PERSONNEL SECURITY 

CLEARANCES

Actions Needed to Ensure 

Quality of Background 

Investigations and 

Resulting Decisions

Statement for the Record of Brenda S. Farrell, Director 

Defense Capabilities and Management

Statement for the Record

To the Committee on Oversight and 

Government Reform, 

House of Representatives 

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 9:30 a.m. EST

Tuesday, February 11, 2014

GAO-14-138T

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-14-138T, a statement for 

the record to the Committee on Oversight and 

Government Reform, House of 

Representatives

February 11, 2014

PERSONNEL SECURITY CLEARANCES

Actions Needed to Ensure Quality of Background 

Investigations and Resulting Decisions

Why GAO Did This Study

Recently the DNI reported that more 

than 5.1 million federal government 

and contractor employees held or were 

eligible to hold a security clearance. 

GAO has reported that the federal 

government spent over $1 billion to 

conduct background investigations (in 

support of security clearances and 

suitability determinations for federal 

employment) in fiscal year 2011. A 

high quality process is essential to 

minimize the risks of unauthorized 

disclosures of classified information 

and to help ensure that information 

about individuals with criminal activity 

or other questionable behavior is 

identified and assessed as part of the 

process for granting or retaining 

clearances.

This statement addresses (1) a general 

overview of the security clearance 

process; (2) what is known about the 

quality of investigations and 

adjudications, which are the 

determinations made by executive 

branch agency officials to grant or 

reject clearance requests based on 

investigations; and (3) the extent of 

reciprocity, which is the decision of 

agencies to honor clearances 

previously granted by other agencies. 

This statement is based on GAO work 

issued from 2008 to 2013 on DOD’s 

personnel security clearance program 

and government-wide suitability and 

security clearance reform efforts. As 

part of that work, GAO (1) reviewed 

relevant statutes, federal guidance, 

and processes, (2) examined agency 

data on the timeliness and quality of 

investigations and adjudications, (3) 

assessed reform efforts, and (4) 

reviewed a sample of case files for 

DOD personnel.

What GAO Found

Several agencies have key roles and responsibilities in the multi-phased 

personnel security clearance process, including the Director of National 

Intelligence (DNI) who, as the Security Executive Agent, is responsible for 

developing policies and procedures related to security clearance investigations 

and adjudications, among other things. The Deputy Director for Management at 

the Office of Management and Budget chairs the Performance Accountability 

Council that oversees reform efforts to enhance the personnel security process.

The security process includes: the determination of whether a position requires a 

clearance, application submission, investigation, and adjudication. Specifically, 

agency officials must first determine whether a federal civilian position requires 

access to classified information. After an individual has been selected for a 

position that requires a personnel security clearance and the individual submits 

an application for a clearance, investigators—often contractors—from the Office 

of Personnel Management (OPM) conduct background investigations for most 

executive branch agencies. Adjudicators from requesting agencies use the 

information from these investigations and federal adjudicative guidelines to 

determine whether an applicant is eligible for a clearance. Further, individuals are 

subject to reinvestigations at intervals based on the level of security clearance. 

Executive branch agencies do not consistently assess quality throughout the 

personnel security clearance process, in part because they have not fully 

developed and implemented metrics to measure quality in key aspects of the 

process. For more than a decade, GAO has emphasized the need to build and 

monitor quality throughout the clearance process to promote oversight and 

positive outcomes such as maximizing the likelihood that individuals who are 

security risks will be scrutinized more closely. GAO reported in 2009 that, with 

respect to initial top secret clearances adjudicated in July 2008 for the 

Department of Defense (DOD), documentation was incomplete for most of 

OPM’s investigative reports. GAO independently estimated that 87 percent of 

about 3,500 investigative reports that DOD adjudicators used to make clearance 

eligibility decisions were missing some required documentation, such as the 

verification of all of the applicant’s employment, the required number of social 

references for the applicant, and complete security forms. In May 2009, GAO 

recommended that OPM measure the frequency with which its investigative 

reports met federal investigative standards to improve the completeness—that is, 

quality—of investigation documentation. In January 2014, DNI officials said that 

metrics to measure quality of investigative reports had not been established.

GAO reported in 2010 that executive branch agencies do not consistently and

comprehensively track the extent to which reciprocity is occurring because no 

government-wide metrics exist to consistently and comprehensively track when 

reciprocity is granted. The acceptance of a background investigation or 

personnel security clearance determination completed by another authorized 

agency is an opportunity to save resources and executive branch agencies are 

required by law to grant reciprocity, subject to certain exceptions, such as 

completing additional requirements like polygraph testing. GAO’s 2010 

recommendation that the leaders of the security clearance reform effort develop 

metrics to track reciprocity has not been fully implemented.

View GAO-14-138T. For more information, 

contact Brenda S. Farrell at (202) 512-3604 or 

farrellb@gao.gov.
Page 1 GAO-14-138T

Chairman Issa, Ranking Member Cummings, and Members of the 

Committee:

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the federal government’s 

approach to background investigations. As you know, we have an 

extensive body of work on issues related to the personnel security 

clearance process. Since 2008, we have focused on the governmentwide effort to reform the security clearance process. A high-quality 

personnel security clearance process is necessary to minimize the 

associated risks of unauthorized disclosures of classified information and 

to help ensure that information about individuals with histories of criminal 

activity or other questionable behavior is identified and assessed as part 

of the process for granting or retaining clearances. However, recent 

events, such as unauthorized disclosures of classified information, have 

shown there is more work to be done by federal agencies to help ensure 

that the clearance process functions effectively and efficiently, so that 

only trustworthy individuals obtain and keep security clearances and the 

resulting access to classified information.

Personnel security clearances allow government and industry personnel 

(contractors) to gain access to classified information that, through 

unauthorized disclosure, can in some cases cause exceptionally grave 

damage to U.S. national security. It is important to keep in mind that 

security clearances allow for access to classified information on a needto-know basis. Federal agencies also use other processes and 

procedures to determine if an individual should be granted access to 

certain government buildings or facilities or be employed as either a 

military or federal civilian employee, or contractor for the federal 

government. Separate from, but related to, personnel security clearances 

are determinations of suitability that the executive branch uses to ensure

that individuals are suitable, based on character and conduct, for federal 

employment in their agency or position.

The federal government processes a high volume of personnel security 

clearances at significant costs. Recently, the Director of National 

Intelligence (DNI) reported that as of October 2013, more than 5.1 million 

federal government and contractor employees held or were eligible to 

hold a security clearance. Furthermore, we have reported that the federal 

government spent over $1 billion to conduct more than 2 million 

background investigations (in support of both personnel security 

clearances and suitability determinations for government employment 

outside of the Intelligence Community) in fiscal year 2011. The 

Department of Defense (DOD) accounts for the majority of all personnel 
Page 2 GAO-14-138T

security clearances—788,000 background investigations that cost over 

$787 million in fiscal year 2011.1

My statement today will focus on three topics related to personnel 

security clearances. First, I will provide a general overview of the security 

clearance process, including how clearances are acquired and retained. 

Second, I will discuss what is known about the quality of clearance 

investigations and adjudications, which are the determinations made by 

agency officials to grant or reject clearance requests based on 

investigations. Third, I will discuss the extent of reciprocity, which is the 

decision of agencies to honor clearances previously granted by other 

agencies.

My statement is based on our reports and testimonies issued from 2008 

through 2013 on DOD’s personnel security clearance program and 

government-wide suitability and security clearance reform efforts. A list of 

these related products appears at the end of my statement. As part of the 

work for these products, we reviewed relevant statutes, federal guidance, 

and processes; examined agency data on the timeliness and quality of 

investigations and adjudications; assessed reform efforts; and reviewed a 

sample of investigative and adjudication files for DOD personnel.

The work upon which this statement is based was conducted in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. Additional details about the 

scope and methodology can be found in each of these related products.

 1

GAO, Background Investigations: Office of Personnel Management Needs to Improve 

Transparency of Its Pricing and Seek Cost Savings, GAO-12-197 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 

28, 2012). 
Page 3 GAO-14-138T

Multiple executive-branch agencies are responsible for different phases of 

the federal government’s personnel security clearance process. For

example, in 2008, Executive Order 13467 designated the DNI as the 

Security Executive Agent.2 As such, the DNI is responsible for developing 

policies and procedures to help ensure the effective, efficient, and timely 

completion of background investigations and adjudications relating to 

determinations of eligibility for access to classified information and 

eligibility to hold a sensitive position. In turn, executive branch agencies 

determine which of their positions—military, civilian, or private-industry 

contractors—require access to classified information and, therefore, 

which people must apply for and undergo a personnel security clearance 

investigation. Investigators—often contractors—from Federal 

Investigative Services within the Office of Personnel and Management 

(OPM)3 conduct these investigations for most of the federal government 

using federal investigative standards and OPM internal guidance as 

criteria for collecting background information on applicants.4

 2

Executive Order No. 13467, Reforming Processes Related to Suitability for Government 

Employment, Fitness for Contractor Employees, and Eligibility for Access to Classified 

National Security Information (June 30, 2008). 

OPM 

provides the resulting investigative reports to the requesting agencies for 

their internal adjudicators, who use the information along with the federal 

adjudicative guidelines to determine whether an applicant is eligible for a 

personnel security clearance. 

3

OPM’s Federal Investigative Services employs both federal and contract investigators to 

conduct work required to complete background investigations. The federal staff constitutes 

about 25 percent of that workforce, while OPM currently also has contracts for 

investigative fieldwork with several investigation firms, constituting the remaining 75 

percent of its investigative workforce.

4

In 2005, the Office of Management and Budget designated OPM as the agency 

responsible for, among other things, the day-to-day supervision and monitoring of security 

clearance investigations and for tracking the results of individual agency-performed 

adjudications, subject to certain exceptions. However, the Office of the Director of National 

Intelligence can designate other agencies as an “authorized investigative agency” 

pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 3341(b)(3), as implemented through Executive Order 13467. 

Alternatively, under 5 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(2), OPM can redelegate any of its investigative 

functions subject to performance standards and a system of oversight prescribed by OPM 

under 5 U.S.C. § 1104(b). Agencies without delegated authority rely on OPM to conduct 

their background investigations while agencies with delegated authority—including the 

Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, National Geospatial-Intelligence 

Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, National 

Reconnaissance Office, and Department of State—have been authorized to conduct their 

own background investigations. 

The Personnel 

Security Clearance 

Process
Page 4 GAO-14-138T

DOD is OPM’s largest customer, and its Under Secretary of Defense for 

Intelligence (USD(I)) is responsible for developing, coordinating, and 

overseeing the implementation of DOD policy, programs, and guidance 

for personnel, physical, industrial, information, operations, 

chemical/biological, and DOD Special Access Program security. 

Additionally, the Defense Security Service, under the authority, direction, 

and control of the USD(I), manages and administers the DOD portion of 

the National Industrial Security Program for the DOD components and 

other federal services by agreement, as well as providing security 

education and training, among other things.5

The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 prompted 

government-wide suitability and security clearance reform.6 The act 

required, among other matters, an annual report to Congress—in 

February of each year from 2006 through 2011—about progress and key 

measurements on the timeliness of granting security clearances. It 

specifically required those reports to include the periods of time required 

for conducting investigations and adjudicating or granting clearances. 

However, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act 

requirement for the executive branch to annually report on its timeliness 

expired in 2011. More recently, the Intelligence Authorization Act of 2010 

established a new requirement that the President annually report to 

Congress the total amount of time required to process certain security 

clearance determinations for the previous fiscal year for each element of 

the Intelligence Community.7

 5

The National Industrial Security Program was established by Executive Order 12829 to 

safeguard federal government classified information that is released to contractors, 

licensees, and grantees of the United States government. Executive Order 12829, 

National Industrial Security Program (Jan. 6, 1993, as amended). 

The Intelligence Authorization Act of 2010 

additionally requires that those annual reports include the total number of 

active security clearances throughout the United States government, 

including both government employees and contractors. Unlike the 

Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 reporting 

requirement, the requirement to submit these annual reports does not 

expire.

6

Pub. L. No. 108-458 (2004) (relevant sections codified at 50 U.S.C. § 3341). 

7

Pub. L. No. 111-259, § 367 (2010) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 3104). 
Page 5 GAO-14-138T

In 2007, DOD and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence 

(ODNI) formed the Joint Security Clearance Process Reform Team, 

known as the Joint Reform Team, to improve the security clearance 

process government-wide. In a 2008 memorandum, the President called 

for a reform of the security clearance and suitability determination 

processes and subsequently issued Executive Order 13467, which in 

addition to designating the DNI as the Security Executive Agent, also 

designated the Director of OPM as the Suitability Executive Agent. 

Specifically, the Director of OPM, as Suitability Executive Agent, is 

responsible for developing policies and procedures to help ensure the 

effective, efficient, and timely completion of investigations and 

adjudications relating to determinations of suitability, to include 

consideration of an individual’s character or conduct. Further, the 

executive order established a Suitability and Security Clearance 

Performance Accountability Council (Performance Accountability Council)

to oversee agency progress in implementing the reform vision. Under the 

executive order, this council is accountable to the President for driving 

implementation of the reform effort, including ensuring the alignment of 

security and suitability processes, holding agencies accountable for 

implementation, and establishing goals and metrics for progress. The 

order also appointed the Deputy Director for Management at the Office of 

Management and Budget as the Chair of the council.8

To help ensure the trustworthiness and reliability of personnel in positions 

with access to classified information, executive branch agencies rely on a 

personnel security clearance process that includes multiple phases: 

requirements determination, application, investigation, adjudication, 

appeals (if applicable, where a clearance has been denied), and 

reinvestigation (where applicable, for renewal or upgrade of an existing 

clearance). Figure 1 illustrates the steps in the personnel security 

clearance process, which is representative of the general process 

followed by most executive branch agencies and includes procedures for 

appeals and renewals. While different departments and agencies may 

 8

The Performance Accountability Council consists of the DNI as the Security Executive 

Agent, the Director of OPM as the Suitability Executive Agent, and the Deputy Director for 

Management, Office of Management and Budget, as the Chair with the authority to 

designate a Vice Chair and designate officials from additional agencies to serve as 

members. As of June 2012, the council included representatives from the Departments of, 

Energy, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, State, the Treasury, and 

Veterans Affairs, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 

Steps in the Personnel 

Security Clearance 

Process
Page 6 GAO-14-138T

have slightly different personnel security clearance processes, the phases 

that follow are illustrative of a typical process.9

 9

The general process for performing a background investigation for either a secret or top 

secret clearance is the same; however, the level of detail and types of information 

gathered for a top secret clearance are more substantial than for a secret clearance. 

Since 1997, federal agencies have followed a common set of personnel security 

investigative standards and adjudicative guidelines for determining whether federal civilian 

workers, military personnel, and others, such as private industry personnel contracted by 

the government, are eligible to hold a security clearance.
Page 7 GAO-14-138T

Figure 1: Steps in the Executive Branch Personnel Security Clearance Process

a

OPM provides background investigation services to over 100 executive branch agencies; however, 

others, including some agencies in the Intelligence Community, have been delegated authority from 

the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, OPM, or both, to conduct their own background 

investigations.
Page 8 GAO-14-138T

In the first step of the personnel security clearance process, executive 

branch officials determine the requirements of a federal civilian position, 

including assessing the risk and sensitivity level associated with that 

position, to determine whether it requires access to classified information 

and, if required, the level of access. Security clearances are generally 

categorized into three levels: top secret, secret, and confidential.10 The 

level of classification denotes the degree of protection required for 

information and the amount of damage that unauthorized disclosure could 

reasonably be expected to cause to national defense.

11

A sound requirements determination process is important because 

requests for clearances for positions that do not need a clearance or need 

a lower level of clearance increase investigative workloads and resultant 

costs. In addition to cost implications, limiting the access to classified 

information and reducing the associated risks to national security 

underscore the need for executive branch agencies to have a sound 

process to determine which positions require a security clearance.

In 2012, we reported that the DNI, as the Security Executive Agent, had 

not provided agencies with clearly defined policy and procedures to 

consistently determine if a position requires a security clearance, or 

established guidance to require agencies to review and revise or validate 

existing federal civilian position designations.12

We routinely monitor the status of agency actions to address our prior 

report recommendations. As part of that process, we found that a January 

We recommended that the 

DNI issue policy and guidance for the determination, review, and 

validation of requirements, and ODNI concurred with those 

recommendations, stating that it recognized the need to issue or clarify 

policy. 

 10A top secret clearance is generally also required for access to Sensitive Compartmented 

Information—classified intelligence information concerning or derived from intelligence 

sources, methods, or analytical processes that is required to be protected within formal 

access control systems established and overseen by the Director of National Intelligence. 

11Unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause (1) “damage,” in the 

case of confidential information; (2) “serious damage,” in the case of secret information; 

and (3) “exceptionally grave damage,” in the case of top-secret information. Executive 

Order 13526, Classified National Security Information, (Dec. 29, 2009). 

12GAO, Security Clearances: Agencies Need Clearly Defined Policy for Determining 

Civilian Position Requirements, GAO-12-800 (Washington, D.C.: July 12, 2012). 

Requirements 

Determination Phase
Page 9 GAO-14-138T

25, 2013 presidential memo authorized the DNI and OPM to jointly issue 

revisions to part 732 of Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, which 

provides requirements and procedures for the designation of national 

security positions. Subsequently, ODNI and OPM drafted the proposed 

regulation; published it in the Federal Register on May 28, 2013; and the 

comment period closed. We reported on October 31, 2013 that ODNI and 

OPM officials stated that they would jointly review and address comments 

and prepare the final rule for approval from the Office of Management and 

Budget. 

Once an applicant is selected for a position that requires a personnel 

security clearance, a security clearance must be obtained in order for an 

individual to gain access to classified information. To determine whether 

an investigation would be required, the agency requesting a security 

clearance investigation conducts a check of existing personnel security 

databases to determine whether there is an existing security clearance 

investigation underway or whether the individual has already been 

favorably adjudicated for a clearance in accordance with current 

standards. During the application submission phase, a security officer 

from an executive branch agency (1) requests an investigation of an 

individual requiring a clearance; (2) forwards a personnel security

questionnaire (Standard Form 86) using OPM’s electronic Questionnaires 

for Investigations Processing (e-QIP) system or a paper copy of the 

Standard Form 86 to the individual to complete; (3) reviews the 

completed questionnaire; and (4) sends the questionnaire and supporting 

documentation, such as fingerprints and signed waivers, to OPM or its 

investigation service provider.

During the investigation phase, investigators—often contractors—from 

OPM’s Federal Investigative Services use federal investigative standards 

and OPM’s internal guidance to conduct and document the investigation 

of the applicant. The scope of information gathered in an investigation 

depends on the needs of the client agency and the personnel security 

clearance requirements of an applicant’s position, as well as whether the 

investigation is for an initial clearance or a reinvestigation to renew a 

clearance. For example, in an investigation for a top secret clearance, 

investigators gather additional information through more time-consuming 

efforts, such as traveling to conduct in-person interviews to corroborate 

information about an applicant’s employment and education. However, 

many background investigation types have similar components. For 

instance, for all investigations, information that applicants provide on 

Application Phase

Investigation Phase
Page 10 GAO-14-138T

electronic applications is checked against numerous databases. Both 

secret and top secret investigations contain credit and criminal history 

checks, while top secret investigations also contain citizenship, public 

record, and spouse checks as well as reference interviews and an 

Enhanced Subject Interview to gain insight into an applicant’s character. 
Page 11 GAO-14-138T

Table 1 highlights the investigative components generally associated with 

the secret and top secret clearance levels. After OPM, or the designated 

provider, completes the background investigation, the resulting 

investigative report is provided to the requesting agencies for their 

internal adjudicators.

Table 1: Information Gathered in Conducting a Typical Investigation to Determine Suitability and Eligibility for a Personnel 

Security Clearance

Type of background 

investigation

Type of information gathered by component Secret Top Secret

1. Personnel security questionnaire: The reported answers on an electronic Standard Form-85P or 

Standard Form-86 

X X

2. Fingerprints: Fingerprints submitted electronically or manually X X

3. National agency check: Data from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, military records, and other 

agencies as required (with fingerprints)

X X

4. Credit check: Data from credit bureaus where the subject lived/worked/attended school for at least 

6 months 

X X

5. Local agency checks: Data from law enforcement agencies where the subject 

lived/worked/attended school during the past 10 years or—in the case of reinvestigations—since 

the last security clearance investigation 

X X

6. Date and place of birth: Corroboration of information supplied on the personnel security 

questionnaire 

X

7. Citizenship: For individuals born outside of the United States, verification of U.S. citizenship directly 

from the appropriate registration authority 

X

8. Education: Verification of most recent or significant claimed attendance, degree, or diploma M X

9. Employment: Review of employment records and interviews with workplace references, such as 

supervisors and coworkers

M X

10. References: Data from interviews with subject-identified and investigator-developed leads M X

11. National agency check for spouse or cohabitant: Data from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 

military records, and other agencies as required (without fingerprint)

X

12. Former spouse: Data from interview(s) conducted with spouse(s) divorced within the last 10 years 

or since the last investigation or reinvestigation

X

13. Neighborhoods: Interviews with neighbors and verification of residence through records check M X

14. Public records: Verification of issues, such as bankruptcy, divorce, and criminal and civil court 

cases 

X

15. Enhanced Subject Interview: Collection of relevant data, and resolution of significant issues or 

inconsistencies 

a X

Sources: DOD and OPM.

Notes: The content and amount of information collected as part of a personnel security clearance 

investigation depend on a variety of case-specific factors, including the history of the applicant and 

the nature of the position; however, items 1 through15 are typically collected for the types of 

investigations indicated.
Page 12 GAO-14-138T

Components with the “M” notation are checked through requests for information sent by OPM’s 

Federal Investigative Services through the mail. 

a

The Enhanced Subject Interview was developed by the Joint Reform Team and implemented by 

OPM in 2011 and serves as an in-depth discussion between the interviewer and the subject to ensure 

a full understanding of the applicant’s information, potential issues, and mitigating factors. It is 

included in a Minimum Background Investigation, one type of suitability investigation, and can be 

triggered by the presence of issues in a secret-level investigation.

In December 2012, ODNI and OPM jointly issued a revised version of the 

federal investigative standards for the conduct of background 

investigations for individuals who work for or on behalf of the federal 

government. According to October 31, 2013, testimony by an ODNI 

official, the revised standards will be implemented through a phased 

approach beginning in 2014 and continuing through 2017.13

During the adjudication phase, adjudicators from the hiring agency use 

the information from the investigative report along with federal 

adjudicative guidelines to determine whether an applicant is eligible for a 

security clearance.14

 13Brian A. Prioletti, Assistant Director, Special Security Directorate, National 

Counterintelligence Executive, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Statement for 

the Record: Open Hearing on Security Clearance Reform, testimony before the Senate 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 113th Cong., 1st sess., 

October 31, 2013. 

To make clearance eligibility decisions, the 

adjudication guidelines specify that adjudicators consider 13 specific 

areas that elicit information about (1) conduct that could raise security 

14For industry personnel, the Defense Security Service adjudicated clearance eligibility for 

DOD and 24 other federal agencies, by agreement, using OPM-provided investigative 

reports. DOD is in the process of consolidating its adjudication functions, including those 

for industry personnel. Per Department of Defense, National Industrial Security Program: 

Operating Manual, DOD 5220.22-M (Feb. 28, 2006), the 24 agencies are the (1) National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration; (2) Department of Commerce; (3) General 

Services Administration; (4) Department of State; (5) Small Business Administration; (6) 

National Science Foundation; (7) Department of the Treasury; (8) Department of 

Transportation; (9) Department of the Interior; (10) Department of Agriculture; (11) 

Department of Labor; (12) Environmental Protection Agency; (13) Department of Justice; 

(14) Federal Reserve System; (15) U.S. Government Accountability Office; (16) U.S. 

Trade Representative; (17) U.S. International Trade Commission; (18) U.S. Agency for 

International Development; (19) Nuclear Regulatory Commission; (20) Department of 

Education; (21) Department of Health and Human Services; (22) Department of Homeland 

Security; (23) Federal Communications Commission; and (24) Office of Personnel 

Management.

Adjudication and Appeals 

Phases
Page 13 GAO-14-138T

concerns and (2) factors that could allay those security concerns and 

permit granting a clearance.15

If a clearance is denied or revoked, appeals of the adjudication decision 

are possible. We have work under way to review the process for security

clearance revocations. We expect to issue a report on this process in the

spring of 2014.

Once an individual has obtained a personnel security clearance and as 

long as he or she remains in a position that requires access to classified 

national security information, that individual is reinvestigated periodically 

at intervals that depend on the level of security clearance. For example, 

top secret clearance holders are reinvestigated every 5 years, and secret 

clearance holders are reinvestigated every 10 years. Some of the 

information gathered during a reinvestigation would focus specifically on 

the period of time since the last approved clearance, such as a check of 

local law enforcement agencies where an individual lived and worked 

since the last investigation. Further, the Joint Reform Team began an 

effort to review the possibility of continuing evaluations, which would 

ascertain on a more frequent basis whether an eligible employee with 

access to classified information continues to meet the requirements for 

access. Specifically, the team proposed to move from periodic review to 

that of continuous evaluation, meaning annually for top secret or similar 

positions and at least once every 5 years for secret or similar positions, 

as a means to reveal security-relevant information earlier than the 

previous method, and provide increased scrutiny of populations that could 

potentially represent risk to the government because they already have 

access to classified information. The revised federal investigative 

 15Federal guidelines state that clearance decisions require a common-sense 

determination of eligibility for access to classified information based upon careful 

consideration of the following 13 areas: allegiance to the United States; foreign influence; 

foreign preference; sexual behavior; personal conduct; financial considerations; alcohol 

consumption; drug involvement; emotional, mental, and personality disorders; criminal 

conduct; security violations; outside activities; and misuse of information technology

systems. Further, the guidelines require adjudicators to evaluate the relevance of an 

individual’s overall conduct by considering factors such as the nature, extent, and 

seriousness of the conduct; the circumstances surrounding the conduct, including 

knowledgeable participation; the frequency and recency of the conduct; and the 

individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct, among others.

Reinvestigation Phase
Page 14 GAO-14-138T

standards state that the top secret level of security clearances may be 

subject to continuous evaluation.16

Executive branch agencies do not consistently assess quality throughout 

the personnel security clearance process, in part because they have not 

fully developed and implemented metrics to measure quality in key 

aspects of the process. We have emphasized—since the late 1990s—the 

need to build and monitor quality throughout the personnel security 

clearance process to promote oversight and positive outcomes such as 

maximizing the likelihood that individuals who are security risks will be 

scrutinized more closely.17 For example, in 2008 two of the key factors we 

identified to consider in efforts to reform the security clearance process 

were building quality into every step of the clearance processes and 

having a valid set of metrics for evaluating efficiency and effectiveness.18

As previously discussed, DOD accounts for the majority of security 

clearances within the federal government. We initially placed DOD’s 

personnel security clearance program on our high-risk list in 2005 

because of delays in completing clearances.

We have begun additional work to review the quality of investigations.

19

 16In March 2009, the Joint Security and Suitability Reform Team issued an Enterprise 

Information Technology Strategy that included a concept of continuous evaluation that 

included automatic and randomly scheduled security evaluations using automated record 

checks. Such checks would provide an automatic notification to the person being 

investigated, security managers, or other designated personnel that continuous evaluation 

is being conducted.

It remained on our list until 

2011 because of ongoing concerns about delays in processing 

clearances and problems with the quality of investigations and 

adjudications. Specifically, we reported in 2009 on (1) incomplete 

investigative reports from OPM, the agency that supplies about 90 

17GAO, DOD Personnel: Inadequate Personnel Security Investigations Pose National 

Security Risks, GAO/NSIAD-00-12 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 27, 1999).

18GAO, Personnel Clearances: Key Factors to Consider in Efforts to Reform Security 

Clearance Processes, GAO-08-352T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 27, 2008).

19GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-05-207 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 2005). Every 

2 years at the start of a new Congress, GAO issues a report that identifies government 

operations that are high risk because of their vulnerabilities to fraud, waste, abuse, and 

mismanagement, or are most in need of transformation to address economy, efficiency, or 

effectiveness. 

Actions Needed to 

Ensure Quality of 

Clearance 

Investigations and 

Adjudications
Page 15 GAO-14-138T

percent of all federal clearance investigations, including those for DOD; 

and (2) the granting of some clearances by DOD adjudicators even 

though some required data were missing from the investigative reports 

used to make such determinations.

For example, in May 2009, we reported that, with respect to DOD initial 

top secret clearances adjudicated in July 2008, documentation was 

incomplete for most OPM investigative reports. We independently 

estimated that 87 percent of about 3,500 investigative reports that DOD 

adjudicators used to make clearance decision were missing at least one 

type of documentation required by federal investigative standards.20

In addition to incomplete investigative reports, our 2009 report also 

identified issues regarding the quality of DOD adjudications. With respect 

to DOD adjudicative files, in 2009, we estimated that 22 percent of the 

adjudicative files for about 3,500 initial top secret clearances that were 

adjudicated favorably did not contain all the required documentation even 

though DOD regulation requires that adjudicators maintain a record of 

each favorable and unfavorable adjudication decision and document the 

rationale for granting clearance eligibility to applicants with security 

concerns revealed during the investigation.

The 

type of documentation most often missing from investigative reports was 

verification of all of the applicant’s employment followed by information 

from the required number of social references for the applicant and

investigative reports did not contain a required personal subject interview.

Officials within various executive branch agencies have noted to us that 

the information gathered during the interview and investigative portion of 

the process is essential for making adjudicative decisions.

21

 20Estimates in our May 2009 report were based on our review of a random sample of 100 

OPM-provided investigative reports for initial top secret clearances granted in July 2008 

by the U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, and U.S. Air Force central adjudication facilities and have 

margins of error, based on a 95 percent confidence interval, of +/- 10 percentage points or 

fewer.

Documentation most 

frequently missing from adjudicative files was the rationale for granting 

security clearances to applicants with security concerns related to foreign 

influence, financial considerations, and criminal conduct. At the time of 

our review in 2009, neither OPM nor DOD measured the completeness of 

its investigative reports or adjudicative files, which limited the agencies’ 

21Department of Defense, DOD Personnel Security Program Regulation 5200.2-R 

(January 1987, incorporating changes Feb. 23, 1996).
Page 16 GAO-14-138T

ability to explain the extent to which or the reasons why some files are 

incomplete.

In November 2010, we reported that agency officials who utilize OPM as 

their investigative service provider cited challenges related to deficient 

investigative reports as a factor that slows agencies’ abilities to make 

adjudicative decisions. The quality and completeness of investigative 

reports directly affects adjudicator workloads, including whether additional 

steps are required before adjudications can be made, as well as agency 

costs. For example, some agency officials noted that OPM investigative 

reports do not include complete copies of associated police reports and 

criminal record checks. Several agency officials stated that in order to 

avoid further costs or delays that would result from working with OPM, 

they often choose to perform additional steps internally to obtain missing 

information. According to ODNI and OPM officials, OPM investigators 

provide a summary of police and criminal reports and assert that there is 

no policy requiring inclusion of copies of the original records. However, 

ODNI officials also stated that adjudicators may want or need entire 

records, as critical elements may be left out. For example, according to 

Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals officials, in one case, an 

investigator’s summary of a police report incorrectly identified the subject 

as a thief when the subject was actually the victim.

As a result of the incompleteness of OPM’s investigative reports on DOD 

personnel and the incompleteness of DOD’s adjudicative files that we first 

identified in our 2009 report, we made several recommendations to OPM 

and DOD. We recommended that OPM measure the frequency with 

which its investigative reports meet federal investigative standards, so 

that the executive branch can identify the factors leading to incomplete 

reports and take corrective actions.22

In a subsequent February 2011 report, we noted that the Office of

Management and Budget, ODNI, DOD, and OPM leaders had provided 

congressional members and executive branch agencies with metrics to 

assess the quality of investigative reports and adjudicative files and other 

aspects of the clearance process. For example, the Rapid Assessment of 

OPM did not agree or disagree with 

our recommendation. 

 22GAO, DOD Personnel Clearances: Comprehensive Timeliness Reporting, Complete 

Clearance Documentation, and Quality Measures Are Needed to Further Improve the 

Clearance Process, GAO-09-400 (Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2009). 
Page 17 GAO-14-138T

Incomplete Security Evaluations was one tool the executive branch 

agencies planned to use for measuring quality, or completeness, of 

OPM’s background investigations.23

According to OPM officials, OPM also continues to assess the quality of 

investigations based on voluntary reporting from customer agencies. 

Specifically, OPM tracks investigations that are (1) returned for rework 

from the requesting agency, (2) identified as deficient using a web-based 

customer satisfaction survey, or (3) identified as deficient through 

adjudicator calls to OPM’s quality hotline. In our past work, we have noted 

that the number of investigations returned for rework is not by itself a valid 

indicator of the quality of investigative work because DOD adjudication 

officials told us that they have been reluctant to return incomplete 

investigations in anticipation of delays that would affect timeliness. 

Further, relying on agencies to voluntarily provide information on 

investigation quality may not reflect the quality of OPM’s total 

investigation workload.

However, in June 2012 an OPM 

official said that OPM chose not to use this tool and opted to develop 

another tool. We currently have work under way to review any actions 

OPM has taken to develop and implement metrics for measuring the 

completeness of OPM’s investigative reports. However, ODNI officials 

confirmed in January 2014 that OPM did not have such metrics in place.

We also recommended in 2009 that DOD measure the frequency with 

which adjudicative files meet requirements, so that the executive branch 

can identify the factors leading to incomplete files and include the results 

of such measurement in annual reports to Congress on clearances.24

 23The Rapid Assessment of Incomplete Security Evaluations tool was developed by DOD 

to track the quality of investigations conducted by OPM for DOD personnel security 

clearance investigations, measured as a percentage of investigations completed that 

contained deficiencies. 

In 

November 2009, DOD subsequently issued a memorandum that 

established a tool to measure the frequency with which adjudicative files 

meet the requirements of DOD regulation. Specifically, the DOD 

memorandum stated that DOD would use a tool called the Review of 

Adjudication Documentation Accuracy and Rationales, or RADAR, to 

gather specific information about adjudication processes at the 

adjudication facilities and assess the quality of adjudicative 

24GAO-09-400. 
Page 18 GAO-14-138T

documentation. In following up on our 2009 recommendations, as of 

2012, a DOD official stated that RADAR had been used in fiscal year 

2010 to evaluate some adjudications, but was not used in fiscal year 2011 

because of funding shortfalls. DOD restarted the use of RADAR in fiscal 

year 2012.

Several efforts are underway to review the security clearance process, 

and those efforts, combined with sustained leadership attention, could 

help facilitate progress in assessing and improving the quality of the 

security clearance process. After the September 16, 2013 shooting at the 

Washington Navy Yard, the President directed the Office of Management 

and Budget, in coordination with ODNI and OPM, to conduct a 

government-wide review into the oversight, nature, and implementation of 

security and suitability standards for federal employees and contractors. 

In addition, in September 2013, the Secretary of Defense directed an 

independent review to identify and recommend actions that address gaps 

or deficiencies in DOD programs, policies, and procedures regarding 

security at DOD installations and the granting and renewal of security 

clearances for DOD employees and contractor personnel. The primary 

objective of this review is to determine whether there are weaknesses in 

DOD programs, policies, or procedures regarding physical security at 

DOD installations and the security clearance and reinvestigation process 

that can be strengthened to prevent a similar tragedy.

We initially placed DOD’s personnel security clearance program on our 

high-risk list in 2005 because of delays in completing clearances.25 In 

February 2011, we removed DOD’s personnel security clearance 

program from our high-risk list largely because of the department’s 

demonstrated progress in expediting the amount of time processing 

clearances.26

Even with the significant progress leading to removal of DOD’s program 

from our high-risk list, the Comptroller General noted in June 2012 that 

sustained leadership would be necessary to continue to implement, 

We also noted DOD’s efforts to develop and implement 

tools to evaluate the quality of investigations and adjudications. 

 25GAO-05-207. 

26GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-11-278 (Washington, D.C.: February 2011).

Recent Efforts and 

Sustained Leadership 

Could Facilitate Progress 

in Assessing Quality
Page 19 GAO-14-138T

monitor, and update outcome-focused performance measures.27 The 

initial development of some tools and metrics to monitor and track quality 

not only for DOD but government-wide were positive steps; however, full 

implementation of these tools and measures government-wide has not 

yet been realized. While progress in DOD’s personnel security clearance 

program resulted in the removal of this area from our high-risk list, 

significant government-wide challenges remain in ensuring that personnel 

security clearance investigations and adjudications are high-quality. 

However, if the oversight and leadership that helped address the 

timeliness issues focuses now on the current problems associated with 

quality, we believe that progress in helping executive branch agencies to 

assess the quality of the security clearance process could be made. 

Although executive branch agency officials have stated that reciprocity is 

regularly granted as it is an opportunity to save time as well as reduce 

costs and investigative workloads, we reported in 2010 that agencies do 

not consistently and comprehensively track the extent to which reciprocity 

is granted government-wide. In addition to establishing objectives for 

timeliness, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 

established requirements for reciprocity, which is an agency’s acceptance 

of a background investigation or clearance determination completed by 

any authorized investigative or adjudicative executive branch agency, 

subject to certain exceptions such as completing additional requirements 

like polygraph testing.28 Further, in October 2008, ODNI issued guidance 

on the reciprocity of personnel security clearances.29 The guidance 

requires, except in limited circumstances, that all Intelligence Community 

elements “accept all in-scope30

 27GAO, Personnel Security Clearances: Continuing Leadership and Attention Can 

Enhance Momentum Gained from Reform Effort, 

security clearance or access 

determinations.” Additionally, Office of Management and Budget guidance 

requires agencies to honor a clearance when (1) the prior clearance was 

GAO-12-815T (Washington, D.C.: June 

21, 2012). 

28Pub. L. No. 108-458 § 3001 (2004).

29Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Reciprocity of Personnel Security 

Clearance and Access Determinations, Intelligence Community Policy Guidance 704.4 

(Oct. 2, 2008). 

30Although there are broad federal investigative guidelines, the details and depth of an 

investigation vary by agency depending upon agency mission. 

Extent of Clearance 

Reciprocity Is Not 

Measured
Page 20 GAO-14-138T

not granted on an interim or temporary basis; (2) the prior clearance 

investigation is current and in-scope; (3) there is no new adverse 

information already in the possession of the gaining agency; and (4) there 

are no conditions, deviations, waivers, or unsatisfied additional 

requirements (such as polygraphs) if the individual is being considered for 

access to highly sensitive programs.31

While the Performance Accountability Council has identified reciprocity as 

a government-wide strategic goal, we have found that agencies do not 

consistently and comprehensively track when reciprocity is granted, and 

lack a standard metric for tracking reciprocity. Further, while OPM and the 

Performance Accountability Council have developed quality metrics for 

reciprocity, the metrics do not measure the extent to which reciprocity is 

being granted. For example, OPM created a metric in early 2009 to track 

reciprocity, but this metric only measures the number of investigations 

requested from OPM that are rejected based on the existence of a 

previous investigation and does not track the number of cases in which 

an existing security clearance was or was not successfully honored by the 

agency. Without comprehensive, standardized metrics to track reciprocity 

and consistent documentation of the findings, decision makers will not 

have a complete picture of the extent to which reciprocity is granted or the 

challenges that agencies face when attempting to honor previously 

granted security clearances.

In 2010, we reported that executive branch officials stated that they 

routinely honor other agencies’ security clearances, and personnel 

security clearance information is shared between OPM, DOD, and, to 

some extent, Intelligence Community databases.32

 31Office of Management and Budget, Memorandum for Deputies of Executive 

Departments and Agencies: Reciprocal Recognition of Existing Personnel Security 

Clearances (Dec. 12, 2005) and Memorandum for Deputies of Executive Departments and 

Agencies: Reciprocal Recognition of Existing Personnel Security Clearances (July 17, 

2006). 

However, we found 

that some agencies find it necessary to take additional steps to address 

limitations with available information on prior investigations, such as 

insufficient information in the databases or variances in the scope of 

investigations, before granting reciprocity. For instance, OPM has taken 

32GAO, Personnel Security Clearances: Progress Has Been Made to Improve Timeliness 

but Continued Oversight Is Needed to Sustain Momentum, GAO-11-65 (Washington, 

D.C.: Nov. 19, 2010).
Page 21 GAO-14-138T

steps to ensure that certain clearance data necessary for reciprocity are 

available to adjudicators, such as holding interagency meetings to 

determine new data fields to include in shared data. However, we also 

found that the shared information available to adjudicators contains 

summary-level detail that may not be complete. As a result, agencies may 

take steps to obtain additional information, which creates challenges to 

immediately granting reciprocity.

Further, we reported in 2010 that according to agency officials since there 

is no government-wide standardized training and certification process for 

investigators and adjudicators, a subject’s prior clearance investigation 

and adjudication may not meet the standards of the inquiring agency. 

Although OPM has developed some training, security clearance 

investigators and adjudicators are not required to complete a certain type 

or number of classes. As a result, the extent to which investigators and 

adjudicators receive training varies by agency. Consequently, as we have 

previously reported, agencies are reluctant to be accountable for 

investigations or adjudications conducted by other agencies or 

organizations.33

Because of these issues identified by agency officials as hindrances to 

reciprocity and because the extent of reciprocity was unknown, we 

recommended in 2010 that the Deputy Director of Management, Office of 

Management and Budget, in the capacity as Chair of the Performance 

Accountability Council, should develop comprehensive metrics to track 

reciprocity and then report the findings from the expanded tracking to 

Congress. Although the Office of Management and Budget agreed with 

our recommendation, a 2011 ODNI report found that Intelligence 

Community agencies experienced difficulty reporting on reciprocity. The 

agencies are required to report on a quarterly basis the number of 

security clearance determinations granted based on a prior existing 

clearance as well as the number not granted when a clearance existed. 

The numbers of reciprocal determinations made and denied are 

categorized by the individual’s originating and receiving organizational 

type: (1) government to government, (2) government to contractor, (3) 

To achieve fuller reciprocity, clearance-granting agencies 

seek to have confidence in the quality of prior investigations and 

adjudications.

 33GAO, Personnel Clearances: Key Factors to Consider in Efforts to Reform Security 

Clearance Processes, GAO-08-352T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 27, 2008).
Page 22 GAO-14-138T

contractor to government, and (4) contractor to contractor. The ODNI 

report stated that data fields necessary to collect the information 

described above do not currently reside in any of the data sets available,

and the process was completed in an agency-specific, semimanual 

method. 

The Deputy Assistant Director for Special Security of ODNI noted in 

testimony in June 2012 that measuring reciprocity is difficult, and despite 

an abundance of anecdotes, real data are hard to come by. To address 

this problem, in 2013 ODNI planned to develop a web-based form for 

individuals to use to submit their experience with reciprocity issues to 

ODNI. According to ODNI, this would allow it to collect empirical data, 

perform systemic trend analysis, and assist agencies with achieving 

workable solutions. However, in January 2014, ODNI officials told us that 

required resources and information technology were not available to 

support the development and implementation of a web-based form. 

Instead, ODNI is conducting a Reciprocity Research Study that will 

involve, among other things, agencies identifying their ability to collect

reciprocity metrics. This study would assist ODNI in developing reciprocity 

performance measures and a new policy for reciprocity. ODNI would also 

use the study to determine if a web-based form would be of value.

In conclusion, to avoid the risk of damaging, unauthorized disclosures of 

classified information, oversight of the reform efforts to measure and 

improve the quality of the security clearance process is imperative. The 

progress that was made with respect to reducing the amount of time 

required for processing clearances would not have been possible without 

committed and sustained congressional oversight and the leadership of 

the Performance Accountability Council. Further actions are needed now 

to fully develop and implement metrics to oversee quality at every step in 

the process. 

Further, ensuring the quality of personnel security clearance 

investigations and adjudications is important government-wide, not just 

for DOD. While reciprocity is required by law and, if implemented 

correctly, could enhance efficiency and present cost savings 

opportunities, much is unknown about the extent to which previously 

granted security clearance investigations and adjudications are honored 

government-wide. Therefore, we recommended that metrics are needed 

to track reciprocity, which have yet to be fully developed and 

implemented. Assurances that all clearances are of a high quality may 

further encourage reciprocity of investigation and adjudications. We will 
Page 23 GAO-14-138T

continue to monitor the outcome of the agency actions discussed above 

to address our outstanding recommendations.

Chairman Issa, Ranking Member Cummings and Members of the 

Committee, this concludes my statement for the record. 

For further information on this testimony, please contact Brenda S. 

Farrell, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management, who may be 

reached at (202) 512-3604 or farrellb@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 

the last page of this statement. GAO staff who made key contributions to 

this testimony include Margaret Best (Assistant Director), Lori Atkinson,

Kevin Copping, Elizabeth Hartjes, Jeffrey Heit, Suzanne Perkins, Amie 

Steele, Erik Wilkins-McKee, and Michael Willems.

GAO Contact and 

Staff 

Acknowledgements
Related GAO Products

Page 24 GAO-14-138T

Personnel Security Clearances: Actions Needed to Help Ensure Correct 

Designations of National Security Positions. GAO-14-139T. Washington, 

D.C.: November 20, 2013.

Personnel Security Clearances: Opportunities Exist to Improve Quality 

Throughout the Process. GAO-14-186T. Washington, D.C.: November 

13, 2013.

Personnel Security Clearances: Full Development and Implementation of 

Metrics Needed to Measure Quality of Process. GAO-14-157T.

Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2013. 

Personnel Security Clearances: Further Actions Needed to Improve the 

Process and Realize Efficiencies. GAO-13-728T. Washington, D.C.: June 

20, 2013.

Managing for Results: Agencies Should More Fully Develop Priority Goals 

under the GPRA Modernization Act. GAO-13-174. Washington, D.C.: 

April 19, 2013.

Security Clearances: Agencies Need Clearly Defined Policy for 

Determining Civilian Position Requirements. GAO-12-800. Washington, 

D.C.: July 12, 2012.

2012 Annual Report: Opportunities to Reduce Duplication, Overlap and 

Fragmentation, Achieve Savings, and Enhance Revenue.

GAO-12-342SP. Washington, D.C.: February 28, 2012.

Background Investigations: Office of Personnel Management Needs to 

Improve Transparency of Its Pricing and Seek Cost Savings.

GAO-12-197. Washington, D.C.: February 28, 2012.

GAO’s 2011 High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-11-394T. Washington, 

D.C.: February 17, 2011.

High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-11-278. Washington, D.C.: February, 

2011.

Personnel Security Clearances: Overall Progress Has Been Made to 

Reform the Governmentwide Security Clearance Process. GAO-11-232T. 

Washington, D.C.: December 1, 2010.

Related GAO Products
Related GAO Products

Page 25 GAO-14-138T

Personnel Security Clearances: Progress Has Been Made to Improve 

Timeliness but Continued Oversight Is Needed to Sustain Momentum. 

GAO-11-65. Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2010.

DOD Personnel Clearances: Preliminary Observations on DOD’s 

Progress on Addressing Timeliness and Quality Issues. GAO-11-185T. 

Washington, D.C.: November 16, 2010.

Personnel Security Clearances: An Outcome-Focused Strategy and 

Comprehensive Reporting of Timeliness and Quality Would Provide 

Greater Visibility over the Clearance Process. GAO-10-117T. 

Washington, D.C.: October 1, 2009.

Personnel Security Clearances: Progress Has Been Made to Reduce 

Delays but Further Actions Are Needed to Enhance Quality and Sustain 

Reform Efforts. GAO-09-684T. Washington, D.C.: September 15, 2009.

Personnel Security Clearances: An Outcome-Focused Strategy Is 

Needed to Guide Implementation of the Reformed Clearance Process. 

GAO-09-488. Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2009.

DOD Personnel Clearances: Comprehensive Timeliness Reporting, 

Complete Clearance Documentation, and Quality Measures Are Needed 

to Further Improve the Clearance Process. GAO-09-400. Washington, 

D.C.: May 19, 2009.

High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-09-271. Washington, D.C.: January 

2009.

Personnel Security Clearances: Preliminary Observations on Joint 

Reform Efforts to Improve the Governmentwide Clearance Eligibility 

Process. GAO-08-1050T. Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2008.

Personnel Clearances: Key Factors for Reforming the Security Clearance 

Process. GAO-08-776T. Washington, D.C.: May 22, 2008.

Employee Security: Implementation of Identification Cards and DOD’s 

Personnel Security Clearance Program Need Improvement. 

GAO-08-551T. Washington, D.C.: April 9, 2008.

Personnel Clearances: Key Factors to Consider in Efforts to Reform 

Security Clearance Processes. GAO-08-352T. Washington, D.C.: 

February 27, 2008.
Related GAO Products

Page 26 GAO-14-138T

DOD Personnel Clearances: DOD Faces Multiple Challenges in Its Efforts 

to Improve Clearance Processes for Industry Personnel. GAO-08-470T. 

Washington, D.C.: February 13, 2008.

DOD Personnel Clearances: Improved Annual Reporting Would Enable 

More Informed Congressional Oversight. GAO-08-350. Washington, D.C.: 

February 13, 2008.

DOD Personnel Clearances: Delays and Inadequate Documentation 

Found for Industry Personnel. GAO-07-842T. Washington, D.C.: May 17, 

2007.

High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-07-310. Washington, D.C.: January 

2007.

DOD Personnel Clearances: Additional OMB Actions Are Needed to 

Improve the Security Clearance Process. GAO-06-1070. Washington, 

D.C.: September 28, 2006.

DOD Personnel Clearances: New Concerns Slow Processing of 

Clearances for Industry Personnel. GAO-06-748T. Washington, D.C.: 

May 17, 2006.

DOD Personnel Clearances: Funding Challenges and Other Impediments 

Slow Clearances for Industry Personnel. GAO-06-747T. Washington, 

D.C.: May 17, 2006.

DOD Personnel Clearances: Government Plan Addresses Some Longstanding Problems with DOD’s Program, But Concerns Remain.

GAO-06-233T. Washington, D.C.: November 9, 2005.

DOD Personnel Clearances: Some Progress Has Been Made but Hurdles 

Remain to Overcome the Challenges That Led to GAO’s High-Risk 

Designation. GAO-05-842T. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2005.

High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-05-207. Washington, D.C.: January 

2005.

DOD Personnel Clearances: Preliminary Observations Related to 

Backlogs and Delays in Determining Security Clearance Eligibility for 

Industry Personnel. GAO-04-202T. Washington, D.C.: May 6, 2004.

(351872)
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