This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Reports. Please 1 see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. 2 Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated 3 errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does 4 not include the filing date. 5 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 6 ELLEN COOK, 7 Plaintiff-Appellant, 8

v. NO. 31,211 9 ELECTROLUX CORPORATION 10 and TRAVELER’S INSURANCE 11 COMPANY, 12 Defendants-Appellees. 13 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SAN JUAN COUNTY 14 William C. Birdsall, District Judge 15 Titus & Murphy Law Firm 16 Victor A. Titus 17 Farmington, NM 18 for Appellee 19 Allen, Shepherd, Lewis, Syra & Chapman, P.A. 20 Kimberly A. Syra 21 for Appellant 22 MEMORANDUM OPINION 23 VANZI, Judge. 242 Plaintiff appeals from the district court’s order denying her motion to reconsider 1 dismissal. Unpersuaded that Plaintiff establishe d that jurisdiction was proper in the 2 district court, we issued a notice of proposed summary disposition, proposing to 3 affirm the district court’s dismissal of Plai ntiff’s claim. Plaintiff has responded to our 4 notice with a memorandum in opposition. We have considered Plaintiff’s response 5 and remain persuaded that Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the district court erred 6 in its jurisdictional decision. We therefore affirm. 7 On appeal, Plaintiff argues that the district court has continuing jurisdiction 8 over her case because (1) she suffered her work-related injury and her cause of action 9 accrued in 1983 before the establishment of th e WCA [RP 1-4], (2) the district court’s 10 1989 judgment ordered Defendants to pay futurebenefits and stated that Plaintiff’s 11 claims for future related healthcare expenses would not be barred by the statute of 12 limitations [RP 110-11], and (3) Plainti ff’s current claim challenges Defendant 13 Traveler’s Insurance Company’s refusal to pay for back surgery recommended in 14 2010 and, therefore, she has not filed a new claim; she merely s eeks to enforce the 15 district court’s 1989 judgment ordering open lifetime medical benefits. [DS 1] 16 For the reasons explained in our notice, we agree with Plaintiff that the 17 appropriate inquiry for the current cas e is whether Plaintiff’s December 2010 18 complaint for medical benefits constitutes a ‘claim’ filed after December 1, 1986, that 193 should be decided by the WCA. The New Me xico Supreme Court has stated clearly 1 that “commencing on December 1, 1986, all claims, regardle ss of when the injury or 2 death may have occurred, shall be filed with the workmen’s compensation 3 administration.” Wylie Corp. v. Mowrer , 104 N.M. 751, 754, 726 P.2d 1381, 1384 4 (1986). In response to our notice, Plainti ff asserts, without c itation to authority or 5 other elaboration, that her claim is not a new claim but an enfor cement of an existing 6 district court judgment. [MIO 1] We continue to believe that Plaintiff’s current action 7 falls within the broad language requiring “ all claims ” filed after December 1, 1986, 8 to be filed with the WCA. We disagree with Plaintiff that her complaint for medical 9 treatment was an attempt to reopen her disability benefits in a manner akin to seeking 10 benefits modification within the statutory period for doing so, as it was in DiMatteo 11 v. County of Dona Ana , 109 N.M. 374, 377-78, 785 P.2d 285, 288-89 (Ct. App. 1985). 12 [DS 4] In response to ourproposed analysis, Plaintiff does not refer us to any 13 provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act that would indicate any legislative intent 14 to exclude her claim for medical benefits from the jurisdiction of the WCA. Also, 15 Plaintiff did not file a motion to reopen the compensation order; rather, she filed a new 16 worker’s compensation complaint for medicalbenefits and attorney fees. [RP 116-17] 17 There was no issue or claim in 1989, when th e district court’s compensation order was 18 issued, contemplating the lumbar fusion surgery. 194 Furthermore, as we stated in our notice, this is not a case like DiMatteo where 1 the district court would be more familiar w ith the issues than the WCA. In response 2 to our notice, Plaintiff contends there is no support for the proposition that the WCA’s 3 expertise is any greater than the district court, asserting that District Court Judge 4 Birdsall handled workers’ comp ensation cases before taking th e bench. [MIO 2] The 5 jurisdiction of the district court does notdepend upon the experience of an individual 6 judge. We also point out that it was JudgeBirdsall who dismissed Plaintiff’s claim 7 for lack of jurisdiction. [RP 159] It is clear that by creating the Plaintiffs’ 8 Compensation Act and the WCA and by re nouncing the applicability of common law 9 actions and defenses of employers and employees, the Le gislature intended to create 10 an administrative agency with the authority and expertise to expeditiously resolve the 11 type of claim for medical benefits that Plaintiff has raised here. See NMSA 1978, § 12 52-5-1 (1990). We see no policy or legislative intent consistent with vesting the 13 district court with jurisdiction over medicalbenefits associated with an over-twenty14 year-old order. 15 For the reasons stated in our notice and in this opinion, we affirm the district 16 court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s claim for lack of jurisdiction. 17 IT IS SO ORDERED. 185 __________________________________ 1 LINDA M. VANZI, Judge 2

WE CONCUR: 3

_________________________________ 4 JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge 5

_________________________________ 6 JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge 7