J. S53031/17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: S.G., A MINOR :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

:

APPEAL OF: F.J.T., III, FATHER : No. 1189 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Order Entered March 24, 2017,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Carbon County

Domestic Relations Division at No. CP-13-DP-0000002-2017

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., OLSON, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. 

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED NOVEMBER 28, 2017

F.J.T., III (“Father”), appeals from the permanency review order 

entered March 24, 2017, in the Court of Common Pleas of Carbon County by 

the Honorable Joseph J. Matika, which continued placement of his minor 

child, S.G. (“the Child”), a female born in April of 2003.1 After careful 

review, we affirm.

By way of background, on October 7, 2016, the Child was evaluated at 

Gnaden Huetten Memorial Hospital due to injuries to her face and suicidal 

ideation. The Child told hospital staff that Father caused the injuries, and 

alleged child abuse report was made to Childline. A psychiatrist evaluated 

the Child, and determined the Child needed inpatient psychiatric care, but no

beds were available at the time. The Child remained in the emergency 

 

1 F.P. (“Mother”) was incarcerated at the time of the permanency review 

hearing. In the instant appeal, Mother, through counsel, filed a joint brief 

with CYS and the guardian ad litem for the Child.
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department until she was discharged to Mother on October 11, 2016 

because CYS requested the Child not be discharged to Father. The Child 

remained in Mother’s care until January 9, 2017, when there was a physical 

altercation between the Child and Mother, which led to Mother’s 

incarceration. The Child was removed from Mother’s home, at Mother’s 

request, and placed with a friend in Coaldale until CYS took custody of the 

Child on January 17, 2017. The trial court summarized the relevant 

procedural and/or factual history from the time CYS took custody of the 

Child as follows:

On January 17, 2017, the Carbon County Office of 

Children and Youth Services [“CYS”] sought and was 

granted an [“]Order of Court to take the Child into 

Emergency Shelter Care[”] based upon a call from 

Father that he believed the Child needed to be 

placed into a diagnostic facility for treatment of a 

mental health issue. That [o]rder placed the Child at 

Youth Services Agency [“CYA”,] pending an 

Emergency Shelter Care Hearing which eventually 

occurred on January 18, 2017. At that hearing, it 

was determined that the Child be continued in 

Emergency Shelter Care at [CYA,] pending an 

acceptance and placement into a diagnostic setting. 

Thereafter, [CYS] sought placement for the Child in 

such a setting while filing a Dependency Petition on 

January 19, 2017, alleging that the Child was 

“without proper parental care or control” as that 

term is defined.

On February 27, 2017, this [c]ourt conducted a 

Dependency Hearing and[,] after taking testimony, 

adjudicated the Child a dependent child on the basis 

that the Child was “without proper care or control, 

subsistence, education as required by law, or other 

care or control necessary for [her] physical, mental 

or emotional health, or morals.” This [c]ourt further 
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ordered that the Child remain in a residential facility.

However, it directed [CYS] to schedule an “early”

Dependency Review Hearing after both sides had an 

opportunity to review a psychological report from 

Dr. Abdo G. Saba, M.D., which was referenced in the 

dependency hearing, but had not yet been obtained 

by Counsel for [CYS].

As a result, a Dependency Review Petition was filed 

on March 7, 2017. The basis for this was to review 

the placement of the Child, consider the report of 

Dr. Saba and determine an appropriate disposition of 

the Child’s placement going forward.

Trial court opinion, 5/10/17 at 1-3 (footnotes omitted).

On March 24, 2017, the trial court held an initial permanency review 

hearing. At that hearing, the trial court heard testimony from Jill Geissinger, 

who is a CYS case supervisor, and the Child. Father also testified on his own 

behalf. That same day, the trial court entered an order continuing the 

Child’s dependency. Father timely filed a notice of appeal and a concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). The trial court filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion 

on May 10, 2017.

Father now raises the following issues for our review, which we have 

re-ordered for ease of disposition. 

[1.] Whether the trial court erred by not returning 

the Child to Father’s custody when [CYS] 

provided no evidence of [Father’s] unfitness or 

that the Child remained “without proper 

parental care and control” and finding that 

placement continued to be “necessary and 

appropriate[?]”
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[2.] Whether the [trial] court erred in finding that 

the Child’s placement was appropriate when 

[CYS] failed in its duty to ensure that the 

Child’s educational, behavioral[,] and mental 

health needs are met[?]

[3.] Whether the trial court erred by not returning 

the Child to Father’s custody when it was the 

least restrictive means of providing protection 

for the minor Child, contrary to the mandates 

of the Child Protective Services Law[,

]23 Pa.C.S.[A] § 6301 et seq.[,] and the 

Juvenile Act[, ]42 Pa.C.S.[A]. § 6301 

et seq.[?]

[4.] Whether the [trial] court erred in granting the 

recommendations of [CYS] in that the 

recommendations are contrary to the Juvenile 

Act[, ]42 Pa.C.S.[A] § 6301[,] and specifically 

[S]ection 6301(b)(1)[,] in that one of the 

purposes of the [Juvenile] Act is to preserve 

the unity of the family whenever possible[?]

[5.] Whether the trial court erred by finding that 

[CYS] exercised reasonable efforts to preserve 

or reunify the family when there was 

undisputed evidence that no services were 

made available nor were reunification efforts 

made by [CYS?]

[6.] Whether the trial court erred in finding Father 

made minimal progress toward alleviating the 

circumstances[,] which necessitated placement 

because he cannot complete his goals without 

insurance when there are no goals requiring 

Father to have insurance on himself, the Child 

has coverage[,] and lack of insurance is not a 

basis for maintaining placement or finding 

continued dependency[?]

[7.] Whether the [trial] court erred by not making a 

finding regarding the likely date for which the 

goal of return to parent might be achieved as 

required by the Juvenile Act[?]
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Father’s brief at 6-7 (capitalization omitted).

We must first determine whether Father’s appeal is properly before 

this court. Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 742, this court has jurisdiction over 

appeals from final orders. With respect to dependency proceedings, an 

order granting or denying a goal change shall be deemed a final order when 

entered. See In re H.S.W.C.-B, 836 A.2d 908, 911 (Pa. 2003). In 

reversing the order of this court that quashed an appeal from an order 

denying a goal change on the basis that it maintained the status quo and 

was not a final order, our supreme court explained,

Maintaining the status quo could put the needs and 

welfare of a child at risk. . . . [T]he denial of goal 

changes which are in the best interest of the child 

should not be sheltered, permanently, from 

independent review: [As a practical matter], these 

petitions go to the same trial judge. If a trial judge 

erroneously denies these motions and improperly 

maintains the status quo, and keeps doing that on 

periodic review, such an improper order will never

be subject to appellate review. 

Id. at 910 (internal quotations and citation omitted).

Instantly, the trial court, while maintaining the status quo by 

continuing the Child’s dependency status, was acting for the Child’s needs 

and welfare by moving her from her placement at CYA to a foster home. 

Father argues that the continuation of the dependency and the Child’s 

placement interferes with the Child’s education, behavioral, and mental 

health needs. As such, we find that the trial court’s order is final and 
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appealable pursuant to In re H.S.W.C.-B. We now turn to the merits of 

Father’s appeal. 

Our standard of review for dependency cases is as follows:

[T]he standard of review in dependency cases 

requires an appellate court to accept the findings of 

fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if 

they are supported by the record, but does not 

require the appellate court to accept the lower 

court’s inferences or conclusions of law. Accordingly, 

we review for an abuse of discretion.

In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010) (citations omitted); see also

In re L.Z., 111 A.3d 1164, 1174 (Pa. 2015). “The trial court is free to 

believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented, and is likewise free to 

make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence.” 

In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa.Super. 2004), quoting In re Diaz, 669

A.2d 372, 375 (Pa.Super. 1995).

Father first argues the trial court erred by not returning the Child to 

Father’s custody as CYS provided no evidence of Father’s unfitness or that 

the Child remained “without proper parental care and control” and finding 

that placement continued to be “necessary and appropriate.” (Father’s brief

at 17.) Father maintains that the Child’s initial dependency determination 

was based on Father’s alleged abuse of the Child, and Mother’s 

incarceration. (Id. at 19.)

Section 6302 of the Juvenile Act, in pertinent part, defines a 

“dependent child” as one who is:
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without proper parental care or control, subsistence, 

education as required by law, or other care or control 

necessary for his physical, mental, or emotional 

health, or morals. A determination that there is a 

lack of proper parental care or control may be based 

upon evidence of conduct by the parent, guardian or 

other custodian that places the health, safety or 

welfare of the child at risk, including evidence of the 

parent’s, guardian’s or other custodian’s use of 

alcohol or a controlled substance that places the 

health, safety or welfare of the child at risk[.]

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302

In order to adjudicate a child dependent under the Juvenile Act, a 

court must determine that the statutory definition of “dependent child” has 

been met by clear and convincing evidence. In re L.V., 127 A.3d 831

(Pa.Super. 2015). To meet the clear and convincing standard, the court 

must determine whether the child is presently without proper parental care 

or control and if this care and control is immediately available to the child. 

In re J.J., 69 A.3d 724 (Pa.Super 2013).

In its opinion, the trial court stated:

For purposes of this case, only the first sentence of 

this definition is applicable. 

In accordance with 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 6351(a)(2)(iii), 

upon finding on February 27, 2017 that the Child 

was in fact “dependent,” this [c]ourt directed that 

the Child be placed with “a public agency authorized 

by law to receive and provide care for the child,” i.e., 

[CYS] [c]ustody for placement in a residential 

facility. That [o]rder was subject to an early review 

which occurred on March 24, 2017. It is at this 

hearing Father is claiming the [c]ourt erred 

regarding continuing the Child in dependency status 

and keeping her in a placement outside of his home.
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Trial court opinion, 5/10/17 at 8-9.

The trial court acknowledged that CYS failed to present evidence of 

Father’s unfitness, but that it ultimately found the Child dependent because 

the Child was without proper parental care or control. (Id. at 15.) The trial 

court further stated:

there was testimony from the Father that[,] while 

the Child was in his care and control, he recognized 

that the Child was suffering from mental health 

issues as far back as July 2016. As a result, Father 

testified that he had the Child hospitalized on two (2) 

occasions and also turned to [Carbon-Monroe-Pike 

Mental Health and Development Services,] but was 

unsuccessful in obtaining help through that agency 

due to insurance issues. Unfortunately, these efforts 

failed to address the Child’s mental health issues, 

prompting a removal of the Child from his home for 

placement in the Child’s Mother’s home on 

October 7, 2016. From that date until the Child was 

taken into Emergency Shelter Care, there apparently 

were little, if any, services provided to the Child to 

address her mental health needs. Accordingly, this 

[c]ourt’s initial determination[,] finding the Child 

dependent and continuing such dependency status 

as a result of the March 24, 2017 permanency 

review hearing[,] was grounded in the failure of the 

Father to provide adequate and appropriate care for 

the Child to address her mental health needs at a 

time when those services were clearly available. 

Additionally, based upon Dr. Saba’s report, the Child 

was in need of some type of psychotherapy to assist 

in addressing her diagnosis of dysthymic disorder 

and reactive attachment disorder. This further 

evidences a need for help, which was not previously 

nor adequately provided by Father nor[sic] Mother.

Id. at 15-16 (footnote omitted).
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Ms. Geissinger testified that the Child is unsafe in Father’s home, and 

that the Child’s relationship with Father is not good. (Notes of testimony, 

3/24/17 at 22.) Ms. Geissinger stated the Child has threatened to run away 

and self-harm if she were to be returned to Father’s home. (Id.) 

Ms. Geissinger further testified that Father told her that he has had trouble 

managing the Child at home without services. (Id.) Ms. Geissinger added 

that Father works outside the home, Father’s girlfriend would be the 

caregiver for the Child, and that Father’s girlfriend is in need of drug and 

alcohol services. (Id.) Additionally, the Child testified that she was not 

getting regular medical and dental care while she was living with Father. 

(Id. at 29.) 

After our careful review of the record in this matter, we find that the 

trial court’s credibility and weight determinations are supported by 

competent evidence in the record. See In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68 at 73-74 

(Pa.Super. 2004). Accordingly, we find that the trial court’s order directing 

continuing dependency is supported by sufficient, competent evidence in the 

record. 

Next Father argues the trial court erred in finding that the Child’s 

placement was appropriate when CYS failed in its duty to ensure that the 

Child’s educational, behavioral, and mental health needs were met. 

(Father’s brief at 22.) 
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At the March 24, 2017 hearing, Ms. Geissinger testified that CYS is 

looking to find a therapeutic program for the Child and Father that would 

help them reunite. (Notes of testimony, 3/24/17 at 7.) Ms. Geissinger 

continued that the Child is afraid of Father, and has refused visits with him 

at CYA. (Id.) Ms. Geissinger further testified she was able to find a foster 

home for the Child, which would be able to do outpatient counseling, as 

recommended by Dr. Saba. (Id.) Ms. Geissinger opined that she would not 

recommend that the Child return to Father’s home because of the Child’s 

fear, and that Child would not be safe if she returned to Father’s home. 

(Id.) Ms. Geissinger outlined the Child’s permanency plan as follows:

[T]he goals in the plan are to have frequent and 

positive visitation with [the Child], that [the Child] 

attend a mental health evaluation and participate in 

any treatment that is needed, to demonstrate stable 

mental health and attend and pass her cases, and to 

participate in drug and alcohol [counseling] as 

needed because there were reports of marijuana 

use, and to not self-harm herself [sic].

Id. at 9.

Ms. Geissinger concluded that the CYS recommendation was to 

continue the Child’s dependency, and for the Child to remain in CYS custody 

for placement in a residential setting, pending an opening in foster care. 

This recommendation was based on the Child’s refusal to return home, fear 

of Father, and the Child has not completed proper therapy that would allow 

her to return home. (Id. at 11.) 
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After our careful review of the record in this matter, we find that the 

trial court’s credibility and weight determinations are supported by 

competent evidence in the record. In re M.G., 855 A.2d at 73-74. 

Accordingly, we find that the trial court’s finding that the Child’s placement is 

proper is supported by sufficient, competent evidence in the record. 

For his third issue, Father argues the trial court erred by not returning 

the Child to Father’s custody when it was the least restrictive means of 

providing protection for the minor Child, contrary to the mandates of the 

Child Protective Services Law and the Juvenile Act.2 (Father’s brief at 26.) 

Father maintains that no evidence was presented at the permanency review 

hearing establishing that it would be unfeasible to return the Child to 

Father’s care with in-home and/or outpatient mental health and family 

therapy in place. (Id. at 28.) Father also asserts that the trial court failed 

to consider any alternative disposition as required, or provide any reasoning 

for rejecting that possibility. (Id.)

Section 6301 of the Juvenile Act sets forth the purpose of the Act, in

relevant part, as:

(b) Purposes.--This chapter shall be interpreted 

and construed as to effectuate the following 

purposes:

(1) To preserve the unity of the family 

whenever possible or to provide 

 

2

In his brief, Father cites that the purpose of the Juvenile Act is set forth in 

Section 6302(b)(1) of the Juvenile Act, which appears to be a typographical 

error.
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another alternative permanent 

family when the unity of the family 

cannot be maintained.

(1.1) To provide for the care, protection, 

safety and wholesome mental and 

physical development of children 

coming within the provisions of this 

chapter.

. . . .

(3) To achieve the foregoing purposes 

in a family environment whenever 

possible, separating the child from 

parents only when necessary for 

his welfare, safety or health or in 

the interests of public safety, by 

doing all of the following:

(i) employing evidence-based 

practices whenever possible 

and, in the case of a 

delinquent child, by using 

the least restrictive 

intervention that is 

consistent with the 

protection of the 

community, the imposition 

of accountability for 

offenses committed and the 

rehabilitation, supervision 

and treatment needs of the 

child; . . .

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6301(b)(1), (b)(1.1), (b)(3)(i).

The Child Protective Services Law (“CPSL”) charges county agencies 

with providing services consistent with the goals of the agency as follows:

(a) Program objectives.--Each county agency is 

responsible for administering a program of 

general protective services to children and 
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youth that is consistent with the agency’s 

objectives to:

(1) Keep children in their own homes, 

whenever possible.

(2) Prevent abuse, neglect and 

exploitation.

(3) Overcome problems that result in 

dependency.

(4) Provide temporary, substitute 

placement in a foster family home 

or residential child-care facility for 

a child in need of care.

(5) Reunite children and their families 

whenever possible when children 

are in temporary, substitute 

placement.

(6) Provide a permanent, legally 

assured family for a child in 

temporary, substitute care who 

cannot be returned to his own 

home.

(7) Provide services and care ordered 

by the court for children who have 

been adjudicated dependent.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6373(a).

The trial court opined:

This [c]ourt believes it is [the least restrictive 

placement] for several reasons. First, the Child is in 

need of psychotherapy which she has not adequately 

received while living with either parent. Secondly, 

the Child refuses to return to Father’s residence. 

Since neither parent has provided the mental health 

help the Child needs[,] and the Child refused to 

return to her Father, returning the Child home would 

not serve the purposes of the Juvenile Act insofar as 

placing her in a setting that addresses her mental, 
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emotional, and physical well-being. Further, since 

the Child is in need of therapy, therapeutic foster 

care is the least restrictive [placement].

Trial court opinion, 5/10/17 at 17.

At the hearing, Ms. Geissinger testified that residential placement 

would be the least restrictive placement for Child at the time of the hearing. 

(Notes of testimony, 3/24/17 at 11.) Ms. Geissinger continued, “pending an 

opening in the foster home through NHS, that would be the least restrictive 

until possibly a family member would come forward.” (Id.)

We note that this court stated, “it is not for this [C]ourt, but for the 

trial court as fact finder, to determine whether [a child’s] removal from 

[his/]her family was clearly necessary.” A.N. v. A.N., 39 A.3d 326

(Pa.Super. 2012), quoting In the Interest of S.S., 651 A.2d 174, 177 

(Pa.Super. 1994). Upon review, the record supports the trial court’s finding 

that Child’s placement in therapeutic foster care is the least restrictive 

means to meet her needs. We find that there was sufficient evidence to 

allow the trial court to make a determination of Child’s needs and 

appropriateness of placement.

Father’s fourth issue is whether the trial court erred in granting the 

recommendations of CYS in that the recommendations are contrary to the 

Juvenile Act, Section 6301(b)(1), which states that one of the purposes is to 
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preserve the unity of the family whenever possible.3 (Father’s brief at 38.) 

Father argues that there is overwhelming evidence in the record showing 

that CYS has not provided reunification services as required by statute. (Id.

at 39.)

The relevant portion of the Juvenile Act specifies the purpose of the

Act is “[t]o preserve the unity of the family whenever possible or to provide 

another alternative permanent family when the unity of the family cannot be 

maintained.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6301(b)(1). This court has held “[t]he state’s 

interest in preserving family unity must be weighed along with the state’s 

interest in protecting children, and a child’s right to a healthy and stable 

environment.” In Re: M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1276 (Pa.Super.2010)

(internal citation omitted).

The trial court found that CYS attempted to reunify the family by 

encouraging the Child to visit with Father while she was in placement during 

the period of time between the dependency adjudication and the 

permanency review hearing. (Trial court opinion, 5/10/17, 18-19.) The trial 

court also found CYS encouraged the Child to participate in counseling with 

Father in an attempt to mend the relationship, but that the Child refused to 

participate. (Id.) The trial court concluded that to force the Child to live 

with Father and engage in counseling with him would be counterproductive. 

 

3 We again note that Father appears to have made a typographical error in 

his brief, and defer to heading of Father’s argument, rather than the body to 

determine the appropriate Section of the Juvenile Act.
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(Id. at 19.) The trial court maintained that all attempts and efforts to 

preserve the family unit were exhausted through October 7, 2016, when the 

Child was initially removed from Father’s care. (Id. at 21.) 

At the hearing, the Child testified that she thinks she will do well in a 

foster placement. (Id. at 26.) The Child further testified that she does not 

have a good relationship with Father, and does not think she can forgive him 

for “what he has done.” (Id. at 28.) The Child stated that CYS has told her 

she should try to repair her relationship with Father, but that she does not 

think that would be possible. (Id. at 29.) Ms. Geissinger testified that the 

Child is “working with Victims’ Resource Center with an advocate and is 

having a hard time talking about things and trying to reunite with [Father].” 

(Id. at 8.)

Upon review, the record supports the trial court’s finding that 

reunification at the time of the permanency review hearing would be 

counterproductive, and that continued dependency was appropriate. 

Next, Father asks this court to determine whether the trial court erred 

by finding that CYS exercised reasonable efforts to preserve or reunify the 

family when there was undisputed evidence that no services were made 

available and no reunification efforts were made by CYS. Father argues that 

CYS failed to present any evidence that it provided the statutorily mandated 
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services required by Section 6374(f) of the CPSL to reunify the family.4 

(Father’s brief at 15.)

The CPSL Section 6373(b) states:

(b) Efforts to prevent need for removal from 

home.--In its effort to assist the child and the 

child’s parents, pursuant to Federal 

regulations, the county agency will make 

reasonable efforts prior to the placement of a 

child in foster care to prevent or eliminate the 

need for removal of the child from his home 

and to make it possible for the child to return 

to home.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6373(b).

In its opinion, the trial court reiterated its rationale for finding that the 

Child’s placement in therapeutic foster care was the least restrictive 

placement to meet the Child’s needs. (Trial court opinion, 5/10/17 at 18.) 

The trial court concluded that reunification is premature. (Id.) 

Upon review, the record supports the trial court’s decision not to 

reunite Father and the Child, and we do not find that the trial court violated 

the CPSL. There was sufficient evidence to allow the trial court to make a 

determination of the Child’s needs and inappropriateness of reunification.

Father’s sixth issue asserts that the trial court erred in finding that 

Father had made minimal progress toward alleviating the circumstances that 

 

4

In his brief, Father cites that the requirements of the CPSL can be found at 

Section 6374(f) which appears to be a typographical error. We defer to the 

trial court’s decision to analyze Father’s argument pursuant to 

Section 6373(b) of the CPSL.
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necessitated the Child’s placement because Father is unable to complete his 

goals without health insurance. (Father’s brief at 15.) Father maintains that 

he was willing and able to pay for treatment out-of-pocket until the 

insurance for the Child can be resolved. (Id. at 34.) Father continues that 

it is improper to hold Father accountable for CYS’ failure to assist Father in 

obtaining medical assistance for the Child as required by Section 6373(c) of 

the CPSL. (Id. at 35-36.) 

At the hearing, Ms. Geissinger testified that Father’s goals were to 

participate in visitation with the Child, demonstrate proper parenting in the 

home and with the Child, demonstrate sober caretaking and counseling, 

positive coping skills due to the reports of violence, and to cooperate with 

CYS. (Notes of testimony, 3/24/17 at 9-10.) Ms. Geissinger continued that 

there has been minimal compliance with the Child’s permanency plan 

because the Child refuses to do anything to rebuild her relationship with 

Father. (Id. at 10.) 

Father testified he lost his insurance in July of 2016. (Id. at 44.) 

Father stated he reapplied for Medicaid, but his application was denied 

because of incomplete financial documents. (Id.) Yet Father maintains that 

he had the financial documents and must reapply again. (Id. at 44-45.) 

Father predicted that it will take a while before he has Medicaid. (Id. at 45.) 

Father further testified that he will do whatever it takes, even going 

out-of-pocket to pay for counseling. (Id.)
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The trial court found that Father did not arrange to get the Child 

counseling while the Child was living with Father, nor was he able to secure 

therapy for the Child by the time of the dependency hearing. (Trial court 

opinion, 3/24/17 at 19.) The trial court states that one of the reasons 

Father was unable to secure therapy for the Child was his lack of insurance. 

(Id.) The trial court continues that the more important reason why it found 

Father’s compliance to be minimal is that the Child is refusing contact with 

Father. (Id.) The trial court maintained that, perhaps through no fault of 

his own, Father cannot make progress in having the Child returned to his 

care when the Child has no desire to return home, and that progress is 

minimal in alleviating the circumstances of the Child’s removal, which is the 

lack of a relationship with Father. (Id. at 19-20.)

Finally, Father argues that the trial court erred by not determining a 

likely date for reunification of Father and the Child as required by the 

Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(f.1)(1). (Father’s brief at 16.) Father 

maintains the permanency review order of March 24, 2017, contains no date 

by which the goal of reunification of the Child with Father might be achieved. 

(Id. at 37.) Father contends that the omission of this date is not a 

“harmless error,” but actually constitutes a goal change from reunification 

without the benefit of a hearing. (Id. at 38.)

In relevant part, the Juvenile Act reads

(f.1) Additional determination.--Based upon the 

determinations made under subsection (f) and 
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all relevant evidence presented at the hearing, 

the court shall determine one of the following:

(1) If and when the child will be 

returned to the child’s parent, 

guardian or custodian in cases 

where the return of the child is 

best suited to the safety, 

protection and physical, mental 

and moral welfare of the child.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(f.1)(1).

In its opinion, the trial court stated:

Father is correct that this [c]ourt did not identify a 

date by which the Child might be returned home to a 

parent. This [c]ourt agrees that both 42 Pa. C.S.A. 

§ 6351(f)(5) and Pa. R.J.C.P. 1608(D)(1)(d) require 

it. However, this [c]ourt finds that the failure to do 

so is justified. Conversely, if it is not justified, it is a 

harmless error under the circumstances.

This [c]ourt has identified a likely return date as 

“unknown.” The basis for this is clear: it is totally 

unpredictable as to when this Child, wrought with a 

mental health diagnosis and refusing to return to 

either parent, may in fact return to a parent. No one 

can project when the psychotherapy may get to the 

point where the Child begins family counselling with 

either or both parties and when she may want to 

return and feel comfortable returning to a parent. 

Further, despite 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 6351(e)(3) requiring 

permanency hearings at least every six (6) months, 

[CYS] conducts them every three (3) months. This 

“likely goal” date was implemented and designed to 

maintain constant vigilance over a Child’s progress 

and attain the goals recommended. Having 

three (3) month review hearings provides the same 

oversight.

Trial court opinion, 5/10/17 at 20-21.
J. S53031/17

- 21 -

This court has said: “[t]o hold the trial court abused its discretion, we 

must determine its judgment was “manifestly unreasonable,” that the court 

disregarded the law, or that its action was “a result of partiality, prejudice, 

bias or ill will.” In re S.B., 943 A.2d 973, 977 (Pa.Super. 2008) (citations 

omitted). Consequently, we find Father’s argument to be without merit. 

The trial court’s decision was reasonable and appropriate under the 

circumstance. 

Accordingly, based on the foregoing analysis of the trial court’s 

permanency review order, we affirm the order of the trial court.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/28/2017