96-696

 No. 96-696

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

 

 1997

BRIAN PARINI,

 Plaintiff and Appellant,

 v.

MISSOULA COUNTY HIGH SCHOOL, DISTRICT NO. 1, and the 

following agents/employees, MIKE FREDRICKSON, MARK WRIGHT, 

NICK CARTER, JAY CHRISTOPHER, GINGER BILILE, JERRY 

PEASE, DICK GUILIANI, ROD BATES, TONY MARINO, 

LORA MEHRER, TEDDY MALOOF, and JOHN FREDERIKSON,

 Defendants & Respondents.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District,

 In and for the County of Missoula,

 The Honorable Diane G. Barz, Judge presiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

 For Appellant:

 Mark E. Jones, Attorney at Law, Missoula, Montana

 For Respondents:

 Molly Shepherd; Worden, Thane & Haines;

 Missoula, Montana

 Submitted on Briefs: May 1, 1997

 Decided: July 3, 1997

Filed:

 __________________________________________

 Clerk

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 Justice Terry N. Trieweiler delivered the opinion of the Court.

 The appellant, Brian Parini, filed a complaint in the District Court for the 

Fourth

Judicial District in Missoula County in which he: (1) appealed the Office of Public

Instruction's determination that he was not denied a free appropriate public 

education; and

(2) asserted an independent claim in which he alleged that the respondents, Missoula

County High School District No. 1 and twelve of its employees, negligently misplaced

and misdiagnosed him as a special education student. The District Court affirmed the

Office of Public Instruction's decision and dismissed the negligent misplacement and

misdiagnosis claim. Parini appeals. We affirm the judgment of the District Court.

 The following issues are presented on appeal:

 1. Did the District Court err when it affirmed the Office of Public

Instruction's determination that Brian Parini was not denied a free appropriate 

public

education?

 2. Did the District Court err when it dismissed Brian Parini's negligent

misdiagnosis and misplacement claim?

 FACTUAL BACKGROUND

 In 1989, when he was in the seventh grade, Brian Parini was diagnosed with a

learning disability. He had previously been diagnosed with Attention Deficit 

Disorder. 

On that basis, school officials determined that he was eligible for special education

services pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). 

 The IDEA provides that disabled children are entitled to receive a free 

appropriate

public education ("FAPE"), see 20 U.S.C. 1400(c); mandates that an individualized

education plan ("IEP") be formulated for each eligible child, see 20 U.S.C. 

1401(a)(18)(D); and sets forth procedural safeguards and remedial provisions to 

ensure

that disabled children receive adequate educational opportunities, see 20 U.S.C. 

1415. 

 In 1994, Rose Parini, Brian's mother, filed a petition with the Office of Public

Instruction ("OPI") pursuant to the IDEA. The petition alleged that school 

officials failed

to properly test and evaluate Brian and that, as a result, he was denied a FAPE. 

After

a due process hearing, however, the OPI determined that he was not denied a FAPE.

 Parini subsequently filed a complaint in the District Court in which he: (1)

appealed the OPI's decision; and (2) asserted an independent cause of action in 

which he

alleged that the School District and twelve of its employees negligently 

misdiagnosed and

misplaced him as a special education student. He claimed, therefore, that he is 

entitled

to relief pursuant to the IDEA's remedial provisions and to compensatory damages. 

The

District Court dismissed Parini's negligent misdiagnosis and misplacement claim and

affirmed the OPI's decision.

 ISSUE 1

 Did the District Court err when it affirmed the Office of Public Instruction's

determination that Brian Parini was not denied a free appropriate public education?

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 Rose Parini filed a petition with the OPI in which she contended that Brian was

denied a FAPE. After an extensive hearing, the OPI concluded that the "IDEA does not

require a school district to maximize the potential of a child with a disability but 

only to

assure that the child receives an appropriate education reasonably calculated to 

enable him

or her to receive educational benefit." Additionally, the OPI made the following

findings:

 7. The absence of a complete three-year comprehensive re-evaluation of

 [Brian] constitutes a procedural flaw or inadequacy under IDEA. [Brian's]

 own conduct is likely to have caused or contributed to the inadequacy. 

 8. The absence of a . . . re-evaluation did not result in [Brian's] loss of

 educational opportunity. His IEP's continued to be constructed on

 informed, particularized assessments of his needs, abilities and

 performance. The October 1993 WORC Center evaluation and the July

 1994 evaluation of Dr. Wollersheim establish that no causal link exists

 between the absence of the re-evaluation and the educational opportunity

 afforded [Brian]. There is no evidence that his IEP's would have been

 constructed differently if a complete three-year re-evaluation had been

 conducted in 1991-1992.

 9. The absence of a . . . re-evaluation also did not materially infringe upon

 [Rose Parini's] opportunity to participate in the process of formulating

 IEP's for [Brian]. With the assistance of experts, advocates and attorneys,

 as well as her own extensive research, she has played a pivotal role in the

 development of [Brian's] IEP's. In particular, she and [Brian's] advocate

 were instrumental in formulating the November 30, 1993 IEP . . . . 

 On that basis, the OPI determined that Parini received an educational benefit 

and

that, therefore, the School District did not deny him a FAPE. 

 Parini subsequently appealed the OPI's decision to the District Court. The 

court

determined that it "can set aside OPI's ruling only after giving due weight to the

administrative disposition and finding the aggrieved party has proved by a 

preponderance

of the evidence the administrative disposition was erroneous." After a hearing, the 

court

made the following findings and conclusions:

 [Brian] contends that the School District failed to provide a FAPE

 because it did not complete a comprehensive evaluation. The School

 District argues that evaluations were not completed because [Brian] was

 uncooperative. Although [Brian] argues that placing him with emotionally

 disturbed students denied him a FAPE, there is no evidence to support this

 claim. The preponderance of the evidence shows that the School District

 made numerous good faith efforts to create an IEP for Brian, but members

 of the team were never able to come to an agreement with [Brian and

 Rose]. Moreover, the testimony at the administrative hearing showed that

 [Brian] received 'some education benefit', which is the substantive standard

 for FAPE. Alamo Heights Indep. School Dist. v. State Bd. of Educ., 790

 F.2d 1153 (5th Cir. 1986). The preponderance of the evidence also shows

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 [Rose] participated extensively in the IEP formulation process. Therefore,

 [Brian] has failed to show that the administrative disposition was erroneous.

 Parini maintains that the District Court erred when it affirmed the OPI's 

decision. 

On appeal to this Court, he claims, as he did before the District Court, that the 

School

District: (1) failed to properly test and evaluate him; (2) improperly placed him 

with

emotionally disturbed students; and (3) failed to administer a comprehensive threeyear

evaluation pursuant to 20 U.S.C. 1412(5)(C) and 34 C.F.R. 300.534. On that 

basis,

he asserts that he was denied a FAPE. 

 The IDEA entitles disabled children to a FAPE. See 20 U.S.C. 1400(c). 

According to the United States Supreme Court, a FAPE "consists of educational

instruction specially designed to meet the unique needs of the handicapped child,

supported by such services as are necessary to permit the child 'to benefit' from the

instruction." Board of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Central School Dist. v. Rowley 

(1982),

458 U.S. 176, 188-89, 102 S. Ct. 3034, 3042, 73 L. Ed. 2d 690, 701. Moreover, the

Court concluded that the IDEA does not obligate a state to maximize each disabled 

child's

potential; rather, the IDEA requires a "basic floor of opportunity," "sufficient to 

confer

some educational benefit upon the handicapped child." Rowley, 458 U.S. at 200-01.

 The IDEA's "basic floor of opportunity" is achieved for each individual child

through: (1) the completion of an evaluation every three years pursuant to 20 U.S.

C. 

1412(5)(C) and 34 C.F.R. 300.534; and (2) the establishment of an IEP pursuant to 

20

U.S.C. 1401(a)(18)(D). An IEP is a written plan which incorporates the placement

decisions made by the child's IEP team of school authorities, the child's parents, 

and

other knowledgeable persons. See 20 U.S.C. 1401(a)(20). Additionally, Congress

devised procedural safeguards and remedial provisions to ensure full parental 

participation

and the proper resolution of substantive disagreements. See 20 U.S.C. 1415. 

 Furthermore, the IDEA, specifically 20 U.S.C. 1415(e), governs judicial review

of the OPI's decisions:

 (1) A decision made in a [due process] hearing conducted [by a state

 educational agency] shall be final, except that any party involved in such

 hearing may appeal such decision under the provisions of . . . paragraph (2)

 of this subsection . . . .

 (2) Any party aggrieved by the findings and decision made [in a due

 process hearing conducted by a state educational agency] . . . shall have the

 right to bring a civil action with respect to the complaint presented pursuant

 to this section, which action may be brought in any State court of competent

 jurisdiction . . . . In any action brought under this paragraph the court shall

 receive the records of the administrative proceedings, shall hear additional

 evidence at the request of a party, and, basing its decision on the

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 preponderance of the evidence, shall grant such relief as the court

 determines is appropriate.

 In Rowley, the Supreme Court interpreted 20 U.S.C. 1415(e), and concluded that

reviewing courts are required to engage in the following two-part inquiry: 

 First, has the State complied with the procedures set forth in [IDEA]? And

 second, is the individualized educational program developed through the

 Act's procedures reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive

 educational benefits? If these requirements are met, the State has complied

 with the obligations imposed by Congress and the courts can require no

 more.

Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206-07; see also Town of Burlington v. Department of Educ. (1st

Cir. 1984), 736 F.2d 773, 788 ("[t]he ultimate question for a court under the Act is

whether a proposed IEP is adequate and appropriate for a particular child at a given 

point

in time").

 Federal case law recognizes, and Parini concedes in his brief, that procedural 

flaws

in the development of an IEP do not necessarily require a finding that a disabled 

child has

been denied a FAPE. See, e.g., Independent Sch. Dist. No. 283 v. S.D. (8th Cir. 

1996),

88 F.3d 556, 562. Rather, a FAPE is denied when procedural flaws result in the

disabled child's loss of an educational opportunity or seriously infringe a parent's

opportunity to participate in the process of formulating the IEP. See W.G. v. Board 

of

Trustees of Target Range Sch. Dist. (9th Cir. 1992), 960 F.2d 1479, 1484; Burke 

County

Bd. of Educ. v. Denton (4th Cir. 1990), 895 F.2d 973, 982; Roland M. v. Concord Sch.

Comm. (1st Cir. 1990), 910 F.2d 983, 994.

 The Supreme Court, in Rowley, concluded that judicial review of actions filed

pursuant to the IDEA includes a substantive review and, therefore, is not limited to 

the

issue of whether a state has complied with the IDEA's procedural requirements. The

Court, however, rejected the proposition that the IDEA confers upon courts broad 

powers

to disturb the placement and policy decisions made by state and local school 

officials:

 [T]he provision that a reviewing court base its decision on the

 'preponderance of the evidence' is by no means an invitation to the courts

 to substitute their own notions of sound educational policy for those of the

 school authorities which they review.

Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206. The Court also recognized that 20 U.S.C. 1415(e) requires

a reviewing court to receive the records of the underlying administrative proceeding 

and,

on that basis, concluded that Congress intended that "due weight" be given to the

administrative proceeding. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206. Additionally, the party who

challenges an administrative decision in an IDEA action bears the burden of proving 

by

a preponderance of the evidence that the decision is erroneous. See Board of Educ. 

of

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Murphysboro v. Illinois Bd. of Educ. (7th Cir. 1994), 41 F.3d 1162, 1167. 

 Therefore, when an appellate court reviews a lower court's findings of fact in 

an

IDEA action, the appellate court is required to uphold those findings unless they are

clearly erroneous. Yankton Sch. Dist. v. Schramm (8th Cir. 1996), 93 F.3d 1369, 

1374;

Light v. Parkway C-2 Sch. Dist. (8th Cir. 1994), 41 F.3d 1223, 1229. When an 

appellate

court reviews a lower court's conclusions of law in an IDEA action, the standard of

review is whether those conclusions are correct. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. B.S. 

(9th

Cir. 1996), 82 F.3d 1493, 1499.After a review of the record, we conclude that,

based on the aforementioned legal principles and the application of those principles 

to the

facts of this case, the District Court's findings of fact are not clearly erroneous 

and its

conclusions of law are correct. Accordingly, we hold that the District Court did 

not err

when it affirmed the OPI's determination that Brian Parini was not denied a free

appropriate public education. 

 ISSUE 2 

 Did the District Court err when it dismissed Brian Parini's negligent 

misdiagnosis

and misplacement claim?

 When we review a district court's conclusions of law, the standard of review is

whether those conclusions are correct. Steer, Inc. v. Department of Revenue (1990), 

245

Mont. 470, 474-75, 803 P.2d 601, 603. Additionally, it is well established that if a

district court reaches the correct result, then we will uphold the court's judgment

regardless of the reasons for its decision. Robinson v. First Wyoming Bank (1995), 

274

Mont. 307, 319, 909 P.2d 689, 696.

 Parini's complaint, filed in the District Court, not only appealed the OPI's

decision, but also asserted an independent claim in which he alleged that the School

District and twelve of its employees negligently misdiagnosed and misplaced him as a

special education student. On that basis, he maintained that he is entitled to

compensatory damages. 

 The defendants, however, filed a motion to dismiss Parini's claim. In its 

April 10,

1996, order, the District Court concluded that:

 The issue of whether a disabled child can sue under Negligent

 Misplacement and Diagnosis has not been brought before the Montana

 Supreme Court since IDEA was enacted. Evaluation and placement are

 covered by IDEA and should be addressed under procedures provided by

 IDEA, not in an independent tort action entitled Negligent Misplacement

 and Diagnosis.

On that basis, the District Court granted the defendants' motion and, accordingly,

dismissed Parini's negligent misdiagnosis and misplacement claim.

 On appeal, Parini contends that the District Court erred when it dismissed his

claim. In support of this contention, he relies on our prior decision in B.M. v. 

State

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(1982), 200 Mont. 58, 649 P.2d 425.

 In B.M., the plaintiff filed a complaint in which she alleged that the State

negligently placed her in a special education program. The District Court, however,

determined that the State does not owe a legal duty of care to students placed in 

special

education programs and, on that basis, granted summary judgment in favor of the 

State.

 On appeal, we reversed the District Court and concluded that the State does have

a duty to use due care when it places students in special education programs. B.M., 

200

Mont. at 63, 649 P.2d at 427. We based our conclusion on Article X, Section 1, of 

the

Montana Constitution, which provides:

 It is the goal of the people to establish a system of education which

 will develop the full educational potential of each person. Equality of

 educational opportunity is guaranteed to each person of the state.

 The School District, however, points out that the cause of action in B.M. 

accrued

in 1973, two years before Congress enacted the Education for All Handicapped Children

Act (now titled IDEA), and that, therefore, we did not consider the IDEA's procedural

safeguards and remedial provisions when we decided B.M. 

 We recognize that the IDEA sets forth comprehensive procedural safeguards and

remedial provisions through which an aggrieved child and his or her parents can seek

redress for alleged violations of the Act. However, we conclude that pursuant to our

decision in B.M., and Article X, Section 1, of the Montana Constitution, a private 

cause

of action against the State for its negligent misdiagnosis or misplacement of a 

special

education student remains viable in Montana. Accordingly, we further conclude that

Parini is entitled, pursuant to Montana law, to bring an independent tort claim 

against the

School District for its alleged negligent misdiagnosis and misplacement of him as a

special education student.

 However, that conclusion does not resolve this issue. Parini asserted his 

negligent

misdiagnosis and misplacement claim after the OPI had already decided that the School

District did not deny him a FAPE. Moreover, the OPI's decision was affirmed by the

District Court, and now this Court on appeal.

 The doctrine of res judicata bars the relitigation of a claim once a final 

judgment

has been entered. Holtman v. 4-G's Plumbing and Heating, Inc. (1994), 264 Mont. 432,

436, 872 P.2d 318, 320. Finality is accorded to the disposition of all issues that 

were

raised or that could have been raised; a party, therefore, is prohibited from 

relitigating

a claim that he or she has already had an opportunity to litigate. Traders State 

Bank v.

Mann (1993), 258 Mont. 226, 238, 852 P.2d 604, 611. The following four elements

must be satisfied in order to apply the doctrine of res judicata: (1) the parties or 

their

privies must be the same; (2) the subject matter of the action must be the same; (3) 

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the

issues must be the same and relate to the same subject matter; and (4) the 

capacities of

the persons must be the same in reference to the subject matter and to the issues. 

Holtman, 264 Mont. at 436, 872 P.2d at 320. 

 We conclude that all four elements are satisfied in the underlying OPI and 

District

Court actions. Furthermore, as stated by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in S.

D.,

"[w]hen that process [exhaustion of administrative remedies pursuant to 20 U.S.C. 

1415(f)] produces an administrative decision that is upheld on judicial review under

IDEA, principles of issue and claim preclusion may properly be applied to shortcircuit

redundant claims under other laws." S.D., 88 F.3d at 562 (citations omitted).

 We conclude that, in this case, therefore, the doctrine of res judicata bars 

Parini

from litigating his negligent misdiagnosis and misplacement claim. Accordingly, we 

hold

that the District Court did not err when it dismissed his claim.

 The judgment of the District Court is affirmed. 

 /S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER

We Concur:

/S/ J. A. TURNAGE

/S/ JIM REGNIER 

/S/ WILLIAM E. HUNT, SR.

Justice Karla M. Gray specially concurring.

 I concur in the Court's opinion on issue one and specially concur in that 

opinion

on issue two.

 I agree that an independent cause of action for negligent misdiagnosis and

misplacement of a special education student remains viable in Montana. While the 

IDEA

sets forth comprehensive procedural safeguards and remedial provisions for alleged

violations of that Act, it is not inconceivable that an action in tort could allege 

and prove

negligence separate from, and not coextensive with, conduct which would violate the

specific federal requirements contained in the IDEA. To the extent any such 

negligence

caused damage to a special education student, that student should be entitled to 

recover. 

It is my view, however, that most IDEA-based cases will involve the same conduct as

would be alleged under an independent tort action and, to that extent, I would hope 

that

special education students continue to assert IDEA claims, in order to ensure that 

they

receive the education required by the IDEA which is so critical to their futures, 

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rather

than independent tort actions in which monetary recovery ordinarily would be a poor

substitute for a more appropriate education provided in a timely fashion. 

 I also agree with the Court that, under the circumstances of this case, res 

judicata

bars Parini from litigating his independent cause of action. This is so because--

while the

Court does not expressly state it--Parini alleged the same underlying facts and 

issues with

regard to his IDEA claim as he alleged in his independent cause of action. Once he

failed to prevail on those facts and issues--here, in the IDEA claim at the OPI 

which was

affirmed by the District Court and now by this Court--that final judgment is res 

judicata

as to any further litigation on the same issues. As I understand the Court's 

opinion, the

same result would have obtained had Parini failed to seek judicial review of the 

adverse

OPI decision and, instead, simply filed his independent action. In that event, the 

OPI

decision would have become final without judicial review and res judicata would bar

litigation of the tort action because the issues had been raised and a final decision

rendered.

 I join the Court in affirming the District Court.

 /S/ KARLA M. GRAY

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