COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Alston, McCull ough and Senior Judge Annunziata Argued at Alexandria, Virginia

JOHN CHRISTOPHER REYNOLDS MEMORANDUM OPINION  BY v. Record No. 2179-12-4 J UDGE ROSSIE D. ALSTON, JR. MAY 27, 2014 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ARLINGTON COUNTY Daniel S. Fiore, II, Judge Dusty Sparrow, Assistant Public Defender (Allison H. Carpenter; Matthew T. Foley, on briefs), for appellant. Rosemary V. Bourne, Assistant Attorney General (Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, II, 1 Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

John Christopher Reynolds (appellant) appeal s his convictions of felony hit and run in violation of Code § 46.2-894 and DWI maiming in violation of Code § 18.2-51.4. On appeal, appellant alleges that the trial court (i) “er red in denying [appellant’s] motion to suppress

evidence seized as a re sult of the Arlington County Police Depa rtment’s unlawful attachment of a GPS unit to [appellant’s] vehicle in Maryland without a search warrant and for purpose of arrest,” and (ii) “erred in denyi ng [appellant’s] motion to suppress ev idence seized as a result of

the unlawful search of his cell-site information for the purpose of tracking [his] movements.” Finding no error, we affirm.

 Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication.

1 Mark R. Herring succeeded Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, II, as Attorney General on January 11, 2014.UNPUBLISHED- 2 - I. Background The night of December 29, 2010, appellant met some friends for drinks in the Ballston neighborhood of Arlington, Virginia. After parting wa ys with his friends, who testified they left appellant sleeping in his car parked in the Ba llston Mall parking garage, appellant drove his vehicle down Fairfax Drive in Arlington and struck Rebekah Grant, a pedestrian, while she was crossing the street with a frie nd. Appellant did not stop, and an eyewitness saw appellant’s vehicle take a right-hand turn off of Fairfax Drive shortly thereafter. A. The Investigation When officers arrived at the scene, they recove red one half of a side marker light with a Dodge Chrysler logo and serial number and a piece of a passenger side mirror with a date stamp of October 2002 and a part number. Through info rmation from Dodge Chrysler, the eyewitness, and the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles , Arlington County Police Of ficer Robert Wright narrowed down the vehicle suspected of hitting Ms. Grant to four Dodge Neons in the area. While working to narrow down the list of susp ect vehicles in the area, Officer Wright received a call from Investigator Rich of the National Insurance Crime Bureau. Investigator Rich relayed to Officer Wright that at a pproximately 4:00 a.m. on December 30, 2010, a call was placed to Progressive Insurance Company (Progr essive) by John J. Reynolds, appellant’s father, who stated that his Dodge Neon wa s involved in an accident in the parking garage of Fair Oaks Mall in Fairfax County, Virginia. Mr. Reynolds ’s Dodge Neon was the same make, model, description, and VIN number as one of the four Dodge Neons on O fficer Wright’s list of suspect vehicles. In addition, the damage to Reynolds’ vehicle was consiste nt with the likely damage to

the vehicle involved in the hit and run. In further conversatio ns with the insurance company, Officer Wright learned that Mr. Re ynolds’s insurance claim had alr eady been paid as a total loss

and he was able to locate and seize the vehicle from a salvage yard in Culpeper, Virginia. When- 3 - he located Reynolds’ vehicle, Officer Wright obs erved damage consistent with the pieces found

at the scene of the hit and run. Officer Wright also learned that the Dodge Neon he ultimately seized was registered to appe llant’s father and mother, Jacqueline Reynolds. Both John J. Reynolds and appellant were listed as aut horized drivers on th e insurance policy. Continuing his investigation, Officer Wright met with th e security guard who was on duty at the Fair Oaks Mall parking garage th e morning of December 30, 2010. The security guard told Officer Wright that he did his r ounds at approximately 11:00 p.m. on December 29, 2010, and did not notice the Reynoldses’ vehicle. Moreover, around 4:00 a.m. on December 30, 2010, the security guard did see the Reynoldses’ ve hicle in the garage but did not observe any debris. At approximately 5:00 a.m., the secu rity guard saw an older white male by the Reynoldses’ vehicle. When approached, the ma n, presumably appellant’s father, told the security guard that the vehicle was involved in a hit-and-run accident on Route 50 when a

woman struck his car and fled the scene. Officer Wright subsequently spoke to Progres sive and learned that appellant’s father reported that appellant parked the car in the mall parking garage to go out with friends and when he returned, the vehicle while pa rked in the lot had been struc k. Officer Wright also learned through Progressive that appellant was the usual driv er of the vehicle and th at he was reported as the driver the night of December 29th into the morning of December 30, 2010. B. The First, Historical Cell-Site 2 Information Court Order Having narrowed down the suspects in the hit and run to appellant or his father, Officer Wright obtained a court order to retrieve historical cell-site in formation (the “January order”) 3

2 FBI Agent Jennifer Banks, admitted by the trial court as an expert in cell-site technology, testified that a “cell” is either a cell tower attached to a pole in the street or a panel attached to the side of a building that has ante nnas emitting radio frequencies. Cell phones use the cells to communicate. Agent Banks testifie d that “your cell phone works a lot like a radio, I mean it is a radio, essentially.” App. at 444-45.- 4 - from appellant’s and his father’s cellular se rvice providers and bank records to help him determine if appellant or his father had been in Arlington the night of th e hit and run. The bank records showed that appellant used his debit card at Union Jack’s, a bar/re staurant in the Ballston Mall, approximately four hours prior to the a ccident. The phone records revealed that appellant’s father used his cel l phone in the early evening hours of December 29, 2010, and then not again until he received a call from a ppellant around 4:00 a.m. on December 30, 2010. Meanwhile, appellant’s phone records revealed that he sent and received text messages and phone calls throughout the evening of D ecember 29, 2010, until a break from approximately 12:20 a.m. to 4:00 a.m. on December 30, 2010, when appellant called his father. The cell-site records also revealed that appe llant’s phone “pinged” off of cellu lar towers in the Ballston area and specifically around Fairfax Drive at the time of the accident. In the hours after the accident, appellant’s phone pinged off of to wers through Rosslyn, into the Dist rict of Columbia, and then

back out Route 66 west towards Fair Oaks Mall. Officer Wright testified at the hearing on appellant’s motion to suppress th at “[a]t that time of the inve stigation, I determined that [appellant] was in the vehicle [at the time of the hit and run].” C. The GPS Tracking Having identified appellant as th e main suspect in the hit and run, Officer Wright decided he wanted to leverage the “element of surprise” and arrest appellant while he was alone, in hopes

3 Data obtained through orders such as the January order exists because during the course of a phone call, if the phone is moving, it is “han ded off between towers” for the best reception. Agent Banks testified that AT&T, appellant’s ce llular service provider, can provide historical “handoff information” from tower to tower for a particular cell phone because it maintains those records for a period of seven years. This allo ws law enforcement, through a court order, to calculate the approximate location of a user’s phone when it was making or receiving phone calls, text messages, or voicemails. Agent Banks further explained that historical cell-site data includes the time a call or text message is actually made or received by the user. When required by court order, AT&T provides a spreadsheet listing the historical in formation and using that and a list of the company’s tower locations, law enforcement expe rts can map the approximate location of an individual’s phone over a given time period.- 5 - of strengthening the case against appellant. Duri ng his investigation, Officer Wright learned that appellant lived in Pennsylvania and traveled exte nsively for work in his own vehicle, including trips to Virginia. Appellant’s parents lived in Fairfax County, a nd appellant’s vehicle registration and driver’s license listed his parents’ address. On February 26, 2011, admittedly without c onsultation with the Commonwealth’s attorney and without a warrant or other court sanction, Officer Wright placed a GPS tracking device on appellant’s vehicle while it was in a pa rking lot in Maryland. For twelve days, Officer Wright monitored appellant’s travel through Virginia, Maryla nd, New York, and Pennsylvania using the GPS information. Officer Wright te stified that the GPS could update him as to appellant’s location in as little as fourteen-second increments thr ough emails sent to him and to Arlington County Police Detective Chris Dengeles. However Officer Wright, to preserve the battery life of the GPS, set the GPS to provide less frequent updates. Officer Wright used a computer interface to adjust the GPS settings a nd to alert him when appellant’s vehicle entered Virginia. D. The Second, Real-Time Cell-Site Inform ation Court Order and appellant’s Arrest

Around midnight the morning of March 9, 2011, Of ficer Wright received a notification from the GPS that appellant travel ed into Virginia and to his pa rents’ house in Fairfax County. Officer Wright contacted the Arlington County Tactical Unit (“TAC unit”) supervisor at approximately 7:00 a.m. to request a TAC unit go to appellant’s parents’ house to visually confirm that appellant’s vehicle was there. The TAC unit arrived at appellant’s parents’ house at approximately 8:30 a.m. and around the same time, appellant left the house in his vehicle and drove to the Tysons Corner area of Fairfax. The TAC unit followed appellant and observed him park and leave his vehicle and ge t in another car with four othe r individuals. The separate vehicle left the scene and, on Officer Wright’s inst ructions to stay with appellant’s vehicle, the- 6 - TAC unit did not follow. Meanwhile, around 9:30 a.m. Officer Wright obtained a warrant to arrest appellant for felony hit and run. The TAC unit stayed with appellant’s vehicl e until approximately 4:00 p.m. when Officer Wright testified they “started to determine what [they] were going to do next.” Officer Wright testified that, armed with a felony arrest warrant, he determined that th ere was a need to take appellant into custody and to that end, he a nd Detective Don Fortunat o, also of the Arlington County Police Department, drafted a court orde r to obtain “real-time” cell-site data from appellant’s phone through AT &T (the “March order”). 4 The March order required AT&T to ping appellant’s cell phone for its location. Once drafted, Officer Wright and Detective Fortunato took the March order to Arlington C ounty Circuit Court, where a judge signed it around 4:00 p.m. or 5:00 p.m. Th e March order authorized AT&T to “ping” appellant’s phone every fifteen minutes and provide its physical location data to Officer Wright. Beginning at approximately 7:00 p.m., AT&T se nt four electronic si gnals in fifteen-minute increments to appellant’s phone. The ping signa ls registered with cell towe rs near appellant’s phone and provided the phone’s approximate GPS coordinate location information to AT&T, which AT&T then forwarded to Officer Wright via email. Officer Wright entered the coordinates into a computer program to determine appellant’s appr oximate location and dire ction of travel.

4 The cell-site data sought in the March orde r was “real-time” location data obtained by “pinging” a user’s phone rather th an historical data, as require d by the January order. Agent Banks testified at appellant’s tr ial that AT&T’s “pinging” tech nology works via a combination of GPS and cell tower communication. The ping signa l sent by AT&T to the phone causes the cell phone to “talk” to a nearby cell towe r, while GPS satellites also “t alk” with the tower. Based on the speed of communication between the phone, towe r, and satellite, a mathematical formula generates the GPS location of the mobile phone . According to Agent Banks, a mobile phone user may only block ping signals initiated by police surveillance if the user turns the phone off. AT&T does not otherwise send pi ng signals in the course of operating its cellular network. Agent Banks testified that the r eason cell phones have th e ability to talk to cell towers via ping signals is because of law enforcement’s need to locate victims in distress for 911 emergency responses.- 7 - The information from AT&T, however, was neither timely nor accurate enough to determine appellant’s precise lo cation and, therefore, the TAC un it remained with appellant’s vehicle. The final ping result re ached Officer Wright after appellant had returned to his vehicle, still under surveillance by the TAC unit, in Tysons Corner. When appellant entered his vehicle and drove away, the TAC unit followed him and in conjunction with Fairfax County police, stopped and arrested appellant on Interstate 495. Upon appellant’s arre st, police impounded and searched appellant’s vehicle, in which they f ound a laptop computer and two cell phones. Search

warrants were later obtained and execut ed on the laptop computer and cell phones.

E. The Trial At trial, Officer Wright te stified, as did individuals who both saw and spoke with appellant the night of the accident. The witness who observed appellant’s car after the accident also testified. Additionally, Agent Banks test ified as to how both hi storical and real-time

cell-site data is obtained and how that data wa s mapped to provide physical location information of both appellant’s and his father’s phones to Of ficer Wright. The historical information was used to determine the individuals appellant wa s with the night of D ecember 29-30, 2010, as well as where appellant’s and his fath er’s phones were geographically lo cated at times that night. Further, Detective Luis Ordonez, who ex ecuted the search of appellant’s laptop computer, testified that the computer showed past internet searches for websites including “hitandrunaccident.com,” “your rights if arrested ,” “how long police can hold one in custody,” “how long after a hit-and-run will you get caugh t,” a “hit and run” keyword search, an article about the accident in question, and “how often hit-and-run driv ers get caught by license plate.” On July 26, 2012, a jury found appellant guilty of felony hit and run and DWI maiming. On October 5, 2012, the trial court denied appe llant’s motion to set aside the verdict and sentenced appellant to three ye ars’ and three months’ incarce ration on the felony hit-and-run- 8 - conviction and twelve months’ incarceration on the DWI maimi ng conviction. This appeal

followed. II. Analysis

A. Standard of Review Appellant’s claim that evidence was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment presents a mixed question of law a nd fact that this Court reviews de novo on appeal. McCain v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 546, 551, 659 S.E .2d 512, 515 (2008) (citing Murphy v. Commonwealth, 264 Va. 568, 573, 570 S.E.2d 836, 838 (2002)). In making such a determination, we give deference to the factual findings of the trial court, but independently determine whether the manner in which the evidence was obtained meets the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 552, 659 S.E.2d at 515; Bass v. Commonwealth, 259 Va. 470, 475, 525 S.E.2d 921, 924 (2000). B. The GPS Tracking Appellant first asserts that th e trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence seized as a result of the Arlington County Poli ce Department’s unlawful attachment of a GPS unit to appellant’s vehicle in Maryland without a search warrant and fo r purpose of arrest. At the outset, we note that this holding does not turn on Officer Wright’s decision to go into Maryland and attach a GPS tracking device to appellant’s vehicle without a warrant. As the United States Supreme Court held in United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012), the placement of a GPS tracking device on an individua l’s vehicle constitutes a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment as it is a phys ical occupation of (in this case appellant’s) private property. Id. at 950-51. As Jones had not been decided when Officer Wright placed the GPS tracking device on appellant’s car on Februa ry 26, 2011, the parties argued on brief, based on prior precedent, whether the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied in this case.- 9 - While it may be problematic in light of Jones to conclude that Officer Wr ight acted in good faith when he, without a warrant, traveled into another jurisdiction and placed a GPS unit on appellant’s car, it is unnecessary to our holding as to this assignment of error for us to engage in this analytical exercise. To put it simply: No evidence derived from the GPS was used in the

affidavit to obtain the arrest warr ant for appellant or was introduced at trial. Therefore, even if the exclusionary rule applied to evidence obtained from the GPS, there would have been nothing for the trial court to suppress as a result. Appellant argues that because Officer Wright learned appellant was at his parents’ house in Virginia from the GPS tracking information, and because he did not disclose that in his

affidavit for the March order and Detective Fortunat o likewise did not disclo se it in his affidavit for the search warrants for items seized from appellant’s vehicle, all evidence obtained as a result should have been suppressed. In other words, ap pellant argues that because Officer Wright knew appellant was in Virginia because of the GPS, anything that occurred or was obtained after that point was tainted or “fruit of the poisonous tree.” See e.g. Warlick v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 263, 265, 208 S.E.2d 746, 748 (1974) (holding that “[t] he exclusionary rule operates not only against evidence seized and information acquired during an unlawful search or seizure but also against derivative evidence discovered because of the unlawful act”). The fatal flaw in appellant’s argument is that the Fourth Amendment viol ation in this case yielde d no “fruit” at all. The evidence offered at trial was that Officer Wright identified appellant as his suspect and decided to arrest him prior to placing the GPS unit on his vehicle. Indeed, the entire purpose of placing the GPS on appellant’s vehicle was to aid in his apprehensi on once he re-entered Virginia. When Officer Wright learned appellan t was in Virginia, he sent a TAC unit to obtain visual confirmation of appellant ’s location. Once the TAC unit obtained visual confirmation, it stayed with appellant’s vehicle until his arrest. Meanwhile, a ne utral and detached magistrate- 10 - issued a warrant for appellant’s arrest based on probable cause that he committed felony hit and run. Significantly, appellant never challeng ed the validity of the arrest warrant. Once appellant returned to his vehicle on March 9, 2011, the TAC unit effectuated a stop and arrested appellant pursuant to the lawful arrest warrant. Officers then conducted a search of appellant’s vehicle incident to arrest. Subsequently, Detect ive Fortunato obtained search warrants for appellant’s laptop co mputer and cell phones. The GPS information – the fact that appellant traveled to his parents’ house in Virginia the morning of March 9, 2011 - did not contribute to or invalidate the pr obable cause findings to arrest appellant, search his vehicle incident to that arrest, or sear ch items found in his vehicle pursuan t to valid warrants. Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not err in denyi ng appellant’s motion to suppress as to evidence

obtained from the GPS unit. C. The January and March Cell-Site Data Orders Appellant next assigns error to the trial cour t’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence

seized as a result of the cell-site information orders. This swiftly-emerging area of Fourth Amendment law involves federal and state compan ion legislation pursuant to which the court

orders in this case were issue d. Therefore, before discussing the constitutionality of evidence

obtained as a result of the Janua ry and March orders, it is impo rtant to understand the statutory framework through which they were issued. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986), consists of three titles, the second of which is the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq. (“SCA”). The SCA sets forth the stat utory privacy rights for customers and- 11 - subscribers of electronic communications service providers. Relevant to this case, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) 5 provides: Requirements for court order. A court order for disclosure under subsection (b) or (c) may be issued by any court that is a court of competent jurisdiction and shall issue only if the governmental entity offers specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the records or other information sought, are relevant and mate rial to an ongoing criminal investigation

. . . . (Emphasis added). In 1988, the Virginia legislature enacted a co mpanion statute to codify the means and methodology by which law enforcement could obtai n records from electronic communications service providers. Code § 19.2- 70.3 provides in relevant part: A. A provider of electronic communication service . . . shall disclose a record or other inform ation pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of such service, excluding the contents of electronic communications, to an investigati ve or law-enforcement officer only pursuant to:

* * * * * * *

5 Section 2703 distinguishes be tween “contents” and non-content “records.” If the government seeks content information about a communication, that is “informa tion concerning the substance, purport, or meaning of that comm unication,” paragraphs (a) and (b) apply. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510(8), 2703(a)-(b), 2711. If the government seeks non-content records, . . . paragraph (c) controls, and provides different pro cedural protections. In Re Application of the United States, 830 F. Supp. 2d 114, 127-28 (E.D. Va. 2011). The January and March orders were for non-content records pursuant to 18 U. S.C. § 2703(c) and (d) as the location information collected and mainta ined by the cellular services providers does not include the “content” of emails, text messages, or voicemails and thus does not constitute “information concerning the substance, purpor t, or meaning” of a communication. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8) (defining “contents ” with respect to wire, oral, or electronic communications). Furthermore, “It is well establis hed that Section 2703(c)(1)(B) of the [SCA] applies to historical cell site location data.” United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384, 396 (D. Md. 2012) (citations omitted).- 12 - 3. A court order for such disclosu re issued as provided in this section;

* * * * * * *

B. A court shall issue an order for disclosure und er this section only if the investiga tive or law-enforcement officer shows that there is reason to believe the records or other information sought are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation

. . . . (Emphasis added). Because the statutory scheme only requires a showing of “specific articulable facts showing that there are r easonable grounds to believe that the . . . records or other information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal inve stigation” to obtain a court order, it clearly requires a lower burden of proof than is necessary to establish probable cause for a warrant to issue. See e.g., In re A pplication of the United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 606 (5th Cir. 2013) (“The ‘s pecific and articulable facts’ standard is a lesser showing than the probable cause standard that is required by the Fourth Amendment to obtain a warrant.” (citing U.S. Const. amend. IV; In re Application of the United States, 620 F.3d 304, 315 (3rd Cir. 2010); United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 291 (6th Cir. 2010))). This discrepancy has generated dozens of cases acro ss the country in which defendants have argued that searches pursuant to SCA court orders and not warrants s upported by probable cause violate their Fourth Amendment rights. Co urts have reached varying results. 6 Though this salient issue

6 Compare In re Application of the Unite d States, 809 F. Supp. 2d 113 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding that the Fourth Amendment is implicat ed when the government monitors historical cell-site location data over a sufficiently long, though unde fined period of time); In re Application of the United States , 736 F. Supp. 2d 578 (E.D.N.Y. 2010); with In re Application of the United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600 (holding that the Fourth Amendment is not implicated by government monitori ng of historical cell-sit e data, pursuant to a court order, based on the third party doctrine an d because cellular service providers maintain historical cell-site data for their own busin ess purposes); accord United States v. Ruby, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18997 (S.D. Cal. February 12, 2013); United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384 (D. Md. 2012); In Re Application of the United States, 830 F. Supp. 2d 114; United States v. Dye, No. 10CR221, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEX IS 42787 (N.D. Ohio 2011); United States v. Velasquez, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118045 (N.D . Cal. 2010); United States v. Benford, 2010- 13 - is one that a Virginia appellate court may have to resolve in an appropriate case, the facts of this case dictate that we need not, and therefore we will not, decide it at this time. See Luginbyhl v. Commonwealth, 48 Va. App. 58, 64, 628 S.E.2d 74, 77 (2006) (“‘It is a well recognized principle of appellate review that constitutional questions should not be decided if the record permits final disposition of a cau se on non-constitutional grounds.’ . . . ‘A congruent principle is one that an appellate court decides cases ‘on the best and narrowest ground available.’” (citations omitted)). In this case, both the January and March orde rs stated: “IT BEING SHOWN that there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed, that the information requested herein is in the possession of AT&T Wire less and that the information sought is relevant and material to a legitimate law enforcement inquiry . . . .” (E mphasis added). This language reflects that, despite the fact that the SCA and Virginia’s co mpanion statute only requi re the government show “specific and articulable facts” that the informa tion requested is “relevan t and material to an ongoing criminal investigation,” in this case, a judge of the Arlingt on County Circuit Court found probable cause to issue the orders for the cell-site data. Both the January and March orders, therefore, met and exceeded the statutory standard and did not violate appellant’s Fourth Amendment rights. 7

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29453 (N.D. Ind. 2010); United States v. Suarez-Bla nca, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111622 (N.D. Ga. 2008); and In re Applic ation of the United States, 509 F. Supp. 2d 76, 80-81 (D. Mass. 2007). See also United Stat es v. Navas, 640 F. Supp. 2d 256, 262 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privac y in real-time cell-site data because he used his phone on public roads, law enforcement did not monitor defendant in a private residence, defendant was not a subscriber to the phone, and if he wanted to keep his location private, he could have turned off his phone).

7 Because the January and March orders were supported by a probable cause finding, we do not reach the issue of whether appellant ha d a reasonable expectati on of privacy in his historical or real-time cell-site data and if so, whether the stat utory standard of “specific and articulable facts” that the inform ation requested is “relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation” violated that expectation.- 14 - We also note that with respect to the Marc h order for “real-time” cell-site data of appellant’s phone, just as with the GPS tracki ng data, no information obtained from the March

order was introduced as evidence at trial. In fact, neither the TAC unit nor Officer Wright learned any information from the March order that le d directly or indirectly to appellant’s arrest or subsequent conviction. The TAC unit visually observed appella nt or his vehicle beginning at approximately 8:30 a.m. on March 9, 2011. AT &T began pinging appellant’s phone around 7:00 p.m. Officer Wright testified that he received the final ping re sult “right at the same time”

the TAC unit resumed visual survei llance of appellant when he retu rned to his vehicle. The TAC unit then followed appellant and arrested him pursu ant to a valid arrest warrant. As discussed, the laptop and cell phones found in appellant’s ca r were seized pursuant to a valid search

incident to arrest and then sear ched pursuant to valid search wa rrants. The location information

obtained as a result of the Marc h order was simply inconsequential to appellant’s arrest or

conviction. For these reasons, we hold that the trial cour t did not err in denying appellant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained from the GPS unit or from either cell-site data court order.

Affirmed.