alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### § 2509.75-4 Interpretive bulletin relating to indemnification of fiduciaries.

On June 4, 1975, the Department of Labor issued an interpretive bulletin, ERISA IB 75-4, announcing the Department's interpretation of section 410(a) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, insofar as that section relates to indemnification of fiduciaries. Section 410(a) states, in relevant part, that “any provision in an agreement or instrument which purports to relieve a fiduciary from responsibility or liability for any responsibility, obligation, or duty under this part shall be void as against public policy.”

The Department of Labor interprets this section to permit indemnification agreements which do not relieve a fiduciary of responsibility or liability under part 4 of title I. Indemnification provisions which leave the fiduciary fully responsible and liable, but merely permit another party to satisfy any liability incurred by the fiduciary in the same manner as insurance purchased under section 410(b)(3), are therefore not void under section 410(a).

Examples of such indemnification provisions are:

(1) Indemnification of a plan fiduciary by (a) an employer, any of whose employees are covered by the plan, or an affiliate (as defined in section 407(d)(7) of the Act) of such employer, or (b) an employee organization, any of whose members are covered by the plan; and

(2) Indemnification by a plan fiduciary of the fiduciary's employees who actually perform the fiduciary services.

The Department of Labor interprets section 410(a) as rendering void any arrangement for indemnification of a fiduciary of an employee benefit plan by the plan. Such an arrangement would have the same result as an exculpatory clause, in that it would, in effect, relieve the fiduciary of responsibility and liability to the plan by abrogating the plan's right to recovery from the fiduciary for breaches of fiduciary obligations.

While indemnification arrangements do not contravene the provisions of section 410(a), parties entering into an indemnification agreement should consider whether the agreement complies with the other provisions of part 4 of title I of the Act and with other applicable laws.

[40 FR 31599, July 28, 1975. Redesignated at 41 FR 1906, Jan. 13, 1976]
§ 23.50 Minimum wage for Federal contractors and subcontractors. ( a ) *General.* Pursuant to Executive Order 14026, the minimum hourly wage rate required to be paid to workers performing on or in connection with covered contracts with the Federal Government is at least: ( 1 ) $15.00 per hour beginning January 30, 2022; and
( 2 ) Beginning January 1, 2023, and annually thereafter, an amount determined by the Secretary pursuant to section 2 of Executive Order 14026. In accordance with section 2 of the Order, the Secretary will determine the applicable minimum wage rate to be paid to workers performing on or in connection with covered contracts on an annual basis beginning at least 90 days before any new minimum wage is to take effect.
( b ) *Method for determining the applicable Executive Order minimum wage for workers.* The minimum wage to be paid to workers, including workers whose wages are calculated pursuant to special certificates issued under 29 U.S.C. 214(c), in the performance of a covered contract shall be at least: ( 1 ) $15.00 per hour beginning January 30, 2022; and
( 2 ) An amount determined by the Secretary, beginning January 1, 2023, and annually thereafter. The applicable minimum wage determined for each calendar year by the Secretary shall be: ( i ) Not less than the amount in effect on the date of such determination;
( ii ) Increased from such amount by the annual percentage increase in the Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers (United States city average, all items, not seasonally adjusted), or its successor publication, as determined by the Bureau of Labor Statistics; and
( iii ) Rounded to the nearest multiple of $0.05. In calculating the annual percentage increase in the Consumer Price Index for purposes of this section, the Secretary shall compare such Consumer Price Index for the most recent year available with the Consumer Price Index for the preceding year.
( c ) *Relation to other laws.* Nothing in the Executive Order or this part shall excuse noncompliance with any applicable Federal or state prevailing wage law or any applicable law or municipal ordinance, or any applicable contract, establishing a minimum wage higher than the minimum wage established under the Executive Order and this part.
( d ) *Relation to Executive Order 13658.* As of January 30, 2022, Executive Order 13658 is superseded to the extent that it is inconsistent with Executive Order 14026 and this part. Unless otherwise excluded by § 23.40, workers performing on or in connection with a covered new contract, as defined in § 23.20, must be paid at least the minimum hourly wage rate established by Executive Order 14026 and this part rather than the lower hourly minimum wage rate established by Executive Order 13658 and its implementing regulations in 29 CFR part 10.
II 

116TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 490 

To designate a mountain ridge in the State of Montana as ‘‘B–47 Ridge’’. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

FEBRUARY 14, 2019 

Mr. DAINES (for himself and Mr. TESTER) introduced the following bill; which 

was read twice and referred to the Committee on Energy and Natural 

Resources 

A BILL 

To designate a mountain ridge in the State of Montana 

as ‘‘B–47 Ridge’’. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘B–47 Ridge Designa5 tion Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. DESIGNATION OF B–47 RIDGE, MONTANA. 

7 (a) DESIGNATION.— 

8 (1) IN GENERAL.—The unnamed mountain 

9 ridge located at 45°14′40.89′′N, 110°43′38.75′′W 

10 that runs south and west of Emigrant Peak in the 


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2 

•S 490 IS

1 Absaroka Range in the State of Montana, which is 

2 the approximate site of a crash of a B–47, shall be 

3 known and designated as ‘‘B–47 Ridge’’. 

4 (2) REFERENCES.—Any reference in a law, 

5 map, regulation, document, paper, or other record of 

6 the United States to the ridge described in para7 graph (1) shall be deemed to be a reference to ‘‘B– 

8 47 Ridge’’. 

9 (b) AUTHORIZATION FOR PLAQUE.— 

10 (1) IN GENERAL.—A plaque that memorializes 

11 the crash of the B–47 (including denoting the names 

12 of the victims of the crash) may be installed on B– 

13 47 Ridge. 

14 (2) FUNDING.—No Federal funds may be used 

15 to design, procure, install, or maintain the plaque 

16 authorized under paragraph (1). 

Æ 


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11TH COURT OF APPEALS

EASTLAND, TEXAS

JUDGMENT

Gerardo Rivas Jr., * From the 183rd District Court

 of Harris County,

 Trial Court No. 1632179.

Vs. No. 11-20-00185-CR * September 25, 2020

The State of Texas, * Per Curiam Memorandum Opinion

(Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,

Stretcher, J., and Wright, S.C.J., 

sitting by assignment)

(Willson, J., not participating)

This court has considered Gerardo Rivas Jr.’s motion to dismiss this appeal 

and concludes that the motion should be granted. Therefore, in accordance with 

this court’s opinion, the appeal is dismissed.
#### CROW v. THE STATE.

(Decided January 30, 1917.)

Appeal from Cleburne Circuit Court.

Heard before Hon. Hugh D. Merrill.

No counsel marked for appellant.

W. L. Martin, Attorney General, for the State.

Per curiam.

Appeal dismissed on motion of Attorney General.
#### JEWELL v TOWNSEND

Ohio Appeals, 4th Dist, Meigs Co

Decided March 27, 1930

Peoples & Peoples, Pomeroy, for Jewell.

A. D. Russell, Pomeroy, for Townsend.

BY THE COURT.

The plaintiff seeks to compel the defendant to specifically perform a contract for the sale of real estate. That the defendant agreed to convey is admitted. He only attempts to avoid further performance by showing non-performance on the part of the plaintiff, and to show non-performance he is compelled to have the contract so reformed as to show the promise whose breach constitutes his grievance. The defendant must establish his right to a reformation, therefore, or his whole defense fails.

The policy of the law, fixed by statute, is that contracts of the kind under consideration must be in writing. It is only by the peculiar powers of a court of equity that one can be heard to fix the terms of of such a transaction in contradiction to or outside the terms of an instrument in writing. A court of equity can not exercise its power in that behalf unless the rights of its suitor are shown by clear and. satisfactory evidence. The court in this case is embarrassed by a real uncertainty as to where the truth lies.. The defendant relies largely upon claimed declarations of the plaintiff. This sort of evidence is uncertain. A conversation may not be fully heard by the witness, imperfectly recollected or inaccurately repeated, where the omission or addition of a single word or the substitution of another word would change .the whole meaning of the party. Crowell v. Bank, 3 OS. 412.

Not being satisfied that the plaintiff intended the contract to be as claimed by the defendant nor that the plaintiff was guilty of fraud, we can not decree reformation. The plaintiff is consequently awarded the decree prayed for.

Middleton, PJ, Mauek and Blosser, JJ, concur.
[Nos. 26816-7-II; 27856-1-II.

Division Two.

October 18, 2002.]

#### The State of Washington, *Respondent,*v. Joseph W. Webb, *Appellant.*

Appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court for Mason County, No. 97-1-00244-3, James B. Sawyer II, J., entered November 30, 2000. *Affirmed*by unpublished opinion per Hunt, C.J., concurred in by Bridgewater and QuinnBrintnall, JJ.
Exhibit 32.02

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

The certification set forth below is being submitted in connection with this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of SERENA Software, Inc. for the fiscal quarter ended July 31, 2006 (the Report) for the purpose of complying with Rule
13a-14(b) or Rule 15d-14(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act) and Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United States Code.

I, Robert I. Pender, Jr., Chief Financial Officer of SERENA Software, Inc. certify that, to my knowledge:



|(1) |  | the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Exchange Act; and
|--- |  | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|(2) |  | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of SERENA Software, Inc.
|--- |  | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



By:

/s/    ROBERT I. PENDER,
JR.Robert I. Pender, Jr. Senior Vice President, Finance And Administration, Chief Financial Officer (Principal Financial And Accounting Officer)


Date: September 14, 2006

This Certification is not deemed filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission and is not to be incorporated by reference into any filing of the Company under the
Securities Act of 1933, as amended, or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (whether made before or after the date of the Form 10-Q), irrespective of any general incorporation language contained in such filing.
#### STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent, v. DINK ROSS, Appellant.

Springfield Court of Appeals,

April 1, 1912.

CRIMINAL LAW: Appeal and Error. Where the defendant appealed from the judgment of conviction in a criminal action, but filed no bill of exceptions and there was no error in the record proper, the judgment will be affirmed.

Appeal from Dent Circuit *Court.'*— Hon. *L. B. Woodside,*Judge.

' Affirmed.

*Wm. P. Elmer*for appellant.

*L. T. McGee,*Prosecuting Attorney, for respondent.

COX, J.

From the record in this case it appears that defendant was tried in the circuit court of Dent county, August 26, 1911, upon a charge of illegally selling liquor, was convicted and a fine of $300' assessed *52against liina. An appeal was granted to this court and time given defendant to file bill of exceptions. No bill of exceptions was filed, however, and there is nothing before us except, the record proper which we have examined and find it free from error. Judgment affirmed.

All concur.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

In re: PAMELA RAE BENNETT,

Debtor.

______________________________

PAMELA RAE BENNETT,

Appellant,

 v.

LESLIE T. GLADSTONE, Trustee; et al.,

Appellees.

No. 14-60018

BAP No. 13-1383

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the Ninth Circuit

Bankruptcy Appellate Panel

Pappas, Kurtz, and Dunn, Bankruptcy Judges, Presiding

Submitted January 18, 2017** 

Before: TROTT, TASHIMA, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.

FILED

JAN 31 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Pamela Rae Bennett appeals pro se from the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel’s

(“BAP”) orders dismissing her appeal from a bankruptcy court’s order and denying

Bennett’s subsequent motion to reconsider its dismissal order. We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). We review for an abuse of discretion the

denial of a motion for reconsideration. Arrow Electronics, Inc. v. Justus (In re

Kaypro), 218 F.3d 1070, 1073 (9th Cir. 2000). We affirm.

The BAP did not abuse its discretion in denying Bennett’s motion for

reconsideration because Bennett failed to show any basis for relief. See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 60(b) (enumerating grounds for relief); Nat’l Bank of Long Beach v.

Donovan (In re Donovan), 871 F.2d 807, 808 (9th Cir. 1989) (a BAP order

denying a motion to reconsider a dismissal for lack of prosecution “is appropriately

analogized to a Rule 60(b) determination”). 

We lack jurisdiction to consider Bennett’s challenges to the BAP’s order

dismissing her appeal because Bennett failed to file a timely notice of appeal from

that order. See Fed. R. App. P. 6(b)(2) (only timely motions for rehearing toll the

time to appeal the underlying order or judgment); Flores v. Arizona, 516 F.3d

1140, 1163 (9th Cir. 2008) (a notice of appeal that is timely as to a motion for

rehearing but untimely as to the underlying judgment confers appellate jurisdiction 

2 14-60018
only as to the order disposing of the motion for rehearing). 

AFFIRMED.

3 14-60018
#### Curley Purcell, *Plaintiff in Error,*v. The State of Florida, *Defendant in Error.*

Criminal Law — Intoxicating Liquor — Judicial Notice.

Where the proofs show that the defendant sold “whiskey” the courts will take judicial notice that it is an intoxicating spirituous liquor the sale of which is prohibited by the statute. The courts will also take judicial notice that lager beer is a malt within the prohibition of the statute.

This case was decided by Division B..

Writ of error to the Circuit Court for Leon County.

The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court.

*Nat R. Walker,*for Plaintiff in Error;

*Park Trammell,*Attorney General, for the State.

Taylor, J.

The plaintiff in error was tried, convicted and sentenced in the circuit court of Leon county on an indictment charging him with an unlawful sale of spirituous liquors in said county contrary to prohibition established by an election in said county and comes here seeking a reversal of the judgment by writ of error.

The only error assigned is the denial of the defendant’s motion for a new trial made upon the ground that the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence. In support of this assignment it is contended that the proofs do not show that the whiskey sold by the defendant was a spirituous liquor or was intoxicating. It is quite true that the proofs do not show that the whiskey sold by the defendant was a spirituous liquor — but it does abundantly show that he did sell “whiskey” to two different parties on two sep*44arate occasions, — this being true, it was unnecessary to prove that the whiskey sold was a spirituous liquor or that it was intoxicating as the courts will take notice judicially of the meaning of the word “whiskey,” that it is an intoxicating spirituous liquor. Frese v. State, 23 Fla. 267, 2 South. Rep., 1.

The proofs further show that the defendant sold lager beer, and the courts will take judicial notice that lager beer is a malt liquor that comes within the prohibition of the statute. Netso v. State, 24 Fla., 363, 5 South. Rep. 8; Caldwell v. State, 43 Fla., 545, 30 South. Rep., 814; Nusebaumer v. State, 54 Fla., 87, 44 South. Rep., 712.

Finding no error, the judgment of the circuit court in said cause is hereby affirmed at the cost of the plaintiff in. error.

Hocker and Parki-iill, J. J., concur;

Whitfield, C. J., and Shackleford and Cockrell, J. J., concur in the opinion.
###### Editorial Note on Part 20

#### Editorial Note:

Nomenclature changes to part 20 appear at 57 FR 31451, July 16, 1992.

#### § 20.62 Responsibilities of the Chief Financial Officer.

The Chief Financial Officer, or his or her designee, shall provide appropriate and binding written or other guidance to Department of Labor agencies and officials in carrying out this subpart, including the issuance of guidelines and instructions, which he or she may deem appropriate. The Chief Financial Officer shall also take such administrative steps as may be appropriate to carry out the purposes and ensure the effective implementation of this regulation.
II 

110TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 942 

To modify the boundaries for a certain empowerment zone designation. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

MARCH 20, 2007 

Ms. SNOWE (for herself and Ms. COLLINS) introduced the following bill; which 

was read twice and referred to the Committee on Finance 

A BILL 

To modify the boundaries for a certain empowerment zone 

designation. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. MODIFICATION OF BOUNDARY OF AROOSTOOK 

4 COUNTY EMPOWERMENT ZONE. 

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Aroostook County empower6 ment zone shall include, in addition to the area designated 

7 as of the date of the enactment of this Act, the remaining 

8 area of the county not included in such designation, not9 withstanding the size requirement of section 

10 1392(a)(3)(A) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and 

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2 

•S 942 IS

1 the population requirements of section 1392(a)(1)(B) of 

2 such Code. 

3 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—Subsection (a) shall take ef4 fect as of the effective date of the designation of the 

5 Aroostook County empowerment zone by the Secretary of 

6 Agriculture. 

Æ 

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```

[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 841 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

110th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 S. 841

   For the relief of Alfredo Plascencia Lopez and Maria Del Refugio 
                              Plascencia.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             March 12, 2007

Mrs. Feinstein introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
               referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   For the relief of Alfredo Plascencia Lopez and Maria Del Refugio 
                              Plascencia.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. PERMANENT RESIDENT STATUS FOR ALFREDO PLASCENCIA LOPEZ AND 
              MARIA DEL REFUGIO PLASCENCIA.

    (a) In General.--Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b) of section 
201 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, Alfredo Plascencia Lopez 
and Maria Del Refugio Plascencia shall each be eligible for the 
issuance of an immigrant visa or for adjustment of status to that of an 
alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence upon filing an 
application for issuance of an immigrant visa under section 204 of that 
Act or for adjustment of status to lawful permanent resident.
    (b) Adjustment of Status.--If Alfredo Plascencia Lopez and Maria 
Del Refugio Plascencia enter the United States before the filing 
deadline specified in subsection (c), Alfredo Plascencia Lopez and 
Maria Del Refugio Plascencia shall be considered to have entered and 
remained lawfully and shall be eligible for adjustment of status under 
section 245 of the Immigration and Nationality Act as of the date of 
enactment of this Act.
    (c) Deadline for Application and Payment of Fees.--Subsections (a) 
and (b) shall apply only if the application for issuance of immigrant 
visas or the application for adjustment of status are filed with 
appropriate fees within 2 years after the date of enactment of this 
Act.
    (d) Reduction of Immigrant Visa Numbers.--Upon the granting of 
immigrant visas or permanent residence to Alfredo Plascencia Lopez and 
Maria Del Refugio Plascencia, the Secretary of State shall instruct the 
proper officer to reduce by 2, during the current or next following 
fiscal year, the total number of immigrant visas that are made 
available to natives of the country of the aliens' birth under section 
203(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act or, if applicable, the 
total number of immigrant visas that are made available to natives of 
the country of the aliens' birth under section 202(e) of that Act.
                                 <all>
```
April 22, 2014

Dr. James R. Fraser 

Federal Air Surgeon 

Federal Aviation Administration 

800 Independence Ave., SW 

Washington, DC 20591

RE: Docket No. FAA-2012-1058, Notice No. 14-02

Dear Dr. Fraser:

The Cargo Airline Association (CAA) respectfully requests that the Federal 

Aviation Administration (FAA) grant a 120-day extension to the comment period 

for the Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) relating to Drug and 

Alcohol Testing of Certain Maintenance Provider Employees Located Outside of 

the United States published on March 17, 2014. CAA members conduct 

worldwide operations and are dependent upon foreign repair stations for much of 

their maintenance. As such, CAA has a substantial interest in the outcome of this 

proceeding. We understand several other associations and organizations have 

filed similar extension requests in this docket and CAA supports these other 

requests.

The ANPRM at issue is the FAA’s first step in implementing the terms of the 

FAA Reauthorization Act which require drug and alcohol testing for repair 

stations, certificated under 14 CFR Part 145, located outside the U.S., whose 

employees perform safety sensitive functions on aircraft operating under 14 CFR 

Part 121. We appreciate the FAA’s decision to begin this process with an 

Advance Notice, thereby gathering much needed information in advance of a 

formal rulemaking process. However, the ANPRM includes over 40 detailed 

questions that will require interested parties to devote significant time and 

resources to research and provide valuable responses. The task of responding is 

further complicated by the fact that much of the information requested is located 

in foreign countries and often in foreign languages. Obtaining such data in the 

time period currently in the ANPRM is simply not possible.

Thank you for your consideration; we look forward to working with the FAA on 

this issue as the ANPRM and NPRM rulemaking process move forward.

Sincerely yours,

Stephen A. Alterman

President