### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON June 22, 200 4 S es sio n

SEILLE R & HA ND MA KER , L .L. P. and GL EN COH EN v. KE LLY FIN NEL L

An Appeal f

romthe Circ uit Court for Sh elby County No. 306486TD K ay S. Robil io, Jud ge

No. W2002-02593-C OA-R3-C V - F iled October 27, 2004

This is an action to e nroll a fore ign judgme nt. A Tenne ssee r esident wa s repr esente d by a Ke ntucky lawy er in a

Kentucky

lawsuit. When the Ke n t u ck ylawy er pur sued collec tion of his fees, the Tenne ssee c lient filed a bar complaint ag ainst him in Kentucky

. The bar complaint was dismissed, and the Ke ntucky

lawy er f iled a malicious prose cution lawsuit in Kentucky ag ainst the client, and obtained a judg ment. I n this action, the Kentuc ky lawy er se ek s t o enroll the Ke ntucky judgme nt

a g a ins t th e Te nn e sse e c lie nt. Th e c lie nt a sse rt s th a t th e jud g me nt shou ld n ot b e e nr oll e d in Tenne ssee be cause it falls under the public p olicy exception to the full faith and cr edit clause of United States Constit uti o n. The c lient bases this arg ument on Tenne ssee Supre me Court Rule 9, section 27.1, which prohibits any lawsuit based on a bar complaint, asserting that the e nrollment of a for eig n judgme nt ba sed on this cause of action would violate Te nnessee public policy . The trial court he ld that the Kentucky judgme nt was entitled to full fa ith and cre dit and domesticated the j u d gm en t

. W e af

fi rm t h e de ci s i o n o f th e tr i al co u rt , fi n d i n g t h at t h e en ro l l m e n t o f t h e f o r ei gn j u d g m e n td o e s n o tv i o l a t e T e n n e s s e e p u b l i c p o l i c y.
Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed

H OL L Y M. K I RBY , J
., delivere d the opinion of the Court, in which A L AN E. H I G H ERS , J . and D A V ID R. F ARMER , J ., joined.

Ma rk Vo rd e r B ru e g g e , Jr. a ndSc ott B . Ost row , Mem phis, Te nn e sse e , f or theapp e llant, Ke lly F inn e ll.

Wendell L . J ones, L ouisvill e, Ke ntucky , for the a ppellees, Seiller & Handmake r, L

. L .P. and Glen Cohen.

OP IN ION
Plaintiff/Appellee Gle n Cohen (“Cohe n”) is a K entucky at t o rn ey associate d with the Kentucky law fi rm Seiller & Handmake r LLP. Cohen and his law firm re prese nted-2-

De f e n d a n t/A p p e ll a n t K e ll y

F in n e ll ( “ F in n e ll ” )
, a

T e n n e s s e e r e s id e n t an d a li c e n s e d Tenne ssee attorney , in a 1993 Ke ntucky lawsuit. After

a succ essful outcome, a

dispute arose reg arding Cohen’s l e g a l f e e s , t o t a l i n g $ 3
, 8 0 0
, a n d F i n n e l l r e f u s e d t o p a y.

I n late November 1997, Cohen filed a la wsuit in Kentucky ag ainst Finnell for

collection of his attorney ’s fe es. In early Dec ember

1997, Finnell sent Cohen a letter de manding t h at Cohen voluntarily

dismiss the collec tion lawsuit and enclosing a propose d b ar compl aint ag ainst Cohen, alleg ing unethical conduct. I n the l etter, Finnell told Cohen that he would ref rain from filing the ba

r complaint and save Cohen the “e mbarra ssm ent” of responding to it if Cohen would dism iss the collection lawsuit. Cohen did not dismiss the collec tion lawsuit, and Finnell filed the ba r complaint

a g a ins t Co he n w iththeKe ntu c ky auth oriti e s.

Finnell’s ba

r complaint ag ainst Cohen was dismissed. Cohen t h en am ended his Kentucky

co llection lawsuit ag ainst Finnell by adding a claim of malicious prosecution, asse rting that the purpose of

Finnell’s ba

r complaint wa s to intimidate and hara ss Cohe n into dropping his claim for fee s ag ainst Finnell. F innell then filed a se cond bar complaint ag ainst C o h en i n Ke n t ucky . The second c omplaint was likewise dismissed.
Although F i n n el l fi led an answer in Ke ntucky to Cohen’s orig inal collection lawsuit, no

answe r wa s filed to the amende d complaint alleg ing ma licious prosecution. Cohen filed a motion fo r d e fa ult judgm e nt, a ndF inn e ll f

a ile d to app e ar at th e he ari ng on themot ion . Co ns e qu e ntl y , in May 1998, a def

ault judgme nt was ente red a g ainst Finnell, with a he aring on damag es set for late r that month.

Prior to the hearing on damag es, F innell paid Cohen’s orig inal $3,800 claim for attorney ’s fee s, plus interest. After

the hea ring on damag es, in Aug ust 1998, the Kentucky trial court e ntere d

a n o rd e r m akin g thefo llo wi ng fi nd ing s:

4. Coh e n s e nt a

bil l f or $3 800. 00 in attorn e y

fe e s a nd$4 00 .0 0 in mediation expenses. .

. . [T] he court finds such fee s and expenses

rea sonable. . . . 5. Finnell neve r paid the f ee. O n November

21 , 1997, the law f

irm filed this laws u i t seeking compensation. On Dece mber 2, 1997, Finnell sent a

proposed ba

r complaint ag ainst Cohen wi t h a letter deman ding Cohe n voluntarily dismiss the ac tion ag ainst him. The court finds the sole purpose of this letter and propose d bar c omplaint

wa s to int imi date a ndha ra ss Co he n a ndthela w f irm. F inn e ll fo llo we d th e le tte r with a tel e ph on e c a ll on De c e mbe r 1 5, 19 97 , a g a in seeking to persuadeCohen to dismis s the l aw s u i t. Finnell testified that he anticipated Cohen would be e mbarra ssed by the bar action. 6. Cohen testified that as a result of the i nitial complaint, as well as

an ame nded complaint filed on F ebrua ry 6, 1998 afte r t h e fi rst one was dismissed, he wa s upset and emba rra ssed.-3- 7. Ag ain Finne ll testified that the purpose of the second ba r
c omp la int , a ndthec ou rt

so fi nd s, wa s to c aus e Coh e n to chang e his int e nti on s o f p ur su ing thefe e lit ig a tio n. Th e se c on d c omp la int is

mor e e g re g iou s than the fi rs t. Whil e it is no t un c omm on for cli ents to c omplain a

bo ut f e e s, to q ue sti on thee thi c s o f an atto rn e y g oe s to the very heart of our prof

essi o n. As a lice nsed attorne y who

c omp le te s th e ne c e ssa

ry e thi c s c ou rs e s to keep his lic e ns e , F inn e ll knew, or should have known, of the imp act on an attorney ’s reputation when such a lleg ations are made. * * * 9. One of the primary purposes of punitive damag es is to deter f urther harmful c onduct by

a party . It is clear from Finne ll’s conduct, towar d Coh e n a n d b e f

o r e th e K e n tu c k y B ar A s s o c iati o n a n d th is c o u rt, that he has littl e reg ard for the pra ctice of law, re putation of lawy ers and

o r d e r s o f th e c o u rts o f K e n tu c k y

. F in n e ll w a s w il li n g to d e s tr oyan attorney ’s re putation for a me re $3800.00 f ee.

Ba sed on these f

indings, in addition to the $3800 in attorney ’s fe es alre ady paid by Fi n n el l , the Ke ntu c ky tria l c ou rt a wa

rd e d Coh e n $2 0, 00 0 fo r e c on omi c los s f or thetim e sp e nt d e fe nd ing a g a ins t Finnell’s ba

r complaints, $ 2 5 ,000 for e motional dist ress, humiliation and embar rassment, a nd $2 5, 00 0 inpu nit iveda ma g e s.

Finnell filed a motion to alter or ame nd, which wa s denied. F innell then appea led the jud g me nt t o th e Ke ntu c ky Cou rt of Ap pe a ls. I n F e br

ua ry 20 01 , th e Ke ntu c ky

Cou rt of App e a ls aff irmed the trial c ourt’s orde r. F innell appea led to the Kentuc ky Supreme Court, and pe rmission for his appe al was de nied in Aug ust 2001.
Cohen filed a pe tition i n the Shelby CountyCircuit Court in Te nnessee to e nroll the Kentuc ky jud g me nt a g a ins t F inn e ll. F inn e ll s ou g ht t o p re ve nt the e nr oll me nt o f the jud g me nt u nd e r the pu bli c policy exception to the Full Faith and C redit C lause of the U.S

. Constit ution. Finnell cited T ennesse e Supreme Court Rule 9, sec tion 27.1, which enfor ces the Code of Profe ssional Responsibil ity , which state s:

Communi cations to the boar d, hearing c ommitt ee members or

disciplinary

counsel re lating to law y er misconduct or disabilityand testimonyg iven in the proc eeding shall be absolutely privileg ed, and no civil lawsuit p re d i cated there on may be instituted ag ainst any

c omp la inant o r w itn e ss

Te nn . S. Ct. R. 9, § 27.1

. F inn e ll ar g ue d that this ru le e xpre sse s a Te nn e sse e pu bli c po lic y

a g a ins t permitting a

lawy er to file a

lawsuit ag ainst one who files an ethics complaint ag ainst the lawy er. To pe rm it the e nr oll me nt i n T e nn e sse e of a fo re ig n judg me nt pr e dic a te d on suc h a la ws uit , F inn e ll

c on te nd e d, wo uldvio late thepu bli c po lic y of Te nn e sse e . T he Te nn e sse e tria l c ou rt re je c te d th isF inn e ll c o n te n d s tha t, in ligh t o f sec tio n 2 7 .1
, L ackey i s no l onger good l aw. 1

-4- arg ument and enr olled Cohen’s Ke ntucky judgme nt ag ainst Finnell. Fr om this order
, Finnell now

app e a ls.

The fa cts of this case are undisputed. The trial c ourt’s leg al conc lusions are re viewed de novo with no presumption of corr ectne ss. Cam pbell v. Florida Ste elCorp. , 919 S.W .2d 26, 35 (Tenn. 1996).

Finnell ar g ues that the Ke ntucky judgme nt should not be enforc ed bec ause the underlying

c au s e o f a c t i o n , m a l i c i o u s p r o s e c u t i o n f o r f i l i n g a b a r c o m p l a i n t , v i o l a t e s T e n n e s s e e p u b l i c p o l i c y. F in n e ll ar g u e s th a t T e n n e s s e e Su p r e me Co u rt Ru le 9
, s e c ti o n 2 7

. 1 g r a n ts ab s o lu te im mu nity from

su it f or on e wh o f

ile s a ba r c omp la int

in Te nn e sse e a g a ins t a la wy e r. F inn e ll m a int a ins that th is R ule

was a dopted to e nsure that those utiliz ing the service s of Tenne ssee lawy ers will not hesitate to report

un e thi c a l c on du c t or

fe ar r e prisa l f

or do ing so . Pe rm itt ing e nr oll me nt o f the K e ntu c ky jud g me nt, Finnell conte nds, would allow a Te nnessee court to be used to punish a Tennessee resident f or filing

a ba r c omp la int

wi th the Ke ntu c ky

B ar A sso c iatio n, in vi olat ionof thepu bli c po lic y

e mbo die d in section 27.1.

I n response , Cohen arg ues that Tennessee permits a malicious prosec ution action arising out

o f afa l s e a n d m al i ci o u s b arco m p l ai n taga i n s tan at t o rn ey , ci t i n g La c ke y v . Met ro po lit an L if e Ins

. Co. , 206 S.W .2d 806 (Tenn. A pp. 1946), and ma intains that Cohen’s claim ag ainst Finnell would be permitted in Tenne ssee. I n the alternative, C ohen conte nds, even if se ction 27.1 is an absolute g rant 1 of immunityto one who files a bar complaint ag ainst a Tennessee lawy er, it does not rise to the leve l of a pu bli c po lic y

wh ic h w ou ld p ro hib it g ivi ng fu ll f a itha ndc re dit

to the Ke ntu c ky

jud g me nt.

F inn e ll c or

re c tly state s th e ru le of la w that “ Te nn e sse e c ou rt s a reno t ob lig a te d to g ivefu ll faith and c redit to any

judgme nt of a state w hich we hold to be violative of Tennessee’ s public policy or the F eder al Constitut ion.” Aqua Sun Invs., Inc. v. Henson
, 1993 WL 382230 *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 3 0
, 1993). F innell acknowle dg es, howe ver, that a party who invokes the public policy exception must identify the publ ic pol icy that is offende d by the fore ign judg ment and has a “‘stern and hea vy ’ burde n.” Id

. (q u o t i n g Biogen Distr ib., Inc. v. Tanner , 8 42 S.W. 2d 25 3, 25 6 ( Te nn . Ct

. App. 1992)).

Tenne ssee public policy

is found in it s “ c o n s tituti on, statutes, judicial decisions, and c ommon law.” Alcazar v. Hayes , 982 S.W. 2d84 5, 85 1 ( Te nn . 1 99 8) . “ Al tho ug h th e de te rm inatio n o f p ub lic policy is primarily

a func tion of the leg isla t u re , the judiciary may determine public policy

in the absenc e of any

constitutional or statutory decla ration.” Id. (q u o t i n g Crawford v. Buckner
, 839 S.W .2d 754, 759 (Tenn.1992) ).

F inn e ll c ite s In re Riggs as an e x ample of a fore ign judg ment denied f ull faith and cr edit by Tenne ssee courts based on the public policy exception. In re Riggs , 612 S.W .2d 461 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980). In Riggs , a child wa s born out of wedlock. The mother rele ased her pare ntal rig hts so that-5-

thec hil d c ou ld b e a do pte d, a ndfa lse ly de nie d any kn owl edg e of thefathe r’ s n a me or

his wher eabouts. Conseque ntly , the biologic al father did not rec eive notice of the c hild’s adoption by a couple in Geor g ia. The adoptive couple moved to Tenne ssee, and in Tennesse e proc eeding s the biologica l father

soug ht custody

of the c hild, arg uing that the Geor g ia adoption decree should not be g iven full faith and c redit in Tenne ssee be cause the father ha d no no t i ce an d n o rig ht to a hearing befor e his pare ntal rig hts were terminated. Th e T en n es s ee Court of Appea ls refuse d to honor the Geor g ia judg ment terminating the father’s pa renta l rig hts beca

use i t was repug nant to “Te nnessee ’s interest in sustaining the fathe r-c hild relationship and protec ting the family unit.” Aqua Sun Inv., Inc.
, 1 9 9 3 W L 3 8 2 2 3 0 (T en n

. C t

. Ap p

. 1 9 9 3 ) (c i t i n g In re Riggs , 612 S.W .2d 461 (Tenn. Ct. App. 19 80 )) . F inn e ll a sse rt s th a t T e nn e sse e Sup re me Cou rt Rul e 9, secti on 27 .1 e vid e nc e s th e pu bli c po lic y of pr ote c tin g theint e g ri ty of thele g a l sy ste m, andthat T e nn e sse e ’s int e re st i n p ro te c tin g its leg al sy stem is as important as the intere sts underly ing the public policy found in Rigg s

.

I ndeed, in In re Est

ate of Da v is , No. M2003-02614-COA- R3-CV, 2004 WL 1950729 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug ust 3, 2004), this Court refused to honor an antenuptial ag ree ment executed in Florida be c aus e thea g re e me nt v iol a te d T e nn e sse e pu bli c po lic y

. I n Te nn e sse e , an a nte nu pti a l a g re e me nt i s enfor cea ble only if it was enter ed into “fr eely , knowledg eably and in g ood faith without exertion of duress or undueinfluence upon either spouse .” Id. at *3 (c iting Te nn

. Code Ann. § 36-3- 501 (2001)) . Thus, the parties to an antenuptial ag ree ment must fullyand fairly disclose their financial condition prior to execution of the ag ree ment if the ag ree ment is later to be e nforc ed, re g ardle ss of whether the marriag e ends by

divor ce o r b y t he dea

th of one of the spouses. I n contra st, under Florida law, full and fair disclosure of both pa rties’ financ ial circ umstances is r equire d o n l yi f t he marria g e ends in divorc e. I f the marria g e ends by the death of one of the spouses, under Florida law, thepa rt ie s to thea nte nu pti a l a g re e ment areno t r e qu ir e d to g ivefu ll and fair dis c los ur e of

the ir fi na nc ia l c on dit ionprior

to exe c uti on of

thea g re e me nt i n o rd e r f

or thea g re e me nt t o b e e nf

or c e able in the probate court. Id. at *4 (citing Fla. Stat. Ann § 732.702 (2002)) . I n Da v is , th e su rv ivi ng sp ou se signe d an antenuptial ag ree ment that waived the elec tive share of her husband’s e state eve n though, at the ti m e t h e agr ee m ent was ex ecute d, she wa s not awar e of his fina ncial condition. Id. at *7. Af te r h e die d, the Te nn e sse e pr ob a te c ou rt he ld that the a nte nu pti a l ag re e me nt wa s e nf or c e able . T his Cou rt re ve rs e d, a nd he ld that th e re qu ir e me nt o f f ull a ndfair

dis c los ur e fo r ante nu pti a l a g re e me nts rises to the leve l of public policy due to the “unique and conf idential nature of t h e marital relationship” and that this policy “promote[s] the highe st deg ree of fiducia ry duty betwee n spouses.” Id.

Thus in Da v is , the husband’s he irs soug ht to enforc e an antenuptial ag ree ment in derog ation of t he wife’s hi storic s tatutory elec tive share

. The Te nnessee leg islature ena cted a statute providing that, i n o rd e r t o e nf

or c e su c h a n a g re e me nt, thepa rt ie s to thea g re e me nt mus t ha ve ful fi lledthe ir fiduciary duty to one another

to fully disclose their c ircumstance s. Thus, this Court found t hat, g iven theun iqu e natur e of

themari ta l re latio ns hip
, the statut e e na c te d by the Te nn e sse e le g isl a tur e ro se to the level of

a stateme nt of public policy

. L ikewise, in Riggs , g iven the fundamental nature of the pare ntal relationship, enforcing a judg ment that terminated the fathe r’s pa renta l rig hts with no noti ce
a ndno ri g ht t o a

he ari ng wa s r e pu g na nt t o th e State ’s str ong i nt eres t in pr ote c tin g thefathe r- c hil d relationship.-6-

Finnell ar g ues that the Supreme Court Rule repre sents public policy beca use the Te nnessee L eg islature empowe red the Tenne ssee Supre me Court to make rules g overning the pra ctice of law in Tennesse e. In response , the Supreme Court promulg ated the Rules of Disciplinary Enforc ement to enforc e the c ode of pr ofessional re sponsibili ty . Howeve r, in Cre ws v. Buckman L ab s. , the Tenne ssee Supre me Court specific ally declin ed to rule “ that every provision of the Code of Professiona l R esponsi bilityref lects an important public policy .” Crews v. Buckm an Labs., 78 S.W .3d 852, 865 (Tenn. 2002) . As such, F innell must meet the burden of showing why section 27.1

r e f l e c t s p u b l i c p o l i c y.
Certainly , both Tennesse e and Kentucky have a strong interest in pr otecting the integ rity of their re spective le g al sy stems. Both states have reg ulations that g overn immunit y from prose cution related to bar c omplaints. Tenn. S. Ct. R. 9 § 27.1; Ky

. Sup. Ct. Rule 3.160. Howeve r, the re levant Te nn e s s e e ru l e i s m u c h b r o a d e r i n s c o p e t h a n t h e c o rr e s p o n d i n g K e n t u c k y ru l e , w h i c h o b v i o u s ly pe rm its the fi lin g of a ma lic iou s pr os e c uti on la ws uit a g a ins t on e wh o f ile s a ba r c omp la int

a g a ins t an attorne y

. The mere rec og nition of a Ke ntucky judgme nt, which is based on a law more narr ow i n s c o p e t h a n t h e T e n n e s s e e c o u n t e rp art , d o e s n o ti n a n d o f i t s e l f v i o l a t e T e n n e s s e e p u b l i c p o l i c y. I nd e e d, thefa c ts o f this c a se ill us tr a te thec omp e tin g int e re sts so ug ht t o b e ba la nc e d b y bo th Tenne ssee and Kentucky . As noted by Finnell, permitting an attorney to respond to a ba

r complaint ag ainst him byfiling a malicious prosec ution lawsuit may deter one with a legitimate complaint fr om fi lin g it, fo r fe ar of re prisa l. As de mon str a te d by F inn e ll’ s con du c t, h ow e ve r, su c h im mun ity c ou ld be utiliz ed by one with impure motives to file a false and malicious bar c omplaint ag ainst a lawy er, leaving the lawy er w ith no recour se. Thus, in balanci n g t h e competing inter ests, Tenne ssee and Kentucky have found the balanc e in differing disc iplinary rules. More over, the interests involved, while important indeed, do not, a s in Da v is , involve an int ere st such as the fiduc iary duty betwee n spouses at the he art of the marital re lationship, or the pare ntal rig hts of a biol og ical father. The ref ore,
as s u m i n g arguendo that se c tio n 2 7. 1 w ou ld p ro hib it i n T e nn e sse e thema lic iou s p ro se c uti on c la im filed by Cohen ag ainst Finnell, we must neverthele ss conclude that enro l l m ent of the K entucky j u d g m e n td o e s n o tv i o l a t e T e n n e s s e e p u b l i c p o l i c y.
This Court has previously held that “a

state court must g ive full faith and c redit to a moneta ry ju d g me n t r e n d e r e d ina

c o u rt o f a n o th e r

s tate , e v e n th o u g h th e e n f o r c in g f o ru m m ig h t n o t r e c o g n iz e the under lying c ause of

action.” M

i r a g e Cas ino -H

ote l v . P e ar sa ll , No. 02A01-9608- CV-00198, 1997 WL 27 55 89 , at *5 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . M a y 27 , 1 99 7) . T he fa c ts o f this c ase fa ll s qu are ly un de r this h o l d i n g.

Th e de c isi on of

the tria l c ou rt

is a ff irme d. Cos ts a

reta xeda g a ins t D e fe nd a nt/Ap pe llant K e lly F i n n e l l
, f o r w h i c h e x e c u t i o n m a y i s s u e i f n e c e s s ar y.

___________________________________

HOLL Y M. KI RBY, JUDGE