UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 20-4359

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

ONEIL WAYNE SOUTH,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, at 

Clarksburg. Thomas S. Kleeh, Chief District Judge. (1:19-cr-00043-TSK-MJA-1)

Submitted: July 26, 2022 Decided: August 18, 2022

Before WYNN and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: Hilary L. Godwin, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Katy J. Cimino, 

Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, 

Clarksburg, West Virginia, for Appellant. William J. Powell, United States Attorney, 

Andrew R. Cogar, Assistant United States Attorney, Danae Demasi-Lemon, Assistant 

United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Clarksburg, 

West Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:

Oneil Wayne South appeals his conviction following a jury trial for possession of a 

firearm as an unlawful user of a controlled substance in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(3), 

924(a)(2). On appeal, South argues that the district court erred (1) in denying his motion 

to suppress evidence recovered during an investigative stop, (2) in its instruction to the jury

with respect to the elements of the offense, and (3) in denying his motion for a judgment 

of acquittal pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 based on insufficiency of 

the evidence. We affirm but remand for correction of a clerical error in the judgment.

First, South asserts that the district court erroneously denied his motion to suppress 

evidence recovered during an investigative stop. Specifically, South argues that Fairmont 

City Police Officers Buck and Moran lacked the requisite reasonable suspicion of criminal 

activity to justify their investigatory detention and search of South following reports of 

suspicious behavior made to police by a caller who identified herself and provided her 

address. 

“When reviewing a district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we review factual 

findings for clear error and legal determinations de novo,” construing “the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the prevailing party.” United States v. Lull, 824 F.3d 109, 114-15 

(4th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). Consistent with the Fourth 

Amendment, “[a]n officer may stop and briefly detain a person when the officer has 

reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person has been, is, or is about to be engaged in 

criminal activity.” United States v. Montieth, 662 F.3d 660, 665 (4th Cir. 2011) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). To justify such an investigative stop, “the police officer must 

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be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational 

inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 

21 (1968). “Thus, a court must look to the totality of the circumstances in determining 

whether the officer had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting criminal 

activity.” United States v. Foster, 634 F.3d 243, 246 (4th Cir. 2011).

“The degree to which the police may rely on a tip to establish reasonable suspicion 

depends on the tipster's veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge.” United States v. 

Kehoe, 893 F.3d 232, 238 (4th Cir. 2018). “We generally presume that a citizen-informant 

or a victim who discloses his or her identity and basis of knowledge to the police is both 

reliable and credible.” Id. Whether a location is a known high-crime area and the lateness 

of the hour are also “permissible factors that can contribute to a finding of reasonable

suspicion in the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis.” United States v. Slocumb, 804 

F.3d 677, 682 (4th Cir. 2015).

We conclude, based on our assessment of the totality of the circumstances, that 

Moran and Buck had reasonable suspicion to conduct the investigatory stop. First, the 

officers were entitled to rely on information provided to the police dispatcher in two phone 

calls from a credible individual who gave police her name and address and reported 

suspicious activity at her location; further, the caller’s basis of knowledge was reliable and 

her tip was generally corroborated. Moreover, although not dispositive, the officers’ 

suspicion was bolstered by the facts that the investigative detention occurred in a highcrime area, known for drug activity, between 3:26 and 4:20 a.m. The tipster observed 

activity that in Moran’s experience was indicative of drug use; and Moran personally 

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observed South walking away from a vehicle when Moran responded to the scene and 

South initially refused to stop after Moran asked him to do so. Accordingly, we conclude 

that the district court did not err by denying South’s motion to suppress.

South next contends that the district court erred in instructing the jury with respect 

to the elements of the offense. Section 922(g)(3) prohibits the possession of a firearm by 

a person “who is an unlawful user of” a controlled substance. Scott argues that the court 

erroneously instructed the jury regarding the definition of an “unlawful user” because it 

did not require the Government to prove that South used drugs “with regularity” and “over 

an extended period of time,” in addition to using drugs contemporaneously with the firearm 

possession.

We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s “decision to give (or not to give) 

a jury instruction and the content of an instruction.” United States v. Savage, 885 F.3d 212, 

222 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). “When jury instructions are 

challenged on appeal, the key issue is whether, taken as a whole, the instruction fairly states 

the controlling law.” Id. at 222-23 (internal quotation marks omitted). Even if the court’s 

instructions were erroneous, however, “we will not set aside a resulting verdict unless the 

erroneous instruction seriously prejudiced the challenging party’s case.” United States v. 

Miltier, 882 F.3d 81, 89 (4th Cir. 2018) (emphasis in original).

We conclude that, here, even assuming an instructional error occurred, it did not 

prejudice South’s case. There was ample evidence to support the conclusion that South 

used drugs contemporaneously with the offense—the evidence established that officers 

discovered a crack pipe and baggies containing crack and powder cocaine in South’s

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pockets when he was arrested, and South admitted to officers that he occasionally used 

crack cocaine. The evidence also demonstrated that South had been using drugs at least 

intermittently for an extended period—the Government presented evidence that, during an 

encounter with South two-and-a-half years before the instant offense, police discovered 

crack cocaine and drug paraphernalia on his person. Thus, even had the district court given 

South’s preferred instruction, the Government produced sufficient evidence to show his 

prolonged drug use.

Finally, South asserts that the district court erred in denying his Rule 29 motion 

based on the sufficiency of the evidence. We review de novo a district court’s decision to 

deny a Rule 29 motion for a judgment of acquittal. United States v. Smith, 451 F.3d 209, 

216 (4th Cir. 2006). “Denial of such a motion is proper where, viewed in the light most 

favorable to the prosecution, substantial evidence supports a guilty verdict.” United States 

v. Ath, 951 F.3d 179, 185 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). Substantial 

evidence is “evidence that a reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate and 

sufficient to support . . . a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Savage, 885 F.3d 

at 219 (internal quotation marks omitted). A defendant challenging the sufficiency of the 

evidence “bears a heavy burden, as appellate reversal on grounds of insufficient evidence 

is confined to cases where the prosecution’s failure is clear.” Id. (internal quotation marks 

omitted).

South contends, as he did below, that the evidence did not sufficiently establish 

either that he was an “unlawful user” of a controlled substance when he possessed the 

firearm or that he was aware of his prohibited status at the time of the possession. In a 

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prosecution under § 922(g), “the Government must prove both that the defendant knew he 

possessed a firearm and that he knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred 

from possessing a firearm.” Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2200 (2019). “‘To 

sustain a conviction under Section 922(g)(3), the [G]overnment must prove that the 

defendant’s drug use was sufficiently consistent, prolonged, and close in time to his gun 

possession to put him on notice that he qualified as an unlawful user under the terms of the 

statute.’” United States v. Hasson, 26 F.4th 610, 615-16 (4th Cir. 2022) (internal brackets 

omitted) (quoting United States v. Sperling, 400 F. App’x 765, 767 (4th Cir. 2010) (No. 

09-5158)). We have previously recognized that the term “unlawful user” is not defined by 

§ 922(g)(3) and that “the exact reach of the statute is not easy to define.” United States v. 

Jackson, 280 F.3d 403, 406 (4th Cir. 2002).

Here, South had a crack pipe and plastic baggies containing both crack and powder 

cocaine in his pockets when he was arrested for the firearm offense. Moreover, at that 

time, South admitted to officers that he occasionally used crack cocaine. The Government 

presented evidence that South had possessed both drug paraphernalia and crack cocaine 

multiple times, and that, in an incident that occurred more than two years prior to the instant 

firearm offense, he admitted to officers that the substance in his possession was crack 

cocaine. We conclude that, viewing the evidence as a cumulative whole and in the light 

most favorable to the Government, there is substantial evidence that South’s drug use was 

consistent, prolonged, and close enough in time to his gun possession to show that he was 

an “unlawful user” of a controlled substance for purposes of § 922(g)(3) and to put him on 

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notice that he qualified as an unlawful user of drugs under the statute. Therefore, the 

district court did not err by denying South’s motion for a judgment of acquittal.

Finally, we note that the criminal judgment contains a clerical error. In addition to 

the § 922(g)(3) offense, South was indicted for reckless flight from a law enforcement 

officer, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 13(a), 7(3), and W. Va. Code § 61-5-17(f) (“Count 

Two”). In February 2020, South pleaded guilty to Count Two without a plea agreement, 

and the case proceeded to a jury trial only on the § 922(g)(3) offense. However, the 

judgment incorrectly states that South pleaded guilty to both counts. 

Accordingly, although we affirm the criminal judgment, we remand the case so that 

the district court may amend the judgment to reflect that South pleaded guilty only to Count 

Two and that he was found guilty on the firearm offense after a plea of not guilty. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 

presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED

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