alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
§ 1917.91 Eye and face protection. ( a ) ( 1 ) ( i ) The employer shall ensure that each affected employee uses protective eye and face protection devices that comply with any of the following consensus standards: ( A ) ANSI/ISEA Z87.1-2010, Occupational and Educational Personal Eye and Face Protection Devices, incorporated by reference in § 1917.3;
( B ) ANSI Z87.1-2003, Occupational and Educational Personal Eye and Face Protection Devices, incorporated by reference in § 1917.3; or
( C ) ANSI Z87.1-1989 (R-1998), Practice for Occupational and Educational Eye and Face Protection, incorporated by reference in § 1917.3;
( ii ) Protective eye and face protection devices that the employer demonstrates are at least as effective as protective eye and face protection devices that are constructed in accordance with one of the above consensus standards will be deemed to be in compliance with the requirements of this section.
( 2 ) For employees wearing corrective spectacles, eye protection equipment required by paragraph (a)(1) of this section must be of a type which can be worn over spectacles. Prescription ground safety lenses may be substituted if they provide equivalent protection.
( 3 ) For additional requirements covering eye protection against radiant energy, see § 1917.152(h).
( b ) Eye protection equipment shall be maintained in good condition.
( c ) Used eye protection equipment shall be cleaned and disinfected before reissuance to another employee.
[48 FR 30909, July 5, 1983, as amended at 62 FR 40201, July 25, 1997; 74 FR 46359, Sept. 9, 2009; 81 FR 16091, Mar. 25, 2016]
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

JUDGMENT RENDERED AUGUST 24, 2018

NO. 03-18-00543-CV

Marina Ginn, Appellant

v.

Gregory Ginn, Appellee

APPEAL FROM THE 425TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WILLIAMSON COUNTY

BEFORE JUSTICES PURYEAR, GOODWIN, AND BOURLAND

DISMISSED ON APPELLANT’S MOTION -- OPINION BY JUSTICE PURYEAR

This is an appeal from the judgment signed by the trial court on May 2, 2018. Appellant has filed a 

motion to dismiss the appeal, and having considered the motion, the Court agrees that the motion 

should be granted. Therefore, the Court grants the motion and dismisses the appeal. Because 

appellant is indigent and unable to pay costs, no adjudication of costs is made.
#### Franklin V. Bradley, an Infant, by Edward J. Bradley, His Guardian ad Litem, Respondent, *v.*Board of Education of City of Oneonta, Appellant.

Argued March 23, 1937;

decided April 27, 1937.

*474
      *O. L. Van Horne, Theodore P. Feury*and *Andrew J. Me Naught, Jr.,*for appellant.

*Donald H. Grant*and *Harry R. Bigelow, Jr.,*for respondent.

Judgment affirmed, with costs; no opinion.

Concur: Crane, Ch. J., Lehman, O’Brien, Hubbs, Loughran, Finch and Rippey, JJ.
#### § 1911.1 Purpose and scope.

This part sets forth rules of procedure for promulgating, modifying, or revoking occupational safety or health standards under section 6(b) (1), (2), (3), and (4) of the Williams-Steiger Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 and under any of the particular statutes listed in § 1911.2(d) which may also cover the employments affected by the standards. The purpose of the rules is to provide for single proceedings in the setting of standards under the several statutes, in order to assure uniformity of the standards to be enforced under the several statutes and in order to avoid needless multiplicity of rulemaking proceedings dealing with the same subjects and issues relating to occupational safety and health standards.
Due to the file size of the CALPUFF modeling files, they are not available from the electronic 

docket. These files are available upon request.

Please email your request to: Erik Snyder (snyder.erik@epa.gov) and Michael Feldman 

(feldman.michael@epa.gov) or call 214-665-7200

Thank you
Editorial Note on Part 1904
Editorial Note: At 82 FR 20548, May 3, 2017, as required by the Congressional Review Act and Public Law 115-21, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration removed all amendments to part 1904 published at 81 FR 91792, Dec. 19, 2016.

§ 1904.37 State recordkeeping regulations. ( a ) *Basic requirement.* Some States operate their own OSHA programs, under the authority of a State plan as approved by OSHA. States operating OSHA-approved State plans must have occupational injury and illness recording and reporting requirements that are substantially identical to the requirements in this part (see 29 CFR 1902.3(j), 29 CFR 1902.7, and 29 CFR 1956.10(i)).
( b ) *Implementation.* ( 1 ) State-Plan States must have the same requirements as Federal OSHA for determining which injuries and illnesses are recordable and how they are recorded.
( 2 ) For other part 1904 provisions (for example, industry exemptions, reporting of fatalities and hospitalizations, record retention, or employee involvement), State-Plan State requirements may be more stringent than or supplemental to the Federal requirements, but because of the unique nature of the national recordkeeping program, States must consult with and obtain approval of any such requirements.
( 3 ) Although State and local government employees are not covered Federally, all State-Plan States must provide coverage, and must develop injury and illness statistics, for these workers. State Plan recording and reporting requirements for State and local government entities may differ from those for the private sector but must meet the requirements of paragraphs 1904.37(b)(1) and (b)(2).
( 4 ) A State-Plan State may not issue a variance to a private sector employer and must recognize all variances issued by Federal OSHA.
( 5 ) A State Plan State may only grant an injury and illness recording and reporting variance to a State or local government employer within the State after obtaining approval to grant the variance from Federal OSHA.
[66 FR 6122, Jan. 19, 2001, as amended at 80 FR 49904, Aug. 18, 2015]
```

[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 4794 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

<DOC>

116th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                S. 4794

     Making emergency supplemental appropriations for the COVID-19 
  Telehealth Program of the Federal Communications Commission for the 
                 fiscal year ending September 30, 2020.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                            October 1, 2020

 Ms. Smith (for herself and Mr. Rounds) introduced the following bill; 
  which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Appropriations

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
     Making emergency supplemental appropriations for the COVID-19 
  Telehealth Program of the Federal Communications Commission for the 
                 fiscal year ending September 30, 2020.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATION FOR COVID-19 TELEHEALTH PROGRAM.

    (a) Appropriation.--There is appropriated, out of any money in the 
Treasury not otherwise appropriated, for the fiscal year ending 
September 30, 2020, for an additional amount for ``Federal 
Communications Commission--Salaries and Expenses'', $200,000,000, to 
remain available until expended, to carry out the COVID-19 Telehealth 
Program established in the Report and Order in the matter of COVID-19 
Telehealth Program that was adopted by the Federal Communications 
Commission on March 31, 2020 (FCC 20-44).
    (b) Emergency Designation.--
            (1) Designation.--The amount made available under 
        subsection (a) is designated by Congress as being for an 
        emergency requirement pursuant to section 251(b)(2)(A)(i) of 
        the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 
        (2 U.S.C. 901(b)(2)(A)(i)).
            (2) Limitation on availability.--The amount described in 
        paragraph (1) shall be available only if the President 
        subsequently designates the amount as being for an emergency 
        requirement and transmits the designation to Congress.
                                 <all>
```
#### Central Hanover Bank and Trust Company, Appellant, *v.*Frederick Kraft et al., Respondents.

Argued March 9, 1937;

decided March 23, 1937.

*Francis S. Bensel*and *W. Frederick Knecht*for appellant.

*Otto A. Samuels*and *Henry Cohen*for respondents.

Judgment of the Appellate Division reversed and judgment of the Special Term affirmed, with costs in this *635court and in the Appellate Division, on the authority of *Heiman*v. *Bishop*(272 N. Y. 83). No opinion.

Concur: Crane, Ch. J., Lehman, O’Brien, Hubbs, Loughran, Finch and Rippey, JJ.
# EUR-Lex - 32000R1067 - EN

Avis juridique important

*|*

# 32000R1067

**Commission Regulation (EC) No 1067/2000 of 19 May 2000 fixing, for the purposes of Regulation (EC) No 411/97, the ceiling for Community financial assistance granted to producer organisations setting up operational funds for 1999 **

*
Official Journal L 119 , 20/05/2000 P. 0010 - 0010 *

Commission Regulation (EC) No 1067/2000

of 19 May 2000

fixing, for the purposes of Regulation (EC) No 411/97, the ceiling for Community financial assistance granted to producer organisations setting up operational funds for 1999

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,

Having regard to Commission Regulation (EC) No 411/97 of 3 March 1997 laying down detailed rules for the application of Council Regulation (EC) No 2200/96 as regards operational programmes, operational funds and Community financial assistance(1), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 1923/1999(2), and in particular Article 10 thereof,

Whereas:

(1) Article 15(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2200/96(3), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 1257/1999(4), provides for the granting of Community financial assistance to producer organisations setting up operational funds. Paragraph 5 of that Article provides that from 1999, financial assistance is to be capped at 4,5 % of the value of the marketed production of each producer organisation, provided that the total financial assistance represents less than 2,5 % of the total turnover of all producer organisations.

(2) According to information forwarded to the Commission by the Member States pursuant to Article 10 of Regulation (EC) No 411/97, the financial assistance applied for in respect of 1999 by producer organisations amounts to EUR 324,30 million against a total turnover of all producer organisations of EUR 12459,63 million. The ceiling for the abovementioned Community financial assistance should therefore be set at 3,6089 % of the value of marketed production of each producer organisation,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

The Community financial assistance provided for in Article 15(1) of Regulation (EC) No 2200/96 shall be capped at 3,6089 % of the value of marketed production of each producer organisation for aid applications in respect of 1999.

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on the third day following its publication in the Official Journal of the European Communities.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 19 May 2000.

For the Commission

Franz Fischler

Member of the Commission

(1) OJ L 62, 4.3.1997, p. 9.

(2) OJ L 238, 9.9.1999, p. 11.

(3) OJ L 297, 21.11.1996, p. 1.

(4) OJ L 160, 26.6.1999, p. 80.
#### Schnur Realty Co., Inc., Appellant, *v.*906 Intervale Avenue Realty Corporation et al., Respondents, Impleaded with Another.

Argued April 21, 1937;

decided May 25, 1937.

*519
      *Hyman J. Reit*for appellant.

*Bernard Hershkopf, Karl Propper*and *Abraham Leichter*for respondents.

Orders reversed and matter remitted to Special Term to proceed in accordance with *Heiman*v. *Bishop*(272 N. Y. 83), with costs in all courts to abide the event. No opinion.

Concur: Crane, Ch. J., Lehman, O’Brien, Hubbs, Loughran, Finch and Rippey, JJ.
[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 13 (Thursday, January 20, 2000)]
[Notices]
[Page 3255]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-1256]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD


Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposed Collection

AGENCY:  Merit Systems Protection Board.

ACTION:  Notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY:  In compliance with the Paperwork Reduction Act (44 U.S.C. 
3501 et. seq.), this notice announces that the U.S. Merit Systems 
Protection Board (MSPB) request for a three year reinstatement of its 
expired Generic Clearance Request for Voluntary Customer Surveys Under 
Executive Order 12862 ``Setting Customer Service Standards'' has been 
forwarded to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for review and 
comment.
    In this regard, we are soliciting comments on the public reporting 
burden. The reporting burden for the collection of information on this 
form is estimated to vary from 10 minutes to 30 minutes per response, 
with an average of 15 minutes, including time for reviewing 
instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and 
maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the 
collection of information.

                                        Estimated Annual Reporting Burden
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                               Annual                                   Hours per
               5 CFR section                  number of     Frequency   Total annual    response     Total hours
                                             respondents  per response    responses     (average)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1201 and 1209.............................        5,000             1         3,750           .25         937.5
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Send comments regarding the burden estimate, or any other aspect of 
the information collection, including suggestions for reducing the 
burden, to the address shown below. Please refer to OMB Control No. 
3124-0012 in any correspondence.

DATES:  Comments must be received on or before February 22, 2000.

ADDRESSES:  Comments concerning the paperwork burden should also be 
addressed to Mr. Bruce Mayor, Merit Systems Protection Board, 1120 
Vermont Ave., NW., Washington, DC 20419 or by calling (202) 653-8900 
and to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of 
Management and Budget, Attention: Desk Officer for MSPB, 725 17th 
Street NW, Washington, DC 20503.

    Dated: January 13, 2000.
Robert E. Taylor,
Clerk of the Board.
[FR Doc. 00-1256 Filed 1-19-00; 8:45 am]
BILLIING CODE 7400-01-U
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Christopher M. Leftwich, Appellant.

[698 NYS2d 366]

—Judgment unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: Defendant failed to preserve for our review his contention that the evidence is insufficient to establish his constructive possession of cocaine found in an apartment *(see,*CPL 470.05 [2]; *People v Gray,*86 NY2d 10, 19). In any event, that contention lacks merit. The evidence is sufficient to establish defendant’s exercise of “dominion and control” over the apartment *(People v Manini,*
      *83379 NY2d 561, 573). Defendant also failed to preserve for our review his contention that County Court erred in failing to conduct a hearing to determine the nature and scope of defendant’s alleged cooperation agreement with police *(see, People v Argentine,*67 AD2d 180). Defendant never moved to dismiss the indictment based on that alleged agreement *(cf., People v Fraisier,*253 AD2d 437; *People v Gupta*[appeal No. 3], 80 AD2d 743).

The verdict convicting defendant of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree (Penal Law § 220.16 [1]) is not against the weight of the evidence *(see, People v Bleakley,*69 NY2d 490, 495). Finally, in light of defendant’s prior criminal history, including convictions for prior drug related offenses, the sentence is neither unduly harsh nor severe. (Appeal from Judgment of Niagara County Court, Hannigan, J. — Criminal Possession Controlled Substance, 3rd Degree.) Present — Denman, P. J., Hayes, Hurlbutt, Scudder and Balio, JJ.
[Civ. No. 2280.

First Appellate District.

October 22, 1917.]

#### WM. S. BRUSSTER, Jr., et al., Petitioners, v. INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT COMMISSION et al., Respondents.

Workmen’s Compensation Act—Injury to Night Watchman—Unwarranted Use op Circular Saw.—Under the Workmen's Compensation Act, an award of compensation to a night watchman for an injury sustained while using a circular saw for the purpose of making a board of suitable length to barricade a door must be annulled, for even assuming that it was within the scope of his employment to see that the doors of the premises were properly secured by locking, the resort to the use of the saw was entirely beyond the scope of his employment.

APPLICATION for a Writ of Review originally made to the District Court of Appeal for the First Appellate District to annul an award of the Industrial Accident Commission.

*82The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

Lilienthal, McKinstry & Raymond, and Barry Colding, for Petitioners.

Christopher M. Bradley, for Respondents.

THE COURT.

Petition for writ of review.

The applicant, being a night watchman in the employ of the petitioners, received an injury while using a circular saw on the premises of his employers, the use of said saw being occasioned by the desire of said watchman to procure a board of suitable length to barricade an outer door of the premises which he. was employed to watch, the lock on said door being defective. He was awarded compensation by the Industrial Accident Commission, and a writ of review is here sought for the purpose of annulling said award upon the ground that there is no evidence to sustain it.

Assuming that it was within the scope of the applicant’s employment to see that the doors of the premises were properly secured by locking, nevertheless we are of the opinion that-his resort to the use of a circular saw for the purpose of making a board that would answer the purpose of extending across the door was entirely beyond the scope of his employment and not in the contemplation of his employers, and was not a resort to reasonable means for the purpose of securing the end intended by him at that time. If we are correct in this conclusion, the award cannot stand; and it is therefore ordered that it be, and it is hereby, annulled.
§ 1614.310 Right to file a civil action. An individual who has a complaint processed pursuant to 5 CFR part 1201, subpart E or this subpart is authorized by 5 U.S.C. 7702 to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court: ( a ) Within 30 days of receipt of a final decision issued by an agency on a complaint unless an appeal is filed with the MSPB; or
( b ) Within 30 days of receipt of notice of the final decision or action taken by the MSPB if the individual does not file a petition for consideration with the EEOC; or
( c ) Within 30 days of receipt of notice that the Commission has determined not to consider the decision of the MSPB; or
( d ) Within 30 days of receipt of notice that the Commission concurs with the decision of the MSPB; or
( e ) If the Commission issues a decision different from the decision of the MSPB, within 30 days of receipt of notice that the MSPB concurs in and adopts in whole the decision of the Commission; or
( f ) If the MSPB does not concur with the decision of the Commission and reaffirms its initial decision or reaffirms its initial decision with a revision, within 30 days of the receipt of notice of the decision of the Special Panel; or
( g ) After 120 days from the date of filing a formal complaint if there is no final action or appeal to the MSPB; or
( h ) After 120 days from the date of filing an appeal with the MSPB if the MSPB has not yet made a decision; or
( i ) After 180 days from the date of filing a petition for consideration with Commission if there is no decision by the Commission, reconsideration decision by the MSPB or decision by the Special Panel.
[No. 20584-3-III.

Division Three.

December 19, 2002.]

#### The State of Washington, *Respondent,*v. Phillip Bruce Zeigler, *Appellant.*

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Benton County, No. 01-1-00190-0, Carolyn A. Brown, J., entered October 15, 2001. *Affirmed*by unpublished opinion per Sweeney, J., concurred in by Brown, C.J., and Kurtz, J.
#### Mack Smith, *Plaintiff in Error, v.*The State of Florida, *Defendant in Error.*

The legislature may make it a felony to commit the second, offense of selling liquor in a county voting against the sale of liquors, even though the prior conviction was had before the passage of the statute.

This case was decided by the Court en Banc.

Writ of error to the Circuit Court for Manatee County.

The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court.

*H. P. Bailey,*for Plaintiff in Error;

*Parle Trammell,*Attorney General, and *Chas. O. Andrews,*for the State.

Cockrell, J.

— Mack Smith was convicted in the 'Circuit Court for Manatee County of being a common liquor dealer, under section 3 of Chapter 6179 laws of 1911, and sentenced to a term of two years in the State prison. The section reads:

“Sec. 3. Whoever is convicted of selling or causing to be sold, any spirituous, vinous or malt liquors, in any -county or precinct which has voted against the sale of such liquors, under the provisions of Article XIX of the Constitution of the State of Florida, or whenever any *92person or persons, firm or association is convicted of selling or causing to be sold, or keeping for sale any spirituous, vinous or malt liquors, without his paying the license required by law, having been before convicted of the like offense, shall be deemed and adjudged, to be a common liquor dealer, in violation of law, and shall be punished, upon conviction, by being fined not more than $3,000.00, or by imprisonment in the State Prison not more than five years, or by both fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.”

The indictment alleges that the first conviction was had on May 13, 1911, before Chapter 6179 went into effect, and Smith unsuccessfully moved that the cause be transferred to the county court, upon the ground that the law did not and could not so penalize an act committed prior to its passage, but such is not the meaning of the term *ex post facto*and the statute is broad enough to punish as felons all who had theretofore been adjudged guilty of selling liquor in a county or precinct that had voted against such sale. The selling for which he stands now convicted took place as alleged after the statute became effective and that is the crime for which he is being tried.

The cases seem to be uniform in holding that the federal inhibition against *ex post facto*laws does not apply to such cases. Ex parte Gutierrez, 45 Cal. 429; State v. Woods, 68 Me. 409; In re Ross, 2 Pick. (Mass.) 165; Commonwealth v. Graves, 155 Mass. 163, 29 N. E. Rep. 579, 16 L. R. A. 256; Sturtevant v. Commonwealth, 158 Mass. 598, 33 N. E. Rep. 648; Blackburn v. State, 50 Ohio St. 428, 36 N. E. Rep. 18; Rand v. Commonwealth, 9 Gratt. (Va.) 738.

The judgment is affirmed.

*93Whitfield, C. J., and Taylor, Shackleford and Hocker, J. J., concur.