NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

MICHELE GRAY, Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.

CAPSTONE FINANCIAL, et al., Defendants/Appellees.

No. 1 CA-CV 21-0538 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CV2021-002225

The Honorable Danielle J. Viola, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Michele Gray, Troy, NY

Plaintiff/Appellant

Engelman Berger PC, Phoenix, AZ

By Bradley D. Pack

Counsel for Defendant/Appellee

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Cynthia J. Bailey delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Peter B. Swann and Judge D. Steven Williams joined.

FILED 4-19-2022
GRAY v. CAPSTONE, et al.

Decision of the Court

2

B A I L E Y, Judge:

¶1 Appellant Michele Gray challenges the dismissal of her 

complaint against Appellees Capstone Financial (“Capstone”) and Tyler 

Stone. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Because Gray appeals the dismissal of her complaint, we state 

its relevant factual allegations and assume they are true for purposes of this 

appeal. Sullivan v. Pulte Home Corp., 232 Ariz. 344, 345, ¶ 2 (2013).

¶3 Cheetah Foods LLC (“Cheetah”), which Gray owns, obtained 

a loan from Capstone in 2016. The loan was secured with a mortgage on a 

South Carolina property then owned by Cheetah. Gray personally 

guaranteed the loan. 

¶4 Gray sought loan modification, which Capstone, through 

Stone, declined. Cheetah quitclaimed the South Carolina property to Gray, 

who then filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection. The bankruptcy court 

lifted the automatic stay to allow Capstone to foreclose on the South

Carolina property, which it did in 2018.

¶5 Gray sued Appellees in February 2021, alleging violations of 

numerous federal statutes and regulations, wrongful foreclosure, and 

negligent infliction of emotional distress. Two months later, she filed an 

amended complaint that alleged nearly identical claims. Appellees 

successfully moved to have the case reassigned to a commercial court

judge. The commercial court judge dismissed Gray’s amended complaint 

without prejudice and gave her approximately two weeks to file a second

amended complaint, stating that “[i]f no amended complaint is filed, the 

Court will place the matter on the dismissal calendar . . . to be dismissed 

without further notice.”

¶6 Four days after the court entered its dismissal order, Gray 

requested a one-month extension to, among other things, consult with 

counsel and contact the Federal Reserve Board. She also moved to have the 

case assigned back to the original judge and for a more definite statement 

from Appellees clarifying the type of loan Cheetah obtained.

¶7 The court denied Gray’s motions. It also denied her request 

for additional time to file an amended complaint, stating that the deadline 

to do so had passed and that the bases for her request were “issues that 

should have been addressed before [she] filed her claim.”
GRAY v. CAPSTONE, et al.

Decision of the Court

3

¶8 Gray timely appealed after the court entered a final judgment. 

We have jurisdiction under Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution 

and Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) sections 12-120.21(A)(1) and 12-

2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶9 The argument sections of Gray’s opening and reply briefs are 

largely identical, listing seven and eight arguments, respectively. We 

address those arguments we can discern from her briefs below. 

I. Gray is Not Entitled to Special Leniency as a Pro Se Litigant.

¶10 Pointing out that she represented herself below, Gray broadly 

contends her claims were ignored. As discussed above, the court did not 

ignore her claims; it instead dismissed the case because she did not timely 

file an amended complaint. In any event, Arizona courts “may not afford 

special leniency to pro se litigants.” Flynn v. Campbell, 243 Ariz. 76, 83-84, 

¶ 24 (2017). 

II. Gray’s Attorneys’ Fee Award Challenge Fails.

¶11 Gray next challenges the attorneys’ fee award to Appellees,

contending the Social Security Act “rejects the disable[d] to pay 100% [of 

fees] in civil litigation.” She cites no authority for this contention on appeal, 

but her similar objection in the superior court cited “section 206(b)(1) of the 

Social Security Act” (42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)) and 20 CFR § 404.977(a). Neither

applies to the fee award in this case, which the superior court determined 

was appropriate under the loan documents and A.R.S. §§ 12-341.01(A) and 

-349. 

III. Gray Does Not Show the Assignment to a Commercial Court Judge 

Was Improper.

¶12 Gray next contends the case should not have been assigned to

a commercial court judge because Gray “made an offer to settle for the 

value of [the South Carolina] property at the time of purchase.” Cases 

seeking only monetary relief of less than $300,000 are not eligible for a 

commercial court assignment. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 8.1(c). Gray sought “actual 

monetary damages of $1.2 million, a new home valued at $250,000.00 and 

punitive damages of (1%) of defendant’s net worth or $500,000” in her 

amended complaint. The assignment to a commercial court judge therefore 

was not improper.
GRAY v. CAPSTONE, et al.

Decision of the Court

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IV. Gray Does Not Develop Her Remaining Arguments.

¶13 An opening brief must include the appellant’s “contentions 

concerning each issue presented for review, with supporting reasons for 

each contention.” ARCAP 13(a)(7)(A). An appellant who does not make a 

“bona fide and reasonably intelligent effort to comply with the rules” 

waives those arguments that are “not supported by adequate explanation, 

citations to the record, or authority.” In re Aubuchon, 233 Ariz. 62, 64-65, 

¶ 6 (2013).

¶14 Gray does not develop any of her remaining arguments. For 

example, Gray contends the commercial court judge violated several 

Canons of Judicial Conduct. She does not identify any specific violations. 

And she only cited the listed Canons as part of her request that the judge 

sign the final judgment by hand. The judge signed the final judgment 

electronically. A hand signature is not necessary to make a judgment final 

and appealable. Haywood Sec., Inc. v. Ehrlich, 214 Ariz. 114, 117, ¶ 15 (2007). 

Gray also does not show that the use of an electronic signature implicates

any of the Canons.

¶15 Gray next objects to a portion of the superior court’s ruling 

granting Capstone’s motion to dismiss without prejudice, contending the 

court made a “threat or warning”:

Defendants requested an award of attorneys’ fees under 

A.R.S. § 12-341.01 and as a sanction under A.R.S. § 12-349. The 

Court declines to enter an award of fees at this time. The 

Court will consider awarding attorneys’ fees either under 

A.R.S. § 12-341.01 or as a sanction under A.R.S. § 12-349 in the 

event further briefing results in a dismissal of Plaintiff’s 

claims or in the event Plaintiff fails to file an amended 

complaint. The parties should carefully consider whether 

further filings are appropriate.

She appears to contend that the last quoted sentence violates the Arizona 

Constitution but does not develop the argument further.

¶16 Gray also contends the superior court’s “competency was an 

error because it was based on the wrong standard of the law and numerous 

errors of the law and contrary to the evidence and to Arizona Rule of Civil 

Procedure 15.” As this is the entirety of her argument, we deem it waived. 

See MacMillan v. Schwartz, 226 Ariz. 584, 591, ¶ 33 (App. 2011) (“Merely 

mentioning an argument in an appellate opening brief is insufficient.”).
GRAY v. CAPSTONE, et al.

Decision of the Court

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¶17 Gray also challenges the court’s denial of her request for 

additional time to file an amended complaint, contending the court applied 

“the wrong standard of law.” As noted above, the court determined her 

reasons for requesting additional time, which included her desire to “speak 

with an attorney” and the “Federal Reserve [Board]” and “to check 

[Capstone’s] license number,” were “issues that should have been 

addressed before [she] filed her claim.” Gray does not show this 

determination was incorrect or improper.

¶18 Finally, Gray contends in her reply brief that “Capstone . . . 

and its corporate name or incorporate ‘CTP Funding’ is being suspended.” 

We typically do not consider arguments raised for the first time in the reply 

brief. Tripati v. Forwith, 223 Ariz. 81, 86, ¶ 26 (App. 2009). Moreover, Gray 

cites no record evidence to support this contention, and the only authority 

she cites—28 U.S.C. § 2514, which provides for the forfeiture of fraudulent 

claims asserted against the United States—does not apply. See MacMillan, 

226 Ariz. at 591, ¶ 33 (finding argument waived because appellant “cite[d]

no law or facts to support her position.”). For these reasons, we affirm.

V. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs on Appeal

¶19 Capstone requests its attorneys’ fees incurred in this appeal 

under the promissory note, the mortgage, and Gray’s guaranty. Generally, 

we enforce a contractual attorneys’ fees provision according to its terms but 

retain discretion to limit the fee award to a reasonable amount. Geller v. 

Lesk, 230 Ariz. 624, 627, ¶ 10 (App. 2012). 

¶20 The promissory note and mortgage obligate Cheetah, not 

Gray, to pay certain fees. Cheetah is not a party to this appeal. As for Gray’s

guaranty, it obligates her to pay “[a]ll costs and expenses, including 

reasonable fees and out of pocket expenses of attorneys . . . incurred by 

Lender in enforcing its rights under this Guaranty.” Capstone does not seek 

to enforce the guaranty in this litigation. We therefore decline to award fees 

under the loan documents.

¶21 Capstone also requests attorneys’ fees under A.R.S. § 12-

341.01(A), which permits a discretionary award to the successful party in 

an action arising out of a contract. Gray’s claims arise out of the loan 

transaction between Capstone and Cheetah. Capstone therefore may

recover reasonable attorneys’ fees and taxable costs upon compliance with 

Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 21. We do not reach Capstone’s 

request for § 12-349 sanctions.
GRAY v. CAPSTONE, et al.

Decision of the Court

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CONCLUSION

¶22 We affirm.