The Honor able James S
. Gw i n, United States District J udg e for the Northe rn District of * Ohio, sitti ng by

desig nation. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 06a0673n.06 F iled: Septem ber 6, 2006 No. 05-6109 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
AL L STATE I

NSURA NCE COMPANY, as Subrog ee of

J ames L indsey , dece ased, Pla int if f- Ap pe lla nt,
v. L G& E ENE RG Y, L L C, Def endant- Appellee
. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE U NI TED STATES DI STRI CT C OUR T FO R THE EASTERN DI STRI CT OF KENTUCKY

Be fore : RYAN and COOK, Circ uit J udg es; and GWI N, District J udg e. * COOK, Circuit J udg e. P laintiff Allstate Insuranc e Company (“A llstate”) a

ppeals fr om the d i s t r i c tc o u rt ’ s o r d e r

d i s m i s s i n g A l l s t a t e ’ s c o mp l a i n ta g a i n s tD e f e n d an tLG & E E n e r g y , LLC (“L G& E”). We a ffirm.
Over three y ear s ag o, as the re sult of a seve re ic e storm , d eb ri s fell on James L indsey ’s proper ty in L exington, Kentucky , causingthe power to hi s h o m e t o go out. When the power w as restore d, L indsey ’s h o m e caught f ire due to the unrepa ired storm-damag e to his home’s ele ctrica l sy stem. L indsey filed a claim wit h Allstate, his proper ty insurer, and Allstate paid almos t $300,000No. 05-6109

A l l s t a t e v . L G &E

- 2 - to L indsey . Allstate, as subrog ee of L indsey , then filed a complaint ag ainst L G& E, whom it figur ed to be L indsey ’s electric company , claiming that L G& E’s neglig ence cause d the damag e to L indsey ’s p r o p e rt y an d

s e e k i n g d am a g e s f

o r t h e a m o u n ti tp a i d

t o L i n d s e y.
On May 20 , 2 00 5, L G& E b oth

ans we re d A lls tate ’s c omp la int and fi le d a mot ion to d ism iss purs ua nt t o F e d. R. Civ
. P . 1 2( b) (6 ), a tta c hin g an a ff ida vit fr om John P. F e nd ig(t

he “ F e nd ig aff idavit”), a senior corpor ate attorney for L G& E, to its m otion to dis miss. Fendig ’s af fidavit denied
a ro le in t he a c c ide nt a s f

oll ow s: [ A ] tn o t i m e d

u r i n g t h e i c e s t o r

m . . . , o r a tan y o t h e r t i m e , h a s LG & E E n e r g y

LLC provided a

ny elec trical powe r in Fa

y ette County , Kentucky ; owned any transmission or distribution sy stem fo r electricity in Fayette County ; had its employ ees inspec t pr op e rt ie s in

F ay e tte County , Ke ntu c ky , or ca us e d e le c tr ic a l po we r t o b e re sto re d to an y p r o p e rt i e s i nL e x i n g t o n , F aye t t e C o u n t y, K e n tu c ky. Allstate did not respond to L G& E’s motion. I nstead, some twenty -seve n day s later, Allstate f iled a motion for lea

ve to f ile an amende d complaint that proposed adding Kentucky Utiliti es (“ KU”) as a def endant with a c ount of neg lige nce ag ainst KU based “[u] pon information and belief, [t hat KU] is a wholly

owned su b s i d i ar y o f L G& E Ener g y .” The following day , the district court g rante d L G& E’ s mo tio n to dis mis s and de nie d a ll p e nd ingmot ion s a s mo ot.
Three wee k s late r , A ll s tate f il e d a “ M o ti o nf

o r Re li e f f r o m t h e Co u rt’ s O r d e r

G r an ti ng Def endant’ s Motion to Dis miss,” pursuant to F ed. R. Civ. P. 60( b)(1) , arguing that excusable neg lect of counse l cause d its failure to re spond to L G& E’s motion. But the district c ourt neve r consider edNo. 05-6109

A l l s t a t e v . L G &E

- 3 - the merits of the e x cusable -neg lect claim beca use just thre e day s into the pe ndency of the Rule 60(b) motio n , Al l s tate appe aled the dismissal order , there by deprivingthe cour

t of furthe r jurisdiction. Acc ording ly , the district c ourt dismiss ed the Rule 60(b) motion. Allstate appe als only from the or der dis mis sin g its c omp la int
. Su mm ar yJ ud gm e nt R ath e r th an 12 (

b) Di sm iss al
Given its relian ce o n t h e F endigaff idavit in dism issing the c omplaint, the district court
ne c e ssa ri ly “ tr e a te d [th e mot ion ] as on e fo r sum mary jud g me nt an d disp os e d o f [i t] a s p ro vid e d in Rule 56.” Fe d. R. Civ. P . 12(b). We thus revie w the dismissal de novo, askingwhether Allstate’s undefe nded complaint should have withstood L G& E’s motion. Brannam v. Huntington Mortgage Co. , 287 F.3d 601, 603 ( 6th Cir. 2002). We take ea ch of A llstate’s arguments in turn, evaluating wh e the r a ny e sta bli sh e s a g e nu ine iss ue of

mate ri a l f

a c t f or tr ia l. Allstate’s Reasons Supporting Reve rsal of Summary Judgme nt
Al lst a te ’s op e nin g br ie f’ s f ir st a rgume nt c on c e des “that th e iss ue s r a ise d in its Mo tio n to Amend and suppor

tin g Memorandum we re be tter suited to a Response” to L G& E’s dismissal motion, and further conce des “that a Response
. . . was not f iled within the 15-day period a llowed by [ t h e local cour

t rule].” Allstate g oes on to urg e that we never theless find its excusable neg lect
wa rr ants re ve rs a l and

re mand fo r t ri a l. T he iss ue of

e xcu sa ble ne g le c t in thi s c a se wa s c og niza ble in the c o n te xt o f F e d
. R. Ci v . P. 6 0 ( b ) ( 1 )
. B u t b e c a u s e th e d is tr ic t c o u rt n e v e r c o n s id ere d theNo. 05-6109

A l l s t a t e v . L G &E

- 4 - 60(b)( 1) issue—whe ther Allstate’ s failure to respond to L G& E’s dismissal mo t i o n resulted f rom excusable neg lect—this court will not consider it in the first instance . As we ha ve s ai d , t he cour

t “will not addre ss issues on appea l t h at we re n ot raised a nd ruled upon be low,” United States v. $100,375.00 i n U. S. Currency , 7 0 F .3 d 4 38 , 4 41 (6 th C ir . 1 99 5) (q uo tatio n o mitte d) , e xce pt i n exceptional circ umstances not pre sented he re. A nd it wa s Allstate that deprive d the district court of j u r is d ic ti o n to r

u le o n th e 6 0 ( b ) mo ti o n b y f il in g a n o ti c e o f a

p p e a l f r o m th e u n d e rly ing or der during the pende ncy

of the 60(b) motion. See SEC v . Johnston , 143 F.3d 260, 263 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that a district cour t does not reta in jurisdiction to rule on a Rule 60(b) motion if a noti ce of appea l from the under ly ing or der is filed be fore the cour t rules on the motion). Allstate next arg ues for

reve rsal on the stre ng th of its complaint, saying tha t its “ o ri g inal Com pla int pr op e rl y ple d n e g lig e nc e a g a ins t L G& E. ” Th e re ply br ie f ec ho e s this po int , p ointin g to the district court’s e rror

in not acce pting Allstate’ s “we ll-pled alleg ations . .
. as t rue,” the 12(b)( 6) standard. A s we discussed a bove, howe ver, the district court disposed of L G& E’s motion under Rule 56 standards, not Rule 12(b)( 6) standards. So this argument fails to acc ount for the import of the Fe ndig a ffidavit in the cour t’s summary

judgme nt decision.
Al lst a te ’s br ie f g oe s o n to c ri tic ize a sp e c ts of the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s op ini on but in e a c h c a se fa ils to tie the claimed de ficienc y to a theory en titli ng it to reversa l. Specifica lly , Allstate laments that “[i] t does not appea

r that the [di strict] cour

t c onsidered any of Allstate’s plea dings,” but offer s no furthe r e la b o r a ti o no r

r e a s o n in g e it

h e r p r o v in g th e p o in t o r

e v e ne xp la in in g h o w th e p r o positionNo. 05-6109

A l l s t a t e v . L G &E

- 5 - should move this cou rt t o reverse. B eca use Allstate fa iled to develop this argument in any meaning ful way , it is deemed waived. See U nited States v. Layne , 192 F.3d 556, 566 ( 6th Cir. 1999) (“[I ]s s u e s a dv e rte d

to in a p e r f u n c to r y ma n n e r , u n a c c o mp an ie d

b y s o me e f f o rt at d e v e loped argumentation, are deeme d waived.” (quotation omitted)). Second, Allstate c laims that “ it does not appea r that the District Court consider ed L G& E’s An sw e r . . . c on tr a dic t[in g ] [L G& E’ s] a sse rt ion s . . . in [its] Mo tio n to Di smi ss. ” Al lst a te su pp or ts this statement w ith a citation to two numbered pa rag raphs of

L G& E’s answe r, leaving it to the cour t to atte mpt

to d isc e rn

the all eg e d c on tr a dic tio n. No ne is a pp are nt. Al lst a te make s n o atte mpt to develop this argument any further
. Third, Allstate conte nds the district court er red in “ finding the [ Fe ndig] Aff idavit . . . was conclusive” beca

use “the corr espondenc e from L G& E’s age nt/repre sentative a nd information from L G& E’s we bsite further

ref utes L G& E’s af

fidavit.” B ut the documents Allstate points to were submitt ed to the court as attachme nts to Allst ate’ s motion t o amend—a motion unrelated to L G& E’s motion to di smiss—and Allstate conce des t hat i t should have filed a response i nstead. Allstate c ites
no a uth or ity fo r t he pr op os iti on

that th e dis tr ic t c ourt

e rr e d b y no t c on sid e ri ngthe se a tta c hme nts
. And eve n if Allstate had attache d these documents to a proper ly filed response , Rule 56(c) require s the district c ourt to c onsider “plea dings, depositions, a nswers to inter

rog atories, and admissions on file, tog ether

with . . . aff

idavits, if any .” Allstate doe s not ex plain how its attachments qualify under any of these c ateg ories.No. 05-6109

A l l s t a t e v . L G &E

- 6 - Upon de novo r eview w e hold that the district court proper ly applied Rule 56 in dismi ssing the complaint. Throug h the Fe ndig aff idavit, L G& E satisfied its initi al burde n of demonstrating the absenc e of a g enuine issue of materia l fac t, and Allstate fa iled to respond with suffic ient evidenc e in support of its claim. See Kraft v. United States , 991 F.2d 292, 296 (6th Cir. 1993); Fe d. R. Civ. P. 56(e).

W aiver of Notice Argume nt
We note that the district court fa iled to notify Allstate of its intention t o “t re at [ L G& E’s motion] as one f

or summary

judgme nt” by

con s i d er i n g “m att ers outside the ple ading ” or to g ive Allstate “a

rea sonable opportunity

to present a ll materia l made pertinent” by Rule 56 as re quired by Fe d. R. Civ. P . 12(b). B ut the failure of the c ourt to provide such notice i s n o t t h e t y p e o f error a revie wing court must raise sua sponte. See Y

as ho n v . G re

go ry , 737 F.2d 547, 552 ( 6th Cir. 1984) (“[A] dist rict court must aff ord the pa rty . . . ten-da y s notice and a

n adequate opportunity

to respond.

. . . Thepa rty

ag ain st w ho m s ua sp on te su mma ry ju dg men t ha s im pr op e rly be e n e nte re d m us t, ho we v e r, de mo ns tra te pr e jud ic e in or der to obt

ain re lie f on ap pe al. ” (e mph a sis a dd e d) ); se e als o Salehpour v. Univ. of Tenn ., 159 F.3d 199, 204 ( 6th Cir. 1998) (“Whether notice . .
. to the opposing pa rt y is n e c e ssa

ry de pe nd s u

po n th e fa c ts a

nd c ir c ums tanc e s o f e a c h c a se . . . . Whe re on e pa rt y is likely to be surprised by

the proc eeding s, notice is require d.”).No. 05-6109

A l l s t a t e v . L G &E

- 7 - Allstate raise s no ar g ument other than those se t forth above . I t never argues er ror in the fa ilure to g ive no tic e . I t do e s n ot a rgue surp ri se —n or

c ou ld it, a s L G& E’ s mo tio n to dis mis s it se lf noted the likely

need f or the c ourt to conver

t the motion to one for summary judgme nt in light of the submitt ed F endig aff

idavit. Nor d o es All state ar g ue that the a bsence of notice pr evente d it from prese nting all of i ts evidenc e. I nstead, Allst ate admits that it failed to timely respond due to its own excusable neg lect. And to compound the e rror , Al l s t at e short-c ircuited the a venue a vailable f or
a vo idi ngthe c on se qu e nc e s o f t his ne g le c t w he n it

no tic e d a n ap pe a l dur ing the pe nd e nc y of the Rul e 60 (b ) m oti on . In a

ny e ve nt, Al lst a te ’s fa ilure to pr e se nt a “ la c k- of -n oti c e ” argume nt i n it s a

pp e llate brief w aives ap p el l at e review of the issue. See B uziashvili v. Inman , 106 F.3d 709, 719 ( 6th Cir. 1997).
We a ff

ir m.No. 05-6109

A l l s t a t e v . L G &E

- 8 - Gw i n , Di s t ri ct J u d ge, d i s s en t i n g, Disag ree ing w ith the ma

jority ’s dispositi on of this c ase, I dissent. Thoug h the Plaintiff failed to raise the waiver of notice a rgument on appea l, Iwould reve rse the district c ourt’s orde r dismissing Al lst a te ’s c omp la int

be c a us e the dis tr ic t c ourt

fa ile d to pro vid e any no tic e to the pa rt ie s tha t it

wo uld treat L G& E’s motion to dism iss as a motion for summary judgme nt. Under our clea r prec edent, suc h notice wa s absolutely

require d befor e the d i s t ri ct cour t could conver

t the motion to di smiss t o a mot ion fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt. The majority

makes much of

the Plaintiff’s fa ilure to timely respond to t he De fenda

nt’s mot ion to d ism iss . H ow e ve r, a dis tr ic t court c ann ot d ism iss a pla int if f’ s c omp la int

so le ly be c a us e the plaintiff fails to r espond to a Rule 12(b) (6) motion to dismi ss. See Carve r v. Bunch , 946 F.2d 45 1, 45 2 ( 6th

Cir . 1 99 1) ; Bangura v. Hanse n , 434 F.3d 487, 498 (6th Cir. 2006) (“the district court
err oneously

place d the burde n on Plaintiffs to demonstrate that they stated a c laim for re lief . . . the moving party bear s the burden of demonstrating that the plaintiff fa iled to state a c laim.”). Whether or not th e p l ai n t i ff responds, the district c ourt’s task re mains the same – it ca nnot dismi ss the
c omp la int un les s it “ c on c lud e [s] ‘b e y on d a do ub t th a t th e pla int if

f c an p ro ve no se t of

fa c ts i n support of his claim which would e nti t l e h i m t o relief .’” Id
. (q u o t i n g Haines v. Kerne r , 4 04 U. S. 519, 521 (1972))
. Moreove r, a district court may not dismi ss a complaint for f ailure to state a

claim base d on a dis belief of the complaint’s fac tual alleg ations. Bove e v. Coopers & Lybrand C.P.A. , 272 F.3d 356,No. 05-6109

A l l s t a t e v . L G &E

- 9 - 36 0 ( 6th Cir . 2 00 1) ; Saglioccolo v. EagleIns. Co. , 1 12 F .3 d 226 , 228 -2 9 (6t h Cir. 19 97 ); W

right v. Me tro He alt

h M e d. Ctr

. , 58 F.3d 1130, 1138 (6th Cir.1995). I nstead, the court must acc ept all of the
c omp la int ’s fact ua l a lle g a tio ns a s tr ue wh e n d e te rm ini ngwh e the r t ho se a lle g a tio ns fo rm

a c la im. Smith v. City of Salem , 378 F.3d 566, 568 ( 6th Cir. 2004).
Occ asionally , such as oc curr ed in the ins tant case , on a Rule 12(b)(6) mot ion to dismi ss, a de fe nd ant m ay

c ha lle ng e the fa c tua l alle g a tio ns of a c omp la int wi th e xtri ns ic e vid e nc e . F e de ra l Ru le of Civil P roce dure 12( b) prov i d es t h at under such circ umstances, a court may

consider matters “outside the plea dings.” Howeve r, in the eve nt the court de cide s t o co n s i d er suc h matters, “the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgme nt and dis posed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parti es shall be given re asonable opportunity to present all materi a l made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56 .” F ed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (emphasis adde d).
I n Briggs v. Ohio Elections Comm’n , 61 F.3d 487, 493 ( 6th Cir. 1995), we he ld that where
a dis tr ic t c ourt int e nd s to c on sid e r mate ri a ls outsi de the ple a din g s, the dis tr ic t c ourt ha s th e duty to provide the pla intiff with notice and a rea sonable opportunity to respond. This proce dural saf eguard preve nts the risk of pre

judicial surprise. Harrington v. Painter , No. 03-5675, 2003 WL23156645 (6 th C ir . D e c . 1 8, 20 03 ). Ac c or din g ly , failur e to c omp ly wi th t he no tic e re qu ir e me nt s e t f or th i n Rule 12(b) is reve rsible er ror. See B riggs , 61 F .3 d a t 49 3; Helwig v. Venc or, Inc ., 251 F.3d 540, 552 (6th Cir. 2001) (“ Ru l e 1 2 authoriz es such a conver sion but mandates that par ties be g iven an opportunity

to submit materia ls to support or oppose summary judgme nt
. ”). Se e als o 27A Fe d.No. 05-6109

A l l s t a t e v . L G &E

- 10 - Proc., L . Ed. § 62:629 (“[A] court which conve rts the motion to a motion fo r s u m m ar y judgme nt under [Rule] 56 m ust comply with the notice and hear ing r equire ments of [Rul e] 56. This is t rue . . . wher e the c ourt otherwise considers matters outside the plea dings. Thus, a s a g ener al rule, notice must be g iven to eac h party that t h e s t at u s of the a ction is now chang ed, and the parties must be g iven a r easona

ble op p o rt u n i ty

to present leg al and f

actua l material in support of or in oppositi on to the motion for summary judgme nt.”) (citations omitted). “We have undersc ored this re quirement of ‘une quivocal notice’ on numerous occ asions.” He lwig , 251 F.3d at 552.
The rule requiringnotice of a court’s intention to conve rt a Rule 12(b) (6) motion to a motion for summary

judgme nt is only fair. U nder Rule 56, De fenda nt-Appellee L G& E Ener g y had eve ry
a b i l i t y t o c l e ar l y s e e k s u m m ar y j u d g m e n tan d t o r e l y

u p o ne v i d e n c e e x t r an e o u s t o t h e p l e a d i n g s . It did no t do thi s. I ns te a d, L G& E E ne rgy a tta c he d im

pe rm iss ibl e e xtra

ne ou s e vid e nc e to i ts R

ule 12(b)( 6) motion to dism iss. Allst ate c ould rea sonably believe, absent notice to the contra ry , that the district court would simply disreg ard the evidenc e dehor s the pleading s. Unless the cour t give s clea

r notice that it will consider evide nce outside the pleading s, the summary judgme nt cannot stand.
I n the instant c ase, the district c ourt provided no notice to the Plaintiff that it would treat the Def endant’ s motion t o dismiss the ca se under Rule 12(b)(6) as a motion for summar y judgme nt. The Def endant did sug g est in its motion to dismiss that conver sion of the motion was possible. Howeve r, Ifind that the Plaintiff lacke d fair notice and no opportunity to seek a n opportunity

under Rule 56( f) to o b t ain di scover

y and submit evidence in oppositi on to the Def endant’ s motion. Even if theNo. 05-6109

A l l s t a t e v . L G &E

- 11 - Plaintiff had bee n fully

awa re of the possibilit y

that the Court would consider the motion as one for summary judgme nt, the Plaintiff had almost no time to conduct discovery and respond – the Court g rante d the Def

endant’ s motion t o dismiss less than a month af ter it was f

iled.
Mo re ov e r , j u d g i n g f

r o m t h e d o c u m e n t s t h a t A l l s t a t e a t t a c h e d t o i t s m o t i o n t o a m e ndits complaint, Ibelieve that, given the opportunity , the Plaintiff could have prese nted evidenc e of Def endant L E& G’s possible involvement with the eve nts in question. For e x ample, whe n it filed its mot ion to amend its complaint, the Plaintiff attached maps taken from L G& E’s website, showing that either L G& E or Ke ntucky Utiliti es provides e lectric ity to Fayette County
. Al lst a te a dd iti on a lly

inc lud e d tw o le tte rs that i t rece ive d f ro m L G& E’ s in sure r, Ris k Manag ement Servic es Corpo ra tion (“Risk Manag ement”) . I n the first letter, dated April 1, 2003, Risk Manag ement re fer s to L G& E and Ke ntucky Utiliti es as a unit, stating that it would “be ha ndling this claim on behalf of L G& E/Kentucky Utiliti es.” ( J .A. at 42). In the sec ond letter, dated S ept emb er 29, 200 3, Ri sk Man agemen t once again refers to it s cl ien t as “Ken tu cky Ut il it ies (L G&E En e rg y ). ” F ur the rm or e , this le tte r ad

mit s that Ke ntu c ky Ut ili tie s per fo rm e d wor k in F ay e tte County afte r the storm: “In response to the storm, KU beg an immediate repa irs to the power sy stem befor e the storm even e nded. To make restoration possibl e, KU ha d its personnel wa lk along KU’s lines to find damag e.” (J .A. at 43). Whil e L G& E denied liabili ty in these letters, it at no point claimed that it was not a prope r par ty
.No. 05-6109

A l l s t a t e v . L G &E

- 12 - We have c onsistently

require d district courts provide notice to the parties pr ior to conver ting
a mot ion to d ism iss int o a mot ion fo r summa ry jud g me nt. Al lst a te wa s e nti tle d to re ly on that r ule and had no duty to independe ntly submit evidenc e in response to Fe nding’ s aff idavit absent notice that the district court would consider m atters outsi de the pleading s. Se e So ng v . Ci ty of E ly ria , O hio , 985 F.2d 840, 842 ( 6th Cir. 1993) (“ When a par ty moves to dismis s an ac tion under Rule 12(b)( 6) for f ailure to state a claim upon which relief can be g rante d, both sides proce ed with the expectation that the cour

t will decide the m otion on the basis of t he pleadings alone unl ess the cour t notifies them otherwise.” ). Ther efor e, I would hold that the di strict court’s f ailure to provide such notice a nd an opportunity

to respond amounts to reve rsible er ror.