alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
§ 1981.102 Obligations and prohibited acts. ( a ) No employer may discharge any employee or otherwise discriminate against any employee with respect to the employee's compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because the employee, or any person acting pursuant to the employee's request, engaged in any of the activities specified in paragraphs (b)(1) through (5) of this section.
( b ) It is a violation of the Act for any employer to intimidate, threaten, restrain, coerce, blacklist, discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any employee because the employee has: ( 1 ) Provided, caused to be provided, or is about to provide or cause to be provided to the employer or the Federal Government, information relating to any violation or alleged violation of any order, regulation, or standard under chapter 601, subtitle VIII of title 49 of the United States Code or any other Federal law relating to pipeline safety;
( 2 ) Refused to engage in any practice made unlawful by chapter 601, in subtitle VIII of title 49 of the United States Code or any other Federal law relating to pipeline safety, if the employee has identified the alleged illegality to the employer;
( 3 ) Provided, caused to be provided, or is about to provide or cause to be provided, testimony before Congress or at any Federal or State proceeding regarding any provision (or proposed provision) of chapter 601, subtitle VIII of title 49 of the United States Code or any other Federal law relating to pipeline safety, or testimony in any proceeding under chapter 601, subtitle VIII of title 49 of the United States Code or any other Federal law relating to pipeline safety, or a proceeding for the administration or enforcement of any requirement imposed under chapter 601, subtitle VIII of title 49 of the United States Code or any other Federal law relating to pipeline safety;
( 4 ) Commenced, caused to be commenced, or is about to commence or cause to be commenced a proceeding under chapter 601, subtitle VIII of title 49 of the United States Code or any other Federal law relating to pipeline safety, or a proceeding for the administration or enforcement of any requirement imposed under chapter 601, subtitle VIII of title 49 of the United States Code or any other Federal law relating to pipeline safety; or
( 5 ) Assisted or participated or is about to assist or participate in any manner in such a proceeding or in any other action to carry out the purposes of chapter 601, subtitle VIII of title 49 of the United States Code or any other Federal law relating to pipeline safety.
( c ) This part shall have no application to any employee of an employer who, acting without direction from the employer (or such employer's agent), deliberately causes a violation of any requirement relating to pipeline safety under chapter 601, subtitle VIII of title 49 of the United States Code or any other Federal law.
[Crim. No. 580.

Second Appellate District.

November 19, 1917.]

#### In the Matter of the Application of B. BERNSON for a Writ of Habeas Corpus.

Habeas Corpus—Voluntary Submission to Imprisonment—Dismissal.—A petition for a writ of *habeas corpus*will be dismissed where the petitioner voluntarily submitted to imprisonment from which he seeks to be discharged for the purpose of presenting in t'he proceeding the question as to the validity of an order holding him to answer for trial in the superior court,

APPLICATION for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, originally made to the District Court of Appeal for the Second Appellate District.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

H. E. Johnstone, and Emmons & Johnstone, for Petitioner.

J. R. Dorsey, District Attorney, and W. P. Grijalva, Deputy District Attorney, for Respondent.

THE COURT.

It appears to the court that the imprisonment of the petitioner from which he seeks to be discharged was voluntarily submitted to by him for the purpose of presenting in this proceeding the question as to the validity of the order holding him to answer to the superior court for trial, and for that reason the remedy by *habeas corpus*should not be available to him.

Upon the authority of *In re Gow,*139 Cal. 242, [73 Pac. 145], *Ex parte Schmitz,*150 Cal. 663, [89 Pac. 438], and *Ex parte Ford,*160 Cal. 334, [Ann. Cas. 1912D, 1267, 35 *345L. R A. (N. S.) 882, 116 Pac. 757], it is ordered that the proceeding be and it is hereby dismissed, and petitioner is remanded to the custody of the sheriff.
§ 2570.117 Summary decision. For 502(c)(6) civil penalty proceedings, this section shall apply in lieu of § 18.41 of this title. ( a ) *No genuine issue of material fact.* ( 1 ) Where no issue of a material fact is found to have been raised, the administrative law judge may issue a decision which, in the absence of an appeal pursuant to §§ 2570.119 through 2570.121 of this subpart, shall become a final order.
( 2 ) A decision made under this paragraph (a) shall include a statement of: ( i ) Findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the reasons therefor, on all issues presented; and
( ii ) Any terms and conditions of the rule or order.
( 3 ) A copy of any decision under this paragraph shall be served on each party.
( b ) *Hearings on issues of fact.* Where a genuine question of a material fact is raised, the administrative law judge shall, and in any other case may, set the case for an evidentiary hearing.
#### FARNSWORTH v SONDELS et

Ohio Appeals, 9th Dist, Summit Co

No 1718.

Decided May 27, 1930

Walter R. East, Akron, for Farnsworth.

S. A. Decker, Barberton, for Sondéis, et.

PER CURIAM

After a careful consideration we have reached the conclusion that the circumstances' are not such as to estop the defendant from discontinuing the arrangement made for a joint driveway and using the part thereof which is upon his property for the purpose of constructing a separate driveway and using dll of his lot the same as if no joint driveway had existed.

Plaintiff’s petition is therefore dismissed, at her costs.

Funk, PJ, Pardee, J, and Washburn, J, concur.
#### CITY OF WICHITA FALLS, TEXAS, Appellant, v. PATRICK HARRISON, INC., Appellee.

No. *24252.*

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

June 2, 1967.

H. P. Hodge, Jr., Malcolm L. Hughes, Wichita Falls, Tex., for appellant.

John Robert Terry, Miami, Fla., Larry Robinson, Wichita Falls, Tex., Terry, McKee & Stephens, Miami, Fla., Jones, Fillmore, Robinson & Lambert, Wichita Falls, Tex., for appellees.

Before BELL, GODBOLD, and DYER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

This is an appeal from a judgment entered under Tit. 9, U.S.C.A., enforcing the provisions of a construction contract requiring arbitration. The district court directed appellant to proceed with arbitration, which appellant had declined to do.

We find not plainly erroneous, in fact agree with, the findings of fact by the district court which caused the contract to be within the provisions of Tit. 9.

Affirmed.
II 

116TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. 4599 

To withdraw certain Federal land in the Pecos Watershed area of the State 

of New Mexico from mineral entry, and for other purposes. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

SEPTEMBER 16, 2020 

Mr. HEINRICH introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred 

to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources 

A BILL 

To withdraw certain Federal land in the Pecos Watershed 

area of the State of New Mexico from mineral entry, 

and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Pecos Watershed Pro5 tection Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. WITHDRAWAL OF FEDERAL LAND IN PECOS WATER7 SHED AREA, NEW MEXICO. 

8 (a) DEFINITION OF FEDERAL LAND.—In this sec9 tion, the term ‘‘Federal land’’ means the Federal land de10 picted as ‘‘Pecos Withdrawal’’ on the map entitled ‘‘Pecos 


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2 

•S 4599 IS

1 Watershed, upstream of I–25 Mineral Withdrawal’’ and 

2 dated September 1, 2020. 

3 (b) WITHDRAWAL.—Subject to valid rights in exist4 ence on the date of enactment of this Act, the Federal 

5 land is withdrawn from all forms of— 

6 (1) entry, appropriation, or disposal under the 

7 public land laws; 

8 (2) location, entry, and patent under the mining 

9 laws; and 

10 (3) disposition under all laws pertaining to min11 eral and geothermal leasing or mineral materials. 

Æ 


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MEMORANDUM 

DATE: 8/26/14

TO: Clean Power Plan for Existing Power Plants; Docket Id: OAR–2013-0602

FROM: Howard J. Hoffman, EPA - OGC

SUBJECT: 8/26/14 Meeting Regarding Proposed Clean Power Plan for Existing Power Plants

with EDF

SUMMARY

On August 26, 2014 I met with Megan Ceronsky of the Environmental Defense Fund to 

discuss legal issues concerning the Clean Power Plan proposal for Existing Power Plants.
#### § 2200.50 [Reserved]
§ 2700.63 Evidence; presentation of case. ( a ) Relevant evidence, including hearsay evidence, that is not unduly repetitious or cumulative is admissible.
( b ) The proponent of an order has the burden of proof. A party shall have the right to present his case or defense by oral or documentary evidence, to submit rebuttal evidence, and to conduct such cross-examination as may be required for a full and true disclosure of the facts.
§ 1986.100 Purpose and scope. ( a ) This part sets forth the procedures for, and interpretations of, the Seaman's Protection Act (SPA), 46 U.S.C. 2114, as amended, which protects a seaman from retaliation because the seaman has engaged in protected activity pertaining to compliance with maritime safety laws and accompanying regulations. SPA incorporates the procedures, requirements, and rights described in the whistleblower provision of the Surface Transportation Assistance Act (STAA), 49 U.S.C. 31105.
( b ) This part establishes procedures pursuant to the statutory provisions set forth above for the expeditious handling of retaliation complaints filed by seamen or persons acting on their behalf. These rules, together with those rules codified at 29 CFR part 18, set forth the procedures for submission of complaints, investigations, issuance of findings and preliminary orders, objections to findings, litigation before administrative law judges (ALJs), post-hearing administrative review, withdrawals and settlements, and judicial review and enforcement. In addition, the rules in this part provide the Secretary's interpretations on certain statutory issues.
Amendment No. 3 to Employment Agreement - Harris J. Pappas


 Exhibit 10.2 
 AMENDMENT NO. 3 TO 
 EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT 

 This Amendment No. 3 (“Amendment”) to the Employment Agreement, dated November 9, 2005, between
Luby’s, Inc., a Delaware corporation (“Company”), and Harris J. Pappas, a resident of Houston, Texas (“Executive”) is executed as of November 19, 2009, (the “Effective Date”). For purposes of
this Amendment, “Luby’s” or the “Company” shall include the subsidiaries of Company. 
 RECITALS 

 WHEREAS, the parties entered into the following agreements: 
 (1) Employment Agreement, dated November 9, 2005 
 (2) Amendment No. 1 to Employment Agreement, dated October 29, 2007 
 (3)
Amendment No. 2 to Employment Agreement, dated November 19, 2008 
 (Collectively referred to as
“Agreements”); 
 WHEREAS, the parties desire to modify said Agreements as hereinafter set forth; and 
 NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the mutual promises, covenants and obligations contained herein, said Agreements shall be
modified as follows, as of the effective date: 
 2. Section 4 of the Agreements is hereby amended and restated as follows:

 “4. Compensation. Executive’s compensation during his employment under the terms of this Agreement shall be as
follows: 
 (a) Base Salary. Commencing November 19, 2009, Luby’s shall pay to Executive a fixed
annual base salary (the “Base Salary”) of Two Hundred and Fifty Thousand Dollars ($250,000) for each year. The Base Salary shall be payable in equal, semi-monthly installments on or about the 15th day and last day of each month or at such
other times and in such installments as may be agreed between Luby’s and Executive. All payments shall be subject to the deduction of payroll taxes, income tax withholdings, and similar deductions and withholdings as required by law.

 (b) Bonus. During each year of the Term, in addition to the Base Salary, Executive shall be eligible
but not entitled to receive incentive compensation in an amount that the independent Board of Directors of the Company or an authorized Committee, shall determine, solely based upon the Company’s performance relative to Board-approved goals
relating to the Company’s achievement of same-store sales (50%) and earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (50%) targets.” 






 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Parties have executed this Amendment effective as of the Effective Date. 

  

							
	 LUBY’S, INC.
	 		 	HARRIS J. PAPPAS
				
	By:	 	/s/ Gasper Mir, III	 		 	/s/ Harris J. Pappas
	Name:	 	GASPER MIR, III	 		 	
	Title:	 	CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD
III 

110TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. CON. RES. 12 

Supporting the goals and ideals of a National Medal of Honor Day to 

mark the significance and importance of the Medal of Honor and to 

celebrate and honor the recipients of the Medal of Honor on the anniversary of the first award of that medal in 1863. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

FEBRUARY 15, 2007 

Mr. AKAKA (for himself, Mr. CRAIG, Mr. LEVIN, Mr. STEVENS, Mr. KERRY, 

Mr. DORGAN, Mr. WEBB, Mr. BROWN, Mr. BINGAMAN, Mr. CRAPO, Mr. 

WARNER, Mr. ENSIGN, Mr. MCCAIN, Mr. SALAZAR, and Ms. SNOWE) 

submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was considered and 

agreed to 

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 

Supporting the goals and ideals of a National Medal of 

Honor Day to mark the significance and importance 

of the Medal of Honor and to celebrate and honor the 

recipients of the Medal of Honor on the anniversary 

of the first award of that medal in 1863. 

Whereas the Medal of Honor, the highest award for valor in 

action against an enemy force that can be bestowed to a 

member of the Armed Forces, is awarded by the President, in the name of Congress, to individuals who have 

distinguished themselves conspicuously by gallantry and 

intrepidity at the risk of their lives above and beyond the 

call of duty; 

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2 

•SCON 12 ATS 

Whereas the United States will forever be in debt to the recipients of the Medal of Honor for their bravery and sacrifice in times of war or armed conflict; 

Whereas the first Medal of Honor awards were presented to 

6 men on March 25, 1863, by the Secretary of War; 

Whereas only 3,443 individuals out of the millions of men 

and women who have served the United States in war, 

military operations, or other armed conflicts have been 

awarded the Medal of Honor; 

Whereas there are 111 living recipients of the Medal of 

Honor, as of January 1, 2007; 

Whereas it is appropriate to commemorate and honor the recipients of the Medal of Honor and what they represent; 

Whereas the people of the United States should always be 

aware of the significance and meaning of the Medal of 

Honor; 

Whereas the designation of a National Medal of Honor Day 

would focus the efforts of national, State, and local organizations striving to foster public appreciation and recognition of Medal of Honor recipients; and 

Whereas March 25, 2007, would be an appropriate date to 

observe National Medal of Honor Day: Now, therefore, be 

it 

1 Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives 

2 concurring), That Congress— 

3 (1) recognizes the heroism and sacrifice of 

4 Medal of Honor recipients; 

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3 

•SCON 12 ATS 

1 (2) recognizes the educational opportunity that 

2 a National Medal of Honor Day would present to 

3 the people of the United States; and 

4 (3) supports the goals and ideals of a National 

5 Medal of Honor Day to celebrate and honor the con6 tributions of Medal of Honor recipients. 

Æ 

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§ 2570.48 Decision to grant exemptions. ( a ) The Department may not grant an exemption under ERISA section 408(a), Code section 4975(c)(2), or 5 U.S.C. 8477(c)(3)(C) unless, following evaluation of the facts and representations comprising the administrative record of the proposed exemption (including any comments received in response to a notice of proposed exemption and the record of any hearing held in connection with the proposed exemption), it finds that the exemption meets the statutory requirements by being: ( 1 ) Administratively feasible for the Department;
( 2 ) In the interests of the plan (or the Thrift Savings Fund in the case of FERSA) and of its participants and beneficiaries; and
( 3 ) Protective of the rights of participants and beneficiaries of such plan (or the Thrift Savings Fund in the case of FERSA).
( b ) In each instance where the Department determines to grant an exemption, it shall publish a notice in the Federal Register which summarizes the transaction or transactions for which exemptive relief has been granted and specifies the conditions under which such exemptive relief is available.
#### § 18.1008 Functions of the judge.

When the admissibility of other evidence of contents of writings, recordings, or photographs under these rules depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the question whether the condition has been fulfilled is ordinarily for the judge to determine in accordance with the provisions of § 18.104(a). However, when an issue is raised whether the asserted writing ever existed; or whether another writing, recording, or photograph produced at the hearing is the original; or whether other evidence of contents correctly reflects the contents, the issue is for the judge as trier of fact to determine as in the case of other issues of fact.
#### § 35.39 Remedial action by recipient.

Where CRC finds discrimination on the basis of age in violation of this Act or this part, the recipient shall take any remedial action that CRC deems necessary to overcome the effects of the discrimination. In addition, if a recipient funds or otherwise exercises control over another recipient that has discriminated, both recipients may be required to take remedial action.
FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________

Nos. 1D17-1205

 1D17-1206

(Consolidated for disposition)

_____________________________

WILLIAM LARRY SCOTT,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Alachua County.

Walter M. Green, Judge.

May 31, 2018

PER CURIAM.

REVERSED and REMANDED with instructions to vacate 

Appellant’s convictions under section 322.34(2)(b), Florida 

Statutes (2016), and adjudicate him guilty of the lesser included 

offense of driving without a valid driver’s license. See Williams v. 

State, 2018 WL 1833396 (Fla. 1st DCA April 18, 2018). 

B.L. THOMAS, C.J., and LEWIS and MAKAR, JJ., concur.
2

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

_____________________________

Andy Thomas, Public Defender, Lori A. Willner, Assistant Public 

Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Sharon S. Traxler, Assistant 

Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
#### Cork Club, Inc., Liquor License

*Stanley M. Greenberg,*for licensee.

*Russell C. Wismer,*for liquor control board.

August 18, 1958.

Sloane, J.,

— This is an appeal from an order of revocation entered by the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board.

The Liquor Code of April 12, 1951, P. L. 90, 47 PS §4-493(12), requires the maintenance of books and records of operation on the premises and makes it unlawful “for any licensee, his servants, agents or employees, to refuse the board or an authorized employee of the board access thereto or the opportunity to make copies of the same when the request is made during business hours.”

The board found that “the licensee, by its servants, agents or employees, refused Board Officers access to all records on the licensed premises, on September 18 and 19, 1957.”

The refusal was not by the licensee but by the licensee’s lawyer. His refusal was based on a refusal by the investigating agent of the board to reveal the name of an individual in connection with whose employment status the agent was demanding access to payroll rec*667ords. A short time later, the lawyer found or discovered the name and then he offered to submit the payroll records.

The licensee argues in this appeal that a refusal without statute-justification must be a refusal with a bad or wrong purpose. We do not think so. Given a proper time and an authorized board employe, access to a licensee’s records must follow. This fiat is in accord with our public policy to control the liquor traffic in our Commonwealth. See Public Welfare Offenses, 33 Columbia Law Review 55. Intent, willfulness, these words with mens rea connotations, need not be prerequisites to unlawfulness in this respect. See Green Gate Inn Liquor Case, 185 Pa. Superior Ct. 214, 218; Commonwealth v. One 1927 Graham Truck, 165 Pa. Superior Ct. 1, 4; Janiro Liquor License Case, 163 Pa. Superior Ct. 398; Commonwealth v. Borek, 161 Pa. Superior Ct. 200.

“The liquor business is unlawful, and its conduct is only lawful to the extent and in the manner permitted by statute”: Commonwealth v. Speer, 157 Pa. Superior Ct. 197, 200. See Commonwealth v. Jackson, 146 Pa. Superior Ct. 328, affirmed 345 Pa. 456. Cf. Morisette v. U. S., 342 U. S 246.

However, we think the lawyer acted honestly, though erroneously, as most of us may do at fallible times. He did offer the payroll records within two weeks of his refusal; for a different reason, I would gather from the testimony, but nevertheless, he offered them, and with his own understanding that no action had been taken either by the investigating agent or by the board. In this posture of the record, we think that his misguidance or illegality was cured by the subsequent offer, and especially so when we balance the refusal with the final action of revocation, rather than suspension. Accordingly, we reverse the order of revocation entered by the liquor control board.
RODRIZGUS RICHARDSON

,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA

,

Appellee

. IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

CASE NO. 1D 13

- 2073

___ __________________________/

Opinion filed December 11, 2014.

An appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County

. Frank Sheffield , Judge

.

Martin L. Black, Hunter & Associates, P.A., Tallahassee, and Jeffrey E. Lewis, General Counsel and Melissa J. Ford, As sistant Conflict Counsel, Office of Criminal Conflict, Tallahassee , for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Justin D. Chapman, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee , for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

WOLF

, ROWE

, and OSTERHAUS

, J J

. , CONCUR.