alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### JONES v STATE OF FLORIDA

Case No. 86-1135 X

Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, Hillsborough County

October 8, 1987

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

Daniel Kirkwood, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.

James M. Barton II, Assistant State Attorney, for appellee.

OPINION OF THE COURT

SUSAN C. BUCKLEW, Circuit Judge.

Appellant appeals the trial court’s order denying Defendant’s Motion to Suppress. The Defendant was arrested on August 17, 1987 and *125charged with Possession of Cannabis. The Appellant raises two issues on appeal: the stop of the Defendant was illegal and the arrest on the warrant was invalid.

In the first issue, Appellant argues that the police officer was unauthorized to stop the Defendant and ask for identification because there were no circumstances which would reasonably indicate to the officer that the Defendant was committing or about to commit a crime. In the instant case the officer approached the Defendant and asked for identification and the Defendant voluntarily complied. Although the officer did not have a well founded suspicion upon which to detain and question the Defendant, the officer’s approaching of the Defendant and merely asking for identification was not a detention and was entirely proper. *Davis v. State,*461 So.2d 1361 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985), *Florida v. Royer,*460 U.S. 491, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed 2d 229 (1983).

In the second issue, Appellant argues that the evidence should be suppressed because the arrest of the Defendant was on a capias for a criminal traffic charge that was eventually dismissed. The Appellant argues that the traffic charge was dismissed because the traffic judge found that the person who signed the ticket was not the Defendant. (The dismissal of the traffic ticket was not made a part of the record on appeal). Therefore, the Appellant argues, the arrest of the Defendant was not legal because the officer relied solely on an erroneous capias as the probable cause for his arrest. The Appellant cites *Martin v. State,*424 So.2d 994 (2d DCA 1983). *Martin*is distinguishable from the instant case because the warrant in *Martin*was void at the time of arrest. Here the capias was not void at the time of arrest. Apparently someone was using the Defendant’s name resulting in a traffic citation and ultimately in a capias under the Defendant’s name. Here the officer acted reasonably and in good faith in arresting the Defendant and the capias on which he was arrested was not void at the time of arrest. The arrest and subsequent search were valid. *Neal v. State,*456 So.2d 897 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984), *McCrae v. State,*475 So.2d 1357 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985).

The trial court’s Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Suppress is *AFFIRMED.*

DONE and ORDERED this 8th day of October, 1987.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MITCHELL NELSON, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

THE BOEING COMPANY; MICHAEL 

CUMMINS, 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 19-35401 

D.C. No. 2:18-cv-00251-RSM 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington

Ricardo S. Martinez, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted June 2, 2020**

Before: LEAVY, PAEZ, and BENNETT, Circuit Judges. 

Mitchell Nelson appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment 

in his employment action alleging violations of Title VII. We have jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Am. Tower Corp. v. City of San 

Diego, 763 F.3d 1035, 1043 (9th Cir. 2014). We affirm.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

JUN 10 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 19-35401 

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Nelson’s sex

discrimination and retaliation claims because Nelson failed to raise a genuine 

dispute of material fact as to whether the legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for 

defendants’ actions were pretextual. See Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 

F.3d 1054, 1061-62, 1064 (9th Cir. 2002) (burden-shifting framework applies to 

sex discrimination and retaliation claims under Title VII; circumstantial evidence 

of pretext must be specific and substantial).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Nelson’s hostile

work environment claim because Nelson failed to raise a genuine dispute of 

material fact as to whether defendant’s alleged conduct was based on his gender, or 

that defendant’s conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions 

of his employment. See Surrell v. Cal. Water Serv. Co., 518 F.3d 1097, 1108-09 

(9th Cir. 2008) (elements of a prima facie Title VII hostile work environment 

claim).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Nelson’s untimely 

demand for a jury trial. See Zivkovic v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1086-

87 (9th Cir. 2002) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that 

inadvertence does not justify granting an untimely jury demand).

AFFIRMED.
J. 

arraguirre 

J. 

The petition satisfies the requirements of SCR 98(5). Accordingly, 

we approve attorney Paul C. Garcia's resignation. SCR 98(5)(a)(2). The 

petition is hereby granted. 

It is so ORDERED. 

Gibbons 

C.J. 

Hardesty 

J. 

Douglas 

cc: David A. Clark, Bar Counsel 

Kimberly K. Farmer, Executive Director, State Bar of Nevada 

Paul C. Garcia 

Perry Thompson, Admissions Office, United States Supreme Court 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(0) 1947A 

2
(LOGO)
Deloitte & Touche LLP

Suite 1200
695 Town Center Drive
Costa Mesa, California 92626-1924
Telephone: (714) 436-7100
Facsimile: (714)436-7200

INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS' REPORT

To Ameriquest Mortgage Company

We have examined  management's  assertion about  Ameriquest  Mortgage  Company's
compliance  with the minimum  servicing  standards  identified  in the  Mortgage
Bankers Association of America's Uniform Single Attestation Program for Mortgage
Bankers (USAP) as of and for the year ended  December 31, 1998,  included in the
accompanying  management  assertion.  Management is  responsible  for Ameriquest
Mortgage  Company's  compliance  with those  minimum  servicing  standards.  Our
responsibility is  to express an  opinion on  management's  assertion  about the
entity's compliance based on our examination.

Our  examination  was  made in  accordance  with  standards  established  by the
American  Institute of Certified Public Accountants and,  accordingly,  included
examining,  on a  test  basis,  evidence  about  Ameriquest  Mortgage  Company's
compliance  with the  minimum  servicing  standards  and  performing  such other
procedures as we considered necessary, in the circumstances. We believe that our
examination  provides a reasonable  basis for our opinion.  Our examination does
not provide a legal  determination on Ameriquest  Mortgage Company's  compliance
with the minimum servicing standards.

In our opinion, management's assertion that Ameriquest Mortgage Company complied
with the aforementioned minimum servicing standards as of and for the year ended
December 3l, 1998 is fairly stated, in all material respects.

Deloitte & Touche LLP
March 12, 1999
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 97-50889

Summary Calendar

 

SAMUEL FIACRO PENA,

Petitioner-Appellant,

versus

JOE AGUIRRE, Warden, El Paso

Prison Camp,

Respondent-Appellee.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. EP-97-CV-344-H

- - - - - - - - - -

July 29, 1998

Before DUHÉ, DeMOSS, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Samuel Fiacro Pena, federal prisoner #50360-098, appeals the

denial of his application pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, in which he

argues: (1) that he was not brought to trial within the time limits

imposed by the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174; (2) that

his guilty plea was not voluntary because his own attorney coerced

him to make it; and (3) that his attorney was ineffective for

failing to investigate possible defenses. Given that each of these
No. 97-50889 

-2-

claims addresses alleged errors that occurred prior to Pena’s

conviction and sentence and that Pena has failed to demonstrate

that relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 would be ineffective or

inadequate, the district court did not err in dismissing Pena’s

motion. See Cox v. Warden, Fed. Detention Ctr., 911 F.2d 1111,

1113 (5th Cir. 1990; see also Lane v. Hanberry, 601 F.2d 805, 806

(5th Cir. 1979). 

AFFIRMED.

Pena’s motion for release pending appeal is moot and is DENIED

as such.
EXHIBIT 21

                       KEYSTONE CONSOLIDATED INDUSTRIES, INC.
                                  AND SUBSIDIARIES


                           SUBSIDIARIES OF THE REGISTRANT




                              Jurisdiction of             Percent of
                               Incorporation      Voting Securities
      Name of Corporation          or Organization                Held (1)


Sherman Wire of Caldwell, Inc.           Nevada                   100.0%

Fox Valley Steel and Wire Company        Wisconsin                100.0%
(formerly Wire Products Company)

DeSoto, Inc.                             Delaware                 100.0%
  J.L. Prescott Company                  New Jersey               100.0%
  DeSoto Environmental
   Management, Inc.                      Delaware                 100.0%
  DeSoto Subsidiary Two Corporation      New Jersey               100.0%

Engineered Wire Products, Inc.           Ohio                     100.0%

(1)  Held by the Registrant or the indicated subsidiary of the Registrant.
§ 1986.106 Objections to the findings and the preliminary order and request for a hearing. ( a ) Any party who desires review, including judicial review, must file any objections and a request for a hearing on the record within 30 days of receipt of the findings and preliminary order pursuant to § 1986.105(c). The objections and request for a hearing must be in writing and state whether the objections are to the findings and/or the preliminary order. The date of the postmark, facsimile transmittal, or electronic transmittal is considered the date of filing; if the objection is filed in person, by hand-delivery or other means, the objection is filed upon receipt. Objections must be filed with the Chief Administrative Law Judge, U.S. Department of Labor, in accordance with 29 CFR part 18, and copies of the objections must be served at the same time on the other parties of record, and the OSHA official who issued the findings.
( b ) If a timely objection is filed, all provisions of the preliminary order will be stayed, except for the portion requiring preliminary reinstatement, which will not be automatically stayed. The portion of the preliminary order requiring reinstatement will be effective immediately upon the respondent's receipt of the findings and preliminary order, regardless of any objections to the order. The respondent may file a motion with the Office of Administrative Law Judges for a stay of the Assistant Secretary's preliminary order of reinstatement, which shall be granted only on the basis of exceptional circumstances. If no timely objection is filed with respect to either the findings or the preliminary order, the findings and/or preliminary order will become the final decision of the Secretary, not subject to judicial review.
[81 FR 63409, Sept. 15, 2016, as amended at 86 FR 1793, Jan. 11, 2021]
### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

JUDGMENT RENDERED AP RIL 10, 2015

NO. 03

- 14

- 00271

- CV

In re Christopher L. Graham

APPEAL FROM 207TH DISTRICT COURT OF COMAL COUNTY

BEFORE JUSTICES PURYEAR, PE MBERTON, AND BOURLAN D

DISMISSED FOR WANT OF PROSECUTION

-- OPINION BY JUSTICE PURYEAR

This is an appeal from a contempt order signed by the tr i a l court on April 8, 2014. Having

reviewed the record , the Court holds that Christopher L. Graham has not prosecuted his appeal

and did not comply with a notice from the Clerk of this Court. Therefore, the Court dismisses

the appeal for want of prosecution. Graham shall pay all costs relating to this appeal, both in this

Court and the court below.
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

1162 

KA 14-00507 

PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., CENTRA, CARNI, WHALEN, AND DEJOSEPH, JJ. 

 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

VERNON W. PEDRO, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

 

MICHAEL G. CIANFARANO, OSWEGO, FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

VERNON W. PEDRO, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT PRO SE.

GREGORY S. OAKES, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, OSWEGO (AMY L. HALLENBECK OF

COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT. 

 

Appeal from a judgment of the Oswego County Court (Walter W.

Hafner, Jr., J.), rendered September 6, 2013. The judgment convicted

defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal possession of a

controlled substance in the second degree. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is

unanimously affirmed. 

Memorandum: Defendant appeals from the judgment convicting him

upon his plea of guilty of criminal possession of a controlled

substance in the second degree (Penal Law § 220.18 [1]). We agree

with defendant that his waiver of the right to appeal was invalid

because, based on County Court’s statements at the time of the plea,

“defendant may have erroneously believed that the right to appeal is

automatically extinguished upon entry of a guilty plea” (People v

Moyett, 7 NY3d 892, 893). In the absence of a written waiver of the

right to appeal “or some indication in the record that defendant

understood the distinction between the right to appeal and other trial

rights forfeited incident to a guilty plea, there is inadequate

assurance that defendant entered into a knowing, intelligent and

voluntary waiver” of the right to appeal (id.; cf. People v Braxton,

129 AD3d 1674, 1675, lv denied 26 NY3d 965).

Given the nature of the offense, we conclude that defendant’s

sentence is not unduly harsh or severe. Defendant failed to preserve

for our review his contention in his pro se supplemental brief

concerning the presentence report (see People v Gibbons, 101 AD3d

1615, 1616), and we decline to exercise our power to review that

contention as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice (see

CPL 470.15 [3] [c]). We have reviewed defendant’s remaining

contention in his pro se supplemental brief and conclude that it lacks
-2- 1162 

KA 14-00507 

merit. 

Finally, we do not consider the additional issue raised by

defendant in his main brief concerning the plea allocution inasmuch as

his attorney withdrew that contention (see People v Santoro, 132 AD3d

1241, 1241). 

Entered: December 23, 2015 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court
<PAGE>
                                                                   EXHIBIT 10.64


                            [RAILWORKS LETTERHEAD]

June 26, 2001

John Kennedy
561 Brentwater Road
Camp Hill, PA 17011

Dear John:

         Reference is made to the Amended and Restated Employment Agreement
("Agreement) pursuant to which you have been employed as Director, Business
Development of RailWorks Corporation. Terms used in the Agreement and not
otherwise defined herein will have the meaning ascribed to them in the Agreement

         Effective June 1, 2001 ("Effective Date"), you agreed to serve as the
Chief Executive Officer of Employer. In connection therewith, we have agreed to
certain changes in the terms of your employment which are described below. Upon
execution of this letter by you, it shall constitute an amendment to the
Agreement. Except as modified by this Amendment, the Agreement shall remain in
full force and effect in accordance with its terms.

         1.       You shall serve as Chief Executive Officer of Employer
("CEO") reporting directly to the Board of Directors. Your appointment as such
shall be for a term of one year commencing on the Effective Date ending on May
31, 2002 ("Term of the Amendment"). The Board of Directors reserves the right
during the Term of the Amendment to hire another person as CEO, in which event
you shall relinquish the title and duties of such office, but, for the
remainder of the Term of Amendment, you shall be entitled to receive the
compensation provided for in this Amendment and shall assist such successor in
an orderly transition.

         2.       During the Term of the Amendment, you shall receive a Base
Salary of Three hundred twenty-five thousand ($325,000) dollars, payable as
provided in the Agreement. In the event the employment of John Larkin as
Chairman of the Board of Directors is terminated during the Term of the
Amendment, your Base Salary shall increase to Four hundred thousand ($400,000)
effective with the first pay period following the termination of Mr. Larkin's
employment.

         3.       Employer will provide you with an efficiency apartment in the
area of its main office in Baltimore, MD and will reimburse you for travel
between your home and the Employer's main office.

         4.       You shall participate in all bonus and compensation plans
applicable to senior executive offices of Employer for so long as this
Amendment is in effect.

         5.       Upon the expiration of the Term of the Amendment, the
Agreement shall continue in effect in accordance with its terms as if this
Amendment had not been executed.
<PAGE>

         If this correctly sets forth our understanding, please sign below and
return a copy to Mr. Wesley Fredericks, Esq. whereupon this Amendment will
become effective in accordance with its terms.

         AGREED AND ACCEPTED:                RAILWORKS CORPORATION


         /s/ John Kennedy                By: /s/ John G. Larkin
         --------------------                ----------------------
         John Kennedy                        John G. Larkin


                                       2
#### New Edgewood Lake Corporation, Appellant, *v.*Kingston Trust Company et al., Respondents.

Submitted January 18, 1937;

decided January 26, 1937.

*525
      *Kenneth S. MacAffer*for motion.

No one opposed.

Motion granted and appeal dismissed, with costs, and ten dollars costs of motion, unless appellant files and serves return and undertaking on appeal and pays ten dollars costs within ten days, in which event the motion is denied.
<PAGE>
<TABLE>
                                                                                     EXHIBIT 12

                             KENTUCKY POWER COMPANY
                       Ratio of Earnings to Fixed Charges
                        (in thousands except ratio data)
<CAPTION>

                                                              Year Ended December 31,
                                                  1997       1998      1999      2000      2001
<S>                                               <C>        <C>       <C>       <C>      <C>
Fixed Charges:
  Interest on First Mortgage Bonds . . . . . .  $14,867    $13,936   $12,712   $ 9,503  $ 6,178
  Interest on Other Long-term Debt . . . . . .    8,597     12,188    13,525    16,367   18,300
  Interest on Short-term Debt. . . . . . . . .    3,034      2,455     2,552     3,295    2,329
  Miscellaneous Interest Charges . . . . . . .      559        634       869     2,523    1,059
  Estimated Interest Element in Lease Rentals.    1,700      1,500     1,200     1,700    1,200
       Total Fixed Charges . . . . . . . . . .  $28,757    $30,713   $30,858   $33,388  $29,066

Earnings:
  Net Income . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  $20,746    $21,676   $25,430   $20,763  $21,565
  Plus Federal Income Taxes. . . . . . . . . .    9,415      9,785    12,993    17,884    9,553
  Plus State Income Taxes. . . . . . . . . . .    2,190      2,096     2,784     2,457      489
  Plus Fixed Charges (as above). . . . . . . .   28,757     30,713    30,858    33,388   29,066
       Total Earnings. . . . . . . . . . . . .  $61,108    $64,270   $72,065   $74,492  $60,673

Ratio of Earnings to Fixed Charges . . . . . .     2.12       2.09      2.33      2.23     2.09
</TABLE>
§ 1601.7 Charges by or on behalf of persons claiming to be aggrieved. ( a ) A charge that any person has engaged in or is engaging in an unlawful employment practice within the meaning of title VII, the ADA, GINA, or the PWFA may be made by or on behalf of any person claiming to be aggrieved. A charge on behalf of a person claiming to be aggrieved may be made by any person, agency, or organization. The written charge need not identify by name the person on whose behalf it is made. The person making the charge, however, must provide the Commission with the name and contact information of the person on whose behalf the charge is made During the Commission investigation, Commission personnel shall verify the authorization of such charge by the person on whose behalf the charge is made. Any such person may request that the Commission shall keep his or her identity confidential. However, such request for confidentiality shall not prevent the Commission from disclosing the identity to Federal, State or local agencies that have agreed to keep such information confidential. If this condition is violated by a recipient agency, the Commission may decline to honor subsequent requests for such information.
( b ) The person claiming to be aggrieved has the responsibility to provide the Commission with notice of any change in contact information so that the Commission may communicate with him or her during the Commission's consideration of the charge.
[42 FR 55388, Oct. 14, 1977, as amended at 56 FR 9624, Mar. 7, 1991; 74 FR 63982, Dec. 7, 2009; 85 FR 65217, Oct. 15, 2020; 89 FR 11169, Feb. 14, 2024]
#### SPITZNAUGLE v GREEN

Ohio Appeals, 6th Dist, Lucas Co

No 2261.

Decided Feb. 17, 1930

Miller, Brady & Yager, Toledo,, for Spitznaugle.

E. C. Froelich, Toledo, for Green.

WILLIAMS, J.

We find from the evidence that this contract was modified by new agreements made from time to time, by which changes were made and extra material and work were put into the construction of the house, so that it cost considerably in excess of $12,600.00. Both Spitznaugle and Green participated in the supervision of the work and consulted together from time to time and we have no trouble in reaching the conclusion that the arrangement between them amounted to a joint adventure and that, as joint adventurers, they were liable for indebtedness incurred by the authorized acts of either in carrying forward such joint adventure. The general rule is that each joint adventurer has power to bind the other in undertakings which are strictly within the scope of the joint enterprise, "j R. C. L, 553, Sec. 7.

Where there is an agreement for the sharing of profits, but no agreement whatever exists as to the sharing of losses, the joint adventurers are bound to share them in the same proportion as profits, and an action for accounting will lie. 33 C. J., 865, Secs. 79, 80 and 81.

Applying these principles to the instant case, we hold that the plaintiff is entitled to an accounting but should not be allowed anything for repairing the furnace or putting in of cinders. As to the commission to be paid for the sale of the property, for which the plaintiff incurred a liability, no allowance will be made to the plaintiff for the reason that the sale was made by an agent in the office of the plaintiff and under his direction and control. What one does by agent he does himself. By the terms of the contract a party thereto was not entitled to a commission for making a sale. Plaintiff could not collect from the defendant any amount by way of commission paid to his own agent and employe.

*214We find that the plaintiff is entitled to an allowance of $2,000.00 for monies expended by him for extras, and the decree will be the same as that in the court of common pleas, except for said allowance.

Lloyd and Richards, JJ., concur.