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17-1905-cv 

KIPP v. United Federation of Teachers 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

SUMMARY ORDER 

\Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order 

filed on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 32.1 and this Court’s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a 

document filed with this Court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an 

electronic database (with the notation “summary order”). A party citing a summary order 

must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel. 

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at 

the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, 

on the 30th day of January, two thousand eighteen. 

PRESENT: GUIDO CALABRESI, 

 JOSÉ A. CABRANES, 

RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., 

Circuit Judges.

 

KIPP ACADEMY CHARTER SCHOOL, 

Plaintiff-Appellant 17-1905-cv 

v. 

UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, AFT NYSUT,

AFL-CIO, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

 

FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: MICHAEL P. COLLINS, Bond, Schoeneck 

& King PLLC, New York, NY. 
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FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE: ORIANA VIGLIOTTI (Jennifer A. Hogan, on 

the brief), Law Office of Robert T. Reilly, 

New York, NY. 

 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of 

New York (Deborah A. Batts, Judge). 

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, 

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the May 19, 2017 judgment of the District Court be and 

hereby is AFFIRMED. 

 Plaintiff-Appellant KIPP Academy Charter School (“plaintiff” or “KIPP”) appeals from the 

District Court’s order granting the motion of Defendant-Appellee United Federation of Teachers, 

AFT NYSUT, AFL-CIO (“defendant” or “UFT”) to dismiss KIPP’s complaint under Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) on the ground that the District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction 

under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the 

procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal. 

BACKGROUND 

KIPP, a charter school in the South Bronx neighborhood of New York City, was created in 

2000 pursuant to New York’s Charter Schools Act. Principally at issue in the dispute between KIPP 

and the UFT is whether the employment policies and practices applicable to other New York City 

public school teachers under the UFT’s collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) with the New 

York City Department of Education applies to KIPP teachers, or whether the school operates 

independently. 

KIPP has claimed its independence from the UFT for quite some time. In 2009, its teachers

filed a petition with the Public Employment Relations Board (“PERB”) in which they sought to 

formally establish that UFT did not represent KIPP teachers, and that the terms of the UFT CBA 

did not apply to KIPP teachers. PERB rejected this petition, and KIPP has since remained under the 

purview of the UFT.1

 KIPP’s attempts at dissociation from the UFT stem from its stated fear that 

inclusion within the UFT would compromise the school’s distinct approach to education, and would 

alter the pay and working conditions of KIPP teachers. 

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 The PERB’s decision “sustained automatic, non-consensual representative status to the UFT in 

relation to KIPP teachers under New York Law.” Appellant Br. at 13. 
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In June 2016, the UFT alleged that KIPP had committed 18 different violations of 10 

provisions of the CBA. After KIPP continued to assert that it was not subject to the CBA’s 

prescribed methods of dispute resolution, the UFT served a demand for arbitration under New 

York State law and American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) rules. The CBA mandates that any 

dispute not resolved by the UFT’s prescribed grievance process must be resolved by arbitration. 

KIPP then filed a petition in New York State Supreme Court seeking a stay of the arbitration on the 

ground that it was not subject to the terms of the UFT’s CBA. It also sought a temporary restraining 

order delaying the arbitration until its petition could be heard on the merits. 

 The New York State Supreme Court dismissed KIPP’s petition and declined to sign KIPP’s 

temporary restraining order. KIPP then filed suit in United States District Court, seeking a 

declaratory judgment that the school is not subject to the CBA, and seeking the same stay of 

arbitration.2

 The District Court dismissed the complaint pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, 

which prohibits a litigant from seeking to reverse an adverse state court judgment by filing suit in 

federal court. The District Court held that KIPP’s federal complaint ran afoul of Rooker-Feldman

because it essentially sought review of the New York State Supreme Court’s decision to decline to 

stay the arbitration. In addition to Rooker-Feldman, the UFT also claimed that KIPP’s complaint was 

barred under the doctrines of issue and claim preclusion. The District Court did not reach those 

arguments, finding Rooker-Feldman a sufficient basis for dismissal. 

DISCUSSION 

 When reviewing the district court’s dismissal of a complaint for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction, “we review factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo, accepting all 

material facts alleged in the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s 

favor.” Liranzo v. United States, 690 F.3d 78, 84 (2d Cir. 2012). It is well-settled that we 

“may affirm on any basis for which there is sufficient support in the record, including 

grounds not relied on by the district court.” Bruh v. Bessemer Venture Partners III L.P., 464 F.3d 202, 

205 (2d Cir. 2006). 

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine directs federal courts to abstain from considering claims when 

four requirements are met: (1) the plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff complains of injuries 

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 The essence of KIPP’s district court action is that the UFT’s insistence on arbitration is 

unlawful because the New York State law under which it purports to act is preempted by the 

National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”). KIPP further contends that under the NLRA, KIPP 

cannot be deemed a party to a UFT CBA to which it never agreed, and the UFT cannot be deemed 

to be the lawful collective bargaining representative of KIPP teachers. 
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caused by the state court judgment; (3) the plaintiff invites district court review of that judgment; 

and (4) the state court judgment was entered before the plaintiff's federal suit commenced. McKithen 

v. Brown, 626 F.3d 143, 154 (2d Cir. 2010); see also Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 

U.S. 280 (2005) (explaining the Rooker-Feldman doctrine). 

I. 

KIPP argues that the District Court erred in dismissing its complaint pursuant to the RookerFeldman doctrine because not all four of the doctrine’s prerequisites were met. KIPP contends that 

its federal complaint did not allege that the New York state court caused its injury, and thus the 

District Court mistakenly found that the second prong of Rooker-Feldman was satisfied. We agree 

with KIPP that the District Court misapplied the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 

KIPP relies on Hoblock v. Albany County Board of Elections, our leading case defining the 

contours of Rooker-Feldman, and notes its holding that the doctrine “does not deprive a District 

Court of subject-matter jurisdiction simply because a party attempts to litigate in federal court a 

matter previously litigated in state court.” 422 F.3d 77, 86 (2d Cir. 2005). If the injury complained of 

is “simply ratified, acquiesced in, or left unpunished” by the state court, the injury claimed in federal 

court is not directly caused by the state court judgment, and Rooker-Feldman does not bar the federal 

suit. Hoblock at 88. KIPP thus correctly contends that “a plaintiff who seeks in federal court a result 

opposed to the one he achieved in state court does not, for that reason alone, run afoul of RookerFeldman.” Id. at 87. 

KIPP did not complain of injuries caused by the state court judgment, but merely reasserted 

claims already adjudicated in the state proceedings. The injury complained of by KIPP in the 

complaint—the UFT’s attempt to force KIPP into arbitration—pre-dated the state court’s dismissal 

of KIPP’s petition and its denial of KIPP’s request for a TRO. Moreover, under Hoblock, the state 

court’s decision to deny KIPP’s requested stay of arbitration did not constitute a new injury, but was 

rather a mere ratification of the UFT’s injurious action to compel arbitration. Put another way, the 

injury of which KIPP complains was not “produced by [the] state-court judgment,” but was instead 

produced by the UFT; had no petition or TRO ever been filed in state court, KIPP would still have 

to contend with the same injury. See id. at 88. As such, Rooker-Feldman’s second prong was not 

satisfied. Dismissal of KIPP’s complaint was nevertheless appropriate because, though not barred 

by Rooker–Feldman, the complaint was issue and claim-precluded by the state court decision. 

II. 

Because the Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. 1738, requires federal courts to accord state 

judgments the same preclusive effect those judgments would have in the courts of the rendering 

state, we apply New York preclusion law. Under New York law, res judicata, or claim preclusion,
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“bars later litigation if an earlier decision was (1) a final judgment on the merits, (2) by a court of 

competent jurisdiction, (3) in a case involving the same parties or their privies, and (4) involving the 

same cause of action.” EDP Med. Comput. Sys., Inc. v. United States, 480 F.3d 621, 624 (2d Cir. 2007) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). 

KIPP’s federal complaint is barred by res judicata. The state court decision was a final 

judgment on the merits. The New York State Supreme Court was a court of competent jurisdiction 

for the relief KIPP sought. The same two parties, KIPP and the UFT, are named in both the state 

and federal actions. And, as already noted, the same causes of action are set forth in both the state 

court petition and federal complaint. In fact, some of the language used in the two documents is 

identical. Though KIPP asserts that it brings a unique claim—a request for declaratory judgment—

in federal court, this claim is unique in name only. KIPP is still asking the District Court to revisit 

the state court’s denial of the stay of the UFT’s demand for arbitration. “[W]hen the factual 

predicate upon which claims are based are substantially identical, the claims are deemed to be 

duplicative for purposes of res judicata.” Berlitz Sch. of Languages of Am., Inc. v. Everest House, 619 F.2d 

211, 215 (2d Cir. 1980) (emphasis added). The state court’s issuance of a decision on the merits is 

binding upon subsequent litigation between the parties, and required dismissal of KIPP’s federal 

suit. 

CONCLUSION 

We have considered KIPP’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. 

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court. 

FOR THE COURT: 

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court