RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1299-18T3

NEW JERSEY DIVISION 

OF CHILD PROTECTION 

AND PERMANENCY, 

Plaintiff-Respondent, 

v. 

S.A.,

Defendant-Appellant,

and 

C.W., 

Defendant.

__________________________

IN THE MATTER OF THE

GUARDIANSHIP OF An.A

and Al.A.,

Minors.

__________________________

Submitted February 3, 2020 – Decided March 3, 2020

Before Judges Messano, Ostrer and Vernoia. 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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A-1299-18T3

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Hudson County, 

Docket No. FG-09-0230-18.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant S.A. (Robyn A. Veasey, Deputy Public

Defender, of counsel; Louis W. Skinner, Designated 

Counsel, on the briefs).

Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for 

respondent (Donna Sue Arons, Assistant Attorney 

General, of counsel; Ellen L. Buckwalter, Deputy 

Attorney General, on the brief).

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, 

attorney for minors (Margo E.K. Hirsch, Designated 

Counsel, on the brief).

PER CURIAM 

Defendant S.A. (Sarah)1appeals from a Family Part order terminating her 

parental rights to her two daughters, An.A. (Andrea), born in August 2013, and 

Al.A. (Amy), born in March 2015. The children's biological father, C.W., 

executed an identified surrender of his parental rights to his mother, D.C., who 

has served as the children's resource parent since their March 2017 removal from 

Sarah's care and who intends to adopt the children.

1

 We employ initials and pseudonyms to protect the privacy of the children and 

for ease of reference. R. 1:38-3(b)(12).
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Sarah contends the New Jersey Division of Child Protection and 

Permanency (Division) failed to present sufficient evidence clearly and 

convincingly establishing the four prongs of the best interests of the child

standard. See N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a). We have reviewed the record, agree with 

the Division and Law Guardian there is substantial credible evidence supporting 

the court's determination that termination of Sarah's parental rights is in the 

children's best interests, and affirm substantially for the reasons set forth in 

Judge Radames Velazquez, Jr.'s thorough written opinion.

During the guardianship trial, the Division presented evidence and 

testimony from D.C.; Division caseworker, Jasmine Soto; Dr. Elizabeth 

Stillwell, Psy.D., who was qualified as an expert in forensic psychology; and 

Dr. Samiris Sostre, M.D., who was qualified as an expert in forensic psychiatry. 

Sarah did not attend the trial or present any witnesses or evidence.

Judge Velazquez made detailed factual findings, addressed each element 

of the best interests standard set forth in N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a), and concluded 

the Division sustained its burden by presenting clear and convincing evidence it 

was in the children's best interests to terminate Sarah's parental rights. We find 

sufficient support for, and presume the parties' familiarity with, Judge 

Velazquez's findings, which we briefly summarize.
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Judge Velazquez found the Division "presented substantial and persuasive 

evidence that the children's health and development has been and will continue 

to be endangered" by the parental relationship with Sarah, due to her "untreated 

severe mental illness, parental neglect, and housing instability," and that the 

children had suffered, and would continue to suffer harm, as a result of Sarah's 

inability to parent and her lack of stable housing.

The court noted Dr. Stillwell's and Dr. Sostre's unrebutted testimony Sarah 

suffered from schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type, and her refusal to comply 

with recommendations for treatment and prescriptions for medication rendered 

her unable to safely parent the children. The court also found Sarah suffered 

from cognitive impairments that rendered her unable "to understand how her 

actions demonstrated poor judgment and parenting skills," and her lack of 

insight into her mental health issues posed additional risks of harm to the 

children because "she [does not] understand why she should be concerned" about 

the treatment of her mental health issues. The judge determined Sarah's failure 

to comply with treatment and refusal to take medications prescribed to 

ameliorate the effects of her significant mental health issues placed the children 

at "substantial risk of harm" and "ensures that [she] will be increasingly unable 

to provide a stable and healthy home for her children in the future." The court 
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relied on Dr. Sostre's testimony that, without medication, there was a 100 

percent chance Sarah would experience additional psychotic episodes that "will 

increase in severity and frequency."

Judge Velazquez further found the Division presented clear and 

convincing evidence Sarah is unable and unwilling to address the harm to the 

children. Relying on the unrebutted expert testimony, the judge found Sarah's 

parenting deficits "are inextricably connected to her chronic mental illness, and 

her refusal to treat her schizoaffective disorder through psychotropic 

medication" and her "inability to understand and appreciate her symptoms[,] 

cause[] her to lack the motivation needed to address and treat her mental illness." 

Relying on Dr. Stillwell's testimony, Judge Velazquez further determined that 

the children have a strong and secure bond with D.C., and they will suffer 

additional harm if the permanency that adoption by D.C. will provide is further

delayed.

The judge also detailed the services the Division offered and provided 

Sarah to assist her in addressing the circumstances leading to the children's 

removal and placement with D.C., and he considered the reasonableness of the 

Division's efforts to provide services "in the context of [Sarah's] unwillingness 

to address her mental illness, which was a necessary step towards stabilization 
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and reunification." Judge Velazquez noted the Division made referrals for Sarah 

to a parent mentor program, parenting skills classes, homemaker services, 

individual therapy, and for psychological, psychiatric, and intellectual 

assessments and evaluations. The Division further provided housing assistance 

to facilitate Sarah's transition from shelters and health care facilities to her own 

apartment, and it offered services "focused on stabilizing [her] mental health 

and addressing her parenting skills."

As noted by the court, at times Sarah utilized the services and appeared to 

make progress towards addressing the issues preventing her from providing the 

children with a safe and secure home. However, Sarah's consistent inability and 

unwillingness to comply with services and address her mental health issues 

through treatment and taking prescribed medications rendered her unable to 

parent her children.

The court also found termination of Sarah's parental rights would not do 

more harm than good based on Dr. Stillwell's unrebutted psychological and 

bonding evaluations and testimony; Sarah's unwillingness to address her mental 

health issues; and D.C.'s willingness to provide permanency through adoption. 

Without contradiction, Dr. Stillwell testified that a break in the bond between 

the children and D.C. "would pose a far greater potential for harm than a break 
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from" Sarah and would cause "significant and enduring harm" to the children's 

emotional and behavioral development. The court accepted Dr. Stillwell's 

testimony that the children share a positive, but inconsistent and insecure, bond 

with Sarah, and they enjoy a positive, secure, and strong bond with D.C., who 

the children view as their psychological parent and who provides nurture and 

guidance. The court also found Sarah's mental health issues, and her 

unwillingness and inability to effectively address them, make it unlikely she will 

be able to safely parent the children at any time in the foreseeable future.

Following the court's entry of the October 31, 2018 judgment of 

guardianship, Sarah appealed. She offers the following arguments for our 

consideration:

[POINT I]

THE [TRIAL] COURT ERRED IN ITS 

CONCLUSION THAT TERMINATION OF 

PARENTAL RIGHTS IS IN THE BEST INTERESTS 

OF THE CHILDREN UNDER N.J.S.A. 30:4C15.1[(a)].

I. THE COURT . . . ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT 

ANDREA AND AMY WERE HARMED BY 

[SARAH][.]

II. THE COURT . . . ERRED IN CONCLUDING 

THAT [SARAH] IS UNWILLING OR UNABLE TO 

ELIMINATE THE ALLEGED HARM FACING 
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ANDREA AND AMY OR TO PROVIDE A SAFE 

AND STABLE HOME[.]

III. THE COURT . . . ERRED IN CONCLUDING 

THAT [THE DIVISION] EXERCISED 

REASONABLE EFFORTS TO PROVIDE SERVICES 

TO HELP [SARAH] TO CORRECT THE 

CIRCUMSTANCES THAT LED TO PLACEMENT 

OUTSIDE THE HOME[.]

IV. THE COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT 

TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS WILL 

NOT DO MORE HARM THAN GOOD IS 

ERRONEOUS[.]

Our review of a trial court order terminating parental rights is limited. 

N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. G.L., 191 N.J. 596, 605 (2007). "A 

Family Part's decision to terminate parental rights will not be disturbed when 

there is substantial credible evidence in the record to support the court's 

findings." N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. K.T.D., 439 N.J. Super. 

363, 368 (App. Div. 2015) (citing N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. F.M., 

211 N.J. 420, 448 (2012)). "We accord deference to factfindings of the family 

court because it has the superior ability to gauge the credibility of the witnesses 

who testify before it and because it possesses special expertise in matters related 

to the family." F.M., 211 N.J. at 448 (citing Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 

(1998)). This enhanced deference is particularly appropriate where the court's 

findings are founded upon the credibility of the witnesses' testimony. N.J. Div. 
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of Youth & Family Servs. v. H.B., 375 N.J. Super. 148, 172 (App. Div. 2005)

(citing Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv'rs Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 

(1974)).

"Only when the trial court's conclusions are so 'clearly mistaken' or 'wide 

of the mark' should an appellate court intervene and make its own findings to 

ensure that there is not a denial of justice." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. 

v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 104 (2008) (quoting G.L., 191 N.J. at 605). No deference 

is given to the trial court's "interpretation of the law," which we review de novo. 

D.W. v. R.W., 212 N.J. 232, 245-46 (2012).

A parent has a constitutionally protected right "to enjoy a relationship with 

his or her child." In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337, 346 (1999). That 

right, however, "is not absolute" and is limited "by the State's parens patriae

responsibility to protect children whose vulnerable lives or psychological wellbeing may have been harmed or may be seriously endangered by a neglectful or 

abusive parent." F.M., 211 N.J. at 447 (citing E.P., 196 N.J. at 102). A parent's 

interest must, at times, yield to the State's obligation to protect children from 

harm. See N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. G.M., 198 N.J. 382, 397 

(2009).
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When terminating parental rights, the court must consider the "best 

interests of the child[ren]." K.H.O., 161 N.J. at 347. The Division's petition to 

terminate parental rights may only be granted if the following four prongs 

enumerated in N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) are established by clear and convincing 

evidence:

(1) The child's safety, health, or development has 

been or will continue to be endangered by the parental 

relationship;

(2) The parent is unwilling or unable to eliminate the 

harm facing the child or is unable or unwilling to 

provide a safe and stable home for the child and the 

delay of permanent placement will add to the harm. 

Such harm may include evidence that separating the 

child from his resource family parents would cause 

serious and enduring emotional or psychological harm 

to the child;

(3) The division has made reasonable efforts to 

provide services to help the parent correct the 

circumstances which led to the child's placement 

outside the home and the court has considered 

alternatives to termination of parental rights; and

(4) Termination of parental rights will not do more 

harm than good.

[N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a).]

"The four criteria enumerated in the best interests standard are not discrete 

and separate; they relate to and overlap with one another to provide a 
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comprehensive standard that identifies a child's best interests." K.H.O., 161 N.J. 

at 348. "[T]he cornerstone of the inquiry [under N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)] is not 

whether the biological parents are fit but whether they can cease causing their 

child harm." In re Guardianship of J.C., 129 N.J. 1, 10 (1992) (citing N.J. Div. 

of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.W., 103 N.J. 591, 607 (1986)).

Sarah argues the court erred by terminating her parental rights because the 

Division failed to present sufficient evidence clearly and convincingly

establishing each prong of the best interests standard. We disagree. Judge 

Velazquez conducted the required fact-sensitive analysis of the statutory factors, 

see K.H.O., 161 N.J. at 348, and the record supports his determination that 

Sarah's unwillingness and inability to address her significant and debilitating 

mental health issues—by failing to comply with treatment recommendations and 

take prescribed medications—renders her incapable of parenting Andrea and 

Amy; caring for them; addressing their needs; and providing for their safety, 

health, and development.

The court accepted the expert testimony Sarah lacked both the ability and 

willingness to address the issues that rendered her unable to safely parent her 

children, and the testimony was unchallenged by any competent evidence. We 

defer to Judge Velazquez's findings because they are supported by substantial 
12 A-1299-18T3

credible evidence, and his factual findings amply support his conclusion the 

Division satisfied each prong of the best interests standard with clear and 

convincing evidence. See E.P., 196 N.J. at 104 ("We will not disturb the family 

court's decision to terminate parental rights when there is substantial credible 

evidence in the record to support the court's findings."). We add only the 

following brief comments.

We reject Sarah's claim the evidence was insufficient to support the court's 

finding the children suffered harm or were at risk of harm under prongs one and 

two of the best interests standard. "Serious and lasting emotional or 

psychological harm to children as the result of the action or inaction of their 

biological parents can constitute injury sufficient to authorize the termination of 

parental rights." In re Guardianship of K.L.F., 129 N.J. 32, 44 (1992).

The evidence established Sarah failed and refused to participate in 

treatment and take the prescribed medications required to address her mental 

health issues, and the concomitant delays in her ability to parent Andrea and 

Amy and provide them with a safe and secure home caused the children 

emotional and psychological harm and placed them at risk of future harm. That 

evidence supports the court's findings under the first and second prongs of the 

best interests standard. See, e.g., F.M., 211 N.J. at 450-51 (stating that untreated 
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mental illness that threatens harm to a child may disqualify a parent from raising 

the child); K.H.O., 161 N.J. at 353 (stating "the second prong may be met by 

indications of parental dereliction and irresponsibility, such as the parent's 

continued or recurrent drug abuse, the inability to provide a stable and protective 

home, [and] the withholding of parental attention and care").

We are not persuaded by Sarah's claim the court erred by finding the 

Division provided reasonable services. "The diligence of [the Division's] efforts 

on behalf of a parent is not measured by their success," In re Guardianship of

DMH, 161 N.J. 365, 393 (1999), particularly where the lack of success results 

from a parent's "failure to cooperate or follow through." N.J. Div. of Youth & 

Family Servs. v. C.S., 367 N.J. Super. 76, 119 (App. Div. 2004). The record 

evidence demonstrates the Division provided reasonable services in light of 

Sarah's individual needs.

Last, Sarah makes no showing the court erred by finding the Division 

sustained its burden of establishing prong four of the best interests standard. 

The court recognized Sarah enjoyed a positive bond with Andrea and Amy, but 

the fourth prong does not require a "showing that no harm will befall the child 

as a result of the severing of biological ties." K.H.O., 161 N.J. at 355. Dr. 

Stillwell's bonding evaluations and expert testimony support the court's 
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conclusion that termination of parental rights would not do more harm than 

good.

Any of Sarah's arguments we have not expressly addressed are without 

sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.