alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
132 STAT. 1626 PUBLIC LAW 115–227—AUG. 1, 2018 

Public Law 115–227 

115th Congress 

An Act 

To amend the White Mountain Apache Tribe Water Rights Quantification Act 

of 2010 to clarify the use of amounts in the WMAT Settlement Fund. 

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 

the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

SECTION 1. USE OF FUNDS IN WMAT SETTLEMENT FUND FOR WMAT 

RURAL WATER SYSTEM. 

(a) AUTHORIZATION OF WMAT RURAL WATER SYSTEM.—Section 

307(a) of the White Mountain Apache Tribe Water Rights Quantification Act of 2010 (Public Law 111–291; 124 Stat. 3080) is 

amended in the matter preceding paragraph (1) by inserting ‘‘, 

(b)(2),’’ after ‘‘subsections (a)’’. 

(b) FUNDING.—Section 312(b)(2)(C)(i)(III) of the White Mountain 

Apache Tribe Water Rights Quantification Act of 2010 (Public Law 

111–291; 124 Stat. 3093) is amended by striking the period at 

the end and inserting the following: ‘‘, including the planning, 

design, and construction of the WMAT rural water system, in 

accordance with section 307(a).’’. 

SEC. 2. EXPANSION OF PUEBLO OF SANTA CLARA LAND ELIGIBLE 

FOR 99-YEAR LEASE. 

Subsection (a) of the first section of the Act of August 9, 

1955 (commonly known as the ‘‘Long-Term Leasing Act’’) (25 U.S.C. 

415(a)), is amended— 

(1) by striking ‘‘Indians,,’’ and inserting ‘‘Indians,’’; 

(2) by inserting ‘‘Ohkay Owingeh pueblo,’’ after ‘‘Cochiti,’’; 

(3) by inserting ‘‘the pueblo of Santa Clara,’’ after 

‘‘Pojoaque,’’; 

(4) by striking ‘‘the the lands’’ and inserting ‘‘the land’’; 

(5) by striking ‘‘lands held in trust for the Pueblo of Santa 

Clara,’’; and 

Aug. 1, 2018 

[S. 2850] 


ralbany on LAP520R082 with PUB LAWS PDF
PUBLIC LAW 115–227—AUG. 1, 2018 132 STAT. 1627 

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY—S. 2850: 

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 164 (2018): 

July 18, considered and passed Senate. 

July 23, considered and passed House. 

Æ 

(6) by striking ‘‘lands held in trust for Ohkay Owingeh 

Pueblo’’. 

Approved August 1, 2018. 


ralbany on LAP520R082 with PUB LAWS PDF
#### Flora Schoenfeld, Respondent, v David Shonfeld, Appellant.

[698 NYS2d 863]

—In an action pursuant to CPLR 3213 for summary judgment in lieu of complaint, the defendant appeals from (1) an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Schmidt, J.), dated June 9, 1998, which granted the plaintiffs motion and denied his cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, and (2) an order of the same court, dated October 29, 1998, which denied his motion, in effect, for reargument.

Ordered that the appeal from the order dated October 29, 1998, is dismissed, as no appeal lies from an order denying re-argument; and it is further,

Ordered that the order dated June 9, 1998, is modified by deleting the provision thereof granting the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment in lieu of a complaint, and substituting therefor a provision denying that motion; as so modified, the order dated June 9, 1998, is affirmed; and it is further,

Ordered that the defendant is awarded one bill of costs.

Since the defendant’s motion, denominated as one for renewal and reargument, was not based upon new evidence which was unavailable at the time of the original motion, the motion was actually one for reargument *(see, Citibank v Olson,*204 AD2d 381; *Chiarella v Quitoni,*178 AD2d 502). Therefore, the appeal from the denial of that motion must be dismissed, as no appeal lies from an order denying reargument *(see, Schumer v Levine,*208 AD2d 605; *DeFreitas v Board of Educ.,*129 AD2d 672).

The court erred when it granted the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment in lieu of complaint, as issues of fact exist as to whether the plaintiff disposed of the defendant’s collateral in a commercially-reasonable manner, and whether the promissory notes at issue were given for valid consideration *450
      *(see, Ford Motor Credit Co. v Hernandez,*210 AD2d 656; *BancAmerica Private Brands v Marine Gallery,*157 AD2d 813; *Mack Fin. Corp. v Knoud,*98 AD2d 713, 714). Bracken, J. P., S. Miller, Thompson and Friedmann, JJ., concur.
**Exhibit 31.1 **CERTIFICATIONS
   
I, Harry Lee Waterfield II, certify that:
  
1.
I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of Kentucky Investors, Inc.;
  
2.
Based on my knowledge, this annual report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this annual report;
  
3.
Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this annual report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this annual report;
  
4.
The registrant's other certifying officers and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant, and we have:
   
(a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this annual report is being prepared,
   
(b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this annual report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this annual report based on such evaluation, and
   
(c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and
  
5.
The registrant's other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's board of directors:
   
(a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process, summarize, and report financial information; and
   
(b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting.
  
Date: March 24, 2005
By: /s/ Harry Lee Waterfield II 
Harry Lee Waterfield II 
President****
EXHIBIT 32


STATEMENT FURNISHED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350





In connection with the Quarterly Report of Capitol Federal Financial (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended March 31, 2010, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), we, John B. Dicus, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, and Kent G. Townsend, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





1)
The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





2)
The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company as of the dates and for the periods presented in the financial statements included in such Report.














Date:   May 10, 2010                                                  By:   /s/ John B. Dicus


John B. Dicus, Chairman, President and


Chief Executive Officer











Date:   May 10, 2010                                                  By:   /s/ Kent G. Townsend


Kent G. Townsend, Executive Vice President and


Chief Financial Officer
#### § 24.101 Definitions.

*Assistant Secretary* means the Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and Health or the person or persons to whom he or she delegates authority under any of the statutes listed in § 24.100(a).

*Business days* means days other than Saturdays, Sundays, and Federal holidays.

*Complainant* means the employee who filed a complaint under any of the statutes listed in § 24.100(a) or on whose behalf a complaint was filed.

*OSHA* means the Occupational Safety and Health Administration of the United States Department of Labor.

*Respondent* means the employer named in the complaint, who is alleged to have violated any of the statutes listed in § 24.100(a).

*Secretary* means the Secretary of Labor or persons to whom authority under any of the statutes listed in § 24.100(a) has been delegated.
#### Mayflower Apartments, Inc., Respondent, *v.*Paul V. Sheehan, Appellant.

Argued June 7, 1937;

decided July 13, 1937.

*500
      *Paul V. Sheehan*appellant, in person.

*Claude V. Kister*for respondent.

Judgment affirmed, with costs; no opinion.

Concur: Crane, Ch. J., Lehman, Hubbs, Loughran, Finch and Rippey, JJ. Talcing no part: O’Brien, J.
[No. 49855-0-I.

Division One.

December 23, 2002.]

#### Nancy W. Rogers, et al., *Appellants,*v. Edwin E. Oliver, et al., *Respondents.*

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for King County, No. 00-2-15382-1, Linda Lau, J., entered December 10, 2001. *Affirmed*by unpublished per curiam opinion.
#### Michael Sipourene, Respondent, v County of Nassau et al., Respondents, and Hendrickson Bros., Inc., Appellant.

[698 NYS2d 705]

—In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant Hendrickson Bros., Inc.,, appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Franco, J.), dated August 18, 1998, as denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against it.

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs payable by the plaintiff-respondent, the motion is granted, the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against the appellant are dismissed, and the action against the remaining defendants is severed.

The plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for injuries he allegedly sustained when his car skidded off the *451road and collided with a tree at the intersection of Peninsula Boulevard and Avon Road in the Town of Hempstead. The defendants included the County of Nassau, the appellant, Hendrickson Bros., Inc., which repaved the road in 1987, and Guy Pratt, Inc., who “grooved” the road in 1992, about two months before the plaintiffs accident.

The proponent of a motion for summary judgment must make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by tendering sufficient evidence to eliminate any material issues of fact from the case *(see, Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr.,*64 NY2d 851, 853). The failure to make such a showing requires the denial of the motion, regardless of the sufficiency of the opposing papers *(see, Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., supra,*at 853). Once this showing has been made, however, the burden shifts to the party opposing the motion to produce evidentiary proof in admissible form sufficient to establish the existence of material issues of fact which require a trial *(see, Alvarez v Prospect Hosp.,*68 NY2d 320, 324).

Here, the appellant’s project coordinator testified at his deposition that the appellant’s work was done in accordance with the specifications of the County of Nassau, using 1A asphalt. Such testimony established prima facie that the work was properly done *(see, Cunneen v Hicksville Free Pub. Lib.,*236 AD2d 357). The affidavits of the plaintiffs expert did not identify any impropriety as to how the work was performed. He merely stated that the appellant’s resurfacing of the roadway in 1987 “did not maintain a proper coefficient of friction for at least 10 years” without identifying the reason, or citing any standard requiring that pavement retain the proper coefficient of friction for at least 10 years. In addition, he did not state that use of 1A asphalt was in any way deficient. In view of the foregoing, the appellant was entitled to summary judgment. Ritter, J. P., Joy, Goldstein and McGinity, JJ., concur.
796 A.2d 967

#### In re Nomination Petition of Bobbi Jo WAGNER, Democratic Nomination for Representative in General Assembly for the 30th Legislative District in the May 21, 2002 General Primary. Appeal of Pat S. Woodke.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

May 15, 2002.

Robert Matthew Owsiany, for Pat S. Woodke.

Robert E. Stewart, for Bobbi Jo Wagner.

*ORDER*

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 15th day of May, 2002, the Order of Commonwealth Court is AFFIRMED.
<PAGE>27
Exhibit 32 Certification of Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer
            pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350


CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB of Citizens First
Corporation (the "Company") for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2004,
as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
"Report") I, Mary D. Cohron, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company


By:  /s/Mary D. Cohron
            Mary D. Cohron
            Chief Executive Officer



Date:  November 15, 2004

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB of Citizens First
Corporation (the "Company") for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2004,
as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
"Report") I, Bill Wright, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company


By:  /s/ Bill D. Wright
             Bill D. Wright
             Chief Financial Officer
                                                27


Date: November 15, 2004
#### § 2200.10 Severance.

Upon its own motion, or upon motion of any party or intervenor conforming to § 2200.40, where a showing of good cause has been made by the party or intervenor, the Commission or the Judge may order any proceeding severed with respect to some or all claims or parties.
#### William Heath, Judge, &c., *versus*Jesse Gay.

In an action of debt brought by the judge of probate, for the benefit of a creditoi to an insolvent estate, against a surety in the administration bond, for the sum due such creditor upon the report of the commissioners, and the decree of the judge thereon, the creditor had execution for the sum due, with interest froir the time of a demand made on the surety.

This was an action of debt, brought in the name of the judge of probate for the county of *Norfolk,*against the defendant, who was surety in an administration bond, for the benefit of a creditor of the intestate, whose estate was insolvent; the creditor’s demand having *been*allowed by the commissioners upon the estate, and a distribution decreed by the judge; the administrator, who was principal in the bond, having died insolvent soon after the decree of distribution was made.

The forfeiture being confessed, and the defendant having moved to be heard in chancery,

*Haven,*for the plaintiff,

claimed to be allowed, over the amount due the creditor by the judge’s decree, interest on that amount from the date of the decree. He likened it to a judgment, upon which interest is always allowed in an action of debt, brought upon the judgment; and he relied on the case of *Paine, Judge,*&c., vs. *M’Intier,*(1) which was an action brought to recover the distributive shares of a grandfather’s estate; and there the Court awarded interest from the decree of distribution.

*Chickering for*the defendant.

(1)

1 Mass. *Rep.*69.

*The Court*

took time for consideration, and afterwards, observing that they did not hold themselves bound by *the*decision in the case cited, decreed that interest should be added [ * 372 ] * to the sum found due by the judge’s decree, from the time when a demand should be proved to have been made on the defendant, the surety in the bond.

*Memorandum.*— On' Saturday, the 30th of October, 1813, died, at his house in Boston, the Hon. Theophilus Parsons, chief justice of this Court; and on the Tuesday following his remains were in-tombed, accompanied by a long procession of relatives and friends *371The pall was supported by his excellency Governor Strong, Lieutenant-Governor Phillips, the Hon. Justices Sewall, Parker, and Jackson, and the Rev. Dr. Kirkland, president of Harvard University.

The general sense of the public loss, in the death of this learned jurist, exemplary magistrate, and real Christian, alike honorable to the community and to the deceased, was shown in the unanimous act of the legislature, directing the secretary of the commonwealth to request of the Hon. Judge Parker a copy of that part of his charge to the grand jury of the county of Suffolk, “wherein he delineated the character of the late venerated Chief Justice Parsons,” and to cause it to be inserted in the next volume of the Reports. That interesting sketch will accordingly be found as an appendix to this volume.

-Breve irreparabile tempus

Omnibus est vitíe; sed famam extendere factis, Hoc virtutis opus *Virgil*
§ 4043.21 Tax disqualification and Title I noncompliance. ( a ) *Reportable event.* A reportable event occurs when the Secretary of the Treasury issues notice that a plan has ceased to be a plan described in section 4021(a)(2) of ERISA, or when the Secretary of Labor determines that a plan is not in compliance with title I of ERISA.
( b ) *Waiver.* Notice is waived for this event.
110TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. CON. RES. 107 

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 

1 Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives 

2 concurring), That it is the sense of Congress that— 

3 (1) Members of Congress (or any employee of 

4 a Member of Congress authorized by that Member) 

5 should not be prohibited, with or without prior no6 tice to the Architect of the Capitol, the Chief Execu7 tive Officer for Visitor Services, or the Capitol Guide 

8 Service, from taking guests or visitors into the pub9 licly accessible areas of the United States Capitol 

10 complex during normal business hours; 

11 (2) nothing in this resolution shall be construed 

12 to affect the authority granted to employees of Mem13 bers of Congress by the respective Members relating 

14 to the movement of such employees through the 

15 United States Capitol complex; 

16 (3) at the direction of the Capitol Police Board 

17 or the fire marshal, the taking of guests or visitors 

18 into the publicly accessible areas of the United 

19 States Capitol complex by a Member of Congress (or 
2 

•SCON 107 ES 

1 any employee of a Member of Congress authorized 

2 by that Member) should be temporarily suspended or 

3 otherwise subject to restriction for safety or security 

4 reasons to the same extent as guided tours of the 

5 United States Capitol complex which are led by the 

6 Architect of the Capitol or the Capitol Guide Serv7 ice; and 

8 (4) nothing in this resolution shall be inter9 preted to contradict the Congressional staff-led tour 

10 policy that ensures that tours of the Capitol are con11 ducted by staff members who have undergone man12 datory life safety and historical accuracy training. 

Passed the Senate December 11 (legislative day, December 10), 2008. 

Attest: 

Secretary. 

110TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. CON. RES. 107 

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 

Expressing the sense of Congress regarding the 

itol complex. Member) to lead tours of the United States Capof a Member of Congress authorized by that rights of Members of Congress (or any employee
§ 2571.7 Scope of discovery. For section 521 proceedings, this section shall apply in lieu of § 18.14 of this title: ( a ) A party may file a motion to conduct discovery with the administrative law judge. The administrative law judge may grant a motion for discovery only upon a showing of good cause. In order to establish “good cause” for the purposes of this section, the moving party must show that the requested discovery relates to a genuine issue as to a fact that is material to the section 521 proceeding. The order of the administrative law judge shall expressly limit the scope and terms of the discovery to that for which “good cause” has been shown, as provided in this paragraph.
( b ) Any evidentiary privileges apply as they would apply in a civil proceeding in federal district court. For example, legal advice provided by an attorney to a client is generally protected from disclosure. Mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of a party's attorney or other representative developed in anticipation of litigation are also generally protected from disclosure. The administrative law judge may not, however, protect from discovery or use, relevant communications between an attorney and a plan administrator or other plan fiduciary, or work product, that fall under the fiduciary exception to the attorney-client or work product privileges. The fiduciary exception to these privileges exists when an attorney advises the plan administrator or other plan fiduciary on matters concerning plan administration or other fiduciary activities. Consequently, the administrative law judge may not protect such communications from discovery or from use by the Secretary in the proceedings. The administrative law judge also may also not protect attorney work product prepared to assist the fiduciary in its fiduciary capacity from discovery or from use by the Secretary in the proceedings. The fiduciary exception does not apply, however, to the extent that communications were made or documents were prepared exclusively to aid the fiduciary personally or for non-fiduciary matters (e.g. settlor acts), provided that the plan did not pay for the legal services. The Secretary need not make a special showing, such as good cause, merely to obtain information or documents covered by the fiduciary exception. Other relevant exceptions to the attorney-client or work product privileges shall also apply.