alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
§ 18.23 Disqualification of representatives. ( a ) *Disqualification* — ( 1 ) *Grounds for disqualification.* Representatives qualified under § 18.22 may be disqualified for: ( i ) Suspension of a license to practice law or disbarment from the practice of law by any court or agency of the United States, highest court of a State, Commonwealth, or Territory of the United States, or the District of Columbia;
( ii ) Disbarment from the practice of law on consent or resignation from the bar of a court or agency while an investigation into an allegation of misconduct is pending; or
( iii ) Committing an act, omission, or contumacious conduct that violates these rules, an applicable statute, an applicable regulation, or the judge's order(s).
( 2 ) *Disqualification procedure.* The Chief Judge must provide notice and an opportunity to be heard as to why the representative should not be disqualified from practice before the Office of Administrative Law Judges. The notice will include a copy of the document that provides the grounds for the disqualification. Unless otherwise directed, any response must be filed within 21 days of service of the notice. The Chief Judge's determination must be based on the reliable, probative and substantial evidence of record, including the notice and response.
( b ) *Notification of disqualification action.* When an attorney representative is disqualified, the Chief Judge will notify the jurisdiction(s) in which the attorney is licensed to practice and the National Lawyer Regulatory Data Bank maintained by the American Bar Association Standing Committee on Professional Discipline, by providing a copy of the decision and order.
( c ) *Application for reinstatement.* A representative disqualified under this section may be reinstated by the Chief Judge upon application. At the discretion of the Chief Judge, consideration of an application for reinstatement may be limited to written submissions or may be referred for further proceedings before the Chief Judge.
#### § 37.102 What happens if a grant applicant or recipient breaches a Conciliation Agreement?

When it becomes known to the Director that a Conciliation Agreement has been breached, the Director may issue a Notification of Breach of Conciliation Agreement.
§ 1955.44 Final decision. ( a ) After review of any exceptions, together with the record references and authorities cited in support thereof, the Secretary shall issue a final decision ruling upon each exception and objection filed. The final decision may affirm, modify, or set aside in whole or in part the findings, conclusions, and the rule or order contained in the decision of the administrative law judge. The final decision shall also include reference to any material fact based on official notice.
( b ) The Secretary's final decision shall be served upon all the parties and shall become final upon the 30th day after service thereof unless the Secretary grants a stay pending judicial review.
#### § 1650.101 Purpose.

This subpart sets forth the procedures to be followed in the collection by salary offset of debts owed to the United States under 5 U.S.C. 5514. The general standards and procedures governing the collection, compromise, termination, and referral to the Department of Justice of claims for money and property that are prescribed in the regulations issued jointly by the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General of the United States, the Federal Claims Collection Standards (31 CFR Parts 900-904), apply to the administrative collection activities of the EEOC. Debts owed by current federal employees to Government travel charge card contractors will be collected in accordance with the regulations issued by the General Services Administration at 41 CFR part 301-54.
r e u U l cui u ez i. ', czt n r LM&tKJt l l-M« P- 2 

02/01/1 0 02:35F11 XARLUK HEALTH CLI 9072412213 p.0 1 

O2-OI-201O D3:46p«. Frw-FILBIES COPV CENTER 435?eriJ51 T-I8T P.001/002 F-4 « 

Tv-V^l c^-^c:\ ^*v^-----t 'p^.^^f o^rChiet Essential Air Service Division 

Office of Aviatioii Analysis ::' 

U.S. Depntoient of Transportation 

1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE 

Washington, D.C. 20S90 

1-202-366-1047 Phone ' 

1-202-366-7638 fax zi 

KgmA^Hng<^.rfgT.»t<;>v 

Kevin Adams 

Tbe Kariulc Tzibal Council would like to endoise Island Airs Qptitm Number two for tlie 

Essentiai Servtoc contract now under consideration. Island Air is cunreatly serving 

Kaduk and perfbms a much needed sovice to our conunimity. They are our carrier of 

choice. 

We have been iinpacted witfa a dowotutn in our tourism economy atvd closure of our river 

^stem doe to poor tetums of Kin^ Saimctn. Option Two will provide some relief with a 

reduced seat &re. This option will help ail travelers with the hi£^ cost of travel. 

Kartttk Tribal Council 

Alicia Andrews 

1-907-241-221S phone 

1-907-241-2208 foe
Docket No: FAA

- 2015

- 1429 Dir ID: 2014

- NM

- 246

- AD

Contacts. With w h om o u tsi d e the F A A has t h is pr o p os al be en dis c u s se d ?

Org a ni z a t i on Per s on C o nta c ted Da t e Re sp on s e

Nat i onal Bus i ness Aircraft As s o ciat i o n Eli Cotti 12 / 12 / 14

R e gio n al Airline As s o ci a ti o n 12 / 12 / 14

Aircraft Owners & Pilots Association Robert Hackman 12 / 12 / 14

Airlines for America Robert Ireland 12 / 12 / 14
#### § 2200.9 Consolidation.

Cases may be consolidated on the motion of any party conforming to § 2200.40, on the Judge's own motion, or on the Commission's own motion, where there exist common parties, common questions of law or fact or in such other circumstances as justice or the administration of the Act require.
#### STUTZ v WILHELM, Exr, etc.

Ohio Appeals, 8th Dist, Cuyahoga Co

No 9112.

Decided Jan 21, 1929

Turney & Sipe, Cleveland, for Stutz.

Teradway & Marlatt, Cleveland, for Wilhelm.

Judges MIDDLETON and MAUCK of the Fourth District and FARR of the Seventh District sitting.

FARR, J

To each of plaintiff’s first four amended petitions, defendant filed a motion to make more definite and certain, which motions were sustained. To plaintiff’s fourth and fifth amended petitions the defendant filed motions to strike from the files for plaintiff’s failure to comply with the orders of the court theretofore made by sustaining the motions to make definite and certain, and while the principal question here is the right of the trial court to strike from the files as above stated, yet it should be observed in passing that the trial court properly sustained the motions to make more definite and certain which is readily apparent from a reading of the petitions, and having done so it is sufficient to say without a further recital of facts that the trial court was not in error in sustaining the motions to strike the fifth amended petition from, the files, because no petition yet filed states a cause of action^ the controlling principle is announced in Harrison vs. Knight, 19 C. C. (NS) 457, the syllabus as follows:

> “The right to strike pleadings from the files because of the failure or refusal of the parties filing them to comply with orders made in respect thereto, is inherent in the courts, and it is no valid objection to the exercise of this right that the pleading, ordered stricken off states a cause of action or a good defense.”

. There are also pertinent and helpful observations in the opinion of the court in the above case at page 459. Another case of interest in this connection, and somewhat similar as to facts, is Poplowsky Plumbing Co vs Rosenstein, 19 Cir. Ct. (NS) 387, where it is held as follows:

> *155“A court is not required to pass upon the same matter more than once; hence there is no error in striking from the files a second motion to vacate a default judgment identical with one overruled five days before.”

This determines the real question at issue; that is to say that the trial court committed no error in striking the fifth amended peition from the files, nor was it in error in sustaining the motions to make more definite and certain the preceeding petitions, the reasons for which are obvious without a recital of the allegations thereof.

For the reasons given, the judgment is affirmed.

Middleton and Mauck, JJ, concur.
<PAGE>

EXHIBIT 99.1


CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

     In connection with the Quarterly Report of Davel Communications, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2002, as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
"Report"), the undersigned, in the capacities and on the date indicated below,
hereby certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that: (1) the Report fully
complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934; and (2) the information contained in the Report fairly
presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of
operations of the Company.


Date:     May 15, 2003       /s/ John D. Chichester
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                             John D. Chichester, Chief Executive Officer


Date:     May 15, 2003       /s/ Donald L. Paliwoda
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                             Donald L. Paliwoda, Interim Chief Financial Officer





                                       30
§ 2570.38 Tentative denial letters. ( a ) If, after reviewing an exemption file, the Department tentatively concludes that it will not propose or grant the exemption, it will notify the applicant in writing. At the same time the Department provides the notification, the Department will also provide a brief statement of the reasons for its tentative denial. Note 1 to paragraph (a). As referenced in § 2570.33(a)(1), the Department will not hold a conference with, or issue a tentative denial letter to, an applicant who does not submit a complete application, or an applicant who does not provide current information.
( b ) An applicant will have 20 days from the date of a tentative denial letter, unless the Department extends the time period at its sole discretion, to request a conference under § 2570.40 and/or to notify the Department of its intent to submit additional information under § 2570.39. If the Department does not receive a request for a conference or a notification of intent to submit additional information within that time, it will issue a final denial letter pursuant to § 2570.41.
[No. 27707-7-II.

Division Two.

December 6, 2002.]

#### The State of Washington, *Respondent,*v. Jason Michael Garner, *Appellant.*

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Kitsap County, No. 01-1-00520-9, Anna M. Laurie and M. Karlynn Haberly, JJ., entered August 13, 2001. *Affirmed*by unpublished opinion per Quinn-Brintnall, A.C.J., concurred in by Houghton and Armstrong, JJ.
Exhibit 21

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>



         SUBSIDIARIES OF LILLY INDUSTRIES, INC. AS OF FEBRUARY 22, 1999

Name of Subsidiary                                       State of Incorporation
------------------                                       ----------------------

<S>  <C>                                                 <C>         
1.   Lilly Industries (USA), Inc.                        Indiana

2.   Lilly Industries (Asia), Limited                    Hong Kong

3.   Lilly Industries (Australia) Pty Ltd.               Australia
     (Subsidiary of Lilly Industries (USA), Inc.)

4.   Lilly Industries (Cornwall) Limited                 Ontario, Canada
     (Subsidiary of Lilly Industries (USA), Inc.)

5.   Lilly Industries (Ireland) Limited                  Ireland

6.   Lilly Industries (Malaysia) Sdn.Bhd.                Malaysia

7.   Lilly Industries (Mexico), S.A. de C.V.             Mexico

8.   Lilly Industries, Inc.(Canada)                      Ontario, Canada

9.   Lilly Industries (Far East), Ltd.                   Taiwan

10.  Lilly Industries (Thailand), Limited                Thailand

11.  London Laboratories GmbH                            Germany
     (Subsidiary of Lilly Industries (USA), Inc.)

12.  Merckens Lackchemie GmbH and Company KG             Germany 
     (Subsidiary of London Laboratories, GmbH)

13.  Dongguan Lilly Paint Industries, Ltd.               Peoples Republic of China
     (Subsidiary of Lilly Industries (Asia), Limited)                        

14.  G.C.I. Insurance Company, Limited                   Bermuda
     (Subsidiary of Lilly Industries (USA), Inc.)

15.  Lilly Industries (UK), LTD                          United Kingdom 
     (Subsidiary of Lilly Industries (USA), Inc.)


16.   Pinturas Dygo, S.A. de C.V.                        Mexico
     (Subsidiary of Lilly Industries (Mexico), 
      S.A. de C.V.)

17.   Lilly Technologies, Inc.                           Delaware

18.   Lilly Industries, LLC.                             Indiana

19.   Lilly Industries International, LTD                Barbados
</TABLE>
#### OTIS STEEL CO v JOHNSON

Ohio Appeals, 8th Dist., Cuyahoga Co

No. 10287.

Decided November 4, 1929

Messrs. Tolies, Hogsett & Ginn, Cleveland, for Steel Co.

Mr. E. W. H. Ro.ssin, Esq., Cleveland, for Johnson.

*7PER CURIAM

It is claimed that the principal issue in this case is whether or not ‘Daitch, to whom the Steel Company paid the check, was a holder in due course and thus entitled to payment, although it had notice at the time that the check had been stolen from the person to whom it was first delivered.

We are referred to certain sections of the General Code claimed to be pertinent to the issue. Section 8114, Section 8135, Section 8157.

It is urged that the conditions set forth in said section were present in this case. First, the check was complete and regular upon its face. Second, Daitch became the holder of it before it was overdue, and without notice that it previously had been dishonored, if such was the fact. Third, that he took it in good faith and for value. Fourth, that at the time it was negotiated to him he had no notice of any infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title of the person negotiating it.

There is but one difficulty with the contention of the plaintiff in error, and that is that by ordering the bank to pay Daitch the amount of the check after it had full notice that the check had been stolen from Clarence Johnson, it deprived Clarence Johnson of an opportunity to show that Daitch did not take it in good faith or for value. When it. ordered the bank to pay it put itself in the position of court and jury and found that Daitch took it in good faith and for value. In our opinion it was clearly the duty of the Steel Company to withhold the payment of the check. The only course which would have been left to Daitch was to enter suit upon the check against the Steel Company, We do not know but in the event of such suit it might have been brought out that he was not a holder in good faith, or that he did not pay value for it. When the Steel Company ordered payment to Daitch it did so at its own risk and without affecting whatever rights Clarence Johnson may have had in the premises.

For the reasons given the judgment of the Municipal Court is affirmed.

Vickery, PJ., Levine and Sullivan, JJ., concur.
----

----

I Informacija

Komisija

----

Menjalni tečaji evra (1)

20. septembra 2004

(2004/C 234/01)

1 euro= 

----

(1)

Vir: referenčni menjalni tečaj, ki ga objavlja ECB.

----

----

Nenasprotovanje priglašeni koncentraciji

(Št. primera COMP/M.3509 – KBC/Rabobank/JV)

(2004/C 234/02)

(Besedilo velja za EGP)

Dne 14. septembra 2004 je Komisija odločila, da ne bo nasprotovala navedeni priglašeni koncentraciji, in jo razglaša za združljivo s skupnim trgom. Ta odločba je sprejeta v skladu s členom 6(1)(b) Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 139/2004. Celotno besedilo te odločbe je na razpolago le v angleščini in bo objavljeno potem, ko bo očiščeno morebitnih poslovnih skrivnosti. Dostopno bo:

----

----

Nenasprotovanje priglašeni koncentraciji

(Št. primera COMP/M.3538 – Uniqua/Claris Vita)

(2004/C 234/03)

(Besedilo velja za EGP)

Dne 13. septembra 2004 je Komisija odločila, da ne bo nasprotovala navedeni priglašeni koncentraciji, in jo razglaša za združljivo s skupnim trgom. Ta odločba je sprejeta v skladu s členom 6(1)(b) Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 139/2004. Celotno besedilo te odločbe je na razpolago le v italijanščini in bo objavljeno potem, ko bo očiščeno morebitnih poslovnih skrivnosti. Dostopno bo:

----

----

Nenasprotovanje priglašeni koncentraciji

(Št. primera COMP/M.3551 – CD&R Fund VI/Culligan)

(2004/C 234/04)

(Besedilo velja za EGP)

Dne 15. septembra 2004 je Komisija odločila, da ne bo nasprotovala navedeni priglašeni koncentraciji, in jo razglaša za združljivo s skupnim trgom. Ta odločba je sprejeta v skladu s členom 6(1)(b) Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 139/2004. Celotno besedilo te odločbe je na razpolago le v angleščini in bo objavljeno potem, ko bo očiščeno morebitnih poslovnih skrivnosti. Dostopno bo:

----
[Civ. No. 2283.

First Appellate District.

October 22, 1917.]

#### ALFRED HERTZ, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT OF THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, Respondent.

Costs—Undertaking in Actions by Nonresidents—Power to Extend Time.—Under the provisions of section 1054 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the superior court has power to extend the time in which to file the bond for costs required of nonresidents and foreign corporations under section 1036 of such code, and where the bond is filed within the extended time, the action will not be dismissed.

APPLICATION for a Writ of Mandamus originally made to the District Court of Appeal for the First Appellate District to compel the dismissal of an action.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

Eric J. Rosenstirn, and Brewton A. Hayne, for Petitioner.

Hartley F. Peart, and Gus L. Baraty, for Respondent.

THE COURT.

Petition for writ of mandate directed to respondent commanding it to dismiss a certain action pending before it because of the alleged failure to file a good and sufficient bond under the provisions of section 1036 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

We are satisfied that the court below was empowered, under the provisions of section 1054 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to extend the time in which the bond in question might be filed; and we think, upon the authority of *Sciutti*v. *Pacific Coal Co.,*30 Utah, 462, [8 Ann. Cas. 942, 85 Pac. 1011], and the case of *Kissler*v. *Budge,*24 Idaho, 246, [133 Pac. 125], the court was within the law when it refused to dismiss the cause after a good and sufficient bond had been filed. For that reason the writ is dismissed. .

A petition to have the cause heard in the supreme court, after judgment in the district court of appeal, was denied by the supreme court on December 20,1917.
#### SCHNACHKE et v UHER et

Ohio Appeals, 8th Dist, Cuyahoga Co

No. 10454.

Decided December 23, 1929

Mr. Arthur A. Neiger, Cleveland, for Schanachke et.

Messrs. Boyd, Cannon, Brooks & Wick-ham, Cleveland, for Uher et.

*79VICKERY, PJ.

While it might be true that technically speaking, the set-off not existing at the time the suit was brought it perhaps could not be used, nevertheless it is, admitted in open court that the monument has been erected and the cost of putting it in place was a trifle more than the court allowed, and it is admitted that the plaintiffs in error, the plaintiffs below, had agreed to pay one-third of the cost.

It seems as if it were a silly thing to reverse this judgment and to permit the costs to pile up and to permit further litigation between the brothers and sisters of a family over the erection of a monument at the graves of their parents. Inasmuch as substantial justice has been done, and the plaintiffs below, if this judgment were reversed, would have to pay more toward the erection of the monument than is charged against them, we cannot see any purpose in reversing this judgment.

The judgment therefore, being properly rendered, there is no error in the record that would warrant us disturbing it, and the same is therefore affirmed.

Levine and Sullivan. JJ., concur.
Editorial Note on Part 20
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 20 appear at 57 FR 31451, July 16, 1992.

§ 20.24 Opportunity for repayment. ( a ) The Department of Labor agency responsible for collecting the claim shall afford the debtor the opportunity to repay the debt or enter into a repayment plan which is agreeable to the agency head (or designee) and is in a written form signed by such debtor. The head of the agency (or designee) may deem a repayment plan to be abrogated if the debtor should, after the repayment plan is signed, fail to comply with the terms of the plan.
( b ) Agencies have discretion and should exercise sound judgment in determining whether to accept a repayment agreement in lieu of offset. The determination should balance the Government's interest in collecting the debt against fairness to the debtor. If the debt is delinquent and the debtor has not disputed its existence or amount, an agency should effect an offset unless the debtor is able to establish that offset would result in undue financial hardship or would be against equity and good conscience.
#### § 2700.51 Hearing dates and sites.

All cases will be assigned a hearing date and site by order of the Judge. In fixing the time and place of the hearing, the Judge shall give due regard to the convenience and necessity of the parties or their representatives and witnesses, the availability of suitable hearing facilities, and other relevant factors.

[71 FR 44208, Aug. 4, 2006]