IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE of the 

STATE OF DELAWARE

 Appellant,

v.

ROBIN S. DENSTEN, 

and

UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 

APPEAL BOARD,

Appellees. 

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C.A. No. N14A-09-008 RFS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Submitted: June 1, 2016

Decided: July 6, 2016

Upon Appeal from the Decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board.

Affirmed. 

Kevin R. Slattery, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney 

for Appellant Department of Justice of the State of Delaware. 

Dimitry Pilipis, Esquire, Legal Services Corporation of Delaware, Inc., Wilmington, 

Delaware, Attorney for Appellee Robin S. Densten.

Paige J. Schmittinger, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Wilmington, Delaware, 

Attorney for Appellee Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board.

STOKES, J.
2

I. INTRODUCTION

This is an appeal by the Department of Justice of the State of Delaware (“DOJ”) from a

decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board (the “UIAB” or “Board”) issued on 

September 18, 2014. The UIAB found that Robin S. Densten (“Ms. Densten”) voluntarily left 

her employment at the DOJ for good cause. For the reasons set forth below, the decision of the 

UIAB is AFFIRMED. 

II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 2005, the appellee, Ms. Densten, became a DOJ Trial Support Specialist. Ms. Densten

was responsible for the preparation of audio/visual and other demonstrative exhibits for the 

DOJ‟s prosecutors. Given Ms. Densten‟s position, she often was required to work late hours. In 

the fall of 2013, Ms. Densten submitted an overtime request that initially was denied because she 

failed to obtain prior approval in accordance with the DOJ‟s policy. On September 27, 2013, 

Ms. Densten submitted her resignation.

On November 15, 2013, Ms. Densten filed a claim for unemployment compensation. A 

Claims Deputy determined that, pursuant to 19 Del. C. § 3314, Ms. Densten left work voluntarily 

without good cause; therefore, she was not entitled to unemployment compensation. Ms. 

Densten filed an appeal, and a hearing was scheduled before an Appeals Referee. At the hearing, 

Ms. Densten appeared pro se and testified. The DOJ presented the testimony of two witnesses, 

Diane Hasse, the DOJ‟s Human Resources Director, and Joseph Grubb, Ms. Densten‟s 

supervisor. Mr. Grubb became Ms. Densten‟s supervisor upon assuming the position of Chief 

New Castle County Prosecutor. In a decision dated March, 26, 2015, the Appeals Referee 

likewise found Ms. Densten was disqualified.
3

Ms. Densten filed a timely appeal of that decision to the UIAB, and a hearing was 

scheduled for July 16, 2014. Because of witness unavailability, the DOJ sought a continuance. 

The UIAB continued the hearing for July 30, 2014. On July 28, 2014, Ms. Densten requested a 

continuance to better prepare her case. This request was granted, and the hearing was 

rescheduled for August 13, 2014. The DOJ, again citing witness unavailability, requested 

another postponement. However, the UIAB essentially informed the DOJ the request would 

have to be made at the hearing. This was an older case on the docket. 

When the DOJ made the request, the UIAB denied it; however, the Board limited the 

scope of Ms. Densten‟s testimony. Specifically, she only could testify to conversations she had 

with Ms. Hasse, the only DOJ witness present at the hearing. On September 8, 2014, the UIAB 

reversed the decision of the Appeals Referee, finding that Ms. Densten did have good cause to 

voluntarily leave work.

The DOJ filed a timely appeal to this Court on September 18, 2014. Briefing is 

complete, and the matter is ripe for decision. 

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court‟s appellate review of decisions of the UIAB is limited. The Court must 

ascertain whether the Board‟s conclusions are supported by substantial evidence and free from 

legal error.1 Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might 

accept as adequate to support a conclusion.2 The Court will not weigh evidence, determine 

questions of credibility, or make its own factual findings.3 Instead, the Court is restricted to a 

 

1 Gsell v. Unclaimed Freight, 1995 WL 339026, at *2 (Del. Super. May 3, 1995). 

2 Oceanport Ind. v. Wilm. Stevedores, 636 A.2d 892, 899 (Del. 1994). 

3

Thompson v. Christiana Care Health Sys., 25 A.3d 778, 782 (Del. 2011). 
4

consideration of the record4in a light most favorable to the prevailing party before the UIAB.5

The scope of review for any court considering a decision of the UIAB on a continuance 

request is whether there was an abuse of discretion.

6

 A procedural decision by an administrative 

agency is not an abuse of discretion unless it is based on clearly unreasonable or capricious 

grounds, or the decision exceeds the bounds of reason in view of the circumstances and ignored 

recognized rules of law or practice so as to produce injustice.7 In the absence of an abuse of 

discretion, the UIAB‟s decision must be upheld.8

IV. DISCUSSION

In support of its appeal, the DOJ raises two arguments. First, the DOJ contends the 

UIAB committed errors of fact and law when it found that Ms. Densten established good cause 

to voluntarily leave her employment.9 Second, the DOJ argues that the UIAB‟s denial of its 

request for a continuance constituted an abuse of discretion.10 

A. Ms. Densten Had Good Cause to Terminate Her Employment

Pursuant to 19 Del. C. § 3314(1), an individual is disqualified from the receipt of 

unemployment compensation if “the individual left work voluntarily without good cause 

attributable to such work . . . .”11 The phrase “left work voluntarily,” means leaving on one‟s 

own volition, as opposed to being discharged.12 Additionally, the employee must have had the 

conscious intention to terminate the employment.13 “Whether an employee‟s voluntary 

 

4 Hubbard v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., 352 A.2d 761, 763 (Del. 1976).

5

Thompson, 25 A.3d at 782. 

6 Funk v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., 591 A.2d 222, 225 (Del. 1991). 

7 Rishel v. Milford Hospitality, 2015 WL 4719839, at *2 (Del. Super. Aug. 5, 2015). 

8

Id.

9 DOJ‟s Op. Br. at 7. 

10 Id. at 14. 

11 19 Del. C. § 3314(1).

12 Gsell, 1995 WL 339026, at *3. 

13 Id.
5

resignation constitutes „good cause‟ is a question of law and should be considered under the 

standard of a reasonably prudent person acting under similar circumstances.”14

“Good cause for quitting a job must be such cause as would justify one in voluntarily 

leaving the ranks of the employed and joining the ranks of the unemployed.”15 Additionally, 

“[g]ood cause exists if the claimant demonstrates that her circumstances involve a substantial 

reduction in wages or hours or a substantial deviation in working conditions from the original 

agreement of hire.”16 By contrast, “unhappiness arising out of an unpleasant work environment, 

without more, does not constitute good cause.”17 The burden is on the employee to establish 

good cause attributable to the employment that justifies voluntarily leaving work.18

The Delaware Supreme Court recently defined good cause in the context of 

unemployment compensation in Thompson v. Christiana Care Health Systems.

19

 For the 

purposes of unemployment compensation, good cause is established where: (1) an employee 

voluntarily leaves employment for reasons attributable to issues within the employer‟s control 

and under circumstances in which no reasonably prudent employee would have remained 

employed; and (2) the employee first exhausts all reasonable alternatives to resolve the issues 

before voluntarily terminating his or her employment.20 With respect to the second prong, the 

Court explained:

In order to exhaust all reasonable alternatives, the employee must at least notify 

the employer of the problem and request a solution. The employee must also 

bring the problem to the attention of someone with the authority to make the 

 

14 Benjamin v. Net, Inc., 2013 WL 1091219, at *4 (Del. Super. Feb. 26, 2013).

15 Sandefur v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., 1993 WL 389217, at *4 (Del. Super. Aug. 27, 1993). 

16 Lamberth v. Brandywine Counseling, 2013 WL 3864504, at *5 (Del. Super. July 23, 2013) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). 

17 Id. 

18 O’Neals’s Bus Serv., Inc. v. Emp’t Sec. Comm’n, 269 A.2d 247, 249 (Del. Super. 1970). 

19 25 A.3d 778, 783 (Del. 2011). 

20 Id.
6

necessary adjustments, describe the problem in sufficient detail to allow for 

resolution, and give the employer enough time to correct the problem.21

1. First Prong of the Good Cause Analysis

The DOJ contends that the UIAB‟s findings and conclusions do not support the first 

prong of the good cause analysis set forth in Thompson. The Court disagrees. At the hearing 

before the Board and the Appeals Referee, evidence was entered into the record indicating that 

Ms. Densten was denied her overtime request despite working late hours to finish projects for 

trial. When Densten met with Ms. Hasse to discuss the matter, she was told her request was 

denied because she did not obtain preapproval as mandated by DOJ policy. It was only after Ms. 

Densten submitted her resignation that the DOJ looked into the matter further and approved the 

request. 

In Sandefur v. Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board of State, the plaintiff was 

required to work overtime after his relief failed to show up on time.22 Shortly thereafter, the 

plaintiff terminated his employment due to the employer‟s failure to pay him for that overtime.23 

A few months later, the plaintiff received a notice of overpayment, which he appealed, claiming 

he had good cause to terminate his employment.24 

On appeal, the court reasoned that “[a] substantial reduction in an employee‟s wage or 

pay constitutes a compelling and necessitous reason for voluntarily terminating employment.”25 

The court held that a refusal to pay an employee for overtime is entirely within the employer‟s 

control and justifies a reasonably prudent employee leaving work voluntarily.26 Delaware courts 

 

21 Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

22 Sandefur, 1993 WL 389217, at *1.

23 Id.

24 Id. at *3. 

25 Id. at *4. 

26 Id.
7

have consistently held that a substantial reduction in one‟s pay establishes good cause to 

voluntarily terminate one‟s employment.27 

The Board found that the DOJ‟s denial of Ms. Densten‟s overtime request was a 

substantial reduction in her pay. A review of the record indicates that in her role as a Trial 

Support Specialist, Ms. Densten often was given tasks at the last minute that required her to stay 

late. Also, during her eight-year tenure at the DOJ, Ms. Densten consistently was paid for 

overtime even though she did not obtain prior approval as required by DOJ policy. Accordingly, 

the Court finds that there is substantial evidence in the record to support the UIAB‟s conclusion 

that the DOJ‟s denial of Ms. Densten‟s overtime compensation constituted a substantial 

reduction in pay, thus satisfying the first prong of the good cause analysis.

28

2. Second Prong of the Good Cause Analysis

The DOJ argues that the UIAB‟s finding that Ms. Densten exhausted all reasonable 

alternatives was erroneous as a matter of fact and law. Again, the Court disagrees. To 

demonstrate that all reasonable alternatives have been exhausted, an employee must show that 

she: (1) brought the problem to the attention of someone with the authority to make the necessary 

adjustments; (2) described the problem in sufficient detail to allow for resolution; and (3) gave 

the employer enough time to correct the problem.29

 

27 See Hopkins Constr., Inc. v. Del. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., 1998 WL 960713, at *3 (Del. Super. Dec. 17, 

1998) (“Good cause may consist of a substantial reduction in one‟s pay.”); Ament v. Rosenbluth Intern., 2000 WL 

1610770, at *2 (Del. Super. Aug. 31, 2000) (“This Court has previously found that good cause exists (1) when an 

employer fails to pay wages; (2) when a decrease in claimant‟s wages renders claimant unable to earn a living; and 

(3) when claimant discussed decrease in wages with employer prior to quitting.”); Thompson, 25 A.3d at 784 

(“Good cause exists when [an employee‟s] ability to earn a living is jeopardized . . . .”) (alteration in original) 

(citation omitted). 

28 Sandefur, 1993 WL 389217, at *4 (“A refusal to pay an employee for overtime strikes the Court as a very 

different situation than a simple wage reduction, and requires a different analysis. Where an employee is working 

for an hourly wage, to require the employee to work to attain an end result without paying the employee for all of 

the employee‟s time is not only unreasonable, but is contrary to federal law which requires a minimum hourly 

wage.”). 

29 See Thompson, 25 A.3d at 783. 
8

The record reflects that Ms. Densten met with Ms. Hasse and discussed the problems she 

was experiencing at the DOJ. In response, Ms. Hasse asked Ms. Densten if she had considered 

looking for a job outside of the DOJ. The UIAB found that this statement could be reasonably 

interpreted by Ms. Densten to mean she was out of options. In other words, Ms. Densten had 

exhausted all reasonable alternatives. Because this statement was made in close proximity of 

Ms. Densten‟s overtime denial, the Board found that she attempted to resolve the issues before 

terminating her employment. 

Moreover, the DOJ‟s contention that Ms. Densten was required to report up the “chainof-command” misstates the second prong of the good cause analysis. “While 19 Del. C. § 331[4] 

does not impose a strict requirement that an employee must exhaust all potential remedies before 

the employee may have good cause to quit, an employee does have an obligation to inform an 

employer of resolvable problems and to make a good faith effort to resolve them before simply 

leaving.”30

Ms. Densten was required to bring the problem to someone with the authority to make the 

necessary adjustments and give that person enough time to correct the problem. The Board 

found that, as the DOJ‟s Human Resources Director, Ms. Hasse had the capability and authority 

to rectify Ms. Densten‟s situation.31 Therefore, when Ms. Hasse suggested that Ms. Densten 

should consider looking for a job outside of the DOJ, it was reasonable for Ms. Densten to 

believe that this advice was Ms. Hasse‟s solution. Accordingly, the Court finds that the UIAB 

did not err when it applied the second prong of the good cause analysis. On the state of the 

record, there substantial evidence to support the UIAB‟s findings; its decision must be upheld. 

 

30 See Dahling v. Sure Equip., 1995 WL 339181, at *4 (Del. Super. May 10, 1995). Further, good cause is 

determined at the time of resignation. 

31 In fact, Ms. Hasse approved Ms. Densten‟s comp time request after she submitted her resignation. See Robin S. 

Densten v. Dep’t of Justice, Appeal Docket No. 20929370, at 19:12-16 (Del. U.I.A.B. Aug. 13, 2014) 

(TRANSCRIPT). 
9

B. The UIAB’s Denial of the DOJ’s Request for a Continuance Was Not an Abuse of Discretion.

The DOJ contends that the UIAB‟s denial of its request for a continuance was 

unreasonable and capricious. Pursuant to internal operating procedure, “[t]he grant or denial of 

any request for continuance or postponement is within the discretion of the Board Chairman or 

his or her designee.”

32

 Additionally, the party that attacks the UIAB‟s decision as unreasonable 

and capricious bears the burden of proof.33 The DOJ has not shown that the UIAB‟s denial of its 

request for a continuance exceeds the bounds of reason in view of the circumstances and ignored 

recognized rules of law or practice so as to produce injustice. 

Both parties offered extensive testimony at the hearing before the Appeals Referee, and 

the DOJ already had been granted a continuance. Furthermore, Ms. Densten‟s testimony at the 

hearing before the UIAB was limited to matters related to the only present witness, Ms. Hasse. 

Lastly, the DOJ has not asserted any specific effects the UIAB‟s denial of its continuance request 

would have on the outcome of the hearing. In light of the extensive testimony offered by both 

parties before the Appeals Referee and that the UIAB already granted the DOJ a continuance, the 

Court is not persuaded that the UIAB‟s denial of the DOJ‟s second request for a continuance 

exceeded the bounds of reason. 

V. CONCLUSION

This Court finds that the UIAB‟s decision is supported by substantial evidence and free 

from legal error. This Court also finds that the UIAB did not abuse its discretion by denying the 

DOJ‟s second request for a continuance. Accordingly, the decision of the UIAB is 

AFFIRMED.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 

32 19 Del. Admin. C. § 1201-4.4.1.

33 K-Mart, Inc. v. Bowles, 1995 WL 269872, at *2 (Del. Super. Mar. 23, 1995).