alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

November 10, 2016

No. 04

- 15

- 00806

- CR

Michael Wilfred LAFLAMME,

Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas, Appellee

From the 406th Judicial District Court, Webb County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2013CRW160

- D4 Honorable Oscar J. Hale, Jr., Judge Presiding



### O R D E R

Appellant ’s retained counsel, Ms. Angela Moore

, filed appellant’s brief on August 23,

2016. The State filed its brief on October 12, 2016

.

On October 5, 2016, Ms. Moore filed a Motion to Withdraw as Attorney of Record. We

remanded the cause to the trial court for it to make appropriate findings and rul ing s . In accordance with our order, the trial court conducted a hearing on October 27, 201 6 and (1) granted Ms. Moore’s motion to withdraw , (2) found that appellant desire d to prosecute his appeal , and (3) allowed appellant to represent himself in this appeal.

In the meantime, appellant has filed a pro se motion for an extension of time in wh ich to

file a response to the State’s brief and a pro se Motion to File Amendment to Appellant’s Brief

. The motion s are GRANTED. Appellant’s pro se amended brief, which may also respond to the State’s brief, is due no later than December 7 , 2016

.

_________________________________ Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said

court on this 10th day of November, 2016

.

___________________________________ Keith E. Hottle

Clerk of Court
§ 1471.760 How long may my suspension last? ( a ) If legal or debarment proceedings are initiated at the time of, or during your suspension, the suspension may continue until the conclusion of those proceedings. However, if proceedings are not initiated, a suspension may not exceed 12 months.
( b ) The suspending official may extend the 12 month limit under paragraph (a) of this section for an additional 6 months if an office of a U.S. Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Attorney, or other responsible prosecuting official requests an extension in writing. In no event may a suspension exceed 18 months without initiating proceedings under paragraph (a) of this section.
( c ) The suspending official must notify the appropriate officials under paragraph (b) of this section of an impending termination of a suspension at least 30 days before the 12 month period expires to allow the officials an opportunity to request an extension.
Exhibit
4.9

    

    


    Power of
Attorney

    


    September
9, 2008

    
       

      
        	Appointee: 	
                NHN Games
      Co., Ltd.

                Address:
      6th Fl., 102-Dong I-Park Bundang Bldg., Jeongja-dong,
      Bundang-gu,

                Seongnam-si,
      Gyeonggi-do, Korea
      
                  Business
      Registration Number:
220-86-93752

                

              


      

      
 

    

    In
accordance with Article 86-6 of the Presidential Decree to the Securities and
Exchange Act of Korea, the undersigned hereby appoints the Appointee as the
attorney-in-fact, with full authority to exercise any power or act on behalf of
the undersigned with respect to the matters arising in connection with Section
200-2 of the Securities and Exchange Act of Korea, and agrees to report as a
co-owner when filing significant equity ownership reports.

    


     

    
      
        	Authorizer:	
                /s/
      Hyung-Cheol Kim

                Address:
      Daelim Acrotel Building 6th Fl, 467-6 Dogok-Dong
      
                  Kangnam-Gu,
      Seoul,Korea 135-971
#### ZOUZOULAS v ADAMS

Case No. CJAP: 86-5

Ninth Judicial Circuit, Orange County

November 26, 1986

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

William J. Sheaffer for appellant.

Belvin Perry, Jr., Assistant State Attorney, for appellee.

OPINION OF THE COURT

LAWRENCE R. KIRKWOOD, Circuit Judge.

Attorney, Alex Zouzoulas, appeals his Adjudication and Sentence for Direct Criminal Contempt, contending that due process was not afforded him under Rule 3.830, Fla. R. Cr. P. The Court agrees and reverses the adjudication and sentence.

The record of the proceedings reflect the following:

MR. ZOUZOULAS: I would just like to state for the record, this prosecutor’s position with respect to this is kind of peculiar, in light of the zealousness with which the Orange County State Attorney’s Office prosecutes people in this county. I *104find it kind of peculiar that they have this deep and grave concern for the . . .

MR. BERMAN: (Interposing) I don’t believe . . .

MR. ZOUZOULAS: (Interposing) Excuse me — excuse me — somebody might incriminate himself, and that that person might subject himself to criminal liability. I’m not going to pursue the questioning any further.

THE COURT: Mr. Zouzoulas, I find your remarks regarding the State Attorney in open court to be contemptuous and I am going to fine you $50.00.

The record of this case clearly shows that- the trial judge failed to provide due process. No effort was made to comply with the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 3.830. The Judgment and Sentence did not include a recital of the facts upon which the adjudication of guilty was based. The trial judge did not inquire as to whether Mr. Zouzoulas had any cause to show why he should not be adjudicated guilty of Contempt of COurt. The trial judge did not present Mr. Zouzoulas with an opportunity to present evidence of excuse or mitigation. The case law requires that the trial judge substantially comply with the Rule and failing to do so is an abuse of discretion.

Adjudication and Sentence is REVERSED.
PUBLIC LAW 113–145—AUG. 4, 2014 128 STAT. 1753 

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY—H.J. Res. 76: 

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD: 

Vol. 159 (2013): Oct. 11, considered and passed House. 

Vol. 160 (2014): Aug. 1, considered and passed Senate, amended. House 

concurred in Senate amendments. 

Æ 

Public Law 113–145 

113th Congress 

Joint Resolution 

Making an emergency supplemental appropriation for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2014, to provide funding to Israel for the Iron Dome defense system 

to counter short-range rocket threats. 

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the

United States of America in Congress assembled, That the following sum is appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury 

not otherwise appropriated, for the fiscal year ending September 

30, 2014, and for other purposes, namely: 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

PROCUREMENT 

PROCUREMENT, DEFENSE-WIDE

For an additional amount for ‘‘Procurement, Defense-Wide’’, 

$225,000,000, to remain available until September 30, 2015, which 

shall be for the Secretary of Defense to provide to the Government 

of Israel for the procurement of the Iron Dome defense system 

to counter short-range rocket threats: Provided, That such funds 

shall be transferred immediately only through an exchange of letters 

to address emergent operations in support of Operation Protective 

Edge, notwithstanding section 3.1.3.2.1 of the U.S.-Israel Iron Dome 

Procurement Agreement: Provided further, That nothing in this 

paragraph shall be construed to apply to previously appropriated 

funds for the procurement of Iron Dome: Provided further, That 

such amount is designated by the Congress as an emergency 

requirement pursuant to section 251(b)(2)(A)(i) of the Balanced 

Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985. 

This joint resolution may be cited as the ‘‘Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Resolution, 2014’’. 

Approved August 4, 2014. 

Emergency 

Supplemental 

Appropriations 

Resolution, 2014. 

Aug. 4, 2014 

[H.J. Res. 76] 


ccoleman on DSK8P6SHH1 with PUBLAWLAW
Order entered July 19, 2013

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-13-00476-CV

EX PARTE: RAYMOND TERRELL RADWAY

On Appeal from the 397th Judicial District Court

Grayson County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. CV-12-1244

ORDER

We GRANT appellant’s July 17, 2013 motion for an extension of time to file a brief. 

Appellant shall file a brief on or before August 21, 2013.

/s/ CAROLYN WRIGHT

CHIEF JUSTICE
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 02-6679

BILLY LAND,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

THEODIS BECK, Secretary of Correction; JAMES

B. BENNETT, Director of Prisons; GRADY J.

HAYNES, Superintendent of Warren Correctional;

HATTIE B. PIMPONG, Chief Disciplinary Hearing

Officer; ROBERT TERRY, JR., Hearing Officer;

LT. NORWOOD; J. R. JAMES, Lieutenant; T.

BROWN, Officer; D. HARDING, Officer; A.

PATTERSON,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle, Chief

District Judge. (CA-01-533-5-BO)

Submitted: June 20, 2002 Decided: June 27, 2002

Before MICHAEL and KING, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Billy Land, Appellant Pro Se.
2

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).

PER CURIAM:

Billy Land, a Virginia prisoner, appeals the district court’s

order denying his self-styled “motion for hearing.” We have

reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion and find no

reversible error. Land claims the district court must conduct a

hearing to determine the constitutionality of a refundable ten

dollar administrative fee imposed upon inmates who file internal

grievances against prison officials. We have already rejected

Land’s claim in a prior opinion. See Land v. Beck, No. 01-7386,

slip op. (4th Cir. Dec. 28, 2001). Therefore, Land’s claim is

barred under principles of res judicata. Accordingly, we affirm

the judgment of the district court. We dispense with oral argument

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in

the materials before the court and argument would not aid the

decisional process.

AFFIRMED
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Emery Miller, Appellant.

[698 NYS2d 881]

—Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Martin, J.), rendered January 5, 1998, convicting him of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

During voir dire, the defense counsel exercised a peremptory challenge to four white prospective jurors, and the prosecutor raised a revers *e-Batson*objection *(see, Batson v Kentucky,*476 US 79; *People v Kern,*75 NY2d 638, *cert denied*498 US 824). The defense counsel offered facially race-neutral explanations, including his assessment that one of the challenged prospective jurors was “a little overweight”, and “seemed a little unhealthy”, and she might be unable to sit through a week or more of testimony. Thereafter, the court denied the defendant’s peremptory challenge to that prospective juror, finding that the explanation was pretextual. We agree.

The racially-motivated use of peremptory challenges by either the defense or the prosecution violates the Equal Protection Clause of both the State and Federal Constitutions (see, *479
      *Hernandez v New York,*500 US 352; *Batson v Kentucky,*476 US 79, *supra; People v Kern,*75 NY2d 638, *cert denied*498 US 824, supra; *People v Thomas,*210 AD2d 515).

The Supreme Court properly determined that the explanation proffered by the defense counsel was a mere pretext offered in an attempt to conceal a racially-discriminatory intent *(see, People v Hawthorne,*80 NY2d 873; *People v Jupiter,*210 AD2d 431; *People v McCoy,*210 AD2d 508; *People v Dixon,*202 AD2d 12). The determination of the Supreme Court is entitled to great deference on appeal and will not be disturbed where, as here, it is supported by the record *(see, Hernandez v New York, supra; People v Garcia,*239 AD2d 599; *People v Guess,*208 AD2d 559; *People v Jones,*204 AD2d 485; *People v Bailey,*200 AD2d 677; *People v Mondello,*191 AD2d 462). O’Brien, J. P., Krausman, Florio and Feuerstein, JJ., concur.
# EUR-Lex - 31998R2720 - EN

Avis juridique important

*|*

# 31998R2720

**Commission Regulation (EC) No 2720/98 of 16 December 1998 amending Regulation (EEC) No 1164/89 laying down detailed rules concerning the aid for fibre flax and hemp **

*
Official Journal L 342 , 17/12/1998 P. 0018 - 0018 *

COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 2720/98 of 16 December 1998 amending Regulation (EEC) No 1164/89 laying down detailed rules concerning the aid for fibre flax and hemp

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 1308/70 of 29 June 1970 on the common organisation of the market in flax and hemp (1), as last amended by the Act of Accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden and by Regulation (EC) No 3290/94 (2), and in particular Article 4(5) thereof,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 619/71 of 22 March 1971 laying down general rules for granting aid for flax and hemp (3), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 1420/98 (4), and in particular Article 5(2) thereof,

Whereas Annex B to Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1164/89 (5), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 2021/98 (6), contains a list of the varieties of hemp eligible for aid; whereas, since it has been established that certain new varieties meet the requirements of the third subparagraph of Article 3(1) of Regulation (EEC) No 619/71, that Annex should be supplemented;

Whereas the measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Flax and Hemp,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

The varieties 'Fedora 17`, 'Felina 32`, 'Futura 75` and 'Dioica 88` are added to Annex B to Regulation (EEC) No 1164/89.

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on the seventh day following its publication in the Official Journal of the European Communities.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 16 December 1998.

For the Commission

Franz FISCHLER

Member of the Commission

(1) OJ L 146, 4. 7. 1970, p. 1.

(2) OJ L 349, 31. 12. 1994, p. 105.

(3) OJ L 72, 26. 3. 1971, p. 2.

(4) OJ L 190, 4. 7. 1998, p. 7.

(5) OJ L 121, 29. 4. 1989, p. 4.

(6) OJ L 261, 24. 9. 1998, p. 8.
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Small Business Administration

          - [Declaration of Disaster #3252] 

As a result of the President's major disaster declaration on May 3, 2000, I find that Crawford, Labette, and Neosho Counties in the State of Kansas constitute a disaster area due to damages caused by severe storms and tornadoes that occurred April 19-20, 2000. Applications for loans for physical damage as a result of this disaster may be filed until the close of business on July 2, 2000, and for loans for economic injury until the close of business on February 5, 2001 at the address listed below or other locally announced locations: U.S. Small Business Administration, Disaster Area 3 Office, 4400 Amon Carter Blvd., Suite 102, Fort Worth, TX 76155.

In addition, applications for economic injury loans from small businesses located in the following contiguous counties may be filed until the specified date at the above location: Allen, Bourbon, Cherokee, Montgomery, Wilson, and Woodson Counties in Kansas; Barton, Jasper, and Vernon Counties in Missouri; and Craig and Nowata Counties in Oklahoma. 

The interest rates are: 

### For Physical Damage

Homeowners with credit available elsewhere: 7.625% 

Homeowners without credit available elsewhere: 3.812% 

Businesses with credit available elsewhere: 8.000% 

Businesses and non-profit organizations without credit available elsewhere: 4.000% 

Others (including non-profit organizations) with credit available elsewhere: 6.750% 

### For Economic Injury 

Businesses and small agricultural cooperatives without credit available elsewhere: 4.000% 

The number assigned to this disaster for physical damage is 325212. For economic injury the numbers are 9H2200 for Kansas, 9H2300 for Missouri, and 9H2400 for Oklahoma. 

Dated: May 8, 2000. 

(Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Program Nos. 59002 and 59008) 

Herbert L. Mitchell, 

Acting Associate Administrator for Disaster Assistance.

[FR Doc. 00-12694 Filed 5-19-00; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 8025-01-P
Record of Discussion 

Docket No. FAA- Directorate Identifier: -AD 

With whom outside the FAA has this AD action been discussed (i.e., Design Approval Holder, 

manufacturer, ATA, NBAA, RAA, AOPA, ALPA, GAMA, etc)? 

ORGANIZATION PERSON CONTACTED DATE TOPICS DISCUSSED 

Boeing Response to June 29, 2012 Concur. 

compliance 

recommendation 

A4A Robert Ireland January 4, 2014 No response. 

Other/ Additional Information:
**EXHIBIT 32.1**

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THESARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 

I,Ivar S. Chhina, President, Chief Executive Officer and Chairman, of InterDentService Corporation (the “Company”), certify, pursuant to Section 906 ofthe Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1)the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the period ended September30, 2006 which this certification accompanies fully complies with therequirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934(U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)); and

(2)information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
|            | /s/ IVAR S.  CHHINA                               |       |   |
|------------|---------------------------------------------------|------------|--------|
|       | Ivar S. Chhina                                    |       |
|       | President, Chief  Executive Officer and  Chairman |       |
| ** ** | November 9, 2006                                  | ** ** |

 

 

----
#### NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Petitioner, v. WENATCHEE THRIFTY DRUGS, INC., Respondent.

No. 21109.

United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.

May 26, 1967.

*364Arnold Ordman, Gen. Counsel, Dominick L. Manoli, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Marcel Mallet-Prevost, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Allison W. Brown, Jr., Harold B. Zanoff, Melvin J. Welles, Attys., NLRB, Washington, D. C., Thomas P. Graham, Director, NLRB, Seattle, Wash., for appellant.

Jon H. Phelps, Engst, Phelps & Young, Wenatchee, Wash., for appellee.

Before POPE, MERRILL and KOELSCH, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

The National Labor Relations Board petitions for enforcement of its order issued against respondent November 15, 1965, 151 N.L.R.B. 752; 155 N.L.R.B. 843.

Respondent contends that the Board’s determination that its assertion of jurisdiction would in this case effectuate the purposes of the National Labor Relations Act runs counter to its own self-imposed jurisdictional standards, since the record does not support the Board’s ruling that respondent and another concern, together, constituted a single employer for purposes of determining gross revenue. We reject this contention under the facts of this case for the reasons assigned in NLRB v. Carroll-Naslund Disposal, Inc., 359 F.2d 779 (9th Cir. 1966).

Respondent contends that the record does not support the Board’s determination that respondent had threatened employees with economic reprisals if a union were selected to represent them. We agree.

The Board’s order is entitled to enforcement as to the § 8(a) (5) violation, based on refusal to bargain. It is. not entitled to enforcement as to the § 8 (a) (1) violation, based upon threats to an employee.

MERRILL, Circuit Judge

(dissenting) :

I would enforce the Board’s order as: to the § 8(a) (1) violation, feeling that the Board’s determination is supported by substantial evidence upon the record as a whole.
Editorial Note on Part 20
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 20 appear at 57 FR 31451, July 16, 1992.

§ 20.76 Definitions. ( a ) *Disposable pay* means that part of current basic pay, special pay, incentive pay, retired pay, retainer pay, or in the case of an employee not entitled to basic pay, other authorized pay remaining after the deduction of any amount required by law to be withheld. Agencies must exclude deductions described in 5 CFR 581.105 paragraphs (b) through (f) to determine disposal pay subject to salary offset.
( b ) As used in this subpart, the terms *claim* and *debt* are deemed synonymous and interchangeable. A *debt* means an amount owed to the United States from sources which include loans insured or guaranteed by the United States and all other amounts due the United States from fees, leases, rents, royalties, services, sales of real or personal property, overpayments, penalties, damages, interest, fines and forfeitures (except those arising under the Uniform Code of Military Justice), and all other similar sources.
( c ) *Employee* means a current employee of an agency, including a current member of the Armed Forces or a Reserve of the Armed Forces (Reserves).
( d ) *Paying agency* means the agency employing the individual and authorizing the payment of his or her current account.
( e ) *Credit agency* means the agency to which the debt is owed.
( f ) *Salary offset* means an administrative offset to collect a debt under 5 U.S.C. 5514 by deduction(s) at one or more officially established pay intervals from the current pay account of an employee without his or her consent.
( g ) *FCCS* means the Federal Claims Collection Standards jointly published by the Justice Department and the Government Accountability Office at 4 CFR 101.1 *et seq.*
( h ) *Waiver* means the cancellation, remission, forgiveness, or non-recovery of a debt allegedly owed by an employee to an agency as permitted or required by 5 U.S.C. 5584, 10 U.S.C. 2774, or 32 U.S.C. 716, 5 U.S.C. 8346(b), or any other law.
[52 FR 3772, Feb. 5, 1987, as amended at 72 FR 37098, July 9, 2007]