SIGAR Audit-09-7 Justice Reform

Documenting Detention Procedures 

Will Help Ensure Counter-Narcotics Justice Center Is 

Utilized As Intended

September 30, 2009
SIGAR Audit-09-7 Justice Reform Page i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Background 2 

U.S.-Funded Counter-Narcotics Detention Facility May 

 Not Be Utilized As Intended 3 

Conclusions 4 

Recommendation 4 

Comments 5 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 6 

Appendix II: Comments from the United States Embassy Kabul 7 

 

Abbreviation

SIGAR Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

INL Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
SIGAR Audit-09-7 Justice Reform Page 1 

OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

September 30, 2009

The Honorable Karl W. Eikenberry

U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan

Ambassador Eikenberry: 

Last month SIGAR issued a report discussing delays in the construction of a new detention facility at the 

$11 million U.S.-funded Counter-Narcotics Justice Center in Kabul, Afghanistan. The Center is a secure 

facility that houses Afghanistan’s Criminal Justice Task Force, consisting of Afghan prosecutors and 

investigators, and Central Narcotics Tribunal, which has exclusive nationwide jurisdiction over significant 

narcotics cases.

1

SIGAR is concerned that the current detention facility at the Center may not be utilized as intended. 

Specifically, during a July 2009 site visit to the Center, SIGAR auditors noted that all the detention cells 

were occupied by low-profile detainees, whereas, according to State and Justice Department officials, 

the Center was built with the intention of housing mid- and high-profile drug traffickers. Because it was 

filled with low-profile detainees, the Center did not have any available detention cells to hold mid- and 

high-profile drug traffickers. Further, SIGAR is concerned that the new detention facility, once 

constructed, may also become filled with low-profile prisoners, rather than the high-value targets for

whom the Center was designed. This could have a negative effect on the ability of the Criminal Justice 

Task Force to investigate major narcotics offenders and the Central Narcotics Tribunal to prosecute 

them. In commenting on a draft of this report, Justice and State officials stated that procedures are in 

place to handle high-volume criminals on a case-by-case basis. However, these procedures have not 

been formalized or documented. 

 We recommended expediting the construction of the new detention facility in order to 

accommodate additional drug-related detainees. During the course of the audit, we identified a 

separate but related issue warranting action. 

Consequently, we recommend that the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan work with appropriate U.S. and 

Afghan officials to formalize and document procedures to ensure that current and future detention 

facilities at the Counter-Narcotics Justice Center are utilized on a priority basis with regard to mid- and 

high-value detainees. This could include a review as to whether the threshold for referring drug-related 

cases to the Central Narcotics Tribunal for adjudication should be raised to help ensure that more 

detention cells at the Center are available for mid- and high-value detainees. Our observations are 

 

1 See SIGAR Audit-09-04, Actions Needed to Resolve Construction Delays at the Counter-Narcotics Justice Center, 

August 27, 2009.
SIGAR Audit-09-7 Justice Reform Page 2 

based on the review of documents from and interviews with officials from the State Department’s 

Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs and the Department of Justice in 

Washington, DC, and in Kabul, Afghanistan, and a site visit to the Center in July 2009. Our work was 

conducted during July and August 2009 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. A discussion of our scope and methodology is in Appendix I.

BACKGROUND

A major goal of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) is to eliminate the narcotics 

industry, which remains a formidable threat to the people and state of Afghanistan, the region and 

beyond. One of the benchmarks under the ANDS is that the Afghan Government will increase the 

number of arrests and prosecutions of drug traffickers and corrupt officials.

To assist the Afghan Government in these efforts, the United States recently completed construction of 

the first phase of an $11 million Counter-Narcotics Justice Center to support ongoing narcotics 

interdiction efforts by the Afghan Government. The Center is a dedicated, secure facility constructed by 

the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers that provides a centralized location for the Afghan Government to 

detain and prosecute major narcotics detainees. It houses Afghanistan’s Central Narcotics Tribunal, 

which has exclusive nationwide jurisdiction over significant narcotics cases, and the Criminal Justice Task 

Force consisting of Afghan prosecutors and investigators who receive mentoring by Department of 

Justice advisors. 

The Center, which consists of a detention building, courthouse, offices for judges and prosecutors, and 

related support facilities, became fully operational in May 2009. The detention building contains 28 

cells that can accommodate a total of 56 prisoners with two prisoners per cell. The courthouse includes 

courtrooms for primary and appellate courts and chambers that accommodate 14 judges—7 for the 

primary court, including a chief judge, and 7 for the appellate court, including a chief judge. There are 

also offices for 35 investigators and 30 prosecutors. Located near the Kabul International Airport, the 

Center will receive two years of operations and maintenance support from the State Department.

A second phase of construction for the Center was to include the design and construction of an 

additional 176-bed detention facility. In August 2009, SIGAR issued an audit report that addressed 

delays in the construction of the additional detention facility.2

 That report included recommendations 

for the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs to expedite 

the construction of the additional detention facility and related utility upgrades in order to 

accommodate a high demand for detaining drug-related prisoners. 

 

2 See SIGAR Audit-09-04.
SIGAR Audit-09-7 Justice Reform Page 3 

U.S.-FUNDED COUNTER-NARCOTICS DETENTION FACILITY MAY NOT BE UTILIZED AS INTENDED

During a site visit to the Center in July 2009, SIGAR auditors observed that, although the Center had only 

been fully operational for three months, its existing detention cells were already filled to capacity. All 28 

detention cells were occupied—27 cells held two prisoners and one cell held one prisoner, for a total of 

55 prisoners. Because of the high demand for detaining prisoners with narcotics-related charges, and 

because construction of the new detention building had been delayed, detention center officials were

considering putting four prisoners in each cell. Meanwhile, excess prisoners were being sent to another 

detention center in Kabul. 

According to officials from the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 

Enforcement Affairs (INL) and the Justice Department’s Criminal Division, the Center was built with the 

intention of housing mid- and high-profile drug traffickers. A threshold was established for determining 

which narcotics-related cases should be referred to the Central Narcotics Tribunal for adjudication.3

INL officials stated that the Center’s existing detention center has been almost entirely filled with lowprofile drug criminals who present little threat to Afghan society and, in these officials’ opinion, are not

particularly useful sources of information about extensive drug operations. However, according to 

Justice Department officials, working with low-level drug traffickers is a common method for reaching 

targets of higher-value. These officials also cited the utility of the sentence reduction provision in Article 

41 of the Afghan Counter Narcotics Law, in which many low-level traffickers have provided useful 

information about other higher-value targets.

 

However, when asked about the type of prisoners being detained, the Afghan commander of the 

detention center indicated that the Center only held those charged as low-profile drug carriers. Due to 

the large number of low-profile detainees being held, the Center had no detention cells available to hold 

mid- and high-profile drug traffickers, as of July 2009. In response to a draft of this report, Justice 

Department officials noted that, as of September 25, 2009, the Center is currently housing three highvalue criminals and has housed several other important targets in the past.

4

Further, INL officials indicated that, because of substantial overcrowding at Ministry of Justice and 

Ministry of Interior detention centers in Kabul, the new detention facility at the Counter-Narcotics 

Justice Center would also likely become overcrowded with low-profile detainees who might be better 

suited for housing at other detention centers. This has left few if any cells available for mid- and highprofile drug criminals. According to INL officials, the Center has no written procedures for ensuring the 

availability of detention cells at the Center for mid- and high-profile drug traffickers—for example, to 

transfer lower-level detainees to other facilities should the need arise to house mid- and high-value 

 According to these officials, several Article 41 reductions 

have been granted in the last year because of information provided by arrestees. 

 

3 The Counter Narcotics Law enacted pursuant to Article 7 of the Constitution of Afghanistan gives the Central 

Narcotics Tribunal exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving more than 2 kilograms of heroin, morphine or 

cocaine, more than 10 kilograms of opium and more than 50 kilograms of hashish or precursor chemicals. 

4

Article 41 of the Counter Narcotics Law provides for a reduction in sentence of up to 50 percent for any defendant 

who cooperates with the government.
SIGAR Audit-09-7 Justice Reform Page 4 

detainees. In addition, according to Justice Department officials, the Kabul Detention Center, which 

now houses the overflow of detainees, is inappropriate for high- or even medium-value targets because 

of a lack of security, close contact between co-conspirator detainees, and the potential for inappropriate 

influences over guards and other personnel. 

In response to a draft of this report, Justice Department officials indicated that the level of traffic has 

allowed detainees to be handled on a case-by-case basis and that there has been no trouble housing 

high-value detainees coming through the Center. According to Justice Department and INL officials, no 

high-value detainees have been turned away from the existing detention facilities and some high-value 

detainees have been successfully prosecuted at the Center. According to these officials, in the event 

that a high-value detainee arrives at the Center and there is insufficient room to house that person, a 

joint assessment is made by the Afghan prosecution, investigators, and Central Prison Department—in 

conjunction with their respective mentors—whether adjustments should be made and whether lowervalue detainees occupying needed cells at the Center should be sent to the Kabul detention center. 

CONCLUSIONS

The conduct of swift and effective investigations and prosecutions of criminals depends upon good 

access to the detainees for the investigators and prosecutors. If major narcotics offenders are not 

actually present at the Counter-Narcotics Justice Center, it becomes more difficult for the Criminal 

Justice Task Force to investigate them and the Central Narcotics Tribunal to prosecute them in a 

successful manner. Substantial overcrowding at detention centers in Kabul and the potential solution to 

house overflow mid- and high-value drug criminals at the Kabul Detention Center present risk to the 

effective investigation and prosecution of mid- and high-profile drug criminals in Afghanistan. With the 

construction of additional detention facilities at the Center, the potential infusion of more U.S. troops in 

drug-producing regions of Afghanistan, as well as an expected increase in operations by the U.S. Drug 

Enforcement Agency throughout the country, the level of detained drug offenders is likely to increase 

accordingly. An increase in drug offenders will make the formalization of detainee procedures even 

more important. However, these procedures have not been formalized or documented. 

RECOMMENDATION

To better ensure that the Counter-Narcotics Justice Center is utilized as intended, we recommend that 

the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan work with appropriate U.S. and Afghan officials to formalize and 

document procedures to ensure that the detention facilities at the Counter-Narcotics Justice Center are 

utilized on a priority basis with regard to mid- and high-value detainees. This could include a review as 

to whether the threshold for referring drug-related cases to the Central Narcotics Tribunal for 

adjudication is being effectively used and whether that threshold should be raised to help ensure that 

more detention cells at the Center are available for mid- and high-value detainees.
SIGAR Audit-09-7 Justice Reform Page 5 

COMMENTS

The United States Embassy in Kabul provided written comments on a draft of this report, which is 

included in appendix II. Officials from the Justice Department and State Department’s Bureau of 

International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs at the U.S. Embassy Kabul also provided technical 

comments on a draft of this report, which we incorporated in this report, as appropriate. 

The United States Embassy in Kabul concurred with the recommendation that evaluation procedures for 

detainees at the Counter-Narcotics Justice Center should be formalized. The Embassy’s Coordinating 

Director for Development and Economic Affairs stated that, based on SIGAR’s recommendation, they are 

in the process of formalizing evaluation procedures conducted by Afghan police investigators, 

prosecution, and Central Prison Directorate command, in conjunction with their respective mentors.

______________________________________________________________

If you have any questions about this report, please contact me at (703) 602-3812 or 

john.brummet@sigar.mil. 

John Brummet

Assistant Inspector General for Audits

Office of the Special Inspector General 

 for Afghanistan Reconstruction
SIGAR Audit-09-7 Justice Reform Page 6 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

During the course of the audit work we conducted and reported on in August 2009 regarding the 

construction of an additional detention facility at the Counter-Narcotics Justice Center in Kabul, 

Afghanistan, we identified a separate but related issue warranting action.5

Our observations in this report are based on the review of documents from and interviews with officials 

from the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs and the 

Department of Justice in Washington, DC, and in Kabul, Afghanistan. Our work was conducted during 

July and August 2009 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 

standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to 

provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusion based on our audit 

objectives. The audit that resulted in the observations in this report was conducted by the Office of the 

Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction under the authority of Public Law 110-181, 

and the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended.

This letter is a part of a series 

of SIGAR audits addressing U.S. efforts to deter corruption and strengthen the rule of law.

 

5 See SIGAR Audit-09-04.
SIGAR Audit-09-7 Justice Reform Page 7 

Appendix II: Comments from the United States Embassy Kabul

(This report was conducted under the audit project code SIGAR-007A). 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 

SIGAR’s Mission The mission of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan

Reconstruction is to enhance oversight of programs for the 

reconstruction of Afghanistan by conducting independent and 

objective audits, inspections, and investigations on the use of 

taxpayer dollars and related funds. SIGAR works to provide 

accurate and balanced information, evaluations, analysis, and 

recommendations to help the U.S. Congress, U.S. agencies, and 

other decision-makers to make informed oversight, policy, and 

funding decisions to: 

• improve effectiveness of the overall reconstruction strategy 

and its component programs; 

• improve management and accountability over funds 

administered by U.S. and Afghan agencies and their 

contractors; 

• improve contracting and contract management processes;

• prevent fraud, waste, and abuse; and 

• advance U.S. interests in reconstructing Afghanistan.

 

Obtaining Copies of SIGAR To obtain copies of SIGAR documents at no cost, go to 

Reports and Testimonies SIGAR’s Web site (www.sigar.mil). SIGAR posts all released 

 reports, testimonies, and correspondence on its Web site.

To Report Fraud, Waste, and To help prevent fraud, waste, and abuse by reporting 

Abuse in Afghanistan allegations of fraud, waste, abuse, mismanagement, and

Reconstruction Programs reprisal contact SIGAR’s hotline: 

 

• Web: www.sigar.mil/fraud

• Email: hotline@sigar.mil

• Phone Afghanistan: +93 (0) 700-10-7300 

• Phone DSN Afghanistan 318-237-2575 

• Phone International: +1-866-329-8893 

• Phone DSN International: 312-664-0378 

• U.S. fax: +1-703-604-0983 

Public Affairs Public Affairs Officer

• Phone: 703-602-8742 

• Email: PublicAffairs@sigar.mil 

• Mail: SIGAR Public Affairs

400 Army Navy Drive

Arlington, VA 22202