2013 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

8-30-2013

William Keitel v. Joseph Mazurkiewicz

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential

Docket No. 12-4027

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2013 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.

Recommended Citation

"William Keitel v. Joseph Mazurkiewicz" (2013). 2013 Decisions. Paper 273.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013/273
PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 12-4027

_____________

WILLIAM A. KEITEL,

 Appellant 

v.

JOSEPH MAZURKIEWICZ; 

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF 

PENNSYLVANIA 

_____________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Pennsylvania

(No. 2-11-cv-01209)

District Judge: Hon. Nora B. Fischer

Before: CHAGARES, VANASKIE, and SHWARTZ, Circuit 

Judges.

(Filed: August 30, 2013)

____________

OPINION

____________
2

Chris R. Eyster, Esq.

100 Ross Street

Suite 304

Pittsburgh, PA 15219-2013

Attorney for Appellant

Ronald M. Wabby, Jr., Esq.

Office of the District Attorney

401 Allegheny County Courthouse

Pittsburgh, PA 15219

Attorney for Appellees

CHAGARES, Circuit Judge.

Appellant William Keitel was convicted in late 1998 

by a jury in the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas of first 

degree murder, third degree murder, aggravated assault, and 

five counts of recklessly endangering another person. 

Keitel’s aggregate sentence was life imprisonment plus thirtyfive to seventy years of imprisonment. Keitel unsuccessfully 

appealed his convictions and sentence. His efforts to seek 

relief under Pennsylvania’s Post Conviction Relief Act were 

similarly unsuccessful.

Keitel filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the United States District 

Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania in September 

2011. The District Court denied the petition and Keitel 

timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 1291 and 2253.

The case has been fully briefed by the parties and is 

listed to be heard by the Court on September 26, 2013. 
3

However, the parties notified the Court that Keitel died on 

August 11, 2013. The appellees now contend that Keitel’s 

case is moot and should be dismissed. In response, Keitel’s 

attorney of record has advised the Court that Keitel’s parents, 

his “next of kin,” desire “to continue the appeal to clear their 

son’s name.”

Article III of the Constitution limits the federal courts 

to adjudication of actual, ongoing “[c]ases” and 

“[c]ontroversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. The “caseor-controversy requirement subsists through all stages of 

federal judicial proceedings, trial and appellate.” Lewis v. 

Cont’l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990). “Courts 

enforce the case-or-controversy requirement through several 

justiciability doctrines,” which “include standing, ripeness, 

mootness, the political-question doctrine, and the prohibition 

on advisory opinions.” Toll Bros., Inc. v. Twp. of 

Readington, 555 F.3d 131, 137 (3d Cir. 2009). As we have 

observed, “[i]f developments occur during the course of 

adjudication that eliminate a plaintiff’s personal stake in the 

outcome of a suit or prevent a court from being able to grant 

the requested relief, the case must be dismissed as moot.” 

Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 698-99 

(3d Cir. 1996). We consider whether Keitel’s death renders 

this appeal moot.

Section 2254 empowers a federal court to grant a 

petitioner relief from unlawful state custody. See Preiser v. 

Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973) (noting that “the 

essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody 

upon the legality of that custody, and that the traditional 

function of the writ is to secure release from illegal 

custody.”); Barry v. Brower, 864 F.2d 294, 296 (3d Cir. 
4

1988) (holding that “a district court’s power to grant a writ of 

habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is limited . . . to 

directing [the petitioner’s] release from custody.”). Because 

Keitel has died, he is no longer “in custody.” See 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(a). Accordingly, we conclude that Keitel’s habeas 

petition has been rendered moot by his death. We note that 

our decision today is in accord with that of every other Court 

of Appeals to have considered this issue. See, e.g., Bruno v. 

Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 700 F.3d 445, 445 (11th Cir. 2012) 

(“The death of the habeas petitioner renders a habeas action 

moot.”); Garceau v. Woodford, 399 F.3d 1101, 1101 (9th Cir. 

2005); McMillin v. Bowersox, 102 F.3d 987, 987 (8th Cir. 

1996); McClendon v. Trigg, 79 F.3d 557, 559 (7th Cir. 1996); 

Knapp v. Baker, 509 F.2d 922, 922 (5th Cir. 1975). See also

Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 168 n.2 (1986) (“[T]he 

habeas petitioner . . . died prior to the District Court’s 

decision, so his case became moot.”); In re Kravitz, 504 

F.Supp. 43, 49-50 (M.D. Pa. 1980).

For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District 

Court’s order denying the petition and remand this case to the 

District Court with instructions to dismiss the petition as 

moot.