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******************************************************
IN RE SENA W.*

(AC 35756)

Beach, Alvord and Sullivan, Js.

Argued November 13—officially released December 26, 2013**

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of New

London, Juvenile Matters at Waterford, Driscoll, J.)
Michael L. W., self-represented, the appellant

(respondent father).

Michael Besso, assistant attorney general, with

whom, on the brief, were George Jepsen, attorney general, and Benjamin Zivyon, assistant attorney general,

for the appellee (petitioner).
Opinion

SULLIVAN, J. The respondent father,1 proceeding

self-represented, appeals from the judgment of the trial

court terminating his parental rights with respect to his

minor child, Sena W. The respondent claims that (1)

the court made factual findings not supported by the

record, (2) the performance of his counsel was deficient, (3) the court improperly denied his motion to

transfer guardianship of Sena to her paternal grandmother, and (4) the court’s finding that the Department

ofChildren and Families (department) made reasonable

efforts to reunify him with Sena was clearly erroneous.

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The court found the following facts. The respondent

met Sena’s mother in 2009. As articulated by the court,

‘‘their relationship included domestic violence, drug

use, criminal activity, and eventually parenthood.’’ Sena

was born on February 3, 2011. Her mother was twentyone at the time of her birth, and the respondent was

forty-two. They were residing together at the time of

Sena’s birth. Sena was born testing positive for cocaine.

On February 7, 2011, the petitioner, the Commissioner

of Children and Families (commissioner), filed a neglect

petition on Sena’s behalf and sought an order of temporary custody. On that date, the court granted temporary

custody of Sena to the commissioner and set specific

steps for reunification with her parents. Sena has

remained in the care and custody of the commissioner

ever since.

Subsequently, the respondent failed to appear at

three scheduled substance abuse evaluations, failed to

comply with court-ordered hair toxicology testing, and

failed to comply with the department’s referral to parenting education classes. The court further found that

the respondent’s supervised visitations with Sena were

‘‘marked [by] his absences and his bellicosity as well

as inappropriate parenting. . . . [A]rgumentative and

disruptive behaviors as well as missing one-third of the

scheduled visits led to a motion to suspend visits and

end . . . supervision . . . [which] was granted by the

court on May 19, 2011.’’ In June, 2011, the respondent

was sentenced to four years of incarceration.

On September 20, 2011, both parents submitted pleas

of nolo contendere and Sena was adjudicated neglected

and committed to the care and custody of the commissioner. Specific steps for reunification were given to

the respondent on that date and acknowledged by him.

As stated by the court, ‘‘[the respondent’s] presenting

issues, as reflected in [these] reunification steps, were

his long history of substance abuse, his criminal activities, his anger management and domestic violence concerns, his lack of parenting skills, and his overriding

mental health needs.’’

The commissioner filed a petition to terminate the
parental rights of both parents on October 27, 2011. As

to the respondent, the commissioner alleged as the sole

ground for termination a failure to achieve personal

rehabilitation pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-112.

A hearing on the petition was held for six days over a

period of five months, during which the court heard

testimony from eleven witnesses. On May 3, 2013, the

court, Driscoll, J., denied the respondent’s motion to

transfer guardianship of Sena to her paternal grandmother, granted the commissioner’s petition, and rendered judgment terminating the respondent’s parental

rights pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B)

(i),2for failure to achieve personal rehabilitation.3 This

appeal followed. Additional facts and procedural history will be presented as necessary.

I

As his first claim, the respondent challenges factual

findings made by the court. Specifically, the respondent

challenges the court’s finding that the respondent was

argumentative with staff during supervised visitations

with Sena at Nutmeg Family Services (Nutmeg), and

once improperly tried to feed two month old Sena an

egg. We are not persuaded.

‘‘Our standard ofreview on appeal from a termination

of parental rights is limited to whether the challenged

findings are clearly erroneous. . . . A finding is clearly

erroneous when there is no evidence in the record to

support it, or the reviewing court is left with the definite

and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. . . .

[G]reat weight is given to the judgment of the trial court

because of the [trial court’s] opportunity to observe the

parties and the evidence. . . . [An appellate court

does] not examine the record to determine whether the

trier of fact could have reached a conclusion other

than the one reached. . . . [Rather] every reasonable

presumption is made in favor of the trial court’s ruling.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Valerie G.,

132 Conn. App. 652, 656–57, 34 A.3d 398 (2011), cert.

denied, 303 Conn. 937, 36 A.3d 696 (2012); see also In re

Alison M., 127 Conn. App. 197, 207, 15 A.3d 194 (2011).

The finding of the court now challenged by the

respondentreads in full: ‘‘On April 14, 2011, [the respondent] and mother became embroiled in an argument

verging on physical violence prior to [the respondent]

leaving [the supervised visitation]. On May 5, 2011, two

months after Sena’s birth, [the respondent] brought an

egg and strawberry banana baby food to feed the child.

He became argumentative and strongly resistant to the

supervisor’s insistence that introduction of these foods

into Sena’s diet be done with the pediatrician’s

approval.’’ The respondent asserts that the court’s factual findings are clearly erroneous because the record

indicates that he did not become angry with the mother

on April 14, 2011, but on a different day, and that he

became angry with the mother and not with a worker
of Nutmeg. Additionally, the respondent acknowledges

that he made a ‘‘bad choice’’ to feed Sena an egg, ‘‘but

did not repeat.’’4

These factual findings now challenged by the respondent are only two findings among pages ofinappropriate

behavior detailed by the court. Nevertheless, even if we

were to assume that these two findings were essential

to the court’s finding of failure to achieve personal

rehabilitation, we are not persuaded that these challenged findings of the court are clearly erroneous; on

the contrary, the record supports each finding. First,

the termination social study created by the department,

admitted as an exhibit at trial, provides that: ‘‘[D]uring

a supervised visit held on April 14, 2011 . . . [the

respondent] and mother began to argue, escalating to

a point where the visitation worker became concerned

that it was going to become physical. . . . [The respondent] also demonstrated a limited understanding of

child development and appropriate care for a child

Sena’s age as evidenced by his attempt to feed two

month old Sena, eggs and strawberry banana baby food.

On May 5, 2011 the undersigned worker attempted to

meet . . . to address the concern of prematurely giving

food to an infant. . . . [The respondent] was argumentative.’’ Second, these events are also detailed in Nutmeg’s supervised visitation forms, also admitted as an

exhibit at trial, in which Nutmeg staff recorded the

events of each of the respondent’s visits and detailed

any concerns. Finally, these events are detailed in the

testimony of Monique Mooney, owner of Nutmeg, and

Christina Little, a department social worker and author

of the termination social study. While the respondent

now asserts that each one of these entries is wrong,

and that he learned from his mistakes, the record fails

to support such claims.

As a result, on the basis of the record before us, we

cannot conclude that the court’s findings were clearly

erroneous. There was sufficient evidence to support

the court’s factual findings and we are not left with a

definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been

made.5

II

The respondent next claims that the performance of

his counsel atthe termination of parentalrights trial was

constitutionally deficient.6 Specifically, the respondent

alleges that his counsel did not receive the commissioner’s exhibits until the day of trial, did not review these

exhibits, and did not review the evaluation of Kelly

Rogers, a psychologist, prior to his testimony. The

respondent also alleges that counsel failed to prepare

the respondent’s older daughter as a witness, caused

family members to wait days to testify, failed to prepare

witnesses to testify, and ‘‘failed to allow respondent to

study and examine reports to build [a] defense.’’ We

are not persuaded.
Ordinarily, we would not review the respondent’s

claim because it was not raised at trial, and therefore,

the record is inadequate to review the claim. See In re

Dylan C., 126 Conn. App. 71, 90–91, 10 A.3d 100 (2011).

Furthermore, the respondent’s claim that he was prejudiced by counsel’s alleged conduct is merely the statement of a legal conclusion and is not adequately briefed.

Id.; see also In re Jah’za G., 141 Conn. App. 15, 36, 60

A.3d 392, cert. denied, 308 Conn. 926, 64 A.3d 329 (2013).

Nonetheless, the evidence on the face of the record

demonstrates that the respondent has failed to establish

that he received incompetent representation at his termination of parental rights trial.

‘‘In Connecticut, a parent who faces the termination

of his or her parental rights is entitled, by statute, to the

assistance of counsel. . . . Because of the substantial

interests involved, a parent in a termination of parental

rights hearing has the right not only to counsel but to

the effective assistance of counsel. . . . In determining

whether counsel has been ineffective in a termination

proceeding, we have enunciated the following standard:

The range of competence . . . requires not errorless

counsel, and not counsel judged ineffective by hindsight, but counsel whose performance is reasonably

competent, or within the range of competence displayed by lawyers with ordinary training and skill in

[that particular area of the] law . . . . The respondent

must prove that [his] attorney fell below this standard

of competency and also that the lack of competency

contributed to the termination of parentalrights.’’(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re

Amanda A., 58 Conn. App. 451, 459–60, 755 A.2d 243

(2000). ‘‘In making such a claim, it is the responsibility

of the respondent to create an adequate record pointing

to the alleged ineffectiveness and any prejudice the

respondent claims resulted from that ineffectiveness.’’

In re Christopher C., 129 Conn. App. 55, 59, 20 A.3d

689 (2011). ‘‘In absence of findings by the trial court in

this regard, we directly review the trial court record.’’

In re Jah’za G., supra, 141 Conn. App. 36; see also

In re Dylan C., supra, 126 Conn. App. 90–91; In re

Christopher C., supra, 58–59.

In regard to the respondent’s assertion that counsel

did not receive the commissioner’s exhibits until trial

and failed to review them, the record indicates that,

although counsel did not receive the exhibits until the

day of trial, he did review them. Specifically, the court

granted a recess from trial to allow counsel to review

the exhibits, and upon returning, counsel stated that

he needed time to review the exhibits with the respondent but did not indicate that he himself needed more

time. On the basis of our review, we conclude that the

respondent’s remaining claims of his counsel’s inadequacies are not supported by the record. The respondent has not established that his attorney fell below
the standard of competency. In re Amanda A., supra,

58 Conn. App. 459–60; see also In re Dylan C., supra,

126 Conn. App. 93 (‘‘[T]he respondent has not identified

where in the record, and we find nowhere in the record,

that [he] alerted the court to [his] dissatisfaction with

counsel and asked the court to appoint new counsel.

. . . The record discloses that the respondent’s parental rights were terminated on the strength of the petitioner’s case . . . .’’ [Footnote omitted.]).

III

The respondent claims that the court improperly

denied the respondent’s motion to transfer guardianship of the child to the paternal grandmother. Specifically, the respondent challenges the court’s finding that

the grandmother declined to serve as a resource when

contacted by the department in 2011, citing her age an

impediment. The respondent further argues that the

court’s denial of his motion to transfer guardianship

was an abuse of discretion. Because the court’s factual

finding was not clearly erroneous, we are not persuaded

that the court’s denial of the respondent’s motion was

a clear abuse of discretion.

The following additional facts and procedural history

are relevant to this claim. On July 27, 2011, prior to

her voluntary relinquishment of parental rights, Sena’s

mother filed a motion for a transfer of guardianship to

Sena’s paternal grandmother. This motion was adopted

by the respondent on August 24, 2012, at the commencement of his termination of parental rights trial and was

consolidated with trial.

The court found, in its May 3, 2013 written decision,

that ‘‘[p]aternal grandmother, while well-intentioned, is

not suitable. She was seventy-six years old at the time

of trial, living alone in senior housing, and in declining

health. She could not stand up to her son. She could

not set boundaries for her son. . . . [The respondent’s]

niece testified as to her willingness to assist her grandmother, but her assistance would be limited and insufficient. Grandmother was anxious and tearful at meetings

with [the department]. She has little interaction with

Sena during her visits, often sitting in a chair and watching her. She ends every visit early. Recently the child

became distraught at one visit and grandmother did not

know how to console the child, though the child was

consoled by a total stranger. Grandmotheris doing what

her son tells her to do, not necessarily because it is

right for Sena, but because he demands it. Sena needs

permanency and stability. . . . The plan to transfer

guardianship to paternal grandmother for the near term

offers only a future of instability and poor parenting.’’

First, the respondent challenges the court’s finding

that, ‘‘[w]hen contacted by [the department] in 2011

with respect to being a resource, grandmother declined

and indicated that her age was an impediment.’’ The
respondent asserts that this finding was clearly erroneous because the grandmother testified that she was

never asked by the department to serve as a resource.

A review of the record indicates that the grandmother

did testify that she was never asked by the department

to be a foster placement on the other hand, Little, a

social worker for the department, testified that the

department asked the grandmother about becoming a

placement resource in March of 2011, and that the

grandmother responded that she was not in a position

to care for Sena due to her age. As a result, the record

indicates that there was evidence before the court that

the paternal grandmother declined to serve as a foster

resource. As the court chose to credit this testimony

over conflicting testimony from the grandmother herself, and because ‘‘[i]t is well established that [i]n a case

tried before a court, the trial judge is the sole arbiter

of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to

be given specific testimony’’; (internal quotation marks

omitted) In re Davonta V., 285 Conn. 483, 488, 940 A.2d

733 (2008); we cannot say that the court’s finding was

clearly erroneous.

Next, the respondent claims that the court should

have granted his motion to transfer guardianship to

the paternal grandmother. Specifically, the respondent

asserts that the court improperly relied upon the grandmother’s age, and that the court impermissibly failed

to credit testimony that indicated that she has a family

network to assist in the upbringing of Sena.7

‘‘Questions of custodial placement generally are

resolved by a factbound determination of what is in

the best interest of the child . . . as shown by a fair

preponderance of the evidence. . . . To determine

whether a custodial placement is in the best interest of

the child, the court uses its broad discretion to choose a

place that will foster the child’s interest in sustained

growth, development, well-being, and in the continuity

and stability of its environment. . . . We have stated

that when making the determination of what is in the

best interest of the child, [t]he authority to exercise the

judicial discretion under the circumstances revealed by

the finding is not conferred upon this court, but upon

the trial court, and . . . we are not privileged to usurp

that authority or to substitute ourselves for the trial

court. . . . Nothing short of a conviction that the

action of the trial court is one which discloses a clear

abuse of discretion can warrant our interference. . . .

In determining whether there has been an abuse of

discretion, the ultimate issue is whether the court could

reasonably conclude as it did. . . . [G]reat weight is

given to the judgment of the trial court because of

[the court’s] opportunity to observe the parties and the

evidence. . . . [Appellate courts] are not in a position

to second guess the opinions of witnesses, professional

or otherwise, nor the observations and conclusions of

the [trial court] when they are based on reliable evi-
dence.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.)In re Valerie G., supra, 132 Conn. App. 662–63.

Here, contrary to the respondent’s assertion, the age

of the paternal grandmother was not the sole basis for

the court’s denial of the respondent’s motion; instead,

the court’s opinion is clear that, while her age was

one factor, the court found the paternal grandmother

inadequate as a potential guardian primarily out of a

concern for her declining health, the negative influence

over her held by the respondent, and Sena’s need for

permanency and stability. Furthermore, the court

acknowledged the willingness of extended family to

assist, but determined that assistance would be limited

and insufficient. Viewing the record as a whole, we

are persuaded that the court carefully reviewed the

evidence presented by all of the parties and decided

reasonably that vesting guardianship of Sena in her

paternal grandmother was not in Sena’s best interest.

IV

As his final claim, the respondent asserts that the

department did not make reasonable efforts to reunify

him with his child, as required by § 17a-112 (j) (1).

Specifically, the respondent asserts that the department

failed to adequately accommodate visitation and notification with his incarceration and ‘‘did not take into

account [the respondent’s] right to raise daughter.’’ The

commissioner responds that this claim is moot because

the respondent has failed to challenge the court’s finding that he was unable to benefit from reunification

efforts. We agree with the commissioner.

Section 17a-112 (j) provides in relevant part: ‘‘The

Superior Court, upon notice and hearing as provided

in sections 45a-716 and 45a-717, may grant a petition

filed pursuant to this section if it finds by clear and

convincing evidence that(1)the [department] has made

reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify

the child with the parent in accordance with subsection

(a) of section 17a-111b, unless the court finds in this

proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to

benefit from reunification efforts . . . .’’ (Emphasis

added.) Here, the court found, by clear and convincing

evidence, that (1) the department made reasonable

efforts to reunify the respondent with his child and (2)

the respondent was unwilling or unable to benefit from

those efforts.

The claim now raised by the respondent was

addressed by our Supreme Court in In re Jorden R.,

293 Conn. 539, 979 A.2d 469 (2009). Interpreting the

language of § 17a-112 (j) (1), the court stated: ‘‘Because

the two clauses are separated by the word ‘unless,’ this

statute plainly is written in the conjunctive. Accordingly, the department must prove either that it has made

reasonable efforts to reunify or, alternatively, that the

parent is unwilling or unable to benefit from reunifica-
tion efforts. Section 17a-112 (j) clearly provides that

the department is not required to prove both circumstances. Rather, either showing is sufficient to satisfy

this statutory element.’’ (Emphasis in original.) Id.,

552–53.

Here, the respondent has not challenged the court’s

finding that he was unable or unwilling to benefit from

reunification efforts. This unchallenged finding provides an independent basis for meeting the requirement

of § 17a-112 (j) (1). See id., 556; In re Christopher C.,

134 Conn. App. 464, 467–69, 39 A.3d 1122 (2012). As a

result, review of the respondent’s claim that the department failed to make reasonable efforts to reunify the

respondent with his child would be improper because

it cannot afford him any practical relief, and therefore,

is moot. See In re Jorden R., supra, 293 Conn. 557; In

re Christopher C., supra, 469. Accordingly, because it

is ‘‘not the province of appellate courts to decide moot

questions, disconnected from the granting of actual

relief or from the determination of which no practice

relief can follow’’;(emphasis omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted) In re Alison M., 127 Conn. App. 197,

206, 15 A.3d 194 (2011); we decline to review this claim.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

* In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142

(b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in this

appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open

for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon

order of the Appellate Court.

** December 26, 2013, the date that this decision was released as a slip

opinion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.

1 The parental rights of Sena’s mother were terminated by her consent

on August 24, 2012. She is not a party to this appeal. Accordingly, we refer

in this opinion to the respondent father as the respondent, and to the

respondent mother as mother.

2 General Statutes § 17a-112 reads in relevant part: ‘‘(j) The Superior Court,

upon notice and hearing as provided in sections 45a-716 and 45a-717, may

grant a petition filed pursuantto this section if itfinds by clear and convincing

evidence that (1) the [department] has made reasonable efforts to locate

the parent and to reunify the child with the parent in accordance with

subsection (a) of section 17a-111b, unless the court finds in this proceeding

that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts

. . . (2) termination is in the best interest of the child, and (3) . . . (B)

the child (i) has been found by the Superior Court or the Probate Court to

have been neglected or uncared for in a prior proceeding . . . .’’

3 Specifically, the court determined, ‘‘In sum, [the respondent] failed to

comply with any of [the department’s] services or significant special specific

step otherthan visitation, and that service was suspended due to [the respondent’s] inappropriate behaviors and failure to appear. [The respondent] was

incarcerated in June, 2011, and may remain so until 2015. The department

can provide no services while [he] is in jail, and there was no credible

testimony that the services provided will assist [him] when he is released.

There was not even consistent testimony as to what services [he] has engaged

in while incarcerated. He has not completed a long-term substance abuse

program with any lasting success at any time in his life. His prognosis for

success is very poor.

‘‘[The department] made reasonable efforts to reunify Sena with [the

respondent] and [he] was unable or unwilling to benefit from those efforts.

. . . [The respondent] has not shown the wherewithal to meet his own

needs. He has shown no ability to meet his daughter’s needs while he is

incarcerated, and he has no present parenting skills.

‘‘The department has demonstrated that there is no reason to encourage
the belief that within a reasonable time, if ever, [the respondent] could

assume a responsible position in his daughter’s life. The adjudicatory

grounds have been proven by clear and convincing evidence.’’ The court

determined that it was in the best interest of Sena to terminate the respondent’s parental rights to free Sena for adoption.

4 The respondent also asserts that, at trial, counsel for the commissioner

impermissibly objected during testimony in attempt to ‘‘stop fact finding.’’

As the respondent’s allegation lacks legal support and substantive analysis,

and the record indicates that counsel was objecting to the form of the

question, in that the respondent’s counsel incorrectly identified the author

of a document, we conclude that this allegation is without merit.

5 The respondent also challenges four other findings of the court that are

eitherinadequately briefed or without merit. First, the respondent challenges

the court’s finding that ‘‘[a]t one point, the [department] worker was advised

by paternal grandfather to avoid meeting [the respondent] at the next visit

forthe worker’s own safety.’’ The respondent asserts thatthis finding is based

upon an impermissible reliance on hearsay testimony that was admitted in

violation of the respondent’s rights under the sixth amendment. A review

of the record indicates that the court admitted this testimony not for the

truth of the matter asserted, in that the respondent actually did threaten

the worker’s safety, but that it was admitted solely as evidence that the

department received such a call. To the extent that the respondent asserts

a violation of his constitutional rights, the respondent has failed to provide

analysis or substantive discussion. ‘‘Where a claim receives only cursory

attention in the brief without substantive discussion, it is deemed to be

abandoned.’’ In re Shyliesh H., 56 Conn. App. 167, 181, 743 A.2d 165 (1999).

The respondent’s challenge is inadequately briefed and is deemed abandoned. See In re Amanda A., 58 Conn. App. 451, 458–59, 755 A.2d 243 (2000).

Second, the respondent asserts that Kelly Rogers, a psychologist, testified

that he met with two prison counselors, and that ‘‘[s]uch communications

are absolutely privileged.’’ The respondent failed to properly cite where in

the transcript Rogers testified about meeting with prison counselors. While

the respondent cites one case, Cabrera v. Cabrera, 23 Conn. App. 330, 580

A.2d 1227, cert. denied, 216 Conn. 828, 582 A.2d 205 (1990), and General

Statutes § 52-146c, which establishes the psychologist-patient privilege, this

claim lacks factual support, analysis, and substantive discussion. We decline

to review this claim because it is considered abandoned. See In re Amanda

A., supra, 58 Conn. App. 458–59; see also In re Isaiah J., 140 Conn. App.

626, 638–39, 59 A.3d 892 (‘‘In [the respondent’s] brief of this claim, the

respondent addresses none of the evidence presented at trial with specificity.

The respondent’s argument is a series of statements paraphrasing the nature

of the claim. Because [c]laims on appeal that are inadequately briefed are

deemed abandoned . . . we are not required to review this claim’’ [Citation

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.]), cert. denied, 308 Conn. 926,

64 A.3d 333, cert. denied, U.S. , 134 S. Ct. 317, 187 L. Ed. 2d 224 (2013).

Third, the respondent asserts that ‘‘nowhere in the transcript did [Rogers]

recommend termination.’’ It is unclear, however, why the respondent makes

this claim because the court did not make a finding that Rogers recommended termination. Further, the respondent failed to cite, and we find no

reference, to the court terminating the respondent’s parental rights upon

the basis of such a recommendation by Rogers. Accordingly, this claim is

without merit.

Fourth, the respondent challenges the court’s finding that his mother

declined guardianship of Sena and indicated to the department that her age

was an impediment. We address this challenge in part III of this opinion.

6 The respondent also requests a review of conflict of interest pursuant

to General Statutes § 46b-129. The respondent asserts that a conflict exists

because Sena’s attorney and guardian ad litem, Priscilla Hammond, ‘‘has

dealt with family of mother on a professional level which had custody of

mother during court case in past.’’ The respondent also asserts that he ‘‘was

not allowed to be involved with consent of mother to her rights. Respondent

must be involved in all of case.’’ The respondent has failed to brief, however,

how Hammond’s representation amounted to a conflict of interest that

adversely affected his interest. We therefore decline to review this claim.

See Bove v. Bove, 128 Conn. App. 811, 817, 20 A.3d 31 (‘‘Although we are

solicitous of [self-represented] litigants, the rules of practice cannot be

ignored completely. . . . We have considered [this claim] and conclude

that [it is] inadequately briefed [and] the record on which to review . . .

the [claim] is inadequate . . . .’’ [Citation omitted.]), cert. denied, 302 Conn.

904, 23 A.3d 1244 (2011).
7 Primarily, the respondent ‘‘is not sufficiently convinced that [the] trial

court did in fact protect [the] constitutional rights of [the] family.’’ The

respondent’s concern is briefed not with substantive discussion and analysis

but instead by a series of statements asserting the importance of family

integrity. As a result, this claim is insufficiently briefed and deemed abandoned. See In re Isaiah J., supra, 140 Conn. App. 638–39.