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THE FUTURE OF TURKISH DEMOCRACY

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, AND 

EMERGING THREATS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JULY 15, 2014

Serial No. 113–184

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

SEAN DUFFY, Wisconsin 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, AND EMERGING THREATS

DANA ROHRABACHER, California, Chairman 

TED POE, Texas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

PAUL COOK, California 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Mr. Nate Schenkkan, program officer, Eurasia Programs, Freedom House ...... 7

Elizabeth H. Prodromou, Ph.D., visiting associate professor of conflict resolution, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University ................ 14

Soner Cagaptay, Ph.D., Beyer Family Fellow and director, Turkish Research 

Program, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy ............................... 20

Kilic Kanat, Ph.D., non-resident scholar, Foundation for Political, Economic, 

and Social Research (SETA) ................................................................................ 25

Mr. Hakan Tasci, executive director, Tuskon-US ................................................. 35

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Mr. Nate Schenkkan: Prepared statement ............................................................ 9

Elizabeth H. Prodromou, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ........................................... 17

Soner Cagaptay, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ......................................................... 22

Kilic Kanat, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ................................................................ 27

Mr. Hakan Tasci: Prepared statement .................................................................. 38

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 60

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 61

The Honorable George Holding, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of North Carolina: Prepared statement .............................................................. 62

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement .............................................. 63

(1)

THE FUTURE OF TURKISH DEMOCRACY 

TUESDAY, JULY 15, 2014

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, AND EMERGING THREATS,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 o’clock p.m., in room 

2200 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dana Rohrabacher 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. The hearing will come to order, and the title 

of this hearing today is The Future of Turkish Democracy. Without 

objection, all members will have 5 legislative days to submit additional questions or extraneous material for the record. So ordered. 

Just over 1 year ago, I gaveled this subcommittee for a hearing 

that focused on the protests that were then going on in Turkey. At 

the close of the hearing I stated my hope that Turkey would use 

the episode of turmoil that they were going through as a vehicle 

to move closer rather than further away from democratic government. 

Today’s hearing seeks to address if my hope for a democratic 

progress back then was well placed. Turkey is a strategically located American partner and a valued NATO ally. That is not hallow rhetoric, the fact is being demonstrated right now that Turkey 

is so important to us. And with the creation of the Southern Gas 

Corridor, Turkey is poised to become a key energy transit country 

for the European Union. 

Turkey has also taken in a huge number of civilian refugees from 

Syria, most likely over 1 million men, women and children. Those 

of us who remember history find it heartening to see Turkey, which 

had been in a killing match with different parts of the Kurdish 

community, is now a very positive force in the Iraqi Kurdish Government and reaching out to its own Kurdish population to find 

areas of cooperation. Yet, the relationship between the Turkish 

people and the American people is built not on geostrategic calculations but on shared democratic values. 

I want to make it very clear that our discussion here today, our 

comments and even our criticisms of the Turkish Government both 

former and current are not aimed at the citizens of Turkey, or are 

being done with great respect to the Turkish people themselves and 

yes, the Turkish Government. The people of the United States and 

the people of Turkey are friends and nothing we say today, even 

though there will be some criticism registered, will alter that fact. 

2

During the Prime Minister Erdogan’s more than 10 years in office he has led Turkey to tremendous economic growth, averaging 

more than 5 percent a year. Unfortunately political freedom in Turkey cannot be measured by the country’s level of economic prosperity. The prime minister has been at times intolerant of legitimate political opposition. 

The AK Party has increasingly gone down a dangerous path. And 

when faced with tough opposition, instead of negotiation and compromise the ruling party has often been intransigent and vengeful. 

Certain social media Web sites have been blocked, journalists jailed 

or fired, and the justice system politicized. 

Let me note that in May of this year, Freedom House downgraded Turkey’s freedom, or oppressed freedom ranking to not free. 

Those of us who count ourselves as friends of Turkey—and let me 

restate that I consider myself a friend of Turkey—cannot help but 

be alarmed by such reports. No matter what political party or leader comes to power in Turkey, liberal democracy is not possible if 

key civil society institutions such as freedom of the press do not 

function. 

The United States wants Turkey to be a stable ally on the edge 

of the Middle East. And as the Middle East goes into such turmoil 

it is even more important that we have a stable Turkey, but we 

don’t want stability at the price of democracy. Our shared national 

interests stem from our shared democratic values. That is and 

must continue to be the bedrock of the relationship between Turkey 

and the United States. 

I would like to hear from our expert witnesses today, their views 

on the state of democracy on Turkey and how the leadership of this 

prime minister has affected the freedom of expression, the media, 

the minority religious groups and the economy. And lastly, how can 

this Congress help to ensure that Turkey is on the pathway of expanding democratic rights for all its citizens and yet remains a valued strategic partner of the United States? 

I would like to thank all of our members here, and recognizing 

that we are blessed by having the chairman of the full committee 

showing a specific interest in this hearing and he is with us today. 

And I would ask if Chairman Royce of the full Committee on Foreign Affairs has an opening statement that he would like to make. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to associate 

myself with your remarks, Mr. Rohrabacher, and I would like to 

also thank you for holding this important hearing. 

An overwhelmingly Muslim country, Turkey is a NATO ally, as 

Mr. Rohrabacher indicated, and it has long been a secular democracy. But I too am concerned as is Mr. Rohrabacher about recent 

events that indicate a shift by Prime Minister Erdogan away from 

democratic ideals. And my concern, my concern would be as that 

shift occurs and it reverts to more authoritarian rule, my concern 

is with some of the comments that I have seen made. One reportedly stated that ‘‘Democracy is like a bus ride. Once I get to my 

stop, I am getting off.’’

With that kind of commentary and also with the use of strong 

arm tactics against opponents, this is what gives rise to concern. 

This approach was clearly demonstrated in the response to the 

2013 protests in which—and I understand the viewpoint there, but 

3

frankly it was treated as though the head of state regarded that 

as illegitimate challenge. And it resorted to violence, it resorted to 

the dispersing of the crowds by violence and a key target was the 

media. You had 153 journalists injured at that time and 39 detained by the police. 

Reporters Without Borders noted in their 2014 report on ‘‘Press 

Freedom in the World’’ that 60 journalists, around 60 journalists 

were in detention in Turkey in 2013, including at least 28 held in 

connection with their work, making the country one of the world’s 

biggest prisons for media personnel. 

In reaction to comments last year on Twitter regarding a corruption investigation involving his AKP party, Erdogan had an immediate response and it was to vilify Twitter stating, ‘‘There is now 

a menace which is called Twitter. To me, social media is the worst 

menace to society.’’ A few days later he moved to block all access 

to the site and followed shortly thereafter to banning access to 

YouTube. 

Freedom of religion is also threatened. According to the 2014 

United States Commission on International Religious Freedom report, ‘‘Politically, religious freedom abuses are linked with the absence of democracy and the presence of abuses of other human 

rights, such as freedom of expression, association and assembly.’’

Religious minorities in Turkey suffer under strict controls governing their affairs, including their ability to choose their own 

church leaders, to manage and raise funds, own property, and even 

access to their historic sites of worship. The continued closure of 

the Orthodox Church’s Halki Seminary by the Turkish Government 

presents a fundamental threat to the Ecumenical Patriarchate. 

Despite optimistic claims by Turkish leaders in 2011 that the revised Foundations Law would allow all church properties to be returned within a year, a majority of properties remain confiscated. 

In many cases the situation has actually gotten worse. Instead of 

returning them to their rightful owners, the Turkish Directorate 

General of Foundations approved the conversion of Byzantine Orthodox churches previously expropriated by the Turkish Government into mosques, and there is even legislation before the Turkish 

Parliament to likewise convert the Hagia Sophia church in 

Istanbul. 

Many believe these actions constitute to eradicate the presence 

of the Christian heritage in Turkey since it first arrived there 

2,000 years ago. That is why I am pleased that a few weeks ago 

the committee passed my legislation, H.R. 4347, which will not 

only call on Turkey to return these properties but also enact a report requirement to hold Turkish leaders accountable for progress 

on this issue. 

By committing ourselves to acting on such legislative measures 

and by holding hearings on the situation in Turkey, it is my hope 

that Congress will send a clear message that the Turkish Government must renew its commitment to democracy and the basic 

human rights for all of its people. And this would be the foundation 

for a closer U.S.-Turkey relationship. 

Thank you again, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, we appreciate your particular 

interest in this hearing and joining us today, and we appreciate 

4

your opening statement. Now have an opening statement from the 

ranking member, Mr. Keating. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for holding this important hearing. I would like to thank today’s witnesses 

for joining us and minority witness, Mr. Cagaptay, for your participation in what has turned out to be a very diverse panel. Thank 

you all. 

I would also like to take a moment to recognize the Turkish hostages that are still missing over a month after they were taken 

from the Turkish consulate and other locations in Mosul. We hope 

for their safe passage back home to their families. 

Turkey is an important U.S. ally in a very different part of the 

world, and as Ranking Member Engel and I discussed in a recent 

letter to the Economist, their membership in NATO cannot be understated. Mr. Chairman, if you will allow me I would like to insert 

that letter into the record. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So ordered. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Nevertheless, challenges in the relationship remain. I am interested to hear our witnesses today discuss their thoughts on what 

happened to this so-called model partnership, the role that domestic politics plays in Turkey’s foreign policy decisions and how this 

ultimately affects the U.S. 

Like all democracies, including our own, there are bumps in the 

road. But with upcoming Presidential elections in Turkey, it is important to gauge how long these bumps in Turkey will persist and 

what impact they will ultimately have. It seems as though in the 

preceding months and years we witnessed the steady intensification of crackdowns on protests. Authorities have at times even arrested doctors treating injured protesters, and lawyers demanding 

more accountability and transparency within the judiciary. 

We have also witnessed the blocking of important communication 

tools such as Twitter and YouTube. Most recently, many observers 

have raised valid concerns that the electoral dominance of Prime 

Minister Erdogan’s AK Party will result, as some observers argue, 

in a Turkey that is now essentially a one-party system. They say 

that opposition parties can no longer voice, much less influence, decision making. 

These issues take on special importance to Congress. Not because 

we have any interest in meddling in Turkey’s internal affairs, but 

simply because we represent hundreds of U.S. citizens of Turkish 

origin, American companies, as well as other groups who continue 

to be affected by these decisions and the overall instability that 

these policies create. 

The United States and Turkey are also dealing with serious 

issues of mutual concern over terrorism and extremism which is 

bubbling up right at Turkey’s border. As we weigh our own international budget priorities in Congress, we need to understand the 

role that Turkey’s internal dynamics have on our own counterterrorism initiatives in the region. It is unclear to what extent Turkey’s internal disputes have disrupted our cooperation in the areas 

of counterterrorism and mutual defense, but I doubt that there has 

been no impact at all. 

5

To cite just a few perplexing matters, in just the last few years 

the top brass of the Turkish military, the first line of defense 

against the extremists in the region, were imprisoned then released. Weapons interdictions along the Syrian-Turkish border continue to occur, and allegedly, recordings pointing to large-scale 

bribes between the prime minister, his family, party officials and 

Iranian businessmen may have larger implications for our policy on 

Iran and sanctions. 

Our job in this subcommittee is to look into these incidents, their 

veracity, the implications that they might have for the U.S., and 

I am happy we are doing so today. That being said, the actual resolution of these disputes and any attempt to mend longstanding 

fault lines based on religion, ethnicity or ideology can only be completed by the Turks and the Turks alone. 

I believe the Turks through civil society engagement and diverse 

economic activities can overcome many of the obstacles that the 

headlines are focusing on today. Great strides have been made to 

open up the Turkish economy, trade and culture to others. This is 

a positive sign as economic security and human rights issues are 

all interlinked, and I believe that one can propel the other in this 

case. 

I know that the administration, Members of Congress, the vibrant Turkish diaspora here in the U.S., and the Government and 

the people of Turkey all deeply value U.S.-Turkey relationships. 

Despite concerns about human rights, I am encouraged by the 

many energetic discussions taking place in Turkey and their implications for the future of Turkey’s democracy and I look forward to 

hearing our witnesses and their perspectives on Turkey’s future. 

With that Mr. Chairman, I yield my time back. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Did you have time to yield back? 

Mr. KEATING. I did, 2 seconds. Two seconds. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And it is the intent of the Chair to break 

after we have one more opening statement and then to return here 

at 15 minutes to 3 o’clock to hear the testimony and to proceed 

with the hearing. 

Mr. Sires? 

Mr. SIRES. For the sake of time I will just summarize a little bit 

of my concerns. I have concerns of the way the government has 

been behaving. I share the comments that my colleague made. I am 

concerned about the hard lines he seems to be taking all the time 

to the Cyprus issue. I am concerned about the amount of troops 

that Turkey has in Cyprus. 

And, quite frankly, I understand that they are a good friend, 

members of NATO, but at the end of the day I think that their behavior at least ought to be the sign in some areas. So I thank you 

for giving me the opportunity to speak. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. And this hearing is 

now in, not adjourned, it is in recess. There we go. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I do not believe that the ranking member will 

be upset if I proceed with just the introduction of the witnesses so 

when he gets here we will be ready to have the testimony. So I call 

this hearing back into order, and I want to apologize about if I misVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:32 Sep 23, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_EEET\071514\88731 SHIRL
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pronounce names. With a name like Rohrabacher I have had my 

name mispronounced forever. But it is okay. 

Okay, our first witness today is Nate Schenkkan—okay, got it—

who is a program officer for Freedom House. He has been closely 

following media freedom in Turkey and coauthored the Freedom 

House’s special report on Turkey earlier this year. He has previously worked as a journalist in Central Asia and earned his masters degree from Columbia University. 

We then have with us Professor Elizabeth Prodromou—okay, 

thank you. She is a visiting associate professor at the Fletcher 

School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. She also previously served as vice chairman of the United States Commission 

on International Religious Freedom and earned a doctorate in political science from MIT. 

I would also like to welcome back Dr. Soner Cagaptay—got it—

who is the director of Turkish Research Program at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He is a widely published expert on U.S.-Turkish relations and who has regularly testified before Congress. He has earned his doctorate from Yale. 

Then we have Mr. Hakan Tasci—got it—and he is executive director of Tuskon, the U.S. representative office of a large confederation of Turkish businesses which represent thousands of companies in Turkey. And before his current job he taught economics at 

the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and earned his 

masters degree from Bilkent University in Turkey. 

And then we have Dr. Kilic Kanat. He is a resident scholar at 

SETA Foundation here in Washington. He also is assistant professor of political science at Pennsylvania State University at Erie, 

and the professor had earned a Ph.D. in political science from Syracuse University. 

And I would welcome all of you today and also express my gratitude to you for your testimony. And we will wait another couple 

minutes, but in the meantime let me just explain that if you could 

keep your remarks to 5 minutes you can submit remarks that long 

for the record. But if you could put them down to 5 minutes we 

could then get to some questions and answers and perhaps some 

dialogue. 

And I am a little bit hesitant about starting the actual testimony 

until one of our minority members are here. So with that said, 

well, I could tell a few jokes if you would like. So you know about 

the story about the woman who set up, an elderly woman who set 

up a pretzel stand outside of a large business. Well, it could be in 

Turkey for all that matter. And it was a big modern business building, and every day a businessman would stop by and—oh, you are 

never going to get to hear the end of this joke. 

With your permission I will finish the joke. 

Mr. KEATING. I have heard it before. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. He has. So every day he stops by and he puts 

50 cents into her plate and then he runs into the building. But he 

never takes a pretzel. This goes on for over a year. And finally, as 

he puts 50 cents into the plate she grabs him by the arm, and he 

looks into her face and he says, you probably want to know why 

for a full year I have been putting 50 cents into your plate but I 

7

have never taken a pretzel. And she says, well, no, I just want to 

tell you pretzels are up to 75 cents. 

All right. They get it. Gratitude. I have already introduced the 

witnesses, and with your permission we will proceed with the testimony. 

STATEMENT OF MR. NATE SCHENKKAN, PROGRAM OFFICER, 

EURASIA PROGRAMS, FREEDOM HOUSE 

Mr. SCHENKKAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to the 

subcommittee for the invitation to speak today. My opening remarks touch on the most recent developments in 2014 affecting 

fundamental freedoms in Turkey. This is a summary of my full testimony. 

I think the statements of Chairman Rohrabacher and Chairman 

Royce on the Gezi protests captured well the sense that the government missed an opportunity to acknowledge the large minority in 

Turkey that was frustrated with its lack of voice in an increasingly 

majoritarian system. Since the time when the government halted 

the Gezi protests with police force in July 2013, the government 

has grown even more intolerant and dismissive of criticism. This 

tendency intensified following the corruption investigation announced on December 17th, 2013, which implicated leading members of the government. The December 17th investigation sparked 

a furious effort on the part of the government to suppress the investigation and the ensuing leaks. 

In this effort, the government has directly targeted the ability of 

journalists and others to access and disseminate information, and 

I would like to describe some of those key negative steps in 2014. 

First, amendments to the already repressive law governing Internet services, Law 5651, which make it easier and faster to block 

Web sites and to determine the identities of Internet users. 

Two, the complete blocking of Twitter and YouTube 1 week prior 

to the March 30th local elections. Although the Constitutional 

Court overturned both of these blocks after the election, they still 

violated freedom of expression and the right to access information 

especially during a political campaign. 

Three, and the most disturbing development is the new law 

granting special powers to the National Intelligence Organization, 

or MIT. The law entitles the MIT to collect all information, documents or data, from any entity in Turkey. It makes publishing information about the MIT punishable by 3 to 9 years in prison. It 

places the MIT and its employees outside of normal structures of 

legal accountability. This supra-legal National Intelligence Organization is a grave threat to Turkish democracy. 

There also continue to be serious problems with freedom of association and assembly that I will mention quickly. The prosecution 

especially of members of Taksim Solidarity, the original organizers 

of the first Gezi Park protest, on the absurd charge of founding a 

criminal organization. 

Now a few words directly on the subject of the panel of The Future of Turkish Democracy. Like most people I expect Prime Minister Erdogan will win the Presidential election in August, likely in 

the first round. Then his first priority will be to create de facto 

Presidential rule, and then following the June 2015 parliamentary 

8

elections, a de jure Presidential system through constitutional reform. 

A Presidential system is not inherently bad, and Turkey needs 

a new Constitution. But given Mr. Erdogan’s ‘‘with us or against 

us’’ style of governance, I fear constitutional reform will be neither 

inclusive nor consultative. Mr. Erdogan sees himself as leading a 

revolution against elites and outside powers, and a revolution requires constantly creating enemies, real or imagined, who must be 

defeated. 

I fear Mr. Erdogan’s presidency will sharpen divisions within 

Turkish society and further weaken institutions in favor of personalized rule. This will harm human rights and fundamental freedoms, and also the rule of law and economic management. 

If there is a slim silver lining from the last 13 months, it is that 

the U.S. Government no longer casts Turkey as a model democracy. 

For many years of AK Party rule, U.S. policy toward Turkey ignored and overlooked highly visible problems with human rights, 

democracy and rule of law. This exercise in positive thinking did 

not serve Turkey and it did not serve the United States. 

The new frankness about Turkey’s internal dynamics offers an 

opportunity for the U.S. to make supporting Turkey’s democracy a 

serious part of its policy planning. The European Union remains 

the best mechanism for the U.S. to support the development in 

Turkey of effective institutions with checks and balances. Right 

now Turkey’s accession has lost momentum. The U.S. has been 

committed to Turkey’s EU membership, but primarily through rhetorical support through to what is treated as an EU-Turkey process. 

The U.S. should elevate Turkey’s accession as an urgent strategic 

priority and create a high level policy dialogue with the Turkish 

Government in consultation with the EU to deploy U.S. support 

where it is needed. A good immediate step toward accession would 

be lifting EU member state blocks on opening chapters 23 and 24 

of the EU acquis on Judiciary and Fundamental Rights and Justice, Freedom and Security. The best way for the U.S. to support 

democracy in Turkey is by integrating democracy and human 

rights into the strategic bilateral policy relationship just as security 

and trade have been integrated. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Schenkkan follows:]

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Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much for your testimony, 

and we will have questions and answers after everyone is complete. 

STATEMENT OF ELIZABETH H. PRODROMOU, PH.D., VISITING 

ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, THE 

FLETCHER SCHOOL OF LAW AND DIPLOMACY, TUFTS UNIVERSITY 

Ms. PRODROMOU. Good afternoon and thank you as well. I want 

to express my thanks to the subcommittee and to the full committee for this hearing. Having served as a commissioner and vice 

chair on the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, 

I am also, currently, as a member of the Secretary of State’s working group on Religion and U.S. Foreign Policy, I am very heartened 

by the committee’s attention to the matters that bring us here this 

afternoon. 

I am going to begin by offering some general remarks and then 

some very specific data points that focus particularly on the issue 

of religious freedom and the rights of religious minorities in Turkey, particularly as these relate to broader questions of media freedom and democracy as a whole. 

The starting point, I think, the best starting point is to reference 

the international human rights standards such as the Universal 

Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on 

Civil and Political Rights. Both of these unequivocally identify the 

right to religious freedom, freedom of thought, conscience and religion as a universal human right and that includes freedom to 

change one’s religion or belief, freedom either alone or within community in public or in private, to manifest a belief as well as teaching, practice, worship and observance. 

So measured within this context, it is fair to say, I think, that 

there have been some evidences of minor progress in Turkey during 

the period since the AKP was elected in 2002. When it comes to 

the rights of religious minorities in the country, I would say that 

that the progress largely lies within the context of a discursive expansion in the form of a far more public discussion of previous 

taboo issues concerning violations against the rights of religious 

minorities. 

And then the second is what I would call minor improvements, 

cosmetic and episodic in nature that have been designed to loosen 

restrictions on religious freedom for Turkey’s religious minority 

communities largely regarding the rights of the country’s tiny 

Christian community and very small Jewish community. And within this second category we could include the 2011 property rights 

law on foundations. 

But even here the progress has been very, very small. Only 23 

percent of applications for return of properties have been accepted 

and that means that 77 percent of applications for the return of 

properties to individuals and groups belonging to religious minorities have been arbitrarily rejected by the government. So measured 

against these small improvements, I think the real sobering picture 

is as follows, and that is that there has been a real failure to make 

any kind of substantive legal and institutional changes that would 

ensure that all of Turkey’s citizens regardless of what religious 

faith community they belong to are seen as equal before the law. 

15

And there are a few emblematic examples, I think, that underscore this point and which speak to again the corrosive effects of 

religious freedom violations on Turkey’s democracy. Some of these 

were mentioned in brief in the opening remarks, but I think they 

are worth emphasizing. A quite aggressive Islamization strategy 

that has been based on the conversion of Christian churches into 

mosques over the last 21⁄2 years alone, the conversion of the church 

of St. Sophia in Trabzon, and then as St. Sophia, at Isnik, into 

functioning mosques, and then the declared commitment of the 

AKP government with no response to the contrary by opposition 

party members to convert the church of Aghia Sophia in Istanbul 

into a functioning mosque. And that is actually a UNESCO World 

Heritage site. 

Second example. The continuing interference in the internal governance structures of Christian and Jewish minority communities 

in Turkey by the Turkish state imposing arbitrary citizenship requirements for election to hierarchical positions. And third example, prohibitions continue on religious education and especially on 

the training of clergy that Greek Orthodox Theological School of 

Halki remains closed after more than 40 years, and the prime minister as well as senior members of his government declared publicly 

that there is absolutely no legal impediment to reopening the Halki 

school. That it is a political issue, pure and simple. 

Two other examples, and I will move to close. One particularly 

concerning example, the Turkish state’s continuing use of a racial 

coding system for its religious minority communities. They are 

called the ancestry codes, and accordingly Greeks, Armenians, 

Syriacs and others presumably in that category, Roman Catholics 

and Protestants, are coded 1 through 5 by the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Information and the Population Directorate, 

and that racial coding system has been designed to exclude those 

groups from government as well as to facilitate massive property 

expropriations on citizen revocations. 

And then finally, the comprehensive religious cleansing policy 

that has been pursued systematically for 40 years by the Turkish 

Armed Forces and the Turkish Cypriot authorities in Turkish-occupied Cyprus. It will be 40 years on this coming 20th of July that 

the Turkish Armed Forces set up occupation on the north of the island. And when I say religious cleansing, I mean the cleansing of 

any kind of presence of Christian communities in the occupied 

north. That is living human beings as well as religious patrimony, 

everything from churches, monasteries, cemeteries. They have been 

desecrated. There has been a systematic looting and black market 

sale of moveable artifacts from those properties, and there are continuing limitations on the ability of those tiny, less than 400 members of the Christian community there to worship. 

What does all this mean? All this is very sobering, I think, for 

the direction of Turkish democracy. And as my copanelist mentioned, I think there is every reason to be concerned about the immediate future. The move to a Presidential system is likely to bode 

very poorly for religious freedom rights for minorities in Turkey, 

and also concerningly, the secular opposition in Turkey has indeed 

been supportive. In fact, they are the architects of most of the legisVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:32 Sep 23, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_EEET\071514\88731 SHIRL
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lature that exists in Turkey that have violated the rights of the 

country’s religious minorities. 

In terms of the United States and our commitment to religious 

freedom, I would reinforce the remarks of my copanelist and also 

encourage the committee to move expeditiously for the passage of 

House Resolution 4347, and also to work with the U.S. Commission 

on International Religious Freedom around issues related to the 

violations of religious minorities in Turkey. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Prodromou follows:]

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STATEMENT OF SONER CAGAPTAY, PH.D., BEYER FAMILY FELLOW AND DIRECTOR, TURKISH RESEARCH PROGRAM, THE 

WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY 

Mr. CAGAPTAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, members of the committee, for giving me the opportunity to testify on 

developments in Turkey and their implications for U.S. policy. The 

following is a summary of my prepared remarks. 

Obviously Turkey is an important country for us. It is a NATO 

ally, but it is also a country that borders vital U.S. interests in 

Ukraine, Russia, Iraq and Syria and therefore is an important 

partner to the United States with regards to U.S. policy in each of 

these countries. With these developments in mind, Turkey’s long 

term stability matters to the United States. 

In this regard, I think we have seen significant progress in Turkey in the last decade. The country has been transformed dramatically in the economic sense, rising as a stable and wealthy nation. 

The Turks had experienced a decade of prosperity when all of their 

neighbors went through economic and political downturn and some 

even experienced war. And as a result of this transformation, Turkey now is in even a better position to be a prime partner for the 

United Stated given its robust economy. 

As I point out in my monograph, ‘‘The Rise of Turkey’’—if I can 

make a shameless plug—Turkey has become a majority middle 

class society in the last decade and this has huge ramifications. 

This is a country now that is on the cusp of becoming history’s first 

large Muslim majority, a universally literate society. The country 

is connected to a global society in ways that cannot be reversed, 

and these are refreshing developments. 

There are also comforting improvements in terms of religious 

freedoms in Turkey, especially for non-Muslim communities. As my 

colleague, Dr. Prodromou, pointed out, the government has started 

restoring property belonging to church and synagogue foundations 

to its rightful owners, so far totaling about $1 billion of property. 

Obviously progress has been made and there is still progress that 

can be made and I think we should encourage that process. 

These are key accomplishments for which Turkey’s Government, 

AKP government and its Prime Minister Erdogan deserve credit. 

But I also have to add that there is a darker side to Erdogan’s legacy and that is when it comes to the issue of freedoms. Ironically, 

while Turkey has become more prosperous under the AKP, simultaneously it has also become less free. 

As measured by international indices, the country’s record on liberties improved significantly when the AKP came to power in 2002 

in conjunction with the country’s work to qualify for EU accession, 

but then somehow it stagnated and then took a nose dive somewhere around the end of the last decade. According to Freedom 

House, Turkey was, for example, ranked 58 out of 100 in terms of 

press freedoms, 100 being the least free, zero being the most free. 

That was in 2001 before the AKP came to power. The country’s 

record improved in 2005, it went up to 48. But then it declined, hitting 62 in 2013. So in terms of freedom of expression, Turkey is 

worse off than it was before the AKP. 

Despite being through a democratic process, I think this is a 

party that governs in authoritarian fashion. It is intolerant of disVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:32 Sep 23, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_EEET\071514\88731 SHIRL
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sent and opposition as we have seen most prominently during the 

2013 Gezi Park rallies as well as the bans on YouTube and Twitter. 

A second alarming concern obviously is Turkey’s pivot to the 

Middle East. That is a concern for the United States in the sense 

that this pivot has met challenges. Before the AKP, the Turks 

thought of themselves as a European country placed next to the 

Middle East. They were not from there, they just lived there. 

This perception was challenged by the AKP elite who decided 

that the path to great power and influence for Turkey was through 

the Middle East rather than Europe, and that pivot turned out to 

be a miscalculation a decade later. With the exception of the Kurds, 

Turkey has no allies in the Middle East. Not only that, it borders 

enemies from the Assad regime to ISIS, Islamic State. 

And among the many problems I think that Turkey’s pivot to the 

Middle East has caused is ISIS to the grave threat it wants to establish a Taliban-like state along Turkey’s longest land border, 800 

miles of border with Iraq and Syria. Nobody wants Taliban as a 

neighbor. Nobody wants Taliban presence in the Middle East, 

which suggests that Ankara, Washington and NATO will work together against this threat and this will cement a strong U.S.-Turkey relationship, and in my view for years to come because what 

is in Turkey’s interest is in the interest of the United States. 

There are other reasons, I think, to be optimistic about Turkey’s 

future. One is the rise of the middle class, which has grown as result of the AKP’s economic policies and which is challenging its 

style of governance, and also the opposition, Republican People’s 

Party, which is slowly but surely turning into a liberal movement. 

Recently the State Department awarded party deputy Safak Pavey 

with International Woman of Courage Award, recognizing the party’s commitment to gender equality and democracy. 

Turkey’s trajectory, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, points toward democracy, and the Turkish people need the 

European Union to drive further reform at home. And I think the 

ISIS threat has caused many Turks to clamor for the day when 

their country stayed out of the Middle East and looked to Europe. 

So we stand at an opportune moment for a pivot. Washington 

should capitalize on this, relying on Turkey in combating ISIS as 

well as promoting the country’s repositioning toward Europe. The 

Middle East may not have panned out the way the Turks hoped, 

but Turkey can still be a major power. It can be a major European 

power. Turkey is of vital interest to Europe and therefore to the 

United States. Its location, its proclivity to capitalism and democracy make it an important ally. Washington and Ankara share interests and Turkey’s path will have great strategic importance to 

the United States in situations ranging from Ukraine to Iraq and 

Syria for years to come. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cagaptay follows:]

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Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. Dr. Kanat? 

STATEMENT OF KILIC KANAT, PH.D., NON–RESIDENT SCHOLAR, FOUNDATION FOR POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL 

RESEARCH (SETA) 

Mr. KANAT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am deeply honored to 

discuss Turkey with you, and I greatly appreciate the invitation to 

do so. And you have my statement. This is a summary of my statement. 

Democratization in Turkey has been a long and challenging process. And despite some bumps and concerns, Turkey’s track record 

with democratization and societal transformation demonstrates 

that there will not be a reversal from democracy that will drag 

Turkey back to authoritarianism. 

There are a couple of reasons that Dr. Cagaptay also mentioned. 

One of them is that democracy has been made possible in the last 

10 years in part due to the rise of the middle class whose demands 

center around a more inclusive and representative governance. 

This new and growing social class has opposed any top-down approach in politics and has challenged the political and social engineering of previous decades. The class is now almost 50 percent of 

the population and economic indicators demonstrate that it will 

continue to grow in the coming years. It will be unlikely for this 

group to cede any democratic gains in the coming years, thus preventing any political party or actor from bringing Turkey back to 

the illiberalism of previous decades. 

Second and related to this, this middle class, especially its youth, 

is more integrated with the world today. There is a growing number of active social media users that connect and interact with 

other users worldwide. The political and social demands of these 

citizens are increasing as they become more exposed to other cultures and they have increasingly used social media to express those 

demands. 

Third, despite some criticism, the Turkish Government itself also 

recognizes the structural problems in Turkish democracy, which 

have been partly the residuals of previous periods and need to be 

resolved. In his vision statement for the Presidential election, for 

example, Prime Minister Erdogan made democratization the first of 

his three pillars in his candidacy platform. 

The prime minister’s recent statement of condolence to the Armenian victims of the events of 1915 and apology to the Alawites for 

the Dersim events can also be considered as steps toward this direction. Furthermore, the current government has also realized 

that it is politically expedient to favor democracy. Every political 

reform that the government has promoted has increased the 

strength of the AK Party and contributed to its electoral victories; 

it doesn’t seem likely for the AK Party to change this course in the 

coming future. 

Lastly, the European Union integration process will continue to 

play an important role in Turkey’s democratization. Despite the declining enthusiasm of the Turkish public, mostly because of the discouraging statements of some European leaders about Turkey’s potential membership, the EU process is still considered the most significant foreign policy dimension of Turkish politics. In order to 

26

avoid any disruption in its political and economic relations, the 

Turkish Government and society will not allow its democratic 

standards to fall short of the Copenhagen Criteria. 

Although Turkey seems to be on the right track for democratization, it still has some significant problems. Most of these challenges 

are structural ones which may require more time, energy and cooperation from other parties. One of the most significant challenge 

lies in the formation of democratic institutions that will protect the 

democratic achievements of previous decades. Particularly in Turkey, an independent, impartial and credible judiciary is needed to 

consolidate the process of democratization and strengthen the rule 

of law in the country. 

The judiciary has always been a major political actor in Turkey, 

and as such the public trust in the judiciary has been lower than 

in other democratic states. Although the referendum and legal reforms brought some improvement, there are still major problems. 

The majority of Turkey citizens’ opinion that recent events were an 

attempt to launch a coup via the judiciary demonstrates the depth 

of Turkish peoples’ mistrust in that branch of government. If Turkey wishes to consolidate and improve its democracy, the judiciary 

must also heed its responsibility to be an impartial and independent body. 

Moreover, the government in the last 10 years has implemented 

many reform packages; however, these half-fixes of rights are no 

longer sufficient to satisfy the wishes of Turkish people. Consequently, a democratic and civilian Constitution is necessary in 

order to guarantee freedoms and liberties in the country. Drafting 

the Constitution must be an inclusive and pluralistic process to be 

considered a valid social contract. It must equally address the concern of all citizens in Turkish society in regards to freedom of religion, media and expression. 

Finally, Turkey must develop a more powerful opposition that 

has a democratic, inclusive and representative vision in order to 

harness the support of the new middle class so that it can push for 

further democratization in the country. If not, Turkey will continue 

to face the problem of a weak and not very credible opposition as 

it did in the 2011 and 2014 elections, where the main opposition 

parties failed to act as a viable alternative to the AK Party. On the 

one hand, this absence of an opposition leaves the AK Party as the 

only party in the political arena capable of producing policy. On the 

other hand, the failure of opposition parties fosters mistrust for the 

political parties in general in Turkey, which fuels increasing street 

politics. 

In summary, Turkey’s path to democratization has been a challenging and convoluted one. However, the country has undergone 

an irreversible transformation and the next step its leaders must 

take should be to the consolidate the country’s democratic gains by 

building institution, drafting a civilian Constitution and responding 

to the democratic demands of a rapidly changing society. Thank 

you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kanat follows:]

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Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, and next we have Mr. 

Tasci. 

STATEMENT OF MR. HAKAN TASCI, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, 

TUSKON–US 

Mr. TASCI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, for giving me the opportunity to testify on the future of 

Turkish democracy. The following is summary of my prepared remarks. And I am a little bit sick, so I am sorry about that. 

The AKP government transformed Turkey into an upper middle 

income country with a strong middle class and more than 20 powerhouse Anatolian cities in last decade. In order to overcome the 

middle income trap, however, structural reforms are essential and, 

specifically, tax code, institutional structure and the judicial system. Turkey’s growth model is dependent on capital flows, foreign 

energy resources and Central Bank policies, especially before the 

municipal elections, they successfully controlled the exchange rate 

3:40:00 in Turkey. And the independence of the Central Bank, 

which is increasingly undermined by Mr. Erdogan during the process, has been a key factor for combating inflation and financial stability. 

Other investor worries are the problem with rule of law, diminishing economy and political checks and balances. Having tamed 

the military and crushed political opposition, Mr. Erdogan consolidated his power by suppressing the media and dissent to a large 

extent. This disproportional use of force and harsh rhetoric against 

Gezi Park protestors sparked an outcry inside Turkey and abroad. 

Mr. Erdogan has presented events as an international conspiracy 

to undermine his government and portrayed dissenters as traitors. 

A similar pattern was evident during the corruption scandal of 

last December which implicated sons of three Turkish cabinet ministers, high level bureaucrats and government friendly businesses. 

Among the suspects are Reza Sarraf, an Iranian businessman dealing with gold trade in sanction era, and Yasin Al Qadi, a businessman who used to be on U.N. terror list for 10 years. Instead of 

complying with prosecutors, Mr. Erdogan presented corruption investigations as a coup effort led by domestic and international actors such as U.S. Ambassador, influential preacher Fethullah 

Gulen, and the ‘‘interest lobby.’’

In a clear attempt to obstruct justice, thousands of police officers 

and hundreds of prosecutors have been purged or reassigned. Turkish Parliament dominated by ruling party passed legislation which 

seriously threaten independence of judiciary and provides almost 

immunity to intelligence. This is a huge setback for rule of law and 

accountability in Turkey and quite antidemocratic laws. 

Mr. Erdogan launched a fierce campaign against the Gulen 

movement, a major independent social force for democracy and 

modernization in Turkey, blaming it for masterminding the corruption investigations with the help of sympathizers in the bureaucracy. Pro-government media follows with orchestrated headlines 

and lies. The PM is not shy of publicly declaring this a witch hunt. 

Thousands of bureaucrats were discredited, demoted or reassigned. 

Without any evidence of wrongdoing, guilt by association has become the norm. 

36

Witch hunt has taken a toll not only in bureaucracy but also in 

civil society, business community and media. He calls Gulen movement sympathizers in public mass as viruses, assassins, leeches, 

traitors, spies and vampires. In addition he is cancelling public 

tenders, changing zoning of existing structures——

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Chairman, was he talking about Fox News? 

No, no. 

Mr. TASCI. Cancelling public tenders, changing zoning of existing 

structures, revoking mining permits, deploying tax inspectors, rejecting venue rentals for programs are among the common practices. Members of my organization, TUSKON, a leading business 

NGO, face government retribution if they don’t resign from membership. Bank Asya was nearly bankrupt due to orchestrated 

defunding efforts by the government. 

Without any indictment or charge, Mr. Erdogan presses the U.S. 

Government to extradite Mr. Gulen who lives in Pennsylvania as 

a legal resident. White House had to issue a rare correction after 

he suggested that Mr. Obama agreed to comply with him. Media 

affiliated with the movement that maintains its independence is a 

constant target. Private tutoring centers will be closed starting 

June 2015 because of 25 percent stake of movement. Erdogan government heavily lobbies against the movement’s peaceful and successful educational institutions in more than 150 nations, and some 

closed already due to pressure. 

Undermining peaceful and constructive Sufi initiatives which 

offer an antidote to extremism and violence is a disservice not only 

to Turkey but to the world. Witch hunt and smear tactics is not 

limited to Gulen circles. Businessmen, associations and media who 

come from different ideological backgrounds are under intense 

pressure to either comply or face consequences. According to press 

reports, 100,000 small and midsized businesses were profiled based 

on their donations, flight arrangements and other confidential 

data. 

AKP leadership tries to justify recent antidemocratic practices 

pointing out electoral victories. However, Professor Omer Taspinar 

describes this overturn as transformation from tyranny of Kemalist 

minority to ‘‘tyranny of majority.’’ Prime Minister Erdogan thinks 

his election victory with 43 percent in March 30 municipal elections 

have cleared him and his party associates from the corruption allegations as well. He does not hide his ambition to force constitutional boundaries to make executive and legislative branches, if not 

judiciary, subservient to him. 

And one last thing. The Erdogan government deserves credit 

with its continued commitment to resolution of the Kurdish question. And finally, Turkey is a strategically important country for 

the West as a relatively successful democractic and free market experiment in a volatile region. Turkey’s Sufi interpretations of Islam 

represent a powerful alternative to violent extremism. Therefore it 

is imperative for friends and allies of Turkey in the West to support and engage Turkey on its democratic and economic journey. 

Turkey’s continued EU accession path is essential for reforms. 

TTIP, Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, might 

open a new and an important gateway for Turkey’s future integration with the EU and the U.S. One must not lose hope with the 

37

future of Turkey democracy and economic potential. Despite occasional downturns, Turkey has historically always found a way to 

recover. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Tasci follows:]

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Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Connolly, with the permission of the committee and unless 

I hear any objections, Mr. Connolly will be treated as a member of 

the committee. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank my friend. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. Well, let me just ask, well, first of 

all, let me just note I accept that there is criticism and just criticism of Turkey or any other country. What we need to do is make 

sure that that criticism is within the perspective of what is happening in other countries and what is the norm and whether Turkey is operating as a norm or whether or not Turkey is headed in 

the wrong direction which is not the norm. 

And let me just go through a few things here. You were mentioning about, Doctor, what was going on in Cyprus. Although this 

is not a hearing on Cyprus, this is a hearing on democracy in Turkey, are there mosques in the Christian areas that have not been, 

and property in the Christian areas of Cyprus that are also being—

your criticism of how the Christian churches and properties are 

being treated in the Muslim side of Cyprus, what about in the 

other areas? Is there a balance there somewhere, or the Turkey 

side is way more repressive against Christians than the Christian 

side is against Muslims? 

Ms. PRODROMOU. The only reason that I introduced what was 

happening in Turkish occupied Cyprus was because I think it is a 

very useful metric for the overall quality of democracy in Turkey. 

After all, the Turkish Armed Forces have absolute control over the 

northern part of Cyprus and unfortunately there is a pattern in the 

occupied section of Cyprus that I think speaks to the broader pattern in terms of what has happened with religious freedom issues 

on the Turkish mainland. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. To be specific, the specific question I asked 

is your testimony criticized the activities going on in the Turkish 

areas with Christian properties. Can that same criticism be leveled 

in Christian areas to Islamic properties? 

Ms. PRODROMOU. Absolutely not. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay, good. That is what I am looking for. 

Because we had a bill about return of Christian properties. And by 

the way I am in favor of return of properties to people who they 

belong to whether they are Christians or Muslims. But there was 

a hearing that we had and I have also heard that there are Muslim 

properties in mosques in Greece, for example, that needed to be addressed as well. 

And what we need to hear and what we need to find out, is it 

a just criticism of Turkey alone? We as a people who believe in 

freedom and treating people decently would hope no countries participate in this, but also we have to make sure we are not singling 

out one country for criticism that is of activities that are going on 

in all countries. 

Let me ask about the censorship there. And at this time is the 

Internet censored in Turkey? 

Mr. SCHENKKAN. It is a complicated question. There are upwards 

of, I believe the number is upwards of 30,000 Internet sites that 

are blocked——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Blocked? 

45

Mr. SCHENKKAN [continuing]. In Turkey. Blocked. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So blocked by whom? 

Mr. SCHENKKAN. Blocked by the government. Blocked by the 

telecommunications. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So we have 30,000 sites that are blocked by 

the government. 

Mr. SCHENKKAN. That is correct. And that includes sites that a 

democracy might also recognize as——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Like pornography, gambling. 

Mr. SCHENKKAN. There could be legitimate reasons for blocking 

sites. The question is whether——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. How many of them are? How many would 

you say are——

Mr. SCHENKKAN. We don’t know because the government doesn’t 

release a list of sites. This number is gathered by an NGO. The 

government stopped releasing a list, I think it was 3 years ago. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, we have a testimony from this witness 

that says that the government is relying on social media to promote progress in their country. And we have another testimony 

here saying that we are blocking all of these sites but we don’t 

know whether or not how many of them are political or they may 

be very legitimate blockage. 

Mr. SCHENKKAN. Well, what we can say is that the process for 

blocking sites is not transparent. It is not able to be contested by 

the owners or the users of the site, and has been the subject of European Court of Human Rights ruling on this issue, a 2012 ruling, 

Yildirim v. Turkey, which held that the law that I mentioned that 

was amended, in my remarks, 5651, that this law was not in line 

with the European Convention on Human Rights which is legally 

binding upon Turkey. And the court said that Turkey needed to revise that law. They did not do so. They made these amendments 

this year that actually made the problems worse. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay, well, let me get to the—you have mentioned again the judicial activity involved with some of these questions. One of our witnesses talked about the purge, the purge of judiciary. All right. But we heard from another witness that traditionally Turkish judiciary is political and politicized. So it is a 

purge to kick out certain people of a political persuasion when they 

themselves took the spot of someone because they were more in 

tune with that political persuasion? So is that a justified criticism 

then? I will give you a chance to answer that. 

Mr. TASCI. I can say a few words on it. I mean as I said in the 

beginning of my remarks, the judicial system was always a problem in Turkey. It didn’t start on December 17th or during the Gezi 

protest or even before. But the problem is the people who are not 

a problem on December 16th become the problem within the judicial system on December 17th, which happens. I mean what happened in that period, just 2 days after the December 17 investigations is filed, they said this is very big case and appointed two new 

prosecutors to the system, now three. And two of those three signed 

the prisonment (sic) of the suspects. Then those two were again 

purged, 3 or 4 days after the election. 

46

So this is not about the politics of the judiciary or impartial behavior of the judiciary, as it becomes an are you with me or are 

you against me? Are you going to follow what I say? 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. That leads to the question that I have got to 

lead up to here, and that is we have—look, we are Americans and 

demand a certain standard. And let me just say that I am not in 

favor of our Government getting involved in the Internet at all. I 

am for Internet freedom. But right now we are trying to assess democracy in Turkey, all right. And if indeed we have seen this type 

of politicization of the judiciary in the past as standard, to criticize 

Turkey right now on that is not necessarily a just criticism of this 

administration. 

Now with that said, I am going to let my colleagues have their 

chance, but I would like to get a one answer from all of you. And 

that is, with the challenges or the problems that we are talking 

about right now this is, Turkey seems to be stepping back from the 

positive direction in democracy, et cetera that we had all been so 

happy about 10 years ago and 5 years ago, is this a problem with 

structure? The judiciary has always been politicized. Or is it a 

problem with you have got a leader with an ego who is now exercising powers that because of his own personal evaluation it is 

more of a personal thing? Because this happens to leaders around 

the world as well, I might add, that if they stay in too long—that 

is why George Washington stepped forward and said he is getting 

out after 8 years by the way and George Washington saved our 

country a lot of anguish because of that. Maybe after 8 years people begin to lose the perspective when they have had so much 

power. So is it structural or is it personal? Just give me, what is 

it? 

Mr. SCHENKKAN. Both. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Both, okay. 

Doctor? 

Ms. PRODROMOU. It is both, but I think it is more deeply structural than personal. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. 

Mr. CAGAPTAY. I think it is structural but that is not the reason 

it should stay around. The argument that you always had problems 

with judiciary and media freedoms in Turkey, therefore problems 

today should be recognized is anachronistic. Turkey is a European 

country. It should have European style liberties. And justifying violations of freedom of expression based on past violations is not an 

excuse. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Let me just note, I never justify any violation 

of human rights. 

Mr. CAGAPTAY. I didn’t suggest——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I know, but I accept that as the standard 

that you are mentioning there. 

Yes, sir? 

Mr. KANAT. I think it is mainly structural. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Structural. 

Mr. TASCI. I think both. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Both. Oh my. Well, thank you very much. I 

will now turn to our ranking member. 

47

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mention that Turkey’s 

in a very dangerous neighborhood, and we are all saddened by the 

news of the Turkish hostages in Mosul and urge that they are released quickly. But this really poses a question in my mind because 

there have been other reports that the Turkish Government aids 

extremist factions in Syria, maybe not militarily but with access to 

borders and medical help and other types of help. 

So how do you reconcile this that in one sense the government 

has been doing this, reports are indicating, while falling victim to 

the groups themselves. Are the reports accurate? What would ISIS 

particularly target in Turkey? Why would they do that if they were 

getting this kind of help? And how are the Turkish people hearing 

about this given some of the blackouts in communication that 

occur? 

So I just wanted to get into that and I would like to ask Dr. 

Cagaptay first and then Dr. Kanat. 

Mr. CAGAPTAY. Thank you, Congressman. I think for a long time 

Turkish-Syria policy was based on the following premise, Assad 

will fall and good guys will take over, therefore anyone who wants 

to go in and fight Assad can do so because when the good guys take 

over they will just sweep them away. That premise has proven to 

be wrong, and just as other premises of Turkey’s pivot to the Middle East have produced problematic results. 

Assad is not falling and good guys are not taking over, so the policy of letting anyone and everyone go in is creating threats long 

and short term for Turkey. And I think Turkey is now coming to 

grips with this conclusion that not only good guys are not taking 

over, but bad guys are laying roots in Syria. And ISIS attack on 

Turkey was unfortunate and rude wake-up call for many Turks 

who did not realize that this group had built an infrastructure in 

Syria, just as it was a rude wake-up call for us here in Washington. 

I think at this stage, Turkey having come to this realization, this 

actually puts Turkey and the United States on an alignment. Now 

Turkey does see a radicalization threat coming from Syria which 

has targeted Turkey. ISIS when it took over Mosul, also attacked 

the Turkish consulate in that city, took 49 Turkish citizens including children and babies hostage, and to this day Turkey has not 

been able to secure their release. This is the worst hostage crisis 

in Turkey’s modern history, and the threat comes from a radical 

group next door, ISIS that has grown in Syria. 

To me this suggests an even closer U.S.-Turkish cooperation on 

Syria on the issue of radicalization because now ISIS is as big a 

threat to Turkey as it is to any other country in the region. 

Mr. KEATING. And is that sifted down to the people? 

Mr. CAGAPTAY. Yes, I have seen recent polls. In fact, today, just 

before we started this hearing, Turkish support for the government’s Syrian and Iraq policy has plummeted, for the first time 

under 50 percent. This used to be a 70 percent, 76 percent support 

in 2011. Now it is 41 percent support for government Syria policy. 

Mr. KEATING. I take it in your answer that you thought there 

was some type of aid that was there at least before. Has that 

ceased? 

Mr. CAGAPTAY. I would not call it aid, Congressman. I think it 

was a policy of basically anticipating that whoever went in would 

48

be cleaned out eventually. I think Turkey is now basically coming 

to grips with the realization that this is a long term problem and 

it will work closer with U.S. and European allies. 

Mr. KEATING. Dr. Kanat, do you want to comment on that? 

Mr. KANAT. I agree with some of Dr. Cagaptay’s statements 

about this. Turkey and Syria have more than a 500-mile border 

without any geographical terrain. So it is very difficult to control 

the border. And then Turkish-Syrian relations were extremely bad 

in the 1990s. There was a huge land mine that basically had a 

post—a military post and everything. But since the improvement 

of the relations and rapprochement, Turkey removed this and Turkey and Syria had good relations and no visa requirements; it was 

basically an open border. 

Now after the Arab Spring and the starting of the Assad regime’s 

killing of its own people, there is this major problem. There is this 

border, a huge border—500-mile border—and it is very difficult to 

control who is entering and who is not in those circumstances. Turkey and United States launch a, actually, initiative, antiterrorism 

initiative, and Turkey and both countries contributed to this $500 

million last year. And about the ISIS there is, starting from the 

emergence of this trend Turkey basically indicated several times 

that ISIS may be a major threat not only for Turkey but for the 

region as a whole. 

Mr. KEATING. In the remaining seconds, if I could, I would just 

like to ask Mr. Tasci. Business community, when they are hearing 

these things, when they are hearing about issues about separation 

of powers, rule of law issues and the closure of communications like 

YouTube, can you just comment what the conversation is among 

the business communities? And you can touch on the Soma mining 

disaster as well. What is the chatter in the business communities? 

Just briefly, so it doesn’t go too much longer over time. 

Mr. TASCI. What is going on in Turkey is a big concern for many 

business people as well. For example, I will give a couple of things 

which are in my prepared statement as well. TUSIAD chairman, 

for example, one of our competitors, let us say, business association 

chairman said, we need rule of law. I mean he made a comment 

about rule of law and the importance of rule of law for international investors. And the response was he is a traitor, I mean he 

got the reaction in a public mass that traitors. And after 3 or 4 

months he had very unusual things happening and he resigned because of his own business interests. And now they have a new 

chairman which had his first meeting with the prime minister and 

the other cabinet members as well. 

And I am sure he is here as well, American-Turkish Council 

chairman and CEO, James Holmes, is one of the leading 

businessperson or one of the leading individual who represents the 

business community in United States is the chair of ATC. His institution is blacklisted, and his conference, which they held last June 

was the 33rd of that conference and the Turkish Government 

blocked it and they didn’t come to the event and he signed his resignation because of that one. 

So I mean this kind of treatment is not unique to one institution 

or another but rather for everyone. You have to comply. You have 

to be silent or you have to face the consequences. 

49

Mr. KEATING. Thank you. I think you have given us a flavor. We 

did ask other business groups if they were interested in this hearing. And I want to thank you for being here. Because I think much 

of the progress that Turkey will have and we will have together 

with Turkey will be grounded on economic activities, and certainly 

some of the concerns you raised are concerns that may affect that 

progress. Thank you, I yield back. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And as the Chair noted in the opening statement, quite often economic progress can be short circuited and cut 

off if the political system does not match the progress going on in 

the economic system. 

Mr. Sires? 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. 

But I find Turkey almost like an enigma. A few years ago they 

were poised to be one of the leading countries in the country that 

were an example. Now I see all these pivoting back, more repressive, less democracy concerns. I was just wondering if you see this 

because of the region they are in and there are concerns all around 

them, or is there an excuse that they are using to pivot away from 

what I think was a democratic way? 

Mr. SCHENKKAN. Thank you, Congressman. I think that Turkey 

has obviously suffered through a very difficult history of coups, of 

illiberalism of a single party period at the founding of the country. 

The democratic tradition in Turkey has been weak even though it 

was a multiparty system after World War II. 

So you have this long history leading up to the rise of the AK 

Party that the party came within that context. And I don’t think 

the party has escaped that context, and perhaps we shouldn’t be 

as surprised as we feel we are. But what we are seeing is the AK 

Party after this period that Dr. Cagaptay mentioned, in the early 

2000s when the EU accession process was more active, when the 

AK Party was more actively courting a liberal democratic trend for 

several years, I would say at least going back to 2007, we have 

seen the party led by the prime minister reinstituting many of the 

habits, reenacting many of the habits of the illiberal state. 

And because the mechanisms of the illiberal state are still there 

in the judiciary, in the police forces, to a certain degree in the culture that is finding fertile ground and it is something that can be 

enacted and it is something that is developing. 

Mr. SIRES. Would you like to respond? 

Mr. CAGAPTAY. Thank you, Congressman. I think Turkey is a democracy. It remains a democracy. It has free and fair elections. 

Mr. SIRES. But it is pivoting away. 

Mr. CAGAPTAY. Governments, I agree with you. Governments can 

be voted out. I think the trend we are seeing is not that it is undemocratic, it has a democratically elected government which does 

rule in an authoritarian fashion. And I think that suggests a consolidation of two branches of government in one hand, executive 

and legislative, and if Prime Minister Erdogan is elected as President he will also appoint judges to the high courts also holding 

power over judiciary. But Turkey does remain a democracy. It has 

robust democratic institutions and the governments are voted in 

and out democratically. 

50

Mr. SIRES. They also in my eyes are very sensitive to anything 

in terms of the Armenian genocide or the recent, that we did in the 

committee—return of the properties, the churches and everything 

else. I had a senior moment, I guess. I should say that, right? 

But I mean, how can I say this? I don’t know. I just see it as 

turning away from all the good things that they have done. I mean 

I even see, I know we are not supposed to bring up the Cyprus 

issue, but they act like thugs. Even when you go and vote here you 

feel like you are voting with the Turkish order we had on any of 

those issues. I mean if you are going to be a country of 75 million 

people and you are going to be a world player, you have got a great 

history, I mean you have to be more understanding that you can’t 

be a thug. 

And I just feel that is the way they behave in many ways, and 

I don’t know whether that is due to the growing pains or it is just 

in the culture. Maybe it is in their history. But if you want to be 

a player, you want to be part of the European Union, you have 

other ways of dealing with many of the issues that they seem to 

go war. 

Mr. CAGAPTAY. As an historian, if I could respond to your dilemma, I follow the reaction to the passage of the resolution in 

Turkish media, in Turkish, and I think the reaction was not so 

much anger at the passing of the resolution but the fact that Turkey has made some progress in restoring, for example, property belonging to synagogue and church foundations after passing a law 

in 2011. It hasn’t restored all property. It has restored property totaling about $1 billion in value. 

Mr. SIRES. I get all that. 

Mr. CAGAPTAY. Yes, yes. 

Mr. SIRES. I understand all that. But if you are going to say 

something negative about a country——

Mr. CAGAPTAY. Right. 

Mr. SIRES [continuing]. Look at what can say about the United 

States. I mean we are like the evil empire. Everybody criticizes no 

matter what we do. But if you want to be a role player in this 

country, want to be in this world, you have 75 million people with 

all this history, I just find that for me perplexing. And maybe I just 

don’t know enough about the history and I am now not being accurate. Thank you, Chairman. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you. And Mr. Connolly? 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank the chairman and I thank my friend the 

ranking member as well for allowing me to participate. Well, first 

of all, I would say to my dear friend Mr. Sires, I am not sure much 

is achieved by referring to the Turkish Government, a NATO ally 

that has been there by our side for the entirety of the Cold War 

and since, as a thug. I just don’t think that is helpful. I also think 

it is not true to history. And I——

Mr. SIRES. I am not setting policies. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I know. I know. And I would just say with respect to Cyprus, actually there is a lot of good news coming out of 

Cyprus recently, finally, and we want to encourage that. And we 

want to be careful about that because the two sides are talking and 

there is actually movement and some sense of hope. And I would 

hope Congress would encourage that. 

51

I will also say while I certainly appreciate this hearing, I don’t 

know how often we have a hearing on a fellow European country 

and member of NATO to investigate how they are doing in their 

internal political process. And I might even have some candidates 

for us to consider if we are going to extend the list. Turkey is a 

work in progress as a democracy, so are we. And I would never justify the crackdown on the press, freedom of religion, freedom of expression, but imperfect is not the same as being hopeless and retrograde and autocratic and authoritarian and oppressive. 

And one of the concerns I have, quite frankly, in our full committee is sometimes that gets lost in our rhetoric and even in our 

actions. And we want to encourage Turkish democracy. We want to 

encourage a secular Muslim society in Turkey. We want to encourage Turkish membership in the EU. We need to get over biases and 

historical problems. Turkey has to come to acknowledgment with 

some of its past, as my friend from New Jersey has indicated, but 

so do others. And we need to deal with the Turkey of here and now, 

not of the Turkey of 100 years ago or 200 years ago or 500 years 

ago for that matter. Some of us are still hung up on Constantinople. But we have to deal with what we are dealing with here and 

now. 

And so none of that is to excuse behavior that looks like, to your 

point Mr. Sires, a regression. And maybe it is structural and maybe 

it is personal and maybe it is both. We have got a government that 

has been in power for quite some time and frankly doesn’t have 

much political opposition that is viable. That is always a dangerous 

situation for any democracy because we get complacent, we get arrogant and the like. 

So let me ask starting with you, Mr. Tasci, from the business 

community’s point of view. Do you believe that the Erdogan government is regressing? That in fact we are risking democratization, 

democratic institutions with some sense of arrogance of purpose 

with this current government? 

Mr. TASCI. So good question, Mr. Congressman. Hard to answer, 

but I will try to be as precise as possible. I am talking about one 

person and the problems with one person does not necessarily 

mean the problem is the problem of everyone in that sector or everyone who supported that party or other kind of people. And you 

may be having problems on one side like the one that I mentioned 

about the Gulen movement and other kind of things, but you may 

have very progressive and very good policymakers when people are 

on your side. 

So I mean that is the kind of different approach compared to like 

Chinese type or like Korean type or different types of countries. I 

mean definitely Turkey is a democracy. Turkey may be a liberal democracy or maybe it is like majoritarian democracy. You may call 

it any way you can. But we have free elections. Is it fair? Questionable. Does the government use its power to enhance and improve 

their own networks and success? I think there may be some legitimacy on that. But in general it is going to be very hard to say it 

is not——

Mr. CONNOLLY. If I may, Mr. Chairman, could I ask Mr. 

Schenkkan if he wants to respond to that as well? 

52

Mr. SCHENKKAN. Yes, thank you. Yes, there is regression underway. This is being documented by Freedom House. It is being documented by other human rights organizations, by journalists on the 

ground, by international journalists. This is a major subject of discussion for everyone who is following Turkey closely. We are seeing 

the regression in all areas of fundamental freedoms. We are seeing 

it in freedom of expression. We are seeing it in freedom of association. We are seeing it in freedom of assembly. 

And I want to stress that just to anticipate the counter argument 

that I am sure the congressmen have heard elsewhere that this is 

nothing compared to what it was like in the 1990s or in the 1980s 

under military rule or during the dirty wars. That is true. That 

doesn’t mean that that is the standard for Turkey. Turkey is, as 

we have said repeatedly, an EU member candidate country. It is 

also a signatory to the European Convention on Human Rights 

which is legally binding. There are a whole host of ways in which 

Turkey’s aspirations and the standard to which Turkey holds itself 

are much higher. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you. 

Mr. CAGAPTAY. Congressman, if I may? I agree with you, Congressman, that what we see in Turkey is a real progress and that 

should be recognized primarily because the country has come a 

long way especially on the economic sphere and that is significant. 

Countries cannot be transformed politically unless they are transformed economically first. So Turkey has done the first part of this 

tough task. It has become a majority middle class society and that 

is a legacy of Prime Minister Erdogan. 

If, as my colleague here, Dr. Kanat, says, Prime Minister 

Erdogan does commit himself to drafting a liberal democratic Constitution for the country, he will also go down in history as the person who has transformed the country politically. He has not done 

that so far. And I think given his political record, it is possible to 

expect that that political transformation is probably not going to 

come from within the governing party but from the liberal opposition that has been building in Turkey in the last decade primarily 

because of the AKP’s successful economic policies, which have produced a majority middle class society which now demands respect 

for individual liberties, freedoms of expression, media, association 

and assembly. This was the tone of the Gezi Park movement and 

I think it is going to stay around in Turkish politics. 

So we could conclude that Prime Minister Erdogan has transformed Turkey economically, but it is the liberals—and I am using 

the word ‘‘liberal’’ here not in the American sense but in the European sense. It is the liberals who are committed to democracy who 

will transform Turkey politically. 

Mr. KANAT. Thank you. I think part of this discussion is about 

what authoritarianism is, as Prime Minister Erdogan is winning 

elections and becoming the predominant leader in Turkey. And we 

have to understand that not all predominant leaders are prone to 

authoritarianism, not always. And when you see the reform packages, especially regarding the Kurdish question, the historic process that we are having right now and the condolences that offered 

for the Armenians, this couldn’t be happening with a predominant 

leader. 

53

And we have to understand that democratization is a moving target, and I totally understand that for some in Turkey the current 

level of democratization may not be enough and comparing constantly with the 1990s or the previous decades may not be a good 

way to understand this. So I think it is a moving target and it is 

a learning process at the same time. 

But Prime Minister Erdogan and the AK Party government, from 

the reform processes that they are in right now and from their determination to write a civilian and pluralistic Constitution, gave 

the signal that especially the period after the elections would be a 

new democratic process. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. You have been most generous. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Actually it is the Chairman’s policy that people have a chance to answer the questions and then if there is a 

discussion that is getting to an important point that we don’t put 

the 5-minute rule into effect in a way to cut off some people from 

getting down to some truths that we are looking for. With that 

said, Mr. Lowenthal, I know, will take about 20 minutes now. 

Mr. LOWENTHAL. Thank you for offering me 1⁄2 hour to speak. 

Mr. KEATING. We want you to take 5 minutes. 

Mr. LOWENTHAL. It is okay. May be an improvement. 

I don’t know what question, I want to kind of frame it in my concerns. About 6 years ago when I was a member of the California 

State Legislature we took a visit, some of the leadership in the legislature, to Turkey and it was a time of great excitement. It was 

a time of, it was, I think, the second term of the AKP party. We 

met with leadership in the Justice and Development Party not with 

Mr. Erdogan but with others just below. And it was a time of 

where there was a great change there. 

At that point as I understood, Turkey had had a history of every 

20 years or so a military coup, and the party was trying to reduce 

the role of the military at the time. He was in a major battle with 

the generals to reduce their power. He was also, I remember at 

that time when I was there, there were great newspaper stories 

about the fight between the justice system and his wanting to replace many of the justices because of some of the tremendous corruption that had taken place historically. There was greater freedom. There was discussion on the streets. We met with women’s 

groups in terms of the role of women. And so it was a time of great 

hope and aspiration. We spent time with families. We didn’t stay 

in hotels, we spent with families as we went across the country visiting schools. 

And synonymous with this and with this tremendous support 

was a greater amount of religious toleration. And we kept meeting 

with people who were very much pro-AKP party and also some of 

the people who were in the Gulen movement who were very synonymous and very similar and really talked about how it was not 

a threat. Unfortunately while this is happening, I have been hearing more and more about the threat to religious freedoms that are 

taking place. That a movement that was seen as not anti, not really anti or pro-government, was now, was really talking about the 

role of education, the role of people, the role was now beginning 

more and more to be perceived as threatening. 

54

And so my question is, is this so? Is this really what is going on? 

I am sure you have talked about it. And I realize that over time 

governments change. It has now been almost, what, the AKP was, 

which I believe before 2002 was not even a major party. It was 

really, and so it has been only now 14 years as a party, but it has 

been a party that has been in power for 14 years. 

So I am really concerned about what the future holds and whether this apparent, is what I heard before, slide away from democracy, slightly, maybe not totally, but some of this movement and 

this lack of religious tolerance is really so, and what role can we 

play in both supporting Turkey and also supporting a movement 

toward democracy? 

Yes? 

Ms. PRODROMOU. I think that your observations are correct that 

there has been backsliding and also there are some danger signals 

when it comes to religious tolerance. I think it is important for us 

to understand that when we speak about secularism in Turkey and 

Turkey as a secular democracy, Turkey secularism has in no way 

meant freedom of religion from the state. The Turkish model of secularism has been promised on the absolute state control over religion in civil society. And I think that is a very different understanding of secularism and therefore leads to very different kinds 

of consequences with religious——

Mr. LOWENTHAL. Many of these schools that we visited were set 

up by people who followed the leadership of Gulen. Has that been 

seen as a threat that now they are educating children in a different 

way? I just wonder if the threat is that people, although, and my 

impression was Gulen, and this movement when we talked to it 

was not anti the government at all, but yet it was pro-education, 

pro-parental involvement in the schools. Tremendous change in 

how the schools—is this being seen as a threat to Turkish or centralized control over both education or religion? 

Ms. PRODROMOU. The initial collaboration and cooperation between the Gulenist movement and civil society and the AKP party 

has been well documented. And I think that——

Mr. LOWENTHAL. And it was that you could feel it when you were 

in the country. 

Ms. PRODROMOU. And the expansion and tolerance for Islam in 

the public sphere for Turkey’s Muslim population has been significant. And I think that is a function, initially, of the cooperation between the AKP and the Gulenist movement. That kind of expansion, however, and the public presence of the Sunni majority population has not been matched by an equal expansion and tolerance 

for, for example, the 20 percent Alawite population in Turkey, and 

it certainly hasn’t been matched by increased tolerance for nonMuslim minorities in Turkey. 

And I think another piece of this discussion that needs to be addressed is the rising anti-Semitism that we have witnessed in Turkey over the last decade, in particular the kinds of public statements by even this warning by Prime Minister Erdogan regarding 

the interest rate lobby, the Jewish lobby, et cetera that has led to, 

I think, a generalized societal intolerance for non-Muslim minorities in Turkey including the Jewish community. 

55

Circling back though to the Galenist-AKP relationship, again I 

think that the initial globalization that allowed for greater public 

presence for Islam in Turkey was driven by the Galenist movement, but with the cleavage now between the current government 

and that movement I think we are beginning to see a backlash. 

Mr. SCHENKKAN. Congressman? 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Very quickly. 

Mr. SCHENKKAN. Yes, a short comment on that. I think the greatest achievement of the AKP in democratization was loosening the 

grip on identity on who could be a Turk, who could legitimately be 

a Turkish citizen. As my colleague said though that was done primarily for the purposes of liberating people to be conservative Muslims in public. It did have an effect though across society, and 

Turkish identity now is much more flexible and much more open 

and that is a very positive development. 

The biggest question now in this regard is will, under President 

Erdogan will a new unitary identity start to be established and 

start to be enforced? And that is probably the most frightening consequence that could come out of the consolidation of power. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Let us quickly——

Mr. CAGAPTAY. Thank you. On the issue of the rights of, and religious freedoms with members in communities, as someone who has 

often gone on the record to criticize the government’s record on liberties I have to disagree with my copanelist, Dr. Prodromou, with 

that. The government has actually done well on the religious rights 

of the non-Muslim communities and improved significantly. 

I have visited this Greek Orthodox Sumela Monastery, Armenian 

Aghtamar Church in the last years. They were both restored with 

government funds, public money. Public money has been spent now 

to pay for utility bills of churches and synagogues, a practice that 

the government has been doing for a very long time for mosques. 

That is equality if that could be construed as such. 

On the broader picture, Congressman, on your question of Turkey’s direction on religion and state, I think there are, broadly 

speaking, two practices of organizing the relation between religion 

and politics. One is the European system which is freedom from religion in education and politics, and the other one is the American 

system which is freedom of religion in education and politics. Turks 

for a long time practiced the first under Kemalism. Because they 

were Europeans this was laı ̈cite ́. This is how the Europeans do it. 

They have switched to the second model, the American model, 

from religion to freedom of religion, education and politics. I think 

Turkey needs both to move forward because it is a country that has 

Muslims and non-Muslims. It has shades of Islam. It has shades 

of practice or the lack thereof. And to accommodate this diversity 

of Islam as well as non-Islam and faith and non-faith and practice 

and non-faith practice, Turkey needs to be a country that provides 

for not just freedom for religion, education and politics, which is 

what it does now, but also freedom from religion, education and 

politics. These two, I think, will be the way to move Turkey forward. Thank you. 

Mr. KANAT. I want to add a couple things to the religious freedom side. The Sumela Monastery and Aghtamar Church was renovated and restored, and in the Sumela Monastery, actually, after 

56

100 years, the first religious services took place in 2012. And same 

in 2013, in the Aghtamar Church, after 88 years, the first religious 

services are taking place. So there is improvement in the rights of 

the non-Muslim community in Turkey. 

And one more thing I want to add about press freedom. You have 

to understand that when we are discussing press freedom in Turkey and censorship, there is a plurality of newspapers in Turkey. 

Actually, there are around 40 newspapers in Turkey with a total 

circulation of 5 million. And 65 percent—60 percent—of these 

newspapers are anti-government and you can see all kinds of antigovernment news in these newspapers. The problem is that none 

of the newspapers have pluralism within them so they become almost homogenous entities, and fighting journalists, I think, would 

take place in anti-government newspapers as well. For example, if 

you write a pro-government column in one of the newspapers—

anti-government newspapers—you would probably lose your job immediately. And because of that, as I was mentioning, there is a 

structural—deep structural—problem to understand press freedom 

in Turkey and to provide any kind of solution for this problem. 

Thank you. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you. And we have one last comment, 

but let us just note there are journalists here who lose their job because they are not towing the line of whoever management is in 

charge as well. Do you want to make one comment on that and 

then we will go there? 

Mr. SCHENKKAN. Thank you. If I may, to respond on the press 

freedom issue as it is a special focus. I think there is somewhat of 

a simplistic understanding sometimes of what it means to not have 

freedom of expression in a repressive environment. It is not that 

one makes a statement and then a piano falls on you or trap door 

opens and you disappear through the floor. 

What happens in Turkey, what happens often, what happens 

dozens if not hundreds of times is that people are fired for speaking 

out, for criticizing the government. They are fired through direct 

government intervention. Through direct intervention from government officials with newspaper and media owners. We know that 

this happens. This has been confirmed. They are also sued. They 

face criminal and civil defamation suits. They are even sent to jail 

for certain kinds of reporting. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. That is a very significant point to make in 

reference to the point that was made. Finally, the last——

Mr. TASCI. One small thing I would like to add, as you asked 

what happened suddenly with this Gulen movement and AK Party 

thing, I would like to say one thing about it. I think you are right 

that there was a heavy support and religious movements or religious ideologies from all sects in Turkey saw by AK Party as their 

own garden. And especially after 2011 elections when they had 

that vast majority, 49 percent of election victory right after the referendum. They feel like it is time to control the religious area as 

well, but the movement was independent as well. 

So the movement stays independent, becomes independent which 

makes the government a little bit troublesome. As force, a civil society force, which is very organized, they may lose in several fronts 

of the community, educational institutions, dialogue centers, et 

57

cetera, but they cannot be controlled. You cannot tell them what 

to do. 

So the monopolization of this religious domain also become an 

important factor for this separation. For example, other movements 

have the similar problems. New movements, for example, have 

their own books and now the government is publicizing that book’s 

publication. So I mean they don’t have the right to publish their 

own books that they wrote, but the government institutions have 

to publish it and it is going to give the books to them. So controlling everything is the main sense and is the main reason I can say. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. The Chair will now ask the ranking 

member if he would like to have 2 minutes to summarize his views 

on the hearing today, and then I will make a 2-minute summary 

as well and that will be it. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Even our own members 

have asked why are we having hearings, why Turkey, why not 

other countries? We touched upon the fact that over the last short 

period of time Turkey has become much more influential in the 

world. And Turkey, I believe, has the opportunity to become even 

more influential in the world. 

So their policies now that they are in this position and have the 

potential to move further, their policies now go beyond their borders more than they did before and they have influenced beyond 

their own borders more than before including the United States. 

Turkey is our strategic partner and we want to keep it that way. 

The U.S. has an interest in Turkey’s democracy becoming stronger. 

The U.S. has an interest in Turkey’s economy becoming stronger, 

and we should do whatever we can to help keep that progress moving forward and not backwards. 

And that is something that I think most of us and I think all of 

us can agree upon as we look at this hearing. There is a lot at 

stake. There is a lot of progress. There is a lot that can be done 

to help the region and the world. And we are very attentive to Turkey and we are very attentive to things that aren’t moving in a direction where our own interests, Turkey’s interests, in fact, European interests and world interests can all be benefited by that. I 

yield back. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I would like to thank our witnesses. I hope 

that you were able to make the points that you needed to make 

and that we got into some areas of discussion that I think are important. That is the purpose of these congressional hearings, is not 

necessarily to come to the ultimate conclusion but instead to make 

sure that people are discussing issues of significance. And you have 

given us a lot of food for thought today so I appreciate all of you 

for testifying. 

Let me just note that just from the chairman’s perspective, some 

cultures can’t accept criticism very well. One of the great attributes 

of Americans is that we generally can take criticism. In fact, when 

people are saying you are doing this wrong or you are doing that 

wrong, we usually think of it as a good suggestion. Let us go take 

a look at it and maybe we can correct it. 

And over the years we have certainly had our share of maladies 

and sins that we committed against our own people, and with the 

open system, and we didn’t always have a free press here. And we 

58

had a freer press than in other places of the world, but we did have 

people who are in various parts of our country faced physical retaliation if they said something bad about the Ku Klux Klan for a 

long time. 

But we basically, our country now that when people criticize us 

we are able to accept that. I don’t think that the Turkish culture 

is the same as the American culture in this regard. And that is 

why when people want to talk about what happened in the Armenian genocide, the Turkish people then think it is a personal attack 

on them even though this is something that happened about 100 

years ago. 

And certainly if someone started going through the sins that we 

committed against the American Indians or against Black Americans 75 years ago, we wouldn’t probably have the same, how do 

you say, sensitivity to it. We would just say, well, we have tried 

our best and if there is still some remnants around we are going 

to make it better even more so. 

So we have to understand that about Turkey. That is part of 

their culture. Today our intent was not just to offer criticisms but 

to understand what is going on and to perhaps communicate with 

our friends, and all the Turkish people are our friends. That we 

have got some concerns that over the last 10 years we were very 

joyful that things seemed to be going in the right direction and now 

there is some indications that it might not be going in the right direction. 

And that is not to say that is worse off than it was under the 

Ataturk regimes that took place for so long, but that there are reasons there are trim lines. I will just say this that when, under 

Ataturk and that regime, young women in the universities were 

not permitted to wear head scarves. And some of my friends, when 

they permitted women to wear head scarves at the university, 

came to me and said how horrible it is to see this radical Islamic 

regime there, they are allowing women to wear head scarves. No, 

it is when women are mandated to wear head scarves that the line 

is crossed and that we should be concerned. 

So there are some areas of concern that we should have about 

freedom of press and making sure that people who demonstrate are 

not incarcerated, et cetera. But we always have to put this in perspective and try of what is going on in other countries but also in 

how it relates to our basic principles as a people. And again, the 

last point is we should not forget that the Turks have stood with 

us for so long and through so many trials during the Cold War, we 

need to keep them as our friends and we need to offer our criticisms not as criticisms but as suggestions of how they can improve 

things and get things on the right track. With that said this hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:40 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(59)

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