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SPACE TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT: 

HOW TO PREVENT A REAL LIFE ‘‘GRAVITY’’ 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND 

TECHNOLOGY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

MAY 9, 2014 

Serial No. 113–74 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://science.house.gov 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY 

HON. LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas, Chair 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

RALPH M. HALL, Texas 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma 

RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois 

LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

BILL POSEY, Florida 

CYNTHIA LUMMIS, Wyoming 

DAVID SCHWEIKERT, Arizona 

THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky 

KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

RANDY WEBER, Texas 

CHRIS COLLINS, New York 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

FREDERICA S. WILSON, Florida 

SUZANNE BONAMICI, Oregon 

ERIC SWALWELL, California 

DAN MAFFEI, New York 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JOSEPH KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

SCOTT PETERS, California 

DEREK KILMER, Washington 

AMI BERA, California 

ELIZABETH ESTY, Connecticut 

MARC VEASEY, Texas 

JULIA BROWNLEY, California 

ROBIN KELLY, Illinois 

KATHERINE CLARK, Massachusetts 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE

HON. STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi, Chair 

RALPH M. HALL, TEXAS 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

MO BROOKS, ALABAMA 

LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

BILL POSEY, Florida 

DAVID SCHWEIKERT, Arizona 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

CHRIS COLLINS, New York 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland, RMM 

SUZANNE BONAMICI, Oregon 

DAN MAFFEI, New York 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

DEREK KILMER, Washington 

AMI BERA, California 

MARC VEASEY, Texas 

JULIA BROWNLEY, California 

FREDERICA WILSON, Florida 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

May 9, 2014 

Page 

Witness List ............................................................................................................. 2 

Hearing Charter ...................................................................................................... 3 

Opening Statements 

Statement by Representative Mo Brooks, Vice Chairman, Subcommittee on 

Space, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ........................................................................................................... 9 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 10 

Statement by Representative Donna F. Edwards, Ranking Minority Member, 

Subcommittee on Space, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, 

U.S. House of Representatives ............................................................................ 11 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 12 

Statement by Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson, Ranking Member, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives .... 13 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 13 

Witnesses: 

Lt Gen. John ‘‘Jay’’ Raymond, Commander, 14th Air Force, Air Force Space 

Command; and Commander, Joint Functional Component Command for 

Space, U.S. Strategic Command 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 15 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 17 

Mr. George Zamka, Deputy Associate Administrator, Office of Commercial 

Space Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 31 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 33 

Mr. Robert Nelson, Chief Engineer, International Bureau, Federal Communications Commission 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 42 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 44 

Mr. P.J. Blount, Adjunct Professor, Air and Space Law, University of Mississippi School of Law 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 49 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 51 

Mr. Brian Weeden, Technical Advisor, Secure World Foundation 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 65 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 67 

Discussion ................................................................................................................. 90 

Appendix I: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions 

Lt Gen. John ‘‘Jay’’ Raymond, Commander, 14th Air Force, Air Force Space 

Command; and Commander, Joint Functional Component Command for 

Space, U.S. Strategic Command ......................................................................... 106 

Mr. George Zamka, Deputy Associate Administrator, Office of Commercial 

Space Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration .................................. 113 

Mr. Robert Nelson, Chief Engineer, International Bureau, Federal Communications Commission .......................................................................................... 120 
Page

IV 

Mr. P.J. Blount, Adjunct Professor, Air and Space Law, University of Mississippi School of Law .......................................................................................... 126 

Mr. Brian Weeden, Technical Advisor, Secure World Foundation ...................... 138 
(1) 

SPACE TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT: HOW TO 

PREVENT A REAL LIFE ‘‘GRAVITY’’ 

FRIDAY, MAY 9, 2014 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY, 

Washington, D.C. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:07 a.m., in Room 

2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mo Brooks 

[Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding. 
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Chairman BROOKS. The Subcommittee on Space will come to 

order. Good morning. Welcome to today’s hearing titled,‘‘Space 

Traffic Management: How To Prevent A Real Life ’Gravity’’’. In 

front of you are packets containing the written testimony, biography, and truth in testimony disclosure for today’s witnesses. Before I begin my opening statement, let me say that the topic we are 

discussing is one that I know is of great interest to Chairman Steve 

Palazzo, and he would be here leading the discussion today if he 

had not been pulled away by the death of a close friend this week. 

I also understand he will be including a statement for the record. 

I would like to offer my condolences to him and his family during 

this time. I recognize myself for five minutes for an opening statement. 

The focus of this hearing is how to prevent a real life ‘‘Gravity’’. 

As was imaginatively portrayed by Hollywood last year, the threat 

of debris in key orbits around the Earth is a very real and serious 

issue. While the movie elevated orbital debris to the forefront of the 

public’s attention, this Committee is no stranger to the topic. Today 

we will continue assessing the key questions involved in space traffic management, and what Congress may do to ensure the safety 

and security of the space environment. 

There are two important facets of this discussion. The first is an 

assessment of what we are doing right now to track and mitigate 

orbital debris. The second is what more needs to be done without 

burdening the space industry with unnecessary bureaucratic hurdles to success. At present, the Joint Functional Component Command for Space, or JFCC Space, is tracking approximately 23,000 

objects in orbit around the Earth, including 4,000 payloads, of 

which 1,200 are active. The current systems available for tracking 

cannot detect objects smaller than four inches in size. This means 

we can’t track a fleck of paint traveling at 17,500 miles an hour, 

which in and of itself, although small, can cause serious damage. 

The Chinese anti-satellite test in 2007 demonstrated just how 

volatile the space environment can be. This test resulted in the 

largest creation of debris in history. So far, almost 3,400 individual 

objects associated with this event have been catalogued, and the 

list is still growing. Additionally, in 2000, the collision of a decommissioned Russian communication satellite, dubbed Kosmos-2251, 

and an active U.S. Communications satellite called Iridium-33 created a debris field that resulted in over 2,000 pieces of debris. Combined, these two events account for almost a quarter of all the objects that JFCC is tracking. 

While tracking existing debris is obviously key to this discussion, 

we must also focus on preventing the proliferation of these objects 

in the first place. There are two key agencies involved in the mitigation of debris, the Federal Aviation Administration, and the Federal Communications Commission. Both of these agencies have developed regulations specific to the creation of orbital debris, and I 

am eager to hear from them today. 

The FAA is responsible for the mitigation of debris as it pertains 

to launch and reentry of transportation vehicles. The National 

Space Transportation Policy released in November of 2013 directed 

the Department of Transportation to execute exclusive authority 

over these activities. While this was not a change in the status quo, 
10 

Dr. George Nield, Associate Administrator for Commercial Space 

Transportation at the FAA, testified before this Subcommittee that 

his agency was ready to start a larger discussion on an expansion 

of their authority to regulate on orbit activities. It is unclear what 

specific authority the FAA is asking for, and how it would anticipate working with other agencies to implement this authority. Regardless of the Administration’s plans, Congress will need to carefully weigh the costs and benefits of increased authority for the 

FAA against the possible overregulation of a still very young industry. 

In 2005, the FCC asserted jurisdiction to regulate orbital debris 

from commercial satellites which require their licenses for the use 

of spectrum. The Commission based this assertion largely on the 

broad mandate in the Communications Act of 1934 to encourage 

‘‘the larger and more effective use of radio in the public interest.’’ 

Although Congress has not provided authority for this type of regulation explicitly, there seems to be some ambiguity in the nature 

of their mandate to utilize the spectrum effectively and efficiently. 

The efforts of Federal agencies should be viewed within the context of separate international and private sector efforts. The United 

States has the most advanced space situational awareness system 

in the world, but tracking and cataloging the space environment 

more effectively may come from key partnerships. We cannot afford 

to ignore these important partners. 

As commercial human spaceflight increases in the coming decades, we must be sure that the nation can protect the health, welfare, and safety of our government astronauts and private 

spaceflight participants. It is also imperative that we secure key orbits to protect assets that are critical to our economy. Similarly, we 

cannot allow national security assets that are used to keep our 

country safe to be threatened by the proliferation of debris. 

The debris events caused by the Kosmos and Iridium collision in 

2009 and China’s ASAT test in 2007 demonstrated that the space 

environment is vulnerable and ever changing. We must be vigilant 

to ensure our national interests are protected. 

I appreciate the appearance of our witnesses today, and I look 

forward to hearing from them. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Brooks follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE VICE CHAIRMAN MO BROOKS

The focus of this hearing is how to prevent a real life ‘Gravity.’ As was imaginatively portrayed by Hollywood last year, the threat of debris in key orbits around 

the Earth is very real and a serious issue. While the movie elevated orbital debris 

to the forefront of the public’s attention, this committee is no stranger to the topic. 

Today we will continue assessing the key questions involved in space traffic management and what Congress may do to ensure the safety and security of the space 

environment. 

There are two important facets of this discussion. The first is an assessment of 

what we are doing right now to track and mitigate orbital debris. The second is 

what more needs to be done without burdening the space industry with unnecessary 

bureaucratic hurdles to success. 

At present, the Joint Functional Component Command for Space, or JFCC 

SPACE, is tracking approximately 23,000 objects in orbit around the Earth, including 4,000 payloads, of which 1,200 are active. The current systems available for 

tracking cannot detect object smaller than four inches in size. This means we can’t 

even track a paint fleck travelling at 17,500 miles an hour, which can cause serious 

damage. 
11 

The Chinese Anti-Satellite test in 2007 demonstrated just how volatile the space 

environment can be. This test resulted in the largest creation of debris in history. 

So far almost 3,400 individual objects associated with this event have been cataloged, and the list is still growing. Additionally, in 2000, the collision of a decommissioned Russian Communications Satellite dubbed Kosmos-2251 and an active U.S. 

communications satellite called Iridium-33 created a debris field that resulted in 

over 2,000 pieces of debris. Combined, these two events account for almost a quarter 

of all the objects JFCC is tracking. 

While tracking existing debris is obviously key to this discussion, we must also 

focus on preventing the proliferation of these objects in the first place. There are 

two key agencies involved in the mitigation of debris, the Federal Aviation Administration and the Federal Communications Commission. Both of these agencies have 

developed regulations specific to the creation of orbital debris and I am eager to 

hear from them today. 

The FAA is responsible for the mitigation of debris as it pertains to launch and 

reentry of transportation vehicles. The National Space Transportation Policy released in November of 2013 directed the Department of Transportation to execute 

exclusive authority over these activities. While this was not a change in the status 

quo, Dr. George Nield, Associate Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation at the FAA testified before this Subcommittee that his agency was ready to 

start a larger discussion on an expansion of their authority to regulate on orbit activities. It is unclear what specific authority the FAA is asking for, and how it would 

anticipate working with other agencies to implement this authority. Regardless of 

the Administration’s plans, Congress will need to carefully weigh the costs and benefits of increased authority for the FAA against the possible overregulation of a still 

very young industry. 

In 2005, the FCC asserted jurisdiction to regulate orbital debris from commercial 

satellites which require their licenses for the use of spectrum. The Commission 

based this assertion largely on the broad mandate in the Communications Act of 

1934 to encourage ‘‘the larger and more effective use of radio in the public interest.’’ 

Although Congress has not provided authority for this type of regulation explicitly, 

there seems to be some ambiguity in the nature of their mandate to utilize the spectrum effective and efficiently. 

The efforts of federal agencies should be viewed within the context of separate 

international and private sector efforts. The United States has the most advanced 

space situational awareness system in the world, but tracking and cataloging the 

space environment more effectively may come from key partnerships. We cannot afford to ignore these important partners. 

As commercial human spaceflight increases in the coming decades, we must be 

sure that the nation can protect the health, welfare, and safety of our government 

astronauts and private spaceflight participants. It is also imperative that we secure 

key orbits to protect assets that are critical to our economy. Similarly, we cannot 

allow national security assets that are used to keep our country safe to be threatened by the proliferation of debris. 

The debris events caused by the Kosmos and Iridium collision in 2009 and China’s 

ASAT test in 2007 demonstrated that the space environment is vulnerable and ever 

changing. We must be vigilant to ensure our national interests are protected. 

I appreciate the appearance of our witnesses today and I look forward to hearing 

from them.### 

Chairman BROOKS. I now recognize the Ranking Member from 

Maryland, Ms. Edwards. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and welcome to everyone to today’s hearing. 

Mr. Chairman, while the accuracy of the events depicted in the 

fictional movie ‘‘Gravity’’ can be questioned, there is no doubt that 

it has made the public at least a little bit more aware of the danger 

of orbital debris, and that is probably a good thing. But in the real 

world, the nature of the danger was brought into stark focus by the 

aftermath of the 2007 anti-satellite test conducted by China. This 

incident is said to have created an estimated debris population of 

150,000 objects larger than one centimeter in size. The resulting increase in space debris has made the space environment more hazardous to military, civil, and commercial satellites and spacecraft 

for years to come. 
12 

So what are we doing to make space travel safe from orbital debris? Well, today a number of government agencies have a role in 

orbital debris mitigation. Three of those agencies are represented 

on the panel today. The DoD Strategic Command is responsible for 

tracking orbital debris. The FCC has jurisdiction for mitigating orbital debris from satellites, and FAA’s Office of Commercial Space 

Transportation regulates orbital debris from commercially licensed 

launch and re-entry vehicles. However, what isn’t quite clear is 

which agencies have, or could have, legitimate roles in space traffic 

management. That is, the authority to tell a space operator to move 

a spacecraft should the potential for collision from debris or another spacecraft require it. 

Other questions also come into mind. Should space traffic management be carried out by one or more existing agencies, or perhaps by a new organization? What needs to happen for the information on space debris and potential collisions to get to the people 

who need it, and when they need it? Is the current system for information transfer working, or does it need improvement? Because 

the causes and consequences of orbital debris are international in 

scope, does successful space traffic management require an international approach? And, lastly, what liability should the agency or 

agencies in charge of space traffic management assume if its direction to a satellite operator to move a spacecraft results in a collision? 

These are just a few of the questions that this Subcommittee will 

need to address if we aim to lay the groundwork for ensuring the 

safety of future space flight from orbital debris and other spacecraft. Mr. Chairman, these are complex issues, and so I hope today’s hearing will start to shed light not only on the important 

issue of orbital debris, but also on the approaches Congress might 

consider for potential space traffic management and regulatory regime. 

And with that, I yield back the balance of my time. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Edwards follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE

RANKING MEMBER DONNA F. EDWARDS

Good afternoon and welcome to today’s hearing.Mr. Chairman, while the accuracy 

of all of the events depicted in the movie ‘‘Gravity’’ can be questioned, there is no 

doubt it has made the public more aware of the danger of orbital debris. 

And that’s a good thing. 

The real world nature of the danger was brought into stark focus by the aftermath of the 2007 anti-satellite test conducted by China. This incident is said to have 

created an estimated debris population of 150,000 objects larger than 1 centimeter 

in size. The resulting increase in spacedebris has made the space environment more 

hazardous to military, civil, and commercial satellites and spacecraft for years to 

come. 

So what are we doing to make space travel safe from orbital debris? 

Today, a number of government agencies have a role in orbital debris mitigation. 

Three of those agencies are represented on the panel today: 

• DOD’s Strategic Command is responsible for tracking orbital debris. 

• FCC has jurisdiction for mitigating orbital debris from satellites. 

• And FAA’s Office of Commercial Space Transportation regulates orbital debris 

from commercially licensed launch and reentry vehicles. 

However, what isn’t quite clear is which agencies have or could have legitimate 

roles in space traffic management—that is, the authority to tell a space operator to 
13 

move a spacecraft should the potential for collision from debris or another spacecraft 

require it. 

And other questions come to mind: 

• Should space traffic management be carried out by one or more existing agencies or perhaps by a new organization? 

• What needs to happen for the information on space debris and potential collisions to get to the people who need it and when they need it? 

• Is the current system for information transfer working, or does it need improvement? 

• Because the causes and consequences of orbital debris are international in 

scope, does successful space traffic management require an international approach? 

• And what liability should the agency or agencies in charge of space traffic management assume if its direction to a satellite operator to move a spacecraft results in a collision? 

These are just a few of the questions this Subcommittee will need to address if 

we aim to lay the groundwork for ensuring the safety of future spaceflight from orbital debris and other spacecraft. 

Mr. Chairman, these are complex issues. 

I hope that our hearing today will start to shed light not only on the important 

issue of orbital debris but also on the approaches Congress might consider for a potential space traffic management and regulatory regime. 

Chairman BROOKS. Thank you, Ms. Edwards. 

I now recognize the Ranking Member of the full Committee, from 

Texas, Ms. Johnson, for a statement. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you very much, and good morning. I want 

to welcome our witnesses to this morning’s hearing, and I look forward to your testimony. I will be brief in my remarks, so that we 

will have enough time to hear from our experts. 

Orbital debris, or space junk, as it is sometimes called, is not 

science fiction. It is a reality, and something that has implications 

for the way we operate both our crewed spacecraft and our commercial and government satellites. It is a growing problem. Dealing 

with the increase in orbital debris will not be easy. As our witnesses will testify, the issues associated with this mitigation, and 

its potential removal from orbit, are complex. 

A number of agencies are involved, not all of whom are represented at today’s hearing. I am pleased that the bipartisan NASA 

reauthorization bill that we recently marked up now contains several provisions related to orbital debris. I believe that their inclusion is a useful start to addressing this complex set of issues. That 

said, I would caution against legislating further in this area until 

we have a better understanding of the issues involved. This morning’s hearing will provide a good starting point for our Members to 

learn about both the challenge presented by orbital debris, as well 

as some of the potential approaches to dealing with that challenge. 

I am pleased that this Subcommittee is holding this hearing. 

In closing, I again want to welcome our witnesses, and I yield 

back the balance of my time. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Johnson follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF FULL COMMITTEEE

RANKING MEMBER EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON

Thank you very much. I want to welcome our witnesses to this morning’s hearings, and I look forward to your testimony. I will be brief in my remarks so that 

we have enough time to hear from these experts before we have to go vote. 
14 

Orbital debris, or ‘‘space junk’’ as it is sometimes called—is not science fiction-it 

is a reality, and something that has implications for the way we operate both our 

crewed spacecraft and our commercial and government satellites. It is a growing 

problem. 

Dealing with the increase in orbital debris will not be easy. As our witnesses will 

testify, the issues associated with its mitigation and its potential removal from orbit 

are complex. A number of agencies are involved, not all of whom are represented 

at today’s hearing. 

I am pleased that the bipartisan NASA Authorization bill that we recently 

marked up now contains several provisions related to orbital debris. I believe that 

their inclusion is a useful start to addressing this complex set of issues. 

That said, I would caution against legislating further in this area until we have 

a better understanding of the issues involved. This morning’s hearing will provide 

a good starting point for Members to learn about both the challenge presented by 

orbital debris as well as some of the potential approaches to dealing with that challenge. I am pleased that the Subcommittee is holding it. 

In closing, I again want to welcome our witnesses, and I yield back the balance 

of my time. 

Chairman BROOKS. Thank you, Ms. Johnson. If there are Members who wish to submit additional opening statements, your statements will be added to the record at this point. 

At this time, I would like to introduce our witnesses. Our first 

witness is Lieutenant General John ‘‘Jay’’ Raymond, Commander, 

14th Air Force, Air Force Space Command, and Commander, Joint 

Functional Component Command for Space, U.S. Strategic Command. As the U.S. Air Force’s operational space component to U.S. 

STRATCOM, General Raymond leads more than 20,500 personnel, 

responsible for providing missile warning, space superiority, space 

situational awareness, satellite operation, space launch, and range 

operations. As Commander, JFCC Space, he directs all assigned 

and attached U.S. STRATCOM space forces, providing tailored, responsive, timely local and global space effects in support of national 

U.S. STRATCOM, and combatant commander objectives. 

Our second witness today is Mr. George Zamka, Deputy Associate Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation at the 

Federal Aviation Administration. Mr. Zamka came to the FAA directly from NASA, where he served as an astronaut, and most recently as a research and instructor pilot at the Johnson Space Center. He is a retired Colonel in the Marine Corps, and, as a pilot, 

has more than 5,000 flight hours in fighter, attack, test, research, 

and training aircraft. He was selected as an astronaut by NASA in 

June 1998. He has spent more than 692 hours in space. 

Our third witness is Mr. Robert Nelson, Chief Engineer, International Bureau, Federal Communications Commission. He is responsible for leading the Bureau’s work on technical issues, including satellite communications and cross-border technical issues. 

Prior to serving as the Bureau’s Chief Engineer, he was chief of the 

Bureau’s satellite division, and chief of the satellite division, engineering branch. Before joining the Commission, Mr. Nelson had 

various engineering positions in the private sector. 

Our fourth witness is Mr. P.J. Blount, Adjunct Professor of Air 

and Space Law at the University of Mississippi School of Law. He 

is also an adjunct professor in the Department of Political Science 

and Law at Montclair State University. Previously he served as research counsel for the National Center for Remote Sensing, Air and 

Space Law, at the University of Mississippi School of Law. He 

teaches space security law, international telecommunications law, 
15 

human rights law, and cyber law. He serves as the assistant executive secretary of the International Institute of Space Law. 

Our final witness is Mr. Brian Weeden, Technical Advisor at the 

Secure World Foundation. As technical advisor, Mr. Weeden conducts research on space debris, global space situational awareness, 

space traffic management, protection of space assets, and space 

governance. Prior to joining SWF, Mr. Weeden served on active 

duty as an officer in the United States Air Force, working in space 

and intercontinental ballistic missile operations. As part of U.S. 

Strategic Command’s Joint Space Operation Center, Mr. Weeden 

directed the orbital and analyst training program and developed 

tactics, techniques, and procedures for improving space situational 

awareness. 

As our witnesses should know, spoken testimony is limited to 

five minutes each, after which the Members of the Committee will 

have five minutes each to ask questions. I now recognize General 

Raymond for five minutes to present his testimony. 

TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL 

JOHN ‘‘JAY’’ RAYMOND, 

COMMANDER, 14TH AIR FORCE, AIR FORCE SPACE COMMAND; 

AND COMMANDER, JOINT FUNCTIONAL COMPONENT 

COMMAND FOR SPACE, U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND 

General RAYMOND. Chairman Brooks, Representative Edwards, 

Members of the Subcommittee, it is an honor to appear before you 

as the United States Strategic Commands Commander of the Joint 

Functional Component Command for Space. I greatly appreciate 

the opportunity to address the Committee, and I look forward to 

working with you to advance our Nation’s space capabilities. Before 

going further, though, I would ask—if I could be so bold to ask you 

for a favor, and just please pass along my condolences to Chairman 

Palazzo. 

It is my highest honor to represent the 3,300 soldiers, sailors, 

airmen, and marines and civilians that make up the Joint Functional Component Command for Space. These professionals, along 

with our exchange officers from Australia, Canada, and the United 

Kingdom ensure our Nation, our allies, and our joint war fighters 

have continued access to the space capabilities that enable the 

American way of life. 

JFCC Space is the world’s premier provider of space situational 

awareness data and products. Over the past few years, we have 

bolstered our commercial and international partnerships. We have 

implemented two-way sharing agreements, and we have worked 

collaboratively to refine our sharing processes. Additionally, we are 

on track to deliver a new command and control system called the 

Joint Space Operations Center Mission System, or JMS for short, 

and additional space situational awareness sensors, the combination of which will give us increased capability, and improve space 

situational awareness for the United States and our partners. 

Although maintaining awareness of the space domain is no small 

task, I am confident that the men and women of JFCC Space are 

prepared to meet the challenges with a spirit of dedicated innovation and devotion to duty, providing our Nation, our allies, and our 

joint war fighters assured access to the world’s premiere space ca-
16 

pabilities. I thank the Committee for your continued support as we 

strive to preserve the space domain, and enhance the space capabilities which are so vital to our nation. 

[The prepared statement of Lieutenant General Raymond follows:] 
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Chairman BROOKS. Thank you for your timely testimony. 

The Chair next recognizes Mr. Zamka for his testimony. 

TESTIMONY OF MR. GEORGE ZAMKA, 

DEPUTY ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR, 

OFFICE OF COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, 

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION 

Mr. ZAMKA. Chairman Books, Ranking Members Edwards, and 

distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for inviting 

me. This is my first opportunity to speak before the Subcommittee, 

and I am particularly fortunate to be able to speak about the FAA’s 

efforts regarding orbital debris mitigation. Aside from launch and 

reentry, orbital debris poses the highest risk to human spaceflight. 

During my two space missions, we flew upside down and backwards to protect our shuttle windows from orbital debris, and even 

doing that, we had cracks on our windows from various small debris strikes. 

With regard to orbital debris mitigation, it is helpful to review 

the operations to which the FAA’s authority applies, and where it 

does not. The FAA is the sole Federal Government agency with authority to license commercial space transportation activities. That 

authority is limited by the Commercial Space Launch Act to the 

launch and reentry of a vehicle. Under that authority, at the end 

of launch, the FAA requires the operator of a launch vehicle to safe 

their vehicle and ensure there is no post-separation contact with 

their deploying payload, in order to prevent orbital debris generation. The FAA also imposes launch window limitations based on a 

launch collision avoidance analysis with habitable spacecraft, such 

as the International Space Station. 

The FAA does not currently have authority to regulate on orbit. 

The only agencies with any regulatory authority in between launch 

and reentry events are the FCC, for communications satellites, and 

NOAA, for remote sensing satellites. The FAA interfaces with the 

FCC and NOAA regularly through payload reviews, and our primary partners in developing effective orbital debris rules are the 

Department of Defense and NASA. 

The NASA Orbital Debris Program Office has been a strong partner in the development of FAA rules, and is an invaluable resource. 

The DoD’s Joint Space Operation Center, or JSPOC, provides 

tracking information and debris detection data that we use to 

evaluate the effectiveness of launch debris mitigation efforts. Only 

the DoD has legislative authority and capability to share space situational awareness information, including notifications of impending collisions, and near collisions, to cooperating space operators, 

but it lacks any enforcement authority. 

An issue of oversight and enforcement authority emerges with 

the increasing number of commercial space transportation vehicles, 

which will operate differently from communications or Earth observing satellites. Rather than travel to and remain in one stable 

orbit, commercial transportation vehicles will move in between orbits and rendezvous with, attach to, and deliver cargo and people 

to other orbiting space vehicles. These orbital operations could 

cause collisions that would create orbital debris. 
32 

As Congress explores the issue of orbital debris and transportation hazards, the FAA urges the Subcommittee to consider at 

least two possible options, separately or in combination. First, it 

should consider whether a regulatory agency should authorize 

transportation on orbit by license. In that scenario, an agency with 

the proper expertise would, as part of a license evaluation, review 

the operator’s plans and debris mitigation measures in advance of 

operations. 

In a second scenario, that may require additional discussion, we 

would consider the benefits of an agency with enforcement authority providing notices of impending hazards and collisions. That 

agency would serve as a referee, advising of impending high risk 

events, and facilitating a safer orbital environment for all commercial and governmental operators. 

This Subcommittee is familiar with the orbital debris environment that consists of spent rocket bodies and debris traveling in 

different directions at speeds 5 to 10 times that of a bullet, and carrying tremendous energy into any collision. Because of minimal atmospheric drag in Earth orbit, objects in orbit tend to stay in orbit, 

at least for a very long time. For example, TIROS–2, which was 

launched over a half century ago, was recently added to the 60-day 

reentry prediction list. 

Collisions between orbiting objects can cause a lot of debris. We 

talked about the Iridium/Kosmos collision that created over 2,000 

of the 23,000 tracked objects on orbit. Orbital debris affects human 

spaceflight as well. The ISS has executed 18 debris avoidance maneuvers, and ISS crew Members have been required to shelter in 

their Soyuz life boats at times when hazardous debris was detected 

with too little warning to plan and carry out a debris avoidance 

maneuver. 

As space transportation capabilities and operations continue to 

advance, and as the risk posed by orbital debris increases, plans for 

mitigation become ever more critical. It is time to explore the orbital safety of commercial space transportation under the Commercial Space Launch Act. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared remarks, and I will 

be pleased to answer any questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Zamka follows:] 
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Chairman BROOKS. Thank you, Mr. Zamka. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Nelson for five minutes. 

TESTIMONY OF MR. ROBERT NELSON, CHIEF ENGINEER, 

INTERNATIONAL BUREAU, 

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION 

Mr. NELSON. Chairman Brooks, Ranking Member Edwards, and 

distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for inviting 

me to speak with you today about the FCC’s role in orbital debris 

mitigation, and how we fit into the overall efforts of the United 

States Government with respect to this issue. 

In 1973, the FCC licensed the first purely private U.S. communication satellites, and the first such satellite began operations in 

the geosynchronous orbit in 1974, slightly more than 40 years ago. 

Under the Communications Act, the FCC is charged with licensing 

radio communications. The Act recognized that radio transmissions 

do not stop at national boundaries, and as a result, the Act was 

drafted with the understanding that regulation needed to extend 

outside the territorial boundaries of the United States. At the same 

time, FCC licensing does not extend to U.S. Federal Government 

transmitters, which are authorized by NTIA in the Commerce Department. 

FCC licensing and regulation are governed by a core principle of 

the Communications Act, that issuing a license requires a finding 

that the public interest must be served. In that vein, the FCC, in 

2004, recognizing work done by NASA and other agencies, adopted 

debris mitigation regulations for the satellite services it licenses. 

The FCC concluded that debris mitigation rules would help preserve the United States’ continued affordable access to space, the 

continued provision of reliable U.S. space based services, as well as 

the contingent safety of persons and property in space, and on the 

surface of the Earth. 

FCC satellite licenses have always included, as one of the terms, 

of the assignment of an orbital location. Deviation from that license 

term is basis for an enforcement action. The FCC licensing process 

includes an opportunity for public comment, and this has, on occasion, resulted in objections to a proposed license modification, 

based on collision risk. In 2004 debris mitigation rules added a requirement to describe debris mitigation plans. Specifically, the FCC 

rules require license applicants to describe steps taken to avoid accidental explosions, to identify and avoid collision risks, and to 

safely dispose of a satellite at the end of its mission. The FCC rules 

also include a requirement to dispose of geostationary satellites, 

consistent with an International Telecommunications Union recommendation adopted in 2003, and a requirement that all satellites 

be left in a safe configuration. The satellite applicant’s plans are 

evaluated as a part of the licensing process. 

The FCC is one of three agencies that license U.S. commercial 

activities in space, the other two being the FAA for launch and reentry activities, and NOAA for remote sensing. Consistent with 

long established radio frequency management processes, the FCC 

is the licensing authority for radio frequency use by private launch 

vehicles and remote sensing satellites. However, the FCC has recognized the FAA’s statutory role under the Commercial Space 
43 

Launch Act, and it recently reiterated that it would not apply its 

debris mitigation rules to commercial space transportation activities that are subject to FAA regulation. The FCC also recognized 

NOAA’s statutory role concerning post-mission disposal of the remote sensing satellites it licenses. 

Although the FCC licensing process is independent from NOAA 

and FAA processes, the FCC consults with these agencies as needed. Consultation is often related to status of particular cases and 

the progress of licensing activities. Further, FCC’s regulations and 

licensing make use of scientific and technical work done by NASA. 

The FCC does not operate any orbital debris tracking equipment, 

such as radar and telescopes. And, like much of commercial satellite industry, the FCC’s main sources of satellite tracking data 

are DoD’s JSPOC, as well as the satellite operators themselves, derived from their radio links with their satellites. 

The efforts to improve space situational awareness of the JSPOC 

and commercial operators, through such mechanisms as the Space 

Data Association, are an important element to an overall debris 

mitigation strategy. To be clear, data sharing between JSPOC and 

commercial operators is on a spacecraft operator to spacecraft operator basis. The FCC is not an intermediary in this process. 

In conclusion, I thank the Committee for this opportunity to describe the FCC’s rules concerning orbital debris mitigation, the 

sources of the FCC’s authority on these rules, and the FCC’s interaction with other Federal Government agencies concerning this important topic. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Nelson follows:] 
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Chairman BROOKS. Thank you, Mr. Nelson. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Blount for five minutes. 

TESTIMONY OF MR. P.J. BLOUNT, ADJUNCT PROFESSOR, 

AIR AND SPACE LAW, 

UNIVERSITY OF MISSISSIPPI SCHOOL OF LAW 

Mr. BLOUNT. Chairman Brooks, Ranking Member Edwards, distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss this important topic. 

Space traffic management is a complex issue, and I will try to 

briefly summarize my written statement. 

Space traffic management as a concept contains two different elements. There—these are the technical capabilities needed to control 

space traffic, and the legal regime which governs appropriate behavior. I will primarily be addressing the legal aspects of space 

traffic management, and will do so in the context of the international obligations of the United States. 

International space law encompasses a variety of principles that 

set the bounds of appropriate state conduct in outer space. These 

principles are broad in scope, and largely undefined. The lack of 

definition means that the United States is in a unique position to 

influence the content of these norms to help create a safe and secure space environment. International space law grants all states 

the right of free access to outer space. Additionally, states shall, 

under Article 9 of the Outer Space Treaty, engage in space activities with due regard to the corresponding interests of other states, 

and states are given a right and an obligation to seek consultations 

when there may be harmful interference between space activities. 

This treaty provision emphasizes international cooperation and coordination in space activities. Article 9 also creates an obligation to 

not harmfully contaminate the space environment. 

Under Article 6 of the same treaty, states are internationally responsible for the activities of non-governmental actors, and are required to authorize and continually supervise these activities. This 

is an extraordinary provision in international law which generally 

does not hold states responsible for the activities of their non-governmental actors. This provision gives states an affirmative obligation to oversee non-governmental actors to ensure that they behave 

responsibly in space. 

As I have already mentioned, these provisions are substantially 

undefined. They require states to engage in space activities in such 

a manner as to preserve space for use and exploration by all for 

peaceful purposes. However, these provisions leave the contours of 

what constitutes responsible behavior up to states, who have traditionally cooperated and coordinated on an ad hoc basis. Notably, 

these provisions have failed to set meaningful limits on the creation of orbital debris. 

The United States has traditionally been a leader in the development of international space law, and space traffic management 

should be no different. When provisions of treaties are unclear, 

state practice in regards to those provisions often help to define the 

content of the—the content and meaning of those provisions. For 

example, following the United States lead, Article 6—the Article 6 
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obligation to authorize and supervise has been implemented by 

states as licensing regimes. 

The United States is in a unique position in the development of 

domestic space traffic management regime to influence the meaning of international norms and the international frameworks developed to coordinate space traffic management among states. To this 

end, in my written testimony, I have identified three key principles 

that should be taken into account when developing a domestic 

space traffic management system. 

First, mechanisms providing for data transparency and access 

are critical to ensuring proper management of space traffic. It is essential to controlling domestic operations, as well as coordinating 

international cooperation. 

Second, a space traffic management system, whether organized 

in one agency or many, needs to ensure that the—that a government agency has unambiguous jurisdiction during all phases of 

space operations. This provides regulatory predictability, which can 

help foster the commercial space industry, and it also ensures that 

the United States complies with its obligation to continually supervise non-governmental actors. 

Finally, whatever government entity or entities is vested with 

the jurisdiction to manage space traffic, that agency needs also to 

vested with technical competence to ensure that it can properly 

oversee these operations. Jurisdiction to management operations 

will be meaningless without the technical capabilities to do so. 

The maintenance of a safe and secure space environment is in 

the national interest of the United States. Civil, commercial, and 

military operations are all dependent on a space environment free 

of interference from other actors. To this end, the United States 

should be a leader in developing a space traffic management system that can foster such an environment, both domestically and 

internationally. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. Thank you again for 

the opportunity. I am happy to answer any questions you may 

have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Blount follows:] 
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Chairman BROOKS. Thank you, Mr. Blount. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Weeden for five minutes. 

TESTIMONY OF MR. BRIAN WEEDEN, 

TECHNICAL ADVISOR, 

SECURE WORLD FOUNDATION 

Mr. WEEDEN. Thank you, Chairman Brooks, Ranking Member 

Edwards, distinguished Members of the Subcommittee. Secure 

World Foundation is dedicated to the long term sustainability of 

the space environment so that all of humanity can continue to use 

space for benefits here on Earth. The growth in space debris, and 

increasing congestion of critical regions of Earth orbit, present significant challenges to space sustainability, and addressing those 

challenges is a key part of our work. 

Regarding the threat that space debris poses, there are three categories of complementary activities that can help address that challenge. The first is space debris mitigation, limiting the creation of 

new debris from human activities in space. The second is active debris removal, also known as remediation, which aims to remove 

some of the existing pieces of debris to help prevent future growth 

in the debris population, or to reduce the collision risk to satellites 

in highly congested regions. The third activity is space traffic management, which I defined in my testimony as minimizing the negative impact of space debris on space activities. All three of these activities are enabled by a fourth, space situation awareness, broadly 

defined as characterized in a space environment, and its impact on 

activities in space. 

The U.S. government’s strong efforts on space debris mitigation 

over the last decade and a half are a good start, but need to be part 

of a more comprehensive approach. My written testimony outlines 

three major steps that can be taken in this direction. The first is 

to find ways to harmonize the implementation of debris mitigation 

guidelines across the various regulatory agencies that currently 

have authority. Doing so can result in a more efficient and effective 

process, with benefits to commercial industry and innovation. 

Second, this Subcommittee can call on the executive branch to 

articulate a comprehensive strategy for dealing with existing space 

debris, which may potentially include active removal. 

Third, this Subcommittee can work with the executive branch, 

and other Committees with jurisdiction, to re-examine the rules 

and responsibilities for space situation awareness and space traffic 

management. 

The key question facing this government moving forward is 

whether or not the Department of Defense should continue to be 

the single Federal agency responsible for all space situation awareness activities, and providing operational space traffic management 

for the world. I believe the answer is no. While space surveillance 

began as a national security function, it has evolved into more than 

just national security. It plays a fundamental role in the breadth 

of space activities being conducted by not only the military, but 

also civil government agencies, and the private sector. 

Thus, I believe it is time for the U.S. government to shift responsibility for part of the SSA mission that directly supports safety of 

space flight to a Federal entity other than the DoD. The shift will 
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allow this new entity to focus on building relationships with commercial and foreign actors, take better advantage of private sector 

innovation, and establish trusted services with all space actors. 

The DoD would certainly retain responsibility for, and a focus on, 

the national security aspects. 

Making this challenge is not—making this change is not without 

considerable challenges. First and foremost is determining which 

Federal department or agency should be assigned this new role. 

One option is to assign it to an agency that already has existing 

authority for regulating and licensing private sector space activities. Another option to assign it to a Federal agency that already 

has significant expertise in space operations and space debris. A 

third option would be to assign it to a new Federal agency with 

both regulatory powers and operational responsibility. Which of 

these options is best depends upon the long term priorities and 

goals for the U.S. government, and the role it wants to play in global space activities. 

This proposed shift in responsibility, I believe, puts the U.S. government in a better position to harness the private sector innovation currently ongoing, and improve its own capabilities and security in orbit. It is very similar to the DoD’s current approach for 

both satellite communications and space-based remote sensing. In 

both of these areas, the government focuses its efforts on exclusive 

niche capabilities the private sector cannot provide. The end result 

has been an increased capability for the military, lower cost to the 

taxpayer, and a booming commercial industry. 

It has become almost trite to point out that the space world has 

changed, but in the context of this hearing, it is worth making the 

point again. The continuing expansion and the number of space actors, the types of space activities, has created a complex space environment. Technological diffusion has commoditized space capabilities, fueled a surge of private sector innovation, and created the 

possibility for many new uses of space for benefits here on Earth. 

It is vitally important for the U.S. government to evolve its approach to stay abreast of this ongoing change and continue to 

maintain its leadership role in supporting the safety of space activities, and encouraging innovation. 

Thank you for your time, and I will be happy to answer any 

questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Weeden follows:] 
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Chairman BROOKS. Thank you, Mr. Weeden, and I thank the witnesses for their testimony. As an aside, it looks like we are going 

to have our second set of votes somewhere around 11:30, roughly 

40, 45 minutes from now. Hopefully we will be able to complete 

these proceedings before those House floor votes are called. 

Reminding Members that Committee rules limit questioning to 

five minutes, the Chair will, at this point, open the round of questions. The Chair recognizes himself for five minutes. 

As a part of my five minutes, and recognizing the prerogative 

that the Chair has, I would like to, at this point, recognize the Falcon Rocket Team from Huntsville, Alabama. If you would please 

stand? We have got Coach Bobby Murphy here with us, Members 

John Aslan, Jack Aslan, Victor Murphy, Dave Green, Matt Kellogg, 

and Jorge Estrada. The competition is tomorrow. They are representing the State of Alabama. And I want to encourage you all 

to do what you can to represent our community, inasmuch as we 

often boast that we are the birthplace of America’s human space 

flight program. And thank you for being here for this hearing 

today. This challenge that we are facing today may be one that we 

need you all to solve tomorrow. 

With that having been said, let me proceed with my—well, with 

that having been said, let me proceed with my first question. Dr. 

Henry Hertzfeld of the George Washington University recently testified before the Committee that FAA should ‘‘clearly be defined, 

and preferably limited to, those issues directly related to launching 

and re-entry.’’ His comments appear to be somewhat inconsistent 

with the request that the FAA is making here today. Can each of 

you comment on Dr. Hertzfeld’s statement concerning the FAA’s 

potential role in this space debris matter? Go ahead, at your leisure. Whoever wants to poke the button first. 

Mr. ZAMKA. Mr. Chairman, it seems like I might be the liable 

first guy. The FAA’s current authority ends at the end of launch. 

That is the last time an operator has contact with their launch vehicle. The FAAs current authority begins at the beginning of reentry. That is when the safety checks begin. So, that is our current 

authority. What we have experience with is talking to the operators, and dealing with orbital debris mitigation. We are also on-site 

as the operators are conducting their operations, as part of our inspection and enforcement function. So, we have existing experience 

and credibility with the launch operators. 

What I will refer you to in my testimony that is new, and that 

would be worth considering, are the new classes of vehicles that 

will operate on orbit. These are vehicles taking personnel, cargo, 

and servicing up to human space stations, and also servicing satellites. 

General RAYMOND. I would just add that, consistent with what 

my panelist partner just said, we work very closely with the FAA 

on the licensing of launch vehicles. In commercial space launches 

that we conduct off of our ranges, we have FAA representation 

there with us as we go. I would just add that we are—consistent 

with the national space policy, we think it is important that you 

look at—that this hearing happened, and that you look at different 

agencies to be able to take on the lead Federal agency role. We are 

not going to pick one or the other, but I think it is important that 
91 

you explore that, and we are interested in exploring that going forward. 

Mr. NELSON. Well, the FCC hasn’t ruled in—on any of these— 

on this issue. It is probably important to point out FAA has had 

a role in the past, for instance, with air transport and human, and 

you know, human transport issues. And the fact that they are involved directly with a launch vehicle situation, carrying that 

through may be an appropriate situation, in regard to transport or, 

you know, further launch operations. 

Mr. BLOUNT. I actually do not answer this question. My testimony is to who should have this authority. I think that there are 

ways that we can envision either a single agency, or fragmented 

agency authority, were we have different agencies handling different functions. However, I do think that General Raymond’s point 

about having a lead Federal agency is very important. An agency 

that can coordinate this information, make sure that all the involved parties and stakeholders are coordinated, is very important. 

And I think that currently FAA looks like the most appropriate for 

that, but I don’t think that it is necessary that it goes there. 

Mr. WEEDEN. I would add that one of the key questions here is 

what kinds of powers are we talking about, and would that extend 

to telling satellite operators what to do? I mean, that is a very complicated question, because a lot of these scenarios, when you are 

getting into potential close approaching space objects, we don’t 

know a yes or no answer whether or not two things will collide, except in very, very specific cases, like, for example, a planned rendezvous between two satellites. In most other cases, it comes down 

to statistics and probability, and so you are having to make a judgment call based upon what is your level of risk. And I think the 

hesitancy by Dr. Hertzfeld is to give a government agency the 

power to somehow tell a private operator what that level of risk 

should be, and what they should do with it. 

Now, I think, on the other side, the situations where that would 

probably need to be exercised are not as numerous as many people 

might think. Most close approaches are between either two pieces 

of debris that no one controls, or a satellite under control and a 

piece of debris. The only situations where maybe that might come 

into play of mandatory control would be if, perhaps, human safety 

was in question. 

Chairman BROOKS. Thank you. At this point, the Chair recognizes the Ranking Member, Ms. Edwards. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the 

witnesses. I want to follow up on this, because, Mr. Zamka, in your 

prepared statement, you are urging us to look at two issues. One 

is whether a regulatory agency should authorize transportation on 

orbit by license, and then the second is the benefit of an agency 

with enforcement authority providing notices regarding impending 

hazards and collisions. 

And I guess—I mean, from my standpoint, I am really not prepared to legislate yet, because I feel like there is still a lot we need 

to know. So I wonder if you might comment about what parties 

would need to be at a table, and in what venue, to begin to explore 

what Congress needs to do in this area, and might that be a better 
92 

approach than going right to identifying an agency that would have 

authority—sweeping authority that we don’t even know about yet? 

Mr. ZAMKA. Yes, ma’am. Thank you for the question. We really 

just want to begin the exploration as to what the solution might 

be. A very important part of that is having the right players at the 

table. So industry, who has to deal with the risk and the expense, 

for instance, of deciding to do a debris maneuver to avoid a collision, is certainly an important player. There are a lot of working 

solutions out there amongst commercial operators, and there are 

numerous ways of dealing with it, shy of regulation, shy of enforcement. We don’t want to get ahead of any particular solutions that 

are out there. But, I would certainly say that industry, and the 

agencies that are involved with on-orbit authority now, would certainly be good players. 

Ms. EDWARDS. And before I go to Mr. Nelson, I will—General 

Raymond, I wonder if you could comment about the role that you 

would see at a future environment with a whole bunch of other actors at play, both domestically and internationally. What, then, is 

the role of the Department of Defense in this? 

General RAYMOND. Well, clearly, ma’am, the Department of Defense is focused on national security, and space situational awareness is absolutely foundational to everything that we do in space 

for a national security purpose. So, when you have these discussions, one of the things that I think we need to really be careful 

about as we go forward is making sure that we have the ability to 

do what we need to do to protect our nation, and protect our nation’s satellites. 

Ms. EDWARDS. All right. And Mr. Nelson? 

Mr. NELSON. Yeah, I—following up on what I said earlier, and 

Mr. Zamka’s comment, I would suggest, at least from the point of 

view of an orbital maneuver situation, or enforcing an orbital maneuver to take place, that, at least from the point of view of the 

folks that we work with, it is in their best interest to move, and 

that is how they would take a look at it. If they were aware that 

there was—a potential collision was coming along, I am sure that 

they would end up moving that satellite in order to take care of 

that. It is just inherently in their best interest, even from—especially from a financial point of view. 

So, from having to have somebody that would have to go through 

and actually force them, and say—to do that, it is probably an unlikely situation to carry through. And, further, as you point out, the 

international aspects of this, we only have a certain percentage of 

the satellites that are on orbit. And the issue of telling some other 

foreign country’s satellite to have to move is—it raises its own 

issues. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Thank you. And, Professor Blount, I wonder if you 

could talk to me about the liability that the agencies either should 

have or do have who should be in charge of space traffic management, and what liability they should assume when it is a direction 

to a satellite operator to move a spacecraft, or its failure to provide 

a timely alert that results in a collision, or debris? 

Mr. BLOUNT. It—can I clarify that question, that you are asking 

about the liability of the Federal agency to the space operator? 
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Ms. EDWARDS. The liability of that the agency has or should 

have. 

Mr. BLOUNT. I think that liability is a very interesting question, 

because these are, obviously, very expensive pieces of equipment 

that are moving at very fast speeds, and can cause a lot of damage. 

And there is—when you define a Federal agency that is going to 

be in charge, they take on a responsibility. And part of these points 

that I have—point out that we should have in the legislation is this 

idea of technological capability. 

And so, right now, that capability is vested with the DoD, and 

if we name a Federal agency, let us say the FAA or the FCC, then 

there becomes a question of where are they getting their data? Are 

they going to have to rely on DoD to get their data, and then are 

they going to do this collision analysis, or are they going to have 

to rely on DoD to do the collision analysis, or are they going to 

have to rely on SDA to do the collision analysis? And so, until the 

problems of where data comes from, and how it is going to be managed by that agency, come through, then it is going to be very difficult to determine who is going to be liable for these actions. 

I will just quickly add that, at the international level, the state 

is liable, and so the way that we manage our domestic assets is 

going to be very important, the way that we interact internationally, because we could be on the hook for something that a commercial actor does. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Well, and it does seem to me—and, Mr. Chairman, I will conclude. It does seem to me that there is a fair amount 

of risk that is inherent when you can’t entirely be accurate if it 

comes to predicting how you move a satellite, or how you move a 

spacecraft. So, you know, these liability issues I think we are going 

to have to explore if we are going to go shoving responsibility to 

some other lead agency. 

And with that I yield. I mean, I think, Mr. Chairman, we have 

a lot more questions to ask and answer before we come to a point 

where we need to legislate in this area. Thank you. 

Chairman BROOKS. Thank you. The Chair now recognizes Mr. 

Bucshon of Indiana. 

Mr. BUCSHON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to focus on 

what do we do with the debris that is already there? And, I mean, 

we are talking mostly about regulating—a regulatory climate right 

now, but I am interested in—anyone can answer this. What is happening with R&D about how to either capture or deflect the orbit 

of existing space debris? Because I think—it seems to me that 50 

years from now, we may not even be able to fly in space if we keep 

going the way we are at all, because we won’t be able to get out 

of the way of stuff flying around the Earth. 

So is there anything going on on? Obviously, when you capture 

this stuff, you have to be going at similar speeds, or else it is just 

going to destroy whatever you try to capture it with. Mr. Zamka, 

maybe you could start? 

Mr. ZAMKA. Yes, sir. It is a difficult problem because of the high 

speeds involved, and, essentially, you would have to rendezvous 

with that particular piece of debris in order to capture it, and then 

bring it down. As part of our Center of Excellence function—thanks 

very much for supporting that—we have six tasks in work to begin 
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to characterize that debris, be able to better predict where it is 

going to be, and then identify potential efforts at remediation. 

There are some things that are out there that could increase the 

drag, or use a magnetic field to begin to bring those pieces down 

sooner, but it is a difficult problem. 

Probably the most important thing relative to today is that any 

plan to remediate debris on orbit is dependent on not creating more 

debris now. As we have seen, any single accident can create a tremendous amount of debris. 

Mr. BUCSHON. Yeah, and—like you pointed out, deflecting the 

orbit, either magnetically or physically, is a possibility, I guess. 

And some of the—I mean, it seems like we could probably come up 

to solve the problem for the bigger stuff, but all the little stuff, you 

know, like the stuff that hit the space shuttle, it is going to be really, really hard to get that stuff out of the orbit, it seems like. 

Mr. ZAMKA. Yes, sir. One of the challenges we have is that 

human spaceflight, our telecommunications satellites, and a lot of 

our Earth observing satellites are all in the same low Earth orbit 

regime, which is where a lot of the debris is, so that is where we 

have to work. 

Mr. BUCSHON. Yeah. Mr. Weeden, you had a comment? 

Mr. WEEDEN. Yes. There is quite a bit of work going on on this 

within the scientific and technical community, both on studying the 

problem, and on looking at some technology that is still in the early 

level, but is—early stages, but with the promising ones that might 

need to be adapted down the road. NASA works with a number of 

other space agencies to do studies on this issue, and they have 

done a lot of modeling. One of the big questions the technical community is grappling with is, do we go after the big things, or the 

little things? Because it generally is different types of technology. 

You are not going to have one solution that does both. And we 

probably—and doing both means twice as much money, probably. 

And the difference is if the big debris is the source of new debris 

in the future. So, removing them, you are kind of controlling long 

term growth. But the small debris is the current threat to satellites, so removing that is a short term lowering of risk. And that 

is kind of a choice between which strategy is more important. And 

that debate is going on right now within the scientific community. 

Mr. BUCSHON. Okay. As far as mitigation in the future, and this 

would apply probably only to U.S. players, because we can’t control 

the international community, but is there any talk about penalizing financially people that generate space junk? Anyone want to 

talk about that? I mean, it seems to me, if you are a private entity, 

or you are—and you put something up into space, and it generates 

a bunch of problems—— 

Mr. WEEDEN. Um-hum. 

Mr. BUCSHON. —you know, who—what can we do about that? Is 

there a way to financially address that? 

Mr. WEEDEN. There have been discussions and proposals, mostly 

in academic journals in the past, of some sort of a tax or something 

on people that generate debris. The recurring problem is, who has 

authority to put that in place? As you mentioned, it is an international environment. There are more than 60 countries that are 
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now launching satellites and space objects, and each of them has 

authority over their own private sector activities. 

Mr. BUCSHON. Yeah, let me just point out, I mean, I am not promoting new taxation—— 

Mr. WEEDEN. Yeah. 

Mr. BUCSHON. —like if you fly something into space, you get 

taxed ahead of time. However, let me just point out that the reality 

is if there is not some incentive not to do something, I wouldn’t call 

it a tax, I would call it penalty. If you do—say you send something 

up, it blows up, and generates 1,000 pieces of space junk, you 

know, if you send something up, nothing happens, it comes down, 

fine. But if, you know, there has to be some incentive for people 

not to generate this stuff. 

Mr. WEEDEN. I would say, there is an added complication that, 

in the areas where debris is the worst, mainly low Earth orbit, between about 600 to 800 kilometers, it is mostly government satellites. There is not a lot at the—at the moment, there is not a lot 

of private actor—private sector activity there. 

Mr. BUCSHON. But there will be. 

Mr. WEEDEN. There will be in the future, but at the moment 

there is not a lot there. So the question is, how do you incentivize 

governments? 

Mr. BUCSHON. Yeah. Good luck. I yield back. 

Chairman BROOKS. Thank you, Mr. Bucshon. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Schweikert of Arizona. 

Mr. SCHWEIKERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is sometimes terrifying what makes us laugh, isn’t it? It is—first question, and I 

just want to make sure I sort of understand some of the hierarchy 

and the mechanics. First off, a U.S., but private commercial satellite, DirecTV, or satellite television, or something of that nature, 

it is put up in space. Does it carry insurance? Mr. Nelson? 

Mr. NELSON. Yes. Most companies do have insurance on their 

satellites. Larger ones may actually self-insure, so they will put up 

money based on—— 

Mr. SCHWEIKERT. But whether they, you know, put up the fund, 

or—but somehow there is an insurance product there? 

Mr. NELSON. Yes. 

Mr. SCHWEIKERT. How about if I am the French, or East Indian, 

or, you know, private telecommunication, or private cable, you 

know, or television provider? Do they carry insurance? Do they 

have, you know, a national indemnity? And considering they are 

often, you know—— 

Mr. NELSON. It, you know, different countries have different 

rules concerning how they go about—as an example, what I am 

aware of is the United Kingdom. For any of the folks that might 

launch under their flag, they have a Space Act, and some of the 

requirements, for instance, is indemnification of the crown, so to 

speak. So they—it depends on the country, and what the rules are 

associated with their activity. 

Mr. SCHWEIKERT. And Mr. Chairman, and to our witnesses, 

where I am trying to head is, these are very expensive objects, 

both, you know, the—those from the private, and those that are 

governmental, have great, great value. We already know that there 

is sort of an insurance regime of some mix. It may not be, you 
96 

know, universal in design. So we know we have incentives because 

of the value. We know there is some structure out there. So what 

happens today? How do they communicate today? 

General, let us say we have—you see something heading towards 

my DirecTV satellite. Do you communicate with them? 

General RAYMOND. Congressman, thanks for the question. Absolutely. We are very interested in maintaining a safe space domain. 

So the—my organization, and specifically the command center that 

I have, the Joint Space Operation Center, located at Vandenberg 

Air Force Base, tracks the 23,000 objects that you have heard 

about. And of those objects, we—not only do we track them, but we 

detect for potential conjunctions. 

Mr. SCHWEIKERT. But what I am after right now, because you— 

that was part of your testimony, and that was very helpful, is sort 

of the communication regime right now. So it is the satellite that 

is providing television for Australia—— 

General RAYMOND. Right. 

Mr. SCHWEIKERT. —do you communicate with them? 

General RAYMOND. We do. So if—is—where I was going, if we detect a potential conjunction on any active satellite that is up in 

space, any country, if we detect a conjunction, we will make an 

emergency notification, because it is in all of our best interests not 

to have a—— 

Mr. SCHWEIKERT. Now, does it go—is it bilateral? Does it come 

the other direction, where the private tracking firm that is managing, you know, do they communicate back to you? 

General RAYMOND. Yes, sir. We have two-way sharing agreements with 41 different companies. We have it with five different 

nations. There is two-way sharing going back and forth. Largely, 

though, the tracking capabilities that are out there are our tracking capabilities, and largely we are the ones that are doing this for 

the world. 

Mr. SCHWEIKERT. And do any of those private firms ever provide 

their statistics saying, hey, we actually believe you missed our orbit 

by a few yards, a few this, few degrees? We have some wobble, you 

know, we have some elliptical? What—I mean, do they share that 

sort of data back and forth? 

General RAYMOND. For those that we have agreements with, they 

provide owner—what we call owner-operator—the address in space, 

if you will. We track it with a radar. They have the exact address 

of theirs, and we—they do provide that back and forth. The challenge that we have today is that our command and control system 

that we have doesn’t allow us to automatically ingest that. We are 

putting a new command system in place as we speak called the 

Joint Space Commission Operation Center System that will allow 

that automated—automatic ingestion of owner-operator data. 

Mr. SCHWEIKERT. Okay. Mr. Chairman, as my buddy here—and 

we were talking sort of one-off a moment ago, as we see the commercialization of space, we know we have the incentives. We have 

very valuable objects up there. You know, we know we have the 

need. We know we have sort of a communication structure, and we 

also know it is ultimately going to be international. Is there a way 

where we could ever get these parties where they have sort of an 

automated information exchange back and forth, and others are 
97 

also carrying the cost of this? So, thank you, Mr. Chairman, yield 

back. 

Chairman BROOKS. Thank you, Mr. Schweikert. The Chair next 

recognizes Mr. Hall, the former Chair of the Science, Space, and 

Technology Committee. 

Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, I thank you. I, of course, thank you for 

holding this hearing. I guess, General Raymond, some time ago, 

maybe 15 years ago, we had a hearing on astronauts—on asteroids, 

and, to our surprise, we found out one had just passed in what they 

said was 15 minutes of the United States. Nobody knew about it, 

and no one gave us any warning about it, or spoke about it. And 

I invited people from France, England, Japan, and others. Japan 

is the only one that answered, because it is a world problem, not 

just the U.S., but got very little hope from most of the—very few 

of them showed. 

We had some good hearings on that, and some things that would 

scare you to death. I guess give us some kind of a sense of the process that goes in when you want to protect our national security and 

our commercial assets could be threatened by orbital debris, and 

what other degree there is? Or how much warning did NASA have 

to avoid their threats that they have had? I don’t think they have 

had one—been instances where they have. Just give us a general 

answer to my question. If it is too general, I will—— 

General RAYMOND. Sir, we track, as we said, every object. We do 

that for NASA as well. We actually have NASA operators that sit 

on our JSPOC floor with us. We take very seriously the protection 

of the International Space Station. You heard from a previous panelist that the space station had moved 16 times. In fact, just last 

month, we recommended to NASA that they move it twice. 

There is a layered approach to doing this. We detect where the 

debris is, and then, as it gets into a certain area around the space 

station, we then put more energy on that debris, refine the orbital 

accuracy of that—of our position estimate of that debris, and then 

we make recommendations with the folks sitting on the floor. So 

it is something that we take very seriously, and there is a set process with NASA operators. We also do that for all of our DoD satellites. And, again, as I mentioned earlier, for any conjunction that 

we see is going to hit on an emergency basis, we notify the world. 

Mr. HALL. I know you must have processes for the government 

operators, to warn them about any possible collision, but what type 

do you—work do you have with the private operators? How do they 

know this, and how do you contact them? Or how do they contact 

you, or how do they watch you and listen for you? 

General RAYMOND. Sir, we have a tracking network of about 21 

different centers around the globe that track what I will call element sensor addresses in space of objects, debris, or satellites. We 

post that on a website, www.spacetrack.org. Anybody can get on 

there, and all of the addresses, or a large portion of the things that 

are in space, we put out there publically for everybody to have. 

Mr. HALL. Now, the private operator just is—operation—government operators to know of your work? 

General RAYMOND. They have that data. For those that enter 

into agreements with us, we actually go beyond that, and we pro-
98 

vide some services to them in addition to that data. And then, 

again, on an emergency basis, even for those that don’t have—— 

Mr. HALL. How many of them know that they need to have that 

agreement with you? 

General RAYMOND. They all know, and we have got 41 different 

companies now that have it, and we have got five different nations 

that we have signed agreements with, and there are five or six 

more in the hopper right now going through the negotiations of 

that as we speak. 

Mr. HALL. I think your work is very, very important, and I thank 

you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BROOKS. Thank you, Mr. Hall. The Chair next recognizes Mr. Rohrabacher of California. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize, I had 

another hearing, a markup from another Committee, and I will be 

reading your testimony. And I think this issue is vitally important 

for the future of not only the United States, but of all of humankind. The debris issue is not a secondary issue. Debris is something 

that will limit humankind’s ability to use space for our benefit, and 

to uplift mankind, humankind. This is—and we are getting to a 

point of saturation now where either we deal with it, or we will 

suffer the consequences of this limited—and this limit on the benefits that we can utilize space for. 

One need only take a look at how we rely on space for weather, 

for communications, you name it. We have got—we have brought 

down the cost of telephone calls so dramatically with the use of 

space. We have agriculture that now depends on space, and GPS. 

We have whole economies based on space that are now in jeopardy 

because we are not cleaning up our trash. And we need to make 

sure that we are just not—track it. It is like—tracking trash in 

space is not the answer. What the answer is, eliminating the trash 

from space. 

And this shouldn’t be just something the American taxpayer 

needs to bear the burden of. We need to make sure that we have 

an initiative. We should—hopefully this hearing will provide step 

number one towards creating an international initiative to clear 

space debris from orbital space. And I would imagine that our 

friends in the EU, and Russia, and perhaps—I can’t speak for 

China, considering the fact that they have contributed so much to 

this problem as of late. But we should make this an international 

effort, and the steps should be made to get this thing moving. Otherwise, we are putting all of these wonderful assets that we have 

invested in, and that are currently helping improve the condition 

of humankind, we are putting them at risk. 

Let me note we—the Chairman, our Chairman of the full Committee, just mentioned that—we talked about near Earth objects, 

and—when he was Chairman, and I think that we probably have 

something where we are tracking them a little bit more than what 

we were then, but I don’t think that we have done anything that— 

right now that we could count on to say, if we see a near Earth 

object that is going to hit the Earth and destroy large numbers of 

people, whether or not we have a system in place that we could 

then activate to deflect that near Earth object. I don’t believe that 

system is in place. 
99 

Well, we have got two major threats there, things we should be 

able to work on with our allies, and friends throughout the world, 

in order to achieve this as a human goal, a goal for all of humankind, as I say. So thank you very much for your testimony, I will 

be reading it. I am sorry that I missed the—and I would be happy 

to yield to my colleague from Maryland. Is that—will you—did you 

want some time? I would be happy to yield. 

Chairman BROOKS. Does the gentleman from California have any 

more questions? 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I am done. 

Chairman BROOKS. All right. Thank you. The Chair, at this 

point, subject to the call for votes on the House floor, is going to 

entertain a second round of questions, and I am going to defer my 

second round at this point, and recognize the Ranking Member 

from Maryland, Ms. Edwards. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And the 

reason I wanted Mr. Rohrabacher to stay is because, in Mr. 

Weeden’s testimony, he had a recommendation for the executive 

branch to clarify its strategy for assessing the orbital debris removal, and it really struck a chord because in our bipartisan Committee passed bill just a couple of weeks ago, we actually included 

a provision in there that would require NASA, in collaboration with 

other relevant Federal agencies, to review the concepts and technological options for removing orbital debris from low Earth orbit. 

So, I mean, getting to this question of not just looking at it and 

knowing where it is, all very important, but what’s going to be our 

strategy for removing it? Because we actually need to free up some 

of that space too for all the additional activity that is going on. And 

so I wonder if any of you have any views, Mr. Weeden, starting 

with you, about what an effective approach NASA might take to 

address this particular provision, assuming that it does become 

law? 

Mr. WEEDEN. That is a very interesting—very challenging question, because, at the moment, there is no single technology that 

seems to be the answer. There are a couple of different technologies 

that have some promise. And so I think a first step would probably 

be to figure out what those technologies are, and then look for, how 

are we going to mature those technologies? Because, at the moment, they are—they exist. We generally know, theoretically, they 

are probably going to work, but most of them have not been demonstrated in an operational manner. 

So it will be identifying what the most promising technologies 

are, and then some sort of a strategy to mature them, do risk reduction, and—toward some sort of a demonstration mission on 

orbit of one or more of these technologies. And I think that is probably going to have to be an international demonstration—mission 

in nature, given the nature that all the debris is international, 

right? A county can only really touch the things that it owns, and 

so there is going to have to be some level of cooperation there. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Well, given that the United States mostly tracks 

all of it, it would—I would assume that we should be able to get 

some cooperation. General Raymond, is there a role that DoD can 

play in terms of maturing some of these technologies? 
100 

General RAYMOND. Ma’am, there are a lot of discussions that are 

going on around the world on this problem, and it is an important 

issue. I think there are roles that we could help. I have not heard, 

to date, though, any specific technology that is out there that I see 

is something near term that us going to be able to solve this problem. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Mr. Nelson, I think you wanted to—— 

Mr. NELSON. Yeah. I think Mr. Weeden touched on it. The technologies, and being able to take the items out of orbit, and getting 

them out of orbit, is very important. Obviously, the sooner you get 

it out, the likelihood is that they won’t crash into something else. 

The point—the issue, though, it comes down to is whether or not 

you take out—and you are—made that mention as well, somebody 

else’s piece of debris. The flags are flying on—even if it is not usable, that particular item is, you know, has the flag of another country. So there probably is going to have to be some sort of treaty 

work, or something along those lines, or agreements made between 

nations in order to be able to effectively work that out. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Right. Well, I know that Goddard Space Flight 

Center has some rather robust activity going on now to try to look 

at ways to re-service some of these decommissioned satellites as a 

way to get them back in service, not put, you know, new ones up, 

but that too is a long way down the line, but something that I 

think we need to invest in. And with that, Mr. Chairman, I will 

yield. 

Chairman BROOKS. Thank you. Mr. Rohrabacher, we have time 

for another round of questions on your end, if you have any additional questions. The House floor vote has not yet been called. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I would just like to suggest that we make 

this the first step, and not just a public relations—I mean, this is 

a problem, you know. We can do something in Congress to work 

with these folks, and to work with people internationally. I have— 

when I travel overseas, I am on the Foreign Affairs Committee, I 

always—when I go to another country, I go and talk to their space 

people. And every time I talk to the space people, whether it is 

Russia, or Japan, or Europe, they all are in tune with the—this is 

a challenge that we—that we are going to have to someday deal 

with, because it is coming to the point now where it is imperative 

to deal with it, because it is limiting what we can do in space. 

So, let me see, it was—I would just say—okay. Have any of you 

had any talk with, for example, the Russians, or the EU, or Japan 

on this issue? 

Mr. ZAMKA. Sir, the FAA is engaged with a lot of international 

partners, to include the European Space Agency, and we have letters of agreement with Spain and Curacao. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. 

Mr. ZAMKA.Because it is such a big international problem, there 

is international will to attack it. One thing that we have an opportunity to do here is identify a civil agency that can represent the 

United States, which is the biggest operator out in orbit, to take 

a leadership role as we begin to address the problem. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, is, you know, one—I remember one of 

the directors of the space program in Russia telling me that they 

had been thinking about some—almost a bulldozer type of thing, 
101 

where you had a—some kind of a big shield in front of a—something that would go forward and get a hold of some of this debris. 

We actually—are we studying anything that would be—I mean, 

there is one idea. I mean, I am not saying that is good or bad. Are 

we really—have—you mentioned that we don’t have any—or is 

there a program on that is actually trying to develop the technology 

in this? 

Mr. WEEDEN. At the moment I am only aware of one NASA funded program to do some technology development. It refers to what 

is known as an electro-dynamic tether, which is a spacecraft that 

can use the combination of electrical field and the Earth’s magnetic 

field to maneuver without using fuel, aside from sunlight. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Um-hum. 

Mr. WEEDEN. And it is—the technology is fairly early stages, but 

it could be one of the more efficient ways of moving around to gather debris. I am not aware of any other U.S. government funded programs to do the technology development. But I will say that, in reference to your question about international efforts, next month 

there is going to be a meeting hosted by CNES, the French Space 

Agency, that has participation from Japan, from NASA, from Russia, from a number of other countries, to—it is a 3 day workshop, 

looking at technology, and engineering solutions for his. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Really? 

Mr. WEEDEN. And this—— 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Where will that be? 

Mr. WEEDEN. That will be in Paris. This is—and they have held 

this workshop every two years. This is the third instance of it. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And what days are they? 

Mr. WEEDEN. It will be June 16, 17, 18, around there. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. Mr. Chairman, I would suggest that 

someone from this Committee go to that hearing—or that meeting. 

Chairman BROOKS. Is that a request? 

Ms. EDWARDS. Mr. Chairman, he may have to compete with the 

Chairman and the Ranking Member. 

Chairman BROOKS. Does the gentleman from California have any 

more questions? All right. Let me exercise my prerogative and now 

ask my question. 

General Raymond, if an event like the Kosmos-Iridium collision 

happened today, how would JFCC respond? Specifically, can you 

give the Committee a sense of the process that goes into actions to 

protect our astronauts on the International Space Station, or other 

national security and commercial assets that could be threatened 

by such an event? 

General RAYMOND. Yes, sir, thank you for the question. If we— 

if an event happened where two satellites collided, obviously, it 

would generate debris. We would detect that debris with our network of sensors around the globe. We would characterize that debris. We would get an orbital element, or the address in space, if 

you will, of that debris, and we would refine that over time, and 

we would put that debris into our catalog. 

Once it is in the catalog, as I discussed earlier, we have the process in place that we do for every active satellite on orbit. We would 

screen against that debris to ensure that we provided proper warning, if something were to collide. 
102 

Chairman BROOKS. That is the vote call, but we still have 15 

minutes before we have to be on the House floor. Quick follow-up 

question, how long does it take, generally speaking, for the orbital 

debris to have its orbit decay to the point where it goes back to 

Earth, and it is no longer an issue? 

General RAYMOND. Mr. Chairman, there is a lot—there is lots of 

factors that go—that are involved in that. 

Chairman BROOKS. Is there some kind of average number of 

years, or decades, or a range? 

General RAYMOND. Sir, I would—I don’t have that at my fingertip, and I don’t think there really is—it—there are so many factors that are involved. It is altitude, size, shape, speed, velocity. 

There are a whole bunch of things. We do predict re-entries, and 

we track those re-entries. We know—we track those, we warn 

against them, when they are going to re-enter. But I can’t tell you, 

you know, I can’t give you a time for how many years. But when 

it gets close, we can characterize that re-entry, and we warn 

against that as well. 

Chairman BROOKS. Mr. Nelson, you wanted to add something? 

Mr. NELSON. Yes. It is, you know, the General actually hit on the 

issues. It is basically the altitude, the shape of the object, the mass 

of the object, and it can range quite—there is a very, very large 

range, from, you know, tomorrow to, you know, maybe a million 

years from now. So—depending on where that particular object is. 

So that brings up the issue of basically taking it out of the orbit. 

Chairman BROOKS. Mr. Weeden? 

Mr. WEEDEN. Just to give you some ballpark numbers, at the altitude of the International Space Station, I would say a rough estimate, on the order of months to maybe a very short number of 

years. When you move up higher, let us say around 800 kilometers, 

where most of the remote sensing satellites are, and the greatest 

congestion of debris is, and the collision was, and the Chinese antisatellite was, at that altitude, you are talking decades or longer. 

And once you get beyond 1,000 kilometers, for all intents and purposes, it is up there pretty much, as far as we are concerned, forever. 

Chairman BROOKS. All right. Thank you. General Raymond, as 

a follow up to my earlier question to you, FAA requested, in their 

written testimony, for the authority to require operators to move 

positions if a possible collision is detected. How would your process 

change, if at all, if that authority is granted to the FAA? 

General RAYMOND. Sir, the FAA would still rely on the data that 

we get from our sensors. We would be providing that data. Today 

we—again, we warn of those conjunctions. We do not have the authority to make some—make a satellite operator move. And I can 

for DoD satellites, but I can’t make commercial satellites, because 

I don’t have that authority, but they would take our data that we 

have and use that data in their new role. 

Chairman BROOKS. Thank you. Any other follow up on that? Yes, 

Mr. Zamka? 

Mr. ZAMKA. Yes, sir. Regarding the request to have the ability 

to require an operator to move, that can be done in a number of 

ways. Earlier is better. Earlier interaction, perhaps, agreement 

with the operator as part of the licensing process as to what the 
103 

criteria would be for which they would move. Probably best of all 

would be an industry based consensus on what is the agreeable 

time to effect a move because probabilities are involved, and a lot 

of expense for the operator, frankly. 

Chairman BROOKS. All right. I thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony, and the Members for their questions. The Members of the Committee may have additional questions for you, and 

you—we will ask you to respond to those in writing. The record will 

remain open for two weeks for additional comments and written 

questions from the Members. The witnesses are excused, and this 

hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:27 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(105) 

Appendix I 

ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS
106 

ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

Responses by Lt Gen. John ‘‘Jay’’ Raymond 
107 
108 
109 
110 
111 
112 
113 

Responses by Mr. George Zamka 
114 
115 
116 
117 
118 
119 
120 

Responses by Mr. Robert Nelson 
121 
122 
123 
124 
125 
126 

Responses by Mr. P.J. Blount 
127 
128 
129 
130 
131 
132 
133 
134 
135 
136 
137 
138 

Responses by Mr. Brian Weeden 
139 
140 
141 
142 
143 
144 
145 
146 
147 
148 
149 
150 
151 
152 

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