UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

TRUE THE VOTE, INC. ,

Plaintiff,

v. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, et al. ,

Defendant s . ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Civil Action No. 13

- 734 (RBW)

MEMORANDUM OPINION
The plaintiff, True the Vote, Inc., brought this civil action against the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”), the United States of America, and several IRS officials in their official capacities , alleging violations of the First Amendment to the United States Co nstitution,
U.S

. Const. amend. I; the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. §§ 1

– 9834 ; and the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701

– 706 , and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as monetary damages. See First Amended Verifi ed Complaint fo r Declaratory Judgment, Injunctive Relief, and Compensatory, Statutory, and Punitive Damages (“Am. Compl.”) ¶¶ 139

– 61, 168

– 206, ECF No. 14. Currently pending before the Court is the intervenor’s

— The Center for Investigative Reporting, Inc. (“CIR”)

— motion for leave to intervene and for access to court
records

. See Motion for Leave to Intervene and f or Access to Court Records (“ CIR ’s Mot.”) at 1 , ECF No. 214

. Upon careful consideration of the CIR’s submissions , 1 the Court concludes for the following reason s that it must grant the CIR’s motion

.

1 In addition to the filings already identified, the Court considered the following submission s in rendering its decision: (1) the CIR’s Memorandum of P oints and Authorities in Support of Movant

- Intervenor’s Motion for Leave to Intervene and for Access to C ourt Records (“CIR’s Mem.”), ECF No. 214; (2) Intervenor The Center for (continued . . .)2 I. BACKGROUND The Court previously set forth the factual background of this case in its Memorandum Opinion issued on October 23, 2014, see True the Vote, Inc. v. Internal Revenue Serv. (“ True the
Vote I ”), 71 F. Supp. 3d 219, 223

– 25 (D.D.C. 2014) (Walton, J.), aff’d in part, rev’d in part and
remanded , 831 F.3d 551 (D.C. Cir. 2016), as well as the procedural history of this case in its Memorandum Opinions issued on May 30, 2019, see True the Vote, Inc. v. Internal Revenue
Serv. (“ True the Vote II ”), No. 13

- cv - 734 (RBW), 2019 WL 2304659, at *2 (D.D.C. May 30, 2019) (Walton, J.), and September 23, 2020, see True the Vote, Inc. v. Internal Revenue Serv. (“ True the Vote III ”), No. 13

- cv - 734 (RBW), 2020 WL 5 656694, at *2 (D.D.C. Sept. 23, 2020) (Walton, J.) , and therefore will not reiterate them in full again here. The Court will, however, briefly summarize the current procedural posture of the case relevant to the resolution of the

m otion that is the subjec t of this Memorandum Opinion

. On May 5, 2017, the plaintiff’s former attorneys

— Public Interest Legal Foundation (“PILF”), f/k/a ActRight Legal Foundation, and Foley and Lardner LLP (“Foley”) (collectively, “Former Attor neys ” 2 )

— file d a notice of their attor ney’s charging lien “based upon legal services performed and expenses and costs incurred in connection with the representation of [the] plaintiff . . . in this action.” Notice of Attorney’s Charging Lien at 1, ECF No. 142

. O n October 2 2, 2020, the plaint iff filed a sealed motion requesting leave to file a motion to quash the Former Attorney s’ charging lien under seal. S ee Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File

(. . . continued) Investigative Reporting, Inc.’s Notice of Conceded Motion (“CIR’s Notice of Con ceded Mot.”) , ECF No. 222; and ( 3) the CIR’s Notice of Supplemental Authority (“CIR’s Notice of Suppl. Auth.”), ECF No

. 25 7.

2 The term “Former Attorneys” also includes The Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence (“CCJ”). See Former Attorneys’ Response i n Opposition to Plaintiff’s Moti on to Quash Attorney’s Charging Lien at 1, EC F No. 196 ( “The Public Interest Legal Foundation [ ], Foley and Lardner LLP [ ], and Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence (together, ‘Former Attorneys’) represented the [p]lai n tiff from the preparation and fi ling of this lawsuit in May of 2013 until lat e February 2017.”)

.3

Documents Under Seal at 1, ECF No. 189. As grounds for its request to file the motion to quash

a nd its accompanying attachments under seal , the plaintiff asserted that one of the attached agreements “contains a specif ic co n tractual agreement that the parties will not divulge the terms of the agreement to any party that does not have a legal interest in the agreement” and that the other attached agreements “al l contain confidential business information that should be protected

a s well.” Id. Furthermore, the plaintiff represented that “both the [m] otion to [q] uash and the [m] emorandum in [s] upport contain refe rences to terms in the [attached] . . . agr eements.” Id. Subsequently , on November 13, 2020, the Former Attorneys filed a sealed motion requesting leave to file their op p osition to the motion to quash under seal because the opposition “also
contains refe rences to the terms of confidential agreements that are presently filed under seal.” Former Attorneys’ Motion for Leave to File Sealed Response to Plaintiff’s Sealed Motion to Quash at 1, ECF No. 19 4

. Likewise, on November 30, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a sea l ed motion requesting leave to file their reply in support of their motion to quash under seal because the “[r]eply contains references to terms in the

. . . agreements.” Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Documents Under Seal at 1, ECF No. 198

. Th e Court granted the parties’ motions , see Minute (“Min .”) Order (Oct. 2 3 , 2020 ); Min. Order (Nov. 17, 2020); Min. Order (Dec. 8, 2020), and the documents were filed under seal a s separate entries on the docket, see Plaintiff’s Motion to Quash PILF’s and Fo ley’s Attorney’s Charging Lien at 1, ECF No. 190; Former A ttorneys’ Response in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Quash Attorney’s Charging Lien at 1, ECF No. 196 ; Reply in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion to Quash PILF’s and Foley’s Attorney’s Charging Lie n at 1, ECF No. 199

. The Court also ordered the parties t o file redacted versions of the sealed d ocuments on the public docket.
S ee Min. Order (Nov. 17, 2020); Min

. Order (Dec. 8, 2020). Accordingly, on December 11,4

2020, the parties filed a redacted ver sion of the motion to quash, the opposition, and the reply on
t he public docket. S e e generally Notice of Compliance with Court Order, ECF No. 200; Notice of Compliance with Court Order, ECF No. 201

. Subsequently, on January 1 7, 2023 , the CIR, “a national nonprofit news organization , ” filed their motion “seek [ i ng] leave to intervene for the purpose of unsealing [the aforementioned] judicial records[.]” CIR’s Mem. at 1 . Additionally, on March 22, 2023, the CIR filed a notice , which indic ated that “no party ha[d] filed any opposition to [the] CIR’s [m]otion

. . . nor . . . requested any additional time to respond” by the deadline to do so, CIR’s Notice of Conceded
Mot. ¶ 3, and “request[ ed ] that the Court grant [its] motion ” based on the l ack of response or opposition, id. ¶ 5. On April 20, 2023, the Court scheduled a status conference and requested that the parties be prepared to discuss, inter alia , the final amount of attorney ’s fees the plaintiff was entitled to be awarded in this case , the outstanding requests related to the plaintif f’s motion to quash , and
the CIR’s motio n to intervene and for access to court records. See Order at 6

– 7 (Apr. 20, 2023),
ECF No. 227

. Due to a change in the Court’s calendar, the hearing regarding the pla intiff’s motion to quash was continued to J uly 5 , 2023, and the Court scheduled a separate motion hearing on the CIR’s motion for J uly 25, 2023. See Order at 1 (June 21, 2023), ECF No. 233

. During the July 5 , 2023 hearing , the Court concluded that the Fo rmer Attorneys “have a valid charging lien on the attorneys ’ fee judgment” in this case, Order at 1

– 2 (Aug. 15, 2023), ECF
No. 245 (citing Transcript of Motion Hearing (“Tr.”) at 19:4

– 11 , ECF No. 244 ), and , thus,
denied the plaintiff’s motion to quash, see i d. at 7. Also, during the July 5 , 2023 hearing , the Court briefly addressed the CIR’s m otion , offering to “entertain any briefing ” from the parties regarding the rationale for the records5

remaining under seal. Tr. at 23: 19

. However, neither the parties n or the Former Attorneys
indicated a desire to file an opposition to the CIR’s motion. See i d. at 23: 22

– 24:20

. Thus, the Court indicated that it “w[ould] issue an appropriate order” resolving the motion, id. at 24:21

– 22, and vacated the July 25, 2023 moti on hearing, see Order at 7 (Aug. 15, 2023), ECF No. 245

. Subsequently, on January 26, 2024, the CIR filed a notice informing the Court of a September 2 6 , 2023 O rder issued by the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Texas in Eshelman v. True the Vote , Civil Action No. 20

- 4034, which “granted [the] CIR’s motion to intervene and to unseal certain judicial records” in that case

. CIR’s Notice of Supp l. Auth. at 1; see also id. , Exhibit (“Ex. ”) A (Order) at 5 , ECF No. 257

- 1

. H owe ver, the Septembe r 2 6 , 2023 O rder issue d by that court did not address the documents that are the s ub ject
of this Memorandum Opi nion.
II. A NALYSIS The CIR moves “for leave to intervene under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b) and for an order gr a nting access to cert ain judicial records that have been placed under seal ” in t his

case. CIR’s Mot. at 1. The Court will f irst address the CIR’s request to intervene before turning to the CIR’s request for the unsealing of certain recor ds

. A. The CIR ’ s Request to Interv ene Th e CIR argues that, “[a]s a member of the press and a representative of the public, [it] has a presumptive common law . . . right to access the court records at issue

. ” 3 CIR’s Mem. at 1

. Furthermore, the CIR asserts that its motion to intervene “meets all requirements und er Rule 24(b) for permissive intervention[,]” id. at 6 , because the motion “is timely[,]” id. , it “satisfies Rule 24’s ‘claim

- or - defense’ requirement,” id. at 7 , and it “does not unduly delay or

3 The CIR also asserts that it “has a First Amendment right of access to the records[,]” but “focuses on the common law right of access in [its] motion[.]” CI R’s Mot

. at 2 n.2.6

prejudice any party’s rights because [the CIR] does n ot seek to distur b the underlying matter[,]”
id. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b) governs permissive intervention and states that , “[o]n timely motion, the court may permit anyone to intervene who: (A) is given a conditional right to intervene by a fe deral statute; or (B) has a claim or defense that shares with the main action a common question of law or fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b). “However, the [District of Columbia] Circuit has ‘ eschewed strict readings of the phrase “ claim or defense ” ’ and embrace d

‘ a flexible read ing of Rule 24(b) ’ when the proposed third

- party intervention does not fit the
mold of a non

- litigant seeking to stake a claim in an ongoing civil action.” Vanda Pharms. v.
Food & Drug Admin. , 539 F. Supp. 3d 44, 50 (D.D.C. 2021) ( quoting Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. Nat’l Children’s Ctr. , Inc. , 146 F.3d 1042, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1998))

. Specifically, “[p]ursuant to [ ] Rule . . . 24(b) and the common

- law right of access, third parties may intervene in cases for the ‘limited purpose of seeking access to materials that have been shielded from public view either b y seal or by a pr otective order

. ’” League of Women Voters of the U.S. v. Newby , 963 F.3d 130, 132 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (quoting Nat’l Children’s Ctr. , 146 F.3d at 1046 ). “Generally, permissive inter vention requires the proposed intervenor to present: (1) an independent ground for subject matter jurisdiction; (2) a timely motion; and (3) a claim or defense that has a question of law or fact in common with the main action

. ” In re Chodiev , No. 18

- mc - 13 (EGS / RMM), 2021 WL 1 795423, at *2 (D.D.C. Mar. 23, 2021), adopted by In re Chodiev , No. 18

- mc - 13 (EGS), 2021 WL 6805642 (D.D.C. May 7, 2021) . However, in several respects, “[w]here intervention is sought only for a collateral purpose like unsealing docum ents, the ordinary requirements for permissive intervention are relaxed.” Vanda Pharms. , 539 F. Supp. 3d at 50. First, “[a]n independent jurisdictional basis is [ ] unneces sary when the movant seeks7

to intervene only for the limited purpose of obtaining access to documents covered by seal . . . because the third party does not ask the court to rule on the merits of a claim or defense.” Nat’l Children’s Ctr. , 146 F.3d at 104 7; see also id. (explaining that “[a] third party seek[ing] to
intervene for the l imited purpose of obtaining access to documents protected by a confidentiality order” need not establish an independent jurisdictional basis because such intervenor is merely asking the court “to exercise a power that it already has, namely the power to mo dify a previously entered confidentiality order”)

. Moreover, “‘Rule 24(b)’s timeliness requirement,’ the purpose of which ‘is to prevent prejudice in the adjudication of the rights of the existing parties,’ need not apply ‘when the existing parties have s ettled their dispute and intervention is for a collateral purpose.’” Vanda Pharms. , 539 F.3d at 50 (quoting Nat’l Children’s Ctr. , 146 F.3d at 1047). Indeed, there is “cons ensus among the courts of appeals that intervention to challenge confidentiality o rders may take place long after a case has been terminated.” Nat’l Children’s Ctr. , 146 F.3d at 1047 ( citation omitted). Finally, “ ‘ no particularly strong n exus of fact or law need exist between ’ the underlying litigation and the case for which the intervenor is seeking to access the sealed documents.” Vanda Pharms. , 539 F.3d at 50 (quoting Nat’l Children’s Ctr. , 146 F.3d at 1048 )

. Accordingly, s ome courts “have gone so far as to hold that the issue of the scope or need for the confident iality order itself presents a common question that links the movant’s challenge with the main action .” Nat’l Children’s Ctr. , 146 F.3d at 1048. Here, the CIR meets the “rel axed” requirements for permissive intervention under
Rule 24(b). Vanda Pharms. , 5 39 F. Supp. 3d at 50. First, the CIR “seeks leave to intervene for the purpose of unsealing judicial records[,]” CIR’s Mem . at 1, rather than to “ask the [C]ourt to
rule on the merits of a claim or defense[,]” Nat’l Children’s Ctr. , 146 F.3d at 1047. Thu s, “[a]n independent jurisdictional basis is [ ] unnecessary” because the CIR “seeks to intervene only for8

the limited purpose of obtaining access to documents covered by sea l[.]” Id. Second, no timeliness concern is present because “the original parties ’ dispute has already been resolved[,]”
Vanda Pharms. , 539 F. Supp. 3d at 51 ; see True the Vote I , 71 F. Supp. 3d at 235 (granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss) ; Consent Order at 1

– 14 (Jan. 19, 2018), ECF No. 150 (resolving the claims reinstated by th e District of Columbia Circuit), and “intervention is for a collateral
purpose , ” Vanda Pharms. , 539 F. Supp. 3d at 51 (quoting Nat’l Children’s Ctr. , 146 F.3d
at 1407) , i.e. , to challenge the Court’s confidentiality orders regarding certain records, see CI R’s Mem. at 1 (challenging “the Court’s orders allowing [certain] records to be sealed”)

. Thus , because the original parties’ dispute has already been resolved , grant ing the CIR’s request to
intervene does not offend the purpose of Rule 24(b)’s timeliness requirement , which is “ to prevent prejudice in the adjudication of the rights of the existing parties [.] ” Nat’l Children’s
Ctr. , 146 F.3d at 1047 (internal quotation marks omitted)

. Finally, “[a]lthough the propriety of publicly releasing previously sea led docket entries is the only common issue of law or fact that [the CIR] shares with the parties, that is sufficient to meet the commonality requi rements for this limited intervention.” In re Chodiev , 2021 WL 1795423, at *3 ; see also Vanda Pharms. , 539
F .3d at 50 (stating that “‘no particularly strong nexus of fact or law need exist between’ the underlying litigation and the case for which the inte rvenor is seeking to access the sealed documents” (quoting Nat’l Children’s Ctr. , 146 F.3d at 1048)). Theref ore, the Court concludes that the CIR may intervene in this case pursuant to Rule 24(b) for the limited purpose of requesting access to certain sea led d ocuments

.9

B. The CIR’s Request for the Documents to be Unsealed Having concluded that the CIR is permitted to intervene in this case for the limited purpose of requesting the unsealing of certain records , the Court now turns to the specific documents which the CIR seeks to unseal. In its motion, the CIR invokes the common law right of access to judicial proce edings, see CIR’s Mem. at 10, to support its request to unseal the following documents in their entirety: “(1) [the plaintiff’s] Motion to Quash PILF’s and Foley’s Attorney’s Charging Lien and its related exhibits ([ECF Nos.] 200

- 1

– 200

- 7); (2) a response i n opposition to that motion filed by PILF, Foley, and the [CCJ] (together ‘Former Attorneys’) ([ECF No.] 201

- 1); and (3) [the plaintiff ’s] reply to the Former Attorneys’ opposition ([ECF No.] 200

- 8) [,] ” i d. at 4

– 5

. 4 In addition, the CIR requests the unsea ling of “the p arties’ motions for leave to file their respective documents under sea l[

. ] ” Id. at 5

. The CIR argues that “the sealed materials are undoubtedly ‘judicial records’ to which the common law right of access

attac hes” and that “the[se] rec o rd s s hould be disclosed under the common law because the balancing of interest s weighs in favor of disclosure.” Id. at 10. “In ‘the courts of this country’

— including the federal courts

— the common law bestows upon the public a rig ht of access to public records a nd documents[,]” Wash. Legal Found. v. U.S. Sent’g Comm’n , 89 F.3d 897, 902 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc ., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978)), and “[t]he common

- law right of public access to judicial record s ‘is a
fundamental element of t he rule of law, important to maintaining the integrity and leg itimacy of an independent [j]udicial [b]ranch[,]’” In re Leopold to Unseal Certain Elec. Surveillance Applications & Ords. , 964 F.3d 1121, 1127 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (quoting MetLife, Inc. v. Fin.

4 The sealed versions of these documents are located on th e docket at ECF Nos. 190, 196, and 199. See Plaintiff’s Motion to Quash PILF’s and Foley’s Attorney’s Charging Lien at 1, ECF No. 190; Former Attorneys’ Response in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Quash Att orney’s Charging Lien at 1, ECF No. 196; Repl y in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion to Quash PILF’s and Foley’s Attorney’s Charging Lien at 1, ECF No. 199.10

S tability Oversight Council , 865 F.3d 661, 663 (D.C. Cir. 2017) )

. “[W]hether a document must be disclosed pursuant to the common law right of access involves a two

- step inquiry.” Wash. Legal Found

. , 89 F.3d at 902. “Fi rst, the court must determine wh ether the document sought is a judicial record.” In re Fort T otten Metrorail Cases , 960 F. Supp. 2d 2, 6 (D.D.C. 2013) (Walton, J.). “If a document qualifies as a judicial record, the [C]ourt proceeds to the second inquiry : balancing the public’s right o f access against the interests favoring nondisclosure.” Id. 1. Judici al Records In this Circuit, “not all documents filed with courts are judicial records [,] ” Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Am. Int’l Grp. , 712 F.3d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2013) , and “whether something is a judicial record depends on ‘ the role it plays in the adjudicatory proces s [,] ’ ” id. ( quoting U nited States v.
El

- Sayegh , 131 F.3d 158 , 163 (D.C. Cir. 1997)). Documents filed i n c o u rt that are “intended to influence the court” qualify as judi cial records. In re L eopold , 9 64 F.3d at 1128; see , e.g. , id. ( concluding that court orders issued pursuant to § 2703(d) of the Stored Communications Act
and “ a pplications for such orders and their supporting documentation ” were judicial records); League of Women Voters , 963 F.3d at 13 6 (“[E]very part of every brief f i l e d to influence a judicial decision qualifies as a ‘judicial record.’”); MetLife , 865 F.3d at 668 (holding that appellate briefs and appendices are judicial records because they are “ intended to influence” the
court and t he court “ma[kes] decisions abou t them”). Here, the Court concludes that the sealed documents the CIR requests that the Court
unseal

— i.e. , (1) the plaintiff’s motion to quash the F ormer Attorneys’ c harging l ien and it s related exhibits, (2) the Former Atto rneys’ o pposition to the plainti ff’s motion, (3) the plaintiff’s reply in support of its motion , and (4) the parties’ motions for leave to file these respective
documents under seal

— qualify as “judicial records” to wh ich the common law right of access appl ies . The parties’ motions for l eave to file the documents under seal were “intended to11

influence the court[,]” In re L eopold , 964 F.3d at 1128, in making its determination of whether to permit the records to be file d under seal, and the briefing on the pl aintiff’s motion to quash was
li kewise “intended to influence the court[,]” id. , in making its decision regarding whether to grant or deny the plaintiff’s motion to quash. Therefore, all of the documents that the CI R is requesting be unsealed qualify as j udicial records. See In Re Los Angeles Times Commc’ns
LLC , 2 8 F.4th 292, 296 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (stating that the D istrict of Columbia Circuit has
characterized “

judicial records ” as “ documents intended to influence a judge ’s decisionmaking ” (internal quota tion marks omitted)). 2. T he Hubbar d Factors Because the documents at issue qualify as judicial records, the Court must balance the public’s right of access against the interests favoring nondisclosure. See In re Fort Totten Metrorail Cases , 960 F. Supp. 2d at 6

. In federal courts, “there is a ‘strong presumption in favor of public access to judicial proceedings ’ ” and the records related to such pro ceedings

. Met L ife , 865 F.3d at 665 (quoting Unite d States v. Hubbard , 650 F.2d 293 , 317 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ).
Ho wever, “ [ t ] he right of public acce ss . . . is not absolute [

. ] ” Id. at 663

. Rather, in United States

v. Hubbard , 650 F.2d 293 (D.C. Cir. 1980) , the D istrict of Columbia Circuit adopted a “six

- factor test to balance” the litigants’ interests in sealing documen ts against the presumption of pu blic access , MetLife , 865 F.3d at 665

. Under this test ,

w hen a court is presented with a motion to seal or unseal, it should weigh: “(1) the need fo r public access to the documents at issue; (2) the extent of previous publi c access to the documents; (3) t he fact that someone has objected to disclosure, and the identity of that person; (4) the strength of any property and privacy interests asserted; (5 ) the possibility of prejudice to those opposing disclosure; and (6) the pu rposes for which the documents w ere introduced during the judicial proceedings. ”12

Id. (quoting Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. Nat’l Children ’ s Ctr., Inc. , 98 F.3d 1406, 1409 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ); see also Hubbard , 650 F.2d at 317

– 22

. “ After considerin g these six

‘ Hubbard factors, ’ a court may only place or keep judicial records under seal if it ‘ concludes that justice so requires. ’ ” Vanda Pharms. , 539 F. Supp. 3d at 52 (qu oting Met L ife , 865 F.3d at 666 )

. The Court will thus address each Hubbard facto r in turn

. 5

a. The Need for Public Access to the Documents at Issue
The first Hubbard factor assesses “the need for public access to the documents at issue [

. ] ”
MetLife , 865 F.3d at 665 (internal quotation marks omitted)

. The CIR argues that this f actor “weig hs heavily in favor of unsealing the documents” because “the IRS and its agents are parties
to the underlying litigation” and “the sealed records at issue pertain to whether or not [the plaintiff’s] former attorneys are entitled to a portion of any fee awa rd in the case .” CIR’s Mot.

at 11. Further more, the CIR argues that the need for public access i s strengthened here because

“ [ a ] ny such fee in this case will be paid by the IRS, which is funded by taxpayers and involves the public fisc [,] ” and “the disput e between [the plaintiff] and it s Former Attorneys implicates
the funding of public interest groups like [the] PILF, which is a 501 (c) (3) public interest law firm.” Id

. “[T]here is a ‘ need for public access ’ in those instances where ‘ the d ocuments at issu e [ are ]

. . . specifically refer red to in the tri al judge’s public decision. ’ ” Nat ’ l Children’s Ctr. , 98 F.3d at 1409 ( omission and second alteration in origin a l) (qu o ting Hubbard , 650 F.2d at 318)

. Additionally, “ t he presumption of transparency is ‘ acce ntuated in cases ’ l ike this one ‘ where the

5 Because the Court did not articulate its reasons for electing to seal the records when it granted the parties’ motions to seal, see Minute (“Min.”) Order (Oct. 2 3 , 2020); Min. Order (Nov. 17, 2020); Min. Order (Dec. 8, 2020), as required by the District of Columbia Circuit, s ee Nat’l Children ’ s Ctr. , 98 F.3d at 1410 (stating that “ it is imperative that a district court articulate its reasons for electing to seal or not to seal a record”), the Court now provides a full analysis of the Hubbard factors in this Mem orandum Opinion and ultimately c oncludes that unsealing of the records is warranted.13

government is a party[,] ’” because “ public attention can act as a strong corrective to government abuses of power.” In re Press Application for Access to Jud. Recs. I n Case No. 23

- SC

- 31 , No. 2 3

- mc - 8 4 (JEB), 2023 WL 8254630, at *4 (D.D.C. Nov. 2 9, 2023) (quoting United States v. All Assets Held at Bank Julius Baer & Co ., 520 F. Supp. 3d 71, 81 (D.D.C. 2020) ) ; see also Hyatt v. Lee , 251 F. Supp. 3d 181, 184 (D.D.C. 2017) (“The interest of the pub l ic a nd press in

acc ess to civil proceedings is at i ts apex when the government is a party to the litigation.” (quoting Doe v. Pub. Citizen , 749 F.3d 246, 2 71 ( 4th Ci r. 2014) ) ; Friedman v. Sebelius , 672
F. Supp. 2d 54, 58 (D.D.C. 2009) (“[I]n cases where the go vernment is a p arty [,] . . . [t]he

a p propriaten ess of making court files accessible is enhanced.” ( omission and third alterati o n in original) (quoting Nat’l Children’s Ctr. , 98 F.3d at 1409))

. Furthermore , “[t] he need for public access is strengthened when the records pertain to fin ancial arrangements involving th e public
fisc. ” DRC, Inc. v. Republic of Honduras , No. 10

- cv - 03 (PLF /AK ), 2011 WL 13257869, at *4 (D.D.C. Aug. 22, 2011)

. When weighing the first Hubbard factor, “[c]ourts must focus on the public value of the withheld informat ion, not the public’s interest i n the overarching subject matter to which that information may relate.” In re Chodiev , 2021 WL 1795423, at *4

. Thus, “ t he proper inquiry is whether the public needs to acce ss the remaining information redacted . . . , no t whether the public needs to ac cess the [documents] as a whole [

. ]” Cable News Network, Inc. v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation , 984 F.3d 114, 119 (D.C. Cir. 2021) . Additionally, “ [ i ] t is not the

. . . burden [of the party seeking unsealing ] to proffer a ne ed for public access[.]” Vanda Pharms. , 539 F. Supp. 3d at 52 ( first alteration in original) ( citation omitted) . Rather, the burden is on the party seeking
to restrict disclosure “to demonstrate the abs ence of a need for public access bec ause the law14

presumes that the p ublic is entitled to access the contents of judicial proceedings.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted)

. Here, as discussed in greater detail below, see infra Section II .B.2.c, neither the parties nor the Former Attorneys filed an opposition to the CIR’ s motion and, thus, no opponent to
disclosure has sought to satisfy the burden of demonstrating the absence of a need for public
access to the redacted information. See Al l Assets Held at Bank Julius Baer & Co

. , 520 F. Supp

. 3d at 82 (“‘[B] ecause the law presumes that the public is entitled to access the contents of judicial proceedings, ’ it is the party arguing against disclosure that has the burden to

‘ demonstrate the abs ence of a need for public access . ’ ” (quoting United States v. ISS Marine Servs., Inc

. , 905 F. Supp. 2d 121, 140

– 41 (D.D.C. 2012) ) )

. Additionally, t he information that remains under seal involves the terms of the r epresentation agreements between the plaintiff and its current and former attorneys. See Notic e of Compliance with Court Order at 1 , ECF No. 200; Notice of Compliance with Court Order at 1 , E CF No. 201. The p ublic has “ an especially strong interest in reviewing ” the terms of these agreements, Vanda Pharms. , 539 F. Supp. 3d at 52 , because they are “specifically referred to in the [ Court’s ] public decision,” id. (internal quotation
marks omitted) , issued on August 15, 2023, in which the Court denied the plaintiff’s motion to quash the Former Attorney s’ charging lien , s ee Order at 2

– 7 (Aug. 15, 2023), ECF No. 245

. Moreover, the IR S is a defendant in this suit, “which, in itself weighs in favor of
disclosure [,] ” All Assets Held at Bank Julius Baer & Co

. , 520 F. Supp. 3d at 82 , because “[t] he presumption of transparency is particularly strong in cases where .

. . a government agency is a party[,]” Fed. Trade Comm’ n v. Match Grp. , Inc. , No. 22

- mc - 54 (RJL/GMH), 2023
WL 3181351, at *10 (D.D.C. May 1, 2023) ( internal citation and internal quotation marks
omitted )

. Relatedly , the remaining redacted informat ion in the briefing on the p lain tiff’s motion15

to quash the Former Attorneys’ charging lien pertains to the issue of whether the plaintiff’s
F ormer A ttorneys are entitled to a portion of the fee award in this case , which the defendants

— including the IRS

— wer e responsible for satisfying

. S ee Order at 6 (Aug. 15, 2023), ECF
No. 245 . The funds are being held by the Clerk of the Court pending the Court’s resolution of the attorneys’ charging lien disputes in this case

. S ee id. ; Deposit of Funds (Mar. 26, 2024)

. T hus, because the fee awa rd w as paid by the IRS, which as the CIR highlights “is funded by taxpayers and involves the public fisc[,]” CIR’s Mem. at 11, the “need for public access [to the

s ealed information] is strengthened[,]” DRC , 2011 WL 13257869, at *4. Cf. King & Spalding,
L LP v . U.S. Dep’t of Hea l th and Hum

. Servs. , No. 16

- cv - 1616 (APM), 2020 WL 1695081, at * 2 (D.D.C. Apr. 7, 2020) (concluding that “[t]he first factor weigh[ed] heavily in favor of not sealing” records involving “King & Spalding ’ s billing rates, staffing strat egies, and detailed billing entries ” because “there is something untoward about [the law firm] a sking to conceal their hourly rates and the work done from public view, while demanding hundreds of thousands of
dollars from th e public treasury as compensatio n”)

. Therefore, the Court concludes that this first factor weighs heavily in favor of disclosure

. b. The Extent of Previous Public Access
The second Hubbard factor is “the extent o f previous public access to the documents[.]”
MetLife , 865 F.3d at 665 (inter nal quotation marks omitted). The CIR contends that “this factor weighs in favor of disclosure” because “[t]he documents at issue have been filed in redacted form, and therefore are largely already in the public domain.” C IR’s Mem . at 1 2. The CIR also

a rgues that “[t]he unredacted portions of the records make it clear that the redacted portions deal with various agreements between [the plaintiff], the Former Attorneys, and [the plaintiff’s] current attorneys, that govern t he allocation of recovered attor ney fees, costs, and expenses[,]”16

and “[t]hus, the co ntours of those agreements are largely already described in the parties’ unredacted filings.” Id. “The fact that a document has been previously accessible to the public ‘ weigh[s] in favor of subsequent access.’” All Assets Held at Bank Julius Baer & Co. , 520 F. Supp. 3d at 82 (quoting Hubbard , 650 F.2d at 318 )

. By contrast, “the second Hubbard factor is neutral where there has been no previous access. ” Vanda Pharm s . , 53 9 F. Supp. 3d at 54 (quoting Gry nberg v.
BP P.L.C. , 205 F. Supp. 3d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2016)) ; see also Hyatt , 251 F. Supp. 3d at 185 (concluding that the second Hubbard factor “d[id] not weigh in favor of disclosure” because “there was no [ ] prior access” to t he documents at issue) . “ [T]he rationale behind treating prior

access as favoring unsealing” is “that it is less harmful to release a document that was once public than to release one that has never been made publicly accessible.” Friedman , 672 F. Supp. 2d at 59. I n assessing this fac tor, cou rts “ should c onsider the publi c ’s previous access to the sealed information, not its previous access to the information available in the overall lawsuit .” Cable News Network , 984 F.3d at 119

. Additionally , “[a]ltho ugh some cases
denominate this f

act or as ‘the extent of previous public access to the documents , ’ later cases
make clear that the focus is on previous public access to the sealed information

. ” Match Grp. , 2023 WL 3181351, at *13 ( quoting Nat’l Children’s Ctr. , 98 F.3d at 1409 ) ; s ee also Cabl e News Network , 984 F.3d at 119 (“[T]he appr o priate question is whether the public has previously accessed the remaining information redacted from the [documents], not whether the [party opposing disclosure] has previou sly disclosed other information from th[ose] same document[s].”)

. Here, a lthough redacted versions of the fully sealed documents are available on the public
docket in this case , s e e generally Notice of Compliance with Court Order, ECF No. 200; Notice17

of Co mpliance with Court Order, ECF N o. 201, the re is no indication that the remaining redacted
information in those documents has been previously accessible to the public

. Therefore, the Court conclud es that “t he extent of previous public access neither weighs in favor nor weighs against sealing ” in this case. Am. Pro. Agency, Inc. v. NASW Assurance Servs., Inc. , 121 F. Supp. 3d 21, 24 (D.D.C. 2013)

.
c. The Parties’ Object i o ns The third Hubbard factor considers whether “ someone has objected to disclosure, and the
id entity of that person[.]” MetLi fe , 865 F.3d at 665 (internal quotation marks omitted)

. The CIR argues that although “the relevant parties, [the p l aintiff] and the Former Attorneys, presumably object to the unsea l ing of the [] records b ecause they init i all y moved to file them under seal[ ,]” they “have already un

- sealed portions of the records in subsequently filed redacted versions after being ordered to do so by the Court

— suggesting t hat they may not object to additional unsealing of these records.” CIR’s Mem. at 13

. Additionally , the CIR asserts that “the fact that, unlike in
Hubbard , the records do not implicate a third party’s property and privacy rights” further “weigh[s] in favo r of disclosure[.]” Id

.

“ The objection to disclosure made by a party to an action generally is deemed to weigh in favor of denial of public access.” United States v. Thomas , 840 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2011)

. Additionally, this factor “provides broader protection from disclosure ‘where a third party’s property and privacy r ights are at issue [and] the nee d for minimizing intrusion is especially great[.]’” United States v. Jackson , No. 21

- mj

- 115 (BAH), 2 021 WL 1026127, at *7 (D.D.C. Mar. 17, 2021) (quoting Hubbard , 650 F.2d at 319)

. However, the objecti o n of a party to an

a ction “do[es] not have the same strength as a third

- party objection

. ” Hyatt , 251 F. Supp. 3d at 185 ; se e also Michaels v. NCO Fi ns. Sys

. Inc. , No. 16

- cv - 1339 (ACR/ZMF), 2023 WL 4857413,18

at *4 (D.D.C. July 31, 2023) (“‘[L]itigants to [a] proceeding have a lesser claim to privacy than
thi rd parties’ when they object in that proceeding.” (quoting Hyatt , 251 F. Supp. 3d at 185 ) ). Here, the CIR ’s motion note s that it is “ opposed by [the plaintiff] and [d] efendants Steven T. Miller, Douglas H. Shulman, Lois Lern er, William Wilkins, Holly Paz, Cindy M. Thomas, Steven Grodnitzky, David Fish, and Michael Seto.” CIR’s Mot. at 1. However, as to the Former Attorneys, the CIR indicate s that the PILF “take[s] no position regarding the motion[,]” id. , and it has receive d no response from Foley and the CCJ, see id

. Moreover, no party filed a n opposition to the CIR’s motion

. See CIR’s Notice of Conceded Mot. ¶ 3 . And, when provided with an additional opportunity to do so by the Court during the July 5 , 2023 hearing , s ee Tr. at 23:19 (indicating that t he Court “would entertain any briefing” in opposition to the request to unseal the documents), the parties and the Former Attorneys declined , see id.
at 24:3

– 7 (representation by the government that it is “not participating in any of th[e] motions
nor in t he motions to seal”); id. at 24:10

– 18 (representation by the plaintiff that “some of the
exhibits c ontain [confidential,] attorney

- client agreements” but that the plaintiff “d[oes not] have any additional input” and does not desire to file an opposition in reference to the issue); id.
at 24:19

– 20 (representation from the PILF that it “[does not] intend to file anything” ).
A lthough the objections made by the plaintiff and some of the defendant s weigh against disclosure, the st rength of such objections is w eakened by the fact that no party to this case filed an opposition brief setting forth their specific arguments a gainst the CIR’s request to unseal the
documents at issue

. See Hubbard , 650 F.2d at 319 (“The strength with wh ich a party asserts its
interest s is a signific ant indication of the importance of those rights to that party.”)

. F urthermore , “the potency of this factor is diluted [in this case] by the absence of any third

- party objection to the disclosure [,]” Lee as N ext Friends of M.L. v. Seed Pub. Charter Sch. of19

Washington, D.C. , No. 18

- cv - 2786 (CKK) , 2021 WL 4819897, at *4 (D.D.C. Oct. 15, 2021) , as
t he Former Attorneys

— who , along with the plaintiffs, maintain the privacy interests protected by
the sealed docum ents

— declined to file an opposit ion to the CIR’s motion to unseal , see Tr.
at 24:14

– 20 ( indicating that the PILF “does[ not] intend to file anything” in response to the Court’s inquiry regarding whether the plaintiff or the Former Attorneys desired “ to fil e

s omething in reference to the issue as to wh y [the documents] should remain under seal”)

. Therefore, the Court concludes that this factor weighs only slightly against disclosure.
d. The Strength of Any Property and Privacy Interest s T he fourth Hubbard fact or is “the strength of any prope rty and priva cy interests asserted[.]” MetLife , 865 F.3d at 665 (internal quotation marks omitted). The CIR argues that this factor favors unsealing because “[t]he documents [at issue here] do not implicate th[e kinds
of ] particularized privacy or proper ty interests” recognized in Hubbard . CIR’s Mem. at 13.

“ [U]nder this factor, the party seeking to avoid disclosure must identify specific privacy
interests in the documents at issue .” Guttenberg v. Emery , 26 F. Supp. 3d 88, 94 (D.D.C. 2014)

. In Hu bbard , the District of Columbia Circuit “illustrated situations where the u nsealing of
documents would implicate cognizabl e interests because they contained material protected by attorney

- client privilege, discussed tax retu rns, or included information abo ut an individual ’s sex life, or other intimate details .” All Assets Held at Bank Julius Baer & Co. , 520 F. Supp. 3d at 83 (citing Hubbard , 650 F.2d at 323

– 24)

. “ Valid privacy and property interests are not limited to
perso nal details, but may also includ e confidential business information that should be kept private for competitive business reasons .” Id. However, “[a] lthough confidentiality agreements between private parties may weigh against disclosure, they do not dicta te whether docum ents can be file d under seal.” Grynberg , 205 F. Supp. 3d at 3 ; see also In re Chodiev , 2021 WL 1795423,20

at *6 (“The fact that the [document] includes an explicit non

- disclosure clause is relevant to, but not dispositive of, the analysis of this factor .”). Here, the priva cy interest identified by the plaintiff and the Former Attorneys is the confidentiality of the representation agreements. See Notice of Compliance with Court Order
at 1, ECF No. 200 ( “ T he various agreements at issue in Form er Attorneys’ Ch arging Lien
cont ain confidentiality provision s or are otherwise governed by the attorneys’ professional duty to maintain client confidentiality.” ); Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Documents Under Seal

at 1, ECF No. 189 ( requesting to f ile the plaintif

f’s motion to qu ash under seal because “[t] he Governing Agreement contains a specific contractual agreement that the parties will not divulge the terms of the agreement to any party that does not have a legal interest in the agreement ” and “[t] he PILF, Fol ey, and BLF agre ements all contain confidential business information that should be protected as well”); Former Attorneys’ Motion for Leave to File Sealed Response to Plaintiff’s Sealed Motion to Quash at 1, ECF No. 194 ( r equesting to file the Former Attor neys’ opposition to the motion to quash under seal because it “ contains references to the terms of confidential agreements that are presently filed under seal ”)

. Based on the stated re asons for the confidentiality of the agreements at iss ue, the Court concludes that the privacy interests at stake weigh against disclosure, but “do[] not compel this Court to seal th[e] document[s] , ” Lee as Next of Friends of M.L. , 2021 WL 4819897, at *4 , because o f the strong need for public access to the
do cuments in this case. S ee id. ( “[T]he D.C. Circuit and multiple courts in this district have reasoned that [ ] confidentiality provisions are but one, non

- dispositive factor weighing against disclosure, which m ay well be overcome by the public interest in judicial transparency.”); In re Fort Totten Metrorail Cases , 960 F. Supp. 2 d at 11 (ordering disclosure of settlement documents even though confidentiality provision weighed against it).21

e. The Possibility of Prej udice
The fifth Hubbard factor considers “ th e possibility of prejudice to th ose opposing
disclosure [.]” MetLife , 865 F.3d at 665 (internal quotation marks omitted) . The CIR asserts that “the parties have not id entified how disclosing the records would prejudice them in future litigation, so this f

actor weighs in favor of disclos ure . ” CIR’s Mem . at 14.

“ The possibility of prejudice refers to ‘whether disclosure of the documents will lead to prejudice in future litigation to the party seeking the s eal.’” United States ex rel. Durham v. Prospect Wat erproofing, Inc. , 818 F. Supp. 2 d 64, 68 (D.D.C. 2011) (quoting Friedman , 672 F. Supp. 2d at 6 0 ). “For this factor to weigh in favor of continued sealing, the party opposing disclosure ‘must have identif ied how the . . . disclosure’ of the relevant materi als ‘causes . . . legal prejudic e.’” All Assets Held at Bank Julius Baer & Co. , 520 F. Supp. 3d at 85 ( quoting Zapp v. Zhenli Ye Gon , 746 F. Supp. 2d 145, 150 (D.D.C. 2010) )

. Here, neither the parties nor the Former Attorneys have submitted any argument regarding how the disc l osure of the records would prejudice them in future litigation. Therefore , to the extent the parties or the Former Attorneys do in fact continue to oppose the unsealing o f the documents despite not filing an opposition, they have no t met their burden under this fa ctor , see All Assets Held at Bank Julius
Baer & Co

. , 520 F. Supp. 3d at 85 (“In case after case in this Circuit, courts have found that an
individual who fails to identify and support a claim of litigation prejudice . . . do es not meet the burden under th[ e] [fifth Hubbard ] factor.”), and this factor therefore does not weigh in favor of continued sealing. f. The Purposes for Which the Documents Were Introduced The sixth and final Hubbard factor concerns “ the purposes for which the documents were
introduced du ring the judicial proceedings.” MetLife , 865 F.3d at 665 (internal quotation marks22

omitted )

. The CIR contends that this factor “also weighs in favor of discl o sure because the purpose for which the documents were introduced was to shed light on the agreem ents between [the pla i ntiff], its current attorneys, and its Former Attorneys which implicate the allocation of any awarded attorneys’ fees.” CIR’s Mem. at 14

. “The Sixth Hubbard factor favors disclosure where the parties e xplicitly intend ed [for] the Cou rt to rely on [ the sealed ] materials in adjudicating their dispute. ” Vanda Pharms. , 539 F. Supp. 3d at 57 (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) ; see also All
Assets Held at Bank Julius Baer & Co

. , 520 F. Supp. 3d at 85 (“Gener ally, there is a strong presumption of public access to documents that a litigant submits with the intention that the court will rely on them.”)

. “W hen a sealed doc ument is considered as part of judicial decisionmaking,
the sixth factor will oftentimes ca rry great weight.” Cable News Network , 984 F.3d at 120

. By contrast, “when the sixth factor highl ights the fact that a sealed document did[ not] affect a judicial decision, it can be the most important element cutting agai nst disclosure.” Id. (internal quot ati on marks omitted). Here, the information the CIR seeks to unseal is contain e d in the briefing on the plaintiff’s motion to quash the Former Attorneys’ charging lien and the underlying motions requesting leave of the Court to file this briefing unde r seal

. Becaus e the plaintiff intended for the Court to rely on th is briefi n g and t he accompanying attachments in resolving its motion to quash the Former Attorneys’ charging lien, and the documents were heavily relied on b y the Court in resolving the mot ion, see Order at 2

– 7 (Aug. 15, 2023), ECF No. 245, this factor weighs in favor of d isclosure , se e ICC Eval uation Serv., LLC, v. Int’ l Ass’n of Plumbing & Mech. Offs. , Inc. , No. 16

- cv - 54 ( EGS/ZMF ), 2022 WL 2785985, at *7 (D. D.C. July 15, 2022 ) (“ [ R ] edactio ns

are disfavored where ‘[t]he information [a party] seek[s] to shield from the public is critical to23

the analysis in the [court ’s ] opinion. ’” (quoting Doe v. Ex xon Mobil e Corp. , 570 F. Supp. 2d 49,
53 (D.D.C. 2008) ) ; c f. Hy att , 251 F. Supp. 3d at 186 (con cluding that the Sixth Hubbard factor “weigh[ed] in favor of disclosure” where “[t]he documents in question [ ] include[d, inter alia ,]

. . . the motions of the parties . . . [that were] presented to the Court in support of the ir motions for summary judgme nt ”).
g. Overview of the Hubbard Factors In sum, the first factor weighs heavily in favor of disclosure and the sixth factor also supports disclosure; the third and fourth factors weigh slightly in favor of non

- disclosure; and the
second and fifth factors are neutral. Although only two of the six Hubbard factors definitively support unsealing the documents in their entirety, the strength of the need for public access to the information and the purpose for which the information was introduced in this judicial proceeding outweigh the remaining factors. See In r e Fort Totten Metrorail Cases , 960 F. Supp. 2d at 11 (stating that “a strong showing on one Hubbard factor can outweigh several other factors”). Consequently , on balance, the Court concludes that the Hub bard factors favor unsealing the documents at issue in their entirety.
III. C ONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that it must grant the intervenor’s motion
to intervene and access court records

. SO ORDERED th is 31st day of May , 2024. 6

REGGIE B. WALTON United States District Judge

6 The Court will contemporaneously issue an Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion.