IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2015-CA-00227-SCT
GEORGE READY

, II

v. RWI TRANSPORTATION, LLC AND DAV ID WILLIAMS
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 01/21/2015 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. C. E. MORGAN, III TRIAL COURT ATTORNEYS: CHARLES M. MERKEL, JR. JAMES R. MOORE, JR. RONALD ERIC TONEY COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: GRENADA COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: EDW ARD P. CONNELL, JR. CHARLES M. MERKEL, JR. CORRIE SCHULER ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES: JAMES R. MOORE, JR. RONALD ERIC TONEY NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - PERSONAL INJURY DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 11/03/2016 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED: BEFORE RANDOLPH, P.J., KITCHENS AND COLEMAN, JJ. RANDOLPH, PRESIDING JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT: ¶1. RW I Transportation L L C ( R W I ) a n d D a v i d W i l l i a m s w e r e g r a n t e d s u m m a r y judgm ent
af ter the trial court determ ined that neither owed a d uty t o George Ready I I rela t e d t o a subsequent accident which occurred approxim ately one hour later and three-f ourths of a m ile
away f rom an initial accident. W e af f i r m the trial court’s grant of sum m ary judgm ent in
f avor of RW I and W i lliam s.STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW

¶2. The parties agreed and stipulated to the f ollowing f

acts: This lawsuit concerns two au t o mo b i le accidents that o ccurred on Interstate 55 North in Grenada County on the evenin g of Thursday , May 24, 2012. The f

irst accident involved David W illiam s and Brian Spurlock (“W illiam s accident”). At 7:13 p.m ., W illiam s was traveling n orthbound on I55 in a tractor-trailer leased to R WI Transportation, L LC. As W illiam s attem pted a lane change, the lef t side of his trailer c o ntacted the right side of a 2004 Ford Ranger truck d riven by Spurlock. This contact caused Spurlock’s truck to overturn com ing to rest partially across b o t h northbound lanes of travel. Spurlock’s truck cam e t o rest on a bridge over the Y al obusha River. The southern e nd o f the bridge i s located approxim ately 4,500 f eet north of the northbound of

f ram p designated as Exit 206. Following the accident, W illiam s drove his tractor-trailer to the east side shoulder of I-55, outside of the travel lanes north of

the Yalobusha River bridge.
Of f ic e r D e r rick W illis of the Mississippi Highway P atrol was dispatched to the accident scene where he arrived at 7:34 p .m
. Of f icer W i llis parked his patrol car south o f the accident scene and activated h is blue f l ashing lights. Of f icer W i llis stopped any northbound traf f ic since Spurlock’s v ehicle was overturned partially across both lanes. At least one City of Grenada police of f icer assisted with traf

f ic control. A tow truck was dispatched to [ turn over] Spurlock’s t ruck and tow it f rom the accident scene. At approxim ately 8:09 p.m ., W illis re-opened both northbound traf f ic lanes a nd lef

t the a c c i d ent scene. The second a c c i d ent involved George Ready , I I, and a UPS tractortrailer driven by S hannon Carroll (“Ready accident”). The R e a d y accident occurred nearly three quarters (3/4) of a m ile south o f the W illiam s a ccident. At the tim e of the second accident, Ready was traveling northbound in the right travel lane of I -55 in a 2007 GMC Sierra truck. Approxim ately 730 f eet north of the ram p to the Exit 206 overpass, Ready collided with the rear of a stopped UPS tractor-trailer driven by Shannon Carroll. The UPS tractor-trailer w a s s t ill stopped in the right hand northbound travel lane where it had been f orced to stop a s a result of backed-up traf f ic f rom the W i l l i a ms a ccident. Of f icer W illis, who had l ef

t the W illiam s accident scene at 8:09 p.m ., crossed over I-55 and traveled s outhbound o n I -55, where he observed R eady ’s truck in the m edian and d i verted to the accident scene, noting his arrival tim e at 8:21 p.m
.

2¶3. Ready f iled s u i t a g a i n s t R WI a n d Wi l l i a m s, alleging c laim s of negligence and negligent entrustm ent. RW I and W illiam s m oved f o r s u m m ary judgm ent, arguing that Ready ’s i njury was not a f o reseeable consequence of W illiam s’s accident, thus Ready could

not establish that he was owed a duty b y RW I and W i lliam s. I n support of their m otion, RW I
and W illiam s subm itted sworn statem ents f rom two witnesses. Of

f i cer W illis testif

ied that
the weather was clear, the lanes w e r e d r y , a n d i t w as day l ight at the t im e of the accident.
G o r d o n E u g ene W ilson Jr. testif ied that he w as positioned directly in f ront of the UPS tractor-trailer that was rearended by Ready

. ¶4. W i lson testif

ied that b oth he and C arroll had activated their f our-way f lashing lights
while stopped. W ilson observed Ready ’s truck traveling at a speed o f s ixty -f ive-to-seventy

m iles p er hour as R eady approached tra f f i c
. J u st bef

ore Ready r earended Carroll’s UPS tractor-trailer, W ilson “heard the pickup truck’s brakes ‘squawk’ as it attem pted to swerve
lef t. But it was too late to avoid striking the U PS tractor-trailer.” W ilson testif ied that he saw nothing that would h ave prevented Ready f r om seeing the UPS tractor-trailer in f r ont of him

. Ready of f ered n o t e s t i m ony by af

f idavit o r otherwise contrary to the sworn t estim ony of
W i llis and W ilson. ¶5. Af ter hearing argum ents, the trial court entered an order granting sum m ary judgm ent
i n f a v o r o f RW I and W illiam s. The trial court stated that, bef ore it could f

ind RW I and
W i lliam s owed a duty to Ready , i t f i r s t m u st determ ine whether Ready ’s injuries were

reasona b l y f

o reseeable. The trial court f ound that the tim e and distance between the two accidents were so rem oved that it was not f oreseeable that W illiam s’s accident w ould cause

3Ready ’s injuries. The trial c o u rt f urther f ound that RW I and W illiam s owed no duty to Ready . He ruled that Ready ’s negligence claim could not survive sum m ary judgm ent. ¶6. Ready f

iled a m otion pursuant to Rule 59 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil P rocedure, requesting the trial c ourt alter or am end its ruling because questions of negligence s hould be
tried b e f ore a j ury
. Ready argued that issues of tim e and distance as they related t o negligence

were jury issues, and sum m a ry j udgm ent was inappropriate. The trial court denied Ready ’s
Rule 59 m otion and issued a f inal judgm ent of dism i ssal with prejudice. Ready appealed and
set f orth the f ollowing issues:
I. W hether the trial court erred in holding that, as a m atter of law, the injuries a nd dam ages involving the p laintif f -appellant, George Read y I I , w e r e an u nf

o reseeable result of the negligence of the def endant s a p p e llee[ s], R

W I T ransportation, LLC a nd David W i lliam s, a n d t h a t t h e def e ndants-appellees accordingly o wed no duty to Ready

. II. W hether, under Mississippi law, the neg l igent a ctions of the def e ndants-appellees were a proxi mate cause or a proxim ate contributing cause of

George Ready

II’s injuries.
III. W hether G eorge Ready II was negligent as a ma t t e r of law under Mississippi law.
This Court will address whether sum m ary judgm ent was properly

granted.
ANALYSIS ¶7. T h i s Court applies a de novo s tandard of r eview f or grants o f sum m ary

judg me n t

. Harris v. Darby , 17 So. 3d 1076, 1078 (Miss. 2 009). “It is well settled that to prevail on a

ne g l i g e n c e c l aim , a plaintif f m ust prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, duty or standard of care, breach, causation and dam ages. Sum m ary judgm ent is appropriate where
the nonm oving party cannot m ake a prim a f acie s howing of all o f the elem ents of his or her

4claim .” Huynh v. Phillips , 9 5 So. 3d 1259, 1262 ( Miss. 2012) (internal c itations om itted).

This C ourt has h eld that the existence of duty is a question o f l aw to be decided by the trial

court. Foster v. Bass , 575 So. 2d 967, 972-73 (Miss. 1990). ¶8. The trial c ourt r

uled that W illiam s and RW I h ad no duty to Ready , as Ready ’s accident
and injuries were too rem ote in space, t im e, a nd distance to their actions. Specif ically , the
trial court f

ound that:
this court m

u st consider how rem ote Ready ’s injuries were f rom t h e a lleged negligence, w h i c h i n the present c ase would be W illiam s’s careless d riving which resulted in the initial accident and the subsequent backed up traf f ic. The record clearly ref

lects that approxim ately 55 m i nutes p a s s e d between W i lliam s ’s and Spurlock’s accident and the Ready a ccident. In a ddition t o the passage of alm o st an hour, th e actual distance between the two accidents is nearly 3/4 of a m ile. Both of these f a ctors represent rem ot e n e s s i n space, distance, and tim e that creates a chasm too wide b etween the two a ccidents to m aintain any duty within the zone of risk b etween W illiam s and Ready

. Furtherm ore, W illiam s was unquestionably culpable f o r the initial a ccident, but to f ind that he is also culpable f or an accident that occurs alm ost an hour af ter his accident and 3/4 of a m ile behind him is out of proportion to his duty as a driver.

. . . W illiam s’s initial negligence in c ausing the Spurlock accident seem s highly unlikely to then cause an accident a n h our and 3/4 of a m ile l ater. W h ile it is f

oreseeable that an accident could trigger events that l e a d to a subsequent accident, i n the present case , tim e and d istance create a scenario so r em ote that to allow [ a claim ] would be unreasonable.

. . . If an accident so rem oved by space, distance, and tim e can be v iewed as f oreseeab l e , t h e n it would allow recovery

“that has no sensible or just stopping point.” (Em phasis added.) ¶9. In exam ining the f our basic elem ents that a p laintif f m us t p r o v e t o p r e v a i l in a negligence action, f

oreseeability can be involved in at l east two of those: d uty and causation. The trial judge’s ref

erence was related to duty and the l egal cause, not to be conf used with proxim ate cause, which includes cause in f act and legal cause. See Huynh , 95 So. 3d at 1263.

5W hile duty and causation b oth involve a f oreseeability analy sis, duty is an issue of law, and
causation is generally a m atter f or the jury

. See W

. Page Keeton, Prosser and Ke e t o n o n Torts § 37, 236 (5th ed. 1984). ¶10. Am ong other duties, drivers of vehicles in our state are charged with: keeping a proper lookout a nd being on alert f or vehicles, objects and persons ahead in the highway , Fowler Butane Gas Co. v . V arner , 244 Miss. 130, 1 41 So. 2d 2 26 (1962); B elk v. Rosam ond , 2 13 M iss. 633, 57 So. 2d 461 (1952),

. . . seeing w hat he should have seen, Tippit v. Hunter , 205 So. 2d 267 (Miss. 1967); Cam

pbell v . Schm idt , 195 So. 2d 87 (Miss. 1967); Layton v. Cook , 2 48 Miss. 690, 160 So. 2d 685 ( 1964), h av[ ing] his [ vehicle] under p roper control, being o n the alert on the highway , and avoiding striking plain objects. Barkley v. Miller Transporters, Inc. , 450 So. 2d 416 (Miss.1984); Shideler v. Taylor , 292 So. 2d 155 (Miss.1974).
Dennis By and Through C obb v . Bolden , 606 So. 2d 111, 113-14 (Miss. 1992). In Robison

v. M cDowell , 247 So. 2d 686, 689 (Miss. 1971), this Court af f irm ed its prior ho l d i n gs in
Hoke v. W

. L. Holcom b & Assocs., Inc. , 186 S o. 2d 474 (Miss.1966) and Mississippi City Lines, Inc. v. Bullock , 194 Miss. 630, 13 So. 2d 34 (1943), that: negligence is rem ote and non-actionable which m erely causes a person to be at a particular place at a particular tim e where s u ch person is i njured as a result of the n egligent act of another, who p uts in m otion a dif f erent a nd intervening cause which ef

f iciently leads in unbroken sequence to the injury

. Saucier v. Walker , 203 So. 2d 299, 304 (Miss. 1967); Bufkin v. Louisville & & Nashville
R.R. Co. , 161 Miss. 594, 137 So. 517 (1931); O zen v. Sperier et a l. , 150 Miss. 458, 117 So.
117 ( 1928); Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Daniels , 1 35 M iss. 3 3, 99 So. 434,(1924);
See also M

a rqueze et al. v. S

ontheim er , 59 Miss. 430 (1882);. In these ty pes of cases, the
f oreseeability

rule is not satisf

ied. Robison , 247 So. 2d at 686.

6The requirem ents of the l aw as to f oreseeability can probably be better expressed in term s o f how f ar the responsibility of an actor extends. If the act com plained of is only a rem ote cause, superseded by an independent, ef f icient intervening cause that leads in unbroken s e quence t o the injury , the o riginal negligent act i s not a p roxim ate, but a rem ote, cause. Thus, not being f oreseeable, the original cause is not actionable.
Id. In our view, when m easured by the settled rules of the law of negligen c e , R WI and
W i lliam s are not liable f

or Ready ’s injuries. See id. ¶11. In a sim ilar case bef ore the United States District Court f o r the Southern District of Mississippi, an e ighteen-wheeler jack k nif ed on Interstate 59, causing both north and south
bound l anes to b e c losed f or se v e r a l hours. Clark v. EPCO, Inc. , 2 :08-cv-103-KS-MTP,
2 0 0 9 WL 2 3 6 6054, *1 (S.D. Miss., July 29, 2009). M ore than two hours af ter the origina l
one-truck accident and seven m iles north of the accident scene, the decedent w as stopped in
traf f i c when another driver, who “was apparently driving too f ast f o r the conditions and was
not observant,” collided violently with the d ecedent’s vehicle, instantly killing the d ecedent.
Id. Af ter settling with the driver who struck the decedent’s vehicle and the driver’s em ploy er, the decedent’s wif

e f iled s uit against the driver of the eighteen-wheeler and his em ploy er. Id. ¶12. T h e plaintif

f s, a s does the plaintif

f in the case sub j u d i c e , a r g u e d t h a t i t w a s f oreseeable that the driv e r ’ s n e g l igence which l ed to the f irst accident could cause a subsequent accident at a later tim e. Id. at *8. The def endants, again like the d ef endants in this

c a s e , a r g u e d that “the f

oreseeability of the possibility o f som e harm to som eone f rom t h e

assum ed negligence of

[ the def e ndant] cannot be transf

orm ed i nto a duty

to [ the decedent]
under the f

acts of this c ase.” Id. The district court held that, while the d ef endant had a duty

to other m otorists to use r easonable c a r e i n o p e rating his truck, that duty could not be

7“stretched in t i m e a n d place t o provide a duty t o [ the decedent] or causation f or [ the decedent’s] unf

ortunate death.

. . . ” Id. at * 7. The d istrict court f urther held that the def

endant
owed no duty to the decedent, f or the def

endant’s “ a ssum ed negligence was sim ply too

rem ote in tim e and place. . . .” Id. ¶13. The t r i a l c o u r t r e a ched the sam e conclusion on the specif ic set of f acts in this case.
The stipulated f

acts, s upra ¶ 2, presented in this case reveal that the f irst accident w as rem ote
in tim e and distance f

rom Ready ’s accident. 1 In the “realm o f f oreseeability ,” if we assum e W i lliam s’s f

ail u r e to properly operate his tractor-trailer “constituted n egligence, such

n e g l i g ence o nly f

urnished the c ondition or occasion f rom which [ Ready ’ s] injuries w e r e received, but i t did not put i n m otio n t h e negligence and wrongf u l agency that caused [ Ready ’s] injuries.” Hoke , 186 So. 2d at 476-77. W illiam s’s presum ed original negligence
is “relegated to the p osition of a rem ote and, theref o re, a nonactionable cause.” Bullock , 13
So. 2d at 36. Theref

ore, we are of the opinion that W illiam s and RW I did not owe a duty to Ready a n d that the n egligence of W illiam s, if any , “ was too rem ote in the e y es of the law to be regarded as connected as cause therewith.” See Perm enter v. Milner C h evrolet Co. , 229 Miss. 385, 391, 91 So. 2d 243, 245 (1956).
CONCLUSION ¶14. W e f

ind that the trial c ourt did not e r r in granting s um m ary judgm ent in f avor of RW I
and W illiam s. W illiam s’s presum ed n egligent conduct was too r em ote in tim e and distance

1 P ro x i m ity i n tim e an d d istan ce d o es n o t p er s e r e n d e r an o rig in al n eg lig en t act a n o n actio n ab le cau s e. 8to have caused Ready ’s dam ages. Theref ore, R e a d y ’ s c l aim s as to W illiam s and RW I are nonactionable, and sum m ary judgm ent as a m atter of law was properly

granted. ¶15. AFFIRMED. WALLER, C .J., D ICKINSON, P.J., KITCHENS, KIN G , COLEMAN, MAX W ELL AND BEAM, JJ., CONCUR. LAMAR, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.

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