alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Klaus M. Hoffman et al., Appellants, v Eastern Long Island Transportation Enterprise, Inc., et al., Defendants, and Alan W. Monroig et al., Respondents.

[698 NYS2d 552]

—In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the plaintiffs appeal from (1) an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Schmidt, J.), dated July 10, 1998, which denied *510their motion for a special trial preference pursuant to CPLR 3403 (a) (3), and (2) an order of the same court, dated November 5, 1998, which granted the motion of defendants Alan W. Monroig and Petro, Inc., for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against them.

Ordered that the appeal from the order dated July 10, 1998, is dismissed as withdrawn; and it is further,

Ordered that the order dated November 5, 1998, is affirmed; and it is further,

Ordered that the respondents are awarded one bill of costs.

The defendants Alan W. Monroig and Petro, Inc., made out a prima facie case of their entitlement to summary judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability by submitting the parties’ examinations before trial, which showed that the vehicle operated by Monroig was lawfully stopped behind the vehicle operated by the injured plaintiff before it was struck from behind by the vehicle operated by the defendant Michael F. Fagan (see, *Zaslavskay v Twine,*249 AD2d 466; *Doris v Calia,*222 AD2d 550; *Edney v Metropolitan Suburban Bus Auth.,*178 AD2d 398). The injured plaintiff testified that he felt only one impact and Michael F. Fagan testified that he had no knowledge as to whether the Monroig vehicle had hit the plaintiffs’ vehicle before his own impact with the Monroig vehicle.

The burden therefore shifted to the plaintiffs to show, by admissible evidentiary proof, the existence of a factual question necessitating a trial. The plaintiffs’ proof consisted of their attorney’s affirmation, which was based upon unsubstantiated hypotheses and suppositions which were insufficient to defeat the motion for summary judgment. Furthermore, the self-serving hearsay statements contained in the police accident report were properly not considered in opposition to the motion for summary judgment *(see, Cover v Cohen,*61 NY2d 261, 274; *Johnson v Phillips,*261 AD2d 269; *Liguori v City of New York,*250 AD2d 738; *Casey v Tierno,*127 AD2d 727, 728; *Turner v Spaide,*108 AD2d 1025, 1026). Bracken, J. P., Santucci, Altman, Friedmann and H. Miller, JJ., concur.
EXHIBIT 32.2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

      In connection with the Quarterly Report of Lite King Corporation (the
"Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ended September 30, 2002 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), the
undersigned, in the capacities and on the date indicated below, hereby certifies
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to his knowledge:

1.    The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
      of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2.    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operation of the Company.

Date: February  23, 2006                By:
                                                 ---------------
                                        Name:    David L. Norris
                                        Title:   Chief Financial Officer

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other
document authentications, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature
that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written
statement required by Section 906, has been provided to Lite King Corporation
and will be retained by Lite King Corporation and furnished to the Securities
and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### CLEVE RY CO v WENDT

Ohio Supreme Court

No 21283.

Decided Mar 20, 1929

Syllabus by

JONES, J.

RAILROADS

(500 Ne) Plaintiff cannot complain of the failure to give warning, of the approach of a street car where he testifies that he saw and knew of its approach in time to save himself from injury.

(500 D2e) While an effort to rescue human life in the presence of a known, imminent peril is justifiable if the rescuer does not rashly and unnecessarily expose himself to danger, one who has dropped his property upon a street car track is not justified in hazarding his own life by attempting to rescue it when he knows his peril to be imminent.

NEGLIGENCE

(370 L2) The “last clear chance” rule presupposes antecedent fault or negligence on the part of the plaintiff; it does not apply in a case where the continuing negligence of the plaintiff and the concurring negligence, pf the defendant both contribute to produce the injury; it only applies *207where the fault or negligence of the plaintiff is the remote and that of the defendant is the proximate cause of the accident.

Marshall, CJ, Kinkade, Robinson, Matthias, Day and Allen, JJ, concur.
§ 1952.19 Arizona. ( a ) The Arizona State plan received initial approval on November 5, 1974.
( b ) The Arizona State plan received final approval on June 20, 1985.
( c ) Under the terms of the 1978 Court Order in *AFL-CIO* v. *Marshall,* compliance staffing levels (benchmarks) necessary for a “fully effective” enforcement program were required to be established for each State operating an approved State plan. In September 1984, Arizona in conjunction with OSHA, completed a reassessment of the levels initially established in 1980 and proposed revised compliance staffing benchmarks of 9 safety and 6 health compliance officers. After opportunity for public comment and service on the AFL-CIO, the Assistant Secretary approved these revised staffing requirements on June 20, 1985.
( d ) The plan covers all private-sector employers and employees, with several notable exceptions, as well as State and local government employers and employees, within the State. For current information on these exceptions and for additional details about the plan, please visit *http://www.osha.gov/dcsp/osp/stateprogs/arizona.html .*
798 A.2d 160

#### COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. James R. ZIMMERMAN, Appellee.

No. 25 MAP 2002.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

April 11, 2002.

*ORDER*

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 11th day of April, 2002, the above captioned appeal is quashed as untimely filed. 42 Pa.C.S. 5571(B), Pa.R.A.P. 903(a).
EXHIBIT 32.1

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

I, Gregory T. Lucier, Chief Executive Officer of Invitrogen Corporation (the
Registrant), do hereby certify in accordance with 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, based on my knowledge:



| | (1) | the Quarterly Report of Form 10-Q of the Registrant, to which this certification is attached as an exhibit (the Report), fully complies with the requirements of section
13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m); and
| | --- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Registrant.
| | --- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                      |  |                        
|--------------------- |  | -----------------------
|Dated: August 3, 2007 |  | /s/ Gregory T. Lucier  
|                      |  | Gregory T. Lucier      
|                      |  | Chief Executive Officer

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating,
acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to Invitrogen and will be retained by Invitrogen and furnished to
the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### FRISCH et v AMMON et

Ohio Appeals, 1st Dist, Hamilton Co

No. 3518.

Decided November 4, 1929

Messrs. Leonard H. Freiberg and Maurice A. Thon, Cincinnati, for Frisch et.

Messrs. Walter W. Helmholz and Moulinier, Bettman & Hunt, Cincinnati, for Ammon et.

ROSS, J.

The statement made by the lienholder in question contained the remark, under the title “Material”, “All material taken out of stock”. The record affirmatively shows, in the cross-examination of the lienholder that material was used upon the job not taken out of stock, furnished by supply houses.

The pertinent portion of 8312 GC, is as follows:

> “The original contractor shall x x make out and give to the owner x x x a statement under oath, showing the name of every laborer in his employ who has not been paid in full and also showing the name of every subcontractor in his employ, and of every person furnishing machinery, material or fuel, and giving the .amount if any, which is due or to become due to them, or any of them, for work done, or machinery, matreial or fuel furnished to him, which statement shall be accompanied by a certificate signed by every person furnishing machinery, material or fuel to him, x x x x”.

Under these facts the provisions of section 8312 were not followed, and the lien, under the provisions of that section, providing that no right of action or lien against the owner shall be maintained ufitil the statements were filed as required, was void against the mortgage.

It is claimed that if the material men were paid it is not necessary to list them. We construe the statute otherwise, and as requiring the listing of all persons for furnishing material whether paid or unpaid at the time of furnishing the statement.

For these reasons, the decision of the court of common pleas will be reversed, and there being no dispute as to the evidence, and the question being one purely of law, we hold that the lien of the A. M. ,-Lewin Lumber Company, by virtue of its second mortgage, is held prior to that of the lienholder,' George C. Ammon.

An entry may be presented accordingly.

Cushing, PJ., and Hamilton, J., concur.
#### JOSIAH PARTRIDGE, App’lt, v. FANNY REUBEN, Resp’t.

*George Wilcox,*for app’lt; *P. & B. Goodhart,*for resp’t.

Motion for re-argument.

See opinion rendered June 3, 1889.
§ 22.1 Basis and purpose. ( a ) *Basis.* This part implements the Program Fraud Civil Remedies Act of 1986, Public Law No. 99-509, sections 6101-6104, 100 Stat. 1874 (October 21, 1986), to be codified at 31 U.S.C. 3801-3812. 31 U.S.C. 3809 of the statute requires each authority head to promulgate regulations necessary to implement the provisions of the statute.
( b ) *Purpose.* This part ( 1 ) establishes administrative procedures for imposing civil penalties and assessments against persons who make, submit, or present, or cause to be made, submitted, or presented, false, fictitious, or fraudulent claims or written statements to authorities or to their agents, and
( 2 ) specifies the hearing and appeal rights of persons subject to allegations of liability for such penalties and assessments.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 03-6930
In Re: DAVID J. OAKES, Petitioner.
On Petition for Writ of Mandamus. (CA-03-227-5-BO) Submitted: October 15, 2003 Decided: October 28, 2003 Before NIEMEYER, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges. Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion. David J. Oakes, Petitioner Pro Se. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: David J. Oakes petitions for a writ of mandamus, alleging the district court has unduly delayed acting on his emergency motion for a temporary restraining order. He seeks an order from this court directing the district court to act. Our review of the docket sheet reveals that the district court entered an order denying Oakes’ emergency motion for a temporary restraining order. Accordingly, because the district court has recently decided Oakes’ case, we deny the mandamus petition as moot. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

PETITION DENIED
EXHIBIT 32.2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

      In connection with the Quarterly Report of Lite King Corporation (the
"Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ended September 30, 2003 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), the
undersigned, in the capacities and on the date indicated below, hereby certifies
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to his knowledge:

1.    The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
      of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2.    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operation of the Company.

Date: March 9, 2006                    By:
                                                -----------------------
                                       Name:    David L. Norris
                                       Title:   Chief Financial Officer

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other
document authentications, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature
that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written
statement required by Section 906, has been provided to Lite King Corporation
and will be retained by Lite King Corporation and furnished to the Securities
and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS CONTAINED IN THE COMPANY'S QUARTERLY
REPORT ON FORM 10-QSB FOR THE PERIOD ENDED JUNE 30, 2000 AND IS QUALIFIED BY
REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

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<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-2000
<CASH>                                              11
<SECURITIES>                                         0
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<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     2
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<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                    17
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<INCOME-PRETAX>                                   (17)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
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</TABLE>
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Eddy M. Caba, Appellant.

[697 NYS2d 522]

—Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Thomas, J.), rendered June 27, 1997, convicting him of robbery in the first degree, robbery in the second degree (two counts), assault in the second degree, kidnapping in the second degree, criminal use of a firearm in the first degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, and grand larceny in the third degree, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

We have reviewed the record and agree with the defendant’s assigned counsel that there are no nonfrivolous issues which *402could be raised on appeal. Counsel’s application for leave to withdraw as counsel is granted *(see, Anders v California,*386 US 738; *People v Paige,*54 AD2d 631; *cf., People v Gonzalez,*47 NY2d 606). O’Brien, J. P., Sullivan, Goldstein and Feuerstein, JJ., concur.
## COURT OF APPEALS SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS FORT WORTH NO. 02 - 17 - 00058 - CR

DAVEY LYNN CROCKETT APPELLANT
V. THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

---------- FROM THE 235TH DISTR ICT COURT OF COOKE C OUNTY

TRIAL COURT NO. 90

- 0 52

---------- 

### MEMORANDUM OPINION 1

---------- Appellant Davey Lynn Crockett attempts to appeal from a n order denying his “Motion To Withdraw the Plea” agreement that he entered into with the State back in 1990. On March 20, 2017, we notified Crockett that, generally, an appellate court may consider appeals by criminal defendants only after a final judgme nt of conviction, see McKown v. State , 915 S.W.2d 160, 161 (Tex. App.

—

1 See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.2

Fort Worth 1996, no pet.), and we informed him that this appeal may be dismissed for want of jurisdiction unless he or any party desiring to continue the appeal filed with the court a re sponse showing grounds for continuing the appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(f), 44.3. Crockett filed two responses, but they do not show grounds for continuing the appeal. 2 We therefore dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction. See Dainwood v. State , No. 09

- 07

- 00424

- CR, 2007 WL 2962772, at *1 (Tex. App.

— Beaumont Oct. 10, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for p ublication) (holding similarly)

. PER CURIAM PANEL: MEIER, GABRIEL, and SUDDERTH, JJ. DO NOT PUBLISH Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERE D: April 27 , 2017

2 Crockett provides no authority to support his contention that “when the trial court denied his motion, and entered a finding that the trial court did not have the actual ‘authority’ to grant the relief request ed, an ‘appealable order’ resulted.” Perhaps this is because relevant authority holds just the opposite. S ee Arms v. State , No. 14

- 16

- 00077

- CR, 2016 WL 1357166, at *1 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14 th Dist.] Apr. 5 , 2016, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“An order denying a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is not a separately appealable order.”).
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-70004

CARLOS MANUEL AYESTAS, also known as Dennis Zelaya Corea, 

Petitioner-Appellant

v.

RICK THALER, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL

JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS DIVISION,

Respondent-Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:09-CV-2999

Before DAVIS, SMITH, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

IT IS ORDERED that the petition for rehearing is DENIED. 

Petitioner has also moved that this court vacate its prior opinion and

remand to the district court for consideration of his previously made claim of

ineffective assistance of state habeas counsel in light of the Supreme Court’s

decision in Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012). This court recently

addressed Martinez’s applicability in Texas. See Ibarra v. Thaler, No. 11-70031,

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

July 11, 2012

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk
No. 11-70004

2

2012 WL 2620520, at *4 (5th Cir. June 28, 2012). We held that, because Texas

does not mandate ineffective assistance claims to be brought first in habeas

proceedings, Martinez does not apply in Texas. Id. Accordingly, we DENY the

motion.
<PAGE>

                                                                      EXHIBIT 32

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Heartland Bancshares, Inc., (the
"Company") on Form 10-QSB for the quarterly period ended March 31, 2005 as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on or about the date hereof (the
"Report"), the undersigned, James C. Clinard, President and Chief Executive
Officer of the Company, and Martha J. Kelley, Chief Financial Officer of the
Company, do hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of
our knowledge:

      (1)   The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
            15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      (2)   The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
            material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
            of the Company.

By: /s/ James C. Clinard
   --------------------------------------
   James C. Clinard
   President and Chief Executive Officer
   May 11, 2005


   /s/ Martha J. Kelley
   --------------------------------------
   Martha J. Kelley
   Chief Financial Officer
   May 11, 2005