III 

110TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. CON. RES. 4 

Expressing the sense of Congress on Iraq. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JANUARY 24, 2007 

Mr. WARNER (for himself, Mr. NELSON of Nebraska, Ms. COLLINS, Mr. 

COLEMAN, Mr. SALAZAR, Mr. BAYH, Mr. SMITH, Ms. LANDRIEU, Mr. 

NELSON of Florida, and Mrs. MCCASKILL) submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations 

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 

Expressing the sense of Congress on Iraq. 

Whereas we respect the constitutional authorities given a 

President in article II, section 2, which states that ‘‘The 

President shall be commander in chief of the Army and 

Navy of the United States;’’ it is not the intent of this 

resolution to question or contravene such authority, but 

to accept the offer to Congress made by the President on 

January 10, 2007, that, ‘‘if members have improvements 

that can be made, we will make them. If circumstances 

change, we will adjust’’; 

Whereas the United States strategy and operations in Iraq 

can only be sustained and achieved with support from the 

American people and with a level of bipartisanship; 


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Whereas over 137,000 American military personnel are currently serving in Iraq, like thousands of others since 

March 2003, with the bravery and professionalism consistent with the finest traditions of the United States 

armed forces, and are deserving of the support of all 

Americans, which they have strongly; 

Whereas many American service personnel have lost their 

lives, and many more have been wounded, in Iraq, and 

the American people will always honor their sacrifices 

and honor their families; 

Whereas the U.S. Army and Marine Corps, including their 

Reserve and National Guard organizations, together with 

components of the other branches of the military, are 

under enormous strain from multiple, extended deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan; 

Whereas these deployments, and those that will follow, will 

have lasting impacts on the future recruiting, retention 

and readiness of our Nation’s all volunteer force; 

Whereas in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, the Congress stated that ‘‘calendar year 

2006 should be a period of significant transition to full 

sovereignty, with Iraqi security forces taking the lead for 

the security of a free and sovereign Iraq’’; 

Whereas United Nations Security Council Resolution 1723, 

approved November 28, 2006, ‘‘determin[ed] that the situation in Iraq continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security’’; 

Whereas a failed state in Iraq would present a threat to regional and world peace, and the long-term security interests of the United States are best served by an Iraq that 


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can sustain, govern, and defend itself, and serve as an 

ally in the war against extremists; 

Whereas Iraq is experiencing a deteriorating and ever-widening problem of sectarian and intra-sectarian violence 

based upon political distrust and cultural differences between some Sunni and Shia Muslims; 

Whereas Iraqis must reach political settlements in order to 

achieve reconciliation, and the failure of the Iraqis to 

reach such settlements to support a truly unified government greatly contributes to the increasing violence in 

Iraq; 

Whereas the responsibility for Iraq’s internal security and 

halting sectarian violence must rest primarily with the 

Government of Iraq and Iraqi Security Forces; 

Whereas U.S. Central Command Commander General John 

Abizaid testified to Congress on November 15, 2006, ‘‘I 

met with every divisional commander, General Casey, the 

Corps Commander, [and] General Dempsey. We all 

talked together. And I said, in your professional opinion, 

if we were to bring in more American troops now, does 

it add considerably to our ability to achieve success in 

Iraq? And they all said no. And the reason is, because 

we want the Iraqis to do more. It’s easy for the Iraqis 

to rely upon us to do this work. I believe that more 

American forces prevent the Iraqis from doing more, 

from taking more responsibility for their own future’’; 

Whereas Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki stated on November 27, 2006, that ‘‘The crisis is political, and the 

ones who can stop the cycle of aggravation and bloodletting of innocents are the politicians’’; 


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Whereas there is growing evidence that Iraqi public sentiment 

opposes the continued U.S. troop presence in Iraq, much 

less increasing the troop level; 

Whereas, in the fall of 2006, leaders in the Administration 

and Congress, as well as recognized experts in the private 

sector, began to express concern that the situation in 

Iraq was deteriorating and required a change in strategy; 

and, as a consequence, the Administration began an intensive, comprehensive review of the Iraq strategy, by all 

components of the Executive branch; 

Whereas, in December 2006, the bipartisan Iraq Study 

Group issued a valuable report, suggesting a comprehensive strategy that includes ‘‘new and enhanced diplomatic 

and political efforts in Iraq and the region, and a change 

in the primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq that will enable the United States to begin to move its combat forces 

out of Iraq responsibly’’; 

Whereas, on January 10, 2007, following consultations with 

the Iraqi Prime Minister, the President announced a new 

strategy (hereinafter referred to as the ‘‘plan’’), the central element of which is an augmentation of the present 

U.S. military force structure through additional deployments of approximately 21,500 U.S. military troops to 

Iraq; 

Whereas this proposed level of troop augmentation far exceeds the expectations of many of us as to the reinforcements that would be necessary to implement the various 

options for a new strategy, and led many members to express outright opposition to augmenting our troops by 

21,500; 


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Whereas the Government of Iraq has promised repeatedly to 

assume a greater share of security responsibilities, disband militias, consider constitutional amendments and 

enact laws to reconcile sectarian differences, and improve 

the quality of essential services for the Iraqi people; yet, 

despite those promises, little has been achieved; 

Whereas the President said on January 10, 2007, that ‘‘I’ve 

made it clear to the Prime Minister and Iraq’s other 

leaders that America’s commitment is not open-ended’’ so 

as to dispel the contrary impression that exists; and 

Whereas the recommendations in this resolution should not 

be interpreted as precipitating any immediate reduction 

in, or withdrawal of, the present level of forces: Now, 

therefore, be it 

1 Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives 

2 concurring), That it is the sense of Congress that— 

3 (1) the Senate disagrees with the ‘‘plan’’ to 

4 augment our forces by 21,500, and urges the Presi5 dent instead to consider all options and alternatives 

6 for achieving the strategic goals set forth below with 

7 reduced force levels than proposed; 

8 (2) the primary objective of the overall U.S. 

9 strategy in Iraq should be to encourage Iraqi leaders 

10 to make political compromises that will foster rec11 onciliation and strengthen the unity government, ul12 timately leading to improvements in the security sit13 uation; 


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1 (3) the military part of this strategy should 

2 focus on maintaining the territorial integrity of Iraq, 

3 denying international terrorists a safe haven, con4 ducting counterterrorism operations, promoting re5 gional stability, and training and equipping Iraqi 

6 forces to take full responsibility for their own secu7 rity; 

8 (4) United States military operations should, as 

9 much as possible, be confined to these goals, and 

10 should charge the Iraqi military with the primary 

11 mission of combating sectarian violence; 

12 (5) the military Rules of Engagement for this 

13 plan should reflect this delineation of responsibil14 ities; 

15 (6) the United States Government should trans16 fer to the Iraqi military, in an expeditious manner, 

17 such equipment as is necessary; 

18 (7) the Senate believes the United States should 

19 continue vigorous operations in Anbar province, spe20 cifically for the purpose of combating an insurgency, 

21 including elements associated with the Al Qaeda 

22 movement, and denying terrorists a safe haven; 

23 (8) the United States Government should en24 gage selected nations in the Middle East to develop 


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1 a regional, internationally sponsored peace-and-rec2 onciliation process for Iraq; 

3 (9) the Administration should provide regular 

4 updates to the Congress, produced by the Com5 mander of United States Central Command and his 

6 subordinate commanders, about the progress or lack 

7 of progress the Iraqis are making toward this end; 

8 and 

9 (10) our overall military, diplomatic and eco10 nomic strategy should not be regarded as an ‘‘open11 ended’’ or unconditional commitment, but rather as 

12 a new strategy that hereafter should be conditioned 

13 upon the Iraqi government’s meeting benchmarks 

14 that must be specified by the Administration. 

Æ 


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