NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. 

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE 

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

RONDA J., Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, A.M., K.J., A.M., Appellees. 

No. 1 CA-JV 15-0253 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County 

No. JD 38003 

The Honorable Bradley H. Astrowsky, Judge 

AFFIRMED 

COUNSEL 

Czop Law Firm, P.L.L.C., Higley 

By Steven Czop 

Counsel for Appellant 

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix 

By JoAnn Falgout 

Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety
RONDA J. v. DCS, et al. 

Decision of the Court 

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Presiding Judge Margaret H. Downie delivered the decision of the Court, 

in which Judge Patricia A. Orozco and Judge Maurice Portley joined. 

D O W N I E, Judge: 

¶1 Ronda J. (“Mother”) appeals from an order terminating her 

parental rights. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

¶2 Mother was convicted of child abuse involving her eldest 

son, K.J., in 2006.1 Mother violated her terms of probation and was 

sentenced to a one-year prison term; the child abuse conviction was 

designated a felony. 

¶3 On October 16, 2013, the Department of Child Safety 

(“DCS”) received a report that Mother’s newborn daughter had been 

hospitalized due to non-accidental injuries.2 (K.J. later admitted causing 

the injuries.) The same day, Mother assaulted her 68-year-old mother, 

whom she held down, hit, and choked. DCS took custody of the children. 

Mother subsequently pled guilty to vulnerable adult abuse, a class four 

felony and domestic violence offense. She was sentenced in March 2014 to 

2.5 years in prison. 

¶4 At a March 26, 2014 juvenile court hearing, Mother asked the 

court to order that the children visit her in prison. The court directed DCS 

to consult with the youngest child’s doctor about such visits, and DCS also 

agreed to consult a psychologist regarding a different child’s visits. The 

minute entry from that hearing states, in pertinent part: 

IT IS ORDERED allowing the mother to have visitation with 

the children at the Arizona Department of Corrections if the 

 

1 Mother has four children, three of whom remain in DCS care. K.J. 

was dismissed as a party when he turned 18 in 2014.

2 The Arizona Department of Economic Security originated this 

action but was later replaced by the Department of Child Safety. See S.B. 

1001, 51st Leg., 2d Spec. Sess. (Ariz. 2014). 
RONDA J. v. DCS, et al. 

Decision of the Court 

3

children can be safely transported and if [A.M.]’s 

pediatrician indicates that is alright for her to visit as well. 

The Department shall make arrangements for the children to 

be transported to the visits. 

¶5 At a hearing on August 26, 2014, the court changed the case 

plan to severance and adoption. Counsel for Mother advised the court 

that visits with the children had not yet occurred. The children’s guardian 

ad litem objected to any prison visits, but the court ordered DCS to “have a 

psychological consult regarding whether the children would be harmed 

visiting the mother in prison.”

¶6 DCS subsequently moved to terminate Mother’s parental 

rights, and a severance trial occurred in May 2015. Mother remained 

incarcerated at the time of the trial. 

¶7 The court issued a ruling terminating Mother’s parental 

rights on the ground of willful abuse of a child under Arizona Revised 

Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 8-533(B)(2).3 Mother timely appealed. We have 

jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A), 12-120.21(A)(1), -2101(A)(1), 

and Arizona Rule of Procedure for the Juvenile Court 108(B). 

DISCUSSION 

¶8 Mother argues the severance order must be reversed 

because: (1) DCS did not make reasonable efforts at reunification; and (2) 

an insufficient nexus exists between her child abuse conviction and the 

risk of future abuse. We will affirm an order terminating parental rights 

unless the juvenile court’s findings are clearly erroneous, meaning the 

record lacks any reasonable evidence to support them. See Minh T. v. Ariz. 

Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 202 Ariz. 76, 78–79, ¶ 9 (App. 2001). 

I. Reunification Efforts 

¶9 The only specific contention Mother raises about 

reunification services is that DCS “could have done a more diligent effort 

in providing visitation with the children to see how Mother interacted 

with [them].” For purposes of our analysis, we assume, without deciding, 

 

3 DCS also alleged the length of Mother’s prison sentence as a basis 

for termination under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(4), but the court concluded DCS 

failed to prove that ground. 
RONDA J. v. DCS, et al. 

Decision of the Court 

4

that DCS must make reasonable efforts at reunification where, as here, 

termination is grounded on willful abuse of another child. 

¶10 Mother received three prison visits with the children, though 

the first visit did not occur until April 2015. The record reflects that DCS

pursued visitation earlier, submitting requests for monthly supervised 

prison visits in June 2014. DCS explained that some of the delay stemmed 

from prison-imposed limitations, communication difficulties with 

corrections officials, and a lack of providers or family members willing to 

transport and supervise the children. 

¶11 Moreover, even assuming DCS should have more diligently 

pursued visitation, Mother has not demonstrated that additional visits 

would have addressed the problems that led to termination of her 

parental rights — specifically, her issues with anger and violence. See 

Mary Ellen C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 193 Ariz. 185, 186, ¶ 1 (App. 1999) 

(DCS is only obligated to undertake measures with a reasonable 

possibility of rehabilitating a parent.). In its severance ruling, the juvenile 

court stated: 

Despite Mother’s conviction for [abusing K.J.], the time she 

spent on probation for same, and the fact that she is 

presently serving a prison term for violating her probation 

pertaining to this abuse, Mother demonstrated no remorse 

and a complete lack of understanding of the wrongfulness of 

her abuse. At trial, Mother blamed [K.J.]’s facial injuries to 

his “squirming.” Mother’s [sic] through her words and 

demeanor at trial, failed to convince this Court that she had 

any remorse for abusing [K.J.] or that she believed, even to 

the slightest degree, that her behavior was inappropriate. 

Add to this act of violence, Mother’s additional act of 

violence against a vulnerable adult on October 16, 2013, and 

a clear picture is presented of an individual with an anger 

problem and a propensity towards violence. 

¶12 Mother argues visitation “would have been beneficial in 

assessing [her] ability to parent and her temperament.” But a reasonable 

trier of fact could conclude that the highly controlled environment of a 

prison would not be a reliable predictor of whether Mother’s longstanding anger and violence issues would place the children at risk if they 

were in her care in a non-custodial setting. 
RONDA J. v. DCS, et al. 

Decision of the Court 

5

¶13 Contrary to Mother’s suggestion, the juvenile court 

implicitly made a reasonable efforts finding. See Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep’t 

of Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 50, ¶ 17 (App. 2004) (If court fails to expressly 

make a necessary finding, we may determine whether the record supports 

an implicit finding.). The court noted that it was required to “find that 

DCS made reasonable efforts to reunify the family, or that such efforts 

would have been futile.” It also observed that “DCS must prove the 

statutory ground, [including] the reasonable efforts aspect by clear and 

convincing evidence.” The court concluded DCS had proven “each 

required element of A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2) by clear and convincing 

evidence.” See Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. Rocky J., 234 Ariz. 437, 441, ¶ 14 

(App. 2014) (“juvenile court will be deemed to have made every finding 

necessary to support the judgment”).

II. Grounds for Termination 

¶14 When a severance order is based on abuse of another child, 

“DCS must show a constitutional nexus between the prior abuse and the 

risk of future abuse to the child at issue.” Tina T. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 

236 Ariz. 295, 299, ¶ 17 (App. 2014). Mother argues there was an 

insufficient nexus between her child abuse conviction and the termination 

of her parental rights. She further argues the “subsequent conviction for 

vulnerable adult abuse is not a sufficient nexus to show that Mother will 

be a threat to any child in the future.” We disagree. 

¶15 Considered together and in context, Mother’s felony 

conviction for child abuse, her more recent felony conviction for 

vulnerable adult abuse, and her dismissive attitude toward both matters 

provided the necessary nexus. See Tina T., 236 Ariz. at 299–300, ¶¶ 17–18 

(if the facts demonstrate “abuse would likely occur again,” termination 

based on prior abuse of another child is proper). In its ruling, the juvenile 

court explained the ongoing risk of abuse: 

The fact that Mother acted in a violent manner against a 

vulnerable adult despite her prior conviction for abusing a 

vulnerable child demonstrates that any child, or person, 

with whom Mother has contact is at great risk of harm and 

physical abuse the next time Mother gets upset with that 

child or person. Had Mother not committed another violent 

offense and demonstrated an understanding of the 

wrongfulness of her violent past, the Court may have 

reached a different conclusion. Sadly for Mother, this is not 

the set of facts before the Court at this time. 
RONDA J. v. DCS, et al. 

Decision of the Court 

6

¶16 The court also found that Mother expressed “no remorse” 

for assaulting her mother and noted her “significant” history with DCS. 

The court described the severity of K.J.’s abuse quite differently from 

Mother’s more benign portrayal, stating: 

Mother’s neighbors reported they heard a child being beaten 

inside Mother’s home, as they heard the child’s screams. 

Mother admitted to law enforcement that she was 

“disciplining” [K.J.], then age 10. Mother further reported to 

“whipping his ass” the week prior as well. [K.J.] was 

observed with a large bruise and bump on his left eye and 

multiple new and old bruises and welts on his upper legs, 

lower back, and buttocks. 

¶17 The facts that the juvenile court cited and relied upon were 

relevant to an assessment of future risk. The termination order is 

supported by both reasonable evidence and an appropriate constitutional 

nexus.
RONDA J. v. DCS, et al. 

Decision of the Court 

7

CONCLUSION 

¶18 We affirm the order terminating Mother’s parental rights.