ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE ATTORNEY FOR AMICI CURIAE

Anthony W. Overholt Alan S. Townsend James W. Beatty 

Maggie L. Smith George T. Patton, Jr. Indianapolis, Indiana 

Indianapolis, Indiana Paul D. Vink 

 Indianapolis, Indiana Indiana Builders Association 

 Indiana School Boards Association 

 Simon Property Group, Inc. 

 C.P. Morgan Communities, L.P. 

 The Broadbent Company 

 Duke Realty Corporation 

 R. H. of Indiana, L.P. 

 Platinum Properties, LLC 

 J. Greg Allen and Associates, LLC 

 REI Real Estate Services, LLC 

 Buckingham Properties, Inc. 

 Cedar Run Limited, Inc. 

 Michael J. Andreoli 

 James F. Beatty 

 Lee T. Comer 

 James A. Federoff 

 Charles D. Frankenberger 

 Steven D. Hardin 

 Michael J. Kias 

 Jack W. Lawson 

 Stephen D. Mears 

 Ronald R. Pritzke 

 Thomas Michael Quinn 

 Joseph Bumbleburg 

________________________________________________________________________ 

In the 

Indiana Supreme Court 

_________________________________ 

No. 49S05-0511-CV-510 

METRO. DEV. COMM’N

OF MARION COUNTY, ET AL., 

Appellants (Defendants below),

v. 

PINNACLE MEDIA, LLC, 

Appellee (Plaintiff below). 
_________________________________ 

Appeal from the Marion Superior Court, No. 49D02-0201-PL-000078 

The Honorable Kenneth H. Johnson, Judge 

_________________________________ 

On Petition for Rehearing 

_________________________________ 

May 3, 2006 

Sullivan, Justice. 

Pinnacle Media, LLC, has asked us to reconsider our opinion, Metro. Dev. 

Comm’n of Marion County v. Pinnacle Media, LLC, 836 N.E.2d 422 (Ind. 2005), in 

which we held that a change in the zoning ordinance of Marion County concerning billboard location permits was applicable to Pinnacle’s plan to erect 10 billboards in Indianapolis. We grant rehearing to address the issues raised by Pinnacle and also those raised 

in an amici curiae brief. 

We start by saying that both Pinnacle and amici read our opinion as constituting a 

dramatic change in land use law. It does not. 

This case had its genesis in Pinnacle’s plan to erect billboards in interstate highway rights-of-way in Marion County. Because those rights-of-way are owned by the 

State, Pinnacle applied to the state highway department for permits. These applications 

were filed on April 19, 2000. At the time the applications were filed, Marion County did 

not require billboard location permits for billboards erected in interstate highway rightsof-way, but it began formal consideration of an ordinance to that effect on April 26, 2000, 

and enacted the ordinance on July 10, 2000. Eleven months later, on June 18, 2001, the 

State approved Pinnacle’s applications for 10 billboards. 

Pinnacle offered our decision in Knutson v. State ex rel. Seberger, 239 Ind. 656, 

160 N.E.2d 200 (1959) (on reh’g), as authority for why the Marion County ordinance 

should not be applied to its billboard project. In Knutson, we said that a zoning ordi2 
nance could not be enacted with retroactive effect depriving a property owner of the right 

to a building permit in accordance with a zoning ordinance in effect at the time of the application for the permit. Knutson, 239 Ind. at 667, 160 N.E.2d at 201 (citing State ex rel. 

Fairmount Center Co. v. Arnold, 34 N.E.2d 777 (Ohio 1941)). 

The key principle at stake in this case—the principal point debated in the parties’ 

briefs in the Court of Appeals—is that changes in zoning ordinances are subject to any 

vested rights in the property. This principle is of constitutional dimension, as our original 

opinion makes clear, and we reaffirm it here. As noted, Knutson said that a zoning ordinance could not be enacted with retroactive effect depriving a property owner of the right 

to a building permit in accordance with a zoning ordinance in effect at the time of the application for the permit. Id. This is certainly so where a property owner has vested rights 

in the property, but Knutson suggested something more, namely, that the mere filing of a 

building permit was enough to create vested rights in the first place. We only overruled 

Knutson’s “suggestion that having a building permit on file creates a vested right that 

cannot be overcome by a change in zoning law.” Pinnacle Media, LLC, 836 N.E.2d at 

428. The fundamental principle that changes in zoning ordinances are subject to any 

vested rights in the property remains in full force and effect. 

In the first two sections of its Petition for Rehearing, Pinnacle argues that our 

original opinion’s treatment of Knutson was incorrect and should be reversed. We will 

return to Knutson in a moment when we consider the amici brief. But our decision that 

Pinnacle was required to comply with the Marion County ordinance stands on grounds 

independent of our holding with respect to Knutson. “Regardless of Knutson’s viability, 

we do not believe its rule is available to Pinnacle in this case.” Id.

Simply put, we held that the Marion County ordinance was in effect 11 months 

before Pinnacle began construction, and so Pinnacle was subject to it. Id. at 429. While 

recognizing that local zoning ordinances can require billboard location permits along 

state highways, Br. of Appellee at 6 n.6, Pinnacle had argued that in this case its filing for 

State permits immunized it from the City’s zoning change. We rejected that contention 

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on a number of grounds in our original opinion, Pinnacle Media, LLC, 836 N.E.2d at 

429, and Pinnacle does not challenge that reasoning on rehearing. Rather, it contends 

that had it not been for “collusion” between the State and the City so that the City could 

“ambush[]” Pinnacle with the new ordinance, the State would have issued its permits in 

time for Pinnacle to have started construction of the signs—and thereby acquire vested 

rights—before the change in the law. Pet. for Reh’g at 13. Absent any citation to any 

evidence in the record supporting these “collusion” and “ambush” contentions, we are 

unable to grant Pinnacle relief on this basis.1

We now turn to the amici brief. It does not argue for Pinnacle’s billboards. 

“Amici do not care whether the signs that Pinnacle has built stay or go.” Amici Curiae 

Br. in Support of Appellee’s Pet. for Reh’g at 6. Rather, it makes two basic points. First, 

it takes issue with our holding with respect to Knutson: 

In short, the “mere filing” for a permit as characterized by 

the Court is far from “mere.” It invokes the expenditure of 

a tremendous amount of time, effort and money; however, 

as amici read the opinion of the Court, the property owner 

is not safe, even though he has spent a tremendous amount 

of money, time and effort. He is at the whim of the legislative or administrative body until such time as he actually 

starts construction. 

Id. at 5 (citation omitted). 

Respectfully, we believe the amici brief does not read our opinion correctly. 

Again, our opinion held only that Knutson’s “suggestion that having a building permit on 

file creates a vested right that cannot be overcome by a change in zoning law.” Pinnacle 

Media, LLC, 836 N.E.2d at 428. The point is that the focus is on whether or not vested 

rights exist, not whether some filing has been made with a government agency, a filing 

that might be purely ministerial and represent no material expenditure of money, time, or 

 

1

 Recently Pinnacle submitted to us legislation enacted by the 2006 General Assembly, P.L. 49-

2006, that it asks we apply in this case. Contrary to Pinnacle’s contention, we see nothing in the 

legislation evidencing intent on the part of the Legislature that it have retroactive effect. 

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effort. We acknowledge, as perhaps our original opinion should have, that vested rights 

may well accrue prior to the filing of certain applications. (We saw no evidence of 

vested rights having accrued in the facts of this case and indeed it was Pinnacle’s position 

that under Indiana law “mere application for a permit . . . grant[s] an applicant a vested 

right to have its application construed in accordance with existing law.” Br. of Appellee 

at 15.) It is beyond the scope of this opinion, and unfair to future litigants, to respond to 

the hypothetical scenarios set forth in the amici brief, but we believe our original opinion 

establishes a basic framework for such analysis in future cases that will protect vested 

rights to the full extent the Constitution requires. 

The second point made by the amici brief is that our decision allows “one governmental agency, whether local, state or federal, . . . the authority to hold the developer 

hostage until such time as a new ordinance or new regulation can be enacted by another 

governmental agency which prohibits the development that the developer intends to construct.” Amici Curiae Br. in Support of Appellee’s Pet. for Reh’g at 6. The amici brief 

illustrates this concern with a lengthy narrative (2-1/2 pages of the 9-page brief) about 

local opposition to a Wal-Mart store in Crown Point, Indiana. We make three brief 

points in response. First, we do not believe that our original opinion stands for the proposition that one governmental agency may hold a developer hostage for the benefit of another. As noted above, Pinnacle made no such assertion that that is what happened in this 

case until its petition for rehearing. Second, it is not clear to us which governmental 

agency is holding the Crown Point Wal-Mart developer hostage for the benefit of another. Third, although both amici and Pinnacle itself seem to contend that our original 

opinion will make it more difficult to develop Wal-Marts (id. at 7-9; Pet. for Reh’g at 3-

4), we can only say that our opinion stands for the proposition that changes in zoning ordinances are subject to any vested rights. To the extent that a Wal-Mart developer—or 

any other property owner—possesses vested rights in property, those rights will be protected, as the Constitution demands. 

Shepard, C.J., and Dickson, Boehm, and Rucker, JJ., concur. 

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