Filed 5/12/23 P. v. Cortez CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

VANESSA CORTEZ,

 Defendant and Appellant.

2d Crim. No. B319506

(Super. Ct. No. 2021002150)

(Ventura County)

Vanessa Cortez appeals a judgment following her 

conviction of second degree robbery after a jury trial. (Pen. Code, 

§ 211.

1) The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and 

placed her on formal probation for 36 months. She subsequently 

was found in violation of her probation conditions and sentenced 

to state prison. We conclude, among other things, that 1) the 

trial court did not err by admitting evidence of Cortez’s prior

misdemeanor convictions for theft and giving false identifying 

1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless 

otherwise stated.
2

information to a police officer as impeachment evidence; and 2) 

Cortez has not shown that the court committed reversible error 

by admitting evidence of her prior misdemeanor battery 

conviction. We affirm.

FACTS

On Christmas Eve, Mohsen Ali was the manager of the 

General Needs Company store. He testified that the store had a 

pink toy car for sale. Christina Davalos and Cortez entered the 

store together. Davalos wanted to buy the toy car with a 50

percent discount and pay $199. But the sale price for the car was 

$399.

Ali was willing to give Davalos a 5 percent discount. 

Davalos placed between $220 and $240 cash on the counter and 

took the car without “permission.” She left the store. Ali went 

outside to try “to bring the car back.” He and Davalos both held 

onto the car. Ali told her to bring it back and he would not call 

the police. Cortez “pushed” him away, and Davalos left with the 

car.

After Davalos and Cortez left the store, they put the toy car 

on “top” of a pickup truck. They were accompanied by two men 

and they left.

Ali called the police. Officer Ramzi Raad arrived and 

viewed a surveillance video of the incident. He recognized Cortez 

and Davalos. He knew that they frequently visit a “transient 

encampment.” When he arrived there, he saw Cortez with the 

toy car and arrested her for robbery.

While in custody, Raad interviewed Cortez after advising 

her of her Miranda rights. He showed her the surveillance video. 

Raad testified Cortez admitted “to using force to take that 

property.” In the transcript of the police interview, Cortez was 
3

asked, “And you used your body to push [Ali] off of it – away from 

it.” Cortez: “Yes. ‘Cause I just told you that right now.”

At trial Cortez testified she was a heroin addict, was 

“kicking,” not feeling well, and was not paying attention to what 

Ali and Davalos were saying. She believed Davalos had paid Ali 

for the toy car. She was surprised when Ali suddenly “darted 

past” her and “grabbed the car.” Cortez testified she “stepped 

into their little scuffle that they had at the door” and did not 

believe Davalos “was doing illegal.”

On cross-examination, Cortez said she knew there was 

“disagreement about the price [of the car].” She knew the money 

Davalos left at the counter was “$260 less than what the store 

owner wanted for that car.” She knows that when someone 

leaves cash, but only pays “half of the cost,” that this is “theft.”

She admitted that she and Davalos started “to pull” the car away 

from Ali. She said she “stepped into him” and “[she] did get in 

the middle of it.” 

Admission of Cortez’s Prior Convictions

In a pretrial proceeding, the trial court allowed the 

prosecutor to introduce evidence of Cortez’s three most recent 

prior misdemeanor convictions. After Cortez and a defense 

witness testified that Cortez was not violent, the court also 

granted the People’s request to introduce Cortez’s prior battery 

conviction as rebuttal evidence. 

DISCUSSION

Evidence of the Three Misdemeanor Convictions

In response to a defense motion in limine, the trial court 

ruled Cortez’s three most recent convictions for petty theft with 

priors (§ 666) in 2010 and 2102, and her misdemeanor conviction 

for providing false identifying information to a police officer 
4

(§ 148.9) in 2015, could be used to impeach Cortez’s testimony 

because those offenses “qualify as moral turpitude crimes.” 

Cortez contends this was error. We disagree. 

We review a trial court’s rulings on the admissibility of 

evidence for abuse of discretion. (People v. Harris (2005) 37 

Cal.4th 310, 337.) “Past criminal conduct involving moral 

turpitude that has some logical bearing on the veracity of a 

witness in a criminal proceeding is admissible to impeach” a 

witness. (Ibid.) Moral turpitude crimes are offenses “in which 

dishonesty is an element.” (People v. Chavez (2000) 84 

Cal.App.4th 25, 28.) “[T]heft crimes necessarily involve an 

element of deceit.” (People v. Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 608.)

Consequently, they involve moral turpitude. (People v. Gray

(2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 635, 641.) The crime of providing false 

information to a police officer necessarily involves dishonesty 

and, therefore, moral turpitude. (People v. Maestas (2005) 132 

Cal.App.4th 1552, 1556, fn. 4.)

Here Cortez testified at trial for the purpose of showing she 

did not commit the charged offense. The trial court properly 

admitted this evidence because the “defendant’s line of defense at 

trial was an outright denial of guilt” and therefore the 

defendant’s “credibility was directly at issue.” (People v. Mendoza

(2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 918, 925.) 

Cortez contends the trial court erred because the 2010 and 

2012 prior convictions were too remote in time to be admissible. 

But courts have held trial courts have properly admitted prior 

convictions for impeachment that were in the age range of 

Cortez’s priors. (People v. Carter (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 322, 330 

[11-year-old prior convictions were properly admitted].) 

Moreover, here the trial court, aware of the remoteness issue,
5

exercised its discretion to only admit the three most recent 

convictions.

Cortez claims the admission of this evidence was unduly 

prejudicial. She contends the prosecutor used these prior 

convictions: 1) to bolster a weak case, and 2) to convince jurors to 

use these prior convictions instead of considering the evidence on 

the charged offense. She notes the prosecutor told jurors, “[Y]ou 

need to evaluate who to believe in this case. Do you believe her? 

Convicted of petty theft with priors in 2010 for the same charge 

in 2012.” 

But the prior convictions were properly admitted for 

impeachment purposes and a prosecutor has a right to make a 

“fair” comment on the evidence. (People v. Young (2005) 34 

Cal.4th 1149, 1191.) Credibility is necessarily involved where the 

defendant testifies with the goal of defeating the People’s case. 

(People v. Mendoza, supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 925.) The 

prosecutor may cite to admitted evidence and ask jurors to draw 

different inferences than the defense draws. (Young, at p. 1191.) 

To make sure the jury would not be distracted, the trial 

court instructed jurors that the evidence of “prior convictions” 

“may be considered by [the jurors] solely for the purpose of 

assessing that witness’s credibility, and for no other purpose.”

(Italics added.) We presume the jury followed those instructions 

and “that jurors treat the court’s instructions as a statement of 

the law by a judge, and the prosecutor’s comments as words 

spoken by an advocate in an attempt to persuade.” (People v. 

Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 663, fn. 8.)

Moreover, the People note that any error is harmless given 

the strength of the People’s case. Robbery is the taking of 

property from the immediate possession of another person 
6

accomplished by the use of force or fear. (People v. Scott (2009) 

45 Cal.4th 743, 749.) “The crime of robbery includes the element 

of asportation, the robber's escape with the loot being considered 

as important in the commission of the crime as gaining 

possession of the property.” (People v. Estes (1983) 147 

Cal.App.3d 23, 27.) The People note Cortez admitted to police 

that she used force to prevent the store clerk from obtaining 

possession of the toy. She was asked, “And you used your body to 

push [Ali] off of it – away from it.” Cortez: “Yes. ‘Cause I just 

told you that right now.” That was a highly incriminating 

admission. There was also a store surveillance video. Both the 

interview and the video were played for the jury. Cortez was 

asked in the police interview, “Why, why did you pull it? Why did 

you start pulling the car?” Cortez: “Because I . . . wanted [Ali] to 

call the police if there was a problem.” (Italics added.) The 

prosecutor also successfully impeached the credibility of Cortez’s 

direct testimony on cross-examination.

The Prior Misdemeanor Battery Conviction

Cortez contends the trial court erred by admitting her prior 

misdemeanor battery conviction because she “did not put her 

character for peacefulness at issue.” (Initial capitalization

omitted.) 

Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a), provides, in 

relevant part, that “evidence of a person’s character or a trait of 

his or her character . . . is inadmissible when offered to prove his 

or her conduct on a specified occasion.” 

But “evidence of the defendant’s character or a trait of his 

character in the form of an opinion or evidence of his reputation 

is not made inadmissible by Section 1101 if such evidence is: [¶] 

(a) Offered by the defendant to prove his conduct in conformity 
7

with such character or trait of character. [¶] (b) Offered by the 

prosecution to rebut evidence adduced by the defendant under 

subdivision (a).” (Evid. Code, § 1102, subds. (a) & (b), italics 

added.)

The People claim Cortez opened the door for rebuttal 

evidence of the battery conviction because evidence in the defense 

case involved her character trait of being nonviolent. Cortez’s 

friend Alejandro Garcia testified about Cortez’s character. He 

said, “I’ve never known her to be violent.” He said she would not 

use physical force against someone. Cortez testified that during 

the incidents involving her prior petty theft convictions she was 

not violent.

“Under the doctrine of ‘opening the door,’ one party may 

render otherwise inadmissible evidence admissible by 

introducing the topic selectively such as to leave a misleading 

impression.” (People v. Kerley (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 513, 553.)

“A trial court’s ruling on whether rebuttal evidence is admissible 

on this theory is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” (Ibid.) The 

court could reasonably find that defense case evidence presented 

the “impression” that Cortez would not be violent, consequently

rebuttal evidence would be appropriate. (Ibid.) 

Cortez claims the rebuttal evidence may not include her 

prior battery conviction. She notes in People v. Mansfield (1988) 

200 Cal.App.3d 82, 88, the court said a battery conviction “need 

not be violent” and it does not involve moral turpitude. Under 

Mansfield, it was not the type of rebuttal evidence to show 

violence or moral turpitude. But see People v. Williams (1985) 

169 Cal.App.3d 951, 957, where the court said, “[B]attery by a jail 

inmate upon a noninmate, a crime of violence, demonstrates ‘a 
8

general readiness to do evil,’ and thus moral turpitude.” (Italics 

added.)

We have reviewed Cortez’s remaining contentions and we 

conclude she has not shown grounds for reversal.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

GILBERT, P. J.

We concur:

YEGAN, J.

BALTODANO, J.
9

David R. Worley, Judge

Superior Court County of Ventura

______________________________

Nancy Wechsler, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant 

Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and Allison H. Chung, 

Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.