alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<PAGE>
<TABLE>
                                                                                                 EXHIBIT 12

                                      KENTUCKY POWER COMPANY
                         Computation of Ratio of Earnings to Fixed Charges
                                 (in thousands except ratio data)
<CAPTION>
                                                                     Year Ended December 31,             
                                                          1993       1994      1995      1996      1997  
<S>                                                     <C>        <C>       <C>       <C>       <C>     
Fixed Charges:                                                                                           
  Interest on First Mortgage Bonds . . . . . . . . .    $17,472    $19,090   $19,090   $14,914   $14,867
  Interest on Other Long-term Debt . . . . . . . . .      2,033       -        2,422     6,446     8,597
  Interest on Short-term Debt. . . . . . . . . . . .      1,001      1,621     2,242     2,849     3,034
  Miscellaneous Interest Charges . . . . . . . . . .        523        485       510       555       559
  Estimated Interest Element in Lease Rentals. . . .        800        700       700       800     1,700 
       Total Fixed Charges . . . . . . . . . . . . .    $21,829    $21,896   $24,964   $25,564   $28,757
                                                                                                         
Earnings:                                                                                                
  Net Income . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .    $18,031    $25,273   $25,128   $16,973   $20,746
  Plus Federal Income Taxes. . . . . . . . . . . . .      1,620      2,178     3,914     5,119     9,415
  Plus State Income Taxes. . . . . . . . . . . . . .      1,116      1,154     1,420       598     2,190
  Plus Fixed Charges (as above). . . . . . . . . . .     21,829     21,896    24,964    25,564    28,757
       Total Earnings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .    $42,596    $50,501   $55,426   $48,254   $61,108
                                                                                                         
Ratio of Earnings to Fixed Charges . . . . . . . . .       1.95       2.30      2.22      1.88      2.12
</TABLE>
13195

#### STATE v. SMALLS

(159 S. E., 555)

*Mr. S. G. Mayfield,*for appellant.

*Mr. B. D. Carter, Solicitor,*for the State,

July 7, 1931.

The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Mr. ChiEE Justice Brease.

The appeal in this case is from the conviction and sentence of the appellant for the crime of manslaughter at the February, 1930, term of the Court of General Sessions for Bamberg County.

There are six exceptions. The fifth is in the following language: “Because his Honor erred in granting and holding as follows: (See pages 2, 3 and 4, testimony).” The exception plainly violates the rules of this *198Court. Even if it complied with the rules, it would be difficult, if not altogether impossible, to ascertain what the ground of the exception is. The brief submitted, which is indeed brief, does not even refer to the exceptions, and the same will not be considered. In fact, we could not consider it if we were of the mind to waive the rule.

The other exceptions, in various forms, charge error on the part of the trial Judge in refusing to hold that the grand jury and the petit jury were illegal and invalid, because one of the jury commissioners had not paid, at the time of his participation in the drawing of the jury, his poll -tax for the year 1929, and that a number of the jurors, both grand and petit, had not paid their poll taxes for that year. The questions raised have been decided by the Court against the contention of the appellant in the case of *State v. Mittle,*120 S. C., 526, 113 S. E., 335. See, also, *Mew v. Railroad Co.,*55 S. C., 90, 32 S. E., 828, and *Veronee v. Charleston Consol. Ry. & L. Co.,*152 S. C., 178, 149 S. E., 753.

The judgment below is affirmed.

Messrs. Justices Cothran, Stabler, Carter and Bonham concur.
128 STAT. 1750 PUBLIC LAW 113–143—AUG. 1, 2014 

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY—H.R. 1528: 

HOUSE REPORTS: No. 113–457, Pt. 1 (Comm. on Energy and Commerce). 

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 160 (2014): 

July 8, considered and passed House. 

July 16, considered and passed Senate. 

Æ 

Public Law 113–143 

113th Congress 

An Act 

To amend the Controlled Substances Act to allow a veterinarian to transport and 

dispense controlled substances in the usual course of veterinary practice outside 

of the registered location. 

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 

the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Veterinary Medicine Mobility 

Act of 2014’’. 

SEC. 2. TRANSPORT AND DISPENSING OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES 

IN THE USUAL COURSE OF VETERINARY PRACTICE. 

Section 302(e) of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 

822(e)) is amended— 

(1) by striking ‘‘(e)’’ and inserting ‘‘(e)(1)’’; and 

(2) by adding at the end the following: 

‘‘(2) Notwithstanding paragraph (1), a registrant who is a veterinarian shall not be required to have a separate registration in 

order to transport and dispense controlled substances in the usual 

course of veterinary practice at a site other than the registrant’s 

registered principal place of business or professional practice, so 

long as the site of transporting and dispensing is located in a 

State where the veterinarian is licensed to practice veterinary medicine and is not a principal place of business or professional practice.’’. 

Approved August 1, 2014. 

Veterinary 

Medicine 

Mobility Act 

of 2014. 

21 USC 801 note. 

Aug. 1, 2014 

[H.R. 1528] 


dkrause on DSKHT7XVN1PROD with PUBLAWS
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RYANT TRIMALE PRATT,

Plainti ff

- Appellant,

v.

B. HE DRICKS, Warden; et al.,

Defendants

- Appellees. No. 18

- 15148

D.C. No. 3:16

- cv

- 01129

- JD

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

James Donato, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted September 12 , 2018 **

Before: LEAVY, HAWKINS, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges.

California state prisoner Ryant Trimale Pratt appeals pro se from the district

court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging a due process

violation stemming from his disciplinary hearing . We have jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo

. Lopez v . Smith , 203 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

SEP 20 2018

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K

U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2 18

- 15148

2000) (en banc)

. We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Pratt’s due process claim arising from a

July 2013 disciplinary hearing because the result of that disciplinary hearing was

overturned on appeal. See Frank v. Schultz , 808 F.3d 762, 764 (9th Cir. 2015)

(administrative reversal may cure due process violations).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued

in the opening brief

. See Padgett v. Wright , 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009)

.

Appellees’ motion to strike (Docket Entry No. 14) is denied.

AFFIRMED.
#### CONTINENTAL OIL CO. v. UNITED STATES

[83 C. Cls. 344; 301 U. S. 694]

Petition for writ of certiorari *denied*by Supreme Court May 17, 1937.
11TH COURT OF APPEALS

EASTLAND, TEXAS

JUDGMENT

Rorey Demone Booth, * From the 385th District Court

of Midland County,

Trial Court No. CR48727.

Vs. No. 11-17-00278-CR * September 19, 2019

The State of Texas, * Memorandum Opinion by Wright, S.C.J.

(Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,

Stretcher, J., and Wright, S.C.J., 

sitting by assignment)

(Willson, J., not participating)

This court has inspected the record in this cause and concludes that there 

is error in the judgment below. Therefore, in accordance with this court’s 

opinion, we modify the judgment of the trial court to reflect a conviction for a 

third-degree felony, and as modified, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
# EUR-Lex - 32000R1566 - EN

Avis juridique important

*|*

# 32000R1566

**Commission Regulation (EC) No 1566/2000 of 18 July 2000 amending Regulation (EEC) No 94/92 laying down detailed rules for implementing the arrangements for imports from third countries provided for in Council Regulation (EEC) No 2092/91 **

*
Official Journal L 180 , 19/07/2000 P. 0017 - 0018 *

Commission Regulation (EC) No 1566/2000

of 18 July 2000

amending Regulation (EEC) No 94/92 laying down detailed rules for implementing the arrangements for imports from third countries provided for in Council Regulation (EEC) No 2092/91

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2092/91 of 24 June 1991 on organic production of agricultural products and indications referring thereto on agricultural products and foodstuffs(1), as last amended by Commission Regulation (EC) No 1437/2000(2), and in particular Article 11(1)(a) thereof,

Whereas:

(1) Article 11(1) of Regulation (EEC) No 2092/91 stipulates that products which are imported from a third country may be marketed only where they originate in a third country appearing on a list drawn up in accordance with the criteria laid down in paragraph 2 of that Article. That list is given in the Annex to Commission Regulation (EEC) No 94/92(3), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 548/2000(4).

(2) The Australian authorities have asked the Commission to include a new inspection and certification body in accordance with Regulation (EEC) No 94/92.

(3) The Australian authorities have provided the Commission with all the necessary guarantees and information to satisfy it that the new inspection and certification body meets the criteria laid down in Article 11(2) of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2092/91.

(4) The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Committee referred to in Article 14 of Regulation (EEC) No 2092/91,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

The Annex to Regulation (EEC) No 94/92 is amended as shown in the Annex hereto.

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on the seventh day following its publication in the Official Journal of the European Communities.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 18 July 2000.

For the Commission

Franz Fischler

Member of the Commission

(1) OJ L 198, 22.7.1991, p. 1.

(2) OJ L 161, 1.7.2000, p. 62.

(3) OJ L 11, 17.1.1992, p. 14.

(4) OJ L 67, 15.3.2000, p. 12.

ANNEX

Point 3 of the text referring to Australia is replaced by the following: "Inspection bodies:

- Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service (AQIS) (Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry)

- Bio-dynamic Research Institute (BDRI)

- Biological Farmers of Australia (BFA)

- Organic Vignerons Association of Australia Inc. (OVAA)

- Organic Herb Growers of Australia Inc. (OHGA)

- Organic Food Chain Pty Ltd (OFC)

- National Association of Sustainable Agriculture, Australia (NASAA)"
[S. F. No. 1940.

Department Two.

January 29, 1902.]

#### PHILIP L. WEAVER, Appellant, v. EDWARD A. REDDY et al., Respondents.

Alms-house of San Francisco—Control under Charter—Municipal Matter—Authority of State Board of Health Divested.—The control of the alms-house of San Francisco by the board of health established under the new charter is a municipal matter of which that board has exclusive jurisdiction; and the city charter has operated to divest the authority of the state board of health over the alms-house.

Id.—Suit by Behoved Superintendent against State Board—Beinstatement—Moot Questions—Appeal—Affirmance.—Where a superintendent of the alms-house removed by the state board of health brought suit against them for reinstatement, and appealed from a judgment against him, after the adoption of the city charter, the questions presented by the appeal are purely academic. And as no relief can be afforded to the appellant, the judgment against him must be affirmed.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco. John Hunt, Judge.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

William Denman, and Chickering, Thomas & Gregory, for Appellant.

Reddy, Campbell & Metson, and Garret W. McEnerney, for Respondents.

HENSHAW, J.

Plaintiff alleges that he was unjustly, and in violation of the law, removed by the board of health of the city and county of San Francisco from the position of superintendent of the alms-house of the city and county, and he brings this action against the board of health and against the defendant Edward A. Reddy to secure a judgment for his reinstatement. The board of health here made defendant is the board created by the general state law, which at that time had sole control of the alms-house. Since the commencement of the action, however, the new charter of the city and county of San Francisco has become operative, and under that *431charter another board of health, a different entity, differently appointed, has come into existence. In the case of *People ex rel. Wm.*M. *Lawlor*v. *Williamson et al., ante,*p. 415, the legal existence of the board of health of the city and county of San Francisco, created by the charter, was recognized, but, as not being necessary to the determination of that case, no attempt was made to define its duties. Under authority of the charter (art. X, sec. 3) this board of health is given substantially the same control of the alms-house as theretofore was vested in the board of health created by the state law. That the management of hospitals and alms-houses is a municipal matter, we think requires no discussion. It follows, therefore, that the board of health, defendant in this case, is no longer in authority or control over the alms-house, and the questions presented upon this appeal become purely academic. No judgment that could be rendered for plaintiff upon his appeal could afford him any relief, and thus it would be futile to discuss the propositions which he presents.

The judgment appealed from is therefore affirmed.

McFarland, J., and Temple, J., concurred.
Exhibit 23

                         CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS

         We consent to the incorporation by reference in this Annual Report
(Form 10-K) of Loehmann's, Inc. of our report dated March 6, 1998, included in
the 1997 Annual Report to Stockholders of Loehmann's, Inc.

         We also consent to the incorporation by reference in Registration
Statements (Form S-8 Numbers 333-31701, 333-05751 and 333-05749) of Loehmann's,
Inc. of our report dated March 6, 1998, with respect to the consolidated
statements incorporated herein by reference.


                                            /s/ Ernst & Young LLP
                                            ---------------------

New York, New York
May 1, 1998
#### Frederick A. Mann, Appellant, *v.*Walter Major, Individually and as Superintendent of Highways of the Town of Irondequoit, Respondent.

Argued June 4, 1937;

decided July 13, 1937.

*498
      *Frederick A. Mann*appellant in person.

*Robert W. Lochner*for respondent.

Appeal dismissed, without costs; no opinion.

Concur: Crane, Ch. J., Lehman, Hubbs, Loughran, Finch and Rippey, JJ. Taking no part: O’Brien, J.
- 1

- 

### S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

**C O U R T O F A P P E A L S**

UNPUBLISHED

In re PORTIS, Minors. April 3, 2018

No. 340197 Wayne Circuit Court Family Division

LC No. 16

- 523962

- NA

Before: G LEICHER

, P .J., and B OONSTRA and T UKEL , JJ.

P ER C URIAM

.

Respondent appeals as of right the order terminating his parental rights to the minor children, RJP, SMP, GP, MJP, AIP, and AMP, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)( i ) (parent caused physical injury to child), ( g ) (failure to provide proper care and custody), and ( j ) (reasonable likelihood that the child will be harmed if returned to parent). We affirm.

Respondent argues on appeal that reversal is warranted because petitioner failed to offer

services to facilitate reunification with his children, but this argument is without merit. Ordinarily, “ [ p etitioner] must prepare a case service plan, which must include . . . a ‘[ s ] chedule of services to be provided to the parent, child, and if the child is to be placed in foster care, the foster parent, to facilitate the child ’ s return to his or her home or to facilitate the child ’ s permanent placement. ’ ” In re Mason , 486 Mich 142, 1 5 6; 782 NW2d 747 (2010), quoting MCL 712A.18f(3)(d). However, petitioner need not make re asonable efforts to reunif y the child and the family when circumstances specifically set forth in MCL 712A.19a(2) or MCL 722.638 are present

. In re Mason , 486 Mich at 1 5 2. MCL 712A.19a(2)(a) states that such efforts to reunify the family do not apply to cases where “ [t]here is a judicial determination that the parent has subjected the child to aggravated circumstances as provided in [ MCL 722.638 (1) and (2)]

. ”

MCL 722.63 8(1)(a)( ii ), in turn, provides that “ criminal sexual conduct involving penetration, attempted penetration, or assault with intent to penetrate ” is one of the crimes for which petitioner is not required to p rovide reunification services.

Here, the trial co urt determined at the preliminary hearing that respondent subjected SMP to aggravated circumstances, as detailed in MCL 722.638(1)(a)( ii ). This determination was supported by respondent’s pleas in this case and in his criminal case, where he admitted to

s exually assaulting SMP. Accordingly, petitioner was not required to provide respondent with reunification services. Moreover, because petitioner sought termination of respondent’s parental- 2

- rights in the initial petition, it was not obligated to provide reunification services. See In re

HRC , 286 Mich App 444, 463; 781 NW2d 105 (2009)

.

Affirmed.

/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher

/s/ Mark T. Boonstra

/s/ Jonathan Tukel
§ 38.14 Reasonable accommodations and reasonable modifications for individuals with disabilities. ( a ) With regard to any aid, benefit, service, training, and employment, a recipient must provide reasonable accommodations to qualified individuals with disabilities who are applicants, registrants, eligible applicants/registrants, participants, employees, or applicants for employment, unless providing the accommodation would cause undue hardship. See the definitions of “reasonable accommodation” and “undue hardship” in § 38.4(rrr)(1). ( 1 ) In those circumstances where a recipient believes that the proposed accommodation would cause undue hardship, the recipient has the burden of proving that the accommodation would result in such hardship.
( 2 ) The recipient must make the decision that the accommodation would cause such hardship only after considering all factors listed in the definition of “undue hardship” in § 38.4(rrr)(1). The decision must be accompanied by a written statement of the recipient's reasons for reaching that conclusion. The recipient must provide a copy of the statement of reasons to the individual or individuals who requested the accommodation.
( 3 ) If a requested accommodation would result in undue hardship, the recipient must, after consultation with an individual with a disability (or individuals with disabilities), take any other action that would not result in such hardship, but would nevertheless ensure that, to the maximum extent possible, individuals with disabilities receive the aid, benefit, service, training, or employment provided by the recipient.
( b ) With regard to any aid, benefit, service, training, and employment, a recipient must also make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability, unless making the modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity. See the definition of “fundamental alteration” in § 38.4(z). ( 1 ) In those circumstances where a recipient believes that the proposed modification would fundamentally alter the program, activity, or service, the recipient has the burden of proving that the modification would result in such an alteration.
( 2 ) The recipient must make the decision that the modification would result in such an alteration only after considering all factors listed in the definition of “fundamental alteration” in § 38.4(z). The decision must be accompanied by a written statement of the recipient's reasons for reaching that conclusion. The recipient must provide a copy of the statement of reasons to the individual or individuals who requested the modification.
( 3 ) If a modification would result in a fundamental alteration, the recipient must take any other action that would not result in such an alteration, but would nevertheless ensure that, to the maximum extent possible, individuals with disabilities receive the aid, benefits, services, training, or employment provided by the recipient.
[No. 49723-5-I.

Division One.

December 23, 2002.]

#### The State of Washington, *Respondent,*v. Dominic Jack Simpson, *Appellant.*

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for King County, No. 01-1-00348-4, Laura Gene Middaugh, J., entered October *26,2001.Affirmed*by unpublished per curiam opinion.
**Exhibit 32.1**

 

           Harry Lee Waterfield II and Raymond L. Carr, being the President and ChiefFinancial Officer and Vice President, respectively, of Kentucky Investors, Inc.,hereby certify as of this 13th day of March, 2008, that the Form 10-K for theyear ended December 31, 2007 fully complies with the requirements of Section13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the informationcontained in the Form 10-K fairly presents, in all material respects, thefinancial condition and results of operations of Kentucky Investors, Inc.

 

 

|  
 
 
**KENTUCKY INVESTORS, INC.**
 
 
 
/s/ Harry Lee Waterfield II
 
BY: Harry Lee Waterfield II
DATE: March 13, 2008
       President
 
 
 
/s/ Raymond L. Carr
 
BY: Raymond L. Carr
DATE: March 13, 2008
       Chief Financial Officer--Vice President
  |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
-80 -79 -78 -77 -76 -75

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### NOAA HYSPLIT MODEL 

## Backward trajectory ending at 2300 UTC 24 Jul 06

EDAS Meteorological DataSource★at 39.41 N 76.30 WMeters AGL