“P ri o r t o t he set t i ng of o ral argument, t he C o urt s hal l revi ew the r eco rd and bri ef s and co nsi d er al l err o rs 1

a ssig n e d . T h e C o u rt m a y e n te r an o rd e r d e sig n a ting tho se issu e s it w ish e s a d d re sse d a t o ra l a rg u m e n t.” T e n n

. S u p . C t. R. 12. 2. 

### IN THE S UP REME COURT OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON N ove m be r 9, 200 5 S es sio n

STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. STEP HEN LY NN HU GUE LEY

Aut om at ic App e al fr omth e Co ur t o f Cr im ina l A ppe als Circuit Court

for Hardem an Coun ty No. 6665 Jon Ke rry Blackwood , Judge

No. W2004-00057-SC- DDT-DD - F iled March 15, 2006

Def end a n t, St e p h e n Ly n n H u g u e le y , w a s c o n v ic te d b y a ju r y o f o n e c o u n t o f

f ir s t d eg ree preme ditated murder

. Du ring the pena lty phase of the trial, the jury

found four

ag g ravating circ umstances: (1) Def

endant was previously

convicted of

one or more felonies whose statutory
e le me nts inv olv e d the u se of vio le nc e to the pe rs on ; ( 2) the mur de r w a s e sp e c ia lly he ino us , a tr oc iou s, or

c ru e l in that it

inv olv e d to rtur e or

se ri ou s p hy si cal abu se be y on d th a t ne c e ssa ry to pr od uc e de a th; (3 ) De fe nd a nt co mmi tte d the mur de r wh ile he wa s in a pl a c e of la wf ul c on fi ne me nt; and (4) the victim was a c orre ctions employ ee. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204( i)(2), ( 5), (8) , (9) ( Su p p

. 1 9 9 9 )

. A d d it

io n a lly , the jury

determined that the evidenc e of the se ag g ravating c ircumstance s outweig hed the e vidence of mitigating circumstance s bey ond a reasonable doubt. I d. at (g)( 1). The jury there upon sentenc ed De fenda nt to death. The Cour t of Criminal Appea ls affirme d the conviction and the de ath sentenc e.

After the ca se wa s dockete d in this Court, we entere d an orde r identifying se vera l issues for

or a l arg ume nt. We n ow ho ld a s f oll ow s: ( 1) t he tr ia l c ou rt didno t c omm it r e ve rs ibl e e rr or in 1

c on c lud ing that Defe nd a nt f a ile d to e sta

bli sh pu rp os e fu l di sc ri min a tio n b y the pr os e c uti on in i ts
e xer c ise of

pe re mpt ory

c ha lle ng e s in vio la tio n of B a tso n v. Ke ntu c ky a nd J.E. B

. v. Al aba ma e x re l. T.B.; (2 ) t h e t ri al court did not commit reve rsible er ror in re fusing to dismi ss prospective jur or Watkins for cause ; and (3) the de ath sentenc e is valid under this Court’s mandatory revie w pursuant to Tennesse e Code Annotated sec tion 39- 13-206(c )(1) (2003). We a g ree with the Court of Criminal Appea ls’ conclusions with respe ct to the re maining issues, the rele vant portions of which a re inc lud e d in the app e nd ix to thi s opin ion

. Ac c or din g ly , the Cou rt of Cr imi na l A pp e a ls’ jud g me nt i s aff irmed.

Tenn. Cod e Ann. § 39-13-206(a) (1); Judgme nt of th e Court of Crim inal Ap peals Aff irm ed-2-

C OR NE L I A A. C LARK , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which W I L L I AM M. B ARKE R , CJ ., AND E. R I L EY A NDE R S ON , AND J ANI CE M. H OL DER , J J ., joined. A DOL PH O A. B I RCH , J R ., J ., filed a

concur ring and dissenting opinion.

F. Michie Gibson, J r. and T. J

. Cross-J ones, Nashville, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellant, Stephen Ly nn H u g u e l e y.

Paul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l a ndRe po rt e r; Mic ha e l E

. Mo or e , So lic ito r G e ne ra l; M ic he lle Chapman McIntyre a nd Michae l Markham, Assistant Attorney s Gene ral; Eliz abeth T. Rice, District Attorney Gene ral; Ter

ry D. Dy cus and Colin Campbell, Assistant District Attorney s Gene ral, for the appellee , State of Tenne ssee.

OP IN ION

F ACTUAL BACK GR OUND

G UI LT P HA SE

The e vidence adduce d at Def endant’ s trial established that, on January 17, 2002, Def

endant

w a s a n i n m a t e a tt h e H ar d e m a n C o u n t y C o rr e c t i o n a l F a c i l i t y, wher e he was housed in the “ F” pod. That day , corr ectional c ounselor De lbert Steed e ntere d the “F ” pod in orde r to counsel inmates. Mr

. Steed was sitting at a table whe n Def endant a pproac hed fr om behind and beg an stabbing Mr. Steed wi th a ho me ma de we apo n. De fe nd a nt s ta bb e d M r. Ste e d a

tot a l of thi rt y -s ix time s. De fe nd a nt d id not cea se stabbing the victim until t he handle of his homemade wea pon broke off. Onc e De fendant
was una ble to continue using his w eapon, he lay down on the floor of the pod and pe rmitted other

corr ectional of

fi ce rs t o restra in and re move him. The victim was re cover ed with the shar pened portion of the we apon still embedded in his back, and he wa s transported to the inf irmary

. Mary Har ris testified that she wa s working in the control room from whic h she could view the ac tivityoccur

ri n g i n t h e pod. She observe d Def endant a pproac h the victim from behind and beg in stabbing him. Upon witnessing De fendant’s attack on Mr . Steed, she c alled for assistance

. Another f emale of fice r opene d the door to the pod and told De fendant to stop. At that, Defe ndant

rose a nd started towa

rd the off icer “with the knife draw n back like he was g oing to stab her.” The of fi c e r c los e d th e do or , a ndDe fe nd a nt r e turne d to the vic tim , r e c omm e nc ing his a tta c k. Ms. Ha rris testified furthe r that Off

icer Donald Watkins entere d the pod and told Def endant to stop. Acc ording to M s. Ha rris, De fe nd a nt sta

bb e d the vic tim on c e or tw ic e mor e a nd the n s top pe d w he n th e ha nd le

o n t h e w e ap o n b r o k e

. A tt h a tp o i n t , D e f e n d a n ta l l o w e d h i m s e l f

t o b e t ak e n i n t o c u s t o d y.

Do na ld Watki ns te sti fi e d th a t he is a Se nio r C or

re c tio na l O fficer at the Ha rd e ma n Co un ty Correc tional Fac ili t y

. He responded to Ms. Harris’ c all for a ssistance. As he looked throug h the door into the pod, he saw Def endant kneeling down next to the victim. When he saw De fendant stab the vi ctim with a homemade weapon, he entere d the pod shouting, “ Drop y our we apon! D rop y our
wea pon!” Mr . Watkins st ated that De fendant complied immediately and lay fac e down on the floor.-3-

Mr . Wa tki ns c a lle d f

or me dic a l a ssi stanc e , a nd wh e n he he ard the vic tim makin g a g ro a nin g no ise “like he w as in pain,” Mr . Watkins t ried to re assure the victim that help was c oming.

Pursuant to h is e mp lo yme n t b y th eTenne ssee De partment of Corr ection as an I nterna l Affa irs I nvestig ator, Mr. Joseph Vernon reported to the crime scene wher e he c ollected e vidence and took photogr aphs. Mr. Ve rnon wa s prese nt wh en t h e m u rder wea pon was re moved from Mr. Stee d’s bo dy . H e de sc ri be d th e we apo n a s a “ qu art e r inc h ro d that ha [d] be e n sh arp e ne d to a ve ry fi ne po int ”

on one e n d

. M r

. V e r n o n s tate d th a t th e p o in t w a s “ r a zo r s h arp

. ” T h e w e ap o n me a sured approximately

eleve n inches long . The ha ndle of the w eapon w as a “ Mag ic Marke r” pe n.
Mr. Don Dunaway , also an Interna l Affa irs I nvestig ator with the Te nnessee Depa rtment of Correc tion, interviewed D efe ndant afte r the killing. Afte r being informed of his rights a nd ag ree ing to wa ive the m, De fe nd a nt g a ve Mr . Dun a way a le ng thy state me nt in w hic h h e de sc ri be d h is i nte ns e dislike of the victim. Mr. Dunaway testified about the state ment. Additionally , an a u d i o tape of Def endant’ s statement was play ed for the jury , and a tr anscript of the tape w as provided. D efe ndant described numerous c onflicts and conf rontations that he had ha d with Mr. Steed in his capa city as
a c or re c tio na l of

fi c e r. De fe nd a nt c la ime d th a t Mr . St e e d h a d th re a te ne d to write him up a ndtol d Def endant that he was “friends with the se g ang s around here ! They like me! The y

love me! . . . y ou ain’t nothing !”

De fe n d ant killed the victim on a Thursday . Def endant told Mr. Duna way that he beg an thinking about killing the victim on the previous M onday

. On that day , he g ot his weapon but then decide d to “j u s t

. . . l eave it alone.” De fendant describe d to Mr. Dunaway what then oc curr ed on Thursday , while Mr. Steed wa s in the pod:

I started to wa lk up and say something to him, and one of the little gang members that he ta lke d to a

lot th ere, run up a ndse t do wn a t th e ta ble a ndsta

rt e d ta lki n’ to h im. An d I sto odov e r t o th e sid e fo r a fe w m inu te s, a ndheloo ke d at me , a ndhe jus t shook his head . . . just turned ar ound and fa ced the other dire ction. And I said,

“ F [--]k th is! ” An d I

we nt t o th e ho us e , a ndg ot m y da mn knif

e a ndpa c ke d my pr op e rt y up re a l qu ic k .

. . thr ow e d my s[- -]t in a bo x a ndun -d on e my TV , a ndse t it over to the side, and went and killed his ass! It was that plain and simple.

Def endant a dmitted to Mr. Dunaway that he intended to kill the victim by stabbing “the most vital org ans first . . . the he art a nd the lung .”

M r

. D u n a w a y t e s t i f

i e d t h a ti n M a y o f 2 0 0 3 , D e f e n d a n tw r o t e a

l e t t e r t o t h e d i s tr i c ta t t o r n e y. Mr. Dunaw ay

obtained this letter and subsequently verifie d with Defe ndant that he ha d written and sig ne d it. Th is le tte r wa s a dmi tte d int o e vid e nc e a nd state s, in pe rt ine nt pa rt , the fo llo wi ng : “ I

did wi th m a lic iou s in te nt p re me dit a te dly mur de r D e lbe rt

Ste e d, a nda s in di c a te d in my state me nt t o I nterna l Affa irs, I

have no r eg ret or r emorse f or this crime and I fully intended to kill others that day but was unable to do so because the ha ndle on my wea pon broke.”-4-

Dr. O’ Brian Clary

Smi t h testified as a n expert in the field of for ensic pathology about the autopsy to the victim. Dr. Smit h remove d the murder wea pon from the victim’s ba ck. He state d that the victim’s c ause of death was “[m] ultiple stab wounds, thirty -six .” Twe lve of these wounds wer e lethal. Dr. Smith testified that there w ere ten wounds to the victim’s chest ar ea, thr ee of which we re f a t a l

. T h e r e w e r e f

o u r t e e n w o u n d s t o t h e v i c t i m ’ s b a c k ar e a , n i n e o f w h i c h w e r e f a t a l

. A d d i t i o n a l l y, there was one wound to the victim’s abdomen a nd eleve n wounds to the victim’s left arm.

De fe nd a nt t e sti fi e d at tria l. H e state d a bo ut h is atta c k o n th e vic tim :

I was stabbing Counselor Steed. He was lay ing on the floor, stomac h down. I wa s trying to dri ve it p lumb th ro ug h a ndhit the c on c re te be low him . T hat w a s my intentions. I hear d the door pop behind me. I turned around and it was the Watkins g uy that testified y esterday , and a little g irl named Perry . When I seen the m, I

took one and a half steps towa

rd them. At that time, I

still h ad t h e we apon in my hand. And they said, “He ’s g ot a knife,” and slammed the door

. And they stood outside the door while I stabbed the ma n while he was laying

on the fl oo r, fa c e do wn , I

sta bb e d h im a

bo ut ei g ht mor e tim e s try ing to r un it p lumb throug h him. They didn’t come in until when I draw ed back g oing to hit him ag ain, I didn’t see nothing bu t a piec e of pe n, Mag ic Marke r sticking out of my hand. . . .

At that po int , D e fe nd a nt thr e w the we apo n ha nd le a way a nd la y do wn on the fl oo r. De fe nd a nt a lso testified about a g rieva nce he had filed in whic h he set forth various complaints about t he victim and the vic tim ’s su pe rv iso r. He e xpla ine d that he ha d ma de nu me ro us c e ll c ha ng e re qu e sts a ndre qu e sts to be place d in the ang er ma nag ement prog ram, “all in an effort to g et away from Counselor Steed” and the unit manag er. D efe ndant st at ed t h at the victim “had a smart ass mouth” which w as the

so ur c e of the ir “proble m.” De fe nd a nt c on tin ue d: “ He ha d a ha bit of sh oo tin g his mou th o ff

to inmates, threatening them, and I wasn’t g oing to stand f

or it in any

way , shape or

form.”

O n c r o s s

- ex am i n at i o n , De fe n d an ts t at ed
, “In t h e w o rl d I l i v e i n , y o u d i e f

o r d i s re s p ec t

. It should a pply to both employ ee and inmate.” He explained that he had made th e m u rd er weapon from a pie ce of

metal re moved from a laundry cart. He used sa ndpaper

from a be lt sander to shar pen the point. He stated that he would not have quit stabbing the victim if the handle of the wea pon had not broken off . He a dmitted that he aimed for the victim’s vital org ans.

Def endant a cknowledg ed that h i s ac t ions in kil ling the vic tim were both intentional and preme ditated. He a lso acknowled ged t h at during his conversations with defense c ounsel he ha d

c o n s i s t e n t l y m a i n t a i n e d t h a th e w a n t e d t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y. Upon considering this proof , the jury returne d a ver dict of g uilty on Def endant’ s char g e of first deg ree preme ditated murder

.W e t ake judici al no t i ce o f t he f act t hat t he H arde m an C o unt y C o rr ect i o nal Fac i l i t y i s m anaged by C o rr ect i o ns 2
C orporat i on of

Am er i ca.

T he t r i al cour t ’ s i ns t r uct i ons t o t he j ur y wer e n ot t r ans cr i bed. T hi s C o urt i s r el y i ng upon t he wr i t t en 3
ins tru c tio n s inc lud e d w ith the ju ry’s v e rd ic t f o rm c o n ta ine d in the tec h n ic a l re c o rd

. -5- P EN AL TY P HA SE
During the pena lty

phase of Def endan t ’s t ri al, t he State introduce d by stipulation t hree

certified judgme nts of conviction ag ainst Def endant. These judgments established that Defe ndant

was c onvicted in 1986 of first deg ree murder; in 1992 of first deg ree murder; and in 1998 of attempt to commit first deg ree murder.

Dr. Smith testified and described the instant murde r wea pon as one that would cause pain “on a living, a wake individual.” He state d that the manner of death in this case wo u l d q u al i fyas “over kill.” Dr. Smith ex plained that the term “ overkill” wa s used in fore nsic patholog y to mean that

“ the re wa s e xce ssi ve inj ury do ne to th e bo dy

fa r i n e xce ss o f w hat w ou ld b e ne c e ssa ry to c aus e death.”

Wil lie L er o y

Steed, the victim’s older br other, testified a bout all of the assistance that the victim had provided to their familymembers prior to his murder. Mr. Steed stated that their brothe r, Paul, who is ha ndicappe d, had bee n able to live unassisted prior to the murder. A fter the murder, beca use the victim was no long er a ble to help with Paul’s needs, Paul ha d to move to a supervise d fac ility

. Their sister, B arba ra, w as also adve rsely

aff ecte d by the murder , having since be come “ very nervous,” a condition for w hich she require s medical he lp. She also now requir es the use of a walking cane

. Their sister, Onita, suffe red a “nervous brea

kdown” a s a re sult of the murder and has visions of the victim at nig ht. Their sister, Marg are t, suf fer ed a heart attack a fter the murder and was subsequently

moved to a nursing home. On cross-examination, Mr. St eed a cknowledg ed that he and another brother, a s executors of the victim’s estate, had filed a lawsuit ag ainst “CCA and Ha rdema n 2 County ” alleg ing ne g lige nce w ith reg ard to the vic tim’s death.

I n a colloquy

with the court, De fendant waived his rig ht to present any mitigating evidenc e.

At the close of

proof, the trial court instructe d the jury on four statutory

ag g rava t i ng
c ir c ums ta nc e s a s f

oll ow s: 3

Tenne ssee law provides that no sente nce of death o r s entence of impriso n m ent for life without possibi lityof par ole shall be imposed by a jury but upon a unanimo us finding that the state has pr oven bey ond a re asonable doubt the

e xiste nc e of

on e (1 ) o r mor e of

the statut ory

a g g ra vatin g c ir c ums ta nc e s, wh ic h s ha ll b e l i m i t ed t o t h e f

o l l o wi n g: [(2) the defe ndant was pr eviously convicted of one (1) or more f elonies, other tha n the pre sent cha

rg e, the statutory

elements of which involve the use of violence to the-6-

person. The state i s rely ing upon the crime( s) of murde r & att. [si c] murder, whic h is ( are ) a fe lon y inv olv ing the us e of

vio le nc e to the pe rs on [;] [(5) The murde r wa s espec ially heinous, atroc ious, or crue l in that it i nvolved torture

or se ri ou s p hy sic a l a

bu se be y on d th a t ne c e ssa ry to p ro du c e de a th[; ] [(8) The murder was committed by the def endant while [he] was in lawful c ustody

or in a pla c e of la wf ul c on fi ne me nt[; ] [(9) The murde r wa s committ ed aga inst any law enf orce ment office r, cor

rec tions of fi c ia l, c or re c tio ns e mpl oy e e , e ng a g e d inthe pe rf orma nc e of

of fi c ia l du tie s. “HEI NOUS” means g rossly

wicked or

repr ehensible, a

bominable; odious; vil e. “ATROCI OUS” mea ns ext reme ly evil or cr

uel; monstrous; exceptionally bad; abominable.

Se e Te nn . Co de An n. § 39- 13 -2 04 (i )( 2) , (5) , (8) , (9) (S up p. 19 99 ). As to m iti g a tin g c ir c ums ta nc e s, the tr ia l c ou rt

ins truc te d th e jury

a s f oll ow s:

Te n n e s s e e l a w p r o v i d e s t h a ti n arr i v i n g a tt h e p u n i s h m e n t , t h e j u r y s h a ll consider a s previously indicated, any mitigating circ umstances r aised by the proof[.] Any other mitigating f

actor which is ra i s ed by

the evidenc e produc ed by either the prosec ution or defe nse at either the g uilt or sentencing hearing; that is, y ou shall consider any aspec t of the defe ndant’s char acte r or rec ord, or any aspec t of the circ umstances of

the offe nse fa vorable to the defe ndant which is sup p o rt ed by the evidenc e. The de fenda nt do e s n o t h a ve the bur den of pr oving a mitigating circ umstance. I f there is some evidence that a mitigating c ircumstance exis ts, then the bu rd en of proof is upon the state to pr ove, bey ond a re asonable d o u b t , t h at t he ag g ravating circ umstance or

circ umstances outwe igh any mitigating circ umstance or circ umstances. There is no require ment of j u ry u n animity as to any

particula r mitigating circ umstance, or

that y ou ag ree on the same mitig ating circ umstance.
See id. at (e )(1)

.
Fol lo w in g d e li b e r a ti o n s , th e ju r y f o u n d th at th e St a te h a d p r o v e n a ll f o u r a g g r a v a ting circ umstances be y ond a re asonable doubt. The jury further d et er m i ned that the a g g ravating circ umst a n c e s o u tw e ig h e d a n y mi ti g a ti n g c ir c u ms tan c e s b e y o n d a r e a s o n ab le d o u b t. T h e jury sentenc ed De fenda nt to death for his fir st deg ree preme ditated murder of De lbert Steed.

On appea l, the Cou rt

of Cr imi na l A pp e a ls a ff

ir me d D e fe nd a nt’ s c on vic tio n a ndde a th

se nte nc e . D e fe nd a nt’ s a

pp e a l w a s th e n auto ma tic a lly do c ke te d inthi s Co urt.T he S up rem e C o urt s ubs equen t l y r ul ed t hat t he St at e may al s o l od ge a B at s on object i on upon per cei ved 4
di s cr i mi nat ory pere mp t ory cha l l eng es by t he defendan t

. See G eorg i a v. M cCo l l um, 50 5 U

. S. 42 , 59 ( 19 92 )

. W e r ef er here t o t he o b ject i ng pa rt y as “def end ant ” fo r eas e o f reading.

-7- AN AL YSI S
I. Jury Selection Issues

A. B a ts o n Cl a i ms
1. Allegedly Race -based P ere m ptory Challenges

We first addre ss Defe ndant’s conte ntion that his consti t u t i o n al rig hts were violated by the pr os e c uti on ’s e xer c ise of

pe re mpt ory c ha lle ng e s to c e rt a in po te nti a l jur or s. De fe nd a nt a sse rt s in his appe l l at e b ri ef t hat the State struck e ight juror s on the basis of their r ace in violation of his equal protec tion rights u n d er Batson v. Kentucky , 476 U.S. 79 (1986). The State responds that no vio la tio n o c c ur

re d b e c a us e the ba sis of

e a c h c ha lle ng e wa s r a c e -n e utr a l.

I n Batson, the United States Supreme Court held that “the Equa l Protection Clause [of the United States Constit ution] forbids the prose cutor to cha lleng e potential jurors solely on acc ount of their ra ce .

. . .” I d. at 89. The Court c raf ted a three -prong ed analy sis f or determining whe ther the suspect cha lleng es we re impermissibl y based on the potential juror’s r ace . At the outset, the defe ndant must establish a prima fa cie c ase of purposef ul discrimination. I n doing so, the defe ndant 4 may rely “solely on evidenc e conce rning the prosec utor’s exercise of per emptory challeng es at the de fe nd a nt’ s tria l.” I d. a t 96 . T hat is , th e de fe nd a nt n e e d n ot prov e a pa st p a tte rnof

ra c ia lly discriminatory jury selec tion prac tices by the prosecution. I d. at 92

- 93; c f. Swain v. Alabama , 380 U.S. 202, 223 (1965), over ruled in part by

Batson, 476 U.S. at 91-92 (re cog nizi ng that an infe renc e of pu rp os e fu l di sc ri min a tio n may be raise d on p ro of

that th e pr os e c uti on str

uc k q ua lif ie d b la c ks “ in

case afte r case , whateve r the circ umstances, whateve r the crime and whoeve r the defe ndant or the victim may

be. . .”) . Once the defe ndant makes out a prima fac ie ca se, the State ha s the burden of pr od uc ing a

ne utr a l e xpla natio n f

or its c ha lle ng e . Batso n, 47 6 U .S. a t 97 . T his e xpla natio n mu st be a c lear and rea sonably specific acc ount of the prose cutor’s le g itimate rea sons for exerc ising the challeng e. I d. at 98 n.20. Howe ver, the rac e or g ender neutra l e x planation need not be per suasive,

or eve n plausible. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767-68 (1995). “’U nless a discriminatory intent is inherent in t he prosecutor’s e x planation, the re ason off ere d will be deeme d rac e neutr al.’” I d. at 768 (quoting Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360 (1991) (plurality opinion)). I f a r ace

ne utr a l e xpla natio n is pr ov ide d, the tr ia l c ou rt mus t the n de te rm ine
, fr om a ll of the c ir c ums ta nc e s, whether the def

endant ha s established purpose ful discrimination. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98. The trial court may

not simpl y

acc ept a pr offe red r ace -n eu t ra l rea son at fac e value but must ex amine the prosec utor’s cha lleng es in context to ensure that the reason is not mere ly prete x tual. See Miller-El v. Dre tke,

__ U. S.

__ , 125 S. Ct. 2317 (2005) (“Miller-El I I ”). I n that case , the C ourt reiter ated that “the r ule i n Batson provides an opportunity to the prosec utor to g ive the re ason for striking the jur or, and it require s the judg e to assess the plausibilit y of that rea son in lig ht of all evidenc e with a be aringD ef endan t ’ s r ace i s i ndi cat ed i n t he R eport of T r i al Judge i n Capi t al Case s pre pare d and s ubmi t t ed by t he t r i al 5

cou r t pu r s u an t t o T en n es s ee Su pr eme Cour t Rul e 12. 1.

In P o wers v. O hi o , 49 9 U

. S. 4 0 0 , 4 1 5

- 1 6 (19 9 1 ), t he Sup rem e C o urt de t erm i ned t hat t he d efend ant and t he 6

e x c lud e d ju ro r n e e d no t b e o f t h e sa m e ra c e in o rd e r fo r th e re to b e a n e q u a l p ro te c tio n c la im

. -8- on it.” I d. at 2331. I f the trial c ourt determines that t he prof fer ed re ason is mere ly

prete x tual and that a ra cial motive is in fact be hind the challeng e, the juror may n o t be excluded. Woodson v. Porter B rown Limestone Co., 916 S.W .2d 896, 903 (Tenn. 1996)

.
As this Court has not ed in the past, “dete rmination of t he prosecutor’s discriminatory intent or lac k there of turns larg ely on the eva luation of the prosec utor’s cre dibilit y , of which the attorney ’s d e me a n o r is o f te n th e b e s t e v id e n c e

. ” St a te v

. Sm ith
, 8 9 3 S. W. 2 d 9 0 8 , 914 (Tenn

. 1 9 9 4 )

. We

a c c or d a tr ia l c ou rt ’s fi nd ing s in thi s r e g ardg re a t de fe re nc e a ndwi ll n ot se t the m a sid e un le ss c le arl y
err oneous. Woodson, 916 S.W .2d at 906; se e also Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.21 (“ S i n ce t h e t ri al judge ’s findi ng s in [t his] context

. . . larg ely will turn on eva luation of cre dibilit y , a re viewing court ord in ari ly sh ou ld g ive tho se fi nd ing s g re a t de fe re nc e .” ). F or thi s r e a so n, “ [t]he tr ia l ju dg e mus t
c are fu lly art ic ulate sp e c if

ic re a so ns fo r e a c h f

ind ing on the re c or d, i.e
., wh e the r a prima fa c ie c a se has been established; whether a neutra l explanation has been g iven; and whe ther the totality of the circ umstances support a

finding of purpose ful discrimination.” Woodson, 916 S.W .2d at 906.

I n this case, de fense counsel objec ted at trial to the State’s pere mptory challeng e of f

ive potential jurors: Ms. I da F erg uson, Mr. Ever ette Woods, Ms. P hy llis McKinnie, Ms. W illie Hear d, and Ms. Hele n Pruitt. Th e re cord indicates that all of these persons a re A frican-American; De fe nd a nt i s Cauc a sia n. B e fo re thi s Co urt, De fe nd a nt a lle g e s th a t th e pr os e c uti on imp ro pe rl y 5

e xclu de d e ig ht A fric a n- Am e ri c a n v e nir e pe rs on s, a dd ing Mr . Joh nn y Hu ds on , M s. Ge rt

ru de Gi bb s, 6 and Ms. Linda Pirtle. Defe ndant’s ar g ument as to these a dditional t hree venire persons is waive d beca use De fenda nt failed to objec t to the S tate’s challeng es t o these three persons in a timely fashion. See State v. Peck, 719 S.W.2d 553, 555 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1986). This Court is not bound t o g rant relief to a party who fails to take “whateve r action was reasona bly available to preve nt or nullify the harmful e ffe ct of a n err or.” Tenn. R. A pp. P. 36( a). I n this c ase, D efe ndant had the oppor tunityat trial to object to ea ch and e very one of the S t at e’ s pere mptory challeng es, there by

g iving the trial

c ou rt the op po rtun ity

to a sse ss the c on sti tut ion a lit y of the State ’s c ho ic e s. De fe nd a nt d id n ot d o s o wi th r e sp e c t to Mr . H ud so n, Ms. Gi bb s, a ndMs. Pirtle

. Ac c or din g ly
, he wi ll no t no w be he ardto complain about the State’ s challeng es t o t h es e t h re e venir e per sons. See State v. J ohnson, 980 S.W .2d 414, 419 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998)

. We w ill, ther efor e, limit our examination of Defe ndant’s

rac e-ba sed B atson claim to the five ve nire pe rsons previously named.

I da F erg uson During voir dire que stioning by the State, Ms. Fe rg uson acknow ledg ed that she h ad a relig ious belief ag ainst the death penalty
, but stated she could “f ollow the law.” She a cknowledg ed having stated on her

jury questionnaire that she felt a se ntence of life without par ole was “ adequate” and that she w ould not want to consider the death pena lty , but reiterated that she “ ha[d] to obey the-9-

laws of the la nd.” I n response to subsequent questions by defe nse counse l, Ms. Fer g uson stated that she “w ould have to have very hard e vidence to consider” imposing either life in prison with no opportunity

for pa role or the death pe nalty

. T h e State ther eaf ter used one of its pere mptory challeng es to remove Ms. Fer g uson from the pa nel. Upon defe nse counse l’s Batson objection, the prosec utor ref

err ed to Ms. Fe rg uson’s response in the jury questionnaire to the que stion, “do y ou have any persona l, moral or relig ious beliefs ag ainst imposit ion of the death penalty ? ” Ac cording to the pr os e c uto r, Ms. F e rg us onha d a ns we re d, “ y e s, ” wi th the e xpla natio n th a t sh e be lie ve d th a t a “life s en t en ce wi thout parole is ade quate, ve ng eanc e is mine said the L ord.” The prosec utor maintained that “the State is striking h er b as ed upon the answe r to that question.” The trial court there upon overr

uled def ense c ounsel’s B atson objection.

Evere tte Woods

The State a sked Mr. Woods during voir dire if he be lieved in the death penalty . Mr. Woods responde d that he did not believe in it. He stated further, howe ver, that he could follow the la w and sig n the de a th wa

rr a nt if De fe nd a nt w a s g uil ty . A ft e r the State pe re mpt orily c ha lle ng e d M r. Woo ds
, defe nse counse l lodge d a Batson objection. The prosec utor responde d that Mr. Woods had indicated on his jury questionnaire that he did not believe in the death penalty . Def ense c ounsel claimed that Mr. Woods had been r ehabilitated during voir dire. The trial court state d nothing on the r ecor d but

e xcu se d M r. Woo ds

. Phy lli s Mc Ki nn ie

Def ense c ounsel objecte d to the State’s challeng e of Ms. Mc Kinnie, stating that she wa s the six th Afric an-A merica n struck by the S tate. The S tate had lodge d five pe remptory challeng es prior to challeng ing Ms. Mc Kinnie. The State ref err ed to Ms. McKinnie’s state ment on her que stionnaire that sh e “ jus t [ do e s not] wa nt to be a pa rt of pu tti ng a ny pe rs on to de a th be c a us e it c ou ld turn o ut t o be a n in no c e nt p e rs on a ft e r y ou ha ve pu t hi m or he r t o d e a th. ” Th e pr os e c uto r a lso a ve rr e d th a t “ a ll six of the ind ivi du a ls [h e ] str

uc k [ha d] in dic a te d o n the ba c k o f the ir jury qu e sti on na ir e s th e y

wo uld have a problem with the death penalty .” De fensecounsel c laimed that Ms. McKin n i e h ad bee n
re ha bil itate d. Th e tr ia l c ou rt

fo un d th a t t he S tat e ha d e sta bli sh e d a ra c ia lly ne utr a l r e a so n f

or its challeng e and ove rruled the objection.

Wil lie Hea rd

The S tate nex t challeng ed Ms. Hea rd, st ating that she had indicated on her questionnaire that she had persona l, mor al, or relig ious be liefs ag ainst the death pe nalty , and that she did not like it but could not stop it. Defense counsel re sponded,

this is t heir seve nth black juror and it ’s t heir six th woman that they have struc k. She, like the ot hers, we nt throug h and said she c ould list en to all three sentenc ing pha ses just li ke the other s but we fe el at this point in t ime y ou’ve g ot seven blac k jurors that have be en stricke n from the r ecor d.T he r ecor d does not i ndi cat e whe t her t he pros ecu t or was r ef er r i ng t o f

our wom en, fou r A f

ric an- A meri can 7

p ers o ns, or fo ur Af

ri can- A m eri can wo m en.
-10- T h e tri al co u rt t h en s t at ed
, “T h e C o u rt fi n d s t h at t h er e i s a r ac i al l y n eu tra l re as o n fo r t h e c h al l en ge but y ou might be c are ful about re habilitating. The Court will look at it a little closer ne x t time.”

He le n Pr uitt

On def ense c ounsel’s B atson objection t o the S tate’s challeng e of Ms. Pruitt, the prosec utor stated,

This is the one I challeng ed beca use when I

was que stioning her , J udg e, her ey es, she looked like she was g oing to c ry to the poi n t t h at I b ac k ed off asking her questions because she wa s sitti ng on the fa r side over

there and I

rea lly felt that she

was a bout to break out in tea

rs and I backe d off a nd I

not i ce d wh en s h e was going into the jury box she g ot teary -ey ed ag ain and wa s shaking her he ad no. That’s the

rea son.

Def ense c ounsel replied, “ Your Honor, we just want for the re cord that’s the eig hth AfricanAmeric an per son and it’s the seventh Afric an-A merican woman stricke n.” The prosec utor retorted that they “still ha ve four on there ,” and the trial court ruled that the State’s re ason for challeng ing 7 Ms. Pruitt was “ not rac ially motivated.”

The St at e l o dg ed no further pe remptory challeng es. The Re port of Tria l J udg e in Capital Cases, filed by

the trial court pursuant t o Tenne ssee Supre me Court Rule 12.1 (“the Rule 12 Report”) , indicates that seve n of the twe lve jurors that de cided De fendant’s case wer e white.
As noted pre viously , this Court has instructe d trial courts that, when making a dete rmination reg arding a B atson objection, they “must car efully articulate specific rea sons f or eac h finding on the

rec ord, i.e., whe ther a

prima fa cie c ase ha s been established; whether a neutral explanation has been g iven; and whe ther the totality of t he circumstance s support a finding of purpose ful discrimination.” Woodson, 916 S .W.2d at 906. Thus, we are initiallyconstraine d to point out t hat the trial c ourt’s finding s on Def

endant’ s Batson objections at t rial ar e bar ely adequate to permit our re view. Af ter
e a c h o f d e fe ns e c ou ns e l’ s o bje c tio ns , th e tr ia l c ou rt faile d to make a

sp e c if ic fi nd ing that a

prima fa c ie c a se of

pu rp os e fu l di sc ri min a tio n h a d be e n mad e

. Ne ve rthe le ss, the pr os e c uto r’ s re sp on se to
eac h objection clea

rly impl i es that the trial court expected the State to proff er its re asons for challeng ing the subject venire person. That is, after eac h Batson objection by defe nse counse l, the tr ia l c ou rt indicat ed in so me fa sh ion that th e se c on d p ro ng of the B a tso n a na ly sis wa s c a lle d in to play . T hu s, we a ssu me that th e tr ia l c ou rt de te rm ine d that, a s to e a c h o f the se fi ve ve nir e pe rs on s, Def endant ha d made out a p ri m a facie c ase of impermissible discrimination. S ee Woodson, 916 S.W .2d at 905 (e ven whe re tria l court made no expli cit finding that the objecting party had made out

a prima fa c ie c a se , it

wa s a pp ro pria te to c on clu de th at th e tr ia l c ou rt ha d d on e so be c aus e “[o] therwise, the court would not have require d [t he st riker] to expl ain the cha lleng e”) . Nor did theT he reco rd i n t hi s case do es no t co nt ai n t he juror q uest i o nnai res or t he jur o r cards us ed by ei t her part y

. T he 8

reco rd d o es cont ai n a t rans cri p t o f t he vo i r di re and t he wri t t en p erem p t o ry chal l enges f i l ed by each p art y

. T he reco rd al so co nt ai ns t he R ul e 1 2 R ep o rt w h ic h c o n ta ins so m e info rm a tio n a b o u t t h e ju ry.
-11- trial court of

fer much commentary on the State’s proff ere d rea sons for its strikes, or re nder de tailed fi nd ing s abo ut its re a so ns fo r ov e rr uli ng e a c h of De fe nd a nt’ s B a tso n c la ims

. We are es pecia lly

conce rned a

bout the trial court’ s failure to make spec ific finding s in light of the United States Supreme Court’s rec ent decision in Miller- El I I

. Although decide d afte r the trial of this c ase, MillerEl I I demonstrates the importance of a c omplete re cord and compre hensive findings by the trial

c ou rt

.
I n M i l l e r

- E l I I , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s S u p r e m e C o u r t e xp o u n d e d o n t h e m e t h o d o l o g y u s e d to

as s es s a B at s o n cl ai m

. I n t h at ca s e, t h e de fe n d an t wa s tri ed an d co n v i ct ed o n a cap i t al m u rd erch ar ge and sente nced to death. 125 S. Ct. at 2322. During jury selec tion, the prosecution used pe remptory strikes ag ainst ten qualified Af rica n-American ve nire men. I d. The defenda nt arg ued, and the Court ag ree d, that the prosec ution’s challeng es we re ra ci al l ymotivated. I d. at 2340. I n analy zing the defe ndant’s cla im, the Court eng ag ed in an exhaustive and fa ct-intensive inquiry , relying upon not only the transc ript of the voir dire , but the completed juror questionnaires and the juror c ards utilized by the prosec ution. 8

As it ex amined the e x tensive evide nce be fore it, the C ourt noted numerous f actor s indicative of the prose cution’s impermissible motive in challeng ing the black venire members. I nitially , the Court pointed to the fac t that the prosec ution ha d pere mptorily struck ten of the e leven, or 91%, of the elig ible Afric an-A merica n venire members. I d. at 2325. W hat it found “[m] ore pow erf ul than these ba re statistics,” howeve r, wer e the results of “side-by -side comparisons of some black ve nire pa ne lis ts w ho we re str

uc k an d whi te pa ne lis ts al low e d to ser ve .” I d. In ma kin g the se c omp ari so ns , the Court determined that, “[i] f a pr osecutor’ s proffe red r eason f or st riking a black panelist applies jus t a s w e ll t o a n o the rw ise -s imi lar n on bla c k w ho is pe rm itt e d to se rv e , that is e vid e nc e te nd ing to pr ov e pu rp os e f

u l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n t o b e c o n s i d e r e d a tB a t s o n ’ s t h i r d s t e p

. ” I d

. T h u s , “ d i s p ar a te treatment” of potential jurors who responde d simil arly to simi lar que stions may be indicative of impermissible discrimination where the only signific ant diffe renc e betwe en the pe rsons is their rac e.

An oth e r f

a c tor ind ic a tiv e of

the pr os e c uti on ’s imp ro pe r m oti ve was its “ dis pa rate questioning” of the ve nire membe rs, depe nding upon the member’ s rac e. The Court found that, for 94% of the w hite members, the prosec utors g ave a “bland description” of the death pe nalty befor e asking for individual fe eling s on the subject. I d. at 2334. Only 47% of the A frican-American ve nire members hear d the “bland” description, with the rema ining 53% hearing what the Court described as a “ g raphic script.” I d. The Court a ppear ed to a g ree with the defe ndant that the prose cution used this tactic in an attempt to “prompt som e ex pression of hesitation to consider the de ath pena lty and thu s to e lic it pla

us ibl y ne utr a l g ro un ds fo r a pe re mpt ory

strike of a po te nti a l ju ro r s ub

je c te d to it, if not a strike for

cause .” I d. at 2333. A s econd form of disparate que stioning involved what the CourtIn f i nd i ng raci al l y m o t i vat ed dis cri m i nat i o n by t he p rosecut i o n, t he C o urt al so t o o k int o a cco unt “ a p roce d ure 9
k n o w n in T e x a s a s the ju ry shu ff le .” M ill e r-E l II , 1 2 5 S

. C t. a t 2 3 3 2

. T h is p ro c e d u re p e rm its e ithe r sid e to “ lite ra lly

res huf f l e t he card s b eari ng p anel m em b ers ’ nam es, t hus rearr angi ng t he o rder i n whi ch m em b ers o f a veni re pane l are
sea t ed an d rea ch ed fo r q ue st i o ning.” Id . P an el m em b ers sea t ed in t he b ac k a re less l i ke l y t o b e q ue st i o ne d
, an d t ho se
no t que st i o ned by t he end of t he week are dis m i ss ed

. I d

. at 23 3 3

. T hus, a pa rt y engagi ng i n raci al l y dis cri m i nat o ry jur y
s el ec t i on ma y s h u f

f l e t h e j u r y i n a n a t t empt t o h av e, for i n s t an ce , Af r i ca n

- Amer i ca n membe r s r es ea t ed i n t h e bac k

. I d. I n M i l l er

- E l I I , t he pros ecu t i on ha d s hu f f l ed t he j ur y s eve r al t i mes. T he C our t found t hat “ no r aci al l y ne ut r al r eas on ha s
e v e r b e e n o ff

e re d in th is c a se [ fo r the s h u ff ling ], a n d n o thin g s to p s the s u sp ic io n o f d isc rim ina to ry in te n t f ro m risin g to

an i nf er enc e. ” I d. J ur y s hu f f l i ng i s not av ai l abl e i n T enn es s ee.

-12- described as “ trickery .” I d. at 2337. The Court e lucidated:
The prose cutors aske d members of the pane l how low a sentenc e they would consider imposing for

murder. Most potential jurors w ere first told that Texas law provided fo r a min imu m te rm

of fi ve y e ars , b ut s ome me mbe rs of the pa ne l w e re not, andif

a pa ne l me mbe r the n in sis te d o n a min imu m a

bo ve fi ve y e ars , th e pr os e c uto r w ou ld suppress his normal pre fer ence for toug h jurors and c laim cause to strike.

I d. The S t at e co n ceded that the manipulative que stioning wa s used to cre ate c ause to strike, but claimed that the f

ive-y ear information was omitted not on the basis of ra ce, but on state d opposition to or ambivalenc e about the de ath pena lty

. I d. The Court found, howe ver, that, while all Afric anAm e ri c a n p a ne l me mbe rs wh o ha d expr e sse d o pp os iti on to o r ambi va le nc e abo ut the de a th p e na lty

wer e aske d the trick que stion, “most white p anel membe rs who expressed similar opposition or ambivalenc e we re not subjec ted to it.” I d. The Court then stated, “ [o] nce a g ain, the implication of

rac e in the prose cutors’ c hoice of questioning c annot be e x plained aw ay .” I d. at 2338.

I n a dd iti on to exa min ing the qu e sti on s ask e d an d tre a tme nt of ve nir e me mbe rs , th e Sup re me Court relied upon history : “We know t h at fo r decade s leading up to the time this case wa s tried prosec utors in the Dallas County office had followed a specific poli cy of sy stematically excluding blacks fr om juries . . . .” I d. I n the Miller-El I I case , the prosec utors had mar ked the r ace of ea ch

ve nir e me mbe r o n th e ir

jur or c ard s a nd“ too k th e ir

c ue s [on jury

se le c tio n] f

ro m a 20 -y e ar o ld manual of tips” which included rea sons for ex cluding minorities from jury service

. I d. at 2339-40.

9

Th e Cou rt

c on c lud e d:

I t bl ink s r e a lit y

to d e ny that th e State str

uc k F ie lds a nd War

re n

. . . b e c a us e they wer e black. The strikes corr elate with no fac t as well as they corr elate w ith race
, and they occur red during a

selec tion infected by

shuffling and disparate questioning that rac e expla i n s b et t er than any rac e-ne utral re ason advanced by the State. The Sta te ’s pr e te xtua l po sit ion s c on fi rm [the de fe nd a nt’s ] cl a im, a ndthe pr os e c uto rs ’

own notes procla im that the Sparling Manual’s e mphasis on rac e wa s on their minds when they

considere d every

potential juror.D ur i ng t he f i r s t r ound of

per emp t ory ch al l eng es , t he St at e c hal l eng ed M r

. H uds on, M s

. G i bb s , an d M s

. P i r t l e. 10
T he Stat e l o d ged a B at son o b ject i o n t o a pe rem p t o ry chal l enge exerci sed b y D efen d a n t agai nst , as d escri b ed by t he p ro sec uto r, “a C au ca si an

. . . m ale.” In re sp o nse , d efen se c o un sel asserted t ha t , d uring it s i nit i al p ere m p t o ry cha l l en ge s, t he Stat e excused “t hree b l ack p eo p l e. ” N ei t her t he t ri al c o urt no r t he p rosecut o r com m ent ed on t hi s d escri p t i o n of M r. H ud son, M s. G i b b s, and M s. P i rt l e. W e co ncl ud e, t herefo re, t hat each o f t hese persons i s A f

ri can- A m eri can.
-13- The state c ourt’s conc lusion tha t t h ep r o secutors’ strikes of F ields and Warre n
wer e not ra cially

determined is shown up as wrong to a clea r and c onvincing deg ree ; the state c ou rt ’s c on c lus ion wa s u nr e a so na ble a s w e ll a s e rr on e ou s.

I d. at 2340. The Court ther eupon g rante d the def endant’ s claim for ha

beas c orpus re lief. I d.

I n contra st to Mil ler-E l I I , the sole indication of purposef ul impermissible discrimination by the State in this case is the fac t t h at eac h of the pe remptory challeng es used by

the State was employ ed agai n s t

an Af ri ca n -A m er i ca n v en i re p er s o n

. A c l o s e e x am i n at i o n o f t h e record c onvinces 10 us, howeve r, that the prose cution’s exercise of these c halleng es wa s for ra ce- neutra l rea sons.

Wit h respe ct to the State’s prof fer ed re asons fo r i t s challeng es, the prose cutor maintaine d that, with respec t to Ms. Fe rg uson, Mr. W oods, Ms. McKinnie, and Ms. Hear d, he wa s challeng ing

eac h of these ve nire pe rsons based upon his or he r convic tions about the death penalty

. Acc ording to the State, eac h of t hese persons had indicated some per sonal or re ligious disinclination to sentence an individual to de ath. This is certainly a fa cially rac e-ne utral re ason for

exercising a per emptory challeng e ag ainst a potential juror in a capital case

. As to Ms. Pruitt, the prose cutor stated that he excused her because, whil e he was questioning her , she looked a s though she was g oing to c ry . She later be came “tea

ry -ey ed” a g ain and “wa s shaking her head no.” We are satisfied that the prose cutor also provided a

fac ially rac e-ne utral re ason for

his challeng e to this juror.

Th e tr ia l c ou rt ult imate ly de te rm ine d that, un de r a ll the c ir c ums ta nc e s, De fe nd a nt f a ile d to establish purposef

ul discrimination. “Be cause the c o re issue is the prosec utor’s discriminatory int e nt, or la c k the re of

, the tr ia l cou rt ’s fi nd ing ‘l arg e ly wi ll turn o n e va luatio n o f c re dib ili ty .’ ” Sta te v. Ellison, 841 S .W.2d 824, 827 (Tenn. 1992) (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.21). Both this Court and the United States Supreme Court ha ve previously rec og nized that “‘[t] here will se ldom be much evidence b ea ri n g on th[ e] issue [ of discriminatory intent] , and the be st evidence often will be the demea nor of the attorney who exercises the challeng e.’” I d. (quoting Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 365 (1991) (plura lityopinion)). Obviously
, we are in no position to second- g uess the trial court’s a ssessment of the prose cutor’s de meanor unless the re cord, a s it did i n Miller-El I I , contains cle ar o b je c ti v e in d ic a ti o n s th a t th e p r o s e c u to r ’ s a v e r me n ts c o n c e r n in g h is o r h e r r e a s o n s f

or challeng ing a

juror ar e simply

not cre dible. We remain c og nizant o f Ba t s o n’s holding that the ultimate burden of e stablishing purpose ful discrimination lies with the party objecting t o the pere mptory

challeng e. 476 U.S. at 93; see also Purkett, 51 4 U. S

. at 768 (re cog nizi ng that “the ultimate burden of pe rsuasio n re gar d i n g rac ial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike ”). We must, examine, there fore
, whether the re cord be fore us contains such

s tr o n g e v i d e n c e o f

i m p e r m i s s i b l e d i s c r i m i n a t o r y i n t e n tb y

t h e p r o s e c u t i o n a s t o r e n d e r c l e a rl yT enness ee R ul e o f C ri m i nal P roce d ure 24 (d) pro vi d es t hat
, where t he charged off ense i s p uni shable b y de at h, 11
the d e fen d a n t an d the S ta te a re e a c h e n tit le d to fi ftee n p e re m p to ry c h a llen g e s.

A l t ho ugh we have d et erm i ned t hat D efend ant wai ved hi s ri ght t o ap p eal t he Stat e’ s exerci se of pe rem p t o ry 12

c h a llen g e s to M r. H u d so n , M s. G ib b s, a n d M s. P irtle, a re v ie w o f t h e c irc u m sta n c e s su rr o u n d ing the ir d ism issa ls is

a pp r op r i a t e t o t h e c o m p r e h e n s i v e a n a l y s i s s e t fo r t h i n M i l l e r

- El I I

. Ea c h o f t h e s e t h r e e p e r s o n s e x p r e s s e d s om e
re se rv a tio n a b o u t i m p o sin g the d e a th p e n a lty d u rin g vo ir d ire

. -14- err oneous the trial c ourt’s dete rmination that Def endant failed to establish purposef ul discrimination by the pr os e c uti on in i ts p e re mpt ory c ha lle ng e s. Taking our cue from Miller-El I I , we first examine the “bare statist ics” in this case r eg arding jury selec tion. The S tate ex erc ised eig ht of its available f ifteen pe remptory

challeng es. All of them

11

wer e ag ainst Afric an-A merica n persons. We do not know, howe ver, h o w many elig ible Afric anAmeric an venir e member s were available . Def ense co u nsel exercised sixteen pere mptory challeng es, one of

which was ag ainst an alternate. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 24(e). The re cord indicates that the State lodg ed B atson objections to two of these challeng es, one of them on the basis that the juror wa s white. The r ecor d indicates that at least one of the other ve nire pe rsons excused by the defe nse wa s white, but we a re una ble to asce rtain the ra ce of the rema ining fourtee n venire persons pere mptorilychalleng ed by Def endant. The United S tates 2000 Census provides that 41% of the po pu la tio n of the c ou nty in wh ic h De fe nd a nt wa s trie d is bla c k o r A fric a n- Am e ri c a n. I t is re a so na ble to i nf e r, the re fo re , th a t a sig nif

ic a nt pr op ortio n of the ve nir e pa ne l wa s Af ri c a n- Am e ri c a n. Th e Rul e 12 Report furthe r indicate s that five of the eventual twelve jurors in this case we re non- Cauca sian. The State ha d seven peremptory challeng es remaining to it at t he ti me t he jury , including the se five nonwhites, was sworn. These ba re statistics do not, i n an d o f themselves, c onvince us that the Sta te ’s pr of

fe re d r a c e -n e utr a l r e a so ns fo r e xcu sin g the fi ve na me d p e rs on s w e re me re ly pr e te xtua l.

A close r eview of

the transcript of the voir dire reve als no disparate treatment based on ra ce. All but one of the e ight pe rsons pere mptorilychalleng ed by the S tate had expressed some hesitation about the death penalty

. No ot h er p er s o n expressed such he sitation and was lef t unchalleng ed. 12 That is, the State was completely succe ssful in eliminating eve ry potential juror who ha d indicated at some point in the proce ss that he or she had rese rvations about imposing the death penalty . There is n o in di c a tio n in the re c or d th a t a ny no nb la c k p e rs on wh o e xpre sse d h e sit a tio n a bo ut the de a th penalty was lef t unchalleng ed by

the State.

There is furthermor e no indication in the re cord that the prosec ution t ai l ored its questions

re g ar d i n g t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y d e p e n d i n g o n t h e r a c e o f t h e t ar g e t e d v e n i r e p e r s o n ( s )

. N o r d o e s t h is Court observe any manipulative questi oning by the State during voir dire whic h we would de scribe

a s “ tr ic ke ry .” F ina lly , th e re is n oth ing be fo re us to ind ic a te that the pr os e c uto rs in H ard e ma n Co un ty ha ve e ve r f

oll ow e d a sp e c if ic po lic y of sy ste ma tic a lly

e xclu din g Af

ri c a n- Am e ri c a ns fr om j urie s. Certainly , more thoroug h finding s by the trial court upon Defen dant’s B atson objections would have be en helpf

ul in our review of this issue. Howeve r, our c lose and c are ful revie w of the

rec o r d b e f

o r e u s c o n v in c e s u s th a t th e r e is n o b a s is f o r u s to d e te r mi n e th a t th e trial court e rre dB ec au se D efen d an t f ail ed t o o b je ct at t rial t o t he S t ate’s p ere m p t o ry c ha l l en ge s to M s. P i rtl e a nd M s. G i b b s, 13

w e h ol d t h a t D e fe n da n t ha s wa i v e d h i s e qu a l pr ot e c t i on c l a i m a s t o t h e e x c l u s i on of t h e s e v e n i r e pe r s on s

. S e e T e n n

. R. App. P. 36( a) ; J oh n s on , 980 S. W

. 2d a t 419.

-15- during the third step o f t h e B atson ana ly sis. This C ourt has pre viouslyrec og nized that a juror’s

re se rv a tio ns abo ut the de a th p e na lty ma y c on sti tut e a le g iti ma te e xpla natio n f or the Sta te ’s e xer c ise of a pe remptory

strike. S ee Smi th, 893 S.W .2d at 914. As t o the State’s dismissal of Ms. Pruitt , we acknow ledg e that “ne utral explanations that are based on subjec tive assessments, such as the juror ’s demea nor, must be ca

ref ully scrutinized.” State v. C arr oll, 34 S.W .3d 317, 320 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000). We note, howe ver, that defe nse counse l did not in any way indicate during the jury selec tion proce ss that the prosec ution’s de scription of Ms. Pruitt’s conduct in the jury box was inac curate. A potential juror who ve rg es on tea rs and shakes her

head “ no” during voir dire would, we are sur e, prompt many

a trial lawy er to exercise a pere mptory challeng e for leg itimate rea sons. Thus, we a re
c on fiden t th at the tr ia l c ou rt a c c ur a te ly

a sse sse d th e pr os e c uto r’ s c re dib ili ty wi th r e g ardto h is explanations and proper ly determined that, under a ll the circumstanc es, D ef endant ha d not est abl is he d p ur

po se fu l di sc ri min a tio n b y the State in i ts e xer c ise of its pe re mpt ory

c ha lle ng e s. Acc ording ly , we hold that De fenda nt is not entit led to relief on this iss ue.
2. Allegedly Ge nder-based P ere m ptory Challenges

We turn n ow to D e fe nd a nt’ s c la im that th e pr os e c uti on pe re mpt orily c ha lle ng e d M s. Pr e wi tt, Ms. He ard , M s. Mc Ki nn ie
, a nd Ms. F e rg us on be c a us e of the ir g e nd e r. I n J.E. B

. v. Al aba ma e x re l. 13 T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994), the United States Supreme Court he ld that “ g ender
, like rac e, is an

un c on sti tut ion a l pr oxy

fo r j ur or c omp e te nc e and im partia lit y .” We ana ly ze a pa rt y ’s c la im that a p er em p t o ry ch al l en ge is i m p er m i s s i b l y gen d er -b as ed i n t h e sa m e ma n n er as a cl ai m t h at a c h al l en ge is racia lly motivated. See id. at 144-45.

I n i t i al l y , we n o t e t h at De fe n d an tfi rs tl o d ged a B at s o n o b j ec t i o n t o a p er em p t o rych al l en ge by the State upon the prose cution’s re moval of I da F erg uson. By this time in the proce eding s, the Sta te ha d p e re mpt orily

c ha lle ng e d Lind a

Pirtle , G e rt

ru de Gi bb s, a ndJohn ny

Hu ds on . T hu s , the State used three of its first four pe remptory challeng es to remove women fr om the jury . The re cord doe s not indicate the spe cific ba sis for Def endant’ s Batson claim as to Ms. Fe rgu s o n

. No r do the trial

c ou rt ’s fi nd ing s in dic a te a sp e c if ic ru lin g a s to wha t ty

pe of prima fa c ie c a se De fe nd a nt a

pp are ntl y made out. Nev er t h el es s, the trial court determined that the State’s re jection of Ms. F erg uson was pe rm iss ibl e . We se e no thi ng in the re c or d be fo re us to ind ic a te that th e tr ia l c ou rt ’s c on c lus ionin this reg ard w as cle arly

err oneous. The State pe remptorily

challeng ed four

more juror s, three of

them fema le. Thus, of a total of eig ht pere mptory challeng es exercised by the prosec ution, six we re utilized ag ainst female venire perso n s , o r

7 5 %

. H o w e v e r , a s to e a c h o f th e f o u r w o me n p e r e mp to r il y

c h a ll e n g e d a n d to w hich De fe nd a nt lod g e d a Batso n obje c tio n, the State pr of fe re d g e nd e r- ne utr a l re a so ns fo r the ir re mov a l. The trial c ourt obviously determined that the State’s pro ff er ed re asons wer e leg itimate and not

mere ly prete x tual. The rec ord befor e us does not convince us that the trial court thereby err ed. TheW e b a se this c o n c lus io n o n o u r re v ie w o f t h e ju ro rs ’ na m e s listed in the trial c o u rt’s o rd e r o f co n v ic tio n

. 14

D e fen d a n t av e rs in this a p p e a l th a t “[ b ]a se d o n B a rr y W a tkin s’s o w n te stim o n y th a t h e w a s n o t allo w e d to 15

own a gu n a nd t hat an Aggr ava t ed R ob bery was cl ear ed up s eve r al y ear s ea r l i er , one c oul d s ur mi s e t hat t hi s j ur or w as i n f act a co nvi ct ed f

el o n. ” W hi l e we ackno wl ed ge t hat p ers o ns co nvi ct ed o f aggravat ed rob b ery are i nco m p et ent t o s erve as j urors, s ee T enn . C o d e A nn . § 22- 1- 10 2(a) ( 2) ( 19 94 ) , t hi s C our t i s not goi ng t o “ s ur mi s e” t hat M r

. W at ki ns ha s been

con v i ct ed of

s ame a bs en t a n y pr oof i n t h e r ec or d.

-16- jury that tried Def

endant included six fema le jurors. The State had sev en o f i t s pere mptory 14

c ha lle ng e s r e ma ini ng wh e n the jur y wa s e mpane le d. Al l bu t on e of the ve nir e pe rs on s p e re mpt orily

c ha lle ng e d b y

the Sta te a ndto w hic h D e fe nd a nt l od g e d a B a tso n o bje c tio n h ad in di cat e d s ome disinclination to impose the death penalty

. The other person, Ms. Pruitt, had ex hibited a demeanor that cause d the prosec utor to doubt her ability to sit on the jury in a composed ma nner. In sum, we
are sa tis fi e d th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt ’s fi nd ing s o n D e fe nd a nt’ s g e nd e r- ba se d B a tso n c la ims are no t c le arl y
err oneous. Ac cording ly , Def endant is not entitled to relief on this iss ue.

B. T r ial Co ur t’ s R e fusal to Di sm iss Jur orforCa use

Def endant a lso asserts in this appeal that the trial court err ed in r efusing to dismi ss potential jur or B arry Watkin s f

or c a us e . T he Sta te dis a g re e s. During the trial court’s initial questioning of the venire , Mr. B arry Watkins responded that he k n ew s o m et h ing a

bout the case . When asked for the source of his information, Mr. Watkins replied that one of his brothers worke d at the prison whe re the killing occ urre d. Mr. Watkins stated, howeve r, that the information he had obtaine d had not caused him to fo rm an o p i n ion about Def endant’ s g uilt or innocence . Def ense c ounsel subsequently reque sted a sequestere d voir dire of Mr. Watkins, which the trial court gr anted. During this additional voir dire, defense counsel a sked Mr. Watkins if he was a

convicted f

elon. Mr. Watkins re sponded that he had be en ar rested but not

c o n v i c t e d

. H e e x p l a i n e d t h a tm o r e t h a n t w e n t y ye ar s e ar l i e r , h e h a d b e e n arr e s t e d f o r a r o b b e r y. Whil e he w as being held, they arr ested “ the g uy

that did it.” The c harg es ag ainst Mr. Watkins were then dismis s ed

. He wa s under the impre ssion that his arrest wa s still “on re cord” beca use he w as
no t a llo we d to bu y

g un s. 15

Mr. W atkins stated t hat M r. Donald Watkins was his half-brother . Mr. Watkins ex plained that he knew his half-brothe r mig ht be ca lled as a pr osecution witness, but maintained that “that’s all I knew.” His half-br other told him that he would need to a dvise the court of their r elationship. When asked by the court if this relationship would affe ct his judgme nt, Mr. Watkins replied, “I can listen to the facts a nd what’s be en prove n to me. He is my bro t h er b u t h e can be mistaken like any body else.” Mr. Watkins maintained that he would not g ive his relative’ s testimon y anymore
we ig ht o r b e lie va

bil ity than th a t of

the oth e r w itn e ss es. Mr . Wa tki ns tol d th e tr ia l c ou rt that hi s brother ha d not told him what his testimony would be about, or what he claimed the fac ts to be . Mr. Watkins st ated that he had not hea rd De fendant’s name until “today .”-17-

F oll ow ing thi s in div idu a l vo ir dir e , d e fe ns e c ou ns e l mo ve d to strike Mr . Wa tki ns fo r c aus e
on the g ro un ds that “ it’ s to o h ardto o ve rc ome the bia s of y ou r br oth e r te sti fying in the State ’s c a se in chief.” The trial c ourt denied de fense counsel’s r equest. Def endant now contends that the trial

c o u r t ’ s ru l i n g r e s u l t e d i n a v i o l a t i o n o f

h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s t o a f a i r a n d i m p ar t i a l j u r y.

We are initiallyconstraine d to point out that Def endant did not raise this i ssue in his moti on for ne w trial. Ac cording ly , this iss ue has bee n waived. See Tenn. R. App. P. 3(e) (“[I ]n all cases tried by a jury , no issue prese nted for r eview sha ll be predic ated upon e rror in the admission or

e xclu sio n of ev ide nc e , ju ry ins truc tio ns g rante d o r r e fu se d, mis c on du c t of jur or s, pa rt ie s o r c ou ns e l, or other a ction committed or occ urring during the trial of the c ase, or other g round upon which a ne w trial is sought, unless the sa me was spe cifica lly stated in a motion for a n ew t ri al; otherwise suc h iss ue s w ill be tr e a te d a s w a ive d. ” ). Ne ve rthe le ss, be c a us e thi s is a c apit a l c a se , a ndbe c a use this iss ue inv olv e s D e fe nd a nt’ s f un da me nta l c on sti tut ion a l rig hts to a fair a ndimp art ia l ju ry , w e c ho os e to a dd re ss i t onthe me ri ts.

Both the U nited States and Tenne ssee Constitutions g uarantee criminal def endants the right to a trial by

an “impartial jury .” U.S. Const. amend. VI ; T enn. Const. art. I , § 9. “The impartial jury g uara nteed by constitutional provisions is one which is of impartial f rame of mind at the beg inning of tr ia l, i s in fl ue nc e d o nl y by legal a ndc omp e te nt e vid e nc e pr od uc e d d uring tr ia l, andba se s it s verdic t upon evidence connec ting de fendant with the commission of the crime cha rg ed.” State v. L awson, 794 S.W.2d 363, 367 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1 9 9 0 ). To protec t this right, litigants ha ve the rig ht to lodge a

“propte r af

fec tum” challeng e for

cause to a potential juror on the basis that he or she is biased or pre

judiced for

or ag ainst one of the parties. See Toombs v. State, 270 S.W .2d 649, 650 (Tenn. 1954) ; State v. Akins, 867 S.W .2d 350, 355 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993). A propter aff ectum
c ha lle ng e sh ou ld b e up he ld w he re so me bia s o r p art ia lit y is e ith e r a c tua lly

sh ow n to e xist o r i s presumed to e x ist from circumstanc es. Durham v. State, 188 S. W

. 2 d 555, 559 (Tenn. 1945)

. Circumstance s justify ing a presumption of bias include a juror’s willful c oncea lment of “ulterior and pr e jud ic ia l mo tiv e s” ari sin g fr om h is p ri or c on vic tio n a ndprior

inv olv e me nt a s p ro se c uti ng wi tne ss in a ca se very

simil ar to the de fendant’s, see id. at 559, and a juror ’s fa ilure t o disclose a “very close” familial relationship between the juror and the pr osecuting attorney ’s wife
, see Toombs, 270 S.W.2d at 651.

I n this case, the trial court ove rruled de fense counsel’s c halleng e for cause to Mr. Watkins af t erb o t h t h e p ro s ec u t i o n an d d ef en s e co u n s el h ad an o p p o rt u n i t y t o cl o s el y q u es t i o n h i md u ri n g a period of se questere d voir dire a nd afte r the trial c ourt itself probed Mr. Watkins’ impartiality . The tr ia l c ou rt wa s o bv iou sly sa tis fi e d that Mr

. Watkin s’ re la tio ns hip wo uldno t pr e ve nt o r s ub stanti a lly impair the per formanc e of his duties as a juror in ac cordance w ith his instructions and his oath. A determ i n ati on of the qua lifications of a juror rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Howell, 868 S.W.2d 238, 248 (Tenn. 1993). We find no abuse of discre t i o n in the trial court’s r efusa l to ex cuse juror Watkins for cause in this case.

Def endant r elies hea vily

on the Court of C riminal Appea ls’ opinion in State v. Pamplin, 138 S.W. 3d 28 3 (T e nn . Crim . App . 2 00 3) . In th a t c a se , th e de fe nd a nt w a s o n tria l f or a ssa ult ing a c ity-18-

police off icer and re sisting ar

rest. One of the potential juror s was a c ounty deputy sheriff who knew both the assaulted o ff

i ce r and the defendant. The deputy had pre viouslyserve d as a judicia l commissioner for e ight y ear s and his sister-in-law worke d for the district attorney . The de puty was
a me mbe r o f the sa me la w e nf orc e me nt a g e nc y

a s o ne of

the pr os e c uti on ’s prima ry wi tne sse s; ind e e d, the de pu ty

wa s a su bo rd inate e mpl oy e e of that witn e ss. Th e de pu ty re po rt e d f

or jury du ty i n h i s u n i fo rm , i n cl u d i n g h i s b ad ge a n d s i d ea rm

. T h e t ri al co u rt d en i ed t h e d ef en d an t ’s ch al l en ge to e xcu se the de pu ty

fr om j urydu ty

fo r c a us e . B e c a us e the de fe nd a nt h a d e xhaus te d a ll o f h is pere mptory

challeng es, the deputy rema ined on the jury and was subseque ntly elec ted its forema n.

On appe al, the interme diate appe llate court determined that the trial court ha d committed manifest error in refusing to excuse the deputy juror, finding that his “profe ssional relationship and interest in the ca se wa s entirely too close to that of [the State’s witness] and [ the victim] .” I d. at 286. The c ourt noted not only

the re lationship between the deputy and the State’ s witnesses, but the nature of the case (involving an assault on a police office r) and the fac t that the deputy serve d on the jury while in full uniform and we ar i n g his sidearm. I d. The c ourt emphasized that “the jury selec tion proce ss should endeavor

to selec t jurors who are not only fair and i mpartial but are also fre e fr om the suspicion of impartiality .” I d. at 287.
We find the Pamplin case to be r eadily distinguishable from Def endant’ s. The c ombination of fa c tor s p re se nt i n th e Pa mpl in c a se c re a te d a n e g re g iou s se t of cir c ums ta nc e s w hic h a re simply not present in the c ase be fore us. Whi le we c erta inly ag ree that a close familial relationship between

a jur or a nda wi tne ss m a y

g ive ri se to a

su sp ic ionof p art ial it y , w e are re luc ta nt t o c on c lud e that a half-sibling connec tion is sufficient, in and of itself, to raise a presumption of bi as so as to re quire a trial c ourt to g rant a

propter a ffe ctum challeng e. We re cog nize t h at m an y ties of kinship do not result i n close relationships, and we are there fore unwilling to presume any particula r l evel of bias arising from the f

amilial relationship betwee n Mr. W atkins and the State’s wit ness. R ather , we a g ree with Mary land’s hig h court on this point: “Although the r elatio n s h i p o f a juror to one of the wi tne sse s may pr e se nt an op po rtun ity fo r pr e jud ic e , bia s will no t be pr e su me d a ndthe de fe nd a nt i s
no t r e lie ve d o f the bu rd e n o f p re se nti ng fa c ts i n a dd iti on to m e re re la tio ns hip wh ic h w ou ld g ive ri se to a showing of actual prejudice .” Bristow v. State, 219 A.2d 33, 34 (Md. 1966); seealso Bow man v. State, 598 S.W .2d 809, 812 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980) (re cog nizi ng that, when the cha lleng ed juror disclosed her

social re lationship with one of the prosec uting attorney s, “[t] he b u rd en i s on the defe ndant to demonstrate tha t t h e j u ro r wa s in some way biased or pr ejudiced” beca use the prosec uting attorney

testified as a

rebuttal witness).

I n th is c a se , D e fe nd a nt h a s faile d to pr e se nt su ff ic ie nt f a c ts a bo ut j ur or Watkin ’s re la tio ns hip wi th h is h a lf

-b ro the r t o d e mon str a te e ith e r a c tua l pr e jud ic e or that a pr e su mp ti on of

pr e jud ic e is jus tif ie d. Juro r Watki ns wa s f

orthc omi ng abo ut his re la tio ns hip wi th one of the State ’s wi tne sse s. Moreove r, he obviously

convince d the trial court that he could judg e the e vidence in a non-biase d

manner and with no prec onceive d notion of Defenda nt’s g uilt. There is nothing in the re cord be fore us that convince s us that the trial court e rre d in rea ching this conclusion.-19-

Mo re ov e r, a s th is C ou rt

ha s pr e vio us ly he ld, “ the failu re to c or re c tly e xclu de a jur or fo r c aus e is gr ounds for re versa l only if the def

endant e x hausts all of his pere mptory challeng es and an incompetent juror is f

orce d upon him.” Howell, 868 S.W.2d at 248 (emphasis adde d). I n this case, Def endant did, ind eed, exhaust all of his peremptory challeng es, using one of the m to ex cuse Mr

. Watkins. However, we disag ree with D efe ndant that an incompetent juror wa s thereby thrust upon him. Defe ndant ar g ues that “[b]ased on the non-e x clusion of . . . Ba rry Watkins for cause , [he] was fo rc e d to a c c e pt at le a st thr e e (3 ) jur or s th a t w e re inc omp e te nt, bia se d a nd /or no t impa rt ia l” be c aus e they had p ri or knowledg e of the alleg ations ag ainst Defe ndant from the me dia or pe rsonal relationships. Defenda nt particular ly targ ets the jury fore person, Mr. B urroug h, who ac knowledg ed

so me prior famil iari ty wi th the c a se fr om a n a c qu a int a nc e wh o wo rk e d a t the Ha rd e man Count y Correc tional Fac ility

.
Mr. B urrough a nswere d aff irmatively

the trial court’s initial inqui ry as to whethe r he ha d “hea rd or r ead any thing at all about th i s case[.] ” Mr. B urroug h explained that his source of information was a n acquaintance that worked at the prison. Mr. B urroug h stated that the information he had he ard ha d not c aused him to form an opinion a bout D efe ndant’s g uilt or innocence and stated fu rthe r that he wo uldbe able to b a se his ve rd ic t onthe la w ande vid e nc e c ha rg e d b y the tr ia l c ou rt

. Simi larly , jurors Edna B lake a nd Eric B olden indicated that they had eac h g ained some information about the ca se fr om the media and/or “hea rsay at work” prior to trial. Eac h assure d the trial court that they had not formed an opi nion about Defenda nt’s g uilt or innocence based on w hat they had hear d.

Ou r r

ule s o f c ri min a l pr oc e du re pr ov ide that a pr os pe c tiv e jur or

ma y be c ha lle ng e d f

or c aus e wher e
[t ]he prosp ec t i v e juror’ s exposure to potentiallyprejudicia l information makes the pe rson unac cepta ble as a juror. B oth the deg ree of ex p o s u re and the pr os pe c tiv e jur or ’s te sti mon y a s to his or

he r s tate of mi ndsh a ll b e c on sid e re d in determining ac cepta

bility . A prospec ti ve juror w ho states that he or she will be unable to ove rcome prec onceptions shall be subject to c halleng e for cause no matter how slight the e x posure. I f the prospec tive juror has seen or hear d and re members inf orma tio n th a t w ill be de ve lop e d in the c ou rs e of tr ia l, o r that may be ina dmi ssi ble but is not so prejudicia l as t o cre ate a substantial risk that his or her judgme nt will be aff ecte d, the prospective j uror’ s acc eptability shall depend on whether the testimony as to impartiality

is believed. I f the prospe ctive juror a dmit s to having formed an opinion, he or she sha ll be subject to cha lleng e for cause unless the examination sh ow s u ne qu ivo c a lly

that th e pr os pe c tiv e jur or c a n b e imp art ia l.

T en n

. R

. C ri m

. P

. 2 4 (b )( 2 ). T h e r ec o rd re v ea l s t h at d ef en s e c o u n s el m ad e n o at t em p tt o ch al l en ge Mr. B urroug h, Ms. Blake , or Mr. B olden for c ause. A ppare ntly , defe nse counse l determined that none of the se persons was so biased or prejudice d by the information they had hea rd prior to trial a s to j us tif y a fo r- c a us e c ha lle ng e . Y e t, D e fe nd a nt n ow c on ten ds that he wa s f or c e d to a c c e pt the se-20-

“incompetent, biased and/or not impartial” jurors be cause he exerc ised a pe remptory cha l l en ge
a g a ins t Mr . Wa tki ns

.
Def endant f ai l s t o explain how these jurors’ mild familiarity with the case prior to trial rende red the m incompetent as juror s. Defe ndant has de monstrated neither partiality on the part of any of t hese jurors, nor any prejudice that he suff

ere d as a r esult of any

of these thr ee pe rsons sitting on the jury . “Juror bias must be shown, not just sus pecte d.” L awson, 794 S.W.2d a t 367 (citing Smit h v. Phill ips, 455 U.S. 209 (1982)). We ar e not per suaded that any of these three j u rors was “incompete nt” as re quired by Howell. Def endant has simplyfailed to de monstrate that he is e ntitled to a new trial on the basis of the tria l court’s re fusal to di smiss Barry Watkins for cause

. Acc ording ly , Def

endant is not entitled to relief on this iss ue.
II. Mandatory Revie w

When a defendant has been sentence d to death, we must conduct a mandatory revie w of the

s e n te n c in g p r o c e s s p u r s u a n t to T e n n e s s e e Co d e A n n o tate d s e c ti o n 3 9

- 1 3

- 2 0 6 ( c ) ( 1 ) ( 2 0 0 3 )

. That provision of our criminal code require s us to determine w hether a) the death se ntence was imposed in any arbit ra ry fa s h ion; b) the evidenc e supports the jury ’s finding of statutory ag g ravating circ umstances; c) the evidenc e supports the jury ’s finding that the ag gra v at i n g circ umstances
ou tw e ig h a ny mit ig a tin g c ir c ums ta nc e s; andd) the se nte nc e of de a th i s e xce ssi ve or

dis pr op ortio nate to the pe na lty

imp os e d in sim ila

r c a se s, c on sid e ri ng bo th the natur e of the c ri me a ndthe de fe nd a nt. I d.

A. Im position of Death P enalty

I nit ia lly , w e fi nd that the se nte nc ing ph a se of De fe nd a nt’ s tria l w a s c on du c te d p ur su a nt t o the proc edure established in the applica ble statutory

provisions and rules of c riminal proce dure. Acc ording ly , we c onclude that the de ath pena lty was not imposed in an ar bitrary fashion.

B. Su ff iciency of Aggravating Circum stances

We turn now to the sufficie ncy of the e vidence supporting t h e j u ry ’s finding of statutory ag g ravating c ircumstance s. I n this case, the jury determined that the State had p ro v en b ey ond a

rea sonable doubt four ag g ravating circ umstances: (a) Def endant wa s previously

convicted of

one or more f elonies, other tha n the present char g e, whose statutory elements invol ve the use of violence to the pe rs on ; ( b) De fe nd a nt’ s mu rd e r o f the vic tim wa s e sp e c ia lly

he ino us , atr oc iou s, or

c ru e l in th a t it in v o lv e d to r tu r e o r s e r io u s p h y s ic a l a b u s e b e y o n d th a t n e c e s s ar y to p r o d u c e d e a th ; ( c) De fe nd a nt c omm itt e d th e mur de r w hil e he wa s in la wf ul c us tod y

or in a pla c e of

la wf ul c on fi ne me nt; and (d) the murder wa s committed ag ainst a cor rec tions employ ee w ho was e ng ag ed in the perf ormanc e of officia l duties. See Tenn. Code A nn. § 39-13-204( i)(2), ( 5), (8) , (9) ( Supp. 1999). We must now review the e vidence supporting e ach of these ag g ravating c ircumstance s in the light most favora

ble to the State and de termine whe ther a ra t i o n al trier of

fac t could have f

ound the exis tence of ea ch bey ond a re asonable doubt. State v. Ba ne, 57 S.W.3d 411, 426 (Tenn. 2001).-21- 1. P r ior Co nvi c ti ons During the sentenc ing pha se of De fendant’s trial, the State introduce d by s t i p u l ati on three

certified judg ments ag ainst Defe ndant. These documents indicate that judgme nts of conviction wer e
e ntere d a g a ins t D e fe nd a nt i n 1 98 6 f or fi rs t de g re e mur de r; in 1 99 2 f or fi rs t de g re e mur de r; a ndin 1998 for c riminal attempt to commit first degr ee mur der. Obviously , the statutory elements of the felony of first deg ree murder involve the use of violenc e to the per son. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 13-202(a ). This Court has furthe r held that the statutory elements of attempted murde r involve the

u s e o f v i o l e n c e t o t h e p e r s o n

. S t a t e v

. C r i b b s , 9 6 7 S

. W

. 2 d 7 7 3 , 7 8 2

- 8 3 ( T e n n

. 1 9 9 8 )

. A c c o r d i n g l y,
we ho ld th at th e e vid e nc e is s uf fi c ie nt t o s up po rt

the jury ’s fi nd ing of

the e xiste nc e of

thi s ag g ravating c ircumstance . See Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-13- 204(i)(2) (Supp. 1999).
2. Especially Hein ous, Atrocious, or Cr uel
The jury determined that Def

endant’ s murder of Steed was espec ially heinous, atroc ious, or

crue l i n th a t i t i n v o lv e d to r tu r e o r s e r io u s p h y s ic a l a

b u s e b e y o n d th a t n e c e s s ar y to p r o d u c e d eath. Se e id. a t ( i) (5 ). Th is a g g ra vatin g c ir c ums ta nc e ma y be app lie d if

the e vid e nce i s su ffi cie nt t o support either tortur e or se rious phy sical abuse bey ond that nece ss ar y t o p roduce death. State v. Suttl es, 30 S.W.3d 252, 262 (Tenn. 2000).

This Court ha s defined “ serious phy sical abuse bey ond that nece ssary to produce death” as fo llo ws :

The wor d “serious” alludes to a matter o f d egr ee. The abuse must be phy sical, as op po se d to me nta l, a nd it mus t be “ be y on d that” or mor e than wh a t is “ ne c e ssa ry to produce death.” “Abuse ” is define d as an a ct that is “excessive” or which makes “improper

use of a thing,” or which uses a thing “in a manne r contra ry to the natura l or leg al rules f

or its use.”

State v. Odom, 928 S.W .2d 18, 26 (Tenn. 1996) (quoting Bla ck’s L aw Dictionary 11 (6th ed. 1990))

. The proof in this case established that Def endant stabbed Steed a total of thirty -six times. Twelve of the wounds wer e fata l. Dr. Smit h testified that Def endant’ s infliction of so many wounds to the victim qua lified for application of the term “over kill.” H e explained: “ther e wa s excessive injury done to the body

far in excess of what would be nece ssary to cause death.” The proof is more than sufficie nt to support the jury ’s finding of this ag g ravating c ircumstance

.
3. Defendan t in Law fu l Custody
The proof at trial that Def

endant wa s in lawful custody or in a plac e of la wful conf inement

a t th e tim e he kil le d St e e d is c le ar andun c on tr ov e rt e d. Th e e vid e nc e is ther e fo re su ff ic ie nt t o support the jury ’s finding of this ag g ravating circumstance

. See Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-13- 204(i)(8) (Supp. 1999).-22- 4. Co r r e c ti ons Em plo ye e Vi c ti m

The re cord in this case contains a copy of t he jury ’s ver dict form which inc ludes the written jury ins truc tio ns pr ov ide d to the jury by the tr ia l c ou rt . T he se ins truc tio ns inf orme d the jury that it could apply

as an a g g ravating c ircumst an ce t h at “[t] he murde r wa s committed ag ainst any law enforce m en t office r, cor

rec tions official, cor

rec tions employ ee, e ng ag ed in the performanc e of officia l duties.” The verdict form returne d by the j ury contains a handwritten finding by the jury that it applie d as an a g g ravating c ircumstance that “the murde r wa s committed ag ainst any law enfor ceme nt office r, cor

rec tions official, cor

rec tions employ ee, e ng ag ed in t h e p er formanc e of officia l duties.”

Th e writt e n ins truc tio n pr ov ide d to the jury on thi s a g g ra vatin g c ir c ums ta nc e wa s e rr on e ou s. Ou r c ri min a l c od e pr ov ide s th a t the fa c t- fi nd e r ma y c on sid e r a s a n a g g ra vatin g c ir c ums ta nc e that

[t ]he murder wa s committed a g ainst any law enf orce ment office r, cor

rec tions officia l, corre ctions employ ee, e merg ency medical or

re s cue worker , emer g ency medical tec hnician, par amedic or firef ighter, who was e ng ag ed in the performanc e of off icial duties, and the defe ndant knew or reasonably should have known that such

v ic ti m w a s a

la w e n f o r c e me n t o f

f ic e r , c o r r e c ti o n s o f

f ic ia l, c o rr e c ti o n s e mploy ee,
emer g ency

medical or

resc ue wor

ker, e merg ency

medical tec hnician, par amedic or fi re fi g hte r e ng a g e d in the pe rf orma nc e of

of fi c ia l du tie s.

I d. at (i)( 9) (empha sis added). The trial court’ s written instruction to the jury in this case omitted the e le me nt r e qu ir ing that De fe nd a nt kn e w or re a so na bly sh ou ld ha ve kn ow n that the vic tim wa s a law enf orce ment office r, corr ections officia l, or corr ections employ ee eng ag ed in the performanc e of of fi c ia l du tie s.

De fe nd a nt d id n ot r a ise thi s is su e a t tria l, in his mot ionfo r n e w t ri a l, o r o n a

pp e a l. Neve rtheless, this Court will review a patently incomplete instruction at a capital se ntencing hearing under the “plain er

ror” doctrine, r eg ardle ss of a defenda nt’s failure to raise the issue. See State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W .2d 530, 554 (Tenn. 1994) ; see a lso St ate v. Hine s, 758 S.W .2d 515, 523 (Tenn. 1988) (c hara cterizi ng as “pla in error ” the tria l court’s i n co m p l ete inst ructions on two of thre e ag g ravating c ircumstance s found bythe jury ). This Court will grant relief unde r the plain e rror doctri n e o n l y

“whe re ne cessa

ry to do substantial just ice.” Tenn. R. Crim. P. 52(b). As we ha ve state d p re vio us ly , “ the e rr or mus t be of

su c h a g re a t mag nitud e that it pr ob ably c ha ng e d th e ou tc ome of the trial.” State v. Faulkner, 154 S.W .3d 48, 58 (Tenn. 2005) . An appe llate court will reverse for plain e rr or

on ly if :
(a ) the re c or d .

. . c le arl y

e sta bli sh [es ] wh a t oc c ur

re d inthe tr ia l c ou rt ; (b ) a c le ar andun e qu ivo c a l rule of la w [h a s] be e n b re a c he d; (c ) a su bs ta nti a l r ig ht o f the a c c us e d [ha s] be e n a dv e rs e ly a ff e c te d; (d) the a ccuse d did not waive the issue f or tac tical re asons; and (e) consideration of the err or is “nec essary to do substantial just ice.”-23-

State v. Smit h, 24 S.W .3d 274, 282 (Tenn. 2000) (quoting State v. Adkisson, 899 S.W .2d 626, 641- 42 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994)). All f ive fac tors must be established and an appellate court ne ed not consider a ll five fac tors if any one fa ctor indicates that relief is not warranted. I d. at 283.

I n th is case , th e pr oo f a

t tria l w a s u nc on tr ov e rt e d th a t D e fe nd a nt kne w the vic tim wa s a
corr ections employ ee: indee d, Def endant c o mmit

te d th emu r d e r

b e c a u s eo f th ev ictim’s performance in that role. The pr oof at trial wa s further uncontrove rted that De fendant knew the victim was eng ag ed in the per formanc e of his official duties when D efe ndant brutally stabbed him to death. Def endant told Mr. Duna way that he approa ched the victim during a counseling session only to be ig no re d. At

that po int , D e fe nd a nt d e te rm ine d to kil l th e vic tim

.
The trial c ourt’s err or in its written instruction to the jury on this ag g ravating c ircumstance is analog ous to that committ ed whe n a trial court omits fr om its instructions an esse ntial element of

a n o ff e ns e . In St ate v. Ga

rriso n, 40 S.W. 3d 42 6, 43 3 ( Te nn . 2 00 0) , th e tr ia l c ou rt omi tte d f ro m it s char ge o n e of the mens r ea e lements of the indicted of fense . This Court found the err oneous instruction harmless bey ond a re asonable doubt because proof o f t h e omi tted element wa s not contested at trial and wa s essentially conce ded by

the def endant. I d. at 435; see a lso Neder v. United S tates, 52 7 U .S. 1, 18 -2 0 ( 19 99 ) ( fi nd ing tr ia l c ou rt ’s failu re to i ns truc t on a n e le me nt o f o ff e ns e harmless be y ond a re asonable doubt where omitted element was supported by u ncontrove rted

ev i d en ce ). T h e s am e r e s u l t o b t ai n s h er e f o r t h e s am e r ea s o n : De fe n d an tad m i t t ed h i s k n o wl ed ge of the victim’s employ ment and that the victim was eng ag ed in offic ial duties at the time Def endant killed him. Thus, the i nstructional error did not adver sely aff ect a substantial rig ht of the a ccuse d.

F inally , g ive n th e natur e of the pr oo f i n th is c a se , w e are c on vin c e d b e y on d a re a so na ble doubt that the jury would have found and applied this a g g ravating circ umstance ha d it rece ived the

corr ect instruction. Theref ore, Defe ndant s uffe red no prejudice as a result of the t rial court’s err or
a nd we ne e d no t re ve rs e his se nte nc e of de a th in or de r to “ do su bs ta nti a l jus tic e .” De fe nd a nt i s entitled to no r el i ef

on the basis of the tria l court’s instructional e rror on this ag g ravating circ umstance.

C. Aggravating Circum stances Outweigh Mitigating Circum stances

After the close of

the State’s proof during the sentenc ing pha se of De fendant’s trial, and while the jury

was out, the trial c ourt questioned De fendant about his deci s i o n reg arding the prese ntation of proof of mitigating circ umstances. Def endant stated that he did not want his lawy ers to p re se nt any

pr oo f o f m iti g a tin g c ir c ums ta nc e s. F urthe rm or e , De fe nd a nt c ho se no t to te sti fy on his own beha lf during the sentenc ing phase. Ac cording ly , the def ense pr esente d no proof during the sentenc ing pha se of De fenda nt’s trial of any mitigating circ umstances that mig ht countera ct the State’s proof of ag g ravating circumstance s. The only proof in the nature of mitigating c ircumstance s prese nted during the g uilt phase of Defe ndant’s trial wa s Defe ndant’s testimony about how the victim had treated him.-24-

We conclude that the State’s proof of ag g ravating c ircumstance s outweig hs any mitigating

c ir c ums ta nc e s b e y on d a

re a so na ble do ub t.

D. P roportionality

We turn now to our ana ly sis of whether t h e s en t en ce imposed in this case is excessive or d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e t o t h e p e n a l t y i m p o s e d i n s i m i l ar c a s e s

. T h i s r e v i e w i d e n t i f i e s ab e rr a n t , ar

b i tr ar y,
or ca pricious sentenc ing by

dete rm i ning w hether

the death sentence is “‘disproportionate to the punishment imposed on others convicted of the same c rime.’” State v. Bla nd, 958 S.W .2d 651, 662 (Tenn. 1997) (quoting Pulley v. Har ris, 465 U.S. 37, 42-43 (1984))

. We be g in w ith the presumption that a death sentence is proportional with the crime of first deg ree murder. State v. Hall, 976 S.W .2d 121, 135 (Tenn. 1998)

.
I n conducting this review, we employ the pre cede nt-seeking method of compa rative pr op ortio na lit y

re vie w, in w hic h w e c omp are thi s ca se wi th o the r c a se s in vo lvi ng sim ila r d e fe nd a nts
a ndsim ila

r c ri me s. Se e B la nd
, 95 8 S.W. 2d a t 66 5- 67

. Whil e no de fe nd a nts or c ri me s a re ide nti c a l,

a de a th s e nte nce i s dispr op ortio nate if a c a se is “ plainl y

la c kin g in c ir c ums ta nc e s c on sis te nt w ith those in case s where the death penalty has been imposed.” I d. at 668. Our inquiry , howeve r, does not require a f

in d in g th a t “ a

s e n te n c e le s s th a n d e a thw a s n e v e r imp o s e d in a

c a s e w ith s im il ar
c ha ra c te ri sti c s. ” I d. a t 665. Th is Cou rt ha s r e pe a te dly he ld that th e po ol o f c a se s c on sid e re d b y thi s Court in its proportionality revie w i ncludes “those first deg ree murder c ases in which the State seeks the death penalty , a capital sentenc ing hearing is he ld, and the sente ncing jury determines whether the sentence s h o u l d b e life imprisonment, life imprisonment without the possibili ty of par ole, or death.” State v. Reid, 164 S.W .3d 286, 316 (Tenn. 2005)

.
I n revie wing the applicable pool of case s, we consider numerous fac tors reg arding t he offe nse: 1) the means of death; (2) the manner of death; (3) the motivation for the killing; (4) the place of death; (5) the victim’s ag e, phy sical condition, and psy cholog ical condition; (6) the a bsence or pre sence of premeditation; (7) the absenc e or prese nce of provocation; (8) the abse nce or prese nce of justification; and (9) the injury to and ef fec t upon non-dec edent victims. Bla nd, 958 S.W .2d at 667. I n addition, we conside r num er o u s fa ctors about the defe ndant: (1) prior criminal re cord or acti v i t y ; (2 ) age , rac e, and g ender ; (3) mental, e motional, and phy sical condition; (4) role in the murder; ( 5) coope ration with authorities; (6) le v el o f remorse; (7) knowle dg e of the victim’s helplessness; and ( 8) potential for reha bilitation. I d.; see a lso Bane , 57 S.W .3d at 428-29 .

I n this case, the inc arc erated De fendant armed himself w ith a wea pon he had c reated sp e c if ic a lly to us e a g a ins t a no the r hu ma n be ing
, wa lke d up be hin d th e se a te d a ndun arm e d v ic tim
, a cor rec tions counsel o r, and began repe atedly stabbing him, aiming initially for the vic tim’s vital org ans. De fenda nt stabbed the victim thirty -six times; twe lve of the wounds we re le thal. Def endant

c omm itt e d th e kil lin g int e nti on a lly a ndwi th p re me dit a tio n. De fe nd a nt kill e d t he vi cti m be c aus e he felt the victim ha d “disrespe cted” him. The victim was fifty -seve n y ear s old. Defe ndant killed Mr. Steed while he was e ng ag ed in hi s officia l duties. Def endant has expressed no remorse for the killing; indeed, De fend an t has made clea r that he w ould commit the kill ing a g ain if g iven the-25-

op po rtun ity . Prior

to the ins ta nt mur de r, De fe nd a nt ha d kil le d tw o oth e r p e rs on s a nda tte mpt e d to kill a third person. De fenda nt has demonstrate d no potential for r ehabilitation.

I n St a te v. Tay lor , 7 71 S.W. 2d38 7, 40 1( Te nn . 1 98 9) , th is C ou rt a ff ir me d a sen te nc e of

de a th afte r the de fenda nt was convic ted of the f irst deg ree mur d er o f a p rison g uard. In Tay lor, the defe ndant was inc arc erated at the Turne y Center. The defe ndant believe d he had be en tre ated unfairly b y

Correc tions Office r Moore on sever al occ asions. On the day of the killing, O ffice r Moore r eprimande d the def endant f or fa iling to prope rly

clea n an ar ea, and this incident ang ere d the defe ndant. L ater

that day
, the defe ndant approa ched Offic er Moor e fr om behind as the off icer was talking to some inmate s, g rabbe d him, a nd beg an stabbing him r epeatedly with a prison-made knife. Despite plea s from other i n m at es t o cea se his attack, the defe ndant continued to stab the of fice r, brandishing his weapon at those who tried to come to Moor e’s aid. The jury sentenc ed the de fendant to death on the ba sis of four a g g ravating c ircumstan ce s : (1 ) the def endant ha d previously

been convicted of

a fe lony that involved the use or thr eat of v i o lence to the person; (2) the murder was espec ially heinous, atroc ious, or crue l in that it involved torture or depra vity of mind; (3) the murde r
wa s c omm itt e d b y

the de fe nd a nt wh ile he wa s in la wf ul c us tod y or in a pla c e of

la wf ul c on fi ne me nt; and (4) the murder

was c ommitt ed ag ainst a cor rec ti o n s em p l oy ee, w ho was e ng ag ed in the per f o r man c e o f h is d u ti e s , a n d th e d e f e n d a n t k n e w th a t th e v ic ti m w a s a c o rr e c ti ons employ ee eng ag ed in the per formanc e of his duties. I d. at 392. This Court upheld t he death sentenc e. I d. at 401.

I n St a te v. He nd e rs on , 2 4 S. W.3 d 3 07 , 31 0 (T e nn

. 20 00 ), the de fe nd a nt mur de re d a de pu ty by shooting him in the bac k of the he ad during an esc ape attempt. Whil e inca rce rate d, the def

endant ha d h is g ir lf

ri e ndsmu g g le to h im a

ha nd g un . T he de fe nd a nt the n arr a ng e d f or a vis it t o a de nti st. Whil e a wa iti ng tr e a tme nt, the de fe nd a nt p ull e d t h e ha nd g un , th re a te nin g the de nti st andhis a ssi sta nt. The de ntist called for help, and the de puty , who had be en in the re ception ar ea, r esponded. The defe ndant fire d at the deputy , g razing him wi t h a gu n s hot. The deputy fell and struc k his head, rende ring him unc onscious. The de fendant left the treatment room, but then returne d and fire d a shot into the back of

the unmoving de puty ’s hea d at point blank rang e, killing him. The de fendant then

esca ped, only to be appr ehende d a short time later . The de fen d an t p l ed gu i lty to first deg ree pr e me dit a te d mu rd e r andwa ive d a jury a s to his se nte nc ing

. I d. a t 31 1. Th e tr ia l c ou rt su bs e qu e ntl y imposed the death se ntence on the basis of four ag g ravating circ umstances: (1) that the def endant knowing ly

cre ated a g reat risk of dea t h t o t wo or more persons, other than the victim murdere d, d u ri n g t h e a ct o f m u rd er ; (2 ) t h at t h e de fe n d an t co m m i t t ed t h e mu rd er fo r th e pu rp o s e of av o i d i n g, interfe ring with, or preve nting a lawful a rre st or prosec ution of the defe ndant or a nother; (3) that the defe ndant committed the murder wh i l e in l awf ul custody

or in a plac e of la wful conf inement or during the def

endant’ s esc ap e fr o m same; and (4) the murder was c ommitt ed ag ainst any law enfor ceme nt office r who wa s eng ag ed in the performanc e of officia l duties. I d. at 312. This Court aff irmed the de fenda nt’s sentenc e of de ath. I d. at 319.

I n State v. Sutton, 761 S .W.2d 7 6 3 , 7 64 (Tenn. 1988) , the def endant wa s convicted of

the first deg ree murder of a fe llow inmate. The State’s pr oof indicate d that the def endant ha d stabbed the victim multiple times w ith a prison-made knife afte r the victim ha d sold h i m u n s at i s fac tory-26-

marijuana . The jury

found and a

pplied three ag g ravating c i rc u m s t an ce s: (1) the de fendant was previously

convicted of

one or more fe lonies involving the use or threat of violence to the person; (2) the mur der w as espe cially heinous, atroc ious, or cruel i n that it involved torture or de pravity of min d; a nd (3 ) the de fe nd a nt c omm itt e d the mur de r wh ile he wa s in a pla c e of la wf ul c on fi ne me nt. I d. This Court affirme d the death sentence . I d.

This Court has upheld the death penalty in nume rous case s wher e the sol e agg ravating circ umstance w as the de fenda nt’s prior conv i ct i o n of a violent fe lony offe nse. See, e .g ., State v. McKinney , 74 S.W .3d 291 (Tenn. 2002) (up h o lding de ath sentenc e of de fendant convicted of pr e me dit a te d mu rd e r f

or sh oo tin g a ndkil lin g a n o ff -dut y po li ce of

fi c e r at ni g ht c lub wh e re so le

a g g ra vatin g c ir c ums ta nc e wa s b a se d o n d e fe nd a nt’ s p ri or c on vic tio n of ag g ra vate d rob be ry ); State v. Chalmers, 28 S.W.3d 913 (Tenn. 2000) (uphol d i n g d ea th sentence of def endant c onvicted of felony murder for shoot ing and ki lling victim during robber y wher e sol e ag g ravating c ircumstance was ba sed on def

endant’ s prior convic tions of attempted espe cially ag g ravated robbe ry

and

a tte mpt e d f

ir st d e g re e mur de r) ; State v. Ke ou g h, 18 S.W. 3d17 5 ( Te nn . 2 00 0) (u ph old ing de a th sentenc e of de fenda nt convicted of preme ditated murder

for stabbing and killing e strang ed wife during arg ument wher e agg ravating c ircumstance was ba sed on def endant’ s prior convic tions for assault to commit voluntary manslaug hter and manslaug hter); St ate v. Smit h, 993 S.W .2d 6 (Tenn. 1999) (upholding death se ntence of def endant c onvicted of felony murder for shoot ing and killing victim during r obbery

wher e ag g ravating c ircumstance was based on defe ndant’s prior c onvictions of ro bb e ry a ndfi rs t de g re e mur de r) ; State v. Ad kin s, 72 5 S.W. 2d 66 0 (T e nn . 1 98 7) (u ph old ing de a th sentenc e of de fenda nt c onvicted of first deg ree murder f or shooting and killing estra ng ed g irlfriend’ s friend w here ag g ravating circ umstance was based on defe ndant’s prior c onvictions of second de g ree murder and ag g ravated assault). As this Court has fr equently stated, this ag g ravating c ircumstance is “ mor e qu a lit a tiv e ly pe rs ua siv e a nd ob je c tiv e ly re lia

ble than o the r[]” a g g ra vatin g c ir c ums ta nc e s. Howell, 868 S.W.2d at 261.

Th is C ou rt

ha s als o uph e ld num e ro us de a th se nte nc e s whe re the de fe nd a nt s ta bb e d to de a th the victim and the jury

applied the heinous, atroc ious, or crue l ag g ravating c ircumstance . See, e.g ., Reid, 164 S.W .3d at 296-97 (upholding two death sentence s upon defe ndant’s convic tions for two preme ditated murder s where defe ndant stabbed vic tim s t o d ea t h in course of robbery , and jury applied as a g g ravating circ umstances defe ndant’s previous violent f elonies, that the murde rs wer e espec ially heinous, atroc ious, or crue l in that they involved torture or

serious phy sical abuse bey ond that ne c e ssa

ry to p ro du c e de a th, a ndthat th e mur de rs we re c omm itt e d to a vo id p ro se c uti on ); Sut tle s, 30 S.W .3d at 260 (upholding death se ntence of def endant c onvict ed o f pre meditated murde r for multipl e stabbing death of estrang ed g irlfriend and jury found as a g g ravating c ircumstance s that the

mur de r w a s e sp e c ia lly

he ino us , atr oc iou s, or c ru e l in th a t it inv olv e d to rtur e or

se ri ou s p hy sic a l a

bu se bey ond that nece ssar y to cause death a nd that defe ndant was pr eviously convicted of

violent felonies) ; State v. Bush, 942 S.W.2d 489 (Te nn. 1997) (upholding death se ntence upon defe ndant’s conviction of pre meditated murde r for stabbing victim forty -three tim es , killing her , and jury de te rm ine d the mur de r to ha ve be e n he ino us , a tr oc iou s, or c ru e l a nd c omm itt e d to avoid prosec ution); St ate v. Hine s, 919 S.W .2d 573 (Tenn. 1995) (uph o l d i ng death se ntence upon de fe nd a nt’ s c on vic tio n o f f e lon y mur de r i n p e rp e tr a tio n o f ro bb e ry wh e re de fe nd a nt s ta bb e d v ic tim-27-

to death in such a manner

as to justify

heinous, atroc ious, or crue l ag g ravator; jury also applied prior vio le nt f e lon y a g g ra vator ); Sta te v. Pa y ne , 7 91 S .W .2 d 10 (Te nn . 1 99 0) (u ph old ing tw o d e a th sentenc es upon def

endant’ s convictions of t wo first degr ee mur ders whe re de fendant stabbed mother and y oung d au gh t er m ultiple tim es and jury applied heinous, atrocious, or c ruel a g g ravating circ umstance) ; State v. J ones, 789 S.W.2d 545 (Tenn. 1990) (upholding death s en tence upon defe n d an t’s first deg ree murder c onviction for stabbing victim mult iple times during c ourse of robbery and jury applied prior violent f

elonies; heinous, atroc ious, or crue l; and fe l o ny murder

a g g ra vatin g c ir c ums ta nc e s) ; S tat e v. Th omp so n, 76 8 S. W.2 d 2 39 (T e nn . 1 98 9) (u ph old ing de a th sentenc e upon def

endant’ s conviction of first de g ree murder f or stabbing victim to death whe re jury applied heinous, atrocious, or c ruel a g g ravating c ircumstance toge ther with ag g ravators for committing t h e m u rder to avoid prosec ution and committing the murde r during a robbe ry or kidnapping ); Sta t e v

. West, 767 S .W.2d 387, 391 (Tenn. 1989) (upholding two death se ntence s wher e def endant involved in stabbing two victims to d ea t h
, involving “torture wounds,” and jury applied he i nous, atrocious, or c ruel; murder committed to avoid prosecution; and f elony murder ag g ravating c ircumstance s).

CO NC LU SION

I n acc ordanc e with Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 39-13-206(c )(1 ) an d the principles adopted in prior decisions, we have considered the e ntire re cord in this case and conc lude that the sentenc e of death has not been imposed arbitra rily
, that the evidenc e supports the jury ’s finding that the a g g ra vatin g c ir c ums ta nc e s ou tw e ig h a ny mit ig a tin g c ir c ums ta nc e s be y on d a re a so na ble do ub t, and that the se ntence is not ex cessive or disproportionate.

We have r eviewe d all of the issues raised by Def endant a nd conclude that they do not warr ant relief . Wit h respe ct to issues that were rais ed i n t h is Court but not addre ssed in this opini on, we aff irm the dec ision of the Court of Cri m i n al Ap p ea l s . Relevant portions of that opinion ar e inc or po rate d he re in a nd are a tta c he d a s a n app e nd ix. De fe nd a nt’ s c on vic tio n a ndse nte nc e of de a th

are aff irmed. The se ntence of death sh al l b e carried out as pr ovided by law on the 15 day

of th Aug ust, 2006, u n l es s o t h er wi se orde red by this Court or other proper authority . I t appea ring that Def endant Stephen L

y nn Hug ueley

is indigent, c osts of this appeal ar e taxed to the State of Tenne ssee.

_________________________________ CO RN ELI A A . CLAR K, JUSTI CE