2020 IL App (1st) 190148-U

SIXTH DIVISION

February 21, 2020 

No. 1-19-0148 

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as 

precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

BAKUL DAVÉ,

Petitioner-Appellant, 

 v. 

STATE OF ILLINOIS EDUCATIONAL LABOR 

RELATIONS BOARD and BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF 

SOUTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY, 

 Respondents-Appellees. 

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Petition for Review of an Order 

of the Illinois Educational Labor 

Relations Board. 

Nos. 18 CA 0005-C 

 18 CA 0039-C 

JUSTICE CONNORS delivered the judgment of the court. 

 Presiding Justice Mikva and Justice Cunningham concurred in the judgment. 

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board’s order dismissing petitioner’s 

charges alleging that the Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University violated 

sections 14(a)(1), (3), (4), and (8) of the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board 

Act is affirmed. 

¶ 2 Petitioner, Bakul Davé, a professor at Southern Illinois University, was placed on unpaid 

administrative leave and subsequently terminated from his position at Southern Illinois University. 

Thereafter, in July 2017 and November 2017, he filed two unfair labor practice charges against 
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respondent, the Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University (SIU) alleging that SIU violated 

sections 14(a)(1), (3), (4), and (8) of the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act (Act) (115 ILCS 

5/14(a) (West 2016)) when it placed him on unpaid administrative leave (2018-CA-0005-C) and 

terminated him (2018-CA-0039-C). The executive director of respondent, the State of Illinois 

Educational Labor Relations Board (Board), consolidated petitioner’s charges and subsequently 

dismissed them. The Board affirmed. Petitioner appeals that decision. We affirm. 

¶ 3 Initially, we note that in October 2016, petitioner submitted an unfair labor practice charge 

against SIU alleging that the Board violated section 14(a) of the Act. The Board dismissed the 

charge and we affirmed in Davé v. State of Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board, 2019 IL 

App (1st) 182442-U.

¶ 4 The following facts are taken from the common law record, which includes exhibits that 

petitioner and SIU submitted to the Board. These exhibits contain emails exchanged between 

petitioner, petitioner’s union representative, SIU faculty members, and certain SIU officials, 

including SIU’s senior associate general counsel, the associate provost for academic 

administration, and the interim provost. 

¶ 5 I. Background 

¶ 6 Petitioner was a faculty member in the chemistry department at SIU since 1996. In May 

2014, SIU terminated petitioner’s employment, after which the Southern Illinois University 

Carbondale Faculty Association, IEA-NEA (Union) filed a grievance against SIU challenging the 

termination. Following arbitration, an arbitrator concluded that SIU should reinstate petitioner to 

his former position. When petitioner returned to work in the spring 2016 semester, SIU assigned 

him office and laboratory space as well as course assignments for the following academic year. 
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A. Office and Laboratory Space

¶ 7 Upon petitioner’s return to work in January and February 2016, he requested that SIU 

assign him the same office and laboratory space that he had occupied before his termination.

However, petitioner’s previous space was occupied by other faculty members. SIU asked these 

faculty members if they would voluntarily move from that space, but they did not want to do so. 

SIU offered petitioner three other options for his laboratory and office space. Petitioner did not 

select any of the options, so SIU assigned him space. Pursuant to petitioner’s request to reconsider 

his office space, on February 21, 2016, SIU reconsidered his space assignment request and 

concluded it was not going to assign him the same space he had occupied before his termination. 

¶ 8 On February 23, 2016, the arbitrator issued a clarification letter, concluding that SIU was 

not required to assign petitioner the exact same space that he had previously occupied before his 

discharge. Petitioner continued to assert that his assigned office space was inadequate. In March 

and April 2016, he told SIU that he had been experiencing health issues in his assigned space. In 

response, on April 13, 2016, SIU’s associate general counsel had the Center for Environmental 

Health and Safety (CEHS) investigate petitioner’s assigned space. The CEHS investigation found 

no concerns with his space and recommended to slightly adjust the ventilation system for humidity 

and clean the air grills. 

¶ 9 On March 18, 2016, petitioner requested an informal grievance meeting with SIU 

concerning his “forced displacement from my office and research labs that denies me access to the 

lab space I have had for the past two decades.” In April 2016, SIU denied petitioner’s grievance.

¶ 10 In May 2016, SIU provided petitioner a “Request for Accommodation” form for him to 

request an accommodation and informed him that he should submit the form along with physician 
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documentation. According to the affidavit of SIU’s associate general counsel attached to SIU’s 

position statement submitted to the Board, petitioner did not submit the form, or any physician 

notes to SIU, before September 1, 2017. 

¶ 11 On May 18, 2016, petitioner informed SIU that he had “not yet been provided the requisite 

space suitable for my research needs that is necessary for the conduct of my work as per the 

arbitrator’s order.” That same day, petitioner’s union representative told SIU in an email that 

petitioner continued to “raise a number of arguments as to why he should be reassigned back to 

his former office and lab space” and that “[w]e have advised him we believe that issue was resolved 

fully and finally by the Arbitrator, an answer he refuses to accept and, which limits our ability to 

assist him or advocate for him on this and other related issues.” 

¶ 12 On August 16, 2016, petitioner told SIU in an email that he had “not been provided the 

requisite space needed for the conduct of my work as per the arbitrator’s order” and “[b]ecause of 

the harm, damage, and injury to my health my doctors have advised me against exposure to harmful 

environment.” 

B. Teaching Assignments 

¶ 13 On April 29, 2016, petitioner requested the chair of the department of chemistry and 

biochemistry, Gary Kinsel, to assign him to teach a course in inorganic chemistry, but Kinsel 

assigned him other chemistry courses. The “workload assignment” signed by the department chair 

that day showed that SIU assigned petitioner to teach Chemistry 579 in the fall of 2016 and 

Chemistry 106 in the spring of 2017. Petitioner did not sign the form. According to various 

documents in the record, petitioner informed the chair that the union wanted to review the form 

before he signed it. According to petitioner’s statement attached to his unfair labor practice charge 
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in case No. 2018-CA-0039-C, Kinsel told him that “it was his policy to give preference to young 

faculty in coursework assignment” and that petitioner’s “assignment was handled as a special case” 

because he had “filed complaints.” 

¶ 14 At the beginning of the fall 2016 semester, the new chair of the department of chemistry 

and biochemistry, Lichang Wang, contacted petitioner to discuss the upcoming semester and 

informed him that she was “interested in learning from you what I can help as chair to advance 

your career and what actions you would suggest for chair to take in order to advance our 

department.” Petitioner subsequently told Wang that he could not teach Chemistry 579 without his 

notes, syllabus, lecture slides, books, and journal articles, which had been in his old office. Wang 

told petitioner that all his materials had been returned to him, that she had obtained class notes 

from a student who took another chemistry course that he had taught, and that she was working to 

obtain Chemistry 579 materials from former students who had taken that course. On August 30, 

2016, SIU cancelled Chemistry 579 for the semester because there were only two students 

registered. 

¶ 15 On September 14, 2016, Wang notified petitioner that SIU had modified his “workload 

assignment,” such that he would not be teaching any courses in the fall of 2016 and was assigned 

to teach Chemistry 106 and Chemistry 579 in the spring of 2017. That same day, petitioner 

requested an informal grievance meeting with SIU regarding his “workload assignments.” He also 

requested copies of communications sent by various parties at SIU regarding his “workload 

assignment” and documents related to other faculty members’ assignments. SIU did not respond

to his informal grievance or request for documents. Thereafter, on October 7, 2016, petitioner filed 
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an unfair labor practice charge with the Board. The Board dismissed his charge, and, on appeal, 

we affirmed. Davé, 2019 IL App (1st) 182442-U, ¶ 49. 

¶ 16 On January 13, 2017, petitioner informed Wang in an email that he had asked to teach 

inorganic chemistry but was not assigned that course. He stated that he had “not been provided 

anything to be able to perform my duties” and he “would not be in a position to be able to teach.” 

Then, on January 17, 2017, petitioner informed Wang that he had sent a formal notification on 

January 13, 2017, stating that he was not able to teach because he had not been provided resources. 

The next day, petitioner did not show up to teach the first day of his assigned courses. 

¶ 17 SIU informed petitioner on January 19, 2017, that it had received notice that he had refused 

to perform his assigned teaching duties and had failed to appear for the first scheduled sessions of 

his assigned courses. SIU told him that, based on his refusal to teach, SIU was starting the 

investigation process to determine whether to take disciplinary action and that, under the terms of 

the Collective Bargaining Agreement, it was placing him on administrative leave without prior 

notice. The next day, SIU informed petitioner that it was conducting an investigatory interview 

about the allegations that he refused to teach the courses assigned to him. 

¶ 18 In March 2017, SIU issued its Investigatory Report, in which it concluded that petitioner 

was assigned to teach Chemistry 106 and Chemistry 579 in the spring of 2017, petitioner knew 

about that assignment, and petitioner did not perform his assigned duties. The report noted that 

petitioner alleged that he could not teach the course unless his previous course materials were 

returned to him. The report stated that petitioner previously taught Chemistry 579, the department 

chair made efforts to obtain his previous course materials for this course, he was competent and 

qualified to “re-develop” and teach the course, and he had sufficient time to do so. The report 
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stated that Chemistry 106 was a chemistry course for non-science majors, that petitioner was 

competent and qualified to teach such a course, and that he had been offered previously developed 

materials for this course. 

¶ 19 Following a disciplinary meeting, SIU officials recommended to SIU’s interim provost that 

petitioner be discharged. In June 2017, the interim provost informed petitioner that she concurred 

with the recommendation and that he was being dismissed from his faculty position for failure to 

perform his assigned duties. Petitioner pursued a formal grievance relating to his termination and 

SIU denied his request.

 C. Unfair Labor Practice Charges 

¶ 20 On July 19, 2017, petitioner filed an unfair labor practice charge with the Board, alleging 

that SIU violated sections 14(a)(1), (3), (4), and (8). Under section 14(a)(1) of the Act, educational 

employers are prohibited from “[i]interfering, restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of 

the rights guaranteed under this Act.” 115 ILCS 5/14(a)(1) (West 2016). Sections 14(a)(3) and 

(a)(4) prohibit educational employers from, respectively, “[d]iscriminating in regard to hire or 

tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage 

membership in any employee organization” and “[d]ischarging or otherwise discriminating against 

an employee because he or she has signed or filed an affidavit, authorization card, petition or 

complaint or given any information or testimony under this Act.” 115 ILCS 5/14(a)(3), (4) (West 

2016). Section 14(a)(8) prohibits educational employers from “[r]efusing to comply with the 

provisions of a binding arbitration award.” 115 ILCS 5/14(a)(8) (West 2016). Petitioner asserted, 

inter alia, that he was denied the necessary resources as mandated by the arbitration award, which 

prevented him from performing his duties, and that he was placed on unpaid administrative leave 
No. 1-19-0148 

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as an act of retaliation for participating in protected activities. On November 22, 2017, petitioner 

filed another unfair labor practice charge with the Board, similarly alleging that SIU violated 

sections 14(a)(1), (3), (4), and (8). He asserted, inter alia, that he was terminated from his position 

based on retaliatory motives. The Board consolidated the charges because they had a common set 

of facts. 

¶ 21 Following an investigation under section 15 of the Act (115 ILCS 5/15 (West 2016)), the 

executive director issued a Recommended Decision and Order (EDRDO), recommending a 

dismissal of the charges and concluding that petitioner failed to show that SIU violated the Act. 

The executive director found that the evidence did not demonstrate that SIU violated sections 

14(a)(1) and (a)(3), as it did not show that SIU placed petitioner on administrative leave or 

terminated him in retaliation for his involvement in a protected activity. The executive director 

found that the investigation showed that petitioner was placed on unpaid administrative leave 

pending allegations that he refused to perform his workload assignments, which resulted in his 

termination.

¶ 22 With respect to petitioner’s allegation that SIU violated section 14(a)(4), the executive 

director concluded that petitioner did not present evidence that established a causal connection 

between SIU’s decisions to place him on administrative leave and terminate him and his previously 

filed unfair labor practice charge. As to petitioner’s claim that SIU violated section 14(a)(8) when 

it denied him necessary resources as mandated by the arbitrator’s award, the executive director 

concluded that the Board had already dismissed this claim for being untimely and that, therefore, 

his claim was barred by collateral estoppel.
No. 1-19-0148 

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¶ 23 Petitioner filed exceptions to the executive director’s decision, arguing, inter alia, that the 

executive director relied on false information provided by SIU. The Board affirmed the executive 

director’s recommended decision to dismiss the charges, noting that the executive director

dismissed petitioner’s charges because he failed to provide any evidence of a causal connection 

between his suspension and termination and his grievance filings, unfair labor practices charge, or 

any other protected activity in which he may have participated. The Board concluded that 

petitioner’s claim that SIU violated the Act by failing to comply with the arbitrator’s award was 

untimely. In doing so, it noted that petitioner emailed SIU on August 16, 2016, stating that he had 

not been provided the requisite space needed to conduct his work pursuant to the arbitrator’s award. 

The Board therefore concluded that petitioner knew of SIU’s alleged refusal to comply with the 

arbitrator’s award by August 16, 2016, which was more than six months before he filed the July 

2017 and November 2017 charges. 

 II. Analysis 

¶ 24 On appeal, petitioner contends that the Board erred when it dismissed his charges without 

holding an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner also argues that the Board erred when it found that his 

claim that SIU violated the Act by failing to comply with the arbitrator’s award was untimely. 

¶ 25 Under section 16(a) of the Act, a petitioner, as here, may seek direct review from the 

appellate court. 115 ILCS 5/16(a) (West 2016). The Administrative Review Law governs review 

of administrative decisions by the Board. 735 ILCS 5/3-101 et seq. (West 2016). We review “all 

questions of law and fact presented by the record before the court.” Board of Education of City of 

Chicago v. Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board, 2015 IL 118043, ¶ 14. 
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¶ 26 Under the Act, an individual may file an unfair labor practice charge with the Board against 

an employer. 115 ILCS 5/15 (West 2016). The executive director of the Board has the authority to 

investigate charges and issue complaints. 80 Ill. Adm. Code 1120.30(a). The party filing the charge 

must submit “all evidence relevant to or in support of the charge.” 80 Ill. Adm. Code 

1120.30(b)(1). If “the Executive Director concludes that the investigation has established that there 

is an issue of law or fact sufficient to warrant a hearing, he or she shall issue a 

complaint.” (Emphasis in original.) 80 Ill. Adm. Code 1120.30(b)(5); 115 ILCS 5/15 (West 2016). 

However, the executive director shall dismiss a charge if the investigation shows that there was no 

issue of law or fact “sufficient to warrant a hearing.” 80 Ill. Adm. Code 1120.30(b)(6). The 

charging party may file exceptions to the executive director’s decision and, when reviewing the 

exceptions, the Board must determine whether the decision is consistent with the Act and the 

Unfair Labor Practice Proceedings of the Illinois Administrative Code. 80 Ill. Adm. Code 

1120.30(c). 

¶ 27 It is within the Board’s sound discretion to dismiss an unfair labor practice charge. Michels 

v. Illinois Labor Relations Board, 2012 IL App (4th) 110612, ¶ 45. When the Board determines 

there is not enough evidence and dismisses a charge, on review, we must determine whether the 

Board abused its discretion. Michels, 2012 IL App (4th) 110612, ¶ 45. The Board abuses its 

discretion only when its decision is “clearly illogical” or when it is “arbitrary and reached without 

employing conscientious judgment.” Id. ¶¶ 45-46. On appeal, it is not enough for a petitioner to 

make a “plausible argument.” Id. ¶ 46. Rather, a petitioner must “establish that no reasonable 

person could possibly take the Board’s view.” Id. Even if we would have reached a different 
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conclusion than the Board, that is not enough, by itself, to justify reversing the Board’s decision. 

Id. ¶ 45. 

¶ 28 As previously discussed, petitioner asserts that the Board erred when it dismissed his 

claims that SIU violated sections 14(a)(1), (a)(3), and (a)(4) of the Act when it placed him on 

administrative leave and terminated him. 

¶ 29 Section 14(a)(1) relates “to adverse action taken against an employee as a result of any 

protected concerted activity” and section 14(a)(3) pertains to “discrimination based on union 

activity.” Speed District 802 v. Warning, 242 Ill. 2d 92, 112 (2011). When alleged violations of 

sections 14(a)(1) and 14(a)(3) are based on the same conduct, as here, section 14(a)(1) is 

considered a “derivative” of a violation of section 14(a)(3) and the section 14(a)(3) test is applied. 

Speed District 802, 242 Ill. 2d at 112-13. To establish that an employer violated section 14(a)(3), 

the evidence must show that the charging party engaged in activity protected by section 14(a)(3), 

the employer was aware of that activity, and the charging party was discharged for engaging in 

that activity. Board of Education, City of Peoria School District No. 150 v. State of Illinois 

Educational Labor Relations Board, 318 Ill. App. 3d 144, 150 (2000). With respect to section 

(a)(4), the charging party must show that he used or participated in the Board’s processes, the 

employer was aware of those actions, and the employer discharged him in part because of that 

activity. Board of Education, City of Peoria School District. No. 150, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 150. 

Accordingly, under sections (a)(1), (a)(3), and (a)(4), petitioner must show that SIU placed him on 

unpaid administrative leave and terminated him because he engaged in activity protected by the 

Act. 
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¶ 30 Here, the parties do not dispute that petitioner engaged in protected activities covered by 

the Act or that SIU was aware of his activities, which included challenging his termination in 2014, 

filing an unfair labor practice charge in 2014, and submitting grievances with SIU regarding his 

space assignment and workload. Thus, the only element at issue is whether SIU discharged 

petitioner because he engaged in protected activities. 

¶ 31 To establish that an employer discharged an employee for engaging in a protected activity, 

a petitioner must show that his protected activity “was a substantial or motivating factor” for the 

termination or other disciplinary action. Speed District 802, 242 Ill. 2d at 113. An employer’s 

motive for retaliating based on union activity may be inferred from several factors, including “an 

employer’s expressed hostility towards unionization, together with knowledge of the employee’s 

union activities,” proximity in time between the employee’s union activity and the employer’s 

adverse employment action, disparate treatment of employees, a pattern of conduct that targets 

union supporters, inconsistencies between the employer’s reason for the employment decision and 

other actions of the employer, and any inconsistent explanations for the employment decision. City 

of Burbank v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 128 Ill. 2d 335, 346 (1989). The proximity in 

time between the employee’s protected activity and the employer’s adverse employment action is 

insufficient, by itself, to find the employer acted with retaliatory motive. Community Unit School 

District No. 5 v. Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board, 2014 IL App (4th) 130294, ¶ 64. 

¶ 32 Here, petitioner has not established that the Board abused its discretion when it dismissed 

his charges without directing the executive director to issue a complaint or holding a hearing. The 

record shows that SIU placed him on administrative leave and terminated him because he failed to 
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perform his assigned teaching duties in the spring of 2017, not because he engaged in any protected 

activities. 

¶ 33 The record shows that petitioner knew about his teaching assignments for the spring of 

2017 — Chemistry 106 and Chemistry 579 — and that he failed to perform his duties. The record 

shows that petitioner knew in spring 2016 that he was assigned to teach Chemistry 106 in spring 

2017, as he acknowledged in his statement attached to his unfair labor practice charge in case No. 

2018-CA-0039-C. In that statement, he stated that he knew about this assignment on April 29, 

2016, when the department chair rejected his request to teach inorganic chemistry and assigned 

him Chemistry 106 instead. With respect to Chemistry 579, although petitioner asserted that he 

was told only a few days before the start of the fall 2016 semester that he was assigned to teach 

this course that semester, SIU ultimately cancelled the course for the semester on August 30, 2016. 

As a result, on September 14, 2016, SIU notified petitioner that his workload assignment had been 

modified such that he was not assigned to teach any courses in the fall of 2016 and was assigned 

to teach Chemistry 579 in the spring of 2017. Despite knowing that he was assigned to teach these

courses in the spring of 2017, on January 18, 2017, the first day of classes for that semester, 

petitioner did not show up to teach his assigned courses. Thereafter, SIU initiated disciplinary 

action against him, which resulted in placing him on administrative leave and terminating him, for 

his failure to appear for and teach his assigned courses. 

¶ 34 There is nothing in the record to show that SIU placed petitioner on unpaid administrative 

leave or terminated him due to anything other than his refusal to appear for and teach his assigned 

courses. There is nothing in the record that demonstrates the existence of any factors in which the 

Board could have inferred that SIU terminated him or placed him on administrative leave because 
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he had previously engaged in protected activity, such as any evidence to infer that SIU expressed 

hostility towards unionization, engaged in disparate treatment of employees, demonstrated a 

pattern of conduct that targeted union supporters, that SIU changed its explanation for its decisions, 

or that there were any inconsistencies between SIU’s reason for its decisions and other actions it 

took. 

¶ 35 Although the email communications contained in the record show that petitioner did not 

request to teach the courses to which he was assigned, there is nothing in the record from which 

the Board could have inferred that SIU assigned him to teach these courses as a result of his 

participation in any activity protected by the Act. Rather, the record shows that another faculty 

member was assigned to teach the inorganic chemistry course he requested. Further, an email from 

the department chair to SIU’s associate general counsel on August 28, 2016, supports that SIU’s 

course assignments were not connected to his participation in protected activities, as she stated 

that she informed petitioner that the department could not let him teach his requested course 

“unless the current faculty who teaches these classes does not want to teach them or get tenure and 

promoted. [Petitioner] agreed.” 

¶ 36 Petitioner asserts that SIU assigned him courses he was not capable of teaching and was 

not provided adequate laboratory space or materials necessary for him to teach. He argues that the 

executive director ignored these facts when finding that SIU was justified in terminating him. The 

record does not support petitioner’s assertions. 

¶ 37 With respect to his course assignments, petitioner took issue with the fact that SIU assigned 

him Chemistry 106, a course he had not previously taught, and Chemistry 579, a course in which 

he previously taught but claimed he could not teach without his previous instructional materials 
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that were not returned to him from his old office. However, the record shows that SIU gave 

petitioner, who had been a faculty member since 1996, time to prepare for the courses and 

attempted to help him obtain the necessary materials. With respect to Chemistry 106, petitioner 

knew in April 2016 that he was assigned to teach this course for non-science majors in the spring 

of 2017, thus providing him about nine months to prepare and obtain the necessary materials. With 

respect to chemistry 579, it was cancelled for the fall 2016 semester, which provided him 

additional time to prepare for teaching the course the following semester. In fact, the department 

chair expressed to school officials in an August 29, 2016, email that cancelling Chemistry 579 for 

the fall 2016 semester would give petitioner “time to recreate all teaching materials.” Further, the 

email communications in the record show that the department chair attempted to help petitioner 

obtain materials for his assigned courses, as she indicated she was gathering notes from students 

who had previously taken his course and was seeking materials from other faculty members. 

Accordingly, we are unpersuaded by petitioner’s assertion that the executive director ignored facts 

that showed that SIU set him up to fail when he returned to work in early 2016 because it assigned 

him courses he was not capable of teaching and did not provide him the materials that were 

necessary for him to teach. 

¶ 38 With respect to petitioner’s assigned office and laboratory space, the record shows that 

when petitioner returned to work in January and February of 2016, he was not satisfied with the 

space that SIU assigned him, as he wanted the space that he had previously occupied. However, 

the arbitrator’s award did not require SIU to assign him the exact same space that he had previously 

occupied and there is nothing in the record to show that SIU assigned him other space because he 

had engaged in protected activity. Rather, the record shows that SIU offered petitioner three other 
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options because there were other faculty members in his old space. Further, after petitioner 

complained that his assigned space was causing him health problems, SIU had the Center for 

Environmental Health & Safety investigate the space for any potential health issues. The 

investigation showed that there were no issues with his space. However, petitioner continued to 

assert that his assigned space was inadequate, so SIU sent petitioner a “Request for 

Accommodation” form. According to SIU’s affidavit submitted to the Board, Petitioner did not 

complete the form until after his termination on September 1, 2017. Thus, we are unpersuaded by 

petitioner’s assertion that the executive director ignored facts that showed that SIU set him up to 

fail when it assigned him inadequate space upon returning to work after the successful arbitration 

in 2015. 

¶ 39 Accordingly, based on this record, we cannot find that the Board’s decision affirming the 

executive director’s conclusion that there was no evidence of a causal connection between SIU’s 

decisions to place him on administrative leave and terminate him and his participation in any 

protected activities was clearly illogical, arbitrary, or that no reasonable person could possibly take 

its view. The Board therefore did not abuse its discretion in dismissing petitioner’s charges alleging 

that SIU violated sections 14(a)(1), (a)(3), and (a)(4) of the Act. 

¶ 40 Petitioner claims that, under the Act, the Board was required to issue a complaint and hold 

an evidentiary hearing because SIU’s motives for its decisions to place him on administrative leave 

and terminate him were questions of fact. An employer’s motive is generally a question of fact. 

Speed District, 802, 242 Ill. 2d at 113. However, as previously stated, under the Act, the executive 

director is only required to issue a complaint if the investigation established that there was an 

“issue of law or fact sufficient to warrant a hearing” and shall dismiss a charge if the investigation 
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showed that there was “not an issue of law or fact sufficient to warrant a hearing.” (Emphasis in 

original.) 80 Ill. Adm. Code 1120.30(b)(5), (6); 115 ILCS 5/15 (West 2016). When “determining 

whether the issues of law or fact are sufficient to warrant a hearing,” the executive director “shall 

consider whether the charge states a cause of action upon which relief can be granted under the 

Act and whether the facts provided in the course of the investigation state a prima facie case.” 80 

Ill. Adm. Code 1120.30(b)(5). 

¶ 41 Here, the executive director dismissed the charges and concluded that petitioner failed to 

provide any evidence of a causal connection between SIU’s decisions to suspend and terminate 

him and any protected activity in which he participated. Thus, the executive director was not 

required to issue a complaint, as it was only required to do so if there was “an issue of law or fact

sufficient to warrant a hearing.” Further, it was within the Board’s discretion to dismiss petitioner’s

charges if there was insufficient evidence. Michels, 2012 IL App (4th) 110612, ¶ 45. As previously 

discussed, based on the record, we cannot find that the Board abused its discretion in dismissing 

petitioner’s charges or that its decision was clearly illogical. 

¶ 42 Petitioner next asserts that the Board erred when it found that his claims that SIU violated 

section 14(a)(8) of the Act by failing to comply with the arbitrator’s award were untimely because 

they were filed more than six months after he knew that SIU was allegedly not going to comply 

with the arbitrator’s award. Section 15 of the Act states that “[n]o order shall be issued upon an 

unfair practice occurring more than 6 months before the filing of the charge alleging the unfair 

labor practice.” 115 ILCS 5/15 (West 2016). Under this section, if a party files the unfair labor 

practice charge more than six months after the alleged unfair practice violation occurred, the Board 

does not have jurisdiction. Jones v. Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board, 272 Ill. App. 3d 
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612, 619-20 (1995). The six-month period begins to run when the charging party became aware, 

or should have become aware, of the employer’s alleged actions that violated the Act and begins 

“even if the charging party does not know the legal significance of the acts which constitute the 

alleged unfair labor practice.” Jones, 272 Ill. App. 3d 612, 619-20 (1995). 

¶ 43 An administrative agency’s findings and conclusions on questions of fact are considered 

prima facie true and correct and we will only reverse these findings if they are against the manifest 

weight of the evidence. Wilson v. Municipal Officers Electoral Board for City of Calumet City, 

2013 IL App (1st) 130957, ¶ 10. Under this standard, we will not reverse the Board’s factual 

findings unless “the opposite conclusion is clearly evident.” Alm v. Lincolnshire Police Pension 

Board, 352 Ill. App. 3d 595, 597-98 (2004). Here, the Board made a factual finding when it 

concluded that petitioner knew more than six months before he filed his charge that SIU was not 

going to comply with the obligations he believed it had under the arbitrator’s award regarding his 

space. 

¶ 44 Petitioner filed his unfair labor practice charges on July 19, 2017, and November 22, 2017. 

He alleged in both charges that SIU violated section 14(a)(8), which prohibits educational 

employers from “[r]efusing to comply with the provisions of a binding arbitration award.” 115 

ILCS 5/14(a)(8) (West 2016). The Board found that petitioner knew of SIU’s alleged refusal to 

comply with the arbitrator’s award by August 16, 2016, as he emailed SIU’s associate counsel on 

this date informing her that SIU had not provided him “the requisite space needed for the conduct 

of my work as per the arbitrator’s order.” The Board found that his claims were untimely because

he filed his charges in July 19, 2017, and November 2017, which was more than one year after he 

knew that SIU was not going to comply with the obligations petitioner believed it had under the 
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arbitrator’s award. We cannot find that the Board’s factual finding that petitioner should have 

known by the date of the August 16, 2016, email that SIU was not going to assign him the space 

he believed it was required to provide him under the arbitrator’s award, was against the manifest 

weight of the evidence. Thus, because petitioner filed his claims more than six months after he 

knew about SIU’s alleged violation, the Board correctly concluded that petitioner’s claims alleging 

that SIU violated the Act by failing to comply with the terms of the arbitrator’s award were 

untimely. 

¶ 45 Further, petitioner does not claim on appeal that he did not have knowledge of SIU’s

alleged refusal to comply with the terms of the arbitrator’s award by August 16, 2016. He however 

asserts that the six-month “statute of limitations” time period applies when an employee is harmed 

by a single overt act and that, if there is a continuing violation by the employer, the “limitations” 

period is tolled until the violation ceases. He asserts that the six-month period was tolled here 

because SIU continued to ignore the arbitrator’s ruling relating to his space assignment. He argues

therefore that the Board improperly dismissed his section 14(a)(8) claims for being untimely. 

¶ 46 Under the continuing violation rule, when “a tort involves a continuing or repeated injury, 

the limitations period does not begin to run until the date of the last injury or the date the tortious 

acts cease.” Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 199 Ill. 2d 325, 345 (2002). 

However, “[a] continuing violation or tort is occasioned by continuing unlawful acts and conduct, 

not by continual ill effects from an initial violation.” Feltmeier v. Feltmeier, 207 Ill. 2d 263, 278 

(2003). Thus, when “there is a single overt act from which subsequent damages may flow, the 

statute begins to run on the date the defendant invaded the plaintiff’s interest and inflicted injury, 

and this is so despite the continuing nature of the injury.” Feltmeier, 207 Ill. 2d at 278. 
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¶ 47 The continuing violations period does not apply here because SIU engaged in one overt 

act, i.e., assigning him space, from which petitioner continued to express dissatisfaction even after 

the arbitrator clarified SIU did not have to assign him to the exact same space he had previously 

occupied. The record shows that, on February 21, 2016, after reconsidering petitioner’s space 

assignment, SIU made its final decision regarding his assigned space. Thus, even though petitioner 

continued to assert his dissatisfaction with his assigned space, SIU engaged in one overt act of 

assigning him office and laboratory space. Further, the six-month period was not extended or tolled 

because petitioner repeatedly renewed his request for SIU to assign him the space he had 

previously occupied. See Jones, 272 Ill. App. 3d at 620 (the court concluded that the petitioner 

could not extend the six-month period “merely by repeated renewal of his request once it was 

denied”). Accordingly, we are unpersuaded by petitioner’s argument that the six-month time 

period in which he had to file his claim was tolled. 

¶ 48 To the extent that petitioner argued in his charges that SIU violated section 14(a)(8) 

because it failed to comply with any obligations petitioner believed it had under the arbitrator’s 

award relating to his course assignments, we also find that his claims were untimely and therefore 

the Board did not have jurisdiction to review these claims. We review the issue of whether an 

administrative agency has jurisdiction de novo. NorthShore University Healthsystem v. Illinois 

Department of Revenue, 2017 IL App (1st) 153647, ¶ 17. Here, the department chair informed 

petitioner on September 14, 2016, that SIU had modified his workload assignment such that he 

was not teaching any courses in the fall of 2016 and was teaching two courses in the spring of 

2017. On this same day, petitioner requested an informal grievance meeting with SIU regarding 

his “workload assignments.” Thus, petitioner knew, or should have known, by at least September 
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14, 2016, that SIU was not going to comply with any obligation petitioner believed SIU had under

the arbitrator’s award relating to his course assignments. Thus, because petitioner knew of this

alleged section 14(a)(8) violation by September 14, 2016, which was more than six months before 

he filed his July 19, 2017, and November 22, 2017, charges, his claims were untimely. The Board 

therefore did not have jurisdiction to review these claims. 

¶ 49 Given our conclusion that the Board did not err in dismissing petitioner’s claims that SIU 

violated section 14(a)(8) of the Act by failing to comply with the arbitrator’s award, we need not 

determine whether collateral estopped applied to his claims. 

¶ 50 IV. Conclusion 

¶ 51 For the reasons explained above, we affirm the Board’s decision. 

¶ 52 Board decision affirmed. (Administrative review direct to the appellate court.)