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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COU RT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : QUINCY KENYATTA BERRY, : : Appellant : No. 1042 WDA 2015

Appeal from the PCRA Order May 27, 2015 In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County Criminal Division No(s).: CP-25-CR-0001251-2014 BEFORE: STABILE, J., DUBOW, J., and MUSMANNO, J. MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED MARCH 17, 2016 Appellant seeks review of the order that the Erie C ounty Court of Common Pleas entered denying, without a hearing, Ap pellant’s petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”)

. 1 We affirm. In 1997, Appellant was convicted of attempted rape. After completing his sentence, Appellant was required to register pu rsuant to a prior version of the Sexual Offender Registration and Notificatio n Act (“SORNA”) and then under SORNA itself. 2

1 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.

2 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.10-9799.41.J. S08025/16

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Appellant did not register as required and was char ged with failing to comply with registration requirements pursuant to 1 8 Pa.C.S. § 4915.1(a)(2). On October 6, 2014, Appellant pled g uilty. Before accepting the guilty plea, the trial court f ully and properly colloquied Appellant about the rights he was relinq uishing by pleading guilty. The trial court concluded that Appellant was enteri ng his plea knowingly and voluntarily. Id . at 15. The court then sentenced Appellant to a te rm of twelve to twenty-four months’ incarceration, with c redit for time served. Appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA Petition alleging that his due process rights had been violated because the court erred in permitting him to plead guilty to violating the SORNA registration requirements. The court appointed William J. Hathaway, Esq. as co unsel who, on April 29, 2015, filed a “no merit” letter and a Pet ition for Leave to Withdraw as Counsel pursuant to Turner/Finley

. 3 On May 8, 2015, the PCRA court filed an opinion and notice of intent to dismiss wi thout a hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1) as well as an Opinion in suppor t of the dismissal. In its Opinion, the trial court properly concluded that Ap pellant’s “claim appears to relate to the imposition of the reporting mandate p ursuant to a preceding case in Philadelphia County and thus no legal or fa ctual basis exists for the relief sought by Petition in his PCRA petition befo re this Court.”

3 Commonwealth v. Turner , 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa.Super. 1988).J. S08025/16

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On May 11, 2015, the PCRA court granted counsel’s P etition to Withdraw and on May 28, 2015, denied Appellant’s PC RA Petition. Appellant timely appealed pro se . The trial court did not order Appellant to file a P a.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement but on July 16, 2015, the PCRA court file d a Memorandum Opinion, stating that it “relies on the reasons set forth in its Opinion and Notice of Intent to Dismiss PCRA Without Hearing Pu rsuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1) dated May 8, 2015 and its Final Order dated May 27, 2015, with regard to the appeal in this matter.” Appellant presented the following Statement of Ques tions Involved:

a. Did the lower court err in denying my P.C.R.A. pet ition? b. Did the lower court err in allowing I (the defendan t) to accept a plea of guilty under a statu[t]e that was unconstit utional?

c. Did the lower court err in not vacating I (the defe ndant) sentence? Appellant’s Brief at 3. Generally, appellate briefs are required to conform to the Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Pa.R.A.P. 2101

. “This Court may ... dismiss an appeal if the appellant fails to conform to the req uirements set forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure.” In re Ullman , 995 A.2d 1207, 1211 (Pa.Super. 2010) (citation omitted). This Court is willing to construe
pro se materials liberally, but “ pro se status confers no special benefit on an appellant.” Id. at 1211–1212. Where an appellate brief fails to provide anyJ. S08025/16

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discussion of a claim with citation to relevant aut hority or fails to develop the issue in any other meaningful fashion capable of re view, that claim is waived. Commonwealth v. Johnson , 985 A.2d 915, 925 (Pa. 2009). See also Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) ( each point treated in an argument must be “followed by such discussion and citation of author ities as are deemed pertinent”). In the case sub judice , Appellant’s argument section of his brief consists of the following three single-spaced sente nces set out as paragraphs:
I. The court erred in violating my 14 th Amendment (Due Process), because the Judge, D.A., and my lawyer knowingly had I (the defendant) to accept a plea of guilty under a fraudulent statute (Act 152 Failure to Regi ster §4915, Article 3 §§3, which I (the defendant) unkno wingly, involuntarily, and unintelligently that such a plea was under an unauthorized statute. ( Com. v. Neiman (Pa. 2013); ( Strickland v. Washington ); Marshall v. Lonberger

(1983); ( Henderson v. Morgan (1976).
II. The court erred in violating my 6 th Amendment (Right to have assistance of counsel), because my lawyer (Mr. Porsch) knowingly had I (the defendant) accept a pl ea of guilt under a fraudulent statue (Act 152 Failure to Register § 4915.1, Article 3 §§ 3, while I (the defendant) w as unknowingly, involuntarily, and unintelligently tha t such a plea was unauthorized statute ( Com. v. Neiman (Pa. 2013); ( Strickland v. Washington ); Marshall v. Lonberger

(1983); ( Henderson v. Morgan (1976).
III. The court erred in violating my 13 th Amendment (Right to be duly convicted), because I (the defendant) was n ever convicted under a Megans Law offense, and not alone under an unauthorized statue ( Com. v. Neiman (Pa. 2013).J. S08025/16

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Appellant’s Brief at 7. Appellant’s brief is woefully inadequate. His “arg ument” consists of bald assertions, no citations to the record, and ab solutely no analysis or discussion of how the cited case law is relevant to the issues raised. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119 (setting forth requirements for the argument section of an appellate brief). Moreover, as the trial court cor rectly noted, Appellant is attempting to challenge a 1997 order in which the c ourt imposed Megan’s Law reporting requirements. The time is long past for such a challenge. See Pa.R.A.P. 903(a) (providing that a notice of appeal must be filed within thirty days after the date of entry of the order); 42 Pa.C.S. § 9544(b) (providing that, for purposes of PCRA eligibility, an issue is waived if the petitioner could have raised it but failed t o do so before trial, at trial, during unitary review, on appeal, or in a prior sta te post-conviction proceeding). Furthermore, Appellant sets forth no argument relev ant to his state and federal constitutional claims other than to ass ert his rights were violated. “A constitutional claim is not self-provi ng and we will not attempt to divine an argument on Appellant’s behalf.” Commonwealth v. Spotz , 18 A.3d 244, 282 (Pa. 2011). Because Appellant has failed to comply with our rul es of appellate procedure, we are unable to provide meaningful revi ew. Appellant’s issues are waived.J. S08025/16

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Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary Date: 3/17/2016