U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

33–089 PDF WASHINGTON : 2018

CYBER–SECURING THE VOTE: ENSURING THE 

INTEGRITY OF THE U.S. ELECTION SYSTEM 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT 

AND GOVERNMENT REFORM 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JULY 24, 2018 

Serial No. 115–111 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov 

http://oversight.house.gov 


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COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

Trey Gowdy, South Carolina, Chairman 

John J. Duncan, Jr., Tennessee 

Darrell E. Issa, California 

Jim Jordan, Ohio 

Mark Sanford, South Carolina 

Justin Amash, Michigan 

Paul A. Gosar, Arizona 

Scott DesJarlais, Tennessee 

Virginia Foxx, North Carolina 

Thomas Massie, Kentucky 

Mark Meadows, North Carolina 

Ron DeSantis, Florida 

Dennis A. Ross, Florida 

Mark Walker, North Carolina 

Rod Blum, Iowa 

Jody B. Hice, Georgia 

Steve Russell, Oklahoma 

Glenn Grothman, Wisconsin 

Will Hurd, Texas 

Gary J. Palmer, Alabama 

James Comer, Kentucky 

Paul Mitchell, Michigan 

Greg Gianforte, Montana 

Michael Cloud, Texas 

Elijah E. Cummings, Maryland, Ranking 

Minority Member 

Carolyn B. Maloney, New York 

Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of Columbia 

Wm. Lacy Clay, Missouri 

Stephen F. Lynch, Massachusetts 

Jim Cooper, Tennessee 

Gerald E. Connolly, Virginia 

Robin L. Kelly, Illinois 

Brenda L. Lawrence, Michigan 

Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey 

Raja Krishnamoorthi, Illinois 

Jamie Raskin, Maryland 

Jimmy Gomez, Maryland 

Peter Welch, Vermont 

Matt Cartwright, Pennsylvania 

Mark DeSaulnier, California 

Stacey E. Plaskett, Virgin Islands 

John P. Sarbanes, Maryland 

SHERIA CLARKE, Staff Director 

WILLIAM MCKENNA, General Counsel 

TROY STOCK, Subcommittee Staff Director 

KILEY BIDELMAN, Clerk 

DAVID RAPALLO, Minority Staff Director 


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C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on July 24, 2018 ............................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Christopher Krebs, Under Secretary, National Protection and 

Programs Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 6 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 9 

The Honorable Thomas Hicks, Commissioner, U.S. Election Assistance Commission 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 14 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 17 

The Honorable Maggie Toulouse Oliver, Secretary of State, New Mexico 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 22 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 24 

The Honorable Ricky Hatch, County Auditor, Weber County, Utah 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 29 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 31 

APPENDIX 

Motion to Issue Subpoena to Dan Coats, offered by Mr. Connolly ...................... 88 

Mr. Meadows Motion to Table the Connolly Motion Vote Sheet ......................... 90 

Letter for the Record from 21 State Attorneys General, submitted by Ranking 

Member Cummings .............................................................................................. 91 

Four Letters for the Record, submitted by Mr. Clay ............................................ 96 

Two Letters for the Record, submitted by Ms. Lawrence .................................... 105 

Report from Capital Research Center, submitted by Mr. Palmer ....................... 116 

Questions for the Record for Mr. Krebs, submitted by Ranking Member 

Cummings ............................................................................................................. 132 


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CYBER–SECURING THE VOTE: ENSURING THE 

INTEGRITY OF THE U.S. ELECTION SYSTEM 

Tuesday, July 24, 2018 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM, Washington, D.C. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:01 a.m., in Room 

2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Trey Gowdy [chairman 

of the committee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Gowdy, Jordan, Sanford, Amash, Gosar, 

Foxx, Massie, Meadows, DeSantis, Ross, Walker, Blum, Hice, 

Grothman, Hurd, Palmer, Comer, Mitchell, Gianforte, Cloud, 

Cummings, Maloney, Norton, Clay, Lynch, Connolly, Lawrence, 

Watson Coleman, Krishnamoorthi, Raskin, Gomez, Welch, 

DeSaulnier, Plaskett, and Sarbanes. 

Chairman GOWDY. Good morning. The Committee on Oversight 

and Government Reform will come to order. 

Without objection, the presiding member is authorized is declare 

a recess at any time. 

I recognize myself for an opening statement, and then the gentleman from Maryland, and then I’ll recognize each of today’s witnesses. 

The right to vote is fundamental in a functioning democracy. In 

fact, the ability to pick our own leaders defines democracy. It’s the 

essence of self-governing. Everything we do in Congress from any 

legislative body, every bill passed, every hearing conducted, every 

witness summoned, every document accessed, all of it derives its 

power and legitimacy from an election. So the legitimacy of what 

we do is inextricably intertwined with the legitimacy of the underlying election. 

The power to vote is likewise contingent on that vote being 

counted, no more or no less than anyone else’s. And the legitimacy 

to govern, therefore, flows from the reliability of the underlying 

election process. 

Further adding to the uniqueness of this idea called ‘‘America’’ 

is the duality that elections are principally governed by and conducted by State and local officials and sometimes volunteers, even 

though many elections have decidedly national implications. The 

stakes are national; the threats are sophisticated and international. The process is State- and local-driven. But the States can 

and do ask for assistance, particularly given the nature of the attacks we now seem so face. 

Today’s hearing is focused generally on election security, on accepting and advancing our individual and collective belief that the 


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legitimacy of our work and the work of others in elective office is 

in direct proportion to the reliability of our own elections. 

Today’s hearing is broader than what happened in 2016, but 

what happened in 2016 must be addressed because the malefactors 

will attack us again. 

I personally am convinced beyond any evidentiary burden that 

Russia interfered with the 2016 election. I’m convinced Russia attempted to undermine the fundamentals of our democracy, impugn 

the reliability of the 2016 election, and sow the seeds of discord 

among Americans. 

Our intelligence community, both past and present, concluded 

this, as did the House Intelligence Committee report, as I am quite 

certain will the Senate Intelligence Committee report, and, equally 

importantly, as did our fellow Americans who served on the two 

grand juries which returned true bills. 

Just 10 days ago, the current Deputy Attorney General announced Russians engaged in cyber operations to interfere in the 

2016 Presidential election. They hacked into computer networks 

and installed malicious software that allowed them to spy on users, 

capture keystrokes, take screenshots, and exfiltrate and remove 

data from these computers. They also discussed the timing of the 

release in an attempt to enhance the impact on the election. 

This was not just his opinion; it was the consensus of average, 

everyday Americans who were called into service on what we call 

a grand jury. 

The Department of Justice said in both indictments, ‘‘There is no 

allegation that this inference changed the vote count or affected 

any election result,’’ but that was likely not for a lack of trying. 

What better way to undermine confidence in every derivative function of government than to cast doubt on the election results as a 

whole? 

Last week, many of us were in a SCIF, meeting with Inspector 

General Michael Horowitz. There were no cameras. It was just us 

and our colleagues from Judiciary. And my suspicion is all of us 

who were there left with a renewed understanding of what happened both in 2016 and even before that. We left even more fully 

cognizant that every election henceforth will be subject to attack, 

and, therefore, we must be prepared, not as partisans, but as fellow 

citizens. 

Russia attacked many institutions in our country. Some were 

successfully attacked, like the DNC and the DCCC, but many others were targeted. And I’m sure my colleagues were struck, as I 

was last week again and am struck every time I have access to relevant information, by the reality that all of us are actually victims. 

Some were impacted more than others, but the target was America, 

which is why those aforementioned indictments allege the ‘‘United 

States of America versus.’’ It’s not a political party or a group or 

an individual; it’s the ‘‘United States of America versus.’’ 

I am sure someone will correct me, as they are kind enough to 

do from time to time. I think it was none other than the Greek philosopher Solon who said—and I’ll get this partially right—the place 

we want to live is a place where even those of us who are not victimized by crime, even those of us who are not injured, even those 


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of us who are not aggrieved feel the pain of the injustice just as 

if we were victims ourselves. 

In 2016, it was one political party that was successfully accessed 

and materials disseminated. Those who seek to do us harm will be 

back at it again in 2018, perhaps with a different target. So we 

must take every precaution to safeguard our electoral process. And 

we’re here today to explore ways to ensure no vote count is ever 

affected and discuss how to protect our entire election process from 

start to finish. 

It is our responsibility to ensure no election is ever successfully 

interfered with. It is likewise our responsibility to ensure, when 

our fellow citizens place their ballot in the ballot box by whatever 

means, their vote is recorded accurately and counted correctly. 

There will be efforts to affect us. There will be attacks. There 

will be efforts to sow the seeds of discord and discontent. And there 

will be efforts to call into question the legitimacy of our electoral 

process. But Americans are uniquely good at coming together in 

the aftermath of a tragedy or a loss or an attack, or at least we 

used to be. It’s one of the most endearing and unifying qualities. 

The challenge is, can we come together even in an environment 

like the one we find ourselves in now and repel the attack before 

it happens? 

Whether we win or lose, we need and want to have confidence 

every valid vote was counted and nothing interfered with the will 

of the American jury. Americans are free to quarrel about who 

should be elected. We will have a hard time sustaining this gift of 

self-governance that we have been given if we begin to quarrel 

about who actually was elected. 

With that, I would recognize the gentleman from Maryland. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. I want to first thank the chairman for this hearing. 

And, as the chairman was talking, I could not help but feel chills, 

because one of the last things that my mother said, a 92-year-old 

woman who had fought for the vote and who had seen people 

lynched and harmed trying to get the vote, one of the last things 

she said on her dying bed is, ‘‘Don’t let them take the vote away 

from us.’’ Chilling. 

And so this hearing means a lot to me personally, and I know 

it means a lot to every Member of this body. After all, we wouldn’t 

be here if people did not have the right to vote. And so I dedicate 

these words to Ruth Elma Cummings. 

I want to thank the chairman for calling this very important 

hearing. Candidly, however, it is not enough. It’s not enough. It’s 

not enough. Words are cheap. 

This is the first time since Donald Trump was elected in 2016 

that the Oversight Committee has held a full committee hearing on 

Russian interference in the election. It took us a year and a half 

to finally hold today’s hearing. 

This hearing comes less than 4 months—hello—4 months before 

the 2018 midterm elections. And most States have already held 

their primaries. 

In addition, the chairman denied our request to invite the Office 

of the Director of National Intelligence to testify today. Congress 


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needs to understand how Russia attacked our States in order to 

help States defend against these attacks in the future. 

And I’m so glad that the chairman acknowledged the fact that 

we are under constant attack. This ain’t nothing new. And they are 

prepared to do it again and again and again. And they have probably learned some things from what they’ve done; they’re going to 

do it even better and try to do it more effectively—that is, interfering with our elections—the next time. 

Dan Coats, the Director of National Intelligence, recently warned 

that, and I quote—listen to what he said: ‘‘The warning lights are 

blinking red.’’ He compared these warning signs to what we saw 

before 9/11. 

Let me repeat that. President Trump’s own Director of National 

Intelligence compared our situation now to the months leading up 

to the attacks of September 11th, 2001. 

Yet Chairman Gowdy would not send an invitation to ask anyone 

from ODNI to testify. We understand that we may get a classified 

briefing at some later date, but a closed-door briefing is no substitute for a public hearing to inform the American people about 

what is going on. We have DHS here. We should have the intelligence community here as well. 

We held a subcommittee hearing in November on election 

cybersecurity, but it was also inadequate. Mr. Krebs, who is here 

from DHS, also testified in November. At that hearing, we asked 

him for documents showing how Russia attacked our States, doing 

our duty as a check on the executive branch. At first, Mr. Krebs 

gave us only a single document. Later, he gave us 50 pages, much 

of which was already public. 

Thank you very much. 

We sent a letter asking Chairman Gowdy to subpoena the documents DHS is withholding, but he ignored it. We sent another letter asking him to let us vote on a subpoena, but he denied our motion. 

Because this issue is so important, we joined with the ranking 

members of other key committees and sent a letter to Speaker Paul 

Ryan. We implored him to help us get from the Trump administration these documents about how Russia attacked our States. But 

all we got was silence. Silence. Radio silence. 

It was not until Special Counsel Robert Mueller indicted 12 Russian military officials on July 13 that we finally learned something 

more about the specific attacks Russia had launched against our 

States. The Trump administration withheld this information from 

us. 

We should not have been forced to read about it in a press release. DHS and other agencies should have provided that information months ago. Again, that is our job, to check the executive 

branch. We can’t even get the information, both classified and unclassified. 

So we have worked with States to help secure their election systems. It is clear that the House Republicans do not want information about Russia’s attack on our States in the last election, which 

seems like a pretty basic first step, pretty basic, just getting the 

information, when you are trying to help these very States defend 

against Russian attacks in the next one. 


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But even worse, the House Republicans are taking active steps 

to hurt State efforts to protect their election systems. Just last 

week, House Republicans blocked all attempts to provide additional 

funding to secure State election systems. They argued that States 

do not need more money because they could cover these security 

upgrades on their own. 

I have a letter here that we just received yesterday completely 

contradicting that Republican talking point. And I ask unanimous 

consent to make it a part of the official hearing record, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman GOWDY. Without objection. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. This letter is from a bipartisan group of 21 State 

attorneys general, both Republican and Democrat. They expressed, 

and I quote, ‘‘grave concern over the threat to the integrity of the 

American election system,’’ end of quote, and they asked for additional funding. 

‘‘We are concerned that many States lack the resources and tools 

they need to protect the polls. Additional funding for voting infrastructure will not only allow States to upgrade election systems but 

will also allow for a comprehensive security risk assessment.’’ 

Let me conclude with this. Some Republicans have recently 

begun to issue more critical statements about President Trump and 

Russia. Chairman Hurd wrote an op-ed in The New York Times asserting that our committee must conduct vigorous and public oversight. And this is his quote. Now, I didn’t say this. Chairman Hurd 

said this. 

‘‘I believe that lawmakers must fulfill our oversight duty as well 

as keep the American people informed of the current danger. As a 

member of the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, I strongly believe in the importance of Congress’s oversight 

responsibilities and will work with my colleagues to ensure that 

the administration is taking the Russian threat seriously,’’ end of 

quote. 

I agree with every syllable Chairman Hurd wrote. I think he’s 

telling the truth. But it would be much more powerful with action 

to back it up. We need all of our Republican colleagues to conduct 

oversight, not just use strong words. 

Support our request to subpoena the Trump administration for 

documents it is withholding about the Russian attacks. 

Support our request for the Director of National Intelligence to 

testify in public. 

Vote in favor of additional funding for States that desperately 

need it. 

We don’t need talk; we need action. This should be a bipartisan 

issue. And, Mr. Chairman, you are absolutely right. This must be 

a bipartisan issue. This must be an issue where we put our party 

hats to the side. And we have less than 4 months to help our 

States before the next election. 

And, with that, I yield back. 

Chairman GOWDY. The gentleman yields back. 

I’m pleased to introduce today’s witnesses. I’ll introduce you in 

group and then recognize you individually for your opening statements. 


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The Honorable Christopher Krebs, Under Secretary for National 

Protection and Programs at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security; the Honorable Thomas Hicks, Commissioner at the U.S. 

Election Assistance Commission; the Honorable Maggie Toulouse— 

I knew I’d get that wrong, so my apologies. It’s my South Carolina 

upbringing. I think I’ll just go with ‘‘Oliver’’ and not even try to 

pronounce it one more time—secretary of State from New Mexico; 

the Honorable Ricky Hatch, county auditor of Weber County, Utah. 

Welcome. Pursuant to committee rules, I’m going to have to administer an oath, so I’d ask you to please stand and raise your 

right hand. 

Do you solemnly swear or affirm the testimony you’re about to 

give shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, 

so help you God? 

May the record reflect that all the witnesses answered in the affirmative. 

You may sit down. There’s a lighting system that will help you. 

You may rest assured that your opening statements are in the possession of every member and they will be read. So, to the extent 

you’re able to summarize your remarks in 5 minutes, that would 

be great. 

With that, Mr. Krebs, you are recognized. 

WITNESS STATEMENTS 

STATEMENT OF THE HON. CHRISTOPHER KREBS 

Mr. KREBS. Thank you. 

Chairman Gowdy, Ranking Member Cummings, and members of 

the committee, thank you for today’s opportunity to testify regarding the Department of Homeland Security’s ongoing efforts to assist State and local election officials, those who own and operate 

election systems, with improving the resilience of election security 

across America. 

Today’s hearing is timely, as primary elections are winding down 

and election officials have time to reflect and get ready for the November elections. In fact, less than 2 weeks ago, Secretary Nielsen 

and the DHS leadership team met with election officials as they 

gathered in Philadelphia for their summer conference. 

Let me state plainly and clearly: The 2018 midterm elections remain a potential target for Russian cyber and influence operations. 

As described in the 2017 intelligence community assessment, we 

know the Russians engaged in a multifaceted campaign to meddle 

in the last election, including some influence tactics that they have 

used for decades. Based on this prior demonstration of capability 

and intent, we are planning and preparing as if they’ll try again 

this fall and beyond. 

In terms of current activity, the intelligence community has observed continued malign influence operations into 2018. While 

these recent activities are designed to exacerbate sociopolitical divisions, there does not appear to be an effort at the same scope or 

scale directed at the midterms that was observed in 2016, nor have 

we seen Russian cyber operations directly targeting State and local 

election systems infrastructure. 


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Having said that, there is little doubt that some adversaries and 

nonstate actors view elections as a target for cyber and influence 

operations. Having been given a roadmap, we are certain some 

cyber actors are interested in identifying and potentially exploiting 

vulnerabilities in election systems, some driven by prior malicious 

actions and global dialogue about risks to election infrastructure. 

Additionally, malicious cyber activity from various actors is regularly observed against U.S. infrastructure, including during the 

2018 primary season, often common types of activity seen by many 

internet-connected systems. 

Due to that threat landscape, we remain vigilant, and any attempt to undermine our democracy will be met with consequences. 

In the meantime, we will continue to work with our election partners to strengthen the resilience of our election systems. 

As I’ve traveled across the country during primary season, it’s 

clear to me that secretaries of State and other election officials are 

not sitting back. They take cybersecurity and security in general 

seriously. 

Our mission at DHS is to help our stakeholders better understand and manage the risks they face through concerted efforts. In 

part by building relationships, establishing trust, and understanding what it is that our stakeholders need to manage their 

risk, we have made significant progress over the last year and a 

half. 

With strong partnership with the Election Assistance Commission, we are working with State and local officials as well as those 

private-sector partners who support them. We have created government and private-sector councils, who collaboratively work to share 

information, promote best practices, and develop strategies to reduce risk to the Nation’s election systems. 

We have created the Election Infrastructure Information Sharing 

and Analysis Center, or EI–ISAC, with almost 1,000 members, including all 50 States. We are sponsoring security clearances for 

multiple election officials in each State. We have increased the 

availability and deployment of free technical assistance. And we 

have offered cybersecurity and physical security training and exercises. And, in fact, later this summer, we’ll conduct a 3-day tabletop exercise with a number of election officials. 

We’ll continue to refine and update our suite of services as the 

requirements identified by our stakeholders mature. This will take 

time and a deliberate effort on both sides, as across the 50 States 

and 5 territories there are over 10,000 jurisdictions that are responsible for elections. The systems, processes, and procedures 

used vary greatly. What works for the voters of Florida likely does 

not work for the voters of California. 

We are focused on engaging those many jurisdictions by each 

State and territory. This effort, known as our Last Mile Initiative, 

is focused on tailoring awareness of the threat, security mitigation 

best practices, and election security guidance checklist to the individual county or local level. We understand that the only way to 

deliver a resilient election system is to work collaboratively with 

those officials, including our partners at the EAC, as well as those 

on the front line running the process. 


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Before I conclude, I want to take a moment to thank Congress 

for legislative progress thus far in strengthening DHS’s 

cybersecurity authorities. And we strongly support the passage of 

the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Act. 

I look forward to further outlining our efforts to enhance the security of elections, our progress to date, and our strategy moving 

forward. 

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Krebs follows:] 


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Statement for the Record 

The Honorable Christopher C. Krebs 

Under Secretary 

National Protection and Programs Directorate 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

FOR A HEARING ON 

"Cyber-securing the Vote: Ensuring the Integrity of the U.S. Election System" 

BEFORE THE 

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM 

Tuesday, July 24, 2018 

Washington, DC 
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Chairman Gowdy, Ranking Member Cummings, and members of the Committee, thank 

you for today's opportunity to testify regarding the U.S. Department of Homeland Security's 

(DHS) ongoing efforts to assist with reducing and mitigating risks to our election infrastructure. 

DHS is eager to share with you the progress we have made to establish trust-based partnerships 

with our Nation's election officials who administer our democratic election processes. 

Recognizing that the 2018 U.S. mid-term elections are a potential target for malicious 

cyber activity, DHS is committed to robust engagement with state and local election officials, as 

well as private sector entities, to assist them with defining their risk, and providing them with 

information and capabilities that enable them to better defend their infrastructure. 

Given the foundational role that elections play in a free and democratic society, in 

January 2017 the Secretary of Homeland Security designated election infrastructure as a critical 

infrastructure subsector. Under our system of laws, federal elections are administered by state 

and local election officials in thousands of jurisdictions across the country. These officials 

manage election infrastmcture and ensure its security and resilience on a day-to-day basis. 

As such, DHS and our federal partners have formalized the prioritization of voluntary 

cybersecurity assistance for election infrastructure similar to that which is provided to a range of 

other critical infrastmcture entities, such as financial institutions and electric utilities. 

Since 2016, DHS's National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) has convened 

Federal Government and election officials regularly to share cybersecurity risk information and 

to determine an effective means of assistance. The Election Infrastmcture Subsector (EIS) 

Government Coordinating Council (GCC) has worked to establish goals and objectives, 

including plans for EIS engagement and the establishment of a sector-specific plan (SSP). GCC 

representatives include DHS, the Election Assistance Commission (EAC), and 24 state and local 

election officials. Participation in the council is entirely voluntary and does not change the 

fundamental role of state and local jurisdictions in overseeing elections. 

The Department and the EAC worked with election industry representatives to launch an 

industry-led Sector Coordinating Council (SCC), a self-organized, self-mn, and self-governed 

council with leadership designated by the sector membership. The SCC serves as industry's 

principal entity for coordinating with the government on critical infrastructure security activities 

and issues related to sector-specific strategies, and policies. This collaboration is conducted 

under DHS's authority to provide a forum in which government and private sector entities can 

jointly engage in a broad spectrum of activities to coordinate critical infrastmcture security and 

resilience efforts which is used in each of the critical infrastructure sectors established under 

Presidential Policy Directive 21, Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience. The process is 

a well-tested mechanism across critical infrastmcture sectors for sharing threat information 

among the Federal Government and critical infrastructure partners, advancing risk management 

efforts, and prioritizing services available to sector partners in a tmsted environment. 

NPPD also engages directly with election officials--coordinating requests for assistance, 

risk mitigation, infonnation sharing, and incident coordination, resources, and services. In order 

to ensure a coordinated approach from the federal government, NPPD has convened stakeholders 
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from across the Federal Government through an Election Task Force. The task force serves to 

provide actionable infom1ation and offer assistance to assist election officials with strengthening 

their election infrastructure by reducing and mitigating cyber risk, and increasing resilience of 

their processes. 

Within the context of today' s hearing, I will address the unclassified assessment of 

malicious cyber operations directed against U.S. election infrastructure and our efforts to help 

enhance the security of elections that are administered by jurisdictions around the country. 

Enhancing Security for Future Elections 

DHS regularly coordinates with the intelligence community and law enforcement 

partners on potential threats to the Homeland. Among non-federal partners, DHS has been 

engaging state and local officials, as well as relevant private sector entities, to assess the scale 

and scope of malicious cyber activity potentially targeting the U.S. election infrastructure. 

Election infrastructure includes the information and communications technology, capabilities, 

physical assets, and technologies that enable the registration and validation of voters; the casting, 

transmission, tabulation, and reporting of votes; and the certification, auditing, and verification 

of elections. 

DHS is committed to ensuring a coordinated response from DHS and its federal partners 

to plan for, prepare for, and mitigate risk to election infrastructure. We understand that working 

with election infrastructure stakeholders is essential to ensuring a more secure election. DHS 

and our stakeholders are increasing awareness of potential vulnerabilities and providing 

capabilities to enhance the security of U.S. election infrastructure as well as that of our 

democratic allies. 

Election officials across the country have a long-standing history of working both 

individually and collectively to reduce risks and ensure the integrity of their elections. In 

partnering with these officials through both new and ongoing engagements, DHS is working to 

provide value-added-yet voluntary-services to support their efforts to secure elections. 

Improving Coordination with State, local Tribal, Territorial (SLTT) and Private 

Sector partners. Increasingly, the nation's election infrastructure leverages information 

technology (IT) for efficiency and convenience, but also exposes systems to cybersecurity risks, 

just like in any other enterprise environment. Just like with other sectors, NPPD helps 

stakeholders in federal departments and agencies, SLTT governments, and the private sector to 

manage these cybersecurity risks. Consistent with our long-standing partnerships with state and 

local governments, we have been working with election officials to share infom1ation about 

cybersecurity risks, and to provide voluntary resources and technical assistance. 

The National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) works 

with the MS-ISAC to provide threat and vulnerability information to state and local officials. 

For nearly a decade, DHS has funded the Multi-State Infom1ation Sharing and Analysis Center 

(MS-ISAC), which has since created the EI-ISAC, to enable its members to share cybersccurity 

information and collaborate with each other. The EI-ISAC's membership includes almost I ,000 

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SLTT election-specific entities. Through the MS-ISAC, it has representatives co-located with 

the NCCIC to enable regular collaboration and access to information and services for state chief 

information officers. 

Providing Technical Assistance and Sharing Information. NPPD actively promotes a 

range of services including: 

Cyber hygiene service for Internet-facing systems: Through this automated, remote 

scan, NPPD may provide a report identifying vulnerabilities and mitigation recommendations to 

improve the cybcrsecurity of systems connected to the Internet, such as online voter registration 

systems, election night reporting systems, and other Internet-connected election management 

systems. 

Risk and vulnerability assessments: We have prioritized state and local election 

systems upon request, and increased the availability of risk and vulnerability assessments 

(RVAs). These in-depth, on-site evaluations include a system-wide understanding of 

vulnerabilities, focused on both internal and external systems. We provide a full report of 

vulnerabilities and recommended mitigations following the testing. 

Incident response assistance: We encourage election officials to report suspected 

malicious cyber activity to the NCCIC. Upon request, the NCCIC can provide assistance in 

identifying and remediating a cyber incident. Information reported to the NCCIC is also critical 

to the federal government's ability to broadly assess malicious attempts to infiltrate election 

systems. This technical information will also be shared with other state officials so they have the 

ability to defend their own systems from similar malicious activity. 

Knowing what to do when a security incident happens-whether physical or cyberbefore it happens, is critical. NPPD supports election officials with incident response planning 

including participating in exercises and reviewing incident response playbooks. Crisis 

communications are a core component of these efforts, ensuring officials are able to 

communicate transparently and authoritatively to their constituents when an incident unfolds. In 

some cases, we do this directly with state and local jurisdictions. In others, we partner with 

outside organizations. We recognize that securing our nation's systems is a shared 

responsibility, and we are leveraging partnerships to advance that mission. 

Information sharing: NPPD maintains numerous platforms and services to share 

relevant information on cyber incidents. State election officials may also receive information 

directly from the NCCIC. The NCCIC also works with the EI-ISAC, which allows election 

officials to connect with the EI-ISAC or their State Chieflnformation Officer to rapidly receive 

information they can nsc to protect their systems. Best practices, cyber threat information, and 

technical indicators, some of which had been previously classified, have been shared with 

election officials in thousands of state and local jurisdictions. In all cases, the inforn1ation 

sharing and/or use of such cybersecurity risk indicators, or information related to cybersecurity 

risks and incidents complies with applicable lawful restrictions on its collection and use and with 

DHS policies protective of privacy and civil liberties. 

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Classified information sharing: To most effectively share information with all of our 

partners-not just those with security clearances-we work with the intelligence community to 

rapidly declassify relevant intelligence or provide tearlines. While DHS prioritizes declassifying 

information to the extent possible, we also provide classified information to cleared stakeholders, 

as appropriate. DHS has been working with state chief election officials and additional election 

staff in each state to provide them with security clearances. By working with ODNI and the 

Federal Bureau oflnvestigation (FBI), in February 2018 election officials from each state 

received one-day read-ins for a classified threat briefing while they were in Washington, DC. 

This briefing demonstrated our commitment to ensuring election officials have the information 

they need to understand the threats they face. 

Field-based cybersecurity advisors and protective security advisors: NPPD has more 

than 130 cybersecurity and protective security personnel available to provide actionable 

information and connect election officials to a range of tools and resources to improve the 

cybersecurity preparedness of election systems; and to· secure the physical site security of voting 

machine storage and polling places. These advisors are also available to assist with planning and 

incident management for both cyber and physical incidents. 

Physical and protective security tools, training, and resources: NPPD provides 

guidance and tools to improve the security of polling sites and other physical election 

infrastructure. This guidance can be found at }YIVW~@~.gov/hometown-scctiJ.i!y. This guidance 

helps to train administrative and volunteer staff on identifying and reporting suspicious activities, 

active shooter scenarios, and what to do if they suspect an improvised explosive device. 

DHS has made tremendous strides and is committed to working collaboratively with 

those on the front lines of administering our elections to secure election infrastructure from risks. 

The establishment of government and sector coordinating councils will build the foundations for 

this enduring partnership not only in 2018, but for future elections as well. We will remain 

transparent as well as agile in combating and securing our physical and cyber infrastructure. 

However, we recognize that there are significant technology needs across SL TT governments, 

and State and local election systems, in particular. It will take significant and continual 

investment to ensure that election systems across the nation are upgraded and secure, with 

vulnerable systems retired. These efforts require a whole of government approach. The 

President and this Administration are committed to addressing these risks. 

In closing, there is a fnndamentallink between public trust in our election infrastructure 

and the confidence the American public places in basic democratic functions. Ensuring the 

security of our electoral process is a vital national interest and one of our highest priorities. Our 

voting infrastructure is diverse, subject to local control, and has many checks and balances. As 

the threat environment evolves, we will continue to work with federal agencies, state and local 

partners, and private sector entities to enhance our understanding of the threat; and to make 

essential physical and cybersecurity tools and resources available to the public and private 

sectors to increase security and resiliency. 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before the Committee today, and I look forward 

to your questions. 

4 
14 

Chairman GOWDY. Mr. Hicks? 

STATEMENT OF THE HON. THOMAS HICKS 

Mr. HICKS. Good morning, Chairman Gowdy, Ranking Member 

Cummings, and members of the committee. I am pleased to testify 

before you today to discuss the U.S. Election Assistance Commission’s work to support State and local election leaders in their efforts to conduct efficient, accessible, and secure elections. 

When Congress passed the Help America Vote Act of 2002, it established the EAC as an independent, bipartisan commission 

charged with developing guidance to help meet HAVA’s requirements: adopting voluntary voting system guidelines and certifying 

election systems, serving as the national clearinghouse of information on election administration, as well as dispensing and auditing 

HAVA funds. 

I am pleased to report that our capable team continues to fulfill 

this mission day-in and day-out, and election officials across the 

country constantly affirm our work does indeed help America vote. 

The EAC is the only Federal entity focused solely on the administration of elections. We serve as the central hub for other Federal 

agencies that spend only part of their time working on this important issue, including those who specialize in technology and 

cybersecurity. Our partners, ranging from DHS and the FBI to the 

U.S. Postal Service and DOD, rely on the EAC to provide deep 

knowledge about how elections work and a clear line of communication to those in the field who administer the vote. 

Election security is not new to those election officials or the tens 

of thousands of election administrative staff members and election 

workers who support that work. That said, you can see from this 

diagram it is not our only responsibility. The work described for 

the election officials encompasses everything from the ADA compliance and voter registration to election mail management and 

human resources. This is why it’s so vital that Congress and Federal agencies, especially the EAC, provide election administrators 

with resources and tools they need to help succeed. 

The establishment of election systems as part of the Nation’s 

critical infrastructure was one way that the Federal Government 

sought to improve the mechanisms it uses to accomplish this goal. 

Following Former Secretary Johnson’s critical infrastructure announcement, the EAC worked actively to provide State and local 

election officials with a voice at the table during discussions about 

how the sector would function. 

DHS has often stated that the sector’s Government Coordinating 

Council, the GCC, was formed faster than any other similar critical 

infrastructure sector council to date. And the EAC takes pride in 

its role we played to make that happen. It is proof of how State, 

local, and Federal governments can effectively worked together for 

a common goal of protecting our Nation’s infrastructure. 

I serve on the GCC’s Executive Committee, which has worked 

diligently to ensure the ‘‘critical infrastructure’’ designation has 

tangible, meaningful impact across the Nation. But we all know 

that many of the solutions to security challenges take resources, 

and we’re pleased that members of this committee and your congressional colleagues recognized this reality when supporting the 


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Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2018. That legislation contained 

$380 million in security funds for States and territories to improve 

the administration of Federal elections. 

Just 4 months after the appropriation bill was signed into law, 

I’m proud to report that we have received disbursement requests 

for 100 percent of the funds. That demonstrates the EAC’s responsiveness and the States’ and territories’ urgency in addressing 

ways to improve election systems. 

Less than 2 weeks after President Trump signed the appropriation bill into law, the EAC personally notified each eligible jurisdiction and issued notice of grant award letters to every State and territory. Just 1 week after that, the first State, Missouri, requested 

funds. 

In the weeks that followed, the EAC conducted a webcast public 

forum to explain the funds and worked directly with the National 

Association of Secretaries of State and the National Association of 

State Election Directors to share information. The EAC also conducted webinars, published FAQs and other resources on our 

website, educated nongovernmental groups, including those focused 

on issues such as accessibility and security about the funds. Our 

expert grants team has also helped States navigate logistical hurdles. 

To date, we know that the States plan to spend the vast majority 

of this money, nearly 75 percent, on cyber protection, new voting 

equipment, updates of registration systems, and audits. These are 

all investments that reflect congressional guidance and priorities. 

For those of you who have specific questions about how your 

State are investing those funds or programs overall, the EAC 

would be happen to establish a time to provide additional details 

about those plans. 

The EAC has a broad spectrum of ongoing work to complement 

our vital role as the administrator of HAVA funds, including the 

testing and certification of election systems; creation of new resources related to a broad spectrum of election administration activities; production of new research; convening of public events that 

bring together election administrators, security experts, academics, 

Federal Government officials, and many others to discuss the approach of election systems to better serve American voters. 

The Commission continues to release new resources, conducting 

training participation in a series of events, including initiatives focused on election security. Our staff was intricately involved in the 

establishment of Harvard University Belfer Center’s tabletop exercise that is conducted across the Nation. And our own staff has 

traveled to nearly a dozen States to conduct election officials as IT 

management trainings for State and local election officials. These 

trainings are ongoing, and we work with DHS to put these 

trainings online. 

While election administrators at the State level, which is yet another layer of security to protect the vote, those who administer 

elections are grateful for Federal support and use these resources 

to ensure the election systems are secure and resilient. The EAC 

appreciates congressional support of our efforts and your commitment to provide resources to the States and territories that we 

serve. 


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I look forward to providing additional details about the Commission’s work and answering any and all of your questions. 

Thank you. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Hicks follows:] 


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House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Hearing: 

"Cyber-securing the Vote: Ensuring the Integrity of the U.S. Election System" 

July 24, 2018 

Commissioner Thomas Hicks, Chair, 

United States Election Assistance Commission (EAC) 

Good morning Chairman Gowdy, Ranking Member Cummings, and members of the committee. 

I am pleased to appear before you today to offer testimony on the pressing issue of election 

security. In this 2018 election year, providing election security tools and resources to state and 

local officials is one of the Election Assistance Commission's most important responsibilities. 

Election security is not new to the EAC, and it is not new to the state and local officials who run 

elections. Much is riding on the shoulders of state and local election officials. These officials 

work endlessly and tirelessly to deliver upon the high expectations our country has of them. The 

EAC Commissioners and staff are privileged to have the opportunity to support these faithful and 

conscientious public servants, who are perpetually focused on ensuring that the nation has secure 

elections. 

As emphasized during the June 20.2018, Senate Rules Committee hearing on election security, 

the EAC focuses solely on elections and that is of great value to election administrators. We have 

attached a diagram at the end of this testimony that demonstrates the broad spectrum of duties 

that require election administrators' awareness and management. Since election officials operate 

in each of these important and distinct areas, the EAC also works to provide support for each of 

these responsibilities. 

Beyond this work, the EAC provides voters with vital resources and assistance needed to register 

to vote and cast their ballots. We also cultivate and maintain a national clearinghouse of election 

administration information that provides our partners in Congress and across federal government, 

state and local leaders, private industry, advocacy organizations, academia, and others in the 

elections industry with the information, research, and best practices that informs their own 

election-related work. 

The EAC also works alongside federal partners to leverage their subject matter specific expertise 

to augment the EAC's whole-of-elections perspective with specialized products. Among our 

wide variety of federal partners are the Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of Justice (DO.J), the Federal Bureau oflnvestigation 

(FBI), the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), and the United States Postal 

Service (USPS). We collaborate with these agencies on a wide range of issues and work with 

their teams to inform new EAC products and initiatives, share timely information with election 

stakeholders, and ensure state and local election leaders are aware of available federal resources 

beyond those offered by the EAC. We also advise federal agencies on how their products can 

best meet the needs of election stakeholders. 

Election security is one of the most integral components of the EAC's work. To this end, the 

EAC has continued to work diligently over the last 12 months to help states secure elections. The 

EAC has expeditiously and responsibly distributed the newly appropriated Help America Vote 

Act (HA VA) funds to the states, assisted our federal partners in establishing and managing the 

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critical infrastructure operational framework, continued to test and certify voting systems, and 

distributed important best practices in election administration as we all look ahead to the 2018 

midterm election and beyond. My testimony will provide more detail about each of these 

activities. 

Distributing Newly Appropriated HA VA Funds 

In the Consolidated Appropriations Act of2018, Congress appropriated $380 million in HAVA 

funds to the states and eligible territories for projects and programs to improve the administration 

of federal elections. In just over 3 months, the EAC has received disbursement requests for 100% 

of the funds from all 55 eligible states and eligible territories, and 100% of the funds are 

available for the eligible states and territories to draw down. This is a remarkable development, 

and on behalf of the states, I thank you for appropriating these vital resources. 

The EAC's work to distribute these HAVA funds reflects our strong commitment to providing 

the unparalleled support for state and local election administrators. The EAC issued Notice of 

Grant Award letters to each state less than two weeks after the bill was signed into law by 

President Trump. Within three weeks of the signing, Missouri became the first state to request its 

funds. In the subsequent I 0 weeks, the EAC conducted a webcast public forum to explain how 

the funding would proceed, worked directly with the National Association of Secretaries of State 

(NASS) and the National Association of State Election Directors (NASED) to share information, 

conducted multiple wcbinars to further discuss how the funds may be used, consulted with 

members of the disability community to hear their views on use of the funds, and had frequent 

contact with each state in an effort to move the funds quickly. 

In addition, the EAC website provides access to a set of Frequently Asked Questions regarding 

the funds, and this information has been updated on a near-daily basis since the law was enacted. 

The attached map, also available on the EAC website (www.eac.gov), now shows the amount of 

funds appropriated to each state and indicates that all of the affected 55 states and territories have 

submitted disbursement requests. The EAC has fulfilled its promise to get the funds to the states 

as quickly as possible, and the EAC is proactively consulting each of the states and territories on 

the proper use of the funds. 

While several administrative issues have arisen in the funds disbursement process, the EAC's 

grants department is endeavoring to help the states navigate such issues so they may receive the 

funds in advance of the coming elections. For example, one roadblock states encountered was the 

ongoing government-wide issue with System for Awards Management (SAM) accounts. The 

EAC's grants department is working alongside our federal partners at the Government Services 

Administration (GSA) to provide additional support to the states' SAM account holders to get 

the funds properly distributed. 

The funds are being disbursed with agreement by the states to provide a short narrative 

describing plans for how the funds will be used. Details from these documents will be shared 

with the entire election community and on the EAC's website, which is a primary portal tor 

information sharing. As states and territories tine tune their own plans for how to invest the new 

HA VA funds, it is essential that they have access to the wealth of ideas and innovative 

approaches contained in other states' activities. The EAC's staff continues to work closely with 

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the states and territories and to compile the information we receive so that the election 

community and others have access to particulars of how the states and territories are expending 

their funds, including efforts to further update and secure their election systems. 

Critical Infrastructure Activities 

The distribution ofHAVA funds is only the latest example of the EAC's work related to election 

security. The EAC has served as a central partner with DHS in ensuring the success of this 

national security effort, including joint efforts that took place well before the 2017 Critical 

Infrastructure designation by former Secretary Jeh Johnson. The DHS has stated that the election 

sector's Government Coordinating Council (GCC) was formed faster than any other similar 

critical infrastructure sector council to date. The EAC took an early leadership role in working 

toward this accomplishment, and we recognize it as an exemplary proof-point of how local, state, 

and federal governments can effectively work together toward the shared goal of protecting our 

nation's election infrastructure. 

Building on that success, the EAC also convened discussions between election system vendors 

and the DHS for the formation of the Sector Coordinating Council (SCC). Thanks to the swift 

establishment of the GCC and the well-established relationships between the EAC and election 

equipment vendors, work on the SCC began in the summer of 2017, and its official formation 

meeting took place before the end of last year. Both councils were functioning before the 2018 

election year, less than one year from the Critical Infrastructure designation by the DHS. 

During and after the 2016 election cycle, the EAC was a key player in federal efforts to share 

vital security information with the states and educate our federal partners about ways to best 

serve the needs of election administrators. For example, the EAC: 

3 

Distributed urgent security alerts and threat indicators from the DHS and the Federal 

Bureau of!nvestigation (FBI) to states and territories to help protect election systems 

from specific cybersecurity threats. 

Met on multiple occasions with staff from the DHS, the FBI, and the White House to 

discuss specific and nonspecific threats, state and local election system security and 

protocols, and the dynamics of the election system and its 8,000 plus jurisdictions 

nationwide. 

Served as the federal government's primary communication channel to provide real-time 

cybersecurity information to election officials around the country. This information 

included current data on cyber threats, tactics for protecting election systems against 

these threats, and the availability and value ofDHS resources for protecting cyber-assets. 

Participated in and convened conference calls with federal officials, Secretaries of State 

and other State Chief Election Officials, state and local election administration officials, 

federal law enforcement, and federal agency personnel to discuss the prospect of 

designating elections as part of the nation's critical infrastructure. These discussions 

focused on topics such as coordinating security flashes from the FBI, the implications of 

a critical infrastructure designation, education on the nation ·selection system, and the 

dynamics of successfully communicating information to every level of election officials 

responsible for running the nation's election system. 
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Provided DHS with perspective, information, and data related to the election system, 

introductions to officials in the election community, and information that assisted the 

agency with shaping communications in a manner that would be useful to the states and 

local election officials. 

Published a white paper entitled "U.S. Election Systems as Critical Infrastructure" that 

provided a basic understanding of critical infrastructure for election officials. 

Contributed to multiple foundational DHS documents used to structure the Elections 

Systems Critical infrastructure designation and sector. 

The EAC Chair serves on the GCC Executive Committee, and all EAC Commissioners are 

chartered members of the committee. Like many other members of the GCC the EAC is seeking 

security clearances through the DHS. We have been assured that the department will address 

those requests soon. 

In 2018, the EAC has focused on steps our commission could take to further serve election 

officials operating in the new threat environment. The EAC gathered election officials, security 

officials, academics, and federal government partners for an Election 2018 kick-off summit at the 

National Press Club in January. This event raised awareness of the security preparations election 

officials had underway and the resources available to the states and localities to help with this 

critical work. In April, the EAC held a live-streamed public forum expressly comprised of 

election officials to facilitate the sharing of security best practices among election colleagues. 

While talking about election security at forums is important, the EAC also knows the importance 

of training. EAC staff was intricately involved in the establishment of Harvard University's 

Belfer Center Table Top Exercises, which have since been conducted across the country. During 

the past year, the EAC has also developed and presented its "Election Official as IT Manager" 

training to officials representing hundreds of election jurisdictions across the country, and we are 

working with the DHS to put this training online through the FedVTE platform so that many 

more election officials can easily access it. 

The EAC also produced a video and supporting meeting materials to help local election officials 

explain the many levels of election security at their jurisdiction. The video was designed to be 

viewed at civic group meetings and election worker trainings. It can also be customized by 

jurisdictions, and some states are tailoring the video to their voters and processes. In addition, the 

EAC Commissioners continuously meet with state and local election officials at regional 

conferences across the country. These visits allow the Commissioners to apprise officials of best 

practices, promote resources available from the EAC and our federal partners, and discuss 

current concerns and topics in election administration, such as contingency planning, 

accessibility, voter registration, and technology management. 

Testing and CertificationNoluntarv Voting System Guidelines 

The Help America Vote Act charges the EAC with administering a federal program for setting a 

voluntary national standard for testing and certificating voting systems. This testing standard is 

the EAC's Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG), and vendors may choose to have 

EAC-accredited and monitored labs test their voting systems against these guidelines for 

certification. The guidelines contain requirements for security, as well as other important 

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components-such as accessibility, usability, and interopcrability. In fact, while security is a 

guiding consideration of certification, so is accessibility for voters with disabilities and voters 

with limited English proficiency. These considerations are deliberated and developed in public 

working groups under the direction of the EAC's Technical Guidelines Development Committee, 

which is chaired by the Director and Undersecretary of Commerce for Standards and 

Technology, currently Dr. Walter G. Copan. 

The TGDC's membership is made up of technical and scientific experts from fields such as 

security, accessibility, voting machine production, and voting machine use. After development 

and approval by the TGDC, the voluntary guidelines are submitted to the EAC's Executive 

Director, provided to the EAC's Standards Board and the Board of Advisors, published for 

public comment, and presented to the EAC's Commissioners for consideration and approval. The 

EAC recently convened its advisory boards to review and comment on the adoption of the 

newest version of the voluntary guidelines, VVSG 2.0. Both Boards recommended that the EAC 

adopt VVSG 2.0. The EAC, however, is currently without its minimum number of three 

commissioners needed for a quorum to vote on the VVSG. 

While the EAC has been hard at work on the newest version of the VVSG, the commission has 

not stopped its ongoing work to rigorously review, test, and certify voting systems. These 

reviews are referred to as test campaigns. In these campaigns, EAC accredited laboratories test 

vendor-submitted voting systems against the standard contained in the VVSG. Once a system 

successfully completes a test campaign, the results of the campaign arc transmitted to the EAC's 

Executive Director for certification of the voting system to the standard against which it was 

tested. Ifthe EAC's Executive Director agrees that the voting system has conformed with the 

standard, it is certified as such and assigned a certification number. 

In addition to the actual certification of the voting systems, the EAC's Testing and Certification 

Program continually conducts quality monitoring of all EAC certified systems and audits the 

quality of the EAC accredited test labs. Monitoring of the voting systems occurs throughout the 

entire span of manufacturing and life of service, including manufacturing facility audits, field 

system review and testing, and field anomaly reporting from manufacturers and election 

officials. 

Conclusion 

The EAC's mission includes supporting election officials across the country with the 

administration of federal elections so that they can help "Help America Vote." We endeavor to 

provide as much support and assistance as possible to the state and local election officials we 

serve. The importance of election security and how the newly appropriated HA VA Funds will 

assist states are primary agency focuses and top priorities. We are honored to support the 

important work carried out by election administrators each and every day. We welcome your 

feedback, and we look forward to answering questions you may have. 

5 
22 

Chairman GOWDY. Ms. Toulouse Oliver? 

STATEMENT OF THE HON. MAGGIE TOULOUSE OLIVER 

Ms. TOULOUSE OLIVER. Good morning. Thank you, Chairman 

Gowdy, Ranking Member Cummings, and members of the committee, for the chance to appear before you today and address some 

of the things happening at the national level and some work specific to New Mexico and also to the National Association of Secretaries of State. 

My name is Maggie Toulouse Oliver. I’m the New Mexico secretary of State. Prior to serving as secretary of State, I was county 

clerk in Bernalillo County, which is the Albuquerque metropolitan 

area. I ran elections in the largest jurisdiction in the State of New 

Mexico for 10 years. 

I’m also the treasurer of the National Association of Secretaries 

of State, known as NASS, and a founding and current member of 

the Election Infrastructure Subsector Government Coordinating 

Council, the EIS GCC. 

NASS is a nonprofit professional organization founded in 1904. 

The organization provides secretaries of State, chief election officials, and other public officials from across the United States with 

opportunities to share public policy ideas and best practices. This 

collaboration is important because it gives election officials access 

to information beyond what is available in our own States, helping 

us find innovative solutions to common election administration 

issues. 

During the recent NASS summer conference held in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, over 80 of our sessions, workshops, and discussions revolved around elections cybersecurity. Election officials like 

myself are taking the possible threat of foreign actors meddling in 

our elections very seriously. 

In addition, during the conference, Department of Homeland Security Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen delivered remarks to members of 

NASS and to the National Association of State Election Directors, 

during which Secretary Nielsen emphasized the fact that election 

security is national security. She also highlighted the positive 

progress and working relationships between DHS and the States to 

protect elections infrastructure. 

While State and local officials have always been focused on election security, the focus of our national organizations and the Federal Government has increased significantly since 2016. It is clear 

that election security will be a top priority for State, local, and Federal officials as well as the general public moving forward. 

What is also clear is that the Federal Government and State and 

local election officials must keep the lines of communication open 

when it comes to election security and must continuously work together to harden our Nation’s election systems. 

Now to a little bit about my State. New Mexico is a leader in 

best practices, I am proud to say. We utilize paper ballots in all 

elections and have robust pre- and post-election testing, accuracy, 

and auditing processes, just to name a few. In fact, New Mexico 

was one of the first States in the Nation to conduct post-election 

audits. 


KING-6430 with DISTILLER
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Additionally, the vote tabulation systems that we use are never 

connected to the internet and include other important security 

mechanisms that reduce the ability for a bad actor to change votes. 

These practices are important election security safeguards that are 

now being adopted by States all across the country. 

In regard to specific State preparations for 2018 and beyond, I 

would like to thank you and your colleagues for appropriating the 

remaining Help America Vote, HAVA, funds to States in the recent 

omnibus bill. According to the U.S. Election Assistance Commission, as of July 16th, 2018, all of the funds have been requested 

by the States and eligible U.S. territories, of course as we just 

heard from Mr. Hicks. 

In New Mexico, we recently requested our portion of over $3.6 

million in HAVA dollars from the U.S. Election Assistance Commission. We plan to use these funds to ensure that New Mexico’s 

election systems continue to be resilient and secure. 

Some of the funds will be used to purchase more robust voting 

systems that provide for additional security features for our counties. We’ve also launched a brand-new election security program 

within our Bureau of Elections, with a portion of the HAVA funds 

earmarked to fund a full-time staff position to manage this program through 2023. 

The program administrator will be responsible for implementing 

security best practices to safeguard New Mexico’s sensitive election 

data and systems at the State and county level and to provide 

training and support to county clerks and their staff on 

cybersecurity issues. This is particularly important in New Mexico’s smaller, more rural counties that may have limited technical 

support available to assist with security issues. We will also allocate some of the funds to assist counties with various system upgrades that they cannot afford on their own. 

We are excited to have the opportunity to put this program into 

effect and appreciate the support of Congress and DHS in these efforts. 

Thank you again, members of the committee and Mr. Chairman, 

for inviting me and my colleagues to testify before you and for giving me the opportunity to speak about this important matter on behalf of NASS and the State of New Mexico. I look forward to answering any questions you may have. 

[prepared statement of Ms. Toulouse Oliver follows:] 


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National Association of Secretaries of State 

444 North Capitol Street, NW- Suite 401 

Washington, D.C. 20001 

202-624-3525 Phone/202-624-3527 Fax 

www.nass.org 
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My name is Maggie Toulouse Oliver, and I am the New Mexico Secretary of State. I am also the Treasurer 

of the nonpartisan National Association of Secretaries of State (NASS), and a founding member of the 

Election Infrastructure Subsector Government Coordinating Council (EIS-GCC). 

Thank you for the chance to appear before you today to address some of the things happening at the 

national level, some work specific to New Mexico and also with NASS. 

The 2018 Primary elections across the country are well underway, with states administering elections in 

a secure, fair manner. Also, the General Election in November is less than 4 months away. 

I. STATE AND FEDERAL PARTNERSHIP EFFORTS TO SECURE ELECTION 

INFRASTRUCTURE 

During the NASS Summer Conference, held recently in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, over 80 percent of 

our sessions, workshops and discussions revolved around elections cybersecurity. Election officials, like 

myself, are taking the possible threat of foreign actors meddling in our elections very seriously. In 

addition, during the conference Department of Homeland Security (D HS) Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen 

delivered remarks to members of NASS and the National Association of State Election Directors 

(NASED), during which Secretary Nielsen emphasized the fact that election security is national security. 

Also, Sec. Nielsen highlighted the positive progress and working relationships between D HS and the 

states to protect elections infrastructure. While state and local officials have always been focused on 

election security, the focus of our national organizations and the federal government has increased 

significantly since the summer of 2016. It is clear that election security will be a priority for state, local 

and federal officials as well as the general public moving forward. 

State and local election officials and the federal government have worked diligently to create a productive 

relationship since former DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson announced the "critical infrastructure" designation 

for election systems in January 2017. As you may know, NASS and its members raised many questions 

and expressed serious concerns about the potential federal overreach into the administration of elections 

- a state and local government responsibility. 

\'(7hile we will remain vigilant about possible federal overreach, we have worked together to ensure that 

the "critical infrastructure" designation functions in a positive and effective way. Thus, we have chosen 

to actively focus on improving communication between the states and the federal government to achieve 

our shared goal of securing elections. In particular, we have utilized the Election Infrastructure Subsector 

Government Coordinating Council (EIS-GCC), to open communications channels and guide future 

collaborative election security endeavors. At the EIS-GCC meeting on July 13, 2018, we approved a 

communications protocol document that my colleagues and I worked on for months. This document 

outlines the way that communications should flow between federal, state and local officials regarding 

threats, incidents, responses and recovery. It was some of our most important work to date and addresses 

the biggest challenge faced in 2016. 

For instance, within the EIS-GCC's Subsector Specific Plan, which was also approved at our July 13'h 
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meeting, there are many short and long-term goals and projects to support election officials, federal 

partners and stakeholders. These include deploying an online training environment for election officials, 

identifying resource gaps at the state level, and establishing a digital portal to increase communication 

between all levels. During our July 13'h meeting, we also began important discussions with the Elections 

Infrastructure Sector Coordinating Council (EI -SCC). This is the Council representing the private sector 

and non-profit sector stakeholders that support election officials. I encourage members of this 

distinguished committee to call on the EI -SCC for more information on what is being done in the private 

sector to safeguard elections equipment and technology. 

However, I would be remiss if I did not point out many of the organizations that have eagerly stepped 

up to help state and local governments with their election security efforts. NASS focuses a great deal on 

election security and our meetings are replete with shared practices from our colleagues around the 

country, along with presentations by security and auditing experts. We also hold forums twice a year for 

our office CIO/CISOs to come together to discuss challenges and solutions. The Belfer Center has 

developed a Tabletop Exercise that we can implement in our states to train both state and local election 

officials on addressing challenges leading up to and on Election Day. The Center for Internet Security 

has developed a handbook of election cybersecurity best practices and a checklist for states to monitor 

their progress. The Democracy Fund is supporting convenings of state and local officials to improve 

communication and governance between state agencies and between state and local governments. And 

private sector companies like Google and Cloudflare have stepped up to provide free resources to state 

and local governments to assist with preventing distributed denial-of-service (DDos) attacks and 

protecting our data and websites. The list truly goes on, but my time is limited. 

II. STATE SPECIFIC EFFORTS TO SECURE 2018 AND 2020 ELECTIONS 

In regards to specific state preparations for 2018 and beyond, I would like to thank you and your 

colleagues for appropriating the remaining Help America Vote Act (HA VA) funds to states in the recent 

omnibus bill. According to the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC), as of July 16, 2018 all of 

the funds have been requested by the states and eligible U.S. territories. Election officials truly appreciate 

this money and it will go a long way in helping states strengthen and improve our elections systems. 

While our upgrades to equipment and cybersecurity improvements will be an ongoing challenge, and for 

many states the federal funding received will regrettably be insufficient to do aii that they want and need, 

we are grateful for the boost these federal funds provide. 

In New Mexico, we recently requested our portion of over $3.6 million in HA VA dollars from the U.S. 

Election Assistance Commission. We plan to use these funds to ensure that New Mexico's election 

systems continue to be resilient and secure. Some of the funds will be used to purchase more robust 

voting systems that provide for additional security features for our counties. \Ve have also launched a 

brand-new Election Security Program within our Bureau of Elections with a portion of the HA VA funds 

earmarked to fund a full-time staff position to manage this program through 2023. The program 

administrator is responsible for implementing security best practices to safeguard New Mexico's sensitive 

election data and systems at the state and county level and to provide training, support and resources to 

county clerks and their staff on cybersecurity issues. This is particularly important in New Mexico's 

2 
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Secretary of State 

smaller, more rural counties that may have limited technical support available to assist with security 

issues. We will also allocate some of the funds to assist counties with priority system upgrades that they 

cannot afford on their own. 

In addition, some of the funds will be used to hire a Native American Election Liaison to assist with 

voter education and outreach in tribal communities which exist in one third of New Mexico's counties. 

Providing specialized outreach on voting procedures, voting rights, and voting technology all while 

addressing the unique language and culmral requirements of the voters living in these communities will 

work to make it easier for Native American voters to cast a ballot so we can finally close that gap in 

election participation. 

New Mexico is a leader in election best practices. We utilize paper ballots in all elections and have robust 

pre- and post-election testing, accuracy and auditing processes just to name a few. These practices are 

important election security safeguards that are now being adopted by states all across the country. These 

enhancements are in addition to what we are already doing, including using a 100 percent paper ballot 

system that allows for votes to be recounted as needed to ensure the vote count is correct. We are also 

proud to be one of the first states to implement post-election risk limiting audits to ensure that the results 

of our elections are accurate. While my state has utilized these auditing processes since 2010, they are 

now being touted by election experts as essential to ensure voting systems are tallying accurately. 

Additionally, the vote tabulation systems that we use are never connected to the internet and include 

other important security mechanisms that reduce the ability for a bad actor to change votes. 

A major component that is necessary to securing our elections is communication and collaboration 

across all levels of government. I am one of eight Secretaries of State serving on the EIS-GCC, which, 

as I said, has developed effective communication protocols between local, state and government officials 

on election security issues. I also served as the Co-Chair of the Elections Committee for the NASS, 

where the other committee members and I share best practices on protecting the integrity of every vote 

cast in our states. 

I would be glad to elaborate during the question and answer portion of this hearing or anytime in the 

future. 

III. THE FUTURE OF ELECTIONS AND VOTER CONFIDENCE 

Much of the national attention over the past year and half has focused on election security issues -

especially cybersecurity - which are of course, extremely important. If people are confident that the 

voting process is secure, they will be much more likely to participate. This is why we need members of 

this committee, D HS and our other federal partners to share with Americans that our elections are secure 

and indeed fair. The risks to our election system are real, and we have and will continue to address them 

appropriately. However, it is important to understand that those systems with the highest risk- online 

voter registration systems and election night reporting- are removed from the process of casting a ballot. 

If our protections to our voter registration system are breached, we can address that and the vote count 

is not impacted. If our protections election night reporting website are breached, we can address that 

3 
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Toulouse OHYet, Ne'\v Mexico Secretary of State 

the U.S. House of Representatives 

and Government Reform 

w~shlrl<'tOn DOC. 

National As&oclation of Secretaries of State 

and the vote count is not impacted" Our voters' confidence may be impacted, and that is not insignificant, 

but they should be aware of the fact that the casting of a vote is separate from all these other parts of 

the system" W'hile we all need to work together to combat misinformation - intentional and accidental -

to maintain voter confidence, I also encourage those citizens watching today to get involved in the 

process by becoming a poll worker, reaching out to their state and local election officials with questions 

and ultimately voting in November. 

In the meantime, please know that state election officials will continue to work to increase cybersccurity 

and run elections with the utmost integrity" The 2018 election will be a test on what we learned in 2016, 

but I feel that we are ready for 2018 and will continue to improve as time marches forward" 

Thank you again Members of this Committee for inviting me and my peers to testify before this hearing 

and for giving me the opportunity to speak about this important matter on behalf of NASS and New 

Mexico" 

I look forward to answering any questions you may have for me" 

4 
29 

Chairman GOWDY. Thank you, Madam Secretary of State. 

Mr. Hatch? 

STATEMENT OF THE HON. RICKY HATCH 

Mr. HATCH. Chairman Gowdy, Ranking Member Cummings, and 

members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify 

this morning on how we can ensure the safety and security of our 

election system. 

My name is Ricky Hatch, and I am the elected clerk auditor for 

Weber County, Utah. Today I’m here on behalf of the National Association of Counties, which represents all 3,069 county governments across the country. 

In addition to running elections in my county, I serve as a NACo 

appointee to the Election Assistance Commission Board of Advisors, I am on the Government Coordinating Council for the Election Infrastructure Subsector, and I am the division director for 

election officials for the International Association of Government 

Officials. 

As elections are the foundation of our democracy, election officials across the country embrace our duty to ensure that our elections are secure, fair, and trustworthy. All elections are local. And 

I’m here today to underscore the importance of including counties 

in Federal and State discussions to strengthen our national efforts 

to secure elections and also to offer suggestions to improve collaboration among all levels of government. 

Counties play a key role in our Nation’s election system and 

work with States to ensure the integrity of the process. In virtually 

every State, counties run the day-to-day operations of elections. 

There are almost 9,000 dedicated local election officials like me 

throughout the country who oversee the allocation of voting machines, manage polling locations, print and mail ballots, recruit and 

train poll workers, and ensure the integrity of the entire voting 

process. During the 2016 election, counties of all sizes managed 

over 100,000 polling locations and hired and trained over 800,000 

poll workers. 

But elections are not just a 1-day event for counties. From a 

cybersecurity standpoint alone, we work year-round to protect 

against direct hacking attempts that seek to improperly access 

voter rolls, remove election information from county websites, or 

alter voting data. We also work to protect voting machines, computers, and other equipment used to cast, record, tally, and certify 

votes. The integrity of the elections process is our main goal, and 

security is a key component of that goal. 

Fortunately, coordination between the Federal Government and 

localities has improved dramatically in the past 18 months. These 

partnerships have been invaluable to help protect us from 

cybersecurity attacks. These include the establishment of the Government Coordinating Council by the Department of Homeland Security, which has been open and refreshingly responsive to our 

frank and frequent feedback during this process. They also include 

the $380 million in the 2018 omnibus. Many States, including my 

home State of Utah, are coordinating with their local governments 

on the best ways to use this funding. Throughout this whole procVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:30 Dec 07, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\33089.TXT APRIL

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30 

ess, the EAC has been the glue in coordinating and promoting all 

of these new efforts. 

While all of these are positive changes, we suggest three items 

to further improve our collective election security efforts. 

First, we encourage Congress to support a dedicated, predictable 

Federal funding stream to help local governments protect elections. 

As you can imagine, resources often get stuck at the State level, 

which can be problematic for those of us on the ground. We upgrade aging equipment and shore up our defenses at great cost to 

county governments, which often do not have the luxury or ability 

to increase revenues to offset these costs. While the omnibus funding was helpful, we need more at the local level to combat these 

cyber threats. 

Second, we recommend additional coordinated Federal and State 

outreach to local jurisdictions, especially those that are more remote and rural, as Ms. Oliver mentioned in her testimony. For a 

variety of reasons, such as limited staff, only a small percentage of 

local election officials are accessing the valuable free technical resources provided by our Federal partners. We urge our Federal and 

State partners to help us reach these jurisdictions. 

And, finally, Congress and Federal agencies should undertake a 

robust federalism consultation process with States and local governments when considering any changes to election cybersecurity 

protocols. Local election officials have the most complete understanding of the elections process, and we want to share that understanding with lawmakers to help ensure that any Federal legislation or programs are fully effective on the ground. 

Ultimately, the best way to safeguard our elections and shore up 

our cyber defenses is to communicate and work together. We stand 

ready to work with you, with Federal agencies, and with our States 

to strengthen our Nation’s elections process and retain the public’s 

confidence. 

Chairman Gowdy and Ranking Member Cummings, thank you 

again for inviting me to testify today. And this concludes my testimony. I’m happy to take any questions. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Hatch follows:] 


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ASSOCIATION NATIONALN~Co ry'COUNTIES 

WRITTEN STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD 

HON. RICKY HATCH 

COUNTY CLERK/AUDITOR 

WEBER COUNTY, UTAH 

ON BEHALF OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF COUNTIES 

CYBER-SECURING THE VOTE: ENSURING THE INTEGRITY OF THE U.S. ELECTION SYSTEM 

BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM 

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JULY 24, 2018 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 
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Chairman Gowdy, Ranking Member Cummings and members of the committee, thank you for the 

opportunity to testify on "Cyber-Securing the Vote: Ensuring the Integrity of the U.S. Election System." 

My name is Ricky Hatch and I currently serve as the elected Clerk Auditor for Weber County, Utah. 

Today, I am representing the National Association of Counties (NACo). In addition to my local 

responsibilities in Weber County, which include running elections, maintaining records and issuing 

marriage licenses, I am one of NACo's two appointees to the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) 

Board of Advisors. I also serve on the Government Coordinating Council (GCC) for the Election 

Infrastructure Subsector, which is jointly convened by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 

the EAC and the National Association of Secretaries of State (NASS). In addition to those roles, I am the 

Division Director for Election Officials for the International Association of Government Officials (iGO), an 

organization focusing on professional training and leadership development for county recorders, 

election officials, treasurers and clerks. 

Elections are the basic foundation of our democracy, and ensuring they are secure, fair and trustworthy 

are the basic goals and responsibilities of every election official across the country. Because all elections 

are local, I am here today to reiterate the importance of including local governments, and especially 

counties, in federal and state discussions to strengthen our national efforts to secure elections. 

About Weber County, Utah 

While Weber County is considered "suburban" with our population of approximately 250,000 residents, 

we have a diverse mix of urban, suburban and rural components. Located north of Salt Lake City, we 

encompass 659 square miles around our county seat of Ogden, Utah. In the 2016 presidential elections, 

Weber County conducted the election partially by mail, and had ten different polling places with 60 poll 

workers. We saw a significant growth in our voting population with nearly 45,000 new and updated 

registrations for the election and an overall turnout of 67.3 percent. 

About NACo 

Founded in 1935, NACo is the only national organization that represents county governments in the 

United States and brings together county officials to advocate with a collective voice on national policy, 

exchange ideas, build new leadership skills, pursue transformational county solutions, enrich the public's 

understanding of county government and exercise exemplary leadership in public service. 

About America's Counties 

Counties are highly diverse, not only in my state of Utah, but across the nation, and vary immensely in 

natural resources, social and political systems, cultural, economic and structural circumstances, public 

health and environmental responsibilities. Counties range in area from 26 square miles (Arlington 

County, Virginia) to 87,860 square miles (North Slope Borough, Alaska). The population of counties 

varies from Loving County, Texas, with just under 100 residents, to Los Angeles County, California, which 

is home to close to ten million people. Of the nation's 3,069 counties, approximately 70 percent are 

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considered "rural," with populations of less than 50,000, and 50 percent of these counties have 

populations below 25,000. At the same time, there are more than 120 major urban counties, which 

collectively provide essential services- including administering elections- to more than 130 million 

people every day. 

Many of the responsibilities of counties are mandated by both the states and federal government. While 

county responsibilities differ widely, most states give their counties significant authorities. These 

authorities include: administration of elections; construction and maintenance of roads, bridges and 

critical infrastructure; assessment of property taxes; record keeping; overseeing jails and court systems; 

and managing public hospitals and health systems. Counties are also responsible for child welfare, 

consumer protection, economic development, employment/workforce training, emergency 

management, land use planning, zoning and environmental protection. 

Today, I hope to highlight the important role counties and other local jurisdictions play in administering 

and securing elections, examine ways we can further collaborate between different levels of 

government and share the following three suggestions for federal action: 

1. Enact a dedicated funding stream for local governments for election administration and 

security 

2. Expand the federal government's efforts to provide technical assistance and best practices to 

local election officials 

3. Engage in a robust federalism process with state and local stakeholders regarding any future 

legislative or regulatory changes 

Counties play a key role in our nation's election system and work in collaboration with states to 

ensure the security and integrity of the process. 

The county role in elections complements the distinctly different role states generally play in the 

elections process. States are tasked with many administrative duties to ensure that elections run 

smoothly. The 2002 Help America Vote Act (HAVA) requires states to develop computerized, statewide 

voter registration lists, which counties use to administer elections at the local level. States continue to 

modernize voter registration through initiatives like online registration and automatic updates from 

motor vehicle departments. In addition to reducing the potential for voter fraud, the modernization of 

voter registration makes our elections more accessible to eligible citizens and reduces costs. As we have 

seen in recent elections, maintaining accurate lists is paramount to ensuring eligible and registered 

voters are not denied the opportunity to cast a ballot during an election. 

In addition to voter registration databases, states may help administer elections by funneling or 

distributing information and resources from the federal government or working with local jurisdictions 

on voting equipment. In Maryland, for example, the State Board of Elections vets voting machines and 

helps deploy them, but mandates that counties pay for the equipment. 

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While states play an instrumental role in our nation's elections, counties and other local governments 

run elections on the ground. In almost every state, counties run the day-to-day operations of elections, 

and in every state, elections are broken down to local precincts for voting and administration. This 

means local governments are responsible for carrying out various key functions, from identifying polling 

places to printing ballots and protecting voting machines. The county official overseeing elections varies 

from state to state and may have one of several titles, including county clerk, county auditor or 

commissioner of elections. This official is responsible for overseeing the allocation of voting machines, 

managing polling locations, recruiting and training poll workers and ensuring the accessibility, integrity 

and efficiency of the voting process. 

There are almost 9,000 dedicated local election officials throughout the country. During the 2016 

election, counties supported over 100,000 polling locations and hired and trained over 800,000 poll 

workers. Counties of all sizes must undertake these tasks: according to data from the U.S. Election 

Assistance Commission (EAC), roughly 1,900 small counties reported having nearly 23,000 polling places 

in 2016 and over 130,000 poll workers. Counties with ten or fewer polling places had an average of 19 

poll workers in 2016, while some of these small jurisdictions had as many as 100 volunteer poll workers. 

Meanwhile, only about seven percent of counties had 100 or more polling places, and these counties 

hired and trained over 400,000 poll workers. 

County responsibilities for administering and securing elections begin well before Election Day and 

continue after votes are cast. 

Before an election takes Place 

Prior to Election Day, county election officials have many responsibilities to ensure we are fully 

prepared for the election. 

From a cybersecurity standpoint, we are most acutely concerned with "social engineering" 

hacking attempts, which include phishing and baiting attempts through email. Counties also 

protect against direct hacks to access voter rolls to alter data and attempts to remove election 

information from county websites. For example, according to Utah Lieutenant Governor Spencer 

Cox, the state of Utah faces about one billion "hacking attempts" every day. Most hacks are 

unsuccessful and crude attempts, akin to a burglar driving down a street looking for open 

windows or jiggling the locks, but it only takes one breach to cause significant problems. 

Counties are also concerned with physical security measures prior to Election Day. We 

strategically place polling locations to ensure that they are accessible to voters and optimize the 

deployment of voting machines and poll workers, and to comply with federal and state 

requirements. Many counties enlist local law enforcement to conduct security sweeps of 

selected polling locations prior to Election Day. Counties also train poll workers to follow specific 

requirements regarding restrictions in and around polling locations. 

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Additionally, we vet, hire and train poll workers to ensure that they are well equipped to assist 

voters and protect against voter fraud or other security risks. Election officials also prepare for a 

wide range of "hard security" challenges at polling locations, including mitigating natural 

disasters and following protocols for an active shooter, fire, floods and other emergencies. 

Election Day 

On Election Day, election officials focus on ensuring the integrity of the voting systems 

themselves. These generally have four components: polling place management, voter 

verification and check-in systems (poll books and e-poll books), recording the vote using voting 

machines, ballot marking devices or paper ballots, and tabulating and reporting the results. 

Counties are meeting the unique security challenges presented by each of these components. 

Through the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA), Congress sought to improve the election 

process by promoting the latest technology and moving away from traditional lever and punchcard machines. Today, approximately three out of every five counties use optical scan 

technology, which employs a scanner to read marked paper ballots and record the results. Two 

out of five counties use direct recording electronic (DRE) equipment that allows voters to make 

their selections via touch screen or other digital interface and records the results on a secure 

memory device. 

Regardless of the type used, these voting machines are never connected to the internet or to 

each other. The transport and storage of voting machines, as well as ballots and vote 

tabulations, are directed by rigorous state and local security protocols. Voting machines are the 

voters' primary focus on Election Day, and though the type of machine each state or county uses 

varies, every state has specific policies governing voting machine setup. These controls include 

maintaining a verifiable chain of custody, pre-numbered tamper-evident seals, physical locks 

and documented reconciliations at the beginning, middle and end of Election Day. 

After an election 

Following Election Day, counties work with other municipalities and their state partners to 

certify the election results. This includes retaining vote counts and ballots, counting provisional 

ballots, verifying signatures and vote history, reconciling totals and preparing for a recount, if 

necessary. Additionally, many states and counties have implemented systems to "audit" the 

election results, including the security of the election. Each of these steps requires the retention 

and safeguarding of sensitive election information. 

It takes time, resources, expertise and money to constantly combat these threats and ensure the 

public continues to place its faith in our electoral system. The cost of running elections is difficult to 

calculate and varies by county. According to the California Institute of Technology/ Massachusetts 

Institute of Technology Voting Technology Project, county election expenditures were an estimated $1 

billion in 2000. 

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However, after HAVA was passed, substantial election reforms were implemented that included 

upgrading voting systems to ensure that voters could verify their selections before their ballot was cast. 

The need to continually upgrade voting machines to increase security and ensure accurate vote 

tabulations has increased the cost to run elections. The financial impact on counties varies depending on 

factors like how many voters vote by mail versus in person, how many machines are used in the county, 

the voting system vendor, state law requirements regarding the voting process, public expectations and 

many other factors. Costs, in addition to the actual equipment, can include transporting units to and 

from polling locations, the printing and mailing of paper ballots, poll worker pay, rent for polling 

locations, advertising, computers, other supplies and the annual maintenance of the machines. 

Our main goal as county election officials is to ensure safe and efficient elections, and to maintain the 

public's trust in these elections. We know communication is one of the best ways to build trust within 

our communities, and counties are employing various strategies to meet this challenge. For example, 

Maricopa County, Arizona implemented a Community Relations Team (CRT) in 2017 to engage in 

proactive outreach activities to empower communities and help organizations register and educate 

voters. Similarly, Carroll County, Maryland developed an interactive website and an enhanced social 

media presence and offers regular opportunities to correspond with candidates and election judges. 

President Dwight Eisenhower said, "Public confidence in the elective process is the foundation of public 

confidence in government." A voter's trust in the nation's elections process is driven by voter's 

experience with their local election office, whether they are registering to vote, receiving a ballot in the 

mail, using voting equipment at a polling place or checking out election results online. Local election 

officials are the face and voice of our nation's election infrastructure and drive the fundamental level of 

trust in each of our nation's elections. In fact, we are very detailed logistical planners, with backup plans 

for our backup plans. We're dedicated to the public trust and to doing things the right way, in full view 

of the public eye. 

Locally-run elections have been a part of our country since its beginning. However, in the last two 

centuries, election administration has evolved as technology, opportunities and threats have all 

changed. While meeting these challenges and integrating new technologies, counties have continuously 

worked to preserve the integrity and security of America's elections, and we will continue to work to 

combat these new, sophisticated risks to election security. 

A strong federal-state-local partnership is critical to securing our election systems. 

Although the federal government, states, counties and other local jurisdictions have different roles in 

our election process, we must all work together to ensure the broader security of the election system. In 

any given election, we are only as secure as our weakest link: a failure in the chain at any point could 

cause major problems for the rest of the system. Since HAVA was implemented in 2002, 

intergovernmental coordination has gradually improved, especially in the last two years, but we need to 

keep improving. 

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A key part of this success was the formation of the U.S. Election Assistance Commissioner (EAC), 

which helps states and local governments in a variety of ways. Establishing the EAC was a landmark 

moment for collaboration on voting guidelines, auditing the use of election funds and establishing a 

national clearinghouse of information on election administration. Since 2002, the EAC has served as a 

reliable partner and information hub for counties as we compile information on best practices, vendor 

authentication and examples of how other counties and states are meeting challenges or needs. 

Congress also boosted security efforts in the 2018 omnibus spending bill passed in March with the 

inclusion of $380 million in HAVA funds designated to improve election security. Many states are still 

determining how to prioritize the use of these extra funds. In Utah, we're using the funding to update 

and strengthen our statewide voter registration database software, buy more secure elections 

equipment and implement a more robust post-election audit process. We are also designating $300,000 

of the funds to employ a new "cyber navigator" consulting program that will assist counties throughout 

the state with training on how to defend against and detect cyber-attacks, as well as how to recover if 

an attack occurs. 

Additionally, the designation of election systems as critical infrastructure in 2017 under the U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) catapulted the election community forward in its 

collaborative efforts. This led to the establishment of the Government Coordinating Council (GCC) in 

2017, where the inclusion of local officials was well received. One third of GCC members are local 

government officials and they serve as an active and helpful addition to the conversation. In my 

experience, DHS has responded to feedback extremely well through the development of the GCC, pilot 

programs and during other discussions regarding election cybersecurity. 

Furthermore, the focus on cyber-securing elections also led to the development of the Elections 

Infrastructure Information Sharing and Analysis Center (EI·ISAC) under the nonprofit Center for 

Internet Security (CIS), creating another central resource for election cybersecurity information that any 

local or state elections official can access. The EI-ISAC enables the quick dissemination of security alerts 

and best practices. Additionally, the completion of the CIS Handbook on Election Security earlier this 

year also gave many election offices a road map for both small and large steps we can take to further 

secure our systems. 

This enhanced coordination is also occurring at the state level. Most states are proactively working 

with counties and other municipalities to determine the best use of the additional $380 million included 

in the FY 2018 omnibus package. Meanwhile, some states are pursuing other partnership opportunities. 

In Iowa, the Secretary of State's {SOS) office formed a Cybersecurity Working Group with representation 

from DHS, the Iowa Office of the Chief Information Officer (OCIO), the Iowa Air National Guard, county 

auditors (election officials) and county information technology directors. The Iowa SOS also held two 

cybersecurity workshops for county elections and IT staff in June, and counties have taken advantage of 

several resources that the Iowa OCJO has made available at no cost to counties, including Enterprise 

Vulnerability Management, Intrusion Detection, a Security Operations Center and other training courses. 

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Moreover, vendors and the private sector are also pitching in to augment our election cyber defenses. 

These partnerships are essential for counties of all sizes. Google's Project Shield and CloudFiare's 

Athenian Project both help safeguard election websites from distributed denial of service (DDOS) 

attacks, which would result in a severe loss of publicly available information about polling locations, 

times and access points. Google also helps with email services to deter some of the social engineering 

attacks I discussed earlier. 

We are grateful that many of these conversations have included an increased opportunity for counties 

to be part of the intergovernmental process, but we still see opportunities for continued improvement. 

We must do more to secure the 2018 elections and future election cycles. 

Securing elections is not just a priority for 2018, nor is it necessary only for federal election cycles; it is a 

continuously changing landscape in constant need of attention, resources and interest. The more 

communication with county election officials, the better. 

While some progress is being made, counties are taking it upon ourselves to shore up our defenses at 

great cost. As the voting machines purchased with HAVA funds age, counties are shouldering the burden 

of replacing these machines with new and updated technologies. For example, Tazewell County, Illinois 

-a mid-size county with a population of 150,000 recently spent $700,000 on new voting machines, 

only a small portion of which will be reimbursed by state and federal resources. Counties are also doing 

this proactively, like Black Hawk County, Iowa, which purchased new voting machines in 2016 when the 

county was financially stable, rather than risking a future crisis. 

Costs are not just confined to voting machines. Securing elections requires appropriate technological 

defenses and firewalls year-round. It also requires proper training for county staff and for volunteers 

and poll workers, hiring security before and during Election Day, safely transporting voting equipment 

and maintaining election information on the county website. 

This growing number of demands comes at a time when counties- regardless of size- are experiencing 

significant fiscal constraints. In many cases, our capacity to fund compliance activities with state and 

federal mandates, or to update technology to meet growing security threats, is limited. In fact, 45 states 

curb counties' property tax authority and only 29 states authorize counties to collect sales taxes, albeit 

with restrictions. Given these constraints, ensuring that our elections are free and secure will take 

continued assistance from our federal and state governmental partners. 

Therefore, to address existing election challenges and improve our collective security efforts, we 

respectfully offer the following suggestions: 

1) Counties support a dedicated, predictable federal funding stream to help local governments 

adequately secure elections, including upgrading and securing voting equipment. Local 

governments fund most election investments, but much of our equipment is exceeding its useful 

7 I National Association of Counties July 24, 2018 
39 


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life. Compounding this problem are our efforts to keep up with technology changes and stay 

ahead of hackers. 

While the omnibus and 2002 HAVA funding is a significant boost, often the resources get stuck 

at the state level. These dollars are needed at all levels, but they are especially vital at the 

county level with which voters interact the most. Furthermore, counties operate balanced 

budgets and approve future budgets up to two years before they are implemented, meaning 

uncertainty in the federal or state budgeting processes can leave counties unsure of if and when 

they will receive additional assistance. 

The development of a reliable funding mechanism for local governments would allow all three 

levels of government to collaboratively target funding in areas of greatest need. These funds, 

when accompanied with training and expertise from our state and federal partners, will help 

local election officials properly implement cybersecurity tools and educate the public to ensure 

that public trust in the election process stays strong. 

2) Counties support continuing and expanding the federal government's efforts to provide 

technical assistance and best practices to local election officials. In addition to funding, the 

federal government should continue to proactively work to distribute the available free 

resources to local elections officials. Only about nine percent of elections officials have joined 

the EI-ISAC to date, meaning the majority still lack access to proper information about the 

current risks they face and the appropriate resources that are available. 

Almost 80 percent of local election jurisdictions have fewer than 20,000 voters, and in many 

cases these small offices tend to be underfunded and are not staffed with cybersecurity experts. 

Therefore, a top priority for federal and state governments should be finding ways to involve 

these smaller jurisdictions and share already-available resources. As I mentioned earlier, a 

breach to even the smallest election office could have significant ramifications for the entire 

system. 

We urge the U.S Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to extend the availability of security 

clearances to local election officials, so that information can quickly flow between the entities 

most impacted by cyber threats. 

The federal government can also engage more directly with local election offices through 

trainings and sharing best practices. Each jurisdiction will have unique challenges. In some rural 

areas, a lack of broadband may prevent local election officials from engaging in enhanced 

technical training that is offered online. A "cyber navigator" program, like the one we are 

deploying in Utah, could help reach more remote offices. Urban areas also face challenges, 

where they must compete with the private sector in hiring and training cybersecurity staff as 

well as thousands of volunteer poll workers for every election. 

8 I National Association of Counties July 24, 2018 
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3) Finally, Congress and federal agencies should undertake a robust federalism consultation 

process with states and local governments when considering any other changes to election 

cybersecurity or administration protocols, The development of the GCC, EI-ISAC and this 

hearing are clear examples of increased efforts from federal officials to include and 

communicate with local- and especially county- officials, We commend these efforts and 

encourage you to continue this trend, 

In conclusion 

Chairman Gowdy and Ranking Member Cummings, thank you again for inviting me to testify today, The 

most important way to guarantee we are working together to safeguard our elections is to ensure local 

officials- those running the elections on the ground- are included in the solutions, Inviting me to testify 

today is indicative of your commitment to including counties in these discussions, and I thank you both 

for your focus on this issue. 

Our nation's counties stand ready to work with Congress, federal agencies and our states to ensure the 

2018 election and any future elections are secure, fair and trustworthy, 

9 I National Association of Counties July 24, 2018 
41 

Chairman GOWDY. Thank you very much. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Chairman? 

Chairman GOWDY. For what purpose does the gentleman from 

Virginia seek recognition? 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Chairman, I have a motion. 

Chairman GOWDY. Reserving a point of order, the gentleman 

from Virginia is recognized for 5 minutes to state his motion. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank the chair. 

Mr. Chairman, like so many of our colleagues on both sides of 

the aisle, I was very concerned by the President’s statements last 

week in Helsinki about his 2-hour one-on-one meeting with Vladimir Putin. 

President Trump capitulated to Mr. Putin on nearly every point 

of contention in the bilateral relationship with Russia. He publicly 

cast doubt on Russian interference in our election. He praised as 

an incredible offer an unprecedented proposal from Mr. Putin to 

hand over American officials, including the former U.S. Ambassador to Russia, for Russian interrogation. According to the Russians, President Trump even made agreements with Mr. Putin on 

Syria and Russian aggression in the Ukraine. 

President Trump refused to allow his own senior staff to attend 

the meeting, and the President has so far declined to provide Congress or the public with any details about what occurred in that 

private meeting. 

Our committee must act swiftly to determine what would cause 

President Trump to act in this way and to what extent President 

Trump is being manipulated by Mr. Putin. To do this, we must immediately hold a hearing with the Director of National Intelligence 

and others who can inform the committee and the public about the 

extent of the Russian threat to our country. 

I’m joined in my concern by Subcommittee Chairman Mr. Hurd, 

who wrote an op-ed stating that he had seen Russian intelligence 

manipulate many people as a CIA undercover officer, but, he said, 

and I quote, ‘‘I never thought I would see the day when an American President would be one of them,’’ unquote. 

Mr. Hurd explained that our committee must work to, quote, ‘‘ensure that the administration is taking the Russian threat seriously,’’ unquote, and ‘‘to fulfill our oversight duty and keep the 

American people informed of the current danger,’’ he went on. 

Even you, Mr. Chairman, said on ‘‘Fox News Sunday’’ that the 

evidence of Russia’s attack on our country is overwhelming and 

that the President needs to say that and act like that. I couldn’t 

agree more, Mr. Chairman. 

In contrast, however, so far, the chair has declined our request 

to invite the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to testify 

during today’s hearing on election security. 

We appreciate your agreement to hold a classified briefing with 

ODNI, but we think the briefing, albeit helpful, needs to be accompanied by a public hearing. Closed-door briefings are simply not a 

substitute for public testimony from the top Federal intelligence official on how States were attacked by Russia in 2016 and the current threats to our election security. 

Mr. Hurd again said, and I quote, ‘‘Lawmakers must fulfill our 

oversight duty as well as to keep the American people informed of 


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the current danger.’’ Certainly, a public hearing would help accomplish that goal. 

For all of these reasons, I hereby move to subpoena the Director 

of National Intelligence, Mr. Dan Coats, to testify in a public hearing before this committee and the public about the extent of the 

Russian threat involved. 

I make this motion, Mr. Chairman, pursuant to House rule XI, 

clause 2(k)(6), and I believe the motion is in order. A written copy 

of my motion and the subpoena is at the clerk’s desk. I ask that 

we dispose of this motion immediately. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. I second the motion. 

Would the gentleman yield? 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Of course. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Chairman, I want to second the motion and 

associate myself with the eloquent words of Mr. Connolly. 

As you know, I asked for you to invite a representative of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to come testify here 

today next to DHS so that our committee members and the public 

could hear directly from the experts about the threat that Russia 

poses to our country and our electoral system. 

Director Coats warned recently that, and I quote, ‘‘the warning 

lights are blinking red,’’ end of quote. He compared these warning 

signs to what we saw before 9/11. 

Our country is under attack, and we must understand that attack in order to protect ourselves. We must make sure that the 

public hears directly from Director Coats about the attack. We 

have to ring the alarm bell, and we need to ring it loud. 

I know, Mr. Chairman, that you believe that Director Coats—because I have heard you say it. And just this past weekend, I heard 

a quote from you, and it says, quote, ‘‘The evidence is overwhelming. It can be proven beyond any evidentiary burden that 

Russia is not our friend and they tried to attack us in 2016.’’ You 

said, going on, ‘‘The evidence is overwhelming, and the President 

needs to say that and act like it.’’ 

If I might just have unanimous consent for 1 more minute, Mr. 

Chairman. 

But the simple fact is that the President is not saying that and 

he’s not acting like that. And that makes it all more important that 

we here in Congress keep ringing that alarm bell and ringing it 

loud, that we make sure that the public understands that we hear 

clearly directly from the experts, that we make the evidence public, 

and that we put our money where our mouths are and fund the solutions. 

Mr. Chairman, we should have Director Coats here testifying at 

this hearing today, but you did not invite him. And so I join my 

distinguished colleague, Mr. Connolly, in his motion to bring Director Coats before this committee on another day to testify about the 

threat that Russia poses to our national security and our electoral 

system. 

And I want to thank the gentleman for yielding. 

Chairman GOWDY. The gentleman from Maryland yields back to 

the gentleman from Virginia. 

For what purpose does the gentleman from North Carolina seek 

recognition? 


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Mr. MEADOWS. Mr. Chairman, I move that we table the motion 

and, pending that, note the absence of a quorum. 

Chairman GOWDY. The gentleman’s correct. A quorum is not 

present. 

The motion to table is made. And the motion to table and the underlying motion are held in abeyance until a sufficient quorum is 

present. Out of respect for our witnesses, I would suggest that we 

move on and proceed with the hearing until such time as that. 

And, with that—— 

Mr. LYNCH. Mr. Chairman, may we be heard on the motion? I 

understand the abeyance and the lack of a quorum. But for the 

members that are here, I think it would help greatly if we were allowed to discuss the merits of the motion. 

Chairman GOWDY. I do understand the gentleman’s concern. 

Since the motion to table is made, I would ask my friend from Massachusetts, you’re welcome to discuss it, but I want to vote on it 

later on, given the fact that the motion to table has been made and 

given the fact that we have our witnesses here. But I will be happy 

to give you a chance to speak on it at the appropriate time. 

Mr. LYNCH. All right. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman GOWDY. With that, the gentleman from North Carolina is recognized for his 5 minutes of questioning, Mr. Walker. 

Mr. WALKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank our panel for 

being here today. 

Just for record notice, Secretary of State, New Mexico, would you 

mind pronouncing that name one more time? I’m going to try here 

in just a second to get it right. 

Ms. TOULOUSE OLIVER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman Member. It’s 

Maggie Toulouse Oliver. 

Mr. WALKER. Toulouse? Toulouse. All right. Okay. All right. 

When I come back around in a minute, we’ll see if I can remember 

that, okay? 

Mr. Hicks, I want to start with you, if that’s possible. This past March, Congress appropriated $380 million in grants for State election security expenses that were intended to update voting equipment and improve cybersecurity practices overall. 

Mr. Hicks, how much of these funds—or how many of these 

funds have been disbursed to States? 

Mr. HICKS. All the money is going to be going to the States. So 

it’s—— 

Mr. WALKER. Would you repeat that answer? Did you say all the 

money will be going to? 

Mr. HICKS. Right. So about 335 million has been disbursed right 

now. But 100 percent of that money has been requested. 

Mr. WALKER. And do you have a timeline as far as when the 

other $50 million or so would be? 

Mr. HICKS. We should have that money out within the next couple of weeks. 

Mr. WALKER. Okay. All right. 

So, Secretary Toulouse Oliver and Mr. Hatch, how much did your 

State request, and how much have you received so far? 

We’ll start with the secretary of State. 

Ms. TOULOUSE OLIVER. Mr. Chair—Mr. Walker, our State requested the full amount of $3.6 million to which we’re entitled 


KING-6430 with DISTILLER
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based on population. We did request that full amount, and we have 

received that full amount. 

Mr. WALKER. Okay. 

Mr. Hatch? 

Mr. HATCH. Utah requested the same full amount— or, not the same amount, but it came to about $4.1 million, $4.2 million. 

Mr. WALKER. Okay. And have you received it as well? 

Mr. HATCH. Yes. We received it last week. 

Mr. WALKER. Okay. Good to hear. 

Mr. Hicks, what election security priorities are the majority of 

States using these funds to pursue? Do you have any information? 

Mr. HICKS. Yes, sir. Most of the States are looking to either do 

cybersecurity upgrades or purchase new voting equipment. About 

75 percent of the money is going towards voter registration or 

cybersecurity or purchasing of new voting equipment. 

Mr. WALKER. Okay. 

Mr. Krebs, from your experience, what is the importance that the 

Federal Government plays in maintaining the integrity of elections? Can you zoom in a little bit and, taking maybe 30, 40 seconds at the most, give me an overview of what you see that role 

as? 

Mr. KREBS. Yes. Thank you for the question. 

So, as Secretary Nielsen has said several times, election security 

is national security. DHS plays a supporting role with the State 

and local officials, and it’s important that we provide our crosscutting cybersecurity expertise to help fill in some gaps at the 

State and local level, where they may not have in-depth 

cybersecurity expertise. 

So where we can bring our broader learning throughout the critical infrastructure community, we can help at the local level. 

Mr. WALKER. Let me follow up with that, if I could, please. What 

do you see, from your perspective, Congress’s role in supporting 

States’ and counties’ electoral administration? Would you speak to 

that? 

Mr. KREBS. Yes, sir. So it would continue to enable me to do my 

job in support of State and local, support the Election Assistance 

Commission, and provide, if necessary, additional support, including resources. 

Mr. WALKER. Ms. Toulouse Oliver and Mr. Hatch, same question 

to you guys. What do you see Congress’s role as, as far as assisting 

in this process? 

Ms. TOULOUSE OLIVER. Mr. Chair Member Walker, I concur with 

Mr. Krebs: the continued provision of tools and resources for State 

and local jurisdictions to utilize, particularly as we get down the 

road with regard to our local entities. 

For example, States utilize centralized statewide voter registration databases. So while I’m managing that and overseeing it from 

my office, it’s being utilized by 33 counties across the State of New 

Mexico, some of which may not even have full-time IT staff. So it’s 

really important that we are able to conduct risk assessments and 

provide the tools that have already been provided at the State 

level. 

So we’ll continue working with DHS, and we would love to have 

the assistance of Congress with regard to that. 


KING-6430 with DISTILLER
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Mr. WALKER. Okay. 

Mr. Hatch, do you want to follow up with that? 

Mr. HATCH. I agree with Secretary Oliver. The best way that the 

Federal Government can help is to provide assistance through resources, consulting, as well as dedicated and predictable funding so 

that we can identify, with our needs, how much we will be able to 

meet those needs financially. 

Mr. WALKER. Yeah. 

The first 2 years I was here, I served on Homeland Security. I 

was amazed at how many times, really on a daily basis, that there 

are attempts from the Russians and their cyber hacking. That’s a 

nonstop. In fact, it was all the way back in 2012 when, I believe, 

a former Presidential candidate pointed out the concern as far as 

the geopolitical threat that Russia is. 

Mr. Hicks, I have a question for you. What advise does the Election Assistance Commission, your area, provide the State and local 

officials when evaluating vendors for cybersecurity? 

Mr. HICKS. Providing vendors? We operate under the Voluntary 

Voting System Guidelines. So that’s a voluntary system. If a vendor wants to submit a system for certification, then we would give 

them guidance on that. 

Mr. WALKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Chairman GOWDY. The gentlelady from New York is recognized. 

Mrs. MALONEY. Thank you, Ranking Member, and thank you, 

Mr. Chairman, for calling this really vital, important hearing. 

This past weekend, I went on a faith and politics pilgrimage— 

bipartisan, led Congressman Tom Reed—to upstate New York, the 

home of two of the vital human rights/social justice/civil rights 

movements in our country: the right to abolish slavery, the fight 

to abolish slavery, and the fight to grant women, half the population, the right to vote. And we went to the graves of Harriet Tubman, Frederick Douglass, Susan B. Anthony—all people that dedicated their lives to freedom and the right to vote for American citizens. 

I cannot think of anything more important than this hearing. 

And I must say it is a national scandal that we have been asking 

for it ever since the election to find out what happened with the 

tampering, of trying to interfere and prevent people from having 

their vote. 

The evidence is absolutely clear that the Russians tampered with 

our elections. Nothing is more important, and I hope, Mr. Chairman, this is the first of many hearings focusing on preserving the 

integrity of our votes and of our election system. I don’t think anything is more important in our country. 

And I’d like to start first by asking Mr. Krebs, have you read the 

indictment from Mr. Mueller, yes or no? 

Mr. KREBS. Yes, ma’am. The most recent on the GRU officers? 

Yes, ma’am. 

Mrs. MALONEY. In the indictment, the object of one of the Russian conspiracies was—and I’m quoting from the indictment—to 

hack into the computers of U.S. persons and entities involved in 

the 2016 Presidential election, steal documents from these computers, and stage releases of the stolen documents to interfere with 

the 2016 U.S. Presidential election. 


KING-6430 with DISTILLER
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Do you believe there is any reason to doubt this statement in this 

indictment, Mr. Krebs? 

Mr. KREBS. No, ma’am. 

Mrs. MALONEY. Okay. 

Also, Mr. Krebs, the indictment goes on to say that in July 2016 

the Russian spies, and I quote, hacked the website of a State board 

of elections and stole information related to approximately 500,000 

U.S. voters, including names, addresses, partial Social Security 

numbers, dates of birth, and driver’s license numbers. 

Do you have any reason to doubt this information, Mr. Krebs? 

Mr. KREBS. No, ma’am. 

Mrs. MALONEY. And, also, the Russian spies, quote, hacked into 

the computers of U.S. vendors—not just voters, but the vendors— 

that supplied software used to verify voter registration information 

for the 2016 U.S. election. 

Do you have any reason to doubt this information, Mr. Krebs? 

Mr. KREBS. No, ma’am. 

Mrs. MALONEY. And then, furthermore, the object of a second 

Russian conspiracy was, quote, again from the indictment, to hack 

into the protected computers of persons and entities charged with 

the administration of the 2016 U.S. election in order to access those 

computers and steal voter data and other information stored on 

those computers. 

Do you have any reason to doubt this information? 

Mr. KREBS. I do not. 

Mrs. MALONEY. Okay. 

I’d like to ask every member of the panel whether or not you 

doubt any of these informations. 

Mr. Hicks, do you doubt this indictment in any way? 

Mr. HICKS. No, ma’am. 

Mrs. MALONEY. Ms. Oliver? 

Ms. TOULOUSE OLIVER. No. 

Mrs. MALONEY. And, Mr. Hatch, do you doubt this in any way, 

any of this information? 

Mr. HATCH. No, ma’am. 

Mrs. MALONEY. You know, now, many people have called this, including the President of the United States, a witch hunt just within the last few days. 

Mr. Krebs, do you consider this a witch hunt, this data, this information? 

Mr. KREBS. Ma’am, this is a duly authorized investigation, authorized and overseen by the Deputy Attorney General. 

Mrs. MALONEY. And do you have any reason to doubt this information or to call it a witch hunt, Mr. Hicks? 

Mr. HICKS. No, ma’am. 

Mrs. MALONEY. Ms. Oliver? 

Ms. TOULOUSE OLIVER. No, ma’am. 

Mrs. MALONEY. And Mr. Hatch? 

Mr. HATCH. No. 

Mrs. MALONEY. Well, nobody, really. And I have no reason to 

doubt it either. And this President and administration and Congress need to take this threat seriously, and I would say this committee needs to take this threat seriously. 


KING-6430 with DISTILLER
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No fight was harder, nor more blood and suffering was shed in 

this country than the fight for liberty, independence, and the right 

to vote. 

And I would like to give to the great State of New Mexico the 

last word, Ms. Oliver, on—I have just a few seconds left—your 

statement on this. How does your State feel about it? How do you 

feel about it? 

Ms. TOULOUSE OLIVER. I’m deeply concerned, Mr. Chair Member 

Maloney, and that is why we are taking this so seriously and working so closely with our Federal partners. 

Mrs. MALONEY. I thank you. 

And I yield back. 

Chairman GOWDY. The gentlelady yields back. 

The gentleman from Michigan is recognized. 

Mr. MITCHELL. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

We had a hearing—I’m concerned about some members of the 

committee talk about how there’s been no hearings on this. With 

Mr. Hurd, we had a hearing on the 2016 election where we had a 

number of people from the elections folks come in and asked them 

very specifically, was there any evidence that the votes in the 2016 

election were altered? We had multiple States there. Not one, not 

at Federal level reporting, not at the State level, indicated that 

votes were in any manner altered. 

There is no quarrel that outside entities, including Russia, attempted to interfere with our election. Conflating the two gets in 

the way of doing the job we’re trying to do here, which is to identify 

the resources we need to protect the integrity of that system. But 

I’m appalled at the ongoing conflating of those two, and suddenly 

the world has come to an end. 

Let me ask you a question. Mr. Hicks, you’re aware of the 

amounts of money put through to States to assist them with their 

elections. I’ve got Michigan’s. Michigan requested—Michigan received $11.242 million to upgrade their systems. All of their voting 

machines will be replaced by the August primary, August 2018. 

Have you received any further requests from Michigan for funding or support beyond that, sir? 

Mr. HICKS. I am not aware of any funding—any other additional 

request from Michigan beyond the request from the—— 

Mr. MITCHELL. So Michigan has not raised a major crisis, that 

our election system in Michigan is suddenly about to come down 

around our ears at this point? 

Mr. KREBS. I’m not aware. 

Mr. MITCHELL. I’ve talked to secretary of State. Are you aware, 

sir, of the review of the State of Detroit’s administration’s 2016 

general election? 

Mr. KREBS. I am not. 

Mr. MITCHELL. Let me give you some data on that. 392 precincts 

in the city of Detroit were out of balance. 26 percent of them, in 

terms of absentee ballot voting, could not be verified. One Detroit 

precinct was found to be missing over 250 ballots. They made six 

recommendations; all of them relate to training and staffing of the 

precincts. Not one, not a single recommendation related to either 

the voter registration file, electronic records, or the actual ballots, 

the actual voting. How are we going to support that given the fact 


KING-6430 with DISTILLER
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that despite the concerns of some of my colleagues have that the 

Russians are coming, the majority of the mistakes that are happening are human errors that just multiply, and they feel they’ve 

reconciled. The city of Detroit, if there was a recount in Michigan, 

by the way, the President won by like 12,000 votes, the city of Detroit could not a sustain an audit, they could not sustain a recount 

because of these problems. How do we support that? 

Mr. KREBS. The EAC remains focused, laser-focused, on all aspects of elections, whether or not that’s voter registration; whether 

or not that’s equipment; whether or not that’s poll worker training; 

whether or not that’s election night reporting. There are about 

8,000 jurisdictions across the country, and each jurisdiction has different aspects of it. And we try our best to help each and every one 

of those jurisdictions function well with the administration of elections through the Federal process. 

Mr. MITCHELL. Do you have a current need for additional resources to support training personnel systems for voting, and what 

would that be? 

Mr. KREBS. I don’t have a specific number, but there’s always 

need for additional resources. States are very tied to the fact that 

they have other things that they focus in on, whether or not that’s 

roads, schools, police and so forth, elections is usually looked at as 

the last. 

As Mr. Hatch talked about, there are additional ways that Congress can look at providing additional funding to the States. 

Mr. MITCHELL. Okay. Ms. Oliver, let’s switch because you’re nodding your head. However we still want to maintain a system that, 

in fact, our elections are State and local, and not a Federal election 

system. I don’t think you want to federalize it. Do you? 

Ms. TOULOUSE OLIVER. No, sir. And speaking on behalf of NASS, 

the Secretaries of State naturally don’t have a position on this 

issue. Speaking for myself personally, my experience in New Mexico, a State which has truly suffered ever since the economic decline, we can always use more funding. And I personally view conducting our Federal, State and local elections together on one ballot 

as a partnership. States have always had skin in the game on this 

issue. We’ve been doing all the election security work. We would 

love to have more resources in that regard, from my perspective. 

Mr. MITCHELL. Has your group identified what those resources 

would be? 

Ms. TOULOUSE OLIVER. Certainly we can provide you a list, but 

I agree with you, I think not only do we need to make sure we have 

the resources to protect in terms of cybersecurity, but we also—we 

have continuing and ongoing needs with regard to training. 

Mr. MITCHELL. Sure. 

Ms. TOULOUSE OLIVER. With regard to resourcing and other 

ways. So I’m happy to provide you any details you would like. 

Mr. MITCHELL. I think any feedback you would have would be 

appreciated by the committee. We ask you to provide that. At this 

point in time, we haven’t had any overwhelming requests. We certainly want to support that partnership. 

I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman GOWDY. The gentleman yields back. The gentlelady 

from the District of Columbia is recognized. 


KING-6430 with DISTILLER
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Ms. NORTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It may not 

be enough, but it certainly is important to have this hearing. 

And Mr. Krebs, before I ask a series of questions to clarify how 

the Russians got so proficient at what they do, can I ask you 

whether it is true, as I believe the President has implied, that the 

United States also engages in hacking or trying to get into the election systems of other countries. 

Mr. KREBS. Ma’am, I have no information on that. My job is to 

help folks like Mr. Hatch and Secretary Toulouse to protect their 

system on a defensive Homeland Security, homeland defense operation. 

Ms. NORTON. So you don’t have any information that would indicate that the tit-for-tat kind of, as we do for example in spying, also 

goes on with respect to hacking into the election systems of other 

countries? 

Mr. KREBS. Ma’am, I do not, in my—any official capacity, no, 

ma’am. 

Mr. Krebs, you testified before the House Committee on Homeland Security, I’m interested because I want to know how the Russians got to be such experts at this. You used words I didn’t understand, you said the Russians had, quote, ‘‘scanned’’ all 50 States. 

Mr. KREBS. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. NORTON. I think you said 21, you were not able to see. What 

is scanning? What does it mean that they scanned all 50 States? 

Mr. KREBS. Yes, ma’am, thank you for the question. So if I could 

back up a little bit. What we historically said dating back to last 

summer, was that we had based on network visibility, so it is sensors that were on state networks that were using DHS indicators 

of Russian activity, we were able to determine 21 States where 

scan—in some senses—— 

Ms. NORTON. You mean scanning, meaning what? 

Mr. KREBS. So scanning can mean a number of things. I one 

sense, it could literally be a Russian officer getting on his computer 

in Moscow or elsewhere, and visiting a county or State system, just 

browsing, going through, whatever his research or search engine is 

of choice—— 

Ms. NORTON. Now, you saw 50—you say that they scanned 50, 

but you were able to see only 21. So why weren’t you able to see— 

certainly we are going to have 50, but you have your own information on only 21? 

Mr. KREBS. Yes, ma’am. So in my written, in my opening, I reference something called an Albert sensor. An Albert sensor is an 

intru—is a network intru—detection—it’s an IDS, I’m sorry, intrusion detection system. What it does is does is it sits on a network 

and it looks for certain traffic IP addresses. So an actual internetconnected device somewhere else, trying to either come in or go out 

of that system. 

Ms. NORTON. So you were able to see for 21 States, but not all 

50. 

Mr. KREBS. So we assume, because we only saw 21, and given 

the fact that we only saw 21, because that’s where we had our Albert sensors deployed, we were able to see those 21. I did not have 

the visibility over the rest of the States. 


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Now, since February of this year, we have quadrupled our visibility. So when we come to 2018 in the midterms, ma’am, I suspect 

we’ll have closer to all 50 States. 

Ms. NORTON. So Albert sensors will be—used for all 50? 

Mr. KREBS. Yes, ma’am. Thank Congress for that. That was in 

the fiscal year 2018 omnibus. We were provided additional funds 

to purchase—— 

Ms. NORTON. Was there anything that the Russians seemed to 

be more interested in, seem to be targeting more than other things? 

Were they just looking at the system to see what they could find? 

I mean, what—give us some information. 

Mr. KREBS. I do believe that, to a certain extent, they were performing a reconnaissance. They were trying to figure out where 

they had landed, and what sort of functionality the systems had. 

And it’s important to know that what they were able to see or scan, 

in one case, access a system of a voter registration database, that 

was all on the administration side. That was on the kind of information management side. It wasn’t in the vote tallying or vote 

counting. 

Ms. NORTON. So what do you think they ultimately want to do 

after scanning? What are they looking to do? 

Mr. KREBS. It is hard to tell, based on their demonstrated capability. We do know that they attempted to interfere in the overarching election, that they intended to interfere in the election. 

Ms. NORTON. And did so. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Krebs. 

Chairman GOWDY. The gentlelady from the District of Columbia 

yields back. 

Before we recognize the gentleman from Georgia for his question, 

a quorum being present, the committee will resume consideration 

for the gentleman from North Carolina’s motion to table. While the 

motion is not debatable, I did tell my friend from Massachusetts 

that he would have an opportunity to be heard. So I’m going to 

keep my word, and I’m going to ask unanimous consent, despite 

the fact that the motion is not debatable, that the gentleman from 

Massachusetts be recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do appreciate the courtesy that is being extended to me. I want to initially associate myself with much of the ranking member. He did correctly point out 

that it has been a long, long time, and I was at the hearing that 

Chairman Hurd had on the general issue of elections in this country, and that subsumed issues such as auditing and voter files and 

the other mechanics internally of our domestic elections. It did not 

precisely attempt to discern the level at which the Russians interfered with our—or attempted to interfere with our elections. 

But I have to say that there is a wide gap between the opinions 

of many Members of Congress, both Democrat and Republican, regarding Russian interference, and opinions that I think are harmonized with our intelligence agencies that Russian interference 

did occur. And that’s not what we hear coming out of the White 

House. And I greatly respect my friends on the other side of the 

aisle when they say they acknowledged it was—there was interference by the Russians. But they then talk for 10 seconds about 

that, and 4 minutes and 50 seconds about Detroit and how the votVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:30 Dec 07, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00054 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\33089.TXT APRIL

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ing files are inaccurate, and we need to train—train our election 

workers, that’s not the point. If we had enough concern about Hillary’s emails to do nine investigations in the House, and two in the 

Senate, and have hundreds of hearings on that issue, because we 

thought—a U.S. official mishandled their emails, hundreds of hearings, and we have two, when every single intelligence agency in 

this country tells us that the Russians hacked our election. 

Two hearings, two hearings, that’s it, after a year and a half. 

This used to be the Oversight Committee, this is the running away 

from oversight committee. 

Since Trump took office, we do zero. I’m surprised we’re having 

this hearing today. I’m shocked, because the Republican effort has 

been to rally around the President, even when he is wrong, even 

when he puts down publicly our intelligence agency, even when he 

disses us and sides with Putin. 

Are you kidding me? Are you kidding me? This is where we are 

at now it? This is a disgrace, a disgrace. That was a national embarrassment in Helsinki. I was embarrassed that our President 

was siding against our intelligence agency and those people worked 

hard. You all work with them. You work with the NSA, you work 

with CIA. You know the good work that they do. And our President 

threw them under the bus in front of the world to side with Putin. 

You’ve got to be kidding me. 

It’s time to decide what you stand for. Do you stand for democracy, or are you stand with that gangster in Moscow? Do you stand 

for the right for your people to have a clean and honest election, 

or do you want to cozy up to the President, you don’t want to make 

him look bad? I can understand when there’s gray issues, but this 

is black and white, come on. I know there are colleagues on the 

other side of the aisle who feel the way that I do, and you’re exasperated about this. But the time has come. On this issue, you can 

be a good Republican and still protect the electoral process in this 

country, you can do both. That’s all I’m asking here. We can get 

at this, fix this problem, and you can still be a good and loyal Republican. It’s not a question of either or. I know there are good men 

and women on your side. I know that. And you care deeply about 

this country. 

I’m just saying on this issue, can we deal with the issue? Can 

we deal with it and fix it on both our behalves? Red States? Blue 

States? All Americans. That should be the goal here. We shouldn’t 

let the President’s quirks on this issue divide us, but to work on 

this problem as Americans. Thank you, I yield back. 

Chairman GOWDY. The gentleman yields back. A quorum being 

present, the committee will resume consideration of the gentleman 

from North Carolina’s motion to table. Those in favor will signify 

by say aye, aye. 

All those in favor will signify by saying aye. Aye 

Those opposed will signify by saying no. 

While close, in the opinion of the chair, the ayes have it. 

Motion from Virginia is laid upon the table. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Chairman, I would ask for a recorded vote. 

Chairman GOWDY. The gentleman from Maryland and the gentleman from Virginia ask for a recorded vote. The clerk will call the 

roll. 


KING-6430 with DISTILLER
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The CLERK. Mr. Gowdy? 

Chairman GOWDY. Yes. 

The CLERK. Mr. Gowdy votes yes. 

Mr. Duncan? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Issa? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Jordan? 

Mr. JORDAN. Yes. 

The CLERK. Mr. Jordan votes yes. 

Mr. Sanford? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Amash? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Gosar? 

Mr. GOSAR. Yes. 

The CLERK. Mr. Gosar votes yes. 

Mr. DesJarlais? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Ms. Foxx? 

Ms. FOXX. Yes. 

The CLERK. Ms. Foxx votes yes. 

Mr. Massie? 

Mr. MASSIE. Yes. 

The CLERK. Mr. Massie votes yes. 

Mr. Meadows? 

Mr. MEADOWS. Yes. 

The CLERK. Mr. Meadows votes yes. 

Mr. DeSantis? 

Mr. DESANTIS. Yes. 

The CLERK. Mr. DeSantis votes yes. 

Mr. Ross? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Walker? 

Mr. WALKER. Yes. 

The CLERK. Mr. Walker votes yes. 

Mr. Blum? 

Mr. BLUM. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Blum votes aye. 

Mr. Hice? 

Mr. HICE. Yes. 

The CLERK. Mr. Hice votes yes. 

Mr. Russell? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Grothman? 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Yes. 

The CLERK. Mr. Grothman votes yes. 

Mr. Hurd? 

Mr. HURD. Yes. 

The CLERK. Mr. Hurd votes yes. 

Mr. Palmer? 

Mr. PALMER. Yes. 

The CLERK. Mr. Palmer votes yes. 

Mr. Comer? 


KING-6430 with DISTILLER
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Mr. COMER. Yes. 

The CLERK. Mr. Comer votes yes. 

Mr. Mitchell? 

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes. 

The CLERK. Mr. Mitchell votes yes. 

Mr. Gianforte? 

Mr. GIANFORTE. Yes. 

The CLERK. Mr. Gianforte votes yes. 

Mr. Cloud? 

Mr. CLOUD. Yes. 

The CLERK. Mr. Cloud votes yes. 

Mr. Cummings? 

Mr. CUMMINGS. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Cummings votes no. 

Mrs. Maloney? 

Mrs. MALONEY. No. 

The CLERK. Mrs. Maloney votes no. 

Ms. Norton? 

Ms. NORTON. No. 

The CLERK. Ms. Norton votes no. 

Mr. Clay? 

Mr. CLAY. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Clay votes no. 

Mr. Lynch? 

Mr. LYNCH. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Lynch votes no. 

Mr. Cooper? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Connolly? 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Nay. 

The CLERK. Mr. Connolly votes no. 

Ms. Kelly? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mrs. Lawrence? 

Mrs. LAWRENCE. No. 

The CLERK. Mrs. Lawrence votes no. 

Mrs. Watson Coleman? 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. No. 

The CLERK. Mrs. Watson Coleman votes no. 

Mr. Krishnamoorthi? 

Mr. KRISHNAMOORTHI. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Krishnamoorthi votes no. 

Mr. Raskin? 

Mr. RASKIN. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Raskin votes no. 

Mr. Gomez? 

Mr. GOMEZ. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Gomez votes no. 

Mr. Welch? 

Mr. WELCH. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Welch votes no. 

Mr. Cartwright? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. DeSaulnier? 


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Mr. DESAULNIER. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. DeSaulnier votes no. 

Ms. Plaskett? 

Ms. PLASKETT. No. 

The CLERK. Ms. Plaskett votes no. 

Mr. Sarbanes? 

Mr. SARBANES. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Sarbanes votes no. 

Chairman GOWDY. Have all members who wish to vote voted? 

The clerk will report the tally. 

The CLERK. Mr. Chairman, on this vote there are 17 ayes and 

15 noes. 

Chairman GOWDY. The ayes have it, the motion is tabled. 

The gentleman from Georgia is recognized for his 5 minutes of 

questions. 

Mr. HICE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You know, I don’t think 

anyone here denies the fact that Russia attempted to meddle in the 

elections. That it really is not the issue. They have done so in the 

past, they attempted in 2016. I don’t have any reason to believe 

they won’t attempt it again in 2018 what’s coming up. I think what 

concerns me when we talk about the witch hunt, it involves over 

a year of an investigation by Mueller where not one bit of evidence 

has come forth that President Trump colluded with the Russians 

to try to influence the election. And, you know, when we’re—Mr. 

Chairman, dealing with all this—this has been going on for a long 

time. Obama administration, this is way back as early as 2014 that 

they were meddling, and he did nothing about it. 

So this is something that the issue of meddling is one thing, the 

issue of the President colluding is another, and that is indeed a 

witch hunt. 

I want to go back to the topic here today, our whole election system involves States, not individual States. We’ve got over 8,000 jurisdictions, 110,000 different polling places throughout all 50 

States, and for the most part, is a State issue, not the Federal Government. And I know in the omnibus that was passed in March, 

there was over merely $400 million that was granted for States to 

try to improve the security of the election infrastructure. One of 

the big concerns that comes along with those kinds of monies and 

funding is States and people know that as a general rule, wherever 

there is Federal funding, there is always strings attached to it, and 

as a result, States are leery of getting involved in accepting that 

kind of funds. I know in my home State of Georgia, that’s certainly 

been an issue. 

Mr. Krebs, I want to start with you. How has the Department 

of Homeland Security overcome these concerns of strings attached 

to some of the funding to try to help with election security? 

Mr. KREBS. Thank you, sir. I can’t speak specifically to any of the 

strings attached to the HAVA funding. And I defer to Mr. Hicks. 

But what we have done at DHS, working with the EAC, working 

with Secretary Toulouse Oliver, said, due to government coordinating counsel, we have worked to develop the set of guidance of 

investment guidance on things that State and local election officials 

can do to improve their cybersecurity. And that information is 

based on a range of factors, including some of the risk and vulnerVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:30 Dec 07, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00058 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\33089.TXT APRIL

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ability assessments that we’ve conducted over the last year or so 

on State networks and on election networks. And so what we’ve 

done across the 17 or so risk and vulnerability assessments, we’ve 

identified clear trends. There are a number of things that we are 

funding consistently across State networks, that frankly we are 

finding across any other IT system. And so, that’s what bakes into 

the guidance and the recommendation, we are there to help from 

a technical perspective, help States implement that guidance. 

Mr. HICE. Let me ask you this: I know that Georgia’s secretary 

of State applied for a security clearance with DHS to try to access 

some of the shared classified threat information. Do you know 

whether or not that has been approved yet? 

Mr. KREBS. So, sir, generally speaking, we don’t discuss security 

clearance issues in public, due to the operation security nature that 

could make Secretary Kemp a target of foreign intelligence collection. I am happy to follow up off-line on that. 

Mr. HICE. I would like to follow up on that, because, again, the 

integrity of State elections is at stake here. 

Ms. Oliver, let me ask you, or Mr. Hatch, or whomever, regarding homeland security. How prepared are we, do you believe, going 

into this next election? 

Ms. TOULOUSE OLIVER. Thank you for the question. I believe we 

always want to be more prepared. I feel fairly confident about 

where we are in New Mexico. I think Secretaries of State across 

the country and chief election officials are taking this issue very seriously. We are as prepared as we can be. And more important 

than prepared, we’re also ready to be able to respond to any issues 

as they arise. 

Mr. HATCH. I agree with Secretary Oliver. County election officials really have always had security, first and foremost, and not 

just cybersecurity, but physical security. So we were prepared. We 

were grateful for the additional funding and any additional resources provided by the DHS and EAC, as well as our States. It’s 

a great partnership between the locals and the States. We enjoy 

sharing information and preparing together, and we feel confident. 

Of course, the attacks will come, and I wouldn’t be surprised if 

there’s a breach somewhere. It just happens with that many localities and that much attention. The key is to be prepared, and also 

to be resilient in the case of a breach. 

Mr. HICE. Thank you very much. I yield back. 

Chairman GOWDY. The gentleman yields back. The gentleman 

from Maryland is recognized. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to 

associate myself with the words of Mr. Lynch. In all my 21 years 

here in Congress, that has been one of the most moving statements 

I have heard in Congress. And I want to thank him for that statement. 

Secretary Oliver, yesterday, a coalition of 21 State Attorneys 

General, both Republicans and Democrats, sent a letter to Congress that directly contradicts Republican claims that additional 

funding is not needed to help protect State election systems. The 

Attorneys General wrote, and I quote, ‘‘The undersigned Attorneys 

General’s right to express our grave concern over the threat of the 


KING-6430 with DISTILLER
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integrity of the American election system,’’ end of quote. I’ve heard 

your answers to other questions. But, have you seen that letter? 

Ms. TOULOUSE OLIVER. Yes, sir, I have. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. AGs also wrote ‘‘We are concerned that many 

States lack the resources and tools they need to protect the polls.’’ 

I heard you say a little bit earlier that you all had gotten what you 

asked for based on a formula.Is that right? 

Ms. TOULOUSE OLIVER. Yes, sir, that’s correct. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Do you agree that the AGs that in many States, 

do not have the funding needed to protect their elections? 

Ms. TOULOUSE OLIVER. So again, Mr. Ranking Member, I won’t 

be speaking on behalf of NASS to answer this question, because we 

don’t have a formal opinion as a group. But speaking on behalf of 

myself and my State, yes, I do strongly believe that ongoing funding is necessary, and that there’s a consistent source of funding. 

Election security is not a one-time issue, it’s—you know, as has 

been mentioned multiple times today during this hearing, interference happened before 2016; it will continue to happen after 

2016. I think 2016 really just brought a level of awareness to all 

of us about how serious the issue truly is. 

And so, yes, I personally believe that elections are severely underfunded, particularly with regard to their significance. And so 

any additional help in terms of tools, resources and funding that 

the Federal Government can continue to provide is important. For 

example, this funding just provided through the omnibus bill 

wouldn’t be enough to replace systems in a State that don’t have 

paper ballot systems that are still using DRE machines, for example. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Well, you’re going exactly where I was trying to 

get to. The AGs signed the letter that I just referred to and this 

is what they said, Ms. Oliver: ‘‘Additional funding for voting for infrastructure will not only allow States to upgrade election systems, 

but will also allow for a comprehensive security risk assessment. 

Unfortunately, past practice has shown that the existing Election 

Assistance Commission grants are simply insufficient to provide for 

the upgraded technology needed. More funding is essential to adequately equip States with the financial resource we need to safeguard our democracy and protect the data of voting members of our 

States,’’ end of quote. 

Secretary Oliver, do you agree with that statement? 

Ms. TOULOUSE OLIVER. Again, speaking for myself personally. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. You can speak for yourself. 

Ms. TOULOUSE OLIVER. Yes, I agree. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And how would more funding help New Mexico 

conduct comprehensive risk assessment? 

Ms. TOULOUSE OLIVER. For example, Mr. Ranking Member, right 

now, we have worked together with DHS to help conduct our State 

risk vul—vulnerability testing. What we don’t have is a good sense 

of where each of our 33 counties in the State stand. I can tell you 

anecdotally, I think about four or five of our counties are in pretty 

good shape, but a giant question mark hangs over the rest. 

So one of the things we want to do is do the same kind of vulnerability testing just to get a baseline to see where we are. If we continue to work with DHS in that process, which we would like to 


KING-6430 with DISTILLER
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do, it’s probably going to take a while, because their resource are 

limited. If we were to try to contact with an outside entity that can 

do that privately, that’s going to cost significantly more funds than 

we have available, even through this most recent grant. So these 

are the types of challenges that we are working within, Mr. Ranking Member. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. The AG closed their letter with the following 

plea, and I quote, ‘‘the integrity of the Nation’s voting infrastructure is that bipartisan issue and one that affects not only the national political landscape, but election, and State, county and municipal local levels. 

It is our hope that you agree and will take swift action to protect 

our national legacy of fair and free elections,’’ end of quote. 

Mr. Krebs, last week Republicans refused, on the House floor, to 

approve another dime for States to protect their election systems. 

What is the Trump administration’s official policy on this specific 

question? And do you support additional funding for State election 

systems or not? 

Mr. KREBS. Sir, thank you for the question. In terms of additional funding, there certainly has been laid out both in the Attorney General letter, as well as Secretary Toulouse Oliver and Mr. 

Hatch have laid out. There is a requirement to update systems 

across the board, that is going to take money. Whether that comes 

from the State or the Federal Government, I don’t have an official 

opinion on that. It is going to take money. We are going to have 

to identify where the risk is. And we’re going to have to focus 

money on that risk. 

As Secretary Toulouse Oliver said, there are still five States that 

have equipment that does not have a voter-verifiable paper trial. 

From a risk management perspective, that is where I would prefer 

that we focus resources and assets. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. As I close, I hope my Republican colleagues will 

reverse the opposition and join us in helping these States. These 

21 AGs are from States many of you represent: North Carolina, 

Michigan, California. Let me close by reading just one more quote 

from their letter. ‘‘It is imperative that we protect the integrity of 

our elections. We must ensure that the upcoming 2018 midterm 

elections are secure and untainted. Accordingly, we ask for your assistance, in shoring up our systems, so that we may protect elections from foreign attacks and interference.’’ 

Let me ask you this: Do you agree with that, Mr. Krebs? 

Mr. KREBS. Sir, I’ll tell you what, if you could repeat that. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Oh, no, no, I’m not going to repeat it. But basically what—what they are saying is, is that we want to make sure 

that our electoral system is protected and that people will know 

that their votes are going to be counted and that the process is untainted. And I would guess that is consistent with what you are in 

office for. 

Mr. KREBS. Yes, sir. And that’s why it’s important that we are 

having this hearing right now, so the American people can hear 

about the efforts that DHS is leading, the Election System Commission is leading, that State secretaries are leading. This is a 

partnership that is working right now. We are improving security 


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practices across the electoral system in this Nation at great pace. 

There is a lot of work to do. This is a marathon, this is not a—— 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Well, speaking of a marathon, Mr. Hicks has 

said, you listed a number of things that you all look at. The one 

thing I notice that you did not mention is voter suppression. Do 

you all look at voter suppression, because that is a booger bear. 

Mr. KREBS. That is not one of the functions of—— 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Okay. So that’s why you didn’t list it? 

Mr. KREBS. Correct. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. All right. Thank you. 

Chairman GOWDY. The gentleman from Florida is recognized. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the witnesses. 

Mr. Secretary, for the 2016 election, was there any cyber activity 

that influenced any of the vote totals in any jurisdiction, to your 

knowledge? 

Mr. KREBS. So very specifically, drilling down to the cyber enabled hacking, we’ll call it, of State election systems, we do not 

have information or evidence to suggest they had access to vote tallying systems. And that’s why I made that distinction earlier; there 

is the administration piece, and then there is the vote tabulation 

and counting side. 

Mr. DESANTIS. So—and the other stuff is obviously is still important. In fact, with the registration, like a registration database, if 

that were to be compromised, how would that have a negative effect? What would be the problem? 

Mr. KREBS. On the specifics, we defer to Secretary Toulouse Oliver, but the way I see it, the way the Nation’s laws are built up, 

there are checks and compensating controls in place, that, in fact, 

that State election, or that registration database, had been compromised to a point where information was deleted or changed such 

that a voter had showed up to vote, and their information was not 

there or otherwise not consistent and there was an abnormality at 

the poll. There are processes in place across the country, including 

provisional ballots that would allow that American voter to cast 

their vote and subsequently that vote would be counted correctly. 

Now, I have to emphasize that the outcome here is not security, 

100 percent security, it is resilience. So we can take a hit and we 

can keep functioning and that there is confidence in the system. 

Yes, that would create some challenges on election day if that had 

not been detected. I do think it probably be detected beforehand as 

we saw in 2016, where that compromise was detected. Nonetheless, 

there are checks, there are compensating controls in place for resilience in the system so that we can sustain those sorts of access and 

compromise. 

Mr. DESANTIS. What’s the breakdown roughly between States 

that use electronic poll books and States that use paper? 

Mr. KREBS. So electronic poll books—and I defer to the voting experts on those numbers, if I can. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Mr. Hicks? 

Mr. HICKS. We would have to get back with you on that information, but there are a number of States that are going towards more 

electronic poll books as opposed to paper poll books, or registration 

things. As Mr. Krebs had talked about earlier, there is a resiliency 

in terms things that these States do. So if the voter registration list 


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is compromised, those are supposed to be backed up, and then also 

having some sort of paper form available, so that folks can make 

sure they are eligible to vote. 

Also with provisional ballots, no voter should be able to leave the 

polls without a chance to cast their ballot under Federal law. 

Mr. DESANTIS. In an age where the cyber stuff is always going 

to be a threat, is it just better for—of a confidence to just have 

paper ballots? 

Mr. KREBS. As long as we continue on with security and accessibility. And right now, paper ballots are auditable. And as long as 

folks can still cast their ballots who are disabled, then I would say 

resoundingly yes. 

Mr. DESANTIS. And what about election night reporting? What 

threats is there vulnerability at the local State, both levels, Mr. 

Secretary? 

Mr. KREBS. So when you think about election night reporting, basically what you’re talking about unofficial election results that are 

being reported to either the media, or in some cases, on a website. 

Keeping in mind, again, that is, on the administration side, it not 

the official data. And what we have seen recently were some either 

technical glitches in election night reporting, or perhaps, cyber 

actor efforts to disrupt election night reporting. 

What’s important here is, because it’s on an NEIT system, it’s 

much like your own congressional web page, it is a web page. There 

are vulnerabilities in any web page. So what we’re trying to do is 

work with election officials, State and local election officials, to 

communicate clearly to the voting public that hey, this is unofficial 

data, if there’s a problem we’re still going to get you the official results or readout, it might take a little more time. But the integrity 

of the official election data is intact. There is no connection back 

between the web site, the reporting website and the official data. 

Mr. DESANTIS. I yield back the balance of my time. 

Chairman GOWDY. The gentleman yields back. The gentleman 

from Missouri is recognized. 

Mr. CLAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And Mr. Krebs, I’d like to discuss some documents about Russian 

attacks on State election systems in 2016, documents that DHS 

and the administration have refused to provide to this committee. 

You are familiar with an October 2017 letter to DHS requesting 

these documents from Ranking Member Cummings and subcommittee Ranking Member Kelly, correct? 

Mr. KREBS. Yes, sir. In fact, I reviewed that letter this morning. 

Yes, sir. 

Mr. CLAY. And you are familiar with the official questions for the 

record requesting these documents, accompanied by a letter signed 

by our IT subcommittee chair, Will Hurd, following your testimony 

at the joint subcommittee hearing last fall. Is that correct? 

Mr. KREBS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CLAY. Okay. Back in late January, all oversight committee 

Democrats wrote to Chairman Gowdy seeking a subpoena for these 

documents. We were ignored. Ranking Member Cummings, along 

with ranking members of five other House committees, wrote to 

Speaker Ryan asking for his assistance in obtaining these documents, they were ignored. 


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Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that these four letters 

be made part of the official record for today’s hearing. 

Chairman GOWDY. Without objection. 

Mr. CLAY. Thank you, sir. 

Now Mr. Krebs, back at that November hearing, you stated, and 

I quote, ‘‘If you’ll permit me to go back and I commit to you that 

we will have a more fulsome answer for you.’’ 

On February 6, 2018, DHS provided approximately 50 pages of 

documents, most of which were already publicly available. The production did not include any classified documents, nor did it include 

documents about the precise nature of these attacks. The number 

of times these States were targeted, or when they were targeted. 

And this has been 8 months. That is not a mere fulsome answer 

to our request. It is just more documents that we did not ask for, 

and that do not answer our questions. Why are you withholding 

from Congress documents about how Russia attacked our State? 

Mr. KREBS. Sir, I don’t believe I’m withholding any information. 

I need to go back and review the answers we provided to those letters. It has always been my commitment to approach this manner 

in a bipartisan—in a bipartisan manner, a nonpartisan manner. In 

fact, I see this as a matter of American security, national security. 

So if you’ll permit me, I’d like to go back and look at the answers 

and also the range of briefings. As I understand, with my staff, we 

provided 30 if not more classified and unclassified briefings. I personally participated in the Housewide classified briefing earlier 

this summer, late spring and provided information on what we 

were doing and what we saw. So, you know, if you’re not satisfied 

with the information, certainly we can go back and look at what 

we have provided previously. 

Mr. CLAY. We are asking what you at the Department of Homeland Security determined about exactly what the Russians, how 

they attacked us. 

Mr. KREBS. Yes, sir, and I think that information is in the intelligence assessment, the intelligence community assessment. The 

unclassified version provides a significant amount of detail. The 

catch here is that on the classified side in terms of the tactics and 

techniques they used against our State networks, it’s not highly 

classified information. It is technical. In fact, the—I think the recent indictments provide additional information. 

Mr. CLAY. Well, how about you initiating the interagency process 

to obtain clearance to give us these documents? Can you do that? 

Mr. KREBS. Sir, I—I will, once again, commit to you that we we’ll 

go back and take a look at this and make sure you get what you 

need. 

Mr. CLAY. You know, in fact, we learn more about what happened in Illinois from reading Special Counsel Mueller’s indictment 

of the 12 Russian intelligence officers than we have received from 

you. We are just asking for some cooperation here, and for you to 

actually share with us what you know. That’s our function, as Mr. 

Lynch said, we have the oversight function, and we really need 

some cooperation. 

Mr. Hurd signed a letter asking for these documents. I will 

yield—I don’t have time to yield to him now, but—— 

Chairman GOWDY. You timed that out perfectly. 


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Mr. CLAY. Yes. Thank you. I yield back. 

Chairman GOWDY. The gentleman from Alabama is now recognized. 

Mr. PALMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think my colleague before, Mr. DeSantis, may have asked this question Mr. Krebs, did 

Russia determine the outcome of our election? 

Mr. KREBS. Sir, based in the cybersecurity technical hacking aspects of State and local election officials, we don’t have any information to suggest they had access it to vote tallying, and therefore, 

any ability to technically change votes. 

Mr. PALMER. One of the ways to implement the outcome of an 

election is not necessarily the vote tally on the day of the election, 

but voter registration. Is that accurate? It could be. 

Mr. KREBS. Well, so, if I can understand your question, you’re 

asking if we can influence votes by disrupting voter registration 

processes? 

Mr. PALMER. Or manipulating the voter registration to register 

people who are not eligible to vote. 

Mr. KREBS. So coming at it from the angle of disrupting the registered voters and their ability to vote, we’ve already talked a little 

bit about the resilience of the system. But in terms of adding additional people to the vote, I’m not sure what the question is. 

Mr. PALMER. Well, my point is this, is that there are more than 

one way to influence the outcome of an election. We saw this in 

2008 and 2010, a group called ACORN. Their voter registration efforts in Nevada, and Colorado, and Florida and other places where 

they were registering people. There was Indiana, 2,100 voter registration forms that were invalidated because they were all filled 

out by the same person. 

There was another 5,000 set aside because of that. We had a lady 

who was leading the 2010 effort in Nevada Project Vote program 

for ACORN who was under indictment, Amy Busefink, and you had 

a situation in Colorado where they pressured the Colorado agencies 

that deal with people who are on public assistance; and their fraudulent registration rate was 4 times the national average. 

So there are other ways to influence the outcome of an election 

other than—trying to manipulate the vote total on election day. Is 

that a fair assessment? 

Mr. KREBS. Sir, I don’t have experience in that side of the vote 

process. I would have to defer to the election officials at the table. 

Mr. PALMER. Anyone want to respond to that? 

Mr. KREBS. Yeah, there will always be attempts to meddle in 

elections, whether that be through a cybersecurity attack, or 

through influencing social media, or through trying to get additional people to register to vote as an election official. As a local 

election official, I have to focus on the things that I can control, 

and the things that are within my domain. And so, we recognize 

that there are all sorts of influence out there, and there will be always. What we do is we make sure that the public is confident in 

the election process itself and we do that by outreach by candidate, 

parties. 

Mr. PALMER. Do you have a responsibility to protect our election 

process from all threats, both foreign and domestic. Is that fair? 

Mr. KREBS. Absolutely, yeah. 


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Mr. PALMER. I just want to enter into the record, Mr. Chairman, 

a report from Capital Research Center on what happened with 

ACORN, just as a reminder, that when we talk about protecting 

our elections, we are not talking about just protecting them from 

foreign influence, but also from domestic influence and it’s critical. 

I agree with my colleagues on both sides of the aisle. It’s absolutely 

critical that people have confidence that the vote count is accurate, 

it reflects the will of the people, and it hasn’t been manipulated. 

So when we talk about that, I hope that every State is taking this 

seriously. 

It is not just making sure that we’re protected from foreign influence, but also from domestic attempts by any group from any side 

of the aisle that would try to influence outcomes from elections. Is 

that part of what we’re doing here, you’re nodding your head, Ms. 

Toulouse Oliver. 

Ms. TOULOUSE OLIVER. Absolutely. And I think the examples 

that you just gave with regard to ACORN, we had similar situations happen when I was a county clerk in New Mexico, found 

questionable voter registrations, referred them to law enforcement 

as appropriate. And I think that goes to what we’ve been talking 

about all along, which is that that we have to not only protect our 

systems, but we can never have a 100 percent secure system. So 

it’s also important to remember that our systems are resilient. And 

so identifying, finding, rejecting fake registrations, being able to 

identify if fake registrations were to come in through an online portal as well, that’s all part of what we’re doing. And absolutely, it 

doesn’t matter who is trying to interfere with our elections, foreign 

or domestic, that’s what we are all focused on. 

Mr. PALMER. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the response of the witnesses. And I just would like to say that each one of us are outraged that Russia’s made an attempt, but we should be equally 

outraged when anyone makes an attempt to deny the American 

public their hard-fought-for and well-defended right to elect for 

themselves the representatives that they want. 

I yield back. 

Chairman GOWDY. The gentleman’s unanimous request is not objected to. And the gentleman from Massachusetts is recognized. 

Mr. LYNCH. I thank the chairman and the ranking member for 

his kind words. I want to thank the witnesses for your willingness 

to be so truthful, and blunt, and honest with your assessment of 

the fact that the Russians have interfered with our elections in the 

past, and are likely had to do so in the future. 

Actually on this committee, I’m actually the ranking member 

Democrat on the Subcommittee on National Security. So with my 

colleagues across the aisle, you know, we travel quite a bit, we 

spend a fair amount of time in Afghanistan. We’ve probably got 20 

trips to Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Nigeria, Egypt. And ironically, 

we look very closely at the rule of law issues, elections. And all of 

these countries, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Nigeria, Egypt, 

among others, have had problems with their elections. And I have 

to say that I think it has a corrosive effect on democracy in those 

countries. You look and there’s no independent judiciary. There is 

a decided and pronounced lack of respect for the rule of law in 

those countries, because it’s not seen as endorsed or supported by 


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the general public, sort of a top-down system with a lot of corruption. 

It’s oftentimes inimical to the interests of minority rights and 

human rights in those countries. So I just worry, I worry that if 

we allow our electoral process, if we allow doubt to creep into the 

minds of the American people that the elections are not legitimate, 

then our leaders are not legitimate, then our laws are not legitimate. It is just, again, a corrosive effect that happens. And I’m just 

very concerned about that. And I think we ought to be all over this, 

with much more gusto than the President has invited. 

Mr. Krebs, I want to start with just a couple of simple questions. 

Recently we had—a little while back we had FBI Director Christopher Wray testify before Congress. And he said that he was not 

specifically directed by the President to address Russian interference. I’m just curious, has the President directed you specifically 

to address the Russian interference? 

Mr. KREBS. Thank you for the question. So—— 

Mr. LYNCH. I think it would be a yes or no. I don’t have a whole 

lot of time here. Either he did or he didn’t. 

Mr. KREBS. I have been in a policy meeting where the Secretary—or the President made it very clear that election security 

is a priority. 

Mr. LYNCH. No, no, Russian interference. 

Mr. KREBS. Russian interference in our election system, yes, sir, 

is a priority. 

Mr. LYNCH. Good, good. That’s a good start. 

DNI, the Director of National Intelligence, Dan Coats, said, there 

was no single agency in charge of our sort of countering Russian 

interference. Is that still the case, or do you think we have a single 

agency that’s taking that over? 

Mr. KREBS. Sir, given the range of authorities and capabilities 

across the Federal Government, this a team effort, this is a wholeof-government effort. 

Mr. LYNCH. Okay. Is there—is there a specific White House guidance on the issue? 

Mr. KREBS. The guidance to secure the election, yes, sir. 

Mr. LYNCH. Oh, that’s it? Okay. I’m just curious. Now, since John 

Bolton came in as National Security Advisor, he fired Rob Joyce, 

who was the cybersecurity coordinator at NSC. He said he wanted 

to streamline things. But a lot of people feel that Rob Joyce was 

one of the smartest people we had on cybersecurity. As a matter 

of fact, he didn’t just fire him, he eliminated the position, so we 

don’t have a—we don’t have an adviser on cybersecurity anymore 

at the White House. Do you think that’s helpful or do you think 

we should use—— 

Mr. KREBS. Sir, I don’t—I don’t mean to contradict you, yet I 

think Mr. Joyce was on a detail from the NSA and he returned to 

the NSA on a detail so he was not fired, he’s still in the Federal 

Government. 

Mr. LYNCH. Okay. The position has been eliminated, though. 

Mr. KREBS. The cyber security coordinator position, as I understand it, has been officially eliminated. There are cybersecurity directors and senior directors in the National Security Council. I 

think the important thing to note here, though, is that operational 


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responsibility resides in the technical agency. So I have a very 

clear job, and my work is to work with—and my job is to work with 

these folks with me at the table, to provide them the resources and 

capabilities they need to secure the election. 

So, again, I have clarity of mission, clarity of purpose. We know 

what we are doing every day. 

Mr. LYNCH. Everybody feels that way? And Mr. Hicks, Ms. Toulouse Oliver, and Mr. Hatch? We’re all on the same page and we’re 

going to secure the election. Is that your general assessment? 

Mr. HICKS. That’s my sworn duty. 

Ms. TOULOUSE OLIVER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. LYNCH. Okay. All right. I have exhausted my time I think. 

I think the gentleman for his courtesy. And I yield back. 

Chairman GOWDY. The gentleman yields back. The gentleman 

from North Carolina, Mr. Meadows. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Krebs, thank you for articulating how clearly you feel the 

mission is for you and your team. We have all kinds of narratives 

that are out there. But will you reiterate for this committee, and 

perhaps for the American people, your primary responsibility to 

make sure that our election process is secure, and that every vote 

is counted, counted accurately, not double-counted and not interfered with? Is that correct? 

Mr. KREBS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MEADOWS. So and you’ve had that articulated from the administration to you and that you feel empowered? 

Mr. KREBS. I have a very clear guidance from my Secretary, I 

have received guidance from the White House, I am empowered to 

do my job, I have clarity of mission, clarity of purpose. I spent 40 

to 50 percent of my day focused on the 2018 mid-terms and beyond. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Well, I appreciate you reiterating that, because 

I’ve talked to the Secretary, and she has articulated that very 

clearly to me, and it’s good. Because sometimes, it doesn’t get 

transferred to those that actually do the work. What you’re saying 

is you have a clear vision. Do the people that work for you have 

a clear vision? 

Mr. KREBS. Sir, I would actually have to defer on answering that 

question. I would actually ask Secretary Toulouse Oliver if she 

feels that my folks that work with her on a daily basis are unable 

to do their jobs. I think that would be the best way to get that answer. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Very well. Go ahead. 

Ms. TOULOUSE OLIVER. Yes. I actually wanted to make a comment earlier as Mr. Krebs was describing the provisional balloting 

process, and some of the other technical processes that we undertake. I am so proud that DHS has learned elections from working 

closely with us, and maybe not completing, but yes, I absolutely do 

believe so, sir. 

Mr. MEADOWS. All right. Thank you both. 

So let me give you a to-do, because one of concerns I have is really that paper trail. Obviously, we have a bill that is a bipartisan 

bill that looks at a paper system. But here’s the problem on elections and part of why we’re seeing this: We need, from a security 

standpoint, really a level of this is most secure—kind of like when 


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you put in a password, you know, you know the longer your password the better it is, but I’m talking about systems. Because in 

my—I represent 16 counties, and we have multiple different ways 

to vote within my own congressional district. So I’ve got paper ballots in part of it, I’ve got electronic ballots in another part. You 

know, we have the typical bubble in and scan in one county and 

we have all electronic. And yet, they are making individual purchases many times on voting systems so it’s not necessarily handled at the secretary of State level in some States. 

So it would be very good to have a resource where they come and 

they said, okay, if you’re looking at upgrading your system, here 

are the five things you need to do and this is most secure, this is— 

because I don’t find that, do we have that currently? 

Mr. KREBS. So I can speak very briefly, and then we’ll quick it 

over to Commissioner Hicks here. 

But we work closely with the EAC. We work through the Government Coordinating Council. 

You’ve got to keep in mind that every State’s different. Some are 

top-down; others are bottom-up. Every county is going to be different in terms of resource, population, the quality of the infrastructure—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. Listen, you’re preaching to the choir. I get that. 

Mr. KREBS. So—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. But the real problem is that there is not a resource at this point at the Federal level. I mean, Mr. Hicks, with 

all due respect as a Commissioner, this is the first time I’ve ever 

heard of the U.S. Election Assistance Commission, you know, and 

I—and when we see that, when you Google that, it doesn’t come 

up. You’re not in the top 10 in terms of search. 

How do we make sure that States not only are aware of not just 

our witnesses today but that there is a real criteria? 

Mr. HICKS. That means we’re doing our job, because we don’t 

want to be known. We want to make sure that we work with the 

States to make sure that they get the resources they need to ensure the process functions correctly. 

We were down in your State of North Carolina about a month 

ago with a testing and certification class. 

And we do certify voting systems, but it’s on a voluntary basis. 

States come to us and they say, these are the systems we want to 

have certified through the manufacturers, and those systems are 

certified. 

Right now, we don’t have a quorum of commissioners, so we can’t 

do the next iteration of those voting system guidelines. They 

haven’t been updated since about 2007. 

Mr. MEADOWS. So is there a Federal guideline on what you 

would recommend to States in terms of how to secure their system? 

Is there that? 

Mr. HICKS. On how to secure their systems? There are guidelines 

on that. 

Mr. MEADOWS. And are there priorities in terms of, if they’re 

going to the replace equipment, what are the recommendations you 

make? Do you have—— 

Mr. HICKS. That’s in our Voluntary Voting System Guidelines 

2.0, which we can’t vote on because we don’t have a quorum. 


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Mr. MEADOWS. All right. 

I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. GOWDY. The gentleman yields back. 

The gentlelady from Michigan is recognized. 

Mrs. LAWRENCE. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

A February 16, 2018, New York Times article titled ‘‘Inside a 3– 

Year Russian Campaign to Influence U.S. Voters’’ mentioned the 

painstaking efforts taken by the Russian Government to not only 

divide our Nation along party lines but also along socioeconomic 

and racial lines. 

And in October, ‘‘Woke Blacks,’’ an Instagram account ran by the 

Internet Resource Agency, carried the message, ‘‘Hatred for Trump 

is misleading the people and forcing Blacks to vote for Killary. We 

cannot resort to the lesser of two devils. Then we’d surely be better 

off without voting AT ALL.’’ 

Then, just days before the Americans went to the poll, another 

Instagram account controlled by the Russians called ‘‘Black Activists’’ urged its followers to choose peace and vote for Ms. Stein, who 

was expected to siphon support from the Clinton campaign. And 

the message read, ‘‘Trust me. It is not a wasted vote.’’ 

I also have—and, Mr. Chairman, I ask for it to be entered into 

the record—I have the February 18th ABC News article ‘‘Russian 

Influence Operation Attempted to Suppress Black Vote.’’ It reveals 

that the special counsel indictments against 13 Russian nationals 

in January of 2018 revealed that a key aspect of the assault on the 

2016 election was an attempt to suppress the turnout by AfricanAmerican voters, which papers filed in a Federal court describe in 

great deal. 

Mr. GOWDY. Without objection. 

Mrs. LAWRENCE. Our esteemed ranking member, Mr. Cummings, 

made a very accurate statement in this article: ‘‘Of particular concern, the indictments show how the Russians tried to suppress the 

votes of minorities across the United States in order to help’’ the 

current President win his Presidency. 

So, to Ms. Oliver and Mr. Hatch, you both represent communities 

where there are minorities votes. And we have actual investigative 

data that shows many campaigns across the country of our Nation 

were targeted at suppressing minority votes. What are you doing 

to ensure that every vote counts? 

Mr. HATCH. Thank you for asking that question, Mrs. Lawrence. 

In Weber County, the county seat is the city of Ogden, which is approximately one-third Hispanic population, and so we do have a 

sizable minority population. 

As an election official, my focus is on removing barriers for voters 

and to ensure that they have confidence that when they go to the 

polls or when they mail their ballot back in, that they have confidence that that ballot will be counted fairly and accurately and 

that the results will be fair and accurate. And I do those regardless 

of the nature of the voter, the location of the voter, whether it’s in 

a neighborhood that is known for having more minorities. 

The focus is clearly on establishing a process that’s full of integrity. And I think by doing that, that allows both those in the majority and those in the minority to know that, as far as election adVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:30 Dec 07, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00070 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\33089.TXT APRIL

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ministration concerns, we’re color-blind and we focus on you as a 

citizen and your right to vote. 

Mrs. LAWRENCE. Ms. Oliver? 

Ms. TOULOUSE OLIVER. I would echo those statements. And I 

would also say that, as election officials, we are also concerned 

about accurate information on the internet and social media, and 

so we are always working to make sure that the most accurate, upto-date information is being provided to the voter. 

Another aspect that really impacts minority voters in our communities and across the country is adequate language minority assistance and ensuring that we are in compliance with section 203 

of the Voting Rights Act. I have many tribal areas in my State, in 

addition to Spanish-speaking areas, so that’s also incredibly important. We are doing everything within our power to do that. But 

there can always be more that can be done. 

Mrs. LAWRENCE. I want to state, because my colleague from 

Michigan referenced some training issues that are desperately 

needed in the State of Michigan, it’s unacceptable, because our vote 

is our democracy. 

But, with that being said, training and to have the resources to 

attack, cyber attacks or meddling in our elections, are two different 

things. And you cannot say, well, the only thing we need is training. And our Secretary of State has accepted and has stated that 

she is using our Federal dollars to fight against the interference of 

the—to protect the integrity of our election. So by no means does 

it mean that. 

My closing question is to you, Mr. Hicks. Mr. Hicks, you have to 

recognize that this concerted effort to suppress the vote is real, it’s 

been documented, and it’s a concerted effort of Russia. Where do 

you, as on the Commission, stand with that? Do you address it? 

Mr. HICKS. That’s something for the Department of Justice to address. But, personally, I’ve always worked towards ensuring that 

voter confidence remains high when I worked in the House, when 

I worked in Massachusetts and so forth. So ensuring that people 

have their right to vote and that they can do so without encumbrance. 

Right now, while this committee is having its hearing, the EAC 

is holding a language summit for folks who have access issues to 

the polls based on language, over at the Newseum. That’s being 

webcast, and there’s about 150 people right there learning more 

about access. 

Mrs. LAWRENCE. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. GOWDY. The gentlelady yields back. 

The gentleman from Texas is recognized. 

Mr. HURD. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I also thank the gentlewoman and chairwoman from North Carolina for her courtesy. 

My opinions on the Russian role in our elections is pretty clear, 

so I won’t get into them today. But I am concerned that some of 

my friends on the other side of the aisle are implying that DHS or 

this Congress is not taking this issue seriously. 

And so my first question for you, Mr. Hicks and Mr. Krebs: How 

many meetings, briefings, hearing, phone calls, responses to memos 

and letters have you had with Congress? And I don’t need an exact 


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amount. Two was mentioned earlier, that there was only two hearings. How many engagements with Congress have you had and 

your staff had on this issue of securing our election? 

Mr. HICKS. Engagements? I wouldn’t have the exact numbers, 

but that’s basically a daily occurrence in our agency right now. But 

that’s not our only function. 

Mr. HURD. So several dozen? 

Mr. HICKS. Of letters from various Members of Congress. 

Mr. HURD. Of responses that you’ve had to give. 

Mr. Krebs, do you have an aggregate number? 

Mr. KREBS. I’ve lost count. It’d be a guess. I’ve personally testified on this matter at least three times. 

Mr. HURD. Mr. Krebs, does your division—or does DHS have 

more money today to deal with support to election than they did 

in 2016? 

Mr. KREBS. Yes, sir. $26.2 million through the FY18 omnibus. 

Mr. HURD. Ms. Toulouse—Secretary Toulouse Oliver, excuse me, 

has your State received more money from the Federal Government 

to help defend election infrastructure in 2018 than they did in 

2016? 

Ms. TOULOUSE OLIVER. Yes, sir, we have. 

Mr. HURD. Mr. Hatch, your State or your county, whichever you 

feel comfortable representing? 

Mr. HATCH. Yes. $4.1 million for the State. 

Mr. HURD. And for both of you election officials, what kind of activity—so let me start with this. I remember, prior to the 2016 election, many secretaries of States were against the idea of establishing our election systems as critical infrastructure. There was a 

number of hearings prior to the election; there was hearings after 

the election. And the previous administration designated it critical, 

and then this current administration continue that. 

Is there still opposition from secretaries of State to have our election systems be critical infrastructure? 

Ms. TOULOUSE OLIVER. Yes, sir, that is the case. And I believe 

that that stems from a genuine concern among secretaries that 

that is—— 

Mr. HURD. Federalizing elections? 

Ms. TOULOUSE OLIVER. Exactly. 

Mr. HURD. Because, ultimately, States are responsible for elections, right? 

Ms. TOULOUSE OLIVER. That is correct. 

Mr. HURD. And, ultimately, States are responsible for defending 

the elections. 

Ms. TOULOUSE OLIVER. That is correct. However, we do conduct 

Federal—— 

Mr. HURD. Sure. 

Ms. TOULOUSE OLIVER. —State, and local elections. And so I do 

personally believe that a partnership with the Federal Government 

is necessary and critical. 

Mr. HURD. So are these kinds of conversations happening in capitols around the country, where Governors and State representatives are increasing State funds to ensure that election officials in 

their States have the resources and tools that they need? 


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Ms. TOULOUSE OLIVER. I can certainly tell you that that has been 

happening in the State of New Mexico. And to the extent that our 

States are receiving these HAVA funds, it is required for the States 

to provide a match. So each State is providing a 5-percent match, 

as we heard here today, every single State. 

Mr. HURD. So can States be doing more as well? 

Ms. TOULOUSE OLIVER. Pardon me? 

Mr. HURD. We’ve heard here today that the Federal Government 

can do more. And can States be doing more as well, too? 

Ms. TOULOUSE OLIVER. Absolutely. States and the Federal Government can both be doing more. 

Mr. HURD. Good copy. 

Mr. Hatch, in your testimony, you stated that only 9 percent of 

election officials are members of the Elections Infrastructure ISAC, 

the Information Sharing and Analysis Center. This seems to me to 

be concerningly low. 

Do you have an opinion on why so few people are actually engaging in the Federal, State, tribal partnerships that’s responsible for 

sharing information on the integrity of our elections? 

Mr. HATCH. Thank you for asking that. Yes, it is low. The main 

reason why is because it’s new, and it’s only been up and running 

for just a couple of months. The rate at which counties are joining 

the EI–ISAC, and States as well, is alarmingly fast, which is really 

hopeful. 

And organizations such as NACO and the International Association of Government Officials, the EAC, NASS, they are all helping—— 

Mr. HURD. So, Mr. Hatch, I’m sorry to interrupt. My time is limited. But you would encourage your fellow election administrators 

across the country to join the Elections Infrastructure ISAC? 

Mr. HATCH. It’s one of my primary jobs. 

Mr. HURD. And how do they do that? 

Mr. HATCH. They go to the website. They contact any association. 

It’s very easy. 

Mr. HURD. Bingo. They can do that through the National Association of Secretaries of State as well, correct? 

Mr. HATCH. Yes. 

Mr. HURD. And, Mr. Krebs, my question—this last question is to 

you and Secretary Oliver as well. 

When it comes to defending the digital infrastructure, security 

vulnerability assessments, technical vulnerability assessments, this 

is something DHS has prepared for and is already doing a lot of 

work. Our States are doing that. 

But my concern is with crisis communications. Who is responsible for dealing with things that happen on the day that is used 

in a way to mislead potential voters? How is that conversation, how 

is that coordination happening amongst election officials and secretaries of States and with the Federal Government? 

Ms. TOULOUSE OLIVER. So that is something that we’ve always 

sort of dealt with on a case-by-case basis. I will say that, through 

our work with the Government Coordinating Council, we recently 

developed a communications protocol, and we are working together 

to develop a comprehensive way in which we approach and talk 


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about and collectively discuss in the public sphere things that may 

occur around election time. 

Mr. HURD. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the time I do not have. 

Mr. GOWDY. The gentleman yields back. 

The gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Krishnamoorthi. 

Mr. KRISHNAMOORTHI. Thank you, Chairman. Appreciate that. 

Secretary Krebs, on April 17th of this year, DHS Secretary 

Nielsen had this to say about Russian interference in the 2016 elections. She said, quote/unquote, ‘‘Two years ago, the Russian Government launched a brazen, multifaceted influence campaign 

aimed at undermining public faith in our democratic process generally and our elections specifically.’’ 

And I think you may have even alluded to some of this before. 

I assume that the DHS stands by the Secretary’s statement, correct? 

Mr. KREBS. DHS stands by the Secretary, and the Secretary 

stands by the intelligence community assessment. 

Mr. KRISHNAMOORTHI. And, of course, you do the same. You 

stand with the Secretary as well as the—— 

Mr. KREBS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. KRISHNAMOORTHI. —intelligence community? 

On January 6, 2017, the Office of the DNI had this to say about 

Russian attacks: Quote/unquote, ‘‘We also assess Putin and the 

Russian Government aspired to help President-elect Trump’s election chances when possible by discrediting Secretary Clinton and 

publicly contrasting her unfavorably to him.’’ 

On July 19th of this year, Secretary Nielsen tweeted the following: Quote/unquote, ‘‘I agree with the intel community’s assessment, full stop.’’ 

I presume DHS stands with Secretary Nielsen’s statement, correct? 

Mr. KREBS. Yes, sir, we do. 

Mr. KRISHNAMOORTHI. And, of course, you stand by Secretary 

Nielsen’s statement, right? 

Mr. KREBS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. KRISHNAMOORTHI. Okay. 

Just—let’s see here—25 minutes ago, President Trump just made 

the following tweet, hot off the tweeter presses: Quote/unquote, 

‘‘I’m very concerned that Russia will be fighting very hard to have 

an impact on the upcoming election. Based on the fact that no 

President has been tougher on Russia than me, they will be pushing very hard for the Democrats. They definitely don’t want 

Trump!′′ 

Obviously, as you saw from the DNI’s report from January 6, 

2017, the entire intelligence community concluded that Russia was 

trying to harm Hillary Clinton’s campaign and help Donald 

Trump’s campaign. 

The question is this: According to the President, the Russians 

definitely don’t want Trump. Mr. Krebs, do you agree with this 

tweet? 

Mr. KREBS. Sir, I have made it a habit to focus on my job and 

work with State and local governments like this and not interpret 

headlines or Twitter. 

I do know that the President, as soon as—oh, thank you. 


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I do know that the President endorses the intelligence community assessment. He was very clear on that last Tuesday. 

As I said to Congressman Meadows earlier, I have a very clear 

direction on what my job is, to help State and local officials protect 

their election systems. Secretary Nielsen has provided me the same 

guidance. I’m empowered to do so. I have the team and the resources—— 

Mr. KRISHNAMOORTHI. I understand, but here’s my question: Do 

you know of any evidence, classified or unclassified, suggesting that 

the Russians are trying to help the Democrats? 

Mr. KREBS. Sir, in terms of any intelligence, I’d have to go back 

and look. I’m not able to speak to any classified matters in this 

forum. 

Mr. KRISHNAMOORTHI. Okay. So you’re suggesting that there may 

be evidence—— 

Mr. KREBS. No, sir, I am not. No, sir, I am not. 

Mr. KRISHNAMOORTHI. You are not. Do you have any knowledge 

of any evidence that might back up what the President just 

tweeted? 

Mr. KREBS. I think the evidence would be that this administration has launched a series of sanctions, has expelled diplomats. 

He’s taken other actions against the Russian Government. 

Mr. KRISHNAMOORTHI. No, but do you have any evidence that 

they are pushing very hard for the Democrats? That is, the Russians. 

Mr. KREBS. Sir, I do not have all—you know, access to the information that informed the President on this, so I’d have to get back 

to you. 

Mr. KRISHNAMOORTHI. Yes, I’d like you to get back to us. Thank 

you. 

Mr. Chairman, this tweet and the substance of this tweet is total 

fiction. It defies reality, and it contradicts everything our own intelligence officials have concluded. 

Mr. Krebs, you must be aware of the fact that the Russians are 

continuing to target our election infrastructure and the upcoming 

elections, correct? 

Mr. KREBS. So I believe that, as we’ve stated, DNI Coats has 

stated, we certainly have not seen anything at the level of 2016. 

They are continuing to conduct information operations against the 

American people in general. 

Mr. KRISHNAMOORTHI. FBI Director Wray on July 18th said, 

‘‘The intelligence community’s assessment has not changed. My 

view has not changed, which is that Russia attempted to interfere 

with the last election, and it continues to engage in malign influence operations to this day.’’ 

You don’t have any basis for disagreeing with his statement? 

Mr. KREBS. No, I agree 100 percent with Director Wray. 

Mr. KRISHNAMOORTHI. Okay. 

Mr. Trump, the President, was asked a question just last 

Wednesday: Is Russia still targeting the U.S., Mr. President? 

Answer: Thank you very much. No. 

Question: No? You don’t believe that to be the case? 

Answer: No. 


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Do you agree with the President that Russia is not targeting the 

2018 election? 

Mr. KREBS. I believe there is some disagreement on exactly what 

happened in that exchange. But I’ll tell you right now that I firmly 

believe that the Russians continue to target not just our democracy 

in general but our critical infrastructure in particular. 

Mr. KRISHNAMOORTHI. So you disagree with the President? 

Mr. KREBS. No, sir, I’m not saying that. 

Mr. KRISHNAMOORTHI. You just did. 

Mr. KREBS. I don’t. No, sir, I—— 

Mr. KRISHNAMOORTHI. Thank you. 

Mr. GOWDY. The gentleman yields back. 

The gentlelady from North Carolina is recognized. 

Ms. FOXX. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Krebs and all of our witnesses today, thank you for being 

here. 

I’m a firm believer that, before any problem can be addressed, we 

need to find out where the responsibility lies. As we all know, 

much of the administration of U.S. elections is explicitly delegated 

to the States through the elections clause of the Constitution. 

And before we turn to what’s being done at the State level to protect the integrity of our elections, I believe it’s necessary to ensure 

that the Federal house is in order. The findings of our Nation’s intelligence agencies and the House Committee on Intelligence leave 

no doubt that Russia maliciously attempted to influence our elections. Clearly, we need to right the ship on the Federal level to ensure Russia and other harmful actors cannot repeat that behavior. 

Unfortunately, the President’s recent comments at the U.S.-Russia summit in Helsinki failed to hold Putin accountable for his attacks on our country’s interests and deter him from future indiscretions. I believe deterring a foreign adversary from meddling in our 

elections and disrupting the malign actions of a foreign adversary 

should be a Federal responsibility. 

Can you assure us that the Department of Homeland Security is 

doing everything in its power, actively, to safeguard our Nation 

from the kind of meddling that we now know has occurred in the 

past, including the hacking of our campaigns by Russian intelligence officers? 

Mr. KREBS. Yes, ma’am. This is one of our top priorities. 

Ms. FOXX. Thank you for that answer, Mr. Secretary. 

Shifting to the topic of security clearances of State officials, is it 

necessary for every State to have an official with a security clearance? 

Mr. KREBS. It’s certainly useful in the event we need to share information. But we do have the ability to provide 1-day read-ins if 

there is a very tactical piece of intelligence where, if I needed to 

share with someone in New Mexico or Utah, I could do that using 

local resources. 

Ms. FOXX. Thank you. 

So what is DHS doing to declassify cyber threat indicators to 

allow for more widespread and timely information-sharing? 

Mr. KREBS. So we work very closely with the intelligence community to define not just what the information of interest for this community would be but also help get a better understanding of what 


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their infrastructure looks like. And so that can go help inform collection. And then, through that process, we can actually identify 

additional intelligence and then start pushing that into the declassified space. 

One thing I’ll note, ma’am, is that, in 2016, when the Department of Homeland Security knocked on the doors of State secretaries and election officials and they said, ‘‘I’ve never talked to you 

before, there’s no trust here, but I’ve got a problem that you need 

to know about,’’ anyone, by very nature, would probably say, ‘‘I’m 

going to need to know a little bit more information.’’ And the response at the time, because it was classified, was, ‘‘I’m sorry, I 

can’t share that with you.’’ 

Two things have happened since then. One, we have established 

that level of trust. So, if someone in New Mexico does not have a 

clearance and yet I work with Secretary Toulouse Oliver and I 

knock on the door and say, ‘‘Hey, we have a problem, it’s classified, 

I need you to do something,’’ I think, my guess is that the level of 

acceptance has changed a little bit. 

But, at the same time, we are more sophisticated in our information-sharing protocols, we are more sophisticated in our ability to 

declassify information and take action. And it is all based on trust. 

We have spent so much time building relationships, building trust 

with these State and local election officials that we are much more 

effective than we were even a year ago. 

Ms. FOXX. Thank you, Mr. Krebs. I think you have made us feel 

a lot better about the situation as it exists now, and so we appreciate the effort that you and your colleagues have put into it. 

Ms. Toulouse Oliver, were you able to obtain a Federal security 

clearance? 

Ms. TOULOUSE OLIVER. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. FOXX. You were. And how many officials in your State have 

a security clearance for election-related purposes? 

Ms. TOULOUSE OLIVER. I have that clearance, and two of my key 

staff have that clearance as well. 

Ms. FOXX. Thank you. 

Mr. Krebs has described a change in behavior and trust level. So 

has information-sharing between DHS and your office improved, 

from your perspective, since you were granted a security clearance? 

Ms. TOULOUSE OLIVER. I believe that communication has improved in general. I don’t think it came as a result of the clearance, 

but I do think that that contributes to our level of confidence that 

we will be able to get accurate and timely information. 

Ms. FOXX. Right. 

One more quick question, Mr. Chairman, if I could. 

Do you have an idea of how much information disseminated from 

DHS and the Federal Government is considered classified or sensitive? Any—— 

Mr. KREBS. In the election space specifically? 

Ms. FOXX. Well, either one of you. 

Ms. TOULOUSE OLIVER. My sense is that, quite frankly, there 

isn’t all that much. It would only be if there was a situationally 

specific piece of information that needed to be conveyed. 

Ms. FOXX. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. GOWDY. The gentlelady yields back. 


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The gentleman from Maryland, Professor Raskin. 

Mr. RASKIN. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and thank you 

for calling this hearing. 

I want to go first to Mr. Hicks, the chair of the Election Assistance Commission. 

As you know, I represent the Eighth Congressional District in 

Maryland proudly. Your offices happen to be in my district, so I follow your work closely. 

In Maryland, we were notified just a couple weeks ago by the 

FBI that the private vendor that our State uses for purposes of 

election administration management of our voter registration database has close ties to a Russian oligarch connected to Vladimir 

Putin. 

This bizarre revelation, perhaps a coincidence, perhaps not, has 

raised profound questions about the potential for interference in 

our elections by compromised private election vendors due to the 

extraordinary lack of regulation on how election vendors do their 

business. So I wanted to ask you several questions about this to see 

how far this problem may indeed go. 

After this revelation about ties to a Russian oligarch of our election vendor in Maryland, has there been any way for you to determine what other States may be using this vendor or other vendors 

who have ties to Vladimir Putin and his oligarchs? 

Mr. HICKS. That’s an ongoing investigation, and the EAC does 

not have the wherewithal to comment on that right now. I would 

defer to my colleague at DHS to talk a little bit more about that. 

Mr. RASKIN. Well, okay. I don’t have too much time, but, Mr. 

Krebs, let me ask you. Is there an ongoing investigation at Department of Homeland Security about whether there’s some kind of systematic plot by Russia to exercise influence over private election 

vendors? 

Mr. KREBS. So we are looking in specific to the Maryland case. 

And thank you for your letter on that front. This is actually one 

of those stories of progress. When the State Board of Elections in 

Maryland was notified that there was a connection, they immediately reached out to us and asked for help, and we have deployed 

that assistance. 

So we are making progress here. Again, those relationships did 

not exist a year ago. 

Mr. RASKIN. Okay. Forgive me for my sense of urgency, but we 

have election in, I think it’s 107 days, maybe it’s 108 days, at this 

point. It is right around the corner. And so it doesn’t give me a lot 

of comfort to learn that there’s progress being made. 

So have you determined that there are any other States whose 

election vendors have been compromised by connections to Russian 

oligarchs or Vladimir Putin? 

Mr. KREBS. This is a broader supply chain conversation. We do 

know that, in the case of Maryland, that there—at least according 

to the information I’ve seen, there was no ability to influence based 

on that venture capital firm. But we are conducting a broader assessment of the risk environment. 

Mr. RASKIN. When do you expect to have the results of this investigation, this ongoing investigation? 


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Mr. KREBS. I assume that this investigation, because of the nature of procurement cycles, will be ongoing and, frankly, will never 

end. As we develop more information, we’ll act on it. 

Mr. RASKIN. Okay, but, Mr. Krebs, forgive me. Are there States 

who have election vendors today that are running elections in November who have ties to Russian oligarchs or the Putin government? 

Mr. KREBS. Sir, at this point, I don’t have information to share 

on that. 

Mr. RASKIN. Is there anyone at the Department of Homeland Security who does have that information? 

Mr. KREBS. Sir, I do not—I’d have to defer, actually, to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 

Mr. RASKIN. Okay. 

Is there anyone on the panel who knows how many States are 

currently contracting with private election vendors who are using 

foreign-made parts or foreign software in their election day products? 

No one can tell us. Okay. 

Mr. Hicks, back to—— 

Mr. KREBS. So this is a broader—— 

Mr. RASKIN. I gotcha. I gotcha. 

Are vendors currently required by Federal law to adhere to 

cybersecurity best practices and/or to report to the EAC in the 

event that there is some breach of cybersecurity? 

Mr. HICKS. No. 

Mr. RASKIN. Are vendors uniformly required to report any cyber 

threats to you? 

Mr. HICKS. Uniformly, no, because it’s a voluntary system. 

Mr. RASKIN. Okay. All right. As I thought. 

I thank you all for your answers, but they demonstrate why I’ve 

introduced H.R. 6435, the Election Vendor Security Act of 2018, 

which requires election vendors to be owned and controlled only by 

citizens or permanent residents of the United States, to adhere to 

cybersecurity best practices, and to report all known or suspected 

cybersecurity breaches or threats to State and Federal authorities 

immediately. 

I would urge all of my colleagues on both sides of the aisle on 

this committee to join me in this effort to protect the integrity of 

our election processes in 2018. This is something that needs to be 

done right now. And this is not something that can be put off to 

another day; it’s not something that can be postponed. And we cannot be satisfied with vague promises of ongoing progress and investigation. This is a democratic emergency. The elections go right to 

the heart of democratic self-government in our country. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. GOWDY. Professor Raskin yields back. 

The gentleman from Wisconsin is recognized. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Right. I have long had an interest in election integrity, going back to the days when I was involved in State election law in the State of Wisconsin. And I can only imagine what 

I would do if I was a foreign country trying to influence our elections or make sure that the wrong person won elections. I’m going 


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to ask you about some areas of election law that, if I were trying 

to influence our elections, I might take advantage of. 

The first thing, in Wisconsin, we finally passed a photo ID law 

last year. And I think the reason we had that is we want to make 

sure that the right person is voting. And if I was going to try fix 

an election, I might try to get people to pretend they were somebody they were not. I know they have photo IDs in Mexico, for example. 

Can you guys comment on, in your experience, how many States 

around the country have done what Mexico does or what Wisconsin 

does and has a photo ID law? And if you’re aware of any States 

that don’t, why wouldn’t they do that? 

Mr. HICKS. I would have to get back with you on the exact number, but there are a number of States that have photo IDs, and 

there’s a number of States that do not. There are different aspects 

to verifying the person who is casting a ballot, but there are other 

ways that people are casting ballots. For instance, there are three 

States in our Union that entirely vote by mail, that don’t require 

you to send in your photo ID. 

But the Help America Vote Act has in it a provision that says, 

if you register to vote by mail for the first time, you have to submit 

some form of ID, whether or not that’s a bill or electrical outlet— 

electrical bill or something to that—or—— 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Why wouldn’t you do it? It seems so basic. I always kind of question politicians who wouldn’t do that. I mean, the 

same politicians who require photo IDs for getting maybe lifesaving 

drugs, a photo ID for a variety of other things, all of a sudden, 

when it comes to elections, they say no. And I always kind of feel 

it opens up our elections to fraud. 

But does anybody—Ms. Toulouse Oliver, do they have photo ID 

in New Mexico? 

Ms. TOULOUSE OLIVER. No, we don’t. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Now, you must be familiar with Mexican law, 

right across the border. Is what I’m told right? Do they have photo 

ID in Mexico? 

Ms. TOULOUSE OLIVER. I am not an expert on Mexican law, and, 

unfortunately, I don’t know. But I take your word for it. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Okay. Any reason why we don’t do that simple 

thing to guard against nefarious influence in our elections? 

Ms. TOULOUSE OLIVER. The main reason is because we have a 

number of individuals within our State who, for one reason or another, do not have certain types of photo ID that might be required. 

For example, our tribal people in New Mexico don’t have, necessarily, photo ID, don’t necessarily want to utilize a photo ID, and 

we still want to provide the opportunity for them to participate in 

our elections. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Okay. And I am under the impression—I might 

be wrong—I’m under the impression from somebody who is Mexican that they one in Mexico, but okay. 

The next thing that concerns me—I always feel if I wanted to 

make sure the—if I wanted to fix an election, I would want to have 

a lot of people not voting in person. You know, when you vote in 

person, at least you watch Glenn Grothman go in. He’s the guy in 

there. Nobody else is whispering in my ear. You do some early votVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:30 Dec 07, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00080 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\33089.TXT APRIL

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ing or absentee voting, you never know if somebody else is really 

filling out that form or who’s filling out that form. 

Over time—and maybe Mr. Krebs, maybe Mr. Hicks would 

know—over time, have we had more people voting in a place in 

which we can see that they are not being influenced, nobody’s whispering in their ear, we can watch who’s filling it out? Or over time, 

have we had more people, like, early voting or voting by mail, 

where who knows who’s really filling out the ballot? 

And I would hope our goal would be, over time, more and more 

people would be voting where we’d have a government official, the 

local clerk, watching to make sure nobody else is following them in 

the booth and saying, ‘‘Vote for Glenn Grothman,’’ this or that. 

That seems like a good thing if we want to increase the integrity. 

Which way are we going in this country? Are we having more 

people in which the government official can watch, or are we having more people voting, you know, somewhere where who knows 

who’s really filling out the ballot? 

Mr. HICKS. Well, Congressman, I believe that a number of our 

military and overseas voters vote not in person but by mail and so 

forth. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Yeah, I know that, but I’m not talking about the 

military. I’m saying, across the board, of all the people who voted, 

say, in the election in 2016 compared to 2008 or 1992, which way 

are we going in this country? We have four experts here. 

Mr. HICKS. Every 2 years, the EAC publishes a document, the 

Election Administration & Voting Survey, where we survey all the 

jurisdictions about the way that they vote. We can get you a copy 

of that, which will lay out all that information on who’s voting 

where and how they’re voting. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Does anybody know? 

Mr. Hatch, you must know. You’re a county auditor there. You 

must know today compared to, say—how long have you had your 

current job or how long have you been involved in elections down 

there in Utah? 

Mr. HATCH. About 7–1/2 years. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Okay. You must know. In the last—you must 

work with people who’ve been around there longer than that—in 

the last 20 years, has it gone up or down? Do we have more election security where we know that person’s voting in the voting 

booth and nobody’s whispering in their ear? 

Mr. HATCH. I can clearly and confidently speak about what’s happened in Utah. Utah is a virtually completely-by-mail State, although we do have vote centers available early as well as on election day. Anybody who votes by mail must sign the envelope, and 

we have human eyes look at every single signature before we allow 

that vote to be cast. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Do you know what the signature should be? 

Like, if I moved to Utah, you’d know what Glenn Grothman’s signature is and it wasn’t somebody else’s signature? 

Mr. HATCH. Yes. In order to register to vote, we will capture your 

signature. 

Mr. GOWDY. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Okay. Thank you. 

Mr. GOWDY. The gentleman from Maryland is recognized. 


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Mr. SARBANES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Krebs, did you say that—you mentioned something called an 

intruder detection system that had been put—did I understand you 

to say that 21 States had the benefit of that? What was it you said 

about that? 

Mr. KREBS. At the time in 2016, 21 State election—about 21 

State election systems at the State level were behind an Albert 

sensor, this intrusion detection sensor, yes, sir. 

Mr. SARBANES. And were those the States that flagged that there 

was—— 

Mr. KREBS. Yes, sir. For the most part, what we were able to do 

was upload some of the indicators that were provided on other activity, including in the State—the Midwest State, and load it up 

into the system. It’s managed by a group called the Multi-State 

ISAC. So the indicator was loaded up into the system, and then 

there were hits across prior traffic. 

Mr. SARBANES. I see. So, in those 21 States, there was evidence 

through this detection system that there had been efforts to hack 

into the—— 

Mr. KREBS. There had been visits, yes, sir. So, basically, what 

we—— 

Mr. SARBANES. Was the IDS in place in other States or just—— 

Mr. KREBS. Not on the election systems, but Albert sensors are 

deployed to every single State. There’d been—— 

Mr. SARBANES. But, in those 21 States, it was on the election systems. 

Mr. KREBS. For the most part, yes, sir. 

Mr. SARBANES. So, in the places where the IDS was deployed on 

election systems, here was a detection of efforts to get in. 

Mr. KREBS. We saw traffic. 

Mr. SARBANES. You saw traffic. 

Mr. KREBS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SARBANES. And so, in all of the places where the IDS system 

was in place with respect to election systems, they were able to detect traffic. 

Mr. KREBS. I don’t have information on whether it was all of the 

systems. I’m just saying in the 21 States where we did have 

the—— 

Mr. SARBANES. It sounds as though that system wasn’t in place, 

the IDS, in 29 States. But based on the experience of the 21 States, 

where they all seemed to get this traffic, one might reach the conclusion that, if that IDS system had been laid on top of the election 

systems in those other States, based on 100-percent occurrence in 

the 21, that you might have found evidence there as well. 

Mr. KREBS. My operating assumption is all 50 States—— 

Mr. SARBANES. Yeah, okay. So that’s an interesting detail I 

hadn’t focused in on before. 

I wanted to talk a little bit again to you, Mr. Krebs, about the 

process you’re going to have when you spot, through DHS or some 

other—you know, in cooperation with the intelligence community 

or what have you, that there is an immediate present danger being 

posed to an election system somewhere in the country, hat you’re 

going to do—what’s the process for reaching out in real-time as 

soon as that threat is picked up to the election administrator in 


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that State to say, ‘‘Look, we’ve flagged this, red alert, here’s what 

we’re hearing,’’ et cetera? Can you just describe how that’s going 

to work? 

Mr. KREBS. Sir, it’s actually not much more sophisticated than 

what you just laid out. We have a duty to warn—the intelligence 

community has a duty to warn when there’s an imminent threat. 

And so what we would do is, working with the intelligence community, identify that information, identify the target, reach out 

through some information-sharing protocols that we’ve developed 

with the Government Coordinating Council. We will notify the chief 

election official in the State, the Governor, the homeland security 

adviser, the chief information officer. So we will hit the big four or 

five in each State, and we’ll say, ‘‘Hey, look, this threat is incoming. 

We need to deal with it now. We are here to help you.’’ 

Mr. SARBANES. Okay. So it’s not just notification. It’s, okay, it’s 

a team effort here, what can we do to help you. And so what kind 

of resources or response or kind of SWAT team effort then gets 

brought to bear when the local person says, oh, my god, okay, 

thank you, and, you know, we’re locking the doors and pulling 

down the shades, but we need your help? What then is forthcoming 

within, say, 24 hours or less? 

Mr. KREBS. So what you’re really getting to is that move and 

that evolution beyond just simply information-sharing. It’s actually 

managing risk. It’s asking two questions: One, so what? What does 

this information mean? And, two, what are going to do about it? 

So when I would theoretically or hypothetically contact Secretary 

Toulouse Oliver and say, ‘‘This is the problem you have, run a 

quick assessment, let me know what you need,’’ I have fly-away 

teams located in D.C., in Florida, and elsewhere throughout the 

country that I can deploy within a couple hours’ notice, with equipment, on the ground supporting the secretaries. 

Now, it’s not just DHS; this is a broader effort. If we need to engage the National Guard, we can do that. If we need to engage—— 

Mr. SARBANES. Can I ask you to do me a favor? I’m going to run 

out of time. What you’re describing sounds good. Based on the experience with what happened with some of the 21 States last time 

and the way the alert was given but then it seemed like the Federal folks, in a sense, kind of walked away from the enterprise, I 

didn’t have as much confidence about this. 

So, if this is going to be the kind of response that you have going 

forward—and I certainly urge that—it would be nice for us to get 

some reporting back, particularly if we’re in the effected States. 

Open up a dialogue. Whether it has to be classified or not, you 

know, that’s your judgment, but we need to know in real-time that 

the alerts are being—that the threats are being taken seriously 

and it’s not just saying, ‘‘Hey, you’ve got a problem,’’ it’s saying, 

‘‘Here’s what we’re going to do about it.’’ Okay? 

Mr. KREBS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SARBANES. And I yield back. 

Mr. GOWDY. The gentleman’s out of time. 

The gentleman from Virginia is recognized. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Krebs, a number of us have repeatedly asked your department for documents showing how Russia attacked State election 


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systems in 2016. Those documents, despite our requests, have been 

withheld since last October. 

Eleven days ago, we finally got some information, but not from 

you. It was from the indictment filed by the special counsel, Mr. 

Mueller, against 12 Russian military intelligence officials. 

Why did DHS withhold this information, when we were able to 

read about it when DOJ released it in the indictment statement? 

Mr. KREBS. Yes, sir. So thank you. That’s actually a—I’d hate 

saying a nuanced answer, because nuance is our enemy here. 

The distinction is that the FBI provided investigators to Special 

Counsel Mueller’s investigation. Those investigators have focused 

on developing the case against Russian operatives. Their information as a result of the investigation stays within the case-building 

that Special Counsel Mueller has developed. 

That has not crossed over the firewall, as it is, into the rest of 

the administration. So there were details within that indictment 

that I had not seen before. 

Now, that is not to say that if they had found something about 

an imminent attack that they wouldn’t have shared, because they 

would have. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, let me—so your department was kept out 

of the loop by the Department of Justice. 

Mr. KREBS. By Special Counsel Mueller’s investigation. They had 

an investigation to conduct on past activities. I have information 

sufficient to work with the various secretaries of State and the 

county officials to provide them cybersecurity expertise. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. So, according to that indictment, in July of 2016, 

Anatoliy Kovalev, a Russian intelligence officer, and his co-conspirators, quote, hacked the website of a State board of elections 

and stole information related to approximately a half a million voters in that State, including their names, addresses, partial Social 

Security numbers, dates of birth, and driver’s license numbers. 

Were you aware of that fact before the indictment? 

Mr. KREBS. Sir, I was aware of the fact that there was a State 

board of elections that was compromised by the Russians. It’s in 

the intelligence community assessment. That, as I understand, is 

the State of Illinois. So we have been working closely with Illinois 

since 2016, frankly, on the incident. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. So, presumably, you could have answered our 

queries about documents, going back to October, at least with respect to this, since you knew about it and you knew the State, 

which was not identified, I believe, in the indictment. 

Mr. KREBS. That is correct, sir, but Illinois has come forward and 

said that they believe that they are—— 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Right. 

Mr. KREBS. —the victim. And they have also said that, yes, they 

were the State in the IC—— 

Mr. CONNOLLY. But couldn’t you have been responsive to our outstanding document request at least with respect to this? 

Mr. KREBS. Sir, I need to go back and look at the information 

we’ve provided. I know that we have provided a number of classified and unclassified briefings to the Congress that has included 

that information. 


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Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, I guess I’m being a little more specific. 

There have been document requests by members of this committee. 

This is the committee of oversight in the United States Congress. 

Mr. KREBS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And, gosh, I remember—maybe you do too, Mr. 

Cummings and Mr. Gowdy—I mean, all kinds of times in the previous administration when, even though there might have been 

tens of thousands of pages of documents provided, that was often 

not adequate, and threats of contempt and subpoenas were issued 

because the entirety of the document request had not been met, for 

whatever reason. 

Lord, I seem to remember excoriating, for example, the former 

IRS Commissioner, John Koskinen, in that regard. Even though he 

sometimes had difficulty in producing the documents we wanted, 

that didn’t matter. 

But, in your case, we’ve got outstanding requests going back to 

October. And I—well, let me ask you this: Are you prepared to 

promise at this hearing that you will cooperate with document requests to the best of your ability going forward? 

Mr. KREBS. I have always made that pledge, and I will continue 

to do so, yes, sir. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. All right. Because we’re probably going to want 

to know more about the Illinois case and whether there were other 

States like that. 

Mr. KREBS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Okay. Because I know my own home State of 

Virginia was also probed by these—and final point. 

Mr. Hatch, I can’t resist, having been in local government. I really appreciated the point you made in your opening statement about 

local governments. So much of Congress is always focused at the 

statewide level. Maybe that’s because so many of my colleagues 

come from State legislatures. And they forget that the implementer 

is local government. 

And I think you were the making the point that most local governments are kind of on their own in running elections. They don’t 

get—I don’t know whether New Mexico provides its local governments with a lot of assistance. Virginia does not. And so we have 

to finance our machines. We have to finance a lot of our elections. 

And so, when you make big changes, it’s a big burden on local 

governments, and some are better able to absorb that cost than 

others. I really appreciate that point being made, because I think 

that escapes a lot of us in Congress, and that’s a very salient fact, 

as we look at reform or tightening up or protecting from cyber attacks. 

If the chairman will allow Mr. Hatch to react to that if he wishes, and then I yield back. 

Mr. HATCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you for those comments. We want to put the ‘‘local’’ 

back in the ‘‘State and local’’ statement. 

The good news is States and locals are working together. I have 

great experience from the State of Utah working with our State, 

and then other individuals such as Secretary Toulouse Oliver and 

the efforts that they have been doing. It’s not perfect. We’re not 


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82 

there yet. But we really appreciate working with our State partners. 

But, yes, you’re correct. In virtually every State, it’s the local 

election administrators who have the boots on the ground that are 

running the day-to-day operations. 

Thank you. 

Mr. GOWDY. The gentleman from Virginia yields back. 

I’ll ask my questions last. I want to start by thanking all four 

of you for your expertise and your comity with one another and 

also with the members of the committee. 

I want to start by addressing some of my colleagues’ concerns, 

because I think they do warrant being addressed. If I understood 

the concerns earlier in this hearing, it was kind of two-part. Number one, they want an investigation into what Russia did, and they 

would prefer that that investigation be public. 

I’m sure some of my colleagues are aware of this, but for those 

who are not in Congress, those who may be watching, those who 

may be reading, I spent the better part of 2017 in a SCIF interviewing more than 70 witnesses on what Russia did to this country. 

And I get that some of my colleagues want every single committee of Congress to look into the fact pattern, including the Small 

Business Administration Committee, including Natural Resources—they want every committee of Congress. But the reality is, 

given the sensitive nature of this information, that investigation is 

best handled in a confidential setting, which is where the House 

Intelligence Committee meets. It’s where we met for the better part 

of 2017. It’s where the Senate Intelligence Committee is currently 

meeting. And they will issue a report. 

And it is not lost on me, and perhaps it won’t be lost on our four 

witnesses, there have been a number of references this morning to 

the indictments that have been issued by the grand jury in the 

Mueller probe. Anyone sit through the grand jury proceedings? 

Anyone got a problem with the fact that you didn’t sit through the 

grand jury proceedings? Anyone sat in on any of Bob Mueller’s 

interviews? Any of you have a problem with the fact that you 

haven’t sat in on any of Bob Mueller’s interviews? 

Everything can’t be done in public. We had the most productive 

classified briefing, I think, that I have ever been part of last week. 

I really wish my fellow citizens could’ve participated in it. I wish 

they could have heard what Inspector General Horowitz told both 

sides, not just this committee but also Judiciary. Because if you 

heard what he said, you would not view this as a partisan issue. 

You would view it as the United States of America was attacked. 

So I hope at some point the light of day can be shown on all of 

what happened in 2016. But I’d just caution my fellow citizens, 

they do not have any issue with the fact that in every one of their 

local jurisdictions somewhere some investigation is being done confidentiality, whether it’s a grand jury, whether it’s deliberations by 

a petit jury, whether it’s deliberations by an appellate court in 

their State, and they don’t have a problem with the fact that certain things are done in confidence. 

And when it comes to not tipping off our adversaries as to what 

we know and how we know it and what we are doing to guard 


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83 

against it in the future, if there’s ever an argument for things to 

be done in confidence, I think that is the best argument. 

Having said that, Madam Secretary, I do not know when you became the secretary of State, so let me start by asking, in 2016, 

were you in your current position? 

Ms. TOULOUSE OLIVER. No, sir, but I was the county clerk in the 

largest county in New Mexico. 

Mr. GOWDY. All right. Well, it would not be fair for me to ask 

you this question, but to the extent you have any information, I do 

want you to weigh in. 

I never really understood why Jeh Johnson was criticized in 

2016, the former DHS Secretary. Elections are predominantly State 

and local matters, and the notion that he, as a Federal Cabinetlevel official, was supposed to summarily decide to inject himself in 

the 2016 elections I don’t think was fair to Jeh. 

But there was a decision made in January 2017 to declare our 

election infrastructure a critical infrastructure. Can any of the four 

of you address why the decision was not made in the fall of 2016 

but it was made in January of 2017? 

Not all at once. 

Mr. KREBS. That predates my time at the Department. 

I’ll just add, though, that the way I look at election infrastructure, it is a national critical function. It is essential to the functioning of this government. And the Department of Homeland Security will continue to support State and local governments. 

Mr. GOWDY. I guess the reason I’ve started off by saying, I really 

wish—I mean, I get that the other 364 days out of the year we’re 

going to quarrel about who should be elected. I would like this to 

be the 1 day that we just quarrel about making sure the person 

who is elected actually serves. 

So we haven’t had hearings about what President Trump discussed with Vladimir Putin, just like we haven’t had hearings 

about what President Obama discussed with Vladimir Putin while 

the hacking was going on in 2016. We’ve had no hearings on that. 

Madam Secretary of State, final question, because I’m out of 

time. There are a lot of ways to count votes. The Senate does it. 

You have to show up in person. The House, you have to show up 

in person but use a voting card. My wife is a first-grade schoolteacher. They use a combination of raising their hands and voice 

vote, based on decibel rather than people. So there are a lot of 

ways to vote. 

What, in your judgment, is the safest, most secure way to vote, 

even accepting that our friends in the media may not know within 

45 minutes of the polls closing who won? If you’re interested in 

making absolutely sure it is safe, secure, and, therefore, reliable, 

what is the safest way to cast a ballot? 

Ms. TOULOUSE OLIVER. So it’s important to emphasize that every 

State utilizes the system that’s right for them. And, even within 

those States, some jurisdictions use slightly different systems. So 

making sure that you’re utilizing a system that voters are comfortable with and have confidence in is extremely important. 

With that being said, in my personal opinion, the use of paper 

ballots is absolutely critical, because you have a paper and a voterverifiable backup at the end of the day. If there’s ever a question 


KING-6430 with DISTILLER
84 

as to whether your tabulators were tampered with, your election 

night reporting system, you are always able to go back and reconstruct the election on the back end utilizing that paper system. 

So that, in my opinion, Mr. Chairman, is the safest and most secure way to conduct an election. But with that being said, every 

State has security and resiliency plans for whatever system they 

are using, and every State is absolutely, 100-percent dedicated to 

making sure those systems are protected. 

Mr. GOWDY. I know it’s a multifactorial analysis. You want to 

incent people to vote. You want to make it as easy for them as you 

can. There, obviously, is a speed element. People don’t want to wait 

3 weeks to see whether or not they won or lost an election. 

But in terms of safety, security, reliability, knowing that the person who received the most number of votes actually was elected, 

in your judgment, at least for New Mexico, that is done with paper 

ballots. 

Ms. TOULOUSE OLIVER. Yes, sir, that’s correct. 

Mr. GOWDY. All right. 

I am out of time, but I was not the only one this morning who 

went over. 

I want to thank our witnesses again for appearing before us 

today, and I really mean that. I appreciate your expertise. I appreciate your public service even in a sometimes trying environment. 

The hearing record will remain open for 2 weeks for any member 

to submit a written opening statement or questions for the record. 

The gentleman from Maryland. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Krebs, you know, my heart wouldn’t let me 

get out of here without me telling you this. Don’t play with us. You 

said that you read the letter this morning about our request. And 

time is short. 

You know, back when Muhammad Ali was fighting, they used to 

do something called the rope-a-dope. And I feel like you rope-adoped us a bit this morning. I’m just telling you how I feel. And 

it’s quite—you know, I wanted to walk out of the room and not say 

anything, but my heart won’t let me do that. 

Would you please give us the documents and don’t play with us? 

I’m not—you know, we’re asking for something that is reasonable. 

We’re simply trying to do our job. You know, I know you said 

you’ve done all these briefings and whatever. Can you let us know 

when we’re going to get the documents? 

Mr. KREBS. Sir, I need to go actually look and see what documents we haven’t provided that you’re still looking for. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Okay. 

Mr. KREBS. I have a job to do as well, and my job is to be as 

transparent as possible with—— 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Right. That’s—— 

Mr. KREBS. —this body—— 

Mr. CUMMINGS. There you go. 

Mr. KREBS. —and I’m doing it. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. That’s what I want. 

Mr. KREBS. I’m doing it. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Yeah, I want you to be as transparent as possible. And I don’t believe, to date, that has been the case. I’m just 

telling you. 


KING-6430 with DISTILLER
85 

Mr. KREBS. I apologize for that impression, but that has not been 

my goal. That has not been the direction I’ve provided my team. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Wonderful. Wonderful. I hope your team is listening so we have now an opportunity to correct that, now that 

we—we’ll start with a new page today. 

And let me tell you the reason why I mention the rope-a-dope. 

The Congress is only going to be in session for a little while, this 

week basically. Then we are out for August. We’ve got an election 

in Maryland—well, all over the country in November. So, I mean, 

time is of the essence. 

And so I’m hoping that your staff will sit down with our staff, 

and I’m talking about bipartisan, and go over these—get us the 

documents that we want. Okay? 

Mr. KREBS. You have that commitment. This all rolls up to me. 

I’m responsible. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. It’s all what? 

Mr. KREBS. It all rolls up to me. I’m going to get you what you 

need. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much. 

And thank all of you for your testimony. It’s been quite helpful. 

Mr. GOWDY. The hearing record will remain open for 2 weeks for 

any member to submit a written opening statement or questions 

for the record. 

Mr. GOWDY. If there’s no further business, without objection, the 

committee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:59 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 


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(87) 

APPENDIX 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD


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MOTION TO ISSUE SUBPOENA TO DAN COATS 

Mr. Connolly moves that the Oversight and Government Reform Committee, pursuant to 

House Rule XI clause 2(k)(6), authorize and issue the attached subpoena to Dan Coats. 
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SUBPOENA 

BY AUTHORITY OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE 

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

Director of National Intelligence, Dan Coats 

To ______________________________________________________________ _ 

You are hereby commanded to be and appear before the 

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

of the House of Representatives of the United States at the place, date, and time specified below. 

0 to produce the things identified on the attached schedule touching matters of inquiry committed to said 

committee or subcommittee; and you are not to depart without leave of said committee or subcommittee. 

0 to testify at a deposition touching matters of inquiry committed to said committee or subcommittee; 

and you are not to depa1t without leave of said committee or subcommittee. 

0 to testify at a hearing touching matters of inquiry committed to said committee or subcommittee; and 

you are not to depart without leave of said committee or subcommittee. 

Place of testimony: Room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building 

Date: July 26,2018 Time: lOam 

To any authorized staff member or the U.S. Marshals Service 

_____________________________ to serve and make return. 

Witness my hand and the seal of the House of Representatives of the United States, at 

the city of Washington, D.C. this 24th day of .::.Ju,l:;_ ______ , 2018 . 

Attest: Chairman or Authorized Member 

Clerk 
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COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM 

115TH CONGRESS 

RATIO 24-18 

ROLLCALL 

Vote on: Meadows Motion to Table the Connolly Motion 

Date· Tuesday July 24 2018 

Ave No Present Democrats 

MR. GOWDY (SC) {Chairman) X MR. CUMMINGS (MD) {Ranking) 

MR. DUNCAN (TN) MS. MALONEY (NY) 

MR. ISSA (CA) MS. NORTON (DC) 

MR.lOR.DAN (OH) X MR. CLAY (MO) 

MR. SANFOR.D (SC) MR. LYNCH (MA) 

MR. AMASH (Ml) MR. COOPER (TN} 

MR. GOSAR (A2) X MR. CONNOLLY (VA) 

MR. DesjARLAIS (TN) MS. KELLY (IL) 

MS. FOXX fNCl X MS. LAWRENCE (MI) 

MR. MASSIE (KY) X MS. WATSON COLEMAN(Nl) 

MR. MEADOWS (NC) X MR. KRISHNAMOORTHL(IL) 

MR. DeSANTIS (FL) X MR. RASK!N (MD) 

MR. ROSS (FL) MR. GOME2 (CA) 

MR. WALKERfNC) X MR. WELCH (VT) 

MR. BLUM (!A) X MR. CARTWRIGHT (PAl 

MR. HICE (GAl X MR. DeSAULNIER (CA) 

MR. RUSSELL (OK) MS. PLASKETT (VI) 

MR. GROTHMAN (WI) X MR. SAREANES (MD) 

MR. HUR.D (TX) X 

MRPALMER(AL) X 

MR. COMER (K¥1 X 

MR. MITCHELL (Ml) X 

MR. GIANFORTE (MT) X 

MR. CLOUD (TX) X 

Roll Call Totals: Ayes: 17 Nays: 15 Present: 

Passed: __lL_ Failed: __ 

VOTE#·1 

Aye No 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

_X_ 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

_X_ 

(REVISED 3/14/18) 
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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE 

July 23, 2018 

Contact: David Carl 

(505) 288-2465 

AG Balderas to Congressional Leaders: "Protect the Integrity of our 

Elections. Our Democracy Depends on it." 

Albuquerque, NM- Today, Attomey General Hector Balderas led a bipartisan coalition of21 

Attomeys General in urging congressional leaders to improve American cyber security and 

protect the integrity of the upcoming 2018 midterm election, and elections to come, against 

cyberattacks and infiltrations like the ones committed by Russia in 2016. The latest 

investigations into that attack shows Russian hackers targeted the American electoral system, 

stole the private information of hundreds of thousands of people, and infiltrated a company that 

supplies voting software across the nation, putting the upcoming election at serious risk. These 

investigations led to the indictment of 12 Russian Intelligence Officers earlier this month. 

"The intelligence could not be more clear," said Attomey General Hector Balderas. "In 2016, 

Russian hackers infiltrated state and local election boards, and stole the sensitive voter 

information of more than 500,000 Americans. This cannot happen again. It is the vital 

responsibility of Congressional leaders to safeguard our elections, and prevent yet another 

dangerous cyber-attack. Nothing short of the fabric of our democracy is at stake." 

The coalition of AG's urged three steps in addressing election security concems. 

Prioritizing and acting on election-secmity legislation. We understand that the Secure Elections 

Act (S.2261) is before the Senate at this time and may address some of our concerns. 

Increasing funding for the Election Assistance Commission to support election security 

improvements at the state level and to protect the personal data of the voters of our states. Many 

states lack the resources and tools they need to protect the polls during this year's upcoming 

elections. Additional funding for voting infrastmcture will not only allow states to upgrade 

election systems, but will also allow for a comprehensive security risk assessment. 

Unfortunately, past practice has shown that the existing Election Assistance Commission grants 

are simply insufficient to provide for the upgraded technology needed. More funding is essential 

to adequately equip states with the financial resources we need to safeguard our democracy and 

protect the data of voting members in our states. 

Supporting the development of cybersecurity standards for voting systems to prevent potential 

future foreign attacks. It is critical that there be a combined effort between governments and 

security expet1s to protect against the increased cyber threats posed by foreign entities seeking to 

weaken our institutions. 

Protecting the integrity of the Ametican voting system is a vital, bipru1isan issue, reflected in the 

bipa11isan nature of the Attomeys General joining AG Balderas. In addition to New Mexico, this 

coalition includes Attomeys General from Califomia, Connecticut, Delaware, The District of 

Columbia, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, 

Mississippi, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, Virginia and 

Washington. 

A copy of the letter is attached below. 
92 


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STATE OF NEW MEXICO 

OFflCEOFTHEATTORNEYGENERAL 

HECTOR H. BALDERAS 

ATTORNEY GENERAL 

House Homeland Security Committee 

Chainnan Michael McCaul 

2001 Rayburn House Office Building 

Washington, DC 20515 

Dear Honorable Committee Members: 

July 23,2018 

Senate Rules and Administration Committee 

Chainnan Roy Blunt 

260 Russell Senate Office Building 

Washington, DC 20510 

The undersigned Attorneys General write to express our grave concern over the threat to the 

integrity of the American election system. As the latest investigations and indictments make 

clear, during the 2016 election, hackers within Russia's military intelligence service not only 

targeted state and local election boards, but also successfully invaded a state election website to 

steal the sensitive infonnation of approximately 500,000 American voters and infiltrated a 

company that supplies voting software across the United States. 

The allegations in these indictments are extremely troubling. They evidence technologically 

vulnerable election infrastructures and the existence of a malicious foreign actor eager to exploit 

these vulnerabilities. Moreover, it has never been more important to maintain confidence in our 

democratic voting process. It is imperative that we protect the integrity of our elections. We 

must ensure that the upcoming 2018 rnidtenn elections are secure and untainted. Accordingly, 

we ask for your assistance in shoring up our systems so that we may protect our elections from 

foreign attacks and interference by: 

• Prioritizing and acting on election-security legislation. We understand that the Secure 

Elections Act (S.2261) is before the Senate at this time and may address some of our 

concerns. 

• Increasing funding for the Election Assistance Commission to support election security 

improvements at the state level and to protect the personal data of the voters of our states. 

We are concerned that many states lack the resources and tools they need to protect the 

polls. Additional funding for voting infrastmcture will not only allow states to upgrade 

election systems, but will also allow for a comprehensive security risk assessment. 

Unfortunately, past practice has shown that the existing Election Assistance Commission 

grants are simply insufficient to provide for the upgraded technology needed. More 
93 


KING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 31 here 33089.031

funding is essential to adequately equip states with the financial resources we need to 

safeguard our democracy and protect the data of voting members in our states. 

• Supporting the development of cybersecurity standards for voting systems to prevent 

potential future foreign attacks. It is critical that there be a combined effort between 

governments and security experts to protect against the increased cyber threats posed by 

foreign entities seeking to weaken our institutions. 

These changes are essential in order to strengthen public trust in our electoral system. The 

integrity of the nation's voting infrastmcture is a bip&tisan issue, and one that affects not only 

the national political landscape, but elections at the state, county, municipal, and local levels. It 

is our hope that you agree, and will take swift action to protect our national legacy of fair and 

free elections. 

Respectfully, 

Hector Balderas Xavier Becerra 

Attorney General ofNew Mexico Attorney General of California 

George Jepsen Matthew P. Denn 

Attorney General of Connecticut Attorney General of Delaware 

K&·l Racine Russell Suzuki 

Attorney General for the District of Columbia Attorney General of Hawaii 

TELEPHONE: (505)490·4060 FAX: (505)490·4883 www.nmauov MAILING ADDRESS: P.O. BOX 1508 ·SANTA FE, NEW MEXICO 87504·1508 

STREET ADDRESS: 408 GALISTEO STREET· SANTA FE, NEW MEXICO 87501 
94 


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Lisa Madigan 

Attorney General of Illinois 

Janet Mills 

Attorney General of Maine 

MauraHealy 

Attorney General ofMassachusetts 

Lod Swanson 

Attorney General of Minnesota 

Gurbir Grewal 

Attorney General of New Jersey 

Thomas J. Miller 

Attorney General of Iowa 

BdanFrosh 

Attorney General of Maryland 

Bill Schuette 

Attorney General of Michigan 

Jim Hood 

Attorney General of Mississippi 

Barbara D. Underwood 

Attorney General ofNew York 

TELEPHONE: (505)490,.4060 FA-X: (505)490·4883 www.nmag.gpy 

MAILING ADDRESS: P.O. !lOX !50S· SANTA FE, NEW MEXICO 87504·1508 

STREET ADDRESS: 408 GALISTEO STREET· SANTA FE. NEW MEXICO Si50! 
95 


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Josh Stein Ellen Rosenblum 

Attorney General of North Carolina Attorney General of Oregon 

Peter F. Kilmartin Mark R. Herring 

Attorney General of Rhode Island Attorney General of Virginia 

Bob Ferguson 

Attorney General of Washington 

TELEPHONE: (505)490·4060 FAX: (505)490·4883 www.nmauov 

MAILING ADDRESS: P.O. BOX !508 -SANTA FE. NEW MEXICO 87-,04-1508 

STREET ADDRESS: 408 Glll.lSTEO STREET ·SANTA FE, NEW MEXICO 87501 
96 


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1'A!V GOWDY. SOUTtl CAit01.lH4 ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

({ongre55 of tbe mnittb $tatt5 

.,oti1Se of l\epresentatibes 

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM 

2157 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6143 

MJ.nl'!rv ao~ l1,..50N 

~..~ •• - ... {2(r.!J 21$-~051 

hl'ls:r.JJO~l.hous!i.go¥ 

October 20, 2017 

The Honorable Robert Kolasky 

Acting Deputy Under Secretary 

National Protections and Programs Directorate 

Department of Homeland Security 

Washington, DC 20528 · 

Dear Acting Deputy Under Secretary Kolasky: 

fllJAH E. CVMMINQS, MAAYLAHO 

RANKING MINORITY MEM0£A 

Last month, the Department of Homeland Security reportedly notified election officials in 

21 states that Russian government hackers had targeted those states during the 2016 election. 1 

We are writing to request copies ofthese notifications and additional documents, as well as a 

briefing from top Department officials on these matters. 

The Department's notifications to these states came nearly a year after the election and 

three months after the Department publicly disclosed that individuals connected·with the Russian 

government sought to hack voter registration files and public election sites in 21 states.2 They 

also came after numerous other reports that Russia engaged in a multifaceted campaign to disrupt 

the 2016 election, including widespread cyber-attacks on state-election infrastructure systems.3 

The Department's recent convening ofthe Government Coordinating Council for the 

Election Infrastructure Subsector, with representatives from the Election Assistance 

Commission, the National Association of Secretaries of State and state and local election 

officials, will hopefully facilitate the sharing of information and expertise.4 

1 DHS Tells States Abo11t Russian HacMng During 2016 Election. Washington Post (Sept. 22, 2017) (online 

at www.washingtonpost.comlworld/national-security/dhs-tells-states-about-russian-hacking·during-2016-

electionl20 17/09/22/fd263a2c-9fe2·11 e7 -Sea l·ed9752854 75e _story.html?utm _term=.55b9l6d66ca3 ). 

2 Russians Tried to Httck Electiol! Systems in 21 Sillies, U.S. Officials Say, Chicago Tribute (June 21, 2017) 

(online at www .chicagotribune.comlnews/nationworld/ct-homeland-security·chief-intelligence-panel·20 170621-

story.html). 

3 See, e.g., Department of Homeland Security, Joint Analysis Repo11: GRIZZLEY STEPPE-Russian 

Malicious Cyber Activity (Dec. 29, 2016) (online at www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/JAR_I6-

20296A_ GRIZZL Y%20STEPPE-20 16-1229.pdf); Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Background to 

"Asse.~ving Russian Activities and lntemions in Recelll US Elections": The An(l/ytic Process tmd Cyber f11cident 

Attribution (Jan. 6, 2017) (online at www.dni.gov/files/documentsi!CA_2017_01.pdl). 

• Department of Homeland Security, DHS and Pmtners Convene First Election Infimtrucwre 

Coordinating Council (Oct. 14, 2017) (online at www.dhs.gov/news/20 17/l 0/14/dhs·and-partners-convene·first· 

election-infrastructure-coordinating-council). 
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Acting Deputy Under Secretary Kolasky 

Page2 

We request that you produce, by October 31,2017, copies of the notifications sent by the 

Department to these 21 states, as well as all accompanying materials relating to Russian 

government-backed attempts to hack state election systems. 

We also request a briefing from appropriate Department officials within the same 

timeframe on the following issues: 

(I) the types of voting equipment that were attacked; 

(2) the timeline by which the Department provided information to these states and the 

reasons for not sharing additional infonnation sooner; 

(3) services and trainings offered to states to detect and prevent cyber-attacks; 

(4) plans to work with states to detect and prevent future cyber-attacks; and 

(5) the operational plans and goals of the newly convened Election Infrastructure 

Coordinating Council. 

If you have any questions, please contact Jennifer Daehn with the Democratic Committee 

staff at (202) 225-5051. Thank you for your consideration of this request. 

Sincerely, 

~6G--~ 'Elijiilii.Cummings 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Oversight and 

Government Refonn 

cc: The Honorable Trey Gowdy, Chainnan 

Committee on Oversight and Government Refonn 

The Honorable Will Hurd, Chainnan 

Subcommittee on Infonnation Technology 
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TRfY GOWO~ SOUTH CAROl FillA ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

QL:ongre1)1) of tbe mlniteb ~tate1) 

;QouS'e of ~eprefl'entatibeS' 

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM 

2157 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6143 

MA.Fml•" ,20<').,>2$-501-1 

M•'IOA!<~ 1Wli 2?5-SO~! 

January 3, 2018 

The Honorable Christopher C. Krebs 

Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Under Secretary 

National Protection and Programs Directorate 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

245 Murray Lane SW 

Washington, DC 20528 

Dear Mr. Krebs: 

ELu ... H f CU!I.1M!NGS o,t~;>.f'IYI..AIIItl 

I'IANK1NG M!NOR•TY MIO~BfR 

Enclosed are post-hearing questions that have been directed to you and submitted to the 

official record for the hearing that was held on November 29, 2017, titled "Cybersecurity of 

Voting Machines." 

In order to ensure a complete hearing record, please return your written response to the 

Committee on or before January 19,2018, including each question in full as well as the name of 

the Member. Your response should be addressed to the Committee office at 2157 Rayburn 

House Office Building, Washington, DC 20515. Please also send an electronic version of your 

response by e-mail to Sharon Casey, Deputy Chief Clerk, at Sharon.Casey@mail.house.gov. 

Thank you for your prompt attention to this request. If you need additional information 

or have other questions, please contact Troy Stock at (202) 225-5074. 

Will Hurd 

Chairman 

Sincerely, 

:,m 

~ --- Subcommittee on Information Technology Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Affairs 

cc: The Honorable Robin L. Kelly, Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Information Technology 

The Honorable Val Butler Demings, Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Affairs 

Enclosure 
99 


KING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 37 here 33089.037

Question for Christopher Krebs 

Senior Official Performing the Duties ofthe Under Secretary 

National Protection & Programs Directorate 

Department of Homeland Security 

Ranking Members Robin Kelly and Val Demings 

Subcommittee on Information Technology and Intergovernmental Affairs 

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

Hearing on "Cybersecurity of Voting Machines" 

November 29,2017 

At the hearing, Rep. Kelly introduced into the record a letter she sent on October 20, 2017, with 

Ranking Member Elijah Cummings. The letter requested "copies of the notifications" the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) provided to 21 states reportedly targeted by Russian 

hacking efforts. The letter also requested copies of all documents "related to the Russian 

government-backed attempts to hack state election systems." Attached is a copy of the letter that 

Rep. Kelly introduced into the record. 

According to press reports, the following states received notifications from DHS that they were 

identified as targets: Washington, Oregon, California, Colorado, Illinois, Alaska, Arizona, 

Oklahoma, Texas, North Dakota, Minnesota Wisconsin, Iowa, Ohio, Alabama, Florida, 

Pennsylvania, Virginia, Maryland, Connecticut, and Delaware. 1 

On the day before the hearing, DHS produced only an email with a short script that DHS 

employees apparently read over the phone to state election officials. It is only 13 sentences long 

and does not refer to any specific state or attack. Rather, it is a generic script that provides no 

specific information. 

DHS has yet to produce any of the other requested documents. 

I. Please immediately produce copies of all documents related to the Russian governmentbacked attempts to monitor, penetrate, or hack state election systems during the 

presidential election campaign of2016, including but not limited to the tools the attackers 

used, the tactics they utilized, the results of your conversations with these states, and the 

steps you took to follow-up. 

2. For each of the 21 states, please provide details of your notification to state officials of 

the attempted cyberattacks, including: 

• the date of the notification; 

1 What We Know about the 21 States Targeted by Russian Hackers, Washington Post 

(Sept. 23, 20 17) (on line at www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/20 17/09/23/what-weknow-about-the-21-states-targeted-by-russ ian-hackers/?utm _term=. 776577e66d8a). 
100 


KING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 38 here 33089.038

• the names of the state officials or offices that were notified; 

• the name of the DHS division that provided the notification; 

• whether it was a telephonic notification, or by other means; 

• services offered during the notification; and 

• the dates of any subsequent communications relating to cyberattacks with state 

officials. 

3. Did DHS notify any other states that their election infrastructure had been targeted by 

cyberattacks in 20 16? If so, please provide similar details of your notifications to those 

States, using the format above. 
101 


KING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 39 here 33089.039

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

<ttongre~~ of tbe Wniteb ~tate~ 

~ousc of ~epreswtntibes 

COMMIITEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM 

2157 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6143 

t..V~·-"~'' /~02!2'25-f:o074 

fo.\t>.<r'<•m· 1202!~25 5051 

January 29, 2018 

The Honorable Trey Gowdy 

Chainnan 

Committee on Oversight and Govemment Refonn 

U.S. House of Representatives 

Washington, D.C. 20515 

Dear Mr. Chainnan, 

ELIJAI1 E t:lJM,_l!NI;S, MARYlAND 

RAII/I( lNG MINOfllll M£M6Efl 

We are writing to request that you issue a subpoena to finally compel the Department of 

Homeland Security to produce documents it has been withholding from Congress for months 

relating to Russian govenunent-backed effotts to monitor, penetrate, or otherwise hack at least 

2 J state election systems in the 2016 election. 

Despite repeated requests over the past several months, the Department has refused to 

provide the Oversight Committee with this infmmation, and to the best of our knowledge, has 

not provided it to any congressional committee. We have been extremely patient, but we can no 

longer allow the Trump Administration to defY our requests and withhold this critical 

information from Congress. The Intelligence Community has wamed us that Russia intends to 

continue intetfering with elections in the United States and around the world. It is our 

responsibility to obtain infonnation about what happened in 20 J 6 so we can adequately prepare 

for fi.tture attempts to interfere with our democracy. 

If you decline to issue this subpoena yourself, then we request that you allow Committee 

Members to debate and vote on a motion to subpoena the Department for these documents at our 

next regularly-scheduled business meeting. 

Multiple Requests Refused by Department of Homeland Security 

According to press reports, the Department notified the following 21 states that they were 

identified as targets of Russian govemment-linked hacking attempts into their election systems: 

Washington, Oregon, Califomia, Colorado, Illinois, Alaska, Arizona, Oklahoma, Texas, North 

Dakota, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Iowa, Ohio, Alabama, Florida, Pelll1sylvania, Virginia, 

Maryland, Connecticut, and Delaware. 1 

1 See, e.g., What We Knoll' About 1/1e 21 States TargeJed by Russian Hackers, Washington Post (Sept 23, 

20 17) (online at www, washinglonposccomlnews/the-fix/wp/20 17/09/23/what-we-know-abouHhe-21-statestargeted-by-russian-hackers/?utm _term=. 77 6577e66d8a). 
102 


KING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 40 here 33089.040

The Honorable Trey Gowdy, Chairman 

Page 2 

On October 20, 2017, Ranking Member Elijah E. Cummings and Information 

Technology Subcommittee Ranking Member Robin Kelly sent a letter requesting "copies of the 

notifications" the Depa11ment provided to these states, as well as copies of all documents 

"related to the Russian government-backed attempts to hack state election systems." They 

requested these documents by October 31, 2017.2 

In response, the Department produced just one e-mail with a short script that Department 

employees apparently read over the phone to state election officials. This script is l3 sentences 

long and does not refer to any specific state or attack. Rather, it is a genelic script that provides 

no specific infornmtionJ 

On November 29,2017, during a joint subcommittee hearing on the "Cybersecurity of 

Voting Machines," Ranking Member Kelly questioned Christopher Krebs, the Senior Official 

Performing the Duties of the Under Secretary of the National Protection and Program 

Directorate. Ranking Member Kelly introduced into the official hearing record the request letter 

from October 20,2017, and asked Mr. Krebs when these documents would be provided. 

Although Mr. Krebs assured Ranking Member Kelly that a response would be forthcoming, no 

ftn1her documents were provided.4 

During the hearing, Mr. Krebs seemed to indicate that he could not provide the requested 

information because it was provided by the states as part of their "confidential relationship" with 

the Department. Instead, he suggested that Committee Members "reach back to your states" to 

obtain the infmmation. He failed to acknowledge that the October 20, 2017, request letter sought 

information the Depa11ment collected from other sources-rather than from the states 

themselves-including infonnation that led the Department to conclude that these 21 states were 

at risk, as well as the specific tactics used by Russian govermnent-backed entities.' 

To follow-up on this request yet again, the Subcommittees sent Mr. Krebs official 

Questions for the Record on January 3, 2018, that included a request by Ranking Members 

Cummings and Kelly that the Department produce, by January 19,2018, the following 

documents and information: 

2 Letter from Ranking Member Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee on Oversight and Government 

Reform, and Ranking Member Robin Kelly, Subcommittee on Information Technology. to Robert Kolasky, Acting 

Deputy Under Secretary, National Protections and Programs Directorate, Department of Homeland Security (Oct. 

20, 2017) (online at democrats-oversight.house.gov/sites/democrals.oversight.house.gov/files/20 17-10-

20.EEC%20Kelly%20to%20Knlasky-NPPD%20re%20Cyberattacks%20on%20State%20Eiection%20Systems.pdf). 

'Email fi·om Jeffrey Mitchell, Departmenl of Homeland Security, to House Committee on Oversiglll and 

Government Reform Staff (Nov, 28,20 17) (online at https://democratsoversight.house.gov/sitesfdemocrats.oversight.house.gov/files/DHS%20Emai1%20Response%20to%20EEC%20%2 

6%20Kelly%20 I 0-20-l7%20Letterl.pdf). 

·l Subcommittee on tnfonnation Technology and Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Affairs. House 

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Join! Hearing on Cybersecurity of Voting A4achines (Nov. 29, 

2017). 
103 


KING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 41 here 33089.041

The Honorable Trey Gowdy, Chairman 

Page 3 

1. Please immediately produce copies of all documents related to the Russian 

government-backed attempts to monitor, penetrate, or hack state election systems 

dming the presidential election campaign of2016, including but not limited to, 

the tools the attackers used, the tactics they utilized, the results of your 

conversations with these states, and the steps you took to follow-up. 

2. For each of the 2! states, please provide details of your notification to state 

officials of the attempted cyberattacks, including: 

the date of the notification; 

the names of the state officials or offices that were notified; 

the name of the DHS division that provided the notification; 

whether it was a telephonic notification, or by other means; 

services offered during the notification; and 

the dates of any subsequent communications relating to cyberattacks with 

state officials. 

3. Did DHS notify any other states that their election infrastructure had been 

targeted by cyberattacks in 2016? If so, please provide similar details of your 

notifications to those States, using the format above. 

Although the letter transmitting these Questions for the Record was signed by both 

Subcommittee Chairmen Will Hurd and Gary J. Palmer, the Department has produced none of 

the requested documents to date.6 

Request for Subpoena 

For the reasons set forth above, we respectfully request that you issue a subpoena to 

compel the Department to produce, by February 5, 2018, documents concerning the information 

requested in the Questions for the Record sent to the Department on January 3, 2018. 

If you chose not to do so, then we ask that you place this matter on the agenda for our 

next regularly scheduled business meeting so that all Committee Members will have the 

opportunity to vote on a motion to issue this subpoena. 

6 Letter from Chairman Will Hurd, Subcommittee on Infonnation Technology, House Committee on 

Oversight and Government Reform and Chairman Gary J. Palmer, Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Affairs, 

House Committee on Oversight and Govemment Reform, to Christopher C. Krebs, Senior Official Performing the 

Duties of the Under Secretary, National Protection and Programs Directorate, Department of Homeland Security 

(Jan. 3, 20 18) (online at democratsoversight.house.gov/sitesldemocrats.oversight.house.gov/fi les/Hurd%20Palmer%20to%20 DHS%200 l-03-

18%20QFRs.pdf). 
104 


KING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 42 here 33089.042

The Honorable Trey Gowdy. Chairman 

!'age 4 

Thank you for your consideration of this request. 

-~ _( 

~~ 

j~ 

Sincerely. 

. 

~~ 

,.L,'Mr 

~d~c:)~ ~~ ~v k ~C~g.,_ . jl/ ~;.,.,.,. 
105 


KING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 43 here 33089.043

<!rongress of u,e lltnifeil ~tates 

ll!usllill!lhm, il<!r 20515 

The Honorable Paul D. Ryan 

Speaker of the House 

U.S. House of Representatives 

Washington, D.C. 20515 

Dear Mr. Speaker: 

April 10,2018 

We are writing to seek your assistance in obtaining documents that the Trump 

Administration has been withholding from Congress for months relating to attacks against 2 1 

states before the 2016 election by entities linked to the Russian govenunent. 

We have been trying to work through the committee process, but we have faced two 

obstacles: the Trump Administration is refusing to provide the documents we requested, and 

Republicans appear to have no interest in compelling the Tnunp Administration to produce them. 

Our goal is not to interfere with the ongoing criminal investigation of the Trump 

Administration being conducted by Special Counsel Robert Mueller. Our goal is to obtain the 

documents collected and prepared by our federal agencies about these Russian attacks in order to 

take concrete steps to help prevent them from happening again. That is our responsibility under 

the Constitution. 

Unfortunately, we are being blocked by Trump Administration officials who refuse to 

produce these documents to Congress and by Republican Chairmen who refuse to demand them. 

These actions create the unfortunate perception that House Republicans do not want to obtain 

these documents relating to the Russian attacks against state election systems. 

Numet·ous Oversight Committee Requests 

On October 20, 2017, Rep. Elijah E. Cummings, the Ranking Member of the Committee 

on Oversight and Government Reform, and Rep. Robin Kelly, the Ranking Member ofthe 

Subcommittee on Information Technology, sent a letter to the Department of Homeland Security 

(DI-!S) requesting "copies of the notifications" that the Department provided to 21 states, as well 

as copies of all documents ·'related to the Russian goverrunent-backed attempts to hack state 

election systems." They requested these documents by October 31, 2017. 1 

1 Letter fi·om Ranking Member Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee on Oversight and Govemment 

Reform, and Ranking Member Robin Kelly, Subcommittee on lnfom1ation Technology, House Committee on 

Oversight and Government Reform, to Robert Kolasky, Acting Deputy Under Secretary, National Protections and 

Programs Directorate, Depamnent of Homeland Security (Oct. 20, 20!7) (online at democratsoversight.house.gov/sitesldemocrats. oversight.house.gov/files/20 17-1 0-20. EEC%20Kelly%20to%20KolaskyNPPD%20re%20Cyberattacks%20on%20State%20Eiection%20Systems.pdt). 

PRtNTEO ON RECYCLED PAPER 
106 


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The Honorable Paul D. Ryan 

Page2 

On November 28, 2017, DHS responded by producing just one e-mail with a short script 

that Department employees apparently read over the phone to state election officials. This script 

is 13 sentences long and does not refer to any specific state or attack. Rather, it is a gene.ric 

script that provides no specific information. 2 

The next day, on November 29, 2017, Christopher Krebs, the Senior Official Performing 

the Duties of the Under Secretary of the National Protection and Program Directorate at DHS, 

testified at a joint subcommittee hearing on the "Cybersecurity of Voting Machines." Mr. Krebs 

assured Committee Members that a further response would be forthcoming? 

To follow-up, the Subcommittees sent official Questions for the Record on January 3, 

2018, with a request for DHS to produce the following documents and information: 

1. Please immediately produce copies of all documents related to the Russian 

government-backed attempts to monitor, penetrate, or hack state election systems 

during the presidential election campaign of 20 16, including but not limited to, 

the tools the attackers used, the tactics they utilized, the results of your 

conversations with these states, and the steps you took to follow-up. 

2. For each of the 21 states, please provide details of your notification to state 

officials of the attempted cyberattacks, including: 

the date of the notification; 

the names of the state officials or offices that were notified; 

the name of the DHS division that provided the notification; 

whether it was a telephonic notification, or by other means; 

services offered during the notification; and 

the dates of any subsequent communications relating to cyberattacks with 

state officials. 

3. Did DHS notify any other states that their election infrastructure had been 

targeted by cyberattacks in 20 16? If so, please provide similar details of your 

notifications to those States; using the format above. 

The letter transmitting these Questions for the Record was signed by both Subcommittee 

Chairmen Will Hurd and Gary J. Palmer.4 

2 Email from Jeffrey Mitchell, Department of Homeland Security, to House Committee on Oversight and 

Government Reform Staff (Nov. 28, 20 11) (online at https://democratsoversighthouse.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/flles/DHS%20Email%20Response%20to%20EEC%20%2 

6%20Kelly%201 0-20-17%20Letter l.pdf). 

3 Subcommittee on Information Technology and Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Affairs, House 

Committee on Oversight and Government Refonn, Joint Hearing on Cybersecurily of Voting Machines (Nov. 29, 

2017). 

4 Letter from Chairman Will Hurd, Subcommittee on Information Technology, and Chainnan Gary J. 

Palmer, Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Affairs, House Committee on Oversight and Government Refonn, to 

Christopher C. Krebs, Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Under Secretary, National Protection and 
107 


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The Honorable Paul D. Ryan 

Page3 

Having received no response for weeks, all Democratic Members of the Committee sent a 

letter to Chairman Trey Gowdy on January 29, 2018, requesting that he issue a subpoena to 

finally compel DHS to produce these documents. If he refused, the Members asked him to allow 

all Committee Members to debate and vote on a motion to subpoena the Department for these 

documents at the next regularly-scheduled business meeting.5 Chairman Gowdy did not respond. 

On February 2, 2018, Ranking Member Cummings and Vice Ranking Member Gerald E. 

Connolly sent another letter to Chairman Gowdy renewing this request and asking for the 

subpoena motion to be placed on the agenda for the Committee's business meetin! on February 

6, 2018.6 Chairman Gowdy did not respond. 

On the day of the Committee's business meeting, February 6, 2018, DHS provided 

approximately 50 pages of documents with information about how Department officials learned 

about the Russian-backed attacks and communicated with states. 7 Most of the production consisted of publicly available documents. For example, DHS produced a Joint Analysis Report 

with the FBI entitled "GRIZZLY STEPPE-Russian Malicious Cyber Activity." Although this 

document was marked "For Official Use Only," DHS released this same document publicly more 

than a year earlier. 8 

The Trump Administration's response has been woefully inadequate. While there have 

been classified and unclassified briefing~ about these Russian-backed attacks, including a 

classified staff briefing scheduled for this week, we have not received all relevant classified 

documents about these attacks. We recognize that it is possible that some of these documents 

fall outside DHS's control. In that case, we would expect DHS to consult with the Intelligence 

Community or other interagency partners to ensure that we obtain the documents we have 

requested. 

Programs Dire1:torate, Department of Homeland Security (Jan. 3, 20 18) (onllne at democrats· 

oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/Hurd%20Palmer"l.20to%20DHS%2001·03· 

l8%20QFRs.pdt). 

' Letter from Ranking Member Elijah E. Cummings eta!. to Chairman Trey Gowdy, House Committee on 

Oversight and Government Reform (Jan. 29, 2018) (online at https:/ldemocratsoversight.house. gov/sitesldemocrats.oversight.house.gov/files/20 18-0 J. 

29.0GR%20Dems%20to%20Gowdy%20re%20DHS%20Doc%20Production%20foro/o20Attacks%20on%20State% 

20 .... pdf). 

6 Letter from Ranking Member Elijah E. Cummings and Vice Ranking Member Gerald E. Connolly to 

Chairman Trey Gowdy, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (Feb, 2, 20!8) (online at 

democrats-oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/20 18·02· 

02.EEC%20%26%20Connolly%20to%20Gowdy%20re.l3%20motion.s%20for%20Subpoenas.pdf). 

7 Email from Legislative Affairs Advisor for Cybersecurity, Department of Homeland Security, to House 

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Staff (Feb. 6, 20 18). 

'Department of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau oflnvestigation, GRlZUY STEPPE-Russian 

Malicious Cyber Activity (Dec. 29 2016) (online at www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/JAR_l6· 

20296A_GRIZZLY%20STEPPE-2016-1229.pdf). 
108 


KING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 46 here 33089.046

The Honorable Paul D. Ryan 

Page 4 

To our knowledge, the Trump Administration has not provided any Committee in the 

House of Representatives with these classified documents about Russian-backed attacks against 

state election systems. 

Request for Assistance 

The election happened 17 months ago. lt is inexcusable that Republican leaders in 

Congress have done so little to investigate--or address-Russian-backed attacks on our states, 

despite the fact that we have been asking repeatedly for congressional action on this important 

matter. We must be able to evaluate the threat that Russia posed-and still poses-but we 

cannot do our jobs effectively without obtaining the racts. 

We have exhausted our efforts at the committee level, and we ask that you now 

personally intervene to protect the integrity and authorities of the House of Representatives to 

obtain the documents we need to protect our nation against foreign attacks. 

Sincerely, 

Ranking Member 

Pem1anent Select C01mnittee on 

Intelligence 

~~ Bennie G. Thompson 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Homeland Security 

anking Member 

Committee on the Judiciary 

Robert A. Brady 

Ranking Member 

Committee on House Administration 

f.~ t. £~ Eliot L. Engel 

Ranking Member 

Committee on foreign Affairs 

cc: The Honorable Trey Gowdy, Chairman 

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

The Honorable Bob Goodlatte, Chairman 

Committee on the Judiciary 
109 


KING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 47 here 33089.047

The Honorable Paul D. Ryan 

PageS 

The Honorable Devin Nunes .• Chairman 

Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 

The Honorable Gregg Harper, Chairman 

Committee on House Administration 

The Honorable Michael McCaul, Chairman 

Committee on Homeland Security 

The Honorable Ed Royce, Chairman 

Committee on Foreign Affairs 
110 


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7124/2018 Inside a 3~Year Russian Campaign to Influence U.S. Voters· The New York Times 

Inside a 3-Year Russian Campaign to 

Influence US. Voters 

By $cott _Shane and Ma.r:K~azze~i 

Feb. 16, 2018 

WASHINGTON- In September, as the first,detailed evidence surfaced of Russia's hijacking of 

social media in the 2016 election, Irina.V. Kav.erzina, one of about 80 Russians working on the 

project in St. Petersburg, emailed a family member with some news. 

"We had a slight crisis here at,work: the F.B.I: busted our activity (not a joke);' she wrote of the 

project in Russia, "So, I got preoccupies! with co:vering tracks together with the colleagues!' She 

added, "I created all these pictures and posts, !l!,1d the Americans believed that it was written by 

their people!' 

A 37-page indictment, handed up oil Fyiday by a Washington grand jury and charging Ms. 

Kaverzina and 12 other people with an ehibor;ate;conspiracy, showed that she and her colleagues 

did not, in fact, hide their tracks so well from Unlt~d States investigators. The charges, brought by 

Robert S. Mueller III, the speci.al counsel, introduced hard facts to a polarized political debate 

over Russia's intervention in AmeriCan democracy, while not yet implicating President Trump or 

his associates. 

The indictment presented in astonishing detail a carefully planned, three-year Russian scheme to 

incite political discord in the United States, damage Hillary Clinton's presidential campaign and 

later bolster the candidacy of Donald J. Trump, along with those of Bernie Sanders and Jill Stein. 

The precise description of the operation suggested that F.B.I. investigators had intercepted 

communications, found a cooperating insider or both. 

The Russians overseeing the operation, which they named the Translator Project, had a goal to 

"spread distrust toward the candidates and the political system in general." They used a cluster of 

companies linked to one called the Internet Research Agency, and called their campaign 

"information warfare." 

The field research to guide the attack appears to have begun in earnest in June 2014. Two Russian 

women, Aleksandra Y. Krylova and Anna V Bogacheva, obtained visas for what turned out to be a 

three-week reconnaissance tour of the United States, including to key electoral states like 

Colorado, Michigan, Nevada and New Mexico. The visa application of a third Russian, RobertS. 

Bovda, was rejected. 

hltps:l/www.nytimes.com/2018/02/16/us/politics/russia·muef!er-election.htm! 115 
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7/2412018 Inside a 3~Y.ear Russian Campaign to Influence U,S. Voters~ The New York Times 

This is your last free article. 

Subscribe to The Times 

The two women bought cameras, SIM cards and disposable cellphones for the trip and devised 

"evacuation scenarios" in case their real purpose was detected. In ali, they visited nine states -

California, Illinois, Louisiana, New York and Texas, in addition to the others - "to gather 

intelligence" on American politics, the indictment says. Ms. Krylova sent a report about their 

findings to one of her bosses in St. Petersburg. 

Another Russian operative visite~ Atlanta in November 2014 on a similar mission, the indictment 

says. It does not name that operative, apossible indication that he or she is cooperating with the 

investigation, legal experts said. 

President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia has repeatedly denied any government role in hacking and 

disinformation aimed at the United States. Maxim ShemetovjReuters 

The operation also included the creation of hundreds of email, Pay Pal and bank accounts and 

even fraudulent drivers' licenses issued to fictitious Americans. The Russians also used the 

identities of real Americans from stolen Social Security numbers. 

At the height of the 2016 campaign, the effort employed more than 80 people, who used secure 

virtual private network connections to computer servers leased in the United States to hide the 

fact that they were in Russia. From there, they posed as American activists, emailing, advising 

https:/lwww.nytimes.coml2018/02/16/us/po!itlcs/russia~mue!ler-election.hlml 215 
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7/2412018 lns1de a 3-Year Russian Campaign to Influence U.S. Voters- The New York Times 

and making payments to real Americans who were duped into believing that they were part of the 

same cause. 

The playing field was mainly social media, where the Russians splashed catchy memes and hash 

tags. Facebook has estimated that the fraudulent Russian posts reached 126 million Americans on 

its platforms alone. 

The Russian operatives contacted, among others, a real Texas activist who, evidently assuming 

they were Americans, advised them to focus on "purple states like Colorado, Virginia & Florida" 

After that, F.B.I. agents found that the phrase "purple states" became a mantra for the Russian 

operation. 

Clinton Watts, a former F.B.I. agent who has tracked the Russian campaign closely, said that he 

had no doubt that President V,ladimir V. Putin of Russia was behind the effort, which was carried 

out by companies controlled by his friend and ally, Yevgeny V. Prigozhin. But he noted that the soc_ 

called trolls employed by Mr. Prigozhin took elaborate steps to obscure their identities and 

locations and to avoid leaving government fingerprints. 

"From the beginning, they built this so it could be plausibly denied," Mr. Watts said. Mr. Putin has 

repeatedly denied any government role in hacking and disinformation aimed at the United States, 

while coyly allowing that patriotic Russians may have carried out such attacks on their own. 

Andrew S. Weiss, a Russia specialist at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, called 

the reported origin of the effort in April2014 "crucially important:' 

"That's a little more than a month after the annexation of Crimea and the launch of Russia's 

covert war in eastern Ukraine," Mr. Weiss said. The resulting crisis "vaporized U.S.-Russian 

relations overnight," he said, setting off multiple Russian efforts "to undermine the United States, 

both in terms of our leading role in the world, but also via our own domestic political 

vulnerabilities!' 

Mr. Weiss said the fact that private companies conducted the social media campaign simply made 

it cheaper and more difficult to trace. 

Mr. Putin has been angry with Mrs. Clinton since at least 2011, when she was secretary of state 

and he accused her of inciting unrest in Russia as he faced large-scaie political protests. Mrs. 

Clinton, he said, had sent "a signal" to "some actors in our country" after elections that were 

condemned as fraudulent by both international and Russian observers. 

Mr. Mueller's indictment does not present evidence that the campaign overseen by Mr. Prigozhin 

was ordered by Mr. Putin. American officials have traced other elements of the Russian meddling, 

notably the hacking and leaking of leading Democrats' emails, to Russian intelligence agencies 

carrying out Mr. Putin's orders. 

https://www.nylimes.comf2018102/16/us/po!iticsfrussia-muei!er-election.html 3/5 
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7/2412018 Inside a 3-Year Russian CampaJgn to Influence U.S. Voters~ The New York Times 

While the indictment certainly undermines Mr. Trump's blanket assertions that the Russian 

interference is a political "hoax:' it does not accuse anyone from his campaign or any other 

American of knowingly aiding in the effort. 

By the beginning of 2016, the Russian strategy was in place, and the conspirators began their 

campaign to sow conflict. An internal message circulated through the Internet Research Agency 

telling operatives to post content online that focused on "politics in the USA." 

"Use any opportunity to criticize Hillary and the rest (except Sanders and Trump-we support 

them);' the message read. 

The scope of the operation was sweeping. The Russians assumed their fake identities to 

communicate with campaign volunteers fqr Mr. Trump and grass-roots groups supporting his 

candidacy. They bought pro-Trump and anti-Clinton political advertisements on Facebook and 

other social media. They used an Instagram account to try to suppress turnout of minority voters 

and campaign for Ms. Stein, the Green Party candidate. 

Applyijlg nearly two years' worth of political 'research, the Russians used all of these tactics to 

target voters in swing states, notably Florida, according to the indictment. 

The Internet Research Agency, in St. Petersburg, Russia, was said to be the hub of the operation. 

Dmitry Lovetsky/Associated Press 

https:/fwww.nyfimes.com/20 18/02/16/uslpoliticslrussia-mueller-e!ectlon.html 415 
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7/2412018 Inside a 3-Year Russian Campaign to Influence U,S. Voters- The New York Times 

By summer 2016, the Russian operatives were mobilizing efforts for coming "Florida Goes 

Trump" rallies across the state, all planned for Aug. 20. Using false identities, they contacted 

Trump campaign staff in Florida to offer their services. One operative sent a message to a 

campaign official saying that the group Being Patriotic was organizing a statewide rally "to 

support Mr. Trump:' 

"You know, simple yelling on the internet is not enough," the message read, according to the 

indictment. "There should be real action. We organized rallies in New York before. Now we're 

focusing on purple states such as Florida:• 

Taking to Facebook, the Russians used tile pseudonym Matt Skiber to advertise the rally. "If we 

lose Florida, we lose America. We can't let it happen, right? What about organizing a YUGE proTrump flash mob in every Florida tqwn?" the.message read, using one of Mr. Trump's favorite 

verbal flourishes. 

They reached out to local organizations to build momentum for the coming rallies and assign 

specific tasks. 

They paid one unwitting Trump supporter to build a cage on a flatbed truck that housed another 

person weaJ;ing a costume that portrayed Mrs. Clinton in a prison uniform. 

After the rallies in Florida, the group applied similar tactics to organize rallies in Pennsylvania, 

New York and elsewhere. 

Weeks before the election, the Russians ratcheted up social media activity aimed at dampening 

support for Mrs. Clinton. 

In mid-October, Woke Blacks, an Instagram account run by the Internet Research Agency, carried 

the message "hatred for Trump is misleading the people and forcing Blacks to vote Killary. We 

cannot resort to the lesser of two devils. Then we'd surely be better off without voting AT ALL." 

Then, just days before Americans went to the polls, another Instagrarn account controlled by the 

Russians - called Blacktivist - urged its followers to "choose peace" and vote for Ms. Stein, who 

was expected to siphon support from Mrs. Clinton's campaign. 

"Trust me;' the message read, "it's not a wasted vote." 

A version of this article appears in print on Feb. 17, 2018, on Page Al of the Ne-.v York .edition with the headline: Mueller Chronicles a Social Media War 

https;f!www.nytimes.comf2018/02/16/us/politicsfrussia-muelter-election,htm! 515 
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The ABC News article titled, "Russian Influence Operation Attempted to Suppress Black Vote: 

Indictment," can be found at: https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/russian-influence-operationattempted-suppress-black-vote-indictment/story?id=53185084. 
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ORGANIZATION TRENDS 

ACORN Lives!: The Ban on Federal Funding 

Expires 

by Matthew Vadum 

NOVEMBER 1,_2010 

ACORN Lives!: The Ban on Federal Funding Expires 

By Matthew Vadum (Organization Trends, November 2010 PDF here) 

Summary: ACORN temporarily lost its federal grants and is lying low, but its 

Project Vote affiliate is still registering voters-even though its leaders are on 

trial for violating state election laws. The voter mobilization effort is being led 

by an ACORN official under indictment in Nevada for conspiracy to violate election laws. Project Vote is also working with "rebranded" ACORN state chapters 

that are waiting to reemerge after the November election. ACORN is expanding 

overseas to shake down Wal-Mart and other U.S. businesses in emerging markets like India. Will the federal ban on grants to ACORN be renewed? Stay 

tuned. 

Like a zombie in a horror movie, ACORN is alive! The Association of Community 

Organizations for Reform Now staged an elaborate prank on April Fool's Day 

by pretending to die. That's when chief organizer Bertha Lewis said the group 

planned to dissolve its national structure. But ACORN remains in business and 
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Lewis continues to send out direct mail solicitations for funds. (ACORN was 

profiled in the November 2008 editions of Foundation Watch and Labor 

Watch.) 

ACORN closed many of its offices, but Lewis is working with a skeleton staff to 

reorganize the empire of leftist activism. Investigators for the House Oversight 

and Government Reform Committee say Lewis is consolidating power and 

hoarding the group's assets. They estimate that ACORN has $20 million in cash 

in more than 800 bank accounts and that its affiliates hold another $10 million. 

While ACORN currently operates below the radar, it plans to resurface under a 

new name after the upcoming elections, according to activist John Atlas, author of Seeds of Change, a book sympathetic to ACORN. Meanwhile, ACORN 

chapters in at least 13 states and the District of Columbia are changing their 

names and seeking separate nonprofit status as 501c4 advocacy groups. (See 

ACORN Rebranding Chart at page 5.) 

Atlas elaborated on ACORN's plan during a panel discussion in June at the 

left-wing "America's Future Now" conference. "The good news is that a lot of 

people who were involved in ACORN, members and leaders as well as their allies, are organizing in over a dozen states to resurrect ACORN using its model, 

focusing on the same constituency, learning from ACORN's strengths as well 

as its mistakes. So it is happening." 

Project Vote: Amassing Money and Preparing for 2012 

Project Vote, ACORN's scandal-plagued voter mobilization division, remains 

open for business. Project Vote has been part of the ACORN network since at 

least 1992 when Barack Obama ran its highly successful Illinois voter drive to 
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elect Democrat Carol Moseley Braun to the U.S. Senate. Project Vote continues 

to operate out of ACORN's Washington, D.C. headquarters, which earlier this 

year hosted a meeting at which another "new" ACORN group was organized. 

The group, Communities United, is active in the District of Columbia and Maryland. 

Inside sources say Project Vote is lying low during the current election cycle 

and plans to return in full force for President Obama's reelection campaign in 

2012. Earlier this year I was told that Project Vote was having a banner year 

despite ACORN's troubles and may be raking in more money than in 2008. According to its 2008 tax return, Project Vote (formal name: Voting for America 

Inc.) received $14,635,002 in contributions and grants that year. 

Project Vote says it is working with at least eight groups on voter mobilization 

drives in battleground states. One of those groups is Pennsylvania Neighborhoods for Social Justice (PNSJ), a "new" group operating out of ACORN's offices 

on Philadelphia's North Broad Street. 

Longtime ACORN national board member Carol Hemingway is on the board of 

PNSJ and its sister nonprofit, Pennsylvania Communities Organizing for 

Change (PCOC). Both non profits filed their incorporation documents on Jan. 8, 

2010. 

Not until long after the 2010 elections will we learn whether Project Vote 

matched its earlier $14 million war chest and how it used the money. That's 

because nonprofit tax returns generally don't become public until one or two 

years after they file with the IRS. 

Guess Who's Running ACORN's Voter Drive? 
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Amy Busefink is an ACORN employee who is currently under indictment in Nevada for violating election laws. Guess what? She is leading Project Vote's 

2010 get out the vote (GOTV) drive. 

Her official Project Vote biography says: 

"As Project Vote's Field Director, Amy Busefink is responsible for the development and execution of field activities across Project Vote's many program areas. Working with the Election Administration program, she works to develop 

field strategies for moving issues in several states, including the preregistration of 16 and 17-year-old citizens and voter registration on high school campuses. Over the last two years, Ms. Busefink has participated in the successful 

fight against legislation that creates barriers to voters, including photo ID efforts in Missouri. She continues to develop voter participation and voter registration field programs, utilizing new and exciting technology for Get-Outthe-Vote efforts." 

The bio adds that Busefink "came to Project Vote as its national voter registration director in June 2006, when she assumed responsibility for Project 

Vote's 2006 voter registration program." She also "ran field operations for 

Project Votes [sic] 2008 voter registration program, which collected 1.1 million 

applications." [emphasis added] 

Well, yes, ACORN and Project Vote did collect more than one million voter registration applications in 2008, but one detail is missing: 400,000 applications 

"were rejected by election officials for a variety of reasons, including duplicate registrations, incomplete forms and fraudulent submissions." (New York 

Times, Oct. 24, 2008) 
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Why does Project Vote acknowledge on its website that a potential felon is 

running its GOTV effort? Perhaps ACORN thinks no one will notice that she has 

been indicted for criminal election law violations in Nevada. 

Busefink came to the attention of authorities in October 2008 when Nevada 

law enforcement officials executed a warrant to seize computers and documents in ACORN's Las Vegas office. In May 2009, Nevada's Attorney General, 

Catherine Cortez Masto, and Secretary of State Ross Miller, both Democrats, 

made public voter registration-related charges against two senior ACORN employees-Busefink, ACORN's deputy regional director at the time, and Christopher Edwards, then ACORN's Las Vegas field director. Both were implicated in 

a massive conspiracy in which they and ACORN as a corporate entity were 

charged with violating election law. Edwards pleaded guilty and has turned 

state's evidence. At the time of writing, the trial against ACORN and Busefink 

was scheduled to begin on Nov. 26, 2010. 

ACORN complained that the raid was a "stunt" calculated to frustrate efforts 

to register minority voters. The group further said that it was following strict 

quality assurance procedures to detect fraudulent registrations, a boast that 

Las Vegas chief elections officer Larry Lomax called "pathetic." Lomax pointed 

out that ACORN gave voter registration jobs to 59 inmates from a work-release 

program and that several of the inmates who were made voter registration 

supervisors had gone to prison for identity theft. 

The state's charges list 26 felony counts of voter fraud and 13 of providing unlawful extra compensation to those registering voters, a practice forbidden 

under Nevada law because it incentivizes fraud. The complaint says voter registration canvassers were paid between $8 and $9 an hour and that their continued employment was conditioned on registering a quota of20 voters per 

shift. 
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"From July 27 through Oct. 2 ACORN also provided additional compensation 

under a bonus program called 'Blackjack' or '21+' that was based on the total 

number of voters a person registered." Canvassers bringing in 21 or more 

completed forms per day would receive a $5 bonus. The complaint says Edwards created the illegal bonus scheme and that "ACORN timesheets indicate 

that corporate officers of ACORN were aware of the Blackjack bonus program 

and failed to take immediate action to stop it." 

Starting later this month Project Vote will have some explaining to do. 

Groups that Work with Project Vote 

Project Vote says that in 2010 it is "working with community-based nonprofit 

leaders to reach low-propensity voters in Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, 

Florida, Kentucky, Illinois, Michigan, Missouri, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, and 

Wisconsin." 

Besides the rebranded and newly incorporated ACORN group Pennsylvania 

Neighborhoods for Social Justice, Project Vote's partner groups this year are 

the Colorado Progressive Coalition, Florida Consumer Action Network, Jobs 

with Justice, Michigan Forward, Missouri ProVote, Ohio Voice, and Wisconsin 

Voices. They represent a cross-section of the kind of groups that will do whatever it takes to expand the base of left-wing voters. 

*Colorado Progressive Coalition 
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A well-organized and well-funded infrastructure of "progressive" organizations is responsible for Republicans' fall from power in Colorado, reports former state representative Rob Witwer in his book The Blueprint: How the Democrats Won Colorado (and Why Republicans Everywhere Should Care). The Colorado Progressive Coalition is an important part of that infrastructure. Big donors to the group include the Tides Foundation ($302,500 since 2001), Needmor Fund ($180,000 since 1999), and Gill Foundation ($174,800 since 2003). 

*Florida Consumer Action Network (FCAN) 

FCAN is another left-leaning but much smaller state coalition of grassroots 

groups affiliated with the Consumer Federation of America and US Action. The 

group insists that voter fraud is a myth. "It just simply does not happen" said 

FCAN director Bill Newton, who argues that requiring people to produce identification when they vote is racist. "The intent is keeping certain people from 

voting," he has said. FCAN is an active supporter of Florida Amendments 5 and 

6, ballot initiatives funded by liberal special interests, including ACORN, to redraw state legislative districts. 

*Jobs with Justice Education Fund 

This front group for organized labor reports $1.6 million in 2009 annual revenue, which allows director Sarita Gupta to organize protests and demonstrations against "corporate greed." It lists as "Friends & Allies" ACORN, the late 

Saul Alinsky's Industrial Areas Foundation, Rev. Jim Wallis's Sojourners magazine, the Association of Trial Lawyers of America, and the small 'c' communist 

National Lawyers Guild and Center for Constitutional Rights. 
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Big JwJ funders include the Ford Foundation ($1,780,000 since 2002), Rockefeller Foundation ($1,685,000 since 2000), and the Nathan Cummings Foundation 

($1 million since 2001). The Woods Fund of Chicago, whose past board members include Barack Obama and Bill Ayers, has given Jobs with Justice $60,000 

since 2005. 

*Michigan Forward 

Founded in Detroit in 2008, Michigan Forward aims to be an urban think tank, 

an unlikely partner in Project Vote's GOTV drive. In late 2009 it reported it had 

not yet received tax-exempt status from the IRS. 

*Missouri ProVote 

ACORN is listed as a "board member" on the 2008 tax return of the Missouri 

Progressive Voter Coalition, coalition of 40 community groups and labor unions. Other board members include Americans for Democratic Action, Planned 

Parenthood, and units of AFSCME, the American Federation of Teachers, Communications Workers of America, SEIU, and the Teamsters. The Tides Foundation has given Missouri ProVote $20,000 since 2000. 

Like ACORN, Missouri ProVote is a magnet for vote fraud felons and political 

extremists. Deidra Humphrey, who registered voters for ACORN and Missouri 

ProVote in 2008, was convicted of mail fraud for forging voter registration 

cards for nursing home residents. Tony Pecinovsky, a ProVote St. Louis area 

board member, is also Missouri/Kansas District Organizer of the Communist 

Party USA, in addition to his work with Jobs with Justice and the Communications Workers of America. 
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*State Voices 

An umbrella group for 600 left-wing organizations in 16 states, State Voices 

was founded in 2005 by "state and local organizations dedicated to winning 

shared policy and civic engagement victories and building long-term power." 

One notable member of its board is Ken Grossinger, a protege of Marxist academic Richard Cloward, who with his wife Frances Fox Piven devised the strategy bearing their names that seeks to flood government with impossible demands in order to force a radical transformation of society. Grossinger is also 

on the board of Social Policy, an ACORN magazine, and he helped to found the 

Committees of Correspondence, a Communist Party USA (CPUSA) splinter 

group. He was previously director of legislative field operations for the AFLCIO and is now executive director of the CrossCurrents Foundation. (See Foundation Watch, October 2010) 

State Voices has received grants totaling $932,100 from the Tides Foundation 

(since 2004) and $100,000 from George Soros's Open Society Institute (2007). It 

received grants totaling $3.4 million from the Beldon Fund, a leftist grantmaker founded by the founders of Steelcase office furniture. The Fund voluntarily 

ceased operations in May 2009. During its 10-year existence, it distributed 

$120 million in grants, including $1 million to ACORN and $250,000 to the 

American Institute for Social justice, an ACORN affiliate (2006). 

*Ohio Voices 
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Once called the Center for Civic Participation, Ohio Voice is part of State Voices. Interim director Gregory T. Moore is president of GTM Consulting Services 

LLC, a "political consulting firm that specializes in program development, public-policy analysis and election services," according to the State Voices website. GTM's clients include the Democratic National Committee's Voting Rights 

Institute and SEIU. Moore was formerly chief of staff and legislative director to 

House Judiciary Committee chairman Rep. John Conyers (D-Mich.) as well as 

executive director of the NAACP National Voter Fund, whose program was 

plagued by voter registration fraud. 

*Wisconsin Voices 

The director of this State Voices affiliate is Linda Honold, previously chairman 

of the Wisconsin Democratic Party and an executive director of Citizen Action 

of Wisconsin. 

"Rebranding" ACORN 

ACORN state affiliates have been rapidly changing their names and filing new 

nonprofit applications with the IRS to avoid the taint of the multiple scandals 

that have weakened ACORN. For instance, ACORN's California chapter quickly 

rebranded itselfthe Alliance of Californians for Community Empowerment 

(ACCE). Clearly, it wants to keep the tax dollars and foundation grants flowing 

into its coffers. The chapter, which boasts 37,000 dues-paying members, is 

critical to the ACORN empire. 
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ACCE claims that it is "up and running as an independent state-wide organization with no legal, financial or structural ties to ACORN." We know ACCE is lying. 

How do we know this? For starters, ACCE's executive director is Amy Schur. 

Schur is a loyal20-plus year ACORN employee who has shown her willingness 

to get her hands dirty for the cause. Marcel Reid, a former member of ACORN's 

national board, said Schur is corrupt and hopelessly tainted. "If there was 

true reform, why would Amy Schur be the head of ACCEr she said. 

Reid, who with other ACORN whistleblowers formed a group called ACORN 8, 

was expelled from ACORN in 2008 when she tried to investigate a nearly $1 

million embezzlement by founder Wade Rathke's brother who was in charge of 

the group's finances. According to the ACORN 8, Schur participated in an 

eight-year long cover-up of the theft whose exposure in 2008led to Rathke's 

ouster. Not long after the theft became public knowledge the group's major financial backers, including the Catholic Campaign for Human Development, 

publicly severed their ties to ACORN. 

Insiders say Schur has intimate knowledge of how ACORN operates. Schur has 

been in charge of the group's national campaigns and may testify in November in Nevada when ACORN goes on trial for illegally paying canvassers bo- , 

nuses to register Nevada voters in the 2008 presidential campaign. Under 

cross-examination Schur may be forced to unearth many of the group's skeletons. 

ACCE registered with the California secretary of state's office on Dec. 8, the 

day after an "independent" review by former Massachusetts Attorney General 

Scott Harshbarger claimed to clear ACORN of wrongdoing. Interestingly, ACCE's 

office address is 3655 S. Grand Ave., Suite 250, Los Angeles 90007. That address happens to be the address of California ACORN's headquarters. 
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ACORN is a tangled mess of interlocking directorates and affiliated tax-exempt groups. But there is no reason to believe ACCE won't be centrally controlled by ACORN, just as other ACORN affiliates are. 

Sleight-of-hand is how ACORN always does business. It plays a game of musical chairs. When an affiliate does something admirable, ACORN emphasizes its 

ties. When an affiliate does something wrong, ACORN plays dumb. Its byzantine structure lets it claim plausible deniability. 

Such chicanery is standard operating procedure at ACORN, according to the 

group's lawyer Elizabeth Kingsley. In an internal legal memo in 2008 Kingsley 

described the hoops that ACORN jumps through to create the fa~ade that its 

affiliates are independent of each other. 

Key ACORN affiliates argue that they are not "'affiliated,' 'related,' or 'controlled' by or with each other, for various legal purposes, while allowing actual 

control to be exercised in a highly coordinated manner," she wrote. ACORN 

has "an organizational culture that resembles a family business more than an 

accountable organization." 

Longtime ACORN ally Rep. Maxine Waters (D·Calif.) has welcomed ACCE to the 

community organizing fold. But Fannie Brown, a former California state delegate on ACORN's national board, is skeptical of the "new" group. "They started 

washing it a little bit and then they poured some bleach on it and kind of polished it up a little more to make it look good," said Brown, who with Reid is a 

member of ACORN 8. 

Congress's Ban on Funding ACORN Lapses 
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ACORN Housing is the ACORN network's primary vehicle for getting its hands 

on federal tax dollars, and it too recently acquired a new name: Affordable 

Housing Centers of America. But in September federal investigators recommended that by whatever name it operates government funding for it be cut 

off immediately. The inspector general for the Department of Housing and Urban Development found that ACORN Housing could not account for millions of 

dollars in federal grants and appeared to have committed massive fraud. 

The investigators must have felt it was necessary to urge a speedy funding 

cutoff because the federal government's prohibition on funding ACORN is not 

a permanent ban. Because the ban was attached to annual appropriations 

bills it ran out at the end of September. 

Many Americans -and some lawmakers-believe Congress permanently cut off 

ACORN from funding last year, but this belief is unfounded. Quirks of parliamentary procedure and the complexity of the appropriations process explain 

the confusion. The funding ban that passed in fall2009 is contained in legislation that covers only the fiscal year that ended on September 30 (i.e. Public 

Law 111-68). 

That the funding ban is not permanent was first noticed by ACORN's lawyers 

and by Judge Roger). Miner. Miner was the appellate court judge who in August overturned Judge Nina Gershon's perverse ruling that Congress's funding 

ban was unconstitutional because it punished ACORN without a trial. Miner 

noticed that all the appropriations laws passed by Congress that prohibited 

grants to ACORN "or any of its affiliates, subsidiaries, or allied organizations" 

applied only to federal spending that ended on Sept. 30, 2010. 

Stop-gap legislation signed into law by President Obama on Sept. 30 that allows the government to continue spending money until new appropriations 

are passed by Congress does not contain the ACORN funding ban. The Trans-
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portation-HUD appropriations bill does prohibit funding for ACORN during the 

fiscal year that begins on Oct. 1, 2010, but it's anyone guess whether lawmakers will pass the bill during the current "lame duck" session with the ACORN 

funding ban intact. 

The Obama Administration Stonewalls 

Meanwhile, the Obama administration is stonewalling Capital Research Center's Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request that seeks correspondence 

between HUD Secretary Shaun Donovan and ACORN. HUD rules state that FOIA 

requests must be answered within 45 days but our request has been pending 

for seven months. 

The request was filed because Donovan is a longtime ally of ACORN. He 

worked closely with ACORN for five years when he was New York mayor Michael Bloomberg's housing development commissioner. 

"Perhaps no administration official has had more interaction with Acorn than" 

Donovan, the New York Times reported (Oct. 16, 2009). ACORN chief organizer 

Bertha Lewis admitted as much. "We grew to respect him, and he grew torespect us." 

Donovan has remained silent about his relationship with ACORN. 

ACORN-and Wade Rathke-Go Worldwide 

Whatever happens to ACORN stateside, the group's overseas affiliates are 

thriving- with the help of the Obama administration. 
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Earlier this year the Obama administration helped the group spread the gospel of left-wing community organizing in India. President Obama's ambassador to India, Timothy J. Roemer, met with ACORN India's representative Vikram 

Adige and lent his name and the prestige of the U.S. government to Adige's efforts to organize rag-pickers in Mumbai (formerly known as Bombay). Roemer 

is a former Democratic congressman who represented an Indiana district. 

ACORN India reports to ACORN International, which also has a new name: 

Community Organizations International. ACORN International is as an umbrella organization for the various national organizations conducting ACORN's 

business outside the U.S. Its Facebook website describes the group's mission 

as "building community groups in low income communities across the world 

to organize for power." In reality, the group was created to allow ACORN to apply its corporate shakedown techniques against Western corporations as they 

expand into rapidly developing markets such as India. 

ACORN International is active in Argentina, Canada, Dominican Republic, Honduras, India, Kenya, Mexico, and Peru. 

ACORN International is headed by ACORN founder Wade Rathke. Like a 

modern-day Karl Marx in exile, Rathke is doing his best to redistribute wealth 

around the globe using the shakedown techniques he mastered in the U.S. 

"Countries like India are the next frontiers of significant market expansion for 

multi-national corporations; and these corporations are now starting to apply 

extreme pressure on the government of India for unfettered access," says the 

ACORN India website. "[The] Indian market is facing an onslaught of both foreign and domestic corporate retailers, the most notable of which is Walmart." 
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ACORN has long set its sights on Wal-Mart, which like ACORN, was founded in 

Arkansas. ACORN created an affiliate, WARN (Wal-Mart Alliance for Reform 

Now), specifically to organize unions in Wai-Mart stores. 

Rathke has traveled extensively in India using the same aggressive, in-yourface organizing tactics that ACORN uses in the U.S. ACORN India's website says 

the group helps to defend the "socialist legacy" of Jawaharlal Nehru, prime 

minister of India from 1947 to 1964. That legacy is "now in danger from the onslaught of the march of global corporatism." 

ACORN's national board fired Rathke as its "chief organizer" in June 2008 after 

discovering his role in covering-up his brother's $1 million embezzlement of 

ACORN funds. But this separation is belied by Rathke's ongoing involvement 

in ACORN International, another entity supposedly "independent" of ACORN. 

Rathke also remains publisher of ACORN's periodical, Social Policy magazine, 

and he is chief organizer of United labor Unions local100 in Louisiana, Arkansas, and Texas, a position he has held since 1979. The union local disaffiliated from the Service Employees International Union last fall. 

"For better or worse, Rathke plans on spending the remaining years of his life 

implementing his ACORN vision to an organization that will have influence the 

world over," Chicago-based blogger Michael Volpe wrote last month. 

"When asked if he thought his name would one day be used like Alinsky, as a 

verb in community organizing, Rathke simply responded, 'yes.'" 

Matthew Vadum is Editor of Organization Trends. 

OT 
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Question#: I 

Topic: Documents 

Hearing: Cyber-securing the Vote: Ensuring the Integrity of the U.S. Election System 

Primary: The Honorable Elijah E. Cummings 

Committee: OVERSIGHT & GOY RFORM (HOUSE) 

Question: On October 20, 2017, Rep. Robin Kelly, the Ranking Member of the 

Subcommittee on Information Technology, and I sent a letter to the Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS) requesting copies of all documents "related to the Russian 

government-backed attempts to hack state election systems." On November 28, 2017, 

DHS responded by producing just one e-mail with a short script that Department 

employees apparently read over the phone to state election officials. This script is 13 

sentences long and does not refer to any specific state or attack. 

On November 29, 2017, you testified at a joint subcommittee hearing on the 

"Cybersccurity of Voting Machines" and assured Members that DHS would provide 

additional documents relating to Russian hacking of state election systems in 2016. 

To follow-up, the Subcommittees sent official Questions for the Record on January 3, 

2018, with a letter signed by both Subcommittee Chairmen Will Hurd and Gary J. 

Palmer. That letter requested "all documents related to the Russian government-backed 

attempts to monitor, penetrate, or hack state election systems during the presidential 

election campaign of2016." 

On February 6, 2018, DHS provided only 50 pages of documents with information about 

how DHS officials learned about the Russian-backed attacks and communicated with 

states. Most of the production consisted of publicly available documents. This 

production did not include any classified documents, nor did it include documents 

relating to the precise nature of these attacks, the number oftimes these states were 

targeted, or when they were targeted. 

Please produce copies of all documents, including classified documents, related to 

Russian government-backed attempts to monitor, penetrate, or hack state election systems 

during the presidential election campaign of2016, including but not limited to: the tools 

the attackers used; the tactics they utilized; communications within DHS or between DHS 

and other federal, state, or local government entities regarding this Russian activity; and 

the results of your conversations with states regarding this Russian activity, and the steps 

you took to follow-up. 

If there are any responsive documents that you will not produce, please provide a brief 

description of each document and the specific reason for withholding each document. 
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Question#: I 

Topic: Documents 

Hearing: Cyber-securing the Vote: Ensuring the Integrity of the U.S. Election System 

Primary: The Honorable Elijah E. Cummings 

Committee: OVERSIGHT & GOY RFORM (HOUSE) 

Response: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has provided significant 

documentation to the Committee regarding the 2016 election. DHS has met with 

Committee staiTto walk through the documents provided by DHS and to answer 

additional questions about what occurred in 2016. DHS will continue to meet with the 

Committee and answer questions to ensure the Committee has a full understanding of 

what occurred. However, it is not appropriate for DHS to share documents ovmed by 

other departments or non-federal entities, whether they are unclassified, contain 

investigative law enforcement information, or are classified intelligence products. DHS 

recommends the Committee should continue to engage with other relevant federal and 

non-federal entities to obtain the relevant information that they ovvn and that is of interest 

to the Committee. 
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Question#: 2 

Topic: Cybersecurity Coordinator 

Hearing: Cyber-securing the Vote: Ensuring the Integrity of the U.S. Election System 

Primary: The Honorable Elijah E. Cummings 

Committee: OVERSIGHT & GOY RFORM (HOUSE) 

Question: At the hearing, you testified that, separate from the eliminated position of 

Cybersecurity Coordinator, "there are cybersecurity directors and senior directors in the 

National Security CounciL" 

In what ways do those individuals coordinate interagency election security efforts? 

How do their responsibilities compare with those of the Cybersecurity Coordinator before 

that position was eliminated? 

Response: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) coordinates regularly with the 

White House and other Federal agencies on national security matters. DHS's roles and 

responsibilities arc defined by statutes, executive orders, and Presidential policies and 

strategies. Changes to the National Security Council staff related to the Cybersecurity 

Coordinator position have had no impact on DHS's ability to execute its mission. 

Previously, the Senior Directors for Cybersecurity reported to the Cybersecurity 

Coordinator, and those positions remain today. DHS defers to the National Security 

Council to define the responsibilities of the Senior Directors and Directors. The 

President has provided clear direction to DHS and other national security agencies, 

stating that they are empowered and expected to execute their authorities and 

responsibilities. Since the creation of the position, the interagency processes have 

matured considerably. DHS and our interagency partners continue to coordinate 

regularly, either through the National Security Council staff on policy matters or through 

operational centers for day-to-day operations. 
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Hearing: Cyber-securingthe Vote: Ensuring the Integrity of the U.S. Election System 

Primary: The 

Question: Separate from general guidance or direction about election security, what 

specific direction has President Trump provided to you or, to your knowledge, Secretary 

Kirstjen M. Nielsen on taking steps to protect our elections from Russian interference? 

Response: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is focused on protecting our 

elections from interference by Russia or other malicious actors. The President has made 

it clear that his Administration will not tolerate foreign interference in our elections from 

any nation state or other malicious actor. The Administration is focused on working with 

state and local election officials to ensure that every American's vote counts and is 

counted correctly. The President reiterated that election security is national security. The 

Administration will continue to provide the support necessary to the owners of election 

systems state and local govermnents - to secure their election processes. 
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Question#: 4 

Topic: POCs 

Hearing: Cyber-securing the Vote: Ensuring the Integrity of the U.S. Election System 

Primary: The Honorable Elijah E. Cummings 

Committee: OVERSIGHT & GOY RFORM (HOUSE) 

Question: Please provide the name and position of your primary point(s) of contact in the 

White House on cybersecurity matters and election security matters, including 

individuals working for or serving on the National Security Council. 

Response: Senior leadership of the Department and I regularly interact with the National 

Security Advisor, Ambassador John Bolton, and his direct reports on the National 

Security Council staff. 
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Question#: 5 

Topic: Work with Cybersecurity Coordinator 

Hearing: Cyber-securing the Vote: Ensuring the Integrity of the U.S. Election System 

Primary: The Honorable Elijah E. Cummings 

Committee: OVERSIGHT & GOY RFORM (HOUSE) 

Question: Please describe your office's work with then-White House Cybersecurity 

Coordinator Rob Joyce prior to the elimination of that position in April2018. 

In what ways has the decision to eliminate the position of White House Cybersecurity 

Coordinator affected or changed your office's interaction and work with the White 

House? 

Response: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) coordinates regularly with the 

White House and other federal agencies on national security matters. DHS's roles and 

responsibilities are defined by statutes, executive orders, and Presidential policies and 

strategies. DHS worked well with Cybersecurity Coordinator Rob Joyce when he served 

on the National Security Council staff, and our work with the National Security Council 

has not changed since his departure. Changes to the National Security Council stati 

related to the Cybersecurity Coordinator position have had no impact on OilS's ability to 

execute its mission.