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[Senate Report 113-240]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

113th Congress 
 2d Session                      SENATE                          Report
                                                                113-240
_______________________________________________________________________

                                     

                                                       Calendar No. 526

 
                       NATIONAL CYBERSECURITY AND

             COMMUNICATIONS INTEGRATION CENTER ACT OF 2014

                               __________

                              R E P O R T

                                 of the

                   COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND

                          GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                              to accompany

                                S. 2519

       TO CODIFY AN EXISTING OPERATIONS CENTER FOR CYBERSECURITY

                 July 31, 2014.--Ordered to be printed
        COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

                  THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware, Chairman
CARL LEVIN, Michigan                 TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas              JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana          RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri           ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
JON TESTER, Montana                  RAND PAUL, Kentucky
MARK BEGICH, Alaska                  MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming
TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin             KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire
HEIDI HEITKAMP, North Dakota

                  Gabrielle A. Batkin, Staff Director
               John P. Kilvington, Deputy Staff Director
                    Mary Beth Schultz, Chief Counsel
          Stephen R. Vina, Chief Counsel for Homeland Security
           Matthew R. Grote, Senior Professional Staff Member
               Keith B. Ashdown, Minority Staff Director
         Christopher J. Barkley, Minority Deputy Staff Director
               Andrew C. Dockham, Minority Chief Counsel
         Daniel P. Lips, Minority Director of Homeland Security
          William H.W. McKenna, Minority Investigative Counsel
                     Laura W. Kilbride, Chief Clerk
                                                       Calendar No. 526
113th Congress
                                 SENATE
                                                                 Report
 2d Session                                                     113-240

======================================================================

  NATIONAL CYBERSECURITY AND COMMUNICATIONS INTEGRATION CENTER ACT OF 
                                  2014

                                _______
                                

                 July 31, 2014.--Ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

 Mr. Carper, from the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
                    Affairs, submitted the following

                              R E P O R T

                         [To accompany S. 2519]

    The Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs, to which was referred the bill (S. 2519), to codify an 
existing operations center for cybersecurity, having considered 
the same, reports favorably thereon with an amendment and 
recommends that the bill, as amended, do pass.

                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page
  I. Purpose and Summary..............................................1
 II. Background and Need for the Legislation..........................1
III. Legislative History..............................................5
 IV. Section-by-Section Analysis......................................5
  V. Evaluation of Regulatory Impact..................................6
 VI. Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate........................7
VII. Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported............7

                         I. Purpose and Summary

    S. 2519, the National Cybersecurity and Communications 
Integration Center Act of 2014, seeks to codify the Department 
of Homeland Security's existing cybersecurity and 
communications operations center, known as the National 
Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC). 
Codification would enable DHS to execute its cyber mission more 
effectively and efficiently.

              II. Background and the Need for Legislation

    The United States faces a variety and growing set of 
sophisticated threats in cyberspace. Cyber criminals, for 
example, routinely steal personal identifiable information, as 
well as trade secrets and financial information from private 
sector and government networks, resulting in the loss of 
intellectual property and billions of dollars. For example, a 
recent indictment brought by the United States Department of 
Justice of six members of the People's Liberation Army 
(``PLA''), the military of the People's Republic of China, 
alleges several cyber attacks through which the defendants 
stole various trade secrets.\1\ One report credibly estimates 
the likely annual cost to the global economy from cybercrime at 
more than $400 billion a year.\2\ Retired General Keith 
Alexander, the former Director of the National Security Agency 
and Commander of U.S. Cyber Command, observed that cyber 
criminals ``are exploiting these targets on a scale amounting 
to the greatest unwilling transfer of wealth in history.''\3\
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    \1\United States of America v. Wang Dong, Sun Kailiang, Wen Xinyu, 
Huang Zhenyu, Gu Chunhui, http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/
5122014519132358461949.pdf.
    \2\McAfee--Intel Security and Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, ``Net Losses: Estimating the Global Cost of 
Cybercrime'' at page 2. (June 2014) http://www.mcafee.com/us/
resources/reports/rp-economic-impact-cybercrime2.pdf (last viewed July 
17, 2014).
    \3\Hearing to Receive Testimony on U.S. Strategic Command and U.S. 
Cyber Command in Review of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal 
Year 2014 and Future Years Defense Programs, Hearing before the U.S. 
Senate Committee on Armed Services, Written Statement of General Keith 
B. Alexander, Commander, U.S. Cyber Command (Mar. 12, 2013).
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    Some actors in cyberspace seek to disrupt or destroy 
computer systems, including those that control some of our 
nation's critical infrastructure--the systems that deliver 
power and water to our homes, our energy pipelines, our nuclear 
plants and our telecommunications systems. Cyber attacks on 
critical infrastructure could potentially lead to massive 
disruptions, catastrophic economic damage, and, in worst case 
scenarios, the loss of human life. In Saudi Arabia, for 
example, a cyber attack against Saudi Aramco, one of the 
world's largest oil companies, damaged 30,000 computers on the 
company's network.\4\ To date, there has been no similarly 
damaging cyber attack with physical effects to critical 
infrastructure in the United States. However, in 2013, major 
financial institutions were targeted by repeated ``denial-of-
service'' cyber attacks, which attempted to disrupt the 
performance of company websites by flooding them with internet 
traffic.\5\ Energy and utility companies in the United States 
have also reportedly been the targets of cyber attacks. For 
example, DHS has reported a widespread, organized intrusion 
campaign across the U.S. oil and natural gas sector.\6\ While 
no physical damage was reported, once a malicious actor gains 
access to a target network, it is not technically difficult to 
cause disruptions or damage.
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    \4\See Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence 
Community, Hearing before the House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence, Written Statement of James R. Clapper, Director of 
National Intelligence (April 11, 2013).
    \5\Id.
    \6\See ICS-CERT, ICS-CERT Monthly Monitor, Department of Homeland 
Security (April 2012) (online at http://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/monitors).
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    The United States has also seen widespread targeting of, 
theft, and disruption of information stored on the federal 
government's own networks, where sensitive information, 
including information related to the operations of critical 
infrastructure, is at risk of disclosure.\7\ For example, the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission stored sensitive cybersecurity 
details for nuclear facilities on an unprotected shared drive, 
making them more vulnerable to malicious cyber actors.\8\ In 
2011, the Thrift Savings Plan (TSP), the retirement savings and 
investment plan used by millions of federal employees and 
members of the uniformed services, suffered a data security 
breach, allowing unauthorized access to the personal 
information of approximately 123,000 TSP participants.\9\ And, 
in 2013, malicious actors broke into the computer network at 
the Department of Energy's Washington headquarters and 
compromised the personal information of hundreds of 
employees.\10\
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    \7\See ``The Federal Government's Track Record on Cybersecurity and 
Critical Infrastructure,'' Minority Staff Report, U.S. Senate Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, Sen. Tom Coburn, February 
4, 2014.
    \8\See Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of the Inspector 
General, ``Audit of NRC's Shared ``S'' Drive,'' (July 27, 2011).
    \9\See Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board, Press Release, 
``Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board Reports a Cyber Attack on 
a Contractor Potentially Affecting TSP Participants'' (May 25, 2012) 
https://www.tsp.gov/PDF/formspubs/Press.Release.2012-05-25.Cyber.pdf 
(last accessed July 20, 2014).
    \10\See Department of Energy, Office of the Inspector General, The 
Department of Energy's July 2013 Cyber Security Breach, DOE/IG-0900 
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 6, 2013). http://
energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2013/12/f5/IG-0900.pdf (last accessed July 
20, 2014).
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    One of the tactics to mitigate the threat of cyber attacks 
against government networks and the private sector is for the 
government and private sector partners to share information 
about cyber security threats, including information about 
threat signatures, system vulnerabilities, and actions that can 
be taken to defend networks from attacks. Other tactics include 
analyzing threat and vulnerability information, and providing 
technical assistance to industry and other partners.
    Within the federal government, the Department of Homeland 
Security (``DHS'' or ``the Department'') is responsible for 
working with the private sector to help protect the nation's 
critical infrastructure from physical and cyber threats and 
overseeing the protection of the .gov domain. At the center of 
DHS' cybersecurity and communications mission is the National 
Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC). 
The NCICC is a round-the-clock information sharing, analysis, 
and incident response center where government, private sector, 
and international partners work together on cybersecurity 
matters.
    The NCCIC has four components: the United States Computer 
Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT), the Industrial Control 
Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT), the National 
Coordinating Center for Telecommunications (NCC), and 
Operations Integration. Among its various functions, the NCCIC: 
analyzes cybersecurity and communications threats and 
vulnerabilities and coordinates findings with partners to 
manage risks to critical systems; creates shared situational 
awareness among public sector, private sector, and 
international partners by collaboratively developing and 
sharing timely and actionable cybersecurity and communications 
information; and responds to cybersecurity and communications 
incidents and events to mitigate harmful activity, manage 
crisis situations, and support recovery efforts.
    In fiscal year 2013 alone, the NCCIC responded to more than 
228,000 incident reports from a variety of stakeholders, 
ranging from minor compromises of personal information to mass 
data thefts.\11\ The NCCIC also released over 11,000 cyber 
alerts to industry, federal agencies and other partners in 
fiscal year 2013, and more than 5,000 organizations have used 
the NCCIC's tools to perform self-assessments to identify their 
own vulnerabilities. \12\ In 2013, NCCIC's ICS-CERT, conducted 
76 onsite assessments across critical infrastructure 
sectors.\13\ During the first nine months of Fiscal Year 2014, 
the NCCIC has received 508,000 reports of incidents, detected 
over 46,599 vulnerabilities, issued over 9,001 actionable 
cyber-alerts, and had over 256,003 partners subscribe to its 
cyber threat warning sharing initiative.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\Department of Homeland Security, NCCIC Weekly Cyber Analytics 
Report, Week ending 14 June 2014 (on file with Committee staff).
    \12\Id.
    \13\Department of Homeland Security, ICS-CERT, Year in Review 
(2013), page 16, https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/Year_In_Review_FY2013_Final.pdf (last viewed July 17, 2014).
    \14\Department of Homeland Security, email correspondence to 
Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee Staff (July 22, 
2014) (on file with Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Indeed, the NCCIC has played a major role in addressing a 
variety of cyber attacks on government and industry networks. 
For example, less than 24 hours after the NCCIC learned about 
the ``Heartbleed'' vulnerability--a weakness in the widely-used 
OpenSSL encryption software that protects the electronic 
traffic across much of the internet--the Center released an 
alert and posted mitigation information on the US-CERT 
website.\15\ During the ``denial of service'' attacks on U.S. 
banks in 2012 and 2013 and periodically in 2014, NCCIC's US-
CERT provided technical data and assistance to the banks, 
including identifying 600,000 distributed ``denial of service'' 
related internet protocol addresses.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\Id.
    \16\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Industry representatives from several sectors of the 
economy sit on the NCCIC floor. In testimony before the 
Committee, a representative from the financial industry praised 
the NCCIC: ``[o]ur presence [there] has enhanced situational 
awareness and information sharing between the financial 
services sector and the government with numerous examples of 
success.'' The witness further stated that the Financial 
Services Sector Coordinating Council--the entity that 
coordinates critical infrastructure and homeland security 
activities in the financial services industry--``supports 
formalization of the NCCIC through legislation.''\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \17\Strengthening Public-Private Partnerships to Reduce Cyber Risks 
to Our Nation's Critical Infrastructure, Hearing before the U.S. Senate 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Testimony of 
Doug Johnson, On behalf of the Financial Services Sector Coordinating 
Council (Mar. 26, 2014).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The NCCIC currently operates under the Homeland Security 
Act's general infrastructure protection authorities.\18\ S. 
2519 seeks to clarify those general existing authorities and to 
explicitly authorize the existing cybersecurity center within 
the Department of Homeland Security, so that the Center can 
continue its important work in serving as a federal civilian 
information sharing center for cybersecurity. The bill would 
also codify several other existing Center responsibilities, 
including authorizing the Center to: (1) provide shared 
situational awareness to enable quick and coordinated 
operational actions across the Federal Government; (2) share 
cybersecurity information and analysis by and among Federal, 
state, and local government entities and private sector 
entities; (3) coordinate cybersecurity information sharing 
throughout the Federal Government; (4) conduct analysis of 
cybersecurity risks and incidents; (5) provide incident 
response and technical assistance to federal and non-federal 
entities; and (6) recommend security and resilience measures to 
enhance cybersecurity. The bill would continue to allow 
personnel from Federal agencies, state and local governments, 
and the private sector to serve at the Center at the discretion 
of the Under Secretary of the National Protection and Programs 
Directorate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \18\See generally, 6 U.S.C. Sec. 121; 6 U.S.C. Sec. 124a; 6 U.S.C. 
Sec. 143. See also 44 U.S.C. Sec. 3546.
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                        III. Legislative History

    Chairman Carper and Ranking Member Coburn introduced S. 
2519 on June 24, 2014. The bill was referred to the Committee 
on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.
    The Committee considered S. 2519 at a business meeting on 
June 25, 2014. Senator Johnson offered one amendment, 
clarifying that S. 2519 does not grant the Secretary of 
Homeland Security any new authority to promulgate regulations 
or set standards relating to the cybersecurity of private 
sector critical infrastructure.
    The Committee adopted the amendment and then ordered the 
bill, as amended, reported favorably, both by voice vote. 
Senators present for both the vote on the amendment and the 
vote on the bill were Senators Carper, Levin, Pryor, Landrieu, 
McCaskill, Tester, Heitkamp, Coburn, McCain, Johnson, and 
Portman. Senators Levin and Tester asked to be recorded as 
voting no on the amendment.

        IV. Section-by-Section Analysis of the Bill, as Reported

Section 1. Short title.

    The short title of the bill is the ``National Cybersecurity 
and Communications Integration Center Act of 2014''.

Section 2. National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center

    Subsection 2(a) of S. 2519 would amend Subtitle A of title 
II of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296) to add 
new section--``210G. Operations Center.''
    Subsection 210G(a) of the Homeland Security Act would 
establish an operations center within the Department of 
Homeland Security, which may carry out the responsibilities of 
the Under Secretary appointed under section 103(a)(1)(H) of the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296) responsible for 
security and resilience (currently named the Under Secretary 
for the National Protection and Programs Directorate). The 
responsibilities of the operations center would include: 
serving as a Federal civilian information sharing hub for 
cybersecurity; providing shared situational awareness to enable 
real-time operations; sharing cybersecurity threat, 
vulnerability, impact and incident information and analysis by 
and among Federal, State, and local government entities and 
private sectors; coordinating cybersecurity information sharing 
throughout the Federal government; conducting analysis of 
cybersecurity risks and incidents; providing technical 
assistance to Federal and non-Federal entities, upon request, 
with respect to threats, attribution, vulnerability mitigation, 
and incident response and remediation; and providing 
recommendations on security and resilience.
    Subsection (b) of the new section of the Homeland Security 
Act would direct that the center is to be composed, at the 
discretion of the Under Secretary responsible for overseeing 
critical infrastructure protection and cybersecurity (see 
subsection (e)), of personnel from Federal agencies, including 
civilian and law enforcement agencies and the intelligence 
community, and representatives from state and local governments 
and other non-Federal entities, including representatives from 
information sharing and analysis organizations and private 
sector owners and operators of critical infrastructure.
    Subsection (c) of the new section of the Homeland Security 
Act would require the Secretary to submit an annual report one 
year after the date of enactment of the S. 2519 and for each of 
the next three years thereafter. The subsection requires the 
report to include an analysis of the performance of the 
operations center in carrying out the functions under 
subsection (a); information on the composition of the center; 
and information on the policies and procedures established by 
the center to safeguard privacy and civil liberties.
    Subsection (d) of the new section of the Homeland Security 
Act would require the Government Accountability Office to 
report to Congress one year after the date of enactment of S. 
2519 on the effectiveness of the operations center.
    Subsection (e) of the new section of the Homeland Security 
Act would make clear that it is within the discretion of the 
Under Secretary whether to include in the center, or provide 
information and assistance to, governmental or private 
entities. It also emphasizes that the fact that one private or 
governmental entity was included in the center or received 
information or assistance from it does not entitle any other 
private or governmental entity to such inclusion, information 
or assistance.
    Subsection 2(b) of S. 2519 would amend the table of 
contents of the Homeland Security Act to reflect the inclusion 
in the Act of the new section related to the operations center.

Section 3. Rule of construction

    Subsection (a) would provide the term ``critical 
infrastructure'' the meaning given under section 2 of the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002.
    Subsection (b) provides that S. 2519 does not grant the 
Secretary of Homeland Security any new authority to promulgate 
regulations or set standards relating to the cybersecurity of 
private sector critical infrastructure. Under this subsection, 
the Secretary retains pre-existing authority to issue 
regulations or standards relating to the cybersecurity of 
private sector critical infrastructure.

                   V. Evaluation of Regulatory Impact

    Pursuant to the requirements of paragraph 11(b) of rule 
XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee has 
considered the regulatory impact of this bill and determined 
that the bill will have no regulatory impact within the meaning 
of the rules. The Committee agrees with the Congressional 
Budget Office's statement that the bill contains no 
intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in the 
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) and would impose no costs 
on state, local, or tribal governments.

             VI. Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate

                                                     July 25, 2014.
Hon. Tom Carper,
Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. 
        Senate, Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has 
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for S. 2519, the National 
Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center Act of 
2014.
    If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be 
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Jason 
Wheelock.
            Sincerely,
                                              Douglas W. Elmendorf.
    Enclosure.

S. 2519--National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center 
        Act of 2014

    S. 2519 would codify in statute the existence of the 
National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center 
(NCCIC) of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The 
NCCIC, which was established in 2009, is located in the 
National Protection and Programs Directorate of DHS and is 
funded by appropriations provided to the Infrastructure 
Protection and Information Security appropriation account. So 
far in 2014 that account has received approximately $1.2 
billion, of which almost $800 million is for cybersecurity 
programs.
    S. 2519 would codify NCCIC's current role in protecting 
federal civilian agencies in cyberspace, sharing information on 
cybersecurity threats with DHS partners, and analyzing 
cybersecurity risks and incidents. CBO estimates that 
implementing the legislation would not result in a significant 
cost.
    Enacting S. 2519 would not affect direct spending or 
revenues; therefore, pay-as-you-go procedures do not apply.
    S. 2519 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector 
mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act and 
would impose no costs on state, local, or tribal governments.
    The CBO staff contact for this estimate is Jason Wheelock. 
The estimate was approved by Theresa Gullo, Deputy Assistant 
Director for Budget Analysis.

       VII. Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported

    In compliance with paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the 
Standing Rules of the Senate, changes in existing law made by 
S. 2519 as reported are shown as follows (existing law proposed 
to be omitted is enclosed in brackets, new matter is printed in 
italic, and existing law in which no change is proposed is 
shown in roman):

                     HOMELAND SECURITY ACT OF 2002

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

    (a) * * *
    (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act 
is as follows:
     * * * * * * *

      TITLE II--INFORMATION ANALYSIS AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION

     * * * * * * *

  Subtitle A--Information and Analysis and Infrastructure Protection; 
                          Access to Information

Sec. 201. Information and Analysis and Infrastructure Protection
     * * * * * * *
Sec. 210G. Operations Center
     * * * * * * *

TITLE II--INFORMATION ANALYSIS AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  Subtitle A--Information and Analysis and Infrastructure Protection; 
Access to Information

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

SEC. 210G. OPERATIONS CENTER.

    (a) Functions.--There is in the Department an operations 
center, which may carry out the responsibilities of the Under 
Secretary appointed under section 103(a)(1)(H) with respect to 
security and resilience, including by--
          (1) serving as a Federal civilian information sharing 
        interface for cybersecurity;
          (2) providing shared situational awareness to enable 
        real-time, integrated, and operational actions across 
        the Federal Government;
          (3) sharing cybersecurity threat, vulnerability, 
        impact, and incident information and analysis by and 
        among Federal, State, and local government entities and 
        private sector entities;
          (4) coordinating cybersecurity information sharing 
        throughout the Federal Government;
          (5) conducting analysis of cybersecurity risks and 
        incidents;
          (6) upon request, providing timely technical 
        assistance to Federal and non-Federal entities with 
        respect to cybersecurity threats and attribution, 
        vulnerability mitigation, and incident response and 
        remediation; and
          (7) providing recommendations on security and 
        resilience measures to Federal and non-Federal 
        entities.
    (b) Composition.--The operations center shall be composed 
of--
          (1) personnel or other representatives of Federal 
        agencies, including civilian and law enforcement 
        agencies and elements of the intelligence community, as 
        such term is defined under section 3(4) of the National 
        Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4)); and
          (2) representatives from State and local governments 
        and other non-Federal entities, including--
                  (A) representatives from information sharing 
                and analysis organizations; and
                  (B) private sector owners and operators of 
                critical information systems.
    (c) Annual Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of 
enactment of the National Cybersecurity and Communications 
Integration Center Act of 2014, and every year thereafter for 3 
years, the Secretary shall submit to the Committee on Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the 
Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives 
a report on the operations center, which shall include--
          (1) an analysis of the performance of the operations 
        center in carrying out the functions under subsection 
        (a);
          (2) information on the composition of the center, 
        including--
                  (A) the number of representatives from non-
                Federal entities that are participating in the 
                operations center, including the number of 
                representatives from States, nonprofit 
                organizations, and private sector entities, 
                respectively; and
                  (B) the number of requests from non-Federal 
                entities to participate in the operations 
                center and the response to such requests, 
                including--
                          (i) the average length of time to 
                        fulfill such identified requests by the 
                        Federal agency responsible for 
                        fulfilling such requests; and
                          (ii) a description of any obstacles 
                        or challenges to fulfilling such 
                        requests; and
          (3) the policies and procedures established by the 
        operations center to safeguard privacy and civil 
        liberties.
    (d) GAO Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of 
enactment of the National Cybersecurity and Communications 
Integration Center Act of 2014, the Comptroller General of the 
United States shall submit to the Committee on Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the 
Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives 
a report on the effectiveness of the operations center.
    (e) No Right or Benefit.--The provision of assistance or 
information to, and inclusion in the operations center of, 
governmental or private entities under this section shall be at 
the discretion of the Under Secretary appointed under section 
103(a)(1)(H). The provision of certain assistance or 
information to, or inclusion in the operations center of, one 
governmental or private entity pursuant to this section shall 
not create a right or benefit, substantive or procedural, to 
similar assistance or information for any other governmental or 
private entity.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                                  
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