alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
MANAGEMENT COMMITMENT – Safety Policy Statement

At Concord Regional Airport safety is a core value of the airport, where the safety and

health of each employee comes first. Personnel and equipment in the aviation industry

are often exposed to many hazards. I acknowledge this fact and am personally

committed to doing everything possible to eliminate injury and damage in our working

environment. The ongoing process of Concord Regional Airport’s Safety Management

System is ultimately the responsibility of Concord Regional Airport Management.

However, each and every employee shall cooperate with management to ensure

implementation of this program.

The Safety Committee at Concord Regional Airport will continue to be proactive to

identify risks that may pose injury to personnel, or damage to equipment. To keep

these risks to a minimum we will continuously examine our operations on the airport and

within its facilities. The management team will respond to incidents, conduct audits,

communicate and document our findings, and constantly train all of our employees on

safety policies.

I have appointed a Safety Committee at Concord Regional Airport which consists of ten

(10) people. They are: City Safety Manager or Designee, Aviation Supervisor

Maintenance, Aviation Supervisor Operations, Customer Service Specialist, Senior

Aviation Service Worker, Aviation Service Worker, Fire Department Representative,

ATC Tower Representative, Non-Airport City Department Safety Representative and

two (2) Airport Tennant Representatives.

As Aviation Director, I carry the ultimate responsibility for the Safety Management

System. I expect that every employee, contractor, and our customers to be active

participants in our Safety Program. Everyone shall use safe practices in their everyday

operations and report any discrepancies to his/her Manager. The Safety Committee will

be held accountable for recommending and monitoring safer steps for the prevention of

incidents and accidents. In addition, no employee will be disciplined for reporting a

Safety hazard or incident through our “non-punitive” reporting system. Employees that

report these hazards will be recognized and commended by the airport.

Richard K. Lewis

Aviation Director
Petition for Writ of Mandamus Denied and Memorandum Opinion filed July 

18, 2013.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-13-00563-CV

IN RE PHILIPPE RENE NOTTEBOHM MAGANA AND MERCATIL 

MURCIA S.A. DE C.V, Relators

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING

WRIT OF MANDAMUS

Probate Court No. 4

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 405,973-401

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

On June 28, 2013, relators Philippe Rene Nottebohm Magana and Mercatil

Murcia S.A. DE C.V filed a petition for writ of mandamus in this court. See Tex. 

Gov’t Code Ann. §22.221; see also Tex. R. App. P. 52. In the petition, relators ask 

this court to compel the Honorable Christine Butts, presiding judge of the Probate 
2

Court No 4 of Harris County to grant their motion for new trial because the court 

reporter who prepared the record of proceedings below was not certified at the 

time.

Mandamus relief is available when the trial court abuses its discretion and 

there is no adequate remedy at law, such as by appeal. In re Prudential Ins. Co., 

148 S.W.3d 124, 135–36 (Tex. 2004). Denial of a motion for new trial can be 

raised on appeal from final judgment, and relators already have such an appeal 

pending in this Court. Consequently, they have an adequate remedy at law. The 

case may be abated to give the successor court reporter an opportunity to certify 

the record.

Relators have not established entitlement to the extraordinary relief of a writ 

of mandamus. Accordingly, we deny relators’ petition for writ of mandamus.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Justices Boyce, Jamison, and Busby.
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Home                 > Browse by Title > Equal Credit Opportunity Act Amendments of 1976

              														Equal Credit Opportunity Act Amendments of 1976, March 23, 1976.						https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/title/1039,			accessed on September 10, 2024.						    

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# EUR-Lex - 32000D0204 - EN

Avis juridique important

*|*

# 32000D0204

**2000/204/EC, ECSC: Council and Commission Decision of 24 January 2000 on the conclusion of the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Kingdom of Morocco, of the other part **

*
Official Journal L 070 , 18/03/2000 P. 0001 - 0001 *

COUNCIL AND COMMISSION DECISION

of 24 January 2000

on the conclusion of the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Kingdom of Morocco, of the other part

(2000/204/EC, ECSC)

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in particular Article 310 in conjunction with the second sentence of the first subparagraph of Article 300(2) and the second subparagraph of Article 300(3) thereof,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, and in particular Article 95 thereof,

After consultation of the Consultative Committee and the unanimous agreement of the Council,

Having regard to the assent of the European Parliament(1),

Whereas the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Kingdom of Morocco, of the other part, signed in Brussels on 26 February 1996, should be approved,

HAVE DECIDED AS FOLLOWS:

Article 1

The Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Kingdom of Morocco, of the other part, the Protocols annexed thereto and the Declarations and Exchanges of Letters attached to the Final Act are hereby approved on behalf of the European Community and the European Coal and Steel Community.

The texts of the Agreement, the Protocols and the Final Act are attached to this Decision.

Article 2

1. The position to be taken by the Community within the Association Council and the Association Committee shall be laid down by the Council, on a proposal from the Commission, or, where appropriate, by the Commission, each in accordance with the corresponding provisions of the Treaties establishing the European Community and the European Coal and Steel Community.

2. The President of the Council shall, in accordance with Article 79 of the Agreement, preside over the Association Council and present the position of the Community. A representative of the President of the Council shall preside over the Association Committee, in accordance with Article 82 of the Agreement, and present the position of the Community.

Article 3

The President of the Council shall deposit the act of notification provided for in Article 96 of the Agreement on behalf of the European Community. The President of the Commission shall deposit that act on behalf of the European Coal and Steel Community.

Done at Brussels, 24 January 2000.

For the Commission

The President

R. PRODI

For the Council

The President

J. GAMA

(1) OJ C 181, 24.6.1999, p. 15.
#### § 1912a.10 Presence of OSHA officer or employee.

The meetings of all advisory committees shall be in the presence of an officer or employee of the Federal Government referred to in § 1912a.4. Such officer or employee shall be empowered to adjourn any meeting whenever he determines adjournment to be in the public interest.
(November 22, 1999)

#### Airline Exchange, Inc., Respondent, v Richard Bag et al., Appellants, et al., Defendants.

[698 NYS2d 694]

—In an action to foreclose a mortgage, the defendants Richard Bag, Toby Bag, and Apparel Industries, Inc., appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Dunne, J.), entered July 7, 1998, which denied their motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (3).

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

*415We disagree with the appellants’ contention that this action is barred by Business Corporation Law § 1312 (a). Business Corporation Law § 1312 (a) constitutes a bar to the maintenance of an action by a foreign corporation found to be doing business in New York without having obtained the required authorization to do business there *(see, Great White Whale Adv. v First Festival Prods.,*81 AD2d 704, 706). It is meant to regulate foreign corporations doing business in New York and to protect against the avoidance of contractual obligations *(see, VonArx, A.G. v Breitenstein,*52 AD2d 1049, 1050, *affd*41 NY2d 958). However, absent proof establishing that the plaintiff is doing business in New York, it is presumed that the plaintiff is doing business in its State of incorporation and not in New York *(see, S & T Bank v Spectrum Cabinet Sales,*247 AD2d 373, 374; *Construction Specialties v Hartford Ins. Co.,*97 AD2d 808).

The plaintiff, a Florida corporation, transacts almost all of its business in Florida. The plaintiff also maintains an office and receives its mail in Florida. The plaintiff has one New York bank account, has occasionally used a New York office which the plaintiffs president maintains for his other business interests, and has, over at least an eight-year period, entered into three or four transactions in New York. These facts do not support a finding that the plaintiffs business activities in New York were so systematic and regular as to manifest continuity of activity in this jurisdiction *(see, S & T Bank v Spectrum Cabinet Sales,*supra;*Alicanto, S.A. v Woolverton,*129 AD2d 601). Accordingly, Business Corporation Law § 1312 (a) does not bar the plaintiff from maintaining this action.

In light of our determination, it is unnecessary to address the appellants’ remaining contentions. Altman, J. P., H. Miller, Schmidt and Smith, JJ., concur.
## Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas

J U D G M E N T

Demondre Deshawn Holiness , Appellant

No. 06

- 21

- 00038

- CR v.

The State of Texas , Appellee Appeal from the 8th District Court of Hopkins County, Texas (Tr. Ct

. No. 2027954 ). Memora ndum Opinion delivered by Justice Stevens

, Chief Justice Morriss and Justice Burgess participating

.

As stated in the Court’s opinion of this date, we find no error in the judgment of the court
below. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

We note t hat the appellant, Demondre Deshawn Holiness , has adequately indicated his
inability to pay costs of appeal. Therefore, we waive payment of costs.

RENDERED OCTOBER 1, 2021 BY ORDER OF THE COURT JOSH R. MORRISS, III CHIEF JUSTICE

ATTEST: Debra K. Autrey , Clerk
#### Sam H. Hartzell, *Appellant,*v. Sarah Z. Brash and Henry Brash, Her Husband, *Appellees.*

1. A general demurrer to a bill of complaint, as for want of equity, will be overruled if there is any ground of equitable relief stated in the bill, even if there are any number of grounds of special demurrer.

2. The practice of moving to dismiss bills of complaint for want of equity does not obtain in this State. .

This case was decided by Division B.

Appealed from the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County.

The facts in the cáse are stated in the opinion of the court.

*F. M. Bimonton*and *H. B. Hampton,*for Appellant;

*M. Henry Cohen*and *Macfarlane &*Chaneey, for Appellees.

Parkhill, J.

The appellant filed a bill of complaint, as amended, in the circuit court in and for Hillsborough *607county against the appellees praying that accounting may be had between the complainant and defendants as to the amounts advanced by each of them, and that the assets of the business may be used to pay the indebtedness of the same, and the moneys advanced by complainant on account of the same; and that a receiver may be appointed to take charge of the assets of the business, collect the outstanding accounts, convert the assets into cash and hold the same pending the further order of the court, and that the defendants be restrained from receiving the mail or endorsing or converting into money any checks, drafts, &c., until further order of the court. The chancellor granted a temporary order restraining the defendants or either of them from collecting its debts, or endorsing its checks or disposing of its assets, and sustained a demurrer to the bill. Upon motion of defendants the bill of complaint was dismissed and the temporary restraining order was dissolved, and from this order and decree the complainant appealed.

The assignments allege error in the sustaining of the demurrer to the bill of complaint, granting the motion to dissolve the injunction and the holding there was no equity in the bill.

A general demurrer to the bill, as for want of equity, will be overruled if there is any ground of equitable relief stated in the bill, even if there are any number of grounds of special demurrer. Thompson v. Maxwell, 16 Fla., 773; Herrin v. Brown, 44 Fla., 782, 33 South. Rep., 522.

The practice of moving to dismiss bills for want of equity does not obtain in this State. Hull v. Burr *et al.,*decided at this term.

We think the bill contained equity. The relation of the complainant to the defendants was not that of a creditor as is contended, but of partnership. The contract *608between the parties provided: “The purpose of this agreement is for a mutual profit of the enterprise, that a strict account shall be kept by the party of the second part of the entire full amount required in manufacturing the goods, and after the goods are sold and collection of said sales are made the profit be divided in equal amounts between both the party of the first part and party of the second part.”

The decree and order appealed from are reversed.

Taylor and Hocker, J. J., concur;

Whitfield, C. J., and Shackleford and Cockrell, J. J., concur in the opinion.
#### D. S. Carlton, as Sheriff, *Plaintiff in Error,*v. Peter Johnson, Frank Wallrous, N. M. Sykes and W. W. Sykes, *Defendants in Error.*

1. Where a writ of error is taken in a *habeas corpus*ease, the appellate court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in error only by the proper service of a writ of *scire facias ad audiendum errores,*or by a waiver or voluntary appearance in such court.

*142. Where a writ of error has been duly issued to review a *habeas corpus*proceeding and a *scire facias*has been served on one of the defendants in error, the appellate court may issue another *scire facias*to be served on all the defendants in error returnable within a reasonable time to be fixed by the court.

This case was decided by the Court En Banc.

Writ of error to the Circuit Court for St. Lucie County.

The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court.

*Gup Gillen,*for Plaintiff in Error;

*Frank W. Pope,*for Defendants in Error.

Whitfield, C. J.

The defendants in error were on a writ of *habeas corpus*before the Circuit Judge discharged from the custody of the sheriff by whom they were held under a capias issued upon an information filed in the County Court for St. Lucie County. A writ of error was allowed by the Circuit Judge under section 2257 Gen. Stats, and was taken in the name of the Sheriff and made returnable to this court on April 11th, 1911. A *scire facias*issued in the cause was served only on W. W. Sykes, one of the defendants in error.

A motion is made to quash the writ of error and to strike the transcript of the record from the files here upon the ground, among others, that no *scire facias*or notice has been served in accordance with law.

Where a writ of error is taken in a *habeas corpus*case, the appellate court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in error only by the proper service of a writ of *scire facias ad audiendum errores,*or by a waiver *15or voluntary appearance in such court. Belch v. Manning, 55 Fla., 229, 46 South. Rep., 91; Hardee v. Brown, 56 Fla., 377, text 381, 47 South. Rep., 834; Moeller v. Stocker, 61 Fla., , 54 South. Rep., 591. The practice as to giving the required notice is within the discretion of the court. Tyler v. Painter, 16 Fla. 144. See also section 11, Art. 3 of the Constitution, as to the power of the Supreme Court to issue “all writs necessary or proper to the complete exercise of its jurisdiction.”

The writ of error transferred the cause to this court, hut only one of the defendants in error has been served with a *scire facias.*The *habeas corpus*proceeding involves the validity of statutes regulating the right to ñsh in the public waters of the State, and the Attorney General acting for the State has, in view of the interest and rights of the public in premises, made a motion that a *sci/re facias*be issued and served in this cause so as to bring all the defendants in error into this court. Therefore the Clerk of this court will issue a *scire facias*to be served by the sheriff of this court by deputy on all the clefendants in error, the *scire facias*to be made returnable Thursday, May 25th, 1911.

It is so ordered.

All concur.
§ 1949.3 Schedule of fees. ( a ) Tuition fees will be computed on the basis of the cost to the Government for the Institute conduct of the course, as determined by the Director of the Institute.
( b ) Total tuition charges for each course will be set forth in the course announcement.
§ 1990.103 Definitions. Terms used in this part shall have the meanings set forth in the Act. In addition, as used in this part, the following terms shall have the meanings set forth below: *Act* means the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (Pub. L. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 *et seq.,* 29 U.S.C. 551 *et seq.).*
*Administrator of EPA* means the Administrator of the United States Environmental Protection Agency, or designee.
*Chairperson of CPSC* means the Chairman of the United States Consumer Product Safety Commission, or designee.
*Commissioner of FDA* means the Commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration, United States Department of Health and Human Services, or designee.
*Director of NCI* means the Director of the National Cancer Institute, United States Department of Health and Human Services, or designee.
*Director of NIEHS* means the Director of the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences, United States Department of Health and Human Services, or designee.
*Director of NIOSH* means the Director of the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, United States Department of Health and Human Services, or designee.
*Mutagenesis* means the induction of heritable changes in the genetic material of either somatic or germinal cells.
*Positive results in short-term tests* means positive results in assays for two or more of the following types of effect: ( 1 ) The induction of DNA damage and/or repair;
( 2 ) Mutagenesis in bacteria, yeast, *Neurospora* or *Drosophila melanogaster;*
( 3 ) Mutagenesis in mammalian somatic cells;
( 4 ) Mutagenesis in mammalian germinal cells; or
( 5 ) Neoplastic transformation of mammalian cells in culture.
*Potential occupational carcinogen* means any substance, or combination or mixture of substances, which causes an increased incidence of benign and/or malignant neoplasms, or a substantial decrease in the latency period between exposure and onset of neoplasms in humans or in one or more experimental mammalian species as the result of any oral, respiratory or dermal exposure, or any other exposure which results in the induction of tumors at a site other than the site of administration. This definition also includes any substance which is metabolized into one or more potential occupational carcinogens by mammals.
*Secretary of HHS* means the Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services, or designee.
```

[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 4762 Engrossed in Senate (ES)]

<DOC>
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
116th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                S. 4762

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
  To designate the airport traffic control tower located at Piedmont 
   Triad International Airport in Greensboro, North Carolina, as the 
          ``Senator Kay Hagan Airport Traffic Control Tower''.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. DESIGNATION.

    The airport traffic control tower located at Piedmont Triad 
International Airport in Greensboro, North Carolina, and any successor 
airport traffic control tower at that location, shall be known and 
designated as the ``Senator Kay Hagan Airport Traffic Control Tower''.

SEC. 2. REFERENCES.

    Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, paper, or other 
record of the United States to the airport traffic control tower 
referred to in section 1 shall be deemed to be a reference to the 
``Senator Kay Hagan Airport Traffic Control Tower''.

            Passed the Senate September 30 (legislative day, September 
      29), 2020.

            Attest:

                                                             Secretary.
116th CONGRESS

  2d Session

                                S. 4762

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

  To designate the airport traffic control tower located at Piedmont 
   Triad International Airport in Greensboro, North Carolina, as the 
          ``Senator Kay Hagan Airport Traffic Control Tower''.
```
Exhibit 10.18


 


Eastern Virginia Bankshares, Inc.


2015 Base Salaries for Executive Officers


 


Effective March 1, 2015


 


The 2015 base salaries for the executive officers
of Eastern Virginia Bankshares, Inc. (the “Company”) are as follows:


 





	Joe A. Shearin
 President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company and EVB
	 	$	346,619	 
	 	 	 	 	 
	Joseph H. James, Jr.
 Senior Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer of the Company and EVB
	 	$	197,007	 
	 	 	 	 	 
	J. Adam Sothen
 Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of the Company and EVB	 	$	157,429	 
	 	 	 	 	 
	James S. Thomas
 Executive Vice President and Chief Credit Officer of EVB	 	$	170,466	 
	 	 	 	 	 
	Douglas R. Taylor
 Executive Vice President and Chief Risk Officer of EVB	 	$	150,737	 
	 	 	 	 	 
	Ann-Cabell Williams
 Executive Vice President and Retail Executive of EVB	 	$	150,737	 
	 	 	 	 	 
	Bruce T. Brockwell
 Executive Vice President and Director of Commercial Banking of EVB	 	$	150,734	 
	 	 	 	 	 
	Mark C. Hanna
 Executive Vice President and President, Tidewater Region of EVB	 	$	225,000