In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 17-1770

KELLY JEAN LINDERMAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION,

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

No. 1:16-cv-00104-LJM-DML — Larry J. McKinney, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED MARCH 28, 2018 — DECIDED APRIL 10, 2018

____________________

Before EASTERBROOK, KANNE, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. Kelly Jean Floyd bought a 

home in 2004 and lived there with her ex-husband, their four 

children, and her parents. In June 2013 her mother asked her 

to move out to reduce intra-family conflicts. Floyd left—and 

she also stopped paying the loan that is secured by a mortgage on the house. A few months later her mother departed

(her father had died years earlier), leaving the house occupied by a single daughter, who moved away in May 2014. 
2 No. 17-1770

The unoccupied structure was vandalized; thieves removed 

its copper pipe and wiring. U.S. Bank, which owns the note 

and mortgage, started foreclosure proceedings in March 

2014; Floyd asserts that she was not notified. A default 

judgment was entered, then vacated in June 2015 at her request. (The parties have not told us what has happened in 

the foreclosure case since then.) In 2014 Floyd remarried and 

took the name Linderman, which we use from now on. She 

has divorced the new husband and has never reoccupied the 

home (or resumed paying off the loan)—though in August 

2015, with the aid of an inheritance, she did buy another 

house nearby. She lives in that house today.

The 2014 vandalism produced insurance money that was

sent to the Bank, to be held in escrow for use in making repairs or as additional security. Linderman hired a homerepair contractor, and early in 2015 the Bank disbursed 

$10,000 from the escrow toward the cost of repairs. The contractor abandoned the job in April 2015, however, telling 

Linderman that it was not confident that she could pay the 

full cost of its work. The house was vandalized twice more 

that spring, and a storm damaged the roof in June 2015.

Linderman has not hired a replacement contractor or 

asked the Bank to disburse additional funds from the escrow. But she did send the Bank a leger, dated September 5, 

2015, asking about the status of the loan and particularly 

about how the insurance money was being handled. The 

Bank sent a response dated September 25. Asserting that she 

had not received that response, Linderman filed this suit 

under the Real Estate Seglement Procedures Act, which the 

parties call RESPA and we call the Act.
No. 17-1770 3

The district judge assumed that the leger met the definition of a “qualified wrigen request”, 12 U.S.C. §2605(e)(1)(B), 

and further assumed that a “servicer” (another defined term) 

must ensure that its response is received. We do not decide 

whether either assumption is correct; the second is questionable given 12 C.F.R. §1024.11, which says that mailing a 

timely and properly addressed response satisfies the Act

whether or not the response is received. (The statute is silent 

on this issue.) Even with the benefit of these two favorable 

assumptions, Linderman lost, because a remedy depends on 

proof of “actual damages”. 12 U.S.C. §2605(f)(1)(A). The district judge found that Linderman’s non-receipt of the information could not have caused or aggravated any of her injuries. 242 F. Supp. 3d 764 (S.D. Ind. 2017).

The dates we have mentioned show why the district 

court reached this conclusion. Only Linderman’s divorce 

from her new husband occurred after September 2015, but 

the events that led to the divorce (inability to find an affordable place to live, disagreements about parenting styles, Linderman’s deteriorating mental health) predated the leger to 

the Bank. Here are a few more dates: in October 2014 Linderman saw a property-preservation company (which she 

had not hired) carting things away from the house; in July 

2015 the City of Indianapolis began to send Linderman notices that the house had become a nuisance and demanding 

that she take steps to secure and repair it to building-code 

requirements (she estimates that she has spent $5,000 responding to the City’s demands); in August 2015 Linderman 

entered treatment for depression and anxiety. None of these 

events can be traced to non-receipt of the Bank’s leger in late 

September 2015.
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Still, Linderman asserts, the lack of a response from the 

Bank has aggravated her problems. She does not explain 

how. The lack of money disbursed from the escrow may be a 

cause of continuing loss, if she cannot afford to repair or secure the house. Similarly, the house’s condition could affect 

her mental well-being. Linderman asserts that she “began to 

feel more anxious and depressed as [she] watched [her] 

home continue [to] deteriorate”. Yet the Act does not require 

a servicer to pay money in response to a wrigen request.

The Act requires a servicer to correct errors in its records 

(§2605(e)(2)(A)) or provide appropriate information if no error needs fixing (§2605(e)(2)(B), (C)). It requires the servicer 

to refrain, for 60 days, from taking steps that would jeopardize the borrower’s credit rating (§2605(e)(3)). Linderman 

does not accuse the Bank of violating the rule about credit 

reports and does not explain how earlier access to the Bank’s 

description of how the account has been handled could have 

helped her. Nor do we see how lack of an adequate response, as opposed to the ongoing foreclosure and need of 

money for repairs, could have contributed to her mental issues. And some of her asserted injuries, such as the breakdown of her marriage, are outside the scope of the Act. Perron v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 845 F.3d 852, 858 (7th Cir. 

2017) (“the breakdown of a marriage is not the type of harm 

that faithful performance of RESPA duties avoids”).

A focus on federal rules can distract people (including 

lawyers) from the more mundane doctrines of state law that 

may offer greater prospect of success. The contract between 

Linderman and the Bank, not federal law, determines how 

insurance proceeds must be handled and when the Bank 

must disburse money from the escrow to make repairs. The 
No. 17-1770 5

Act does not require servicers to explain the details of contracts (or contract law) to customers or their lawyers. Contract law also governs the arrangement between Linderman 

and the repair firm that walked in April 2015; if the contract 

required the firm to finish the job, Indiana law would supply 

a remedy. Likewise Indiana law (rules of conversion, replevin, and trespass) could provide relief against the company 

that may have taken harmful steps in October 2014. Linderman may even have a claim against her mother, who did not

pay the loan after Linderman moved out. (Linderman told 

the district judge that she believed that her mother would 

repay the loan, though she does not say that her mother 

promised to do so or that she took any step to add her mother to the account with the Bank.) Yet she does not pursue any 

of these theories. The sole claim in this suit is that the Bank 

injured her by not adequately responding to her leger. That 

claim fails for the reasons we have given.

AFFIRMED