[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 16-15303

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 1:15-cr-00246-WS-B-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

 versus

CHARLES ANDREW GOSS RICHARDS, 

a.k.a. Junior, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Alabama

________________________

(December 7, 2017)

Before MARTIN, ROSENBAUM, and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Case: 16-15303 Date Filed: 12/07/2017 Page: 1 of 8 
2

Charles Andrew Goss Richards appeals his convictions and total sentence of 

630 months of imprisonment after pleading guilty to one count of conspiring to 

distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and two counts of 

discharging a firearm during and in relation to and in furtherance of a crime of 

violence or drug-trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). After 

careful review, we affirm. 

I.

On September 20, 2015, Richards and his girlfriend arrived in a stolen van at 

“Kelly’s Clay Pit” near Foley, Alabama, to sell another couple $25’s worth of 

methamphetamine ice. After the exchange, Richards accosted one of the buyers

for “talking bad” about him in the county jail. Richards then pulled out a gun and 

shot the man in the arm. As the man began to run away, Richards shot at him 

again but missed. Turning to the other buyer, Richards told her he was going to 

take her car and grabbed the keys from her hand. Richards and his girlfriend then 

drove away in the two cars, leaving the two buyers. Eventually, Richards’s

girlfriend picked him up in the stolen van. They were later apprehended after 

leading police on a high-speed chase. 

After his arrest, Richards was indicted on five counts: (1) conspiring to 

distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; (2) distributing 

methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); (3) discharging a firearm 

Case: 16-15303 Date Filed: 12/07/2017 Page: 2 of 8 
3

during and in relation to and in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime (distributing 

methamphetamine), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A); (4) carjacking, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119; and (5) discharging a firearm during and in relation 

to and in furtherance of a crime of violence (carjacking). Under a written plea 

agreement, Richards agreed to plead guilty to the drug-conspiracy offense (Count 

1) and the two firearms offenses (Counts 3 and 5). The government agreed to 

dismiss the remaining counts. 

At the change-of-plea hearing, Richards was informed that he faced up to 20

years of imprisonment on Count 1, a mandatory consecutive term of at least 10 

years on Count 3, and a mandatory consecutive term of at least 25 years on Count 

5. After confirming that he understood the penalties he faced and the elements of 

the offenses, Richards admitted to the facts of his offense conduct summarized 

above and then pled guilty to Counts 1, 3, and 5 of the indictment. The district 

court accepted the plea as knowing and voluntary. 

Richards’s presentence investigation report calculated an advisory guideline 

range of 210 to 240 months for the drug-conspiracy offense, plus mandatory 

consecutive terms of 10 and 25 years for the firearms offenses. 

At his sentencing, Richards argued that it violated the Fifth Amendment’s 

Double Jeopardy Clause to impose multiple terms of imprisonment for a single act 

of discharging a firearm. The district court rejected this argument and then 

Case: 16-15303 Date Filed: 12/07/2017 Page: 3 of 8 
4

sentenced him to 210 months on Count 1, 120 months on Count 3, and 300 months 

on Count 5, with all terms to be served consecutively. Richards now appeals.

II.

On appeal, Richards offers two reasons why, in his view, the district court 

could not have imposed multiple, consecutive punishments for the two § 924(c) 

convictions. First, he asserts that Count 5 lacks a sufficient evidentiary basis 

because he was not convicted of the predicate crime of violence (carjacking), 

which the government dismissed as part of his plea. Second, he maintains that his 

§ 924(c) convictions and corresponding sentences violate the Fifth Amendment’s 

guarantee of protection against multiple punishments for the same offense because, 

in his view, both firearm convictions were based on the same predicate offense.1

 

 1

 The government contends that Richards has waived his right to raise these arguments 

on appeal for two distinct reasons. First, the government cites the plea agreement’s limited 

waiver of Richards’s right to file a direct appeal challenging “his guilty plea, conviction, or 

sentence.” After Richards filed his initial brief on appeal, the government filed a motion to 

dismiss the appeal as barred by the waiver. That motion was carried with the case, and the 

government then filed its response brief. We find that the wavier does not apply because 

Richards primarily challenges his convictions and, to the extent the waiver applies to such 

arguments, the district court did not specifically address that aspect of the waiver during 

Richards’s plea colloquy. See United States v. Bushert, 997 F.3d 1343, 1350–51 (11th Cir. 

1993). Accordingly, we DENY the government’s motion to dismiss. In any case, even if the 

waiver applies, the government has already addressed the merits of the appeal, so we will not be 

depriving the government of the central benefit of its bargain by deciding the merits. See United 

States v. Buchanan, 131 F.3d 1005, 1008 (11th Cir. 1997). 

Second, the government argues that Richards waived his arguments by pleading guilty. 

See United States v. Smith, 532 F.3d 1125, 1127 (11th Cir. 2008) (“The general rule is that a 

guilty plea waives all non-jurisdictional challenges to a conviction”). The government is likely 

correct in this regard. See United States v. Fairchild, 803 F.2d 1121, 1124 (11th Cir. 1986) 

(holding that a guilty plea waived the argument that “there was an insufficient factual basis to 

support the indictment”); Smith, 532 F.3d at 1127–28 (holding that a guilty plea waives some, 

Case: 16-15303 Date Filed: 12/07/2017 Page: 4 of 8 
5

We review claims of double jeopardy and questions of statutory 

interpretation de novo. United States v. Bobb, 577 F.3d 1366, 1371 (11th Cir. 

2009); United States v. Rahim, 431 F.3d 753, 756 (11th Cir. 2005). 

The Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause protects against, among 

other things, multiple punishments for the same offense. Bobb, 577 F.3d at 1371. 

The multiple-punishment inquiry focuses on congressional intent. See id.

(“Congress, of course, has the power to authorize multiple punishments arising out 

of a single act or transaction.”). If the same act or transaction violates two 

statutory provisions, courts must first determine whether the legislature clearly 

intended each violation to be a separate offense with separate punishments. See id.

at 1371–72. When legislative intent is unclear, we apply the “same elements” test 

established in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932). United 

States v. Smith, 532 F.3d 1125, 1128 (11th Cir. 2008). “Under this test, two 

offenses are different for the purposes of double jeopardy analysis if each requires 

proof of an additional fact which the other does not.” Id. (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

Section 924(c) provides that “any person who, during and in relation to any 

crime of violence . . . for which the person may be prosecuted in a court of the 

 

but not all, double-jeopardy challenges). However, we would engage in a similar doublejeopardy analysis to determine if Richards waived his argument, see Smith, 532 F.3d at 1128–29, 

and Richards is not entitled to relief on the merits in any event, so we proceed directly to the 

merits. 

Case: 16-15303 Date Filed: 12/07/2017 Page: 5 of 8 
6

United States, uses or carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such crime, 

possesses a firearm” shall be sentenced to an additional term of imprisonment

depending on the facts. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). A minimum penalty of 10 years 

applies if the firearm was discharged, while a lesser penalty applies if the firearm 

was brandished or merely possessed. Id. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii). In the case of a 

“second or subsequent” § 924(c) conviction, the defendant must be sentenced to at 

least 25 years. Id. § 924(c)(1)(C)(i). This enhanced penalty provision “applies to 

multiple offenses, even if the offenses are charged in a single indictment.” United 

States v. Hamilton, 953 F.2d 1344, 1346 (11th Cir. 1992) (citing United States v. 

Rawlings, 821 F.2d 1542, 1545–46 (11th Cir. 1987)). 

Notably, the penalties for violating § 924(c) must be “stacked.” That is, 

each term of imprisonment for a § 924(c) offense must be imposed consecutive to

the term of imprisonment for any other offense, including the underlying predicate 

offense. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii). 

Here, Richards has not shown that the district court erroneously imposed 

multiple punishments for the two § 924(c) convictions. Richards first argues that 

his conviction on Count 5 cannot stand because he was not convicted of the 

predicate carjacking offense. But a “conviction under section 924(c) does not 

require either that the defendant be convicted of or charged with the predicate 

offense.” United States v. Frye, 402 F.3d 1123, 1127 (11th Cir. 2005). Instead,

Case: 16-15303 Date Filed: 12/07/2017 Page: 6 of 8 
7

§ 924(c) “requires only that the drug trafficking crime be one that ‘may be 

prosecuted.’” Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)). Richards admitted as part of 

his guilty plea that he in fact committed the offense of carjacking, even if he was 

not convicted of that offense. Thus, the fact that he was not convicted of 

carjacking does not undermine his § 924(c) conviction for discharging a firearm 

during and in relation to the predicate offense of carjacking. See id. at 1127–28.

Richards’s second contention—that it violates the Double Jeopardy Clause 

to base multiple § 924(c) convictions on the same predicate offense—is misguided 

because his two § 924(c) convictions rest on distinct predicate offenses.

In Rahim, we held that two or more convictions under § 924(c) can arise 

from the same course of conduct when the convictions are based are distinct 

predicate crimes. 431 F.3d at 757–58 (declining to “reach the issue whether 

predicate offenses consisting of ‘virtually the same conduct’ can support multiple 

924(c) convictions”). And multiple § 924(c) convictions do not violate the 

Double Jeopardy Clause so long as “each of the two offenses charged requires 

proof of an additional fact”—the predicate crime—“which the other does not.” 

Id. at 758 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, in Rahim, we held that the 

defendant’s multiple § 924(c) convictions for (1) use of a firearm during a robbery

and (2) use of a firearm during a carjacking, did not violate the Double Jeopardy

Clause, even though they arose from a single course of conduct, because each 

Case: 16-15303 Date Filed: 12/07/2017 Page: 7 of 8 
8

conviction required proof of a different predicate crime of violence. Id. 

Here, Richards’s multiple § 924(c) convictions do not violate the Double 

Jeopardy Clause. Even though his convictions arose out of the same course of 

conduct, each conviction required proof of an element the other does not. See id at 

757–58; see also Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304. Specifically, Count 3 charged 

Richards with discharging a firearm during and in relation to and in furtherance of 

the predicate crime of selling methamphetamine. Count 5 charged Richards with 

discharging a firearm during and in relation to and in furtherance of the predicate 

crime of carjacking. Thus, Richards is incorrect that his § 924(c) convictions were 

based on the same predicate offense. And because his § 924(c) convictions rest on 

distinct predicate offenses, no double-jeopardy violation occurred. See Rahim, 431 

F.3d at 758.

In sum, the district court properly concluded that Richards’s multiple 

§ 924(c) convictions did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause because they were 

based on distinct predicate offenses. For that reason, we likewise find no error in 

the court’s imposition of multiple, consecutive terms of imprisonment, as directed 

by the statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(C)(i), (D)(ii). Accordingly, Richards’s 

convictions and total sentence are affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

Case: 16-15303 Date Filed: 12/07/2017 Page: 8 of 8