United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 12-1348

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United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Ryan Christopher Lumpkins, also known as Dale E. Hubbard

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

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 Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Western District of Missouri - Kansas City

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 Submitted: June 13, 2012

 Filed: August 6, 2012

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Before LOKEN, GRUENDER, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

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GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.

Ryan Lumpkins entered a conditional plea of guilty to possession with intent

to distribute cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) and

possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 924(c). He now appeals the denial by the district court of his motion to 1

suppress evidence obtained from a warrantless search of a rental vehicle, as well as

the district court’s determination that he is a career offender for purposes of the

United States Sentencing Guidelines. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.

On the afternoon of February 3, 2011, two officers of the Kansas City Police

Department patrolling in a car observed a 2010 Ford Taurus with heavily tinted

windows pass by. Because the officers believed the tint was sufficiently dark to

violate a Kansas City ordinance, they followed the vehicle to investigate. The vehicle

pulled into the driveway of a nearby residence, and the officers pulled in behind it and

activated the emergency lights of the squad car. The driver, Lumpkins, exited the

vehicle, looked at the officers, and started walking away at a casual pace. One of the

officers made eye contact with Lumpkins and asked him to “come here,” and

Lumpkins refused, replying that he was on private property. The officers placed him

in handcuffs out of concern for officer safety. Because the side and rear windows of

the vehicle were effectively blacked out, one officer looked through the front

windshield of the vehicle “just to verify that we didn’t have a threat in the car.” 

While verifying that the vehicle had no other occupants, the officer noticed a

plastic bag holding a green leafy substance in the center console that appeared

consistent with how the officer had “seen marijuana bags packaged in the past.” He

also noticed what appeared to be a small marijuana blunt in the cup holder-ashtray

area. The officers attempted to seize the contraband but discovered that the doors of

the vehicle were locked and, in addition, that the keys to the vehicle were lying on the

driver’s seat, locked inside.

The Honorable Howard F. Sachs, United States DistrictJudge for the Western 1

District of Missouri, adopting the report and recommendation ofthe Honorable Sarah

W. Hays, United States Magistrate Judge for the Western District of Missouri.

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The officers soon learned from a status check on the vehicle’s license plates

that it was registered to Budget Rent-a-Car. It had been rented by Latisha Hughes. 

Lumpkins was not listed as an authorized driver. Hughes was present at the residence

and came outside to talk to the officers, but she did not have a spare key and refused

to give consent for the officers to enter the vehicle. The officers contacted Budget

Rent-a-Car and explained the situation to Michelle Konecny, a local office manager. 

Konecny informed the officers that the vehicle was overdue for return and that

Budget had been demanding its return from Hughes for several days. Konecny

requested that the officers wait with the vehicle until she arrived to take custody of

it.

When Konecny arrived, she showed the officers proof of ownership of the

vehicle and unlocked it remotely with a spare set of keys. She then consented to a

search of the vehicle. A drug dog which had been brought to the scene immediately

alerted to the center console, and the previously observed marijuana was removed. 

The drug dog alerted again to the center console, however, and the officers

discovered crack cocaine, powder cocaine, ecstasy pills, and more marijuana within

the console. They also discovered a Herstal 5.7 x 28 handgun under the driver’s seat. 

The handgun was loaded with twenty rounds of ammunition capable of penetrating

bullet-proof vests.

After his indictment, Lumpkins moved to suppress the drugs and firearm

recovered fromthe vehicle, arguing that the search was not valid under any exception

to the Fourth Amendment. The district court denied the motion on each of several

alternative grounds, including that Konecny validly consented to the search. 

Lumpkins subsequently pled guilty pursuant to a written plea agreement, conditioned

on his right to pursue this appeal.

When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we review “the district

court’s findings of fact for clear error and its determinations of probable cause and

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reasonable suspicion de novo.” United States v. Robinson, 664 F.3d 701, 703 (8th

Cir. 2011).

Lumpkins contends that the warrantless search of the vehicle was not justified

under any exceptions to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. We disagree 2

and hold that the search was valid pursuant to the consent obtained from Konecny. 

“[A] vehicle search pursuant to voluntary consent from a third party with authority

over the vehicle does not violate the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Chavez

Loya, 528 F.3d 546, 554 (8th Cir. 2008).

The rental contract for the vehicle stated, “If Renter fails to return the vehicle

. . . within 24 hours following . . . oral demand . . . Renter will be deemed to be in

unlawful possession ofthe vehicle.” It is undisputed thatBudget personnel contacted

Hughes and made an oral demand for the return of the vehicle on January 31; thus,

by February 3, the day of the search, Hughes’s possession was in violation of the

agreement. The rental agreement further provided that “[t]he vehicle may be

repossessed . . . without notice if it . . . is used in violation of law or of this

agreement.” Therefore, when Konecny arrived as a representative of Budget, she had

the authority to take immediate custody of the vehicle and to give valid consent to a

search of the vehicle. 

The parties dispute whether Lumpkins had a reasonable expectation of privacy 2

in the vehicle so asto confer standing to challenge the search. While Lumpkins, who

was not listed as an authorized driver on the rental agreement, had permission from

Hughes to use the vehicle, cf. United States v. Best, 135 F.3d 1223, 1225 (8th Cir.

1998); United States v. Muhammad, 58 F.3d 353, 355 (8th Cir. 1995) (per curiam),

by February 3 Hughes’s own authorization arguably had been revoked. For purposes

of our analysis, we assume without deciding that Lumpkins had standing to challenge

the search.

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Lumpkins, relying on Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006), argues that

Konecny’s consent to the search was invalid in the face of contemporaneous refusals

of consent from Hughes and Lumpkins. See id. at 122-23 (holding that “a physically

present inhabitant’s express refusal of consent to a police search is dispositive as to

him, regardless of the consent of a fellow occupant”). It is not clear that Randolph,

which involved a search of a residence, applies in the context of a vehicle search. See

id. at 115 (relying on the “centuries-old principle of respect for the privacy of the

home” and noting that “it is beyond dispute that the home is entitled to special

protection as the center of the private lives of our people” (quotations omitted)); cf.

Chavez Loya, 528 F.3d at 555 (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148 (1978)

(“We have on numerous occasions pointed out that cars are not to be treated

identically with houses or [a]partments for Fourth Amendment purposes.”)). In any

event, neither Lumpkins nor Hughes would qualify as a “fellow occupant,” Randolph,

547 U.S. at 123, of the vehicle for purposes of Randolph after Konecny arrived to

repossess it. There is no “commonly held understanding” in society that a driver of

an overdue rental car, on notice that the rental car company is entitled to repossess its

vehicle at any time, nevertheless may exercise authority over the vehicle contrary to

the repossessor’s. See id. at 111.

Because consent for the search was validly obtained, the warrantless search of

the vehicle did not violate the Fourth Amendment. See Chavez Loya, 528 F.3d at

554.3

Additionally, while Lumpkins does not dispute that the traffic stop to

investigate his illegally tinted windows was valid, he argues that his nearly immediate

detention and placement in handcuffs constituted an arrest without probable cause. 

The district court rejected this argument, finding that Lumpkins was not under arrest

Because we find the warrantless search valid on the basis of consent, we need 3

not address the alternative theories advanced by the Government to justify the search.

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at the time of his initial detention and that the detention was “reasonably related in

scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” Terry

v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968). However, we need not decide the question of whether

Lumpkins’s initial detention violated the Fourth Amendment. Even assuming that it

did, we have held in similar circumstances that, where consent to search a vehicle is

validlyobtained, a preceding illegal seizure and detention of another vehicle occupant

is “independent and separate from the discovery of” contraband in the vehicle. 

United States v. Green, 275 F.3d 694, 700 (8th Cir. 2001). That rule applies here

because Konecny, like the consenting vehicle occupant in Green, gave authoritative

consent to the search of the vehicle. Thus, “the discovery of drugs [and a firearm] in

the car is not a ‘fruit’ of [Lumpkins’s] illegal detention” and suppression of that

evidence is not warranted. See id. at 699.

Finally, Lumpkins challengesthe application ofthe career-offender provisions

of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 to the calculation of his advisory sentencing guidelines range. 

However, Lumpkins’s plea agreement “expressly waives his right to appeal his

sentence . . . on any ground except claims of (1) ineffective assistance of counsel; (2)

prosecutorial misconduct; or (3) an illegal sentence.” Moreover, the plea agreement

specifies that “a misapplication of the Sentencing Guidelines” is not an “illegal

sentence” for purposes of the waiver. We can identify nothing in the record to

suggest that this waiver was unknowing, involuntary, or would result in a miscarriage

of justice. See United States v. Birbragher, 603 F.3d 478, 491 (8th Cir. 2010). 

Accordingly, we enforce Lumpkins’s waiver of the right to appeal his sentence, and

we decline to reach the merits of his § 4B1.1 claim. See id. at 492.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the denial of the motion to suppress and

the sentence pronounced by the district court.

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