alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
T hi s di s pos i t i on i s notappr opr i a t e f orpubl i c a t i on and i s notpr e c e de nt * e xc e pta s pr ovi de d by9th C i r . R . 36- 3.

T he pa ne l una ni m ous l yc onc l ude s thi s c a s e i s s ui t abl e f orde c i s i on ** w ith o u t o r a l a r g u m e n t. See F ed. R . A pp . P . 34 (a )( 2). NOT F OR P UB L I CAT I ON UN I TE D STATE S C OU RT OF APPE ALS FOR T HE NI NTH CI RC UI T UN I T E D S T AT E S OF AME R I C A, P l ai nt i ff

- A pp el l ee , v. S AU L AG UI L AR - S AG UN , D e f

e n d a n t - A p p e lla n t. N o. 10- 30191 D. C . No . 3 : 0 9 - c r - 0 5 6 0 1 - B HS ME MOR AN DU M *

A pp ea l fr om the U ni t ed S t at es D i stri ctC ou rt f orthe W e s t e rn D i s tr i c tof W a s hi ngt on B e nj a m i n H . S e tt l e , D i s tr i c tJ udge , P r e s i di ng S ubm i tt e d J ul y12, 2011 ** B e f o r e : S C H R O E D E R , A L A R C Ó N , a n d L E A V Y , C ir c u it J u d g e s . S aul A gu i l ar -S agun appeal s f rom the 12 0-m on th sent ence i m po se d f ol l ow i ng hi s gui l typl e ac onvi c t i on f orpos s e s s i on w i th i nt e ntt o di s tr i but e he r oi n, i n v i ol at i on of 21 U . S . C . § 8 41 (a )( 1), (b)( 1)(A ). W e have j uri sdi ct i on un der 

# FI LED JU L 15 2011 M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U . S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS10- 30191 2 2 8 U .S .C . § 1 2 9 1 , a n d w e d is m is s . A gu i l ar -S agun pl ea ded g ui l ty pursuantt o a w ri tt en agree m entthati ncl ud ed a n appe a l w a i ve r . H e c ont e nds tha thi s appe a l w a i ve rw a s notknow i ng a nd v o lu n ta ry b e c au s e h is a tto rn e yw a s in e f f e c tiv e f o ra llo w in g h im to e n te rag u ilty p le ath a t d id n o t p r e s e rv e h is ab ilityto ap p e a l th e d is tr ic t c o u rt’s d e n ia l o f h is m ot i on t o s uppr e s s . A s age ne r a l rul e , w e do notr e vi e w c ha l l e nge s t o the e f f e c tiv e n e s s o f

d e f e n s e c o u n s e l o n d ir e c t ap p e a l u n le s s ( 1 ) th e r e c o r d o n ap p e a l is suff i ci ent l y devel op ed t o p erm i tdet erm i nat i on of the i ss ue, or (2) the l egal r e p r e s e n ta tio n is s o in a d e q u a te th a t it o b v io u s lyd e n ie s ad e f e n d a n t h is S ix th A m e n d m e n t r ig h t to c o u n s e l. Se e Un i te d S ta te s v . J

e r o n i mo , 398 F . 3d 1149, 1155- 56 (9th C i r. 20 05 ). N ei ther e xcept i on appl i es t o thi s c as e. B as ed on the re cord before thi s c ou rton di re ctappeal , w e c on cl ud e thatA gu i l ar -S agun ’ s app ea l w ai ver, w h i ch w ai v ed an y ch al l en g e t o th e d i stri ctco u rt ’ s d en i al o f h i s m o t i o n t o su p p ress, w a s v o lu n ta ryan de n f

o r c e ab le . Se e id. a t 1 1 5 6 - 5 7 . DI S MI S S E D.
Exhibit
32.2   Section 1350 Certification





In
connection with the Quarterly Report of Citizens First Corporation (the
"Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2009, as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report") I,
Steve Marcum, Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer, of the
Company, certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:





(1) The
Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2) The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.








By:
            /s/ Steve MarcumSteve
      MarcumExecutive
      Vice President and Chief Financial OfficerDate:
            November
      5, 2009
Exhibit-21




                LACLEDE GAS COMPANY AND SUBSIDIARIES

                  SUBSIDIARIES OF THE REGISTRANT



                                                         PERCENT OF
                                                       VOTING STOCK
                                                           OWNED
                                                       ------------



Subsidiaries of Laclede Gas Company (Parent)

   Laclede Pipeline Company                                 100%
   Laclede Investment Corporation*                          100%
   Laclede Development Company**                            100%

  *Subsidiary Company of Laclede Investment Corporation
       Laclede Energy Resources, Inc.                       100%
   Subsidiary Company of Laclede Energy Resources, Inc.     100%
       Laclede Gas Family Services, Inc.
***Subsidiary Company of Laclede Development Company
       Laclede Venture Corp.                                100%

All of the above corporations have been organized under the laws of the
State of Missouri.






























                                105
DEP T OFTRANSPORIfflO N 1 'onK H s

• . i OST-2010-004 6 Secretar y o f th e DOT Dea r Sir : Mountai n Tim

e i s ou r heritag e andou

r Uve s thi s i s n o simpl e switch . Let u s kee p ou r wa y o f life . Kee p Mountai n Time . Rura l Merce r Count y Resident
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

BARBARA JEAN DENNIS, 

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-10437 

D.C. No. 2:10-cr-00091-KJD

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

Kent J. Dawson, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted April 11, 2018**

Before: SILVERMAN, PAEZ, and OWENS, Circuit Judges. 

Barbara Jean Dennis appeals from the district court’s judgment and 

challenges the $80,952.41 restitution order and $10,000 fine imposed following her 

guilty-plea conviction for bankruptcy fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 157(1). 

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we vacate and remand.

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

APR 16 2018

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 16-10437 

Dennis contends that the restitution order fails to comport with the 

Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663A-3664. The government 

concedes error and affirmatively waives the opportunity to seek a new restitution 

order on remand. We agree there was error and vacate the restitution order and 

remand for the district court to strike it from the judgment.

 Upon remand, the district court shall also reconsider the fine imposed 

under the factors specifically set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3572(a).

VACATED and REMANDED.
#### § 1956.24 Procedures for withdrawal of approval.

The procedures and standards contained in part 1955 of this chapter shall be applicable to the withdrawal of approval of plans approved under this part 1956, except that (because these plans, as do public employee programs aproved and financed in connection with a State plan covering private employees, must cover all employees of State and local agencies in a State whenever a State is constitutionally able to do so, at least developmentally), no industrial or occupational issues may be considered a separable portion of a plan under § 1955.2(a)(10); and, as Federal standards and enforcement do not apply to State and local government employers, withdrawal of approval of a plan approved under this part 1956 could not bring about application of the provisions of the Federal Act to such employers as set out in § 1955.4 of this chapter.
#### In the Matter of Steven A. Christiano, Appellant, v Howard Safir, as Police Commissioner of the City of New York and as Chair of the Police Pension Fund, Article II, et al., Respondents.

[698 NYS2d 23]

—Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Louis York, J.), entered October 17, 1997, which denied petitioner’s application pursuant to CPLR article 78 to annul respondents’ determination denying his request for accident disability retirement benefits and dismissed the proceeding, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Respondents’ Medical Board found that petitioner’s disability arose out of a congenital degenerative arthritic condition rather than a line of duty accident, and as the Medical Board’s findings were supported by some credible evidence, the ensuing determination of respondent’s Board of Trustees, in reliance upon the Medical Board’s findings, to deny petitioner’s application for accident disability retirement benefits, may not be judicially disturbed *(see, Matter of Borenstein v New York City Employees’ Retirement Sys.,*88 NY2d 756, 761). Concur — Sullivan, J. P., Rosenberger, Lerner, Rubin and Andrias, JJ.
----

Reference for a preliminary ruling by the Tribunale di Roma (District Court, Rome) by order of that court of 7 April 2004 in the case of Stefano Macrino and Claudia Capodarte against Roberto Meloni

(Case C-202/04)

(2004/C 179/11)

Reference has been made to the Court of Justice of the European Communities by order of the Tribunale di Roma (District Court, Rome) (Italy) of 7 April 2004, received at the Court Registry on 6 May 2004, for a preliminary ruling in the case of Stefano Macrino and Claudia Capodarte against Roberto Meloni on the following question:

Do Articles 5 and 85 of the EC Treaty (now Articles 10 and 81 EC) preclude a Member State from adopting a law or regulation which approves, on the basis of a draft produced by a professional body of members of the Bar, a tariff fixing minimum and maximum fees for members of the profession in respect of services rendered in connection with activities (so-called non-court work) that are not reserved to members of the Bar but may be performed by anyone?

----
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS

- - - - - - - -
NO. 20-0246 SUBRINA BRENHAM AND SUBRINA'S TAX SERVICES v. JOSEPH KEMP AND KRR HH RETAIL, LLC § § § § § § Dallas County, 5th District.

July 3, 2020 Petitioner's petition for review, filed herein in the above numbered and styled case, having been duly considered, is ordered, and hereby is, denied. November 13, 2020 Petitioner's motion for rehearing of petition for review, filed herein in the above numbered and styled case, having been duly considered, is ordered, and hereby is, denied.  I, BLAKE A. HAWTHORNE, Clerk of the Supreme Court of Texas, do hereby certify that the above is a true and correct copy of the orders of the Supreme Court of Texas in the case numbered and styled as above, as the same appear of record in the minutes of said Court under the date shown. It is further ordered that petitioner, SUBRINA BRENHAM AND SUBRINA'S TAX SERVICES, pay all costs incurred on this petition. WITNESS my hand and seal of the Supreme Court of Texas, at the City of Austin, this the 13th day of November, 2020.

Blake A. Hawthorne, Clerk By Monica Zamarripa, Deputy Clerk
[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 96 (Wednesday, May 17, 2000)]
[Notices]
[Page 31348]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-12421]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION

[Investigations Nos. 731-TA-406 & 408 (Review)]


Electrolytic Manganese Dioxide From Greece and Japan

Determinations

    On the basis of the record \1\ developed in the subject five-year 
reviews, the United States International Trade Commission determines, 
pursuant to section 751(c) of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 
Sec. 1675(c)) (the Act), that revocation of the antidumping duty orders 
on electrolytic manganese dioxide from Greece and Japan would not be 
likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of material injury to an 
industry in the United States within a reasonably foreseeable time. \2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ The record is defined in sec. 207.2(f) of the Commission's 
Rules of Practice and Procedure (19 CFR Sec. 207.2(f)).
    \2\ Chairman Lynn M. Bragg dissenting.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Background

    The Commission instituted these reviews on May 3, 1999 (64 FR 
23675) and determined on August 25, 1999 that it would conduct full 
reviews (64 FR 46407, August 25, 1999). Notice of the scheduling of the 
Commission's reviews and of a public hearing to be held in connection 
therewith was given by posting copies of the notice in the Office of 
the Secretary, U.S. International Trade Commission, Washington, DC, and 
by publishing the notice in the Federal Register on October 6, 1999 (64 
FR 54353). The hearing was held in Washington, DC, on March 2, 2000, 
and all persons who requested the opportunity were permitted to appear 
in person or by counsel.
    The Commission transmitted its determinations in these reviews to 
the Secretary of Commerce on May 9, 2000. The views of the Commission 
are contained in USITC Publication 3296 (May 2000), entitled 
Electrolytic Manganese Dioxide from Greece and Japan: Investigations 
Nos. 731-TA 406 and 408 (Review).

    Issued: May 12, 2000.
    By order of the Commission.
Donna R. Koehnke,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 00-12421 Filed 5-16-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7020-02-P
#### STRAX BREAST CANCER DETECTION INSTITUTE, INC. v CHRISTOFOLIS

Case No. 89-12222 (CZ)

Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County

August 28, 1989

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

Strax Breast Cancer Detection Institute, Inc., pro se.

Marianne Christofolis, pro se.

OPINION OF THE COURT

DALE ROSS, Circuit Judge.

This Cause comes before this Court on Appellee’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to File Timely Brief and being fully advised in the premises, this Court herein denies Appellant’s Motion for Extension of Time to File Brief and grants Appellee’s Motion to Dismiss.

The Appellant in this case filed a Notice of Appeal of a County Court decision on May 2, 1989. The Appellant’s initial brief was due on July 11, 1989. The Appellant failed to file the brief at said time and neglected to file a Motion for an Extension of Time within the prescribed period. On July 21, 1989, Appellant filed a request for *58dismissal of the appeal due to Appellant’s failure to file the brief before the deadline. Four days later, on July 25, 1989, Appellee filed a Motion fo the Extension of Time to File Brief. After a hearing to consider said motion, this Court denied the request for an extension of time.

This Court now dismisses this appeal pursuant to Rule 9.410, Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. Rule 9.410 allows dismissal of proceedings for violations of the procedural rules governing appeals. Appellant’s failure to file an initial brief within 70 days of filing the notice, its failure to file a motion for extension of time within that period, and its failure to provide adequate reasons for the granting of said extension in its belated request, constitutes a violation of Rule 9.110(f). A Court may dismiss an appeal for failure to file a brief. *Swicegood v Florida Department of Transportation,*394 So.2d 111 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); *Kerr McGee Chemical Corp. v Lipford,*395 So.2d 249 (Fla. 1st DCA).

Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that this appeal be dismissed.

DONE AND ORDERED at Fort Lauderdale, Broward County, Florida, on this 28th day of August, 1989.
Exhibit 10.4


 


AMENDMENT
TO employment agreement


 


THIS AMENDMENT
TO THE EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT DATED APRIL 1, 2014 is made and entered into as of March 31, 2015, by and between MassRoots, Inc.
(the “Company”), and Isaac Dietrich (the “Employee”).


 


R E C I T A L S


 


WHEREAS, the Company
and Employee entered into an Amended Employment Agreement on April 1, 2014.


 


WHEREAS, the Company
has determined the Employee has routinely exceeded key performance metrics in his area of operations.


 


NOW, THEREFORE,
be it resolved that Section 5 (a) of the Employment Agreement dated April 1, 2014 be amended effective April 1, 2015 to state:


 


(a) Employee shall receive an annual salary of ninety
thousand dollars ($90,000) (“Base Salary”) paid in accordance with the Company’s normal payroll practices.
The Company may make such deductions, withholdings or payments from sums payable to Employee hereunder which are required by
law for taxes and similar charges. The Company will review Employee’s base salary in accordance with the
Company’s normal payroll procedures.


 


IN WITNESS WHEREOF,
Employee and the Company have executed this Employment Agreement as of the day and year first above written.


 


	 	By:/s/ Isaac Dietrich

        

        Name: Isaac Dietrich

        Title: Chairman and CEO

	 	 
	 	 
	 	 
	 	By:/s/ Isaac Dietrich
	 	Employee Signature
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1997
<CASH>                                             259
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    7,381
<ALLOWANCES>                                       287
<INVENTORY>                                      3,503
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                11,933
<PP&E>                                          33,089
<DEPRECIATION>                                  18,199
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  31,955
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            5,769
<BONDS>                                          9,059
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           819
<OTHER-SE>                                      17,127
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    31,955
<SALES>                                         48,556
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                48,556
<CGS>                                           37,979
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   46,718
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 781
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  1,057
<INCOME-TAX>                                       468
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                589
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                       589
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .09
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .09


</TABLE>
~VERMONT 

State ofVermont 

Deparbnent ofEnvironniental Conservation 

Waste Management & Prevention Division 

1 National Life Drive- Davis 1 

Montpelier, VT 05620-3704 

(802) 828-1138 

Mr. H. Curtis Spaulding 

Regional Administrator 

EPA Region 1(Mail Code ORAOI-4) 

5 Post Office Square, Suite I 00 

Boston, MA 02109-3912 

Dear Mr. Spaulding: 

AGENCY OF NATURAL RESOURCES 

August 20,2013 

The State of Vermont hereby submits its application for authorization of revisions made to Vermont's hazardous 

waste management program under the Resource Conservation & Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), as amended by the 

Hazardous & Solid Waste Amendments of 1984 (HSWA). The application consists of the following documents: a 

copy of the Vermont Hazardous Waste Management Regulations (VHWMR) that became effective on March 15, 

2013 (previously submitted to your staff); a copy of 10 V.S.A. § 6680 (Act No. 58 of the 2013 Session (Adj. 

Session)), which designates postconsumer paint as universal waste; authorization revision checklists (previously 

submitted to your staff); and an Attorney General's Statement. At the request of EPA Region I, Vermont is not 

submitting VHWMR § 7-502(o)(8), and the VHWMR § 7-103 definition of"wastewater evaporation unit" as part of 

its authorization application. 

Through this application, Vermont is seeking authority for rules within RCRA Clusters XVI, XVII, XIX, XX and 

XXI. Following thorough review by this Division and the Office of Vermont's Attorney General, it is our belief that 

Vermont's revised·hazardous waste program meets the statutory criteria ofRCRA § 3006 and therefore can be 

granted authorization to implement these provisions as part of its program in lieu of the federal program. 

The application documents are enclosed with the copy of this letter directed to Beth Deabay in the Office of 

Ecosystem Protection. I am confident that the continued cooperation between our agencies will lead to expeditious 

completion of this authorization process. 

eorge Desch, Director 

Waste Management & Prevention Division 

Cc: Beth Deabay 

Regional Offices- BarrejEssexJct./RutlandjSpringfield/St. Johnsbury
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 

DARLENE WILLIAMS HICKMAN, 

Appellant, 

vs. 

MARVIN L. HICKMAN, 

Respondent. 

No. 68468 

FILED 

APR 0 1 2016 

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL 

This is an appeal from a decree of divorce. Eighth Judicial 

District Court, Family Court Division, Clark County; Charles J. Hoskin, 

Judge. 

When our initial review of the docketing statement and other 

documents before this court revealed potential jurisdictional defects, we 

ordered appellant to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed 

for lack of jurisdiction. Specifically, it was not clear whether the decree 

resolved all of the claims and issues raised in the district court such that it 

was appealable as a final judgment under NRAP 3A(b)(1). If the decree 

was a final judgment, it appeared that the notice of appeal was 

prematurely filed after a tolling motion was timely filed in the district 

court on July 9, 2015, but before the tolling motion was formally resolved, 

and that the tolling motion remained pending in the district court. See 

NRAP 4(a)(6). 

In response to our order, appellant asserts that the decree was 

the final judgment. She also appears to assert that the July 9, 2015, 

motion is not a tolling motion because motions for reconsideration do not 

toll the time to file a notice of appeal. 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(0) 1947A 0 - /CSO 
Ch9-41,12.4", 

Cherry 

J. 

Assuming that the decree was the final judgment, the July 9, 

2015, motion to alter or amend, or in the alternative for reconsideration—

which also sought a new trial under NRCP 59—was a tolling motion. See 

NRAP 4(a)(4) (identifying a motion to alter or amend the judgment and a 

motion for a new trial as tolling motions); see also AA Primo Builders, LLC 

v. Washington, 126 Nev. 578, 585 245 P.3d 1190, 1195 (2010) (laying out 

circumstances under which a motion for reconsideration is considered a 

tolling motion). The motion was timely filed after service of notice of entry 

of the divorce decree on June 25, 2015. Appellant does not assert that the 

motion has been resolved and it appears from the documents before this 

court that the motion remains pending in the district court.' Accordingly, 

it appears that the notice of appeal was prematurely filed before entry of 

an order resolving the timely tolling motion and this court lacks 

jurisdiction. See NRAP 4(a)(6) ("A premature notice of appeal does not 

divest the district court of jurisdiction."). We thus 

ORDER this appeal DISMISSED. 

-7)0e/wie 

Douglas 

'Appellant represents that the motion was "vacated" via a minute 

order for lack of jurisdiction due to the pending appeal. Such a minute 

order is without effect. See Div. of Child and Family Servs. v. Eighth 

Judicial Din. Court, 120 Nev. 445, 92 P.3d 1239 (2004). 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(0) 1947A ae 

2 
cc: Hon. Charles J. Hoskin, District Judge, Family Court Division 

Ara H. Shirinian, Settlement Judge 

Thomas Michaelides 

Kainen Law Group 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(C)) 1947A •4IZ7P 

3