No. 3--05-0668 

Filed August 9, 2006 

IN THE 

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS 

THIRD DISTRICT 

A.D., 2006 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court 

ILLINOIS, ) of the 12th Judicial Circuit, 

 ) Will County, Illinois 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) No. 05--DT--743 

) 

ARMANDO DOMINGUEZ, ) Honorable ) Richard C. Schoenstedt, 

Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge, Presiding. 

PRESIDING JUSTICE SCHMIDT delivered the opinion of the court: 

On May 13, 2005, the defendant, Armando Dominguez, was 

issued three traffic tickets, including one for driving while 

under the influence of alcohol, other drug or drugs, intoxicating 

compound or compounds, or any combination thereof, in violation 

of section 11--501(a)(6) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (the Code). 

 625 ILCS 5/11--501(a)(6) (West 2004). Subsequently, defendant 

received notice that his driving privileges were to be summarily 

suspended pursuant to section 11--501.1 of the Code. Defendant 

filed a petition to strike and rescind his statutory summary 

suspension, which was granted by the circuit court of Will 

County. The State appeals from the circuit court's order 
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granting defendant's petition. 

BACKGROUND 

On the day defendant was issued the three traffic tickets, 

he agreed to provide a sample of blood and urine to determine 

whether he had ingested any illegal drugs. Several weeks later, 

the police officer who issued the tickets received a lab report 

which indicated that defendant had, in fact, ingested illegal 

drugs. The police officer prepared a supplemental sworn report. 

 Copies of this report were mailed to the defendant and the 

Secretary of State. The Secretary of State then sent a 

confirmation of defendant's statutory summary suspension to the 

defendant. No sworn report was mailed to the circuit court of 

Will County. 

Prior to the date upon which his statutory suspension was to 

become effective, defendant filed a petition to strike and 

rescind the suspension. This petition was based upon the fact 

that the officer failed to forward his sworn report to the 

circuit court of Will County in compliance with section 11--

501.1(f) of the Code. 625 ILCS 5/11--501.1(f) (West 2004). The 

circuit court granted defendant's petition. The State appeals. 

ANALYSIS 

The sole issue on appeal is whether the circuit court 

properly granted defendant's petition. To resolve this issue, we 

must interpret section 11--501.1(f) of the Code. 625 ILCS 5/11--

501.1(f) (West 2004). Statutory construction is a matter of law 
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and, therefore, our standard of review is de novo. People v. 

Phelps, 211 Ill. 2d 1, 809 N.E.2d 1214 (2004). 

Section 11--501.1 states, in pertinent part, as follows: 

 "(a) Any person who drives or is in actual 

physical control of a motor vehicle upon the 

public highways of this State shall be deemed 

to have given consent, subject to the provisions 

of Section 11-501.2, to a chemical test or tests 

of blood, breath, or urine for the purpose of 

determining the content of alcohol, other drug or 

drugs, or intoxicating compound or compounds or 

any combination thereof in the person's blood if 

arrested, as evidenced by the issuance of a 

Uniform Traffic Ticket, for any offense as defined 

in Section 11-501 or a similar provision of a 

local ordinance. The test or tests shall be 

administered at the direction of the arresting 

officer. *** 

 *** 

 (d) If the person refuses testing or submits 

to a test that discloses an alcohol concentration 

of 0.08 or more, or any amount of a drug, substance, 

or intoxicating compound in the person's breath, 

blood, or urine resulting from the unlawful use 

or consumption of cannabis listed in the Cannabis 
4 

Control Act, a controlled substance listed in the 

Illinois Controlled Substances Act, or an intoxicating 

compound listed in the Use of Intoxicating Compounds 

Act, the law enforcement officer shall immediately 

submit a sworn report to the circuit court of venue 

and the Secretary of State, certifying that the 

test or tests was or were requested under paragraph 

(a) and the person refused to submit to a test, or 

tests, or submitted to testing that disclosed an 

alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more. 

 *** 

 (f) *** In cases where *** any amount of a 

drug, substance, or compound resulting from the 

unlawful use or consumption of cannabis as covered 

by the Cannabis Control Act, a controlled substance 

listed in the Illinois Controlled Substances Act, 

 or an intoxicating compound listed in the Use of 

Intoxicating Compounds Act is established by a 

subsequent analysis of blood or urine collected at 

the time of arrest, the arresting officer or 

 arresting agency shall give notice as provided in 

this Section or by deposit in the United States 

mail of the notice in an envelope with postage 

prepaid and addressed to the person at his address 

as shown on the Uniform Traffic Ticket and the 
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statutory summary suspension shall begin as provided 

in paragraph (g). *** The officer shall immediately 

forward the driver's license or permit to the 

 circuit court of venue along with the sworn report 

provided for in paragraph (d)." 625 ILCS 5/11-- 

501.1 (West 2004). 

The trial court's order states that it granted defendant's 

petition "due to the failure to file the sworn report with the 

clerk of the court." Defendant maintains that the trial court 

acted properly in that section 11--501.1(f) of the Code 

unequivocally and clearly directs the officer to forward to the 

circuit court the sworn report once it has been completed. 625 

ILCS 5/11--501.1(f) (West 2004). Therefore, defendant continues, 

after the court took notice that the sworn report was not filed 

with the court, its only option was to strike and rescind 

defendant's statutory summary suspension. 

The State disagrees. The State admits that the officer 

failed to send a copy of the sworn report to the circuit court as 

directed by the statute. However, the State notes that the 

statute is silent as to the proper remedy available in such an 

instance. The State suggests that failing to send a copy of the 

sworn report to the circuit court can be cured by later tendering 

a copy of the report to the court. The State suggests that 

allowing a defendant to escape the statutory summary suspension 

called for in the Code as a result of a clerical error belies the 
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purpose and subverts the intent of the statute. We agree and 

hold that the trial court erred in granting defendant's petition 

to strike and rescind his statutory summary suspension. 

Neither party cites authority which directly addresses this 

issue. However, the State draws our attention to People v. 

Badoud, in which the Illinois Supreme Court held that an 

officer's failure to fulfill every technical requirement of 

section 11--501.1 did not mandate the rescission of a defendant's 

statutory summary suspension. People v. Badoud, 122 Ill. 2d 50, 

521 N.E.2d 884 (1988). The Badoud court dealt with a provision 

contained in section 11--501.1(d) of the Code which states that 

the arresting officer "shall immediately submit a sworn report" 

to the Secretary of State and circuit court after the arrested 

driver refuses or fails an appropriate sobriety test. Badoud, 

122 Ill. 2d at 53, citing Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 952, par. 

11-501.1(d). The officer in Badoud failed to properly swear to 

the report filed so there was technically no "sworn report" filed 

with the Secretary of State. Badoud, 122 Ill. 2d at 56. Some of 

the consolidated defendants in the Badoud case argued that the 

officer's technical violation of failing to properly swear to the 

report "ends the matter and necessitates dismissing the charges." 

Badoud, 122 Ill. 2d at 57. In answering these arguments, the 

supreme court stated: 

 "[W]e conclude that the General Assembly 
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intended an officer's good-faith failure to 

initially swear to the report to be curable. 

This interpretation fosters the accomplishment 

of the legislation's obvious objective of protecting individuals using the roads in this 

State. 

 We next consider whether an initial failure 

to swear to the report must be corrected before

the Secretary of State can enter the suspension. 

We conclude that this is not essential. *** 

 [W]e believe that the summary suspension 

provision should be liberally construed to 

accomplish the General Assembly's obvious purpose 

of fostering highway safety, and we believe that 

the legislative objective would be thwarted by 

holding void suspensions such as those occurring 

in the instant cases. The most reasonable 

interpretation of the statutory scheme is that, 

while it permits a defendant to insist on having 

an unsworn report corrected, it does not permit 

him to escape responsibility for drunk driving by 

pointing to this technical deficiency in the 

completion of the officer's report." (Emphasis 

in original.) Badoud, 122 Ill. 2d at 59-60. 

We find Badoud instructive on this issue and similarly 
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believe that the most reasonable interpretation of the statutory 

scheme is that failure of an officer to forward a copy of the 

sworn report to the circuit court is a technical deficiency which 

can be cured. The record is clear that both the defendant and 

the Secretary of State were provided a copy of the sworn report. 

 The State is correct that the statute does not specifically 

identify a remedy available to a defendant when the officer fails 

to provide the circuit court the sworn report. To use our 

supreme court's words from Badoud, this statute simply does not 

permit a defendant to escape responsibility for driving under the 

influence of alcohol or drugs by pointing to a technical 

deficiency in the completion of an officer's duties. Badoud, 122 

Ill. 2d at 60. Any other holding would thwart the General 

Assembly's obvious purpose of fostering highway safety. Having 

received a copy of the report himself, this defendant was not 

prejudiced in any way by the officer's failure to forward a copy 

to the court. The supreme court stated in Badoud that the 

statute gives defendant the right to have an unsworn report 

properly attested to, but, to paraphrase, does not allow a 

defendant to engage in a game of technical "gotcha" to avoid the 

statutory summary suspension. Badoud, 122 Ill. 2d at 60. 

Similarly, we hold in this instance that the statute permits a 

defendant to have a copy of the sworn report forwarded to the 

circuit court, but an officer's initial failure to do so does not 

mandate rescission of the statutory summary suspension. 
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CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the circuit court 

erred in granting defendant's petition to strike and rescind his 

statutory summary suspension. Therefore, the judgment of the 

circuit court of Will County is reversed and this case remanded. 

Reversed and remanded. 

BARRY and McDADE, JJ., concur.