alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### CARPENTER et v DECKERT et

Ohio Appeals, 9th Dist, Summit Co

No 1616.

Decided May 3, 1929

Burroughs & Burroughs and W H Crawford, all of Akron, for Carpenter, et.

Myer Wise and Chalmers 1VC Hamill, both of Akron, for Deckert. et.

PER CURIAM

The general rule is that where land is described in the memorandum py ownership, acreage and general location, parol evidence is admissable to apply such description to a particular tract of land; but if either the ownership, acreage or location is not stated in the memorandum, and no other particulars are stated which will indicate with reasonable certainty the land intended, parol evidence is not competent: because the court will not receive such evidence both to describe the land and then to apply the description.

The farm is sufficiently identified as to area and as to location, but there is no statement as to ownership or similar designation which would indicate tne land intended to be described. If the contract had read that Deckert agreed to convey his 55-acre farm in Green township, Summit county, Ohio, parol evidence would be admissable to explain the meaning and application of the descriptive language used and thereby identify the 55-acre farm in that township referred to; but that is not the wording of the contract. The contract reads “to deed 55 acre farm m Green Township, Summit Co., Ohio,” and parol evidence is not competent to show that the parties intended to describe the 55-acre farm in said township which Deckert owned or on which he resided, for the statute requires the parties to descrioe the land in the writing and prevents specific performance if that is not done •with reasonable certainty.

It is claimed, however, that the provision in the contract with reference to the payment . of taxes indentifies Deckert as the owner of the 55-acre farm.

*331That Dart of the contract reads: “Taxes to be paid on properties for Dec. 1927 by respective owners of property at this time.’ That is not a statement that Deckert owned the 55-acre farm or that he would pay the taxes thereon, but is a statement that the owner, whoever he might be, would pay the taxes.

Where the description contains a patent ambiguity which appears on the face of the writing itself, the uncertainty in the description cannot be cured by extrinsic evidence.

In this case the uncertainty appears on the face of the writing. There is no particular stated which in any way indicates what 55-acre farm in said township the parties meant to describe, and parol evidence is not competent to supply that essential of the contract.

While parol evidence is competent to apnlv a reasonably certain description to a particular tract of land, it is not competent for thgi purpose of remedying an uncertain description.

A decree denying specific performance a,nd dismissing the petition without prejudice' may be entered.

Funk, PJ, Pardee, J, and. Washburn, J. concur.
#### § 91.15 Dropping objects.

No pilot in command of a civil aircraft may allow any object to be dropped from that aircraft in flight that creates a hazard to persons or property. However, this section does not prohibit the dropping of any object if reasonable precautions are taken to avoid injury or damage to persons or property.
#### RADABAUGH v LANTZ

Ohio Appeals, 1st Dist., Hamilton Co.

No 3648.

Decided April 21, 1930

Harry E. Marble, Cincinnati, for Radabaugh.

Closs & Closs, Cincinnati, for Lantz.

*463HAMILTON, J.

The question of the statute of frauds has no bearing on the proposition. It was an executed transaction.

The payment of the $425 by Lantz to Radabaugh was a voluntary payment under a claim for services in procuring the optional contract. There is mo connection between this transaction and the transaction under which the sale was actually made and the commission of $812.50 earned. To entitle Lantz to the setoff, it would necessarily be as for money had and received or payment, made under mistake of fact amounting to legal fraud. There is nothing in the record showing either situation. The fund of $1,000 was procured by Radabaugh bringing in the party who entered into the optional contract, and Lantz received the $1,000 by reason of this service. Radabaugh would not have been entitled to maintain an action under the statute to recover any part of the $1,000. Radabaugh was able to induce Lantz in good conscience that he was entitled to one-half. Lantz testified, that feeling he wanted to do what was right in the matter, voluntarily paid $425 to Radabaugh, and this transaction was over.

We are unable to see under what rule of law Lantz would be entitled to maintain an action against Radabaugh to recover money voluntarily paid upon a claim which he did not at the time of payment dispute, although he knew all the facts of the transaction.

We are therefore of the opinion that the court committed error in allowing the set-off as against the claim sued upon in this action, and that the judgment should have been for the full sum of $812.50.

The judgment of the court of Common Pleas will be set aside, and held for naught, and the facts not being materially in dispute, we will enter the judgment here that the court below ought to have entered.

Judgment will be entered here for the plaintiff in error for the amount of $812.50 and costs.

Cushing, PJ, and Ross, J, concur.
EX-4.11






Exhibit 4.11




Form of Irrevocable Voting Proxy




     The undersigned hereby irrevocably appoints Mr. Haidong Pang/Guoxiang Liu, as his or her true
and lawful attorney and proxy, with full power of substitution for and in his or her name, with
respect to all of the shares of Linkage Technologies International Holdings Limited (the “Company”)
held by him or her, to vote and otherwise act at any and all meetings of shareholders of the
Company and to give written consent on behalf of the undersigned to any and all matters of the
Company requiring shareholder approval.



     This Proxy shall become effective as of November           , 2009 and shall automatically terminate
with respect to any such Shares upon the transfer and disposition of such Shares not otherwise in
violation of any agreement with the Company.



     Neither this Proxy nor any provision hereof may be modified, waived, discharged, or terminated
orally, but only by an instrument in writing executed by the parties hereto.



     This Proxy shall be governed by the laws of the State of New York, USA (without giving effect
to the conflict of laws provisions). This Proxy may be executed in one or more counterparts, each
of which shall be deemed an original, but all of which together shall constitute one and the same
instrument.



     IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned have duly executed this Proxy on the date first written above.



	 	 	 
	/S/
 


	 	 
	 
	 	 
	Accepted and agreed by:
	 	 
	 
	 	 
	/S/
	 	 
	 
	 	 
	[Haidong Pang] [Guoxiang Liu]
§ 1987.103 Filing of retaliation complaint. ( a ) *Who may file.* An employee who believes that he or she has been retaliated against in violation of FSMA may file, or have filed by any person on the employee's behalf, a complaint alleging such retaliation.
( b ) *Nature of filing.* No particular form of complaint is required. A complaint may be filed orally or in writing. Oral complaints will be reduced to writing by OSHA. If the complainant is unable to file the complaint in English, OSHA will accept the complaint in any language.
( c ) *Place of filing.* The complaint should be filed with the OSHA office responsible for enforcement activities in the geographical area where the employee resides or was employed, but may be filed with any OSHA officer or employee. Addresses and telephone numbers for these officials are set forth in local directories and at the following Internet address: *http://www.osha.gov .*
( d ) *Time for filing.* Within 180 days after an alleged violation of FSMA occurs, any employee who believes that he or she has been retaliated against in violation of that section may file, or have filed by any person on the employee's behalf, a complaint alleging such retaliation. The date of the postmark, facsimile transmittal, electronic communication transmittal, telephone call, hand-delivery, delivery to a third-party commercial carrier, or in-person filing at an OSHA office will be considered the date of filing. The time for filing a complaint may be tolled for reasons warranted by applicable case law. For example, OSHA may consider the time for filing a complaint to be tolled if a complainant mistakenly files a complaint with an agency other than OSHA within 180 days after an alleged adverse action.
Editorial Note on Part 1926
Editorial Notes: 1. At 44 FR 8577, Feb. 9, 1979, and corrected at 44 FR 20940, Apr. 6, 1979, OSHA reprinted without change the entire text of 29 CFR part 1926 together with certain General Industry Occupational Safety and Health Standards contained in 29 CFR part 1910, which have been identified as also applicable to construction work. This republication developed a single set of OSHA regulations for both labor and management forces within the construction industry. 2. Nomenclature changes to part 1926 appear at 84 FR 21597, May 14, 2019.

§ 1926.1405 Disassembly—additional requirements for dismantling of booms and jibs (applies to both the use of manufacturer procedures and employer procedures). *Dismantling (including dismantling for changing the length of) booms and jibs.* ( a ) None of the pins in the pendants are to be removed (partly or completely) when the pendants are in tension.
( b ) None of the pins (top or bottom) on boom sections located between the pendant attachment points and the crane/derrick body are to be removed (partly or completely) when the pendants are in tension.
( c ) None of the pins (top or bottom) on boom sections located between the uppermost boom section and the crane/derrick body are to be removed (partly or completely) when the boom is being supported by the uppermost boom section resting on the ground (or other support).
( d ) None of the top pins on boom sections located on the cantilevered portion of the boom being removed (the portion being removed ahead of the pendant attachment points) are to be removed (partly or completely) until the cantilevered section to be removed is fully supported.
11TH COURT OF APPEALS

EASTLAND, TEXAS

JUDGMENT

In the interest of E.A.O. * From the 446th District Court

and R.R.B., children, of Ector County,

Trial Court No. E-3554-PC.

No. 11-17-00297-CV * November 2, 2017

* Per Curiam Memorandum Opinion

(Panel consists of: Wright, C.J.,

 Willson, J., and Bailey, J.)

 This court has inspected the record in this cause and concludes that the appeal 

should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Therefore, in accordance with this 

court’s opinion, the appeal is dismissed.
§ 1614.604 Filing and computation of time. ( a ) All time periods in this part that are stated in terms of days are calendar days unless otherwise stated.
( b ) A document shall be deemed timely if it is received or postmarked before the expiration of the applicable filing period, or, in the absence of a legible postmark, if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
( c ) A hearing request, appeal, brief, or other document filed by a complainant using the EEOC Public Portal, or filed by an agency using FedSEP, shall be deemed filed on the date the document is uploaded to the Public Portal or FedSEP. The timeliness of documents submitted through the Public Portal and FedSEP will be determined based on the time zone from which the document was submitted.
( d ) An EEOC decision that is transmitted to a complainant through the Public Portal or by email shall be deemed to be received when the decision is accessed on the Portal or when received if transmitted via email, or within five days of when the decision is uploaded to the Portal or emailed, whichever occurs first.
( e ) For the purposes of §§ 1614.108, 1614.109, 1614.204(i), and 1614.401 through 1614.405, the terms *accept, file,* *filed, filing,* *issue, issuance,* *issuing, notify,* *notified, receive,* *receipt, send,* *serve, served,* *service, submit,* *submission, submitted,* *transmit,* and *transmitted,* shall include digital transmissions made through FedSEP, the EEOC Public Portal, or by email.
( f ) The time limits in this part are subject to waiver, estoppel and equitable tolling.
( g ) The first day counted shall be the day after the event from which the time period begins to run and the last day of the period shall be included, unless it falls on a Saturday, Sunday or Federal holiday, in which case the period shall be extended to include the next business day.
[57 FR 12646, Apr. 10, 1992, as amended at 64 FR 37661, July 12, 1999; 88 FR 57881, Aug. 24, 2023]
#### Eugene A. Perkins, Respondent, *v.*Guaranty Trust Company of New York, Defendant, and Idonah S. Perkins, Appellant.

Submitted June 10, 1937;

decided June 11, 1937.

Motion for reargument denied, with ten dollars costs and necessary printing disbursements. (See 274 N. Y. 250.)
#### § 1915.1011 4-Aminodiphenyl.

Note:

The requirements applicable to shipyard employment under this section are identical to those set forth at [§ 1910.1003 of this chapter](/on/2024-09-19/title-29/section-1910.1003).

[[61 FR 31430](https://www.federalregister.gov/citation/61-FR-31430), June 20, 1996]
#### Ellen B. Velasco MARTIN and Walther Memorial Hospital, Petitioners, v. John GARDNER, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare Department, Respondent.

No. 16119.

United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.

May 16, 1967.

*353Gene Shapiro, Chicago, 111., for petitioner.

Edward V. Hanrahan, U. S. Atty., Chicago, 111., for respondent.

Before HASTINGS, Chief Judge, and KILEY and CUMMINGS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Petitioners have asked us to review a decision of the Exchange Visitor Review Board of the Health, Education and Welfare Department. Petitioner Martin, a Philippine citizen, was admitted to the United States as an exchange student pursuant to 22 U.S.C. § 2451 et seq. In March 1961, she sought a permanent visa. This request was denied by the Immigration and Naturalization Service because it was not established that she “has resided and been physically present in the country of [her] nationality or [her] last residence, or in another foreign country for an aggregate of at least two years following departure from the United States” (8 U.S.C. § 1182(e)). Pursuant to the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (75 Stat. 524), petitioners filed an application with the Board seeking a waiver of the aforementioned two-year foreign residence requirement. The application was denied.

To support judicial reviewability of the Board’s decision, the petitioners rely upon the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 and upon 8 U. S.C. § 1105a. Respondent has filed a motion to dismiss asserting that the Board’s decision is not reviewable.

As to the 1961 Act, petitioners have shown no provision therein entitling them to judicial review of the Board’s decision. Our examination of that statute has also uncovered no provision for court review. Therefore, petitioners’ first asserted jurisdictional basis is untenable.

As to 8 U.S.C. § 1105a, the courts of appeals have been empowered to review “all final orders of deportation * * * made against aliens within the United States”. No deportation order has been entered against petitioner Martin. If a final deportation order is eventually entered against her, that action of the Immigration and Naturalization Service will be judicially reviewable.

Because the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Program Act of 1961 commits the waiver of the requirement of two-year foreign residence to agency discretion, Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. § 1009) is also of no avail to petitioners. Cf. Montgom*354ery v. Ffrench, 299 F.2d 730, 735 (8th Cir.1962).

Since no statute empowers this Court to review the Board’s discretionary denial of petitioners’ application for a waiver of the two-year foreign residence requirement under the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961, this petition for review must be dismissed. Samala v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 336 F.2d 7, 13 (5th Cir.1964).

Respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition is granted.
# Euroopan unionin C 184A/17.

| | ISSN 1725-2490 |
| --- | --- |
| Euroopan unionin
  virallinen lehti | C 184A |
| | |
| Suomenkielinen laitos | Tiedonantoja ja ilmoituksia | 47. vuosikerta17. heinäkuu 2004 |

ISSN 1725-2490

Euroopan unionin

virallinen lehti

C 184A

Suomenkielinen laitos

Tiedonantoja ja ilmoituksia

47. vuosikerta17. heinäkuu 2004

---

| Ilmoitusnumero | Sisältö | Sivu |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | III   Tiedotteita |
| | Neuvosto |
| 2004/C 184A/1 | | 1 |

Ilmoitusnumero

Sisältö

Sivu

III   Tiedotteita

Neuvosto

2004/C 184A/1

1

| FI | |
| --- | --- |

FI

---

III Tiedotteita

Neuvosto

| 17.7.2004 | FI | Euroopan unionin virallinen lehti | CA 184/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

17.7.2004

FI

Euroopan unionin virallinen lehti

CA 184/1

---

ILMOITUS AVOIMESTA VIRASTA

(Viite A/014)

PÄÄJOHTAJA

(2004/C 184 A/01)

Euroopan unionin neuvoston pääsihteeristössä on täytettävänä pääjohtajan virka pääosastossa H — oikeus- ja sisäasiat.

Lisätietoja (englanniksi ja ranskaksi) ja hakulomakkeita saa valinta- ja palvelukseenottoyksiköstä sähköpostitse osoitteesta: service.recrutement@consilium.eu.int tai yksikön verkkosivun kautta osoitteesta: http://ue.eu.int/concours.

Hakuaika päättyy 3. syyskyuuta 2004 (kyseisen päivän postileima riittää).

---
§ 102.33 Transfer of charge and proceeding from Region to Region; consolidation of proceedings in same Region; severance. ( a ) Whenever the General Counsel deems it necessary to effectuate the purposes of the Act or to avoid unnecessary costs or delay, a charge may be filed with the General Counsel in Washington, DC, or, at any time after a charge has been filed with a Regional Director, the General Counsel may order that such charge and any proceeding regarding the charge be: ( 1 ) Transferred to and continued before the General Counsel for investigation or consolidation with any other proceeding which may have been instituted in a Regional Office or with the General Counsel; or
( 2 ) Consolidated with any other proceeding which may have been instituted in the same region; or
( 3 ) Transferred to and continued in any other Region for the purpose of investigation or consolidation with any proceeding which may have been instituted in or transferred to such other region; or
( 4 ) Severed from any other proceeding with which it may have been consolidated pursuant to this section.
( b ) The provisions of §§ 102.9 through 102.32 will, insofar as applicable, govern proceedings before the General Counsel, pursuant to this section, and the powers granted to Regional Directors in such provisions will, for the purpose of this section, be reserved to and exercised by the General Counsel. After the transfer of any charge and any proceeding which may have been instituted with respect thereto from one Region to another pursuant to this section, the provisions of this subpart will, insofar as possible, govern such charge and such proceeding as if the charge had originally been filed in the Region to which the transfer is made.
( c ) The Regional Director may, prior to hearing, exercise the powers in paragraphs (a)(2) and (4) of this section with respect to proceedings pending in the Director's Region.
( d ) Motions to consolidate or sever proceedings after issuance of complaint must be filed as provided in § 102.24 and ruled upon as provided in § 102.25, except that the Regional Director may consolidate or sever proceedings prior to hearing upon the Director's own motion. Rulings by the Administrative Law Judge upon motions to consolidate or sever may be appealed to the Board as provided in § 102.26.
================================================================================

                                  EXHIBIT 32.1

                                  CERTIFICATION

         Pursuant to Section 906 of the Public Company Accounting Reform and
Investor Protection Act of 2003 (18 U.S.C.ss. 1350, as adopted), I, Dianne
Hatton-Ward, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of the Company,
hereby certifiy that, to the best of his or her knowledge:

         1. The Company's Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB for the period ended
March 31, 2008, and to which this Certification is attached as Exhibit 32.1 (the
"PERIODIC REPORT") fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

         2. The information contained in the Periodic Report fairly presents, in
all material respects, the financial condition of the Company at the end of the
period covered by the Periodic Report and results of operations of the Company
for the period covered by the Periodic Report.

Dated: May 12, 2008


/s/ Dianne Hatton-Ward
-----------------------
Dianne Hatton-Ward
CEO & CFO

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to Yummies, Inc. and will be retained by Yummies, Inc. and furnished to
the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request

THIS CERTIFICATION ACCOMPANIES THIS REPORT PURSUANT TO SS. 906 OF THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2004 AND SHALL NOT BE DEEMED "FILED" BY THE COMPANY FOR
PURPOSES OF SECTION 18 OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, AS AMENDED.




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