DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

TYLER JOSEPH HADLEY,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 4D14-1228

[April 27, 2016]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, St. 

Lucie County; Robert R. Makemson, Judge; L.T. Case No. 

562011CF002340A.

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Patrick B. Burke, Assistant 

Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Laura Fisher, 

Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

FORST, J.

Appellant Tyler Hadley entered an open plea to two counts of firstdegree murder with a weapon (a hammer) in relation to the murder of his 

parents while Appellant was seventeen years old, still a juvenile. He was 

convicted and sentenced to two consecutive life sentences without the 

possibility of parole in early 2014.

The Supreme Court’s 2012 decision in Miller v. Alabama held that 

“mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of 

their crimes violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on ‘cruel and 

unusual punishments.’” Miller, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012). As a result, 

the State of Florida’s juvenile sentencing scheme was forced to undergo a 

complete overhaul, with the Legislature ultimately adopting a 

comprehensive new sentencing plan that was later made retroactive by the 

Supreme Court of Florida in Horsley v. State, 160 So. 3d 393 (Fla. 2015). 

Appellant was sentenced during the period of time between the Court’s 

decision in Miller and the Legislature’s passage of the new sentencing 
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scheme. Because Appellant was sentenced during this transitional period, 

the trial court was forced to operate with little concrete guidance as to the 

sentencing options available for Appellant. While the trial court did an 

admirable job in anticipating the requirements of the new statutory 

system, we nonetheless must reverse Appellant’s sentence and remand for 

the trial court to consider the new sentencing requirements. We affirm 

without discussion Appellant’s other challenge on appeal, related to 

testimony by both parties’ experts that referenced the testing results of 

another expert who did not testify.

Background

Appellant was seventeen years, five months old when he killed his 

parents. As noted above, he pled no contest to both counts of first-degree

murder with a weapon and the entire two weeks of hearings in this case 

were devoted to sentencing. Given the unsettled state of the law at the 

time, the trial court believed it had two options for sentencing Appellant: 

life without parole or, using the theory of statutory revival, life with a 

mandatory minimum of twenty-five (25) years. After listening to extensive 

testimony from family members, friends, and numerous expert witnesses, 

the trial court sentenced Appellant to two consecutive terms of life 

imprisonment without the possibility of parole.

Analysis

“The legality of a sentence is a question of law and is subject to de novo

review.” Flowers v. State, 899 So. 2d 1257, 1259 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005). 

However, the trial court’s findings on aggravating or mitigating factors are 

reviewed for competent substantial evidence. See Martin v. State, 107 So. 

3d 281, 318-19 (Fla. 2012). In this case, the trial court made two errors 

that require reversal and resentencing. First, the trial court made an 

incorrect finding of fact as to Appellant’s prior criminal history. Second, 

the trial court incorrectly applied the theory of statutory revival when 

considering possible sentences for Appellant. 

As discussed above, Florida has adopted a new sentencing scheme for 

juvenile defendants who commit capital felonies. Codified in sections 

775.082, 921.1401, and 921.1402, Florida Statutes (2014), this new 

legislation provides, in part, that a juvenile defendant who commits a 

capital felony shall be punished by either a life sentence or by a term of at 

least forty years. § 755.082(1)(b)1. In determining if a life sentence is 

appropriate, the trial court should conduct a hearing, considering “factors 

relevant to the offense and the defendant’s youth and attendant 

circumstances,” including the factors enumerated in section 
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921.1401(2)(a)-(j). § 921.1401(2). Under section 921.1402(2)(a), “[a] 

juvenile offender sentenced under s. 755.082(1)(b)1. is entitled to a review 

of his or her sentence after 25 years,” unless he or she was previously 

convicted, as “part of a separate criminal transaction or episode,” of one of 

the crimes listed in that section. As noted earlier, this new sentencing 

scheme has been made retroactive by the Supreme Court of Florida in 

Horsley v. State.

In this case, the trial court properly considered the factors enumerated 

in section 921.1401(2)(a)-(j) when determining the appropriate sentence 

for Appellant. However, the trial court found that Appellant had 

committed a prior capital felony. There was no support for such a finding 

in the record. In fact, the only capital felonies committed by the Appellant

were the ones for which he was being sentenced, which were part of the 

same “criminal transaction or episode.” For the trial court to consider 

these crimes as part of Appellant’s “prior criminal history,” as required in 

section 921.1401(2)(h), was erroneous.

Additionally, the trial court mistakenly (in hindsight) believed its 

options for sentencing were either life without parole or to apply statutory 

revival and sentence Appellant to life with a mandatory minimum of 25

years. The Supreme Court has specifically held that statutory revival is 

inappropriate in these cases. Horsley, 160 So. 3d at 395. Instead, the 

trial court’s alternative to a life sentence would be sentencing Appellant to 

a term of “at least 40 years.” § 755.082(1)(b)1. Although the trial court 

clearly believed a mandatory minimum of twenty-five years was 

insufficient, it did not have the option of a term of at least forty years to 

consider as a more appropriate sentence than life without the possibility 

of parole. Therefore, this matter is remanded for the purpose of the trial 

court resentencing Appellant with the correct options before it.

Conclusion

The trial court made a finding of fact (that Appellant had a prior 

criminal history) that was unsupported by the record. Additionally, the 

trial court did not consider the correct alternative to a life sentence. We 

are therefore compelled to reverse and remand for resentencing. We 

further note that any new sentence under section 775.0821(1)(b)1. is 

subject to review after twenty-five years, as required by section 

924.1402(2)(a). 

Reversed and remanded for resentencing.

STEVENSON and GROSS, JJ., concur.
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* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.