* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### SEP 22 2004 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

DEAN H. CHRISTENSEN,

Plaintiff - Appellant, No. 04-4020
v. (D.C. No. 2:03CV304 PGC) UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,

Defendant - Appellee. (D. Utah)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before BRISCOE , McKAY , and HARTZ , Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff Dean Christensen brought four claims agai nst the Department of the Interior (DOI), alleging that its employees pro vided false information about him to a grand jury, the Internal Revenue Service, and the bankruptcy court. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, holding that three of the claims were barred by sovereign immunity, an d that the limitations period had expired with respect to the fourth. The distri ct court held, in the alternative,-2-

that Plaintiff’s fourth claim failed to state a cla im for which relief could be granted. Although Plaintiff was represented by counsel before the district court, he now appeals pro se. We review de novo a distric t court’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, and we accept findings of fact pertai ning to jurisdiction unless clearly erroneous. See Maestas v. Lujan , 351 F.3d 1001, 1013 (10th Cir. 2003). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and af firm. I. BACKGROUND We assume the truth of the factual allegations in P laintiff’s complaint. See Wyoming v. United States , 279 F.3d 1214, 1222 (10th Cir. 2002). In 1993 a grand jury was convened to investigate Plaintiff’s operation of oil wells and payment of royalties. Several DOI employees knowin gly gave false testimony that he had not paid certain royalties. In 1996 tw o DOI employees released their testimony to the IRS, which filed a $500,000 claim against Plaintiff. Plaintiff subsequently refuted this testimony, and the IRS cl aim was reduced to zero. Plaintiff subsequently filed a tort action against the DOI employees in Utah state court. The United States was substituted as a defendant and the action removed to federal court. The federal court dismis sed the complaint, directing Plaintiff to pursue administrative remedies throughthe DOI. See 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (under Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), cl aimant must exhaust administrative remedies before pursuing claims in f ederal court). After his claims-3-

were denied on October 7, 2002, Plaintiff filed sui t in federal district court. His complaint alleged federal question jurisdiction bas ed on (1) disclosure of grand jury testimony in violation of Federal Rule of Crim inal Procedure 6(e); (2) knowing disclosure of false information to a federa l bankruptcy court and grand jury under 16 U.S.C. § 1623; (3) filing a false cla im with a bankruptcy court under 18 U.S.C. § 152; and (4) disclosure of inform ation in violation of the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a. Plaintiff conceded in the district court that the f irst three claims were barred by sovereign immunity, but argued that the P rivacy Act claim waived sovereign immunity with respect to the other three claims. The district court did not address the argument because it found the Priva cy Act claim to be barred by the statute of limitations. In response to Plainti ff’s argument that the limitations period should have been tolled while he pursued adm inistrative remedies, the court found that the matter pursued administratively “involved different claims and does not create any basis for tolling the Priva cy Act statute of limitations.” R. Doc. 15 at 6. II. DISCUSSION The Privacy Act bars a federal agency from disclosi ng records unless certain conditions are met. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b). An action arising under the Privacy Act may be brought “within two years from the date on which the cause-4-

of action arises.” 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(5). A Priva cy Act cause of action arises when the plaintiff knew or had reason to know of th e violation. See Bergman v. United States , 751 F.2d 314, 316 (10th Cir. 1984). Plaintiff claims that the DOI employees wrongfully disclosed information to the IRS in December 1996 and admits that he learned of the disclosures by June 1999. Thus, the limitations period expired no later than two years later, in June 2001. Plaintiff filed his complaint in federa l district court on March 31, 2003. Although Plaintiff’s appellate brief is less than clear, he seems to argue that he met the limitations deadline because he filed his administrative claim in May 2001. The filing of Plaintiff’s administrative claim is i rrelevant to the Privacy Act limitations period, which applies to filing in fede ral court. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(5) (“[a]n action to enforce any liabilitycreated under this section may be brought in the district court of the United States . . . within two years from the date on which the cause of action arises. . . .”) ( emphasis added). Furthermore, there is no basis for tolling the limitations perio d while Plaintiff pursued his administrative claim, because there is no administr ative exhaustion requirement when a plaintiff seeks damages under the Privacy Ac t, see, e.g. , Quinn v. Stone , 978 F.2d 126, 137 & n.22 (3d Cir. 1992); Diedrich v . Department of Army , 878 F.2d 646, 647-48 (2d Cir. 1989), and thus, there wa s no impediment to raising-5-

Privacy Act claims in federal court while Plaintiff’s administrative claims were pending. III. CONCLUSION We therefore AFFIRM the judgment of the district co urt. ENTERED FOR THE COURT

Harris L Hartz Circuit Judge