1

Filed 7/8/13

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

SIERRA CLUB, )

)

Petitioner, )

) S194708

v. )

) Ct.App. 4/3 G044138

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF ORANGE )

COUNTY, ) Orange County

) Super. Ct. No. 134941

Respondent; )

)

COUNTY OF ORANGE, )

)

Real Party in Interest. )

___________________________________)

Like many counties in California, Orange County (the County) maintains a large 

database of information about land parcels in a geographic information system (GIS) file 

format. With this database, called the OC Landbase, a user with appropriate software can 

create a layered digital map containing information for over 640,000 specific parcels of 

land in Orange County, including geographic boundaries, assessor parcel numbers, street 

addresses, and links to additional information on the parcel owners. The issue in this 

case is whether the OC Landbase is subject to disclosure in a GIS file format at the actual 

cost of duplication under the California Public Records Act or whether, as the County 

contends, it is covered by the statute‘s exclusion of ―[c]omputer software‖ (Gov. Code, 

§ 6254.9, subd. (a)) — a term that ―includes computer mapping systems‖ (id., § 6254.9, 

subd. (b)) — from the definition of a public record. We hold that although GIS mapping 

software falls within the ambit of this statutory exclusion, a GIS-formatted database like 

the OC Landbase does not. Accordingly, such databases are public records that, unless 

otherwise exempt, must be produced upon request at the actual cost of duplication.
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I.

In June 2007, petitioner Sierra Club sent a letter to the Orange County Assessor 

requesting a copy of the OC Landbase pursuant to the California Public Records Act

(PRA). Amici curiae representing a variety of media and open-government groups 

explain the functionality and value of the database at issue: ―Using software available on 

the open market and the GIS-formatted landbase that is at issue in this case, any 

interested person can layer other publicly available electronic datasets on top of the 

landbase and perform a computer-assisted analysis of those datasets in ways that are 

simply not possible without the base layer. . . . [¶] For example . . . a property owner can 

use GIS-formatted landbase data to locate other similar parcels and see whether [the 

owner‘s] taxes are higher or lower than those being paid by others, or to determine 

whether zoning decisions are similar as to comparable properties, which in turn can shed 

light on the fairness of a government‘s taxing or zoning decisions. . . . [P]ublic 

dissemination of GIS-formatted mapping data is also critical to the non-profit sector‘s 

ability to monitor and respond to government actions involving real property. For 

example, Petitioner Sierra Club sought the records at issue in this action to determine —

and convey to the public — the status of large areas of open space in Orange County, 

including whether each area is protected from development by conservation easements or 

public ownership or is threatened by a proposed development.‖

Sierra Club‘s request began a lengthy exchange between the two parties concerning 

the public record status of the OC Landbase. In March 2009, the County agreed to produce 

records containing the information underlying the OC Landbase, including assessment 

rolls, parcel maps, tract maps, survey records, lot line adjustments, and transfer deeds. The 

County offered to provide such records in Adobe PDF electronic format or as printed paper 

copies. However, the County took the position that the PRA did not require it to disclose 

the same records in a GIS file format and that it would provide the records in that format 

only if Sierra Club paid a licensing fee and agreed to the license‘s restrictions on disclosure 
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and distribution. According to the County, the licensing agreement enables the County to 

recoup a portion of the substantial costs it incurs to develop and maintain the OC 

Landbase. A 2009 declaration by the County‘s surveyor reported that the County had spent 

over $3 million in the previous five years to maintain the OC Landbase. According to 

Sierra Club‘s expert, the County‘s licensing policy is different from the practice of most 

counties in California: 47 of the state‘s 58 counties, including Los Angeles County, 

provide access to GIS-formatted parcel base maps as public records. If the OC Landbase 

must be disclosed as a public record, the County could charge Sierra Club only the actual 

cost of duplication. If it is not, the County has the option to license the database according 

to the terms of its licensing policy.

Sierra Club sought a writ of mandate from the superior court to compel the County 

to provide the OC Landbase in a GIS file format as a public record for a fee covering 

only the direct cost of duplication, with no requirement that Sierra Club comply with the 

licensing agreement. Before ruling, the superior court permitted extensive briefing from 

both parties and conducted a two-day evidentiary hearing. The hearing focused on the 

County‘s claim that the OC Landbase was excluded from the PRA‘s definition of a public 

record because it fell within the statutory exclusion for ―computer software,‖ a term that 

―includes computer mapping systems.‖ (Gov. Code, § 6254.9, subds. (a), (b) (hereafter 

section 6254.9(a) and section 6254.9(b)); all further undesignated statutory references are 

to the Government Code.)

Before the hearing, the parties stipulated that the OC Landbase refers to the 

County‘s parcel data in a GIS file format. They defined ―GIS file format‖ to mean ―that 

the geographic data can be analyzed, viewed, and managed with GIS software, and it 

includes formats such as ESRI Shape Files, Modular GIS Environment ( ̳MGE‘), and 

Oracle Spatial.‖ Although the County uses the term ―Landbase‖ internally to refer to its 

entire mapping system — not only the data but also the software used to run it — the 

County confirmed at the hearing that the term ―Landbase,‖ when used externally, refers 
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only to the parcel map data held in a GIS file format. The parties agree that ―[t]he OC 

Landbase in the format the Sierra Club has requested, and in which it is currently 

distributed to OC Landbase licensees, does not contain programs, routines, and symbolic 

languages that control the functioning of computer hardware and direct its operation.‖ 

The County relies on software obtained from Oracle to create and access the OC 

Landbase. If the OC Landbase is produced in a GIS file format, Sierra Club must use its 

own GIS software to access the data.

Following the evidentiary hearing, the superior court issued an order denying the 

petition for writ of mandate, along with a 16-page statement of decision. The court found 

that the County ―offered persuasive testimony and evidence that the term  ̳GIS‘ refers to 

 ̳an integrated collection of computer software and data used to view and manage 

information about geographical places, analyze spatial relationships and model spatial 

processes.‘ ‖ The court further ―credit[ed] the County‘s evidence and the testimony of 

witnesses that the OC Landbase in a GIS file format is part of a computer mapping 

system.‖ ―To that end, the OC Landbase in GIS file format is not a public record, but 

falls within Section 6254.9‘s exception to the PRA‘s general rules of disclosure.‖ On that 

basis, the superior court denied Sierra Club‘s petition for writ of mandate. 

On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed. Finding the statutory language 

ambiguous, the Court of Appeal determined that the legislative history of section 6254.9 

supported the County‘s position that GIS-formatted files fall within the meaning of 

―computer mapping system.‖ Based on its review of the legislative history and purpose 

of section 6254.9, the Court of Appeal concluded that the County met its burden to prove 

that the OC Landbase was not a public record subject to disclosure.

We granted review and now reverse.

II.

The PRA and the California Constitution provide the public with a right of access 

to government information. As this court has explained: ―Openness in government is 
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essential to the functioning of a democracy.  ̳Implicit in the democratic process is the 

notion that government should be accountable for its actions. In order to verify 

accountability, individuals must have access to government files. Such access permits 

checks against the arbitrary exercise of official power and secrecy in the political 

process.‘ [Citation.]‖ (International Federation of Professional & Technical Engineers, 

Local 21, AFL-CIO v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 319, 328–329 (Local 21).) In 

adopting the PRA, the Legislature declared that ―access to information concerning the 

conduct of the people‘s business is a fundamental and necessary right of every person in 

this state.‖ (§ 6250.) ―As the result of an initiative adopted by the voters in 2004, this 

principle is now enshrined in the state Constitution . . . .‖ (Local 21, at p. 329.) The 

California Constitution, article I, section 3, subdivision (b)(1) provides: ―The people 

have the right of access to information concerning the conduct of the people‘s business, 

and therefore, the meetings of public bodies and the writings of public officials and 

agencies shall be open to public scrutiny.‖

The PRA applies to ―public records,‖ defined as ―any writing containing 

information relating to the conduct of the public‘s business prepared, owned, used, or 

retained by any state or local agency regardless of physical form or characteristics.‖ 

(§ 6252, subd. (e).) In this case, the County‘s offer to produce alternative records with 

the information underlying the OC Landbase implicitly recognizes that the information

within the OC Landbase constitutes public records subject to disclosure unless otherwise 

exempt from the PRA. What the parties dispute is whether the OC Landbase in a GIS file 

format is a public record that must be disclosed in that format pursuant to the PRA.

The format of information is not generally determinative of the public record 

status of government information. A 2000 amendment to the PRA makes electronic data 

available in whatever format it is normally maintained by the agency. (§ 6253.9, added 

by Stats. 2000, ch. 982, § 2, p. 7142.) Section 6253.9 provides in relevant part: ―(a) 

Unless otherwise prohibited by law, any agency that has information that constitutes an 
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identifiable public record not exempt from disclosure pursuant to this chapter that is in an 

electronic format shall make that information available in an electronic format when 

requested by any person and, when applicable, shall comply with the following: [¶] (1) 

The agency shall make the information available in any electronic format in which it 

holds the information. [¶] (2) . . . The cost of duplication shall be limited to the direct 

cost of producing a copy of a record in an electronic format.‖ (§ 6253.9, subd. (a)(1), (2)

(hereafter section 6253.9(a)(1) and section 6253.9(a)(2)).) Section 6253.9 further 

provides: ―Nothing in this section shall be construed to require the public agency to 

release an electronic record in the electronic form in which it is held by the agency if its 

release would jeopardize or compromise the security or integrity of the original record or 

of any proprietary software in which it is maintained.‖ (§ 6253.9, subd. (f).)

However, a separate provision of the PRA, section 6254.9(a), excludes 

―[c]omputer software‖ from the definition of a public record. Section 6254.9(b) says,

―  ̳computer software‘ includes computer mapping systems, computer programs, and 

computer graphics systems.‖ The question before us is whether the term ―computer 

software,‖ as used in section 6254.9, encompasses the OC Landbase in a GIS file format. 

If so, then the GIS-formatted OC Landbase is not a public record subject to disclosure; if 

not, then it is a public record subject to disclosure unless otherwise exempt under the 

PRA.

A.

When we interpret a statute, ―[o]ur fundamental task . . . is to determine the 

Legislature‘s intent so as to effectuate the law‘s purpose. We first examine the statutory 

language, giving it a plain and commonsense meaning. We do not examine that language 

in isolation, but in the context of the statutory framework as a whole in order to 

determine its scope and purpose and to harmonize the various parts of the enactment. If 

the language is clear, courts must generally follow its plain meaning unless a literal 

interpretation would result in absurd consequences the Legislature did not intend. If the 
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statutory language permits more than one reasonable interpretation, courts may consider 

other aids, such as the statute‘s purpose, legislative history, and public policy.‖ 

(Coalition of Concerned Communities, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2004) 34 Cal.4th 733, 

737.) ―Furthermore, we consider portions of a statute in the context of the entire statute 

and the statutory scheme of which it is a part, giving significance to every word, phrase, 

sentence, and part of an act in pursuance of the legislative purpose.‖ (Curle v. Superior 

Court (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1057, 1063.)

In this case, our usual approach to statutory construction is supplemented by a rule 

of interpretation that is specific to the issue before us. In 2004, California voters 

approved Proposition 59, which amended the state Constitution to provide a right of 

access to public records. As noted, article I, section 3, subdivision (b)(1) provides: ―The 

people have the right of access to information concerning the conduct of the people‘s 

business, and therefore, the meetings of public bodies and the writings of public officials 

and agencies shall be open to public scrutiny.‖ Subdivision (b)(2) provides guidance on 

the proper construction of statutes affecting this right of access: ―A statute, court rule, or 

other authority, including those in effect on the effective date of this subdivision, shall be 

broadly construed if it furthers the people‘s right of access, and narrowly construed if it 

limits the right of access.‖ In addition, subdivision (b)(5) provides: ―This subdivision 

does not repeal or nullify, expressly or by implication, any constitutional or statutory 

exception to the right of access to public records or meetings of public bodies that is in 

effect on the effective date of this subdivision, including, but not limited to, any statute 

protecting the confidentiality of law enforcement and prosecution records.‖ (Cal. Const., 

art. I, § 3, subd. (b).)

Sierra Club does not independently challenge the denial of access to the GISformatted OC Landbase as a constitutional violation if disclosure is not required by the 

PRA, and in light of article I, section 3, subdivision (b)(5), we may not countermand the 

Legislature‘s intent to exclude or exempt information from the PRA‘s disclosure 
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requirements where that intent is clear. But to the extent that legislative intent is 

ambiguous, the California Constitution requires us to ―broadly construe[]‖ the PRA to the 

extent ―it furthers the people‘s right of access‖ and to ―narrowly construe[]‖ the PRA to 

the extent ―it limits the right of access.‖ (Cal. Const., art. I, § 3, subd. (b)(2).) ―Given the 

strong public policy of the people‘s right to information concerning the people‘s business 

(Gov. Code, § 6250), and the constitutional mandate to construe statutes limiting the right 

of access narrowly (Cal. Const., art. I, § 3, subd. (b)(2)),  ̳all public records are subject to 

disclosure unless the Legislature has expressly provided to the contrary.‘ ‖ (Office of 

Inspector General v. Superior Court (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 695, 709, quoting Williams 

v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 337, 346, italics added by the Court of Appeal; see 

also Local 21, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 348 (conc. & dis. opn. by Kennard, J.) [courts must 

narrowly construe any statute limiting the people‘s right of access to public records].) 

B.

With these principles in mind, we turn to the relevant statutory language. Section 

6254.9(a) provides: ―Computer software developed by a state or local agency is not itself 

a public record under this chapter. The agency may sell, lease, or license the software for 

commercial or noncommercial use.‖ Section 6254.9(b) says: ―As used in this section, 

 ̳computer software‘ includes computer mapping systems, computer programs, and 

computer graphics systems.‖ Further, section 6254.9, subdivision (d) (hereafter section 

6254.9(d)) provides: ―Nothing in this section is intended to affect the public record status 

of information merely because it is stored in a computer. Public records stored in a 

computer shall be disclosed as required by this chapter.‖ We must decide whether the 

statutory exemption for ―[c]omputer software‖ (§ 6254.9(a)) — a term that ―includes

computer mapping systems‖ (§ 6254.9(b)) — encompasses mapping data in a GIS file 

format, as the County contends, or only GIS mapping software, as Sierra Club contends.

In construing ―computer mapping systems‖ in section 6254.9(b), neither party has 

offered any standard definition of the term, and dictionary definitions provide little help. 
9

The Court of Appeal relied on a definition of the word ―system‖ as a ―  ̳complex unity 

formed of many often diverse parts subject to a common plan or serving a common 

purpose‘ ‖ (quoting Webster‘s 3d New Internat. Dict. (2002) p. 2322) to conclude that ―a 

computer mapping system should include more than solely a computer program

component.‖ Similarly, the County argues that a computer mapping system includes not 

only mapping software but also databases in a format compatible with mapping software, 

since such formatting, unlike a printed copy or PDF version of the underlying data, 

enables a database to function as part of a computer mapping system. But this 

interpretation, though reasonable, is not compelled by the ordinary meaning of ―system,‖ 

a rather general word that is just as reasonably construed to refer only to mapping 

software.

Part of the challenge in construing ―computer mapping system‖ is that the 

technology for geographic information management and analysis has evolved 

significantly since its inception in the 1960s. As recounted by Sierra Club‘s expert, early 

computer graphics systems could only create drawings with lines and other geometric 

features. At the next stage, computer-aided drafting systems allowed users to create more 

precise engineering drawings. Next came automated mapping systems, also called 

computer-aided mapping, which allowed users to link their drawings with coordinating 

degrees representing the surface of the earth. Later programs allowed users to connect 

automated mapping (AM) systems with facility management (FM) systems. These 

AM/FM systems linked drawings with informational databases, including parcel 

databases. Finally, AM/FM systems were supplanted by modern GIS systems that allow 

complex geospatial and topographical analysis.

According to the County‘s deputy surveyor, the term ―computer mapping system‖ 

as used in 1988, when section 6254.9 was enacted, is simply a precursor to GIS 

technology and necessarily includes both software and related databases. Sierra Club‘s 

expert counters that while the term ―GIS‖ can be used broadly today to refer to both 
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software and GIS-formatted data, the term ―computer mapping system‖ as used in the 

1980s referred only to a system of linked software modules and did not include any 

related databases. Both parties point to a 2006 text defining ―GIS‖ as ―[a]n integrated 

collection of computer software and data used to view and manage information about 

geographic places, analyze spatial relationships and model spatial processes. A GIS 

provides a framework for gathering and organizing spatial data and related information so 

that it can be displayed and analyzed.‖ (Wade & Sommer, A to Z GIS: An Illustrated 

Dictionary of Geographic Information Systems (2d ed. 2006) p. 90.) But a 2006 

definition of ―GIS‖ does not shed light on what the Legislature meant by the term 

―computer mapping system‖ in 1988.

Although the term ―computer mapping system‖ by itself is susceptible of either 

Sierra Club‘s or the County‘s interpretation, we must also consider the statutory context 

in which the term appears. Section 6254.9(b) refers to ―computer mapping systems‖ as 

an item ―include[d]‖ in the term ―computer software.‖ We agree with Sierra Club that 

because the statute refers to ―computer mapping systems‖ as a species of ―computer 

software,‖ the term ―computer mapping systems‖ should be construed in light of the 

meaning of ―computer software.‖

According to Sierra Club, ―the plain meaning of the subject term  ̳software‘ in 

subdivision (a) is commonly understood to be distinct from the data upon which the 

software operates.‖ Dictionary definitions contemporaneous with the 1988 adoption of 

section 6254.9 tend to support Sierra Club‘s view. (See Webster‘s 9th New Collegiate 

Dict. (1987) p. 1121 [defining ―software‖ as ―1 : The entire set of programs, procedures, 

and related documentation associated with a system and esp. a computer system; specif : 

computer programs . . .‖]; 15 Oxford English Dict. (2d ed. 1989) p. 937 [defining 

―software‖ as ―a. The programs and procedures required to enable a computer to perform 

a specific task, as opposed to the physical components of the system . . . b. esp. The body 

of system programs, including compilers and library routines, required for the operation 
11

of a particular computer and often provided by the manufacturer, as opposed to program 

material provided by a user for a specific task.‖]; American Heritage Dict. (3d ed. 1992) 

p. 1713 [defining ―software‖ as ―The programs, routines, and symbolic languages that 

control the functioning of the hardware and direct its operation . . . .‖].) These definitions 

of ―software‖ do not encompass user-generated data in a format compatible with specific 

software.

The Legislature gave a similar meaning to the term ―computer software‖ in 2004

when it enacted Business and Professions Code section 22947.1, subdivision (c), which 

defines ―computer software‖ as ―a sequence of instructions written in any programming 

language that is executed on a computer.‖ (Stats. 2004, ch. 843, § 2, p. 6420.) On the 

other hand, the Legislature in 1987 — nine months before the adoption of Government 

Code section 6254.9 — defined ―computer program or software‖ more broadly in the 

Penal Code to mean ―a set of instructions or statements, and related data, that when 

executed in actual or modified form, cause a computer, computer system, or computer 

network to perform specified functions.‖ (Pen. Code, § 502, subd. (b)(3), italics added; 

Stats. 1987, ch. 1499, § 3, p. 5782.) Thus, although the ordinary meaning of ―computer 

software‖ tends to support Sierra Club‘s contention that the term ―computer mapping 

systems‖ in section 6254.9(b) refers only to mapping software, the Legislature 

contemporaneously used ―computer software‖ elsewhere to mean not only a program or 

sequence of instructions but also related data.

Whether the Legislature intended a similarly broad meaning of ―computer 

software‖ in section 6254.9 is illuminated by considering another feature of the statutory 

context — namely, section 6254.9(b)‘s reference to ―computer programs‖ and ―computer 

graphics systems‖ in addition to ―computer mapping systems‖ as forms of computer 

software. (See § 6254.9(b) [―As used in this section,  ̳computer software‘ includes 

computer mapping systems, computer programs, and computer graphics systems.‖].) 

―[W]hen a statute contains a list or catalogue of items, a court should determine the 
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meaning of each by reference to the others, giving preference to an interpretation that 

uniformly treats items similar in nature and scope. [Citations.] In accordance with this 

principle of construction, a court will adopt a restrictive meaning of a listed item if 

acceptance of a more expansive meaning would make other items in the list unnecessary 

or redundant, or would otherwise make the item markedly dissimilar to the other items in 

the list.‖ (Moore v. California State Bd. of Accountancy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 999, 1011–

1012.)

The County adopts the Court of Appeal‘s view that interpreting ―computer 

mapping systems‖ to encompass only mapping software would make that term 

superfluous in light of section 6254.9(b)‘s inclusion of ―computer programs‖ as a form of 

computer software. Although this argument is not without force, Sierra Club responds 

that ―one could just as easily argue that  ̳computer mapping systems‘ are also  ̳computer 

graphics systems[,]‘ a term that is also used in § 6254.9(b). Thus, even if the term 

 ̳computer mapping systems‘ in § 6254.9(b) was construed to include the data such 

mapping systems operate upon, the term would remain surplusage.‖

Further, Sierra Club contends, if a computer mapping system includes not only 

mapping software but also parcel data in a compatible format, then presumably a 

computer graphics system would include not only graphics software but also graphics 

data in a compatible format — a construction that ―would arguably exclude from the 

PRA all computer data operated upon by programs using a graphical interface such as 

those found on Microsoft Windows or Apple Macintosh computers . . . .‖ Amicus curiae 

Electronic Frontier Foundation similarly notes that ―computer graphics systems,‖ under 

the County‘s reading, would include public databases of mug shots or other images 

consisting of files (for example, JPEG files) formatted to be viewed and manipulated by 

graphics software. As a practical matter, such an interpretation would tend to make the 

mandate in section 6253.9(a)(1) that ―[t]he agency shall make the information available 

in any electronic format in which it holds the information‖ a virtual nullity or, at least, a 
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limited exception rather than a general rule. Almost all data stored in computers are 

formatted in some manner to be used with application software. It seems implausible that 

the Legislature — having expressly stated that ―information . . . stored in a computer‖ is a 

type of public record subject to disclosure (§ 6254.9(d)) and having provided for access 

to such information ―in any electronic format in which [the agency] holds the 

information‖ (§ 6253.9(a)(1)) — would have intended to exclude large categories of 

computer databases (mapping and graphics) merely because the files they contain are 

formatted to be read and manipulated by mapping and graphics software.

In sum, the analysis above leads us to conclude that although the term ―computer 

mapping systems‖ by itself is ambiguous, the ordinary meaning of ―computer software‖ 

supports Sierra Club‘s contention that the public records exemption for computer 

mapping systems covers GIS mapping software but not GIS-formatted data. It is true that 

the Legislature has elsewhere used the term ―computer software‖ more broadly to include 

―related data.‖ (Pen. Code, § 502, subd. (b)(3).) But such an interpretation — applied 

not only to ―computer mapping systems‖ but also in parallel to ―computer graphics 

systems‖ in section 6254.9(b) — would substantially undermine section 6253.9(a)(1)‘s 

general mandate that ―[t]he agency shall make the information available in any electronic 

format in which it holds the information.‖ Accordingly, we believe the better view, 

based on statutory text and context, is that GIS-formatted databases are not covered by 

the statutory exclusion of computer software, including computer mapping systems, from 

the definition of a public record.

C.

Although both parties rely on legislative history in support of their respective 

positions, our review of the history does not reveal anything decisive on the issue before 

us.

In considering the history of the statutes at issue, we grant the requests of the 

parties and amici curiae to take judicial notice of legislative history documents for 
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Assembly Bill No. 3265 (1987–1988 Reg. Sess.), Assembly Bill No. 1293 (1997–1998 

Reg. Sess.), Assembly Bill No. 2799 (1999–2000 Reg. Sess.), Assembly Bill No. 1014 

(2001–2002 Reg. Sess.), and Assembly Bill No. 1978 (2007–2008 Reg. Sess.); ballot 

materials concerning Proposition 59 (Gen. Elec. (Nov. 2, 2004)); the American Heritage 

Dictionary‘s definition of ―program‖; and Board of Supervisors of Orange County, 

Resolution No. 11-196 (Dec. 13, 2011). We deny Sierra Club‘s requests to take judicial 

notice of a ―GIS Needs Assessment Study,‖ an excerpt from Ceruzzi, A History of 

Modern Computing (1998), and a LexisNexis report of amendments to the PRA, as none 

is the proper subject of judicial notice.

Section 6254.9 was enacted in 1988. (Stats. 1988, ch. 447, § 1, p. 1836.) As 

introduced on February 11, 1988, Assembly Bill No. 3265 (1987–1988 Reg. Sess.) 

provided in relevant part: ―Nothing in this chapter prohibits an agency from selling 

proprietary information or requiring a licensing agreement for payment of royalties to the 

agency prior to any subsequent sale, distribution, or commercial use of the proprietary 

information by any person receiving the information. For purposes of this subdivision, 

 ̳proprietary information‘ includes computer readable data bases, computer programs, and 

computer graphics systems.‖ (Id. at p. 2.) An amendment changed the term ―proprietary 

information‖ to ―computer software‖ and added a provision that ―[n]othing in this section 

is intended to affect the public record status of information merely because it is stored in 

a computer.‖ (Assem. Bill No. 3265, as amended Apr. 4, 1988, p. 2.) A Senate 

amendment replaced the term ―computer readable data bases‖ with ―computer mapping 

systems.‖ (Sen. Amend. to Assem. Bill No. 3265 (1987–1988 Reg. Sess.) June 9, 1988, 

p. 2.)

The bill was sponsored by the City of San Jose. A report by the Assembly 

Committee on Governmental Organization noted that the city had ―developed various 

computer readable mapping systems, graphics systems, and other computer programs for 

civic planning purposes. A number of utility companies, engineering firms, private 
15

consultants and other commercial interests are requesting the city‘s software under the 

California Public Records Act.‖ (Assem. Com. on Governmental Organization, analysis 

of Assem. Bill No. 3265 (1987–1988 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 4, 1988, p. 1.) The 

report further said, ―The City is concerned about recouping the cost of developing the 

software.‖ (Ibid.)

The Department of Finance originally opposed the bill, in part because the 

inclusion of ―computer readable data bases‖ in the definition of ―computer software‖ was 

contradictory to the intent expressed in the provision of the bill that said ―[n]othing in this 

section is intended to affect the public record status of information merely because it is 

stored in a computer.‖ (Dept. Finance, analysis of Assem. Bill No. 3265 (1987–1988 

Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 4, 1988, p. 2.) The Department of Finance dropped its 

opposition after the Senate amendment on June 9, 1988 changed ―computer readable data 

bases‖ to ―computer mapping systems‖ and addressed other concerns about the scope of 

an agency‘s licensing authority. (Sen. Amend. to Assem. Bill No. 3265 (1987–1988 Reg. 

Sess. June 9, 1988, p.2; see Dept. Finance, analysis of Assem. Bill No. 3265 (1987–1988)

as amended June 15, 1988, p. 1.)

The legislative history reveals no attempt to define ―computer mapping system‖ 

after the term was introduced by the June 9, 1988 amendment. Instead, various terms 

were used loosely to explain the scope and effect of the bill. For example, an Assembly 

report concurring in the final Senate amendments said that the City of San Jose ―has 

developed computer readable mapping systems‖ and that the ―city is concerned about 

recouping the cost of developing the software.‖ (Concurrence in Sen. Amends. to 

Assem. Bill No. 3265 (1987–1988 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 15, 1998, p. 1, italics 

added.) The same report noted that the bill ―draws a distinction between computer

software and computer-stored information‖ (id. at p. 2, italics added), with the latter but 

not the former constituting a public record. By contrast, the Department of Finance‘s 

final fiscal analysis of the bill noted: ―The potential revenue generated by the sale of 
16

computer programs, graphics, and information data bases could be substantial . . . .‖ 

(Dept. Finance, analysis of Assem. Bill No. 3265 (1987–1988 Reg. Sess.) as amended 

June 15, 1988, p. 1, italics added.) Similarly, a Republican analysis for the Assembly 

Committee on Governmental Organization stated that the final amended bill would 

―allow agencies to recover development and maintenance costs of computer software by 

selling or licensing computer programs and data bases that have been developed 

sometimes at considerable public expense.‖ (Assem. Republican Caucus, analysis of 

Assem. Bill No. 3265 (1987–1988 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 15, 1988, p. 1, italics 

added.)

The Court of Appeal‘s decision below relied on the fact that the City of San Jose 

originally proposed the bill to include ―computer readable data bases‖ to suggest that the 

bill was intended to reach databases like the OC Landbase. The Court of Appeal noted 

that the legislative file of the Senate Committee on Governmental Organization included 

a memorandum from the city, which stated: ―The City of San Jose, like many other 

government agencies[,] has developed various computer readable data bases, computer 

programs, computer graphics systems and other computer stored information at 

considerable research and development expense. For example, the City‘s Department of

Public Works has recently completed development of a data base for a computer mapping 

system known as the Automated Mapping System (AMS). [¶] The AMS is the product 

of eight years of efforts on the part of Public Works to collect and store on computer 

magnetic tape, city wide information regarding the location of public improvements and 

natural features. This wide range of data can be arranged in various ways to produce

many types of maps for specialized uses, such as fire response, sewer collection, or police 

beat maps. Public Works estimates that development costs to date have exceeded $2 

million dollars.‖ (City Atty. Joan R. Gallo, City of San Jose mem. (Jan. 19, 1988) 

[legislative proposal for authority to sell or license proprietary information].)
17

It may be that the City of San Jose intended the bill to exclude ―computer readable 

data bases‖ from the definition of a public record. However, ―  ̳[i]n construing a statute 

we do not consider the objective of an authoring legislator when there is no reliable 

indication that the Legislature as a whole was aware of that objective and believed the 

language of the proposal would accomplish it.‘ ‖ (People v. Garcia (2002) 28 Cal.4th 

1166, 1175–1176, fn. 5.) The City of San Jose‘s memorandum is not such a ―reliable 

indication.‖ Moreover, we decline to place great weight on the city‘s intent since the 

Legislature subsequently amended the bill to specifically remove the city‘s proposed 

reference to ―computer readable data bases.‖ Ultimately, the legislative history does not 

clearly indicate whether the replacement term ―computer mapping systems‖ was intended 

to eliminate the exclusion for ―computer readable data bases‖ of all kinds or to narrow 

the exclusion so that it would cover databases compatible with computer mapping 

systems but not other databases.

In sum, the legislative history of section 6254.9 reveals a significant change in the 

scope of the bill from the time it was introduced in February 1988 until it was enacted in 

June 1988. The legislation evolved from a bill solely concerned with allowing agencies 

to recoup the cost of developing proprietary information to a statute that balanced such 

concerns with a general intent to maintain the public record status of electronically stored 

information. The broad terms ―proprietary information‖ and ―computer readable data 

bases‖ were replaced with the narrower terms ―computer software‖ and ―computer 

mapping systems,‖ respectively. And a separate section was added to clarify that the 

statute was not intended to exclude information from the definition of a public record 

simply because it is stored in a computer. Although the trajectory of the bill appears to 

recognize a general distinction between software and data, the legislative history does not 

speak to the particular data at issue here: a database with format characteristics specific 

to computer mapping systems. In the end, it is unclear whether the Legislature intended 

the term ―computer mapping systems‖ to exclude both mapping software and parcel data 
18

in a system-compatible format from the definition of a public record, or to remove all 

―computer readable data bases‖ from the ambit of the exclusion.

Nor does the Legislature‘s 2000 addition of section 6253.9, which specifically 

governs the disclosure of electronic records, help to resolve the matter. (See Stats. 2000, 

ch. 982, § 2, p. 7142, added by Assem. Bill No. 2799 (1999–2000 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly 

Bill 2799).) As noted, section 6253.9(a) says: ―Unless otherwise prohibited by law, any 

agency that has information that constitutes an identifiable public record not exempt from 

disclosure pursuant to this chapter that is in an electronic format shall make that 

information available in an electronic format when requested by any person . . . .‖ 

Assembly Bill 2799 was sponsored by the California Newspaper Publishers Association 

―to ensure quicker, more useful access to public records.‖ (Assem. Com. on 

Governmental Organization, analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2799 (1999–2000 Reg. Sess.) as 

introduced Feb. 28, 2000, p. 2.) As originally introduced, the bill did not specify that it 

applied only to electronic records already subject to disclosure under the PRA, prompting 

opposition from various public entities intent on preserving the exclusion for ―proprietary 

software‖ in section 6254.9(a). (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, analysis of Assem. Bill 

No.2799 (1999–2000 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 22, 2000, p. 10 (Senate Analysis).) 

This concern was remedied through amendments clarifying that the bill applied only to 

information otherwise subject to disclosure. (Ibid.) In particular, the Senate Judiciary 

Committee noted that Assembly Bill 2799 as amended allows agencies to reject any 

request that would require an agency to release proprietary software along with the 

requested records. (Sen. Analysis, p. 5.)

Meanwhile, other agencies expressed concern that because the bill would require 

electronic disclosure of ―massive databases,‖ it would require significant amounts of staff 

time to redact nondisclosable information and would increase the risk of unintentional 

release of nondisclosable information when compared with nonelectronic production. 

(Assem. Com. on Governmental Organization, analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2799 (1999–
19

2000 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 27, 2000, pp. 2–3.) The Legislature does not appear to 

have adopted any amendments in response to this concern, and documents in the 

Governor‘s Chaptered Bill File suggest that these concerns remained in effect through the 

final enrolled bill. (See, e.g., Dept. Information & Technology, Enrolled Bill Rep. on

Assem. Bill No. 2799 (1999–2000 Reg. Sess.) Sept. 25, 2000, p. 2.)

As with section 6254.9, the legislative history of section 6253.9 reveals no clear 

answer to the question before us. On one hand, we can infer that the Legislature 

recognized a distinction between software and data, since it amended Assembly Bill 2799 

to protect proprietary software while rejecting agency concerns that the disclosure of 

databases in an electronic format might require significant staff time. On the other hand, 

even if the Legislature adopted section 6253.9 on the premise that electronic databases 

are generally subject to disclosure, it does not follow that a GIS-formatted database, in 

particular, is also subject to disclosure in light of section 6254.9(b)‘s exclusion of 

―computer mapping systems‖ from the definition of a public record.

Because legislative history is inconclusive on the question presented, our review 

of the history does not alter the conclusion we previously reached. Considering the 

relevant terms of section 6254.9 by themselves and in their statutory context, we believe 

the public records exemption for ―[c]omputer software‖ (§ 6254.9(a)), a term that 

―includes computer mapping systems‖ (§ 6254.9(b)), does not cover GIS-formatted 

databases like the OC Landbase at issue here.

D.

Any remaining doubt about the proper interpretation of section 6254.9 in this case 

is dispelled by the interpretive rule in article I, section 3, subdivision (b)(2), of the 

California Constitution: ―A statute, court rule, or other authority, including those in 

effect on the effective date of this subdivision, shall be broadly construed if it furthers the 

people‘s right of access, and narrowly construed if it limits the right of access.‖
20

To the extent that the term ―computer mapping system‖ is ambiguous, the 

constitutional canon requires us to interpret it in a way that maximizes the public‘s access 

to information ―  ̳unless the Legislature has expressly provided to the contrary.‘ ‖ (Office 

of Inspector General v. Superior Court, supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at p. 709.) As explained 

above, we find nothing in the text, statutory context, or legislative history of the term 

―computer mapping system‖ that allows us to say the Legislature clearly sought to 

exclude GIS-formatted parcel data from the definition of a public record when it can be 

disclosed without any accompanying software. Applying the interpretive rule set forth in 

article I, section 3, subdivision (b)(2), we must conclude that section 6254.9(b)‘s 

exclusion of ―computer mapping systems‖ from the definition of a public record does not 

encompass a parcel database in a GIS file format. Contrary to what the County contends, 

this reading of the statute does not ―repeal or nullify‖ a ―statutory exception to the right 

of access to public records‖ in contravention of article I, section 3, subdivision (b)(5). 

Our holding simply construes the terms of section 6254.9 in light of the constitutional 

mandate that a statute ―shall be . . . narrowly construed if it limits the right of access.‖ 

(Cal. Const., art. I, § 3, subd. (b)(2).)

We note that this interpretation is consistent with a 2005 opinion letter issued by 

the Attorney General in response to a request by a member of the Assembly to determine 

whether ―parcel boundary map data maintained in an electronic format by a county 

assessor [is] subject to public inspection and copying under provisions of the California 

Public Records Act[.]‖ (88 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 153, 153 (2005).) The opinion letter 

explained that ―the term  ̳computer mapping systems‘ in section 6254.9 does not refer to 

or include basic maps and boundary information per se (i.e., the basic data compiled, 

updated, and maintained by county assessors), but rather denotes unique computer 

programs to process such data using mapping functions — original programs that have 

been designed and produced by a public agency.‖ (88 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. at p. 159.) 

―Accordingly,‖ the Attorney General concluded, ―parcel map data maintained in an 
21

electronic format by a county assessor does not qualify as a  ̳computer mapping system‘ 

under the exemption provisions of section 6254.9‖ (88 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. at p. 159) and 

must be provided upon request as a public record at a fee limited to the direct cost of 

producing the copy (id. at pp. 163–164). As noted above, the record here indicates that 

47 counties in California maintain GIS-formatted parcel base maps and provide access to 

those GIS-formatted databases as public records. (Ante, at p. 3.) Of those 47 counties, 

19 changed their fee policies following the Attorney General‘s opinion letter, according 

to Sierra Club‘s expert.

Because section 6254.9(b) does not exclude GIS-formatted databases like the OC 

Landbase from the definition of a public record, such databases are subject to disclosure 

unless otherwise exempt from the PRA. Unlike the records at issue in County of Santa 

Clara v. Superior Court (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1301, the County here does not argue 

that the OC Landbase is subject to any other exemptions. The fact that the County 

offered to produce the information underlying the database in an alternative format 

suggests that no such exemption applies. Similarly, the County‘s general practice of 

producing the OC Landbase to the public, albeit pursuant to a licensing agreement, 

suggests that its contents do not implicate any of the confidentiality or other concerns 

underlying the exemptions set forth in section 6254. Because the OC Landbase is not 

excluded from the definition of a public record under section 6254.9(b), and because the 

County does not argue that the database is otherwise exempt from disclosure, the County 

must produce the OC Landbase in response to Sierra Club‘s request ―in any electronic 

format in which it holds the information‖ (§ 6253.9(a)(1)) at a cost not to exceed the 

direct cost of duplication (§§ 6253.9(a)(2), 6253, subd. (b)).
22

CONCLUSION

For the reasons above, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and 

remand to that court with directions to remand to the superior court to issue a writ 

consistent with this opinion.

LIU, J.

WE CONCUR: CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.

KENNARD, J.

BAXTER, J.

WERDEGAR, J.

CHIN, J.

CORRIGAN, J.
See last page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion Sierra Club v. Superior Court

__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion

Original Appeal

Original Proceeding

Review Granted XXX 195 Cal.App.4th 1537

Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No. S194708

Date Filed: July 8, 2013

__________________________________________________________________________________

Court: Superior

County: Orange

Judge: James Di Cesare

__________________________________________________________________________________

Counsel:

Venkus & Associates, Sabrina D. Venkus and Dean Wallraff for Petitioner.

Holme Roberts & Owen, Bryan Cave, Rachel Matteo-Boehm, Katherine Keating and Leila Knox for Media and 

Open Government, First Amendment Coalition, Freedom Communications, Inc., Publisher of the Orange County 

Register, Los Angeles Times Communications LLC, The Associated Press, Bay Area News Group, Bloomberg 

News, Courthouse News Service, Gannett Co., Inc., Hearst Corporation, Lee Enterprises, Incorporated, The 

McClatchy Company, Patch Media Corporation, The San Francisco Examiner, Wired, American Society of News 

Editors, Association of Capitol Reporters and Editors, California Newspaper Publishers Association, Digital Media 

Law Project, Citizen Media Law Project, Electronic Frontier Foundation, First Amendment Coalition of Arizona, 

National Freedom of Information Coalition, Openthegovernment.org, The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the 

Press and Society of Professional Journalists as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.

M. Rhead Enion for Academic Researchers in Public Health, Urban Planning and Environmental Justice as Amici 

Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.

Jack Cohen as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.

Otten & Joyce, Victor J. Otten and Brigid Joyce for 212 GIS Professionals and 23 GIS Organizations as Amici 

Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.

Meyer, Klipper & Mohr, Christopher A. Mohr, Michael R. Klipper, Colby F. Block; Coblentz, Patch, Duffy & Bass, 

Jeffrey G. Knowles and Julia D. Greer for Consumer Data Industry Association, Corelogic, LexisNexis, The 

National Association of Professional Background Screeners and the Software & Information Industry Association as 

Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.

Stanford Environmental Law Clinic, Deborah A. Sivas, Alicia E. Thesing, Leah J. Russin, Matthew H. Armsby and 

Margaret Brennan for Advocates for the Environment as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.
Page 2 – counsel continued – S194708

Counsel:

Mark Rumold for Electronic Frontier Foundation as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.

Michel & Associates and C. D. Michel for the Geographic Information Systems Community as Amici Curiae on 

behalf of Petitioner.

Law Offices of Michael W. Stamp, Michael W. Stamp and Molly Erickson for The Open Monterey Project as 

Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.

No appearance for Respondent. 

Nicholas S. Chrisos, County Counsel, Mark D. Servino, Rebecca S. Leeds and Karen L. Christensen, Deputy 

County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest.

Richards, Watson & Gershon and Ginetta L. Giovinco for California Assessors‘ Association as Amicus Curiae on 

Behalf of Real Party in Interest.

Best Best & Krieger, Shawn Hagerty and Rebecca Andrews for League of California Cities and California State 

Association of Counties as Amici Curiae on Behalf of Real Party in Interest.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Sabrina D. Venkus

Venkus & Associates

21 South California Street, Suite 204

Ventura, CA 93001

(805) 641-0247

Mark D. Servino

Deputy County Counsel

333 West Santa Ana Boulevard, Suite 407

Santa Ana, CA 92701

(714) 834-3300