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. e du/thir dc ir c uit_1999/172Filed June 28, 1999

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

Nos. 98-1491, 98-1632, and 98-1700

MARY CHURCHILL,

Appellant in No. 98-1491

v.

STAR ENTERPRISES, a/k/a STAR STAFF INCORPORATED; JOSEPH JANTORNO, a/k/a STAR STAFF INCORPORATED; DAVID SMITH, a/k/a STAR STAFF INCORPORATED; BERNADINE LANE, a/k/a STAR

STAFF INCORPORATED

MARY CHURCHILL,

Appellant in No. 98-1632

v.

STAR ENTERPRISES a/k/a STAR STAFF INCORPORATED;
JOSEPH JANTORNO; DAVID SMITH

MARY CHURCHILL,

v.

STAR ENTERPRISES a/k/a STAR STAFF INCORPORATED;
JOSEPH JANTORNO; DAVID SMITH,

Appellants in No. 98-1700On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania District Judge: Honorable Harvey Bartle, III (D.C. Civ. Nos. 97-03527 and 98-01751)

Argued May 26, 1999

BEFORE: GREENBERG and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges , and DOWD,* District Judge

(Filed: June 28, 1999)

Thomas M. Holland (argued)
437 Chestnut Street The Lafayette Building Philadelphia, Pa. 19106

Attorney for Mary Churchill

Irving L. Hurwitz (argued) Gary S. Prish Carpenter, Bennett & Morrissey 100 Mulberry Street Three Gateway Center Newark, New Jersey 07102

Attorneys for Star Enterprises a/k/a Star Staff Incorporated, Joseph Jantorno, and David Smith

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*Honorable David D. Dowd, Jr., Senior Judge of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, s itting by designation.

2OPINION OF THE COURT

GREENBERG, Circuit Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

This case involves a question of claim preclusion: what steps must a plaintiff take to bring about the cons olidation of her consecutively filed cases in the district co urt so that claims in the later case are not precluded by the e arlier action? In particular, the district court barred ap pellant Mary Churchill by a judgment on the pleadings from proceeding with a law suit, Churchill v. Star Enter prises, 3 F. Supp.2d 625 (E.D. Pa. 1998) ("Churchill II"), al leging
claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act an d the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act because she alread y had brought a suit, Churchill I, based on the same facts and related issues against the defendants in Church ill II, asserting claims in Churchill I under the Family an d Medical Leave Act. See Churchill v. Star Enters., 3 F. Supp.2d 622 (E.D. Pa. 1998) ("Churchill I").

We will affirm the district court's judgment on the pleadings in Churchill II because the two cases inv olved the same parties and germane facts, as well as related issues, and for claim preclusion purposes constituted a sin gle cause of action that should have been joined in a s ingle
case. We also will affirm the district court's orde r on the Appellees' cross-appeal from the denial of an order under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 seeking sanctions against Church ill for filing Churchill II. Finally, we will affirm on Chu rchill's separate appeal from an order denying in part her application for attorney's fees in Churchill I.

II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. Background

The facts that we find material to our disposition of these appeals are not contested. Churchill began work at Star Enterprises, a.k.a. Star Staff Inc. ("Star Staff"), in July

31991 managing a food mart at a Texaco station in

Pennsylvania. In June 1996, Churchill was diagnosed with oral cancer. She then notified her temporary superv isor, Walter Schreiber, of her condition and of her need to undergo treatment. During the next two months she underwent three surgical procedures and between Aug ust and October 1996, she received radiation treatments

. Churchill was limited substantially in performing m ajor life activities, and thus was disabled, but nevertheless continued to work. Churchill made numerous requests to Star Staff for reasonable accommodations during thi s time, communicating these requests to David Smith, her manager, and Joseph Jantorno, her regional manager, but they were unresponsive. On January 29, 1997, Church ill made a final request for accommodation, and put Sta r Staff on notice that due to her medical needs she qualifi ed for leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 199 3, 29 U.S.C. SS 2601-2654 ("FMLA"). Jantorno then instruc ted
Smith to evaluate Churchill and then Jantorno and S mith
consulted with Deborah Cox of Star Staff's Human Resources Department regarding the case. Star Staff terminated Churchill on February 5, 1997, because o f her disability. Churchill I and II and these appeals fo llowed.

B. Procedural History

1. Churchill I

Churchill initiated Churchill I on May 20, 1997, ag ainst Star Staff and three of its employees: Jantorno, Sm ith, and Bernadine Lane, who replaced her as the station man ager. Churchill alleged that Star Staff, Jantorno, and Sm ith violated the FMLA when they discharged her and also were liable to her on common law claims for bad faith an d wrongful discharge.1 She charged Lane with defamati on,

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1. FMLA grants an "eligible employee" the right to 12 work weeks of leave, over any 12-month period: (1) because of the birth of the employee's child, in order to take care of the chil d; (2) because of the placement of a child with the employee for adoption or foster care; (3) in order to care for the employee's child, spouse, or parent, if the child, spouse or parent has a serious health condition; or (4) because of a serious health condition that makes the employee un able to perform the

4but dropped that count on December 19, 1997, and

dismissed Lane as a defendant.

The district court entered judgment on January 27, 1998, for the three remaining defendants on the sta te law claims because FMLA preempted them. Trial began on the other counts on February 11, 1998, and on February 13, 1998, the jury rendered its verdict for Churchill, holding the defendants jointly and severally liable for dam ages of $8,609.02, plus interest at 6.5%, or $559.59. The c ourt doubled the award as liquidated damages, finding th at the defendants' violation of FMLA was not in good faith . On February 17, 1998, the court entered judgment for $18,337.22, and ordered that Churchill be reinstate d to a position equivalent to her prior position with equi valent wages and benefits.

Churchill then sought attorney's fees of $52,018.20 , as well as costs pursuant to 29 U.S.C. S 2617(a)(3). O n April 17, 1998, the district court issued a Memorandum an d Order partially granting and partially denying Chur chill's fee application and ordering the defendants to pay $37,062.50 for attorney's fees and $9,410.19 costs.

Churchill filed a motion for reconsideration of tha t order, which the court denied by an order entered on May 2 8, 1998. On this appeal, Churchill seeks reversal of t he portion of the order denying attorney's fees for (1 ) time spent in connection with an unemployment compensati on hearing on March 26, 1997, on a claim Churchill bro ught after her discharge and (2) for time to prepare for and conduct a deposition of Lane.

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functions of the employee's position. 29 U.S.C.S 26 12(a)(1). After a period of qualified leave, an employee is entitled to reinstatement to her former position or an equivalent one with the same benefits and terms. 29 U.S.C. S 2614(a). FMLA declares it "unlawful for any employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of o r the attempt to exercise, any right provided" in the FMLA. 29 U.S.C. S 2615(a )(1). FMLA similarly declares it "unlawful for any employer to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any individual for oppo sing any practice made unlawful" under the FMLA. 29 U.S.C. S 2615(a)( 2). Section 2917(a) of FMLA authorizes civil damage actions by employee s. 29 U.S.C. S 2617(a).

52. Administrative Claims

Churchill pursued her claims against Star Staff alo ng parallel courses. Thus, on February 26, 1997, Churc hill filed an administrative complaint alleging disabili ty discrimination with the Pennsylvania Human Relation s Commission ("PHRC"), and at that time her administr ative complaint was dual filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") asserting an Americ an with Disabilities Act claim. The PHRC dismissed the disability discrimination claim on or about Novembe r 14, 1997, and on April 26, 1998, Churchill received a r ight to sue letter dated April 24, 1998, from the EEOC. As we will discuss, she had not requested a right to sue lette r.

3. Churchill II

On April 2, 1998, about two months after the jury reached its verdict in Churchill I, Churchill filed a complaint against the Appellees, Star Enterprises, Jantorno, and Smith, under the Americans with Disabilities Act (" ADA"), 42 U.S.C. SS 12101 et seq. (Counts I and II); the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act ("PHRA"), 43 Pa. C ons. Stat. Ann. SS 951 et seq. (1991 & Supp. 1998) (Coun ts III and IV); and the New Jersey Family Leave Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. SS 34:11-B1 et seq. (West Supp. 1999) (Counts V and VI).2 The Appellees answered the complaint on April 23, 1998, including as an affirmative defense the conte ntion that Churchill's claims were "barred by the doctrin e of res judicata," and that Appellees had "fully satisfied the court's judgment entered February 17, 1998 . . . ." There i s no doubt that the Appellees' answer raised the res jud icata defense in reliance on the proceedings in Churchill I and
Churchill does not contend otherwise.

The district court on Appellees' motion to dismiss entered a judgment for the Appellees on the pleadings on Ju ne 23, 1998, on claim preclusion principles because Church ill II
and Churchill I "involved the same cause of action. " Churchill II, 3 F. Supp.2d at 628. On July 21, 1998
,

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2. Churchill's complaint was apparently premature w ith respect to her ADA claim as she brought it before she received the right to sue letter.

6Churchill appealed in Churchill II, seeking reinsta tement of

her ADA and PHRA Counts.3

4. Star Staff's Rule 11 Motion

On May 1, 1998, the Appellees served Churchill with notice that they intended to seek sanctions against her for filing Churchill II and unless she withdrew that ca se within 21 days they would file the motion for sanctions. O bviously, Churchill did not comply with their request and on May 29, 1998, when the Appellees filed their motion to dism iss Churchill II on res judicata grounds, they also mov ed for sanctions in the form of reimbursement of attorneys ' fees and costs incurred in bringing the motion. Although , as we have indicated, the district court granted the Appe llees judgment on the pleadings, it denied their motion f or sanctions "under the totality of the circumstances. " Churchill II, 3 F. Supp.2d at 631.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We exercise plenary review of the order for judgmen t on the pleadings, see Jablonski v. Pan Am. World Airwa ys, Inc., 863 F.2d 289, 290 (3d Cir. 1988), and thus of the application of claim preclusion in Churchill II, se e Rider v. Pennsylvania, 850 F.2d 982, 988-95 (3d Cir. 1988), and we
review the denial of Rule 11 sanctions for abuse of discretion, see Napier v. Thirty or More Unidentifi ed Federal Agents, Employees or Officers, 855 F.2d 1080, 1091 (3d Cir. 1988). On Churchill's appeal from the partial denia l of her attorney's fee application in Churchill I we exerci se an abuse of discretion standard. See EEOC v. L.B. Fost er Co., 123 F.3d 746, 750 (3d Cir. 1997).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Claim Preclusion

This case seems to present the first application in any

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3. Churchill does not appeal from the dismissal of the New Jersey Family Leave Act counts. She apparently brought that claim because Star Staff's office is in New Jersey.

7court of appeals of claim preclusion barring the as sertion of

claims following a case already litigated under FML A.4 Yet
while the constellation of facts in this case is ne w, the principles of the doctrine of claim preclusion are familiar. Moreover, the circumstance that FMLA and the intere sts it protects are involved in this case does not mean th at we should honor Churchill's request that we depart fro m those principles. In particular, this case implicates iss ues involving Churchill's failure to seek a stay of Chu rchill I so that her claims in Churchill II could have been joi ned in
that action. It also involves consideration of Chur chill's failure to seek a right to sue letter from the EEOC so that she could have expedited bringing Churchill II.

The district court decided that the fact that there are administrative procedures that a plaintiff must fol low before she pursues a PHRA or ADA claim in court did not ju stify the court in refusing to apply claim preclusion pri nciples. The court in reaching its decision indicated that C hurchill could have expedited the administrative procedures and sought a stay of Churchill I so that the PHRA and A DA
claims could have been included in that case.

Churchill argues that she should not have been requ ired to seek a stay of Churchill I because a stay, by de laying her opportunity to obtain relief under FMLA, would have prejudiced her and frustrated public policy. She al ternately argues that she did move for a stay in Churchill I. She further argues that she should not have been requir ed to request that the EEOC expedite issuance of the righ t to sue
letter in order to exhaust the administrative claim s. For the reasons that follow we reject those arguments, and uphold the district court's application of claim preclusio n principles.

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4. We have found only one other opinion which appli ed claim preclusion to a suit involving an FMLA allegation; however, th at case involved preclusion of the reasserted FMLA claim itself, not allegations under other statutes. Solien v. Physicians Business Netwo rk, Inc. 22 F. Supp.2d 1237 (D. Kan. 1998) (res judicata precluded plainti ff 's FMLA suit where defendant prevailed on motion for summary judgment)

.

81. The claims in Churchill II required admin istrative

exhaustion.

As we have indicated the court granted Appellees' m otion for judgment on the pleadings on Churchill's ADA an d PHRA claims in Churchill II.5 Unlike the FMLA, both the ADA and the PHRA require pursuit of administrative remedies before a plaintiff may file a complaint in court. Thus, a party who brings an employment discriminati on claim under Title I of the ADA must follow the administrative procedures set forth in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-5. See Bishop v. Okidata, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 416, 424 (D.N.J. 1994). Accordingly, a party must wait 180 days after filin g a charge with the EEOC for ADA violations before bein g able to forego the administrative process and file suit in court. See 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-5(e)(1). After 180 days, "[i] f a complainant is dissatisfied with the progress the E EOC is making on his or her charge of employment discrimin ation, he or she may elect to circumvent the EEOC procedur es and seek relief through a private enforcement actio n in a
district court." Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Califo rnia v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 361, 97 S.Ct. 2447, 2451 (1977).

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5. At the oral argument before us a question was ra ised as to whether the district judge who heard Churchill I could dism iss Churchill II on the pleadings on the basis of the record. We are satisf ied that the judge's review of the complaints in Churchill I and II and the answer in Churchill II adequately supported dismissal based on the face of the pleadings and that the outcome of this case did not hinge in the district court on the circumstance that the same judge heard Churchill I and Churchill II and thus had a special insight into the case. While we recognize that the Appellees did not attach copies of the pleadings fr om Churchill I to their answer in Churchill II as they might have pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c), still in view of the circumstance that the o perative facts are

those in the pleadings in the two cases which are matters of public record, we
decline to remand the matter to the district court so that the Appellees
can amend their answer in Churchill II to include t he pleadings from Churchill I which then would be "part [of the answe r] for all purposes." Id. See Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. White Con solidated Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993) ("To decide a mo tion to dismiss, courts generally consider only the allegations cont ained in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint and matters of p ublic record.) (emphasis added); Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 339 n.3 (3d Cir. 1989).

9Similarly, a party must wait one year after filing charges

with the PHRC for alleged PHRA violations before ha ving the option to forego the state administrative proce ss and file suit in court. PHRA provides that the PHRC shall ha ve exclusive jurisdiction of an administrative claim f or one year after its filing, unless the PHRC resolves the claim before the one year has elapsed. See 43 Pa. Cons. S tat. Ann. S 962(c)(1).6

As we discuss below, Churchill should have moved to consolidate Churchill I and Churchill II for they a dvanced
the same cause of action. Churchill could have file d both the PHRA and ADA claims presented in Churchill II i n time to join them with her FMLA claim in Churchill I. In the case of the PHRA claim, no special steps were needed to preserve that claim and join it to the FMLA action. On May 2 0, 1997, the date Churchill filed Churchill I, the PHR C still was investigating her PHRA claim. The EEOC charge w as held in abeyance pending the PHRC's investigation. The PHRC made a finding of no probable cause on the PHR A charge on November 14, 1997. Thus, prior to the sta rt of the trial in Churchill I, Churchill knew that the P HRC had dismissed her PHRA complaint, and accordingly she c ould have brought an action on that claim about three mo nths
before Churchill I went to trial.

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6. The PHRA provides in relevant part:

If within one (1) year after the filing of a complaint with the Commission, the Commission dismisses the com plaint or has not entered into a conciliation agreement to whi ch the complainant is a party, the Commission must so notify the com plainant. On receipt of such a notice the complainant shall be ab le to bring an action

in the courts of common pleas of the Commonweal th based on the right to freedom from discrimination granted by this act. If the

court finds that the respondent has engaged in or is engaging in an unlawful discriminatory practice charged in the complaint, the

court shall enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful discriminatory practice and order affirmativ e action which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatemen t or hiring of employees, granting of back pay, or any other legal or equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.

43 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 962(c)(1).

10As for the ADA claim, Churchill could have requeste d a

right to sue letter after 180 days had passed from the filing date of her EEOC charge. "At the end of the 180-day period the employee is entitled to sue, regardless of EEOC proceedings." Waiters v. Parsons, 729 F.2d 233, 237 (3d Cir. 1984). Thus, on August 25, 1997, well before t he Churchill I trial, she could have requested a right to sue letter.7 The EEOC must issue the letter upon request. See McNasby v. Crown Cork and Seal Co., 888 F.2d 270, 2 74 n.3 (3d Cir. 1989). Churchill did not request a rig ht to sue letter, instead waiting for the EEOC to issue it. T hus, she "sat on her rights" when she could have attempted t o join
the ADA claim to the FMLA claim in consolidated lit igation. While Churchill argues that in some cases the EEOC may not respond promptly and correctly to such requests , we will not address the argument because she did not a ttempt
to obtain the letter.

Moreover, the district court correctly alternativel y held that Churchill could have requested the court to st ay Churchill I, while she waited for the right to sue letter, and by that procedural step preserved the PHRA and ADA claims now precluded. See Churchill II, 3 F. Supp.2 d at 630. Churchill points out that the court in Churchi ll I was aware of her pending administrative claims, and ass erts that the court improperly and unfairly put "the responsibility of promoting the ideas of claim prec lusion and judicial economy solely on [her] back." We reje ct that argument summarily. Attorneys should organize litig ation that they are pursuing to avoid claim preclusion. Accordingly, the mere fact that the district court was aware of Churchill's administrative claims and sua sponte might

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7. The district court believed that because of the application of 42

U.S.C. S 2000e-5(c) the 180-day period did not begin to ru n until after 60 days following Churchill's PHRA filing. See Churchill II , 3 F. Supp.2d at 630. We need not explore this point further because Chur chill did not request a right to sue letter at any time and the addition of the 60 days to the 180-day period would not affect our result as the e xtended period would have expired several months before the trial in Chu rchill I. We described the relationship between PHRA and EEOC proceedings in Trevino-Barton v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 919 F.2d 874 (3d Cir. 199 0). See also Berkoski v. Ashland Reg'l Med. Ctr., 951 F. Supp. 544 (M.D. Pa 1997).

11have stayed Churchill I did not relieve Churchill o f the

necessity to take steps to preserve her claims. See , e.g., Nernberg v. United States, 463 F. Supp. 752 (W.D. P a. 1979).

Churchill argues that she made a motion for a stay at trial. In support of this assertion she refers to a side bar conference during Churchill I, in which the court e xcluded
references to the administrative claims. The court did not permit reference to the PHRA and ADA claims because they were not being litigated along with the FMLA claim. While these evidentiary proceedings demonstrate that the court was aware of the administrative claims, they surely do not include a motion for a stay. In any event, if Churc hill desired that the court stay Churchill I so that she could include her PHRA and ADA claims in that action, she should have asked for the stay before the trial.

Churchill also argues that if the court stayed Chur chill I she would have been prejudiced because FMLA offers equitable relief, such as reinstatement and resumpt ion of benefits, which should not be delayed for reasons o f judicial economy. Arguing that she sought a "prompt determination" of her FMLA claims, she contends tha t she now has been prevented unjustly from pursuing her r ights

under the ADA and PHRA.

In considering this argument, we address the policy concerns behind FMLA which Congress enacted to prom ote job stability when workers confront illness or fami ly emergencies. The FMLA history evinces Congress's in tent to pass FMLA as an addition to federal labor laws esta blishing minimum standards for employment:

The [FMLA] accommodates the important societ al interest in assisting families, by establish ing a
minimum labor standard for leave. The bill i s based on the same principle as the child labor laws, the minimum wage, Social Security, the safety an d health laws, the pension and welfare benefit laws, and other
labor laws that establish minimum standards for employment.

S. Rep. No. 103-3 at 4, 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6-7.

12Congress stated that the purposes of FMLA include t he

following: "(1) to balance the demands of the workp lace with the needs of families, to promote the stability and economic security of families, and to promote national inter ests in preserving family integrity; [and] (2) to entitle e mployees to take reasonable leave for medical reasons, for the birth or adoption of a child, and for the care of a child, s pouse or parent who has a serious health condition; . . ." F MLA S 2(b)(1), (2), 29 U.S.C. S 2601(b)(1), (2).

In support of its decision to enact FMLA, Congress made several findings, including the recognition that"th e primary responsibility for family caretaking often falls on women, and such responsibility affects the working lives o f women more than it affects the working lives of men; . . ." FMLA S 2(a)(2), (3), (5), 29 U.S.C. S 2601(a)(2), (3), ( 5). Given this background, it is clear that FMLA is intended to ai d workers --especially but not exclusively working mo thers like Churchill--maintain job stability when they mu st care for themselves or their family. Nevertheless, despi te the substantive protection FMLA provides, we see no rea son to hold that Congress intended in enacting FMLA that proceedings under the statute are not to be given p reclusive effect in later litigation. Thus, while FMLA provid es for equitable relief, including reinstatement, we canno tfind that this important legislative goal "trumps" long standing preclusive effect doctrines.

Case law dealing with FMLA is limited. Churchill do es not cite any case law to buttress her contention that a n FMLA plaintiff is somehow due greater latitude than othe r plaintiffs with respect to the need to delay litiga tion in order to consolidate separate cases. To the contrary, fed eral
courts thus far have viewed FMLA as similar to Titl e VII, the ADA, and other laws which protect employees. Se e, e.g., Holmes v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 1998 WL 564443, a t *8 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (FMLA, PHRA and ADA "protect the sa me interests and provide relief for the same violation s").

We may look to case law under Title VII in assessin g the situation of plaintiffs who do not seek a stay of a n FMLA suit as they wait for an EEOC right to sue letter b efore asserting an ADA claim, or who for some other reaso n delay bringing an ADA claim. Three courts of appeals have held

13that a plaintiff in an employment discrimination ca se may

have to forego administrative remedies and obtain a n early right to sue letter. See Heyliger v. State Univ. an d Community College Sys. of Tenn., 126 F.3d 849, 855 n.2 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 1054 (1998 ); Herrmann v. Cencom Cable Assocs., Inc., 999 F.2d 22 3, 225 (7th Cir. 1993); and Woods v. Dunlop Tire Corp., 97 2 F.2d 36, 40 (2d Cir. 1992). We agree with these persuasi ve decisions.

In Heyliger, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Cir cuit held that an employee's prior state court lawsuit a gainst his employer under a state civil rights law prevented t he employee from suing the employer in federal court f or allegedly violating Title VII. The court determined that the state and federal claims arose out of the employer' s decision not to renew the employee's contract, the state court had entered a valid and final judgment on mer its of state claims, and the Title VII claim could have be en added to the state claims. The court of appeals concluded that requiring a plaintiff in the circumstances in Heyli ger to seek a right to sue letter and to amend his complai nt to add the federal claim would not impose a burden on him beyond that of a due diligence standard. Id. at 856

. Similarly, in Herrmann v. Cencom Cable Assoc., Inc. , 999 F.2d at 225-26, the court held that the plaintiff, in order to avoid claim preclusion, had been obliged to seek a right to sue letter and join his Title VII claim with anothe r, sufficiently related, pending federal action. Final ly, in Woods v. Dunlop Tire Corp., 972 F.2d at 40-41, the court precluded a Title VII action where the plaintiff co uld have sought a right to sue letter and an order to file a n amended complaint in a pending federal case to include the Title VII
claim.

Thus, courts have rejected favoring "the language a nd policy of Title VII" as "against application of wel l-settled claim preclusion principles." Woods, 972 F.2d at 39 . We do not find that the language and policy of FMLA is so different from that of Title VII as to "trump" the claim preclusion principles. Title VII, like FMLA, provid es for back pay and front pay or reinstatement. 42 U.S.C. SS 20 00e et seq. See Marinelli v. City of Erie, 25 F. Supp.2d 6 74, 678

14(W.D. Pa.), appeal dismissed, 135 F.3d 765 (3d Cir. 1998).

Accordingly, the harm to a successful plaintiff und er both FMLA and Title VII will be mitigated in many cases by the accrual of back pay and prejudgment interest if she prevails.

We recognize the burden placed upon working, single parents like Churchill in confronting their own ser ious illness or that of a family member, and acknowledge the protection offered by FMLA and the important intere sts it addresses. Yet Title VII similarly addresses injuri es sustained by employees suffering discrimination, wh o wrongly may be forced from work and required to wai t for redress in the form of reinstatement or back pay as they pursue their claims. Persons pursuing rights under these statutes must preserve their ability to seek redres s in a manner compatible with longstanding principles of j udicial economy: requesting a right to sue letter is not an onerous burden, and we believe that in many cases a motion to stay an FLMA action will preserve all legal claims witho ut undue prejudice to the plaintiff. We believe that distric t courts are likely to look favorably on applications for stays of FMLA proceedings while plaintiffs promptly pursue admini strative
remedies under Title VII and similar state laws and we urge them to do so.8

It is also important to bear in mind another point.
Churchill I and II involved statutes with fee-shift ing provisions. See 29 U.S.C. S 2617(a)(3) (FMLA); 43 P a. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 962(c.2) (PHRA); 42 U.S.C. S 12205 (AD A). Thus, an employer held liable in consecutive action s without doubt will be confronted with multiple moti ons for attorney's fees and costs. Moreover, employers defe nding consecutive actions, whether or not the actions are successful, will incur greater attorney's fees and other expenses for their defenses than they would incur i f defending only a single case. Surely it is only fai r that such applications and expenses be avoided as the purpose of

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8. Obviously we are not concerned here with a situa tion in which a court denied a diligent plaintiff's application for a sta y in an FMLA action and thus precluded her from asserting her various claim s in a single case. In those circumstances we might reach a different resu lt.

15statutes such as the FMLA, the PHRA, and the ADA is to

provide protection for employees and to allow them to recover damages or other relief for employers' cond uct if the employees can establish liability under the applica ble statute. Congress did not pass the statutes for the purpose of generating legal fees for plaintiffs' and defend ants' attorneys. We are not so naive that we do not recog nize that if we reached a different result on the claim precl usion issue we would be encouraging knowledgeable plainti ffs' attorneys to bring separate cases to generate addit ional attorney's fees in situations in which a single cas e would suffice. Applying claim preclusion principles as we do will further the legitimate policy of avoiding unnecessa ry legal

expenses.

Overall, then, we are satisfied that in this case w e should apply ordinary claim preclusion principles. Thus, w e address the question of whether Churchill I and Chu rchill II
involved the same cause of action so that Churchill II is precluded.

2. The cause of action.

The purpose of claim preclusion is to avoid pieceme al litigation of claims arising from the same events. See Board of Trustees of Trucking Employees of North Jersey W elfare Fund, Inc. v. Centra, 983 F.2d 495, 504 (3d Cir. 19 92). "[A] final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues t hat were or
could have been raised in that action." Rivet v. Re gions Bank of Louisiana, 522 U.S. 470, 473, 118 S.Ct. 921 , 925 (1998) (internal citation omitted). A determination of
whether two lawsuits are based on the same cause of action "turn[s] on the essential similarity of the underlying events giving rise to the various legal claims." Bo ard of Trustees, 983 F.2d at 504, quoting U.S. v. Athlone Indus., Inc., 746 F.2d 977, 983 (3d Cir. 1984). Because the courts have not defined precisely "causes of action," for claim preclusion purposes, we take a broad view, focussin g on the underlying events of the two actions. Athlone, 746 F.2d

at 984.

Claim preclusion gives dispositive effect to a prio r judgment if "a particular issue, although not litig ated, could

16have been raised in the earlier proceeding. Claim p reclusion

requires: (1) a final judgment on the merits in a p rior suit involving; (2) the same parties or their privities; and (3) a subsequent suit based on the same cause of action." Id. "Courts should not apply this conceptual test mecha nically, but should focus on the central purpose of the doct rine, to require a plaintiff to present all claims arising o ut the same occurrence in a single suit." Id.

The Appellees clearly demonstrated the presence of the first two requirements set forth in Athlone when t hey sought judgment in their favor in Churchill II and Churchill acknowledges this point. There had been a final jud gment on the merits in Churchill I, and Churchill I and I I involved the same parties. As for the third requirement, i.e ., whether the cause of action was the same, the district cour t properly concluded that the case "involve[d] the sa me cause of action because the underlying events in both cas es are the same," as the acts complained of were the same, and
the evidence at the trial would have been the same. While Churchill cited different statutes to support her t wo cases, the FMLA in Churchill I and the ADA and PHRA in Chu rchill II, the court correctly observed that the fact that Churchill advanced different legal theories does not mean tha t her second action will not be precluded.

Churchill contends that Churchill II differs from C hurchill I because the Churchill II complaint introduced "ne w material facts" and "new elements of . . . damages. " She argues in particular that the following "new materi al facts" were presented as "additional allegations" in the C hurchill II complaint: (1) David Smith replaced temporary super visor Walter Schreiber in October 1996; (2) in Churchill II she listed side effects including fatigue, depression, weight loss, loss of appetite, difficultly swallowing, dry mouth , sores in the mouth, and limited range of movement in the nec k; (3) Smith informed Jantorno of her requests for accommodation; (4) Jantorno then scheduled an "unti mely"
evaluation of Churchill and asked Smith to conduct an evaluation; and (5) Smith and Jantorno consulted wi th

17Deborah Cox of the Human Resources Department of St ar

Staff, as to how to deal with the situation.9

Indeed, these were new allegations but the thrust o f the two complaints remained practically identical. See Harding v. Duquesne Light Co., 1995 WL 916926 at *3 (W.D. P a. 1995) (no showing of different "causes of actions" where complaints "practically identical"). In each compla int, Churchill stated where, when and for whom she worke d, that she was diagnosed for cancer in the summer of 1996, had three surgeries and radiation treatment, that s he sought staff assistance as an accommodation to her medical condition, that several requests for accomm odation were ignored and that she was fired as a result of her disability and medical needs and efforts to receive the accommodation she claimed was due. Moreover, in Churchill II she was seeking a recovery for essenti ally the same wrongful conduct for which she obtained a reco very in Churchill I.

Thus, we conclude that the district court properly found that the claims were the same under Athlone, and th at claim preclusion should apply. There is simply no e scaping
from the fact that Churchill has relied on differen t legal theories to seek redress from the Appellees for a s ingle course of wrongful conduct. Because the claims were the same, Churchill asserted a single cause of action i n both cases that the doctrine of claim preclusion require d her to have joined in one suit. Thus, this case at bottom is simply a classic example of splitting a cause of action. 1 0

___________________________________________________ ______________

9. Specifically, Churchill I's complaint does not s pecify that Smith replaced Schreiber, but merely identifies Schreiber as her temporary supervisor, and identifies Smith as "at all times [ Churchill's] Manager";
states that Churchill had and was treated for cance r, but does not specify the side effects suffered; states that on J anuary 29, 1997, "[Churchill] provided sufficient notice to Defendan t Smith that she had a serious medical need which qualified [Churchill] for Family Medical Leave," but otherwise does not describe how the App ellees became aware of her condition, and does not include information about the evaluation
and how Cox was involved.

10. It should not be thought that by artful pleadin g of unnecessary allegations in a second complaint a plaintiff can a void the result we

reach.

18B. The Remaining issues

As we indicated, the Appellees have filed a cross-a ppeal
from the denial of sanctions under Rule 11 and Chur chill has filed an appeal from the denial of certain atto rney's fees and costs in Churchill I. We have reviewed these ap peals carefully and have concluded that they are without merit. Thus, we will affirm on these appeals without furth er discussion.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons we will affirm the order entered May 28, 1998, on appeal in No. 98-1491, denying reconsideration of the order with respect to counse l fees and costs, and will affirm the order entered June 2 3, 1998, on appeal on Nos. 98-1632 and 98-1700, granting the Appellees judgment on the pleadings but denying the ir
motion for sanctions.

A True Copy:

Teste:

Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit

19