[Cite as State v. Velazquez, 2016-Ohio-5203.]

COURT OF APPEALS 

MUSKINGUM COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

STATE OF OHIO : JUDGES: 

 : Hon. Sheila G. Farmer, P.J. 

 Plaintiff-Appellee : Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J. 

 : Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J. 

-vs- : 

 : 

GENAR VELAZQUEZ : Case No. CT2015-0043 

 : 

 Defendant-Appellant : O P I N I O N 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Court of Common 

Pleas, Case No. CR2015-0011 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed 

DATE OF JUDGMENT: August 1, 2016 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant 

GERALD V. ANDERSON II ERIC J. ALLEN 

27 North Fifth Street 713 South Front Street 

P.O. Box 189 Columbus, OH 43206 

Zanesville, OH 43702-0189 
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2015-0043 2 

Farmer, P.J. 

{¶1} On January 7, 2015, the Muskingum County Grand Jury indicted 

appellant, Genar Velazquez, on one count of possession of drugs in violation of R.C. 

2925.11, one count of trafficking in drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.03, and one count of 

possession of criminal tools in violation of R.C. 2923.24. Said charges arose after a 

traffic stop wherein appellant was a passenger in the vehicle. The vehicle was first 

stopped by Ohio State Highway Patrol Trooper Timothy Williamson in Madison County 

for a traffic violation. A responding K-9 jumped up to the open passenger window of the 

vehicle. The trooper let the vehicle go, and then decided the K-9 had alerted on the 

vehicle and he should have conducted a search. Trooper Samuel Hendricks was called 

to be on the look-out for the vehicle. Trooper Hendricks stopped the vehicle for traffic 

violations in Muskingum County. A K-9 was called to the scene and alerted to the 

presence of drugs. A subsequent search revealed two suitcases full of marijuana in the 

trunk of the vehicle. 

{¶2} On March 2, 2015, appellant filed a motion to suppress, claiming an illegal 

search of the vehicle. Hearings were held on March 5, and May 11, 2015. At the 

conclusion of the hearings, the trial court denied the motion. The trial court never 

memorialized its decision via an entry. 

{¶3} A jury trial commenced on June 16, 2015. The jury found appellant guilty 

as charged. By entry filed August 11, 2015, the trial court sentenced appellant to an 

aggregate term of forty-two months in prison. 

{¶4} Appellant filed an appeal, contesting the denial of his motion to suppress. 

This court remanded the matter to the trial court for findings of fact and conclusions of 
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2015-0043 3 

law which the trial court filed on July 13, 2016. See State v. Velazquez, 5th Dist. 

Muskingum No. CT2015-0043, 2016-Ohio-4782. This matter is now before this court for 

consideration. Assignments of error are as follows: 

I 

{¶5} "THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT OVERRULED 

THE APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS." 

II 

{¶6} "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SENTENCING APPELLANT TO 

CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES AS THE COURT FAILED TO ENGAGE IN THE 

REQUISITE THREE PART ANALYSIS REQUIRED TO SENTENCE A DEFENDANT 

TO CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES BY FAILING TO FIND THAT ANY OF THE THREE 

FACTORS LISTED IN R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a)-(c) APPLIED." 

I 

{¶7} Appellant claims the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress as 

there was insufficient probable cause to stop the vehicle, the stop was predicated on a 

"tip" via a previous stop in Madison County, and the stop was too lengthy an intrusion. 

We disagree. 

{¶8} There are three methods of challenging on appeal a trial court's ruling on a 

motion to suppress. First, an appellant may challenge the trial court's findings of fact. 

In reviewing a challenge of this nature, an appellate court must determine whether said 

findings of fact are against the manifest weight of the evidence. State v. Fanning, 1 

Ohio St.3d 19 (1982); State v. Klein, 73 Ohio App.3d 486 (4th Dist.1991); State v. 

Guysinger, 86 Ohio App.3d 592 (4th Dist.1993). Second, an appellant may argue the 
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2015-0043 4 

trial court failed to apply the appropriate test or correct law to the findings of fact. In that 

case, an appellate court can reverse the trial court for committing an error of law. State 

v. Williams, 86 Ohio App.3d 37 (4th Dist.1993). Finally, assuming the trial court's 

findings of fact are not against the manifest weight of the evidence and it has properly 

identified the law to be applied, an appellant may argue the trial court has incorrectly 

decided the ultimate or final issue raised in the motion to suppress. When reviewing 

this type of claim, an appellate court must independently determine, without deference 

to the trial court's conclusion, whether the facts meet the appropriate legal standard in 

any given case. State v. Curry, 95 Ohio App.3d 93 (8th Dist.1994); State v. Claytor, 85 

Ohio App.3d 623 (4th Dist.1993); Guysinger. As the United States Supreme Court held 

in Ornelas v. U.S., 517 U.S. 690, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 1663 (1996), "...as a general matter 

determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause should be reviewed de 

novo on appeal." 

{¶9} In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968), the United States Supreme Court 

determined that "a police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate 

manner approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior 

even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest." However, for the propriety 

of a brief investigatory stop pursuant to Terry, the police officer involved "must be able 

to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences 

from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." Id. at 21. Such an investigatory 

stop "must be viewed in the light of the totality of the surrounding circumstances" 

presented to the police officer. State v. Freeman, 64 Ohio St.2d 291 (1980), paragraph 

one of the syllabus. 
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2015-0043 5 

{¶10} This case involves two separate stops, the first in Madison County and the 

second in Muskingum County. Both stops involved K-9 officers. During the first 

suppression hearing held on March 5, 2015, the first stop came to light. The trial court 

instructed the prosecutor to seek information on the first stop as it "may have been the 

predicate to this stop" and provide the information to defense counsel. March 5, 2015 

T. at 21. The suppression hearing then continued on the Muskingum stop. 

{¶11} Trooper Hendricks stated he pulled the vehicle over for failure to stay left 

while traveling through the city of Zanesville. Id. at 25. He admitted he was looking for 

the red vehicle with the California registration from the first stop. Id. at 19, 27. On 

redirect, Trooper Hendricks explained he pulled out behind the vehicle for "following too 

closely" to the vehicle in front, because otherwise he "wouldn't know until they drove all 

the way through Zanesville that they failed to get over to the left." Id. at 32. After 

stopping the vehicle and observing "nervous indicators" from the driver, Trooper 

Hendricks ran a records check and called for a K-9 unit. Id. at 13. It took ten minutes 

for the K-9 unit to arrive. Id. During this time, Trooper Hendricks was working on the 

citation, running the records check, and typing out the driver's information because the 

driver had a license from the state of Delaware. Id. at 13-14. The K-9 alerted to the 

vehicle. Id. at 15. The entire stop lasted approximately twenty minutes. Id. at 14-15. 

{¶12} At the end of the hearing, defense counsel explained his issue was with 

the first stop in Madison County. Id. at 38. He did not have an issue with the K-9's 

qualifications or reliability with the Muskingum County stop. Id. The trial court stated, 

"unless there's some issues with the other stop, the Court is going to rule in your 

[appellee] favor." Id. at 40. The trial court explained (Id.): 
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2015-0043 6 

 Because, obviously, there's no refuting that the testimony was they 

were following too close and they didn't get over. He had the right to stop 

the car. There's no question that - - or anything raised that the dog didn't 

get there within a reasonable time of doing the ticket. Therefore, the 

stop's okay. 

 *** 

 But if there's something hinky about how the stop was made 

because of what happened over there, then that's another issue. 

{¶13} Defense counsel indicated he was fine with that. Id. at 40-41. 

{¶14} The second suppression hearing was held on May 11, 2015, wherein 

Troopers Williamson, Michael Wilson, and Gerald March testified to the first stop. 

Trooper Williamson explained he pulled the vehicle over for speeding. May 11, 2015 T. 

at 12. Trooper March observed the stop and stopped to assist with his K-9 officer. Id. 

at 23. The K-9 walked around the vehicle, showed a "change of behavior," and put his 

paws on the window, looking inside the vehicle. Id. at 18, 24-25. The vehicle was not 

searched and the troopers let the vehicle leave. Id. at 15, 19, 25. Thereafter, the 

troopers determined the K-9's response was an "alert" and because Trooper Williamson 

believed "there was possibly criminal activity that was continued down the roadway," 

called Trooper Wilson and explained the situation for "somebody down the way" out 

east. Id. at 5-6, 8, 15, 18-19, 27. Trooper Wilson in turn called Trooper Hendricks and 

alerted him to a red vehicle with California plates. Id. at 8-9; March 5, 2015 T. at 18-19. 
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2015-0043 7 

{¶15} In its findings of fact and conclusions of law filed July 13, 2016, the trial 

court stated the following: 

After the first and second day of suppression hearings the defense 

counsel stated that the stop of the vehicle in Muskingum County was valid 

and the dog sniff and search were also valid. The sole issue raised was 

that the car in which Mr. Velazquez was riding in should not be permitted 

to be stopped twice in the same day even though there is not an argument 

that there wasn't a traffic violation which caused the second stop. No legal 

authority was presented to establish this argument of counsel therefore 

the motion to suppress is denied. 

{¶16} The tip received by Trooper Hendricks indicated a red vehicle with 

California plates was traveling eastbound on I-70 and was suspected of containing 

drugs. The record clearly demonstrates Trooper Hendricks observed two minor traffic 

violations by a red vehicle with California plates. We find there were observable traffic 

violations that gave rise to the stop. We further find the amount of time for the K-9 unit 

to arrive was a reasonable length of time and did not prolong the stop, as Trooper 

Hendricks was still in the process of issuing a citation. See State v. Batchili, 113 Ohio 

St.3d 403, 2007-Ohio-2204. 

{¶17} Upon review, we find the trial court did not err in denying the motion to 

suppress. 

{¶18} Assignment of Error I is denied. 
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2015-0043 8 

II 

{¶19} Appellant claims the trial court erred in sentencing him to consecutive 

sentences. We disagree. 

{¶20} R.C. 2953.08 governs appeals based on felony sentencing guidelines. 

Subsection (G)(2) sets forth this court's standard of review as follows: 

 (2) The court hearing an appeal under division (A), (B), or (C) of 

this section shall review the record, including the findings underlying the 

sentence or modification given by the sentencing court. 

 The appellate court may increase, reduce, or otherwise modify a 

sentence that is appealed under this section or may vacate the sentence 

and remand the matter to the sentencing court for resentencing. The 

appellate court's standard for review is not whether the sentencing court 

abused its discretion. The appellate court may take any action authorized 

by this division if it clearly and convincingly finds either of the following: 

 (a) That the record does not support the sentencing court's findings 

under division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13, division (B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of 

section 2929.14, or division (I) of section 2929.20 of the Revised Code, 

whichever, if any, is relevant; 

 (b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law. 

{¶21} "Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof which 

is more than a mere 'preponderance of the evidence,' but not to the extent of such 
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2015-0043 9 

certainty as is required 'beyond a reasonable doubt' in criminal cases, and which will 

produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought 

to be established." Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph three of the 

syllabus. 

{¶22} R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) governs consecutive sentences and states the 

following: 

 (4) If multiple prison terms are imposed on an offender for 

convictions of multiple offenses, the court may require the offender to 

serve the prison terms consecutively if the court finds that the consecutive 

service is necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish 

the offender and that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to 

the seriousness of the offender's conduct and to the danger the offender 

poses to the public, and if the court also finds any of the following: 

 (a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses 

while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction 

imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised 

Code, or was under post-release control for a prior offense. 

 (b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of 

one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of 

the multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single 

prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses 

of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender's conduct. 
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2015-0043 10 

 (c) The offender's history of criminal conduct demonstrates that 

consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future 

crime by the offender. 

{¶23} Appellant was convicted on three counts, two felonies of the third degree 

and one a felony in the fifth degree. By entry filed August 11, 2015, the trial court 

merged the two felonies of the third degree and sentenced appellant to thirty month on 

that count and twelve months on the remaining count, to be served consecutively for a 

total term of forty-two months in prison. 

{¶24} During the sentencing hearing, the trial court noted appellant had three 

prior felony convictions in 2007, 1999, and 1998, and he was "transporting drugs from 

Las Vegas to either Philadelphia or Delaware depending upon which story came 

through." August 10, 2015 T. at 6-7. In ordering the sentences to be served 

consecutively, the trial court stated the following (Id. at 7): 

The Court finds this to be necessary based upon your criminal 

history which shows a propensity and to protect the public from any future 

crimes you may commit. The Court also finds it is not disproportionate to 

the seriousness of the conduct and the danger you pose to the public. 

The multiple offenses were committed during the course of conduct 

that you engaged in, and you did so knowingly as well as with your 

accomplice that you had with you whose whole trial is yet to come up. 
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2015-0043 11 

{¶25} The trial court echoed these findings in its judgment entry filed August 11, 

2015, and again noted "Defendant has three (3) prior felony convictions." We find the 

trial court complied with State v. Bonnell, 140 Ohio St.3d 209, 2014-Ohio-3177, 

syllabus, and R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) in ordering consecutive service. 

{¶26} Upon review, we do not find clear and convincing evidence that the trial 

court violated R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a) or (b) in sentencing appellant. 

{¶27} Assignment of Error II is denied. 

{¶28} The judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Muskingum County, Ohio 

is hereby affirmed. 

By Farmer, P.J. 

Delaney, J. and 

Baldwin, J. concur. 

 

 

 

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