IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-41692

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

JUAN ANTONIO COMPIAN, 

 Defendant - Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 2:16-CR-418-1

Before STEWART, Chief Judge, and HAYNES and WILLETT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Juan Antonio Compian appeals the district court’s imposition of two sexoffender-related special conditions of supervised release—a registration 

condition and a locational condition. He argues that the district court abused 

its discretion in imposing the sex-offender-related special conditions because 

they (1) are not reasonably related to the statutory sentencing factors under 

18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(d)(1) and 3553(a), and (2) impose a greater deprivation of 

liberty than necessary to achieve the statutory sentencing goals. In the 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

May 1, 2018

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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alternative, Compian argues that the district court judge did not sufficiently 

explain her reasons for imposing the special conditions, in violation of 

§ 3553(c). Upon review, we remand for the limited purpose of modifying the 

registration condition to reflect that Compian must register as a sex offender 

to the extent required by state law. We otherwise affirm. The Government’s 

motion to supplement the record is denied.

I. Background

Compian was charged with two counts of transporting an undocumented 

alien within the United States, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii), 

(A)(v)(II), and (B)(ii). In December 2016, he pleaded guilty to count two and

was sentenced to twenty-one months in custody, followed by a three-year term 

of supervised release.

The sentencing judge imposed two sex-offender-related special 

conditions on Compian: a locational condition and a registration condition.1 

The locational condition restricted Compian’s access to areas “primarily used 

by children under the age of 18, or where children may frequently congregate,” 

while the registration condition required him to register as a sex offender in 

Texas. Compian’s attorney objected to both conditions on the basis that

Compian’s sex offense “was a twenty-five year old offense unrelated to the case 

at hand.” The district court declined to remove the sex-offender-related special 

conditions and entered a written judgment.

 

1 In 1991, while in his early twenties, Compian pleaded no contest to a Florida charge 

of lewd and lascivious conduct or indecent assault upon or in the presence of a child. He was 

sentenced to three and a half years in custody and ten years’ probation, which was fully 

completed on October 29, 2002. Although he committed additional crimes prior to his 

conviction here, none were sex crimes.

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II. Imposition of Sex-Offender-Related Special Conditions of 

Supervised Release

“When challenged on appeal [and preserved in the district court], 

conditions of supervised release are reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” 

United States v. Huor, 852 F.3d 392, 397 (5th Cir. 2017). Conditions of 

supervised release must be “reasonably related” to at least one of the following

factors: (1) “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and 

characteristics of the defendant;” (2) “afford[ing] adequate deterrence to 

criminal conduct;” (3) “protect[ing] the public from further crimes of the 

defendant;” and (4) “provid[ing] the defendant with needed educational or 

vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most 

effective manner.” 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1), (2)(B)–(D), 3583(d)(1); see also 

United States v. Weatherton, 567 F.3d 149, 153 & n.1 (5th Cir. 2009).

Compian argues that imposing the sex-offender-related special 

conditions is not reasonably related to any of the four justifications, noting that 

his current offense is not a sex offense. He also argues that his sole prior sex 

offense was committed twenty-five years ago. However, we have held that past 

sex offenses can be taken into account in assessing special conditions of 

supervised release. See Weatherton, 567 F.3d at 153. The special condition in 

such a situation must be “justified by a defendant’s criminal history,” United 

States v. Salazar, 743 F.3d 445, 452 (5th Cir. 2014), and bear some connection 

to the prior offense, United States v. Fields, 777 F.3d 799, 803 (5th Cir. 2015).

Here, there is a connection between the conditions and Compian’s 

criminal history, as access to children was necessary to Compian’s Florida

conviction for lewd and lascivious or indecent assault or act upon or in the 

presence of a child. See id. at 804. This differentiates Compian’s case from

cases where, for example, we struck down prohibitions on “sexually 

stimulating” materials because access to such materials was wholly unrelated 

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to the defendant’s conviction. See, e.g., Huor, 852 F.3d at 402; Salazar, 743 

F.3d at 450–52. While timing and number of offenses are relevant, those 

factors are not dispositive. See, e.g., Fields, 777 F.3d at 804; United States v. 

Cuneo, 554 F. App’x 313, 318–19 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam).

Compian’s “only” sex offense involved a victim under twelve years old. 

Although Compian has not since committed another sexual offense, he has 

been convicted of various crimes, including assault causing bodily injury to a 

family member. Given the totality of the record, and in light of our precedents, 

the special conditions could be reasonably justified by Compian’s history and 

characteristics, deterrence, and protecting the public. Thus, it was not an 

abuse of discretion for the district court to impose sex-offender-related

conditions in this instance.

III. Restrictiveness of Conditions

Even if the sex-offender-related special conditions are reasonably related 

to the § 3553(a) factors, they may “involve no greater deprivation of liberty 

than is reasonably necessary for the purposes [of § 3553(a)].”2 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3583(d)(2). Compian argues that both the registration and locational 

conditions are a greater deprivation of liberty than necessary in these 

circumstances.

A. Registration Condition

The registration condition requires that Compian register as a sex 

offender for the duration of his supervised release. The Government argues 

that, because Compian is already required to register as a sex offender under 

Texas law, the registration condition was appropriate in this case. Compian 

 

2 The special conditions also must be “consistent with any pertinent policy statements 

issued by the Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(3). Compian does not argue that 

his special conditions are inconsistent with Sentencing Commission policy statements. 

Therefore, this argument is waived. See United States v. Zuniga, 860 F.3d 276, 284 n.9 (5th 

Cir. 2017).

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disputes the Government’s contention that he is required to register as a sex 

offender in Texas.3 We need not decide whether Compian is required to 

register by state law, though, to conclude that the condition, as written, is 

unduly restrictive.

Because “it is axiomatic that a district court can include as a condition 

that the defendant obey the law,” a special condition that requires a sex 

offender who is required to register to continue doing so would be appropriate 

as requiring no more than that the sex offender follow the law. See United 

States v. Talbert, 501 F.3d 449, 452 (5th Cir. 2007); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)

(“The court shall order, as an explicit condition of supervised release, that the 

defendant not commit another Federal, State, or local crime during the term 

of supervision.”). However, the condition here is broader than that, requiring 

registration without consideration of whether Compian is otherwise required 

to register under state law.

Imposing sex offender registration undoubtedly carries a stigma. See 

Jennings v. Owens, 602 F.3d 652, 659 (5th Cir. 2010) (noting that imposing 

sex-offender-related special conditions “would indeed cause stigma,” but 

finding the conditions permissible because “the parole board admittedly 

label[ed] [the defendant] as a sex offender” and that “label [was] not false as 

applied to [the defendant]; it accurately reflect[ed] [the defendant’s] status”).

 

3 When the Government filed its appellate brief, it also moved to supplement the 

appellate record or, in the alternative, for this court to take judicial notice of a Texas 

Department of Public Safety (“DPS”) document (the “DPS document”) that is not available 

on a public website. The DPS document purportedly will inform the court as to whether the 

Florida offense of which Compian was convicted is “substantially similar” to a Texas offense 

which requires lifetime registration, in which case Compian would be required to register for 

life in Texas. See TEX. CODE. CRIM. PROC. art. 62.001(5)(H). Because we need not decide 

today whether Compian is required to register under Texas law, the motion to supplement 

the appellate record is irrelevant to our inquiry and is therefore denied. See United States v. 

Chavez-Suarez, 644 F. App’x 289, 290–91 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 162 

(2016).

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Although registration serves as an important notice to the public to protect it 

from sexual predators, having registered sex offender status is a clear restraint 

on liberty. Given that Compian has not committed another sexual offense since 

1991, registration here is a greater deprivation of liberty than reasonably 

necessary to protect the public if the law does not otherwise require 

registration. Notably, the Government has stated that it is not opposed to 

modification of the registration condition to require registration if Compian 

must do so under state law. Therefore, we remand to the district court to 

amend Compian’s conditions of supervised release to reflect that “sex offender 

registration is required to the extent required by state law.”

B. Locational Condition

Compian’s locational restriction states: “The defendant shall not reside, 

work, access, or loiter within 1,000 feet of school yards, parks, playgrounds, 

arcades, or other places primarily used by children under the age of 18, or 

where children may frequently congregate, unless approved in advance in 

writing by the United States Probation Officer.” Compian argues that this 

locational condition is a greater deprivation of his liberty than reasonably 

necessary because the restrictions are overly broad in light of the fact that he 

has only one prior sex offense.

In Fields, we held that a locational condition imposing “lifestyle 

restrictions,” including not residing or “going to places where a minor or minors 

are known to frequent without prior approval of the probation officer,” was not 

overly restrictive. 777 F.3d at 802, 806. Notably, a variation of “frequent” 

appears in both the locational condition in Fields and in this case. Although 

Compian argues that “may frequently congregate,” as used here, is more 

subjective than “known to frequent,” as used in Fields, those phrases are 

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materially and sufficiently similar.4 See id. at 806 (noting that “frequent” can 

provide an objective standard, which can be interpreted by the defendant, or 

“especially through consultation with his probation officer”). Therefore, the 

language itself does not appear to have been an abuse of discretion.

Further, it is important to note that the sex-offender-related special 

conditions here last only three years. The duration of sex-offender-related 

special conditions is a consideration in determining whether they are overly 

restrictive. See, e.g., Cuneo, 554 F. App’x at 319 (upholding conditions of parole 

including mental health treatment, although a sex offense was committed in 

1989, noting “that this special condition has a finite duration of five years, and, 

during that time, [the defendant] could move to modify the condition” (citing 

18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1); FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(c))).

We agree that the better practice is for the sentencing court to provide

specific guidance with respect to how a locational condition will be applied to 

make it clear, both for a defendant and for a parole officer interpreting the 

locational condition on the defendant’s behalf, where a defendant is and is not 

permitted to be. However, in this case, the condition is limited sufficiently in 

both scope and duration for us to conclude that it was not an abuse of discretion 

for the district court to impose it.

IV. Adequacy of Explanation

In the alternative, Compian argues that the district court failed to 

articulate a reasonable relationship between the two sex-offender-related 

special conditions and the statutory sentencing factors. Because Compian did 

 

4 Compian also argues that the use of “access” in the locational condition renders it 

unduly restrictive, as it may include activities such as “walk[ing] or driv[ing] down the 

street.” However, a reasonable person could determine that access clearly does not sweep 

that broadly, and thus, this argument is not persuasive. See, e.g., Access, OXFORD ENGLISH 

DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2011) (defining “access,” in relevant part, to mean “[t]o gain admission 

to; to enter”). 

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not object on this basis at his sentencing, this claim is reviewed for plain error.

See United States v. Mondragon-Santiago, 564 F.3d 357, 361 (5th Cir. 2009). 

Plain error requires Compian to show “a clear and obvious error affecting his 

substantial rights . . . [which] ‘seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public 

reputation of judicial proceedings.’” United States v. Barton, 879 F.3d 595, 598 

(5th Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. Escalante-Reyes, 689 F.3d 415, 419 

(5th Cir. 2012) (en banc)).5

The first two prongs of plain error require showing an error that is both 

clear and obvious. See id. Section 3553(c) requires that a “judge at the time of 

sentencing . . . state in open court the reasons for its imposition of the 

particular sentence” with respect to special conditions. “[C]ourts of appeals 

have consistently required district courts to set forth factual findings to justify 

special probation conditions.” Salazar, 743 F.3d at 451 (quoting United States 

v. Warren, 186 F.3d 358, 366 (3d Cir. 1999)). “A full explanation of the 18 

U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors is not required in every case. The district court need 

only ‘set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that [it] has considered the 

parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising [its] own legal 

decisionmaking authority.’” United States v. Fuentes-Cruz, 690 F. App’x 219, 

220 (5th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (citation omitted) (quoting Rita v. United 

States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007)). This court “focus[es] on the district court’s 

statements in the context of the sentencing proceeding as a whole.” United 

 

5 The Supreme Court recently heard argument on the proper application of the 

fairness prong of plain-error review from this circuit’s decision in United States v. RosalesMireles, 850 F.3d 246 (5th Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 138 S.Ct. 55, 198 L.Ed.2d 781 (2017). In 

the meantime, we apply the en banc majority opinion in Escalante-Reyes rather than the 

“shocks the conscience” language from the dissenting opinion. United States v. Broussard, 

669 F.3d 537, 554 (5th Cir. 2012); Wicker v. McCotter, 798 F.2d 155, 157–58 (5th Cir. 

1986) (even when the Supreme Court has granted certiorari, we continue to follow our own 

precedents unless and until the Court says otherwise); see, e.g., United States v. MatiasSanchez, No. 16-51462, 2018 WL 280679, at *2 n.2 (5th Cir. Jan. 3, 2018) (per curiam).

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States v. Diaz Sanchez, 714 F.3d 289, 294 (5th Cir. 2013). 

Here, immediately before sentencing Compian and imposing the special 

conditions, the sentencing judge stated, “I’m going to look at the factors in 3153 

– 3553(a) to come up with a place in the new Guidelines, looking at protecting 

the public, and it looks quite impossible to deter your future criminal conduct.” 

The judge stated that (1) she intended to follow § 3553(a), which helps 

determine whether special conditions are appropriate under § 3583, in 

imposing Compian’s sentence, and (2) she considered deterrence and 

protecting the public as factors in sentencing. Further, when Compian’s 

attorney objected on the basis that the sex offense was twenty-five years old at 

the time, the judge said the following: “And was the child under the age of 

twelve that he tried to rape? No, I think he needs to be a registered sex 

offender.” In the context of the proceeding as a whole, it appears that the 

sentencing judge did appropriately articulate her considerations in sentencing 

Compian to sex-offender-related special conditions, such that it was not a clear 

or obvious error. Therefore, Compian’s argument that the sentencing judge’s 

explanation was inadequate fails plain error review.

V. Conclusion

The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED as modified and remanded 

to the district court to modify the registration sex-offender-related special 

condition in accordance with this opinion. The Government’s motion to 

supplement the record is DENIED.

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