FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

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No. 1D17-2793

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JOSHUA BRANDYN GASKEY,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Holmes County.

Christopher N. Patterson, Judge.

May 21, 2019

WINOKUR, J.

Following a jury trial, Joshua Brandyn Gaskey was 

convicted of two counts of first-degree murder, one count of 

armed robbery, and one count of armed burglary. Gaskey shot 

and killed Sheley and Jacquelyn Brooks in their home while

stealing their prescription medication to satisfy a drug debt. We 

affirm Gaskey’s judgment and sentence.

I.

The day after the murders, Gaskey and his girlfriend, Sarah 

Carroll, were arrested. Carroll was placed in an interview room 

and was questioned by Holmes County Sheriff’s Office 

Investigator Michael Raley and Lieutenant Tyler Harrison. 
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Carroll waived her Miranda rights and stated that she had 

driven to the Brookses’ residence on the day of the incident with 

Gaskey and a man known to her as “Pooh.” Gaskey entered the 

home while Carroll and Pooh stayed in the car. According to 

Carroll, Gaskey had been in the home for approximately fifteen to 

twenty minutes when she heard three loud bangs. Gaskey then 

left the home and got back in the car with two bottles of 

prescription pills. Gaskey, Carroll, and Pooh then drove to a 

motel where Pooh divided up the pills to settle Gaskey’s drug 

debt. Carroll stated that she asked Gaskey about the bangs she 

heard in the residence and Gaskey responded that he didn’t know 

what she was talking about.

Prior to the start of his interview, Gaskey asked an officer 

why he was hearing Carroll cry. The officer repeatedly told 

Gaskey to stay seated and that he did not know why or if Carroll 

was crying. Gaskey then became belligerent and went on an 

expletive-laced tirade against the officer and police in general.

After entering Gaskey’s interview room, Raley and Harrison 

informed Gaskey of his Miranda rights. Gaskey told Raley he 

understood his rights, and read and initialed a Miranda rights 

form indicating that he understood his rights. As to the question 

whether he had “previously asked any law enforcement officer to 

speak to an attorney,” Gaskey wrote “Not Yet!” Regarding the 

question “[w]ith these rights in mind do you wish to speak with 

me?” Gaskey wrote “Yes!”

From the outset of his interview, Gaskey asked Raley and 

Harrison if Carroll was the person he heard crying in the other 

room. Raley confirmed that Carroll was in the other room crying. 

As the interview progressed, Gaskey became confrontational and 

told the officers that he did not care about the Brookses and that 

all he was concerned about was Carroll’s well-being:

I, I care about [Hardin, the son of the Brookses], and I 

care about [Carroll], but I really don’t care about that 

s**t, I just want to know what’s going on with [Carroll]. 

After that, I just want to go to a cell and lay down for a 

while. I’m probably going to sit here and dope sick off my 

ass right now, I just want to know what’s wrong with 
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[Carroll], that’s all I care about, everything, I don’t care 

about any of this.

The officers told Gaskey that his cell phone and video 

surveillance placed him in the vicinity of the crime scene, Gaskey 

informed Raley and Harrison that he would tell them the truth if 

he saw Carroll. Gaskey then proceeded to state that he owed 

Pooh a drug debt and that Pooh threatened Carroll’s life over it. 

As a result, they went to the Brookses’ home to get their 

prescription pills. Gaskey planned to just ask the Brookses for 

the pills or to take them by force if they did not agree since they 

were elderly. Gaskey admitted that he went inside the residence 

with a gun intending to scare them into giving him the pills, but 

the gun had a “hair trigger” and went off. Gaskey also confirmed 

that he shot Sheley Brooks first and that he threw the gun into 

the ocean off the Three Mile Bridge.

Before trial, Gaskey filed a Motion to Suppress Evidence 

regarding his post-arrest interrogation alleging that he had

invoked his right to silence and counsel. The trial court held a 

hearing and issued an order denying the motion, concluding that 

Gaskey did not make an unequivocal statement indicating that 

he wanted to cease questioning. Gaskey then filed a second 

suppression motion, arguing that law enforcement misstated the

law during the interrogation. The trial court held another 

evidentiary hearing and denied this second motion, concluding 

that law enforcement did not make any misrepresentations of 

fact or law.

II.

A trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence 

presents a mixed question of law and fact. Connor v. State, 803 

So. 2d 598, 608 (Fla. 2001). The trial court’s factual findings will 

be upheld if there is competent, substantial evidence to support 

them. State v. Young, 974 So. 2d 601, 608 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). 

However, the trial court’s application of the law to those facts is 

reviewed de novo. Id.

Both the United States Constitution and the Florida 

Constitution provide protections against self-incrimination. 
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Amend. V, U.S. Const.; art. I, § 9, Fla. Const. Any statements 

obtained by police in violation of these constitutional provisions 

are to be suppressed pursuant to the exclusionary rule. Cuervo v. 

State, 967 So. 2d 155, 160 (Fla. 2007). In Miranda v. Arizona, the 

United States Supreme Court created a prophylactic rule 

whereby police are required to inform defendants of their right to 

remain silent, as well as their right to counsel prior to any 

custodial interrogation. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 

Once a suspect has waived Miranda rights, police are not 

required to end an interrogation if the defendant makes an 

equivocal or ambiguous request for counsel. State v. Owen, 696 

So. 2d 715, 717 (Fla. 1997) (citing Davis v. United States, 512 

U.S. 452, 459 (1994)). Only an unambiguous and unequivocal 

request for counsel requires that police terminate an 

interrogation. Owen, 696 So. 2d at 719. Similarly, a defendant’s 

invocation of the right to silence must also be unequivocal and 

unambiguous. Kalisz v. State, 124 So. 3d 185, 202 (Fla. 2013)

(citing Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 381-82 (2010)).

III.

Gaskey argues that while he initially waived his Miranda

rights, he subsequently invoked his right to counsel during the 

interrogation. As a result, Investigator Raley should have ceased 

questioning. Because we see neither an unequivocal nor an 

unambiguous assertion of his right to counsel, we disagree.

Gaskey read and signed a form informing him of his 

Miranda rights and stated that he wanted to speak with Raley 

and Harrison. Almost immediately after the interrogation began, 

Gaskey began to pepper Raley with questions about Carroll. As 

the interrogation continued, Gaskey became more frustrated 

about why Carroll was crying. Raley told Gaskey that Carroll was 

crying because she had “figured out what happened today.” 

Gaskey replied that he did not really care what happened to the 

Brookses and that all he cared about was finding out what was 

happening to Carroll. Exasperated, Gaskey stated as follows:

Go ahead and, go ahead and tell me your conclusions, I 

don’t care, or what [Carroll’s] conclusions are, I don’t 
5

care, like I said, I just want to know what’s wrong with 

[Carroll]. So, tell me what she’s figured out, and after 

that, go ahead and f*****g sign off that I need a lawyer 

or whatever if I’m being arrested. If I’m not being 

arrested, then take me to a cell for my other warrants, 

so I can go ahead and get this s**t over with. But other 

than that, like I said, I want to know what’s wrong with 

her, so whatever she’s figured out, tell me what she’s 

figured out so I can go ahead and go to a cell now 

because other than that, I’m done.

Gaskey points to this exchange as an unequivocal and 

unambiguous invocation of his right to counsel. We disagree. It 

appears that Gaskey’s primary motivation was to get information 

about Carroll. Indeed, Gaskey’s entire conversation with Raley 

centered on Gaskey’s repeated requests to find out why Carroll 

was crying and later what she “figured out.” 

More importantly, Gaskey’s statement was entirely 

conditional. To the extent Gaskey was asserting his rights to 

counsel or to end questioning, it was dependent on receiving 

information about Carroll. In fact, he ended his statement by 

saying “tell me what she’s figured out so I can go ahead and go to 

a cell now because other than that, I’m done.” Thus, it is 

reasonable to assume that Gaskey had no intention of ending the 

interrogation in order to confer with counsel. Instead, Gaskey 

simply wanted more information about Carroll. This is bolstered 

by the fact that Gaskey kept talking with Raley and answering 

his questions. It appeared that Gaskey was only vaguely 

referencing his right to counsel as a way to extract information 

about Carroll from police. Such a statement is not an 

unambiguous and unequivocal assertion of ones Miranda rights.1

 1 Florida courts have ruled that statements that appear to be 

more explicit requests for counsel than Gaskey’s are equivocal. 

See Jones v. State, 748 So. 2d 1012, 1020 (Fla. 1999) (finding the 

defendant’s request “to talk to his mother [and] his attorney” 

insufficient to invoke his right to counsel); Long v. State, 517 So. 

2d 664, 667 (Fla. 1987) (concluding that the statement “I think I 

might need an attorney” was equivocal); Waterhouse v. State, 429 

So. 2d 301, 305 (Fla. 1983) (holding that the statements “I think I 
6

Accordingly, Raley was under no obligation to stop the 

interrogation based on these statements.

IV.

Gaskey also argues that his incriminating statements during 

the interview were involuntary because Lieutenant Harrison 

misstated the law. Since his confession came after the alleged 

misstatement of law, Gaskey asserts that the trial court erred in 

denying his motion to suppress. 

An involuntary confession is inadmissible. Martin v. State, 

107 So. 3d 281, 298 (Fla. 2012). A confession is voluntary if it is 

“the product of free will and rational choice,” which is determined 

by the totality of the circumstances surrounding the confession. 

Id. Direct or implied promises render a confession inadmissible

only if the promise made the confession involuntary in the 

totality of the circumstances. Id. at 313-14. A causal connection, 

however, must be found between the improper promise or 

coercive conduct and the defendant’s subsequent confession. 

Ramirez v. State, 15 So. 3d 852, 855-56 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009).

After a long exchange with Investigator Raley and 

Lieutenant Harrison regarding what he did the day of the 

murders, Gaskey reiterated his near-constant request to know 

why Carroll was crying. Gaskey then immediately proceeded to 

state that whatever he knew was irrelevant based on the 

allegations Raley and Harrison were making about Gaskey’s 

involvement in the crime. At that point Harrison explained the 

difference between first-degree murder, second-degree murder, 

and manslaughter using hypothetical scenarios to illustrate the 

difference between them:

[HARRISON]: Well, yeah, there is, see, there’s different 

levels of murder, there’s premeditated, that's where you 

 

want to talk to an attorney before I say anything else” and “I 

think I’d like to talk to my attorney” were both equivocal).
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said I’m going to drive over there and I’m going to kill 

them for the pills, that’s premeditated, I don’t want to 

believe that, okay. Then there’s second degree, that’s 

where you go over there, in the heat of the moment, 

something happens, somebody dies. Then there’s 

manslaughter, that’s where he got over there and 

something accidentally, it was fight over the gun and 

something like that happened, that’s the lowest level, 

okay. So, you’re talking about everything from life in 

prison all the way down to a few years in prison, so 

that’s where I need to know that why and where, okay, 

that why, because without that why, all I can do is go 

back and say, he’s saying he ain’t left Pensacola, we can 

put him here, we can show it, I got witnesses, I got 

everything else, but he wants to say that, okay, but that 

is why I need to know that why. That’s where that why 

comes in very important, so I need to know why that 

happened. What was your train of thought? What were 

you thinking? I mean, I know you saw (sic) you’ve been 

doping all day.

Afterwards, Gaskey responded, “[i]f you want to hear my 

answer, I want to tell it to [Carroll], I want her to hear it from 

me, I’ll tell you whatever you want to know.” Gaskey also 

promised to tell “the truth.” Gaskey then proceeded to confess to 

entering the Brookses’ residence with the intention of stealing 

their prescription pain medication and accidentally shooting both 

of them multiple times.

Gaskey relies on Baptiste v. State, 179 So. 3d 502 (Fla. 1st 

DCA 2015), for his assertion that Harrison misstated the law as 

it related to homicide, which rendered his confession involuntary. 

In Baptiste, police told the defendant that if he committed the 

armed robbery they were investigating with a BB gun and not a 

firearm then “‘this is the time for you to tell us that’ because ‘it 

makes a world of difference.’” Id. at 504. When the defendant 

then asked why it made a difference, the officers told the 

defendant that if he used a BB gun to commit the robbery that it 

was attempted robbery and not armed robbery. Id. at 505. The 

defendant subsequently confessed and was charged with two 

counts of armed robbery with a deadly weapon. Id. On appeal, 
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this Court found that the officers misstated the law since using a 

BB gun can support a conviction for armed robbery. Id. at 506. 

Thus, the officers’ promise that the defendant could not be 

charged with armed robbery if he confessed to using a BB gun 

rendered his subsequent confession involuntary. Id. at 507.

In this case, Lieutenant Harrison made no comparable 

statement. Harrison simply responded to Gaskey’s statement 

with the accurate observation that his mindset during the 

commission of the crime is important to determining the 

punishment he faced. While Harrison’s explanation may seem 

somewhat inapt to experienced criminal practitioners, it was

nothing like the clearly erroneous legal explanation given by the 

officers in Baptiste. More importantly, “advis[ing] a suspect of 

potential penalties and consequences does not amount to a 

threat.” Martin, 107 So. 3d at 305. Harrison simply informed

Gaskey that his mindset during the incident would matter. As a 

result, Harrison did not make a misstatement of law.

In any event, Gaskey’s confession was not causally connected

to Harrison’s statement. Immediately after Harrison’s 

explanation about the different classifications of homicide, 

Gaskey stated that he would tell “the truth” if he could say it to 

Carroll. It was only after this response from Gaskey that Raley 

and Harrison told him that they would bring Carroll over, but 

that Gaskey would have to tell them the truth first. Based on 

Gaskey’s obsession with Carroll throughout the interrogation, it 

is reasonable to assume that Gaskey was attempting to exploit 

Harrison’s desire to know what occurred by demanding to see 

Carroll. Again, Gaskey made no statement indicating that he 

would say anything the officers wanted to hear. Gaskey stated 

that he would tell “the truth” in exchange for seeing Carroll. 

There is nothing to indicate that Gaskey confessed because of 

Harrison’s explanation.

Gaskey’s overture to police is similar to the facts in Black v. 

State, where both the defendant and his girlfriend were arrested 

after a police search of the defendant’s home yielded marijuana in 

a dresser belonging to his girlfriend. 630 So. 2d 609, 614 (Fla. 1st 

DCA 1993). At the police station, the defendant became 

concerned over her well-being and “offered to provide details of 
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the robberies if [his girlfriend] was not charged for those 

offenses.” Id. On appeal, this Court found the defendant’s 

subsequent confession voluntary concluding that “there was no 

police overreaching [and] [i]nstead, the extraction of any 

‘promises’ from the police was induced solely by overtures from 

the appellant, motivated by his concern for the welfare of 

his girlfriend.” Id. at 617. 

As in Black, Gaskey proposed the “offer” of telling police “the 

truth” in exchange for seeing Carroll. As a result, it cannot be 

said that Harrison misstated the law, made any promises, or 

otherwise induced Gaskey to confess.

V.

In conclusion, Gaskey waived his Miranda rights and 

voluntarily spoke to police. Gaskey’s overriding concern 

throughout the interrogation was Carroll’s well-being. At no point 

did Gaskey unequivocally invoke his right to silence or counsel. 

Furthermore, the interrogating officers did not misstate the law. 

Gaskey simply attempted to leverage his knowledge of the 

murders in order to see Carroll, and in the process confessed to 

the crime. As a result, Gaskey’s confession was neither coerced 

nor involuntary. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in 

denying Gaskey’s suppression motions. We, therefore, affirm his 

judgment and sentence.2

AFFIRMED.

B.L. THOMAS, C.J., and KELSEY, J., concur.

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Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

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 2 We reject all other arguments Gaskey makes in this appeal.
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Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Steven L. Seliger, Assistant 

Public Defender, and Barbara J. Busharis, Assistant Public 

Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.