MAJOR AUTOMATED 

INFORMATION 

SYSTEMS

Selected Defense 

Programs Need to 

Implement Key 

Acquisition Practices

Report to Congressional Committees

March 2014

GAO-14-309

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-14-309, a report to 

congressional committees

March 2014

MAJOR AUTOMATED INFORMATION SYSTEMS

Selected Defense Programs Need to Implement Key 

Acquisition Practices

Why GAO Did This Study

The National Defense Authorization 

Act for Fiscal Year 2012 mandated that 

GAO select and assess DOD MAIS 

programs annually through March 

2018. This report discusses the results 

of GAO’s second annual assessment. 

Based on the act’s requirements,

GAO’s objectives were to (1) describe 

the extent to which selected MAIS 

programs have changed their planned 

cost and schedule estimates and met 

performance targets; (2) assess 

selected MAIS programs’ actions to 

manage risks; and (3) assess the 

extent to which selected MAIS 

programs used key information 

technology acquisition best practices. 

To do so, GAO selected 15 of the 42 

DOD MAIS programs based on several 

factors, including representation from 

multiple DOD components, and 

summarized the results of analyses of 

cost, schedule, and performance 

across the programs. Further, GAO 

selected 3 of the 15 programs (1 each 

from DHA, DLA, and Navy) and 

assessed them against best practices 

for risk management, requirements 

management, and project monitoring 

and control.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DOD direct the 

programs to address respective 

weaknesses in their risk management, 

requirements management, and 

project monitoring and control 

practices. DOD concurred with six of 

GAO’s recommendations and partially 

concurred with the remaining two.

GAO maintains that it is important that 

the DHA program trace all capabilities 

to their associated requirements and 

update its capabilities baseline to 

reflect program scope changes. 

What GAO Found

Of the 15 selected Department of Defense (DOD) major automated information 

system (MAIS) programs, 13 had cost information available (2 did not, due to 

revisions to requirements and changes in scope). Of these 13 programs, 11 

experienced changes in their cost estimates, including 7 that experienced 

increases ranging from 4 to 2,233 percent and 4 that experienced decreases 

ranging from 4 to 86 percent. Two programs remained unchanged in their cost 

goals. Additionally, of 14 programs that had schedule information available (1 did 

not due to revisions to requirements), 13 experienced schedule changes—

including 12 that had slippages ranging from a few months to 6 years, and 1 that 

accelerated its schedule. One program remained on schedule. Further, of 11 

programs that had system performance data available, 3 programs met their 

system performance targets, while 8 did not fully meet their targets. 

The three programs selected for analysis of risk management demonstrated 

mixed progress in effectively defining and managing risks. Specifically, the 

Defense Health Agency’s (DHA) Theater Medical Information Program – Joint 

Increment 2 had implemented key risk management practices. While the Navy’s 

Global Combat Support System – Marine Corps program did not, among other 

things, update its risk tracking log during a 5-month period in 2013, the program 

recently updated its risks and mitigation plans, which should help the program to 

more effectively manage risks going forward. The Defense Logistics Agency’s 

(DLA) Defense Agencies Initiative program had taken steps to implement 

selected risk management practices, including establishing a risk management 

board. However, the program was still in the early stages of identifying risks and

had not yet identified a comprehensive set of program risks, nor consistently 

evaluated and categorized its risks. Until this program maintains a complete risk 

log and mitigation plans, and accurately evaluates and categorizes its risks, it will 

lack assurance that it is appropriately mitigating all identified risks.

The three programs also demonstrated mixed progress in implementing key 

requirements management and project monitoring and control best practices. 

Specifically, the Navy program had implemented all key requirements 

management best practices and the DLA program had recently taken steps to do 

so. However, while the DHA program had implemented many requirements 

management best practices, it had not maintained complete traceability between 

its requirements and work products. Additionally, the DHA program had not 

updated its capabilities baseline to reflect program scope changes. Until DHA 

implements these requirements management best practices, stakeholders will 

lack assurance that the system will have all intended functionality to meet users’ 

needs. Regarding project monitoring and control, each of the programs lacked 

key practices. For instance, the DLA program had not tracked significant 

deviations in performance. Additionally, the Navy program did not always take 

timely corrective actions to address issues. Further, the DHA program did not 

use earned value management to track contractor performance in meeting 

planned cost targets, even though these data were being collected and certain 

contracts met DOD’s threshold for its use; as such, the program had not 

effectively determined progress against the plan. Until the three programs 

implement these project monitoring best practices, they will be limited in their 

ability to manage the programs. 

View GAO-14-309. For more information, 

contact Carol R. Cha at (202) 512-4456 or 

chac@gao.gov
Page i GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

Letter 1 

Background 5

Most Selected Programs Changed Their Planned Cost and 

Schedule Estimates, and Over Half Did Not Fully Meet System 

Performance Targets 16

Selected Programs’ Implementation of Key Risk Management 

Practices Varied in Effectiveness 28

Mixed Progress in Applying Key IT Acquisition Best Practices 34

Conclusions 45

Recommendations for Executive Action 46

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 47

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 52

Appendix II Profiles of Selected DOD MAIS Programs 59

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Defense 91

Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 95

Tables

Table 1: Summary of Cost, Schedule, and System Performance 

Results for the Selected Programs 17

Table 2: Changes in Selected Programs’ First Approved Baseline 

Estimates and Latest Planned Total Life-cycle Cost 

Estimates 22

Table 3: Selected MAIS Programs’ Schedule Slippages Compared 

to First Approved Baseline Schedules 25

Table 4: Causes for Schedule Slippages among 12 Selected 

Programs 26

Contents
Page ii GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

Figures

Figure 1: Simplified DOD Organizational Structure 5

Figure 2: Defense Acquisition Management System Framework 8

Figure 3: Business Capability Life-cycle Acquisition Model 10

Abbreviations

AFIPPS Air Force Integrated Personnel and Pay System

AOC-WS Air and Space Operations Center-Weapon System

APB acquisition program baseline

BITI Wireless Base Information Transport Infrastructure Wireless 

CMMI-ACQ Capability Maturity Model® Integration for Acquisition 

DAI Defense Agencies Initiative

DCGS-A Distributed Common Ground System-Army

DHA Defense Health Agency

DOD Department of Defense 

GCCS-M Global Command and Control System – Maritime

GCSS-MC Global Combat Support System-Marine Corps

iEHR Integrated Electronic Health Record

IPPS-A Integrated Personnel and Pay System-Army

ISPAN Integrated Strategic Planning and Analysis Network

IT information technology

IV&V independent verification and validation

JMS Joint Space Operations Center Mission System

JPI Joint Personnel Identification

MAIS major automated information system 

NGEN Next Generation Enterprise Network 

PMBOK® Project Management Body of Knowledge

TMIP-J Theater Medical Information Program-Joint

VA Department of Veterans Affairs

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

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without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain 

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Page 1 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

March 27, 2014 

Congressional Committees

The Department of Defense (DOD) is one of the largest and most 

complex organizations in the world. To meet its mission, it relies heavily 

on the use of information technology (IT). In this regard, according to 

DOD’s IT investment portfolio for fiscal year 2012, the department spent 

approximately $35.0 billion for its IT investments.1 Of this amount, DOD 

officials reported that at least $4.5 billion was spent on major automated 

information system (MAIS) programs, which are intended to help the 

department sustain its key operations.2

DOD IT investments that fall within one of the following categories are 

designated as MAIS programs: (1) program costs in any single year 

exceed $32 million, (2) total program acquisition costs exceed $126 

million, or (3) total life-cycle costs exceed $378 million.3

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 mandated 

that we select, assess, and report on DOD MAIS programs annually 

through March 2018.

The Secretary of 

Defense can also use discretion to designate a program as a MAIS if it 

does not meet these cost thresholds.

4

 

1

DOD’s IT investment portfolio identifies all of its IT investments and associated costs 

within the department and its components.

This is the second assessment in our series of 

annual reviews. Our objectives for this assessment were to (1) describe 

the extent to which selected MAIS programs have changed their planned 

cost and schedule estimates and met performance targets, (2) assess 

selected MAIS programs’ actions to manage risks, and (3) assess the 

extent to which selected MAIS programs have used key IT acquisition 

best practices.

2

The $4.5 billion represents the amount that DOD officials reported they spent in fiscal 

year 2012 for 41 of 42 2012 MAIS programs. Budget information was not available for the 

remaining program.

3

10 U.S.C. § 2445a(a).

4

Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 1078 (Dec. 31, 2011) requires that we report on these 

assessments no later than March 30 of each year from 2013 through 2018.
 

Page 2 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

To accomplish the first objective, we selected 15 of the 42 MAIS 

programs listed in DOD’s April 2012 MAIS oversight list for evaluation.5

To select these programs, we first identified programs that met several 

criteria, including those that had established an acquisition program 

baseline (APB),6

 represented multiple DOD components, and were not 

included in our first MAIS review.7 This analysis resulted in a selection of 

nine programs. Next, we selected five additional programs that had been 

without APBs for the longest periods of time.8

To determine the extent to which each of the 15 programs had changed 

their planned cost and schedule estimates, we compared the program’s 

The final program was 

selected because, of the remaining MAIS programs, it had not 

established an APB for the longest period of time, was an enterprise 

resource planning system, and had the largest planned life-cycle costs.

 

5

The 15 MAIS programs included in our review were: Air Force’s Air and Space 

Operations Center-Weapon System (AOC-WS) Increment 10.2; Air Force Integrated 

Personnel and Pay System (AFIPPS); Base Information Transport Infrastructure Wireless 

(BITI Wireless); Integrated Strategic Planning and Analysis Network (ISPAN) Increment 2; 

and Joint Space Operations Center Mission System (JMS) Increment 1; Army’s 

Distributed Common Ground System-Army (DCGS-A) Increment 1, Integrated Personnel 

and Pay System-Army (IPPS-A) Increment 1, and Joint Personnel Identification (JPI) 

version 2; Defense Health Agency’s (DHA) integrated Electronic Health Record (iEHR) 

Increment 1 and Theater Medical Information Program-Joint (TMIP-J) Increment 2; 

Defense Logistics Agency’s (DLA) Defense Agencies Initiative (DAI) and Eprocurement; 

and Navy’s Global Combat Support System-Marine Corps (GCSS-MC) Increment 1; 

Global Command and Control System – Maritime (GCCS-M) Increment 2; and Next 

Generation Enterprise Network (NGEN) Increment 1.

6

A program’s APB contains the life-cycle cost estimate, schedule estimate, and 

performance parameters that were approved for that program by the milestone decision 

authority. 

7

The 14 MAIS programs included in our first review were: Air Force’s Defense Enterprise 

Accounting and Management System Increment 1, Expeditionary Combat Support System 

Increment 1, Financial Information Resource System, Information Transport Services 

Increment 1, and Mission Planning Systems Increment 4; Army’s Global Combat Support 

System – Army; Global Command and Control System – Army Block 4; and Tactical 

Mission Command; Defense Information Systems Agency’s Global Combat Support 

System – Joint Increment 7 and Teleport Generation 3; and Navy’s Common Aviation 

Command and Control System Increment 1, Consolidated Afloat Networks and Enterprise 

Services, Distributed Common Ground System – Navy Increment 1, and Navy Enterprise 

Resource Planning. GAO, Major Automated Information Systems: Selected Defense 

Programs Need to Implement Key Acquisition Practices, GAO-13-311 (Washington, D.C.: 

Mar. 28, 2013).

8

During our review, one of these programs—Air Force’s AOC-WS Increment 10.2—

established an APB. 
 

Page 3 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

best cost (in then-year dollars) and schedule estimates established in the 

first APB (where available) to the latest planned total life-cycle cost and 

schedule estimates.9 For the programs that had not established APBs, we 

compared the cost and schedule estimates established in these 

programs’ initial estimates to the latest planned total life-cycle cost 

estimates (in then-year dollars) and schedule estimates.10 In order to 

determine whether the programs experienced significant or critical 

deviations in their cost and schedule estimates, we compared any 

deviations to thresholds established by statute.11 Specifically, according 

to the statute, a program is considered to have undergone a “significant” 

change when it has (1) experienced a schedule change that will cause a 

delay of more than 6 months but less than a year; (2) experienced an 

estimated development or full life-cycle cost increase of at least 15 

percent, but less than 25 percent over the original estimate; or (3) 

experienced a significant, adverse change in the expected performance 

of the system. A program is considered to have undergone a “critical” 

change when it has (1) experienced a schedule change that will cause a 

delay of 1 year or more; (2) experienced an estimated development or full 

life-cycle cost increase of 25 percent or more over the original estimate; 

(3) failed to achieve a full deployment decision within 5 years after the 

milestone A decision for the program or, if there was no milestone A 

decision, the date when the preferred alternative was selected for the 

program;12

 

9

An estimate in then-year dollars includes the effects of economic inflation. The first APB 

is established after the program has assessed the viability of various technologies and 

refined user requirements to identify the most appropriate technology solution that 

demonstrates that it can meet users’ needs. DOD guidance refers to a program’s best 

cost and schedule estimates as objective estimates.

or (4) experienced a change in the expected performance of 

the system or major IT investment to be acquired under the program that 

will undermine the ability of the system to perform the functions 

anticipated.

10Prior to establishing an APB, programs establish initial cost and schedule estimates. 

These estimates are based on limited information about the program’s requirements and 

the viability of technologies available to meet the program’s needs. 

1110 U.S.C. § 2445c.

12Prior to the November 2013 DOD interim policy discussed in footnote 18, a milestone A 

decision either authorized entry into the technology development phase (for programs 

following DOD’s 2008 defense acquisition management system framework, discussed 

later) or the prototyping phase (for programs following DOD’s business capability life-cycle 

acquisition model, also discussed later).
 

Page 4 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

Additionally, to determine whether system performance targets were met, 

we analyzed each program’s system performance targets against actual 

performance data, and reviewed the results of operational assessments 

and program evaluations conducted on the systems. We then aggregated 

and summarized the results of our cost, schedule, and performance 

analyses across the programs, as well as developed individual program 

profiles, which are presented in appendix II.

To address the second objective, we selected 3 of the 15 programs from 

the first objective, including 2 programs that had established APBs and 

had the highest planned total life-cycle costs, and 1 program that had 

been without a baseline for the longest period of time.13 To assess each 

program’s actions to manage risks, we identified key risk management 

practices from the Software Engineering Institute’s Capability Maturity 

Model® Integration for Acquisition (CMMI-ACQ) and the Project 

Management Institute’s Guide to the Project Management Body of 

Knowledge (PMBOK®), and assessed each of the 3 programs against 

these criteria.14

To address the third objective, we selected the same three programs as 

in objective two to determine the extent to which each program was 

implementing (1) requirements management and (2) project monitoring 

and control best practices, as defined by CMMI-ACQ and PMBOK®. We 

also assessed these programs against key best practices for employing 

independent verification and validation (IV&V).

Specifically, for each of the 3 selected programs, we 

analyzed risk management documentation, such as risk logs and 

mitigation plans, to identify levels of risks and determine the status of 

each program’s key risks and the actions that were taken to manage 

these risks. Additionally, we interviewed program officials about the risks 

and risk management practices that they used.

15

 

13The three selected MAIS programs are DAI, GCSS-MC Increment 1, and TMIP-J 

Increment 2.

To determine the extent 

to which each program’s acquisition practices were consistent with these 

14Software Engineering Institute, Capability Maturity Model® Integration for Acquisition 

(CMMI-ACQ), Version 1.3 (Pittsburgh, Pa.: November 2010); Project Management 

Institute, A Guide to the Project Management Body of Knowledge (PMBOK® Guide), Fifth 

Edition, (Newton Square, Pa: 2013). “PMBOK” is a trademark of the Project Management 

Institute, Inc.

15GAO, Information Technology: DHS Needs to Improve Its Independent Acquisition 

Reviews, GAO-11-581 (Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2011).
 

Page 5 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

best practices, we assessed program management and systems 

documentation, such as program requirements and program 

management reports. We also interviewed program officials to obtain 

additional information on each program’s IT management processes in 

these areas.

We conducted this performance audit from April 2013 to March 2014 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. See appendix I for a more 

detailed discussion of our objectives, scope, and methodology.

DOD is a massive and complex organization. It includes the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the military departments, 

numerous defense agencies and field activities, and various unified 

combatant commands that contribute to the oversight of DOD’s 

acquisition programs. Figure 1 presents a simplified depiction of DOD’s 

organizational structure.

Figure 1: Simplified DOD Organizational Structure

a

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff serves as the spokesperson for the commanders of the 

combatant commands, particularly for the operational requirements of the commands.

Background
 

Page 6 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

In support of its military operations, DOD performs an assortment of 

interrelated and interdependent business functions, such as logistics 

management, procurement, health care management, and financial 

management. As we have previously reported, the DOD systems 

environment that supports these business functions is overly complex and 

error prone, and is characterized by (1) little standardization across the 

department, (2) multiple systems performing the same tasks, (3) the 

same data stored in multiple systems, and (4) the need for data to be 

entered manually into multiple systems.16 According to DOD’s IT 

investment portfolio, for fiscal year 2012, the department spent 

approximately $35.0 billion to operate, maintain, and modernize its IT 

systems. We have designated DOD’s business systems modernization 

program as high risk for the past 19 years, due to challenges in 

modernizing the department’s business systems environment.17

Of the $35.0 billion spent on DOD IT investments for fiscal year 2012, 

according to DOD officials, at least $4.5 billion was for MAIS programs. 

The MAIS programs include a range of systems, such as communications 

systems, business systems (e.g., logistics management and financial 

management systems), and command and control systems, which are 

intended to provide department and component officials with easy access 

to information to effectively organize, plan, direct, and monitor mission 

operations.

Prior to November 2013, MAIS programs were required to comply with 

one of two DOD acquisition frameworks.18

 

16GAO, Business Systems Modernization: DOD Continues to Improve Institutional 

Approach, but Further Steps Needed, 

The first framework—referred 

GAO-06-658 (Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2006) and

DOD Financial Management: Implementation Weaknesses in Army and Air Force 

Business Systems Could Jeopardize DOD’s Auditability Goals, GAO-12-134 (Washington, 

D.C.: Feb. 28, 2012).

17GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-13-283 (Washington, D.C.: February 2013).

18DOD recently issued an interim policy, in November 2013, which updates the first 

acquisition framework—the defense acquisition management system framework—and 

incorporated guidance from the second framework—the business capability life-cycle 

acquisition model. This interim policy is also intended to supersede the business capability 

life-cycle acquisition model, and includes additional decision points, and guidance for 

applying the framework to multiple acquisition models. As of November 2013, this interim 

policy represents the only framework for acquiring MAIS programs. This updated 

framework was not used during this review. Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, 

Defense Acquisition, November 26, 2013.

DOD’s Acquisition 

Guidance for MAIS 

Programs
 

Page 7 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

to as the defense acquisition management system framework—applied to 

all DOD IT acquisition programs except business system modernization 

programs that exceeded $1 million in total costs.19 The second 

framework—referred to as the business capability life-cycle acquisition 

model—applied to all business system modernization programs with total 

costs that exceeded $1 million.20

The 2008 defense acquisition management system framework 

established the steps that programs should take as they planned, 

designed, acquired, deployed, operated, and maintained their systems. 

This framework consisted of five program life-cycle phases and five 

related decision points, which are shown in figure 2 and described 

following the figure.

The business system modernization 

programs were required to use this framework instead of the defense 

acquisition management system framework in an effort to address 

challenges previously experienced when implementing business systems, 

such as implementing solutions without fully understanding business 

needs.

21

 

19DOD Instruction 5000.02, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System (Dec. 8, 2008).

The milestone decision authority for programs that 

complied with this framework was either the Under Secretary of Defense 

for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; the DOD component head; a 

component acquisition executive; or when authorized, a designee.

20Directive-Type Memorandum 11-009, Acquisition Policy for Defense Business Systems 

(DBS) (June 23, 2011).

21The November 2013 interim policy that updates the defense acquisition management 

system framework includes additional decision points, and guidance for applying the 

framework to multiple types of acquisitions, such as software-intensive systems and 

incrementally acquired systems. This interim policy replaced the 2008 defense acquisition 

management system framework policy and applies to all DOD acquisition programs.
 

Page 8 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

Figure 2: Defense Acquisition Management System Framework

• Materiel solution analysis: Refine the initial system solution 

(concept) and create a strategy for acquiring the solution. A decision 

is made at the end of this phase to authorize entry into the technology 

development phase—referred to as milestone A.

• Technology development: Determine the appropriate set of 

technologies to be integrated into the system solution while 

simultaneously refining user requirements. A decision is made at the 

end of this phase to authorize product development based on welldefined technology and a reasonable system design plan—referred to 

as milestone B. An APB is first established at the milestone B decision 

point.22

• Engineering and manufacturing development: Develop a system 

and demonstrate through developer testing that the system can 

function in its target environment. A decision is made at the end of this 

phase to authorize entry of the system into the production and 

A program’s first APB contains the original life-cycle cost 

estimate, schedule estimate, and performance parameters that were 

approved for that program by the milestone decision authority. The 

first APB is established after the program has assessed the viability of 

various technologies and refined user requirements to identify the 

most appropriate technology solution that demonstrates that it can 

meet users’ needs.

 

22An APB reflects the threshold and objective values for the minimum number of cost, 

schedule, and performance attributes that describe the program over its life cycle.
 

Page 9 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

deployment phase or into limited deployment in support of operational 

testing—referred to as milestone C.

• Production and deployment: Achieve an operational capability that 

satisfies the mission needs, as verified through independent 

operational test and evaluation, and to implement the system at all 

applicable locations.

• Operations and support: Operationally sustain the system in the 

most cost-effective manner over its life cycle.

In addition to the three milestone decision points included in this 

framework (milestones A, B, and C), the framework also included two 

other decision points: (1) materiel development decision, which 

authorized officials to conduct analyses to assess the potential solutions 

that can satisfy the program’s requirements, and (2) full deployment 

decision, which authorized the system to be deployed to all remaining 

locations beyond limited fielding locations.23

In March 2009, the Defense Science Board reported that DOD’s 

acquisition process for IT systems was too long, ineffective, and did not 

accommodate the rapid evolution of IT.24 As such, the Board 

recommended that DOD develop new acquisition and requirements 

development processes for IT systems that would be agile, incremental, 

and allow requirements to be prioritized based on need and technical 

readiness. Subsequently, DOD developed a new framework—the 

business capability life-cycle acquisition model—that outlined the key 

steps that programs should take through the life cycle of acquisition of 

each major business system.25

 

23Limited fielding was the deployment of a capability to a limited number of users to test 

the capability in an operational environment.

This framework was intended to allow for 

more flexible acquisition processes that may be tailored to specific 

programs. Additionally, the framework was intended to address 

24Defense Science Board, Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on 

Department of Defense Policies and Procedures for the Acquisition of Information 

Technology (Washington, D.C.: March 2009).

25As discussed earlier, DOD’s recent November 2013 interim policy that updates the 

defense acquisition management system framework also incorporates guidance from and 

replaced the business capability life-cycle acquisition model. This updated framework was 

not used during this review. 
 

Page 10 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

challenges that have previously impacted the delivery of IT business 

capabilities, such as programs lacking well-defined, strategically linked 

requirements, and transitioning too quickly from identifying a perceived 

business problem to implementing a specific solution. Specifically, this 

model consisted of seven program life-cycle phases and five milestone 

decision points, as shown in figure 3. The milestone decision authority for 

programs that were required to comply with this framework was either the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; a 

component acquisition executive; or when authorized, a designee.

Figure 3: Business Capability Life-cycle Acquisition Model

Of these seven life-cycle phases, six were consistent with or similar to the 

five phases in the defense acquisition system framework (one of the 

phases in the defense acquisition system framework, production and 

deployment, corresponded to two phases in the business capability lifecycle model—limited fielding and full deployment). The seventh phase in 

the business capability life-cycle model was called business capability 

definition and occurred at the start of a program. The purpose of this 

phase was to analyze a perceived business problem or capability gap. 

This model also included the five decision points included in the defense 

acquisition management framework—milestones A, B, and C, materiel 

development decision, and full deployment decision.
 

Page 11 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

MAIS programs must also comply with annual and quarterly reporting 

requirements identified in statute.26

Moreover, on a quarterly basis, the program manager for each MAIS 

program is required to provide the senior DOD official responsible for the 

program a report that identifies any variance in the program’s cost, 

schedule, or performance. Depending on the determination after 

reviewing the variance identified in the quarterly report, the senior DOD 

official must notify the congressional defense committees of any 

programs that have experienced either a significant or critical change, as 

described below:

In this regard, each calendar year, 

DOD must submit to Congress a report on each MAIS program, including 

information on the cost, schedule, and performance of the program. 

Specifically, DOD must report, among other things, on each program’s 

development and implementation schedules and development and full 

life-cycle cost estimates; and provide a summary of the key performance 

parameters for each program. It must also provide a summary of any 

major changes for each MAIS program.

• Significant change. A significant change must be declared if the

program has experienced a schedule delay of more than 6 months but 

less than a year; estimated costs for the program have increased by 

at least 15 percent but less than 25 percent; or there has been a 

significant adverse change in the expected performance of the 

system. If such an event occurs, the senior DOD official must notify 

the congressional defense committees in writing no later than 45 days 

after receiving the quarterly report from the program manager.

• Critical change. A critical change must be declared if the program 

failed to achieve a full deployment decision within 5 years after the 

milestone A decision or, if there was no milestone A decision, the date 

when the preferred alternative was selected for the program; 

experienced a schedule delay of more than 1 year; experienced an 

estimated development or full life-cycle cost increase of 25 percent or 

more over the original estimate; or experienced a change in the 

expected performance of the system that will undermine the ability of 

the system to perform as intended. If such an event occurs, the senior 

DOD official must carry out an evaluation of the program and submit a 

 

2610 U.S.C. §§ 2445b and 2445c.

Statutory Requirements 

for MAIS Programs
 

Page 12 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

report to the congressional defense committees no later than 60 days 

after receiving the quarterly report from the program manager.27

For programs that declare a critical change, the evaluation must assess 

the projected cost and schedule for completing the program if current 

requirements are not modified; assess the projected cost and schedule 

for completing the program based on a reasonable modification of 

requirements; and assess the rough order of magnitude of the cost and 

schedule for any reasonable alternative system or capability.

 

Entities such as the Project Management Institute, the Software 

Engineering Institute at Carnegie Mellon University, and GAO have 

developed and identified best practices to help guide organizations to 

effectively plan and manage their acquisitions of major IT systems, such 

as the MAIS programs.28 Our prior reviews have shown that proper 

implementation of such practices can significantly increase the likelihood 

of delivering promised system capabilities on time and within budget.29

• Risk management: A process for anticipating problems and taking 

appropriate steps to mitigate risks and minimize their impact on 

program commitments. It involves identifying and documenting risks, 

categorizing them based on their estimated impact, prioritizing them, 

developing risk mitigation strategies, and tracking progress in 

executing the strategies.

These practices include, but are not limited to:

 

27In certain cases, DOD does not need to carry out an evaluation and submit a report. 

Specifically, if the senior DOD official with milestone decision authority determines that a 

critical change is primarily due to an extension of a program and involves minimal 

developmental risk, the official may instead submit to the congressional defense

committees a certification that the official has made those determinations. This 

certification must be submitted within 45 days after receiving the quarterly report.

28PMBOK®; CMMI-ACQ; and GAO, Executive Guide: Information Technology Investment 

Management, A Framework for Assessing and Improving Process Maturity, GAO-04-394G 

(Washington, D.C.: March 2004).

29See, for example, GAO, Information Technology: Foundational Steps Being Taken to 

Make Needed FBI Systems Modernization Management Improvements, GAO-04-842 

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 10, 2004) and Information Technology: FBI Is Implementing Key 

Acquisition Methods on Its New Case Management System, but Related Agencywide 

Guidance Needs to Be Improved, GAO-08-1014 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 23, 2008).

Best Practices for 

Managing IT Acquisition 

Programs
 

Page 13 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

• Requirements management: Requirements establish what the 

system is to do, how well it is to do it, and how it is to interact with 

other systems. Effective management of requirements includes 

developing criteria for the evaluation and acceptance of requirements, 

obtaining commitments to requirements, and controlling requirements 

changes over the course of the program. It also ensures that 

requirements are validated against user needs and that each 

requirement traces back to the business need and forward to its 

design and testing.

• Project monitoring and control: Provides an understanding of the 

project’s progress, so that appropriate corrective actions can be taken 

if performance deviates from plans. Effective practices in this area 

include monitoring program performance against the program plan, 

monitoring stakeholder involvement throughout the life of the program, 

and managing corrective actions to closure.

• Independent verification and validation: A process whereby 

organizations can reduce the risks inherent in system development 

and acquisition efforts by having a knowledgeable party who is 

independent of the developer determine that the system or product 

meets the users’ needs and fulfills its intended purpose.

We have previously reported and made recommendations on DOD’s 

efforts to implement certain MAIS programs.

• In July 2008, we reported that DOD had not effectively implemented 

key IT management controls on its Global Combat Support System – 

Marine Corps (GCSS-MC) program.30

 

30GAO, DOD Business Systems Modernization: Key Marine Corps System Acquisition 

Needs to Be Better Justified, Defined, and Managed, 

For example, we reported that 

the program’s schedule baseline was not reflective of certain 

important scheduling practices, such as conducting a schedule risk 

assessment and allocating schedule reserve. Additionally, we noted 

that not all program risks had been adequately managed, and certain 

risk mitigation strategies were either not fully implemented or the 

strategies did not mitigate the risks, resulting in risks becoming actual 

problems. As a result, we recommended that DOD, among other 

GAO-08-822 (Washington, D.C.: 

July 28, 2008). 

GAO Previously Reported 

on DOD’s Challenges in 

Implementing Certain 

MAIS Programs
 

Page 14 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

things, ensure that the GCSS-MC program office (1) performs a 

schedule risk analysis to determine the level of confidence in meeting 

the program’s activities and completion date, (2) allocates schedule 

reserve for high-risk activities on the critical path, (3) tracks and 

evaluates the implementation of mitigation plans for all risks, and (4) 

discloses to appropriate program oversight and approval authorities 

whether mitigation plans have been fully executed and have produced 

the intended outcome(s). DOD concurred in full or in part with the 

recommendations in the report and took actions to implement nearly 

all of them.

• In March 2011, we reported that the Navy did not sufficiently analyze 

alternative acquisition approaches for the Next Generation Enterprise 

Network (NGEN) program because the alternatives analysis 

contained key weaknesses in its cost estimates and analysis of 

operational effectiveness.31 We also found that the Navy did not have 

a reliable integrated master schedule, and that acquisition decisions 

were not always performance- and risk-based. We recommended, 

among other things, that DOD reconsider the selected acquisition 

approach, ensure that the NGEN integrated master schedule 

substantially reflects key scheduling practices, and that future 

acquisition reviews and decisions fully reflect the state of the 

program’s performance and its exposure to risks. DOD concurred in 

full or in part with nearly all of the recommendations and took actions 

to implement some of them. Additionally, we reported in September 

2012 that, while the Navy did not revisit the analysis of alternatives for 

NGEN, it had reconsidered and revised its acquisition approach to 

support program executability and reduce program risk.32

 

31GAO, Information Technology: Better Informed Decision Making Needed on Navy’s Next 

Generation Enterprise Network Acquisition, 

Implementation of this revised acquisition strategy is expected to save 

the program about $2.58 billion between fiscal years 2013 through 

2017. Finally, we also reported in September 2012 that the program’s 

risks were not being adequately mitigated because not all risk 

mitigation plans were comprehensive and current, and we therefore 

recommended that DOD develop comprehensive risk mitigation plans. 

DOD concurred with our recommendation.

GAO-11-150 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 11, 

2011). 

32GAO, Next Generation Enterprise Network: Navy Implementing Revised Approach, but 

Improvement Needed in Mitigating Risks, GAO-12-956 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 19, 

2012).
 

Page 15 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

• In May 2011, we reported that the Air Force’s Joint Space Operations 

Center Mission System (JMS) faced development challenges and 

risks, such as the use of immature technologies and planning to 

deliver all capabilities in a single, large increment, versus smaller and 

more manageable increments.33

• In March 2013, we reported that large variations existed in the extent 

to which 14 selected programs stayed within planned cost and 

schedule estimates and met system performance targets.

We recommended, among other 

things, that DOD assure that key program risks have been fully 

assessed to help ensure cost, schedule, and performance goals will 

be met. We also noted in the report that implementing this 

recommendation may require dividing the program into separate 

increments. DOD agreed with this recommendation and noted that the 

requirement to assess key program risks to ensure cost, schedule, 

and performance goals is part of the milestone B review, approval, 

and certification process.

34

• We reported in February 2014 that the Department of Veterans Affairs 

(VA) and DOD had abandoned their plans to develop an integrated 

electronic health record (iEHR) system and were instead pursuing 

separate efforts to modernize or replace their existing systems in an 

attempt to create an interoperable electronic health record.

We also 

noted that three selected programs—Air Force’s Defense Enterprise

Accounting and Management System, Army’s Global Combat Support 

System-Army, and Navy’s Consolidated Afloat Networks and 

Enterprise Services—demonstrated mixed results in effectively 

defining and managing risks of various levels, and in implementing 

key requirements management and project monitoring and control 

best practices. We made recommendations to the Army program to 

address weaknesses in its risk management and IV&V practices. 

DOD concurred with these recommendations and stated that it will 

comply with them. 

35

 

33GAO, Space Acquisitions: Development and Oversight Challenges in Delivering 

Improved Space Situational Awareness Capabilities, 

We also 

GAO-11-545 (Washington, D.C.: 

May 27, 2011). 

34GAO-13-311. 

35GAO, Electronic Health Records: VA and DOD Need to Support Cost and Schedule 

Claims, Develop Interoperability Plans, and Improve Collaboration, GAO-14-302

(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 27, 2014).
 

Page 16 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

noted that VA and DOD had not substantiated their claims that the 

revised approach will be less expensive and more timely than the 

single-system approach. We therefore recommended, among other 

things, that VA and DOD develop and compare the estimated cost 

and schedule of their current and previous approaches to creating an 

interoperable electronic health record and, if applicable, provide a 

rationale for pursuing a more costly or time-consuming approach. VA 

and DOD concurred with our recommendations and noted actions that 

were being taken to address them.

Among the 15 MAIS programs selected for our study, there were large 

variations in the extent to which programs had changed their planned cost 

and schedule estimates and met system performance targets. Of the 15 

selected MAIS programs, 13 had cost data available, 14 had schedule 

data available, and 11 had system performance data available. Of the 13 

selected programs with cost data available, 11 programs experienced 

changes in their cost estimates—including 7 that had experienced 

increases and 4 that had experienced decreases; and 2 remained 

unchanged in their cost goals. Additionally, of the 14 programs with 

schedule data available, 13 programs experienced schedule changes—

including 12 that had slippages and 1 that had accelerated its schedule 

and met a milestone earlier than planned; and 1 that remained on 

schedule, as planned. Further, of the 11 programs that had system 

performance data available, 3 programs met their system performance 

targets, while 8 did not fully meet their targets. Program profiles with cost, 

schedule, and system performance details on each of the selected 

programs, including causes for cost and schedule changes, are included 

in appendix II. Table 1 provides a summary of the cost, schedule, and 

performance results for the 15 selected programs.

Most Selected 

Programs Changed 

Their Planned Cost 

and Schedule 

Estimates, and Over 

Half Did Not Fully 

Meet System 

Performance Targets
 

Page 17 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

Table 1: Summary of Cost, Schedule, and System Performance Results for the Selected Programs

Component/

program

No change 

in cost 

estimate

Change in 

cost 

estimate (%)

No change in 

schedule 

estimate

Change in 

schedule 

estimate

Met system 

performance 

targets 

Did not fully 

meet system 

performance 

targets 

Air Force

Air Force Integrated Personnel 

and Pay System (AFIPPS)a,b

 8%  1.5 years

AOC-WS Increment 10.2b,c  

Base Information Transport 

Infrastructure (BITI) Wireless 

 8  6 months 

Integrated Strategic Planning and 

Analysis Network (ISPAN) 

Increment 2

 4  6 months 

JMS Increment 1   2 months 

Army

Distributed Common Ground 

System - Army (DCGS-A) 

Increment 1

 9  3 months d

Integrated Personnel and Pay 

System - Army (IPPS-A) 

Increment 1

 10  1 year 

JPI Version 2b,e

Defense Health Agency (DHA)

iEHR Increment 1f  11 months 

TMIP-J Increment 2  2,233  6 years  d

Defense Logistics Agency 

(DLA)

DAIa  159  5 years 

EProcurement  4  2 months 

Navy

Global Command and Control 

System - Maritime (GCCS-M) 

Increment 2

 86  3.5 years 

GCSS-MC Increment 1  302  6 years 

NGEN Increment 1a,b  15  2 years

Total 2 11

(7 

4 ) 

1 13

(12 

1 ) 

3 8 

Legend:  cost increase  cost decrease  schedule slippage  schedule acceleration

Source: GAO analysis of data provided by DOD officials.

a

Three programs—AFIPPS; DAI; and NGEN Increment 1—had not yet established an APB. As such, 

we compared their latest cost and schedule estimates against initial estimates. These initial estimates 
 

Page 18 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

were based on limited information about the program’s requirements and the viability of technologies 

available to meet the program’s needs.

b

System performance data for these programs were not available due to two primary reasons: (1) 

programs were early in development or implementation of the systems and had not yet fully deployed 

any portion of the systems, or (2) the program was not under contract.

c

The AOC-WS Increment 10.2 program recently established its first APB in October 2013. However, 

in December 2012, prior to establishing its first APB, the program declared a critical change as 

required by law because it had not achieved a full deployment decision within 5 years from the time 

the program selected the technology to be used. 

d

While neither DCGS-A Increment 1 nor TMIP-J Increment 2 fully met performance measures, these 

programs deferred or removed the problematic capabilities from the programs and subsequent tests 

on the modified system releases showed that the systems performed acceptably once those 

capabilities were removed.

e

Cost and schedule data were not available for JPI Version 2 because, as of December 2013, 

program officials were working to revise JPI’s requirements and expected to reach milestone B (the 

point at which an APB would be established) about 18 months after the program’s requirements are 

approved.

f

As of January 2014, the iEHR program did not have a cost estimate available that was reflective of 

recent scope changes made to the program. iEHR officials stated that they plan to revise the cost 

estimate to reflect recent scope changes, and expected this update to occur at milestone C 

(authorizes a program to begin limited fielding of the system), which is currently planned for May 

2014.

Eleven of the 15 selected programs experienced changes in their planned 

total life-cycle cost estimates. Specifically, 4 programs had reduced their 

cost estimates and 7 had increased these estimates.

Four programs experienced decreases in their planned total life-cycle 

cost estimates, ranging from about 4 percent to 86 percent. According to 

DOD officials, these decreases were due to cost savings from competitive 

contracting, implementing new technology that cost less, program budget 

cuts, or transferring costs to another DOD program. 

• The latest life-cycle cost estimate (as of December 2013) for Navy’s 

NGEN Increment 1 program had decreased about 15 percent from its 

initial estimate—from $25.4 billion to $21.6 billion.36

• The latest life-cycle cost estimate for Navy’s GCCS-M Increment 2 

program had decreased about 86 percent from its first APB 

estimate—from $4.4 billion in February 2006 to approximately $641.8 

million as of December 2013. GCCS-M officials attributed this 

decrease primarily to the Navy’s transfer of certain hardware 

Program officials 

attributed this decrease to cost savings from competitive contracting.

 

36Initial cost estimates are based on limited information about the program’s requirements 

and the viability of technologies available to meet the program’s needs. 

Most of the Selected 

Programs Experienced 

Changes in Their Planned 

Total Life-cycle Cost 

Estimates
 

Page 19 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

requirements—such as procuring and installing servers and other 

network equipment—to Navy’s common computing environment that 

will be provided by Navy’s Consolidated Afloat Networks and 

Enterprise Services program, and the removal of costs associated 

with operations and maintenance and military personnel that are now 

planned to be funded by sources outside of the program office.

• The latest life-cycle cost estimate (as of March 2014) for Air Force’s 

ISPAN Increment 2 program had decreased about 4 percent from its 

first APB estimate—from $152.5 million in November 2010 to $146.2 

million. According to program officials, this decrease was due to the 

program’s switch from a systems architecture environment that 

included multiple hardware items, such as computers and servers, to 

a virtualized environment in which certain computers are softwarebased.37

• The latest life-cycle cost estimate for Army’s DCGS-A Increment 1 

program had decreased about 9 percent from its first APB estimate of 

$11.2 billion in March 2012 to approximately $10.2 billion as of 

December 2013. DCGS-A officials attributed this decrease, among 

other things, to a reduction in the number of brigade combat teams, 

which was due, in part, to the Budget Control Act of 2011 (which 

required DOD to reduce its future expenditures) and the drawdown of 

forces in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Seven programs experienced increases in the planned total life-cycle cost 

estimates, ranging from 4 to 2,233 percent.

• The latest life-cycle estimate for DHA’s TMIP-J Increment 2 program 

increased approximately 2,233 percent from its first APB estimate of 

$67.7 million in November 2002 to $1.58 billion as of December 2013. 

Program officials attributed the cost increase to the addition of 

capabilities originally intended to be included in a future increment, 

new requirements necessary to meet the needs of the warfighter, and 

the inclusion of operations and maintenance costs that were not 

included in the first APB because it was initially thought that such 

costs would be paid by the military services.

 

37Virtualization is a technology that allows multiple, software-based machines to run in 

isolation, side-by-side, on the same physical machine. Virtual machines can be stored as 

files, making it possible to save a virtual machine and move it from one physical server to 

another.
 

Page 20 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

• The latest life-cycle cost estimate for Navy’s GCSS-MC Increment 1 

program (as of December 2013) had increased approximately 302 

percent from its first APB estimate of $461.4 million in June 2007 to 

$1.86 billion. Program officials attributed the cost increase to technical 

challenges associated with developing the second release and 

extending the period of contractor maintenance to allow additional 

time for transferring post-deployment system support to the 

government.

• The latest life-cycle cost estimate for DLA’s DAI program increased 

about 159 percent from the program’s initial estimate of approximately 

$209.2 million in March 2007 to $543.0 million as of December 2013. 

Program officials attributed this program’s cost increases to adding 5 

years to the estimate’s life cycle, understating initial assumptions on 

licensing and hardware costs, and a need for additional change 

management efforts.

• The latest life-cycle cost estimate (as of December 2013) for the Air 

Force’s AFIPPS program had increased about 8 percent from the 

program’s initial estimate of about $1.72 billion in July 2010 to $1.86 

billion. Program officials reported that the increases in costs were 

primarily due to (1) an increase in contractor staff within the program 

office, (2) DOD’s direction to the program to switch from using a 

development environment hosted at a contractor site to one hosted by 

DOD’s Defense Information Systems Agency, and (3) the addition of 

new requirements, including supportability requirements for the 

network and training environment.

• The Air Force’s BITI Wireless program had an approximately 8 

percent increase in its latest cost estimate compared to its first APB 

estimate—from $499.5 million in April 2010 to $541.4 million as of 

December 2013. Program officials reported that the cost increase was 

due to the need to maintain the program’s wireless infrastructure 

longer than originally planned, which increased operations and 

maintenance costs.

• The latest life-cycle cost estimate (as of December 2013) for Army’s 

IPPS-A Increment 1 program increased about 10 percent from its first 

APB estimate of $358.4 million in March 2012 to about $395.3 million. 

IPPS-A officials attributed this increase to significant program 

schedule slippages.
 

Page 21 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

• Further, DLA’s EProcurement program had about a 4 percent 

increase in its latest life-cycle cost estimate compared to its first APB 

estimate—from $528.0 million in March 2012 to $549.7 million as of 

December 2013. According to program officials, this increase was due 

to a 2-month slip in the full deployment date, which shifted estimates 

into the next fiscal year and added inflation.

As of December 2013, two programs had not experienced any cost 

increases or decreases in their planned total life-cycle cost estimates 

when compared to their first APB estimates.

• The latest cost estimate (as of December 2013) for Air Force’s JMS 

Increment 1 program was about $155.6 million, which is the same as 

the program’s first APB, which was established in April 2013.

• The Air Force’s AOC-WS Increment 10.2 program’s first APB cost 

estimate was established in October 2013. The program spent 

approximately $176 million and took 6 years (when compared to the 

program’s 2007 initiation date) before it established this APB. 

Program officials attributed the delays in developing the APB, in part, 

to the Air Combat Command’s determination that the original scope 

was unaffordable and a subsequent re-planning of the program to 

reduce its scope.

One program did not have cost information available.

• In February 2013, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

determined that the proposed 10-year funding profile for the Army’s 

JPI Version 2 program was unaffordable. Subsequently, the program 

was working to revise JPI’s requirements and reassess the 

functionality that will be included in the program. Program officials 

expect to reach milestone B (the point at which an APB would be 

established) about 18 months after the program’s requirements are 

approved.

Additionally, DHA’s iEHR increment 1 program did not have a cost 

estimate available that was reflective of recent scope changes made to 

the program. Program officials stated that they plan to revise the cost 

estimate to reflect recent scope changes, and expected this update to 

occur at milestone C (authorizes a program to begin limited fielding of the 

system), which is currently planned for May 2014.

Table 2 provides a summary of the percent of cost increase or decrease 

for each selected program’s latest planned total life-cycle cost estimates.
 

Page 22 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

Table 2: Changes in Selected Programs’ First Approved Baseline Estimates and 

Latest Planned Total Life-cycle Cost Estimates

Component Program

Percent change in lifecycle cost estimate (%)

Air Force AFIPPS 8%a

AOC-WS Increment 10.2 0 

BITI Wireless 8 

ISPAN Increment 2 4 

JMS Increment 1 0 

Army DCGS-A Increment 1 9 

IPPS-A Increment 1 10

JPI Version 2 n/ab

DHA iEHR Increment 1 n/ac

TMIP-J Increment 2 2,233

DLA DAI 159a

EProcurement 4 

Navy GCCS-M Increment 2 86

GCSS-MC Increment 1 302

NGEN Increment 1 15a

Source: GAO analysis of data provided by DOD officials.

a

AFIPPS, DAI, and NGEN Increment 1 had not yet established an APB. As such, we compared their 

latest cost estimates against initial estimates. These initial estimates were based on limited 

information about the program’s requirements and the viability of technologies available to meet the 

program’s needs.

b

As of December 2013, JPI Version 2 did not have cost information available. In February 2013, the 

Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff determined that the proposed 10-year funding profile for the 

program was unaffordable. As of December 2013, the program was working to revise JPI’s 

requirements and reassess the functionality that will be included in the program.

c

As of January 2014, the iEHR program did not have a cost estimate available that was reflective of 

recent scope changes made to the program. iEHR officials stated that they plan to revise the cost 

estimate to reflect recent scope changes, and expected this update to occur at milestone C 

(authorizes a program to begin limited fielding of the system), which is currently planned for May 

2014.

Thirteen of the 15 selected programs had experienced changes in their 

schedule estimates, including 1 program that accelerated its schedule 

and met its full deployment milestone earlier than planned and 12 

programs that had experienced slippages. One of the selected programs 

did not experience a change in its schedule estimate. Specifically, the Air 

Force’s AOC-WS Increment 10.2 program had just established its first 

APB schedule estimate in October 2013.

Most of the Selected 

Programs Experienced 

Schedule Estimate 

Changes
 

Page 23 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

One of the selected programs accelerated its schedule compared to its 

first APB schedule estimate. Specifically, Air Force’s JMS Increment 1 

program accelerated its full deployment date by about 2 months and was

deemed fully deployed in April 2013. Program officials attributed the early 

completion of this milestone to a successful operational trial period and 

initial operational capability decision.

Twelve of the 15 selected programs had experienced slippages in their 

planned schedule estimates, ranging from a few months to 6 years. Two 

of the 12 programs had experienced significant slippages in their 

schedules, having experienced 11-month and 12-month delays, 

respectively. Six programs had experienced critical slippages of more 

than 1 year. For example,

• Compared to its first APB schedule, Navy’s GCSS-MC Increment 1 

program experienced a 6-year slippage in its full deployment date, 

currently scheduled for the fourth quarter of 2015. These delays were 

due to technical challenges in developing the second release of the 

system. 

• DHA’s TMIP-J Increment 2 program experienced an over 6-year 

slippage in its full deployment date compared to its first APB 

schedule—from May 2009 to the first quarter of fiscal year 2016. 

Program officials attributed this delay primarily to an increase in 

requirements related to supporting warfighters; and configuration 

management and software usage problems experienced when 

preparing the first release for deployment.

• Navy’s GCCS-M Increment 2 program experienced a 3.5 year 

slippage in its full deployment decision date compared to its first APB 

schedule—from August 2007 to March 2011. Program officials 

attributed this slippage to schedule delays in the availability of ships 

for operational testing, and a program restructure in 2007, which 

required new work to be done to develop software in accordance with 

the newly proposed common infrastructure and software baseline.

• DLA’s DAI program experienced over a 5-year slip in its planned date 

to obtain approval to begin production and deployment of the system 

(referred to as milestone C) when compared to its initial schedule, 

which planned for it to occur in January 2009. In September 2013, the 

program was restructured into two increments, and DOD decided that 

increment 1 would not proceed to milestone C and would be placed 

into the operations and support phase. DOD also decided that 
 

Page 24 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

additional milestones would be reached through the second 

increment. However, as of January 2014, program officials were 

uncertain when they would set a schedule for increment 2 and reach 

milestone C.38

• Navy’s NGEN Increment 1 program experienced an almost 2-year 

slippage in its planned date to obtain approval to begin production and 

deployment of the system when compared to its initial schedule—from 

August 2011 to June 2013. Program officials attributed the slippages 

to the need to conduct more detailed planning for acquiring NGEN 

services; delays in solicitation activities; the proposals received not 

being of the desired quality, which led to delays in contract award; and 

a contract award protest.

DAI officials attributed this slippage to fluctuation in the 

number of agencies to deploy DAI and the agency deployment 

schedule; the change in program designation to pre-MAIS (meaning it 

was expected to meet MAIS thresholds), which resulted in additional 

oversight requirements; and to the change in parent organization from 

the Business Transformation Agency to DLA.

• Air Force’s AFIPPS program experienced about a 1.5-year schedule 

slip in its planned date for milestone B (authorizes a program to begin 

system development) when compared to its initial schedule—from the 

first quarter of fiscal year 2013 to June 2014. Program officials 

reported that the program decided to delay milestone B until after the 

development contract was awarded because, among other things, the 

work to be performed under the contract is expected to better define 

the program and provide additional details that can be used when 

developing the program’s first APB.

One program did not have schedule information available.

• Army’s JPI Version 2 program did not have schedule information 

available because, in February 2013, the Vice Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff determined that the proposed 10-year funding profile 

for JPI Version 2 was unaffordable. Subsequently, the program has 

been working to revise JPI’s requirements and reassess the 

functionality that will be included in the program. Program officials 

expect to reach milestone B (the point at which an APB would be 

 

38Initial schedule estimates are based on limited information about the program’s 

requirements and the viability of technologies available to meet the program’s needs. 
 

Page 25 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

established—including an approved schedule estimate) about 18 

months after the program’s requirements are approved.

Table 3 provides a summary of the slippages experienced by the selected 

MAIS programs.

Table 3: Selected MAIS Programs’ Schedule Slippages Compared to First Approved 

Baseline Schedules

Component Program

Schedule slippage since first APB 

(slipped milestone)

Air Force AFIPPS 1.5 years (milestone B)a

AOC-WS Increment 10.2 none

BITI Wireless 6 months (full deployment)

ISPAN Increment 2 6 months (full deployment)

JMS Increment 1 none 

Army DCGS-A Increment 1 3 months (full deployment decision)

IPPS-A Increment 1 1 year (milestone C)

JPI Version 2 n/ab

DHA iEHR Increment 1 11 months (full deployment decision)

TMIP-J Increment 2 6 years (full deployment)

DLA DAI 5 years (milestone C)a

EProcurement 2 months (full deployment)

Navy GCCS-M Increment 2 3.5 years (full deployment decision)

GCSS-MC Increment 1 6 years (full deployment)

NGEN Increment 1 2 years (milestone C)a

Source: GAO analysis of data provided by DOD officials.

a

An APB was never established for AFIPPS, DAI, or NGEN Increment 1. As such, we compared their 

initial schedule estimates to their latest estimates. These initial estimates were based on limited 

information about the program’s requirements and the viability of technologies available to meet the 

program’s needs.

b

As of December 2013, JPI Version 2 did not have schedule information available and the program 

was working to revise its requirements and reassess the functionality that will be included in the 

program.

Program officials attributed the schedule slippages for the 12 programs to 

numerous causes, ranging from needing more time for planning and test 

activities to contractor performance problems. Table 4 provides examples 

of schedule slippage causes identified by the programs.
 

Page 26 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

Table 4: Causes for Schedule Slippages among 12 Selected Programs 

Component/

program

More time 

needed for 

planning 

activities

System 

performance 

problems 

Unanticipated 

requirements 

or unplanned 

work

Deploymentrelated 

issues

More time 

needed 

for test 

activities

Contract 

award 

delays

Contractor 

performance 

problems

Organizational 

restructure

Air Force

AFIPPS 

BITI Wireless 

ISPAN 

Increment 2

 

Army

DCGS-A 

Increment 1



IPPS-A 

Increment 1

  

DHA

iEHR 

Increment 1

  

TMIP-J 

Increment 2

  

DLA

DAI  

EProcurement 

Navy

GCCS-M 

Increment 2

 

GCSS-MC 

Increment 1



NGEN 

Increment 1

 

Total 5 4 3 3 3 2 1 1 

Source: GAO analysis of data provided by DOD officials.

Further discussion of the specific causes for schedule slippages among 

the 12 programs is included in appendix II.
 

Page 27 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

Three of the 15 selected programs reported meeting their system 

performance targets. These programs were Air Force’s JMS Increment 1 

program, Army’s IPPS-A Increment 1 program, and the Navy’s GCCS-M 

Increment 2 program. For example, a system operational evaluation was 

completed on the JMS system in December 2012, which concluded that 

JMS was effective for the limited scope of operational capabilities 

delivered and that increment 1 met the targets for its two key performance 

parameters related to displaying the user-defined operational picture and 

supporting network-based military operations. Additionally, as of 

December 2013, the Navy had tested three of the four planned system 

configurations for GCCS-M increment 2. The Navy determined that all 

three of the system configurations were operationally effective and 

suitable; however, it identified deficiencies with two configurations of the 

system. The program has since addressed those deficiencies.

Four programs did not have system performance data available. 

Specifically, system performance data for Air Force’s AFIPPS and AOCWS Increment 10.2 programs; and Army’s JPI Version 2 program were 

not available because these programs were either early in the 

development or implementation stages and had not yet fully deployed any 

portion of the systems. Additionally, system performance data for Navy’s 

NGEN Increment 1 program were not available because the program had 

not yet transitioned to the new NGEN contract and, as such, the Navy 

had not yet evaluated system performance targets for NGEN.

On the other hand, 8 of the 15 selected programs reported experiencing 

system performance problems, which resulted in these systems not 

performing as intended and reducing the value of the systems. 

Specifically, each of these 8 programs had experienced numerous 

system deficiencies. For example, an initial operational test and 

evaluation of release 1 of the Army’s DCGS-A Increment 1 system in 

2012 determined that it was operationally effective with limitations. 

Specifically, the system was unable to meet certain requirements, such 

as synchronizing data passed between different classified network 

domains (e.g., between secret and top secret networks). Additionally, in 

December 2012, the Navy’s GCSS-MC Increment 1 program reported 

that the second system release was unable to successfully complete 

developmental and operational testing due to technical problems 

associated with certain capabilities in that release, including 

synchronizing remote computers to the primary system. Further, in 

September 2012, an operational evaluation on the Air Force’s BITI 

Wireless system identified 14 deficiencies among three of the six critical 

operational areas that were evaluated, including network command and 

Three of the Selected 

Programs Reported 

Meeting System 

Performance Targets, 

While Eight Reported Not 

Fully Meeting Targets, and 

Four Did Not Have System 

Performance Data 

Available
 

Page 28 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

control. As of December 2013, five of the eight programs with system 

performance issues were still experiencing these issues, and the other 

three programs—Army’s DCGS-A Increment 1, Navy’s GCSS-MC 

Increment 1, and DHA’s TMIP-J Increment 2—had removed or deferred 

the problematic capabilities from the scope of the programs, rather than 

correcting the issues.

According to CMMI-ACQ and PMBOK®, an effective risk management 

process identifies potential problems before they occur, so that riskhandling activities may be planned and invoked, as needed, across the 

life of the project in order to mitigate adverse impacts on achieving 

objectives. Specifically, key risk management practices include:

• identifying risks, threats, and vulnerabilities that could negatively 

affect work efforts;

• evaluating and categorizing each identified risk using defined risk 

categories and parameters, such as likelihood and consequence, and 

determining each risk’s relative priority;

• developing risk mitigation plans for selected risks to proactively 

reduce the potential impact of risk occurrence; and

• monitoring the status of each risk periodically and implementing the 

risk mitigation plan as appropriate.

DLA’s DAI program is intended to modernize the financial management 

processes of 21 defense agencies and components and is a key 

component of the DOD plan for achieving fully auditable financial 

statements by September 30, 2017. DAI began as a non-MAIS program 

in 2007 and was declared a MAIS program with two increments in 

September 2013. Increment 1 deployed five releases to 11 defense 

agencies and components from 2008 to 2012. Increment 2 was to provide 

new and enhanced capabilities and to deploy to the remaining 10 defense 

agencies and components. As of January 2014, DAI officials were 

uncertain when the program would begin system development of 

increment 2.

DLA had taken steps to implement risk management practices for DAI, 

but it did not have a documented process for managing risks during the 

first 6 years of the program and recent efforts to implement key risk 

Selected Programs’ 

Implementation of 

Key Risk 

Management 

Practices Varied in 

Effectiveness

DLA’s DAI Program Had 

Recently Taken Steps to 

Implement Risk 

Management Practices, 

but More Work Remains to 

Effectively Identify and 

Manage Risks
 

Page 29 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

management practices still need improvement. Although it is uncertain 

how DAI was impacted by the lack of a documented risk management 

process during the first 6 years of the program—during which it deployed 

five releases to 11 defense agencies and components—the program’s 

costs increased by about 159 percent and its schedule slipped by over 5 

years (as discussed in app. II).

• Identify risks, threats, and vulnerabilities that could negatively 

affect work efforts. The DAI program had not fully identified risks, 

threats, and vulnerabilities that could negatively affect work efforts, 

but recently took steps to do so. Specifically, the program did not 

document risks during the first 6 years of the program, and instead 

allowed risks to be handled at the team level. DAI established a risk 

management board in July 2013 to review and approve risks on a 

monthly basis, and began documenting risks in a log. However, the 

program office was still in the early stages of identifying and approving 

risks, and had not been accurately maintaining its risk log. 

Specifically, the July through October 2013 risk logs did not accurately 

capture the status of the potential risks identified by the program, and 

therefore it was not clear which risk(s) had been approved by the risk 

management board. The program office recognized the lack of 

maturity in its risk management practices and hired a risk 

management expert to help the program improve its risk management 

efforts in September 2013. As a result, the November 2013 risk log 

accurately reflected risk management board decisions and 

appropriately identified the three risks that had been approved by the 

board. However, program officials stated that the three risks do not 

represent a comprehensive set of risks facing the program and added 

that they are still in the process of identifying and approving additional 

program risks. While these are positive steps, until the program is 

routinely identifying and managing a risk log that represents a 

complete set of risks facing the program, effective risk management of 

the DAI program will be limited.

• Evaluate and categorize each identified risk using defined risk 

categories and parameters, such as likelihood and consequence, 

and determine each risk’s relative priority. The DAI program had 

not consistently evaluated and categorized its identified risks, but 

recently took steps to do so. Specifically, as previously stated, the 

program office did not document risks during the first 6 years of the 

program, but recently began establishing a structured risk 

management process. As part of this effort, the program office 

finalized a risk management plan in June 2013 that included key risk 

management practices, such as processes for evaluating and 
 

Page 30 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

categorizing identified risks using defined risk categories and 

parameters, including likelihood and consequence, and determining 

each risk’s relative priority. However, as previously stated, the 

program office was still in the early stages of identifying and 

assessing risks and the assessments in the early risk logs that were 

established under the new risk process—July through November 

2013—did not consistently align with the defined parameters. For 

example, DAI did not appropriately assess consequence to cost 

based on the program’s five defined levels (i.e., percent of budget 

increase) for two of the three approved risks in the November 2013 

risk log. As previously stated, officials told us that they were still 

learning the process and had hired an expert to help improve their risk 

management practices. Without conducting appropriate risk 

assessments, the program will lack assurance that it is prioritizing its 

resources for risk mitigation in the most effective manner.

• Develop risk mitigation plans for selected risks to proactively 

reduce the potential impact of risk occurrence. The DAI program 

had not fully developed risk mitigation plans because it was still in the 

early stages of implementing its risk management practices and had 

only recently begun developing risk mitigation plans for identified 

risks. In the absence of appropriate mitigation plans for all program 

risks, the program will lack assurance that it is avoiding the likelihood 

that those risks materialize into issues.

• Monitor the status of each risk periodically and implement the 

risk mitigation plan as appropriate. The DAI program was still in the 

early stages of implementing its risk management practices and 

monitoring the status of its risks. Additionally, the program’s 

discussion of potential risks in weekly program status reviews did not 

accurately reflect risk status and did not align with the risk log. For 

example, during an August 2013 status review, the program office 

rated certain program areas, such as configuration management and 

requirements, “green” (meaning no issues) even though the office had 

identified potential risks or issues in each of the areas. Officials 

recognized that the weekly program status reviews needed to better 

align with program risks. Subsequently, in January 2014, officials 

reported that they were using the risk log to inform the weekly 

reviews.
 

Page 31 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

GCSS-MC Increment 1 is intended to support logistics planners and 

operators worldwide to manage combat logistics, including planning, 

warehousing, distribution, depot maintenance, and asset visibility. In 

August 2013, following a critical change that was declared in December 

2012 due to technical challenges associated with capabilities in GCSSMC’s second planned release, and a subsequent review of the program, 

the Navy reduced the scope of the program by removing one of the two 

planned releases from the first increment of GCSS-MC. In place of the 

second release, the Navy added an enhancement release to the first 

release that is intended to provide minimal functionality to users without 

network connectivity. Program officials reported that, by March 2013, 

DOD had fielded the first release—which provided logistics capabilities to 

users that had access to the system via the internet—to all intended 

users except those in Afghanistan because the Navy did not want to 

disrupt ongoing combat operations. As of December 2013, program 

officials expected to begin fielding the enhancement release in the 

second quarter of 2015.

The Navy’s GCSS-MC program’s risk log was out of date and its risk 

management board did not conduct risk review meetings between March 

2013 and July 2013; however, the Navy had recently taken steps to 

implement key risk management practices for GCSS-MC, including 

resuming monthly risk management board meetings and updating its risks 

and plans for mitigating them.

• Identify risks, threats, and vulnerabilities that could negatively 

affect work efforts. GCSS-MC had identified risks, threats, and 

vulnerabilities that could negatively affect work efforts. However, 

between March and July 2013, the program’s overall risk log was out 

of date and the program’s risk management board did not conduct risk 

review meetings that assessed risks and associated mitigation plans 

on a monthly basis. Specifically, although program officials stated that 

they were managing risks at the product level on an ongoing basis, 

the program-level risk log provided in May 2013 showed that the 

status of risks had not been updated since February 2013, when the 

program stopped conducting monthly risk management board 

meetings. The program office reported that these activities were 

halted during certain periods of the critical change review because the 

primary work originally planned to be performed during that time was 

the development of the second planned release, which was paused 

during the review. However, during this time, operations and 

maintenance activities with the first release were still ongoing, yet 

risks were not being tracked and monitored by the risk management 

Navy’s GCSS-MC 

Program Had Recently 

Shown Progress in 

Implementing Key Risk 

Management Practices
 

Page 32 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

board. It was not until August 2013—at the end of the critical change 

review—that the program resumed the risk management board 

meetings on a monthly basis. In November 2013 the program had 

updated its risks and its plans for mitigating them. Continued 

implementation of reinstituted risk management activities should help 

ensure that, moving forward, the program is properly identifying and 

managing its program risks.

• Evaluate and categorize each identified risk using defined risk 

categories and parameters, such as likelihood and consequence, 

and determine each risk’s relative priority. During the program’s 

recent reassessment and validation of its risks, as discussed above, 

GCSS-MC had evaluated and categorized its risks. For example, as 

of November 2013, the program had categorized 3 of its 14 approved 

risks as low risk, 8 as medium risk, and 3 as high risk.

• Develop risk mitigation plans for selected risks to proactively 

reduce the potential impact of risk occurrence. The program had 

developed mitigation plans for its identified risks. However, as stated 

previously, these risks and mitigation plans were out of date for 

approximately 5 months and the program had recently taken steps to 

update its mitigation plans for its risks.

• Monitor the status of each risk periodically and implement the 

risk mitigation plan as appropriate. Prior to the conclusion of the 

program’s latest critical change, the program had not periodically 

monitored the status of each program-level risk. Specifically, the 

program’s risk management board had not conducted risk review 

meetings from March 2013 to July 2013. GCSS-MC officials stated 

that risk reviews were not held because the program was focused on 

addressing its critical change. Program officials also stated that they 

were regularly monitoring the status of product-level risks throughout 

the critical change, as discussed above. As stated previously, the 

program had recently taken steps to improve its risk management 

process, including monitoring and assessing program-level risks and 

associated mitigation plans on a monthly basis.

By taking these actions, the GCSS-MC program had established and 

implemented key practices as part of its risk management process. Doing 

so should increase the likelihood that the program is positioned to 

mitigate negative impacts from potential problems before they occur.
 

Page 33 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

TMIP-J Increment 2 is a set of applications that support warfighters and 

health care providers in military theater operations with patient, medical 

logistics, and medical command and control data. The program also 

integrates with medical systems at sites that support military bases. 

Increment 2 is intended to upgrade legacy systems and add significant 

new functionality to the first increment, including support for wounded 

warriors. TMIP-J Increment 2 is intended to be fielded in three releases. 

Program officials estimated that 80 percent of planned capabilities were 

met with the first installed release, which began fielding in 2008. In 

December 2013, the program was granted full deployment decision 

based on test results for the second release, and the third release was in 

the requirements development phase.

The TMIP-J program had implemented key practices as part of its risk 

management process.

• Identify risks, threats, and vulnerabilities that could negatively 

affect work efforts. The TMIP-J program had identified risks, threats, 

and vulnerabilities that could negatively affect work efforts. In 

particular, as of June 2013, key risks as identified by the program 

office included (1) the possibility of a backup database not being 

synchronized with the production database if the size of the backup 

database is not increased, and (2) the possibility of the backup 

database needing to be re-synchronized to the production database if 

a certain requirement is implemented in the production database.

• Evaluate and categorize each identified risk using defined risk 

categories and parameters, such as likelihood and consequence, 

and determine each risk’s relative priority. The program had 

evaluated and categorized its risks based on probability and impact. 

For example, the program reported that the first aforementioned key 

risk had a “highly likely” probability (meaning a 60-79 percent 

probability of occurrence) and “significant” performance impact 

(meaning it may cause significant degradation in technical 

performance).

• Develop risk mitigation plans for selected risks to proactively 

reduce the potential impact of risk occurrence. TMIP-J had 

developed mitigation plans to proactively reduce the potential impact 

of risk occurrence. For example, the risk mitigation plan for the first 

aforementioned key risk included the program planning and 

requesting additional backup database space for the next 5 years. For 

the second aforementioned key risk, the program determined that 

DHA’s TMIP-J Program 

Had Implemented Key 

Risk Management 

Practices
 

Page 34 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

there is no mitigation strategy available for the risk; instead, the 

program planned to accept the risk and resynchronize the backup 

database as soon as possible.

• Monitor the status of each risk periodically and implement the 

risk mitigation plan as appropriate. The program monitored its risks 

and documented the status of risk mitigation actions that had been 

taken. For example, the program monitored its risks on a quarterly 

basis and tracked the number of open mitigation steps for each risk.

In taking these actions, the TMIP-J program had established and utilized 

effective risk management practices. Doing so should better position the

program to mitigate adverse impacts from potential problems before they 

occur.

DLA’s DAI, Navy’s GCSS-MC, and DHA’s TMIP-J programs 

demonstrated varied progress in implementing IT acquisition best 

practices for requirements management and project monitoring and 

control. Specifically, while DAI and GCSS-MC had fully implemented 

requirements management best practices, TMIP-J had not clearly defined 

its capabilities nor maintained complete traceability between all of its 

requirements and work products. Regarding project monitoring and 

control, DAI, GCSS-MC, and TMIP-J had each implemented selected 

project monitoring and control best practices. However, DAI had not 

documented significant deviations in performance; GCSS-MC had not 

always taken corrective actions to address issues in a timely manner; and 

TMIP-J had not effectively determined its progress against the project 

plan nor appropriately communicated to stakeholders on the status of the 

program. Without fully implementing effective acquisition management 

practices, these programs may be at risk of not meeting planned cost and 

schedule milestones, and may implement systems that do not fully meet 

user needs.

Mixed Progress in 

Applying Key IT 

Acquisition Best 

Practices
 

Page 35 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

According to requirements management best practices, effective 

requirements management involves39

• establishing criteria for identifying appropriate requirements providers;

• establishing objective criteria for the evaluation and acceptance of 

requirements;

• assessing the impact of requirements on existing commitments;

• reviewing project plans, activities, and work products to ensure that 

they are consistent with the defined requirements; and

• ensuring traceability between the requirements and work products.

Prior to January 2014, the DAI program had not consistently ensured 

traceability between its requirements and work products, but the program 

had recently taken steps to implement key requirements management 

best practices and, as of January 2014, it was ensuring traceability 

between its requirements and work products.

• Establish criteria for identifying appropriate requirements 

providers. DAI had established criteria for distinguishing appropriate 

requirements providers. Specifically, the program’s requirements 

management plan identified roles and responsibilities for the entities 

that were to identify and maintain requirements.

• Establish objective criteria for the evaluation and acceptance of 

requirements. DAI had established criteria for evaluating and

accepting requirements. Specifically, the program required standard 

information to be submitted for system change requests, such as the 

rationale for the change and the level of effort needed to implement it. 

The program also had standard criteria for evaluating the requests, 

such as feasibility of the request.

 

39CMMI-ACQ, Version 1.3 (November 2010), and PMBOK® Guide, Fifth Edition, (2013). 

The DLA and Navy 

Programs Had Fully 

Implemented Key 

Requirements 

Management Best 

Practices, and the DHA 

Program Had 

Implemented Many Key 

Practices, but Could Not 

Always Trace 

Requirements to User 

Needs

DLA’s DAI Program Had 

Recently Taken Steps to 

Implement Key Requirements 

Management Best Practices
 

Page 36 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

• Assess the impact of requirements on existing commitments.

DAI had assessed whether new requirements would impact existing 

commitments. For example, the program had assessed the impact 

that system change requests would have on DAI’s business 

processes, the program’s schedule, and the level of effort and 

resources needed.

• Review project plans, activities, and work products to ensure 

that they are consistent with the defined requirements. The 

program had ensured consistency between its defined requirements 

and project plans. For example, following DAI’s restructuring into two 

increments in September 2013, the program updated its integrated 

master schedule to reflect this change.

• Ensure traceability between the requirements and work 

products. As of January 2014, the program was ensuring traceability 

between its requirements and work products. However, prior to this, 

the program had not consistently maintained this traceability. 

Specifically, the program had not maintained its requirements 

traceability matrix with complete and up-to-date information. For 

example, in a May 2013 version of the matrix, almost 3,000 out of 

over 4,300 requirements were missing implementation status 

information. In response to our audit finding, the program updated its 

matrix. Specifically, a matrix from September 2013 addressed the 

nearly 3,000 requirements that had been missing status information.

Additionally, while DAI had mapped each of its higher-level 

capabilities to its associated lower-level requirements, the program 

had not completed its mapping of each of its lower-level requirements

to a higher-level capability. For example, as of September 2013, 

nearly 600 requirements in the program’s traceability matrix did not 

identify a source from which the requirements originated. Officials 

recognized there were issues with the matrix and stated that it had 

been consolidated from multiple requirements matrices and that the 

program was in the process of reconciling the consolidated data. By 

January 2014, the program had reconciled the data in the traceability 

matrix. Program officials also stated that they were preparing to 

acquire a requirements management tool in the second quarter of 

fiscal year 2014 that is intended to help improve requirements 

management capabilities—including traceability—and interface with 

the program’s existing configuration management tool. Continued 

implementation of these requirements management activities should 

increase the likelihood that the program develops a system that 

includes all intended functionality.
 

Page 37 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

As a result, the DAI program had established effective requirements 

management best practices, which should help ensure that the DAI 

system will be deployed with functionality that meets users’ needs.

GCSS-MC had fully implemented key best practices for its requirements 

management process.

• Establish criteria for identifying appropriate requirements 

providers. The program had established criteria to identify 

appropriate requirements providers. Specifically, in November 2013, 

the Navy drafted a systems engineering plan that identified roles and 

responsibilities for the entities that were to identify and maintain 

requirements.

• Establish objective criteria for the evaluation and acceptance of 

requirements. GCSS-MC had established criteria for evaluating and 

accepting new requirements. For example, according to the program’s 

draft systems engineering plan, the engineering review team is 

expected to assess new requirements based on impacts to cost, 

schedule, and performance.

• Assess the impact of requirements on existing commitments.

The program had assessed the impact of requirements on existing 

commitments. For example, the program assessed the impact that 

system requirement change requests would have on users prior to 

approving the requests in December 2012. In addition, in November 

2011, the program’s requirements oversight council removed 

requirements from the scope of GCSS-MC Increment 1 in order to 

reduce cost and schedule risk.

• Review project plans, activities, and work products to ensure 

that they are consistent with the defined requirements. GCSS-MC 

had ensured consistency between its requirements and project plans. 

For example, in its November 2013 draft systems engineering plan, 

the program had documented the Navy’s August 2013 decision to 

remove certain capabilities that were originally planned for the second 

system release from the scope of Increment 1.

• Ensure traceability between the requirements and work 

products. The program maintained traceability between its 

requirements and work products. Specifically, for the first system 

release, GCSS-MC had traced each requirement in its requirements 

traceability matrix to its associated higher-level capabilities, as well as 

to its test results. Additionally, program officials reported in December 

Navy’s GCSS-MC Program 

Had Fully Implemented Key 

Requirements Management 

Best Practices
 

Page 38 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

2013 that GCSS-MC was in the process of completing the design and 

test specifications for the program’s recently established 

enhancement release, and the program expected to complete the 

traceability of this release’s requirements by March 2014.

As a result, the GCSS-MC program had established and utilized effective 

requirements management practices, which should increase the 

likelihood that the program delivers a system that meets users’ needs.

TMIP-J had implemented many key requirements management best 

practices; however, consistency between requirements and project plans 

could not be determined because the program’s scope was not clearly 

defined, and the program did not maintain complete traceability between 

its requirements and work products.

• Establish criteria for identifying appropriate requirements 

providers. The program had established criteria for identifying 

requirements providers. For example, the program’s requirements 

management plan identified roles and responsibilities for the entities 

that were to identify and maintain requirements.

• Establish objective criteria for the evaluation and acceptance of 

requirements. The program had established criteria for the 

evaluation and acceptance of requirements. For example, TMIP-J had 

defined a list of documents that were required to be submitted with 

requests for new functional requirements, including an analysis of the 

impact on interfaces and a risk assessment.

• Assess the impact of requirements on existing commitments.

The program had assessed the impact of requirements on existing 

commitments. For example, the program had reviewed the cost of 

adding a requirement, and the risk of dropping a requirement, before 

approving these changes.

• Review project plans, activities, and work products to ensure 

that they are consistent with the defined requirements.

Consistency between requirements and project plans could not be 

determined because the program’s scope was not clearly defined in 

the master program document establishing expected system 

capabilities—referred to as the capabilities baseline document 

(discussed in the following section). Without a clearly defined scope, 

TMIP-J is limited in its ability to develop project plans and work 

products that are consistent with the intended program scope.

DHA’s TMIP-J Program Had 

Implemented Many 

Requirements Management 

Best Practices, but More Work 

Remains to Ensure Traceability 

of Requirements to Work 

Products
 

Page 39 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

• Ensure traceability between the requirements and work 

products. The program did not maintain complete traceability 

between its requirements and work products. Specifically, the 

program had not updated its capabilities baseline document to include 

new program requirements that were added after the baseline was 

established in 2007, such as those for tracking concussions and 

equipment used during medical evacuations. While the program had 

documented these new requirements in its traceability matrix, these 

requirements were not traced to any higher-level capability in the 

capabilities baseline document. Program officials said that they did 

not update the capabilities baseline document because of time 

pressures resulting from an increase in program activity due to the 

escalation of the War on Terror, and to changes in the program office 

structure.

Additionally, the program did not trace certain capabilities that were in 

its capabilities baseline document (such as those related to tracking 

exposure to occupational hazards) to its requirements traceability 

matrix. Officials stated that these capabilities are being met by 

applications that are the responsibility of programs outside TMIP-J; 

however, this information was not recorded in TMIP-J’s requirement 

traceability matrix to show that these capabilities are being addressed 

elsewhere.

Further, the program developed a system capability that did not trace 

to any program requirement. Specifically, although the program 

documented in its traceability matrix a requirement to develop a 

capability to navigate among medical records, and subsequently took 

steps to develop this capability, it was not a program requirement. 

According to TMIP-J officials, the documented requirement and the 

capability that was developed to meet it were both created in error. 

Program officials did not discover this error until the capability that 

was developed to meet the requirement failed system testing, after 

which the program removed it from the system. In the absence of 

updating the capabilities baseline document to reflect program scope 

changes and tracing all capabilities to their associated requirements 

and system components, stakeholders will lack assurance that the 

system will be deployed with all intended functionality to meet users’ 

needs.
 

Page 40 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

According to project management best practices,40

• determining progress against the project plan,

an effective project 

monitoring and control process provides oversight of the program’s 

performance, in order to allow appropriate corrective actions if actual 

performance deviates significantly from planned performance. Key 

activities in tracking the program’s performance include:

• communicating to stakeholders the status of assigned activities,

• documenting significant deviations in performance, and

• taking corrective actions to address issues when necessary.

Additionally, as we have previously reported, the implementation of IV&V 

is a best practice for large and complex system development and 

acquisition programs, and can provide important information to help 

program officials monitor and control their programs.

41

DLA had implemented selected practices for DAI’s project monitoring and 

control, but its ability to monitor and control the program was limited 

because it had not documented significant deviations in performance.

To be effective, 

IV&V activities should be performed by an entity that is independent of 

the management processes and products that are being reviewed.

• Determine progress against the project plan. DAI had determined 

progress against the project plan. For example, the program office 

monitored progress against the program’s integrated master 

schedule. Additionally, officials told us that they tracked costs 

expended over time. Further, although two of DAI’s major contracts 

did not exceed DOD’s threshold for requiring the use of earned value 

 

40CMMI-ACQ, Version 1.3 (November 2010), and PMBOK® Guide, Fifth Edition (2013).

41GAO, Homeland Security: U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology 

Program Planning and Execution Improvements Needed, GAO-09-96 (Washington, D.C.: 

Dec. 12, 2008) and Information Technology: Actions Needed to Fully Establish Program 

Management Capability for VA’s Financial and Logistics Initiative, GAO-10-40 

(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 26, 2009).

The DHA, DLA, and Navy 

Programs Had 

Implemented Many Key 

Project Monitoring and 

Control Practices, but 

Lacked Others

DLA’s DAI Program Had 

Implemented Most of the Key 

Project Monitoring and Control 

Practices, but Had Not 

Documented Significant 

Deviations in Performance
 

Page 41 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

management, DAI began requiring the use of earned value 

management for these contracts in October 2013.42

• Communicate to stakeholders the status of assigned activities.

The program regularly communicated the status of assigned activities 

and work products to stakeholders. For instance, the program held 

weekly and monthly meetings with various stakeholders to review 

DAI’s progress and performance.

• Document significant deviations in performance. While the 

program documented system change requests and problem reports, 

officials told us that they did not track or document significant 

deviations in project planning parameters, such as cost and schedule. 

Officials attributed this to the management of the program being 

treated differently when DAI was a non-MAIS program. Officials told 

us that once DAI became a pre-MAIS program in February 2011, they 

decided to put more structured processes in place. Officials also 

stated that they intended to begin tracking significant deviations once 

the second increment of DAI is baselined as a MAIS program, but as 

of January 2014, DAI officials were uncertain when that would occur. 

However, since the start of the program in 2007, DAI’s planned total 

life-cycle costs increased about 159 percent and its schedule slipped 

by over 5 years. Without tracking and documenting such information, 

stakeholders will be limited in their knowledge of whether the program 

will be able to provide the intended functionality on time and within 

budget.

• Take corrective actions to address issues. The program took 

corrective actions to address system issues identified by users 

through its configuration management process. Specifically, in 

response to issues identified based on system change requests, the 

program implemented changes as part of regular system releases. 

Additionally, in November 2013, it developed an issues log to track 

other program issues and their planned corrective actions.

 

42Earned value management is a project management tool that, when properly used, can 

provide accurate assessments of project progress, produce early warning signs of 

impending schedule delays and cost overruns, and provide unbiased estimates of 

anticipated costs at completion. 
 

Page 42 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

• Use an IV&V agent. The program had assigned IV&V agents to 

assess topics of concern that were identified by the DAI program 

office. For example, in June and November 2012, DAI used an IV&V 

agent to conduct assessments of the system’s ability to exchange 

data with other systems. Additionally, as of September 2013, officials 

stated that an independent contractor was conducting assessments to 

determine DAI’s compliance with standards related to financial 

management and information systems. 

GCSS-MC had implemented nearly all key practices for project 

monitoring and control, but the program had not always taken corrective 

actions to address issues in a timely manner.

• Determine progress against the project plan. The program office 

reported that it consistently monitored the progress of tasks against 

the project plan. Specifically, although GCSS-MC did not measure 

progress using its program-level integrated master schedule—which 

officials stated had been put on hold during the critical change—

program officials reported that they maintained lower-level schedules 

at the product level. Following the critical change review, in December 

2013 the program completed updating the program-level integrated 

master schedule to align with the results of the critical change and 

officials reported that they are now using this schedule to monitor 

progress. Continued use of the product-level schedules and 

implementation of the updated program-level integrated master 

schedule should help ensure that the program is able to assess 

project progress.

• Communicate to stakeholders the status of assigned activities.

The program regularly communicated to stakeholders on the status of 

assigned activities. Specifically, although the program’s oversight 

group did not conduct documented quarterly program reviews 

between September 2012 and June 2013, the program provided 

updates in other meetings that were held on at least a quarterly basis.

• Document significant deviations in performance. The program 

had reported significant deviations from its project planning 

parameters. For instance, in August 2013 the program reported to 

Congress that it had experienced over a 1-year slip in achieving its full 

deployment decision (when compared to the planned date that the 

program submitted to Congress in 2010) due to technical challenges 

with the system.

Navy’s GCSS-MC Program 

Had Implemented Most Key 

Project Monitoring and Control 

Practices, but Did Not Always 

Take Timely Corrective Actions 

to Address Issues
 

Page 43 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

• Take corrective actions to address issues. GCSS-MC did not 

always identify or take timely corrective actions to address program 

issues, although it had consistently reported these issues. For 

example, as early as December 2008, the program was aware of 

technical complexities involved with delivering GCSS-MC capabilities 

to users who lacked internet connectivity. Given this, DOD decided to 

divide the program into two releases and assigned these capabilities 

to the second major release. During the first half of 2012, the program 

continued to report that the technical immaturity of the second system 

release was a problem. Additionally, status reviews from 2012 that 

discussed this issue did not identify corrective actions for it. However, 

it was not until August 2013—approximately 4.5 years after the 

program was aware of these technical complexities—that the program 

decided to discontinue developing the second release and remove it 

from the scope of increment 1. According to program officials’ 

estimates, the program had spent approximately $48.4 million 

developing the second release prior to its removal. The program’s 

August 2013 critical change report noted that the program had 

focused too much attention on technologies that could not meet the 

intended capabilities for the second release. In the absence of 

including timely corrective actions and time frames for implementing 

these actions in the program’s analysis of critical issues identified, and 

monitoring actions taken against those time frames, the program risks 

future delays and cost impacts on the program as it develops and 

implements its enhancement release.

• Use an IV&V agent. The program used an IV&V agent to conduct 

operational testing on the system. For example, in 2011, the Marine 

Corps’ independent test agency evaluated certain capabilities of the 

GCSS-MC system.

Similar to DAI and GCSS-MC, TMIP-J had implemented many best 

practices for project monitoring and control; however, the program had 

not effectively determined its progress against the project plan and had 

not appropriately communicated to stakeholders on the status of the 

program.

• Determine progress against the project plan. The program office 

maintained an integrated master schedule to track progress against 

scheduled activities. However, the program did not use earned value 

management to track contractor performance in meeting planned cost 

targets, even though these data were being collected and certain 

TMIP-J contracts met DOD’s thresholds for its use. Instead, the 

program office tracked the rate of funds spent and funds remaining in 

DHA’s TMIP-J Program Had 

Implemented Many Project 

Monitoring and Control Best 

Practices, but Did Not 

Effectively Monitor Project 

Progress nor Communicate to 

Stakeholders on Program 

Status
 

Page 44 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

each contract’s performance period, which did not provide insight into 

potential cost overruns, as the use of earned value data would have 

provided. TMIP-J officials said that the program did not use earned 

value because the program office staff’s knowledge on how to 

conduct earned value analyses was immature. For example, TMIP-J 

officials reported that, as of September 2013, only three of nine senior 

program officials had taken required training in the use of earned 

value management. In the absence of earned value management and 

staff properly trained to use it, the program will not have the valuable 

insights into project performance that earned value management

provides, and TMIP-J will be limited in its ability to effectively manage 

the program.

Further, the program had not consistently documented the 

applications that the program must interface with and, as such, could 

not effectively monitor progress related to these items. In particular, 

the program did not have an authoritative listing of all applications with 

which TMIP-J must interface and key program documents cited 

different numbers and names of such interfaces. Without effectively 

determining progress against project plans using earned value 

management, and having an authoritative listing of all interfaces 

currently included in the program, program officials will not have a 

complete understanding of the status and scope of the program, thus 

hindering their ability to fully monitor and control it.

• Communicate to stakeholders the status of assigned activities.

The program communicated the status of assigned activities to 

stakeholders during regular progress reviews; however, key 

information was lacking in those reviews. Specifically, although the 

program conducted quarterly progress reviews, it did not convey key 

program scope information regarding the number of current users and 

planned sites, which officials reported will vary based on the pace of 

operations. For example, officials estimated that the number of users 

at full deployment will range from 21,000 to 62,000 depending on 

operations, such as combat troop withdrawal from the Middle East. 

Officials said that they have not reported this information to 

stakeholders because the system must be maintained regardless of 

the number of users, and because it is the services’ responsibility to 

determine user numbers. However, the TMIP-J program is 

responsible for the operations and maintenance of the system 

software and knowing the number of users and sites would help the 

program plan for system maintenance. TMIP-J officials stated in 

December 2013 that they intended to determine the number of users 
 

Page 45 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

and sites and report this information to DOD as part of a report 

required before the program’s full deployment decision milestone, 

which occurred in late December 2013. Although this report included 

information on types of units and sites who would use the system 

(e.g., certain medical support units), it did not identify the total number 

of users or sites. As such, TMIP-J was limited in its ability to 

accurately plan for potential system maintenance requests. In the 

absence of communicating to stakeholders on the status of assigned 

activities, including key program scope information, stakeholders will 

not be informed of changes to scope and will be unable to 

appropriately plan for system maintenance.

• Document significant deviations in performance. The program 

had reported significant deviations from its project planning 

parameters. For instance, in April 2009, the program reported to 

Congress a critical change in its cost and schedule estimates.

• Take corrective actions to address issues. TMIP-J had taken 

corrective actions to address issues. For example, the program’s April 

2009 critical change report identified corrective actions that needed to 

be taken to improve program management. In 2012, DOD reported 

that these corrective actions had been substantially implemented.

• Use an IV&V agent. TMIP-J used an IV&V agent to verify and 

validate testing. Specifically, an IV&V agent conducted system 

integration testing on TMIP-J in 2012.

Of the 14 selected MAIS programs that had cost, schedule, and/or 

system performance data available, 12 had experienced cost increases, 

schedule slippages, and/or system performance problems, and 5 

experienced all three conditions. As such, these 12 programs were either 

costing more than planned, taking longer than planned to deliver, and/or 

the systems had not performed as intended.

While a number of best practices for risk management, requirements 

management, and project monitoring and control have been implemented 

for DAI, GCSS-MC, and TMIP-J, all three programs lacked key practices 

essential to effectively acquiring their systems. To its credit, the DAI 

program had recently taken steps to improve its risk management and IT 

acquisition practices. However, the program’s lack of a complete and upto-date log of risks with associated mitigation plans, as well as its 

inaccurate evaluation and categorization of its risks, reduce assurances 

Conclusions
 

Page 46 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

that the program has appropriately mitigated all program risks. 

Additionally, the program has been limited in its ability to monitor project 

performance, and will continue to do so until program officials begin 

tracking significant cost and schedule deviations. In light of this, the 

program is at risk of not carrying out a program that is on cost and 

schedule, and performs as expected.

Regarding GCSS-MC, while the program recently updated its risks and 

mitigation plans and had implemented other key risk and requirements 

management practices, the program’s inability to take timely corrective 

actions to address issues may jeopardize its chances of meeting its 

planned cost and schedule targets and deploying the system with all 

intended functionality. Additionally, to TMIP-J’s credit, the program had 

fully implemented risk management best practices; however, the

program’s lack of a capabilities baseline document that reflects program 

scope changes and appropriately traces its capabilities to associated 

requirements and system components reduces assurances that the 

system will include all intended functionality for meeting users’ needs. 

Further, by TMIP-J opting not to use earned value management to assess 

contractor performance, or training staff to analyze earned value data and 

trends, the program limited its ability to identify impending schedule 

delays and cost overruns, thus hindering its ability to effectively gauge 

program status. Moreover, TMIP-J’s lack of an authoritative listing of all 

interfaces currently included in the scope of the program and the 

program’s decision to not communicate key status information to 

stakeholders on the number of system users and sites limits the 

program’s ability to fully monitor and control the program. Therefore, the 

program is at risk of developing a system that does not meet all users’ 

needs, and may not meet cost and schedule targets.

To better ensure that DAI implements effective risk management and IT 

acquisition best practices, we are recommending that the Secretary of 

Defense direct the Director of the Defense Logistics Agency to direct the 

DAI program office to take the following two actions:

• Establish a comprehensive risk log that includes all up-to-date risks 

with evaluations and categorizations that comply with DLA’s defined 

parameters; and associated mitigation plans,

• Identify and document significant cost and schedule deviations from 

the program’s plan.

Recommendations for 

Executive Action
 

Page 47 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

To help ensure that GCSS-MC implements effective project monitoring 

and control best practices, we are recommending that the Secretary of 

Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy to direct the GCSS-MC program 

office to include corrective actions and time frames in future analyses of 

critical issues and monitor actions taken against those time frames.

To improve the TMIP-J program’s implementation of IT acquisition best 

practices, we are recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the 

Director of the Defense Health Agency to direct the TMIP-J program 

office take the following five actions:

• update the program’s capabilities baseline to reflect program scope 

changes,

• trace all capabilities to their associated requirements in the 

requirements traceability matrix,

• implement earned value management in accordance with DOD’s 

policy and train management staff with project oversight 

responsibilities on the proper use of earned value management,

• develop an authoritative listing of all interfaces currently included in 

the scope of the program, and

• report to stakeholders the number of current and planned system 

users and sites and provide updates as needed.

We received written comments on a draft of this report from DOD’s 

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Acquisition). The comments are reprinted 

in appendix III. 

In its comments, the department concurred with six of our eight 

recommendations and partially concurred with the other two. Specifically, 

the department concurred with our recommendations that the DAI 

program establish a comprehensive risk log and associated mitigation 

plans, and identify and document significant cost and schedule 

deviations; the GCSS-MC program include corrective actions and time 

frames in future analyses of critical issues and monitor those actions; and 

the TMIP-J program implement earned value management, develop an 

authoritative listing of all interfaces currently included in the scope of the 

program, and report to stakeholders the number of current and planned 

system users and sites.

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
 

Page 48 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

The department partially concurred with our recommendation to update 

the TMIP-J program’s capabilities baseline to reflect program scope 

changes. In this regard, the department stated that the TMIP-J program 

will ensure that all future program capabilities are traced to their 

associated requirements in the appropriate requirements traceability 

matrices and the program office will update the program’s capabilities 

baseline to reflect program scope changes. However, DOD also stated 

that there is no benefit in updating the requirements documentation for 

capabilities that have already been built, tested, and deployed. We 

disagree with that assertion. Without an updated baseline that reflects all 

program capabilities, key agency governing boards and congressional 

committees will not have a clear picture of what capabilities were 

originally planned to be delivered, what capabilities were delivered, and 

whether there are any gaps between what was planned and delivered.

The department also stated that the December 2011 acquisition strategy 

for TMIP-J addressed the change in current program scope and is 

mapped to the program’s 2007 capabilities baseline document. However, 

that document is not sufficient in that it did not clearly identify the scope 

change. Specifically, while the acquisition strategy identified certain 

capabilities that were not included in the program’s capabilities baseline 

document, it did not distinguish these as new capabilities, nor were these 

new capabilities written at the same level of detail as those in the 

capabilities baseline document. As such, the total planned scope of the 

program was unclear. Therefore, we maintain that additional work is 

needed to ensure changes in scope have been adequately incorporated 

and documented. Without clearly identifying and documenting all program 

capabilities and changes to those capabilities, stakeholders will lack 

assurance that the system will be deployed with all intended functionality 

to meet users’ needs.

The department partially concurred with our recommendation to trace all 

capabilities to their associated requirements in the requirements 

traceability matrix. DOD stated that the TMIP-J program will ensure that 

all future program capabilities are traced to their associated requirements 

in the appropriate requirements traceability matrices. It also reiterated its 

assertion that there is no benefit in updating the requirements 

documentation for capabilities that have already been built, tested, and 

deployed. While TMIP-J has committed to tracking all future program 

capabilities, it had not documented in its requirements traceability matrix 

that capabilities that were in its baseline document were being addressed 

by programs outside of TMIP-J. We maintain that it is important to trace 
 

Page 49 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

these capabilities. In the absence of such documentation, it is not clear 

how all planned capabilities will be addressed. 

In addition, we received technical comments from DOD’s Assistant 

Secretary of Defense (Acquisition), which we have incorporated, as 

appropriate.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 

committees; the Secretary of Defense; and other interested parties. This 

report also is available at no charge on the GAO website at 

http://www.gao.gov.

Should you or your staffs have any questions on information discussed in 

this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4456 or ChaC@gao.gov. 

Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public 

Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made 

major contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV.

Carol R. Cha

Director

Information Technology Acquisition Management Issues
 

Page 50 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

List of Committees

The Honorable Carl Levin

Chairman

The Honorable James M. Inhofe

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Thomas R. Carper

Chairman

The Honorable Tom Coburn

Ranking Member

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

United States Senate

The Honorable Richard J. Durbin

Chairman

The Honorable Thad Cochran

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Howard P. “Buck” McKeon

Chairman

The Honorable Adam Smith

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

The Honorable Darrell E. Issa

Chairman

The Honorable Elijah Cummings

Ranking Member

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

House of Representatives
 

Page 51 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

The Honorable Rodney Frelinghuysen

Chairman

The Honorable Pete Visclosky

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 52 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 mandated 

that we select and assess Department of Defense (DOD) major 

automated information system (MAIS) programs annually through March 

2018.1

To address the first objective, we established the following criteria for 

selecting a sample of the 42 DOD MAIS programs that were included in 

DOD’s April 2012 MAIS oversight list:

This report is the second in our series of annual assessments. Our 

objectives were to (1) describe the extent to which selected MAIS 

programs have changed their planned cost and schedule estimates and 

met performance targets, (2) assess selected MAIS programs’ actions to 

manage risks, and (3) assess the extent to which selected MAIS 

programs used key information technology (IT) acquisition best practices.

• an acquisition program baseline (APB) had been established,

• the program was not fully implemented or recently approved for 

termination,

• the program had not recently started,

• the program was not included in the first MAIS annual review,2

• at least one enterprise resource planning system was included in our 

review,3

 

1

Pub. L. No. 112-81 § 1078 (Dec. 31, 2011). 

and

2

The 14 MAIS programs included in our first review were: Air Force’s Defense Enterprise 

Accounting and Management System Increment 1, Expeditionary Combat Support System 

Increment 1, Financial Information Resource System, Information Transport Services 

Increment 1, and Mission Planning Systems Increment 4; Army’s Global Combat Support 

System – Army; Global Command and Control System – Army Block 4; and Tactical 

Mission Command; Defense Information Systems Agency’s Global Combat Support 

System – Joint Increment 7 and Teleport Generation 3; and Navy’s Common Aviation 

Command and Control System Increment 1, Consolidated Afloat Networks and Enterprise 

Services, Distributed Common Ground System – Navy Increment 1, and Navy Enterprise 

Resource Planning. GAO, Major Automated Information Systems: Selected Defense 

Programs Need to Implement Key Acquisition Practices, GAO-13-311 (Washington, D.C.: 

Mar 28, 2013).

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 53 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

• the programs represented a variety of DOD components.

Relying on these criteria, we made an initial selection of nine programs. 

Next, we selected five additional programs that had been without APBs 

for the longest periods of time.4

The 15 selected programs were:

The criteria we used to select the final 

program were that, of the remaining MAIS programs, it (1) had not 

established an APB for the longest period of time, (2) was an enterprise 

resource planning system, and (3) had the largest planned life-cycle 

costs. 

• the Air Force’s

• Air and Space Operations Center-Weapon System Increment 

10.2;

• Air Force Integrated Personnel and Pay System;

• Base Information Transport Infrastructure Wireless;

• Integrated Strategic Planning and Analysis Network Increment 2; 

and

• Joint Space Operations Center Mission System Increment 1.

• The Army’s

• Distributed Common Ground System-Army Increment 1,

• Integrated Personnel and Pay System-Army Increment 1, and

• Joint Personnel Identification version 2.

• The Defense Health Agency’s

 

3

An enterprise resource planning system is an automated system using commercial offthe-shelf software consisting of multiple, integrated functional modules that perform a 

variety of business-related tasks, such as general ledger accounting, payroll, and supply 

chain management. 

4

During our review, one of these programs—Air Force’s Air and Space Operations CenterWeapon System Increment 10.2—established an APB.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 54 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

• Integrated Electronic Health Record Increment 1 and

• Theater Medical Information Program-Joint (TMIP-J) Increment 2.

• The Defense Logistics Agency’s

• Defense Agencies Initiative (DAI) and

• Eprocurement.

• The Navy’s

• Global Combat Support System-Marine Corps (GCSS-MC) 

Increment 1,

• Global Command and Control System – Maritime Increment 2, 

and

• Next Generation Enterprise Network Increment 1.

To address the first objective, we analyzed and compared each selected 

program’s first APB objective cost estimate (in then-year dollars) to the 

latest life-cycle objective estimate to determine the extent to which 

planned program costs had changed.5

 

5

DOD guidance refers to a program’s best cost and schedule estimates as objective 

estimates.

For the programs that had not 

established APB estimates, we compared these programs’ initial life-cycle 

objective cost estimates to their latest objective cost estimates (in thenyear dollars). Similarly, to determine the extent to which these programs 

had changed their planned schedule estimates, we compared each 

program’s first APB schedule (or initial schedule, for the programs that 

had not established APBs) to the latest schedule. We did not compare the 

latest cost or schedule estimates to subsequent APBs established after 

the first APB. We relied on the thresholds established by statute to 

describe the amount of any deviation (i.e., significant or critical) that each 

program’s latest life-cycle cost and schedule estimates experienced from 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 55 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

the first APB.6 To develop the schedule graphics included in each 

program profile in appendix II, we used either the business capability lifecycle acquisition model or the defense acquisition management system 

framework that was established in December 2008 (which was the most 

up-to-date framework at the time of our review), depending on which 

framework was used by the program.7

To determine whether the selected programs met their performance 

targets, we compared program and system performance targets against 

actual performance data in test reports. We reviewed the results of 

operational assessments and program evaluations conducted on the 

systems. We also reviewed additional information on each program’s 

cost, schedule, and performance, including program documentation, such 

as DOD’s MAIS annual and quarterly reports; APBs; monthly status 

briefings; system test reports; and our prior reports. We also interviewed 

program officials from each of the selected MAIS programs to obtain 

additional information on cost, schedule, and performance. System 

performance targets were rated as “met” when (1) system tests were 

passed with no deficiencies or limitations, (2) the program met all of its 

key performance parameters, or (3) a program had addressed all 

deficiencies or limitations that were identified during system tests. System 

performance was rated as “not fully met” when a program either (1) did 

not fully pass system testing and was still in the process of addressing the 

deficiencies or limitations identified during system testing; or (2) did not 

 

6

10 U.S.C. § 2445c(c), (d). With regard to schedule and cost deviations, a program is 

considered to have undergone a “significant” change when it has (1) experienced a 

schedule change that will cause a delay of more than 6 months but less than a year; (2) 

estimated its life-cycle costs to have increased by at least 15 percent, but less than 25 

percent, over the original estimate; or (3) experienced a significant, adverse change in the 

expected performance of the system. A program is considered to have undergone a 

“critical” change when it has (1) experienced a schedule change that will cause a delay of 

1 year or more; (2) estimated its life-cycle costs to have increased by 25 percent or more 

over the original estimate; (3) failed to achieve a full deployment decision within 5 years 

after the milestone A decision for the program or, if there was no milestone A decision, the 

date when the preferred alternative is selected for the program; or (4) experienced a 

change in the expected performance of the system or major IT investment to be acquired 

under the program that will undermine the ability of the system to perform the functions 

anticipated.

7

At the end of our review, DOD issued an interim policy in November 2013 that updated 

the defense acquisition management system framework, and incorporated guidance from 

and replaced the business capability life-cycle acquisition model. This updated framework 

was not used during this review.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 56 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

pass system testing and subsequently removed the problematic 

functionality from the system in order to pass subsequent system tests, 

instead of fixing the problematic functionality and keeping it in the planned 

release of the system. We provided our assessments to the program 

management offices of each selected program for comment. We 

aggregated and summarized the results of these analyses across the 

programs, as well as developed individual profiles for each program (see 

app. II).

To address the second and third objectives, we selected 3 of the 15 

programs included in the first objective for an in-depth review. 

Specifically, we selected the 2 programs that had established APBs and 

had the highest planned total life-cycle costs—GCSS-MC and TMIP-J—

and 1 program that had been without a baseline for the longest period of 

time—DAI.

To address the second objective, we reviewed risk management 

documentation from the three selected programs and compared it to key 

risk management best practices, including the Software Engineering 

Institute’s Capability Maturity Model® Integration for Acquisition (CMMIACQ) and Project Management Institute’s Guide to the Project 

Management Body of Knowledge (PMBOK®).8

• identifying risks, threats, and vulnerabilities that could negatively 

affect work efforts;

These key practices 

included:

• evaluating and categorizing each identified risk using defined risk 

categories and parameters, such as likelihood and consequence, and 

determining each risk’s relative priority;

• developing risk mitigation plans for selected risks to proactively 

reduce the potential impact of risk occurrence; and

• monitoring the status of each risk periodically and implement the risk 

mitigation plan, as appropriate.

 

8

Software Engineering Institute, Capability Maturity Model® Integration for Acquisition 

(CMMI-ACQ), Version 1.3 (November 2010); Project Management Institute, A Guide to 

the Project Management Body of Knowledge (PMBOK® Guide), Fifth Edition, (Newton 

Square, Pa: 2013). “PMBOK” is a trademark of the Project Management Institute, Inc.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 57 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

Specifically, we analyzed program risk documentation, including monthly 

risk logs and reports, risk-level assignments, risk management plans, risk 

mitigation plans, and risk board meeting minutes. Additionally, we 

interviewed program officials to obtain additional information about their 

risks and risk management practices.

To address the third objective, we analyzed each selected program’s IT 

acquisition documentation and compared it to certain key requirements 

management and project monitoring and control best practices—including 

CMMI-ACQ and PMBOK® practices, and independent verification and 

validation practices—to determine the extent to which the programs were 

implementing these practices.9

• establish criteria for identifying appropriate requirements providers;

In particular, the key requirements 

management best practices were:

• establish objective criteria for the evaluation and acceptance of 

requirements;

• assess the impact of requirements on existing commitments;

• review project plans, activities, and work products to ensure that they 

are consistent with the defined requirements; and

• ensure traceability between the requirements and work products.

Additionally, the key project monitoring and control best practices were:

• determine progress against the project plan,

• communicate to stakeholders the status of assigned activities,

• document significant deviations in performance,

• take corrective actions to address issues when necessary, and

• utilize an independent verification and validation agent.

 

9

CMMI-ACQ, PMBOK®, and GAO, Information Technology: DHS Needs to Improve Its 

Independent Acquisition Reviews, GAO-11-581 (Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2011). 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 58 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

Specifically, we analyzed monthly program management review briefings, 

acquisition strategies, concepts of operations, milestone and baseline 

review documentation, independent verification and validation reports, 

significant and critical change documentation, system requirements 

documentation, requirements management plans, requirements change 

requests, and system test and defect reports. Further, we interviewed 

program officials to obtain additional information on each program’s 

management processes in these key IT acquisition areas. An internal 

subject matter expert validated our assessments on the extent to which 

the three selected programs implemented key requirements management 

and project monitoring and control best practices.

To assess the reliability of the data that we used to support the findings in 

this report, we reviewed relevant program documentation to substantiate 

evidence obtained through interviews with agency officials. We 

determined that the data used in this report were sufficiently reliable, with 

the exception of selected risk and requirements data provided by DLA’s 

DAI program, and selected requirements data provided by DHA’s TMIP-J 

Increment 2 program. We discuss limitations with these data in the report. 

We have also made appropriate attribution indicating the sources of the 

data.

We conducted this performance audit from April 2013 to March 2014 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Appendix II: Profiles of Selected DOD MAIS 

Programs

Page 59 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

This section contains profiles of the 15 selected MAIS programs. Each 

profile presents data on the program’s purpose and status, its latest cost 

and schedule estimates compared to the first APB (where established) or 

initial estimates (where an APB had not yet been established), as well as 

system performance data, where available.1

The first page of each two-page profile contains a description of the 

program’s purpose and a figure that provides a comparison of the 

program’s first APB (where established) or initial schedule to the 

program’s latest schedule. The years depicted on the figure represent 

calendar years and the milestones represent the program’s best 

estimates of dates for those milestones. The first page also provides (1) 

essential program details, such as the name of the prime contractor, as 

well as the total number of active contractors—which includes the prime 

contractor, as well as any other contractors (and in some cases 

subcontractors) supporting the program; (2) program costs (in then-year 

dollars), comparing the program’s latest life-cycle cost estimate 

(separated into acquisition and operations and maintenance costs) to its 

first APB (where established) or initial estimate (subsequent APBs that 

may have been established are not identified);2

The second page of each two-page profile provides detailed information 

on each program’s status, costs, schedule, and performance. In the 

status section, we discuss recent and upcoming milestones and events 

for each program. In the cost section, we identify the extent to which the 

program’s life-cycle cost estimate has changed from its first APB (where 

(3) deployment details, 

such as the number of expected users and locations to which the system 

will be deployed; and (4) a summary of the cost, schedule, and 

performance of each program, which is further discussed on the second 

page of the profile. The arrows included in the summary box on the first 

page of each 2-page profile and in the headings on the second page 

represent whether a program’s cost estimate had increased () or 

decreased (), and whether the program’s schedule estimate had slipped 

() or been accelerated to meet milestones earlier than planned ().

 

1

A program’s first APB contains the original life-cycle cost estimate, schedule estimate, 

and performance parameters that were approved for that program by the milestone 

decision authority. The first APB is established after the program has assessed the 

viability of various technologies and refined user requirements to identify the most 

appropriate technology solution that demonstrates that it can meet users’ needs. 

2

An estimate in then-year dollars includes the effects of economic inflation.

Appendix II: Profiles of Selected DOD MAIS 

Programs
Appendix II: Profiles of Selected DOD MAIS 

Programs

Page 60 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

established) or initial estimate, as well as the causes for any changes 

identified. In the schedule section, we discuss the extent to which the 

program’s schedule has changed from its first APB (where established) or 

initial estimate, and the causes for any schedule changes identified. 

Finally, in the performance section, we identify the extent to which each 

program has met its established measures, as well as discuss the results 

of system performance tests. These performance ratings represent a 

point-in-time assessment as reported by the program. System 

performance targets were rated as “met” when: (1) system tests were 

passed with no deficiencies or limitations, (2) the program fully met all of 

its key performance parameters, or (3) a program had addressed all 

deficiencies or limitations that were identified during system tests. System 

performance was rated as “not fully met” when a program either (1) did 

not fully pass system testing and was still in the process of addressing the 

deficiencies or limitations identified during system testing; or (2) did not 

pass system testing and subsequently removed the problematic 

functionality from the system in order to pass subsequent system tests, 

instead of fixing the problematic functionality and keeping it in the planned 

release of the system.
Appendix II: Profiles of Selected DOD MAIS Programs

Page 61 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

Air and Space Operations Center-Weapon System (AOC-WS) Increment 10.2

The Air Force’s AOC-WS Increment 10.2 program is intended to enable personnel at select air and space 

operations centers to plan, execute, and assess theaterwide air and space operations. Specifically, it is intended 

to replace the currently fielded AOC 10.1 system and provide additional capabilities, such as dynamic planning 

and execution; data management; information assurance; predictive battlespace awareness; and airspace 

management.

Program Essentials (as of December 2013)

DOD component: Department of the Air Force

Program owner: Air Combat Command

Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman

Total number of contractors: 13

Fiscal year 2014 funding requested: $62.9 million

Program Costs (then-year dollars in millions)

First APB

(10/2013)

Latest Estimate

(12/2013)

Life-cycle cost estimate $5,585.2 $5,585.2

Acquisition 462.7 462.7

Operations and 

maintenance 

____________

5,122.5 5,122.5

Amount spent to date

(as of October 2013) 

$176.3

System Deployment Details (as of December 2013)

Current number of total expected users: 0 of 2,449

Current number of total expected locations: sensitive 

dataa

Legacy systems to be replaced: 10

Annual cost of legacy systems: $217.9 million

Number of expected system interfaces: 56

Cost, Schedule, and Performance Summary

» No change in cost estimate

» No change in schedule estimate

» Unavailable system performance data

Source: Data reported by DOD officials. 

a

This is a weapons system; as such, deployment details are considered sensitive by DOD.
Appendix II: Profiles of Selected DOD MAIS Programs

Page 62 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

AOC-WS Increment 10.2

Program Status

In August 2008, a reconciled cost estimate showed that the original program scope was unaffordable. As a 

result, the Air Combat Command directed the program to reduce the scope of AOC-WS Increment 10.2. In 

October 2012, the program began piloting limited capabilities of the system in test environments. In December 

2012, the program declared a critical change as required by law because it had not achieved a full deployment 

decision within 5 years from the time the program selected the technology to be used.1

No Change in Cost Estimate

In October 2013, the Air 

Force provided the critical change report to Congress. This report stated that the key factors causing the critical 

change were (1) a need to reduce the scope of the originally envisioned program, as previously mentioned; (2) 

changes in defense acquisition policies; and (3) a need to accomplish additional risk reduction work prior to 

moving into the development phase of the program. As a result, the scope of the program was reduced and the 

program reached milestone B (authorizes a program to begin system development) in October 2013.

As of December 2013, the program had not experienced a change in its cost estimate since its first APB, which 

was recently established in October 2013. However, the program spent approximately $176 million and took 6 

years (when compared to the program’s 2007 initiation date) before establishing its first APB and developing a 

robust estimate for how much AOC-WS Increment 10.2 was expected to ultimately cost.

No Change in Schedule Estimate

AOC-WS Increment 10.2 had not experienced a schedule change since establishing its first APB, but it 

experienced a critical 5-year delay in establishing this APB (when compared against an initial 2008 estimate). 

Specifically, the program had planned to reach milestone B (at which point an APB would be established) in July 

2008, but the first APB was not established until the program reached milestone B in October 2013. This delay 

was due, in part, to the re-planning of the program when it was determined that the original scope was 

unaffordable. Additionally, in June 2010, the milestone decision authority directed the program to delay 

milestone B (authorizes a program to begin system development) until after (1) a modernization contract was 

awarded; (2) the modernization contractor performed and completed certain activities, including a design review; 

and (3) the program office revised its acquisition strategy.

Unavailable System Performance Data

As previously mentioned, the program was in the early stages of development. Thus, system performance data 

were not available.

 

1

10 U.S.C. § 2445c(d).
Appendix II: Profiles of Selected DOD MAIS Programs

Page 63 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

Air Force Integrated Personnel and Pay System (AFIPPS)1

AFIPPS is intended to provide a comprehensive, web-based solution to integrate existing personnel and pay 

processes from 30 of the Air Force’s existing systems into one self-service system that can be accessed 

worldwide. Further, it is intended to support the Air Force’s Regular, Reserve, and Air National Guard 

components. AFIPPS is to be implemented in five releases. The first four releases are to include the design, 

development, testing, and deployment of leave request management and personnel and pay capabilities, and 

the fifth release is to provide enhancements to the system.

1

DOD originally planned to develop the Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System, which was to provide a joint, integrated, standardized 

personnel and pay system for all military personnel departmentwide. Following the cancellation of that program, each military service is now responsible 

for developing its own integrated personnel and pay system—including AFIPPS.

Program Essentials (as of December 2013)

DOD component: Department of the Air Force

Program owner: Program Executive Office and Service 

Acquisition Executive, Air Force

Prime contractor: IBM 

Total number of contractors: 9 

Fiscal year 2014 funding requested: $90.1 million

Program Costs (then-year dollars in millions)

Initial 

Estimate

(07/2010) 

Latest 

Estimate

(12/2013)

Life-cycle cost estimate $1,715.4 $1,857.8

Acquisition 769.6 824.6

Operations and 

maintenance 

____________

945.8 1,033.2

Amount spent to date

(as of November 2013)

$71.8

System Deployment Details (as of December 2013)

Current number of total expected users: 0 of ~507,000

Current number of total expected locations: not 

applicablea

Legacy systems to be replaced: 22b

Annual cost of legacy systems: $120 millionb

Number of expected system interfaces: 148

Cost, Schedule, and Performance Summary

» Change in cost estimate () 

» Change in schedule estimate () 

» Unavailable system performance data

Source: Data reported by DOD officials.

a

AFIPPS is a web-based system that is available worldwide.

b

In addition to fully replacing 22 systems, AFIPPS is intended to provide a subset of capabilities from 8 additional legacy systems. According to program 

officials, the $120 million annual cost of the legacy systems includes the costs of the 22 systems to be fully replaced, as well as the costs for the subset of 

capabilities that will be replaced from the 8 additional systems.
Appendix II: Profiles of Selected DOD MAIS Programs

Page 64 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

AFIPPS

Program Status

In March 2011, the Air Force completed an analysis of alternative approaches for developing the AFIPPS 

system. Based on the results of that analysis, in June 2011, DOD directed the Air Force to release a request for 

proposals that would allow potential contractors to choose between two approaches because neither was 

significantly better than the other. After reviewing contractor responses, in August 2013, the program selected its 

preferred development approach. Additionally, it awarded a contract for the analysis and decomposition of the 

Air Force’s business processes and requirements for the first four releases of the AFIPPS system. The contract 

award was protested in September 2013 and the protest was dismissed in December 2013. AFIPPS officials 

reported in December 2013 that the program expected to begin developing the capabilities for the first release 

(leave request management) in May 2014 and deploying these capabilities in June 2015.

Change in Cost Estimate () 

The program’s cost estimate increased by about 8 percent. Specifically, while the program had not established 

an APB as of December 2013, the program’s latest pre-APB life-cycle cost estimate was about $1.86 billion—an 

approximately 8 percent increase from the program’s initial estimate of $1.72 billion. Program officials reported 

that the increases in costs were primarily due to (1) an increase in contractor staff within the program office, (2) 

DOD’s direction to the program to switch from using a development environment hosted at a contractor site to 

one hosted by DOD’s Defense Information Systems Agency, and (3) the addition of new requirements, including 

supportability requirements for the network and training environment.

Change in Schedule Estimate () 

The program experienced about a 1.5-year schedule slip in the planned date for milestone B (authorizes a 

program to begin system development) when compared to its initial schedule—from the first quarter of fiscal 

year 2013 to June 2014. Program officials reported that the program decided to delay milestone B until after the 

development contract was awarded because, among other things, the work to be performed under the contract 

is expected to better define the program and provide additional details that can be used when developing the 

program’s first APB.

Unavailable System Performance Data

As of December 2013, the program did not expect to deploy any functionality until June 2015. As such, system 

performance data were not available.
Appendix II: Profiles of Selected DOD MAIS Programs

Page 65 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

Base Information Transport Infrastructure Wireless (BITI Wireless)

The Air Force’s BITI Wireless program provides a secure wireless infrastructure, which includes features such 

as intrusion detection, monitoring, and central administration that incorporates high-availability and multitiered 

network administration for wireless entry into local area networks at 97 Air Force bases worldwide. Prior to 

becoming a standalone MAIS program, the wireless infrastructure for 30 of the 97 bases had been provided by 

the Combat Information Transport System program, but in April 2009, this program was restructured into two 

smaller programs— BITI (formerly known as Information Transport Services) and Air Force Intranet.1 

1

The Combat Information Transport System program portfolio was intended to provide the information infrastructure, network management, and network 

defense capabilities to meet the multimedia information transport needs of Air Force bases.

Program Essentials (as of December 2013)

DOD component: Department of the Air Force

Program owner: Commander, Air Force Space Command

Prime contractors: General Dynamics; NCI, Inc.; and Telos 

Corporationa

Total number of contractors: 3 

Fiscal year 2014 funding requested: $15.2 million

Program Costs (then-year dollars in millions)

First APB

(04/2010)

Latest Estimate

(12/2013)

Life-cycle cost estimate $499.5 $541.4

Acquisition 348.9 202.9

Operations and 

maintenance 

____________

150.6 338.5

Amount spent to date

(as of October 2013)

$202.9

System Deployment Details (as of December 2013)

Current number of total expected users: ~500,000 of 

~500,000

Current number of total expected locations: 97 of 97

Legacy systems replaced: not applicableb

Annual cost of legacy systems: not applicableb

Number of system interfaces: not applicableb

Cost, Schedule, and Performance Summary

» Change in cost estimate () 

» Change in schedule estimate () 

» Did not fully meet system performance targets

Source: Data reported by DOD officials.

a

For each Air Force base, one of these contractors was selected to complete the wireless infrastructure upgrade at that location. b

This was a hardware replacement effort.
Appendix II: Profiles of Selected DOD MAIS Programs

Page 66 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

BITI Wireless

Program Status

In June 2009, funds were first obligated by the BITI Wireless program. In March 2013, the Air Force completed 

its deployment of BITI Wireless at all 97 locations, and the program is currently in an operations and 

maintenance status. In March 2013, the program began replacing wireless equipment that is no longer 

supported, or able to receive enhanced encryption capabilities and operating system updates to correct software 

problems. As of December 2013, the program was working to address deficiencies identified during a 2012 

operational evaluation (see performance discussion below).

Change in Cost Estimate () 

As of December 2013, the life-cycle cost estimate for BITI Wireless was about $541.4 million, which represented 

a cost increase of approximately 8 percent from the program’s first APB cost estimate of about $499.5 million. 

Program officials reported that the increase in costs was due to the need to maintain the program’s wireless 

infrastructure longer than originally planned, which increased operations and maintenance costs by about 

$187.9 million. Specifically, program officials reported that BITI Wireless extended its hardware refresh cycle 

from 6 years to 10 years when the program that was planned to succeed BITI Wireless was not funded. While 

the program’s life-cycle cost estimate increased overall, BITI Wireless reduced its acquisition costs by $146 

million, in comparison to its first APB estimate. Program officials attributed these savings to the following actions: 

(1) the program office provided more detailed information in its request for contract proposals, which enabled 

contractors to more accurately assess equipment needs, crew sizes, and travel costs prior to contract award; 

and (2) re-competing the wireless infrastructure upgrade contracts for certain locations.

Change in Schedule Estimate () 

BITI Wireless experienced a 6-month slippage in its full deployment date compared to its first APB schedule—

from September 2012 to March 2013. Program officials attributed this delay to, among other things, problems 

and events that occurred at certain Air Force bases, such as schedule issues due to an increase in operational 

activity, and technical and power issues. For example, program officials reported that the increase in mission 

maintenance and flight operations impeded a base’s ability to provide access and escort support to the BITI 

Wireless contractor installation teams.

Did Not Fully Meet System Performance Targets

In September 2012, an operational evaluation identified 14 deficiencies among three of the six critical 

operational areas that were evaluated, including network command and control. Nevertheless, the testing team 

recommended that the program continue deploying BITI Wireless to the remaining bases. In March 2013, 9 of 

the deficiencies remained open; however, the program was deemed fully deployed because all of the critical 

operational areas were either partially or fully effective and suitable. As of August 2013, program officials 

reported that these 9 deficiencies had not yet been addressed, but as of December 2013, expected them to be 

addressed by May 2014.
Appendix II: Profiles of Selected DOD MAIS Programs

Page 67 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

Defense Agencies Initiative (DAI)

The DAI system is intended to modernize the financial management processes of 211 defense agencies and 

components by streamlining financial management capabilities and transforming the budget, finance, and 

accounting operations. When DAI is fully implemented, it is expected to have the capability to control and 

account for all appropriated working capital and revolving funds at each of the 21 agencies and components. 

DAI is also intended to be a key component of the DOD plan for achieving fully auditable financial statements by 

September 30, 2017, as required by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010. DAI is being 

deployed in two increments, with the first increment having deployed five releases.

1

The agencies include the Defense Technical Information Center, Missile Defense Agency, Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences, Defense 

Health Agency, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Defense Technology Security Administration, Defense Media Activity, Defense Security Service, 

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Office of Economic Adjustment, Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office, Defense Commissary 

Agency, DOD Education Activity, Defense Contract Management Agency, Defense Contract Audit Agency, Defense Acquisition University, Defense 

Security Cooperation Agency, Defense Human Resources Agency, DOD Inspector General, Defense Information Systems Agency - General Fund, and 

Defense Microelectronics Activity.

a

In February 2011, the program began complying with the business capability life-cycle acquisition model. Prior to that change, the program was complying 

with the defense acquisition management system framework—which contains fewer life-cycle phases. b

In September 2013, the program was restructured into two increments. Increment 1 was placed into the operations and support phase with no further 

milestones planned, and increment 2 was to proceed to a milestone B decision. As of January 2014, program officials were uncertain when the program 

would reach milestones B and C for increment 2.

Program Essentials (as of December 2013)

DOD component: Defense Logistics Agency

Program owner: Financial Management

Prime contractors: not applicablea

Total number of contractors: 6 

Fiscal year 2014 funding requested: $91.2 million

Program Costs (then-year dollars in millions)

Initial 

Estimate

(03/2007)

Latest 

Estimate

(12/2013)

Life-cycle cost estimate $209.2 $543.0

Acquisition 114.5 342.0

Operations and 

maintenance 

____________

94.7 201.0

Amount spent to date

(as of October 2013)

$235.2

System Deployment Details (as of December 2013)

Current number of total expected users: 9,200 of 74,769

Current number of total expected locations: 11 of 21b

Legacy systems to be replaced: 10

Annual cost of legacy systems: $35 million

Number of expected system interfaces: 23 of 36

Cost, Schedule, and Performance Summary

» Change in cost estimate () 

» Change in schedule estimate () 

» Did not fully meet system performance targets

Source: Data reported by DOD officials.

a

The government is serving as the system integrator overseeing the contractor development teams. b

This represents the number of defense agencies and components that were approved to implement the system. According to program officials, each 

agency and component may have one or more locations.
Appendix II: Profiles of Selected DOD MAIS Programs

Page 68 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

DAI

Program Status

DAI began as a non-MAIS program under the Business Transformation Agency in January 2007 and reached 

milestone B in October 2010. In February 2011, the program was designated pre-MAIS (meaning it was 

expected to meet MAIS cost thresholds). In August 2011, responsibility for the program was transferred from the 

disestablished Business Transformation Agency to the Defense Logistics Agency. Between October 2008 and 

October 2012, the program developed and deployed five of six planned releases at 11 defense agencies and 

components, which provided capabilities such as cost accounting and time and labor. In September 2013, the 

program was declared a MAIS program and restructured into two increments. Increment 1 consisted of the five 

previously deployed releases and was placed into the operations and support phase. Increment 2 was initiated 

to provide new and enhanced capabilities to the 11 existing agencies and components and deploy to 10 new 

agencies and components. As of January 2014, program officials were uncertain when the program would begin 

system development of increment 2.

Change in Cost Estimate () 

As of December 2013, the latest cost estimate for DAI was about $543.0 million, which was a 159 percent 

increase from its initial estimate of about $209.2 million, established in March 2007. According to officials, 

estimated costs increased because 5 years were added to the estimate’s life cycle, initial assumptions on 

licensing and hardware costs were understated, and additional change management efforts were needed. 

Additionally, according to a DOD inspector general report, a software upgrade was not included in the initial 

estimate.1

Change in Schedule Estimate () 

As of December 2013, officials stated that they were preparing an APB that would include updated 

costs for increment 2 only.

DLA’s DAI program experienced over a 5-year slip in its planned date to obtain approval to begin production and 

deployment of the system (referred to as milestone C) when compared to its initial schedule, which planned for it 

to occur in January 2009. In September 2013, DOD decided that increment 1 would not proceed to milestone C 

and would be placed into the operations and support phase, and that additional milestones would be reached 

through increment 2. However, as of January 2014, program officials were uncertain when they would set a 

schedule for increment 2 and reach milestone C. DAI officials attributed this slippage to fluctuation in the number 

of agencies to deploy DAI and the agency deployment schedule; the change in program designation to preMAIS (meaning it was expected to meet MAIS thresholds), which resulted in additional oversight requirements; 

and to the change in parent organization from the Business Transformation Agency to DLA. 

Did Not Fully Meet System Performance Targets

DAI experienced several system defects, some of which were still being addressed. Specifically, as of 

December 2013, DAI had addressed three of the five interfaces that either did not meet requirements or were 

not tested during a November 2012 interoperability assessment, but was still addressing the remaining two noncritical interfaces. According to officials, they were in the process of evaluating if there was still a need for one of 

the interfaces and the other interface had been deferred to a later release.

 

1

DOD Inspector General, Status of Enterprise Resource Planning Systems’ Cost, Schedule, and Management Actions Taken to Address Prior 

Recommendations, DODIG-2013-111 (Alexandria, Va: Aug. 1, 2013).
Appendix II: Profiles of Selected DOD MAIS Programs

Page 69 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

Distributed Common Ground System – Army (DCGS-A) Increment 1

DCGS-A is intended to be the Army’s primary system for collecting, processing, integrating, and displaying 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance information about potential adversarial forces, the weather, and 

the terrain to Army Commanders at all echelons. It is intended to acquire and synthesize data from multiple 

intelligence sources, such as humans, geospatial information (e.g., imagery of earth’s terrain), and information 

derived from electronic transmissions. DCGS-A Increment 1 is to include three software releases that will be 

integrated into commercial off-the-shelf laptops and servers.

a

DCGS-A was authorized to proceed beyond milestone B prior to becoming a MAIS program.

Program Essentials (as of December 2013)

DOD component: Department of the Army

Program owner: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command 

Capability Manager – Sensor Processing

Prime contractors: Lockheed Martin and Booz Allen Hamilton 

Total number of contractors: 67

Fiscal year 2014 funding requested: $295.1 million

Program Costs (then-year dollars in millions)

First APB

(03/2012)

Latest Estimate

(12/2013)

Life-cycle cost estimate $11,234.4 $10,212.4

Acquisition 6,598.6 5,642.9

Operations and 

maintenance 

____________

4,635.8 4,569.5

Amount spent to date

(as of September 2013)

$2,810.1

System Deployment Details (as of December 2013)

Current number of total expected users: 24,858 of 34,290

Current number of total expected locations: 1,722 of 2,175

Legacy systems to be replaced: 25

Annual cost of legacy systems: $255 milliona

Number of expected system interfaces: 740

Cost, Schedule, and Performance Summary

» Change in cost estimate () 

» Change in schedule estimate () 

» Did not fully meet system performance targets

Source: Data reported by DOD officials.

a

Program officials reported that the program expects sustainment costs to decrease to approximately $170 million per year beginning in fiscal year 2016 

due to the program’s implementation of certain acquisition best practices, more efficient enterprise user agreements, and better coordination and 

accountability with sustainment providers.
Appendix II: Profiles of Selected DOD MAIS Programs

Page 70 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

DCGS-A Increment 1 

Program Status

The DCGS-A program was established in May 2001 to consolidate nine sets of intelligence systems. 

Subsequently, the Army made several significant changes to the program. Specifically, in 2004, DOD began 

requiring that each of the services’ intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems become 

interoperable with each other as a family of systems—including DCGS-A.1

Change in Cost Estimate () 

Also in 2004, DCGS-A was directed 

to build a hardware and software configuration of the system that was able to be mounted on vehicles used by 

brigade combat teams. In 2005, the Army directed that a capability called the Joint Intelligence Operational 

Capability-Iraq be integrated into DCGS-A. In May 2011, DCGS-A was refocused to concentrate on developing 

software, and certain hardware requirements related to mounting the system on a specific type of vehicle were 

removed from the program. In December 2012, the program was granted full deployment decision for a modified 

configuration of release 1 (discussed in the performance section below). As of December 2013, the program 

expects to deploy release 2 beginning in the second quarter of fiscal year 2015.

As of December 2013, DCGS-A’s latest life-cycle cost estimate was approximately $10.2 billion, which was 

about a 9 percent decrease from its first APB estimate of $11.2 billion established in March 2012. Program 

officials attributed this decrease, among other things, to a reduction in the number of brigade combat teams, 

which was due, in part, to the Budget Control Act of 2011 (which required DOD to reduce its future 

expenditures) and the drawdown of forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. Program officials reported that the reduction 

in force decreased the amount of DCGS-A infrastructure needed and the amount of DCGS-A equipment that 

needs to be refreshed every 5 years in accordance with the program’s refresh cycle.

Change in Schedule Estimate () 

As of December 2013, DCGS-A was expected to be fully deployed in September 2019. The program 

experienced a nominal 3-month slippage in achieving full deployment decision compared to its first APB 

schedule (established in March 2012)—from September 2012 to December 2012. DCGS-A officials attributed 

this slippage, in part, to problems experienced during operational testing of release 1 (discussed below). 

Officials also stated that, based on the results of these tests, the program required additional time to update and 

receive approval for regulatory and statutory documentation required to achieve full deployment decision, 

including receiving the final operational test report from the testing agency.

Did Not Fully Meet System Performance Targets

In May 2012 through June 2012, the US Army Test and Evaluation Command conducted an initial operational 

test and evaluation on release 1 of the DCGS-A system and determined that it was operationally effective with 

limitations, and was not operationally suitable or survivable. Specifically, the system was unable to meet certain 

requirements, such as synchronizing data passed between different classified network domains (e.g., between 

secret and top secret networks). Subsequently, the Army modified release 1 to defer the capability for users to 

access data in the top secret security domain until release 2. In October 2012, additional tests were conducted 

on the reduced scope of release 1, which showed that the system performed acceptably. However, until the top 

secret domain is deployed, the system is unable to fully meet two key performance parameters.

 

1

The DCGS family of systems includes Air Force-DCGS, DCGS-A, DCGS-Marine Corps, DCGS-N, and DCGS-Special Operations Forces.
Appendix II: Profiles of Selected DOD MAIS Programs

Page 71 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

EProcurement

EProcurement is intended to provide enterprisewide procurement capabilities, such as managing purchase 

requests and contract awards, for Defense Logistics Agency acquisition and procurement users. The system is 

to replace multiple legacy procurement systems to reduce redundancy and cost, and to standardize a contract 

writing and administration methodology across the agency. EProcurement consists of three releases. Releases 

1.0 and 1.1 were to demonstrate limited functionality for a limited user base and focused on providing manual 

order processing capabilities. Release 1.2 is to provide full procurement capabilities to all users.

Program Essentials (as of December 2013)

DOD component: Defense Logistics Agency

Program owner: Acquisition Directorate

Prime contractor: Accenture 

Total number of contractors: 6 

Fiscal year 2014 funding requested: $16.5 million

Program Costs (then-year dollars in millions)

First APB

(03/2012)

Latest Estimate

(12/2013)

Life-cycle cost estimate $528.0 $549.7

Acquisition $337.8 354.2

Operations and 

maintenance 

____________

$190.2 195.5

Amount spent to date

(as of October 2013)

$349.3

System Deployment Details (as of December 2013)

Current number of total expected users: 2,700 of 4,000

Current number of total expected locations: not applicablea

Legacy systems to be replaced: 3 

Annual cost of legacy systems: $14.5 million

Number of expected system interfaces: 62

Cost, Schedule, and Performance Summary

» Change in cost estimate () 

» Change in schedule estimate () 

» Did not fully meet system performance targets

Source: Data reported by DOD officials.

a

EProcurement is a web-based system that is intended to be used by acquisition and procurement specialists worldwide.
Appendix II: Profiles of Selected DOD MAIS Programs

Page 72 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

EProcurement

Program Status

The EProcurement program has deployed two of the three planned releases of the system. The first release was 

fielded in November 2010 to approximately 50 acquisition and procurement users and the second release was 

fielded in February 2011 to approximately 320 users. As of December 2013, the program was in the process of 

deploying the third release to all 4,000 planned EProcurement users, and officials expected the system to be 

fully deployed by February 2014.

Change in Cost Estimate () 

The program’s life-cycle cost estimate had increased nominally by about 4 percent compared to the program’s 

first APB cost estimate. Specifically, as of December 2013, the latest life-cycle cost estimate for EProcurement 

was about $549.7 million, and the program’s first APB cost estimate, as of March 2012, was about $528.0 

million. According to program officials, this increase was due to a 2-month slip in the full deployment date, which 

shifted estimates into the next fiscal year and added inflation.

Change in Schedule Estimate () 

EProcurement had experienced an approximately 2-month slippage in its full deployment date compared to its 

first complete APB schedule. Specifically, program officials had planned to deploy the system by December 

2013; however, as of December 2013, the program estimated that it would be fully deployed in February 2014. 

EProcurement officials stated that this delay was necessary to reduce program risks during system deployments 

and ensure that staff would be adequately trained. Additionally, EProcurement experienced a 3-month schedule 

slippage in the planned date for full deployment decision compared to its first APB schedule—from May 2012 to 

August 2012. According to EProcurement officials, the slip was due to scheduling conflicts with the program’s 

milestone decision authority.

Did Not Fully Meet System Performance Targets

An initial operational test completed in June 2012 determined that release 1.2 of EProcurement was 

operationally effective and suitable, but had deficiencies in the areas of training, usability, help desk operations, 

and supportability. Consequently, the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation made seven 

recommendations to address these deficiencies, including that the program improve the quality of training for its 

users. According to program officials, as of December 2013, four of the recommendations had been addressed 

and the remaining three recommendations were expected to be addressed in fiscal year 2014. Additionally, in 

December 2013, the program reported that it was meeting the targets for all of its performance metrics, such as 

net-readiness and the number of purchase requests created in a workday.
Appendix II: Profiles of Selected DOD MAIS Programs

Page 73 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

Global Combat Support System- Marine Corps (GCSS-MC) Increment 1

GCSS-MC is intended to be the primary technology enabler for the Marine Corps logistics modernization 

strategy and provides the backbone for all logistics information required by the Marine Air Ground Task Force. 

GCSS-MC Increment 1 is intended to support logistics planners and operators worldwide to manage combat 

logistics, including planning, warehousing, distribution, depot maintenance, and asset visibility.

Program Essentials (as of December 2013)

DOD component: Navy, United States Marine Corps 

Program owner: Assistant Secretary for Research, 

Development, and Acquisition, Navy

Prime contractors: Accenture, Oracle Consulting, and Space 

and Naval Warfare Systems Center Atlantica

Total number of active contractors: 3 

Fiscal year 2014 funding requested: $ 72.8 million

Program Costs (then-year dollars in millions)

First APB

(06/2007)

Latest Estimate

(12/2013)

Life-cycle cost estimate $461.4 $1,856.3

Acquisition 194.4 389.6

Operations and 

maintenance 

____________

$267.0 1,466.7

Amount spent to date

(as of December 2013)

654.1

System Deployment Details (as of December 2013)

Current number of total expected users: 26,288 of 26,288b

Current number of total expected locations: 72 of 72 

Legacy systems to be replaced: 4 

Annual cost of legacy systems: $4 million

Number of expected system interfaces: 44

Cost, Schedule, and Performance Summary

» Change in cost estimate () 

» Change in schedule estimate () 

» Did not fully meet system performance targets

Source: Data reported by DOD officials.

a

The initial contract for system development was awarded to Accenture, but that contract was terminated in 2006. Oracle Consulting then became the 

prime contractor for system development of the first GCSS-MC release, which was fully deployed by March 2013. Space and Naval Warfare Systems 

Center Atlantic is a government entity that is responsible for the sustainment of the first release and development of an enhancement release (discussed 

on the next page).

b

Program officials reported that the program is authorized to have up to 36,000 users.
Appendix II: Profiles of Selected DOD MAIS Programs

Page 74 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

GCSS-MC Increment 1

Program Status

In September 2008, the program declared its first critical change in its cost and schedule estimates due to 

technical challenges experienced during system development. As a result, Increment 1 was divided into two 

releases. The first release was to provide GCSS-MC capabilities to users that have access to the system via the 

Internet. The second release was to provide GCSS-MC to deployed users lacking Internet connectivity. 

According to program officials, DOD had fielded the first release to all intended users except those in 

Afghanistan. Officials stated that those users will not receive the first release to avoid disruption of combat 

operations. As a result, Afghanistan users continue to use legacy logistics systems, which has delayed the 

retirement of those systems until these users return to the United States. The second release was not deployed 

due to technical challenges associated with capabilities in that release (see the performance section), which 

resulted in a critical change to the schedule that was reported in February 2013. In August 2013, based on a 

review of the critical change, the program removed the second release from the first increment of GCSS-MC. 

Additionally, the program added an enhancement release that is intended to provide minimal functionality to 

users without network connectivity, including capturing and storing logistics data on a laptop to enable the data 

to be later transferred to the network once the user is in a location with internet connectivity. As of December 

2013, program officials expected to begin fielding this enhancement release in the second quarter of 2015.

Change in Cost Estimate () 

As of December 2013, the latest life-cycle cost estimate for the reduced scope of GCSS-MC Increment 1 was 

about $1.86 billion, which is an increase of about 302 percent from the first APB estimate of $461.4 million in 

2007. As previously discussed, in September 2008, the program declared a critical change in its cost estimate, 

which was primarily due to technical challenges associated with developing the second release. Program 

officials attributed subsequent cost increases to extending the period of contractor maintenance to allow 

additional time for transferring post-deployment system support to the government, and to the technical 

immaturity of the second release (see the performance section).

Change in Schedule Estimate () 

As of December 2013, the reduced scope of the GCSS-MC program is expected to be fully deployed in the 

fourth quarter of fiscal year 2015, almost 6 years behind its first APB estimate of November 2009. As previously 

discussed, these delays were due to technical challenges in developing the second release.

Did Not Fully Meet System Performance Targets

In 2011, the program reported that the first release of GCSS-MC Increment 1 met both of its key performance 

parameters related to net readiness and the time it takes for system transactions to be visible to users. 

However, in 2011, the program conducted developmental testing on the second release and identified significant 

system deficiencies. Moreover, in December 2012, the program reported that the second release was unable to 

successfully complete additional developmental and operational testing due to technical problems associated 

with certain capabilities in that release, including synchronizing remote computers to the primary system. As a 

result, that release was removed from the scope of Increment 1 (as previously discussed).
Appendix II: Profiles of Selected DOD MAIS Programs

Page 75 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

Global Command and Control System-Maritime (GCCS-M) Increment 2

GCCS-M Increment 2 is intended to provide maritime commanders afloat and at ashore fixed command centers 

with a single system that integrates and displays available intelligence and environmental information on 

friendly, hostile, and neutral land, sea, and air forces. GCCS-M requirements were initially met in Increment 1, 

and Increment 2 is to include additional software capabilities to ensure synchronization and interoperability with 

the rest of the GCCS family of command and control systems, which includes GCCS-Army, GCCS-Air Force, 

and GCCS-Joint. GCCS-M Increment 2 is being deployed in four different configurations, based on ship types 

and sizes.

Program Essentials (as of December 2013)

DOD component: Department of the Navy

Program owner: Program Executive Office for Command, 

Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence

Prime contractor: Science Applications International 

Corporation

Total number of contractors: 6 

Fiscal year 2014 funding requested: $35.6 million

Program Costs (then-year dollars in millions)

First APB

(02/2006)

Latest Estimate

(12/2013)

Life-cycle cost estimate $4,442.0 $641.8

Acquisition 1,388.0 351.9

Operations and 

maintenance 

____________

3,054.0 289.9

Amount spent to date

(as of December 2013)

$193.9

System Deployment Details (as of December 2013)

Current number of total expected users: 210 of 1,870

Current number of total expected locations: 24 of 269

Legacy systems to be replaced: 1 

Annual cost of legacy systems: $12.2 million

Number of expected system interfaces: 69

Cost, Schedule, and Performance Summary

» Change in cost estimate () 

» Change in schedule estimate () 

» Met system performance targets

Source: Data reported by DOD officials.
Appendix II: Profiles of Selected DOD MAIS Programs

Page 76 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

GCCS-M Increment 2

Program Status

In April 2007, GCCS-M Increment 2 was directed to cease all development work and restructure the program to 

align with the Navy’s new common computing environment, to be provided by Navy’s Consolidated Afloat 

Networks and Enterprise Services (CANES) program, and the GCCS-Joint software baseline of the GCCS 

family of systems.1

Change in Cost Estimate () 

This restructure resulted in the removal of hardware requirements from GCCS-M, making it a 

software-only program. In September 2011, the Navy fielded three of the four planned system configurations.

According to program officials, as of December 2013, the Navy was testing the remaining configuration and 

expected deployment to begin in fiscal year 2014.

The program’s cost estimate decreased by about 86 percent. Specifically, the first APB cost estimate for GCCSM Increment 2, established in February 2006, was approximately $4.4 billion and the latest life-cycle cost 

estimate, as of December 2013, was approximately $641.8 million. According to program officials, this decrease 

was primarily due to the transfer of hardware requirements—such as procuring and installing servers and other 

network equipment—to Navy’s common computing environment, and the removal of costs associated with 

operations and maintenance and military personnel that are now planned to be funded outside of the program.

Change in Schedule Estimate () 

GCCS-M Increment 2 had experienced a 3.5- year schedule slippage in the program’s full deployment decision 

date compared to its first APB schedule estimate—from August 2007 to March 2011. Program officials attributed 

this slippage to new software development work that was needed when the program was directed to be 

restructured to align with a new common infrastructure and software baseline (previously discussed), as well as 

schedule delays in the availability of ships for operational testing. As of December 2013, program officials 

expected the system to be fully deployed in December 2014.

Met System Performance Targets

As of December 2013, the Navy had tested three of the four planned system configurations for GCCS-M 

Increment 2, and was in the process of testing the fourth configuration. Specifically, in November 2010, the Navy 

completed an initial operational test on the first configuration, which determined that the system was 

operationally effective and suitable, except for a deficiency in logistic supportability, which was subsequently 

addressed in June 2011. In May 2011, the Navy completed an initial operational test on the second 

configuration, which determined that the system was operationally effective and suitable, except for a limitation 

in training, which was subsequently addressed in September 2011. The Navy then completed an initial 

operational test on the third configuration in July 2011, which determined that the system was operationally 

effective and suitable. In May 2013, system integration testing was completed on the fourth configuration, which 

determined that the system could integrate into the CANES network. According to officials, an initial operational 

test is planned for the fourth configuration during the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2014. Additionally, in August 

2013, the program office reported that the system was meeting the targets for seven of eight key performance 

metrics, such as operational availability. Officials reported that the program did not measure the eighth

performance metric—equipment survivability—because it was to be met by the network infrastructure provider.

 

1

The CANES program is intended to, among other things, reduce and eliminate existing standalone afloat (i.e., surface ships and

submarines) networks and reduce the hardware footprint on 259 afloat and maritime operations center platforms.
Appendix II: Profiles of Selected DOD MAIS Programs

Page 77 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

Integrated Electronic Health Record (iEHR) Increment 1

In February 2013, the Secretaries of DOD and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) changed the scope of 

the iEHR program—which was to include multiple increments—from an effort to develop a single, integrated 

DOD and VA health record system, to an effort to achieve interoperability by pursuing separate efforts to 

modernize or replace their existing DOD and VA health record systems. The revised iEHR program is intended 

to provide the infrastructure and services for standardizing and integrating electronic healthcare data between 

DOD’s and VA’s systems. Specifically, increment 1 of iEHR is intended to provide DOD with seven capabilities: 

(1) enhance user sign-in, (2) enhance medical record views among multiple systems, (3) allow users to roam 

among multiple devices, (4) upgrade a DOD medical record database, (5) deploy a testing facility for DOD and 

VA electronic record integration, (6) develop a pilot to consolidate data centers, and (7) develop a pilot graphical 

user interface.

Program Essentials (as of December 2013)

DOD component: Defense Health Agency 

Program owner: DOD/VA Interagency Program Office

Major contractors: Planned Systems International, ICS-Nett, 

General Dynamics One Source, SAIC

Total number of contractors: 12

Fiscal year 2014 funding requested: $66.2 million

Program Costs (then-year dollars in millions)

First APB

(02/2013)

Latest Estimate

(01/2014) 

Life-cycle cost estimate $1,025.9 TBDa

Acquisition 366.3 TBD

Operations and 

maintenance 

____________

659.6 TBD

Amount spent to date

(as of February 2014)

$199.4

System Deployment Details (as of December 2013)

Current number of total expected users: 0 of 102,000

Current number of total expected locations: 1 of 20

Legacy systems to be replaced: 0 

Annual cost of legacy systems: not applicable

Number of expected system interfaces: 27

Cost, Schedule, and Performance Summary

» Cost estimate to be determined

» Change in schedule estimate () 

» Did not fully meet system performance targets

Source: Data reported by DOD officials.

a

As of January 2014, program officials stated that they plan to revise iEHR’s cost estimate to reflect recent scope changes (discussed in the following 

section) at milestone C (authorizes a program to begin limited fielding of the system), which is currently planned for May 2014.
Appendix II: Profiles of Selected DOD MAIS Programs

Page 78 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

iEHR Increment 1

Program Status

As discussed previously, in February 2013, the Secretaries of DOD and VA changed the scope of the iEHR 

program to an effort to achieve interoperability by pursuing separate efforts to modernize or replace their 

existing DOD and VA health record systems. In the summer of 2013, DOD officials recommended removing 

three capabilities from the scope of increment 1. Those capabilities were (1) enhancing user sign-in, (2) 

enhancing views of medical records among multiple systems, and (3) allowing users to roam among multiple 

devices. However, in January 2014, DOD officials directed the program to implement these three efforts by May 

2014. Additionally, DOD delayed deployment of the testing facility for DOD and VA electronic record integration 

from December 2013 to May 2014. DOD also removed the regional data center and the graphical user interface 

from the scope of increment 1. Officials reported that the upgrades to the DOD medical record database were 

implemented in the third quarter of fiscal year 2013.

Cost Estimate To Be Determined

As discussed previously, as of January 2014, program officials stated that they plan to revise the cost estimate 

to reflect the scope changes discussed above, and expected this update to occur at milestone C (authorizes a 

program to begin limited fielding of the system), which is currently planned for May 2014.

Change in Schedule Estimate () 

As of January 2014, the program had experienced an 11-month slip in its planned date for Milestone C—

currently planned for May 2014—compared to its first APB schedule estimate. Additionally, the program had 

experienced an 11-month slip in its planned date for full deployment decision—from December 2013 to 

November 2014. Officials attributed these slippages to needing additional time to prepare for operational testing 

of the capabilities that DOD directed to remain in the program in January 2014 (as discussed above).

Did Not Fully Meet System Performance Targets

DOD reported that four developmental tests were conducted in fiscal year 2013 and revealed 32 system 

defects—10 of which remained open as of January 2014. Program officials stated that they plan to resolve these 

defects by the end of February 2014. As of January 2014, the program planned to assess the performance of 

the following capabilities in an operational environment by May 2014: (1) enhancing user sign-in, (2) enhancing 

views of medical records among multiple systems, and (3) allowing users to roam among multiple devices. 

Additionally, officials stated that they intend to validate the performance of the test center in May 2014.
Appendix II: Profiles of Selected DOD MAIS Programs

Page 79 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

Integrated Personnel and Pay System – Army (IPPS-A) Increment 11

IPPS-A is intended to provide a 24-hour, web-based, integrated human resources system to soldiers, human 

resources professionals, combatant commanders, personnel and pay managers, and other authorized Army 

users. Specifically, IPPS-A Increment 1 is to include one release, which is intended to provide a consolidated, 

foundational database of trusted personnel data that is extracted from 15 existing human resources systems 

(additional functionality is intended to be part of a different MAIS program—IPPS-A Increment 2).

1

DOD originally planned to develop the Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System, which was to provide a joint, integrated, standardized 

personnel and pay system for all military personnel departmentwide. Following the cancellation of that program, each military service is now responsible 

for developing its own integrated personnel and pay system—including IPPS-A.

Program Essentials (as of December 2013)

DOD component: Department of the Army

Program owner: Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of 

Staff G-1 

Prime contractor: EDC Consulting, LLC

Total number of contractors: 56 

Fiscal year 2014 funding requested: $13.4 milliona

Program Costs (then-year dollars in millions)

First APB

(03/2012)

Latest Estimate

(12/2013)

Life-cycle cost estimate $358.4 $395.3

Acquisition 157.0 193.9

Operations and 

maintenance 

____________

201.4 201.4

Amount spent to date

(as of November 2013)

$162.3

System Deployment Details (as of December 2013)

Current number of total expected users: 0 of ~1.2 million

Current number of total expected locations: n/ab

Legacy systems to be replaced: 0c

Annual cost of legacy systems: $0

Number of expected system interfaces: 15

Cost, Schedule, and Performance Summary

» Change in cost estimate () 

» Change in schedule estimate () 

» Fully met system performance measures

Source: Data reported by DOD officials. 

a

Although the program requested about $13.4 million in fiscal year 2014 funding, IPPS-A officials reported in November 2013 that the fiscal year 2014 

funding required by the program is $51 million. Officials attributed this increase to schedule slippages experienced by the program (discussed on the next 

page). 

b

IPPS-A Increment 1 is intended to be a web-based database that will be available worldwide.

c

Officials stated that IPPS-A Increment 1 will not replace any legacy systems, but 49 systems are planned to be replaced by IPPS-A Increment 2.
Appendix II: Profiles of Selected DOD MAIS Programs

Page 80 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

IPPS-A Increment 1

Program Status

According to program officials, in June 2013, the Army halted the development of IPPS-A Increment 1. Program 

officials attributed this to significant contractor performance issues that were experienced when implementing 

the design of the database (see the performance section). As a result of these issues, the Army Acquisition 

Executive directed the IPPS-A program to task an independent organization to conduct a review of the design of 

the database to determine the adequacy and completeness of it, and whether it would meet the program’s 

requirements. The independent review was completed in August 2013 and found that the current design of 

IPPS-A Increment 1 was at low risk for not meeting the program’s requirements, and that the system design was 

not complete. Based on the results of the independent review, DOD plans to implement a 3-wave deployment 

approach and decide on whether IPPS-A Increment 1 can proceed into production and deployment in February 

2014.

Change in Cost Estimate () 

As of December 2013, the program’s latest life-cycle cost estimate was approximately $395.3 million, which was 

about a 10 percent increase from the program’s first APB estimate of $358.4 million. Program officials attributed 

this increase to significant schedule slippages experienced by the program (discussed in the schedule section).

Change in Schedule Estimate () 

As of December 2013, the program had experienced a 1-year slip in the planned date for milestone C 

(authorizes a program to begin production and deployment) compared to its first APB schedule estimate of 

February 2013. Additionally, the planned date for full deployment decision slipped 1 year—from April 2013 to 

April 2014. IPPS-A officials attributed these slippages to significant performance issues experienced by the 

prime contractor (discussed in the performance section), a 90-day delay in awarding the IPPS-A Increment 1 

contract, and the addition of new requirements that were added late in the design phase.

Fully Met System Performance Targets

In March 2013, the program’s prime contractor conducted data validation tests to determine whether the data 

contained in the IPPS-A Increment 1 database were (1) accurately received from external systems, (2) 

accurately mapped to the appropriate field in the IPPS-A database, and (3) consistent with the data values 

received from the external system. According to program officials, the contractor was planning to conduct 39 

data validation tests; however, the system failed the first 6 tests and consequently, the remaining data validation 

tests were discontinued. As a result, the Army Acquisition Executive directed the program to review the system’s 

design, which was completed in August 2013 (as previously discussed). As of January 2014, of the 39 originally 

planned tests, the program had re-tested the 6 previously failed tests, and conducted 19 more tests. The 

program successfully passed these 25 tests. According to DOD officials, the program will conduct the remaining 

14 tests during wave 2 and 3 deployment activities.
Appendix II: Profiles of Selected DOD MAIS Programs

Page 81 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

Integrated Strategic Planning and Analysis Network (ISPAN) Increment 2

ISPAN Increment 2 provides additional capabilities for DOD’s Global Adaptive Planning Collaborative 

Information Environment, which is a web-enabled environment that allows worldwide users to collaborate online 

while providing planning and analyses to senior decision makers. ISPAN Increment 2 included two major 

releases and two enhancement efforts.

Program Essentials (as of December 2013)

DOD component: Department of the Air Force

Program owner: U.S. Strategic Command

Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin 

Total number of contractors: 10

Fiscal year 2014 funding requested: $8.5 million

Program Costs (then-year dollars in millions)

First APB

(11/2010)

Latest Estimate

(03/2014) 

Life-cycle cost estimate $152.5 $146.2

Acquisition 47.6 42.2

Operations and 

maintenance 

____________

104.9 104.0

Amount spent to date

(as of October 2013)

$49.0

System Deployment Details (as of December 2013)

Current number of total expected users: 8209 of 8209a

Current number of total expected locations: not applicableb

Legacy systems to be replaced: 0 

Annual cost of legacy systems: not applicable

Number of expected system interfaces: 14

Cost, Schedule, and Performance Summary

» Change in cost estimate () 

» Change in schedule estimate () 

» Did not fully meet system performance targets

Source: Data reported by DOD officials.

a

This represents the total number of registered user accounts that have access to ISPAN. The network is able to accommodate 500 concurrent users.

b

ISPAN Increment 2 is a web-based system that is available worldwide.
Appendix II: Profiles of Selected DOD MAIS Programs

Page 82 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

ISPAN Increment 2

Program Status

The ISPAN Increment 2 program deployed two major releases in December 2011 and September 2012. 

Subsequently, the program deployed two system enhancements in March 2013 and August 2013. Following the 

testing and evaluation of the second enhancement, DOD achieved full deployment in November 2013 and is 

currently in an operations and maintenance status. As discussed in the following performance section, the 

program is currently working to address deficiencies identified in 2012.

Change in Cost Estimate () 

The program had experienced a 4 percent cost estimate decrease. Specifically, according to officials, as of 

March 2014, the latest life-cycle cost estimate for ISPAN Increment 2 was about $146.2 million, which is 

approximately $6.3 million less than the program’s first APB estimate of $152.5 million. Program officials 

attributed this to a decrease in acquisition-related costs that occurred when the program switched from a 

systems architecture environment that included multiple hardware items, such as computers and servers, to a 

virtualized environment in which certain computers are software-based. Further, officials stated that this change 

resulted in reduced costs associated with procurement; hardware and software installation; and software 

licensing.

Change in Schedule Estimate () 

The program had experienced a 6-month slippage in its date for full deployment when compared to its first APB 

schedule—from May 2013 to November 2013. Program officials reported that the schedule delay was due to 

needing additional time to (1) define stable requirements for the first major capability release and (2) prepare for 

the initial operational test and evaluation, and the activities associated with the test event.

Did Not Fully Meet System Performance Targets

In summer 2012, the Air Force’s Operational Test and Evaluation Center conducted an operational test and 

evaluation on ISPAN Increment 2 capabilities and ultimately determined that the system was effective, suitable, 

and mission capable, because the system ultimately met its requirements. However, the Air Force’s Operational 

Test and Evaluation Center reported that at the start of the test, there were 184 deficiencies with the system, 

which required workarounds in order to complete certain functions. As of August 2013, program officials 

reported that they had addressed 148 of those deficiencies and, as of December 2013, planned to address the 

remaining deficiencies by April 2014.
Appendix II: Profiles of Selected DOD MAIS Programs

Page 83 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

Joint Personnel Identification (JPI) – Version 2

JPI version 2 is intended to provide an Army tactical biometric collection capability to capture an adversary or 

neutral person’s biometric data (e.g., fingerprint, iris image, and facial image) and enroll them into DOD’s 

enterprise authoritative biometric database to positively identify and verify the identity of actual or potential 

adversaries. JPI version 2 is intended to be used in any theater where military forces are deployed.

Program Essentials (as of December 2013)

DOD component: Department of the Army 

Program owner: Assistant Secretary of the Army for 

Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology

Prime contractors: CACI and SciTech

Total number of contractors: 22 

Fiscal year 2014 funding requested: $12.45 million

Program Costs (then-year dollars in millions)

Initial Estimate

(12/2013)

Life-cycle cost estimate TBDa

Acquisition TBDa

Operations and 

maintenance 

____________

TBDa

Amount spent to date

(as of October 2013)

$31.2

System Deployment Details (as of December 2013)

Current number of total expected users: 0 of unknownb

Current number of total expected locations: 0 of unknownb

Legacy systems to be replaced: unknownb

Annual cost of legacy systems: unknownb

Number of expected system interfaces: unknownb

Cost, Schedule, and Performance Summary

» Unavailable cost data

» Unavailable schedule data

» Unavailable system performance data

Source: Data reported by DOD officials.

a

As discussed in the next section, in February 2013, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff determined that the program’s proposed 10-year 

funding profile was unaffordable. Program officials expected to reach milestone B (the point at which an APB would be established—including an approved 

cost estimate) about 18 months after the program’s requirements are approved.

b

JPI version 2 officials have not yet determined the appropriate system solution, nor the expected number of users, system locations, legacy systems to be 

replaced, and system interfaces.
Appendix II: Profiles of Selected DOD MAIS Programs

Page 84 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

JPI Version 2

Program Status

In January 2011, funds were first obligated for JPI version 2. According to program officials, since that time the 

program has, among other things, conducted a requirements analysis to determine program requirements, and 

developed draft system performance specifications and an economic analysis. In February 2013, the Vice 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff determined that the proposed 10-year funding profile for the program was 

unaffordable. Subsequently, program officials stated that the program has been working to revise JPI’s 

requirements and reassess the functionality that will be included in the program. JPI officials reported that, in 

October 2013, the Army recommended that the JPI program make certain changes to its baseline requirements 

document. JPI officials reported that they presented this recommendation to the chair of a DOD requirements 

oversight board, but as of December 2013, the chair had not yet made a decision. Program officials stated that 

they expect to reach milestone B (the point at which an APB would be established) about 18 months after the 

program’s requirements are approved.

Unavailable Cost Data

As of December 2013, an APB—including an approved cost estimate—had not been established for JPI version 

2. As previously discussed, program officials expect to reach milestone B (the point at which an APB would be 

established) about 18 months after the program’s requirements are approved.

Unavailable Schedule Data

As of December 2013, an APB—including an approved schedule estimate—had not been established for JPI 

version 2. As previously stated, program officials expect to reach milestone B (the point at which an APB would 

be established) about 18 months after the program’s requirements are approved.

Unavailable System Performance Data

As of December 2013, JPI version 2 was in the early stages of design and no part of the system had been 

implemented. As such, system performance data were not available.
Appendix II: Profiles of Selected DOD MAIS Programs

Page 85 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

Joint Space Operations Center Mission System (JMS) Increment 1

JMS is intended to provide an integrated, network-based, space situational awareness and command and 

control capability for the Joint Force Component Commander for Space at the Joint Space Operations Center 

near Lompoc, California. Specifically, JMS increment 1 established the foundational capabilities for future JMS 

increments, including deploying an initial set of operator mission tools, such as providing automated links to 

existing data sources and a user-defined operational picture to integrate and display information.

Program Essentials (as of December 2013)

DOD component: Department of the Air Force

Program owner: Air Force Space Command

Prime contractor: not applicablea

Total number of contractors: 5 

Fiscal year 2014 funding requested: $4.5 million

Program Costs (then-year dollars in millions)

First APB

(04/2013)

Latest Estimate

(12/2013)

Life-cycle cost estimate $155.6 $155.6 

Acquisition 146.6 146.6

Operations and 

maintenance 

____________

9.0 9.0

Amount spent to date

(as of October 2013)

$138.6b

System Deployment Details (as of December 2013)

Current number of total expected users: 260 of 260

Current number of total expected locations: 1 of 1

Legacy systems to be replaced: 0c

Annual cost of legacy systems: not applicable

Number of expected system interfaces: 15

Cost, Schedule, and Performance Summary

» No change in cost estimate

» Change in schedule estimate () 

» Met system performance targets

Source: Data reported by DOD officials.

a

The government is directly managing the integration of government- and commercially developed software onto commercial-off-the-shelf hardware.

b

Officials stated that the remaining planned acquisition expenditures are to be used for future contract support costs during the integration of increment 1 

into increment 2 in fiscal year 2014.

c

Not directly applicable for JMS increment 1. Future JMS increments will replace legacy systems.
Appendix II: Profiles of Selected DOD MAIS Programs

Page 86 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

JMS Increment 1

Program Status

In 2011, the JMS program was restructured to address programmatic challenges that were identified in a 

February 2011 independent program assessment. Specifically, the assessment found that, among other things, 

the program was not ready for a milestone B decision and would have to declare a critical change as required by 

law because it would not be able to achieve full deployment decision within 5 years.1

No Change in Cost Estimate

Additionally, the 

assessment found that the program’s plan to implement the program in a single increment increased program 

risk and did not optimally support the warfighter. As part of the program restructure, the program was split from a 

single increment into a multi-increment approach and the government assumed the role of lead integrator. This 

split was intended to allow JMS to reduce program costs and accelerate the transition from its legacy system by 

leveraging existing government prototypes that could be used while additional JMS capabilities were developed. 

Consistent with this approach, the Air Force identified an Air Force Research Lab prototype that already had 

significant operational capability, met some of the key requirements for JMS, and could immediately be used by 

the warfighter. In 2011, the JMS program was directed to manage development and testing of this prototype and 

it was designated JMS increment 1. In December 2012, the Air Force completed testing on JMS increment 1 

and, in April 2013, the program was deemed fully deployed.

JMS increment 1 did not experience a change in its cost estimate from its first APB, which was established in 

April 2013. The program had been underway for approximately 4 years before it established its first APB, which 

was approved about 2 weeks prior to full deployment of increment 1 (see schedule section). As a result, about 

90 percent of the estimated costs in the program’s first APB represented sunk costs.

Change in Schedule Estimate () 

JMS increment 1 accelerated its full deployment date by about 2 months. Specifically, when the first APB was 

established on April 2, 2013, the program planned to have increment 1 fully deployed by June 2013; however, 

increment 1 was deemed fully deployed on April 15, 2013. Officials attributed the early completion of this 

milestone to a successful operational trial period and initial operational capability decision.

Met System Performance Targets

An operational utility evaluation was completed in December 2012, which concluded that the system was 

effective for the limited scope of operational capabilities delivered and that increment 1 met the targets for its 

two key performance parameters related to displaying the user-defined operational picture and supporting 

network-based military operations. Additionally, as of December 2013, officials reported that JMS increment 1 

had continued to meet its performance targets.

 

1

10 U.S.C. § 2445c(d).
Appendix II: Profiles of Selected DOD MAIS Programs

Page 87 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

Next Generation Enterprise Network (NGEN) Increment 1

NGEN is intended to replace and improve the enterprise network and services (e.g., data storage, e-mail, and 

video teleconferencing) that were provided by the Navy Marine Corps Intranet through a departmentwide 

network services contract to Navy and Marine Corps personnel worldwide.1 NGEN Increment 1 will transition the 

service provider, while maintaining the same network infrastructure and services that were provided by the Navy 

Marine Corps Intranet. Increment 1 is also intended to form the foundation for the Navy’s future networking 

environment.

1

To bridge the time between the end of the Navy Marine Corps Intranet contract in 2010 and full transition to NGEN, Navy awarded a $4.9 billion continuity 

of services contract to the existing provider—Hewlett-Packard—which is scheduled to end in April 2014.

a

According to officials, although the program office was established in July 2007, the program’s funds first obligated date was August 2009. Between 

program initiation and funds first obligated, NGEN program office activities were funded by its predecessor program—Navy Marine Corps Intranet. b

NGEN refers to these milestones as final transition decision and final transition complete because the program is transitioning to the new service contract, 

while maintaining the same fully-deployed network.

Program Essentials (as of December 2013)

DOD component: Department of the Navy

Program owner: Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Research, 

Development and Acquisition

Prime contractor: Hewlett Packard Enterprise Services

Total number of contractors: 5 

Fiscal year 2014 funding requested: $1,791.7 million

Program Costs (then-year dollars in millions)

Initial 

Estimate

(11/2011)

Latest 

Estimate

(12/2013)

Life-cycle cost estimate $25,447.7 $21,587.1

Acquisition 926.3 926.3

Operations and 

maintenance 

____________

24,521.4 20,660.8

Amount spent to date

(as of December 2013)

$2,817.7

System Deployment Details (as of December 2013)

Current number of total expected users: 0 of 800,000a

Current number of total expected locations: 0 of 2,500a

Legacy systems to be replaced: not yet determinedb

Annual cost of legacy systems: not yet determined

Number of expected system interfaces: not applicable

Cost, Schedule, and Performance Summary

» Change in cost estimate () 

» Change in schedule estimate () 

» Unavailable system performance data

Source: Data reported by DOD officials.

a

According to officials, the number of users and locations will increase gradually as the network transitions to the new contract.

b

Officials stated that the total number of legacy systems is being determined through an ongoing effort by the Navy Enterprise Information Governance 

Board to review legacy networks and decide whether they should be consolidated into NGEN.
Appendix II: Profiles of Selected DOD MAIS Programs

Page 88 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

NGEN Increment 1

Program Status

Navy released a request for proposals for NGEN in May 2012 and awarded the contract to Hewlett Packard 

Enterprise Services in June 2013. Subsequently, a bid protest was filed in July 2013 that was denied in October 

2013, and officials stated that they have since begun performance of the contract. Since the Navy Marine Corps 

Intranet contract ended in 2010, Navy has been operating under the continuity of services contract, which 

continues to deliver network services until Navy fully transitions to NGEN.

Change in Cost Estimate () 

NGEN’s planned total life-cycle cost estimate had decreased by about 15 percent. Specifically, while the 

program had not established an APB as of December 2013, the program’s initial cost estimate of about $25.4 

billion, established in November 2011, had decreased to about $21.6 billion in its latest estimate, as of 

December 2013. This was due to a $3.9 billion decrease in operations and maintenance costs, which officials 

told us was the result of a shift in the contracting approach to allow for either separate or bundled services, thus 

providing increased competition and potentially greater cost savings.1

Change in Schedule Estimate () 

NGEN had experienced an almost 2-year slip in milestone C (authorizes a program to begin production and 

deployment, and authorized award of the NGEN contract) compared to its initial schedule estimate— from 

August 2011 to June 2013.2

Unavailable System Performance Data

NGEN had also experienced about a 7-month slip in its full deployment date (which 

the program calls final transition complete), from May 2014 to December 2014. Officials attributed the slippages 

to the need to conduct more detailed planning for acquiring NGEN services; delays in solicitation activities; the 

proposals received not being of the desired quality, which led to delays in contract award; and the contract 

award protest (previously discussed). As a result of the delays, Navy officials stated that they are planning to 

extend the continuity of services contract.

Navy had not yet evaluated system performance targets for NGEN because it had not yet transitioned to the 

new NGEN contract. Thus, system performance data were not available. Navy plans to conduct performance 

assessments to ensure that the network meets performance targets under the NGEN contract, with the first 

assessment planned to occur in the third quarter of fiscal year 2014. According to officials, until the NGEN 

performance measurements are fully implemented, the network will be subject to the performance targets of the 

current network operating under the continuity of services contract, which had been meeting its performance 

targets, as of December 2013.

 

1

In March 2011, we recommended that Navy reconsider its acquisition approach for NGEN (GAO, Information Technology: Better 

Informed Decision Making Needed on Navy’s Next Generation Enterprise Network Acquisition, GAO-11-150 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 11, 

2011)). In September 2012, we reported that Navy had reconsidered and made changes to how NGEN services were to be acquired

(GAO, Next Generation Enterprise Network: Navy Implementing Revised Approach, but Improvement Needed in Mitigating Risks, 

GAO-12-956 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 19, 2012)). 

2

We previously reported that Navy was experiencing delays in the NGEN program and that these delays had compressed the timeline 

for, and increased the risks associated with, transitioning to the new network before the end of the continuity of services contract 

(GAO-11-150 and GAO-12-956). 
Appendix II: Profiles of Selected DOD MAIS Programs

Page 89 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

Theater Medical Information Program- Joint (TMIP- J) Increment 2

TMIP-J Increment 2 is a set of applications that support warfighters and health care providers in areas of military 

operations (called theaters) by maintaining patient electronic health records, integrating medical logistics 

information, tracking patient movement, and providing medical command and control data. The program also 

integrates with medical systems at sites that support theaters, called sustaining bases. TMIP-J Increment 2 is 

intended to upgrade legacy systems and add significant new functionality to the first increment, including 

increased support for wounded warriors. This increment is intended to be fielded in three releases.

Program Essentials (as of December 2013)

DOD component: Defense Health Agency 

Program owner: Health Affairs Force Health Protection and 

Readiness 

Prime contractors: Evolvent, Data Networks Corporation, 

KRATOS, LEIDOS, Base Tech, Space and Naval Warfare 

Systems Center Atlantic, Deloitte, MSGI

Total number of contractors: 17

Fiscal year 2014 funding requested: $71.8 million

Program Costs (then-year dollars in millions)

First APB

(11/2002)

Latest Estimate

(12/2013)

Life-cycle cost estimate $67.7 $1,579.2

Acquisition 67.7 826.6

Operations and 

maintenance 

____________

0.0 752.6

Amount spent to date

(as of October 2013)

$535.0

System Deployment Details (as of December 2013)

Current number of total expected users: 30,000 of 21,000 

to 62,000a

Current number of total expected locations: 509 to 1273 of 

743 to 1856a

Legacy systems to be replaced: 2 

Annual cost of legacy systems: $430,000b

Number of expected system interfaces: 114 

Cost, Schedule, and Performance Summary

» Change in cost estimate () 

» Change in schedule estimate () 

» Did not fully meet system performance targets

Source: Data reported by DOD officials.

a

According to Defense Health Agency officials, the number of expected users and expected locations varies based on current demand for military 

operations.

b

This is the annual cost for the one remaining legacy system; the other was replaced in February 2009.
Appendix II: Profiles of Selected DOD MAIS Programs

Page 90 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

TMIP-J Increment 2

Program Status

In 2008, the first of three TMIP-J Increment 2 releases was approved for limited fielding. Program officials 

estimated that this first release delivered 80 percent of the capabilities planned for the increment. Also in 2008, 

the program reported a critical change in its cost and schedule estimates due to an increase in new 

requirements to support the influx of wounded warfighter initiatives, which increased the program’s scope. For 

example, capabilities were added to track warfighter concussions. The second and third releases are intended 

to enhance some of the applications that were deployed as part of the first release, as well as address new 

requirements, such as the previously mentioned concussion tracking. In September 2012, a capability to 

facilitate viewing the patient record, called context management, was dropped from the scope of this increment. 

In December 2013, the program achieved full deployment decision based on test results for the second release 

(discussed in the performance section) and the third release was in the requirements development phase.

Change in Cost Estimate () 

As of December 2013, the latest life-cycle cost estimate for TMIP-J Increment 2 was about $1.58 billion, which 

represented an approximately 2,233 percent increase from the program’s first APB estimate of $67.7 million, 

established in November 2002. The program reported that key reasons for this increase were (1) the addition of 

capabilities originally intended to be included in a future increment, including new warfighter requirements 

(previously discussed); and (2) operations and maintenance costs. Program officials stated that operations and 

maintenance costs were not included in the first APB estimate because it was initially thought that such costs 

would be paid by the individual military services.

Change in Schedule Estimate () 

As of December 2013, TMIP-J Increment 2 is expected to be fully delivered to the Services in the first quarter of 

fiscal year 2016—more than 6 years later than the May 2009 delivery date estimated in the first complete APB. 

Program officials reported that key reasons for this schedule change were, as previously discussed, the addition 

of new warfighter requirements and capabilities originally intended for another increment, and the Services’ 

request to delay the third release deployment due to their budget and schedule constraints. Program officials 

also reported that other delays were due, in part, to configuration management and software usage problems 

experienced when preparing the first release for deployment.

Did Not Fully Meet System Performance Targets

The first release of TMIP-J Increment 2 was tested in 2008 and found to be operationally effective, suitable, and 

survivable, with limitations, which did not prevent fielding. In August 2012, the second release did not fully pass 

system qualification testing due to defects with the previously mentioned context management capability. 

Subsequently, the program removed this capability from the increment and the test director recommended that 

the second release proceed to system acceptance testing. In December 2013, based on tests that were 

conducted primarily in a simulated environment, a multiservice operational test and evaluation determined that 

the second release was operationally effective and suitable for the Army, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy; 

and survivable for each of those services except the Navy, which must correct a major defect related to backup 

and restoration before the system can be fully deployed to the Navy. Additionally, the evaluation showed that 8 

of 46 critical and external interfaces passed testing, while the remaining 38 interfaces could not be evaluated 

until they are fielded.
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 91 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

Appendix III: Comments from the 

Department of Defense
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 92 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 93 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 94 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 95 GAO-14-309 Defense Major Automated Information Systems

Carol R. Cha at (202) 512-4456 or ChaC@gao.gov

In addition to the contact name above, the following staff also made key 

contributions to this report: Shannin O’Neill, Assistant Director; Milton 

Clement; Rebecca Eyler; Claudia Fletcher; Javier Irizarry; Emily Kuhn; 

Madhav Panwar; and Jeanne Sung.

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments

(311602)
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