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File Name: 15a0381n.06

Case No. 13-1373

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

MOSES WILLIAMS ,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

CINDI CURTIN,

Respondent-Appellee.

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ON APPEAL FROM THE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

COURT FOR THE EASTERN 

DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

O P I N I O N

BEFORE: DAUGHTREY, McKEAGUE, and STRANCH, Circuit Judges.

McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge. Petitioner Moses Williams, a Michigan state prisoner 

convicted of second degree murder, appeals from the denial of his petition for writ of habeas 

corpus. One issue has been certified for appeal: whether the state trial court impermissibly 

infringed Williams’ Sixth Amendment right to present a defense when it disallowed testimony of 

a putative alibi witness because Williams failed to give timely notice of his alibi defense. The 

district court denied relief holding that the state courts did not unreasonably apply clearly 

established federal law. Finding no error, we affirm.

I

In December 2004, Moses Williams and Tommy Tiggs were jointly tried before two 

separate juries in connection with the April 2004 shooting death of Edward Beasley in Flint, 
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Michigan. The prosecution proofs showed that both men participated in the shooting. There was 

little physical evidence implicating Williams. The prosecution’s case depended on the 

eyewitness testimony of Beasley’s friend, Carole Cooper. Cooper was with Beasley and the two 

assailants in Beasley’s Cadillac during negotiations for the sale of the car immediately before the 

shooting and was still in the car with Beasley at the time of the shooting. Cooper later identified

Williams as one of the shooters from a photo array. Williams did not testify or present any 

defense proofs. After a four-day trial, Tiggs was found guilty of first degree murder and 

Williams was found guilty of second degree murder. Tiggs was sentenced to life imprisonment; 

Williams was sentenced to a prison term of 25 to 50 years. Both convictions were affirmed on 

direct appeal.

In his direct appeal, Williams argued that the trial court abused its discretion and 

effectively denied him his right to present a defense when it refused to allow alibi witness Kessa 

Peters to testify. Peters purportedly would have testified that Williams was with her,

approximately 250 miles away in Columbus, Ohio, at the time of the shooting. Williams 

acknowledges that he failed to comply with the state law requirement that he give the 

prosecution written notice of intent to present an alibi defense not less than ten days prior to trial. 

Mich. Comp. Laws § 768.20(1). Although Williams’ counsel was aware of a possible alibi 

defense five months prior to trial, he did not give the court and prosecutor notice until Friday, 

December 3, 2004, at a pretrial conference four days prior to trial. At that time, counsel advised 

that he had managed to contact Peters by phone that morning and that she lived in Columbus and 

did not have a telephone. Despite the late notice, the prosecutor agreed to waive objection,

provided Peters contacted the investigating officer, Sergeant Besson, before Monday afternoon 
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when Besson finished her duty, i.e., 3:00 p.m. on December 6th. R. 8-7, Pretrial Hrg. Tr. at 4–5, 

Page ID 539–40. 

Unfortunately, Peters did not meet this condition. Instead, she left a voicemail message 

Monday at 3:51 p.m., indicating simply that she would testify that Williams was with her during 

a certain time frame. She did not leave a telephone number or address. Hence, neither Sergeant 

Besson nor the prosecution was able to contact Peters and question her or otherwise investigate 

her story. At the start of trial Tuesday morning, the prosecution objected to the proposed late 

addition of Peters as an alibi witness. Defense counsel requested more time to produce Peters, 

noting “the alibi witness would probably not be called until at least Thursday afternoon.” R. 8-8, 

Trial Tr. at 6, Page ID 553. The trial court noted that the time had come to pick a jury and, 

unwilling to continue “playing the game,” advised Williams’ counsel that the request to allow 

Peters to testify as an alibi witness would be denied unless there was anything else to support a 

possible exception to the ten-day notice rule. Id. at 5–6, Page ID 552–53. Williams’ counsel did 

not request a continuance but asked that the prosecutor be precluded from commenting on the 

defense’s inability to produce witnesses corroborating any alibi defense. The court so instructed 

the prosecutor and proceeded with jury selection. Williams’ defense consisted solely of

counsel’s cross-examination of prosecution witnesses and counsel’s argument that the evidence 

did not prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Following his conviction, the Michigan Court of Appeals rejected Williams’ claim that 

the trial court abused its discretion in excluding Peters and denied him his right to present a 

defense. People v. Williams, 2006 WL 2000101 (Mich. Ct. App. July 18, 2006). In evaluating 

the trial court’s enforcement of the statutory alibi notice requirement, the court of appeals
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considered the factors prescribed by the Michigan Supreme Court in People v. Travis, 443 Mich. 

668, 682; 505 N.W.2d 563 (1993):

(1) the amount of prejudice that resulted from the failure to disclose, (2) the 

reason for nondisclosure, (3) the extent to which the harm caused by 

nondisclosure was mitigated by subsequent events, (4) the weight of the properly 

admitted evidence supporting the defendant’s guilt, and (5) other relevant factors 

arising out of the circumstances of the case.

Williams, 2006 WL 2000101 at *2. None of these factors was deemed to weigh in favor of 

finding an abuse of discretion. 

After the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal, Williams sought postconviction relief. The trial court denied the motion and the Michigan Court of Appeals and 

Michigan Supreme Court both denied leave to appeal. Williams petitioned for a writ of habeas 

corpus, contending again, among other claims, that his right to present a defense had been 

abridged when the trial court refused to allow Peters to testify. The district court denied relief, 

holding that the Michigan Court of Appeals’ denial of the claim on direct review was not an 

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. R. 18, Opinion and Order at 10–11, 

Page ID 1765–66, Williams v. Woods, 2013 WL 625750 at *6–7 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 20, 2013). 

The district court concluded that the state court had identified and balanced the relevant factors 

and had not acted arbitrarily. The court held this sufficient to satisfy the highly deferential 

“benefit of the doubt” review that governed evaluation of Williams’ habeas petition, citing 

Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010). Id. at 11, Page ID 1766, Williams, 2013 WL 625750 at 

*7. 

However, the district court granted a certificate of appealability and counsel was 

appointed to represent Williams in this appeal. Williams maintains he is entitled to habeas relief 

because the Michigan Court of Appeals’ decision, based on state law, and devoid of citation to 
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United States Supreme Court decisions establishing the governing federal law, is “contrary to” 

the clearly established federal law. 

II

We review the district court’s denial of habeas relief de novo. O’Neal v. Bagley, 

743 F.3d 1010, 1014 (6th Cir. 2013). As the district court observed, under the provisions of the 

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), habeas review of the state court’s 

adjudication on the merits is extremely deferential. For claims adjudicated on the merits, habeas 

relief may be granted only if the state court decision is “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court” or is “based

on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court 

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) and (2).

“A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so 

long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” 

Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 

652, 664 (2004)). This standard is difficult to meet by design. Id. A federal court may “not 

lightly conclude that a State’s criminal justice system has experienced the ‘extreme 

malfunctio[n]’ for which federal habeas relief is the remedy.” Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10, 16

(2013) (quoting Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 786).

1

 

1Williams cites Sixth Circuit precedent for the notion that “modified AEDPA deference” 

applies where, as here, the state court decision under review contained little analysis of the 

substantive constitutional issue. Vasquez v. Jones, 496 F.3d 564, 569 (6th Cir. 2007). In 

Harrington, however, the Court made it clear that AEDPA’s highly deferential review applies to 

the result of the state court decision, irrespective of whether the state court decision includes 

citation to Supreme Court cases or any reasoning at all. Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 784. 

Consequently, since Harrington, the notion of “modified AEDPA deference” lacks continuing 

vitality. See Jackson v. Smith, 745 F.3d 206, 209–10 (6th Cir. 2014); Piscopo v. Michigan, 

479 F. App’x 698, 703–04 (6th Cir. 2012); Smith v. Coleman, 453 F. App’x 625, 627 (6th Cir. 
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Williams contends under § 2254(d)(1) that the Michigan Court of Appeals’ decision is 

“contrary to” the clearly established federal law. The “contrary to” standard is met only if the 

state court applied “a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases.” 

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000). The standard is met if the state court decision is 

diametrically different from, or opposed in character or nature to, clearly established precedent. 

Id. at 405–06. Or, the “contrary to” standard is met if the state court confronted a set of facts 

materially indistinguishable from facts presented in a Supreme Court case and yet reached a 

result different from that reached by the Supreme Court. Id. at 406.

Our review requires us to first identify the clearly established federal law. Marshall v. 

Rodgers, 133 S. Ct. 1446, 1449 (2013). Federal law is clearly established under § 2254(d)(1) by 

the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, in Supreme Court decisions. White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 

1697, 1702 (2010). Because circuit precedent is not “clearly established Federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court,” it “cannot form the basis for habeas relief under AEDPA.” 

Parker v. Matthews, 132 S. Ct. 2148, 2155 (2012); see also Glebe v. Frost, 135 S. Ct. 429, 431 

(2014) (per curiam); White, 134 S. Ct. at 1702 n.2.

III

The parties agree on the source and substance of the clearly established law that governs 

here. In Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 (1988), the Court recognized that an accused has a 

fundamental right to present witnesses in his own defense under the Sixth Amendment. But the 

right is not unfettered. “The right may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other 

legitimate interests in the criminal trial process.” Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 55 (1987) 

(quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

 

2011). See also Treesh v. Bagley, 612 F.3d 424, 429 (6th Cir. 2010) (consistent with 

Harrington).
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The right is subject to “rules of procedure that govern the orderly presentation of facts and 

arguments to provide each party with a fair opportunity to assemble and submit evidence to 

contradict or explain the opponent’s case.” Taylor, 484 U.S. at 411. “The trial process would be 

a shambles if either party had an absolute right to control the time and content of his witnesses’ 

testimony.” Id. The Taylor Court expressly recognized the salutary purposes served by noticeof-alibi rules. Considering the ease with which an alibi defense can be fabricated, the Court 

recognized that such discovery rules serve the prosecution’s interest in protecting itself against 

an eleventh-hour defense as well as the public interest in a full and truthful disclosure of critical 

facts. Id. at 411–12. 

The Taylor Court declined to prescribe a comprehensive standard to guide the exercise of 

discretion in every conceivable case. Instead, the Court discussed countervailing interests that 

would often come into play and need to be considered:

[A] trial court may not ignore the fundamental character of the defendant's 

right to offer the testimony of witnesses in his favor. But the mere invocation of 

that right cannot automatically and invariably outweigh countervailing public 

interests. The integrity of the adversary process, which depends both on the 

presentation of reliable evidence and the rejection of unreliable evidence, the 

interest in the fair and efficient administration of justice, and the potential 

prejudice to the truth-determining function of the trial process must also weigh in 

the balance. 

A trial judge may certainly insist on an explanation for a party's failure to 

comply with a request to identify his or her witnesses in advance of trial. If that 

explanation reveals that the omission was willful and motivated by a desire to 

obtain a tactical advantage that would minimize the effectiveness of crossexamination and the ability to adduce rebuttal evidence, it would be entirely 

consistent with the purposes of the Compulsory Process Clause simply to exclude 

the witness’ testimony.

The simplicity of compliance with the discovery rule is also relevant. As 

we have noted, the Compulsory Process Clause cannot be invoked without the 

prior planning and affirmative conduct of the defendant. Lawyers are accustomed 

to meeting deadlines. Routine preparation involves location and interrogation of 

potential witnesses and the serving of subpoenas on those whose testimony will 
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be offered at trial. The burden of identifying them in advance of trial adds little to 

these routine demands of trial preparation.

Id. at 414–16 (footnotes and citations omitted). In light of these considerations, the Taylor Court 

upheld the exclusion of testimony of late-noticed witnesses. Even as it acknowledged that 

alternative sanctions were available and that prejudice to the prosecution could have been 

avoided, the Court held that exclusion was justified because of willful misconduct, as the record 

supported the inference that “witnesses are being found that really weren’t there” and that notice 

was given late to obtain tactical advantage. Id. at 416–17.

IV

Williams acknowledges that the Michigan Court of Appeals decision is not contrary to 

clearly established federal law simply because it does not cite Taylor. He maintains, however, 

that both the reasoning and result of the decision contradict the holding of Taylor. Yet, several 

of the factors considered are common to both decisions. And the holdings of both decisions are 

facially consistent: upholding the trial court’s exercise of discretion to exclude testimony in 

enforcement of a discovery rule. In both cases, the defendant’s right to present his defense 

bowed to the prosecution’s interest in protecting itself from an eleventh-hour defense, the court’s 

interest in protecting the integrity of the adversary process, and the public’s interest in the 

truthful disclosure of critical facts.

Still, despite these consistencies, Williams identifies two shortcomings in the Michigan 

Court of Appeals decision that he says render it so contrary to the teaching of Taylor as to 

compel agreement among all fairminded jurists that the Michigan Court of Appeals erred and 

that he is entitled to habeas relief. In particular, Williams contends that the state court’s opinion 

falls short because it includes no consideration of his fundamental right to present a defense. 
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The state court’s analysis is thus said to contravene Taylor’s instruction that the fundamental 

character of his right not be ignored. 

To be sure, the Michigan Court of Appeals opinion contains little explicit recognition of 

the importance of Williams’ right to present a defense. But neither is the right completely

ignored. The state court’s implicit recognition is evidenced first by its acknowledgement that the 

trial court did not automatically deny Williams’ initial request, even though the request was 

made six days after the statutory deadline and a mere two working days before the start of trial, 

and even though Williams’ counsel, even then, was still unable to provide Kessa Peters’ contact 

information to the prosecution. Williams, 2006 WL 2000101 at *2. The court of appeals 

recognized that the trial court, instead of summarily denying the request as untimely, went along 

with the prosecution’s proposed accommodation in an effort to preserve Williams’ right to 

present an alibi defense. But Williams also failed to meet the prosecution’s condition the day 

before trial was to begin. The court of appeals thus recognized that the trial court did not 

actually deny Williams’ request until the day of trial. At that point, Williams still had failed to 

provide the prosecution with notice that would have permitted verification of Peters’ supposed 

testimony and investigation of the putative alibi. Then, as the trial court announced its intention 

to deny the eleventh-hour request, it gave Williams’ counsel a final opportunity to address the 

court—either to clarify his objection or propose an alternative remedy. Hearing neither, the trial 

court proceeded with jury selection. But, as the court of appeals also recognized, the trial court 

further honored Williams’ right to present a defense by acknowledging that he remained free to 

testify and present other witnesses’ testimony in support of the alibi defense—without comment 

by the prosecutor on Williams’ failure to otherwise corroborate the defense. Id. No, Williams’ 

right to present a defense was not ignored by the state courts. 
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Williams also contends the Michigan Court of Appeals’ decision is contrary to 

established law because it failed to address the trial court’s failure to consider alternative 

sanctions before applying the drastic sanction of preclusion. To the contrary, the foregoing 

discussion demonstrates the court of appeals’ recognition that the trial court did not rush to apply 

preclusion as a sanction simply because the deadline passed, but patiently worked with the 

parties to protect the relevant interests. 

Moreover, the Taylor Court did not hold that the availability of alternative sanctions 

would preclude use of the preclusion sanction. Far from it. Taylor actually upheld preclusion 

even as it recognized that “a less drastic sanction is always available.” Taylor, 484 U.S. at 413. 

The Court noted that “[p]rejudice to the prosecution could be minimized by granting a 

continuance or a mistrial to provide time for further investigation” and that “further violations 

can be deterred by disciplinary sanctions against the defendant or defense counsel.” Id. But 

despite the availability of alternative sanctions, the Taylor Court upheld the exclusion of 

testimony in enforcement of the discovery rule. The Court reasoned that use of alternative 

sanctions, though facially suitable in a particular case, “would be less effective than the 

preclusion sanction” and, in some cases, “would perpetuate rather than limit the prejudice to the 

State and the harm to the adversary process.” Id. After all, the Court noted, “[o]ne of the 

purposes of the discovery rule itself is to minimize the risk that fabricated testimony will be 

believed.” Id. In an observation no less apt in the instant case, the Taylor Court noted that it is 

“reasonable to presume that there is something suspect about a defense witness who is not 

identified until after the 11th hour has passed.” Id. at 414. 

There has been no finding in this case that Williams’ late notice was willful or 

deliberately designed to gain unfair tactical advantage. It is undisputed, however, that his
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counsel was aware of the possibility of an alibi defense a full five months before trial. Yet, he 

offered no explanation for the late notice except that, after trying unsuccessfully for a couple of 

weeks, he did not manage to contact Kessa Peters until four days prior to trial. This does not 

necessarily evidence willfulness but, at a minimum, it bespeaks a lack of due diligence. If 

Carole Cooper’s identification of Williams as the second shooter really were erroneous, and if 

Williams really were 250 miles away in Columbus at the time of the murder, due diligence 

would have demanded a much more timely and thorough development of the defense. If counsel 

had undertaken such efforts and been stymied by Peters’ elusiveness, then it should nonetheless 

have been a simple matter for him to give timely notice of Williams’ intent to rely on the alibi 

defense, alert the court and prosecution to his inability to contact Peters, and show cause for a 

continuance of trial. The fact that defense counsel did not proceed in this manner is not 

damning, but it is telling. As the Supreme Court noted in Taylor, “The simplicity of compliance 

with the discovery rule is also relevant” in evaluating the appropriateness of preclusion.2 Id. at 

415. 

It follows that the state courts’ failure to more explicitly consider alternative sanctions 

does not render their decision contrary to clearly established federal law. Instead, the manifest 

reasons to question the truthfulness of the supposed alibi defense render the result reached by the 

Michigan Court of Appeals entirely consonant with established federal law, as reflected in both 

the analysis and result in Taylor. 

 

2No less telling is the fact that the record is still devoid of evidence of what Peters’ 

testimony would have been—even after direct review, collateral review, and these habeas 

proceedings—if she had appeared to testify. To date, we have nothing more than trial counsel’s 

representation as to what Peters told him over the phone. But counsel did not offer to make a 

proffer establishing the contents of the anticipated testimony. Peters was not subpoenaed, never 

appeared to testify, was never interviewed by the prosecution or defense counsel, and has not 

even signed an affidavit.
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To the extent Williams’ “contrary to” argument rests on Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145 

(1991), it is plainly wrong. In Lucas, the Court overturned a decision holding that preclusion of 

evidence for violation of a discovery rule is a per se violation of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment 

right to present a defense. The Lucas Court simply vacated the ruling and remanded for further 

proceedings in light of the teaching of Taylor v. Illinois. Lucas, 500 U.S. at 152–53. Citing dicta 

in Lucas, Williams would have us construe Taylor as holding that the interests in favor of 

enforcement of a discovery rule must be found to outweigh, or justify limitation of, the 

defendant’s right to present a defense before the rule can be enforced to exclude evidence. But 

dicta appearing in a Supreme Court opinion will not make out “clearly established Federal law, 

as determined by the Supreme Court.” Only the opinion’s holding does that. White, 134 S. Ct. 

at 1702. 

Moreover, the Supreme Court, in Nevada v. Jackson, 133 S. Ct. 1990, 1993 (2013) (per 

curiam), recently rejected the very construction of Lucas that Williams urges us to adopt. The 

Jackson Court stated that Lucas “did not even suggest, much less hold, that it is unconstitutional 

to enforce such a [notice] rule unless a case-by-case balancing of interests weighs in favor of 

enforcement.” Id. at 1993. Instead, as Jackson notes, Lucas expressed no opinion as to whether 

preclusion was justified in that case and remanded the matter to the state court for assessment in 

light of the considerations outlined in Taylor. Id.3

Thus, Taylor’s holding, properly understood, teaches that various factors are potentially 

relevant in evaluating the appropriateness of the preclusion sanction; it does not prescribe a 

 

3Williams’ reliance on our decision in Ferensic v. Birkett, 501 F.3d 469 (6th Cir. 2007), 

is similarly misplaced. Ferensic, of course, is not a holding of the Supreme Court and is 

therefore not “clearly established Federal law” under AEDPA. Parker, 132 S. Ct. at 2155. 

Further, Ferensic relies in part on the same construction of Lucas that the Supreme Court 

expressly disavowed in Jackson.
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comprehensive standard, and it does not mandate interest-balancing. It follows, that because 

Taylor’s “rule” is a general one, state courts whose rulings are reviewed under AEDPA as being 

contrary to or unreasonable applications of such rule, are entitled to “more leeway . . . in 

reaching outcomes in case-by-case determinations.” Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 786 (quoting 

Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)).

In this case, as both parties concede, the governing clearly established federal law is 

made out by the holding of Taylor v. Illinois. The Michigan Court of Appeals’ decision, albeit 

devoid of citation to Taylor, is not diametrically different from or opposite in character to the 

Supreme Court’s ruling in Taylor. The Michigan Court of Appeals’ decision rested on 

consideration of several factors identified in Taylor as relevant considerations and the result 

reached, upholding preclusion of testimony based on those considerations, is consistent with 

Taylor. Our review, under the deferential standard prescribed by AEDPA, does not reveal such 

an arbitrary enforcement of the preclusion sanction that all fairminded jurists would necessarily 

find it to be contrary to Taylor and therefore violative of Williams’ Sixth Amendment right to 

present a defense. 

V

Finding no “extreme malfunction” of the state’s criminal justice system, we have no 

warrant to grant habeas relief. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment denying 

Williams’ petition for writ of habeas corpus.
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STRANCH, J., concurring. I write separately only to address footnote one of the 

majority opinion. I acknowledge that our court has held, since the Supreme Court decided 

Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770 (2011), that modified AEDPA deference should no longer 

be applied. Jackson v. Smith, 745 F.3d 206, 209–10 (6th Cir. 2014); Piscopo v. Mich., 479 F. 

App’x 698, 703–04 (6th Cir. 2012); Smith v. Coleman, 453 F. App’x 625, 627 (6th Cir. 2011). 

Since Harrington, our court has also applied modified AEDPA deference in two published cases. 

Peoples v. Lafler, 734 F.3d 503, 516–17 (6th Cir. 2013); Moore v. Mitchell, 708 F.3d 760, 795 

(6th Cir. 2013). Our conflicting case law leaves me unable to agree with the conclusion in 

footnote one.