mark W. Adams

5th Battalion, 11th Marines LtCol James L. Sachtleben

1st Battalion, 12th Marines LtCol Robert W. Rivers

3d Battalion, 12th Marines LtCol Joel L. Goza (to 31Oct90)

LtCol Charles W. Adair (from 1Nov90)
1st Light Armored Infantry Battalion LtCol Clifford O. Myers III

(-) (Reinforced) (Task Force Shepherd)

3d Assault Amphibian Battalion LtCol Ronald S. Eluk

(-) (Reinforced)

1st Reconnaissance Battalion LtCol Charles W. Kershaw (to 31Dec90)

(-) (Reinforced) LtCol Michael L. Rapp (from 1Jan91)

2d Marine Division

Commanding Officer MajGen William M. Keys

Assistant Division Commander BGen Russell L. Sutton

Chief of Staff Col James K. Van Riper

G-1 Col Mary K. Lowery

G-2 LtCol Christopher J. Gregor

G-3 Col Klaus D. Schreiber (to 14Oct90)

Col Ronald G. Richard (from 15Oct90)

G-4 LtCol James D. Lenard (to 11Nov90)

Col Morris O. Fletcher (from 12Nov90)

G-6 Col Sepp D. Ramsperger

Division Sergeant Major SgtMaj Ronald A. Chamberlain

Headquarters Battalion (-) (Reinforced) Col Roger C. McElraft

6th Marines (-) (Reinforced) Col Lawrence H. Livingston

(Task Force Breach Alpha)

1st Battalion, 6th Marines LtCol Thomas S. Jones

3d Battalion, 6th Marines LtCol Arnold Fields

2d Battalion, 2d Marines LtCol Brian M. Youngs

8th Marines (-) (Reinforced) Col Larry S. Schmidt

(Task Force Breach Bravo)

1st Battalion, 8th Marines LtCol Bruce A. Gombar

2d Battalion, 4th Marines LtCol Richard L. Pugh (to 18Oct90)

LtCol Kevin A. Conry (from 19Oct90)

3d Battalion, 23d Marines LtCol Ray C. Dawson

10th Marines (-) (Reinforced) Col Leslie M. Palm

2d Battalion, 10th Marines LtCol Joseph R. Stewart

3d Battalion, 10th Marines LtCol Philip E. Hughes

5th Battalion, 10th Marines LtCol Harold W. Evans III (to 3Dec90)

LtCol Andrew F. Mazzara (from 4Dec90)

2d Battalion, 12th Marines LtCol Michael J. Swords

1st (Tiger) Brigade, 2d Armored Division Col John B. Sylvester, USA

1st Battalion, 67th Armored Regiment LtCol Michael T. Johnson, USA

Appendix A 243
244 Liberating Kuwait

3d Battalion, 67th Armored Regiment LtCol Douglas L. Tystad, USA

3d Battalion, 41st Mechanized LtCol Walter Wojdakowski, USA

Infantry Regiment

1st Battalion, 3d Field Artillery LtCol James R Kerin, USA

502d Forward Support Battalion LtCol Coy R. Scroggins, USA

142d Signal Battalion LtCol Henry C. Cobb Jr., USA

5th Air Defense Artillery (no commander listed)

2d Light Armored Infantry Battalion LtCol Keith T. Holcomb

(-) (Reinforced)

2d Tank Battalion (-) (Reinforced) LtCol Cesare Cardi

8th Tank Battalion (-) (Reinforced) LtCol Michael D. Cavallaro

2d Assault Amphibian Battalion LtCol Robert L. Williams

(-) (Reinforced)

2d Combat Engineer Battalion LtCol John D. Winchester

(-) (Reinforced)

2d Reconnaissance Battalion LtCol Scott W. McKenzie

(-) (Reinforced)

3d Marine Aircraft Wing

Commanding General MajGen Royal N. Moore

Assistant Wing Commander BGen Harold W. Blot (to 4Oct90)

BGen Granville R. Amos (from 5Oct90)

Chief of Staff Col William A. Forney

G-1 LtCol Rudolph Lowery

G-2 LtCol Walter F. McTernan II

G-3 Col Terrance R. Dake

G-4 Col Robert W. Coop (to 20Oct90)

LtCol Brian E. Dyck (to 31Oct90)

Col Ronald M. Damura (from 1Nov90)

G-6 LtCol Philip J. O’Brien (to 11Oct90)

Maj Les Duer (from 12Oct90)

Sergeant Major SgtMaj Frederick T. Pattee

Marine Wing Headquarters Squadron 3 (-) LtCol Cass D. Howell

Marine Aircraft Group 11 Col Manfred A. Rietsch 

Marine Aviation Logistics Maj Samuel L. Flores Jr. (date unknown)

Squadron 11 (Forward) LtCol John J. Moyer (date unknown)

Marine All-Weather Attack LtCol Stephen F. Mugg 

Squadron 121

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 212 LtCol James M. Collins II

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 232 LtCol Victor A. Simpson

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 235 Col William C. McMullen III
Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 314 LtCol George G. Stuart

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 333 LtCol Thomas A. Benes

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 451 LtCol Andrew S. Dudley Jr.

Marine All-Weather Attack LtCol William J. Horne

Squadron 224

Marine All-Weather Attack LtCol Waldo B. Cummings Jr.

Squadron 533

Marine Tactical Electronic LtCol Richard W. Bates 

Warfare Squadron 2

Marine Aerial Refueler LtCol Arlen D. Rens

Transport Squadron 352

Marine Aircraft Group 13 Col John R. Bioty Jr.

Marine Aviation Logistics Maj Christopher D. Platt

Squadron 13 (Forward)

Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 14 LtCol Richard L. Owen Jr.

Marine Attack Squadron 231 LtCol William R. Jones 

Marine Attack Squadron 311 LtCol Dickie J. White

Marine Attack Squadron 542 LtCol Theodore N. Herman

Marine Observation Squadron 1 LtCol Richard R. Lazisky

Marine Observation Squadron 2 LtCol Clifford M. Acree

Maj Steven J. Antosh (acting from 19Jan91)

Marine Aircraft Group 16 Col Larry T. Garrett

Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 16 LtCol Henry A. Commiskey Jr.

Marine Medium Helicopter LtCol Gary J. Price

Squadron 161

Marine Medium Helicopter LtCol Marvin D. Hall

Squadron 165

Marine Light Attack Helicopter LtCol Terry J. Frerker

Squadron 367

Marine Light Attack Helicopter LtCol Michael M. Kurth

Squadron 369

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 462 LtCol Daniel R. Rose

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 463 LtCol John R. Mills

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 465 LtCol Ronnie S. Johnston

Marine Heavy Helicopter LtCol Raymond L. Nymeyer

Squadron 466 (-)

Marine Aircraft Group 26 Col Michael J. Williams

Marine Aviation Logistics LtCol John F. Phelps

Squadron 29 (Forward)

Marine Medium Helicopter LtCol Emerson N. Gardner Jr.

Squadron 261

Marine Medium Helicopter LtCol John F. Pettine

Squadron 266

Marine Medium Helicopter LtCol Steven K. Bowman

Squadron 774

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 464 LtCol Richard J. Klinker (to 18Dec90)

LtCol Ralph F. Tice (from 19Dec90)

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 362 LtCol Robert A. Forrester

Marine Attack Helicopter Squadron 775 LtCol Paul W. Martin

Marine Light Helicopter Squadron 767 Col Al C. Boudreaux

Appendix A 245
246 Liberating Kuwait

Marine Air Control Group 38 Col Joseph Della-Corte

Headquarters and Headquarters Maj Eric D. Zobel

Squadron 38

Marine Air Control Squadron 2 LtCol William M. Prather (to 5Dec90)

LtCol John R. Garvin (from 9Dec90)

Marine Air Control Squadron 6 (-) LtCol Ronald J. Armstrong

Marine Air Traffic Control Squadron 38 Maj Robert J. Bozelli

Marine Air Support Squadron 3 LtCol Dennis C. Sorrell

Marine Wing Communications LtCol Timothy J. Himes

Squadron 38

2d Light Antiaircraft Missile Battalion LtCol John E. Ryan

3d Light Antiaircraft Missile Battalion LtCol Louis L. Boros

2d Low Altitude Air Defense LtCol Richard K. Bartzer

Battalion (-)

3d Low Altitude Air Defense LtCol George S. Fick

Battalion (-)

Marine Wing Support Group 37 Col Robert W. Coop

Headquarters and Headquarters Maj Clifford C. Holbrook

Squadron 37

Marine Wing Support Section 174 LtCol James P. Chessum

Marine Wing Support Section 271 LtCol Richard H. Zegar

Marine Wing Support Section 273 LtCol William L. Riznychok

Marine Wing Support Section 373 LtCol Stephen D. Hanson

Marine Wing Support Section 374 LtCol Stephen G. Hornberger (to 2Feb91)

LtCol Brian E. Dyck (from 3Feb91)

Building Blocks of 1st Force Service Support Group

(August–September 1990) 

Brigade Service Support Group 7 Col Alexander W. Powell

Combat Service Support Detachment 71 Capt Guido G. Aidenbaum

Maj Allen Coulter

Combat Service Support Detachment 72 Capt Kerry K. Feldman

Combat Service Support Detachment 73 Capt Adrian W. Burke

Brigade Service Support Group 5 LtCol Ernest G. Beinhart III

Combat Service Support Detachment 31 Maj Thomas J. Nielsen

1st Force Service Support Group (-) (Reinforced)

(September 1990–April 1991) 

Commanding General BGen James A. Brabham Jr.

Chief of Staff Col Thomas D. Stouffer

G-1 LtCol John M. Cassady

G-2 Capt Michael W. Oppliger

G-3 LtCol Hugh M. McIlroy Jr. (to 9Oct90)

LtCol Kenneth W. Quigley (from 10Oct90)

Col John J. Hully (from 23Nov90)
G-4 Maj Lowell K. Brueland (to 7Dec90)

LtCol George M. Conroy (from 8Dec90)

G-6 Maj Christopher M. Weldon (to 7Oct90)

LtCol Lawrence E. Troffer (from 8Oct90)

Sergeant Major SgtMaj Phillip S. Williams

Headquarters and Service Battalion (-) LtCol Henry T. Hayden

General Support Group 1 Col Thomas E. Hampton

Col Paul A. Pankey

Combat Service Support Maj Allen Coulter

Detachment 131 Capt Ritchie L. Rodebaugh

Combat Service Support Capt Guido G. Aidenbaum

Detachment 132 Capt Tom D. Barna

2d Supply Battalion (-) (Reinforced) LtCol Grant M. Sparks

2d Maintenance Battalion Col Marlin D. Hilton

(-) (Reinforced)

6th Motor Transport Battalion LtCol Larry D. Walters

(-) (Reinforced)

1st Landing Support Battalion LtCol J. D. Burke (to 6Dec90)

(-) (Reinforced) Maj J. E. McLean II (to 9Dec90)

Capt C. Frazier Jr. (to 31Dec90)

Maj Michael W. LaVigne (from 1Jan91)

1st Dental Battalion Capt Robert A. Brunhofer, USN

General Support Group 2 Col Thomas E. Hampton

 7th Motor Transport Battalion LtCol Charlie F. Smith

(-) (Reinforced)

 2d Landing Support Battalion (-) LtCol David B. Kirkwood

 1st Medical Battalion (-) Cdr Gary C. Breeden, USN

 Combat Service Support LtCol Linden L. Sparrow

Detachment 91 (enemy prisoners of war)

 Combat Service Support Detachment 82 LtCol David B. Kirkwood

 Combat Service Support Capt Eric R. Junger

Detachment 133

Direct Support Command

Commanding General BGen Charles C. Krulak

Chief of Staff Col John A. Woodhead III

Headquarters and Service LtCol James E. Vesely

Battalion (-), 2d Force Service Support Group

7th Engineer Support Battalion LtCol David L. John

(-) (Reinforced)

8th Engineer Support Battalion LtCol Charles O. Skipper

(-) (Reinforced)

8th Motor Transport Battalion LtCol Thomas S. Woodson

(-) (Reinforced)

2d Medical Battalion (-) (Reinforced) LCdr William G. Brown, USN

2d Dental Battalion (-) (no commander listed)

Appendix A 247
248 Liberating Kuwait

*

Redesignated as Ammunition Company, 2d Supply Battalion, General Support Group 1, in December 1990.

Direct Support Group 1 Col Alexander W. Powell

Combat Service Support Capt Adrian W. Burke

Detachment 141

Combat Service Support Capt William H. Ritchie III

Detachment 13

Combat Service Support Capt Nello E. Dachman

Detachment 142*

Mobile Combat Service Support Capt Edward J. Winter

Detachment 17

Direct Support Group 2 Col Thomas P. Donnelly Jr.

Mobile Combat Service Support LtCol David L. Wittle

Detachment 26

Mobile Combat Service Support LtCol James W. Head

Detachment 28

Rear Area Security

24th Marines (-) Col George E. Germann

2d Battalion, 24th Marines LtCol Francis A. Johnson

3d Battalion, 24th Marines LtCol Ronald G. Guilliams

Commander Mobile Construction Battalions Forward

3d Naval Construction Regiment

Commanding Officer Capt Michael R. Johnson, USN

 Naval Mobil Construction Battalion 4 Cdr James T. Corbett, USN

 Naval Mobil Construction Battalion 5 Cdr David F. Walsh, USN

 Naval Mobil Construction Battalion 7 Cdr Gary M. Craft, USN

 Naval Mobil Construction Battalion 24 Cdr James McGarrah, USN

 Naval Mobil Construction Battalion 40 Cdr John R. Doyle, USN

 Naval Mobil Construction Battalion 74 Cdr William P. Fogarty, USN

U.S. Naval Forces Central Command

4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade

Commanding General MajGen Harry W. Jenkins Jr.

Chief of Staff Col William W. Scheffler

G-1 Maj John R. Turner

G-2 LtCol Michael M. Bullen

G-3 LtCol Robert P. Mauskapf

G-4 LtCol Gary W. Collenborne

G-6 LtCol Glenn R. Williams
Sergeant Major SgtMaj Douglas E. Berry

Headquarters and Service Company Capt Richard O. Bartch Jr.

Regimental Landing Team 2 Col Thomas A. Hobbs

 Headquarters Company, 2d Marines Capt Richard B. Fitzwater

 1st Battalion, 2d Marines LtCol Robert P. McAleer

 3d Battalion, 2d Marines LtCol James T. Conway

 1st Battalion, 10th Marines LtCol Douglas A. Okland

 2d Light Armored Infantry Battalion (-) (no commander listed)

Marine Aircraft Group 40 Col Glenn F. Burgess

 Marine Attack Squadron 331 LtCol Jerry W. Fitzgerald

 Marine Medium Helicopter LtCol Robert J. Wallace

 Squadron 263

 Marine Medium Helicopter LtCol Robert Saikowski

 Squadron 365

 Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 461 LtCol Daniel J. Moseler

 Marine Light Attack Helicopter LtCol Kenneth W. Hill*

 Squadron 269 (-)

 Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 14 LtCol Richard L. Owen Jr.

 Headquarters and Headquarters LtCol Jackie K. Clark

 Squadron 28 (-)

 Marine Air Control Squadron 6 (-) LtCol Ronald J. Armstrong

 Marine Wing Communications LtCol William X. Spencer

 Squadron 28 (-)

 Marine Wing Support Squadron 274 LtCol T. J. Williams

Brigade Service Support Element 4 Col James J. Doyle Jr.

5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade

Commanding General BGen Peter J. Rowe

Chief of Staff Col Drake F. Trumpe

G-1 Maj Leslie E. Garrett

G-2 LtCol Malcolm Arnot

G-3 LtCol Thorys J. Stensrud (to 18Nov90)

 Col Robert J. Garner (from 19Nov90)

G-4 Col Eugene L. Gobeli

G-6 LtCol William V. Cantu

Sergeant Major SgtMaj Elliot E. Harvey (to 19Nov90)

 SgtMaj Joseph I. Celestine (from 20Nov90)

Appendix A 249

*

There were two Marine helicopter pilots named Kenneth W. Hill during the same period. Capt Kenneth W. Hill was killed in an accident in 1988 during Operation Praying Mantis.
250 Liberating Kuwait

Headquarters and Service Maj Clifton R. Weyeneth

Company

Regimental Landing Team 5 Col Randolph A. Gangle

 Headquarters Company, 5th Marines Maj Gary K. Schenkel

 2d Battalion, 5th Marines LtCol Kevin M. Kennedy

 3d Battalion, 5th Marines LtCol Donald R. Selvage

 3d Battalion, 1st Marines LtCol Robert S. Robichaud

 2d Battalion, 11th Marines LtCol Paul A. Gido

(-) (Reinforced)

Marine Aircraft Group 50 Col Randall L. West

 Marine Medium Helicopter LtCol Melvin W. Forbush

Squadron 268

 Marine Medium Helicopter LtCol John D. Holdstein

Squadron 265

 Marine Light Attack Helicopter LtCol Theron D. Rogers

Squadron 169 (-)

 Marine Attack Helicopter LtCol James M. Dunn

Squadron 773

Brigade Service Support Group 5 LtCol Robert E. Lupton

13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable)

Commanding Officer Col John E. Rhodes

Executive Officer LtCol Rollin G. Napier

S-1 Capt Christopher G. Wright

S-2 Maj Steven J. Cash

S-3 LtCol John A. Clauer

S-4 Maj Russell O. Scherck

Sergeant Major SgtMaj Anthony Reese

Communications Officer Maj Marshall K. Snyder

1st Surveillance, Reconnaissance, Capt Jon A. Stallings

and Intelligence Support Group

2d Platoon, 2d Reconnaissance Company Capt Ignatius P. Liberto

1st Platoon, 4th Reconnaissance Company Capt Kenneth Grimes

Battalion Landing Team LtCol George W. Flinn

1st Battalion, 4th Marines

Marine Medium Helicopter LtCol Guy M. Vanderlinden

Squadron 164 (Composite)

MEU Service Support Group 13 LtCol Bradley M. Lott
251

A

AAA—Antiaircraft Artillery

AAFS—Amphibious Assault Fuel System

AAV—Amphibious Assault Vehicle

AB—Air Base

ABCCC—Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center

A-Box—Fire Support Box

ACE—(1) Aviation Combat Element, or (2) Armored

Combat Earthmover

ACR—Armored Calvary Regiment

AFCent—U.S. Air Forces Central Command

AI—Air Interdiction

AMALs—Authorized Medical Allowance Lists

ANGLICO—Air-Naval Gunfire Liaison Company

AO—Air Officer

AOR—Area of Responsibility

APC—Armored Personnel Carrier

APOD—Aerial Port of Debarkation

APS—Afloat Prepositioning Ships

ArCent—U.S. Army Forces Central Command

ASE—Air Support Element

ASOC—Air Support Operations Center 

ASP—Ammunition Supply Point

ATACC—Advanced Tactical Air Command Center

ATC—Air Traffic Control

ATDL—Army Tactical Data Link

ATF—Amphibious Task Force

ATO—Air Tasking Order

AVLB—Armored Vehicle Launched Bridge

AWACS—Airborne Warning and Control System

AWC—Assistant Wing Commander

B

BAT—Battlefield Air Interdiction

BARCAP—Barrier Combat Air Patrol

BCP—Battery Command Post

BDA—Battle Damage Assessment

BDF—Bahrain Defense Force

BFV—Bradley Fighting Vehicle

BGen—Brigadier General

BSSG—Brigade Service Support Group

BW—Biological Warfare

C

C2—Command and Control

C3I—Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence

CAAT—Combined Antiarmor Team

CAFMS—Computer-Assisted Force Management

System

CAP—Combat Air Patrol

CAS—Close Air Support

CATF—Commander Amphibious Task Force

CAX—Combined Area Exercises

CE—Command Element

CEC—Civil Engineer Corps

CentCom—U.S. Central Command

CFR—Crash Fire and Rescue

CG—Commanding General

CIFS—Close-In Fire Support

CinC—Commander in Chief

CinCCent—Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command

CJCS—Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

CLF—Commander Landing Force

CMC—Commandant of the Marine Corps

CNO—Chief of Naval Operations

CO—Commanding Officer

COC—Combat Operations Center

ComCBPac—Commander, Naval Construction Battalions Pacific Fleet

CommEx—Communications Exercise

ComUSNavCent—Commander, U.S. Naval Forces

Central Command

CONUS—Continental United States

CP—(1) Control Point, or (2) Command Post

CRAF—Civil Reserve Air Fleet

CRC—Control and Reporting Center

CSAR—Combat Search and Rescue

CSP—Contingency Support Package

CSS—Combat Service Support

CSSA—Combat Service Support Area

CSSD—Combat Service Support Detachment

CSSE—Combat Service Support Element

CSSOC—Combat Service Support Operations Center

CUCV—Commercial Utility Cargo Vehicle

CV—Aircraft Carrier

CVN—Aircraft Carrier, Nuclear

Selected Terms and Abbreviations from

Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm

u APPENDIX Bu
252 Liberating Kuwait

CVW—Carrier Air Wing

CVWR—Reserve Carrier Air Wing

CWAR—Continuous Warning/Wave Acquisition Radar

D

DAS—Deep Air Strike

DASC(A)—Direct Air Support Center (Airborne)

DASC—Direct Air Support Center

DMAC—Division Mechanized Assault Course

DOD—Department of Defense

DOS—Days of Supply

DPICM—Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munitions

DSC—Direct Support Command

DSG—Direct Support Group

E

EAF—Expeditionary Airfield

ECM—Electronic Countermeasures

EDM—Engineering Development Module or Model

ELINT—Electronics Intelligence

EMCON—Emission Control

EOD—Explosive Ordinance Disposal

EPAC—Eastern Province Area Command

EPW—Enemy Prisoner of War

EW—Electronic Warfare

EW/C—Early Warning and Control

F

FAC—Forward Air Controller

FAC(A)—Forward Air Controller (Airborne)

FAE—Fuel Air Explosive

FARP—Forward Arming and Refueling Point

FASP—Forward Ammunition Storage Point

Fast FAC(A)—Fast Forward Air Controller (Airborne), F/A-18D

FAST—Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team

FEBA—Forward Edge of the Battle Area

FIE—Fly-In Echelon

FLIR—Forward Looking Infrared Radar

FMF—Fleet Marine Force

FMFLant—Fleet Marine Force Atlantic

FMFPac—Fleet Marine Force Pacific

FOB—Forward Operating Base

FOD—Foreign Object Damage

FRAGO—Fragmentary Order

FROG—Free Rocket Over Ground (missile)

FSCC—Fire Support Coordination Center

FSCL—Fire Support Coordination Line

FSSG—Force Service Support Group

G

GCE—Ground Combat Element

GPS—Global Positioning System

GSG—General Support Group

H

H2S—Hydrogen Sulfide Gas 

H&HS—Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron

H&SG—Headquarters and Support Group

HARM—High Speed Anti-Radiation Missile

HAWK—Homing All the Way Killer (MIM-23B surface-to-air missile)

HC—Helicopter Combat Support Squadron

HCS—Helicopter Combat Search and Rescue/Special Warfare Support Squadron

HDC—Helicopter Direction Center

HEAT—High Explosive Anti-Tank (munition)

HEFS—Helicopter Expeditionary Fuel System

HEMTT—Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck

HIDACZ—High Density Airspace Control Zone

HM—Helicopter Mine Countermeasures Squadron

HMA—Marine Attack Helicopter Squadron

HMH—Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron

HMLA—Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron

HMM—Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron

HMMWV—High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled

Vehicle

HMX—Marine Helicopter Squadron

HPIR—High Power Illuminator Radar

HQMC—Headquarters Marine Corps

HS—Helicopter Antisubmarine Squadron

HSL—Helicopter Antisubmarine Squadron Light

HST—Helicopter Support Team

HT—Helicopter Training Squadron

HTACC—Helicopter Tactical Air Command Center

HUD—Head-Up Display

HUMINT—Human Intelligence

HVA—High Value Asset

HVU—High Value Unit

I

IADS—Integrated Air Defense System

ICM—Improved Conventional Munitions

IDASC—Improved Direct Air Support Center

IFASC—Interim Forward Automated Services Center

IFF—Identification, Friend or Foe

IMINT—Imagery Intelligence

INTEL—Intelligence

IOC—Initial Operational Capability

IR—Infra-Red
IRT—In Response To

ISO—In Support Of

J

JCS—Joint Chiefs of Staff

JFACC—Joint Force Air Component Commander

JFC—Joint Force Commander

JFC-E—Joint Forces Command–East

JFC-N—Joint Forces Command–North

JNAF—al-Jubayl Naval Air Facility

Joint STARS—Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar

System

K

KAANB—King Abdul Aziz Naval Base

KIA—Killed In Action

KTO—Kuwait Theater of Operations

L

LAAD—Low Altitude Air Defense

LAAM—Light Antiaircraft Missile

LAI—Light Armored Infantry

LAN—Local Area Network

LAV—Light Armored Vehicle

LCU—Landing Craft, Utility 

LD—Line of Departure

LDT—Laser Detector Tracker

LGB—Laser-Guided Bomb

LLL—Low Light Level

LNO—Liaison Officer

LREOS—Long Range Electro Optical System

LRI—Long-Range International (passenger aircraft)

LSB—Landing Support Battalion

LtGen—Lieutenant General

M

MAC—Military Airlift Command

MACCS—Marine Air Command and Control System

MACG—Marine Air Control Group

MACS—Marine Air Control Squadron

MAG—Marine Aircraft Group

MAGTF—Marine Air-Ground Task Force

MajGen—Major General

MALS—Marine Air Logistics Squadron

MANPADS—Man Portable Air Defense System

MarCent—U.S. Marine Forces Central Command

MarDiv—Marine Division

MARFORSWA—Marine Forces, Southwest Asia

MASS—Marine Air Support Squadron

MATCS—Marine Air Traffic Control Squadron

MAW—Marine Aircraft Wing

M-Box—Maneuver Box

MCAS—Marine Corps Air Station

MCB—Marine Corps Base

MCCDC—Marine Corps Combat Development

Command

MCLC—Mine Clearing Line Charge

MCSSD—Mobile Combat Service Support Detachment

MEB—Marine Expeditionary Brigade

MedEvac—Medical Evacuation

MedLog—Medical Logistics

MEF—Marine Expeditionary Force

MEU—Marine Expeditionary Unit

MEU (SOC)—Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special

Operations Capable)

MHE—Materials Handling Equipment

MLRS—Multiple Launch Rocket System

MOPP—Mission Oriented Protective Posture. Protective equipment for chemical attack consists of a

suit made of charcoal-activated cloth, overboots,

gloves, and a gas mask with hood. There are four

MOPP levels, depending upon the threat of a chemical attack, and each prescribes which items are to

be worn. Level 1 consists of wearing the suit

(trousers and jacket) and carrying the boots, gloves,

and mask with hood. Level 2 involves wearing the

overboots in addition to the suit, with the gloves

and mask with hood still carried. At level 3 the

mask with hood is worn. Level 4 requires the wearing of the entire outfit, including the gloves.

MP—Military Police

MPF—Maritime Prepositioning Force

MPS—Maritime Prepositioning Ship

MPSRON—Maritime Prepositioning Ship Squadron

MRE—Meal, Ready-To-Eat

MRL—Multiple Rocket Launcher

MRR—Minimum Risk Route

MSC—Major Subordinate Command

MSSG—Marine Expeditionary Unit Service Support

Group

MULE—Modular Universal Laser Equipment

MV—(1) Merchant Vessel, or (2) Motor Vessel

MWCS—Marine Wing Control Squadron

MWHS—Marine Wing Headquarters Squadron

MWSG—Marine Wing Support Group

MWSS—Marine Wing Support Squadron

N

NAF—Naval Airfield

NAS—Naval Air Station

Appendix B 253
254 Liberating Kuwait

NATO—North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

NATOPS—Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures Standardization

NAVCENT—Navy Component Central Command

NAVCHAPGRU—Naval Cargo Handling and Port

Group

NBC—Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical

NBCB—Naval Base Construction Battalion

NM—Nautical Mile

NMCB—Naval Mobile Construction Battalion

NNOR—Non-Nuclear Ordnance Requirements

NSE—Navy Support Element

NVG—Night-Vision Goggles

O

OAS—Offensive Air Support

OP—Observation Post

OPEC—Organization of the Petroleum Exporting

Countries

OpCon—Operational Control

OPP—Off-Load Preparation Party

OpRdy—Operational Readiness

ORF—Operational Readiness Float

P

PacFlt—Pacific Fleet

PACOM—Pacific Command

Pax—Personnel

PL—Phase Line

PLRS—Position Location Reporting System

PMO—Provost Marshal’s Office; Military Police

POET—Primed Oscillator Expendable Transponder

POG—Port Operations Group

PTO—Pilot Training Officer

Q

QEP—Quick Exchange Program

R

RAF—Royal Air Force (United Kingdom)

RAP—Rocket Assisted Projectile

RAS—Rear Area Security

RCT—Regimental Combat Team

RGFC—Republican Guard Forces Command

ROE—Rules of Engagement

ROWPU—Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Unit

RPG—Rocket-Propelled Grenade

RPV—Remotely Piloted Vehicle

RSAF—Royal Saudi Air Force

RTB—Return to Base

RTCH—Rough Terrain Container Hauler

RWR—Radar Warning Receiver

S

SAAWC—Sector Antiair Warfare Coordinator

SAM—Surface-to-Air Missile

SAR—Search and Rescue

SASSY—Marine Corps Automated Supply Support

System

SBT—Support Breach Team

SCUD—Soviet surface-to-surface missile

SEAD—Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses

SEAL—Sea, Air, and Land (Naval Special Warfare

Team)

SecDef—Secretary of Defense

SecNav—Secretary of the Navy

SIGINT—Signals Intelligence

SIM—Simulated

SIMCAS—Simulated Close Air Support

SLEP—Service Life Extension Program

SLRP—Surveillance, Liaison, and Reconnaissance

Party

SMCR—Selected Marine Corps Reserve

SOC—Special Operations Capable

SOP—Standard Operating Procedure

SPCC—Ships Parts Control Center

SRI—Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence

SRIG—Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence Group

SRISG—Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence Support Group

SSM—Surface-to-Surface Missile

STOVL—Short Take-Off Vertical Landing

STT—Single Target Track

SWA—Southwest Asia

SWATG—Southwest Asia Training Group

T

TAC (A)—Tactical Air Coordinator (Airborne)

TACAIR—Tactical Air

TACAN—Tactical Air Navigation System

TACC—Tactical Air Command Center

TacEx—Tactical Exercise

TACP—Tactical Air Control Party

TADIL—Tactical Digital Information Link

TAFDS—Tactical Airfield Fuel Dispensing System

TALD—Tactical Air-Launched Decoy

TAMPS—Tactical Aircraft Mission Planning System

TAOC—Tactical Air Operations Center

TAOM—Tactical Air Operations Module
TAOR—Tactical Area of Responsibility

TAR—Tactical Air Response

TAVB—Aviation Logistics Support Ship

TERPES—Tactical Electronic Reconnaissance Processing and Evaluation System

TEWT—Tactical Exercise without Troops

TF—Task Force

TFW—Tactical Fighter Wing

T/O—Table of Organization

TOO—Target of Opportunity

TOS—Time on Station

TOT—Time on Target

TOW—Tube-launched, Optically-tracked, Wireguided missile

TPFDL—Timed-Phase Force Deployment List

TWMP—Track Width Mine Plow

TWSEAS—Tactical Warfare Simulation Evaluation

and Analysis System

U

UAV—Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

UDP—Unit Deployment Program

USNS—United States Naval Ship (civilian manned)

UW—Urban Warfare

V

VA—Attack Squadron

VAW—Carrier Airborne Early Warning System

VC—Fleet Composite Squadron

VF—Fighter Squadron

VFA—Strike Fighter Squadron

VFC—Fighter Composite Squadron

V/STOL—Vertical/Short Take-Off and Landing

VMA—Marine Attack Squadron

VMA(AW)—Marine All-Weather Attack Squadron

VMAQ—Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare

Squadron

VMFA—Marine Fighter Attack Squadron

VMFA(AW) Marine All-Weather Fighter Attack

Squadron

VMGR—Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron

VMO—Marine Observation Squadron

VP—Patrol Squadron

VPU—Patrol Squadron Special Projects Unit

W

WIA—Wounded In Action

WTI—Weapons Tactics Instructor

WP—White Phosphorus

X

XO—Executive Officer

Appendix B 255

257

1979

16 July Saddam Hussein becomes president of Iraq.

4 November Iranian militants seize U.S. embassy personnel, starting the Iranian hostage crisis.

1980

March The U.S. Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force is established.

22 September Iraq launches air strikes against Iran, beginning the Iran-Iraq War.

23 September Iraq invades Iran.

1981

January Iran launches first counteroffensive against Iraq.

20 January The Iranian hostage crisis ends.

7 June Israeli Air Force destroys Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor. 

1982

July The first battle of Basrah between Iran and Iraq takes place.

1983

1 January U.S. Central Command is established.

1985

27 November Gen George B. Crist becomes commander of U.S. Central Command.

1987

January The second battle of Basrah occurs.

17 May USS Stark (FFG 31) is hit by two Iraqi Exocet missiles. 

Chronology of Significant Events

u APPENDIX Cu
258 Liberating Kuwait

July Operation Earnest Will, the U.S. Central Command’s convoying of Kuwaiti tankers

through the Persian Gulf, begins.

August Detachment 2, 24th Marine Amphibious Unit (24th MAU), arrives in the Persian

Gulf on board USS Guadalcanal (LPH 7), beginning Marine Corps involvement

in Operation Earnest Will.

21 September U.S. forces capture the Iranian vessel Iran Ajr as it lays mines in the Persian Gulf.

8 October U.S. forces sink or destroy three Iranian motorboats after they fire on U.S. forces.

November Contingency Marine Air-Ground Task Force (CMAGTF) 1-88 aboard USS Okinawa

(LPH 3) relieves Detachment 2, 24th MAU, in the Persian Gulf.

1988

February Iraq begins launching surface-to-surface missiles at Tehran in the final “War of the

Cities.”

CMAGTF 2-88 aboard USS Trenton (LPD 14) relieves CMAGTF 1-88 in the Persian

Gulf. 

April Iraqi forces drive the Iranians from the al-Faw Peninsula. USS Samuel B. Roberts

(FFG 58) is severely damaged by an Iranian mine. In response, Operation Praying

Mantis is conducted by U.S. forces, which sink an Iranian frigate, severely damage

another, sink or destroy multiple Iranian small craft, and destroy two oil platforms.

During the operation, a Marine AH-1T Sea Cobra crashes, and its crew members—

Capts Stephen C. Leslie and Kenneth W. Hill—are killed.

May to July Iraqis launch a series of offensives against the Iranians.

June CMAGTF 3-88 relieves CMAGTF 2-88 in the Persian Gulf. 

3 July USS Vincennes (CG 49) mistakenly shoots down Iran Air Flight 655, killing its 290

civilian passengers. 

8 August Iran and Iraq announce a cease-fire, ending the Iran-Iraq War.

September Operation Earnest Will ends.

23 November Gen H. Norman Schwarzkopf, USA, becomes commander of U.S. Central Command.

1990

2 August Iraqi military forces invade Kuwait. The U.S. government orders two carrier battle

groups to the Persian Gulf.

6 August Saudi Arabia requests U.S. assistance. 

The United Nations (UN) authorizes economic sanctions against Iraq. 

7 August President George H. W. Bush orders U.S. armed forces to Saudi Arabia. Operation

Desert Shield begins.
I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF), 1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade (1st MEB),

4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (4th MEB), and 7th Marine Expeditionary

Brigade (7th MEB) receive warning orders for possible deployment to the Persian

Gulf.

8 August LtGen Walter E. Boomer assumes command of I MEF and U.S. Marine Forces Central Command.

10 August The Commander-in-Chief Atlantic Fleet orders the 4th MEB from Camp Lejeune,

North Carolina, to the Persian Gulf.

11 August Brigade Service Support Group 7 arrives in Saudi Arabia to prepare the port of alJubayl, Saudi Arabia, for unloading Maritime Prepositioning Ship Squadron Two

(MPSRON-2).

12 August Three ships of MPSRON-2 arrive at the port of al-Jubayl.

14 August First Marine helicopters (AH-1Ws) and fixed-wing aircraft depart El Toro, California. 

The 7th MEB, from the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center at Twentynine

Palms, California, is the first Marine combat organization to arrive in the Persian

Gulf.

15 August Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 369 (HMLA-369), comprising the first

Marine Aircraft Group 70 (MAG-70) aircraft, arrives in theater.

Headquarters Marine Corps announces the commitment of 45,000 troops to the

Persian Gulf area. They consist of elements of I MEF, including units from the 1st

Marine Division, 1st Force Service Support Group (1st FSSG), 3d Marine Aircraft

Wing (3d MAW), and 7th MEB. Also en route are elements of the 4th MEB, including units from 2d Marine Division, 2d Force Service Support Group, and 2d

Marine Aircraft Wing. Additionally, MPSRON-2 had been at Diego Garcia in the

Indian Ocean. The five-ship squadron contains 7th MEB’s equipment and enough

supplies to sustain the 16,500-person force for 30 days.

Ultimately, the Marines would comprise a portion of the approximately 200,000

U.S. ground troops.

16 August Military Airlift Command begins flying missions to al-Jubayl Naval Air Facility.

20 August Marine Attack Squadron 311 (VMA-311), with the first Marine fixed-wing aircraft

(AV-8Bs), arrives in theater.

22 August President Bush orders the first mobilization of U.S. military reserves in 20 years

and declares the call-up “essential to completing our mission” of thwarting Iraqi

aggression in the Persian Gulf. 

24 August MAG-70 begins combat air patrol missions over the northern Persian Gulf.

The U.S. embassy in Kuwait is ordered closed. Marine security guards and approximately 100 U.S. officials and citizens are transferred to the U.S. embassy in

Baghdad by the Iraqi government. They are among an estimated 1,000 Americans

held hostage in Iraq during the crisis.

25 August MajGen Hopkins reports 7th MEB is combat ready and ready to defend al-Jubayl,

a week prior to expectations.

Appendix C 259
260 Liberating Kuwait

3 September MAG-70 dissolves and 3d MAW stands up. 

BGen James A. Brabham assumes command of the 1st FSSG.

7 September 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (13th MEU [SOC])

arrives in North Arabian Sea.

8 October The first fatal accident for Marines in Operation Desert Shield claims eight lives

when two UH-1N helicopters crash into the North Arabian Sea during a night

training mission. The Marines were assigned to Marine Medium Helicopter

Squadron 164, part of the 13th MEU (SOC).

13 October The 13th MEU (SOC) interdicts and boards the Iraqi vessel Al Mutanabbi.

22 October The 13th MEU (SOC) interdicts and boards the Iraqi vessel Al Sahil Al Arabi. 

28 October The 13th MEU (SOC) interdicts and boards the Iraqi vessel Amuriya.

8 November President Bush announces that he plans to add more than 200,000 U.S. troops to

those already deployed in Operation Desert Shield in the Persian Gulf area. 

18 November The 2d Marine Division receives orders to deploy to the Kuwait Theater of Operations.

22 November President Bush addresses U.S. Marines, U.S. sailors, and British soldiers during his

visit to Saudi Arabia. Standing before a crowd of more than 3,000 frontline forces,

the president reaffirms his resolve to see Iraqi strongman Saddam Hussein ousted

from Kuwait. The president and Mrs. Bush then join the Marines for a traditional

Thanksgiving Day meal.

29 November UN Security Council Resolution 678 authorizes the use of “all necessary means”

to get Iraqi forces to leave Kuwait if they have not done so by 15 January 1991.

11 December I MEF increases by 58 percent when air flow reinforcements start bringing an average of 945 Marines and sailors and 222 short tons of cargo every day for the remainder of the month.

24 December The British 1st Armored Division is transferred to the operational command of

U.S. Army Forces Central Command (ArCent); the U.S. Army’s 1st (Tiger) Brigade,

2d Armored Division, is transferred to I MEF.

26 December The 4th MEB interdicts and boards the Iraqi vessel Ibn Khaldoon.

30 December The 4th MEB interdicts and boards the Iraqi vessel Ain Zallah.

1991

2 January Operation Eastern Exit is launched when the 4th MEB contingency MAGTF departs

Masirah, Oman, for Somalia.

5 January Operation Eastern Exit continues. Two CH-53s launched from USS Trenton insert

a 60-man evacuation force and then return to USS Guam (LPH 9) with 61 evacuees. Task Force 158/I MEF holds planning meeting.
6 January Operation Eastern Exit, the Somalia evacuation, is completed. 

6–15 January Direct Support Command’s (DSC’s) engineers build a sprawling complex of more

than 40 square kilometers at Kibrit, Saudi Arabia, directly west of al-Mishab, as a

defensive measure against Iraqi air and artillery attack.

8 January I MEF reports six Iraqi helicopters cross the border near Observation Post 4 (OP4). The helicopters are in contact with Saudi and Marine interpreters on the

ground. Helicopters requesting to land in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, are refused and

advised to land 30 miles south of the border. Four land at al-Khafji, Saudi Arabia,

and two land near OP-4.

10 January The U.S. Army’s Tiger Brigade reports to the 2d Marine Division from ArCent.

11 January Operation Eastern Exit ends; the 262 evacuees debark at Muscat, Oman.

12 January Congress approves the president’s use of military force against Iraq.

15 January The UN deadline for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait passes with Iraq still occupying

that nation.

17 January Operation Desert Shield becomes Operation Desert Storm as forces of the allied

Coalition launch an air assault against targets in Iraq and occupied Kuwait in an

effort to liberate Kuwait and enforce the UN Security Council’s resolutions. 

17–19 January The Iraqis respond to the Coalition air bombardment by shooting FROG (free

rocket over ground) missiles at al-Mishab.

18 January Marine Observation Squadron 2 (VMO-2) loses an OV-10 Bronco flown by its

commander, LtCol Clifford M. Acree. LtCol Acree and his observer, CWO-4 Guy L.

Hunter, are captured by Iraqi forces.

The last of the 2d Marine Division’s units, the 2d Tank Battalion, completes its offload of equipment at al-Jubayl and moves forward to join the division.

Iraq begins launching Scud missiles at Israel and Saudi Arabia.

21 January 1st Marine Division conducts an artillery raid against Iraqi forces in Kuwait.

Baghdad airs footage of captured allied airmen. Marine prisoners are identified as

LtCol Clifford Acree and CWO-4 Guy Hunter.

26 January 1st Marine Division conducts an artillery raid against Iraqi forces in Kuwait; Iraq

begins dumping oil from Mina al-Ahmadi oil terminal into the Persian Gulf.

27 January Saddam Hussein presents his plan for the attack on al-Khafji to the III Corps and

IV Corps commanders in the Iraqi city of Basrah. Gen Salah Aboud Mahmoud

promises to present Saddam with the city of al-Khafji as a present on the morning

of 30 January.

The 2d Marine Division conducts its first offensive operations with an artillery raid

against Iraqi positions.

28 January VMA-311 loses an AV-8B Harrier. Its pilot, Capt Michael C. Berryman, is taken prisoner by the Iraqis.

Gen Salah Aboud Mahmoud meets with his division commanders at the 5th Mechanized Division headquarters, beneath the al-Maqwa oil refinery.

Appendix C 261
262 Liberating Kuwait

The 3d Marine artillery raid into Kuwait is conducted.

E-8C Joint STARS aircraft note Iraqi movement on the Saudi-Kuwaiti border.

Coalition aircraft strike columns of the 3d Armored Division moving through the

al-Wafrah oil fields.

29 January The Iraqi 5th Mechanized Division and 3d Armored Division assault the KuwaitiSaudi border, beginning the Battle of al-Khafji.

Two Marine light armored vehicles are destroyed by friendly fire at OP-4 during

the Iraqi assault. Eleven Marines are killed.

30 January The 5th Mechanized Division occupies al-Khafji.

Iraqi forces assaulting the berm at OP-4 are repulsed.

The 7th Battalion, 2d Brigade, Saudi Arabian National Guard, launches an attack

to retake al-Khafji and is repulsed.

A U.S. Air Force AC-130 attacking Iraqi reinforcements bound for al-Khafji is shot

down by an Iraqi surface-to-air missile; the 14-man crew is lost.

31 January 7th Battalion, 2d Brigade, Saudi Arabian National Guard, launches another attack

to retake al-Khafji and is repulsed.

1 February The 7th and 8th Battalions, 2d Brigade, Saudi Arabian National Guard, secure alKhafji and end Iraqi resistance in the city.

2 February An AH-1 helicopter of Marine Attack Helicopter Squadron 775 crashes during an

emergency MedEvac conducted using night-vision goggles; both pilots, Capt

Jonathan R. Edwards and Maj Eugene McCarthy, die in the crash.

U.S. Navy aircraft mistakenly bomb Battery S, 5th Battalion, 11th Marines, 30 kilometers north of al-Qaraah, killing one Marine, LCpl Eliseo C. Felix, and wounding

two others.

3 February HMLA-369 loses a UH-1N when it crashes into the ground; four fatalities result.

3–7 February A Marine explosive ordnance disposal team clears al-Khafji, destroying a total of

4,000 pieces of ordnance and removing 80 armored vehicles in the process.

8 February Khanjar forward logistics base established.

9 February Marine Attack Squadron 231 loses an AV-8; the pilot, Capt Russell A. C. Sanborn,

is taken prisoner.

9–20 February DSC moves from Kibrit to Khanjar, approximately 160 kilometers northwest of

Kibrit, in a massive supply buildup.

15 February USS Tarawa (LHA 1) offloads AV-8Bs at al-Jubayl and is just missed by a Scud

missile attack. 

17 February USS Tripoli (LPH 10) is disabled after it hits a mine. 

18 February Marine reconnaissance teams cross into Kuwait to conduct surveys of Iraqi minefields and obstacles and to identify any gaps and weaknesses.

20 February The 2d Combat Engineer Battalion begins to make cuts through the berm along

the Kuwaiti-Saudi border.
Marine Attack Squadron 331 (of Marine Aircraft Group 40) conducts 20 combat sorties

from USS Nassau (LHA 4); this is the first fixed-wing combat strike from this class of ship.

21 February The 2d Light Armored Infantry Battalion begins screening the 2d Marine Division

in Kuwait.

22 February The 2d Combat Engineer Battalion finishes the cuts through the berm. 

The 3d Battalion, 23d Marines, moves into Kuwait to provide security for artillery

surveying parties.

23 February Marine Attack Squadron 542 loses an AV-8; its pilot, Capt James N. Wilburn III, is

killed in action.

Four of the 2d Marine Division’s artillery battalions move into Kuwait to provide

fire support for the division’s assault.

24 February Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 161 loses a CH-46 Sea Knight on a night-visiongoggle takeoff during the lift for Task Force X-Ray.

I MEF begins the liberation of Kuwait. 

1st and 2d Marine Divisions breach the Saddam Line. 

25 February Marine Attack Squadron 542 loses an AV-8; the pilot, Captain John S. Walsh, is recovered by friendly forces.

VMO-1 loses an OV-10; Maj Joseph J. Small III is taken prisoner, and Capt David

M. Spellacy, the pilot, is killed in action.

2d Marine Division assaults and secures its first objective, fighting through the “Ice

Cube” and the “Ice Cube Tray.”

The Battle of Burqan, an Iraqi counterattack launched at the 1st Marine Division,

ends with a Marine victory.

Task Force X-Ray lands near Task Force Papa Bear. 

26 February Another counterattack is defeated on the 2d Marine Division’s right flank. Iraqi

units are reported to be withdrawing from Kuwait. 

The Tiger Brigade, 6th Marines, and 8th Marines attack to their final division objectives on the outskirts of al-Jahrah and Kuwait City.

1st Marine Division’s Task Force Ripper reaches Kuwait International Airport. 

Eight thousand Iraqi prisoners of war (POWs) reach the holding compound at Kibrit.

27 February Arab forces of the Joint Forces Command–North pass along the 2d Marine Division’s front and participate in the liberation of Kuwait City. 

2d Marine Division consolidates its positions outside of al-Jahrah and Kuwait and

clears the last pockets of Iraqi resistance.

1st Marine Division consolidates its area and clears the last pockets of resistance

around Kuwait International Airport.

28 February Operation Desert Storm ends when the cease-fire declared by President Bush goes

into effect. 

3 March Cease-fire accepted at Safwan airfield in Iraq.

4 March 13th MEU (SOC) captures more than 1,400 Iraqi POWs on Faylakah Island.

8 March Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 212 loses two F/A-18s in a midair collision.

13th MEU (SOC) departs Persian Gulf.

Appendix C 263
264 Liberating Kuwait

9 March 4th MEB begins retrograde.

10 March Five Marine POWs are among the 21 POWs who arrive at Andrews Air Force Base

near Washington, DC. The Marine POWs were freed on 5 March and transported

from Iraq by an International Red Cross aircraft. They are LtCol Clifford Acree,

Maj Joseph Small III, Capts Michael Berryman and Russell Sanborn, and CWO-4

Guy Hunter.
265

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

WASHINGTON

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the NAVY CROSS to

LIEUTENANT COLONEL MICHAEL M. KURTH

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION:

For extraordinary heroism as Commanding Officer of Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 369

during Operation Desert Storm on 26 February 1991. As the 1st Marine Division attacked north to

prevent Iraqi forces from escaping, Lieutenant Colonel Kurth’s repeated acts of bravery in providing

close in fire support to embattled Marines helped collapse the Iraqi defenses. With visibility nearly

impossible due to hundreds of burning oil field fires, and with total disregard for his own safety, he

flew under and perilously close to high voltage powerlines. Placing himself at grave personal risk to

intermittent Iraqi ground and antiaircraft fire, Lieutenant Colonel Kurth flew continuously for ten hours

during the most intense periods of combat, twice having to control crash his aircraft. Employing a

commercially borrowed Forward Looking Infrared Radar and Laser Designator, he flew through the

al-Burqan Oil Field fires, between the AH-1W holding pattern and Task Force Ripper’s forward lines,

leading flight after flight of rearmed gunships to requesting units and then remaining dangerously exposed forward of friendly lines as he designated Iraqi armored vehicles for engagement. Lieutenant

Colonel Kurth’s courage and fearless dedication rallied fellow Marines and resulted in the destruction

of as many as 70 Iraqi armored vehicles destroyed that day. By his outstanding display of decisive

leadership, unlimited courage in the face of heavy enemy fire, and utmost devotion to duty, Lieutenant

Colonel Kurth reflected great credit upon himself and upheld the highest traditions of the Marine

Corps and the United States Naval Service.

Navy Cross and Unit Citations

u APPENDIX Du
266 Liberating Kuwait

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

WASHINGTON

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the NAVY CROSS to

CAPTAIN EDDIE S. RAY

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION:

For extraordinary heroism while serving as Commanding Officer, Company B, 1st Light Armored

Infantry Battalion, Task Force Shepherd, 1st Marine Division, in the Emirate of Kuwait on 25 February

1991. During the early morning hours of G+I of Operation Desert Storm, an Iraqi mechanized division

counterattacked elements of the 1st Marine Division in the vicinity west of the flame and smoke engulfed Burqan Oil Field in Southeastern Kuwait. As dense black smoke shrouded the battlefield, an

Iraqi mechanized brigade engaged the 1st Marine Division Forward Command Post security forces.

During the ensuing intense ten hour battle, Captain Ray repeatedly maneuvered his Light Armored

Vehicle Company in harm’s way, skillfully integrating his Light Armored Infantry weapons, reinforcing

TOWs and AH-1W Attack Helicopters to decisively defeat main Iraqi counterattacks. Leading from

the front and constantly exposed to large volumes of enemy fire, Captain Ray led swift, violent attacks

directly into the face of the vastly larger enemy force. These attacks shocked the enemy, destroyed

50 enemy armored personnel carriers, and resulted in the capture of over 250 Iraqi soldiers. Operating

perilously close to the attacking enemy, Captain Ray’s courage, composure under fire, and aggressive

war fighting spirit were instrumental in the defeat of a major enemy effort and the successful defense

of the Division Forward Command Post. By his outstanding display of decisive leadership, unlimited

courage in the face of heavy enemy fire, and utmost devotion to duty, Captain Ray reflected great

credit upon himself and upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval

Service.
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

WASHINGTON

The Secretary of the Navy takes pleasure in presenting the NAVY UNIT COMMENDATION to

I MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION:

For exceptionally meritorious service during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm from 14

August 1990 to 16 April 1991. An imminent Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia was deterred when the 7th

Marine Expeditionary Brigade made the first Maritime Prepositioning Combat Deployment in history;

moving 15,248 personnel, 194 aircraft, 548 tanks and heavy weapons, and more than 11,000 tons of

supplies 12,000 miles in less than a week. During the next three months intensive training in the

harsh desert prepared I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) for combat action. On 17 January the 3d

Marine Aircraft Wing initiated Marine participation in Operation Desert Storm. Marine aircraft flew

8,910 sorties and dropped 14,864 tons of ordnance while interdicting Iraqi command, control, and

communications systems, striking strategic targets, isolating the future battlefield, and destroying Iraqi

fortifications, weapons, and vehicles. The 1st and 2d Marine Divisions and the Direct Support Command secretly moved 100 kilometers west to occupy forward bases and assembly areas. Amphibious

demonstrations held more than 50,000 Iraqis in static positions. From 18 to 23 February, Marine units

entered Kuwait by stealth to prepare the battlefield. Combat engineers breached extensive minefields

and barriers to allow mechanized forces, to swiftly penetrate enemy defenses. I MEF severed lines of

communication, destroyed or captured enemy forces, aided the liberation of Kuwait City and then

assumed defensive positions. The 1st Force Service Support Group and the Direct Support Command

delivered more than 75,000 tons of supplies to forward units and detained 22,308 enemy prisoners of

war. In 100 hours, I MEF won a stunning victory, captured all assigned objectives, destroyed 1,040

enemy tanks, 608 armored personnel carriers, and 432 artillery pieces. By their valiant fighting spirit,

professional competence, and relentless devotion to duty, I Marine Expeditionary Force reflected great

credit upon themselves and upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States

Naval Service.

Appendix D 267
268 Liberating Kuwait

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

WASHINGTON

The Secretary of the Navy takes pleasure in presenting the NAVY UNIT COMMENDATION to

OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM

AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION:

For exceptionally meritorious service in support Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, including combat operations, as part of U.S. Naval Forces Central Command while deployed to Southwest Asia from August 1990 to April 1991. During this period, the Amphibious Task Force was involved

in an unprecedented deployment of the largest and most capable Amphibious Task Force assembled

in the last three decades. Consisting of 31 ships and more than 20,000 Marines from Atlantic and

Pacific Fleet units, the Amphibious Force was fully integrated and capable of supporting a single, cohesive plan of attack. Execution of amphibious raids and demonstrations in the days prior to the

ground offensive prevented the enemy from redeploying any part of the six divisions deployed to

defend against an amphibious assault. In conjunction with these operations, Marine Harriers conducted

their first combat operations from an Amphibious Assault Ship while other units harassed and confused

the enemy. The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps Amphibious force contributed immeasurably to the victorious conclusion of Operation Desert Storm. By their superb professionalism, outstanding readiness,

and inspiring devotion to duty, the officers and enlisted personnel of the Operations Desert Shield

and Desert Storm Amphibious Task Force reflected great credit upon themselves and upheld the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service.
269

3d Marine Aircraft Wing

Unit Aircraft Type Tail Code/Call Sign

(Quantity)

Marine Aircraft Group 11

Marine All-Weather Attack Squadron 121 F/A-18D (12) VK Green Knights

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 212 F/A-18C (12) WD Lancers

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 232 F/A-18C (12) WT Red Devils

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 235 F/A-18C (12) DB Death Angels

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 314 F/A-18A (12) VW Black Knights

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 333 F/A-18A (12) DN Shamrocks

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 451 F/A-18A (12) VM Warlords

Marine All-Weather Attack Squadron 224 A6-E (10) WK Bengals

Marine All-Weather Attack Squadron 533 A6-E (10) ED Hawks

Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron 2 EA-6B (12) CY Playboys

Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 35 KC-130R (7) QB Raiders

Marine Aircraft Group 13

Marine Attack Squadron 231 AV-8B (19) CG Ace of Spades

Marine Attack Squadron 311 AV-8B (19) WL Tomcats

Marine Attack Squadron 542 AV-8B (18) WH Tigers

Marine Observation Squadron 1 OV-10A/ ER Sweet

OV-10D+ (11)

Marine Observation Squadron 2 OV-10A/ UU Hostage

OV-10D+ (7)

Marine Aircraft Group 16

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 161 CH-46E (12) YR The First

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 165 CH-46E (11) YW White Knights

Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 367 AH-1W (10)/ VT Scarface

UH-1N (12)

Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 369 AH-1W (17)/ SM Gunfighters

UH-1N (5)

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 462 CH-53D (12) YF Heavy Haulers

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 463 CH-53D (8) YH Pegasus

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 465 CH-53E (8) YJ Warhorses

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 466 (-) CH-53E (8) YK Wolfpack

Marine Aircraft Group 26

Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 29 (Forward) 

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 261 CH-46E (12) TV Raging Bulls

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 266 CH-46E (12) ES Griffins

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 774 CH-46E (12) MQ Wild Goose

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 464 CH-53E (8) EN Condors

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 362 CH-53D (6) YL Ugly Angels

Marine Attack Helicopter Squadron 775 AH-1J (11) WR Coyotes

Marine Light Helicopter Squadron 767 UH-1N (12) MM Nomads

Aircraft Types, Distribution, and Call Signs

u APPENDIX Eu
270 Liberating Kuwait

4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade

Unit Aircraft Type Tail Code/Call Sign

(Quantity)

Marine Aircraft Group 40

Marine Attack Squadron 331 AV-8B (19) VL Bumblebees

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 263 CH-46E (12) EG Thunder Chickens

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 365 CH-46E (12) YM Blue Knights

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 461 CH-53E (12) CJ Ironhorses

Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 269 (-) AH-1T (3)/ HF Gunrunners

AH-1W (12)/

UH-1N (6)

5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade

Marine Aircraft Group 50

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 268 CH-46E (8)/ YQ Red Dragons

CH-53E (4)

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 265 CH-46E (12) EP Dragons

Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 169 (-) AH-1W (6)/ SN Vipers

UH-1N (12)

Marine Attack Helicopter Squadron 773 AH1-J (14) MP Red Dogs 
271

Marine Corps Uniforms in the Gulf War

by LtCol Charles H. Cureton

u APPENDIX Fu

Originally published as appendix D in U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990–1991: With the 1st Marine Division in Desert

Shield and Desert Storm by LtCol Charles H. Cureton.

The authority governing Marine uniforms andpersonal equipment is contained in the Marine

Corps uniform regulations and Central Command–

generated directives regarding wear. Neither Major

General James M. Myatt nor Lieutenant General

Walter E. Boomer officially authorized changes to

the prescribed uniform. Differences existed among

the Services, however. Unit insignia, name tags, and

branch or specialty insignia characteristic of Army

and Air Force dress were much in evidence. By

mid-September 1990, Marines began applying the

distinctive eagle, globe, and anchor USMC pocket

insignia to the desert battle dress uniform. In addition, the green, and later tan, flight clothing;

medium green “nomex” flame-retardant tracked vehicle and helicopter crew clothing; and green coveralls continued in use by those Marines authorized

to wear such clothing. The use of those items added

variety to the basic desert uniform and contributed

to the gradual emergence of sometimes obvious,

sometimes subtle, differences among the Marines,

their units, and their commands.

Departures from the prescribed desert uniform

and regulation equipment partly resulted from supply shortages which took place during the massive

increase in American forces beginning in December

1990. For several weeks the desert battle dress uniform remained in short supply. The onset of cold

weather and the lengthy period of field deployment

contributed to the emergence of nonregulation

sweat suits worn as undergarments, as well as various colored watch caps. Some of the differences

proved to be idiosyncratic (“selective disobedience”

as one officer noted) in nature, which Generals

Boomer and Myatt tacitly permitted by their silence

on the subject of dress—so long as everyone retained a semblance of uniformity.

During Operation Desert Shield the manner of

wearing the pistol emerged as one obvious example of individualism and, to a lesser extent, of status

and unit affiliation. Many of the officers and staff

noncommissioned officers deploying with the 7th

Marine Expeditionary Brigade wore the black

leather shoulder belt designed for tank crews. On

the I Marine Expeditionary Force staff the tanker

shoulder belt distinguished former 7th Marine Expeditionary Brigade members from later arrivals.

This distinction disappeared in time. The shoulder

belt’s convenience and comfort made it universally

popular. Its use in the 1st Marine Division by persons authorized to carry the pistol centered on

tracked vehicle personnel, division staff, and regimental staffs. Some battalion officers wore the

shoulder belt, but it was uncommon in infantry

units.

The tanker shoulder belt proved difficult to obtain as supplies of the belt disappeared. By December 1990, privately purchased belts made an

appearance, but most aviation personnel held to

their issue aviator shoulder belt. A variation to the

shoulder belt was to affix the Beretta pistol holster

to the upper nylon straps on the desert camouflage

flak jacket cover and slide the holster’s base into

the jacket’s breast pocket. Some members of the I

Marine Expeditionary Force staff performing essentially office work, combined with the perceived remoteness from serious attack, dispensed with

shoulder and waist belts and attached the holster

and magazine pouches to the wide strap of the gas

mask. They either wore this arrangement from

around the waist in the prescribed manner for

wearing the gas mask, or created a sort of quasishoulder holster rig with the gas mask case. Some

members of the Marine expeditionary force staff

merely slung the gas mask and pistol combination

over their shoulder like a carry bag. Two members

of the 4th Civil Action Group wore the holster attached to their trouser waist belts, thus making it

inconspicuous and more suitable for their work

with Saudi nationals. This configuration was not

seen in the 1st Marine Division.

Regardless of the manner Marines carried the pistol, they normally had it attached to the green regulation nylon pistol lanyard. The prescribed method

of wearing the lanyard was over the opposite shoulder from the pistol (if worn on the waist belt) and

across the body. In time it proved more convenient

to simply loop the lanyard through the metal bar at

the base of the holster and attach the snap to the

pistol, thereby dispensing with having to remove

the lanyard every time the pistol belt came off. With

shoulder belts, the lanyard looped around a con-
272 Liberating Kuwait

Uniforms worn during Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm. 

Painting by Maj Donna J. Neary

Desert Camouflage

Utilities

Nuclear, Biological, and

Chemical Warfare (NBC)

Defense Ensemble

Flying Ensemble

(F/A-18 Pilot)

Desert Camouflage

Utilities with Weapon

Desert Camouflage

Utilities with

Field Equipment

Nighttime Desert

Camouflage Utilities 
Appendix F 273
274 Liberating Kuwait

Drawing by Sgt Charles G. Grow

Some ways of carrying the pistol and M-16.

venient strap. Though rare, some officers adopted

the British method of wearing the lanyard from the

neck rather than across the body. A few officers,

Lieutenant Colonel Frank L. Kebelman III of the 1st

Combat Engineer Battalion chief among them, managed to obtain British Army lanyards. Since the cord

proved too wide for the metal bar on the Beretta

holster, Lieutenant Colonel Kebelman tied the loop

of his lanyard around his waist belt.

Every member of the 1st Marine Division was issued desert battle dress uniform hat. The desert hat

was part of the basic uniform made up of hat, boots,

trousers, blouse, and green T-shirt. With the hat’s capacity of being styled in a variety of ways, its proper

wear was one of the few uniform matters to receive

official guidance. The prescribed manner of wear

was with the brim turned down along its entire circumference. Yet, immediately upon issue every conceivable interpretation emerged, some less subtle

and outrageous than others. Popular styles included

the rolled up “cowboy” brim, the flat hat with its absolutely level brim and flat crown (the latter achieved

by a cardboard insert), the completely upturned

brim, and the “fedora” worn by General Boomer.

The shaped battle dress hat typified Marines belonging to the force service support group, 3d Marine Air Wing units, or Marine expeditionary force

headquarters. Its existence proved less common in

the 1st Marine Division where field conditions, and

some commanders, proved a natural deterrent.

Within the division, styled hats appeared among

rear echelon personnel rather than with Marines assigned to maneuver units. In October 1990 it would

be a hat worn by a member of the division that

prompted a Central Command directive against

styling. In a visit to forward deployed units, Marine

expeditionary force Sergeant Major Rafe J. Spencer

spotted the one hat that went too far. While the hat

in question merely had its front and back brims

turned up, what pushed Sergeant Major Spencer

into taking action was the fact that its owner was a

gunnery sergeant and he used one of his metal collar rank insignia to pin the front brim to the crown.

The resulting commander-in-chief of Central Command directive of 21 October prohibited all but regulation wear:

When the desert battle dress uniform floppy

hat is worn, the chin strap will be tucked into

the hat so it does not show and the brim of

the floppy hat will be worn down. Curling or

bending the brim of the hat, other than its nat-
Appendix F 275

Drawing by Sgt Charles G. Grow

The “fedora” style favored by LtGen Walter E. Boomer was

often seen, 9 January 1990.

Drawing by Sgt Charles G. Grow

1stSgt Wimer, Company D, 3d Assault Amphibian Battalion, Task Force Ripper, is wearing the desert hat in the correct manner, 7 January 1991.

ural configuration, is not authorized. Sweat

bands or bandannas worn separately or in

conjunction with authorized headgear are not

authorized.

The message’s impact was minimal. While it

slightly reduced the extreme deviations, styling remained an aspect of dress throughout Operations

Desert Shield and Desert Storm. General Boomer

continued to wear his characteristic “fedora.”

The errant gunnery sergeant notwithstanding,

Marines generally wore the desert hat without insignia. Exceptions were the iron-on eagle, globe,

and anchor utility cap stencil and, in rare instances,

the metal service cap device.

Two other caps appeared among Marines in

Saudi Arabia. The familiar green camouflage utility

cap was the usual substitute for their desert hat. By

December, desert camouflage versions of the green

utility cap (manufactured by commercial firms in

the United States) began to appear. Purchased on

an individual basis, they enjoyed limited use in the

1st Marine Division. Partly this resulted from the

lengthy period between ordering the cap and its receipt via the very slow mail service. Also, by December the well-worn desert hat marked the

veteran from the newly arriving reinforcements, a

number of whom had the desert camouflage utility

cap. General Myatt preferred the desert utility cap

and wore it constantly during the latter part of Operation Desert Storm.

Each service used the same pattern desert battle

dress uniform, distinguishable only by insignia peculiar to each organization. Air Force personnel assigned to I Marine Expeditionary Force wore name

tags, and their specialty and insignia embroidered

in black thread on green backings as designed for

the green utility uniform. Some managed to obtain

these items done with brown thread letters on a tan

backing. Army officers and enlisted men wore the

same insignia and badges authorized for use on the

green utility uniform. After December 1990, some

examples of brown devices on tan cloth came into

use, but those proved rare. Rank insignia consisted

of the subdued style, either pin-on or embroidered

on green backing.

Until mid-September 1990 Marine desert uniforms did not carry the eagle, globe, and anchor

USMC pocket insignia. After 15 September, a large

supply of iron-on labels arrived in Saudi Arabia and

within a few weeks most utilities, but not all, carried

this insignia. Typically, Marine desert battle dress

uniforms went without unit patches of any kind. A

notable exception was the I Marine Expeditionary

Force liaison officers assigned to the British 7th Armored Brigade. They wore the brigade’s red on
276 Liberating Kuwait

Photo by LtCol Charles H. Cureton

A Marine from 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, is shown in the

dress worn at the start of Desert Storm, 17 January 1991.

The camouflage netting on the helmet characteristic of

that battalion is clearly evident.

Painting by LtCol Donna J. Neary

Marine Tanker.

black desert rat patch on the upper right sleeve.

Some Marines assigned to Central Command wore

name and service tags over their breast pockets.

The service identifying tag consisted of “U.S. MARINE CORPS” in brown thread on tan cloth. These

patches came in the same shape and dimensions

and were worn in the same manner as Air Force

name and service tags.

By December a crisis occurred in the availability

of desert uniforms. The extensive buildup of American forces exhausted supplies, and some arriving

units went without the desert battle dress for

awhile. Complaints from General Myatt and other

commanders resulted in a redistribution of desert

uniforms. Marines assigned to the 1st Force Service

Support Group working in the port at Jubayl largely

gave up their desert uniforms and reverted to green

camouflage utility dress. That alleviated the more

pressing requirements and, by February, all Marines

in the 1st Marine Division were entirely clothed in

desert camouflage.

Correct wear of the desert battle dress uniform,

sometimes referred to as the “chocolate chip” uniform, included the desert hat and either the jungle

boot; black leather combat boot; or, by late February and March, the tan desert boot. When in combat

dress during Operations Desert Shield and Desert

Storm, prior to the ground offensive, the full uniform consisted of appropriate equipment as well as

the green camouflage flak jacket or armored vest

and Kevlar helmet, both of which came with special

issue desert camouflage covers. With the onset of

hostilities, General Myatt required everyone to wear

the flak jacket and helmet. The pack also had a

desert cover provided. The desert cover was sometimes used as a field expedient cover for the M16.

By December, the onset of cooler weather

brought with it increasing use of the cold-weather

night desert camouflage parka, a loose coat com-
Appendix F 277

plete with a removable liner. General Myatt left it

as a matter of choice whether Marines wore the

parka under or over the flak jacket. Matching

trousers came with the parka. Most Marines, however, used the night desert camouflage trousers infrequently. Instead, in addition to the parka coat,

many wore civilian sweat suit tops and bottoms

under their desert utilities. Most sweat suits were

gray in color, but it was not unusual to find division

Marines wearing red, yellow, and blue suits. Since

the weather had grown very cool and wet in January and little of the color showed anyway, unit

commanders generally permitted the wearing of

sweat suits and nonregulation watch caps of various

colors without comment. 

Supply shortages made it difficult for commanders to achieve total uniformity. From the beginning

of Operation Desert Shield, items of green camouflage utility uniform were acceptable substitutes for

missing desert items. All combinations proved possible, but there occurred no simultaneous wearing

of desert jackets with green utility trousers or desert

trousers with the green utility jacket. The mixing of

green and desert items remained limited to caps

and hats, the wearing of black, jungle, or tan boots,

and occasionally the green camouflage field jacket.

In addition, maintenance personnel frequently wore

the issue green overalls. Tracked vehicle personnel

wore fire-retardant “nomex” suits.

During the ground offensive all forward deployed I Marine Expeditionary Force personnel put

on the mission-oriented protective posture jacket

and trousers as well as chemical protective boots of

various styles. In the 1st Marine Division, the flak

jacket generally went over the mission-oriented

protective posture jacket. The feeling in the division

was that while everyone was vulnerable to chemical attack at all times, the flak vest frequently

needed to be removed. In contrast, General William

M. Keys, commanding the 2d Marine Division, directed that the mission-oriented protective posture

jacket be worn over the flak vest. He felt that if contamination occurred, the flak jacket would not then

require cleaning or replacement. After the first 24

hours of the ground offensive, General Keys saw

that the chemical threat in the division’s zone was

sufficiently remote that he had the 2d Marine Division cease wearing mission-oriented protective posture suits. General Myatt saw the situation

differently, and the 1st Marine Division continued

using mission-oriented protective posture suits

throughout the ground offensive. The mission-oriented protective posture suit, and the manner in

which Marines wore the suit, became a manner of

identifying to which division a Marine belonged.

The practice of personalizing equipment and

clothing differed from unit to unit. Though largely

confined to the division’s artillery battalions, in those

units, graffiti appeared on the covers of flak vests

and helmets. Graffiti took the form of calendars,

names of girlfriends, pithy comments, religious symbols, cartoon characters, and the 1st Marine Division’s World War II patch in outline. In one instance

the blue patch with its red number “1” appeared on

the well-worn pocket of a flak jacket cover. Otherwise, marking clothing and equipment seldom went

beyond that allowed by Marine Corps Uniform Regulations MCO P1020.34, which specified ink stamping the owner’s name in certain inconspicuous

locations. Some individuals, however, followed the

practice of stenciling their names in one-inch-high

letters across the back of utility jackets and flak vests.

A few units adopted organizational symbols for

the uniform. Marines in Task Force Papa Bear stenciled the task force’s paw print symbol on the back

of flak vest covers as well as on the sides of vehicles. The 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, was distinctive

in its use of camouflage netting on all helmets.

Marines used three types of boots in Saudi Arabia. During the extreme hot weather, the jungle

boot surpassed the all-leather black boot in comfort,

and it became the only boot available through unit

supply. The boot proved generally adequate, eyelets located on the lower portion trapped sand, and

it did not keep the foot particularly warm during

the winter months. General Boomer recognized the

boot’s shortcomings, and in December 1990 the Marine Expeditionary Force G-4, Colonel Raymond A.

List, announced that the tan desert boot would be

available by January 1991. The desert boot was essentially the same as the jungle boot, but it was

made of roughened tan leather and without eyelets.

Since the desert boot initially appeared among

Marines assigned to Central Command headquarters

in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, it was viewed as an affectation and called the “tinkerbell boot.”

The abrasiveness of desert sand tended to wear

off the black dye of the leather combat boot and

the jungle boot; eventually the entire boot came

apart as the result of abrasion and constant use. Replacing worn-out boots proved difficult because of

the strained supply situation during the allied build

up. Frustrated by the slowness of resupplies of any

boots, division Marines frequently acquired commercially made desert boots from catalogs. However, quantities of desert boots began arriving in
278 Liberating Kuwait

late January. First issues went to Task Forces Shepherd, Grizzly, and Taro. The rationale was that the

Marines of Task Force Shepherd deserved the boot

because of the length of time they had spent as the

division’s forward element. General Myatt felt that

the Marines of Task Forces Taro and Grizzly needed

the boots for their long desert march. Complete

issue of the desert boot to the entire division occurred following its return from Kuwait.

Other items typical of Marine dress include the

regulation tan web trouser belt with its brass open

buckle and the khaki green tee shirt. The web belt

proved durable, yet some Marines preferred belts

made from nylon parachute straps. In one instance,

a staff noncommissioned officer in the 1st Battalion,

7th Marines, wore a parachute cord around the

waist in combination with two cloth straps as a sort

of field expedient suspenders.

Nonstandard dress never gained official sanction.

In September 1990, General Boomer stated his position that every I Marine Expeditionary Force Marine and sailor needed assurance that the frame of

reference for himself and for unit discipline had not

changed simply by virtue of serving under the

unique circumstances of Saudi Arabia. He saw

“squared away uniforms” and well-kept appearances

as a demonstration that Marines were taking care of

themselves. Dress and appearance acted as an outward indicator of unit morale and discipline. Yet,

General Boomer recognized that conditions varied

from one unit to another, and he allowed commanders the flexibility to authorize “temporary deviations

due to unusual circumstances.” Those deviations that

occurred remained within parameters established by

General Boomer or resulted from the “unusual circumstances” inherent in a lengthy field campaign.
279

Military Map Symbols

u APPENDIX Gu

Axis of Advance Helicopter Assault

Screen Line

Division Boundary Corps Boundary

Fortification Breech

Defensive

Entrenchments

Size (C)

Designation (E)

Type (A)

Description (D)

Command

Relation (F)

Function/

Branch (B)
280 Liberating Kuwait

Combat Service Support Area Kibrit

1st Marines (-) (Reinforced)

(Task Force Papa Bear) 

4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade

6th Light Armored Division (FR) 

2d Saudi Arabian

National Guard Brigade

Hammurabi Armored Division

(Republican Guard)

Military Units—Identifications

Unit Size and Symbols

Color Code

Examples

Headquarters

Service

Support

Area

Mechanized

Infantry

Marine

Expeditionary

Airborne

(Air Assault)

Special

Forces

Naval

Infantry

Artillery

Infantry Aircraft Helicopter Light Armored

Infantry

Tracked Airborne (US)

Armor

Squad

Section/Detachment

Platoon/Troop

Company/Battery

Battalion/Squadron

Regiment/Group

Brigade

Division/Wing

Force/Corps

Army/Air Force

l

ll

lll

x

x x

x x x

X

XX

XXX

XXXX

Blue = U.S. Forces Green = Allied Forces Red = Enemy Forces

Nebuchadnezzar Infantry Division = NEB

al-Fao Infantry Division = FAW

Tawakalna Mechanized Division = TAW

Medina Armored Division = MED

Adnan Mechanized Division = ADN

Baghdad Mechanized Division = BAG

The following abbreviations are used for the Iraqi Republican Guard units:
281

Brief on Iraqi Forces

by LtGen Bernard E. Trainor

u APPENDIX Hu

On 10 December 1990, Lieutenant General Walter

E. Boomer’s staff and senior commanders received

a briefing on the Iraqi military from retired Lieutenant General Bernard E. Trainor. General Trainor

retired from the Marine Corps in 1985 after a career

that included combat service in Korea and Vietnam,

and then he went on to become a war correspondent

for the New York Times. General Trainor went to

Iraq in the winter of 1987–88 to report on the IranIraq War, and his status as a retired senior officer

convinced the Iraqis to grant him unusual access to

the front lines and their operational units. 

GEN TRAINOR: I went to Iraq during the winter of

1987–88 during what was known as the Cobla 5/6

Offensive by the Iranians. The Iranians called it their

final offensive, and indeed it was the final offensive,

but not in the way that the Iranians intended. They

intended it to be the final offensive wherein they

would have toppled the regime of Saddam Hussein.

It turned out it was the final offensive before the

collapse of the Iranian armed forces. But I got a

good look at the Iraqis, and that’s what I would like

to address today. I’ll give you an assessment, and

then I think more importantly in the Q&A [question

and answer], we can develop some of these things.

One of the beauties of going and becoming a military correspondent—or analyst as I was for the New

York Times—was that when I went out to all of these

Third World wars that I covered, and I covered just

about every one of them during the period I was with

the Times, once I made contact with military people

I was running free; I was able to do things and go

places that attachés could never go, or other journalists would go. There’s kind of a brotherhood—a military brotherhood that exists—and it transcends

national boundaries and ideologies, and once you are

able to contact a military guy, in the position that I

was in, all sorts of doors opened up to you, and that’s

what happened when I went to Iraq.

It [Iraq] is a very closed society, a paranoid society, a real police state, and you have attached to you

a “bird dog” [close observer] and he never lets you

out of his sight. When you go there and you say you

are a retired three-star general from the Marine

Corps who is now a journalist, you see the flicker

in their eyes which essentially says “b——t,” and the

assumption is that you’re a CIA [Central Intelligence

Agency] agent and your military rank is a political

rank. But once you get down and talk to another

soldier and talk about soldierly things that only another military man would talk about, then your bona

fides are established at least with the military fellow,

if not the political guy bird-dogging you, and that’s

what I was able to do. And they brought me down

to—and I’m sure you all have a reasonable familiarity with the southern portion of Iraq. I went down

to the area of al-Amarah, al-Majarr, as-Sulayb, down

to al-Basrah and the Fish Lake* area where most of

these offensives were taking place over the period

of the four years of defensive operations that the

Iraqis conducted.

There was no greater intention than letting me get

below division level, but when I got talking with the

division commander and he recognized that I was

in fact a military man, then he was very anxious for

me—he was typical military, “I want to show you

what my guys do,” and there was some business of

compare and contrast—and I found this throughout

the Third World. People, when they find out you

were in Vietnam, well, everybody in the world

knows about Vietnam, and they want to know how

you did it in Vietnam and how you did it differently

than the way they are fighting. The fact that I fought

in Korea didn’t mean a thing; nobody even knew

what a Korea was, but they knew what Vietnam was.

This was a marvelous entrée. Whether I was talking with a young private in the Sandinista army or

a major general in the Iraqi Army, this opened

doors. So, this division commander, because he not

only had military clout but he also had considerable

political clout—and the two of them go together in

the senior ranks of the Iraqi armed forces—he was

able to go to the bird dog and get me down to

where the fighting was and get right up on the

lines. And I spent 45 minutes in an artillery OP [observation post] during an artillery exchange between the Iraqis and the Iranians—and you couldn’t

get much farther forward than that.

So I did get a good look at them, and what I’m

going to tell you now is a judgment of their capability and their liabilities as I judged them during

*

Fish Lake was a barrier created by Iraq on its border with Iran

that was intended to prevent an Iranian assault. In addition to

water, the lake was filled with mines, concertina wire, and highvoltage electrical lines.
282 Liberating Kuwait

the period from 1987 to 1988. Now, recognize that

there have been some improvements. They have

been qualitative improvements, but I think the improvements are just in a matter of degree. We can

go into that maybe in the Q&A.

Let me start off with their officer corps and those

generals that I talked about. The senior generals of

the Iraqi Army are now skilled professional soldiers.

This was not always true. During the eight or so

years of the Iran-Iraq War, there were a lot of incompetent but politically loyal generals who led the

Iraqi forces into Iran and got themselves whipped.

Then these fellows were relieved and more competent professional military officers started to emerge

or were appointed but were politically suspect, so

therefore the direction of the war was conducted

by Saddam Hussein and his small group, and that

led to military incompetence regardless of the professional competence of the senior commanders.

Well, because of this interference, in 1985–86 the

Iraqi Army was nearly defeated by the Iranians, and

the military finally—they didn’t revolt, obviously

you don’t revolt against Saddam Hussein—but they

convinced Saddam Hussein, “We are loyal, but you

have to leave the business of fighting the war to

us.” Saddam Hussein is not a military man, and he’s

very suspicious of his military because the military

constitutes the only institution that can overthrow

him or threaten him. So the competent generals

who were politically loyal now were the final outcome of the original case where you had incompetent generals who were politically loyal.

The senior officers owe their positions and their

prestige and their power—which is considerable—

to the fact that they are on Saddam Hussein’s

“team.” And oh, by the way, don’t get too big for

your britches or Saddam Hussein will remove you,

and remove you physically, as may have been the

case here just in the past week or so with the chief

of staff of the armed forces.

What I am trying to imply is that while they are

loyal to Saddam Hussein and they are very nationalistic Iraqis, they are also scared to death of Saddam Hussein. All the horror stories that you’ve ever

heard about Saddam Hussein are probably true—

and there are probably a lot more that we don’t

even know about—so these guys are going to stay

close to Saddam Hussein. They are very competent.

Most of them have been trained not only in Iraqi

professional military schools—these are two-stars

and above—but they have also been trained in foreign schools. They have been to professional

schools in the Soviet Union and Britain, in France,

in Pakistan and India and other countries, so they

have a broad amalgam of military concepts and

doctrine. But make no mistake about it, the Iraqi

military doctrine is not a Soviet doctrine, it’s not a

British doctrine, it’s not a French doctrine; it’s Iraqi

and it developed out of the eight years of war. It’s

peculiarly theirs, but it has features of the experiences of other military forces.

Now let me drop down to the brigade level,

brigade and battalion level. Oddly enough, these

officers—and these now are the fellows who have

grown up in the war and grew up as part of Saddam Hussein’s regime. These are the fellows that

survived the war as the platoon leaders, and now

they are battalion commanders and/or brigade commanders. This was again at the same time frame I

was there. None of these fellows have been to foreign schools, and that was probably because they

were too busy fighting the war, but they have all

been through the professional schools within Iraq

and they, too, are very competent.

The company commanders and the platoon

commanders, needless to say, have not been to any

foreign schools, but they were very competent. That

artillery position that I was in, the young lieutenant

that was the FO [forward observer]—big strapping

fellow, good looking guy, other than his hair being

about as long as mine, you’d take him for a Marine—he knew his stuff, knew how to employ his

artillery. And I couldn’t speak any Arabic, but he

had his maps out in front of him and we were able

to point and touch and communicate with one another, and so he was competent.

Now, in terms of a danger to Saddam Hussein, it

probably comes less from the senior officers than it

does from the brigade and battalion commanders.

He doesn’t have a firm a grip on these people as

he does the senior ones.

One of the things he would do during the IranIraq War, during the lull when there wasn’t any activity, fighting corps and divisions were kind of

permanently established all along the 800-mile

front, but the brigades would constantly move. Divisions and corps were wired in—all of their communications were underground—they have radios

to use, but they normally would communicate via

landlines, which is, as I said, were buried. So these

guys have these permanently well-established positions, but the brigades would move every 30 days.

Now, he did this for three reasons.

[The] number one reason [was] to keep the

troops from getting too bored. They are looking at

the same piece of terrain all the time, their fighting
edge leaves, and [they get] the feeling that the grass

is always greener on the other fellow’s yard, so

every 30 days they switch them around. And they

may only go 5 miles, 10 miles, 200 miles, but they

would constantly move them every 30 days for

morale purposes.

Now, there was another reason he did it. From a

professional standpoint, it gave the staff good training in the tactical movement of the troops, because

when these brigades would move, they would

move tactically. So it was good staff training.

And the third reason—and this is the political reason—Saddam Hussein, with his paranoia and his fear

of conspiracy, he wanted to move these brigades so

the young Turks would not get to know each other

too well and perhaps conspire against him.

Well, those are the three reasons that they moved

them around.

In my analysis and judgment on the Iraqi staff,

their staff work is very good. Now, I would give it

an outstanding to off-the-page for what they were

doing facing the Iranians, but then again, they had

enough practice of doing that because the Iranians

did the same thing to them move after move after

move, so they got the business of fighting a defensive war with their peculiar tactics. They got it

down to a fine art.

Now, how does that translate when they are

fighting a different type of enemy and a different

type of war? Well, the fundamental soundness of

their staff procedures will stand them in good stead,

but the thing that they know how to do so well

when they are facing the Iranians will no longer

apply, so obviously their staff work is not going to

be that good. But still don’t think of them as a

bunch of “rag heads” who can’t put their act together. They are good.

Okay. Now let me talk about the individual military arms within the armed forces. Let me start off

with their air force and disposal of it.

Now I will talk about their aviation element. It

came in basically two packages—strategic aviation,

designed to go deep into Iranian territory and take

out deep targets and carry out terror bombings, and

psychological, to break the morale of the Iranians.

Those guys were in French planes, trained by the

French, [and were] very good. These are the fellows

that brought the Exocet [missile] into the [USS] Stark.

They were quite good, but the Iraqis were so concerned about losing those aircraft and losing those

pilots that the campaigns were spurts. They would

launch the aircraft and carry on an air campaign for

anywhere from days to maybe a week, and then

they would cut it off before the Iranians learned

how to deal with the air attacks and started to trip

their aviation. So those fellows are very good and

one should keep that in mind—not that I have any

concern that we would not, with the massive

amount of early warning and aircraft we have out

here—but I feel they could really effectively use

that strategic arm very well. They are very good at

cover and deception and you always have to worry

about a leaker [undetected aircraft] getting through.

But let me dispose of those. I didn’t see that much

of them. I just know more about them than I do of

having seen them.

On the tactical side, battlefield interdiction, close

air support—they were very, very poor, and I don’t

think they have improved particularly on it. Very

poor. The close air support and interdiction aircraft

didn’t really give the Iranians that much trouble,

and the pilots were poorly trained. They did not

have the desire to close in battle. And the tactical

helicopters were absolutely ridiculous. They would

be well behind their lines and they would just fire

their rockets in the direction of the Iranians, and

then they drop down and feel they have satisfactorily done their job. So that, in a nutshell, is my assessment of the aviation side of the house.

Now let me go to that which I saw in much

greater detail. Let me start off with their infantry.

The infantry was basically conscript. Some of them

would go on and stay on. Those that were bright

went on for awhile, then they were sent off to college, but always subject to recall.

The infantry that I saw in the Iraqi Army reminded

me very much of the infantry that I saw in the Soviet

forces in Germany facing the NATO [North Atlantic

Treaty Organization] forces. They were obedient, competent soldiers with very limited military knowledge

beyond that which they themselves were assigned. In

other words, if he’s an RPG [rocket-propelled grenade]

man, he knew how to use the RPG. If he had an AK47 [assault rifle], he knew how to use an AK-47. If you

ask one of them to move on to a crew-served

weapon, he wouldn’t have any particular tactical

sense of how to employ it; they were simple guys but

reasonably competent infantrymen.

Now, those of you who faced the North Koreans

or the Chinese in the Korean War, or the VC [Viet

Cong] or the NVA [North Vietnamese Army] in the

Vietnam War, they do not come up to any of the

enemies that we have fought in the past. Their infantry, they just don’t match them [the VC or NVA],

but they are still pretty good guys and know how

to fire the weapons.

Appendix H 283
I’d go down—and this would be both in support

positions on the second line, or even up on the line

itself—you look in the eye, see whether there’s fire

there, whether they have any fight in their belly,

and you didn’t get too bright a look. They were

there and they just wanted to survive, praise Allah

they would. But you check their weapons: the

weapons would be clean, and check the magazines,

take out some of the rounds, magazines were clean,

good to go. You look at their face mask—chemical

mask, open the thing up, didn’t find pogey-bait

[candy] in there, you found the mask, it was ready

to go, in good shape. Field sanitation, one of the

things I looked as I went around the Third World

to assess some of these forces and given frontline

positions, it was pretty damn good. So that’s kind

of the picture of the infantryman in the Iraqi Army.

Their NCO [noncommissioned officer] system is

a little queer. It’s kind of like the Soviet system, kind

of like a warrant officer, and he—this large bevy of

all conscripts is too large for this sort of fellow, but

they depend mostly on the platoon leaders to keep

the forces together.

Now, they would withstand these Iranian attacks

simply because they didn’t have any choice, and their

only job was to sit there and shoot, but I have to tell

you, they were scared to death of the Iranians.

The Iranians—first, they never knew when the

Iranians were coming, literally never knew, and

they were afraid they were coming every night. And

those that used to go out on outpost duty would be

absolutely scared to death because when the Iranians attacked, they didn’t signal their attack with artillery barrages or concentrations or prep[aration]

fires of any sort. They didn’t give anything away by

SIGINTs [signals intelligence] because the Iranians

really didn’t have any radios and they did all their

planning face-to-face and by sending messengers.

And the Iranian Army, the regular army was simply

in a support role.

The major fighting and the major planning was

done by the [Iranian] Revolutionary Guard, and they

would start off their attacks with these 12s- and 14-

year-old kids called “Bahais,” and these kids were

going to go to Allah—that’s what they wanted—and

they would have two hand grenades and their job

was to go out, not screaming, but they would infiltrate to get through the minefields, get through the

wire, and blow up the outpost position which provided the main battle positions—and I’ll describe

those momentarily—to blow those fellows up in

there and clear the minefields either by blowing

them up, that was usually the way, and cutting

through the barbed wire. Then the Revolutionary

Guards, the older fellows, they would start the

charge and come at them [the Iraqis] like a bunch

of Indians [Native Americans].

Well, this scared the hell out of the Iraqis. The

Iranians were able to concentrate large numbers of

forces at the breakthrough point, and the Iranians

outnumbered the Iraqis, population-wise, 3 to 1 as

it was, and at the point of contact, they would outnumber them 50 to 1. So, when these Iranians came,

they came, and for some poor fellow sitting in that

outpost, why he’s going to go to Allah. So they were

very, very nervous about that sort of thing, and if

they ever tried to go to the rear, they were through

because their own officers would shoot them. So

there wasn’t much joy among these fellows. They

would stay there and literally be overrun.

Now let me move on to their armored forces,

their tanks. They had lots of tanks, and we know

they have the T-72, but they also have a lot of junk,

and among that junk was the T-62, which the Iraqis

considered useless. When I was out there, they

were using them basically as a pillbox, too, because

the maintenance on the thing was always breaking

down, so they put them in these positions and

pointed the tube [gun barrel] at the Iranian side.

Now, the supposedly best [Iraqi] units were the

Republican Guards, and this was kind of a special

force created by Saddam Hussein, really, for his

own protection against a coup by the rest of the

army, but they were used in the latter part of the

war in kind of a semicounterattack role after these

Iranian offenses started to lose their momentum. I

was not at all impressed and I never saw any of the

Republican Guard units in action, but I saw their

other armored units in action and the maintenance

was poor, the crews were poorly trained, [and] they

didn’t have the know-how to coordinate. I just was

not impressed by their armor.

Now, subsequent to my presence out there and

the very last stages of the war, the Iraqis went on

the offensive and went against Iranian positions at

a place called al-Faw—which I’m sure some of you

are aware of, and it was a pretty impressive armored attack. But when I was there they were very

poor, and they tried to put together a combined

arms operation supporting the infantry and the

tanks to go against the salients over by Fish Lake

that the Iranians had supported by tanks that were

on the Iraqi side on the Shatt al-Arab, and it was, I

think, their first attempt at a combined arms approach in the attack, and it worked. But it was so

primitive and so clumsy that going up to Twenty284 Liberating Kuwait
nine Palms, California, they would have been

laughed out of the corridor.

Now, presumably they have improved since

then, but I can’t imagine they have improved that

much in either the use of the armor or their ability

to combine the armor. I think they were successful

at al-Faw, and I think they were successful at

Mehran, and when they went into Kuwait, which

was pretty impressive because it was a set piece

battle that they had set there and planned it and rehearsed it, then they moved, and they didn’t have

that much opposition. At al-Faw they caught the Iranians by surprise. At Mehran there was minimum

resistance, and of course in Kuwait there was minimum resistance, but in terms of having to use their

armor forces with any sort of flexibility, I don’t think

they are going to do that well with it.

Now about the so-called Republican Guard, I

haven’t seen them, but I do know this. During the

war there were only four of those divisions, and

now they have expanded them. It depends on who

you have talked to, whether they have six or eight

of them—you may have a better handle on that

than I do—but you just can’t double your number

and maintain the same sort of quality. So, I think

they may have more of these Republican Guard

units, but they probably deleted the quality.

Armor. Sure, it’s going to be a problem, armor’s always a problem, but I wouldn’t think you’ll have [German Field Marshal Erwin] Rommel roaring at you from

these guys. They are going to make a lot of targets.

That’s another thing I should say. I didn’t see this

so much in the Iran-Iraq War, but in some of the

other conflicts that I have observed, Third World

soldiers, if a tank is hit, they don’t consider it a stationary pillbox that you can stay in and fight out of.

The first it’s hit, [all] they want to do is haul ass,

they got to get out. You really don’t even need a

catastrophic kill, just a mobility kill and most of

them are going to abandon the tanks.

Another interesting thing is you—and this was

clearly brought out in Angola [in Africa]—you get

the lead tank, everyone else tends to panic because

that’s the leader. He goes and everybody else finds

convenient reasons to go into holy defilade someplace. Might be something to keep in mind. Mind

you, I don’t know if it applies to the Iraqi, but I

have seen it in other venues, including the Soviets.

This is what was happening to the Soviets in

Afghanistan, and I also saw it in Chad with the

Libyans, so it’s a point to keep in mind.

Let me move on from the armor to what I really

think is going to be the casualty-maker capability

within the Iraqi armed forces. That’s their artillery.

They have lots of it, they know how to use it, and

they don’t operate the way we do. Where we have

kind of an economy of force measure—you look

for a point destruction mission, you try to get the

target, adjust your rounds on to it, destroy it—their

whole approach—and this, I guess is kind of an

adoption from the Soviet model—is just throw that

stuff out there. Put enough of it out there with all

the tubes that you have, saturate the area and get

the target you’re aiming at. So that artillery is going

to come, both the gun artillery and their rockets.

They are going to crank that stuff out, and that will

be a problem unless you get the artillery out. And

they do have, probably, the best gun in the world

that they bought from the South Africans, the G5

[155mm howitzer]. I don’t know if they have any of

the G6s, which is the SP [self-propelled] version of

it. They also have another 210[mm howitzer], which

they manufactured themselves [that] is supposed to

be a pretty good artillery piece.

So, there’s a lot of it, but the point is the way

they employed it against the Iranians was based on

the fact that they were sitting in these defensive positions for so long that they had these enormous

stockpiles of ammunition behind them. And they

have probably duplicated that sort of concept in

their fixed positions up along the Kuwaiti border,

that they brought lots of bullets with them. So, in

order to get their supply point and get the guns

themselves—but after that they are going to have

an enormous problem of resupply just because of

that concept of excess . . . they are going to have

terrible ones up there, but I think the artillery is

going to be a bugaboo for you.

Now let me talk about what I think is their best

arm, and it’s not a combat arm, it’s their combat engineers. Their combat engineers, they put the best

people in it, the best officers. You got these guys

who are civil engineers and graduates of the universities, and you’re not dealing with a peasant

army up there. They are a pretty well-educated

group of people.

These guys are just magnificent. They have lots

of equipment and lots of capability, and very innovative, and they can put up positions so fast under

fire it can make your head swim. I saw them doing

this under those tremendous barrages they were

being subjected to by the Iranians. So they can

build roads, build obstacles, they can build defenses

very, very quickly, and they have lots of equipment

to do it with.

Now, to kind of put some of this together for

Appendix H 285
286 Liberating Kuwait

you, let me show you the way they have their defenses, then you can tell me how this matches up

with what your intelligence is telling you up north.

[Uses a chalkboard]

Basically, this would be north—as I recall it’s always at the top of the map—and this would be the

Iranian positions. What they would do in their defenses, they would have an outpost line, and these

basically were little strongpoints that almost look

like some of those trench and even berm positions

that we had in Vietnam, which were triangular in

shape with strongpoints at each of the apex. These

would be in supporting position of one another.

This is ideally—what I’m describing to you—what

would exist throughout the entire front, but obviously it doesn’t, but it’s notional and will give you

an example of the way they conduct their defense.

So these will be the fellows that would give early

warning when the Bahais go get them, and they

would have wire and mines in front of them, and

they would have wire and mines behind them.

These, generally speaking, were in supporting distance, and in some instances, crew-served distance

from the MLR—their main line of resistance—and

the main line of resistance was usually conducted

on a ridgeline, and what you saw here was basically

the same sort of thing that you would see in pictures of World War I. They would have . . . trench

lines in front, connecting trenches to the back, lateral trench line back there with bunkers and fighting positions here.

Now, normally they would do this on a natural

piece of terrain, but if they didn’t have a natural

piece of terrain—and that was a likely avenue of

approach—then they would construct one and their

combat engineers would go in and use these earth

movers. And when I was there they had about 1,300

of these enormous Japanese earth movers, and they

would come in and build a ridge, and they would

stabilize the soil with, I don’t know, I guess it was

epoxy and cement and some other synthetics, and

literally build a ridge. Then they would put their

trenches in it just as I have shown here on the natural ridge.

The trench line would run seven or eight feet

deep, and they would have chicken wire on either

side of them. They would be very narrow for just

enough for one man to get through—and let me digress a moment. That was how I got into the artillery FO position. I had spotted it as we moved

up—I could see the antenna sticking up and I knew

there was an OP there—and we were on the back

slope of this defensive position, and I could see the

antenna sticking up on the forward slope. When we

got to the connecting trench that went up there, I

simply took a left and went on up there, and my

bird dog behind me was trying to grab me to stop

me, but he couldn’t catch up, so I got into the

bunker. Their overhead cover—there’s just really

room for two people in there, the FO and I guess

presumably the radioman—so I was able to duck

in there and my bird dog was caught outside in the

connecting trench shouting for me to come out, but

he was in somewhat of an untenable position because the artillery was coming in and he was exposed, so I was able to spend 45 minutes in there.

So they would construct these positions.

Now, back here you would have another position identical to these, and what they would do is

sometimes they have two up, one back, and sometimes they have one up and two back, but basically

these first two lines would be identical. This would

be in supporting distance of this position; these

would be in supporting position of the outpost; the

outpost would be able to give mutual support, one

to the other, so you see they had an integrated defense, and they would set these things up to try to

channelize the attacks into a killing sack, and they

would either make use of the natural terrain or

when they would construct these hill lines, these

ridgelines, they would angle them to try to create

that sack.

Now, back here they would have another line.

This, of course, would be occupied. This would be

identical to these two, but unoccupied, but the

trenches are there, the bunkers are there. Back here

they would simply have sand berms, would have

revetted positions in there that you could drive

tanks into the fire, and . . . they would have these

things as far back as you wanted to go, and if they

didn’t have enough—if this was the main attack,

and you can obviously see what their game plan

was when the Iranians would attack, the idea was

to just trip them, bring them deeper into these defensive positions. And while these were reasonably

rightly held, they kept their reserves back, and back

here, coming all the way from Baghdad down to

al-Amarah down to Basrah, was this marvelous road

network and they could speed these lowboys [semitrailers] carrying the earth movers, the lowboys carrying the tank reinforcements, they would be

coming down these roads to move into these preprepared positions, and the engineers would simply

stop and build successive positions, so eventually

the Iranian attack would start to peter out.

Now, back here on the far side of the road they
would have all the supply and water points, ammunition points to support these defenses, and they

had been developed over the years—they had more

damn ammunition and stuff than you could imagine. When I was out there they had so much of it

and from so many different countries and such a

mixed bag that they had hired a Japanese firm to

computerize their inventory control, and I presume

that they have accomplished that by now, but they

would just wear them out coming in like that.

But because he was afraid of taking too many

casualties, he didn’t want to take casualties—he

being Saddam Hussein—there was rarely a counterattack. They would simply absorb the blow and

then use their massive artillery and tank fire to reduce these Iranian positions, just literally beat them

into the ground. The Iranians had very poor tactical

logistics, and pretty soon these guys were hung out

there and eventually crushed. It was only after the

resistance was completely gone that the Iraqis

would launch their counterattacks to restore the position. That was mainly their defense.

Now let me talk a little bit about—and I’ll conclude on this and open it up to questions—the psychology. This is a police state in Iraq. Everybody is

fearful, but everybody pretends life is lovely. Let me

give you an illustration of that.

When the Iraqis would launch one of the strategic air campaigns of theirs and then shut it off, the

Iranians would then respond, but of course they

didn’t have the capability. The way they responded

was by popping off some Scuds, and normally they

fired three Scuds at a time at Baghdad. Right after

one of these Iraqi air campaigns ceased, everybody

knew the Iranian Scuds were coming and they

would be walking around on eggshells, and people

shopping or talking to the guy, the market man or

the fellow in the suit, everybody was looking over

their shoulders, keeping an ear cocked for the

Scuds to come in.

I said, they come in with three. I was in Baghdad

one night—I didn’t hear two of them but I heard

the third one and the thing made a hell of a racket.

And immediately after it, I heard sirens, and I heard

bells and whistles and horns honking, pots, and

pans. I said, “Jesus, what the hell did this hit to

cause such a reaction?” You know what it was?

They were all out celebrating because the three

rounds had come in; they knew it would be the end

until the next Iraqi air campaign. They were out celebrating: “The other guy got blown away, but that’s

his problem, not mine.”

There’s this unreal sense of normalcy—the cities

were all hit up, but Amarah, which was right behind

the line, everybody was acting as if nothing is wrong.

You never saw a wounded or maimed Iraqi soldier

in any of the main cities. They had sanitariums for

them. They were kept out in sanitariums because he

[Saddam] didn’t want to upset the populace with this

view of wounded people, even though every family

had a relative either killed or wounded or captured,

but they had to pretend everything was perfectly

normal. The families would be taken out there, but

their sons could not come into the cities. It was an

eerie unreal sort of world, which I think shows you

a degree of fragility in the morale of the Iraqis.

Let me give you a rather gruesome example of

the extent to which Saddam Hussein went to maintain this facade of normalcy.

As you know, the war was not a constant war, it

was a cyclical war. The Iranians would gear up and

launch a massive offensive, then peter out, go build

up their logistics, and come at them again. They did

this year after year. Well, the Iranians always took

more casualties than the Iraqis took—a substantial

number of casualties—but Saddam Hussein, during

one of these campaigns, was reluctant to let the

families know that their sons had been killed in action, so back here on the far side of the road, out

beyond where all the supply and water points and

ammo [ammunition] points were, he also had these

warehouses which were refrigerated, and that’s

where the bodies were put, put on ice. And during

the period of the lull, the bodies would be taken

out and sent on home to the families for burial, and

along with a very, very handsome indemnity on the

part of a grateful government—anything to [lessen]

the shock of war to the Iraqi people.

Now, part of this was political, because the leadership of the Iraqi Army was made up of Sunni

Muslims, and the foot soldiers were basically Shiite

Muslims; and the Iranians were basically Peshites

[Shiites] co-religionists, and Saddam Hussein was

very much afraid of the revolt against the Sunni

rule. So, for that reason he didn’t want to suffer

many casualties and didn’t want people to realize

how desperate the war was, and he went to this extent to hide it.

Now, I think that sort of mentality still exists, and

let me give you the evidence of that. You probably

know that as part of a deception plan to indicate

that our blockade was hurting him, he instituted gas

rationing in Iraq. That was two months ago, and it

lasted about a week. There was such public outcry

and upset over this that he was afraid of this delicate morale balance and he said, “Okay, no more

Appendix H 287
288 Liberating Kuwait

gas ration[ing].” That was a mistake, and he fired

the minister of energy.

You probably haven’t seen that much out here,

being in somewhat remote area, but back in the

[United] States on all the networks, and CNN [Cable

News Network], you see these “man in the street”

interviews in beautiful downtown Baghdad: “Oh,

no war, no war. If there is a war, we are battle-hardened, we ought to be able to beat the Americans.”

These guys are wrestling in the dark. Saddam Hussein himself constantly talks about, “The Americans

can’t take casualties; we can take hundreds of thousands of casualties. We have done it in the Iran[-

Iraq] War; we are battle-hardened. We can stand

these casualties, [but] the Americans can’t stand to

bleed.” Again, it’s all a psyche thing.

It’s my judgment, although it’s just to this incorrect evidence that I recently cited and also my observation of [them] during the war, that while they

[the Iraqi Army] are a large and a very competent

force in many respects, I think they tend to be a

very fragile force. They have never had visited upon

them the sort of firepower that we can deliver

against them. If it comes to that, I think you’re not

going to find—you’re certainly not going to find

them fighting like the Japanese, or the North Koreans, or the VC or the NVA, and they may not fight

well at all. I think they may collapse very quickly. I

wouldn’t plan on that sort of thing, but I think it’s

a distinct possibility.

Okay, I talked long enough and now it’s your

opportunity to ask me questions. Any of those that

I can answer, I’ll be happy to do it.

QUESTION: What is your assessment of their rear

area security?

GEN TRAINOR: Rear area security was reasonably good.

At least they had the guys there guarding all of these

positions. The Iranians didn’t have much of a capability to get at them, but they still had them pretty well

guarded. How alert these guys were? I don’t know. 

One thing that I have to tell you on their mobile

reserves—they were used to moving these reserves,

and not only the Republican Guards, but also they

did have reserve units. Because with that 800-mile

front, what they had to do, they would hold the

forces back until they found out where the main attack was coming because when the Iranians

launched one of their offensives—not all of them

were like this, some of them were deceptions, and

the Iraqis could not afford to make a mistake—so

they let the attacks develop until they determined

which was the main one. That’s when they would

converge on the position, when all the earth movers

come barreling down the highways, and tanks and

trucks full of infantry to fill up these positions. So

that was the basic idea of their defense in depth, that

they could take the time in making the decision on

the reserves until the battle developed sufficiently.

But your question brings up something I seriously omitted. This may not go too well in the [Marine aircraft] wing, for those of you going in

helicopters. I think in terms of the business of gaining air superiority, that’s a doable job. It’s going to

cost some effort, obviously, and we will take some

losses, but I think electrically controlled or radar

controlled we will be able to take out their low and

intermediate altitude defense. . . . But let me tell

you, anybody falling below 10,000 feet is in harm’s

way because they have so many SAM-7s [surfaceto-air missiles], ZSU-23s [23mm self-propelled antiaircraft guns], so many garden-variety antiaircraft

pieces that they will just make hell.

There’s a mistaken belief that there was an Iranian plane during this period of just before the Scud

came in. There was a report that there was an Iranian plane coming, and the antiaircraft opened up

from downtown Baghdad and it was absolutely

staggering. You have seen the displays at the Washington Monument on the Fourth of July? All you

could see were tracers going up there, and driving

down the road to Basrah, and in the most unlikely

places there’s a ZSU-23 crew sitting out there at a

gas station or just sitting out by a small oasis.

They [have] all sorts of antiaircraft stuff and all

of their armored forces where they are disposed

right now, I would suspect are under an umbrella

of that antiaircraft, and you’re going to have to get

it out. It’s not going to be easy because no targeteer

could target all that they have, and they will be able

to move it around. So helicopter operations, unless

they were properly planned, good cover and deception, good attack support that goes along with

it, it could be very hazardous to the infantryman’s

health. And just flying the helicopter at an altitude

below 10,000 feet is also going to be harmful.

QUESTION: You didn’t talk about CBR [chemical, biological, radiological weapons].

GEN TRAINOR: Well, he’s got the chemical weapons.

I think once you accept the fact that he’s going to

use them, it would be foolish to say he would never

use them. So, yeah, I think he would use them if

he found value to them, but the question is how

much value is he going to get out of them? How is

he going to deliver: by artillery or rocket, or by airplane? An aerosol version in a bomb version, or if

he manages to be able to fit something on the nose
of a Scud? And I think the intelligence community

is a little undecided about that.

But okay, let’s give him that. So what is he going

to use? The artillery and rockets would be against

frontline troops. What forces are probably the best

prepared to cope with something like that? The

frontline troops. A real good target will be a target

in the rear—an airfield or logistics base, and that

would be a good sort of chemical target, but how

is he going to deliver it: airplane or the Scud? [The]

Scud is notoriously inaccurate—he may hit it, he

may not, it may not land in Saudi Arabia. And in

terms of the aircraft, presumably we are going to

be able to take out most of his aircraft. However,

as I say, he may get a leaker in there.

But then again, how much damage is that going

to do? It’s going to be more psychological than anything else. There will be casualties, but not mass casualties. On top of that, our intelligence community,

I would hope, has made this a priority of EEIs [essential elements of information], and then we preempt, so I don’t see that the chemical thing would

be a problem. I think it’s something that has been

kind of overrated in terms of the anxiety factor, but

let me tell you, this guy [Saddam] is a shrewd son of

a b——h, and we talk about what we will do when

we go to war, but it takes two to tango, and this guy

has a few surprises up his sleeve. I’m sure he has a

few technical surprises, and maybe a few tactical surprises, but this guy, knowing the fact that his air

force is going to be decimated if we can get through

those hardened bunkers built to NATO specifications—but he might take out one of these aircraft

and load it up with some super Exocets, fly it over

Iran airspace and try to beat the AWACS [airborne

warning and control system aircraft], the [Northrup

Grumman] E-2 [Hawkeye], beat everything and pop

one off. And boy, wouldn’t that be nice to catch an

amphibious ship with all those Marines sitting there

waiting to go to shore? Lots of casualties.

This is the sort of thing he wants. He knows

what happened to the American policy in 1983

when the Beirut barracks was blown up and the

whole presidential policy in Lebanon collapsed.

That’s in the back of his mind, so he’s looking for

great casualties. How about some sort of a commando raid? He’s got a good commando force.

Commando attack even before we go to war, if he

becomes convinced that we are going to war and

it’s coming within the next 48 hours, and he

launches six or seven of these commando teams—

not at the frontline troops, but gets back to the rear,

the supply areas where there’s support people, and

not quite as combat ready as they are up on the

line, and causes a lot of destruction there. They may

all die in the process, but a wonderful thing if CNN

was to have this film [transmitted] to the United

States, fire and smoke going up and all those

women bleeding out there in the desert.

Boy, oh boy, the reaction of the United States is

going to be enormous. So that would be a psychological coup de main. So this son of a b——h is a

clever rascal, and you’re not going up against a

primitive army, and you’re certainly not going up

against a dunce. Next question?

QUESTION: Given the fact that he gave back all the

gains from the Iran-Iraq War, how susceptible do

you think a PSYOP [psychological operations] campaign against the [Iraqi] army would work?

GEN TRAINOR: I don’t think the PSYOP campaign

against the army would work right now at all. I

think it should be tried, not against the army but

against the population, that “this guy is leading you

down the path of national suicide.” The only thing

he [Saddam] has to worry about is the army turning

against him, and the army is not going to turn

against him if they are not suffering anything. I say

the possibilities go up dramatically once the fighting

starts and anguish and destruction is visited upon

that army. Then they might have second thoughts

about it; but until that happens, I don’t think there’s

any chance of turning that one institution that can

threaten Saddam Hussein into a real threat.

But one of the things that Saddam Hussein could

do at the eleventh hour is, you know, if he really is

convinced after January 15 we are coming at him, he

says, “Okay, I’ll back off, I’ll back off,” and pulls out,

and then everybody is standing there waiting to go—

and don’t anticipate the command. So there we are.

Now he pulls out. “Oh, he loses face and all that.”

Loses face? What do you mean? He controls the country; he’s got an iron grip on the country. Is the army

going to turn against him? He just saved them from

getting their head handed to them, so they are not

going to turn against him. Then what does he do?

He’s left us. He might do it. He might do it. 

On the other hand, the Saudis, who are urging us

to go get him, and the Israelis, who are in rare agreement with the Saudis, are saying he’s got to go and

saying to the United States, “If you don’t get him, we

will do it, we will provoke it and make you do it.” So

that’s a possibility, but all crises eventually come to

an end. This one, I think you’re going to see the resolution of the current crisis sometime between now

and the middle of March. Now, in the process, it may

be creating another crisis, but that’s another subject.

Appendix H 289
290 Liberating Kuwait

QUESTION: General, you alluded to use of a commando technique that they would apply. What did

you see in their application of special forces

brigades and commando companies?

GEN TRAINOR: I didn’t see any. This was just a

straight war, but I know he does have the commando forces. They come in by helicopter and do

a reasonably good job. I think they are probably

good for this reason: the Arab states have been able

to develop very good commando-type forces. The

Syrians have had good ones as far back as the ’73

war with the Israelis [the Yom Kippur War; also

known as the 1973 Arab-Israeli War]. The PLO

[Palestine Liberation Organization] has very good

commandos, so by extension I’m saying Saddam

Hussein and these professional military leaders that

run the Iraqi armed forces have probably turned out

a pretty good special operations commando organization, but I did not see them in action.

QUESTION: General Trainor, did you get a feel for

how low they would delegate authority to make

tactical decisions to commit counterattacks, shift

their axis of attack, that sort of thing?

GEN TRAINOR: The corps commander kind of set the

tone, but within the desires of the corps commander,

the division commanders would maneuver their

brigades. Brigade commanders had tactical authority,

so on down the line, but in the type of war they

were fighting, the only significant decisions were really the allocation of resources, where they are going

to reinforce. But down on the tactical level there

wasn’t much for these guys to do other than defend

their positions. So in a sense, the question is moot.

I don’t know. He gave greater tactical flexibility

to his senior leaders in the last three years of the

war than he did before that. Below that, I know the

tactical commanders are capable of exercising considerable initiative, but they didn’t have to do it in

the type of war that they were fighting. But their

command and control remains very vulnerable;

their logistics remain vulnerable, as long as we have

the air superiority.

QUESTION: Do you think we will see a lot of POWs

[prisoners of war]?

GEN TRAINOR: Well, he has 450,000 troops and 29

divisions in Kuwait, and I assume that there are basically divisions along the coast. Then, turning to

defend against the amphibious operation, and turning westward across the Saudi border and refusing

up their right flank, and behind those you have

some armored forces, central reserve in the middle

of Kuwait, and his general reserve of armored

forces up around Basrah.

Now, 450,000—he’s got supposedly a millionman army, but beyond that he can get some militia,

but of that million-man army that’s relatively available to him, maybe 534,000 are what you might call

reasonably good troops, and he’s in a geopolitically

untenable position. He’s got a potential enemy—

certainly an enemy in terms of his habitual Persian

Turks to the east, in Iran the political facade, and

the Syrians to the west, to say nothing of the Israelis

in the south, this army in the south ready to move

north—this is a tough position for a guy to be in.

So how is he going to defend against all of

these? He just can’t ignore the Iranians, the Turks,

or the Druze that are over in that area. Also, he’s

got to keep some of these forces, decent forces

there. So, he put a lot of stuff down south. A lot of

it is second-rate units, second-rate infantry. So in

answering your question, what it comes down to is

he’s got a field army of 450,000 men, and 225,000

of them [are] KIA [killed in action] and you’ve destroyed his military capability.

And I don’t know what the battle plans are—and

I’m not interested in knowing, so I’m free to speak

my mind—but it seems to me the way you conduct

this war, you conduct an air campaign against military industrial-related targets in Iraq itself to bring

the war home to Iraq. Then you conduct your air

campaign, your ground campaign and amphibious

campaign, as the opportunity presents itself, to destroy his field army in Kuwait. That’s where you

want to do it, in Kuwait; that’s the killing zone;

that’s where he put the people. The more he sends

down there, the more POWs and MIAs [troops missing in action] you can inflict on him. If he does that,

he can’t last. Like the Republican Guard unit bit, it

would seem to me they would be the ones more

than likely than any other part of the armed forces

to turn against Saddam Hussein.

GEN WALTER E. BOOMER: The Iranians captured three

times the number of POWs than the Iraqis captured,

so I would think that would indicate that some units

gave up—although I’m not certain about that, and

that really is my question. Do you have a feel for

that? What would we be faced with in terms of the

numbers of POWs we have to deal with?

GEN TRAINOR: It would be enormous. The infantry—

once you get through the infantry, what you’re engaging then is his mech ID [mechanized infantry

divisions], and all of these divisions, they are not

going anywhere, they are dug in, and a lot of them

are going to be dug in permanently if you drop a

few arc lights on them. But once you get around

them—and I presume you’re smart enough to—then
Appendix H 291

you cut off their logistics, their lifeline, you’re pounding the hell out of them with naval air and gunfire.

The large numbers of Iraqi prisoners that were taken

by the Iranians were primarily in the initial part of

the war when the Iraqis conducted a very inept campaign into Iran, and when the Iranians counterattacked they scarfed up a lot of them. Early in the

Iranian counterattack phase, the Iraqis got smart and

started to develop the defenses I’ve just described.

QUESTION: General, in your experience, what did

you see as the most effective tactical-physical deception the Iraqis pulled?

GEN TRAINOR: I don’t know what they were doing

to deceive the Iranians. It was more the Iranians deceiving the Iraqis. But I would say the cover and

concealment of the Iraqis were very good. I think

if you were over on the Iranian side looking back

at these positions, they would be very difficult to

get them because I know, being in one of the frontline positions and looking back at these successive

positions, it was almost like looking out at sea. You

really couldn’t identify distance and what exactly

was there, so they were very good in their cover

and concealment, but they had plenty of time to do

that sort of thing. I don’t think I can adequately answer your question.

Okay. Thanks for the opportunity to be with you.

I hope it was some value to you.

GEN BOOMER: General, it was of value and we appreciate it. Thank you very much.

293

u APPENDIX Iu

List of Reviewers

Marines

General Walter E. Boomer (Ret)

General Carlton W. Fulford (Ret)

General Charles C. Krulak (Ret)

General Michael J. Williams (Ret)

Lieutenant General John E. Rhodes (Ret)

Major General John H. Admire (Ret)

Major General Harry W. Jenkins Jr. (Ret)

Brigadier General James A. Brabham Jr. (Ret)

Brigadier General Thomas V. Draude (Ret)

Colonel James A. Fulks (Ret)

Colonel Richard W. Hodory (Ret)

Scholars

Dr. John F. Guilmartin

Dr. Kevin L. Osterloh

Dr. Kevin M. Woods

295

Abbasid Caliphate, 2

Abd al-Aziz, Sabir (LtGen, Iraq), 154

Abd al-Ilah, Amir, 4, 5

Abd as Razzaq, 6

Abdullah as Salim, Sheikh Saad al- (Crown Prince of Kuwait), 21

Abu Bakr, 1

Abu Hadriyah, Saudi Arabia, 47

Abu Ja’far al-Mansur, 2

Acree, Clifford M. (LtCol), 83, 218, 245, 261, 264

Adair, Charles W. (LtCol), 242

Adams, Mark W. (LtCol), 242

Adams, Thomas R. (LCpl), 44

‘Adi al-Mutairi, Sultan (MajGen, Saudi Arabia), 103, 119, 124–25,

127, 175

Admire, John H. (Col), 45, 52, 101, 103–4, 123, 125, 126, 130,

133, 154, 164, 195, 242

Afghanistan, Soviet invasion of, 8, 19, 285

Aguilar, Michael J. (LtCol), 177

Ahmad, Sultan Hashim, 213

Ahmadi ammunition storage facility, 87

Aidenbaum, Guido G. (Capt), 246, 247

Ain Zallab (Iraqi ship), 58, 260

Aircraft, U.S.

 AWACS (airborne warning and control system aircraft), 289

 Bell AH-1J and AH-1T Sea Cobra, 17, 42, 79, 82, 145, 258

 Bell AH-1W Super Cobra, 17, 38, 57, 79, 81–82, 104, 119,

120, 121, 125, 126, 130, 166, 187, 197, 198,

212, 259, 262, 265, 266

 Bell UH-1N Iroquois (“Huey”), 38, 42, 44, 46, 57, 104, 145,

187, 198–99, 212, 260, 262

 Boeing B-52 Stratofortress, 126, 151

 Boeing KC-135 Stratotanker, 85–86

 Boeing Vertol CH-46E Sea Knight, 38, 41, 46, 61, 177, 187,

198, 263

 C-130 Hercules, 86, 94, 139

 Cobras, 168, 171, 177, 184

 electronic warfare aircraft, 80

 Fairchild Republic A-10 Thunderbolt II (“Warthog”), 81, 82,

84, 87, 106, 114–15, 116, 117, 119, 128

 General Dynamics F-16 Fighting Falcon, 84, 106, 117

 Grumman A-6 and A-6E Intruder, 17, 38, 46, 69, 78, 79, 82,

83, 84, 89, 96, 108, 117, 121, 141, 145, 148,

198, 203, 204, 216

 Grumman E-8C Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS), 82, 106, 128–29, 262

 Grumman EA-6B Prowler, 46, 69, 78, 80, 96, 141, 160, 220

 Lockheed AC-130 Spectre, 119, 129, 262

 Lockheed F-117A Nighthawk, 78

 Lockheed KC-130 Hercules, 46, 78, 220

 McDonnell Douglas AV-8B Harrier and Harrier II, 38, 41,

46, 57, 69, 77, 79, 80–81, 82, 83, 84, 86, 89,

94, 104, 116, 117, 121, 128, 130, 146, 147,

148, 149–50, 156, 157, 171, 177, 187, 202,

216, 259, 261, 262, 263, 268

 McDonnell Douglas F-15C Eagle, 79

 McDonnell Douglas F-15E Strike Eagle, 119

 McDonnell Douglas F-16C Fighting Falcon, 119

 McDonnell Douglas F/A-18A, F/A-18C and F/A-18D Hornet, 38, 46, 69, 77, 78, 79, 82, 83, 85, 89, 96,

117, 128, 141, 142, 145, 146, 148, 157, 177,

204, 216, 217, 264

 McDonnell Douglas KC-10 Extender, 85–86

 McDonnell Douglas RF-4B Phantom, 143–45

 McDonnell Douglas “Wild Weasel” F-4G Phantom II, 78

 North American Rockwell OV-10 Bronco, 46, 57, 79, 80, 83,

96, 104, 121–22, 141, 144, 157, 187, 216, 261,

263

 Pioneer remotely piloted vehicles, 144

 Sikorsky CH-53D Sea Stallion, 38, 46, 61, 177, 198, 260

 Sikorsky CH-53E Super Stallion, 38, 41, 46, 61, 187

 Sikorsky MH-53E Sea Dragon, 153

Air Force, U.S.

 airborne command and control centers, 81, 150

 assets, early shortages of, 40

 attack on Saddam’s convoy by, 106

 at Battle of al-Khafji, 114–15, 117, 119–20, 262

 casualties and losses, 129, 262

 and Desert Storm, planning of, 68–69

 doctrine conflicts with USMC in air campaign planning, 69–

70, 87–89, 145–46, 147–48

 friendly fire incidents, 87

 Marine liaison officers with, 87, 150

 perspective on Battle of al-Khafji, 134

 postwar studies on JSTARS, 128–29

 reconnaissance, Marine dependence on, 143–44

 uniforms, 275

 views on Gulf War, 222

Air Force Airborne Command and Control Center, 81, 150

Air Force bases

 Langley Air Force Base, VA, 35

 Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, 51

 McDill Air Force Base, FL, 9

Air Force Central Command (AFCENT)

 and air campaign, planning of, 69

 campaign planning cell (the “Black Hole”), 69, 82

 in chain of command, 32, 43

Air Force units

 Tactical Fighter Wings

 1st, 35

 33d, 58th Tactical Fighter Squadron, 78–79

Air support

 Battle of al-Khafji, 113–15, 116–17, 119–21, 126–27, 128–

29, 130–32

 ground campaign

 1st day (24 February), 176–78

 2d day (25 February), 187–88

 3d day (26 February), 197–99, 265

 4th day (27 February), 202–4

Air tasking order (ATO), 69

 and communications, clogging of, 88–89

 for days 1–3 of air war, 77, 82, 83

 Marine concerns about, 79–80, 87–89

 Marines’ opting out of, 89, 90

Air war, 77–92

 17 January (first night), 77–82

 as largest since Vietnam War, 78

 success of, 78

 18 January (second day), 82–83

Index
296 Liberating Kuwait

Air war (continued)

19–27 January, 83–87

 28–31 January, 89–92

 air superiority, achievement of, 77

 civilian casualties in, 147

 commencement of, 77, 261

 crowded skies and, 82

 early objectives of, 77

 first kill since Vietnam War, 79

 friendly fire incidents, 87, 141, 145, 160, 262

 and ground campaign, Marine air sorties in preparation for,

143–49

 control of, 146

 impact of, 148–49

 number of, 146

 reconnaissance limitations and, 143–45, 146

 return of to Marine tasking, 145–46, 147–48

 Iraq as initial focus of, 77

 and Iraqi defenses, inability to shift forces, 154

 Iraqi preparations for, 66

 Iraqi responses to, 87

 and Iraqi retreat from Kuwait, coalition efforts to maximize

destruction during, 195–98, 202, 203–4, 208,

290

 in Kuwait

 impact of, 89–92, 107, 131–32, 143, 148–49

 reconnaissance limitations and, 143–45

 kill boxes, 146

 Marine sorties, 80–82, 83, 89

 number of sorties, 89–90

 sorties from amphibious task force, 149–50

 targets, 77, 84

 Marine sorties, number of, 84, 267

 planning of, 68–70

 and conflicts in USAF and USMC doctrines, 69–70,

87–89, 145–46, 147–48

 Instant Thunder plan, 69

 premission briefings, 85–86

 refueling practices, 85–86

 rescue combat air patrols, 86

 routinization of, 85

 potential danger of, 87

 Saddam’s expectations for, 97

 target classification, 146

 targets in Iraq, 77, 78, 84

 typical mission, described, 86–87

Air War College (Maxwell Air Force Base), 51

al-Ahmadi Province, Kuwait, 7, 25

al-Amarah, Iraq, 281

al-Bakr tanker platform, 25

al-Burqan. See Burqan, Battle of

al-Burqan oil field

 Battle of Burqan and, 178, 181, 182, 185

 Iraqi burning of, 95, 168–69, 169–70, 171, 185

 toxins released by, 185

 and visibility, 178, 181, 183, 184, 191, 265, 266

al-Faw Peninsula, in Iran-Iraq War, 13, 14, 17, 21, 258, 285

Ali, Rashid, 5

Ali Salih as Saadi, 5

al-Jahrah, Kuwait, 150, 186, 263

al-Jarah Province, 7

al-Jathathil, Saudi Arabia, 96, 103

al-Jubayl, Saudi Arabia, 39–40, 42, 45, 46, 48, 147, 215, 259, 261,

262, 276

al-Jubayl Naval Air Facility, 46, 259

al-Khafji, Battle of, 40, 111–34, 262

 29–30 January, night of, 111–23

 30 January, 123–27

 31 January, 129–32

 Air Force perspective on, 134

 Army tractor-trailers captured in, 126

 artillery coordination in, 130

 capture of U.S. prisoners as goal of, 101

 clearing of al-Khafji, 130, 132

 Coalition air support, 113–15, 116–17, 119–21, 126–27, 128–

29, 130–32

 Coalition communications, problems with, 110, 112

 Coalition coordination, problems with, 119

 Coalition counterattack

 air support for, 126–27

 first attack, 127–28, 262

 isolation of Iraqi forces in al-Khafji, 124–25, 128–29,

130

 Saudi insistence on leading, 125–26, 127

 Saudi plan for, 124–25

 Saudi preparations for, 127

 second attack, 130–32, 262

 Coalition dispositions, 102–4

 Coalition failure to detect Iraqi preparations for, 106–8, 116

 Coalition intelligence on, 106

 confusion among Coalition forces, 112, 115

 defense of al-Khafji, complicating factors in, 102

 early Iraqi reconnaissance assault, 107

 exposure of Iraqi units by, 128, 143

 as first major ground combat of war, 96

 friendly fire incidents in, 112–13, 115, 132, 134, 150, 262

 Iraqi attack on al-Khafji, 118–22, 262

 Iraqi attack on Observation Post 1, 116–17

 Iraqi attack on Observation Post 2, 118

 Iraqi attack on Observation Post 4, 111–16, 119, 262

 Iraqi attack on Observation Post 6, 117

 Iraqi attack on Observation Post 7, 118, 121–22

 Iraqi attack on Observation Post 8, 118

 Iraqi casualties and losses, 132

 Iraqi choice of al-Khafji for attack, 98

 Iraqi commandos, Coalition destruction of en route, 110,

121

 Iraqi motives for attack, 96–98

 Iraqi perspective on, 115–16, 122–23, 134

 Iraqi plan for, 96–101

 Iraqi preparations for, 106–7, 261–62

 Iraqi units participating in, 99

 Iraqi withdrawal plans, 122–23, 129

 Kibrit logistics base and, 103

 Marine perspective on, 133–34

 Marine reconnaissance teams in al-Khafji, 123, 125, 127,

128, 129–30

 ordnance cleanup and disposal following, 262

 as proof of Saudi reliability, 133–34

 Saddam’s meeting with commanders prior to, 105–6

 Saudi Arabian and Qatari forces, 123–25

 Saudi Arabia perspective on, 134

 Saudi casualties and losses, 130, 132

 Saudi-Marine relations and, 101

 Saudi reaction to fall of al-Khafji, 123

 tactical air control, performance of, 119–20

 Task Force Cunningham and, 104

 U.S. casualties and losses, 129, 132
Index 297

al-Khafji, Saudi Arabia, 51, 80, 90, 96, 261

 Coalition shelling of, 129–30

 evacuation of, 101

 Iraqi shelling of, 95, 106

 Marine reconnaissance training missions in, 103–4

al-Kut, Iraq, 3

Allison, John M. (Capt), 193–94

al-Majarr, Iraq, 281

al-Manaqish, Saudi Arabia, 51, 99, 157

Almanza, Michael V. (SSgt), 141

al-Maqwa, Kuwait, 106, 262

Almiki, Abbud Gambar Hasen (BGen, Iraq), 212

Al-Mutanabbi (Iraqi ship), 45, 260

al-Mutla police post, capture of, 196

al-Qadisiyah, Battle of (637 AD), 1

Al Sahil Al Arabi (Iraqi ship), 45, 260

al-Thal, Kuwait, 107

al-Wafrah, 154

al-Wafrah Forest, 153, 212

al-Wafrah oil fields, 103, 137, 139, 176, 262

 Iraqi sabotage of, 95

al-Zabr, Saudi Arabia, 111–16

Amarah, Iraq, 287

Amidon, Kenneth W. (Capt), 157

Amos, Granville R. (BGen), 57, 84, 222, 244

Amphibious doctrine, chain of command under, 42–43

Amphibious Task Force

 air assets, transfer of to ground campaign support, 197

 Central Command representation for, 75

 command of, 43, 75

 components of, 40–43, 45, 63–64

 departure from theater, 215–16

 in Desert Storm plan, 70, 72, 75, 135, 137

 exercises, 44, 55–56, 57, 93–95

 Gen Gray’s concerns about use of, 75

 Iraqi mines and, 137, 153

 Kuwaiti islands, amphibious raids on, 110, 212–13

 Marine air sorties, 149–50

 mission of, 43–44, 45, 57–58, 94, 135, 137

 Navy Unit Commendation, 268

 Operation Desert Sting, 110

 role of as threatening force, 44, 72, 110, 137, 142, 151–53,

176, 187, 198, 207, 222, 267, 268

 Iraqi views on, 66, 154

 size of, 64, 268

 transfer of elements to Desert Storm ground offensive, 137

 and U.S. Somalian embassy, evacuation of, 94

Amuriya (Iraqi ship), 46, 260

Anchorage (LSD 36), 63

Anderson, Gregory D. (1stLt), 82

Andre, Gerald W. (Sgt), 27n

an-Nasiriyah, Iraq, 78, 163

an-Nuayriyah, Saudi Arabia, 47

Antosh, Steven J. (Maj), 245

Applegate, Michael F. (Maj), 40

Arab Conquest, 1

Arabian Peninsula, history of Islam in, 1

Arab-Israeli conflict, history of, 7

Arab League, response to Kuwait invasion, 30

Arab nationalism, history of, 5

Arab nations. See also Gulf states; specific nations

 armed forces of

 in Coalition command structure, 51

 in Desert Storm plan, 72

 structure of, 51

 and Desert Shield, 47

 leadership of, struggle over, 30

 responses to Kuwait invasion, 29–30

Arabs

 tribal culture of, 1

 unification of, as goal of Saddam Hussein, 19–20

 uprising against U.S. influence, Saddam Hussein expectations for, 20

Arafat, Yasser, 20

Arif, Abd ar Rahman, 5, 6

Arif, Abd as Salaam, 5

Armed Forces Policy Council, 37

Armor, Marine Corps

 AAV-7 amphibious assault vehicle, 67, 165

 D7-G dozer, 172

 General Dynamics LAV-25 (light armored vehicle), 67, 95,

109, 112, 114–15, 132, 142, 168, 183

 command variant, 186–87

 effectiveness of, 133, 222–23

 General Dynamics LAV-AT (antitank light armored vehicle),

109–10, 112–13, 115, 117, 132

 General Dynamics LAV-M (light armored vehicle with mortar), 117

 M1A1 Abrams main battle tank, 67, 181

 M60A1 Patton main battle tank, 10, 67, 165, 171, 194

Armstrong, Ronald J. (LtCol), 246, 249

Army, U.S.

 casualties and losses, 175, 196

 light infantry forces, rapid deployment of, 35

 and Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, command of, 8,

9

 uniforms, 275

 views on Gulf War, 222

Army commands and units [in descending order]

 command units

 Army Central Command (ARCENT), 32, 43, 74, 206,

260

 forces

 Special Forces, 15, 52, 102, 121, 123, 200

 corps

 Airborne Corps, 47, 72, 163, 178, 189, 200

 VII Corps, 72, 163, 178, 189, 200

 divisions

 Airborne Divisions

 82d, 40, 47, 48, 163

 2d Brigade, 35

 101st (Air Assault), 47–48, 163

 Armored Divisions

 1st, 163

 2d, 1st (Tiger) Brigade, 75, 135, 172, 174, 175,

185, 195–97, 197–98, 217, 243,

260, 261, 263

 3d, 163

 Cavalry Division, 1st, 47, 48, 163

 Infantry Divisions

 1st (Mechanized), 163

 24th (Mechanized), 47, 48, 163, 178, 189, 200,

212

 brigades

 Military Police Brigade, 800th, 206

 groups

 Special Plans Group (“Jedi Knights”), 70–72, 72–73

 
298 Liberating Kuwait

Army commands and units (continued) 

regiments

 Air Defense Artillery, 5th, 244

 Armored Cavalry Regiment, 2d, 189

 Armored Regiments, 67th

 1st Battalion, 243

 3d Battalion, 195, 244

 Field Artillery Regiments

 3d, 1st Battalion, 244

 92d, Battery A, 96, 172

 Infantry Regiments, 41st (Mechanized), 3d Battalion,

244

 battalions

 Forward Support Battalion, 502d, 244

 Signal Battalions, 142d, 244

 companies

 Transportation Company, 233d, 126

Army schools, School of Advanced Military Studies, 70

Arnot, Malcolm (LtCol), 249

Arthur, Stanley A. (VAdm, USN), 75, 89, 137, 153, 176

Artillery, U.S.

 25mm cannon, 96, 109, 110, 113

 in Battle of Burqan, 181, 184, 185

 battleship 16-inch guns, 141–42, 153, 176, 187

 M109A1 and M109A3 155mm self-propelled howitzers, 96,

141

 M110A2 8-inch self-propelled howitzers, 96, 141

 M198 155mm howitzers, 96, 184

 M252 81mm mortar, 117, 158, 191

 misfires, casualties from, 175

 raids into Kuwait, 95–96, 106, 141–43, 153–54, 261, 262

Ash Shu’aybah, Kuwait, 135, 137, 187

as Said, Nuri, 5

As Salam, Kuwait, 163

as-Sulayb, Iraq, 281

Assyrians, 1

‘Ath Thawra al Iraqiyya al Kubra, 4

ATO. See Air tasking order

Aurora T (leased ship), 42, 45

Austro-Hungarian Empire, 3

Awards and citations

 Bronze Stars, 172–73, 215

 Distinguished Flying Crosses, 17, 78, 82, 157, 215

 LtGen Boomer’s guidelines on, 214–15

 Navy Crosses, 198, 215, 265, 266

 Navy Unit Commendations, 266, 268

 Silver Stars, 157, 159–60, 164, 171, 172, 173, 180–81, 182,

184, 186, 188, 215

Az Zwar, 150, 198–99

B., Imad (Maj, Iraq), 148–49

Baath (Renaissance) Party

 in Egypt, 30

 ideology of, 5

 in Iraq

 headquarters, as target, 78

 rise of, 5–6

 and Saddam’s opposition to oil-rich Gulf states, 30

 Saudi opposition to Iraq and, 49

 in Syria, 5, 30

Babylonians, 1

Baczowski, Daniel K. (Capt), 123

Baghdad

 Coalition bombing of, 147

 history of, 2

 infrastructure, 3

 in Iran-Iraq War, 287

 public opinion on war in, 288

 U.S. embassy

 detention of U.S. personnel in, 27

 evacuation of Kuwait embassy staff to, 29, 259

 evacuation of nonessential staff, 27

 Marines in, 25–27

Bahais, in Iran-Iraq War, 284, 286

Bahraini Army, infantry companies, 176

Bahrain International Airport, 45–46

Bangladesh, Cyclone Marian and, 216–17

Barbey (FF 1088), 35

Barbour County (LST 1195), 63

Barker, Michael D. (Capt, USN), 64, 216

Barna, Tom D. (Capt), 247

Barrow, Robert H. (Gen), 8, 37

Barry, Richard M. (LtCol), 80–81, 106, 107, 119

Bartch, Richard O., Jr. (Capt), 249

Bartzer, Richard K. (LtCol), 246

Bases, Marine. See also Marine air bases

 Camp Lejeune, NC, 41

 Khanjar Combat Service Support Area 2, 139–41, 199, 204,

206, 262

 Kibrit Combat Service Support Area 1, 62, 93, 103, 120, 139,

140, 199, 204–6, 263

 Quantico, VA, 27

Basrah, 1st Battle of, 11, 257

Basrah, 2d Battle of, 13, 257

Basrah, Iraq

 air defenses in, 288

 in Gulf War, 66, 72, 74, 83, 105, 188, 200, 261

 infrastructure, 3, 105

 in Iran-Iraq War, 11, 13, 99, 257

 as Ottoman province, 3

 uprising against Saddam, 219

 U.S. observer in, during Iran-Iraq War, 281

Basrah oil field, U.S. attacks on, 78

Bassro Polar (leased ship), 42, 45

Bates, Richard W. (LtCol), 245

Bazzaz, Abd ar Rahman, 5–6

Beaufait, Donald A. (Col), 85

Beinhart, Ernest G., III (LtCol), 246

Bench, Johnny, 60

Benes, Thomas A. (LtCol), 245

Benz, Kurt H. (Cpl), 145

Berlin Wall, fall of, 19

Berry, Douglas E. (SgtMaj), 249

Berryman, Michael C. (Capt), 89, 218, 261, 264

Billière, Peter Edgar de la Cour de la (LtGen, Great Britain), 73–

74

Bioty, John R., Jr. (Col), 46, 80, 83, 146, 222, 245

Bley, John C., II (Capt), 106, 108, 124

Blose, Robert W., Jr. (LtCol), 242

Blot, Harold W. (BGen), 244

Blue Ridge (LCC 19), 137

Blystone, James J. “Jim,” 27

Bode, Kenneth (Maj), 204

Boling, Harold S. (LCpl), 123

Bombs, U.S., laser-guided GBU-10 2,000-pound, 89
Index 299

Boomer, Walter E. (LtGen)

 on air campaign, 69–70, 90

 and air support, 197

 on Battle of al-Khafji, 123, 127, 134

 and British armor, in Desert Storm planning, 72, 74

 career of, 33

 and chain of command, 43, 45, 47, 62, 75, 76, 259

 as commander I MEF, 33, 241

 departure from theater, 215

 and friendly fire incidents, 87, 132, 134, 150

 and ground campaign

 deception actions prior to, 153

 message to Marines prior to commencement of, 162

 planning of, 71–72

 and Highway of Death, views on, 203–4

 and Iraqi artillery, concerns about, 146

 on Iraqi military

 as hollow force, 134

 responses to preparatory probing attacks, 158

 and Iraqi prisoners, 142

 on junior Marines, contributions of, 223–24

 and Kibrit logistical base, location of, 103

 and Kuwait City, liberation of, 207

 and Kuwait invasion, first news of, 33–34

 on light armored vehicles, effectiveness of, 222–23

 and Marine air targeting, 77

 as Marine operational commander, Gulf War, 33

 and Marine uniforms, 271, 274, 277, 278

 mobile command post, advance into Kuwait in, 186–87,

197

 and psychological warfare operations, 153

 and rear area security, 62

 staff of, 55

 on troops in Saudi Arabia, restrictions on, 50

 and two breach attack plan, 135–39

 on U.S. embassy in Kuwait, recapture of, 200

 on withdrawal of U.S. forces, 214

Boros, Louis L. (LtCol), 246

Boudreaux, Al C. (Col), 245

Bowman, Steven K. (LtCol), 245

Bozelli, Robert J. (Maj), 246

Brabham, James A., Jr. (BGen), 46–47, 62, 139, 206, 223, 246,

260

Braden, James R. (Capt), 104, 119, 124, 125

Brazen (F91) [British ship], 110, 121

Breeden, Gary C. (Cdr, USN), 247

Bridgetown (Kuwaiti tanker), 15

Brock, Michael V. (Col), 47, 241

Brooks, Dennis M. (RAdm, USN), 15

Brown, Harold, 8, 37

Brown, Jeffery D. (Cpl), 123, 130

Brown, Ross A. (Col), 242

Brown, William G. (LCdr, USN), 247

Brueland, Lowell K. (Maj), 247

Brunhofer, Robert A. (Capt, USN), 247

Brunn, Bruce E. (LtCol), 241

Bubiyan Island, 21, 198

Bull, Gerald V., 19

Bullen, Michael M. (LtCol), 248

Burgess, Duncan H. (LtCol), 150

Burgess, Glenn F. (Col), 41, 249

Burke, Adrian W. (Capt), 246, 248

Burke, Delta, 59

Burke, J. D. (LtCol), 247

Burqan, Battle of, 178–85, 263

 1st Marine Division headquarters

 attacks on, 183–85, 266

 security force for, 178–80

 Coalition air support, 184

 Iraqi counterattack plan, 178

 Iraqi perspective on, 182–83, 185

 Marine anticipation of counterattack, 178–80

 “Reveille Counterattack,” 180

Bush, Barbara P., 58, 260

Bush, George H. W.

 cease-fire, announcement of, 209

 and Combined Task Force Provide Comfort, 220

 and Congressional authorization for war, 77

 and Desert Storm planning, 71

 and ejection of Iraq, decision to undertake, 55, 62, 64, 72, 260

 Marine Reserves, mobilization of, 259

 response to Kuwait invasion, 29, 31, 258

 Thanksgiving 1990 visit to Kuwait, 58, 260

 ultimatum to Iraq, 58

Byzantine Empire, 1

Callahan, Kevin (HM, USN), 123

Camp David Accords, Saddam’s denunciation of, 30

Can, William D., Jr. (Col), 84

Cantu, William V. (LtCol), 249

Cape Domingo (T-AKR 5053), 42

Cape Girardeau (T-AK 2039), 63

Cardi, Cesare (LtCol), 174, 244

Cardiff (D108) [British ship], 110, 121

Carter, James E. “Jimmy,” Jr., 7

Carter Doctrine, 8

Carver, P. C. (Cpl), 25n

Cash, Steven J. (Maj), 250

Cassady, John M. (LtCol), 246

Cavallaro, Michael D. (LtCol), 244

Cayuga (LST 1186), 40

Cease-fire, 209–11

 announcements of, 209, 210, 263

 and Iraqi dead, burial of, 211

 and Iraqi-held prisoners, return of, 218

 and Iraqi insistence on right to fly helicopters, 213, 219

 Iraqi units unaware of, 211–12

 Iraqi views on, 134, 222

 lack of peace agreement following, 213

 negotiations, at Safway, Iraq, 213, 218, 263

 ordnance disposal work following, 211

Celestine, Joseph I. (SgtMaj), 249

“Cement Factory Ridge” (Saudi Arabia), 40, 48, 52

Central Command, U.S.

 and chain of command, 32, 43

 command of, 9, 32

 departure of U.S. forces and, 215–16

 and Desert Storm, planning of, 69

 directive on individual styling of desert hat, 274–75

 establishment of, 9–10, 257

 General Order Number One, 50

 and Iraqi military, overestimation of, 134

 and Iraqi prisoners, management of, 199

 and Joint Task Force Southwest Asia, 220–21

 and Kuwait invasion, intelligence on, 22, 29

 Marine representation at, 75
300 Liberating Kuwait

Central Command, U.S. (continued)

 and Operation Earnest Will, 15, 258

 and Operation Imminent Thunder, 55

 Operation Plan 1002-90, 22

 relations with Middle Eastern nations, establishment of, 10

 staff, uniforms, 276, 277

Central Treaty Organization, 7

Chamberlain, Charles W. (SgtMaj), 242

Chamberlain, Ronald A. (SgtMaj), 243

Chandler (DDG 996), 15

Chemical suits, 172, 277

Cheney, Richard B. “Dick,” 32, 33

Chessum, James P. (LtCol), 246

Childers, Carroll D., 150

Christmas, celebration of in 1990, 58–59

Churchill, Winston, 6

Clarey, Stephen S. (RAdm, USN), 63

Clark, Jackie K. (LtCol), 249

Clauer, John A. (LtCol), 250

Coalition. See also specific topics

 air attacks, Iraqi preparations for, 66

 assembly of forces, 30, 60–64

 Combined Task Force Provide Comfort, 220

 diplomacy by

 for release of Iraqi hostages, 55, 259

 for withdrawal from Kuwait, 55, 58, 77

 military response, Iraqi expectations for, 64–65, 65–66, 68

 Saddam’s expectations for collapse of, 55, 64, 65, 68, 101

 strategy, Iraqi military on, 97–98

Cobb, Henry C., Jr. (LtCol, USA), 244

Cochran, Paul S. (GySgt), 166

Cold War

 Iraq War and, 1, 29

 and Marine role, 8

 and Middle East tensions, 19

 and U.S. Middle East policy, 7, 8

Collenborne, Gary W. (LtCol), 248

Collins, James M., II (LtCol), 244

Collins, Timothy W. (Cpl), 160

Combined operations

 definition of, 55n

 exercises to test, 55

Combined Task Force Provide Comfort, 220

Commiskey, Henry A., Jr. (LtCol), 245

Communications

 air tasking order and, 88–89

 failures of, in Battle of al-Khafji, 110, 112

 radio problems

 and close air support in Kuwait, 82

 Iraqi jamming, 112

Congress, U.S., authorization for war, 77, 261

Connor, Michael R. Sr. (SSgt), 96

Conroy, George M. (LtCol), 247

Conry, Kevin A. (LtCol), 243

Conway, James T. (LtCol), 249

Coop, Robert W. (Col), 244, 246

Cooper, Alan L., Jr. (LCpl), 123

Corbett, James T. (Cdr, USN), 248

Cordingley, Patrick Anthony John (Brig, Great Britain), 47, 72,

74

Cortez, Christopher (LtCol), 165, 242

Coughlin, Sean T. (1stLt), 211

Coulter, Allen (Maj), 246, 247

Counselman, John D. (LtCol), 242

Cpl Louis J. Hauge, Jr. (T-AK 3000), 39

Craft, Gary M. (Cdr, USN), 248

Crist, George B. (Gen), 9–10, 15, 32, 257

Cronin, William D., Jr. (Capt), 44

Cudjoe, G. E. (SSgt), 25n

Culp, Mart J., 172–73

Cummings, Waldo B., Jr. (LtCol), 78, 245

Cureton, Charles H. (LtCol), 164–65, 166, 171, 193–94

Curtiss (T-AVB 4), 39, 147

Curts (FFG 38), 110

Cyclone Marian, 216–17

Dachman, Nello E. (Capt), 248

Dake, Terrance R. (Col), 244

Damascus, history of, 2

Damura, Ronald M. (Col), 244

David R. Ray (DD 971), 35

Dawson, Ray C. (LtCol), 243

Dayrit, Carlos (HM, USN), 123

Deckert, Paul B. (1stLt), 130

Deist, David W. (Capt), 78

Della-Corte, Joseph (Col), 246

DeMars, Melvin W., Jr. (Col), 84

Denver (LPD 9), 63, 64, 216

Department of Defense, U.S. See also Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986

 Cold War strategy of, 8

 Office of Program Manager for the Modernization of the

Saudi Arabian National Guard, 51, 126

Deployment to Saudi Arabia. See also Maritime Prepositioning

Ship Squadrons

 Amphibious Task Force, 40–45

 billeting in, 39

 cultural differences and, 49–50

 efforts to minimize impact on Saudis, 39, 49–50

 1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade, 45

 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, 45–47

 first U.S. forces in, 35

 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, 41–42, 43

 Marine arrival in, experience of, 38–39

 Marine deployments, 34–47

 maritime prepositioning and, 36–37

 restrictions on U.S. troops, 50

 Saudi agreement to, 30, 258

 Saudi image and, 49

 7th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, 37–40, 45

 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit, 40–41, 43

 unit cohesion and, 45

Deptula, David A. (LtCol, USAF), 69, 88

Desert Shield, 35–54. See also Deployment to Saudi Arabia

 and Interservice competition, 43

 liaisons with Saudi forces, 52–54

 planned defense of Saudi Arabia, 47–48, 57

 Saudi forces, 50–54

 success of, 55, 224

 as test of Marine Corps capability, 36

 uses of Marine Corps in, 43–44

Desert Storm. See also Air war; Cease-fire; Ground campaign;

other specific topics

 commencement of, 77, 261

 planning of

 air campaign, 68–70
Index 301

 and conflicts in USAF and USMC doctrines, 69–

70, 87–89, 145–46, 147–48

 Instant Thunder plan, 69

 British armor and, 72–73

 ground campaign, 70–72, 153

 initial one corps plan, 66, 70–72, 135

 Marine role and, 71–72

 two corps plan, 72, 135–39

 as successful Marine operation, 224

Diego Garcia Naval Base, 15, 36, 39, 259

Diggs, Alphonso B., Jr. (LtCol), 165–66, 168, 242

Dillard, Mark V. (Capt), 124, 127

Dillon, Gary S. (Capt), 44

Diplomacy, Coalition

 for release of Iraqi hostages, 55, 259

 for withdrawal from Kuwait, 55, 58, 77

Diplomacy, Iraqi

 goals of, 55

 and Iran, efforts to reconcile with after Kuwait invasion, 30

 responses to demands for withdrawal from Kuwait, 55, 77

 responses to global opposition to Kuwait invasion, 30–31

Direct air support center, conflicts with Marine air command, 84–

85

Dolvin, Kevin R. (Capt), 44

Donnelly, Thomas P., Jr. (Col), 62, 248

Doyle, James J., Jr. (Col), 41, 94, 249

Doyle, John R. (Cdr, USN), 140, 248

Draeger, Rhory R. (Capt, USAF), 79

Draude, Thomas V. (BGen), 52, 53, 59–60, 101, 153, 166, 184,

241

Druze, 290

Dudley, Andrew S., Jr. (LtCol), 245

Duer, Les (Maj), 244

Dunn, James M. (LtCol), 250

Durham (LKA 114), 40

Duri, Izzat Ibrahim al-, 21

Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69), 35

Dyck, Brian E. (LtCol), 244, 246

Edwards, Jonathan R. (Capt), 145, 262

Egypt

 and Arab leadership, struggle over, 30

 Baath Party in, 30

 and Camp David Accords, 30

 exercises in, 10

 history of Islam in, 1

 and Six-Day War (1967), 10

Egyptian military, in Desert Storm, 51, 72, 163, 185, 201, 207

Ehlert, Norman E. (MajGen), 215, 241

Eisenhower, Dwight D., 7

Eluk, Ronald S. (LtCol), 243

Embargo of Iraq

 effect of in Iraq, 288

 enforcement of, 45, 57–58, 260

 UN imposition of, 30, 45

Embassies, U.S.

 in Baghdad

 detention of U.S. personnel in, 27

 evacuation of Kuwait embassy staff to, 29, 259

 evacuation of nonessential staff, 27

 Marines in, 25–27

 classified documents, destruction of, 25, 27–28

 in Iran, U.S. hostage crisis in, 8, 10

 and chain of command reforms, 31–32

 and Maritime Prepositioning program, 37

 rescue attempt, 8, 31

 in Kuwait City

 evacuation of, 29, 259

 Marines in, 27–29

 retaking of, 29, 207

“Emir’s Farm,” 168

England (CG 22), 35

Enterprise (CVN 65), 17, 221

Ethiopia, contingency planning for, 216

European Command, U.S.

 and Central Command, cooperation with, 9

 and chain of command, 32

Evans, Harold W., III (LtCol), 243

Exercises

 Bold Guard 90, 41

 Bright Star, 10

 Gallant Eagle, 10

 Internal Look 90, 22

 Sea Soldier III, 57

 Sea Soldier I–II, 44

 Sea Soldier IV, 93–95

 Teamwork, 41

 to test joint and combined operations, 55

Faisal, Prince, 4

Faisal II (King of Iraq), 5

Fallon, Michael O. (LtCol), 171, 242

Farsi Island, 15

Faylakah Island, 24, 25, 65, 198–99, 212–13, 264

Feeley, John F., Jr. (Maj, USA), 27, 28

Feldman, Kerry K. (Capt), 246

Felix, Elisco C. (LCpl), 141, 262

Fick, George S. (LtCol), 246

Fields, Arnold (LtCol), 243

Firmi, Turki al- (Col, Saudi Arabia), 124, 125, 127, 130

1stLt Alexander Bonnyman, Jr. (T-AK 3003), 39, 45

Fish Lake, Iraq, 281, 285

Fitzgerald, Jerry W. (LtCol), 249

Fitzwater, Richard B. (Capt), 249

Flaherty, Thomas A. (LtCol), 47, 241

Fleet Marine Force Manual 1, Warfighting (FMFM1), 33

Fletcher, Morris O. (Col), 243

Flickertail State (T-ACS 5), 63

Flinn, George W. (LtCol), 250

Flores, Samuel L., Jr. (Maj), 244

FMFM1. See Fleet Marine Force Manual 1, Warfighting

Fogarty, William P. (Cdr, USN), 248

Forbush, Melvin W. (LtCol), 250

Ford, Gerald R., 32

Foreign nationals

 Iraqi detention of, after Kuwait invasion, 30–31, 55, 101,

259

 use of as human shields, 31

Forney, William A. (Col), 84, 244

Forrester, Robert A. (LtCol), 245

Fort McHenry (LSD 43), 40

France

 history in Middle East, 7

 Iraqi diplomacy and, 55
302 Liberating Kuwait

France (continued)

 military

 Light Armored Division, 6th, 163

 and Operation Provide Comfort, 220

 response to Kuwait invasion, 29

Franks, Frederick M., Jr. (LtGen, USA), 163

Frazier, C., Jr. (Capt), 247

Frederick (LST 1184), 63

Freeman, Bryan R. (Cpl), 184

Frerker, Terry J. (LtCol), 120, 245

Fulford, Carlton W., Jr. (Col), 38, 40, 45, 164, 168, 242

Fulks, James A. (Col), 156, 158, 159, 163, 242

Gangle, Randolph A. (Col), 63, 64, 176, 250

Gardner, Emerson N., Jr. (LtCol), 245

Garner, Robert J. (Col), 64, 216, 249

Garrett, John C. (LtCol), 242

Garrett, Larry T. (Col), 46, 245

Garrett, Leslie E. (Maj), 249

Garvin, John R (LtCol), 246

Garza, Arthur O. (LCpl), 96

General Alfred M. Gray Marine Corps Research Center, 215

The Generals’ War (Gordon and Trainor), 32n

Gentil, Mark S. (Capt), 124, 127

Germann, George E. (Col), 62, 248

Germantown (LSD 42), 63, 64, 216

Germany, in World War I, 3

Ghazi, Prince, 4

Gido, Paul A. (LtCol), 250

Glaspie, April C., 21, 25

Glosson, Buster C. (BGen, USAF), 69, 119

Gloucester (D96) [British ship], 110, 121

Gobeli, Eugene L. (Col), 249

Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act

of 1986, 9, 9n

 and chain of command, reorganization of, 31–33

 and joint force air component commander, 69–70

Gombar, Bruce A. (LtCol), 173, 243

Gonsalves, James D. (2dLt), 169

Goodman, John F. (LtCol), 150

Gordon, Michael R., 32n

Goza, Joel L. (LtCol), 242

Grady, Robert M. (LCpl), 157

Gray, Alfred M., Jr. (Gen), 33, 36, 64, 75

Great Britain

 British aircraft

 Panavia Tornado GR.l, 78

 SEPECAT GR-1A Jaguar, 110, 121

 Westland HMA.8 Lynx, 110, 121

 British armor

 FV3040/4 Challenger main battle tank, 47, 73

 British Army forces

 Armored Brigades, 7th, 47, 72

 Armored Division, 1st, 73–74, 163, 189, 200, 260

 in Desert Storm planning, 72–74

 and Operation Desert Fox, 221

 and Operation Provide Comfort, 220

 views on Marines, 73–74

 history in Iraq, 3–5, 6

 history in Kuwait, 6

 history in Middle East, 7

 and Iraqi chemical weapons, 19

 response to Kuwait invasion, 29

 Royal Air Force attack on Iraqi fast patrol boats, 110, 121

 Royal Navy Air attack on Iraqi fast patrol boats, 110, 121

Great Iraqi Revolution, 4

Greene, Dennis M. (Capt), 116–17

Gregor, Christopher J. (LtCol), 243

Gregory, Gordon T. (Sgt), 164

Grenada, U.S. invasion of, 31, 32

Grimes, Kenneth (Capt), 250

Ground campaign. See also al-Khafji, Battle of

 1st day (24 February)

 air operations, 176–78

 breaching of Saddam Line, 263

 by 1st Marine Division, 163–71, 174–75

 by 2d Marine Division, 172–75

 by Joint Forces Command–East, 175–76

 2d day (25 February), 178–88

 air operations, 187–88

 and al-Burqan oil field, necessity of clearing, 185

 Battle of Burqan, 178–85, 263

 1st Division headquarters

 attacks on, 178–80, 183–85, 266

 security force for, 178–80

 Coalition air support, 184

 Iraqi counterattack plan, 178

 Iraqi perspective on, 182–83, 185

 Marine anticipation of counterattack, 178–80,

182

 “Reveille Counterattack,” 180

 “Ice Cube Tray” and “Ice Cube,” taking of, 185–87,

263

 3d day (26 February), 189–200

 air operations, 197–99, 265

 al-Mutla police post, capture of, 196

 Battle of 73 Easting, 189

 difficulty distinguishing functioning vs. nonfunctioning Iraqi armor, 189, 191

 Kuwait International Airport, surrounding of by Coalition forces, 189–95

 Mutla Ridge, retaking of, 195–97

 4th day (27 February), 200–208

 air operations, 202–4

 Kuwait International Airport, recapture of, 200–202

 Iraqi efforts to provoke, 95, 97–98, 105. See also al-Khafji,

Battle of

 Iraqi intelligence on, 187–88

 Iraqi perspective on, 188

 and Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, 188

 major maneuver commands in, 163

 planning of, 70–72, 153

 initial one corps plan, 66, 70–72, 135

 Marine role and, 71–72

 two corps plan, 72, 135–39

 post-cease-fire clearing operations, 212–13

 preparation for

 amphibious landing exercises, 44, 55–56, 57, 93–95

 artillery raids, 141–43

 battles of 19–23 February, 154–62

 Iraqi reports on, 157, 158

 building of offensive capability, 60–64

 feints and deceptions, 150, 153–54

 logistics and, 139–41

 Marine air sorties, 143–49

 control of, 146
Index 303

 impact of, 148–49

 number of, 146

 reconnaissance limitations and, 143–45, 146

 return of to Marine tasking, 145–46, 147–48

 probing attacks and reconnaissance, 154–62, 262–63,

267

 psychological warfare campaign, 150–53

 Saddam on, 178

Grow, Charles G. (Sgt), 163

Grubb, William C., Jr. (LtCol), 130

Guadalcanal (LPH 7), 15, 258

Guam (LPH 9), 42, 94, 260

Guilliams, Ronald G. (LtCol), 248

Gulf states. See also Arab nations

 oil-rich, Saddam’s verbal attacks on, 30

 responses to Kuwait invasion, 29–30

 support of Iraq in Iran-Iraq War, 14, 19

 U.S. aid to, for port and airfield improvements, 37

Gulf War. See also Air war; Coalition; Ground campaign; other

specific topics

 casualties in, 221

 Iraqi Army studies on, 222

 as largest since Vietnam War, 1

 Saddam’s expectations for outcome of, 21, 68

 Saddam’s views on outcome of, 221–22

 U.S. military’s views on, 222–24

Gunston Hall (LSD 44), 42

Haddad, Albert G., Jr. (Cpl), 145

Haifa, Israel, 82

Hall, Marvin D. “Sam” (LtCol), 177, 245

Hamdani, Ra’ad (BGen, Iraq), 22, 78

Hammond, Randall W. (Capt), 120–21

Hampton, Thomas E. (Col), 47, 62, 247

Hancock, Ben D. (Maj), 202–3

Hannigan, Timothy J. (LtCol), 159, 242

Hanson, Stephen D. (LtCol), 246

Harvey, Elliot E. (SgtMaj), 249

Hasan al-Bakr, Ahmad, 6

Hashemite family, 4

Hashem Sultan (Gen, Iraq), 105

Hassan, Gha’ib (RAdm, Iraq), 23–24

Hastings, Eric E. (Col), 241

Hawthorne, James D. (Sgt), 202

Hayden, Henry T. (LtCol), 47, 247

Head, James W. (LtCol), 248

Hearney, Richard D. (MajGen), 241

Hearnsberger, Brian J. (Capt), 93

Heikal, Mohamed, 49

Hendrickson, Gene D. (Col), 150

Hercules (barge), 15

Herman, Theodore N. (LtCol), 245

Herr, David R., Jr. (Capt), 145

Hill, Kenneth W. (Capt), 17

Hill, Kenneth W. (LtCol), 249

Hill, Robert G. (Col), 241

Hill 191, 164

Hilton, Marlin D. (Col), 247

Himes, Timothy J. (LtCol), 246

Hoage, Adam T. (PFC), 158–59

Hoar, Joseph P.

 on Marine logistics, 37–38

 on prepositioned ships, deployment of, 36–37

Hobbs, Thomas A. (Col), 41, 249

Hodory, Richard W. (Col), 170, 181, 182, 242

Holbrook, Clifford C. (Maj), 246

Holcomb, Keith T. (LtCol), 156–57, 244

Holdstein, John D. (LtCol), 250

Holzbauer, Joseph R. (Col), 242

Hope, Bob, 59–60

Hope, Delores, 59, 60

Hopkins, John I. (MajGen), 37, 40, 45, 241, 259

Hornberger, Stephen G. (LtCol), 246

Horne, William J. (LtCol), 245

Horner, Charles A. (LtGen, USAF), 69, 89, 119–20, 126, 147

Hornets Over Kuwait (Stout), 77, 82

Hospital, at Khanjar, Saudi Arabia, 140

Howard, Patrick G. (Col), 45, 242

Howell, Cass D. (LtCol), 244

Huddleston, Craig S. (Maj), 126

Hudson, David K. (Sgt), 27n, 29

Hughes, Edward L (Capt, USA), 96

Hughes, Philip E. (LtCol), 243

Hulagu Khan, 2

Hully, John J. (Col), 246

Humble, Jerome D. (LtCol), 242

Hunter, Guy L., Jr. (CWO-4), 83, 218, 261, 264

Hurley, William J. (Capt), 44

Husayn, al-, 1

ibn Abi Sufyan, Muawiyah, 1

ibn Abi Talib, Ali, 1

ibn Affan, Uthman, 1

ibn al-Khattab, Umar, 1

Ibn Khaldoon (Iraqi ship), 58, 260

Ibn Saud, 50

Ibrahim ad Daud, 6

Ikhwan (tribal militia), 50

Independence (CV 62), 35

Indian Ocean, history of U.S. involvement in, 7

Ing, Gary R. (Maj), 241

Ingraham, Charles H., III (Cpl), 123, 129

Instant Thunder plan, 69

Intelligence, Iraqi

 accuracy of, 66, 70–71

 on Coalition ground attack plans, 154, 187–88

Intelligence, U.S.

 on Battle of al-Khafji, 106

 on Iraqi military, 72, 281–91

 on Kuwait invasion, 22, 29

 Kuwaiti resistance as source of, 89, 136

 mass defection, false rumors of, 95

 observation posts and, 102

Interservice competition, Desert Shield and, 43

Iran. See also Iran-Iraq War

 ambitions as regional power, 7

 and Central Treaty Organization, 7

 Iraq’s efforts to reconcile with, after Kuwait invasion, 30

 and postwar Middle East, 213

 Revolution (1979), 7, 8, 10

 tensions with Iraq, history of, 5, 6

 as threat to Iraq during Gulf War, 290

 as threat to U.S. naval forces, 43

 as traditional Arab foe, 19
304 Liberating Kuwait

Iran (continued)

 U.S. aid to, 7

 U.S. hostage crisis in, 8, 10, 257

 and chain of command reforms, 31–32

 and Maritime Prepositioning program, 37

 rescue attempt, 8, 31

 and U.S. Middle East policy, 7

Iran Air Flight 655, 17, 258

Iran Ajr (Iranian minelaying ship), 15, 258

Iran-Contra scandal, 19–20

Iranian Air Force

 in Iran-Iraq War, 10, 12, 15

 U.S. arms embargo and, 12

Iranian armor

 FV 4201 Chieftain Mark V main battle tank, 10

 M60A1 Patton main battle tank, 10

Iranian Army, 16th Armored Division, 10

Iranian missiles

 HY-2 Hai Ying “Silkworm” antiship missile, 14

 Scuds, 287

Iranian naval mines, 15

Iranian Navy

 Combattante II fast-attack ship, 17

 frigates, 17

 in Iran-Iraq War, 15–17, 258

 small craft, 15, 16

Iran-Iraq War, 10–18, 257–58

 air war, 12, 257

 Arab support for Iraq in, 14, 19

 Cobla 5/6 Offensive, 281

 end of, 17, 258

 ground war, 10–12, 13–14, 17, 257, 258

 initial Iraqi invasion, 10, 257

 Iran Air Flight 655, U.S. downing of, 17, 258

 Iranian counterattacks, 10–11, 257, 281

 Iranian Scud attacks, 287

 Iranian tactics, 284

 Iraqi air defenses, 12

 Iraqi Army image after, 18, 19, 21, 31

 Iraqi attacks on cities, 12, 14, 17, 258

 Iraqi attacks on oil assets, 12–13, 14

 Iraqi chemical weapons in, 11, 13

 Iraqi debt following, 19

 and Iraqi expectations for Coalition attacks, 64, 65, 105, 288

 Iraqi fear of political consequences of excessive casualties,

287

 Iraqi fortifications in, 11, 285–87, 291

 and Iraqi military reforms, 11–12, 282

 Iraqi position following, 18

 Iraqi rotation of brigades during, 282

 Iraqi soldiers’ fear of Iranians, 284

 Iraqi tactics in, 286–87, 288

 Kuwait and, 14–15

 POWs in, 290

 Tanker War, 10n, 14–17, 258

 U.S. intelligence on, 281–91

 U.S. observer within Iraqi Army during, 281

Iraq

 and Arab leadership, struggle over, 30

 and Central Treaty Organization, 7

 constitutional monarchy in, 4–5

 debt following Iran-Iraq War, 19

 difficult geopolitical position of, 290

 diplomatic isolation of, 29

 economic policies, after Iran-Iraq War, 19

 economy, after Iran-Iraq War, 19

 embargo of

 effect of in Iraq, 288

 enforcement of, 45, 57–58, 260

 UN imposition of, 30, 45

 factionalism, history of, 3, 4

 history of, 1–6

 independence, 4

 overseas assets, freezing of, 29

 as police state, 281

 postwar

 and Combined Task Force Provide Comfort, 220

 no-fly zone, 221

 as threat to regional stability, 213

 United Nations oversight of, 219–21

 uprisings against Saddam, 219

 as public opinion, 287

 Shia-Sunni conflict, history of, 2–3

 tensions with Iran, history of, 5, 6

 tribal culture of, 2

Iraqi aircraft

 Dassault Mirage F-1, 87

 Mikoyan MiG-29 “Fulcrum,” 79

Iraqi air defenses

 Amphibious task force threat and, 222

 Coalition suppression of, 77–78, 85, 150, 198

 inaccuracy of, 78

 Iraqis’ limited faith in, 64–65

 Kari integrated air defense command and control system,

12, 64

 in Kuwait, 81, 157, 177

 missiles and air defense artillery, 64, 78

 orders to conserve ammunition, 87

 U.S. intelligence on, 288

 volume of fire from, 78, 82

 ZSU-23 antiaircraft gun, 288

Iraqi airfields, 200

 al-Jaber Air Base, 25, 164, 168–69, 174–75, 178, 181, 185,

187, 189, 198

 Shaibah Air Base, 78

 Tallil Airfield, 82

Iraqi Air Force

 and Coalition attack, plans to meet, 65

 defections, 261

 effectiveness of, 65

 escape to Iran, 87

 helicopterborne commandos, 22, 23, 24

 in Iran-Iraq War, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 283

 in Kuwait invasion, 23, 24, 25, 65

 losses in, 24, 25

 offensive air sorties, 87

 reconnaissance missions, 22–23

 size of, 21, 65

 U.S. intelligence on, 283

Iraqi armor

 assets prior to Kuwait invasion, 21

 BMP-1 and BMP-2 armored personnel carrier, 99, 100

 BRDM-2 scout vehicle, 99, 100

 BTR armored personnel carrier, 195

 condition of, 210

 destruction of, during retreat from Kuwait, 195–98, 202,

203–4, 208, 290 

 T-54/55 main battle tank, 11, 66, 99, 100, 125, 181, 183
Index 305

 T-62 main battle tank, 11, 66, 99, 100, 117, 120–21, 158,

284

 T-72 main battle tank, 11, 100, 181, 284

 Type-64 armored personnel carrier, 181

 U.S. intelligence on, 284–85

Iraqi Army

 abandoned weapons, as postwar concern, 214

 after Iran-Iraq War

 image of, 18, 19, 21, 31

 maintenance of wartime size, 19

 armored forces, U.S. intelligence on, 284–85

 artillery, U.S. intelligence on, 285

 and Battle of al-Khafji, views on, 115–16, 122–23, 134

 casualties and losses, 24, 25, 132, 221, 267

 and Coalition military response, expectations for, 64–65,

65–66, 68

 on Coalition strategy, 97–98

 combined arms capabilities, U.S. intelligence on, 285

 commandos, U.S. intelligence on, 289, 290

 cross-border raids into Saudi Arabia, 95

 dead, burial of, 211

 defense of Kuwait, units, 66

 Directorate of General Military Intelligence, 65

 doctrine of, 282, 283

 engineers, U.S. intelligence on, 285–87

 as hollow force, 31, 134

 infantry

 as primarily Shiite, 287–88

 U.S. intelligence on, 283–84

 in Kuwait

 effect of air campaign on, 89–92

 looting by, 28, 198, 210–11

 size and quality of, 290

 supply issues faced by, 91

 logistics, vulnerability of, 289, 290

 losses in Desert Storm, 208

 morale of

 in Gulf War

 air war and, 92, 107, 143

 difficulty of evaluating, 143

 as poor, 21, 134, 142, 222

 in Iran-Iraq War, 284, 287

 NCO system, 284

 officers

 as primarily Sunni, 287–88

 tactical flexibility, 290

 training and ability, 282

 and postwar revolts, suppression of, 219

 rear area security, U.S. intelligence on, 288

 reforms, following Iran-Iraq War, 11–12, 282

 Republican Guard

 in Desert Storm planning, 72, 73, 74

 in Iran-Iraq War, 13, 284

 in Kuwait invasion, 24–25

 casualties in, 25

 preparation for, 21–23

 and postwar revolts, suppression of, 219

 pre-cease-fire efforts to reduce, 208

 professionalism of, 12, 24–25

 retreat from Kuwait, 66

 as small percentage of Iraqi force, 31

 taking of Mutla Ridge, 195

 as target of air strikes, 77, 82, 83, 84

 U.S. intelligence on, 284, 285, 290

 retreat from Kuwait, 263

 Coalition efforts to maximize destruction during, 195–

98, 202, 203–4, 208, 290

 size of, after Iran-Iraq War, 21

 staff of, 283

 strategy, bluffing in, 66

 strengths and weaknesses, exposure of in Kuwait invasion,

21

 structure of, 66

 studies on Gulf War, 222

 U.S. intelligence on, 72, 281–91

 vehicles, poor condition of, 90–91, 106

Iraqi Army units [in descending order]

 corps

 III Corps, 12, 66, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 95, 99, 105, 107,

146, 148, 154, 162, 178, 188, 208, 213,

261

 IV Corps, 66, 90, 99, 105, 106, 107, 154, 261

 VII Corps, 13, 66, 178, 189

 divisions

 Armored Divisions

 3d, 66, 99, 106, 107, 116, 119, 122, 178, 180, 262

 6th Armored Brigade, 107, 111–16, 132

 15th Mechanized Infantry Brigade, 181,

182

 20th Infantry Regiment, 192

 6th, 10, 66

 10th, 66, 200

 12th, 189, 200

 52d, 189, 200

 Infantry Divisions

 7th, 98, 99, 106, 148, 151, 157, 178, 180, 188

 8th, 98, 99, 178

 501st Brigade, 184

 14th, 98, 99, 106, 158, 188

 18th, 98

 26th, 158

 29th, 98, 99, 158, 159, 162, 188

 48th, 189

 Mechanized Divisions

 1st, 66, 99, 119, 122

 5th, 66, 99, 106–7, 110, 111, 116, 121, 122, 132,

178, 261–62

 15th Mechanized Brigade, 119, 132

 20th Mechanized Brigade, 132

 22d Brigade, 170, 181, 184

 26th Mechanized Brigade, 119, 122, 132

 Republican Guard

 3d Republican Guard, Special Forces Brigade,

24

 16th Republican Guard, Special Forces Brigade,

24

 Adnan Division, 200

 Armored Brigade, 10th, 10

 Hammurabi Armored Division, 17th Armored

Brigade, 22, 24, 212

 Medina Division, 24, 25, 200

 Nebuchadnezzar Division, 24

 Tawakalna Division, 189, 200

 brigades

 15th Mechanized Brigade, 119, 132

 20th Mechanized Brigade, 132

 22d Brigade, 170, 181, 184

 26th Mechanized Brigade, 119, 122, 132
306 Liberating Kuwait

Iraqi Army units (continued)

 brigades (continued)

 449th Artillery Brigade, 185

 battalions

 Field Artillery Battalion, 159th, 148

Iraqi artillery

 73mm gun, 120

 152mm howitzer, 99

 152mm self-propelled battery, 80–81

 155mm howitzer, 99, 285

 210mm howitzer, 285

 air defense artillery, 64, 148, 186

 Amphibious Task Force threat and, 222

 assets prior to Kuwait invasion, 21

 in battle of al-Khafji, 119

 counterfire capabilities, 141

 in fixed fortifications, 66

 G5 155mm howitzer, 285

 in Kuwait

 bombardment of, prior to commencement of ground

campaign, 172

 as target of Marine air attacks, 77, 80–82, 91, 96, 146,

177

 U.S. raids on, 95–96, 106, 141–43

 Kuwait invasion and, 22

 mortars, 27, 157, 164, 171, 193

 and postwar revolts, suppression of, 219

 shelling of al-Khafji, 95, 106

 sound-ranging systems, 141

 U.S. intelligence on, 285

 ZSU-23-4 Shilka antiaircraft weapon system, 64, 186

Iraqi biological weapons

 as deterrent for coalition forces, 67

 as target of Coalition aircraft, 146

Iraqi chemical weapons

 Coalition false alarms, 172, 191

 Coalition precautions against, 172

 as deterrent for coalition forces, 31, 66–67

 Iraqi failure to use, 172

 preparations to use, 67

 and Scud missile attacks, precautions surrounding, 82

 as target of Coalition aircraft, 146

 threats to use against Israel, 19

 U.S. intelligence on, 289

 use in Iran-Iraq War, 11, 13, 67

Iraqi defenses, 64–68. See also Iraqi air defenses; Saddam Line

 air attacks, preparations for, 66

 Air Force assets, 65

 Army units, 66

 booby traps, 212

 Coalition efforts to deceive, 150

 deceptions and decoy equipment, use of, 66, 90, 142, 291

 deployments, 66

 effectiveness of, 222

 examinations of, 202, 210, 212–13

 fixed fortifications, 98–99

 bunkers, described, 202

 in Gulf War, 66

 Marine plan to breach, 72

 Saddam Line, 98–99

 in Iran-Iraq War, 11, 285–87, 291

 U.S. intelligence on, 285–87, 291

 formidable reputation of, 150

 Iraqi confidence in, 67–68

 Navy assets, 65

 planning of, 207

 psychological warfare measures against, 150–53

 Scud missiles in, 66–67

 shifting of forces, Coalition air campaign and, 154

 weapons of mass destruction and, 66–67

Iraqi diplomacy

 goals of, 55

 and Iran, efforts to reconcile with after Kuwait invasion, 30

 responses to demands for withdrawal from Kuwait, 55, 77

 responses to global opposition to Kuwait invasion, 30–31

Iraqi Directorate of General Military Intelligence, 21, 154

Iraqi intelligence

 accuracy of, 66, 70–71

 on Coalition ground attack plans, 154, 187–88

Iraqi mines

 land mines, minefields and obstacle belts

 within Kuwait, 191, 200

 on Saddam Line, 98–99

 clearing techniques, 165, 170–71, 172–73

 effectiveness of, 188

 logistics and, 204

 losses to, 171, 173, 175

 penetration of, 156, 158, 159–60, 163, 164–66,

169–70, 170–71, 172–74, 185, 267

 Gen Schwarzkopf on, 208

 naval, 65, 137, 150

 Coalition clearing operations, 153, 216

 Coalition losses to, 262

Iraqi Ministry of Defense, 78, 213

Iraqi missiles and rockets

 2K12 Kub (SA-6 Gainful) surface-to-air missile, 64, 157

 9K31 Strela-1 (SA-9 Gaskin) surface-to-air missile, 64

 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail) surface-to-air missile, 64

 9K33 Osa (SA-8 Gecko) surface-to-air missile, 64, 81

 9K34 Strela-3 (SA-14 Gremlin) surface-to-air missile, 64

 9K35 Strela-10 (SA-13 Gopher) surface-to-air missile, 64

 Aérospatiale AM 38 and AM 39 Exocet anti-ship missile,

12–13, 257, 283, 289

 as Coalition target, 78

 FROG (free rocket over ground) rocket, 261

 infrared surface-to-air missiles, 83, 89, 146, 148, 177, 187,

202

 Isayev S-125 Neva/Pechora (SA-3 Goa) surface-to-air missile, 64

 number of prior to Kuwait invasion, 21

 Roland surface-to-air missile, 64

 S-75 Dvina (SA-2 Guideline) surface-to-air missile, 64, 146

 SAM-7 surface-to-air missiles, 288

 as Soviet-supplied, 64

 SS-1/R-17 Scud-B al-Hussein surface-to-surface

 attacks, air operations and, 82, 262

 and chemical weapons threat, 66–67, 82

 firing of at Israel, 82, 261

 firing of at Saudi Arabia, 82, 147, 261

 and “Great Scud Hunt,” 82

 inaccuracy of, 82

 in Iran-Iraq War, 12, 14

 surface-to-air, 21, 64, 78, 82, 129, 150, 157, 216, 262

Iraqi nationalists, British colonialism and, 4, 5

Iraqi naval bases, Umm Qasr Naval Base, 150

Iraqi naval mines, 65

Iraqi Navy

 26th Naval Infantry Brigade, 13
Index 307

 440th Naval Infantry Brigade, 24, 25, 65, 212

 and Coalition attack, plans to meet, 65

 fast patrol boats, 110, 121

 in Kuwait invasion, 23–24, 25

 missile boats, 25

 size of, 65

Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osirak, Israeli destruction of (1981), 12,

19, 64, 257

Iraqi nuclear weapons

 as deterrent for coalition forces, 67

 development program, status of, 67

 as target of Coalition aircraft, 146

Iraqi small arms

 captured, 110, 214

 rocket propelled grenades, 193

Iraqi War College

 on choice of al-Khafji for Iraqi attack, 98

 on Coalition strategy, 97

 postwar doctrine on air attacks, 91

Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. See also Iraqi chemical weapons

 efforts to build, 19

 Iraqi defense of Kuwait and, 66–67

 as target of Coalition aircraft, 146

 U.S. intelligence on, 289

Islam

 history of, 1

 militaristic tenets of, 1

Islamic world

 asymmetrical struggle with Western world, 1

 U.S. relations with Saudi Arabia and, 49

Israel

 Arab-Israeli conflict, history of, 7

 Coalition equipment from, 135

 destruction of, as goal of Saddam Hussein, 19, 30

 and Iraqi chemical weapons, 19

 Iraqi reaction to creation of, 5

 Iraqi Scud missiles fired at, 82, 261

 Iraqi threats against, 19

 and Iraq’s Osirak reactor, destruction of, 12, 19, 64, 257

 on Kuwait invasion by Iraq, 290

 Six-Day War (1967), 10

 and Suez Canal, 7

 Yom Kippur War (1973), 8, 290

Italian Army, and Operation Provide Comfort, 220

Iwo Jima (LPH 2), 42

Jalio, Saed (LtCol., Iraq), 25

Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, 21, 30

“Jedi Knights” (Special Plans Group), 70–72, 72–73

Jenkins, Harry W., Jr. (MajGen), 41, 43, 44, 45, 64, 75, 248

Jews, Iraqi, history of, 5

John, David L. (LtCol), 247

Johnson, Francis A. (LtCol), 248

Johnson, Michael R. (Capt, USN), 47, 62, 93, 241, 248

Johnson, Michael T. (LtCol, USA), 243

Johnston, Robert B. (MajGen), 71

Johnston, Ronnie S. (LtCol), 245

Joint Chiefs of Staff

 chairman of, and chain of command, 32

 and Desert Storm planning, 71

 and Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, 9n

 and Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, 8, 9

Joint Command, Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force and, 9

Joint Forces Air Command, 120, 145–46, 147

 commander, dispute over, 69–70

Joint Forces Command, 51

Joint Forces Command–East, 51, 52, 72, 101, 102, 103, 104, 118,

119, 126, 137, 163, 175, 188, 199, 207

 Task Force Abu Bakr, 103, 175

 Task Force Omar, 103, 175, 176

 Task Force Othman, 103, 175–76

 Task Force Tariq, 175, 176

Joint Forces Command–North, 51, 72, 163, 185, 201, 263

Joint operations

 definition of, 55n

 exercises to test, 55

Jones, H. L. (Sgt), 25n

Jones, James L., Jr. (Col), 220

Jones, Phillip J. (Cpl), 175

Jones, Thomas S. (LtCol), 243

Jones, William R. (LtCol), 86, 87, 146–47, 209–10, 245

Jordan, evacuation of Baghdad embassy personnel to, 27

Joseph Strauss (DDG 16), 17

Joshan (Iranian fast-attack ship), 17

Journalists, Battle of al-Khafji and, 126

Juneau (LPD 10), 63

Junger, Eric R. (Capt), 247

Kebelman, Frank I., III (LtCol), 242, 274

Keller, Kenneth T. (Sgt), 44

Kelley, Paul X. (Gen), 8–9

Kendall, David (1stLt), 113

Kennedy, Kevin M. (LtCol), 250

Kephart, Michael M. (LtCol), 171, 242

Kerin, James R. (LtCol, USA), 244

Kershaw, Charles W. (LtCol), 243

Keys, William M. (MajGen)

 as commander, 2d Marine Division, 60, 75, 157, 172, 174–

75, 185, 243

 and Iraqi retreating force, destruction of, 195

 on lessons of Iraq War, 222

 and Marine uniforms, 277

 and two breach attack plan, 135–36

Khaled bin Sultan (Gen, Saudi Arabia), 51, 101, 118–19, 123, 126–

27, 134, 213

Khanjar, Saudi Arabia, Combat Service Support Area 2 at, 139–

41, 199, 204, 206, 262

Khorramshahr, Iran, 10, 11

Khuzestan, Iran, 10

Kibrit, Saudi Arabia, 103, 120

 Combat Service Support Area 1 at, 62, 93, 103, 120, 139,

140, 199, 204–6, 263

Kilkus, John R. (Sgt), 44

Kilpatrick, Michael S. (LCpl), 182

Kingston, Robert C. (LtGen, USA), 9

Kirkwood, David B. (LtCol), 247

Kleinsmith, Douglas R. (Capt), 108, 118, 121–22, 123, 130, 131, 176

Klinker, Richard J. (LtCol), 245

Knowles, Brian G. (1stLt), 199–200

Knutzen, Robert M. (Maj), 177

Krock, Kasey A. (LCpl), 170–71

Krulak, Charles C. (BGen), 62, 93, 103, 136–37, 139, 140, 204–6,

218, 247
308 Liberating Kuwait

Kur, Daniel A. (SSgt), 172

Kurdistan, 4

Kurds

 and factionalism in Iraq, 3, 4

 revolts by, 4, 5, 6, 219, 220

Kurth, Michael M. (LtCol), 120, 198, 245, 265

Kuwait

 border with Iraq, history of, 6

 Coalition decision to eject Iraq from, 55, 62, 64, 72, 260

 damage to, Coalition efforts to avoid, 137

 economic prosperity of, 6

 history of, 6

 and Iran-Iraq War, 14–15, 19

 Iraqi claims on, history of, 5

 Iraqi looting of, 28, 198, 210–11

 occupied, freezing of overseas assets, 29

 reconstruction of, 217

Kuwait City

 Coalition reentry of, 199–200, 201, 263

 invasion of Kuwait and, 24

 Iraqi Army retreat from, Coalition efforts to maximize destruction during, 195–98, 202, 203–4

 Iraqi defense of, 188

 Iraqi looting of, 198, 210–11

 liberation celebrations in, 210–11

 U.S. embassy

 evacuation of, 29, 259

 Marines in, 27–29

 recapture of, 199–200, 207

Kuwaiti airfields

 Ali al-Salem Air Base, 24, 195

 al-Jaber Air Base, 25, 164, 168–69, 174–75

 attacks on, 24, 25

Kuwaiti Air Force, 23, 24

Kuwaiti Army

 6th Mechanized Brigade, 24

 35th Armored Brigade, 24

 in Joint Forces Command, 51, 176

 Kuwait invasion and, 24

 shooting of Iraqi prisoners, 28

Kuwaiti citizens, celebrations of liberation, 201, 207, 211

Kuwaiti islands, amphibious landings on, 110, 212–13

Kuwaiti linguists, 153

Kuwaiti missiles, Raytheon Hawk MIM-23B surface-to-air, 23

Kuwaiti monarchy

 Royal Family, Iraqi plans to capture, 22, 24

 Saddam’s overthrow of, 30

Kuwaiti naval bases, Ras al-Qulayah Naval Base, 24, 25, 110, 121

Kuwaiti Navy, Kuwait invasion and, 25

Kuwait International Airport

 airliners destroyed at, 147

 plans to retake, 72

 recapture of, 200–202, 263

 surrounding of by Coalition forces, 189–95

Kuwait invasion by Iraq, 1, 24–25, 258

 decision, factors in, 19–21

 fuel shortages in, 24

 and Iraqi Army, apparent effectiveness of, 31, 285

 Iraqi casualties and losses in, 24, 25, 221

 Iraqi demands prior to, 21

 Iraqi detention of foreign nationals following, 30–31, 55,

101, 259

 Iraqi reconnaissance, 22–23

 and Iraqi weaknesses, exposure of, 21

 Kuwait casualties, efforts to minimize, 22

 plan for, 21–24

 preparations for, 21–23

 U.S. detection of, 22

 pretexts for, 19, 21

 Saddam’s views on, 30

 and Saudi Arabian foreign relations, 49

 size of Iraqi force, 290

 U.S. embassy and, 27–29

 U.S. response, 29, 31, 258

 and ejection of Iraq, decision to undertake, 55, 62,

64, 72, 260

 Iraqi expectations for, 21

 Saddam’s expectations for, 20–21

 U.S. Operations Plan 1002-90 and, 22, 32–33

 world’s response to, 29–31, 258

 Iraq’s defiance of, 30–31, 64

Kuwaiti oil fields

 Iraqi burning of (“Tariq Project”), 95, 146, 150, 157, 160–

62, 168–69, 169–70, 171, 185

 toxins released by, 185

 and visibility, 178, 181, 183, 184, 186, 187, 191, 193,

197, 198, 204, 265, 266

 Iraqi sabotage of, 95

Kuwaiti resistance

 Iraqi prisoners’ fear of, 201

 as source of intelligence, 89, 136

Kuwait National Guard, 28

LaMoure County (LST 1194), 42

Landersman, David W. (Capt), 118, 188

Landing Zone Sandy, 177

Lane, Brian L. (LCpl), 185

Lang, Kurtis E. (Lt), 108, 118, 119

LaPlante, John B. (RAdm, USN), 42, 43, 55–56

Larson, T. D. (Cpl), 25n

LaSalle (AGF 3), 35

LaVigne, Michael W. (Maj), 247

Lazisky, Richard R. (LtCol), 245

League of Nations, 4

Lebanon, U.S. withdrawal from, 21, 31, 289

Lee, Kerry (Cpl), 201

LeGarde, Joseph A. (SSgt), 180

Lenard, James D. (LtCol), 243

Leno, Jay, 59

Lentz, Lawrence M. (Cpl), 123, 129

Leslie, Stephen C. (Capt), 17, 258

Lessons of Gulf War, study and preservation of, 215

Lewis, P. A. (Sgt), 25n

Liberia, 41

Liberto, Ignatius P. (Capt), 250

Libya, U.S. air conflicts with (1980s), 31

Lilly, Jasper C. (Col), 242

Line charges (MCLC), 173

 MK58 single-shot, 165

 MK154 three-shot, 165, 170

List, Raymond A. (Col), 241, 277

Livingston, Lawrence H. (Col), 60, 172, 243

Lockett, David (Spec, USA), 126

Logistics. See also Deployment to Saudi Arabia; Maritime Prepositioning Ship Squadrons

 departure from theater, 213–18
Index 309

 equipment recovery and removal, 217–18

 Iraqi prisoners, management of, 166–68, 170, 199, 204–7

 logistic component of 7th Marine Expeditionary Brigade,

37–38

 success of in Gulf War, 223, 267

 two breach plan and, 136–37, 139–41

Lohman, Charles M. (Col), 241

Lott, Bradley M. (LtCol), 250

Lowery, Mark K. (Col), 243

Lowery, Rudolph (LtCol), 244

Luck, Gary E. (LtGen, USA), 47, 163

Lucy, Forest I. (Col), 241

Lupton, Robert E. (LtCol), 63, 250

Mabus, James I. (Sgt), 38–39

Macak, William (Maj), 204

MacGhee, William (LtCol), 242

Magill, Charles J. (Capt), 78–79

Mahmoud, Ibdil Raziq (Col, Iraq), 107

Mahmoud, Salah Aboud (MajGen, Iraq)

 and Battle of al-Khafji, 95, 99–101, 105, 106–7, 111, 115–

16, 122–23, 129, 134, 261–62

 on Battle of Burqan, 182–83, 185

 on capture of Marine pilot, 187

 cease-fire negotiations, 213

 Coalition air strikes on, 89

 on Coalition air war, effects of, 91

 as commander of III Corps, 66

 counterattack against Desert Storm advances, 178

 on defense of Kuwait, 66

 on Desert Storm, 178

 and professionalization of Iraqi Army, 12

 and sabotage of Kuwaiti oil fields, 95

Mahoud, Aboud Haneed (Col, Iraq), 105

Majchrzak, James D. (Col), 72

Major Dad (TV sitcom), 59

Maj Stephen W. Pless (T-AK 3007), 61

Maloney, Michael V. (LtCol), 177, 242

Manifah Bay, 40, 46, 47

Manitowoc (LST 1180), 42

Map symbols, 279–80

Marine Air. See also Aircraft, U.S.; Air war

 aborted operations, 177–78

 casualties and losses

 in Gulf War, 89, 94, 145, 146–47, 148, 150, 187,

202–3, 216, 217, 260, 261, 262, 263,

264

 first aircraft shot down, 82–83

 in Iran-Iraq War, 17

 command structure, as issue, 61, 69–70, 79–80, 84–85

 maritime prepositioning and, 40

 pilots views on conflict, 77

 role in air war, 77

 and Somalian embassy evacuation, 94

 sorties

 in Kuwait, 80–82, 83, 89

 total number of, 84, 267

 uniforms, pistol, manners of wearing, 271

Marine air bases

 Beaufort, SC, 40

 Cherry Point, NC, 40

 Lonesome Dove (Khanjar, Saudi Arabia), 140, 177, 197

Marine Air units [in descending order]

 task forces

 Task Force Cunningham, 57, 104

 wings

 Marine Aircraft Wings, 218

 1st MAW, 61

 2d MAW, 61, 259

 3d MAW, 43, 45, 47, 57, 61, 69, 77, 83–84, 89,

90, 96, 120, 144, 146, 147, 148,

157, 171, 177–78, 184, 187, 197,

204, 217, 222, 244–46, 259, 260,

267, 274

 4th MAW, 61

 groups

 Marine Aircraft Control Group 38, 38, 246

 Marine Aircraft Groups

 MAG-11, 45, 61, 78, 82, 85, 89, 204, 244–45, 269

 MAG-13, 46, 61, 80, 146, 222, 245, 269

 MAG-16, 46, 61, 177, 245, 269

 MAG-26, 61, 140, 245, 269

 MAG-40, 41–42, 198, 249, 263, 270

 MAG-50, 63, 250, 270

 MAG-70, 38, 39, 259, 260

 Marine Wing Support Group 37, 211, 246

 squadrons

 Headquarters and Headquarters Squadrons

 H&HS-28, 249

 H&HS-37, 246

 H&HS-38, 246

 Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadrons

 VMGR 35, 269

 VMGR 352, 245

 Marine Air Control Squadrons

 MACS-2, 246

 MACS-6, 246, 249

 Marine Air Support Squadron 3, 246

 Marine Air Traffic Control Squadron 38, 246

 Marine All-Weather Attack Squadrons, 84

 VMA(AW)-121, 244, 269

 VMA(AW)-224, 38, 78, 245, 269

 VMA(AW)-533, 78, 245, 269

 Marine All-Weather Fighter Attack Squadrons,

VMFA(AW)-121, 145, 148, 204

 Marine Attack Helicopter Squadrons

 HMA-773, 250, 270

 HMA-775, 145, 245, 262, 269

 Marine Attack Squadrons

 VMA-224, 148, 216

 VMA-231, 86, 146, 209, 216, 245, 262, 269

 VMA-311, 38, 89, 148, 216, 245, 259, 261, 269

 VMA-331, 41, 94, 149–50, 202, 216, 249, 263, 269

 VMA-542, 38, 147, 148, 187, 216, 245, 263, 269

 Marine Aviation Logistics Squadrons

 MALS-11, 244

 MALS-13, 245

 MALS-14, 245, 249

 MALS-16, 245

 MALS-29, 245, 269

 Marine Fighter Attack Squadrons

 VMFA-121, 244

 VMFA-212, 217, 244, 264, 269

 VMFA-232, 244, 269

 VMFA-235, 38, 244, 269

 VMFA-312, 221
310 Liberating Kuwait

Marine Air units (continued)

 squadrons (continued)

 VMFA-314, 38, 148, 177, 216, 245, 269

 VMFA-333, 38, 78, 148, 245, 269

 VMFA-451, 38, 82, 146, 148, 216, 245, 269

 Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadrons

 HMH-362, 245, 269

 HMH-461, 41, 249, 270

 HMH-462, 38, 245, 269

 HMH-463, 245, 269

 HMH-464, 245, 269

 HMH-465, 38, 245, 269

 HMH-466, 38, 245, 269

 Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadrons

 HMLA-167, 17

 HMLA-169, 63, 250, 270

 HMLA-267, 44

 HMLA-269, 42, 197, 198–99, 249, 270

 HMLA-367, 38, 120, 125, 245, 269

 HMLA-369, 38, 82, 120, 145, 198, 245, 259, 262,

265, 269

 Marine Light Helicopter Squadron 767, 212, 245, 269

 Marine Medium Helicopter Squadrons

 HMM-161, 38, 245, 263, 269

 HMM-164, 40, 250, 260

 HMM-165, 177, 245, 269

 HMM-261, 245, 269

 HMM-263, 41, 249, 270

 HMM-264, 220

 HMM-265, 63, 250, 270

 HMM-266, 245, 269

 HMM-268, 63, 64, 216, 250, 270

 HMM-365, 41, 249, 270

 HMM-774, 245, 269

 Marine Observation Squadrons

 VMO-1, 80, 187, 216, 245, 263, 269

 VMO-2, 83, 157, 216, 245, 261, 269

 Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron 2, 245,

269

 Marine Wing Communications Squadrons

 MWCS-28, 249

 MWCS-38, 246

 Marine Wing Headquarter Squadron 3, 244

 Marine Wing Support Squadron 274, 249

 sections

 Marine Wing Support Sections

 174, 246

 271, 246

 273, 246

 373, 246

 374, 246

Marine bases

 Camp Lejeune, NC, 41, 259

 Khanjar Combat Service Support Area 2, 139–41, 199, 204,

206, 262

 Kibrit Combat Service Support Area 1, 62, 93, 103, 120, 139,

140, 199, 204–6, 263

 Quantico, VA, 27

Marine Corps. See also Amphibious Task Force; other specific topics

 Air-Ground Task Forces

 conflicts with USAF doctrine, 69–70, 87–89, 145–46,

147–48

 in Desert Storm, 176–77

 in Iran-Iraq War, 15, 258

 casualties and losses, 87, 96, 112–13, 115, 116, 132, 134,

141, 145, 158–59, 160, 163–64, 171, 175, 185,

193, 201–2, 212, 221, 262. See also Marine Air,

casualties and losses

 in Desert Shield, uses of, 43–44

 in Desert Storm, Gen Schwarzkopf on performance of, 208

 evaluations of Gulf War, 222–24

 Lessons Learned System, 215

 Marine Expeditionary Force I (I MEF)

 air combat element, 45–46

 allied contingent, 47, 72, 75

 area of operations, 48, 103, 163

 cease-fire announcement, 209

 and chain of command, 43, 85

 command of, 33, 75, 259

 deployment to Saudi Arabia, 259, 260

 and Desert Storm planning, 72, 75

 expansion of, in preparation for Desert Storm, 60–64

 field historian, 199, 204

 friendly fire investigations, 115

 LtGen Boomer’s pre-attack message to, 162

 ground combat element, 45

 and ground operation, commencement of, 162

 headquarters, 215

 losses inflicted on Iraqis, 208

 mobile command post, 186–87, 197

 staff, 45, 55, 241

 briefings, 153

 uniforms of, 271, 274, 275

 successful completion of objectives by, 207–8

 support elements, 46–47, 62

 withdrawal from theater, 213–18

 Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, command of, 8, 9

Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center (Twentynine Palms,

CA), 38, 259

Marine Corps birthday, celebration of in 1990, 58

Marine Corps Central Command (MARCENT), 32, 43

 combat arm of, 45

 command of, 33, 45, 75, 259

Marine Corps Commandant

 and chain of command, 33

 Gen Gray as, 33

Marine Corps doctrine

 conflicts with Air Force doctrine, in air campaign planning,

69–70, 87–89, 145–46, 147–48

 and Desert Storm planning, initial one corps plan, 72

 Gulf War as test of, 36

Marine Corps History and Museums Division, captured equipment collected by, 214

Marine Corps Research Center, 215

Marine Corps Reserve

 4th Marine Division, 33

 24th Marines, 62, 64

 financial hardships faced by, 64

 Marine Reserve Military Police, 206

 mobilization of, 259

 number serving in Desert Storm, 63, 64

 performance of, 64

Marine Corps Reserve Air, Marine Reserve Attack Helicopter

Squadrons, 773, 63

Marine Corps units [in descending order]

 command units

 Direct Support Command (DSC), 62, 103, 136, 199,
Index 311

204–7, 218, 247–48, 262, 267

 General Support Command, 62

 Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 215

 Marine Forces, Southwest Asia, 215, 218

 expeditionary forces

 Marine Expeditionary Forces

 I MEF, 33, 34, 43, 45–47, 48, 55, 60–64, 72, 75,

85, 95–96, 103, 115, 123, 135, 153,

162, 186–87, 197, 199, 204, 207–

8, 213–18, 215, 241, 259, 260, 267,

271, 274, 275

 IV MEF, 64

 corps

 I Marine Expeditionary Corps, 75–76

 task forces

 Amphibious Task Force (TG 150.6), 43

 Contingency Air-Ground Task Forces

 CMAGTF 1-88, 15, 258

 CMAGTF 1-91, 220

 CMAGTF 2-88, 15, 258

 CMAGTF 3-88, 15, 258

 Task Force 158, 260

 Task Force Breach Alpha, 172, 243

 Task Force Breach Bravo, 243

 Task Force Grizzly, 156, 158, 159, 163–64, 175, 242,

277–78

 Task Force Papa Bear, 166, 170–71, 177, 178, 181–82,

184, 185, 189, 191–94, 242, 263, 277

 Task Force Ripper, 163, 164–69, 164n, 178, 180, 185,

187, 189–91, 242, 263

 Task Force Shepherd, 45, 96, 102–3, 109–10, 112, 115,

117, 141, 142, 168, 169–70, 184, 185,

189, 194, 200–202, 243, 266, 277–78.

See also Light Armored Infantry Battalions, 1st Battalion, under battalions

 Company A, 117, 118, 169

 Company B, 103, 169, 178–80, 183

 Company C, 103, 169

 Company D, 109–18, 180

 Task Force Taro, 96, 103, 104, 154–56, 158, 164, 164n,

169, 194–95, 200–201, 242, 277–78

 Task Force Troy, 137, 153, 177

 Task Force X-Ray, 170, 185, 263

 divisions

 Marine Divisions

 1st, 43, 45, 47, 72, 101, 102, 135, 137, 139, 153,

154–56, 158, 160, 163–71, 174–75,

177, 189–95, 201, 217, 222, 241–

43, 259, 261, 263, 266, 267, 271,

274, 276, 277

 2d, 60–61, 72, 75, 96, 103, 135–36, 139, 142–43,

153, 154, 156–57, 158, 172–75,

178, 180, 185–86, 196, 197, 199,

201–2, 217, 222, 243–44, 259, 260,

261, 263, 267, 277

 4th, 33

 brigades

 Marine Expeditionary Brigades

 1st MEB, 45, 259

 4th MEB, 41–42, 43, 44, 55, 57–58, 60, 62, 72,

93–95, 137, 198, 215, 248–49, 259,

260, 264

 5th MEB, 62–64, 72, 94, 137, 176, 199, 212, 215–

16, 216–17, 249–50

 7th MEB, 37–40, 45, 62, 213–14, 259, 267, 271

 groups

 Amphibious Groups

 2, 43

 3, 63, 212, 216

 Brigade Service Support Groups

 4, 41, 94, 249

 5, 63, 246, 250

 7, 38, 246, 259

 Civil Action Group, 4th, 271

 Civil Affairs Group, 220

 Direct Support Groups

 1, 62, 248

 2, 62, 248

 Force Service Support Groups, 218, 274

 1st FSSG, 43, 46–47, 62, 204–7, 217, 223, 246–

47, 259, 260, 267, 276

 2d FSSG, 62, 259

 General Support Groups

 1, 62, 247

 2, 62, 247

 Marine Expeditionary Unit Service Support Groups

 11, 64, 216

 13, 40, 110, 250

 24, 220

 Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence

Groups

 1st, 47, 80, 89, 102–3, 106, 107, 118, 199–200,

241, 250

 5th, 249

 regiments

 1st Marines, 259

 1st Battalion, 170, 171, 181, 182, 185, 242

 Company C, 178, 183, 184

 3d Battalion, 63, 176, 199, 250

 2d Marines

 1st Battalion, 41, 249

 Company B, 15, 17

 Company C, 94

 2d Battalion, 172n, 243

 3d Battalion, 41, 249

 3d Marines, 45, 52, 101, 103–4, 123, 125, 127, 129–30,

154, 262

 1st Battalion, 164n, 177, 242

 Company C, 93

 2d Battalion, 158–59, 164n, 200, 242

 3d Battalion, 126, 164n, 242, 277

 Company I, 50, 58–59

 4th Marines, 242

 1st Battalion, 250

 2d Battalion, 243

 5th Marines, 64

 1st Battalion, 38, 164n, 165, 198, 242

 2d Battalion, 63, 250

 3d Battalion, 63, 250

 6th Marines, 60, 172–74, 185, 195, 243, 263

 1st Battalion, 172n, 243

 Company C, 185

 3d Battalion, 172n, 243

 7th Marines, 38, 45, 242

 1st Battalion, 38, 164n, 165, 166, 168–69, 185,

189–91, 198, 201, 242, 278

 2d Battalion, 38, 156, 163, 163n, 242

 Company G, 160
312 Liberating Kuwait

Marine Corps units (continued)

 regiments (continued)

 3d Battalion, 159, 163, 163n, 185, 242

 8th Marines, 60, 185, 195, 217, 243, 263

 1st Battalion, 172, 173, 180, 243

 Weapons Company, 173, 180

 9th Marines

 3d Battalion, 170–71, 181, 182, 242

 Company I, 182

 3d Battalion, 38

 10th Marines, 60, 172, 243

 1st Battalion, 41

 2d Battalion, 243

 3d Battalion, 142–43, 175, 243

 5th Battalion, 243

 Battery Q, 96

 Battery R, 96

 11th Marines, 45, 168, 189, 242

 1st Battalion, 184, 242, 249

 Battery A, 184

 2d Battalion, 63, 250

 3d Battalion, 38, 242

 5th Battalion, 141, 142, 159, 242

 Battery Q, 96

 Battery S, 96, 141, 262

 Battery T, 141

 12th Marines

 1st Battalion, 96, 125, 127, 160, 210, 242

 Battery A, 125, 129–30

 Battery C, 125, 129–30

 2d Battalion, 243

 Battery E, 153–54

 3d Battalion, 142, 242

 14th Marines, 3d Battalion, Battery H, 184

 23d Marines, 3d Battalion, 243, 263

 24th Marines, 62, 64

 2d Battalion, 248

 3d Battalion, 248

 25th Marines, 1st Battalion, 163n, 242

 regimental teams

 Regimental Combat Team 7, 40

 Regimental Landing Teams

 RLT-2, 41, 249

 RLT-5, 63, 176, 250

 expeditionary units

 Marine Expeditionary Units

 11th MEU, 64

 13th MEU (Special Operations Capable), 40–41,

43, 44, 45, 55–56, 64, 187, 212,

216, 250, 260, 264

 22d MEU, 41

 24th MEU (Special Operations Capable), 220

 units

 Marine Amphibious Unit, 24th, 15, 258

 battalions

 Assault Amphibian Battalions

 2d, 61, 244

 Company A, 41

 3d, 38, 40, 45, 243

 4th

 Company A, 63

 Provisional General Support Company,

172n

 Battalion Landing Teams, 250

 BLT 1/4, 40, 110

 BLT 2/8, 220

 BLT 3/1, 64, 216

 Combat Engineer Battalions

 1st CEB, 45, 164n, 242, 274

 2d CEB, 61, 173, 244, 263

 Company B, 172n

 4th CEB, Company D, 172n

 Communications Battalion, 8th, 41

 Dental Battalions

 1st Den Bn, 247

 2d Den Bn, 41, 247

 Engineer Support Battalions

 7th ESB, 93, 139, 247

 Company A, 193

 8th ESB, 41, 93, 139, 247

 Headquarters and Service Battalions, 247

 Headquarters Battalions

 1st Marine Division, 242

 2d Marine Division, 243

 Landing Support Battalions

 1st LSB, 247

 2d LSB, 41, 247

 Light Antiaircraft Missile Battalions

 2d LAAM, 246

 3d LAAM, 246

 Light Armored Infantry Battalions

 1st Battalion, 45, 95, 96, 109–10, 243. See also

Task Force Shepherd under Marine Corps units, task forces

 Company A, 96, 115, 117, 118, 150, 169

 Company B, 96, 102–3, 266

 Company C, 103, 117, 169

 Company D, 63, 102, 169

 2d Battalion, 61, 96, 103, 156–57, 158, 185, 263

 Company A, 116–17

 Company B, 41, 156

 Company C, 157, 244, 249

 Company D, 41

 3d Battalion, 38, 96

 Company D, 109–10, 111–16, 117–18

 Low Altitude Air Defense Battalions

 2d LAAD, 246

 3d LAAD, 246

 Maintenance Battalion, 2d, 41, 247

 Marine Security Guard Battalion, 27

 Medical Battalions

 1st Med Bn, 247

 2d Med Bn, 41, 247

 Motor Transport Battalions

 6th Mt Bn, 140, 247

 7th Mt Bn, 247

 8th Mt Bn, 41, 204, 247

 Radio Battalion, 1st, 47, 241

 Reconnaissance Battalions

 1st Recon Bn, 45, 95, 123, 142, 156, 243

 Company A, 109, 111–13

 Company B, 63

 2d Recon Bn, 61, 156, 244

 3d Recon Bn

 Company A, 104, 123

 Company C, 109

 Supply Battalion, 2d, 41, 247

 Support Engineer Battalion, 8th, 172
Index 313

 Tank Battalions

 1st TB, 45, 170, 171, 182, 184, 192

 2d TB, 61, 174, 202, 244, 261

 Company A, 41

 3d TB, 38, 45, 164n, 165–66, 168, 180, 189, 198,

242

 Company C, 169

 4th TB, 172n

 Company A, 63

 Company B, 180–81

 8th TB, 61, 244

 Company C, 185–86

 companies

 Air-Naval Gunfire Liaison Company

 1st ANGLICO, 101, 102, 104, 106, 108, 119, 123–

24, 125–26, 127, 128, 130, 132,

133, 175, 176, 188, 220

 2d ANGLICO, 175

 Force Reconnaissance Company

 1st FORECON, 45, 87

 3d FORECON, 118, 121, 123

 Headquarters and Service Company

 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, 249

 I Marine Expeditionary Force, 241

 Headquarters Company

 2d Marines, 249

 5th Marines, 250

 Military Police Company, 2d, 41

 Reconnaissance Companies

 2d, 250

 4th, 250

 Remotely Piloted Vehicle Company, 2d, 220

 detachments

 Combat Service Support Detachments

 71, 38

 72, 38

 73, 38

 82, 247

 91, 206, 247

 133, 247

 tiger team, 150

Marines 

 as ambassadors, 53–54

 arrival in Saudi Arabia, experience of, 38–39

 first experience under fire, 156

 and friendly fire, feelings of those receiving, 163–64

 LtGen Boomer on spirit of, 223–24

 investigation of friendly fire incidents, 132, 150

 and psychological adjustment to peace, 209–10

 return home, 218

 souvenirs, regulations on, 214

Maritime Prepositioning Force, 62

Maritime Prepositioning Ship Squadrons, 8

 amphibious forces support by, 45

 creation of, 37

 departure from theater, 217

 first use of, 39, 267

 and Gulf state ports and airfields, preparation of, 37

 in Gulf War, deployment timing, 36–37

 problems with, 39, 40

 Squadron 1, 36, 61

 Squadron 2, 36, 37, 39, 259

 Squadron 3, 36, 45

 success of, 40, 267

Maritime Sealift Command, 63

Markaz al-Zabr, 108–10

Markaz as Sur, Kuwait, 142

Marolda, Edward J., 199–200

Marshall, Alice B. (Col), 241

Martin, Anthony M. (HM, USN), 171

Martin, Paul W. (LtCol), 245

Martin, Steve, 59

Masoud Saad al-Sorour, Salem (Col, Kuwait), 24

Matar, Hamid (LtCol, Saudi Arabia), 127

Mattis, James N. (LtCol), 165, 166, 168, 189–91, 242

Mauer, Roger J. (LtCol), 242

Mauskapf, Robert P. (LtCol), 248

Mauz, Henry H., Jr. (VAdm), 43–44

Mazzara, Andrew F. (LtCol), 96, 243

McAleer, Robert B. (LtCol), 249

McCarthy, Eugene T. (Maj), 145, 262

McCartney, Stephen M. (LtCol), 242

McCarty, Robert T. (Maj), 150

McClelland, Thomas L. (Capt, USN), 110

McCusker, Michael J. (Capt), 50, 58–59

McElraft, Roger C. (Col), 243

McGarrah, James (Cdr, USN), 248

McIlroy, Hugh M., Jr. (LtCol), 246

McKenzie, Scott W. (LtCol), 156, 244

McKissock, Gary S. (Col), 139

McLean, J. E., II (Maj), 247

McMullan, V. D. (Cpl), 25n

McMullen, William C., III (Col), 244

McNamee, David S. (LCpl), 123

McRaney, Gerald, 59

McTernan, Walter F., II (LtCol), 244

Mechler, Kevin G. (1stLt), 157

Media

 amphibious landing exercises and, 55–56

 criticism of Highway of Death, 203

Mediterranean Sea, history of U.S. involvement in, 7

Mehran, Iran, 285

Mesopotamia, 1

Michaels, Gregory J. “Greg” (Sgt), 150

Middle East

 and Central Command, relationships in, 10

 political instability, 7

 Soviet Union collapse and, 19

 stability of, postwar, as issue, 213

 U.S. policy in, history of, 6–10

Midhat Pasha, 3

Military Airlift Command, U.S., 37, 259

Military Sealift Command, U.S., 36, 37, 42, 45, 63

Mills, John R. (LtCol), 245

Mina al-Ahmadi oil terminal, 261

Mines, land (minefields and obstacle belts)

 within Kuwait, 200

 penetration of, 191

 on Saddam Line, 98–99

 clearing techniques, 165, 170–71, 172–73

 effectiveness of, 188

 logistics and, 204

 losses to, 171, 173, 175

 penetration of, 156, 158, 159–60, 163, 164–66, 169–

70, 170–71, 172–74, 185, 267

 Schwarzkopf on, 208

Mines, naval

 Iranian, in Iran-Iraq War, 15, 258
314 Liberating Kuwait

Mines, naval (continued)

 Iranian, in Iran-Iraq War, (continued)

 Coalition losses to, 153, 258

 effectiveness of, 153

 Iraqi, in Desert Storm, 65, 137, 150

 Coalition clearing operations, 153, 216

 Coalition losses to, 262

Miracle well (Khanjar Combat Service Support Area), 140

Mishab, Saudi Arabia. See Ras al-Mishab, Saudi Arabia

Missiles and rockets, U.S.

 901A1 TOW 2 antitank guided missile, 109–10

 AGM 65 Maverick air-to-ground missile, 115

 AGM-88 high-speed antiradiation missile, 78, 160

 AGM-114 Hellfire air-to-surface missile, 197

 AIM-7 Sparrow radar-guided missile, 79, 146

 AT-4 antitank rocket, 182, 183

 Emerson 901A1 TOW 2 antitank guided missile, 96

 General Dynamics BG-109 Tomahawk cruise missile, 78

 MIM-23 medium-range surface-to-air missile, 87

 multiple rocket launchers, 172

 TOW antitank missile, 158, 189, 266

Missouri (BB 63), 141

Mobile (LKA 115), 63, 64, 216

Mogadishu, Somalia, evacuation of U.S. embassy in, 94, 260–61

Molofsky, Joseph (Capt), 52, 101, 102, 104, 119, 123, 127, 128,

133, 134

Mongols, 2

Moore, Molly, 186, 197, 202, 207

Moore, Royal N., Jr. (MajGen), 61, 83–84, 89, 244

Morale, Coalition, Christmas celebration of 1990 and, 58–59

Morale, Iraqi

 in Gulf War

 air war and, 92, 107, 143

 difficulty of evaluating, 143

 as poor, 21, 134, 142, 222

 in Iran-Iraq War, 284, 287

Morgan, George J. (Cpl), 173

Moroccan Army, 103, 124

Moseler, Daniel J. (LtCol), 249

Moser, Alan B. (Capt, USN), 94

The Mother of All Battles (Woods), 19, 221–22

Mount Vernon (LSD 39), 63

Moyer, John J. (LtCol), 244

Mroczkowski, Dennis P. (LtCol), 173–74, 196

Mubarak, Hosni, 21

Mugg, Stephen F. (LtCol), 244

Muhammad (Islamic prophet), 1

Muhammad, Husayn Rashid (LtGen, Iraq), 162

Musca, Joseph I. (Maj), 193, 194

Mustafa, Muzahim (Col, Iraqi Navy), 25

Mutla Ridge, 22, 24, 186, 195–97

Myatt, James M. (MajGen)

 and al-Burqan oil field, necessity of clearing, 185

 on Amphibious Task Force, 222

 and Battle of Burqan, 178

 attacks on headquarters of, 178–80, 183–85, 266

 as commander, 1st Marine Division, 45, 72, 164, 241

 and Desert Storm advance, 191, 194, 195, 201

 on Iraqi artillery, destruction of, 177

 and liaisons with Saudi Arabia forces, 52, 101

 and Marine uniforms, 271, 275, 276–77, 278

 and training of Saudi forces, 52

Myers, Clifford O., III (LtCol), 45, 115, 133–34, 169, 243

Naif (Lt Col, Saudi Arabia), 119, 128

Napier, Rollin G. (LtCol), 250

Nassau (LHA 4), 42, 58, 94, 149–50, 199, 202, 263

Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 5

National Command Authority, Rapid Deployment Joint Task

Force and, 9

NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization)

 Cold War and, 8

 and Operation Provide Comfort, 220

 Turkey and, 7

Naval Air, U.S.

 Helicopter Mine Countermeasures Squadron 14, 153

 in Iran-Iraq War, 17

Naval bases, U.S.

 Diego Garcia Naval Base, 15, 36, 39, 259

Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT), 32, 43, 64, 215,

248–50, 268

Naval Historical Center, 199–200

Navy, U.S. See also Amphibious Task Force

 and air tasking order, concerns about, 88–89

 battleship 16-inch guns, supporting fire by, 141–42, 153,

176, 187

 and Desert Shield, 35, 40, 42–43, 47

 reconnaissance, Marine dependence on, 143–44

 special operations forces, 15

 and Tanker War, 14–17

 and UN embargo on Iraq, enforcement of, 30

 unmanned aerial vehicles, fire direction control and, 141

 views on Gulf War, 222

Navy units, U.S. [in descending order]

 fleets

 Pacific Fleet, 47

 Seventh Fleet, 40

 Sixth Fleet, 7

 task forces

 Joint Task Force Middle East, 15, 35

 Landing Force (TG 150.8), 43

 groups

 Amphibious Group 2, 42

 Transit Group 1, 42

 Transit Group 2, 42

 Transit Group 3, 42

 regiments

 Naval Construction Regiment, 3d, 47, 62, 93, 241, 248

 Naval Special Warfare Command, SEALs (Sea, Air, and

Land Teams), 45, 57–58, 94, 102, 108,

118, 200

 battalions

 Navy Mobile Construction Battalions (Seabees), 47,

153, 248

 NMCB 4, 248

 NMCB 5, 248

 NMCB 7, 248

 NMCB 24, 248

 NMCB 40, 140, 248

 NMCB 74, 248

 squadrons

 Amphibious Squadrons

 PHIBRON 1, 64, 216

 PHIBRON 5, 40, 43, 110

 PHIBRON 6, 94

New Orleans (LPH 11), 63, 64, 216

New York Times, 72, 281

Nielsen, Thomas J. (Maj), 246
Index 315

Nixon, Richard M., 7

Nixon Doctrine, 7

Noland, William B. (LCpl), 157

Noline, Michael A. (LCpl), 96

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. See NATO

Norway, 8

Novak, Robert L. (Cpl), 173, 186

Nymeyer, Raymond L., 245

O’Brien, Philip J. (LtCol), 244

Observation Posts, 82, 84, 102–3

 numbering of, 116n

 OP 1, 102, 103, 106, 116–17, 119

 OP 2, 87, 102, 103, 106, 118

 OP 3, 153–54

 OP 4, 96, 102, 103, 106, 108–10, 111–16, 261, 262

 OP 5, 102–3, 117–18

 OP 6, 87, 95, 102, 103, 117, 141, 142

 OP 7, 102, 103, 106, 108, 121–22, 130

 OP 8, 102, 106, 108

O’Connor, Thomas O. (2dLt), 183

O’Donnell, James P. (LtCol), 242

O’Donovan, John A. (LtCol), 199

Ogden (LPD 5), 40, 45, 212

Oil

 demand for, and U.S. Middle East policy, 6–7

 embargo of 1973, 8

 Iraq’s pumping of into Persian Gulf, 87, 261

 price fall after Iran-Iraq War

 causes of, 19

 and Iraqi economy, 19

 as weapon, Iraqi plans to use, 65

Oil fields, Kuwaiti

 Iraqi burning of (“Tariq Project”), 95, 146, 150, 157, 160–

62, 168–69, 169–70, 171, 185

 toxins released by, 185

 and visibility, 178, 181, 183, 184, 186, 187, 191, 193,

197, 198, 204, 265, 266

 Iraqi sabotage of, 95

Okinawa (LPH 3), 15, 40, 44, 187, 220

Okland, Douglas A. (LtCol), 249

Oman, training in, 44

Omani Army, infantry battalion, 176

Omnibus Agreement for Command and Control of Marine Tactical Aviation in Sustained Operations Ashore

(1986), 15

OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries), 19

Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003)

 documents captured in, 149

 and fall of Saddam, 224

Operations. See also Desert Shield; Desert Storm

 Desert Fox, 221

 Earnest Will, 15–17, 258

 Eastern Exit, 94, 260–61

 Imminent Thunder, 55–56

 Northern Watch, 220, 222

 Praying Mantis, 17, 258

 Provide Comfort, 220

 Southern Watch, 221, 222

 Urgent Fury, 32

Oppliger, Michael W. (Capt), 246

Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries. See OPEC

Osirak, Israeli destruction of Iraqi nuclear reactor at, 12, 19, 64,

257

Ottoman Empire, 2–3, 6

Owen, Richard L., Jr. (LtCol), 245, 249

Pacific Command, U.S.

 and Central Command, cooperation with, 9

 and chain of command, 32

Pack, Aaron A. (Cpl), 160

Pahlavi, Muhammad Reza Shah, 7, 8

Pakistan, and Central Treaty Organization, 7

Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), 290

Palm, Leslie M. (Col), 60, 243

Panama, U.S. invasion of, 31

Pan-Arabism, Baath Party and, 5

Pankey, Paul A. (Col), 62, 247

Paris Peace Conference (1919), 4

Parkyn, Michael B. (LtCol), 203

Parthian Empire, 1

Pattee, Frederick T. (SgtMaj), 244

Paxton, Charles D. (CWO-2), 185–86

Peace, preparations for transition to, 209–10

Peace agreement, lack of, 213

“Peace Ship”, 58

Pearson, Jeremiah W., III (MajGen), 45, 241

Pensacola (LSD 38), 42

Peoria (LST 1183), 63, 64, 216

Persia, history of, 1, 2

Persian Gulf

 amphibious operations in, 43–44

 and Tanker War, 14–17

 U.S. policy in, history of, 6–10

 U.S. power projection in, and Maritime Prepositioning, 37

Pettine, John F. (LtCol), 245

PFC Eugene A. Obregon (T-AK 3006), 61

PFC James Anderson, Jr. (T-AK 3002), 39

PFC William B. Baugh (T-AK 3001), 39, 45

Pham, Duchoa (Cpl), 194

Phase Line Horse, 186

Pheasant (leased ship), 42, 45

Phelps, John F. (LtCol), 245

Philippines, earthquake of July 1990, 41

Platt, Christopher D. (Maj), 245

PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization), 290

Pollard, Roger L. (Capt), 109, 112, 113–15

Pomeroy, Steven M. (LtCol), 221

Porter, Christian J. (LCpl), 164

Portland (LSD 37), 42

Powell, Alexander W. (Col), 38, 46–47, 62, 246, 248

Powell, Colin, L. (Gen, USA), 32, 58

Powell Doctrine, 32

Powers, Jeffrey A. (Maj), 117

Prather, William M. (LtCol), 246

Price, Gary J. (LtCol), 245

Princeton (CG 59), 153

Prisoners of war, Iraqi, 81, 108, 110, 117, 120, 141, 142, 158, 160,

162

 on air war impact, 148–49

 at battle of al-Khafji, 128

 containment areas for, 199, 204–6, 263

 and Kuwaiti Resistance Forces, fear of, 201

 low morale of, 134, 142
316 Liberating Kuwait

Prisoners of war, Iraqi (continued)

 management of, 166–68, 170, 199, 204–7, 263, 267

 mass defection, false rumors of, 95

 minefield information provided by, 159

 misbehavior by, 201, 204–6

 predicted numbers of, 72, 290–91

 taken in ground campaign, 221

 1st day, 164, 166–68, 170, 171, 174, 176

 2d day, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 188, 266

 3d day, 191, 192, 196

 4th day, 200, 201

 post-cease-fire clearing operations, 212–13, 264

 total number of, 206

 U.S. cross-border raids to take, 141, 142

Prisoners of war, U.S.

 at Battle of al-Khafji, 126, 132

 female, 126

 Iraqi abuse of, 83, 89, 146, 187, 218

 Iraqi broadcast of film of, 261

 Iraqi cross-border raids in search of, 95, 101

 Iraqi failure to acknowledge, 89

 Iraqi perception of value of, 101

 Marine aviators as, 83, 89, 146, 187–88, 218, 221, 261, 262

 return of, 218, 264

Propaganda leaflets, Coalition, 150–53

Protzeller, Thomas R. (Capt), 117

Psychological warfare campaign

 in preparation for ground campaign, 150–53

 U.S. intelligence on potential effectiveness of, 289

Pugh, Richard L. (LtCol), 243

Purvis, Joseph H. “Joe” (LtCol, USA), 70, 71, 72

Pvt Harry Fisher (T-AK 3004), 39

Q-36 AN/TPO counterbattery radar, 160

Qaruh island, 110

Qasim, Abd al-Karim, 5, 6

Qatari Army

 ANGLICO teams with, 123–24

 armor, AMX-30 main battle tank, 124, 125, 126, 130

 armored battalion, 103, 175

 and battle of al-Khafji, 124, 125, 126, 127, 130

 mechanized brigade, 51, 119

 reliability of, Battle of al-Khafji as proof of, 133

 training, 52

Quigley, Kenneth W. (LtCol), 246

Quilter, Charles J., II (Col), 150, 159, 181, 199, 204

Quinlan, Scott M. (1stLt), 177

Qurnah, Iraq, 78

Ragawa, Saudi Arabia, 119

Railroads, World War I construction of in Iraq, 3

Raleigh (LPD 1), 42

Ramey, Peter M. (Capt), 140

Ramirez, Rick A. (Cpl), 141

Ramsperger, Sepp D. (Col), 243

Randolph, Gerald (Cpl), 173

Rania, Iraq, 219

Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, 8–9, 37, 257

Rapp, Michael L. (LtCol), 156, 242, 243

Ras al-Ghar, Saudi Arabia, 46

Ra’s al-Khafji, Saudi Arabia. See al-Khafji, Saudi Arabia

Ras al-Mishab, Saudi Arabia, 55, 84, 101, 103, 118, 119, 120, 123,

139, 176, 212, 261

Ras al-Qulayah, Kuwait, naval base at, 24, 25, 110, 121

Ras Tanura oil terminal, 87

Rathbun-Nealy, Melissa (Spec, USA), 126

Rawi, Ayyad Fateeh al-, (LtGen, Iraq), 66

Ray, Eddie S. (Capt), 178, 183, 184, 185, 266

Reagan, Ronald W., 14–15

Reagan Corollary, 8

Reconnaissance, limitations of, and air war damage assessments,

143–45, 146

Redlin, Robert K. (Col), 241

Reese, Anthony (SgtMaj), 250

Reid (FFG 30), 35

Renaissance Party. See Baath (Renaissance) Party

Rens, Arlen D. (LtCol), 245

Restifo, Charles T. (SSgt), 159–60

Rhodes, John E. (Col), 40, 55, 110, 212, 250

Richard, Ronald G. (Col), 243

Rietsch, Manfred A. (Col), 38, 45, 82, 85, 89, 144, 204, 244

Ritchie, William H., III (Capt), 248

Rivera, Manuel, Jr. (Capt), 94

Rivers, Robert W. (LtCol), 242

Rivers and waterways

 Euphrates, 1, 5

 Shatt al-Arab waterway, 5, 10, 13

 Tigris, 1, 5, 200

Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, 45, 47

Riznychok, William L. (LtCol), 246

Roads

 al-Jahra road, 72

 al-Salami road, 195

 Atraf road junction (Kuwait), 24

 coastal highway, Kuwait, 39, 47, 48, 57, 102, 104, 108, 118,

119, 120, 121, 175

 Highway of Death, 196–98, 202, 203–4

 six-ring road, 195

 Tapline Road, 47, 48

Robert G. Bradley (FFG 49), 35

Robichaud, Robert S. (LtCol), 250

Rodebaugh, Ritchie L. (Capt), 247

Rodriguez, Paul G. (Sgt), 27, 27n, 28, 29

Rogers, Theron D. (LtCol), 250

Roman Empire, 1

Romei, Timothy W. (Cpl), 44

Roosevelt, Franklin D., 6

Rose, Daniel R. (LtCol), 245

Ross, Steven A. (1stLt), 109, 110, 111–16

Route packages, air campaign planning and, 15

Rowe, Peter J. (BGen), 62, 64, 137, 249

Royal Military Academy (Sandhurst), 51

Royal Saudi forces. See under Saudi Arabia

Royer, Mark E. (Cpl), 27n, 29

Rumaylahl oil field, Iraqi claims to, 21

Russia, and Kuwait invasion, training of Iraqi forces in, 25

Ryan, John E. (LtCol), 246

Sabah, Sheik Fahd al-Ahmed al-, 24

Sabah family, 6

 Arab League support for, 30

 deposing of, by Saddam, 30

Sabalan (Iranian frigate), 17
Index 317

Sabkha, 102, 123

Sachtleben, James L. (LtCol), 141, 242

Saddam Hussein

 air attack on convoy of, 106

 and Battle of al-Khafji, visit to commanders prior to, 105–

6, 261

 on cease-fire, 222

 and Coalition, expectations for collapse of, 55, 64, 65, 68,

101

 and Coalition air campaign, expectations for, 97

 Coalition decision not to remove from power, Iraqi views

on, 134, 222

 and Coalition ground campaign

 efforts to provoke, 97–98

 views on, 178

 and Coalition military response

 expectations for, 64, 65, 68

 strategy to meet, 66

 coup attempt by (1959), 5

 detention of U.S. personnel in Baghdad embassy, 27

 distrust of regular Army, 21, 282, 283

 on Gulf War, outcome of, 221–22

 and Iran-Iraq War, 10, 11–12

 fear of political consequences of excessive casualties,

287

 fear of Shiite-majority common soldiers, 287–88

 status after, 18

 and Iraqi air defenses, orders to conserve ammunition, 87

 on Iraqi people, toughness of, 288

 Iraqi uprisings against, postwar, 219

 and Kuwait

 annexation of, 31

 monarchy, deposing of, 30

 pretexts for invasion of, 19–21

 maximization of U.S. casualties as strategy of, 21, 95, 97–

98, 105, 288, 289

 and military reforms, 11–12

 on “Mother of All Battles,” 97, 98

 officers’ fear of, 282

 opposition to oil-rich Gulf states, 30

 removal from power, 224

 rise to power, 6, 257

 and Scud missile attacks, expectations for effect of, 82

 self-image as great Arab leader, 19–20

 on suicide bombers as weapon against United States, 20

 on United States

 anti-Iraq conspiracy of, 19–20, 21

 lack of resolve of, 20–21, 98, 105, 288, 289

 perception of, 13

 preparations for confrontation with, 20

 U.S. intelligence on, 289–90

 and U.S. prisoners, desire for, 101

 and U.S. response to Kuwait invasion, expectations for, 20–

21

 and withdrawal from Kuwait, 188

Saddam Line, 98–99

 breaching of, 263

 by 1st Marine Division, 163–71, 174–75

 by 2d Marine Division, 172–75

 by Joint Forces Command–East, 175–76

Saeed, Ali (Col, Qatar), 124

Safavids, 2

Safwan, Iraq, 200, 213, 218, 219

Saginaw (LST 1188), 42

Saikowski, Robert (LtCol), 249

Samuel B. Roberts (FFG 58), 15, 258

Sanborn, Russell A. C. (Capt), 146–47, 218, 262, 264

Sanders, Michael D. (Cpl), 141

Sassanid Persian Empire, 1

Sassan oil platform, 15–16

Saud, Fahd bin Adbul Aziz al- (King of Saudi Arabia), 33, 123,

126

Saudi Arabia, 48–49

 and al-Khafji, perspective on Battle of, 134

 and al-Khafji, response to fall of, 123

 and Arab leadership, struggle over, 30

 border forts, 102

 deployment to, 35–47. See also Maritime Prepositioning

Ship Squadrons

 Amphibious Task Force, 40–45

 billeting in, 39

 cultural differences and, 49–50

 efforts to minimize impact on Saudis, 39, 49–50

 1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade, 45

 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, 45–47

 first U.S. forces, 35

 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, 41–42, 43

 Marine arrival in, experience of, 38–39

 maritime prepositioning and, 36–37

 restrictions on U.S. troops, 50

 Saudi agreement to, 30, 258

 Saudi image and, 49

 7th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, 37–40, 45

 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit, 40–41, 43

 unit cohesion and, 45

 embassy in Kuwait City, recapture of, 199

 infrastructure improvements, U.S. deployment and, 35, 47

 and Iran-Iraq War, 19

 and Iraqi dead, burial of, 211

 Iraqi intentions toward, 55n

 Iraqi Scud missiles fired at, 82, 147, 261

 Kuwaiti units’ retreat to, 24, 25

 planned defense of, 47–48

 response to Kuwait invasion, 29–30, 290

 U.S. aid to, 7

 history of, 48–49

 for port and airfield improvements, 37

 U.S. relationship with

 benefits of, 48–49

 political impact of for Saudis, 49

 and U.S. Middle East policy, 7, 8

 and USO entertainers, restrictions on, 60

 Wahhabism in, 50n

Saudi Arabian air bases

 al-Jubayl Naval Air Facility, 46, 259

 King Abdul Aziz airfield, 46, 80, 86

 Shaikh Isa Air Base, 45

Saudi Arabian aircraft

 F-15C, 87

 Northrop F-5, 126

 Panavia Tornado, 126

Saudi Arabian Air Force (Royal Saudi Air Defense Forces), 50,

51

Saudi Arabian armor

 Cadillac Gage V-150 Commando armored car, 127, 130

 M60 tank, 125

 M113 armored personnel carrier, 125
318 Liberating Kuwait

Saudi Arabian-Kuwaiti border. See also Observation Posts; Saddam Line

 Coalition loudspeaker broadcasts across, 150, 153

 defense of, two breach attack plan and, 137

 Iraqi fortifications along, 98–99

 Iraqi prisoners taken along, 141, 142

 Saudi border forts, 102

 U.S. artillery raids across, 95–96, 106, 141–43, 153–54

Saudi Arabian Marines (Royal Saudi Marines), 52, 103, 119, 176

Saudi Arabian military. See also Saudi Arabian Air Force; Saudi

Arabian Marines; Saudi Arabian Ministry of Defense and Aviation; Saudi Arabian National Guard

(SANG)

 and Coalition command structure, 51

 relations with Marines, 101

 structure of, 50–51

 U.S. liaisons with, 52–54

 U.S. training of, 51, 52–53

Saudi Arabian Ministry of Defense and Aviation

 Mechanized Brigades

 8th, 103, 125, 128, 175

 10th, 103, 176, 188

 training and morale of, 50–51, 128, 188

Saudi Arabian missiles

 AIM-9 Sidewinder air-to-air missile, 87

 TOW antitank missile, 127

Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG)

 2d Brigade, 52, 101, 103, 124, 175

 5th Battalion, 103, 119, 125, 128, 130

 7th Battalion, 125, 127–28, 130, 262

 8th Battalion, 124, 125, 130, 262

 8th Brigade, 119

 10th Brigade, 119

 in Joint Forces Command, 51

 Marine air-naval gunfire teams and, 122, 123

 Marine liaison to, 52

 role of, 50

 training and morale of, 50–51, 128

 U.S. training of, 51

“Saudi Motors,” 139

Scanlan, John M. (Capt), 148

Scheffler, William W. (Col), 248

Schenkel, Gary K. (Maj), 250

Scherck, Russell O. (Maj), 250

Schmidle, Robert E. (Maj), 78

Schmidt, Larry S. (Col), 60, 243

Schneider, Kyle (PFC), 160

Schneller, Robert J., Jr., 199–200

Schreiber, Klaus D. (Col), 243

Schwarzkopf, H. Norman, Jr. (Gen, USA)

 and amphibious forces, planned use of, 137, 153

 briefing of Saudis, 33

 career of, 32

 and cease-fire negotiations, 213

 as commander, Central Command, 32, 258

 as commander of Gulf War forces, 32

 and Desert Shield, amphibious units in, 43–44

 and Desert Storm, planning of, 68–69, 70, 72, 74–75

 and ground assault, preparations for, 147

 headquarters, Marine representation in, 75

 and Iraqi-held prisoners, return of, 218

 and Iraqi military, responses to preparatory probing attacks,

158

 on Marine performance in Desert Storm, 208

 and Marines, faith in capability of, 75

 “Mother of All Briefings,” 208

 and Operation Imminent Thunder, 55

Scroggins, Coy R. (LtCol, USA), 244

2dLt John P. Bobo (T-AK 3008), 61

Secretary of Defense, and chain of command, 32

Selvage, Donald R. (LtCol), 250

September 11 terrorist attacks, 1

Service chiefs, and chain of command under Goldwater-Nichols

Act, 31–32

Sgt Matej Kocak (T-AK 3005), 61

Shaikh Isa, Bahrain, 86, 146, 148

Shaw, Gary D. (Maj), 120

Sheehan, John J. (MajGen), 75, 241

Shia Islam

 history of, 1

 in Iraq

 history of, 2–3

 and Iran-Iraq War, 11

 ordinary soldiers of Army as, 287–88

 postwar uprising against Saddam, 219–20

Ship types, U.S.

 aircraft maintenance ships, 39

 amphibious assault ships, 268

 amphibious vessels, 15, 63

 aviation logistics support ships, 147

 battleships, 141–42, 153, 176, 187

 carriers, 35

 command ships, 35

 cruisers, 17, 35

 destroyers, 17, 35

 frigates, 15, 35

 guided missile cruisers, 35

 Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS), 37, 39, 45, 216

Shreveport (LPD 12), 42

Shupp, Michael A. (Capt), 115, 117

Simpson, Victor A. (LtCol), 244

Sirri oil platform, 15–16

Six-Day War (1967), 10

Skipper, Charles O. (LtCol), 247

Slavenas, Marcus C. (LCpl), 123

Small, Joseph J., III (Maj), 187–88, 218, 263, 264

Small arms, U.S.

 AT4 antitank weapon, 109

 light antiarmor weapons (LAAWs), 191

 M16 rifle, 109

 M60 machine gun, 109

 M249 squad automatic weapon, 109

 machine guns, 191

 MK19 grenade launcher, 158, 191

 thermite grenades, 191

Smith, Charlie F. (LtCol), 247

Smith, J. B. (SSgt), 27, 27n, 29–30

Smith, Michael H. (LtCol), 171, 242

Smith, Rodney N. (LtCol), 242

Snipers, Iraqi, 196

Snyder, Larry (CWO), 191

Snyder, Marshall K. (Maj), 250

Sollis, John B. (LtCol), 242

Somalia, evacuation of U.S. embassy in, 94, 260–61

Songer, Robert L. (Maj), 206

Sorrell, Dennis C. (LtCol), 246

Southern Command, 32

Souvenirs of Gulf War, regulations on, 214
Index 319

Soviet Union

 Afghanistan invasion, 8, 19, 285

 collapse of, and Middle East destabilization, 19

 diplomatic efforts to prevent war, 77

 Iraq as client state of, 19

 and hope for protection from United States, 21

 Iraqi diplomacy and, 55

 in Middle East, 8

 response to Kuwait invasion, 29

 as source of Iraqi missiles, 64

Spanish Army, and Operation Provide Comfort, 220

Sparks, Grant M. (LtCol), 247

Sparrow, Linden L. (LtCol), 206, 247

Special operations forces, in Iran-Iraq War, 15

Special Plans Group (“Jedi Knights”), 70–72, 72–73

Spellacy, David M. (Capt), 187, 263

Spencer, Rafe J. (SgtMaj), 274

Spencer, William X. (LtCol), 249

Springer, Stephen G. (Capt), 82

Stalin, Joseph, 6

Stallings, Jon A. (Capt), 250

Stanley, Clifford L. (Col), 215

Stanton, Martin N. (Capt, USA), 24–25

Stark (FFG 31), 13, 15, 20–21, 65, 257, 283

Stark, Thomas IV (Sgt), 184

State Department, and Baghdad embassy, 27

Steed, Billy C. (Col), 241

Steele, Michael L. (Maj.), 120

Stennick, John F. (Col), 242

Stensrud, Thorys J. (LtCol), 249

Sterling, Patrick A. (LCpl), 123

Stewart, Joseph R. (LtCol), 243

Stouffer, Thomas D. (Col), 246

Stout, Jay A. (Capt), 77, 82, 87

Strait of Hormuz, 14, 17, 43

Stricklin, Gregory R. (Cpl), 160

Strong Texan (T-AK 9670), 42

Stuart, George G. (LtCol), 245

Sudairy, Ahmad al- (BGen, Saudi Arabia), 126

Suez Canal, 7, 42

Suicide bombers, Saddam Hussein’s endorsement of, 20

Sumerians, 1

Sunni Islam

 history of, 1

 in Iraq

 history of, 2–3, 6

 leadership of Army as, 287–88

 political prominence of, 3, 4

Susangerd, Battle of, 10–11

Sutton, Russell L. (BGen), 243

Sweeney, Chris A. (LCpl), 180–81

Swofford, Anthony (LCpl), 156, 163–64

Swords, Michael J. (LtCol), 243

Sylvester, John B. (Col, USA), 75, 172n, 174, 195–96, 197–98, 243

Syria

 and Arab leadership, struggle over, 30

 Baath Party in, 5, 30

 and postwar Middle East, 213

Syrian Army, 51, 72, 163, 185, 201, 207, 290

Talkington, Rory E. (Capt), 142

Tallil, Iraq, 78

Tanker War, 10n, 14–17, 258

Tarawa (LHA 1), 63, 147, 262

Tariq Project. See Oil fields, Kuwaiti, Iraqi burning of

Tariq Task Force, 103

Task forces. See also under Marine Corps units

 Joint Task Force Middle East, 15, 35

 Joint Task Force Southwest Asia, 220–21

 Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, 8–9, 37, 257

Taylor (FFG 50), 35

Taylor, Michael (LtCol, USA), 127

Tehran Conference (1943), 6

Tel Aviv, Israel, 82

Thanksgiving 1990, VIP visits to troops on, 58

Thatcher, Margaret H., 29

Thompson, Phillip (Capt), 160, 210–11

Thorp, James K. (Capt), 145

Tice, Ralph F. (LtCol), 245

Tikrit, rise of Baathists from, 6

Tippin, Aaron, 60

Toney, Shawn (Sgt), 184

Training

 for amphibious operations, 44

 reconnaissance training, in Saudi Arabia, 103–4

 of Saudi and Qatari forces, 51, 52–53

 Saudi restrictions on, 39

 in special operations, 40–41

Training exercises

 Bold Guard 90, 41

 Bright Star, 10

 Gallant Eagle, 10

 Internal Look 90, 22, 32–33

 Sea Soldier III, 57

 Sea Soldier I–II, 44

 Sea Soldier IV, 93–95

 Teamwork, 41

 to test joint and combined operations, 55

Trainor, Bernard E. (LtGen), 32n, 72, 281–91

Trenton (LPD 14), 15, 42, 57–58, 94, 258, 260

Tripoli (LPH 10), 63, 153, 216, 262

Troffer, Lawrence E. (LtCol), 247

Trumpe, Drake F. (Col), 249

Turkey

 and Central Treaty Organization, 7

 and NATO, 7

 as threat to Iraq during Gulf War, 290

Turner, John H. (Maj), 181

Turner, John R. (Maj), 248

The Twelve Months of Exile (Marine Christmas Carol parody), 60

Twin Pillars policy, 7, 8

Tystad, Douglas L. (LtCol, USA), 244

Umayyad Caliphate, 1–2

Umm al-Maradim island, 110

Umm Gudair oil fields, 141

Umm Hajul, Iraq, 99

Umm Hujul, Kuwait, 96

Umm Qasr, Iraq, 150, 200

UN. See United Nations

Underwood, Reginald C. “Woody” (Capt), 150, 202–3

Uniforms and equipment

 authority governing, 271, 277

 boots, 277–78
320 Liberating Kuwait

Uniforms and equipment (continued)

 desert battle dress

 correct wear, 276

 shortages of, 276

 flak jackets/armored vests, 276, 277

 hats

 desert, individual styling of, 274–75

 green camouflage utility cap, 275

 nonregulation, 271, 274, 277

 jackets

 mission-oriented protective posture, 277

 night desert camouflage parka, 276–77

 Kevlar helmets, 276, 277

 nonregulation clothing, 271, 277, 278

 tolerance of, in unusual circumstances, 278

 nonregulation insignia and markings, 271, 274, 275, 277

 pistol, manners of wearing, 271

 pistol lanyard, manners of wearing, 271–74

 service and rank insignia, 275–76

 supply shortages, 271, 276, 277

 trousers

 mission-oriented protective posture, 277

 night desert camouflage, 277

 varieties worn, 271, 277

 web trouser belt, 278

United Arab Emirates, OPEC and, 19

United Arab Republic, history of, 5

United Nations (UN)

 embargo on Iraq

 effect of in Iraq, 288

 enforcement of, 45, 57–58, 260

 imposition of, 30, 45

 Iran-Iraq War cease-fire resolution, 17

 Security Council

 deadline for Iraqi withdrawal, 77, 261

 Resolution 660, 29

 Resolution 661, 30, 45

 Resolution 678, 260

 Resolution 688, 220

 response to Kuwait invasion, 29, 30, 258

United Service Organizations (USO), shows, holiday season of

1990, 58–59

United States

 Congressional authorization for war, 77, 261

 response to Kuwait invasion, 29, 31, 258

 and ejection of Iraq, decision to undertake, 55, 62,

64, 72, 260

 Iraqi expectations for, 21

 Saddam’s expectations for, 20–21

 U.S. Operations Plan 1002-90 and, 22, 32–33

 Saddam on

 anti-Iraq conspiracy of, 19–20, 21

 lack of resolve of, 20–21, 98, 105, 288, 289

 perception of, 13

 preparations for confrontation with, 20

United States military

 in 1990, as untested, 31, 36

 chain of command, Goldwater-Nichols Act reorganization

of, 31–33

 commanders, 32–33

 demoralization of in 1970s–80s, 31

Uskoski, Scott A. (Cpl), 123

USO. See United Service Organizations

Utbi tribes, 6

Vancouver (LPD 2), 63

Vandegrift (FFG 48), 35

Vanderlinden, Guy M. (LtCol), 250

Van Riper, James K. (Col), 243

Vehicles, U.S.

 6x6 5-ton truck, 109

 General Dynamics LAV-25 light armored vehicle, 95, 114

 High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV)

[humvee], 95, 104, 109, 126, 130, 157, 175,

211

 Logistics Vehicle System, 204

 XM93 Fox chemical reconnaissance vehicle, 172

Vesely, James E. (LtCol), 247

Vietnam War

 awards and citations, LtGen Boomer on, 214–15

 homecoming experience of troops, 218

 Saddam Hussein on, 21

 and specter of lingering defeat, 21, 31

 Third World militaries’ interest in, 281–82

Vincennes (CG 49), 17, 258

Vinnell Corporation, 51, 126

Wadi al-Batin, 47, 66, 70, 154, 163, 189

Wafrah. See al-Wafrah

Wagner, Scott A. (Cpl), 123

Wahhabism, in Saudi Arabia, 50n

Waldron, John E. (LCpl), 193

Waldron, Joseph (LtCol), 242

Wallace, Robert J. (LtCol), 249

Walsh, David F. (Cdr, USN), 248

Walsh, John S. (Capt), 187, 263

Walters, Larry D. (LtCol), 247

Ward, Mark T. (Sgt), 27n

Ward, Troy A. (Capt), 157

Warden, John A., III (Col, USAF), 69

Warfighting (FMFM1). See Fleet Marine Force Manual 1,

Warfighting

“War of the Cities,” 12, 14, 17, 258

Warren, William J. (Sgt), 174

Washington Post, 186, 202

Weapons of mass destruction. See Iraqi weapons of mass destruction

Weldon, Christopher M. (Maj), 247

Wells, at Khanjar Combat Service Support Area, 140

West, Randall L. (Col), 63, 250

Weyeneth, Clifton R. (Maj), 249

White, Dickie J. (LtCol), 245

Wilburn, James N., III (Capt), 148, 263

Williams, Glenn R. (LtCol), 248

Williams, Michael J. (Col), 61, 245

Williams, Phillip S. (SgtMaj), 247

Williams, Robert L. (LtCol), 244

Williams, Scott P. (Lt), 113, 114

Williams, T. J. (LtCol), 249

Willis, Edmund W., III (Cpl), 117

Wilson, Joseph C., IV, 25–27

Wimbrown VII (barge), 15

Winchester, John D. (LtCol), 173, 244

Winter, Edward J. (Capt), 248

Wisconsin (BB 64), 141, 176

Withdrawal of U.S. forces

 homecoming experience of Marines, 218
Index 321

 logistics of, 213–18

 safety concerns in, 214

Wittle, David L. (LtCol), 248

Witzke, Harold R. (SFC, USA), 196

Wojdakowski, Walter (LtCol, USA), 244

Woodarek, Jude A. (LCpl), 123

Woodhead, John A., III (Col), 247

Woods, Kevin W., 19, 82, 221–22

Woodson, Thomas S. (LtCol), 204–6, 247

World War I, 3–4, 50

World War II, 6

Wright (T-AVB3), 42, 147

Wright, Christopher G. (Capt), 250

Wright, Larry W. (LtCol), 242

Yeosock, John J. (LtGen, USA), 43, 74–75

Yom Kippur War (1973), 8, 290

Youngs, Brian M. (LtCol), 243

Yugoslavia, breakup of, 1

Zagros Mountains, 10

Zaki, Yaiyd Khalel (MajGen, Iraq), 66, 99, 105

Zawalick, Russell T. (Cpl), 113, 114–15

Zedin, Hussan (BGen, Iraq), 99, 107, 116

Zegar, Richard H. (LtCol), 246

Zickefoose, Bryan K. (Cpl), 182

Zimmick, Steven M. (Maj), 93

Zinni, Anthony C. (BGen), 220

Zobel, Eric D. (Maj), 246

Cover: Marines of Task Force Shepherd roll

into Kuwait International Airport in light armored vehicles after the defeat of Iraqi forces.

At right is a CH-53 Sea Stallion helicopter.

Photo by TSgt David McLeod
HISTORY DIVISION U.S. MARINE CORPS QUANTICO, VA