Present: All the Justices 

JERALD LORENZO JACKSON 

v. Record No. 031867 OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 

 April 23, 2004 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Relying on a tip from an anonymous informant, a police 

officer conducted an investigatory stop of an automobile in 

which the defendant was a passenger. The issue is whether 

the information from the anonymous caller, corroborated in 

part by police officers’ observations, provided reasonable 

articulable suspicion to justify the investigative traffic 

stop. We conclude that it did not and that, therefore, 

evidence seized from the defendant during a subsequent 

search should have been suppressed by the trial court. 

PRIOR RELEVANT PROCEEDINGS 

The appellant, Jerald Lorenzo Jackson, was indicted in 

the Circuit Court for the City of Newport News for 

possession of cocaine in violation of Code § 18.2-250, and 

possession of a firearm while in possession of a controlled 

substance in violation of Code § 18.2-308.4(A). He was 

also charged with a misdemeanor, possession of a concealed 
weapon in violation of Code § 18.2-308.1

 Jackson filed a 

pretrial motion to suppress evidence, specifically a 

firearm and cocaine, seized during a warrantless search of 

his person. He asserted that the police did not have a 

reasonable articulable suspicion justifying the 

investigative traffic stop. The trial court denied the 

suppression motion and convicted Jackson of the charged 

offenses. 

Jackson appealed his convictions to the Court of 

Appeals of Virginia. That court affirmed the convictions 

and the judgment of the circuit court. Jackson v. 

Commonwealth, 39 Va. App. 624, 576 S.E.2d 206 (2003). Upon 

granting Jackson’s petition for a rehearing en banc, 

Jackson v. Commonwealth, 40 Va. App. 88, 578 S.E.2d 51 

(2003), the Court of Appeals again affirmed the 

convictions, Jackson v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 211, 583 

S.E.2d 780 (2003). We awarded Jackson this appeal limited 

to the question whether the circuit court erred in denying 

Jackson’s pretrial motion to suppress. 

RELEVANT FACTS 

At approximately 2:10 a.m. on June 17, 2001, M. A. 

Cook, a police officer with the City of Newport News Police 

 1

 The misdemeanor charge was on appeal to the circuit 

court. See Code § 16.1-132. 

2
Department, received a dispatch, based on information from 

an anonymous caller, regarding a firearm. According to 

Officer Cook, “[u]nits were dispatched to 34th [Street] and 

Jefferson [Avenue]. . . . in reference to three black males 

in a white Honda that were disorderly and one of the 

subjects brandished a firearm.” There was a small bar and 

a gasoline station situated at that location. As Officer 

Cook was approaching the specified intersection 

approximately five minutes after receiving the dispatch, he 

observed a white Honda automobile that was occupied by 

three black males. The vehicle was leaving the gasoline 

station and “pulled out right in front of” Officer Cook, 

allowing the headlights of his vehicle to shine into the 

window of the Honda automobile. At that point, Officer 

Cook executed a “U-turn” and proceeded to follow the Honda 

automobile until other police units arrived. He then 

executed a traffic stop, causing the automobile to pull 

into the parking lot of a fast-food restaurant. Officer 

Cook approached the driver of the vehicle and explained the 

reason for the traffic stop. The defendant was sitting in 

the front passenger seat of the vehicle. 

Sergeant James Hogan, another police officer who 

responded to the dispatch, assisted Officer Cook in the 

traffic stop. Sergeant Hogan approached the stopped Honda 

3
vehicle from the rear and moved up to the front door on the 

passenger side. He then shined his flashlight into the 

vehicle and spotted Jackson sitting in the front passenger 

seat. 

The defendant had his arms folded across his stomach, 

but Sergeant Hogan noticed a bulge in Jackson’s shirt under 

his arms just above the waistband of his pants. According 

to Sergeant Hogan, “[the] bulge . . . obviously was not 

part of [Jackson’s] body[;] . . . it was too big” to be 

anything other than a firearm. Sergeant Hogan asked 

Jackson if he had a firearm, and Jackson responded, “No.” 

Sergeant Hogan requested Jackson to move his hands, but 

Jackson just raised his hands and put them back on his 

stomach. Sergeant Hogan then asked Jackson to pull his 

shirt up, but Jackson merely pulled his shirt out a few 

inches and then put it back, placing his arms back across 

his stomach. 

Due to Jackson’s unwillingness to cooperate with 

Sergeant Hogan’s requests, Sergeant Hogan pulled his 

firearm out of its holster, pointed it at Jackson, and 

directed him to get out of the vehicle. As Jackson was 

doing so, Officer Brendan D. Bartley, who was standing 

behind Sergeant Hogan, reached around Jackson and removed a 

firearm from the waistband of Jackson’s pants. The firearm 

4
was underneath Jackson’s shirt. Officer Bartley handcuffed 

Jackson and proceeded to search him subsequent to arrest. 

During that search, Officer Bartley found four, 

individually wrapped “rocks of cocaine” in the left pocket 

of Jackson’s pants. 

Officer Cook acknowledged that the driver of the Honda 

automobile was not violating any traffic laws and that he 

would not have stopped the vehicle except for the dispatch. 

He also did not have any information other than what was 

contained in the original dispatch to the police officers. 

Similarly, Sergeant Hogan knew of no efforts to confirm the 

information received by the dispatcher. Like Officer Cook, 

he saw the white Honda automobile and it matched the 

description of the vehicle for which they were looking. 

So, Sergeant Hogan turned his police vehicle around and 

followed Officer Cook, who was pursuing the white Honda 

automobile. Likewise, Officer Bartley responded to the 

original dispatch and saw the white Honda vehicle turning 

southbound on Jefferson Avenue. He did, however, testify 

that he had a clear vision of the entire parking lot at the 

small bar and he did not see another white Honda automobile 

there. 

ANALYSIS 

5
The Fourth Amendment protects “persons” from 

“unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. 

IV. An investigatory stop (sometimes referred to as a 

“Terry stop”), such as the traffic stop at issue in this 

case, constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the 

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments “even though the purpose 

of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite 

brief.” Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979); see

United States v. Hassan El, 5 F.3d 726, 729 (4th Cir. 

1993). Consequently, such action by a police officer “must 

be justified by probable cause or a reasonable suspicion, 

based on specific and articulable facts, of unlawful 

conduct.” Hassan El, 5 F.3d at 729; see Bass v. 

Commonwealth, 259 Va. 470, 475, 525 S.E.2d 921, 923-24 

(2000)(“stop of an automobile . . . is unreasonable under 

the Fourth Amendment absent a reasonable, articulable 

suspicion that the driver is unlicensed or that the 

automobile is not registered, or that either the vehicle or 

an occupant is otherwise subject to seizure for violation 

of the law”); United States v. Bell, 183 F.3d 746, 749 (8th 

Cir. 1999) (“An investigative stop does not violate the 

Fourth Amendment if the police have reasonable suspicion 

that the vehicle or its occupants are involved in criminal 

activity.”) If evidence is seized during an illegal stop, 

6
it is not admissible at trial under the doctrine known as 

“the fruit of the poisonous tree.” Hassan El, 5 F.3d at 

729; see Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). 

The issue we decide in this appeal is whether the anonymous 

tip together with the police officers’ observations of the 

white Honda automobile and its occupants provided 

reasonable articulable suspicion to justify the 

investigative traffic stop. 

In deciding that issue and reviewing the trial court’s 

denial of Jackson’s motion to suppress, we consider the 

evidence and all reasonable inferences flowing from that 

evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 

the prevailing party at trial. Bass, 259 Va. at 475, 525 

S.E.2d at 924. Since the constitutionality of a search and 

seizure under the Fourth Amendment involves questions of 

law and fact, we give deference to the factual findings of 

the trial court but independently decide whether, under the 

applicable law, the manner in which the challenged evidence 

was obtained satisfies constitutional requirements. McCain 

v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 483, 490, 545 S.E.2d 541, 545 

(2001); see Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696-97 

(1996). The Commonwealth carries the burden of showing 

that a warrantless search and seizure was constitutionally 

permissible. Simmons v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 200, 204, 

7
380 S.E.2d 656, 659 (1989). However, a defendant must 

show, when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the Commonwealth, that the denial of the motion to 

suppress evidence was reversible error. McCain, 261 Va. at 

490, 545 S.E.2d at 545; Fore v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 1007, 

1010, 265 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1980). 

The constitutionality of the traffic stop in this case 

turns on whether the anonymous tip sufficed to give rise to 

reasonable suspicion. Reasonable suspicion is something 

“more than an ‘inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 

“hunch” ’ of criminal activity.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 

U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 

(1968)). However, it is something less than probable 

cause. Bass, 259 Va. at 475, 525 S.E.2d at 923. In 

Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990), the Supreme 

Court of the United States explained that 

[r]easonable suspicion is a less demanding standard 

than probable cause not only in the sense that 

reasonable suspicion can be established with 

information that is different in quantity or content 

than that required to establish probable cause, but 

also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise 

from information that is less reliable than that 

required to show probable cause. 

The “totality of the circumstances,” which includes 

“the content of information possessed by police and its 

degree of reliability,” i.e. “quantity and quality,” must 

8
be considered when determining whether reasonable suspicion 

exits. Id. “[I]f a tip has a relatively low degree of 

reliability, more information will be required to establish 

the requisite quantum of suspicion than would be required 

if the tip were more reliable.” Id.; see also Illinois v. 

Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 233 (1983) (“a deficiency in one [the 

informant’s ‘veracity’ or ‘reliability’ and his or her 

‘basis of knowledge’] may be compensated for, in 

determining the overall reliability of a tip, by a strong 

showing as to the other, or by some other indicia of 

reliability”). The converse is likewise true. See State 

v. Rutzinski, 623 N.W.2d 516, 522 (Wis. 2001) (“if there 

are strong indicia of the informant’s veracity, there need 

not necessarily be any indicia of the informant’s basis of 

knowledge”). 

The interplay between an informant’s reliability and 

the informant’s basis of knowledge is illustrated by 

comparing the decision in Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 

with the decision in Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 

(1972). In the former case, the police received a 

telephone call from an anonymous informant who stated that 

the defendant would leave a particular address “at a 

particular time in a brown Plymouth station wagon with the 

right taillight lens broken,” would drive to a named motel, 

9
and would be in possession of cocaine inside a brown 

attaché case. White, 496 U.S. at 327. The police 

proceeded to the specified address where they observed both 

the automobile as described by the informant and the 

defendant as she left the building and drove away in the 

automobile. Id. The police followed the vehicle as it 

proceeded along the most direct route to the named motel. 

Id. The police stopped the defendant’s vehicle shortly 

before it reached the motel and conducted a consensual 

search of the station wagon. Id. During the search, the 

police found the brown attaché case, which contained 

marijuana. Id. They also discovered cocaine in the 

defendant’s purse. Id. At trial, the defendant moved to 

suppress the evidence seized during the search on the basis 

that the police officers did not have a reasonable 

suspicion justifying the initial investigative stop. Id.

at 327-328. 

Although the Supreme Court described White as a 

“close” case, it concluded “that under the totality of the 

circumstances the anonymous tip, as corroborated, exhibited 

sufficient indicia of reliability to justify the 

investigatory stop” of the defendant’s vehicle. Id. at 

332. The Court acknowledged that the police officers had 

not verified every detail mentioned by the anonymous caller 

10
but that they had corroborated certain facts, including 

that a woman had left a particular building, had gotten 

into the described automobile, and had driven along the 

most direct route toward the named motel. Id. at 331. The 

Court stated that it was “important that . . . ‘the 

anonymous [tip] contained a range of details relating not 

just to easily obtained facts and conditions existing at 

the time of the tip, but to future actions of third parties 

ordinarily not easily predicted.’ ” Id. at 332 (quoting 

Gates, 462 U.S. at 245). The Court explained that the 

police officers’ finding an automobile exactly as the 

anonymous caller had described in front of a particular 

building was an example of readily obtained facts which 

anyone could have known. Id. at 332. However, “[w]hat was 

important was the caller’s ability to predict [the 

defendant’s] future behavior, because it demonstrated 

inside information − a special familiarity with [the 

defendant’s] affairs” that the general public would have no 

way of knowing. Id. Once the police verified the caller’s 

predictions, it was reasonable to conclude that the caller 

had reliable information about the defendant’s illegal 

activities. Id. That “basis of knowledge” provided the 

anonymous caller with sufficient indicia of reliability to 

justify the investigatory stop. Id. at 329. 

11
In contrast, the decision in Adams v. Williams turned 

on the informant’s veracity rather than the informant’s 

basis of knowledge. There, an informant approached a 

police officer and stated that “an individual seated in a 

nearby vehicle was carrying narcotics and had a gun at his 

waist.” 407 U.S. at 144-45. The informant was personally 

known by the police officer and had provided him with 

information in the past. Id. at 146. Based on the 

informant’s tip, the police officer approached the vehicle 

and, when the defendant rolled down the window, the officer 

reached into the vehicle and removed a fully loaded firearm 

from the defendant’s waistband. Id. at 145. The firearm 

was not visible to the police officer from outside the 

automobile, but it was located precisely where the 

informant had indicated. Id. During a subsequent search 

incident to arrest, police officers found heroin, a 

machete, and another firearm. Id.

Emphasizing that the police officer personally knew 

the informant and had received information from him in the 

past, the Supreme Court concluded that the officer “acted 

justifiably in responding to his informant’s tip.” Id. at 

146. The Court stated that this case was “stronger” than 

one involving “an anonymous telephone tip” because “[t]he 

informant here came forward personally to give information 

12
that was immediately verifiable at the scene.” Id. Also 

important in the Court’s analysis was the fact that the 

informant might have been subject to immediate arrest for 

making a false complaint had the officer’s investigation 

proved the tip to be false. Id. at 147. 

This analysis brings us to the Supreme Court’s most 

recent case involving an anonymous informant, Florida v. 

J. L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000). There, an anonymous caller 

reported to the police “that a young black male standing at 

a particular bus stop and wearing a plaid shirt was 

carrying a gun.” Id. at 268. There was no audio recording 

of the call, and the police did not know anything about the 

caller. Id. Proceeding on the information provided by the 

informant, the police went to the bus stop and observed 

three black males there. Id. One of them, J. L., was 

wearing a plaid shirt. Id. Apart from the anonymous tip, 

the police did not observe any suspicious behavior, nor did 

the officers see a firearm. Id. Nevertheless, “[o]ne of 

the officers approached J. L., told him to put his hands up 

on the bus stop, frisked him, and seized a gun from J. L.’s 

pocket.” Id. J. L. was charged with carrying a concealed 

weapon without a license and possessing a firearm while 

under the age of 18. Id. at 269. At trial, he moved to 

suppress the introduction of the firearm that was seized 

13
from him on the basis that it was “the fruit of an unlawful 

search.” Id.

The question presented to the Supreme Court was 

whether the anonymous tip pointing to J. L. had the 

required indicia of reliability as enunciated in Adams and 

White. Id. at 270. In J. L., the officers’ suspicion that 

the defendant was carrying a concealed weapon came not from 

their own observations “but solely from a call made from an 

unknown location by an unknown caller.” Id. Thus, the 

Court concluded that, unlike a tip such as the one in Adams

where the informant was known and could be held responsible 

if the allegations were proven to be false, “ ‘an anonymous 

tip alone seldom demonstrates the informant’s basis of 

knowledge or veracity.’ ” Id. (quoting White, 496 U.S. at 

329). 

The tip concerning J. L. also lacked the indicia of 

reliability present in White because the anonymous caller 

did not provide any “predictive information” which the 

police could use to test the informant’s basis of knowledge 

or credibility. Id. at 271. The fact that the informant 

provided an accurate description of an “observable location 

and appearance” served only to “help the police correctly 

identify the person whom the tipster [meant] to accuse.” 

Id. at 272. The reasonable suspicion at issue in J. L. was 

14
whether the informant was reliable in the assertion of 

concealed criminal activity, “not just in [the tip’s] 

tendency to identify a determinate person.” Id. Thus, 

since all the police had in J. L. was “the bare report of 

an unknown, unaccountable informant who neither explained 

how he knew about the gun nor supplied any basis for 

believing he had inside information about J. L.,” the Court 

concluded that the investigatory stop and ensuing search 

were unconstitutional. Id. at 271. 

The Court also rejected a “firearm exception” to its 

well-established reliability analysis. Such an exception 

would allow a stop and frisk when a tip alleges an illegal 

firearm even if the tip lacked sufficient indicia of 

reliability. Id. at 272. But, the Court pointed out that 

it was not saying that there could never be “circumstances 

under which the danger alleged in an anonymous tip might be 

so great as to justify a search even without a showing of 

reliability,” such as information that a person is carrying 

a bomb. Id. at 273. 

Turning now to the case before us, we agree with the 

statement that “[r]arely are the facts of two cases as 

congruent as the facts in J. L. and this case.” Jackson, 

41 Va. App. at 240, 583 S.E.2d at 795 (Benton, J., 

dissenting). As in J. L., Officer Cook had nothing more to 

15
go on than an anonymous, unaccountable informant who 

neither explained how he knew that Jackson was brandishing 

a firearm nor furnished any basis for believing that he had 

inside knowledge about Jackson. Both the “quantity and 

quality” of the information supplied to the police here 

lacked sufficient indicia of reliability to justify the 

investigatory stop. Nor did the police officers observe 

any suspicious behavior once they spotted the white Honda 

automobile. 

Unlike the informant in Adams, the caller in this case 

was not known to the police nor did he or she personally 

appear before an officer. Thus, the informant was not 

subjecting himself or herself to possible arrest if the 

information provided to the dispatcher proved false. See

Code § 18.2-461. In other words, the informant was not 

placing his or her credibility at risk and could “lie with 

impunity.” J. L., 529 U.S. at 275 (Kennedy, J., 

concurring). There also is no evidence that the caller had 

supplied information on any previous occasions. When, as 

in this case, there are virtually no indicia of the 

informant’s veracity, more information is required in order 

“to establish the requisite quantum of suspicion than would 

be required if the tip were more reliable.” White, 496 

U.S. at 330. 

16
The tip in this case, however, also lacked sufficient 

information to demonstrate the informant’s basis of 

knowledge and to establish the “requisite quantum of 

suspicion.” Id. The Court of Appeals correctly noted that 

Officer Cook verified six details reported by the 

informant: the make and color of the vehicle; its location; 

and the number, race, and gender of the vehicle’s 

occupants. Jackson, 41 Va. App. at 229, 583 S.E.2d at 789. 

Based on the officer’s verification of these details, the 

Court of Appeals concluded that it was objectively 

reasonable for the officer to believe “that the remaining 

portion of the tip − that one of the suspects had brandished 

a firearm only moments before − was likewise true.” Id. We 

do not agree. The tip included only “easily obtained facts 

and conditions existing at the time of the tip” which 

anyone could have known, including the allegation of 

brandishing a firearm. White, 496 U.S. at 332. It failed 

to include the kind of details critical to the Supreme 

Court’s analysis in White, predictions about the 

defendant’s future behavior. Such details are important 

because they demonstrate “inside information” that would 

not be available to the public generally. Id.

Thus, as in J. L., “[t]he anonymous call . . . 

provided no predictive information and therefore left the 

17
police without means to test the informant’s knowledge or 

credibility.” 529 U.S. at 271. That the officers in fact 

found a gun when they searched Jackson does not mean that, 

prior to the search, they had a reasonable basis for 

believing that Jackson had engaged in criminal conduct. 

See id. Even when an informant reports the commission of 

an open and obvious crime, if the tip is truly anonymous 

and provides no explanation for how the informant acquired 

the information, i.e., the informant’s basis of knowledge, 

there remains a “layer of inquiry respecting the 

reliability of the informant that cannot be pursued.” 

J. L., 529 U.S. at 275 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 

The Court of Appeals distinguished this case from 

J. L. and found the tip here 

“reliable in its assertion of illegality” because 

this tip − unlike the “carrying a gun” tip in J.L.

− provided information permitting the officers 

reasonably to infer that it (i) came from a 

concerned citizen making a contemporaneous 

eyewitness report, (ii) involved an open and 

obvious crime rather than mere concealed 

illegality,[2

] and (iii) described criminality 

posing an imminent danger to the public. 

 2

 The Court of Appeals stated that “[w]hen an anonymous 

caller reports an open and obvious crime . . . , the Fourth 

Amendment may require no showing that the caller have 

inside information about the suspect capable of predicting 

his future conduct.” Jackson, 41 Va. App. at 227, 583 

S.E.2d at 788. In support of that assertion, the court, in 

a footnote, cited its decision in Beckner v. Commonwealth, 

15 Va. App. 533, 535, 425 S.E.2d 530, 531 (1993). However, 

in Beckner, it was not necessary for the informant to have 

18
Jackson, 41 Va. App. at 235, 583 S.E.2d at 792 (quoting 

J. L., 529 U.S. at 272) (internal citation omitted). 

However, the first factual predicate is not supported by 

the record, the second factor does not distinguish this 

case from J. L., and the third element was rejected by the 

Supreme Court in J. L.

As to the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that this tip 

came from a concerned citizen making an eyewitness report, 

the record contains the testimony of two police officers 

concerning the dispatch that directed them to proceed to 

34th Street and Jefferson Avenue. Officer Cook stated that 

“[w]e were dispatched in reference to three black males in 

a white Honda [who] were disorderly and one of the subjects 

brandished a firearm.” Sergeant Hogan testified that he 

was backing up Officer Cook “on a call that someone was 

brandishing a firearm and that they were getting, he and 

two other guys were getting into a car and leaving.” This 

testimony is the police officers’ recitation of the 

information reported to them by the police dispatcher. The 

dispatcher did not testify nor is there any evidence that 

 

predicted future action by the defendant because the 

informant had “a face-to-face confrontation with the police 

officer.” Id., 425 S.E.2d at 532. Thus, the informant had 

subjected himself to possible prosecution if he gave false 

information. 

19
the informant’s call was audio-recorded or its content 

preserved in some other manner. 

Thus, even when viewing the police officers’ testimony 

in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth and 

imputing the dispatcher’s knowledge to the officers, see

Feathers v. Aey, 319 F.3d 843, 849 (6th Cir. 2003), there 

simply is no evidence from which a reasonable inference can 

be drawn that the informant in this case was a concerned 

citizen making an eyewitness report as a crime was being 

committed as opposed to a prankster or someone with a 

grudge against Jackson. The informant provided no details 

about himself or herself, cf. State v. Williams, 623 N.W.2d 

106, 114 (Wis. 2001) (informant provided “self-identifying 

information”); no descriptive facts showing that he or she 

personally observed the firearm instead of having received 

information from another person; and no time frame for when 

the illegal activity was observed, cf. United States v. 

Thompson, 234 F.3d 725, 727 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (tipster 

stated that he “just saw” the defendant with a gun).3 In 

other words, the anonymous informant here provided no basis 

for his or her knowledge. 

 3

 The evidence showed only that Officer Cook arrived 

at the scene approximately five minutes after receiving the 

dispatch. 

20
Implicit in the second factor central to the Court of 

Appeals’ holding is its statement that one fact alone 

distinguishes this case from J. L., that the informant here 

asserted specific illegal activity while the informant in 

J. L. made no assertion of illegality. However, as the 

dissent noted, “[i]f . . . the issue in J. L. concerned the 

failure of the informant’s tip to convey evidence of 

criminal conduct, the resolution of that case would not 

have required any discussion about the informant’s 

reliability.” Jackson, 41 Va. App. at 242, 583 S.E.2d at 

796 (Benton, J., dissenting). Moreover, the Supreme Court 

rejected any suggestion that a report of illegal conduct 

justifies a stop and frisk: “[t]he mere fact that a tip, if 

true, would describe illegal activity does not mean that 

the police may make a Terry stop without meeting the 

reliability requirement.” 529 U.S. at 273 n. *. The Court 

made no distinction between concealed criminal conduct and 

open, obvious criminal activity. 

Additionally, as already discussed, the police here 

had no way to test the anonymous informant’s basis of 

knowledge and to determine his or her reliability. The 

informant did not provide, contrary to the Court of 

Appeals’ conclusion, any “first-person, present-tense” 

details of the alleged illegal conduct. Jackson, 41 Va. 

21
App. at 233, 583 S.E.2d at 791. See, e.g. Rutzinski, 623 

N.W.2d at 519 (unidentified motorist reported, by cellular 

phone, erratic driving by another motorist and that he or 

she was in the vehicle in front of the swerving pickup). 

Nor did the informant provide any information about the 

defendant’s future behavior. We do not suggest that every 

anonymous tip must include predictive information, see

United States v. Wheat, 278 F.3d 722, 734 (8th Cir. 2001) 

(“the predictive aspects of an anonymous tip may be less 

applicable to tips purporting to describe contemporaneous, 

readily observable criminal actions as in the case of 

erratic driving witnessed by another motorist”); but, even 

when an informant reports open and obvious criminal 

conduct, sufficient indicia of reliability must be present 

before a stop and frisk is justified. 

Finally, with regard to the Court of Appeals’ reliance 

on the imminent danger to the public, the Supreme Court 

declined to carve out a “firearm exception” to its 

established reliability requirements for anonymous tips. 

J. L. 529 U.S. at 272. The Court stated that “an automatic 

firearm exception . . . would rove too far” because it 

“would enable any person seeking to harass another to set 

in motion an intrusive, embarrassing police search of the 

targeted person simply by placing an anonymous call falsely 

22
reporting the target’s unlawful carriage of a gun.” Id. 

See also Harris v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 407, 416, 551 

S.E.2d 606, 611 (2001) (a police officer’s “hunch” that the 

defendant was trespassing could not be raised to the level 

of reasonable suspicion based on an anonymous informant’s 

assertion that the defendant was armed; the Commonwealth 

could not “bootstrap[] the legitimate concern for law 

enforcement officers’ safety, which permits a protective 

search of a legally detained suspect, to serve as the basis 

for detaining the suspect”). 

Nor are we persuaded by the cases relied on by the 

Commonwealth and the Court of Appeals. Those cases are 

either inapposite or involved tips that contained indicia 

of reliability not present here. For example, Wheat, 278 

F.3d 722; State v. Walshire, 634 N.W.2d 625 (Iowa 2001); 

Rutzinski, 623 N.W.2d 516; and State v. Boyea, 765 A.2d 862 

(Vt. 2000), all addressed the reliability of anonymous 

reports of erratic or drunk drivers. That circumstance and 

the imminent public danger associated with it are not 

factors in this case. As the court in Boyea recognized, “a 

drunk driver is not at all unlike a ‘bomb,’ and a mobile 

one at that.” 765 A.2d at 867. We agree that “[i]n 

contrast to the report of an individual in possession of a 

gun, an anonymous report of an erratic or drunk driver on 

23
the highway presents a qualitatively different level of 

danger, and concomitantly greater urgency for prompt 

action.” Id.

Continuing, in Williams, 623 N.W.2d 106, the informant 

was not truly anonymous. There, the caller identified her 

location; indeed, she referred to it as “my house.” Id. at 

114. The court concluded that the informant had provided 

“self-identifying information” and therefore put her 

“anonymity at risk.” Id. “Risking one’s identification 

intimates that, more likely than not, the informant is a 

genuinely concerned citizen as opposed to a fallacious 

prankster.” Id. at 114-15. Similarly, the informant in 

Rutzinski “exposed him − or herself to being identified” 

because the informant told the police “that he or she was 

in the vehicle in front of Rutzinski’s pickup.” 623 N.W.2d 

at 525. 

CONCLUSION 

Under the totality of the circumstances presented 

here, the anonymous tip lacked sufficient indicia of 

reliability to justify the investigatory stop of the 

vehicle in which Jackson was a passenger. Thus, the stop 

was illegal as well as the subsequent search of Jackson’s 

person. Therefore, we hold that the trial court erred in 

refusing to grant Jackson’s pre-trial motion to suppress 

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the evidence seized from him. Accordingly, we will reverse 

the judgment of the Court of Appeals and dismiss the 

indictments against Jackson. 

Reversed and dismissed.

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