This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER

contains notices to the public of the proposed

issuance of rules and regulations. The

purpose of these notices is to give interested

persons an opportunity to participate in the

rule making prior to the adoption of the final

rules.

Proposed Rules Federal Register

2445 

Vol. 75, No. 10 

Friday, January 15, 2010 

1 In this notice, the terms ‘‘consequence’’ or 

‘‘consequentiality’’ refer to the potential adverse 

effects on human life or health from a successful 

terrorist incident at a chemical facility. See 

generally 72 FR 17696, 17700–17701. DHS also has 

authority to determine that a facility is high-risk 

based on potential consequences to national 

security or critical economic assets. See 6 CFR 

27.105; 72 FR 17700–17701. 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 

SECURITY 

6 CFR Part 27 

[DHS 2009–0141] 

Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism 

Standards 

AGENCY: Department of Homeland 

Security, National Protection and 

Programs Directorate. 

ACTION: Request for comments; 

withdrawal. 

SUMMARY: The Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS or the Department) 

invites public comment on issues 

related to certain regulatory provisions 

in the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism 

Standards (CFATS) that apply to 

facilities that store gasoline in 

aboveground storage tanks. In addition, 

we are withdrawing the version of this 

document published in the Federal 

Register, at 75 FR 1552, on January 12, 

2010, because the footnotes in that 

document were misplaced. This 

document supersedes the January 12 

document. 

DATES: Written comments must be 

submitted on or before March 16, 2010. 

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments, 

identified by docket number DHS– 

2009–0141, by one of the following 

methods: 

• Federal eRulemaking Portal: http:// 

www.regulations.gov. Follow the online 

instructions for submitting comments. 

• Mail: U.S. Department of Homeland 

Security, National Protection and 

Programs Directorate, Office of 

Infrastructure Protection, Infrastructure 

Security Compliance Division, Mail 

Stop 8100, Washington, DC 20528. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Todd Klessman, Office of Infrastructure 

Protection, Infrastructure Security 

Compliance Division, Mail Stop 8100, 

Washington, DC 20528, telephone 

number (703) 235–5263. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Abbreviations and Terms Used in This 

Document 

ASP—Alternative Security Program 

CFATS—Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism 

Standards 

COI—Chemical(s) of Interest 

CVI—Chemical-Terrorism Vulnerability 

Information 

DHS—Department of Homeland Security 

EPA—Environmental Protection Agency 

RMP—Risk Management Program 

SSP—Site Security Plan 

STQ—Screening Threshold Quantity 

SVA—Security Vulnerability Assessment 

VCE—Vapor Cloud Explosion 

I. Comments Invited 

A. In General 

DHS invites interested persons to 

submit written comments, data, or 

views. For each comment, please 

identify the document number and 

agency name for this notice. DHS 

encourages commenters to provide their 

names and addresses. You may submit 

comments and materials electronically 

or by mail as provided under the 

ADDRESSES section. DHS will file in the 

public docket all comments received by 

DHS, except for comments containing 

confidential information, sensitive 

information, or Chemical-terrorism 

Vulnerability Information (CVI) as 

defined in 6 CFR 27.400(b). 

B. Handling of Confidential and 

Sensitive Information and ChemicalTerrorism Vulnerability Information 

(CVI) 

Do not submit comments that include 

trade secrets, confidential commercial 

information, Chemical-terrorism 

Vulnerability Information (CVI) or other 

sensitive information to the public 

docket. Please submit such comments 

separate from other non-sensitive 

comments regarding this notice. 

Specifically, please mark any 

confidential or sensitive comments as 

containing such information and submit 

them by mail to the individual listed in 

the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT

section. Any comments containing CVI 

should be marked and handled in 

accordance with the requirements of 6 

CFR 27.400(f). 

DHS will not place any confidential 

or sensitive comments in the public 

docket; rather, DHS will handle them in 

accordance with applicable safeguards 

and restrictions on access. See, e.g., 6 

CFR 27.400. See also the DHS CVI 

Procedural Manual (‘‘Safeguarding 

Information Designated as CVI,’’ 

September 2008, located on the DHS 

Web site at http://www.dhs.gov/ 

chemicalsecurity). DHS will hold any 

such comments in a separate file to 

which the public does not have access, 

and place a note in the public docket 

that DHS has received such materials 

from the commenter. 

C. Reviewing Comments in the Docket 

For access to the docket to read the 

public comments received and relevant 

background documents referred to in 

this notice, go to http:// 

www.regulations.gov. 

II. Background 

A. Chemical Facility Security 

Rulemaking 

Section 550 of the Homeland Security 

Appropriations Act of 2007 (Pub. L. 

109–295, Oct. 2006) required the 

Department to issue, within six months, 

interim final regulations for the security 

of chemical facilities that, ‘‘in the 

Secretary’s discretion, present high 

levels of security risk.’’ Under that 

authority, the Department promulgated 

the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism 

Standards, 6 CFR part 27 (CFATS), on 

April 9, 2007. See 72 FR 17688. 

The CFATS interim final rule sought 

public comment on Appendix A, a 

tentative list of over 300 chemicals of 

interest (COI) with the potential to 

create significant human life or health 

consequences if released, stolen or, 

diverted, or sabotaged. Section 

27.200(b)(2) of the CFATS regulation 

requires any chemical facility that 

possesses any COI at or above the 

applicable screening threshold quantity 

(STQ) specified in Appendix A to 

complete and submit an online data 

collection (the Top-Screen) to DHS. The 

Department uses the facility’s TopScreen and, where applicable, other 

available information to perform a 

preliminary assessment of the facility’s 

capacity to cause significant adverse 

consequences if targeted for a terrorist 

attack.1 DHS uses that preliminary 


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2Among other things, the November 2007 rule 

provided additional criteria related to the physical 

state (liquid, gas, or solid), concentration levels, and 

forms of packaging applicable to various chemicals 

of interest that must be counted under Appendix A. 

3There is no single chemical composition for the 

mixture typically called ‘‘gasoline,’’ which varies in 

content and blending components from company to 

company, region to region, and season to season. 

All formulations of gasoline, however, contain a 

significant percentage of certain release-flammable 

chemicals (e.g., pentane, butane) and typically have 

a National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 

flammability hazard rating of 3. 

4See 40 CFR Part 68. 

5EPA’s exclusion of flammable chemicals in 

gasoline from the RMP rules was mandated by the 

Chemical Safety, Information, Site Security and 

Fuels Regulatory Relief Act, Pub. L. 106–40. Cf. 72 

FR 65410 (EPA RMP program excludes flammable 

fuels). In addition, EPA agreed to delete gasoline 

from the original version of the RMP mixture rule, 

which had included gasoline, in settlement of 

litigation with the gasoline industry. See 63 FR 640 

(Jan. 6, 1998). The RMP exclusion for gasoline and 

other flammable fuels was codified by EPA at 40 

CFR 68.126. 

6This notice will refer to all facilities with 

aboveground gasoline storage tanks, including 

facilities (such as petroleum refineries) that may 

possess other chemicals that trigger the Top-Screen 

requirement, as ‘‘gasoline terminals’’ or ‘‘terminals.’’ 

Approximately 4,000 terminals submitted TopScreens and DHS initially identified 405 of those 

facilities as high-risk. 

consequence assessment to make an 

initial high-risk determination for the 

facility. See 6 CFR 27.200–27.210. 

The Department assigns each facility 

that is initially determined to be highrisk to a preliminary risk-based tier level 

(Tiers 1–4, with Tier 1 representing the 

highest risk) and notifies the facility that 

it must submit a Security Vulnerability 

Assessment (SVA) to DHS. The 

Department uses the SVA to make a 

final high-risk and tiering 

determination. Only those facilities that 

are finally determined to be high-risk 

are subject to the full scope of the 

regulations and required to submit, for 

DHS approval, Site Security Plans 

(SSPs) or Alternative Security Programs 

(ASPs) that satisfy the risk-based 

performance standards specified in the 

CFATS regulations. See 6 CFR 27.220– 

27.225. 

DHS issued the final Appendix A on 

November 20, 2007. See 72 FR 65396. 

The November 2007 rule clarified that 

chemicals of interest listed in Appendix 

A due to potential risks related to 

‘‘release’’ are classified as ReleaseExplosives, Release-Flammables, or 

Release-Toxics, according to the type of 

potential harm they may cause. See 72 

FR 65397. In response to comments on 

the tentative Appendix A, DHS also 

added provisions to CFATS to clarify 

under what circumstances 2 and in what 

manner facilities must calculate the 

quantities of certain types of COI under 

Appendix A to determine if they are 

required to submit Top-Screens. See 72 

FR 65397–65398. 

B. Special Provisions for Counting COI 

in Mixtures 

Among other clarifications made in 

November 2007, DHS added § 27.203, 

which instructs facilities on when and 

how to calculate the STQ for certain 

types of chemicals of interest. With 

respect to chemicals in gasoline, 

§ 27.203(b)(1)(v) requires facilities to 

count release-flammable COI (such as 

butane and pentane) contained 

in gasoline, diesel, kerosene or jet fuel 

(including fuels that have flammability 

hazard ratings of 1,2, 3 or 4, as determined 

by using National Fire Protection Association 

(NFPA) [standard] 704 * * * ) stored in 

aboveground tank farms, including tank 

farms that are part of pipeline systems. 

In response to comments requesting 

that DHS clarify whether and how 

facilities should count COI in mixtures 

when calculating whether a facility 

meets or exceeds the applicable STQ 

under Appendix A, the November 2007 

rule also added § 27.204. That section 

specifies how to calculate the amount of 

Release-Toxic, Release-Flammable and 

Release-Explosive COI (as well as TheftCOI) in chemical mixtures. See 72 FR 

65399, 65416. In particular, 

§ 27.204(a)(2) (the ‘‘flammable mixtures 

rule’’) clarified how to calculate the 

quantity of Release-Flammable COI 

contained in chemical mixtures, 

including gasoline 3 and the other fuels 

specified in § 27.203(b)(1)(v), for 

purposes of Appendix A. 

The CFATS flammable mixtures rule 

generally parallels the rules previously 

adopted by the U.S. Environmental 

Protection Agency (EPA) under the 

Clean Air Act’s Risk Management 

Program (RMP) for counting—or 

excluding—flammable chemicals 

contained in mixtures that may be 

inadvertently or accidentally 

released.4 See 72 FR 65402. As 

explained in the preamble to the 

November 2007 rule, however, given the 

different purposes, scope, and 

applicability of CFATS and the EPA 

RMP rules, there are several important 

differences between the CFATS and 

RMP mixture regulations. See 72 FR 

65398–65399, 65401–65402. 

One such difference is that the CFATS 

flammable mixtures rule requires that 

Release-Flammable COI (such as butane 

or pentane) contained in gasoline (and 

other fuels specified in § 27.203(b)(1)(v)) 

must be counted under Appendix A, 

even though EPA does not count the 

flammable chemicals in gasoline under 

the terms of the RMP ‘‘mixtures rule,’’ 42 

CFR 68.115(b)(2).5 See 72 FR 65399 and 

n. 8. The November 2007 rule explained 

that, while EPA’s RMP rules are 

premised solely on accidental releases 

of chemicals, the COI in these 

flammable mixtures, including gasoline, 

should be counted under Appendix A 

because of the potential consequences to 

human life or health of an intentional 

terrorist attack. See 72 FR 65399. 

C. Implementation of CFATS 

Over 36,000 facilities have submitted 

Top-Screens to DHS and about 6,500 of 

those facilities were preliminarily 

determined by DHS to be high-risk and 

required to submit SVAs. DHS is now in 

the process of notifying those facilities 

that, based on review of their SVAs, 

DHS has finally determined to be highrisk and thus required to submit SSPs. 

On June 29, 2009, DHS issued final 

high-risk notifications to 10 

aboveground gasoline storage tank 

facilities (i.e., terminals).6 Subsequently, 

DHS extended the SSP due dates for 

those facilities to allow the Department 

to coordinate further actions regarding 

terminals as a group. This extension is 

indefinite, pending the Department’s 

consideration of certain technical issues 

and questions raised during the initial 

high-risk determination process for 

those facilities, as discussed below. 

III. Issues Raised by the Gasoline 

Terminals Industry 

A. Petition From International Liquid 

Terminals Association 

Soon after promulgation of the 

November 2007 Appendix A final rule, 

several trade associations representing 

gasoline terminals raised both technical 

and procedural issues related to the 

applicability of Appendix A and the 

Top-Screen requirement to those 

facilities. Procedurally, those 

associations claimed that DHS did not 

provide advance notice and opportunity 

to comment on the provisions of 

§§ 27.203 and 27.204 related to 

aboveground fuel storage facilities that 

DHS added to CFATS in November 

2007. Technically, the industry 

associations claimed that DHS had 

overestimated the potential 

consequences of a terrorist attack on 

gasoline terminals by relying on a model 

that calculates the impacts of a ‘‘vapor 

cloud explosion’’ from release of 

flammable liquids from aboveground 

storage tanks, which the industry 

asserted is unrealistic for gasoline 

terminals. 

On May 13, 2009, the International 

Liquid Terminals Association (ILTA) 

submitted a petition to DHS under the 

Administrative Procedure Act 

requesting that DHS exempt gasoline 


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7The ILTA petition is included in the public 

docket for this notice and available for review at 

http://www.regulations.gov. 

8EPA’s VCE model is available in Appendix C of 

EPA’s ‘‘RMP Guidance for Offsite Consequence 

Analysis’’ (April 1999) at http://www.epa.gov/OEM/ 

docs/chem/oca-all.pdf. 

9See Letter dated December 10, 2008, from Sue 

Armstrong, DHS, to Robin Rorick, American 

Petroleum Institute, et al., which is available in the 

public docket for this notice. 

10The ignition of such a vapor cloud, and the 

resulting explosion, would be relatively easy to 

cause once the other circumstances were in place. 

11See ‘‘Buncefield Major Incident Investigation 

Board: The Buncefield Incident,’’ 11 December 2005 

Final Report (2008), available at http:// 

www.buncefieldinvestigation.gov.uk/reports. DHS 

does not believe that it is necessary or appropriate 

to detail all the circumstances of that incident, or 

to respond to every facet of the gasoline terminals 

industry analyses of those circumstances, in this 

notice. 

12The pool fire model is described in EPA’s 

‘‘RMP Guidance for Offsite Consequence Analysis’’ 

(April 1999) at http://www.epa.gov/OEM/docs/ 

chem/oca-all.pdf. As is true for the VCE model, 

EPA’s RMP pool fire model reflects assumptions 

that may be appropriate for worst-case accidental 

release scenarios but that are not necessarily 

appropriate for plausible, worst-case intentional 

release scenarios. 

13See letter dated December 10, 2008, from Sue 

Armstrong, DHS, to Robin Rorick, American 

Petroleum Institute, et al., available in the public 

docket for this notice. The mitigating effects, if any, 

Continued 

from CFATS and remove all references 

to gasoline terminals from 

§ 27.203(b)(1)(v) and the CFATS 

flammable mixtures rule 

(§ 27.204(a)(2)).7 Through this notice, 

DHS invites comments on certain 

technical issues related to the 

applicability of CFATS to gasoline 

terminals. 

B. Modeling of Potential Consequences 

From Aboveground Gasoline Storage 

Tanks 

In deciding to add provisions to 

CFATS for counting chemicals of 

interest in aboveground gasoline storage 

tanks, DHS considered several possible 

methods for modeling the potential 

consequences of terrorist incidents 

directed at such facilities—i.e., the 

vapor cloud explosion (VCE) model and 

the ‘‘pool fire’’ model. 

1. Modified VCE Model for Gasoline 

Terminals 

In essence, a VCE model calculates 

the maximum distance at which a vapor 

cloud produced by release of flammable 

chemicals would be harmful or lethal to 

persons in or near the cloud (the 

‘‘distance to endpoint’’), based on the 

amount of flammable liquid chemical 

available, the estimated amount of the 

liquid that would convert to vapor, and 

the distance the vapor cloud could 

spread before becoming too ‘‘lean’’ to 

explode when exposed to an ignition 

source. 

Since EPA had already developed a 

VCE model for estimating the 

consequences of accidental releases of 

flammable chemicals, including 

flammable mixtures, under the RMP 

regulations, DHS used the EPA VCE 

model as a starting point for modeling 

potential VCE consequences for all 

Release-Flammable COIs, including 

those at gasoline terminals.8 DHS 

modified the EPA VCE model, however, 

to account for certain differences 

between gasoline and other flammable 

liquids mixtures, as explained below. 

DHS believes the modified VCE model 

reflects a plausible worst-case scenario 

for terminals and is an appropriate tool 

for assessing the potential consequences 

of a terrorist attack against gasoline 

terminals. 

Specifically, DHS refined the EPA 

VCE model to provide an even more 

plausible estimate of the potential 

consequences of a terrorist attack on 

gasoline terminals in particular. While 

EPA’s VCE model assumes that (up to) 

ten percent of a given amount of a 

flammable liquid will participate in the 

explosion (the ‘‘yield factor’’), DHS 

assumes that only one percent of 

gasoline will participate, based on 

gasoline’s combustion properties and its 

storage at ambient conditions.9 This 

modification results in a reduction of 

the potential consequences calculated 

by the model, as compared to EPA’s 

model, and appears to be consistent 

with the consequences from prior vapor 

cloud explosions involving gasoline, as 

discussed below. Therefore, the 

modified VCE model allows DHS to 

reasonably estimate the number of 

plausible worst-case casualties resulting 

from a successful attack on a gasoline 

terminal. 

DHS understands that the formation 

of a gasoline vapor cloud with the 

potential to cause significant harm to 

human life and health requires that a 

number of natural and man-made 

circumstances combine in a certain way, 

and that accidental gasoline vapor cloud 

explosions are therefore uncommon. 

DHS has determined, however, that 

those necessary conditions are more 

likely to exist in the event of an 

intentional terrorist incident than in the 

context of an accident, and thus, that it 

is reasonable and within the Secretary’s 

discretion under Section 550 to apply 

the modified VCE model to gasoline 

terminals. See generally 72 FR 65399. 

For example, in 2005 (long after EPA 

excluded gasoline from the RMP rule, 

see n. 5, supra), a vapor cloud explosion 

resulting from an unintentional 

overflow of a gasoline storage tank at the 

Buncefield Oil Storage Depot in 

Hertfordshire, UK caused significant 

injuries and other damage. Several 

gasoline storage trade associations have 

asserted that the combination of specific 

circumstances resulting in the 

Buncefield incident—e.g., accidental 

but prolonged and undetected overflow 

of the tank, failure of detection devices, 

congestion from nearby obstacles, 

weather conditions favoring 

accumulation rather than dispersal of 

the vapor cloud 10—are so rare that DHS 

should disregard the possibility of such 

explosions at gasoline terminals.11

DHS has concluded, however, that a 

terrorist seeking to cause such an 

explosion could target a facility where 

the necessary physical conditions exist 

(or are likely to occur at some point in 

time). In order to maximize the 

consequences of the explosion, such a 

terrorist could attempt to cause gasoline 

to leak or overflow from the targeted 

tank(s) in such a way as to make 

formation of a vapor cloud more likely 

than it would be in an accident like the 

Buncefield explosion. 

Nonetheless, DHS invites public 

comment on the modified VCE model 

and on any alternatives to the specific 

modification made by DHS to the yield 

factor in the model. 

2. ‘‘Pool Fire’’ Models 

DHS considered other options for 

evaluating the potential consequences of 

a release from such facilities. 

Specifically, DHS considered an 

existing model that calculates the 

potential consequences from the 

radiated heat of a ‘‘pool fire’’ caused by 

ignition of liquid gasoline suddenly 

released from one or more aboveground 

tanks, but that implicitly assumes the 

pool fire is confined within dikes or 

other secondary containment 

surrounding the tank(s).12 The gasoline 

industry asserts that this ‘‘contained 

pool fire’’ scenario is more realistic for 

terrorist incidents involving gasoline 

terminals (e.g., attacks using explosive 

devices or weapons) than the VCE 

scenario. The industry also asserts that 

the potential consequences of such 

contained pool fires do not warrant 

subjecting terminals to any CFATS 

requirements. 

DHS did not rely on the ‘‘contained 

pool fire’’ scenario, however, because 

any model that assumes the 

effectiveness of secondary containment 

does not represent a plausible, worstcase terrorist scenario, since an 

adversary seeking to maximize the 

consequences of attacking a terminal 

would also attempt to breach the 

secondary containment.13


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of secondary containment may be taken into 

account, however, during the Department’s 

determination as to whether a covered facility’s Site 

Security Plan satisfies the CFATS risk-based 

performance standards. 

14Models currently available for calculating the 

consequences of an uncontained pool fire include 

assumptions that may be appropriate for releases 

from certain small sources (e.g., a gasoline tank 

truck) but that are not realistic or appropriate for 

worst-case modeling of large-scale releases (e.g., a 

sudden release from an aboveground gasoline 

storage tank). For example, the current EPA RMP 

model assumes that the surface upon which the 

gasoline has been released is perfectly flat and nonpermeable. See EPA’s ‘‘RMP Guidance for Offsite 

Consequence Analysis’’ (April 1999) at http:// 

www.epa.gov/OEM/docs/chem/oca-all.pdf. 

DHS is currently considering, 

however, and seeks comments on, 

whether it is feasible to refine existing 

models or develop a new model for 

uncontained pool fires (i.e., where the 

contents of one or more gasoline storage 

tanks escape from secondary 

containment),14 so that such a model 

could be used for future consequence 

assessments for gasoline terminals—in 

lieu of or in addition to the modified 

VCE model. 

IV. Issues for Commenters 

Comments that will provide the most 

assistance to DHS should address the 

following issues and questions. 

Commenters should include 

explanations and relevant supporting 

materials with their comments 

whenever possible. 

a. Comments on the inclusion of 6 

CFR 27.203(b)(1)(v) (counting of 

Release-COI in gasoline, diesel, 

kerosene, or jet fuel in aboveground 

storage tanks) and 6 CFR 27.204(a)(2) 

(the flammable mixtures rule), as they 

apply to gasoline terminals. 

b. Comments on the applicability of 

the modified VCE model to gasoline 

terminals, including: Whether the 

reduction of the vapor yield for gasoline 

from ten percent (as in EPA’s VCE 

model) to one percent reasonably 

reflects the potential consequences for a 

vapor cloud explosion from gasoline (as 

compared to other liquid flammable 

chemicals); and whether a different 

yield factor adjustment might better 

reflect the potential consequences for a 

vapor cloud explosion from gasoline. 

c. Comments on whether a reasonable 

model exists or should be developed for 

future use that would allow DHS to 

estimate the plausible worst-case 

consequences of an uncontained pool 

fire resulting from a successful attack on 

gasoline terminals. 

Dated: January 12, 2010. 

Rand Beers, 

Under Secretary for National Protection and 

Programs. 

[FR Doc. 2010–738 Filed 1–14–10; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE P 

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE 

Forest Service 

36 CFR Part 242 

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR 

Fish and Wildlife Service 

50 CFR Part 100 

[Docket No. FWS–R7–SM–2009–0061; 

70101–1261–0000L6] 

RIN 1018–AW71 

Subsistence Management Regulations 

for Public Lands in Alaska—2011–12 

and 2012–13 Subsistence Taking of 

Fish and Shellfish Regulations 

AGENCIES: Forest Service, Agriculture; 

Fish and Wildlife Service, Interior. 

ACTION: Proposed rule. 

SUMMARY: This proposed rule would 

establish regulations for fishing seasons, 

harvest limits, methods and means 

related to taking of fish and shellfish for 

subsistence uses during the 2011–2012 

and 2012–2013 regulatory years. The 

Federal Subsistence Board is presently 

on a schedule of completing the process 

of revising subsistence taking of fish and 

shellfish regulations in odd-numbered 

years and subsistence taking of wildlife 

regulations in even-numbered years; 

public proposal and review processes 

take place during the preceding year. 

The Board also addresses customary and 

traditional use determinations during 

the applicable cycle. When final, the 

resulting rulemaking will replace the 

existing subsistence fish taking 

regulations, which expire on March 31, 

2011. Future rules will not have 

expiration dates but will be revised 

according to the applicable cycle. This 

rule would also amend the customary 

and traditional use determinations of 

the Federal Subsistence Board and the 

general regulations on subsistence 

taking of fish and wildlife. 

DATES: Public meetings: The Federal 

Subsistence Regional Advisory Councils 

will hold public meetings to receive 

comments and make proposals to 

change this proposed rule on several 

dates between February 15 and March 

26, 2010, and then hold another round 

of public meetings to discuss and 

receive comments on the proposals, and 

make recommendations on the 

proposals to the Federal Subsistence 

Board, on several dates between August 

24 and October 15, 2010. The Board will 

discuss and evaluate proposed 

regulatory changes during a public 

meeting in Anchorage, AK, on January 

18, 2011. See SUPPLEMENTARY

INFORMATION for specific information on 

dates and locations of the public 

meetings. 

Public comments: Comments and 

proposals to change this proposed rule 

must be received or postmarked by 

March 24, 2010. 

ADDRESSES: Public meetings: The 

Federal Subsistence Board and the 

Regional Advisory Councils’ public 

meetings will be held at various 

locations in Alaska. See SUPPLEMENTARY

INFORMATION for specific information on 

dates and locations of the public 

meetings. 

Public comments: You may submit 

comments by one of the following 

methods: 

• Electronically: Go to the Federal 

eRulemaking Portal: http:// 

www.regulations.gov and search for 

FWS–R7–SM–2009–0061, which is the 

docket number for this rulemaking. 

• By hard copy: U.S. mail or handdelivery to: USFWS, Office of 

Subsistence Management, 1011 East 

Tudor Road, MS 121, Attn: Theo 

Matuskowitz, Anchorage, AK 99503– 

6199, or hand delivery to the Designated 

Federal Official attending any of the 

Federal Subsistence Regional Advisory 

Council public meetings. See 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION for 

additional information on locations of 

the public meetings. 

We will post all comments on http:// 

www.regulations.gov. This generally 

means that we will post any personal 

information you provide us (see the 

Public Review Process section below for 

more information). 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Chair, Federal Subsistence Board, c/o 

U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 

Attention: Peter J. Probasco, Office of 

Subsistence Management; (907) 786– 

3888 or subsistence@fws.gov. For 

questions specific to National Forest 

System lands, contact Calvin H. Casipit, 

Acting Regional Subsistence Program 

Leader, USDA, Forest Service, Alaska 

Region; (907) 586–7918. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Background 

Under Title VIII of the Alaska 

National Interest Lands Conservation 

Act (ANILCA) (16 U.S.C. 3111–3126), 

the Secretary of the Interior and the 


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