COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Willis, Annunziata and Senior Judge Cole 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

HAROLD FRANCIS SHEPPARD 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 0571-95-2 JUDGE MARVIN F. COLE 

 APRIL 9, 1996 

CYNTHIA CAUDLE SHEPPARD 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRICO COUNTY 

George F. Tidey, Judge 

 Carolyn P. Carpenter (Carpenter, Woodward & 

 Wagner, P.L.C., on briefs), for appellant. 

 Jeffrey L. Galston (Hyder, Lowe & Galston, on 

 brief, for appellee. 

 Harold Francis Sheppard, appellant, appeals from a final 

order entered in the Henrico County Circuit Court on February 15, 

1995. He presents the following issues for our review: 

 1. Whether the trial court erred by including in 

its judgment $17,071.67 awarded by a North Carolina 

court, when wife had registered the foreign decree and 

begun execution; 

 2. Whether wife's claim for $17,071.67, plus 

interest, is barred by the doctrine of res judicata; 

 3. Whether the trial court erred in applying the 

doctrine of specific performance to enforce the foreign 

judgment; 

 4. Whether there was sufficient evidence to 

support the trial court's finding that husband failed 

to pay $900 per month on the Central Carolina Bank 

loan; and 

 5. Whether the trial court erred by failing to 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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give husband credits allowed him under the North 

Carolina order. 

 In addition to the above issues, Cynthia Caudle Sheppard, 

appellee, presents for our review the following: 

 1. Whether the trial court failed to give the 

North Carolina order full faith and credit; and 

 2. Whether the trial court erred in failing to 

recognize the North Carolina court order of specific 

performance. 

 Cynthia Caudle Sheppard (wife) and Harold Francis Sheppard 

(husband) were married in Guilford County, North Carolina, on 

March 11, 1987. They separated on or about April 16, 1989. They 

negotiated and executed a property settlement agreement dated 

May 26, 1989. The agreement was incorporated by reference into a 

divorce decree on November 30, 1990, in North Carolina Guilford 

County District Court. Later, husband brought an action against 

wife in the same court for rescission of the agreement on the 

ground that the agreement had been entered into under duress and 

undue influence, alleging that wife had breached the agreement. 

Wife filed a counter-suit, alleging that husband had breached the 

agreement and asking for specific performance of the agreement. 

 A jury trial was held on February 24, 1993, and the jury 

determined that the agreement was not entered into under duress 

or undue influence and that wife had not breached the agreement. 

 The jury further determined the amount that husband owed wife 

under the terms of the agreement. In an order, nunc pro tunc on 

May 24, 1993, the court adjudged, ordered and decreed as follows: 

 1. Husband was ordered to pay to wife the sum of 
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$17,071.67, together with interest at the legal rate, 

from May 5, 1993, for arrearages due under the 

agreement. 

 2. Both parties were ordered not to make any 

further withdrawals from the equity line account at 

First Home Federal Savings and Loan Association (now 

Central Carolina Bank) and that all future payments 

made to the account would be applied to principal and 

interest owed on the account. 

 3. Specific performance of the agreement was 

decreed to the following extent: 

 (a) Effective March 1, 1993, husband was 

ordered to pay the principal and interest 

monthly payment on three loans encumbering 

wife's residence: City of Greensboro loan; 

HUD loan (now Windover Funding); and First 

Home Federal Savings and Loan Association 

(now Central Carolina Bank) loan. 

 (b) Husband was ordered to pay to wife 

$145.00 monthly toward utilities. 

 (c) Husband was ordered to pay to wife 

$227.50 monthly for spousal support, subject 

to a credit for any auto liability insurance 

premiums paid by husband on behalf of wife 

subsequent to June 30, 1991, and subject to a 

credit for rent received on wife's residence. 

 (d) Husband was ordered to pay $300 

monthly to wife's attorneys as payment toward 

an award of $10,000 attorney's fees. 

 Husband moved from North Carolina to Henrico County, 

Virginia. On May 26, 1994, wife filed a Bill of Complaint in the 

Henrico County Circuit Court in an equity suit, seeking recovery 

of the amount of the North Carolina judgment as well as 

additional costs and arrearages since the entry of the North 

Carolina order on May 24, 1993. The prayer of her Bill of 

Complaint was that specific performance of the agreement and the 
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Guilford District Court's order be decreed and ordered, and that 

other general equitable relief be granted to her, including civil 

contempt and attorney's fees. Husband filed an Answer and 

special pleas of Res Judicata and/or Collateral Estoppel. Upon 

trial of the issues, wife was granted a recovery of $37,348.89, 

based upon the North Carolina outstanding judgment of $17,071.67, 

together with interest in the amount of $2,048.60, additional 

arrearages in the amount of $13,228.62, and $5,000 in attorney's 

fees. Husband has appealed the court's decision. 

 In addition to the suit, wife registered the North Carolina 

judgment order in the clerk's office of the Henrico Circuit Court 

under the provisions of Code § 8.01-465.2. 

 Husband contends that the trial court erred when it entered 

a judgment in the amount of $17,071.67 against him because a 

judgment in the same amount arising out of the same facts had 

been granted in North Carolina, making two judgments against him 

for the same cause of action. He concludes that the doctrine of 

res judicata bars this Court from entering a second judgment. 

Furthermore, he alleges that the North Carolina judgment has been 

registered in the Henrico County Circuit Court and a second 

judgment in Virginia is improper. In this case, a North Carolina 

court has entered a valid judgment against the husband and has 

decreed specific performance of the terms of a valid property 

settlement agreement. The status of the North Carolina agreement 

has been determined in North Carolina and a North Carolina court 
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has ordered specific performance of the agreement. Payment of 

the arrearages and future installment payments have become 

absolute and vested in North Carolina. 

 Even if the courts of Virginia were not compelled to do so 

under the full faith and credit clause of the federal 

constitution, "upon principles of comity they may establish as 

their own decree a foreign decree . . ., with the same force and 

effect as if it had been entered in Virginia, provided, of 

course, the foreign decree violates no public policy of 

Virginia." See McKeel v. McKeel, 185 Va. 108, 113, 37 S.E.2d 

746, 749 (1946). Moreover, such a result now seems required by 

the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, Code § 20-88.32, et

seq. See also Code § 8.01-465.2; Alig v. Alig, 220 Va. 80, 84, 

255 S.E.2d 494, 497 (1979). We find no merit to the husband's 

contention. Furthermore, we find the doctrine of res judicata

not applicable. The Henrico Circuit Court has not entered a 

separate and independent judgment against husband. The 

proceeding here is ancillary to the North Carolina judgment in an 

effort to enforce the terms of a judgment of a sister state. 

 Both husband and wife raise the issue whether the trial 

court should have applied the doctrine of specific performance. 

As we view the record, the court did not grant specific 

performance of the property settlement agreement or the North 

Carolina judgment. In a letter to counsel, the trial judge 

stated he assumed husband would comply with the terms of the 
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agreement. The North Carolina order decreed specific performance 

of the agreement. 

 Our Supreme Court has upheld the wife's right to sue for 

specific performance of a contract for spousal support, 

emphasizing that equitable relief extended to collection of 

arrearages and "to 'relief to cover payments thereafter falling 

due.'" Chattin v. Chattin, 245 Va. 302, 307-08, 427 S.E.2d 347, 

351 (1993) (citation omitted). The Court further stated: 

The wife did not have an adequate remedy at law because 

she either would have to sue on the contract each time 

the husband failed to make a payment, or wait until a 

significant arrearage had accumulated before filing 

suit. Under either option, her legal remedy would be 

inadequate to "reach the whole mischief." Further, the 

husband's support arrearages were great and the trial 

court had no reason to believe that his future 

compliance would be forthcoming. 

Id. at 308, 427 S.E.2d at 351 (citation omitted). See also Hupp 

v. Hupp, 239 Va. 494, 391 S.E.2d 329 (1990). 

 In accordance with the same principles, we hold that the 

trial court abused its discretion in failing to decree specific 

performance of the property settlement agreement as was done in 

the North Carolina order. 

 Husband contends that the evidence was insufficient to 

support the trial court's finding that he should pay $900 monthly 

on the equity line loan with Central Carolina Bank, successor to 

First Home Federal Savings and Loan Association. The North 

Carolina judgment requires that husband pay "the principal and 

interest required pursuant to the terms of the equity line loan." 
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 The record establishes that Central Carolina Bank requires only 

the interest payment at the present time and does not require any 

contribution toward principal. Therefore, we hold that the trial 

court erred in assessing an additional $400 monthly charge 

against husband. Husband is entitled to an adjustment of $400 

per month for each month that is included within the arrearage of 

$13,228.62. If the bank should adjust its requirements in the 

future, the amount to be paid by the husband shall likewise be 

adjusted. In other words, husband is required to pay "the 

principal and interest required pursuant to the terms of the 

equity line loan." Since the record does not reflect the number 

of months charged to the husband, we remand the case back to the 

trial court to make such determination and give credit to the 

husband for the amount included, if any. 

 Husband claims that the trial court's decision fails to give 

him credits for rent on the wife's residence, liability insurance 

on her automobile, mortgage interest tax deduction received by 

wife, and payments he made to her in the amount of $1,887.23. 

 The North Carolina judgment provides that "any rent proceeds 

which the [wife] should henceforth receive from a boarder in her 

home should be a credit against any amounts payable by the 

[husband] under the aforesaid separation agreement and property 

settlement." Husband asserts that he should be given a credit at 

the rate of $350 per month for the period March 1993 through 

October 1994 totaling $7,000. He also contends that he should 
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receive a credit of $350 per month for the period from August 

1993 to March 1994 when she provided free room and board for her 

nephew. This amounts to $2,800, making a total credit of $9,800 

for rent. 

 The wife testified that she gave husband a credit of $250 

monthly from March 1993 through June 1993. Her boarder changed 

jobs and could not pay $250 monthly. In order to keep her, the 

rent was reduced to $100 monthly from July 1993 through June 

1994. In June 1994 wife found out that her residence was in a 

historic district and that she could not charge rent because it 

was a one-family unit. Thereafter, she received no rent but 

permitted her boarder to remain because she was scared to live 

there alone. In her calculations, husband was given a credit of 

$1,700 for rent. She made no charge to her nephew for rent. We 

find credible evidence in the record to support the conclusion 

that wife has given a credit to husband for all sums she received 

as rent. The agreement did not require her to rent any part of 

her residence or make any attempt to fix the rent she would 

charge. 

 Husband claims that he is entitled to a credit of $755.59 

that he paid on behalf of wife for automobile liability insurance 

from March 1993 until October 1994. He claims a similar credit 

of $1,045.77 for sums he paid from June 30, 1991 to March 1993, 

making a total of $1,801.36. 

 The agreement dated May 26, 1989, provided the wife was 
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entitled to possession of the Acura automobile from the date of 

the agreement until husband purchased a new car for wife, at 

which time the Acura was to be transferred to husband. Husband 

agreed to purchase a new car comparable to a new 1989 Honda 

Accord for wife within six months from the date of the agreement. 

 Husband also agreed to pay the automobile insurance on the car 

for one year from the date of purchase of the new vehicle. 

 The new car was purchased on June 30, 1990, and husband paid 

the liability insurance through June 30, 1991. Husband claims he 

is entitled to a credit for liability insurance premiums he paid 

on behalf of wife after June 30, 1991. The trial judge found 

that he did not prove this claim by a preponderance of the 

evidence. 

 Husband's exhibit 7 documents insurance coverage for the 

period ending January 14, 1991, which is irrelevant to the period 

involved in this claim. The two other exhibits related to 

husband's claim are confused and erroneous. Therefore, we find 

credible evidence in the record to support the decision of the 

trial court that this claim for credit was not proved. 

 Husband contends that he is entitled to a credit of 

$1,472.27, the value of the tax benefit received by wife for a 

mortgage interest tax deduction. The record establishes that 

husband was not entitled to a tax deduction for interest paid on 

the residence mortgage, although he made the mortgage payment, 

because he did not own or reside in the home. Therefore, husband 
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agreed to wife taking the deduction. She never agreed to give 

him a credit and he was not entitled to the deduction. The trial 

court did not err in refusing to grant a credit to husband for 

the tax deduction. 

 Husband claims that he made payments to wife pursuant to the 

terms of the property settlement agreement in the amount of 

$1,887.23. The claims presented do not prove that they represent 

expenses for which wife is responsible under the terms of the 

agreement. 

 For the above reasons, we reverse the decision of the trial 

court and remand for further proceedings for modification of its 

decree as follows: (1) award specific performance in accordance 

with the terms of the North Carolina decree; (2) adjust the 

arrearage figures to reflect any credit due husband for amounts 

he paid in addition to the $500 monthly interest payment on the 

Central Carolina Bank loan; (3) modify the decree to include 

interest at the North Carolina legal rate from October 31, 1994, 

until paid; and (4) adjust the decree to include a reasonable 

attorney's fee and court costs to wife for this appeal. 

 Reversed and remanded for 

 further proceedings.