(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2014 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

REYES MATA v. LYNCH, ATTORNEY GENERAL 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 

No. 14–185. Argued April 29, 2015—Decided June 15, 2015 

After petitioner Noel Reyes Mata, an unlawful resident alien, was convicted of assault in a Texas court, an Immigration Judge ordered him 

removed to Mexico. Mata’s attorney filed a notice of appeal with the

Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA or Board), but never filed a brief,

and the appeal was dismissed. Acting through different counsel, 

Mata filed a motion to reopen his removal proceedings, as authorized

by statute. See 8 U. S. C. §1229a(c)(7)(A). Acknowledging that he had 

missed the 90-day deadline for such motions, see §1229a(c)(7)(C)(i), 

Mata argued that his previous counsel’s ineffective assistance was an

exceptional circumstance entitling him to equitable tolling of the time

limit. But the BIA disagreed and dismissed the motion as untimely. 

The BIA also declined to reopen Mata’s removal proceedings sua 

sponte based on its separate regulatory authority. See 8 CFR 

§1003.2(a). On appeal, the Fifth Circuit construed Mata’s equitable

tolling claim as an invitation for the Board to exercise its regulatory 

authority to reopen the proceedings sua sponte, and—because circuit 

precedent forbids the court to review BIA decisions not to exercise

that authority—dismissed Mata’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 

Held: The Fifth Circuit erred in declining to take jurisdiction over 

Mata’s appeal. A court of appeals has jurisdiction to review the BIA’s

rejection of an alien’s motion to reopen. Kucana v. Holder, 558 U. S. 

233, 253. Nothing about that jurisdiction changes where the Board 

rejects a motion as untimely, or when it rejects a motion requesting 

equitable tolling of the time limit. That jurisdiction likewise remains

unchanged if the BIA’s denial also contains a separate decision not to 

exercise its sua sponte authority. So even assuming the Fifth Circuit 

is correct that courts of appeals lack jurisdiction to review BIA decisions not to reopen cases sua sponte, that lack of jurisdiction does not 
 

2 REYES MATA v. LYNCH 

Syllabus 

affect jurisdiction over the decision on the alien’s motion to reopen. It 

thus follows that the Fifth Circuit had jurisdiction over this case. 

The Fifth Circuit’s contrary decision rested on its construing 

Mata’s motion as an invitation for the Board to exercise its sua sponte

discretion. Court-appointed amicus asserts that the Fifth Circuit’s 

recharacterization was based on the premise that equitable tolling in

Mata’s situation is categorically forbidden. In amicus’s view, the 

court’s construal was therefore an example of the ordinary practice of

recharacterizing a doomed request as one for relief that may be

available. But even if equitable tolling is prohibited, the Fifth Circuit’s action was not justified. If Mata is not entitled to relief on the 

merits, then the correct disposition is to take jurisdiction and affirm

the BIA’s denial of his motion. For a court retains jurisdiction even if 

a litigant’s request for relief lacks merit, see Steel Co. v. Citizens for 

Better Environment, 523 U. S. 83, 89, and a federal court has a “virtually unflagging obligation,” Colorado River Water Conservation 

Dist. v. United States, 424 U. S. 800, 817, to assert jurisdiction where 

it has that authority. Nor can the established practice of recharacterizing pleadings so as to offer the possibility of relief justify an approach that, as here, renders relief impossible and sidesteps the judicial obligation to assert jurisdiction. Pp. 4–8. 

558 Fed. Appx. 366, reversed and remanded. 

KAGAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, 

C. J., and SCALIA, KENNEDY, GINSBURG, BREYER, ALITO, and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion. 
 

 

_________________ 

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Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 14–185 

NOEL REYES MATA, PETITIONER v. LORETTA E.
 

LYNCH, ATTORNEY GENERAL
 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
 

[June 15, 2015]

 JUSTICE KAGAN delivered the opinion of the Court. 

An alien ordered to leave the country has a statutory

right to file a motion to reopen his removal proceedings.

See 8 U. S. C. §1229a(c)(7)(A). If immigration officials

deny that motion, a federal court of appeals has jurisdiction to consider a petition to review their decision. See 

Kucana v. Holder, 558 U. S. 233, 242, 253 (2010). Notwithstanding that rule, the court below declined to take

jurisdiction over such an appeal because the motion to

reopen had been denied as untimely. We hold that was 

error. 

I 

The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 66 Stat.

163, as amended, 8 U. S. C. §1101 et seq., and its implementing regulations set out the process for removing 

aliens from the country. An immigration judge (IJ) conducts the initial proceedings; if he orders removal, the 

alien has the opportunity to appeal that decision to

the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA or Board).

§§1229a(a)(1), (c)(5). “[E]very alien ordered removed” also 
 

 

 

2 REYES MATA v. LYNCH 

Opinion of the Court 

“has a right to file one motion” with the IJ or Board

to “reopen his or her removal proceedings.” Dada v. 

Mukasey, 554 U. S. 1, 4–5 (2008); see §1229a(c)(7)(A).

Subject to exceptions not relevant here, that motion to 

reopen “shall be filed within 90 days” of the final removal 

order. §1229a(c)(7)(C)(i). Finally, the BIA’s regulations

provide that, separate and apart from acting on the alien’s

motion, the BIA may reopen removal proceedings “on its 

own motion”—or, in Latin, sua sponte—at any time. 8 

CFR §1003.2(a) (2015).

Petitioner Noel Reyes Mata is a Mexican citizen who

entered the United States unlawfully almost 15 years ago.

In 2010, he was convicted of assault under the Texas 

Penal Code. The federal Department of Homeland Security (DHS) immediately initiated removal proceedings

against him, and in August 2011 an IJ ordered him removed. See App. 6–13. Mata’s lawyer then filed a notice

of appeal with the BIA, indicating that he would soon

submit a written brief stating grounds for reversing the

IJ’s decision. But the attorney never filed the brief, and

the BIA dismissed the appeal in September 2012. See 

App. 4–5.

More than a hundred days later, Mata (by then represented by new counsel) filed a motion with the Board to 

reopen his case. DHS opposed the motion, arguing in part

that Mata had failed to file it, as the INA requires, within 

90 days of the Board’s decision. Mata responded that the 

motion was “not time barred” because his first lawyer’s 

“ineffective assistance” counted as an “exceptional circumstance[]” excusing his lateness. Certified Administrative 

Record in No. 13–60253 (CA5, Aug. 2, 2013), p. 69. In 

addressing those arguments, the Board reaffirmed prior 

decisions holding that it had authority to equitably toll the 

90-day period in certain cases involving ineffective representation. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 7; see also, e.g., In re 

Santa Celenia Diaz, 2009 WL 2981747 (BIA, Aug. 21, 
 

Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

2009). But the Board went on to determine that Mata was 

not entitled to equitable tolling because he could not show 

prejudice from his attorney’s deficient performance; accordingly, the Board found Mata’s motion untimely. See 

App. to Pet. for Cert. 7–8. And in closing, the Board decided as well that Mata’s case was not one “that would 

warrant reopening as an exercise of” its sua sponte authority. Id., at 9 (stating that “the power to reopen on our own

motion is not meant to be used as a general cure for filing 

defects” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

Mata petitioned the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit to review the BIA’s denial of his motion to reopen,

arguing that he was entitled to equitable tolling. The 

Fifth Circuit, however, declined to “address the merits 

of Mata’s equitable-tolling . . . claim[].” Reyes Mata v. 

Holder, 558 Fed. Appx. 366, 367 (2014) (per curiam). It 

stated instead that “[i]n this circuit, an alien’s request [to 

the BIA] for equitable tolling on the basis of ineffective 

assistance of counsel is construed as an invitation for the 

BIA to exercise its discretion to reopen the removal proceeding sua sponte.” Ibid. And circuit precedent held that

courts have no jurisdiction to review the BIA’s refusal to 

exercise its sua sponte power to reopen cases. See ibid. 

The Court of Appeals thus dismissed Mata’s appeal for 

lack of jurisdiction. 

Every other Circuit that reviews removal orders has

affirmed its jurisdiction to decide an appeal, like Mata’s,

that seeks equitable tolling of the statutory time limit to 

file a motion to reopen a removal proceeding.1 We granted 

—————— 

1See, e.g., Da Silva Neves v. Holder, 613 F. 3d 30, 33 (CA1 2010) (per 

curiam) (exercising jurisdiction over such a petition); Iavorski v. INS, 

232 F. 3d 124, 129–134 (CA2 2000) (same); Borges v. Gonzales, 402 F. 

3d 398, 406 (CA3 2005) (same); Kuusk v. Holder, 732 F. 3d 302, 305– 

306 (CA4 2013) (same); Barry v. Mukasey, 524 F. 3d 721, 724–725 (CA6 

2008) (same); Pervaiz v. Gonzales, 405 F. 3d 488, 490 (CA7 2005) 

(same); Hernandez-Moran v. Gonzales, 408 F. 3d 496, 499–500 (CA8 
 

4 REYES MATA v. LYNCH 

Opinion of the Court 

certiorari to resolve this conflict. 574 U. S. ___ (2015). 

And because the Federal Government agrees with Mata

that the Fifth Circuit had jurisdiction over his appeal, we

appointed an amicus curiae to defend the judgment below.2 We now reverse. 

II 

As we held in Kucana v. Holder, circuit courts have 

jurisdiction when an alien appeals from the Board’s denial

of a motion to reopen a removal proceeding. See 558 U. S., 

at 242, 253. The INA, in combination with a statute crossreferenced there, gives the courts of appeals jurisdiction to 

review “final order[s] of removal.” 8 U. S. C. §1252(a)(1); 

28 U. S. C. §2342. That jurisdiction, as the INA expressly 

contemplates, encompasses review of decisions refusing

to reopen or reconsider such orders. See 8 U. S. C. 

§1252(b)(6) (“[A]ny review sought of a motion to reopen or 

reconsider [a removal order] shall be consolidated with the 

review of the [underlying] order”). Indeed, as we explained in Kucana, courts have reviewed those decisions 

for nearly a hundred years; and even as Congress curtailed other aspects of courts’ jurisdiction over BIA rulings, it left that authority in place. See 558 U. S., at 

242–251. 

Nothing changes when the Board denies a motion to

reopen because it is untimely—nor when, in doing so, the 

Board rejects a request for equitable tolling. Under the 

INA, as under our century-old practice, the reason for the 

—————— 

2005) (same); Valeriano v. Gonzales, 474 F. 3d 669, 673 (CA9 2007) 

(same); Riley v. INS, 310 F. 3d 1253, 1257–1258 (CA10 2002) (same); 

Avila-Santoyo v. United States Atty. Gen., 713 F. 3d 1357, 1359, 1362– 

1364 (CA11 2013) (per curiam) (same). Except for Da Silva Neves, 

which did not resolve the issue, all those decisions also held, on the 

merits, that the INA allows equitable tolling in certain circumstances. 

See infra, at 7–8. 2We appointed William R. Peterson to brief and argue the case, 574

U. S. ___ (2015), and he has ably discharged his responsibilities. 
Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

BIA’s denial makes no difference to the jurisdictional 

issue. Whether the BIA rejects the alien’s motion to reopen because it comes too late or because it falls short in

some other respect, the courts have jurisdiction to review 

that decision. 

Similarly, that jurisdiction remains unchanged if the

Board, in addition to denying the alien’s statutorily authorized motion, states that it will not exercise its separate sua sponte authority to reopen the case. See supra, at 

1–2. In Kucana, we declined to decide whether courts 

have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s use of that discretionary power. See 558 U. S., at 251, n. 18. Courts of 

Appeals, including the Fifth Circuit, have held that they

generally lack such authority. See, e.g., EnriquezAlvarado v. Ashcroft, 371 F. 3d 246, 249–250 (CA5 2004); 

Tamenut v. Mukasey, 521 F. 3d 1000, 1003–1004 (CA8 

2008) (en banc) (per curiam) (citing other decisions).

Assuming arguendo that is right, it means only that judicial review ends after the court has evaluated the Board’s 

ruling on the alien’s motion. That courts lack jurisdiction 

over one matter (the sua sponte decision) does not affect

their jurisdiction over another (the decision on the alien’s 

request).

It follows, as the night the day, that the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over this case. Recall: As authorized 

by the INA, Mata filed a motion with the Board to reopen 

his removal proceeding. The Board declined to grant Mata

his proposed relief, thus conferring jurisdiction on an

appellate court under Kucana. The Board did so for timeliness reasons, holding that Mata had filed his motion

after 90 days had elapsed and that he was not entitled to

equitable tolling. But as just explained, the reason the

Board gave makes no difference: Whenever the Board 

denies an alien’s statutory motion to reopen a removal

case, courts have jurisdiction to review its decision. In 

addition, the Board determined not to exercise its sua 
 

 

 

 

6 REYES MATA v. LYNCH 

Opinion of the Court 

sponte authority to reopen. But once again, that extra 

ruling does not matter. The Court of Appeals did not lose

jurisdiction over the Board’s denial of Mata’s motion just 

because the Board also declined to reopen his case sua 

sponte. 

Nonetheless, the Fifth Circuit dismissed Mata’s appeal 

for lack of jurisdiction. That decision, as described earlier, 

hinged on “constru[ing]” Mata’s motion as something it 

was not: “an invitation for the BIA to exercise” its 

sua sponte authority. 558 Fed. Appx., at 367; supra, at 3. 

Amicus’s defense of that approach centrally relies on a

merits-based premise: that the INA forbids equitable

tolling of the 90-day filing period in any case, no matter 

how exceptional the circumstances. See Brief for Amicus 

Curiae by Invitation of the Court 14–35. Given that is so, 

amicus continues, the court acted permissibly in “recharacteriz[ing]” Mata’s pleadings. Id., at 36. After all, courts 

often treat a request for “categorically unavailable” relief 

as instead “seeking relief [that] may be available.” Id., at 

35, 38. And here (amicus concludes) that meant construing Mata’s request for equitable tolling as a request for 

sua sponte reopening—even though that caused the Fifth 

Circuit to lose its jurisdiction.

But that conclusion is wrong even on the assumption—

and it is only an assumption—that its core premise about 

equitable tolling is true.3 If the INA precludes Mata from 

—————— 

3We express no opinion as to whether or when the INA allows the

Board to equitably toll the 90-day period to file a motion to reopen.

Moreover, we are not certain what the Fifth Circuit itself thinks about 

that question. Perhaps, as amicus asserts, the court believes the INA 

categorically precludes equitable tolling: It is hard to come up with any

other reason why the court construes every argument for tolling as one 

for sua sponte relief. See Brief for Amicus Curiae by Invitation of the 

Court 2, 10, 14, n. 2. But the Fifth Circuit has stated that position in

only a single sentence in a single unpublished opinion, which (according

to the Circuit) has no precedential force. See Lin v. Mukasey, 286 Fed. 

Appx. 148, 150 (2008) (per curiam); Rule 47.5.4 (2015). And another 
 

Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

getting the relief he seeks, then the right course on appeal

is to take jurisdiction over the case, explain why that is so,

and affirm the BIA’s decision not to reopen. The jurisdictional question (whether the court has power to decide if 

tolling is proper) is of course distinct from the merits

question (whether tolling is proper). See Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U. S. 83, 89 (1998) 

(“[T]he absence of a valid . . . cause of action does not 

implicate subject-matter jurisdiction”). The Fifth Circuit 

thus retains jurisdiction even if Mata’s appeal lacks merit.

And when a federal court has jurisdiction, it also has a

“virtually unflagging obligation . . . to exercise” that authority. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. 

United States, 424 U. S. 800, 817 (1976). Accordingly, 

the Court of Appeals should have asserted jurisdiction

over Mata’s appeal and addressed the equitable tolling 

question.

 Contrary to amicus’s view, the practice of recharacterizing pleadings so as to offer the possibility of relief cannot 

justify the Court of Appeals’ alternative approach. True 

enough (and a good thing too) that courts sometimes 

construe one kind of filing as another: If a litigant misbrands a motion, but could get relief under a different 

label, a court will often make the requisite change. See, 

e.g., 12 J. Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice, §59.11[4] (3 ed.

2015) (explaining how courts treat untimely Rule 59 motions as Rule 60 motions because the latter have no time 

limit). But that established practice does not entail sidestepping the judicial obligation to exercise jurisdiction.

And it results in identifying a route to relief, not in rendering relief impossible. That makes all the difference be-

—————— 

unpublished decision cuts in the opposite direction, “hold[ing] that the

doctrine of equitable tolling applies” when exceptional circumstances

excuse an alien’s failure to meet the 90-day reopening deadline. See 

Torabi v. Gonzales, 165 Fed. Appx. 326, 331 (CA5 2006) (per curiam).

So, in the end, it is hard to say. 
 

 

 

8 REYES MATA v. LYNCH 

Opinion of the Court 

tween a court’s generously reading pleadings and a court’s

construing away adjudicative authority.

And if, as amicus argues, that construal rests on an

underlying merits decision—that the INA precludes any

equitable tolling—then the Court of Appeals has effectively 

insulated a circuit split from our review. Putting the 

Fifth Circuit to the side, all appellate courts to have addressed the matter have held that the Board may sometimes equitably toll the time limit for an alien’s motion to 

reopen. See n. 1, supra. Assuming the Fifth Circuit

thinks otherwise, that creates the kind of split of authority 

we typically think we need to resolve. See this Court’s 

Rule 10(a). But the Fifth Circuit’s practice of recharacterizing appeals like Mata’s as challenges to the Board’s 

sua sponte decisions and then declining to exercise jurisdiction over them prevents that split from coming to light. 

Of course, the Court of Appeals may reach whatever conclusion it thinks best as to the availability of equitable

tolling; we express no opinion on that matter. See n. 3, 

supra. What the Fifth Circuit may not do is to wrap such

a merits decision in jurisdictional garb so that we cannot 

address a possible division between that court and every 

other. 

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of

the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

It is so ordered. 
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Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015) 1 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 14–185 

NOEL REYES MATA, PETITIONER v. LORETTA E.
 

LYNCH, ATTORNEY GENERAL
 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
 

[June 15, 2015] 

JUSTICE THOMAS, dissenting. 

The Court’s opinion in this case elides an important 

distinction between construing a court filing and recharacterizing it. See Castro v. United States, 540 U. S. 375, 386 

(2003) (SCALIA, J., concurring in part and concurring in

judgment) (discussing this distinction). Courts routinely 

construe ambiguous filings to make sense out of them, as

parties—both counseled and uncounseled—sometimes 

submit documents lacking even rudimentary clarity. See, 

e.g., Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 989 

F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1287 (MD Ala. 2013) (“The filings and 

arguments made by the plaintiffs on these claims were

mystifying at best”). Recharacterization is something very

different: It occurs when a court treats an unambiguous

filing as something it is not. That practice is an unusual

one, and should be used, if at all, with caution. See Castro, 540 U. S., at 385–386 (opinion of SCALIA, J.). Courts 

should not approach recharacterization with a freewheeling attitude, but with “regard to the exceptional nature of 

recharacterization within an adversarial system.” Ibid. 

Recharacterization has, for example, been used “deliberately to override a pro se litigant’s choice of a procedural 

vehicle.” Id., at 386 (disapproving of the practice). But it 

is not the role of courts to “create a ‘better correspondence’ 

between the substance of a claim and its underlying pro-
 

 

2 REYES MATA v. LYNCH 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

cedural basis.” Ibid. 

In my view, then, it makes all the difference whether 

the Court of Appeals here properly construed an ambiguous motion or recharacterized an unambiguous motion

contrary to Mata’s stated choice of procedural vehicle. 

Although the majority’s opinion does not address this 

point, Mata’s motion to reopen does not expressly state 

whether he was invoking statutory relief under 8 U. S. C.

§1229a(c)(7)(A) or instead requesting sua sponte reopening

under the Board of Immigration Appeals’ asserted inherent authority. Had the Court of Appeals engaged in the 

discretionary action of construing that ambiguous filing, it

might not have abused its discretion by concluding that

Mata really meant to ask for sua sponte reopening rather 

than equitable tolling of the statutory time bar. 

The Court of Appeals, however, did not purport to construe an ambiguous motion. Instead, it applied what 

appears to be a categorical rule that all motions to reopen

that would be untimely under §1229a(c)(7)(A) must be

construed as motions for sua sponte reopening of the proceedings. See 558 Fed. Appx. 366, 367 (CA5 2014) (per 

curiam) (“In this circuit, an alien’s request for equitable 

tolling on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel is

construed as an invitation for the BIA to exercise its discretion to reopen the removal proceeding sua sponte”).

That rule would appear to foreclose a litigant from ever

filing an untimely statutory motion to reopen removal

proceedings seeking equitable tolling, as well as to invite

improper recharacterization in the event any such a motion is filed. The Court of Appeals should have assessed

Mata’s motion on its own terms. It erred in not doing so.

The reason it erred, though, has nothing to do with its

fidelity to our precedents discussing “the judicial obligation to exercise jurisdiction,” ante, at 7. That obligation

does not allow evasion of constitutional and statutory 

jurisdictional prerequisites. It is true that “when a federal 
 

Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015) 3 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

court has jurisdiction, it also has a ‘virtually unflagging

obligation to . . . exercise’ that authority.” Ibid. (quoting 

Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 

424 U. S. 800, 817 (1976)). But that “unflagging obligation” arises only if a court actually has jurisdiction. Federal courts have no obligation to seek out jurisdiction, nor 

should they misconstrue filings to satisfy jurisdictional

requirements. Rather, federal courts should “presume

that [they] lack jurisdiction unless the contrary appears 

affirmatively from the record.” See DaimlerChrysler Corp. 

v. Cuno, 547 U. S. 332, 342, n. 3 (2006). And they should

apply the ordinary rule that the party asserting federal 

jurisdiction bears the burden of proving that jurisdictional

prerequisites are met. Ibid. The practice of construing

filings does not alter the usual rules of establishing jurisdiction in federal court. 

I would vacate and remand for the Court of Appeals to

consider the BIA’s judgment without the burden of what 

appears to be a categorical rule demanding that Mata’s

motion be construed (or recharacterized) as a request for 

sua sponte reopening. Because the majority does more

than this by reversing the judgment below, I respectfully 

dissent.