UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-4348

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

DEON DINKINS,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Columbia. Cameron McGowan Currie, District 

Judge. (3:11-cr-02061-CMC-1)

Submitted: September 26, 2012 Decided: October 22, 2012

Before MOTZ and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Katherine E. Evatt, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Columbia, 

South Carolina, for Appellant. William N. Nettles, United 

States Attorney, William K. Witherspoon, Assistant United States 

Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Deon Dinkins pled guilty to being a felon in 

possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) 

(2006), and was sentenced to 180 months’ imprisonment. On 

appeal, Dinkins challenges the district court’s denial of his 

motions to suppress evidence and his statements to police. We 

affirm.

We review the factual findings underlying a district 

court’s ruling on a motion to suppress for clear error and its 

legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Foster, 634 F.3d 

243, 246 (4th Cir. 2011). When evaluating the denial of a 

suppression motion, we construe the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the Government. Id. 

The evidence and statements that Dinkins sought to 

suppress resulted from the execution of a search warrant on 

Dinkins’ residence. Dinkins first argues that the district 

court erred in concluding that probable cause supported the 

issuance of the search warrant in this case. When presented 

with an application for a search warrant, the magistrate’s task 

“is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, 

given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before 

him, . . . there is a fair probability that contraband or 

evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.”

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). The reviewing 
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court must determine whether the warrant application “provide[d] 

the magistrate with a substantial basis for determining the 

existence of probable cause.” Id. at 239. Reviewing courts 

accord great deference to a magistrate’s probable cause 

determination. United States v. Clyburn, 24 F.3d 613, 617 (4th 

Cir. 1994).

We have reviewed the record and agree with the 

district court that the magistrate had a substantial basis to 

conclude that probable cause existed to support issuance of a 

search warrant of Dinkins’ residence. Therefore, the district 

court did not err in denying Dinkins’ motion to suppress the 

evidence discovered in the search.

Dinkins also challenges the denial of his motion to 

suppress an incriminating statement regarding his ownership of 

the firearm, claiming he was not advised of his rights as 

required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). However, 

the district court found credible the testimony of two arresting 

officers that verbal Miranda warnings were issued prior to 

Dinkins’ statement.

We defer to the district court’s credibility 

determinations, “for it is the role of the district court to 

observe witnesses and weigh their credibility during a pre-trial 

motion to suppress.” United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 

232 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have 
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reviewed the record, and conclude that the district court’s 

credibility findings are not clearly erroneous, and that, 

construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

Government, the court did not err in denying the motion to 

suppress the contested statement. Although Dinkins argues on 

appeal that his claim is supported by the lack of a written 

waiver, a written waiver is not required under Miranda. See

North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979).

We therefore affirm the judgment of the district 

court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process. 

AFFIRMED