alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### ROSENBERRY, Recr v TAYLOR ROSENBERRY, Recr v WILLIAMS

Ohio Appeals, 8th Dist, Cuyahoga Co

Nos 10150 & 10149.

Decided Nov 25, 1929

Warren M. Briggs, Cleveland, for Rosenberry.

M. C. Portman, Cleveland, for Taylor & Williams.

*206VICKERY, PJ.

Now it is admitted by counsel for the plaintiff in error that this was a trust fund, that a trust was created; but it is claimed that inasmuch as this fund was commingled and mixed with the assets of the Hydraulic Develpoment Company and could not be traced, that it had lost its identity as a trust fund and, therefore, while the plaintiff below was entitled to a judgment against the receiver for the amount, he came in only as a general creditor and was not entitled to a preference; and that is the issue to be decided in this court, the Common Pleas Court holding that it was a trust fund and that the (plaintiff below had the right to follow that fund and had a preference and that if there was enough money in the receiver’s hands to pay it, it should be paid before any other amount that was owing.

We are familiar with the maxim of equity that equity regards that as done which ought to have been done, and it is argued in this case that the Hydraulic Development Company should have set this fund apart and, therefore, in equity they did set it apart. The trouble with that reasoning is, while admitting the soundness of the maxim, yet in this case there was to be no setting apart of this fund, because if the Hydraulic Development Company had gone on in business and Williams had broken his contract, this money would have belonged to the Hydraulic Development Company as liquidated damages. Therefore, it was not intended by either party to keep this a separate and distinct fund, but the depositing of this money with the Hydraulic Development Company simply created a relation of debtor and creditor between these two parties, and the plaintiff was not entitled to a preference out of the money in the hands of the receiver.

We are constrained to come to this conclusion and in doing so, we follow a very able decision of the Ninth District Court of Appeals, — opinion by Judge Washburn, —in the case of Ohio State Banking and Trust Company vs. Biltwell Tire and Rubber Company, 22 O. L. R. 322, (2 Abs. 205), where Judge Washburn discussed the question at length to the effect that inasmuch as the fund could not be traced, the party who deposited the fund was relegated to the position of a general creditor.

This ruling is likewise sustained by 26 Ruling Case Law, page 1354, Section 218 of the Article on Trusts, where the whole matter is ably and capably discussed.

Therefore, we can come to no other conclusion than that the plaintiff in error as receiver was wrongfully ordered to pay this money as a preference and the judgment of the court must, therefore, be reversed, and the same ruling will apply in both cases. It is admitted that the fund cannot be traced nor any product realized from said fund and, therefore, it comes squarely within the decisions above cited and the judgment of the Common Pleas Court so far as it makes this a preference must be reversed.

Sullivan and Levine, JJ., concur.
[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 13 (Thursday, January 20, 2000)]
[Notices]
[Page 3256]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-1283]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD


Public Hearing

    The National Transportation Safety Board will convene a public 
hearing beginning at 9:00 a.m., local time on Wednesday, January 26-29, 
2000, at the Arkansas Excelsior Hotel, Three Statehouse Plaza, Little 
Rock, Arkansas 72201, concerning American Airlines, Inc., Flight 1420, 
McDonnell Douglas MD-82 Accident in Little Rock, Arkansas on June 1, 
1999. For more information, contact Ben Berman, NTSB Office of Aviation 
Safety at (202) 314-6331 or Paul Schlamm NTSB Office of Public Affairs 
at (202) 314-6100.
    Individuals requesting specific accommodation should contact Mrs. 
Carolyn Dargan on 202-314-6305 by Friday, January 21, 2000.

    Dated: January 13, 2000.
Rhonda Underwood,
Federal Register Liaison Officer.
[FR Doc. 00-1283 Filed 1-19-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7533-01-M
#### RILEY v BOARD OF EDUCATION, et

Ohio Appeals, 4th Dist, Highland Co

Decided April 29, 1930

H. S. Pulse, Lynchburg, for Riley.

Harold A. Predmore, Hillsboro and Wilson & Morrow, Hillsboro,, for Board of Education, et.

MIDDLETON, PJ.

We are favored in the consideration of the case by a written opinion of the Court of Common Pleas in which the petition is discussed in detail .and with which in its conclusion we are not disposed to differ.

The basis for the action for an injunction rests upon the alleged fact that the petition for the transfer of the Oak Grove District prayed for such transfer to a district designated in such petition as the ■ Hillsboro, Ohio, School District of Hillsboro, Highland County, Ohio, while the county board of *415education made such transfer to the Hillsboro, Ohio, Exempted Village School District of Highland County, Ohio. It is urged in support of the petition that the difference in the names of the Hillsboro districts as they so appeared makes the transfer wholly void. There is no allegation in the petition, however, that the Hillsboro, Ohio, Exempted Village School District of Highland County, Ohio, was and is not in fact the district to which the signers to such petition intended the transfer to be made. There is no allegation in the petition that the transfer as made by the county board was not in accordance with the desire and intent of the petitioners for the transfer.

Section 3698 GC. prescribed no particular form for a petition nor does it require that the material facts alleged therein shall be stated in any specific ■ and definite words. The petition, of course, must so describe and designate the territory to be transferred and the district to which it is to be transferred in words so definite and specific as to leave no question or doubt of the purpose and intent of the petitioners to have the transfer made from and to the districts subsequently acted upon by the county board of education. It necessarily follows that when the description in the petition is so definite and certain as to leave no room for doubt and as a matter of fact, as in the instant case, may only refer to the districts acted upon by the county board of education the petition is sufficient. Whether or not it is sufficient is a mixed question of law and fact and its determination is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the county board of education. It does not appear in plaintiff’s petition that there was or is any district in Highland County resembling in name the district specified in the petition filed for the transfer other than the Hillsboro, Ohio, Exempted Village School District. We conlude ' that until the petition alleges that the Oak Grove District was not in fact transferred to the district intended by the petitioners it lacks sufficient facts to justify a court of equity in interfering with the action of the county board of education. And in this respect lies the difference between the instant case and State ex rel Stipe v. Carr, et al, Summit County.

The demurrer to the petition is sustained.

Mauck and Blosser, JJ., concur.
III 

110TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. CON. RES. 23 

Expressing the sense of Congress that provisions that provoke veto threats 

from the President should not be included on bills that appropriate 

funds for the implementation of recommendations of the Base Closure 

and Realignment Commission. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

MARCH 22, 2007 

Mr. BROWNBACK (for himself and Mr. ROBERTS) submitted the following 

concurrent resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Appropriations 

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 

Expressing the sense of Congress that provisions that provoke veto threats from the President should not be included on bills that appropriate funds for the implementation of recommendations of the Base Closure and Realignment Commission. 

Whereas Congress and President George W. Bush approved 

the final recommendations of the Defense Base Closure 

and Realignment Commission under the 2005 round of 

defense base closure and realignment; 

Whereas these recommendations propose major changes in 

the positioning of United States military personnel; 

Whereas the Department of Defense is moving rapidly to implement these recommendations; 

mstockstill on PROD1PC66 with BILLS

2 

•SCON 23 IS 

Whereas the communities near military installations that are 

slated to receive major troop increases have already invested time and capital in making preparations for upcoming increases in population; and 

Whereas funding these recommendations on an annual basis 

is absolutely necessary for their implementation and the 

economic confidence of the communities that are expecting increases in population: Now, therefore, be it 

1 Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives 

2 concurring), That it is the sense of Congress that Con3 gress should not include provisions that provoke veto 

4 threats from the President in bills that appropriate funds 

5 for the implementation of recommendations of the Base 

6 Closure and Realignment Commission. 

Æ 

mstockstill on PROD1PC66 with BILLS
Exhibit 10.15


 


November 7, 2014


 


Gentlemen.


 


Reference is made to those certain promissory
notes (“Notes”), dated November 9, 2013, December 5, 2013 and April 1, 2014, made by Long Island Brands Beverages LLC.
(“Company”) in favor of Cullen Agricultural Holding Corp.


 


The parties hereby agree that the “Maturity
Date” (as defined in the Notes) shall be extended from November 15, 2014 to March 15, 2015.


 


Except as set forth herein, all terms of the Notes
shall remain in full force and effect.


 


	 	LONG ISLAND BRAND BEVERAGE LLC
	 	 
	 	By:	/s/ Philip Thomas
	 	Name: Philip Thomas
	 	Title: CEO


 


Accepted and Agreed:


 


CULLEN AGRICULTURAL HOLDING CORP.


 


	By:	/s/ Paul Vassilakos	 
	Name: Paul Vassilakos	 
	Title: CEO
Exhibit 99.1



                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Annual Report of Keystone Consolidated  Industries,  Inc.
(the  "Company")  on Form 10-K for the period  ended  December 31, 2002 as filed
with the Securities and Exchange  Commission ("the SEC") on the date hereof (the
"Report"),  I, David L.  Cheek,  President  and Chief  Executive  Officer of the
Company,  certify,  pursuant to 18 U.S.C.  Section 1350, as adopted  pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     (1) The Report fully  complies  with the  requirements  of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  The  information  contained  in the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all
material  respects,  the  financial  condition  and result of  operations of the
Company.

A signed  original of this  written  statement  required by Section 906 has been
provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the
SEC or its staff upon request.





/s/  David L. Cheek
-------------------------------------
David L. Cheek
President and Chief Executive Officer
April 11, 2003
Exhibit 23



                    Consent of Independent Auditors


We consent to the  incorporation  by reference in this Annual Report (Form 10-K)
of Lilly Industries,  Inc. of our report dated January 14, 1999, included in the
1999 Annual Report to Shareholders of Lilly Industries, Inc.

Our audits also included the financial  statement  schedule of Lilly Industries,
Inc. listed in Item 14(a). This schedule is the  responsibility of the Company's
management.  Our responsibility is to express an opinion based on our audits. In
our opinion, the financial statement schedule referred to above, when considered
in relation to the basic financial statements taken as a whole,  presents fairly
in all material respects the information set forth therein.

We further consent to the incorporation by reference in Registration  Statements
(Form S-8 Nos.  2-59159,  2-76317,  33-52954,  33-52956  pertaining to the Lilly
Employees'  Stock Purchase Plan, the Lilly  Industries,  Inc. Stock Option Plan,
the Lilly  Industries,  Inc.  1991  Director  Stock Option  Plan,  and the Lilly
Industries,  Inc. Employee 401(k) Savings Plan,  respectively,  and 33-52958 and
333-32205  pertaining to the Lilly  Industries,  Inc. 1992 Stock Option plan) of
our report dated January 14, 1999,  with respect to the  consolidated  financial
statements  incorporated  herein by  reference,  and our report  included in the
preceding paragraph with respect to the financial statement schedule included in
this Annual Report (Form 10-K) of Lilly Industries, Inc.




                                                  /s/ Ernst & Young LLP

Indianapolis, Indiana
February 25, 1999
```

[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 90 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

110th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 S. 90

To modify the application of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 
                           to Indian tribes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                            January 4, 2007

  Mr. Vitter introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
         referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To modify the application of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 
                           to Indian tribes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. APPLICATION OF FECA TO INDIAN TRIBES.

    (a) Contributions and Expenditures by Corporations.--Section 316 of 
the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 441b) is amended by 
adding at the end the following:
    ``(d) Treatment of Indian Tribes as Corporations.--
            ``(1) In general.--In this section, the term `corporation' 
        includes an unincorporated Indian tribe.
            ``(2) Treatment of members as stockholders.--In applying 
        this subsection, a member of an unincorporated Indian tribe 
        shall be treated in the same manner as a stockholder of a 
        corporation.''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall 
apply with respect to any election that occurs after December 31, 2007.
                                 <all>
```
exv10w2







Exhibit 10.2




Description of post-employment medical and prescription drug benefits



On September 17, 2009, the Board of Directors of National Fuel Gas Company (the “Company”) voted to
provide to Matthew D. Cabell post-employment medical and prescription drug benefits, subject to
certain conditions. Mr. Cabell is President of Seneca Resources Corporation (“Seneca”), the
Company’s natural gas and oil exploration and production subsidiary. As a threshold eligibility
requirement, Mr. Cabell must be employed in good stead at Seneca or another subsidiary of the
Company until at least March 20, 2018. These benefits will be provided, if at all, at the time
Mr.Cabell’s employment ceases, subject to the same terms and conditions, including at the same
monthly cost to him and with the same levels and types of benefits, if any, as may then be
applicable to retiring officers of the Company’s utility subsidiary. The Company may from time to
time in its sole discretion revise or eliminate, in whole or in part, the benefits to be provided
to Mr. Cabell in the same manner and to the same extent as the benefits to be provided to officers
of the Company’s utility subsidiary. In addition, Mr. Cabell will forfeit these benefits if he
resigns on or before March 20, 2018 or if the Company or one of its subsidiaries terminates his
employment at any time.
[No. 28136-8-II.

Division Two.

November 8, 2002.]

#### The State of Washington, *Respondent,*v. Richard James Roberts, *Appellant.*

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Lewis County, No. 01-1-00529-9, David R. Draper, J., entered November 28, 2001. *Affirmed*by unpublished opinion per Quinn-Brintnall, A.C.J., concurred in by Houghton and Armstrong, JJ.
§ 22.8 Service of complaint. ( a ) Service of a complaint must be made by certified or registered mail or by delivery in any manner authorized by Rule 4(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Service is complete upon receipt.
( b ) Proof of service, stating the name and address of the person on whom the complaint was served, and the manner and date of service, may be made by— ( 1 ) Affidavit of the individual serving the complaint by delivery;
( 2 ) A United States Postal Service return receipt card acknowledging receipt; or
( 3 ) Written acknowledgment of receipt by the defendant or his representative.
#### § 2570.164 Consequences of default.

For 502(c)(8) civil penalty proceedings, this section shall apply in lieu of § 18.5(a) and (b) of this title. Failure of the respondent to file an answer to the notice of determination described in § 2560.502c-8(g) of this chapter within the 30 day period provided by § 2560.502c-8(h) of this chapter shall be deemed to constitute a waiver of his or her right to appear and contest the allegations of the notice of determination, and such failure shall be deemed to be an admission of the facts as alleged in the notice for purposes of any proceeding involving the assessment of a civil penalty under section 502(c)(8) of the Act. Such notice shall then become the final order of the Secretary, within the meaning of § 2570.161(g) of this subpart, forty-five (45) days from the date of service of the notice.
#### SMITH v N Y C Rd Co SROKA v GREEN CAB CO GREEN CAB CO v SROKA, et

Ohio Supreme Court

No 21993. No 22129. No 22147.

Decided Mar 12, 1930

Decided Mar 12, 1930

Decided Mar. 12, 1930

Kinkade, Jones, Matthias, Day and Allen, JJ., concur.
#### In the Matter of Mary J. Glover, an Incompetent Person, Respondent; M. O’Connell & Co., Builders, Inc., et al., Appellants.

Submitted May 19, 1937;

decided June 1, 1937.

*Owen E. Reilly*for appellants.

No appearance for respondent.

*586Order affirmed, with costs; no opinion.

Concur: Crane, Ch. J., Lehman, O’Brien, Hubbs, Loughran, Finch and Rippey, JJ.
`[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. Con. Res. 68 Referred in House (RFH)]







110th CONGRESS
  2d Session
S. CON. RES. 68


_______________________________________________________________________


                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           February 12, 2008

           Referred to the Committee on House Administration

_______________________________________________________________________

                         CONCURRENT RESOLUTION


 
    Authorizing the use of the rotunda of the Capitol by the Joint 
            Congressional Committee on Inaugural Ceremonies.

    Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring),

SECTION 1. USE OF THE ROTUNDA OF THE CAPITOL BY THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL 
              COMMITTEE ON INAUGURAL CEREMONIES.

    The rotunda of the United States Capitol is authorized to be used 
on January 20, 2009, by the Joint Congressional Committee on Inaugural 
Ceremonies in connection with the proceedings and ceremonies conducted 
for the inauguration of the President-elect and the Vice President-
elect of the United States.

            Passed the Senate February 8 (legislative day, February 6), 
      2008.

            Attest:

                                                NANCY ERICKSON,

                                                             Secretary.`
§ 1977.3 General requirements of section 11(c) of the Act. Section 11(c) provides in general that no person shall discharge or in any manner discriminate against any employee because the employee has: ( a ) Filed any complaint under or related to the Act;
( b ) Instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to the Act;
( c ) Testified or is about to testify in any proceeding under the Act or related to the Act; or
( d ) Exercised on his own behalf or on behalf of others any right afforded by the Act.
Any employee who believes that he has been discriminated against in violation of section 11(c) of the Act may, within 30 days after such violation occurs, lodge a complaint with the Secretary of Labor alleging such violation. The Secretary shall then cause appropriate investigation to be made. If, as a result of such investigation, the Secretary determines that the provisions of section 11(c) have been violated civil action may be instituted in any appropriate United States district court, to restrain violations of section 11(c)(1) and to obtain other appropriate relief, including rehiring or reinstatement of the employee to his former position with back pay. Section 11(c) further provides for notification of complainants by the Secretary of determinations made pursuant to their complaints.
#### CELKE v STATE

Ohio Appeals, 8th Dist, Cuyahoga Co

No. 10314.

Decided November 25, 1929

Mr. Louis Fernberg, Esq., Cleveland, for Celke.

Mr. L. O. Payne, Esq., Cleveland, for State.

VICKERY, PJ.

Celke claims that he had rented this place in the rear of the front house to somebody, — a man by the name of Shimmel,— but Shimmel was not produced and whether he was a tenant there is seriously disputed: but it is in the record that the plaintiff in error gave the officer the keys to the property, after having denied that he owned it, and that the officers went back there and found the liquor. As already stated in the immediate vicinity, about fifty feet away, Celke owned a billiard and pool parlor.

Lieutenant Snyder testifies that Celke when arrested admitted that this liquor was his and that he sold it for 25c a drink and one dollar a pint, and Celke admits that he said this in substance, but adds that he was “just' kidding” with the officer, that he knew him, and that they were “kidding” back and forth. Well, sometimes, “kidding” does not pay, and apparently from the view the court below took of it, it did not pay the plaintiff in error in this case, because he took his so-called “kidding” in dead earnest.

Now we have in the record then the fact that Celke owned the property; that he had the_keys to the property which he probably would not have had if it had been bona fide rented to some other person, and we find the liquor there in that house. We find he carried on a billiard and pool parlor in close proximity to it and we find him admitting that he owned the liquor and sold it for 25c a drink or one dollar a pint. Of course, he says this was kidding.

Under the circumstances, the court had the parties before it and could tell whether Celke acted as if it was a kidding match between him and Lt. Snyder and the other officers, or whether the facts warranted the court in coming to the conclusion that this man owned the liquor.

It is admitted that the liquor was fit for beverage purposes; that it contained 45% alcohol by volume and we think from the whole record that the evidence shows that Celke was guilty as charged in the affidavit and that the evidence warrants the conviction. At least the judgment of the court is not so manifestly against the weight of .the evidence that a reviewing court would, be justified in disturbing it.

The judgment will, therefore, be affirmed.

Sullivan and Levine, JJ., concur.