1

STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

Ronald R. Hughes Sr.,

Plaintiff Below, Petitioner

vs.) No. 18-0956 (Raleigh County 18-C-244)

Lawrence Homes, Inc., and Gary Shleser,

Defendants Below, Respondents

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Petitioner Ronald R. Hughes Sr., self-represented litigant, appeals the July 31, 2018, order 

of the Circuit Court of Raleigh County awarding summary judgment to Respondents Lawrence 

Homes, Inc., and Gary Shleser (collectively, “respondents”) and directing petitioner to vacate the 

real property at 137 Prillerman Avenue, Beckley, West Virginia, by 5:00 p.m. on September 4, 

2018. Respondents, by counsel James G. Anderson III, filed a summary response in support of the 

circuit court’s order. Petitioner filed a reply.

The Court has considered the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal. The facts and legal 

arguments are adequately presented, and the decisional process would not be significantly aided 

by oral argument. Upon consideration of the standard of review, the briefs, and the record 

presented, the Court finds no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error. For these reasons, 

a memorandum decision affirming the circuit court’s order is appropriate under Rule 21 of the 

Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Respondent Shleser is the owner of Building Services, Inc. which performed repairs to the 

real property at 137 Prillerman Avenue, Beckley, West Virginia, in 2002 pursuant to a contract 

with petitioner. Respondent Shleser is also the owner of Respondent Lawrence Homes, Inc. which 

ultimately purchased the real property at issue in 2008.

On June 30, 2003, Building Services, Inc. filed a civil action1in the Circuit Court of 

Raleigh County against petitioner and other members of petitioner’s family, seeking the sale of 

real property owned by the family at 137 Prillerman Avenue to satisfy a mechanic’s lien 

respondents filed for repair work on the property performed by Building Services, Inc. By order 

entered on November 22, 2004, the circuit court upheld the validity of the mechanic’s lien, found 

that Building Services, Inc. was entitled to a judgment in the amount of $9,430, including interest 

and court costs, and directed the sale of the real property. 

1Raleigh County Case No. 03-C-533-B.

FILED

August 28, 2020

EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

OF WEST VIRGINIA
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By order entered on March 26, 2008, the circuit court clarified that the sale of the real 

property did not include the life estate in the property belonging to petitioner’s niece. Thereafter, 

the real property was sold pursuant to the circuit court’s March 26, 2008, order and bought by 

respondents. Respondent Lawrence Homes, Inc.’s deed was recorded on December 10, 2008, and, 

consistent with the circuit court’s March 26, 2008, order, noted that the sale did not include 

petitioner’s niece’s life estate in the real property.

Petitioner’s niece died on October 9, 2013. On October 15, 2013, petitioner filed his first

action against respondents in the Circuit Court of Raleigh County, Case No. 13-C-838-H, seeking 

to have Building Services, Inc.’s mechanic’s lien invalidated and for petitioner to be awarded the 

title of the real property. Respondents filed an answer on November 7, 2013, and a motion to 

dismiss on November 26, 2013. At a January 24, 2014, hearing, the circuit court heard testimony 

and treated respondents’ motion as a motion for summary judgment. By order entered on 

September 18, 2014, the circuit court awarded summary judgment to respondents. On October 8, 

2014, petitioner filed a motion for relief from judgment, which the circuit court denied by order 

entered on April 27, 2015.

 On November 18, 2015, petitioner filed a second civil action in the Circuit Court of Raleigh 

County, Case No. 15-C-957-K, again seeking to have Building Services, Inc.’s mechanic’s lien 

invalidated and for petitioner to be awarded the title of the real property. Petitioner argued that 

Building Services, Inc. failed to complete the contracted repairs to the real property in 2002. On 

December 28, 2015, respondents filed an answer and a motion for summary judgment with 

exhibits. By order entered on May 31, 2016, the circuit court awarded respondents summary 

judgment.

On August 18, 2016, petitioner filed a third civil action in the Circuit Court of Raleigh 

County, Case No. 16-C-545-K, again alleging that Building Services, Inc. failed to complete the 

contracted repairs to the real property in 2002. Given the lapse of time, petitioner further argued 

that he had reacquired ownership of the real property through adverse possession. Respondents 

filed an answer and a motion for summary judgment, with exhibits, on July 5, 2017. By order 

entered on July 19, 2017, the circuit court awarded summary judgment to respondents, finding that 

(1) “[t]here is no breach of contract . . . in question”; and (2) “[t]here is no adverse possession [of] 

the property in question.” The circuit court further cautioned petitioner’s daughter, Jodi L. Hughes, 

a non-attorney who filed petitioner’s third action on his behalf as a “limited power of attorney,” 

that she might be sanctioned if she filed the same action “again in the future[.]” 

On August 22, 2017, Ms. Hughes appealed the circuit court’s July 19, 2017, order to this 

Court. By order entered on September 28, 2017, this Court directed Ms. Hughes to provide a 

statement as to “whether this matter should be docketed in light of the fact that a power of attorney 

cannot file documents on behalf of others in a proceeding on appeal.” On December 4, 2017, Ms. 

Hughes filed a motion asking this Court to docket the appeal. By order entered on January 3, 2018, 

this Court refused to docket the appeal. 

On May 10, 2018, petitioner filed the instant civil action—his fourth—in the Circuit Court

of Raleigh County, Case No. 18-C-244-H, again alleging that respondents were “deeded this 

property by means of a questionable mechanic’s lien in 2008” and that petitioner had reacquired 
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ownership of the real property through adverse possession. On June 11, 2018, respondents filed an 

answer and a motion to dismiss. On July 25, 2018, the circuit court held a hearing on the motion 

to dismiss, and the parties submitted documentation to support their respective positions. Petitioner 

requested that Ms. Hughes be allowed to speak for him. The circuit court refused the request, 

finding that Ms. Hughes was not a party and “cannot act as a lawyer.” Petitioner argued that 

Building Services, Inc. failed to complete the contracted repairs to the real property in 2002 and 

that petitioner had reacquired the real property through adverse possession. Respondents countered 

that the instant action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata because the issues raised by 

petitioner were previously adjudicated in respondents’ favor. Respondents requested possession 

of the real property.

By order entered on July 31, 2018, the circuit court treated respondents’ motion to dismiss

as a motion for summary judgment. The circuit court awarded summary judgment to respondents 

based on the doctrine of res judicata, finding that the issues raised by petitioner were previously 

adjudicated in respondents’ favor and that the validity of the mechanic’s lien was first adjudicated 

in the 2003 action filed by Building Services, Inc. Accordingly, by order entered on July 31, 2018, 

the circuit court directed petitioner to vacate the real property by 5:00 p.m. on September 4, 2018.2

Petitioner now appeals the circuit court’s July 31, 2018, order awarding summary judgment 

to respondents. “A circuit court’s entry of summary judgment is reviewed de novo.” Syl. Pt. 1, 

Painter v. Peavy, 192 W. Va. 189, 451 S.E.2d 755 (1994). Rule 56(c) of the West Virginia Rules 

of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment shall be granted where “there is no genuine 

issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” 

In syllabus point 4 of Painter, we held, in pertinent part, that “[s]ummary judgment is appropriate 

where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving 

party[.]” 192 W. Va. at 190, 451 S.E.2d at 756.

On appeal, petitioner does not address the circuit court’s ruling that the doctrine of res 

judicata barred the instant action. Rather, petitioner argues that Building Services, Inc.’s 

mechanic’s lien was invalid because the contracted repairs to the real property were never 

completed.3 Respondents counter that the circuit court properly awarded them summary judgment. 

We agree with respondents.

2The circuit court’s July 31, 2018, order was not stayed pending the resolution of this 

appeal. However, neither party states whether petitioner has vacated the real property. At the time 

petitioner filed this appeal on October 31, 2018, he still listed his address as 137 Prillerman 

Avenue, Beckley, West Virginia.

3To the extent that petitioner raises on appeal issues that he did not present to the circuit 

court, we decline to address those issues. See Watts v. Ballard, 238 W. Va. 730, 735 n.7, 798 

S.E.2d 856, 861 n.7 (2017) (finding that “[t]his Court will not pass on a nonjurisdictional question 

which has not been decided by the trial court in the first instance”) (quoting Syl. Pt. 2, Sands v. 

Sec. Trust Co., 143 W. Va. 522, 102 S.E.2d 733 (1958)). 
4

 The standard for determining whether a party is barred from filing a second action by the 

doctrine of res judicata is the following:

“Before the prosecution of a lawsuit may be barred on the basis of res 

judicata, three elements must be satisfied. First, there must have been a final 

adjudication on the merits in the prior action by a court having jurisdiction of the 

proceedings. Second, the two actions must involve either the same parties or 

persons in privity with those same parties. Third, the cause of action identified for 

resolution in the subsequent proceeding either must be identical to the cause of 

action determined in the prior action or must be such that it could have been 

resolved, had it been presented, in the prior action.” Syllabus Point 4, Blake v. 

Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 201 W.Va. 469, 498 S.E.2d 41 (1997).

Syl. Pt. 2, Dan Ryan Builders, Inc. v. Crystal Ridge Dev., Inc., 239 W. Va. 549, 803 S.E.2d 519 

(2017).

Here, we find that all of the prior actions between the parties were final adjudications on 

the merits.4 The subject real property is located in Beckley, West Virginia, and there is no 

allegation that the Circuit Court of Raleigh County lacked jurisdiction in the previous actions. 

Every prior action involved petitioner being sued by or suing respondents and/or Building 

Services, Inc. which is owned by Respondent Shleser. Finally, based on our review of the record, 

we find that the issues raised by petitioner in the instant action were adjudicated in the previous 

actions and that the validity of the mechanic’s lien was first adjudicated in the 2003 action filed 

by Building Services, Inc. Therefore, we concur with the circuit court’s finding that the doctrine 

of res judicata barred the instant action. We conclude that the circuit court’s award of summary 

judgment to respondents was proper. 

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s July 31, 2018, order awarding 

summary judgment to respondents and directing petitioner to vacate the real property at 137 

Prillerman Avenue, Beckley, West Virginia.

Affirmed.

ISSUED: August 28, 2020

CONCURRED IN BY:

Chief Justice Tim Armstead

Justice Margaret L. Workman

Justice Elizabeth D. Walker

Justice Evan H. Jenkins

DISQUALIFIED:

Justice John A. Hutchison

4With regard to the 2013, 2015, and 2016 actions, we note that “[a] summary judgment 

order is a decision on the merits.” Tolley v. Carboline Co., 217 W.Va. 158, 164, 617 S.E.2d 508, 

514 (2005) (quoting Stemler v. Florence, 350 F.3d 578, 587 (6th Cir. 2003)).