J-S27021-16

*Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

AMANDA E. BECKER

Appellant No. 1626 MDA 2015

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence August 19, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-36-CR-0001807-2014

CP-36-CR-0001810-2014

CP-36-CR-0001811-2014

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., DUBOW, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED JULY 22, 2016

This is an appeal from the judgment of sentence entered in the Court 

of Common Pleas of Lancaster County following Appellant’s open guilty plea 

to two counts of aggravated assault, and one count each of aggravated 

harassment, resisting arrest, disorderly conduct, and theft by unlawful 

taking.1 On appeal, Appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of her 

sentence. We affirm. 

The relevant facts and procedural history have been aptly set forth by 

the trial court, in part, as follows:

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702(a)(3), 2703.1, 5104, 5503(a)(2), and 3921(a), 

respectfully. 
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On April 3, 2014, [Appellant] stole a 1998 Dodge Grand 

Caravan that belonged to the father of a friend with whom she 

had stayed for several nights, resulting in a charge of [t]heft by 

[u]nlawful [t]aking (F-3) on Docket 1811-2014.

At the preliminary arraignment, bail was set for this charge 

and, being unable to make bail, [Appellant] was remanded to the 

Lancaster County Prison[.] She subsequently became combative 

and violent when police [officers] attempted to put her in the 

patrol unit, and she kicked an officer in the right leg. This 

resulted in a new charge of [a]ggravated [a]ssault (F-4) on 

Docket 1807-2014.

The four charges on Docket 1810-2014 stem from the 

following series of incidents. [Appellant], while being 

interviewed on March 27, 2014, as a potential witness in an 

animal attack investigation, became belligerent and 

uncooperative and, upon being advised to relax, continued to 

yell and scream. [The] [p]olice soon determined that 

[Appellant] had two summary warrants through the Lancaster 

City Police and was taken into custody. Upon being taken into 

custody, [Appellant] became violent and combative. When 

officers attempted to place [Appellant] in a police car, she 

continued to resist, kicking one of the officers in the right leg 

several times. After continuing to kick and flail, police [officers] 

finally succeeded in restraining [Appellant] by using leg 

restraints and a hobble device. Finally, following her arrival at 

the Ephrata Police Department, she spit in another officer’s face.

Trial Court Opinion, filed 11/10/15, at 1-3 (footnotes and citations to record 

omitted). 

The trial court consolidated the charges, and on September 17, 2014, 

Appellant pled into the Lancaster County Mental Health Court Program 

(“Mental Health Court Program”). Specifically, on September 17, 2014, she 

pled guilty to theft by unlawful taking on Docket 1811-2014, and she was 

placed on probation for five years with numerous conditions, including 

successful completion of the Mental Health Court Program. On Docket 1807-
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2014, she pled guilty to one count of aggravated assault, and on Docket 

1810-2014, she pled guilty to four offenses, including aggravated assault, 

aggravated harassment, resisting arrest, and disorderly conduct. 

Sentencing was deferred on the charges at Dockets 1807-2014 and 1810-

2014 pending Appellant’s successful completion of the Mental Health Court 

Program. 

Thereafter, Appellant did not successfully complete the Mental Health 

Court Program, and in fact, she absconded. Appellant was eventually 

apprehended and discharged from the Mental Health Court Program. At the 

time of the discharge, the trial court ordered a pre-sentence investigation 

report.

Following a sentencing hearing on August 19, 2015, at which Appellant 

was represented by counsel, the trial court sentenced Appellant as follows: 

On Docket 1807-2014, as to aggravated assault, ten months to two years in 

prison. On Docket 1810-2014, as to count one, aggravated assault, ten 

months to two years in prison, to run consecutively to the sentence imposed 

on Docket 1807-2014; as to count two, aggravated harassment, ten months 

to two years in prison, to run consecutively to the sentence imposed on 

count one of Docket 1810-2014 and Docket 1807-2014; as to count three, 

resisting arrest, and count four, disorderly conduct, costs only. On Docket 

1811-2014, as to theft by unlawful taking, one year to two years in prison, 

to run concurrently with the other sentences. The resulting aggregate 
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sentence was two and one-half years to six years in prison. The trial court 

gave Appellant credit for all time served.

On August 27, 2015, Appellant filed a timely, counseled post-sentence 

motion in which she preserved her challenge to the imposition of consecutive 

sentences by alleging “the imposition of the consecutive sentences is 

excessive, in light of the fact that [Appellant] has already spent nearly 10 

months incarcerated in Lancaster County Prison prior to and during her 

participation in Mental Health Court.” Appellant’s Post-Sentence Motion, 

filed 8/27/15. 

By order entered on September 1, 2015, the trial court denied 

Appellant’s post-sentence motion, and this timely appeal followed. The trial 

court directed Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, Appellant 

timely complied, and the trial court filed a responsive Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) 

opinion.

On appeal, Appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of her 

sentence. A challenge to the discretionary aspects of sentencing is not 

automatically reviewable as a matter of right. Commonwealth v. Hunter, 

768 A.2d 1136 (Pa.Super. 2001). Prior to reaching the merits of a 

discretionary sentencing issue: 

We conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether 

appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902 

and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at 

sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence, 

see [Pa.R.Crim.P. 720]; (3) whether appellant's brief has a fatal 

defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial 
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question that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate 

under the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).

Commonwealth v. Evans, 901 A.2d 528, 533 (Pa.Super. 2006) (citations 

omitted). 

In the instant case, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and a 

timely post-sentence motion. She also included a separate Pa.R.A.P. 

2119(f) statement in her appellate brief. As to whether Appellant has 

presented a substantial question, we must examine the specific sentencing 

issue raised by Appellant. 

In her Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement, Appellant alleges “the trial court’s 

cumulative sentence of two and one-half to six years incarceration was 

clearly unreasonable and so manifestly excessive as to constitute an abuse 

of discretion.”2 Appellant’s Brief at 8 (citations omitted). 

It is well-settled that:

____________________________________________

2 To the extent Appellant suggested in her Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement that 

the imposition of consecutive sentences raised a substantial question since 

the sentence was not consistent with the factors set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 

9721, this argument is waived since it was not presented to the sentencing 

court in the post-sentence motion or during Appellant’s sentencing hearing. 

See Commonwealth v. Griffin, 65 A.3d 932 (Pa.Super. 2013) (discussing 

preservation of discretionary aspects of sentencing claims). Moreover, 

Appellant’s attempt to preserve this specific issue in her court-ordered 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement is unavailing. Commonwealth v. McAfee, 

849 A.2d 270, 275 (Pa.Super. 2004) (holding the failure to preserve specific 

discretionary aspects of sentencing claims in post-sentence motions or at the 

sentencing hearing may not be cured by raising the claim for the first time in 

a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement). 
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The determination of what constitutes a substantial question 

must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. A substantial 

question exists only when the appellant advances a colorable 

argument that the sentencing judge's actions were either: (1) 

inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or 

(2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the 

sentencing process.

Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa.Super. 2010) (citation, 

quotation marks, and quotation omitted). 

With regard to the imposition of consecutive sentences, which resulted 

in Appellant’s cumulative sentence of two and one-half to six years 

incarceration, this Court has held: 

A court's exercise of discretion in imposing a sentence 

concurrently or consecutively does not ordinarily raise a 

substantial question. Commonwealth v. Mastromarino, 2 

A.3d 581, 587 (Pa.Super. 2010)[.] Rather, the imposition of 

consecutive rather than concurrent sentences will present a 

substantial question in only “the most extreme circumstances, 

such as where the aggregate sentence is unduly harsh, 

considering the nature of the crimes and the length of 

imprisonment.” Commonwealth v. Lamonda, 52 A.3d 365, 

372 (Pa.Super. 2012)[(en banc)].

[An appellant] may raise a substantial question 

where [s]he receives consecutive sentences within 

the guideline ranges if the case involves 

circumstances where the application of the guidelines 

would be clearly unreasonable, resulting in an 

excessive sentence; however, a bald claim of 

excessiveness due to the consecutive nature of a 

sentence will not raise a substantial question.

Commonwealth v. Swope, 123 A.3d 333, 338-39 (Pa.Super. 2015) 

(quotation omitted). As this Court has emphasized, “the key to resolving 

the preliminary substantial question inquiry is whether the decision to 
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sentence consecutively raises the aggregate sentence to, what appears upon

its fact to be, an excessive level in light of the criminal conduct at issue in 

the case.” Commonwealth v. Prisk, 13 A.3d 526, 533 (Pa.Super. 2011) 

(quotation marks and quotation omitted). 

In the case sub judice, as the Commonwealth cogently argues in its 

appellate brief, Appellant’s preserved challenge to the imposition of 

consecutive sentences does not raise a substantial question permitting our 

review. See Commonwealth’s Brief at 7-8. Simply put, Appellant has not 

framed and preserved her issue in a manner that suggests the trial court’s 

decision to impose consecutive sentences “raises the aggregate sentence to, 

what appears on its face to be, an excessive level in light of the criminal 

conduct at issue in this case.” Prisk, 13 A.3d at 533 (quotation marks and 

quotation omitted). Accordingly, we conclude Appellant has not raised a 

substantial question permitting our review as to the trial court’s imposition 

of consecutive sentences. 3 

____________________________________________

3 We note that, in her post-sentence motion, Appellant also averred 

“[Appellant] has struggled with mental health issues from an early age, and 

desires to seek serious treatment in a long-term inpatient mental health 

facility as opposed to a State Correctional Institution.” Id. This averment 

does not present a cogent issue concerning the trial court’s exercise of 

discretion in imposing Appellant’s sentence. To the extent Appellant was 

attempting to argue the trial court did not adequately consider the mitigating 

factor of her mental health in imposing jail time, as she suggested on 

appeal, such would not present a substantial question. See 

Commonwealth v. Berry, 785 A.2d 994 (Pa.Super. 2001) (holding 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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For all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

Affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/22/2016

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

allegation the trial court failed to consider a certain mitigating factor 

adequately does not raise a substantial question).