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U.S. POLICY TOWARD SUDAN AND SOUTH SUDAN

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, 

GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND 

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

FEBRUARY 26, 2014

Serial No. 113–178

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

LUKE MESSER, Indiana 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, Chairman 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

KAREN BASS, California 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

AMI BERA, California 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Donald Booth, Special Envoy to Sudan and South Sudan, 

U.S. Department of State .................................................................................... 6

Mr. John Prendergast, co-founder, Enough Project .............................................. 25

Walid Phares, Ph.D., co-secretary general, Transatlantic Legislative Group 

on Counter Terrorism .......................................................................................... 35

Mr. Adotei Akwei, managing director for government relations, Amnesty 

International USA ................................................................................................ 56

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Donald Booth: Prepared statement .............................................. 10

Mr. John Prendergast: Prepared statement .......................................................... 30

Walid Phares, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ............................................................. 39

Mr. Adotei Akwei: Prepared statement ................................................................. 59

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 72

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 73

The Honorable Christopher H. Smith, a Representative in Congress from 

the State of New Jersey, and chairman, Subcommittee on Africa, Global 

Health, Global Human Rights, and International Organizations: Material 

submitted for the record ...................................................................................... 74

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U.S. POLICY TOWARD SUDAN AND

SOUTH SUDAN 

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 26, 2014

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH,

GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:34 p.m., in room 

2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher H. Smith 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. SMITH. The subcommittee will come to order and good afternoon. I, first of all, want to apologize to all, including our distinguished witnesses. We did have a series of votes and, unfortunately, you can never plan for that. So I do apologize. 

Good afternoon. Today’s hearing is very important, and not only 

because the United States Government has been involved in Sudan 

and its various crises for the past three decades. 

Many of us first became interested in Sudan in the 1980s because of the persistent reports of modern-day slavery in which 

northern Arabs enslaved African southerners. 

I would point out parenthetically I held my first hearing when 

I was chairman of the subcommittee that dealt with human rights 

after we took control in 1994 on slavery in Sudan and we had freed 

slaves come and testify and it was a very telling experience to hear 

them tell of the atrocities that they had suffered. 

My office also more recently helped to bring one of the unfortunate people who had been enslaved to America for medical treatment after he was freed, and his story affected me deeply once 

again. 

Ker Deng had been kidnapped into slavery while still a child, 

and while he was an adolescent the man who held him in bondage 

rubbed peppers in his eyes, blinded him, and later abandoned him. 

Ker is studying here in the United States thanks to his benefactor, Ellen Ratner, and is awaiting a second operation to help 

him recover at least some of his eyesight. The question always is 

posed how many other Sudanese will never have that opportunity 

or even achieve their freedom. Ker’s mother has never been freed 

from bondage. 

We began supporting southern Sudanese efforts to end the oppression from the North in the mid-1990s. In 2005, we helped—the 

United States did—both North and South achieve the ComprehenVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:08 Sep 23, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AGH\022614\86870 SHIRL
2

sive Peace Agreement to end this long civil war and provide the 

steps for a mutually beneficial peace and productive coexistence. 

Unfortunately, the rebellion in the Darfur region distracted from 

efforts to fulfill that agreement. Khartoum’s alliance with the 

Janjaweed Arabs resulted in mass killings and displacement in 

Darfur. 

An estimated 1.9 million people were displaced, more than 

240,000 people were forced into neighboring Chad, and an estimated 450,000 people—nobody knows for sure what the real number is but it is extraordinarily high—were killed. 

At the time, Congress insisted that this was a genocide. Eventually, the Bush administration concurred, but the United Nations 

declined to go so far in their terminology, calling what happened 

in Darfur crimes against humanity. 

A peace agreement between the main rebel force in Darfur and 

the Government of Sudan was signed in May 2006 but it did not 

last. 

In fact, no sustained agreement has been reached between the 

government and Darfur rebel groups partly because these groups 

have continued to split and form offshoots but also because the 

Khartoum Government has not appeared willing to resolve the 

Darfur situation constructively. 

In June 2005, the International Criminal Court initiated an investigation that resulted in arrest warrants for Sudanese President 

Omar al-Bashir and three other government officials and militia 

leaders. 

None of these warrants have been served, none of the four have 

been taken into custody and the Government of Sudan has refused 

to cooperate with the ICC. Meanwhile, the CPA remained 

unimplemented. 

In January 2011, South Sudan, which had been a semi-autonomous region of the country since the signing of the CPA, voted in 

a referendum on whether to remain part of Sudan or become independent. 

Having been marginalized and mistreated for decades, it was not 

surprising that southern Sudanese voted overwhelmingly, at the 

level of 98.8 percent, to become an independent nation. 

On July 9, 2011, South Sudan became the world’s newest nation. 

However, these unimplemented elements of the CPA would bedevil 

the new country from its birth. A referendum in the disputed Abyei 

region and consultations on the status of Sudan’s Southern 

Kordofan and Blue Nile States were never completed. 

In May 2011, Sudanese Armed Forces assumed control of the 

towns in Abyei, quickly forcing at least 40,000 residents to flee. 

Within weeks, fighting spread to Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile 

States as Khartoum sought to crush the Sudan People’s Liberation 

Army-North, which had fought with southerners in the north-south 

civil war. 

Northern attacks on residents in those areas continued 

unabated. Last year, Sudan and South Sudan engaged in a conflict 

over oil supplies from South Sudan involving allegations that Khartoum was undercounting the level of oil flow to cheat South Sudan, 

as well as South Sudan’s seizure of the oil town of Heglig. 

3

Again, this dispute was largely the result of unresolved issues 

from the CPA. South Sudan continues to be engaged in a conflict 

that began last December, despite a cessation of hostilities agreement. 

Thousands have been killed. Tens of thousands have been displaced. Exact figures are constantly shifting because this conflict 

continues. I will soon introduce a resolution offering a sequenced 

approach to reaching a lasting solution to this newest crisis. 

This conflict also is the result of too little attention paid to the 

warning signs because of a preoccupation with one of the many 

other crises in the two Sudans. 

Over the last three decades, I and other members of the subcommittee and subcommittee chairs have held numerous, numerous hearings on Sudan and, of course, we have all traveled there. 

Mr. Wolf, who is joining us from the Appropriations Committee, 

was there back in 1989, I think even before that, but certainly in 

1989 and has been a steadfast voice and a power in trying to bring 

relief to that troubled region. 

In fact, too often, however, each crisis is seen as a problem unto 

itself when these things break out, unrelated to other issues, then 

we move on to other things, it seems, even notwithstanding the 

good work of our Special Envoy. 

In fact, successive administrations and Congresses, advocacy 

groups, and humanitarian organizations have focused so much on 

individual crises and issues that no one has created a panoramic 

view which shows us all these individual crises and how they interrelate with each other. 

This stovepiping of government policy and public attention and 

focus and prioritization has meant that long-term solutions have 

been neglected while short-term eruptions have had to be dealt 

with. 

In reality, the two Sudans are inexorably linked and no crisis in 

either can be resolved successfully without taking into account the 

entire Sudan-South Sudan panorama. 

We must end this cycle of myopic policy formulation based on the 

crisis of the moment and adopt a longer-term, holistic vision of 

what the best interests of the people of Sudan and South Sudan 

demand—indeed, what would be in the best interests of the entire 

region. 

As we learned in our subcommittee hearing on the Sahel crisis 

last May, Islamic extremists have their sights set on making inroads wherever there is conflict, across the belt of Central Africa, 

stretching from Senegal to Sudan and beyond. Continuing unrest 

in the two Sudans only serves to provide training grounds or bases 

of operation for terrorists. 

Hardened ethnic conflicts can spread to long-term enmity that no 

peace agreement alone can resolve. Hopefully, this will not be the 

case in South Sudan, but that conflict is headed in that ominous 

direction. 

Two years ago, I held a meeting in my office with representatives 

from Sudan’s Nubian, Darfuri, Beja, and Nuba communities, who 

all believe that Khartoum is engaged in a long-term effort to exterminate non-Arab Sudanese. 

4

Have we missed such a pernicious campaign while hopping from 

one crisis to another as each appeared? The purpose of today’s 

hearing is to examine current U.S. policy toward Sudan and South 

Sudan to see how we can unify our policy in order to more effectively end long-term running tragedies that appear to get worse despite all the attention to which we pay them. 

This involves more than what the Department of State and other 

executive agencies do and even what Congress can do. Advocacy 

and humanitarian organizations also must join the government in 

seeing the forest and not just the trees, so to speak. 

And let me also say the importance of engaging the faith community remains a very important component if we are to bring, or 

help bring, a lasting and sustainable peace to that troubled part of 

the world. 

I would like to now yield to my friend and colleague, Ms. Bass, 

for opening comments. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for today’s hearing and as 

always thank you for your leadership on this issue. 

I want to thank our witnesses today. I had the pleasure of working with the U.S. Special Envoy before he was the Special Envoy 

but when he was the Ambassador to Ethiopia. So it is a pleasure 

to see you here at the committee today. 

The U.S. engagements in the Sudan, government officials in both 

diplomacy and development have faced tremendous challenges in 

devising holistic and unified approaches to grappling with each nation’s concerns. 

These include, of course, issues of governance, human rights, 

international justice and the seemingly intractable conflicts that 

continue with tragic consequences in the Sudan and South Sudan. 

The context of the post-9/11 world heightened these challenges as 

our Government increasingly focused on regional stability in East 

Africa and the counterterrorism cooperation of regional governments including the Government of Sudan. 

In dealing with these varied obstacles, U.S. foreign policy efforts 

have often been crafted to address specific issues which in some instances raises the question of our approach and my question as to 

whether or not it has actually been problematic. 

For example, focusing on the status of Abyei, the conflicts in 

Darfur and the Blue Nile, often at the expense of broader comprehensive approaches which seek redress of the root causes of conflict in South Sudan and in Sudan. So addressing the crisis individually as opposed to looking at both nations together. 

The separation of Sudan and South Sudan—these root causes 

continue to stoke internal conflict, threaten regional stability, 

produce hundreds of thousands of refugees and IDPs, and bring 

about massive loss of life. 

I hope today from the witnesses that we can learn the lessons 

of the past and formulate new ways to work through our Special 

Envoy and his international counterparts as well as regional bodies 

such as IGAD and the AU to find sustainable solutions which bring 

peace, stability and economic growth to Sudan and South Sudan. 

I am, of course, committed to continuing to work toward these 

ends and look forward to engaging my colleagues here in Washington and on the continent to make this a reality. 

5

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. 

I would like to now yield to Chairman Frank Wolf. 

Mr. WOLF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to second what 

Ms. Bass said about you. I appreciate your good efforts and I think 

you have probably done more on this issue, on most issues than 

any other Member of the Congress since I have been here. 

I am not a member of the subcommittee and I have an appointment at 3 o’clock but I want to put on the record a question that 

I hope that someone would follow up on. 

On December 30th, Ambassador Booth, I wrote Secretary Kerry 

urging that the administration, and at that time it was at a crisis 

point—December 30th—and now we are ready to go into March—

urging that the administration enlist the aid of former President 

George W. Bush and his team at the Bush Library whose administration was absolutely pivotal in birthing South Sudan. 

I was there in 2005 when Colin Powell and John Danforth were 

with President Bush where they appointed the Special Envoy that 

led to the new South Sudan. I noted that South Sudanese President Salva Kiir’s trademark black cowboy hat was in fact a gift 

from President Bush. 

President Bush and his team forged lasting relationships with 

Salva Kiir and the South Sudanese leadership and would be well 

positioned with the full blessing, obviously, working under you, 

working under Secretary Kerry, working under the President to engage in diplomacy and rebuilding the efforts at this critical time. 

I have had conversations with senior administration officials over 

the last 2 months and yet nothing has happened. I would urge you 

to take this request back to the Secretary. Such an overture would 

send an important message to the suffering people of South Sudan. 

And the closing paragraph of the letter dated December 30, 2013, 

to Secretary Kerry said, ‘‘It’s been said that politics stops at the 

water’s edge.’’ While perhaps not always the case, I would hope 

that this administration, despite its past differences with the Bush 

administration, would recognize the wisdom of inviting former 

President Bush and key members of his team who forged a lasting 

relationship with the leadership of South Sudan to engage in highlevel diplomacy with the various actors involved in the current crisis and to do so with the full support and blessing of the U.S. State 

Department and, of course, the White House. 

Such an overture would send a clear message to the people of the 

fledgling nation that they have not been abandoned. And also, 

President Clinton was used in Haiti. President Obama took President Bush to Mandela’s funeral. President Bush has fallen in love 

with Africa, HIV/AIDS, PEPFAR. 

So I would ask you, and maybe you ought to talk to Mr. Smith 

at the next vote what your answer is, tell us will the administration, will you, will Secretary Kerry, will the President do this, and 

I think this picture of President Bush with President Obama in the 

White House saying we are going to engage and use all the resources, working with people like John Prendergast and so many 

others, all the resources I think would make a tremendous difference. 

I appreciate Mr. Smith having this hearing. Yield back. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Chairman Wolf. 

6

And before I do introduce Ambassador Booth, I would just echo 

his concern. When I read the letter in the op-ed that Mr. Wolf 

wrote, it made a very compelling case. 

It would really, I think, send a message to the key players including Salva Kiir, who greatly esteems President George W. Bush, 

and that kind of working side by side with you and Secretary Kerry 

and, of course, President Obama would show a unity on the part 

of the United States but also on the ground. Senator Danforth 

worked wonders and we all credit him with pulling an amazing 

feat with the CPA. 

So perhaps, you know, in your opening comments you could address the feasibility of that and I think it could act as a tourniquet 

to this ever-worsening crisis. 

Now, if I could introduce the Ambassador, our U.S. Special 

Envoy to Sudan and South Sudan, Ambassador Donald Booth, who 

was appointed Special Envoy August 28, 2013. 

He previously served as Ambassador to Ethiopia, Zambia, and 

Liberia. Prior to that, he was director of the Office of Technical and 

Specialized Agencies at the Department of State’s Bureau of International Organization Affairs. 

Ambassador Booth has also served as director of the Office of 

West African Affairs, deputy director of the Office of Southern African Affairs, economic counselor in Athens and division chief for Bilateral Trade Affairs at the U.S. Department of State. 

Mr. Ambassador. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DONALD BOOTH, SPECIAL 

ENVOY TO SUDAN AND SOUTH SUDAN, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

STATE 

Mr. BOOTH. Chairman Smith and Ranking Member Bass, members of the committee, Chairman Wolf, I want to thank you very 

much for the opportunity to testify before you here today. I am 

going to summarize what has been submitted for the record. 

This hearing comes at a tumultuous time for both Sudan and 

South Sudan. South Sudan is mired in a devastating internal conflict that has already caused widespread death and destruction, 

and threatens to unravel the social fabric of that young nation. 

With the interests of other regional neighbors so heavily in play, 

any increase in tensions has the potential to foment broader regional instability. To the north, Sudan continues to respond to the 

grievances of marginalized groups with violence, particularly in 

Darfur and the ‘‘two areas’’ of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile 

States where government forces have engaged in indiscriminate 

aerial bombardments. 

Linked by geography and resources, Sudan and South Sudan’s 

interdependence could be a source of stability, but recent steps toward resolving bilateral issues have been overshadowed by the conflict in South Sudan. 

As someone who has been in the region almost continuously 

since December 21, I can assure you that the U.S. Government has 

and will continue to be fully engaged in support of the President’s 

goals of two countries at peace internally and with each other and 

with the region. 

7

We stand ready to help both Sudan and South Sudan build a 

peaceful and prosperous future in which all their citizens are respected, protected and have a say in the governance of their respective countries. 

On South Sudan, 3 years after its historic referendum for independence, South Sudan is again riven by conflict—not with Khartoum, however, but with itself. This is devastating for all of use 

who hoped to see it escape the terrible cycles of violence that 

marked its past. 

The cessation of hostilities signed by the parties on January 23rd 

was a critical step. But, unfortunately, both parties have continued 

to violate this agreement. 

A true cessation of hostilities is our most pressing priority and 

we are providing significant support to the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, IGAD, the monitoring and verification 

mechanism that they lead which will monitor the cessation of hostilities and identify violators. 

We are also deeply focused on moving the parties to a meaningful and inclusive political discussion of the root causes of the problem. Looking back, the government attempted to contain intercommunal violence without fully committing to the hard work of addressing its causes. 

On top of this, the Government of South Sudan progressively reduced the space for political competition within and outside the ruling party as well as for the independent media and civil society. 

IGAD mediators have proposed meaningful political dialogue between the two sides with a broad representation of others in South 

Sudanese society. 

Their premise, one with which I agree, is that a return to business as usual with a quick fix and political accommodation for the 

main protagonists will not restore peace. 

Peace will require a process of national reconciliation and a 

transparent mechanism for accountability for gross violations of 

human rights committed during the conflict. The African Union is 

establishing a commission of inquiry that will help deliver both justice and reconciliation. 

Finally, we are pressing all parties in South Sudan to permit immediate and unconditional humanitarian access to the hundreds of 

thousands of South Sudanese who are the real victims of this violence. 

The humanitarian crisis will only intensify in the coming months 

with the coming of the rainy season, and to help the United States 

has already committed close to an additional $60 million in lifesaving humanitarian assistance and we have sent our disaster assistance team into South Sudan to assess what, in addition, needs 

to be done. 

Now, on Sudan and South Sudan relations, I would like to note 

that in the months just prior to the conflict there were signs of an 

improving relationship between Juba and Khartoum and it appears 

that Sudan has so far played a constructive role with the IGADled mediation. 

But greater involvement by Sudan could cause friction with other 

regional actors as well as opposing sides in South Sudan and we 

will continue to press for restraint. 

8

There are still unresolved issues between the two nations that 

cannot be allowed to fester. They need to implement the September 

2012 agreements and also endeavor to resolve the final status of 

Abyei. 

Turning to Sudan, as I mentioned, the country continues to suffer from internal conflicts. Economic and social tensions last fall 

was a result of cuts to subsidies and resulted in the largest protest 

seen under the National Congress Party’s rule. 

Unfortunately, the government responded with a violent crackdown on the protestors, resulting in hundreds of deaths and injuries. In South Kordofan and Blue Nile States, despite the resumption of talks between the SPLM-North and the Government of 

Sudan earlier this month, fighting continues. 

And I will continue to work with both parties as well as the umbrella opposition group of the Sudan Revolutionary Front to urge 

them to achieve a cessation of hostility and humanitarian access. 

In Darfur, peace remains elusive as violence and insecurity have 

increased. Last year alone, more than 1⁄2 million people were newly 

displaced primarily as a result of intertribal conflicts and lawlessness. 

The United States has provided $7 billion to date in humanitarian, transition, and reconstruction assistance to the people of 

Darfur and we continue to press the Sudanese Government to 

allow greater or open humanitarian access and to engage with all 

parties in Darfur for a comprehensive political solution. 

Against the backdrop of continued conflict and repressive response to public demonstrations in September, we do take note of 

President Bashir’s speech of January 27 in which he called for an 

inclusive process to redraft the constitution, a process that would 

include both armed and nonarmed opposition groups and that 

would address issues of peace, economic development, political reform, and a dialogue about Sudanese identity. 

The world will be watching Sudan carefully to gauge the seriousness of this initiative which, if truly holistic, inclusive and comprehensive, offers an opportunity to address the underlying causes 

of Sudan’s tragic history of war between its center and its periphery. 

Along with other senior U.S. Government officials, I have endeavored to coordinate international engagement with key partners 

such as China, the United Kingdom, Norway, the African Union, 

the European Union, Ethiopia, Egypt, Qatar, and Russia, among 

others. 

While it is critical that we continue engagement, improvement of 

our relations with the Government of Sudan will continue to be 

predicated on genuine and sustained improvements in how Sudan 

treats its citizens and adheres to its international obligations. 

So in conclusion, despite the horrendous conflicts that have continued and erupted over the past months, opportunities for peace 

do exist. The Government of Sudan can make the choice to undertake a truly comprehensive and inclusive constitutional process 

and national dialogue on the country’s future. 

Similarly, the Government of South Sudan has a crucial opening 

to establish an inclusive peaceful nation representative of all. 

9

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for this opportunity and for your continued commitment to the peoples of Sudan and South Sudan and 

I look forward to your questions. 

And if I could, Mr. Chairman, just to answer the question posed 

by Chairman Wolf, the administration indeed did take on board 

that recommendation and, indeed, even before, early in the stages 

of the crisis before the 30th of December, had reached out to previous administrations—the previous Presidents and members of 

their senior leadership and had tried to engage them. 

And some of them did, indeed, intervene, make calls out to the 

Government of South Sudan to try to put an end to the conflict, 

to try to call for an early cessation of hostilities and to sit down 

at the peace table. So I would be happy to go into that further if 

you would like. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Booth follows:]

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Mr. SMITH. I would appreciate that. Did President Bush make a 

phone call? And I think, again, what Mr. Wolf is suggesting and 

I think, you know, sometimes thinking outside the box while working inside the box as robustly as possible helps yield a result. 

The Danforth team, obviously, Bush’s team, brings another layer 

of people who were there when many of these things were hammered out. So did George Bush make a call but, more importantly, 

will you engage even more thoroughly? 

Mr. BOOTH. Well, I will certainly take the engagement of former 

President Bush back to the Secretary for further consideration. It 

was former Secretary Rice who tried to engage President Kiir. 

Former President Carter did as well. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. Let me just ask a couple of questions. Again, 

if you could get back to us, you know, perhaps by early next week. 

Time is of the essence. 

I mean, there was an article in Voice of America a day ago about 

Malakal deserted, destroyed and new South Sudan fighting. The 

article points out, and I am sure you know this, that Oxfam has 

pulled out and said that the streets were littered with bodies. 

And the comment was made in the article fighting resumed in 

Malakal, the capital of the largest oil-producing state in South 

Sudan, weeks after the two sides in the conflict signed a cessation 

of hostilities agreement. 

Certainly, it hasn’t reached that town and many, many others. 

So, again, the sense of urgency you might want to comment on this 

because I know many of our witnesses do call and make very persuasive argument on the need, and you said it as well, of being 

able to get humanitarian workers in. 

One, people are being killed, absolutely innocent women, men 

and children who happen to be Sudanese or visitors there, perhaps 

even some Americans. But now we have Oxfam and others pulling 

out. So if you could maybe speak to that now, Mr. Ambassador. 

Mr. BOOTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Clearly, both sides have not respected the cessation of hostilities 

agreement that they signed. Fighting continued after that agreement was signed in late January in Addis. 

There were attacks on the towns of Leer in Unity State and 

other areas, in Gadiang in Jonglei State by the government forces, 

and then as you rightly mentioned, last week was the attack on 

Malakal by the opposition forces. 

One of the critical things to make the cessation of hostilities a 

reality is to deploy the monitoring and verification mechanism that 

IGAD had foreseen in the cessation of hostilities agreement and we 

have been working day and night with them. 

I have secunded a member of my staff to work with the IGAD 

mediation to get that team established. They have been into South 

Sudan. They have visited numerous sites where the teams will operate out of. They have verified that it is indeed possible for those 

teams to operate. 

We are working on a memorandum of understanding with the 

U.N. Mission in South Sudan to provide some support to that team, 

and just this week money that we had made available was put on 

a contract to provide the services and support needed for those 

teams to deploy. 

19

So I understand the headquarters team will deploy this week to 

Juba and as the other staff are brought on board from IGAD member states and international partners the monitoring and 

verification teams will be out there. 

Now, these are monitoring teams and they will not be able to enforce the cessation of hostility. The enforcement will really come 

primarily from the political clout of the region—the countries in the 

region that both parties in South Sudan will need to live with and 

deal with. 

And so the premise of the monitoring and verification mechanism 

is that once good information is available the Presidents of the 

countries in the region will be able to intervene to ensure that 

those violations stop. 

Mr. SMITH. You have said that ominous signs in South Sudan 

have been visible for quite some time. Matter of fact, on February 

7th in your remarks before the Africa Center for Strategic Studies 

you suggested that, including internal political tensions, shrinking 

political space, and intercommunal tensions. 

In light of the U.S. commitment to the world’s newest country, 

what can we do differently now to address these issues that we 

have not done previously and what new direction is likely to succeed at this point? 

Mr. BOOTH. Mr. Chairman, I think the—as you mentioned, there 

were signs that there was closing political space in the country. We 

and others in the international community engaged with the government to try to reverse that, to slow that down. 

I personally was in Juba in early December and was very active 

in lobbying the government to modify an NGO bill that they were 

on the verge of passing, trying to keep this space open. I also spoke 

out about the need for space for press freedom at that time. 

Now, clearly, the issue is not sort of what more might have been 

done but what can we do to avoid a repetition of this, and this is 

why the IGAD mediators with our full support and encouragement 

have proposed that there be a very broad dialogue going forward, 

that the solution to the crisis in South Sudan is not going to be one 

that is a stitch up between a couple of politicians to decide who 

gets what share of power but, rather, something that is going to 

involve the civil society of South Sudan, the religious leaders, the 

traditional leaders, the business community, women, youth, as well 

as the political class, as well as the political parties. 

In order to look at the issues of how South Sudan should be governed, there is already a constitutional process underway that 

needs to be revised and invigorated. That is one of the proposals 

from the IGAD mediation. 

There are also proposals that the—this discussion needs to look 

at some of the contributing causes to the current conflict such as 

the security sector. The SPLA became a military force which continued to grow after independence as more and more militias were 

incorporated. 

How can the security sector be reformed so that you don’t have 

an army that at the first sign of trouble will fracture, as the SPLA 

did on the night of the 15th of December and subsequently? 

Issues of financial accountability and transparency, allocation of 

resources that the government does have and how do they actually 

20

get out to benefit more broadly the people of South Sudan—those 

are all issues that have been put on the table by IGAD. 

We fully support that and we believe that by addressing all of 

those issues with a broad range of stakeholders from South Sudan 

to reach a consensus, at least a sufficient consensus among those 

stakeholders on the way forward will be what will address these 

ongoing issues. 

There will also be a need, frankly, for an accountability and a 

reconciliation process. People need to know what was done. Those 

most responsible for gross violations of human rights will need to 

face justice. 

But there will above all need to be a reconciliation process among 

the communities. Some things that have been an issue in South 

Sudan are tensions between ethnic groups. These are issues that 

we were working on before the conflict. 

We spent a lot of time, particularly over this past summer, in 

dealing with the crisis in Jonglei State which was a conflict there 

between ethnic groups and we will continue to try to work on this 

issue of reconciliation. 

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Ambassador, are faith leaders actively involved 

in the reconciliation part in the pursuit of peace? Are they included 

in the discussions? 

Mr. BOOTH. Most definitely. In fact, there were a number of the 

religious leaders from South Sudan who came to Addis Ababa to 

talk with the mediators, to talk with the delegations that were 

there. 

When I was in Juba in late December, I met with several of the 

religious leaders and was probing with them for their views on how 

they might be able to contribute. 

The religious community has long been a respected pillar of 

South Sudanese society and I think definitely needs to part of any 

ongoing efforts at both reconciliation but also at the issue—addressing the issues of governance and the constitution. 

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Akwei from Amnesty International points out 

that Darfur is awash in small arms and he says that the U.N. Security Council needs to immediately expand the current U.N. arms 

embargo to cover the whole of Sudan in order to stop military-related supplies reaching all parties of the conflict of Darfur. 

Is that something that you are looking at, that you think should 

be done? 

Mr. BOOTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

It is, indeed, something that we think should be done and it is 

something that we have proposed in New York in the Security 

Council. We have, unfortunately, not had cooperation from some of 

the other permanent members of the Security Council and so we 

have not been able to succeed in expanding that. 

But we believe that the arming of so many people in Darfur is, 

indeed, what is contributing now not just to the organized fighting 

between tribes but also the general lawlessness in the area. 

Mr. SMITH. Among his many suggestions and recommendations, 

Mr. Prendergast points out that Eritrea needs to be investigated 

‘‘for its support of the opposition forces.’’ Are arms flowing from 

Eritrea? 

21

Mr. BOOTH. We have certainly heard those allegations and we 

are trying to verify whether there is any reality to them. 

They have been brought to our attention by a number of governments in the region. There is certainly a concern about regionalization of this conflict, and it is not just Eritrea but it is the potential 

for this conflict, as I mentioned in my opening remarks, to spread 

because of the fundamental interest that the neighboring countries 

have in the region. And so we are working very hard to try to get 

this conflict contained without the intervention of outside forces. 

Mr. SMITH. Dr. Phares, in his testimony, suggests that there 

needs to be Presidential statements on the crisis and I have read 

both of those that have been posted on the White House Web site, 

and they were good but one was two paragraphs and one was four. 

Not much length to it, and length doesn’t necessarily convey lack 

of substance but it suggested to me that more could have been 

there. 

But he asked for that but he also says that there should be an 

invitation to representatives from both sides or factions, I should 

say, to come to Washington for consultations with the goal of finding a definitive solution to the divisions. 

Sometimes when you take a group out of Addis, at least out of 

Sudan, but sometimes when you come even a further distance it 

has the consequence of sharpening the mind. 

I mean, we have done that with so many players from so many 

different countries over the years, including Northern Ireland. 

When the disparate parties there would meet here, all of a sudden 

things were improved. 

Is that something you are looking at? 

Mr. BOOTH. We believe the IGAD mediation, which is being led 

by former Foreign Minister Seyoum Mesfin as well as General 

Sumbeiywo who led the CPA process, are doing an outstanding job. 

We have been fully supportive of them and we have been working 

very closely with them. 

There is a danger in opening multiple channels of negotiation 

and that you open then the parties up to forum shopping. And so 

we, at this point, are committed to supporting the IGAD mediation 

and we will continue to do so as long as it continues to make 

progress and has the trust of both parties. 

Mr. SMITH. Well, frankly, I am not suggesting multiple venues. 

I mean, he is recommending and it sounded like it had some merit 

to it, that—the idea of bringing people here, perhaps to the White 

House, you know, where things could be—the ball could be moved 

further down the field. 

Mr. BOOTH. Well, we are certainly open to all ideas and we can 

take that under advisement. 

Mr. SMITH. Appreciate that. Could you also tell me when the last 

time you briefed the President personally on matters relating—was 

it in the Oval Office or was it by phone and when was that? 

Mr. BOOTH. I believe the date was the 24th of January and it 

was in the Oval Office. 

Mr. SMITH. And is it your recommendation that the President 

should call the players including Salva Kiir? 

Mr. BOOTH. We have had many calls to Salva Kiir as well as to 

Riek Machar by senior administration officials and we are caliVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:08 Sep 23, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AGH\022614\86870 SHIRL
22

brating when we need to use which official to try to move the issue 

at the particular time. 

So that is something that is certainly on the table and that will 

be used when we consider that that would be the best way forward 

at that time to move the—move us off of a sticking point or otherwise breaking a log jam. 

Mr. SMITH. But, again, the fact that Oxfam has vacated one of 

the larger cities, things are not moving, certainly not in the direction as fast as we would like. 

I don’t think we wear out our welcome if the President makes 

that phone call. I really don’t. You know, maybe multiple phone 

calls would be advisable. So please take that back, if you would. 

Mr. Cicilline. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to begin by thanking you and Ranking Member Bass for 

holding today’s hearing on this very important issue and thank our 

witness for being here. 

For several years, U.S. foreign policy focused on addressing tensions and instability in the Sudan and South Sudan and today we 

remain concerned about the civility of these countries and the quality of life of their citizens. 

As we all know, South Sudan is engulfed in conflict and terrible 

violence and the United States Government continues and must 

continue to work to achieve a peaceful solution and in particular 

I believe we must ensure that U.N. peacekeepers in South Sudan 

who are working to protect people seeking refuge are provided with 

the resources they need. 

I think our approach should be to craft a foreign policy that focuses on Sudan and South Sudan and promotes democratic values 

including respect for human rights, the necessity of enfranchisement and equal protection under the law. 

Religious tensions, ethnic tensions, and economic tensions all underscore the need for a comprehensive approach that can take 

these into account and I thank you, Ambassador Booth, for the 

work that you are doing. 

I would like you to focus, if you would, on the humanitarian relief efforts in South Sudan and to what extent you see them being 

constrained by the evacuation of foreign aid workers, whether there 

are pro-government or anti-government forces that are seeking to 

actually restrict relief efforts or humanitarian air access, and what 

is the status of the refugees that have taken refuge in U.N. compounds—are their most urgent needs being met and what can we 

do to be of assistance? 

And finally, if you would speak about the capacity of the U.N. 

peacekeepers in South Sudan, their ability to protect those civilians 

sheltering at U.N. bases and those beyond. 

I asked this question last time during the last hearing, and that 

is due to the legislative cap on peacekeeping contributions that is 

currently in place and is set to remain in place unless Congress 

acts, the U.S. did not pay its full assessed rate for any of the peacekeeping missions, and for UNMISS alone the shortfall amounted to 

about $10 million. 

This funding shortage, I believe, continues to deny critical resources to the missions and it means top troop-contributing counVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:08 Sep 23, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AGH\022614\86870 SHIRL
23

tries like Bangladesh and Ghana are not fully reimbursed for their 

services. 

And so would you talk a little bit about what it means for this 

funding to not be in place, what impact it has on the mission and 

what the long-term responsibilities that we have in terms of our 

supporting U.N. peacekeeping work? 

Mr. BOOTH. Well, thank you, Congressman. 

You had a lot of questions there but let me try to see if I can 

answer most of them. 

UNMISS, I think, should be credited with savings tens of thousands of lives during this current crisis in South Sudan. They have 

given refuge in their own compounds to close to 80,000 South Sudanese. 

Now, that is just a fraction of the number of South Sudanese 

who have been displaced internally in the country but they were 

able to offer protection. Not foolproof protection in all cases, as 

some of their compounds actually were in the path of fighting that 

moved back and forth, particularly in the town of Bor. 

And so the administration and other members of the Security 

Council voted in late December to increase the troop ceiling and 

the number of foreign police with the UNMISS mission, almost 

doubling the size of the mission to give it capacity. 

Despite efforts to recruit those forces very quickly, unfortunately, 

I have to report that to date only several hundred have actually arrived in country. More are on the way, but it does take a number 

of the troop-contributing countries, those countries willing to contribute, time to organize their forces, provide the appropriate 

equipment and get them transported to theater. 

I think the top priorities of the U.N. Mission in South Sudan are 

three, really. One is the protection of civilians including the protection of civilians in their own compounds. Two is to monitor the 

human rights situation and report on it, and there was an 

UNMISS interim human rights report that was just issued I believe the end of last week. And then three is that of assisting the 

rest of the U.N. community there and others in ensuring humanitarian access to those in need. 

The U.N. I think has estimated that humanitarian need in the 

country will be about $1.27 billion this year of which only about 

$225 million has been pledged to date. So there, clearly, is, if the 

U.N. estimates are accurate and we have no reason to challenge 

them at this point, there will be a funding shortfall in providing 

humanitarian assistance. 

Our Embassy has been drawn down to de minimis staffing but 

the first people that we sent in in addition to de minimis staff we 

have there was our disaster assistance team—our DART team—

and they went in and they spent over a week working with the 

U.N. and others to come up with a plan and an assessment of what 

needs to be done and how to get it done. 

In terms of the actual access on the ground, there have been 

places and instances where the U.N. Mission has not been able to 

fly in at particular times. We understand that the cooperation now 

from both the opposition and the government is improving though 

it is not foolproof yet in trying to move humanitarian assistance. 

24

There is an urgency to all of this as South Sudan will soon enter 

its rainy season and if particularly bulky items—heavy items such 

as food cannot be prepositioned in time, this will result in either 

having to deliver this in a much more expensive manner by air or 

that people will be on exceedingly short rations. 

So there is a huge humanitarian need that needs to be met 

there. We are working with the U.N. and other humanitarian agencies to try to meet that, and actually the humanitarian access was 

one component of the cessation of hostilities agreement and one 

that we indeed will hold both the government and the opposition 

to their word on that to allow humanitarian assistance. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Would you just spend a moment and speak about 

the U.N. peacekeeping, the funding and our failure to pay the assessed amount, and what impact that is having on both the participation of other countries and our position in that part of the world? 

Mr. BOOTH. Well, I am not the expert on the U.N. peacekeeping 

budget. I would really ask that I pass your question to our international organization bureau that we work very closely with, obviously, and perhaps have them come back to you on that impact as 

they are the ones who are working through the Department of 

Peacekeeping Operations in New York and would have a better 

sense of what the impact of the shortfall of U.S. funding is. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield 

back. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

Mr. Ambassador, thank you very much for your testimony. 

Mr. BOOTH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. A pleasure. 

Mr. SMITH. I would like to now introduce our second panel, beginning first with Mr. John Prendergast, who is a human rights activist, best-selling author and co-founder of the Enough Project, an 

initiative to end genocide and crimes against humanity. 

He has worked for the National Security Council under President 

Clinton, the State Department, and in several congressional offices. 

He has also worked for the National Intelligence Council, 

UNICEF, Human Rights Watch, the International Crisis Group 

and the U.S. Institute of Peace. 

He has helped fund schools in Darfurian refugee camps and have 

launched the Satellite Sentinel Project with actor and activist 

George Clooney. Mr. Prendergast has worked for peace in Africa for 

more than 25 years and has frequently appeared before our subcommittee to provide his expert advice. 

We will then hear from Dr. Walid Phares, who is co-secretary 

general of the Transatlantic Legislative Group on Counter Terrorism, a position he has held since 2008. He has also been an advisor to the U.S. House of Representatives Caucus on Counter Terrorism since 2007. 

He is an expert on conflicts and terrorism, and lectures on campuses nationwide as well as internationally. He has testified before 

and conducts briefings in Congress, the European Parliament and 

the European Commission, the U.N. Security Council, the U.S. Department of State, and other foreign ministries worldwide. Again, 

for 25 years he has written books and articles on various developments in Sudan and South Sudan. 

25

We will then hear from Adotei Akwei who rejoined Amnesty 

International as the managing director for government relations. 

He was a senior policy advisor for CARE where he also worked as 

regional advocacy advisor in Asia. 

Before joining CARE, Mr. Akwei worked with Amnesty International for 11 years. He also served as Africa director for the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, now Human Rights First. 

Prior to that, he served as research and human rights director 

for the American Committee on Africa and the Africa Fund. 

Mr. Prendergast, please proceed. 

STATEMENT OF MR. JOHN PRENDERGAST, CO–FOUNDER, 

ENOUGH PROJECT 

Mr. PRENDERGAST. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. Thanks 

for the chance to address this subcommittee and for your steadfast 

concern for the people of Africa for many years. 

I just returned last week from South Sudan and I saw the aftermath of some horrific atrocities perpetrated by both sides in this 

conflict. I also in 2013 went to the Darfur-Chad border as well as 

into the Nuba Mountains in rebel-held territory in the Nuba Mountains and met with the survivors of equally horrific atrocities. 

I think Adotei will focus on the human rights issues, rightly so, 

as Amnesty, so I would like to spend my time just zeroing in on 

possible solutions. 

I think the U.S. needs a real peace strategy for both Sudans, 

something that is much more comprehensive and proactive than 

the existing approach that we have taken, and I think I would 

focus today on just four areas—on peace, democracy, accountability, 

and then the leverage the U.S. needs to build in order to make 

progress on those first three. 

So the first element of a peace strategy for both countries would 

be—I hate to use this term because of its overuse—but a diplomatic 

surge. When the pre-referendum crisis was unfolding, the U.S. dramatically upgraded its diplomatic strategy. 

We had the President, the Secretary of State, the National Security Advisor and the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. all working the 

issue. We had three envoys, effectively. We had former Senator 

Kerry, who was chairman of the SFRC, we had Princeton Lyman, 

who then became the Special Envoy, and we had Scott Gration, 

who was the Special Envoy. You know, we were all over it, a full 

court press, and it paid off. This alliance that was forged included 

China and other countries to pressure Khartoum into allowing the 

referendum to occur, and averted what many of us worried would 

be a catastrophic conflict. 

The same could be said for the Bush administration’s efforts during the 2002 to 2005 period, which Congressman Wolf was referring to and you were supporting, in that the full court press the 

administration undertook with a very senior envoy supported by a 

number of senior Foreign Service Officers, one of whom is in the 

room right now, Jeff Millington, who has experience doing these 

things. I mean, that model works so we need to do it. We need to 

use it. 

The escalating crises in both of those countries today I think demand a similar diplomatic surge. One Special Envoy, no matter 

26

how capable Ambassador Booth is, pales in comparison, I think, to 

the current diplomatic requirements. 

The wars in both countries are so complicated they require their 

own envoys, and the interplay between these two conflicts in the 

broader region demands a deeper political team upon which these 

two envoys could rely. 

So either a second Special Envoy or this kind of approach that 

has been discussed already today where a senior political figure, 

whether it is a former President like President Bush or a former 

Secretary of State like Secretary Rice, Secretary Albright, Secretary Clinton, these are all people who have a very deep history 

and concern with what is happening in Sudan and a direct participation in the history of the events when they served publicly. 

And so I think that dispatching somebody like Senator Danforth 

back in those days, that could make a big difference. Who exactly 

it is let us talk about it but, definitely, let us put it on the table 

with something that could really make a difference. 

In South Sudan, I think—all right. Let us start with Sudan, and 

Congresswoman Bass said it very clearly in your opening remarks, 

you know, we need—there needs to be one unified peace process for 

Sudan. 

There are all these—we have talked about it for so long—there 

are all these truncated stovepiped approaches, to Darfur over here 

to—there is Nuba Mountains there to eastern Sudan to—there are 

all these different initiatives, precisely what Khartoum wants—divide and conquer, divide and conquer. 

We can’t play into that and, again, I don’t think that an envoy, 

again, no matter how capable Don Booth is, there is not time to 

be able to work the—develop the international coalition to pressure 

Khartoum to allow for a comprehensive peace process to occur. 

I think we understand it needs to happen. Well, how do you 

make it happen? You have to operationalize the diplomatic strategy 

to do it. 

In South Sudan, one of the things I definitely wanted to note is 

that well over half the countries in the world that are in war go 

back to war once they have a peace deal. So it is not crazy and unusual that this is happening in South Sudan. It is a tragedy, but 

it is somewhat predictable. 

South Sudan has its chance now to reboot and I think the odds 

for developing a real sustainable track is in what everyone has said 

today, which is there needs to be an inclusive peace process. 

We have all these civil society groups and you mentioned religious leaders, the political parties, youth groups, women. They all 

have to be included. We agree on that, but you have to 

operationalize the diplomatic strategy to make that happen. 

We have to be much more proactive in pushing and building the 

countries that have leverage with South Sudan and the rebels to 

encourage that they allow that to happen. 

We can talk all day about the importance of this but if those 

guys block it they won’t do it and will sit there with, again, a little 

closed room with the people with the biggest guns deciding the future of the country and probably leading to another war. 

So I think, again, a huge push on something like that from 

whether it is former President Bush, whether it is Secretary 

27

Condoleezza Rice, Albright, Clinton, or someone with stature can 

make a strong push. 

The second element I would put forward for a comprehensive 

peace strategy would be democracy promotion. DG Program—Democracy and Governance Programs globally are going down. 

This is, obviously, a bigger issue than what we have today. But 

in Sudan and in South Sudan, both countries, the need to get in 

there and support and be in solidarity with the civil society groups 

and the opposition parties and independent voices, the media, those 

that are pushing for solutions, is more, I think, vital than ever. 

And so I think figuring out a way that we can get some more resources and support to the independent sector in both countries, 

and I know that USAID grapples with this and I think, again, with 

Congress’ support there could be more done in that regard. 

The third element of a peace strategy is accountability, justice 

and reconciliation. You know, I think, again, who disagrees? We 

have a problem. In Sudan and South Sudan, no one has ever been 

held accountable for any crime—war crime or crime against humanity they have ever committed. 

At least there are a few people who have been issued arrest warrants in The Hague. That is a beginning. But I think what, and 

particularly now with South Sudan exploding as it has with these 

terrible crimes being committed by both parties, ensuring that 

there is some kind of a mechanism, we suggest in our testimony 

a hybrid court or a mixed court, you know, where—when a justice 

system of a country, especially an embryonic country 21⁄2 years old, 

is dwarfed by the needs, well, some international support—still 

South Sudanese-led—it is not a violation of sovereignty, it is support for sovereignty—to build up the capacity of the judicial sector, 

to try the worst cases of these crimes, I think, would be terribly 

important. 

And on the flip side of that, a lot of Africans and people who 

work on justice around the world talk about restorative justice and, 

you know, in South Sudan, for example, when somebody kills someone or when someone steals something in a community, the restorative judicial mechanism is compensation. 

So negotiating a form of compensation in this regard where there 

is truth telling about who did what to whom and then there is 

some compensation involved in addition to the more formal accountable measures is the kind of thing you can see underlying a 

solution going forward. 

And then on Sudan itself, another push, whatever the politics are 

in the ICC—the push for holding those people that have already 

been indicted to—holding them accountable. President Bashir’s visiting the Congo today—that is a signatory to the ICC. Of course, 

he will skate in and skate out with no problem. Redoubling our efforts—again, another reason why understanding one lonely envoy 

is not enough for the enormity of these crises. 

The fourth and final element of a peace strategy is building the 

leverage so that we can get some of these things done. We often 

say in a lot of these crises, well, the U.S., we don’t have any leverage anymore—we don’t have any influence anymore. I just don’t 

buy that at all, and I think what we suggest here in—is a number 

of things. 

28

First and foremost, you always got to really, really examine what 

are the incentives and the pressures—what are the sticks and the 

carrots that can be put forward in this kind of an environment. 

Creating real penalties—when I say creating I mean they don’t 

exist. You have to create them. This requires imagination and it requires some real discussion about what would actually hurt some 

of these folks that are undermining peace or committing terrible 

human rights atrocities. 

We have to look at this, and so developing those sticks and carrots, and we can talk a little bit about what they might be. Working with other countries that have significant leverage. You know, 

let us be honest about it. China has more leverage than anyone. 

China has dipped in and out of the diplomatic efforts and the 

peace efforts in somewhat mildly encouraging ways. In other 

words, not like it was a few years ago where they wouldn’t even 

engage at all—they wouldn’t even—that is an internal matter, it is 

not our business. 

Their economic stake is so at risk now because of what is happening that they have begun to, out of pure self-interest, get involved in the—in supporting negotiations. Very generally, I would 

like to see a senior person from Washington go to Beijing and talk 

to China about how we can work together on this in limited ways. 

We have maybe the same end goal, which is peace. What our interests are may be wildly different. Doesn’t matter. Let us figure 

out how we can work together. 

Going in with China with the parties in both Sudan and South 

Sudan on particular things—even if it is just humanitarian issues, 

that would make a difference. That would bring leverage. That 

would build leverage that we don’t have now or that we are lacking 

now. 

Targeted sanctions is something that I think we need to use 

more liberally in this case for war crimes and crimes against humanity and folks that are undermining the peace process. 

So the African Union has already put targeted sanctions on the 

table for South Sudan. That is encouraging. We need to get behind 

that very strongly as well and build, again, a coalition of countries 

that are willing to—so it is not just the U.S. standing alone. 

Build the coalition who is willing to exact a price for those that 

would commit terrible atrocities to achieve their political objectives 

and likely the U.N. Security Council once again will not be amenable to this because of China and Russia. Again, this is where it 

is. 

So we go around it, build the coalition that is willing to do this 

kind of stuff and push it and jam some of these actors who are 

doing—undertaking the kind of actions that they are. 

Sudan has a particular vulnerability, I think. Given the loss of 

revenue from oil, not just the post-2011 loss but now even more because of the revenues declining even further, they have turned to 

gold. 

Last year in 2013, they committed terrible ethnic cleansing 

crimes in Darfur—north Darfur in order to consolidate control or 

to gain control over the exports of gold from Darfur. 

At the very least, the U.S. should lead a multilateral effort to 

target the Khartoum Government’s lifeline by labelling Sudan’s 

29

gold as conflict-affected and work with the U.N. sanctions committee to see if there are particular people that are involved in that 

gold trade that can be sanctioned to hurt their business interests, 

to hurt their economic interest, and then definitely working multilaterally to ensure that any offer of debt relief, which many countries are constantly bringing up the possibility of providing debt relief to Sudan even in the midst of all the terrible atrocities that 

they are committing, making that debt relief contingent on an end 

to the wars inside and transformative political reform. 

Thanks so much for the time that you have given me. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Prendergast follows:]

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Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. 

Dr. Phares. 

STATEMENT OF WALID PHARES, PH.D., CO–SECRETARY GENERAL, TRANSATLANTIC LEGISLATIVE GROUP ON COUNTER 

TERRORISM 

Mr. PHARES. Chairman Smith, Madam Ranking Member Congresswoman Bass, thank you very much for this invitation. It is a 

pleasure and honor to be speaking to your subcommittee about it. 

I would like to ask the chairman to add my written testimony to 

the record. 

Mr. SMITH. Without objection, so ordered, and anything else you 

would like to add to the record—you know, additional papers and 

what not. 

Mr. PHARES. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, over the past 35 years from 1979 until this year 

I have been monitoring, analyzing, and publishing about Sudan, 

north and south, and about the ethnic conflicts taking place inside 

Sudan. 

The first work was in 1979. That was in the first war, after the 

first war of Sudan before the second one and my last work will appear in a month in a new book, ‘‘The Lost Spring’’ in 2014. 

Based on my research, what I would like to address today is a 

global strategic assessment rather than going into the actual case 

by case. I know my colleagues have addressed human rights. We 

will also address the humanitarian issue. 

I divide my findings in three—1) dealing with Sudan, i.e. northern Sudan, the Republic of Sudan, 2) about South Sudan and, 3) 

a few suggestions, as you have requested, on how to adapt U.S. foreign policy to these two crises. 

On Sudan, as I show in map number two—if you have the opportunity to show it, at least I will show the chairman—what is very 

important for the American public and also our bureaucracy and 

our Government to understand is that the map of Sudan is one of 

a central government, a central regime which has an ideology, at 

war or at conflict with five other ethnic communities that happen 

to be African minorities in Sudan. 

If we don’t understand that concept, it will be very difficult to 

deal—to jump from one area to the other area without understanding that there is a grand design, a grand architecture of the 

regime trying to implement it on the ground and in a very dramatic way. 

In Sudan, you have the center, of course, which is Arab-Sudanese. The regime in that center has an ideology. It is a jihadi regime. It has been involved in the past in the—as of 1989 and, of 

course, throughout the 1990s in supporting jihadist organizations 

around the world. 

Dr. Turabi, but also the regime of Mr. Bashir, have convened 

conferences in Khartoum in 1992, 1993 with many organizations, 

some of which are on our terrorist list and the terrorist list of other 

countries as well. 

The problem is that you have four issues this regime is involved 

with. Number one, it is at war with five ethnic communities. One 

is Darfur that my colleagues have mentioned. Despite all the agreeVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:08 Sep 23, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AGH\022614\86870 SHIRL
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ments on Darfur, the regime is still involved in arming forces and 

factions against the population of Darfur. 

The labeling of these are factions fighting against each other is 

not as much accurate as the regime arming the neo-Janjaweed because you had the Janjaweed in the past and now the new forces 

with a different name to stop the implementation of human rights 

or protection of Darfur. 

Darfur still is a open wound. Darfur is as large as Syria, though 

in Syria you had 120,000 people killed. In Darfur, more than 

200,000 people killed. 

Then you have the issue of the Kordofan in the south where the 

government—the regime, as it was mentioned several times, is conducting air raids. This is a military activity against a civilian population, not just against the SPLM in that area. 

The regime is also engaged in a third ethnic confrontation with 

the Nubians in the north both on the political and on the cultural 

fronts. What we see coming in all these four ethnic conflicts is the 

fact that the regime is denying the African identity of these communities. 

That is the bottom line. It is denying them their school, their languages, their political representation and as a result you have a rebellion, as was the case with South Sudan. 

Last but not least, the Beja area, which is across eastern Sudan 

including Port Sudan, this is a community—an African community—which also is suppressed by this regime. And the fifth group 

basically is located in between South Sudan and northern Sudan. 

Map number four would show that. It is the area of Abyei. 

We do know that it is about oil and petrol and political control 

of this area but there is a population and that population, as you 

just said in your statement, has not been consulted yet about its 

future, as South Sudan has been consulted before. 

So one aspect that U.S. foreign policy needs to address is to put 

pressure on the Sudan-Khartoum regime to recognize the basic 

rights of these four or five ethnic African communities in Sudan, 

and if need be this issue, as I recommend, should go to the United 

Nations. 

This is an issue that is very similar to what has happened in 

East Timor, to what has happened in Kosovo and to what has happened, as you just mentioned, in Northern Ireland. 

B, inside the north Arab Muslim country, as map number two 

shows, you have an actual opposition to the Khartoum regime. So 

it is not just an issue of ethnicity, of Arab versus non-Arab. 

Inside the Arab Muslim Sunni area of northern Sudan you have 

a civil society rising. You have something similar to what happened 

in Tunisia or in Egypt or in Syria. People are opposing the Bashir 

regime—not just that he has been responsible for genocide against 

African neighbors and co-citizens but because it is suppressing 

them. This is something that also should be added to all U.S. foreign policy thinking and policy about Sudan. 

There are two more crises that the north is generating—the 

northern regime. One, a constant support by the Bashir regime to 

jihadist organizations. Bases are being established there. 

Our intelligence and security committees in Congress should request more reports from our intelligence agencies about the backVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:08 Sep 23, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AGH\022614\86870 SHIRL
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ing that the Bashir regime has been supplying, has been bringing 

not just to jihadi organizations including Hamas, which is on our 

list of states—of organizations that are terrorists. 

Last but not least, what is very worrisome, as we show in map 

number eight, is the rise of Iranian military activities on the eastern coast of Sudan on the Red Sea. 

We now know that Iranian military presence in Port Sudan and 

the regions around Port Sudan is now facilitated by that regime. 

That regime is engaged in five ethnic conflicts, suppressing its own 

community, backing Hamas and other jihadist organizations, and 

now opening its own coast and ports to Iranian facilities. 

These should be the basis of our policy with regard to that regime, with regard to South Sudan, if I may. South Sudan is a 

drama that should not exist. 

The way we are handling it, as if this is a conflict—this is a conflict that’s going to last for many years and we are trying to look 

at the humanitarian issue. This is a conflict that should have not 

even existed. 

We should have reacted to it in a very firm way. The loss of 

South Sudan would be the loss of the latest independent country 

in the world, would be the loss of a very promising African democracy, would be the loss of an ally which has huge experience in 

fighting terrorism. 

These forces, the SPLM, SPLA, despite the fight that they have 

now inside Southern Sudan, are the most experienced African 

forces on the continent against jihadi forces for the last 30 years. 

We will be losing this experience, and if that goes down then 

many—as you just mentioned, Mr. Chairman, many jihadi organizations in central Africa, in Somalia and other parts of the Sahel 

will be converging to Sudan to create those bases. 

So in my recommendations, which I am going to go over very 

quickly and you have mentioned one, I would strongly recommend 

that the President of the United States, President Obama, will address in public the issue of Sudan. 

He has visited the continent of Africa twice. He has delivered 

speeches in Cairo and other places. He should, in my view, modestly, deliver a speech and the reason is simple. 

We need high energy. People in South Sudan, those commanders 

on the ground, needs to have a very high important personality 

that would address them from Washington that would ask them to 

cease fire. 

This is a civil war, and in civil wars they are not going to listen 

to diplomats. They are going to listen to the highest personality, especially Mr. Obama. President Obama is well seen in Africa, well 

seen in the Sudan. 

He should be, as was mentioned by Congressman Wolf, have 

with him a delegation and leaders such as President Bush, who 

had in the past been working on the issue. 

Leaders like yourself, like the madam and others should be 

present so that the psychological message being sent to the South 

Sudan, not just to the President and the former Vice President but 

to the fighting forces on the ground—the commanders, when they 

will see that the President of the United States is addressing them. 

38

As you just mentioned, inviting representatives to Washington, 

we had the Israelis and the Palestinians. We had the Irish here. 

We had many other people. Let us take them to Camp David or 

bring them to the Congress and put that psychological pressure so 

that they will understand it is a U.S. priority. 

On Sudan, we are dealing with not one, but four or five Darfurs. 

What I would recommend at this point in time is that the President, when addressing the issue of South Sudan, would call on 

Khartoum, would call on Mr. Bashir and tell him you are under 

international indictment and you are responsible for the security 

and the rights of these four African communities in Sudan. 

Second, we need to invite to Washington representatives of the 

Beja, of the Nubians, of the Darfuris, and of the Kordofan, and 

other areas in northern Sudan so that the American public will understand what are their claims and what are their difficulties. 

When we have issues of conflict, especially ethnic conflict, it is 

very important that our foreign policy would be backed by the public. Lawmakers represent the public and the public needs to see 

them. 

That is why I would recommend as well that there will be another hearing in this committee and other committees where representatives from Sudanese NGOs will be here at this table and 

then making those statements. 

Beja people, American citizens, and people from Darfur and people from the Nubians will be actually addressing the American 

public and explaining their situation. 

Last but not least, we are funding a significant amount of aid 

and help to U.S. media. We have Voice of America. We have Radio 

Free Europe. 

It is time now that we would instruct Voice of America to start 

addressing the issue of Sudan using ethnic languages. 

If we want to have any leverage by sending our diplomats, fine. 

The diplomats are going to be meeting few people. We need to 

speak with their languages, and we have significant budgets. 

We have significant bureaucracies. You don’t need to add any additional budget. Just giving instructions to VOA to start addressing 

these ethnic communities with their language. 

Thank you very much for giving me that opportunity. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Phares follows:]

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Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Dr. Phares. 

Mr. Akwei. 

STATEMENT OF MR. ADOTEI AKWEI, MANAGING DIRECTOR 

FOR GOVERNMENT RELATIONS, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL 

USA 

Mr. AKWEI. Thank you, Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Bass. 

It is an honor to be testifying before you today. Your long record 

of engagement in Africa continues to be an inspiration and we look 

forward to working with you going forward. 

I am going to go straight to my conclusions and to the recommendations, given the very strong recommendations from my 

peers on the panel. I think these hearings, first of all, come at a 

critically important time. 

Maybe they bring into focus the crisis in South Sudan but they 

certainly should serve to remind Washington of its long history of 

engagement and the investment that it has made in Sudan and in 

South Sudan and also on the issues of promoting human rights and 

freedom for the people in South Sudan. 

The U.S. has been heavily engaged in Sudan since the 1970s, 

first providing support to the government in Khartoum and then 

in 1989 leading the international effort to end the protracted 

bloody civil war between the SPLM and the Government of Sudan. 

The United States also has responded to different humanitarian 

crises that have cost millions of lives. The U.S. played a key role 

in brokering the end of the civil war and orchestrating the process 

that resulted in the secession of South Sudan, its birth as an independent nation and has been the single largest donor to the new 

government in addition to providing support to a government 

formed from an armed group that had been fighting over 20 years. 

In other words, the near collapse of the new government in Juba 

represents not only another tragedy for the people of South Sudan 

unless resolved in a manner that leads to sustained improved governance and respect for human rights, it sends a chilling message 

for the entire continent and, arguably, here in Washington. This is 

why the peace talks in Addis, as John mentioned, must not be conducted in a business as usual manner, leaving the shaping of the 

cease fire, its implementation and hopefully ensuring its longevity 

only to the Government of Sudan and the forces of former Vice 

President Riek Machar and their supporters. 

The manner in which a peace agreement is reached will be as 

important as the agreement itself because it will help cement the 

legitimate and critical role of civil society in affairs of their country 

and include historically marginalized populations. 

It will also underscore the concept of accountability for governments and the people in those governments to meet the ceasefire 

and to live and abide by it. 

So for Amnesty International, it is important that policy makers 

in Washington deliberate on the steps going forward and that there 

is clarity on the nature of the issues that both countries face individually that are similar but that are in different context, and 

those where seeking to address an issue in one country would benefit from better coordination or efforts to address that with the 

other. 

57

In this category, we would include improving the delivery of humanitarian assistance and expanding and robustly informing the 

U.N. arms embargo which, Chairman Smith, you referred to. 

While over 800,000 people have been displaced by the current 

crisis in South Sudan with over 700,000 of those internally displaced and either seeking shelter in U.N. bases or staying in rural 

open settings with little to no access to food or water, sanitation 

or shelter, in Sudan the delivery of essential humanitarian assistance to civilian populations in conflict-affected areas has been severely hindered due to government restrictions and widespread insecurity. 

The United States and the international community must 

prioritize getting the Governments of Sudan and South Sudan to 

facilitate the unrestricted work of humanitarian organizations. 

This includes removing obstacles to their operations, working to 

ensure the safety of staff delivering humanitarian assistance, ensuring access to at-risk communities, and ensuring the safety and 

protection of refugees and internally displaced. 

Second, the destructive role of the glut of small arms in both 

South Sudan and Sudan has contributed to conflicts, loss of life and 

destruction of livelihoods. 

This is despite the U.N. Security Council’s imposed arms embargo on Darfur. We all know that there has been compelling evidence 

that arms have been and continue to be used to commit serious violations of international humanitarian and human rights law in 

Darfur and other parts of Sudan. 

As such, the U.N. Security Council must immediately expand the 

current U.N. arms embargo to cover the whole of Sudan in order 

to stop military and related supplies reaching all parties of the conflict in Darfur. 

The flow of small arms to the region has not stopped and the civilian populations continue to suffer the consequences. Reducing 

the availability of these weapons will be critical to helping curb 

abuses in Darfur, Blue Nile and southern Kordofan and will be essential for conducting effective DDR processes in South Sudan 

where abuses carried out by soldiers and armed civilians in the last 

few months have underscored the dangers of unrestricted easy access to weapons. 

However, as these bilateral challenges must be taken up, there 

must be continued focus on the human rights challenges inside 

each of these countries. In Sudan, the United States must work 

with the international community to immediately cease all attacks 

in violation of international humanitarian law and human rights in 

Darfur, southern Kordofan, and Blue Nile, including deliberate attacks on civilians and indiscriminate aerial bombardments in civilian areas. 

The United States must also push the Sudanese Government to 

promptly, independently and impartially investigate all allegations 

of attacks against civilians by members of the Sudanese paramilitary forces in line with the requirements of international law, 

standards of fair trial, and to ensure that perpetrators are held to 

account. 

The Government of Sudan must comply with the arms embargo 

in Darfur including stopping all offensive military flights and seekVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:08 Sep 23, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00061 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AGH\022614\86870 SHIRL
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ing prior authorization with the Security Council sanctions committee to move military equipment to Darfur or into Darfur. 

And the United States must also express concern over the ongoing restrictions on basic civil and political rights and the continued 

harassment of critics of the government including through the 

practice of arbitrary detention, torture, ill treatment, restrictions 

on freedom of expression, association, and assembly. 

And I would point out that the civil society groups in Sudan have 

issued statements calling for a comprehensive response and approach to the situation in the country. We must build on that, as 

my colleague has just said. That is going to be the critical actor 

and agent to sustain reform inside Sudan. 

In South Sudan, I think we have all reached fairly easy agreement that the consensus is that the cease fire and implementing 

an effective cease fire is the priority. 

We must ensure that the peace negotiations and the establishment of the AU Commission of Inquiry prioritize accountability, as 

well as reconciliation, ensuring that those responsible for abuses 

during the conflict are brought to justice and ending the cycle of 

impunity that John referred to. 

The negotiations in Addis have to be opened up. Representatives 

of all stakeholders—women, civil society groups, and other 

marginalized communities—must be allowed to participate and, as 

John said, we must work to facilitate that. 

If there is going to be a lasting peace, there has got to be broader 

ownership, and the protection of human rights in the country is 

helped and strengthened by all of their involvements. 

I will thank you there. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Akwei follows:]

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Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Akwei. 

We do have votes again occurring so I will just ask two questions 

and then yield to my colleague. 

You mentioned, Mr. Akwei, that hundreds of activists were arrested in September 2013 and we haven’t, I don’t think, brought 

enough attention to what has become of them. 

Has there been access by NGOs or other humanitarian groups or 

the Red Crescent, the Red Cross, anyone, to any of those people? 

Are they being tortured, do we know? 

Mr. AKWEI. No, and in fact, unfortunately the history of the 

country is that people who are arrested in Sudan are very much 

at risk of ill treatment if not torture. So this has to be prioritized 

in terms of not letting the spotlight completely drop away from 

what is going on. 

Mr. SMITH. No, I appreciate you underscoring it in your testimony. 

Let me ask you, Mr. Prendergast, you talked about the diplomatic surge very diplomatically and, I believe, very sincerely. You 

talk about how, you know, a very capable Special Envoy could only 

do so much. It has to be all hands on deck. 

This has to happen now. It seems to me that we are in an absolutely urgent situation. Which way is this trending? I mean, can 

this get significantly worse in days, weeks, and months if something is not done that would really signal U.S. full, all-in, type engagement? 

Mr. PRENDERGAST. Yes. To address both of those points, on the 

one hand, I do think it could get worse. I think it could get much 

worse. 

I think if there isn’t a stoppage with a real cessation of hostilities 

that is respected that it is really about the nature of the attacks. 

So if there were just two armies battling each other, like we saw 

in Ethiopia and Eritrea—they fought each other, civilian damage 

was not insignificant but minimal and the losses were to the armed 

forces. That is one thing. 

It is not what is happening here. It is not what happened when 

they fought the war—the North-South war when there was the 

intra-south war from ’91 to ’96. 

They attack each other’s communities and when I went into some 

of the neighborhoods that had been where soldiers from the government had gone house to house looking for particular people from 

a particular ethnic group, the Nuer, and pulling them out of 

houses, executing them, I mean, this reverberates throughout the 

country. 

And then I just—we went up to Bor after that and in that place 

the rebel groups led by, sadly, Nuer—young Nuer people who were 

recruited into these militias, these paramilitary forces principally 

called the White Army, and the kinds of atrocities they committed 

there—going into the hospital killing everybody in the hospital, 

going into the church compound killing the female pastors, raping 

and killing—like very, very terrible atrocities that, again, send 

major signals to each other’s communities. 

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tween Nuer and Dinka and that is—you know, these are politicians 

using ethnicity as a mobilizing force. 

And so that is what worries me about things getting worse. So 

yes, I do believe we need to do more than what we are doing now. 

What we are doing now in standard diplomatic terms makes sense. 

But this isn’t a standard diplomatic problem. 

Mr. SMITH. Now, is it time for the President to call Salva Kiir 

and Machar? 

Mr. PRENDERGAST. Yes. There are gradations of things. He 

should definitely be engaged. We need additional firepower, diplomatically, to go out. 

I think all these ideas are good and let us see if President Bush 

or Condoleezza Rice or Hillary Clinton or Madeleine Albright or 

somebody of a significant stature who has a history of doing things 

positively in Sudan to be deployed out there, to bring a message, 

to push forward for the process to begin in earnest. 

Mr. SMITH. Ms. Bass. 

Ms. BASS. Yes. I am sorry that we will have to go because I have 

at least 100 questions. But just real quickly—one, I just really appreciate, you know, the quality of your comments and recommendations and all, and you mentioned that inside of South Sudan that 

there would be a call from folks for a comprehensive response and 

I am wondering with what Mr. Prendergast said if that is an example. 

So in other words, I love the term diplomatic surge. You know, 

if we really went in with full force would that be responsive to 

what you feel people are calling, and then also, you know, with 

you, Dr. Phares, you know, you described all of the different struggles that are taking place within Sudan. How do you feel that type 

of response could help? 

Mr. PHARES. For Southern Sudan, may I recommend a shock 

treatment at this point in time. As my colleagues have mentioned, 

we are way beyond the traditional confrontation on our border line. 

And the shock treatment—I am going to repeat one more time—

the President of the United States has immense weight in the eyes 

not just of the two leaders on the ground but other commanders on 

the ground. 

They look at him as he is the head of the free world, and if he 

can include in his speech directed to them I will make you responsible if you continue to kill civilians, and then we could have our 

diplomats, former Presidents, so on and so—we need that shock 

treatment. 

And number two, we need to invite representatives. I am not 

sure at what level but bring your representatives here. Sending 

that message—that image back by TV into South Sudan will create 

an energy that is different. 

Because now people are killing people. They think that the international community and United States are just sending one diplomat. 

Mr. AKWEI. I would think that having that kind of political representation that speaks directly to these civil society groups would 

be one of the most powerful things we could do because it would 

send a statement to the ‘‘leaders’’ of the major armed forces that 

these groups matter, these groups have to be listened to, these 

69

groups have a legitimate stake in the future of the country and you 

are not the only ones driving the future. 

Mr. PRENDERGAST. And one footnote to that is part of what you 

surge diplomatically for is to ensure those voices are at the table 

and heard but you also want to surge because in South Sudan itself 

the trend line in the year before the conflict started was a closing 

of space. 

Freedom of speech, freedom of assembly—all those were under 

siege and that space needs to be reopened for people to have the 

confidence that anything that is agreed to in Addis Ababa can be 

brought back to the country and people will have a chance to really 

build this country with and have a free and fair electoral process 

that will allow for everyone to be able to participate in an equal 

way. 

So I think that is what we are really missing here is the pressure—the high-level pressure that says this matters to us deeply 

and in the absence of that inclusivity and those rights how can you 

build this country, and you won’t get our help because that means 

it is going the wrong way if you are not doing those things. 

Mr. SMITH. I want to thank our distinguished witnesses. Thank 

you for your expertise, your very significant recommendations we 

will follow up on. 

I hope the administration takes to heart all that you have said 

as well. 

And without any further ado, the hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:04 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

(71)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

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MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, 

A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, AND CHAIRMAN, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS


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