alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# U ni te d S ta te s Co ur t of A pp ea ls For the Eig hth Circu it

__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ _ No. 1 7- 32 86

__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ _ Uni te d S ta te s o f Am eri ca
ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll l Pla in ti

ff - App el le e

v.
Carl Merl o
ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll l Defe nd

an t - Ap pe ll an t

__ __ __ __ __ __ App eal fro m

Uni te d S ta te s Di st ric t Co ur t fo r th e Weste rn Dis tri ctof Ark an sa s - F ay et te vi ll e

__ __ __ __ __ __ Subm it te d: Apri l 1 9, 2 01 8 Fi le d: Apri l 2 4, 2 01 8 [Un pu bl is he d]

__ __ __ __ __ __ Befo re GRUENDER, BENTON, andSTRAS, Ci rcu it Ju dg es
.

__ __ __ __ __ __ PER CURI AM.

Carl Mer lo di rect ly ap pe a l s aft er he pl ead ed gu il ty to a ch il d- po rn og rap hy ch arg e an d th e di st ric t co ur t va rie d do wnwar d fro m th e cal cu la te d Gui de li ne s ran ge 1

Th e Hon or ab le Tim ot hy L. Bro ok s, Uni te d St at es Dis tri ct Ju dg e fo r t h e 1 W es te rn Dis tri ctof Ark an sa s.to im

po se an 87 -m on th pr is on te rm
. His co un se l ha s m ov ed to wit hd raw an d ha s fil ed

a br ie f un de r Ande r

s v

. C a l i fo rn ia , 38 6 U.S. 73 8 (1 96 7) , arg ui ng th at Mer lo ’s

se nt en ce is su bs ta nt iv el y un reas on ab le , as th e co ur t s h o ul d ha ve va rie d do wnwar d fu rth er i n l ig ht of v ari ou s m it ig at in g fa ct or s.
Upo n care fu l rev ie w , w e co nc lu de th at th e di st ric t co ur t di d no t im po se an
un reas on ab le se nt en ce. Se e Uni te d St at es v. Feems te r , 57 2 F.3 d 45 5, 46 1- 62 (8 th Ci r. 20 09 ) (en ba nc ) (rev ie win g a se nt en ce un de r th e de fere nt ia l ab us e-o f-d is cret io n st an da rd an d di sc us si ng su b s t a nt iv e reas on ab le ne ss ); se e al so Uni te d St at es v. McCa ul ey , 71 5 F.3d 11 19 , 11 27 (8 th Ci r. 20 13 ) (n ot in g th atwhen th e d is tri ctco ur t ha s va rie d be lo w th e Gui de li ne s ran ge , it is “ ne arl y in co nc ei va bl e” t h a t th e co ur t ab us edit s d is cret io n i n n ot va ry in g d own wardfur th er).

Hav in g i n d e p en de nt ly rev ie wed th e reco rd pu rs ua nt to Pen so n v. Ohi o , 48 8 U.S. 75 (1 98 8) , we fin d no no nf riv ol ou s is su es fo r ap pe al

. A c c o r d in gl y , we gr an t
co un se l l eav e to wit hd raw, an d we a ffi rm
.

__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __

-2

-
# EUR-Lex - 31998D0249 - EN

Avis juridique important

*|*

# 31998D0249

**98/249/EC: Council Decision of 7 October 1997 on the conclusion of the Convention for the protection of the marine environment of the north-east Atlantic **

*
Official Journal L 104 , 03/04/1998 P. 0001 - 0001 *

COUNCIL DECISION of 7 October 1997 on the conclusion of the Convention for the protection of the marine environment of the north-east Atlantic (98/249/EC)

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in particular Article 130s(1), in conjunction with Article 228(2) and (3), first subparagraph thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the Commission,

Having regard to the opinion of the European Parliament (1),

Whereas the Commission, on behalf of the Community, took part in the negotiations on the drafting of the Convention for the protection of the marine environment of the north-east Atlantic;

Whereas the Convention was signed on behalf of the Community on 22 September 1992;

Whereas the Convention aims to prevent and eliminate pollution and to protect the maritime area against the adverse effects of human activities;

Whereas the Community has adopted measures in the area covered by the Convention and should therefore undertake international commitments in that area; whereas the Community's action is a necessary complement to that of the Member States directly concerned and its participation in the Convention would appear to comply with the principle of subsidiarity;

Whereas pursuant to Article 130r of the Treaty, Community policy on the environment contributes, inter alia, to pursuit of the objectives of preserving, protecting and improving the quality of the environment, protecting human health, and prudent and rational utilisation of natural resources; whereas, moreover, with their respective spheres of competence, the Community and the Member States cooperate with third countries and with the competent international organisations,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The Convention for the protection of the marine environment of the north-east Atlantic, as signed in Paris on 22 September 1992, is hereby approved on behalf of the Community.

The text of the Convention is attached to this Decision.

Article 2

The President of the Council is hereby authorised to designate the person or persons empowered to deposit the instrument of approval with the Government of the French Republic in accordance with the provisions of Article 26 of the Convention.

Article 3

The Community shall be represented by the Commission as regards matters within the sphere of Community competence, in the commission established under Article 10 of the Convention.

Done at Luxembourg, 7 October 1997.

For the Council

The President

J.-C. JUNCKER

(1) OJ C 89, 10.4.1995, p. 199.
<PAGE>

                                                               Exhibit 99.2



                   Certificate Furnished Under Section 906
                      Of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

I, Douglas H. Yaeger, Chairman of the Board, President and Chief Executive
Officer of The Laclede Group, Inc., hereby certify that

         (a)      To the best of my knowledge, the accompanying report on
                  Form 10-K for the year ended September 30, 2002 fully
                  complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
                  of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and

         (b)      To the best of my knowledge, the information contained in
                  the accompanying report on Form 10-K for the year ended
                  September 30, 2002 fairly presents, in all material
                  respects, the financial condition and results of
                  operations of The Laclede Group, Inc.


Date:    December 5, 2002                    /s/ Douglas H. Yaeger
                                            -----------------------------

                                            Douglas H. Yaeger
                                            Chairman of the Board, President
                                            and Chief Executive Officer
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                      18 U.S.C. 1350,
                  AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
       SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the quarterly report of American Sports
Development Group, Inc. on form 10-QSB for the period ended
September 30, 2003 as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, William R.
Fairbanks, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to
section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)
or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of
operations of the Company.



November 14, 2003                 /s/ William R. Fairbanks,
                             -----------------------------------
                                     William R. Fairbanks,
                             President, Chief Executive Officer
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Christopher Simmons, Appellant.

[698 NYS2d 503]

—Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Eng, J.), rendered January 8, 1998, convicting him of burglary in the first degree (two counts), criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree (two counts), upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing (Spires, J.), of that branch of the defendant’s omnibus motion which was to suppress identification evidence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant contends that the police unlawfully arrested him in his apartment without a warrant and that this *Payton*violation *(see, Payton v New York,*445 US 573; *People v Minley,*68 NY2d 952, 953) requires the suppression of the complainant’s subsequent lineup identification of him. The hearing court determined that no *Payton*violation occurred because the defendant was outside of his apartment when the arrest occurred *(see, People v Land,*198 AD2d 438; *People v Anderson,*146 AD2d 638, 640). We decline to disturb that determination, as it is supported by the record *(see, People v Prochilo,*41 NY2d 759, 761).

The defendant’s remaining contentions are without merit. O’Brien, J. P., Ritter, Santucci and Thompson, JJ., concur.
**Exhibit 23.1**

 

July 12, 2005

 

U.S. Securities andExchange Commission

450 5th Street N.W

Washington, D.C. 20549

 

Ladies/Gentlemen,

 

Re. Kenilworth SystemsCorporation

                Form 10-K/A, Amendment No.1, y/e* *12/31/04

 

We concur with therestated financial statements contained therein and, audited by us. Theoriginal Form 10-K contained unaudited financial statements. Our audit forthe period ended December 31, 2004 of the restated financial statementswas not completed until June 17, 2005.

 
| /s/ Demetrius &  Company, |
|------------------------------------|
| L.L.C.                             |
|                               |
| JAD:jad                            |

 

***Remainder of page intentionally left blank***
§ 1983.109 Decision and orders of the administrative law judge. ( a ) The decision of the ALJ will contain appropriate findings, conclusions, and an order pertaining to the remedies provided in paragraph (d) of this section, as appropriate. A determination that a violation has occurred may be made only if the complainant has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that protected activity was a contributing factor in the adverse action alleged in the complaint.
( b ) If the complainant has satisfied the burden set forth in the prior paragraph, relief may not be ordered if the respondent demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same adverse action in the absence of any protected activity.
( c ) Neither the Assistant Secretary's determination to dismiss a complaint without completing an investigation pursuant to § 1983.104(e) nor the Assistant Secretary's determination to proceed with an investigation is subject to review by the ALJ, and a complaint may not be remanded for the completion of an investigation or for additional findings on the basis that a determination to dismiss was made in error. Rather, if there otherwise is jurisdiction, the ALJ will hear the case on the merits or dispose of the matter without a hearing if the facts and circumstances warrant.
( d ) ( 1 ) If the ALJ concludes that the respondent has violated the law, the ALJ will issue an order that will require, where appropriate: affirmative action to abate the violation; reinstatement of the complainant to his or her former position, together with the compensation (including back pay and interest), terms, conditions, and privileges of the complainant's employment; and payment of compensatory damages, including, at the request of the complainant, the aggregate amount of all costs and expenses (including attorney's and expert witness fees) reasonably incurred. Interest on back pay will be calculated using the interest rate applicable to underpayment of taxes under 26 U.S.C. 6621 and will be compounded daily.
( 2 ) If the ALJ determines that the respondent has not violated the law, an order will be issued denying the complaint. If, upon the request of the respondent, the ALJ determines that a complaint was frivolous or was brought in bad faith, the ALJ may award to the respondent a reasonable attorney's fee, not exceeding $1,000.
( e ) The decision will be served upon all parties to the proceeding, the Assistant Secretary, and the Associate Solicitor, Division of Fair Labor Standards, U.S. Department of Labor. Any ALJ's decision requiring reinstatement or lifting an order of reinstatement by the Assistant Secretary will be effective immediately upon receipt of the decision by the respondent. All other portions of the ALJ's order will be effective 14 days after the date of the decision unless a timely petition for review has been filed with the Administrative Review Board (ARB), U.S. Department of Labor. The decision of the ALJ will become the final order of the Secretary unless a petition for review is timely filed with the ARB and the ARB accepts the petition for review.
§ 2200.74 Filing of briefs and proposed findings with the Judge; oral argument at the hearing. ( a ) *General.* A party is entitled to a reasonable period at the close of the hearing for oral argument, which shall be included in the transcript of the hearing. Any party shall be entitled, upon request made before the close of hearing, to file a brief, proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, or both, with the Judge. In lieu of briefs, the Judge may permit or direct the parties to file memoranda or statements of authority.
( b ) *Time.* Briefs shall be filed simultaneously on a date established by the Judge. A motion for extension of time for filing any brief shall be made at least 3 working days prior to the due date and shall recite that the moving party has conferred with the other parties on the motion. Reply briefs shall not be allowed except by order of the Judge.
( c ) *Untimely briefs.* Untimely briefs will not be accepted unless accompanied by a motion setting forth good cause for the delay. The form and content of motions shall comply with § 2200.40.
§ 1604.9 Fringe benefits. ( a ) “Fringe benefits,” as used herein, includes medical, hospital, accident, life insurance and retirement benefits; profit-sharing and bonus plans; leave; and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.
( b ) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate between men and women with regard to fringe benefits.
( c ) Where an employer conditions benefits available to employees and their spouses and families on whether the employee is the “head of the household” or “principal wage earner” in the family unit, the benefits tend to be available only to male employees and their families. Due to the fact that such conditioning discriminatorily affects the rights of women employees, and that “head of household” or “principal wage earner” status bears no relationship to job performance, benefits which are so conditioned will be found a prima facie violation of the prohibitions against sex discrimination contained in the act.
( d ) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to make available benefits for the wives and families of male employees where the same benefits are not made available for the husbands and families of female employees; or to make available benefits for the wives of male employees which are not made available for female employees; or to make available benefits to the husbands of female employees which are not made available for male employees. An example of such an unlawful employment practice is a situation in which wives of male employees receive maternity benefits while female employees receive no such benefits.
( e ) It shall not be a defense under title VIII to a charge of sex discrimination in benefits that the cost of such benefits is greater with respect to one sex than the other.
( f ) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to have a pension or retirement plan which establishes different optional or compulsory retirement ages based on sex, or which differentiates in benefits on the basis of sex. A statement of the General Counsel of September 13, 1968, providing for a phasing out of differentials with regard to optional retirement age for certain incumbent employees is hereby withdrawn.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-7382

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

DERRICK GRATE,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Leonie M. Brinkema, District

Judge. (CR-93-161-A)

Submitted: February 11, 1999 Decided: February 24, 1999

Before ERVIN, NIEMEYER, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Derrick Grate, Appellant Pro Se. Peter Hugh White, OFFICE OF THE

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
* Although the district court’s order is marked as “filed” on

September 4, 1998, the district court’s records show that it was

entered on the docket sheet on September 8, 1998. Pursuant to

Rules 58 and 79(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it is

the date that the order was entered on the docket sheet that we

take as the effective date of the district court’s decision. See

Wilson v. Murray, 806 F.2d 1232, 1234-35 (4th Cir. 1986).

2

PER CURIAM:

Derrick Grate seeks to appeal the district court’s order

declining to reconsider the order denying his motion filed under 28

U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West 1994 & Supp. 1998). See Fed. R. Civ. P.

60(b). We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of

the district court. See United States v. Grate, No. CR-93-161-A

(E.D. Va. Sept. 8, 1998).* We dispense with oral argument because

the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional

process.

DISMISSED
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

October 31, 2018

No. 04-18-00651-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF D.B., B.N.B., AND T.L.S., CHILDREN,

From the 73rd Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2017-PA-02206

Honorable John D. Gabriel, Jr., Judge Presiding

O R D E R

In this accelerated appeal of the trial court’s order terminating Appellant’s parental rights, 

Appellant’s court-appointed attorney filed an Anders brief. In the brief, counsel states that after a 

professional evaluation of the record, counsel finds no reversible error, concludes the appeal is 

without merit and frivolous, and attached a motion to withdraw. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 

738, 744 (1967); In re R.R., No. 04-03-00096-CV, 2003 WL 21157944, at *4 (Tex. App.—San 

Antonio May 21, 2003, no pet.) (applying Anders procedure in a parental rights termination appeal).

Counsel informed Appellant of her right to file a pro se brief and her right to a free copy of 

the appellate record. 

The State filed a letter waiving its right to file an appellee’s brief unless Appellant files a pro 

se brief.

If Appellant desires to file a pro se brief, we ORDER Appellant to do so within TWENTY 

DAYS of the date of this order. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.6(a). 

If Appellant files a pro se brief, the State may file a responsive brief not later than TWENTY 

DAYS after Appellant’s pro se brief is filed in this court. See id. R. 38.6(b).

The motion to withdraw is HELD IN ABEYANCE pending further order of this court.

_________________________________

Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said court 

on this 31st day of October, 2018.

___________________________________

KEITH E. HOTTLE,

Clerk of Court
[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 13 (Thursday, January 20, 2000)]
[Notices]
[Pages 3204-3205]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-1260]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

International Trade Administration

[A-351-605]


Frozen Concentrated Orange Juice From Brazil; Antidumping Duty 
Administrative Review; Time Limits

AGENCY:  Import Administration, International Trade Administration, 
Department of Commerce.
SUMMARY:  The Department of Commerce is extending the time limits of 
the preliminary results of the 12th antidumping duty administrative 
review of frozen concentrated orange juice from Brazil. The review 
covers four producers/exporters of the subject merchandise to the 
United States and the period May 1, 1998, through April 30, 1999.

EFFECTIVE DATE:  January 20, 2000.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:  Shawn Thompson at (202) 482-1776, or 
Irina Itkin at (202) 482-0656, Office of AD/CVD Enforcement, Import 
Administration, International Trade Administration, U.S. Department of 
Commerce, 14th Street and Constitution Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C., 
20230.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:  Because it is not practicable to complete 
this administrative review within the time limits mandated by the 
Uruguay Round Agreements Act (245 days from the last day of the 
anniversary month for preliminary results, 120 additional days for 
final results), pursuant to section 751(a)(3)(A) of Tariff Act of 1930, 
as

[[Page 3205]]

amended (the Act), the Department is extending the time limit for 
completion of the preliminary results until May 30, 2000. See 
Memorandum to Robert LaRussa, dated January 11, 2000.
    This extension is in accordance with section 751(a)(3)(A) of the 
Act (19 U.S.C. 1675(a)(3)(A)).

    Dated: January 12, 2000.
Richard W. Moreland,
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Import Administration.
[FR Doc. 00-1260 Filed 1-19-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-DS-P
JAMES WILLIAM FOWLER,

Appellant,

v.

KRISTY L. FOWLER,

Appellee.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO 

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND 

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

CASE NO. 1D15-0843

_____________________________/

Opinion filed May 15, 2015.

An appeal from an order of the Circuit Court for Alachua County.

James P. Nilon, Judge.

James William Fowler, pro se, Appellant.

No appearance for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Upon consideration of the appellant's response to the Court's order of April 

14, 2015, the Court has determined that the Partial Final Judgment of Dissolution 

of Marriage is not a final order as it reserves jurisdiction to expend additional 

judicial labor over the non-collateral issues of child support and parental 
2

responsibility. See Hoffman v. O’Connor, 802 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002); 

Klein v. Klein, 551 So. 2d 1235 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). Accordingly, the appeal is 

hereby dismissed as premature.

WOLF, ROWE, and SWANSON, JJ., CONCUR.