alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### VANDERMULLEN In Re

Ohio Appeals, 9th Dist, Wayne Co

No 872.

Decided Oct. 9, 1930

■ Rodgers & Wendling, for Morris C. Vander mullen.

Daniel C. Funk and Charles C. Jones, both of Wooster, for Charles & Mabel Ster*687ling.

PARDEE, J.

At the time the original order was made, on the 20th of August, 1929, in which the court found the averments of the complaint to be true, the child immediately became a ward of the court and remains such until she attains the age of 21 years, and the jurisdiction of said court over said child continues until such time. (1643 GC.) So, the subsequent applications .filed by the parties interested related solely to the question as to who should have the custody of said child, under the control and supervision of the court.

The power of the court to change said custody being continuous, the evidence that was taken at said Rearing related only to the matter of custody and not to the termination of the power of the court over said child. Therefore, the only matter before us for consideration and decision involves the question as to whether or not the decision of the court as to who should.have the custody of said child is manifestly against the weight of the evidence.

Upon that question we have fully read and considered all the evidence offered, and we are not. unanimously of the opinion that the judgment of the tri,al court is manifestly 'against the weight of the evidence.

But we do find that the part of the order giving the permanent custody of said child to Charles and Mabel Sterling is ■ unauthorized, as the child remains a ward of the court until she attains the age of 21 years.

The judgment of the trial court is therefore modified as to permanent custody, and no other prejudicial erorr in the record having- been found, the judgment of the trial court, as so modified, is affirmed.

Funk, PJ, and Washburn, J, concur.
§ 15.203 When should a claim under the MPCECA be filed? A claim under this subpart may be allowed only if it is filed in writing within 2 years after accrual of the claim. For the purpose of this part, a claim accrues at the later of: ( a ) The time of the accident or incident causing the loss or damage;
( b ) Such time as the loss or damage should have been discovered by the claimant by the exercise of due diligence; or
( c ) Such time as cause preventing filing no longer exists or as war or armed conflict ends, whichever is earlier, if a claim otherwise accrues during war or an armed conflict or has accrued within 2 years before war or an armed conflict begins, and for cause shown.
§ 1905.27 Decisions of hearing examiners. ( a ) *Proposed findings of fact, conclusions, and rules or orders.* Within 10 days after receipt of notice that the transcript of the testimony has been filed or such additional time as the presiding hearing examiner may allow, each party may file with the hearing examiner proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and rule or order, together with a supporting brief expressing the reasons for such proposals. Such proposals and brief shall be served on all other parties, and shall refer to all portions of the record and to all authorities relied upon in support of each proposal.
( b ) *Decision of the hearing examiner.* Within a reasonable time after the time allowed for the filing of proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and rule or order, the presiding hearing examiner shall make and serve upon each party his decision, which shall become final upon the 20th day after service thereof, unless exceptions are filed thereto, as provided in § 1905.28. The decision of the hearing examiner shall include ( 1 ) a statement of findings and conclusions, with reasons and bases therefor, upon each material issue of fact, law, or discretion presented on the record, and
( 2 ) the appropriate rule, order, relief, or denial thereof. The decision of the hearing examiner shall be based upon a consideration of the whole record and shall state all facts officially noticed and relied upon. It shall be made on the basis of a preponderance of reliable and probative evidence.
Submitted on motion to dismiss second appeal September 25,

appeal dismissed and rehearing denied November 20, 1928.

#### EMIL JOHNSON et al. *v.*W. M. JACKSON.

(272 Pac. 258.)

For the motion, *Mr. L. E. Schmitt*and *Mr. Bradley A. Ewers.*

*Contra, Mr. Milton W. Smith.*

RAND, C. J.

On motion of respondents, defendant’s first appeal was dismissed for the reason that the transcript had not been filed in this court within *301tlie time limited by tbe Code. Thereafter defendant again appealed and respondents now move to dismiss the same.

The judgment first appealed from was entered in the Circuit Court for Multnomah County on February 21, 1928, and notice of appeal from said judgment was served and filed on February 24, 1928, and the undertaking on appeal was served and filed on February 25, 1928. No exceptions to the sufficiency of the surety were filed and the appeal became perfected at the end of March 6, 1928. Unless the time was lawfully extended, appellant was required to file his transcript on appeal in this court within thirty days thereafter. The transcript was not filed until. June 18, 1928, which was too late unless the time for filing the same had been enlarged by some lawful order of the trial, court or by one of the justices of this court.

Section 554, Or. L., as amended by Chapter 316, Laws of 1927, provides that an order enlarging the time for filing the transcript “shall be made within the time allowed to file transcripts, and only after three- days’ notice has been given to the opposing party.” This provision which was contained in the 1927 amendment was considered in *Meyers*v. *Pacific States Lumber Co.,*122 Or. 315 (259 Pac. 203), and it was in effect held that, in the absence of a stipulation, an order extending the time for the filing of the transcript without the requisite statutory notice having been given was invalid and of no effect. Evidently, through inadvertence, the trial court, without notice to the opposing party, made various orders extending the time for filing the transcript, all of which orders were, on June 1, *3021928, set aside and vacated by the trial court because of the want of such notice. When that matter was called to the attention of this court, the first appeal was dismissed for the reason that the transcript had not been filed within the time limited by the Code, or within any time lawfully extended. Subsequent to such dismissal, appellant appealed from the order setting aside and vacating the former void orders of the trial court. The order vacating said orders is not an appealable order and the time for appealing from the. original judgment had long since expired before the second appeal was attempted to be taken. For these reasons, this court is wholly without jurisdiction to entertain this latter appeal ¿nd the same -must be dismissed. It is so ordered.

Appeal Dismissed.
#### HELEN DE WOLFE MORGAN ET AL., EXECS. v. UNITED STATES

[Ante, p. 138;

302 U. S. 716]

Petition for writ of certiorari *denied*by Supreme Court October 11, 1937.
EXHIBIT 10.5



<PAGE>
                           (THE BANK OF NEW YORK, NA)
                           National Community Division






                                                                  April 14, 1997




LCS Industries, Inc.
120 Brighton Road
Clifton, NJ 07012-1694

Attn:    Pat R. Frustaci
         Vice President-Finance

Dear Pat:

         The Bank of New York  National  Association  (the "Bank") is pleased to
confirm  that it holds  available  to LCS  Industries,  Inc.  (the  "Company") a
$5,000,000 unsecured line of credit.

         Advances  under this line of credit  shall be  evidenced  by,  shall be
payable as  provided  in, and shall bear  interest at the rate  specified  in, a
promissory note of the Company in the form included with this letter.

         All obligations of the Company to the Bank with respect to this line of
credit shall be guaranteed,  jointly and severally, by Spec Holdings,  Inc., The
SpeciaLISTS,  Ltd., Computer Marketing Systems, inc. and Catalog Resources, Inc.
(collectively,  the  "Guarantors")  pursuant to a guarantee in the form included
with this letter.

         For so long as this line of credit is held  available to the Company or
the Company has any obligations  outstanding under this line of credit,  neither
the Company nor any of its Guarantors shall create,  incur,  assume or suffer to
exist any pledge,  lien, charge or other encumbrance upon or with respect to any
of the accounts receivable of the Company and/or any of the Guarantors.

         As you know lines of credit are cancelable at any time by either party,
and any advance under this line of credit is subject to the Bank's satisfaction,
at the time of such  advance,  with the  condition  (financial  and  otherwise),
business, prospects and operations of the Company and each of the Guarantors.
<PAGE>





Unless  cancelled  earlier as provided in the first sentence of this  paragraph,
this line of credit shall be held available until March 31, 1998.  Additionally,
all  advances  under  this line of credit  will have to be reduced to zero for a
period of thirty  consecutive days during the period this line of credit is held
available.

                                                       Very truly yours,

                                                       THE BANK OF NEW YORK (NJ)




                                                       By:     /s/Brian J. Clark
                                                               -----------------
                                                               Brian J. Clark
                                                       Title:  Vice President
<PAGE>   1

                                                                     EXHIBIT 11


                   THE LIBERTY CORPORATION AND SUBSIDIARIES
                  CONSOLIDATED EARNINGS PER SHARE COMPUTATION
                  FOR THE THREE YEARS ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1996
                      (In $000's, except per share data)

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                                         1996      1995     1994
                                                                       ---------------------------
<S>                                                                    <C>       <C>       <C>    
PRIMARY SHARES

   Weighted average common shares outstanding                           20,150    19,951    19,721
   Weighted average common stock options outstanding                       153       119        87
   Preferred stock considered a common stock equivalent                    600       502      --
                                                                       ---------------------------
     Total primary shares                                               20,903    20,572    19,808
                                                                       ===========================

FULLY DILUTED SHARES

   Weighted average common shares outstanding                           20,150    19,951    19,721
   Weighted average common stock options outstanding                       168       136        89
   Preferred stock considered a common stock equivalent                    600       502      --
   Assumed conversion of redeemable preferred stock not considered a
   common stock equivalent                                               1,262     1,265     1,010
                                                                       ---------------------------
    Total fully diluted shares                                          22,180    21,854    20,820
                                                                       ===========================

NET INCOME

  Earnings                                                             $37,340   $59,353   $26,178
                                                                       ===========================

PREFERRED STOCK DIVIDENDS

  Dividends paid on redeemable preferred stock                         $ 2,652   $ 2,658   $ 2,117
                                                                       ===========================


Primary earnings per share  (Net income minus preferred dividends
   divided by total primary shares)                                    $  1.66   $  2.76   $  1.22
                                                                       ===========================

Fully diluted earnings per share (Net income divided by total fully
   diluted shares)                                                     $  1.68   $  2.72   $  1.26
                                                                       ===========================
</TABLE>




                                      33
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

WESTERN DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

DENNIS ANDREW KATONA,

Petitioner

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 281 WAL 2018

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from 

the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 3rd day of January, 2019, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is 

GRANTED. The issues, as stated by Petitioner are:

(1) Whether this Court should grant allowance of appeal to determine if the [e]n 

[b]anc Superior Court decision conflicts with and renders meaningless this 

Court’s definition of the Independent Source Doctrine as set forth in 

Commonwealth v. Melendez, 676 A.2d 226 (Pa. 1996).

(2) Whether, assuming this Court agrees that in Issue [1], the [e]n [b]anc 

Superior Court clearly misapplied the Independent Source Doctrine and 

thus failed to address the primary issue in this case, allowance of appeal 

should be granted to determine: - as a matter of first impression - if 

Commonwealth v. Brion, 652 A.2d 287 (Pa. 1994) and 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 

5704(2)(iv), require prior judicial approval (i.e. a separate search warrant or 

order) for each separate entry of either a law enforcement agent or CI who 

is seeking to record private conversations within a defendant’s residence.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

 v.

GLEN RAY BRIGGS,

 Defendant - Appellant.

Nos. 11-30382

 11-30383

 11-30384

 11-30385

D.C. Nos. 2:07-cr-02065-LRS

 2:07-cr-02063-LRS

 2:07-cr-02114-LRS

 2:07-cr-02066-LRS

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Washington

Lonny R. Suko, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted October 9, 2012** 

Before: RAWLINSON, MURGUIA, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.

In these consolidated appeals, Glen Ray Briggs appeals from the 240-month

sentence imposed following his guilty-plea convictions for various drug, firearm

FILED

OCT 17 2012

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 11-30382, 11-30383, 11-30384, 11-30385

and escape offenses. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Briggs contends that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because his

Guidelines sentencing range was based on a fictional amount of drugs, and because

the sentence is greater than necessary to accomplish the goals of sentencing. The

district court considered Briggs’s mitigation arguments, including his contentions

regarding the fictional nature of the drugs, in imposing a below-Guidelines

sentence. In light of the totality of the circumstances and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)

sentencing factors, the sentence is substantively reasonable. See Gall v. United

States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).

AFFIRMED.
<PAGE>


                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.1


                CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                    AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
                           SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

         Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and in
connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K of The Enstar Group, Inc. (the
"Corporation") for the year December 31, 2003, as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), the undersigned, the
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Corporation, certifies that:

         (1)      The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2)      The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Corporation.



/s/ Nimrod T. Frazer
-----------------------------------------
Nimrod T. Frazer
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
March 15, 2004
§ 2700.30 Assessment of penalty. ( a ) In assessing a penalty the Judge shall determine the amount of penalty in accordance with the six statutory criteria contained in section 110(i) of the Act, 30 U.S.C. 820(i), and incorporate such determination in a written decision. The decision shall contain findings of fact and conclusions of law on each of the statutory criteria and an order requiring that the penalty be paid.
( b ) In determining the amount of penalty, neither the Judge nor the Commission shall be bound by a penalty proposed by the Secretary or by any offer of settlement made by a party.
§ 35.11 Definitions of the terms “normal operation” and “statutory objective.” As used in this part, the term: ( a ) *Normal operation* means the operation of a program or activity without significant changes that would impair the ability of the program or activity to meet its objectives.
( b ) *Statutory objective* means any purpose of a program or activity expressly stated in any Federal statute, State statute, or local statute or ordinance adopted by an elected, general purpose legislative body.
[Civ. No. 2023.

First Appellate District.

October 23, 1917.]

#### P. E. PETERSON, Administrator, etc., Respondent, v. TITLE GUARANTY *&*SURETY COMPANY (a Corporation) , Appellant.

Statute of Limitations — Action on Bond of Notary Public.—An yaction against the surety on the bond of a notary public for damages sustained through reliance upon a false certificate of acknowledgment is barred in three years from the date of the acknowledgment, as section 338, subdivision 1, of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to such an action.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Santa Clara County. P. F. Gosbey, Judge.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

Geo. F. Hatton, Hartley F. Peart, and Gus L. Baraty, for Appellant.

N. E. Wretman, and C. L. Witten, for Respondent.

THE COURT.

In this action the plaintiff sought to recover from the defendant, as surety upon the official bond of a notary public, damages sustained by plaintiff’s intestate through his reliance upon a false certificate of acknowledgment issued by said notary. The defendant both by demurrer to the complaint and by answer pleaded section 338, subdivision 1, of the Code of Civil Procedure, requiring an action upon a liability created by statute other than a penalty or forfeiture to be brought within three years of its accrual—■ it appearing upon the face of the complaint that the present action was commenced some five years after the making and issuing of the false acknowledgment.

The trial court took the view that this section and subdivision of the code was not applicable to an action upon the official bond of a notary, but the supreme court in a very recent case *{Norton*v. *Title Guaranty & Surety Co.,*176 Cal. 212, [168 Pac. 16]), following other cases decided in this jurisdiction in which actions upon official bonds were involved, held, in an action brought upon this identical bond, *104that this provision of the statute of limitations was to he given application in this class of cases.

It follows that the trial court erred in overruling the demurrer of the plaintiff. Upon the authority of *Norton*v. *Title Guaranty & Surety Co.,*176 Cal. 212, [168 Pac. 16], the judgment is reversed.

A petition to have the cause heard in the supreme court, after judgment in the district court of appeal, was denied by the supreme court on December 20, 1917.
Exhibit
32.1





STATEMENT
FURNISHED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE


SARBANES-OXLEY
ACT OF 2002, 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350





In
connection with the Quarterly Report of Horizon Bancorporation, Inc. (the
“Company”) on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2010, as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
“Report”), I, Charles S. Conoley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the
Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





1)
            The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
and





2)
            The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company
      as of the dates and for the periods presented in the financial statements
      included in such Report.





/s/Charles
S. Conoley


President
and Chief Executive Officer


November 22,
2010
§ 2584.8477(e)-3 Procedures for allocation. ( a ) Any allocation made by the Board must— ( 1 ) Be authorized by the concurring vote of a majority of the total membership of the Board;
( 2 ) Be made in writing, signed by the Chairman of the Board and acknowledged in writing by the receiving Board member or members;
( 3 ) Set forth the duties and responsibilities allocated, either in the body of the document or by reference to another document existing at the time of the allocation; and
( 4 ) Be communicated in an appropriate written form to the Executive Director, the participants and the beneficiaries of the Thrift Savings Fund.
( b ) Any allocation made by the Executive Director must— ( 1 ) Be made in writing, signed by the Executive Director and acknowledged in writing by the receiving fiduciary;
( 2 ) Set forth the duties and responsibilities allocated, either in the body of the document or by reference to another document existing at the time of the allocation; and
( 3 ) Be communicated in an appropriate written form to the participants and beneficiaries of the Thrift Savings Fund.
----

Euro exchange rates (1)

24 August 2004

(2004/C 213/01)

1 euro= 

----

(1)

Source: reference exchange rate published by the ECB.

----
#### PACIFIC COAST BISCUIT CO. v. UNITED STATES

[Ante, p. 381;

302 U. S. 729]

Petition for writ of certiorari *denied*by Supreme Court October 18, 1937.
Electronically Filed

Intermediate Court of Appeals

CAAP-10-0000163

14-MAR-2014

08:09 AM