Filed 12/29/21

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

In re Marriage of DORIT and 

AVI REICHENTAL.

2d Civil No. B307255

(Super. Ct. No. 17FL00447)

(Santa Barbara County)

DORIT REICHENTAL,

 Appellant,

v.

AVI REICHENTAL,

 Respondent.

Dorit Reichental (Wife) filed a petition for the 

dissolution of her 39-year marriage to Avi Reichental (Husband). 

The parties stipulated to the appointment of the Honorable 

Melinda Johnson, retired seasoned veteran in family law, as 

temporary judge “to hear and determine the above-entitled 

matter until its final determination.” At Husband’s request and 

after an eight-day evidentiary hearing, Judge Johnson entered a 
2

“non-CLETS”1 domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) 

prohibiting Wife from entering the property where Husband was 

residing with Jenna Jobst, his girlfriend, harassing or surveilling 

either of them, communicating with them, or coming within 50 

yards of them. 

Wife contends Judge Johnson lacked jurisdiction to 

enter the DVRO because it was beyond the scope of the parties’ 

stipulation and Wife did not consent to have the DVRO request

heard by her. She further contends the order must be vacated 

because it is a “non-CLETS” order, in violation of Family Code 

section 63802 and because it improperly extends to Jobst, who is 

not a party to this matter. Wife also contends Judge Johnson

erred in ruling on the application because Husband did not first 

file it in the Superior Court. 

We conclude Judge Johnson did not exceed the scope 

of her appointment when she heard and decided Husband’s 

request for a DVRO, but did err as a matter of law when she 

specified that the restraining order was a “non-CLETS” order. 

We will remand the matter to permit Judge Johnson to enter an 

order in compliance with section 6380. In all other respects, the 

order is affirmed.

1 “CLETS” refers to the California Law Enforcement 

Telecommunications System. Domestic violence restraining 

orders (DVROs) are reported to law enforcement through this 

system. (Fam. Code, § 6380, subd. (a).)

2 All further statutory references are to the Family Code, 

unless otherwise stated.
3

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY3

Wife filed the petition for dissolution of marriage in 

February 2017. In May 2017, the parties agreed to the 

appointment of Judge Johnson. The stipulation provides, “The 

temporary judge shall hear and try the above- entitled matter, 

including hearing and determining all pretrial motions, discovery 

matters, and orders to show cause; presiding over the trial; 

rendering judgment; and hearing and determining all post-trial 

motions and orders to show cause.” 

Husband filed a request for a DVRO. His supporting 

declaration described receiving “numerous harassing and 

threatening emails from [Wife] that have frightened me and 

caused me to be concerned about her mental stability.” Husband 

noted that, after their separation, Wife bought a home that was 

near their former residence, where he was living with Jobst. He 

believed that Wife was watching him and Jobst from a neighbor’s 

property and that she gained access to his gated property 

through that neighbor’s yard. Husband claimed Wife had filed a 

false police report accusing him and Jobst of disabling the 

security system and installing listening devices in her home. He 

also described an incident in which a package addressed to Wife 

was delivered to his house. The package contained a book titled, 

“Women Who Love Psychopaths: Inside the Relationships of 

Inevitable Harm with Psychopaths, Sociopaths, & Narcissists.” 

Husband declared that Wife had “repeatedly accused me of being 

a sociopath and narcissist,” and that she repeatedly left a copy of 

the book on his bedside table while they were still living together. 

3 Wife does not challenge the evidentiary basis for the 

restraining order. As a consequence, we offer an abridged 

statement of the facts on which the DVRO request is based. 
4

The final incident Husband described involved Wife and two 

other people standing in his driveway, looking through the 

wrought-iron gate in the direction of his house. 

Jobst provided a declaration in which she described 

two interactions with Wife. First, she described Wife following 

her in an aggressively unsafe manner as Jobst drove Husband’s 

Bentley on the northbound 101 Freeway, down the Conejo grade.

Second, on four occasions in one week, Jobst saw Wife parked in 

a bus stop near Husband’s house. From this vantage point, Wife 

could “monitor each person who enters or leaves our street.” 

Wife’s opposition argued Husband’s claims were not a 

sufficient basis for a restraining order. She denied that her 

emails were abusive, threatening or harassing, and contended 

that filing the police report was a constitutionally protected 

activity. Wife further asserted that Husband’s residence was 

community property and that there was no “exclusive use” order 

in place. Consequently, it was not improper for her to walk onto 

the property, knock on the front door of the house or look at the 

house through the gate. Wife provided similar, purportedly 

innocent, explanations for the other conduct described in 

Husband’s declaration. 

In addition to her written opposition to the DVRO 

request and her declaration, Wife filed written objections to 

Husband’s evidence and requested that Judge Johnson rule on 

those objections. 

After a two-hour hearing, Judge Johnson denied the 

request for “temporary emergency orders” without prejudice and 

directed the parties “to obtain the first available date for an 

evidentiary hearing on the petition.” The parties selected dates 

for the evidentiary hearing and then engaged in discovery, 
5

including producing documents and deposing Husband, Jobst and 

Wife.

On the first day of the evidentiary hearing, Wife 

objected to Judge Johnson presiding over Husband’s DVRO

request. She contended the DVRO request should be dismissed 

because the proceeding was outside the scope of the stipulation 

appointing the temporary judge. She described the DVRO 

request as an ancillary proceeding that was independent from the 

dissolution action referred to Judge Johnson. Wife noted the 

DVRO request was based on facts that arose after the petition for 

dissolution was filed and included a request that the order extend 

to Jobst, who is not a party to the dissolution action. 

Judge Johnson declined to dismiss the DVRO 

proceeding, concluding that it was related to the petition for

dissolution and fell within the scope of the parties’ stipulation. 

Judge Johnson acknowledged that the DVRO request relied on 

circumstances arising after the dissolution petition was filed but 

noted, “[T]here are a lot [of] things that we try that weren’t 

contemplated at all at the time the petition[] or response was 

filed. That is typical in family law, particularly the ones that 

linger on for some period of time.”

Over the next eight days, Judge Johnson heard in 

exacting detail the content of emails and text messages Husband 

considered abusive or threatening, and the instances in which he 

believed Wife spied on him or entered the property where he was 

living. Wife provided explanations for her language and 

behavior. She attempted to impeach Husband’s testimony that 

he felt harassed or threatened with evidence that, for example, he

sometimes initiated communication with her, visited her house, 
6

offered to set up weekly breakfasts or lunches with her, and 

stayed at the same hotel when they traveled to family events.

Judge Johnson granted a “non-CLETS” restraining 

order accompanied by a statement of decision. She concluded 

many of Wife’s communications to Husband were “disturbing, 

annoying and often extremely insulting and profane.” While 

these communications were “unwelcome and intrusive,” they 

were not, in the Judge Johnson’s view, “enjoinable.” However, 

Wife engaged in other conduct that was a proper basis for a 

restraining order. Wife copied some of her inappropriate 

communications to third parties, including the couple’s therapist 

and their grown children. She exploited Husband’s childhood 

traumas and threatened to destroy his reputation by revealing

negative information about him if he did not do what she wanted. 

Judge Johnson credited Jobst’s testimony about Wife 

chasing her on the freeway. She found this conduct, “is evidence 

of [Wife’s] volatility and of the very real possibility of her acting 

on her threats.” In addition to expressing concerns about Wife’s 

credibility, Judge Johnson noted that Wife had never 

acknowledged her behavior was inappropriate, raising the

concern it would be repeated. She concluded Wife had destroyed 

Husband’s sense of mental and emotional calm by threatening to 

use the “highly sensitive information” she possessed to “expose” 

Husband and damage his reputation “if he did not behave as she 

wished in the context of the divorce litigation.” 

Judge Johnson acknowledged that direct 

communication between the parties had “largely ended,” and that 

Wife had not engaged in “similarly abusive and harassing 

behavior” since the dissolution petition was filed. However, the 

litigation was ongoing and complex financial issues remained to 
7

be decided. “The situation remains volatile and [Wife’s] total 

failure to comprehend the seriousness of her behavior raises 

concerns it could be repeated as the litigation proceeds.”

In addition, Judge Johnson acknowledged that a 

CLETS order would have “the potential of disrupting [Wife’s] 

employment as a life coach and, perhaps, eventually, a therapist, 

to an unwarranted degree.” She concluded a non-CLETS order, 

“[a]lthough disfavored in the law,” was appropriate. The judge 

explained, “just as the pattern of the behavior is such as to leave 

the Court in a state of mind to believe re-offen[d] is more than a 

hypothetical possibility, the length of time since the last reported 

incident suggests something less than the full force of law may be 

sufficient to prevent such a re-offense.” 

The resulting “non-CLETS” order provided: (1) 

Husband has exclusive use of the former marital residence and 

Wife is prohibited from entering the premises, including the

driveway, except by invitation; (2) Wife shall not “harass, attack, 

strike, threaten, hit, follow, stalk, molest, destroy personal 

property, disturb the peace, keep under surveillance or block the 

movements of” Husband or Jobst “as a household member;” (3) 

Wife shall stay 50 yards away from Husband, Jobst and their 

vehicles; (4) Wife shall not communicate with Husband or Jobst, 

“except in the case of a true emergency.” The order further 

specified, “Nothing in this order is intended to prevent [Wife] 

from driving the most direct route to her residence . . . , even if it 

entails driving closer than 50 yards” from Husband’s residence.
8

DISCUSSION

Jurisdiction

Wife contends the DVRO proceeding is ancillary to 

and independent of the dissolution action that she consented to 

have decided by a temporary judge. As a consequence, she 

contends, the temporary judge lacked jurisdiction to enter the 

“non-CLETS” restraining order.

“‘“The appointment of a temporary judge to hear a 

particular ‘cause’ carries with it the power to act until the final 

determination of that proceeding. [Citation.] . . .”’” (Gridley v. 

Gridley (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1562, 1581, quoting In re Steven 

A. (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 754, 768.) In determining whether a 

temporary judge is authorized to resolve a particular matter, 

“courts apply the rule that ‘[t]he determination of a cause 

encompasses subsequent proceedings that are its “direct 

progeny,” but not those considered “ancillary” to the stipulated 

cause. [Citation.] Direct progeny are those which are a 

continuation of the stipulated cause or question its finality, such 

as motions to vacate or reconsider. [Citations.] An ancillary 

proceeding, on the other hand, is heard on a separate record and 

seeks an independent judgment or reviewable order. . . .’” 

(Gridley, supra, at pp. 1582-1583.)

Wife argues the parties’ stipulation appointing Judge 

Johnson defined the “cause” assigned to her as the dissolution of 

the parties’ marriage. The DVRO proceeding is ancillary to that 

“cause,” she contends, because it is a separate cause of action that 

proceeds on its own record and whose outcome does not impact 

any final judgment in the dissolution action. We disagree.

The parties stipulated that Judge Johnson was 

authorized to “hear and try the above-entitled matter,” e.g., the 
9

petition for the dissolution of the parties’ marriage, “including 

hearing and determining all pretrial motions . . . .” In the family 

law context, a request for order is the equivalent of a motion. 

(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.92(a)(1)(A).) The Family Code also 

expressly authorizes the court to issue a DVRO “in a proceeding 

for dissolution of marriage . . . .” (§ 6221, subd. (a).) We conclude

a request for a domestic violence restraining order, filed in a 

pending dissolution case, is a motion in that case. (S.A. v. 

Maiden (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 27, 37.) Phrased otherwise, a 

DVRO can, as this case shows, arise out of, and may be the 

offspring of, or “direct progeny” of, a marital dissolution action. 

(Gridley, supra, 166 Cal.App. 4th at pp. 1582-1583.) Accordingly, 

the parties’ stipulation authorizing Judge Johhson to hear and 

determine pretrial motions applies to Husband’s request for a 

DVRO.

Wife protests that a DVRO request is an ancillary 

proceeding and not a motion because the request can be made by 

filing a form petition, without also seeking a dissolution or 

separation. (Nakamura v. Parker (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 327, 

335; § 6221, subd. (a) [DVRO may be issued “in a proceeding 

brought pursuant to this division,” in an action under the 

Uniform Parentage Act, or in a dissolution proceeding].) The 

DVRO request has a separate record and resolution of the 

request need not impact the judgment in the dissolution action. 

But the fact that a DVRO may be obtained in a separate 

proceeding does not mean that it must be a separate proceeding. 

As we have noted, a DVRO may also be obtained in a dissolution 

proceeding, as it was here. A DVRO may be included in a 

judgment of dissolution and may impact other provisions of the 

judgment, such as the division of property and child custody. 
10

Here, the parties agreed the Judge Johnson would 

“hear and try the above-entitled matter until its final 

determination.” Husband’s DVRO request arose during the 

pendency of the dissolution and relates to incidents that occurred 

while the matter was pending. There has been no “final 

determination.” We conclude the DVRO request is part of the 

“above-entitled matter,” was therefore within the scope of the 

temporary judge’s appointment.

Family Code § 6380

Family Code section 6300 grants the court discretion 

to enter a DVRO to “prevent acts of domestic violence [or] 

abuse . . .” when the person seeking the order “shows, to the 

satisfaction of the court, reasonable proof of a past act or acts of 

abuse.” (§§ 6220, 6300, subd. (a).) Abuse in this context includes 

physical abuse or injury and acts that “destroy[] the mental or 

emotional calm of the other party.” (In re Marriage of Nadkarni

(2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1483, 1497.)

Section 6380 provides, “Upon the issuance of a 

protective order to which this division applies . . . the Department 

of Justice shall immediately be notified of the contents of the 

order . . . .” (Id., subd. (b).) This process enters the order into 

CLETS, which permits it to be enforced by law enforcement

officers. Section 6380 describes the process of reporting a DVRO 

and entering its contents in CLETS in mandatory, not 

discretionary terms. 

Wife contends Judge Johnson abused her discretion 

by specifying that the restraining order was based on a finding of 

domestic abuse but was a “non-CLETS” order that would not be 

reported to the Department of Justice. The “non-CLETS” aspect 

of the order was an error of law. Judge Johnson found that Wife 
11

committed acts of abuse within the meaning of the statute. 

Section 6380 required the resulting restraining order to be 

reported to the Department of Justice and entered in CLETS. 

(§§ 6221, 6380.) The obligation to register the order in CLETS 

was mandatory, not discretionary. 

Wife contends the remedy for this error is to vacate 

the order in its entirety. She is incorrect. Judge Johnson found 

Wife had engaged in abuse within the meaning of section 6320 

and properly granted Husband’s DVRO request. (§ 6300; see, 

e.g., In re Marriage of Nadkarni, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p.

1497.) The appropriate remedy is to remand the matter, to 

permit Judge Johnson to enter an order that complies with the 

mandatory provisions of section 6380. 

Scope of Order

Wife contends Judge Johnson erred because the

DVRO included Husband’s girlfriend, Jobst, as a protected 

person, even though Jobst is not a party to the dissolution. She is 

incorrect. Section 6320 grants the court discretion to “issue an ex 

parte order enjoining a party from . . . disturbing the peace of the 

other party, and, in the discretion of the court, on a showing of 

good cause, of other named family or household members.” (Id., 

subd. (a).) Section 6340 grants the trial court discretion to issue 

“any of the orders described in Article 1 (commencing with 

Section 6320) after notice and a hearing.” (Id., subd. (a).)

Jobst is a member of Husband’s household because 

she lives with him. Judge Johnson found good cause to include 

Jobst in the protective order based on Wife’s conduct in chasing

Jobst on the freeway, falsely accusing Jobst and Husband of 

disabling her home security system and surveilling Husband and

Jobst from the neighbor’s property. Including Jobst in the 
12

restraining order was not an abuse of discretion. (In re Marriage 

of Nadkarni, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 1495 [decision to grant 

DVRO “‘“‘rests in the sound discretion of the trial court . . . ’”’”].)

For similar reasons, we conclude Judge Johnson did 

not err when she permitted Jobst to testify. The testimony 

regarding Wife’s conduct toward Jobst was admissible because 

Jobst was entitled to protection as a member of Husband’s 

household. (§ 6320.) Additionally, Jobst witnessed acts of abuse 

committed against Husband. Her testimony was relevant to 

establish that those acts occurred. (Tanguilig v. Valdez (2019) 36 

Cal.App.5th 514, 522 [testimony of third party witness to act of 

elder abuse properly admitted].)

Rule 2.400

California Rules of Court, rule 2.400 (rule 2.400) 

provides, “All original documents in a case pending before a 

temporary judge or referee shall be filed with the clerk in the 

same manner as would be required if the case were being heard 

by a judge, including filing within any time limits specified by 

law and paying any required fees.” (Rule 2.400, subd. (b)(1).) 

Here, Husband initially filed his request for a DVRO with Judge

Johnson and only later with the clerk of the superior court. Wife 

contends the initial failure to file with the court clerk deprived

Judge Johnson of jurisdiction to consider the DVRO request.

“Rule 2.400 is intended to ensure open access to 

records in any proceedings before temporary judges and referees.” 

(In re Conservatorship of Townsend (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 691, 

705.) The filing requirement ensures “‘that the court clerk’s office 

has the complete case file and can make all nonconfidential 

portions of the file available to the public . . . .’” (Ibid.)
13

Townsend held that a motion to vacate a judgment 

did not extend the moving party’s time to file a notice of appeal

because the motion was filed with a temporary judge and not 

with the clerk of the superior court. (In re Conservatorship of 

Townsend, supra, 231 Cal.App.4th at pp. 705-706.) “While there 

may be circumstances in which the failure to file documents with 

the superior court clerk as required under rule 2.400(b) may be 

waived, a motion to vacate is not one of the circumstances. . . . A 

motion to vacate is part of the calculation to determine the 

jurisdictional time limits to file an appeal. To extend the time to 

appeal, the procedural requirements in [Code of Civil Procedure] 

section 663a must be met. We have no authority to rewrite the 

statute to create exceptions in section 663a, subdivision (a) in 

proceedings before a temporary judge where the parties submit 

the motion to vacate to the temporary judge but do not file it with 

the clerk.” (Ibid.)

Here, Husband filed his DVRO request with Judge

Johnson before filing it with the superior court clerk. The 

document was, however, filed with the superior court clerk before 

the evidentiary hearing concluded and before Judge Johnson

entered the order. Unlike a motion to vacate or a notice of 

appeal, there is no jurisdictional time period within which a 

DVRO request must be filed. Under these circumstances, as 

Husband points out, any error is harmless.

Attorney Fees

Wife contends she was the prevailing party on the 

DVRO request because Judge Johnson denied Husband’s request 

for a CLETS order. Wife had contended the DVRO request 

should be denied in its entirety. Instead, the DVRO request was 

granted, even though Judge Johnson entered a “non-CLETS” 
14

order. Husband obtained the restraining order he sought. He 

should have been awarded the CLETS order he sought. 

Disposition

The matter is remanded to Judge Johnson with 

instructions to enter a modified order that complies with Family 

Code section 6380. In all other respects, the order is affirmed. 

Husband shall recover his costs on appeal.

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.

YEGAN, Acting P. J.

We concur:

PERREN, J.

TANGEMAN, J.
Melinda A. Johnson, Temporary Judge*

Superior Court County of Santa Barbara

______________________________

M. Jude Egan, for Appellant.

Phillips Jessner, Gregory W. Jessner, Adam N. King 

and Raymond K. Martinez, for Respondent.

* Superior Court of Santa Barbara, Melinda A. Johnson, Temporary Judge. 

(Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.)