alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**EXHIBIT
      32.2**




**CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO**


**18
      U.S.C. SECTION 1350**


**AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**


**SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**





In
      connection with the Quarterly Report of Lite King Corporation (the “Company”) on
      Form 10-QSB for the period ended March 31, 2007 as filed with the Securities
      and
      Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), the undersigned, in the
      capacities and on the date indicated below, hereby certifies pursuant to 18
      U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
      Act of 2002, that to his knowledge:




1.  The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and




2.  The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and results of operation of the Company.


Date:
                May 9, 2007
            By:
            /s/
              John
              T. RuddyName:John
                T. RuddyTitle:Chief
                Financial Officer




A
      signed
      original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document
      authentications, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears
      in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required
      by Section 906, has been provided to Lite King Corporation and will be retained
      by Lite King Corporation and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission
      or its staff upon request.




EXHIBIT
            32.2
###### Editorial Note on [Part 1926](/current/title-29/part-1926?toc=1)

#### Editorial Notes:

1. At [44 FR 8577](https://www.federalregister.gov/citation/44-FR-8577), Feb. 9, 1979, and corrected at [44 FR 20940](https://www.federalregister.gov/citation/44-FR-20940), Apr. 6, 1979, OSHA reprinted without change the entire text of [29 CFR part 1926](/on/2024-09-19/title-29/part-1926) together with certain General Industry Occupational Safety and Health Standards contained in [29 CFR part 1910](/on/2024-09-19/title-29/part-1910), which have been identified as also applicable to construction work. This republication developed a single set of OSHA regulations for both labor and management forces within the construction industry.

2. Nomenclature changes to part 1926 appear at [84 FR 21597](https://www.federalregister.gov/citation/84-FR-21597), May 14, 2019.

#### § 1926.1114 2-Acetylaminofluorene.

Note:

The requirements applicable to construction work under this section are identical to those set forth at [§ 1910.1003 of this chapter](/on/2024-09-19/title-29/section-1910.1003).

[[61 FR 31433](https://www.federalregister.gov/citation/61-FR-31433), June 20, 1996]
#### M. W. Ulmer, *Plaintiff in*Error, v. The First National Bank of St. Petersburg, a Corporation, *Defendant in Error.*

This case was decided by Division A.

Writ of error to the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County.

*McMullen é McMullen,*for Plaintiff in Error;

*E. R. Chmby*and *Wm. Hunter,*for Defendant in Error.

Per Curiam.

In accordance with an agreement filed herein and upon the authority of the decision in the case of Ulmer v. First National Bank of St. Petersburg this day filed, the judgment herein is reversed.
§ 2550.408c-2 Compensation for services. ( a ) *In general.* Section 408(b)(2) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (the Act) refers to the payment of reasonable compensation by a plan to a party in interest for services rendered to the plan. Section 408(c)(2) of the Act and §§ 2550.408c-2(b)(1) through 2550.408c-2(b)(4) clarify what constitutes reasonable compensation for such services.
( b ) ( 1 ) *General rule.* Generally, whether compensation is “reasonable” under sections 408 (b)(2) and (c)(2) of the Act depends on the particular facts and circumstances of each case.
( 2 ) *Payments to certain fiduciaries.* Under sections 408(b)(2) and 408(c)(2) of the Act, the term “reasonable compensation” does not include any compensation to a fiduciary who is already receiving full-time pay from an employer or association of employers (any of whose employees are participants in the plan) or from an employee organization (any of whose members are participants in the plan), except for the reimbursement of direct expenses properly and actually incurred and not otherwise reimbursed. The restrictions of this paragraph (b)(2) do not apply to a party in interest who is not a fiduciary.
( 3 ) *Certain expenses not direct expenses.* An expense is not a direct expense to the extent it would have been sustained had the service not been provided or if it represents an allocable portion of overhead costs.
( 4 ) *Expense advances.* Under sections 408(b)(2) and 408(c)(2) of the Act, the term “reasonable compensation,” as applied to a fiduciary or an employee of a plan, includes an advance to such a fiduciary or employee by the plan to cover direct expenses to be properly and actually incurred by such person in the performance of such person's duties with the plan if: ( i ) The amount of such advance is reasonable with respect to the amount of the direct expense which is likely to be properly and actually incurred in the immediate future (such as during the next month); and
( ii ) The fiduciary or employee accounts to the plan at the end of the period covered by the advance for the expenses properly and actually incurred.
( 5 ) *Excessive compensation.* Under sections 408(b)(2) and 408(c)(2) of the Act, any compensation which would be considered excessive under 26 CFR 1.162-7 (Income Tax Regulations relating to compensation for personal services which consitutes an ordinary and necessary trade or business expense) will not be “reasonable compensation.” Depending upon the facts and circumstances of the particular situation, compensation which is not excessive under 26 CFR 1.162-7 may, nevertheless, not be “reasonable compensation” within the meaning of sections 408(b)(2) and 408 (c)(2) of the Act.
[42 FR 32393, June 24, 1977]
IN THE COURT OF CRIM INAL AP P EALS

OF TEXAS

N O

. P D

- 0 3 0 2

- 2 2

E X P A R T E C A M E R O N M I C H A E L M O O N

, A p p e l l a n t

O N S T A T E ’ S P E T I T I O N F O R D I S C R E T I O N A R Y R E V I E W

F R O M T H E F I R S T C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

H A R R I S C O U N T Y

P e r c u r i a m

.

O R D E R

T h e C o u r t g r a n t s t h e S t a t e ’ s p e t i t i o n f o r d i s c r e t i o n a r y r e v i e w a n d a l s o g r a n t s t h e

f o l l o w i n g g r o u n d o n i t s o w n m o t i o n : W h e n S e c t i o n 5 4

. 0 2 ( j ) ( 3 ) o f t h e F a m i l y C o d e s p e a k s

o f a n “ a d j u d i c a t i o n ” a n d a n “ a d

j u d i c a t i o n h e a r i n g

, ” d o e s t h e m e a n i n g o f t h o s e w o r d s a l s o

e m b r a c e e v e n t s t h a t m i g h t o c c u r i n a n a d u l t c r i m i n a l t r i a l

, o r a r e t h e i r m e a n i n g s r e s t r i c t e d t o

t h e c o n t e x t o f j u v e n i l e p r o c e e d i n g s ?

T h e C l e r k o f t h i s C o u r t w i l l s e n d c o p i e s o f t h i s o r d e r t o t h e C o u r t o f A p p e a l s f o r t h e

F i r s t D i s t r i c t

, t h e S t a t e P r o s e c u t i n g A t t o r n e y

, t h e H a r r i s C o u n t y D i s t r i c t A t t o r n e y

, a n d

A p p e l l a n t

.F i l e d : S e p t e m b e r 7

, 2 0 2 2

D o n o t p u b l i s h
----

COUNCIL DECISION

of 28 June 2004

appointing a member of the Boards of Appeal of the Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs)

(2004/C 174/01)

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community trade mark (1), and in particular Articles 120 and 131 thereof,

Having regard to the candidatures presented by the Administrative Board of the Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) on 26 April 2004,

HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS:

Article 1

Ms Ilse MAYER, born in Gmünd (Austria) on 19 October 1955, is hereby appointed member of the Boards of Appeal of the Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) for a period of five years.

Article 2

The date on which the five-year period referred to in Article 1 will commence shall be determined by the Administrative Board of the Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs).

Done at Luxembourg, 28 June 2004.

For the Council

The President

M. CULLEN

----

(1)OJ L 11, 14.1.1994, p. 1. Regulation as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 422/2004 (OJ L 70, 9.3.2004, p. 1).

----
# EUR-Lex - 32000D0582 - EN

Avis juridique important

*|*

# 32000D0582

**2000/582/EC: Decision No 176 of 24 June 1999 concerning the reimbursement by the competent institution in a Member State of the costs incurred during a stay in another Member State by means of the procedure referred to in Article 34(4) of Regulation (EEC) No 574/72 (96/249/EC) **

*
Official Journal L 243 , 28/09/2000 P. 0042 - 0042 *

Decision No 176

of 24 June 1999

concerning the reimbursement by the competent institution in a Member State of the costs incurred during a stay in another Member State by means of the procedure referred to in Article 34(4) of Regulation (EEC) No 574/72 (96/249/EC)

(2000/582/EC)

THE ADMINISTRATIVE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES ON SOCIAL SECURITY FOR MIGRANT WORKERS,

Having regard to Article 81(a) of Council Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 of 14 June 1971 on the application of social security schemes to employed persons and their families moving within the Community(1), under which it is made responsible for dealing with all administrative questions arising from Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 and Regulation (EEC) No 574/72,

Having regard to Article 34(4) of Regulation (EEC) No 574/72,

Whereas:

(1) The task of initiating the procedure referred to in Article 34(4) of Regulation (EEC) No 574/72 falls to the competent institution.

(2) This procedure represents an administrative simplification and promotes rapid reimbursement to the benefit of the insured person.

(3) It is therefore expedient to increase the possibility of having recourse to this procedure and to increase the maximum limit as provided for in Decision No 161 of 15 February 1996 and consequently to replace this Decision.

(4) Acting in accordance with Article 80(3) of Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71,

HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS:

1. The provisions of Article 34(4) of Regulation (EEC) No 574/72 shall apply only where the total amount of the costs incurred during the temporary stay is less than or equal to the amount fixed by each Member State up to a maximum of EUR 1000.

2. For the purpose of applying the provisions referred to in point 1, the amount of the costs incurred shall be converted, where necessary, at the rate applicable during the month in which the reimbursement is made.

3. This Decision, which replaces Decision No 161, shall enter into force on the first day of the month following its publication in the Official Journal of the European Communities.

The Chairman of the Administrative Commission

Arno Bokeloh

(1) OJ L 149, 5.7.1971, p. 2.
Exhibit 32.1



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



The certification set forth below is being submitted in
connection with this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of SERENA Software, Inc. for the fiscal quarter ended October 31, 2005 (the Report) for the purpose of complying with Rule 13a-14(b) or Rule 15d-14(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(the Exchange Act) and Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United States Code.



I, Mark E. Woodward, Chief Executive Officer of SERENA Software, Inc. certify that:



|(1) |  | the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Exchange Act; and
|--- |  | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|(2) |  | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of SERENA Software, Inc.
|--- |  | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



By:

/s/    MARK E. WOODWARDMark E. Woodward President and Chief Executive Officer And Director




Date: December 9, 2005
Green Tree Servicing 

Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

November 26, 2013

No. 04-13-00506-CV

Robert G. CORONA and Christina M. Mozisek and all occupants,

Appellants

v.

GREEN TREE SERVICING LLC,

Appellee

From the County Court at Law No. 3, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 385145

Honorable Jason Wolff, Judge Presiding

O R D E R

Sitting: Karen Angelini, Justice

Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice

Marialyn Barnard, Justice

Appellee Green Tree Servicing LLC has filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, 

arguing that this appeal is moot. Green Tree emphasizes that in this forcible detainer action, 

Green Tree requested issuance of a writ of possession and that appellants voluntarily vacated the 

property on September 18, 2013. Green Tree points to case law stating that when defendants in a 

forcible detainer action are no longer in possession of the premises at issue, the appeal is moot 

unless the defendants can assert a potentially meritorious claim of right to current, actual 

possession. See Marshall v. Hous. Auth., 198 S.W.3d 782 (Tex. 2006). While the issue of 

possession may be moot, issues independent of possession are reviewable on appeal. Rice v. 

Pinney, 51 S.W.3d 705, 707 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, no pet.); Cavazos v. San Antonio Hous. 

Auth., No. 04-09-00659-CV, 2010 WL 2772450, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2010, no pet.). 

In the trial court’s summary judgment, appellants were ordered to pay Green Tree’s attorney’s 

fees in the amount of $7,000 and were ordered to pay future appellate attorney’s fees. Thus, 

because issues independent of possession are reviewable on appeal, we DENY Green Tree’s 

motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
Appellants’ brief was due October 30, 2013. Neither the brief nor a motion for extension 

of time has been filed. We, therefore, ORDER appellants to file, on or before December 6, 2013

their appellants’ brief and a written response reasonably explaining (1) their failure to timely file 

the brief and (2) why appellee is not significantly injured by their failure to timely file a brief. If 

appellants fail to file a brief and the written response by the date ordered, we will dismiss the 

appeal for want of prosecution. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.8(a); see also TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(c) 

(allowing involuntary dismissal if appellant has failed to comply with a court order).

_________________________________

Karen Angelini, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 26th day of November, 2013.

___________________________________

Keith E. Hottle

Clerk of Court
#### § 1626.12 Conciliation efforts pursuant to section 7(d) of the Act.

Upon receipt of a charge, the Commission shall promptly attempt to eliminate any alleged unlawful practice by informal methods of conciliation, conference and persuasion. Upon failure of such conciliation the Commission will notify the charging party. Such notification enables the charging party or any person aggrieved by the subject matter of the charge to commence action to enforce their rights without waiting for the lapse of 60 days. Notification under this section is not a Notice of Dismissal or Termination under § 1626.17.

[89 FR 12232, Feb. 16, 2024]
§ 1917.93 Head protection. ( a ) The employer shall ensure that each affected employee wears a protective helmet when working in areas where there is a potential for injury to the head from falling objects.
( b ) ( 1 ) The employer must ensure that head protection complies with any of the following consensus standards: ( i ) American National Standards Institute (ANSI) Z89.1-2009, “American National Standard for Industrial Head Protection,” incorporated by reference in § 1917.3;
( ii ) American National Standards Institute (ANSI) Z89.1-2003, “American National Standard for Industrial Head Protection,” incorporated by reference in § 1917.3; or
( iii ) American National Standards Institute (ANSI) Z89.1-1997, “American National Standard for Personnel Protection—Protective Headwear for Industrial Workers—Requirements,” incorporated by reference in § 1917.3.
( 2 ) Head protection devices that the employer demonstrates are at least as effective as head protection devices that are constructed in accordance with one of the above consensus standards will be deemed to be in compliance with the requirements of this section.
( c ) Protective hats previously worn shall be cleaned and disinfected before issuance by the employer to another employee.
[48 FR 30909, July 5, 1983, as amended at 62 FR 40201, July 25, 1997; 74 FR 46359, Sept. 9, 2009; 77 FR 37599, June 22, 2012]
#### STUMP et v BOYD et

Ohio Appeals, 6th Dist, Wood Co

No. 449.

Decided December 9, 1929

Mr. Benjamin F. James, Bowling Green, for Stump et.

Messrs. Ora Wade and S. W. Bowman, Bowling Green, for Boyd et.

WILLIAMS, J.

It is claimed, however, by counsel for plaintiffs, that a deed for 180 acres of land was executed and delivered the defendant, Henry D. Boyd by his father and was given as an advancement and with the understanding that it would be in full of the son’s share in his father’s estate. Evidence has been offered in this court tending to show the circumstances surrounding the transaction in which the deed was given and various conversations which throw more or less light upon the intention of the parties to the deed. It is claimed that this evidence is incompetent and that the recital of the consideration of one dollar and other valuable considerations. contained in the deed is conclusive that the deed was not given as an advancement. We are of the opinion that such evidence is competent and where a deed is made under such circumstances that it constitutes an advancement, that fact may be shown by competent evidence. The principle laid down in the case of Gardner vs. Kern, 115 Ohio St., 575, to the effect that the recital of a valuable consideration in a deed from father to son conclusively establishes the title conveyed thereby as one of purchase, does not apply. The real consideration mav always be shown to determine whether a deed was given as an advancement.

Considering the evidence of this nature along with the other evidence in the case, we are of the. opinion that the evidence discloses that the conveyance was not an advancement but was a gift made by father to son in recognition of services and attention given by the son to the father. A decree will therefore be entered for partition of tlie pronerty described in the petition apartlng to the defendant, Henry D. Boyd, a one-fourth interest in the premises and to the other parties their respective parts and portions thereof.

Lloyd and Richards, JJ., concur.
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

August 21, 2018

No. 04-18-00496-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF M.A.S.L. AND K.J.L., CHILDREN,

From the 45th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2017-PA-01773

Honorable Charles E. Montemayor, Judge Presiding

ORDER

The reporter’s record in this accelerated appeal was due July 27, 2018. However, court 

reporter Elva Chapa failed to file her portion of the reporter’s record. On August 9, 2018, this 

court notified Ms. Chapa by letter that her portion of the record had not been filed. See TEX. R.

APP. P. 37.3. Our notice required Ms. Chapa to file the record no later than August 19, 2018, 

unless appellant had failed to pay or make arrangements to pay the fee for preparing the record 

and is not entitled to the record without paying the fee, in which case she was required to file a 

notice so advising the court no later than August 14, 2018. See id. On August 15, 2018, Ms. 

Chapa filed a notification of late record asking for an extension of time of ten (10) days. In her 

notice, Ms. Chapa explains she was not notified timely about this record, but she anticipates 

completing it by August 27, 2018. 

We remind the court reporter that, by statute, this appeal is accelerated, and is to take 

precedence over other matters. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 109.002(a-1) (West Supp. 2017). 

Strict deadlines exist with regard to disposal of appeals dealing with termination of parental 

rights — specifically, the appellate court must dispose of the appeal within 180 days of the date 

the notice of appeal is filed in the trial court. With regard to the appellate record, pursuant to 

Rule 35.3(c) of the appellate rules, this court may not grant an extension of more than ten days in 

an accelerated appeal. TEX. R. APP. P. 35.3(c). Moreover, in appeals involving the termination 

of parental rights, any extensions granted “must not exceed 30 days cumulatively, absent 

extraordinary circumstances.” See R. 28.4(b)(2). 

We therefore GRANT the court reporter’s request for an extension of time to file the 

reporter’s record in this court. We ORDER court reporter Elva Chapa to file the reporter’s 

record in this court on or before August 27, 2018. 

We further order the clerk of this court to serve a copy of this order on all counsel, the 

court reporter, and the trial court. 
_________________________________

Marialyn Barnard, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 21st day of August, 2018.

___________________________________

KEITH E. HOTTLE,

Clerk of Court
Placeholder for information received claimed as Confidential Business Information (CBI)

Information regarding emission factors claimed as CBI received from SEMI. This information is 

being maintained in a separate confidential portion of the docket. 

For more information please contact Kirsten Cappel by phone at (202) 343-9556 or by email at 

cappel.kirsten@epa.gov.