Opinion filed August 8, 2024

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals __________

No. 11-24-00073-CV

__________

IN THE INTEREST OF I.N., F.N., AND E.N., CHILDREN

On Appeal from the 326th District Court

Taylor County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 10921-CX

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

This is an accelerated appeal from an order in which the trial court terminated 

the parental rights of the mother and father of I.N., F.N., and E.N.

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 Only the father, 

Appellant, has appealed. On appeal, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the 

evidence to support the trial court’s finding that termination is in the children’s best 

interest. We affirm the trial court’s order of termination.

Termination Findings and Standards

The termination of parental rights must be supported by clear and convincing 

evidence. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b) (West Supp. 2023). To terminate 

1

We use initials to refer to the children and their family members. See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b).
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one’s parental rights, it must be shown by clear and convincing evidence that the 

parent has committed one of the acts listed in Section 161.001(b)(1)(A)–(V), and 

that termination is in the best interest of the child. Id. at § 161.001(b)(2). Clear and 

convincing evidence is “the measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind 

of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought 

to be established.” FAM. § 101.007 (West 2019).

In this case, the trial court found that clear and convincing evidence 

established that Appellant committed at least one of the acts listed in 

Section 161.001(b)(1)—specifically, that Appellant: (1) knowingly placed or 

knowingly allowed the children to remain in conditions or surroundings which 

endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the children; (2) engaged in 

conduct or knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged in conduct 

which endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the children; 

(3) constructively abandoned the children who have been in the permanent or 

temporary managing conservatorship of the Department of Family and Protective 

Services (the Department) for not less than six months, and despite the Department’s 

reasonable efforts to return the children to Appellant, he did not regularly visit or 

maintain significant contact with the children, and demonstrated an inability to 

provide the children with a safe environment; and (4) failed to comply with the 

provisions of a court order that specifically established the actions necessary for 

Appellant to obtain the return of the children who had been in the permanent or 

temporary managing conservatorship of the Department for not less than nine 

months as a result of the children’s removal from Appellant under Chapter 262 

because of Appellant’s abuse or neglect of the children. See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), 

(E), (N), (O).
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The trial court further found, pursuant to Section 161.001(b)(2), that 

termination of Appellant’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest. See id.

§ 161.001(b)(2). On appeal, Appellant challenges the trial court’s best-interest 

finding as being unsupported by legally or factually sufficient evidence. 

In reviewing a legal sufficiency challenge, we must decide whether “a 

reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding 

was true.” In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d 726, 741 (Tex. 2022). Cognizant of the required 

appellate deference to the factfinder, “we look at all the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the finding, assume that the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor 

of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could do so, and disregard all evidence that a 

reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or found to have been incredible.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted). “However, we may not disregard ‘undisputed 

facts that do not support the finding,’” and the factfinder is “the sole arbiter of the 

witnesses’ credibility and demeanor.” Id. (quoting In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 

(Tex. 2002) (then quoting In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d 304, 312 (Tex. 2021))). As 

such, when considering the credibility of the evidence presented, we may not 

substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder. J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d at 316.

In assessing whether the evidence is factually sufficient, we weigh the 

disputed evidence that is contrary to the finding against all the evidence that favors 

the finding. In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 631 (Tex. 2018). We give due deference 

to the finding and determine whether, on the entire record, a factfinder could 

reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the allegations against 

the parent. In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 345 (Tex. 2009); In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 

17, 25–26 (Tex. 2002); In re L.C.C., 667 S.W.3d 510, 512 (Tex. App.—Eastland 

2023, pet. denied). 

With respect to the best interest of a child, no unique set of factors need be 

proved. L.C.C., 667 S.W.3d at 513; In re C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d 261, 266 (Tex. App.—
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Eastland 2010, pet. denied). Further, the best interest determination does not restrict 

the proof to any specific factor or factors. In re D.M., 58 S.W.3d 801, 814 (Tex. 

App.—Fort Worth 2001, no pet.). However, courts may use the non-exhaustive 

Holley factors to shape their analysis. Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 

(Tex. 1976). These include, but are not limited to: (1) the desires of the child; (2) the 

emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the future; (3) the emotional 

and physical danger to the child now and in the future; (4) the parental abilities of 

the individuals seeking custody; (5) the programs available to assist these individuals 

to promote the best interest of the child; (6) the plans for the child by these 

individuals or by the agency seeking custody; (7) the stability of the home or 

proposed placement; (8) the acts or omissions of the parent that may indicate the 

existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one; and (9) any excuse for the acts 

or omissions of the parent. Id.

To support a best interest finding, the Department is not required to prove 

each Holley factor; in some circumstances, evidence of the presence of only one 

factor will suffice. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27; In re D.M., 452 S.W.3d 462, 473 (Tex. 

App.—San Antonio 2014, no pet.). Additionally, the same evidence that proves one 

or more statutory grounds for termination may also constitute sufficient, probative 

evidence illustrating that termination is in the child’s best interest. C.H., 89 S.W.3d 

at 28; C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d at 266.

The absence of evidence of some Holley considerations does not preclude the 

factfinder from reasonably inferring or forming a strong conviction or belief that 

termination is in the child’s best interest, particularly if the evidence indicates that 

the parent-child relationship and the parent’s conduct has endangered the safety and 

well-being of the child. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27. This is so because the best interest 

analysis evaluates the best interest of the child, not the parent. In re E.C.R., 638 
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S.W.3d 755, 767 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2021, pet. denied) (citing In re B.C.S., 479 

S.W.3d 918, 927 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, no pet.)).

In this regard, the factfinder may measure a parent’s future conduct by his past 

conduct and determine whether termination is in the child’s best interest. In re E.D., 

419 S.W.3d 615, 620 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, pet. denied); In re D.S., 333 

S.W.3d 379, 384 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.). The factfinder may infer 

that a parent’s past conduct that endangered the safety and well-being of the child 

may recur in the future if the child is returned to the possession of the parent. In re 

J.D., 436 S.W.3d 105, 118 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.); May v. 

May, 829 S.W.2d 373, 377 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1992, writ 

denied). Additionally, the factfinder may infer from a parent’s past inability to meet 

the child’s physical and emotional needs an inability or unwillingness by the parent 

to meet the child’s physical and emotional needs in the future. J.D., 436 S.W.3d at 

118; see also In re A.S., No. 11-16-00293-CV, 2017 WL 1275614, at *3 (Tex. 

App.—Eastland Mar. 31, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.). 

The Evidence Presented at Trial

The Department sought temporary managing conservatorship of I.N., F.N., 

and E.N. on December 15, 2022, while they were living with their mother. At that 

time, Appellant was confined in the Taylor County jail for assaulting the mother, but 

was released in May of 2023. 

Appellant eventually contacted the Department in July of 2023. Brittany 

Elizondo, the 2INgage permanency case manager, met with Appellant to explain the

court-ordered requirements in his Family Plan of Service. Elizondo verified 

Appellant’s reported address, which was “a halfway house for men to . . . get help 

getting on their feet.” Due to the “people coming and going,” and the Department’s 

inability to “run background checks on everybody in that place,” it was not a safe 
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home environment for children. Appellant has not reported a change in residence 

since July of 2023. 

Appellant was present for the final hearing on March 12, 2024. The mother 

did not appear, and previously signed an affidavit of voluntary relinquishment of her 

parental rights to her children. At trial, the Department introduced judgments 

reflecting Appellant’s six misdemeanor convictions, including criminal mischief, 

harassment, and assault family violence committed against the mother. In addition 

to Appellant’s criminal convictions, the mother reported at least one other incident 

of abuse to the Department that occurred on July 4, 2023 in which Appellant struck 

her in the face by throwing a phone at her. And as recent as January 30, 2024, 

Appellant was arrested for kicking in the mother’s front door, grabbing her, pulling

her down the stairs, and punching her in the face multiple times.

The trial court heard from two witnesses: Elizondo, and the children’s paternal 

aunt and current caregiver, A.F., who hopes to adopt them. Elizondo described 

Appellant’s participation in his service plan requirements as “[t]ouch and go.” As 

part of his service plan, Appellant was ordered to:

• maintaining safe, stable, and appropriate housing free from domestic 

violence, drugs, and alcohol;

• notify his permanency case manager of any changes in employment, 

address, phone number, or household members;

• provide proof of legal employment by check or W-2;

• “engage in an organized program to assist him in dealing with 

anger/battering issues involved in domestic violence”;

• submit to random drug and alcohol testing by urinalysis, hair follicle, or 

oral swab when requested, and “test negative on both urine and hair drug 

tests”;

• attend individual counseling, family counseling, and “Betty Hardwick for 

any mental health needs”;

• attend scheduled supervised visitation with his children.
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Appellant completed his parenting classes and psychological evaluation, but did not 

participate in the recommended individual and family counseling and psychiatric 

consultation. Appellant was asked to drug test “bare minimum monthly,” but he 

often failed to comply. He provided a hair sample in July of 2023, the results of 

which were positive for methamphetamine and marihuana. Appellant subsequently

refused to test in September of 2023, and again from November through February 

of 2024 when he stopped responding to Elizondo’s contact attempts. 

Coinciding with Appellant’s sporadic communication with the Department, 

he only attended four of the scheduled visits with his children, and has not seen them 

since October of 2023. A.F. testified that he brought her groceries for the children

once, but has never provided financial support.

With A.F., the children are “doing awesome . . . they’re all just doing really 

good, and they’re happy.” A.F. lamented that the children “came from a . . . very 

hard home,” and “were really confused” when she began caring for them. But after 

having been with her for over a year, they are “very happy,” and have grown 

“[e]motionally . . . [e]ducationally . . . in all aspects.”

The trial court terminated Appellant’s parental rights under 

Section 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (N), and (O), and found termination to be in the best 

interest of the children. This appeal followed.

The Best Interest of the Children Determination

In Appellant’s sole issue, he challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the 

evidence to support the trial court’s finding that termination of his parental rights is 

in the best interest of the children.

First, we reiterate that evidence of each Holley factor is not required to support 

a best interest finding. In re S.R., 452 S.W.3d 351, 366 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 

Dist.] 2014, pet. denied); In re S.O., No. 05-22-01019-CV, 2023 WL 2237084, at 

*11 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 27, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.). Put differently, the 
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absence of evidence on some of these factors does not preclude a best interest 

finding, “particularly if [the] undisputed evidence shows the parental relationship 

endangered the child’s safety.” In re N.T., 474 S.W.3d 465, 477 (Tex. App.—Dallas 

2015, no pet.). “[E]vidence relating to one single factor may be adequate in a 

particular situation to support a finding that termination is in the best interests of the 

child.” In re K.S., 420 S.W.3d 852, 855 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014, no pet.). 

“‘[B]est interest’ is a term of art encompassing a much broader, facts-andcircumstances based evaluation that is accorded significant discretion.” In re Lee, 

411 S.W.3d 445, 460 (Tex. 2013).

The trial court, as the trier of fact, is the sole judge of the witnesses’ 

credibility. J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d at 312. We are not at liberty to disturb the 

determinations of the trier of fact so long as those determinations are not 

unreasonable. Id. at 311–12; In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005). Giving 

due deference to the trial court, as we must, we hold that, based on the evidence in 

the record and the application of the Holley factors, the trial court could have 

reasonably formed a firm belief or conviction that termination of Appellant’s 

parental rights was in the best interest of the children. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 

371–72.

In its best interest determination, a trial court, as the factfinder, may infer that 

a parent’s past endangering conduct may recur if the child is returned to the parent.

See In re L.N.C., 573 S.W.3d 309, 318 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, pet. 

denied); J.D., 436 S.W.3d at 118; see also In re T.B., No. 09-20-00172-CV, 2020 

WL 6787523, at *8 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Nov. 19, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) 

(“factfinder may consider prior CPS history of neglect, drug abuse, or lack of care 

for the children”). Evidence that is relevant to Section 161.001(b)(1) termination 

grounds may also be relevant to the determination of the child’s best interest. In re 

C.V.L., 591 S.W.3d 734, 753 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2019, pet. denied). And evidence 
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that supports termination under the grounds listed in Section 161.001(b)(1) can be 

considered in the best-interest analysis. See C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28; C.J.O., 325 

S.W.3d at 266. Therefore, the trial court could properly consider Appellant’s failure 

to comply with the conditions of his family plan of service, his drug use, and other 

evidence of endangerment in determining whether the termination of his parental 

rights was in the children’s best interest. See C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28; C.J.O., 325 

S.W.3d at 266. 

The record shows that Appellant and the mother of I.N., F.N., and E.N. had 

an abusive, tumultuous relationship. They were unable to co-parent without the 

mother occasionally ending up in the hospital, calling the police, or both. Less than 

two months before the final hearing, Appellant violently assaulted the mother. 

Appellant’s criminal history and violence demonstrate “a pattern of conduct that is 

inimical to the very idea of child-rearing.” C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28; see also J.F.-G., 

627 S.W.3d at 316–17 & n.51. Such evidence weighs heavily in favor of the trial 

court’s finding that terminating Appellant’s parental rights was in the children’s best 

interest. See L.C.C., 667 S.W.3d at 515 (domestic violence between the parents 

supports the trial court’s finding that termination of parental rights is in the child’s 

best interest); see also In re J.G., No. 04-23-00879-CV, 2024 WL 1293953, at *4 

(Tex. App.—San Antonio Mar. 27, 2024, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“The trial court 

could have reasonably concluded that Father’s refusal to address his domestic 

violence and anger issues poses an emotional and physical danger to the children.”).

The uncontroverted evidence likewise shows that Appellant was unwilling or 

unable to provide a safe and stable home for the children, failed to maintain 

consistent contact with his permanency case manager, and did not complete his 

required services. See J.W., 645 S.W.3d at 742 (considering the parent’s unstable 

and uncertain living situation in upholding the trial court’s best-interest finding); 

Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72. He provided no proof of stable housing or 
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employment, refused to submit to drug testing when requested, and admitted to using 

methamphetamine two months prior to the final hearing. Appellant ignored his 

numerous referrals for the substance abuse assessment and individual and family 

counseling, missed scheduled visitation with his children, and never attended his 

required anger and domestic violence courses. Appellant’s continuing pattern of 

illegal drug use, failure to comply with his service plan, and his failure to secure a 

safe and stable home for his children support the trial court’s best-interest finding. 

See In re E.D., 682 S.W.3d 595, 607 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2023, pet. 

denied) (continuing pattern of illegal drug use “implicates most of the Holley

factors”); E.C.R., 638 S.W.3d at 769 (“A trial court is permitted to consider a 

parent’s . . . failure to comply with a family plan of service in its best interest 

determination.”); In re S.B., 207 S.W.3d 877, 887–88 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, 

no pet.) (“A parent’s drug use, inability to provide a stable home, and failure to 

comply with his family service plan support a finding that termination is in the best 

interest of the child.”).

Between October of 2023 and February of 2024, Appellant disengaged from 

communications, services, and the children themselves, thereby “posing a 

substantial risk to the children’s emotional well-being.” In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d 

269, 281 (Tex. 2024). Despite his assertion on appeal that he “checked in with [A.F.] 

on different occasions,” Appellant’s inconsistent “check[ing] in” was by sending 

A.F. a text message “once a month, usually, but that’s about it.” He provided no 

financial support, and refused to submit to drug testing as a prerequisite to resume 

visitation. The trial court could have rationally inferred that Appellant was 

indifferent to seeing his children, and continued to use methamphetamine during the 

pendency of this case, which supports a finding that termination is in the children’s

best interest. See In re A.J.D.-J., 667 S.W.3d 813, 823 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
11

Dist.] 2023, no pet.) (“[S]ignificant evidence of parental indifference weighs heavily 

in favor of a factfinder’s finding that termination is in a child’s best interest.”). 

Finally, and most “[i]mportantly, given the child-centered focus of the bestinterest inquiry, we may not discount or minimize the level of permanence” and 

stability that the children have achieved in A.F.’s care. See J.W., 645 S.W.3d at 747. 

The children are happy, attending school and regular medical appointments, and are 

surrounded by “plenty of caretakers.” They have bonded with A.F., and expressed 

the desire to stay with her. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72. Appellant heavily 

relies on A.F.’s testimony that the children “ask about having contact with [him],” 

but that is only one factor that we consider in the overall best interest analysis. See 

Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 372; cf. In re F.M.E.A.F., 572 S.W.3d 716, 732 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, pet. denied) (“A child’s love for a parent cannot be 

ignored as a reflection of the parent’s ability to provide for the child’s emotional 

needs.”). A child’s wishes cannot override or outweigh evidence of danger to the 

child and are not binding on the trial court. See FAM. § 153.009(c) (West 2014); 

F.M.E.A.F., 572 S.W.3d at 732; see also In re J.S., No. 11-23-00234-CV, 2024 

WL 1313075, at *8 (Tex. App.—Eastland Mar. 28, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing 

Hart v. Kozik, 242 S.W.3d 102, 109 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2007, no pet.)).

Upon considering the record as it relates to Appellant’s actions and inactions, 

the emotional and physical danger to the children now and in the future, the 

emotional and physical needs of the children now and in the future, Appellant’s 

parental abilities, Appellant’s criminal history, the domestic violence in the home, 

and the Department’s plans for the children, we hold that the evidence is legally and 

factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that termination of Appellant’s 

parental rights is in the best interest of the children. See J.W., 645 S.W.3d at 741;

Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72. Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s sole issue.
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VI. This Court’s Ruling

We affirm the order of the trial court.

JOHN M. BAILEY

CHIEF JUSTICE

August 8, 2024

Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,

Trotter, J., and Williams, J.