IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Robert Gene Rega, :

Petitioner :

 :

v. : No. 244 M.D. 2017

 : Submitted: December 1, 2017

Pennsylvania Department of :

Corrections; Bruce Beemer (Atty. :

General); John E. Wetzel (Secretary :

of Department of Corrections); :

Robert Gilmore (Super. for S.C.I. :

Greene); Karen Patterson (Business :

Manager); Tiffany Pauley :

(Accountant); Joan Kennedy :

(Clerk/Accounts); Theron R. Perez, :

Esq. (Chief Counsel); Tonya S. Geist :

Geist (Prothonotary for Jefferson :

County); Brian K. Spencer :

(Prothonotary for Clearfield County) :

 :

Respondents in Their Individual :

and Official Capacity, :

Respondents :

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge

HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge

HONORABLE DAN PELLEGRINI, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY

JUDGE COHN JUBELIRER FILED: January 31, 2018
2

Presently before the Court are the preliminary objections in the nature of a 

demurrer filed by the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC), Bruce 

Beemer, John E. Wetzel, Robert Gilmore, Karen Patterson, Tiffany Pauley, Joan 

Kennedy, Theron Perez, Esq., Tonya Geist, and Brian K. Spencer (Respondents, 

collectively).1 Respondents filed preliminary objections to an Amended Petition for 

Review filed in this Court’s original jurisdiction by Robert Gene Rega (Rega), an 

inmate at the State Correctional Institution at Greene, which challenges the 

deduction of $5,528.03 from his inmate account for alleged outstanding fines, costs, 

and fees. For the reasons that follow, the preliminary objections are overruled in 

part and sustained in part.

Initially we note that, when ruling on preliminary objections, the Court must 

accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, along with any inferences

reasonably deduced therefrom. Neely v. Dep’t of Corr., 838 A.2d 16, 19 n.4 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2003). Preliminary objections should not be sustained unless it “appear[s] 

with certainty that the law will not permit recovery and any doubt should be resolved 

by a refusal to sustain them.” Id.

With this standard in mind, we consider the facts as alleged by Rega. Rega is 

currently serving sentences in the following cases:

 Clearfield County Docket No. CP-17-CR-0000819-1996, where he 

pleaded guilty on June 24, 1996, and was subsequently sentenced to nine 

 

1 At the time of the allegations in Rega’s Amended Petition, Beemer was the acting 

Attorney General; Wetzel was the Secretary for the DOC; Gilmore was the superintendent at the 

State Correctional Institution at Greene (SCI-Greene); Patterson was the business manager at SCIGreene; Pauley was an accountant at SCI-Greene; Kennedy was an accounting clerk at SCIGreene; Perez was chief counsel for DOC; Geist was Prothonotary of Jefferson County; and 

Spencer was Prothonotary of Clearfield County. (Am. Petition ¶¶ 3-12.)
3

months to five years in state prison. According to Rega, no fines or costs 

were imposed.2 (Am. Petition ¶¶ 13-14.) 

 Jefferson County Docket Nos. CP-33-CR-0000026-2001 and CP-33-CR0000524-2001, where he was tried and convicted on June 21, 2002, and 

was subsequently sentenced to, inter alia, the death penalty.3 According 

to Rega, no fines or costs were imposed. (Id. ¶¶ 16, 19.) 

 Jefferson County Docket No. CP-33-CR-0000174-2001, where he was 

tried and convicted on January 28, 2004, and was subsequently sentenced 

to 147 years to 344 years in state prison. According to Rega, one set of 

costs and $4,000 in fines was imposed. (Id. ¶¶ 21-22.)

On or about September 20, 2016, while incarcerated, Rega received a 

settlement check for $10,000 from an action he brought in federal court against the 

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. (Id. ¶ 27, Ex. 1-A.) Rega “adamantly objected” 

to the deposit of the settlement funds into his inmate account. (Id. ¶ 30.) Shortly 

after the funds were deposited, he requested Respondent Pauley to draft a check for 

$9,000 payable to Hunter Labovitz for the purpose of establishing a trust for his two 

daughters. (Id. ¶¶ 32, 35.) Before the check was cashed, a stop payment on the 

check was issued. (Id. ¶¶ 34, 36-37.) The funds were subsequently re-deposited 

into Rega’s inmate account. (Id. ¶ 39.) 

After the funds were re-deposited, four deductions were made from Rega’s 

inmate account to pay fines, costs and fees: (1) $233.53 paid towards Docket No. 

CP-17-CR-000819-1996; (2) $496.00 paid towards Docket No. CP-33-CR-000026-

2001; (3) $272.50 paid towards Docket No. CP-33-CR-000524-2001; and (4) 

 

2 Although Rega avers that there was no fine imposed, the Itemized Account of Fines, 

Costs, Fees, and Restitution for the Clearfield County case lists a $100 “County Fine.” There is 

no sentencing order in the record to confirm whether this fine was ordered by the court. 

3 Rega averred that the two cases were joined by court order. (Am. Petition ¶ 17.)
4

$4,536.00 paid towards Docket No. CP-33-CR-000174-2001. (Id.) According to a 

letter to Rega from Inmate Accounting dated November 29, 2016:

Pursuant to PA law, 42 Pa. C.S. § 6608,[4]“By statute in the 

Pennsylvania state [Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 Pa. C.S. 

§§ 6601-6608], any settlement [in] favor of [an] inmate regarding 

prison conditions litigation must go first to pay off any outstanding 

restitution, costs, etc. associated with the criminal sentence.”

(Id. ¶¶ 41-42, Ex. 1-A (emphasis omitted).)

Rega challenges the deductions on a number of bases, including, inter alia, 

that the deductions violate: the Supremacy Clause found in Article VI, Section 2 of 

the United States Constitution; the ex post facto clause found in Article I, Section 17 

of the Pennsylvania Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the United States

Constitution; the separation of powers clause found in Article V, Sections 1 and 10 

of the Pennsylvania Constitution; his due process rights under Article I, Section 1 of 

the Pennsylvania Constitution and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the 

United States Constitution; and DOC policy. In addition, Rega avers that 

 

4 Section 6608 provides:

Monetary damages awarded to a prisoner in connection with prison conditions 

litigation or paid in settlement of prison conditions litigation which is payable from 

funds appropriated by the General Assembly or by a political subdivision or an 

insurance policy purchased by the Commonwealth or political subdivision shall 

first be used to satisfy any outstanding court orders requiring the prisoner to pay 

restitution, costs, bail, judgments, fines, fees, sanctions or other court-imposed 

amounts in connection with a criminal prosecution or sentence. Upon receipt of a 

copy of an outstanding court order, the government party or person designated by 

the government party shall deduct the full amount owed from the remaining moneys 

and arrange to pay it directly to the person or entity owed in accordance with 

Pennsylvania law.

42 Pa. C.S. § 6608.
5

Respondents acted negligently in deducting the funds from his inmate account. He 

seeks return of the $5,528.03, along with costs, costs of litigation, attorney fees, 

interest, and delay damages. 

In response, Respondents filed preliminary objections in the nature of 

demurrers asserting that Rega has no cause of action because the deductions were 

properly made pursuant to the PLRA and/or Section 9728(b)(5) of the Sentencing 

Code, 42 Pa. C.S. § 9728(b)(5), which is commonly referred to as Act 84.5 

Respondents also argue that Rega’s claims are barred either by sovereign immunity 

or by what is commonly referred to as the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act

(Tort Claims Act), 42 Pa. C.S. §§ 8541-8542. Finally, Respondents argue that Rega 

fails to state a claim for any of his alleged constitutional violations. We address 

these preliminary objections in turn.

I. PLRA and/or Act 84

Respondents first argue that Rega fails to state a claim because the deductions 

were authorized under either the PLRA and/or Act 84. They argue the bulk of the 

deductions, $4,000, went towards court-ordered fines in one of the Jefferson County 

 

5 Section 9728(b)(5) provides, in pertinent part:

[T]he Department of Corrections shall be authorized to make monetary deductions 

from inmate personal accounts for the purpose of collecting restitution or any other 

court-ordered obligation or costs imposed under section 9721(c.1). Any amount 

deducted shall be transmitted by the Department of Corrections . . . to the probation 

department of the county or other agent designated by the county commissioners of 

the county with the approval of the president judge of the county in which the 

offender was convicted. The Department of Corrections shall develop guidelines 

relating to its responsibilities under this paragraph.

42 Pa. C.S. § 9728(b)(5). 
6

cases. The remaining costs and fees did not need to be specifically included in a 

court-order, they argue, because they are mandated by statute. 

Rega responds, inter alia, that the costs and fees must be court ordered in 

order to be collected, and here, they were not. Therefore, the imposition of such 

costs and fees violates the prohibition against ex post facto laws in the Pennsylvania 

and United States Constitutions.6 As for the $4,000 in fines, Rega acknowledges 

they were ordered at sentencing but contends that they are not yet due because that 

sentence, including the payment of the fines, is to be served consecutive to another 

Jefferson County case in which he received the death penalty. (Am. Petition ¶¶ 23-

24, 26.)

Both the PLRA and Act 84 authorize deductions for certain fines, costs, and 

fees. Section 6608 of the PLRA requires that any monetary settlement an inmate 

receives in connection to prison conditions litigation be used first to satisfy any 

outstanding court orders requiring the inmate to pay restitution, costs, fees, fines, 

and other court-imposed amounts. 42 Pa. C.S. § 6608. Act 84 authorizes DOC to 

deduct restitution, any other court-ordered obligation, or costs imposed under 

Section 9721(c.1) from an inmate’s account. 42 Pa. C.S. § 9728(b)(5). The common 

thread between PLRA and Act 84 is that both statutes apply to court-ordered fines, 

costs, and fees. 

However, certain statutorily mandated costs or fees may not need to be 

included in a court order in order to be valid. For instance, Section 1101(e) of the 

 

6 Article I, Section 17 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides, “No ex post facto law . . . 

shall be passed.” Pa. Const. art. I, § 17. Article I, § 10 of the United States Constitution similarly 

forbids the passage of any law which imposes any punishment for an act not punishable at the time 

it was committed or which imposes additional punishment to that then prescribed. See Weaver v. 

Dep’t of Corr., 720 A.2d 178, 182 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998).
7

Crime Victims Act7 expressly provides that “[n]o court order shall be necessary in 

order for the defendant to incur liability for costs under this section.” 18 P.S. 

§ 11.1101(e). This Court has held that statutorily mandated costs are non-waivable 

and can be deducted absent an express court order. Saxberg v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 

42 A.3d 1210, 1215-16 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012); Spotz v. Commonwealth, 972 A.2d 125, 

134 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009). However, waivable costs must be expressly provided for 

by court order to be collectable. Spotz, 972 A.2d at 134. 

Here, Respondents make no attempt to identify which costs or fees are nonwaivable, statutorily mandated costs or fees, and which are not. Instead, they argue 

it does not matter because, under Section 9721(c.1), they are recoverable even in the 

absence of a court order. Section 9721(c.1) provides as follows: 

Notwithstanding the provisions of section 9728 (relating to collection 

of restitution, reparation, fees, costs, fines and penalties) or any 

provision of law to the contrary, in addition to the alternatives set forth 

in subsection (a), the court shall order the defendant to pay costs. In 

the event the court fails to issue an order for costs pursuant to 

section 9728, costs shall be imposed upon the defendant under this 

section. No court order shall be necessary for the defendant to 

incur liability for costs under this section. The provisions of this 

subsection do not alter the court’s discretion under Pa.R.Crim.P. [] 

706(C) (relating to fines or costs). 

42 Pa. C.S. § 9721(c.1) (emphasis added). 

The problem with Respondents’ reliance on Section 9721(c.1) is that it was 

not enacted until 2010, long after Rega was sentenced.8 As a result, Respondents 

cannot rely on Section 9721(c.1) to excuse the absence of a court order because such 

 

7 Act of November 24, 1998, P.L. 882, as amended, 18 P.S. §§ 11.101-11.5102.

8 Section 9721(c.1) was added by Section 2 of the Act of October 27, 2010, P.L. 949.
8

application would constitute an ex post facto law.9 In Commonwealth v. Allshouse, 

924 A.2d 1215, 1230 (Pa. Super. 2007), the Superior Court concluded that an 

amended version of 42 Pa. C.S. § 9728(g), which provides for recovery of 

transportation costs, was penal in nature and therefore could not be constitutionally 

applied retroactively without violating the prohibition against ex post facto laws.10 

Section 9721(c.1) is similarly penal in nature in that it imposes greater punishment 

by allowing for the expansion of recoverable costs – from those that are specifically 

included in a court order to those that are not.

11

 

The Itemized Account of Fines, Costs, Fees, and Restitution12 identify a 

variety of costs and fees, ranging from vague references to “Judicial Computer 

Project” and “Automation Fee” to more general “Clerk Costs” and “Sheriff Costs” 

to more specific references to “Crimes Commission Cost (Act 96 of 1984)” and 

“Domestic Violence Compensation (Act 44 of 1988).” As stated above, 

Respondents have not identified which costs are statutorily mandated and which are 

not. Furthermore, given the state of the record at this early procedural posture, we 

cannot determine whether any of the costs or fees were, in fact, court-ordered.13 

 

9 Notably, even the DOC Policy DC-ADM 005 governing collections from inmate accounts 

recognizes that, for inmates sentenced prior to December 26, 2010, court costs are not collectible 

unless they were specifically ordered by the court. (Am. Petition, Ex. 25.)

10 Although we “are not bound by the Superior Court’s precedents, . . . we may adopt the 

Superior Court’s reasoning where persuasive.” Commonwealth v. Irland, 153 A.3d 469, 482 (Pa. 

Cmwlth.), petition for allowance of appeal granted, 169 A.3d 1052 (Pa. 2017). 

11 We are cognizant of our holdings in George v. Beard, 824 A.2d 393 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003) 

and Commonwealth v. Ralston, 800 A.2d 1007, 1009 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002), in which we found Act 

84 is “procedural in nature” and may be applied retroactively. However, in those cases, Section 

9721(c.1) was not at issue because the trial court did, in fact, order the payment of costs and 

restitution as part of its sentencing orders.

12 The itemizations are attached to Rega’s Amended Petition as Exhibits 2-5. 

13 Not all sentencing orders are included as exhibits to Rega’s Amended Petition. In 

addition, only excerpts of the sentencing transcripts are attached as exhibits.
9

Because this matter is before us on preliminary objections, we must accept Rega’s 

averment that the costs and fees were not court-ordered as true, and as a result, are 

constrained to overrule Respondents’ first preliminary objection, at least with regard 

to the costs and fees. However, it is undisputed that $4,000 in fines was court 

ordered as part of Rega’s sentence in Jefferson County. Rega argues that his 

sentence in that case was to run consecutive to another sentence and therefore, his 

fines are not due until that sentence is completed. Rega cites no authority for this 

position. Nor are we convinced that the sentencing court intended that Rega pay the 

fines after his other sentence was completed, particularly since that sentence was 

death. Accordingly, we sustain Respondents’ preliminary objection to Count I but 

only to the extent the $4,000 fine was properly deducted. 

II. Immunity

Next, Respondents argue that Count 2 of Rega’s Amended Petition is barred 

either by sovereign immunity for the Commonwealth Respondents or by the Tort 

Claims Act for the two county prothonotaries, Geist and Spencer.14 Count 2 of the 

Amended Petition sounds in negligence. 

Under Section 8521 of the Judicial Code, commonly referred to as the 

Sovereign Immunity Act,15 42 Pa. C.S. § 8521, Commonwealth employees and 

 

14 In the heading of their second preliminary objection, Geist and Spencer state they are 

seeking a demurrer to Counts 2, 3, 4, 6 and 8 of the Amended Petition on immunity grounds. 

However, in both the preliminary objections and in their supporting brief, they only identify Count 

2, sounding in negligence, as the subject of their preliminary objections. Accordingly, we, too, 

limit our discussion of the immunity issue to Count 2. Inclusion of the other counts appears to be 

in error and referring to the original petition for review, as the Amended Petition only has five 

counts. To the extent they were seeking a demurrer to the other counts (Counts 3 and 4) on 

immunity grounds, we find that their failure to develop their argument constitutes waiver of that 

argument. 

15 42 Pa. C.S. §§ 8521-8528.
10

officials acting within the scope of their duties are immune from civil liability. Dep’t 

of Corr. v. Tate, 133 A.3d 350, 359 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016). Like many general rules, 

there are exceptions. Section 8522(b) of the Sovereign Immunity Act provides for 

nine instances in which Commonwealth parties may be liable: (1) vehicle liability; 

(2) medical-professional liability; (3) care, custody, or control of personal property; 

(4) Commonwealth real estate, highways, and sidewalks; (5) potholes and other 

dangerous conditions; (6) care, custody, or control of animals; (7) liquor store sales; 

(8) National Guard activities; and (9) toxoids and vaccines. Section 8522(b) of the 

Judicial Code, 42 Pa. C.S. § 8522(b). 

The Tort Claims Act similarly provides that employees of a local agency are 

immunized from liability for any injuries caused by negligent acts committed within 

the scope of their office or duties. Section 8542(a)(2) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa. 

C.S. § 8542(a)(2). It lists eight exceptions: (1) vehicle liability; (2) care, custody,

or control of personal property; (3) real property; (4) trees, traffic controls, and street 

lighting; (5) utility service facilities; (6) streets; (7) sidewalks; and (8) care, custody,

or control of animals. 42 Pa. C.S. § 8542(b). 

Here, the only feasible exception that could apply to Rega’s negligence claim 

is the one related to care, custody, or control of personal property. 42 Pa. C.S. §

8522(b)(3); 42 Pa. C.S. § 8542(b)(2). However, we have previously held that while 

the Commonwealth may be liable for damage to or the negligent handling of an 

inmate’s personal property, it cannot be liable for the taking of that property. Tate, 

133 A.3d at 360; Goodley v. Folino (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 2376 C.D. 2010, filed July 
11

22, 2011), slip op. at 8.16,17 Here, it is the seizure of Rega’s property that is in dispute. 

Therefore, Respondents are immune from the negligence claim. Accordingly, we 

will sustain Respondents’ second preliminary objection and dismiss Count 2 of 

Rega’s Amended Petition.18

III. Constitutional Claims 

In their final preliminary objections, Respondents argue that Rega failed to 

state a claim for any of the constitutional violations he alleges. In Counts 3 through 

5 of the Amended Petition, Rega asserts violations of the Supremacy Clause, due 

process, and separation of powers, respectively. 

With respect to Count 3, asserting a Supremacy Clause violation,19 the United 

States Supreme Court has held that the Supremacy Clause “does not create rights 

 

16 Although Tate and Goodley dealt with the personal property exception under the 

Sovereign Immunity Act, the rationale equally applies to the personal property exception found in 

the Tort Claims Act. Thus, the county prothonotaries are likewise immune from Rega’s negligence 

claim. 

17 Goodley is an unreported panel decision of this Court, which is cited in accordance with 

Section 414(a) of this Court’s Internal Operating Procedures, which provides that an unreported 

panel decision issued by this Court after January 15, 2008 may be cited “for its persuasive value, 

but not as binding precedent.” 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a). 

18 Given our disposition of this issue, we need not address Respondent Beemer’s or 

Respondent Perez’s alternative argument that they are entitled to absolute immunity. 

19 Article VI, clause 2, of the United States Constitution provides:

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in 

Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 

Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the 

Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws 

of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.

U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
12

enforceable under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983.”

20

 Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los 

Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 107-08 (1989). Thus, we sustain Respondents’ preliminary 

objection and dismiss Count 3 of the Amended Petition. 

With respect to Count 4, asserting a due process violation,21 in Buck v. Beard, 

879 A.2d 157, 160-61 (Pa. 2005), our Supreme Court held that a sentencing hearing 

provides an inmate with all of the due process required prior to deductions being 

made from his inmate account. See also Richardson v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 991 A.2d 

394, 396 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010); Ingram v. Newman, 830 A.2d 1099, 1102-03 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2003); George v. Beard, 824 A.2d 393, 396 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003) (all holding 

same). Rega’s reliance on Montanez v. Secretary Pennsylvania Department of 

Corrections, 773 F.3d 472 (3d Cir. 2014), is not persuasive. First, the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court has not yet adopted Montanez.

22

 Second, in Montanez, the United 

States Third Circuit Court of Appeals “largely agree[d]” with the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court’s holding in Buck, but noted that it did not address whether inmates 

 

20 Section 1983 provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or 

usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to 

be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction 

thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 

Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in 

equity, or other proper proceeding for redress[.]

42 U.S.C. § 1983.

21 Rega asserts his due process claim under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 

United States Constitution. However, the Fifth Amendment is inapplicable, as it only affords 

enforceable rights against the federal government and its actors, not state or local governments and 

their actors. Moore v. Richman, 797 F.Supp. 2d 572, 580 (W.D. Pa. 2011). 

22 Opinions from the United States Third Circuit Court of Appeals are instructive, but not 

binding, on either the Pennsylvania Supreme Court or any other court of this Commonwealth. 

Tate, 133 A.3d at 358 n.11 (citing Goldman v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 57 A.3d 1154, 1169 n.12 (Pa. 

2012)). 
13

should be notified of the DOC’s policy concerning deductions and the final amount 

of costs to be deducted. Id. at 485. In Tate, this Court stated:

Even if we view Montanez as instructive,[] it does not support Tate’s 

claim that the Department’s inmate account deductions violated his due 

process rights because he did not receive a pre-deduction hearing. The 

decision has little value when determining whether Tate’s Amended 

Petition alone sets forth a due process violation against the Department 

to withstand preliminary objections because the Amended Petition, on 

its face, reflects that Tate was aware of what he owed in costs, fines 

and restitution, and that he sought review under the Department’s 

grievance procedures. Moreover, the Amended Petition does not 

state that he was deprived of pre-deduction notice by way of the 

inmate handbook or written notice, but rather that he was not 

afforded a pre-deprivation hearing which, even the Montanez

Court acknowledged, was not required. Accordingly, the Amended 

Petition fails to state facts sufficient to support a claim that the 

Department’s failure to afford Tate a pre-deduction hearing violated his 

due process rights.

133 A.3d at 358 (footnote omitted; emphasis added).

Here, it is obvious Rega was aware of the DOC policy, as he attached a portion 

of it as an exhibit to his Amended Petition, along with a portion of the Inmate 

Handbook discussing collection of inmate debts. (Am. Petition, Exs. 24-31-B.) 

Furthermore, he was aware of the total amount allegedly owed as early as July 2016 

when he was informed in the settlement of the federal court action that the money 

was owed and was going to be deducted. (Am. Petition, Exs. 7-A-7-B.) He also 

availed himself of the grievance procedure. (Am. Petition, Exs. 6-A-6-I.) Based 

upon our precedent, Rega was afforded the process he was due. Accordingly, we 

sustain Respondents’ preliminary objection and dismiss Count 4 of the Amended 

Petition.

With respect to Count 5, asserting a separation of powers violation, our Court 

has also rejected this claim in the past. See Richardson, 991 A.2d at 396; Boyd v. 
14

Dep’t of Corr., 831 A.2d 779, 783 n.8 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003), aff’d, 886 A.2d 222 (Pa. 

2005). Accordingly, we sustain this preliminary objection and dismiss Count 5 of 

Rega’s Amended Petition. 

IV. Conclusion

At this early stage of the proceedings, based upon the record before us and in 

light of our limited standard of review, we overrule Respondents’ preliminary 

objection as to whether the costs and fees were properly deducted under the PLRA 

and/or Act 84. However, we sustain Respondents’ remaining preliminary 

objections, finding the $4,000 fine was properly deducted as it was court-ordered 

and that Rega failed to state a claim against Respondents for negligence or for the 

violation of the Pennsylvania and United States Constitutions. 

_____________________________________

RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Robert Gene Rega, :

Petitioner :

 :

v. : No. 244 M.D. 2017

 : Submitted: December 1, 2017

Pennsylvania Department of :

Corrections; Bruce Beemer (Atty. :

General); John E. Wetzel (Secretary :

of Department of Corrections); :

Robert Gilmore (Super. for S.C.I. :

Greene); Karen Patterson (Business :

Manager); Tiffany Pauley :

(Accountant); Joan Kennedy :

(Clerk/Accounts); Theron R. Perez, :

Esq. (Chief Counsel); Tonya S. Geist :

(Prothonotary for Jefferson :

County); Brian K. Spencer :

(Prothonotary for Clearfield County) :

 :

Respondents in Their Individual :

and Official Capacity, :

Respondents :

O R D E R

NOW, this 31st day of January, 2018, the preliminary objections filed by 

Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, Bruce Beemer, John E. Wetzel, Robert 

Gilmore, Karen Patterson, Tiffany Pauley, Joan Kennedy, Theron Perez, Esq.,

Tonya Geist, and Brian K. Spencer (Respondents, collectively) to the Amended 

Petition for Review filed by Robert Gene Rega (Petitioner) are OVERRULED IN 

PART and SUSTAINED IN PART. Respondents’ preliminary objection in the 

nature of a demurrer on the grounds the alleged deductions from Petitioner’s inmate 
2

account for costs and fees were proper is OVERRULED. Respondents’ preliminary 

objection with regard to the deduction of court-ordered fines is SUSTAINED, as are 

Respondents’ remaining preliminary objections. Accordingly, Counts 2 through 5 

of Petitioner’s Amended Petition for Review are DISMISSED as to all Respondents. 

Respondents shall file an answer to the remainder of Petitioner’s Amended Petition 

for Review within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order.

_____________________________________

RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge