### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Jul y 21, 200 4
STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. RO SE M AR IE HER NA ND EZ
Direc t Appeal from the Bedford Cou nty Circuit Court

No. 15,231 Lee R ussell, Ju dge

No. M2003- 01756-CCA -R3-C D - F iled Dece m ber 16, 2004

T h e d e f e n d a n t , R o s e M ar i e H e r n a n d e z , p l e d g u i l t y t o s e v e n t y c o u n t s o f f o r g e r y, a C l a s s E f e l o n y, which the trial court merg ed into thirty -five convictions of forg ery , and the trial court sente nced he r as a Rang e I I I , persistent offe nder to f ive y ear s and six months for eac h conviction. The trial c ourt order ed some of the sentenc es to r un concur rently and others to r

un consec utively

for a n eff

ective sentenc e of thirt y -t h ree y ear s and six months in t he De partment of Corr ection. The defe ndant
app e a ls, c la imi ng the tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d in app ly ing c e rt a in e nh a nc e me nt fa c tor s in vio la tio n of the ru le
announce d in Blake ly

v. Washington, 542 U.S.

_ _ , 124 S. Ct . 2531 (2004), a nd in deny ing
a lte rn a tiv e se nte nc ing . A lth ou g h w e c on c lud e that th e se nte nc ing pr oc e du re vio la te d th e ru le
announce d in Blakely , we hold it to be harmless bey ond a re asonable doubt. We affirm the jud g me nts of

the tr ia l c ou rt

. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nts of

the Circ uit Court Aff

irm ed
J OS EP H M. T I PTON , J. d e li v e r e d th e o p in io n o f th e c ourt, in which J OE G. R I L EY , S P
. J ., joined. R OB E R T W. W EDEMEYER , J., c on c ur re d in the re su lt.
A n d r e w J. D e ar in g , I I I , Sh e lb y v il le , T e n n e s s e e , f o r th e a p p e ll a n t, Ro s e M ar ie H e r n a n d e z. Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gene ral a nd Reporter ; Thomas E. Wil liams, I I I , Assistant Attorney Gene ral; W. Michael McCown, District Attorney Gene ral; and Micha el Randles, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee
.

OP IN ION
This case relates to the defe ndant’s for g ing c hecks. The Be dford County Gra nd J ury

indicted the def endant for s eventy counts of forg ery , thirty -five f or making forg ed che cks and thirty -five f or pa ssi ng the m, andon e c ou nt o f c us to dial int e rf e re nc e . A t th e ple a

a c c e ptanc e he ari ng , th e Sta te re c ite d th e fa c ts that it

wo uldha ve pr ov e d at tria l a s f oll ow s:-2-

[I ]n D e c e mbe r o f [2 00 2], M r. Do na ld G ibb s w e nt t o th e sh e ri ff ’s de pa rt me nt t o repor t that s o me o f

h is c h e c k s h a d b e e n s to le n a n d ap p ar e n tl y f o r g e d

. A joint investigation wa s conducte d by the [Bedfor d County ] sheriff’s de partment a nd [t he Shelby ville] police depa

rtment[, a] nd they

develope d an investi g ation that led them to the defe ndant. They went to some merc hants wher e the c hecks ha d been f org ed wi t h a photo lineup to include the pictur e of the defe ndant[,] and [] sever al of the
me rc ha nts pic ke d th e de fe nd a nt a s h a vin g be e n th e pe rs on that pas sed th e c he c ks

. They then interview ed the de fenda nt and she admitted she took his chec kbook and sh e a dmi tte d to fo rg ing a ndpa ssi ng a nu mbe r o f the c he c ks

. The de fenda nt pled g uilty to the s eventy counts of forg ery , and the tria l court dismissed the custodial interfe renc e cha

rg e. The trial court mer g ed the thirty -five counts of m aking forg ed che cks with the thirty -five c ounts of passing them for a total of thirty -five c onvictions of forg ery , one for eac h forg ed ch ec k

. P u rs u an tt o t h e p l eaagr ee m en t , t h e t ri al co u rt wa s t o d et er m i n e s en t en ci n g.
At the s entenc ing hearing, the State enter ed the de fenda nt’s prese ntence report into evidence, which showe d sh e h ad t we n ty prior convic tions for forg ery , two prior convic tions for theft under $5 00 , and on e prior

c on vic tio n f

or drivi ng un de r the inf

lue nc e of a n in toxic a nt. Th e re po rt a lso sh ow e d th a t th e de fe nd a nt h a d p re viou sl y been s e nte nc e d to pr ob a tio n o r c ommun ity c or re c tio ns , that she had violated the terms of her rele ase into the community on four separ ate occa sions, and that she committed the cur

rent for g erie s while on parole

. The defenda nt testified t hat she wa s participating in a substance abuse a nd rela pse pre vention pr og ram a t th e Te nn e sse e Pr iso n f or Wome n. She e xpla ine d th a t th e pr og ram to ok a y e ar t o complete a nd included ang er ma nag ement, re laxation t echnique s, and counse ling. S h e s ai d the counseling was he lping he r dea l with sex ual abuse that she ex perie nced as a child. She said that she has prog r e s s e d th r o u g h th e s u b s tan c e ab u s e p r o g r a m a n d th a t a t th e ti me o f th e tria l, she was “re prese nting” some of the inmates at counseling and mentoring other inmates.
The de fenda nt testified that her use o f i l l eg al drug s had led to the loss of her children, husband, sister, dad, and home. She said s h e had be en in a lot of trouble be cause of her drug
a dd ic tio n. She sa id, “ I ha ve ma de a lot of mis take s. I ha ve vio la te d my

c ommun ity

c or re c tio ns ; I did violate my

parole .” She said, howeve r, that she was learning from her mistakes. The de fenda nt also prese nted an a ffidavit fr om a counselor i n Morristown, Tenne ssee, who stated that the def endant had a g ood heart and that she wa s willing to help the de fenda nt throug h the proc ess of re covery
. The state a sserted that the defe ndant qualified a s a ca ree r offender , but the defe ndant challeng ed some of her p ri or convic tions byasserting that they wer e not sepa

rate and distinct
e pis od e s
. T h e tr i a l c o u r td e t e r m i n e d t h e d e f e n d a n tw a s a

R a n g e I I I , p e r s i s t e n to f

f e n d e r
. B e c a us e the counts of f

org ery wer e Class E fe lonies, the ava ilab l e s entence ra ng e wa s four to six y ear s for
eac h conviction.-3-

The trial c ourt applied the f ollowing e nhance ment fac tors pursuant to T.C.A. § 40-35-114: (2 ) a prior his tory of c ri min a l c on vic tions in add it ion to tho se us e d to de te rm ine the app ro pria te rang e; (9) a

previous history

of unwillingne ss to comply with the conditions of re lease ; and (14) the crimes oc curr ed while the de fenda nt was on par ole. The tria l court also applied mitigating f actor s (1) a nd (13), but it did not affor d them g reat weig ht. See T.C.A. § 40-35-113( 1), (1 3 ). The trial court sente nced the defe ndant to five y ear s and six months in p ri s o n fo r eac h of the thirty -five
c on vic tio ns
. When deciding whether

to run the defe ndant’s sentenc es conc urre ntly or conse cutively , the trial court f

ound that the fac t the forg erie s were committed while the def endant wa s on parole and the fa ct that the def

endant ha d an extensive c riminal rec ord overc ame the presumption in f avor of
concur rent sente ncing

. See T.C.A. § 40-35-115( b)(2) , (6). The trial court ordere d the sentenc es for twenty -nine of the counts run conc urre ntly with the sentenc es for six of the counts. I t then order ed those six counts run conse cutively to eac h other, for

an ef fec tive sentenc e of thirty -three y ear s and six months in prison.
The trial c ourt next determined that the def endant w as n o t an appr opriate c andidate f or alternative sentenc ing. After considering the fa ctors provide d by statute, the def

endant’ s phy sical and mental c ondition, he r s o ci al history , the fa cts and c ircumstance s surrounding this particular offe nse, her

prior criminal hist ory

and her previous actions and chara cter , the trial court found that the pre sumption i n favor

of alternative sente ncing was overc ome beca use the def

endant’ s potential for r e h ab il it a ti o n w a s r e a s o n ab ly u n li k e ly

. T h e tria l c o u rt a ls o f o u n d th a t a

h ig h r is k e xis te d th at the def endant would c ommit another crime w hile on probation. The de fenda nt appea ls, contending that the trial court improperly denied he r alternativ e s entenc ing and improperly applied the enhanc ement fa ctors in violation of Bla kely . The state a

rg ues that t h e t ri al co urt properly denied alternative sentenc ing and that the def endant ha s waived a ny

Blakely issue s b y faili ng to present th em in the tr ia l c ou rt

. I n the alternative, the state contends that a ny Blakely violations were ha rm le ss b e y on d a

re a so na ble do ub t.
I. SEN TEN CI NG AN AL YSI S Appellate r eview of

sentenc ing is de novo on the re cord w ith a p resumption that the trial court’s determinations are corr ect. T.C.A. § 40- 35-401(d) . As the Sentenc ing Commission Comments to this section not e, the burden is now on the appe aling party to show that the sentenc ing is improper. This means that if the trial court followe d the statutory sentenc ing pr ocedur e, made finding s of fa ct that ar e ade quately supported in the record, and g ave due consideration and proper we ig ht t o th e fa c tor s a ndprinc ipl e s th a t ar e re le va nt to s e nte nc ing un de r the 19 89 Se nte nc ing Ac t, we may not disturb the sentence even if a diffe rent re sult were pr efe rre d. S tate v. F letcher , 805 S.W .2d 785, 789 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991)

. Ho we ve r , “ t h e p r e s u m p t i o n o f c o rr e c t n e s s w h i c h a c c o m p a n i e s t h e tr i a l c o u r t ’ s a c t i o n is conditioned upon t he af

firmative showing in the rec ord that the trial c ourt consider ed the se ntencing-4-

principles and a ll releva nt fac ts and circumstance s.” S tate v. Ashby , 823 S.W .2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991). I n this respec t, for the pur pose of meaningf

ul appellate r eview,
the trial court must pl ace on the re cord its re asons for a rriving at the final sentenc ing de cision, identify the mitigating and enh an ce ment fac tor s found, state the spe cific f acts supporting eac h enhanc ement fac tor found, and a

rt iculate how the mitigating and enhanceme nt fac tors have be en eva luated an d b a la n c e d in determining the se ntence

. T.C.A. § 40-35-210( f) ( 1990).
Sta te v. Jone s, 88 3 S. W.2 d 5 97 , 5 99 (T e nn . 1 99 4). I n con du ctin g a de no vo re vie w, we mus t consider ( 1) the e vidence , if any , rec eived at the trial and sente ncing hearing, ( 2) the pre s en t ence report, (3) the principles of sentenc ing and arg uments as t o sentenc ing a lternatives, ( 4) the nature a nd char acte ristics of the criminal conduct, (5) any mitigating or statutory enhanc ement fa ctors, (6) any statement that the de fenda nt made on his own beha lf, and (7) the pot en t i al fo r rehabilitation or tr e a tm e n t. T

. C. A

. § § 4 0

- 3 5

- 1 0 2 , - 1 0 3 , - 2 1 0 ; s e e A s h b y , 8 2 3 S. W. 2 d a t 1 6 8 ; St a te v
. M o s s , 727 S.W .2d 229, 236-37 (Te nn. 1986).
Th e rang e of pu nis hme nt fo r a Ra ng e I I I , pe rs ist e nt of fe nd e r is fo ur to six y e ars fo r a Cla ss E fe l o n y
. T.C.A. § 40-35-112( c)( 5). Unless e nhance ment fac tors are prese nt, the presumptive sentenc e to be imposed is the minimum in t he r an ge. T.C.A. § 40-35-210( c). O ur sentenc ing a ct provides that proc edura lly , the trial court is to inc rea se the sentenc e within the r ang e base d on the exis tence o f en h an ce ment fac tors and, then, r educe the sentenc e as a ppropriate for a ny

mitigating fac tors. T.C.A. § 40-35-210( d), (e ). The w eig ht to be aff orded a n exis ting fac tor is left to the trial court’s discr etion so long a s it complies with the purposes and principles of the 1989 S entenc ing A ct and its findings a

re a d eq u atelysupported by the re cord. T.C.A. § 40- 35-210, Sentenc ing Commi ssion Com ments; Moss, 727 S .W.2d at 237; see Ashby , 823 S.W .2d at 169.
We first consider w hether the trial cou r

t’ s a p p li c ati o nof ce rtain enha nceme nt fac tors violated the def endant’ s rig ht to trial by jury . The trial c ourt compl ied with the principles of the 1989 Sentencing A c t w h e n it

ap p li e d e n h a n c e me n t f

a c to r s ( 2 ) , ( 9 ) , a n d ( 1 3 ) to in c r e a s e e a c h o f the defe ndant’s se n t en ces f

rom four y ear s to five y ear s and six months. However , the United States Supreme Court’s B lakely decision aff ects the portion of our 1989 Sentencing Act that allows judg es to find applicable ce rt ain enha nceme nt fac tors and use those f actor s to increa se a de fenda nt’s sentenc e above the pre sumptive sentence in the rang e. See B lakely , 5 2 4 U.S . at __, 124 S. Ct. at 2537; State v. Chester Way ne Walters, No. M2003-03019-CCA-R3-CD, Whit e County , slip op. at 19-21 (Te nn. C ri m. App. Nov. 30, 2004). B lakely specifie s that other than prior convictions, any fac ts not reflec ted i n t h e j u ry ’s ver dict or admitted by the def endant whic h are used to incre ase a defe ndant’s punishment above the pre sumptive s entenc e must be found by the jury , not the trial court. 524 U.S. at __, 124 S. Ct. at 2537.
Th e de fe nd a nt te sti fi e d a t he r se nte nc ing he ari ng a nda c kn ow le dg e d h e r p ri or c on vic tio ns , wh ic h B lake ly

a llo ws the tr ia l c ou rt

to u se fo r e nh a nc e me nt pur po se s. Ho we ve r, the de fe nd a nt a lso-5-

admitted in her testimony to substantial and continuous illega l dr ug use, to consistent violations of the terms of he r prior se ntence s involving re lease into the community , and to commi s s i o n o f t he forg e r ie s w h il e o n p ar o le

. T h e p r e s e n te n c e r e p o rt b u tt r e s s e d th e s e a d mi s s io n s
. I n c o n te xt, the admissions would support factors ( 2), that the defenda nt has a previous history of criminal behavior, (9), that the de fenda nt has a history of unwillingne ss to comply with condi t i o n s o f a sentence involving re lease into the community , and (14) , that the def endant c ommitt ed the instant offense s while on par ole. J udg e Wedemey er ma intains his view held by the majorit y in Walters that an admission by the defe ndant at a se ntencing hearing may justify application of e nhance ment fac tors without violating Blakely

. Howeve r, the majority of this c ourt conclude s that t h e d efendant’s admissions did not constitute admission in the Blake ly context and, theref

ore, that the trial court’ s app licat io n o f f

a c tor s ( 2) , f

or c ri min a l be ha vio r, (9 ), a nd(1 3) vio la te d th e de fe nd a nt’ s Sixth Am e nd me nt rig ht t o tria l by jury . We c on c lud e , th ou g h, that B lake ly e rr ors are su bj e c t to constitutional harmless err or ana ly sis

. S ee Walters, slip op. at 23-25. I n this reg ard, g iven the defe ndant’s testimonial admissions, we hold that the trial court’ s application of the foreg oing enhanc ement fa ctors wa s harmless bey ond a re asonable doubt.
The trial c ourt also order ed six of the defe ndant’s sentenc es to r un consec utively to the others by finding that the def

endant c ommitt ed the f

o rge ri es while on pa

role a nd by

finding that the defe ndant had a n extensive criminal h i story . See T.C.A. § 40-35- 115(b)( 2), (6) . We note that althoug h the defe ndant has not r aised this issue on a ppeal, this court ha s held that Bla kely does not apply to consec utive sentenc ing de terminations. See State v. Ea rice Roberts, No. W 2 0 0 3 -0 2 668- CCA-R3-CD, Shelby

County , slip op. at 15 ( T en n
. C ri m App. Nov. 23, 2004); State v. L awr ence Warren Pier ce, N o. M2003-01924-CCA-R3-CD, Davidson County , slip op. at 16 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 9, 2004). We ag ree with Roberts and Pierce and likewise c onclude that Blakely does not aff ect c on se c uti ve se nte nc ing de te rm inatio ns
. We next consider w hether the trial court erre d i n d eny ing the defe ndant alternative sentenc ing. T he def

endant implies that she is presume d to be a favor able candidate for a lternative
s e n te n c in g p u r s u a n t t o T

. C. A

. § 4 0

- 3 5

- 1 0 2 ( 6 )

. Sh e main ly ar g u e s th a t p r o b a ti o n w a s w arr a n te d

. We note, thoug h, that she is a Rang e I I I , persistent offender to whom the fa vorable presumption does not apply . I d.; State v. Anderson, 985 S.W.2d 9, 18-19 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997). In any event, the burden w as on her to e stablish her suitabilityfor pr obation. T.C.A. § 40-35-303( b) Sentenc ing Commi ssion Com ments. I n order to meet this burden, the d ef en d an t “must demonstrate that probation ‘will subserve the ends of justice and the be st interest of both t h e public and the defe nd an t

. ’” State v. Bing ham, 910 S.W.2d 448, 456 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) (quoting State v. Dykes, 803 S.W.2d 250, 259 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990)).
No brig ht l ine ru le e xists fo r d e te rm ini ng wh a t is ne c e s s ary to d e mon str a te that pr ob a tio n w ill
se rv e the e nd s o f j us tic e a ndthe be st inte re st o f b oththe pu bli c a ndthe de fe nd a nt. Se e B ing ha m, 910 S.W .2d at 456. I n determining whether to g rant or deny probation, t he trial court must consider the circ umstances surr ounding the offe nse; the defe ndant’s criminal recor d; the deter rent e ffe ct on other criminal activity ; the defe ndant’s phy sical and mental health; the def endant’ s backg round and social history ; and the likelihood that probation is in the best interests of both the def endant a nd the-6-

public. State v. Goode, 956 S.W .2d 521, 527 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) ; State v. Parker, 932 S.W.2d 945 , 9 5 8 ( T e n n
. Crim

. A p p
. 1 9 9 6 )

. A tria l c o u r t may d e n y a d e f e n d a n t’ s r e q u e s t f

o r alter native sentenc ing and sent ence a def endant to conf

inement base d on any

one of the following
c on sid e ratio ns :
Confinement is nece ssary to protect socie ty

by restra ining a

defe n d ant wh o h a s a lon g his tory

of c ri min a l c on du c t; Confinement is nece ssary to avoid depre ciating the seriousne ss of the offe nse or confinement is particularly suited to provide an e ffe ctive deter renc e to others likely

to commit si milar offe nses; or Me a su re s le ss r e stric tiv eth anc o n f i n e m e n t h a ve fr e qu e ntl y

or re c e ntl y been a pplied unsucce ssfully

to the defe ndant. T.C.A. § 40-35-103( 1)(A) -(C).
I n deny ing the defe ndant alternative sente ncing , the trial court stated:
There is a presumption in favor of alternative sente ncing [i f the defe ndant is a] mit igating or standard of

fende r in a C, D or E [felony ]; that’s not the ca se. Even if sh e we re, c erta inly

the presumption would be over come in thi s particular case for se vera l
rea sons. One is h er p ri or re cord a nd her te ndency to violate on an
on g oin g ba sis the te rm s o f h e r r e le a se int o th e pu bli c , [th is] s ug g e sts that sh e ha s li ttl e or

no po te nti a l f

or re ha bil itatio n. And th a t is a fac tor that’s set out in [T.C .A. §] 40-35-103, subpart five. Her rec ord ha s bee n to viol a te , some tim e s not caug ht fo r a w hil e , s he wo uldus e i l l e g a l d ru g s e x t e n s i v e l y a n d n o tg e tc a u g h tf o r a w h i l e ; i n v ar i a b l y, sh e do e s g e t c a ug ht d oin g ill e g a l a c tiv ity , o rd ina ri ly so me thi ng to su pp ort th is d ru g ha

bit of he rs . Ce rt a inl y

sh e is a ve ry po or c a nd idate for a lternative se ntencing

. I ha ve take n int o a c c ou nt a ll tho se fa c tor s se t ou t by statut e wh e n ma kin g a de te rm inatio n a s to wh e ther so me on e is e nti tle d to alternative sentenc ing. I hav e re ad the pr esente nce r eport, the defe ndant’s phy sical and me ntal condition, her socia l history , the fac ts a nd circ umstances surrounding this pa rticular of fense , her prior criminal history , her pr evious ac tions and her c hara cter

. I n this case, it’s very important that I consider whether or not the def endant mig ht rea sonabl y b e ex pecte d to be re habilitated and her pote ntial or her la ck of pote nt i al t o be re habilitated. I believe there is very

littl e of that. I

think there is a high risk during the period of any probation that she would c ommit another crime. I t d o es not-7- appea r, re asonably

appea r that she w o uld abide by the terms of probation. And for

these reasons, I am going to deny her pr obation.
W e c o n c l u d e t h a tth et

ri a l c o u r tp r o p e r l y c o n s i d e r e d t h e r e l e v a n ts e n t e n c i n g p r i n c i p l e s
. A c c o r d i n g l y, we will conduc t a de novo revie w of the record with a presumption that the t rial court’s sentenc ing determinations are c orre ct. See T.C.A. § 40- 35-401(d)

. The de fenda nt cites S t at e v
. S m i th, 735 S.W .2d 859, 864 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987) , and
asserts t h at evidence must show that the sente nce imposed w ill have a de terre nt effe ct within the jurisdictio n b efore a trial judge is justi fied in denying pr obation. The trial c ourt, howeve r, did not deny the def endant’ s reque st for alternative sentenc ing ba sed upon dete rre nce. It denied alternative sentenc ing because “her prior rec ord and her tendency to violate on an ongoing basis the t erms of her r elea se into the public, sug g est[s] that she has littl e or no pote ntial for re habilitation.” The trial court de termined that the defe ndant s hould serve her sentence in confineme nt because of a lack of potential for r ehabilitation. We a g ree with the trial court’s finding s. The de fenda nt has bee n g iven the opportunity to r ehabilitate herse lf under less restric tive means, and she has failed to t ake advanta g e of the se opportunities. Moreove r, t he ex tensive record of criminal ac tivityindicates that
s h e i s n o t a go o d ca n d i d at e f o r a l t er n at i v e s en t en ci n g. T h e r ec o rd s u p p o rt s t h e t ri al co u rt ’s fi n d i n gs and its determination deny ing the defe ndant probation or any alternative sentenc e. We conclude that the def endant ha s not met her burden of demonstrating the i mpropriety of the trial c ourt’s dec ision.
Ba sed upon the for eg oing and the re cord a s a whole, w e af firm the judg ments of the trial
c ou rt

.

___________________________________ J OSEPH M. TI PTON, J UDGE