IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS 

DIVISION ONE

IN RE THE MATTER OF:

RICHARD A. KENT, Petitioner/Appellee,

v.

CHRISTINE CARTER-KENT, Respondent/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 13-0067

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. FC2007-008845

The Honorable Daniel J. Kiley, Judge

The Honorable Michael R. McVey, Judge (retired)

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Burt & Feldman, Scottsdale

By Sandra Burt

Co-Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee

Law Office of Melinda K. Cekander, Flagstaff

By Melinda K. Cekander

Co-Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee
2

Law Office of Scott E. Boehm, P.C., Phoenix

By Scott E. Boehm

Co-Counsel for Respondent/Appellant 

The Cavanagh Law Firm, Phoenix

By Christina S. Hamilton

Co-Counsel for Respondent/Appellant

OPINION

Judge Jon W. Thompson delivered the opinion of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Andrew W. Gould and Judge Peter B. Swann joined.

T H O M P S O N, Judge:

¶1 This action arises from the family court’s valuation of 

Richard E. Kent’s (Husband’s) interest in his law practice. Christine 

Carter-Kent (Wife) appeals from a post-dissolution ruling denying her 

motion for new trial. Finding no abuse of discretion or legal error, we 

affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 After fifteen years of marriage, Husband petitioned for 

dissolution. Husband is an attorney and fifty percent shareholder in Kent 

& Wittekind, P.C. (Law Firm).

¶3 Throughout this protracted litigation, the parties disagreed 

concerning the valuation of the community’s interest in Law Firm and in a 

$1,447,500 settlement obtained by Law Firm (the Turner Litigation 

Proceeds or TLP). In the parties’ joint pre-trial statement, Wife addressed 

the disposition of the TLP and the Law Firm valuation as two separate 

issues. 

A. The Trial

¶4 During a two-day trial, each party presented expert 

testimony concerning the valuation of the community’s interest in Law 

Firm. Wife’s expert, Lynton Kotzin, valued the parties’ interest in Law 

Firm at $920,350, and Husband’s expert, Frank Pankow, valued the 

interest at $701,000. 
KENT v. CARTER-KENT

Opinion of the Court

3

¶5 The family court awarded Husband his interest in Law Firm 

in a post-trial minute entry order. It also granted Wife’s ensuing Rule

83(A) motion on the failure to allocate the net TLP, and ordered “that the 

Kimberly Kent litigation proceeds [TLP] be divided as a community 

asset.” At the evidentiary hearing on this issue, Kotzin testified that Wife 

would be entitled to some value of the TLP, while Pankow asserted that it 

had no value.

¶6 On August 29, 2009, the family court found that each party 

was entitled to twenty-five percent “of the net proceeds recovered” by 

Law Firm, i.e., “gross proceeds less actual incremental expenses incurred

both before . . . and after the date of valuation.” Husband unsuccessfully 

moved to alter or amend the judgment on the ground that Wife should be 

liable for costs associated with other contingency fee cases.

B. The Decree

¶7 On October 6, 2009, the family court signed a Decree 

awarding Husband all right and interest in Law Firm, and awarded Wife 

a $460,000 “equitable offset.” The Decree characterized the TLP as an 

asset of Law Firm and reserved jurisdiction “to determine . . . the 

community’s interest in . . . the [TLP] . . .” and to determine Law Firm’s 

value in light of the TLP and Law Firm’s associated costs.

C. The Amended Decree

¶8 Wife moved to amend the Decree in order to reduce the 

$460,000 equitable offset to a judgment, and argued that the community

interest in Law Firm’s value was considered separately from the 

community’s interest in the TLP. Husband objected that the Decree 

reserved jurisdiction to determine whether the valuation of Husband’s 

interest in the Law Firm “should be adjusted.” But Wife contended that 

the prior ruling granted a new trial on the limited issue of the TLP only, 

and that ruling did not affect the finality of its determination that Wife 

was entitled to recover $460,000. 

¶9 The family court accepted Wife’s argument, and amended 

the Decree by deleting the equitable offset and granting her a judgment 

“for her community interest in the law firm” in the amount of $460,000 

(the Judgment). After filing an appeal, which he later dismissed, Husband 

began to make payments to satisfy the Judgment.

¶10 Wife moved several months later to resolve outstanding 

issues concerning the TLP, including the amount owed to Wife under the 
KENT v. CARTER-KENT

Opinion of the Court

4

August 29, 2009 order. Husband countered that the TLP was a Law Firm 

asset, and the parties’ interests in Law Firm had been finally resolved in 

an unappealed judgment. He also claimed that the family court lacked 

jurisdiction over Law Firm, a non-party, and moved to vacate the 

evidentiary hearing. At this point, Wife conceded that the TLP belonged 

to Law Firm, but argued that she was entitled to judgment for twenty-five 

percent of the TLP. 

D. The Motion for New Trial

¶11 On June 1, 2012, the family court granted Husband’s motion 

to dismiss, explaining that the August 29, 2009 order should not be given 

effect because it purported to assert jurisdiction over Law Firm, a nonparty, and declining Wife’s request to follow that order’s “methodology” 

in valuing the TLP. Wife unsuccessfully moved for a new 

trial/reconsideration under Rule 83(A)(6) of the Arizona Rules of Family

Law Procedure, contending that she had been deprived of her right to 

“collect her fair share” of Law Firm’s value. 

¶12 In denying the motion, the family court explained that Wife 

was not entitled to change her position and claim that the proceeds were a 

component of Law Firm’s value. Wife appeals from the denial of this 

motion.1 We have jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes 

(A.R.S.) § 12-2101(A)(1) (Supp. 2013).

DISCUSSION

A. Wife’s TLP Claim is Barred

¶13 Wife appeals only from the denial of a motion for new trial, 

and we review rulings on the issues raised in that motion for abuse of 

discretion. See Ariz. Mgmt. Corp. v. Kallof, 142 Ariz. 64, 66-67, 688 P.2d 710, 

712-13 (App. 1984); Pullen v. Pullen, 223 Ariz. 293, 296, ¶ 10, 222 P.3d 909, 

912 (App. 2009). 

¶14 The relief Wife seeks is compensation for her equitable 

interest in the “community’s . . . increased value of Husband’s law firm.” 

She now characterizes the TLP as a valuation component of Law Firm 

which remains in the family court’s jurisdiction to award. According to 

 

1 Prior to our conference and oral argument in this matter, Wife filed an 

unopposed motion for an extension of time to file her reply brief. We 

have considered the matters set forth and argued in the reply. 
KENT v. CARTER-KENT

Opinion of the Court

5

Husband, however, the family court has already compensated Wife for 

her community share of Law Firm in the Amended Decree.

¶15 We interpret a decree according to its natural and legal 

import. Lopez v. Lopez, 125 Ariz. 309, 310, 609 P.2d 579, 580 (App. 1980). In 

addition, we construe a decree provision in a manner that would not 

render any other part meaningless. Cohen v. Frey, 215 Ariz. 62, 66, ¶ 12, 

157 P.3d 482, 486 (App. 2007).

¶16 The amended Decree awards Wife a $460,000 judgment for 

her community interest in Law Firm. It also purports to reserve 

jurisdiction

to determine the extent and apportionment of 

the community’s interest in Husband’s 

shareholder interest in [Law Firm’s] interest in 

the net proceeds from the Turner/Kent 

litigation, and to determine whether the 

Court’s valuation of Husband’s interest in 

[Law Firm] should be adjusted as a result of 

the valuation’s inclusion and consideration of 

the firm’s costs related thereto. Said 

determinations will be made pursuant to a 

separate Order of the Court following the 

evidentiary hearing thereon. 

¶17 This provision attempting to reserve jurisdiction,

2 along with 

a footnote stating that the TLP is a Law Firm asset and reiterating the 

reservation of jurisdiction, appeared in the Decree prior to amendment 

and was premised on the assumption that the family court would revisit 

 

2 In her second supplemental citation of authorities, Wife cites four 

Arizona cases in support of her position at oral argument that the trial 

court properly “reserved jurisdiction” to determine the increased value of 

the community’s interest in Law Firm due to the TLP after the entry of the 

Decree. Three of the cases, Johnson v. Johnson, 131 Ariz. 38, 41-42, 638 P.2d 

705, 708-09 (1981), Boncoskey v. Boncoskey, 216 Ariz. 448, 452, 167 P.3d 705, 

709 (App. 2007), and Hetherington v. Hetherington, 220 Ariz. 16, 19, 202 P.3d 

481, 484 (App. 2008), involve pension issues and discuss the present cash 

value method vs. the reserved jurisdiction method of apportioning 

pensions. The fourth case, Spector v. Spector, 23 Ariz. App. 131, 141, 531 

P.2d 176, 186 (1975), is discussed infra at paragraph 18.
KENT v. CARTER-KENT

Opinion of the Court

6

the valuation of Law Firm and enter a separate order at that time. Wife’s 

insistence on obtaining a $460,000 judgment has now changed the 

equitable offset in the initial Decree into an adjudication on Law Firm’s 

value. That Judgment is final and unappealed, and Wife is judicially 

estopped from seeking further compensation for the value of TLP, a Law 

Firm asset. See Mecham v. City of Glendale, 15 Ariz. App. 402, 404, 489 P.2d 

65, 67 (App. 1971) (litigant who assumes one position and obtains relief on 

the basis of it is estopped from assuming a contrary position).

¶18 Arizona Revised Statutes § 25-327(A) (2007) contemplates 

finality with regard to property disposition in divorce cases: “The 

provisions as to property disposition may not be revoked or modified, 

unless the court finds the existence of conditions that justify the reopening 

of a judgment under the laws of this state.” Wife, however, contends that 

Spector, 23 Ariz. App. 131, 531 P.2d 176, authorized the judge to grant her 

a judgment regarding the value of the law firm while leaving for future 

determination the extent of her interest in the TLP. Spector was a divorce 

case where husband had been a lawyer in a partnership with another 

lawyer. Id. at 141, 531 P.2d at 186. Prior to the divorce, the law 

partnership was dissolved and litigation over the firm’s “financial affairs” 

ensued. Id. The law firm litigation was still going on at the conclusion of 

the divorce trial, “making a determination of the extent of the community 

interest in the firm impossible to determine.” Id. The trial court entered a 

Rule 54(b) judgment as to “all property and financial issues except 

equitable division of the community interest of the parties, if any, in the . . 

. law partnership.” The Spector court wrote:

The court reserved jurisdiction to determine 

and apportion their interest after the final 

determination of the Spector-Johnson lawsuit. 

We find no error in this procedure. Rule 54(b) 

of the Rules of Civil Procedure allows the trial 

court to enter judgment in fewer than all of the 

claims presented. Clearly the disposition of 

these assets must await the outcome of the 

Spector-Johnson suit, while all other issues are 

resolved by the judgment in this one. 

Id. at 141, 531 P.2d at 186. 

¶19 Here, unlike in Spector, no procedural rule could authorize a 

partial judgment. There was no separate claim. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 54(b) 

(“the court may direct the entry of final judgment as to one or more but 
KENT v. CARTER-KENT

Opinion of the Court

7

fewer than all of the claims . . . .”) (Emphasis added); (accord Ariz. R. Fam. 

L. P. 78(B)). Wife took the position that she had a separate entitlement to a 

separate community asset (the TLP). But Wife’s prospective entitlement 

regarding the TLP was only in relation to the Law Firm’s valuation – the 

TLP was not a community asset subject to division. See Steinfeld v. Copper 

State Mining Co., 37 Ariz. 151, 160, 290 P. 155, 163 (1930) (“[a] stockholder 

has no right, title or interest in the assets of a corporation. The property 

belongs to the corporation.”). See also Marriage of Goldstein, 120 Ariz. 23, 

24, 583 P.2d 1343 (1978) (value of individual assets is included in the value 

of a corporation). 

¶20 Moreover, Wife is not entitled to use her motion for new trial 

as a vehicle for a revaluation of Law Firm, because that remedy was not at 

issue in the underlying order. That order, filed on June 1, 2012, did not 

value Law Firm, revalue Law Firm, or address the propriety of revaluing 

Law Firm. Instead, the order rejects Wife’s interpretation of the August 

29, 2009 order, concludes that the August 29, 2009 order improperly 

ordered Law Firm to divide the TLP, and distinguishes Garrett v. Garrett, 

140 Ariz. 564, 683 P.2d 1166 (App. 1983). Wife’s position was that she was 

entitled to a share of TLP “in addition to her one-half share of the value of 

Husband’s law practice.” Accordingly, Wife waived the law firm 

revaluation issue by raising it for the first time in her motion for new trial 

challenging that order. See Conant v. Whitney, 190 Ariz. 290, 293-94, 947 

P.2d 864, 867-68 (App. 1997) (holding that a party cannot raise a new 

argument in a motion for new trial). 

¶21 Our holding obviates the need to address Husband’s 

argument that the TLP had no value as of the December 31, 2007 valuation 

date.

B. Res Judicata Did Not Attach to the August 29, 2009 Order

¶22 Wife nevertheless contends that the family court erroneously 

failed to give effect to the earlier August 29, 2009 order awarding her 

twenty-five percent of the TLP, because that order became “final” and res 

judicata as to that order’s methodology upon entry of the Decree. We 

assume, without deciding, that Wife has preserved this issue.

¶23 Under the res judicata doctrine, “a final judgment on the 

merits in a prior suit involving the same parties or their privies bars a 

second suit based on the same claim.” Dressler v. Morrison, 212 Ariz. 279, 

282, ¶ 15, 130 P.3d 978, 981 (2006). Contrary to Wife’s assertion, the 

August 29, 2009 order was not “final” because it did not resolve all issues 
KENT v. CARTER-KENT

Opinion of the Court

8

before the family court. Moreover, that order did not become final upon 

entry of the October 6, 2009 Decree. When entered, the Decree (1) did not 

yet contain an award of attorneys’ fees, and (2) expressly reserved 

jurisdiction as noted above. Further, the Decree still made reference to an 

“equitable offset.” It follows that the August 29, 2009 order did not 

become final upon entry of the Decree, because the Decree itself was not 

yet final, and accordingly Husband was not required to challenge the 

August 29, 2009 order by taking an immediate appeal from the Decree. 

The final Decree entered by amendment February 12, 2010, which gave 

Wife the $460,000 judgment no longer involved any properly reserved 

jurisdiction regarding the TLP.

¶24 Res judicata is also inapplicable because Wife was not 

seeking to enforce the August 29, 2009 order; rather, she was asking the 

family court to change it. In her new trial motion, Wife disavowed any 

suggestion that “the marital community has a direct claim on the net 

proceeds recovered by the law firm,” but argued that the “defect in the 

original remedy” did not merit dismissal and asked the family court to 

apply the August 29, 2009 order’s “methodology” to divide the TLP. 

Because Wife in her new trial motion sought a remedy other than an 

award of a twenty-five percent interest in the TLP, res judicata does not 

apply to the August 29, 2009 order. Furthermore, because the August 29, 

2009 order was not final, the family court judge or a successor judge could 

reconsider it. See State v. King, 180 Ariz. 268, 279, 883 P.2d 1024, 1035 

(1994). Our holding obviates the need to address the parties’ remaining 

arguments.
KENT v. CARTER-KENT

Opinion of the Court

9

CONCLUSION

¶26 We affirm the family court’s denial of Wife’s motion for new 

trial. After considering the reasonableness of the parties’ positions and 

their resources, we deny both parties’ requests for attorneys’ fees on 

appeal in the exercise of our discretion under A.R.S. § 25-324(A) (Supp. 

2013). Husband is entitled to his costs on appeal contingent upon his 

compliance with Rule 21(b) of the Arizona Rules of Civil Appellate 

Procedure.