alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

March 17, 2004

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 03-40308

Summary Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

RODOLFO GAMBOA, also known as Rudy Gamboa,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. C-03-CR-1-1

--------------------

Before JONES, BENAVIDES, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Rodolfo Gamboa appeals the district court’s revocation of

his supervised release. He argues that revocation was error

because it was based on unreliable and conflicting hearsay

information that he had assaulted his wife. 

The district court did not err in revoking Gamboa’s

supervised release. United States v. Alaniz-Alaniz, 38 F.3d 788,

792 (5th Cir. 1994). There was sufficiently reliable evidence in
No. 03-40308

-2-

the form of the police report, the assault victim’s statement,

and the testimony of the probation officer to support the

district court’s determination that Gamboa assaulted his wife. 

Id. at 791 & n.8. The judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.
#### § 38.60 Evaluation of compliance.

From time to time, the Director may conduct pre-approval compliance reviews of grant applicants for WIOA Title I-financial assistance to determine the ability to comply with the nondiscrimination and equal opportunity provisions of WIOA and this part and may conduct post-approval compliance reviews of recipients to determine compliance with the nondiscrimination and equal opportunity provisions of WIOA and this part. Reviews may focus on one or more specific programs or activities, or one or more issues within a program or activity. The Director may also investigate and resolve complaints alleging violations of the nondiscrimination and equal opportunity provisions of WIOA and this part.
[Civ. No. 2318.

First Appellate District.

January 7, 1918.]

#### VERNON HUCKABY, Appellant, v. ELIZABETH A. NORTHAM et al., Respondents.

Quieting Title — Appeal—Concessions op Pabties—-Beversal op Judgment.—On an appeal from a judgment in an action to quiet title in favor of the respondents the judgment must be reversed where it is conceded by the respondents in open court that the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to support the finding of title in the respondents, and it is also conceded that the appellant was in possession of the property at the time the action was commenced, and that such possession, as against a person who had no better title or no title at all, should have compelled a finding in favor of the appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County. H. Z. Austin, Judge.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

Theodore A. Bell, for Appellant.

C. K. Bonestell, and W. D. Crichton, for Respondents.

THE COURT.

This was an action to quiet title, in which judgment was rendered in favor of the defendants, and the plaintiff appeals.

It is conceded by the respondents in open court that the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to support the finding of title in the defendants as made by the trial court; and it is also conceded that the plaintiff was in possession of the property in suit at the time the action was commenced, and that such possession, as against a person who had no better title or no title at all, should' have compelled a finding in favor of the plaintiff. That being so, there remains nothing for this court to do but to reverse the case upon that point alone.

The point decided being determinative of the entire case, there is no necessity to discuss the other points presented.

It is ordered that the judgment be and the same is hereby reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.
§ 2570.84 Payment of civil penalty. ( a ) The civil penalty must be paid within 60 days of service of the notice of assessment.
( b ) At any time prior to the expiration of the payment period for the assessed penalty, any person who has committed, or knowingly participated in, a breach or violation, or has been alleged by the Secretary to have so committed or participated, may submit a written request for a conference with the Secretary to discuss the calculation of the assessed penalty. A person will be entitled under this section to one such conference per assessment. If such written request is submitted during the 60 day payment period described in subparagraph (a), such a request will not toll the running of that payment period.
( c ) The notice of assessment will become a final order (within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. 704) on the first day following the 60 day payment period, subject to any tolling caused by a petition to waive or reduce described in § 2570.85.
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_____________________

No. 95-31321

Summary Calendar

_____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JOSEPH E. FRYAR,

Defendant-Appellant.

_________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 95-CA-3549

_________________________________________________________________ JULY 17, 1996

Before JOLLY, JONES, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Joseph E. Fryar, #06590-035, appeals th e district court's

dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion for abuse of the procedure

and the denial of his motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis

on appeal, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Fryar argues that the

district court lacked territorial jurisdiction over the 31 U.S.C.

§§ 5313(a) and 5322(b) offenses for failure to file a currency

transaction report.-2-

Fryar has failed to show cause for not rais ing his claim in

his previous motion; therefore, this court need not consider

whether there is prejudice. S ee United States v. Flores

, 981 F.2d

231, 234-35 (5th Cir. 1993). Further, failure to hear his claim

would not result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice because he

has not asserted his innocence. S ee Sawyer v . Whitley , 505 U.S.

333, 339 (1992). The district court did not abuse its discretion

in dismissing Fryar's second § 2255 motion as abusive.

The district court did not err in denying Fryar's motion for

leave to proceed IFP because he can present no legal points

arguable on their merits. S ee Howard v. King

, 707 F.2d 215, 219-20

(5th Cir. 1983).

A F F I R M E D.
<PAGE>


                                                                 EXHIBIT 10.95


                          AMENDMENT TO LG&E ENERGY CORP.
            AMENDED AND RESTATED OMNIBUS LONG-TERM INCENTIVE PLAN


1.      The first sentence of Section 4.1 of the Plan shall be deleted and
        replaced in its entirety  as follows:

        "Subject to adjustment as provided in Section 4.3 herein, the
        aggregate number of Shares that may be delivered under the Plan at any
        time shall not exceed five percent (5%) of the total outstanding Shares
        of common stock of the Company at such time."

2.      The first sentence of Section 8.1 of the Plan shall be deleted and
        replaced in its entirety as follows:

        "Subject to the terms and provisions of the Plan, the Committee, at
        any time and from time to time, may grant Shares of  Restricted Stock
        under the Plan to such Participants and in such amounts as it shall
        determine, provided that the maximum number of Shares of Restricted
        Stock that may by granted to any individual Participant in any calendar
        year shall be two hundred thousand (200,000) shares."

The amendments described herein shall be effective as of April 21, 1999.
#### LOUIS BREISACH v. LEAH BREISACH et

Ohio Appeals, 6th Dist, Lucas Co.

No. 2367.

Decided May 26, 1930

Ralph Emery, Toledo, and Paul J. Ragan, Maumee, for Louis Breisach.

DeWitt Fisher, Toledo, for Leah Breisach, et.

*451RICHARDS, J.

It is urged on behalf of plaintiff in error that this was in effect the rendition of a judgment in favor of one not a party to the case, and that it is therefore void. Section 11987 GC. relating to divorce and alimony, provides that

> “the court shall make such order for the disposition, care and maintenance of the children, if any, as is just.”

There seems to be a wide discretion reposed in the trial court in providing, in divorce cases, for the care and maintenance of children, but the order must be just. The evidence introduced at the time Mr. Fisher was first named a strustee has not been preserved and we do not know what moved the court to require that the payemnts should be so made, but we must assume that sufficient grounds were shown to exist therefor. The order making the sums payable to him for the use of the children is not a judgment in his favor but rather a finding and order that Breisch pay to him as trustee, the amount named. Fisher, as trustee, would therefore become a representative or agent of the court to receive the amounts ordered paid and look after their proper disbursement for the-benefit of the children.

The same infirmity claimed to exist against the order made in this case was urged in the case of ex parte Gordon, 95 Cal., 374. In that case,, an action for divorce, the custody of the child of the marriage had beep awarded to the grandmother and a further order was made that the father pay to the grandmother a monthly allowance for the support of the child. It was argued that the order was void because it amounted to a judgment in favor of a stranger to the action, but the court held that it was only an order for the payment of money to an agent or ’officer of the court, charged with the duty of carrying its decree into effect.

Counsel cite a decision of this court, Owens vs. Owens, 20 Ohio App., 518, but the order in that case is not parallel to the one in the case at bar, for in that case the wife, to whom the award was made, was directed to place $50,000.00 in trust for the benefit of the minor child.

Under the broad language of the section of the General Code and the authority of ex parte Gordon, cited supra, this court is of the opinion that the order is valid and it will be affirmed.

WILLIAMS and LLOYD, JJ., concur.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 23-6416

LARRY WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

WARDEN KELLY; JAMES SAVGE; DOC DEEZIEN; PAM C. KELLY; SUSAN 

THOMAS JAMES; AL GREEN; S. QUE; PAT BARFIELD; JOE HARRIS,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at 

Orangeburg. Mary G. Lewis, District Judge. (5:22-cv-00004-MGL)

Submitted: June 22, 2023 Decided: June 27, 2023

Before HARRIS and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Larry Williams, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

USCA4 Appeal: 23-6416 Doc: 17 Filed: 06/27/2023 Pg: 1 of 2
2

PER CURIAM:

Larry Williams appeals the district court’s order accepting the recommendation of 

the magistrate judge and dismissing Williams’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B). We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, 

we affirm the district court’s order. Williams v. Kelly, No. 5:22-cv-00004-MGL (D.S.C. 

Apr. 12, 2023). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions 

are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

AFFIRMED

USCA4 Appeal: 23-6416 Doc: 17 Filed: 06/27/2023 Pg: 2 of 2
EXHIBIT 32.1



CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER



I, Gregory T. Lucier, Chief Executive Officer of Invitrogen Corporation (the Registrant), do hereby certify in accordance with 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, based on my knowledge:



(1) the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Registrant, to which this certification is attached as an exhibit (the Report), fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m); and



(2) the information
contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Registrant.



|                        |  |  |  |                                          
|----------------------- |  |  |  | -----------------------------------------
|                        |  | 
|Dated: November 7, 2005 |  |  |  | /s/ Gregory T. Lucier                    
|                        |  |  |  | Gregory T. Lucier Chief Executive
Officer



A signed original of this written
statement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been
provided to Invitrogen and will be retained by Invitrogen and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### Michael Casey *vs.*The Connecticut Company.

Third Judicial District, Bridgeport,

October Term, 1917.

Prentice, C. J., Roraback, Wheeler, Beach and Shumway, Js.

In crossing a street-railway track one is bound to make a reasonable use of his faculties to avoid being injured.

In the present case the plaintiff, while crossing an empty quiet street in the middle of a block about 10:30 o’clock on a fair evening, stepped in front of a rapidly moving trolley-car and was. struck and injured. *Held*that the trial court was justified in setting aside a verdict in his favor.

Argued October 23d —

decided December 15th, 1917.

Action to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the defendant’s negligence, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven *234County and tried to the jury before *Greene, J.;*verdict for the plaintiff for $2,000, which the trial court, upon motion, set aside as against the evidence, and appeal by the plaintiff.

*No error.*

*Dennis W. Coleman,*for the appellant (plaintiff).

*Joseph F. Berry,*for the appellee (defendant).

Per Curiam.

An examination of the evidence satisfies us that the court did not err in setting aside the verdict on the ground that the plaintiff failed to make reasonable use of his faculties in stepping in front of a rapidly moving. trolley-car in an empty quiet street about 10:30 on a fair evening. Unless the car was already in sight when the plaintiff stepped off the sidewalk, it must have been running at headlong speed until within a few feet of the plaintiff, and it hardly needs the evidence before us to prove that under the conditions stated a trolley-car, although no signal is given, makes noise enough to attract the attention of a reasonably prudent person of good hearing who is about to cross the track diagonally in the middle of a block.

There is no evidence that the motorman had an opportunity to avoid the collision after it became apparent that the plaintiff was in a position of peril from which he was making no effort to escape.

There is no error.
# EUR-Lex - 32000D0192 - EN

Avis juridique important

*|*

# 32000D0192

**2000/192/EC: Commission Decision of 7 February 2000 concerning the conclusion of an Agreement amending the Agreement between the European Community and Australia on trade in wine (notified under document number C(2000) 224) **

*
Official Journal L 060 , 07/03/2000 P. 0023 - 0023 *

COMMISSION DECISION

of 7 February 2000

concerning the conclusion of an Agreement amending the Agreement between the European Community and Australia on trade in wine

(notified under document number C(2000) 224)

(2000/192/EC)

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,

Having regard to Council Decision 94/184/EC, of 24 January 1994, concerning the conclusion of an Agreement between the European Community and Australia on trade in wine(1), and in particular Article 3 thereof,

Having regard to the Agreement between the European Community and Australia on trade in wine signed in Brussels and in Canberra respectively on 26 and 31 January 1994(2),

Whereas:

(1) The Commission negotiated, on behalf of the Community, an amendment of the aforementioned Agreement aiming to extend, until 30 June 2000, the provisional authorisation granted to Australian wines treated with cation exchange resins.

(2) The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Wine Committee,

HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS:

Article 1

The Agreement amending the Agreement between the European Community and Australia on trade in wine is hereby approved on behalf of the Community.

The text of the Agreement is attached to this Decision.

Article 2

This Decision and the Agreement referred to in Article 1 shall be published in the Official Journal of the European Communities.

Done at Brussels, 7 February 2000.

For the Commission

Franz FISCHLER

Member of the Commission

(1) OJ L 86, 31.3.1994, p. 1.

(2) OJ L 86, 31.3.1994, p. 3.
----

----

I Meddelelser

Kommissionen

----

FÆLLES SORTSLISTE OVER LANDBRUGSPLANTEARTER

11. tilføjelse til 22. samlede udgave

(2004/C 182 A/01)

Forklaring

Liste over landbrugsplantearter

I.

Roer

II.

Foderplanter

III.

Olie- og spindplanter

IV.

Korn

V.

Kartofler

FORKLARING

I

1.BETA VULGARIS L.

2.BETA VULGARIS L.

II

13.FESTUCA ARUNDINACEA SCHREBER

14.FESTUCA OVINA L.

15.FESTUCA PRATENSIS HUDSON

16.FESTUCA RUBRA L.

17.LOLIUM MULTIFLORUM LAM.

18.LOLIUM PERENNE L.

19.LOLIUM × BOUCHEANUM KUNTH

22.PHLEUM PRATENSE L.

26.POA PRATENSIS L.

27.POA TRIVIALIS L.

30.LOTUS CORNICULATUS L.

31.LUPINUS ALBUS L.

32.LUPINUS ANGUSTIFOLIUS L.

35.MEDICAGO SATIVA L.

38.PISUM SATIVUM L. (PARTIM)

39.TRIFOLIUM ALEXANDRINUM L.

40.TRIFOLIUM HYBRIDUM L.

41.TRIFOLIUM INCARNATUM L.

42.TRIFOLIUM PRATENSE L.

44.TRIFOLIUM RESUPINATUM L.

46.VICIA FABA L. (PARTIM)

48.VICIA SATIVA L.

53.RAPHANUS SATIVUS L. VAR. OLEIFORMIS PERS.

III

55.BRASSICA RAPA L. VAR. SILVESTRIS (LAM.) BRIGGS

57.BRASSICA NAPUS L. (PARTIM)

59.CANNABIS SATIVA L.

62.GOSSYPIUM SPP.

63.HELIANTHUS ANNUUS L.

64.LINUM USITATISSIMUM L.

66.SINAPIS ALBA L.

67.GLYCINE MAX (L.) MERRILL

IV

68.AVENA SATIVA L.

69.HORDEUM VULGARE L.

72.SECALE CEREALE L.

73.SORGHUM BICOLOR (L.) MOENCH

75.SORGHUM BICOLOR (L.) MOENCH × SORGHUM SUDANENSE (PIPER) STAPF.

76.× TRITICOSECALE WITTM.

77.TRITICUM AESTIVUM L. EMEND. FIORI ET PAOL.

78.TRITICUM DURUM DESF.

80.ZEA MAYS L.

V

81.SOLANUM TUBEROSUM L.

----

(1)EUT C 91 A af 16.4.2003. Senest ændret ved 10. tilføjelse (EUT C 161 A af 18.6.2004, s. 1).

(2)EUT L 193 af 20.7.2002, s. 1.

----

----

FÆLLES SORTSLISTE OVER GRØNTSAGSARTER

5. tilføjelse til 22. samlede udgave

(2004/C 182 A/02)

Forklaring

Liste over grøntsagsarter

FORKLARING

2.ALLIUM CEPA L.

4.ALLIUM PORRUM L.

8.ASPARAGUS OFFICINALIS L.

10.BETA VULGARIS L. VAR. CONDITIVA ALEF.

12.BRASSICA OLERACEA L. CONVAR. BOTRYTIS (L.) ALEF. VAR. BOTRYTIS L.

15.BRASSICA OLERACEA L. CONVAR. CAPITATA (L.) ALEF. VAR. SABAUDA L.

16.BRASSICA OLERACEA L. CONVAR. CAPITATA (L.) ALEF. VAR. ALBA DC.

17.BRASSICA OLERACEA L. CONVAR. CAPITATA (L.) ALEF. VAR. RUBRA DC.

21.CAPSICUM ANNUUM L.

22.CICHORIUM ENDIVIA L.

24.CICHORIUM INTYBUS L. (PARTIM)

25.CITRULLUS LANATUS (THUNB.) MATSUM. ET NAKAI

26.CUCUMIS MELO L.

27.CUCUMIS SATIVUS L.

29.CUCURBITA PEPO L.

32.DAUCUS CAROTA L.

34.LACTUCA SATIVA L.

35.LYCOPERSICON LYCOPERSICUM (L.) KARSTEN EX FARW.

38.PHASEOLUS VULGARIS L.

39.PISUM SATIVUM L. (PARTIM)

40.RAPHANUS SATIVUS L.

43.SOLANUM MELONGENA L.

44.SPINACIA OLERACEA L.

45.VALERIANELLA LOCUSTA (L.) LATERR.

----

(1)EUT C 308 A af 18.12.2003. Senest ændret ved 4. tilføjelse (EUT C 161 A af 18.6.2004, p. 37).

(2)EUT L 193 af 20.7.2002, s. 33.

----
§ 2590.716-1 Basis and scope. ( a ) *Basis.* Sections 2590.716-1 through 2590.725-4 implement sections 716-725 of ERISA.
( b ) *Scope.* This part establishes standards for group health plans, and health insurance issuers offering group or individual health insurance coverage with respect to surprise medical bills, transparency in health care coverage, and additional patient protections. This part also establishes an independent dispute resolution process, and standards for certifying independent dispute resolution entities.
[86 FR 36959, July 13, 2021, as amended at 86 FR 56111, Oct. 7, 2021; 86 FR 66699, Nov. 23, 2021]
No. 17,767.

#### Stony Creek Township *v.*Kabel et al.

Partition *Fence.—Statute*Construed.— The provision of the act of June 4, 1852, section 16, as amended, that if either of two adjoining owners fail to maintain his portion of the partition fence, as provided for “in the preceding section,” it can be repaired by the township and the cost made a lien on his land, became ineffective when such preceding section was made void by a second amendment in violation of the constitution.

*502
      *Statute.—Amendment of Section Previously*Amended.—Void.—An act purporting to amend a section of an act which has previously been amended is unconstitutional and void.

From the Randolph Circuit Court.

*Thompson & Canaday*and *F. C. Focht,*for appellant.

*S. A. Canada, E. L. Watson*and *C.. L. Watson,*for appellees.

McCabe, J.

The appellant sued the appellee, Philip Kabel, to recover the cost of rebuilding a partition fence between the lands of said Kabel and the lands of the other appellee, Willard Haynes, and the foreclosure of a lien therefor on the said lands of said Kabel, under the provisions of sections 6564 and 6565, R. S. 1894. The sections were enacted March 9, 1891 (Acts 1891, p. 399), as amendments to sections 15 and 16 of an act approved June 14, 1852, defining a lawful partition fence, etc., and being sections 4848 and 4849, R. S. 1881. The circuit court sustained a demurrer to the complaint, and the plaintiff failing to plead over, the appellee, Kabel, had judgment upon demurrer. The appellant assigns error upon this ruling. The point made in support of the ruling is that said section 15 had been previously amended, to-wit: by the act approved December 19, 1865, p. 182, and this we find to be true, and for that reason the act of 1891, assuming to amend it again, appellee contends, was void, because it was not in existence to amend. And further, that the amended section 16 depends entirely for its force and effect upon the existence of the amended section 15.

It is the settled law in this State that an act purporting to amend a section of an act that has heretofore already been amended is unconstitutional and *503void. *Feibleman*v. *State, ex rel.,*98 Ind. 516; *Boring,*v. *State, ex rel.,*141 Ind. 640, and cases there cited. The 16th section provides that “if either party fail to maintain his or her portion of such fence as provided for in the preceding section,” etc., then the right to call on the trustee of the township to rebuild or repair the same is created, making the cost thereof a lien on the land of the failing owner, to be enforced as other liens are enforced.

Filed April 14, 1896.

But if there is no preceding section, as we hold there is not, providing for the maintenance of partition fences equally by the owners or occupants of lands on both sides, then there is nothing for section 16 to apply to. It being thus dependent on the existence and force of the other section of the act, and that section being unconstitutional and void, the whole must fall.

The circuit court did not err in sustaining the* demurrer to the complaint.

Judgment affirmed.