# United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit Chicago, Illinois 60604

Argued December 6, 2021

Decided August 1, 2022

Before

KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge

DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge

THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge

No. 21-2349

S EIDU I DDRISSU and R OBIN S ANDERS
, Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v

.

A LEJANDRO M AYORKAS , Secretary of U.S. Department of Homeland Security, et al., Defendants-Appellees

. Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois,

Eastern Division.

No. 1:19-CV-04391

Charles R. Norgle,
J udge

.

O R D E R

Seidu Iddrissu, a citizen of Ghana, is married to Robin Sanders, an American citizen. Sanders petitioned to have Iddri ssu recognized as her immediate relative spouse, which would entitle him to lawful pe rmanent residency in this nation. But the immigration authorities concluded that Sand ers’s petition must be denied because Iddrissu had previously sought to evade the immigration laws by entering into a fraudulent marriage. The couple challenged th at determination in federal district court, NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited onl y in accordance with F ED

. R. A PP

. P. 32.1No. 21-2349 Page 2

but the district court dismissed, ruling that under our precedents the couple had not stated even a plausible claim for relief. We agree and affirm.

I

Seidu Iddrissu is a citizen of Ghana who seeks permanent residency in the United States through his marri age to an American citizen. To that end, Iddrissu’s
American wife, Robin Sanders, fi led an I-130 immediate relative visa petition on his

behalf in late 2013. This petition, if granted, would ca use Iddrissu to be recognized as one of Sanders’s immediate family members, see 8 U.S.C. § 1154(b), entitling him to lawful permanent residency, see 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i).

Three years later, United States Citize nship and Immigration Services (USCIS) issued a Notice of Intent to Deny Sanders’s petition. The NOID indicated that Sanders’s petition was to be denied by reas on of the so-called marriage bar codi fi ed at 8 U.S.C. § 1154(c), which precludes lawful permanent re sidency for any non-citizen who has previously sought immediate relative status as the spouse of an American citizen “by reason of a marriage ... [found] to have been entered into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws.”

As it turns out, Iddrissu had previously been married to another American
citizen, a woman named Shirlanda Sivels, from 2004 to 2013. Just as Sanders would later
do, Sivels had fi led an I-130 petition on Iddrissu’s behalf following their 2004 marriage. But in 2006 Sivels withdrew that petition and, in doing so, apparently admi tt ed that her marriage to Iddrissu had been a sham meant to evade the immigration laws. According
to the NOID, Sivels admi tt ed under oath that: (1) her marriage to Iddrissu was for the purpose of his staying in the United States permanently; (2) she had entered into it in exchange for fi nancial support from Iddrissu; and (3) the two had never lived together. The NOID explained that these statements supported application of the marriage bar, but that the couple was entitled by the agen cy’s regulations to rebut this information within 30 days.

In pursuit of that rebu tt al opportunity, the couple requested a wri tt en copy of
Sivels’s admissions, which th e NOID had merely summarized. But USCIS never provided that copy. So Sanders and Iddrissu instead challenged USCIS’s marriage bar determination by submi tt ing a notarized statement from Sivels, Iddrissu’s ex-wife.No. 21-2349 Page 3

Sivels’s notarized statement a tt ested to the bona fi de nature of her marriage to Iddrissu, stating that: (1) she and Iddrissu were married and lived together for six years; (2) the marriage was based on mutual love and a ff ection; (3) they had established a life together; (4) Sivels and Iddrissu often argue d over small things; (5) Sivels had accused

Iddrissu of in fi delity; and (6) they had both decided to end the relationship.

USCIS was unconvinced. In Fe bruary 2017, it issued a wri tt en decision denying Sanders’s I-130 petition under the marriage bar, concluding that Sivels’s admissions of fraud constituted the substantial and prob ative evidence necessary to deem the marriage bar applicable. Although USCIS’s de cision acknowledged Sivels’s notarized
statement, it found that statement insu ffi cient to rebut her earlier admissions. USCIS’s

decision also added a few more details abou t Sivels’s admissions of fraud, including that they were made freely and voluntarily and that they were witnessed by two immigration o ffi cers and by her a tt orney.

Sanders sought review of USCIS’s decision with the Board of Immigration Appeals, which dismissed, agreeing that Sanders’s petition was precluded by the marriage bar. Like USCIS, the Board found that Sivels’s statements a tt esting to the legitimacy of her marriage to Iddrissu failed to overcome her earlier statements to the
contrary. It noted, too, that Sivels’s submission s of a joint lease and joint bank account in support of her I-130 petition on Iddri ssu’s behalf did nothing to undercut her

admissions of fraud. The Board’s dismissal also o ff ered further details on those admissions, including that Sivels had acknow ledged meeting Iddrissu through a friend and described their marriage as “a favor for help.”

From there, Sanders and Iddrissu fi led a joint lawsuit challenging the denial of Sanders’s petition in federal district court. 1 They faulted the agency in two respects. First, they contended that th e agency’s decision was so unreasoned as to be arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act. Second, they argued that the agency had commi tt ed reversible procedural error by failing to provide them with a copy of Sivels’s earlier statements calling their marriage a sham.

1 Iddrissu participates as a plaintiff in this lawsuit under 5 U.S.C. § 702, which authorizes any person “adversely affected ... by agency action,” to seek review of the agency’s decision in federal court. For ease of reference, we at times refer to the couple solely by Iddrissu’s name.No. 21-2349 Page 4

The agency responded by moving to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. In response to the couple’s argument that
its decision was unreasoned, th e agency insisted: (1) that its decision was adequately explained and supported by record evidence; and (2) that Sanders and Iddrissu merely sought reweighing of the evidence, which th e district court lacked authority to do. As for the couple’s procedural argument, the agency maintained that the NOID’s summary

of Sivels’s statements had satis fi ed the relevant notice requirements.

The district court agreed. It concluded that the agency’s decision was not arbitrary or capricious because it had been adequately supported by record evidence and was reasonably explained. It likewise concluded that our precedents rendered the agency’s summary of Sivels’s admissions adequate as a ma tt er of law. Because these

conclusions meant that Sanders and Iddrissu had failed to state a plausible claim for relief, the district court granted the motion to dismiss. The couple then timely appealed.

II

Before us, Iddrissu presses the same two arguments raised in the district court: that the agency’s decision was arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act, and that the failure to provide a copy of Sivels’s statements was reversible procedural error. We consider each argument in turn, assessing de novo whether the motion to dismiss was properly granted, Proft v. Raoul

, 944 F.3d 686, 690 (7th Cir. 2019), because the couple failed to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation and quotation

omi tt ed).

A

Iddrissu insists that the agency’s de cision fell short of the Administrative Procedure Act’s requirements. We review agen cy determinations with great deference,

see FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. , 556 U.S. 502, 513 (2009), and we cannot substitute our judgment for that of the agency, see Dep’t of Com. v. New York , 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2571 (2019). But we remain authorized by the Admi nistrative Procedure Act to set aside those decisions that are—among other things—arb itrary, capricious, or not supported by substantial evidence, see 5 U.S.C. § 706(2), meaning such evidence as “a reasonable

mind would fi nd adequate to support [the challenged] conclusion,” Ghaly v. INS , 48 F.3d 1426, 1431 (7th Cir. 1995). The arbitrary and ca pricious standard requires an agency
to do its homework; decisions that overlook relevant record evidence or lack aNo. 21-2349 Page 5

satisfactory explanation don’t pass muster. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm

Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. , 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). Iddrissu thinks this is one such decision.

We think otherwise. Agencies must satisfac torily explain their decisions, but that requires only that “the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned.” Id. (citation

omi tt ed). USCIS (and the Board in dismissing ) articulated exactly what evidence it thought justi fi ed applying the marriage bar: Sivels’s admission, under oath, that her marriage to Iddrissu was a sham. The agency’s path is crystal clear, not merely

discernable.

Iddrissu insists that the agency gave shor t shrift to Sivels’s notarized statement, overlooking any evidence that contradicted its initial view on the applicability of the marriage bar. He speci fi cally faults USCIS for not discussing Sivels’s statements in its

wri tt en decision: her assertions that her marriag e to Iddrissu was based on mutual love

and a ff ection, that they lived together, and th at the relationship broke down under

accusations of in fi delity.

But USCIS had no duty to go line-by-line through Sivels’s statement in issuing its

decision. Vergara-Molina v. INS , 956 F.2d 682, 685 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting that an agency “need not ... write an exegesis on every contention”) (citation omi tt ed). And the Board, in dismissing Sanders’s petition for re view, did in fact consider those speci fi c assertions. It just found them unpersuasive and insu ffi cient to rebut Sivels’s earlier admission of

fraud.

Iddrissu says this was just a conclusion , devoid of explanation. But what more

could the Board have said? It had two contra dictory statements from Sivels, and it was

entitled to credit one ov er the other. See, e.g., Fliger v. Nielsen , 743 F. App’x 684, 688 (7th Cir. 2018) (“It was reasonable for the agen cy to discount [the prior spouse’s] a tt empt to recant his sworn statement. Courts tend to be suspicious of a tt empts to retract sworn testimony after it produces some un favorable result.”). And the Board o ff ered further explanation, observing that Sivels’s no tarized statement lacked any documentary support, weakening its evidentiary value. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(a)(1)(i)(B)(5) (“A ffi davits should be supported, if possible, by one or more types of documentary evidence ... .”). What’s more, the Board no ted (correctly) that Sivels’s notarized statement did not directly rebut her ear lier admissions, nor even discuss them. Cf. Fliger , 743 F. App’x at 689 (upholding applicat ion of marriage bar where petitioners provided evidence of an a ff ectionate marriage but that evidence did not directly rebutNo. 21-2349 Page 6

earlier admission that the m arriage was entered into for immigration purposes). The Board considered all the evidence that it must and adequately explained its decision.

B

Iddrissu next contends that USCIS commi tt ed a reversible procedural error when it failed to provide him with a wri tt en copy of Sivels’s initial statements. By its own regulations, USCIS needed to inform Iddrissu of any “derogatory” information unknown to him which underpinned the deni al of the I-130 petition, and to provide him with an opportunity to rebut that inform ation. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(16)(i). Iddrissu’s view is that he was denied that opportun ity by USCIS’s refusal to provide a wri tt en copy of Sivels’s statements.

But USCIS provided Iddrissu with all the information that he needed. It told him

that Sivels had admi tt ed to the prior fraudulent marriage. And it o ff ered details, including Sivels’s statements that: (1) she ha d met Iddrissu through a friend; (2) she had entered into the marriage in exchan ge for Iddrissu’s promises of fi nancial help with her children; (3) the couple had never lived to gether while married; and (4) Sivels had contacted Iddrissu only when needing help or a favor.

Iddrissu dislikes that he learned certai n details regarding Sivels’s statements— including that they were made in front of two immigration o ffi cers and her a tt orney— only upon the Board’s dismissal of the petiti on for review. But all that the regulations require is the disclosure of derogatory information, and there’s nothing inherently derogatory about a statement being made in front of government o ffi cials and an

a tt orney. It was Sivels’s allegations of fraud that were derogatory, not the circumstances under which they were made, and the NOID gave Iddrissu full notice of those. To be
sure, details about Sivels’s statements we re provided only in summary form. But a summary provided Iddrissu all the opportunity he needed for rebu tt al in this case. His

a tt empted (albeit unsuccessful) rebu tt al with the later notarized statement from Sivels shows as much. Beyond that, any qu alms we might have about the pro ff ered summary
don’t warrant reversal if harmless, see Sahara Coal Co. v. O ff

. of Workers Comp. Programs, U.S. Dep ʹ t of Lab.

, 946 F.2d 554, 558 (7th Cir. 1991), and Iddrissu makes no meaningful argument that he would have been be tt er able to rebut the agency’s determination had

he received wri tt en copies of Sivels’s statements.No. 21-2349 Page 7

Because the agency adequately explained itself and gave Iddrissu the required opportunity to rebut its marriage bar determination, we A FFIRM the district court’s

dismissal for failure to state a claim.