NOTICE: NOT FOR PUBLICATION. 

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE 

LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED.

IN THE 

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondent, 

v.

DAVID URIARTE, JR., Petitioner. 

No. 1 CA-CR 12-0487 PRPC 

 

Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Maricopa County 

No. CR 2010-005836-001 

The Honorable John R. Hannah, Jr., Judge 

REVIEW GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED 

COUNSEL 

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix 

By Diane Meloche 

Counsel for Respondent 

David Uriarte, Jr., Florence 

Petitioner 
STATE v. URIARTE 

Decision of the Court 

2 

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Presiding Judge Andrew W. Gould, Judge Peter B. Swann, and Judge Jon 

W. Thompson delivered the following decision. 

PER CURIAM: 

¶1 Petitioner David Uriarte, Jr., petitions this court for review 

from the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. Presiding 

Judge Andrew W. Gould and Judges Peter B. Swann and Jon W. 

Thompson have considered the petition for review and, for the reasons 

stated, grant review but deny relief. 

¶2 Uriarte pled guilty to three counts of attempted molestation 

of a child, all dangerous crimes against children. The trial court sentenced 

Uriarte to a presumptive term of ten years of imprisonment for one count 

and placed him on lifetime probation for the other two. Uriarte filed a pro 

se of-right petition for post-conviction relief after his counsel found no 

colorable claims for relief. The trial court dismissed the petition and 

Uriarte now seeks review. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Ariz. R. Crim. 

P. 32.9(c). 

¶3 The petition properly presents one issue for review. Uriarte 

argues that his trial counsel was ineffective when she failed to “challenge 

the Court about the conduct of the Judge and the [prosecutor] for basin[g] 

everything [on] pure speculation.” To state a colorable claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that counsel’s performance 

fell below objectively reasonable standards and that the deficient 

performance prejudiced the defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 

668, 687 (1984). To show prejudice, a defendant must show that there is a 

“reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the 

result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. “A 

reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence 

in the outcome.” Id. 

¶4 We grant review but deny relief. Uriarte does not identify 

any specific action or inaction on the part of the trial court or the 

prosecutor that his counsel should have challenged, nor does he identify 

how any alleged action or inaction on the part of the court or the 

prosecutor prejudiced him. Further, Uriarte does not identify the specific 

legal grounds for any proposed challenge that his counsel should have 
STATE v. URIARTE 

Decision of the Court 

3 

made. He has, therefore, failed to state a colorable claim for relief based 

on ineffective assistance of counsel. If the “pure speculation” to which 

Uriarte refers is the evidence supporting the convictions themselves, 

Uriarte does not contest that he pled guilty to each count and gave a 

sufficient factual basis to support each guilty plea. 

¶5 While the petition for review presents several additional 

issues, Uriarte did not raise those issues in the petition for post-conviction 

relief he filed below. A petition for review may not present issues not first 

presented to the trial court. State v. Bortz, 169 Ariz. 575, 577, 821 P.2d 236, 

238 (App. 1991); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9(c)(1)(ii). 

¶6 For the reasons stated above, we grant review but deny 

relief.