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ASSESSING TERRORISM IN THE CAUCASUS AND 

THE THREAT TO THE HOMELAND 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

COUNTERTERRORISM 

AND INTELLIGENCE 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

APRIL 3, 2014 

Serial No. 113–61 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas, Chairman 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

PETER T. KING, New York 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan, Vice Chair 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah 

STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

RICHARD HUDSON, North Carolina 

STEVE DAINES, Montana 

SUSAN W. BROOKS, Indiana 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

MARK SANFORD, South Carolina 

VACANCY

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

RON BARBER, Arizona 

DONDALD M. PAYNE, JR., New Jersey 

BETO O’ROURKE, Texas 

FILEMON VELA, Texas 

ERIC SWALWELL, California 

VACANCY

VACANCY

BRENDAN P. SHIELDS, Staff Director 

MICHAEL GEFFROY, Deputy Staff Director/Chief Counsel 

MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

I. LANIER AVANT, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND INTELLIGENCE 

PETER T. KING, New York, Chairman 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania, Vice Chair 

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah 

VACANCY

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas (ex officio) 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (ex officio) 

MANDY BOWERS, Subcommittee Staff Director 

DENNIS TERRY, Subcommittee Clerk 

HOPE GOINS, Minority Staff Director 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Peter T. King, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 1 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 2 

The Honorable Brian Higgins, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of New York, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Counterterrorism 

and Intelligence: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 3 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 3 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland 

Security: 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 4 

WITNESSES

Mr. Gordon M. Hahn, Ph.D., Analyst and Advisory Board Member, 

Geostrategic Forecasting Corporation: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 5 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 8 

Mr. William F. Roggio, Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 14 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 15 

Mr. Andrew C. Kuchins, Ph.D., Director and Senior Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 20 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 23 

(1) 

ASSESSING TERRORISM IN THE CAUCASUS 

AND THE THREAT TO THE HOMELAND 

Thursday, April 3, 2014 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, SUBCOMMITTEE ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND INTELLIGENCE, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:01 p.m., in Room 

311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Peter T. King [Chairman 

of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives King and Higgins. 

Also present: Representative Jackson Lee. 

Mr. KING. Good afternoon. The Committee on Homeland Security 

Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence will come to 

order. Ranking Member Higgins is not here, but I have discussed 

that with him. In view of the votes that will be coming up sometime in the next 15 minutes or half-hour we are going to start the 

hearing and the Ranking Member will deliver his statement when 

he arrives. 

The subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony examining 

terrorism in the Caucasus and the threat which that poses to the 

homeland. I recognize myself for an opening statement, which I 

will keep brief. I will include my full statement in the record. 

Caucasus are a volatile region, home to several extremist networks that are aligning themselves with al-Qaeda’s global jihadist 

movement and spreading out to join conflicts outside their traditional homeland. 

Most alarmingly, we saw this with the Boston bombers, and 

showing that this conflict has inspired violent extremism around 

the world, including the U.S. homeland. Sadly, we approach the 1- 

year anniversary of the Boston Marathon bombings, that were at 

least partly inspired by the insurgency in the Caucasus and caused 

three deaths and more than 200 serious injuries. Militants from 

the region have also reportedly fought in the Balkans, attacked 

U.S. forces in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and have taken leadership positions with terrorist organizations in Syria, such as the alNusra Front and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. 

In this hearing, we will explore the threat that these groups pose 

both inside and outside the region, as well as examine the potential 

these networks may eventually pose to U.S. interests. Also, we will 

discuss the extent to which the Russian invasion of Crimea could 

impact any cooperation we have with the Russians regarding working against these terrorist groups. I look forward to the hearing, 

and I really want to thank the witnesses for being here. 
2 

1Zachary Laub, ‘‘Instability in Russia’s North Caucasus Region’’ Council on Foreign Relations, 

February 6, 2014, available at: http://www.cfr.org/russian-federation/instability-russias-northcaucasus-region/p9021. 2 Alan Cullison, ‘‘Meet the Rebel Commander in Syria that Assad, Russia and the U.S. All 

Fear’’, Wall Street Journal, November 19, 2013, available at: http://online.wsj.com/news/ 

articles/ SB10001424052702303309504579181962177007316. 

As I said, I will insert the remainder of my statement into the 

record, unless the Ranking Member objects. 

[The statement of Chairman King follows:] 

STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN PETER T. KING

APRIL 3, 2014 

The Caucasus are a volatile region home to several extremist networks that are 

aligning themselves with al-Qaeda’s global jihadist movement, and spreading out to 

join conflicts outside their traditional homeland. Most alarmingly as we saw with 

the Boston bombers, this conflict has inspired violent extremism around the world, 

including the U.S. homeland. 

Sadly, we approach the 1-year anniversary of the Boston Marathon bombings that 

were at least partly inspired by the insurgency in the Caucasus that caused 3 

deaths and more than 200 serious injuries. 

Militants from the region have also reportedly fought in the Balkans, attacked 

U.S. forces in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and have taken leadership positions with 

terrorist organizations in Syria, such as al-Nusra front and the Islamic State of Iraq 

and the Levant (ISIL). This hearing will explore the threat that these groups pose 

both inside and outside the region, as well as examine the potential threat these 

networks may eventually pose to United States interests. 

While al-Qaeda senior leadership is weakened, its brand and ideology is thriving 

and spreading. The Arab Spring, U.S. troop withdrawals in Iraq and Afghanistan 

and the civil war in Syria have breathed new life into al-Qaeda. Today we see elements of al-Qaeda operating in 16 countries, new jihadist media publications that 

leverage the latest social media technology to reach new audiences inspiring violence around the globe, and a growing army of jihadists gaining battlefield experience in the Syrian conflict. 

Instability in the ethnically-diverse Caucasus region has been an on-going problem for centuries: A simmering cauldron mostly contained within the borders of the 

Russian Federation. In recent years the Russian government’s tactics have transformed the battle from a nationalist fight, with anti-Russian roots to a struggle 

based on Islamist ideology. This conflict is now showing signs of boiling over into 

unstable havens of terrorist activity in other parts of the world, and is threatening 

Europe and potentially the homeland. 

We also have to examine recent actions by Russia to annex Crimea, part of the 

sovereign nation of Ukraine. How will these actions and whatever additional hostile 

actions Russia may take in the region impact intent of the Caucasus Emirate? 

Chechens trained with al-Qaeda in Afghanistan prior to the September 11, 2001 

attacks, and Osama bin Laden’s network supplied fighters and funds to them during 

the second Chechen war.1 A Chechen now leads the ISIS forces in northern Syria 

and has masterminded a series of strategic defeats of Assad’s troops.2

While the current threat to homeland from the Caucasus today appears minor, 

we must remember that we have made the mistake of underestimating the threat 

from terrorists in places like Afghanistan, Somalia, and Yemen before. The Obama 

administration designated the now-deceased leader of the Caucasus Emirate, Doku 

Umarov, as a global terrorist in 2010 and the United Nations Security Council alQaeda Sanctions Committee has both Umarov and the Caucasus Emirate on its list 

of terrorists. 

As this subcommittee has stressed time and again, global terrorism does not require regiments of hardened soldiers with sophisticated weapons to have a lasting 

impact on society. Rather, a handful of committed murderers using household pressure cookers, or hijacking commercial airplanes can fundamentally change the 

course of history if they are disciplined and able to successfully conduct just one or 

two dramatic acts of violence. Al-Qaeda is an opportunistic ideological movement 

that thrives in ungoverned spaces such as the Caucasus. 

Fifteen years ago, most experts would not have forecasted an attack on the homeland to originate from Nigeria, Pakistan, or Yemen, but this committee’s mandate 

is to examine emerging threats to homeland security and I look forward to hearing 

from today’s witnesses regarding the state of terrorist groups in the Caucasus, and 
3 

the export of jihadists from the region to Syria and other safe havens of terrorist 

activity that threaten the United States and the West. 

Mr. KING. I am pleased to welcome the Ranking Member, Mr. 

Higgins, from New York and ask him if he wants to give an opening statement. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. 

I will submit my opening statement for the record so that we can 

get right to the panel of expert witnesses. 

[The statement of Ranking Member Higgins follows:] 

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER BRIAN HIGGINS

APRIL 3, 2014 

I look forward to hearing today’s testimony as we continue to expand our knowledge of the threats, groups, and counterterrorism efforts within the Caucasus region. Several inter-ethnic conflicts that developed at the end of the Soviet Union remain unresolved and continue to fuel tensions within the Caucasus region. 

Specifically, a historical exclusionary political system and competition over land 

and resources has fueled conflicts in the multi-ethnic Russian republics of the North 

Caucasus. While several extremists groups have emerged and then later disappeared as a result of these conflicts, one group, the Caucus Emirate, remains active today. The Caucasus Emirate has admitted to planning and executing numerous terror attacks in the Caucasus region and in Moscow since its founding in 2007. 

Two of the most deadly attacks claimed by the Caucasus Emirate have occurred in 

Moscow. 

On March 29, 2010, two suicide bombers killed 40 people and wounded more than 

100 people after attacking two metro stations. On January 24, 2011 a suicide attack 

at Moscow’s busiest international airport killed 35 people and wounded as many as 

180 people. While all of the attacks executed by the Caucasus Emirates deserve our 

attention, I am especially concerned by these two attacks on high-impact transportation targets. 

As the Representative of the Buffalo-Niagara region, I have a keen awareness and 

concern for high-impact transit targets. Buffalo is home to the Peace Bridge, one of 

the busiest crossings at the Northern Border. Over 30 billion dollars of annual commerce travels through the Peace Bridge in Buffalo, Niagara region. An attack, similar to those carried out by the Caucasus Emirate in this area could be catastrophic. 

For this reason and many more, I remain disturbed that the Buffalo-Niagara Region is not considered ‘‘high-risk’’ enough for State and locals in this area to receive 

funding under The Department of Homeland Security’s Urban Area Security Initiative ‘‘UASI’’ program. 

Without UASI funding, the local law enforcement and emergency personnel do not 

have the ability to sustain the advancements they have made since 9/11. How can 

the Buffalo-Niagara region be expected to protect and respond to attacks and 

threats without the same basic funding provided to other, less utilized transit targets? 

I want to emphasize that many experts assert that based on known threats and 

capabilities an attack on the United States from the Caucasus Emirate or other 

Caucasian groups is unlikely as these groups are generally not preoccupied with the 

United States. However, the Caucasus Emirate has stated that it has no conflict 

with the United States and it will not harm any civilians, including Russians, yet 

this has not always been the case. Therefore, I believe it is fair to both consider 

and discuss this group and others in a global context, their roles within the larger 

global jihadi network. 

Mr. KING. All right. I thank the Ranking Member. I also acknowledge that the gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee is here 

and remind all the Members of the committee that opening statements may be submitted for the record. 

[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:] 
4 

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER BENNIE G. THOMPSON

APRIL 3, 2014 

I would also like to thank the witnesses for testifying to further this committee’s 

efforts to better understanding terrorist threats, their makeup, and the activities of 

extremists groups within the Caucasus region. 

The Boston Marathon bombing and the Sochi Olympics spurred a growing interest 

in the Caucasus region, and I commend the subcommittee for exploring the topic. 

However, the subcommittee must be cautious in its approach. There is an opinion 

that many within the Caucasus region have been radicalized into an extremist mentality of global war. Many want to suggest this was the mentality of Tamerlan 

Tsarnaev, brother of alleged co-conspirator Boston Marathon bomber Dzhokhar 

Tsarnaev. 

Mr. Chairman, like I have reminded you that on several occasions throughout our 

years on this committee, our words go beyond these four walls. We must remember 

that we have a responsibility to the people of Boston and the rest of the American 

public, not to create a defense for the capital case against Dzhokhar Tsarnaev. 

While others suggest that there is a possibility that Tamerlan Tsarnaev was inspired by extremist groups in the Caucasus region, I believe that speculation about 

any influence he may have received is not helpful to the prosecution. 

Just last Friday, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev’s defense team filed motions based on a report by committee staff. While I do not believe we need to jeopardize the prosecution 

of Dzhokhar Tsarnaev by speculating on Tamerlan’s dealings in the Caucasus region, I do believe it is necessary for us to understand not only which groups are 

becoming radicalized in the Caucasus region, but also, why this is happening. The 

Caucasus region continues to be plagued by poverty, high unemployment, and challenges in governance and stability. 

Like in other regions, it is possible that these social problems are being exploited 

to boost recruitment. There is also evidence that suggests religious ideology plays 

only a limited role in the violence of extremist groups in the Caucasus region, but 

is used to mask the business of organized crime. According to reports, approximately 

one quarter of the violence in the North Caucasus is from organized crime. 

Mislabeling acts of organized crime as ‘‘terrorism’’ diminishes the real threats of terrorism in the region. 

Moreover, since 2009, when Russia ended its counter-terrorism operation in 

Chechnya, there has been a surge in violence and security forces within the North 

Caucasus region. While it is unclear if violence in the region has created a need for 

more security forces, it is well-documented that the actions of these security forces— 

continuous engagement in a brutal and violent harassment and religious profiling— 

feeds a cycle of insurgency. It is clear that the instability of governance throughout 

the Caucasus region continues to prohibit religious freedoms and rights, which ultimately fuels al-Qaeda, its affiliates, and other extremists groups. Ultimately, if we 

hope to gain a serious understanding of terrorists and extremist threats, we must 

do a thorough examination. 

Rather than viewing terrorists and insurgencies in an over-generalized way, I encourage all Members of this committee to seek more information to understand the 

global and local dynamics fueling the insurgency in the Caucasus region. 

Mr. KING. Before introducing our distinguished panel of witnesses, though, I wanted to recognize Jim Nichol from the Congressional Research Service. He is here today. It is his last day of work 

before retirement. He has been a significant resource to this committee, both when I was Chairman and Ranking Member and certainly, now, under Chairman McCaul in preparation of this hearing. He served CRS and the Congress for more than 30 years. 

There is no one on the Hill that knows about Eurasia and his expertise will be missed. 

Mr. Nichol, we want to congratulate you and thank you for your 

years of service and dedication and for doing the impossible of 

making us look reasonably smart. So thank you very much. 

Now, for today’s hearing we will be hearing testimony from three 

expert witnesses: Dr. Gordon Hahn, Dr. William Roggio, and Dr. 

Andrew Kuchins. 
5 

I want to welcome all three witnesses here, and I will ask, first, 

Dr. Hahn. He is an analyst and advisory board member for 

Geostrategic Forecasting Corporation, a global think tank that provides qualitative and quantitative analysis and business intelligence solutions to prominent geopolitical and geoeconomic threats. 

He is senior associate in Russia and Eurasia program with the 

Center for Strategic and International Studies. He is the author of 

numerous scholarly and analytic articles on jidadism in Russia and 

Eurasia, and has authored two books on Russia. 

We are pleased to have you here today as a witness, and you are 

recognized for approximately 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF GORDON M. HAHN, PH.D., ANALYST AND ADVISORY BOARD MEMBER, GEOSTRATEGIC FORECASTING CORPORATION 

Mr. HAHN. Thank you for the invitation, Representative King, 

and the committee and the help from the staff. I am gonna start 

off talking about my main conclusions first so I get to them in case 

we run out of time, then give a little background, and then talk 

about—focus a little bit on the Caucasus Emirate mujahedin in 

Syria. Okay, in terms of main conclusions, I do not foresee the 

Caucasus Emirate directly undertaking operations to attack the 

United States homeland, on its own, in the short- to mid-term. 

However, the Caucasus Emirate-affiliated militants will, sooner or 

later, be involved in global jihadi plots to do so. 

They will probably be from among those fighting in Syria, perhaps those also fighting in AfPak. These are the so-called 

mujahedin, or those who have emigrated, or made the hijrah, to 

fight on another front. Also returning mujahedin and/or IK 

Caucasus there in mujahedin, remaining in Russia could attempt 

to attack U.S.-related soft targets in Europe and Eurasia, in particular inside Russia, with attacks that could include embassies, 

schools, various public venues, transporter pipelines. 

The Caucasus Emirate could partner in carrying out such attacks 

with foreign groups and groups, its mujahedin now more closely 

networked with in Syria, such as al-Qaeda or AQ and At-Takfir 

wal-Hirja, which attempted an attack in Moscow last year, or 

groups from central Asia that are—have made the hijrah through 

the AfPak region and are now also some are located—fighting in 

Syria; groups like the Islamic movement of Uzbekistan, the Islamic 

Jihad Union, and some others. 

In Russia, I suspect that the Caucasus Emirate will see the lowest annual tally of attacks in this year, since its inception in 2007, 

because of the exodus of mujahedin to Syria. Okay, in terms of 

background, I have been arguing for many years—pretty much 

alone amongst Cretologists, but not among terrorist experts—that 

beginning in the 1990s, the extremist Chechen nationalist separatist movement, the Chechen republic of Ichkeriya and continuing 

with its global jihadi successor organizing, the Caucasus Emirate, 

Chechen and North Caucasus militants who had ties to the global 

jihadi revolutionary movement, including al-Qaeda, and that the 

Chechen Republic of Ichkeria was becoming jihadized and likely 

would become part of the global revolutionary movement and partner with al-Qaeda or other global jihadi groups. 
6 

Months after publication of my book, the then-Chechen Republic, 

which Dokku Umarov abolished the Chechen Republic of Ichkeriya, 

established the Caucasus Emirate took the position of emir instead 

of president, took the jihadi nom de guerre Abu Usman, and declared the Caucasus Emirates enemies to be Russia, the United 

States, Great Britain, Israel, and any country fighting Muslims 

anywhere around the world. 

In October 2007, in addition to the Imarat Kavkaz, some—since 

October 2007, in addition to the Caucasus Emirates, some 2,400 insurgent terrorist attacks and jihadi-related incidences, including 54 

suicide bombings. The Caucasus Emirate mujahedin and North 

Caucasus lone wolves have inspired by it have plotted or carried 

out insurgent terrorist attacks across the globe from Waziristan to 

Azerbaijan in the East and from Europe to Boston in the West. 

In sum, many years ago the Caucasus Emirate became not just 

a threat for Russian national security, but an emerging one for 

U.S. and international security. I want to talk a little bit about the 

new emir. The reports came out, the Caucasus Emirate confirmed, 

that Emir Dokku Umarov had been killed sometime last year. They 

confirmed this a couple of weeks ago. The new emir is one Sheik 

Ali Abu Muhammad ad-Dagestani—he was born Aliaskhab 

Alibutatovich Kabekov and is likely to radicalize and, perhaps, further globalize, and even deterritorialize the Caucasus Emirate further, given his deeper religious and Abu Dagestani roots. 

In July 2011, Dagestani stated, ‘‘We are doing everything possible to build the caliphate.’’ In his most recent lecture, he said, 

‘‘Oh, Allah, punish the Jews, the Americans, the Russians, Iran 

and Bashar Assad, their followers and helpers.’’ Sheikh Dagestani 

is 42 years old. He was born on January 1, 1972. He has been the 

kadhi—that is, the Sharia court judge—for the Caucasus Emirate 

for the last—going on 4 years. He faces three basic challenges that 

I can see. 

First is reinvigorating the Caucasus Emirates non-Dagestani networks in Chechnya and in Gushedia. Second, maintaining a balance of power between different ethnic groups. Third and most important, dealing with the negative effects on Caucasus Emirate because of the exodus-emigration of fighters—of Caucasus Emirate 

fighters and other North Caucasus radicals to Syria. The Caucasus 

Emirate has had some global reach, as I alluded to before. They 

have had three foreign plots, all of them failed: One in Belgium, 

one in the Czech Republic, and on in Azerbaijan in 2012. 

They have inspired three plots, only one of which was successful. 

Unfortunately for us, that successful attack was in Boston last 

year. But the most important move by the Caucasus Emirate 

abroad has been to Syria, as I mentioned before. IK-affiliated 

emirs, such as Tarkhan Batirasvili, are playing the leading role— 

at least the leading combat role—among the foreign mujahedin 

fighting in Syria that is now the main global front in the global 

jihad. 

Despite apparent reservations, Umarov appears to have backed 

three key emirs’ hijrah to Syria in late 2011. Then they would take 

leading positions in the jihad there. According to the most prominent of these emirs, Batirashvili, Emir Umarov initially financed 

their activities. First, Batirashvili and the other emirs allied with 
7 

al-Qaeda affiliate, Jabhat al-Nusra, and then shifted towards the 

ISIS. Through 2012, hundreds of IK and North Caucasian 

mujahedin and other foreign muhajarine—that is, emigres consolidated around these Chechen emirs—by March 2013 their group, 

Jeish Mukhajirin va Ansar, the army of emigrants and helpers, or 

JMA, reportedly numbered more than 1,000. 

As relations between al-Nusra and ISIS deteriorated and devolved into violent clashes, Batirashvili took the lifetime loyalty 

oath, or bayat, to ISIS Emir Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and was promoted to the position of the ISIS’ military emirs. So we have a 

Chechen holding one of the top posts in this al-Qaeda-affiliated organization. He did this in October 2013. A schism resulted from 

this and some other factors, leaving at least three major Syrianbased groups, a foreign muhajarine led by Caucasus Emirate 

emirs. One of them is even named now the Caucasus Emirate in 

Shama or in Syria. 

There is also now for the first time, by the way, a Caucasus 

Emirate in the Horasan organization that is in AfPak. We don’t 

know exactly where they are—presumably they are in Waziristan. 

I want to briefly review nine implications—or maybe I won’t get 

through all. I don’t know how much time I have left—nine implications of the hijrha of—— 

Mr. KING. Actually, if you could try to do it like in the next 11⁄2

minutes, sir. 

Mr. HAHN. Okay, okay. 

Mr. KING. Thanks. 

Mr. HAHN. First is the debilitating effect on the Caucasus Emirate’s capacity. Second is that the high profile of the Caucasus 

Emirate and other North Caucasus and Russian mujahedin in the 

Syrian jihad strengthens the Caucasus Emirate’s ties to, and profile within, the overall global jihadi revolutionary movement, offering opportunities for greater access to recruits, financing, and 

weapons. Third, Caucasus Emirate fighters in Syria could acquire 

some of Assad’s chemical weapons. 

Fourth, because of the first three implications I mentioned and 

the advent of a new emir there is a very high likelihood that the 

new emir is going to change tactics and, perhaps, strategy. That is, 

globalize the organization more, radicalize it more, maybe even 

more emphasis on spectacular attacks and suicide bombings. Fifth, 

likely is the expansion of Caucasus Emirate fighters to other global 

jihadi fronts. Sixth, a corollary of the fifth is the development of 

a—because of the networking in Syria—of a Eurasian—more tightly-knitted Eurasian group of fighters two hubs; one in the North 

Caucasus, another in central Asia. Because all these groups are 

now in Syria and in AfPak, together, fighting. 

Seventh, the new vulnerability to Shia-dominated Azerbaijan to 

attacks by the Sunni-dominated Caucasus Emirate and other fighters in Syria. Eighth, the possibility of a disastrous rout of Caucasus 

Emirate forces, damaging its capacity for years to come. Then finally, because of the ties between the Caucasus Emirate and foreign fighters in Syria, we are likely to see Russia be move up higher on the agenda of the global jihad in terms of targeting. 

With that, I close. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hahn follows:] 
8 

1 ‘‘Fatva Sheikha Abu Mukhammada al’-Makdisi o fitne v Imarata Kavkaz,’’ Islam Umma,9 

September 2010, 10:44, http://islamumma.com/index.php?option=comlcontent&view=- 

article&id=1253:2010-09-10-07-35-03&catid=130&Itemid=485 and ‘‘Fatwa Sheikha Abu 

Mukhammada al’-Makdisi (da ukrepit ego Allakh),’’ Kavkaz tsentr, 10 September 2010, 20:55, 

www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2010/09/10/75149.shtml. 2 Umarov said in full: ‘‘We ask Allah that He accepts the martyrdom of Sheikh bin Laden, 

because that man abandoned his wealth and peaceful worldly life for the sake of protecting 

Islam. And that is a great goal, and the reward for it is great. With regard to the question of 

whether bin Laden’s death will affect the situation in the world, in my opinion the infidels do 

not believe themselves that their lives will become easier. According to all signs, it is clear that 

the world is in such situation that the death of the leaders of the Jihad in no way can stop 

the process of Islam’s rebirth. It is the kind of cause that will move forward, regardless of 

whether the United States, Russia or the UN want it or not.’’ ‘‘Amir Dokku Abu Usman o bin 

Ladene, Imarate Kavkaz i poteryakh modzhakhedov,’’ Kavkaz tsentr, 17 May 2011, http:// 

kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2011/05/17/81607.shtml. 3This is a snapshot estimate derived from comparing IK and global jihadi activity in December 2013. Specifically, it compares IntelCenter’s global data with my own data on IK operations 

derived in part from reports on Kavkaz uzel (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru) and ‘‘IMARAT KAVKAZ. 

Svodka boevykh operatsii modzhekhedov za mesyats Safar 1435 g kh. (5.12.2013–2.01.2014 g.),’’ 

Umma News, 14 January 2014, http://ummanews.com/news/last-news/11967----------1435----5- 

-2013--2--2014-.html. IntelCenter tracked 2,077 people killed and 2,558 people injured in 688 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GORDON M. HAHN

APRIL 3, 2014 

INTRODUCTION

For a decade voices resonated in U.S. media and think tanks asserting that 

Chechen separatists and the Caucasus Islamists, such as those who forged the IK, 

had nothing to do with al-Qaeda and the global jihadi revolutionary movement, despite a plethora of contrary evidence. Some of those same voices still can be heard 

today. 

Contrary to those voices’ claims and expectations, we now see the Imarat Kavkaz 

(Caucasus Emirate or IK) mujahedin and their lone wolves inspired by them carrying out insurgent and terrorist attacks across the globe from Waziristan in the 

East to Boston in the West. 

In fact, for nearly 2 decades, beginning with the extremist Chechen national separatist movement, the Chechen Republic of Ichkeriya (ChRI), and continuing with its 

global jihadist successor organization, the IK founded on October 31, 2007, Chechen 

and North Caucasus militants have had ties to the global jihadi revolutionary movement (al-Qaeda, its affiliates, and allied groups), including al-Qaeda (AQ). Indeed, 

in September 2009, Jordan’s Sheikh Abu Muhammad Asem al-Maqdisi, whom the 

United States Military Academy’s Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) designated 

‘‘the most influential living Jihadi Theorist,’’ endorsed IK as a major jihadist organization and urged Muslims to support it ‘‘so the Emirate becomes the door to Eastern 

Europe.’’1 Consistent with Maqdisi’s call, IK would expand operations into Europe 

and elsewhere abroad. 

Though rejected by most, I have been arguing since at least 2006 that the IK has 

been part and parcel of that movement, supporting its goal of a global caliphate, 

and employing signature jihadi tactics such as suicide bombing or ‘‘istishkhad’’ attacks and other mass-casualty attacks. Since 2007 Umarov and CE ideologists have 

stated repeatedly that the organization is part of the global jihadi revolutionary alliance and supports AQ and other jihadi groups, though many refused to listen. CE 

websites now publish jihadi literature alone, including that of Osama bin Laden, 

Ayman al-Zawahiri, Anwar al-Awlaki, and hundreds of others. Published fatwas justify the use of weapons of mass destruction to kill ‘‘millions’’ of Americans, and 

translated issues of AQ’s journal Inspire and articles like ‘‘Make a Bomb in Your 

Mom’s Kitchen’’ instruct prospective mujahedin how to build IEDs from pressure 

cookers as the Tsarnaevs did. After U.S. forces brought justice to Osama bin Laden 

in May 2011, the now-deceased IK amir Dokku ‘‘Abu Usman’’ Umarov said the AQ 

amir’s reward in Paradise for his service to jihad would be ‘‘great’’ and asserted that 

neither the death of jihadi leaders nor the desires of ‘‘the United States, Russia, or 

the UN’’ can stop ‘‘Islam’s rebirth.’’2 Thus, long ago IK became not just a threat for 

Russian national security but an emerging one for U.S. and international security. 

Since its October 2007 founding, the IK has carried out or been involved in some 

2,400 insurgent and terrorist attacks and violent incidents, including 54 suicide attacks, inside Russia. Those attacks have produced approximately 9,000 casualties, 

including more than one thousand civilians. For comparison, the IK’s attacks in 

Russia constitute approximately 6 percent of jihadi attacks globally, a ratio that 

does not include IK mujahedin attacks in Syria.3
9 

terrorist/rebel attacks worldwide in December 2013. ‘‘Global Casualty Data for Terrorist/Rebel 

Attacks, Dec. 2013,’’ IntelCenter, 15 January 2014, http://us5.campaign-archive1.com/ 

?u=16cbb24e56cdcd360e9954d7a&id=32cc518d96&e=722a32839a. My own estimate for the same 

month in Russia was 42 insurgent and terrorist attacks. It should be taken into account that 

December is not usually the busiest month for CE activity given the cold and snow in the 

Caucasus mountains where many of the IK mujahedin winter. Moreover, this does not count 

attacks carried out by CE-affiliated mujahedin in Syria. 4 ‘‘Stennogramma video: Kadii IK Abu Mukhammad—‘Otvety na voprosy’—1 chast’,’’ 

Guraba.info, 8 July 2011, 00:18, http://guraba.info/2011-02-27-17-59-21/30-video/1117--i-q-q-1- 

.html and VDagestan.info, 8 July 2011, http://vdagestan.info/2011/07/08/ 

%d0%ba%d0%b0%d0%b4%d0%b8%d0%b9%d0%b8%d0%ba%d0%b0%d0%b1%d1%83%d0%bc%- 

d1%83%d1%85i%d0%b0%d0%bc%d0%bc%d0%b0%d0%b4%d0%be%d1%82%d0%b2%d0%b5%- 

d1%82%d1%8b%d0%bd%d0%b0%d0%b2%d0%be%d0%bf%d1%80%d0%be/. 5For both the Russian-language transcript and Arab-language video, see ‘‘Amir IK Ali Abu 

Mukhammad: Poslanie s sovetom mudzhakhidami Shama VIDEO,’’ Kavkaz tsentr, 20 March 

2014, www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2014/03/20/103638.shtml. The Arab-language video 

is also at VDagestan.com, http://dagestan.com/obrashhenie-amira-ik-k-bratyam-v-sirii.djihad. 6For details of the Azerbaijan plot, see Gordon M. Hahn, Islam, Islamism, and Politics in Eurasia Report (from here on cited as IIPER), Nos. 56 and 58, http://csis.org/files/publication/ 

120507lHahnlIIPERl56.pdf and http://csis.org/files/publication/120621lHahnlIIPERl58.pdf. 7For details on the Putin assassination plot, see Gordon M. Hahn, Islam, Islamism, and Politics in Eurasia Report, No. 53, 12 March 2012, Center for Strategic and Internationmal Studies, 

http://csis.org/files/publication/120312lHahnlIIPER53.pdf. 

THE IK’S NEW AMIR

The death of the CE’s founder and first amir Dokku ‘‘Abu Usman’’ Umarov, perhaps as early as July 8, and the announcement of his successor ‘‘Sheikh Ali Abu 

Muhammad ad-Dagestani’’ (born Aliaskhab Alibutatovich Kebekov) has potential to 

bring change to IK, pushing it even a more radical direction. Sheikh Dagestani is 

an ethnic Avar from Dagestan and has been (and may still be at least for now) the 

IK’s Shariah Court qadi or chief judge since autumn 2010. In July 2011 IK’s new 

amir publicly-endorsed AQ’s and the global jihadi revolutionary movement’s goal of 

creating a global caliphate, noting: ‘‘We are doing everything possible to build the 

Caliphate and prepare the ground for this to the extent of our capabilities.’’4

His ascension to the IK’s top leadership post is the culmination of the rise to 

dominance within the IK of its Dagestan network, the so-called ‘‘Dagestan Vilaiyat’’ 

or DV. From April 2010 through 2013 the DV has been the IK’s spearhead, with 

Dagestan seeing approximately 70 percent of the IK’s some 1,700 attacks and violent incidents in Russia and the DV carrying out more than half of the istishkhad 

attacks during the same period, including those outside the North Caucasus. 

Sheikh Dagestani’s rise also marks the culmination of the IK’s theo-ideological 

and strategic jihadization. As the IK’s qadi, Dagestani was the IK’s chief theologian 

and ideologist, charged with ensuring the compliance of Umarov’s and other amirs’ 

actions with the Koran and the Sunna. Therefore, he was at the forefront of 

strengthening Islamist knowledge among the IK mujahedin. In a hundred or more 

video lectures, ad-Dagestani exhibits superb knowledge of the Koran, the Sunna, 

and the Arabic language, unlike his predecessor. His video lectures are replete with 

Koranic citations delivered in Arabic with the appropriate musical-style recitation 

and elongated vowel inflection. His first statement after that announcing his succession of Umarov was delivered entirely in Arabic to the IK mujahedin fighting in 

Syria.5

THE IK’S GLOBAL REACH

Since at least 2010, IK has undertaken operations and inspired attacks outside 

Russia on a limited scale. The years 2010 and 2011 saw IK’s first two major forays 

into Europe. In November 2010, a ‘‘Shariah4Belgium’’ cell was uncovered, including 

Chechens, Moroccans, Belgians, and Dutch. It used a Russian-language website tied 

to al-Qaeda to recruit fighters, raise funds, and plan attacks on NATO targets. In 

April 2011, a DV-tied cell, including Dagestanis, was uncovered in the Czech Republic, planning attacks in a third country. In April 2012, Azerbaijani security forces 

foiled a second DV (Dagestani Vilaiyat) foreign plot to carry out attacks in Baku 

and elsewhere in the southern Caucasus country, home to the strategic BakuTbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline.6 There was also an alleged, still shadowy plot to assassinate President Vladimir Putin reported in late February 2012. Operations for the 

assassination were to be in Ukraine, with operatives from Kazakhstan moving 

through Turkey and the Middle East.7

IK likely inspired the Chechen Lars Dakaev’s failed plot to bomb the Danish 

newspaper Jyllands-Posten that published caricatures of Mohammed, setting off vio-
10 

8For my detailed report on IK’s inspiration of Tamerlan and Jokhar Tsarnaev, see Gordon 

M. Hahn, The Caucasus Emirate Comes to America: The Boston Marathon Bombing, 

Geostrategic Forecasting Corporation (GFC) White Paper, October 2013, 

www.geostrategicforecasting.com/products-page/whitepapers-studiesandreports/boston-marathon-attack/. 9 ‘‘Amir IK Ali Abu Mukhammad: Poslanie s sovetom mudzhakhidami Shama VIDEO.’’ 

10 ‘‘Interv’yu s Abu Umarom Ash Shishani,’’ Beladusham.com, www.beladusham.com/ 

0392.html, last accessed 26 March 2014. 11 ‘‘Siriya: K brigade ‘Kataib Mukhadzhirin’ prisoedinilis’ dva siriiskikh podrazdeleniya,’’ 

Kavkaz tsentr, 22 March 2013, www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2013/03/22/96932.shtml. 12 ‘‘Siriya: Prisyaga siriiskikh modzhakhedov Amiru Armii mukhadzhirov i ansarov Umaru 

Shishani,’’ Kavkaz tsentr, 26 March 2013, www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2013/03/26/ 

97014.shtml. 13 ‘‘Operatsiya ‘Fatikh’,’’ FISyria.com, 7 December 2013, http://fisyria.com/?p=1630. 

lent demonstrations around the Muslim world, as well as a foiled plot to attack targets in Gibraltar during the 2012 London Summer Olympic Games and later elsewhere in Europe being planned by a group of three terrorists, two of them from the 

North Caucasus. The leader of the group planning the latter attack, an ethnic 

Chechen and/or Dagestani, Eldar Magomedov, was said by the Spanish court and 

police to be AQ’s leading operative in Europe based on U.S. and Russian intelligence. The IK certainly inspired the successful Boston Marathon bombings that 

killed four and wounded 260.8

But nowhere does the IK’s increasingly de-territorialized and global orientation 

resonate with such large implications as it does in Syria. 

THE IK IN SYRIA

North Caucasian mujahedin, especially those affiliated with the IK in the past 

and present, are playing the leading role among foreign mujahedin fighting in Syria. 

Amir ad-Dagestani underscored the Syrian jihad’s importance for the IK by making 

it the subject of his first video lecture after announcing his assumption of the IK 

leadership. He noted: ‘‘When jihad began in Shama, we were overjoyed, first, because we studied Islamic sciences in Shama, but second because we studied the 

hadiths which tell about the achievements of Shama, about the fact that in the endtime of troubles the faith will be in Shama, that Allah’s angels will spread their 

wings over Shama, that the best land is in Shama, and that the Heavenly Group 

will be in Shama at the end of time.’’9

Despite having an ambivalent attitude towards the emigration of IK mujahedin 

to Syria, Umarov appears to have backed three key amirs who made the ‘‘hijra’’ and 

took over leading positions in the Syrian jihad: Tarkhan Batirashvili (jihadi nom de 

guerre ‘‘Abu Umar al-Shishani’’ or Abu Umar the Chechen), Muslim Margoshvili 

(Abu Walid), and (Seifullah al-Shishani) Ruslan Machaliashvili (sometimes 

Meslikaev). They all appear to be ethnic Chechen Kists with ties to Georgia’s 

Pankisi Gorge and previous connections to the CE. They arrived in Syria as a group 

in late 2011 or early 2012 and were initially financed by Umarov, according to 

Batirashvili, the most prominent of them.10

Through 2012 hundreds of North Caucasian mujahedin and other emigres or 

muhajirin from Russia, Eurasia, Europe, and the Muslim world began to consolidate 

around the Chechen amirs through 2012. By late 2012 they formed the brigade 

‘‘Kataib al-Mujahirin’’ (KaM), with Batirashvili serving as its amir, and allied with 

the AQ-affiliated Jabkhat al-Nusra. 

In March 2013, Batirashvili received the ‘‘bayat’’ or Islamic loyalty oath from two 

Syrian rebel units, ‘‘Kataib Khattab’’ and ‘‘Jeish Muhammad,’’ which included some 

600 fighters who joined the KaM.11 According to the IK’s main website, ‘‘Kavkaz 

tsentr,’’ the KaM, renamed ‘‘Jeish Mukhajirin va Ansar’’ (the Army of Emirants and 

Helpers) or JMA, now numbered more than a thousand militants.12

The JMA, in particular amir Batirashvili, began to drift towards the then AQ-affiliated group, the Islamic State in Iraq and Sham (Syria) or ISIS, recently denounced by AQ amir Zayman al-Zawahiri for its radical excesses. JMA amir 

Batirashvili was appointed military amir of the ISIS’s northern front in summer 

2013. As relations between Nusra and the ISIS deteroriated and devolved into violent clashes, Batirashvili took the lifetime bayat to ISIS amir Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi 

and was promoted to the ISIS’s overall military amir in late October.13

This prompted a series of splits within the JMA, producing at least three major 

Syria-based jihadi groups led by Chechen amirs from the IK or the North Caucasus 

in addition to Batirashvili’s ISIS-loyal JMA: 

• Margoshvili’s Jund al-Sham (JS) appears to function autonomously; 
11 

14See the announcement in ‘‘Dzheish Khilafa Al-Islamiya ob’yadenilas s Dzhabkhat anNusra,’’ Usudu Sham, December 2013, [sic]. 15 Jolani noted that he and Machaliashvili fought closely together in Guta and elsewhere and 

that ‘‘the Caucasus always will give birth to new heroes, and they will restore the former influence of the Umma.’’ ‘‘Amir ‘Dzhabkhat an-Nura’ Abu Mukhammad al’-Dzhavlani ob amire 

Sefullakh Shishani,’’ Kavkaz tsentr, 10 February 2014, www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/ 

2014/02/10/103115.shtml. 16 Compare the CE’s own data for those Arabic calendar months in 2013 and 2014 in 

‘‘IMARAT KAVKAZ. Svodka boevikh operatsii modzhakhedov za mesyats rabbi as-sanii 1434 

goda po khidzhre (12 fevralya–12 marta 2013 g.),’’ Umma News, 13 March 2013, http:// 

ummanews.com/news/kavkaz/10099------------1434----12---12--2013-.html and ‘‘Svodka 

Dzhikhada za mesyats Rabi as-Sani 1435 g. kh. (02.02.2014–02.03.2014g.),’’ Kavkaz tsentr, 10 

March 2013, www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2014/03/10/103490.shtml, respectively. 17For more on the potential chemical threat, see Gordon M. Hahn, ‘‘Considering the Caucasus 

Emirate Chemical Threat to Sochi,’’ Russia and Eurasia Program Blog, Center for Strategic and 

International Studies, 7 February 2014, http://csis.org/blog/considering-caucasus-emiratechemical-attack-threat-sochi. 

• Jeish al-Khalifat Islamiya (Army of the Islamic Caliphate) or JKhI, the amir 

of which—Machaliashvili—was killed in February and which is allied with JS 

but taken the bayat to Nusra Front amir Abu Muhammad al-Jolani;14

• and the Imarat Kavkaz in Sham (Syria) or IKS led by the IK’s JMA/ISIS envoy, 

Salahuddin, appointed by late IK amir Umarov. 

In sum, IK-affiliated amirs are playing the leading role among the foreign 

mujahedin fighting in Syria—the main front in the global jihad at this time. 

Batirashvili’s rise to the ISIS’s top ranks and the eulogy to Machaliashvili by alNusrah amir Jolani testify to this fact.15 Greater testimony comes from the IK-affiliated amirs’ leading command role and their North Caucasian-dominated jamaats’ 

combat role in key battles, in particular those in and around Aleppo. Moreover, IK 

is in a more intimate relationship with AQ than ever before. 

IMPLICATIONS OF THE IK MUHAJIRIN IN SYRIA

The Caucasus mujahedin’s important role in the Syrian jihad has at least nine 

implications for the the global jihadi revolutionary movement and the struggle 

against it in Russia and the West. 

First, the the flood of many hundreds of IK mujahedin and other North Caucasian 

and Russian Islamists to the jihad in Syria is having a debilitating effect on the 

IK’s capacity in the North Caucasus and Russia. Even if only several hundred IK 

fighters have gone to Syria, this is a relatively large number to take away from IK 

in the Caucasus which only reached some 1,000 fighters. Thus, the Caucasus-Russian hijra to the Syrian jihad is having a debilitating effect on the IK’s four networks, including the spearhead Dagestani network, the so-called Dagestan Vilaiyat 

(DV). But all three other vilaiyats—the OVKBK, Chechnya’s Nokchicho Vilaiyat 

(NV) and Ingushetiya’s Galgaiche Vilaiyat (GV)—are seriously crippled by the hijra 

to Syria. Since it began in 2011, the number of insurgent and terrorist attacks in 

Russia (99 percent of them in the North Caucasus) has declined steadily. By my 

own estimate there were 583 in 2010, 546 in 2011, 465 in 2012, and 439 in 2013. 

According to IK-affiliated figures, in the second Arabic month of 2014, the decline 

in the number of attacks in Russia reached a nadir, declining to 10 from 31 during 

the same period in 2013.16 This and IK Umarov’s death late last year go a long way 

towards explaining the IK’s failure to attack the February-March Sochi Winter 

Olympic and Para-Olympic Games, despite its leaders’ many threats going back 

many years to do so. 

Second, the high profile of the IK and other North Caucasus and Russian 

mujahedin in the Syrian jihad relative to their actual numbers raises the IK’s ties 

to, and profile within the overall global jihadi revolutionary movement. The IK now 

has stronger ties to AQ and other global jihadi groups and fighters from across the 

globe, including those from countries in the immediate region such as Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Iraq. These stronger ties to the global jihad open opportunities for greater access to recruits, financing, and weapons. 

Third, JMA/IK fighters in Syria could acquire some of Assad’s chemical weapons 

and manage to transport them into Russia for WMD attacks. On the eve of the 

Sochi Olympics one amir Umar of a IK DV ‘‘diversionary group’’ called ‘‘Ansar alSunni’’ not only claimed responsibility for the December 2013 Volgograd sucide 

bombings in Volgograd, but warned Sochi that ‘‘attacks up to and including chemical 

attacks’’ were ready to be approved by IK amir Doku Umarov.17 Umarov’s death 

may have delayed this attack, or perhaps the chemical materials had not yet been 

acquired or transported to the Caucasus. Moreover, there is some evidence that 

rebels in Syria may have acquired chemical agents from Bashar al-Assad’s stock-
12 

18Karen Hodgson, ‘‘Reports claim Al Nusrah Front members in Turkey were planning sarin 

gas attacks,’’ Long War Journal, 31 May 2013, www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/ 

archives/2013/05/onlmayl30lthelturkish.php. 19Thomas Jocelyn, ‘‘Crisis in Syria: Implications for Homeland Security,’’ Testimony of Thomas Joscelyn (Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies and Senior Editor, The Long 

War Journal) Before the House Committee on Homeland Security, United States Congress, September 10, 2013, http://docs.house.gov/meetings/HM/HM00/20130910/101297/HHRG-113- 

HM00-Wstate-JoscelynT-20130910.pdf. 20Seymour M. Hersh, ‘‘Whose Sarin,’’ London Review of Books, Volume 34, Number 24, 13 

December 2013, www.lrb.co.uk/2013/12/08/seymour-m-hersh/whose-sarin. 21Linda Lundquist, ‘‘Extremists, including Chechens, Egyptians, Tunisians, and Syrians, are 

reportedly flocking to the Ain al-Hilweh refugee camp,’’ Long War Journal, 8 February 2014, 

www.longwarjournal.org/today-in/2014/02/securitylforceslinlzahleldetai.php. 22 ‘‘Obrashchenie Amira mudzhakhidov Imarata Kavkaz Abdullakha k mudzhakhidam 

Kavkaza i musul’manam Rossii,’’ Kavkaz tsentr, 20 March 2014, www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/ 

content/2014/03/20/103616.shtml. 

piles. On 30 May 2013, Turkish authorities arrested a JaN fighters in possession 

of about 2 kilos of sarin nerve gas, but no information has been made public about 

their nationalities.18 Days later, on June 1, Iraqi officials announced that they interdicted an AQ cell plotting to launch sarin gas attacks in Iraq, Europe, and possibly 

North America.19 A recent article by investigative journalist Seymour Hersh contends that CIA analysts reported to the Obama administration in the spring of last 

year that Syrian rebels may well have acquired some of Assad’s stockpiles of chemical agents.20 Certainly, with the chaos of an on-going civil war in Syria and the 

more than 40 sites at which Assad’s chemical weapons have been reported to be located, it is possible that one or more jihadi groups could have acquired chemical materials. 

The first three implications plus the advent of a new era in the IK under its new 

amir, Sheikh ad-Dagestani’ (Kebekov), raises a fourth possible implication: A shift 

in IK tactics, strategy, and/or goals. The goals of building the global caliphate and 

its affiliate in the North Caucasus, the IK, will remain. However, the more religiously-steeped Dagestani, who will surely seek to leave his mark both on the local 

IK and global jihad, could turn to even greater reliance on suicide bombings, mass 

casualty attacks, and joint operations with foreign jihadi groups perhaps beyond 

Russia’s borders as ways of compensating for lost capacity and maintaining a higher 

profile given the drain of potency to Syria. He may also change strategy by trying 

to expand operations more aggressively into the predominantly ethnic Russian 

North Caucasus regions of Stavropol, Krasnodar, and Rostov and to Volga Tatar regions as an ethnic and cultural bridge to the Crimean Tatars. 

A fifth implication could be the expansion of IK and North Caucasian mujahedin 

involvement on many of the global jihad revolutionary movement’s various fronts; 

something we have already seen as summarized briefly in this report’s introduction. 

For example, Chechens fighting in Syria were reported to be among a flood of extremists, including also Egyptians, Tunisians, and Syrians, heading to the Ain alHilweh refugee camp near Sidon Lebanon and joining the Abdallah Azzam Brigades’ 

Ziad Jarrah Brigades and Lebanon’s Jund al-Sham in order to carry out attacks in 

Beirut, the Bekaa valley, and Tripoli.21

This fifth implication raises a possible sixth—the formation of a more closelylinked Eurasian network of jihadi organizations with a second pillar after the IK 

in the North Caucasus becoming Central Asia’s jihadi groups on the eve of the 

Western withdrawal from Afghanistan and the possible return to power of the 

Taliban. There are significant numbers of Central Asian mujahedin who have arrived in Syria from the homelands and from AfPak where a series of Central Asian 

jihadi organizations—the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Islamic Jihad Union, 

Tajikistan’s ‘‘Jamaat Ansarullah’’, and Kazakhstan’s ‘‘Jund al-Khalifat’’—are on 

their own hijra in AfPak. The IK and these groups already exchange personnel, including the travel of North Caucasians to these AQ-tied groups’ training camps in 

AfPak, as well as video propaganda messages for mutual support. More recently, a 

group calling itself the ‘‘Imarat Kavkaz in Khorosan’’ and its amir Abdullah announced their presence somewhere in AfPak.22 Now these groups are mingling using 

their common, if often weak Russian-language knowledge and their peoples’ common 

colonial experiences with Russia that will build bonds beyond those forged in combat. 

Seventh, Azerbaijan is increasingly vulnerable to jihadi terrorist activity given its 

geographical proximity to Turkey, Syria, and Iraq and its use as a travel route by 

militants traveling to and from the Syrian and North Caucasus/Russian jihadi 

fronts. As noted in the introduction the IK already attempted a major plot in Azer-
13 

23 Anne Barnard and Eric Schmitt, ‘‘As Foreign Fighters Flood Syria, Fears of a New Extremist Haven,’’ New York Times, 9 August 2013, www.nytimes.com/2013/08/09/world/middleeast/ 

as-foreign-fighters-flood-syria-fears-of-a-new-extremist-haven.html?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=- 

editlthl20130809&lr=0. 24 ‘‘V Moskve arestovany 15 chlenov ‘‘At Takfir val’-Khidzhra’,’’ Kavkaz uzel, 29 November 

2013, www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/234336/. 25To reiterate, the four AfPak-based, Central Asian groups are: The Islamic Jihad Union, the 

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan’s Jamaat Ansarullah, and Kazakhstan’s Jund alKhalifat. 

baijan in 2012. Azerbaijan also has been plagued, if rarely, by jihadi terrorist attacks and CE incursions into its northern regions. 

Eighth, there is the possibility of disaster for the IK in Syria. In a major routes 

of the jihadis by Syrian forces, the bulk of its fighters could be wiped, or IK 

mujahedin may be so discouraged by the divisions and bloodshed between jihadi 

groups that they abandon their caliphate and emirate dreams. 

Ninth, given the IK’s even greater integration into the global jihad and Russia’s 

support for the Bashir Assad regime against which the jihadists are fighting, Russia 

is likely to move higher on the global jihadi revolutionary movement’s target list. 

One Syrian ISIS commander told a Western journalists that Russia would be a target of the ISIS: ‘‘Russia is killing Muslims in southern Muslim republics and sends 

arms and money to kill Muslims in Syria as well . . . I swear by God that Russia 

will pay a big price for its dirty role in the Syrian war.’’23

POTENTIAL THREAT TO THE U.S. HOMELAND

Although I do not foresee the IK undertaking operations to attack the U.S. homeland on its own, I would expect that IK- or North Caucasus-affiliated militants, especially from among those fighting in Syria and AfPak will sooner or later be involved in international plots to do so. We have seen this already in the AQ plot uncovered in Spain and France during the 2012 London Summer Olympic Games. In 

that plot, two Chechens, one of whom was identified as AQ’s top operative in Europe 

by the Spanish court based on U.S. and Russian intelligence. 

We should also be on guard against similar plots or even plots organized by the 

IK alone targeting U.S.-related soft targets in Europe and Eurasia, in particular in 

Russia. In addition to AQ and At-Takfir wal-Hijra—the latter of which undertook 

a plot to attack Moscow last year 24—IK could partner with the four more or less 

Russian-speaking, Central Asian jihadi groups in AfPak with which it maintains 

ties mentioned above as well as the Waziristan-based Volga Tatar ‘‘Bulgar Jamaat,’’ 

elements of which have also made the hijra to Syria and fight along IK-affiliated 

groups there.25

IMPLICATIONS FOR RUSSIAN FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

Russia’s greater vulnerability to attacks by global Sunni jihadi groups as a result 

of the IK’s growing ties with the global jihadi revolutionary movement raises several 

foreign policy implications. 

First, all else remaining equal, Moscow will have greater reason to maintain its 

relationships with Iran and Syria hoping against hope that the Shiites can at least 

absorb and contain the Sunni jihadi threat. 

Second, this likely will complicate non-proliferation efforts in both Iran and Syria 

and make it more difficult to remove Assad from power and secure Israel’s national 

security. 

Third, any major attack emanating from IK or other jihadi groups in Syria could 

raise tensions in a Russo-Turkish relationship potentially burdened by Istanbul’s 

pan-Turkish impulse to protect Crimea’s Tatars from real or perceived Russian 

transgressions. 

Fourth, the same is true regarding Russia’s relations with the Arab Gulf and 

Western states supporting the Syrian rebels. 

In sum, the Syrian civil war and jihad is reshaping the geopolitical and security 

landscape across Eurasia. For the IK, the Syrian jihadi crucible could provide new 

momentum through a pivotal jihadi victory in the region or swallow up the IK’s 

mujahedin in a grand jihadi failure. Either way, this will have important implications for Russian national security and foreign policy and for Eurasian and international security as well. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Dr. Hahn. 

Our next witness, Mr. William Roggio, is a senior fellow at the 

Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a non-profit, nonpartisan 
14 

policy institute focusing on foreign policy and National security. At 

the foundation, Mr. Roggio is the editor of The Long War Journal, 

which provides original reporting and analysis of the global war on 

terror. He is also the president of Public Multimedia, Inc., a nonprofit media organization dedicated to covering the long war. He 

was embedded with the U.S. Marine Corps and the U.S. Army in 

Iraq in 2005, 2006, and 2007, and with the Canadian Army in Afghanistan in 2006. 

We are privileged to have you here today as a witness, we thank 

you for being here, and you are recognized. 

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM F. ROGGIO, SENIOR FELLOW, 

FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES 

Mr. ROGGIO. Thank you, Chairman King. Thank you for the invitation to speak today. I agree—with what Dr. Hahn said about the 

al-Qaeda’s—or the Islamic Caucus Emirate’s links to al-Qaeda. 

They are historical, they are well-documented, and they span decades. You know, not only has Dokku Umarov, the former emir, you 

know, threatened the United States. But he has said, prior to his 

death in July he had said that the Islamic Caucus Emirates is part 

of the global jihad. 

You can see this by how this group and how its fighters are dispersed in the major theaters. The Islamic Caucus Emirates fighters 

have been spotted in Afghanistan and Pakistan for years. They 

haven’t had the prominence that we are now seeing in Syria. They 

have operated more in the shadows. But they served as combatenablers, basically special forces. They impart critical tactics and 

serve in—embedded with not just the Taliban but with al-Qaeda 

forces and other groups in the region. 

They supported groups like Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and 

Islamic Jihad Union. As Dr. Hahn had mentioned, a group—the 

Caucus mujahedin in the Emirate—in the Kurasan was formed, 

and this group announced its presence in 2011. This group had actually said that it was loyal to the Taliban. So we are seeing—I 

think it is a key indication of how this group has networked 

throughout the region. 

They—al-Qaeda has long had roots in the Caucasus. Bin Laden 

supplied—provided support for Ibn Khattab and Shamil Basayev. 

Our mujahedin fought in Chechnya and in the Caucasus in the 

1990s from the beginning. Al-Qaeda also routinely highlights the 

importance of the Chechen theater. Zawahiri himself, in multiple 

speeches he talks about the importance of the fighting and the history of the fighting in Chechnya. They are upheld as ideal fighters. 

He, at one point in one speech said—he said follow the Chechen’s 

lead in their resistance to democracy and resistance to Russian 

rule. 

Chechnya has been used as a recruiting tool in al-Qaeda’s propaganda. Some of the 9/11 hijackers, they initially were—wanted to— 

they were gonna be deployed to fight in Chechnya, but were retasked to actually conduct the attacks. Islamic Caucus Emirates 

employs al-Qaeda’s tactics: Suicide bombing, suicide assaults, roadside bombings, and all of the other tools in the insurgency. We see 

this even in a recent video that was just released the other day in 

Syria. 
15 

We see a training camp from the army of the immigrants and 

supporters—that is a Chechen-led group, obviously, or Caucus 

Emirates-like group. This camp looks just like an al-Qaeda training 

video that they have released over the decades. You see fighters 

navigating obstacle courses, you see fighters even in an IED class. 

Building IEDs and then deploying them. Same types of IEDs that 

have been used against U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

But where we are really seeing the Islamic Caucus Emirate having its greatest effect is in Syria. While in Afghanistan and Pakistan it largely operated in the shadows, I think in Syria it has really advertised its fighting. That is because instead of having, say, 

scores of fighters in the Afghan-Pakistan region you now have hundreds if not thousands of fighters from the Caucasus. I think Dr. 

Hahn laid out a very good, detailed description of how the Islamic 

Caucus Emirates fighters began to form and coalesce inside Syria. 

It has become quite effective. We are now seeing fighters that are 

appearing in videos—fighters and commanders, they are appearing 

in videos—with al-Qaeda leaders or al-Qaeda-linked fighters. Including one sheikh, Abdullah Mohaisany, who has taken sides with 

al-Qaeda in its dispute with the Islamic State of Iraq. They are 

seen on the battlefield celebrating. You have two Chechen commanders, you have a leader of the group called Ahrar al-Sham, 

which is in the Islamic front. 

You have a top Saudi cleric, extremely popular Saudi cleric—who 

definitely is tied to al-Qaeda, all celebrating moments after overrunning a Syrian military position. One of the—the fighters from 

the Caucasus are considered some of the most tactically-proficient 

fighters amongst the jihadists. I think this is where they are having a major impact in Syria. They are imparting those tactics that 

they did on a smaller level in Afghanistan, and they are making 

these Syrian Islamist groups and jihadist groups far more effective. 

I think that is why we are seeing them having such—success 

against Syrian military formations. The other—I think the biggest 

concern I have is how they are interacting, in general—the fighters 

from the Caucasus are interacting in general—with all these other 

jihadist groups. We even have—there is this one person who identifies himself as an American. His name is Abu Mohamed Amriki, 

which means, obviously, ‘‘the American.’’ He is currently being investigated for his ties. He claimed to live in the United States for 

10 to 11 years. 

He is pictured with top leaders from the Caucus Emirates, such 

as Omar al-Shishani, who is now the military emir of the Islamic 

State of Iraq and al-Sham. As these individuals are interacting 

with Westerners or, better, joining the battlefield in Syria, or from 

countries that, you know—that would easily access the United 

States, I am deeply concerned with the tactics and capabilities that 

they are imparting. 

Thank you very much for your time. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Roggio follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF WILLIAM F. ROGGIO

APRIL 3, 2014 

Chairman King, Ranking Member Higgins, Members of the committee, thank you 

for inviting me here to discuss the terrorist threat emanating from the Caucasus. 
16 

1 U.S. State Department, Office of the Spokesman, ‘‘Designation of Caucasus Emirate,’’ May 

26, 2011; http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/05/164312.htm. 2 U.S. State Department, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, ‘‘Designation of 

Caucasus Emirates Leader Doku Umarov,’’ June 23, 2010; http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/ 

des/143564.htm. 3 U.S. State Department, Office of the Spokesman, ‘‘Rewards for Justice—Doku Umarov Reward Offer,’’ May 26, 2011; http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/05/164314.htm. 4Kavkaz Center, ‘‘Caucasus Emirate Emir Dokku Abu Usman urged to prevent Olympic 

games in Sochi,’’ July 3, 2013; http://www.kavkazcenter.com/eng/content/2013/07/03/ 

17994.shtml. 5 9/11 Commission Report, p. 64. 

6 9/11 Commission Report, p. 58. 

Unfortunately, as we saw nearly 1 year ago today at the Boston Marathon, the jihad 

in the Caucasus has already impacted lives here in the United States. 

There is still much we do not know for certain about Tamerlan Tsarnaev’s travels 

in Dagestan and Chechnya, but we do know that, at a minimum, he was sympathetic to the jihadists operating there. Tamerlan Tsarnaev and his younger brother 

were, of course, responsible for the attacks on the Boston Marathon. As a report by 

the House Homeland Security Committee noted just last month, it ‘‘is reasonable 

to assume that Tamerlan Tsarnaev was at least inspired by’’ the ‘‘activity and ideology’’ of jihadists fighting in the Caucasus and he was ‘‘driven to take part in the 

vision of global jihad which they share with al-Qaeda.’’ Indeed, the Imarat Kavkaz 

or ‘‘IK’’ (otherwise known as the Islamic Caucasus Emirate) does have links to alQaeda. And Tsarnaev is known to have sympathized with the IK and its fighters. 

The IK has openly proclaimed itself a threat to the United States and the West, 

and we should take these threats seriously. The U.S. State Department certainly 

does. In May 2011, the State Department officially designated the IK as a terrorist 

organization. ‘‘The designation of Caucasus Emirate is in response to the threats 

posed to the United States and Russia,’’ Ambassador Daniel Benjamin, the State 

Department’s Coordinator for Counterterrorism, said at the time. ‘‘The attacks perpetrated by Caucasus Emirate illustrate the global nature of the terrorist problem 

we face today,’’ Benjamin added.1 In June 2010, the State Department added Doku 

Umarov, who was then the emir of the IK, to the U.S. Government’s list of Specially 

Designated Global Terrorists.2 And in May 2011, Foggy Bottom offered a reward of $5 million for information leading to Umarov’s location.3 In both its June 2010 and 

May 2011 announcements, the State Department noted that Umarov and the IK 

pose a threat to the United States and other countries. Indeed, Umarov described 

the IK as ‘‘a part of the global Jihad’’ in a July 2013 statement in which he called 

for further attacks aimed at disrupting Russia’s plans for the 2014 Winter Olympic 

Games in Sochi.4

Despite the fact that Umarov was recently killed, there are good reasons to suspect that the IK will continue to pose a threat to American and Western interests 

both in and outside of Russia. As with other al-Qaeda-affiliated groups, the IK will 

continue to spend most of its resources waging insurgencies, both inside Russia and 

elsewhere. Still, in my testimony today, I will highlight several key reasons why the 

IK poses a terrorist threat to the West. Those reasons are: • Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda helped transform the insurgency in Chechnya 

from a nationalist one into part of the global jihad.—Al-Qaeda’s senior leadership established its influence within the Caucasus long ago. While al-Qaeda was 

headquartered in Sudan from 1991 to 1996, Osama bin Laden maintained a 

network of training camps and other facilities that shuttled fighters to several 

jihadist fronts, including Chechnya.5 During the 1990s al-Qaeda and the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) funneled cash and other support to Muslim rebels in 

Chechnya through a charity in Baku, Azerbaijan.6 Ayman al-Zawahiri himself, 

then the head of the EIJ, as well as second-in-command of al-Qaeda, set out 

for Chechnya in late 1996. He was accompanied by other dual-hated al-QaedaEIJ operatives. Zawahiri was arrested in Dagestan before he reached Chechnya 

and spent several months in prison. Zawahiri’s trip to the region underscores, 

from al-Qaeda’s perspective, the importance of supporting the jihad in 

Chechnya. 

Al-Qaeda’s efforts in Chechnya have clearly borne fruit. Two highly influential 

jihadists in Chechnya became closely allied with al-Qaeda’s senior leaders. 

Shamil Salmanovich Basayev (a Chechen) and Ibn al Khattab (a Saudi) established the Islamic International Brigade (IIB). ‘‘In October 1999,’’ according to 

the United Nations Security Council committee responsible for sanctioning alQaeda and Taliban-affiliated groups, ‘‘emissaries of Basayev and al Khattab 

traveled to Osama bin Laden’s home base in the Afghan province of Kandahar, 

where Bin Laden agreed to provide substantial military assistance and financial 
17 

7 United Nations Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 

(2011) concerning al-Qaeda and associated individuals and entities, ‘‘QE.1.99.03. Islamic International Brigade (IIB),’’ September 7, 2010; http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/ 

NSQE09903E.shtml. 8 Ibid. 

9 ISAF Press Release, DVIDS, May 31, 2011; http://www.dvidshub.net/news/71346/isafjoint-command-morning-operational-update. 10 Bill Roggio, ‘‘Fighters from ‘Caucasus Mujahideen in Khorasan’ issue message to ‘brothers’ 

in southern Russia,’’ The Long War Journal, Oct. 22, 2011; http://www.longwarjournal.org/ 

archives/2011/10/fighterslfromlcaucas.php. 11 United Nations Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 

(2011) concerning al-Qaeda and associated individuals and entities, ‘‘QI.U.290.11. Doku 

Khamatovich Umarov,’’ March 10, 2011; http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/ 

NSQI29011E.shtml. 12 9/11 Commission Report, p. 191. 13SITE Intelligence Group, ‘‘Zawahiri Praises Chechen Fighters As Models for Jihad,’’ January 25, 2014. 14 9/11 Commission Report, p. 160. 

aid, including by making arrangements to send to Chechnya several hundred 

fighters to fight against Russian troops and perpetrate acts of terrorism.’’ Also 

in 1999, bin Laden ‘‘sent substantial amounts of money to’’ Basayev, al Khattab 

and other jihadists in Chechnya. The money ‘‘was to be used exclusively for 

training gunmen, recruiting mercenaries and buying ammunition.’’ By the end 

of 2002, IIB leaders ‘‘had received several million dollars from international terrorist organizations, including al-Qaeda.’’ Al-Qaeda continued to raise funds for 

the IIB after the 9/11 attacks.7

By 1995, the U.N. notes, ‘‘Arab Afghans’’—that is, men from throughout the 

Arab world who traveled to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan during the 1980s— 

accounted for a ‘‘substantial’’ number ‘‘of those fighting against Russian troops.’’ 

Al-Qaeda not only supported the jihad inside Chechnya, but also made sure to 

integrate Chechens into its operations in Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda’s elite ‘‘055 Brigade,’’ which fought alongside the Taliban against the Northern Alliance, ‘‘included a number of Chechens, many of whom were believed to be followers of’’ 

IIB leaders. In October 2001, al Khattab supported al-Qaeda’s fight against coalition forces by sending ‘‘additional fighters to Afghanistan’’ and promising ‘‘to 

pay the volunteers’ families a substantial monthly stipend or a large lump-sum 

payment in the event of their death.’’8

Fighters from the Caucasus are present in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region to 

this day. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has identified 

‘‘Chechen’’ fighters in Afghanistan as recently as May 2011, when it noted that 

a foreign fighter network in Kunduz ‘‘facilitates foreign suicide bombers including Chechens and Pakistanis throughout the province.’’9 A group calling itself 

the Caucasus Mujahideen in Khorasan announced its presence in October 2011, 

saying it was in direct contact with its ‘‘brothers’’ in Russia.10 The United Nations has noted that Umarov, the deceased head of the IK, supported both the 

Islamic Jihad Group and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU).11 Both 

groups are based in South Asia and closely allied with al-Qaeda. 

• Al-Qaeda has repeatedly highlighted the fighting in Chechnya in its propaganda 

videos.—After the U.S.S. Cole bombing in October 2000, Osama bin Laden ordered his media committee to produce a propaganda video that included a reenactment of the Cole bombing, as well as footage from Chechnya and other 

jihadist hotspots.12 The plight of Muslims in Chechnya remained a theme in alQaeda’s messaging in the years that followed. And al-Qaeda continues to 

present the fighting in Chechnya as part of its global jihad. In January of this 

year, Ayman al-Zawahiri praised Chechen fighters, saying that the ‘‘fighting for 

Chechnya is another page of the pages of eternal jihad to as to achieve true justice in the name of Allah.’’ Zawahiri asked if other jihadists would be willing 

to follow the Chechens’ example: ‘‘Are we, as Muslims, ready to take the path 

of the Chechens, and enroll in the ranks of the fight in the name of Allah?’’ 

Zawahiri called on Muslims in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia to follow the 

Chechens’ lead in rejecting democracy and waging jihad.13

• The jihad in Chechnya has been used to recruit terrorists—including a number 

of the 9/11 hijackers—who were repurposed for attacks against American interests.—As the 9/11 Commission reported, al-Qaeda’s Hamburg cell traveled ‘‘to 

Afghanistan aspiring to wage jihad in Chechnya,’’ but al-Qaeda ‘‘quickly recognized their potential and enlisted them in its anti-U.S. jihad.’’14 The Hamburg 

cell included the terrorists who flew the hijacked planes on 9/11. Some of the 
18 

15 9/11 Commission Report, p. 233. 16 9/11 Commission Report, p. 149. 17 9/11 Commission Report, p. 274. 18 Bill Roggio, ‘‘Caucasus Emirate leader claims Moscow airport suicide attack,’’ The Long War 

Journal, Feb. 7, 2011; http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/02/ 

caucasuslemiratelcla.php. 19 Bill Roggio, ‘‘ ‘Black Widow’ female suicide bombers kill 37 in Moscow metro blasts,’’ The 

Long War Journal, March 29, 2010; http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/03/ 

femalelsuicidelbombel3.php. 20Lisa Lundquist, ‘‘Suspected ‘Black Widow’ suicide bomber kills 6 in southern Russia,’’ Oct. 

21, 2013; The Long War Journal, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/10/ alsuspectedlblacklwi.php. 21 Bill Roggio, ‘‘Suicide bomber strikes again in southern Russia,’’ Dec. 30, 2013, The Long War 

Journal; http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/12/suicidelbomberlstrikl8.php. 22 Benjamin Shapiro, ‘‘Caucasus jihad: Terror tactics back on the horizon?’’, The Long War 

Journal, May 21, 2009; http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/05/ caucasusljihadlterro.php. 23 United Nations Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 

(2011) concerning al-Qaeda and associated individuals and entities, ‘‘QE.1.99.03. Islamic International Brigade (IIB),’’ September 7, 2010; http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/ 

NSQE09903E.shtml. 24Miriam Elder, ‘‘Russian Islamist Doku Umarov calls for attacks on 2014 Winter Olympics,’’ 

The Guardian, July 3, 2013; http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/03/russia-islamistattack-olympics-sochi. 

muscle hijackers from Saudi Arabia initially wanted to fight in Chechnya.15

Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM), the mastermind of 9/11, also attempted to 

join the ranks of the main jihadist leader in Chechnya, Ibn al Khattab.16 And 

in August 2001, French authorities provided evidence to the U.S. Government 

that Zacarias Moussaoui, who was slated to take part in a follow-on attack after 

9/11, had his own ties to Khattab.17

• The IK has adopted al-Qaeda’s tactics, including the use of suicide bombers in 

attacks against civilians. The organization has developed expertise in committing mass casualty terrorist attacks. Since the formation of the IK in 2007, the 

group has executed multiple suicide attacks against security forces, government 

officials, and civilians. The attacks have not been confined to the Caucasus region of Russia; IK has struck in the heart of Moscow several times. Two of the 

most deadly IK attacks in Moscow over the past several years are the January 

24, 2011 suicide attack at the Domodedovo International Airport in Moscow 

that killed 35 people and wounded scores more 18 and the March 29, 2010 suicide attack by two female bombers, or Black Widows, who killed 39 people in 

the Moscow metro.19

Other major suicide bombings include the June 22, 2009 attack that wounded 

Yunus Bek Yevkurov, the President of the Republic of Ingushetia and suicide 

attacks on Oct. 21, 2013,20 Dec. 29, 2013, and Dec. 30 2013 21 that targeted 

transportation nodes (a bus, a train station, and a trolley respectively) in the 

city of Volgograd. All of these attacks were executed by the suicide teams of the 

Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs 

(RSRSBCM), a unit that predates the IK and was responsible for attacks such 

at the school siege in Beslan, the destruction of commercial airlines, and the 

theater siege in Moscow.22 The IK is closely linked to the RSRSBCM.23

• The IK’s threat against the 2014 Olympics in Sochi was real, despite the fact 

that no terrorist attack materialized.—In June 2013, Doku Umarov called on his 

supporters to use ‘‘maximum force’’ to stop the 2014 Olympic Games. ‘‘Today we 

must show those who live in the Kremlin... that our kindness is not weakness,’’ Umarov said. ‘‘They plan to hold the Olympics on the bones of our ancestors, on the bones of many, many dead Muslims buried on our land by the Black 

Sea. We as mujahideen are required not to allow that, using any methods that 

Allah allows us.’’24

The Russian government erected substantial security barriers in order stop terrorists from striking the Olympic festivities. It is likely that these measures either stopped an attack from occurring, or dissuaded the IK from attempting 

one. If the opportunity for an attack had presented itself, there is little doubt 

that the IK would have taken it. And the IK would not have discriminated between Russian government officials/civilians and others who were visiting the 

games from abroad. That is, the IK’s threat against the Olympic Games was 

not just a threat against Russia, but was in fact a threat against the international community. 

• The IK operates as part of al-Qaeda’s global network. As we’ve learned over the 

past several years, the terrorist threat against the United States can come from 
19 

25 Bill Roggio, ‘‘Chechen commander leads Muhajireen Brigade in Syria,’’ The Long War Journal, Feb. 20, 2013, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/02/chechenlcomman- derlle.php. 26Kavkaz Center, ‘‘Syria. Appeal of Emir of Brigade of Emigrants Abu Omar al-Chechen,’’ 

Feb. 7, 2013; http://www.kavkazcenter.com/eng/content/2013/02/07/17333.shtml. 27 Bill Roggio, ‘‘Chechen commander forms ‘Army of Emigrants,’ integrates Syrian groups,’’ 

The Long War Journal, March 28, 2013; http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/02/ 

chechenlcommanderlle.php. 28 Bill Roggio, ‘‘Muhajireen Army fires on Syrian helicopter with surface-to-air missile,’’ The 

Long War Journal, June 27, 2013; http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/ 

2013/06/muhajireenlarmylfireslonlsyria.php. 29 Bill Roggio, ‘‘Muhajireen Army uses BMP to launch suicide assault on Aleppo airport,’’ The 

Long War Journal, June 27, 2013; http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/06/ 

muhajireenlarmyluses.php. 30 Bill Roggio, ‘‘ ‘American’ jihadist in Syria pictured with dangerous ISIS commanders,’’ The 

Long War Journal, March 19, 2014; http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/03/ 

americanljihadistlin.php. 31The video can be found on YouTube, see: https://www.youtube.com/ 

watch?v=TPNIOL34bA4&feature=youtu.be. 

any part of al-Qaeda’s international network. The IK is integrated with this network. Today, this can best be seen in Syria, where multiple IK commanders and 

other affiliated fighters have joined the insurgency against Bashar al Assad’s 

regime. 

Jihadist from the IK play a pivotal role in the fighting in Syria, and leaders 

from the Caucasus command large numbers of Syria and foreign fighters in several jihadist groups operating in the country. Those groups include the Al 

Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant, al-Qaeda’s official branch in Syria; 

the Islamic State of Iraq and the Sham, or ISIS, an al-Qaeda splinter group; 

and the Islamic Front, an Islamist alliance that is allied with the Al Nusrah 

Front. Both the Al Nusrah Front and the ISIS are on the U.S. Government’s 

list of Specially Designated Global Terrorist entities. 

Fighters from IK originally fought in the Kateeb al Muhajireen wal Ansar, or 

the Brigade of the Emigrants and Helpers. This group was formed in February 

2013 and was led by Omar al Shishani (a Chechen).25 Kavkaz Center noted that 

the group ‘‘includes volunteers from the Caucasus Emirate.’’26 In March 2013, 

the group expanded and rebranded itself the Jaish al Muhajireen wa Ansar, or 

Army of the Emigrants and Helpers. Syrian jihadist groups merged with Abu 

Omar’s forces at this time.27

The Army of the Emigrants and Helpers served as the vanguard for jihadist 

forces in Syria. It was spotted at the tip of the spear during the fighting at 

nearly every crucial battle in 2013. The group launched joint assaults with the 

Al Nusrah Front and the ISIS to overrun Syrian military bases. The Army of 

the Emigrants and Helpers has shot down a Syrian helicopter with a surfaceto-air missile and used a captured BMP armored fighting vehicle as a suicide 

car bomb in order to penetrate the perimeter at a Syrian military base.28 29

The Army of the Emigrants and Helpers splintered in the fall of 2013 as ISIS 

and the Al Nusrah Front clashed over a leadership dispute and the former’s unwillingness to submit to sharia courts. Abu Omar al Shishani took a faction of 

fighters and joined the ISIS. Three commanders, known as Saifullah al 

Shishani, Salahuddin Shishani, and Abu Musa al Shishani, joined the Al 

Nusrah Front. Salahuddin has even been photographed in Syrian sitting in 

front of an IK flag. And another commander, known as Muslim al Shishani, reformed the Army of the Emigrants and Helpers and remained independent 

from, but allied with, the Al Nusrah Front and the ISIS. 

The prevalence of IK fighters and leaders on the Syrian battlefield has serious, 

long-term ramifications for the global jihad. IK members are interacting with 

and sharing their tactical skills with Westerners and others. For instance, a 

jihadist who identifies himself as an American and is known as Abu Muhammad al Amriki has been seen in photographs with Omar al Shishani.30 He is 

also seen fighting alongside IK fighters and even speaks in Russian.31

Thank you again for inviting me to testify today, and I look forward to answering 

your questions. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Roggio. Appreciate your testimony. 

Now, Dr. Andrew Kuchins is a senior fellow and director of the 

Russia and Eurasia program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He is an expert on Russian foreign and domestic 

policies, with his more recent scholarship being dedicated to U.S.- 
20 

Russian relations and the Russia-Asian strategy; and the role of 

energy in the Russian Far East. 

From 2003 to 2006, Dr. Kuchins was a senior associate at the 

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, where he served as 

director of its Russian and Eurasian program, and was the director 

of the Carnegie Moscow Center in Russia. I am glad they got your 

nameplate straight. We are very privileged to have you here today 

as a witness, Dr. Kuchins. 

You are recognized, thank you. 

STATEMENT OF ANDREW C. KUCHINS, PH.D., DIRECTOR AND 

SENIOR FELLOW, RUSSIA AND EURASIA PROGRAM, CENTER 

FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 

Mr. KUCHINS. Thank you very much Chairman King. It is a great 

pleasure and honor for me to have the opportunity to speak before 

the committee today, and, along with the two very distinguished 

colleagues. I should say out the outset that I agree very, very much 

with what my predecessors have said, particularly about the dangers of the links between fighters from the North Caucasus and 

their link-up with those in Syria, and the potential implications. 

The thrust of my remarks will be somewhat different. In my 

view, the terrorist threat to the U.S. homeland emanating from the 

North Caucasus region of the Russian Federation is likely to increase in the years ahead. The judgment is based on my perception 

of several on-going trends and phenomena. I want to make, basically, six points. One, the governance problems in the Northern 

Caucasus that plague the region at large are growing. While the 

incidents of violent acts may have subsided moderately in the past 

few years, the underlying issues of poor governance, economic deprivation, high unemployment, and endemic corruption are all getting worse. 

In addition, oppression on the basis of religion by the Russian 

state is increasing in the face of the growing role of Islam, including radical and violent Salafi groups in ideology in the North 

Caucasus, in Russia more broadly. Many people who may have initially been quite moderate in their views and goals have been 

radicalized by the very unpleasant experiences of themselves or 

those close to them in encounters with Russian state authority. 

Two, the growing resonance of Russian nationalism and national 

politics is feeling increasing resentment about the subsidization of 

the region. This sentiment, which has been captured by the popular 

phrase ‘‘stop feeding the Caucasus’’ is pushing the Russian government to curtail government spending toward the region just as the 

strains of economic stagnation in the Russian economy at large— 

there is a less than a 1 percent annual growth at the moment— 

are putting pressures on the budget more broadly. The near-term 

prospects for the Russia economy have much greater downside risk 

today than upside potential. 

In a CSIS report on the Northern Caucasus published in 2011, 

we concluded that the Northern Caucasus is increasingly looking 

like a virtually ungovernable region under kind-of a different jurisdictional administrative regime than that which prevails in the 

rest of the country; maybe more akin to the Fatah in Pakistan. 

This is also reflected in growing sentiment among Russians that 
21 

people from the Caucasus are not ‘‘nosh’’ or ‘‘ours.’’ That this is a 

region populated by peoples that are not really Russia, certainly 

not Ruski, maybe even not Rasiski. 

Three, Islam, as it is in many countries and regions of the world, 

is becoming a more significant part of individual’s identity in the 

Northern Caucasus and elsewhere in the Russia Federation, notably the Volga Region and other large cities. Not surprisingly, we 

see increasing voice for Islam being expressed in the political context. Chechen leader, Ramzan Kadyrov for example, has embraced 

and promoted this in Chechnya, even endorsing the implementation of Sharia law. We also see greater prevalence of radical Salafi 

strains of Islam, as well as overt linkages with global jihadist ideology, which is largely facilitated by the internet, as well as the direct links that Gordon and Bill talked about. 

Four, significant numbers, likely, hundreds not thousands, according to available data, of jihadists from the Northern Caucasus 

have left for Syria to take up arms against the Assad regime. Here, 

they have become battle-hardened veterans with much deeper ties 

to global jihadist financial, ideological, arms, and warfare training 

networks. Vladimir Putin’s strong stance supporting Assad only 

deepens their hatred of the ruling order in Russia and their desire 

to demolish it if, and when, they return to Russia. 

The success of the mujahedin in Afghanistan in the 1980s was 

a watershed event for the emergence and consolidation of embryonic jihadist networks If there were a similar success in Syria for 

the jihad-inspired forces in taking down the Assad regime, we 

should also anticipate how this event could prompt another quantum leap in the capabilities of jihadist networks globally in terms 

of recruiting, financing, training, among other areas. Already, as 

my colleagues have laid out, the linkages between the Northern 

Caucasus and the battleground in Syria have strengthened in 

many ways. We should anticipate that the success—and even to a 

lesser extent, even with the—if it were to—with failure of jihadists 

in Syria could dramatically increase the dangers that groups and 

individuals present in the Northern Caucasus. 

The Obama administration has consistently under-appreciated 

this factor as a major reason for Vladimir Putin’s staunch support 

for the Assad government for the past 3 years. 

Five, the poor state of U.S.-Russia relations was already a contributing factor in suboptimal counterterrorism and intelligence 

sharing that, in part—a lesser part for sure—facilitated the intelligence failure represented by the Boston bombing by the Tsarnaev 

brothers in April 2013. 

Committee Members know far better than I that intelligence 

sharing, even with our closest allies, is a complicated and challenging task. Intelligence sharing with a partner like the Russian 

Federation, where mutual trust is very low, is that much less likely 

to be successful and useful. Since the mutual intelligence failure of 

the Boston bombings a year ago—again, clearly, the lion’s share of 

this responsibility falls on U.S. intelligence and law enforcement 

institutions, given that the act took place on U.S. territory—U.S.- 

Russia relations have dramatically worsened over issues including, 

but not limited to, the Snowden affair and Russia’s military occupation and subsequent annexation of Crimea. 
22 

As we sit here today, it is extremely difficult for me to imagine 

that existing problems in U.S.-Russia intelligence sharing on interactions between dangerous individuals and groups in the Northern 

Caucasus with like-minded individuals and groups in the United 

States or elsewhere, who may pose a threat to the U.S. homeland— 

will improve. Realistically, the current dysfunctional status quo in 

U.S.-Russia counterterrorism cooperation will be politically hard to 

maintain. 

Six, a far more dangerous threat to the U.S. homeland could 

emerge if Russian government intentions regarding how it manages its own terrorist threat changes in certain ways. What do I 

mean? My previous point suggested expectations of cooperation 

from Russia to help contain threats that we had identified as at 

least, to some extent, mutual in the past are likely to be disappointed. 

A far more acute danger for the United States would emerge, 

however, if the Russian government decided, for reasons to contain 

the threat of jihadist-inspired terrorists committing terrorist acts 

on a Russian territory and/or to asymmetrically punish the United 

States, they could be a facilitator for attacks on the U.S. homeland. 

Always with plausible deniability of course. 

Alternatively, but with a similar result, could we imagine that 

Moscow and Tehran could conclude to direct other Islamic-inspired, 

non-Salafi jihadists—terrorist networks to wreak havoc on the U.S. 

homeland, out of mutual interest—to asymmetrically punish the 

United States. So in conclusion, I am virtually certain that the 

problems in the North Caucasus, to some degree, have increased 

the threat to the U.S. homeland. 

Although we do not know or understand everything that transpired between the act of the Tsarnaev brothers to set off the bomb 

at the Boston Marathon a year ago, and their links and interactions with groups and individuals in the Northern Caucasus, for 

me this terrorist attack is indisputably demonstrated that, in some 

form, what is going on in the Northern Caucasus increases the 

overall threat assessment for the United States. 

The confluence of the on-going Syrian imbroglio, the Iranian nuclear problem, and the dramatic worsening in U.S.-Russia relations 

that has no end in sight, is certainly increasing the threat to the 

United States. There are clear links from the problems in the 

Northern Caucasus to this threat, but they are not the only reason 

that Russia’s position could very significantly increase the threat to 

the U.S. homeland. That is my final point. 

This brings me—and it revolves around the psychology and the 

potential intentions of Vladimir Putin and, more ominously, those 

around him who may have much darker motivations and intentions. Mr. Putin has been underestimated by Russian as well as 

foreign elites, very always to their regret since he emerged on Russia’s national political stage in 1999. Undoubtedly this is a phenomenon that he personally has encountered and manipulated to 

his benefit since his youth. 

Americans, but not only Americans, also have deeply underestimated the national psychological trauma that the collapse of the 

Soviet Union constituted for Vladimir Putin and tens of millions of 

other Russians. We need to conceptualize the Russian Federation 
23 

1Sergey Markedonov, The Rise of Radical and Nonofficial Islamic Groups in Russia’s Volga 

Region (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 2013). 

as continuing to endure something akin to post-traumatic stress 

disorder. Mr. Putin resonates so well with the majority of Russians 

because he taps directly into this very, very rich psychological vein. 

I do not pretend to know much about psychology, but I do know 

that if PTSD is not treated its symptoms get worse, not better, over 

time. Mr. Putin, as he did in Brussels last week, and—sorry, as a 

starting point I would recommend to our President to refrain from 

publicly taunting Mr. Putin as he did in Brussels last week, and 

caution other American politicians and officials from doing the 

same. I would also recommend that the President and other officials refrain from revealing in public to Mr. Putin and others 

around the world what are our deepest fears that keep us up at 

night. 

In addition, I urge all to carefully read the speech Mr. Putin gave 

to the federal assembly on March 18 in Moscow. Because it is possible that historians in the future may mark that moment as the 

tipping point of Weimar Russia into a fascist state. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kuchins follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ANDREW C. KUCHINS

APRIL 3, 2014 

It is my view that the terrorist threat to the U.S. homeland emanating from the 

Northern Caucasus region of the Russian Federation is likely to increase in the 

years ahead. This judgment is based on my perception of several on-going trends 

and phenomena: 

(1) The governance problems in the Northern Caucasus that plague the region 

at large are growing. While the incidence of violent acts may have subsided 

moderately in the past few years, the underlying issues of poor governance, economic deprivation, high unemployment, and endemic corruption are all getting 

worse. In addition, oppression on the basis of religion by the Russian state is 

increasing in the face of the growing role of Islam, including radical and violent 

Salafi groups and ideology, in the North Caucasus and Russia more broadly. 

Many people who may have initially been quite moderate in their views and 

goals have been radicalized by the very unpleasant experiences of themselves 

or those close to them in encounters with Russian state authority. 

(2) The growing resonance of Russian nationalism in national politics is fueling 

increasing resentment about the subsidization of the region. This sentiment, 

which has been captured by the popular phrase ‘‘Stop Feeding the Caucasus,’’ 

is pushing the Russian government to curtail government funding toward the 

region just as the strains of economic stagnation (less than 1 percent annual 

GDP growth at current estimations) are putting pressure on the budget more 

broadly. The near-term prospects for Russian economy have much greater 

downside risk than upside potential. In a CSIS report on the Northern 

Caucasus published in 2011, we concluded that the Northern Caucasus is increasingly looks like a virtually ungovernable region under a different jurisdictional administrative regime than that which prevails in the rest of the country, 

similar to the FATA in Pakistan. This is also reflected in growing sentiment 

among Russians that people from the Caucasus are not Nash (ours), and that 

this is a region populated by peoples that are not really Russian. 

(3) Islam, as it is in many countries and regions of the world, is becoming a 

more significant part of individuals’ identity in the Northern Caucasus and elsewhere in the Russian Federation (notably the Volga Region and other large cities).1 Not surprisingly, we see increasing voice for Islam being expressed in the 

political context. Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov, for example, has embraced 

and promoted this in Chechnya, even endorsing the implementation of Sharia 

law. We also see a greater prevalence of radical Salafi strains of Islam as well 
24 

as overt linkages with global Jihadist ideology, which is largely facilitated by 

the internet. 

(4) Significant numbers (likely hundreds, not thousands according to available 

data) of Jihadists from the Northern Caucasus have left for Syria to take up 

arms against the Assad regime. Here they have become battle-hardened veterans with much deeper ties to global jihadist financial, ideological, arms, and 

warfare training networks. Vladimir Putin’s strong stand supporting Assad only 

deepens their hatred of the ruling order in Russia and their desire to demolish 

it if and when they return to Russia. The success of the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan in the 1980s was a watershed event for the emergence and consolidation 

of embryonic Jihadist networks. If there were a similar success in Syria for the 

Jihad-inspired forces in taking down the Assad regime, we should also anticipate how this event could prompt another quantum leap in the capabilities of 

Jihadist networks globally in terms of recruiting, financing, and training, 

among other areas. Already the linkages between the Northern Caucasus and 

the battleground in Syria have strengthened in many ways, and we should anticipate that the success (and to a lesser extent, even failure) of Jihadists in 

Syria could dramatically increase the dangers these groups and individuals 

present in the Northern Caucasus. The Obama administration has consistently 

underappreciated this factor as a major reason for Vladimir Putin’s staunch 

support for the Assad government for the past 3 years. 

(5) The poor state of U.S.-Russia relations was already a contributing factor in 

sub-optimal counter-terrorism and intelligence sharing that in part facilitated 

the intelligence failure represented by the Boston bombing by the Tsarnaev 

brothers in April 2013. Committee members know far better than I that intelligence sharing even with our closest allies is a complicated and challenging 

task. Intelligence sharing with a partner like the Russian Federation where mutual trust is very low is that much less likely to be successful and useful. Since 

the mutual intelligence failure of the Boston bombings a year ago (though clearly the lion’s share of this responsibility falls on U.S. intelligence and law enforcement institutions given that this act took place on U.S. territory), U.S.-Russian relations have dramatically worsened over issues including but not limited 

to the Snowden affair and Russia’s military occupation and subsequent annexation of Crimea. As we sit here today, it is extremely difficult to imagine that 

existing problems in U.S.-Russia intelligence sharing on interactions between 

dangerous individuals/groups in the Northern Caucasus with like-minded individuals/groups in the United States or those elsewhere who may pose a threat 

to the U.S. homeland will improve. Realistically, the current dysfunctional status quo in U.S.-Russia counter-terrorism cooperation will be politically hard to 

maintain. 

(6) A far more dangerous threat to the U.S. homeland could emerge if Russian 

government intentions regarding how it manages its own terrorist threat 

changes in certain ways. What do I mean? My previous point suggests that expectations of cooperation from Russia to help contain threats that we had identified as, at least to some extent, mutual in the past are likely to be disappointed. A far more acute danger for the United States would emerge, however, if the Russian government decided, both for reasons to contain the threat 

of Jihadist-inspired terrorists committing terrorist acts on Russian territory 

and/or to asymmetrically punish the United States, to be a facilitator for attacks on the U.S. homeland—always with plausible deniability of course. Alternatively, but with a similar result, could we imagine that Moscow and Tehran 

could collude to direct other Islamic-inspired (i.e. non-Salafi Jihadists) terrorist 

networks to wreak havoc on the U.S. homeland out of mutual interests to asymmetrically punish the United States? 

In conclusion, I am virtually certain that the problems in the Northern Caucasus 

to some degree have already increased the threat to the U.S. homeland. Although 

we do not know or understand everything that transpired between the act of the 

Tsarnaev brothers to set off the bomb at the Boston marathon a year ago and their 

links and interactions with groups and individuals in the Northern Caucasus, for 

me this terrorist act indisputably demonstrated that in some form what is going on 

in the Northern Caucasus increases the overall threat assessment for the United 

States. The confluence of the on-going Syrian imbroglio, the Iranian nuclear problem, and the dramatic worsening in U.S.-Russia relations that has no end in sight 

is certainly increasing the threat to the United States. There are clear links from 

the problems in the Northern Caucasus to this threat—but they are not the only 

reason that Russia’s position could very significantly increase the threat to the U.S. 

homeland. 
25 

2 Vladimir Putin, ‘‘Address by President of the Russian Federation,’’ Kremlin.ru, March 18, 

2014, accessed March 29, 2014, http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/6889. 

This brings me to my final point that revolves around the psychology and potential intentions of Vladimir Putin and, more ominously, those around him who may 

have much darker motivations and intentions. Mr. Putin has been underestimated 

by Russian as well as foreign elites, virtually always to their regret, since he 

emerged on Russia’s national political stage in 1999. Undoubtedly, this is a phenomenon that he has encountered and manipulated to his benefit since his youth. 

Americans, but not only Americans, have also deeply underestimated the national 

psychological trauma that the collapse of the Soviet Union constituted for Vladimir 

Putin and tens of millions of other Russians. We need to conceptualize the Russian 

Federation as continuing to endure something akin to Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). Mr. Putin resonates so well with the majority of Russians because 

he taps directly into this rich psychological vein. I do not pretend to know much 

about psychology, but I do know that if PTSD is not treated its symptoms get worse, 

not better, over time. As a starting point, I would recommend to our President to 

refrain from publicly taunting Mr. Putin (as he did in Brussels last week), and caution other American politicians and officials from doing the same. I would also recommend that the President and other officials refrain from revealing in public to 

Mr. Putin and others around the world what are our deepest fears that keep us up 

at night. In addition, I urge all to carefully read the speech Mr. Putin gave to the 

Federal Assembly 2 on March 18 because it is possible that historians in the future 

may mark that moment as the tipping point of Weimar Russia into a fascist state. 

Mr. KING. On that encouraging note—— 

Mr. KUCHINS. Yes! 

Mr. KING [continuing]. Thank you. Thank you, Dr. Kuchins, for 

your testimony. 

Mr. KUCHINS. There is the bad news. 

Mr. KING. In view of the schedule, I think we will have a chance 

to get through most of the hearing. When you are talking about the 

terrorist jihadist network in the Caucasus, are there any ethnic or 

geographic differences which would split them? Or does the 

Islamist theology, or dogma, unite them? 

Mr. HAHN. Yes, okay. It is a complicated story. There was a split 

in August 2010 involving the majority of the Chechen emirs from 

Emir Umarov and the rest of the Caucasus Emirate. However, it 

was not based on ethnicity, per se, and it was certainly not based 

on any rejection of the Salafist takfir’s goal of creating the caliphate, as the splitters themselves stated explicitly. It was more a result, I believe, of competition between the different networks, 

right? 

So if you have a—the Chechen network is based on the Chechen 

Republic, the Dagestani network is based on the Dagestani Republic. The Dagestanis were on the rise in terms of the number of attacks and becoming more prominent. The kadhi, the Sharia court 

judge of the Caucasus Emirate was a Dagestani. So there was a 

certain sense among the Chechens that they were getting—they 

were moving on to this—they were being pushed aside, essentially, 

within the movement. That is what drove it. 

So in the—so there is not really inter-ethnic tensions, per se. 

There is tension between networks. The overriding ideology is antiethnic; that is, they don’t believe—it is sort of like the communist 

ideology, right? They don’t believe in ethno-national compartments, 

right? They believe in an overriding ideology that unites all Muslims. So if you—assuming that your Islamic faith complies with 

their view of Islamic faith. So ethnicity is something to be put on 

the second plane. 
26 

Mr. KING. Okay. Mr. Roggio. 

Mr. ROGGIO. Yes, I agree with what Dr. Hahn had said. I think 

their ideology ultimately resolved that dispute, that split that existed in 2010. To amplify the point that he made that they look to 

be inclusive, they even have recently stated, with the Russian invasion of the Crimea, that they were permitting any jihadists in the 

Crimea to fight alongside—if any—if fighting did begin against a 

Russian occupation, they permitted fighters to join alongside what 

they would consider to be secular fighters in order to punish the 

Russians. 

So they are—I think we are seeing this in Syria, as well, the alQaeda. They are trying to be a little bit more inclusive. I—that 

doesn’t make them more moderate. It only makes them more dangerous. 

Mr. KING. Dr. Kuchins. 

Mr. KUCHINS [continuing]. The vast majority of Muslims in the 

Northern Caucasus, and the Russian Federation at large, of course, 

are not global jihadists. There is, I think however, quite serious 

ethnic or national competition, to some extent—that is maybe not 

the right way to phrase it—amongst different strains of Muslim 

thought. I mean, in Dagestan, for sure, you have the—probably the 

oldest and the deepest and the most sort-of serious school, I think, 

of Islam within the Northern Caucasus. 

If you go back historically to elsewhere in the Russian Federation, you go to the Volga region—to Tartarstan, Bashkidistan—they 

also have extremely rich and deep tradition in their interpretation 

of the Koran and Muslim practices. In other places, Chechnya and 

the, you know, the understanding of the Koran would be considered, I think, by many serious scholars, of which I am not of this, 

quite superficial and, you know, sort of less significant in ways. 

Not significant—not less significant for the purposes of global 

jihad, but sort of in the pantheon of comparative Muslim religious 

life. 

Mr. HAHN. Can I just qualify one thing I said in my remarks? 

Mr. KING. Sure. 

Mr. HAHN. That split that I mentioned actually was overcome, 

right? These Chechen emirs returned to the Caucasus Emirate, and 

that is evidence in and of itself that they didn’t reject the global 

jihadi goals of the Caucasus Emirate. 

Mr. KING. My time is almost expiring. Could each of you give a 

brief answer, if possible, as to why IK or any of the other groups 

was not successful in attacking the Olympics? 

Mr. HAHN. I can outline three reasons, basically. One potential 

reason is, depending on the timing, it was the death of Umarov. 

Because he basically controlled a group called the Riyad usSaliheyn Martyrs Brigade that would have carried out suicide 

bombings to attack Sochi or around Sochi or some—at the time of 

Sochi. The other was very intensified counterterrorist operations in 

which, of course, the Russians, as usual, violated human civil 

rights on occasion. 

But they also targeted the correct spot, and that was Buinaksk 

in Dagestan where there was a very dangerous cell involving ethnic 

Russians who had become mujahedin. Third was the exodus of 

fighters to Syria—the most capable, the most fervent, fighters, 
27 

mujahedin and Caucasus Emirate—because of the lack of capacity 

and the repression in the North Caucasus are leaving Syria, where 

they can operate more openly and more effectively. 

Mr. KING. Mr. Roggio. 

Mr. ROGGIO. Yes, I think the—one, the Russians laid down a significant security blanket, that was quite effective and multilayered, 

limited their capacity to conduct attacks. Second, I agree with Dr. 

Hahn. I think the exodus of fighters from the region to Syria certainly took—you know, it limited their capacity to focus and conduct attacks. 

Mr. KING. Dr. Kuchins. 

Mr. KUCHINS. I would agree with what Gordon and Bill just said. 

The honest answer, though, is that I was surprised that there 

wasn’t an attack, either in Sochi itself or somewhere, elsewhere in 

the Russian Federation, particularly after the two successful attacks in Volgograd in late December. So it appears that they decided to keep their powder dry. The problem is not going away. 

Certainly, the most recent act by Russia in Crimea and the Crimea—there, for the Crimean Tartars is only gonna add more fuel 

to their furor. They are going to—they are gonna come back. The 

problem is not going away. 

Mr. KING. The Ranking Member, Mr. Higgins. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You know, I have often 

heard Vladimir Putin characterized as being more tactical than he 

is strategic. He seems to be appealing to Russian nationalist aspirations to somehow reconcile the collapse of the Soviet Union. Dr. 

Kuchins, you had indicated that the Obama administration underestimates Caucasus Emirate as a factor in Putin’s involvement or 

support in Syria. Can you collaborate on that? 

Mr. KUCHINS. I have been struck, over the past 3 years—particularly if you go back to the reactions to the administration or our 

former ambassador to the United Nations, Susan Rice, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton—to their surprise that the Russians 

did not vote with us on the sanctions against Syria in the the U.N. 

Security Council. I am mystified as to why they were surprised. 

There should have been—there was no indication whatsoever that 

the Russians would ever vote with us on sanctions against Syria. 

But what really struck me subsequently was the way we, they, 

kind-of castigated the Russian position in moral terms, in some 

kind of moral degradation. I think rather than trying to look a little bit more seriously into the substantive reasons as to why the 

Russians have not been with us on Syria. For me, if you look at 

them, I don’t find it very difficult to come up with a series of reasons that make pretty good sense in the Russian context, in the 

Russian context of their interest, and they are not simply about 

just blocking the United States’ interests. 

They’re not even—certainly, the desire to prevent, you know, 

military regime change is an important factor for the Russians. But 

even that, I think, is not right at the heart of the matter. We could 

never answer to the Russians, effectively, what would happen if 

Mr. Assad goes? Can you explain to me why it would be more stable in the region if Mr. Assad goes? That was the question from the 

Russians, and I don’t think that we could ever give them a satisfactory answer. 
28 

Then subsequently, when the Russians see what happened in 

Egypt, when they see what happened when they saw what happened in Libya, it only confirmed what were their preconceptions 

going in that this Arab Spring and this wave of democratization in 

the Middle East would result in greater instability and danger. 

Mr. HIGGINS. But, you know, it seems—there was a debate 6 

months ago here about authorizing the administration to use military force in Syria if they determined that was necessary. I think 

a lot of the concern at that point was, you know, this was really 

not, in Syria, a fight for freedom and democracy. It was really a 

fight for power. In that part of the world, which is highly pluralistic—you know, minorities are aligning themself with Assad for 

one reason, survival. 

Because, you know, in that part of the world if you are not on 

top you get slaughtered. You know, the one thing that wasn’t coming from the administration at that time, they were trying to use 

100,000 people being killed because of chemical weapons in Syria. 

Well, the opposition, the best fighters—and I think it has been 

identified here—were all al-Qaeda affiliates, including the 

Caucasus Emirate. You know, they were beheading people. So you 

can choose your own demise, I guess. 

But, you know, this is what makes that situation, I think, the 

larger situation in that part of the world complicated. To find the 

right entry point if, in fact, there ought to be one. Because, you 

know, a great book by Marwa Mawasher, ‘‘The Second Era of 

Awakening,’’ he argues this, that without pluralism in the Middle 

East, in that region, you are never gonna have peace and stability. 

Because it is not, again, a fight for freedom or democracy, regardless of what these revolutions, you know, express to be their objective. What you really have is minorities afraid that, you know, if 

Assad goes they will be next to be attacked. 

Because, as we know, Syria is about 75 percent Sunni, and 

Sunnis take control. This is the problem that we have made in 

Iraq. You know, Nouri al-Malaki is pushing Americans away 5 

years ago, saying, ‘‘Well, we have other allies in the region.’’ He 

was talking about Ahmadinejad in Iran. Then, because of his failure to embrace the Sunni population, he has got a Sunni problem, 

he has got an al-Qaeda problem. So now he is back to the United 

States, saying, ‘‘We need financing for our arms because we have 

to fight this problem.’’ 

Who caused the problem? You did. I think that, you know, permeates throughout the Middle East. I just think this is another 

iteration of the manifestation of that inability to embrace minorities. To convey to them, you know, life ain’t great but we are not 

gonna slaughter you. That is a big problem here. 

I yield back. 

Mr. KING. The gentlelady from Texas is recognized. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me thank both the Chairman and the 

Ranking Member for their courtesies in this committee. I sit on the 

full committee and serve on another committee, but this is a crucial moment in our history. 

Let me just go to Dr. Hahn very quickly. You mentioned Azerbaijan. I just want to know if—Azerbaijan is leaning as far as they 

can, in my belief—these are my words—toward Europe. What are 
29 

you saying about the terrorist presence, Chechen presence, in Azerbaijan? Or is it on the border, or—because don’t you think that 

they are certainly a bright light in the region? Dr. Hahn. 

Mr. HAHN. One of the problems is that Azerbaijan is a transit 

route for some of the mujahedin going from the North Caucasus to 

Syria and back. Since they are predominantly Sunnis, and they are 

fighting the Shiites in Syria, there is a possibility, certainly, that 

they would try to carry out attacks against Shia-dominated Azerbaijan. Also, in the past there was—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. In their travels going through, but not that 

Azerbaijan would be coddling any of—— 

Mr. HAHN. No, no, no, no. No, I didn’t mean to say that. The 

other issue is that there have been incursions from the north, from 

Dagestan into Azerbaijan, by Caucasus Emirate mujahedin. The 

other issue is that there was a Dagestani plot, Dagestanis from the 

Caucasus Emirate, to attack the Eurovision games in Baku in 

2012. It was a Mumbai—the plot was a Mumbai-style plot in which 

they were gonna try to assassinate the president, they were gonna 

try to attack the Eurovision music festival, bomb a couple of hotels, 

then retreat from the capitol and then set up an insurgency in the 

mountains. 

That was uncovered in spring and summer 2012. So there is a 

Sunni—there has been a pattern of a potential Sunni threat to 

Azerbaijan. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Well, they are in the region. 

Mr. HAHN. Right. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. They remain under threat. Let me move 

quickly, because of the time—and thank you very much. 

Mr. Roggins, as I note, the North Caucasus do not have a dominant ethnic Russian. There is a multiple ethnicities there. Are they 

in the line of Russia’s eyesight? Are they in a position to fend Russia off, because there is not a dominant political body that wants 

to associate with Russia? How will Russia—how do you perceive 

that playing out? Rebel fights or terrorist fights? Russia leaving 

them alone? Russia wanting them to go away? How do you perceive 

that? 

Mr. ROGGIO. Well, currently the Caucasus Emirates really is the 

only opposition to the Russians. The rest of the—Dagestan, 

Ingushetia, Chechnya, they are Russian republics with their governments. The fight in Chechnya really was the insurrection there, 

and that has largely been put down and just replaced by the Caucus Emirates current jihad against the Soviet regime. I am sorry, 

the Russian regime. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. So it is a standoff in that—— 

Mr. ROGGIO. Yes. You know, look, this has been going on for 

years. It has been ebb-and-flows. Right now, the Russians seem to 

have the upper hand. But as we have seen, they have declared the 

Caucus Emirates dead, or their predecessors dead in the past. They 

have come back and regenerated their forces. Conducted attacks 

even inside Moscow. You know, so it is an ebb-and-flow, but this 

is a persistent group with an ideology that appeals to a certain segment of the population and it is not going away. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you. 

Is it Mr. Kuchins? 
30 

Mr. KUCHINS. Kuchins. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Kuchins. Thank you very much. Well, there 

is a lot that I want to ask you. But let me just quickly say, as I 

looked at the comments that the President made—might I take 

issue a little bit with taunting—I think it was the President who 

gave a little leeway for Putin in terms of making negative comments prior to the interaction on Ukraine just in trying to keep relationships. I think if it was anything, the President gets criticized 

for either not being strong or being strong. 

Putin has brought his problems on himself. We didn’t contribute 

to Soviet Union’s demise. The people rose up and the Cold War 

ended and independent-minded individuals decided to move into 

their own sovereign nation. So the question for us, for Putin, is 

whether or not he will live in the world order. Which is we have 

sovereign nations and we don’t necessarily take well to people invading other countries. Which is Ukraine, and Crimea which is associated with Ukraine. 

My question to you, then, is Russia has its own share—affairs on 

terrorism, either inside the country or around its borders. Isn’t that 

a full plate for it to then be engaged in a full-scale war with the 

West? When I say that, through promoting or coddling terrorists so 

that they can launch from Russia. Their own people are under 

threat, their own people are not stable. If we continue the sanctions, if they continue to look as if they are gonna move 40,000 to 

80,000 troops into Ukraine, I can’t imagine that a combination of 

Western minds—European Union, the NATO coalition—is not 

going to have to find a way to be very strong with it if it starts 

with sanctions. 

Mr. KUCHINS. The challenge that we face, and particularly our 

President faces, I think, is really trying to understand the mind of 

Vladimir Putin and the calculations and the framework that he 

has. They are very, very, very different. I think if we look at Russian history, Russians have shown a remarkable capacity to endure 

incredible economic hardship and deprivation. To do things that we 

would consider absolutely inconceivable because of the hardship 

that they would entail for things that have been decided that, you 

know, are to achieve the greater good. 

So we have to be very cautious in applying, I think, our mindset 

on Mr. Putin and his elite. The second thing, and this is what has 

been very, very disappointing to me in the United States’ response 

to Crimea, is that I think there has been a deep mismatch in rhetoric and action. It began on the very first day, on February 28. It 

really simply hasn’t been, it hasn’t been corrected effectively. I am 

afraid that we may—‘‘we,’’ the United States of America—our leadership may not understand, I think, the magnitude of the danger 

that Mr. Putin potentially could present. 

You know, just for example, there was an opportunity last—2 

weeks ago in Brussels, where the President made a speech. That 

was to be the speech that was gonna be the—kind of the hallmark 

of the trip. I can’t tell you how disappointed I was personally with 

the speech. Because the speech was all about ideals, platitudes, 

values kind-of at 30,000 feet. There was not one thing said about 

what the United States and the Europeans can, should, will do to 

support Ukrainian sovereignty. 
31 

So I completely agree with you that we have to focus like a laser 

beam on supporting Ukrainian sovereignty. For the Ukrainians 

and Kiev, and around the country, who have no interest in joining 

the Russian Federation, I am sure when they heard that speech 

they cried. When they read it in Moscow they laughed. We have— 

if we create this perception, too-permissible of an atmosphere, 

Putin is gonna further make a deep, deep, deep, miscalculation. I 

think he is making miscalculations, and ultimately—to put in 

vernacular terms, ‘‘screwing himself over.’’ 

But it is the collateral damage that he could cause in doing so. 

The Soviet Union and Mr. Gorbachev went out with a whimper. I 

don’t see that happening with this guy. There is no question in my 

mind that whether he invades Eastern Ukraine or not, I mean, 

whatever he and the Russians are doing it is ultimately at the goal 

of depriving Ukraine of its sovereignty. Fundamentally depriving 

Ukraine of its sovereignty, that is the goal. 

That goal is not gonna stop. He is going to be relentless about 

it. He is gonna use every possible trick in the KGB Russian—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Kitchen. 

Mr. KUCHINS [continuing]. Historical—to pursue that. So frankly, 

I would actually like to see—to me, what the strength right now 

is to showing, not showing but doing, providing Ukrainians the capability—and they have shown a remarkable lack of capability over 

the last 10 years themselves. They have created the problem themselves because of their dysfunctional governance, the total failure 

of the Orange Revolution 10 years ago, unfortunately. 

Hopefully, you know, as Samuel Johnson said about the imminence of the beheading will focus the mind. That Ukrainian elites 

will realize that, literally, their independence and their sovereignty 

is at stake if they don’t get it together. But they need help on this, 

from us on that. The change, the calculation, in Mr. Putin’s mind 

that we and the Europeans are not gonna roll over. There is nothing Mr. Putin would like to do better than to expose the Transatlantic Alliance as a complete sham. 

There is nothing Mr. Putin would like to do more, and it is all 

there in that March 18 speech, to basically undo the covenants, the 

agreements of the post-Cold War order. Because in his view and 

the views of the people around him they are unfair, they are unjust 

to Russia. They took advantage of Russia’s weakness, et cetera, et 

cetera, et cetera. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Dr. Kuchins. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I yield back to the gentleman. Thank you. 

Mr. KING. Time is running down on the vote. I have one question 

for Dr. Hahn, if I could. If you would try to limit your answer to 

about 90 seconds, and then any written supplement you want to 

provide would be greatly appreciated. 

In your testimony you mention that the new emir seems to be 

more aggressive as far as a global jihad. Then we have the factor 

of more and more people from the Caucasus going to Syria. As far 

as a threat to the United States, the homeland, are there any red 

flags we should be looking for? Is there anything that you would 

look out there as a warning signal to us that we should be on the 

lookout over the next 6 months, year, 2 years? 
32 

Mr. HAHN. Well, if the emir or someone close to him started to 

emphasize the United States more in his rhetoric that would be 

one signal. I think most of these things are gonna be hard to identify. It is gonna be—you know, it is gonna be North Caucasus 

mujahedin getting involved in the kind of camps that Bill—William 

Roggio described previously. Because we have had this report of alQaeda, right, planning to set up camps specifically in Syria for the 

purpose of attacking the United States in Syria. 

So it is really indirect. It is the threat from the Caucasus Emirate is—for the present is indirect in that it is part of the global 

jihadi revolutionary movement. So it is very much likely to be involved in any plots organized through Syria by al-Qaeda or other 

groups. Because they are gonna try to have an international flavor 

to any plot. A good model might be the 2000 plot to hijack a plane 

in Frankfurt, where the plan was to have a Pakistani, I believe an 

Arab of some nationality, and a Chechen. 

The Chechens eventually pulled out of that plot, and it never 

came off. So I think we are gonna see that kind of a model more 

in the global jihad. 

Mr. KING. Time is running down to vote. If either of you would 

want to add to that, Mr. Roggio, Dr. Kuchins? 

Mr. ROGGIO. Just real quick. Yes. Yes, sir. Thank you. Real 

quick, the camps. One of the key things, this has been al-Qaeda 

historically has done this. They use those camps to train for the 

local jihad, and they siphon off a small amount to conduct its— 

what they call its ‘‘external operations.’’ The question is—is alQaeda interested in that right now to conduct attacks on the U.S. 

homeland or U.S. interests abroad? Or are they interested in focusing all their efforts in—because they are being quite successful in 

their local insurgencies in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Mali, 

et cetera. 

That is what we don’t know right now. But the fact that this 

camp run by the Caucasus Emirates was disclosed, two other 

camps run by the al-Nusra Front, which is al-Qaeda’s official affiliate. They are in action and they look just like the videos you used 

to watch back in the 1990s of—you know, of al-Qaeda fighters 

going through the motions. That is really what disturbs me the 

most. I think we need to keep an eye on these camps that are out 

there and, perhaps, take some direct action if needed. 

Mr. KING. Dr. Kuchins, we have about 30 seconds, then I have 

to—— 

Mr. KUCHINS. Well, the one major takeaway I took from the Boston bombing is that we really need to raise our awareness level and 

our monitoring level of, you know, what is happening in the Northern Caucasus and jihadists that we know are from the Northern 

Caucasus; where they are traveling, what they are doing. It is a 

level that we look at places like Yemen and other countries and regions. That we are at a higher kind of risk level for us. I think the 

Northern Caucasus needs to be at that higher level. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Doctor. Let me thank all the witnesses. 

Also thank you for accommodating us with the compressed schedule today. 

Unfortunately, the vote schedule was different from what we 

thought it was going to be. But, again, you managed to get an 
33 

awful lot in. If you have any other thoughts you want to give us, 

believe me we would look forward to it. I want to thank you for 

your testimony today, for your cooperation. I also thank the Ranking Member for his cooperation in holding this hearing. 

So thank you very much. With that, the meeting stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:01 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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