alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
================================================================================

EXHIBIT 32.1

                                  CERTIFICATION

         Pursuant to Section  906 of the Public  Company  Accounting  Reform and
Investor  Protection  Act of 2002 (18  U.S.C.ss.  1350,  as adopted),  I, Dianne
Hatton-Ward, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of the Company,
hereby certifiy that, to the best of her knowledge:

         1. The Company's  Quarterly  Report on Form 10-QSB for the period ended
March 31, 2006, and to which this Certification is attached as Exhibit 99.1 (the
"PERIODIC  REPORT")  fully  complies with the  requirements  of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

         2. The information contained in the Periodic Report fairly presents, in
all material respects,  the financial condition of the Company at the end of the
period  covered by the Periodic  Report and results of operations of the Company
for the period covered by the Periodic Report.

Dated: May 12, 2006


S/ Dianne Hatton-Ward
-------------------------------
Dianne Hatton-Ward
CEO & CFO

A signed  original of this  written  statement  required by Section 906 has been
provided to Yummies, Inc. and will be retained by Yummies, Inc. and furnished to
the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request

THIS  CERTIFICATION   ACCOMPANIES  THIS  REPORT  PURSUANT  TO  SS.  906  OF  THE
SARBANES-OXLEY  ACT OF 2002 AND SHALL NOT BE DEEMED  "FILED" BY THE  COMPANY FOR
PURPOSES OF SECTION 18 OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, AS AMENDED.













--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM
KNICKERBOCKER VILLAGE INC. AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1997
<CASH>                                           2,479
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  480,924
<ALLOWANCES>                                   282,000
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             1,680,921
<PP&E>                                       7,590,818
<DEPRECIATION>                                 533,097
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              10,434,673
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        1,982,307
<BONDS>                                      6,155,229
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       317,048
<OTHER-SE>                                   1,134,645
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                10,434,673
<SALES>                                     10,030,039
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            10,039,594
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                9,816,113
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             555,324
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                223,481
<INCOME-TAX>                                    32,000
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            191,481
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   191,481
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     1.30
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0


</TABLE>
#### Christopher Halpin, Resp’t, *v.*Hotchkiss S. Finch, App’lt.

*(Supreme Court, General Term, Fifth Department,*

*Filed June 22, 1889.)*

•Contract—Of employment—When verdict of jury not disturbed.

In an action to recover for personal services rendered by plaintiff under *885an alleged employment of him by defendant, there was a conflict of testimony as to how plaintiff was to obtain his compensation, and the question was submitted to the jury under an impartial charge to which no exception in defendant’s behalf was taken. *Held,*that the jury having found for plaintiff, the judgment entered therein will not be disturbed.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment entered in Tates county, upon a verdict of a jury at the circuit, and also upon an order denying a motion for a new trial.

*Calvin J. Huson,*for resp’t; *John H. Young,*for app’lt.

Macomber,

This action was brought to recover for personal services of the plaintiff under an alleged employment of him by the defendant, to take the care of and to run a grist mill.

No question is presented by this record, but that the plaintiff actually rendered the services alleged, and that they were reasonably worth the amount for which the verdict was rendered, nor is it seriously disputed that the defendant himself, though not having the legal title to the premises, was the person who secured the plaintiff’s services by a contract of some sort. It is claimed in his behalf, and such is his testimony, corroborated in part, at least, by the testimony of one, French, that the plaintiff was to obtain his compensation solely out of the avails of the milling business.

At one time he did conduct the same mill under a like agreement with Mr. French, who was the owner of the premises at that time. Under the plaintiff’s evidence, however, supported as it is to some extent by the letters written by the defendant bimself, and by circumstances, the case presented a question solely for the consideration of the jury. The case was properly laid befoi’e them by the learned judge at the circuit, and no exception appears in behalf of the defendant, either to the charge or to any ruling, which requires any consideration from us. There is not that clear preponderance of evidence in behalf of either side which would justify us in interfering with the verdict, particularly as the judge at the circuit, with the benefit and advantage of having the several witnesses before him, has, upon a motion, denied such relief to the appellant.

The judgment should be affirmed, with costs.

All concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING

MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

OF FLORIDA

SECOND DISTRICT

ROBERT W. CRENSHAW, )

DOC #970221, )

)

Appellant, )

)

v. ) Case No. 2D16-5015

)

STATE OF FLORIDA, )

)

Appellee. )

________________________________ )

Opinion filed October 16, 2019.

Appeal from the Circuit Court for 

Charlotte County; Donald H. Mason, 

Judge.

Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, 

and Richard P. Albertine, Jr., Assistant 

Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant. 

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, 

Tallahassee, for Appellee.

 

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. 

SILBERMAN, MORRIS, and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-50998

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff–Appellee

v.

RAMIRO DIAZ-ORTIZ, also known as Jose Rangel Ididro, also known as Jose 

Isidro Rangel-Romero, also known as Isidro Rangel,

Defendant–Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 1:12-CR-232

Before PRADO, OWEN, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Ramiro Diaz-Ortiz challenges the substantive reasonableness of his 12-

month revocation sentence. We review his sentence under the plainly 

unreasonable standard. See United States v. Miller, 634 F.3d 841, 843 (5th 

Cir. 2011). Although Diaz-Ortiz argues that this standard is incorrect, he 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

August 28, 2014

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 

 Case: 13-50998 Document: 00512749846 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/28/2014
No. 13-50998

acknowledges that this argument is foreclosed and he raises it only to preserve 

the issue for further review. 

At the revocation hearing, the district court acknowledged Diaz-Ortiz’s 

arguments. The district court expressed its concern with his four prior 

reentries following deportation, the speed with which he returned to the 

United States after his most recent departure, and his use of numerous aliases, 

false birth dates, drugs, and alcohol. These reasons echo the relevant 

sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), particularly the need to deter 

future criminal conduct and protect the public from further crimes by DiazOrtiz, as well as the kinds of sentences available generally and for Diaz-Ortiz’s 

situation in particular. See § 3553(a)(2)-(5).

We find no indication in the record that the district court failed to 

account for a factor that should have received significant weight, gave such

weight to an improper factor, or clearly erred in balancing the relevant 

sentencing factors. See United States v. Cooks, 589 F.3d 173, 186 (5th Cir.

2009). Diaz-Ortiz has failed to overcome the presumption of reasonableness

accorded his sentence. See United States v. Lopez-Velasquez, 526 F.3d 804, 809 

(5th Cir. 2008). The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

2

 Case: 13-50998 Document: 00512749846 Page: 2 Date Filed: 08/28/2014
§ 1979.111 Withdrawal of complaints, objections, and findings; settlement. ( a ) At any time prior to the filing of objections to the findings or preliminary order, a complainant may withdraw his or her complaint under the Act by filing a written withdrawal with the Assistant Secretary. The Assistant Secretary will then determine whether the withdrawal will be approved. The Assistant Secretary will notify the named person of the approval of any withdrawal. If the complaint is withdrawn because of settlement, the settlement shall be approved in accordance with paragraph (d) of this section.
( b ) The Assistant Secretary may withdraw his or her findings or a preliminary order at any time before the expiration of the 30-day objection period described in § 1979.106, provided that no objection has yet been filed, and substitute new findings or preliminary order. The date of the receipt of the substituted findings or order will begin a new 30-day objection period.
( c ) At any time before the findings or order become final, a party may withdraw his or her objections to the findings or order by filing a written withdrawal with the administrative law judge or, if the case is on review, with the Board. The judge or the Board, as the case may be, will determine whether the withdrawal will be approved. If the objections are withdrawn because of settlement, the settlement shall be approved in accordance with paragraph (d) of this section.
( d ) ( 1 ) *Investigative settlements.* At any time after the filing of a complaint, and before the findings and/or order are objected to or become a final order by operation of law, the case may be settled if the Assistant Secretary, the complainant and the named person agree to a settlement.
( 2 ) *Adjudicatory settlements.* At any time after the filing of objections to the Assistant Secretary's findings and/or order, the case may be settled if the participating parties agree to a settlement and the settlement is approved by the administrative law judge if the case is before the judge, or by the Board if a timely petition for review has been filed with the Board. A copy of the settlement shall be filed with the administrative law judge or the Board, as the case may be.
( e ) Any settlement approved by the Assistant Secretary, the administrative law judge, or the Board, shall constitute the final order of the Secretary and may be enforced pursuant to § 1979.113.
<PAGE>
                                                                      Exhibit 23




                        CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS


We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement (Form
S-8 No. 333-63280, Form S-8 No. 333-93251, Form S-8 No. 033-62433, Form S-8 No.
333-12585, Form S-8 No. 333-46953, Form S-8 No. 333-61911, Form S-8 No.
333-51330 and Form S-3 No. 333-65795) pertaining to The Lamson & Sessions Co.
Nonemployee Directors Stock Option Plan, the Deferred Compensation Plan for
Nonemployee Directors, The Lamson & Sessions Co. Deferred Savings Plan, The
Lamson & Sessions Co. 1998 Incentive Equity Plan and the 1988 Incentive Equity
Performance Plan, of our report dated March 5, 2002, with respect to the
consolidated financial statements and schedule of The Lamson & Sessions Co.
included in this Annual Report (Form 10-K) for the year ended December 29, 2001.




                                               /s/ Ernst & Young LLP


Cleveland, Ohio
March 5, 2002
# Fourth Court of Appeals

**San Antonio, Texas**

JUDGMENT

No. 04

- 18

- 00355

- CV

In the ESTATE OF MARY JANE HARGROVE , Deceased

From the County Court at Law, Val Verde County, Texas

Trial Court No. 6430 Honorable Sid L. Harle, Judge Presiding

BEFORE JUSTICE MARTINEZ

, JUSTICE ALVAREZ , AND JUSTICE RODRIGUEZ

In accordance with this court’s opinion of this date, the trial court’s “Order Probating Will And Authorizing Letters Testamentary” and “Order On Jim Bob Hargrove’s Counter

- Application

For Probate Of Codic il” are AFFIRMED. All costs of appeal are assessed against appellant Jim Bob Hargrove.

SIGNED March 6, 2019.

_____________________________ Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice
§ 1983.112 Judicial review. ( a ) Within 60 days after the issuance of a final order (including a decision issued by the Secretary upon his or her discretionary review) for which judicial review is available, any person adversely affected or aggrieved by the order may file a petition for review of the order in the United States Court of Appeals for the circuit in which the violation allegedly occurred or the circuit in which the complainant resided on the date of the violation.
( b ) A final order is not subject to judicial review in any criminal or other civil proceeding.
( c ) If a timely petition for review is filed, the record of a case, including the record of proceedings before the ALJ, will be transmitted by the ARB or the ALJ, as the case may be, to the appropriate court pursuant to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and the local rules of such court.
[77 FR 40503, July 10, 2012, as amended at 85 FR 30623, May 20, 2020]
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED July 29, 2005 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-30274 Summary Calendar

In The Matter Of: CHARLES DUPRE, Debtor.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ CHARLES DUPRE, Appellant,

versus MARTIN A. SCHOTT, Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana (USDC No. 3:03-CV-68)

_________________________________________________________ Before REAVLEY, JOLLY and OWEN, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: *2

Reviewing under the same standard as the district court, we affirm the Bankruptcy Court’s denial of debtor’s discharge under 11 U.S.C. §§ 727(a)(2) and (4) for the following reasons: 1. Because there is significant record evidence that Dupre knowingly failed to make a full and complete disclosure of his assets, we find no clear error in the Bankruptcy Court’s findings of fact supporting denial of discharge under both subsections. 2. Specifically, we find the cumulation of Dupre’s repeated schedule omissions and inconsistent testimony regarding the ownership and possession of certain assets to evidence a pattern of disregard for the truth that supports fraudulent intent. See In re Sholdra, 249 F.3d 380, 382-83 (5th Cir. 2001) (finding that the cumulative effect of a series of falsehoods in a bankruptcy proceeding indicates a pattern of “reckless and cavalier disregard for the truth” supporting fraudulent intent). 3. We find no clear error in the Bankruptcy Court’s rejection of Dupre’s reliance on counsel as a valid defense to his omission of assets from the schedules. 4. Specifically, there is record evidence that Dupre did not make a full disclosure of all pertinent facts about his assets to his attorney. See Dillworth v. Boothe, 69 F.2d 621, 623 (5th Cir. 1934) (stating that a reliance-on-counsel defense to asset omission requires full disclosure to the3 attorney). Further, Dupre’s statements during the trustee’s inventory and his trial testimony belie his claim of ignorance as to the ownership of marital assets. Finally, even after learning of his obligation to report certain property, Dupre failed to include property in his amended schedules. Because of Dupre’s failure to fully inform his attorney, his inconsistent statements regarding asset ownership, his persistent omissions, and his previous experience with bankruptcy proceedings, Dupre’s claim of reliance on counsel is neither reasonable nor credible. Affirmed.
<PAGE>



                                                                    Exhibit 32.2

                CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


     In connection with the quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Student Advantage,
Inc. (the "Company") for the period ended September 30, 2003 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Report"), the undersigned, Sevim M.
Perry, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, hereby certifies, pursuant to
Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code, that:

     (1) the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.

Dated: November 13, 2003                           /s/ Sevim M. Perry
                                                   -----------------------------
                                                   Sevim M. Perry
                                                   Chief Financial Officer
#### AMERICAN PAPER GOODS CO. v. UNITED STATES

[Ante, p. 421;

302 U. S. 737]

Petition for writ of certiorari *denied*by Supreme Court November 8, 1937.
2015.01.30 EX 10.1






Exhibit 10.1




AMENDMENT NUMBER SIX TO THE
LOWE’S COMPANIES
BENEFIT RESTORATION PLAN


THIS AMENDMENT NUMBER SIX to the Lowe’s Companies Benefit Restoration Plan, as amended and restated effective January 1, 2008 (the “Plan”), is hereby adopted by Lowe’s Companies, Inc. (the “Company”).
W I T N E S S E T H:
WHEREAS, the Company currently maintains the Plan; and
WHEREAS, under Section 15 of the Plan, the Company may amend the Plan in whole or in part at any time;
WHEREAS, the Company desires to amend the Plan to simplify the participant experience and reflect more clearly the Plan’s operations;
NOW, THEREFORE, the Plan is hereby amended effective as of November 1, 2014 unless otherwise indicated as follows:
1.    The first paragraph in Section 3 shall be revised to read as follows:
An employee shall be eligible to participate in the Plan as of the date he is designated by the Committee for eligibility, either individually or as a member of a class of employees. Effective for Plan Years beginning on and after January 1, 2015, until determined otherwise by the Committee, the employees who are eligible to become Participants for a given Plan Year are those employees of the Company (i) who have submitted on or before the Election Date applicable to such Plan Year an irrevocable election to participate in the 401(k) Plan during such Plan Year, and (ii) who are on or before the Election Date applicable to such Plan Year vice president level or above.  Notwithstanding the foregoing, a person who would otherwise become eligible to participate in the Plan as a result of promotion within the Company or as a result of being rehired by the Company, shall not be eligible to participate in the Plan until the first day of the Plan Year following the date such promotion or rehire becomes effective. 
2.    Except as expressly or by necessary implication amended hereby, the Plan shall continue in full force and effect.
IN WITNESS HEREOF, this Amendment Number Six has been executed on the date shown below, but effective as of the date specified herein.


	
			
	 
	LOWE'S COMPANIES, INC.

	 
	 
	 

	 
	By:
	/s/ Maureen K. Ausura

	 
	 
	Maureen K. Ausura
Chief Human Resources Officer

	 
	 
	 

	 
	Date:
	December 12, 2014
```

[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 184 (Thursday, September 22, 2011)]
[Notices]
[Page 58768]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2011-24487]

=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS

Sunshine Act Notice

AGENCY: United States Commission on Civil Rights.

ACTION: Notice of meeting.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DATE AND TIME: Tuesday, September 20, 2011; 4 p.m. EDT.

PLACE: Via Teleconference, Public Dial in: 1-800-597-7623, Conference 
ID  11909439.

Meeting Agenda

    This meeting is open to the public, except where noted otherwise.

I. Approval of Agenda.
II. Discussion of the Agency's 2012 Appropriations Status.
III. Adjourn.

CONTACT PERSON FOR FURTHER INFORMATION: Lenore Ostrowsky, Acting Chief, 
Public Affairs Unit, (202) 376-8591.

    Dated: September 20, 2011.
Kimberly Tolhurst,
Senior Attorney-Advisor.
[FR Doc. 2011-24487 Filed 9-20-11; 4:15 pm]
BILLING CODE 6335-01-P
```
#### BORNTRAGER v RICHARDS

Ohio Appeals, 1st Dist, Hamilton Co

No 3593.

Decided March 10, 1930

Wm. Thorndyke, Cincinnati, for Borntrager.

Edw. H. Moeller, Jr., Cincinnati, for Richards.

HAMILTON, J.

Borntrager prosecutes error to this court, claiming'that the granting of the motion to dismiss the appeal was premature, in that by virtue of 10388 GC, such judgment could not be entered until the succeeding term after the expiration of the 30 day limitation. This requires a consideration of 10388 GC, which provides:

The first part of this section gives the appellee the right to have the case docketed at the term' of court next after the expiration of the thirty days. This right is secured to him in order to hold the sureties on the appeal bond, and by so doing he could have judgment on the appeal, thereby holding the sureties on the appeal bond.

Under the latter part of the section, *441namely, “or, with, the consent of the appellee it (the court) may dismiss the appeal at the cost of the appellant, and remand the cause to the justice to be proceeded in as if no appeal had been taken”, an additional proceeding is provided. If this proceeding is invoked and the appeal is dismissed, the sureties would be released. It is therefore optional with the appellee to have the case docketed and the cause heard at a subsequent term in order to hold the sureties on the appeal bond; or, he may give his consent, as provided in the latter part of the section above quoted, and have the cause dismissed and remanded to the justice as if no appeal had been taken. Whereupon, he would be entitled to have execution ' issue against the judgment debtor.

In the case under consideration, the appellee, by motion to dismiss, consented to the dismissal of the appeal, on which the court acted and dismissed the appeal, remanding the cause to the justice, to be proceeded in as if no appeal had been taken.

There is no error in this proceeding, and the judgment is affirmed.

Cushing, fPJ, and Ross, J, concur