alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
From: Higgins, Cortney [mailto:Cortney_Higgins@omb.eop.gov] 

Sent: Sunday, June 01, 2014 7:54 PM 

To: Hoffman, Howard 

Cc: Tsirigotis, Peter; Wayland, Robertj; Culligan, Kevin 

Subject: Re: One more thing -- RE: Legal Memo -- revised draft 

We have no further edits. Please let me know if there are any edits to this document or any of the 

TSDs. 

Regards, 

Cortney 

From: Hoffman, Howard [mailto:hoffman.howard@epa.gov] 

Sent: Sunday, June 01, 2014 04:26 PM Eastern Standard Time 

To: Higgins, Cortney 

Cc: Tsirigotis, Peter <Tsirigotis.Peter@epa.gov>; Wayland, Robertj 

<Wayland.Robertj@epa.gov>; Culligan, Kevin <Culligan.Kevin@epa.gov> 

Subject: One more thing -- RE: Legal Memo -- revised draft 

Cortney – in the last draft, we should have included a footnote, as follows: 

In the clean version, on p. 42, at the end of the second full paragraph, after the phrase “(in which 

case, the standard will reflect a relatively larger part of the emission performance level)”, add new 

fn. 79, and renumber the rest of the footnotes accordingly. 

In the red-line version, on p. 47, at the end of the carryover paragraph, add this as new fn. 82, and 

renumber the rest of the footnotes accordingly. 

Attached are a revised red-line version and clean version with this addition. 

Howard J. Hoffman US EPA-OGC-Air (202) 564-5582 (voice) (240) 401-9721 (cell) (202) 564-5603 

(fax) 

CONFIDENTIAL communication for internal deliberations only; may contain deliberative, attorneyclient, attorney work product, or otherwise privileged material; do not distribute outside EPA or 

DOJ. 

<< Leg-Mem_05-30-14_06-01-14_4-15pm_red-line.docx >> 

<< Leg-Mem_06-01-14_4-15pm_clean.docx >>
###### Editorial Note on [Part 1926](/current/title-29/part-1926?toc=1)

#### Editorial Notes:

1. At [44 FR 8577](https://www.federalregister.gov/citation/44-FR-8577), Feb. 9, 1979, and corrected at [44 FR 20940](https://www.federalregister.gov/citation/44-FR-20940), Apr. 6, 1979, OSHA reprinted without change the entire text of [29 CFR part 1926](/on/2024-09-19/title-29/part-1926) together with certain General Industry Occupational Safety and Health Standards contained in [29 CFR part 1910](/on/2024-09-19/title-29/part-1910), which have been identified as also applicable to construction work. This republication developed a single set of OSHA regulations for both labor and management forces within the construction industry.

2. Nomenclature changes to part 1926 appear at [84 FR 21597](https://www.federalregister.gov/citation/84-FR-21597), May 14, 2019.

#### § 1926.1102 Coal tar pitch volatiles; interpretation of term.

Note:

The requirements applicable to construction work under this section are identical to those set forth at [§ 1910.1002 of this chapter](/on/2024-09-19/title-29/section-1910.1002).

[[61 FR 31433](https://www.federalregister.gov/citation/61-FR-31433), June 20, 1996]
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v David James Bradley, Appellant.

[698 NYS2d 891]

—Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Suffolk County (Cacciabaudo, J.), rendered November 24, 1998, convicting him of rape in the first degree, sodomy in the first degree, sexual abuse in the first degree, course of sexual conduct against a child in the first degree, and endangering the welfare of a child, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The record establishes that the defendant knowingly, volun*467tarily, and intelligently entered his plea of guilty *(see, People v Harris,*61 NY2d 9; *People v Anderson,*260 AD2d 643).

The defendant’s remaining contentions are either unpreserved for appellate review *(see,*CPL 470.05 [2]) or lacking in merit *(see, People v Frederick,*45 NY2d 520; *People v Tinsley,*35 NY2d 926; *People v McCray,*262 AD2d 585; *see also, People v Calloway,*176 Misc 2d 161). Bracken, J. P., S. Miller, Thompson and Friedmann, JJ., concur.
§ 1952.10 Tennessee. ( a ) The Tennessee State plan received initial approval on July 5, 1973.
( b ) The Tennessee State plan received final approval on July 22, 1985.
( c ) Under the terms of the 1978 Court Order in *AFL-CIO* v. *Marshall,* compliance staffing levels (benchmarks) necessary for a “fully effective” enforcement program were required to be established for each State operating an approved State plan. In September 1984 Tennessee, in conjunction with OSHA, completed a reassessment of the levels initially established in 1980 and proposed revised compliance staffing benchmarks of 22 safety and 14 health compliance officers. After opportunity for public comment and service on the AFL-CIO, the Assistant Secretary approved these revised staffing requirements on July 22, 1985.
( d ) The plan covers all private-sector employers and employees, with several notable exceptions, as well as State and local government employers and employees, within the State. For current information on these exceptions and for additional details about the plan, please visit *http://www.osha.gov/dcsp/osp/stateprogs/tennessee.html .*
1 ... T h i s pr oce edi n g ar i s es ou t of Cau s e N o. 89- 09- 00928- CR , s t y l ed St at e v. Rober t J am es Wat s on , i n t he 2 nd 2 5 t h Jud i ci al D i st ri ct C o urt , G uad al up e C o unt y , T exas, t he H o no rable W
. C
. K i rkenda l l presi d i ng. i i i i i i



### MEM ORA ND UM OP INION No
. 04 -0 9- 00 46 8- CR IN RE Rob e rt

Jame s WATSON Orig inal Mandamus Proce eding 1 PER C URI AM Sitt ing: Kar en Ang elini, J ustice

Phy lis S peedlin, Just ice Steven C. Hilbig, Just ice Deliver ed and F iled: Aug ust 12, 2009 PETI TI ON F OR WR I T OF MANDAMUS DI SMI SSED FOR L ACK OF J URI SDI CTI ON On J uly 31, 2009, rela tor Robert James W atson filed a pe tition for writ of mandamus, see king to compel the trial c ourt to “set aside judgme nt and sentenc e in this cause and dis pose of this matter as law and justice require s in this cause.” I n 1990, rela tor plead g

uilty to ag g rava ted robbe ry

and wa s sentenc ed to 45 y ear s’ conf inement. Relator did not timely appea l the conviction to this court. On ly the Te xas C ou rt

of Cr imi na l A pp eal s has j ur isd ic tio n o ve r m a tte rs re la te d to po stconviction re lief fr om an otherw ise final felony conviction. Se e At e r v . E igh th C ou rt o f A pp e als , 802 S
. W
. 2 d 2 4 1 , 2 4 3 ( T e x. 19 91 ); see also T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . ANN . art. 11.07 (V ernon Supp.04
- 09
- 00 46 8- CR

- 2- 20 08 ); Bd . o f Pa rd on s & Pa ro le

s e x re l. Ke e ne v . Cou rt o

f A pp e als for

Ei gh th D ist
. , 910 S.W .2d 481, 4 8 3 (T ex . C ri m . Ap p . 1 9 9 5 ) (h o l d i n g t h at “A rt i cl e 11
. 0 7 p ro v i d es t h e ex cl u s i v e me an s t o ch al l en ge
a final felony conviction.”)
. Be cause the relief soug ht in rela tor’s petition r elates to post-conviction relief from an othe rwise f

inal felony

conviction, we a

re w ithout jurisdi ction to consider his petition for wr it of mandamus. Acc ording ly , re l at o r’ s petition is DI SMI SSED FOR L ACK OF J URI SDI CTI ON. Ad dit ion a lly , r e la tor

fi le d a n A pp lic a tio n for

L e a ve to F ile Pe tit ion

fo r Wr it o f M a nd a mus . N o le a v e is r e q u ir e d to f il e a p e ti ti o n f

o r a w r it o f ma

n d a mu s in th is c o u rt. T EX . R. A PP . P. 52. There fore , rela tor’s motion for lea ve to file is DENI ED as moot. P E R C U R I A M DO NO T PU B L I SH
#### CHAPMAN v. CHESAPEAKE & OHIO RY. CO.

Ohio Appeals, 1st Dist., Hamilton Co.

No. 3522.

Decided Feb. 3, 1930

Grischy & Grischy, Cincinnati, for Chapman.

Galvin & Tracy and Paul Geohegan, all of Cincinnati, for Railway Co.

CUSHING, P.J.

Plaintiff testified as to the sudden movement of the train. Another passenger, Robert Demmy, was seated on the rear platform, .and testified, that as the train lurched, he was thrown from his chair, and -protected himself from falling by grabbing the rail around the platform.

There is evidence that the train was within five miles of the station at Ashland, and just prior to the lurch was moving smoothly along the tracks. There is also evidence that the forward- jerk of the train w,as violent, unusual, and sudden. From this evidence a reasonable inference may be drawn that the sudden jerk of the train was unnecessary. The verdict was instructed upon a construction of the evidence that there was no proof that the sudden, unusual, and violent movement of the train was unneces-. sary.

The questions of whether the jerk of the train was so unnecessary as to constitute a failure to exercise due care, and whether, if necessary, a proper amount of care had been used to secure the door, should have been submitted to the jury.

For error of the court in instructing the verdict, the judgment will be reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial.

ROSS & HAMILTON, J.J., concur.
#### Charlie Benson BOWEN, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Ralph KEMP, Warden Georgia Diagnostic and Classification Center, Respondent-Appellant.

No. 84-8327.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

Jan. 28, 1987.

Susan V. Boleyn, William B. Hill, Jr., Asst. Attys. Gen., Atlanta, Ga., for respondent-appellant.

Paul H. Kehir, Snellville, Ga. (Court-appointed), for petitioner-appellee.

Before RONEY, Chief Judge, GODBOLD, TJOLAT, HILL, FAY, VANCE, KRAVITCH, JOHNSON, HATCHETT, ANDERSON, CLARK and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.

*ON SUA SPONTE RECONSIDERATION*

BY THE COURT:

On the Court’s own motion, a majority of the judges in active service having voted in favor of rehearing this appeal en banc,

IT IS ORDERED that the mandate issued on July 11, 1986, is RECALLED and that this case shall be heard by this court *1008sitting en banc, *with*oral argument on a date hereafter to be fixed. The clerk will specify a briefing schedule for the filing of en banc briefs.

The previous panel’s opinion and the order entered on December 2, 1985, denying rehearing and rehearing en banc are VACATED.
#### MOLNAR v BERISWELL, et

Ohio Supreme Court

No 21998.

Decided May 7, 1930

Marshall, C. J., Kinkade, Robinson, Day and Allen,' JJ., concur. Jones, J., dissents from the judgment.
**EXHIBIT 23**

[KPMG LLP LOGO HERE]

**Consent of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm**

 

The Board of Directors

LaBarge, Inc.:

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the registration statements (Nos. 333-53583, 333-108357, 333-124556, 033-62215 and 333-121031) on Form S-8 of LaBarge, Inc. and subsidiaries (the Company) of our report dated August 28, 2009, with respect to the consolidated balance sheets of the Company as of June 28, 2009 and June 29, 2008, and the related consolidated statements of income,stockholders’ equity, and cash flows for each of the years in the three-year period ended June 28, 2009, and the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting as of June 28, 2009, which report appears in the June 28, 2009 annual report on Form 10-Kof the Company.The Company acquired Pensar Electronic Solutions, LLC (Pensar) during the year ended June 28, 2009, and management excluded from its assessment of the effectiveness of the Company’s internal control over financial reporting as of June 28, 2009 Pensar’sinternal control over financial reporting associated with total assets of $48.9 million and total revenues of $25.9 million included in the consolidated financial statements of the Company as of and for the year ended June 28, 2009. Our audit of internal control overfinancial reporting of the Company also excluded an evaluation of the internal control over financial reporting of Pensar.

/s/KPMG LLP

St. Louis, Missouri

August 28, 2008
#### § 1910.214 Cooperage machinery. [Reserved]
December 22, 2015 United States Department ofTransportation Docket Management System 1200 NewJersey Ave., SE West Building Ground Floor Room W12-140 Washington, DC 20590 RE: Amendment to Exemption No. 11367, Regulatory Docket No. FAA-2015-0106 Dear Sir or Madam: We are writing pursuant to the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of2012 and the procedures contained in 14 C.F.R. 11 , to request that ADM Crop Risk Services, Inc. ("ADMCRS"), an already FAA approved owner and operator ofsmall unmanned aircraft to add another aircraft to its crop scouting operations. We appreciate the FAA for approving our petition to operate the DJI Phantom 2 and now we ask to operate the DJI Phantom 3 to enhance and grow our offerings to our customers. We respectfully write that the FAA approve our request. Name and Address ofApplicant is: ADM Crop Risk Services Attn: John Fahl, Vice President Claims Department 350 North Water Street Decatur IL 62523 Main Office 1-888-523-6277 Fax 1 -217-451-7829 Email: jfahl@admcrs.com Our request is similar in all material respects to relief previously requested in Grant of Exemption No. 11367. The Phantom 2 and 3 are built on the same frame and are almost identical in every way. Weight is only increased by 38 grams, but the total is still onlyweighing in at 1280 grams. The Phantom 3 has built in rotor enhancements for greater control ofthe aircraft and thereby offering greatersafety. The Phantom 3 has an increased payload due to advanced camera function, but also the 

### 1

### addition ofauto-sensing technology which will make the aircraft even safer. ADMCRS will continue to operate Phantom 3 aircraft according to their 333 exemption which include, but are not limited to: DJI Phantom 3 weighs less than 55 pounds UAS operation not exceeded 87 knots {100 miles per hour) UAS operation at altitude under 400 feet above ground level UAS operated within visual line ofsight {VLOS) Operations always utilizing a visual observer {VO) Pre-flight and post-flight inspections performed on UAS No operation within 5 nautical miles of an airport UAS operationswill remain clear and give way to all manned aviation activities ADMCRS respectfully requests that the FAA grant its request to operate the DJI Phantom 3. Thank you for yourtimely consideration . (Attached are technical specifications and user manual) Sincerely,

John Fahl, Vice President ofClaims ADM Crop R isk Services

2
§ 35.35 Prohibition against intimidation or retaliation. A recipient may not engage in acts of intimidation or retaliation against any person who: ( a ) Attempts to assert a right protected by the Act or this part; or
( b ) Cooperates in any mediation, investigation, hearing or other part of CRC's investigation, conciliation, and enforcement process.
#### Otis Vinal *versus*Nathan Burrill *et al.*

*March 9th.*

*March*21st.

!¿ assumpsit against several, who joined in a plea of *non assumpsit,*only one of them appeared when the case came on for trial. It was *held,*that this one was not legally entitled to have the others defaulted, in order that he might use them as witnesses.

If one of several defendants in assumpsit be defaulted, it seems he is not a competent witness for his co-defendants ; being interested, not so much to throw on his co-defendants a portion of the demand in suit, as to reduce the plaintiff’s recovery to a nominal sum.

This was an action of assumpsit against three defendants, Burrill, Kimball, and Valentine, formerly copartners' under the firm of Burrill, Kimball & Co , to recover the balance of an account stated. The defendants pleaded jointly *non assumpsit,*and issue was joined thereon. The case was once tried before *Morton*J. and a new trial was granted. (See 16 Pick. 401.) It came on again for trial, at November term 1835, before *Wilde*J., upon the same issue. Before the trial began, S. *D.*Parker, stated that be did not appear for Burrill or Kimball, and moved, in writing, that they should be defaulted, no one appearing for them. The motion was overruled. Burrill was in court, but he did not personally request leave to withdraw his plea, nor apply to be defaulted. He was offered by Valentine to be sworn as a witness ; but the judge would not permit him to be sworn.

S. *D. Parker,*for the defendant Valentine.

*C. P. Curtis,*for the plaintiff.

Putnam J.

delivered the opinion of the Court. It seems to us, under the circumstances, that Valentine had no right to interfere with Burrill and Kimball. If they did not choose to be defaulted, we think that Valentine had no right to the order or assistance of the court to have them defaulted. They stood then as parties to the record, relying upon their pleas, and it could not then appear to the court but that they might be discharged upon their pleas. The judge, we think, did right to leave them to manage the cause in their own way.

It was contended for Valentine, that if Burrill and Kimball were defaulted, and admitted as witnesses for'him, their interest would have been against him, because if they testified so *30as that he would be discharged, they would be liable !k¡r the whole demand, upon their default, and could not have had any contribution against him. But we think their stronger interest would have been, in such case, to reduce the demand of the plaintiff against Valentine to nominal damages, and then no greater damages could be assessed against them upon their default.'

But however that might be, we think that Valentine had. no right to compel them to be defaulted. The plaintiff might unquestionably have moved for their default.
§ 38.70 Required contents of complaint. Each complaint must be filed in writing, either electronically or in hard copy, and must contain the following information: ( a ) The complainant's name, mailing address, and, if available, email address (or another means of contacting the complainant).
( b ) The identity of the respondent (the individual or entity that the complainant alleges is responsible for the discrimination).
( c ) A description of the complainant's allegations. This description must include enough detail to allow the Director or the recipient, as applicable, to decide whether: ( 1 ) CRC or the recipient, as applicable, has jurisdiction over the complaint;
( 2 ) The complaint was filed in time; and
( 3 ) The complaint has apparent merit; in other words, whether the complainant's allegations, if true, would indicate noncompliance with any of the nondiscrimination and equal opportunity provisions of WIOA or this part.
( d ) The written or electronic signature of the complainant or the written or electronic signature of the complainant's representative.
( e ) A complainant may file a complaint by completing and submitting CRC's Complaint Information and Privacy Act Consent Forms, which may be obtained either from the recipient's EO Officer or from CRC. The forms are available electronically on CRC's Web site, and in hard copy via postal mail upon request. The latter requests may be sent to CRC at the address listed in the notice contained in § 38.35.
#### EDMONDS v EDMONDS ELEVATOR CO

Ohio Appeals, 8th Dist, Cuyahoga Co

No 10611.

Decided May 26, 1930

George W. Spooner, Cleveland, for Edmonds.

Turney & Sipe, Cleveland, for Company. MIDDLETON, PJ and MAUCK, J (4th Dist) and SHERICK, J (5th Dist) sitting

MIDDLETON, PJ.

The plaintiff insists that he is entitled to the reformation of -the notes described in his petition, which are three in number and in the usual form of promissory notes for the unconditional payment of money. The total amount evidenced by the notes is approximately $10,000.00. They bear the *458date of February 1, 1927 and all are made payable three months after date. The evidence wholly fails to support a claim for reformation. It clearly appears that plaintiff signed these notes with full knowledge of their provisions and when they would become due and tends very strongly to show that the notes were executed by him under the advice of his legal counsel and in the presence of the latter.

The fraud which the plaintiff claims, arises from an agreement or contract made ’ prior to the execution o.f the notes which he maintains by its terms was to allow him to pay the notes from dividends received from the defendant corporation and that he was further to have substantially unlimited time within which to pay. He testifies that he was to be given twenty-five years within which to liquidate the notes.

It appears from the evidence that he was a director of the defendant corporation and that at the time the notes were given he was indebted to the corporation in the amount covered by the notes. It further appears that he has failed to make any payment whatsoever on the notes and that no dividends have been paid by the corporation since the notes were executed. If the contract was made as he claims, and the corporation should continue to fail in the payment of dividends, he would be released eventually from payment of the notes.

It is apparent from these facts that a court of equity could afford him no relief if it were possible for him to properly place such facts before the court. But the notes evidence the final agreement, and as before observed, his action is for a reformation of the notes and there is no evidence that they were not signed by him with full knowledge of all the liabilities they imposed.

The petition is dismissed.

Mauck, J, ,and Sherick, J, concur.
#### § 1985.115 Special circumstances; waiver of rules.

In special circumstances not contemplated by the provisions of these rules, or for good cause shown, the ALJ or the ARB on review may, upon application, after three days' notice to all parties, waive any rule or issue such orders that justice or the administration of CFPA requires.
#### CORNFELDT v RIHACEK

Ohio Appeals, 6th Dist, Lucas Co

No 2391.

Decided Sept. 29, 1930

Meek & Meek, Toledo, for Cornfeldt.

Elmer E. Davis, Toledo, for Rihacek.

*677RICHARDS, J.

The defendant further averred that the contract was made between the plaintiff as party of the first part and her husband and herself jointly, as parties of the second part, and she insisted that, being a joint contract, an action would not lie against her alone. It appears from the record that her husband died prior to the commencement of the action. Under the provisions of 10733 GC., the death of one joint contractor renders the contract in effect joint and several and permits an action against either the survivor or the administrator of the deceased party. Burgoyne, Admr. vs. Ohio Life Insurance & Trust Co., 5 Oh St, 586.

On the trial, the jury, by its answer to a special interrogatory, found that there was no damage due to the defendant under her crQss-petition. Thereupon the plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial and later filed a motion for ,a judgment notwithstanding the general • verdict, both of which motions were overruled. The state of the evidence is such that the plaintiff was not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law for the full amount claimed notwithstanding the answer to the special interrogatory, for some evidence was introduced against plaintiff’s claim on the issue made by the denial in the answer.

A careful examination of the bill of exceptions makes it apparent that the answer to the special interrogatory, finding that there was no damgae due to the defendant under her cross-petition was reached because of the failure of the defendant to prove specifically, except as to one item of $300.00, the amount of damages she claimed in her cross-petition. The verdict which was returned does not in any way respond to the issue made on the cross-petition.

• ■ Objection is made that this court can not review the judgment on the weight of the evidence because exhibit No. 1 is not made a part of the bill of exceptions. Although a witness was inquired of about Exhibit No. 1, the exhibit was not submitted to nor read by the jury, nor was it offered in evidence, and therefore was not required to be made a part of the bill of exceptions.

The finding of the jury that the plaintiff was entitled to recover no more than $1,000.00 is manifestly against the weight of the evidence. The judgment as rendered does not accomplish substantial justice between the parties as shown by the record and the judgment should be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial on all the issues.

Williams and Lloyd, JJ, concur.