alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 32.2



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



The certification set forth below is being submitted in
connection with this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of SERENA Software, Inc. for the fiscal quarter ended October 31, 2005 (the Report) for the purpose of complying with Rule 13a-14(b) or Rule 15d-14(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the
Exchange Act) and Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United States Code.



I, Robert I. Pender, Jr., Chief Financial Officer of SERENA Software, Inc. certify that:



|(1) |  | the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Exchange Act; and
|--- |  | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|(2) |  | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of SERENA Software, Inc.
|--- |  | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



By:

/s/    ROBERT I. PENDER,
JR.Robert I. Pender, Jr. Senior Vice President, Finance And Administration, Chief Financial Officer (Principal Financial And Accounting Officer) And Director




Date: December 9, 2005
# AGENCY:

 Import Administration, International Trade Administration, Department of Commerce. 

# SUMMARY:

 The Department of Commerce is extending the time limits of the preliminary results of the 12th antidumping duty administrative review of frozen concentrated orange juice from Brazil. The review covers four producers/exporters of the subject merchandise to the United States and the period May 1, 1998, through April 30, 1999. 

# EFFECTIVE DATE:

 January 20, 2000. 

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

 Shawn Thompson at (202) 482-1776, or Irina Itkin at (202) 482-0656, Office of AD/CVD Enforcement, Import Administration, International Trade Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, 14th Street and Constitution Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C., 20230. 

# SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

                     Because it is not practicable to complete this administrative review within the time limits mandated by the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (245 days from the last day of the anniversary month for preliminary results, 120 additional days for final results), pursuant to section 751(a)(3)(A) of Tariff Act of 1930, as                     Start Printed Page 3205                    amended (the Act), the Department is extending the time limit for completion of the preliminary results until May 30, 2000.                     *See*                     Memorandum to Robert LaRussa, dated January 11, 2000.                 

This extension is in accordance with section 751(a)(3)(A) of the Act (19 U.S.C. 1675(a)(3)(A)). 

Dated: January 12, 2000. 

Richard W. Moreland, 

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Import Administration. 

[FR Doc. 00-1260 Filed 1-19-00; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 3510-DS-P
#### § 1918.35 Open hatches.

Open weather deck hatches around which employees must work that are not protected to a height of 24 inches (.61 m) by coamings shall be guarded by taut lines or barricades at a height of 36 to 42 inches (.91 to 1.07 m) above the deck, except on the side on which cargo is being worked. Any portable stanchions or uprights used shall be supported or secured to prevent accidental dislodgement.
#### Commonwealth v. Tompkins

*Robert D. O’Connor,*for Commonwealth.

*Edwin W. Tompkins,*for defendant.

August 8, 1958.

Lipez, P. J.,

This case is before us upon certiorari to Justice of the Peace M. L. Loudenberg, of Chapman Township. The record discloses that defendant was found guilty of a Vehicle Code violation upon unsworn testimony. We believe this to be a fatal defect requiring reversal of the conviction.

The general rule is that a witness can be heard only upon oath or affirmation. The evident purpose is to *404affect the conscience of the witness and thereby compel him to tell the truth: 58 Am. Jur 306.

At common law, any mode of swearing that the witness believed to be binding upon his conscience sufficed: 58 Am. Jur. 307. In Pennsylvania, an oath or affirmation is specifically required by statute in all proceedings heard before judges, aldermen, magistrates, justices of the peace, etc. See Act of March 21, 1772, 1 Sm. L. 387, sec. 1, as amended by Act of April 3, 1895, P. L. 32, sec. 1, 28 PS §251. As early as the Act of May 31, 1718, 1 Sm. L. 387, reflecting a remarkable religious tolerance for that early period, such an oath could be taken according to the “conscientious persuasion” of the witness, or by affirmation for Quakers. See historical note under 28 PS §252. By the Act of April 23, 1909, P. L. 140, sec. 4, 28 RS §252, the right of affirmation was given to any witness, and hence today in Pennsylvania an oath or affirmation is sufficiently elastic to provide for any religious belief or nonbelief. See Commonwealth v. Tresca, 45 Pa. Superior Ct. 619.

In criminal cases where a person’s life or liberty may be at stake an oath is especially important. Hence, it is generally held that witnesses in criminal cases must be sworn or affirmed before they may be allowed to testify: 3 Wharton’s Criminal Evidence, 12th ed., §835. Thus, in Commonwealth v. Capero, 35 Pa. Superior Ct. 392, it was held to be reversible error for the court on the trial of an indictment for felonious assault on a child seven years old to permit the child to make a statement not under oath.

Such a requirement is no less important in the trial of summary offenses where one’s liberty may also be involved. Thus, in Newcastle v. Casacchia, 58 D. & C. 184, where defendant was found guilty before the mayor on unsworn testimony of violating the city ordinance, the court on certiorari (Braham, P. J.) held *405this to be a “fatal defect”, and reversed the conviction (for this and other reasons not pertinent).

We, therefore, enter the following

*Order*

And now, August 8,1958, the judgment of conviction is set aside.
#### HODGE DRIVE-IT-YOURSELF CO et v CINCINNATI (city) et

Ohio Appeals, 1st Dist, Hamilton Co

No 3602.

Decided March 24, 1930

Julius R. Samuels, Cincinnati, for Companies.

John D. Ellis, City Solicitor and Milton H. Schmidt, Assistant City Solicitor, Cincinnati, for city.

CUSHING, PJ.

The duty of the City with reference to its streets is defined by 3714 GC.

Section 3632 GC, provides in part:

> “To regulate the use of x x x x coaches, omnibuses, automobiles, and every description of carriages kept for hire or livery stable purposes; to license and regulate the use of streets by persons who use vehicles, or solicit or transact business thereon; x x x x”

So that the municipality is not only charged with the duty of keeping the streets open, in repair, and free from nuisance, but it may license and regulate^ the use of the streets by automobiles for hire.

Plaintiffs claim that the ordinance is unconstitutional in that there is a taking of property of the plaintiffs without due process of law, and an interference with the inalienable rights of plaintiffs to acquire, possess, and protect their property. On authority of the case of State, ex rel McBride v. Deckebach, 117 Ohio St., 227, we hold that the ordinance is not a discriminatory or unreasonable exercise of the police power conferred upon the City by section 3 of Article XVIII of the Constitution of Ohio.

A decree may be presented accordingly.

Ross and Hamilton, JJ., concur.
#### § 1915.1028 Benzene.

Note:

The requirements applicable to shipyard employment under this section are identical to those set forth at [§ 1910.1028 of this chapter](/on/2024-09-19/title-29/section-1910.1028).

[[61 FR 31431](https://www.federalregister.gov/citation/61-FR-31431), June 20, 1996]
11 TH COURT OF APPEALS

EASTLAND

, TEXAS

JUDGMENT

Gerardo Rivas Jr.

, * From the 183rd District Court

of Harris County,

Trial Court No. 16321 7 9

.

Vs. No. 11

- 20

- 00 1 8 5

- CR * September 25 , 20 20

The State of Texas

, * Per Curiam Memorand um Opinion

(P anel consists of: Bailey , C.J.,

Stretcher , J. , and Wright, S.C.J.,

sitting by assignment )

( Willson , J., not participating)

This court has considered Gerardo Rivas Jr.’s motion to dismiss this appeal

and concludes that the motion should be granted. Therefore, in accordance with

this court’s opinion, the appeal is dismissed.
#### § 2570.70 Scope of review.

The review of the Secretary shall not be *de novo* proceeding but rather a review of the record established before the administrative law judge. There shall be no opportunity for oral argument.
§ 1990.104 Scientific review panel. ( a ) *General.* At any time, the Secretary may request the Director of NCI, the Director of NIEHS and/or the Director of NIOSH to convene a scientific review panel (“the panel”) to provide recommendations to the Secretary in the identification, classification, or regulation of any potential occupational carcinogen.
( b ) *Membership.* The panel will consist of individuals chosen by the respective Director(s). The panel will consist of individuals who are appropriately qualified in the disciplines relevant to the issues to be considered, and who are employed by the United States. The panel does not constitute an advisory committee within the meaning of section 6(b) or 7(b) of the Act, or the Federal Advisory Committee Act (Pub. L. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770).
( c ) *Report.* The Secretary shall request that the panel submit a report of its evaluation within ninety (90) days after the appointment of the members of the panel. The Secretary shall place a copy of the report in the record of any relevant rulemaking undertaken pursuant to this part and allow an appropriate time for public review and comment. If a panel is not established or fails to file a timely report, or if the Secretary determines that it is necessary to proceed without waiting for the panel's report, the Secretary may proceed in making any determination without such report.
( d ) *Other aid and assistance.* Nothing herein precludes the Secretary from obtaining advice or other aid from any person or organization including NCI, NIEHS, and NIOSH.
§ 2570.131 Definitions. For 502(c)(7) civil penalty proceedings, this section shall apply in lieu of the definitions in § 18.2 of this title: ( a ) *Adjudicatory proceeding* means a judicial-type proceeding before an administrative law judge leading to the formulation of a final order;
( b ) *Administrative law judge* means an administrative law judge appointed pursuant to the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 3105;
( c ) *Answer* means a written statement that is supported by reference to specific circumstances or facts surrounding the notice of determination issued pursuant to § 2560.502c-7(g) of this chapter;
( d ) *Commencement of proceeding* is the filing of an answer by the respondent;
( e ) *Consent agreement* means any written document containing a specified proposed remedy or other relief acceptable to the Department and consenting parties;
( f ) *ERISA* means the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended;
( g ) *Final order* means the final decision or action of the Department of Labor concerning the assessment of a civil penalty under ERISA section 502(c)(7) against a particular party. Such final order may result from a decision of an administrative law judge or the Secretary, the failure of a party to file a statement of reasonable cause described in § 2560.502c-7(e) of this chapter within the prescribed time limits, or the failure of a party to invoke the procedures for hearings or appeals under this title within the prescribed time limits. Such a final order shall constitute final agency action within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. 704;
( h ) *Hearing* means that part of a proceeding which involves the submission of evidence, by either oral presentation or written submission, to the administrative law judge;
( i ) *Order* means the whole or any part of a final procedural or substantive disposition of a matter under ERISA section 502(c)(7);
( j ) *Party* includes a person or agency named or admitted as a party to a proceeding;
( k ) *Person* includes an individual, partnership, corporation, employee benefit plan, association, exchange or other entity or organization;
( l ) *Petition* means a written request, made by a person or party, for some affirmative action;
( m ) *Pleading* means the notice as defined in § 2560.502c-7(g) of this chapter, the answer to the notice, any supplement or amendment thereto, and any reply that may be permitted to any answer, supplement or amendment;
( n ) *502(c)(7) civil penalty proceeding* means an adjudicatory proceeding relating to the assessment of a civil penalty provided for in section 502(c)(7) of ERISA;
( o ) *Respondent* means the party against whom the Department is seeking to assess a civil sanction under ERISA section 502(c)(7);
( p ) *Secretary* means the Secretary of Labor and includes, pursuant to any delegation of authority by the Secretary, any assistant secretary (including the Assistant Secretary for Employee Benefits Security), administrator, commissioner, appellate body, board, or other official; and
( q ) *Solicitor* means the Solicitor of Labor or his or her delegate.
§ 2570.45 Requests for reconsideration. ( a ) The Department will entertain one request for reconsideration of an exemption application that the Department has denied pursuant to § 2570.41 if the applicant either: ( 1 ) Presents significant new facts or arguments in support of the application, which, for good reason, could not have been submitted for the Department's consideration during its initial review of the exemption application; or
( 2 ) The applicant received a final denial letter pursuant to § 2570.41(a) before the Department issued a tentative denial letter under § 2570.38 or conducted a hearing on the exemption under either § 2570.46 or § 2570.47.
( b ) An applicant must submit a request for reconsideration of a previously denied application within 180 days after the issuance of the final denial letter and include with the request a copy of the Department's final denial letter and a statement setting forth the new information and/or arguments that provide the basis for reconsideration.
( c ) A request for reconsideration must also be accompanied by a certification that the new information provided to the Department is true and correct, which is signed by a person qualified under § 2570.34(b)(6) to sign the certification.
( d ) If, after reviewing a request for reconsideration, the Department decides that the facts and arguments presented do not warrant reversal of its original decision to deny the exemption, it will send a letter to the applicant reaffirming that decision.
( e ) If, after reviewing a request for reconsideration, the Department decides to reconsider its final denial letter based on the new facts and arguments submitted by the applicant, it will notify the applicant of its intent to reconsider the application in light of the new information presented. The Department will then take whatever steps remained to be completed to process the exemption application when it issued its final denial letter.
( f ) If, at any point during its subsequent processing of the application, the Department decides again that the exemption is unwarranted, it will issue a letter to the applicant affirming its final denial.
( g ) The Department does not consider a request for reinstatement of an exemption application pursuant to § 2570.44(d) as a request for reconsideration governed by this section.
( h ) If an applicant whose application was finally denied pursuant to § 2570.41(a)(1) or (2) cures the application by providing all required and requested information upon submission for reconsideration, the Department will reconsider the application under paragraph (e) of this section. If, upon reconsideration, the Department concludes that an exemption is not warranted, the Department will either hold a conference with the applicant under § 2570.40 or issue a tentative denial pursuant to the procedures in § 2570.38.
#### ROYAL INDEM CO v PEEBLES CERAMIC PROD CO

Ohio Appeals, 4th Dist, Scioto Co

Decided Feb 15, 1929

Marshall & Harlan, Dayton and Bannon & Bannon, Portsmouth, for Indem Co.

William J. Meyer, Portsmouth, for Prod Co.

MAUCK, J.

It appears that the petition was an action on a bond given pursuant to Section 2365-1 et seq. G. C. The form provided for bonds of this character is of a joint and several nature, and consequently the plaintiff had a right to maintain its action against the surety alone unless inhibited by some provision of the general law. Plaintiff in error claims that such provision is found in Section 11, 242 G. C., which authorizes any person entitled to the benefit of a bond to bring an action thereon against the person and his sureties. The claim is made that unless both the principal and the sureties are made parties defendant the court is without jurisdiction to entertain an action against the surety alone. It seems clear to us that this old Section 11,242, governing actions upon bonds generally, has no application to the particular bond under consideration. The bond sued upon was by the terms of the statute authorizing it a joint and several instrument, and there is nothing in Section 11,242 which undertakes to require an action upon a joint and several bond to proceed against both principal and surety in order to bind the surety. The section relied upon is, consequently, not applicable to the case at bar, and this was the conclusion of the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals of this district in Royal Indemnity Company v Cliff Wood, Coal & Supply Company, 10 Fed. (2nd Series) 501 Upon that authority we affirm the judgment herein.

If we were without the authority just cited, and if 11,242 were held to apply to an action brought on a bond given under Section 2365-1 et seq., we would nevertheless be constrained to hold that the defendant could not after judgment attack the judgment as being beyond the jurisdiction of the court of rendition. The failure to make the principal a co-defendant was after all nothing more than a defect of parties. A defect of parties must be attacked by special demurrer and a failure to demur is a waiver of the question. Hoop v. Plummer, 14 Ohio St. 448, 34 Corpus Juris 559.

Middleton, PJ, and Blosser, J, concur.
FI LED U. S . COURT OF AP PE ALS E L E V E N T H C IR C U IT A ugus t 25, 2006 T HOM AS K. KAHN CL E RK [ DO NO T P UB L I S H] I N THE UN I TE D STATE S C OU RT OF APPE ALS F O R T H E E L E V E N T H C IR C U IT

________________________ N os . 06- 11201 & 06- 11455 N on -A rgum entC al endar

________________________ D . C. D o c k e tN o . 0 5 - 0 0 1 4 6 - CR- O RL- 1 9 - K RS U N I T E D S T A T E S O F A M E R I C A , P la in tif f - A p p e lle e , v ersu s C H A R L E S F L O Y D G A N N O N , D e f e n d an t- A p p e llan t.

________________________ A pp ea l s f

rom the U ni t ed S t at es D i stri ctC ou rt f orthe M i ddl e D i s tr i c tof F l or i da

_________________________ ( A u gu s t 25, 2006) B efo re T JO F L A T , P R Y O R an dF A Y , C i rcu i tJu d g es. P E R C U R I A M:2

S t e phe n L a ngs , appoi nt e d c ouns e l f orC har l e s G annon i n the s e appe a l s f r om the r e voc a t i on of

G a nnon’ s s upe rvi s e d r e l e a s e t e rm , ha s m ove d t o w i thdr aw f r om f urthe rr e pr e s e nt a t i on of the appe l l anta nd f

i l e d abr i e f

pur s uantt o A nde r s v. C a l i f orni a , 386 U . S . 738, 87 S . C t . 1396, 18 L . E d. 2d 493 ( 1967) . O uri nde pe nde nt r e vi e w of

the e nt i r e r e c or d r e ve a l s tha tc ouns e l ’ s a s s e s s m e ntof the r e l a t i ve m e r i tof these appeal s i s c orre ct . B ec ause i nd ependentexam i nat i on of the ent i re re cord rev eal s n o arg u ab l e i ssu es o f m eri t , co u n sel ’ s m o t i o n t o w i th d raw i s G R A N TED , and the re vo cat i on of G anno n’ s s up ervi se d rel ea se t erm and the re sul t i ng se nt ence ar e A FFI R M ED .
#### § 2704.310 Payment of award.

Payment of awards made under the Equal Access to Justice Act by final orders of the Commission or its administrative law judge shall be in accordance with the applicable rules of the Department of Labor.
<PAGE>

                                                                      EXHIBIT 23

                          INDEPENDENT AUDITORS' CONSENT

         We consent to the incorporation by reference in Registration Statement
No. 33-39102 and 333-01275 of Lancaster Colony Corporation on Form S-8 of our
report dated August 19, 2003 (which expresses an unqualified opinion and
includes an explanatory paragraph relating to the Company changing its method of
accounting for goodwill and other intangible assets to conform to Statement of
Financial Accounting Standards No. 142), appearing in the Annual Report on Form
10-K of Lancaster Colony Corporation for the year ended June 30, 2003.

/S/DELOITTE & TOUCHE LLP
------------------------
   Deloitte & Touche LLP

Columbus, Ohio
September 25, 2003
### STATE OF LOUISIANA IN THE NO. 

### 2023 KW 1215 INTEREST OF D.M. 

### JANUARY 18, 

### 2024 In Re: D.M., applying for 

### supervisory writs, 

### City Court of

East St. 

### Tammany, Parish of St. 

### Tammany, No. 

### 23JP1021. BEFORE: GUIDRY, 

### C.J., CHUTZ AND LANIER, JJ.

WRIT DENIED. JMG WRC WIL

COURT OFAPPEAL, 

### FIRST CIRCUIT



### PUTY C ERKOF COURT FOR THE COURT
§ 22.6 Prerequisites for issuing a complaint. ( a ) The reviewing official may issue a complaint under § 22.7 only if— ( 1 ) The Department of Justice approves the issuance of a complaint in a written statement described in 31 U.S.C. 3803(b)(1), and
( 2 ) In the case of allegations of liability under § 22.3(a) with respect to a claim, the reviewing official determines that, with respect to such claim or a group of related claims submitted at the same time such claim is submitted (as defined in paragraph (b) of this section), the amount of money or the value of property or services demanded or requested in violation of § 22.3(a) does not exceed $150,000.
( b ) For the purposes of this section, a related group of claims submitted at the same time shall include only those claims arising from the same transaction (*e.g.,* grant, loan, application, or contract) that are submitted simultaneously as part of a single request, demand, or submission.
( c ) Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the reviewing official's authority to join in a single complaint against a person claims that are unrelated or were not submitted simultaneously, regardless of the amount of money, or the value of property or services, demanded or requested.
## In The

Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06

- 12

- 00210

- CR

MARCY LENA MEJIA, Appellant

V.

STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 336th District Court

Fannin County, Texas

Trial Court No. CR

- 12

- 24506

Before Morriss, C.J., Carter and Moseley, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Morriss2 

### MEMORANDUM OPINION

Marcy Lena Mejia has filed four appeals from separate convictions. The convictions

stemmed from her plea of guilty pursuant to a plea agreement. In this particular case, pursuant to

the agreement, Mejia was sentenced to ten years’ confinement, probated f or five years. We

contacted the parties in reference to apparent jurisdictional defects and have received and

considered their response s on this issue. The procedural posture of this case is identical to that

discussed in our opinion of this date in Marc y Lena Mejia v. The State of Texas , 06

- 12

- 00208

-

CR. We addressed th e jurisdictional issue in detail in that opinion, and

, f or the reasons stated

therein, we likewise conclude that we have no jurisdiction over this appeal.

We dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

Josh R. Morriss, III

Chief Justice

Date Submitted: May 16 , 2013

Date Decided: May 17 , 2013

Do Not Publish