IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION TWO

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF

ORETTE TARIZ SHAYANA MORRIS,

FKA ORETTE MANDEL,

Petitioner/Appellant,

and

CHRISTOPHER MANDEL,

Respondent/Appellee.

No. 2 CA-CV 2022-0083-FC

Filed April 25, 2023

Appeal from the Superior Court in Pima County

No. D20201560

The Honorable Cynthia T. Kuhn, Judge 

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; 

VACATED IN PART AND REMANDED

COUNSEL

Southern Arizona Legal Aid Inc., Tucson

By Christine Trueblood and Kristin Fitzharris

Counsel for Petitioner/Appellant

Law Office of Charles Brown PLLC, Phoenix

By Charles W. Brown Jr.

Counsel for Respondent/Appellee
IN RE MARRIAGE OF MORRIS & MANDEL

Opinion of the Court

2

OPINION

Judge Sklar authored the opinion of the Court, in which Vice Chief Judge 

Staring and Judge O’Neil concurred.

S K L A R, Judge:

¶1 This case requires us to address the statutory framework for 

legal decision-making and parenting time when one parent has committed 

domestic violence. The trial court ordered Orette Morris and Christopher 

Mandel to share joint legal decision-making of their child. We conclude 

that A.R.S. § 25-403.03(A) precluded it from doing so because the court also 

found that Mandel had a significant history of domestic violence. We also 

conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in increasing Mandel’s

parenting time as the child reached school age. Finally, we conclude that 

the court deviated from the child-support guidelines on past care and 

support without appropriately considering the relevant factors.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Morris and Mandel have one minor child, K.M., who was 

born in 2019. Morris filed a petition for dissolution in June 2020, when the 

parties lived in Arizona. That same month, Mandel filed his own petition 

for dissolution. The trial court treated that petition as a response to Morris’s

petition and consolidated the two cases. 

¶3 With her petition, Morris filed a motion for emergency 

temporary orders. She asserted that Mandel had engaged in a significant 

history of domestic violence against her. She also sought a temporary order 

allowing her to relocate with K.M. to South Korea for a military 

deployment. 

¶4 The domestic violence allegations arose in part from an 

incident in 2018 that led to Mandel pleading guilty to criminal charges. 

Because Mandel attended a diversion program, however, the charges were 

dismissed. Morris also obtained orders of protection against Mandel in 

2019 and 2020. Both orders were affirmed after contested hearings. In 

addition, Mandel was jailed in 2019 for domestic violence against Morris. 
IN RE MARRIAGE OF MORRIS & MANDEL

Opinion of the Court

3

Morris dismissed the 2019 order before it expired to allow Mandel to be 

present for K.M.’s birth. 

¶5 After a hearing in July 2020, the trial court entered temporary 

orders granting sole legal decision-making to Morris. The court reasoned 

that Morris had “shown by a preponderance of the evidence that there ha[d]

been a significant history of domestic violence.” Therefore, the court 

concluded that “an award of joint legal decision-making is barred by A.R.S. 

§ 25-403.03(A).” The court also awarded primary parenting time to Morris

in South Korea, with Mandel entitled to daily video calls and parenting time 

in South Korea during Morris’s leave.

¶6 Over the next two years, while the dissolution was pending, 

Morris left the military, returned from South Korea, and moved to 

Massachusetts. Mandel moved to South Carolina. In May 2022, after a

dissolution trial, the trial court issued a detailed ruling that included the 

parties’ divorce decree. 

¶7 In the decree, the trial court incorporated its prior finding that 

Mandel had engaged in a significant history of domestic violence. It also 

awarded the parties joint legal-decision making. In addition, it entered a 

parenting plan designating Morris as the primary residential parent, with 

Mandel having parenting time that would increase once K.M. began 

kindergarten. Finally, it ordered Mandel to pay child support of $383 per 

month, and it ordered Morris to pay $2,439 in past care and support. 

¶8 Morris appealed. We have jurisdiction under A.R.S. 

§ 12-2101(A)(1). 

TRIAL COURT JURISDICTION

¶9 Because Morris, Mandel, and K.M. had left Arizona by the 

time the trial court entered the decree’s legal decision-making and 

parenting-time orders, we initially address the court’s jurisdiction to enter 

those orders. Neither party addressed this issue in its briefing, but we have 

an independent obligation to determine whether the court had subjectmatter jurisdiction. See Angel B. v. Vanessa J., 234 Ariz. 69, ¶ 5 (App. 2014).

¶10 Cross-jurisdictional legal decision-making and 

parenting-time issues are governed by Arizona’s Uniform Child Custody 

Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, A.R.S. §§ 25-1001 to 25-1067 (UCCJEA). 

Under the UCCJEA, the final orders were a “child custody determination,”

which is defined as a “permanent, temporary, initial and modification 
IN RE MARRIAGE OF MORRIS & MANDEL

Opinion of the Court

4

order, for legal custody, physical custody or visitation with respect to a 

child.” § 25-1002(3)(a). Legal decision-making is synonymous with “legal 

custody.” A.R.S. § 25-401(3). 

¶11 Determining whether the trial court had authority to enter the 

final orders requires us to first address whether it had authority to make an 

“initial” child custody determination. A court has such authority if Arizona 

was “the home state of the child on the date of the commencement of the 

proceeding.” § 25-1031(A)(1). Here, when the proceedings commenced, 

Arizona was K.M.’s home state, as he lived here from his birth in 2019 until 

the proceedings commenced in June 2020. See § 25-1002(7)(a) (defining 

“home state” as “state in which a child lived with a parent . . . for at least 

six consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a child 

custody proceeding”). Thus, the court had jurisdiction to make an initial 

determination.

¶12 Here, the initial child custody determination came in the 

temporary orders. See § 25-1002(3)(a) (including temporary orders in 

definition of “child custody determination”), (8) (defining “[i]nitial 

determination”). As noted, though, the parties and K.M. left Arizona after 

the trial court made this determination and before trial. However, it does 

not follow that the court lost jurisdiction. See § 25-1031(C) (“Physical 

presence of or personal jurisdiction over a party or a child is not necessary 

or sufficient to make a child custody determination.”). Rather, a court has 

jurisdiction to modify its initial determination “if it has jurisdiction to make 

an initial determination under § 25-1031.” § 25-1032(B). As we have 

explained, the court had such jurisdiction. We therefore conclude that the 

court had jurisdiction to enter the final orders, and we proceed to the 

substantive issues.

LEGAL DECISION-MAKING

¶13 Morris first challenges the trial court’s award of joint legal 

decision-making. She argues that once the court found in its temporary 

orders that Mandel had engaged in a significant history of domestic 

violence, it lacked the authority to modify that finding in its final orders. 

But the final orders did not modify that finding. They incorporated it. We 

therefore need not address whether the court had the authority to modify 

the finding. Instead, we must address whether the court had the authority 

to award joint legal decision-making despite finding in its final orders that 

Mandel had a significant history of domestic violence.
IN RE MARRIAGE OF MORRIS & MANDEL

Opinion of the Court

5

¶14 We review the trial court’s legal decision-making and 

parenting-time orders for an abuse of discretion. Engstrom v. McCarthy, 243 

Ariz. 469, ¶ 4 (App. 2018). An abuse of discretion occurs when the court 

commits an error of law in reaching a discretionary conclusion or when the 

record lacks competent evidence to support the decision. Id.

¶15 The relationship between domestic violence and legal 

decision-making is governed primarily by A.R.S. § 25-403.03. When the 

trial court finds a parent has committed an act of domestic violence against 

the other parent, subsection (D) creates “a rebuttable presumption that an 

award of sole or joint legal decision-making to the parent who committed 

the act of domestic violence is contrary to the child’s best interests.” 

§ 25-403.03(D). But “[n]otwithstanding subsection D,” when the court finds 

“significant domestic violence” or a “significant history of domestic 

violence,” subsection (A) requires that “joint legal decision-making shall 

not be awarded.” § 25-403.03(A). 

¶16 Here, Mandel does not challenge the trial court’s finding that 

Morris had met her burden of establishing a significant history of domestic 

violence by Mandel. Indeed, the court heard substantial evidence and 

testimony to support that finding, and it adequately explained the finding 

in its orders. At that point, no further analysis was needed. Under 

§ 25-403.03(A), the court was precluded from ordering joint legal 

decision-making. 

¶17 Nevertheless, the trial court undertook the analysis that 

applies when a parent has committed domestic violence that is not 

“significant,” and it found that Mandel had rebutted the presumption 

against an award of legal decision-making. See § 25-403.03(D), (E). But as 

we have explained, subsection (D)’s rebuttable presumption did not apply.

¶18 Mandel argues that this result is unreasonable. He relies on

the trial court’s extensive findings that he had rebutted the presumption

and that joint legal decision-making was in K.M.’s best interests. He also

argues that as a public-policy matter, it is unfair to preclude a parent who 

has committed significant domestic violence or has a significant history of 

domestic violence from exercising joint legal decision-making. These 

arguments are foreclosed by the language of § 25-403.03(A). See JH2K I LLC 

v. Ariz. Dep’t of Health Servs., 246 Ariz. 307, ¶ 9 (App. 2019) (“When the 

statute is clear and unambiguous, we must apply its terms without further 

analysis.”). We therefore vacate the award of joint legal decision-making 

and remand for the court to award sole legal decision-making to Morris.
IN RE MARRIAGE OF MORRIS & MANDEL

Opinion of the Court

6

PARENTING TIME

¶19 We turn next to parenting time. The trial court ordered that 

until K.M. began kindergarten, Mandel would exercise parenting time for 

two continuous weeks at the end of each calendar quarter. Once 

kindergarten began, Mandel’s parenting time would increase to eight 

weeks in the summer, plus half of Christmas break and one week at spring 

break. In addition, the court allowed him up to one week of parenting time 

per month in Morris’s state of residence. 

¶20 Morris argues that this arrangement improperly increased 

Mandel’s parenting time once K.M. started kindergarten. As with legal 

decision-making, we review parenting-time orders for an abuse of 

discretion and treat a legal error as such an abuse. Engstrom, 243 Ariz. 469, 

¶ 4.

¶21 Morris’s argument is premised in part on Mandel’s history of 

domestic violence. Unlike with legal decision-making, our statutory 

scheme does not prohibit parenting time for a parent who has engaged in 

“significant domestic violence” or a “significant history of domestic 

violence.” Rather, parents who have committed domestic violence—

“significant” or otherwise—must “prov[e] to the court’s satisfaction that 

parenting time will not endanger the child or significantly impair the child’s 

emotional development.” § 25-403.03(F). 

¶22 If the parent does so, the trial court “shall place conditions on 

parenting time that best protect the child and the other parent from harm.” 

Id. The statute does not specify the conditions, but it provides that the court 

“may” issue certain orders, such as: (1) requiring exchanges to occur in 

protected settings; (2) requiring the perpetrator to complete an intervention 

program; (3) prohibiting the perpetrator from consuming drugs or alcohol 

during parenting time; or (4) “impos[ing] any other condition that the court 

determines is necessary to protect the child, the other parent and any other 

family or household member.” Id. 

¶23 As with all parenting-time decisions, the trial court must also 

conduct a best-interests analysis under A.R.S. § 25-403. The existence of 

domestic violence and child abuse is one of that statute’s eleven 

enumerated factors. See § 25-403(A)(8). It is also potentially relevant to 

other enumerated factors. See, e.g., § 25-403(A)(1) (“past, present and 

potential future relationship between the parent and the child”), (A)(5) 

(“mental and physical health of all individuals involved”). For all those 
IN RE MARRIAGE OF MORRIS & MANDEL

Opinion of the Court

7

factors, courts must make specific findings on the record. Hart v. Hart, 220 

Ariz. 183, ¶ 9 (App. 2009). The court must also consider domestic violence 

as contrary to the child’s best interests, and it must consider the child and 

victim’s safety to be “of primary importance.” § 25-403.03(B). 

¶24 Here, the trial court engaged in a detailed analysis of K.M.’s 

best interests. It made findings under § 25-403 that addressed Mandel’s

history of domestic violence. Although the court gave weight to that 

history, it also found that Morris had withheld parenting time from Mandel

and misled the court about K.M.’s whereabouts. In addition, the court 

found that K.M. had good relationships with both parents. Those findings 

are supported by the record, and we find no abuse of discretion.

¶25 The trial court sufficiently addressed subsection (F), despite 

Morris’s suggestion to the contrary. Although the court did not expressly 

say so, it necessarily found that Mandel proved parenting time would not 

endanger K.M. or significantly impair his emotional development. The 

court noted that the parties had agreed Mandel could exercise 

unsupervised parenting time, the domestic violence had occurred years 

earlier, and K.M. was physically and mentally healthy. In addition, Morris

proposed a parenting plan that allowed Mandel to exercise parenting time. 

¶26 The trial court also addressed the conditions that may be 

imposed under § 25-403.03(F). First, it found that Mandel had completed a 

batterer’s prevention program, which is one such condition. It also limited 

communication during exchanges to further protect the parties. See 

§ 25-403.03(F)(1) (allowing court to order that exchanges occur in protected 

setting), (F)(9) (allowing court to impose other necessary conditions). 

Expressly citing subsection (F) in this analysis would have been a better 

practice. But because the court substantively addressed it, doing so 

implicitly was sufficient. 

¶27 Nor do we find an abuse of discretion in the trial court’s 

parenting-time orders. The court reasonably recognized that as children 

enter school, parenting-time arrangements must account for school 

schedules. The two-weeks-per-quarter arrangement for K.M.’s 

pre-kindergarten years would not work with most school calendars. As a 

result, the court crafted a schedule that would comply. Morris has also 

pointed to no authority that precludes a court from gradually increasing a 

parent’s parenting time. Rather, the increase comports with the public 

policy that absent evidence to the contrary, it is in a child’s best interests to 

have “substantial, frequent, meaningful and continuing parenting time 
IN RE MARRIAGE OF MORRIS & MANDEL

Opinion of the Court

8

with both parents.” A.R.S. § 25-103(B)(1). We therefore affirm the 

parenting-time orders.

CHILD SUPPORT

¶28 In calculating past care and support, the trial court treated the 

parties as if they had equal parenting time through March 2022, although 

Mandel had exercised little time. The court reasoned that it was 

“appropriate to attribute equal parenting time based on Father’s inability 

to exercise parenting time with the minor child internationally, or without 

a tremendous financial burden.” Morris challenges this conclusion. 

¶29 Child-support awards are within the trial court’s discretion, 

and we review them only for an abuse of that discretion. State ex rel. Dep’t 

of Econ. Sec. v. Ayala, 185 Ariz. 314, 316 (App. 1996). As with legal 

decision-making and parenting time, a legal error in reaching a 

discretionary conclusion is an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Robinson 

& Thiel, 201 Ariz. 328, ¶ 5 (App. 2001).

¶30 Application of the child-support guidelines is mandatory. 

A.R.S. § 25-320(D) (“The amount resulting from the application of the[] 

guidelines is the amount of child support ordered . . . .”). Under the 

guidelines, trial courts must calculate parenting time based on either a 

“court order, a parenting plan, by the parents’ expectation, or by historical 

practice.” A.R.S. § 25-320 app. § V(C). 

¶31 In certain circumstances, however, the trial court “must

deviate” from the child-support guidelines. Before ordering a deviation, 

the court must “consider[] all relevant factors.” § 25-320 app. § IX(B). These 

factors include those set forth in § 25-320 and applicable case law. Id. The 

court must: (1) conclude that applying the guidelines is inappropriate or 

unjust; (2) consider the child’s best interests; (3) make written findings why 

application of the guidelines is inappropriate and unjust, as well as why a 

deviation is in the child’s best interests; (4) show in its order the amount of 

the award without a deviation; and (5) show in its order the amount after 

deviating. Id.

¶32 Here, we agree with Morris that, in the past-care-and-support 

ruling, the trial court did not calculate parenting time based on “court 

order, a parenting plan, by the parents’ expectation, or by historical 

practice,” as required by § 25-320 app. § V(C). It instead considered a 

different factor, namely, Mandel’s inability to exercise parenting time given 
IN RE MARRIAGE OF MORRIS & MANDEL

Opinion of the Court

9

the distance between the parties. The court erred in calculating parenting 

time in this manner, as it is unsupported by the statute or guidelines.

¶33 Of course, the trial court was authorized to deviate from the 

guidelines. That was arguably the effect of its decision. In fact, the 

child-support guidelines provide that a deviation may be warranted where 

the parenting plan “will require a parent to incur significant travel expenses 

related to parenting time and the cost thereof in combination with child 

support may impede the parent’s ability to exercise parenting time.” 

§ 25-320 app. § IX(D)(4). The court concluded, however, that “[n]o evidence 

was presented to support a deviation.” It also did not follow the procedure 

for a deviation, which includes making findings and incorporating 

child-support worksheets showing the deviation. Accordingly, the 

decision constituted a legal error.

¶34 We therefore vacate the trial court’s decision on past care and 

support and remand for additional proceedings consistent with this 

decision. In its discretion, the court may order a deviation from the 

child-support guidelines if it follows the required procedures and considers 

the required factors. 

ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL

¶35 Mandel requests an award of attorney fees and costs on 

appeal under Rule 21, Ariz. R. Civ. App. P., and A.R.S. § 25-324. Section 

25-324 allows a court to award a party reasonable attorney fees “after 

considering the financial resources of both parties and the reasonableness

of the positions each party has taken throughout the proceedings.” Having 

reviewed the record as to the financial resources of both parties and 

considered the reasonableness of the parties’ positions, we deny Mandel’s

request for attorney fees in our discretion. See Doherty v. Leon, 249 Ariz. 515, 

¶ 24 (App. 2020). 

¶36 Mandel is also not the prevailing party on appeal, as Morris

prevailed on more issues. Mandel is therefore not entitled to his costs on 

appeal. See id. Although Morris did not request fees on appeal, we 

conclude that she is the prevailing party, so she is entitled to her costs upon 

compliance with Rule 21(b). See id. 
IN RE MARRIAGE OF MORRIS & MANDEL

Opinion of the Court

10

DISPOSITION

¶37 We reverse the trial court’s decision to award the parties joint 

legal decision-making, and we vacate the decision on past care and support. 

We remand with directions that the court enter a new decree that awards 

sole legal decision-making to Morris and addresses past care and support 

in a manner consistent with this opinion. We otherwise affirm.