SUMMARY

September 8, 2022

2022COA103

No. 21CA0109 Mohammadi v. Kinslow — Courts and Court 

Procedure — Limitation of Actions — Limitations for Persons 

Under Disability — When a Statute Begins to Run

Under section 13-81-103(1)(c), C.R.S. 2021, a plaintiff who is a 

“person under disability” when her cause of action accrues but 

whose disability is later terminated may take action “within the 

period fixed by the applicable statute of limitations or within two 

years after the removal of the disability, whichever period expires 

later.” As a matter of first impression in Colorado, a division of the 

court of appeals is asked to determine the application of section 

13-81-103(1)(c) to a situation in which the plaintiff’s disability is 

terminated before the applicable statute of limitations expires. A 

divided division concludes that it is bound by supreme court 

precedent holding that the applicable statute of limitations is tolled 

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions 

constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by 

the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be 

cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division. 

Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion 

should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
during the plaintiff’s period of disability and begins to run when the 

disability is terminated. The division further concludes that the 

supreme court has not recognized any exception to this rule when 

the disability is terminated before the statute of limitations expires.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2022COA103

Court of Appeals No. 21CA0109

Arapahoe County District Court No. 19CV32997

Honorable John L. Wheeler, Judge

Daniala Mohammadi,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Mark Kinslow,

Defendant-Appellee.

JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE

REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division V

Opinion by JUDGE YUN

Dunn, J., concurs

Welling, J., dissents

Announced September 8, 2022

The Viorst Law Offices, P.C., Anthony Viorst, David Chambers, Denver, 

Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant

Jeremy R. Maline & Associates, Kevin R. Kennedy, Andrew M. LaFontaine, 

Westminster, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee
1

¶ 1 In this car-bicycle accident case, the plaintiff, Daniala 

Mohammadi, a minor at the time of the accident, appeals the 

district court’s judgment dismissing her complaint against the 

defendant, Mark Kinslow, as time barred.

¶ 2 Section 13-81-103(1)(c), C.R.S. 2021, provides that when “the 

disability of any person is terminated” — e.g., when, as here, a

minor turns eighteen — “such person shall be allowed to take 

action within the period fixed by the applicable statute of 

limitations or within two years after the removal of the disability, 

whichever period expires later.” No published Colorado opinion has 

addressed the application of section 13-81-103(1)(c) to the situation 

presented here, in which Mohammadi turned eighteen before the 

applicable statute of limitations expired.

¶ 3 The district court ruled that the three-year statute of 

limitations was not tolled1 because Mohammadi’s disability was

terminated — because she turned eighteen — before the limitations 

1 “A tolling statute suspends the running of a time period that 

otherwise would expire.” Cintron v. City of Colorado Springs, 

886 P.2d 291, 294 (Colo. App. 1994). Throughout this opinion, we 

use the word “toll” to mean suspend. See Thurman v. Tafoya, 

895 P.2d 1050, 1054 n.5 (Colo. 1995).
2

period expired. Thus, the court explained, Mohammadi had either 

three years from the date of the accident or two years from the date 

she turned eighteen, whichever was later, to bring her lawsuit. 

Because Mohammadi did not meet the later deadline, the district 

court granted Kinslow’s motion to dismiss.

¶ 4 We reverse and remand for the district court to reinstate 

Mohammadi’s complaint. We conclude that we are bound by 

supreme court precedent holding that the applicable statute of 

limitations is tolled during a plaintiff’s period of disability and

“begins to run when the minor reaches the age of eighteen.” 

Rudnicki v. Bianco, 2021 CO 80, ¶ 16 (quoting Elgin v. Bartlett, 

994 P.2d 411, 414 (Colo. 1999), overruled on other grounds by 

Rudnicki, 2021 CO 80)). We further conclude that the supreme 

court has not recognized any exception to this rule when the

disability ends before the statute of limitations expires.

I. Background

¶ 5 On November 6, 2015, Mohammadi, then sixteen years old,

was injured when Kinslow hit her bicycle with his car. At the time 

of the accident, Kinslow was making a right turn while Mohammadi 

was crossing the intersection. Mohammadi turned eighteen on 
3

January 1, 2017, and sued Kinslow almost three years later, on

December 30, 2019, alleging negligence and negligence per se.

¶ 6 Kinslow moved to dismiss the lawsuit as untimely. He argued 

that, because Mohammadi was a minor at the time of the accident, 

section 13-81-103(1)(c) applied to her case. Under that section, he 

argued, Mohammadi had to bring her action either within the 

applicable three-year limitations period (that is, by November 6, 

2018) or within two years after she turned eighteen (that is, by 

January 1, 2019), whichever was later.

¶ 7 In response, Mohammadi agreed that section 13-81-103(1)(c) 

applied but argued that, under that section, the three-year 

limitations period was tolled and did not begin to run until her

eighteenth birthday. Accordingly, she argued, she did not need to 

bring her action until three years after she turned eighteen (that is, 

by January 1, 2020). Mohammadi further advised the district court 

that a factually similar case was pending on appeal and asked the 

court to stay this case “so that the dispositive issue [of the 

interpretation of section 13-81-103(1)(c)] can be resolved by the

Colorado Court of Appeals.”
4

¶ 8 Later, in Roske v. Estate of Anderson, slip op. at ¶¶ 2, 20-21 

(Colo. App. No. 19CA0484, Sept. 10, 2020) (not published pursuant 

to C.A.R. 35(e)), a division of this court held that, because the 

plaintiff was a minor at the time of her accident but turned eighteen 

before the three-year limitations period expired, section 

13-81-103(1)(c) required her to file suit “within three years from the 

date of the collision, or two years from the date she turned eighteen, 

whichever was later.”

¶ 9 While the district court noted that it could consider the 

unpublished Roske decision for its “persuasive value,” see

Patterson v. James, 2018 COA 173, ¶ 40, the court undertook its 

own textual analysis of section 13-81-103(1)(c). It ruled that,

because Mohammadi turned eighteen before the three-year statute 

of limitations expired, she had either three years from the date of 

her accident or two years from the date she turned eighteen, 

whichever was later, to bring her lawsuit. Because she did not 

meet the later deadline, the court concluded that her suit was time 

barred.
5

II. Analysis

¶ 10 Mohammadi contends that the district court’s interpretation of

section 13-81-103(1)(c) is inconsistent with supreme court 

precedent. We agree.

A. Standard of Review

¶ 11 The district court’s judgment granting Kinslow’s C.R.C.P. 

12(b)(5) motion to dismiss turns on its interpretation of section 

13-81-103(1)(c). We review the court’s interpretation of that statute 

de novo. Roberts v. Bruce, 2018 CO 58, ¶ 8.

B. Statutory Interpretation

¶ 12 When interpreting a statute, our task is to give effect to the

intent of the General Assembly. Klinger v. Adams Cnty. Sch. Dist. 

No. 50, 130 P.3d 1027, 1031 (Colo. 2006). In doing so, we look to 

the plain language of the statute as a whole and give “consistent, 

harmonious, and sensible effect to all its parts.” Roberts, ¶ 8.

¶ 13 In general, a person injured in a motor vehicle accident must 

bring suit within three years of the date of the accident. See 

§§ 13-80-101(1)(n)(I), -108(1), C.R.S. 2021. At the time of her

accident, however, Mohammadi was a minor and, therefore, a 

“person under disability.” See § 13-81-101(3), C.R.S. 2021 (defining 
6

a minor under eighteen as a “[p]erson under disability”). 

Accordingly, she was entitled to take advantage of the provisions of 

section 13-81-103.

¶ 14 Section 13-81-103 states, in pertinent part:

(1) When . . . a limitation is fixed upon the time 

within which a right of action . . . may be 

asserted . . . and the true owner of said right is 

a person under disability at the time such 

right accrues, then:

(a) If such person under disability is 

represented by a legal representative at the 

time the right accrues, or if a legal 

representative is appointed for such person 

under disability at any time after the right 

accrues and prior to the termination of such 

disability, the applicable statute of limitations 

shall run against such person under disability 

in the same manner, for the same period, and 

with the same effect as it runs against persons 

not under disability. Such legal 

representative, or his successor in trust, in 

any event shall be allowed not less than two 

years after his appointment within which to 

take action on behalf of such person under 

disability, even though the two-year period 

expires after the expiration of the period fixed 

by the applicable statute of limitations.

. . . .

(c) If the disability of any person is terminated 

before the expiration of the period of limitation 

in paragraph (a) of this subsection (1) and no 

legal representative has been appointed for 
7

him, such person shall be allowed to take 

action within the period fixed by the applicable 

statute of limitations or within two years after 

the removal of the disability, whichever period 

expires later.

¶ 15 In interpreting section 13-81-103(1)(c), the district court 

concluded the following:

 the phrase “before the expiration of the period of 

limitation in paragraph (a) of this subsection (1)” means 

before the expiration of the applicable statute of 

limitations;

 accordingly, section 13-81-103(1)(c) applies to someone

who is a “person under disability” when her cause of 

action accrues but whose disability is “terminated” or 

“remov[ed]” before the applicable statute of limitations

expires;

 because Mohammadi was a minor at the time of the 

accident but turned eighteen before the expiration of the 

three-year statute of limitations, section 13-81-103(1)(c) 

applied to her case;

 section 13-81-103(1)(c) unambiguously requires the 

calculation of two dates, and the later of the two 
8

determines the last day on which a plaintiff’s claim may 

be filed;

 the first date is “within the period fixed by the applicable 

statute of limitations” — here, three years from the date 

of the accident, or November 6, 2018;

 the second date is “within two years after the removal of 

the disability” — here, two years from Mohammadi’s 

eighteenth birthday, or January 1, 2019; and

 because Mohammadi did not bring her action on or 

before January 1, 2019, the later of the two dates, it was 

barred.

¶ 16 The federal district court’s reading of the statute in 

McKinney v. Armco Recreational Products, Inc., 419 F. Supp. 464, 

465 (D. Colo. 1976), supports these conclusions. The McKinney

court concluded that, when a plaintiff’s disability is terminated 

before the applicable statute of limitations expires, “[p]ursuant to 

§ 13-81-103(1)(c)[,] the applicable statute of limitations is not tolled, 

but rather continues to run. However, even if the period in which 

suit may be brought expires[,] a plaintiff still has two years [after 
9

the removal of the disability] in which to initiate an action.” Id. The 

court then illustrated its interpretation of the statute as follows:

For example, if a cause of action accruing to a 

minor arises under a six-year statute of 

limitations, but the action is not actually 

brought until seven years later which is three 

years after the minor has reached the age of 

majority[,] the action would be barred under

§ 13-81-103(1)(c) since it would be more than 

six years after accrual and more than two 

years after reaching the age of majority.

Id.

¶ 17 We acknowledge that both the plain language of the statute 

and McKinney support the district court’s interpretation of the 

statute. But while we might agree with the district court’s 

interpretation “were we writing on a blank slate, we are not writing 

on such a slate.” Harner v. Chapman, 2012 COA 218, ¶ 20, rev’d, 

2014 CO 78. Rather, as we will discuss below, we are bound by the 

decisions of our supreme court. Id.

C. Supreme Court Precedent

¶ 18 Since McKinney was decided in 1976, our supreme court has 

made it clear that section 13-81-103(1)(c) operates as Mohammadi 

says it does — that is, it tolls the applicable limitations period until 

a minor plaintiff reaches the age of eighteen. Our supreme court, 
10

not the federal district court, is the ultimate arbiter of the meaning 

of a Colorado statute. See People ex rel. Salazar v. Davidson, 

79 P.3d 1221, 1229 (Colo. 2003). And our supreme court has

interpreted section 13-81-103 multiple times over the years.

¶ 19 In In re Estate of Daigle, 634 P.2d 71, 75 (Colo. 1981), the 

court said,

Section 13-81-103(1), C.R.S. 1973, . . . creates 

what is the equivalent of a statutory toll to 

applicable statutes of limitations for persons 

under disability, such as minors, at the time a 

right of action accrues. Upon termination of 

the disability, section 13-81-103(1)(c) allows 

“such person . . . to take action within the 

period fixed by the applicable statute of 

limitations, or within two years after the 

removal of the disability, whichever period 

expires later.”

(Citations omitted.)

¶ 20 Similarly, in Southard v. Miles, 714 P.2d 891, 897 (Colo. 1986), 

the court concluded that “there can be no question that [section 

13-81-103] is intended to toll the applicable statute of limitations 

during the period of disability.” Specifically, “[t]he provisions of 

section 13-81-103 . . . operate to suspend the running of the 

applicable statute of limitations until either the disability is 
11

removed or, as expressly provided in subsection (1)(a), a ‘legal 

representative’ is appointed for the ‘person under disability.’” Id.

¶ 21 In Elgin, 994 P.2d at 414, the court recognized that

[a] person under disability, for whom the court 

has not appointed a legal representative, is 

protected by the statute of limitations’ tolling 

provisions. See § 13-81-103(1)(c), 5 C.R.S. 

(1999). The statute of limitations begins to 

run when the minor reaches the age of 

eighteen or when, if it does, a court appoints a 

legal representative for the minor.

¶ 22 Most recently, in Rudnicki, the court reaffirmed that “we have 

construed section 13-81-103(1)(c)” to mean that, unless a legal 

representative is appointed, “the statute of limitations . . . ‘begins to 

run when the minor reaches the age of eighteen.’” Rudnicki, ¶ 16

(quoting Elgin, 994 P.2d at 414). Although Rudnicki overruled Elgin 

on other grounds, it explicitly adopted Elgin’s reading of section

13-81-103(1)(c).

¶ 23 The dissent says that these supreme court cases are not 

binding because they do not address “what happens when a 

disability terminates, if at all, after the expiration of the otherwise 

applicable limitations period.” Infra ¶ 40. But that is precisely 

what section 13-81-103(1)(c) addresses — when “the disability of 
12

any person is terminated before the expiration of the period of 

limitation in paragraph (a) of this subsection (1).” And the supreme 

court, interpreting the same provision as the dissent, broadly 

concluded that section 13-81-103(1)(c) tolls the statute of 

limitations and, most recently, explained that “the statute of 

limitations . . . ‘begins to run when the minor reaches the age of 

eighteen.’” Rudnicki, ¶ 16 (quoting Elgin, 994 P.2d at 414). 

Because the supreme court has not excepted from its broad 

interpretation situations in which the minor turns eighteen before 

the statute of limitations expires, neither may we.

¶ 24 We therefore conclude that the district court erred by finding 

that Mohammadi’s lawsuit was time barred. Mohammadi was 

sixteen when the accident occurred on November 6, 2015. Under 

the supreme court’s interpretation of section 13-81-103(1)(c), 

because no legal representative was appointed, the applicable 

three-year limitations period was tolled and did not begin to run 

until she turned eighteen on January 1, 2017. Consequently, as 

she argued, Mohammadi had until January 1, 2020 — three years 

from her eighteenth birthday — to file her action.
13

¶ 25 We are not persuaded otherwise by Kinslow’s argument that 

section 13-81-106, C.R.S. 2021, confirms the district court’s 

interpretation of section 13-81-103(1)(c). Section 13-81-106 is 

titled “Removal of disability — effect,” and provides as follows:

If before the expiration of the period fixed by 

the applicable statute of limitations the 

disability of any person under disability is 

removed, the fact of such removal shall not in 

any way affect or stop the running of the 

applicable statute of limitations, except as 

provided in section 13-81-103(1)(c).

¶ 26 Kinslow argues that, “[u]nder this provision, once the 

disability is removed, the concept of tolling is wholly inapplicable.” 

But the operation of this provision is limited by the phrase, “except 

as provided in section 13-81-103(1)(c).” And the supreme court has 

interpreted section 13-81-103(1)(c) to mean that the statute of 

limitations is tolled until the minor turns eighteen. We are not at 

liberty to disregard a rule announced in prior supreme court 

decisions absent “some clear indication” that the supreme court has

overruled its earlier decisions. Harner, ¶ 20 (quoting Silver v. Colo.

Cas. Ins. Co., 219 P.3d 324, 330 (Colo. App. 2009)). Thus, any 

tension between section 13-81-106 and the supreme court’s 
14

interpretation of section 13-81-103(1)(c) must be resolved by that 

court or by the legislature.

¶ 27 Nor are we persuaded by Kinslow’s alternative argument that, 

because Mohammadi asked the district court to stay this case “so 

that the dispositive issue [of the interpretation of section 

13-81-103(1)(c)] can be resolved” in Roske, she is bound by the 

unpublished decision of the Roske division. As the district court 

correctly noted, unpublished decisions of the court of appeals are 

not binding. See Patterson, ¶ 40 (“[O]ur supreme court has made 

it . . . clear that unpublished opinions ‘have no value as precedent.’” 

(quoting Welby Gardens v. Adams Cnty. Bd. of Equalization, 71 P.3d 

992, 999 (Colo. 2003))). And in any event, we are not obligated to 

follow another division’s decision. People v. Johnson, 2020 COA 

124, ¶ 12, aff’d, 2021 CO 79.

¶ 28 Further, we are unpersuaded by Kinslow’s argument that the 

doctrine of judicial estoppel precludes Mohammadi from taking a 

position contrary to Roske. “Judicial estoppel is a narrow doctrine 

that precludes a party from taking a position in a proceeding that is 

totally inconsistent with a position the party took earlier in the 

same or related proceeding in an intentional effort to mislead the 
15

court.” Tuscany Custom Homes, LLC v. Westover, 2020 COA 178, 

¶ 35. For three reasons, judicial estoppel does not apply here. 

First, this doctrine “normally applies to inconsistent factual 

positions rather than legal positions,” Arko v. People, 183 P.3d 555, 

560 (Colo. 2008), and this case involves the latter. Second, 

Mohammadi did not mislead, much less intentionally mislead, the 

district court when she stated that the court of appeals in Roske

was considering the dispositive issue in this case. And third, 

Mohammadi’s position on appeal is not “totally inconsistent” with 

her position in the district court because she never agreed to be 

bound by an unpublished decision.

¶ 29 For all these reasons, Mohammadi’s filing of the action on 

December 30, 2019, fell within the time allowed by law, and the 

district court therefore erred by dismissing her case against 

Kinslow.

III. Request for Attorney Fees

¶ 30 Kinslow requests attorney fees under section 13-17-201, 

C.R.S. 2021. That statute provides that an award of attorney fees is 

mandatory when a district court dismisses a tort action under 

C.R.C.P. 12(b). Crandall v. City of Denver, 238 P.3d 659, 663 (Colo. 
16

2010). Further, “[a] party who successfully defends a dismissal 

order is entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees incurred on 

appeal.” Wilson v. Meyer, 126 P.3d 276, 284 (Colo. App. 2005). 

However, because we reverse the district court’s dismissal order, we 

deny Kinslow’s request for attorney fees.

IV. Conclusion

¶ 31 The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the 

district court with directions to reinstate Mohammadi’s complaint. 

Kinslow’s request for attorney fees is denied.

JUDGE DUNN concurs.

JUDGE WELLING dissents.
17

JUDGE WELLING, dissenting.

¶ 32 In my view, the clear and unambiguous language of section 

13-81-103(1)(c), C.R.S. 2021, dictates the outcome in this case. It 

is undisputed that Daniala Mohammadi turned eighteen years 

old — and her age-related disability terminated — before the 

expiration of the three-year limitations period that would have 

otherwise governed her claim. Under such circumstances, section 

13-81-103(1)(c) required Mohammadi to file suit within three years 

from the date of her injury, or two years from the date she turned 

eighteen, whichever was later. Because she didn’t file her 

complaint before this deadline, the district court properly dismissed 

her case.

¶ 33 Where I depart from the majority is in its interpretation and 

application of Rudnicki v. Bianco, 2021 CO 80, and Elgin v. Bartlett, 

994 P.2d 411 (Colo. 1999), overruled on other grounds by Rudnicki, 

2021 CO 80. The majority concludes that Rudnicki and Elgin are 

controlling in the circumstances presented here. Because I 

disagree, I respectfully dissent.
18

I. The Unambiguous Language of the Statute Bars Mohammadi’s 

Claim

¶ 34 “If the statutory language is unambiguous, we apply it as 

written and go no further.” Ford Motor Co. v. Forrest Walker, 2022 

CO 32, ¶ 19 (citing Nieto v. Clark’s Mkt., Inc., 2021 CO 48, ¶ 12). 

Only if the statutory language is ambiguous — “meaning that it is 

susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation” — may we 

turn to other interpretive aids to discern the legislature’s intent. Id.

(citing Nieto, ¶ 13). And in no event do the tools at our disposal 

“include adding our own words or deleting any the legislature has 

chosen.” Id. (citing Nieto, ¶ 12); see also Dep’t of Revenue v. Agilent 

Techs., Inc., 2019 CO 41, ¶ 16 (“[W]e must respect the legislature’s 

choice of language, and we will not add words to a statute or 

subtract words from it.”).

A. Applying the Statute as Written

¶ 35 Article 81 of title 13 treats a minor — someone “under 

eighteen years of age” — as a “person under disability” for the 

purpose of the running of a statute of limitations. See

§ 13-81-101(3), C.R.S. 2021. And section 13-81-103 governs when 

and how a statute of limitations runs against certain persons who 
19

are or were under disability. Specifically, section 13-81-103(1) is

divided into three subsections, each governing a different scenario: 

(a) when a “legal representative” represents or is appointed to 

represent a person under disability; (b) when a person dies while 

still under disability; and (c) when the disability “terminate[s]” 

before the expiration of the limitations period. Here, we are faced 

with the third of the three circumstances contemplated by section 

103(1). The pertinent paragraph provides as follows:

If the disability of any person is terminated 

before the expiration of the period of limitation 

in paragraph (a) of this subsection (1) and no 

legal representative has been appointed for 

him, such person shall be allowed to take 

action within the period fixed by the applicable 

statute of limitations or within two years after 

the removal of the disability, whichever period 

expires later.

§ 13-81-103(1)(c) (emphasis added).

¶ 36 The statutory language couldn’t be clearer: if (1) the disability 

“terminate[s]” before the expiration of the limitations period and 

(2) no legal representative has been appointed for the person, then 

the person must bring suit before the expiration of the longer of 

(A) what remains in the limitations period or (B) two years after the 

“removal of the disability.” Id.
20

¶ 37 The application of this rule to the facts of this case is equally 

straightforward. Mohammadi was just under two months shy of 

her seventeenth birthday when she was hit by a car driven by Mark 

Kinslow and her cause of action against him accrued. A three-year 

statute of limitations applies to Mohammadi’s claim against 

Kinslow. See § 13-80-101(1)(n)(I), C.R.S. 2021. Because she was 

under eighteen when she was injured, at the time her claim accrued 

she was “a person under disability” for the purpose of the running 

of the statute of limitations. The three-year limitations period had 

not yet expired when Mohammadi reached her eighteenth birthday 

and her “disability” was removed; there were approximately 

twenty-two months remaining in the limitations period at that time. 

Because less than two years remained on the statute of limitations

when Mohammadi turned eighteen (and the disability was 

removed), she had two years from her eighteenth birthday (i.e., until 

her twentieth birthday) to file her complaint. § 13-81-103(1)(c). 

The complaint wasn’t filed until two days before her twenty-first 

birthday, so it was untimely. § 13-81-103(2).
21

B. Supreme Court Cases

¶ 38 Up to this point I don’t think there is much daylight between 

my view and that adopted by the majority.

¶ 39 Where I part ways with the majority is the effect to accord a 

line of supreme court cases addressing how courts are to treat legal 

disability under circumstances not explicitly covered by section 

13-81-103(1). (Indeed, section 13-81-103 is silent as to what 

happens when a limitations period expires while a plaintiff is still 

under a disability.)

¶ 40 The cases that Mohammadi and the majority rely on address a 

scenario not covered by section 13-81-103: what happens when a 

disability terminates, if at all, after the expiration of the otherwise 

applicable limitations period. See Rudnicki, ¶ 16; Elgin, 994 P.2d at 

414; cf. Southard v. Miles, 714 P.2d 891, 897 (Colo. 1986); In re 

Estate of Daigle, 634 P.2d 71, 75 (Colo. 1981).

¶ 41 Rudnicki and Elgin are medical malpractice cases involving 

children who were injured at birth and at nine years old, 

respectively, and the applicable two-year statute of limitations, 

therefore, expired long before they turned eighteen. Rudnicki, ¶ 1; 

Elgin, 994 P.2d at 413.
22

¶ 42 Southard and Estate of Daigle aren’t any more on point. 

Southard involved a plaintiff who contended that he was under an 

ongoing disability when he attempted to amend his complaint to 

include a claim against an additional defendant after the underlying 

statute of limitations would have expired but for the alleged 

disability. 714 P.2d at 895. And Estate of Daigle involved wrongful 

death claims brought by three children who were still under the age 

of majority at the time the claims were filed on their behalf. 

634 P.2d at 73.

¶ 43 Simply put, none of the cases relied on by the majority involve 

the application of any provision of section 13-81-103. Instead, 

those cases involve the supreme court filling a gap not explicitly 

addressed by section 13-81-103 (or any other statutory 

provision) — namely, how is a limitations period affected when it 

expires while a plaintiff is still under a disability.

¶ 44 To be sure, the cases cited by the majority speak broadly of 

the statute of limitations being “tolled” while a plaintiff is under 

eighteen. See, e.g., Rudnicki, ¶¶ 16-17; Elgin, 994 P.2d at 413-14.

The majority concludes that because the supreme court has not 

excepted situations in which the minor turns eighteen before the 
23

statute of limitations expires from its broad interpretation, neither 

may we. Supra ¶ 23. I disagree. Instead, because the supreme 

court hasn’t addressed what happens when a plaintiff’s disability is 

terminated before the applicable statute of limitations expires, we 

must look to the plain language of the statute and not extend a 

supreme court ruling to where the supreme court itself hasn’t said 

it applies.

¶ 45 And I am not persuaded that the supreme court’s use of 

sweeping language to address circumstances outside the reach of 

the statute at issue circumscribes the operation of the statute 

under circumstances actually covered by the statute. More to the 

point, the cases cited by the majority don’t alter the plain meaning 

of section 13-81-103(1)(c); in my view, that slate remains blank.

II. Application

¶ 46 The timeline below illustrates section 13-81-103(1)(c)’s 

application to the facts of this case. The red line represents the 

period that Mohammadi was under a disability due to her age; the 

green line represents the three-year period after the claim accrued. 

As shown by the red and green lines together, Mohammedi’s 

disability terminated (she reached the age of majority) before the 
24

three-year limitations period expired. The solid orange line 

represents the two-year period following the termination of the 

disability (the period between her eighteenth and twentieth 

birthdays). That period expired on January 1, 2019 (Mohammedi’s 

twentieth birthday)



; the complaint wasn’t filed until December 30, 

2019 (the vertical blue line). Accordingly, I would conclude that 

Mohammadi’s complaint is time barred.

¶ 47 The limitations period urged by Mohammadi and adopted by 

the majority is the one shown by the dashed orange line, which is 

the three-year period following the termination of disability. Only 

this interpretation saves Mohammadi’s complaint. Because this 

interpretation is inconsistent with section 13-81-103(1)(c) and 

 Although Mohammadi’s birthday falls on a legal holiday, see

C.R.C.P. 6(a)(2), her deadline to file her negligence complaint would 

still have been the second anniversary of the termination of her 

disability, see Morin v. ISS Facility Servs., Inc., 2021 COA 55, ¶¶ 14, 

19; Williams v. Crop Prod. Servs., Inc., 2015 COA 64, ¶ 2.
25

because, in my view, it isn’t required by any binding authority, I 

reject it and, therefore, respectfully dissent.