UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-4507

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

YVONNE CASTLE TAYLOR, 

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Baltimore. George L. Russell III, District Judge. 

(1:13-cr-00080-GLR-1)

Submitted: August 8, 2014 Decided: September 24, 2014

Before WYNN and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Lance C. Hamm, Houston, Texas, for Appellant. Rod J. 

Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Evan T. Shea, Assistant 

United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, 

Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Yvonne Castle Taylor (Taylor) 

conditionally pleaded guilty to the charge of failing to file a 

required report of international transportation of currency in 

violation of 31 U.S.C. § 5316, reserving the right to challenge 

on appeal the district court’s denial of her motion to suppress. 

She was sentenced to five years’ probation and fined $3,000.00. 

On appeal, she argues, first, that the district court erred when 

it denied her motion to suppress and, second, that venue was 

improper in the District of Maryland. For the reasons stated 

below, we affirm.

I

A

On the morning of May 28, 2011, Homeland Security 

Investigations (HSI) Special Agent Roy Rutherford (Agent 

Rutherford), who was stationed in Atlanta, Georgia, received a 

phone call from HSI Special Agent Mary Horn (Agent Horn), who 

was stationed in Baltimore, Maryland. During the call, Agent 

Horn indicated that she had received a tip that Taylor would be 

attempting to smuggle a large amount of currency out of the 

United States that day while traveling from Baltimore to Montego 

Bay, Jamaica. According to Agent Horn, Taylor was scheduled to 

fly from Baltimore-Washington International Airport (BWI) to 
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Sangster International Airport (MBJ) in Montego Bay, connecting 

through Atlanta Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport 

(Atlanta Hartsfield).1 Based on this information, Agent 

Rutherford contacted the United States Customs and Border Patrol 

(CBP) Passenger Analysis Unit (PAU) duty officer at Atlanta 

Hartsfield and asked her to assign two CBP officers the task of 

interviewing Taylor as she boarded the plane bound for MBJ. In 

response, the CBP PAU duty officer instructed CBP Officers 

Abdullah Shahbaaz (Officer Shahbaaz) and Christopher Horton 

(Officer Horton) to interview Taylor before she boarded the 

plane. 

Later that morning, Agent Rutherford received another call 

from Agent Horn. During this call, Agent Horn indicated that 

Taylor was searched by Transportation Security Administration 

officers at BWI and that no “bulk sum of currency [was found] on 

her person.” (J.A. 135). After receiving this information, 

Agent Rutherford contacted the CBP PAU duty officer at Atlanta 

Hartsfield and asked her to call off the operation concerning 

Taylor because no bulk sum of currency was found on Taylor’s 

person during the search at BWI.

 1 More specifically, Taylor was scheduled to fly on Airtran 

Airlines, departing BWI at 8:32 a.m. and arriving at Atlanta 

Hartsfield at 10:26 a.m., and then departing Atlanta Hartsfield 

at 12:30 p.m. and arriving at MBJ at 2:24 p.m.
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The CBP PAU duty officer, who has the independent authority 

to order passenger interviews, declined to call off the 

operation. Instead, she informed Officer Shahbaaz of the 

results of the BWI search and asked him, “as a courtesy, just to 

go and talk to [Taylor before she boarded the flight to MBJ], 

again as a courtesy to whomever sent the intel.” (J.A. 83).

The flight to MBJ was scheduled to depart from Gate C-14. 

Prior to the scheduled departure, Officers Shahbaaz and Horton 

proceeded to the gate, positioning themselves just inside the 

jetway, about six or seven steps past the threshold that 

passengers must cross when they leave the terminal. Because all 

they had was Taylor’s name, Officers Shahbaaz and Horton decided 

to stop and interview all passengers as they boarded the flight, 

asking them “about carrying effects aboard, money, declaring any 

type of gifts or whatever.” (J.A. 70). 

Taylor was about the tenth person interviewed by Officer 

Shahbaaz. He initially asked her if she was “familiar with the 

currency reporting requirements to enter or exit the country.” 

(J.A. 72). When she hesitated, Officer Shahbaaz asked Taylor 

how much money she was carrying. Taylor hesitated for a moment, 

looked up at the ceiling, and responded that she had $3,000.00. 

Because this response was not in the same “rhythm that the other 

passengers . . . [gave],” Officer Shahbaaz repeated the 

question, and this time Taylor looked out the jetway window 
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before saying that she was carrying $2,000.00. Taylor’s 

demeanor and her inconsistent answers caused Officer Shahbaaz to 

ask Taylor if she was sure how much money she had on her person, 

and Taylor responded that she did not know how much money she 

had. Officer Shahbaaz asked “further questions specifically 

concerning money, and [Taylor] then stated something to the 

effect that it was more than” $100,000.00. (J.A. 73). Officer 

Shahbaaz then asked Taylor how she knew that she was carrying 

more than $100,000.00, and Taylor responded, “[T]hey didn’t tell 

me how much money it was.” (J.A. 73). When Officer Shahbaaz 

asked her where the money was, Taylor pointed to her midsection 

and said “it’s here,” implying that the money was concealed 

under her clothing.

At this point, Officers Shahbaaz and Horton decided to 

escort Taylor to a “secondary area,” an area separate from the 

public areas of the airport, to conduct a pat-down search of her 

person and to confirm the exact amount of cash. (J.A. 75).2

 As 

they were proceeding to the secondary area, Officer Shahbaaz 

contacted Agent Rutherford to inform him that Taylor had 

 2 Of note, Officers Shahbaaz and Horton never asked Taylor 

if she filled out a Report of International Transportation of 

Currency or Monetary Instruments Form (CMIR Form), which was 

required for her to transport the money she was carrying abroad. 

See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 5316 (failing to file a required report 

of international transportation of currency).
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indicated that she was in possession of at least $100,000.00. 

In response, Agent Rutherford indicated that he would report to 

the secondary area to assist.

At the secondary area, the pat-down search was conducted by 

CBP Officer Alla Swords (Officer Swords) in a separate room in 

the presence of another CBP female officer. During the pat-down 

search, Officer Swords recovered approximately $102,000.00 from 

Taylor’s clothing. Following this recovery, Officer Swords 

escorted Taylor to a conference room where Agent Rutherford was 

present.

During a recorded interview, Agent Rutherford advised 

Taylor of her Miranda3 rights, but Taylor indicated that she did 

not want to waive those rights, so the recorded interview ended. 

Thereafter, Agent Rutherford began to fill out a United States 

Marshal Arrest and Booking Form. He asked Taylor for basic 

information, such as her name, date of birth, address, phone 

number, and emergency contact information. While he was filling 

out this form, Taylor said “she had done a trip with bulk sums 

of currency on two prior occasions, and that the money was going 

into a bank.” (J.A. 143). At this point, Agent Rutherford 

turned the recorder back on and informed Taylor that the only 

way he could talk to her is if she understood her Miranda rights 

 3 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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and waived them. Taylor indicated that she wanted to consult 

with an attorney, so the recorded interview ended and Agent 

Rutherford finished the booking process. 

B

On June 2, 2011, a federal grand jury sitting in the 

District of Maryland returned a one count indictment charging 

Taylor with bulk cash smuggling in violation of 31 U.S.C. 

§ 5332(a). On June 1, 2012, Taylor filed a motion to suppress 

the money seized from her and the statements she made during the 

booking process on May 28, 2011. She filed a supplement to this 

motion on November 16, 2012. Following a hearing, the district 

court denied the motion to suppress. In its oral ruling, the 

district court first concluded that the questioning of Taylor on 

the jetway was reasonable under controlling border stop and 

search precedent. The district court next concluded that there 

was probable cause to arrest Taylor on the jetway for bulk cash 

smuggling. Finally, the district court concluded that there was 

no Miranda violation in the case because Taylor’s incriminating 

statements were not made in response to police questioning.

On February 22, 2013, Taylor and the government entered 

into a plea agreement. For her part, Taylor agreed to plead 

guilty to the charge of failing to file a required report of 

international transportation of currency in violation of 31 

U.S.C. § 5316, reserving the right to appeal the district 
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court’s denial of her motion to suppress. She also agreed to 

waive any right to appeal her “conviction on any other ground.” 

(J.A. 323). For its part, the government agreed to dismiss the 

indictment charging bulk cash smuggling.

On February 25, 2013, a one count criminal information was 

filed charging Taylor with the § 5316 offense. That same day, 

the district court held an arraignment at which Taylor entered 

her conditional plea of guilty to the criminal information. At 

the hearing, Taylor stated she understood that, although she 

reserved the right to appeal the denial of her motion to 

suppress, she waived her right to appeal “her conviction . . .

on any other ground.” (J.A. 347). As a result of the 

conditional guilty plea to the § 5316 offense, the district 

court dismissed the indictment charging bulk cash smuggling.

A sentencing hearing was held on June 21, 2013. At the 

hearing, Taylor was sentenced to five years’ probation and fined 

$3,000.00. Judgment was entered on June 24, 2013, and Taylor 

noted a timely appeal on July 1, 2013.

II

Taylor argues that the district court erred when it denied 

her motion to suppress. We review the district court’s factual 

findings regarding the motion to suppress for clear error, and 

the district court’s legal conclusions de novo. United States 
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v. Burgess, 684 F.3d 445, 452 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 133 S.

Ct. 490 (2012). When a suppression motion has been denied by 

the district court, we construe the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the government. United States v. Foster, 634 F.3d 

243, 246 (4th Cir. 2011). We also defer to the district court’s 

credibility findings. United States v. Griffin, 589 F.3d 148, 

150–51 n.1 (4th Cir. 2009).

The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable 

searches and seizures. U.S. Const., Amend IV. Routine border 

stops and searches may be conducted without probable cause or 

reasonable articulable suspicion, in order to regulate 

collection of duties and prevent introduction of contraband. 

United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985). 

Border searches have been considered to be reasonable by 

definition because the person or item in question came into the 

United States from elsewhere. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 

606, 619 (1977).

At the time she was stopped on the jetway, Taylor was at 

the functional equivalent of an international border, even 

though she was leaving as opposed to entering the United States. 

See Almeida–Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973) 

(“[A] search of the passengers and cargo of an airplane arriving 

at a [United States] airport after a nonstop flight from 

[abroad] would clearly be the functional equivalent of a border 
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search.”); United States v. Oriakhi, 57 F.3d 1290, 1295-97 (4th 

Cir. 1995) (“[W]e join the several other circuit courts which 

have held that the Ramsey border search exception extends to all 

routine searches at the nation’s borders, irrespective of 

whether persons or effects are entering or exiting from the 

country.”). Thus, under the precedent of Montoya de Hernandez, 

Ramsey, Almeida–Sanchez, and Oriakhi, there is no question that 

the initial stop and questioning of Taylor on the jetway 

complied with the Fourth Amendment. 

Taylor argues that the district court erred when it 

concluded that there was probable cause to arrest her on the 

jetway for bulk cash smuggling. She posits that the subsequent 

search of her person and her subsequent incriminating statements 

were the fruits of an illegal arrest. The government’s response 

is two-fold. First, it argues that there was probable cause to 

arrest Taylor on the jetway for the charge of bulk cash 

smuggling. Alternatively, it argues that the subsequent search 

of Taylor was a permissible border search. Because we agree 

with the government’s probable cause argument, we need not 

address its alternative border search argument.

A police officer may make a warrantless arrest in a public 

place if the officer has probable cause to believe that the 

individual is or will soon be involved in criminal activity. 

United States v. Dickey–Bey, 393 F.3d 449, 453 (4th Cir. 2004). 
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The requirement of probable cause may be satisfied by “facts and 

circumstances within the officer’s knowledge that are sufficient 

to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in 

believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect has 

committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense.” 

Id. (quoting Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979)

(internal quotation marks omitted)). We consider under the 

“totality of the circumstances” the question whether an arrest 

was supported by probable cause, affording “defer[ence] to the 

expertise and experience of law enforcement officers at the 

scene.” Id.

The district court concluded that the following facts gave 

Officers Shahbaaz and Horton probable cause to arrest Taylor for 

bulk cash smuggling: (1) Taylor hesitated and looked away when 

she was asked how much money she was carrying; (2) Taylor gave 

inconsistent answers concerning the amount of money she was 

carrying, culminating with her “more than $100,000.00” response, 

(J.A. 73); (3) someone else gave Taylor the money to carry 

abroad; and (4) the money was hidden on Taylor’s person. 

The thrust of Taylor’s attack on the district court’s 

probable cause analysis is that Officers Shahbaaz and Horton 

lacked probable cause to believe that she had not filed or she 
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did not intend to file the CMIR Form.4 This attack misses the 

mark. 

Officers Shahbaaz and Horton were entitled to use their 

common sense and experience to infer from the concealment, 

Taylor’s demeanor, her contradictory statements about the amount 

of money she was carrying, her lack of knowledge concerning the 

exact amount of money she was carrying, and the fact that 

someone else gave her a large sum of money to carry abroad, that 

Taylor had failed to file and/or intended not to file a CMIR 

Form. Taylor’s argument to the contrary simply ignores the 

reasonable inferences that Officers Shahbaaz and Horton were 

entitled to draw from the facts presented. In short, at the 

time of her arrest on the jetway, Officers Shahbaaz and Horton 

had probable cause to arrest Taylor on the charge of bulk cash 

smuggling, as the district court so held.

 4 The charge of bulk cash smuggling is similar, but not 

identical to the charge of failing to file a required report of 

international transportation of currency. See United States v. 

Tatoyan, 474 F.3d 1174, 1180-82 (9th Cir. 2007) (bulk cash 

smuggling and failing to file a required report of international 

transportation of currency do not merge under Blockburger v. 

United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932) because each offense has an 

element that the other does not). Relevant here, bulk cash 

smuggling requires that the defendant intend to fail to file the 

CMIR Form, while failing to file a required report of 

international transportation of currency requires that the 

defendant fail to file the required report.
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III

Taylor also argues that venue was improper in the District 

of Maryland. The question of venue in a criminal prosecution is 

reviewed de novo. United States v. Wilson, 262 F.3d 305, 320 

(4th Cir. 2001).

Under Rule 18 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 

venue is proper “in [any] district where the offense was 

committed.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 18. According to Taylor, because 

she was arrested while attempting to leave the United States 

from Atlanta, venue was proper in the Northern District of 

Georgia, not the District of Maryland.

Taylor’s venue argument has insurmountable hurdles. First, 

by pleading guilty without reserving the right to challenge 

venue on appeal, she waived any right to challenge venue in this 

court. See United States v. Bundy, 392 F.3d 641, 650 n.3 (4th 

Cir. 2004) (“Where a defendant who pled guilty presents on 

appeal an issue that he did not even attempt to preserve by 

means of a conditional plea, we decline to entertain the appeal 

on the ground that the defendant’s unconditional plea waived 

that issue altogether.”); United States v. Calderon, 243 F.3d 

587, 590 (2d Cir. 2001) (collecting cases and explaining that 

“[v]enue is not jurisdictional” and is waived by a “valid 

plea”). 
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Second, a defendant who fails to clearly challenge venue in

the district court waives the right to raise such issue on 

appeal. United States v. Stewart, 256 F.3d 231, 238 (4th Cir. 

2001). In order to raise the issue of venue in the district 

court, a defendant is not required to file a written pleading, 

because such a requirement does not serve the two purposes of 

the contemporaneous objection rule--preserving judicial 

resources and preventing sandbagging. Id. at 238-39. Moreover, 

“[b]ecause proper venue is a constitutional right, waivers of 

venue rights through failure to object should not readily be 

inferred,” id. at 238, and any “ambiguity as to the defendant’s 

intent to waive venue [is] interpreted in favor of the 

defendant.” Id. at 239.

In this case, the issue of venue was not raised in the 

district court, either orally or in writing, as Taylor 

apparently recognizes. Thus, the district court was not 

presented with an opportunity to rule upon any venue question. 

Nevertheless, Taylor asks us to address the merits of her venue 

argument, contending that she “should not suffer because [all of 

the parties, including the district court] missed the boat” on 

the venue issue. Appellant’s Reply Br. at 11. We must decline 

this request. Simply put, Stewart clearly prevents us from 

addressing the merits of Taylor’s venue argument. 256 F.3d at 

238-39.
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IV

For the reasons stated herein, the judgment of the district 

court is affirmed.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED