The Honor able Gr eg ory F. Va n Tatenhove , United States District Court for the Ea stern * District of Ke ntucky , sitti ng by desig nation NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 07a0766n.06 F iled: October 30, 2007 No. 06-5978 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT UNITED STAT ES O F AMERICA, P laintif f-App ellee,
v. SIDNEY HOL LOWAY, Defendan t-Appellant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P EA L F RO M THE UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE E ASTERN DI STR IC T OF TEN NE SSEE

BEFORE: KEITH, GRIF F IN, Circ uit Jud ges; and VAN TATENHOVE, District Judge * DA M ON J. KEITH , Circuit Judge
. Def endant- Appellant Sidney

Holloway

(“H olloway ”) pled g uilty t o b ei ng a fe lon in possession of a fire arm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g )(1) , and possession of a short-ba

rre led shotg un, in violation of 26 U.S.C. 5861(c) . Holloway was sente nced to 7 1 mo nth s o f i mpr iso nme nt to run c on se c uti ve ly to a ny state or fe de ra l se nte nc e . H oll ow ay tim e ly appea led, and this Court aff irmed his conviction but rema nded the c ase f

or re sentenc ing in lig ht of United States v. Book

er , 543 U.S. 220 (2005). On rema nd, the district c ourt aff

irmed its pervious sentenc e. Holloway

now appe als his sentence , arguing that district court fa iled to properly consider the fa ctors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a ), improperly ran his sentence consec utively to his state court sentenc e, and imprope rly

calc ulated his criminal his tory cate g ory . For the reasons that follow, weNo. 06-5978

United States v. Holloway Pag e 2 AF F IRM
. I. BACKG ROUND The fa cts relat ing to Hollowa y ’s conduc t, in larg e par t, were retrie ved fr om the plea ag ree ment. On Aug ust 18, 2002, Holloway fell aslee p at a r ed lig ht while driving his car. A n office r approa ched a

nd observe d Holloway

sleeping with his foot o n t h e b ra k es . The off icer woke Holloway , and whe n asked, H olloway admitted he had dr ank five to six beer s. Holloway ’s disorientation and slurre d speec h confirme d his admission. Therea fter, the office r dete rmined that Ho llo wa y ’s lic e ns e wa s susp e nd e d for a DU I . H oll ow ay

wa s p la c e d und e r a

rr e st, and a se arc h o f h is person pr oduced a p re s cr i p t ion bottle (with the label torn off ) with sever al unknown pills and 3.7 g rams of ma

rijuana. Afurther sear ch of his vehic le re veale d an unre g istered, loade d New E ng land Ar ms sawe d- of

f 12 g a ug e sh otgun be tw e e n the dr ive r’ s se a t and the dr ive r’ s d oo r. Th e of fi c e r a lso found a gre en bagof rolling paper , digital sc ales, binocula rs, a sc anner , a list of police code s and fre quencie s, and $300 ca sh. A later se arc h of Holloway (af ter he arr ived at the jail) also uncove red a cle ar c ontainer hidde n in his pant’s pocket whic h contained 1.7 grams of me thamphetamine. As a result of t his incident, Holl oway pled guilty in state court to: 1) driving on a revoked license; 2) posse ssion of a controlled substanc e for resa le; 3) poss ession of m arijuana for r esale ; 4)
car rying a prohibited wea

pon; and 5) drivingunder the influence . He wa s g iv en probation. On November

1, 2002, “an a ffidavit fo r v i olation of probation” w as issued for Holloway

beca use he fa ile d to c omp ly

wi th t he te rm s of his pr ob a tio n. On No ve mbe r 12, 20 02 , off ic e rs e xec ute d ana rr e st
war rant for Holloway . He wa s found aslee p at the pre mises of Gina Sullivan and wa s arr ested. During a sea

rch inc ident to arre st, office rs fo u nd a loade d sawe d-off 12 g aug e shotg un under theNo. 06-5978

United States v. Holloway Pag e 3

The Pre- Sentence Report (“ PSR ”) a lso indicates that Holloway was a rre sted on 1 No ve mbe r 1 8, 20 02 . T he re c or d, ho we ve r, is unc le ar a s to wh e the r t his wa s a dif fe re nt a rr e st from the Nove mber 12, 2002 a rre st. mattress whe re H olloway was ly ing. On November 22, 2002, Holloway ’s probation was revoke d, 1 and acc ording to the Government, the s tate court sentenc ed Holloway to nine m onths for ea ch of the f i v e o f f e n s e s t o r u nc o n c u r r e n t l y. On J anuar

y 15, 2003, a six -count indictment w as filed in the Easter n District of Tenne ssee, char g ing H olloway

with crimes related to the Aug ust 18 and November 12, 2002 incidents. Count one cha rg ed him with possession with the i ntent to distribute methamphetamine on Aug ust 18, 2002, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) and 841(b)( 1)(C). Count two cha rg ed him with possession of a fire arm in fur

thera nce of a drug traffic king crime, in violation of 18 U.S .C. § 924(c). Count three char g ed Holloway

with being a felon in possession of a firea rm on Aug ust 18, 2002, in viol ation of 18 U. S.C. § 922 (g )( 1)
. Count fo ur c ha rg e d him with pos se ssi ng a sh or t- ba rr e le d sho tg un

on Au g us t 18, 2002, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(c). Count 5 charg ed him with being a fe lon in possession of a fi re arm on No ve mbe r 12 , 20 02 , in vio la tio n of 18 U. S.C. § 92 2( g )( 1) , and c ou nt s ix ch arg e d h im with possessing a short-bar rele d shotgun on November 12, 2002, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(c). On April 3, 2003, Holloway pled guilty to counts three a

nd four. In the PSR , it was ag ree d that Holloway ’s base offe nse leve l would be 20. Holloway then rec eived a four- level incre ase unde r U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5) beca use he posse ssed a sa

wed- off- shotgun in c onnection wi th possessing
me th a mph e tamin e and

be inga c on vic te d f

e lon pr oh ibi te d f

ro m po sse ssi ngfi re arm s. He a lso
rec eived a three -leve l reduc tion for ac cepta nce of responsibility , resulting in a total offe nse leve l of 21. The PRS also calculate d Holloway ’s cr iminal hist ory points, under U
. S
. S
. G. § 4A1.1, to beNo. 06-5978

United States v. Holloway Pag e 4

I n calc ulating a

defe ndant’s cr iminal hist ory points, U.S.S .G. § 4A1.1(b) provides for the 2 addition of two points for ea ch prior se ntence of imprisonment of at lea st six ty day s not counted in U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(a). § 4A1.1( a) c alls for the a ddition of three points for e ach pr ior sentenc e of imprisonment exceeding one y ear and one month. eig ht. Four of

these points wer e base d on Holloway ’s p ri o r m isdemeanor convictions under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(c), two poin t s we re based on H olloway ’s conc urre nt nine-month state sentenc e following the re vocation of his probation under U.S.S.G
. § 4A1.1(b), a nd two points were a dded since Hollowa

y was on probation at t he ti me of the i nstant offe nse under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(d). A total of eig ht c riminal history points resulted in a cr iminal hist ory cate g ory of I V. Acc ording ly , the the n- mand a tor

y Gu ide lin e s c a lle d f

or a se nte nc e ra

ng e of 57 to 71 mon ths
. F ur the rm or e , b e c a

us e Holloway was ser ving a term of imprisonment due to the revoc ation of his probation, the PSR noted, pursuant to U. S
. S
. G. § 5 G1.3, t hat the sente nce imposed should be se rved c onsecutively to the
curr ent term of imprisonment. On November 7, 2003, a sentenc ing hear ing was held. During th e h ea ri n g, Holloway objected to the PSR’s calc ulation of his criminal history points. Holloway contende d that the two points based on hi s n i n e- m onth state sentenc e following his probation revoc ation should not be added beca

use the judgme nt w as ambig uous, making it impossible to determine w hetherthe ninemonth sentence had bee n imposed for each of the five case s to run conc urre ntly (as the G overnme nt argues), or whether eac h case had a differ ence sentenc e, with the tot al of the sentenc es equaling nine months. Bec ause of

this purpor

ted ambig uity in the judgme nt, H olloway claimed that it could not be deter mined which conviction ca rried w hat sentenc e, and mor e importantly , which sente nce w as “60 day s or more” for the pur poses of c alculatingcriminal hi story points under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(b). 2No. 06-5978

United States v. Holloway Pag e 5

I n h is b ri e f, Ho llo wa y a lso su g g e sts that he wa s p un ish e d tw ic e fo r t he same c on du c t in 3 fede ral a nd state proc eeding s. This arg ument lacks mer it as the cha rg es he ple d g uilty

to in the instant case a

re c lear ly differ ent from the c harg es he ple d to and was c onvicted of in state c ourt. I n r e sp on se , th e Go ve rnme nt s ta te d t hat i t c on su lte d w iththe pr ob a tio n o ff ic e in M c Minn Co un ty (whe re the judgme nt was ente red) and they confirme d that Holloway was sente nced to nine- months
on eac h char g e to run concur rently
. After some consideration, the district c ourt denied Hollowa y ’s objection, finding that the PSR acc urate ly

ref lected H olloway ’s cr iminal hist ory . The district cour

t, pursuant to the then-ma ndatory Guidelines, sentenc ed Holloway to the high e nd of the Guide lines—71 months of imprisonm ent to run conse cutive to any state or feder al sentenc e. Holloway

filed a timely

appea l. On Aug ust 9, 2005, this C ourt aff irmed his conviction, but vacated and r emande d the ca se for rese ntencingin light of Booke r . On Dec ember 15, 2005, the dis tr ic t c ourt

he ld a re se nte nc inghe ari ng . Dur ing the he ari ng , H oll ow ay re ne we d h is o bje c tio n to t h e cal cu l at i o n o f hi s cr i m i n al h i s t o ry s co re . Ho l l o wa y al s o ar gu edt h at af

t er co n s i d er i n g Booke r

and the 1 8 U
. S
. C
. § 3 5 5 3 ( a ) f a c t o r s , h i s s e n t e n c e s h o u l d b e r e d u c e d t o 4 7 m o n t h s . T h e d i s tr ic t c ou rt , noting that it consider ed all o f t he fa ctors stated in § 3553(a ), re imposed its original sente nce, sentenc ing H olloway to 71 months of imprisonment to run conse cutive to any other state or

fede ral sentenc e. On that same day , Holloway filed a timely

notice of a

ppeal. II. AN AL YSI S On appe al, Holloway

argues that the district c ourt: 1) failed to c onsider the pr ovisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), a

nd thus his sentence is unre asonable ; 2) i mproperly ran his sente nce in the instant
case consec utive to his state court sentenc e; and 3) improperly calc ulated his criminal history cate g ory . We will consider ea ch of H olloway ’s ar g uments in turn.

3No. 06-5978

United States v. Holloway Pag e 6

I n p e rt ine nt p art , 1 8 U .S. C. § 35 53 (a ) s ta te s th a t:

4 the cour

t, in determining the par

ticular sentence to be imposed, shall consider; (1) the nature a

nd ci rc u m s t an ces of

the offe nse and the history and char acte ristics of the def

endant; (2) (A) - (D) the need for the sentence imposed to r e fl e c t th e se ri ou sn e ss o f t he of fe ns e , to pr omo te re sp e c t f or the law, and

to pr ov ide jus t pu

nis hme nt for the of

fe ns e ; to a ff

or d a de qu a te de te rr e nc e to c ri min a l c on du c t; t o p ro te c t th e pu bli c fr om f

urthe r c ri me s o f t

he de fe nd ant; an d t o p ro v i d e t h e d ef

en d an twi t h n ee d ededu ca t i o n al o r v o ca t i o n al t ra i n i n g, medical care , or ot her corre ctional t reatment in the most effe ctive manne r; (3) the kinds of sentenc es available; (4) the kinds of sentence and the sentenc ing ra ng e e sta bli sh e d .
. . ; ( 5) any

pe rt ine nt po lic y state me nt
. . . ; ( 6) the ne e d to avoid unwar

rante d sentenc e disparities among defe ndants with simil ar r ecor ds who have been f

ound g uilty of similar conduc t; and (7) the ne ed to provide restitution to any

victims of the offe nse. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

A. Consideration of

the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) Ho llo wa y argues th at the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s se nte nc e of 71 mon ths of

imp ri so nme nt i s
un re a so na

ble . In p art ic ula

r, Ho llo wa

y c on te nd s that th e dis tr ic t c ourt sh ou ld h a ve se nte nc e d h im t o 47 m onths due to the mitigating fac tors he put forth, a nd beca use the district cour

t disag ree d and ins te a d im

po se d a 71 mon th s e nte nc e , th e dis tr ic t c ourt fa ile d to c on si der th e § 3 55 3( a ) f a c tor s. Holloway ’s ar g ument is unpersuasive. “Rea sonablene ss is the appellate standard of revie w in judging whether a district cour

t has accomplished its task.” United States v. Collington , 461 F.3d 805, 807 ( 6th Cir. 2006) (quotation
mark s o mit te d) ; see also United States v. W ilms , — F .3 d — , 2 00 7 WL

20 77 36 7, a t *2 (6 th C ir . July 23, 2007) (“On appeal, we must deter mine whether

a district cour

t’s sentenc ing de termination was
re as o n ab l e. ” ( ci t i n g Rita v. Uni t ed Stat es , — U.S. —, 127 S.C t. 2456, 2459 (2007) )) . There fore , “[o] nce a district c ourt has settled on a sentenc e that it de ems to be rea sonable, it then bec omes [our] duty to r eview that sentenc e to e nsure its rea sonablene ss with an ey e towar d those same § 3553( a) 4No. 06-5978

United States v. Holloway Pag e 7 fac tors.” United States v. J ackson , 408 F.3d 301, 304 ( 6th Cir. 2005). I n revie wing challeng es t o a sentence, “we ha ve distinguished be tween the proce dural a nd substantive rea sonablene ss of sentenc es.” Un ite d S tat es v . D av is , 458 F.3d 491, 495 (6th Cir. 2006).

“ A s e nte nc e may be pr oc e dura lly un re a so na

ble if the dis tr ic t ju dg e fa ils to c on sid e r t he a pp lic a ble Guidelines rang e or neg lects to c onsider the other fac tors listed in 18 U.S.C . § 3553(a) , and instead simply selec ts what the judg e dee ms an appropr iate sentence w ithout such require d consideration.” Colli ngton , 461 F.3d at 808 (internal quotation mar ks omi t t ed ). On t he other hand, “[a] sentence may be conside red substantively unrea sonable whe n the district court ‘se lect[s] the s en t en ce arbitra rily , bas[es] t he sente nce on imper missibl e fa ctors, fa il[ s] t o consider pe rtinent § 3553(a) fac tors or g iv[ es] an unrea sonable amount of wei gh t to any pertinent fa ctor.’” Id
. (q u o t i n g United States v. W

ebb , 403 F.3d 373, 385 ( 6th Cir. 2005) (first alter ation not in origina l). Fur thermore , a sentenc e within the g uideline ra ng e is presumptively

rea sonable. United States v. W illiams , 436 F.3d 70 6, 70 8 (6 th Cir . 2 00 6) ; see also United States v . Liou , — F .3 d —, 200 7 WL 20 66 85 4, a t *3 (6 th Cir. J uly 20, 2007) (“ I n Ri ta , th e Sup re me Court he ld that ‘t he law pe rm its the c ourt s of a pp e a ls t o use th[e] presumption’ of r easona bleness whe n addre ssing within-Guidelines sentenc es.” ( quoting Ri ta , 127 S.Ct . at 2459)). N onetheless, “ [t ]hi s rebuttable pr esumption does n o t relieve the sentenc ing c ourt of it s obligation to ex plain to the parties a nd the re viewing court its rea sons for imposing a pa

rticular se ntence .” Un i t ed States v. Richardson , 437 F.3d 550, 554 ( 6th Cir. 2006).

“ Th is a ssu

re s n ot o nly

tha t th e de fe nd ant c an und e rs tand the ba sis fo r t

he pa rt ic ula r s e nte nc e bu t a lso that the re viewing court c an intellige ntly deter mine whether

the s p ecif

ic sentenc e is indeed
rea sonable.” Id
.No. 06-5978

United States v. Holloway Pag e 8

Holloway

also sug g ests that beca

use the district cour

t imposed a 71 month sentence pre- 5 Booke r , r e c e ivi ngthe same se nte nc e po st- Booke r amounts to a g reater sente nce be cause the g uidelines are now advisory and conside ration of § 3553( a) w ould result in a lower sentenc e. Her e, the distric t co u rt proper ly considere d the applica

ble Guidelines. The district court
no te d that Ho llo wa

y ’s a dv iso ry Gu ide lin e ra

ng e wa s 5 7 to 71 mon ths . H oll ow ay wa s se nte nc e d to 71 months, the upper end of the advisory ra n ge. Be fore rende ring this sentence, the district court state d it s r e a so ns . T he dis tr ic t c ourt re fe re nc e d H oll ow ay ’s c ri min a l hi sto ry , n oti ngthat hi s “presentenc e re port shows pag e af ter pa g e af

ter pa g e of c riminal convictions.” (JA at 77). The district court we nt on to discuss how incarc eration has serve d as an a dequ at e d eterrenc e for Hollow ay . T h e d is tr ic t c o u rt e xp la in e d , “ f r o m w h a t yo us a id

an d w h a t M r . D u r

p r e e [H o ll o w a y ’s counsel] say s, that [i ncar cer ation] apparently was having the corr ect e ffe ct on y ou, that y ou have se en the er ror of y our past life and y ou are making some eff ort to r ectify that and lea d a law- abiding and upstanding life in the future
. I think since the purpose of incar cer ation has been well s erve d in y our
case , it would be a mistake for this Court t o do any

thing to cha

ng e the se ntence that was imposed initially .” Id
. Af t er co nsidering Holloway ’s bac kg round, the nature of the offe nse, and “ all the fa ctors state d in Se c tio n 355 3, ” th e di str ic t c ourt “ imp os [ed ] the or ig ina l [71 mon th] s e nte nc e in a ll respe cts.” Id . Having revie wed this rec ord, and beca use “[ t] here is no require ment that the district
c o u rt .
. . e n g a g e in

a r it u a li s ti c in c an tati o no f

th e § 3 5 5 3 ( a ) f

a c to r s it c o n s id e r s,” Un i t ed

States v. Chandler , 419 F.3d 484, 488 ( 6th C i r. 2 0 0 5) (c itation omit ted) (a lterations in orig inal), we cannot say that the district court fa iled to consider the § 3553( a) f actor s. Holloway ’s sentenc e is not
unrea sonable. 5No. 06-5978

United States v. Holloway Pag e 9

This argument is unpersuasive f or the same rea sons we find Hollowa y ’s sentenc e not unrea sonable. § 5G1.3(a ) provides f

or a c onsecutive se ntence wher e the “ instant offense was 6 committed while the def

endant wa s serving a ter

m of imprisonment (including w ork re lease , furloug h, or esc ape status) or af ter sente ncing for, but bef ore c ommencing service of, such ter m of imprisonment . . . .” This provision is not applicable in this matter bec ause H olloway was not servinga ter

m of imprisonment at the time of the instant offe nse. Also, § 5G1.3(b) provides for a conc urre nt sentence if the “te rm of imprisonment resulted f rom another

offe nse that is rele vant conduct to the instant off

ense of conviction . . . and that wa s the basis for a n incre ase in the of fe ns e le ve l f

or the ins tant o ff

e ns e . . . . ” Simi lar t o § 5G 1. 3( a ), § 5 G1 .3 (b ) i s n ot a pp lic a ble to Ho llo wa y be c a us e his un dis c ha

rg e d te rm of imp ri so nme nt e xten ds fr om h is p ri or c on vic tio ns in state cour t, and they

wer e not pre dicate c onvictions for incre asing his offense level in the instant case . B. Consecutive Sentence Ho llo wa y argue s th a t th e dis tr ic t c ourt imp ro pe rl y

ra n h is s e nte nc e in th e ins tant c a se
consec utively

to his state sentence
. Be sides his a ssertion, Holloway ’s provides no leg al support for his contention. We reviewa district cour t’s decision to impose a sente nce to r un consec utively

under U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3 for abuse of discre tion. Un it ed St ate s v . Ca mp be ll , 309 F.3d 928, 930 ( 6th Cir. 2002). T h is Co u rt h a s h e ld th a t “ [a ] d is tr ic t c o u rt h a s th e d is c r e ti o n to im p o s e c o n s e c utive or
con cu rr en t s en t ence s pursuant to § 5G1.3, upon consider ation of the fa ctors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and the a

pplicable guidelines and pol i cy statements in eff

ect at the time of sentenc ing.” Un ite d S tat es v . Co v e rt , 1 17 F .3 d 9 40 , 9 45 (6 th C ir . 1 99 7) . U nd e r § 5G1 .3 , “[ i] n . . . c a se [s] involving a n u n d i s ch arge d term of imprisonment, the sente nce f or the instant offe nse may be imposed to run concur

rently , partially

concur rently , or consecutively to the prior undischa rg ed ter m of imprisonment to achieve a re asonable punishment f or the instant of

fense .” USSG § 5G1.3(c). 6No. 06-5978

United States v. Holloway Pag e 10 He re , it is und isp ute d th a t H oll ow ay ’s pr ior state c on vic tio ns (r e su lti ngfr om t he Au g us t 18, 2002 incident) we re not pre dicates f or incre asing his offense level in the instant ca se, or that h e w a s s u b j e c tt o anu n d i s c h ar g e d

t e r m o f i mp r i s o n m e n ta tt h e t i m e o f s e n t e n c i n g . A c c o r d i n g l y, and as c oncluded a

bove, the r ecor d shows that befor e imposing H olloway ’s sentenc e to run
c on se c uti ve ly

wi th h is s ta te c ourt

se nte nc e , th e dis tr ic t c ourt c on sid e re d, wh ile no t e xplic itl y mentioning, the f

actor s listed in § 3553(a). See supra Part A. The district c ourt revie wed the prese ntence repor

t, in addition to considering H olloway ’s bac kg round, his criminal history , the
natur e of the of fe ns e , a nd the ne e d to a ff

or d a de qu a te de te rr e nc e fo r c ri min a l c on du c t. B e c a us e the district court a dequate ly considere d the fa ctors listed in § 3553(a) , in addition to reading the PSR , which sets for

th the commentar

y of the Sentenc ing G uidelines, se e Cov e rt , 117 F.3d at 946, we do not find a

n abuse of

discretion. C. Calculation of

Hollow ay’s Crim inal H istory Cat egory Holloway argues that the district court improper ly deter mined his criminal history cate g ory to be I V i nstead of I I I
. The P SR calc ulated Holloway ’s cr iminal hist ory points to be eig ht, a cr iminal his tor y c a te g or y of I V. Ho llo wa

y on ly ob je c ts t o tw o o ut o f t

he e ig ht po int s, c la imi ng that th e state judgme nt (listing his prior state c onvictions for his probation re vocation) w as ambig uous and did not clea rly state the pe riod of imprisonment he re ceive d for e ach c onviction. Specifica lly , Holl o way argues that in the s t at e j u d g ment, “he [was] order ed to serve nine months[ ,]” (J .A. at 121), but he claims it is im possible to determine whe ther he rec eived a sentenc e over

60 day s for a

ny one particula r state c onviction to warra nt the assessment of two criminal history points under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(b).No. 06-5978

United States v. Holloway Pag e 11 We review a district court’ s findings of fac t for purpose s of its sentencingg uidelines
c a lc ulatio ns fo r c le ar e rr or , a nd its int e rp re ta tio n o f t

he guid eli nes de novo
. United States v. Galloway , 439 F.3d 320, 322 ( 6th Cir. 2006). “All such fi n d i n gs o f fact that are cruc ial to a deter mination of a defenda

nt’s base of

fense level and c riminal history cate g ory must be based upon a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e.” Un ite d S

tat es v . R us se ll , 156 F.3d 687, 690 ( 6th Cir. 1998). The g overnme nt ne ed not pr ove the fac ts be y ond a re asonable doubt. United States v. Rutledge , 33 F.3d 671, 673 (6th Cir.1994). As the re viewing Court, we must “g ive due de fer ence to the district court’s application of the g uidelines to the fac ts.” 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e). Thus, the district c ourt’s finding s of fac t ma y be disturbed only if they are clea rly err oneous—“a

decision [that] strike[s] us as more tha n jus t ma y be or pr ob a bly wr on g ; it must

. . . s tr ike us a s w ro ngwi th t he fo rc e of

a fi ve -w e e k- old unref rig era ted dea d fish.” U

n i t e d S t a t es v . Pe rry , 9 08 F .2 d 5 6, 58 (6 th C ir . 1 99 0) (a lte ratio ns in orig inal). F urthermor e, we find clea r er ror whe n “‘a lthough ther e is evid en ce t o support it, the revie wing court on the entire evidenc e is le ft with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake ha s been c ommitt ed.’” Ru sse ll , 1 5 6 F. 3 d at 6 9 0 (q u o t i n g United Sta t es v. United States Gypsum Co. , 333 U.S. 364, 365 (1948)). Her e, we are unmoved b y Ho l l o way ’s ar g ument in light of the PSR and the probation of fi c e r’ s se c on d a dd e nd

um, wh ic h in dic a ted th a t a ft e r c on su lti ngwi th t he Mc Minn Co un ty Misdemeanor

Probation Offic e (the jurisdiction whe re the state judgme nt w as ente red) , Holloway ’s nine-month sentenc e applied to e ach c onvi ction listed on the judgme nt, with each se ntence to run
concur rently . The Gove rnm en t p rese nted this evidence to the district court during the initial
se nte nc ingand

the re se nte nc inghe ari ng . Wh ile Ho llo wa y argue s th a t th e stat e jud g me nt i sNo. 06-5978

United States v. Holloway Pag e 12 ambi g u o u s , h e h a s f

a il e d to p r o v id e u s w it

h an y e v id e n c e th a t l e a v e s u s w it h a “ d e f in it e an d f irm conviction” that the district co u rt err ed by assessing Holloway ’s two points under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(b). See Ru sse ll , 156 F.3d at 690. Acc ording ly , the district c ourt did not commit clear e rror . III . C ON CL USI ON For the af oreme ntioned rea sons, we AF F IRM the district court’s se ntence
.