1998 

United States Department of State 

Bureau of Diplomatic Security 

contents contents

emerging trends emerging trends

in transnational crime in transnational crime

contents 

5 Letter From the Editor 

6 Contributors 

emerging trends 

in transnational crime 

Combatting Transnational Crime 

by Susan Snyder 

10 Tracking the Global Crime Threat 

by Russell Ross 

16 Organized Crime in South Africa 

by Stephen L. Capelli 

30 Nigerian Advance Fee Fraud 

by Andy Corsun 

58 Crime in China 

by Jim Dunne 

70 Truck Hijackings and Cargo Theft in Mexico


by Kevin J. Huska 

76 Nordic Motorcycle Gangs 

by Peggy Brown 

7 
issues in issues in

personal security personal security

issues in 

90 Travel Safe, Travel Smart 

by Carl F. Troy 

94	 Now You See It, Now You Don’t 

—Laptop Theft 

by Andy Corsun 

104Tips to Avoid Being a Victim 

of Pickpockets 

by Peggy Brown 

108Carjacking in Africa 

—a Particular Concern 

for Foreign Residents 

by Stephen L. Capelli 

116Rape—What Everyone 

Needs to Know 

by Lynda M. Graham 

and Lisa C. Meeks 

120A-OK—A Safety Program 

for American Children 

Living Overseas 

by Jane S. DeKay 

124Taxi Cab Violence: A Growing 

Special thanks are extended to the


Graphics Section of the State


Department’s Publishing Services


Division, which is responsible for


most of the original art work in


this publication.


This publication was prepared by


the Bureau of Diplomatic Security,


Office of Intelligence and Threat


Analysis (DS/DSS/ITA).


Comments and queries are


welcomed and may be directed to


the Office Director of DS/DSS/ITA


on 202.663.0786.


Department of State


Publication 10521


Bureau of Diplomatic Security


Released May 1998


Internet Addresses:


http://www.state.gov


http://www.travel.state.gov


http://www.heroes.net


Concern for U.S. Travelers in Mexico


by Danny Rothstein 
letter from the editor letter from the editor letter from the editor letter from the editor letter from the editor letter from the editor

With the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s, we saw the emergence of a new global security 

threat—transnational crime. Transnational crime results in the loss of billions of dollars annually, can 

affect bilateral relations between nations, and can destroy the fabric of society. 

In an effort to sensitize and educate the reader on the ramifications of transnational crime, the Bureau 

of Diplomatic Security’s Office of Intelligence and Threat Analysis (DS/DSS/ITA) is inaugurating a new 

publication, Issues in Global Crime. We discuss the role diplomacy plays in combatting transnational 

crime. Next we look at how the Department of State allocates resources to protect the diplomatic 

community overseas. 

We take an indepth look at some emerging trends in transnational crime. Such as Nigerian Advance Fee 

Fraud, a confidence scheme that, according to U.S. Secret Service Financial Crimes Division, “represents 

a serious financial threat to the United States.” Other disturbing new transnational crime trends that will 

be addressed in this publication are rising crime in China, organized crime in South Africa, motorcycle 

gang warfare in the Nordic countries, and the truck hijackings in Mexico, where losses to businesses 

because of cargo theft are estimated in the $100s millions. 

Whereas transnational crime primarily affects business enterprises and international organizations, the 

most prevalent threat overseas is crime against your person. The information provided in our articles on 

personal security is general and has application globally. We examine the problem of carjackings in 

Africa, and the crimes of pickpocketing, rape, and the theft of laptop computers. The State Department’s 

Bureau of Consular Affairs provides important information for Americans who are contemplating safe 

travel or residence abroad. 

Hopefully, throughout this premiere issue, we offer countermeasures and suggestions to protect 

potential victims. 

Issues in Global Crime, complements DS/DSS/ITA’ 

Violence Against Americans, and its analytical publication Terrorist Tactics and Security Practices 

Andy Corsun, Editor 

s annual chronology Significant Incidents of Political 

. 
contributors contributors contributors contributors contributors contributors 

Jim Dunne is the East Asia and 

the Pacific Analyst for the Bureau 

of Diplomatic Security’s Office of 

Intelligence and Threat Analysis. 

Kevin Huska is a Diplomatic 

Security Special Agent detailed to 

cover Latin America. 

Carl Troy is the Division Chief 

for Europe and Canada, 

Bureau of Consular Affairs, 

Office of Overseas Citizens 

Services. 

Susan Snyder is the Press 

Officer for the Bureau of 

International Narcotics and Law 

Enforcement Affairs. 

Lynda Graham is a Health 

Systems Specialist working 

with the Bureau of 

Diplomatic Security’s Mobile 

Security Division. She is also 

the coordinator of the Rape Awareness 

Program for the Bureau. 

Lisa C. Meeks is a Special 

Agent with the Bureau of 

Diplomatic Security’s 

Mobile Security Division. 

Danny Rothstein covers 

Central America and 

Mexico for the Bureau of 

Diplomatic Security’s Office 

of Intelligence and Threat 

Analysis. 

Andy Corsun is the 

Division Chief for Africa 

and Europe, Bureau of 

Diplomatic Security’s Office 

of Intelligence and Threat 

Analysis. 

6­
Combatting 

Transnational 

Crime 

by Susan Snyder 

International crime has become a serious national 

and international security threat. Where in the 

past, countries most feared armed attacks from 

hostile neighbors, governments now face the 

more insidious threat of internal corruption manipulated by powerful drug syndicates. Sheer 

firepower and size of armies are no longer the 

primary measures of power. Money has taken their 

place. 

Access to wealth on a grand scale makes international criminals a unique international security 

threat. Since their main objective is to create a 

secure operating environment, they can buy 

themselves protection at almost any level of government—thereby manipulating the machinery of 

democratic government to serve their own purposes. 

Around the globe, examples of drug and other 

corruption are abundant. In the Western Hemisphere, we have only to look at Colombia—and, 

of course, at Mexico—to see just how effective 

drug criminals can be. On the other side of the 

world, we see authorities in Burma and increasingly in Afghanistan, using the drug trade as vital 

sources of state income. In Africa, the most egregious example is Nigeria where all forms of crime 

and graft are practiced with virtual impunity. 

In the State Department, the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) 

is responsible for all activities related to curbing 

the threat of international crime, including drug 

trafficking. 

In the late 1980s, when the Cold War began to 

thaw, and transnational crime began its ascendancy, INL was forced to rethink its diplomatic 

strategy and tactics. We were used to dealing 

government-to-government, assuming that elected 

governments are in a position to speak for their 

nation’s actions. But, what do you do in a case 

when the leadership is corrupt and working 

against the interests of its own citizens as well as 

against the interests of the United States? Or how 

do you cope with a government whose intentions 

may be good at the highest levels, but is institutionally incapable of achieving common goals? 

These are not abstract questions. The diplomatic 

carrots and sticks of financial aid or military pressure are not always credible in countries where 

international criminals have immediate access to 

larger sums of money and better firepower than 

even our own government can muster on short 

notice. But we have learned that we have a 

unique weapon in our diplomatic arsenal: experience building and maintaining democratic institutions under the rule of law. 

Here are some examples of how INL is making 

diplomatic use of our experience. Most of what we 

are doing falls under the rubric of institution building. We need to instill a much wider and more 

profound respect for the rule of law in countries 

where law was often based on the whims of 

authoritarian rulers. Criminal organizations took 

advantage of these conditions to “legalize” their 

outlaw status. This would not be possible in a just 

system where the rule of law prevails. 

To that end, we are training police, lawyers, 

judges, court reporters, and investigators throughout the world. We provide them with equipment 

necessary to do their jobs. We are also aiding 

nations in developing strong, fair laws outlawing 

the production and transit of illegal drugs, providing assistance in reforming criminal codes, and 

helping to draft strong antimoney laundering and 

asset seizure statutes. 
Key to this effort is regional cooperation among 

law enforcement agencies. The goal is to destroy 

the criminal organization’s infrastructure by sharing 

critical information between governments. We are 

helping to facilitate this information exchange at 

the working level through joint operations and 

joint training seminars. 

Last year, law enforcement officials in countries 

where INL has programs seized 140 metric tons of 

cocaine products. These 140 tons represent a 

significant portion of the 700–800 metric ton 

theoretical worldwide production of cocaine. 

Meanwhile, the leaders of the world’s drug and 

crime syndicates, whose acts of violence and 

corruption terrorize societies and paralyze governments, are under pressure as never before. 

Strengthened through U.S.-provided training, 

information, and assistance, police organizations 

in Colombia, Mexico, Thailand, and elsewhere 

have investigated, tracked, and apprehended 

some of the world’s most powerful and historically 

invulnerable criminals. And with the successful 

incapacitation of each top layer of criminal leadership, the capabilities of the security forces expands 

and the strength of the crime syndicates erodes, 

tipping the balance of this struggle increasingly in 

favor of antidrug and anticrime forces. 

We are also encouraging the global community to 

rethink—in the most positive and constructive 

sense—some of its traditional views on national 

sovereignty. Transnational criminal organizations 

routinely violate borders, and then evade justice 

by using those same borders to their advantage. 

But our enforcement capacity is constrained by 

national political concerns and geopolitical limits. 

Through diplomatic efforts, we are trying to promote the political will necessary to permit effective 

interdiction, extradition, information sharing, and 

prosecution. 

We are negotiating such agreements around the 

globe, and encouraging regional cooperation in 

areas such as Latin America. For example, Bolivia, 

Paraguay, Brazil, and Argentina have signed biand trilateral cooperation agreements aimed at 

targeting crossborder drug and crime problems. 

And, throughout Latin America and the Caribbean, we have signed extensive maritime agree8 

ments that enhance U.S. and host country law 

enforcement efforts against maritime drug smuggling by permitting our Coast Guard to board 

suspicious vessels on the high seas and to pursue 

them, if necessary, into the territorial waters of 

these countries. 

We continue to strike at the very heart of the 

world’s largest drug and crime syndicates by limiting their access to legitimate banking systems. In 

the 10 years since INL began seeking global solidarity in fighting money laundering, we have 

made considerable progress. For many years, 

some bankers chose to ignore the source of deposits on the theory that once in the system, there is 

no such thing as dirty money. Working through 

our G-7 allies and the Financial Action Task Force, 

we have convinced most governments, if not most 

bankers, that the source of funds is not only important but can ultimately become a national security 

concern. Aside from the inflationary consequences 

of large infusions of drug money into an economy, 

the corruptive power of this money jeopardizes 

the viability of democratic governments. 

We are also using our own laws more creatively. 

President Clinton has invoked his executive powers 

under the International Economic Emergency 

Powers Act to keep drug-tainted Colombian enterprises and individuals out of the U.S. market place. 

These are powers normally invoked only during 

national emergencies. In the past, they have been 

used against Libya, Iran, Iraq, and Haiti under the 

Cedras regime. 

We are using our strengthened visa laws to prohibit suspected drug traffickers and money launderers, their families and associates from entering 

the United States, as we have long done in the 

case of terrorists. In some instances we have 

revoked the visas of high-ranking government 

officials, like Colombian President Samper, who 

have been implicated in corruption scandals. This 

action is extremely effective, putting on notice all 

who are tempted by criminals’ bribes and payoffs. 

Finally, we promote the eradication of illegal drug 

crops. The coca crop offers the most immediate 

opportunity for radical reductions. Extensive coca 

cultivation occurs in the three largest coca-producing countries—Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia. On 

average, every 200 hectares of coca eradicated in 
Peru and Bolivia deprives the drug trade of a 

metric ton of refined cocaine. A coca field is a 

large, stationary target; a load of finished cocaine 

distributed among trucks, boats, and aircraft is 

not. Even manual eradication, therefore, can play 

an important role. 

In 1996, there was a net reduction in Peru of 

21,000 hectares of coca. These hectares could 

have produced approximately 100–105 metric 

tons of cocaine—or roughly a year’s supply of 

cocaine for 2 million addicts. Additionally, our 

eradication programs in Colombia and Bolivia 

destroyed another 17,500 hectares. This easily 

translates into a reduction of finished product of 

about 45–50 metric tons. In total, our source 

country eradication programs removed about 150 

metric tons of potential cocaine from the system. 

We are also taking steps to reduce illicit opium 

cultivation. Eradicating opium poppies is time 

consuming because the crops can be quickly 

replaced, whereas coca takes 18 months to mature. However, we have successfully reduced 

opium poppy cultivation in many countries around 

the world such as Thailand, Guatemala, and 

Mexico. 

By law, the Secretary of State is responsible for 

coordinating international counternarcotics and 

crime assistance and policy. The Secretary carries 

out his or her responsibilities through the 

President’s representative in country—the ambassador—who coordinates the actions of all agencies 

involved in crime control through the 

ambassador’s country team. Our mission is to stem 

the flow of drugs to the United States and curb 

the effects of transnational crime on U.S citizensand contrary to some common misperceptions— 

the State Department’s international antidrug and 

anticrime programs are making a difference. We 

play a critical role as catalyst in promoting a coordinated, and effective, international crime control 

effort. While our material assistance enables countries to accomplish a host of tasks that might 

otherwise not be possible, our national commitment to end international crime, including drug 

trafficking, is a powerful, if intangible, motivation 

to other governments. 

The most revealing example of our success is 

demonstrated through our counternarcotics programs. Without INL’s international drug control 

programs, there would be a significant increase of 

cocaine available for sale on the streets of the 

United States. There would also be much more 

heroin. Drug prices would fall as supplies increased. And as there is a direct relationship between drug availability and use, we could expect 

to see a marked rise in new use among vulnerable 

youth. 

We know that our antidrug programs work. Cocaine use in the United States has dropped significantly over the past decade and a half. And INL’s 

programs continue to take a major bite out of the 

worldwide supply of cocaine. In 1996, working 

with our allies in the Western Hemisphere, we 

collectively removed nearly 300 metric tons of 

cocaine from the system—and this in spite of the 

drug trade’s ability to outspend us, manipulate 

corrupt officials, and otherwise sabotage antidrug 

operations. The bottom line is that for an annual 

investment of $150–$250 million dollars—less 

than 2 percent of the entire Federal drug control 

budget—our programs have eliminated $30 billion 

worth of cocaine. 

There is no silver bullet solution to transnational 

crime and drug trafficking problems. However, 

the global community has the ability to deny 

criminals what they desire most: a secure operating environment, access to the legitimate 

economy and banking sector, the ability to travel 

freely, and in the case of drug traffickers, the 

source of their illicit wealth. We are making 

progress in these areas and are gradually weakening the stronghold of international criminals.� 

9

To meet its foreign policy objectives, 

the United States maintains diplo�

matic relations with 184 nations at 

about 280 localities worldwide. The U.S. 

presence in these areas is usually highprofile. Over the years, this visibility has 

had the undesired result of attracting the 

unwanted attention of persons or causes 

who wish us ill. The roster of movements 

and individuals who have sought to strike 

at the U.S. diplomatic presence overseas 

has ranged from international terrorists 

and violent demonstrators to dangerous 

cranks and hardened criminals. In the last 

decade, these specific threats have been 

amplified by a general ambience of law�

lessness that has seized many a capital city 

of the world. Many of these capitals, espe�

cially, but not exclusively, in the Third 

World, have become breeding places for 

rampant crime, even as the capability of 

host governments to cope with it has been 

stretched to the breaking point. 

Tracking the Global 

CrimeThreat 

by Russell R. Ross. 

U.S. companies are operating overseas, frequently in locali�

ties where law and order is lacking. The State Department 

system of measuring the crime threat at U.S. diplomatic locations abroad, and applying resources to counter the mea�

surable threat may offer an example worthy of imitation by 

U.S. enterprises doing business abroad. 
The responsibility of protecting U.S. diplo�

matic personnel and facilities in these 

foreign areas falls to the Bureau of Diplo�

matic Security (DS) of the U.S. Department 

of State. As reports of growing crime 

around the world began to reach the De�

partment from its embassies, DS acted 

methodically to meet its protective respon�

sibilities. If crime is increasing around the 

world, then a system had to be developed 

to measure its seriousness. The system had 

to be sufficiently generic in its measure�

ment tools so that they could be applied 

worldwide. In other words, to keep the 

playing field level for all State Department 

posts abroad, the criteria by which the 

crime threat would be measured had to 

apply equally to all overseas locations, 

irrespective of their orderliness or anomie. 

At the same time, the system had to be 

sufficiently flexible to produce a differenti�

ated picture of crime, for example, in cities 

such as Luxembourg or Rejkavik, where it 

was acknowledged to be low, as compared 

to Lagos or Karachi, where it was acknowl�

edged to be much higher. In this way, if a 

uniform system could be applied worldwide to quantify the crime threat in a for�

eign city, DS could then allocate its protec�

tive resources commensurate with the 

threat level, according to a uniform stan�

dard. Decisions to apply security measures 

made by seat-of-the-pants, ad hoc evalua�

tions would be avoided, and in a time of 

shrinking government resources, a dollar’s 

worth of security measures would be made 

to do the work of two, as the crime threat 

and its countermeasures were made to 

coincide. 

With the help of a project officer skilled in 

both criminology and statistics, DS’ first 

definitive crime rating system was unveiled 

in 1991. It was based on the reporting of 

crime incidents against the official U.S. 

community at a diplomatic post overseas. 

To this objective criterion, the number of 

incidents, the Regional Security Officer 

(RSO) at an overseas post added his nu�

merical evaluation of local police effective�

ness and the response time to an emer�

gency call from U.S. Embassy officials. 

These factors: the incidents, the police 

effectiveness and response time, were 

given a statistical weight, which was then 

translated into a textual crime threat rat�

ing of low, medium, high, or critical at an 

overseas locality. The lowest scores pro�

duced a rating of low; the highest scores 

produced a rating of critical. 

The same crime rating system was applied 

to all posts. When it was in place, it obvi�

ated ad hoc, seat-of-the-pants evaluations 

of the local crime threat, and it served as a 

benchmark for the allocation of security 

resources at overseas installations. DS 

could ascertain the crime threat rating in a 

given area, then bring to bear a package of 

security countermeasures appropriate to 

the threat and to safeguard U.S. employ�

ees. 

The system worked well enough, and pro�

duced differentiated threat levels that 

generally reflected the incidence of crime 

and police effectiveness (or ineffectuality) 

at posts around the world. There was, however, a steady drumbeat of criticism from 

ambassadors and RSOs. This criticism fo�

cused on two arguments. First, in counting 

only incidents against the embassy com�

munity, the statistical sample was too nar�

row. An area might be abidingly dangerous 

for expatriates in general, but because 

embassy staffers went unscathed, a post 

might still receive a threat rating of low. 

Second, a post untouched by incidents 

against its members, and consequently 

receiving a crime threat rating of low, 

might find itself penalized for having in 

11

Crime Threat Crime Threat

Levels At Levels At

Overseas Posts Overseas Posts

1991

Crime Threat 

Levels At 

Overseas Posts 

31 

53 

93 

88 

14 

24 

103 

145 

1997 

1991 

Critical Medium 

High Low 

Comparison of figures from first year’s survey 

to the last available survey. 

place good security procedures and programs that held criminal acts against its 

personnel to a minimum. Theoretically, 

this could produce a bureaucratic absur�

dity whereby a post with a recorded low 

crime threat could have its security resources abridged, until its members were 

sufficiently victimized to raise its crime 

threat level, at which point security resources would be restored. While human 

intervention prevented this cycle from 

taking hold, the criticism from the field 

made sense, and in 1993, it was decided to 

revisit the methodology by which the 

crime threat at overseas diplomatic posts 

had been determined. 

As research to accomplish this revision got 

underway, DS was given a new mandate. 

Since a major security expenditure of the 

bureau was to hire local guards to protect 

residences and official buildings at a diplo�

matic post, the new methodology needed 

to yield a crime rating that reflected the 

crime threat in these areas. After experi�

menting with various criteria, it was de�

cided that the crime threat in a locality 

could be measured by three variables: 

crime environment, perpetrator profile, 

and police effectiveness. 

The crime environment was further defined by two factors: ambient crime, which 

was the occurrence of all incidents in a 

given location, irrespective of whether the 

victims were members of the embassy 

community, and the mobility of crime, 

which was the extent to which criminal 

elements from other quarters of the city 

intruded into areas of the city where diplo�

matic installations and residences were 

located. 

The perpetrator profile was defined by 

three factors characterizing the criminals 

12

in an area: their aggressiveness, their arm�

ing, and their aggregation into gangs. It 

was felt that these traits had a great deal to 

say about the seriousness of the crime 

threat in an area. If the perpetrators were 

prone to confrontation and gratuitous 

violence toward their victims, rather than 

relying on stealth thievery, for example, 

surely this should have a bearing on the 

crime threat level. By the same token, if 

the criminals were armed with firearms, 

rather than a club or knife, this should 

have a similar bearing, as would the aggre�

gation of criminals into gangs, as opposed 

to single perpetrators. 

Police effectiveness was defined by two 

factors: police deterrence/response and 

training/professionalism. Police deterrence 

meant the ability of local law enforcement 

agencies to forestall crime by their pres�

ence in a locality. Police response meant 

their disposition to answer requests for 

help from the U.S. Embassy promptly, and 

to investigate cases, arrests suspects, and 

bring them to a closure. Police training or 

professionalism in a more general sense 

referred to the overall behavior and pro�

bity of local law enforcement officials: 

their disinclination to take or solicit bribes, 

their disposition to act responsibly with 

both citizens and suspects, and their aver�

sion to the abuse of their official position 

by engaging in illegal activities. 

The above factors grouped under the three 

variables indicated were judged to be the 

determinants of the crime threat level in a 

given locality. They were combined into a 

questionnaire consisting of no more than 

seven questions (one for each factor). For 

each question, the respondent was given a 

set of multiple-choice answers, indicating 

in varying degrees the prevalence or seri�

ousness of that factor in a given foreign  1991 

12 10 

25 

3 7 

30 

14 

1 0 16 

36 

58 

0 9

16 0 2 7

14 12 

3 5

0 

0 

Critical 

5 

2 

Africa 

Latin America 

East Asia and 

the Pacific 

Western Europe 

Eastern Europe 

Middle East 

South Asia 

Global Crime Global Crime  Global Crime

Survey Stats Survey Stats  Survey Stats

0 

0 

High Medium Low 
1996 

Critical 

Global Crime Global Crime  Global Crime

Survey Stats Survey Stats  Survey Stats

19 19 12 

18 

24 

2 

1 15 

30 

42 

0 14

10 13 

12 10 

5 6 

0 

0 

1 

2 

0 

3 

8 

2 

Africa 

Latin America 

East Asia and 

the Pacific 

Western Europe 

Eastern Europe 

Middle East 

South Asia 

High Medium Low 

1 

1 

area. The respondent had only to check 

the answer corresponding most closely to 

conditions at post. The questionnaire was 

then transmitted to all U.S. diplomatic 

posts overseas, and RSOs were instructed 

to respond to it annually. 

RSO responses from the field were weighed 

statistically, with the maximum possible 

score fixed at 100. Post inputs were recorded in a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet, 

which aggregated the total scores for each 

foreign locality. The scoring range from 0 

to 100 was then divided into quartiles, 

with 0–25 rendering a crime threat level of 

low; 26–50 a level of medium; 51–75 high; 

and 76–100 critical. The crime threat levels 

for all posts were compiled into a master 

list, which was circulated for commentary 

among all Washington agencies having 

representation at overseas State Depart�

ment posts. After this coordination was 

accomplished, the list became the authori�

tative compilation of crime threat levels 

for the Department. 

After publication, this list became a risk 

management tool for DS, permitting the 

allocation of security resources, as envi�

sioned, according to the crime threat level. 

As list followed list at regular intervals, the 

accumulation also found another pur�

pose—as a tool for analytical research. DS 

analysts tracking global security develop�

ments could follow the evolving crime 

threat at individual diplomatic posts 

around the world, and discern trends 

which could then be drawn to the attention 

of bureau policymakers. 

Experience with preparation of the list, in 

the meantime, gradually established the 

validity of the criteria and their statistical 

evaluation, as crime threat levels so derived closely matched anecdotal reporting 

from varied sources around the world. In 
ing order. 

A focused, definitive system for keeping 

its responsibilities to keep abreast of the 

cient and responsive manner. 

the 5 years that have elapsed since a crime 

rating system has been in place, analysts 

have seen the worldwide crime threat esca�

late. As the attached table indicates, the 

trend is clearly discernible: In 1991, we 

had 14 overseas posts where we judged the 

crime threat to be critical; in 1996 that 

number had more than doubled to 31 

posts. In 1991, we had 24 posts where we 

judged the crime threat to be high; in 1996 

that number had more than doubled to 58. 

During the same time frame, the number 

of medium-threat posts dropped from 101 

to 89, and the number of low-threat posts 

dropped from 118 to 83. Most of the upsurge occurred in Africa, Latin America 

(especially Central America), Eastern Eu�

rope, and the republics of the former So�

viet Union. By contrast, the safest regions 

of the world, comparatively speaking, were 

western Europe, where it seemed people 

were more orderly, and in the Middle East 

and Far East, where repressive or authori�

tarian regimes were more skilled in keeptrack of the evolving crime threat around 

the world thus has enabled the DS to fulfill 

state of anomie in the world, and to bring 

its protective resources to bear in an effi1997 

Global Crime Global Crime  Global Crime

Survey Stats Survey Stats  Survey Stats

Critical 

14 

19 

17 0 

20 

8 

20 

5 

2 1 13 

0 0 14 

12 12 

0 0 11 12 

0 5 6 0 

27 

40 

3 4 

Africa 

Latin America 

East Asia and 

the Pacific 

Western Europe 

Eastern Europe 

Middle East 

South Asia 

High Medium Low 
Organized Organized

Crime in Crime in

South Africa South Africa

emerging trends in transnational crime  emerging trends in transnational crime

“The time has come for our nation to choose whether we 

want to become a law-governed and peaceful society or 

hapless hostages of lawlessness.” 

—South African President Nelson Mandela, 1996. 

Organized 

By

Crime in  Steve 

Capelli 

South Africa 

Special thanks to Dr. Chris de Kock, Head 

of Crime Research, South African Police 

Service and Lala Camerer of the Institute 

for Defense Policy, South Africa. 

(Notes appear at the end of this article) 

16 

America and its allies will 

face many national security 

threats in the twenty-first 

century, but none will be as 

intractable or insidious as 

the growth of transnational 

organized crime gangs.  As 

the world’s richest consumer 

market, America is an attrac�

tive locus for international 

drug traffickers.  Once only 

a local problem, organized 

crime has now become glo�

bal in scope. 
With the advent of international transpor�

tation, communication, trade, and finance, 

these nefarious groups now have an un�

precedented ability to transport illicit 

materials and to undermine banks and 

other financial institutions around the 

world.  Drug profits flow, once cycled, 

through the same modern infrastructure, 

into legitimate investments, comingling 

with and competing against legitimate 

commercial revenues, threatening to 

strangle our legitimate economy.  While 

America will be greatly affected by growing 

crime syndicates, newly democratized 

countries will be at an even greater risk. 

Using their huge drug profits or corrupting 

government officials and driving out legiti�

mate businesses, these global criminals 

threaten to set back progress in developing 

nations before it even begins.1 

A case in point is South Africa.  Since the 

end of apartheid, crime in all its various 

forms has expanded exponentially.  No one 

is immune.  Affluent South Africans, tour�

ists, expatriates, business people, and the 

poor have all been affected by this growing 

crime wave.  South Africa is commonly 

referred to in the media as “the world’s 

most dangerous country outside a war 

zone.”  To back this astonishing claim, 

press reports point out that one out of 

every four South Africans either knows or 

has been a victim of violent crime.  Violent 

crime is not restricted to locals.  After a 

German executive was killed in an attempted carjacking in August 1996, the 

German Chamber of Commerce conducted 

an oft cited survey in which 16 out of 30 

Chief Executives of German subsidiaries in 

the country reported that they had been 

victims of violent crime. 

Many South Africans are upset and they 

are demanding harsher punishments for 

all offenders.  This concern for personal 

safety has driven many South Africans and 

foreign residents alike to flee the country. 

Those who remain can be heard on radio 

talk shows, which seem to be flooded with 

callers demanding a reinstatement of the 

death penalty.  While others, living in 

wealthy suburbs, ensconce themselves in 

homes hidden behind high walls topped 

with razor wire and protected by guard 

dogs.  “Crime threatens our lives,” cries 

Tokyo Sexwale, the provincial Premier in 

Johannesburg.  We are becoming “a gang�

ster state where hijackers, drug lords, mug�

gers, and other criminals trample (our) 

hard-won democratic rights into the dust,” 

declares George Fivaz, Commissioner of the 

South African Police Service (SAPS).2 

Crime Grows 

A cursory review of crime statistics reveals 

the pervasiveness of South Africa’s crime 

problem.  In 1995 alone, crime drained 

$7.1 billion out of the South African 

economy.  That amount represents 6 percent of the nation’s GDP—equivalent to 

estimated profits of the proposed Cape 

Town Olympic games.3  This is an unac�

ceptable loss which no economy, let alone 

a developing one, can sustain.  Moreover, 

the SAPS recorded nearly 2 million violent 

crimes, including 18,983 murders, 36,888 

rapes, and 66,838 armed robberies.  This 

works out to a serious crime every 17 seconds.4  (Violent crime committed by roving 

street gangs is particularly prevalent in the 

provinces of—the worse being Gauteng— 

KwaZulu-Natal, and Eastern and Western 

Cape.)  17 
Although crime statistics are notoriously 

unreliable, recently complied SAPS data 

show a clear upward trend.  Since 1990, 

South Africa has experienced a dramatic 

increase in almost every category the SAPS 

tracks.  Comparative data from 1990 to 

1995 shows a: 

• 93.8 percent increase in attempted murders 

• 72.3 percent increase in incidents of robbery with 

aggravated assault 

• 234 percent increase in arson cases 

• 35 percent increase in residential break-ins 

• 20 per cent incr ease in bur glaries at businesses 

• 44 percent increase in vehicle theft 

• 27 percent increase in theft from vehicles 

• 238 percent increase in truck hijackings 

• 394 percent increase in seizure of counterfeit 

banknotes 

In addition to violent street crime, South 

Africa is faced with spreading organized 

crime and accompanying political corrup�

tion.  While most foreign businesses can 

control street crime through countermea�

sures and increased insurance premiums, 

which they figure into their bottom-line, 

organized crime, on the other hand, is less 

controllable and more insidious.  It also 

eats away at a nation’s sovereignty and 

ability to govern, eroding law and order. 

This leaves a hostile climate for legitimate 

investment.  Therefore it is the growth of 

organized crime, not street crime per se, 

which most worries corporate CEOs and 

political leaders.  For it will be the 

government’s ability to contain organized 

crime, along with growing street crime, 

which will determine if South Africa’s tran�

sition to multiparty democracy and minor�

ity rule is ultimately successful. 

Understanding 

South Africa’s Gangs 

According to SAPS statistics, there are ap�

proximately 500 well-organized and wellarmed crime syndicates active in South 

Africa, half of which are located in and 

around Johannesburg.5  These gangsters 

engage in a myriad of crimes.  Police 

sources say 178 of the 500 are involved in 

the global drug trade.  While the rest, 

dabble in everything from vehicle theft 

and counterfeiting to smuggling gold, dia�

monds, arms, household goods, and 

people. 

Gangs in South Africa have a long history 

and a tight internal order.  Criminologist 

Vernie Peterson says gangs existed in work�

ing-class coloured areas for decades.  In 

the traditional coloured areas razed by 

apartheid, gangs were celebrated in song 

and legend.  Looked upon as local heroes, 

they controlled petty crime and in return 

dispensed limited patronage.  The scope of 

local gangs is immense.  Media reports 

claim that some 80,000 gangsters control 

much of the crime in the Cape Flats, a 

working-class district in Cape Town. 

South African gangs or syndicates, as described by Joan Wardrop in her study of 

Soweto street gangs, are organized like a 

typical Mafia organization.  These gangs 

are headed by a boss or makulu baas, who, 

with the help of his second-in-command, 

usually a brother or cousin, macro-manages a large hierarchical organization. 

Immediately under the makulu baas are 

his confidants who form a tight “inner 

circle.”  This inner circle is mainly respon18

sible for protecting the boss and devising 

new money-making schemes.  They are 

also in charge of the workforce, which 

encompasses a legion of prostitutes, spot�

ters, enforcers, truck drivers, and other 

lackeys.  Lastly, there are the foot soldiers. 

High-profile members entrusted with car�

rying out the gangs most dangerous and 

risky work.  Many of these street-level 

hoods, called tsotsi, were once shock 

troops for the African National Congress 

(ANC) in its struggle against the government.6  They have now transferred their 

guerrilla training, learned to combat an 

oppressive political system, to illegal ends. 

Now the gangs recruit in prisons, offering 

to lost youth an identity and a sense of 

belonging, as well as an income.7 

Although syndicates operate along strict 

internal controls, increasingly they are 

working with other syndicates to increase 

their power.  By reaching agreements with 

smaller gangs or contracting work out to 

individuals, they are better able to ship 

their products.  Just like multinationals, 

they must “buy” into local operations and 

expand them or contract subsidiary orga�

nizations to conduct their work for them in 

areas where they do not have expertise.8 

For example, a gang may hire a subcon�

tractor with a particular skill in vehicle 

theft or smuggling drugs, guns, or aliens. 

These formal and informal linkages between gangs are usually based on more 

than just mutual business interests.  Many 

gangs are derived from family, clan, reli�

gious, and civic ties that go back again to 

the apartheid era.9  This explains the 

growth of transnational criminal alliances, 

in which cartels in one region will link with 

gangs in other areas in order to ship their 

goods and open new markets. 

Sociologist Alan Block aptly describes this 

new criminal trend in his definition of 

crime syndicates.  He sees transnational 

organized crime as “a loosely constructed 

social system and social world.”  This is a 

world in which a loose set of “relationships” bind professional criminals, politi�

cians, law enforcement, and various entre�

preneurs together. These links are clearly 

seen in South Africa’s drug trade. 

A New 

Transshipment Point 

As law enforcement agencies across the 

globe crack down on transnational narcot�

ics traffickers, drug lords are forced to find 

new places from which to ship their wares 

and launder their ill-gotten gains.  Because 

of South Africa’s developed infrastructure, 

as well as its overworked customs inspec�

tors, and its convenient location between 

East Asia and South America, it is becom�

ing an attractive new drug transshipment 

point for gangs from as far away as Russia 

and Asia. 

Working through Nigerians, these 

transnational criminal organizations link 

up with local South Africa gangs to create 

new drug transit routes to the United 

States and Europe. Both feed off one another in a symbiotic relationship. 

Transnational crime groups need the locals 

to do the ground work, while local gangs 

need the money that the global drug trade 

provides to maintain their turf. 

19

Most of the drugs that come into South 

Africa are smuggled in by Nigerians crimi�

nals, who pose either as tourists or refu�

gees.  Since customs officials worldwide are 

on the look-out for Nigerian criminals’ 

smuggling contraband, many Lagos-based 

drug syndicates have relocated to other 

countries in order to take heat off themselves.  Nigerian criminals see South Africa 

as the perfect transit hub.  It provides 

them unequaled access to other countries 

in Africa and a convenient base not too far 

away from home.  Due to massive refugee 

flows, no one actually knows how many 

Nigerians have migrated to South Africa.  It 

is commonly believed, however, that there 

are large pockets of them in Johannesburg, 

Durban, and Cape Town. 

For example, cartels in Colombia often get 

semiprocessed cocaine from Bolivia and 

Peru and move it through go-betweens in 

Brazil.  Nigerian drug mules take 

semiprocessed cocaine from South America 

to Africa.  Contacts in South Africa then 

ship it to Europe, where the Italian Mafia 

distributes some of the drug in Western 

Europe, while Russian gangs distribute the 

rest in Eastern Europe. 

Hashish comes from Afghanistan and Paki�

stan through Kenya to Nigerian criminals 

in South Africa.  Meanwhile, LSD and ec�

stasy (XTC) avoid other countries entirely 

by coming to South Africa directly from 

the Netherlands and England respectively. 

From southeast Asia, Nigerian gangs, in 

cooperation with Chinese Triads, move 

heroin from the “Golden Triangle” through 

South Africa and then into the West, as 

well as Mandrax from India, which flows in 

from a number of African countries includ�

ing Zambia, Zaire, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, 

Mozambique, Swaziland, and Kenya. 

As cited above, South Africa’s neighbors 

have very porous borders and are often 

used as transit states.  In addition, other 

nations such as Zambia are known transit 

points for drugs from southern Asia to 

South Africa and Europe.  On February 2, 

1994, three Zambians were arrested in the 

Groot Marica area and police seized 5,000 

Mandrax sedative tablets.10  In West Africa, 

Ghana is another major drug transit state. 

On December 23, 1994, South African 

police arrested three Ghanaian men and 

seized over 2,910 grams of cocaine 

wrapped in condoms and swallowed by the 

drug traffickers.11 

Growing Domestic 

Drug Use 

It is important to note that while close to 

90 percent of all the drugs shipped to 

South Africa end up in other countries, 

some stay.  Many SAPS officials see South 

Africa as gradually becoming a major drug 

market.  Recent police statistics show some 

disturbing trends.  For instance, there has 

been a marked increase in the consump�

tion of so-called designer drugs, like co�

caine and heroin, as well as newer drugs 

like ecstasy and its derivative nexus.12  In 

1992 police seized 1,341 grams of heroin, 

1,846 grams in 1993 and an astonishing 

24,745 grams in 1994.13  South Africa has 

also earned the dubious distinction of 

being one of the largest producers of mari�

juana (dagga) in the world, edging out 

traditional front-runners, Mexico and Mo�

rocco. 

20

To illustrate the growing spread of cocaine 

use in South Africa.  Police point to the 

doubling of arrests for cocaine-related 

offenses during the period from 1992 to 

1994.  In addition, the amount of cocaine 

seized rose sixfold from 24 lb. to 152 lb.14 

In 1995, police confiscated 400 lb. of co�

caine, two and a half times more than the 

year before.15 Even more indicative of 

increasing availability of cocaine is the 

dramatic decrease in its street price.  Today a rock of cocaine goes for about $14. 

Police fear that cocaine—which is half the 

price it was a year ago—will become as 

cheap as mandrax, which sells for between 

$8 and $10 a tablet.16  Moreover, the 

people who run drug rehabilitation cen�

ters, have also noticed a sudden rise in 

cocaine use.  Four years ago it was com�

mon to have one cocaine case a year.  Now 

they are getting six to 12 cases a day.17 

In addition, 80 percent of all of the 

mandrax produced globally is destined for 

South Africa.  Mandrax was a legally available sleeping pill until the 1970s.  Since 

then, many South Africans have taken to 

crushing it, mixing it with marijuana and 

smoking it.  Officials estimate that 4.5 

million tablets of mandrax were sold in 

South Africa in 1995.18  And finally, the 

highly addictive crack form of cocaine is 

swiftly replacing dagga as the drug of 

choice. 

Smuggling 

Police are quick to point out the fact that 

once a drug smuggling route is established 

it can easily be used to transport other 

illicit goods like arms, cars, ivory, gems, 

and counterfeit notes.  For example, 

mandrax is increasingly being bartered for 

stolen vehicles and spare parts from South 

Africa.  South Africa’s national road, N-4, 

from Mozambique and Swaziland is fast 

becoming one of the main smuggling 

routes.  On May 12, 1995, police confis�

cated approximately 4,000 mandrax tablets valued at 60,000 Rand, and found 12 

bags of marijuana the next day.19 

Asian criminal organizations are very ac�

tive in smuggling in ivory, rhino-horn, 

abalone, minerals, vehicles, and aliens.20 

Some of Asia’s most powerful criminal 

groups, such as the 14 K-Hau Tsz Triad 

Society, the Table Mountain Gang (a Tai�

wan-based criminal organization), the Wo 

Shen Wo Triad Society and others from 

China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan are active 

in South Africa. 

Cheap guns, a legacy of Africa’s many 

armed conflicts, abound in the region. 

Asian gangs are also involved in the illegal 

arms trade.  Trade in these weapons is 

highly profitable, even as prices fall.  SAPS 

reports that during the period from Janu�

ary 1 to August 31, 1995, a total of 7,247 

firearms was confiscated by them, 3,983 in 

the volatile KwaZulu-Natal Province alone. 

South African police uncovered a “crack 

Japanese gunrunning syndicate” in Cape 

Town last August.  Gang members were 

reportedly buying .38 caliber handguns 

from local gun dealers and then shipping 

them via Mauritius to Japan where they 

were given to local Mafia members.21 

While Asian gangs had a late start, they 

have swiftly secured their place in South 

Africa’s underworld.  They can be found 

throughout South Africa, but their primary 

headquarters are in Cape Town.  Triads 

also run quasilegitimate businesses such as 

night clubs, restaurants, travel agencies 

and movie companies.  These are, as a rule, 

supported with ill-gotten gains. 

Police believe that seven large organized 

syndicates control most of the gold and 

diamond smuggling trade.  Using money 

21

from illicit activities, such as narcotics 

trafficking, smugglers are able to buy con�

signments of minerals and then ship to 

Europe for sale on the black market.  Sto�

len gold and diamonds are flown by small 

planes to neighboring countries or it is 

sent by ship straight to Europe.  All this 

requires a highly organized syndicate.  In 

1995,  20 tons of gold worth $34 million 

were stolen from the nation’s mines. Dia�

mond theft also runs into the millions with 

3,594 uncut gems stolen from mines in the 

Johannesburg area alone.  While costly, 

many in the mining industry dismiss it as 

petty theft carried out by miners.  In real�

ity, it is middle and upper level managers, 

who have connections to mobsters, not 

miners, pilfering the company.  Most of the 

money received from stolen bullion and 

gems goes into Swiss bank accounts.21 

Smuggling illicit goods is made simple by 

inefficient and corrupt customs officials. 

Hundreds of Zimbabweans sneak into 

South Africa daily.  Low paid and overworked customs officials on both sides of 

the border are susceptible to bribes, this 

allows smugglers to brazenly enter South 

Africa without any documentation.  Many 

smugglers use taxicabs, whose drivers will 

allow anyone to enter the country without 

detection for the right price.23  Corruption 

can also be found at airport terminals.  In 

October 1995, police uncovered a smug�

gling ring that had almost circumvented 

airline security, airport security, customs, 

and the police.  It is believed that the con�

traband almost passed inspection because 

customs officials are either bribed to look 

the other way or they are busy looking for 

weapons.  Police believe that this is just the 

tip of the iceberg.24 

All this lucrative contraband provides the 

criminals with ready cash with which they 

are able to purchase legitimate businesses. 

Since these legitimate businesses are subsi�

dized by crime, they can run-off the com�

petition by undercutting their competitor’s 

prices.  Ultimately, they are left with a 

monopoly.  This is just another of the 

negative consequences of rampant crime. 

Carjacking and 

Motor Vehicle Theft 

Police reports state that a car is stolen 

every 9 minutes in South Africa. 

Carjackings are taking place at a very rapid 

rate—one every 53 seconds.25  This 

amounts to over 8,000 carjackings in 1995 

alone.  Over 75 percent of these armed 

thefts took place in Gauteng Province, 

which includes crime-ridden 

Johannesburg.  The total financial lost 

from car theft and hijacking in 1995 

equaled 4.5 billion Rand ($53 million, 

which is two-thirds of what South Africa’s 

legitimate car makers made that year.26  In 

addition, during South Africa’s transition 

from apartheid to democracy (1990–95) 

truck hijackings rose by 238 percent. 27 

SAPS says there are over 112 organized 

criminal syndicates involved in vehicle 

theft.  These syndicates have wide ranging 

networks spanning the globe. 

Experts believe that close to 80 percent of 

all vehicle thefts can be traced to orga�

nized criminal syndicates, who smuggle 

these vehicles to other countries or chop 

them up to sell their parts on the black 

market.  For instance, some of these stolen 

cars are being found in places as far away 

as Europe and Australia.  In order to make 

a profit, poor street kids are enticed by 

criminal gangs to steal vehicles at gun 

22

point.  Since new legislation make it illegal 

for the police to arrest anyone under the 

age of 18, most carjackers are teenagers, 

who commit these crimes with impunity. 

The gangs get the vehicles and then transship them to other southern African na�

tions, such as Zimbabwe and Botswana. 

Recently South Africa police, with help 

from Zambia and Zimbabwe, broke up a 

large-scale organized car theft ring, netting 

7.25m Rand ($2million) worth of stolen 

vehicles. 

Money Laundering 

Crime syndicates are truly international 

businesses, and like any business, these 

organizations are fueled and motivated by 

the huge profits that are their lifeblood. 

Without this money, they cannot finance 

the manufacturing, the transportation, the 

smuggling, the distribution, the murder, 

and the intimidation that are essential to 

their illegal trade.  According to U.N. esti�

mates, organized crime is a $750 billiondollar-a-year enterprise.  All this money 

most go somewhere.  Thus, drug smug�

glers are constantly looking for places were 

they can launder their profits.  With the 

advent of high speed computers and an 

increase in international money transfers, 

money laundering is easier now than ever 

before.  South Africa, with its lax banking 

regulations, is the perfect place to launder 

money. 

According to Special Agent Harold Wankel, 

Chief of Operations for the United States 

Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement 

Administration, in his testimony before the 

House Banking and Finance Committee in 

February 1996, “Globalization of the drug 

trade has necessitated an expansion and 

sophistication of the laundering of illegal 

drug profits.”  Methods of laundering drug 

money vary by country and region, driven 

by a number of factors, including the so�

phistication of banking and financial cen�

ters, the existence of underground banking 

systems that operate largely along ethnic 

lines and strength of enforcement pressure.28 

FBI Director Louis J. Freeh in testimony 

given before the Senate Appropriations 

Committee, Subcommittee on Foreign 

Operation’s hearing on International 

Crime, said that criminal organizations are 

attracted to new democracies because of 

the “relaxed borders and improved tele�

communications systems that have 

emerged in recent years to facilitate their 

illegitimate operations.  These countries 

are targets of opportunity for the major 

drug trafficking organizations, like the 

Colombian cartels, which seek to establish 

new and lucrative markets.”29 

23

Commercial Crime 

SAPS reports that 85 organized gangs are 

involved in sophisticated commercial 

crimes, including embezzlement.  This 

equates to a $6.8 billion (31 billion Rand) 

drain on the economy.30  In 1996, 54,846 

cases valued at $852 million (R3.8 billion) 

were reported to police, a 7.3 percent increase in reported cases and a 37 percent 

increase in the value involved when com�

pared to figures for 1995.  Some 42 percent of all commercial crimes committed in 

South Africa in 1996 took place in Guateng 

Province, the nation’s commercial nerve 

center. 

Police reason that social, political, and 

technological developments have led to 

rising commercial crime, especially with 

South Africa’s access to technology.  The 

fear is that because of lax laws and negli�

gible enforcement, white-collar crime will 

expand.  As lucrative U.S. firms enter South 

Africa they will make tempting targets. 

SAPS officials are concerned about the 

scope and depth of commercial crime.  In 

the past, the police have had a difficult 

time controlling fraud and embezzlement 

cases.  Problems arose because the police 

lacked the resources to deal with these 

“victimless crimes” and because most com�

panies are reluctant to report these crimes. 

However, a KPMG Aiken and Peat Forensic 

Auditors Survey shows that more compa�

nies are now willing to report commercial 

crimes.  Moreover, heavily publicized com�

mercial crime cases have shown law 

enforcement’s resolve in hunting down 

commercial criminals. 

Crimes Effect on 

Foreign Investors 

America is the third largest foreign inves�

tor with some 250 firms, behind both Brit�

ain and Germany, but that number is 

growing faster than for any other nation.31 

American businesses are obviously inter�

ested in South Africa, but they are with 

good reason wary about the growth of 

organized crime. 

Organized crime can hurt foreign busi�

nesses through a variety of methods.  It 

mainly tries to drive out legitimate compe�

tition, by using its ability to call on mas�

sive amounts of cash to influence local 

governments.  Organized crime does not 

try to compete on an equitable basis and 

therein lies the threat.  Illicit profits 

pumped into a legitimate business by its 

criminal overlords will help to sustain that 

business as its lowers its prices in an effort 

to drive out other competitors.  Once com�

petition has been eliminated, a monopoly 

is formed in that sector by criminal gangs. 

In addition to the ability to undermine 

legitimate businesses through illegal com�

petition, organized criminal groups’ influ�

ence over labor unions can also be an ef�

fective tool for eliminating competitors. 

24

For instance, control over teamsters or 

garbage collectors can quickly run up costs 

for private sector businessmen.  Labor 

strikes are another effective tool wielded 

against legitimate business. 

The danger of being financially undermined by the Mafia is not the only peril 

faced by business.  There are unsubtle 

methods as well: extortion and intimida�

tion are also practiced.  This has not yet 

been the case in South Africa, but it is 

something that will need to be closely 

monitored. 

In South Africa, crime affects business 

mainly through quality of life issues.  If 

workers are constantly under threat from 

violent crime they will be less productive. 

It will also increase fixed costs associated 

with security measures for workers and for 

plant and equipment.  Crime affects the 

cost of doing business in an area if the 

ports and transportation routes are 

haunted by systematic theft and hijacking. 

All these factors work to undermine long 

term capital investment by both foreign 

and domestic firms.  This internal strife 

undermines the government’s tax base. 

Without this source of revenue the govern�

ment has little money to support police 

protection.  Consequently, with little or no 

policing taking place, a vicious crime cycle 

begins.  Thus a self-perpetuating downward economic and social spiral starts. 

Why Now and 

Why South Africa? 

Mark Shaw in his recent work on crime, 

notes that there are two dovetailing trends 

that facilitated the growth of organized 

crime and crime in general in South Africa. 

First is the nation’s transition from apart�

heid to democracy.  Shaw says that, “Com�

parative evidence suggests that crime increases markedly in periods of political 

transition coupled with instability and 

violence.”  He cites Eastern Europe during 

its transition to democracy, and in the 

final days of the Soviet Union and the first 

days of the Soviet Republics, as examples 

where economic and political collapse 

created a vacuum into which organized 

crime grew.  The obvious answer then 

could be that political instability breeds 

crime. 

The legacy of apartheid makes South 

Africa’s history much different than that of 

nations in Eastern Europe.  The erosion 

and then collapse of apartheid boundaries 

allowed crime to move out of the townships and into the suburbs, where it was 

more likely to be recorded.  Greater afflu�

ence in these areas—and in parts of black 

townships as barriers to black economic 

empowerment dropped—increased the 

rewards available to criminals and the 

incentive to engage in more organized, 

sophisticated crime. 

It is the effects of apartheid on the SAPS 

which make today’s crime fighting that 

much more difficult.  In the past, the po�

lice were agents of a state helping to enforce the nation’s idea of a morale society. 

According to Shaw, even the South African 

Police’s official historian concedes that 

during the apartheid era, only one in ten 

members of the force were engaged in 

25

crime detection and investigation.  Com�

bating crime was secondary to the policing 

of apartheid and the maintenance of inter�

nal security.32  Hence, older police have 

little experience in actual crime fighting in 

the Western sense.  This inexperience is 

now showing as organized crime is getting 

a foothold in the nation.  The police are 

unprepared for this type of work and are 

just now reorganizing their forces to better 

combat organized crime, but there are still 

some large gaps.  For instance, there are 

only 400 officers assigned to a nationwide 

drug task force.  The number of interna�

tional flights into South Africa has more 

than tripled since 1994.33 

Moreover, South Africa has many of the 

attending social ills seen throughout subSaharan Africa.  Rapid urbanization, cheap 

weapons, high unemployment, high popu�

lation growth rate, illegal immigration, 

high illiteracy rates, and one of the world’s 

most unequal income distributions.  Socio�

economic factors are a long-term problem 

that the government hopes to address 

through economic development and reform, but short-term crime issues are being 

addressed by some new SAPS initiatives. 

Police Response 

Over the past 2 years, the SAPS have begun 

several projects with other nations and 

with local businesses to promote coopera�

tion.  These initiatives include: 

A Tourism Safety Task Force Joint was 

established in November of 1995.  This is a 

joint project between the police and the 

community.  Where stakeholders, like tour 

groups and hotels, provide funds so that 

the police can provide extra security and 

information for tourists.  In addition, a 

nongovernmental agency, National Busi�

ness Against Crime and Corruption, was 

formed to provide a liaison between the 

police and the business community.  Over 

the past year this organization produced a 

media awareness campaign and provided 

the Guateng Police with 4,000 cellular 

phones and 100 BMW police vehicles. 

SAPS has created a unit specialized in orga�

nized crime, the National Crime Investiga�

tion Service, which solely monitors and 

tracks organized criminal gangs.  They 

have also enhanced their intelligence and 

information management networks, and 

are developing both a national- and pro�

vincial-level computerized data base.  Plus 

South Africa participated in its first joint 

crime combatting exercise in June–July 

1995.  The government has also signed 

anticrime cooperation agreements with 

Mozambique and Swaziland in March and 

August of 1995 respectively. 

On June 13, 1996, Police commissioner 

George Fivaz announced the start of “a no 

nonsense, back-to-basics policing plan 

aimed at crushing crime wherever it is 

encountered.”  He pledged to arrest 10,000 

of South Africa’s “most wanted” criminals 

within 1 month, as part of phase one of a 

long-range anticrime campaign.  These are 

all steps in the right direction, but even 

more must be done. 

26

How the Private Sector CanHelp Fight Organized CrimeSo what can be done to stop this growing 

trend? 

First, there needs to be more cooperation 

between the private sector and govern�

ment.  Information sharing is a key ingre�

dient in the fight against organized crime. 

These groups actively seek to hide their 

activities.  Thus a bright light is needed to 

bring their actions out into the open for 

everyone to see.  Opponents need to know 

what they are up against before any coun�

termeasures can be devised.  By sharing 

information both the private and public 

sectors can work together to defeat the 

enemy. 

Second, police need the latest technology 

in order to have a level playing field.  Cur�

rently, the SAPS do not have simple tools 

like a computerized fingerprint identifica�

tion system.  Thus, many criminals go free 

because they can not be linked with other 

crimes quickly enough and are let out on 

bail.  The SAPS also need more advanced 

equipment to conduct drug interdiction 

operations.  More X-ray machines at airports, would do wonders for interdiction, 

as well as more people and dogs to check 

bags. 

Only through cooperation between the 

public and private sectors can organized 

crime be defeated.  To facilitate better 

crime prevention measures and to imple�

ment effective law enforcement tech�

niques, there must be more communica�

tion, a better exchange of information, and 

a more efficient dissemination of ideas 

among governmental agencies.  With increasing awareness by both sectors of soci�

ety, it is possible that the scourge of orga�

nized crime can be curtailed in South Af�

rica.  This effort to dismantle the orga�

nized crime syndicate must be accom�

plished in the immediate future before the 

tentacles of the crime organization become 

so embedded in South Africa’s social and 

political scenes that they may never be 

removed. 

27

1994 1995 1996

17 18 15


84 69 62


43 37 35


* American Chamber of Commerce, South Africa 

Crime Ratios per 100,000 People 1994–96* 

1994  1995  1996 

Violent Crimes 

Murder 

Attempted Murder 

Robbery w/Aggravating Circumstances 

43 42 37 

46 44 43 

139 136 107 

Social Fabric Crimes 

Rape 

Serious Assault (GBH) 

Common Assault 

64 70 74 

321 334 334 

299 314 309 

Property-Related Crimes 

Housebreaking (Residential) 

Housebreaking (Business) 

Other Robbery 

Stock Theft 

Shoplifting 

Theft of Motor Vehicles 

Theft out of Motor Vehicles 

Other Thefts 

365 388 385 

150 146 142 

56 58 79 

64 66 65 

110 101 96 

170 170 152 

295 307 295 

582 590 595 

Commercial Crimes 

Fraud, Forgery, Misapproriations, 

Embezzlements and Other 103 100 99 

Violence Aimed at Property 

Arson 

Malicious Damage to Property 

19 18 15 

194 201 198 

Selected Other Crimes 

Illegal Possission of Firearms 

Drug-related Crimes 

Driving Under the Influence of 

Alcohol or Drugs 

28

Endnotes1Karen A. Tellis, “The World of Drugs” Transnational Organized Crime, Vol. 1, No. 1, Spring 1995, 117.­

2William Rees Mogg, “Economic, Social Woes Threaten S. Africa’s Democratic Euphoria.” Times of London. 

07/07/96. 

3Juliette Saunders, “Crime Costs S. Africa 5.6 Percent of GDP—Survey,” Reuter, 06/11/96 

4Reuters, 6/13/96. 

5Mark Shaw, “The Development of Organized Crime in South Africa,” in Policing the Transformation—New 

issues in South Africa’s crime debate. IDP Monograph Series, No. 3, April 1996, 68. 

6Joan Wardrop, “Policing the Cities: Soweto, Syndicates and ‘Doing Business,’” a paper presented at The 

South African Institute of International Affairs, August 4–6, 1996, 6–8. 

7Brendan Boyle, “Gangs Sow Fear Under S. Africa’s Table Mountain,” Reuters, 08/08/96. 

8Shaw, 69. 

9Wardrop, 15. 

10Transnational Organized Crime, Vol. 1, No. 1, Spring 1995, 131. 

11Transnational Organized Crime, Vol. 1, No. 1, Spring 1995, 148. 

12Bronwyn Wilkinson, “Police Seize First Batch of New Designer Drug—Nexus.”  The Star.  11/04/95. 

13Elsa Semmelink, “Narcotic Bureau Says Heroin Becoming ‘Serious Threat.’” Saturday Star. 7/29/95. 

14“Drug Barons See South Africa as Conduit, Police,” Reuters, 07/05/95. 

15Suzanne Daley, “Apartheid’s Fall Opens Door To Scourge of Cocaine,” New York Times,  02/19/96, A4. 

16Daley, 02/19/96. 

17Daley, 02/19/96. 

18Daley, 02/19/96. 

19Johannesburg SABC TV 1 Network in Afrikaans, FBIS May 12, 1995, “N-4 Highway Cited as Major Drug 

Smuggling Route.” 

20OICJ, Analytical Studies Unit. 

21“Japanese Police Investigate Gun-Running Syndicate.”  Johannesburg SAPA, 08/02/95. 

22Melanie Cheary, “Smugglers Get Rich On Stolen S. African Gold,”  Reuters, 05/08/96. 

23“Smuggling, Corruption Said Widespread at Border.”  Johannesburg SAPA, 10/19/95. 

24Bobby Brown,“Smuggling Incidents Raise Concerns Over Airport Security,” Johannesburg The Star, 

10/26/95, A3. 

25Juliette Saunder, “Violent Crime Mars South Africa’s Democracy,” Reuters, 6/05/96. 

26Saunder, 6/05/96. 

27Saunders, 6/11/96. 

28DEA Chief of Operations, Special Agent Harold D. Wankel in testimony given to the House Banking and 

Finance Committee, February 28, 1996. 

29FBI Director Louis J. Freeh in testimony given before the Senate Appropriations Committee, 

Subcommittee on Foreign Operation’s hearing on International Crime, March 12, 1996. 

30Saunders, 6/11/96. 

31Catherine O’Mahony, “German Firms Take Wait-And-See Stance on S. Africa.”  Reuters, 05/23/96. 

32Mark Shaw, “Urban Conflict, Crime and Policing in South Africa Cities.”  African Insight.Vol. 25, No. 4, 

1995, 217. 

33Daley, 02/19/96 

29

Nigerian Nigerian

Advance Advance

Fee Fraud Fee Fraud

emerging trends in transnational crime  emerging trends in transnational crime

Nigerian 

Advance 

Fee Fraud 

By 

Andy 

Corsun 

Special thanks to David Manley, formerRegional Security Officer in Lagos, Nigeria;­

Mike Zupan, Assistant Regional SecurityOfficer, Lagos, Nigeria, and the U.S. SecretService Financial Crimes Division.­

(Notes appear at the end of this article)­

While checking the office mail 

you come across a poorly 

handwritten envelope addressed to you (or your com�

pany) postmarked from 

Lagos, Nigeria. Inside, on of�

ficial-looking stationery, is an 

unsolicited “confidential busi�

ness proposal,” from someone 

purporting to be a Nigerian 

civil servant. The offer states: 

30

“Having consulted with my colleagues, 

and based on information gathered from 

the Nigerian Chamber of Commerce, I am 

pleased to propose a confidential busi�

ness transaction to our mutual benefit. I 

and my colleagues have in our possession 

instruments to transfer the sum of 

$35,500,000.00 into a foreign company’s 

account in our favor. This amount ema�

nated as a result from an over-invoiced 

contract, executed, commissioned, and 

paid for about two years ago by a foreign 

contractor. We are therefore seeking your 

assistance in transferring this money to 

your account as it can only be remitted 

to a foreign account, and as civil ser�

vants, we are forbidden to operate for�

eign accounts. The total sum will be 

shared as follows: 

30% for the account owner (you) 

60% for us 

10% to settle any incidental expenses 

“We shall commence the transfer of 

funds immediately, as soon as you send 

the following documents/information 

through the above fax number. 

1. Four copies of your company’s letter 

head and invoice papers signed and 

stamped 

2. Your banker’s name, address and fax 

numbers 

3. The account number and name of 

would be beneficiary. 

“Bear in mind that this is absolutely a 

private and personal deal, nonofficial; 

and should be treated with all measure of 

secrecy and confidentiality.” 

You have just received an Advance Fee 

Fraud (AFF) letter, also known as “419” 

after the section of the Nigerian penal law 

that deals with this type of fraud.1 

AFF letters and faxes are confidence 

schemes and appear as various proposals 

from “officials” of Nigerian Government 

ministries, existing companies, or Nigerian 

Government contracts. The letters and 

faxes contain official-looking stationery 

with appropriate government seals, stamps, 

and signatures. The aforementioned AFF 

letter is an example of a transfer of funds 

from an over-invoiced contract. 

The quality of AFF letters has evolved over 

the years, from poorly handwritten letters 

to more professional products prepared on 

word processors. Word processors also 

allow AFF criminals to generate more let�

ters. 

AFF criminals include university-educated 

professionals who are the best in the world 

for nonviolent spectacular crimes. 

AFF letters first surfaced in the mid-1980s 

around the time of the collapse of world oil 

prices, which is Nigeria’s main foreign 

exchange earner. Some Nigerians turned to 

crime in order to survive. Fraudulent 

schemes such as AFF succeeded in Nigeria, 

because Nigerian criminals took advantage 

of the fact that Nigerians speak English, the 

international language of business, and the 

country’s vast oil wealth and natural gas 

reserves—ranked 13th in the world—offer 

lucrative business opportunities that attract many foreign companies and indi�

viduals. 

31

AFF Schemes: Themes and Variations

AFF confidence schemes are limited only 

by imagination, however, they usually fall 

into the following categories: 

• Transfer of Funds From 

Over-Invoiced Contracts 

• Contract Fraud 

(C.O.D. of Goods and Services) 

• Conversion of Hard Currency 

(Black-Money) 

• Sale of Crude Oil at 

Below Market Prices 

• Purchase of Real Estate 

• Disbursement of Money from Wills 

(Benefactor of a Will) 

• Threat Scams or Extortion 

• Clearinghouse 

Each of these business schemes will be 

discussed in detail in the section entitled 

AFF Schemes: Themes and Variations. 

According to the Metropolitan Police Com�

pany Fraud Department in London, some 

3,000 AFF letters a week are mailed or 

faxed worldwide; primarily from Nigeria. 

The United States and Great Britain are the 

recipients of over 50 percent of this material. 

To circumvent the cost of mailing the let�

ters, these criminals will use counterfeit 

stamps and forged franked stamps or pos�

sibly attempt to bribe corrupt Nigerian 

Postal Service workers. It is believed that 

AFF letters with counterfeit stamps are 

surreptitiously placed in overseas mail or 

delivered by hand. 

Names and addresses of potential victims 

are obtained through various trade jour�

nals, business directories, magazine and 

newspaper advertisements, chambers of 

commerce, and the internet. 

Actual monetary losses to AFF scams are 

hard to obtain. Many victims are reluctant 

to come forward and report their loses in 

AFF scams because of fear or embarrass�

ment.  It is estimated that AFF scams result 

in the loss of hundreds of millions of dol�

lars annually worldwide. 

The U.S. Secret Service Financial Crimes 

Division, which receives 100 calls a day 

from Americans approached or defrauded 

from AFF criminals, indicates that 

“Nigerian organized crime rings running 

fraud schemes through the mail and phone 

lines are now so large, they represent a 

serious financial threat to the country 

[United States].” 

Profits obtained in AFF are often used to 

support other more violent crimes such as 

narcotics trafficking. In the early 1990s, 

Nigerian drug traffickers expanded their 

operations to include AFF, which is less 

risky, does not require much travel, nor 

the movement of contraband. According to 

the Nigerian Drug Law Enforcement 

Agency, drugs and financial fraud are 

inextricably intertwined in Nigeria. Conser�

vative estimates indicate that about 30–40 

percent of heroin that moves throughout 

the world is either moved by or its move�

ment is controlled by Nigerian criminals. 

AFF has created such a negative impact on 

legitimate Nigerian businesses, the Nige�

rian Government periodically places no�

tices in newspapers worldwide warning 

people of the fraud. 

Though basically a nonviolent crime, AFF 

has resulted in the kidnaping or death of 

foreign victims. Part of the criminal’s ruse 

is to have the victim travel to Nigeria (ei�

ther directly or via a bordering country) to 

32

CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA. 

PRESS STATEMENT 

ON 

ADVANCE FEE FRAUD SCAM 

EFFORTS MADE IN THE PAST THROUGH PRESS STATEMENTS TO COMBAT THEADVANCE FEE FRAUD/ 

TELEFAX SCAM,IT HAS CONTINUED UNABATED,WITH INCREASING SOPHISTICATION.THE BANK IS ALSO 

WORRIED BY THE RECKLESS ABANDON WITH WHICH NAMES OF SOME TOP CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA OFFICIALS ARE OFTEN FRAUDULENTLY USED BY THE FRAUDSTERS TO LEND CREDIBILITY AND 

RESPECTABILITY TO THE SPURIOUS TRANSACTIONS. 

2. GIVEN THE FREQUENCY WITH WHICH SOME GULLIBLE PEOPLE STILL FALL VICTIM TO THE BUSINESS SCAMS,THE CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA DEEMS IT NECESSARY ONCE AGAIN,TO RE-ISSUE THE 

PRESS STATEMENT (FIRST ISSUED IN 1991) TO ALERT THE INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS COMMUNITY,OF 

THE INCREASING SPAT OF THE ATTEMPTS BY INTERNATIONAL SYNDICATE OF FRAUDSTERS TO DEFRAUD THEM. 

3. THE FRAUDULENT ATTEMPTS TAKE THE FORM OF CIRCULAR LETTERS, UNAUTHORIZED FAX AND 

TELEX MESSAGES RELATING TO PURPORTED APPROVED TRANSFERS OF FUNDS RUNNING INTO THE 

MILLIONS OF U.S. DOLLARS ARISING FROM ALLEGED FOREIGN CONTRACTS.THE “BUSINESS PROPOSALS” SHOULD ORDINARILY HAVE PUT ANY RESPECTABLE INDIVIDUAL ON INQUIRY.HOWEVER DRIVEN 

BY GREED AND THE URGE FOR QUICK MONEY, MANY HAVE IGNORED THE WARNING BY THE CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA. THE AUTHORS OF THE CIRCULAR LETTERS WHO BEAR NIGERIAN NAMES 

ARE PART OF AN INTERNATIONAL SYNDICATE WHO ARE OUT TO DUPE GULLIBLE OVERSEAS RECIPIENTS WHO ARE THEMSELVES BOTH VILLAINS AND VICTIMS IN THE BOGUS “BUSINESS” DEALS. 

4. THE CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA,THEREFORE,WISHES ONCE AGAIN,TO WARN ALL RECIPIENTS OF 

SUCH FRAUDULENT LETTERS,ETC. THAT THEY DO NOT EMANATE FROM THE BANK AND THAT THE 

BANK HAS NO KNOWLEDGE OR RECORDS, WHATSOEVER, OF THE PURPORTED CLAIMS OR TRANSFERS OR EVEN THE RELATED ALLEGED CONTRACTS. RECIPIENTS SHOULD, AS SUCH, EXERCISE CAUTION AND IMMEDIATELY CONTACT THEIR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES OR THE INTERNATIONAL POLICE ORGANIZATION (INTERPOL) NEAREST TO THEM IN ORDER TO HELP TRACK DOWN 

THE INTERNATIONAL CROOKS AND SWINDLERS. 

5. THE BANK WILL NOT BEAR ANY RESPONSIBILITY FOR ANY LOSS SUSTAINED BY ANY PERSON OR 

CORPORATION THAT FAILS TO HEED THIS WARNING. 

CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA 

TINUBU SQUARE, P.M.B. 12194, LAGOS, NIGERIA 

THE CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA IS VERY MUCH CONCERNED THAT IN SPITE OF THE VARIOUS 

THE WASHINGTON POST DECEMBER 8, 1995 

○ ○ ○ ○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○ 33 
meet a (with) Nigerian Government 

“official(s)” to complete the transaction. 

Often, the victim is told that it is not necessary to get a visa, or the criminals will get 

one for him or her.2 

Once in Nigeria, these criminals will attempt to solicit more money from the victim, either by continuing the elaborate 

ruse, or if that fails—physical intimidation. 

Over the past 3 years, 15 foreign businessmen (one American) have been murdered 

in Nigeria in AFF scams.3 

Since September 1995, at least eight 

Americans have been held against their 

will by these criminals in Lagos that have 

come to the attention of the U.S. Embassy. 

In 1996 the U.S. Embassy helped repatriate 

ten Americans who came to Lagos looking 

for their “pot of gold.” 

On July 2, 1996, a Swedish businessman 

was kidnaped from his hotel in Lome, 

Togo. Kidnapers, reportedly Nigerian 

criminals, demanded $500,000 ransom. It 

is believed that the businessman was a 

victim of an AFF scam that deteriorated 

into a kidnaping. After lengthy negotiations between the kidnapers and Swedish 

police, the victim was released unharmed 

on July 12, 1996. 

There has been little success in prosecuting 

these perpetrators. One explanation is that 

only 5–10 percent of AFF victims will come 

forward and report an incident. Other 

reasons are: 

• AFF victims may not want to admit 

they were defrauded, and involved in 

what they were led to believe was an 

illegal proposition. 

• Victims may believe they can recoup 

their losses by continuing to play out 

the fraud. Criminals rely on this logic, 

refered to as “gambler’s mentality,” 

resulting in more losses for the victim. 

• Victims may believe if they report the 

fraud they will be prosecuted under 

U.S. law as a co-conspirator. At least one 

U.S. court has upheld civil forfeiture of 

the proceeds  attributed to AFF. 

• Sections 5 and 6 of the Nigerian Presidential Decree of April 1995, make 

receipt and/or possession of a fraudulent letter by a victim an offense. This 

may deter victims from returning to 

Nigeria to aid in the prosecution of 

these criminals. 

Once a targeted victim forwards money 

and/or products to Nigeria in one of these 

scams, it is difficult, if not impossible, to 

recoup losses. Perhaps the best defense 

against AFF is to adhere to the old adage 

“if it looks too good to be true, it probably 

is.” 

The purpose of this report is to provide the 

reader with a basic understanding of how 

AFF works. Included are steps and guidelines on how to recognize AFF, and ways to 

determine legitimate business proposals 

and partners in Nigeria. 

34

How Advance How Advance

Fee Fraud Fee Fraud

Works

How Advance 

Fee Fraud 

Works 

After a victim responds positively to an 

AFF letter by sending the required documentation (for example, signed company 

letterheads, bank account number, etc.) 

the hook is in. The primary reason for the 

documentation is not to rob the victim’s 

bank account, but to perpetuate the illusion that the deal is legitimate and moving 

forward. The blank signed letterheads are 

altered and used by the criminals as props 

in other frauds, letters of reference to 

obtain visas, or sold to other AFF criminals. 

For the next week to 10 days, the perpetrators establish a level of trust with the victim. This is accomplished by sending the 

victim more “official” documentation verifying the bona fides of the deal and the 

people involved. The criminals will correspond with the victim via fax machines and 

courier mail because it is difficult to trace. 

In the past, these criminals made extensive 

use of business centers in Lagos to place 

phone calls and send faxes, but the Nigerian Government reports—and evidence 

seems to confirm—that business centers 

were closed in an effort to thwart AFF 

scams. 

The criminals also conduct the scams from 

their homes or other locations (front companies). To ensure the integrity of the 

phone lines at those locations, they will 

gain access to active telephone lines. The 

telephone lines were either abandoned by 

the owner who could no longer afford it, or 

are used without the knowledge or consent 

of the owner. Therefore, a criminal will use 

a phone line that is registered to someone 

living in another part of the city, making it 

almost impossible to trace. 

What happens next is the most crucial 

point in the fraud and can take a number 

of directions. A victim will be advised that 

the deal is near completion, however, an 

emergency has arisen and money is 

needed to pay an unforeseen government 

fee or tax before the money can be released. If the fee is paid, the criminals will 

come up with another “problem” that requires immediate payment by the victim. 

Each “problem” is supported by “official” 

documentation. 

The criminals can run this ruse for months 

or even years, depending on the gullibility 

of the victim or his or her desperation to 

recoup losses. One Western diplomat described it as “. . . kind of like gambling. 

You get in so deep you keep putting money 

in to get something out of it.” 

At some point during the fraud, the criminals will attempt to have the victim travel 

to Nigeria or a bordering country to finalize the contract, money transfer, or other 

transaction. If the victim appears reluctant 

to go to Nigeria, the criminals will suggest 

a neutral country where an AFF team, unbeknownst to the victim, is already established. The AFF team will not target a victim in the victim’s own country where they 

have established roots and can easily check 

on the validity of the scam. 

Pictured are some typical telephone lines in Lagos. 

It is very difficult for law enforcement officials to 

trace these telephone /fax lines to the perpetrators. 

35

��������������

One reason why it is so difficult to catch 

“419” criminals is that the address and 

phone/fax number found on a “419” 

letter/fax usually do not correspond to 

the correct area code of the section of 

Lagos from where it was actually sent. 

Nigerian “419” criminals usually conduct 

the scams from their homes or other 

locations. The criminals gain access to 

active telephone lines, which were either 

abandoned by the owner or used without 

the consent of the owner, making it impossible to trace. 

For example, if a “419” letter/fax shows 

an address and area code of Yaba (area 

code 86, see map) it could 

originated from Agege (area code 49, see 

map). Even in those instances where the 

address and phone/fax line are in the 

same area code, is still no guarantee that 

police will be able to trace the phone/fax 

line to the correct address. Nigerian 

“419” criminals are also using cellular 

phone number in scams which further 

adds to the difficulty in tracing their 

location. 

IKOYI

Area Code 26 Area Code 26

VICTORIA ISLAND VICTORIA ISLAND

Area Code 26 Area Code 26

U.S. 

Embassy 

LAGOS

ISLAND

Area Code 26 APAPA

Area Code Area Code

88 

YABA

Area Code Area Code

86 

SURULERE SURULERE

Area Code Area Code

58 

FESTAC

Area Code Area Code

88 

ISOLO

Area Codes Area Codes

52 & 55 52 & 55

MAFOLUKU MAFOLUKU

Area Codes Area Codes

49, 52, & 55 49, 52, & 55

IKEJA

Area Code Area Code

49 

AGEGE

Area Code Area Code

49 

Allen 

Avenue 

Airport 

Ireakari 

Street 

Okota 

Estates 

Western 

Avenue 

Oluwole 

Street Lagos

Harbor

Porto

Novo

Creek

LAGOS

have actually 

36

Travel to Nigeria 

In some instances, prior to coming to Nigeria, the criminals will tell a victim to bring 

expensive watches, pens, and men’s suits 

as “gifts.” Proceeds from these items are 

kept by the criminals. 

The criminals may tell the victim that a 

visa is not required to enter Nigeria, or a 

visa has been arranged to be issued upon 

arrival. Without exception, a valid Nigerian 

visa is required for entry and departure, 

and airport visas are not available. Travel 

to Nigeria should not be undertaken without first verifying the bona fides of a company or business partners. If a victim 

meets the criminals in a bordering country, the victim may find that he or she still 

must travel to Lagos. Entry without a visa, 

gives the criminals leverage over the victim 

and leads to other forms of extortion. 

Once in Lagos, the victim will be housed in 

one of the many small hotels (euphemistically known as “419” hotels), located primarily around Murtala Muhammad Airport. At this point, the victim is totally 

immersed in the scam, and the criminals 

have total control over the victim’s every 

move. The victim is taken to meetings with 

criminals posing as Nigerian Government 

officials, or possibly corrupt government 

officials, to finalize the deal. The meetings 

can take place in government offices or 

annexes that are “rented” by the criminals 

or in a office that is setup to resemble a 

government office. These offices are often 

located near government buildings to add 

authenticity to the fraud. 

If the victim is sufficiently duped by this 

elaborate ruse, he or she returns home 

unharmed and the scam continues. However, if the victim decides not to pay additional payments and/or sign a contract, 

the victim will be subjected to threats and 

physical abuse until he or she arranges for 

more payments. 

Neutral Country 

If the victim is reluctant to go to Nigeria, 

the criminals will suggest a neutral country 

where a team is already established. The 

victim will be requested to provide them 

with his or her flight itinerary and the 

name of the hotel he or she will be staying. 

This is the first step in controlling the 

victim’s movements during the scam. 

Operating under the guise that the business contacts are in Nigeria, the criminals 

will have the victim send roundtrip airline 

tickets from Lagos to the neutral country 

for face-to-face meetings with business 

contacts. The victim is also requested to 

reserve hotel rooms in his or her name for 

the contacts. The hotel rooms are never in 

the same hotel as the victim’s.4  The criminals will cash the airline tickets, and use 

the hotel rooms, which are reserved under 

the name of a legitimate business person, 

or his or her company, in other scams or 

sell to another AFF criminals. 

Meetings will be setup in areas of the city 

unfamiliar to the victim. To keep the victim off balance and allow the criminals 

time to conduct countersurveillance, the 

criminals will schedule and cancel a number of meetings with the victim. 

Whether the victim decides not to pursue 

the “deal” or at some point during a scam, 

the victim stops paying, the criminals will 

not walk away from the victim. They will 

attempt to reconsumate the fraud using 

various ruses. The AFF criminals might 

pose as Nigerian Government officials 

attempting to get the victim’s money back 

or try to convince the victim that they are 

the legitimate government officials and the 

other men he or she dealt with were 

frauds. Revictimization will be perpetrated 

either by the original criminals, or sold to 

another AFF team to operate. 

37

Advance Advance

Fee Fraud: Fee Fraud:

Themes and Themes and

Variations Variations

Advance 

Fee Fraud: 

Themes and 

Variations 

All AFF proposals share a common thread. The 

proposals are unsolicited, emphasize the urgency 

and confidentiality of the deal, and require the 

victim to pay various government and legal fees and 

taxes before receiving what turns out to be nonexistent money. 

Below are examples of some of the more common 

forms of Advance Fee Fraud. 

Transfer of Money From 

Over-Invoiced Contracts 

About 90 percent of AFF are over-invoiced contract 

scams. The scam involves an offer to transfer large 

sums of money into an overseas bank account 

owned by a foreign company. The money comes 

from over-invoiced contracts from a Nigerian 

company or one of the Nigerian Government ministries (that is, Central Bank of Nigeria, Nigerian 

National Petroleum Corporation). The author of the 

letter claims to be a government or bank official 

who is willing to pay the victim a generous commission of up to 30 percent for assisting in the 

transfer of the funds. Initially, the victim is asked to 

provide company letterhead and bank information 

to initiate the transfer of funds. The victim soon 

finds out that he or she is required to pay various 

“transaction fees” before the money can be released. The victim can be strung along for months 

or years paying various fees and taxes before realizing that the money does not exist. 
PROJECTS COSTS CONSULTANTS 

QUANTITY SURVEYORS, CONSTRUCTION COST CONSULTANTS & PROJECT MANAGERS 

OFFICE: NO.160 KOLAWOLE STREET, SHOMOLU, LAGOS-NIGERIA 

TEL: 2341-824153, FAX:234-1-4978114 

OUR REF: PCC/BE/O1_____________________YOUR REF:_________________DATE: 28/12/95_____ 

ATTN: THE PRESIDENT/CHIEF EXECUTIVE 

Dear Sir, 

REQUEST FOR URGENT BUSINESS EXECUTION 

We are writing based on the information about you and your firm we gathered from the foreign office of Nigerian Chamber of 

Commerce. We write with absolute confidence in the legality of our firm and that of you and your firm. Basically, the business 

we are about to introduce is based on trust and real confidence which we believe can exist between us. 

For your introduction, we are a small but very influential firm of quality surveyors, construction costs consultants and project 

managers who have been involved in the planning and execution of a number of projects for the Nigerian National Petroleum 

Corporation (NNPC) which were executed by foreign contractors. Most of these contracts were deliberately over-measured and 

over-invoiced at their planning stages. These projects have been commissioned and the contractors paid their rightful dues 

leaving the over-invoiced sums owed them by the Corporation. 

The military Government of Nigeria is part of an effort to win international support has directed that we examine these contracts 

and recommend all outstanding debts due all foreign contractors for payment. As consulting quantity surveyors on these projects, 

we and our colleagues at the corporation were able to discover these over-invoicing and over-management. At the end of this 

exercise, we are left with huge sums of money at the moment in a suspense account of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) 

resulting from the initial over invoice costs. We are therefore introducing to you one of these contracts where the sum of 

US$35M (Thirty Five Million U.S. Dollars) was over-measured and over-invoiced. We now seek the assistance of a trusted 

foreign company in order to process, claim and remit these funds into a nominated account as debt owed your company. In order 

to accomplish this therefore we shall require from you the following: 

i) A letter of trust and confidence to attest that we can 

trust and rely on you. 

ii) Three (3) copies of your company or any other company 

letter head and proforma invoice duly stamped and 

signed below with which you want us to process the claim. 

iii) Particulars of the bank account where you wish the 

funds to be transferred into. 

You are expected to send these to me via my fax number 234-1-4978114. 

During our deliberations, we resolve that my firm and my colleagues shall take 60% of the funds while 30% shall be given to 

you for your assistance and the remaining 10% shall be used to off-set all expenses that may be incurred by both parties during 

the course of executing the business. You are therefore advised to keep records of all your expenses in the course of executing 

the business. 

If this business interest you, please reply only by fax message so that we provide more details. While trying to reach us either by 

fax or phone, please dial direct. Do not go through the international operator in view of the confidential 

NATURE OF THE BUSINESS. 

Please trust with utmost confidence and urgency as we hope to hear from you soon. 

Yours faithfully, 

for: PROJECTS COSTS CONSULTANTS 

MR. FELIX OBI (PRINCIPAL PARTNER 
Contract Fraud 

(C.O.D. of Goods and 

Services) 

This fraud is sometimes referred to as “trade default” and targets primarily small companies with 

little export experience. According to the U.S. 

Department of Commerce, “Twenty-five percent of 

reported fraudulent business solicitations from 

Nigeria involve large orders for products of U.S. 

companies.” 

The targeted company receives an order from a 

Nigerian company and a bank draft for items to be 

shipped via air freight. The Nigerian company will 

attempt to solicit a sample of the product and/or 

introductory price under the guise of planning to 

introduce the product into Nigeria. The Nigerian 

company will try to convince the targeted company 

that registration, import, and other fees are required 

to bring the product into Nigeria.5 They will do this 

by sending the targeted company documentation 

from real or fictitious law firms. 

The Nigerian company will usually place a number 

of small orders (less than $10,000) with the targeted 

company, paying with legitimate bank drafts. This 

is to develop a business relationship with the targeted company and convince them that they have 

established an export opportunity and a new distribution system in Nigeria. The U.S. Commerce 

Department cautions American businesses whenever overseas bank drafts are used as payment by 

Nigerian companies or individuals. “While there is 

a possibility that such a draft could be legitimate, it 

is far safer to request payment in the form of an 

irrevocable letter of credit. The letter of credit 

should be confirmed by a reputable and known 

financial institution.” 

The targeted company will then receive an urgent 

letter indicating that the Nigerian company was just 

awarded a lucrative contract with the Nigerian 

Government. The targeted company is requested to 

immediately send a large shipment of their product. 

A bank draft is included with the letter. The shipment is sent, and the targeted company learns too 

late that the bank draft is fraudulent, the goods are 

not recoverable, and the Nigerian company does not 

exist. 

40

roundworld 

promotion & coy. 74 Iga-Iduganran Street (Registered in Nigeria) 

Isale-Eko, Lagos 

Nigeria 

Our Ref: RPA/092/96 Your Ref:______________Date: 9th JULY, 1996 

Our FAX NO:234-1-5450026-ATTN:FDS 044 

MESSRS: “TAKE PRIORITY ACTION” 

DEAR SIRS, 

RE: SUPPLIES OF COMPUTER SPARE PARTS – IBM COMPARTIBLE PARTS 

WE HAVE BEEN CUTTING STEPS CONTINEOUSLY TRYING TO GET THE NAME OF THE ADDRESS 

OF A RELIABLE EXPORTERS OF THE ABOVE FROM YOUR COUNTRY WHICH WE ARE FORTUNATE 

TO OBTAIN THROUGH A GOOD SAMARITAN AS A RELIABLE AND HONEST PARTY TO CONTACT 

FOR REGULAR SUPPLIES OF SAME AND SHALL APPRECIATE YOUR EVERY POSSIBLE CO-OPERATION ON THIS FIELD. 

FIRSTLY, WE ARE COMPELLED AS TO DRAW YOUR KIND ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT WE ARE 

ALSO REGISTERED AS A LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, WHOSE ACTIVITIES INVOLVE IMPORTS/ 

EXPORTS FOR MANY YEARS, ESPECIALLY ON ELECTRONICS ITEMS AND SHALL APPRECIATE 

YOUR EARLY RESPONSE TO THIS FRUITFUL NEGOTIATIONS. 

AT THIS RATE, WE FEEL FREE AS TO ENCLOSE HEREWITH, THE FOREIGN BANK DRAFT ISSUED TO 

US BY OUR FOREIGN FINANCING HOUSE IN AN EQUIVALLENT TO THE LOCAL CURRENCY DEPOSIT WE HAVE HAD WITH THEM, TO ENABLE YOU ARRANGE SHIPMENT OF THIS ORDER ON C&F 

LAGOS BY AIR PARCEL POST OR THROUGH ANY COURIER TO US JUST FOR PROMOTIONAL 

PURPOSE AT THE FORTHCOMING TRADE FAIR. THIS DRAFT IS TO BE ENTERTAINED INTO YOUR A/ 

C., BY WAY OF T/T ON ACCOMPANY THIS DRAFT WITH COPIES OF THE DISPATCH DOCUMENTS 

AS THE COUNTER BANK WILL TAKE DOWN THE RECORD OF PURPOSE OF RELEASING FUNDS 

INTO YOUR ACCOUNT. PLEASE COOPERATE, AND WE ARE PLANNING TO SEND OUR IMPORTS 

MANAGER OVERTHERE IN THE MONTH OF OCTOBER 1996. 

YOU WILL KINDLY SEND US A FAX DETAILING US ITEMS TO BE INVOLVE ON THE SHIPMENTS 

TO US AND POSSIBLY FULL DETAILS OF SHIPMENT OF THIS SAMPLE COLLECTIONS ETC., TO 

ENABLE US FOLLOW UP ACCORDINGLY. 

IT IS THE DESIRE OF THIS HOUSE AS TO BE YOUR SOLE AGENT, SINCE WE ARE PRESENTLY 

OPERATING THROUGHOUT THE WHOLE STATES WE HAVE IN NIGERIA AND WE HAVE NEGOTIATIONS FOR SUPPLIES OF THE UNDER MENTIONED ITEMS: 

OUR BOOKINGS:— COMPUTER SPARE PARTS — IBM COMPATIBLE PARTS 

SHIPMT: BY AIR PARCEL POST ON C&F LAGOS OR THROUGH ANY COURIER AND FAX US URGENTLY THE DISPATCH SLIP, ETC., AS TO ENABLE US FOLLOW UP. 

REMARKS:— PLS LET US KNOW IF YOU ARE ABLE TO ACCEPT THE V.A.T CHECKS FOR YOUR 

IMMEDIATE CLEARANCE AT YOUR END, AWAITING YOUR ACCEPTANCE CONMFIRMATIONS AND 

BEST RGARDS TOWARDS YOUR EARLY RESPONSE. 

YOURS FAITHFULLY, 

DIRECTOR 

(A.A.ABBEY) Esq. 

ENCL:INTERN.BANK DRAFT: 

USD 35,000,000. 

SPECIALITIES: 

IMPORTER, 

EXPORTER, 

MARKET 

PROMOTION & 

PUBLICITY. 

PRESS/SCREEN 

PRINTING 

SERVICES. 

DESIGNER, 

STATIONERY 

SUPPLIER & 

GENERAL 

CONTRACTOR. 

T

H

E

COMPLETE INDUSTRIAL SERVICES 

41

Conversion of Conversion of

Hard Currency Hard Currency

Conversion of 

Hard Currency 

(Black Money) 

This fraud is reminiscent of the 1930s 

flimflam whereby a con artist would put a 

piece of paper into a box and pull out a 

dollar bill from the other end. Today’s 

version is called Conversion of Hard Money 

or “Wash-Wash.” It is more sophisticated, 

but the results are the same. 

The letter or fax entices the victim with a 

“chance of a lifetime” offer. Once the victim agrees to allow the criminals to obtain 

a visa for him or her and meet them in 

Nigeria, (or a neutral country) the following scenario occurs: 

The victim will be shown a suitcase allegedly full of U.S. currency in $100 bill denominations that was temporarily defaced 

with a black waxy material (vaseline and 

iodine) to mask their origin. The criminals 

tell the victim that there is $40 million 

dollars in the suitcase. However, in order 

to remove this material, and restore the 

notes, the victim must purchase a special 

solution (commercial cleaning fluid) which 

is very expensive. The cost of the special 

solution ranges from $50,000 to $200,000. 

The victim will receive 40 percent of the 

$40 million as his or her “commission.” 

In front of the victim, the criminals will 

wash one of the bills with the special solution restoring the U.S. currency to its original form. In an effort to assuage any 

doubts the victim may have, the victim will 

be asked to pick out another $100 bill at 

random to be cleaned. Before the criminal 

A microwave is sometimes used in the “wash-wash” 

scam. Instead of “solution” to remove the black 

material, criminals will use a microwave to melt the 

waxy material. 

cleans the bill, the victim is momentarily 

distracted by one of the criminal’s accomplices. During that split second, the criminal using slight of hand, will pull out a real 

$100 bill from his sleeve, and clean it in 

front of the victim. The “treated” notes are 

given to the victim to take to a bank for 

verification. 

In some instances, as a sign of good faith, 

the victim will be able to keep the suitcase 

for a short time, until the victim gets the 

money to buy the solution. To prevent the 

victim from opening the suitcase, the victim is told that exposure to the air will 

cause the black substance to ruin the 

money. Ammonia is placed inside the suitcase in the event the victim opens the 

suitcase giving the impression that the 

money is disintegrating. 

The criminals walk away with the victim’s 

money, and the victim ends up with a 

suitcase full of blank paper. 

42

ENGR.KEBBI ZANNA 

LAGOS, NIGERIA. 

Telfax:234-1-885553, 5890814 

Dear Sir, 

BUSINESS PROPOSAL STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL 

Your contacts came to me through a friend who does business between your country 

and Lagos. But I was careful not to reveal to him why I needed a competent foreign 

link in the person of your respected self. 

In short,I am a trained Chemist specializing in currency chemistry and top official in 

the Nigerian Security Printing and Minting Limited, in Lagos. During the last political 

dispensation in Nigeria (1992 to 1993), I was hired and involved in the chemical 

reconversion of otherwise genuine US Dollar Bills brought into Nigeria under hidden 

circumstances by powerful arab National who were out to give Financial Support to 

a moslem former presidential aspirant. And of course, this was with the tacit connivance of the then military government. 

Now in the heat that followed the political crises and the subsequent cancellation of 

the elections, the former moslem presidential aspirant was clamped in jail and has 

since remained in detention, with the result that some package containing a little less 

than (Forty-Million United States Dollars) $40, Million U.S. Dollars, awaiting reconversion, were abandonned in my care and custody. 

As a result of the discreet nature of the reconversion exercise, which in fact is known 

only to me, I now have in my exclusive control about (Forty-Million United States 

Dollars) $40 Million U.S. Dollars bills in cash, presently in the form of bonded 

retractable negative 267,03 mint stage, deliberately defaced to elude detection and 

facilitate their importation into Nigeria. The bills now require only chemical reconversion to grade A1 135 neon proof mint stage and subsequent movement outside of 

Nigeria for choice investments preferably in your country. 

After successfully reconverting the Dollar bills by chemical process, and in the event 

that you accept to work with me, you shall entitled to 40% of this funds and another 

5% shall be set aside for expenses, while the remainder of 55% shall be fore me and 

(2) subordinates. 

What in essence, the whole exercise entail, is that you shall be required to make a 

brief visit to Nigeria to see things for yourself and be convinced beyond doubts, that 

the reconverted bills would really meet any scientific or commercial tests in terms of 

its genuiness, either in Nigeria, Europe or in the U.S.A. 

Your visit will also avail us the opportunity of knowing each other and collectively 

plan workable strategies for smooth conclusion of this exercise. A letter of invitation 

to enable you obtain a visa to Nigeria will be faxed to you in due course. 

Finally, it is important to keep the facts of this exercise to yourself, the way I have 

done all these months. You must agree with me, that we cannot blow up a chance of 

a lifetime because we cannot be discreet over a matter that would defintely work to 

our mutual satisfaction. 

I await your urgent response, while I remain with best regards for your kind attention. 

Sincerely yours, 

ENGR. KEBBI ZANNA 
Sale of Crude 

Oil at Below 

Market Prices 

The victim is offered 

special crude oil 

allocations at lower 

than market rate. As 

in other AFF business 

proposals, the victim 

is required to pay 

special registration 

and licensing fees to 

acquire crude oil at 

below market price, 

only to find that the 

“sellers” have disappeared once the fees 

have been paid.6 

On July 2, 1996, officers of 

the Nigerian Federal Investigative and Intelligence Bureau 

(FIIB), accompanied by U.S. 

Secret Service agents and the 

Regional Security Officer in 

observer roles, executed 

search warrants on 16 locations in Lagos, resulting in the 

arrest of 43 Nigerians. One of 

the addresses, No. 84 Okota 

Ire Akarai Estate, Isolo, was not 

Dyke Bourder Oil Services but 

the office of NJIMA Industries 

(below), a manufacturer of 

high quality paints. Two 

facsimile machines, and five 

telephone sets were seized 

along with fake letterhead 

from the Central Bank of 

Nigeria, and the Nigerian 

Petroleum Corporation. Also 

correspondence from victims 

worldwide and N390,000 

(approximately US$4,800.) 

believed to be proceeds from 

AFF scams. 

DYKE BOURDER OIL SERVICES 

(PETROLEUM CONSULTANTS) 

NO 84, OKOTA ROAD, OKOT A-ISOLO, LAGOS, NIGERIA. 

FAX: 234-1-525346, TEL: 234 - 1- 525972 

OUR REF:................................... YOUR REF............................................... TE......................................... 

ATTN: THE PRESIDENT/C.E.O. 

Dear Sir, 

OFFER FOR SALE OF NIGERIA CRUDE OIL(SPOT LIFT). 

QUALITY: Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) standard export. 

TYPES: Nigerian Bonny Light, QUA IBOE Light, Penning Ton Light, Forcados Blend, 

Escravos Light, Bonny Medium, Brass Blend. 

QUANTITY: Three Million Barrels only. From quarterly allocation of the Nigerian National 

Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). 

SPECIFICATION: SPECIAL GRAVITY 084.98% 

FOR BONNY API 37.00 

LIGHT RSW 0.6% VOL 

WATER CONTENT 0.2% 

POUR POINT BELOW 4OF 

SULPHUR WT 0/14 

PRICE: 

The price per barrel shall be the arithmetic means of “Brent” dated quotation as reported on the plant meter wire as per 

average low/light of four (4) quotation (TWO) days before and Two days after discharge. The offer is less a gross discount of 

US$5.00 (United States Five Dollars) per barrel. This amount minus the current export price of US$17.50 per barrel. 

Letter of intent to be submitted to the Honourable Minister of Petroleum and mineral Resources, Nigerian National Petroleum 

Corporation (NNPC), Nol 7 Kofo Abayomi Street, Victoria Island, Lagos, Nigeria (i.e. contact through DYKE BOURDER OIL 

SERVICES). 

These conditions are as follows: 

1. Spot Life 

2. Quantity: 1 milliion barrels per month for 12 months 

3. OFFER ON F.O.B. 

4. OFFER OFF “OPEC” records 

5. Freight at buyer's account at US$1.24 per barrel 

6. Port charges, customs fees at buyers account at US$250,000.00 per vessel of the Million barrel. 

7. Buyer shall be the importer of records and shall be responsible for the paymnet of all customs duties or fees. Lay-time, 

demurrage, if any, at port of discharge shall bear all responsibilities in accordance with the terms and conditions of the 

charter party agreement. 

8. Payment of letter of credit shall be made by the buyer after ten (10) days to discharge of the crude oil into shore and upon 

presentation of the shipping documents to the buyer's bank. 

9. VAT (Value Added Tax). 

I do hope this will mark the beginning of a good business relationship between your company and mine in the nearest future. 

Thanks for your cooperation 

I.C. Okwe 

Chairman, 

DA 12the December, 1994 

44

Purchase of 

Real Estate 

This fraud involves an 

offer to purchase real 

estate using the services 

of a real estate broker 

or a “well established” 

business executive. 

Once a home is located, 

the broker or person 

acting on behalf of the 

home buyer is required 

to pay certain fees to 

complete the transaction in return for receiving a normal commission. 

JETAG PROJECTS W.A. LTD 

BRIG. GEN. BRIGHTH ONYE (RTD) 

PLOT 3 FASHADE CLOSE 

OREGUN 

IKEJA - LAGOS 

ATTENTION: 18th October 1994 

SIR, 

THANK YOU FOR YOUR EARLY REPLY, AS I MENTIONED TO YOU OVER THE TELEPHONE CONVERSATION, I USED MY COMPANY JETAG PROJECTS W.A. LETD AS A RETIRED SENIOR ARMY OFFICER TO 

FRONT FOR MY FORMER COLLEAGUES IN VARIOUS BUSINESSE. 

I WISH TO INFORM YOU AT THIS STAGE THAT I HAVE SUCCEEDED IN THIS RESPECT DUE TO THE 

CONFIDENCE PROPOSED ON ME BY THE MENTIONED. THE ARMY IS NOT VERY POPULAR HERE IN 

NIGERIA AND MY CLIENTS ARE EITHER BUYING PROPERTIES ABROAD OR DEPOSITING MONEY INTO 

ACCOUNTS OVERSEAS. 

IT IS THEREFORE GOING TO BE VERY INTERESTING AND PROFITABLE IF YOU CAN UNDERSTAND THE 

NEED TO MAINTAIN ABSOLUTE CONFIDENTIALITY OVER ANY TRANSACTION CARRIED OUT BY MY 

CLIENTS. MY CLIENTS NAME WILL NOT BE GIVEN TO YOU FOR NOW AND YOU CAN ONLY SEE THEM 

WHEN WE HAVE CONCLUDED AND FINALIZED THE TRANSACTION (PAYMENT STAGE). 

AS I AM WRITING THIS REPLY, YOUR SECRETARY FAXED ME MORE LITERATURES WHICH I DON_T 

THINK WILL EITHER INTEREST MY CLIENT OR HAVE ANY MEANING TO THE BUSINESS AT HAND. 

WHAT RATHER I THINK MY CLIENT WANT TO SEE IS (1) COLOUR PICTURE OF VARIOUS ELAVATIONS OF 

A RESIDENTIAL BUILDING IN FLORIDA THAT CAN HOUSE MY CLIENT HIS 3 WIVES AND 14 CHILDREN. 

PICTURES OF A PROPOSED HOUSE THAT WILL BE CONVERTED TO A 20 ROOMS MOTEL TO SERVE MOST 

NIGERIAN DIGNITORIES WHEN EVER THEY ARE IN USA. 

THIS IS TO HAVE SWIMMING POOL HEALTH CLUB LAWN TENNIS ETC. THE ABOVE SHOULD SECRETLY 

BE ARRANGED AND POSTED TO ME BY THE COURIER SERVICE IMMEDIATELY FOR DISCUSSION WITH 

MY CLIENT. THE FINANCIAL PRICE SHOULD BE STATED WHICH WILL MAKE PROVISION FOR 10% 

COMMISSION FOR MY COMPANY AND YOUR COMMISSION INCLUSIVE. 

I LOOK FORWARD TO IMMEDIATE ACTION. 

j

p 

A homeowner in Lagos, Nigeria, has 

placed a warning to prevent real 

estate fraud. 
Disbursement of Money From Wills 

In this variant of the money transfer fraud, charities, religious groups, universities, and 

nonprofit organizations receive a letter or fax from a mysterious benefactor interested 

in the group’s cause and wishing to make a sizable contribution. Before the contribution 

can be released, the recipient must first pay an inheritance tax or various government 

fees and taxes. The victim also may be requested to travel to Nigeria and/or a bordering 

country to collect the “gift.” 

UBA, ADE, USMAN & CO.

(EZU-OGALI CHAMBERS) 

BARRISTERS, SOLICITORS AND NOTARY PUBLIC 

Our Ref: UAU/EG/AD/96/06/06 

Your Ref:.......................................... 

ATTN: 

Dear Sir, 

RE: TESTAMENTARY BEQUEST OF LADY KOKI KAWASHIMA ADETOLA TO 

We hereby acknowledge the receipt of your fax dated 06-06-96. We are satisfied with your proof 

of identity. 

Based on the Will of Late Lady Kiko Kawashima Adetola, she bequeathed to 

the sum of $250,000.00 U.S. Dollars. 

We are making rapid progress with respect to the grant of probate and we shall inform you how 

far we have gone in our next correspondance. 

Equally, we shall send to you in our next correspondance,an extract of the Will of the Late Lady 

Kawashima Adetola for your records. 

In all, our sacrosanct duty remains the execution of the testamentary wishes of the deceased 

testator by ensuring that all gifts made in the Will is passed to the intended beneficiaries eventually. 

Please acknowledge receipt of this letter immediately. 

Kind regards, 

DR. AHMED USMAN 

(Managing Partner) 

No. 9 Apo Palace Way Tel/Fax: 234-1-4528037 

Ago-Okota-Isolo 

lagos-Nigeria Date: 6th June 1996 

46

Threat Scam (Extortion) 

This type of AFF is not common, and is seen primarily in Europe. It threatens the life of 

the recipient of the letter or fax unless funds are deposited in a certain bank on a specific day. There is no evidence that this fraud has been carried out. 

EXECUTION! EXECUTION!! EXECUTION!!! 

NATIONAL CORPORATION HEADQUARTERS LAGOS 

Bankers 

Midland Bank, central London 

Riyald National Bank, Saudi Arabia 

Nordic Banking Group, Holand 

Change Banking Inc. Group, Hong Kong 

Chemical Bank Inc. Texas 

Chase Manhattan Bank, New York 

United bank for Africa, Lagos 

APN Amro Bank Geneva 

Your Ref:_____________________Our Ref: 1-94___ 

PRIVACY 

ATTN: 

We wish to introduce our company/ourselves as a subsidiary of INTERNATIONAL 

ASSASINATORS AND WORLD SECURITY ORGANZATIONS, with branches in one hundred and 

two (102) countries. 

We have received a fax message our World Headquarters, New York, this morning to 

inform you to produce a mandatory sum of US$35,000.00 (THIRTY-FIVE THOUSAND 

UNITED STATES DOLLARS) 

Ninety Six hours (96), alternatively, you will kidnapped and forced to commit 

suicide during the period of our on-coming anniversary of fifty years. 

APM AMRO BANK 

12 QUAI GENERA GUISAN 

1212 Geneva 3 

A/C NO. 8270LB (L.N.SIADU) 

SWITZERLAND 

CAUTION 

1. Fax immediately to this office, the payment slip, confirming the payment an to 

enable us reconcile with our files and deploy our men already monitoring you. 

2. We will as well waste no time to carry our operations, if we discover that 

this contract is disclosed to any second party including the following:-

(a) Police (b) Relation and (C)Friends 

3. We guarantee your safety locally and internationally, on the completion of 

this contract and will not hesitate to disclose our men in your country to you 

and as well render our service if needed or on request. 

We seek your urgent co-operation, for it is not our wish to get you eliminated. 

PRINCE (DR) BVANO H. JIMOH 

SECRETARY 

E E

JANSO/0587/52AB______________Date 15-1

only, into our account given below in Switzerland within 

47

Clearinghouse 

The newest twist in AFF has Nigerian and 

non-Nigerian criminals living outside of 

Nigeria claiming to be a clearinghouse or 

venture capital organization for the Central 

Bank of Nigeria (CBN).7 In essence, clearinghouses are noninterested third parties 

setup by the criminals to provide payment 

instructions allegedly from the CBN to the 

victim. Clearinghouses also lend credibility 

to the AFF scam by alleviating any doubts 

the victim may have in dealing with a Nigerian bank. It is for this reason that a number of fraudulent clearinghouses have been 

setup in the United States. 

A clearinghouse will not be setup in the 

same country as the country where victim 

resides. This makes it harder for the victim 

to verify the legitimacy of the clearinghouse. 

The clearinghouse will either launder the 

proceeds from AFF or funnel its proceeds 

to the criminals who in turn deposit it into 

bank accounts in those world financial 

centers (Geneva, New York, London) whose 

strict banking laws limit police access to its 

records. From these bank accounts, the 

money is transferred to a corresponding 

bank in Lagos. Once the money hits Lagos, 

it is almost impossible to trace. Nigerian 

criminals in general do not sit on their 

money. AFF criminals will convert the 

money into consumable goods. They will 

buy expensive cars (via structured payment, lease plan, or steal them), appliances, or household goods (for example, 

heavy generators) and ship them back to 

Nigeria to sell. They will invest the profits 

in other ventures—including narcotics— 

and ship it back to the United States or 

Europe. 

48

The U.S. The U.S.

Government Government

Response Response

The U.S. 

Government 

Response 

The U.S. Government is taking a 

multipronged approach to the problem of 

Nigerian criminal activity. It is being actively pursued on the law enforcement and 

foreign policy fronts. 

Senior-level meetings chaired by the Department of State, and attended by members of the U.S. intelligence community 

and U.S. law enforcement officials, including the U.S. Attorney General have been 

ongoing concerning Nigerian criminal 

activity.  A U.S. Government working plan 

has been drafted to combat this issue, and 

a number of recommendations have been 

implemented. 

Internationally, in 1996, the Political Eight 

(G–7 plus Russia) met in Lyon, France, to 

coordinate enforcement efforts against 

transnational crime. One outcome of the 

meeting was the formation of a subgroup 

dedicated to combatting Nigerian criminal 

activity. 

The United States and 38 other governments have raised the issue of Nigerian 

criminal activity with the Nigerian Government to impress upon them the serious 

nature of this problem. 

The best defense against Nigerian Advance 

Fee Fraud is public awareness. To receive 

additional information on Nigerian Advance Fee Fraud, contact the Financial 

Crimes Division of the U.S. Secret Service 

(see page 50) for assistance. District Offices 

of the U.S. Department of Commerce (see 

pages 51–53) and the Commercial Counselor at the U.S. Embassy in Lagos, Nigeria, 

also stand ready to assist any U.S. firm 

seeking information about a particular 

Nigerian company or the Nigerian business 

climate in general. 

Update 

On March 31, 1998, members of the Nigerian police fraud unit, or 419, and the 

local Interpol, accompanied by U.S. Secret 

Service agents and Regional Security Officers carried out raids on seven homes and 

businesses in Lagos. The homes and businesses were being used to carry out Advance Fee Fraud. (The Nigerian police were 

acting on information provided to them by 

the U.S. Secret Service.) A total of 55 arrests were made as a result of 25 search 

warrants. Telephones, fax machines, and 

documents used in 419 frauds were also 

seized. 

Determining the Legitimacy 

of Nigerian Business 

Proposals and Partners 

The following was prepared by the 

U.S. Department of Commerce. 

If a proposed transaction looks legitimate, 

and a U.S. company is interested in pursuing it, the company is strongly urged to 

check the bona fides of the Nigerian company before proceeding. However, the 

legitimacy of a firm is not necessarily a 

sufficient indication that all solicitations 

using the firm’s name are legitimate. The 

transaction itself must be verified, because 

many scams use legitimate company names 

or names of Nigerian Government agencies 

in fraudulent solicitations. Until the specific proposal is verified, the U.S. company 

should not send out letterhead, invoices, 

bank account information, or product 

samples. 

Domestically, this can be done by requesting a World Traders Data Report  (WTDR) 

through a U.S. Department of Commerce 

District Office. 49 
These reports, which are prepared by the commercial staff at the U.S. Embassy in Nigeria, provide the following types of information: types of organizations, year established, 

principal owners, size, product line, and financial and trade references. Due to specificity and detailed nature of the service, the WTDR takes 4–6 weeks and costs $100. Overseas, the U.S. company representative should contact American Citizen Services Unit of 

the Consular Section at the U.S. Embassy or Consulate. 

Remember, it is important to verify both the transaction and the company. Through 

prudent skepticism, American companies can avoid falling victim to individuals involved in fraudulent business activities, yet continue to take advantage of lucrative 

business opportunities with legitimate companies. 

Reporting a Fraudulent Business Proposal 

In the United States contact: 

U.S. Secret Service


Financial Crimes Division


1800 G Street, NW


Room 942


Washington, DC  20223


Phone: (202) 435-5850


Fax: (202) 435-5031


Or contact the local U.S. Secret Service Field Office. 

Overseas, contact the Foreign Commercial Service (FSC) at the nearest U.S. Embassy or 

Consulate. If there is no FCS office, contact the American Citizens Services Unit of the 

Consular Section or the Regional Security Office. 

50

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 

INTERNATIONAL TRADE ADMINISTRATION 

U.S. AND FOREIGN COMMERCIAL SERVICE 

EXPORT ASSISTANCE CENTER DIRECTORY 

August 15, 1996 

Lauri J. Fitz-Pegado Vacant Daniel J. McLaughlin 

Assistant Secretary and Director General Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary Deputy Assistant Secretary, Domestic Operations 

U.S. and Foreign Commercial Service U.S. and Foreign Commercial Service U.S. and Foreign Commercial Service 

14th Street and Constitution Avenue, N.W. 14th Street and Constitution Avenue, N.W. 14th Street venue, N.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20230 Washington, D.C. 20230 Washington, D.C. 20230 

PHONE: (202) 482-5777, FAX: (202) 482-5013 PHONE: (202) 482-0725, FAX: (202) 482-5013 PHONE: (202) 482-4767, FAX: (202) 482-0687 

ALABAMA 

Birmingham - Patrick T. Wall, Director 

950 22nd Street North, , ZIP 35203 

PHONE: (205) 731-1331, FAX: (205) 731-0076 

ALASKA 

Anchorage - Charles Becker, Director 

World Trade Center, 421W. First St.; ZIP: 99501 

PHONE: (907) 271-6237, FAX: (907) 271-6242 

ARIZONA 

Phoenix - Frank Woods, Director 

2901 N. Central Ave., 

PHONE: (602) 640-2513, FAX: (602) 640-2518 

ARKANSAS 

Little Rock - Lon J. Hardin, Director 

425 W. Capitol Ave., 

PHONE: (501) 324-5794, FAX: (501) 324-7380 

CALIFORNIA 

LONG BEACH ector 

US&FCS Director - Steve Morrison 

One World Trade Center, Ste. 1670, ZIP: 90831 

PHONE: (310) 980-4550, FAX: (310) 980-4561 

Inland Empire - Fred Latuperissa, Director 

2940 Inland Empire Blvd, Suite 121 

Ontario 

PHONE: (909) 466-4134, FAX: (909) 466-4140 

Los Angeles 

11000 Wilshire Blvd., Room 9200, ZIP: 90024 

PHONE: (310) 235-7104, FAX: (310) 235-7220 

Orange County - Paul Tambakis, Director. 

3300 Irvine Avenue, Suite 305 

Newport 

PHONE: (714) 660-1688, FAX: (714) 660-8039 

Sacramento - Brooks Ohlson, Director 

917 7th Street, 2nd Floor, 

PHONE: AX: (916) 498-5923 

San Diego - Mary Delmege, Director 

6363 Greenwich Drive, Suite 230, ZIP: 92122 

PHONE: (619) 557-5395, FAX: (619) 557-6176 

San Francisco acant, Director 

250 Montgomery St., 14th Floor, ZIP: 94104 

PHONE: (415) 705-2300, FAX: (415) 705-2297 

Santa Clara , Director 

5201 Great American Pkwy., #456, ZIP: 95054 

PHONE: (408) 970-4610, FAX: (408) 970-4618 

COLORADO 

DENVER - Ann Tull, Director 

1625 Broadway, Suite 680, ZIP: 80202 

PHONE: (303) 844-6622, FAX: (303) 844-5651 

CONNECTICUT 

Middletown 

213 Court Street, Suite 903 

PHONE: (860) 638-6950, FAX: (860) 638-6970 

DELAWARE 

Served by the Philadelphia Export 

Assistance Center 

FLORIDA 

MIAMI - Peter B. Alois, Director 

P.O. Box 590570, ZIP: 33159 

5600 Northwest 36th St., Ste. 617, ZIP: 33166 

PHONE: (305) 526-7425, FAX: (305) 526-7434 

Clearwater - George Martinez, Director 

128 North Osceola Avenue, ZIP: 34615 

PHONE: (813) 461-0011, FAX: (813) 449-2889 

Orlando - Lou Nixon, Director 

Eola Park Centre, Suite 1270 

200 E. Robinson Street, ZIP: 32801 

PHONE: (407) 648-6235, FAX: (407) 648-6756 

Tallahassee - Michael Higgins, Director 

107 West Gaines Street, Room G-01, ZIP: 32399 

PHONE: (904) 488-6469, FAX: (904) 487-1407 

GEORGIA 

ATLANTA - Tapan Banerjee, ector 

285 Peachtree Center Avenue, NE, Suite 200, 

ZIP 

PHONE: (404) 657-1900, FAX: (404) 657-1970 

Savannah - Barbara Prieto, Director 

120 Barnard Street, Room A-107, ZIP: 31401 

PHONE: (912) 652-4204, FAX: (912) 652-4241 

HAWAII 

Honolulu - George B. Dolan, Director 

P.O. Box 50026 

300 Ala Moana Blvd., Room 4106, ZIP: 96850 

PHONE: (808) 541-1782, FAX: (808) 541-3435 

The 

COMMERCIAL 

SERVICE 

United States of America 

Department of Commerce 

and Constitution A

7th Floor

Suite 970, ZIP 85012 

Suite 700, ZIP 72201 

- Joe Sachs, Dir

ZIP: 91764 

- Sherwin Chen, Director 

Beach ZIP: 92660 

ZIP: 95814 

(916) 498-5155, F

- V

- James S. Kennedy

- Carl Jacobsen, Director 

ZIP: 06457-3346 

Dir

30303-1229 
IDAHO 

Boise - Steve Thompson, Director


700 West State Street, 2nd Floor, ZIP: 83720


PHONE: (208) 334-3857, FAX: (208) 334-2783


ILLINOIS 

CHICAGO - Brad Dunderman, Director


Stanley Bokota, US&FCS Director


55 West Monroe Street, Suite 2440, ZIP: 60603


PHONE: (312) 353-8040, FAX: (312) 353-8098


Rockford - James Mied, Director


P.O. Box 1747


515 North Court Street, ZIP: 61110


PHONE: (815) 987-8123, FAX: (815) 963-7943


Wheaton - Roy Dube, Director


c/o Illinois Institute of Technology


201 East Loop Road, ZIP: 60187


PHONE: (312) 353-4332, FAX: (312) 353-4336


INDIANA


Indianapolis - Dan Swart, Director


11405 N. Pennsylvania Street, Suite 106


Carmel, IN. 46032


PHONE: (317) 582-2300, FAX: (317) 582-2301


IOWA 

Des Moines - Randall J. LaBounty, Director


210 Walnut Street, Room 817, ZIP 50309


PHONE: (515) 284-4222, FAX: (515) 284-4021


KANSAS 

Wichita - George D. Lavid, Director


151 N. Volutsia, ZIP: 67214


PHONE: (316) 269-6160, FAX: (316) 683-7326


KENTUCKY 

Louisville - John Autin, Director


601 W. Broadway, Room 634B, Zip: 40202


PHONE: (502) 582-5066, FAX: (502) 582-6573


Somerset - Sara Melton, Director


2292 S. Highway 27, Suite 320, ZIP 42501


PHONE: (606) 677-6160, FAX (606) 677-6161


MISSISSIPPI 

Jackson - Mark E. Spinney, Director


201 W. Capitol Street, Suite 310, ZIP: 39201


PHONE: (601) 965-4388, FAX: (601) 965-5386


MISSOURI


ST. LOUIS - Sandra Gerley, Director


8182 Maryland Avenue, Suite 303, ZIP: 63105


PHONE: (314) 425-3302, FAX: (314) 425-3381


Kansas City - Rick Villalobos, Director


601 East 12th Street, Room 635, ZIP: 64106


PHONE: (816) 426-3141, FAX: (816) 426-3140


MONTANA 

Served by the Boise Export Assistance Center 

NEBRASKA 

Omaha - Allen Patch, Director


11135 “O” Street, ZIP: 68137


PHONE: (402) 221-3664, FAX: (402) 221-3668


NEVADA 

Reno - James K. Hellwig, Director


1755 East Plumb Lane, Suite 152, ZIP: 89502


PHONE: (702) 784-5203, FAX: (702) 784-5343


NEW HAMPSHIRE 

Portsmouth - Susan Berry, Director


601 Spaulding Turnpike, Suite 29, ZIP: 03801


PHONE: (603) 334-6074, FAX: (603) 334-6110


NEW JERSEY 

Trenton - Rod Stuart, Director


3131 Princeton Pike, Bldg. #6


Suite 100, ZIP 08648


PHONE: (609) 989-2100, FAX: (609) 989-2395


Newark - Tom Rosengren, Director


Gateway One, 9th Floor, ZIP: 07102


PHONE: (201) 645-4682. FAX: (201) 645-4783


NEW MEXICO 

Santa Fe - Sandra Necessary, Director


c/o New Mexico Dept. of Economic Develop.


P.O. Box 20003, Zip 87504-5003


PHONE: (505) 827-0350, FAX: (505) 827-0263


NEW YORK 

NEW YORK - Joel W. Barkan, Acting Director


6 World Trade Center, Rm. 635, 10048


PHONE: (212) 264-0635, FAX: (212) 264-1356


Buffalo - George Buchanan, Director


111 West Huron Street, Rm 1304, ZIP: 14202


PHONE: (716) 551-4191, FAX: (716) 551-5290


Rochester - James C. Mariano, Director


111 East Avenue, Suite 220, ZIP: 14604


PHONE: (716) 263-6480, FAX: (716) 325-6505


Harlem - K.L. Fredericks, Director


163 West 125th Street, Suite 904, ZIP 10027


New York, New York ZIP: 10027


PHONE: (212) 860-6200, FAX (212) 860-6203


Long Island - George Soteros, Director


1550 Franklin Avenue, Room 207


Mineola, ZIP 11501


PHONE: (516) 739-1765, FAX:(516) 571-4161


Westchester - Bill Spitler, Director


707 West Chester Ave, White Plains ZIP 10604


PHONE: (914)682-6218, FAX:(914)682-6698


NORTH CAROLINA 

CHARLOTTE - (Announced)


Greensboro - Samuel P. Troy, Director


400 West Market Street, Suite 400, ZIP: 27401


PHONE: (910) 333-5345, FAX: (910) 333-5158


NORTH DAKOTA 

Served by the Minneapolis EAC 

OHIO


CLEVELAND - John McCartney, Director


600 Superior Avenue, East, Ste 700, ZIP: 44114


PHONE: (216) 522-4750, FAX: (216) 522-2235


Cincinnati - John M. McCaslin, Director


36 East 7th Street, Suite 2650, ZIP: 45202


PHONE: (513) 684-2944, FAX: (513) 684-3227


Columbus - Michael Miller, Director


37 North High Street, 4th Floor, OH ZIP: 43215


PHONE: (614) 365-9510, FAX: (614) 365-9598


Toledo - Robert Abrahams, Director


300 Madison Avenue, 43604


PHONE: (419) 241-0683, FAX:(419) 241-0684


OKLAHOMA 

Oklahoma City - Ronald L. Wilson, Director


6601 Broadway Extension, ZIP: 73116


PHONE: (405) 231-5302, FAX: (405) 231-4211


Tulsa - Thomas Strauss, Director


440 South Houston Street, Rm 505, ZIP: 74127


PHONE: (918) 581-7650, FAX: (918) 581-2844


OREGON 

Portland - Denny Barnes, Director


One World Trade Center, Suite 242


121 SW Salmon Street, ZIP: 97204


PHONE: (503) 326-3001, FAX: (503) 326-6351


Eugene - Richard E. Henry, Director


1401 Willamette St., ZIP 97401-4003


PHONE: (541) 465-6575, FAX (541) 465-6704


52

PENNSYLVANIA 

PHILADELPHIA - Maria Galindo, Director


615 Chestnut Street, Ste. 1501, ZIP: 19106


PHONE: (215) 597-6101, FAX: (215) 597-6123


Harrisburg - Deborah Doherty, Director


One Commerce Square


417 Walnut Sreet, 3rd Floor, ZIP: 17101


PHONE: (717) 232-0051, FAX: (717) 255-3298


Scranton - Henry LaBlanc, Director


One Montage Mountain Road, Suite B


Moosic ZIP: 18507


PHONE: (717) 969-2530, FAX: (717) 969-2539


Pittsburgh - Ted Arnn, Director


2002 Federal Bld 1000 Liberty Ave., ZIP: 15222


PHONE: (412) 644-2850, FAX: (412) 644-4875


PUERTO RICO 

San Juan (Hato Rey) - J. Enrique Vilella, Director


Rm G-55, Fed Bldg,Chardon Avenue, ZIP: 00918


PHONE: (787) 766-5555, FAX: (787) 766-5692


RHODE ISLAND 

Providence - Raimond Meerbach, Director


One West Exchange Street, ZIP: 02903


PHONE: (401) 528-5104, FAX: (401) 528-5067


SOUTH CAROLINA 

Columbia - Ann Watts, Director


1835 Assembly Street, Suite 172, ZIP 29201


PHONE: (803) 765-5345, FAX: (803) 253-3614


Charleston - David Kuhlmeier, Director


P.O. Box 975, ZIP: 29402


81 Mary Street, ZIP: 29403


PHONE: (803) 727-4051, FAX: (803) 727-4052


Upstate - Denis Csizmadia, Director


Park Central Office Park, Bldg. 1, Ste. 109


555 N. Pleasantburg Drive, Greenville. SC:


PHONE: (864) 271-1976, FAX: (864) 271-4171


SOUTH DAKOTA 

Siouxland - Harvey Timberlake, Director


Augustana College, 2001 S. Summit Avenue,


Room SS-29A Sioux Falls, ZIP: 57197


PHONE: (605) 330-4264, FAX: (605) 330-4266


TENNESSEE 

Nashville - Jim Charlet, Director


Parkway Towers, Suite 114


404 James Robertson Parkway, ZIP: 37219


PHONE: (615) 736-5161, FAX: (615) 736-2454


Memphis - Ree Russell, Director


22 North Front Street, Suite 200, ZIP: 38103


PHONE: (901) 544-4137, FAX: (901) 544-3646


Knoxville - David McNeill, Director


301 East Church Avenue, TN ZIP: 37915


PHONE: (423) 545-4637, FAX: (615) 545-4435


TEXAS 

DALLAS - Bill Schrage, Director


2050 N. Stemmons Fwy., Suite 170, ZIP: 75207


P.O. Box 420069 ZIP: 75342-0069


PHONE: (214) 767-0542, FAX: (214) 767-8240


Austin - Karen Parker, Director


1700 Congress, Ste 300R,2nd floor, ZIP: 78701


P.O. Box 12728 Zip: 78711


PHONE: (512) 916-5939, FAX: (512) 916-5940


San Antonio - Mitchel Auerbach, Director


1222 N. Main, Suite 450, ZIP: 78212


PHONE: (210) 228-9878, FAX (210) 228-9874


Houston - James D. Cook, Director


500 Dallas, Suite 1160, ZIP: 77002


PHONE: (713) 718-3062, FAX: (713) 718-3060


UTAH 

Salt Lake City - Stephen P. Smoot, Director


324 S. State Street, Suite 105, ZIP: 84111


PHONE: (801) 524-5116, FAX: (801) 524-5886


VERMONT 

Montpelier - James Cox - Director


109 State Street, 4th Floor, ZIP: 05609


PHONE: (802) 828-4508, FAX: (802) 828-3258


VIRGINIA 

Richmond - Philip A. Ouzts, Director


704 East Franklin Street, Suite 550, ZIP: 23219


PHONE: (804) 771-2246, FAX: (804) 771-2390


WASHINGTON 

SEATTLE - Lisa Kjaer-Schade, Director


2001 6th Ave, Suite 650, ZIP: 98121


PHONE: (206) 553-5615, FAX: (206) 553-7253


Tri-Cities - Mark Weaver, Director


320 North Johnson Street, Suite 350


Kennewick, WA. 99336


PHONE: (509) 735-2751, FAX: (509)783-9385


WEST VIRGINIA


Charleston - W. Davis Coale, Jr., Director


405 Capitol Street, Suite 807, ZIP: 25301


PHONE: (304) 347-5123, FAX: (304) 347-5408


Wheeling - Martha Butwin, Director


1310 Market Street, 2nd Floor, ZIP 26003


PHONE (304) 233-7472, FAX (304) 233-7492


WISCONSIN 

Milwaukee - Paul D. Churchill, Director


517 E. Wisconsin Avenue, Room 596, ZIP: 53202


PHONE: (414) 297-3473, FAX: (414) 297-3470


WYOMING 

Served by the Denver Export Assistance Center 

REGIONAL OFFICES: 

EASTERN REGION


Roger Fortner, Regional Director


World Trade Center, Ste 2450, 401 E. Pratt St.


Baltimore, MD 21202


PHONE: (410) 962-2805, FAX: (410) 962-2799


MID-EASTERN REGION


Gordon B. Thomas, Regional Director


36 East 7th Street, Suite 2025


Cincinnati, OH 45202


PHONE: (513) 684-2947, FAX: (513) 684-3200


MID-WESTERN REGION


Sandra Gerley, Acting Regional Director


8182 Maryland Avenue, Suite 1011


St. Louis, MO 63105


PHONE: (314) 425-3300, FAX: (314) 425-3375


WESTERN REGION


Keith Bovetti, Regional Director


250 Montgomery St., 14th Floor


San Francisco, CA 94104


PHONE: (415) 705-2310, FAX: (415) 705-2299


53


29607 
“Entry Requirements: “Entry Requirements:

Determining the Legitimacy of a Business Proposal 

For help in determining the legitimacy of a business proposal, contact: 

U.S. Department of Commerce 

Office of Africa, Room 2037 

Nigerian Desk Officer 

Washington, DC 20230 

Phone: (202) 482-5149 

Fax: (202) 482-5198 

To obtain marketing information on Nigeria and other countries: 

All reports on the National Trade Data Bank can be accessed by CD-ROM disks 

in libraries or by subscribing for internet access. For more information, 

call 1-800-STAT-USA. 

Before You Go 

For information on travel conditions in Nigeria and other countries, contact the U.S. 

Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs. The Bureau of Consular Affairs produces Consular Information Sheets on all countries.  Consular Information Sheets provide warnings, country descriptions, entry requirements, as well as information on air 

travel safety, crime and criminal violence, commercial fraud, areas of instability, traffic 

safety and road conditions, medical facilities, photography restrictions, currency regulations, drug penalties, and the location of the U.S. Embassy. Request the Consular Information Sheet for Nigeria. The following information is excerpted from the latest Information Sheet for Nigeria dated November 25, 1996: 

“Entry Requirements: A visa is required and must be obtained in advance; 

airport visas are not available.  Promises of entry into Nigeria without a visa are 

credible indicators of a fraudulent commercial scheme in which the perpetrators 

seek to exploit the foreign traveler’s illegal presence in Nigeria with threats of 

extortion or bodily harm. U.S. citizens cannot legally depart Nigeria unless they 

can prove, by presenting their entry visas, they entered Nigeria legally. There is 

an airport departure tax. Entry information (and information on departure tax) 

may be obtained at the Embassy of the Republic of Nigeria, 2201 M Street, NW, in 

Washington, DC 20037, telephone (202) 822-1550, or at the Nigerian Consulate 

General in New York, telephone (212) 715-7200. Overseas, inquires may be made 

at the nearest Nigerian embassy or consulate. 

54

“Commercial Fraud: “Commercial Fraud:

Recorded Information: Recorded Information:

Automated Fax System: Automated Fax System:

Internet World Wide Web: Internet World Wide Web:

Automated Fax System: Automated Fax System:

Internet World Wide Web: Internet World Wide Web:

“Commercial Fraud: A major and continuing problem is the commercial scam 

or sting that targets foreigners, including many U.S. citizens. Such scams could 

involve U.S. citizens in illegal activity, resulting in extortion or bodily harm. The 

scams generally involve phony offers of either outright money transfers or lucrative sales or contracts with promises of large commissions or up-front payments. 

Alleged deals frequently invoke the authority of one or more ministries or offices 

of the Nigerian government and many even cite by name the support of a Nigerian government official. The apparent use in some scams of actual government 

stationery, seals, and offices is grounds for concern that some individual Nigerian 

officials may be involved in these activities. The ability of U.S. Embassy officers to 

extricate Americans from unlawful business deals is extremely limited. Nigerian 

police do not always inform the U.S. Embassy of an American in distress. The 

Department of Commerce has issued advisories to the U.S. Business community 

on doing business in Nigeria. Both the Department of Commerce and the U.S. 

Embassy in Lagos can provide business travelers with further details.” 

For information on travel conditions in Nigeria and other countries, contact the U.S. 

Department of State, Overseas Citizens Services: 

Recorded Information: (202) 647-5225 

Automated Fax System: (202) 647-3000 

Internet World Wide Web: http://travel.state.gov 

The U.S. Department of State publishes a pamphlet entitled 

Tips for Business Travelers to Nigeria. To obtain a copy: 

Automated Fax System: (202) 647-3000 (Code 1044) 

Internet World Wide Web: http://travel.state.gov 

Single copies are also available at no charge from the Office 

of American Citizens Services and Crisis Management, Room 

4811, U.S. Department of State, Washington,  DC  20520-

4818. Please enclose a stamped, self-addressed envelope. 

55

NEW NIGERIA POLICE 

ORGANIZATION CHART 

Pictured is a flowchart of the Nigerian 

National Police. Nigerian 

is handled by the Nigerian Federal 

Investigative Intelligence Bureau (FIIB) 

and Interpol. Both offices come under 

Investigations (Dept D). 

Inspector General Inspector General Inspector General

Police

Deputy Inspector Deputy Inspector

General General General

DEPT. A DEPT. A

General General

Administration Administration

DEPT. B DEPT. B

Operation Operation

DEPT. C DEPT. C

Transport/ Transport/

Engineering Engineering

DEPT. D DEPT. D

Investigation Investigation

DEPT. E DEPT. E

Special Branch Special Branch

DEPT. F DEPT. F

Research Research

Kano, Kaduna, Kano, Kaduna,

Jigawa, Katsina Jigawa, Katsina

Lagos, Ogun, Oyo Lagos, Ogun, Oyo

Bornu, Bauchi, Bornu, Bauchi,

Adamawa, Yobe, Adamawa, Yobe,

Gombe

Benue, Enugu, Taraba Benue, Enugu, Taraba

Plateau, Nassarawa, Plateau, Nassarawa,

Ebonyi

Edo Delta Rivers Edo Delta Rivers

Anambra, Bayelsa Anambra, Bayelsa

Imo, Akwa Ibom, Imo, Akwa Ibom,

Abia, Cross River Abia, Cross River

Sokoto, Kebbi, Sokoto, Kebbi,

Niger, Abuja Niger, Abuja

Ondo, Oshun, Ondo, Oshun,

Kwara, Kogi, Ekiti Kwara, Kogi, Ekiti

3

2

1

5

4

6

7

8

Note:Each state is being commanded by a commissioner of police while departments have 

commisioners of police in charge of some sections. 

Force HQ Command Force HQ Command Zonal Command Zonal Command

“419” Fraud 

56

His U.S. passport indicated that he was admitted to

Nigeria without a visa or entry stamp by immigration officials. Nigeria without a visa or entry stamp by immigration officials.

Endnotes 

1The “419” penal law was revised and expanded with the issuance in April 1995, of Presidential Decree 

No.13 entitled Advance Fee Fraud and other Fraud Offenses Decree 1995. 

2Nigerian law requires a valid visa for entry and departure. Airport visas are not issued and valid visas 

should only be obtained at a Nigerian diplomatic mission. U.S. citizens are encouraged to register at the 

U.S. Embassy in Lagos or U.S. Liaison Office in Abuja to obtain updated information on travel and security 

in Nigeria. 

3On May 20, 1995, the U.S. Embassy in Lagos reported that James Breaux, an American businessman, was 

shot and killed in Surulere, Lagos. There are strong indications that Mr. Breaux, a resident of Switzerland, 

was lured to Nigeria by AFF criminals.  His U.S. passport indicated that he was admitted to 

Nigeria without a visa or entry stamp by immigration officials. 

4Surprisingly, nine out of ten victims comply with this request. 

5The U.S. Commerce Department indicates that “. . . only if an American exporter sells to the Nigerian 

Government through an agent is there a registration fee requirement. When registration fees are legitimately connected to government contracts, they are clearly published by the ministries to which they are 

payable, and they do not exceed Naira 5,000 (approximately $61 at N81=US$1 as of June 1996).” 

6The U.S. Embassy advises that all sales of Nigerian crude oil are made through the Crude Oil Marketing 

Division of the NNPC. 

7The Central Bank of Nigeria does not have a clearinghouse, and, as with most legitimate banks in Nigeria, 

it goes through a corresponding bank in the United States or Europe. 

57

emerging trends in transnational crime emerging trends in transnational crime

Crime

in China in China in China

Special thanks to Regional Security Officer 

Don Schurman in Beijing and Brent A. 

Barker in Shanghai. 

By 

Jim 

Dunne 

It is no longer news that many 

Pacific Rim countries, especially China, offer a wealth of 

opportunities for business investment. 

resentatives are venturing 

into China’s cities and countryside to take advantage of 

that nation’s vast, untapped 

markets. 

economic 

abroad has also encouraged a 

greater number of students 

and tourists to come and 

“The victim’s lack of awareness of his or her surroundings 

can be a major contributor to incidents.” 

—State Department General Crime Report on China 

More business repChina’s openness to 

activity  from 

58

spend time in the country historically known as “the sleeping giant.”  What is news to 

many of the business people, 

students, and tourists who 

explore China is the rising rate 

of crime there.  Many in the 

West do not realize that in tandem with economic reforms 

undertaken by China in the 

past two decades, criminal 

activity has increased substantially.  As a result, too 

many Americans and other 

Westerners come to China 

unprepared for the possibility of a criminal encounter 

and some conclude their visits with a loss of property or 

even a loss of life. 

With more Americans visiting China, the 

Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) is recording a greater number of criminal encounters in which the victims are Americans or other Westerners.  Crimes affecting 

Americans range from simple purse-snatching and pickpocketing to the more elaborate schemes of organized gangs.  While all 

criminal activity is of interest to the intelligence analysts of DS, crimes involving 

violence against persons or property receive the bulk of our attention.  To a limited extent, we do monitor the growth of 

Asian organized crime, in so far as it creates a fertile climate for acts of criminal 

violence. 

This brief article is not intended to be a 

comprehensive report of all criminal activity in China.  It also does not endeavor to 

address every crime that visitors might 

encounter.  Such reports might fill several 

volumes.  Instead, this article aims chiefly 

to present an overview of the kinds of 

crimes Americans and others have encountered in China in recent years and to highlight possible trends these incidents might 

suggest.  The incidents and trends themselves, of course, deserve commentary. 

After reviewing several criminal incidents, 

we will consider some possible causes for 

China’s rise in crime.  For comparative 

purposes, we will briefly sketch the crime 

situations in a handful of other East Asian 

countries.  Finally, we will present proposed steps toward preventing, avoiding or 

countering crime. 

59

The Problem The Problem

China long has been and remains one of 

the safer places in the world to visit.  In 

fact, Americans are less likely to experience crime in China than they are in many 

American cities. Crime rates are rising 

throughout China, but the vast majority of 

victims are native Chinese.  In some respects, crime in China is assuming forms 

more commonly found in Western societies.  In April 1997, for example, Shanghai’s 

first case of serial murder reportedly 

alarmed many of the city’s citizens.  The 

problem is that, as crime rates climb and 

more expatriates arrive, they and their 

communities may be expected to experience more criminal activity as well.  More 

crimes against foreigners in China are 

being reported. An analysis of these crimes 

reveals that the victims might have been 

particularly vulnerable because they had 

relaxed their normal precautions. 

Here is a sample of crimes against foreigners that occurred in the past few years.  A 

French tourist was found strangled on 

Mount Taishan.  She had been traveling on 

her own for about a month.  A German 

tourist was wounded by a knife on Beijing’s 

Tiananmen Square.  Police said the attacker was mentally ill.  An Italian diplomat was found with his throat slashed in 

an expensive residential hotel complex in 

Beijing. As in most such crimes in China, it 

is likely none of the victims felt particularly threatened and probably took no 

extraordinary precautions to guard against 

a criminal attack. 

A number of Westerners have been attacked in their hotel rooms.  Two such 

attacks in 1996 received extensive media 

coverage and raised some alarms about the 

security of foreigners doing business in 

China.  In one case, a British consultant 

working for a U.S. company in Shenzhen 

was found stabbed to death at his hotel. 

Police suspected robbery was the motive as 

the victim’s money, passport, and briefcase 

were missing from the room.  In another 

case, a Chinese woman employed by a 

Western company’s Beijing office was 

found killed in her room at a five-star 

hotel in Guangzhou.  Further details were 

not disclosed and personal motives could 

not be ruled out in either case. 

Unpleasant incidents encountered by foreigners in China are not limited to assaults 

and thefts and may not even be violent. 

Here are several unusual incidents experienced by Americans in China in 1995.  In 

February, an American business woman 

said she had been lured to China from 

Hong Kong by a company director who 

invited her to a Chinese New Year holiday 

banquet.  After the banquet, her host told 

her to immediately settle a large amount of 

outstanding payments for merchandise he 

had delivered.  She proposed a payment 

schedule, which he rejected.  As they discussed the dispute, Chinese security officials suddenly arrived to serve her court 

papers.  She reluctantly surrendered her 

passport, which was confiscated by the 

authorities.  In an unrelated incident later 

the same month, an American filed a report with Chinese officials concerning a 

large embezzlement by several Chinese 

employees of his firm.  Shortly thereafter, 

he claimed to have been threatened by his 

business partners.  In March, an American 

and her husband, investors in a Chinese 

cement factory, said they were prevented 

by workers from leaving the factory when 

they refused to authorize a general pay 

raise.  The couple were allegedly beaten. 

According to their story, the police arrived 

but failed to secure the couple’s freedom 

and left the scene.  A local deputy mayor 

intervened and effected their release but 

did so only after the husband authorized 

the pay raise. 

60

Labor-related encounters complicated by 

the action or inaction of law enforcement 

personnel continued in 1996.  In March, an 

American joint venture in China attempted 

to transfer about 20 workers to a factory 

that belonged to its Chinese partner. 

Workers responded to the attempted transfer by rioting and threatening two American citizens working for the company. 

Police responded to the scene but made no 

effort to contain or control the rioting 

workers.  In April, an American company 

chief was held against his will by workers 

who had been falsely told the chief would 

not pay them their salaries.  The police 

eventually arrived, but it was not clear 

whether they were there to secure the 

American’s release or simply to press him 

to solve the dispute with the workers.  Finally, in May, an American company operating in China claimed to have experienced 

police harassment.  Company heads believed the harassment resulted from the 

termination of a plant employee who had a 

relative on the local police force.  The 

alleged harassment included unexplained 

thefts, policemen arriving in large groups 

to ask for money or food, and the detention of a Chinese employee.  The employee 

reportedly was forced to watch the beating 

of another prisoner before he was released. 

The growth of organized crime, which 

often involves the transactions of huge 

sums of money, is the issue which perhaps 

has most successfully commanded the 

attention of Western governments and 

business people.  For years the United 

States has urged China to crack down on 

the illegal copying of compact disks (CDs) 

and to arrest CD pirates.  Since December, 

1996, when Chinese authorities stepped up 

efforts against CD pirates, they claim to 

have arrested more than 100 violators and 

closed 28 underground factories, where 

each disk-making machine could copy 

10,000 disks a day. 

A survey of the available literature on 

organized crime in China reveals a wide 

range of activity.  Illegal trading in stock 

and commodities markets has reportedly 

become a major source of economic crime. 

Other areas of organized criminal activity, 

much of it quite lucrative, include the theft 

of semiconductor chips, the pirating of 

software, and trademark counterfeiting. 

The counterfeiting of convertible currencies and credit cards also constitute a 

thriving enterprise.  Such organized criminal activity certainly has its financial victims, but is generally nonviolent and normally is not the primary concern of professionals in the Bureau of Diplomatic Security.  Nonetheless, organized crime can 

lead to violent incidents, sometimes involving confrontations between rival gangs and 

between gangs and law enforcement personnel.  Without doubt, the prevalence of 

even nonviolent organized crime can create an environment that fosters violent 

crime. 

Americans in China, of course, are also 

subject to the more common criminal acts 

faced by many expatriates.  A review of 

State Department reporting on crime involving Americans in China in 1996 reveals a handful of wallet thefts and 

pickpocketing, a bicycle theft, a few attempted and actual break-ins of vehicles 

and residences, and some vandalism. 

While these offenses may seem petty and 

might make the threat from crime seem 

slight, remember that diplomatic personnel, along with some business representatives, tend to be the best-protected expatriates in most overseas locations.  Some 

61

criminal incidents are more noteworthy 

than others, however.  In one locale, for 

example, two residential break-ins were 

followed by tampering with computer 

equipment found in the residence.  In 

Shanghai, an American citizen was forced 

into a taxi cab at the railway station by two 

men.  He was able to escape when the cab 

stopped at a traffic light. In Beijing, a 

teacher at the international school was 

robbed and beaten around noon in the 

vicinity of the school. 

Americans and other Westerners, of 

course, are rarely singled out as targets of 

crime because of their nationality.  In most 

cases, Americans and other Westerners are 

subject to crime because of their relative 

affluence and fall victim to criminal attacks 

for which relatively affluent Chinese might 

also be targeted. One attribute that makes 

Americans and other Westerners in China 

more vulnerable than their Chinese counterparts, however, is that they are often 

obviously on unfamiliar territory and often 

appear uncertain of their surroundings.  In 

addition to being seen as wealthy, they 

may also be seen as “easy.” 

China’s government has provided exhaustive statistical studies of the country’s rates 

of crime and the scale of the problem is 

often staggering.  For perspective, remember that China is a country of 1.2 billion 

people. In the first 10 months of 1996, 

China’s courts handled 560,000 cases involving serious crimes, a rise of 0.9 percent 

over the same 1995 period.  Major crimes 

reported in China in 1995 totaled more 

than 700,000 cases. China is said to have 

more than 380,000 drug addicts.  In 1996, 

Chinese police arrested more than 110,000 

people for drug-related crimes and solved 

more than 87,000 narcotics cases.  Yunnan 

Province alone arrested more than 29,000 

drug traffickers over a 4 1/2-year period. 

In a recent 5-year period, China’s police 

addressed 677,000 cases of prostitution 

involving 1.34 billion people. 

Leading the concerns about crime in China 

is the huge and growing issue of official 

corruption.  Last year, according to an 

annual report by Chinese authorities, 

among the criminal suspects investigated 

were 3,622 personnel of “party and government leading bodies,” 2,134 personnel 

of administrative organs, and 3,303 personnel of economic management organs. 

These figures, according to the report, 

added up to 13,530, an increase of 3.5 

percent over the previous year. 

62

Why is Crime on the Rise? Why is Crime on the Rise? Why is Crime on the Rise?

“To Get Rich Is Glorious”—Deng Xiao Ping 

Most China-watchers agree that the rise in 

crime of all kinds has coincided with the 

country’s rapid growth as an economic 

power.  China’s leaders, who have been 

remarkably open about the country’s problems with crime and corruption, might be 

the first to agree.  For some who engage in 

criminal activity, the motive may be survival.  In any developing society in which a 

few people manage to amass wealth, many 

of the “have nots” may be expected to 

target the “haves.”  Also of significance in 

the growth of crime is the elevated role of 

opportunity.  The economic opportunities 

afforded many Chinese by the government 

have opened the door to criminal opportunities, as well.  Author Ian Buruma, writing 

on China for The New York Times, said, 

“The cynicism bred by years of Communist 

propaganda has created a perfect climate 

for graft and corruption.”  Certainly, active 

underground markets for narcotics and 

weapons, which probably have been enhanced by China’s economic liberalism, 

establish a fertile ground for a wide variety 

of criminal activity.  China, of course, is 

often quick to blame foreign influence. 

Last summer, Ren Jianxin, President of 

China’s Supreme People’s Court, warned 

that “prostitution, drug addiction, drug 

trafficking, and other ugly social phenomena are spreading and becoming more 

intense.”  He singled out international drug 

cartels as leading culprits. 

As it does in much of the world, the illicit 

narcotics trade perpetuates much of the 

crime in China.  According to Chinese officials, police in China arrested more than 

110,000 people for drugs-related crime 

and solved more than 87,000 narcotics 

cases in 1996.  China’s proximity to the 

extensive reach of narcotics cartels in the 

so-called “Golden Triangle” of Burma, Laos, 

and Thailand makes it a convenient transit 

point for drug shipments bound for other 

countries.  China’s southwestern provinces 

of Yunnan—where narcotics activity is said 

to be especially intense—Sichuan, and 

Guangxi, Guangdong, Hunan, and Gansu 

all launched special wars on drugs last 

year, according to Chinese press accounts. 

Of all the factors contributing to the 

growth of crime in China, those of a cultural nature may be the most significant. 

Williard H. Myers, Director of the Center 

for the Study of Asian Organized Crime, 

has provided a definition for the quality of 

guanxi.  He describes it as “a social strategy by which individuals in a hierarchical 

society seek to ensure access to resources, 

which are controlled by powerful elites, 

who can arbitrarily allocate them.”  It may 

also be described as a complex network of 

bonds, obligations, debts, and repayments 

and usually excludes those who do not 

contribute to the bond.  Guanxi may be 

considered as comparable to what we in 

the West call “networking,” but it is much 

more complex and encompassing in practice.  The Chinese concept of guanxi generally governs any actions taken in business 

relationships.  The rules of guanxi in business enterprises in China may be considered to assume the role played by law, as it 

is commonly understood in Western society.  As a result, many Chinese engage in 

business practices that seem appropriate to 

them, but are widely considered illegal in 

the West.  To the Western merchant attempting to do business in China according 

to Western norms, the dictates of guanxi 

may appear to be an impenetrable stumbling block, allowing him to act only in 

ways he considers at least highly unethical. 

63

What Can Be Done? What Can Be Done? What Can Be Done?

Criminal encounters in China are a surprise to foreign visitors who think the 

tightly controlled, authoritarian nature of 

the society ensures them a crime-free visit. 

Naturally, the best way to avoid such surprises is to know what criminal activity has 

occurred and learn what steps may be 

taken to avoid an encounter with crime. 

There are many ways to acquire such 

knowledge, but security professionals often sum up such efforts with the admonition, “Practice security awareness and 

exercise caution.” 

vice can help you avoid being victimized 

by petty crime, including pickpocketing 

and purse-snatching, as well as the more 

sophisticated approaches of organized 

crime. 

James Pringle of the London Times’ Beijing 

office has described the common and some 

of the more unconventional criminal approaches in China. One common ploy, 

he points out, involves a Chinese 

woman striking up a conversation with 

a foreign man in a hotel bar. 

man returns to his room, accomplices 

claiming to be police officers knock at 

his door. 

woman has made an accusation of 

sexual harassment. 

make demands for money. 

mands may become violent. 

Pringle offers the following advice to 

travelers in China. 

your hotel room door unless you know 

who is on the other side. 

forms are easily purchased. 

see policemen only in the presence of 

senior hotel staff. 

money, camera, and valuables out of 

sight on trains and buses. 

sit near the driver. 

crowds. 

the cheerful girls haunting hotel coffee 

Prisoners being transported in a truck in Canton with banner exhorting 

firm punishment on economic criminals. 

Remembering this adWhen the 

The accomplices say that the 

At that point, they 

The deFirst, never open 

Police uniAgree to 

Second, keep your 

If possible, 

Beware of jostling 

Third, as he puts it, chat with 
shops and buy them ice cream, but leave it 

at that. 

Also, avoid the growing drug scene. 

Fourth, beware of safes in anything but 

four-star or five-star hotels. 

of advice Pringle offers recalls the security 

professional’s admonition to “Practice 

security awareness and exercise caution.” 

“Don’t become paranoid,” he says, “but 

abandon the notion that nothing bad can 

happen to you in China. 

dence you would maintain in other developing countries.” 

fact, may lead the smart traveler to avoid 

altogether those areas where trouble is 

most commonly found, such as trains, 

buses, and their stations. 

sively outside your hotel may make you a 

more visible target for petty theft. 

ing in any activity commonly thought to be 

a vice is, of course, of high risk. 

Far from ignoring or denying the problem, 

law enforcement authorities in China have 

grappled with the country’s climbing 

crime rate in the same way China has 

dealt with other crises in the past halfcentury–by launching a campaign against 

it. 

crime appears to involve a combination of 

public trials and executions. The anticrime 

campaign, known as “Strike Hard,” has 

reportedly resulted in thousands of executions since it was first launched in April 

1996. 

push is considered to be probably the 

most far-reaching drive since a similar 

effort took place in 1983 and 1984. 

In some of the more crime-ridden parts of 

China, national and local leaders are traversing various other avenues to battle 

crime. 

Prisoners sentenced to death in Pehong Prefecture, Yunna Province, during 

anti-drugs campaign. 

The AIDS problem is spreading. 

The fifth piece 

Adapt the pruExercising caution, in 

Lingering excesEngagChina’s principal tactic in fighting 

By some estimates, the anticrime 

In Beijing’s Dongcheng District, 
A man standing trial accused of stealing a 

television set. 

authorities claimed to have cut the crime 

rate by more than half after putting a more 

visible police presence on the streets.  Police in Guangdong Province are said to 

have turned to “brains and technology.” 

They attribute some of their success stories 

to an “urgent meeting” system, which enables them to deploy thousands of police to 

strategic parts of the province through the 

use of a telephone hot line system and 

advanced telecommunications for information exchange.  For some business executives and employees, kidnaping remains an 

ever-present threat.  Near Guangzhou, the 

People’s Liberation Army’s Physical Education College has made bodyguard training 

available to civilian men and women.  Last 

year, China called for the adoption of modern security technology and methods to 

replace its reliance on security personnel. 

A number of security employees were 

thought to have used their access and talents to perpetrate crime themselves. 

The U.S. Embassy’s Regional Security Officer and Consular personnel are available 

to provide information about criminal 

threats and render whatever assistance is 

possible in the event of a criminal incident. 

It is always advisable to register with the 

U.S. Embassy when you begin an extended 

stay in a foreign country and to check with 

Embassy personnel regarding the latest 

criminal ploys and locations to avoid. 

Once you are victimized in a criminal 

attack, however, the unfortunate truth is 

that you may be at the mercy of local law 

enforcement personnel long before Embassy staff can come to your rescue.  It is 

for this reason that you are also advised to 

“do your homework” before an incident 

occurs so that you may avoid unpleasant 

surprises. 

“Toto, I don’t 

think we’re in 

Kansas anymore.” 

—Dorothy, The Wizard Of Oz 

Like Dorothy in “The Wizard of Oz,” you 

may wonder how you can cope in a land 

where the rules of the game are not the 

ones you know. There are, of course, no 

easy solutions, but experience has shown 

that steps can be taken.  The recommendations that follow do not necessarily apply 

only to China, but can often be applied 

globally. 

According to an old adage, “There is no 

substitute for knowing your territory.”  A 

thorough knowledge of local laws, customs, 

and business practices can help to prevent 

misunderstandings and miscalculations. 

Before anything adverse happens, it may 

be advantageous to establish a relationship 

with local authorities, especially the police. 

As one security professional put it, “That is 

often done by inviting the head cop and a 

66

Conclusion

few of his cronies to a lunch or dinner 

followed by several drinks of the local 

white lightning.”  Many foreign companies 

operating in China are said to have an 

official Chinese partner.  It could, and 

perhaps should, be the Chinese partner 

who serves as your source for local rules, 

your conduit to the authorities, and your 

intermediary in disputes. 

Without a doubt, the information you possess and carry deserves as much protection 

as you do.  Be strongly advised that you 

should expect little privacy in the conduct 

of your affairs.  Your information is desirable and may be aggressively targeted.  Do 

what you can to make it hard to get. 

Lapses in information security are common, mostly because efforts to obtain information are not always obvious.  It is a 

good idea to work closely with a security 

professional to protect your information at 

home, at the office, in your communications, and on the road.  OSAC, the State 

Department’s Overseas Security Advisory 

Council, provides useful information to 

that end. 

Often, as OSAC has pointed out, the quickest route to your information is through 

you.  Practitioners of industrial espionage 

are only too willing to exploit your weaknesses for their gain.  Many Americans 

possess personality traits that increase 

their vulnerability to the classic attempts 

at espionage.  Americans, it is said, want to 

be liked, and we tend to be social and gregarious even with casual contacts.  We also 

place a high value on candor and trust, 

and we tend to be more open towards 

those who display those traits.  In another 

way, Americans who appear to place a 

great emphasis on economic status may be 

vulnerable to an approach that exploits 

our perceived obsession with wealth and 

“things.”  Similarly, Americans tend to be 

ambitious, oriented toward job advancement and professional recognition.  These 

three personality traits—sociability, status, 

and ambition—are logical targets for those 

attempting to apply a direct approach to 

either deceive Americans into carelessly 

providing competitive information or to 

seduce the unprincipled to cooperate in 

turning over information to business rivals. 

Americans should also be on guard against 

false appeals to ethnicity.  In fact, an intelligence service may attempt a “false flag” 

recruitment, in which an American with a 

strong sense of ethnic identity is approached on the basis of his or her ancestral country, when in reality the real recipient of the information is a different country entirely. 

Conclusion 

The breadth and scope, if not necessarily 

the intensity, of possible criminal encounters in China is truly staggering.  It is clear 

that the myriad forms crime may take as a 

result of China’s booming economy, together with the apparent shortcomings of 

the authorities in adequately halting crime, 

create a situation in which fear of crime is 

fear of the unknown.  If there is a common 

thread among the various criminal incidents recounted in this article, it is that, in 

most cases, the crime that occurred is one 

that the victim did not expect. 

The solution, or, at least, the first step 

toward a solution, would seem to be an 

expanded knowledge of crimes that have 

occurred and that are occurring, so that a 

greater portion of the unknown becomes 

known and that more of the unexpected 

becomes expected. In the security field, it 

is sometimes half-seriously said that, “A 

little paranoia never hurt anyone.”  Before 

doing business in China, or, for that matter, any country, an expatriate should re67

Crime

Elsewhere in Elsewhere in

Asia

search as thoroughly as possible, through 

the media or any other source, the criminal environment she or he is likely to face. 

It is my hope that this brief article has 

begun to serve that purpose. 

Crime 

Elsewhere in 

Asia 

Just as crime levels and trends vary considerably from region to region in China, 

so do they vary among the countries of 

East Asia and the Pacific.  Not surprisingly, 

the more developed countries of the region enjoy relatively low, but rising, crime 

rates.  The region’s developing countries, 

mostly located in Southeast Asia, must 

contend with more serious crime problems.  In some cases, the disparity in crime 

levels between countries is so extreme that 

it is often not useful to excessively generalize about “crime in Asia.”  Here are some 

impressions of criminal activity in several 

East Asian countries obtained largely from 

media accounts: 

In May of 1996, Cambodian authorities 

were said to be drawing up measures to 

counter the rising number of armed 

robberies against foreigners in Phnom 

Penh, the capital.  The report cited one 

American journalist who had hired an 

armed bodyguard. 

Kidnaping has been described as 

“nearly an industry” in the Philippines, 

where bandits usually target wealthy 

Filipinos and ethnic Chinese who will 

quietly pay the ransom and avoid noti68 

fying the authorities.  The chief criminal 

threat facing most Westerners in Manila 

is normal urban crime, including pursesnatching, which may be accomplished 

by a thief on a motorbike.  In January, 

1997, President Fidel Ramos described 

corruption in the government as a 

“nightmare.” 

Violence among “triad” crime gangs 

appears to be increasing in Hong Kong, 

and especially in Macao.  In May, 1997, 

Portugal sent several anti-organized 

crime police officials to Macao to help 

fight an escalation of violence among 

rival gangs. 

In early 1996, authorities in Singapore, 

where the crime rate is quite low, expressed concern that more criminal acts 

were being committed by “foreigners.” 

In May of 1997, police figures indicated 

that more than half of the murders 

committed in Singapore in 1996 were 

crimes of passion. 

Citizens of Japan who are long accustomed to low crime rates have reportedly grown alarmed by a rise in criminal 

activity.  Concerns were said to have 

arisen in 1995 when, in the wake of the 

Sarin subway attack and the shooting of 

the national police chief, police in November of that year found 17 dead 

babies in two suburban apartments. 

The influence of organized crime is said 

by some to be large and growing.  In 

spite of fears about crime and other 

social problems, one journalist opined 

that “The likelihood of being shot and 

killed in Japan is akin to the chance of 

being struck by lightning.” 

By far, the region’s worst location for 

crime, in terms of severity and frequency, is Papua New Guinea.  Roaming 
gangs of mostly young and violent thieves known as “raskols” rely on numbers and 

force to threaten even the best-protected residences of diplomats and business 

people.  Many missionaries and other less-protected expatriates pay for their vulnerability with chronic exposure to violent crime.  Rape is said to be nearly as common 

as property theft. 

SAY “NO” 

WHEN A STRANGER APPROACHES YOU AND INVITES 

YOU TO A JEWELRY SHOP, PLEASE SAY “NO”. 

WHEN A STRANGER OFFERS YOU FREE FOOD AND 

DRINKS, PLEASE SAY “NO”. 

IF YOU ARE NOT SURE ABOUT A SITUATION YOU ARE 

FACING, PLEASE CALL 281-5051 AND 282-8129. 

TOURIST ASSISTANCE CENTER AT YOUR SERVICE 

TOURISM AUTHORITY OF THAILAND 

NO 

The location, which seems to produce the most exotic tales about crime, probably 

because it receives a large number of foreign visitors, is Thailand.  A number of tourists have fallen victim to an increasingly common ploy in which they are drugged by 

strangers who offer them food or drink.  The luckier victims merely lose their valuables.  The Bangkok Post reported in April 1997, that rising crime has fueled a boom 

in the sale of security systems.  A recent official study revealed that economic crimes 

in the country increased 25 percent in 1996. 

69 
emerging trends in transnational crime emerging trends in transnational crime

Truck

Hijackings Hijackings Hijackings

and Cargo and Cargo and Cargo

Theft in Mexico Theft in Mexico Theft in Mexico

Special thanks to John P. Rodriguez, 

Industrial Security Consultant, 

El Paso, Texas. 

By 

Kevin J. 

Huska 

Have you wondered why the 

cost of that personal computer or high-end electronic 

equipment you’ve had your 

eye on keeps increasing in 

price? 

the additional cost encountered by manufacturers who 

must protect or replace raw 

materials or finished commercial products from highway 

bandits or organized criminals. 

business executive states an 

One of the reasons is 

In fact, an American 

70

� 

additional $200 is added to 

each personal computer due 

to the cost of theft and protecting these items while in 

transit through remote foreign lands. 

Cargo theft and truck hijackings occur 

around the world: on the railroad operating between St. Petersburg and 

Vladivostok in Russia; or the mountain 

roads winding through Eastern Europe, 

and on the heavily used route from Sao 

Paulo, Brazil, to Paraguay and the triborder region.  However, due to the increased trade between Mexico and the 

United States, cargo theft in Mexico has 

become an increasingly difficult problem 

for those responsible for the security of 

the product.  According to corporate security managers, the number one security 

problem in Mexico is truck hijackings and 

cargo theft.  The Regional Security Officer 

at the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City advised 

that there were an estimated 20,000 

truckjackings in 1996 nationwide, affecting both multinational and locally owned 

businesses.  These crimes have caused 

added expenses to business in Mexico due 

to additional security measures required 

to ensure the safety of cargo shipments. 

The magnitude of the problem should not 

be understated.  Although there are no 

national-level numbers for the monetary 

loss to U.S. companies related to cargo 

theft, industry estimates have put worldwide losses at $30 billion annually; and 

losses in Mexico in the 100s of millions of 

dollars.  In discussions with the Department of Transportation, FBI, National 

Cargo Security Council, American Truckers 

Association, corporate security managers, 

private consultants, and the U.S. Embassy 

in Mexico City, it is evident the problem is 

huge and that there is no coordinated 

effort to quantify or correct it between 

private government officials. 

In analyzing the cargo theft problem, two 

key and consistent factors become evident. 

First, Mexican organized gangs and local 

street thugs actively seek opportunities to 

steal transport vehicles and cargo.  Their 

reward is quick cash with very little risk of 

apprehension.  Secondly, the primary commercial targets are computer equipment, 

where the average truck load is valued at 

$250,000; high-end electronic equipment; 

and name-brand clothing and sports apparel.  Most any stolen product can be 

resold in a matter of hours on the black 

markets in Mexico.  The frequent ease with 

which truckjackings in Mexico are carried 

out is causing business managers to expend 

increasing amounts of valuable resources 

to address transportation security matters 

and protect their investments. 

71

Piñatas on Wheels Piñatas on Wheels

Internal Controls and

Other Concerns Other Concerns

Piñatas on Wheels 

How do criminals know what specific cargo 

container or truck out of hundreds to target?  One answer is their understanding of 

the entire shipping process.  In order to 

clear the Mexican customs process, it is 

necessary for American companies to forward invoices to the Mexican authorities or 

private custom brokers.  This is usually 

done by fax.  Business managers have indicated that shipping invoices are copied, 

shared, and sold by criminal elements, 

giving organized groups specific knowledge of cargo contents, specific routes, 

shipping dates, and destinations. 

Insider knowledge is a major element in 

the operation and success of these criminal 

endeavors.  It is a known fact that information leaks originating from trusted company employees are routine.  Product information and transportation schedules 

are valuable commodities to criminal organizations and sensitive data about cargo 

movements is potentially worth “big 

money.”  U.S. and Mexican transportation 

companies might as well deliver the goods 

to the bad guys directly, because currently 

the process of protecting information is 

inviting criminals to take advantage of 

lucrative opportunities. 

Operationally, the thieves have little difficulty identifying cargo trucks as they depart a factory or distribution center.  Typically, armed gangs of three to eight individuals will follow a truck until an opportunity presents itself, then approach the 

driver (always with a weapon) and simply 

hijack the truck.  Drivers wisely and rarely 

give any resistance to protect the cargo 

entrusted to them.  In Mexico City, smaller 

delivery trucks are also targeted.  One local 

company reported losing 10 percent of its 

fleet per day—incredible but true—with 

the vehicles recovered hours later without 

the retail items.  A majority of the trucks 

hijacked on remote highways are recovered within a matter of hours, which indicates complicity by the drivers and/or the 

carriers.  Those trucks that are not recovered, some of which are owned by U.S. 

companies, are sold or stripped down for 

parts by these enterprising criminals. 

Internal Controls and 

Other Concerns 

Another problem is the failure to fully 

check the background, including criminal 

history, of contract drivers.  There have 

been instances of drivers with a history of 

criminal activity who are entrusted with 

thousands of dollars of material and who 

are later found to be directly involved in 

the theft of the goods.  In addition, U.S. 

companies that rely on local contractors to 

transport material throughout Mexico 

report that many problems can be directly 

related to improper procedures by the 

contract drivers.  For example, drivers 

often have been found to use remote areas 

to take breaks instead of protected rest 

areas to sleep.  This practice leaves drivers 

and their cargo vulnerable to approaches 

by criminals on the lookout for an easy 

score.  Regrettably, it is always feasible 

that the drivers looking for a financial 

windfall are involved in the theft of trucks 

and cargo. 

Truck hijacking gangs target companies 

that have products that can be sold with 

ease on the black market, this includes 

pharmaceutical supplies and even food. 

72

One of the biggest losers, as mentioned, 

seems to be clothing companies.  One apparel maker has lost a number of tractortrailer rigs and goods in the past year, with 

monetary losses in the millions of dollars. 

Once stolen, these items can be easily 

moved through the illegal underground 

markets that can be found throughout the 

capital city.  The Regional Security Officer 

at the U.S. Embassy estimates that 60 percent of the merchandise disappears within 

Mexico City, the world’s largest metropolis, 

within 24 hours.  It is common knowledge 

that name brand blue jeans, athletic foot 

wear, and electronic equipment are sold at 

local flea markets where intervention by 

law enforcement or local authorities is 

minimal.  It should come as no surprise 

that as long as problems with the enforcement of Mexican law continues, these informal markets and the number of cargo 

thefts will continue to grow. 

Interestingly, Mexico is virtually an uninsured country.  Under Mexican law a motor 

carrier’s responsibility, which includes 

contractors, is limited to about $400 per 

metric ton of cargo.  However, insurance 

coverage is constantly being canceled due 

to the high loss ratio in Mexico.  Some 

insurers have doubled their rates while 

others are balking at writing Mexican policies.  Self-insurance policies, sometimes 

costing $500,000, has become a new but 

expensive way local managers are dealing 

with the problem. 

A final area of concern is the placement of 

road blocks and checkpoints along highways where military and police units 

search for weapons, drugs, and other contraband.  These official checkpoints have 

been a source of problems for all shippers. 

Helping oneself to goods from a truck is 

quite common in Mexico, and unfortuWhere are the trucks most vulnerable? 

from the delivery trucks that make routine, 

scheduled deliveries within the larger cities, trucks 

are vulnerable while on the highways in transit. 

Trucks carrying commercial goods are usually 

hijacked within 60 miles of major cities and along 

the heavily used transportation routes such as the 

Laredo-Monterry Highway, the port of Veracruz to 

Mexico City, and the Guadalajara-Mexico City 

highway corridor. 

Aside 

73

What Can Be Done? What Can Be Done?

� 

nately, some checkpoint police feel “it is 

their right” to appropriate goods in transit, 

according to Mexico -based security managers.  With police officers earning approximately US$70 per week, protecting 

shipments is a low priority.  Persistent 

problems with corruption are a problem in 

Mexico and dramatic improvements in this 

area are not anticipated for the foreseeable 

future. 

What Can Be Done? 

Many proactive managers have improved 

the process of transporting goods by scrutinizing their contract drivers, removing 

corporate logos from their vehicles, and 

hiring armed security escorts for the vehicles—including off-duty Mexican police 

officers.  These procedural changes have 

had only limited success in attacking the 

problem and reducing monetary losses 

incurred by U.S. companies operating in 

Mexico.  In some cases, the entire process 

of better managing resources to protect 

life and property needs to be revamped. 

The issue of truck hijackings and thefts of 

cargo containers shipped to and from large 

distribution centers is a problem towards 

which managers must take a proactive and 

aggressive approach.  One method is for 

business managers to consider establishing 

a countrywide transportation security 

policy.  Most importantly, managers 

should document and report incidents to 

Mexican and U.S. officials.  Though reaction and recovery of stolen product is very 

minimal, documenting the Mexican authorities’ response to corporate problems 

is important.  The scope and complexity of 

the issue can never be fully appreciated or 

understood unless losses are quantified 

and passed to decisions makers in the 

respective governments.

74 

Strong growth in the trade between Mexico 

and the United States is expected to continue and the problem of cargo thefts will 

also continue to escalate.  The emergence 

of stronger, better organized drug trafficking cartels also poses a threat to the security of cargo.  Furthermore, corruption of 

Mexican officials will only intensify and 

prolong the problem as criminal organizations expand and increase their influence. 

The actions to date by Mexican law enforcement, which operates with dwindling 

resources, leads to the conclusion that 

there is no solution for this type of crime. 

One of the keys to correcting the problem 

is for business and security managers to 

work together and quantify monetary 

losses, product loss, location, and modus 

operandi of thefts.  With this information, 

government entities will be better able to 

understand and address the damage cargo 

theft is having on business development in 

Mexico and focus the limited resources on 

combatting the crime. 
TRANSPORTATION TRANSPORTATION SECURITY POLICY SECURITY POLICY SECURITY POLICY

Some security managers have found success in combatting thefts by instituting the following transportation policies: 

� Conduct an analysis of the entire shipping process and identify vulnerabilities. 

� Handle shipping and customs documents as sensitive information. 

� Subject employees with access to shipping information to personnel screening. 

� Coordinate convoys of 3–5 trucks. 

� Utilize armed-protection services during overland transportation. 

� Use toll roads, which are generally safer than alternate, less traveled routes. 

� Travel only during daylight hours. 

� Stop only at approved rest areas and gas stations. 

� Use new technology—including Global Positioning System coverage—to counter 

thieves and track cargo. 

� Check-in and update local offices while cargo is in transit. 

� Immediately report any incidents to Mexican law enforcement authorities. 

� Establish a preventative, proactive program and test it periodically. 

� Share information with other security managers and the U.S. Embassy.

� 
Nordic

Motorcycle Motorcycle

Gangs

emerging trends in transnational crime emerging trends in transnational crime

“People are frightened of the motorcycle 

gangs, which are putting the lives of ordinary 

people at risk with their internecine rivalry. 

This is Denmark, not Chicago.”


Nordic 

Motorcycle 

By 

Peggy Gangs Brown 

Special thanks to ATF Special Agent 

Theodore Baltas, Alcohol, Tobacco, and 

Firearms; DS Special Agent Ken Luzzi, 

Houston Field Office; Houston Police Department, Criminal Intelligence Division; 

John Schilling, RSO Copenhagen and RSO 

staff; Karen Schaefer, RSO Stockholm; and 

Foreign Service Investigator Trevor Klink. 

—Danish Prime Minister Rasmussen 

Since 1994, the traditionally 

peaceful Nordic countries of 

Denmark, Finland, Sweden, 

and Norway have become a 

battleground for violent attacks between two Americanbased motorcycle gangs. The 

two gangs, or motorcycle 

clubs, are the California-based 

Hell’s Angels and the Texasbased Bandidos. During this 

period, the violence has resulted in the death of 11 

people and injured numerous 

76

bystanders.  A  favored 

weapon in this ongoing feud 

has been the Swedish-manufactured Carl Gustav, a shoulder-fired antitank missile, 12 

of which were stolen from a 

Swedish army store near 

Malmo in February 1994 by 

the Bandidos. 

This violence against each others’ clubhouses and members has caused an outcry 

among the citizens in Scandinavia, particularly in Denmark, which has faced the 

brunt of the violence since four killings 

occurred in that country. In 1996, 

Denmark’s Prime Minister pledged new 

powers for the police to fight the gangs’ 

activities and indicated that Denmark 

would not stand this escalating violence. In 

1997, Denmark banned Hell’s Angels clubs 

and motorcycle gangs and Danish police 

started to routinely stop and search known 

gang members on sight. The Danish Government had already banned gang members from setting up clubhouses in residential areas following an October 1996 

antitank missile attack in downtown 

Copenhagen that killed 2 persons and 

wounded 19. 

In June 1997, Norway’s Prime Minister 

vowed to copy Denmark’s law and drive 

biker clubhouses out of urban areas, after 

a female bystander’s death in Drammen, 

Norway. In Sweden this incident prompted 

the Justice Minister to suggest banning 

biker clubs from all populated areas. 

Denmark’s Hell’s Angels are apparently 

now looking to countries in the east, such 

as Russia, Ukraine, and the Baltic States, 

for further expansion. Papers found during 

a 1996 search of a Hell’s Angels building in 

Roskilde, Denmark, detailed an elaborate 

plan for reorganization and expansion. 

The reorganization of the European section 

apparently is being driven by Danish Hell’s 

Angels members who want to divide Europe into three regions.  The Copenhagen 

chapter would be in charge of all the 

Scandinavia countries, the Baltics, Russia, 

and Ukraine under a “Northwest Region 

Two.” The United Kingdom would fall 

under “Region One” and Austria, France, 

Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, and Switzerland would be “The Central European 

Region.” Hell’s Angels in Europe currently 

has 34 or 35 chapters in more than nine 

countries and wants to double the number 

of countries with Hell’s Angels representation. Interpol has now established a special 

task force to investigate the criminal activities that international motorcycle gangs 

are involved in. 

77

Roots of the Conflict Roots of the Conflict

Motorcycle Clubs’ Motorcycle Clubs’

Criminal Activities Criminal Activities

Roots of the Conflict 

The dispute between Hell’s Angels and the 

Bandidos started in 1994 after the 

Bandidos set up chapters in several Scandinavian countries a few years earlier. The 

Hell’s Angels had been established in 

Copenhagen for over 10 years by that 

time. The Bandidos-affiliated clubs in these 

countries initially formed in an attempt to 

avoid being taken over by the Hell’s Angels 

or basically for their self preservation. The 

conflict between the two biker gangs was 

initially a turf battle in which the Hell’s 

Angels did not intend to share their turf 

with the newly established Bandidos gang. 

By March 1996, the dispute started making 

news following a Hell’s Angels attack at 

Copenhagen’s airport against Bandido 

members which killed one and wounded 

two. Then in October 1996, a car bomb 

exploded outside the Hell’s Angels Oslo 

headquarters. 

There are a number of theories on how the 

feud originally started between the two 

clubs. One view is that the duel was initially sparked by a barroom brawl in Denmark when a group of Bandidos harassed a 

lone Hell’s Angels member. The lone member apparently hid out in a ladies’ 

restroom to escape the gang. This then led 

to retaliation by Hell’s Angels and escalated to the present feud. One Danish sociologist said gaining honor is of prime importance to these club members and this is 

often achieved by stealing it from another 

man, most likely in a violent manner. Another problem faced in the Nordic countries is lack of space. An observer noted 

that the United States was large enough to 

handle various American gangs in different 

regions. The fact that rival clubs in the 

Nordic countries establish club houses 

near each other creates even more tension. 

Motorcycle Clubs’ 

Criminal Activities 

There are several factors contributing to 

the current duel between the two motorcycle gangs. The conflict involves a gang’s 

power, territory, and share of the criminal 

market in the Scandinavian countries. The 

clubs are involved in trafficking hashish, 

amphetamines, and “Ecstasy” and have 

now ventured into marijuana, cocaine, and 

heroin markets.  However, club rules 

strictly forbid members from using drugs 

intravenously. Individual bikers have also 

been known to run sophisticated rings that 

are also involved in prostitution, arms 

smuggling, and other illegal activities. 

These illegal activities are hidden behind 

legitimate businesses the clubs run, including bike shops and tattoo parlors. Traditionally, most of the gangs’ members were 

criminals before joining clubs. Some police 

in Scandinavia suspect that the current 

struggle with the Bandidos has been exacerbated in the competition for access to 

Eastern Europe and a share in its criminal 

market. 

78

Hell’s Angels in the Hell’s Angels in the

Nordic Countries Nordic Countries

One reason the American-based motorcycle 

clubs have expanded in the Nordic countries is the easy access to surrounding 

open seas due to the number of ports 

which facilitate the import and export of 

illegal goods. These countries were seen as 

ideal locations for various drug activities. 

There has been a major increase in the 

supply of amphetamines, cocaine, and 

other hard drugs since the motorcycle 

clubs’ arrival to the region. Some youths 

are attracted to the motorcycle clubs’ mystique due to rising unemployment, crime, 

or family problems. Membership requirements to these clubs are the same as those 

in the United States. Membership is restricted to white males who are at least 21 

years old. An unofficial requirement is the 

possession of a criminal record and time 

served in jail. 

The growing popularity of motorcycles and 

the biker movement in Europe is also affecting the price and availability of Harley 

Davidson motorcycles to the extent that 

World War II vintage and non-running 

Harleys are extremely expensive. Despite 

the large number of stolen and counterfeit 

Harley parts from the United States, there 

remains a great demand for these items. 

Motorcycles stolen in the United States are 

quickly disassembled and a new Vehicle 

Identification Number is etched to replace 

the original number. The motorcycle parts 

are then shipped overseas as machinery or 

other miscellaneous items. In the Houston 

area, where the Bandidos are based, stolen 

Harley Davidsons only have a 5 percent 

recovery rate. It is believed that the 

Bandidos are stealing these motorcycles 

and shipping them overseas for resale to 

finance their narcotics operations and help 

fund their expansion into new countries. 

Hell’s Angels in the 

Nordic Countries 

Hell’s Angels was established in Denmark 

in 1977 when four local Danish gangs 

united and applied for membership 

through Hell’s Angels in California. They 

were threatened by a local rival gang and 

11 died in the skirmishes before the Angels 

claimed victory. There were no problems 

until 1993, when another American-based 

group, the Bandidos, were formed in Denmark. Hell’s Angels Copenhagen was established on December 31, 1980. The second 

Angels chapter was set up in Denmark in 

1978 and was known as Black Sheep South 

Coast.  In 1985, they became 

“hangarounds’ for Hell’s Angels and later 

prospects as Denmark South. On December 

31, 1987, Hell’s Angels Denmark South was 

approved as a full chapter. This chapter 

was subsequently closed in August 1996 

and split into three separate chapters. 

Hell’s Angels Denmark Aarhus gained full 

membership in December 1992 after being 

a prospect chapter since April 1991. Hell’s 

Angels Aalborg became a chapter in November 1996. As other local groups were 

destroyed, Hell’s Angels Copenhagen became the leading motorcycle gang in Denmark and most powerful. Hell’s Angels 

currently has the following chapters in 

Denmark: Copenhagen, Nomads, West End, 

Roskilde, Odense, Aarhus, and Aalborg. 

79

The Bandidos in the The Bandidos in the

Nordic Countries Nordic Countries Hell’s Angels is an extremely organized 

club in Denmark and has “friends” in 25 

clubs which can be called upon for assistance. Hell’s Angels are split up with 85 

members in Sweden, 110 in Denmark, 70 

in Norway, and 25 in Finland. There are 15 

official chapters in all. When the third 

Hell’s Angels chapter opened in March 

1997 in Sweden, between 250 to 300 international members attended to celebrate 

the opening of the new “Angels’ Place.” 

In Sweden the outlaw motorcycle gangs are 

involved in organized crime and have 

participated in murder, attempted murder, 

armed robbery, and illegal possession of 

firearms and explosives. The violent conflict between the Hell’s Angels and 

Bandidos has dominated the local crime 

scene in this country. In 1997, a Super 

Rally was held at High Chaparral amusement park in Jonopings Ian in southern 

Sweden and was well attended by the Hell’s 

Angels and most of their supporter clubs. 

The Hell’s Angels currently have two clubs 

in Sweden, the Malmo and Helsingborg 

Sweden clubs. The latter was admitted to 

full membership in February 1996. The 

Hell’s Angels have one prospect chapter, 

Stockholm Southside and approximately 

15 motorcycle supporter clubs. So far the 

supporter clubs have not taken an active 

role in the ongoing conflict with the 

Bandidos in Sweden. Gamlestans Goteborg 

Motorcycle Club is probably the next 

group to become a Hell’s Angels 

hangaround club. The Bandidos so far 

have one chapter known as Bandidos Sweden and a supporter club called Aphuset. 

Swedish police, however, believe that one 

or two outlaw motorcycle gangs will become affiliated with the group in the near 

future. 

The Bandidos in the 

Nordic Countries 

In late 1988, the Morticians, a supporter 

group to the Hell’s Angels, broke with the 

Angels following disputes and established 

Undertakers Northland and Undertakers 

East Coast. Then in 1992, they contacted 

the Bandidos in France and the United 

States seeking membership. After serving 

as prospects to this group for a short time, 

they became full Bandido members in 

1993. The Bandidos Denmark Northland in 

Stenlose, Sjaelland, has the distinct status 

as Bandidos National Chapter for Europe 

which handles Bandidos’ matters for all of 

Europe. 

In late 1996, three hangaround chapters 

and one prospect chapter were established. 

The Bandidos Motorcycle Club has the 

following chapters in Denmark: Northland, 

East Coast, Southside, South Island, and 

National Chapter Europe. Frederiksvaerk is 

the only prospect group and the three 

hangaround chapters are Bandidos 

Aalborg, Bandidos Horsens, and Bandidos 

Copenhagen. The Bandidos have 130 members across the Scandinavian countries in 

at least seven chapters. More than 100 

gang members have been imprisoned in 

the Nordic countries since 1991. 

Adding to the feud are instances when club 

members have shifted their alliance between the two groups. A Danish former 

president of Hell’s Angels Copenhagen, 

Michael Garcia Lerche Olsen, served first in 

the Titangade-based chapter but was expelled from the club, deprived of his motorcycle, vest, and colors. He now is the 

president for the Swedish branch of the 

Bandidos in Kattarp outside Helsingborg. 

Other Danish former Hell’s Angels have 

80

joined Olsen and are considered traitors by 

the Hell’s Angels. The June 1997 attack 

against the Bandidos clubhouse in 

Drammen, Norway, was an attempt to kill 

the visiting Bandido leader Michael Olsen. 

The Bandidos based in the United States 

apparently believer the Nordic Bandidos 

are beyond their control and distanced 

themselves from these overseas branches. 

There is also a concern that the gang warfare and activities of the Nordic chapters 

could be tied into those involving the 

American chapters. On the other hand, the 

Bandidos in the Nordic countries seem to 

be disappointed that they are not getting 

full support from their mother chapter. 

Peace Agreement 

In September 1997, the Nordic Hell’s Angels and Bandidos established a truce and 

recently agreed to set up mutual motorcycle workshops. Apparently, the Danish 

Hell’s Angels have ordered their Scandinavian “brothers” to avoid confrontations 

with Bandidos. Further, the Danish press 

has reported that gangs are willing to expel 

their own members if they carry weapons 

or wear bullet-proof vests. 

Police in the Nordic countries report that 

the two motorcycle clubs appear to be 

concentrating on their illegal businesses 

since the truce. There has been extensive 

contact between the clubs and the criminal 

communities in the Nordic Countries. Also, 

recent arrests indicate that the clubs are 

building up their financial base with illegal 

activities involving drugs and weapons. 

American law enforcement officials believe 

that the recent truce by presidents of the 

chapters was for propaganda purposes to 

keep local legislation from outlawing the 

mototcycle gangs entirely. 

Chronology of Chronology of Chronology of

Incidents in Incidents in Incidents in

Nordic Countries Nordic Countries Nordic Countries

1994-97 1994-97 1994-97

Denmark Denmark

December 26, 1995 December 26, 1995

Copenhagen, Denmark Copenhagen, Denmark

Five to ten Bandidos attack two Hell’s Angels members at a Copenhagen restaurant and severely beat 

them. 

Death at 

the Airport 

March 10, 1996 

Copenhagen, Denmark 

Members of Hell’s Angels ambushed a group 

of rival Bandidos at Copenhagen’s airport. A 

Bandido Southside member was killed and 

one member, one prospect, and one 

hangaround were injured. 
April 17, 1996 April 17, 1996

Denmark Denmark

Hell’s Angels Denmark South’s clubhouse in 

Snoldelev was hit by a rocket. Fourteen members 

were inside but none were badly injured. 

April 26, 1996 April 26, 1996

Denmark Denmark

A Bandidos Southside leader was nearly killed when 

several persons broke into Hoirserod State Prison 

and tossed a hand grenade through his jailcell 

window that exploded under his bed. 

May 7, 1996 May 7, 1996

Copenhagen, Denmark Copenhagen, Denmark

A Hell’s Angel Copenhagen member and two companions were injured by two grenades thrown in 

front of his home in Copenhagen. 

July 10, 1996 July 10, 1996

Nykoebing, Denmark Nykoebing, Denmark

Danish EOD defuse a small bomb planted under the 

van of a Bandidos gang member outside the 

Bandidos clubhouse in Nykoebing. 

July 21, 1996 July 21, 1996

Copenhagen, Denmark Copenhagen, Denmark

A bag of explosives was found outside of a Hell’s 

Angels’ Copenhagen chapter in downtown 

Copenhagen. 

July 25, 1996 July 25, 1996

Copenhagen, Denmark Copenhagen, Denmark

An imprisoned leader of Hell’s Angels Copenhagen 

was attacked by several unknown men while sleeping in his Jyderup State Prison cell. The attackers 

failed to break through the cell door, but the prisoner was badly injured from three shots from their 

automatic weapons. 

August 5, 1996 August 5, 1996

Greve, Denmark Greve, Denmark

A civilian was hit by bullets in a drive-by shooting 

in Greve, south of Copenhagen. Police believe the 

victim was mistaken for a Hell’s Angels member 

living in the same building. 

Aerial view of the attack site. Remains of the 

car bomb are under the white tarpaline. 

Explosion! 

September 12, 1996 

Roskilde, Denmark 

A car bomb exploded outside a Hell’s Angels 

clubhouse in Roskilde causing extensive 

damage but no injuries. The clubhouse is 

located in a densely populated residential 

neighborhood. 

� 

� 

The bomb was detonated by police. 
August 14, 1996 August 14, 1996

Denmark Denmark

A Bandidos Southside supporter was shot in his car 

while leaving the Bandidos chapter. 

September 2, 1996 September 2, 1996

Aalborg, Denmark Aalborg, Denmark

A Hell’s Angels Aalborg member was shot and 

wounded, by two men, in a drive-by shooting as he 

closed a store in Aalborg owned by the Hell’s Angels 

defense fund. 

September 4, 1996 September 4, 1996

Aalborg, Denmark Aalborg, Denmark

A car bomb exploded in a parking lot in Aalborg 

but failed to injury a Hell’s Angels member as he 

drove by. 

September 22, 1996 September 22, 1996

Roskilde, Denmark Roskilde, Denmark

In the early morning, the Hell’s Angels Roskilde 

chapter was attacked by 250 machinegun rounds. 

Only one member was injured by the attack. 

December 1, 1996 December 1, 1996

Copenhagen, Denmark Copenhagen, Denmark

A gunfight took place outside a Copenhagen restaurant between members of Hell’s Angels and the 

Bandidos. No one was injured. 

December 5, 1996 December 5, 1996

Copenhagen, Denmark Copenhagen, Denmark

Two members of the Bandidos were attacked by 

gunfire while they were trapped in a private yard in 

Valby, Copenhagen. One was injured. 

December 9, 1996 December 9, 1996

Aalborg, Denmark Aalborg, Denmark

A member of the Bandidos Aalborg chapter was 

attacked by gunfire as he waited in his car at night. 

Although he was hit by ten bullets, he survived the 

attack. 

Rocket Attack! 

October 6, 1996 

Copenhagen, Denmark 

The Hell’s Angels Copenhagen chapter was 

attacked by a rocket during the yearly Viking 

Party. ospect and one guest were 

killed and 17 were injured. An unused rocket 

was found nearby. 

Circle indicates 

site of impact. 

One pr
84 

Finland Finland

February 12, 1996 February 12, 1996

Helsingfors, Finland Helsingfors, Finland

There were two hand grenade attacks in 

Helsingfors. One was against a restaurant belonging 

to a member of Hell’s Angels Finland which badly 

injured two people. 

a motorcycle garage belonging to Hell’s Angels 

Finland chapter. 

March 1, 1996 March 1, 1996

Helsinki, Finland Helsinki, Finland

A Finnish Bandido leader was shot and killed at 

their clubhouse in Helsinki. A Hell’s Angels car fled 

the scene following the attack. 

May 12, 1996 May 12, 1996

Finland Finland

An unexploded hand grenade was found outside 

the Hell’s Angels’ Finland chapter. 

May 18, 1996 May 18, 1996

Finland Finland

Two Bandidos threw two hand grenades at the 

Hell’s Angels’ Finland chapter which injured two 

members. 

August 1996 August 1996

Helsinki, Finland Helsinki, Finland

A Hell’s Angels member was beaten up by an unknown intruder in a prison near Helsinki. 

Norway

January 15, 1996 January 15, 1996

Hamar, Norway Hamar, Norway

A bomb went off against the 

Screwdriver motorcycle club, a Hell’s Angels 

hangaround club. No one was injured. 

January 18, 1996 January 18, 1996

Norway

There was a firebomb at the Hell’s Angels Norway 

chapter in Oslo. 

March 10, 1996 March 10, 1996

Oslo

A Bandidos Sweden member was shot and wounded 

in Fornebu Airport in Norway by members of Hell’s 

Angels. 

May 9, 1996 May 9, 1996

Oslo, Norway Oslo, Norway

Two tourists were wounded in Oslo when the car 

they were driving was shot at, as they passed by the 

Hell’s Angels’ Norway chapter. 

July 15, 1996 July 15, 1996

Oslo, Norway Oslo, Norway

A Bandidos Sweden member was shot and killed in 

Norway. 

July 16, 1996 July 16, 1996

Drammen, Norway Drammen, Norway

A Danish Bandidos gang member was shot dead 

near Drammen. 

July 19, 1996 July 19, 1996

Oslo, Norway Oslo, Norway

There were shots fired from another car in a driveby shooting in Oslo, however nobody was injured. A 

Hell’s Angels member and companion were in the 

targeted car. 

June 5, 1997 June 5, 1997

Drammen, Norway Drammen, Norway

A bomb went off in a car parked next to the 

Bandidos clubhouse killing a woman driving past 

the building in Drammen. 

Sweden

1994

Helsingborg, Sweden Helsingborg, Sweden

A Hell’s Angels member was murdered in 

Helsingborg. 

1995

Sweden

Since 1995, there have been two antitank missile 

attacks against the Hell’s Angels compound in 

Hasslarp, Sweden. The missiles were stolen from a 

Swedish military depot near Malmo by the 

Bandidos. 

July 31, 1995 July 31, 1995

Helsingborg, Sweden Helsingborg, Sweden

An antitank missle was fired into the Sweden 

Helsingborg Motorcycle clubhouse but no one was 

injured. The group was a Hell’s Angel prospect 

chapter at the time. 

December 6, 1995 December 6, 1995

Helsingborg, Sweden Helsingborg, Sweden

There was a shoot-out between two vehicles on a 

highway outside of Helsingborg. A Hell’s Angel 

Sweden member was wounded in the leg. 

February 29, 1996 February 29, 1996

Helsinborg, Sweden Helsinborg, Sweden

A hand grenade left by the car of a Hell’s Angels’ 

Helsinborg hangaround did not explode as he 

moved his car. 

The second attack was against 

Hamar chapter of the 
March 5, 1996 March 5, 1996

Helsinborg, Sweden Helsinborg, Sweden

There was gunfire between two cars in Helsinborg. 

One Bandidos Sweden prospect was seriously injured. 

April 11, 1996 April 11, 1996

Hasslarps: Hasslarps: Hasslarps:

Early in the morning, the Hell’s Angels Helsingborg 

chapter was hit by two rockets. 

in the attack, but the clubhouse was severely damaged. 

July 23, 1996 July 23, 1996

Helsingborg Helsingborg

The president of Bandidos Sweden was shot in the 

leg while driving a car close to the Hell’s Angels 

Helsingborg clubhouse. He went to a local hospital 

and police later found several bullet holes in his 

car. 

August 4, 1996 August 4, 1996

Helsinborg, Sweden Helsinborg, Sweden

A member of Hell’s Angels Helsinborg was attacked 

by gunfire while driving his car in Helsingborg. He 

was badly injured in the attack. 

August 27, 1996 August 27, 1996

Stockholm, Sweden Stockholm, Sweden

A member of Bandidos Sweden was attacked while 

driving his car. Sixteen rounds were fired at him 

but he was not hit. 

August 28, 1996 August 28, 1996

Helsinborg, Sweden Helsinborg, Sweden

A member of Hell’s Angels Helsinborg was attacked 

by three men as he went to his garage. He was shot 

three times but survived. 

September 10, 1996 September 10, 1996

Hasslarp, Djurslov, and Malmo, Sweden Hasslarp, Djurslov, and Malmo, Sweden

Swedish police seized 12 members of Hell’s Angels 

in raids on three clubhouses in southern Sweden. 

They were being questioned on suspicion of conspiracy to murder. They were seized after police 

raided clubhouses in Hasslarp, Djurslov and Malmo. 

September 15, 1996 September 15, 1996

Helsingborg, Sweden Helsingborg, Sweden

A parked car was hit by bullets and 15 shells were 

found later on the street. The suspicion is that the 

Hell’s Angels and Bandidos opened fire on each 

other but there is no proof. 

September 24, 1996 September 24, 1996

Helsingborg, Sweden Helsingborg, Sweden

The Hell’s Angels Helsingborg chapter was attacked 

by a rocket. No one was injured in the attack. 

September 28, 1996 September 28, 1996

Helsinborg, Sweden Helsinborg, Sweden

The Hell’s Angels Helsinborg chapter was attacked 

by a rocket, two hand grenades and a bomb. No one 

was injured in this attack. 

October 3, 1996 October 3, 1996

Malmo, Sweden: Malmo, Sweden: Malmo, Sweden: A large blast outside a Hell’s 

Angels clubhouse in Malmo injured four people and 

caused widespread damage to buildings within 

several hundred yards of the clubhouse. Twenty 

families had to be evacuated. Four members of the 

biker gang were in the clubhouse but not injured. 

The following day approximately 100 people participated in a demonstration against the Hell’s 

Angels. 

January 13, 1997 January 13, 1997

Helsinborg, Sweden Helsinborg, Sweden

A member of the Bandidos Helsinborg chapter was 

in a shoot-out outside his home in Helsingborg. Two 

persons fled by car and later a member of Hell’s 

Angels Stockholm visited a hospital to have a bullet 

wound treated. 

March 22, 1997 March 22, 1997

Helsingborg, Sweden Helsingborg, Sweden

An antitank missile was fired into the Hell’s Angels 

Helsingborg clubhouse but the grenade did not 

explode and there were no injuries. 

April 28, 1997 April 28, 1997

Helsingborg, Sweden Helsingborg, Sweden

A bomb exploded outside of the Aphuset clubhouse 

causing only material damage. Aphuset is a 

Bandidos supporter club. Another bomb exploded 

simultaneously outside of a garage used by Bandido 

supporters. 

No one was killed 

85

Hell’s Angels Hell’s Angels Hell’s Angels

“The Fighting Will Only End When The 

Angles Win.”—A Canadian Scholar 

The Hell’s Angels Motorcycle Club is an 

international outlaw motorcycle gang with 

about 1,500 members worldwide. It is the 

largest motorcycle gang, with the most 

chapters overseas and the largest membership. The group started after World War II, 

formed by disgruntled veterans that 

formed a club in San Bernardino, California, in 1948. The Marlon Brando movie 

The Wild One brought national attention 

to the activities of bikers in 1953. Four 

years later, the Oakland chapter was 

formed by Sonny Barger and became the 

“Mother” chapter which issues all charters 

for new chapters. In the 1950s, the American Motorcyclist Association maintained 

that only 1 percent of all motorcycle riders 

were troublemakers and not the majority 

of riders. The Hell’s Angels and other motorcycle gangs adopted this notion and 

now display a 1% logo on their vests, or 

“colors” as they are commonly called. A 

“one percenter” has become the term used 

for outlaw motorcycle gangs. 

Hell’s Angel’s is now a legitimate nonprofit 

organization in the United States with their 

trademark patented. They are considered 

the most sophisticated motorcycle gang 

with a tight management structure, strict 

discipline, and a sophisticated communications system. They often greet each other 

with a bear hug, which is also a convenient 

way to check for possible wires on each 

other. Hell’s Angels has been attempting to 

control the world’s drug market and is the 

fastest growing organized crime group in 

the United States and Europe. Their numbers in the United Kingdom are also growing rapidly. Interpol estimates 96 Hell’s 

Angels chapters in 16 different countries. 

The club is now turning their attention to 

the former Eastern Bloc countries for expansion into their markets. 

Becoming a full member of Hell’s Angels is 

not a simple procedure. Applicants who 

wish to join Hell’s Angels must first fill out 

an application form and pass a background 

and credit check. If an applicant passes, 

then he must commit specific crimes to 

prove he is tough enough to join. The official policy for membership is that only 

white males over age 21 may join. In the 

past, a criminal record was required for 

membership, however, many in Hell’s Angels today do not have criminal records. 

Law enforcement officials and politicians 

are barred from membership. A prospective member must own a Harley Davidson 

bike, possess a desired skill, and speak 

English. 

In Hell’s Angels there is not a single international leader and every member is considered equal. Also every chapter, known 

as a “charter” by Hell’s Angels, is considered equal. Every chapter has weekly meetings that members must attend. The club 

even has a copyright on their “Filthy Few” 

skull emblem. The club has their own attorney who has successfully sued companies 

for unauthorized use of the Hell’s Angels 

name and insignia. A winged death’s head 

sticker on a motorcycle means “Don’t mess 

with this bike.” 

86

Bandidos 

“I think the Bandidos are going to win. 

They’re the meanest. Hurt one of us and 

we all bleed—hat’s what they believe. 

That’s their honor code.”—A Swedish 

youth. 

The Bandidos motorcycle gang is the third 

largest outlaw motorcycle gang in the 

world and is only slightly smaller than the 

Outlaws motorcycle gang. Excluding Brazil, 

the Bandidos have chapters in every major 

motorcycle market along with the Hell’s 

Angels. This gang was started in Texas by 

Vietnam War veterans in 1966.  They 

shifted their headquarters from Houston to 

Corpus Cristi, Texas. Most of their membership includes white, middle-aged men who 

prefer heavy drinking, drug use, and violence. Their headquarters is Wolfy’s, a 

topless bar, owned by a club member who 

is a millionaire. Many of the Bandidos have 

jobs in his assorted businesses. The 

Bandidos are concentrated in the southern 

and northwestern regions of the United 

States. Their overseas chapters can be 

found in most of Europe, Australia, and 

North America. 

Police believe the Bandidos’ colors are 

modeled after the Frito Bandito. This 

occured after a gang member known as the 

“Fat Mexican” posed for a picture wearing 

a serape and sombrero while holding a 

pistol and a knife. Some gang members 

thought he resembled the Frito Bandito 

and patches were made in his likeness. The 

gangs activities consist of dealing narcotics, prostituting their women, and stealing 

and selling motorcycles and motorcycle 

parts to be shipped overseas. Since motorcycles and parts are in higher demand 

overseas, some of the profits are sent back 

to the mother headquarters. 

Pictured are back and front view of the 

Bandidos colors. The top photo shows the name 

of the motorcycle gang on top rocker with 

country name on lower rocker. The 1% rocker 

indicates the Bandidos as part of the one-percent which are outlaw motorcycle gangs, The 

logo in the middle is that of the Frito Bandido. 

Lower photo shows the front view of the 

Bandidos colors. On the jacket is the name of 

the Bandido chapter on lower rocker 

“Northland.” The location is probably in Stenlose, 

Denmark. The BFFB stands for “Bandidos forever, 

forever Bandidos.” 

87

Some Terms Some Terms

Defined Defined

Some Terms 

Defined 

Bike Run 

Basically a run consists of a group of bikers 

traveling together on an outing for a special reason. In Hell’s Angels, prospects are 

required to go on Angels bike runs or gettogethers as are full members. These mandatory runs are held each year in the 

United States and overseas. Each chapter is 

expected to send at least two members for 

overseas world-runs. The latest Hell’s Angels world-run was held in November 1997 

in South Africa. 

The formation during a run is two bikers 

abreast and club officers and members in 

certain formations. The president and road 

captain will lead the run with full members 

behind. The sergeant at arms is next followed by probationary members and associates or honorary members in back. The 

motorcycles do not pass or leave this formation unless a bike has mechanical problems. A crash truck will be either a mile in 

front of the group or behind. Normally the 

crash trucks will carry spare motorcycle 

parts, beer, drugs, and weapons. They are 

also equipped with mobile phones and 

police scanners to alert the bikers to approaching police. This formation is used by 

most biker gangs but not in all instances. 

Colors 

Refers to the black leather vest and 

patches worn by biker gang members and 

prospects. Normally the front of the vest 

will depict a members’ chapter and have 

the motorcycle club logo. The back will 

have the logo with the club name on top 

and the country name on the bottom. 

Associates or 

Hangers on 

(would-be strikers) 

Road 

Captain President 

Full-color 

wearing 

members 

Sergeant at Arms 

(enforcer and keeper 

of club arsenal) 

Strikers or Probates 

(wearing bottom rocker of 

colors only with M.C.) 

Road 

Captain 

(occasionally a 

second road captain) 

Sergeant 

at Arms 

Crash Truck 

(1.5 to 2 miles ahead 

or behind the pack) � 

Bike Run Bike Run Bike Run

88

Fly Colors 

To ride a motorcycle wearing colors. 

Hag or Hog 

Harley-Davidson Motorcycle Owner 

Group. 

Honorary Member 

Usually a member in good standing and 

retired from the club.  Also retains club’s 

colors and is required to attend club funerals. 

Prospect 

A prospect is always sponsored by a member and will be able to wear colors that 

have the rocker “prospect” emblazoned 

on their jacket where the club name usually appears. A person will serve as prospect anywhere from 6 months to 1 year 

and may have duties including watching 

members’ bikes. They are frequently required to commit one or more crimes, 

which help to eliminate potential unsuitable members. This also helps eliminate 

undercover law enforcement officials who 

will be reluctant to commit criminal acts. 

A prospect will get their top rocker with 

the club’s name when they become a full 

member. The application  process for a 

chapter is similar to that of an individual. 

The chapter will be a hanger-on and then 

a prospect chapter before full membership. 

Road Captain 

He rides at the front with the president. 

Some clubs have two road captains, one of 

which will ride at the rear of the pack with 

the sergeant at arms. 

Rocker 

Has two meanings. It is the term for the 

patches that a member wears on their vest. 

Also in the Nordic countries, bikers are 

called “rockers” which comes from a 1960s 

British term “mods and rockers.” The patch 

with the number “13” on it indicates the 

member is either a drug user or supporter 

of drug use. The letter “M” is the 13th 

letter in the alphabet and signified “Methamphetamine” and/or Marijuana.” Normally the number will be followed by 

something innocuous such as “13 motorcycle.” The number “22” will signify that 

the gang member has been in prison. 

Sergeant at Arms 

Keeps order during all club meetings and 

outings and usually rides at the rear of the 

pack on club runs. 

Supporters/Hangers-On/ 

Hangaround 

These are individuals who act as apprentices in the hopes of joining the ranks as 

full members in the future. A hanger-on or 

hangaround may be someone who is interested in the organization and will literally 

hang around social events the motorcycle 

club is involved in. They will usually do 

this from 6 months to a couple of years but 

have no responsible duties. 

War Lord 

Will carry out orders of the president when 

club battles with another club. Often keeps 

the club’s arsenal. 

89

TRAVEL SMART 

TRAVEL SAFE 

by 

Carl F. Troy 

Office of Citizen Services 

Bureau of Consular Affairs 
Know Before You Go 

One of the most important things that a U.S. 

citizen can do before traveling abroad is to consult 

the State Department’s travel information program, 

administered by the Bureau of Consular Affairs. 

The Bureau issues Consular Information Sheets, 

Travel Warnings, Public Announcements, and 

country or regional “Tips for Travelers” booklets. 

The objective of the program is to inform the 

American public of practices, conditions, problems, 

and security concerns that they should consider 

before traveling to a particular country. Our 

Foreign Service posts also provide crime and 

security-related information to American citizens in 

their respective countries through their consular 

sections and registration and warden systems. 

This continually updated travel information is 

available on the Internet at “http:// 

travel.state.gov” and through the Bureau of Consular Affairs’ automated telephone (202-647-5225) 

and telefax (202-647-3000) systems. It is also 

available from any of the 13 regional passport 

agencies, at U.S. Embassies and consulates 

abroad, through airline computer reservation 

systems, or by sending a self-addressed, stamped 

business-sized envelope to the Office of Overseas 

Citizens Services, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Room 

4811, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC 

20520-1813. The Department’s Public Affairs 

Office also disseminates this information to the 

media. 

Consular Information Sheets


Consular Information Sheets are available for every 

country of the world. In addition to crime and 

security information, they include the location of 

the U.S. Embassy or consulate in the subject country, unusual immigration practices, health conditions, minor political disturbances, unusual currency and entry regulations, and drug penalties. If 

an unstable condition exists in a country that is 

not severe enough to warrant a Travel Warning, a 

description of the condition(s) may be included 

under an option section entitled “Areas of Instability.” Consular Information Sheets generally do not 

include subjective advice, but present information 

in a factual manner so the traveler can make his or 

her own decision concerning travel to a particular 

country. 

One of the most frequent questions that travelers 

will ask when planning a trip overseas is whether 

it is safe and whether crime is a problem. Consular Information Sheets will help travelers be better 

informed on crime. For example, the crime section in the Department’s Consular Information 

Sheet for Italy tells travelers that “Italy has a low 

rate of violent crime.” It also includes information 

about petty street crime and thefts and what 

travelers should do in the event they become a 

victim of crime. The Consular Information Sheet 

also gives the address for the U.S. Embassy and 

consulates where travelers can get country-specific 

security information and even replace a stolen 

passport. 

Travel Warnings 

Travel Warnings are issued when the State Department decides, based on all relevant information 

concerning the safety of American travelers, to 

recommend that Americans avoid travel to a 

certain country. Countries where avoidance of 

travel is recommended will have Travel Warnings 

as well as Consular Information Sheets. As of 

January 1998, there were Travel Warnings in effect 

for 24 countries. 

91

Public Announcements 

Public Announcements are a means of disseminating information about terrorist threats and other 

relatively short-term and/or transnational conditions posing significant risks to the security of 

American travelers. They are made any time there 

is a perceived threat that could include Americans 

as a particular target group. Public Announcements have been issued to deal with short-term 

coups, bomb threats to airlines, violence by terrorists, anniversary dates of specific terrorist events, 

and outbreaks of contagious diseases, such as 

Ebola. 

Tips for Travelers 

Millions of U.S. citizens travel abroad each year. 

When you travel abroad, the odds are in your 

favor that you will have a safe and incident-free 

trip. However, crime and violence, as well as 

unexpected difficulties, can befall U.S. citizens in 

all parts of the world. This series of brochures 

offers additional safety and other information to 

Americans who are contemplating safe travel or 

residence overseas. Included with Consular Affairs’ 

pamphlets is a brochure entitled, A Safe Trip 

Abroad . In that publication, the Department tells 

Americans what they need to do to help ensure an 

incident-free trip. Crime is a growing problem 

worldwide and tourists or business travelers are 

particularly targeted by criminals because they are 

usually carrying cash and are often easy to distract. Any traveler can become a victim of crimes 

such as pick-pocketings, robberies, assaults, or 

muggings. That booklet also has information on 

protection against terrorism, travel to high-risk 

areas, and hijacking and hostage situations. 

Other brochures in this series provide tips for 

Americans residing abroad, for older Americans, 

and for travelers to specific countries or regions, 

including Russia and the Newly Independent 

States, Sub-Saharan Africa, Mexico, the Caribbean, 

South Asia, and the People’s Republic of China. 

Assistance Abroad 

Once you have departed the United States, you 

may contact an American embassy or consulate to 

obtain updated information on the crime and 

security situation in that country. If you plan to 

stay more than 2 weeks in one place, if you are in 

an area experiencing civil unrest or a natural 

disaster, or if you are planning travel to a remote 

area, it is advisable to register at the Consular 

Section of the nearest U.S. Embassy or consulate. 

This will make it easier if someone at home needs 

to locate you urgently or in the unlikely event that 

you need to be evacuated in an emergency. It will 

also facilitate the issuance of a new passport 

should it be necessary. 

If, despite these precautions, your possessions are 

lost or stolen, you should report the loss immediately to the local police and keep a copy of the 

police report, both for insurance claims and as an 

explanation of your plight. After reporting missing 

items to the police, report the loss or theft of: 

• travelers checks to the nearest agent of 

the issuing company, 

• credit cards to the issuing company, 

• airline tickets to the airline or travel agent 

• passport to the nearest U.S. Embassy or 

consulate. 

In addition to replacing a stolen passport, the 

embassy or consulate can also assist American 

victims of crime abroad by contacting family, 

friends, or business associates in order to obtain 

funds and provide listings of English-speaking 

attorneys and physicians, if needed. 

92

For additional travel information, the following 

pamphlets are available from the Consular Affairs 

home page on the Internet (http:// 

travel.state.gov) or the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20420, tel. 202-512-1800: 

� Your Trip Abroad ($1.25) 

� A Safe Trip Abroad 

� Tips for Americans Residing Abroad 

� Travel Tips for Older Americans 

� Tips for Travelers to Canada 

� Tips for Travelers to the Caribbean 

� Tips for Travelers to Central and South America 

� Tips for Travelers to Mexico 

� Tips for Travelers to the Middle East 

and North Africa ($1.50) 

� Tips for Travelers to the People’s 

Republic of China 

� Tips for Travelers to Russia and the 

Newly Independent States 

� Tips for Travelers to South Asia 

� Tips for Travelers to Sub-Saharan Africa ($1.50) 

The price of each publication is about $1.00, 

except where noted. 

subject to change without notice. 

with the Government Printing Office for more 

Prices and availability are 

Please check 

information.


93

Now You Don’t... 

Now You See It, 
 If industry estimates are correct, by the year 2000, 

three out of every five computers in the corporate 

world will be laptops, we can expect to see an 

increase in the theft of these computers. With 

some laptops weighing less than 4 pounds and 

costing upwards of $10,000, they are an attractive 

target for criminals. Laptops can be resold for up 

to 50 percent of their retail value, and their parts 

(i.e., hard drive, rechargeable batteries, CD-ROMS, 

etc.) stripped and sold individually. This does not 

take into account the loss of proprietary information contained inside the computer that can be 

sold to a business competitor and/or ransomed, 

nor the lost time in replacing the data. 

Thefts of laptop computers are most vulnerable in 

high traffic areas—restaurants, hotels, train and 

bus stations, airports, tourist sites. According to 

SAFEWARE, automobiles, airports, and hotels are, 

in order of priority, primary locations for these 

thefts. It is also estimated that 20 percent of laptop 

thefts occur in office buildings by employees or 

people with inside information. 

The number and types of scams used to steal 

laptops are limited only by one’s imagination, 

however, the following scams are recognized as 

the most commonly used. 

By Andy Corsun 

In 1996 approximately 265,000 laptop 

computers valued at $805,000 were 

stolen. In 1997, the number of laptop 

thefts increased to 309,000 with a 

dollar value of $1,026,000. 

—SAFEWARE 

–LAPTOP 

THEFT 
The X-Ray Machine 

This scam is also referred to as a “diversion theft,” 

and occurs primarily at airports. Thieves, working 

in teams, will look for a traveler carrying a laptop, 

usually by the carrying case. As the victim puts his 

or her laptop on the conveyor belt of the security 

x-ray machine, two thieves will slip in front of the 

victim. The first thief, sometimes carrying a large 

coat or garment bag (used to cover up the theft of 

the laptop), will go through the metal detector 

without a problem and loiter around the area 

where the carry-on bags come out of the x-ray 

machine. Meanwhile, the second thief will carry a 

metal object to intentionally setoff the alarm. 

(Sometimes, they will carry more than one metal 

object to setoff the metal detector a second time 

causing further delay and distraction for the victim.) 

As the second thief holds up the line emptying his or her pockets “looking” for the metal 

object(s), the first thief will pick up the laptop as it 

comes through the x-ray machine. He will hide it 

under his coat or garment bag and either continue walking into the terminal or turn around and 

walk out of the area, sometimes passing it to a 

third accomplice. 

1 2

3 4

96

A variation of this scam has one thief in 

front and one in back of the victim. After the first 

thief goes through the metal detector, the second 

thief will pass through the metal detector immediately after the victim and setoff the alarm. 

The commotion will momentarily distract the 

victim, allowing the first thief to steal the laptop. 

Keep in mind, that it takes only a few seconds for 

a professional thief to steal a laptop. There have 

also been instances, where security personnel 

operating the x-ray machines were involved in the 

scams. 

The following security tips will help safeguard your laptop against the x-ray scam. However, basic security precautions against all scams 

and thefts of laptops should include, (a) obtaining 

specialized computer insurance for your laptopremember, insurance does not cover the data 

stored in the laptop, (b) keeping propriety information on a separate diskette and in a separate 

location rather than on the hard drive, and (c) 

keeping the make, model, and serial number 

separate from your laptop should you have to 

report it stolen. You can also place your business 

card both inside and outside the computer and 

use an engraving pen to etch your initials, date of 

birth, etc., on the laptop for further identification 

purposes. Do not etch your social security number 

on the machine. These and other security tips are 

contained in the section entitled Securing Your 

Laptop Computer on page 102. 

1 2

3 4

97

SECURITY TIPS 

1. 

time. A harried traveler has a tendency to be 

preoccupied with other concerns (i.e., getting tickets, confirming seating location, etc.) 

and less security conscious. 

2. Place your laptop in a nondescript briefcase or larger piece of luggage. Computer 

carrying cases are a “red flag” for thieves. 

3. During check-in, notify the ticket agent 

that you have a laptop computer and would 

like to maintain control of it during the 

screening process. The ticket agent will be 

able to advise you of the screening procedures at that particular airport. (The age and 

sophistication of x-ray machines vary at 

different airports domestically and overseas.) 

4. Try to avoid long lines at x-ray machines. If 

unavoidable, do not put your laptop on the 

x-ray conveyor belt until you know that you 

are the next person to go through the metal 

detector. Visually follow your laptop as it 

goes through the x-ray machine and rolls 

down the conveyor belt. 

5. When going through the x-ray machine, 

do not pay attention to the person in front of 

you. Watch what is happening in front of 

him or her. 

6. Ask the security guard at the screening 

station if they would do a security check of 

your laptop (i.e., by powering it up) without 

putting it through the x-ray machine. 

7. Ask security personnel at the screening 

station to help watch your laptop after it 

goes through the x-ray machine. 

When traveling, allow yourself plenty of 

The Condiment Scam 

In this scam, a victim is approached, usually in a 

busy location by a stranger who tells him that he 

has ketchup or mustard (which he just squirted) 

on the back of his jacket. The thief is usually very 

polite and may even offer the victim a tissue to 

wipe it off. As the victim puts down his luggage 

and laptop to take off his jacket to look at the 

mess, an accomplice walks off with the laptop. 

Another twist to this ruse has a thief eating a hot 

dog or hamburger bump head-on into the victim 

spilling mustard or ketchup on his cloths. The thief 

distracts the victim by apologizing profusely while 

trying to wipe the condiment off his clothes. As 

soon as the victim puts down his laptop to clean 

off the mess, an accomplice will pickup the laptop 

and walk away. In both scenarios, the laptop may 

be passed to a third accomplice. 
1 2

3 4

SECURITY TIPS 

1. Try to get to a restroom and/or a less 

crowded area before removing your coat. This 

will enable you to better safeguard your 

laptop. 

2. If you remove your coat at the site of the 

“accident,” place your laptop between your legs 

or rest it diagonally across your foot to maintain 

control of your items—never have your laptop 

out of sight or touch! 

99

Other Scams 

Thieves will carry a computer carrying case filled 

with paper or a book approximating the weight of 

a laptop. When they come upon a victim with a 

similar carrying case who appears inattentive or 

preoccupied, one thief will distract the victim, 

while a partner switches the computer case. 

A thief “accidentally” drops some coins near a 

victim. As the victim bends down to help pick up 

the coins, a second thief will steal the victim’s 

laptop. 

100

A thief carrying luggage will “bump” into a victim 

on the opposite side of where his laptop is sitting. 

As the thief apologizes to the victim, an accomplice will approach the victim from the opposite 

side and steal the laptop. This scam is another 

example of the “bump diversion” and occurs 

primarily at ticket and check-in counters. 

Security Tip 

Place the laptop on the counter and keep it in 

front of you at all times. Again, if you must put 

the laptop on the floor, place it between your 

legs or resting diagonally across your foot. 

101

No security precautions are 100 percent foolproof, but the following security tips will reduce the chances of your laptop being stolen 

and/or help in its recovery. 

1. Obtain specialized insurance for your laptop. 

Remember, insurance does not cover the data 

stored inside the computer. 

2. Do not take an expensive laptop on trips. If 

possible, buy the cheapest one that will meet 

your needs. 

3. Keep the make, model, and serial number 

separate from your laptop should you have to 

report it stolen. Place your business card both 

inside and outside the computer and also use 

“While the rate of increase in desktop 

theft dropped dramatically, laptop computer thefts increased 17 percent, a 

slower increase than reflcted by 1996 

figures, but still accounting for more 

than 53 percent of all dollar losses.” 

—SAFEWARE Insurance Company 

Securing Your 

Laptop Computer 
an engraving pen to etch your initials, date of 

birth, etc., on the laptop for further identification purposes. Do not etch your social security 

number on the machine. 

4. Disguise your laptop by 

placing it in your briefcase or 

in nondescript luggage. 

Thieves are on the look out 

for computer carrying cases. 

A shoulder bag is one way 

to secure your laptop. 

5. Allow yourself plenty of time to get to the 

airport, train station, etc. A harried traveler has 

a tendency to be preoccupied with other 

concerns (i.e., getting tickets, confirming seating location, etc.) and less security conscious. 

6. At a ticket or check-in counter, keep your 

laptop on the counter and in front of you at all 

times. 

7. At the airport, do not check your laptop as 

luggage. Be especially alert at check-ins 

counters, and security screening stations. 

8. When going through the x-ray machine, do 

not pay attention to the person in front of you. 

Watch what is happening in front of him or 

her. 

9. Do not store your laptop in the overhead 

compartment of a plane. When seated, keep 

your laptop under the seat in front of you, and 

resting on your foot. 

10. If you must leave your laptop in your car, 

keep it in the trunk. Remember, vehicles are a 

prime target for laptop thefts. 

11. On the road, do not keep sensitive proprietary information on the hard drive. Back up 

the files onto diskettes every day. Keep the 

diskettes separate from your laptop. 

12. If you must put the laptop on the floor, 

keep it between your legs or resting diagonally 

across your foot. 

13. Look into the various security products on 

the market to protect your laptop and software. 

14. If you are staying in a hotel, and cannot 

leave sensitive company information at the 

office, store your diskette in the hotel safe. 

Laptops and hard drives should be locked in 

your hard side luggage. Laptops can also be 

secured by a portable drawer-lock device. 

15. Remember, common sense is the best 

deterrent against laptop theft. Never leave it 

out of sight or touch! 

103

“The pickpocket is basically

a sneak thief...and if it were

not for the public being

careless, about 70 percent of careless, about 70 percent of

all pickpockets would be out all pickpockets would be out

of business.” of business.”

New York City Police Department

“The pickpocket is basically 

a sneak thief...and if it were 

not for the public being 

careless, about 70 percent of 

all pickpockets would be out 

of business.” 

New York City Police Department 
II

I

Tips to Avoid 

Being A Victim of 

Pickpockets 

By Peggy Brown 

Special thanks to Sergeant Elizabeth Mahaney,


Spedial Frauds Squad, New York City


Police Department


Pickpocketing is a common crime everywhere and 

statistics indicate that this type of crime will continue to be popular to thieves looking for quick 

cash. One of the reasons it may be favored over 

other crimes, could be the smaller number of risk 

factors involved, rather than in other crimes such 

as the use of weapons and complicated logistics. 

Although several tactics are used in pickpocketing, 

many of these common elements are followed by 

most pickpockets around the world. Public awareness and common sense are the best defenses 

against pickpocketing. New York City’s Transit 

Police note that approximately 70 percent of all 

pickpockets would be out of business if the general public became more aware of their tactics and 

were more cautious. 

Travelers overseas are especially vulnerable to 

pickpocketing and purse snatching since they are 

in unfamiliar surroundings and unaware of the 

support they may receive from host country police. 

Also, many business travelers or tourists never 

inquire about security conditions or crime statistics 

before embarking on their journey overseas. A 

1995 survey by the Visa credit card company, 

conducted in Europe, showed that more than half 

of the business travelers interviewed worry about 

being mugged while they travel abroad. Two-fifths 

of those surveyed complained that their companies failed to provide them with adequate security 

information on the countries they planned to visit. 

Approximately 59 percent of those interviewed 

worried about muggings and 40 percent worried 

about pickpocketing. Despite these growing concerns by the business community, few of those 

interviewed obtained information concerning their 

personal safety prior to their travel. 

Pickpockets can come in many guises such as 

children, pregnant women, or as tourists. Some of 

these pickpockets are so well trained, they can 

steal someone’s money without the victim noticing 

or feeling anything suspicious. Travelers should 

give themselves ample time to arrive at their mode 

of transportation—trains, airports, etc. A harried 

traveler is vulnerable to pickpockets and other 

types of petty criminals. Once the thieves note 

where a visitor keeps his or her money, they are 

able to go after their “mark.” It is a good idea to 

keep money in more than one spot to avoid having everything stolen at once. It is also beneficial 

to have exact change or cash handy before entering subway stops or airports so wary pickpockets 

will not note where the remaining money is hidden. Several scenarios are commonly used. For 

example: 

I. In Eastern Europe, which has seen a steady 

increase in crime since 1991, pickpocketing has 

become quite common. One tactic used involves 

a grIoup of three or four thieves. Often they will 

block a pedestrian’s path as one member distracts 

the intended victim while another will steal the 

money. On crowded subways, they may elbow 

the victim and get close enough to easily grab a 

purse or fanny pack without the victim becoming 

suspicious. 

II. Child migrants are another type of thief becoming more commonplace in Western Europe. These 

young children, some as young as 8 years old, 

work in or IIganized teams, and are often supervised

by an adult. The children will crowd around an 

intended victim, often waving and shouting, while 

the youngest child steals the person’s purse or 

wallet. They may all grab at the victim’s clothing 

so the actual theft is not felt. If a child is ever 

caught, he or she has probably passed the stolen 

item to an accomplice and will claim not to speak 

English. 

105 
Foreign visitors are particularly vulnerable in busy 

crowded areas such as tourist sites, train stations, 

subway areas, and even in airports. In fact, some 

may have their belongings stolen in airports before they even get to their destinations if they are 

not aware of their surroundings. Many of the 

methods are used worldwide and some are common to certain geographic areas. The following 

are several crime tips and suggestions for a safer 

vacation or business trip: 

Crime Tips for Air Travelers 

Travelers in airports are especially attractive targets 

since they carry large sums of money or traveler’s 

checks. 

� Ensure that tickets, traveler’s checks, and important documents are within reach. They should not 

be placed in checked luggage or unattended 

baggage. 

� Passengers should keep an eye on purses and 

other personal belongings while passing through 

metal detectors and customs in airports. This 

precaution will work if the passenger proceeds 

directly through the metal detector rather than 

having to wait in a long line while the luggage is 

passed through first. 

� In restrooms, women should not hang their 

purses on stall doors since they can easily be 

grabbed from outside the stall and stolen. If a 

team of two or three is involved in this, the initial 

thief will have passed the stolen purse by the time 

the victim attempts pursuit. 

According to the New York City Police Department, “The subway environment presents an unparralled target for pickpockets; it has all the ingredients: crowds, constant movement of people, exchange, and 

display of money.” 

Subways and Subway Stations 

Pickpockets often target people in places where 

crowds gather such as tourist attractions, street 

markets, or subway stations. When traveling by 

public transportation or in popular tourist areas, 

try to take appropriate precautions to avoid becoming another victim of these crimes. 

� Especially avoid crowding in the area of subway car doors, when entering or exiting. This will 

minimize the chance of losing property to a pickpocket. 

� Beware of loud arguments or commotions as 

pickpockets work in pairs or gangs. Often these 

incidents are staged to distract a potential victim 

while their wallet or purse is stolen. 

� If traveling on a subway or bus, keep your 

purse in your lap, as well as holding on to it. Try 

to stay alert and not fall asleep since this will only 

make you more vulnerable to purse snatchers. 

� Always keep your bag or briefcase where you 

can see or feel it, such as between your feet or on 

your lap. Do not hang purses over the backs of 

chairs. 

� Avoid carrying your wallet in a rear trouser 

pocket. Instead, use a money belt or inside jacket 

pocket. Women should carry handbags with a 

zipper and/or the flap facing in toward their body. 

106

� If your purse is stolen or pocket is picked, call 

out immediately to warn the driver, conductor, or 

others in the area. Alert everyone that a pickpocket is in the area. 

� Place other items, such as credit cards, 

traveler’s checks, or passports, in inner pockets but 

not all together. Traveler’s checks and their numbered receipts should be kept separately. Also 

take only a minimum number of credit cards. If 

something is stolen, hopefully not all the valuables 

will be taken at once. (However, don’t leave 

valuables in your jacket or coat pockets if you are 

likely to take it off.) Wearing a money belt is also 

recommended in particularly high crime areas. 

While Walking 

� Always drop your hotel key in a drop box or 

hand it to a hotel employee at the desk before 

exiting your hotel. Don’t leave keys at an unattended reception desk. If you are issued a hotel 

security card, keep the room number separate 

from the card. 

� Be on guard if a stranger draws your attention 

to a stain or spot on your clothes. This stranger 

may be a pickpocket attempting to distract you 

before stealing your wallet or purse. If this happens, continue walking and check your clothing 

when you are in more secure and familiar surroundings. 

� In cities with many motorcyclists, hang your 

purse strap on your shoulder facing away from 

the street traffic. Many snatch-and-crab tactics 

include speeding by an unsuspecting pedestrian 

with a dangling purse. Do not hang the purse 

strap diagonally across your chest. If a purse 

snatcher grabs your bag, you may lose your balance and fall. 

� In some countries thieves commonly will slash 

the rear pockets of trousers or sides of purses with 

a razor blade. In this case, the victim is unaware of 

the theft until looking for the wallet or purse. This 

is another reason to place items in inner pockets 

or in money belts. 

� Be careful and aware of your surroundings 

while banking at a money machine. Also, if a 

stranger claims you have dropped money, be 

aware that this is another con used to distract a 

potential victim. Continue to walk on. 

Statistics from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) indicated 26,660 reported 

pickpocketing incidents in 1996, with the 

average loss being $320. The number of 

reported purses stolen that year was 35,233, 

with an average loss estimated at $290. 

The good news is these totals were down 

from those reported the previous year. 

Pickpocketing incidents were down 3.3 

percent and purse snatching incidents were 

down 7.3 percent from 1995 statistics. The 

increase in activity prior to 1991 can be 

attributed, in part, to a variety of reasons 

including increased gang activities and the 

use of crack cocaine. Consequently, the 

decline of pickpocketing incidents after 

1991 can partially be explained by the 

higher number of arrests and lengthy incarceration of criminals. (Statistics for 1997 will 

not be available until the fall of 1998. 

Worldwide figures on pickpocketing are 

almost impossible to obtain.) 

107

Carjacking in Africa Carjacking in Africa Carjacking in Africa

By Stephen L. Capelli 

Special thanks to Michael Ross, former RSO U.S. Embassy Yaounde, Cameroon; Nancy Rolph-O’Donnel, 

RSO, U.S. Embassy Lusaka, Zambia; and Seymour Dewitt, former RSO, U.S. Embassy Nairobi , Kenya. 
Drivers in Africa have a troubling new concern. Past 

worries revolved around long traffic jams, poor road 

maintenance, and the lack of adequate roads. These 

mundane fears have been replaced by the horror of 

violent crime. Today motorists are more likely to 

have an AK-47 held by a desperate youth shoved into 

their face than they are to get a speeding ticket. Reporting indicates car hijacking (or “carjacking” as it is 

known) is a low risk, high profit venture. In the past 2 

years, thousands of people across the continent have 

been victimized by this violent crime, and there 

appears to be no end in sight. Consequently, as the 

number of young street toughs with access to weapons 

increases and the gap between rich and poor widens, 

incidents of carjackings should rise as well. 

Scope 

Doing a comprehensive statistical analysis on the 

exact number of carjackings in Africa is nearly impossible. There is just not enough data to perform a 

reliable quantitative analysis of the problem. For the 

most part, police forces in Africa do not have the 

ability or the means to collect adequate statistical data 

and what statistics are available are notoriously 

unreliable. The only way to locate particular “hot 

spots” in Africa where car hijacking is getting worse 

is by monitoring broad police reporting trends. 

Acknowledging these difficulties is required when 

talking about crime rates in Africa. Still, looking at 

anecdotal evidence, one can discern a marked increase 

in the incidents of car hijacking throughout the continent. This trend has been especially noticeable in 

Nigeria, South Africa, Mozambique, Angola, Burundi, 

Tanzania, Nigeria, Cote d’Ivoire, Kenya, Somalia, 

Cameroon, and Uganda over the last 2 years. 

Victims 

Expatriates, business executives, aid agency workers, 

tourists, and diplomats have all been victimized, because 

they drive the luxury and four-wheel-drive vehicle that 

the carjackers crave. ficials say thieves are 

looking for brand names, such as BMW, Nissan, and 

Toyota that can be resold quickly for large profits. They 

are also looking for four-wheel-drive sports utility 

vehicles (particularly, Land Rover “Discoverys,” Toyota 

“Land Cruisers,” and Mitsubishi “Pajeros”). Thieves 

particularly like Japanese sports utility vehicles, especially white ones that are easily concealed. 

cars stolen in Nairobi, Kenya, last April, 95 percent 

were white. This has prompted Kenyan authorities to 

advise expatriates to stop driving them for their own 

safety. , criminals are looking for vehicles with 

diplomatic tags, because the tags allow them to go 

through military checkpoints without being questioned. 

It’s important to point out that carjackers are not only 

looking for new cars. 

the continent, a lucrative trade exists in used car parts. 

Stolen cars can be quickly stripped at chop shops and 

their parts resold for a large profit. Thus in Africa, older 

cars are definitely worth more broken up than the sum 

of their parts. 

Modus Operandi 

Carjackings occur with such frequency and in so many 

different locations that it is difficult to isolate a particular pattern. To say that carjackings occur more often in 

urban or rural areas, day or night, weekday or weekend, 

is problematic. , the best way to describe 

the phenomenon is to detail the criminal’s tactics, which 

can then be used to help explain the width and depth of 

the problem. 

Although car thieves in Africa vary in method and skill, 

they do share some basic techniques, five of which will 

be discussed below. 

groups involved, one scenario may be more common 

than another. The tactics are ranked based only on their 

prevalence against Westerners, with the understanding 

that some patterns are more likely in one nation than 

another. 

Police of

Of the 300 

Lastly

Due to the lack of spare-parts on 

Consequently

Depending on the country and the 
Roadblocks 

The most common technique employed against Westerners is the “roadblock.” In this scenario, criminals place 

various objects in the middle of the road to force cars to 

stop. These makeshift roadblocks are made from both 

innocuous and treacherous objects, including twigs, 

cardboard beer boxes, rocks, and wood planks with nails 

sticking out of them. The use of common debris often 

makes them difficult for drivers to detect. However, 

drivers ignore them at their peril. Many a driver has had 

their back windows shot out, while “accidentally” 

driving through a roadblock. Most roadblocks are set up 

in isolated spots within both rural and urban areas, 

outside the purview of local police. 

The Trap 

Next, is a technique that is most appropriately labeled as 

the “trap.” This method involves carjackers search for 

potential victims, by watching the traffic from key 

traffic “chokepoints.” These chokepoints are located 

near traffic circles or at the entrance roads to exclusive 

residential areas. Criminals also watch major thoroughfares, such as highways leading to and from airports, 

looking for unsuspecting travelers loaded down with 

large amounts of spending money. These chokepoints 

provide the thieves with a good view of the road and 

easy access to their prey. In this scenario, the thieves 

will follow the victim to his or her driveway, hoping to 

drive right up behind the victim, trapping him or her 

between the garage door and the criminals’ vehicle. 

This way the thieves are able to quickly remove the 

victim from the vehicle, gather the car keys, and in some 

instances the house keys as well, and then leave the 

scene in a matter of minutes. 

Hit and Drive 

The third scenario can be labeled the “hit and drive.” 

This tactic is very simple, yet effective. The criminals 

again await their victim at a chokepoint, usually an 

intersection. Once a suitable target is spotted, they run 

up to the victim with their weapons drawn and then 

commandeer the vehicle. This direct approach takes 

place mainly in crowded urban areas, where carjackers 

can observer passing motorists without drawing attention to themselves. 

Ambush 

The fourth most common targeting technique used 

against Westerners is the “military-style ambush.” This 

technique is slightly more coordinated than the previous 

three techniques and usually involves military weapons, 

AK-47s and pistols. Ambushes are usually take place in 

isolated rural areas rather than in urban centers. Sometimes these ambushes are more than just “militarystyle.” In several instances, the military has been 

directly involved in the planning and carrying out of this 

type of assaults. 

Go Slows 

Lastly, the fifth most common technique, is a variation 

on the military-style ambush, which occurs in Africa’s 

notorious “go-slows.” These go slows are interminable 

traffic jams, that can stretch out for miles and last for 

many hours. Go slows are an everyday occurrence in 

many African metropolitan areas. Since motorists are 

trapped in their vehicles, they are helpless against 

carjackers. Bandits simply approach the vehicle, pull 

out their weapons and seize the vehicle. If the driver 

attempts to resist, bandits will not hesitate to shoot or 

stab them. 

Carjackers usually want to get themselves in and the 

driver out of the vehicle as quickly as possible. This is 

one of the reasons people get hurt during carjackings. 

Often times the carjacker will assault the driver and 

passengers if they take too long to get out of the vehicle. 

However in some cases, thieves take time to steal small 

personal items, like watches, wallets, and jewelry before 

driving away. 

Hostage taking is a disturbing new trend in carjacking. 

With the advent of complicated security systems, such 

as cut off switch and electronic monitoring devices, 

criminals are starting to take the driver hostage so that 

they can deactivate the system. In some instances 

carjackers have taken passengers hostage for a few 

hours or days, driving around town weighing their 

victim’s fate. There have been several reported cases of 

sexual assault and murder of kidnaped victims. Hostages are often dumped by the side of the road in remote 

rural areas or left for dead in a locked trunk. Thus what 

the owner thought would be an ideal security device, not 

only fails to prevent car theft but also end up getting the 

driver killed. 

110

Perpetrators 

Carjackers often work in teams. These groups can be as 

small as two members or as large as ten. They are not 

gangs, in the American sense of the term, rather they are 

an ad hoc gathering of opportunists. One person may 

have a car, while the others supply the weapons. This 

coincidence of needs is all that is necessary to bring the 

thieves together. 

These ad hoc groups also need a more sophisticated 

organized criminal network in order to fence their stolen 

vehicles. While organized crime is believed to be 

behind most carjackings in Africa, there is little substantiated evidence to support this claim. Only in Southern 

Africa is a discernible level of organized criminal 

activity evident. It appears that vehicles are being stolen 

in South Africa and then resold in neighboring countries. 

Police officials in Swaziland say that cars taken from 

South Africa appear regularly for resale in the capital 

Mbabane. To get cars across national borders—past 

customs officials, police, and military checkpoints—for 

resale in another country takes a certain level of criminal 

sophistication. This suggests that there must be a 

greater level of organization involved in Southern 

African carjackings than typically seen throughout the 

rest of Africa. 

Although usually loosely grouped, these thieves are 

nevertheless always heavily armed. Many bandits use 

knives, pistols, or AK-47s in the commission of their 

crimes. Weapons abound in Africa, because of the 

various nationalist and internal struggles that have 

proliferated in the past 2 decades. In addition, there are 

many cheap weapons that were dumped into the African 

market by former Soviet states looking for a quick 

profit. For example, a person can buy an AK-47 in 

South Africa for as little as $10. 

Why Now? 

There are many factors that contribute to the rising 

crime rates in Africa. The four most important are high 

rates of unemployment, particularly among young 

males; high inflation; increased levels of poverty; and a 

deterioration of police prevention measures due to a lack 

of public sector funds. For Africa, the 1980s was a lost 

decade. All nations on the continent showed a marked 

decrease in most relevant economic categories. Understandably, where the economic conditions are deteriorating, crime rates are rising. For example, Nigeria is 

currently running an estimated 400 percent per year 

inflation rate, while its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 

per capita has fallen dramatically from $1,000 in 1980 

to less than $300 in 1994. (Figures provided by 

USAID.) This pervasive poverty has driven many 

young men to cities looking for work. Unfortunately, 

there are few opportunities for these unskilled and 

uneducated young men. African cities continue to fillup with young men who are unemployed with few 

prospects on the horizon. They eventually become 

desperate, which often leads them to pursue a life of 

crime. 

Deteriorating economic conditions have not only caused 

more people to become involved in crime, but have also 

severely limited the state’s ability to deter crime. Police 

forces in Africa have very little money. Most police 

officers are poorly paid, overworked, untrained, and lack 

the basic necessities needed to combat crime, like police 

vehicles, and radios. This police incompetence has 

created a new generation of criminal who are bolder and 

more arrogant in their tactics because they no longer 

fear the police. It is now common to hear of car hijackers operating in the middle of town during the day, even 

in areas with a heavy police presence. 

111

The situation for impoverished police officers has 

become so bad that many are now turning to crime 

themselves to supplement their meager incomes. There 

have been several incidents reported, where police 

officials, either allowed criminals to operate freely or 

where the police were complicit in the criminal act 

themselves. Police officers have been known to serve as 

lookouts for the carjackers, by allowing drivers to pass 

first through the police check point, only to be robbed 

further on down the road. Other incidents include 

painfully slow response times or no response at all to a 

victims request for assistance. When police do arrive 

and provide adequate service, they often demand a 

gratuity from the victim. 

Travelers in Africa should be wary of soldiers as well as 

the police. African armies are usually better funded than 

the police, but in some remote sections, they may not 

have received their pay in some time. This creates a 

situation in which troops are forced to live off the 

populace. They do this by “shaking down” travelers 

along main highways and by stealing basic necessities. 

Since their vehicles are usually in need of repair, it is 

common for soldiers to commandeer vehicles when they 

need to respond to outbreaks of violence. Usually the 

vehicles are not returned, and if they are, they tend to be 

damaged. Drivers should be cautious of the military, 

always remembering to obey their commands and never 

challenging their authority. 

112

Never travel alone at night, this is even more important 

to remember than during the day. 

Remove all valuables from your vehicle, such as expensive tool sets or luggage, to reduce your lost if the 

vehicle is stolen. 

tion form and keep that in a separate location, preferably 

your place of business to avoid having it stolen. 

Always keep car keys and house keys separate from one 

another. t automatically lose your household possessions as well. 

Try to keep your vehicle in the lane next to oncoming 

traffic. This will help if you are suddenly confronted 

with a dangerous situation up ahead, such as a demonstration or a roadblock. With the vehicle next to the 

oncoming traffic lane, you can more easily perform a Uturn and avoid a troubling situation entirely. 

When pulling into a gated-front driveway, make sure no 

one is loitering around outside. , then 

drive up to the gate remembering to not pull up directly 

behind the gate. This will allow you room to escape if 

attacked. 

by positioning their vehicles directly behind yours, 

trapping you in between them and the gate. To avoid 

this, stay immediately outside on the street and honk 

your horn to alert the guard that you want them to open 

the gate. 

Keep travel after dark, especially to rural areas, to an 

absolute minimum. 

inform someone where you are going and when you 

should be expected. Also bring along a portable radio, 

so you can contact someone in case of an emergency. 

How to Avoid Becoming a 

Carjacking Victim 

Below are some commonsense safety tips to keep in 

mind while traveling throughout Africa. 

Safe Driving Tips 

Be aware of all potential threats. Check with the 

Embassy’s Regional Security Officer for information on 

areas to avoid. 

Take on a lower profile. 

sedan, rather than an expensive four-wheel drive vehicle, is one good way to become less conspicuous. 

Planning is the key to avoiding dangerous situations. 

Always think of an alternative route, just in case your 

primary pathway is closed for some reason. 

Be aware of your surroundings and conscious of potential pitfalls. 

working order, especially in warm climates, so that you 

can keep your car doors locked and your windows rolled 

up at all times. 

Avoid police and military checkpoints, if at all possible. 

When confronted by police or military officials, always 

obey their commands and never challenge their authority. 

Always be aware of vehicles with a driver and passengers in them parked along the side of the road. 

often work in teams and as mentioned earlier, look for 

potential targets at various vehicle chokepoints, like 

thoroughfares leading into residential areas and at traffic 

circles. 

If you are being followed, go directly to a crowded 

public area. 

Try to maintain a safe distance (at least a half a car 

length away) from the vehicle in front of your own. The 

goal is to be able to take evasive action if it should 

become necessary. 

Make a copy of your vehicle registraIf you do lose your car, you won’

If the coast is clear

Otherwise bandits can take advantage of you 

If you do have to travel at night, 

For example, driving an older 

Make sure your air conditioner is in proper 

Bandits 
What To Do When Confronted 

When confronted by armed gunmen, do not resist. 

When confronted by a gunman, it is better to show the 

thieves your hands, making only slow deliberate movements, if asked to hand over car keys, wallet, or personal belongings. 

particularly reaching under the seat or into the glove 

box. 

Give up your vehicle and any valuables readily, because 

thieves in Africa would rather shoot you then argue with 

you. 

? 

Do not make any sudden moves, 

Selected Incidents of Car 

Hijackings Involving Westerners 

In Nigeria on December 6, 1994, an American citizen 

and a Nigerian national were attacked in their Toyota 

Land Cruiser on the highway between Ibadan and Ife, 

about 150 miles north of Lagos. After passing through a 

military checkpoint, they encountered three vehicles 

barricading the road. The Nigerian took evasive action 

and attempted a U-turn back towards the military checkpoint, only to find it gone. The three vehicles took up 

the chase and began firing automatic weapons. The 

Nigerian was grazed in the head by a bullet, forcing him 

to pull over. Once the Land Cruiser had stopped, five 

men emerged from the three vehicles and pulled the two 

out of their vehicle. The thieves began firing their 

weapons into the ground and threatening to kill the 

victims unless they surrendered U.S. currency. After 

they stole $1,000 from the American, they then took 

both victims’ laptop computers and various personal 

items, including the American’s passport, and before 

driving off, they shot out the Land Cruiser’s tires. 

While not a car hijacking per se, this incident does 

highlight the various tactics used in car thefts, particularly the military complicity and the ambush-style 

assault. 

In Abidjan on June 6, 1995, the dependent son of a 

French diplomat was abducted from the parking lot of 

the International School in Abidjan (ICSA). The dependent son was picked up by a driver in the parking lot of 

the ICSA at approximately 2030 hours. The car was 

immediately surrounded by three armed bandits. Both 

the driver and the boy were taken on a long harrowing 

ride through the city before being released unharmed in 

a forested area near Yopougon. 

In Addis Ababa on July 5, 1995, the Deputy Chief of 

Mission, Regional Security Officer, their spouses and a 

Foreign Service national driver had their vehicle seized 

by five gunmen. It was later learned that the bandits 

were escapees from the prison at Awassa. Their motive 

appears to have been the need for quick transportation 

rather than strictly robbery. Ethiopian police eventually 

found the suspects at a bar in Addis Ababa. 
In Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, on August 5, 1995, five 

American citizens were kidnaped and their vehicle 

seized by three armed bandits near Mikumi National 

Park. Three men armed with AK-47s approached the 

American missionaries’ parked vehicle head-on along 

the shoulder of the road. The armed bandits ordered 

everyone down on the ground. When one man did not 

move quickly, he was struck in the face with the butt of 

an AK-47. At one point, the bandits discussed shooting 

the victims one by one, but when they discovered the 

victims were missionaries, they stopped discussing this 

option. Shortly after this, the victims were given an 

unknown liquid to drink, apparently a drug given to 

induce sleep, and then were left on the side of the road. 

In Nairobi on August 17,1995, the Headmaster of the 

Japanese Community School, was shot at point blank 

range in the course of a carjacking, when he did not 

respond fast enough to the criminals’ instructions. 

In Abidjan on September 21, 1995, a Peace Corps 

vehicle was hijacked by four or five armed men. The six 

Peace Corps volunteers where unharmed, but the thieves 

made off with their personal items and clothing. The 

vehicle (a Mitsubishi Pajero) was able to avoid a police 

checkpoint because of its diplomatic tags. 

In Lagos on November 15, 1995, an American citizen 

was carjacked at gunpoint, beaten, thrown into the trunk 

of her vehicle and then driven around the capital for 

hours. Her car was then used to terrorize other motorists, and in one case, to rob and sexually assault a Lebanese woman. After several hours both women were 

released. 

In Nairobi on November 24, 1995, a British High Commission diplomat was partially paralyzed during an 

attempted carjacking. As the victim drove home from an 

diplomatic function, he noticed he was being followed. 

After taking evasive action, he believed he had eluded 

his stalkers, but he suddenly his found his path blocked 

and shots were fired into the vehicle. The first shot 

struck only the windshield, the second struck the victim, 

causing instant paralysis. His vehicle crashed into a gate 

and the assailants drove off into the night. 

In Burundi on January 29, 1996, an American living in 

the capital had his vehicle stolen from outside his home 

by six assailants armed with revolvers. The bandits 

were able to force themselves past his private security 

guard and steal several small personal items before 

commandeering the vehicle. 

115

RAPE 

What Everyone 

Needs To Know 
Rape is a crime of violence, not passion. Everywhere in the world, rape 

is the most violent crime against a person, short 

of homicide. It is motivated by a sense of powerlessness 

and a need to humiliate others. 

person’s personal space. 

from the psychological effects of supreme control over 

another person, alleviating their own feelings of inadequacy. 

victims and seems to change their lives forever. 

affect each and every day of their lives. 

Sexual violence is a worldwide problem. 

and sexual assault incidences usually occur when other 

crime statistics rise. 

your vehicle. 

your personal belongings. Rapes have also occurred in 

countries where there has been political strife or declining economies. Americans are perceived as being 

wealthy, with their nice homes, vehicles with drivers, 

roving patrols, or their personal security guards. Anger 

is one of the driving factors in these crimes overseas. 

one particular case, an angry gang believed that the 

American husband and wife had put pressure on the 

government and it had affected the price of the market 

goods being purchased by the local people. 

members broke through the steel fence and for several 

hours repeatedly raped both husband and wife. 

By 

Lynda M. Graham 

Rape Awareness Coordinator, 

and Lisa C. Meeks 

Special Agent 

Mobile Support Division 

Bureau of Diplomatic Security 

It is a violation of a 

Rapists receive satisfaction 

Experiencing rape transforms people into 

It will 

Increased rape 

Carjackers no longer just want 

Breaking and entering is not always for 

In 

Gang 
When selecting a victim, a rapist will often choose 

someone who appears vulnerable. What does a vulnerable victim look like? Someone they believe will be 

paralyzed by fear and not put up a fight. They are the 

ones not paying attention to their surroundings and may 

be burdened with packages or small children. American 

women may be singled out since they are considered 

“loose.” In a foreign culture, we may send a completely 

different message than we intend simply by the clothing 

we wear or by our actions. It gives the rapist the perception that you are begging to be treated roughly and 

“asking” to have your personal body space violated. 

The denial syndrome is alive and well both in the United 

States and overseas. Many people think that rape only 

happens to young, pretty women, that it cannot happen 

to them. It can happen to anyone regardless of age, 

Rape is a crime 

of violence, 

not passion. 

race, social class, personal appearance, or sex. Elderly 

women, infants, pregnant women, and men have all 

been victims of rape. Most rape victims had a sense that 

something was wrong but did not trust their instincts. 

A common misconception is that rape only happens in 

dark parking lots, unoccupied buildings, and 

unpopulated areas. The crime does occur in these areas, 

but several of the most recently reported incidents have 

occurred in the victims’ home. Simple “Peeping Tom” 

activities can provide the information necessary to plan 

the attack. With this information, perpetrators can enter 

through unlocked doors or windows knowing they will 

meet little or no resistance. Once inside, the home 

provides the rapists with the isolation they desire. 

The majority of rape cases are not reported to law 

enforcement officials. Rape is considered the most 

underreported of all criminal offenses. It is estimated 

that for every rape reported, 10–20 go unreported. 

Humiliation is cited as one of the main reasons for not 

reporting these crimes. The most silent group is the 15– 

19 year old age group. Imagine your 16-year-old daughter having to come home and tell you that her body has 

been violated. 

The emotional impact of any traumatic event, to include 

being the witness to a violent crime, was first studied in 

the mid 1970s. It was found that many victims suffered 

from an acute stress reaction to a life threatening situation. Victims of crime experience crisis reactions 

similar to those experienced by victims of war, natural 

disaster, and catastrophic illness. While victims’ specific emotional and physical symptoms varied, they fell 

into a discernible pattern, which became known as Post 

Traumatic Stress Syndrome. This includes a wide range 

of feelings such as shock or disbelief. Confusion, along 

with sleep disturbances, and eating disorders are some 

of the most common occurrences. As one victim put it, 

“It’s like being on an ‘emotional rollercoaster.’” 

Men feel that rape is a “women’s issue.” Men have 

been victims of rape, both in the United States and 

overseas. During Desert Storm, military personnel were 

briefed on this subject. Rape against a man is just as 

humiliating and degrading as with a woman. It carries 

the same emotional impact, only men are more silent 

with their feelings. 

Responding to the victims’ needs is a very important 

step toward their full recovery. Many people do not 

realize that rape is a “brush with death.” At any time 

during this violent attack, the victim could lose her or 

his life. Victims need to be taken to a safe place. Let 

the victim be part of that decision making process. This 

will aid in the recovery since during these crimes, the 

victims are not in control of their lives and cannot make 

decisions. 

Reporting the crime and seeking medical help are 

essential to the well-being and recovery of rape survivors. Overseas, report to the Regional Security Officer 

or domestically to police or law enforcement. Treatment 

of sexually transmitted diseases and testing for possible 

pregnancy is recommended. Medical facilities may also 

be a resource for information concerning this subject. 

Victims should start a positive support system early. 

118

Local Rape Crisis Centers may be available to assist in 

this process. 

Acknowledging that rape is a crime of violence, understanding victim selection, trusting your instincts, reporting to law enforcement, and seeking help are the key 

factors to understanding the crime of rape. Victims of 

rape must realize that nothing they did would make it 

their fault or justify that they deserved it. Bad judgment 

is not a rapeable offense. 

Rape against a man is just as 

humiliating and degrading as with a 

woman. It carries the same emotional impact, only men are more 

silent with their feelings. 

Home 

� Lock doors and windows 

� Do not admit strangers 

� Close drapes to prevent surveillance 

� Report suspicious activity 

� Keep areas around the home well lit 

� If you have an alarm, use it 

Vehicle 

� Control access to your vehicle 

� Never pick up hitchhikers 

� Keep vehicle properly maintained 

� Park in well lit areas 

� Check the back seat 

� Know safehavens along the way 

Public Places 

� Walk with confidence 

� Don’t flaunt valuables 

� Travel in groups 

� Stay in well lit areas 

� Be aware 

� If followed, seek a crowded area 

TRUST YOUR INSTINCTS 
By 

Jane S. De Kay 

Alert Overseas Kids: 

The Bureau of Diplomatic Security 

Provides Safety Information for 

American Children Living Overseas 

Opening illustration by Jacob Starnes, grade 3, in Asuncion. 
One of the primary responsibilities of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) is to protect our 

employees overseas. 

People working at U.S. 

diplomatic missions are 

at risk at post, on the 

street, and in their 

homes; and their families 

are often at equal risk. 

The Bureau has many programs to protect 

these people, and one of the most important is A-OK—a security program for children. 

Initiated in 1987, the A-OK program 

(which stands for Alert Overseas Kids) is 

an awareness program that provides elementary school-level safety information 

and education to American children living 

overseas.  A-OK is designed to reach children of State Department and other foreign affairs agency employees serving 

abroad, children of expatriate U.S. business 

families, and children attending American 

Schools.  The A-OK program is managed by 

DS’s Security Awareness staff (SA). 

Through networking within Diplomatic 

Security and with other offices in the Department, as well as with other agencies 

and representatives of private business 

and national safety organizations, SA researches current threats to children’s security and safety at our posts.  Security officers and community liaison officers periodically are asked about issues of current 

concern and what materials are needed. 

In response to defined needs, a range 

of security and safety materials are distributed to posts, usually once or twice a 

year.  Materials can consist of coloring 

books, activity booklets, pamphlets for 

parents and children to read and discuss 

together, and videos.  The principal focus 

is personal security and safety-at home, at 

school, and on the street.  The materials 

are directed at enabling children to become more aware of measures to be taken 

to avoid danger and react appropriately in 

threatening situations or emergencies.  At 

the same time, security awareness messages for adults are reinforced through 

participation in and the results of 

children’s program activities.  Occasionally, specific problems at post may create a 

need for special materials.  For example, a 

rise in child abductions may instigate a 

post’s request for “stranger safety” materials.  We also have had requests for information on drug and substance abuse, first 

121 

aid, and baby sitter guidelines. 

These packets of information are meant to 

encourage each post to conduct a security 

program or activity for children. 

posts conduct some type of security 

awareness event at least annually and, 

with the help of A-OK program materials, 

many add a segment specfically for the 

children. 

requests for materials and give-aways that 

might make their programs more effective 

and interesting. 

Most 

SA attempts to respond to post 
David Mattei, grade 5, in 

Canberra, was given a special award for this illustration. 

Nesting magpies are very 

protective; about 50 people 

a year lose their sight from 

swooping magpies. 

Ellyn Echols, grade 4 in Kuwait depicts the dangers of landmines, a 

hazard unknown in America but 

prevalent in many parts of the world. 

John Edwards, grade 5, in New 

Delhi, shows ua a hazard all of us 

would like to avoid. 
To maintain interest and reward participation in program activities, SA conducts an 

annual contest in which children demonstrate their security awareness by producing entries that depict security awareness 

rules and practices.  In years past, we have 

produced posters, stickers, a coloring 

book, and most recently, calendars. 

For the past 4 years, a calendar has 

been produced with drawings submitted 

by children from posts around the world. 

Entries are judged in three grade categories, K–2, grades 3–4, and grades 5–6. 

Within each grade group, a first, second, 

third, and fourth place is awarded.  This 

allows us to feature a different drawing for 

each month.  Within the first year or two 

of the contest, however, the judges had 

great difficulty in limiting themselves to 

12 winners.  We then began giving “special 

awards” and “honorable mentions” for 

additional drawings that appear on the 

cover and in a smaller size in the back of 

the calendar.  This gives us the opportunity 

to have more “winners” in the contest and 

encourages participation in the program. 

Every child whose drawing is selected for 

the calendar receives a special certificate 

signed by the Assistant Secretary of DS and 

by their own ambassador.  Every other 

entrant also receives a certificate of appreciation for their participation. 

Over the years, we have found that 

the A-OK program is successful in teaching 

our smallest diplomats basic security and 

safety information. 

123

By 

Danny Rothstein 

Taxicab Violence: Taxicab Violence: Taxicab Violence:

A Growing Concern for U.S. Travelers 

in Mexico 

Special thanks to the Regional Security Office 

of the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City. 

Do not hail cabs on the street. 

Always ask your host or hotel to call and 

reserve a “Sitio” (pronounced “C-T-O”) taxi 

cab which is located at legal taxi stands 

throughout the city .(For more security tips see 

page 120.) 
“U.S. citizens visiting Mexico 

City should absolutely avoid 

taking any taxi not summoned by telephone or on 

their behalf by a responsible 

individual or contracted in 

advance at the airport. Robbery assaults on passengers in 

taxis have become more frequent and violent, with passengers subjected to beatings 

and sexual assault.” 

— U.S. Department of State’s 

Consular Information Sheet, 

April 29, 1998 

The United States Department of State warns 

American travelers that crime in Mexico City 

has reached critical levels. The one crime that has 

placed Mexico City in a glaring spotlight within the last 

2 years is taxicab robberies. 

Taxicab assaults and robberies frequently occur in 

roving Volkswagen bugs that are typically painted green 

and white or yellow and white. These cabs are called 

“Libre” taxis, and can also be identified by a green 

stripe on the vehicle’s license plate. 

In addition to being robbed, passengers often are subjected to physical brutality, including severe beatings 

and sexual assaults while riding in these roving 

Volkswagen bugs. Assaults and robberies in these illegal 

taxicabs usually occur in one of two ways. In one 

scenario, the driver will stop unexpectedly and several 

armed accomplices will jump into the vehicle. In another scenario, a vehicle carrying armed assailants will 

follow a cab and target the passenger when the two 

vehicles are on a side street or idling at a red light. On 

many occasions the driver in both scenarios is directly 

involved with the planned assault and robbery. 

Furthermore, what may start off as a robbery can rapidly 

turn into a “quick-napping,” when an unsuspecting 

passenger is held hostage in the cab while the criminals 

drive throughout the city emptying the victim’s bank 

account with his or her ATM card. These quick-nappings 

and robberies have lasted as long as 24 hours, with 

victims usually beaten and women passengers sometimes raped. 

To be fair, many taxi drivers in Mexico City are by and 

large an honest and hardworking lot in a dangerous 

profession. Many legal taxi drivers themselves are 

victims. Bandits beat them up, steal their taxi and start 

cruising the city for fares and potential victims. 
Case Examples and Statistics 

Mexico City’s Office of the Attorney General recently 

reported that 664 tourists were robbed in taxicabs in the 

first 4 months of 1998—536 of whom were Mexicans 

and 128 foreigners. During 1997, more than 1,300 

violent crimes were committed in taxicabs, with 165 

cases involving foreign tourists. The numbers were even 

more staggering for 1996. Drawing upon Mexican 

government figures, the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City 

reports 2,215 persons were assaulted while riding in 

taxicabs. 

Taxicab robberies crossed a threshold in December 

1997, when an American businessman living in Mexico 

City was shot and killed. His body was eventually 

dumped in the same neighborhood where he lived with 

his wife and four children. More recently, in April 1998, 

four American journalists from Texas hailed a greenand-white sedan taxi in Mexico City. Unfortunately, the 

four passengers did not see another green-and-white 

Volkswagen taxi following their sedan. Within minutes, 

the sedan pulled over and two male Mexican perpetrators from the Volkswagen bug, armed with a revolver 

and a pistol, entered the sedan. The four passengers 

were robbed and one was shot in the back after struggling with one of the armed assailants. 

Due to the growing accounts of taxicab assaults and 

robberies, the Department of State has issued Public 

Announcements cautioning Americans from hailing one 

of the many roving Volkswagen bug taxicabs. Following suit, authorities in Canada, Germany, and France 

have issued their own advisories, urging citizens against 

the use of these pirate taxicabs. 

TAXI! 

(pictured above and left) 

Illegal taxis picking-up passengers 

at Mexico City’s Benito Juarez 

International Airport. 

TAXI! 

The Mexican government has es- The Mexican government has es­ The Mexican government has estimated that over 26,000 of the timated that over 26,000 of the

city’s 110,000 taxis are operating city’s 110,000 taxis are operating

illegally without having obtained illegally without having obtained

the required license. the required license. the required license.
How and Why They Exist 

Taxi “piracy” is defined as using unregistered vehicles 

as legitimate or authorized taxis. The Mexican government has estimated that over 26,000 of the city’s 

110,000 taxis are operating illegally without having 

obtained the required license. This leaves a large number of taxicabs not registered, unregulated, and untraceable, driving the streets of Mexico City. 

Taxi piracy plagues Mexico City for many reasons. 

Separate from the many cabs that are stolen from legitimate drivers, shady lawyers help provide false documentation and legal cover for would-be taxi drivers and 

conspire to prevent the legal system from taking action. 

These lawyers supply the would-be taxi driver with a 

legal writ to get their business started. Consequently, the 

pirate taxi driver who robs his passengers cannot be 

traced because his vehicle was never legally registered. 

In addition, pirate taxis exist because penalties for 

drivers are considerably light and offer no serious 

deterrent. When a taxi pirate is caught, the vehicle is 

confiscated and the driver must pay a fine equivalent to 

$656. However, once the fine is paid, the driver can 

reclaim his car and return to the street. Furthermore, 

since the many pirate taxicabs are considerably cheaper 

than legally sanctioned taxis, pirate drivers know they 

will always be in demand. 

Another factor which contributes to the everyday proliferation of the pirate taxicab is the simple fact the since 

many legal cabs are stolen from honest drivers, it is 

becoming more difficult for authorities to differentiate 

between legal and illegal cabs, especially when the 

stolen cab is a vehicle other than the familiar 

Volkswagen bug. Likewise, when unsuspecting tourists 

see a green-and-white or yellow-and-white Volkswagen 

bug with a working meter, displaying a company shield 

and driver’s certificate, and large black identification 

numbers on the vehicle’s rooftop, they think the vehicle 

is a legitimate taxicab. 

Finally, the lack of police presence and rampant police 

corruption throughout Mexico City aids in the proliferation of these renegade taxicabs. On many occasions, the 

police are either accomplices of the cab driver or they 

turn a blind eye while the crime is being committed. 

So, What is Being Done? 

“We do not deny the problem of taxi robberies. We are 

telling you what the size is and what we are doing about 

it.”—A spokesman for the Mexican government. 

Although Mexico City police claim they are holding 

spot checks on cab drivers and fining those not displaying proper identification cards, tourists visiting Mexico 

City continue to be victims in taxicab robberies. Fearing 

a negative impact upon its tourism trade, Mexico City 

officials have implemented several security initiatives in 

the hopes of curbing this crime. 

Travelers arriving at Mexico City’s International Airport 

can now obtain security advice from information booths 

set up throughout the airport on how to obtain the 

services of a legally sanctioned taxi. Similarly, many 

hotels throughout the city now distribute to all guests 

information cards in English on safe taxi usage and 

other security tips which can aid visitors to the capital. 

In the final months of 1997, Mexico City officials also 

announced plans to establish special security zones 

where police presence and surveillance would be increased, especially in the Zona Rosa, a popular shopping 

and restaurant district. Along these same lines, city 

officials announced special taxis and buses would be 

designated solely for tourists. However, while a few 

more police officers have been assigned to patrol the 

Zona Rosa, the city government has yet to implement 

any police security zones or establish special means of 

transportation for tourists visiting Mexico City. 

127

LEGAL 

Helpful Security Tips 

Unless a concentrated effort is undertaken to stop 

taxicab robberies and assaults, this criminal activity 

will continue to flourish. In the mean time, there are 

a few things that travelers can do to ensure a safe 

stay in Mexico City. 

dures are recommended: 

� Travelers should never hail or ride in a roving 

green or yellow Volkswagen bug taxi. Most major 

hotels do not allow these illegal cabs on hotel 

property. 

� The U.S. Embassy in Mexico City is aware of no 

cases of criminality involving the passengers of 

taxis officially and permanently marked as airport 

taxis, with taxis operating from Sitio stands, nor 

with tourists cars located at most major hotels. 

� Always make sure that the driver’s identification 

is displayed and that the photo matches the 

driver’s face. All Sitio cab drivers wear a large 

identification card around their necks. 

� If at all possible, do not travel alone in any 

taxicab. Try to travel in pairs and be extra cautious 

after dark. While in the cab, lock the door and roll 

up the windows and demand the driver do the 

same. 

� Avoid cabs lined up or those cruising outside 

theaters, night clubs, or other tourist areas. 

� Always enter a cab that has a working meter. If 

no meter exists, determine a price before you enter 

the vehicle. Along these same lines, always have 

your money ready when you enter or exit the cab, 

and never flash jewelry or other expensive items 

during the cab ride. 

� Pay attention to your surroundings. Indicators 

that you are being targeted include another vehicle 

following your taxi, a driver who appears to be 

taking a roundabout route, or a 

to spot someone on the street. If you feel you are 

being targeted while riding in a taxicab, insist the 

driver take you to the U.S. Embassy, a well-known 

hotel, or the nearest public facility. 

� Above all, if you do become a robbery victim, do 

not resist. Give the perpetrator your valuables 

without hesitation. Your valuables are not something to lose your life over. 

While crime in Mexico City has reached crisis 

proportions, the U.S. Embassy stresses that travel�

ers need not cancel travel plans to Mexico’s capi�

tal. By taking security precautions which are neces�

sary when visiting any large and unfamiliar city, 

millions of visitors can enjoy the city without inci�

dent. 

� While at the airport, take only authorized airport 

taxis. These taxis are not Volkswagen bugs, but 

are instead yellow-and-white cars with an airplane 

pictured on one side of the vehicle. A traveler can 

safely purchase an airport taxIcab ticket while 

inside the terminal. 

SITIO 

� Do not hail cabs on the street. Always ask your 

host or hotel to call and reserve a “Sitio” (pro�

nounced “C-T-O”) taxicab which is located at legal 

taxi stands throughout the city. While Sitio cabs are 

more expensive than the roving Volkswagen bugs, 

they are far safer. In addition to not being a 

Volkswagen bug, a Sitio cab can be recognized by 

the red stripe on the car’s license plate. 

The following security proce�

driver who is trying 
PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Office of the Spokesman 

MEXICO 

March 26, 1998 

The U.S. Embassy in Mexico strongly urges American citizens to only use taxis summoned by telephone. 

We are reissuing the Announcement that was made in the aftermath of the shooting death of a U.S. citizen 

resident in Mexico City on December 15, 1997, in an apparent taxi robbery. 

It is possible to call Mexico City radio taxis and fixed site taxis (sitios) by phone, and receive positive 

identification of the taxi and/or driver. Travelers may also wish to use “tourist taxis,” to which their hotels 

can direct them. U.S. citizens should especially avoid taking taxis parked outside the Bellas Artes Theatre, 

in front of nightclubs, restaurants, hotels, or cruising throughout the city. In particular, Volkswagen “bug” 

taxis are to be avoided. Americans arriving at the international airport in Mexico City should only take 

“airport” taxis (yellow in color and marked with an airplane), after purchasing a ticket in the airport 

arrival hall. 

Although the December 15 incident was the first robbery we know of leading to the death of a U.S. 

citizen, taxicab robberies, which affect not just U.S. citizens but all Mexico City residents, are becoming 

more frequent and violent. 

For further information about travel to Mexico, please consult the Consular information Sheet for Mexico, 

dated June 18, 1997. 

This extends the Department of State’s Public Announcement for Mexico, which expired March 18, 1998, 

to June 27, 1998, reissued without change. 

Department of State travel information and publications are available at Internet address: http://travel.state.gov. U.S. travelers may 

hear recorded information by calling the Department of State in Washington, D.C. at 202-647-5225 from their touchtone telephone, 

or receive information by automated telelfax by dialing 202-647-3000 from their fax machine. 

129

Taxicab Crime 

U.S. citizens visiting Mexico City should absolutely avoid taking any taxi not summoned by telephone or on their behalf by a responsible individual or contracted in 

advance at the airport. Robbery assaults on passengers in taxis have become more 

frequent and violent, with passengers subjected to beatings and sexual assault. In 

December 1997, a U.S. citizen was murdered in a taxi robbery. When in need of a 

taxi, telephone a radio taxi or sitio (pronounced C-T-O). Ask the dispatcher for the 

driver’s name and the cab’s license plate number. If you walk to a sitio taxi stand, use 

only a driver known to you. Ask the hotel concierge or other responsible individual 

calling on your behalf to write down the license plate number. Passengers arriving at 

Mexico City’s Benito Juarez International Airport should take only airport taxis (yellow, with an airport symbol on the door) after prepaying the fare at one of the special booths inside the airport. Radio taxis may be called at tel. 271-9146, 271-9058, 

and 272-6125. U.S. citizens should avoid taking taxis parked outside the Bellas Artes 

theater, in front of nightclubs, restaurants, or cruising throughout the city. 

U.S. Department of State 

Consular Information Sheet