This memorandum opinion was not selected for publi cation in the New Mexico Reports. Please see 1 Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please 2 also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other 3 deviations from the official paper version file d by the Court of Appeals and does not include the 4 filing date. 5 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 6

MARK MINTEER, 7 Petitioner-Appellant, 8

v. NO. 31,197 9 DIANE SUDLOW, 10 Respondent-Appellee. 11 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY 12 Elizabeth E. Whitefield, District Judge 13 Melendres, Melendres & Harrigan P.C. 14 Antonia Roybal-Mack 15 Albuquerque, NM 16 for Appellant 17 Diane Sudlow 18 Albuquerque, NM 19 Pro Se Appellee 20 MEMORANDUM OPINION 21 WECHSLER, Judge. 22 Petitioner-Appellant Mark Minteer (Petitioner) appeals from the district court’s 232 ruling of Judge Elizabeth E. Whitefield th at denies his request to set aside the 1 restraining order against him. Our noti ce proposed to affirm and Petitioner filed a 2 timely memorandum in opposition. We remain unpersuaded by Petitioner’s 3 arguments and therefore affirm. 4 In issue one, Petitioner continues to arguethat Judge Gerard J. Lavelle should 5 have recused from reviewing and entering th e temporary orders of protection because 6 he served as the child’s guardian ad litem prior to becoming a judge. [MIO 2; DS 2, 7 9; RP 21, 33] As provided in our notice, Petitioner did not raise this argument below 8 and thus failed to preservethis issue for appeal. See generally Graham v. Cocherell , 9 105 N.M. 401, 404, 733 P.2d 370, 373 (Ct. App. 1987) (explai ning that this Court is 10 “a court of review and [is] limited to a review of the questions that have been 11 presented to and ruled on by th e trial court”). Defendant’s status as a pro se litigant 12 below does not lessen the preservation requirements. [MIO 5] See Newsome v. Farer , 13 103 N.M. 415, 419, 708 P.2d 327, 331 (1985) (p roviding that pro se litigants must 14 comply with the rules and orders of the c ourt and will not be treated differently than 15 litigants with counsel). Moreover, whilePetitioner may not have had an opportunity 16 to object to Judge Lavelle ruling on the temporary order of protection until after such 17 order was entered [MIO 3], he nonethel ess was not precluded from moving to set 18 aside the temporary restraining order on such basis. See In re Candice Y. , 2000- 193 NMCA-035, ¶ 21, 128 N.M. 813, 999 P.2d 1045 (refusing to consider the argument 1 that a judge should have recused becauseno evidence supporting recusal was on the 2 record; noting also that “although Appellants did not learn of the relationships that 3 they now protest until after entry of the c ourt’s judgment, Appellants did not attempt 4 to reopen the court proceedings to press this issue”). 5 Nor do we agree that, despite the lack of preservation, reversal is merited by 6 application of either the fundamental error or general public interest exceptions. [MIO 7 3] SeeRule 12-216(B)(1)(2) NMRA. We apply fundamental error only in rare 8 circumstances and solely to prevent a mis carriage of justice where some fundamental 9 right has been invaded. See State v. Reyes , 2002-NMSC-024, ¶¶ 41-42, 132 N.M. 10 576, 52 P.3d 948. To rise to the level of fundamental erro r, the error must go “to the 11 foundation or basis of a defendant's rights or must go to the foundation of the case or 12 take from the defendant a right which was e ssential to his defens e and which no court 13 could or ought to permit him to waive.” State v. Cunningham , 2000-NMSC-009, ¶ 13, 14 128 N.M. 711, 998 P.2d 176 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, 15 while Petitioner alleges bias or prejudice, no actual bias or prejudice has been shown. 16 “In order to require recusal, bias must be of a personal nature against the party seeking 17 recusal.” State v. Ruiz , 2007-NMCA-014, ¶ 15, 141 N.M . 53, 150 P.3d 1003 (internal 18 quotation marks and citation omitted). A claim of bias or prejudice, including a claim 194 of an appearance of bias or prejudice, cannot be based on mere speculation. United 1 Nuclear Corp. v. Gen. Atomic Co. , 96 N.M. 155, 246-48, n. 156, 629 P.2d 231, 322-24, 2 n.156 (1980). Moreover, even assuming that recusal was merited based on an 3 appearance of bias or prejudice, the restraining order entered by Judge Lavelle was 4 temporary only, Petitioner was given the opportunity to modify the temporary order, 5 and a special commissioner with no a lleged bias or prejudice nonetheless 6 recommended an order of protection ninet een days later, which was approved by 7 Judge A. Hadfield the same day. [RP 44] The order befo re us on appeal was issued 8 by Judge Whitefield. [RP 80-81] See In re Ernesto M. , 1996-NMCA-039, ¶ 10, 121 9 N.M. 562, 915 P.2d 318 (“An assertion of prejudice is not a showing of prejudice.”). 10 Under such circumstances, we cannot agree that fundamental error took place. 11 Similarly, whether Judge Lavelle shoul d have recused from ruling on Petitioner’s 12 temporary restraining order does not rais e a question of a general public nature 13 affecting the interest of the state at large. See State v. Pacheco , 85 N.M. 778, 779, 517 14 P.2d 1304, 1305 (Ct. App. 1973) (noting an exception to the preservation requirement 15 for “questions of a general public nature a ffecting the interest of the state at large” 16 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 17 Further, while Petitioner maintains that the rubber-stamped signature of Judge 18 Lavelle reflects that he was not afforded meaningful review as a consequence of the 195 judge’s prior role as guardian [MIO 6], we disagree. Case law recognizes the validity 1 of stamped signatures. See generally Pena v. Westland Dev. Co. , 107 N.M. 560, 566, 2 761 P.2d 438, 444 (Ct. App. 1988) (recogni zing the validity of rubber-stamped 3 signatures on the basis that “if a party intends that the purported signature be a 4 signature, it will be treated as such”). And we do not infer bias from the judge’s 5 adverse ruling against Petitioner. See State v. Hernandez, 115 N.M. 6, 20, 846 P.2d 6 312, 326 (1993) (stating that adverse rulings or enforcement of the rules do not 7 establish judicial bias). 8 In issue two, Petitioner continues to argue that his right to due process was 9 violated. [DS 6; MIO 7] In support of hi s argument, Petitioner maintains that he was 10 denied the right to present evidence to the special commissioner. [DS 11; MIO 9-10] 11 As detailed in our notice, however, to th e extent any of Petitioner’s evidence was not 12 before the special commissioner, it was dueto Petitioner’s failure to introduce such 13 evidence, rather than the special co mmissioner preventing Petitioner from doing so. 14 See Bruce v. Lester , 1999-NMCA-051, ¶ 4, 127 N.M. 301, 980 P.2d 84 (stating that 15 we hold pro se litigants to the same standard as attorneys). While certain 16 accommodations may be extended to pro selitigants, such as the availability of 17 simplified forms [MIO 7], see, e.g. , NMSA 1978, § 40-13-3(G) (2008), pro se litigants 18 are not relieved of responsibility of introduc ing evidence in support of their positions. 196 Defendant also maintains that he was denied due process b ecause he lacked an 1 opportunity to be heard by the district court when he was not granted a new hearing 2 on the objections raised in his Rule 1-060( B) NMRA motion. [MIO 10; DS 8, 10] 3 Relevant to this argument, Rule 1-053.1(H )(1)(b) NMRA, provides that “[i]f the party 4 files timely, specific objections to the recommendations, the court shall conduct a 5 hearing appropriate and sufficient to reso lve the objections [and the] hearing shall 6 consist of a review of the record unless th e court determines that additional evidence 7 will aid in the resolution of the objections.”As noted in our notice, Petitioner failed 8 to file objections to the special commissi oner’s recommendations as contemplated by 9 Rule 1-053.1(F)(2) & (G) NMRA, but instead filed a Rule 1-060(B) NMRA motion 10 outside the ten-day period to file objections . [RP 62] Despite this failure, however, 11 the district court nonetheless “reviewed all the court files [and] listened to the CD of 12 the entire hearing” [RP 80] and determined that “[f]urther evidence is not required to 13 aid in the resolution of the case.” [RP 81] This review amply satisfied the hearing 14 requirement of Rule 1-053.1(H)(1)(b), whic h provides that the “hearing shall consist 15 of a review of the record unless the court determines that additional evidence will aid 16 in the resolution of the objections.” Becau se the district court determined that 17 additional evidence was not required to resolve the case, a de novo hearing was not 187 merited. [MIO 12] Moreover, because Petitioner was provided an initial hearing by 1 a special commissioner, with the pleadings and hearing subsequently reviewed by the 2 district court, we hold that he was afford ed sufficient review by the district court. 3 [MIO 13] See generally Lujan v. Casados-Lujan , 2004-NMCA-036, ¶¶ 19-21, 135 4 N.M. 285, 87 P.3d 1067 (affirming the district court’s approval of the special 5 commissioner’s recommendations when “nothing in the record shows that the judge 6 did not inform herself as to everything sh e needed to know in order to understand and 7 intelligently rule on Respondent’s contentions.”); Buffington v. McGorty , 2004- 8 NMCA-092, ¶ 30, 136 N.M. 226, 96 P.3d 787 (comparing the district court’s review 9 of a hearing officer’s recommendations to the review of a special commissioner’s 10 recommendations, and concluding that “[t]he nature of the hearing and review to be 11 conducted by the district court will depend upon the nature of the objections being 12 considered”). 13 In issue three, Petitioner continues to argue that the evid ence was insufficient 14 that he committed an act of domestic abuse. [MIO 14] As provided in our notice, 15 Appellee Diane Sudlow (Respondent) testified to behavior by Petitioner that made her 16 feel harassed. [RP 81] See generally NMSA 1978, § 40-13-2(D)(2)(a)-(j) (2010) 17 (defining “domestic abuse,” which includes harassment). Petitioner provides this 18 Court with no authority for the proposition that an abuse victim’s testimony is not 198 sufficient to support a finding of domestic abuse. [MIO 15-16] See In re Adoption 1 of Doe , 100 N.M. 764, 765, 676 P.2d 1329, 1330 (1984) (stating that “[i]ssues raised 2 in appellate briefs which are unsupported by cited authority will not be reviewed by 3 us on appeal,” and that an appellate court will not do basi c legal research for counsel). 4 Nonetheless, we have long held that “the testimony of a single witness may legally 5 suffice as evidence upon which the jury may found a verdict of guilt.” See State v. 6
Hunter , 37 N.M. 382, 384, 24 P.2d 251, 252 (1933) . Moreover, while Petitioner may 7 believe that his conduct was not such tocause Respondent emotional distress [MIO 8 15-16] and that his conduct instead served a lawful purpose [MIO 16], it was the fact9 finder’s prerogative to determine otherwise. See generally Mascarenas v. Jaramillo , 10 111 N.M. 410, 412, 806 P.2d 59, 61 (1991) (recognizing that the trial court, sitting as 11 fact finder, weighs the evidence, determines credibility of testimony, and resolves 12 factual conflicts). 13 Lastly, Petitioner does not provide any additional arguments with regard to 14 issue four. See Frick v. Veazey , 116 N.M. 246, 246, 861 P.2d 287,287 (failure to file 15 memorandum in opposition to calendar notice constitutes acceptance of proposed 16 disposition). 17 In conclusion, for reasons set forth he rein and in our notice, we affirm. 18 IT IS SO ORDERED. 199 _______________________________ 1 JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge 2 WE CONCUR: 3

_______________________________ 4 CYNTHIA A. FRY, Judge 5

_______________________________ 6 J. MILES HANISEE, Judge 7