alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
§ 1902.34 Certification of completion of developmental steps. ( a ) Upon the completion of all of the developmental steps in a State's plan, which is to be accomplished not later than three years following commencement of plan operations after approval of the plan by the Assistant Secretary under section 18(c), the Assistant Regional Director shall certify, as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, that all developmental steps in the plan have been met and that the State's program is to be evaluated on the basis of its eligibility for an 18(e) determination after at least one year of evaluations of the plan.
( b ) Upon determining that a State has completed all of its developmental steps, the Assistant Regional Director shall prepare a certification which he shall promptly forward to the Assistant Secretary. The certification shall include, but shall not be limited to, the following; ( 1 ) A list of all developmental steps or revisions thereof, plan amendments or changes which result in the completion of the steps or revisions thereof, and the dates the Assistant Secretary's or the Assistant Regional Director's approval of each change was published in the Federal Register;
( 2 ) Substantive changes, if any, in the State program which were approved by the Assistant Secretary and their dates of publication in the Federal Register;
( 3 ) Documentation that the legal basis for the applicable State merit system has been approved by the U.S. Civil Service Commission and that the actual operations of the State merit system has been found acceptable by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration with the advice of the U.S. Civil Service Commission; and
( 4 ) A description of the issues which are covered by the State plan. Where applicable, the certification shall include a description of those separable portions of the plan which have been certified for 18(e) evaluation purposes as well as those portions of the plan which were not certified by the Assistant Regional Director.
( c ) After a review of the certification and the State's plan, if the Assistant Secretary finds that the State has completed all the developmental steps specified in the plan, he shall publish the certification in the Federal Register.
[40 FR 54782, Nov. 26, 1975, as amended at 80 FR 49904, Aug. 18, 2015]
EXHIBIT 32.2

                    CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
                       PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

     In  connection  with  the  accompanying  Annual  Report On Form 10-KSB/A of
Gateway  Distributors,  Ltd.  for  the  fiscal year ending December 31, 2005, I,
Richard A. Bailey, Chief Financial Officer of Gateway Distributors, Ltd., hereby
certify  pursuant  to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to the best of my knowledge and belief, that:

     1.   Such Annual  Report  on  Form  10-KSB/A  for  the  fiscal  year ending
December  31,  2005,  fully  complies  with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d)  of  the  Securities  Exchange  Act  of  1934;  and

     2.   The information  contained  in  such  Annual  Report  on Form 10-KSB/A
for  the  fiscal year ending December 31, 2005, fairly presents, in all material
respects,  the  financial  condition  and  results  of  operations  of  Gateway
Distributors,  Ltd.

     Dated:  July 21, 2006.
                                  /s/  Richard A. Bailey
                                  ----------------------------------------------
                                  Richard A. Bailey, Chief Financial Officer of
                                  Gateway Distributors, Ltd.
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.2

                CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

         Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, in connection with the filing of the Form
10-K/A (Amendment No. 1) of The Lamson & Sessions Co. (the "Company") for the
period ended January 3, 2004 as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (the "SEC") on March 31, 2004 (the "Report"), the undersigned officer
of the Company certifies that, to such officer's knowledge:

         (1)      The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
                  13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2)      The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
                  all material respects, the financial condition and results of
                  operations of the Company as of the dates and for the periods
                  expressed in the Report.

         A signed original of this written statement has been provided to the
Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the SEC or its
staff upon request. This certification is provided solely pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, and shall not be deemed to be a part of the Report or "filed" for any
purpose whatsoever.

March 31, 2004

                                        /s/ James J. Abel
                                        -------------------------------------
                                        James J. Abel
                                        Executive Vice President, Secretary,
                                        Treasurer and Chief Financial Officer
                                        (Principal Financial Officer)


                                       11
### D ISTRICT 

### C OURT 

### O F 

### A PPEAL 

### O F 

### T HE 

### S TATE 

### O F 

### F LORIDA

F OURTH D ISTRICT

ROBERT ALLEN EVANS,

Appellant,

v.

COLETTE EVANS,

Appellee

.

No. 4D22

- 2053

[ July 6, 2023 ]

Appeal from the C ircuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,

Broward County ; Dale C. Cohen , Judge; L.T. Case No. FMCE 10

- 007036.

David M. Scott of Law Office of David Scott, P.A., Fort Lauderdale

, for

appellant.

Nancy W. Gregoire Stamper of Birnbaum, Lippman & Gregoire, PLLC,

Fort Lauderdale , for appellee.

P ER C URIAM

.

Affirmed

.

K LINGENSMITH

, C. J

., F ORST and A RT AU

, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
§ 1983.108 Role of Federal agencies. ( a ) ( 1 ) The complainant and the respondent will be parties in every proceeding and must be served with copies of all documents in the case. At the Assistant Secretary's discretion, the Assistant Secretary may participate as a party or as amicus curiae at any time at any stage of the proceeding. This right to participate includes, but is not limited to, the right to petition for review of a decision of an ALJ, including a decision approving or rejecting a settlement agreement between the complainant and the respondent.
( 2 ) Copies of documents must be sent to the Assistant Secretary and to the Associate Solicitor, Division of Fair Labor Standards, U.S. Department of Labor, only upon request of the Assistant Secretary, or where the Assistant Secretary is participating in the proceeding, or where service on the Assistant Secretary and the Associate Solicitor is otherwise required by these rules.
( b ) The Consumer Product Safety Commission, if interested in a proceeding, may participate as amicus curiae at any time in the proceeding, at the Commission's discretion. At the request of the Commission, copies of all documents in a case must be sent to the Commission, whether or not it is participating in the proceeding.
<TABLE>
                                                     Exhibit 12


                    LACLEDE GAS COMPANY AND SUBSIDIARY COMPANIES

           SCHEDULE OF COMPUTATION OF RATIO OF EARNINGS TO FIXED CHARGES
           -------------------------------------------------------------

<CAPTION>
                                        Fiscal Year Ended September 30,
                                  ----------------------------------------
                                  1997     1996     1995     1994     1993
                                  ----     ----     ----     ----     ----
                                            (Thousands of Dollars)
<S>                            <C>      <C>      <C>      <C>      <C>
Income before interest
 charges and the cumulative
 effect of change in
 accounting                    $51,554  $50,771  $39,428  $38,611  $41,380
 
Add: Taxes based on
       utility income           17,962   18,603    9,878   12,517   14,997 

     Taxes based on
       miscellaneous income        392     (205)     252      121    1,068

     One third of applicable
       rentals charged to
       operating expense
      (which approximates the
      interest factor)             294      291      288      287      284   
                               -------------------------------------------
        Total Earnings         $70,202  $69,460  $49,846  $51,536  $57,729   
                               ===========================================
 
Interest on long-term debt     $14,169  $13,939  $12,544  $12,626  $14,415
Other interest                   4,919    4,008    5,983    3,768    1,798

One-third of applicable rentals
  charged to operating expense
  (which approximates the
  interest factor)                 294      291      288      287      284
                               -------------------------------------------
   Total Fixed Charges         $19,382  $18,238  $18,815  $16,681  $16,497   
                               ===========================================

Ratio of Earnings to 
  Fixed Charges                   3.62     3.81     2.65     3.09     3.50

</TABLE>




                                    81
#### John Donald FRY *v.*Charles B. FREEMAN, Ex’r

5-5649

473 S.W. 2d 906

Opinion delivered November 22, 1971

[Rehearing denied January 10, 1971.]

*John O. Maberry*and *Merrill L. Norton,*for appellant.

*Lewis E. Epley, Jr., for*appellee.

Carleton Harris, Chief Justice.

This appeal relates to a will contest, appellant, John Donald Fry, a son of William W. Fry, deceased, contending that the overwhelming preponderance of all substantial evidence before the court revealed that the father suffered from an insance delusion toward appellant which motivated the testator to, in effect, disinherit the son. There are between 355 and 360 pages of testimony in the record, but there is no abstract of the testimony of any of these witnesses. We have stated in numerous cases that it is not practical for the seven members of the court to examine the one record filed here, and under Rule 9 (d) of the rules of the court, the burden is on appellant to furnish an abstract that will give the various members of the court an understanding of the question, or questions, presented. *Pyramid Life Ins. Co.*v. *Hamilton,*237 Ark. 797, 376 S. W. 2d 555; *Financial Security Life Assurance Co.*v. *Birtie L. Powell,*247 Ark. 609, 447 S. W. 2d 64. Of course, appellant’s case is dependent upon the testimony, and since appellee did not supplement the record, we are unable to consider the case on its merits.

Affirmed.
#### GALE REALTY CO v COOK

Ohio Appeals, 8th Dist, Cuyahoga Co

No 9290.

Decided Feb 4, 1929

Gottfried & Silber, Cleveland, for Realty Co.

Ray T Miller & E J Hopple, both of Cleveland, for Cook.

*231LEVINE, J.

It is contended on the part of defendant in error that the rule caveat emptor applies to a purchaser at judicial sales and that therefore a bidder at Sheriff’s sale does so at his own risk and once the property is sold to him as the highest bidder he is bound to go through with the purchase and that the sheriff is only required by law to convey whatever he has and no more.

It appears that the common pleas court adopted a rule that in every foreclosure case an abstract of title must be presented to the court and that before a decree is entered by the court the court must pass on the question whether all parties having an interest in the property were made parties. There may be some question as to the power of the court to adopt such a rule, but the purpose of the rule is quite clear, namely, to protect bidders at Judicial Sales, and to permit no judicial or sheriff’s sales unless the sheriff can give a marketable title.

The proceedings for contempt in this case were had under the provisions of Sec. 11687 GC. of Ohio, which is as follows:

> “The court from which an execution or order of sale issues, upon notice, and motion of the officer who makes the sale, or of an interested party, shall punish, as for contempt, any purchaser of real property who fails to pay the purchase money therefor.”

It seems to us that in the exercise of sound discretion on the part of the court, a purchaser at judicial sales should not be punished for contempt for declining to take property where there is an apparent serious defect in the title making the same unmarketable. Otherwise the court would become a party to perpretrating a fraud upon a bidder in good faith at a judicial sale. There is this additional element in the case, namely, that the rule of the common pleas court which requires an abstract of title to be filed in every foreclosure case, and also requires the court, before entering a decree, to pass upon the question as to whether all parties having an interest in the property were made parties, amounts to a representation to all bidders at Sheriff’s sales that the decree was entered in full compliance with said rule and that it is safe to bid at judicial sales in foreclosure cases. Plaintiff in error had a right to rely upon this representation.

Since it is the admitted fact that Burton Nicholson who has an undisputed dower interest in the land was not made a party in accordance with the law, and that there is therefore a serious defect affecting the marketability of the title, the plaintiff in error could not be adjudged guilty of contempt under the circumstances.

Holding, .as we do, the judgment of the Common Pleas Court is reversed and judgment is entered in favor of plaintiff in error.

Sullivan, PJ, and Vickery, J, concur.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-1489

JOHN DORTUE WEAH, Petitioner,
versus
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; JOHN ASHCROFT, U.S. Attorney General, Respondents.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals. (A79-477-351) Submitted: January 5, 2005 Decided: January 26, 2005 Before WILLIAMS, MICHAEL, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges. Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion. Ronald D. Richey, LAW OFFICE OF RONALD D. RICHEY, Rockville, Maryland, for Petitioner. Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, Michelle E. Gorden, Senior Litigation Counsel, Larry P. Cote, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent Ashcroft. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).- 2 - PER CURIAM: John Dortue Weah, a native and citizen of Liberia, petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“Board”) affirming, without opinion, the immigration judge’s order denying his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. In his petition for review, Weah challenges the immigration judge’s determination that he failed to establish his eligibility for asylum. To obtain reversal of a determination denying eligibil ity for relief, an alien “must show that the evidence he presented was so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find the requisite fear of persecution.” INS v. Elias-Zacarias , 502 U.S. 478, 483-84 (1992). We have reviewed the evidence of record and conclude that Weah fails to show that the evidence compels a contrary result. Accordingly, we cannot grant the relief that he seeks. We further uphold the immigration judge’s determination that Weah’s asylum application was frivolous. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.20 (2004). Additionally, we uphold the immigration judge’s denial of Weah’s request for withholding of removal. “Because the burden of proof for withholding of removal is higher than for asylum--even though the facts that must be proved are the same--an applicant who is ineligible for asylum is necessarily ineligible for withholding of removal under [8 U.S.C.] § 1231(b)(3).” Camara v. Ashcroft , 378- 3 - F.3d 361, 367 (4th Cir. 2004). Because Weah fails to show that he is eligible for asylum, he cannot meet the higher standard for withholding of removal. We also find that Weah fails to meet the standard for relief under the Convention Against Torture. To obtain such relief, an applicant must establish that “it is more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2) (2004). We find that Weah fails to make the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny the petition for review. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

PETITION DENIED
§ 1960.38 Committee formation. ( a ) Upon forming such committees, heads of agencies shall submit information to the Secretary concerning the existence, location, and coverage, in terms of establishments and population, of such committees, certifying to the Secretary that such committees meet the requirements of this subpart. The information submitted should include the name and telephone numbers of the chairperson of each committee, and should be updated annually as part of the annual report required by § 1960.74 to reflect any changes that may have occurred.
( b ) If, upon evaluation, the Secretary determines that the operations of a committee do not meet the requirements of this subpart, the Secretary shall notify the agency and identify the deficiencies to be remedied. If the agency does not satisfy the Secretary within 90 days that the committee meets the requirements of this subpart, the committee shall not be deemed a committee under Executive Order 12196 and this part.
[45 FR 69798, Oct. 21, 1980; 45 FR 77003, Nov. 21, 1980, as amended at 49 FR 3080, Jan. 24, 1984]
Exhibit 10.1


 


American Italian Pasta Company


Board of Directors Compensation
Program


Effective as amended August 17,
2009*


 


	
  Annual
  Board Retainer

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  Cash  

  	
   

  	
  Chairperson:
  $60,000 in cash  

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  Other
  Board members: $30,000 in cash  

  
	
  Equity Grants

  	
   

  	
  A
  number of shares of common stock equal to $55,000 payable once each year on,
  and based on the market price on, the first to occur of (1) the day of
  the annual stockholder meeting or (2) the third Thursday in February

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  Audit
  Committee Chairperson

  	
   

  	
  $8,000
  per year

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  Compensation
  Committee Chairperson

  	
   

  	
  $5,000
  per year

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  Governance
  Committee Chairperson

  	
   

  	
  $5,000
  per year

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  Enterprise
  Risk Management Committee Chairperson

  	
   

  	
  $5,000
  per year

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  Board
  Meeting Attendance

  	
   

  	
  $1,500
  per meeting (as designated by the Chairperson as an official Board meeting)

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  Committee
  Meetings

  	
   

  	
  $1,000
  per meeting (as designated by the Committee Chairperson as a paid meeting)

  



 






*Compensation
for service on any other committees will be reviewed and approved by the Board
of Directors upon recommendation of the Compensation Committee when such
committees are formed.


 


**Directors
are required to maintain stock ownership equivalent to $75,000 in equity value.
Skip Links

USGS HomeContact USGSSearch USGS

Scientific Investigations Report 2013–5037

Pubs Warehouse

### Prepared in cooperation with Clean Water Services

## Plankton Communities and Summertime Declines in Algal Abundance Associated with Low Dissolved Oxygen in the Tualatin River, Oregon

#### By Kurt D. Carpenter and Stewart A. Rounds

----

### Suggested citation:

Carpenter, K.D., and Rounds, S.A., 2013, Plankton communities and summertime declines in algal abundance associated with low dissolved oxygen in the Tualatin River, Oregon: U.S. Geological Survey Scientific Investigations Report 2013–5037, 78 p.

----

### Contents

Executive Summary

Introduction

Sample Collection and Data Analysis Methods

Climate, Streamflow, and Water-Quality Conditions

Patterns in Plankton Populations

Multivariate Analyses of Phytoplankton Assemblages and Environmental Data

Bioassay Experiment Results

Declines in Phytoplankton Populations

Changes in River Hydrology and Wastewater Management, 1991–2008

Case Studies of Low Dissolved Oxygen Events and Bloom Crashes in 2003–08

Evaluation of Hypotheses to Explain Phytoplankton Declines

Conclusions and Implications for River Management

Possible Future Studies, Monitoring, and Research

Acknowledgments

References Cited

Appendixes

AccessibilityFOIAPrivacyPolicies and Notices

U.S. Department of the Interior |            U.S. Geological Survey                                                URL: http://pubs.usgs.gov/sir/2013/5037/            Page Contact Information: GS Pubs Web Contact                        Page Last Modified: Thursday, May 09, 2013, 02:13:12 PM
#### McCullough *v.*The State.

Selling Mortgaged Property.

(Decided March 23, 1917.

74 South. 755.)

Mortgages; Selling Property Covered by; Jury Question. — Where the evidence supported an inference that the property belonged to defendant when the mortgage thereon was given, and that the mortgage constituted a lien on such property, the question whether defendant unlawfully sold the property, and whether the mortgage constituted a lien thereon, was one for the jury.

Appeal from Barbour Circuit Court.

Heard before Hon. J. S. Williams.

Jesse McCullough was convicted of selling mortgaged property, and he appeals.

Affirmed.

The evidence tended to show that defendant was indebted to one W. T. Middlebrooks, and in order to secure said indebtedness mortgaged to Middlebrooks two cows and a calf, together with other property, that when he left Middlebrooks’ place he turned over all the property except one cow to one Hartsogg, who was agent for Middlebrooks, and that he told Middlebrooks the other cow had been sold to Mr. Stephens at Clio, Stephens testifying that be bought the cow from defendant’s wife, and not defendant. Stephens further testified that defendant owed him an account, and that he went to defendant about it, and saw some cows in the pasture, and asked defendant about selling him one, and he told him that he could not sell him the cow as they belonged to his wife, but that, if his wife would sell him the cow, it would be all right.

E. W. Norton, and McDowell & McDowell, for appellant.

W. L. Martin, Attorney General, for the State.

BROWN, P. J.

The only question presented for review arises from a refusal of the affirmative charge requested by the defendant; the contention of appellant being that the undisputed evidence shows that the property alleged to have been unlawfully disposed of was never the property of the defendant, and hence the witness Middlebrooks had no lien thereon by virtue of his mortgage.

*662The opinion prevails that the evidence offered by the state reasonably affords an inference that the property was that of the defendant when the mortgage was given, and that the paper held by Middlebrooks was a lien thereon. If this was true, the question whether or not he sold the property was likewise for the jury. Stephens testified that he consented that his wife might sell the cow, and if the cow belonged to defendant, and he had given a mortgage on it, and thereafter consented to a sale of the cow, he would be guilty as charged.

Affirmed.