alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
§ 2200.202 Eligibility for Simplified Proceedings. ( a ) Those cases selected for Simplified Proceedings will be those that do not involve complex issues of law or fact. Cases appropriate for Simplified Proceedings will generally include those with one or more of the following characteristics: ( 1 ) Relatively few citation items,
( 2 ) An aggregate proposed penalty of not more than $20,000,
( 3 ) No allegation of willfulness or a repeat violation,
( 4 ) Not involving a fatality,
( 5 ) A hearing that is expected to take less than 2 days, or
( 6 ) A small employer whether self-represented or represented by counsel.
( b ) Those cases with an aggregate proposed penalty of more than $20,000, but not more than $30,000, if otherwise appropriate, may be selected for Simplified Proceedings at the discretion of the Chief Administrative Law Judge.
[84 FR 14558, Apr. 10, 2019; 84 FR 45655, Aug. 30, 2019]
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<CIK>                         0001073780
<NAME>                        TECH-CREATIONS, INC.
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1
<CURRENCY>                                     U.S. Currency

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-mos
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              Sep-30-1999
<PERIOD-START>                                 Oct-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                   Mar-31-2000
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                1
<CASH>                                         5,662
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  0
<ALLOWANCES>                                   0
<INVENTORY>                                    0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               5,662
<PP&E>                                         0
<DEPRECIATION>                                 0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 5,662
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          0
<BONDS>                                        0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       500
<OTHER-SE>                                     5,662
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   5,662
<SALES>                                        0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               0
<CGS>                                          0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               1,675
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (1,675)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            0
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (1,675)
<EPS-BASIC>                                    0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  0



</TABLE>
#### § 38.50 Subpart application to State Programs.

This subpart applies to State Programs as defined in § 38.4. However, the provisions of § 38.52(b) do not apply to State Workforce Agencies (SWA), because the Governor's liability for any noncompliance on the part of a SWA cannot be waived.
```

[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. Con. Res. 105 Agreed to Senate (ATS)]

  2d Session
S. CON. RES. 105

  Directing the Clerk of the House of Representatives to correct the 
                        enrollment of H.R. 6063.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

            October 1 (legislative day, September 17), 2008

 Mr. Nelson of Florida submitted the following concurrent resolution; 
                   which was considered and agreed to

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION

 
  Directing the Clerk of the House of Representatives to correct the 
                        enrollment of H.R. 6063.

    Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), 
That in the enrollment of the bill H.R. 6063, an Act to authorize the 
programs of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and for 
other purposes, the Clerk of the House of Representatives shall make 
the following corrections:
    In section 601(b)(2)(A)(iii) of the bill, strike ``Orbiter''.
    In section 611(d)(1) of the bill, strike ``first President'' and 
insert ``President''.
    In section 611(e)(3) of the bill, strike ``correctly'' and insert 
``currently''.
    In section 611(e)(7) of the bill, strike ``extention'' and insert 
``extension''.
    In section 612 of the bill, strike ``operations'' and insert 
``operational''.
    In section 1119 of the bill, strike ``The Report'' and insert ``The 
report''.
                                 <all>
```
EXHIBIT 32.2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

      In connection with the Quarterly Report of Lite King Corporation (the
"Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ended September 30, 2003 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), the
undersigned, in the capacities and on the date indicated below, hereby certifies
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to his knowledge:

1.    The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
      of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2.    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operation of the Company.

Date: March 1, 2006                    By:
                                                -----------------------
                                       Name:    David L. Norris
                                       Title:   Chief Financial Officer

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other
document authentications, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature
that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written
statement required by Section 906, has been provided to Lite King Corporation
and will be retained by Lite King Corporation and furnished to the Securities
and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
§ 1953.3 General policies and procedures. ( a ) *Effectiveness of State plan changes under State law.* Federal OSHA approval of a State plan under section 18(b) of the OSH Act in effect removes the barrier of Federal preemption, and permits the State to adopt and enforce State standards and other requirements regarding occupational safety or health issues regulated by OSHA. A State with an approved plan may modify or supplement the requirements contained in its plan, and may implement such requirements under State law, without prior approval of the plan change by Federal OSHA. Changes to approved State plans are subject to subsequent OSHA review. If OSHA finds reason to reject a State plan change, and this determination is upheld after an adjudicatory proceeding, the plan change would then be excluded from the State's Federally-approved plan.
( b ) *Required State plan notifications and supplements.* Whenever a State makes a change to its legislation, regulations, standards, or major changes to policies or procedures, which affect the operation of the State plan, the State shall provide written notification to OSHA. When the change differs from a corresponding Federal program component, the State shall submit a formal, written plan supplement. When the State adopts a provision which is identical to a corresponding Federal provision, written notification, but no formal plan supplement, is required. However, the State is expected to maintain the necessary underlying State document (e.g., legislation or standard) and to make it available for review upon request. All plan change supplements or required documentation must be submitted within 60 days of adoption of the change. Submission of all notifications and supplements may be in electronic format.
( c ) *Plan supplement availability.* The underlying documentation for identical plan changes shall be maintained by the State. Annually, States shall submit updated copies of the principal documents comprising the plan, or appropriate page changes, to the extent that these documents have been revised. To the extent possible, plan documents will be maintained and submitted by the State in electronic format and also made available in such manner.
( d ) *Advisory opinions.* Upon State request, OSHA may issue an advisory opinion on the approvability of a proposed change which differs from the Federal program prior to promulgation or adoption by the State and submission as a formal supplement.
( e ) *Alternative procedures.* Upon reasonable notice to interested persons, the Assistant Secretary may prescribe additional or alternative procedures in order to expedite the review process or for any other good cause which may be consistent with the applicable laws.
[67 FR 60125, Sept. 25, 2002, as amended at 80 FR 49908, Aug. 18, 2015]
#### NORTHERN OHIO PRINTING CO. v. INVESTMENT SERVICE INC.

Ohio Appeals, 9th Dist., Summit Co.

No. 1719.

Decided June 5, 1930

Schwab & Heiser, Akron, for Printing Cq.

Jonathan Taylor, Akron, for Service Co.

*476PER CURIAM.

Was the- claim sued on one for work within the meaning of 11819 GC?

It is apparent that the service to be performed by the defendant in error involved skill and judgment and was to be paid for on the basis of professional services, rather 'than ordinary work, and that while the claim upon which suit was brought included work performed by the defendant in error, it included something besides work, as that term is ordinarily understood.

In a sense, work is involved in and is a part of almost all service rendered by a person, natural or artificial, for another. A lawyer who drafts a pleading, a physician who visits a patient or writes, a prescription, an electric company which furnishes electricity, an architect who superintends the ' construction of a building,— these all “work,” as does a salesman who sells property; and in fact, in a broad sense, all physcial or mental exertions for the attainment of any object, other than recreation or amusement, is “work.”

If we consider the word “work” in the broad sense indicated, then in practically all cases where a person, natural or artificial, is hired, either expressly or impliedly, to render service for another, the claim therefor is at least to some extent for work; but we do not think that the legislature, in providing by 11819 GC. that an attachment can be issued on a “claim for work,” intended to authorize an attachment in all such cases where work to some extent was involved, but rather that the legislature intended that the claim for which an attachment can issue on the ground that it is for work, is confined to a claim that is entirely for work; if the claim is partially for work and partially for materials, there can be no attachment except upon some ground other than that it is a claim for work.

West Side Motor Co. v. Politz Bros., 27 Oh. Ap. 116.

If an attachment can issue for a claim only a part of which is for work, no satisfactory line of demarcation can be drawn by which an attachment may be denied, even though but a very small part of the claim is for work. We do not think that the legislature intended that, as a ground for attachment, a claim should be considered a claim for work if any part of it was for something else than work.

In the case at bar it is evident that the claim of the defendant in error is not wholly and entirely for work, and that therefore the motion to discharge the attachment should have been sustained. For error in overruling such motion, the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded, with instructions to the trial court to sustain said motion and discharge said attachment.

FUNK, P.J., PARDEE, J., and WASH-BURN, J., concur.
§ 2590.717-1 Preventing surprise medical bills for air ambulance services. ( a ) *In general.* If a group health plan or a health insurance issuer offering group health insurance coverage provides or covers any benefits for air ambulance services, the plan or issuer must cover such services from a nonparticipating provider of air ambulance services in accordance with paragraph (b) of this section.
( b ) *Coverage requirements.* A plan or issuer described in paragraph (a) of this section must provide coverage of air ambulance services in the following manner— ( 1 ) The cost-sharing requirements with respect to the services must be the same requirements that would apply if the services were provided by a participating provider of air ambulance services.
( 2 ) The cost-sharing requirement must be calculated as if the total amount that would have been charged for the services by a participating provider of air ambulance services were equal to the lesser of the qualifying payment amount (as determined in accordance with § 2590.716-6) or the billed amount for the services.
( 3 ) The cost-sharing amounts must be counted towards any in-network deductible and in-network out-of-pocket maximums (including the annual limitation on cost sharing under section 2707(b) of the PHS Act) (as applicable) applied under the plan or coverage (and the in-network deductible and out-of-pocket maximums must be applied) in the same manner as if the cost-sharing payments were made with respect to services furnished by a participating provider of air ambulance services.
( 4 ) The plan or issuer must— ( i ) Not later than 30 calendar days after the bill for the services is transmitted by the provider of air ambulance services, determine whether the services are covered under the plan or coverage and, if the services are covered, send to the provider an initial payment or a notice of denial of payment. For purposes of this paragraph (b)(4)(i), the 30-calendar-day period begins on the date the plan or issuer receives the information necessary to decide a claim for payment for the services.
( ii ) Pay a total plan or coverage payment directly to the nonparticipating provider furnishing such air ambulance services that is equal to the amount by which the out-of-network rate for the services exceeds the cost-sharing amount for the services (as determined in accordance with paragraphs (b)(1) and (2) of this section), less any initial payment amount made under paragraph (b)(4)(i) of this section. The total plan or coverage payment must be made in accordance with the timing requirement described in section 717(b)(6) of ERISA, or in cases where the out-of-network rate is determined under a specified State law or All-Payer Model Agreement, such other timeframe as specified by the State law or All-Payer Model Agreement.
( c ) *Applicability date.* The provisions of this section are applicable with respect to plan years beginning on or after January 1, 2022.
§ 38.74 Recipient's obligations when it determines that it has no jurisdiction over a complaint. If a recipient determines that it does not have jurisdiction over a complaint, it must notify the complainant, in writing within five business days of making such determination. This Notice of Lack of Jurisdiction must include: ( a ) A statement of the reasons for that determination; and
( b ) Notice that the complainant has a right to file a complaint with CRC within 30 days of the date on which the complainant receives the Notice.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>        5

<S>                                    <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                             9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                      DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                         JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                           SEP-30-2000
<CASH>                                      74,275
<SECURITIES>                                     0
<RECEIVABLES>                              121,703
<ALLOWANCES>                                     0
<INVENTORY>                                 91,086
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                           348,421
<PP&E>                                     118,505
<DEPRECIATION>                              45,144
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             480,321
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                    1,216,788
<BONDS>                                          0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                            0
<PREFERRED>                                      0
<COMMON>                                    84,753
<OTHER-SE>                                (571,220)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>               480,321
<SALES>                                  1,453,317
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                         1,453,317
<CGS>                                      716,235
<TOTAL-COSTS>                            2,852,515
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                 0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                         (2,115,433)
<INCOME-TAX>                                     0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                     (2,115,433)
<DISCONTINUED>                                   0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                  0
<CHANGES>                                        0
<NET-INCOME>                            (2,115,433)
<EPS-BASIC>                                   (.32)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                 (.32)


</TABLE>
#### § 1989.115 Special circumstances; waiver of rules.

In special circumstances not contemplated by the provisions of these rules, or for good cause shown, the ALJ or the ARB on review may, upon application, and after three days' notice to all parties, waive any rule or issue such orders that justice or the administration of TFA requires.
#### LEE v HEMPY

Ohio Appeals, Third Dist, Seneca Co

No 203.

Decided Oct 25, 1929

Ora R. Wade, Fostoria, for Lee.

Jean E. Simpson, Forest, for Hempy.

CROW, J.

No reported case in Ohio, had facts which raised the precise question; but it was held in 3 Ohio Appellate Reports 111, *156that the husband is not relieved from liability when he and his wife were living separate and apart and there was a written contract wherein it was stipulated that he was released from all claims his wife might have against him for her support and maintenance. The court also said that recovery could be had from either the surviving husband, or from the deceased wife’s estate.

The case in 21 Ohio Decisions, 726, decided that where husband and wife were living separate and apart and an allowance had been made to her of alimony pending suit, recovery could be had from the surviving husband.

It is so well settled as to require no citation of authority that at common law the surviving husband was primarily liable for the funeral expenses of his wife, and such is still the law unless the statute altering the status of women as regards their rights and obligations in respect to property, have abrogated the rule.

This feature was ably treated in 3 Ohio Appellate Reports, supra, and it was there decided that no such abrogation had been made. We fully sanction that holding.

The case of McClellan v. Filson, 44 OS. 184, settled the point that the statute directing the payment of funeral expenses may apply to the estate of the deceased wife, though she left a husband surviving, who had property. But the, funeral expense had been incurred by a son who became executor under the will of the deceased wife.

The learned judge who delivered the opinion forcefully discussed the reason underlying the statute and alluded to the. surviving husband’s liability “as between him and the undertaker,” and by other language, recognized the liability of such husband. Although what was said concerning that matter, must be regarded as dictum, inasmuch as the controversy was not between the' undertaker and the husband, it is readily apparent that the writer of the opinion strongly believed that the liability of such husband was primary. Indeed, some doubt was cast on the liability of the wife’s estate, for her funeral expenses in. the absence of special circumstances.

Whether, under facts such as those existing in the case before us, there could be a recovery by the husband from the estate of his wife, after payment by him, we do not discuss, but will merely refer to two cases directly in conflict, namely, 9 N. P (N. S.) 565, affirmed by the Circuit Court on the reasoning in the opinion of the trial court, which judgment of affirmance was affirmed in 82 OS. 403, and the case of Clawson, Administrator v. Briggs, 16 C. C. (N. S.) 225.

We hold that the common law liability of the surviving husband continues to exist, and therefore plaintiff was entitled to the judgment in his favor for the articles and services he furnished for the wife’s burial.

Before Judges Hughes, Justice and Crow.
#### Richard E. SHAW, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. REPUBLIC DRILL CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 86-1610.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued Nov. 12, 1986.

Decided Jan. 28, 1987.

*150Holland C. Capper, Holland, Capper, Cap-per, P.C., Chicago, 111., for plaintiff-appellant.

Hyman K. Bielsky, Matkov, Griffin, Parson, et al., Chicago, 111., for defendant-ap-pellee.

Before POSNER and COFFEY, Circuit Judges, and PELL, Senior Circuit Judge.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant Richard Shaw, seeking damages on an employment contract, has come to the wrong court. Shaw does not want damages for breach of the employment contract from his former employer. Rather, he seeks damages from the corporation that allegedly bought substantially all of the assets of Republic Drill and Tool Company, his former employer. His case rests on a provision in his employment contract which provides that “in the event that Employer shall sell all or substantially all of [its] assets ... this [agreement shall be binding upon any such successors.” Although Illinois law controls here, Shaw does not refer us to any Illinois cases to support his claim that this provision can be enforced against the purchasing corporation.

Our review of the Illinois case law discloses that the general rule is that a corporation purchasing the assets of another corporation does not assume the liabilities of the selling corporation. *See Green v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.,*122 Ill. App.3d 204, 77 Ill.Dec.2d 591, 460 N.E.2d 895, 898 (2d Dist.1984); *Gonzalez v. Rock Wool Engineering,*117 Ill.App.3d 435, 72 Ill.Dec. 917, 453 N.E.2d 792 (1st Dist.1983); *Nguyen v. Johnson Machine & Press Corp.,*104 Ill.App.3d 1141, 60 Ill.Dec. 866, 433 N.E.2d 1104 (1st Dist.1982); *State ex rel. Donahue v. Perkins & Will Architects, Inc.,*90 Ill.App.3d 349, 45 Ill.Dec. 696, 413 N.E.2d 29 (1st Dist.1980). Illinois recognizes four exceptions to the general rule but none of these exceptions are applicable here. Shaw asks us to create a fifth exception to the general rule in order to enforce the contract against the purchasing corporation. We decline appellant’s invitation to create a fifth exception in Illinois to the general rule of nonliability. In the context of pendent state law claims, we have already indicated our unwillingness to speculate on any trends in state law. *See Trembath v. St. Regis Paper Co.,*753 F.2d 603, 605 (7th Cir.1985); *see also Enis v. Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co.,*795 F.2d 39 (7th Cir.1986). This policy applies with special force to a plaintiff in a diversity case who has chosen to litigate his state law claim in federal court. We write only to emphasize that our policy will continue to be one that requires plaintiffs desirous of succeeding on novel state law claims to present those claims initially in state court.

AFFIRMED.