NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v. DAVID WAYNE HODGE,

Defendant

- Appellant. No. 20

- 30155
D.C. No. 2:17

- cr - 00266

- TSZ

- 1

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington Thomas S. Zilly, District Judge, Presiding Submitted November 16, 2020 * * San Francisco, California Before: NGUYEN, HURWITZ, and BRESS, Circuit Judges. David Wayne Hodge appeals from the revocation of his supervised release and the sentence imposed

. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 , and we
affirm.
About six months after Hodge began a period of supervised release , the

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

NOV 19 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2

Probation Office filed a report alleging several violations of his terms of release , including driving with a suspended license and attempting to elud e a police vehicle in the early morning hours of June 3, 2020 , in violation of Wash. Rev. Code §
46.61.024

. After a hearing at which the district court heard testimony from Hodge’s Probation Officer and Seattle police officer Chesney , the district court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Hodge had committe d the eluding and driving on suspended license violations, among others . The district court

sentence d Hodge to six months of imprisonment , to be followed by thirty months of supervision. Hodge argues the evidence is insufficient to prove that he drove t he vehicle in question , or that he drove in a “reckless manner , ” which is an element of attempting to elude. 1 Wash. Rev. Code § 46.61.024 (1)

. W e ask whether “ viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of a violation by a preponderance of the
evidence .” United States v. Ochoa , 932 F.3d 866, 869 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. King , 608 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2010))

. 1. The evidence is sufficien t to prove that Hodge was driving the car.

1 To the extent Hodge challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting other violations, he fails to provide specific and distinct argumen ts , and therefore has forfeited th ose issues. See Koerner v. Grigas , 328 F.3d 1039, 1048 (9th Cir. 2003)

.3

Officer Chesney testified to his familiarity with Hodge’s physical appearance from prior investigative work. He also noted that Hodge usually has a thick beard and a shaved head, which made him “relatively easy to distinguish.” Chesney stated he

saw Hodge a “minimum” of twice in the same car in the weeks prior to the June 3 , 2020 incident: first, “in the driver[’s] seat ” of the car while it was parked by a Walgreens; and second , in the car by a liquor store. Chesney testified that on June 3, 2020 , he recognized the car and followed it to identify the driver. A s Chesney approached the car from behind in his patrol car, he saw Hodge’s face in the
driver’s side mirror . W hen Chesney pulled up to the right of the car at a stoplight,
he also saw Hodge’s profile. T here were no obstructions , and the streetlights were

on
. Chesney stated he was “100 percent confident” in the identification.

T he Probation Officer’s testimony also support ed the fi nding that Hodge
was the driver. The Probation Officer described social media posts from the same period , in which Hodge appear s in the driver’s seat of a car that matched the one in question

. 2. The evidence is also sufficient to prove that Hodge drove in a reckless

manner
. Wash. Rev. Code § 46.61.024(1); State v. Perez , 269 P.3d 372, 374

- 75 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012)

. R eckless manner “means ‘a rash or heedless manner, with indifference to the conseq uences.’” State v. Naillieux , 241 P.3d 1280, 1286 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010) (quoting State v. Ratliff , 164 P.3d 516, 518 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007)).4

The government need not prove that the defendant endangered anyone else or that there was a high probability of a ctual harm. State v. Refuerzo , 7 P.3d 847, 851 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000).
The district court ’s finding that Hodge drove in a reckless manner is ampl y support ed by the record. Officer Chesney testified that Hodge sped away “in the neighborhood or faster than 50 miles an hour” down Cherry Stree t , a twenty

- five miles per hour zone , then turned onto 27th Avenue , a twenty miles per hour zone. Cherry Street narrows to a single lane in each direction in a residential area with parking on either side, and 27th Avenue is an “extremely narrow” and “very dark” street with space for just one car to pass at a time and a foot or two of clearance on
each side. The government also submitted dashcam footage of the car speeding

away , and the subsequent police pursuit

. Hodge argues that his speed, without more, is not enough to show that he drove in a reckless manner. The argument fails for at least two reasons. First , the
district court found that Hodge drove recklessly because of his speed and because
the incident wa s in residential area
. “ R eckless manner ” driving flow s logically
from the surrounding circumstances, like the parked cars and narrow streets

. Second, a rational trier of fact could find by a preponderance of the evidence , which included Officer Chesney’s testimony and the dashcam footage, that Hodge
drove in a r eckless manner with indifference to the consequences

. Ochoa , 9325

F.3d at 869

. 3. F inally, Hodge argu e s the district court miscalculated the sentencing guideline s range based on its mistaken conclusion that Hodge attempted to elude the police, a Gra d e B violation. Because the attempting to elude violation stands , so does the Grade B determination and resulting sentence.
AFFIRMED.