alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# L_2014298DE.01006301.xml

| 16.10.2014 | DE | Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union | L 298/63 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.10.2014

DE

Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union

L 298/63

---

Berichtigung des Beschlusses 2000/365/EG des Rates vom 29. Mai 2000 zum Antrag des Vereinigten Königreichs Großbritannien und Nordirland, einzelne Bestimmungen des Schengen-Besitzstands auf sie anzuwenden

(
  Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union L 131 vom 1. Juni 2000
  )

(
  Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union L 131 vom 1. Juni 2000

Im Inhaltsverzeichnis und auf Seite 43 im Titel:

anstatt:

„Beschluss 2000/365/EG des Rates vom 29. Mai 2000 zum Antrag des Vereinigten Königreichs Großbritannien und Nordirland, einzelne Bestimmungen des Schengen-Besitzstands auf sie anzuwenden“

muss es heißen:

„Beschluss 2000/365/EG des Rates vom 29. Mai 2000 zum Antrag des Vereinigten Königreichs Großbritannien und Nordirland, einzelne Bestimmungen des Schengen-Besitzstands auf es anzuwenden“

.

Auf Seite 43, zweiter Bezugsvermerk:

anstatt:

„in Anbetracht des Antrags der Regierung des Vereinigten Königreichs Großbritannien und Nordirland mit Schreiben vom 20. Mai 1999, vom 9. Juli 1999 und vom 6. Oktober 1999 an den Präsidenten des Rates, einige in diesen Schreiben angeführten Bestimmungen des Schengen-Besitzstands auf sie anzuwenden,“

muss es heißen:

„in Anbetracht des Antrags der Regierung des Vereinigten Königreichs Großbritannien und Nordirland mit Schreiben vom 20. Mai 1999, vom 9. Juli 1999 und vom 6. Oktober 1999 an den Präsidenten des Rates, einige in diesen Schreiben angeführte Bestimmungen des Schengen-Besitzstands auf es anzuwenden,“

.

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1 Site Visit Report Alaska Seafood Processing Industry Petition Response

Lindsay Guzzo Environmental Engineer U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Region 10 Permits Division guzzo.lindsay@epa.gov

206-553-0268 Betsy Bicknell Senior Environmental Engineer Eastern Research Group, Inc. (ERG) betsy.bicknell@erg.com

703-633-1612

Plant Name Alaska Fresh Seafood

Plant Address Kodiak, Alaska
NPDES Permit #

Date of Visit Tuesday, August 17, 2010 People Contacted Rey Blanco, Plant Manager

Seafood processed Cod (sable fish)

Halibut Salmon (all types)

Crab

Pollock

Products Fresh and frozen Whole (round) fish (H&G)

Fillets Roe (ikura and sujiko) Range of annual production vol ume [Confidential Business Information, removed from this report] Months of operation January – mid December. Discharge type Screened solids are trucked to Kodiak Fishmeal Company Screened wastewater is discharged through NPDES permitted outfall, meets O&G and TSS limits.

Website

Alaska Fresh Seafood (AFS) operates year-round, shutting down in mid-December for maintenance. In January and February they process cod and crab. In March they process black cod (sable fish). In the summer th ey process salmon. They also process fresh

halibut and a little bit of pollock. Halibut and black c od are their main products.

AFS is a co-owner of the Kodiak Fishmeal Company and they take their solid waste to the fish meal plant. They pay a dump f ee based on the type of fish waste:

Halibut: $24.05 per ton Whitefish: $30.65 per ton Crab: $43.50 per ton

They also pay to have the waste picked up at th eir plant and trucked to the fishmeal plant.2 Operations. AFS bring fish into the plant in totes or they use a fish pump to transfer fish to their fish storage hopper. They hand butch er, and fish heads are conveyed to a tote. Guts are dropped from the table into totes. The equipment in the pl ant can be re-arranged as needed for different products.

Crab are sectioned and cooked and crab shells are placed in totes for the meal plant. Waste Management. Some of the wastes produced at the butchering table are dropped directly into totes. Other wastes are washed into floor drains which are routed to a sump. From the sump wastewater is pumped to a hydrosieve with a 1 mm mesh screen. According to Mr. Blanco, the hydrosieve requires very little maintenance.
#### James Francis SWARTZ, Petitioner-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 17363.

United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.

June 8, 1967.

*26James H. Hayes, Cincinnati, Ohio, for appellant.

Harry E. Pickering, Asst. U. S. Atty., Cleveland, Ohio (Merle M. McCurdy, U. S. Atty., Cleveland, Ohio, on the brief), for appellee.

Before PHILLIPS, CELEBREZZE and McCREE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

This cause is before the court on appeal from an order of the district court denying the motion of James Francis Swartz, petitioner-appellant, for vacation of judgment of conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Appellant was convicted and sentenced on June 19, 1959, for three violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d). He did not perfect an appeal, but has filed previous § 2255 motions to vacate sentence.

No evidentiary hearing was held by the district court in the present proceeding. In this action appellant contends that he undertook to appeal from his original conviction but that his attorneys failed to follow his instructions and did not file a formal notice of appeal. It is asserted, however, that petitioner wrote letters to the district court and to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit seeking to appeal and that such letters were mailed by him from the county jail in Raleigh, North Carolina, on or about the 25th day of June, 1959, within ten days after the imposition of his sentence. Unless some paper was filed by appellant which could be treated as a notice of appeal, no relief now can be granted in a § 2255 proceeding. The filing of a notice of appeal within the time prescribed by Rule 37(a) (2), Fed.R. Crim.P., is mandatory and jurisdictional. United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220, 80 S.Ct. 282, 4 L.Ed.2d 259; United States v. Stigall, 374 F.2d 854 (C.A. 6).

The clerk of this court has certified that he has made a careful search of his files and has found no record of any such letter having ever been received from appellant. Whether such a letter was received by the district court presents a question of fact. See Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473.

Upon consideration, we have concluded that the order of the district court should be vacated and that the case should be remanded to the district court for a determination of the following question:

Have the assertions made in the present case by appellant, to the effect that he mailed a letter to the district court asking for an appeal within ten days after his sentence, been passed upon by the district court at an evidentiary hearing in any previous § 2255 proceeding filed by appellant? If not, that the district court make a determination as to whether that court or the clerk thereof received from appellant a letter or any other paper susceptible of being treated as a notice of appeal within the time prescribed by Rule 37(a) (2), Fed.R.Crim.P.

Vacated and remanded.
#### In the Matter of Philip D., a Child Alleged to be Permanently Neglected. Erie County Department of Social Services, Respondent; Philip B., Appellant.

(Appeal No. 1.)

[698 NYS2d 191]

—Appeal unanimously dismissed without costs *(see, Matter of Lisa E.*[appeal No. 1], 207 AD2d 983). (Appeal from Order of Erie County Family Court, Szczur, J. — Permanent Neglect.) Present — Pine, J. P., Hayes, Pigott, Jr., Scudder and Callahan, JJ.
#### In the Matter of the Claim of Margaret Donohue, against Yonkers Sash Weight Corporation et al., Respondents. State Industrial Board, Appellant.

Argued September 28, 1937;

decided October 12, 1937.

*567
      *John J. Bennett, Jr., Attorney-General (Roy Wiedersum*of counsel), for appellant.

*Jeremiah F. Connor*for respondents.

Order affirmed, with costs against State Industrial Board; no opinion.

Concur: Crane, Ch. J., Lehman, O’Brien, Hubbs, Loughran, Finch and Rippey, JJ.
#### § 2570.114 Consequences of default.

For 502(c)(6) civil penalty proceedings, this section shall apply in lieu of § 18.5(a) and (b) of this title. Failure of the respondent to file an answer to the notice of determination described in § 2560.502c-6(g) of this chapter within the 30 day period provided by § 2560.502c-6(h) of this chapter shall be deemed to constitute a waiver of his or her right to appear and contest the allegations of the notice of determination, and such failure shall be deemed to be an admission of the facts as alleged in the notice for purposes of any proceeding involving the assessment of a civil penalty under section 502(c)(6) of the Act. Such notice shall then become the final order of the Secretary, within the meaning of § 2570.111(g) of this subpart, forty-five (45) days from the date of service of the notice.

[68 FR 3738, Jan. 24, 2003]
----

Corrigendum to the opinion of the European Central Bank of 16 April 2004 at the request of the Council of the European Union on a proposal for a Council regulation concerning medals and tokens similar to euro coins (COM(2004) 39final)

(CON/2004/13)

(2004/C 186/04)

(Official Journal of the European Union C 134 of 12 May 2004)

On page 11, paragraph 3, third line:

for:

‘... of the euro symbol (IJ) on metallic objects ...’,

read:

‘... of the euro symbol (€) on metallic objects ...’.

----
#### BENTLEY MOTOR CO v CLARK

Ohio Appeals, 7th Dist, Mahoning Co

Decided March 28, 1930

Wm. E. Pfau, Youngstown, for Motor Co.

Wm. A. Ambrose, Youngstown, for Clark.

*652PARR, J.

It is clear that Clark was afflicted with pulmonary tuberculosis some two or three years prior to the accident and his death. He had abandoned his employment. He was drawing the sick benefits allowed to railway trainmen under such circumstances, in the sum of seventy-five dollars per month. He went away to Arizona and the testimony of the' physician who .attended him there was that after about a year’s treatment his expectancy of life would not be more than one year. It proved, however, that this physican was somewhat at fault in judgment, because Clark lived from two to three years .afterwards. The brother testified that there were some bruises upon Clark’s breast after the accident, and one of the doctors says that when he was called to see him in the August following the accident, that his condition was so serious that he could not “percus” the breast. While it is true that his'brother and his friend testified to his appearance ,as having changed for the better, indicating at least a partial recovery, yet the medical testimony is decidedly quite to the contrary.

Two physicians after his return from Arizona saw him. Both say that it was a case of slow, progressive tuberculosis, so that it is certainly apparent from the testimony in the Record that his expectancv of life could not possibly be for long. The jury found upon the facts in this case that he had been injured, no doubt reaching the conclusion that the injury probably produced a hemorrhage from the lungs. While the finding of the jury was in favor of a recovery, yet having in mind the testimony as to his expectancy of life, it does seem that this verdict is surely excessive. Ten thousand dollars for a man lingering just upon the “border land”. If his personal representative be entitled to recover, it must necessarily have been based upon his expectancy of ’life and how much he would have meant to this minor son.'

The testimony clearly shows that he was afflicted with this f,atal disease prior to the time of the accident, a disease which in such a large percentage of cases proves fatal, that his expectancy of life could not have been of great length. Therefore, the verdict is surely excessive. Having reached that conclusion, and without questioning the finding of the jury as to personal representatative’s right to recover, the verdict is so excessive that it should be divided in half; that is to say, if a remittitur be consented to in the amount of half of this award the judgment will be affirmed for that amount, and if not, it will be reversed upon the ground that it is excessive.

Pollock and Roberts, JJ, concur.
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<BONDS>                                        129,050
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</TABLE>
II 

110TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 988 

To extend the termination date for the exemption of returning workers from 

the numerical limitations for temporary workers. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

MARCH 26, 2007 

Ms. MIKULSKI (for herself, Mr. WARNER, Mr. LEVIN, Mr. VOINOVICH, Mr. 

LEAHY, Mr. LIEBERMAN, Mr. GREGG, Ms. COLLINS, Mr. ENZI, Ms. 

SNOWE, Mr. SUNUNU, Mr. STEVENS, Mr. KENNEDY, and Mr. CARDIN) 

introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the 

Committee on the Judiciary 

A BILL 

To extend the termination date for the exemption of returning workers from the numerical limitations for temporary 

workers. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Save Our Small and 

5 Seasonal Businesses Act of 2007’’. 


jcorcoran on PROD1PC62 with HEARING
2 

•S 988 IS

1 SEC. 2. EXTENSION OF RETURNING WORKER EXEMPTION 

2 TO H–2B NUMERICAL LIMITATION. 

3 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 214(g)(9)(A) of the Im4 migration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1184(g)(9)(A) is 

5 amended, by striking ‘‘an alien who has already been 

6 counted toward the numerical limitation of paragraph 

7 (1)(B) during fiscal year 2004, 2005, or 2006 shall not 

8 again be counted toward such limitation during fiscal year 

9 2007.’’ and inserting ‘‘an alien who has been present in 

10 the United States as an H–2B nonimmigrant during any 

11 1 of the 3 fiscal years immediately preceding the fiscal 

12 year of the approved start date of a petition for a non13 immigrant worker described in section 

14 101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(b) shall not be counted toward such lim15 itation for the fiscal year in which the petition is approved. 

16 Such alien shall be considered a returning worker.’’. 

17 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by 

18 subsection (a) shall be effective during the 5-year period 

19 beginning on October 1, 2007. 

Æ 


jcorcoran on PROD1PC62 with HEARING
[No. 47112-1-I.

Division One.

December 16, 2002.]

#### The State of Washington, *Respondent,*v. Mark A. Hill, *Appellant.*

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for King County, No. 99-1-05082-3, Carol A. Schapira, J., entered July 24, 2000. *Affirmed*by unpublished opinion per Appelwick, J., concurred in by Becker, C.J., and Schindler, J.
§ 1989.114 District court jurisdiction of retaliation complaints. ( a ) If the Secretary has not issued a final decision within 180 days of the filing of the complaint, and there is no showing that there has been delay due to the bad faith of the complainant, the complainant may bring an action at law or equity for de novo review in the appropriate district court of the United States, which will have jurisdiction over such an action without regard to the amount in controversy. Either party shall be entitled to a trial by jury.
( b ) A proceeding under paragraph (a) of this section shall be governed by the same legal burdens of proof specified in § 1989.109.
( c ) Within seven days after filing a complaint in federal court, a complainant must file with OSHA, the ALJ, or the ARB, depending on where the proceeding is pending, a copy of the file-stamped complaint. A copy of the complaint also must be served on the OSHA official who issued the findings and/or preliminary order, the Assistant Secretary, and the Associate Solicitor, Division of Fair Labor Standards, U.S. Department of Labor.
§ 2200.67 Duties and powers of Judges. It shall be the duty of the Judge to conduct a fair and impartial hearing, to assure that the facts are fully elicited, to adjudicate all issues and avoid delay. The Judge shall have authority with respect to cases assigned to the Judge, between the time the Judge is designated and the time the Judge issues a decision, subject to the rules and regulations of the Commission, to: ( a ) Administer oaths and affirmations;
( b ) Issue authorized subpoenas and rule on petitions to modify, revoke, or affirm, in accordance with § 2200.65;
( c ) Rule on claims of privilege and claims that information is protected and issue protective orders, in accordance with § 2200.52(d) and (e).
( d ) Rule upon offers of proof and receive relevant evidence;
( e ) Take or cause depositions to be taken whenever the needs of justice would be served;
( f ) Regulate the course of the hearing and, if appropriate or necessary, exclude persons or counsel from the hearing for contemptuous conduct and strike all related testimony of witnesses refusing to answer any proper questions;
( g ) Hold conferences for the settlement or simplification of the issues;
( h ) Dispose of procedural requests or similar matters, including motions referred to the Judge by the Commission and motions to amend pleadings; also to dismiss complaints, or portions of complaints, and to order hearings reopened or, upon motion, consolidated prior to issuance of a decision;
( i ) Make decisions that conform to 5 U.S.C. 557 of the Administrative Procedure Act;
( j ) Call and examine witnesses and to introduce into the record documentary or other evidence;
( k ) Approve or appoint an interpreter;
( l ) Request the parties to state their respective positions concerning any issue in the case or theory in support of their position;
( m ) Adjourn the hearing as the needs of justice and good administration require;
( n ) Take any other action necessary under the foregoing and authorized by the published rules and regulations of the Commission.
[84 FR 14558, Apr. 10, 2019; 84 FR 45654, Aug. 30, 2019]
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 99.1

                  CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER
                       PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the accompanying Form 10-K of Kewaunee Scientific Corporation
(the "Company") for the period ending April 30, 2003, I, William A. Shumaker,
President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, hereby certify pursuant to
18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:

     (1)  such Form 10-K of the Company for the period ended April 30, 2003,
          fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
          Securities and Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  the information contained in such Form 10-K of the Company for the
          period ended April 30, 2003, fairly presents, in all material
          respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
          Company.

Date:  July 23, 2003


                                       By:        /s/ William A. Shumaker
                                           -------------------------------------
                                                    William A. Shumaker
                                           President and Chief Executive Officer
§ 2520.104-26 Limited exemption for certain unfunded dues financed welfare plans maintained by employee organizations. ( a ) *Scope.* Under the authority of section 104(a)(3) of the Act, a welfare benefit plan that meets the requirements of paragraph (b) of this section is exempted from the provisions of the Act that require filing with the Secretary an annual report and furnishing a summary annual report to participants and beneficiaries. Such plans may use a simplified method of reporting and disclosure to comply with the requirement to furnish a summary plan description to participants and beneficiaries, as follows: ( 1 ) In lieu of filing an annual report with the Secretary or distributing a summary annual report, a filing is made of Report Form LM-2 or LM-3, pursuant to the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA) and regulations thereunder, and
( 2 ) In lieu of a summary plan description, the employee organization constitution or by-laws may be furnished in accordance with § 2520.104b-2 to participants and beneficiaries together with any supplement to such document necessary to meet the requirements of §§ 2520.102-2 and 2520.102-3.
( b ) *Application.* This exemption is available only to welfare benefit plans maintained by an employee organization, as that term is defined in section 3(4) of the Act, paid for out of the employee organization's general assets, which are derived wholly or partly from membership dues, and which cover employee organization members and their beneficiaries.
( c ) *Limitations.* This exemption does not exempt the administrator from any other requirement of part 1 of title I of the Act.
[42 FR 37184, July 19, 1977, as amended at 67 FR 776, Jan. 7, 2002]
**Exhibit 32.1**

 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

In connection with theQuarterly Report of Crdentia Corp. (the “Company”) on Form 10-QSB for theperiod ended September 30, 2005 as filed with the Securities and ExchangeCommission (the “Report”), I, James D. Durham, Chief Executive Officer of theCompany, hereby certify as of the date hereof, solely for the purposes of Title18, Chapter 63, Section 1350 of the United States Code, that to myknowledge:

 

1.                                       the Report fully complies with therequirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

2.                                       theinformation contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial condition and results of operations of the Company at the datesand for the periods indicated.

 

This Certification has not been, and shallnot be deemed, “filed” with the Securities and Exchange Commission.

 

 
| Date: November 14, 2005 | By:                                   | /S/ James D. Durham |   |
|------------------------------|---------------------------------------|---------------------|--------|
|                         | James D.  Durham                      |
|                         | Chairman and  Chief Executive Officer |

 

1

----