alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
ARMED SERVICES BOARD OF CONTRACTAPPEALS Appeal of

-- Northrop Grumman Corporation Under Contract No. FA8810-09-C-OOO 1 APPEARANCE FOR THE APPELLANT: ) ) ) ) )

APPEARANCES FOR THE GOVERNMENT: ASBCA No. 60735
Stephen J. McBrady, Esq.

Crowell & Moring LLP Washington, DC E. Michael Chiaparas, Esq.

DCMA ChiefTrial Attorney Carol L. Matsunaga, Esq.

Senior Trial Attorney Defense Contract Management Agency Carson, CA ORDER OF DISMISSAL The dispute has been settled. The appeal is dismissed with prejudice. Dated: June 26, 2018

Administrative Judge Chairman Armed Services Board ofContract Appeals I certify that the foregoing is a true copy ofthe Order ofDismissal ofthe Armed Services Board ofContract Appeals in ASBCA No. 60735, Appeal ofNorthrop Grumman Corporation, rendered in conformance with the Board's Charter. Dated:

JEFFREYD. GARDIN Recorder, Armed Services Board ofContract Appeals
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-6311

KEITH TYRONE JOHNSON, Petitioner - Appellant,
versus
WARDEN, NOTTOWAY CORRECTIONAL CENTER, Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond. Robert E. Payne, District Judge. (CA-95-577-3) Submitted: July 23, 1996 Decided: July 31, 1996 Before WIDENER, NIEMEYER, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Keith Tyrone Johnson, Appellant Pro Se. John H. McLees, Jr., OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Appellant seeks to appeal the district court's order denying relief on his petition brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1988), as amended by Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1217. We have reviewed the record and the district court's opinion and find no error as to all but one of Appellant's claims. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of probable cause to appeal as to these claims; to the extent that acertificate of appealability is required, we deny such a certificate. We dismiss all but one of Appellant's claims on the reasoning of the district court. Johnson v. Warden, Nottoway , No. CA-95-577-3 (E.D. Va. Feb. 14, 1996).The remaining claim alleged that Appellant was denied effective assistance of counsel because his trial attorney failed to have closing arguments transcribed and therefore may have impeded his ability to bring a sufficiency of the evidence claim under Virginia law. The Supreme Court of Virginia barred this claim under Penn v. Smyth , 49 S.E.2d 600 (Va. 1948), which requires that petitions allege facts and not mere conclusions or opinions. Because Appellant was not afforded the opportunity to particularize his conclusory claim in state court, we reviewed the me rits of the claim. We find, however, that a review on the merits does not entitle Appellant to the relief he seeks. Taking the testimony presented at trial in the light most favorable to the Government, a reasonable fact finder could find Appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.3 See Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (providing standard for a sufficiency of the evidence challenge). Accordingly, Appellant has not demonstrated that his attorney's failure to ensure transcription of the closing arguments resulted in any prejudice. See Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (providing standard for ineffective assistance of counsel claim). Having thus disposed of all claims raised by the Appellant, we deny a certificate of probable cause to appeal or, to the extent that one is required, a certificate of appealability, and dismiss. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
```

[113th Congress Public Law 154]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

[[Page 128 STAT. 1827]]

Public Law 113-154
113th Congress

                                 An Act

 
To amend the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 to include the 
  desecration of cemeteries among the many forms of violations of the 
   right to religious freedom. <<NOTE: Aug. 8, 2014 -  [H.R. 4028]>> 

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. <<NOTE: 22 USC 6401 note.>>  FINDINGS.

    Congress finds the following:
            (1) Cemeteries are sacred sites that are of great spiritual, 
        cultural, and historical significance to many religious and 
        ethnic groups.
            (2) Congress is committed to protecting and preserving the 
        heritage and sacred sites of national, religious, and ethnic 
        groups, which includes cemeteries in the United States and 
        abroad.
            (3) Cemeteries around the world have and continue to be 
        defaced or destroyed as a direct result of their affiliation 
        with a particular religious or spiritual group.
            (4) Such attacks constitute an assault on the fundamental 
        right to freedom of religion, and are especially egregious when 
        sponsored or tolerated by the local or national governments in 
        the countries in which such offenses occur.
SEC. 2. AMENDMENT TO INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT OF 1998.

    Section 2(a)(4) of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 
(22 U.S.C. 6401(a)(4)) is amended in the fourth sentence by inserting 
``desecration of cemeteries,'' after ``confiscations of property,''.

    Approved August 8, 2014.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY--H.R. 4028:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

SENATE REPORTS: No. 113-214 (Comm. on Foreign Relations).
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 160 (2014):
            May 28, considered and passed House.
            July 29, considered and passed Senate.

                                  <all>
```
EXHIBIT 12


                 KERR-McGEE CORPORATION AND SUBSIDIARY COMPANIES
              COMPUTATION OF RATIO OF EARNINGS TO FIXED CHARGES(1)



(Millions of dollars)           2000       1999      1998     1997     1996
                               ------     -----     -----     ----     ----

Income (loss) from
  continuing operations        $  842      $146     $(345)    $351     $358

Add -
  Provision (benefit) for
    income taxes                  457       111      (175)     184      225
  Interest expense                208       190       157      141      145
  Rental expense
    representative
    of interest factor             12        14        12       13       10
                               ------      ----     -----     ----     -----

  Earnings                     $1,519      $461     $(351)    $689      $738
                               ======      ====     =====     ====      ====

Fixed Charges -
  Interest expense             $  208      $190     $157      $141      $145
  Rental expense
    representative
    of interest factor             12        14       12        13        10
  Interest capitalized              5         9       28        24        25
                               ------      ----     ----      ----     -----

      Total fixed charges      $  225      $213     $197      $178      $180
                               ======      ====     ====      ====      ====

Ratio of earnings to
  fixed charges                   6.8       2.2        -(1)    3.9       4.1
                               ======      ====     ====      ====     =====


(1)Earnings were inadequate to cover fixed charges by $548 million in 1998.
IV 

110TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. CON. RES. 12 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

FEBRUARY 16, 2007 

Referred to the Committee on Armed Services 

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 

Supporting the goals and ideals of a National Medal of 

Honor Day to mark the significance and importance 

of the Medal of Honor and to celebrate and honor the 

recipients of the Medal of Honor on the anniversary 

of the first award of that medal in 1863. 

Whereas the Medal of Honor, the highest award for valor in 

action against an enemy force that can be bestowed to a 

member of the Armed Forces, is awarded by the President, in the name of Congress, to individuals who have 

distinguished themselves conspicuously by gallantry and 

intrepidity at the risk of their lives above and beyond the 

call of duty; 

Whereas the United States will forever be in debt to the recipients of the Medal of Honor for their bravery and sacrifice in times of war or armed conflict; 

Whereas the first Medal of Honor awards were presented to 

6 men on March 25, 1863, by the Secretary of War; 


hmoore on PROD1PC68 with HMBILLS
2 

SCON 12 RFH 

Whereas only 3,443 individuals out of the millions of men 

and women who have served the United States in war, 

military operations, or other armed conflicts have been 

awarded the Medal of Honor; 

Whereas there are 111 living recipients of the Medal of 

Honor, as of January 1, 2007; 

Whereas it is appropriate to commemorate and honor the recipients of the Medal of Honor and what they represent; 

Whereas the people of the United States should always be 

aware of the significance and meaning of the Medal of 

Honor; 

Whereas the designation of a National Medal of Honor Day 

would focus the efforts of national, State, and local organizations striving to foster public appreciation and recognition of Medal of Honor recipients; and 

Whereas March 25, 2007, would be an appropriate date to 

observe National Medal of Honor Day: Now, therefore, be 

it 

1 Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives 

2 concurring), That Congress— 

3 (1) recognizes the heroism and sacrifice of 

4 Medal of Honor recipients; 

5 (2) recognizes the educational opportunity that 

6 a National Medal of Honor Day would present to 

7 the people of the United States; and 


hmoore on PROD1PC68 with HMBILLS
3 

SCON 12 RFH 

1 (3) supports the goals and ideals of a National 

2 Medal of Honor Day to celebrate and honor the con3 tributions of Medal of Honor recipients. 

Passed the Senate February 15, 2007. 

Attest: NANCY ERICKSON, 

Secretary. 


hmoore on PROD1PC68 with HMBILLS
§ 2200.200 Purpose. ( a ) The purpose of the Simplified Proceedings subpart is to provide simplified procedures for resolving contests under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, so that parties before the Commission may reduce the time and expense of litigation while being assured due process and a hearing that meets the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 554. These procedural rules will be applied to accomplish this purpose.
( b ) Procedures under this subpart are simplified in a number of ways. The major differences between these procedures and those provided in subparts A through G of the Commission's rules of procedure are as follows. ( 1 ) Complaints and answers are not required.
( 2 ) Pleadings generally are not required. Early discussions among the parties and the Judge are required to narrow and define the disputes between the parties.
( 3 ) The Secretary is required to provide the employer with certain informational documents early in the proceeding.
( 4 ) Discovery is not permitted except as ordered by the Judge.
( 5 ) Interlocutory appeals are not permitted.
( 6 ) Hearings are less formal. The admission of evidence is not controlled by the Federal Rules of Evidence except as provided for in § 2200.209(c). The Judge may allow the parties to argue their case orally at the conclusion of the hearing, and may allow or require post-hearing briefs or statements of position. The judge may render a decision from the bench.
<PAGE>   1




                                                                      Exhibit 21


                          LANCASTER COLONY CORPORATION
                     SIGNIFICANT SUBSIDIARIES OF REGISTRANT
                     ======================================

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                                         State                         Percent of
                Name                                               of Incorporation                     Ownership
                ----                                               ----------------                     ---------

<S>                                                                    <C>                               <C>
Colony Printing & Labeling, Inc.                                       Indiana                           100%
Dee Zee, Inc.                                                          Ohio                              100%
E. O. Brody Company                                                    Ohio                              100%
Fostoria Glass, LLC                                                    Ohio                              100%
Indiana Glass Company                                                  Indiana                           100%
Jackson Plastics Operations, Inc.                                      Ohio                              100%
LRV Acquisition Corp.                                                  Ohio                              100%
LaGrange Molded Products, Inc.                                         Delaware                          100%
Lancaster Colony Commercial
 Products, Inc.                                                        Ohio                              100%
Lancaster Glass Corporation                                            Ohio                              100%
New York Frozen Foods, Inc.                                            Ohio                              100%
Pretty Products, Inc.                                                  Ohio                              100%
Sister Schubert's Homemade Rolls, Inc.                                 Alabama                           100%
T. Marzetti Company                                                    Ohio                              100%
The Quality Bakery Company, Inc.                                       Ohio                              100%
Reames Foods, Inc.                                                     Iowa                              100%
Waycross Molded Products, Inc.                                         Ohio                              100%
</TABLE>

All subsidiaries conduct their business under the names shown.
#### E. R. HENRY, Jr. et al *v.*C. C. STUART et al

5-5759

473 S.W. 2d 164

Opinion delivered November 8, 1971

*Dickey, Dickey & Drake,*for appellants.

*Gill ir Clayton,*for appellees.

*362Lyle Brown, Justice.

Appellants are qualified electors and taxpayers of the Desha County School District. Appellees are members of the Desha County Board of Election Commissioners. Appellants brought this action in mandamus to require the appellees to recount the votes cast in an election for increasing the millage to erect a school building. On demurrer the circuit court dismissed the petition, holding that it had no authority to issue a writ of mandamus to compel the board to perform an act which was discretionary. On appeal,, appellants contend that the writ should have been granted.

The statute provides that one who is dissatisfied with the returns from any precinct may have a recount at any time before the canvass of the votes is completed. Any dissatisfied party or parties may file a petition “showing reasonable grounds for believing that the return, as made by the judges of election, does not give a correct statement of the vote as actually cast, as the same is shown by the ballot returned with the certificate of the judges. . . .” Ark. Stat. Ann. § 3-508 (Supp. 1969).

Of course we are not bound by the prayer for relief in determining whether appellants stated a cause of action. We look at all the facts stated in the pleading to determine whether mandamus is appropriate. See *Culp*v. *Scurlock,*225 Ark. 749, 284 S. W. 2d 851 (1955). If the facts alleged “entitle the plaintiff to any relief, either legal or equitable, although they may not entitle him to all the relief prayed for, the complaint is not subject to demurrer upon the ground that its allegations are insufficient to state a cause of action.” 41 Am. Jur., Pleading § 110.

It is asserted in appellants’ pleading that they petitioned the board of election commissioners for a recount and that the board “declined to consider the petition.” In other words the fact is alleged that the board refused to act, one way or the other, on the petition for recount. If that fact is established on hearing in the circuit court then that court would have authority to direct the board, acting with sound discretion, to take action and either grant or deny the petition. The court cannot order the *363board to recount the votes, as requested in appellants’ petition. That is because the board must find, as a prerequisite to a recount, that there are reasonable grounds for believing the returns are incorrect. That is clearly not a ministerial act but an act of discretion. “Our law holds that the writ of mandamus will not be granted to review the exercise of discretion of an officer or official board, but can be invoked only to compel the officer or board to exercise such discretion.” *Ellis*v. *Rockefeller,*245 Ark. 53, 431 S. W. 2d 848 (1968).

Appellants are entitled to a hearing on their allegation that the board of election commissioners has refused to act on their petition.

Reversed and remanded.
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-50425

Summary Calendar 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee 

v. 

JOSE RAFAEL CARPIO-NATIVIDAD, 

Defendant-Appellant 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Texas 

USDC No. 4:15-CR-27-1 

Before DAVIS, SOUTHWICK, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

Following his guilty plea conviction for illegal reentry after removal, Jose 

Rafael Carpio-Natividad was sentenced within the recommended guidelines 

range to 24 months of imprisonment. Carpio-Natividad argues that the district 

court erred by convicting, sentencing, and entering judgment against him 

pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) based upon its determination that his 2014

conviction for assault/family violence in violation of Texas Penal Code 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

January 4, 2017

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 15-50425 Document: 00513820924 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/04/2017
No. 15-50425

2 

§ 22.01(b)(2)(A) was a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16 and thus was an 

aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F). Relying primarily on 

Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), he argues that the definition 

of a crime of violence in Section 16(b) is unconstitutionally vague on its face. 

He further contends that this court cannot apply Section 16(b) in this case 

without violating due process.1 

The Government has filed an unopposed motion for summary 

affirmance, urging that Carpio-Natividad’s challenge to Section 16(b) is

foreclosed by our decision in United States v. Gonzalez-Longoria, 831 F.3d 670 

(5th Cir. 2016) (en banc), petition for cert. filed (Sept. 29, 2016) (No. 16-6259). 

The Government is correct that Gonzalez-Longoria forecloses CarpioNatividad’s facial challenge to Section 16(b) as well as, in this case, an asapplied challenge to Section 16(b).2 See id. Accordingly, the motion for 

summary affirmance is GRANTED, and the district court’s judgment is 

AFFIRMED. The Government’s alternate motion for an extension of time to 

file a brief is DENIED. 

 

1 Carpio-Natividad also argues that his Texas assault/family violence conviction is not 

a crime of violence under Section 16(a). We need not reach this issue given that the conviction

qualifies as a crime of violence under Section 16(b).

2 The recent grant of certiorari by the United States Supreme Court on the issue of 

whether Section 16(b) is unconstitutional in light of Johnson in Lynch v. Dimaya, 137 S. Ct. 

31 (2016), does not alter the analysis. This court is bound by its own precedent unless and 

until that precedent is altered by a decision of the Supreme Court. See Wicker v. McCotter, 

798 F.2d 155, 157–58 (5th Cir. 1986). 

 Case: 15-50425 Document: 00513820924 Page: 2 Date Filed: 01/04/2017
[No. 28355-7-II.

Division Two.

December 20, 2002.]

#### The State of Washington, *Respondent,*v. James Victor Waddington II, *Appellant.*

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Cowlitz County, No. 95-1-00321-1, Randolph Furman, J., entered August 17, 1995. *Remanded*by unpublished opinion per Quinn-Brintnall, A.C.J., concurred in by Morgan and Seinfeld, JJ.
----

----

III Pranešimai

Vykdančioji protingos energijos agentūra

----

KVIETIMAS TEIKTI PARAIŠKAS

(2004/C 205 A/01)

Vykdančioji protingos energijos agentūra ieško kandidatų, tinkančių kai kurioms pozicijoms užimti. Papildoma informacija apie šias pozicijas, Agentūros misiją bei dalyvavimo procedūrą rasite Agentūros internetiniame puslapyje http://europa.eu.int/comm/energy/intelligent/index_en.html

----
§ 2582.8478-4 Permanent amount of the bond. ( a ) *General.* Under the authority of section 8478(b)(1) of the Federal Employees' Retirement System Act of 1986 (FERSA), the amount of a bond for each person, group or class to be bonded shall not be less than 10 percent of the amount of funds handled by such person, group or class with respect to any fiscal year of the Fund. In no case shall such bond be less than $1,000 nor more than $500,000. However, the Secretary of Labor reserves the authority under section 8478(b)(1) of FERSA to prescribe an amount in excess of $500,000, after due notice and opportunity for hearing to all interested parties, and other consideration of the record.
( b ) *Effective date.* This section shall become effective January 1, 1990, and remain in effect until it is amended or withdrawn in accordance with section 8478(b)(1) of FERSA.
[54 FR 53609, Dec. 29, 1989]