alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# •

• SPA 20 RCRA REVISION CHECKLIST 170 Land Disposal Restrictions Phase IV -- Zinc MicronutrientFertilizers, Amendment 63 FR 46332-46334

August 31, 1998 (RCRA ClusterIX, HSWA) Note: This August 31, 1998 (63 FR 46332) notice stays the land disposal treatment standards for metalbearing hazardous wastes which exhibit the characteristic oftoxicity as it applies to zinc micronutrient fertilizers. Zinc micronutrient fertilizers are now subject to the applicable treatment standards in 268.41 contained in the July 1, 1990 edition of the CFR. The stay remains in effect until further regulatory action is taken by the Agency. If and when further action is taken, EPA will publish a notice in the Federal Register (a notice ofProposed Rulemaking is expectedin 1999). A checklist is necessary because the code is affected. Because this amendmentraises the level to which certain constituents must be treated and is, therefore, less stringentthan previous standards, States are not required to adopt this checklist. As such, this checklist has been designated as optional.

STATEANALOG IS: ANALOGOUS STATE FEDERAL REQUIREMENTS FEDERALRCRA CITATION CITATION EQUIV- LESS MORE BROADER WAC 173-303- STRlN- STRlN- ALENT GENT GENT IN SCOPE PART 268 - LAND DISPOSALRESTRICTIONS

SUBPART D - TREATMENT STANDARDS APPLICABILITY OF TREATMENT STANDARDS



# • L] add newsubparagraph; zinccontaining fertilizers produced for general public use and 140(2)(a) produced from or 40 CFR part 268 is containing recycled characteristic 268.40(i) (first entry) incorporated by X hazardous wastes reference into the (D004-D011) are State's regulation. subject to 268.41 treatment standards in the July 1, 1990 edition of the CFR

Note that paragraph 268.40(i) was added by 63 FR 46332-46334( August 31,1998, Revision Checklist 170) and a second paragraph 268.40(i) was added 63 FR 47410-47418 (September4, 1998, Revision Checklist 171). August 31, 1998 - Page 1 of 1 CL170- Revised:918/99 Printed:12119/01
EX-4.32



 Exhibit 4.32 

Letter of Commitment 
 To aBitCool
Broadband Inc., 
 With the view to expedite the business development of aBitcool Small Micro Network Technology (BJ) Co., Ltd. (the “Target
Company”), the undersigned hereby make the following commitments: 
  

	 	1.	Since the establishment of the Target Company, the Target Company has not distributed any dividends or made other forms of asset distribution to Sheng Chen or Jun Zhang. 


 

	 	2.	If the Target Company distributes any dividends or makes other forms of asset distribution to Sheng Chen and Jun Zhang in the future, Sheng Chen and Jun Zhang will transfer, for free of charge, relevant amount received
by them to aBitCool Broadband Inc. or any company designated by it within five working days after receiving such amount. 


Undertaking Party: 
 /s/ Chen
Sheng 
 /s/ Zhang Jun 
 /s/
aBitcool Small Micro Network Technology (BJ) Co., Ltd. 
 July 1, 2014
Exhibit 31.2

Certification of Principal Financial Officer

I, Kathleen M. Jepson, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of Horizon Bancorporation, Inc,.;
2. Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this quarterly report;
3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this quarterly report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this quarterly report;
4. The registrant's other certifying officers and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) [Intentionally Omitted] for the registrant and we have:
5. designed such disclosure controls and procedures to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this quarterly report is being prepared;
6. [Intentionally Omitted];
7. evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and
8. disclosed in this quarterly report any change in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting;
9. The registrant's other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation, to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent function):
10. all significant deficiencies and material weakness in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and
11. any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting.

Date: November 14, 2005

/s/ Kathleen M. Jepson 
Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
§ 35.40 Exhaustion of administrative remedies. ( a ) A complainant may file a civil action under the Act following the exhaustion of administrative remedies. Administrative remedies are exhausted if: ( 1 ) One hundred eighty days have elapsed since the complainant filed the complaint with CRC, and CRC has made no finding with regard to the complaint; or
( 2 ) CRC issues any finding in favor of the recipient.
( b ) If CRC fails to make a finding within 180 days, or issues a finding in favor of the recipient, CRC will promptly: ( 1 ) Notify the complainant;
( 2 ) Advise the complainant of his or her right to bring a civil action for injunctive relief; and
( 3 ) Inform the complainant that: ( i ) The complainant may bring a civil action only in a United States district court for the district in which the recipient is found or transacts business;
( ii ) A complainant who prevails in a civil action has the right to be awarded the costs of the action, including reasonable attorney's fees, but that the complainant must demand these costs in the complaint filed with the court;
( iii ) Before commencing the action, the complainant must give 30 days notice by registered mail to the Secretary, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Attorney General of the United States, and the recipient;
( iv ) The notice required by paragraph (b)(3)(iii) of this section must state the alleged violation of the Act, the relief requested, the court in which the complainant is bringing the action, and whether or not attorney's fees are demanded in the event that the complainant prevails; and
( v ) The complainant may not bring an action if the same alleged violation of the Act by the same recipient is the subject of a pending action in any court of the United States.
<PAGE>

                                                                      EXHIBIT 21

                          LANCASTER COLONY CORPORATION
                     SIGNIFICANT SUBSIDIARIES OF REGISTRANT


<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                                                  STATE           PERCENT OF
                NAME                                                        OF INCORPORATION       OWNERSHIP
                ----                                                        ----------------       ---------

<S>                                                                             <C>                  <C>
Colony Printing & Labeling, Inc............................................     Indiana              100%
Dee Zee, Inc...............................................................     Ohio                 100%
E. O. Brody Company........................................................     Ohio                 100%
Fostoria Glass, LLC........................................................     Ohio                 100%
Indiana Glass Company......................................................     Indiana              100%
Jackson Plastics Operations, Inc...........................................     Ohio                 100%
LRV Acquisition Corp.......................................................     Ohio                 100%
LaGrange Molded Products, Inc..............................................     Delaware             100%
Lancaster Colony Commercial Products, Inc..................................     Ohio                 100%
Lancaster Glass Corporation................................................     Ohio                 100%
New York Frozen Foods, Inc.................................................     Ohio                 100%
Pretty Products, Inc.......................................................     Ohio                 100%
Sister Schubert's Homemade Rolls, Inc......................................     Alabama              100%
T. Marzetti Company........................................................     Ohio                 100%
The Quality Bakery Company, Inc............................................     Ohio                 100%
Reames Foods, Inc..........................................................     Iowa                 100%
Waycross Molded Products, Inc..............................................     Ohio                 100%
</TABLE>

All subsidiaries conduct their business under the names shown.



                                       40
796 A.2d 965

#### TOWNHALL OF AMERICA, INC., A Pennsylvania Corporation, Petitioner, v. SALEM TOWNSHIP, A Political Subdivision of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Respondent. Salem Township, A Political Subdivision of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Respondent, v. Townhall of America, Inc., t/d/b/a “Climax,” A Pennsylvania Corporation, and Nicholas Fratangelo, Petitioners. Townhall of America, Inc., A Pennsylvania Corporation, petitioner, v. Salem Township, A Political Subdivision of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Respondent. Townhall of America, Inc., A Pennsylvania Corporation, v. Salem Township, A Political Subdivision of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Salem Township, A Political Subdivision of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, v. Town Hall of America, Inc., t/d/b/a “Climax,” A Pennsylvania Corporation, and Nicholas Fratangelo. Petition of Townhall of America, Inc., t/d/b/a “Climax,” A Pennsylvania Corporation, and Nicholas Fratangelo.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

April 10, 2002.

*326
      *ORDER*

PER CURIAM.

, AND NOW, this 10th day of April, 2002, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is hereby DENIED and the Application for Supersedeas is DISMISSED AS MOOT.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 03-6060
BART FITZGERALD MCCLAIN, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Avery-Mitchell Facility; OFFICER FOX; OFFICER EDWARDS; CODY BLAKE STEWART, Correctional Officer; BRUCE C. CARPENTER, Correctional Officer; JAY CARTER, Lieutenant, Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Asheville. Graham C. Mullen, Chief District Judge. (CA-01-20-1-MU-2) Submitted: March 20, 2003 Decided: March 28, 2003 Before WILLIAMS and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Bart Fitzgerald McClain, Appellant Pro Se. Deborrah Lynn Newton, Assistant Attorney General, James Philip Allen, Roy Cooper, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NORTH CAROLINA, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellees.2 Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).

PER CURIAM: Bart Fitzgerald McClain seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying his motion to compel. This court may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000), and certain interlocutory and collateral orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2000); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp. , 337 U.S. 541 (1949). The order McClain seeks to appeal is neither a final order nor an appealable interlocutory or collateral order. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
#### Wooten v. School District of Philadelphia

*464
      *Jerome E. Furman,*for plaintiff.

*Edward B. Soken,*for defendant.

June 11, 1958.

Flood, J.,

— Plaintiff alleges that she was injured on December 10, 1956, as a result of a defect in the sidewalk in front of the McDaniel Public School. From the petition and the supplemental answer of the school district it appears that plaintiff promptly notified the principal of the school, Miss Hood, of the occurrence, who in turn assured plaintiff that she would report the alleged accident to the proper school authorities. Nothing more was done within the six months’ period.

This constitutes no notice whatever to the City of Philadelphia. The petition for leave to institute suit against the city must be denied.

As to the school district it appears to us that notice to the principal of the school involved might well be considered by the average citizen to constitute notice to the school district itself. It is true that we have seen no case which goes so far as to hold notice to a school principal is sufficient notice to the school district. All of the cases to date show either actual knowledge on the part of the officials responsible for defending the action or physical disability on the part of plaintiff excusing the failure to give the required notice. However, no cases that we have seen deny the right to sue in the situation before us.

While there is no evidence of authority for Miss Hood to accept notice on behalf of the school district, *465and we suppose there is no implied authority under the circumstances, yet we do feel that plaintiff’s action was the natural one to take. Upon the principal’s statement that she would report the accident to the proper authorities, plaintiff, in the words of the statute has shown “. . . reasonable excuse for [her] failure to file . . .” the notice.

*Order*

Rule absolute as to the School District of Philadelphia. Rule discharged as to the City of Philadelphia.
EXHIBIT
32.1






Statement Pursuant to
Section 906 of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002






The
undersigned, Sherry Couturier, CFO of American International
Industries, Inc., a Nevada corporation, hereby makes the following certification
as required by Section 906(a) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, with respect to
the following of this report filed pursuant to Section 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934: Quarterly Report of Form 10-Q for the period ended June
30, 2009.






The
undersigned certifies that the above annual report fully complies with the
requirements of Section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and
information contained in the above quarterly report fairly presents, in all
respects, the financial condition of American International Industries, Inc. and
results of its operations.






Date:  August
14, 2009


Sherry
Couturier


CFO


/s/ Sherry
Couturier
13314

#### GARDINER v. PALLES

(161 S. E., 776)

*27
      *Messrs. C. W. Muldrow*and *Samuel Want,*for appellant,

*Mr. Preston B. Thames,*for respondent,

January 4, 1932.

The opinion of the Court was delievered by

Mr. ChiEE Justice Bonham.

This is an action to recover of the defendant the balance due on an alleged subscription to the capital stock of Fes Fleures de Joie, a corporation organized to promote an amusement plant. Despite its enticing name, the enterprise went to pot and landed in the bankrupt Court. The plaintiff is the duly elected trustee of the bankrupt. In that capacity he sues in the Civil Court of Florence County, to recover of the defendant the sum of $75 which, he alleges, is the balance due on defendant’s subscription for one share of the capital stock of the corporation. The defendant, for answer, sets up: (1) A general denial. (2) That he did not subscribe to the stock of the corporation but made tO' the promoter of the enterprise a donation of $25 to aid him in it. That at the request of the solicitor for stock he signed his name on a blank sheet of paper in order that it might be exhibited to others as an inducement to them to subscribe for stock. (3) That when he was threatened with suit upon the alleged stock subscription it was proposed on behalf of plaintiff that if defendant would pay $15 it would be accepted *28in settlement of the claim; that defendant made the payment, which was accepted.

The case went to trial upon these issues before Judge Sharkey and a jury. The testimony covered a wide range, and the motions and argument thereabout took a range equally as wide. Of his own motion his Honor directed a verdict for the defendant.

The plaintiff appeals upon three exceptions. Nos. 1 and 2 are abondoned. No. 3 is as follows: “The trial Judge erred it is respectfully submitted in directing a verdict in favor of defendant and against the plaintiff, the error being that upon the pleadings and the testimony the plaintiff was entitled tO' have the case submitted to a jury on the issues of fact made by the pleadings.”

This exception must be sustained. The cardinal issues of fact were: Did the defendant subscribe to the capital stock of the corporation? Did he pay $15 in settlement of the claim against him, and was it accepted ? There was decidedly contradictory testimony about these issues. It does not need to1 cite authorities in support of the established canon of this Court that, if there is any competent testimony relevant to the issues, the case must be submitted to the jury.

The judgment of the Court below is reversed, and the case remanded for trial.

Mr. ChiEE Justice BeEase and Messrs. Justices Stab-EER and Carter concur.

Mr. Justice Cothran did not participate on account of illness.
#### SHEAR v HARTMAN

Ohio Appeals, 1st Dist, Hamilton Co

No 3502.

Decided Nov 4, 1929

Joseph L. Meyer, Cincinnati, and Ben Schwartz, for Shear.

Albert L. Weinstein and Kenneth Mooter, both of Cincinnati, for Hartman.

*218ROSS, J.

A broker is not permitted to accept compensation from both parties to a transaction, without their knowledge, and, if he attempts to do so, he cannot collect from either. There is evidence in this case indicating that the parties to the trade were ignorant of the double employment of the broker, but there is also evidence that the parties to the trade knew of such double employment. In such case, it is a question for the trier of the facts, and this court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the trial court, sitting as a jury.

It is claimed that the trade had been cancelled, but it is not denied the contract for the sale of the property of the plaintiff in error had been signed by the purchaser. Under such circumstances, the agent instrumental in the execution of such contract is entitled to his commission, regardless of the fact that thereafter the transaction may be annulled by the parties to

the original contract.

It is claimed that the original contract was valueless to the plaintiff in error because of misrepresentations of the agent. It is however, undisputed in evidence that the plaintiff in error did accept the tire shop, which was a partial consideration in the trade of her real estate, and it was for the trial court to determine whether or not the contract of trade w,as void, and constituted a failure of consideration for the commission of the broker.

Moreover, while the evidence is in conflict as to whether or not plaintiff in error knew of the claimed misrepresentations and double agency at the time she signed the contract and note, it is certain that she knew all the facts at the time she issued the check sued upon, and took up the note before maturity. Her conduct was, therefore, inconsistent with a claim of misrepresentation, or want of knowledge of a double agency. She knew as much when she gave the check as she did when she stopped payment.

There being evidence sufficient to support the judgment of the municipal court the judgment fo the court of common pleas, affirming the judgment of the municipal court, is affirmed.

Cushing, PJ., and Hamilton, J., concur.
#### Lamb *vs.*Coe.

ALBANY,

June, 1838.

Attorney’s fee attending prepared for the argument of a bill of exceptions, pursuant to notice from the adverse party, is taxable, although he do not actually attend.

A defendant who obtains a verdict, which is confirmed by the court, may en. ter upon the record a bill of exceptions taken by the plaintiff at the circuit, and is entitled to an allowance therefor, unless the plaintiff waive the right to bring error.

A witness is entitled to an allowance for one day in coming to, and one day in returning from the place of trial, although his residence is only eight miles from such place.

On motion for *retaxation*of costs, the following points were decided by Mr. *Justice*Bronson :

1. When a witness does not reside in the place where the court is held, he is entitled to an allowance for one day in coming to and one day in reluming from the place of attendance, altough his residence is only eight miles from the court house. The chancellor has given a different rule, 2 Paige, 465 ; but the question was settled in this court several years since.

2. Attorney’s fee for attending prepared for the argument of a bill of exceptions, &c. pursuant to notice from the adverse party, is a proper charge, although the attorney does not actually attend. *Wilson*v. *White, 2*Wendell, 265, The change of phraseology in the present statute, 2 R. S. 633, has not altered the rule which prevailed under the old law

3. On the trial, the plaintiff took a bill of exceptions, and „ the verdict was for the defendant, in whose favor judgment was finally rendered. The taxing officer allowed for entering the bill of exceptions on the judgment record. A like charge was disallowed in *Green*v. *Green,*1 Wendell, 102; but, under the former statute, it was not the practice to incorporate the bill of exceptions in the record. Under the present statute, it has been held by the court for the correction of errors that the bill should be incorporated in the *128record. If the plaintiff did not wish to bring error, he should have given notice that *he*waived the right to have the bill inserted in the record. As such notice was not given, the charge was properly allowed.