alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# EUR-Lex - 31999D0481 - EN

Avis juridique important

*|*

# 31999D0481

**1999/481/CFSP: Council Decision of 19 July 1999 amending Common Position 96/184/CFSP concerning arms exports to the former Yugoslavia **

*
Official Journal L 188 , 21/07/1999 P. 0003 - 0003 *

COUNCIL DECISION

of 19 July 1999

amending Common Position 96/184/CFSP concerning arms exports to the former Yugoslavia

(1999/481/CFSP)

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 15 thereof,

Whereas:

(1) On 26 February 1996 the Council adopted Common Position 96/184/CFSP concerning arms exports to the former Yugoslavia(1), which was amended by Council Decision 98/498/CFSP(2);

(2) This Common Position should be updated in the light of changes in the international military presence in Bosnia, in particular the deployment of the Stabilisation Forces (SFOR);

(3) In order to pursue pacification and stabilisation in Bosnia and Herzegovina transfers of small arms to the police forces should not be subject to the embargo,

HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS:

Article 1

Common Position 96/184/CFSP is hereby amended as follows:

1. Point 2(i) shall be replaced by the following: "(i) during the period of the deployment of SFOR, as well as other operations including IPTF, the EU embargo on arms, munitions and military equipment(3) will be maintained towards Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Transfers of equipment needed for demining activities and transfers of small arms to the police forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina are not covered by this embargo. States will inform the Council of those transfers;"

2. Point 3 shall be replaced by the following: "3. This Common Position shall be re-examined before the end of the deployment of SFOR."

Article 2

This Decision shall take effect on the date of its adoption.

Article 3

This Decision shall be published in the Official Journal.

Done at Brussels, 19 July 1999.

For the Council

The President

T. HALONEN

(1) OJ L 58, 7.3.1996, p. 1.

(2) OJ L 225, 12.8.1998, p. 1.

(3) The abovementioned embargo covers weapons designed to kill and their ammunition, weapons platforms, non-weapons platforms and ancillary equipment as listed in the EC embargo list of 8 and 9 July 1991. The embargo also covers spare parts, repairs, transfer of military technology and contracts entered into prior to the onset of the embargo.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 96-6169
CRAIG SANDERS BOONE, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus FRANKLIN FREEMAN, Secretary DOC; HARRY L. ALLSBROOK; Q. REHNER; CAPTAIN HARDY; ACREE, C/O; PATTON, C/O; LIEUTENANT BOBBIT; SERGEANT GREGORY; K. MO ORE, Sergeant; J. PORTER, C/O; ARRINGTON, C/O; HILL, C/O; JONES, C/O; LPN SCHULTZ, C/O; LPN LYNCH, C/O; DOCTOR BROWN; M. ALESHIRE, C/O; COLLIE, C/O; JUSTICE, C/O; PILGREEN, C/O, Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle, District Judge. (CA-94-840-CRT-BO) Submitted: June 20, 1996 Decided: July 1, 1996 Before HALL, WILKINS, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Craig Sanders Boone, Appellant Pro Se. Mark John Pletzke, NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellees. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).23 PER CURIAM: Appellant appeals from the district court's orders denying relief on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) complaint. We have reviewed the record and the district court's opinions and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. Boone v. Freeman , No. CA-94-840-CRT-BO (E.D.N.C. Dec. 14, 1995). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
#### Leavy v. Leavy

*Williamson & Cupp,*for plaintiff.

*Frederick Y. Dietrick,*for defendant.

August 26, 1958.

Greevy, J.,

— This is an action in equity for partition under the Act of May 10, 1927, P. L. 884, as amended by the Act of May 17, 1949, P. L. 1394, 68 PS §501 et seq.

On September 25,1957, Frederick Y. Dietrick, Esq., was appointed by the court as. trustee to make sale of certain real property situate in the twelfth ward of the City of Williamsport, Lycoming County, owned at the time of the divorce by plaintiff and defendant.

*699The parties were married on August 25,1945. They acquired title to the property as tenants by the entire-ties on September 12, 1947. They were divorced on August 12, 1957, and being unable to agree upon a private sale of the property, this action was instituted.

On December 2, 1957, the trustee filed his first and final account with statement of proposed distribution. On December 10, 1957, plaintiff filed exceptions thereto, contending that one Budd Leavy, an equitable lienholder, should receive the balance for distribution rather than the parties.

The complaint sets forth in paragraph 8, that “there is an equitable lien against said real estate in favor of Budd Leavy, father of the Plaintiff above-named, who at the time of the purchase of said real estate loaned the Plaintiff and Defendant the sum of $1800, as part of the purchase price of said real estate and as such is entitled to be paid out of the proceeds of the sale of said real estate.” The attorney for Budd Leavy contends that these facts are admitted as no answer was filed by defendant.

From .our examination of the act, we are of the opinion that the exceptions are without merit.

Section 1 of the Act of May 17, 1949, P. L. 1394, 68 PS §503, provides, inter alia:

> “The proceeds of any sale had under the provisions of this act, after the payment of the expenses thereof, shall be equally divided between the parties, subject, however, to the deduction therefrom .of the amount of any lien entered of record jointly against both of the respective parties, together with any interest due thereon and docket costs . . .”

The Act of 1927, as amended, supra, is to be strictly construed: Lazare v. Lazare, 365 Pa. 591. Only liens of record can be impressed as proper charges against the proceeds of sale of property under this act. Equi*700table liens, as well as other bona fide debts, which are not of record cannot be deducted from the proceeds. The claim of Budd Leavy for an equitable lien has no place in these proceedings which are entirely statutory. Budd Leavy must resort to his remedy at law. See Wilson v. Wilson, 4 D. *&*C. 2d 152.

We make the following

*Order*

And now, August 26, 1958, the exceptions to the trustee’s first and final account are dismissed; report of the trustee is confirmed absolutely and the trustee is directed to make distribution in accordance with the schedule contained therein.
Certification
              Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
       2002 (Subsections (a) and (b) of Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title
                             18, United States Code)

Pursuant to (b) of section 1350, I hereby certify, to the best of my knowledge,
that:

     The Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2002 (the
     "Form 10-K ") of the Company fully complies with the requirements of
     section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
     information contained in the Form 10-K fairly presents, in all material
     respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.




By: /s/ Gail L. Hanson
----------------------
Gail L. Hanson
Chief Financial Officer
March 21, 2003
# Z57-/5
COA# 08-11-00317-CR 

### OFFENSE: 19.02

___„ ,_ Johnny Green, Jr. v. The State4 

## STYLE: ofTexas COUNTY: Tarrant COA DISPOSITION: Affirm/Reform 

### TRIAL COURT: 372ndDistrict Court DATE: 11/22/13 Publish: NO TC CASE #: 1199474D



### IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS ELECTRONIC RECORD Johnny Green, Jr. v. The State STYLE: ofTexas 

### ?RnsF Petition FOR DISCRETIONARYREVIEW IN CCA IS: 

# DATE: ^//7/^<- JUDGE: ^ CCA #: CCA Disposition: DATE: JUDGE: SIGNED:, PUBLISH:

REHEARING IN CCA IS: JUDGE: PC:. DNP:

MOTION FOR
#### In the Matter of Pelham Masonic Historical Society of City Island, Appellant, v Tax Commission of the City of New York, Respondent.

[697 NYS2d 276]

—Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (George Friedman, J.), entered June 25, 1998, which denied and dismissed petitioner’s CPLR article 78 proceeding to annul and vacate respondent’s determination *8denying petitioner an exemption from real property taxes pursuant to Real Property Tax Law § 420-b, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Petitioner, as the party seeking exemption from real property taxes, bore the burden of establishing its entitlement thereto *(see, Matter of Mobil Oil Corp. v Finance Adm’r of City of N. Y., 58*NY2d 95, 99-100). To satisfy that burden, it was required to demonstrate, *inter alia,*that its property was used exclusively for one or more of the exempt purposes set forth in the statute *(see, Matter of Syracuse Council of Am. Youth Hostels v Srogi,*116 Misc 2d 394, 395, *affd*90 AD2d 674, *lv denied*58 NY2d 606). Given petitioner’s failure to demonstrate it had actually used the subject property “exclusively” for an exempt historical purpose, or that it “owned” the property (Real Property Tax Law § 420-b [1] [a]), or that it was organized in good faith for historical purposes (Real Property Tax Law § 420-b [1] [c]), there was a rational basis for denial of an exemption *(Matter of Mobil Oil Corp. v Finance Adm’r of City of N. Y., supra; Matter of Pell v Board of Educ.,*34 NY2d 222, 230-231). Concur — Ellerin, P. J., Williams, Wallach, Buckley and Friedman, JJ.
###### Editorial Note on Part 1926

#### Editorial Notes:

1. At 44 FR 8577, Feb. 9, 1979, and corrected at 44 FR 20940, Apr. 6, 1979, OSHA reprinted without change the entire text of 29 CFR part 1926 together with certain General Industry Occupational Safety and Health Standards contained in 29 CFR part 1910, which have been identified as also applicable to construction work. This republication developed a single set of OSHA regulations for both labor and management forces within the construction industry.

2. Nomenclature changes to part 1926 appear at 84 FR 21597, May 14, 2019.

#### § 1926.1100 [Reserved]
§ 1921.9 Prehearing conferences. ( a ) Upon his own motion or the motion of the parties, the hearing examiner may direct the parties or their counsel to meet with him for a conference to consider: ( 1 ) Simplification of the issues;
( 2 ) Necessity or desirability of amendments to pleadings for purposes of clarification, simplification, or limitation;
( 3 ) Stipulations, admissions of fact and of contents and authenticity of documents;
( 4 ) Limitation of the number of expert witnesses; and
( 5 ) Such other matters as may tend to expedite the disposition of the proceeding.
( b ) The record shall show the matters disposed of by order and by agreement in such pretrial conferences. The subsequent course of the proceeding shall be controlled by such action.
The State of TexasAppellee



# Fourth Court of Appeals

**San Antonio, Texas**

May 21, 2014

N o. 04

- 14

- 00307

- CR

Thomas Edward KUNKEL

, Appellant

v.

The STATE o f Texas, Appellee

From the 187th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2014CR1566 Honorable Raymond Angelini, Judge Presiding



### ORDER

Defendant pled guilty to stalking and was sentenced within the terms of a plea bargain. Defendant timely filed a general notice of appeal. The trial court’s Certification of Defendant’s Right of Appeal states this “is a plea

- bargain case, and the defendant has NO right of appeal

. ”

See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 25.2(a)(2). The clerk’s record contains a written plea bargain, and the punishment assessed did not exceed the punishment recommended by the prosecutor and agreed to by defendant; therefore, the trial court’s certification accurately reflec ts that defendant’s case is a plea bargain case. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 25.2(a)(2).

“In a plea bargain case .

. . a defendant may appeal only: (A) those matters that were raised by written motion filed and ruled on before trial, or (B) after getting the tr ial court's permission to appeal.” T EX

. R. A PP

. P . 25.2(a)(2). The clerk’s record does not contain a written motion ruled on before trial nor does it indicate the trial court granted defendant permission to appeal. This court must dismiss an appeal “if a certification that shows the defendant has the right of appeal has not been made a part of the record.” T EX

. R. A PP

. P . 25.2(d).

It is therefore ORDERED this appeal will be dismissed pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 25.2(d), unless an ame nded trial court certification that shows defendant has the right of appeal has been made part of the appellate record by June 20, 2014

. See Daniels v.

State , 110 S.W.3d 174 (Tex. App.

— San Antonio 2003, order); T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 25.2(d); 37.1.All other appellate deadlines are SUSPENDED pending our resolution of the certification

issue.

_________________________________ Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said

court on this 21st day of May, 2014

.

___________________________________ Keith E. Hottle

Clerk of Court
§ 93.351 General requirements for operating in the East River and/or Hudson River Exclusions. Pilots must adhere to the following requirements: ( a ) Maintain an indicated airspeed not to exceed 140 knots.
( b ) Anti-collision lights and aircraft position/navigation lights shall be on, if equipped. Use of landing lights is recommended.
( c ) Self announce position on the appropriate radio frequency for the East River or Hudson River as depicted on the New York VFR Terminal Area Chart (TAC) and/or New York Helicopter Route Chart.
( d ) Have a current New York TAC chart and/or New York Helicopter Route Chart in the aircraft and be familiar with the information contained therein.
UN PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 21
- 6062

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,

v. CHARLES ALGERNON BOOMER, III , Defendant

- Appellant

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia , at Norfolk

. Raymond A. Jackson , District Judge. ( 2:19

- cr - 00191

- RAJ

- RJK

- 1 )

Submitted : March 16, 2021 Decided: March 19, 2021

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge , NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge , and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge

.
Affirmed by un published per curiam opinion

. Charles Algernon Boomer, III, Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Charles Algernon Boomer, III, appeals the district court’s order denying his motion for compassionate release , pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), as amended by the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115

- 391, § 603(b)(1), 132 Stat. 5194, 5239. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order. See United States v. Boomer , No. 2:19

- cr - 00191

- RAJ

- RJK

- 1 (E.D. Va. Dec. 16, 2020). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequa tely presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CHERI SMITH, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 

OF SAN JUAN COUNTY; et al.,

Defendants-Appellees, 

and 

DOUG ALLEN ECHOLS; et al.,

Defendants.

No. 20-15763 

D.C. No. 2:19-cv-04641-DLR-ESW 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Douglas L. Rayes, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted July 19, 2021**

Before: SCHROEDER, SILVERMAN, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.

Cheri Smith appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing her 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

JUL 21 2021

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
 2 20-15763 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal and state law claims. We have 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion the 

district court’s dismissal under its local rules. Hinton v. Pac. Enters., 5 F.3d 391, 

395 (9th Cir. 1993). We affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Smith’s action

after Smith failed to file an opposition to defendants’ motions to dismiss as 

required by Local Rule 7.2(i). See D. Ariz. R. 7.2(i) (providing that failure to file 

the required answering memoranda to a motion “may be deemed a consent to the . . 

. granting of the motion”); Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53-54 (9th Cir. 1995) 

(setting forth factors to be considered before dismissing an action for failure to 

follow the local rules, concluding that this court may review the record 

independently if the district court does not make explicit findings regarding the 

factors, and noting that pro se litigants are bound by the rules of procedure). 

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Smith’s motion to 

file a second amended complaint because Smith failed to describe how the 

amendments would cure the deficiencies in the prior complaint, and the proposed 

amendments did not cure the deficiencies. See D. Ariz. R. 15.1 (providing that the 

proposed amended pleading “must indicate in what respect it differs from the 

pleading which it amends”); Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 

1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that 
 3 20-15763 

dismissal without leave to amend is proper when amendment would be futile).

We reject as meritless Smith’s contention that the district court erred by not 

taking judicial notice of her proposed exhibits.

All pending motions (Docket Entry Nos. 36, 46, 54, and 55) are denied. 

Defendants’ request that this court designate Smith a vexatious litigant, set 

forth in the answering brief, is denied.

AFFIRMED.
FILED

February 20, 1998

Cecil W. Crowson

Appellate Court Clerk

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

CURTIS L. LANDRY, JR. d/b/a )

LANDRY AND ASSOCIATES, )

)

Plaintiff/Appellee, ) Rutherford Circuit

) No. 36960

VS. )

) Appeal No.

JOHN DANIEL RUDD, ) 01A01-9707-CV-00303

)

Defendant/Appellant. )

CONCURRING OPINION

I concur with the results of the court’s opinion. Persons opposing the

domestication of a foreign judgment cannot, for the first time, assert affirmative

defenses that should have been raised in the foreign proceeding. Since Dr. Rudd did

not assert his accord and satisfaction defense in the Louisiana proceeding, he has

waived his right to assert this defense now. Accordingly, the trial court was not

required to grant Dr. Rudd an evidentiary hearing on a defense that had been waived

as a matter of law.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 26-6-104(c) (1980) states that authenticated foreign

judgments are “subject to the same procedures, defenses and proceedings for

reopening, vacating, or staying as a judgment of the court of record of this state.”

Accordingly, Dr. Rudd could have filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60 motion seeking postjudgment relief from the Louisiana judgment. Dr. Rudd’s accord and satisfaction

defense cannot reasonably be construed as a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60 motion, and this

court cannot engraft claims for relief that the party himself has not pleaded. 

_______________________________

WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE
MINISTERIO DE FOMENTO



### FAX FROM: Deputy Director General forAir Transport Mr. Raúl Medina Caballero TO: Director, Office of International Aviation 

### US DepartmentofTransportation Office of the Secretary ofTransportation Mr. Paul Gretch DIRECCIÓN GENERAL DE AVIACIÓN CIVIL

SUBJECT: TAGAVIATIONESPAÑANON-SCHEDULED AIR SERVICESTO/FROM THEUNITED STATES 

### S/REF/ N/REF/ &{ llo\U 

### FECHA/\H February2014 NUMBER OF PAGES INCLUDING THIS ONE: 1
Dear Mr. Gretch, With reference to the intentions of TAG Aviation España to conduct non-scheduled air services to/from the United States based on fifth freedom traffic rights, the Spanish Civil Aviation 

### Authohty hereby confirms that similar requests submitted by the United States air carriers will be treated on the basis of reciprocity.

|e-mail:| lrmcaballero@fomento.es| Deputy Director General for AirTransport

P° DE LA CASTELLANA, 67 28071 MADRID TEL: 91 597 87 99 FAX: 91 597 86 43
§ 93.345 VFR outbound procedures for fringe airports. ( a ) A pilot may depart from a fringe airport as defined in § 93.335 without filing a flight plan or communicating with Air Traffic Control, unless requested, provided: ( 1 ) The aircraft's transponder transmits code 1205;
( 2 ) The pilot exits the DC SFRA by the most direct route before proceeding on course; and
( 3 ) The pilot monitors VHF frequency 121.5 or UHF frequency 243.0.
( b ) No pilot may operate an aircraft arriving at a fringe airport or transit the DC SFRA unless that pilot complies with the DC SFRA operating procedures in this subpart.
State of TexasAppellee/s 

# Fourth Court of Appeals **San Antonio, Texas** August 11, 2014 N o s . 04
- 14
- 00004
- C R , 04
- 14
- 00005
- CR, 04
- 14
- 00006
- CR, & 04
- 14
- 00007
- CR Devon Alexander KANE , Appellant v. STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee From the 216th Judicial District Court, Kerr County, Texas Trial Court No s . A1319 , A1320, A1321, & A1322

Honorable N. Keith Williams, Judge Presiding 

### ORDER The State ’ s Motion for Extension of Time to File Brief is hereby GRANTED. The State ’ s brief is due August 27 , 2014.

_________________________________ Marialyn Barnard, Justice IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said court on this 11th day of August, 2014 .

___________________________________ Keith E. Hottle Clerk of Court
Exhibit 32


                        CERTIFICATIONS UNDER SECTION 906


    Pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a)
and (b) of section 1350, chapter 63 of title 18, United States Code), each of
the undersigned officers of The First Years Inc., a Massachusetts corporation
(the "Company"), does hereby certify, to such officer's knowledge, that:

    The Annual Report for the year ended December 31, 2003 (the "Form 10-K") of
the Company fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the information contained in the Form
10-K fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and
results of operations of the Company.

    Dated: March 15, 2004

                           /s/ RONALD J. SIDMAN
                           --------------------
                           Ronald J. Sidman, Chief Executive Officer,
                           Chairman of the Board of Directors, and President


    Dated: March 15, 2004
                           /s/ JOHN R. BEALS
                           -----------------
                           John R. Beals, Treasurer and Senior Vice President -
                           Finance (Chief Financial Officer and Chief Accounting
                           Officer)