IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 21-1475

Filed October 5, 2022

STATE OF IOWA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

DEVON LARONE WEBSTER,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Celene Gogerty, Judge.

Devon Webster appeals following his guilty plea. AFFIRMED.

Britt Gagne of Gagne Law Office, Des Moines, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Thomas J. Ogden, Assistant 

Attorney General, for appellee.

Considered by Ahlers, P.J., and Badding and Chicchelly, JJ.
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AHLERS, Presiding Judge.

Devon Webster pleaded guilty to assault causing bodily injury (count I), two 

counts of harassment in the first degree (counts II and III), and stalking (count IV). 

After his plea was accepted, Webster did not file a motion in arrest of judgment. 

Following a later sentencing hearing, the court sentenced Webster to a combined 

seven-year term of incarceration, assessed fines on each count, ordered Webster 

to pay a 15% surcharge on any portion of the fines not suspended, then suspended 

the fines, and assessed a $90 domestic or sexual abuse surcharge on the stalking 

charge. 

Webster appeals and raises two issues. First, he claims the court failed to 

inform him of the 15% surcharges when taking his plea, making his plea 

involuntary. See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.8(2)(b)(2) (requiring the court to inform the 

defendant of “[t]he mandatory minimum punishment, if any and the maximum 

possible punishment”); State v. Fisher, 877 N.W.2d 676, 685–86 (Iowa 2016) 

(concluding surcharges, like fines, are punitive and must be disclosed to the 

defendant to comply with Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.8). Second, he claims 

there is confusion in the sentencing order as to whether the 15% surcharge was 

imposed on all fines and how much of the surcharges was suspended.

I. Challenge to the Plea

As to Webster’s first challenge, “[w]e review challenges to plea proceedings 

for correction of errors at law.” See State v. Weitzel, 905 N.W.2d 397, 401 (Iowa 

2017). However, before we may consider the merits of Webster’s claim, we must 

determine whether he has established good cause to appeal. See Iowa Code

§ 814.6(1)(a)(3) (2021) (prohibiting an appeal from a conviction where the 
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defendant pleaded guilty except for a class “A” felony or “in a case where the

defendant establishes good cause” (emphasis added)).

What amounts to “good cause” to appeal following a guilty plea is context 

specific, but it must be “a legally sufficient reason.” State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 

98, 105 (Iowa 2020). “By definition, a legally sufficient reason is a reason that 

would allow a court to provide some relief.” State v. Treptow, 960 N.W.2d 98, 109 

(Iowa 2021). 

Because Webster failed to file a motion in arrest of judgment to challenge 

his guilty plea, he is precluded from obtaining appellate relief unless an exception 

applies. See id. There used to be two recognized exceptions to this bar. Id. One 

of the exceptions—when the failure to file a motion in arrest of judgment resulted 

from ineffective assistance of counsel—has been abolished by enactment of Iowa 

Code section 814.7, which prohibits raising claims of ineffective assistance of 

counsel on direct appeal. Id. This leaves only one recognized exception—when 

the district court fails to adequately advise the defendant of the consequences of 

not filing a motion in arrest of judgment. Id. Webster relies on this exception to 

assert he has good cause to appeal from his guilty plea.

Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.8(2)(d) requires the defendant to be 

informed “that any challenges to a plea of guilty based on alleged defects in the 

plea proceedings must be raised in a motion in arrest of judgment and that failure 

to so raise such challenges shall preclude the right to assert them on appeal.” 

However, we do not require strict compliance with the rule’s requirements; 

substantial compliance is sufficient. State v. Loye, 670 N.W.2d 141, 150 (Iowa 

2003). Webster asserts the following advisory given by the district court at his plea 
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hearing was not adequate to advise him of the consequences of not filing a motion 

in arrest of judgment:

[I]f you decide to challenge your—any of these guilty pleas, you must 

file a motion in arrest of judgment. This must be filed no later than 

forty-five days from this date or at least five days prior to your 

sentencing date, whichever comes first. If you don’t file your motion 

in arrest of judgment, you may lose grounds for an appeal. If you 

have questions about how to file a motion in arrest of judgment, 

please ask your attorneys.

Webster argues the advisory was deficient because it advised him that he “may

lose grounds for an appeal” and use of “may” incorrectly suggests his loss of the 

ability to appeal his plea was conditional. We disagree. While ideally the district 

court would have used the word “shall” rather than “may” in order to strictly comply 

with rule 2.8(2)(d), looking at the advisory as a whole, we find substantial 

compliance. See id. Webster was informed that he “must” file a motion in arrest 

of judgment in order to challenge his guilty plea, which negates any suggestion 

that he may have been misled by being told he “may” lose his appeal rights if he 

didn’t. Finding substantial compliance with the rule, Webster’s failure to file a 

motion in arrest of judgment precludes his right to challenge the plea on appeal. 

As the appellate court cannot provide relief, Webster has failed to establish 

good cause to pursue his appeal as a matter of right under Iowa Code 

section 814.6, so we reject his challenge to his guilty plea, affirm his conviction, 

and proceed to address his sentencing challenge.

II. Challenge to the Sentence

Unlike the challenge to his guilty plea, Webster has good cause to challenge 

his sentence. See Damme, 944 N.W.2d at 105 (finding good cause to appeal from 

a conviction following a guilty plea when the defendant challenges the sentence 
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rather than the guilty plea). Webster’s claimed sentencing error stems from the 

court’s imposition of the 15% crime-services surcharge required by Iowa Code 

section 911.1. He claims it is not clear for which counts the district court imposed 

the surcharge or how much, if any, of the surcharges were suspended. The 

claimed confusion originates from this statement by the district court during the 

sentencing hearing:

I am ordering fines in these cases. With regard to count I the 

fine is $430. counts II, III, and VI, the fine each is $855 plus a crime

services surcharge of 15 percent. However, those fines are 

suspended. I am required to assess the domestic and sexual abuse 

related crime surcharge of $90. You will be ordered to pay victim

pecuniary damages in an amount to be determined, and there will be 

a separate order with that amount.

We agree with Webster that the district court’s pronouncement during the hearing 

was ambiguous to a degree. However, any ambiguity was cleared up by the 

written sentencing order that followed, which reads:

The written sentencing order clarifies that the district court imposed the surcharge 

on all counts and suspended the fine on all counts. The entire suspension of the 

fines operated to suspend the entire corresponding surcharges imposed pursuant 

to section 911.1. See Iowa Code § 911.1(3) (“When a fine or forfeiture is 

suspended in whole or in part, the court shall reduce the surcharge in proportion 
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to the amount suspended.”); Horton v. State, 966 N.W.2d 663, 667 (Iowa Ct. App. 

2021) (holding that when the entire fine is suspended, the entire surcharge 

imposed pursuant to section 911.1 must be suspended as well). As it is clear that 

the district court properly imposed the 15% surcharge on all counts and properly 

suspended all those surcharges by suspending all the fines, we find no error in the 

sentence imposed.

III. Conclusion

Webster has not established good cause to challenge his guilty plea on 

appeal, so we affirm his conviction. We find no error in the sentence imposed. 

Accordingly, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.