Page 1 GAO-14-438R U.S. Civil-Military Strategic Framework

441 G St. N.W.

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April 1, 2014

Congressional Committees

Afghanistan: Changes to Updated U.S. Civil-Military Strategic Framework Reflect 

Evolving U.S. Role

The U.S. Civil-Military Strategic Framework for Afghanistan is intended to articulate the strategic 

vision guiding U.S. government efforts to achieve U.S. national goals and to facilitate U.S. 

civilian and military cooperation and partnership in Afghanistan. The Department of State (State) 

notes that this framework serves as strategic guidance for all U.S. civilian and military personnel 

serving in Afghanistan. In March 2012, the framework replaced the Integrated Civilian-Military 

Campaign Plan, which was first signed in August 2009 by the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan 

and the Commanding General, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan. The framework was subsequently 

updated, in October 2012 and, most recently, in August 2013.1

The August 2013 version of the framework—likely the final update, according to State officials—

shows, among other things, a heightened focus on transition in Afghanistan.

 

2

Section 1220 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (NDAA) mandates

GAO to report on any substantial updates to the campaign plan for Afghanistan, which the 

strategic framework has replaced.

 The framework 

defines “transition” to mean a shift, through the end of 2014, in security responsibility for 

Afghanistan to Afghan security institutions and the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) as 

well as a shift in U.S. policy toward a more traditional diplomatic and development model. After 

January 1, 2015, when the last U.S. combat troops are expected to have withdrawn from 

Afghanistan, the United States plans to continue to support the government of Afghanistan in its 

efforts to achieve longer-term goals for governance and development. According to State 

officials, the 2013 revision of the framework was intended to reflect changes in U.S. goals and 

priorities, better align them with Afghan goals and priorities, and reflect changing circumstances 

on the ground.

3

To conduct this work, we reviewed the October 2012 and the August 2013 versions of the CivilMilitary Strategic Framework for Afghanistan to identify differences between them. To 

To satisfy the mandate, this report broadly compares the 

August 2013 version of the framework with the October 2012 version, summarizing the 

differences between them. 

 

1 We previously conducted an analysis of the October 2012 framework. See GAO, Afghanistan: Key Oversight 

Issues, GAO-13-218SP (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 11, 2013).

2 According to State, the U.S. government will replace the August 2013 version of the framework with a more typical 

country-level planning document, known as an integrated country strategy, that State produces in other U.S. 

missions.

3 Pub. L. No. 112-239, § 1220, 126 Stat. 1632, 1991 (Jan. 2, 2013). 
Page 2 GAO-14-438R U.S. Civil-Military Strategic Framework

understand the reasons for the revisions, we interviewed State officials in Washington, D.C., 

and in Kabul, Afghanistan. 

We conducted this performance audit from February 2014 to April 2014 in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and 

perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained 

provides a reasonable basis for our findings based on our audit objectives. 

Differences Between the October 2012 and August 2013 Versions of the Framework

Although there are similarities between the October 2012 and August 2013 versions of the U.S. 

Civil-Military Strategic Framework for Afghanistan, the two versions differ in several aspects that 

reflect, among other things, the U.S. government’s heightened emphasis on transition. 

Structurally, the two versions are broadly similar: both versions address four categories of U.S. 

efforts in support of U.S. national goals in Afghanistan, with security, the first category, as the 

foundation for the other three categories, or “pillars”—governance, rule of law, and 

socioeconomic development (see fig. 1). Both versions also address the same crosscutting 

issues—for example, recognizing and supporting the Afghan political reconciliation process and 

supporting policies and programs that continue to advance the essential role of women in 

Afghan society.4

Figure 1: Categories of U.S. Civil-Military Efforts in Support of U.S. National Goals in Afghanistan

 

Differences between the October 2012 and August 2013 versions of the framework include the 

following. 

• In the August 2013 version, the functions of the framework and statement of U.S. 

national goals have been modified to reflect changes in U.S civilian and military 

efforts during and after the transition. For example, the October 2012 version states that 

the second of the framework’s two primary functions is to ensure that U.S. civilian and 

military efforts in Afghanistan are fully integrated and complementary. In the August 2013 

version, the framework’s second primary function has been reworded to “facilitate U.S. 

civilian and military cooperation and partnership in Afghanistan.” Similarly, the second of the 

two U.S. national goals has been reworded to reflect changes articulated by the President in 

 

4 The other crosscutting issues identified in the framework focus on U.S. government efforts to, among other things, 

improve the Afghan government’s border management practices and its institutional capacity to facilitate legitimate 

trade; pursue information initiatives that enable credible and inclusive elections, promote the legitimacy of the Afghan 

government, counter violent extremism, and facilitate the transition; and bring greater stability to Afghanistan and the 

broader region.
Page 3 GAO-14-438R U.S. Civil-Military Strategic Framework

May 2013.5

• The August 2013 version contains new information about the U.S.-Afghan partnership 

during and after the transition. The August 2013 framework includes a new section about 

the U.S. government’s partnership with the Afghan government during the transition. The 

new section provides guiding principles emphasizing, among other things, the need for the 

U.S. government to align its efforts with Afghan national priorities; to ensure that the Afghan 

government can preserve gains in the U.S. government’s four categories of effort—security, 

governance, rule of law, and socioeconomic development; and to reinforce the U.S. and 

Afghanistan strategic partnership at every opportunity. 

 In the October 2012 version of the framework, the second U.S. goal was to 

build a partnership with the Afghan people to ensure that the United States could continue to 

target terrorists and support the Afghan government. In the August 2013 version, the second 

goal has been revised to “strengthen Afghanistan so that it can never again be a safe haven 

for international terrorism.” 

The August 2013 framework also includes a revised section on the United States’ plans for 

its partnership with Afghanistan in the decade after the transition. For example, the revised 

section notes that the U.S. government is committed to helping the government of 

Afghanistan achieve its long-term goals, including reducing dependence on international 

assistance, improving delivery of government services, and promoting fundamental 

freedoms and human rights. Specifically, the section notes that the U.S. government will 

focus on governance and socioeconomic development; training, advising, and assisting 

Afghan security institutions and the ANSF; and continuing counterterrorism efforts. 

• The August 2013 version includes new, transition-focused subsections for each of 

the three strategic pillars—governance, rule of law, and socioeconomic 

development—assessing the impact of reduced U.S. resources and presence on U.S. 

objectives and priorities. For example, for socioeconomic development, the August 2013 

version notes that there will be a shift away from capital-intensive U.S. socioeconomic 

infrastructure projects and priorities toward a focus on providing advice and assistance to 

the Afghan government. Regarding security—the foundational category of U.S. effort—the 

August 2013 version notes that U.S. and coalition forces intend to transition full security 

responsibility to the government of Afghanistan and assume a supporting role in Afghan-led 

security efforts. This shift is intended to enable the U.S. government to focus more on 

governance and development efforts in Afghanistan after the transition. 

• The August 2013 version provides fewer details about the future U.S. government 

footprint in Afghanistan, reflecting uncertainty affecting the U.S. post-2014 strategy.

For instance, the October 2012 version of the framework specified that the locations of the 

post-2014 U.S. footprint in Afghanistan would consist of the U.S. Embassy in Kabul and four 

field platforms, in Kandahar, Herat, Mazar-e Sharif, and Jalalabad. In contrast, the August 

2013 version states that the U.S. footprint in Afghanistan will consist of the U.S. Embassy in 

Kabul, with additional representation at other locations as security and resources allow. 

• The August 2013 version replaces a section about measuring progress with a new 

section about civil-military coordination. In the October 2012 version, the section about 

measuring progress stated that regular strategic assessments would be conducted to inform 

future revisions of the framework as well as U.S. government leadership in Afghanistan and 

 

5 Remarks by the President at the National Defense University at Fort McNair, Office of the Press Secretary, the 

White House, Washington, D.C., May 23, 2013. 
Page 4 GAO-14-438R U.S. Civil-Military Strategic Framework

decision-makers in Washington, D.C. This section in the October 2012 framework also 

stated that the U.S. diplomatic mission in Afghanistan and the International Security 

Assistance Force (ISAF) would collaboratively assess qualitative and quantitative metrics 

and that interagency working groups would be responsible for further development, 

monitoring, and assessment of their respective sectors, such as security and governance. 

In the August 2013 framework, the new section on civil-military coordination states that 

existing interagency working groups in Afghanistan monitor progress in addition to 

performing other functions. However, the August 2013 framework does not state whether 

regular strategic assessments of progress will be conducted and whether the U.S. Mission 

and ISAF will continue to collaboratively assess qualitative and quantitative metrics. State 

officials said that although they are no longer completing regular strategic assessments of 

overall progress, the individual interagency working groups are continuing to assess 

progress in their areas of responsibility as needed. In addition, State officials said that they 

plan to continue to collaboratively assess qualitative and quantitative metrics through the 

interagency working groups; however, collecting these metrics will become increasingly 

difficult as the transition date approaches. The officials stated that they expect resources to 

become more limited and that, because of the U.S. military drawdown, their access to 

locations outside Kabul will become more restricted.

• The August 2013 framework excludes a list of strategic risks and of factors that could 

mitigate those risks. The October 2012 version listed 13 strategic risks and mitigating 

factors related to a range of topics, such as economic growth, security, political will, and 

corruption. For example, one strategic risk was that “early withdrawal of U.S. and/or coalition 

forces before ANSF units are ready to replace them reverses security gains.” A mitigating 

factor for this risk was “sustain a U.S. and coalition military presence structured to support 

ANSF-led operations.” Unlike the October 2012 version, the August 2013 version includes a 

general discussion of two risks that may affect the achievement of U.S. national goals. 

These two risks are that (1) gains made in each category of effort may not be as robust as 

expected or preserved when the international presence declines after the transition and (2) 

the strategic planning assumptions the framework incorporates may prove invalid and the 

U.S. government may subsequently have insufficient time and resources to adjust. The 

August 2013 version identifies no mitigating factors. According to State officials, this change 

responded to comments from U.S. civilian and military personnel in Afghanistan. The State 

officials said that U.S. personnel had commented that all of their efforts in Afghanistan 

included some degree of risk and that the suggested mitigating factors were actions the U.S. 

government was already taking to implement the strategic framework. The officials noted 

that the absence of mitigating factors also reflects the need to collaboratively identify risk 

mitigations with the Afghan government as it works to assert its own strategic vision.

Agency Comments 

We are not making recommendations in this report. We provided a draft of this report to State 

and the Department of Defense (DOD) for comment. State provided technical comments, which 

we have incorporated as appropriate. DOD did not provide comments.

- - - - - 

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees and the 

Secretaries of State and Defense. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO 

website at http://www.gao.gov. 
Page 5 GAO-14-438R U.S. Civil-Military Strategic Framework

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-8980 or 

CourtsM@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs 

may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report were Hynek Kalkus 

(Assistant Director), B. Patrick Hickey, and Kira Self. Also contributing to this report were Ashley 

Alley, Pedro Almoguera, Jacob Beier, Jonathan Fremont, Reid Lowe, and Marc Schwartz.

Michael J. Courts

Director, International Affairs and Trade
Page 6 GAO-14-438R U.S. Civil-Military Strategic Framework

List of Committees 

The Honorable Carl Levin

Chairman

The Honorable James Inhofe

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Dick Durbin

Chairman

The Honorable Thad Cochran

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Howard P. “Buck” McKeon

Chairman

The Honorable Adam Smith

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

The Honorable Rodney Frelinghuysen

Chairman

The Honorable Pete Visclosky

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives

(321014)
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