IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION THREE

JAMES-BENJAMIN BARSTAD,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Respondent.

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No. 35809-7-III

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

LAWRENCE-BERREY, C.J. — James Barstad, pro se, appeals the trial court’s 

dismissal of his lawsuit against the State of Washington. We affirm.

FACTS

After a violent prison incident, the Washington State Department of Corrections 

(DOC) served Mr. Barstad with a GVRS1“Notification of Restrictions” document and 

removed his JPay player for a period of 30 days. GVRS is a policy that was implemented 

by the DOC to reduce and deter violent acts among inmates by imposing privilege 

restrictions. 

 

1 Group Violence Reduction Strategy.

FILED

MARCH 14, 2019

In the Office of the Clerk of Court

WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
No. 35809-7-III

Barstad v. State

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Mr. Barstad filed a grievance with DOC and exhausted his potential administrative 

remedies. He then filed the present civil action against the State for over $46 million, 

alleging that DOC trespassed against him and violated his due process rights by removing 

his JPay player before giving him notice and an opportunity to be heard. 

The State moved to dismiss this action for failure to state a claim. The State

additionally requested the trial court to enter a finding that the action was frivolous. The 

trial court granted the State’s dismissal motion and entered the requested finding. 

Mr. Barstad appealed. 

ANALYSIS

Mr. Barstad argues the trial court erred by dismissing his civil action against the 

State. We review de novo an order granting dismissal under CR 12(b)(6). FutureSelect 

Portfolio Mgmt., Inc. v. Tremont Grp. Holdings, Inc., 180 Wn.2d 954, 962, 331 P.3d 29 

(2014).

A. CR 12(b)(6) DISMISSAL STANDARD

CR 12(b)(6) permits summary dismissal of a civil action if the complaint fails to 

state a claim on which relief can be granted. When ruling on a CR 12(b)(6) motion, the 

trial court presumes all facts alleged in the plaintiff’s complaint are true. Tenore v. AT&T 

Wireless Servs., 136 Wn.2d 322, 330, 962 P.2d 104 (1998). Also, any hypothetical 
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situation conceivably raised by the complaint will defeat a CR 12(b)(6) motion. Bravo v. 

Dolsen Cos., 125 Wn.2d 745, 750, 888 P.2d 147 (1995). “If a plaintiff’s claim remains 

legally insufficient even under his or her proffered hypothetical facts, dismissal pursuant 

to CR 12(b)(6) is appropriate.” Gorman v. Garlock, Inc., 155 Wn.2d 198, 215, 118 P.3d 

311 (2005). 

B. MR. BARSTAD WAS ENTITLED ONLY TO THE PROCESS AFFORDED TO HIM 

UNDER DOC REGULATIONS

Mr. Barstad argues that DOC’s removal of his JPay player for 30 days without 

notice or an opportunity to be heard violated his due process rights. 

The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits any state 

from depriving “any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” 

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Generally, procedural due process requires notice and an 

opportunity to be heard before a deprivation of life, liberty, or property. Amunrud v. Bd. 

of Appeals, 158 Wn.2d 208, 216, 143 P.3d 571 (2006). 

However, in the prison context, a prisoner’s liberty interest is protected only when 

the actions of prison officials impose “‘atypical and significant hardship . . . in relation to 

the ordinary incidents of prison life.’” In re Pers. Restraint of Gronquist, 138 Wn.2d 

388, 397, 978 P.2d 1083 (1999) (alteration in original) (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 

U.S. 472, 484, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 132 L. Ed. 2d 418 (1995)). “Where sanctions imposed 
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for general infractions result at most in loss of privileges and not loss of good time 

credits, prisoners charged with general infractions are not entitled to minimum due 

process and the process afforded by regulation is all the inmate is due.” Gronquist, 138 

Wn.2d at 397. Sanctions that are imposed for general infractions include loss of a 

privilege. WAC 137-28-240(2)(c). 

DOC controls what items may be retained by an inmate, and those privileges may 

be suspended for safety, medical, or mental health reasons. See WAC 137-36-030. Here, 

DOC’s 30-day removal of Mr. Barstad’s JPay player was not an atypical and significant 

hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. Rather, it was a loss of a 

privilege and, therefore, a general sanction. As such, the process afforded by DOC 

regulations was the only process required to be followed. Those regulations set forth a 

post-deprivation grievance procedure, which Mr. Barstad pursued. 

We conclude that Mr. Barstad’s complaint failed to state a claim on which relief 

could be granted, and the trial court did not err in granting the State’s motion to dismiss. 

C. WE DECLINE TO REVIEW CLAIMS OF ERROR NOT RAISED BELOW

Mr. Barstad makes many incoherent statements and claims in his opening and 

reply briefs. To the extent these statements or claims raise nonconstitutional or 

nonjurisdictional issues, they were not raised in the trial court, and we decline to review 
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them. See RAP 2.5(a) (appellate court generally will decline to review arguments not 

raised in the trial court). To the extent the statement or claims raise constitutional issues, 

the arguments are incoherent, and we decline to address them. See Norcon Builders, LLC 

v. GMP Homes VG, LLC, 161 Wn. App. 474, 486, 254 P.3d 835 (2011) (appellate court 

will not consider inadequately briefed arguments). To the extent Mr. Barstad asserts that 

the trial court lacked jurisdiction over him or the ability to decide his case, he submitted 

himself to the trial court’s jurisdiction when he filed his complaint and sought relief from 

that court. See Threlkeld v. Tucker, 496 F.2d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 1974) (state court had 

jurisdiction over the plaintiff because plaintiff instituted the action). 

D. FRIVOLOUSNESS OF APPEAL

The State requests that we find Mr. Barstad’s appeal frivolous so as to limit his 

ability to file future actions or appeals without first paying filing fees. See

RCW 4.24.430. 

“‘A lawsuit is frivolous [for purposes of RCW 4.24.430] when it cannot be 

supported by any rational argument on the law or facts.’” Matthews v. State, No. 50835-

4-II, slip op. at 5 (Wash. Ct. App. Sept. 18, 2018) (unpublished),

http://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/D2%2050835-4-
No. 35809-7-III 

Barstad v. State 

II%20Unpublished%200pinion.pdf2 ( quoting Tiger Oil Corp. v. Dep 't of Licensing, 88 

Wn. App. 925,938,946 P.2d 1235 (1997)). Here, Mr. Barstad's assertions, including 

assertions that DOC violated his due process rights, cannot be supported by any rational 

argument. We find that Mr. Barstad's appeal was frivolous. 

Affirmed. 

A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the 

Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to 

RCW 2.06.040. 

Lawrence-Berrey, C.J. 

WE CONCUR: 

Fearing, J. 

2 Under GR 14.1, unpublished opinions have no precedential value, but may be 

cited as nonbinding authorities and accorded such persuasive value as the court deems 

appropriate. 

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