SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-5623-18

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

KATRELL TRENT,

Defendant-Appellant.

_______________________

Submitted January 20, 2022 – Decided April 4, 2022

Before Judges Alvarez and Mitterhoff.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Hudson County, Indictment No. 17-11-0775.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Marcia Blum, Assistant Deputy Public 

Defender, of counsel and on the brief).

Esther Suarez, Hudson County Prosecutor, attorney for 

respondent (Patrick R. McAvaddy, Assistant 

Prosecutor, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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Tried by a jury, defendant Katrell Trent was convicted of second-degree 

possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a)(1), 

second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun without a permit, N.J.S.A. 

2C:39-5(b)(1), and the second-degree aggravated assault of Terrell Corbin. The 

trial judge sentenced defendant on the weapons offenses to concurrent five-year 

prison terms, subject to a Graves Act one-year parole ineligibility. See N.J.S.A. 

2C:43-6(c). The judge imposed a concurrent eight-year term of imprisonment 

on the aggravated assault, subject to the No Early Release Act's (NERA) eightyfive percent parole ineligibility. See N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. The jury acquitted 

defendant of a charge of first-degree attempted murder of Corbin, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-

1(a)(1) and 2C:11-3(a)(1), and second-degree serious bodily injury assault of 

Davon Gordon, N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6 and 2C:12-1(b)(1). We affirm the convictions

and sentence.

At trial, Corbin testified that in the early morning hours of June 4, 2016, 

he and Gordon passed a bar; Corbin noticed a group of about ten to fifteen men 

standing outside. As they went by, Gordon exchanged words with someone in 

the group. Corbin was on his phone and did not hear what was said. 
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Gordon parked about a block away, and as the men walked back, someone 

approached Corbin and asked if Corbin had said an obscenity to him earlier. 

Corbin denied doing so, turned away, and was shot in the left buttock.

Police recovered security camera recordings from the area, from which 

they extracted still photographs. The surveillance videos and the photographs 

were shown to the jury, and while testifying, Corbin described his assailant as 

brown-skinned, with a short haircut, and wearing a red hoodie. He identified a

man in the video as the shooter, although he could not identify defendant in 

court. 

Tavin Robinson, a participant in the assault charged by separate 

indictment, identified defendant as the man wearing red in a recorded interview 

with police. Robinson's interview was played for the jury after he repudiated 

his statement on the stand. See State v. Gross, 121 N.J. 1 (1990), and N.J.R.E. 

803(a). That repudiation included Robinson claiming police made him 

memorize a lengthy narrative before the recording equipment was activated. 

After he was shot, Corbin was pummeled and "stomped" by the shooter 

and his companions, whom Corbin identified as a bald man, a man with 

dreadlocks, and a man with a ponytail. As he was beaten, Corbin lay curled on 

the ground in the fetal position. When his assailants heard the sound of gunfire,
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they fled. The surveillance videos show the man in the red shirt throwing away 

a black object, which the State contended was the gun used to shoot Corbin. 

Corbin got up and tried to rouse Gordon, who was prone between two parked 

cars. Gordon had been shot multiple times and could not move; he was 

hospitalized but died hours later.

A nearby resident testified that he was awakened by the sound of a 

gunshot, and when he looked out the window, he saw a group of men brutally

beating someone who was lying on the ground. The witness said there were 

three assailants, including a man in a red shirt.

During deliberations, the trial judge allowed jurors to have the State's 

transcription of Robinson's recorded statement. The judge's instructions did not 

include a specific unanimity charge; none was requested. The transcript of 

Robinson's Mirandized statement was admitted into evidence.

On appeal, defendant raises the following four points:

POINT I

IT WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR FOR THE 

PROSECUTOR TO DEFINE REASONABLE DOUBT 

AS A "GUESSTIMATED" MATHEMATICAL 

CALCULATION.
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POINT II

THE ASSAULT CONVICTION MUST BE 

REVERSED BECAUSE DIFFERENT JURORS MAY 

HAVE CONVICTED OF ASSAULT BASED ON 

DIFFERENT ACTS, BUT THEY WERE NOT 

REQUIRED TO IDENTIFY THE ACTS OR TO FIND 

ONE ACT UNANIMOUSLY.

POINT III

IT WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR FOR THE COURT 

TO GIVE THE JURY A TRANSCRIPTION OF 

ROBINSON'S VIDEORECORDED PRETRIAL 

STATEMENT IMPLICATING DEFENDANT IN THE 

ASSAULT, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE JURY 

DID NOT REQUEST THE STATEMENT AND 

ROBINSON DISAVOWED THE STATEMENT AT 

TRIAL.

POINT IV

THE SENTENCE OF EIGHT YEARS, SIX YEARS 

AND TEN MONTHS WITHOUT PAROLE, IS 

BASED ON UNSUPPORTED AGGRAVATING 

FACTORS AND IMPROPERLY REJECTED 

MITIGATING FACTORS, AND IS EXCESSIVE.

I.

Defendant's first objection is to the prosecutor's comments during 

summation. The prosecutor said: 

So let's talk about reasonable doubt. And it's 

true, people always want some quantification. What 

percentage? There's no percentage. And it's supposed 

to be that way. 
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But let me ask, offer two potentially useful 

insights. Let me actually first correct something 

counsel[] said last night. 

Mr. Robinson's attorney said if you have any 

doubt, if you have a duty or responsibility and an 

obligation, not guilty. That is simply not accurate. The 

law is right before you and the Judge will read you the 

law.

As it says, we know very few things for absolute 

certainty, so that doesn't say that you have to have no 

doubt. It's reasonable doubt. And here's what I would 

suggest. That first word is every bit as important as that 

second word.

Right? Don't drop it out. Reasonable qualifies 

what that doubt has to be. So what I did on the bottom 

is I, and I hope I don't offend anyone, I approximated 

maybe average ages of the jurors. 40. Right? Let's 

take that number.

And there'll be 12 of you deliberating. So 40 

times 12 times 365 days in the year. What we have is 

the number of days that you have been on this planet 

collectively. Obviously guesstimated. Here's the 

question, right? That I think you should ask yourself.

Is this something that doesn't happen every day? 

Or is this something that doesn't happen every day? 

Because if it hasn't happened in y[o]ur collective 

175,000 days on the Earth, then I think you have some 

good insight into whether, whatever doubt you may or 

may not have would be reasonable.

[19T69:1-70:8]
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We assess defendant's assertion of prejudice within the context of the 

judge's instruction in the model closing charge, Model Jury Charges (Criminal), 

"Criminal Final Charge" (rev. May 12, 2014), that the comments of the attorneys 

are not the law. Even in the absence of that context, it seems clear that the 

prosecutor's intent was to merely dramatize the fact that jurors bring their

common sense and life experiences to deliberations. Before the analogy, he said

that "the law is right before you and the judge will read you the law." Thus, his

statement could not have confused the jurors into thinking that reasonable doubt 

was defined by anything other than the judge's instructions, which reiterated the 

definition of reasonable doubt both in the opening and the closing charge. The 

contention that the prosecutor's characterization misled the jury into a different, 

improper definition of reasonable doubt has no merit.

During deliberations, the jury expressed concern they might be unable to 

reach a unanimous verdict on all the charges. Nothing in the record connects 

their concern with the prosecutor's analogy. The jury's comment, along with 

their request for playbacks of testimony and video recordings, does not manifest 

a misunderstanding of the meaning of reasonable doubt. Instead, it signifies 

their careful and thoughtful consideration of the case, and ultimate decision—

which included defendant's acquittal of some of the charges. 
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The proofs in this case demanded careful scrutiny. The prosecutor's 

statement, to which no objection was raised, was not an infringement on 

defendant's right to a fair trial. It was not plain error, a misstatement "of such a 

nature as to have been clearly capable of producing an unjust result." See R.

2:10-2; State v. Maloney, 216 N.J. 91, 104 (2013). 

II.

Defendant's next point, that a unanimity jury instruction was necessary as 

to the aggravated assault, is anchored in his position that some jurors may have 

convicted because they believed he shot Corbin, while others may have done so 

because they believed he punched or kicked Corbin, or in some other way 

participated in the melee. Thus, he argues, the verdict might not have been 

unanimous.

Defendant did not request a unanimity instruction during trial. Since the 

challenge to the charge is being raised for the first time on appeal, we review it 

under the plain error standard. State v. Morais, 359 N.J. Super. 123, 134-35 

(App. Div. 2003). We presume the instructions were adequate. Ibid.

In State v. Parker, the defendant was charged with sexual assaults 

involving several students. 124 N.J. 628, 632 (1991). The Supreme Court 

directed that where "a danger [exists] of a fragmented verdict[,] the trial court 
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must upon request offer a specific unanimity instruction." Id. at 637. But the 

failure to charge does not necessarily constitute reversible error. Ibid. The 

danger of a fragmented, non-unanimous verdict arises only "where the facts are 

exceptionally complex, or where the allegations in a single count are either 

contradictory or only marginally related to one another, or where there is a 

variance between the indictment and the proof at trial, or where there is a 

tangible indication of jury confusion." Id. at 636 (citations omitted). 

Because the acts in Parker, even though they involved different students, 

stemmed from the defendant's violation of the special relationship between 

teacher and student, the Court found no need for a unanimity charge. Id. at 639. 

Furthermore, the Court concluded the jury was not confused about reaching a 

unanimous verdict, although it asked questions regarding official misconduct 

and endangerment. Ibid.

In State v. T.C., 347 N.J. Super. 219, 223 (App. Div. 2002), the defendant 

engaged in several forms of physical abuse and negligence of her son over a 

period of roughly fifteen months. Because "there was no indication of juror 

confusion, nor were there two separate theories being submitted to the jury[,]" 

there was no need for a unanimity instruction, and no error by its omission. Id.

at 243. This was true even though jurors may have convicted the defendant on 
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her commission of different acts: "[t]here was but one theory of ongoing 

emotional and physical abuse over a period of time[.]" Ibid.; see also State v. 

Kane, 449 N.J. Super. 119, 127-42 (App. Div. 2017) (where defendant assaulted 

victim on different occasions during a single evening, causing multiple injuries,

no unanimity instruction was necessary because defendant's conduct was a 

"continuum of violence.").

The assault in this case involved a continuum of violence. It is noteworthy 

that the jury convicted only defendant of aggravated assault upon Corbin, and 

either acquitted the remaining co-defendants or found them guilty of simple 

assault. There was "no realistic possibility that a minority of jurors was willing 

to ground" the aggravated assault conviction on the punching and kicking as 

opposed to the shooting. See Kane, 449 N.J. Super. at 142.

III.

Rule 1:8–8 provides that "[t]he jury may take into the jury room the 

exhibits received in evidence . . . . " State v. A.R., 213 N.J. 542, 560 (2013). 

This language does not distinguish "between testimonial evidence, such as 

statements or depositions, and non-testimonial evidence," and if read literally, 

the rule would authorize the presence of all exhibits in the deliberation room. 

Ibid. However, courts have held that a jury cannot be permitted unfettered 
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access to video exhibits. Ibid.; State v. Burr, 195 N.J. 119, 134 (2008); State v. 

Weston, 222 N.J. 277, 289-94 (2015); State v. Michaels, 264 N.J. Super. 579, 

643-44 (App. Div. 1993). As the Court explained in Burr,

[A] video replay . . . presents much more information 

than does a transcript reading. In essence, the witness 

is brought before the jury a second time . . . . The 

witness' words and all of the animation, passion, or 

sympathy originally conveyed are again presented to 

the jury. It is difficult to deny that there is an advantage 

that may be gained in such circumstances.

[195 N.J. at 133 (quoting Michaels, 264 N.J. Super. at 

644).]

Thus, when confronted with a jury's request to view a video exhibit a second 

time, a trial court must abide by certain specific procedural safeguards. Id. at 

135.

With regard to this jury's access to transcripts in the deliberation room, 

which defendant challenges, the law is different. There is "no error in admission 

into the jury room of transcripts of tape recordings of conversations obtained by 

the State." State v. DeBellis, 174 N.J. Super. 195, 199 (App. Div. 1980). A 

judge may admit them where he is "certain that they [are] reasonably accurate," 

and the judge instructs the jury as to their reliance upon the transcripts. Ibid.

The judge did not instruct the jury that the controlling evidence was the 

video, not the transcript. However, the lack of warning is inconsequential since 
12 A-5623-18

defendant does not challenge now, nor did he at trial, the accuracy of the 

transcript.

Robinson did not say he saw defendant with a gun; neither did the 

neighbor. Defendant's weapons convictions were likely the result of Corbin's 

testimony that someone wearing red clothing shot him and assaulted him, and

his identification of that person on the surveillance video. Robinson's statement 

to the police linked Corbin's identification to defendant by naming the person 

wearing red clothing. The jury heard at least three times during trial that 

Robinson had told police the person in red clothing was defendant. Thus, the 

admission of the transcript did not prejudice defendant because its impact was 

likely minimal.

Defendant's claim that the jury might have convicted because they might 

have given more weight to the transcript of Robinson's statement, as opposed to 

Robinson's renunciation of it while on the stand, requires little discussion. 

Robinson's narrative was probably rejected by the jury because it was so 

implausible—that police invented a lengthy story and forced him to memorize 

it before he was interviewed on camera.
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IV.

Finally, defendant contends that the sentence imposed on him, a NERA 

eight-year term, is based on unsupported aggravating factors and improperly 

rejected mitigating factors and is therefore excessive. We do not agree that the 

judge's analysis did not support the aggravating factors he found. Aggravating 

factor three, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3), risk of recidivism, was justified by 

defendant's prior contacts with the system, and the fact, as the judge noted, that 

defendant's crimes escalated in intensity over time. Aggravating factor nine, 

N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9), the need to deter, was highly relevant given the violent 

nature of defendant's conduct. 

The judge gave defendant the benefit of the doubt in awarding mitigating 

factor seven, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(7), since his criminal history was mainly in 

the juvenile court. Nothing about the sentence shocks our conscience. See State 

v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 364-65 (1984). It included terms of parole ineligibility 

required both under NERA and the Graves Act.

We review sentencing decisions deferentially. State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 

57, 70 (2014). This means a sentence is affirmed unless the judge violated the 

sentencing guidelines, found aggravating and mitigating factors not based on 

competent credible evidence, or misapplied the sentencing guidelines. Roth, 95
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N.J. at 364-65. The judge fully explained his analysis. Fuentes, 217 N.J. at 73. 

No abuse of discretion occurred.

Affirmed.