MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Ruth A. Johnson

Marion County Public Defender

Indianapolis, Indiana

Timothy J. Burns

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Lyubov Gore

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

Christina D. Pace

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Devell L. Coleman,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

October 5, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No.

49A02-1601-CR-183

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court.

The Honorable Allan Reid, 

Commissioner.

Cause No. 49G10-1507-CM-023468

Shepard, Senior Judge

[1] A security guard for an apartment complex called the police and reported that 

Devell Coleman was trespassing on the property. Coleman was charged, tried, 

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and convicted of criminal trespass as a Class A misdemeanor. He appeals, 

arguing insufficient evidence. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] CSI Protective Services, LLC (“CSI”) is a private company that provides 

security services to apartment complexes in Indianapolis. Chad Butts is the 

owner and an employee of the company. In May of 2013, the company that 

managed the Strawbridge Green Apartments contracted with CSI to provide 

security services for the complex. Butts served as the guard.

[3] The complex had an anti-loitering policy. On June 27, 2015, Butts saw a group 

of people, including Coleman, loitering on the property. When Butts told the 

group to disperse, Coleman became upset and began to “voice his opinion.” 

Appellant’s Br. p. 6. Butts told Coleman “that [he] knew he wasn’t a resident 

of the community” and that he would consider him a trespasser if he did not 

“go inside [of an apartment], or start walking or do something other than the 

loitering . . . .” Tr. pp. 15-16. When Coleman did not comply, Butts decided 

he was a trespasser and called the police. 

[4] Butts soon cancelled the call to police because an individual led Coleman into 

an apartment, and Butts was unable to give the police an exact location for 

Coleman. As Coleman walked away, however, Butts verbally informed him

that he was considered a trespasser, stating: “[A]s an agent of the property, you 

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are hereby trespassed from Strawbridge Green Apartments . . . – that includes 

all building[s], sidewalks, yards and grass of the community.” Id. at 17.

[5] On July 4, 2015, Butts again encountered Coleman on the property and advised 

him that he was trespassing. Coleman ignored Butts, proceeded to place items 

in a trash dumpster, and then retreated to an apartment. Butts called the police. 

An officer with the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department arrived at the 

complex, entered the apartment to which Coleman had retreated, and arrested 

Coleman for trespassing. 

[6] Coleman was charged with Class A misdemeanor criminal trespass.

1

 

Following a bench trial, Coleman was found guilty as charged.

Issues

[7] Coleman presents two issues:

I. Whether sufficient evidence was presented to establish an 

agency relationship between CSI and the owner of the 

apartment building; and

II. Whether there was sufficient evidence to prove Coleman 

did not have a property interest in the apartment in which 

he was found.

1 Ind. Code § 35-43-2-2(b)(1) (2014).

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Discussion and Decision

[8] When reviewing sufficiency claims, we consider only the probative evidence 

and reasonable inferences supporting the judgment, without reweighing the 

evidence or reassessing witness credibility. Morgan v. State, 22 N.E.3d 570 (Ind.

2014). We affirm if there is substantial evidence of probative value such that a 

reasonable trier of fact could have concluded the defendant was guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt. Bailey v. State, 907 N.E.2d 1003 (Ind. 2009). 

[9] To convict Coleman of criminal trespass, the State needed to prove beyond a 

reasonable doubt that Coleman (1) did not have a contractual interest in the 

apartment complex property, and (2) knowingly or intentionally entered the 

property (3) after having been denied entry by the owner of the apartment 

complex or the owner’s agent. See Ind. Code § 35-43-2-2(b)(1). 

I. Agency Relationship

[10] Coleman first contends that Butts was without authority to deny him entry to 

the apartment complex because the evidence at trial did not adequately

establish an agency relationship between CSI and the owner of the complex. 

We disagree. 

[11] The evidence was that the property management company overseeing the 

complex contracted with CSI to provide security services at the Strawbridge 

Green Apartments. Butts testified that he signed the contract and that under 

the contract, he had the authority to act as the apartment complex’s agent. 

Butts further testified that one of his duties was to prevent loitering. From this 

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evidence, a reasonable fact-finder could determine that Butts had the authority 

to act on behalf of the complex and that Coleman was barred from entering by 

an agent of the owner.

II. Contractual Interest

[12] Coleman next argues that the State did not present sufficient evidence to show 

he lacked a contractual interest in the apartment in which he was found. He 

maintains that the renter of the apartment gave him permission to stay there

and that he had been on home detention at that location. He contends that his 

reasonable belief that he had a right to be in the apartment should have 

precluded prosecution for criminal trespass. 

[13] A “contractual interest,” as it is used in the criminal trespass statute, refers to 

the right to be present on another’s property, arising out of an agreement 

between at least two parties that creates an obligation to do or not to do a 

particular thing. A.E.B. v. State, 756 N.E.2d 536, 540 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). In 

proving the lack of a contractual interest, the State need not “disprove every 

conceivable contractual interest” that a defendant might have obtained in the 

real property at issue. Fleck v. State, 508 N.E.2d 539, 541 (Ind. 1987). The State 

satisfies its burden when it disproves those contractual interests that are 

reasonably apparent from the context and circumstances under which the 

trespass is alleged to have occurred. Lyles v. State, 970 N.E.2d 140 (Ind. 2012).

[14] Sufficient evidence was presented that Coleman had no contractual interest in 

the apartment in which he was found, and that his belief that he had a right to 

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be in the apartment was not reasonable. Coleman was not listed on the lease of 

the apartment and Coleman had previously been warned by Butts that his 

presence on the apartment complex property was considered a trespass. See 

Myers v. State, 190 Ind. 269, 272, 130 N.E. 116, 117 (1921) (belief that one has a 

right to be on the property of another “must have a fair and reasonable 

foundation”). There was no evidence that Coleman had any enforceable right 

against the actual renter, and Coleman’s act of listing the address as his location 

for home detention likewise did not create any enforceable obligation. Lyles, 

970 N.E.2d at 143 (defendant lacking a contractual interest held to be 

trespasser).

Conclusion

[15] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

[16] Affirmed.

Vaidik, C.J., and Riley, J., concur.

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