18-1815

Zheng v. Barr

BIA

Poczter, IJ

A208 019 392

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION 

TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED 

AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS 

COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT 

FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX 

OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A 

PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY 

NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 

2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall 

3 United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 

New York, on the 14th 4 day of July, two thousand twenty.

5

6 PRESENT:

7 DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,

8 RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,

9 STEVEN J. MENASHI,

10 Circuit Judges.

11 _____________________________________

12

13 MENGQIAN ZHENG,

14 Petitioner,

15

16 v. 18-1815

17 NAC

18 WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES

19 ATTORNEY GENERAL,

20 Respondent.

21 _____________________________________

22

23 FOR PETITIONER: James A. Lombardi, New York, NY.

24

25 FOR RESPONDENT: Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant Attorney 

26 General; Song E. Park, Senior 

27 Litigation Counsel; Matt A. Crapo, 

28 Trial Attorney, Office of 
2

1 Immigration Litigation, United 

2 States Department of Justice, 

3 Washington, DC.

4 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 

5 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 

6 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review 

7 is DENIED.

8 Petitioner Mengqian Zheng, a native and citizen of the 

9 People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a May 29, 2018, 

10 decision of the BIA affirming a June 26, 2017, decision of an 

11 Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Zheng’s application for 

12 asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the 

13 Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Mengqian Zheng, 

14 No. A 208 019 392 (B.I.A. May 29, 2018), aff’g No. A 208 019 

15 392 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Jun. 26, 2017). We assume the 

16 parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural 

17 history.

18 Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed 

19 the IJ’s decision as modified by the BIA. See Xue Hong Yang 

20 v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005). 

21 Because the BIA assumed credibility, we assume credibility as 

22 to Zheng’s subjective fear of future harm. See Yan Chen v. 

23 Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271-72 (2d Cir. 2005). The 
3

1 applicable standards of review are well established. See

2 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 

3 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009). 

4 Zheng began practicing Christianity while in the United 

5 States and alleged a fear of persecution in China because she 

6 would continue to practice Christianity if removed. Absent 

7 past persecution, an alien may establish eligibility for 

8 asylum by demonstrating a well-founded fear of future 

9 persecution. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2); Ramsameachire v. 

10 Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 178 (2d Cir. 2004). To demonstrate 

11 a well-founded fear, an applicant must show either a 

12 reasonable possibility that she would be singled out for 

13 persecution or that the country of removal has a pattern or 

14 practice of persecuting similarly situated individuals. 8 

15 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(iii); see In re A-M-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 

16 737, 741 (BIA 2005) (defining pattern or practice of 

17 persecution as “systemic or pervasive” persecution); Santoso 

18 v. Holder, 580 F.3d 110, 112 & n.1 (2d Cir. 2009) (upholding 

19 denial of pattern or practice claim where under this “systemic 

20 or pervasive” standard). “[I]n order to establish 

21 eligibility for relief based exclusively on activities 
4

1 undertaken after [her] arrival in the United States, an alien 

2 must make some showing that authorities in [her] country of 

3 nationality are (1) aware of [her] activities or (2) likely 

4 to become aware of [her] activities.” Hongsheng Leng v. 

5 Mukasey, 528 F.3d 135, 137 (2d Cir. 2008).

6 Zheng does not allege that the Chinese government is 

7 aware of her religious practice, and she does not challenge 

8 the agency’s ruling that she had not shown a reasonable 

9 possibility that she would be singled out for persecution. 

10 Instead, Zheng argues that there is a reasonable possibility 

11 that the Chinese government will become aware of her religious 

12 practice because she intends to attend an underground church, 

13 and that there is a reasonable possibility that she will be 

14 persecuted as a result because the government has a pattern 

15 or practice of persecuting similarly situated Christians. 

16 However, the agency reasonably concluded that Zheng failed to 

17 show a pattern or practice of persecution of Christians who 

18 attend unregistered churches in China.

19 The State Department’s 2015 International Religious 

20 Freedom Report states that there are approximately 45 million 

21 Christians practicing in unregistered churches in China and 
5

1 that authorities in some areas of the country allow 

2 unregistered churches to hold services “provided they 

3 remained small in scale,” although authorities in other areas 

4 target and close such churches. See China 2015 Int’l 

5 Religious Freedom Rep. at 3, 14, available at 2009-

6 2017.state.gov/documents/organization/256309.pdf. It

7 further reports that China’s State Administration for 

8 Religious Affairs policy provides that “family and friends 

9 have the right to meet at home for worship, including prayer 

10 and Bible study, without registering with the government.”

11 Id. at 6. The other country conditions evidence Zheng 

12 submitted reflect abuses against people who are not similarly 

13 situated to Zheng—who testified that she would attend 

14 services at an unregistered church, but not that she would 

15 take a leadership role, proselytize, or engage in other 

16 activism—or concern areas of China other than Zheng’s native 

17 Fujian province. See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 

18 165–66, 174 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding that the BIA does not err 

19 in requiring localized evidence of persecution when the 

20 record reflected wide variances in how policies are 

21 understood and enforced throughout China). Similarly, 
6

1 although Zheng alleged that she had heard of people being 

2 persecuted for their religious beliefs, she did not provide 

3 details of specific instances of persecution of individuals 

4 for attending churches in in her home province. Cf. id. at 

5 160 (holding that “unattributed reports” of forced 

6 sterilizations absent “specificity as to number or 

7 circumstance” did not “demonstrate a reasonable possibility 

8 . . . [of] future persecution”).

9 Given the large number of Christians practicing in 

10 unregistered churches in China, the nationwide variation and 

11 the dearth of documented persecution of individual members of 

12 unregistered churches in Zheng’s home province, the agency 

13 reasonably concluded that Zheng failed to establish 

14 a pattern or practice of persecution of similarly situated 

15 individuals. See id. at 165–66, 174; see also Santoso, 580 

16 F.3d at 112 & n.1 (denying petition where agency considered 

17 background materials and rejected pattern or practice claim

18 because violence was localized). Accordingly, because Zheng

19 failed to demonstrate the well-founded fear of persecution 

20 needed for asylum, the agency did not err in finding that she 

21 failed to meet the higher standard for withholding of removal.
7

1 See Lecaj v. Holder, 616 F.3d 111, 119 (2d Cir. 2010).

2 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 

3 DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and 

4 stays VACATED.

5 FOR THE COURT: 

6 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,

7 Clerk of Court

8