2019 IL 122905

IN THE

SUPREME COURT

OF

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

(Docket No. 122905)

DAVID PICCIOLI, Appellant, v. THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE TEACHERS’ 

RETIREMENT SYSTEM et al., Appellees.

Opinion filed April 4, 2019.

JUSTICE BURKE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Chief Justice Karmeier and Justices Kilbride and Neville concurred in the 

judgment and opinion.

Justice Theis dissented, with opinion, joined by Justices Thomas and Garman.

OPINION

¶ 1 Plaintiff, David Piccioli, appeals directly to this court from an order of the 

Sangamon County circuit court holding a 2007 amendment to the Illinois Pension 

Code (Code) (Pub. Act 94-1111 (eff. Feb. 27, 2007) (adding 40 ILCS 

5/16-106(10)) unconstitutional and entering summary judgment in favor of 
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defendants, the Board of Trustees of the Teachers’ Retirement System (TRS) and 

its individual trustees. We reverse the circuit court’s judgment and remand with 

directions to enter summary judgment in favor of plaintiff.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 On February 27, 2007, Public Act 94-1111 (eff. Feb. 27, 2007) (2007 Act) was 

enacted into law. Among other things, the 2007 Act added a new provision to 

article 16 of the Code, which governs the TRS. Id. (adding 40 ILCS 5/16-106(10)). 

This provision allowed an officer or employee of a statewide teachers’ union, such 

as the Illinois Federation of Teachers (IFT) or the Illinois Education Association 

(IEA), who was a certified teacher as of the effective date of the amendment, to 

establish service credit in the TRS for his or her union work prior to becoming 

certified as a teacher.1 Id. To obtain this benefit, an individual had to meet three 

requirements: (1) be certified as a teacher on or before the effective date of the 

legislation (i.e., Feb. 27, 2007), (2) apply in writing to the TRS within six months 

after the effective date of the legislation, and (3) pay into the system both the 

employee contribution and employer (State) contribution, plus interest, for his or 

her prior union service. Id.

¶ 4 According to the legislative debates, the goal of the 2007 amendment was to

allow employees of teachers’ unions to “pick up their service” in the TRS for the 

period during which they worked for the union prior to becoming certified as a 

teacher. 94th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, Nov. 28, 2006, at 68-69 

(statements of Representative Hannig); 94th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, 

Nov. 30, 2006, at 50 (statements of Senator Martinez). 

¶ 5 Plaintiff worked as a lobbyist for the IFT from 1997 until his retirement on 

December 31, 2012. In December 2006, plaintiff obtained a substitute teaching 

certificate. On January 22, 2007, he worked for one day as a substitute teacher in 

the Springfield public schools. By taking these steps, plaintiff met the statutory 

 1

The 2007 Act also amended the Code to allow officers or employees of state employee unions 

who had previously earned creditable service in the State Employees’ Retirement System of Illinois 

(SERS) to purchase service credit in that system for both their prior union service and their union 

service going forward. See Pub. Act 94-1111, § 5 (eff. Feb. 27, 2007) (adding 40 ILCS 

5/14-103.05(c)). These provisions have not been altered and are still part of the Code. 
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criteria to qualify as a certified teacher prior to February 27, 2007, the effective date 

of the 2007 amendment. 105 ILCS 5/21-9 (West 2006); 40 ILCS 5/16-106(10) 

(West 2006). Within six months of that date, plaintiff applied in writing to the TRS. 

On June 1, 2007, plaintiff officially became a member of the TRS. Plaintiff then 

contributed $192,668 to the system for his union service during the period from 

1997 through May 31, 2007.2 It is undisputed that plaintiff complied with all of the 

statutory requirements for obtaining service credit in the TRS for his union service 

prior to becoming a certified teacher. 

¶ 6 In October 2011, the Chicago Tribune published an article and editorial which 

identified plaintiff by name and criticized the law that allowed him to become a 

member of the TRS and qualify for a teacher’s pension. In response to the negative 

media coverage, Public Act 97-651 (eff. Jan. 5, 2012) (2012 Act) was enacted into 

law on January 5, 2012. Among other things, the 2012 Act repealed the 2007 

amendment at issue in this case. Id. §§ 5, 97 (amending 40 ILCS 5/16-106(10)). 

The 2012 Act stated, in part:

“Retroactive repeal. This amendatory Act *** hereby repeals and declares void 

ab initio the last paragraph of Section 16-106 of the Illinois Pension Code as 

contained in Public Act 94-1111 as that paragraph furnishes no vested rights 

because it violates multiple provisions of the 1970 Illinois Constitution, 

including, but not limited to, Article VIII, Section 1 [(Ill. Const. 1970, art. VIII, 

§ 1) (‘Public funds, property or credit shall be used only for public 

purposes.’)].” Id. § 97. 

¶ 7 The repeal provision also provided for a refund of contributions to employees 

who had qualified for benefits pursuant to the 2007 amendment. The provision 

stated: 

“Upon receipt of an application within 6 months after the effective date of this 

amendatory Act of the 97th General Assembly, the System shall immediately 

refund any contributions made by or on behalf of a person to receive service 

credit pursuant to the text set forth in Public Act 94-1111, as well as any amount 

 2

Plaintiff also contributed approximately $172,000 to the TRS for his ongoing union service 

from June 1, 2007, to December 31, 2012, pursuant to section 16-106(8) of the Code (40 ILCS 

5/16-106(8) (West 2006)). Plaintiff’s service credit for this time period is not at issue in this appeal. 
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determined by the Board to be equal to the investment earned by the System on 

those contributions since their receipt.” Id.

¶ 8 Pursuant to the 2012 Act, the TRS eliminated the service credits plaintiff had 

received for his union service from 1997 through May 31, 2007, and issued a 

refund of his contributions. Thereafter, plaintiff filed a complaint against 

defendants in the circuit court. Plaintiff sought injunctive relief and a declaratory 

judgment that the retroactive repeal of the 2007 amendment violated several 

provisions of the state constitution, including the pension protection clause (Ill. 

Const. 1970, art. XIII, § 5). The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. 

In their motion, defendants argued for the first time that the 2007 amendment was 

unconstitutional special legislation (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, § 13) and, therefore, 

that the 2012 Act repealing that provision was constitutionally valid. 

¶ 9 The trial court agreed with defendants’ argument and entered summary 

judgment for defendants and against plaintiff. The court first rejected plaintiff’s 

claim that defendants lacked standing to attack the constitutionality of the 2007 

amendment. The court then held that the effective-date cutoff in the 2007 

amendment, which limited benefits to employees who met the eligibility criteria as 

of the effective date of the legislation, rendered that provision special legislation. 

Accordingly, the court declared the provision unconstitutional and void ab initio. 

Plaintiff appealed the trial court’s decision directly to this court. Ill. S. Ct. R. 

302(a)(1) (eff. Oct. 4, 2011). 

¶ 10 ANALYSIS

¶ 11 I. Standing

¶ 12 Plaintiff first contends that defendants lack standing to attack the 

constitutionality of the 2007 amendment. The doctrine of standing ensures that 

courts decide actual controversies and not abstract questions. People v. $1,124,905 

U.S. Currency & One 1988 Chevrolet Astro Van, 177 Ill. 2d 314, 328 (1997) (citing 

In re Marriage of Rodriguez, 131 Ill. 2d 273, 279-80 (1989)). Under Illinois law, 

standing requires “some injury in fact to a legally cognizable interest.” Greer v. 

Illinois Housing Development Authority, 122 Ill. 2d 462, 492 (1988). “To have 

standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute, *** one must have sustained 
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or be in immediate danger of sustaining a direct injury as a result of enforcement of 

the challenged statute.” Wexler v. Wirtz Corp., 211 Ill. 2d 18, 23 (2004). “The 

claimed injury must be (1) distinct and palpable; (2) fairly traceable to defendant’s 

actions; and (3) substantially likely to be prevented or redressed by the grant of the 

requested relief.” Chicago Teachers’ Union, Local 1 v. Board of Education of the 

City of Chicago, 189 Ill. 2d 200, 207 (2000) (citing Glisson v. City of Marion, 188 

Ill. 2d 211, 221 (1999)). Questions of standing are reviewed de novo. Wexler, 211 

Ill. 2d at 23.

¶ 13 As he did in the circuit court, plaintiff argues that defendants have no personal 

interest in the controversy because they are in no danger of suffering an injury to 

their personal rights. Plaintiff maintains that the TRS is merely a fiduciary for the 

benefit of its members and, thus, has no personal interest in the fund it administers. 

Accordingly, plaintiff argues, defendants “lack[ ] power to unilaterally attack the 

2007 Act’s constitutionality.” We agree with the circuit court that plaintiff’s 

standing argument is without merit. 

¶ 14 Defendants are not seeking judicial redress for any alleged violations of their 

personal rights. The party seeking judicial review and enforcement in this case is 

plaintiff, not defendants. In arguing that the 2007 amendment is unconstitutional, 

defendants are simply defending the constitutionality of the 2012 Act and the 

actions they took pursuant to that legislation. Defendants complied with the 2007 

Act by allowing plaintiff to join the TRS as a member and make contributions for 

his past union service. Defendants then complied with the 2012 Act by voiding 

plaintiff’s service credits and refunding his contributions. Defendants have the 

right to defend the validity of the 2012 Act by virtue of the fact that plaintiff has 

filed a lawsuit against them seeking a declaratory judgment that the enactment is 

unconstitutional. Thus, we reject plaintiff’s argument that defendants lack standing 

to challenge the constitutionality of the 2007 amendment.

¶ 15 II. Special Legislation

¶ 16 We now turn to the central issue raised in this appeal. The question before this 

court is whether the 2007 amendment to section 16-106(10) of the Code is special 

legislation in violation of the state constitution. Our answer to this question will 

dictate whether the 2012 Act, which repealed the 2007 amendment and required 
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that beneficiaries have their benefits revoked and their contributions refunded, 

violated the pension protection clause (Ill. Const. 1970, art. XIII, § 5). 

¶ 17 The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law subject to de novo review. 

Board of Education of Peoria School District No. 150 v. Peoria Federation of 

Support Staff, Security/Policeman’s Benevolent & Protective Ass’n Unit No. 114, 

2013 IL 114853, ¶ 41. Statutes carry a strong presumption of constitutionality. 

Moline School District No. 40 Board of Education v. Quinn, 2016 IL 119704, ¶ 16. 

It is this court’s duty to uphold the constitutionality of a statute if reasonably 

possible. Id. As the party alleging that the 2007 amendment is unconstitutional, 

defendants bear the burden of establishing the statute’s constitutional infirmity. Id.

¶ 18 Special legislation is expressly prohibited by our state constitution: “The 

General Assembly shall pass no special or local law when a general law is or can be 

made applicable. Whether a general law is or can be made applicable shall be a 

matter for judicial determination.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, § 13. “The special 

legislation clause prohibits the General Assembly from conferring a special benefit 

or privilege upon one person or group and excluding others that are similarly 

situated.” Crusius v. Illinois Gaming Board, 216 Ill. 2d 315, 325 (2005). The clause 

prevents the legislature from making classifications that arbitrarily discriminate in 

favor of a select group. Id. To determine whether a law constitutes special 

legislation, we apply a two-part test. First, we must decide whether the statutory 

classification at issue discriminates in favor of a select group and against a similarly 

situated group. Second, if the classification does so discriminate, we must 

determine whether the classification is arbitrary. Id.; Big Sky Excavating, Inc. v. 

Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 217 Ill. 2d 221, 235 (2005).

¶ 19 There is no question that the 2007 amendment discriminates in favor of 

employees who began working for statewide teachers’ unions prior to its effective 

date and discriminates against employees who began after that date. The 2007 

amendment creates a cutoff date whereby those individuals who were not 

employed by one of the unions on or before February 27, 2007, were excluded from 

availing themselves of the benefits in the statute. In addition, the amendment 

distinguishes between employees of statewide teachers’ unions who were certified 

as teachers on or before the effective date and those who were not, and it confers a 

benefit on the former that is unavailable to the latter. See Pub. Act 94-1111 (eff. 
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Feb. 27, 2007) (amending 40 ILCS 5/16-106(10)) (restricting benefit to an officer 

or employee of a statewide teachers’ union who was “certified as a teacher on or 

before the effective date of this amendatory Act”); see also Crusius, 216 Ill. 2d at 

325-26. However, the existence of a cutoff date in the statute does not necessarily 

render the law unconstitutional. Under the second step of the special legislation 

analysis, we must consider whether the classification created by the cutoff date is 

arbitrary. Id. at 325. 

¶ 20 Whether a classification is arbitrary is generally determined under the same 

standards that are applicable to an equal protection challenge. Moline School 

District No. 40 Board of Education, 2016 IL 119704, ¶ 24. Where, as here, a statute 

does not affect fundamental rights, we use the rational basis test to assess its 

constitutionality. Id. Under this test, we ask whether the statutory classification is 

rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Id. The classification does not need 

to be supported by evidence or empirical data. Big Sky Excavating, Inc., 217 Ill. 2d 

at 240. In determining whether a statute satisfies the rational basis standard, a court 

does not engage in “courtroom fact finding.” People ex rel. Lumpkin v. Cassidy, 

184 Ill. 2d 117, 124 (1998). “Under the rational basis test, the court may 

hypothesize reasons for the legislation, even if the reasoning advanced did not 

motivate the legislative action. [Citation.] If there is any conceivable basis for 

finding a rational relationship, the law will be upheld.” (Emphasis added.) Id.

Moreover, the fact that a law may be ill-conceived does not create a constitutional 

problem for the courts to fix. Moline School District No. 40 Board of Education, 

2016 IL 119704, ¶ 28. “[W]hether a statute is wise and whether it is the best means 

to achieve the desired result are matters for the legislature, not the courts.” Id. 

(citing Crusius, 216 Ill. 2d at 332). 

¶ 21 The inclusion of a cutoff date in a statute, especially a statute that confers 

benefits or establishes a government program reliant on public funding, is entirely 

rational. Since state and local governments operate with limited resources and 

budgets, restricting benefits to a finite number of participants is not only reasonable 

but necessary. Advancement of the State’s economic goals clearly is a legitimate 

rationale for legislation. See Crusius, 216 Ill. 2d at 327 (holding that promotion of 

the State’s economic goals is a reasonable legislative objective that withstands a 

special legislation attack); Moline School District No. 40 Board of Education, 2016 
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IL 119704, ¶ 27; Jacobson v. Department of Public Aid, 269 Ill. App. 3d 359, 

368-69 (1994). 

¶ 22 Under the circumstances in this case, the legislature reasonably could have 

chosen to impose a cutoff date for the purpose of budgetary responsibility and 

preservation of the State’s pension funds. It certainly is not unusual for the 

legislature to make pension benefits contingent upon an individual’s eligibility as 

of the statute’s effective date. See, e.g., Pub. Act 97-651 (eff. Jan. 5, 2012) 

(amending 40 ILCS 5/16-106(8)) (allowing a teachers’ union employee to establish 

service credit in the TRS for future union service if “the individual first became an 

officer or employee of the teacher organization and becomes a member before the 

effective date of this amendatory Act of the 97th General Assembly”); Pub. Act 

96-889 (eff. Apr. 14, 2010) (establishing “Tier 1” annuity benefits for persons who 

became members of public retirement systems prior to January 1, 2011, and “Tier 

2” annuity benefits for persons who became members on or after January 1, 2011). 

Accordingly, we find that the cutoff date in the 2007 amendment was rationally 

related to a legitimate government interest in offering pension benefits to current 

employees while, at the same time, containing costs by excluding future employees 

from those benefits. 

¶ 23 Moreover, even if the 2007 amendment were totally revenue-neutral, that is, it 

neither imposed costs on the State nor saved the State any money, it would still 

survive constitutional scrutiny. It is perfectly reasonable for the legislature to 

include a cutoff date in a statute establishing a public program or benefit. We are 

aware of no constitutional rule that requires a government program to continue in 

perpetuity. Nor does the failure of a statute to extend particular benefits to all 

eligible employees, for all time, render the law unconstitutional. In order to satisfy 

the rational basis standard, a statutory classification requires “[n]either perfection 

nor mathematical nicety.” Maddux v. Blagojevich, 233 Ill. 2d 508, 547 (2009). The 

mere fact that a law could have gone further than it did does not offend rational 

basis. Id.; see also Chicago National League Ball Club, Inc. v. Thompson, 108 Ill. 

2d 357, 372 (1985) (“Classifications are not required to be precise, accurate or 

harmonious so long as they accomplish the legislative purpose.”). In general, there 

is nothing arbitrary about using a cutoff date to limit benefits to a finite number of 

individuals. Therefore, since a rational reason for the classification in the statute is 
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conceivable, it is not special legislation. See Big Sky Excavating, Inc., 217 Ill. 2d at 

240. 

¶ 24 Despite the foregoing, defendants nevertheless contend that the 2007 

amendment is special legislation. Defendants make three arguments. First, they 

contend that numerous IEA employees were unaware of the 2007 amendment until 

after it was passed. According to defendants, these employees were unfairly 

deprived of the opportunity to participate in the benefits, and therefore, the statute 

is special legislation. We reject this contention. 

¶ 25 An individual’s knowledge or ignorance of a law has no relevance to whether it 

is special legislation. “[I]t is well settled that ‘[a]ll citizens are presumptively 

charged with knowledge of the law.’ ” People v. Boclair, 202 Ill. 2d 89, 104 (2002) 

(quoting Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 130 (1985)). 3 On its face, the 2007 

amendment made the benefit available to any current employee who met its criteria 

on or before the effective date. There was nothing preventing eligible employees 

from doing exactly what plaintiff did, i.e., obtain a substitute teaching certificate 

for purposes of attaining TRS membership and purchasing credits for past union 

service. The same benefit available to plaintiff was available to other employees. 

They simply chose not to avail themselves of it. The fact that an employee does not 

choose to opt in to a particular benefit by the deadline does not, in some way, render 

the statutory benefit special legislation. 

¶ 26 Defendants raise a second argument that the cutoff date was arbitrary, i.e., not 

rationally related to a legitimate government interest. According to defendants, 

fiscal responsibility was not the legislature’s actual reason for including the cutoff 

date. Defendants point to two comments from the legislative debates indicating that 

the 2007 amendment would not impose any additional costs on the State. See 94th 

Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, Nov. 28, 2006, at 68 (statements of 

Representative Hannig) (stating that no part of the legislation would “cost the State 

of Illinois any additional pension moneys”); 94th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate 

Proceedings, November 30, 2006, at 51 (statements of Senator Martinez) (stating 

 3

In response to defendants’ argument, plaintiff has filed a motion to take judicial notice of a 

legislative record that purportedly indicates that the IEA was, in fact, aware of the 2007 legislation 

before its passage. That motion is denied. See Rural Electric Convenience Cooperative Co. v. 

Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 118 Ill. App. 3d 647, 652 (1983) (declining to take judicial notice of an 

irrelevant exhibit).
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that the bill “does not have any unfunded liability”). Based on these two statements, 

defendants conclude that the cutoff date in the statute could not further the goal of 

fiscal responsibility, since the statutory benefit was not going to cost the State any 

money to begin with. Therefore, according to defendants, the classification created 

by the cutoff date is arbitrary. We also reject this argument. 

¶ 27 There is no evidence that the legislators’ two comments that the bill would not 

cost the State any money are accurate. In fact, defendants’ contention that the bill 

was revenue-neutral is highly dubious, given the critical media coverage of the 

2007 amendment and the legislature’s decision to repeal the amendment in 

response to that criticism. As we noted, however, even if it is true that the statute is 

revenue-neutral, the legislature does not need a special reason to cut off 

government benefits or programs by a certain date. 

¶ 28 Finally, defendants argue that the analysis in Peoria School District, 2013 IL 

114853, is controlling. That case is factually distinguishable and, thus, has no 

bearing on our decision in this case. The statutory amendment at issue in Peoria 

School District changed the laws governing labor disputes for “peace officers 

employed by a school district in its own police department in existence on the 

effective date of this amendatory Act” of the 96th General Assembly (Pub. Act 

96-1257 (eff. July 23, 2010) (amending 5 ILCS 315/3 (West 2010))). Peoria School 

District, 2013 IL 114853, ¶ 7. The district challenged the amendment as special 

legislation because, as of the effective date of the amendment, Peoria School 

District No. 150 was the only school district that employed peace officers in its own 

police department. Id. ¶ 10. This court held that there was no rational justification 

for applying one set of laws to a school district currently employing peace officers 

in its own police department and applying a different set of laws to school districts 

that may do so in the future. Id. ¶¶ 59-60. Since there was no rational justification 

for limiting the reach of the statute to one particular school district, we held the 

amendment violated the special legislation clause. Id. ¶ 60. 

¶ 29 Defendants contend that the cutoff date provision in Peoria School District is 

no different from the cutoff date in the 2007 amendment. Accordingly, defendants 

argue, our analysis in this case is subject to the same general principle set forth in 

that case:
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“[A] law the legislature considers appropriately applied to a generic class 

presently existing, with attributes that are in no sense unique or unlikely of 

repetition in the future, cannot rationally, and hence constitutionally, be limited 

of application by a date restriction that closes the class as of the statute’s 

effective date. Barring some viable rationale for doing so, it would, for 

example, violate the proscription of the constitution for the legislature to apply 

a law to a person or entity in existence on the effective date of enactment, but 

make it inapplicable to a person or entity who assumed those attributes or 

characteristics the day after the statute’s effective date.” Id. ¶ 54.

¶ 30 We reject defendants’ argument for the simple reason that the “cutoff date” in 

Peoria School District bears no relevant similarities to the “cutoff date” in the case 

at bar. The cutoff date in that case was a descriptor, clearly intended to target one 

specific school district that, at the time, was involved in a labor dispute with its 

peace officers. See id. ¶ 10 (complaint alleged that legislators knew, when they 

passed the amendment, that it would only apply to that district); see also Crusius, 

216 Ill. 2d at 325-26 (statute discriminated in favor of “licensees that were ‘not 

conducting riverboat gambling on January 1, 1998’ (230 ILCS 10/11.2(a) (West 

2000)),” of which Emerald Casino, Inc., was the only one). By contrast, the “cutoff 

date” in the 2007 amendment was simply a deadline that employees were required 

to meet in order to establish eligibility for a particular pension benefit. On its face, 

the 2007 amendment applied generally to all eligible employees who met its 

criteria. It was not directed at a specific individual. Moreover, the statute in Peoria 

School District did not involve a government program or benefit, which, as we have 

explained, is not constitutionally required to exist in perpetuity for all future 

applicants. Accordingly, the analysis in that case does not apply. 

¶ 31 III. Pension Protection Clause

¶ 32 Since the 2007 amendment is not special legislation and the circuit court did not 

invalidate the law on any other constitutional grounds, we hold that it confers a 

pension benefit protected by our state constitution. See Ill. Const. 1970, art. XIII, 

§ 5 (“Membership in any pension or retirement system of the State, any unit of 

local government or school district, or any agency or instrumentality thereof, shall 

be an enforceable contractual relationship, the benefits of which shall not be 
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diminished or impaired.”). Plaintiff followed everything the law required in order 

to establish his eligibility to purchase TRS credit for his past union service. While 

nothing prevented the legislature from eliminating this benefit for future 

employees, there is no legal justification for reducing or eliminating the pension 

benefits plaintiff was awarded pursuant to the 2007 amendment. See Carmichael v. 

Laborers’ & Retirement Board Employees’ Annuity & Benefit Fund of Chicago, 

2018 IL 122793 ¶ 26 (pursuant to the pension clause, “once a person commences to 

work and becomes a member of a public retirement system, any subsequent 

changes to the Pension Code that would diminish the benefits conferred by 

membership in the retirement system cannot be applied to that person”). We hold 

that the provision in the 2012 Act (Pub. Act 97-651 (eff. Jan. 5, 2012)) that repealed 

the 2007 amendment violates the pension protection clause in the Illinois 

Constitution and, therefore, that plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment. 

¶ 33 CONCLUSION

¶ 34 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the decision of the circuit court declaring 

the 2007 amendment to section 16-106 of the Code (Pub. Act 94-1111 (eff. Feb. 27, 

2007) (adding 40 ILCS 5/16-106(10))) unconstitutional and granting summary 

judgment to defendants. We remand the cause to the circuit court with directions to 

enter summary judgment in favor of plaintiff.

¶ 35 Circuit court judgment reversed; cause remanded with directions.

¶ 36 JUSTICE THEIS, dissenting:

¶ 37 I agree with the majority that plaintiff David Piccioli’s standing argument lacks 

merit. I disagree with the majority that Piccioli’s pension protection clause 

argument has merit. In my view, the 2007 amendment to section 16-108(10) of the 

Pension Code (Pub. Act 94-1111 (eff. Feb. 27, 2007) (adding 40 ILCS 

5/16-106(10)) violates the special legislation clause (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, § 13). 

Consequently, the 2012 Act (Pub. Act 97-651 (eff. Jan. 5, 2012) (amending 40 

ILCS 5/16-106(10))), which repealed the 2007 amendment, does not violate the 

pension protection clause (Ill. Const. 1970, art. XIII, § 5).
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¶ 38 As Piccioli’s attorney admitted at oral argument, the optics created by the facts 

of this case are not great. The majority’s background, however, whitewashes those 

facts. For context, I offer details that the majority overlooks.

¶ 39 Administrators, teachers, and other staffers who work in public schools outside 

Chicago participate in the Teachers’ Retirement System (TRS), which was 

established and is governed by article 16 of the Code. See 40 ILCS 5/16-101 et seq.

(West 2016). Before 2007, article 16’s definition of “teacher” included officers or 

employees of statewide teacher organizations who had “previously established 

creditable service” by teaching and who elected to become TRS members. See 40 

ILCS 5/16-106(8) (West 2006). That provision allowed former teachers who later 

worked for teacher organizations to earn TRS service credit for their union work. 

There are two statewide teacher organizations in Illinois—the Illinois Federation of 

Teachers (IFT) and the Illinois Education Association (IEA).

¶ 40 In the 94th General Assembly, Senate Bill 36 concerned the Illinois Municipal 

Retirement Fund and early retirement benefits. Final Legislative Synopsis and 

Digest of the 94th Ill. Gen. Assem. (No. 13), at 41, ftp://12.43.67.2/Digest/94th

FinalDigest.pdf. The bill was introduced on January 26, 2005; it was approved by 

the Senate and sent to the House on March 2, 2005. Id. at 42. There, it was referred 

to the rules committee and then assigned to the executive committee. Id. The bill 

was re-referred to the rules committee and then assigned to the veterans affairs 

committee. Id. at 42-43. The bill was again re-referred to the rules committee, 

where it stalled. Id. at 43.

¶ 41 The record here contains the discovery deposition of Steven Preckwinkle, the 

IFT’s director of political activities. Preckwinkle stated that, shortly after the 2006 

general election, he was approached by a House Democratic staff member who 

asked if the organization would be interested in reviving a new version of the bill. 

Preckwinkle discussed that version with the IFT’s president, who expressed 

concerns about its cost to taxpayers and its potential for “damaging exposure” if the 

organization supported it. Ultimately, the organization decided to do so. 

Preckwinkle admitted that he saw draft language for the bill, but he could not 

remember if anyone at the IFT was involved in writing that language. He added: 
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“I don’t think anybody in the IFT wrote the words of the amendment. I’m 

fairly certain of that. I certainly don’t recall that. I think I would have 

remembered some discussion about it.

We did have a lobbyist that worked on pension *** matters and whether or 

not he had some involvement, possibly had worked with a legislative staffer 

*** on it[,] I don’t know.”

¶ 42 The record also contains an e-mail from that pension lobbyist, the IFT’s 

legislative director, Nick Yelverton, to a Legislative Reference Bureau (LRB) 

attorney. The e-mail was dated October 19, 2006, and the subject was “1st one is 

wrong.” Attached to the e-mail was a document titled “IFT-TRS draft lang 

10-18-06” that featured a cut-and-paste of section 16-106 of the Code from the 

General Assembly’s website and an underlined paragraph appended to subsection 

(8). The paragraph stated that teacher organization employees could establish TRS 

service credit for their prior union work if they became certified as teachers before 

the legislation went into effect and paid contributions required for such credit. One 

minute later, Yelverton sent an e-mail to Preckwinkle with the subject “Language 

to LRB.” That e-mail included the same attachment as the e-mail to the LRB 

attorney.

¶ 43 On November 9, 2006, Preckwinkle sent an e-mail to approximately 40 IFT 

employees who were “not currently participating in a public pension system like 

TRS.” Preckwinkle informed them that he had scheduled two meetings concerning 

“individuals’ rights under the law” to participate in TRS. At the meetings, 

Preckwinkle and Yelverton would review “rights currently provided by law as well 

as other related pending legislation that may be considered in the upcoming veto 

session.” Preckwinkle noted, “If you received this e-mail it is believed you likely 

fall in to this category of employee.” He advised that “Persons who should attend 

one of these meetings are those with a bachelor’s degree (or higher) or the interest 

in obtaining one while employed by the IFT.” (Emphasis in original.)

¶ 44 Piccioli was a House Democratic staffer between 1987 and 1997, after which he 

took a position as a legislative lobbyist for the IFT. His supervisor was 

Preckwinkle. Piccioli received Preckwinkle’s e-mail and attended one of the 

meetings.
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¶ 45 On November 15, 2006, the House extended the final action deadline for Senate 

Bill 36, and it was referred to the personnel and pensions committee. The following 

day, that committee scrapped the entire bill and replaced everything after the 

enacting clause. As rewritten, the bill included the substance of the IFT’s 

paragraph. The bill proposed that teacher organization employees could establish 

TRS service credit for their prior union work if they met the definition of “teacher” 

in section 16-106(8) of the Code (40 ILCS 5/16-106(8) (West 2006)) and satisfied 

three additional conditions: (1) they became certified as teachers before the 

legislation went into effect, (2) they applied in writing to the TRS within six 

months of the legislation’s effective date, and (3) they paid the TRS contributions 

equal to “the normal costs calculated from the date of first full-time employment” 

for the union, plus interest. 94th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Bill 36, 2006 Sess. The 

definition of “teacher” required “previously established creditable service” (40 

ILCS 5/16-106(8)(i) (West 2006)), which included work as a substitute (id.

§ 16-130(c)). At the time, certification as a substitute teacher necessitated only a 

bachelor’s degree. 105 ILCS 5/21-9 (West 2006). A pension note from the 

Commission on Government Forecasting and Accountability stated, “The fiscal 

impact of allowing certified teachers to upgrade periods of service in a 

non-certified capacity in TRS while employed by a statewide teachers’ union 

cannot be calculated, but is expected to be minor.” Final Legislative Synopsis and 

Digest of the 94th Ill. Gen. Assem. (No. 13), at 42, ftp://12.43.67.2/Digest/94th

FinalDigest.pdf.

¶ 46 On November 28, 2006, the House approved the bill. The next day, 

Preckwinkle sent an e-mail to IFT employees:

“Please note that the legislation I referred to in our recent pension meetings *** 

passed the House last night ***. It is now in the Senate where a vote is expected 

tomorrow afternoon. *** [I]t appears headed for final passage. After that, 

approval by the Governor could take place anytime within the next 90 days. I 

want to reiterate that the TRS retroactivity section of the bill will only apply to 

those who have established TRS service credit on the date the bill is signed by 

the [G]overnor.” (Emphasis in original.)

On November 30, 2006, the Senate approved the bill. That day, Preckwinkle sent 

another e-mail to IFT employees:
- 16 -

“Please be advised that [Senate Bill] 36 passed the Senate today and will be sent 

to the Governor. I will do what I can to slow down the bill signing process to 

allow for everyone who wishes to participate in the TRS provisions the 

opportunity to do so. If things go well on that end, the effective date could be as 

late as mid-February, but there is really no way to know that for sure.”

And in a January 10, 2007, e-mail, Preckwinkle provided an update:

“[Senate Bill] 36 was sent to the [G]overnor on December 29, 2006. He has a 

maximum of 60 days from that date to sign it. At this time I need to know who 

is in the pipeline for completing a substitute teaching assignment, your status, 

and when you expect to satisfy the requirements of the bill. I will try to ensure 

that anyone who wishes to get coverage under this legislation has enough time 

to do so prior to his signature.”

¶ 47 Preckwinkle became certified as a substitute teacher on November 2, 2006, 

because he was “interested in becoming a member of TRS.” Preckwinkle worked 

as a substitute teacher for one day. Piccioli became certified as a substitute teacher 

on December 8, 2006. On January 22, 2007, he worked as a substitute teacher in a 

Springfield elementary school. He never worked as a teacher again. 

¶ 48 On February 27, 2007, exactly 90 days after the bill passed both houses, 

Governor Blagojevich signed Public Act 94-1111, which became effective 

immediately. See Pub. Act 94-1111 (eff. Feb. 27, 2007) (amending, inter alia, 40 

ILCS 5/16-106(10) (West 2006)). According to TRS manager Scott Hepperly, both 

Piccioli and Preckwinkle submitted applications to obtain retroactive service credit 

for their union work. Preckwinkle was satisfied with a TRS pension from the date 

of his substitute teaching through his retirement. Only Piccioli made the required 

contributions for past credit. He paid $192,668 in installments over four years.

¶ 49 In late 2011, the Chicago Tribune published an article about Piccioli and 

Preckwinkle and their TRS pensions. Ray Long & Jason Grotto, 2 Teachers Union 

Lobbyists Teach for a Day to Qualify for Hefty Pensions, Chi. Trib., Oct. 22, 2011, 

https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-met-pensions-teacher-perk-20111023-

story.html [https://perma.cc/79EP-BFFV?type=image]. That story, part of an 

ongoing investigation by the Tribune and WGN-TV, raised public awareness of 

union employees receiving public pensions for private sector work. The General 
- 17 -

Assembly responded with a House bill to roll back a variety of Pension Code 

provisions. See 97th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, Nov. 29, 2011, at 38 

(statements of Representative Cross) (“We are attempting, in this Bill, to address a 

variety of problems that came about as a result of some news articles ***.”).

¶ 50 In 2012, Governor Quinn signed the bill as Public Act 97-651 (eff. Jan. 5, 

2012). One part of the 2012 Act directly addressed the 2007 amendment to section 

16-106(10):

“This amendatory Act of the 97th General Assembly hereby repeals and 

declares void ab initio the last paragraph of Section 16-106 of the Illinois 

Pension Code as contained in Public Act 94-1111 as that paragraph furnishes 

no vested rights because it violates multiple provisions of the 1970 Illinois 

Constitution, including, but not limited to, Article VIII, Section 1. Upon receipt 

of an application within 6 months after the effective date of this amendatory Act 

of the 97th General Assembly, the System shall immediately refund any 

contributions made by or on behalf of a person to receive service credit 

pursuant to the text set forth in Public Act 94-1111, as well as any amount 

determined by the Board to be equal to the investment earned by the System on 

those contributions since their receipt.” Id.4

¶ 51 The posture of this case is unique in that both parties contest the 

constitutionality of different statutes. Piccioli’s main argument is that the 2012 Act 

is unconstitutional and violative of the pension protection clause because the 2007 

amendment to section 16-106(10) is constitutional and not violative of the special 

legislation clause. The main argument by TRS is that the 2012 Act is constitutional 

and not violative of the pension protection clause because the 2007 amendment is 

unconstitutional and violative of the special legislation clause. Both arguments 

hinge on whether the 2007 amendment passes constitutional muster.

¶ 52 Article IV, section 13, of the Illinois Constitution provides, “The General 

Assembly shall pass no special or local law when a general law is or can be made 

applicable. Whether a general law is or can be made applicable shall be a matter for 

judicial determination.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, § 13. That section, the so-called 

 4

The constitutionality of other parts of Public Act 97-651 was addressed in Carmichael v. 

Laborers’ & Retirement Board Employees’ Annuity & Benefit Fund, 2018 IL 122793.
- 18 -

special legislation clause, has deep roots in our jurisprudence. Moline School 

District No. 40 Board of Education v. Quinn, 2016 IL 119704, ¶ 19. The special 

legislation clause is grounded on “the conviction that governments should establish 

and enforce general principles applicable to all their citizens and not enrich 

particular classes of individuals at the expense of others.” Id. (citing Best v. Taylor 

Machine Works, 179 Ill. 2d 367, 391-92 (1997)). A general law applies to all 

persons and entities in the same situation; a special law does not. See Board of 

Education of Peoria School District No. 150 v. Peoria Federation of Support Staff, 

Security/Policeman’s Benevolent & Protective Ass’n Unit No. 114, 2013 IL 

114853, ¶ 48 (Peoria School District).

¶ 53 When a statute is challenged under the special legislation clause, our analysis is 

twofold. Initially, we must determine whether the classification created by the 

statute discriminates in favor of a certain person or group. Moline School District, 

2016 IL 119704, ¶ 23. If so, we must determine whether the classification was 

arbitrary. Id.

¶ 54 The classification created by the 2007 amendment to section 16-106(10) 

satisfies the first step of the analysis. The majority concludes, “There is no question 

that the 2007 amendment discriminates in favor of employees who began working 

for statewide teachers’ unions prior to its effective date and discriminates against 

employees who began after that date.” Supra ¶ 19. In fact, the amendment did more 

than that. It discriminated in favor of teacher organization employees who were not 

previously TRS members, but who became certified as teachers and established 

creditable service before the legislation went into effect, and against teacher 

organization employees who were not previously TRS members, and who did not 

become certified as teachers and establish creditable service before the legislation 

went into effect. The question then becomes whether the classification—i.e., the 

effective date cutoff—satisfies the second step.

¶ 55 The hallmark of a statutory classification that violates the special legislation 

clause is its arbitrariness. Allen v. Woodfield Chevrolet, Inc., 208 Ill. 2d 12, 28-29 

(2003) (citing Best, 179 Ill. 2d at 396); In re Petition of the Village of Vernon Hills, 

168 Ill. 2d 117, 122 (1995); Cutinello v. Whitley, 161 Ill. 2d 409, 417 (1994). We 

have noted repeatedly that the second step of the special legislation analysis tracks 

the analysis for equal protection challenges. See Big Sky Excavating, Inc. v. Illinois 
- 19 -

Bell Telephone Co., 217 Ill. 2d 221, 237 (2005). Where the classification does not 

impact a fundamental right or a suspect class, we review it under the rational basis 

test. Crusius v. Illinois Gaming Board, 216 Ill. 2d 315, 325 (2005). Under that test, 

a classification passes constitutional muster if it is rationally related to a legitimate 

government interest. Id. Stated differently, a statutory classification violates the 

special legislation clause when it is not based upon reasonable differences in kind 

or situation that are sufficiently related to the problem targeted by the statute. 

Grasse v. Dealer’s Transport Co., 412 Ill. 179, 195 (1952); In re Belmont Fire 

Protection District, 111 Ill. 2d 373, 380 (1986). The rational basis test is deferential 

to the findings of the legislature, but it is not toothless. People v. Jones, 223 Ill. 2d 

569, 596 (2006) (citing Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U.S. 181, 185 (1976)).

¶ 56 The threshold inquiry is to identify a legitimate government interest animating 

the statute. We can only decide that the means chosen by the legislature are 

rationally related to the end pursued by the legislature if we know the end. People v. 

Johnson, 225 Ill. 2d 573, 584 (2007) (“Under the rational basis test, *** we must 

determine whether there is a legitimate state interest behind the legislation, and if 

so, whether there is a reasonable relationship between that interest and the means 

the legislature has chosen to pursue it.”).

¶ 57 Piccioli suggests that the 2007 amendment was designed to “protect[ ] TRS’[s] 

fisc” because it limits “those who qualify to receive annuities from TRS’[s] finite 

funds.” In support of his theory, Piccioli points to the pension funding crisis 

documented in In re Pension Reform Litigation, 2015 IL 118585. The majority 

follows his lead, positing that there is “a legitimate government interest in offering 

pension benefits to current employees while, at the same time, containing costs by 

excluding future employees from those benefits.” Supra ¶ 22. From there, the 

majority backs into a rational relation between that interest and the cutoff:

“The inclusion of a cutoff date in a statute, especially a statute that confers 

benefits or establishes a government program reliant on public funding, is 

entirely rational. Since state and local governments operate with limited 

resources and budgets, restricting benefits to a finite number of participants is 

not only reasonable but necessary.” Supra ¶ 21.
- 20 -

The majority concludes that the legislature “reasonably could have chosen to 

impose a cutoff date for the purpose of budgetary responsibility and preservation of 

the State’s pension funds.” Supra ¶ 22.

¶ 58 The legislature certainly could have chosen to do so for that purpose. Here, it 

did not. The majority even acknowledges that the purpose of the 2007 amendment 

to section 16-106(10), as expressed in the legislative debates, was to allow teacher 

organization employees to purchase TRS service credit for their union work. Supra

¶ 4.

¶ 59 Representative Hannig, a sponsor of the bill that included what became the 

2007 amendment, described it to the House. He stated that the bill “does several 

things, none of which will cost the State of Illinois any additional pension moneys.” 

94th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, Nov. 28, 2006, at 68 (statements of 

Representative Hannig). That was because former state employees “would be 

required to *** put in the full amount of the cost.” Id. at 76. Regarding article 16, he 

observed that the bill

“provides a window for people who in the Teachers[’] Retirement System who 

have also worked who have employment in organizations representing 

teachers. It would provides [sic] that... it additionally... last year when we did a 

technical cleanup on the early retirement option there were two areas that we 

failed to actually allow teachers to go back and pick up their service. And so it 

corrects this technicality.” Id. at 68-69.

Representative Black, who otherwise questioned the propriety of the bill, 

conceded, “Staff on both sides have indicated the long-term liability to any state 

pension system would be minimal.” Id. at 74 (statements of Representative Black).

¶ 60 Senator Martinez, a sponsor of the original bill, described the new version of it 

to the Senate. She stated that the bill “provides that a [sic] officer or an employee of 

the statewide teacher organization or officers of a national teacher organization, 

who is a certified teacher, may establish service credit.” 94th Ill. Gen. Assem., 

Senate Proceedings, Nov. 30, 2006, at 50 (statements of Senator Martinez). She 

assured her colleagues that the bill “does not have any unfunded liability,” 

concluding, “[i]t’s a great bill,” and “[i]t’s a great day.” Id. at 51.
- 21 -

¶ 61 Those comments indicate that the legislature was not concerned with fiscal 

discipline or defense of state revenue. The House and Senate sponsors of the bill 

that included the 2007 amendment attested that it would have little or no impact on 

state coffers because teacher organization employees would bear any costs. The bill 

was intended to be a quick, technical fix of an inadvertent omission in an earlier 

statute. A discrete subset of teacher’s organization employees—those who were not 

previously TRS members—would have a 90-day window from the date that Senate 

Bill 36 passed both houses of the General Assembly to the date that Governor 

Blagojevich signed the bill and the law went into effect to become certified as 

teachers and establish teaching service, so they could purchase retroactive credit 

toward a constitutionally protected public sector pension for their private sector 

work.5

¶ 62 The legislature itself later questioned its earlier aim, opining that the 

amendment violated article VIII, section 1(a), of the 1970 Illinois Constitution, 

which provides, “Public funds, property or credit shall be used only for public 

purposes.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. VIII, § 9; see Pub. Act 97-651, § 97 (eff. Jan. 5, 

2012). Assuming, arguendo, that the state interest is legitimate, the question 

becomes whether that 90-day window is rationally related to that interest or is, 

instead, arbitrary and violative of the special legislation clause.

¶ 63 This court addressed a similar question in Peoria School District. There, a 

school district brought suit against a police union, the Illinois Educational Labor 

Relations Board, and the Illinois Labor Relations Board, seeking a declaration that 

a new statute violated the special legislation clause. The statute provided that police 

and security officers directly employed by school districts on its effective date were 

public employees, subject to the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (5 ILCS 315/1 

et seq. (West 2010)). Peoria School District, 2013 IL 114853, ¶ 6. Consequently, 

disputes between such districts and the officers’ unions would be sent to interest 

arbitration. Id. ¶ 9. At the time that the statute became effective, the school district 

challenging it was the only district in the state that directly employed security 

 5

The actual window was even longer for IFT employees, who had Preckwinkle meeting with 

them a week before Senate Bill 36 was taken up again in the House and encouraging them to 

substitute teach.
- 22 -

officers. Id. ¶ 10. The trial court rejected the district’s constitutional challenge, but 

the appellate court reversed the trial court’s decision. Id. ¶¶ 21-22.

¶ 64 This court held that the statute was unconstitutional special legislation. Id. ¶ 60. 

We observed that, under the first step of the special legislation clause analysis, a 

consideration of “those who might occupy a similar position in the future[ ] is not 

foreign to our special legislation jurisprudence.” (Emphasis in original.) Id. ¶ 43. 

This court has remained “steadfast in analyzing special legislation challenges by 

reference to not only classes presently existing, but also those that might be 

similarly situated in the future.” (Emphases in original.) Id. ¶ 46. A statute that 

creates a “temporal dichotomy” between those who benefit from it on its effective 

date and those who cannot benefit from it after that date is not a general law but 

rather a specific one that violates the special legislation clause. Id. ¶ 53 (discussing 

Wright v. Central Du Page Hospital Ass’n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 331 (1976)). From our 

cases, we distilled 

“the principle that a law the legislature considers appropriately applied to a 

generic class presently existing, with attributes that are in no sense unique or 

unlikely of repetition in the future, cannot rationally, and hence 

constitutionally, be limited of application by a date restriction that closes the 

class as of the statute’s effective date. Barring some viable rationale for doing 

so, it would, for example, violate the proscription of the constitution for the 

legislature to apply a law to a person or entity in existence on the effective date 

of enactment, but make it inapplicable to a person or entity who assumed those 

attributes or characteristics the day after the statute’s effective date.” Id. ¶ 54.

¶ 65 We found no basis for restricting the reach of the statutory amendment at issue 

to districts who directly employed police or security officers on its effective date. 

Id. ¶ 59. We added that it was irrational not to extend the benefits of the Act to those 

school districts that may later employ their own officers. Id. We concluded, “there 

is no reason ‘for restricting the advantages’ of the legislation to a district with 

characteristics currently qualifying and ‘not extending the same advantages to 

those districts’ qualifying ‘at a subsequent time.’ ” Id. (quoting People ex rel. East 

Side Levee & Sanitary District v. Madison County Levee & Sanitary District, 54 Ill. 

2d 442, 447 (1973)).
- 23 -

¶ 66 The majority says that the effective date cutoff in Peoria School District “bears 

no relevant similarities” to the cutoff in this case. Supra ¶ 30. According to the 

majority, the cutoff there was “a descriptor,” while the cutoff here is “a deadline.” 

Supra ¶ 30. The majority’s semantics are unconvincing. The statute in Peoria 

School District and the 2007 amendment to section 16-106(10) both created 

classes, membership in which ended on the effective date of their respective public 

acts. Compare Pub. Act 96-1257 (eff. July 23, 2010) (“on the effective date of this 

amendatory Act of the 96th General Assembly”), with Pub. Act 94-1111 (eff. Feb. 

27, 2007) (“on or before the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 94th 

General Assembly”).

¶ 67 Peoria School District clarifies the proper special legislation clause analysis for 

statutes with effective date cutoffs. A statute that creates a classification benefitting 

only a person or group with certain characteristics on its effective date 

discriminates in favor of that person or group and against a person or group who 

may obtain those characteristics later. When that classification is based simply 

upon the fortuity of falling on the early side of a moment in time, it is arbitrary and 

not rationally related to a legitimate government interest.

¶ 68 Like the effective date cutoff in Peoria School District, the cutoff here was 

arbitrary. There is no reason for restricting the advantages of the 2007 amendment 

to section 16-106(10) to teacher organization employees who met the amendment’s 

certification and teaching service requirements before February 27, 2007, and not 

extending those same advantages to employees who met those requirements 

thereafter. That arbitrariness is manifest in how the subject of possible TRS 

eligibility was presented within the IFT. Teacher organization employees who 

attended one of Preckwinkle’s meetings were counseled to begin the process of 

preemptively satisfying the certification and teaching requirements of a 

then-nonexistent proposal for new legislation. They were later advised to complete 

that process in a narrow window of time between the date that the bill was passed 

by both houses and the date that it would presumably be signed by Governor 

Blagojevich and become effective, so they would not be shut out of receiving a 

constitutionally protected public sector pension for private sector work. That is, 

IFT employees were advised to meet the requirements of a law that was not yet a 

law, lest they be excluded from its benefits once it became a law. They even 

received assurances from Preckwinkle that he would “slow down the bill signing 
- 24 -

process,” so everyone “who is in the pipeline for completing a substitute teaching 

assignment” could “get coverage” under a statute that had not gone into effect. 

Slamming a window shut before it ever opened smacks of special legislation.

¶ 69 The trial court correctly held that the 2007 amendment violated the special 

legislation clause. Because I would hold that the 2007 amendment was 

unconstitutional, I would also hold that it conferred no rights for the pension 

protection clause to protect. See People v. Blair, 2013 IL 114122, ¶ 28 (stating that 

an unconstitutional statute is “ ‘ “not a law” ’ ” and “ ‘ “confers no rights” ’ ” 

(quoting Perlstein v. Wolk, 218 Ill. 2d 448, 454 (2006), quoting Norton v. Shelby 

County, 118 U.S. 425, 442 (1886))).

¶ 70 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.

¶ 71 JUSTICES THOMAS and GARMAN join in this dissent.