### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON A SS IG N E D O N BR IE FS A PR IL7, 200 6
LAT REA YL MITC HELL v. M ICHA EL GR EEN
Direc t Appeal from the Juvenile Court for Shelb y County

No. L6977 Ge orge Blancet t, Judge

No. W2005-01057-C OA-R3-JV - F iled May 30, 2006

I n this appeal, we are asked to de termine whe ther the juve nile court e rre d when it i n cr ea s ed the amount of child s u p p o rt t h e father wa s require d to pay the mother for

their child born out of we dlo c k. Th e fathe r o ri g ina lly fi le d a pe tit ion to mod if

y c hil d sup po rt se e kin g to de c re a se his c hil d su pp ort ob lig a tio n b a se d o n th e fa c t th a t he ha d a no th er chi ld with ano the r w oman th a t c ur re ntl y re sid e s w ithhim . T he juv e nil e c ou rt inc re a se d h is c hil d s up po rt ob lig a tio n fi nd ing that he faile d to vis it h is c hil d a ft e r the mothe r m ov e d to Kn oxvil le , T e nn e ssee, in clu di ng c e rt a in p e ri od s o f t ime when the mother

broug ht the child to Me mphis, Te nnessee to visit the father. The fathe r conte nds that it was error for the juvenile court to increa se his child support obligation because the mother wa s in violation of the pare ntal reloc ation statute, section 36-6- 108 of t he Tennessee Code, and that the f a th e r w a s p r e v e n te d f

r o m v is it in g his chil d d u e to th e d is tan c e a n d h is me d ic a l c o n d it io n
. We a ff ir m.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Juvenile Court Affi rm ed
A L AN E. H I G H ERS , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which D AVI D R. F ARMER , J ., and H O LLY M. K I RBY , J ., joined.
Britton J . Allan, Memphis, TN, for Appellant Gail W. Horner, G erma ntown, TN, for Appellee-2- OP IN ION
I. F A C TS & P R OC EDU R A L H I S T ORY
On No ve mbe r 3, 19 99 , Mic ha e l Gr e e n (“ Gr e e n” or “ Ap pe llant” ) a nd L atr eay l Mitc he ll (“Mitche ll” or “A ppellee” or collec tively with Gree n, the “Par t i es ”) ha d a child out of we dlock. There afte r, Mitchell filed a petition with the juvenile court to establish parenta g e. The juvenile court enter ed an order

finding Gre en to be the f ather of the c hild and requiring Gre en to pay $322 per month in child support. On October 4, 2000, G ree n filed a petition for visi tation seeking visitation “eve ry other we ekend, holiday s and vacation weeks during summer m onths” of the Parties’ child. T h e j u v e n i l e c o u r t r e f

e r e e i n i t i a l l y g r a n t e d t e m p o r ar y v i s i t a t i o n p r i v i l e g e s t o G r e e n
. S u b s e q u e n t l y, the juvenile court refe ree dismiss ed Gr een’ s petition stating that Gre en failed to appea r at the hea

ring on Gr e e n’ s mo tio n. I n A ug us t of 20 03 , Mitc he ll mov e d to K no xvill e , T e nn e sse e wi th the Part ie s’ child. On Octobe r 13, 2003, the juvenile c ourt enter ed an administrative order for modification of curr ent support incre asing Gre en’s c hild support obligation to $574 per month without fee s.
On Oc tob e r 5 , 200 4, Gr e e n f ile d a pe tit ionto m od if

y c hil d s up po rt

se e kin g to d e c re a se his child support obligation based on the fact that he ha d another child born on Jul y

7, 2004 with another woman. Af

ter a h earing on Gre en’s pe tition, t he juvenile c ourt ref ere e re commended that the juv e nil e c ou rt ’s pr e vio us c hil d s up po rt ord er shou ld b e mod if

ie d to inc re a se Gr e e n’ s mo nth ly obligation to $700 due to Gree n’s lack of visitation wit h the Parties’ c hild. The juvenile court re fe re e al s o rec ommended that Gr een pay $300 for Mitche ll’s attorney ’s fe es. On De cembe r 10, 2004, Gre en filed a request for hearing before the presiding judge of the j uvenile court. On April 14, 20 05 , th e juv e nil e cou rt ent e re d a n o rd e r i nc re a sin g Gr e e n’ s mo nth ly c hil d s up po rt

fr om $ 57 4 to $1078.00 monthly beg inning May 1, 2004 due to G ree n’s lack of visitation wit h the Parties’ c hild.
II. I SS U E P R ESENTED Appellant has timely

filed his notice of a

ppeal a nd prese nts the following issue f or re view: 1. Whether the juvenile c ourt err ed whe n it increa sed App el lant’s child support obligations based on his lac k of visitation with his child.
F or the fo llo wi ng re a so ns , w e a ff ir m th e de c isi on of

thejuv e nil e c ou rt

. III . S TA N D A R D O F R EVIEW
T h is Co u r t r e v ie w s f

in d in g s o f

f a c t b y a tria l c o u r t s itti n g w ith o u t a ju r y u n d e r a de novo standard w ith a pre s u m p t i on of cor rec tness for the trial court’s f indings. Te nn. R. App. P. 13(d). This Court revie ws a trial c ourt’s conc lusions of law under a de novo standard w ith no presumption of cor rec tness for those finding s. Union C arbide Corp. v. Huddleston , 854 S.W .2d 87, 91 (Tenn. 1 9 9 3 ) ( ci t i n g Estate of A dkins v. W hite Consol. Indus., Inc. , 788 S.W .2d 815, 817 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989)).U n d e r th e c h ild su p p o rt g u id e line s, A R P sta n d s fo r the A lter n a te R e sid e n tial P a re n t, w h ic h is “the p a re n t with 1 wh om t h e ch i l d r es i des l es s t h an f i f t y pe r ce n t ( 50 % ) of

t h e t i me. ” T en n
. Comp. Admi n
. R. & Reg s
. 1240- 2- 4-

. 02( 4) (20 0 5 ). -3- “We re view child supp o rt d ecisions for a buse of discr etion.” Lindsay v. Lindsay , No. M2005-00207-COA- R3-CV, 2006 Tenn. App. L EXI S 51, at * 7 (T en n . Ct. App. J an. 25, 2006) (c i t i n g State ex re l. Vaughn v. Kaatrude , 21 S.W .3d 244 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000)) . “Howe ver, a trial court’s discr etion is lim ited beca use such ‘ discretion must be ex erc ised within the strictures of the Child S upport Guidelines.’” Id. (q u o t i n g B e r r y h il l v

. R h odes , 21 S.W .3d 188, 193 (Tenn. 2000) ).
Under an abu se of

dis c re tio n s ta nd ard , w e mus t c on sid e r “ (1 ) w he the r the de c isi on ha s a sufficie nt evidentiary

foundation, (2) whether

the court corre ctly

identified and properly

applied the app ro pria te le g a l princ ipl e s, and (3) wh e the r the de c isi on is w ith in the rang e of a c c e pta ble alternatives.” State v. Kaatru de , 21 S.W .3d 244, 248 (T en n. Ct. App. 2000) (citations omitted). Further, “ [w] hile we will set aside a discretionary d ecision if it rests on an ina dequate evidentiary foundation or if it is contra ry to the g overning law, we will not subst itute our judg ment for that of the trial court merely

beca use we might havechosen another a lternative.” Id.

IV. D I S CUS S I ON
On app e a l, A pp e lla nt a sse rt s th a t the juv e nil e c ou rt e rr e d w he n it inc re a se d h is m on thl y

c hil d support obligations. P ursuant to section 36-5-101(g )(1) of t he Tennessee Code, upon a pe tition for mod if ic a tio n o f c hil d s up po rt

ob lig a tio ns , a

tria l c ou rt
sh a ll d e c re e a n in c re a se or de c re a se of su pp ort w he n th e reis f

ou ndto be a sig nif ic a nt v ari a nc e , a s d e fi ne d in the c hil d s up po rt g uid e lin e s .

. . , b e tw een the g uid e lin e s a ndthe a mou nt o f s up po rt c ur re ntl y ord ered, u nle ss the va

ri a nc e ha s r e su lte d f

ro m a pr e vio us c ou rt

order ed deviation from the g uidelines and the c ircumstan ce s that cause d the deviation havenot chang ed. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 5-101(g )(1) (2005). The child support g uidelines in eff ect at the time of the he ari ng de fi ne a

sig nif ic a nt v ari a nc e a s
1. At least a fifte en per cent ( 15%) c hang e in the g ross income of the ARP;[ ] and/or

1
2. A c ha ng e in the nu mbe r o f c hil dr e n f or wh om the AR P is l e g a lly responsible a nd actua lly

supporting; a nd/or 3. A child supported by

this order be coming disabled; and/orU nd er t he chi l d s up p o rt gui d el i nes, P R P st and s fo r t he P ri m ary R esi d ent i al P arent , whi ch, general l y , i s “t he 2 par en t w i t h w h om t h e ch i l d r es i des mor e t h an f i f t y per ce n t ( 50% ) of

t h e t i me. ” T en n
. Comp. Admi n
. R. & Reg s
. 1240- 2- 4

- . 0 2 (19 )( a) ( 2 0 0 5 ). -4-

4. The pa

rties vol u ntarily

entering into an a g ree d order to modify support in compliance w ith th es e R ules, and submitting complete d workshee ts with the ag ree d order ; and
5. At least a fiftee n perc ent (15%) chang e betwee n the amount of the curr ent support orde r and the amount of the proposed support order if the cur rent suppo rt is one hundre d dollars ($ 100) or g reater pe r mon th an d at le a st f

if te e n d oll ars ($ 15 ) i f the c ur re nt s up po rt

is l e ss than one hundr ed dollars ( $ 100) per month; or
6

. At l ea s t a se v en an d o n e- h al f pe rc en t (7

. 5 % or 0

. 0 7 5 ) c h a n ge betwee n t h e amount of the curr ent support orde r and the amount of the proposed support order if the tribunal dete rmines that the adjusted g ross income of the pare nt seeking modification qualifies that parent as a low- income provide r. Tenn. Comp. Admin. R. & Reg s. 1240-2-4-.05( 2)(b) (1)- (6) ( 2005). F urther,

[u]po n a de mon str a tio n o f a sig nif ic a nt v ari a nc e , th e tr ibu na l sh a ll inc r e a s e o r

d e c r e a s e th e s u p p o r t o r d e r a s ap p r o p r iate ina c c o r d a n ce with these Guidelines unless the sig nificant varia nce only exis ts due to a pre vious decision of the t ribunal t o deviate f rom the Guidelines a n d t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s t h a t c au s e d t h e d e v i a t i o n h a v e n o tc h a n g e d

. If the circ umstances that resulted in the deviation have not chang ed, but the re e xist o the r c ir c ums ta nc e s, su c h a s a n in c re a se or decre a se in income, that would lea d to a s ignif icant variance betwee n the amount of the c urre nt or d er , ex cluding the deviation, and the amount of the proposed or der, the n the orde r may be modified.
Te nn . Co mp. Ad min . R. & Re g s. 12 40 -2 -4 -. 05 (6 ) (2 00 5)

. Whe n d e te rm ini ng the a mou nt o f c hil d support a par ent is responsible for , the child support g uidelines

presume that, in Tennessee , when parents li ve separate ly , the childre n will typicallyreside primarily with one par ent, the PRP,[ ] and stay 2 overnig ht with the othe r pare nt, the ARP, a minimum of eve ry other wee kend fr om Friday

to Sunday , two (2) we eks in t h e summer, and two (2) we eks during holiday s throug hout the y ea r, for a total of e ig hty (8 0) day s p e r y e ar. Th e Gu ide lin e s a lso re c og nize that so me families may

have differ ent parenting situations and, thus, allow for an adjustment in the ARP's c hild support oblig ation, as appr opriate,-5- in complia n ce wi th the criteria spec ified below. The calc ulations ma d e f o r e a c h p ar e n ti n g s itu a ti o n ar e b a s e d o n s p e c if ic f a c tual information re g arding the amount of time ea ch par ent has with t he child. Tenn. Comp. Admin. R. & Reg s. 1240-2-4-.03( 6)(e )(1) (2005). As suc h,

[ i ] f t h e ARP spends fifty -three (53) or few er day s per c alenda

r y ear with a child, an assumption is made that the primary residential pa

rent (PRP) is m aking g reater e x penditures on the child for items such a s food and ba

by -sitting assoc iated with the incr ease d pare nting time by the PRP , and an inc rea se in the ARP's c hild support obligation may be made to acc ount for these expenses, as set forth in this chapte r. (ii) The A RP's child support obligation may be incr ease d for the reduct i o n in day s of the ARP' s pare nting time base d upon the following schedule : 53 -- 39 day s = 10% incr ease in support
38 -- 24 day s = 20% incr ease in support
23 -- 9 day s = 30% incr ease in support
8 -- 0 day s = 35% incr ease in support (i ii) Th e pr e su mpt ionthat le ss p are nti ng tim e by theAR P sh ou ld result i n an increase to the AR P’s support obligation may be re butted by evidenc e.
Te nn . Co mp. Ad min . R. & Re g s. 12 40 -2 -4 -. 03 (6 )( e )( 3) (2 00 5) . T he pu rp os e be hin d in c re a sin g c hil d support obligations based on lack of visitation i s “not [based on] t he re asonable ness of the la ck of visitation, but instead aimed at t he protection of t he best int ere st of the child . . . .” Smith v . Smith , No. M 2 0 0 0 -02186-COA-R3-CV, 2001 Tenn. App. L EXI S 673, at *25 (Tenn. Ct. App.Sept. 11, 20 01 ). An inc re a se in c hil d s up po rt ob lig a tio ns ba se d o n a la c k of vis itatio n “ re fl e c ts the e c on omi c rea lities face d by

the obl ige e/custodial par ent who, in addition to having a lar g er sha re of custody than contemplate d . . . , also ass u m es a l ar ger share of the financ ial burden in c aring for the children.” Kurt

s v . P ar ris h , No. W2004-00021-COA-R3-CV, 2004 Tenn. App. LEXI S 771, at *12- 13 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 17, 2004) (citations omitted).
I n this case, it is undisputed that Appellant filed a petition to modi fy

hi s child support obligations seeking a downwa rd modification bec ause of t h e b i rt h o f his second c hild. W hen the juvenile court calc ulated Appellant’s proposed support, it was much g reater than fifteen pe rce nt ofAppe l l an t ’ s c h i l d s u ppor t obl i g at i on a t t h e t i me h e pet i t i on ed t h e j u v en i l e cou r t f or modi f i ca t i on w as $574. 3 T h e ju v e n ile c o u rt fo u n d tha t his p ro p o se d su p p o rt sh o u ld b e $ 1 0 7 8 , re su lti n g in a n inc re a se o f $ 5 0 4

. -6- his c ur re nt s up po rt

. Th e inc re a se wa s inlarg e pa rt du e to h is l a c k o f v isi ta tio n wi th th e Part ie s’ 3 child.
Ho we ve r, the c hil d sup po rt g uid e lin e s d o a llo w A pp e llant, a s a lte rn a te re sid e nti a l pa re nt, to prese nt evidence to rebut the incr ease war rante d by a lac k of visitation. On appea l, Appellant contends that the j uvenile court err ed when it did not cre dit Appellant for his lack of visitation (1) beca use he de monstrated that Appellee undermined Appellant’s a bilityto visit their child whe n Ap pe lle e mov e d mo re than 1 00 mil e s a way fr om Ap pe llant wi th the ir c hil d wi tho ut c omp lying wi th the p ar e n ta l r e lo c a ti o n s tatu te , s e c ti o n 3 6

- 6

- 1 0 8 o f th e T e n n e s s e e Co d e a n d ( 2 ) bec ause he demonstrated that his medical condition preve nts him fr om driving to seehis child. I n essenc e, Ap pe lla nt c on te nd s th a t th e s eh i n dranc e s sh ou ld r e bu t th e pr e su mpt ionthat hi s la c k o f v isi ta tio n w ith the Part ie s’ c hil d s ho uldwa rr a nt an in c re a se in h is c hil d s up po rt

. First, Appe llant arg ues th atb ec au s e A p p el l ee m o v ed fr o mM em p h i s , T en nesseeto Knox ville, Tenne ssee without comply ing w ith the pare ntal reloc ation statute, section 36-6- 108 of the Te nnessee Cod e , A pp e lle e ha s h ind e re d h is a bil ity to v isi t hi s c hil d. Ap pe llant arg ue s that th is h indranc e sh ou ld h a v e b e e n ta

k e n in to c o n s id e r a ti o n b y th e ju v e n il e c o u r t w h e n it mo d if ie d h is c h il d s u p p ort obligation.
Se c tio n 3 6- 6- 10 8 o f the Te nn e sse e Cod e state s in pe rt ine nt p art : (a) I f a pa

rent who is spe nding intervals of time with a child desires to re l o ca t e outside the state or more than one hundred ( 100) miles from the other

pare nt within the state, t he relocating pare nt shall send a notice to the othe r par ent at the other pare nt’s last known addre ss by reg istered or

ce rtified mail. Unless excused by the court for exige nt c i r c u m s t a n c e s , t h e n o t i c e s h a l l b e m a i l e d n o tl a t e r t h a n s i x t y ( 6 0 ) d a ys p ri o r t o t h e m o v e. T h e n o t i ce s h al l co n t ai n t h e f o l l o wi n g: (1) Statement of

intent to move; (2) L ocation of pr oposed new residenc e; (3) Rea sons for propose d reloc ation; and (4) St atement that the ot her parent may file a pe tition i n opposition to the move within thirty(30) day s of re ceipt of the notice. (b) Unle ss th e p ar en t s can a g ree on a new visitation schedule, the reloc ating pare nt s h al l fi le a pe tition s eeking to alter visitation. The-7- court shall conside r all re levant fa ctors, including those fac tors enum erated within subsection (d). The court shall also c onsider the availability

of alternative ar

rang ements to foster and continue the child’s re lationship with and acc ess t o the other pa rent. The court shall assess the c osts o f transporting the child for visitation and determine whether

a deviatio n from the c hild support guidelines should be consider ed in light of all fac tors including, but not lim ited to, additional costs incurre d for transporting the child for visitation.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 6-108(a )-( b) (2005)

. I n this case, it is undisputed that Appel l ee m o v ed with the Parties’ c hild more than one hundred miles fr om Appellant. Althoug h Appellee testifie d th at s he informe d Appellant that she w as moving to K n o x v i l le, nothing in the r ecor d demonstrates that she complied with the notice re qu ir e me nts of

the pa re nta l r e loc a tio n s ta tut e . F urthe r, A pp ell ee di d not a tte mpt to w or k o ut a visitation sche dule with A ppellant and did not ask the court to se t a proper vi s i t at i o n s chedule

. Ap pe lla nt a

rg ue s th a t th e se failu re s o n A pp e lle e ’s pa rt c on sti tut e d a n in te nti on a l con tr ibu tio n to his lack of visitation, and, thus , his lack of visitation should not result i n an increase of hi s child support obligations.
Howeve r, despite Appe llee’s intentional contribution to Appellant’s lack of visitation, Appellant has not de monstrated how App el l ee ’s compliance with the pare ntal reloc ation statute, inc lud ing imp le me nti ng a dif fe re nt vis itatio n s c he du le , w ou ld a lle viate his la c k o f v isi ta tio n w ithhis c hil d. At the juv e nil e c ou rt

he ari ng , A pp e lle e te sti fi e d w ith ou t r e bu tta l th a t sh e a ndthe Part ie s’ c hil d re turne d to Me mph is o n s ix oc c a sio ns on the ir ow n ac c or d an d tha t App e llant wo uld e xer c ise so me visitatio n ti me w ith h is c h il d b u t n e v e r h a d th e c h il d s tay o v e r n ig h t w ith h im

. A p p e ll ant eve n admitted that Appellee broug ht their child to visit althoug h he could not remember the exact number of times Appellant did so. Acc ording to Appellee’ s unrebutted testimony , Appellant has ne ver a sked Appellee if their child could come to Memphis for an ove rnig ht visit . Further, Appe llant admitted at the juvenile c ourt hea

ring that he has made no attempts to establish visit ation with his child. As su c h, we fi nd that the juv e nil e c ou rt didno t a bu se its dis c re tio n w he n d e te rm ini ng Ap pe llant’ s c hil d su pp ort ob lig a tio n a s it

ha d a su ff ic ie nt e vid e nti ary

fo un datio n f

or de te rm ini ng Ap pe llant’ s c hil d support without giving him credit for his lack of

visitation based on Appellee ’s violation of the pare ntal reloc ation statute and a s it properly applied the g overning law.
L ikewise, Appe llant’s medical c ondition does not provide an exception for the a pplication of t he child support g uidelines in this case
. At the hearing , Appellant testi fied that he cannot drive to Knox ville because he suf fer s from post traumatic stre ss disorder. Appe l l ee contends that Ap pe lla nt p ro vid e d n o p ro of oth e r tha n h is ow n tes tim on y to p ro ve that he wa s me dic a lly un able to t ra v el t o Kn ox ville to visi t the Parties’ c hild, and, thus, was insufficie nt to prove his medical condition. Howeve r, as we have pr eviously stated in T

y ne r v . Tyner , No

. 48, 1985 Tenn. App. LEXI S 3285 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec

. 5, 1985), “a lay witness may testify to [ his or] her own phy sical-8-

conditio n i f [ h e or] she sets forth fac ts . . . .” Id. at *6 (a llowing a wife to testify

as to her deteriorating health condition to determine her a bilityto earn future inc ome). Although in this ca se, Appe llant’s testimonycan besufficie nt proof to establish his medical c on dit ion , A pp e lla nt a dmi tte d tha t his med ic a l con dit ion did no t pre ve nt him fr om t akin g a lte rn a te modes of t ransportation to visit his daug hter. Additionally , as stated e arlier , Appellant has a dmitted to taking no steps to establish visitation with his child. Further , acc ording to Appellee’ s unrebutted te sti mon y , A pp e lla nts min ima lly vis ite d wi th the Part ie s’ c hil d wh e n Ap pe lle e wo uld bring the c hil d to Memphis to vis it Appellant and neve r kept the Parties’ child overnight. As suc h, we f ind that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion whe n determining Appe llant’s child support obligation as it had a suff

icient evidentiary

foundation for

determining Appe llant’s child support without giving him c redit for his me dical condition and a s it properly applied the g overning law. Ac cording ly , we a ff ir m th e de c isi on of

the juv e nil e c ou rt

inc re a sin g Ap pe llant’ s c hil d s up po rt ob lig a tio ns
. V. C ONCL US I ON For the foreg oing rea sons, we affirm the decision of the juvenile court increa sing A ppellant’s c h i l d s u p p o r to b l i g a t i o n s
. C o s t s o f t h i s ap p e a l ar e t a x e d t o A p p e l l a n t , M i c h a e l G r e e n , a n d h i s s u r e t y, f o r w h i c h e x e c u t i o n m a y i s s u e i f n e c e s s ar y.

___________________________________

ALAN E. HI GHERS, J UDGE