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THE PROMISE OF THE TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

MARCH 14, 2014

Serial No. 113–135

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

LUKE MESSER, Indiana 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Mr. Kin Moy, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific 

Affairs, U.S. Department of State ...................................................................... 5

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Mr. Kin Moy: Prepared statement ......................................................................... 8

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 32

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 33

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement .............................................. 35

The Honorable Lois Frankel, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Florida: Prepared statement ........................................................................... 36

(1)

THE PROMISE OF THE TAIWAN RELATIONS 

ACT 

FRIDAY, MARCH 14, 2014

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:45 a.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ed Royce (chairman of 

the committee) presiding. 

Chairman ROYCE. This hearing will come to order. I am going to 

ask all members to take their seats. 

This hearing is on the promise of the Taiwan Relations Act. Let 

me just say it has been 35 years, and for that period of time the 

Taiwan Relations Act has served as the legal framework governing 

the important relationship between the United States of America 

and the Republic of China (Taiwan). Since the act came into force 

in 1979, there have been few other pieces of foreign policy legislation as consequential as the TRA. Indeed, it is the steadfast support of the United States Congress that has helped Taiwan become 

what it is today: A thriving, modern society that strongly supports 

human rights, strongly supports the rule of law, free markets, and 

is democratic. 

The purpose of today’s hearing is to consider whether the administration is doing enough to fulfill the larger promise of the Taiwan 

Relations Act. America’s support for Taiwan is now more important 

than ever, and it is vital that we speak with one voice when it 

comes to our support for Taiwan. 

Strengthening the U.S. relationship with Taiwan is one of the 

committee’s top legislative priorities. In fact, I have led two bipartisan delegations to Taipei in the last 13 months. Last year, our 

delegation trip included a visit to Taiwan’s World War II-era submarines based near Kaohsiung. And just last month, a committee 

delegation of eight Members of Congress traveled to Tainan to see 

firsthand the fleet of fighter jets that serves as the backbone of the 

Taiwanese Air Force. The fact that the first batch of these jets entered into service in 1965 is a stark reminder that Taiwan needs 

continuous U.S. support in order to maintain a credible deterrence 

across the Taiwan Strait. On this front, I reluctantly submit that 

we are not doing enough to meet the spirit of the Taiwan Relations 

Act. We need to do more here in the United States. 

And just as necessary as defense sales are to Taiwan, it is equally important that the U.S. actively support Taiwan’s efforts to 

maintain and expand its diplomatic space. When it comes to matVerDate 0ct 09 2002 17:06 May 28, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\031414\87140 SHIRL
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ters of public safety or public health, the U.S. must do its utmost 

to ensure that Taiwan has a seat at the table. For this reason, I 

authored legislation that was signed into law to help Taiwan participate in the International Civil Aviation Organization last year. 

Taiwan’s absence from ICAO prevents it from obtaining air safety 

information in realtime. The recent disappearance of the Malaysian 

aircraft highlights the importance of cooperation in the aviation 

field. As a result of my legislation, Taiwan has finally been able to 

have a seat at ICAO for the first time since 1976. 

Taiwan’s participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership Free 

Trade Agreement is an important opportunity that we must not 

overlook. By working to include Taiwan in a high-quality multilateral trade agreement, the U.S. would be helping to preserve Taiwan’s ability to do business internationally. The events unfolding 

in the Ukraine remind us of the strategic weakness of relying on 

one major trading partner. 

I understand that the Government of Taiwan will soon announce 

its intention to seek membership in TPP. As chairman of this committee, I strongly urge the administration to support Taiwan’s inclusion in TPP. American consumers and exporters would benefit. 

The story of Taiwan is really a story about transformation. From 

the grinding poverty of the post-war era to a military dictatorship 

to a thriving multiparty democracy, the investment that the American people made in Taiwan has more than paid off. Today Taiwan 

is a beacon of democracy in a region of the world that still yearns 

for freedom. The good people of Taiwan have also been a part of 

America’s own success story, with many Taiwanese Americans participating as leaders in business and government and in their own 

communities. 

As we acknowledge the 35th anniversary of the Taiwan Relations 

Act, let us come together to support and strengthen the U.S.-Taiwan relationship. Our actions will directly impact the future of Taiwan and our strategic and economic standing in the critical AsiaPacific region. 

Let me turn to Mr. Eliot Engel of New York for his opening remarks, our ranking member of the committee. 

Mr. ENGEL. Chairman Royce, thank you for calling this hearing 

on the Taiwan Relations Act. I am a big supporter of Taiwan and 

have traveled there many times, most recently with you last year 

on your first codel as chairman. I want to agree with everything 

you just said about Taiwan. 

Next month marks the 35th anniversary of the Taiwan Relations 

Act. The act, passed in 1979, is the cornerstone of the relationship 

between our two nations. It has been instrumental in maintaining 

peace and security across the Taiwan Strait and in East Asia and 

serves as the official basis for friendship and cooperation between 

the United States and Taiwan. I am proud to be a lead sponsor 

with you, Mr. Chairman, on H. Res. 494, which reaffirms the importance and relevance of the Taiwan Relations Act 3 decades after 

its adoption. 

Taiwan is a flourishing, multiparty democracy of over 20 million 

people with a vibrant free-market economy. It is a leading trade 

partner of the United States, alongside much bigger countries like 

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ship has undergone dramatic changes, but Taiwan’s development 

into a robust and lively democracy underpins the strong U.S.-Taiwan friendship we enjoy today. 

Our relationship with Taiwan was initially defined by a shared 

strategic purpose of stopping the spread of communism in Asia. 

With the end of the cold war, Taiwan’s political evolution from 

authoritarianism to one of the strongest democratic systems in Asia 

has transformed the U.S.-Taiwan relationship from one based solely on shared interests to one based on shared values. 

One of the main obligations of the United States under the Taiwan Relations Act is to make available to Taiwan defensive arms 

so that Taiwan is able to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. Despite improvement on the political and economic ties between Taiwan and mainland China, Beijing’s military buildup opposite Taiwan is continuing, and the balance of cross-strait military 

forces continues to shift in China’s favor. I encourage the administration to work closely with Congress in meeting our obligations 

under the Taiwan Relations Act and to provide Taiwan with the 

defensive weapons it requires. 

In that light, I am very concerned about the decision of the U.S. 

Air Force not to fund the so-called CAPES program in next year’s 

budget that would have upgraded the avionic system of F–16 fighter jets, including about 150 of Taiwan’s F–16s. The Taiwan Defense 

Ministry now faces a tough decision on how to move forward with 

the upgrade of its fighters at a reasonable cost, an upgrade that 

it desperately needs. I hope our witness will be able to shed some 

light on this issue and on the way forward for Taiwan and the 

United States. 

Taiwan’s political, economic, and social transformation over the 

past 60 years has demonstrated that a state can be modern, democratic, and thoroughly Chinese. Taiwan’s example is an inspiration 

for other countries in Asia and throughout the world that linger 

under the control of one person or one party. The fact that Taiwan 

has now held five direct Presidential elections is a clear sign of the 

political maturity of the Taiwanese people and, frankly, a signal to 

Beijing that any change in relations between Taiwan and China 

cannot be imposed by the mainland. 

For many years, I have been a staunch supporter of the people 

of Taiwan, and I will continue to lead efforts here in Congress to 

demonstrate continued U.S. support for Taiwan. I think it is a 

moral obligation for the United States to defend Taiwan and to be 

supportive of Taiwan and to stand with Taiwan. So I look forward 

to the testimony of our witness this morning and hearing his view 

on how to further strengthen ties between the United States and 

Taiwan. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Engel. 

We will have two more opening statements: 2 minutes from Mr. 

Chabot of Ohio, chairman of the Asia Subcommittee, and then 2 

minutes from Mr. Brad Sherman of California. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this important hearing. 

I was pleased to join you in traveling to Taiwan just a couple of 

weeks ago, and I think we had a productive trip and certainly had 

4

the opportunity to meet with a host of top Taiwan officials, especially President Ma. I know my colleagues on the codel were very 

happy with our warm reception and the many courtesies extended 

to us by our hosts, so we appreciate that. 

As one of the original founding co-chairs of the Congressional 

Taiwan Caucus, I am, of course, a strong supporter of a strong 

U.S.-Taiwan alliance. Taiwan is a democracy. It is a loyal friend 

and ally, and it deserves to be treated as such by the U.S. Government. 

As we commemorate the 35th anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act this year, it is only appropriate that we strive to move 

even closer to the policy objectives set out in that landmark piece 

of legislation, chief among which is the principle that our diplomatic relationship with the PRC, the People’s Republic of China, is 

premised on the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means. 

For over 3 decades, the Taiwan Relations Act has served as the 

cornerstone of U.S.-Taiwan relations. Along with President Reagan’s six assurances in 1979, the Taiwan Relations Act has played 

an indispensable role in the maintenance of peace and security in 

the East Asia-Pacific region. 

Taiwan has come a long way since 1979. It has conducted direct 

Presidential elections, something that would have been unthinkable back in 1979. These open and vigorously contested electoral 

campaigns testify to the values of pluralism, transparency, and the 

rule of law shared by our two nations and deeply rooted in Taiwanese society. 

At the same time, the threat of military aggression posed by the 

PRC to Taiwan has grown exponentially over recent years. When 

I first came to Congress back in 1995, China had perhaps a couple 

of hundred missiles pointed at Taiwan. Since then, it grew to hundreds of them and is now at 1,600 short- and mid-range ballistic 

missiles. 

I look forward to hearing from our witness this morning on the 

continued relationship between the United States and Taiwan, 

which is very important to both countries. 

Thank you. 

Chairman ROYCE. Mr. Sherman? 

Mr. SHERMAN. Yes. I want to commend the chairman for putting 

together and leading an outstanding codel to Asia, particularly to 

Taiwan. I see Mr. Weber, Mr. Messer, and of course Mr. Chabot 

was on that codel. 

And I remember Mr. Chabot leading us in our effort to seek the 

release on humanitarian parole of former President Chen. I don’t 

think we can conclude one way or the other about the judicial determination there, but, certainly, given his poor health, given his 

service to the country, and given the unifying effect this would 

have, I would hope that we would continue to press for the humanitarian treatment and release of Mr. Chen. 

I think that it is important that we provide Taiwan the tools to 

defend itself, but Taiwan needs to act, as well. Taiwan spends less 

than $11 billion on its defense, less than one-fifth per capita what 

we in America do. And God blessed us with the Pacific Ocean separating us from China; Taiwan has only the Taiwan Strait. On a 

5

percentage-of-GDP basis, Taiwan spends roughly half what we do. 

So we should be willing to sell them the tools, and they should be 

willing to spend the money to buy those tools. I am also concerned 

with the reduction in the reserve requirements imposed on young 

people in Taiwan for military service. 

Finally, I do disagree, only slightly, with the chairman. I do want 

to see Taiwan involved in the trade negotiations so long as America 

is out of those negotiations until such time as we revamp our trade 

policy, which has given us the largest trade deficit in the history 

of life on the planet. 

I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. This morning, we are pleased to be joined by 

Mr. Kin Moy, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. 

A career member of the Senior Foreign Service, Mr. Moy previously served as Deputy Executive Secretary in the office of Secretary of State Clinton. He was director of the Executive Secretariat staff and Deputy Director of the Office of Maritime Southeast Asia. 

We are going to ask him to summarize his prepared statement, 

if he would. 

And we will remind members that you will all have 5 calendar 

days to submit statements or questions or any extraneous material 

you want to put into the record for this hearing. 

And so, Mr. Moy, you have the floor. 

STATEMENT OF KIN MOY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, 

BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. MOY. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman and members of 

the committee. I am grateful to appear today to share news about 

the strength, substance, and success of our unofficial U.S.-Taiwan 

relationship. 

I wish to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your leadership and 

strong interest in regional prosperity and stability. Your commitment was evidenced by the large congressional delegation you led 

last month to Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea. 

As you noted earlier in your remarks, April 10th marks the 35th 

anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act. The resilience and development of our robust relations with Taiwan over the past 35 years 

have been greatly fostered by the framework that Congress established in the TRA. The U.S.-Taiwan relationship is grounded in 

history, shared values, and our common commitment to democracy 

and human rights. 

Maintaining and deepening our strong relations with Taiwan is 

an important part of the U.S. rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region. 

Through the American Institute in Taiwan, we work closely with 

Taiwan authorities on a wide rage of issues. In security, maintenance of peace across the Taiwan Strait is crucial to stability and 

prosperity throughout the Asia-Pacific. The Obama administration 

has notified Congress of over $12 billion worth of arms sales to Taiwan. This is a tangible sign of the seriousness with which we regard Taiwan’s security. 

6

We encourage Taiwan to adopt innovative approaches to maintain a credible self-defense capacity on an austere defense budget 

in order to effectively deter coercion or aggression. In a region that 

is experiencing tensions, the United States appreciates Taiwan’s 

cooperative efforts to peacefully resolve disputes and share resources. 

In the area of the economy and economic engagement, in 2013, 

Taiwan was the 16th-largest export market for U.S. goods and the 

8th-largest export market for U.S. agriculture, fish, and forestry 

products. In 2012, direct investment from Taiwan to the United 

States stood at approximately $7.9 billion. 

Our commercial relationship with the people of Taiwan is vibrant 

and continues to grow. Last year, we were pleased to host two 

large delegations of Taiwan business leaders, first at the 

SelectUSA summit at the end of October and again in mid-November during a visit of Taiwan’s CEOs, led by former Vice President 

Vincent Siew. The Siew delegation brought news of over $2 billion 

in new or ongoing Taiwan manufacturing investments in the 

United States. 

In March 2013, we restarted our engagement with Taiwan under 

our Trade and Investment Framework Agreement, otherwise 

known as TIFA, after a 6-year hiatus. We have taken note of Taiwan’s intention to formulate new economic reforms to demonstrate 

its willingness and capability of joining in regional economic integration initiatives. The United States will continue to encourage 

Taiwan to further liberalize its trade and investment measures. 

And, as you noted, Mr. Chairman, the area of concern also to us 

is Taiwan’s international space. As a top-20 world economy and a 

full member of the WTO and APEC, Taiwan plays a constructive 

role in the Asia-Pacific region and worldwide. Taiwan participates 

in about 60 international organizations as well as hundreds of 

international nongovernment organizations. 

The United States supports Taiwan’s membership in international organizations that do not require statehood for membership, and we support Taiwan’s meaningful participation in other 

international organizations. We are pleased that since 2009 Taiwan 

has participated every year in the World Health Assembly as an 

observer. We welcome Taiwan’s participation at the International 

Civil Aviation Organization, otherwise know as ICAO—that ICAO 

assembly in Montreal in 2013 as guests of the ICAO Council president. And we support Taiwan’s expanded participation in the future. 

We also encourage the U.N., U.N. System agencies, and other 

international organizations to increase Taiwan participation in 

technical or expert meetings. Taiwan’s role as a responsible player 

in the global community has been well-demonstrated by its disaster 

relief efforts in the region. Taiwan was a quick and generous donor 

of supplies and funding after the 2011 triple disaster in Japan and 

after last November’s Typhoon Haiyan off the Philippines. In short, 

Taiwan, a stable and capable friend in the region, contributes to 

peace and security. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I thank 

you again for the opportunity to appear today to highlight the 

strength and durability of ties between the people of the United 

7

States and the people of Taiwan and to underscore the substance 

and success of our cooperative efforts within the context of unofficial relations. 

Taiwan has earned a respected place in the world. Every society 

wishes dignity for itself, and people on Taiwan are no exception. 

Thanks to the Taiwan Relations Act, people of goodwill in the 

United States and on Taiwan have a firm foundation on which to 

strengthen, or further strengthen, our robust relationship. 

With that, thank you so much, and I look forward to answering 

your questions. 

Chairman ROYCE. Well, I thank you, Mr. Moy. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Moy follows:]

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Chairman ROYCE. I have to tell you, there is one really disappointing thing to me, and that is I frequently speak to Assistant 

Secretary Danny Russel on the phone about different issues, and 

I believe he intended to be here to testify. I believe I talked to him 

twice about it. But time after time—and this is something that the 

Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific has talked to me about—for 

whatever reason, the administration pulls the witnesses. 

And I know it isn’t a lack of engagement on the part of Danny 

Russel because we have talked to him repeatedly about issues. But 

there is something about the relationship here with the State Department, when Eliot Engel and I make these requests, or Subcommittee Chairman Chabot on the Asia and the Pacific Subcommittee with Mr. Faleomavaega, for some reason the witnesses 

are always cancelled. 

And what we want to talk about is Asia policy. And, as far as 

I know, Danny Russel and I are in concurrence on a lot of these 

issues, but I don’t know about further up in the administration. I 

am going to ask you a question now, for example. 

As I mentioned in my opening statement, I strongly believe that 

Taiwan should be included in the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Does 

the U.S. Government support Taiwan’s inclusion in the TPP? That 

is my question for you. Can you speak, you know, on behalf of the 

administration here? 

Mr. MOY. Thank you very much. I do appreciate your comments. 

And I did have a chance to speak to Danny Russel before coming 

up, and he wanted me to pass on his regrets and also his appreciation for your setting up this meeting. 

I can say that, from our part, I don’t think that there is anything 

preventing us from talking about Taiwan issues here——

Chairman ROYCE. Well, it is not just Taiwan. If Subcommittee 

Chairman Chabot wasn’t equally concerned about this, equally disappointed, as he brought up with the Secretary of State here yesterday, I probably wouldn’t bring it up. But it is just a pattern 

that, at this point. To us, the Asia-Pacific region is vitally important. We spend a lot of time on it, on this issue, and we want the 

administration to be equally engaged on this. And so, if you will 

carry that information back. 

Mr. MOY. I will. 

Chairman ROYCE. But, again, particularly given Taiwan’s almost 

singular reliance on cross-Strait trade, does the U.S. Government 

support Taiwan’s inclusion in the TPP? 

Mr. MOY. Well, thank you. And I will relay those comments to 

my colleagues. It certainly isn’t a statement about our commitment 

to very strong U.S.-Taiwan on official relations. In fact, I think that 

we have a very strong record, and I think we have a very good 

story to tell about that. 

With regard to your question about TPP, we welcome Taiwan’s 

interest in it. And we have heard from them very recently about 

their interest. 

We also welcome—and I think that you met with President Ma 

Ying-jeou on your recent congressional delegation. But we welcome 

his steps to liberalize Taiwan’s economy. 

I think that as you know, we are in ongoing negotiations on TPP, 

and I think what I can say about this is that, you know, perhaps 

14

it is best if we move toward conclusion on those negotiations before 

we discuss additional membership. 

But I think that, you know, we are taking a step-by-step approach here. We have heard from Taiwan, as well as others, about 

interest in TPP, and we certainly, again, welcome that interest. 

And we are willing to definitely consider, along with some countries that have approached us most recently—we are willing to discuss TPP in the future. 

Chairman ROYCE. Well, one of the most important aspects of TPP 

beyond the important trade-related benefits is that the grouping 

will help shape East Asia’s multilateral political architecture by 

firmly anchoring nation-states in a binding legal agreement. I want 

to make certain that Taiwan is part of that agreement. 

I think it is critical to Taiwan that it be included, not only because it is in one of the world’s top-20 economies, but also because 

it is in our own strategic interest. And adding Taiwan to TPP will 

allow it greater access to other trade agreements, with Europe for 

example. It is going to serve as a strong symbol of American support, and that is why I strongly support this. 

There was another issue I wanted to just briefly talk to you 

about, and that is the F–16 upgrades. Does the United States remain fully committed to Taiwan’s F–16 upgrade program? 

Mr. MOY. We do. 

Just back on TPP, what we would encourage Taiwan to do—as 

you know, TPP is a consensus-type membership, and so we would 

encourage Taiwan to raise its interest in membership with all of 

the other parties, as well. 

Now, absolutely. I know that Congressman Engel also raised his 

concerns about the issue of the CAPES program. So, as I understand, the U.S. Air Force funding for the CAPES program will continue through 2014. 

The U.S. Air Force F–16 program office has determined that the 

lack of U.S. Air Force participation beyond Fiscal Year 2014 will 

not have a significant impact on the Taiwan program and that all 

funding can be covered in Taiwan’s current letter of offer and acceptance. As a result, potential cuts in USAF, or U.S. Air Force, 

funding for the CAPES program will not negatively impact the Taiwan F–16 retrofit program. 

Mr. Chairman, we certainly are committed to the F–16 retrofit 

program. I think that we have demonstrated that, and we have certainly had discussions with Taiwan in that regard. 

Chairman ROYCE. It is discouraging to me and to others because, 

of course, many of us here, including myself, wrote you, talked to 

the administration, about the sale of new F–16s. So now we are 

talking about retrofitting. We want to make certain that this goes 

forward. I would suggest the sale of new F–16s would be an easy 

solution to this. I strongly support this. 

But my time has expired. I had best go to Mr. Eliot Engel of New 

York. 

Mr. ENGEL. Well, Mr. Chairman, thank you. Let me pick up 

where you left off. 

And, of course, in my opening remarks, I talked about the F–16s 

and the CAPES program, and I am really very, very concerned 

about it. 

15

And, you know, the Taiwan Defense Ministry now faces a tough 

decision on how to move forward with the upgrade of its fighters 

at a reasonable cost. And this is an upgrade that it desperately 

needs. So, you know, maybe they will continue with it, maybe they 

won’t. 

I am concerned about Taiwan being able to maintain its fleet of 

F–16s. And certainly the decision that we apparently made, the 

U.S. Air Force made, not to fund the CAPES program was a poor 

decision. It just makes no sense to me whatsoever. 

And, you know, when it comes to Taiwan, there is this sort of undercurrent that we feel over time where, you know, we bend over 

backwards to try not to upset the sensitivities of the Beijing regime. And, frankly, it irks me. Not that I don’t wish to have good 

relations with Beijing, because we should, but not at the expense 

of our relations with Taiwan or not at the expense of our friendship 

with Taiwan. 

And so it really just irritates me that we make a decision like 

this, which has an adverse impact on our friend Taiwan and 

doesn’t seem to be for any good policy purpose other than to placate 

Beijing. 

So the chairman and I have said the same thing. We haven’t 

even really discussed this. We have both independently come up 

with this because we are just very disturbed about it. 

Mr. MOY. Well, thank you very much. I regret I am not able to 

speak for my colleagues in the Air Force on that. I do understand 

your concerns, and I will relay those to my colleagues. 

But what I do want to do is to strongly emphasize that all our 

improvement in bilateral relations with the PRC does not come at 

the expense of our relationship with Taiwan. In fact, I think that 

our relationship with Taiwan right now is as strong as it ever has 

been. And we have oftentimes emphasized that point, that certainly we have an interest in strengthening relations with Beijing, 

but absolutely not at the expense of our very strong relationship 

with Taiwan and the people of Taiwan. 

Mr. ENGEL. Well, I certainly hope that that continues to be the 

case, because sometimes it appears that that is not really the case. 

But I certainly take your word and, you know, want it duly noted 

that we on this committee feel very strongly about it. 

Let me ask you this, Mr. Moy: What steps is the administration 

taking to ensure that Taiwan is accorded an appropriate level of 

participation in international organizations such as the World 

Health Organization and the International Civil Aviation Organization? 

Mr. MOY. Yeah, thank you very much. 

As I stated in my introductory remarks, it is an area that is of 

primary importance to us. It is a priority that the expertise from 

Taiwan is recognized. There is so much professional expertise 

there, so much knowledge in Taiwan, that it deserves to be recognized in the international organizations. This is not just a matter 

of knowledge, however. It is a matter of dignity, too. And we take 

it very seriously. 

So we do review different opportunities to expand. I think just 

one that the chairman had noted, and you may have also as well 

earlier, was the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). 

16

And I think that, working together with a number of other countries, we have supported not just Taiwan’s, sort of, guest participation, as they appeared as a guest last year at the assembly, but 

more frequent interaction with ICAO because there is a lot of technical expertise they can bring to those types of meetings. 

But, as you noted, World Health Assembly; we also look at opportunities working on climate change issues. Various types of international organizations we often consult, because there oftentimes 

are issues where Taiwan has a unique ability to provide knowledge, recommendations, just imaginative ideas beyond just their 

technical expertise. And we want to take advantage of that, and we 

will continue to do that. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. 

Let me ask you this final question. Is the administration providing Taiwan the defensive weapons it requires, as required by 

the Taiwan Relations Act? Are there defensive weapons systems 

that Taiwan has requested but we have decided not to provide? 

And if so, what are they? 

Mr. MOY. I am not aware of such systems, but we are absolutely 

in compliance with the Taiwan Relations Act in making available 

to Taiwan defense articles and services that are necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain sufficient self-defense capability. 

We will continue to be in compliance with that. We often review—‘‘we’’ meaning the U.S. Government—often review their defensive capabilities, and I think that we have a very strong record 

in this administration of providing that. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Engel. 

Ms. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen from Florida, our chairman emeritus. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. Thank 

you to you and to our ranking member for holding this important 

hearing, because relations between the U.S. and Taiwan are at a 

critical juncture. 

I am concerned, as all of us are, about China’s continued rise and 

aggression in the East and South China Seas and the feeble response by our State Department to North Korean missile launches, 

which are a clear violation of international sanctions. The people 

of Taiwan have every reason to fear developments in the West Pacific, to worry about the future of their land, and to question both 

the resolve and the commitment of the United States. How tragic. 

And as we approach this 35th anniversary of the very important 

and essential Taiwan Relations Act anniversary, we remember that 

this crucial legislation forms the cornerstone of U.S.-Taiwan relations. It is the foundation of policy that has been and will be and 

will remain forevermore the anchor of peace and security in the 

West Pacific. 

But as we reflect on the promise of the Taiwan Relations Act on 

this 35th anniversary, we must also gauge the fulfillment of its 

specific policies and reexamine the lack of strategic vision in this 

part of the world and talk about where we go from here. 

As we watch China again increase its defense budget by double 

digits, begin construction on a second aircraft carrier, establish an 

air defense identification zone in the East China Sea, and continue 

17

its aggression over the Senkaku Islands, there is no better time to 

reaffirm, to clarify, and to strengthen relations with our democratic 

ally and our strongest friend, Taiwan. 

But instead of recommitting to Taiwan, we continue to hear our 

State Department speak in half-truths, invent a laundry list of 

items that hinder our relations with Taiwan and our Pacific allies, 

and do everything it can to not provoke China. And that, sadly, 

seems to be our policy with Taiwan: Don’t antagonize China. 

The Taiwan Policy Act, introduced by my colleagues, the chairs 

of the Taiwan Caucus, and me, passed out of this committee last 

August. The bill aims to rectify these problems by advancing the 

sale of essential defense articles. And I would like to point out that 

the new sales of F–16s is included in this bill. It encourages highlevel visits between the U.S. And Taiwan officials. It promotes bilateral trade agreements. 

What is the administration’s policy on the Taiwan Policy Act? 

Secondly, how does the administration plan to counterbalance 

China’s power when we don’t even commit to our democratic ally 

Taiwan and, by extension, any of our other regional allies? 

And, thirdly, what is the administration going to do to develop 

Taiwan’s economic bond with the United States, its independence, 

strengthen our economic bonds? What is the State Department’s 

policy, the Obama administration’s policy on Taiwan, other than 

don’t make China mad? 

Mr. MOY. Thank you very much. 

I don’t think that our Taiwan policy is founded on the principle 

of let’s not make China mad. In fact, I think that if you look at 

the record, we have done an enormous amount to expand our relationship, strengthen it in all areas. It is not just the security aspects of it; it is the economic side. It is also the people-to-people 

side, as well. 

As you may know, with the help of others, we granted to Taiwan——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. If you——

Mr. MOY. I am sorry. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I apologize, but the time is so limited. 

Mr. MOY. Oh, of course. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I only have 35 seconds. 

Mr. MOY. Yeah, yeah, yeah. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Have you read the Taiwan Policy Act that we 

have filed? I would like to give that to you and have an administration policy on it. And how are we counterbalancing China’s power 

in committing to Taiwan? 

Mr. MOY. Thank you very much. 

I am, of course, very pleased to take a look with my colleagues 

at the legislation, but I think, again, we have a very strong record 

of support for Taiwan through our unofficial relations and in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act. 

As I noted, the 35th anniversary is a reason to celebrate. It is 

a reason to also commemorate just how far we have come, what we 

need to do in the future. We can still, you know, refine, enhance——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Excuse me, I appreciate that. 

And I know my time is up, Mr. Chairman. 

18

But I don’t believe that the people of Taiwan share those sentiments. I don’t think that they see us as upholding the principles 

that are enshrined in the cornerstone of our U.S. Foreign policy related to Taiwan, which is the Taiwan Relations Act. It promises a 

lot, and I think that the people of Taiwan would think that we 

haven’t really fulfilled those missions. 

Do you think that we have? 

Mr. MOY. I do believe—I mean, I haven’t seen any recent polls, 

but I would imagine that the people on Taiwan regard the U.S. relationship, if not as the most important relationship for Taiwan, it 

has to be right up there. 

They are good friends of ours. They think like we do. Their values we share. I would think that they are very supportive of the 

things that we have done. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Do you think that we need to do more? 

Mr. MOY. We are always looking for ways to strengthen relations. Just as we are looking in the larger context in our rebalanced Asia, we want to strengthen our relationships with our allies. We want to strengthen our relationships——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And new sales of new F–16s and higher-technology planes for defensive needs of Taiwan? 

Mr. MOY. Again, we have had a very strong record of providing 

defense articles to Taiwan. And, you know, no decision——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Well, thank you. 

We go now to Mr. Brad Sherman, California. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. 

One issue we brought up with President Ma was the incarceration of former President Chen. One of the red flags that a democracy isn’t working real well is that the former President is in jail. 

That is true in just about any country. 

What are we doing to seek either the humane treatment or the 

humanitarian parole of former President Chen? 

Mr. MOY. Thanks. 

As you know, the former President was convicted on corruption 

charges after his, you know, 2000 and 2008 Presidency, including 

the transfer of, you know, Presidential office funds to private Swiss 

bank accounts. We believe that his conviction was in a system that 

is fair, impartial, and transparent. Rule of law exists in Taiwan. 

In regard to your specific question, though, certainly, you know, 

we have heard varying accounts of the status of his health, and 

certainly we would want Taiwan to, you know, review his health 

condition. I am not aware of any—or I don’t have an update on——

Mr. SHERMAN. Let me go on to the next question. 

Taiwan is spending only half as much per average GDP on defense as we are. I don’t mind good to my district and saying, ‘‘Let’s 

pay taxes,’’ but Taiwan is on the front lines. Now, I am sure you 

have had discussions, and they say they can’t afford to spend any 

more. And we are very concerned about the maintenance of their 

F–16 aircraft. The United States taxpayer may not be able to pay 

for that. 

Taiwan has only a 5 percent value-added tax. Has the United 

States pushed Taiwan not just to spend more on its defense but, 

19

if they say they don’t have the money, to make its value-added tax 

or other taxes at the rate of our European allies, who also we push 

to pay for their own defense? 

Mr. MOY. Well, certainly on the issue of spending more, we have 

encouraged Taiwan to fulfill what it has said in the past, that it 

will spend up to 3 percent of GDP on defense. And so——

Mr. SHERMAN. Well, why do we accept 3 percent for them and, 

including veterans’ benefits, 5 percent for us? 

Mr. MOY. Well, this is what President Ma has stated in the past, 

and so we do hope that—we do understand that it is a different——

Mr. SHERMAN. I think the best way to get the 3 percent is to 

start demanding 6 percent or insisting that a good ally that seeks 

our support, that a country that faces possible eradication or forced 

incorporation ought to be doing well more than the United States 

per capita. And I think if we start talking about 6 percent, we may 

someday see the 3 or 4 percent that would be a minimum. 

Finally, what are we doing to push Taiwan to adopt better laws 

against peer-to-peer Web sites for piracy of movies? 

Mr. MOY. Well, I think that this is part of our economic engagement with Taiwan. What we have said in the past is—and this is 

in terms of all of our dialogues—we would like to have a little bit 

more confidence, especially in areas of intellectual property protection——

Mr. SHERMAN. But are we specifically focusing on peer-to-peer 

Web sites, the lack of legislation in that area, and the pirating of 

our movies? 

Mr. MOY. Yeah, I am not aware of that specific area, but definitely——

Mr. SHERMAN. Well, I hope that you would make that a specific 

issue. 

Mr. MOY [continuing]. Intellectual property protection is a priority of ours, absolutely. 

Mr. SHERMAN. A general statement about intellectual property 

protection won’t have the specific effect, may have no effect, compared to the specificity. And I hope that you will specifically focus 

their attention on the peer-to-peer Web site piracy of our movies. 

Finally, what steps is the administration taking to make sure 

that Taiwan has appropriate participation in international organizations, such as the World Health Organization, ICAO, and the climate control—UNFCCC? 

Mr. MOY. Thanks very much. 

As I noted earlier, international space is a priority of ours, and 

we are looking for opportunities for Taiwan, you know, experts, 

professionals to shine in their fields in international fora. We will 

continue to do that. It really does help those organizations, it really 

does help the global community when they are able to participate. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. 

Chairman ROYCE. Mr. Chris Smith of New Jersey. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Moy, thank you for your testimony. 

Over the past few years and across two different administrations, 

we have witnessed alarming number of gushing statements by senior American officials on the U.S.’s ‘‘one China’’ policy. Last year, 

20

PLA General Chen Bingde, during a visit to Washington, claimed 

that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated that U.S. policy 

maintains there is only one China in the world and that Taiwan 

is part of China. Not long after that, Admiral Mullen said that he 

shared the view of a ‘‘peaceful reunification of China.’’

Well, let me ask you, Mr. Moy: The People’s Republic of China, 

as we all know, is a dictatorship. It is a gulag state. And would we 

have wished for reunification of West Germany into East Germany 

when Honecker was ruling as a cruel dictator in East Germany? 

I think not. So I think those kinds of statements are not helpful. 

I do believe—and I want to ask your view on this, as to whether 

or not the time as come that the cold war relic—and I know all 

about the Shanghai Communique. I have read it. I actually had an 

argument with Li Peng once in China when we brought up human 

rights and he said the Shanghai Communique said nothing about 

human rights at all. And that is true, but he used that as a dodge 

and as a way of precluding any discussion on human rights. 

But shouldn’t we have a ‘‘one China, one Taiwan’’ policy? 

And, secondly, if you could, the Taiwan—the act, section 2, points 

out that the enactment of this act is necessary to help maintain 

peace, security, and stability in the Western Pacific. 

What are the consequences for the U.S. security if Taiwan were 

to come under PRC control? And do we fully realize that such a 

shift would have devastating implications for U.S. longstanding security partners and allies in East Asia, including Japan and South 

Korea? 

Mr. MOY. Thank you very much. 

I think I might have been in that meeting with Li Peng that you 

speak of. 

Mr. SMITH. With Frank Wolf and I, you might recall. 

Mr. MOY. It was a few years ago. 

Thank you very much for your comments. 

I think what I would like to point to is most recently I think that 

you may have seen in the press that there has been more dialogue 

between the two sides of the Strait recently. The head of the Mainland Affairs Council from Taiwan, Wang Yu-chi, met with Zhang 

Zhijun, who is the head of their Taiwan Affairs Office. We have 

gone on record as saying that we support that kind of warming of 

ties. 

And I think one of the reasons why there has been such a discussion is that we have been so supportive of Taiwan, giving them the 

confidence so they can have these kinds of dialogues. So I think 

that we do have a very strong record of that. We do support the 

increased dialogue between the two sides. 

In terms of consequences, I wouldn’t want to get into any sort of 

hypothetical kinds of scenarios here. I don’t think that that is 

something that we view as very likely right now. And the——

Mr. SMITH. But have we anticipated what happens? I mean, we 

do have scenarios that we certainly consider at the Pentagon and 

at State. 

Mr. MOY. Well, you know, it is not something that is, sort of, a 

normal feature of our discussions, these types of hypotheticals. 

What I can say is that, you know, I heard your remarks about 

the ‘‘one China’’ policy, but this is a policy that has endured 

21

through many administrations. And, again, I think what we have 

done—and much of this has to do with the Taiwan Relations Act, 

but it has given Taiwan a great deal of confidence over the last few 

years to increase the kind of, you know, intensity of discussions 

with the PRC. Knowing that the United States is always in support 

is, I think, greatly comforting to the Taiwan side. 

Mr. SMITH. But, frankly, some of our diplomats, including our 

former Ambassador, Belici, has suggested that the ambiguity and 

the statements that have been made could send the wrong signal 

to the PRC, particularly as they build up militarily in and around 

or in proximity to Taiwan. 

And, of course, with the saber-rattling that we see occurring in 

the South China Sea and an ever-expansive foreign policy, the ugliness toward Japan coming out of Beijing, you know, the useful diplomatic fiction—perhaps it was useful for a while—it seems to me 

could inadvertently lead to a miscalculation by Beijing about what 

happens if they take Taiwan. 

Mr. MOY. I don’t think that Beijing questions U.S. resolve on the 

Taiwan issue. We continue to be extremely supportive, and we continue to expand, you know, our unofficial relations. And that, I 

think, does a great deal to help strengthen and to allow for a more, 

sort of, peaceful and stable environment across the Strait. 

Thank you so much, sir. 

Chairman ROYCE. Mr. Lowenthal of California. 

Mr. LOWENTHAL. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

I have one statement. I would like to, before I ask any questions, 

echo the chair’s comments. I recently visited Taiwan and met with 

many government officials and found it very, very educational. And 

I, too, believe very strongly that the State Department and the government should understand the importance of Taiwan being part 

of the TPP. And I think that should be a message back, before I 

ask a question, that many of us, I think, really strongly believe in 

and that we should do whatever we can to encourage that development. 

When I was there, I was very impressed with the cross-Strait 

dialogue that was going on between Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China. And I would like to know, what is the State Department or our involvement in that dialogue between Taiwan? 

How can we be helpful in promoting engagement between Taiwan 

and China? 

It seemed to me that President Ma was very proud of the agreements that already had been made, especially the trade agreements, the increased tourism that was going on, the increased 

flights that were going between mainland China. I would like to 

know what our involvement in that has been? 

And the second question is, what is your perspective on the current and forthcoming political situation in Taiwan, including the 

2016 Presidential election in which President Ma will be termed 

out? How will that affect cross-Strait relationships? And will that 

be one of the defining characteristics in terms of that election? 

Mr. MOY. Thank you very much. 

In terms of the cross-Strait dialogue, we don’t play a direct role, 

of course. I mean, they have had direct talks. In fact, the dialogue 

that I was referring to between Wang Yu-chi and Zhang Zhijun 

22

was really the first time in 60 years that they have had such a discussion. 

What we have done, however, is I think we have given Taiwan 

a great deal of confidence through our policies, through our direct 

assistance, and that has enabled them to, I think, have more engagement across the Strait. And we believe that more engagement, 

especially if it is at a pace that is consistent with the aspirations 

of the people on Taiwan, the people on both sides of the Strait, we 

would very much support that, because we think that it creates a 

more stable and peaceful environment. But it does have to come at 

the pace that the people on Taiwan feel comfortable with. 

In terms of the upcoming election, I mean, we don’t really, sort 

of, speculate on how that is going to affect cross-Strait relations. 

But it is a good time to highlight how supportive we have been and 

still are of the thriving democracy that exists on Taiwan. It is really remarkable. I mean, just personally, the first time I went to Taiwan was in 1978. You just cannot imagine the change that has 

taken place there. 

And, Mr. Chairman, when you go to Taiwan, it just highlights 

the kind of values they share with us. And you know very well that 

it is this very, kind of, energetic kind of democracy that exists 

there. 

And so I won’t speculate on—you know, we don’t get involved in 

their, sort of, domestic politics and how that is going to play out 

in terms of their foreign policy in the future or their cross-Strait 

policy. But it is really a good time to celebrate what is a remarkable story in Asia, the democracy that exists in Taiwan. 

Mr. LOWENTHAL. Thank you. 

And I yield back my time. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. 

We now go to Steve Chabot of Ohio, the chairman of the Asia 

Subcommittee. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to personally thank Mr. Sherman for raising the 

issue of President Chen, which he did strongly when we were on 

the codel recently in Taiwan. 

And prior to that trip, I had been there about a year ago with 

another of my Democratic colleagues, the ranking member of the 

Asia and the Pacific Subcommittee, Eni Faleomavaega. And on that 

particular codel, Eni and I went down to the prison where President Chen is being held. And he has been there going on 5 years 

now. 

And you are correct, there was a conviction for corruption 

charges. We understand that completely. There are a whole lot of 

aspects of that which we could discuss in great detail. For example, 

there is an argument that there was a judge that was more favorable to him who was replaced by a judge less favorable. There are 

all kinds of stories you hear, and I don’t want to go into all the details about that. 

But the fact is he has been in prison now for going on 5 years. 

And I have read the medical reports, I have talked to the doctors 

that have examined him, I have seen him with my own eyes. I met 

with him many times when he was President of Taiwan. He is the 

second democratically elected President and served for 8 years. And 

23

I think Mr. Sherman is absolutely right when he says that there 

is something wrong when one administration comes in and, you 

know, a previous administration is imprisoned. Something is not 

right. 

And, you know, I have seen, again, with my own eyes, the man 

has Parkinson’s. He shakes, you know, almost constantly. He has 

cardiovascular problems, deep depression, a whole range of things. 

And we have talked to President Ma and others about it. And I believe that medical parole, as Mr. Sherman mentioned, is the logical 

conclusion here as to what ought to be done. 

Does the administration have a position on granting President 

Chen medical parole? We are not saying that he would be free, but 

at least could go home to his family with whatever years he has 

left. 

Mr. MOY. Sure. And thank you, Congressman, for raising that 

issue again. 

As I noted earlier, we have confidence in the fairness, impartiality, and transparency of Taiwan’s judicial system. And we have 

made clear to Taiwan our expectation that procedures governing 

the terms of Chen Shui-bian’s imprisonment and access to health 

care will be transparent, fair, and impartial. 

And so, you know, if there are occasions—and this is just, I 

think, a general statement from the U.S. Government—when there 

are cases when there are such health concerns, we would certainly, 

you know, make note of that to, in this case, the Taiwan authorities but to other governments, as well, when there may be some 

humanitarian considerations that could be made. 

But, certainly, we believe that the original case was tried in——

Mr. CHABOT. Well, I am not talking about the original case. I am 

talking about now—and that was an excellent answer, but my 

question is, does the administration have a position on medical parole? 

Mr. MOY. Well——

Mr. CHABOT. Is there a position? I mean, you have said that he 

ought to be treated humanely in prison. We are saying he shouldn’t 

be in prison at this time. He has been in prison; he is there now. 

We are saying that medical parole at this point should be granted. 

Mr. MOY. Yeah. What I think that what we have done and what 

we——

Mr. CHABOT. I am just asking, do you have a position on that? 

Should he be granted—if you don’t have one, that is okay, but I 

just would like to know. 

Mr. MOY. Yeah, I don’t think that we take a position on that——

Mr. CHABOT. Okay. Thank you. That was my question. All right. 

And I will ask you another position, if you have this. The President, the Vice President, the Defense Minister, and Foreign Minister can’t come to Washington, DC. If we want to meet with them, 

we have to go to San Francisco or Baltimore or somewhere. They 

are not allowed to come to the capital of the United States, which 

I think is a travesty for an ally, close ally, of the United States. 

We have introduced legislation innumerable times to dump that 

policy, which I think is unfair to Taiwan. Does the administration 

have a position on that? 

24

Mr. MOY. Well, we continue to have our, you know, ‘‘one China’’ 

policy that is set forth in the three joint communiques——

Mr. CHABOT. I am aware of that. Do you have a position on 

whether they should be able to come here——

Mr. MOY. Our position is, yeah, in terms of the travel of Taiwan 

authorities, that is consistent with those policies—our ‘‘one China’’ 

policy. 

Mr. CHABOT. So you believe we should continue—the President, 

the Vice President, the Foreign Minister, and Defense Minister, 

they should not be allowed to come to Washington, DC? 

Mr. MOY. I think our policy has been very consistent over a number of——

Mr. CHABOT. I am asking for a ‘‘yes’’ or ‘‘no,’’ really. 

Mr. MOY [continuing]. Administrations, and I believe it will continue. 

Mr. CHABOT. So you are saying that they should not be allowed 

to come here, continue with that policy. We are saying we should 

change that policy; you say stick with it. 

Mr. MOY. I say that our policy has been consistent and, I believe, 

will be consistent in the future. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. 

Chairman ROYCE. I am going to just announce to the committee 

here, we will go to a couple more speakers, but then we are going 

to recess for about 25 minutes for two votes and then come right 

back so that the junior members will then be able to ask their 

questions. 

And with that said, let’s go to Mr. Gerry Connolly of Virginia. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I look forward to 

the questions of the junior members of the committee. 

I do want to compliment Mr. Engel for being sartorially correct 

today. He is resplendent in green and shamrocks. And as an IrishAmerican member of this committee, I deeply appreciate it. 

Mr. Moy, briefly, what, in your opinion, or the administration’s 

opinion, does the Taiwan Relations Act commit the United States 

to do with respect to the military relationship with Taiwan? 

Mr. MOY. Well, as I noted earlier, we are obligated to make 

available to Taiwan defense articles and defense services that are 

necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. 

It is an obligation that we don’t shirk. These obligations are 

under—not the obligations are under constant review, but the 

needs of Taiwan are under constant review. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Okay. Good. I would agree with you. 

Would you also agree that something Beijing does understand is 

that big stick of Teddy Roosevelt’s? We can talk softly, but they 

have to know we also carry a big stick, that we mean it, that we 

will keep our commitments, and that whatever happens ultimately 

in the Taiwan Strait will happen peacefully, it is not going to happen by military force, and the United States is prepared to make 

sure that it doesn’t happen by military force. 

Do you think, especially in light of Chinese behavior in various 

and sundry islands throughout the Pacific Rim, that that message 

is maybe more important than ever from the United States with respect to Taiwan? 

25

Mr. MOY. Well, I don’t think—as I noted earlier, I don’t think 

that the PRC doubts our resolve, our continued positive presence 

in the East Asia-Pacific region. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Really? With respect to Taiwan? 

Mr. MOY. I think absolutely with respect to Taiwan. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Oh. All right. So, gee, the United States in 2001 

tentatively agreed to sell diesel submarines to Taiwan. Thirteen 

years later, where are we in that submarine sale? 

Mr. MOY. Well, I think as you know, we continue to review the 

defense needs, and we make decisions that are appropriate——

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Moy, have we sold a single one of those diesel submarines to Taiwan 13 years later? 

Mr. MOY. I am not aware of that, sir. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. No. And did, by any chance, did Beijing object to 

that sale? 

Mr. MOY. We don’t discuss arms sales or defense——

Mr. CONNOLLY. Did they express themselves publicly or privately 

through any channels that you are aware of? 

Mr. MOY. I am not aware of——

Mr. CONNOLLY. So what would be the hang-up? Why not sell the 

diesels, then? 

Mr. MOY. Again, we make decisions not with the People’s Republic of China in mind; we make those decisions based on what we 

feel are our needs. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Oh. So the decision tentatively to sell submarines 

to Taiwan in 2001 is still under consideration as to whether it really meets your definition of appropriate defense for Taiwan? 

Mr. MOY. There are a range of systems, there are a range of different packages that we constantly——

Mr. CONNOLLY. What about F–16s? The Congress has repeatedly 

said the sale of 66 F–16s makes sense to us. Is that also under review for whether it is an appropriate part of the defense of Taiwan? 

Mr. MOY. We made a determination that the F–16A/B retrofit 

was the most appropriate type of weapons system to sell to Taiwan, 

and we continue to believe that that is the case. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And what about military exercises? Any consideration to maybe including Taiwan, for example, in RIMPAC? 

Mr. MOY. Well, we always, you know, consider—and this is our 

policy worldwide. We are always considering, you know, different 

participants. I am not aware of such consideration, but I think my 

colleagues in the Defense Department can better address that. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I just—you know, we don’t want to ever be provocative, but we need to stand by our alliances. We want a good 

and productive relationship, it seems to me, with the People’s Republic of China. But I also know from history that Beijing respects 

strength. Peace through strength. 

And our commitment to Taiwan is an extraordinary test case, 

and it seems to me that we have to follow through on our commitments with respect to Taiwan. Beijing doesn’t have to like it, but 

it will have to respect it. 

With that, I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. 

We are going to go to Mr. Randy Weber of Texas. 

26

Mr. WEBER. Thank you. 

Mr. Moy, I am going to follow up on some of Mr. Connolly’s comments about actually selling or being concerned about Taiwan’s defense capability, I guess. 

You said earlier, I think with Chairman Chris Smith’s questioning, that when you make decisions, you all don’t consider Beijing in your decisions. And you just reaffirmed that with my colleague, Mr. Connolly. 

I think Chris Smith raised the issue of a ‘‘one China’’ policy. 

Does it not bother you that that exists? That there are statements 

that people have made, high-level officials that have said they 

agree to a ‘‘one China’’ policy? Does the administration not view 

that as a problem? 

Mr. MOY. Our ‘‘one China’’ policy is one that has existed for, you 

know, several decades now. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. Well, let me——

Mr. MOY. Several administrations——

Mr. WEBER. I take that as a ‘‘no.’’ But let me follow up with what 

Gerry Connolly said. So you haven’t sold submarines yet. You don’t 

take Beijing into account. People around the world watch us; words 

and actions have consequences. 

Would you agree that you all would be okay with a ‘‘one Russia’’ 

policy when it comes to Crimea and the Ukraine? Is that akin to 

the same kind of ideology? 

Mr. MOY. Well, I can’t speak to those issues. But, again, we are 

obligated to provide those defense materials and services to Taiwan. And we have been through several administrations, I think, 

very vigilant in terms of providing that. 

Mr. WEBER. But in view of recent events, wouldn’t you agree that 

the administration ought to be thinking about revamping its policy, 

that perhaps we would want to get in gear? And I forget the exact 

date of the sale of diesel submarines; I think Mr. Connolly said 

2001. That is 13 years. Has the world changed in 13 years? 

Mr. MOY. In what sense, sir? 

Mr. WEBER. Well, how about in your view of the imminent danger of, perhaps, mainland China trying to, whatever you want to 

call it, take back over Taiwan? 

I mean, we have said that they are our close friend and our ally. 

The fact that their officials cannot come to Washington, DC, is a 

problem. Events around the world should indicate that now, more 

than ever, we need a stronger relationship with Taiwan. 

Does the administration understand the seriousness, especially 

in light of recent events—Russia, Ukraine, Crimea, I mean, you 

can go right down the list. Things aren’t getting any better. So is 

there a possibility you all might step up the program to sell those 

defense weapons to Taiwan? 

Mr. MOY. Right. I mean, those——

Mr. WEBER. I mean, maybe before the next 14, 13 years? 

Mr. MOY. Thank you, sir. 

Those—as I noted, they are under constant review. 

I take your point about the world changing and having to adjust 

to those changes. Remarkably, as I noted earlier, there is more dialogue between Taipei and Beijing than there ever has been before. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. Well, let me ask you this. 

27

Mr. MOY. There are agreements that have been——

Mr. WEBER. I am running out of time. 

Mr. MOY. Yeah. Okay, please. 

Mr. WEBER. So there are going to be some exercises over in Hawaii. Beijing was invited; Taiwan was not. Why? 

Mr. MOY. I think that our policy in terms of, you know, strengthening military-to-military relations with Beijing are fairly apparent. I can, of course, defer to my colleagues in the Defense Department to comment on the status of those relations. 

But, I think, as part of our, you know, rebalance, our consideration of making or of strengthening the stability and peace in East 

Asia, I think this is a good idea. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. Obviously, because they weren’t invited. 

But does it strike you as odd that Beijing is not near as concerned about what we are doing as it seems—and words and actions have consequences. Witness Russia’s recent invasion of Crimea into the Ukraine, so to speak. 

Does it not strike you as odd that we seem a lot more worried 

about Beijing than they do about us? Do you all take into that account? 

Mr. MOY. I don’t think that we balance our concerns about—we 

don’t think about it——

Mr. WEBER. Well, that is obvious. 

Mr. MOY. Yeah. But what I can tell you is that I think it is a 

very smart thing to expand our relations with all countries in East 

Asia. And I don’t think that any of this comes at the expense of 

Taiwan. And I think that our relations with Taiwan have been extremely strong, and we continue to strengthen those relations. 

Mr. WEBER. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Weber. 

Thank you, Mr. Moy. 

Now we have just enough time to get to this vote. We stand in 

recess. We will reconvene in approximately 25 minutes. 

Thank you, Mr. Moy. 

[Recess.] 

Chairman ROYCE. I am going to reconvene the committee at this 

time and again express my appreciation to Mr. Moy for his testimony here today. 

And we are going to go to Mr. Scott Perry of Pennsylvania. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Moy, I appreciate your presence here. 

I feel like I can’t get a whole lot of straight answers, so I would 

like to go to some kind of yes-and-no format, if I could, because it 

seems to be a lot of time just kind of discussing the fact that the 

administration is interested in talking about or considering or 

whatever. 

Regarding the force buildup, the PLA force buildup, U.S. Analysts assessed that the primary driver of the PLA’s force buildup 

is preparation for conflict over Taiwan status, including contingencies for possible U.S. intervention. That is U.S. analysts. 

So the question is, is this still the assessment of the executive 

branch? Briefly. 

Mr. MOY. I am not a spokesperson for our colleagues in Defense——

28

Mr. PERRY. Well, but I am talking about the executive branch. 

I mean, is this your assessment? It is just ‘‘yes’’ or ‘‘no,’’ ‘‘I don’t 

know.’’ How about that? 

Mr. MOY. Well, I mean, of course, we would stand by assessments that have been made. So, certainly——

Mr. PERRY. So the answer is essentially yes, essentially? 

Mr. MOY. We stand by reports that we do. 

Mr. PERRY. Okay. So do you know if Taiwan shares the same assessment? 

Mr. MOY. You know, Taiwan certainly has taken many precautions in its, you know, defense posture. I think that it is best 

to ask them that question. But, certainly, there is discussion that 

goes on about this sort of thing, and I would imagine that——

Mr. PERRY. But you don’t really know. I mean——

Mr. MOY. Well, I can’t speak for Taiwan. 

Mr. PERRY. I understand, but in the discussions that the administration has had, you don’t know what their position is. If that is 

how they are posturing their forces and their strategy based on 

that assessment, you don’t know. 

Mr. MOY. Is your question whether Taiwan believes it or whether——

Mr. PERRY. Yes. 

Mr. MOY [continuing]. The administration——

Mr. PERRY. Do they share the assessment? Do they share the 

United States’ assessment that that is the reason for the buildup? 

Mr. MOY. Again, I think that you would have to ask them. 

Mr. PERRY. Okay. 

Regarding Taiwan membership in TPP, the administration’s position, for or against? It is important for us to know. 

Mr. MOY. We welcome their interest. And I don’t think the conversations have gone so far as to be, you know, pro or con. We are 

a long way away from that. But we welcome their interest——

Mr. PERRY. I am sure we do. But so you are saying that the administration hasn’t decided yet. You are happy for their interest, 

but you don’t know. 

Mr. MOY. No, the issue hasn’t come up to that point yet. 

Mr. PERRY. The issue hasn’t been brought up? Or it isn’t to a 

point where you can decide ‘‘yes’’ or ‘‘no’’? 

Mr. MOY. It hasn’t come up to the point. Certainly, we know that 

Taiwan has expressed an interest, and, as I noted earlier, we are 

welcoming that interest. 

But, you know, we are a long way away from discussing that. We 

have other discussions that we are having on Taiwan’s economic 

policies, and we are certainly engaged in those, and we want to 

continue warming our economic and trade relations with Taiwan. 

Mr. PERRY. All right. 

Regarding the PRC’s Air Defense Identification Zone, the ADIZ, 

what have been concerns in Taiwan’s response to the PRC’s ADIZ 

announced in November 2013? 

Mr. MOY. I am sorry, what do you mean by ‘‘concerns’’? 

Mr. PERRY. The administration’s concerns. Do you have any? Are 

you in agreement? 

Mr. MOY. Well, I think what is important here is President Ma 

has gone on record as expressing concern. What he has said in pubVerDate 0ct 09 2002 17:06 May 28, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\031414\87140 SHIRL
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lic and what is encouraging is that he wants a peaceful, sort of, 

stable environment in the region, that if there are disagreements, 

they should be resolved through a dialogue and——

Mr. PERRY. Let me stop you there, if I could, because I just have 

a little bit of time left. 

Do you know what our response would be if there were an Air 

Force or Navy intercept in the ADIZ? If the PLA had an intercept 

of Taiwanese aircraft or marine vessels in that area and there was 

some incursion, what would our response be? 

Mr. MOY. Yeah, I am not going to get into any, sort of, speculation on, kind of, a hypothetical situation. But we have gone on 

record, in response to the announcement of this ADIZ, as not accepting it. And so, again, I don’t want to speculate on any kind 

of——

Mr. PERRY. All right. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MOY [continuing]. Possibilities in the future. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Perry. 

And thank you, Mr. Moy. Thanks for being here before our committee today. 

And, as you can see, there is tremendous bipartisan support for 

Taiwan. It is my sincere hope that the administration will take a 

more proactive stance on Taiwan, including working with Taiwan 

so that it can join the Trans-Pacific Partnership. 

The Asia-Pacific region is going to witness significant economic 

growth in the next 10 years. And positioning the United States—

we are, after all, on the Pacific Rim—to take advantage of this opportunity is a task that we take very seriously on this committee. 

And as chairman of this committee, I have made the Asia-Pacific 

region a top priority. So I look forward to working closely with the 

administration on this and other issues. 

And I thank you. 

And the hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:31 a.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

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