U.S. Department of Justice

National Institute of Corrections
U.S. Department of Justice

National Institute of Corrections

320 First Street, NW

Washington, DC 20534

Morris L. Thigpen

Director

Thomas J. Beauclair

Deputy Director

Virginia A. Hutchinson

Chief, Jails Division

Vicci Persons and Cheryl McKinney Paul

Project Managers

National Institute of Corrections

www.nicic.gov
Dennis A. Kimme

Project Director

Gary M. Bowker

Associate Project Director

Robert G. Deichman

Project Staff

March 2011

NIC Accession 

Number 024806
This project was supported by grant number 94J04GHZ8 from the National Institute of Corrections, U.S. 

Department of Justice. Points of view or opinions stated in this document are those of the authors and do not 

necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Copyright © 2011, Kimme & Associates, Inc., 510 South Staley Road, Suite C, Champaign, IL 61822, 

217–351–7036.

The National Institute of Corrections reserves the right to reproduce, publish, translate, or otherwise use, and to 

authorize others to reproduce, publish, and otherwise use, all or any part of the copyrighted material contained in

this publication.
v

Table of Contents

Foreword .........................................................................................................................................xix

Preface ............................................................................................................................................xxi

Acknowledgments .......................................................................................................................... xxv

SECTION 1. GETTING STARTED

Chapter 1. Introduction .....................................................................................................................3

Problems Overcome ............................................................................................................................4

Planning: A Key Component ................................................................................................................4

About This Guide ...............................................................................................................................4

Intended Audience .........................................................................................................................4

Organization ..................................................................................................................................5

Smaller Jails ...................................................................................................................................5

Note on Construction ..........................................................................................................................5

Chapter 2. Predesign Planning ..........................................................................................................7

Why Plan? ..........................................................................................................................................7

Can a Prototype Replace the Need to Plan? ...........................................................................................9

The Possibility of Reuse .................................................................................................................9

Buyer Beware .............................................................................................................................. 10

Planning Steps .................................................................................................................................. 10

Phase 1: Project Recognition .............................................................................................................. 11

Phase 2: Needs Assessment ............................................................................................................... 11

Phase 3: Facility Program Development ..............................................................................................12

Phase 4: Project Definition and Implementation Plan ..........................................................................12

Developing a Mission Statement ...................................................................................................12

Learning More About Jails ............................................................................................................13

Establishing Bed Capacity ............................................................................................................13

Major Building Considerations ......................................................................................................14

Option Development ....................................................................................................................15

When Planning Works Well ...............................................................................................................15

Planning to Plan ..........................................................................................................................15

Who Does the Work? ...................................................................................................................16

How Long Does It Take? ...............................................................................................................16

SECTION 2. MAJOR DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS

Chapter 3. Site Selection and Design ................................................................................................19

Site Size ...........................................................................................................................................19

Building Area ..............................................................................................................................19

Building Expansion ......................................................................................................................20

Parking .......................................................................................................................................20
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Table of Contents

Staff ............................................................................................................................................20

Outdoor Spaces ...........................................................................................................................22

Access to the Site and the Facility .................................................................................................22

Support Elements ........................................................................................................................22

Total Site Area .............................................................................................................................23

Site Location ....................................................................................................................................23

Linkages ......................................................................................................................................23

Surroundings ...............................................................................................................................23

Views and Inmate Contact ............................................................................................................24

Existing Jail Sites .........................................................................................................................25

Technical Requirements ................................................................................................................26

Site Costs .........................................................................................................................................27

Site Selection Process ........................................................................................................................28

Chapter 4. Image/Appearance .........................................................................................................29

Exterior ............................................................................................................................................29

Interior .............................................................................................................................................29

Maintenance of Physical Security ..................................................................................................30

Operations: Key to Normalization .................................................................................................30

Describing Desired Appearance ......................................................................................................... 31

Chapter 5. Classification/Separation ................................................................................................33

Separation Problems .........................................................................................................................33

Inmate Types ...............................................................................................................................33

Program Space Considerations ......................................................................................................34

Cost of Housing for Different Inmate Types Versus Frequency of Need ............................................34

Changes in Inmate Population ......................................................................................................34

Surveillance/Supervision Method .................................................................................................34

Cell Occupancy ............................................................................................................................35

Classification Systems .......................................................................................................................36

When and Where Classification Occurs .........................................................................................36

Juveniles .....................................................................................................................................37

Resolving the Numbers Problem in Smaller Jails: Multijurisdictional Options ..................................37

Designing for Proper Separation .........................................................................................................38

Inmate Types ...............................................................................................................................38

Degree of Inmate Separation Required ...........................................................................................38

Options for Housing Area Flexibility .............................................................................................40

Strengths and Weaknesses of Different Surveillance Methods ......................................................... 41

Use of Temporary Holding Cells ....................................................................................................43

Use of Single-Occupancy Cells ......................................................................................................43

Separate Housing of Work Release and Periodic-Sentence Inmates ..................................................43

Privacy Concerns .........................................................................................................................44
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Table of Contents

Chapter 6. Surveillance/Supervision ................................................................................................45

Methods of Surveillance/Supervision .................................................................................................45

Constant Staff Presence Required ..................................................................................................45

Periodic Staff Presence Required ...................................................................................................46

Design Considerations .......................................................................................................................46

Selecting Inmate Management and Supervision Modes ...................................................................46

Staffing Versus Facility Durability ..................................................................................................47

Remote Surveillance Design ..........................................................................................................47

Intermittent Surveillance Design ...................................................................................................50

Direct Supervision Design ............................................................................................................53

Electronic Surveillance Design ......................................................................................................55

Nonhousing Surveillance ..............................................................................................................56

Chapter 7. Staffing Impact ...............................................................................................................57

Legal Issues ......................................................................................................................................58

24-Hour Coverage .............................................................................................................................58

Possible Staff Types ...........................................................................................................................59

Design Factors ..................................................................................................................................59

Facility Location ..........................................................................................................................60

Single-Level Versus Multilevel Design ............................................................................................60

Vertically Connected Posts ............................................................................................................60

Inmate Separation ........................................................................................................................ 61

Surveillance/Supervision Methods ................................................................................................ 61

Circulation and Movement ...........................................................................................................62

Shared Activities ..........................................................................................................................63

Security Perimeter ........................................................................................................................63

Emergency Response ....................................................................................................................63

Staff Backup ................................................................................................................................64

Designing Staff Workstations ........................................................................................................64

Cell Occupancy ............................................................................................................................65

Electronic Monitoring Versus Staff Monitoring ...............................................................................66

Work Environment .......................................................................................................................66

Conclusion .......................................................................................................................................66

Chapter 8. Security Perimeter ..........................................................................................................69

Ingredients of Security ......................................................................................................................69

Design Focus ...............................................................................................................................70

Perimeters and Zones ...................................................................................................................70

Building Areas Outside the Security Envelope ................................................................................ 71

Design Considerations .......................................................................................................................72

General Considerations ................................................................................................................72

Main Security Envelope ................................................................................................................74
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Table of Contents

Perimeter Fences/Walls ................................................................................................................79

Internal Security Zones ................................................................................................................80

Conclusion ....................................................................................................................................... 81

Chapter 9. Criminal Justice Interface ...............................................................................................83

A General Caution ............................................................................................................................83

Law Enforcement Interface ................................................................................................................83

Public/Staff Separation .................................................................................................................84

Law Enforcement Dispatch and Jail Control in Small Jails ..............................................................84

Records .......................................................................................................................................85

Arrest Processing .........................................................................................................................86

Investigations and Lineups ...........................................................................................................86

Jail Administration and Staff .........................................................................................................87

Food Service ................................................................................................................................87

Deliveries ....................................................................................................................................87

Courts Interface ................................................................................................................................87

Corridor Movements ....................................................................................................................88

Movement to Offsite Court ...........................................................................................................88

Appearances at the Jail ................................................................................................................88

Attorneys .........................................................................................................................................89

Public Defenders ...............................................................................................................................90

Probation/Parole ...............................................................................................................................90

Conclusion ....................................................................................................................................... 91

Chapter 10. Functional Components and Relationships ....................................................................93

Jail Components ...............................................................................................................................93

Degrees of Development ....................................................................................................................94

Food Service ................................................................................................................................94

Laundry Service ...........................................................................................................................95

Component Relationships ..................................................................................................................96

Relationship Matrix ......................................................................................................................96

Relationship Diagram ...................................................................................................................96

Critical Relationships ...................................................................................................................96

Space-Sharing Possibilities .................................................................................................................99

Special Housing ...........................................................................................................................99

Indoor Programs and Services .................................................................................................... 100

General Housing in the Smaller Jail ............................................................................................ 100

Contact Visiting/Counseling ....................................................................................................... 100

Indoor/Outdoor Recreation ..........................................................................................................101

Space-Sharing Problem ...............................................................................................................101

Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................101
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Table of Contents

Chapter 11. Planning and Designing to Standards .......................................................................... 103

State Standards ............................................................................................................................... 103

American Correctional Association and the Commission 

on Accreditation for Corrections .................................................................................................. 103

National Fire Protection Association Life Safety Code® ....................................................................... 105

Americans with Disabilities Act ....................................................................................................... 105

Location or Dispersion of Accessible Cells ................................................................................... 106

Basic Features of the Accessible Cell ........................................................................................... 107

Furniture, Hardware, and Equipment .......................................................................................... 107

Common-Use Areas ................................................................................................................... 107

Public and Staff Areas ................................................................................................................ 107

Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... 108

Chapter 12. Expansion ................................................................................................................... 109

Why Plan for Expansion? ................................................................................................................ 109

Expansion Options .......................................................................................................................... 109

Satellite Jail ............................................................................................................................... 109

Double Bunking ..........................................................................................................................110

Planned Additions to the Jail .......................................................................................................110

When To Develop an Expansion Plan ................................................................................................110

Setting Expansion Capacity ..............................................................................................................110

Vertical Versus Horizontal Expansion ................................................................................................110

Potential Adverse Effects of Initial Design on Future Expansion .....................................................111

Higher Initial Construction Cost ...................................................................................................111

Disruption to Facility Operations ..................................................................................................111

Expansion Concept for Each Component ...........................................................................................111

Master Control ............................................................................................................................111

Intake-Release ........................................................................................................................... 112

Property Storage ........................................................................................................................ 112

Health Care ............................................................................................................................... 112

Visiting Areas ............................................................................................................................ 112

Exercise Areas ........................................................................................................................... 112

Programs and Services ............................................................................................................... 112

Inmate Commissary ................................................................................................................... 113

Food Service .............................................................................................................................. 113

Laundry .................................................................................................................................... 113

Lobby ....................................................................................................................................... 113

Administration Area ................................................................................................................... 113

Staff Areas ................................................................................................................................. 113

Storage Areas ............................................................................................................................ 113

Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... 113
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Table of Contents

SECTION 3. FUNCTIONAL COMPONENTS

Chapter 13. Master Control ............................................................................................................ 117

Key Decisions ................................................................................................................................. 117

Detail Issues ................................................................................................................................... 117

Users ........................................................................................................................................ 118

Activities ................................................................................................................................... 118

Security ..................................................................................................................................... 119

View ......................................................................................................................................... 121

Design Efficiency ....................................................................................................................... 122

Environment ............................................................................................................................. 123

Communication ......................................................................................................................... 124

Equipment ................................................................................................................................ 124

Fire Safety ................................................................................................................................. 125

Expansion ................................................................................................................................. 125

Space List ....................................................................................................................................... 125

Relationships and Components ........................................................................................................ 126

Chapter 14. Intake-Release ............................................................................................................ 127

Key Decisions ................................................................................................................................. 128

Detail Issues ................................................................................................................................... 129

General Design .......................................................................................................................... 129

Receiving (“Booking”) Area Design ............................................................................................. 133

Arrestee Processing .................................................................................................................... 137

Admissions Area Design ............................................................................................................. 143

Release Area Design ................................................................................................................... 145

Space List ....................................................................................................................................... 146

Relationships and Components ........................................................................................................ 147

Chapter 15. General Housing ......................................................................................................... 149

Key Decisions ................................................................................................................................. 150

Detail Issues ................................................................................................................................... 151

Basic Design Issues .................................................................................................................... 151

Sleeping Area Design Issues ....................................................................................................... 162

Dayroom Design Issues .............................................................................................................. 167

Miscellaneous Furniture and Equipment ..................................................................................... 168

Inmates With Disabilities ........................................................................................................... 168

Staff Control Post Design ............................................................................................................ 170

Miscellaneous Design Issues ....................................................................................................... 175

Space List ....................................................................................................................................... 178

Relationships and Components ........................................................................................................ 179
xi

Table of Contents

Chapter 16. Special Housing .......................................................................................................... 181

Key Decisions ................................................................................................................................. 182

Detail Issues .................................................................................................................................... 182

Work Release/Periodic-Sentence Inmates .................................................................................... 183

Inmate Workers ......................................................................................................................... 187

Protective Custody Inmates/Juveniles ......................................................................................... 187

Medical Isolation and Medical Housing ....................................................................................... 189

Disciplinary Detention/Administrative Segregation ...................................................................... 192

Mental Illness/Suicide Threat/Intoxication .................................................................................. 194

Space List ....................................................................................................................................... 197

Relationships and Components ........................................................................................................ 198

Chapter 17. Health Care ................................................................................................................. 199

Key Decisions ................................................................................................................................. 200

Detail Issues ................................................................................................................................... 200

Examination Area ...................................................................................................................... 200

Medication Storage .................................................................................................................... 205

Miscellaneous Issues .................................................................................................................. 208

Space List ........................................................................................................................................210

Relationships and Components .........................................................................................................211

Chapter 18. Visiting Areas ............................................................................................................. 213

Key Decisions ................................................................................................................................. 214

Detail Issues ................................................................................................................................... 215

Activities ................................................................................................................................... 215

Size of Spaces ............................................................................................................................ 215

Number of Visiting Stations ........................................................................................................ 218

Location/Movement ................................................................................................................... 218

Security ..................................................................................................................................... 220

Quality ...................................................................................................................................... 221

Space List ....................................................................................................................................... 222

Relationships and Components ........................................................................................................ 223

Chapter 19. Exercise Areas ............................................................................................................ 225

Key Decisions ................................................................................................................................. 225

Detail Issues ................................................................................................................................... 226

General Issues ........................................................................................................................... 226

Combination Indoor and Outdoor Exercise .................................................................................. 230

Indoor Exercise .......................................................................................................................... 231

Outdoor Exercise ....................................................................................................................... 232

Space List ....................................................................................................................................... 234

Relationships and Components ........................................................................................................ 234
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Table of Contents

Chapter 20. Programs and Services ................................................................................................ 237

Key Decisions ................................................................................................................................. 237

Detail Issues ................................................................................................................................... 237

General Issues ........................................................................................................................... 238

Counseling ................................................................................................................................ 242

Religious Services ...................................................................................................................... 244

Library Services ......................................................................................................................... 245

Education .................................................................................................................................. 247

Recreation ................................................................................................................................. 248

Jail Industries ............................................................................................................................ 249

Space List ....................................................................................................................................... 249

Relationships and Components ........................................................................................................ 250

Chapter 21. Inmate Commissary .................................................................................................... 251

Key Decisions ................................................................................................................................. 251

Detail Issues ................................................................................................................................... 252

Size .......................................................................................................................................... 252

Location .................................................................................................................................... 253

Equipment ................................................................................................................................ 253

Security ..................................................................................................................................... 254

Communication ......................................................................................................................... 254

Space List ....................................................................................................................................... 254

Relationships and Components ........................................................................................................ 254

Chapter 22. Food Service ............................................................................................................... 255

Key Decisions ................................................................................................................................. 256

Detail Issues ................................................................................................................................... 256

Food Service Provider ................................................................................................................ 256

In-House Food Service ............................................................................................................... 257

Location of Inmate Dining .......................................................................................................... 258

Food Preparation and Storage ..................................................................................................... 260

Cleanup and Waste Handling ...................................................................................................... 261

Food Delivery ............................................................................................................................ 261

Staff Accommodations ............................................................................................................... 262

Security ..................................................................................................................................... 262

Inmate Workers ......................................................................................................................... 263

Staff Dining Area ....................................................................................................................... 263

Space List ....................................................................................................................................... 264

Relationships and Components ........................................................................................................ 264
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Table of Contents

Chapter 23. Laundry Area ............................................................................................................. 265

Key Decisions ................................................................................................................................. 265

Detail Issues ................................................................................................................................... 265

Laundry Provider ....................................................................................................................... 266

Security Location ....................................................................................................................... 266

Size .......................................................................................................................................... 266

Work/Storage ............................................................................................................................ 269

Characteristics ........................................................................................................................... 269

Space List ....................................................................................................................................... 270

Relationships and Components ........................................................................................................ 270

Chapter 24. Administration and Public Areas ................................................................................ 271

Key Decisions ................................................................................................................................. 272

Detail Issues ................................................................................................................................... 272

Location/Arrangement ............................................................................................................... 272

Lobby/Reception ....................................................................................................................... 274

Administrative Support Work Areas ............................................................................................ 277

Administrator’s Office ................................................................................................................ 279

Conference Areas ....................................................................................................................... 280

Security Equipment .................................................................................................................... 281

Space List ....................................................................................................................................... 282

Relationships and Components ........................................................................................................ 283

Chapter 25. Staff Areas .................................................................................................................. 285

Key Decisions ................................................................................................................................. 285

Detail Issues ................................................................................................................................... 286

General Issues ........................................................................................................................... 286

Locker/Shower Areas ................................................................................................................. 286

Physical Conditioning Area ......................................................................................................... 289

Break Room/Dining Area ........................................................................................................... 290

Training/Multipurpose Area ....................................................................................................... 291

Toilets ....................................................................................................................................... 293

Space List ....................................................................................................................................... 294

Relationships and Components ........................................................................................................ 294

Chapter 26. Storage Areas .............................................................................................................. 295

Key Decisions ................................................................................................................................. 295

Detail Issues .................................................................................................................................... 295

Miscellaneous Storage Needs ...................................................................................................... 295

Overall Facility Storage Concerns ................................................................................................ 297
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Table of Contents

Space List ....................................................................................................................................... 301

Relationships and Components ........................................................................................................ 302

SECTION 4. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS

Chapter 27. Single Versus Multiple Occupancy .............................................................................. 305

Definitions ..................................................................................................................................... 305

Multiple Occupancy ................................................................................................................... 305

Single Occupancy ...................................................................................................................... 306

Standards and Legal Issues .............................................................................................................. 306

The Issue ....................................................................................................................................... 307

Costs ......................................................................................................................................... 307

Operational Concerns ................................................................................................................. 308

Single-Occupancy Concerns ............................................................................................................. 308

Costs of Multiple Occupancy ........................................................................................................... 309

Double-Occupancy Single Cells ........................................................................................................ 309

Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................310

Chapter 28. Renovating Nonsecure Buildings Into Jails ..................................................................311

A Common Renovation Example .......................................................................................................311

Security Construction ...................................................................................................................... 312

Perimeter Issues ........................................................................................................................ 312

Interior Issues ............................................................................................................................ 313

Costs .............................................................................................................................................. 313

Construction Costs...................................................................................................................... 313

Operational Costs ...................................................................................................................... 315

Acquisition Costs ....................................................................................................................... 315

Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... 315

Chapter 29. Construction and Project Costs .................................................................................... 317

Construction Costs .......................................................................................................................... 317

Project Cost .................................................................................................................................... 317

Project Cost Factors .................................................................................................................... 318

Example .................................................................................................................................... 319

Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... 319

Chapter 30. Making a Building Work ............................................................................................ 321

Construction Monitoring ................................................................................................................. 322

Policy and Procedure Development .................................................................................................. 322

Final Staffing Plan and Staff Post Orders ........................................................................................... 323

Staff Recruitment and Selection ....................................................................................................... 323

Staff Training .................................................................................................................................. 324

Move Logistics ................................................................................................................................ 324

Summary ....................................................................................................................................... 325
xv

List of Exhibits

Chapter 2. Predesign Planning 

2-1. Distribution of Project Costs ....................................................................................................8

2-2. Phases of Predesign Planning ................................................................................................. 11

2-3. Daily Counts and Average Annual Population .........................................................................14

2-4. Typical Allocation of Time for Predesign Planning ...................................................................16

Chapter 3. Site Selection and Design 

3-1. Typical Irregular Shape of Jail ................................................................................................20

3-2. Multiple Parking Areas .......................................................................................................... 21

3-3. Common Facility Access Points ..............................................................................................22

3-4. Window Sill Height Above Floor Level Prevents View Conflict ................................................24

3-5. Placement of Window To Look Out Onto Controlled Space .....................................................25

Chapter 5. Classification/Separation 

5-1. Remote Surveillance Housing Unit .........................................................................................35

5-2. Intermittent Surveillance Housing Unit ..................................................................................35

5-3. Using a Storage Area To Buffer Sound ....................................................................................39

5-4. Program Area Located Between Housing Units for Sight and Sound Separation ........................39

5-5. Special Management Area in a Smaller Jail ............................................................................40

Chapter 6. Surveillance/Supervision 

6-1. Direct Supervision Housing Unit ............................................................................................45

6-2. Intermittent Surveillance .......................................................................................................46

6-3. Remote Surveillance Housing Pod ..........................................................................................47

6-4. Placement of Control Stations To Prevent Unwanted Views Between Inmates ...........................48

6-5. Preferred Placement of Fixed Posts ........................................................................................49

6-6. Traditional Back-to-Back Cellblocks ....................................................................................... 51

6-7. Inmate View Conflict ............................................................................................................52

6-8. Entry Pocket To Prevent Inmate View Conflict ........................................................................53

6-9. Three-Dimensional Overhead View of Direct Supervision Housing Pod ....................................53

6-10. Colocation of Essential Daily Functions With Housing in a Direct Supervision Unit .................54

6-11. Blind Corner ........................................................................................................................55

Chapter 7. Staffing Impact 

7-1. Average 30-Year Life Cycle Costs ............................................................................................57

7-2. Stairway for Vertical Connection Between Multilevel Posts ...................................................... 61

7-3. Simplified Circulation Corridor ..............................................................................................62

7-4. Evacuation Routes ................................................................................................................64

Chapter 8. Security Perimeter 

8-1. Secondary Internal Security Zones ......................................................................................... 71

8-2. Relationship of Overall Building to Main Security Perimeter .................................................... 71

8-3. Security Ceiling ....................................................................................................................74

8-4. Security Vestibule .................................................................................................................75

8-5. Visiting Area in Relationship to Main Security Perimeter .........................................................78
xvi 

List of Exhibits

Chapter 9. Criminal Justice Interface 

9-1. Separation of Public From Nonpublic Areas ...........................................................................85

9-2. Location of Master Control and Communications/Dispatch Operations 

Relative to Jail and Law Enforcement Areas and Public Lobby ................................................85

9-3. Provisions for Arresting Officers ............................................................................................86

9-4. Inmate Waiting Area Adjacent to Attorney-Client Visiting Rooms .............................................90

Chapter 10. Functional Components and Relationships 

10-1. Catered Food Service ...........................................................................................................95

10-2. Relationship Matrix .............................................................................................................97

10-3. Relationship Diagram ..........................................................................................................98

10-4. Relationship of Work Release Area to Other Inmate Areas .....................................................98

10-5. Recreation Area That Can Be Used for Both Indoor and Outdoor Space .................................101

Chapter 11. Planning and Designing to Standards 

11-1. Layout of an Accessible Cell ............................................................................................... 107

Chapter 13. Master Control

13-1. Entry to Secure Perimeter Doubles as Secure Entry to Master Control .................................. 121

13-2. Master Control Position Expected To Observe Too Many Things ........................................... 121

13-3. Floor Height of Master Control Raised Above Dayroom and Corridor ................................... 122

13-4. Preferred Control Panel Configuration ................................................................................ 123

13-5. Master Control Component Diagram .................................................................................. 126

Chapter 14. Intake-Release 

14-1. Intake-Release Area ........................................................................................................... 127

14-2. Detailed View of Intake-Release Area in a Smaller Jail ......................................................... 132

14-3. Vehicle Sallyport Showing Drive-Through Design ................................................................ 134

14-4. Vehicle Sallyport Showing Floor Area Configuration ............................................................ 135

14-5. Pedestrian Entry Vestibule ................................................................................................. 136

14-6. Secure Pedestrian Entry Vestibule ...................................................................................... 136

14-7. Visiting Area .................................................................................................................... 141

14-8. Release Area Design .......................................................................................................... 145

14-9. Relationships Between Receiving and Admissions Areas ..................................................... 147

14-10. Components of Booking Area ........................................................................................... 147

Chapter 15. General Housing 

15-1. Unobstructed Views of Two Tiers of Cells ........................................................................... 155

15-2. Emergency Exit Stair for Second-Tier Egress ....................................................................... 155

15-3. Examples of Variations in Design Approach ........................................................................ 157

15-4. Use of High, Small Windows and Skylights ........................................................................ 158

15-5. Use of Clerestory Window To Introduce Light Into Interior Cells .......................................... 159

15-6. Fire Zones ........................................................................................................................ 161

15-7. Comparison of Space Needed for Combination Fixture Versus Separate Toilet and Sink ......... 164

15-8. Options for Exposure of the Face of the Cell ....................................................................... 166

15-9. Configuration of Dayroom in Two-Tiered Housing Unit ....................................................... 168
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List of Exhibits

15-10. Dayroom Table With Swing-Out Seat To Accommodate Wheelchair .................................... 169

15-11. Remote Observation Control Post ..................................................................................... 171

15-12. Vertical View in Two-Tier Housing Obscured by Single-Level Vestibule ............................... 174

15-13. Sizing of Security Vestibule To Allow for Door Swings and Passage of Equipment ............... 176

15-14. Relationships Between Housing Unit Space Components ................................................... 179

15-15. Component Diagram of a Typical Cell ............................................................................... 179

Chapter 16. Special Housing 

16-1. Privacy Partition in Sleeping Area ...................................................................................... 183

16-2. Direct Line of Sight Into Sleeping and Dayroom Areas ......................................................... 184

16-3. Entry/Exit for Work Release/Periodic-Sentence Inmates ...................................................... 185

16-4. Entry Sequence for Work Release/Periodic-Sentence Inmates .............................................. 185

16-5. Door in Dayroom Partition ................................................................................................ 188

16-6. Secondary Access to Cell ................................................................................................... 188

16-7. Security-Related Spatial Affiliations in Medical Housing ...................................................... 192

16-8. Relationships Between Special Housing Areas and Other Jail Areas ...................................... 198

16-9. Components of Work Release Unit ..................................................................................... 198

16-10. Components of ADA-Compliant Cell ................................................................................. 198

16-11. Components of Suicide/Mental Health/Detoxification Observation Cell .............................. 198

Chapter 17. Health Care 

17-1. Access Around Examination Table ..................................................................................... 203

17-2. Examination Room Designed for Natural Light ................................................................... 205

17-3. Medication Storage Area ................................................................................................... 206

17-4. Possible Locations of Medication Storage Area .................................................................... 207

17-5. Relationships in Health-Care Area .......................................................................................211

17-6. Component Diagram of Health-Care Area ............................................................................211

Chapter 18. Visiting Areas 

18-1. Single and Double Visiting Stations .................................................................................... 216

18-2. Sample Visiting Assumptions ............................................................................................ 218

18-3. Moving the Inmate to the Visitor ....................................................................................... 219

18-4. Secure Visitor Corridor Constructed Above the Primary Inmate Corridor .............................. 219

18-5. Security Vestibule in Visiting Area ..................................................................................... 221

18-6. Relationships Between Visiting Area and Other Jail Areas ................................................... 223

18-7. Components of Visiting Areas ............................................................................................ 223

Chapter 19. Exercise Areas 

19-1. Sample Exercise Space Needs ............................................................................................ 227

19-2. Centrally Located Exercise Yard ......................................................................................... 229

19-3. Exercise Area Monitored by Staff Who Monitor Other Areas ................................................ 229

19-4. Exercise Areas Immediately Adjacent to Housing Units ....................................................... 229

19-5. Outdoor Exercise Area Surrounded by Building .................................................................. 233

19-6. Emergency Refuge Area ..................................................................................................... 234

19-7. Relationships Between Exercise Areas and Housing and Public Areas .................................. 234

19-8. Components of Indoor and Outdoor Exercise Areas ............................................................ 235
xviii 

List of Exhibits

Chapter 20. Programs and Services 

20-1. Storage Space Adjacent to Multipurpose Area ..................................................................... 240

20-2. Counseling Rooms Adjacent to Multipurpose Area .............................................................. 242

20-3. Use of Shutters To Provide Privacy in a Contact Visiting/Individual 

 Counseling Area Not Associated With Multipurpose Space .................................................. 242

20-4. Altar Area That Can Be Closed Off During Nonreligious Activities ........................................ 245

20-5. Area Requirements for Different Activities .......................................................................... 249

20-6. Relationship of Programs/Services Area to Housing and Lobby ............................................ 250

20-7. Components of a Programs/Services Area .......................................................................... 250

Chapter 21. Inmate Commissary 

21-1. Commissary Adjacent to Multipurpose Area ....................................................................... 253

21-2. Relationship of Commissary to Housing and Multipurpose Areas ......................................... 254

21-3. Commissary Components .................................................................................................. 254

Chapter 22. Food Service 

22-1. Centralized Dining Area Adjacent to the Kitchen ................................................................. 258

22-2. Production Flow for Food Preparation ................................................................................ 260

22-3. Jail Delivery Vestibule/Loading Dock ................................................................................. 262

22-4. Relationship of Food Service Area Components .................................................................. 264

22-5. Sample Food Service Area ................................................................................................. 264

Chapter 23. Laundry Area 

23-1. Location of Separate Laundry Facilities for Work Release Inmates ........................................ 267

23-2. Relationship of Laundry Components ................................................................................. 270

23-3. Sample Laundry Area ........................................................................................................ 270

Chapter 24. Administration and Public Areas 

24-1. Administration Area in Relationship to Security Perimeter ................................................... 273

24-2. Secure Reception Area ....................................................................................................... 276

24-3. Jail Administrator’s Office ................................................................................................. 280

24-4. Assumptions for Size of Conference Area ........................................................................... 281

24-5. Relationship of Administration Area to Jail Operations and Public Lobby ............................. 283

24-6. Components of Administration Area .................................................................................. 283

Chapter 25. Staff Areas 

25-1. Lockers Elevated on a Base ................................................................................................ 289

25-2. Use of Folding Partition in Staff Multipurpose Room ........................................................... 293

25-3. Relationships Between Staff Areas and Security Perimeter ................................................... 294

25-4. Physical Conditioning and Locker/Shower Areas ................................................................ 294

Chapter 26. Storage Areas 

26-1. Relationships Between Miscellaneous Storage Areas and Other Jail Components .................. 302

26-2. Central Storage Area ......................................................................................................... 302
xix

List of Exhibits

Chapter 27. Single Versus Multiple Occupancy 

27-1. Sample Floorplan of Dormitory-Style Multiple-Occupancy Housing ...................................... 306

27-2. Sample Floorplan of a Single-Occupancy Cell ..................................................................... 306

27-3. Sample Floorplan of a Single-Occupancy Cell Showing Unencumbered Floorspace ................ 307

27-4. Square Footage Requirements for Double and Single Cells Based on 

American Correctional Association Performance-Based Standards for Local 

Adult Detention Facilities ....................................................................................................310

Chapter 28. Renovating Nonsecure Buildings Into Jails 

28-1. Hospital Wing With Poor Views of Rooms and Lack of Dayroom Space .................................311

28-2. Comparison of a Typical Hospital Wall With a Typical Jail Wall ........................................... 312

28-3. Jail Costs by Construction Component ............................................................................... 314

28-4. Jail Shell Costs ................................................................................................................. 314

28-5. Cost Analysis of Renovation That Requires Addition of One Staff Post .................................. 316

Chapter 29. Construction and Project Costs 

29-1. Total Project Cost .............................................................................................................. 317

29-2. Hypothetical Project Budget .............................................................................................. 319
xxi

Foreword

New jail construction is a major capital undertaking that often represents the single largest 

project in which county officials will ever be involved. Many local jurisdictions are replacing outdated facilities as well as expanding bedspace to accommodate increasing numbers of 

inmates. The U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, reports that as of June 2008, 

the total rated capacity of the nation’s jails was 813,502 beds, up from an estimated 677,787 beds at 

midyear 2000 (an average increase of 2.6 percent per year).1

To respond to local jurisdictions’ need for assistance in jail planning and design, the National Institute of Corrections offers the Facility Development Process that provides guidance as jurisdictions 

proceed with jail planning, design, construction, and transition. This guide supports the Facility 

Development Process by providing information about basic concepts and issues surrounding jail 

design.

The Jail Design Guide, Third Edition, is a revised and expanded version of the original Small Jail 

Design Guide published in 1988. It now includes specific information relevant to planning not only 

for small jails but information that can be used for planning jails of any size. Based on information 

from correctional practitioners and the authors’ analysis and experience, the document discusses 

current correctional standards and architectural principles that are important to building a costefficient jail to meet a locality’s particular needs. While plainly written, it is sufficiently technical 

and detailed to guide local officials, architects, and planners who may be unfamiliar with jail design, 

construction, and operational issues. It does not, however, include sample floor plans, as that would 

imply the recommendation of model solutions to jail planning and design issues. Each jurisdiction 

needs to craft a jail design to meet its unique situation and community needs.

The information presented here will be beneficial to anyone involved in the planning, design, and 

construction of a new jail: sheriffs, county commissioners, jail administrators, directors of corrections, criminal justice planners, and interested citizens. The Jail Design Guide can help local officials 

assume and retain control of this important process and direct it toward the most beneficial solution 

for their community.

Morris L. Thigpen

Director

National Institute of Corrections

1

 William J. Sabol and Todd D. Minton, Jail Inmates at Midyear 2007 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of 

Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2008), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/jim07.pdf, accessed June 9, 2010.
xxiii

Preface

T

his third edition of the Jail Design Guide is, as was its predecessor, an information resource 

intended to help jurisdictions design better and more effective jails. Whereas the original publication targeted small jails—then defined as those with 50 or fewer beds—and the second edition targeted both small and medium-sized jails, this edition provides general information for those 

designing jails of any size, as well as specific information for smaller jails. 

The focus of what is now simply entitled the Jail Design Guide, Third Edition was broadened for 

two reasons:

■ Increases in local jail populations have significantly reduced the demand for new jails of only 

50 or fewer beds. 

■ Reflection and feedback on the previous editions have made it clear that most of the issues raised 

in the original document apply equally to jails of any size.

This publication provides the reader with information concerning the important elements and concepts of successful jail design. Although it has been redefined as a design guide for all jails, the Jail 

Design Guide, Third Edition, recognizes that there are some fundamental differences between small/

medium-sized jails and large jails or systems of facilities found in major metropolitan areas. These 

fundamental differences exist in many areas, a key one being the challenge of designing to accommodate the separation of inmates with various classification and security needs. Large systems can 

respond to this issue by devoting entire housing pods, or even separate facilities, to different classifications while still maintaining staff efficiency. The response in smaller facilities is more complicated 

and calls for different answers. The techniques used to design for the separation of inmates by classification needs are the subject of considerable discussion in the Guide, as are many other special 

design challenges that result from constructing a facility of lesser scale and more limited resources. 

The Guide avoids re-creating information that already exists in other areas of importance to jurisdictions in the process of designing a new jail. Specifically, it does not present detailed information on 

the predesign planning process, inmate supervision approaches, or staff training and needs analysis 

because other excellent resources on these topics already exist. However, because these and other 

so-called nondesign issues so greatly affect design, their influence is acknowledged throughout this 

publication. One of the main principles of the Jail Design Guide, Third Edition, is that planning and 

operational issues cannot be separated from design and, in fact, shape the design of every facility.

Background

Problems Recognized 

The primary incentive for developing the original Small Jail Design Guide (1988) was that staff of 

the Jails Division at the National Institute of Corrections (NIC), as well as other professionals in 

the field, became increasingly aware that some very ineffective and outdated small jails were being 

designed and built. These facilities came to NIC’s attention because design flaws created many management problems and political controversies for the owners and operators. These problems generated numerous technical assistance requests to NIC, and it was often the case that little could be done 

to correct major flaws in the architecture of something as permanent as a jail.
xxiv 

Preface

NIC staff quickly realized that there were additional reasons to pay special attention to small jails. 

Small jails represented the majority of the jail facilities in the United States; however, very little of 

the research and literature was really applicable to the small jail. NIC staff also realized that even 

though small jails are obligated to meet most of the same requirements as large jails, they typically 

have far fewer resources with which to address their problems and often less access to information 

to enable their administrators to make informed decisions. In addition, there were problems unique 

to small jails that were not problems for large jails, simply because of differences in scale.

NIC Response

Instead of continuing to react to small jails’ requests for assistance, NIC adopted a proactive approach to help them recognize and address the issues they face. To fill the information void surrounding small jails, NIC initiated the Small Jails grant program in 1984.

The Small Jails program began with an evaluation of new county jails with a capacity of 50 or fewer 

beds that had opened since 1974. The evaluation was designed to find out what worked in small jail 

design and what did not and to identify operational problems related to design in these facilities.

The evaluation identified some successful facilities and operations but also confirmed that there 

were indeed serious and widespread problems in the design and operation of recently built small 

jails. In some cases, these problems were unsolvable, and in others they were manageable. Most disappointing was that many traditional problems of small jails were being repeated in ways that were 

irreversible short of major renovation.

The original Small Jail Design Guide attempted to provide jurisdictions with information that would 

help in the planning of new jail facilities to avoid past design problems. It represented the last publication in a series of products that addressed this general goal by documenting and applying the lessons learned from the initial evaluation work with small jails. Preceding the Small Jail Design Guide,

NIC released two publications that were direct products of the small jails evaluation: The Nature of 

New Small Jails: Report and Analysis (1985) and Small Jail Special Issues (1986). These are companion pieces to the original Small Jail Design Guide and the revised Jail Design Guide: A Resource for 

Small and Medium-Sized Jails (1998). Although these documents were published many years ago, 

many of the issues discussed in them are still applicable to small jails and may also apply to 

medium-sized jails.

The Third Edition

The Jail Design Guide, Third Edition retains the basic purpose, organization, and content of the first 

two editions. It updates the second edition by:

■ Including information affected by current standards and codes.

■ Expanding the information provided so that it is equally relevant to small, medium, and large 

jails. Sidebars were added for information that is significant to smaller jails, but not necessarily to 

larger jail facilities.
xxv

Preface

■ Adding revised material that broadens and sharpens the document’s contents. 

■ Revising graphics and substantially increasing the number of photos from actual projects.

The information presented in this publication is based on lessons from experience—ideas and 

concepts that have been found to work for jurisdictions faced with the challenge of building a 

new jail facility. The information also focuses, to a significant, but lesser degree, on what has not 

worked. Consequently, it is hoped that through use of the Jail Design Guide, Third Edition, some of 

the lessons learned by others will benefit jurisdictions about to enter their own planning and design 

process. In this way, users of this publication can move one step closer to creating safe, secure, and 

lasting facilities.
xxvii

Acknowledgments

T

he project team is indebted to the National Institute of Corrections (NIC) for the opportunity to 

revise and update the Jail Design Guide: A Resource for Small and Medium-Sized Jails (1998), 

which was a revision of the Small Jail Design Guide (1988). The original Guide was a large and 

complicated undertaking, but one that provided its authors with many rewards based on its documented value to planning professionals and local officials alike. Without NIC’s Small Jail Design 

Guide or the subsequent Jail Design Guide, they would have been without a substantial planning 

and design resource as they undertook major projects involving millions of dollars in construction 

and jail staff time.

The project team is still enormously indebted to Michael O’Toole, former NIC Jails Division Chief, 

for his stewardship of this complicated and lengthy project. His patience, professionalism, and commitment to a quality end-product were a major driving force during the course of the original and 

second edition work. Thanks also to Tom Reid, NIC Project Monitor at the second edition’s conclusion, for his review assistance and guidance, and to Nancy Sabanosh, former NIC Publications Manager, for her superb editorial and production assistance on the original two efforts. Additional thanks 

to James R. Rowenhorst, corrections specialist, and David E. Bostwick, architect, for their contributions to this document.

We greatly appreciate the enthusiasm, support, and direction provided to us on the third edition 

work by our NIC project manager, Correctional Program Specialist Vicci Persons. Vicci’s continued 

belief in the value of the Jail Design Guide was gratifying and inspirational. We would also like to 

thank Voorhis Robertson Justice Services, Jim Rowenhorst, and Liebert & Associates for providing 

new photographs for the Guide.

At the Kimme & Associates’ office, Sue Van Matre’s attention to endless revisions through all three 

publications is greatly appreciated. 

Finally, recognition must again go to many current and former NIC Jails Division staff who invested 

considerable time in reviewing and improving the document, and to the many superb people in the 

field who completed the surveys behind the original research for the project and hosted research 

visits by the project team.

Dennis A. Kimme
Section 1

Getting Started

Chapter 1. Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Chapter 2. Predesign Planning. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3

Chapter 1

Introduction

T

he opening statement of the preface to 

this guide identifies its purpose as one 

of helping to create “better” and “more 

effective” jails. Because such terms can mean 

different things to different people, they should 

be defined.

The findings of the original small jails research 

indicated that better, more effective jails are fundamentally those that satisfy the basic needs of 

their occupants, users, and owners for safety, 

security, effective inmate management, and efficiency. More specifically, evaluations of old and 

new jails throughout the country suggest that the 

following minimum operational and architectural 

characteristics are essential to attaining a better, 

more effective jail.

Operational characteristics:

■ Staff that are well trained in jail operations and 

inmate management.

■ Adequate and efficient staffing, including 

around-the-clock jail staff and female staff on 

duty when women are housed in the facility.

■ Existence of written policies and procedures to 

guide operations and facilitate training.

■ Constant surveillance or supervision of inmates, as opposed to intermittent observation.

■ Inmate programs and amenities that can be 

used to influence positive inmate behavior and 

alleviate idleness.

■ Existence and fair application of inmate rules 

and disciplinary procedures.

■ Sufficient operational funding available prior 

to the opening of the new facility.

Architectural characteristics:

■ Adequate capacity, including the right kinds of 

bedspace to allow proper inmate classification 

and separation, and flexibility in the use of 

housing areas.

■ Good lines of sight and visibility of housing 

areas.

■ Cell and dormitory occupancy levels appropriate to the inmate classification.

■ Control of sound levels and elimination of 

visual conflicts.

■ An appropriate physical environment (space, 

temperature, light, color, humidity) for inmates 

to live in and for staff to work in.

■ Minimum need to rely on electronic surveillance, especially closed-circuit television.

■ Spatial organization that accommodates the 

flow of activities rather than inhibits it.

■ Ample storage.

■ Adherence to some form of recognized 

standards.

■ Ability to expand the facility in terms of both 

capacity and support services.

■ Ability to maintain the facility through the use 

of local service personnel and the purchase of 

locally available parts and equipment, wherever possible.

Although these operational and architectural 

characteristics may seem obvious to many readers, many jails fail to realize them. Some jails 

lack even the most rudimentary of these design 

characteristics and are considered architectural 
4

S e c t i o n 1 : 

Getting Started

disasters by their owners. Poor design can result 

in expensive mistakes laden with financial and 

political costs that can haunt local officials for 

years to come.

Problems Overcome

Generally, jails with the characteristics outlined 

above have overcome or minimized some traditional problems:

■ Accommodation of small and special inmate 

populations, such as women and inmates who 

are intoxicated, present behavioral problems, 

or require special management (i.e., mental 

health or medical treatment).

■ Assaults against staff and inmates.

■ Suicides and suicide attempts.

■ Fires.

■ Vandalism.

■ Lawsuits.

■ Contraband passage.

■ Standards compliance.

Planning: A Key Component

One key component to a better and more effective jail is comprehensive predesign planning. 

Jail evaluations and practical experiences clearly 

demonstrate that jurisdictions that take the time 

to plan before they design and to determine what 

they need before they authorize the architect to 

proceed with design have fewer operational and 

facility problems when the facility is complete. 

Local governments that do the predesign work 

necessary to learn and apply the characteristics 

of better, more effective jails can achieve a greater degree of satisfaction and efficiency with their 

new facilities.

Besides achieving the characteristics cited above, 

jurisdictions that did comprehensive predesign 

planning also improved their architectural designs in the following areas:

■ Circulation patterns in the jail.

■ Placement of rooms within the facility.

■ The right types and number of rooms.

■ Adequate space for inmates, staff, and 

support services.

■ Environmental quality.

■ Durability of materials and hardware used.

■ Proper sightlines into and within inmate 

housing areas.

These are all fundamental and necessary attributes of a successful jail facility design.

About This Guide

Good planning involves identifying users and 

activities, and good design is clearly measured by 

the degree to which a building conforms to the 

needs and activities of the people who will use 

and live in the facility. To borrow an old phrase, 

good jail design is based on the premise that 

“form follows function.”

The approach taken in this design guide is informed by the findings of the original small jails 

research, subsequent feedback on the original 

design guide, and the authors’ two and a half 

decades of practical experience regarding the 

importance of planning to attaining successful 

design.

Intended Audience

The primary readers of this document will be the 

people who operate and design jails. Other local 
5 

C h a p t e r 1 : 

Introduction

officials such as county commissioners, judges, 

and prosecuting attorneys will also likely find 

elements of this publication useful and informative. Those involved in the design of a new jail, 

regardless of their role and regardless of the facility’s size, should find the Jail Design Guide, Third 

Edition to be a helpful resource.

Organization

The Jail Design Guide, Third Edition presents information in a format designed to be easily used 

by the reader. It is organized in four sections:

■ Section 1, Getting Started. The first section of 

the Guide comprises chapter 1—the present 

introduction—and chapter 2, “Predesign Planning.” Although this publication is not intended to be a “how-to” guide on jail planning, 

comprehensive predesign planning is, as noted 

above, fundamental to achieving a better, more 

effective jail. Therefore, before embarking on 

the examination of design considerations and 

functional components, the Guide discusses 

the process of predesign planning, and identifies the characteristics of good predesign planning in relation to its influence on architectural 

design. Planning considerations that affect design also are noted throughout the Guide.

■ Section 2, Major Design Considerations. 

Chapters 3–12 identify the major considerations that shape the overall approach to the 

design of the jail: site selection and design, 

image/appearance, classification/separation, 

surveillance/supervision, staffing impact, 

security perimeter, criminal justice interface, 

functional components and relationships, planning and designing to standards, and future 

expansion. These considerations relate to the 

fundamental operational and security decisions that are made during predesign planning. 

■ Section 3, Functional Components. Chapters 

13–26 present detailed information about 

various functional components of a facility—

master control, intake-release, general housing, 

special housing, health care, visiting areas, 

exercise areas, programs and services, the inmate commissary, food service, laundry areas, 

the administration area and public lobby, staff 

areas, and storage areas—in the context of the 

design considerations identified in section 2.

■ Section 4, Special Considerations. Chapters 

27–29 address design and construction issues 

that have caused difficulty or controversy in 

jurisdictions throughout the country. Chapter 

30 concludes the Guide with a discussion of 

issues related to the transition to the new jail, 

specifically, the key activities (e.g., the development of policies and procedures for the new 

facility, master scheduling, staff training) that 

must take place during the construction phase 

to make a facility an operational success.

Smaller Jails

Although the Guide provides general information 

for use by any jurisdiction designing a new facility, it still specifically addresses issues faced by 

smaller jails. Information pertaining to small jails 

is flagged with the following icon: 

Note on Construction

This Guide does not address architectural construction details to any great extent. Although 

this may disappoint some readers, construction 

details are excluded for several reasons, not the 

least of which is the wish to avoid creating an 

overly lengthy and complex document. Also, the 

authors want to encourage rather than limit local 
6

S e c t i o n 1 : 

Getting Started

involvement, learning, and choice in the detail 

development of individual facilities.

The goal of this document is to provide direction 

and assistance, not to act as a substitute for local 

efforts and decisionmaking. Providing detail and 

specific material recommendations could well 

stifle creativity and the search for answers proper 

to the widely varying needs of jurisdictions 

across the United States. Also, trying to deal with 

the full range of detail issues could easily lead to 

the unintended exclusion of alternative materials 

and hardware. Consequently, this document is 

limited to the major design questions and influences affecting jails, leaving owners, architects, 

and engineers to develop proper detail, hardware, 

material, and equipment responses to larger 

design issues.
7

Chapter 2

Predesign Planning

Many communities fail to recognize the 

value of and need for predesign planning. Once they acknowledge that construction of a new jail facility is unavoidable, 

they frequently want to move quickly to a solution. Hiring an architect to start drawing plans, 

buying a prototype design, or signing a designbuild contract on the strength of a budget and 

bed need estimate can seem to be the most expeditious choice for many communities.

Unfortunately, jails designed without adequate 

predesign work often experience problems after 

the facility opens. The facility may be too small 

and quickly become crowded, or it may be large 

enough but too expensive to operate. Important 

design features may have been left out, such as 

the ability to see into inmate living areas from 

a single control point or to move easily through 

the building. The facility may not allow for appropriate inmate classification and separation 

requirements, resulting in failure to comply with 

standards and vulnerability to litigation. Support 

spaces may be inadequate or missing altogether. 

The building may lack important equipment or 

functional areas, and/or may use furniture and 

equipment prone to wear and breakage. The 

completed building may be nothing like local officials imagined or what the public expected for 

its tax dollars. Once these faults are discovered, 

in something as permanent and visible as a jail, 

they tend to be thorns in the side of local officials 

for many years.

Jurisdictions that simply “buy a jail” leave out an 

essential part of the facility development process: 

predesign planning, that is, the work that needs 

to be done before the architect can start a design. 

This early planning work is needed to answer a 

number of critical questions:

■ How many beds should the jail have? How 

many inmates will it hold when it opens and 

further into the future? 

■ How many and what types of inmates will 

need separation from others?

■ How will inmates be supervised?

■ What are the options in terms of renovation, 

addition, or new construction?

■ How should the jail interrelate with other 

criminal justice functions?

■ What programs and services will the jail 

provide, and to what extent?

■ How many staff will be needed?

■ What kinds of spaces should be in the jail? 

How big should they be? How should they 

be arranged?

■ How much and what type of expansion capability should be built into the facility design?

■ How much will it cost to build and operate 

a jail?

Although it is not the purpose of the Jail Design 

Guide, Third Edition to be a complete predesign 

planning resource, planning is extremely important to the jail design process and merits a brief 

review of its nature and impact.

Why Plan?

Planning takes time, effort, and money. Why 

should a jurisdiction bother with this involved 

and detailed process, rather than go ahead and 

build a new jail? Aren’t all jails the same? Here 

are some reasons for local jurisdictions to commit 

to, and be involved with, the predesign process:
8

S e c t i o n 1 : 

Getting Started

■ The predesign process provides an opportunity 

for jurisdictions to evaluate their inmate population as to who they are incarcerating, why 

they are incarcerating them, and how they can 

better manage this population.

■ As jail populations continue to grow, the planning process is an opportunity for jurisdictions 

to conduct a thorough evaluation of capacity 

reduction measures, such as pre- and posttrial 

alternatives to incarceration for low-risk offenders. This is an opportunity for all aspects 

of the criminal justice system (e.g., courts, district attorney, jail, law enforcement, probation) 

to work together to develop a criminal justice 

plan for the entire system.

■ The process allows existing jail staff to have 

input into the facility development process. 

Their operational experience is invaluable, and 

their early participation ensures they develop 

ownership in the process.

■ This may be the only chance during an official’s lifetime to influence the direction of a 

facility that should last at least 30 or 40 years. 

In some ways, design has less impact than predesign planning, where the really big decisions 

are made.

■ Planning allows local officials to take control 

of the process and ensure that the jail built is 

what is needed and wanted rather than what 

someone else thinks is needed or wanted. This 

is an opportunity for officials to educate themselves on what they will need to do to design, 

build, and operate a jail that meets the needs 

of their jurisdiction.

■ Planning is a vehicle for gaining broad political 

and public support for the project. It can help 

prevent the project from being vetoed when it 

comes to getting the money needed to build.

■ Money-saving ideas, which might not come up 

during design, can be considered in this phase. 

Examples are the creation of nonjail programs 

(saving beds) or contracting for food and laundry services instead of paying for expensive 

staff, space, and equipment.

■ The architects or design-builders, no matter 

how experienced in jail design, will not truly 

know what to design to meet a jurisdiction’s 

needs without planning information provided 

by the jurisdiction. Consequently, they will 

have to design according to their view of what 

a jail should be, rather than the client’s view, 

and may well miss features important to local 

operations.

■ The costs of predesign planning are negligible 

compared with the costs of designing, constructing, and operating a jail, particularly 

one that is ill-suited to local needs (exhibit 

2-1). Yet it is the most influential step in the 

creation of future facilities and operations. Predesign planning usually costs roughly half of 1 

percent of total project costs.

Because of the money and liabilities involved in 

building and operating a jail, local officials owe it 

to their constituents and themselves to consider 

the critical issues that predesign planning is intended to resolve, rather than prematurely jumping into design, buying prototypes, or initiating a 

design-build process.

Exhibit 2-1. Distribution of Project Costs

Project

money

invested

Construction Other project

costs:

- Furniture, equipment

- Site development

- Temporary utilities

- Etc.

Architectural/engineering/construction manager fees

Predesign planning Transition/occupancy
9 

C h a p t e r 2 : 

Predesign Planning

Can a Prototype Replace the 

Need to Plan?

Local officials, and sometimes the public, frequently express the opinion that all jails are 

alike—or that they cannot be that much different—

so why bother with planning? Why not just use 

someone else’s design, why not just buy a prototype, to save time and money?

Every community is unique and has different 

problems, but many have at least one common 

problem: their jail is crowded or antiquated and 

they need a new or expanded one. Although all 

jails have cells and need support service space—

administrative offices, a lobby, a booking area, 

food service, laundry, program areas, mechanical 

rooms, and storage—these commonalities rarely 

lead to an identical description of facilities needed 

by different communities. Many variables change 

the exact way in which people solve their problems, thus leading away from prototypes. For example, each local jurisdiction may have different:

■ Jail standards (these can vary widely from 

state to state).

■ Building and life safety codes.

■ Jail site characteristics (e.g., size, shape, 

elevation, soils, water tables, flood plain).

■ Physical relationships to the courthouse and 

other services (e.g., on same site, across the 

street, remote).

■ Budgets.

■ Climates.

■ Bed capacity and expansion needs.

■ Mixes of inmate populations.

■ Ideas regarding facility design/management 

concepts (e.g., direct supervision versus intermittent surveillance).

■ Technology needs.

■ Qualities of architectural detailing and engineering systems (e.g., mechanical, electrical, 

plumbing).

■ Correctional philosophies and public attitudes.

■ Operational policies and procedures (some 

dictated by law).

■ Availability of qualified staff (ranging from 

low-paid and poorly educated to highly paid 

and highly educated).

All of these considerations tend to interact in 

ways that diminish the likelihood that a jail design appropriate for one community can be successfully used in another.

The Possibility of Reuse

In spite of the issues raised above, it does seem 

theoretically possible to find a building plan 

that would exactly fit a community’s needs. It 

is, however, more likely that specific parts of a 

prototype might meet those needs. To accommodate the differences, adjustments to the prototype 

would have to be made. Once adjustments to a 

prototype are needed, a community may have 

the worst of both worlds: adapting most of its 

needs to someone else’s solution while absorbing 

nearly the full price of design after purchasing 

the drawings and paying for plan adjustments.

To prove that an existing plan could work, 

a community would be advised to at least 

“program-in-reverse.” That is, a team of community representatives, composed of jail staff, 

the sheriff, county board members, facility operations staff, and others, should visit the prototype 

facility being considered and spend considerable 

time there evaluating the following elements in 

detail:

■ All of the spaces and how those spaces work.

■ The staffing required by those spaces.
10

S e c t i o n 1 : 

Getting Started

■ The building’s construction and its compliance 

with current codes and standards.

■ The building’s potential for expansion.

■ Compatibility with sites being considered in 

the jurisdiction. 

If everything about the building works for the 

jurisdiction, it would be fair to consider it a potential prototype. If not, the jurisdiction must 

determine whether it can adapt its operations, 

staffing, and needs to accommodate the prototype’s noncompliance with local requirements, 

preferences, and practices. As with any other 

purchase, however, the jurisdiction is advised 

to check products and prices at more than one 

location.

The cost savings realized by buying someone 

else’s plan may not be as great as hoped. The initial savings may not be worth the loss of the opportunity to creatively plan and program a facility 

to meet the specific needs of the local community that will operate it for the next 30 years or 

more. For example, assume the architectural and 

engineering fees for a normally developed project are 7 percent of the cost of construction. In 

buying someone’s plans, the community would 

have to negotiate payment to the programmers, 

architects, and engineers who created the design 

and who retain copyrights to it. The community 

may also have to negotiate payment to the client 

who paid for the design and who may have legal 

rights to it. Costs will also be incurred for doing 

whatever site adaptation is required and for preparing a full set of drawings to which the architect can legally affix his or her license stamp and 

for which permits will be sought. Any changes to 

the prototype plan would also incur potentially 

significant costs.

The savings that actually accrue from reduced 

planning and design and an earlier construction 

start are likely to be 2–4 percent of project costs. 

If a jurisdiction considers that over a 30-year life 

cycle, the operating costs for a jail are 10 times 

greater than the construction costs, the savings 

realized through using a prototype dwindle to 

0.2–0.4 percent of project costs. For example, a 

creatively planned and designed original facility 

that saves one full-time-equivalent staff position 

per year as compared with the prototype will, 

over 30 years, accrue many times the amount of 

savings on design and planning costs hoped for 

with use of a prototype.

Buyer Beware

Not all jails are alike. Cost savings through use of 

a prototype are generally not as significant or as 

certain as a community may think or hope. Use 

of a prototype should be approached carefully 

and thoughtfully, with a complete awareness of 

the issues involved. Decisionmakers should focus 

on the real cost implications of sacrificing opportunities for creative, efficient, and specific solutions to community needs if thorough predesign 

planning and original design are bypassed.

Planning Steps

Four main phases in predesign planning are 

directed toward answering basic planning questions and preparing a jurisdiction for design 

(exhibit 2-2). They can be initiated separately in 

sequence or collapsed into one overall predesign 

planning process as part of a larger facility development process.1

■ The first phase is project recognition.

■ The second phase is needs assessment.

■ The third phase is facility program development.

1

 These phases are based on the facility development process developed for the National Institute of Corrections by Gail Elias, Dennis 

Liebert, and James Robertson (2004).
11 

C h a p t e r 2 : 

Predesign Planning

■ The fourth phase is the project definition and 

implementation plan. 

Each phase is described briefly here. More information is available from the National Institute 

of Corrections’ Jails Division and Information 

Center.

In general, the local planning team will need the 

assistance of an experienced consultant to assist 

with these steps. However, it is essential that local officials, staff, and citizens remain very involved with the process to ensure that the results 

are compatible with local needs and desires.

Exhibit 2-2. Phases of Predesign Planning

Project recognition Needs assessment Program development Project definition and

implementation

Phase 1: Project Recognition

This phase begins when local officials start looking at crowding issues and conditions in the 

existing jail. It involves several tasks related to 

taking a hard look at the criminal justice system 

as a whole and then starting or completing the 

following tasks:

■ Recognizing the problem. Is jail crowding the 

precipitating event? Is the facility in need of 

expansion, repair, or replacement?

■ Developing the project’s organizational structure. Who can and should be included in the 

process? What role will they play?

■ Identifying resources. Where can data be 

found? Who can retrieve needed data? What 

information technology is available or needed?

■ Identifying the agency taking the lead. Which 

agency will be responsible for facilitating the 

process, ensuring that assignments are completed, and noting the decisions that are made?

This phase involves the start of the following 

activities:

■ Gathering information for the selection of the 

facility site.

■ Identifying the financial considerations for the 

project.

■ Evaluating the need for a criminal justice planner for project guidance.

Phase 2: Needs Assessment

The needs assessment phase is frequently referred to by other names that are less descriptive, 

such as “master plan” and “feasibility study.” 

For brevity, it will be referred to as the “needs 

assessment” phase. In phase 2, participants are 

involved in the following tasks:

■ Developing a policy group.

■ Reviewing applicable standards and legal 

requirements.

■ Developing the system mission statement and 

goals.

■ Evaluating the current criminal justice system 

and policies.

■ Evaluating the existing facility for standards 

compliance.

■ Evaluating existing alternative programs.
12

S e c t i o n 1 : 

Getting Started

■ Evaluating current staffing levels against the 

staffing levels that are needed.

■ Identifying options, including:

❏ Evaluating changes to policies and practices 

in the criminal justice system.

❏ Evaluating the facility to determine whether 

renovation/expansion is needed.

❏ Evaluating nonfacility alternative programs.

■ Appointing a transition team leader who will 

be involved in all aspects of the project.

■ Developing cost estimates for the project and 

staffing/operational costs for the first checkpoint for the project.

■ Developing and producing a needs assessment 

report and a determination of inmate capacity 

by year.

■ Starting to develop support for the project in 

the community.

The needs assessment phase is to the facility 

development process what the foundation is 

to a building. If the foundation is weak, the 

entire building is likely to exhibit flaws throughout its life.

Phase 3: Facility Program 

Development

The functional and space programs are brought 

together in phase 3 in a document that will tell 

the architects how the jail will function. In phase 

3, participants will be involved in the following 

tasks:

■ Developing a functional program, which 

includes:

❏ Developing operational principles and 

functional scenarios.

❏ Reviewing applicable state and national 

standards.

❏ Developing a staffing plan for the new 

facility.

■ Developing a space program, which includes:

❏ Identifying square footage needs for the 

new facility.

❏ Developing adjacency diagrams.

❏ Analyzing design criteria.

Phase 4: Project Definition and 

Implementation Plan 

In this phase, all of the information gathered and 

decisions made in the previous phases are further refined and gelled into a conceptual design 

and the refinement of site requirements. In phase 

4, participants will be involved in the following 

tasks:

■ Evaluating facility options (new construction 

versus renovation/expansion).

■ Developing a conceptual design for the new 

facility.

■ Developing a cost-benefit analysis and lifecycle costs.

■ Conducting user and owner reviews.

When a jurisdiction is going through the planning process, there are many tasks that must be 

addressed to ensure successful design and occupancy of the new facility. The following tasks 

must be completed in the predesign process.

Developing a Mission Statement

The basis for making project decisions is to define the purposes of the jail in the jurisdiction 

and develop what is often called a mission statement. The mission statement will define many 

fundamental aspects of the jail and includes:
13 

C h a p t e r 2 : 

Predesign Planning

■ The legal mandates for the jail.

■ The entities responsible for its operation and 

funding.

■ Who will be incarcerated in the jail and why.

■ Responsibilities for safety, security, and service 

to inmates, staff, and the community.

■ The correctional philosophy of the jail with 

respect to both pretrial and sentenced inmates, 

including programming, goals of punishment, 

reintegration into the community, rehabilitation, and so forth.

Although some of these issues may seem vague, 

they can have a direct impact on the size and 

type of jail that is built. For example, if the planning team determines that responding to alcohol 

abuse is part of the facility’s mission, planners 

will be guided to provide spaces not only for receiving people who are under the influence, but 

also for offering counseling and other support 

services.

Learning More About Jails

Two truths apply to jail planning. First, things 

have probably changed greatly since the last time 

the jurisdiction built a jail. Second, although the 

jail staff works hard on a daily basis, they may 

be too mired in the existing jail’s problems to be 

broadly aware of modern concepts, requirements, 

and possibilities. It is therefore very valuable to 

spend time early in the process, before preconceived notions take root, to learn more about 

modern jails. Learning about current issues and 

concepts can be done by:

■ Participating in training programs on jail planning and inmate management, like those provided by the National Institute of Corrections.

■ Attending conferences sponsored by professional organizations such as the American 

Jail Association and its affiliated state 

organizations.

■ Touring new facilities in other jurisdictions.

■ Reading articles and books.

■ Working with experienced jail planning consultants who can make oral and visual presentations on jail issues.

Establishing Bed Capacity

No one has a crystal ball to see into the future. 

Yet projecting the number and type of jail beds 

that will be needed in the years after the new jail 

opens is an important early task in the needs assessment phase. The total number of beds drives 

facility development and operational costs more 

than any other factor.

Establishing bed capacity is not simply a function 

of executing mathematical projections of future 

need based on past data trends. For one thing, 

past data may be of limited use because crowded 

conditions may have forced local criminal justice 

officials to release people in ways that are normally undesirable. The data then would be artificially low and unrepresentative of true historic 

needs. Mathematical projections based on that 

data would be too low, raising the unhappy prospect of crowded new facilities shortly after opening. Multiple issues should be considered when 

establishing future bed needs:

■ Projections of data other than jail average daily 

population (e.g., bookings, criminal case load, 

arrests, average length of stay).

■ The condition of the local economy and 

community.

■ Local and regional population growth and 

demographic changes.

■ Use of alternatives to incarceration, such as 

releasing pretrial inmates on their own recognizance or creating a home arrest program 

(electronically monitored or otherwise) for 

sentenced inmates.
14

S e c t i o n 1 : 

Getting Started

■ Streamlined criminal justice case processing 

that results in shorter pretrial lengths of stay 

and thus a lower jail population.

■ Changes in law that could measurably increase 

or decrease the jail population, such as a state 

mandate that nonviolent felons serve jail time 

rather than a state prison sentence.

■ Inmate classification and separation requirements 

(see chapter 5, “Classification/Separation”).

■ Daily, monthly, and annual deviations from 

the projected trend line to examine population 

peaks (exhibit 2-3).

The bed capacity must be arrived at by a consensus of local officials using jail data, analysis of 

past and current forces impacting the jail population, and good judgment. A mathematical projection is only one tool to help in establishing the 

bed capacity.2

The results of a bed-capacity-setting process will 

include capacity projections broken down by:

Exhibit 2-3. Daily Counts and Average Annual 

Population

Annual population 

trend line

Peak range

Year 1 Year 2 Year 3

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

Daily count

Annual average

population

■ Year (for 10–20 years into the future for initial 

construction, and beyond for use in planning 

for expansion).

■ Types of beds needed (male/female, security 

or classification type, special needs, program 

or reentry), which will determine the number 

and size of the jail’s living units.

In addition, the capacity-setting process may recommend alternative policies and practices for the 

criminal justice system to limit the growth in the 

number of inmates or describe otherwise unexpected increases due to changes in policy or law.

Conditions that can lead to inadequate capacities 

in the future include the following:

■ Lack of adequate data about the past.

■ Trends that are difficult to interpret.

■ Poor implementation of alternatives to incarceration that are central to the adequacy of 

the selected capacity.

■ Unanticipated changes in law, philosophy, and 

culture.

Major Building Considerations

Once the capacity is set, reasonable conclusions 

about the general magnitude and character of 

the building can be reached by making basic 

decisions with respect to several major considerations. These allow preliminary calculations of 

required building square footage and thus allow 

the development of feasible options and accurate 

cost estimates. They also drive operational costs. 

Following are the major considerations to address:

■ Confirming the inmate classification/

separation system established during capacity 

setting.

2

 For additional guidance on establishing bed capacity, see David M. Bennett and Donna Lattin, Jail Capacity Planning Guide: A 

Systems Approach (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Corrections, 2009).
15 

C h a p t e r 2 : 

Predesign Planning

■ Determining the appropriate occupancy level 

for each classification of inmate (i.e., singleoccupancy cell, double-occupancy cell, 

multiple-occupancy cell, dormitory).

■ Establishing the method(s) by which inmate 

surveillance/supervision will occur in housing 

areas.

■ Estimating staffing needs relative to different 

design and management concepts.

■ Identifying the range of nonhousing functions 

in the jail that must be supported by space 

(e.g., booking, medical services, programs, 

administration).

■ Ascertaining which services (e.g., food, laundry) can be obtained elsewhere or to what 

outside agencies the jail might provide services 

through expanded facilities.

■ Deciding the degree of expansion to be 

accommodated.

Option Development

Once the planning team has a picture of jail 

space needs, it can begin to explore options for 

accommodating those needs. The team will see 

the shortfall between needed beds and support 

space and the existing jail capabilities. Can the 

needs be accommodated through a renovation of 

or addition to the existing jail? Can the existing 

jail accommodate the key supervision and occupancy concepts established? Is new construction 

the only practical way to provide capacity and 

solve other problems with the existing facility? 

Should facilities separate from the jail be provided for inmates assigned to work release or other 

types of programs? Can a multijurisdictional facility be created for all inmates or selected groups, 

such as females? What are the differences between downtown construction and building on 

the edge of town or at a remote site?

The needs assessment phase will help answer 

these questions and also develop an idea of the 

construction, project, and operational costs of 

each option as well as sources for the needed 

funds.

When Planning Works Well

Rather than viewing planning as a number of 

hurdles that stand in the way of getting a new 

building, jurisdictions should see it as an opportunity to ensure that they get the building they 

need—one that will serve the community for 

many years to come. Planning works best when:

■ It is done with considerable involvement of local government, which must fund the jail; the 

sheriff’s office or jail management authority 

staff who will work in the jail; other affected 

agencies in the criminal justice system; and 

citizens, whose taxes support the jail.

■ It results in these groups buying into the project and supporting it at each major phase, 

from funding to operations.

■ The jurisdiction gets a jail that fits its needs 

and budget.

To achieve these benefits, jurisdictions are advised to consider: planning to plan, who will do 

the work, and how long it will take.

Planning to Plan

It is important that:

■ Sufficient time is allocated to planning.

■ The process is understood by all of the 

participants.

■ Group authority and the decisionmaking 

process are outlined.

■ The tasks and steps are clearly organized.
16

S e c t i o n 1 : 

Getting Started

■ A timetable is followed.

■ Resources are allocated to planning.

The planning team will need to define the steps 

that the jurisdiction will take, develop a schedule 

for each phase, and obtain the staff time, money, 

and perhaps consultant expertise required to do 

the work.

Who Does the Work?

Can local staff do the predesign planning work? 

They may be able to if the jurisdiction has people 

available with the expertise and the time, but 

most do not. Because whoever develops the basis 

for the planning effort must be able to analyze 

the justice system and work with jail staff to 

describe the operations of the jail, most architects would not qualify either. In most cases, 

the jurisdiction will need to consider the use of 

consultants who are specialists in jail planning. 

They may be hired as part of the architectural or 

design-build team or separately, before the design 

team is selected. The latter arrangement has the 

advantage of establishing the scope of the project 

prior to negotiating fees, which are usually based 

on the size, cost, and complexity of the building.

How Long Does It Take?

The project recognition phase (phase 1) can take 

a great deal of time or very little time, depending 

on the jurisdiction. However, as a rule of thumb, 

if adequate data are available, jurisdictions 

should allow 4 to 6 months for the needs assessment, 4 to 6 months for facility program development, and 4 to 6 months for project definition 

and implementation. Additional time is often 

needed for data collection if the data cannot easily be retrieved, report writing, public and agency 

involvement, and county review and approval. 

Exhibit 2-4 shows an example of a predesign 

planning schedule.

Exhibit 2-4. Typical Allocation of Time for 

Predesign Planning

Phase 2 – Needs

Assessment

Phase 3 – Program

Development

Phase 4 – Definition and

Implementation Plan

Months
Section 2

Major Design Considerations

Chapter 3. Site Selection and Design. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Chapter 4. Image/Appearance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Chapter 5. Classification/Separation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Chapter 6. Surveillance/Supervision. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Chapter 7. Staffing Impact. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

Chapter 8. Security Perimeter. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 

Chapter 9. Criminal Justice Interface. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

Chapter 10. Functional Components and Relationships. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 

Chapter 11. Planning and Designing to Standards. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 

Chapter 12. Expansion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
Major Design Considerations

When predesign planning is complete, it is time for the architect and the client to 

undertake the design process. This process starts with preliminary schematic designs 

of a very basic nature. These initial designs explore a series of major considerations 

that will fundamentally influence the direction of the design well before individual 

spaces are drawn. They also allow for a preliminary estimate of staffing needs.

Each of these major considerations involves fundamental operational and security 

decisions that should have been made during the predesign planning process. They 

are, in essence, the “big ideas” that make the design work in the way intended by 

local officials, operators, and users.

This section identifies and elaborates on the major considerations relevant to jail 

design. Specific information about various jail components and spaces—the detail 

that completes a design—is given in section 3. The considerations addressed in this 

section are as follows:

■ Site selection and design.

■ Jail image and appearance.

■ Classification and separation.

■ Surveillance and supervision.

■ Staffing impact.

■ Security perimeter (the “envelope”).

■ Criminal justice interface.

■ Functional components and relationships.

■ Planning and designing to standards.

■ Expansion possibilities.

Although it is not the purpose of the Jail Design Guide, Third Edition to instruct on 

the predesign planning process, considerable planning and operational content is 

included in each discussion.
19

Chapter 3

Site Selection and Design

T

he location of the jail will affect its operations, access to other components of the 

criminal justice system, and the convenience of staff and visitors for years to come. It 

will also affect construction, project, and annual 

operating costs.

Site selection is frequently a difficult political issue. Finding a location acceptable to the public 

has been a major stumbling block to many projects, resulting in delays and, in some cases, the 

termination of an otherwise well-planned effort.

Careful site selection is one of the most important features of a successful facility development 

process, as is the consideration of a site’s impact 

on design. This chapter presents information 

about site selection and design needs that must 

be taken into account in choosing and developing a site for a new jail. The various issues surrounding site selection can be organized around 

three primary factors: size, location, and cost.

Site Size

The size of the site will greatly influence design. Size needs are a function of the size of the 

ground-level area of the building (including areas 

for nonjail functions) and other areas needed for 

expansion, parking, building access and roads, 

outdoor activities, landscaping buffers, and support elements such as outdoor equipment. In rural sites, nonbuilding elements may comprise 80 

percent of the site area.

Building Area 

When first considering site possibilities, it is important for jurisdictions to appreciate how much 

larger a new jail will be as compared with the 

existing jail. It is not unusual, for example, for 

new facilities to be four to six times larger than 

older facilities, even though they have only twice 

the capacity. This is typically due to the increase 

in bed capacity and several other key factors:

■ Increased requirements for square footage per 

bed in housing areas.

■ Increased provision of program and support 

space. 

■ Inclusion of oversized support and program 

areas to accommodate future expansion of 

bed capacity.

■ Compliance with jail standards.

Jurisdictions may expect the new jail to be only 

twice as large because the projected capacity 

need is only twice as great. This misperception 

has led to difficulties in developing a useful list 

of site possibilities and to early public commitments to sites that were too small.

The actual ground area required for the building 

is critical to determining site size. However, for 

the following reasons, ground area is rarely the 

same as the total square footage documented in 

the space program developed during predesign 

planning.

■ Irregular shapes. To achieve interior efficiency, 

many jails have irregular (e.g., nonsquare or 

nonrectangular) shapes that create unusable 

spaces between portions of the building 

(exhibit 3-1).

■ Multiple levels. Whereas small and mediumsized jails tend to be most effectively developed as one-level structures, larger facilities 

may require multiple levels because of their 

large size. Additionally, the facility, whatever 

the size, might be developed on multiple levels 
20

S e c t i o n 2 : 

Major Design Considerations

if it is to house other criminal justice functions 

(e.g., law enforcement, courts). Such multilevel structures might include a basement level 

for mechanical systems, computer rooms, and 

storage. Jurisdictions are cautioned against 

deciding to build a multilevel jail merely to 

save on the amount of site area needed. Before 

committing to a multilevel jail, jurisdictions 

should confirm that such a structure will not 

compromise the functioning and security of 

the building and will not increase staffing 

needs beyond acceptable and supportable levels. If a multilevel jail must be developed, the 

functions that must be on the ground 

level should be identified and potential sites 

studied to see if they can accommodate 

those functions. 

■ Two-tier housing. Some designs use two-tier 

housing—one cell over another and sharing 

a common single-level dayroom—thus saving 

ground area coverage.

Exhibit 3-1. Typical Irregular Shape of Jail

Unused site space

Building Expansion 

Many new jails are designed without consideration of the need to expand capacity in the future. With the many changes that have occurred 

and can occur in criminal justice philosophy, 

state law, and arrest rates, expansion planning 

must be part of any facility development process. 

In establishing the size of the required site, jurisdictions must consider the potential need for 

future expansion in the following areas:

■ Bed capacity.

■ Jail support services and program area.

■ Nonjail functions that share the building or 

site, for example:

❏ Law enforcement.

❏ Courts and court services.

❏ Clerk of courts.

❏ Prosecuting attorney.

❏ Probation/parole. 

❏ Pretrial services.

❏ Day reporting or other alternatives to 

incarceration.

❏ Other county offices.

In the absence of specific expansion plans, providing twice the area of the jail for expansion 

needs would not be unreasonable.

Parking 

The parking needs of a jail facility can be considerable and, at approximately 350–400 square feet 

per car, can represent a significant onsite requirement. Jurisdictions should consider the number 

of facility staff, family and professional visitors 

for inmates, and other visitors when determining 

the amount of space allocated for parking. 

Staff 

Planners should estimate one car per employee 

on the largest two shifts combined to allow adequate parking at shift change. For example, if 9 

employees work on shift 1 and 7 employees work 
21 

C h a p t e r 3 : 

Site Selection and Design

on shift 2, then 16 parking spots will be needed 

at shift change. It is also important to consider 

parking for administrative and support staff.

Inmate family and personal visitors 

Two cars for the maximum number of visitors allowed at one time allows enough parking for both 

the persons visiting and the persons arriving for 

the next visiting period. This provision assumes 

scheduling of visits so that visitors arrive sequentially rather than all at once. Without scheduling, 

parking demands will be greater. For example, 

if the maximum number of visitors during a visiting period is 20, then parking for 40 cars is necessary during the visiting period: 20 for current 

visitors and 20 for visitors waiting for the next 

visiting period. 

Others 

Parking spaces should also be allocated, as 

appropriate, for:

■ Arresting officers from city, county, and state 

agencies.

■ Outside service providers (doctors, nurses, 

counselors, volunteers, maintenance workers).

■ Work release inmates.

■ Official vehicles, such as transport vans and 

patrol cars.

■ Business/official visitors (lawyers, bondspersons, sales representatives, vendors, probation 

officers, judges, prosecutors, law enforcement 

officials).

Exhibit 3-2. Multiple Parking Areas

Patrol parking

Staff

parking

Public

parking

Number of parking areas 

A key consideration in determining parking needs 

is whether all parking can be in one large area or 

whether it must be in multiple areas with separate access. The chief advantage of a single large 

parking area is that during peak needs, such as 

those occurring at staff shift changes and during 

visiting, additional vehicles can be better absorbed into fewer overall parking stalls through 

scheduling. A primary advantage of multiple 

parking areas is that secured parking can be 

provided for staff cars and official vehicles that 

are sometimes subject to vandalism (exhibit 3-2). 

Additionally, separate areas tend to better recognize an official, professional status, particularly 

if select parking stalls are reserved or protected 

from the elements (such as shedlike covered 

areas or a parking structure). At a minimum, 

consideration should be given to establishing 

a certain number of reserved parking stalls if a 

single large area is developed.

Convenience and functionality are additional reasons to consider separate parking areas, accesses, 

and drives and their impact on site size. For 

example, it may be desirable to create separate 

parking for arresting officers near the booking 

area and near where they can reenter the facility 

to complete any remaining business pertaining 

to an arrest (e.g., filing reports or evidence, 
22

S e c t i o n 2 : 

Major Design Considerations

disposing of inmate property). Expansion needs 

must also be considered when calculating a facility’s parking and site needs.

Outdoor Spaces 

The principal outdoor areas needed for a jail are 

as follows:

■ Inmate exercise area(s), which can be walled, 

fenced, or unenclosed, depending on the security level of inmates. 

■ Emergency egress/refuge area, a controlled 

outdoor area where inmates can be temporarily evacuated in an emergency. This may be the 

same as the exercise area, if it is far enough 

from the main building to safely contain inmates (check local building and fire codes for 

more details).

■ Outdoor visiting area for minimum-security 

inmates, perhaps with table seating.

■ Farm or garden area, if the facility grows 

some of its own food or has an inmate work 

program.

■ General landscaping area for aesthetic purposes and the creation of buffers between the 

building and the public.

Exhibit 3-3. Common Facility Access Points 

Public

entry

Staff

entry

Work

entry

Deliveries

Arrest

entry

Access to the Site and the Facility

Land area will be needed for the vehicle driveways and pedestrian walks required for building 

access and services. The principal forms of access for which area must be provided include the 

following (exhibit 3-3):

■ Arrestee delivery and transport, frequently in 

association with a secure vehicle sallyport and 

a secure pedestrian entry.

■ Food service delivery, which may involve 

semi-trailer trucks.

■ Supply delivery, which may also require space 

for semi-trailer trucks.

■ Staff (affiliated with parking).

■ Public/official visitors (affiliated with 

parking).

■ Inmates, staff, or visitors with disabilities 

(affiliated with parking). 

■ Work release/periodic inmates, when, for security reasons, they enter and exit at a point 

different from that for arrestees and releases.

■ Garbage removal.

■ Emergencies, including medical and fire, 

which may require space for staging large 

vehicles.

■ Mechanical repair/equipment replacement.

■ Personnel from other agencies, such as law 

enforcement.

Support Elements 

Ground space may be needed for:

■ Radio antennas.

■ Gas tanks and pumps.
23 

C h a p t e r 3 : 

Site Selection and Design

■ Utilities (e.g., transformers, sewage treatment).

■ Water retention areas (in locations where onsite management of water runoff from heavy 

rainstorms is a concern).

■ Garbage dumpster/compactor.

■ Maintenance shop.

■ Storage buildings.

■ Special law enforcement needs (e.g., impound 

yard or building, vehicle service bay).

As “green” building increases in popularity, 

space may also be needed for geothermal sites 

and other green services.

Total Site Area 

The total area required for the site is the sum of 

the elements discussed above:

Site size = building area (multiplied by an 

irregular shape factor)

+ building expansion area 

+ parking areas and parking expansion 

+ outdoor spaces 

+ walk and drive access areas 

+ support element areas

When the size of the site has been determined, 

identification of a location can begin in earnest.

Site Location 

The location of the jail must satisfy the following 

major concerns: linkages, surroundings, views 

and inmate contact, existing jail sites, and technical requirements.

Linkages 

In locating the jail, several important relationships, or “linkages,” should be satisfied. The jail 

should be designed with awareness of relationship or proximity needs to:

■ Courts. Maintaining efficient and secure movement of inmates between the jail and the 

courts may be the single most critical linkage. A direct physical connection through 

secure walkways or tunnels is most desirable, 

although being on the same site is of some 

value. On the other hand, if inmates must be 

transported between the jail and the courts, a 

distance of a few blocks or a few miles makes 

little difference because most of the transfer 

time is taken up with readying the inmate and 

loading, unloading, and readmitting the inmate rather than with driving.

■ Sheriff’s law enforcement functions. These 

include investigations, interrogation, sharing 

of staff and facilities, and backup. It is considered most desirable to have a direct physical 

connection between the jail and other law 

enforcement functions, although being on the 

same site but unconnected is also valuable. 

This is especially true for smaller facilities that 

rely on law enforcement personnel for backup 

in the jail. (See chapter 9, “Criminal Justice 

Interface.”)

■ Services. It can be desirable for the jail to be 

convenient to lawyers, a health care center, 

educational resources, volunteers, employees’ 

homes, and community groups such as Alcoholics Anonymous. Additionally, proximity to 

emergency resources such as the fire department and medical emergency facilities is 

important.

■ Transportation. The jail should be easily accessible to all staff working in the facility as well 

as to visitors and others. Proximity to public 

transportation systems in the area is desirable.

Surroundings 

It is important that the jail be located in appropriate surroundings. If the jail is located in the 

right type of area, conflicts with different types 

of functions will be avoided. The best locations 
24

S e c t i o n 2 : 

Major Design Considerations

are in government, light industrial, or commercial areas. 

Views and Inmate Contact 

Controlling views and contact between inmates 

and people of the surrounding area is an important consideration in site selection and design. 

There are several typical problems: outdoor exercise areas, view conflicts from inmate-occupied 

areas, physical contact at the security perimeter, 

inmate workers, and arrestee entry.

Exhibit 3-4. Window Sill Height Above Floor 

Level Prevents View Conflict

Cell

Outdoor exercise areas 

The tendency to create an inexpensive, groundlevel exercise area that can double as an outdoor 

emergency refuge area can, especially in downtown areas, create sight, sound, and physical 

contact problems, especially escape and contraband passage through, under, or over fences.

To help resolve this, the use of solid walls, protective screens over the exercise area, and careful placement of exercise yards within the floor 

plan can be effective. (See chapter 19, “Exercise 

Areas.”)

View conflicts from inmate-occupied areas 

View conflicts can result, especially in downtown 

areas, from the use of windows to provide required or desired natural light in inmate-occupied 

areas. This is most acutely the case with cell 

windows at ground level, although view conflicts 

from program areas (e.g., multipurpose rooms) 

can also occur. Some solutions to the problem 

include:

■ Creating a heavily landscaped visual buffer 

(recognizing that trees and shrubs take time to 

grow).

■ Creating window sill heights well above floor 

levels (exhibit 3-4).

■ Using tinted or reflective glass in windows in 

conjunction with night lighting on the exterior 

of the building, to limit exterior-to-interior visibility while preserving inmate views and discouraging outside approaches to the building.

■ Using translucent glazing in windows to provide natural light only (if allowed by local 

standards and codes).

■ Using inaccessible skylights or clerestory windows to provide natural light and, possibly, 

a view of the sky. Clerestory lighting, in particular, has to be studied because views may 

unintentionally be created between the inmate 

areas and the upper portions of an adjacent 

midrise building.

■ Placing windows where they look out onto 

controlled exterior spaces, such as courtyards 

or walled-in areas (exhibit 3-5).

Another concern is view conflicts between different inmate-occupied areas where total visual separation is required (see chapter 5, “Classification/

Separation”). Care must be taken, for example, 

not to create view conflicts between male and 

female cell areas through exterior or interior 

windows.
25 

C h a p t e r 3 : 

Site Selection and Design

Physical contact at the security perimeter 

(the “envelope”) 

Physical contact with windows in inmate-occupied 

areas, especially housing areas at ground level, is 

a major concern in terms of escape and contraband passage. Responses include:

■ Building secondary perimeters (fences, walls).

■ Keeping sill heights as far above grade as 

possible.

■ Planting tough, thorny bushes around the 

perimeter to discourage spontaneous, random 

contact (although such plantings can provide a 

hiding place as well).

■ Using security glass in a secure window design 

(framing, anchoring, glazing, opening size), 

possibly also including alarm systems built 

into the window.

■ Eliminating exterior windows (where allowed 

and acceptable) and introducing natural light 

indirectly through better protected sources 

within the perimeter.

■ Using perimeter security systems (e.g., closed 

circuit television (CCTV), lighting, infrared 

systems, pressure sensitive systems), although 

careful consideration must be given to costs 

for the systems, staffing requirements to monitor such systems, and the aesthetic impact on 

site surroundings.

Exhibit 3-5. Placement of Window To Look Out 

Onto Controlled Space

Cell Courtyard

Screen

wall

Inmate workers 

Jail operations usually include an inmate work 

program in which inmates provide services inside the facility (e.g., kitchen and laundry workers) and sometimes outside the facility (e.g., car 

washing, lawn mowing). Such a program, and 

the visibility and contact it implies, should be 

considered in terms of its impact on surrounding 

land uses.

Arrestee entry 

Officers bring arrestees to the jail daily, sometimes with the arrestee in an agitated state. 

Although providing a fully enclosed vehicle sallyport for this purpose has become common, some 

facility programs may not include a sallyport. 

The absence of an enclosed sallyport presents 

view, sound, security, and even physical contact 

issues that may be totally inappropriate for certain sites, given the surrounding buildings and 

their functions.

Existing Jail Sites

Existing jail sites are frequently considered natural sites for new facilities because they are generally in good locations and are already accepted 

by the public for jail use. However, there are four 

typical concerns with existing jail sites: early demolition, integration of the existing jail, the effect 

on other criminal justice facilities, and historic 

preservation.

Early demolition 

If the existing jail must be demolished to make 

way for construction of the new facility, major 

inconvenience and cost can be incurred for:
26

S e c t i o n 2 : 

Major Design Considerations

■ Transporting and boarding inmates elsewhere 

during the entire construction period.

■ Making arrangements for short-term holding of 

arrestees or for holding arrestees who are required to make regular court appearances.

■ Ensuring timely court appearances.

■ Displacing associated law enforcement and 

criminal justice functions if they were also in 

the jail building.

Integration of the existing jail 

There is a temptation to reuse the existing jail for 

part of the new jail’s functions. Doing so would 

be disadvantageous were it to result in a relatively small amount of generally deficient jail space 

overly influencing and compromising the design 

of a significant amount of new facility space.

Effect on other criminal justice facilities 

When the jail is on the courthouse site, planners 

must be careful not to limit growth options for 

adjacent court and criminal justice functions by 

focusing the planning on the jail alone. In such 

cases, jurisdictions are advised to consider doing 

a master plan for the entire local justice system 

before making site commitments, to ensure that 

all needs are adequately accommodated. Planning for new facilities on existing courthouse/

criminal justice sites must also consider overall 

county government parking needs, which are frequently overlooked.

Historic preservation 

Existing jails, or the buildings that house existing 

jails, particularly if they are associated with the 

courts, frequently have historical value, if not to 

county officials, to citizens’ organizations and to 

state or federal officials. Jurisdictions considering demolition or renovation should ascertain 

the historical status and value of existing jails. It 

is also wise to check the historical status of any 

building that may be affected by the proposed 

project either now or in the future when expansion might occur.

Technical Requirements 

The design team should identify and deal with 

technical site design factors. Some of the technical factors are:

■ The types of soils on the site, which affect the 

height and cost of the building.

■ Utilities available at the site or the cost of carrying them to the site.

■ Topography, or slope, which affects site drainage and the potential for flooding.

■ Zoning, which could limit the height or square 

footage of the building or prevent its construction altogether.

■ Impact on traffic flow around the site.

■ Environmental impact studies.

Facade of a historic jail facility. 

(Photograph courtesy of Jim Rowenhorst.)
27 

C h a p t e r 3 : 

Site Selection and Design

Site Costs 

The cost factors associated with any given site 

can be a significant element in determining its 

desirability. Key cost factors include:

■ Acquisition costs, which may include legal 

costs if condemnation proceedings are 

required to obtain certain parcels or the entire 

proposed site.

■ Demolition costs for existing buildings and removing materials from the site.

■ Utility costs for bringing new utilities to a 

site or relocating existing utilities that would 

otherwise interfere with proper building development: gas, waste, storm sewer, telephone, 

electrical, and water lines. Utility costs can be 

quite high if the site under consideration must 

provide its own utilities, such as sewage treatment and water supply/treatment.

■ Site preparation costs, which can include significant grading of uneven sites, providing fill 

in low sites or sites with unstable soil conditions, and excavating rock to create basements 

or foundations.

■ Construction impact costs, which are additional costs that a site with special conditions or 

restrictions imposes on design or construction. 

Examples of conditions that impact construction costs are:

❏ Less flexibility in design, leading to a less 

efficient facility that requires more staff.

❏ Need for more elaborate and expensive exterior detailing, as with the greater needs 

of a downtown building next to a historic 

courthouse versus a rural site with no surrounding structures.

❏ Need for a more expensive, tight, or complicated midrise or highrise structure due to a 

lack of site area.

❏ Need for special basement foundation walls 

if the site is in a flood plain.

❏ Difficulty in staging construction due to limited land on which to store building supplies 

and set up construction headquarters.

❏ Site limitations that require underground 

parking or a parking structure.

■ Environmental impact study costs associated 

with producing, or hiring consultants to produce, the required information regarding the 

selected site and/or effect of the project on the 

surrounding environment.

■ Environmental cleanup costs associated with 

cleaning soil contaminated by gas and oil 

products or chemical spills.

■ Lost tax revenue costs as the result of losing 

tax-producing land (e.g., businesses, farms, 

personal residences) or revenue-producing land 

(e.g., county parking lots, rental property).

■ Transportation costs associated with providing 

staff and vehicle(s) for transporting inmates 

between the new jail site and the courthouse 

or other detention, corrections, or serviceproviding facilities. Additionally, a site remote 

from the courts might demand creating a secure vehicle sallyport and holding facilities at 

the courthouse for the secure management of 

inmates.

■ Boarding costs generated by housing inmates 

at another facility. A typical example is when 

use of the existing jail site requires housing 

all inmates at other facilities during the construction period.

■ Annual energy costs, which can differ according to site characteristics such as the presence 

of an aquifer that can be a source of chilled 

water to lessen air-conditioning and heating 

costs.
28

S e c t i o n 2 : 

Major Design Considerations

■ Phasing costs of doing construction in multiple 

steps due to special conditions such as keeping 

an existing jail open during initial construction 

but tearing it down part way through the project in order to complete the project. 

Site Selection Process 

If only in terms of initially identifying and generally evaluating site possibilities, site selection 

must be handled early in the planning process. 

Preferably, it is done during predesign planning, 

as discussed in chapter 2. In selecting a site, 

jurisdictions should follow these steps:

■ Define site needs, including size, type of location, and so forth.

■ Set other site evaluation criteria.

■ Identify potential sites.

■ Gather information and evaluate each site.

■ Allow for public input and discussion.

■ Select one site.

■ Acquire the site, if it is not already owned by 

the jurisdiction. If condemnation proceedings 

are needed to acquire parcels of a site, both 

time and funds may be required.

■ Prepare a master plan of the site and an environmental impact report, if required. Jurisdictions are advised that an environmental 

impact report can take a considerable amount 

of time to prepare.

Risks of Premature Site Selection 

Although early work on site selection is valuable, selecting the site too soon can be risky. Before selecting 

a site, a jurisdiction must develop enough information 

about the future operational space needs of the jail 

to answer the questions discussed in this chapter. 

Prematurely selecting a site that turns out to be too 

small or in the wrong location will result in a major 

setback in time, momentum, and, perhaps, money, as 

well as in embarrassment.

This happened in one jurisdiction in which the site 

was selected by the county (along with a federal 

agency) without any public knowledge or input and 

before facility requirements had been explored. 

When the location was revealed, it stirred up great 

controversy, although later it was determined that the 

site was too small anyway. Such situations can be 

avoided with proper planning done at the right time.

The site selection process can take quite a long 

time, especially if controversy or politics is involved. See the National Institute of Corrections’ 

Jail Site Evaluation and Selection,1

 part of the 

New Jail Planning series, for more detail on the 

site selection process.

1 Ken Ricci, Jail Site Evaluation and Selection (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Corrections, 2006), 

http://nicic.gov/Library/021280, accessed February 26, 2010.
29

Chapter 4

Image/Appearance

T

he jail projects an image and sends a message to the people who pass by, visit, work, 

or are confined there, although the way 

each person responds to the jail depends on why 

he or she is there. The building’s image helps 

people recognize the type of place it is and establishes their expectations of what will happen 

there, how they will be treated, and how they 

should behave.

The typical jail of the past is easily recognizable: hard and impenetrable, with steel bars and 

barbed wire. Many people now think that this 

traditional jail image is inappropriate, given new 

attitudes about the role and purpose of the jail; 

that is, the desire to elicit normal behavior and 

to create a positive and accessible addition to 

the local community. Older jails tend to convey a 

message only of punishment and inaccessibility.

Exterior

The outside of the building conveys a message 

to the public about law enforcement and the role 

of the jail in the community. Jurisdictions should 

decide whether they wish to convey an image of 

community service, deterrence, frugality, or some 

other quality.

In considering the jail’s appearance, jurisdictions 

should take into account the context in which it 

will be located. If it is to be located downtown, it 

may be important to repeat the materials, colors, 

and scale of surrounding buildings so that it fits 

in. If the jail is to be near or adjacent to other 

government buildings, it is probably desirable for 

the jail to complement those buildings to create a 

unified and identifiable government image. Even 

when facilities are located in rural areas, care 

should be taken to ensure that the building fits in 

its surroundings.

However, if the jail is to be located away from 

other buildings, the jurisdiction may be freer to 

choose the architectural elements desired. These 

might include less costly exterior building materials, such as decorative concrete block instead of 

brick.

The Lexington-Fayette County Adult Detention Center in Lexington, Kentucky, 

was designed to fit into a rural area with numerous horse barns. 

(Photograph courtesy of Dennis Liebert.)

Interior 

The interior image and character of the jail environment will be most important to staff and inmates, but will also be important to visitors. Staff 

will spend more time in the jail over the years 

than will individual inmates. The image and 

character of the jail interior can affect staff’s satisfaction with their jobs and can send a message 

about how they are perceived by their employers.
30

S e c t i o n 2 : 

Major Design Considerations

The interior of the jail can also express and reinforce an expectation about inmate behavior, since 

all people tend to respond to their environment. 

That is why good church design inspires quiet 

and reverence, why good field house design encourages openness and participation, and why 

good office design enhances productivity.

These concerns must be balanced against the 

perceptions of elected officials and the public. An 

interior that appears to be too nice to the casual 

observer can be interpreted as an intent to coddle 

inmates and create a hotel-quality environment. 

The mission statement of the jail (see chapter 2) 

will go a long way toward setting the aesthetic 

tone for the interior of the building.

Research has shown that where jails have eliminated the symbols of incarceration and provided 

a more normal setting, there have been positive 

effects on inmate behavior (e.g., a reduction in 

vandalism, assaults, and stress), as long as this 

approach is rooted in the actual operational philosophy used to manage the inmates. These jails 

tend to use elements such as carpet on the floor, 

wooden cell doors, nonfixed furnishings, bright 

colors, and lots of daylight. Although using these 

features may seem counter to ideas about what 

makes a jail secure, inmates tend to treat the jail 

with more respect if its design communicates to 

them that they are also going to be treated with 

respect.

Differentiating the physical character of housing 

units can also be used to reinforce good behavior. 

For example, disciplinary housing units could 

have a more traditional jail appearance, such 

as concrete floors and fixed furniture, than the 

normalized general housing units. Thus, a more 

normal environment can be a reward for good 

behavior.

Dayroom with carpet, wooden doors, and more normative furnishings. 

(Photograph courtesy of Voorhis Robertson Justice Services.)

Maintenance of Physical Security 

A more normal appearance does not require that 

security perimeters and fundamental construction 

be nonsecure. Floors underneath carpet can be 

concrete, and bright and pleasing paint can cover 

reinforced and grouted concrete masonry units. 

Wooden cell doors can be used in direct supervision general population units where penetration 

of the door will only allow the inmate access to a 

supervised dayroom in which an officer is always 

present, and daylight can be provided by securityglazed openings looking into secure-controlled 

exterior courtyards.

Operations: Key to Normalization 

The latitude that can be taken in creating a more 

normative environment depends to a significant 

degree on concepts of surveillance, staffing, and 

classification, as well as on a clearly defined security envelope and internal zoning system. An 

inadequately staffed facility that does not maintain constant surveillance over inmates, poorly 

classifies and separates inmates, and poorly defines and controls its security perimeter will have 
31 

C h a p t e r 4 : 

Image/Appearance

less success with concepts of architectural normalization. Concepts of appearance and character must be derived from, and intertwined with, 

concepts of operations and security.

Describing Desired Appearance 

After the jurisdiction considers the image and 

behavior it desires in the jail, the planning team 

must communicate its decisions to the design 

team. Adjectives should be used to describe the 

desired appearance of the new jail, or reference 

should be made to other buildings with the desired characteristics. Here are some contrasting 

adjectives to choose from:

■ Open/closed.

■ Spacious/confined.

■ Free/controlled.

■ Warm/cold.

■ Welcoming/rejecting.

■ Minimal/adequate/generous.

■ Light, bright/dark, dim.

■ Colorful/plain.

■ Soft/hard.

■ Friendly/unfriendly.

■ Safe/dangerous.

■ Caring/indifference.

It is essential that the planning team from the jurisdiction be clear about their desires and expectations so there is no misunderstanding when the 

facility design process begins.
33

Chapter 5

Classification/Separation

P

hysically separating classifications of inmates from each other remains a major 

design and operational problem for all jails. 

It is perhaps the problem that most distinguishes 

smaller jails from larger jails. This is because 

smaller jails must respond to the same variety of 

inmates as a medium or large jail, but generally 

have far less capacity with which to disperse and 

manage those inmates.

Housing units constitute about half of a jail’s 

square footage and are the primary security areas 

of the jail. Consequently, classification and housing area separation have a fundamental influence 

on basic design arrangements and facility success. Attaining proper separation in the nonhousing areas is also essential to successful design 

and ultimate compliance with jail standards.

Classification and the issues of surveillance/

supervision mode and staffing are closely linked. 

Consequently, readers are strongly advised to refer to chapter 6, “Surveillance/Supervision,” and 

chapter 7, “Staffing Impact,” when considering 

classification and separation issues.

Separation Problems

The difficulty of obtaining proper physical separation results from several basic problems: inmate types, cost of housing for different inmate 

types versus frequency of need, changes in inmate population, surveillance method, and cell 

occupancy.

Inmate Types 

All jails, even very small jails, must develop an 

inmate housing plan based on the types of inmates housed in the current facility and, if data 

are available, a projection of the future inmate 

population. This is done by reviewing inmate 

population types, or categories of inmates, and 

the number in each category. These data are then 

used to inform the design process to ensure that 

there is adequate housing for all categories of 

inmates.

When developing an inmate housing plan, the 

jurisdiction must consider which groups must be 

housed separately, and those that are traditionally housed separately, based on risk and need or 

legal reasons. However, depending on the supervision level in the facility, some of these categories might be housed together. These categories 

may include:

■ Males/females/transsexuals.

■ Adults/juveniles detained as adults.

■ Inmates with special needs, such as those with 

contagious diseases or severe mental health 

problems (including suicidal ideation and developmental or physical disabilities). 

■ Prior arrest and/or conviction history.

■ Prior incarceration experience.

■ History of assaultive behavior.

■ History of escape.

■ Short- and long-term stays.

■ Inmate workers/work release inmates.

■ Arrest for a violent offense.

■ Arrest for a drug- or alcohol-related offense.

■ Immediate health problems.

■ Intoxication.

■ Sexual predators.

■ Under medical treatment.

■ History of alcohol or drug abuse.
34

S e c t i o n 2 : 

Major Design Considerations

■ Violent and combative at intake.

■ Known enemies in the facility.

■ Gang members.

Unfortunately, many counties and 

designers dismiss the need for translating the separation needs of a classification system housing plan into 

the design of smaller jails. This may 

in part be due to an erroneous belief that smaller 

jails do not have to respond to the diversity of 

inmates encountered in larger jails. Experience 

has shown, however, that smaller jails must cope 

with many types of inmates—some of whom require physical separation and management—only 

in smaller numbers. 

Inmates who present management problems and 

require special consideration in housing placement typically fall into several categories:

■ Those who require protection and separation 

because they may be in danger from other inmates or are a danger to themselves.

■ Those who, by reason of their offense, criminal record, or institutional behavior, require 

enhanced security and close supervision.

■ Those who have received unusual publicity 

because of the nature of their charge or crime, 

the circumstances of their arrest, or the threat 

they pose to the public.

■ Those who, by reason of their mental or physical condition, require special housing.

Program Space Considerations 

In addition to using data on the characteristics 

of the current and projected jail population to 

make decisions about security levels, housing 

separations, and housing unit capacity, jail administrators and designers can use this information to make decisions about the type and size 

of program space needed in the new facility. For 

example, if projections are that the jail population will include a high percentage of persons 

with drug- or alcohol-use problems, jurisdictions can use this information when planning for 

counseling and program space. If the population 

is characteristically youthful, planners may want 

to program space for physical activity and educational opportunities accordingly.

Cost of Housing for Different Inmate Types 

Versus Frequency of Need

Attempting to provide a cell or housing unit for 

each type of inmate is impractical because some 

types of inmates appear at the jail rarely or infrequently (e.g., civil commitment, severe mental 

illness). Yet when they do appear, the jail must 

have the capability to provide appropriate physical, sight, and/or sound separation.

Changes in Inmate Population 

The makeup of the jail population can change 

considerably from year to year or month to 

month. Populations may go from two-thirds sentenced to one-third sentenced or from two-thirds 

felon to one-third felon in relatively short periods 

of time. The adult female population seems to be 

most vulnerable to major swings in peak as well 

as average daily counts and presents a significant 

design as well as management challenge. The 

impact of this variability tends not to be as extreme in a large jail, but is a special problem for 

smaller jails.

Surveillance/Supervision Method 

Different forms of housing unit surveillance and 

supervision, and related staff posting concepts, 

create different challenges in maintaining proper 

inmate separation. Three approaches—remote 

surveillance, intermittent surveillance, and direct 

supervision—are summarized below. Surveillance methods and staffing are addressed in 

greater detail in chapters 6 and 7, respectively.
35 

C h a p t e r 5 : 

Classification/Separation

Remote surveillance 

Remote surveillance designs, in which several 

housing units are clustered around a fixed control 

position, pose the greatest challenge, as visual 

and perhaps acoustic conflicts can occur between 

individual housing units as a byproduct of the 

clustering design (exhibit 5-1).

Intermittent surveillance 

The success of podular/direct supervision over 

the past 20 years has caused most jurisdictions 

that are planning new facilities to eliminate or 

minimize the traditional linear jail design that relies on intermittent surveillance. In the intermittent surveillance model, the location and size of 

housing units are not closely tied to the location 

of a staff post; therefore, this model allows for 

many separate cellblocks and thereby facilitates 

the physical separation of inmates. However, 

intermittent surveillance has many operational 

drawbacks. Visual and acoustic separation capabilities are lost when housing units are located 

across from each other, back-to-back with each 

other, or next to each other in one common cellblock area (exhibit 5-2). Many intermittent surveillance designs use steel bars on cell and dayroom 

fronts, thereby sacrificing sound separation and, in 

some cases, sight and physical separation.

Exhibit 5-1. Remote Surveillance Housing Unit

Control

Housing

unit 

Housing

unit 

Housing

unit 

Sound and

view conflict 

Direct supervision 

Separation tends not to be a problem with direct 

supervision because the units can operate in an 

essentially self-contained manner, thereby eliminating the need to affiliate them with control positions outside the unit or to expose them to full 

views from corridors.

Exhibit 5-2 . Intermittent Surveillance Housing Unit

Sound transfer

through door

Sound transfer through

pipe chase vent 

Cell Cell

Housing

unit 

Housing

unit 

Housing

unit 

Cell Occupancy 

Older jails have much of their capacity in 

multiple-occupancy cells and dormitories that 

often compromise classification and physical 

separation decisions, especially when cells with 

four or more beds predominate. In such a jail, 

when an inmate requires separation from other 

inmates, he or she effectively occupies four beds 

rather than one. Furthermore, proper separation 
36

S e c t i o n 2 : 

Major Design Considerations

still cannot be achieved because the “special 

housing” cell is part of an entire cellblock. The 

traditional bar grill cell-front design only worsens 

this problem, because not even physical separation can be fully achieved.

Classification Systems 

A logical first step toward resolving separation 

problems in design is for the local community 

and jail administrators to identify the number 

and types of inmates with whom they must deal 

and to classify them into appropriate groups. 

Classification is a process of systematically assessing the risks and needs of jail inmates in 

order to respond to safety, security, health, and 

programmatic concerns. In some cases, the 

classification plan calls for separate housing 

of certain classification categories or requires 

that inmates in certain categories be housed in 

space equipped to handle their particular needs. 

Because of space limitations and the many classifications that can be established, a classification 

plan should also specify which types of inmates 

can be housed together.

Bar front cells in an intermittent surveillance facility.

Jail classification systems have improved, but 

some tend to be very subjective, in that they 

require independent judgments by jail personnel 

making the classification decision. In general, the 

subjective approach is based on determining an 

inmate’s relative conformance with several basic 

criteria (rules, regulations, policies, and procedures) that are extensions of the agency’s correctional mission and physical plant capability.

Objective jail classification systems are preferable 

because they minimize subjectivity by using classification criteria to which weights or values have 

been assigned. An objective classification process 

promotes fundamental fairness and consistency, 

two attributes that the courts increasingly look 

for when evaluating the adequacy of classification systems.

When and Where Classification Occurs 

Initial classification typically takes place during 

the intake process in the booking area. If the jail 

does not have either holding cells in the receiving area or an intake housing unit, new inmates 

are assured of swift transfer into the general inmate population unless some means of release 

can be arranged almost immediately. Many jails 

rely heavily on multiple-occupancy cells that 

hold two or more inmates. These cells are not 

appropriate for inmates who have not yet been 

classified, as they can provide the opportunity for 

several foreseeable problems, including assaults, 

intimidation, fights, spread of disease, and passage of contraband.

If holding cells are available, classification decisions must be made during the inmate’s initial 

stay in temporary holding. If the facility has 

an intake housing unit for initial stays of up to 

72–96 hours, observation of inmate behavior and 

classification can take place in a more deliberate 

fashion.
37 

C h a p t e r 5 : 

Classification/Separation

After classification, inmates are given a housing 

assignment consistent with their risk and needs 

assessment. However, an appropriate housing 

assignment is only possible if the facility design, 

and the separation it provides, is compatible with 

the established system.

Juveniles 

With regard to housing juveniles in an adult jail, 

most standards call for housing only those who 

are subject to trial as adults and, even then, only 

if they are kept separate from adults. All other 

juveniles should be housed in separate facilities. 

Despite professional positions on this subject, the 

housing of juveniles remains a serious problem 

for geographically remote counties with small or 

medium-sized jails.

Given the sometimes protracted nature of the 

judicial process, housing juveniles to be tried as 

adults can involve stays of many months. This 

presents a real design and operational dilemma, 

in that the jurisdiction should probably provide 

enhanced supervision for juveniles. From a design perspective, however, it is difficult to achieve 

physical, sight, and sound separation for one or 

a few juvenile inmates without isolating them, 

thus reducing the potential for proper supervision 

and increasing the likelihood of problems such as 

vandalism, assault, depression, or suicide.

As difficult as the juvenile housing problem is for 

smaller jails, especially those in geographically 

remote areas, it is always more suitable to pursue alternative placement for juvenile inmates. 

Their presence in an adult jail presents nearly 

insurmountable operational and design problems. 

Jurisdictions should strive to place juveniles in 

facilities designed and operated exclusively for 

juveniles. 

Resolving the Numbers Problem in Smaller Jails: 

Multijurisdictional Options 

The basic classification problem for 

smaller sized jails is one of numbers. 

There are simply not enough inmates 

in most special categories to make 

complete separation consistent with 

an ideal classification system. Neither clever design nor advances in technology can ever fully 

bridge the gap, especially if affordable staffing 

patterns and facilities are required. Economics 

requires most small and medium-sized jails to 

house all inmate classifications in a single facility 

rather than provide one facility for adult males, 

one for adult females, and one for juveniles.

One way to solve the numbers problem is to 

create larger sets of numbers by pooling the resources of several jurisdictions to build one larger 

facility. Increasing the jail capacity solves other 

problems as well by creating more economical 

staff-to-inmate ratios and opportunities to provide more quality programs and services.

Although the multijurisdictional approach is 

sometimes problematic politically and may present difficulties with transportation, visiting, and 

local holding, many counties already engage in it 

to a minor degree through the occasional leasing 

of bed space on a per diem basis. Some counties 

find it easier to form limited multijurisdictional 

solutions for special, small, hard-to-manage classifications such as juveniles and women.

The National Institute of Corrections publication 

Small Jail Special Issues1 addresses the multijurisdictional issue and references other sources 

on this option. When creating local classification systems, jurisdictions should consider the 

potential impact of a multijurisdictional approach 

on staffing, design, and costs.

1 Dennis A. Kimme, Gary M. Bowker, Bruce R. Bounds, Robert G. Deichman, and Harry L. Baxter. Small Jail Special Issues

(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Corrections, 1986).
38

S e c t i o n 2 : 

Major Design Considerations

Designing for Proper Separation 

To design the jail for proper separation of inmates, jurisdictions should consider the following 

issues during the planning and design process:

■ The types of inmates expected to be housed.

■ The degree of separation these types of inmates require.

■ Options for housing area flexibility.

■ The strengths and weaknesses of different surveillance methods.

■ The use of temporary holding cells.

■ The use of single-occupancy cells.

■ Separate housing for work release and periodicsentence inmates.

■ Privacy needs.

Inmate Types 

Jail staff should identify the various types of inmates that will be detained in the new jail facility. A key part of this endeavor is to identify the 

types of inmates that require separate housing. 

Smaller jails may send these inmates to other facilities, either within the county or elsewhere.

The following inmate types should be considered 

for alternative housing, either in the proper type 

of cell within the jail or in other facilities in the 

community: 

■ Juveniles.

■ The acutely mentally ill.

■ Those who are suicidal.

■ Those requiring medical isolation.

■ Those who are acutely intoxicated.

It is recognized that most inmates, including 

some or all of those in the groups listed above, 

must be detained at the jail, even if for very brief 

periods. These special needs inmates can cause a 

strain on space, management, and staff training 

needs, and a plan must be in place to deal with 

the requirements of these inmates in the design 

process. During the planning process, jurisdictions should carefully determine the probable 

long-term availability of outside resources for 

special groups before designing a jail without the 

capability to house them.

Degree of Inmate Separation Required 

It is important to identify the degree of separation required among various inmate groups. 

Separation should be considered between housing areas, during movement through the facility 

to program or service areas, and during programs 

and services.

Housing area separation

The degree of separation needed in the housing 

area varies greatly for different groups. Physical 

separation may be all that is necessary between 

some groups of adult male populations. For example, only physical barriers may be needed to 

separate the high-security adult male population 

from the general adult male population. Sight 

and sound separation may not be a critical 

issue. On the other hand, sight and sound separation, as well as physical separation, are commonly required between the male and female 

housing areas.

Sound separation is required to prevent harassment between groups, eliminate undesirable 

communication, attain proper privacy, and 

eliminate disturbances between groups. Different 

kinds of sound might be controlled:

■ Normal conversation.

■ Shouting.
39 

C h a p t e r 5 : 

Classification/Separation

■ Television and other artificially generated 

sounds.

■ Impact sounds (banging, kicking, tapping).

■ Noise from group movements.

Total sound separation is typically required between men and women and between juveniles 

and adults. Total sound separation of mentally 

disturbed inmates may also be desired. Sound 

separation between inmates, however, should not 

preclude or impede staff/inmate communication.

Conversational sounds can be managed by the 

use of solid, insulated partitions between adjacent areas (exhibit 5-3). The isolation of other 

sounds may not only require heavier partitioning but sound-conscious detailing of doors and 

other openings that might allow the transmission 

of sounds through corridors and shared openings (e.g., jointly used security vestibules). Total 

sound isolation can frequently be achieved only 

by locating areas requiring isolation from each 

other in different parts of the facility.

Sound can also be transmitted through ceiling 

plenums, ductwork, and electrical outlets placed 

back-to-back between two areas. Consequently, 

close review of these details is required to preclude 

unwanted sound transmission, especially for 

high-security groups.

Exhibit 5-3. Using a Storage Area To Buffer 

Sound

Exercise

(noisy)

Storage

(buffers sound)

Visiting

(quiet)

Movement separation

Separation during times of movement must 

be considered. Is it acceptable to have female 

inmates walk past adult male housing units and 

therefore have the opportunity to see and to be 

seen? Whether this is acceptable depends on 

applicable state standards and what has been 

deemed to be acceptable practice in the jurisdiction. However, passage through another area may 

not be objectionable in terms of having a disciplinary detention classification of male inmates 

move past other adult male housing units, even 

though physical, sight, and sound separation may 

be required between their housing units.

One way to prevent sight and sound contact during movement is to identify the basic degrees of 

separation desired in housing, to create appropriate clusters of housing accordingly, and to locate 

key program and service areas between those 

clusters (exhibit 5-4). Such positioning enables 

inmates from the various clusters to move to program and service areas without having to directly 

pass the housing units of the classifications from 

which they must be totally separated.

Exhibit 5-4. Program Area Located Between 

Housing Units for Sight and Sound Separation

Exercise

Housing Housing
40

S e c t i o n 2 : 

Major Design Considerations

Program/service area separation

Separation in program and service areas might 

be treated differently than separation for housing 

and movement or might lead to special design 

considerations in joint-use areas. For example, 

although it may be desirable to separate the 

housing areas of the general male population 

from those of the inmate worker population and 

to separate women from each of these, some inmates in each category might participate jointly 

in alcohol counseling programs or wait in a 

common area for medical exams, depending on 

classification goals and methods of supervising 

the activities. To some degree, proper separation might be attained through the scheduling of 

key activities, since the flow through these areas 

might be limited.

Attaining desired separation in the intake-release 

area is critical because all arrestees, and sometimes inmates who are being released or transferred (including inmates going to court), pass 

through this area. When considering the design 

of this area, it is desirable to plan for separate 

areas for the booking and release of inmates and 

a separate transportation area for those inmates 

going to court or leaving the facility. Concern 

here centers on attaining proper separation for 

the following purposes:

■ Temporary holding cells for the management 

of loud, disruptive, violent, and medical/

mental health inmates.

■ Use of telephones.

■ Searches (controlling contraband dumping or 

exchange).

■ Showers and dress-out.

The design of this area is discussed in greater 

detail in chapter 14, “Intake-Release.”

Options for Housing Area Flexibility 

Given periodic changes in population mix, it is 

essential that jurisdictions explore options for 

flexibility in housing area development. Possibilities include special management housing and/or 

general housing in smaller jails.

Special management housing in 

smaller jails 

Given that some types of inmates appear at the jail rarely or infrequently, 

opportunities might exist for creating 

housing units that can serve more 

than one type of special management 

inmate. This kind of multiuse housing capability 

requires that the groups sharing the space not be 

in the facility at the same time and have similar 

design requirements. This might also be an option for medium-sized jails.

A key concept to evaluate is the creation of a 

constantly monitored special management area 

(exhibit 5-5). This area might consist of several 

small housing units that feature single-occupancy 

cells as well as dayrooms, showers, and so forth. 

This area would be separated from other areas of 

the jail with respect to sight, sound, and physical 

contact and would offer the same level of separation between individual special management units. 

It also would be flexibly designed to accommodate 

the various applicable groups.

Exhibit 5-5 . Special Management Area in a 

Smaller Jail

Special

housing

Main Jail

Control

Special

housing

Special

housing
41 

C h a p t e r 5 : 

Classification/Separation

A special management area might be used for the 

following types of inmates, which smaller jails 

generally encounter only on a rare, irregular, or 

infrequent basis: 

■ Those requiring medical isolation.

■ Material witnesses.

■ Juveniles bound over to adult court.

■ Those with physical or mental disabilities.

■ Those requiring administrative segregation because they are dangerous or disruptive.

■ Those needing protective custody because they 

are at risk from others.

General housing in smaller jails 

Since the general population of a small or 

medium-sized jail can change considerably, it is 

a good idea to consider whether an area that is 

basically designed for low-security adult males, 

for example, might on another occasion accommodate high-security adult males. This type of 

flexibility can be accommodated in two basic 

ways: subdividing the capacity of the jail or 

planning for “swing” space.

Subdividing the capacity of the jail. Jurisdictions 

can subdivide the capacity of the jail into units 

small enough to accommodate the growth or 

decline of certain groups by, say, four to eight 

inmates simply by reassigning a couple of key 

swing housing areas.

Because this problem of variation seems to affect 

the adult male population the most, it would be 

wise to concentrate the entire male population 

into several basic units exclusive of the special 

housing areas. For example, where the adult male 

population demands a total of 64 new beds in 

two basic classifications, one being a generalpopulation unit of 48 beds and the other a highsecurity unit of 16 beds, it might be better to 

subdivide that grouping even further. Such a subdivision could be 32 beds for general population, 

16 beds for high security, and 16 beds (or two 

groups of 8 beds) for swing space that accommodates variations in population.

Planning for swing space. Another kind of flexibility desirable in general housing relates to the 

need to handle the occasional overflow of female 

inmates. Although the female population of most 

smaller jails is relatively low, the size of this population will surge upward periodically, usually 

for short periods of time. During such times, the 

overflow of inmates from female housing 

areas must be housed elsewhere. Swing space 

can absorb overflow for short periods if it has 

been properly designed to provide the necessary 

separation by sight, sound, and movement.

The flexibility required by these two approaches 

suggests a more standardized approach to the design of furniture, equipment, and hardware. 

Strengths and Weaknesses of Different 

Surveillance Methods 

Each of the basic surveillance/supervision methods discussed earlier in this chapter has an impact on the ability to attain proper sight, sound, 

and physical separation between various inmate 

categories. Although surveillance methods are 

discussed in chapter 6, it is not premature at this 

stage to identify the surveillance methods and 

their various strengths and weaknesses with regard to separation.

Direct supervision 

Direct supervision is a very effective approach for 

managing the behavior of inmates. It allows staff 

to be in total control of all spaces and activities 

within the jail. Inmates are under constant staff 

supervision. The principal effect of direct supervision on inmate classification is positive because 

it allows for the merging of some populations 
42

S e c t i o n 2 : 

Major Design Considerations

that otherwise might not be housed together. 

For example, there may not be a need to create a 

medium security group and to separate it from a 

minimum security group. In addition, with direct 

supervision, there is less concern about slight 

variations in the makeup of the population as it 

changes over time.

The direct supervision model can be 

more difficult to implement in the 

smaller jail, due to the staffing levels 

required to directly supervise smaller 

groups of inmates. Some smaller 

jails have implemented direct supervision in 

one general population adult male module and 

used remote surveillance in the remainder of the 

housing areas (e.g., females and special management), due to their smaller numbers.

Intermittent surveillance 

Intermittent surveillance approaches, such as 

those used in linear jails, do not assume that 

staff will observe housing units constantly and 

therefore place no special requirements on grouping the various units around a constantly staffed 

post. The use of intermittent surveillance allows 

housing clusters to be dispersed for physical, 

sight, or sound separation.

However, intermittently monitored facilities tend 

to have greater operational problems dealing with 

assaults, suicides, escape attempts, and vandalism. Consequently, if this approach is adopted in 

lieu of constant surveillance or supervision, the 

separation of inmates should be more discriminating to ensure minimal density in each housing area and physical separation of inmates who 

pose security or management risks. However, 

physical separation cannot fully compensate for a 

lack of staff presence. It is recommended that facilities using intermittent surveillance design the 

building with higher security construction.

Remote surveillance 

Design that allows the constant view of inmates 

by staff in remote surveillance settings (commonly referred to as “podular remote” or “podular 

indirect” design) helps mitigate some differences 

in classification that call for separation of certain 

groups. However, although superior to intermittent surveillance in terms of reduced operational 

problems, remote surveillance poses a challenge 

to attaining necessary physical, sight, and sound 

separation between the different housing units 

under the supervision of the staff post. The presence of staff behind a barrier tends to minimize 

the effect of such separation problems, but it 

does not mitigate the fact that staff sitting in a 

control post or making periodic rounds through 

a housing unit find it difficult to manage the behavior of inmates or to take a proactive role in 

managing the pod.

In designing for remote surveillance, the following special concepts should be implemented to 

mitigate sight and sound separation problems:

■ Creation of separate housing clusters for 

groups that require complete separation. For 

example, all-male clusters could be developed 

separate from all-female clusters.

■ Control of sound through the use of solid construction consisting of security glass and concrete block or concrete wall elements instead 

of bar or grill cellblock faces. Not only do 

acoustic and physical separation demand that 

dayroom faces be solid, but fire codes typically 

do as well. Walls should extend past ceilings 

and above roof construction, and/or ceilings 

should be secure and resistant to sound transmission through ceiling plenums. 

■ Control of views by the manipulation of dayroom faces, dividing walls, and the use of other barriers, such as intervening corridor doors.
43 

C h a p t e r 5 : 

Classification/Separation

■ Control of views by placing housing units 

above each other.

■ Use of reflective glass surfaces in the control 

position to eliminate views through the control 

center to other housing units. Some administrators feel that the inability of inmates to see 

the officer through such obscured glazing has 

a positive behavioral influence, in that inmates 

never know when the officer is watching 

them. Such an approach is not without problems, however. Reflective glass can limit the 

control officer’s view by creating darker, more 

reflective surfaces through which to look. This 

problem is complicated when light levels are 

higher in the control center than in the areas 

being viewed. This approach also tends to depersonalize the jail environment by hindering 

inmate/officer interaction.

Officer in control station in remote surveillance, two-tiered housing unit. 

(Photograph courtesy of Liebert & Associates.)

Use of Temporary Holding Cells 

The use of temporary holding cells in and around 

the booking area may help minimize classification problems because many arrestees are 

released very quickly from jail. These people include some who would require separation within 

the jail, such as the intoxicated and the mentally 

ill, who are referred to more appropriate serviceproviding agencies. 

Use of Single-Occupancy Cells 

Multiple-occupancy spaces such as dormitories 

reduce flexibility and the ability to subdivide the 

population into distinct groups. Single-occupancy 

cells not only improve inmate management but 

allow greater flexibility in limiting the capacity of any given housing unit. They also prevent 

inmate-on-inmate assaults during lockdown periods (e.g., sleeping hours) when staff surveillance 

and supervision are normally reduced.

For information on the standards and legal issues 

affecting the design and use of sleeping and holding cells, see chapter 27, “Single Versus Multiple 

Occupancy.”

Separate Housing of Work Release and 

Periodic-Sentence Inmates 

Two groups that pose a special problem in terms 

of the introduction of contraband into the facility 

are work release and periodic-sentence inmates 

(typically weekenders). Because both of these 

groups of inmates leave and return to the jail on 

a daily or other regular basis, they have ample 

opportunity to obtain and arrange for the passage 

of drugs, weapons, and other contraband that 

may be desired by other inmates. When housed 

with other general population inmates they may 

be threatened and coerced to carry contraband or 

weapons into the facility. Consequently, inmates 

on work release and those with periodic sentences may share a housing unit, but it should be 

completely separated from the rest of the inmate 

population, particularly from inmate workers 

who, as part of their work detail, frequently move 

throughout the jail.

Some of the problems associated with these 

inmates may be handled operationally. To guarantee total separation of work release and periodicsentence inmates from the rest of the inmate 
44

S e c t i o n 2 : 

Major Design Considerations

population, the following design considerations 

apply: 

■ Separate areas for initial intake and release.

■ Separate housing units.

■ Separate entrance and exit.

■ Separate visiting and recreation areas.

■ Separate laundry facilities, so that contraband 

may not be passed into the general population 

by laundry workers.

■ Potentially separate food staging or food 

service area.

These design approaches are discussed in greater 

detail in chapter 16, “Special Housing.”

Privacy Concerns 

The issue of privacy comes into play in two 

ways. The first is when one inmate type passes 

the area of another inmate type. Of particular 

concern is when inmates of one gender pass the 

housing area of the other gender and the design 

is such that they can view toilet and shower 

areas.

This same consideration also applies in relation 

to staff, who must be able to supervise shower 

and toilet areas without unnecessary invasion of 

privacy. Design of the shower and toilet areas, as 

well as other areas with a privacy implication, 

must allow for the prospect that staff of the opposite gender will be working in and around the 

housing unit.
45

Chapter 6

Surveillance/Supervision

Akey operational decision that has a major 

impact on facility design is the method of 

inmate supervision or surveillance to be 

used. Concepts of surveillance and supervision 

have much to do with the way in which jail spaces are organized, with the amount of time staff 

are in physical or visual contact with inmates, 

and with the number of staff required to manage 

the facility effectively. The degree to which the 

jail is a safe and secure facility in which to live 

and work depends greatly on these concepts and 

how they are translated into design.

The issue of surveillance and supervision is 

closely linked to the issues of classification/

separation and staffing. Readers are advised to 

refer to chapter 5, “Classification/Separation,” 

and chapter 7, “Staffing Impact,” when considering surveillance and supervision.

Methods of Surveillance/Supervision 

There are at least four basic approaches to 

observing or supervising inmates: direct supervision, remote surveillance, intermittent 

surveillance, and electronic monitoring. The 

fundamental difference between them is that the 

first two require the constant presence of staff 

and, therefore, fixed staff posts and the other two 

do not, thereby leaving inmates without supervision for significant periods of time (up to 60 minutes in many jurisdictions). The application of 

these four methods within housing units is 

described next.

Constant Staff Presence Required 

Direct supervision 

In this method, no barriers separate staff from 

inmates. Jail staff members are constantly positioned within each housing unit in direct contact 

with inmates (exhibit 6-1). The word “supervision” is used because the staff officer can actually manage, supervise, interact with, and control 

inmate activities and behavior when in direct 

contact, rather than just watch and react, as is 

the case when staff members are separated from 

the inmates by a physical barrier.

Remote surveillance 

Remote surveillance results in a facility designed 

with a series of podlike units that ring a central 

or master control station that is constantly occupied by jail staff. The staff member is outside 

the housing units rather than inside—that is, 

remote from the inmates. In this arrangement, 

staff are always able to look directly into the 

housing units or activity areas and can maintain 

a constant level of surveillance. However, interaction between the inmates and the control station 

staff is minimal. The interaction may be limited 

to verbal communication through an intercom, 

passthrough, or wire mesh or to a crude system 

of hand signals and window tapping. The role of 

the staff person at this fixed post is essentially 

that of observer. Direct interaction with inmates 

is accomplished through use of a roving officer 

who moves in and out of the housing area “as 

needed” or on an unscheduled basis.

Exhibit 6-1. Direct Supervision Housing Unit 

Dayroom

Cells

Staff

Pod

Direct Supervision
46

S e c t i o n 2 : 

Major Design Considerations

Periodic Staff Presence Required 

Intermittent surveillance 

With this method, staff are actually posted in a 

different area of the jail than the inmates and, 

therefore, have only intermittent, periodic contact 

with them, usually for minutes, or even seconds, 

at a time (exhibit 6-2). Although staff frequently 

and regularly patrol inmate-occupied areas 

(typically once per hour or once per half hour), 

inmates are largely responsible for their own 

behavior. In some cases, electronic surveillance 

is used to compensate for the lack of constant 

staff presence around the inmates. This method 

of surveillance is rarely used in new jails today 

and, if used, should only be used for selected 

low-security populations such as inmate workers 

and work release inmates. The key design impact 

of this concept is that housing unit or support 

space locations are not directly dependent on 

staff placement because staff play a minimal role 

in these areas. 

Electronic monitoring 

Consisting of closed-circuit television (CCTV) or 

listening devices, or both, this method of surveillance generally does not involve any frequent 

or routine staff presence in the cell areas, but is 

merely a monitoring capability from a remote 

Exhibit 6-2. Intermittent Surveillance

Dayroom

Staff corridor

Cells

location. This method also has no direct bearing on the arrangement of space in relation to 

staff positions. Indeed, in extreme cases found 

in some older small jails, the monitoring center 

is not even in the same building. The limitations of such a system are well documented and 

include a less than desirable view of the area to 

be monitored; frequent vandalism, tampering, or 

destruction of monitoring devices in the inmateoccupied area; and poor reception on monitors 

due to environmental conditions.

Design Considerations 

The remainder of this chapter provides design 

information about the four surveillance and supervision methods. The focus is on those things 

that have a significant impact on overall design 

arrangement as well as some of the details that 

affect the successful implementation of those 

concepts.

Selecting Inmate Management and 

Supervision Modes 

The place to begin in managing the design elements resulting from surveillance/supervision 

modes is to match the various classifications of 

inmates to preferred surveillance/supervision 

approaches. Jurisdictions do not need to select 

one mode of surveillance/supervision for all 

types of inmates. In fact, a commitment to a single approach could be quite detrimental to 

the operation of a facility. Rather, it is possible, 

if not desirable, to use a variety of methods according to the level of control desired for each 

classification.

It is clear, for example, that even though direct 

supervision may be the most desirable form of 

managing general population inmates, it is probably not appropriate as the sole means of supervision for such groups as disciplinary detention 

inmates or inmates whose behavior poses serious 

dangers to staff and other inmates. Additionally, 
47

C h a p t e r 6 : 

Surveillance/Supervision

the commitment of full-time staff to constant supervision of inmate workers or inmates on work 

release may seem unnecessary and is probably 

not practical, given the low-security nature of 

those classifications. Intermittent surveillance 

may be adequate for inmates on work release 

and inmate workers but have serious limitations 

for inmates who pose high-security risks and 

those in administrative segregation. 

Staffing Versus Facility Durability 

In considering the architectural impact of a 

surveillance/supervision approach, one fundamental thought about the interrelationship 

of staff, surveillance, and architecture should 

be kept in mind: Staff and the surveillance/

supervision mode tend to be more critical to 

security than architecture.

None of the so-called state-of-the-art security 

hardware and materials will resist unrestrained 

attack. Even though security hardware and construction are meant to take abuse and contain 

an inmate population, they cannot provide total 

security by themselves. Buildings contain behavior, people (staff) control behavior. The key 

to security is a balance among the elements of 

proactive supervision (where staff and management provide fundamental security and safety), 

technology, and architecture. 

Remote Surveillance Design 

The following issues are important to consider 

in the use of remote surveillance design (also 

known as “podular remote” and “podular indirect” design) (exhibit 6-3) in housing and 

nonhousing areas: the number of staff posts, unwanted views between inmates, the staff view of 

housing areas, whether the staff post is closed or 

open, surveillance of movement, monitoring of 

support areas, sound control, lighting, and furniture and equipment. 

Exhibit 6-3. Remote Surveillance Housing Pod

Overhead view of a 46-bed, double-tier remote 

surveillance housing pod. Cells ring the perimeter 

and housing control is in the center.

Number of staff posts 

A key consideration in designing a cluster of cells 

for remote surveillance is identifying the number 

of staff posts that will be required to achieve the 

proper balance between security and economy. 

The type and number of inmates to be monitored 

from a single post must be carefully evaluated, 

as this will have a significant effect on the overall 

arrangement of the facility and on the degree of 

separation and classification that can be attained. 

Unwanted views between inmates 

The greatest challenge in developing the remote 

surveillance concept in housing is to provide officers with a full view of all areas they are expected to observe from a fixed post and, at the same 

time, avoid conflicts in views between the individual housing units associated with that post. 

The primary way to avoid unwanted views between inmates is to locate control stations so that 

the same staff are not required to observe inmate 

types that require separation (exhibit 6-4). 

However, designing to accommodate minimum 

staffing levels frequently requires that different 
48

S e c t i o n 2 : 

Major Design Considerations

Exhibit 6-4. Placement of Control Stations To 

Prevent Unwanted Views Between Inmates

Housing

control 

officer

Booking

control

officer

Central

control

officer

General

male 

housing 

Mental

health

Detox

Female

housing 

groups be situated around the same control position. In the smallest of jails, the desire may be to 

do this around one fixed post. Several strategies 

can be used to try to achieve this without creating sight and sound conflicts:

■ Subdivide the corridor within the area to create visually and acoustically separate subparts.

■ Manipulate the location of dayroom side and 

front walls to preclude side-to-side views between units.

■ Consider placing housing units one over the 

other to preclude side-to-side view.

■ Consider using mirrored glazing or a mirrored 

film over the glazing at the face of each unit 

(usually the dayroom glazing) to preclude 

views between different housing units in the 

pod. (The limitations of this strategy are noted 

in chapter 5, “Classification/Separation.”)

Staff view of housing areas 

Not only the dayrooms of housing units need to 

be visible; cell interiors should also be visible to 

some degree, if possible. Since most new jails do 

not use bars on the fronts of cells, for reasons of 

fire safety and sound containment, the view into 

the cells is typically provided by vision panels 

(windows) in doors and/or side lights (side windows). Visibility of all cell doors is a minimum 

view requirement.

The concern in cell design is to strike a proper 

balance between visibility and privacy. The 

degree to which cell exposure is required 

depends on three considerations:

■ The security level of the inmate population 

(i.e., low or high custody, disciplinary detention, medical housing, etc.).

■ The operation of the individual units. For example, if inmates are locked out of their cells 

during the day and in them at night, remote 

visibility of the cell is less critical because staff 

can view everyone in the dayroom during the 

day and securely enter the housing unit intermittently at night to observe cells.

■ Of critical importance to the officer at a remote 

surveillance post is the need to maintain ongoing verbal communication with inmates to 

ensure compliance with rules and regulations 

and acceptable behavior in the dayrooms, give 

verbal commands and instructions to inmates, 

and respond to inmate requests. If the officer 

is to maintain control, adequate means to 

communicate easily and clearly with inmates 

View from the officer’s station into a two-tiered dayroom. 

(Photograph courtesy of Jim Rowenhorst.)
49

C h a p t e r 6 : 

Surveillance/Supervision

must be incorporated in the housing control 

station.

■ No matter how good the visibility is into individual cells, it is still necessary for officers 

in remote surveillance facilities to enter the 

housing area and check the well-being of the 

inmates at regular intervals.

Closed or open staff post in remote 

surveillance housing

The decision to use an enclosed staff space versus an open staff space must weigh the following 

considerations:

■ The advantages and disadvantages of having a 

total physical barrier between the officer’s station and the inmates in the housing area corridor versus a limited barrier (normally at least 

a high counter).

■ Lesser versus better ability to hear, smell, and 

see what is happening in the housing area.

■ Almost total reliance on electronic means of 

communication versus an ability to communicate directly with inmates in a dayroom or cell 

at all times.

■ Limited ability to provide services to the housing units versus total freedom to move around 

the pod to provide services and more quickly 

respond to inmate needs.

If the open-counter approach is used at the control post, the post may be operated somewhat 

like a direct-supervision housing unit. That is, 

there must be limits on what doors or other security features are controlled at the post to reduce 

the risk of harm to the officer at the post. The 

following measures can be used to limit that risk 

to the officer:

■ Maintain control of the accesses to and 

exits from the overall housing area at master 

control.

■ Have backup controls at master control to 

assume control of the area in the event of an 

emergency.

■ Provide a means by which the housing officer 

can stay in constant communication with master control as he or she moves around in the 

housing area (e.g., two-way radios). 

Surveillance of movement 

The remote surveillance approach to monitoring 

movement requires placing fixed staff posts (e.g., 

master control and housing control posts) in a 

position that allows staff to look down key corridors. Ideally, designs will feature the ability not 

only to monitor corridors but also to maintain 

direct visual contact with other control positions 

within the jail (exhibit 6-5). There is also the 

potential here to supplement staff monitoring of 

inmate movement with electronic surveillance, 

especially for minimum-security inmates.

Monitoring support areas 

Staff positions can be affiliated with support and 

program areas much as they are with housing 

units. Program area control posts do not necessarily need to be enclosed, given that they tend to 

serve a very limited function. However, enclosures 

would be required if the posts had controls that 

might facilitate release from the security perimeter.

Exhibit 6-5. Preferred Placement of Fixed Posts

Staff

post

Staff

post

Staff

post

Corridor control and visual

link between posts
50

S e c t i o n 2 : 

Major Design Considerations

Because many jails do not have sufficient staff 

to create separate observation posts to monitor 

program and support areas, an important concept is to arrange key program and service areas, 

such as exercise and visiting, in direct view of a 

housing unit officer. In essence, these functions 

then become part of the overall design plan for 

the housing unit. Careful planning is necessary to 

eliminate potential blind spots. In addition, opportunities for officer diversion must be taken into 

account, especially when the officer is expected to 

control or monitor more than one activity.

Sound control 

The control of sound—for both inmates and 

staff—is an important challenge for the remote 

surveillance setting because of the close proximity of housing areas. The principal way in which 

sound might be controlled is through use of solid 

partitions consisting of concrete masonry and 

security glass within each unit. However, such 

sound containment has the related problem of 

cutting the officer off from things that he/she 

needs to hear and from communicating with the 

inmates in the various housing units. The answer 

to this dilemma is to consider various means by 

which the officer can communicate:

■ Intercoms between cells and the control position and between the dayroom and the control 

position.

■ Telephones between the dayroom and the control position.

■ Security openings or speaker ports in the dayroom walls through which the officer and inmate can communicate. (Note: Fire codes with 

respect to such openings must be observed, as 

must fire separation requirements.)

Lighting 

In providing a good view to remote surveillance 

officers, it is important to consider the level of 

lighting. This is particularly true when the staff 

post is enclosed. In this case, the officer is potentially looking through three glass panels and 

three spaces to view the inside of a cell. To minimize the amount of reflection from the glass, 

reduce eye strain, and increase view quality, the 

design should reduce the amount of artificial or 

natural light shining toward the officer and provide higher levels of lighting in inmate areas than 

in the staff area. Officer control of lighting levels 

is also recommended so that the officer can adapt 

his/her space to changing natural and artificial 

lighting conditions. 

Furniture and equipment 

Designers have felt that in selected housing units, 

the constant presence offered by remote surveillance allows both for less costly, nonfixed institutional furnishings to be used in place of fixed 

detention furnishings and for locks and hardware 

of a lower security nature to be used. Additionally, a lesser need for electronic surveillance, 

particularly CCTV, has been perceived in remote 

surveillance housing settings. However, the security envelope of the building cannot be compromised and must be maintained with high-security 

construction.

Intermittent Surveillance Design 

Intermittent surveillance is not recommended as 

the primary method of inmate housing area control, for the following reasons:

■ It essentially puts inmates rather than staff 

in control of the inmate housing areas, and 

inmate control usually results in coercion, intimidation, violence, and damage to facilities.

■ It tends to limit access to activities and services because of the greater need for escorted 

movement.

■ It inhibits the flow of information between inmates and staff.
51

C h a p t e r 6 : 

Surveillance/Supervision

■ It creates more minor and major inconveniences for jail staff, including having to move 

inmates from one place to another and being 

required to directly supervise their work activities throughout the jail.

■ It makes discipline difficult to achieve because 

many times the officer does not observe the 

rule violation and violators cannot be easily 

identified after the fact.

However, the following information is presented 

for those selected classifications and nonhousing 

areas of the facility that might be suitably monitored by intermittent surveillance.

Movement 

One of the key concepts that shape the organization of spaces in an intermittently monitored 

area is the efficiency of officer movement in 

making rounds. Although the design benefit of 

the intermittent surveillance concept (particularly as it refers to housing units) is that there is 

much more latitude in the placement of spaces, 

totally random and loosely developed concepts 

of arrangement can make for very awkward and 

difficult movement patterns for the officers. Consequently, a key design consideration is how the 

spaces to be monitored can be arranged to allow 

efficient movement of the officers who must view 

different areas.

A critical aspect of movement patterns in facilities designed for intermittent surveillance relates 

to the tradition of arranging housing areas in 

a series of back-to-back cellblocks. These cellblocks are generally not monitored from a primary corridor but by leaving the primary corridor 

and entering a perimeter guard corridor around 

the housing units.

Monitoring cellblocks in this fashion is difficult 

because of the additional movement required and 

because the arrangement virtually precludes random, unannounced surveillance. Staff entrance 

into the cellblock area is difficult to mask, because 

it is either quite noisy or easily visible to inmates. 

Remote view into cellblock areas is typically limited because the traditional back-to-back design allows nothing but a look across the cell fronts from 

the main corridors of the facility.

The traditional back-to-back cellblocks with a perimeter officer corridor sometimes feature more 

than two separate housing units in the area to 

achieve construction economy (exhibit 6-6). In 

this case, to get proper degrees of separation, one 

might be creating a difficult movement pattern 

for the officer as he/she moves through a series 

of doors in the officer corridor to see each separate unit. The likelihood of random surveillance 

is further diminished by the noise the officer 

makes coming through each door and such designs prevent any view of the rear units from the 

central corridor.

Furniture and equipment

Because housing areas monitored by intermittent surveillance leave inmates unsupervised for 

the majority of time, there is a critical need for 

Exhibit 6-6. Traditional Back-to-Back Cellblocks

Main corridor

Unit

2

Unit

3 Unit

4

Unit

5

Staff corridor with door

barriers between housing units 

Cell Cell

Unit

1
52

S e c t i o n 2 : 

Major Design Considerations

Poor sitelines in a linear-designed cell block. 

(Photograph courtesy of Jim Rowenhorst.)

vandal-resistant furnishings, fixtures, finishes, 

and hardware.

Impact of design on staffing 

Experience in numerous jurisdictions has shown 

that two staff members are required for intermittently monitored housing units because one officer must be available to back up the officer who 

enters the cellblock. Because no fixed control 

post monitors the area, both officers are roving 

staff—one officer controls the cellblock from outside while the other is within the cellblock. 

View conflict

Although intermittent surveillance allows for the 

relatively random dispersal of housing units and 

program spaces, designing for efficient movement creates the prospect of view conflicts. For 

example, a view conflict may exist because two 

housing units are placed across from each other 

off a main corridor to facilitate staff movement 

and observation (exhibit 6-7). The conflict may 

become acute if the entire face of each dayroom 

is glazed to allow the intermittently roving staff 

to have a good line of sight across the entire dayroom and a direct line of sight into each cell. 

Exhibit 6-7. Inmate View Conflict

Roving staff

with good view

Inmate view conflict

Such view conflicts are no more desirable in intermittent surveillance settings than they are in 

remote surveillance settings. Indeed, they are less 

desirable because staff are not constantly available to control the consequence of two different 

groups being able to see, communicate with, and 

signal/gesture to each other. This can result in 

limitations in the use of various cellblocks for inmates of noncompatible classifications.

A way to resolve a view conflict is to associate 

groups that could see and communicate with 

each other without creating a problem. However, 

because the need for separation may limit the potential for associating inmate groups, special design techniques might be used to limit exposure:

■ Using solid-face dayroom fronts with shuttered 

vision panels at key points along the corridor.

■ Creating entry pockets that allow the officer a 

good view of all parts of the dayroom from the 

pocket (exhibit 6-8).

Backup surveillance 

Because backup electronic monitoring is essential 

to retaining some surveillance over intermittently 

observed housing or program areas, installing 
53

C h a p t e r 6 : 

Surveillance/Supervision

Exhibit 6-8. Entry Pocket To Prevent Inmate 

View Conflict

Dayroom Dayroom

Cells Cells

Staff movement

Exhibit 6-9. Three-Dimensional Overhead View 

of Direct Supervision Housing Pod

CCTV units and/or audio monitoring systems 

in those areas is advisable. However, to make 

backup electronic surveillance effective, a staff 

position dedicated to the task of monitoring (and 

not distracted by a multitude of other duties) 

must be created. Although a small jail typically 

assigns the monitoring role to master control, it 

must be recognized that master control functions 

can require the majority, if not all of the officer’s 

attention, in even the smallest jail. (For more information on the functions of master control, see 

chapter 13.) 

Direct Supervision Design 

The direct supervision approach to 

inmate management has gained wide 

acceptance across the country as the 

preferred inmate management style 

in midsize to large jail facilities (exhibit 6-9). Incidents of inmate violence, vandalism, and disruptive behavior reportedly occur at 

very minimal levels in direct supervision facilities. However, in smaller jails, due to the limited 

size of their inmate populations, it simply is not 

staff-efficient to post an officer in all of the housing units. Additionally, jail standards in many 

states require separation of inmates according to 

a range of variables or criteria that place restrictions on the types of individuals who may share 

a common housing unit. These conditions often 

preclude the creation of larger scale housing 

units (usually in the 48- to 64-bed range) needed 

to achieve efficient staffing.

Security 

Security begins with risk assessment, classification, and the assurance that a person in a direct 

supervision module is not a danger to staff and 

other inmates and is capable of responding to 

supervision and directions. Beyond that, a key 

supporting concept of direct supervision places 

the officer at minimal risk by virtue of the design itself. However, it is critical that the direct 

supervision officer has no control of entrance or 

egress from the unit. This greatly diminishes the 

benefit of inmates assaulting the unit officer and 

attempting to take control of the unit. Master 

control should control all exits from the unit.

It is also essential that the direct supervision officer be able to communicate directly with master 

control from any point in the housing unit. This 

would suggest the use of telephones or intercoms 

at the control position within the housing unit 

and mobile communication, radios, or portable 

telephones on the officer’s person.
54

S e c t i o n 2 : 

Major Design Considerations

Movement 

Although movement within the housing unit is 

not an issue, moving out of the unit to programs 

and services can be. By the very nature of the 

direct supervision concept, the housing unit officer is confined to the housing unit and cannot 

perform duties outside the unit. Consequently, 

a key idea behind direct supervision is to focus 

as many activities and programs as possible 

within or adjacent to the housing unit (exhibit 

6-10). This can be done with all essential daily 

functions, such as dining, exercise, sick call, 

counseling, and visiting. Otherwise all movement 

outside the housing unit must be monitored by 

other staff unless all inmates in the unit are moving out of the unit.

Furniture and equipment 

One of the benefits of the direct supervision concept is that the security features and construction 

of the facility can be lessened and normalized 

because of greater staff control, thereby reducing 

initial construction costs. The following furniture 

and equipment selections have commonly been 

made in direct supervision housing units: 

Exhibit 6-10. Colocation of Essential Daily 

Functions With Housing in a Direct Supervision Unit

Visitor

access

Exercise

yard

Visiting Sick call and

counseling 

Dining

Inmate movement 

■ Nonfixed, nonsecurity dayroom furnishings.

■ Nonfixed, nonsecurity stools and desks in 

cells.

■ Low-security locks and hardware on cell doors.

■ Solid wood core or lighter gauge hollow metal 

doors on cells (gauge mainly decided by durability considerations).

■ Carpeted floor surfaces.

■ More lightly constructed and reinforced 

partitions.

■ Nonsecurity vitreous china toilet and sink 

fixtures.

The use of more normalized materials, equipment, and hardware is consistent with and reinforces the direct supervision concept, which in 

large part is based on an assumption of rational 

behavior by inmates classified for general population. More normative furnishings can be graduated from level to level to provide incentives for 

positive inmate behavior. However, even with 

more normalized materials, hardware, and equipment used within the housing unit, it is critical 

that the exterior perimeter of the housing unit be 

as secure as any other portion of the jail facility.

Support areas 

Direct supervision has commonly been used 

to monitor program and service areas in jails. 

Control booths or observation counters are not 

needed outside of program and service areas. 

However, the agency may wish to consider providing the program staff member or officer with 

backup by direct surveillance from a control post 

or by electronic supplements such as panic buttons in the walls, voice-activated intercoms in 

walls or ceilings, personal radio alarm systems, 

and, perhaps, CCTV monitoring of program areas. Care must be taken that direct supervision is 

not relied on in areas that require privacy (e.g., 

attorney/client visiting, private counseling). 
55

C h a p t e r 6 : 

Surveillance/Supervision

View 

Although the officer is positioned within the 

housing unit or program area, it is still wise to 

provide a good view of the entire area being 

supervised. “Blind corners” and out-of-the-way 

pockets of space are problematic to direct supervision officers and are a threat to inmate safety 

(exhibit 6-11).

Electronic Surveillance Design 

Contemporary standards encourage constant and 

active forms of surveillance and discourage nonconstant or passive forms, such as intermittent 

and electronic surveillance, at least for the housing areas of the facility. Conventional wisdom 

also dictates that audio or electronic surveillance 

methods should only be used to supplement or 

enhance staff supervision, and not as a substitute 

for supervision. Following are additional reasons 

why reliance on electronic surveillance (CCTV 

or audio monitoring) is not recommended as the 

primary method of inmate supervision for housing areas:

■ Inability to monitor areas constantly and effectively due to fatigue, preoccupation with other 

Exhibit 6-11. Blind Corner 

Dayroom Cell

Staff view

Blind 

corner

activities, or too many cameras and monitors 

to manage.

■ Almost total lack of supervision over inmates 

for significant portions of time.

■ Initial purchase costs and repair costs related 

to monitoring equipment.

■ Dangerous conditions created by malfunctioning or inoperable equipment.

■ Lack of staff to respond to problems where insufficient staffing originally resulted in reliance 

on the electronic surveillance.

■ Vulnerability when inmates determine what is 

not monitored.

However, electronic surveillance does have a role 

in a jail. Considering where and how electronic 

surveillance might supplement the basic approaches used to control the inmate population 

or enhance staff safety can influence the general 

approach to design. In general, CCTV can be suitable for: 

■ Monitoring building perimeters.

■ Monitoring corridor movement when that 

movement cannot be monitored from the fixed 

post and/or where nonescorted movement is 

desired.

■ Monitoring remote areas or areas not typically 

occupied by inmates (e.g., exits and other access points to the secure perimeter, vehicle 

sallyport, fire egress, stairways, mechanical 

spaces).

■ Monitoring ingress/egress points to ascertain 

the identity and status of persons at those 

points.

■ Providing backup support for selected areas 

(e.g., kitchens, laundry, pharmaceuticals 

storage, outdoor exercise areas, multipurpose 

rooms, and/or general housing unit areas).
56

S e c t i o n 2 : 

Major Design Considerations

Color monitors provide much better resolution 

than black and white monitors and enhance 

security.

Audio surveillance and communication seem best 

suited to the following applications, all of which 

should allow inmate communication with staff:

■ Two-way audio to cells, including special cells.

■ Two-way audio to dayrooms/dayroom entries.

■ Two-way audio to program and support areas.

■ Two-way audio at ingress/egress points at internal perimeters.

In general, overreliance on the use of CCTV tends 

to result from a deficiency in design. It is recommended that housing areas and support areas 

be monitored by staff as opposed to by CCTV or 

audio monitoring. Electronic surveillance techniques should never be viewed as a suitable replacement for staff. 

Nonhousing Surveillance 

Another important aspect of surveillance/

supervision methods is their impact on the 

supervision/monitoring of the nonhousing areas 

of the facility and on inmate, public, and staff 

movement. Surveillance of nonhousing areas 

may be equally significant to the design of facilities and may influence the efficiency, safety, and 

security of the building as much as housing unit 

surveillance. Key areas of inmate supervision in 

nonhousing areas that should be addressed in the 

facility design are as follows: 

Black-and-white CCTV camera monitor with multiple views shown 

simultaneously.

(Photograph courtesy of Kimme & Associates.)

■ Inmate movement to and from housing.

■ Inmate visitation.

■ Inmate exercise.

■ Inmate program or multipurpose rooms.

■ Medical services.

■ Public lobby and visitor waiting.

■ Loading docks/trash dumpsters.

■ Public seating in attached courtrooms or video 

arraignment rooms.

■ Areas where inmate workers may be assigned 

(such as laundry and kitchen).
57

Chapter 7

Staffing Impact

Without adequate numbers of trained 

staff who are properly assigned and 

supervised, the jail will not be able to 

respond to day-to-day operational requirements 

or to emergency situations. Unfortunately, a 

poor understanding and appreciation of staffing 

requirements and determinants, combined with 

scarce monetary resources, has resulted in the 

understaffing of many jails.

Planners and local officials must recognize one 

particular finding of national studies: over the 30-

year life cycle of a correctional facility, construction costs for the average, standards-compliant 

new jail will amount to only about 10 percent 

of the total combined cost of operations and 

construction (exhibit 7-1). This means that for 

every $1 million invested in capital construction, 

communities will spend another $9 million for 

operations over 30 years. Of this $9 million, an 

average of $7.8 million will be spent on staffing. 

The impact of staffing on design, and vice versa, 

is clearly one of the most important issues to 

consider in developing any new jail. 

The impact of staffing can be more acute for 

smaller jails than for larger ones because the 

high ratio of inmates to staff found in large jails 

cannot be realized easily, if at all, in smaller jails. 

When one considers the challenge of separating 

different classifications (especially by gender) 

and the variety of possible surveillance approaches available, the impact of design on staff 

efficiency and costs becomes readily apparent.

Although an indepth analysis of staffing requirements is beyond the scope of this guide, staffing 

analysis is an important component of jail planning. This chapter reviews the basic concepts 

necessary for calculating staffing by net annual 

work hours (NAWH) and examines how jail 

design can affect staffing requirements. Previous editions of the Jail Design Guide discussed 

calculating staffing using the shift relief factor 

(SRF) method. The primary difference between 

the two methods is that with the SRF method, 

shifts are often considered independently, which 

may fail to consider many categories of time off 

(e.g., jury duty, light duty assignments, provisions of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 

1993). The NAWH method considers each job 

classification independently and does not calculate by shift. It also takes multiple leave factors 

into consideration in determining the number of 

hours staff are actually available to work. For a 

more indepth presentation on how to use NAWH 

to calculate staffing needs, see Staffing Analysis 

Workbook for Jails, Second Edition.1

Readers are advised to review chapter 5, 

“Classification/Separation,” and chapter 6, 

“Surveillance/Supervision,” in conjunction with 

Exhibit 7-1. Average 30-Year Life Cycle Costs

63% 18%

9%

7% 3%

Salaries

Utilities/maintenance/supplies

Inmate care

Construction

Furnishings/equipment

Source: Kimme & Associates, Inc., Champaign, Illinois.

1

 Dennis R. Liebert and Rod Miller, Staffing Analysis Workbook for Jails, Second Edition (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of 

Justice, National Institute of Corrections, 2003).
58

S e c t i o n 2 : 

Major Design Considerations

the present chapter because staffing, surveillance/

supervision, and classification/separation are 

closely linked.

Legal Issues 

Federal courts have made it clear that those who 

fund and operate jails have a duty to protect inmates from violence and to provide for their safe 

and secure detention. Key court decisions indicate that staff must:

■ Protect inmates from themselves and from 

other inmates.

■ Regularly visit inmate-occupied areas and 

maintain communication with inmates. (The 

timing of these visits may vary according to 

the type of inmate in specific housing areas, 

standards, and agency policy.)

■ Respond to inmate calls for assistance.

■ Classify and separate inmates for their own 

protection.

■ Maintain a safe environment for inmates.

■ Maintain security systems and implement 

procedures for the use of those systems.

■ Process and supervise female inmates.

■ Monitor electronic surveillance.

■ Ensure that all required inmate activities, services, and programs are delivered (e.g., medical services, exercise, visits).

■ Initiate contingency plans in emergency 

situations.

Court decisions and contemporary standards have 

also defined important parameters for jail operations that affect staffing through establishing:

■ Minimum levels of service, such as requirements for visitation, exercise, meals, health 

care, and so forth.

■ Policies and procedures to define and support 

operations.

■ Prohibited practices.

■ Specific required operational actions, including functions such as inmate counts, security 

rounds, and cell searches, that relate to the 

local government’s duty to protect.

Perhaps most important of all, courts have repeatedly ruled that a lack of resources is insufficient reason for failure to meet constitutional 

minimums. Judging from past rulings, arguments 

that proper staffing cannot be provided because 

of expense will receive little support from the 

courts.

24-Hour Coverage 

Staff costs in a properly operated jail are high because jails are so unlike other county operations. 

For example, although a county’s administrative 

offices might only be open from 8:30 a.m. to 4:30 

p.m., Monday through Friday, jails never close. 

They require 24-hour-a-day, 7-day-a-week coverage and, in some jurisdictions, same-sex staffing 

(that is, female staff for female inmates and male 

staff for male inmates).

This discussion uses the assumption that the 

facility operates on three 8-hour shifts. Changes 

to shift hours affect staffing requirements. For 

example, the number of staff required to fill a 

24-hour post using a 12-hour shift or a 10-hour 

shift changes the overall number of staff needed 

to operate the facility. Each agency should consider the ramifications of alternate shift schedules 

when calculating staffing needs.

A 24-hour-a-day, 7-day-a-week post, such as master control with one officer, requires 8,760 hours 

of coverage for 1 year. If it has been determined 

that each of the staff assigned to master control 

is actually available for 1,752 hours a year, the 
59 

C h a p t e r 7 : 

Staffing Impact

number of positions required to cover the post is 

calculated using the following formula: For a given post (e.g., master control), the annual number 

of hours of staff coverage required (N = 8,760), 

divided by the annual number of hours available 

per staff classification (N = 1,752), equals the 

number of staff required to fill the position: 

5 staff.

Annual 

hours staff 

coverage 

÷

Annual 

hours available per 

staff person

=

Staff 

required to 

fill master 

control 

post

8,760 ÷ 1,752 = 5

Consider a post that may need to be staffed only 

16 hours a day, 7 days a week. The calculations 

might look something like this:

Annual 

hours staff 

coverage 

÷

Annual 

hours available per 

staff person

=

Staff 

required to 

fill visiting 

clerk post

5,840 ÷ 1,600 = 3.7

Each jurisdiction must calculate its own NAWH 

when determining its particular staffing needs.

All personnel required for other functions, including those that are not 24-hour posts, should 

be calculated. These calculations should be realistic, given the design, and based on the tasks 

that need to be completed by staff.

Possible Staff Types 

The kinds of jail staff for whom space might need 

to be included in the facility are:

■ Administrator and assistants.

■ Supervisors.

■ Master control.

■ Booking.

■ Housing (officers and control).

■ Movement or support security.

■ Court transport.

■ Clerical/records.

■ Programs (in-house and/or outside service 

providers):

❏ Work release.

❏ Counseling.

❏ Substance abuse.

❏ Ministerial.

❏ Medical.

❏ Education.

❏ Library.

❏ Mental health.

■ Food service.

■ Laundry.

■ Maintenance.

Jurisdictions will need to conduct a thorough 

analysis of their staffing requirements to determine which posts or staff types are needed on 

a continuous basis versus those that might be 

needed on selected shifts.

Design Factors 

The following information addresses the primary 

issues planners should be concerned about when 

developing staff-efficient and secure jail designs: 

facility location, single- versus multilevel design, 

vertically connected posts, inmate separation, 

surveillance/supervision methods, circulation 
60

S e c t i o n 2 : 

Major Design Considerations

and movement, shared activities, security perimeter, emergency response, staff backup, nature of 

staff posts, cell occupancy, electronic monitoring 

versus staff monitoring, and work environment.

Facility Location 

In many cases, when the jail is located some 

distance from the court, full-time staff positions 

are required to transport inmates to and from 

court. Additional transportation staff may also 

be needed to transport inmates to doctor’s visits, 

the hospital, or other outside appointments or 

between facilities.

Those contemplating building a new jail at a 

location remote from court facilities should consider the staffing impact and whether alternatives 

to in-court appearances, such as video first appearance or a first appearance court at the jail, 

would be feasible. Designers must also consider 

the following effects of frequent movement to 

court facilities:

■ Separating the flow of inmates, the public, and 

court personnel.

■ Searches before and after court appearances.

■ Temporary court holding.

■ Holding at the remote court facilities.

■ Potential meal service, attorney visits, and 

emergency medical services.

Another staff-consuming activity is providing 

transportation to, and security at, medical facilities in the community. When possible, providing the ability for minor triage and treatment at 

the facility and the support space needed to do 

so will reduce the requirement to transport the 

inmate for medical and/or dental care and may 

reduce the need for additional transport staff.

Single-Level Versus Multilevel Design 

A multilevel design in a smaller jail that has just 

20–30 beds on each floor can drive staffing costs 

to unaffordable levels. For example, assuming the 

24-hour-a-day, 7-day-a-week posts require 5 staff 

to cover each post (see calculations for master 

control shown above under “24-Hour Coverage”) 

and each floor requires a minimum of 1 post, a 

3-floor jail with a capacity of 90 beds could well 

require a minimum of 15 housing area security 

staff just to meet minimum standards in some 

states and to ensure safety and security. To properly manage the behavior of inmates on each 

floor, a staff post should be staffed on each floor. 

This does not include administrative staff, support staff, or any other security staff such as master control, booking, and movement officers.

In addition, movement of people and services 

(food service and laundry, for example) can become more time consuming and complicated 

in a multilevel facility, particularly a small one 

with fewer staff. Required stairways and elevators present the jail staff with additional surveillance problems and security risks. Multiple levels 

also add to fire safety complications in terms of 

design and evacuation. Also, the potential exists 

for increased maintenance problems and costs 

(elevator service, more potential for equipment 

failure, and more problems in managing operations when essential equipment fails).

Multiple levels also eliminate the ability to create 

direct sightlines between staff posts and preclude 

any direct interrelationship between them unless 

an attempt is made at some sort of vertical connection, such as a stairway (exhibit 7-2).

Vertically Connected Posts 

Any attempt to connect fixed posts on two or 

more levels must be carefully evaluated, as this 

approach has potentially serious limitations:
61 

C h a p t e r 7 : 

Staffing Impact

Exhibit 7-2. Stairway for Vertical Connection 

Between Multilevel Posts

Stair/

elevator

Movement movement

staff

Floor

control

staff

■ Loss of control. With vertically connected 

control positions, the loss of one position in 

an assault can cause the loss of the other(s) 

unless special precautions are taken. These 

precautions (lockable hatches or doors) can 

complicate design and limit the actual connection between levels.

■ Insufficient staffing. Placement of a secure 

control post on each floor visually linked to 

adjacent housing units represents a remote 

surveillance form of design. Yet if cost-saving 

measures result in only one officer moving 

vertically from one floor’s observation post to 

another to control both floors, the design compromises the benefits that make the remote 

surveillance approach superior to intermittent 

surveillance (i.e., continuous observation of 

the inmate population and immediate intervention during conflicts and altercations).

Additionally, staffing control posts on multiple 

floors with one person becomes problematic 

when staff are needed simultaneously on two 

levels (e.g., to unlock doors or back up roving 

officers).

Inmate Separation

The extent to which inmates are separated in the 

facility and the manner in which separation is 

achieved can translate into staffing requirements. 

The need to separate inmates is addressed in all 

standards and is discussed in an earlier section 

of this document. Often, the greater the number 

of distinct housing units a facility has, the more 

staff are needed to supervise the units.

The types of inmates to be housed in the facility 

can also dictate the types and number of staff 

needed. A facility that houses both male and female inmates, for instance, should have both a 

male and a female jail officer on duty at all times 

and space for both genders (posts, lockers, showers, and so forth). 

If the jail has a long-term population, more programs and services, such as exercise, visitation, 

work release, education, counseling, and mental 

health services, will require additional staff to 

administer those programs. A facility that primarily detains violent felons and career criminals requires more intensive staffing than one 

that houses nonviolent misdemeanants such as 

drunk-driving and minor property offenders.

Decisions on inmate separation, housing types, 

and staffing levels should be based on the collection and analysis of data very early in the functional programming phase of the project.

Surveillance/Supervision Methods

The method of surveillance or supervision selected for housing and nonhousing functions has a 

direct bearing on staffing needs. Remote observation and direct supervision methods, for example, 

require constant staffing and clear sightlines from 

established staff positions, as discussed in the 

preceding section. The implications of limiting 

the movement of staff (and thus the tasks that 

can be performed) in a remote observation setting versus the freedom of movement and flexibility staff have in a direct supervision setting 

must be carefully evaluated. It is not necessarily 

true that remote observation facilities require 

fewer staff than direct supervision. If the goal is 
62

S e c t i o n 2 : 

Major Design Considerations

to manage the behavior of inmates, there is still 

a need to provide sufficient staff to make continuous and frequent contact with inmates. Remote 

observation may add another layer of surveillance, but it does not take the place of staff 

contact in managing inmate behavior. The added 

ramification of monitoring needed separation according to classification is significant. 

Exhibit 7-3. Simplified Circulation Corridor

Special

housing 

Booking

Inmate

programs 

Services

Male

housing

Visiting

Main corridor

Circulation and Movement 

Jail operations require constant movement within 

the security perimeter by staff and inmates. Inmates move to and from activities and services, 

and staff are constantly moving to provide basic 

supervision and security. Additionally, the public enters the facility for a variety of purposes, 

including visiting, securing someone’s release, 

picking up property, and providing programs and 

services.

Controlling movement within the jail is an essential and staff-intensive ingredient of security. 

The design of the facility can either enhance or 

inhibit effective movement control and will influence the need for staff. For example, complicated 

staff circulation patterns for surveillance rounds 

can diminish staff efficiency and safety and reduce the chances that rounds will be executed 

as frequently and effectively as necessary. The 

following key design considerations regarding 

movement and circulation are discussed below: 

simplicity, corridor width, functional relationships, housing area linkage, unescorted movement, and public movement.

Simplicity

It is desirable to keep circulation corridor patterns simple and to minimize the number of 

levels (exhibit 7-3). This makes movement more 

direct as well as easier to observe and supervise.

Corridor width 

Corridors should be designed with ample width 

to accommodate the movement of food and 

laundry carts, officers escorting inmates through 

the facility, and people passing each other in the 

corridor. Corridor width should also be sufficient 

to allow doors to swing into the corridor without 

blocking egress or flow. It is recommended that 

primary corridors be at least 8 feet wide.

Functional relationships 

Arrange functional components according to their 

use and their users. For example, since inmates 

eat three times a day, a convenient location for 

food services that permits efficient delivery of 

food to the pods and the return of trays and refuse to the kitchen becomes important to staff. 

On the other hand, since the commissary is probably used once or twice a week, its location is 

less critical.

Housing area linkage

Identify services and programs that occur frequently, such as exercise or visiting, and locate 

them in or adjacent to housing units. This allows 

already established staff posts to monitor movement to the activity and the activity itself. This 

strategy is particularly applicable to remote surveillance and direct supervision housing areas.

Unescorted movement 

Identify the need for surveillance of inmate 

movement between inmate areas and plan for 

unescorted movement wherever possible. Identify 

whether any of these design possibilities exist:
63 

C h a p t e r 7 : 

Staffing Impact

■ Movement directly monitored from constantly 

staffed posts.

■ Movement monitored by electronic means 

such as closed-circuit television (CCTV) and 

audio.

■ Unmonitored movement (i.e., where housing 

officers issue passes to low-security inmates 

that permit them to move to agreed-upon areas 

in the secure perimeter, such as to programs or 

medical facilities).

Public movement 

Minimize the need for public/visitor movement 

within the facility, especially within the security 

perimeter. Public/visitor movement presents special security problems that can only be solved by 

staff presence or electronic surveillance. Use the 

facility design to create locations at which visitors can conduct business without entering the 

security perimeter (e.g., a security passage or 

video visitation area).

Shared Activities 

Monitoring inmate activities outside of the housing unit can be quite time consuming, so it is 

advantageous to identify which groups might 

participate safely together in various activities 

(e.g., visiting, exercise) and to design space accordingly. Designing space to accommodate 

larger groups of inmates for exercise rather than 

smaller groups would save staff time. For example, if eight different housing groups could be 

safely combined into four groups without sacrificing important classification considerations, and 

each of the four groups exercised separately for 1 

hour daily, 4 hours of staff time would be saved 

daily.

An alternative to moving inmates to activities 

and programs is to provide multipurpose rooms 

and exercise areas adjacent to housing units that 

can be accessed directly from different housing 

units. The room can be used for shared activities and programs or individually by one housing 

unit, depending on the classification separation 

issues. Programs and activities may in some 

cases be held in dayrooms as well. Each of these 

options provides an alternative to moving groups 

of inmates within the facility.

Security Perimeter 

Every jail should have a well-defined security 

perimeter with each point of entry controlled 

through a security vestibule (a set of two interlocked doors that can be opened in unison only 

in an emergency). All exterior windows and 

other potential means of egress from the security 

perimeter must be secure. The weaker the security perimeter, the more staff it will take to control and supervise inmate movement and housing 

(see chapter 8, “Security Perimeter”).

Emergency Response 

A constant minimum level of staffing is required 

to accomplish three key activities during an 

emergency:

■ Respond to the scene and implement intervention and/or suppression procedures (e.g., 

break up disturbance, put out fire).

■ Evacuate the housing area or the entire facility 

promptly and safely.

■ Provide containment and continuing inmate 

supervision after evacuation.

The design of the facility and delineation of 

evacuation routes and holding areas have critical 

staffing implications for emergency response.

Material and equipment choices are of critical 

importance with respect to detection and containment of fire and smoke, exhaust of toxic 

fumes, and quick evacuation. Equipment that 

allows cells to be remotely unlocked in groups, 

with egress routes monitored, is recommended. 
64

S e c t i o n 2 : 

Major Design Considerations

Places for temporary and long-term containment, 

to which inmates would evacuate and be monitored, must be quickly and securely accessible 

in order for staff to function effectively (exhibit 

7-4).

The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 

Exhibit 7-4. Evacuation Routes

Vestibule for

ultimate

evacuation

to transport

if required

Exercise yard

(temporary refuge)

Housing 

evacuation

route

Housing 

evacuation

route

Staff monitoring

Life Safety Code® 2 and local codes should be 

referred to for more information on safety precautions and evacuation. The state fire authority 

and local fire chief or fire marshal should be contacted for guidance on this issue.

Staff Backup 

All jails must plan their staffing levels to accommodate backup for emergencies, especially 

in direct supervision and remote surveillance 

facilities, because in those facilities, the officer 

who supervises or provides surveillance for the 

inmates is at a fixed post and cannot leave that 

post to provide assistance. Obviously, the master 

control officer or the housing control officer’s inability to provide direct assistance eliminates the 

possibility of direct intervention. However, he/

she does play an important inmate observation 

and support function for responding staff by:

■ Providing a psychological deterrent to further 

misbehavior by his/her presence.

■ Monitoring and witnessing illegal behavior 

and, therefore, guaranteeing successful prosecution of offenders.

■ Serving as a communication link to obtain 

assistance from other personnel outside the 

immediate area of the jail, including nonjail 

sheriff’s staff, municipal police, and fire department and ambulance personnel.

■ Directing the appropriate intervention.

Designing Staff Workstations 

When a facility features a staff post for housing control (other than master control), a major 

design and operational question is whether to 

fully enclose and secure the post or to leave it an 

open, counter-like area, as discussed in chapter 

6, “Surveillance/Supervision.”

The open-counter area is much more versatile 

from a staff point of view, allowing the officer to 

move freely from the post to perform duties and 

services other than those demanded within the 

post itself. Such versatility potentially distributes 

work better, improves supervision by allowing 

better and more frequent inmate contact, facilitates two-way communication between staff and 

inmates, and minimizes the need for additional 

staff. Without careful planning and design, however, the open design can lead to security 

compromises.

The following questions should be considered 

when determining the design of a staff post:

■ Can tasks be performed more efficiently from 

a post that restricts staff movement or one that 

enhances staff movement and flexibility?

2

 National Fire Protection Association, NFPA 101®: Life Safety Code® (Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection Association, 2009).
65 

C h a p t e r 7 : 

Staffing Impact

Staff Backup in the Smaller Jail

In many smaller jails, a single master control officer will be able to observe most inmate housing 

areas from a remote, fixed post. However, that staff 

member’s ability to physically respond, unassisted, to 

incidents such as assaults, medical emergencies, or 

escape attempts may be severely limited by a need 

to retain control of the secure post and by concerns 

for his/her own personal safety. Although that officer 

cannot respond directly to a problem, he/she is able 

to provide direct visual backup assistance to officers 

who do enter the housing units or other inmateoccupied areas.

Unfortunately, it can be assumed that numerous 

small jails may be staffed with two-person, male/

female teams on each shift, with one officer in a 

secure master control station and the other in a roving capacity. Given the need to maintain the security 

of a master control room, the officer can ill afford 

to leave it to render assistance. Therefore, his/

her chief tool in providing backup assistance is an 

unobstructed view of all inmate-occupied areas and 

communication linkages through which to interact 

verbally with inmates and, most critically, to summon 

outside assistance. However, if outside assistance, 

such as from law enforcement personnel in adjacent 

areas of the facility, is not immediately available, 

this two-person approach becomes quite problematic 

when serious problems arise. The goal should be to 

provide backup for any staff member in any area of 

the jail, with the desired approach of providing sufficient staff within the secure perimeter at all times. If 

this is not achievable, the alternative option of using 

sworn law enforcement staff who are available at 

any time from an adjacent, attached building may be 

considered.

Through this team approach, which combines direct 

interaction of the roving officer with the backup of a 

master control officer and outside assistance, the welldesigned small jail can respond to most occurrences 

without creating excessive risk to staff or inmates.

■ Is backup security available to reduce the risks 

of an open-counter arrangement?

■ What is at stake if the post is lost?

■ What is the impact on inmate surveillance and 

supervision if the post is opened or closed?

■ What level of inmate contact and communication is desired?

■ Do staff have the ability to communicate with 

other staff in the area?

■ What are the potential staff savings?

The open-counter housing post is not viable unless the jail maintains a secure master control 

room with complete override capability on all 

security systems and full control of the perimeter 

of the housing area.

Cell Occupancy

Although there is no irrefutable evidence that 

single-cell jails are less costly to staff than facilities with multiple-occupancy cells, there are 

strong arguments that single-cell housing results 

in more efficient use of staff. These arguments 

generally include the following:

■ Multiple-occupancy housing greatly reduces 

the staff’s ability to prevent physical or sexual 

assaults, especially during night lockdown, 

when staffing levels tend to be reduced. 

Multiple-occupancy housing may eliminate 

the ability to reduce staffing at night.

■ During a disturbance in a multiple-occupancy 

cell, the staff’s ability to take full control of the 

incident is reduced due to the inability to fully 

separate combative inmates.

■ Multiple-occupancy cells diminish staff’s ability to maintain discipline and control because 

vandalism is difficult to attribute to individual 

inmates.
66

S e c t i o n 2 : 

Major Design Considerations

However, these arguments assume a limited measure of control on the part of the officer and/or 

the absence of staff in the unit during most of the 

day and night (remote observation or linear surveillance). A well-run housing unit, with a staff 

member present 24 hours a day, that is designed 

to provide the maximum amount of vision into 

all areas of the unit will generally mitigate or 

eliminate the concerns expressed above.

Electronic Monitoring Versus Staff Monitoring 

Audio monitoring and CCTV have their place in 

the jail security system, but such equipment is 

effective only when staff are provided to monitor the systems and summon assistance. Often, 

surveillance equipment is installed, but staffing 

is not appropriately allocated to monitor it, thus 

compromising its effectiveness. In addition to 

the staff assigned to monitor the electronic systems, other staff must be available to respond 

to inappropriate inmate behavior detected by 

the electronic surveillance. Personal supervision 

by trained staff should be provided in all jails, 

regardless of the electronic tools used to supplement it. Electronic monitoring should be used 

to enhance rather than supplant staff functions. 

The appropriate blending of staff and technology 

should be reinforced during the transition process.

Work Environment 

A key fact to remember when creating the jail 

environment is that it is not only an inmate environment but a staff environment. Buildings 

contain behavior. Staff control inmate behavior.

Indeed, the jail is more of a staff work environment, in that the average officer works in the facility over a period of years, whereas the average 

inmate stays only about 15–25 days.

Additionally, jails often experience a major problem with staff turnover. Much of it has to do 

with salary and career opportunities, but some 

of it has to do with very poor and stressful work 

conditions in older jails. Consequently, designs 

developed with staff in mind may help eliminate 

this trend and even set in motion improvements 

in other areas.

Staff-oriented considerations include the 

following:

■ Personal safety and security.

■ Ease of movement and ease of general 

job performance.

■ Pleasantness of environment:

❏ Natural light.

❏ Artificial light.

❏ Sound.

❏ Color.

❏ Ventilation.

■ Control over personal environment, especially 

staff posts.

■ Amenities.

■ Lockers and showers.

■ Training areas.

■ Lounge/break room.

■ Exercise facilities.

■ Parking.

Conclusion 

It is important to remember that the design of the 

facility can greatly enhance the ability of staff to 

do their jobs effectively and safely. Conversely, a 

poorly planned facility can create problems with 

facility operations and the management of inmate 

behavior. Spending the time to develop a wellthought-out operational plan and working with 

the planners and architects to design a facility 
67 

C h a p t e r 7 : 

Staffing Impact

that achieves the goal of safety and security for 

staff and inmates is the key to developing a facility that can be safely operated using an appropriate number of staff.

It is also important to remember that there is no 

one-size-fits-all staffing plan, and it is incumbent 

on each agency to take the time necessary to collect accurate and complete staffing information to 

ensure staffing decisions are made based on desired operations for the new facility and real data 

that can be used to justify those decisions.
69

Chapter 8

Security Perimeter

E

scape and contraband are deeply troubling 

words to sheriffs and jail administrators. 

They represent the manifestation of basic 

security defects within the jail’s physical plant 

or problems with its operation. New jail design 

approaches, hardware technology, and improved 

training for jail staff during the recent past have 

reduced, but not eliminated, problems of escape, 

contraband passage, and related breaches in jail 

security.

Many breaches in jail security result from human 

error in recruitment, selection, and supervision 

of jail staff or a lack of adequate training and 

written policies and procedures. Some escapes 

early in the life of a new jail occur because staff 

were inadequately trained in the new building’s 

control equipment, which is frequently more 

complex than that found in the old jail. However, 

even the most elite correctional staff cannot be 

expected to make an inadequately designed and 

equipped jail consistently secure through staff effort alone. They must rely, to some extent, on the 

integrity of the materials, hardware, and design 

to complement effective security procedures.

The failure to define and establish, through planning and design, a clearly identifiable and reliable security perimeter (envelope) is a primary 

contributor to problems in small and mediumsized jails. Architecture, operational procedures, 

and technology are elements of jail security. 

Equipment, materials, and design decisions are 

influenced by the nature of the inmate population and are oriented toward basic security objectives. This chapter describes an overall approach 

to security and recommends measures to enhance jail security.

Ingredients of Security 

Security systems engineers and analysts have 

identified four major ingredients involved in 

providing building security: denial, detection, 

response, and assessment.

■ Denial. In practical terms, denial means that 

the building is designed to restrict inmate access to unauthorized internal areas or the outside; provide physical separation for various 

inmate classifications (e.g., separate housing 

for inmate workers); control inmate movement 

through the use of sallyports, staff supervision, 

and other means; and eliminate the potential 

for the passage of contraband in the jail by 

building and maintaining a secure perimeter.

■ Detection. If the denial element fails or is 

compromised (e.g., a lock malfunctions or 

security glass is penetrated), then detection is 

necessary. Detection in jails often comes about 

through regular inmate counts or random cell 

checks and searches that reveal an escape or 

contraband. Detection might also mean that 

an officer observes an inmate scaling a fence 

or bolting through a door to an unsecured 

area. In modern jails, detection can involve 

sophisticated technology such as perimetersensing devices to detect attempts at escape 

or intrusion.

■ Response. After detection and assessment, 

the response is the action taken by staff to 

counteract the problem. In addition to sending 

staff to the affected area, this may include triggering alarms, lighting selected areas, closing 

gates, and initiating evacuation procedures.

■ Assessment. Assessment is simply an evaluation of the problem that has been detected. It 

is largely a matter of determining the nature 
70

S e c t i o n 2 : 

Major Design Considerations

and degree of a situation (e.g., escape attempt, 

window tampering, unauthorized movement 

in a secure zone). Assessment may or may not 

be made with the assistance of sophisticated 

technology.

Design Focus 

The focus during jail planning is on the fundamental design features and the staffing required 

for effective denial, detection, response, and assessment. Detection, response, and assessment 

primarily require the involvement of staff, supplemented by technologies such as closed-circuit 

television (CCTV), motion detection, audio monitoring, and remote control of locks, lights, and 

alarms. Staff can be helped to effectively do their 

job in these areas by operational decisions and 

building designs that use constant and effective 

staff surveillance or supervision of all inmateoccupied or inmate-utilized areas, routes of 

egress, and the exterior of the facility.

This chapter is devoted to the fundamental design features that provide the ingredient of denial. Denial of escape and contraband passage is 

fundamentally accommodated in the design of 

the physical plant in the following ways:

■ Creating an overall barrier, commonly referred 

to as a “security perimeter,” that precludes 

contraband passage from the outside and unauthorized access to and egress from the jail. 

■ Creating internal security zones that preclude 

escape and contraband passage within the jail 

by controlling internal movement and maintaining separation between key activities and 

inmate-occupied areas, especially those that 

house inmates who pose the greatest risk of 

escape or contraband passage according to the 

facility’s classification plan. (See chapter 5, 

“Classification/Separation.”)

Perimeters and Zones 

The different kinds of perimeters and zones that 

might be created to assist staff in denying escape 

and contraband passage are described below.

Main security perimeter 

The main security perimeter is the fundamental 

barrier that is intended to preclude escape, unauthorized ingress or egress, and contraband passage. It might best be thought of as a security 

envelope because the main security perimeter is a 

three-dimensional rather than a two-dimensional 

element. That is, it consists of the ceilings, roofs, 

and floors, as well as the exterior and interior 

walls, doors, passthroughs, and windows, which 

help deny escape or contraband passage from 

the outside.

Secondary security perimeter 

The secondary security perimeter is a wall, security fence, or other support elements that complement the main security perimeter of the jail. This 

element normally consists of fences that define 

large outdoor exercise or farm and garden areas 

and that inhibit (though not necessarily prohibit) 

access to the main security perimeter. It may also 

consist of walls that create controlled exterior 

spaces to preclude view as well as inhibit access. 

These perimeter fences and walls do not create a 

three-dimensional security envelope.

Primary internal security zones 

Primary internal security zones are threedimensional areas within the main security 

perimeter that provide for basic security separation and control of primary movement routes 

within the jail, denying or delaying access to 

other zones. Typical examples of primary security 

zones in a jail include:
71 

C h a p t e r 8 : 

Security Perimeter

■ Master control.

■ Housing pods or areas.

■ Female housing areas.

■ Special housing areas, especially those for 

work release or periodically confined inmates.

■ Program and support service areas.

■ Visiting areas, especially those accessible to 

the public.

Access to these zones is typically controlled remotely by master control. In some cases, selected 

primary internal security zones coincide with fire 

and smoke containment zones within the overall 

structure.

Secondary internal security zones 

Secondary internal security zones are threedimensional areas within both the main security perimeter and the primary internal security 

zones (exhibit 8-1). Their purpose is typically to 

preclude unauthorized and uncontrolled access 

between functional components (e.g., laundry 

and food services) or between areas that are part 

of functional components (e.g., separate housing 

units) within a primary internal security zone. 

Access to these zones is typically controlled remotely by master control or either remotely or 

directly by other facility staff.

Exhibit 8-1. Secondary Internal Security Zones

Housing unit

Secondary zones

within primary internal

security zone 

Housing unit

Primary internal

security zone

(housing perimeter)

Main security

perimeter

Zoning may go to a third level because individual 

spaces, such as cells and medication storage, 

frequently require fully secure protection from 

outside intrusion, escape attempts, and uncontrolled access within a secondary internal security zone. These spaces might be referred to as 

“tertiary internal security zones.”

Building Areas Outside the Security Envelope 

The overall building envelope is virtually never 

the same as the security envelope of the jail. 

There are functions outside of the jail security 

envelope that often share the building and contribute to the effectiveness of jail operations. Typically, these include the sheriff’s law enforcement 

functions and, possibly, court and probation 

functions. For these nonjail functions to share the 

building with the jail effectively, their needs must 

be recognized, their interrelationship with the jail 

understood, and their components integrated into 

the design in a way that avoids security conflicts. 

These issues are examined more closely in chapter 9, “Criminal Justice Interface.”

Jail-related functions that need to be outside of 

the primary jail security envelope (like the lobby 

or jail administration) also share the overall 

building envelope (exhibit 8-2). Access to some 

or all of these areas may be controlled by jail 

staff within the security envelope.

Exhibit 8-2. Relationship of Overall Building to 

Main Security Perimeter

Main security

perimeter

Overall building

envelope Nonjail areas

of building 
72

S e c t i o n 2 : 

Major Design Considerations

The most common functions affiliated with the 

jail, but outside its main security envelope, are 

the public lobby, the night lobby/vestibule, and 

the jail administration and staff areas (these can 

be provided in association with the law enforcement area). These public areas require different 

levels of access control. Nonjail spaces should be 

grouped depending on the type of access control 

required:

■ Uncontrolled public areas. These areas consist 

of spaces to which the public has unrestricted 

access, although they may be monitored by 

direct observation from a constantly staffed 

post and/or by electronic means (CCTV and/

or audio). Spaces that frequently fall into this 

category are the main lobby and its affiliated 

spaces (e.g., public restrooms, property locker 

areas) and the night lobby/vestibule.

■ Periodically controlled areas. These are areas 

to which the public has unrestricted access 

only during portions of the day. At other times, 

access is precluded and controlled by jail staff 

(usually master control) or by law enforcement staff (normally the dispatcher). The public lobby and its affiliated spaces can fall into 

this category, especially when a night lobby/

vestibule is incorporated to accommodate unrestricted public contact after visiting and office hours.

■ Controlled access areas. These are areas to 

which public access must be controlled or 

restricted at all times. The jail administration 

area is the main example of a set of spaces to 

which the public must have access only in a 

controlled and regulated way. The staff spaces 

(lockers, training, and exercise) are normally 

within this area because public access should 

be restricted.

Design Considerations 

Following are design considerations for the development of the main security envelope and the 

internal security zones essential to the denial of 

escape, unauthorized access, and contraband 

passage. More information on the security development of different functional components 

and spaces within functional components can be 

found in section 3, “Functional Components.”

General Considerations 

Overlapping perimeters/zones 

Because of the nature of internal zoning, the 

floors, walls, and/or roof areas that define internal zones and the main security envelope frequently overlap. For example, the exterior wall of 

an individual cell, which may be defined as part 

of a tertiary internal security zone, is frequently 

also the wall of the housing unit (secondary security zone), the general population male housing area (primary security zone), and the jail as a 

whole (main security envelope). In such a case, 

it is critical to design the wall according to the 

needs of the most stringent security condition—

in this case, those of the main security envelope.

In the same example, however, the ceiling of the 

cell might not coincide, or overlap, with that 

of other zones. This is because the security demands of the cell, or tertiary zone, might require 

the use of a securely constructed ceiling (concrete, steel, cement plaster on metal lath) that 

precludes access to a roof system above. If the 

roof system is securely constructed, it may serve 

separately as part of the main security perimeter or part of a secondary or a primary security 

zone. In another instance, the cell may be located 

under another cell sharing the same two-tier 

housing unit, or under a floor of another internal 

security zone.
73 

C h a p t e r 8 : 

Security Perimeter

Impact on design 

The primary reason for establishing a main security perimeter (envelope) and internal security 

zones is basic facility safety and security. However, an important architectural and economic 

benefit also accrues: development of a sound 

security envelope and effective internal zones 

allows wider latitude in the development of individual internal spaces in terms of material finishes, hardware, and furniture selection. This 

is especially true when perimeter and zoning 

concepts are coupled with a well-developed 

classification/separation plan and with concepts 

of constant staff presence and surveillance, thus 

providing detection, assessment, and response 

capabilities.

For example, if the main security envelope and 

the primary internal security zone of a housing 

area consisting of several housing units are well 

defined and properly designed, as well as constantly observed by staff, some of the following 

options and associated cost savings might become available.

■ Less heavily reinforced and constructed partitions and less costly security glazing to separate housing-unit dayrooms from the zone 

corridor because the zone is clearly defined 

and controlled, offering little gain to inmates 

penetrating the wall.

■ Less costly doors, frames, hardware, and locks

on general-population cells because there is 

little to be gained by penetration.

■ Less costly dayroom ceiling materials because 

penetration offers no viable escape route from 

the zone.

■ Elimination of costly security vestibules at the 

entry to housing units because escape from the 

individual unit is contained within the primary 

housing area security zone.

■ Elimination of costly enclosed housing control 

posts because assaultive behavior by inmates 

will not result in egress from the primary 

housing area security zone.

In evaluating these types of options, the issue of 

durability should not be neglected, nor should 

it be forgotten that physical security is still a 

required ingredient. From an operational viewpoint, good perimeter and good internal zoning 

may also allow for unescorted inmate movement 

between different points in the facility without 

fear of a successful escape attempt. An example 

would be unescorted movement between housing 

and visiting zones.

Master control 

A key consideration in the development of an effective security envelope and effective internal 

security zones is creation of a master control 

position. This position, which must be a primary 

internal security zone in its own right, must be 

able to:

Housing unit within the secure perimeter and primary internal security 

zone with solid-core wood doors, nonfixed furnishings, and open officer’s 

station.

(Photograph courtesy of Voorhis Robertson Justice Services.)
74

S e c t i o n 2 : 

Major Design Considerations

■ Monitor all security systems (e.g., CCTV, 

alarms, pressure-sensitive motion detectors).

■ Communicate with, control and monitor, and 

observe people at all ingress/egress points in 

the main security envelope.

■ Communicate with, control and monitor, and 

observe people at the doors or gates that help 

define internal security zones and inhibit 

movement between them.

■ Communicate with facility staff, wherever they 

are located in the facility.

■ Control entry into the master control space. 

(Note: An emergency key should be kept outside the facility’s security perimeter to open 

the room if the officer becomes incapacitated.)

■ Facilitate efficient staff and inmate movement 

throughout the facility.

More on the design of this space can be found in 

chapter 13, “Master Control.”

Compatibility of construction

In creating the security envelope and internal 

security zones, it is important that materials, finishes, and hardware in perimeter and zone barriers are compatible and comparable. For example, 

it is not helpful to provide glass-clad polycarbonate glazing material (a very high security window 

material) when the base wall consists of gypsum 

board (standard drywall). Similarly, it is inappropriate to provide a high-security lock for a lightweight hollow metal door and door frame. Other 

incompatible elements are concrete floors and 

reinforced concrete masonry unit walls combined 

with lightweight suspended metal acoustic ceiling panels that lead to unsecured ceiling plenums 

(the space between ceilings and roofs).

Security above the zone 

One often-overlooked consideration in the development of the security envelope and internal 

security zones is security above the space or 

area that is being defined as a zone or envelope. 

Failing to realize that the envelope and zones 

are three-dimensional, planners often give inadequate attention to the development of the ceiling 

in relation to the ceiling plenum and the roof as 

a key element of the envelope or zone. There are 

several considerations in this regard:

■ The ceiling of a space should be securely constructed if the walls around the zone do not 

extend to the roof or construction above and/

or if the roof or construction above is not secured (exhibit 8-3).

■ The ceiling should be securely constructed 

regardless of the nature of the roof or construction above and regardless of the degree 

to which the walls exceed the ceiling line if 

elements in the ceiling (e.g., electrical lines, 

water lines, ductwork) need protection or if 

access to the plenum is intolerable under any 

circumstance.

■ Openings in a secure ceiling should be 

sized and designed to preclude unwanted 

penetration.

Main Security Envelope 

The following design considerations apply to 

the main security envelope of the jail. The main 

security envelope must assist in denying escape 

Exhibit 8-3. Security Ceiling

Roof

Security

ceiling

Security

ceiling

Open attic

plenum
75 

C h a p t e r 8 : 

Security Perimeter

and contraband passage and must be constructed 

with the assumption that extremely dangerous 

and sophisticated criminals may be held in the 

jail. Escape and contraband passage are constant 

risks that can be initiated by individual inmates 

or in conjunction with outside collaborators. The 

preservation of a safe environment inside the jail 

and the prevention of assisted escapes or contraband passage from the outside require strict control over all penetrations of the security envelope. 

A variety of design considerations to prevent escapes and contraband passage pertain to the development of the main security envelope:

■ Limited access points. The number of access 

points must be limited to the minimum necessary for the efficient operation of the building, 

separation of conflicting traffic flows, and compliance with life safety codes. The fewer entry 

and exit points into the building, the fewer 

chances that security at these areas will be 

compromised. Minimum access points needed 

in a security perimeter to properly control traffic flow and satisfy codes include:

❏ Main public access to visiting and program 

areas.

❏ Staff access to the perimeter, which may be 

the same as the public access, although this 

may not be desirable.

❏ Arrestee/arresting officer access.

❏ Access for delivery of food/supplies and 

garbage removal.

❏ Required points of emergency egress.

■ Security vestibule with interlocking doors. All 

access points into the main security perimeter 

should be through a security vestibule with interlocking doors that allow for override of the 

interlock by master control during an emergency (exhibit 8-4).

Exhibit 8-4. Security Vestibule

Security

vestibule

Observation

Main security

perimeter 

Interlock doors Entry

■ Key override capability. Access points into the 

main security perimeter should have a key 

override capability. Keys to these doors should 

be under the direct control of the master control officer and should never be removed from 

the master control area except in an emergency. However, it is sometimes desirable to keep 

a master key in a secure location outside the 

secure perimeter (most frequently the sheriff’s 

office) in case of an equipment failure or other 

emergency in master control.

■ Metal detectors. Metal detectors should be 

available at all access points used by the public and outside service providers and, depending on the policy of the jail administration, at 

access points used by jail staff and other officials. Metal detectors can be integrated into 

the architecture of the facility in ways that 

hide them from view. Although the integrated 

detectors may be more visually appealing, 

the use of freestanding or hand-held detectors 

might be more of a deterrent at access points.

■ Secure construction of access points. All access 

points should be securely constructed. Following are some examples:

❏ Swing or sliding doors of 12- or 14-gauge 

steel.
76

S e c t i o n 2 : 

Major Design Considerations

❏❏ Frames grouted and anchored securely to 

the wall.

High-security detention-grade locks and 

hardware.

Windows, if used, that employ the strongest 

security glass products.

Walls, floors, and ceilings that are securely 

constructed and create their own threedimensional security zone.

❏❏

❏❏

❏❏

■ Use of impenetrable materials. The materials 

and construction methods used for the envelope must be relatively impenetrable, even 

from sustained attack with tools. For example:

Floors: concrete with various finishes.

Walls: precast or cast-in-place concrete; concrete masonry units reinforced and grouted 

every 8 to 16 inches on center.

Ceilings: precast or cast-in-place concrete; 

steel security panels; cement plaster on expanded metal lath.

Roof: precast or cast-in-place concrete with 

built-up roofing membrane; heavy-gauge 

metal deck securely fixed in place with roofing membrane.

Windows: typically inoperable unless heavily screened with security-grade products; 

and constructed with the strongest security, 

detention grade glass products available and 

securely anchored. 

❏

❏

❏

❏

❏

■ Secured openings. Other types of openings into 

the main security envelope (other than the access points) should be secured. For example:

❏❏ Passthroughs for such things as packages, 

money, and mail.

Ductwork.

Electrical openings.

Roof fan openings.

❏❏

❏❏

❏❏

❏❏

Secured windows in an indoor recreation yard. Note that these windows 

open for air circulation but have security mesh to prevent penetration.

(Photograph courtesy of Voorhis Robertson Justice Services.)

Air supply grills.

❏❏ Skylights.

In general, these openings or penetrations in 

the walls, ceilings, and roof of the main security perimeter should not exceed 5 inches 

in one dimension unless the opening can be 

confined to an area of 8 x 8 inches or less. 

Openings exceeding these dimensional limits 

should be protected by steel bars or other 

security elements that effectively reduce the 

size of the opening.

■ Limited public view. Public view of inmate living or activity areas must be limited as much 

as possible. Techniques to accomplish this and 

still provide natural light to inmate-occupied 

areas are discussed in chapter 3, “Site Selection and Design.”

Secured outdoor exercise areas. Outdoor exercise areas traditionally present special problems for security envelope design, including at 

least five typical concerns:

■

❏❏ Eliminating view conflicts and physical 

contact with the public.
77 

C h a p t e r 8 : 

Security Perimeter

❏ Controlling the introduction of contraband 

from outside sources.

❏ Preventing intrusion or escape through, under, or over the exercise area fence or wall.

❏ Providing a means of egress from the area if 

it is to serve as a containment area for facility evacuations.

Outdoor exercise areas represent a particularly vulnerable point in the main security 

envelope, and special care must be taken during the design effort to close potential holes. 

Related design considerations are addressed 

in chapter 19, “Exercise Areas.”

■ Use of CCTV. CCTV monitoring systems can 

provide some control over the exterior of the 

main security perimeter. If CCTV is used, several considerations apply:

❏ The number of cameras should be minimized to facilitate effective monitoring by 

master control.

❏ Recesses and pockets in the exterior of the 

building should be minimized to reduce the 

number of cameras and monitors required 

and facilitate a better exterior view.

❏ Cameras should be placed in locations inaccessible to public contact and potential 

tampering.

❏ Cameras should be able to accommodate 

changes in light level (day-night), where 

applicable.

❏ Cameras with swivel and zoom features are 

desirable, to allow master control to focus 

on specific areas on the perimeter.

If a CCTV system is used, monitoring of the 

rooftop should be considered, especially if 

the facility is a single-story structure. Building 

rooftops should be as clear of obstructions as 

possible. Designs can discourage access 

to the roof via downspouts, light fixtures, 

and other elements that protrude from the 

exterior. 

■ Use of perimeter lighting. Perimeter lighting is 

a useful feature for discouraging approaches to 

the security envelope by the public or persons 

collaborating with inmates on escape attempts.

■ Secured access to mechanical rooms, buildings, 

or penthouses. Access to these areas should be 

secured at both the outside and inside access 

points to the rest of the jail.

■ Security-sensitive landscaping. Facility landscaping must be considered in light of overall 

security design. All shrubs and trees should 

be placed to ensure that sightlines to the perimeter are not obscured. They should not 

be positioned where they can be used by an 

intruder to scale perimeter walls and fences. 

Landscaping may be useful to help preclude 

approaches to the exterior (tough, thorny 

bushes, for example).

■ Climate-controlled heating, ventilating, and 

air-conditioning (HVAC) system. Installation of 

a fully climate-controlled HVAC system should 

be considered to avoid the need for operable 

windows.

■ Limited access for inmate visitors. The design should limit inmate visitors to a primary 

internal security zone created for visitation 

purposes adjacent to the public lobby (exhibit 

8-5). Contact visits, if permitted, should occur 

in a designated area within this zone under 

staff supervision.

Special considerations for denying contraband 

Most of the preceding design considerations that 

help deny escapes fundamentally help deny contraband passage from outside parties. However, 

contraband can be introduced into the facility 
78

S e c t i o n 2 : 

Major Design Considerations

Exhibit 8-5. Visiting Area in Relationship to 

Main Security Perimeter 

Main security

perimeter

Controlled

public access

Visiting

zone

Staff

Lobby

by inmates and others entering the main security 

envelope. Three types of inmates are usually 

involved:

■ The escorted inmate who acquires contraband 

while outside the main security envelope (e.g., 

in court or at a medical appointment). Contraband enters the jail when officers returning the 

inmate fail to perform an adequate clothed or 

unclothed search prior to returning the inmate 

to his/her housing area.

■ The work releasee, or inmate worker who has 

outside privileges and is not subject to search 

each time he/she reenters the main security 

perimeter of the facility. This is especially 

problematic if work release inmates do not 

have a separate entrance into the facility or are 

not housed separately from general population 

inmates.

■ Inmates who come in contact with outside 

parties such as attorneys, counselors, or contract food service workers who either inadvertently or purposely pass contraband.

Design features that can be incorporated to reduce the risk of contraband passage include:

■ Separate entryways. Separate entry and exit 

should be provided for work releasees and 

inmate workers, who both provide a natural 

chain of contraband passage. If separate entryways are not achievable, staff will have to 

control opportunities for contact and passage 

of contraband.

■ Separate clothing exchange areas. Separate areas should be provided in which inmate workers and work releasees can leave potentially 

contaminated clothing and personal items and 

dress in institutional clothing prior to returning 

to a secure housing area.

■ Separate housing areas. The housing areas of 

work releasees should be clearly separated 

from those of inmate workers by locating the 

two in separate primary internal security zones 

and precluding one group from entering the 

zone of the other.

■ Separate laundry facilities for work releasees. 

Work release inmates should have separate 

laundry facilities. Providing work releasees 

with separate facilities for exercise, visiting, 

and other activities might also be considered 

unless staff action can minimize contraband 

passage opportunities.

■ Vestibules. Vestibules allow all escorted inmates, work releasees, and inmate workers to 

be searched at reentry. Where inmate workers 

are involved in receiving and storing food or 

packaging refuse, creating an enclosed delivery vestibule and refuse storage area is a good 

idea. Such an area would use a system of interlocking doors observed by CCTV from master control and/or directly by staff.

■ Separate work areas for inmate workers. All 

activities and work functions of inmate workers (e.g., food preparation, laundry) should be 

located inside the main security envelope and 

outside of primary internal security zones provided for inmate housing.

■ Pedestrian entrance vestibules. These vestibules should be designed to avoid hiding 
79 

C h a p t e r 8 : 

Security Perimeter

places that could be used for concealment and 

later retrieval of contraband during entry and 

exit by inmates.

■ Exterior doors. The doors used should seal 

tightly to prevent the introduction of contraband under the door or between the frame and 

the door.

■ Secure routes to court facilities. Opportunities for public contact should be eliminated or 

minimized.

■ Secure space for interviewing. Space for interviewing inmates should be provided within the 

main security envelope rather than outside the 

envelope in jail administration or law enforcement areas.

■ Search rooms. Providing search rooms allows 

inmates to be checked as they depart from different areas of the facility to their housing unit 

after contact with others.

■ Metal detection. Metal detection equipment 

should be located at key points of entry 

through which all visitors must pass under the 

supervision of an officer.

Perimeter Fences/Walls 

The perimeter fencing most commonly found at 

jails built on large parcels of land in nonurban 

areas typically consists of two parallel fences 

around the entire institution. The only openings 

in the fences are at the public entry near the administration portion of the building and at a vehicle entry point. Some distance between the two 

fences is necessary to prevent jumping from the 

top of one fence over the other or using instruments (e.g., ropes, ladders) to bridge from one 

fence to the other. The space between the two 

fences also allows for the placement of security 

wire to inhibit movement if the first fence is penetrated or scaled.

For the jail that is a single discrete building, the 

need for such a perimeter fence or wall is less 

clear than for large facilities that have multiple 

buildings and high levels of required outdoor 

inmate movement. In the majority of jails, most 

or all inmate housing activities and movement 

occur within the secure envelope of the physical 

plant, negating the need to physically contain 

outdoor movement.

There are, however, reasons that a perimeter 

fence or wall around some or all of a jail makes 

sense:

■ There may be concerns regarding the jail’s immediate adjacency to sensitive public areas 

that justify additional separation or screening, 

such as schools, playgrounds, parks, nursing 

homes, or densely populated areas.

■ The amount and type of inmate activity occurring outside the jail building, such as inmate 

gardening, groundskeeping, building maintenance, and field recreation, might require a 

fenced enclosure.

In most instances, a single fence rather than a 

double fence makes sense, especially if inmates 

do not have access to the outdoor areas or if only 

a few inmates use the areas and they are directly 

supervised by staff. If view conflicts are perceived or the appearance of a fence is objectionable, a perimeter wall would be more appropriate 

but probably more costly.

If a perimeter fence or wall is incorporated into 

the building plan, several design characteristics 

should be considered:

■ A minimum height of approximately 12 feet.

■ If a fence is used, a tightly woven mesh or 

wire to inhibit climbing.
80

S e c t i o n 2 : 

Major Design Considerations

■ Security wire (e.g., razor wire) at the top of 

the fence or wall (in the case of a wall, the 

security wire might be just behind the wall out 

of public view for aesthetic purposes).

■ An ability to observe all portions of the area 

defined by the fence, especially if inmates are 

to use the area (by a direct view from a constantly staffed post, by CCTV, or by both).

■ An extension of the fence or wall below grade 

to preclude tunneling under it.

■ Perimeter lighting to enhance nighttime surveillance and to discourage assaults from the 

outside during the night.

Internal Security Zones 

Primary internal security zones incorporate the 

following key principles into facility design and 

operation:

■ Ingress and egress are regulated and monitored 

by direct visual or CCTV observation from a 

master control center.

■ All movement of people and materials from 

one zone to another is restricted and controlled by strategic placement of corridor gates 

or doors remotely operated by master control.

■ All out-of-cell inmate activities in the zones 

are directly supervised, observed from a constantly staffed post, or monitored by CCTV.

■ A secure three-dimensional envelope is created, similar in construction to that of the 

main security perimeter, although the zone 

can frequently share elements with the security envelope.

One key aspect of defining primary internal security zones is to achieve a proper balance between 

security needs and efficiency. It is possible to 

subdivide the jail into so many zones that movement of staff and inmates becomes difficult and 

burdensome. One consequence of doing so is that 

staff prop open doors that are meant to be closed 

and are indicated as closed on control panel annunciators. Thus, the value of sophisticated control technologies is contravened and concepts of 

zoning and movement control break down.

Jail with dual fenced perimeter with razor wire. 

(Photograph courtesy of Jim Rowenhorst.) 

Secondary internal security zones incorporate the 

following key principles into facility design and 

operation:

■ Ingress and egress are regulated and monitored 

by master control or another officer through 

locked doors that may be operated either remotely or manually.

■ Inmate activities in the zones may be supervised or unsupervised, depending on the risk 

level of the inmates in the zones.

■ Construction and material approaches for 

secondary, and even tertiary, internal security 

zones might be less secure than those for the 

main security envelope and primary internal security zones, although needs vary on a 

space-by-space basis.
81 

C h a p t e r 8 : 

Security Perimeter

For example, the security needs of a medication 

storage space or a disciplinary detention cell, 

both of which might be defined as tertiary security zones, may well demand construction similar 

to that of a primary zone. Conversely, the indoor 

exercise area, as a secondary internal security 

zone, would typically not require construction 

as heavy or as secure as a primary zone or the 

main security envelope unless a portion of it 

(wall, ceiling/roof) coincided with a higher level 

perimeter.

Readers are advised to examine the data on individual functional components presented in 

section 3 and assess the implications for security 

construction.

Conclusion 

Accurately defining and creating security envelopes and zones is essential in an architecturally 

secure facility. Effective development of envelopes and zones is also one of the key spaceorganizing principles of a jail design. To be fully 

effective, however, the architectural concepts 

must complement and, in fact, derive from fully 

developed operational principles regarding inmate classification and separation, supervision 

and surveillance, staffing, and basic policies and 

procedures of operations. If a true marriage between security design and operations is achieved, 

the jail’s basic mission of ensuring exterior and 

interior security will be achieved.
83

Chapter 9

Criminal Justice Interface

Ajail does not operate in a vacuum. It is 

only one part of a larger, interrelated criminal justice system. Officials from other 

elements of the system interact with jail inmates 

and staff on a daily basis, and jail designs need 

to enhance the effectiveness of these interactions. 

This section identifies ways in which other criminal justice system participants interface with the 

jail.

The system elements that have the most interaction with the jail include:

■ Affiliated law enforcement agencies, most 

typically the sheriff’s office and local police 

departments.

■ Courts.

■ Defense and prosecuting attorneys.

■ Probation and parole.

A General Caution 

Establishing proper interface between the jail 

and other elements of the criminal justice system 

entails more than just making sure inmates get 

to court or see an attorney. Sometimes design 

processes get so focused on solving jail facility 

problems that they inadvertently create problems 

for law enforcement, probation, court, and other 

related functions.

This problem is especially acute when the jail 

facility shares a site with other criminal justice 

functions. Specifically, jurisdictions have expanded jails in less-than-desirable ways on existing sites solely because the courts are also there. 

These solutions have often ignored the growth 

needs of the courthouse or its fundamental inadequacy as a modern, secure court facility.

Then, when the jurisdiction later turns its attention to court needs, it discovers that the available 

space on the site is inadequate and that solutions 

require either a new facility or an additional facility at a different location. The jurisdiction is left 

with the worst of all worlds: higher costs for the 

court solution, no interconnection between the 

jail and courts, and a jail design that was compromised by erroneous site considerations.

To avoid this scenario, jurisdictions should consider taking the following steps during predesign 

planning for the jail:

■ Develop a broad understanding of facility, 

parking, and operational needs of related criminal justice functions.

■ If possible, develop a criminal justice facilities 

master plan so that the jail project fits into a 

clearly understood present and future context.

■ Invite criminal justice officials to be routinely 

involved in jail planning meetings.

■ Before using a shared site, develop sketch 

work that shows how the site will accommodate the jail design, jail expansion, expansion 

of the other facilities at the site, and all related 

parking needs.

■ Evaluate jail options at varying distances 

from the site to test actual functional and 

cost differences—it may be that a new location 

would not be as detrimental as staying on the 

courthouse site.

Law Enforcement Interface 

Most county jails are organizationally a part of 

the local sheriff’s department. In practical terms, 

while larger facilities may be built in suburban 

or rural areas, some distance from the sheriff’s 
84

S e c t i o n 2 : 

Major Design Considerations

office, virtually all smaller jail facilities are constructed in combination 

with a sheriff’s administrative, road 

patrol, civil, and dispatch functions. 

The close administrative and arrestprocessing ties between law enforcement and 

jail operations frequently result in a blurring of 

distinctions between the two different functional 

needs. For example, in smaller jails, law enforcement communications/dispatch staff are often 

responsible for control and electronic monitoring 

of jail areas, and the kitchen in some jails is the 

break area for law enforcement staff.

Although some sharing of staff and space can be 

successfully planned and designed, experience 

has shown jail resources are frequently used to 

compensate for insufficient law enforcement provisions. The most frequent complaints relate to 

provisions for storage and/or staff support. Many 

jurisdictions find they need to reassign some jail 

space for law enforcement use to relieve critical 

deficiencies, creating a twofold problem:

■ Space planned for jail use is lost, thereby recreating some of the same overcrowded or deficient jail conditions that originally prompted 

new construction.

■ The reassigned spaces are not efficiently 

located, requiring law enforcement staff to 

regularly move in and out of the jail security 

envelope for nonjail purposes. This increases 

the workload for jail control staff and potentially generates security concerns. Secure jail 

operations require a specific security envelope 

that restricts and controls access of all nonjail 

persons and activities. This concept of control 

should include nonjail sheriff’s department 

staff.

The principal reason space shortages exist in 

new law enforcement components seems to be 

that most of the focus was on the jail throughout 

the facility development process—a logical thing 

when one considers the controversies that frequently propel jail projects. The solution? Treat 

both the jail and law enforcement functions more 

equally, beginning with a solid review of how 

they interrelate.

When the jail facility is jointly constructed with 

law enforcement spaces, a number of spacesharing concepts can be considered in both the 

jail and law enforcement areas. Space sharing 

can help eliminate duplication of resources while 

providing a comprehensive facility plan at minimal construction cost. These issues and their design implications are discussed next.

The success of the jail design can, to some extent, depend on the successful planning and 

design of adjacent nonjail areas. The following 

issues, while not dealing with law enforcement 

design per se, focus on the design of key law enforcement elements that interface with the jail: 

public/staff separation, law enforcement dispatch 

and jail control in small jails, records, arrest processing, investigations and lineups, jail administration and staff, food service, and deliveries.

Public/Staff Separation 

The organization of jail building and site designs 

frequently focuses on separation of staff, law enforcement, and public access, including parking, 

staff entry, arrestee entry, visitor entry, service 

delivery access, and so forth. Law enforcement 

functions need to be similarly separated. Coordinating these separations during initial site 

utilization studies can create the basis for better 

separation of public from nonpublic areas and 

possibly yield a more efficient shared public lobby and unified staff parking area (exhibit 9-1).

Law Enforcement Dispatch and Jail Control 

in Small Jails

Jurisdictions with smaller sheriff’s 

departments and jails may use staff in 

the dual role of jail master control 
85 

C h a p t e r 9 : 

Criminal Justice Interface

officer and law enforcement communications/

dispatch officer. Whether this operational practice 

can, or should, continue is a critical decision in 

developing a small jail design. It is rarely an issue 

or option for medium- and large-scale facilities.

The expectations for staff monitoring of inmate 

activities in new jails and the sophisticated building and security electronics systems in these jails 

dramatically increase the tasks and responsibilities of jail staff when compared with systems in 

older jails. Where population growth is a factor, 

the increasing volume of communication calls 

alone may dictate separate dispatch staff. To assess the issues involving the master control jail 

position and communications dispatch, see chapter 13, “Master Control,” in section 3. 

Exhibit 9-1. Separation of Public From 

Nonpublic Areas

Road patrol

work area

Evidence

Sheriff's

administration

Records

Public

lobby

Public toilets

Staff

only

Controlled

access

Public

access

Public

Staff parking

parking

Care should be taken in the selection of staff 

used in this dual function to avoid the problems 

that can arise when staff trained as dispatchers 

are thrust into a jail control role they do not want 

and that they perform reluctantly and ineffectively. In designs where the master control/

dispatch center is strategically located to visually 

monitor and control a series of jail spaces and 

activities around it, dispatch staff frequently cut 

off the views by placing blinds or curtains over 

the vision panels, which can create a dangerous 

situation. In these instances, the use of trained 

correctional officers in the dual role is essential.

When communications/dispatch operations are 

to be combined with the master control space, 

the space may need to be located adjacent to or 

closely connected to the records area and/or the 

public lobby (exhibit 9-2). Dispatchers in small 

agencies frequently need access to records information not available in electronic data systems. 

They also frequently respond directly to citizen 

requests for assistance, especially during evening 

and weekend hours.

Exhibit 9-2. Location of Master Control and 

Communications/Dispatch Operations Relative to Jail 

and Law Enforcement Areas and Public Lobby

Dispatch

Records counter

Jail

area

Master

control

Jail security

perimeter

Law enforcement

area

Security

vestibule

Public

lobby

Records

When law enforcement and the jail share the 

same building, records storage and retrieval functions must be organized to ensure that both entities can access files easily. The active, hardcopy 

files for inmates should be created and stored in 

the jail until an inmate is released or transferred. 

The physical transfer of those files to a central 

records area requires little more than the design 

of a staff access route between the jail and law 

enforcement records areas or the creation of another means, like a pneumatic tube system.
86

S e c t i o n 2 : 

Major Design Considerations

Arrest Processing

The chief interface between law enforcement and 

the jail is the transfer of custody of an arrestee 

from local police, state police, or sheriff’s deputies to the jail staff. This is a daily occurrence 

that the jail design must easily accommodate.

An enclosed vehicle sallyport for entry of the arrestee and arresting officer is virtually standard 

in modern jails. Beyond that, provisions for the 

arresting officers should also include the following (exhibit 9-3):

Exhibit 9-3. Provisions for Arresting Officers

Report

writing Intakerelease

Weapons

lockers

CCTV camera

to master control

Vehicle sallyport

Pedestrian entry

■ Weapons lockers in the vehicle sallyport.

■ An exterior pedestrian entry through which an 

officer can reenter after moving his/her vehicle 

out of the sallyport or can park outside and 

walk the arrestee into the booking area.

■ Visual monitoring by intake-release and/or 

master control staff of the entire arrestee route, 

in case the arresting officer needs assistance.

■ A work area/security vestibule that provides 

a secure entry point through the jail’s security 

envelope as well as a place for law enforcement officers to do pat searches, take property, 

and complete prebooking paperwork.

■ Sobriety testing equipment in or adjacent to 

the work area/vestibule.

■ Interview/interrogation space.

■ A report-writing area, possibly with a telephone and computer access, for the arresting 

officer.

Other provisions for the arresting officer might 

include:

■ Restroom facilities.

■ Quick access to a temporary holding room for 

uncooperative arrestees or for processing multiple arrests.

These provisions should all be located adjacent 

to the intake-release area in a way that does not 

require the arresting officer to go beyond the 

entry vestibule and deeper into the jail security 

envelope. For more information on this topic, see 

chapter 14, “Intake-Release,” in section 3.

Investigations and Lineups

Local and state law enforcement officers frequently need to interview jail inmates. To alleviate security concerns with inmate movement, 

interview space can be provided within or directly adjacent to the jail security envelope. If scheduling conflicts can be avoided, space used for law 

enforcement interviews can often be shared with 

the areas used for attorney visits and other professional visits.

Some departments indicate a periodic need for a 

lineup room for victim/witness identification of 

arrestees. This should be located so as to minimize public penetration of the jail and securely 

separate victim/witness movement from that of 

inmates. Given the limited use of lineup facilities, 

these spaces are prime candidates for multipleuse consideration. If located within the security 

envelope, the lineup room may also be used for 

inmate counseling, library, or religious services. 

If the space is located along the security envelope, extra care should be taken in selecting the 
87 

C h a p t e r 9 : 

Criminal Justice Interface

type of security glass used to separate inmates 

from the nonsecure side.

Jail Administration and Staff 

Space for the jail administrator, clerical activities, 

conferences, staff training, and staff lockers and 

showers does not necessarily need to be within 

the jail security envelope. When law enforcement offices are built in conjunction with the 

jail, creation of one administrative and staff area 

can minimize expensive secure space and eliminate unnecessary duplication of spaces. Clerical, 

conference, and jail administration activities can 

take place in the same area. For example, with 

proper scheduling the same space can be used 

as a training classroom for both correctional officers and law enforcement officers. Jail and law 

enforcement staff locker areas can be combined 

outside the secure jail envelope with joint-use 

toilet and shower facilities. However, when these 

staff and administrative spaces are shared by 

both jail and law enforcement staff, care must 

be taken to ensure that there are adequate space 

and equal amenities (e.g., full-size lockers for all 

staff members) and that there will be no scheduling conflicts when using the space. For more 

information on these issues, see chapter 24, 

“Administration and Public Areas,” and chapter 

25, “Staff Areas,” in section 3.

Food Service

The jail food service area is frequently used as 

a lunch and coffee-break space for law enforcement officers. This sharing of kitchen space has 

also emerged where space for disaster services/

emergency operations are included in an overall facility plan. If the kitchen is located outside 

the security envelope, this sharing of space is 

problematic only to the extent that it tends to discourage the use of inmate workers in food preparation and cleanup. Securely moving three meals 

a day in and out of the security envelope can be 

an inefficient use of staff time.

It is usually better to dedicate kitchen facilities to 

jail meal preparation and to locate these spaces 

within the jail envelope to enhance security and 

to minimize staff time in serving meals and returning trays and utensils. Separate canteen or 

break area facilities for law enforcement staff outside of the jail security envelope result in minimal addition of space and equipment and a more 

efficient and secure operation overall.

Deliveries 

In older facilities the secure vehicle sallyport 

used for delivering arrestees is often used for 

deliveries of supplies into the facility. Using the 

arrestee sallyport for other purposes can be dangerous because of the equipment left in the area, 

the potential to introduce contraband into the 

secure perimeter, and because it can block secure delivery of arrestees. The ideal solution is to 

provide a separate loading dock for the delivery 

of food and supplies. Additionally, the vehicle 

sallyport should not be used for other functions 

not related to the processing of arrestees, such 

as vehicle maintenance or equipment or supply 

storage.

Courts Interface 

Although the jail’s interface with the courts varies by jurisdiction and state law, many of the 

arrestees booked into the typical jail will make 

one or more court appearances before they are 

released from custody. If inmates are remanded 

into custody or cannot make bail, they are often 

taken to court many times during their incarceration for their trial and other court proceedings. 

Inmate movement to and from court tends to 

occur in three ways:

■ The inmate is walked through secure and/or 

nonsecure corridors directly to the courtroom.

■ The inmate is either driven or walked to a 

courtroom at a separate location.
88

S e c t i o n 2 : 

Major Design Considerations

■ The inmate appears in court facilities specially 

set up at the jail.

Corridor Movements 

When the jail and the courthouse are directly connected, the following considerations should be 

taken into account during the planning process:

■ Movement through the jail security envelope 

should be through an interlocked security 

vestibule.

■ Once out of the security envelope, as much 

movement as possible should be through 

corridors, stairs, and elevators to which the 

public has no access or where public access 

can be temporarily precluded. Moving inmates 

through the public corridors of the courthouse 

is highly undesirable.

■ Movement should also be monitored by jail 

staff other than the escort officer, such as the 

master control officer.

Movement to Offsite Court 

Increasingly, new jails are being built on sites 

other than the courthouse site. When the jail 

is on a separate site, court attendance requires 

movement of inmates outdoors, thus introducing increased risks of escape and assault. Even if 

the jail is only one block from the courthouse, it 

is strongly recommended that an inmate not be 

walked to the courthouse, but driven there in a 

secure vehicle. When planning for the movement 

of inmates to court, other related considerations 

include the following:

■ Departure from the jail should be through the 

vehicle sallyport.

■ Access to the sallyport should, if possible, be 

via a secure route that does not go through the 

intake/booking area.

■ Necessary restraint equipment should be readily accessible near the vehicle sallyport.

■ A place to hold or stage the inmates to be 

transported should be available.

■ The courthouse should have its own vehicle 

sallyport to avoid the need for any inmate 

exposure to the public.

Appearances at the Jail 

Some jurisdictions with separate jail and court 

facilities conduct early, uncomplicated court appearances at the jail. Such appearances include 

arraignments (also called first appearances) and, 

in some states, probable cause hearings that are 

required before arrestees can be booked. Even 

preliminary hearings are conducted at some jails.

These early proceedings can be done at the jail 

because they are brief (3–5 minutes for arraignments) and do not involve many people. A very 

high percentage of inmates are released on bail, 

recognizance, or a third-party signature immediately or shortly after their first court appearance.

Court appearances at the jail generally take place 

in two ways:

■ All participants are brought to a specially built 

court space or an easily adaptable multipurpose space at the jail.

■ A video appearance system allows everyone 

but the inmate, and perhaps a public observer, 

to participate from the courthouse.

Courtrooms at the jail

Building a courtroom or multiple courtrooms into 

a jail is an option that is not taken very often, especially in smaller jails. It is frequently perceived 

as inconvenient to judges and court officials, it 

adds to construction costs, and it broadens security responsibilities at the jail. When this concept 

is pursued, several questions must be answered:

■ Do jail staff have security responsibilities in 

the courtroom, or do the court and its bailiffs?
89 

C h a p t e r 9 : 

Criminal Justice Interface

■ Will all noninmate participants be screened 

through jail facility security, including metal 

detectors?

■ Will defendants who are not in custody 

also make their first appearance at the jail 

courtroom?

■ How extensive will the court operation be? 

Must there be space for a judge’s office, a 

clerk’s office, attorney-client consultation, 

public waiting?

■ In smaller jails, can the court space be used 

by the jail for program activities in the evening 

and on weekends?

Following are some design considerations 

that apply if a courtroom is designed into a 

jail facility:

■ Separate interlocked security vestibules for 

access to the courtroom by (1) inmates and 

(2) the public and officials.

■ Closed-circuit television (CCTV) monitoring 

and intercom communications to the master 

control center.

■ A primary security zone for the court area 

(e.g., window openings constructed of 

detention-grade materials).

Video appearances at the jail

Using video technologies has become the common way to hold initial court appearances at 

many jails, especially when the jail is remote 

from the courthouse. With video, the only participants at the jail are typically the inmate and 

jail security staff. In some states, public observers may have the right to directly witness the 

inmate’s court appearance at the jail. Judges, 

prosecuting attorneys, court reporters, clerks, 

bailiffs, and defense attorneys stay at the courthouse. So do most, if not all, of the public and all 

out-of-custody defendants.

Space requirements for video appearances are 

minimal and can easily be provided at most jails 

in a multipurpose room. Equipment needs are 

generally limited to a television (TV) monitor, 

a camera, a microphone, switching equipment, 

chairs, and a table or podium. Video signals are 

transmitted via microwave, cable TV lines, or 

by dedicated wiring if the courtroom is close 

enough. Monitors generally provide “split-screen” 

views so that all major participants can be seen 

at one time.

In developing a video appearance capability 

at the jail, several design issues should be 

addressed:

■ Provision of backup observation of the space 

by CCTV or, preferably, direct line of sight 

from a staff post.

■ Protection of video appearance equipment 

from tampering or accidental damage if the 

space is shared by other functions (e.g., 

through means such as closeable cabinets, 

roll-away carts, or closeable alcoves).

■ Configuration of the space so that multiple 

inmates can simultaneously hear the initial instructions from the judge.

■ Provision of a fax machine or some other 

means by which papers can be moved quickly 

between locations.

■ Provision of sufficient distance between camera and defendant to accommodate full-body 

views if desired by the judge.

Attorneys 

Inmates need access to attorneys, particularly 

defense attorneys. This is accomplished primarily through telephone conversations and personal 

meetings or interviews.
90

S e c t i o n 2 : 

Major Design Considerations

Telephones in the dayrooms of housing units 

facilitate inmate/attorney consultation but have 

the disadvantage of offering limited privacy. A 

more private telephone alcove or a prefabricated, 

acoustically screened station may be a good 

solution.

Attorney/client interview space can be either 

contact or noncontact, or both, depending on the 

standards of individual states. Discussion with 

the local bar association is advised to determine 

the best solution in terms of appropriate access 

and security.

Attorney access to contact interview spaces 

should always be gained by passing through 

metal detectors and an interlocked security 

vestibule. Jurisdictions considering the use of 

noncontact visiting space should remember that 

attorneys sometimes must pass paperwork to the 

inmate for review or signature. Without a secure 

paper pass, jail officers will bear the burden of 

passing paperwork back and forth.

When planning for attorney and other professional visiting areas, the jurisdiction should consider 

the following issues:

■ Good acoustic quality.

■ Ample desk surface for files and paperwork.

■ Adequate artificial lighting on the desk surface.

■ Seating for at least two attorneys.

■ Accessible space compliant with the provisions 

of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) 

for attorneys or inmates who are wheelchairbound or have other disabilities such as hearing or sight issues.

■ A means of communication that allows attorneys to talk to staff (e.g., to announce the end 

of a visit).

■ A panic alarm, in case of an emergency, especially if the space is not directly observed by a 

staff member.

■ Locating the space so that random or constant 

staff observation is possible.

Public Defenders

The needs of public defenders are somewhat different from those of private attorneys. It is not 

unusual, for example, for the public defender 

to see several inmates during one trip to the jail 

or, in smaller jails, to represent most of the jail’s 

population. For efficiency’s sake, it is helpful to 

design an inmate waiting area adjacent to the 

attorney-client visiting rooms (exhibit 9-4). Since 

such a space could hold a mix of inmate classifications, it should be in direct view of a constantly staffed post, if possible.

Another way to make the public defender’s work 

more efficient would be to provide a small office 

with access to a telephone, computer, and fax 

machine. The computer should be linked to any 

court or relevant, nonprivate inmate data systems 

available.

Exhibit 9-4. Inmate Waiting Area Adjacent to 

Attorney-Client Visiting Rooms

Security

vestibule

Visitor

screening

area

Jail

corridor

Inmate

waiting

Attorneyclient

meeting

Staff control post

Attorneyclient

meeting

Probation/Parole 

Probation and parole staff have interview needs 

similar to those of attorneys, and the space 
91 

C h a p t e r 9 : 

Criminal Justice Interface

provided for attorney/inmate interviews is normally sufficient for their needs. The planner must 

ensure, however, that enough space is available 

to meet the needs of all who will share the space.

The most distinctive need of probation/parole 

officers is for hearing space. Probation/parole 

hearings occur when offenders are arrested for alleged violation of probation or parole conditions. 

Many jurisdictions accommodate hearings at the 

jail to minimize inmate movement outside the 

facility. Hearing rooms should accommodate four 

to eight people, provide a large table and chairs, 

have good acoustics, and provide convenient 

electrical outlets for recording and transcription 

equipment.

Conclusion

There are important points of interface between 

the jail and other components of the criminal justice system. Although the collective space needs 

or space organization demands of these other 

functions are not great, they have significant impact on the successful operation of the jail. These 

interface issues deserve serious consideration 

during predesign planning and skillful development during design.
93

Chapter 10

Functional Components and Relationships

Ajail is a single building made up of many 

small pieces, or components, that represent different functions or activities. Together, the components are intended to satisfy all 

of the needs of inmates, staff, and public users of 

the jail. 

The selection of appropriate components, the 

details of their development, and their arrangement in relation to each other on a selected 

site are what make each jail design unique and 

responsive to local conditions. It is this uniqueness of need and condition that makes it difficult 

to apply one standard, “cookie-cutter” design to 

all jail design problems. Developing a working 

knowledge of the various components needed by 

the jurisdiction in terms of their function, interrelationship, and impact on design is critical to 

meeting local jail needs effectively.

In response to the need for information on jail 

components, the purpose of this chapter is 

twofold:

■ To identify the major and typical components 

of a jail.

■ To describe how these components typically 

interrelate. 

Detailed functional and design information about 

individual components is presented in section 3, 

along with elaboration on many of the issues 

raised in this section. 

An additional purpose of this chapter is to review 

how certain types of functions might occur in the 

same room or area, that is, to identify jail functions that can share space. This is an important 

concept for smaller jails in particular, because 

the infrequency of certain activities sometimes 

makes sharing space essential to the efficient use 

of scarce local resources.

Jail Components

If a person documented every possible activity 

that could occur in a jail, the resulting list would 

be quite lengthy. Fortunately, not all of these 

activities have space implications. Many are comfortably managed within major activity categories 

for which proper space is designed and allocated, 

and some have no direct space impact at all (e.g., 

key control and inspections). Following are the 

major activity categories, or functional components, for which dedicated space is needed: 

■ Master control: Monitors and controls all 

building communications, safety and security systems, entrance and egress routes, and 

movement within the facility and often coordinates management of emergencies in the early 

stages.

■ Intake-release (also referred to as “booking,” 

“reception,” and “admissions”): Receives and 

processes incoming arrestees or inmates and 

releases outgoing inmates.

■ Housing—general: Accommodates the individual security, sleeping, hygiene, privacy, and 

routine personal needs of the main, or general, 

inmate population of adult men and women. 

■ Housing—special: Accommodates the individual security, sleeping, hygiene, privacy, and 

unique care needs of special inmate groups 

(e.g., those in disciplinary detention or protective custody; those who have disabilities 

or who are mentally ill, suicidal, intoxicated, 

or medically infirm; juveniles remanded as 

adults) and of inmates who regularly leave 

and return to the jail on a regular basis (work 

release or periodic confinement). 

■ Health care: Accommodates the health care 

needs of inmates, including medical and 
94

S e c t i o n 2 : 

Major Design Considerations

dental exams, tests, distribution of medications, sick call, medical records, and storage. 

■ Visiting: Accommodates individual and 

group contact between inmates and family or 

official visitors (staff, counselors, attorneys, 

etc.).

■ Indoor and/or outdoor exercise: Accommodates the physical exercise needs of inmates 

in an indoor or outdoor setting and storage of 

necessary support equipment.

■ Programs/services: Accommodates inmate 

needs in areas such as recreation, education, 

counseling, training, library services, and religious services.

■ Commissary: Accommodates basic inmate 

needs or wants for miscellaneous items such 

as pens, paper, toiletries, and snacks.

■ Food service: Accommodates the receipt and 

storage of food and food supplies; the preparation, delivery, and consumption of meals; 

cleanup after food preparation and meals; and 

removal of refuse.

■ Laundry: Receives, cleans, mends, stores, and 

distributes all reusable personal items used in 

the facility, such as clothing, linens, bedding, 

pillows, and mattresses.

■ Administration/public area: Organizes and 

manages the daily business of the facility, accommodates public access to the facility, and 

responds to the public’s need for information 

and services.

■ Staff: Accommodates the training, hygiene, fitness, and personal needs of facility staff.

■ Storage: Accommodates the need to maintain 

various types of supplies, equipment, and 

spare parts safely and securely.

■ Maintenance: Initiates preventive maintenance, fixes and replaces worn or damaged 

equipment and materials, and cleans and 

maintains existing facilities.

■ Mechanical services: Provides heat, ventilation, and air conditioning; water and waste 

lines; and main and emergency power 

supplies.

Degrees of Development 

The typical jail has each of the preceding functional components. However, there are significant 

variations from facility to facility in the degree 

to which some of these functions are provided, 

largely because of operational and economic considerations. In some facilities, the functions are 

minimally developed. As a result, the function 

has a limited impact on space and equipment 

requirements. In other facilities, the same components are fully developed and require a complete 

range of space and equipment. 

Local officials, planners, and architects must 

determine needs with respect to each functional component during predesign planning to 

design and arrange spaces properly.

Some of the functional components that vary 

greatly in their degree of development in jails are 

discussed below. These components reveal significant opportunities for space savings and measurably affect the way in which a facility operates 

on a daily basis. They are discussed further in 

section 3. In larger jails there is generally less 

flexibility in the development of these spaces.

Food Service

Larger jails will need adequate space and equipment for food service. An industrial food service 

operation will require space for cooking equipment (e.g., grills, steam kettles); refrigeration 

units; freezers; dry food storage; food preparation 

areas; a meal distribution system; a cleanup area, 
95 

C h a p t e r 1 0 : 

Functional Components and Relationships

to include commercial dishwashing equipment; 

storage for trays, cups, and utensils; and a food 

cart sanitation area. Developing space requirements for a food preparation and distribution 

area is complex and will generally require input 

from a food service expert.

Due to the expense involved in building and running a food service operation in the jail, some smaller jails 

have found contracting with local restaurants, hospitals, or schools to cater 

food to be more economical than preparing their 

own meals (exhibit 10-1). This approach can significantly reduce space and equipment needs for 

food service preparation, storage, and cleanup. 

Other facilities choose to serve a cold breakfast 

and cater the remaining meals, reducing space 

needs compared with a full-service kitchen 

operation.

However, with the elimination or limitation of 

food service space and equipment, new operational and design concerns arise:

■

■

■

Exhibit 10-1. Catered Food Service

Jail Food

School

kitchen 

Ensuring secure delivery of meals each day, 

including dealing with nonjail personnel in the 

delivery process.

Maintaining the temperature and quality of 

food, which may require equipment and space 

for reheating or cooling meal items at the jail.

Distributing the food and, perhaps, providing 

space for food distribution equipment, storage, 

and cleanup.

■ Identifying the source of trays, cups, and utensils and, if the jail is the source, how and 

where they are accounted for, cleaned, and 

stored.

Allowing for the possibility of losing catering 

services.

Planning for increases in the inmate population to a point where it is no longer cost effective to have meals catered.

■

■

Laundry Service

Most jails design new facilities with areas for 

laundry and storing of clothing and linens used 

in the facility. These laundry areas usually contain industrial washers and dryers; space for 

sorting and folding clothing and other items; storage areas to hold supplemental clothing, linens, 

pillows, and mattresses; and areas for laundry 

collection and distribution carts. It is a common 

practice to have work release inmates do their 

own laundry at the jail, and washers and dryers 

are often installed in the work release housing 

area.

However, some jails have found it economical 

to use outside laundry services, thus reducing 

facility space and equipment needs. Others send 

some laundry out (sheets, blankets, jail clothing) 

and wash personal underwear, socks, and nonjail 

clothing in house.

Even if laundry services are provided by outside 

sources, several operational and design issues 

remain:

■ Ensuring of secure delivery of laundered goods 

by nonjail personnel.

■ Storing and sorting of laundered goods, including personal clothing, before distribution.

■ Storing goods that are not immediately 

distributed.
96

S e c t i o n 2 : 

Major Design Considerations

■ Storing carts or other devices used in the pickup and distribution of laundered goods (usually a twice weekly clothing/linen exchange).

■ Laundering at the facility selected items (such 

as clothing soiled during arrest) required 

before the next cleaning cycle because of 

imminent court appearance or release.

■ Cleaning of nonlaunderable items such as 

mattresses.

■ Allowing for the loss of contractual services.

Component Relationships

Although each functional component plays a 

role in the facility and is generally expressed as a 

distinct, consolidated group of subsidiary spaces, 

no component operates in a vacuum. The components serve the same body of users and are 

therefore interrelated to some degree. This interrelationship may require that certain components 

be next to each other, that some merely be close 

to each other, or that some be separated from 

each other. It may require the ability to see, hear, 

or communicate with another space. Understanding these interrelationships is critical to organizing a jail design efficiently and effectively.

Exhibits 10-2 and 10-3 identify the typical interrelationships between all of the functional components that might be assembled in a jail. These 

relationships will probably prove satisfactory 

for most jails, but it must be stressed that each 

jurisdiction must set its own criteria for these 

relationships and that there is plenty of room for 

variation, no matter how minor. More detailed 

information on functional components is given in 

section 3.

Relationship Matrix

One way to express component relationships is 

through a matrix. This technique uses symbols 

or, as in exhibit 10-2, numbers to indicate the nature of a relationship. By reading along the boxes 

leading from two different components to where 

they converge, one can find the number describing the relationship between the two spaces. A 

matrix is an effective form of documentation, in 

that it is very complete and can be as precise as 

desired. The weakness of a matrix seems to be 

that many people find the format difficult to 

follow.

Relationship Diagram 

To some, a more effective way to communicate 

relationships is through use of a relationship diagram (exhibit 10-3). This is normally a drawing 

that consists of simple shapes arranged to reflect 

the relationship of one component to another. 

That is, if two components need to be adjacent, 

they are drawn adjacent to each other. If they need 

to be nearby, they are drawn nearby and linked by 

a line or graphic connector of some sort.

The component shapes in a relationship diagram 

are frequently drawn loosely enough that they 

are commonly referred to as “bubbles.” Hence 

the phrase, “bubble diagram.”

Relationship diagrams are used more frequently 

than matrixes because they can communicate a 

greater variety of information, such as view connections and external relations or public view 

conflicts and delivery service access.

Critical Relationships 

A series of relationships and nonrelationships 

seems to be especially critical in a jail. Some of 

these involve subcomponents of the jail and deserve special attention: work release and other 

inmate areas; female housing and male housing; 

control positions and inmate-occupied areas; arrestee access, intake-release, and control; public 

lobby, visiting, and inmate areas; and maintenance support spaces and inmate housing areas.
97 

C h a p t e r 1 0 : 

Functional Components and Relationships

Exhibit 10-2. Relationship Matrix

Master control

Booking

Housing—general

Housing—special

Housing—work related

Health care

Food services

Laundry

Visiting

Exercise

Programs/services

Commissary

Administration

Public

Staff

General storage

Mechanical

Maintenance

2

2

2

2

–2

–2

–2

–2

–2

–2

–2

–2

–2

–2

–2

–2

–2

–2

–2

–2

–2

–2

–2

–2

–2

–2

–2

–2

–2

–2

–2

–2

–2

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1 1

1

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

3

4

–2

–2

–1

–1

1

4

1

EXAMPLE OF MATRIX USE:

The relationship between “Visiting” and

“Public” is “1,” or “Nearby, no visual link.”

The relationship between “Visiting” and

“Master control” is “2,” or “Nearby, direct 

visual link.”

 MATRIX KEY:

 4 = Adjacent, direct visual link

 3 = Adjacent

 2 = Nearby, direct visual link

 1 = Nearby, no visual link

 0 = No relation

–1 = Acoustical, physical separation

–2 = Acoustical, visual, physical separation
98

S e c t i o n 2 : 

Major Design Considerations

Exhibit 10-3. Relationship Diagram

Discretionary

segregation 

Special

housing Master

control 

Lobby

Visiting

Public

entry 

Booking

Laundry

Kitchen

Delivery

Vehicle

sallyport 

Arrest

entry 

Multipurpose 

Male

housing 

Housing

control

Exercise

GRAPHIC KEY

= functional area component

= fixed staff post

= exterior access

= primary area access

Male

housing 

Male

housing 

Work release and other inmate areas

Since work release inmates come and go from the 

jail on a daily basis, there is a high potential for 

contraband passage between them and the rest 

of the inmate population. Consequently, work 

releasees must be kept distinctly separate from 

the rest of the inmate-occupied areas of the jail. 

Each area shared with non-work-release inmates 

provides the opportunity for hiding of contraband 

by work releasees for later retrieval by non-workrelease inmates. Contraband may also be passed 

to inmate workers during delivery of meals to 

the work release area or be hidden on meal trays 

and carts to be taken to other inmates in the jail 

population. To be effective, separation of work 

releasees should include separate entrances, 

laundry facilities, and exercise areas. In larger 

jails, inmates sentenced to work release are often 

housed in separate buildings. Their area, as noted in exhibit 10-4, is actually outside the secure 

perimeter of the jail.

Exhibit 10-4. Relationship of Work Release 

Area to Other Inmate Areas

Toilets

&

showers

Laundry

Sleeping

area

Dayroom

Work release entry

Main jail

security

perimeter 

Vestibule

Intakerelease

Main jail corridor

Intermittent staff

monitoring 

Search & clothing 

exchange

Intermittent staff

monitoring 

Female housing and male housing

Female housing areas should be physically, visually, and acoustically separate from male housing areas. This requires careful design when the 

areas are nearby or placed in completely different 

locations within the building.

Control positions and inmate-occupied areas 

To assure the safety and security of inmates and 

staff and to reduce vandalism to the facility in 

remote surveillance facilities, staff posts—

potentially including master control—should 

be located with a direct view of inmate-occupied 

areas (housing, visiting, booking, exercise, and 

so forth). Constant direct view allows for better 

control of inmate behavior and reduces incidents 

that typically occur with intermittent observation, such as vandalism, assaults, and graffiti

Arrestee access, intake-release, and control 

This set of relationships is critical because of the volume of incoming traffic at booking, the tension and risks 

involved in the booking process, the 

presence of officers from other jurisdictions, and traffic associated with the release 

process. If space allows it is ideal to separate the 

booking and release functions so that arrestees 
99 

C h a p t e r 1 0 : 

Functional Components and Relationships

are released from a different door than they enter. Often, in smaller jails master control will be 

situated in a place where they can observe the 

area and quickly summon assistance in case of 

trouble, thereby providing backup for the booking officer.

Public lobby, visiting, and inmate areas 

Control of public access to the secure areas of the 

facility is important in any jail. Because visiting 

is by far the most common reason for the public 

to enter the jail, visiting areas should be located 

adjacent to the lobby in a way that allows visitors 

to enter a controlled area but never to penetrate 

the inmate-occupied zones of the facility, including corridors. (See chapter 8, “Security Perimeter.”) If a courtroom is to be associated with 

the jail, it too should be located adjacent to the 

public lobby.

Maintenance support spaces and inmate 

housing areas

To facilitate daily cleaning, maintenance support 

spaces, such as janitor closets, need to be located 

inside or in close proximity to each inmate housing area. Staff must be able to provide inmates 

cleaning supplies and equipment quickly and 

efficiently so that inmates can clean their cells 

and dayroom spaces.

Space-Sharing Possibilities 

Some functions occur infrequently and could 

well take place in the same space at different 

times, especially in smaller facilities. This flexibility, if accommodated by proper design, can save 

money in facility construction.

Space-sharing possibilities should be examined 

during predesign planning and should be judged 

on the basis of solid functional programming 

information, namely, function, activity type, 

scheduling, security, and numbers and types of 

users. If space sharing still seems a possibility 

after such an evaluation, the varying architectural requirements should be examined to assure 

construction compatibility. Some of the functions 

in which space-sharing possibilities can be found 

are special housing, indoor programs and services, general housing in the smaller jail, contact visiting/counseling, and indoor/outdoor 

recreation.

Special Housing 

Compatibility concept: A common space or spaces could be used interchangeably for short-term 

holding of intoxicated individuals, individuals 

with mental illness, or temporarily out-of-control 

inmates. Given that smaller jails, in particular, often will not receive mentally ill and out-of-control 

inmates at the same time, and that intoxicated 

people tend to be received at specific times during the week, it would seem wasteful to create a 

bank of cells for each of these categories.

Architectural compatibility issues:

■ Spartan space with minimum equipment and 

protrusions.

■ Benches low to the floor (8 inches).

■ Security toilet/sink fixture.

■ Floor drain (possibly flushing).

■ High ceilings.

■ Location observable from a staff post or frequently passed by staff.

■ Space that accommodates personnel and/or 

crisis intervention workers.

■ Sound control.

■ Special ventilation.

■ Washable surfaces.

■ Variable lighting.
100

S e c t i o n 2 : 

Major Design Considerations

■ Temporary housing only.

■ No particular requirement for natural light.

■ Protection of the inmate from self-injury by 

incorporating rounded edges, padding (if feasible by code, fire safety, and durability considerations), protective clothing for the inmate, 

and so forth.

Indoor Programs and Services

Compatibility concept: A variety of programs and 

services for inmates occur on a regular basis in 

most jails. Planning might determine that most, if 

not all programs and services can occur in one or 

more multipurpose spaces, depending on scheduling, the nature of the services, and the number 

and type of users: Smaller program rooms can 

be located in the housing area to cut down on 

inmate movement and can be used for a variety 

of activities, such as meetings or counseling sessions, barbering, classification interviews, and 

so forth. Larger multipurpose rooms outside the 

housing area can be used for educational classes, 

meetings, and religious services.

Architectural compatibility issues:

■ Acoustical compatibility of various activities 

with adjoining areas.

■ Size adequate to accommodate the most 

space-consuming activity planned for the area.

■ Flexibility in furnishings and equipment.

■ Storage for alternative furnishings and 

equipment.

■ Temperature and light control.

■ Finishes compatible with each function.

■ Ability to clearly observe the space(s).

■ Lack of security conflicts.

General Housing in the Smaller Jail 

Compatibility concept: Given that the 

nature of the population in a smaller 

jail can change rapidly, it makes 

sense to create at least one small 

housing area that can accommodate 

a variety of inmate types. Specifically, one or 

more areas could be designed in such a way as 

to accommodate either high- or low-security men 

or women. Such a housing area is sometimes referred to as a “flex” or “swing area.”

Architectural compatibility issues:

■ Small capacity unit(s).

■ Ability to clearly observe the space from a 

fixed post.

■ Appropriately separated from other housing 

units.

■ Higher security detailing for flexibility (lowsecurity inmates held in the area could be 

provided less-restrictive custody through management options).

Contact Visiting/Counseling 

Compatibility concept: Attorney contact visiting, 

family contact visiting, and counseling all share 

a need for privacy, small groups, and interaction 

with the public. During the predesign programming phase, each jurisdiction will make decisions on how it will accommodate contact visits, 

who will be allowed to have contact visits, when 

contact visits will occur, and how they will be 

monitored. Even agencies that minimize contact 

visiting must, at the least, provide space for attorneys, clergy members, and representatives from 

other government agencies (e.g., social services, 

law enforcement, probation, parole, or Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Larger facilities 

often have several meeting rooms within a larger 

space designated for contact visits and staff dedicated to monitoring the contact visiting area. The 
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C h a p t e r 1 0 : 

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frequency of these activities in smaller jails suggests that one common space or set of spaces can 

be used, rather than providing separate physical 

accommodations for each activity. Attorneys and 

other potential contact visitors should be consulted 

during programming to identify their space needs.

Architectural compatibility issues: 

■ Private space.

■ Small-scale space.

■ Location in zone between public areas and 

main inmate-occupied areas.

■ Ability to clearly observe the space.

Indoor/Outdoor Recreation 

Compatibility concept: Both indoor and outdoor 

recreation spaces accommodate the same activities, such as basketball, handball, and weight lifting. The only difference is outdoor recreation is 

open to the outside—natural light and fresh air. 

By creating the ability to close open air access to 

the outside, a recreation area can be used as both 

indoor and outdoor space (exhibit 10-5).

Exhibit 10-5. Recreation Area That Can Be 

Used for Both Indoor and Outdoor Space 

Rolling steel

shutter to

close opening

Wall opening

to exterior

with security

mesh barrier

Architectural compatibility issues:

■ Adequate size to accommodate basketball and 

exercise equipment.

■ Storage for recreational and exercise 

equipment.

■ Heating, cooling, and lighting when used as 

indoor exercise space.

■ High ceiling to allow for basketball.

■ Ability to clearly observe the space.

■ Located in close proximity to inmate housing.

■ Sight and sound separation from housing areas 

to allow use by both males and females at different times.

Space-Sharing Problem 

A space-sharing problem occurs where a space 

used by inmates is also used by the public at other times. For example, public access to a multipurpose space that inmates would also use later for 

another program creates the potential for a major 

contraband passage problem. The visitor could 

bring nonmetallic contraband into the facility, undetected by the normal metal detector, and hide 

it for an inmate to retrieve later during a program 

in the multipurpose area. This problem could be 

solved by operational procedure (i.e., a thorough 

area search after use by the public) or by preventing space sharing by the two functions. This type 

of potential problem should be considered along 

with other space-sharing opportunities as each 

functional component of the jail is developed.

Conclusion

The space-sharing possibilities and issues discussed in this chapter merit consideration. 

However, it is important to reiterate that shared 

space should be carefully determined only after 

predesign planning verifies that function, security 

concerns, scheduling needs, and user types make 

it feasible.
103

Chapter 11

Planning and Designing to Standards

Designing a jail involves the application of 

codes and standards developed by various 

local, state, and/or national agencies. Adherence to legally mandated codes and standards 

requires interaction with officials who represent 

the agencies that have established the codes/

standards to obtain the approvals necessary to 

initiate construction. Awareness of and adherence to applicable codes and standards early in 

the planning and design process is necessary for 

a successful project.

Some people may view codes and standards as 

an intrusion into their jail design process and 

plans. However, building codes and standards 

exist to preserve the health, safety, and welfare 

of building occupants. Codes tend to be ideologically neutral; virtually all of their content is 

based on unsatisfactory and sometimes tragic 

experiences. Standards generally represent the 

collected wisdom of specialists and practitioners 

in a particular field.

If approached positively and early in the process, codes and standards can be useful tools in 

establishing safe and proven design parameters. 

Personnel from agencies that develop codes and 

standards can provide significant assistance to 

local officials and designers based on their experience with similar projects in the area and 

throughout the state. Both legally binding and 

advisory standards are worth reviewing before 

design, and even before programming, begins.

This chapter identifies standards and legal requirements that are referred to throughout the 

Jail Design Guide, as well as those that are particularly relevant to communities involved in the 

jail design process.

State Standards

In many states, one or more state government 

agencies have legislative authority to promulgate and enforce minimum jail standards. These 

agencies vary greatly in terms of the resources, 

approaches, and legal authorities they employ. 

In some states, design and operational standards 

for jails are extremely detailed and are strictly enforced; the responsible authority has the means 

to enforce standards up to the point of bringing 

suit against local governments whose facilities 

are noncompliant or by closing noncompliant 

facilities. In other states, the responsible agency 

may have detailed standards but lack the authority to enforce them and may therefore be limited 

to simply encouraging compliance through educational strategies such as training and technical 

assistance.

In some states, more than one agency has authority over jail planning, design, and operation. Often one agency focuses on the planning, 

design, and construction requirements while 

another agency is primarily charged with establishing operational requirements that deal with 

nonarchitectural aspects such as training standards, policies and procedures, and inmate services. Identification and review of state standards 

along with an understanding of their official role 

in the development of a proposed jail project are 

essential.

American Correctional Association 

and the Commission on Accreditation 

for Corrections

Persons both within and outside the corrections 

field may refer to the standards published by the 

American Correctional Association (ACA) and 
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S e c t i o n 2 : 

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the Commission on Accreditation for Corrections 

(CAC) as mandated “national standards” or “federal standards.” However, neither ACA nor CAC 

have the authority to mandate or enforce compliance with their published standards.

ACA and CAC are private, nonprofit organizations 

that administer the only national accreditation 

program for all components of adult and juvenile 

corrections. Their purpose is to promote improvement in the management of correctional agencies and in the design of correctional facilities 

through the development and revision of useful 

standards. This effort is supported by the corrections profession. Contributions from practitioners 

throughout the nation have enhanced these standards. Agencies that voluntarily decide to participate in CAC’s formal accreditation program are 

required to comply with certain eligibility criteria 

and enter into an accreditation contract.

In some states, the state standards affecting jails 

are outdated and are limited in their scope and 

applicability to modern jails. Seventeen states 

have no formal jail standards, and in some states 

with jail standards, no specific agency is charged 

with the enforcement of those jail statutes or 

standards. Therefore, little guidance is available 

to local officials and jail staff who are responsible 

for the funding and operation of local jails. In 

such cases, the ACA/CAC standards for adult local detention facilities represent a logical set of 

physical plant and operational criteria on which 

to base the planning, design, and operation of a 

new jail.

ACA/CAC standards pertaining to city and county 

jails or local adult detention facilities at the time 

of this writing are published as the PerformanceBased Standards for Adult Local Detention Facilities, Fourth Edition. A supplement is published 

periodically to document additions, revisions, 

deletions, and/or interpretations for all ACA/CAC 

standards manuals.1

 Those who use the ACA/

CAC standards must review both the prevailing 

base standards document in its current edition as 

well as the most recent supplement.

ACA has recently released a new set of standards 

for local adult detention facilities, Core Jail Standards.2

 In these new standards, the minimum requirements have been carved out of the broader 

professional standards, leaving only those requirements that apply to every jail, and which 

could pose serious liability if compliance was not 

maintained.

Whether or not a local community formally 

participates in the ACA/CAC accreditation program, which requires entry into a contract and 

payment of an accreditation fee, a jail can use 

the Performance-Based Standards for Adult Local 

Detention Facilities or the Core Jail Standards to 

evaluate its operations and facilities. As stated 

in the “Introduction to Accreditation” section of 

Performance-Based Standards, “The recognized 

benefits of such a process may include improved 

management; increased accountability and enhanced public credibility for administrative and 

line staff; safer and more humane environment 

for personnel and inmates; and the establishment 

of measurable criteria for upgrading programs, 

personnel, and the physical plant on a continuing 

basis.”3

1

 In addition to standards for detention facilities, ACA/CAC publishes standards for most other areas of adult and juvenile 

corrections, including prisons, probation and parole, and community residential facilities.

2

 American Correctional Association, Core Jail Standards (Alexandria, VA: American Correctional Association, 2010). 3

 American Correctional Association, Performance-Based Standards for Adult Local Detention Facilities, Fourth Edition (Alexandria, 

VA: American Correctional Association, 2004), p. xvi.
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National Fire Protection Association 

Life Safety Code ®

Established in 1896, the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) is the leading nonprofit 

organization dedicated to protecting lives and 

property from the hazards of fire. NFPA publishes 

hundreds of nationally recognized codes and 

standards, including the National Electrical Code 

and the Fire Protection Handbook, as well as numerous fire-service training and fire-safety education materials.

The NFPA Life Safety Code® 4 is the most authoritative and widely used resource available to 

planners, architects, engineers, building and fire 

officials, safety personnel, and manufacturers 

whose responsibilities include fire and life safety. 

The Code has many provisions that are mandatory for all types of occupancies. The term “occupancies” refers to buildings of different types and 

varying uses. The chapters “New Detention and 

Correctional Occupancies” and “Existing Detention and Correctional Occupancies” are especially 

useful to those who are designing a new jail.

NFPA also publishes the Life Safety Code® Handbook, which includes clarifying commentary and 

illustrations to help users understand and apply 

Code requirements.5 The Handbook also explains 

changes to the Code since the previous edition 

was published.

Although NFPA publications and training seminars are excellent resources, NFPA does not have 

the authority to enforce compliance with the 

Code or other recommendations. However, many 

state and local building regulatory agencies have 

adopted the Code in whole or in substantial part, 

thereby giving its life safety requirements the 

force of law in jurisdictions under their purview.

It is important to consult applicable federal, state, 

and local laws and regulatory agencies that are 

relevant to the planning and design of jails. NFPA 

clearly states that it does not endorse compliance 

with its Life Safety Code® in cases where Code

requirements are in conflict with other laws with 

which a local project must achieve mandatory 

compliance.

Fire exit blocked with stored items in violation of fire codes.

(Photograph courtesy of Jim Rowenhorst.)

Americans with Disabilities Act 

Passed by Congress in 1990, the Americans with 

Disabilities Act (ADA) seeks to protect individuals with physical and mental disabilities from 

discriminatory practices in employment, public 

services, transportation, public accommodations, 

4

 National Fire Protection Association, NFPA 101®: Life Safety Code® (Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection Association, 2009). 5

 Ron Coté and Gregory E. Harrington, NFPA 101®: Life Safety Code® Handbook (Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection Association, 

2009).
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S e c t i o n 2 : 

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and telecommunication services. ADA extends 

comprehensive civil rights protections to individuals with disabilities similar to those provided to 

persons on the basis of race, sex, national origin, 

and religion under the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Title II of ADA is intended to prevent state and 

local governments (including entities that operate 

jails) from discriminating against persons with 

disabilities. The law protects detainees in the jail 

and others, including staff, program providers, 

and visitors.

Although at the time of this writing ADA does 

not require retrofitting existing buildings to eliminate barriers, it does require accessibility for 

new construction. Under Title II, state and local 

governments must ensure that newly constructed 

buildings are free of architectural barriers that 

restrict access or use by individuals with disabilities. In the case of alterations to existing buildings, the altered portions must be accessible. 

It is important for local agencies to be aware of 

the Title II enforcement provision, which states 

that private parties and individuals may initiate 

lawsuits to enforce their rights under ADA Title 

II. In such cases, local governments may be liable 

for damages and plaintiff’s attorney fees. In fact, 

in the 2004 U.S. Supreme Court case Lane vs. 

Tennessee, the court upheld ADA Title II as well 

as its damages provisions.

In addition to private lawsuits, individuals may 

also file complaints with eight federal agencies 

under Title II. The U.S. Department of Justice 

(DOJ) handles complaints specific to correctional 

institutions.

Under the provisions of ADA, DOJ maintains and 

enforces technical design standards for compliance with the act. At the time of this writing, 

local governments may choose between two 

standards for accessible design: the Uniform Federal Accessibility Standard (UFAS), established 

under the Architectural Barriers Act of 1973, or 

the Americans with Disabilities Act Accessibility Guidelines (ADAAG), published in 1991 and 

adopted by DOJ for places of public accommodation and commercial facilities covered by Title III 

of ADA. (The elevator exemption for small buildings under ADAAG would not apply to entities 

covered by Title II).

Neither the UFAS nor ADAAG, as adopted by 

DOJ, cover in detail the design standards for 

detention facilities. However, since its original 

publication, ADAAG has been revised to include 

design criteria for public facilities such as detention facilities. DOJ has not adopted the revised 

guidelines (ADAAG–Interim Final Guidelines); 

however, these guidelines provide important design criteria that should be used in the design of 

jail facilities.

Jurisdictions should review UFAS, ADAAG, and 

ADAAG–Interim Final Guidelines and follow the 

most stringent requirements of each. Such an 

approach would ensure compliance with ADA. 

Jurisdictions should also review state and local accessibility requirements, if there are any. 

Between local guidelines and UFAS/ADAAG/

ADAAG–Interim Final Guidelines, the most stringent requirement will generally prevail. 

The following sections provide additional information about ADA and its impact on jail planning and design.

Location or Dispersion of Accessible Cells 

Dispersing accessible cells throughout a facility 

ensures that inmates with disabilities can 

be housed with other inmates of the same 

classification.
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C h a p t e r 1 1 : 

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Basic Features of the Accessible Cell

Wheelchair-bound inmates need to be able to 

enter their cell, move around inside, and use 

the cell’s furnishings without assistance. Careful 

planning will incorporate a wider cell door, adequate clear floor space, and appropriate models 

and placement of furniture and plumbing fixtures 

(exhibit 11-1). The accessible cells should contain the same features as other cells for inmates 

housed at the same classification level. For 

example, if other cells have a writing desk, an 

accessible writing desk should be provided in 

the accessible cell.

Exhibit 11-1. Layout of an Accessible Cell

Bed

Door

Toilet

Grab bars

Desk

Shelf

hooks

Lavatory

Areas of needed

clearance indicated

by dashed lines

Chase behind Based on the U.S. Department of Justice’s fixtures

ADA and ABA Accessibility Guidelines, dated 

July 22, 2004.

Furniture, Hardware, and Equipment

ADA specifies the size, height, clear floor space, 

and placement of the following:

■ Desks.

■ Dayroom tables.

■ Seating.

■ Bunks and beds.

■ Showers (grab bars and seats).

■ Toilet fixtures (grab bars).

■ Sinks and lavatories.

■ Mirrors.

■ Shelves.

■ Alarms.

■ Communications (intercoms).

■ Doors (width and clearances surrounding 

the door).

■ Door handles.

■ Televisions.

■ Telephones.

■ Visiting stations.

As awareness of design issues for inmates with 

disabilities has grown, an increasing number of 

products have become available to meet ADA 

requirements.

Common-Use Areas 

Common-use areas include locations that serve a 

group of detainees, for example, exercise yards, 

programming/multipurpose rooms, visiting stations, dayrooms (including shower areas), and 

medical areas. A common-use area must be accessible if it serves an accessible bed or cell or if 

it will be used by a detainee who has a disability. 

Public and Staff Areas

ADA requirements apply to jail staff and to the 

public; therefore, these requirements affect all 

areas of a facility. ADA covers a wide range of 

disabilities. Although the needs of people confined to wheelchairs receive primary attention 

from most designers, other disabilities (such as 

hearing and sight impairments) also require attention when designing a jail facility. 

Compliance with ADA is the law for new facilities. Noncompliance can lead to lawsuits and to 

awards of damages to plaintiffs. Local governments undertaking a jail project must be aware 
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Major Design Considerations

of the latest ADA and other accessibility standards, guidelines, case law, and other laws, and 

should consider hiring consultants, architects, 

and/or engineers who are experienced in implementing the requirements of accessibility laws. 

Conclusion

Codes and standards are a significant factor in 

the design of a new jail. The latest versions of applicable codes and standards should be identified 

early and applied before design begins (i.e., during the predesign planning stage). Local officials 

who are familiar with the codes and standards 

should be involved early in the facility development process.

Special standards developed by national organizations can serve as an important supplement to 

required state or local codes. Jurisdictions should 

take the time to find these standards and apply 

them as necessary in the design of a new jail.
109

Chapter 12

Expansion

Ajail is a large capital expenditure for a 

community, so it is paramount that the 

facility has a long and useful life. The 

key to ensuring the jail’s longevity is to plan 

for future expansion.

Why Plan for Expansion? 

Many communities have the foresight to build 

a jail that not only meets their capacity needs 

today, but also their projected needs for the next 

15 to 20 years. Sometimes these projections are 

correct, and sometimes they are not. Developing 

bed capacity projections is not entirely precise 

because key assumptions that go into formulating the projections may change. For example, the 

jurisdiction’s population may grow or its crime 

rate may increase faster than anticipated.1

Totally unforeseen factors can also affect the size 

of the jail population. Recently, two phenomena—

mandatory sentences and overcrowded state 

prison systems—have increased jail populations, 

forcing many jurisdictions to build additional 

beds they did not think they would need. Sometimes the additions are needed within a few years 

after a new jail opens.

The failure to develop an expansion plan can 

have significant consequences for a community 

in terms of public safety and the overall budget. 

For example, if a jail does not have the ability 

to expand because of design or site constraints, 

it could be rendered obsolete because it does 

not meet the jurisdiction’s capacity needs. If the 

facility is relatively new (e.g., less than 15 years 

old), it may be difficult to persuade taxpayers to 

approve funding for a new jail. If that happens, 

the jurisdiction may be forced to crowd the jail 

beyond its capacity—to the detriment of safety 

and security—or board inmates in other jurisdictions at considerable expense.

Expansion Options 

A number of basic options are available to local 

jurisdictions as they plan their expansion strategy.

Satellite Jail 

Many jurisdictions have built “satellite jails” as 

an adjunct to their existing jail. Typically, they 

have pursued this course because:

■ Site constraints do not permit expansion of the 

existing jail.

■ The existing jail is relatively new and it would 

not be prudent (for political and/or fiscal reasons) to discontinue its use.

■ The jurisdiction is interested in developing a 

separate treatment or program facility.

The following costs are normally associated with 

a satellite jail:

■ Site acquisition. Purchasing a new site could 

be required if the jurisdiction does not own a 

suitable parcel of land.

■ Duplicate building components. Several components of the existing jail (such as exercise 

and visiting areas) cannot be shared with the 

satellite jail and must be replicated.

■ Duplicate staff. The jurisdiction will lose some 

staffing efficiency because of the need for 

1

 For guidance on estimating future capacity needs, see David M. Bennett and Donna Lattin, Jail Capacity Planning Guide: A Systems 

Approach (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Corrections, 2009).
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S e c t i o n 2 : 

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some duplicate staff (such as shift supervisors) 

in two facilities.

Double Bunking

Many jurisdictions view double bunking of single 

cells as an expansion option because it can increase capacity quickly and inexpensively. However, this option has several major drawbacks, 

which are discussed at length in chapter 27, “Single Versus Multiple Occupancy,” in section 4.

Planned Additions to the Jail 

Constructing additions to the jail (such as new 

housing pods) is the preferred expansion option 

because it is less expensive and more staff efficient than building a satellite jail. It is preferred 

over double bunking because the fundamental 

security and management capabilities of the initial construction can be maintained.

When To Develop an Expansion Plan 

Planning for expansion should begin during the 

predesign planning phase and continue through 

the development of the facility program because 

the expansion plan will affect the jail’s site selection, design, and operations. It is important to 

realize that the expansion plan will greatly affect 

the initial design of the jail because it will tell the 

architect how each component will grow and by 

how much. The architect must then arrange and 

design the components to allow for that growth. 

The expansion plan will assist with site selection because it will give the architect information 

to determine how many square feet are needed 

for the building as well as the need for off-street 

parking.

The expansion plan should contain the following 

information:

■ The expansion capacity of the facility 

(generally, the jail’s ultimate bed capacity).

■ How each component of the facility should 

expand and by how much (in terms of cells, 

square feet, equipment needs, or policy 

changes).

■ The capacity to increase the amount of 

parking spaces.

Setting Expansion Capacity 

One method for setting expansion bed capacity is 

to use bed capacity projections developed during 

the needs assessment step of predesign planning. 

If the determination of initial capacity is based 

on a projection for the next 15 years, it would 

be reasonable to use the same data to project a 

future expansion capacity for the next 25 to 30 

years.

No matter what method or expansion capacity 

number is chosen, it is best to project for the addition of more beds than may actually be needed. 

The expansion plan does not mean the jurisdiction is committed to build additional beds; however, if additional capacity is ever needed, it can 

be accommodated by the building and the site as 

specified in the plan.

Vertical Versus Horizontal Expansion

Additions to a jail can be built in two ways—

vertically or horizontally.

Vertical expansion assumes that future construction will be on top of the existing jail. In the case 

of housing, expansion is typically planned to be 

built on top of an existing housing pod, with the 

new pod having the same basic design and perimeter wall footprint as the pod below. Horizontal expansion assumes that future construction 

will be adjacent and contiguous to the existing 

building.
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C h a p t e r 1 2 : 

Expansion

The major benefit of vertical expansion is that a 

smaller site can be used because the expansion 

will take place on top of the existing building. 

This may be desirable if the jail is to be built on 

a small downtown site. However, several drawbacks to the vertical expansion approach should 

be considered:

■ Potential adverse effects of the initial design 

on future expansion.

■ Higher initial construction cost.

■ Disruption to facility operations.

Potential Adverse Effects of Initial Design on 

Future Expansion 

If housing expansion is going to be constructed 

above an existing housing pod, it is usually assumed that the future pod will be designed in the 

same way as the pod below. This could, however, adversely affect the design of the expansion 

housing by eliminating design flexibility.

For example, assume that the vertical expansion plan calls for a dormitory to be built above 

an existing dormitory but, because of changing 

circumstances, a high-security housing pod with 

single cells is needed instead of a dormitory. Unless there is major renovation to the dormitory, 

the high-security housing cannot easily be built 

above it, because the locations of interior plumbing and mechanical chases are not compatible 

with high-security housing.

In the same vein, jail standards could change 

from the time the jail is built to the time when 

expansion is needed. New standards may dictate 

different requirements for cell size, dayroom size, 

number of showers per inmate, and so forth. As 

in the example above, the housing area below 

dictates the design of vertical expansion housing 

to a great extent.

Horizontal expansion, on the other hand, can 

provide flexibility. It will not be constrained by 

an existing building footprint or the plumbing 

and mechanical chases of a housing unit below.

Higher Initial Construction Cost 

If vertical expansion is to be used, initial construction costs for the structural elements of the 

building will be higher because the structure 

(columns, beams, and so forth) must be designed 

and built so that it will support the weight of the 

future expansion construction. The initial design 

of stairs, elevators, and the mechanical system 

must also account for future capacity.

Disruption to Facility Operations 

Vertical expansion will likely disrupt facility operations during construction because construction workers, tools, and equipment will need 

to be inside the security envelope. If expansion 

housing is to be built on top of an existing housing area, that area may need to be vacated during 

construction. This would be extremely disruptive 

because the use of beds in that area could be 

eliminated for a long period of time.

Expansion Concept for Each 

Component 

The expansion plan should not only include an 

expanded bed capacity, but also an expansion 

concept for every functional component of the 

jail. These expansion concepts will tell the designer how each component will accommodate 

future capacity requirements and will, in turn, 

begin to dictate design and location. Considerations and options for expanding each component follow.

Master Control

Allowance must be made for future control systems, touch screens, panels, equipment racks, 
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S e c t i o n 2 : 

Major Design Considerations

and stations. If the control system is computerized, expansion can be accommodated by adding control screens to the monitor; this does not 

require much (if any) additional space. If a hardwire control system is used, space must be 

allocated during initial construction for panels 

that will control future locks and intercoms. 

Since this component is typically buried in the 

core of the building, it is difficult to expand 

without major renovation and disruption to operations; therefore, the system should be sized 

initially to accommodate expansion capacity.

Intake-Release

This component should be sized to accommodate 

the jail’s expansion capacity because it must be 

available continuously for the intake and processing of arrestees. Renovation or expansion of 

this area would be extremely disruptive to jail 

operations.

Property Storage

Many jails store inmate property in garment bags, 

and this component can be expanded in several 

ways. First, the area could be oversized initially 

to accommodate additional hanging racks at a 

later date. Second, a tiered hanging rack could 

be used; that is, the lower tier could accommodate the initial capacity and the upper tier 

could be used for the expansion capacity. Third, 

the space could be designed to accommodate a 

hanging conveyor system similar to that found at 

a dry cleaning business. A conveyor system allows property bags to be stored more compactly, 

which eliminates the need for additional space. 

Storage space for bulk property items should also 

be sized to allow for expansion.

Health Care 

This component could be designed for expansion 

capacity or it could be designed for initial capacity and expanded when the need arises. If the 

latter option is chosen, the health-care component 

should be located on an outside wall so that expansion does not infringe on adjacent components.

Visiting Areas 

Visiting areas are typically located in the core 

of the jail, which makes physical expansion difficult or even impossible. This component can be 

expanded without enlarging the physical area by 

increasing the visitation schedule. For example, 

expanding visitation from twice a week to four 

times a week will allow twice the number of opportunities for inmates to have visitors.

In direct supervision facilities, visiting rooms 

are often located in each housing area, with no 

centralized visitation function. This configuration allows the number of visiting rooms to be 

expanded easily as the facility grows.

Another design consideration, video visitation, 

is becoming more common in newer facilities. 

With this option the visitor comes to a central 

site (either inside the jail or at a remote location) 

and visits with the inmate via video camera. In 

most cases, the inmate can access the video visitation booth in the housing area.

Exercise Areas 

This component can be expanded in two ways. 

First, the number of hours that the exercise area 

is available for use by inmates can be increased. 

Second, new exercise areas can be built as part of 

housing expansion instead of enlarging existing 

exercise areas.

In direct supervision facilities, exercise areas 

are often attached to each housing area; as new 

housing pods are built, new exercise areas will be 

attached.

Programs and Services 

The number of hours per week that programs 

and services are offered can be increased if the 
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C h a p t e r 1 2 : 

Expansion

schedule allows. Otherwise, new space would be 

required for expanded programs and services.

Inmate Commissary 

Expansion can be accomplished by building a 

commissary storage area large enough for a highdensity storage system at a later date or by locating the commissary on an exterior wall so that it 

can be physically expanded.

Food Service 

Extra space can be provided for the addition of 

food service equipment when bed capacity is 

expanded, or the kitchen can be located on an 

outside wall and physically expanded. Physical 

expansion of this component, however, can be 

difficult because of the precise arrangement of 

equipment in specific work areas, including storage and receiving, food preparation, cooking, 

meal tray assembly, and cleanup. Special mechanical considerations such as exhaust ventilation, gas lines, and drain lines also make physical 

expansion difficult. Jurisdictions often choose to 

over build the kitchen in anticipation of increases 

in the inmate population.

Laundry

The laundry operation can be expanded by 

increasing the number of operating hours, by 

providing space for additional equipment when 

capacity is added, or by locating the laundry 

room on an exterior wall and physically expanding it.

Lobby 

The lobby is typically sized to allow for the facility’s expansion capacity.

Administration Area 

The administration area can be sized to accommodate the maximum number of staff or can 

be located on an exterior wall and physically 

expanded. It is always a good idea to include extra square footage or extra offices in the area as 

part of the initial construction because additional 

administrative staff are often added before jails 

reach the point of expansion.

Staff Areas 

Locker rooms are typically sized for expansion 

capacity and for the maximum number of staff. 

However, they could be located on an exterior 

wall to permit physical expansion.

Storage Areas 

Some storage areas can be added when additional housing is built. For example, a new mattress 

storage area or linen storage area could be built 

as part of new housing expansion so that it can 

be located closer to the housing areas it serves. 

Another alternative is to use high-density storage 

systems at a later date if feasible. Separate standalone buildings could be used to provide storage 

for areas that do not have security concerns.

Conclusion

It is difficult, if not impossible, to predict how the 

needs of a jail may change in the future. Jail expansion concepts that are easy to execute, cause 

minimal disruption to existing day-to-day operations, and permit flexibility in future design will 

serve the community for decades to come.
Section 3

Functional Components

Chapter 13. Master Control. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117

Chapter 14. Intake-Release. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127

Chapter 15. General Housing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149

Chapter 16. Special Housing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181

Chapter 17. Health Care. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199

Chapter 18. Visiting Areas. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213 

Chapter 19. Exercise Areas. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225

Chapter 20. Programs and Services. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237 

Chapter 21. Inmate Commissary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251 

Chapter 22. Food Service. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255

Chapter 23. Laundry Area. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265

Chapter 24. Administration and Public Areas. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271

Chapter 25. Staff Areas. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285

Chapter 26. Storage Areas. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295
Functional Components 

This section contains detailed information on the purpose and design of the major 

functional components of a jail. This information is organized to provide local officials, board members, and planners with a sound background in the fundamental 

issues, characteristics, and concepts of each major component. This information 

should help local sheriffs, commissioners, and planners create a solid foundation 

from which to develop a detailed set of plans that responds to unique local jail 

needs.

All of the sections are organized alike. The following kinds of information are 

provided for each functional component:

■ Description of the function.

■ Key decisions to be made regarding the function.

■ Detailed functional requirements and impacts on the design (detail issues).

■ Space list (a list of the spaces associated with the function).

■ Relationship diagram(s).

■ Component diagram(s) (a diagram that details all of the components in a 

particular space).

The concepts addressed in section 2, “Major Design Considerations,” are discussed 

throughout the following chapters. The link between sections 2 and 3 is critical 

because, as the following pages show, a design is truly the result of the functional 

and operational needs of facility users—needs that are determined during predesign planning.
117

Chapter 13

Master Control

T

he basic function of master control (also 

referred to as “central control”) is to serve 

as the monitoring and control center for all 

communications, life safety and security systems, 

and all general building movement patterns, 

including entries and exits through the main security envelope of the jail. Master control may 

also function as a point from which some inmate 

housing units or other inmate or public areas are 

monitored. In smaller jails, it might also be combined with the law enforcement dispatch function and handle public reception during some or 

all shifts. In some very small jails, master control 

may serve as the only secure, fixed staff post 

within the facility and is truly the “nerve center” 

of the operation.

All jails, including very small jails, have traditionally had some sort of control center, even if 

it consisted only of an unprotected control panel 

Computerized master control room with two staff stations. 

(Photograph courtesy of Voorhis Robertson Justice Services.)

in a relatively insecure room. In smaller jails, the 

only reason the control post was staffed 24 hours 

a day often was because it also doubled as the 

dispatch center for the law enforcement agency 

affiliated with the jail. 

Key Decisions

The following decisions should be made as the 

role of the master control component is evaluated 

because decisions made here will have a fundamental effect on design requirements:

■ Will master control only monitor electronic 

security and safety systems, or will it have 

other responsibilities such as lobby reception, 

housing area surveillance, intake-release area 

surveillance, record keeping, answering outside telephone calls, supervising visiting, or 

receiving packages? That is, what are master 

control’s responsibilities and how many staff 

will be needed to do the job?

■ Where must the master control space be located to function effectively in conjunction with 

other facility activities and still be adequately 

protected from assault?

■ Will the master control function be combined 

with the law enforcement dispatch function? 

Can both jobs be done by one person throughout the life of the facility? Are both functions 

compatible in terms of security, since the loss 

of master control to an inmate takeover would 

also mean the loss of all law enforcement 

communications?

Detail Issues

The details of the functional-architectural issues 

discussed below should be considered in the development of the master control component.
118 

S e c t i o n 3 : 

F u n c t i o n a l C o m p o n e n t s 

Users

Issue: Use of the master control center should 

be principally limited to master control staff.

Response: The need for security in master 

control clearly precludes access to the space 

by inmates or the public, but access by jail 

staff should also be limited. Routine communications and contact between master 

control and other officers should be accomplished through means such as intercoms, 

radio communication, and passthroughs 

rather than by entry into master control. 

Master control should not serve as the focal 

point for staff breaks or periods of inactivity, as it does in many facilities.

Activities 

Issue: Master control functions must be identified and priorities set in terms of tasks and 

workload responsibilities.

Response: Experience with newer jails has 

shown that it is easy to overburden this vital position. Facilities with as few as 20 beds 

can have noticeable difficulty using a single 

master control position effectively for many 

jail functions when master control is also 

responsible for law enforcement dispatch 

functions.

Examples of master control jail functions:

■ Monitoring electronic surveillance systems 

(audio, closed-circuit television (CCTV)).

■ Controlling entries to and exits from the secure 

perimeter of the facility.

■ Monitoring various building systems (radio, 

surveillance alarms, perimeter lighting, and 

other mechanical and electrical systems).

■ Monitoring and facilitating all internal staff 

and inmate movement.

Combined law enforcement dispatch and jail master control functions, 

with one staff member.

(Photograph courtesy of Jim Rowenhorst.)

■ Serving as the communications center for the 

facility, including receiving and/or handling 

telephone calls.

■ Maintaining and monitoring necessary 

security/safety equipment, such as fire alarms, 

smoke and thermal detection systems, selfcontained breathing apparatus, key lockbox, 

flashlights, and storage for riot gear (e.g., batons and restraints).

■ Monitoring and assuming final responsibility 

for inmate counts.

■ Producing and/or managing jail records and 

logs.

■ Distributing keys, logs, radios, flashlights, and 

other equipment to staff.

■ Exchanging packages and paperwork with the 

public and mail with postal workers and receiving bail and commissary moneys.
119 

C h a p t e r 1 3 : 

Master Control

■ Monitoring staff shift changes, including identification checks and logging of arrivals and 

departures.

■ Providing surveillance of adjacent housing 

units and inmate activity areas.

■ Providing surveillance of special temporary 

holding areas, such as those for the mentally 

ill or intoxicated.

■ Providing primary or backup observation and/

or monitoring of:

❏ Public lobby or night vestibule (i.e., 

public access).

❏ Main jail corridors.

❏ Elevators.

❏ Housing units.

❏ Visitors (public, attorneys).

❏ Vehicle sallyport.

❏ Intake-release area.

❏ Temporary holding cells.

❏ Multipurpose or indoor exercise room.

❏ Outdoor exercise areas.

❏ Storage of bond moneys and legal 

documents.

❏ Storage of prescription medicines and 

first-aid kits.

Examples of master control law enforcementrelated functions:

■ Radio dispatching of patrol cars.

■ Receiving incoming department telephone 

calls.

■ Handling of 911 emergency system.

■ Dispatching ambulance services.

■ Coordinating emergency disaster dispatching.

■ Monitoring fire alarms and burglar alarms at 

local businesses and institutions.

■ Record keeping and computer data entry.

■ Managing national, state, and/or local criminal 

data systems.

It should be clear that combining the many functions just described for law enforcement with 

those for the jail would create an unmanageable 

situation for one person to handle on some or all 

shifts. However, with staff at a premium, good 

planning should attempt to get the most from the 

master control post without sacrificing facility 

security and staff and public safety.

A full evaluation of the workload of master control is warranted prior to the design phase. Such 

an evaluation should take into account future 

change and workloads because master control 

may require two people rather than one on certain shifts. For smaller systems that combine 

the functions of master control and dispatch, be 

aware that all control of the jail and all security 

and communication links within the county may 

be severed if the space is overtaken by inmates.

Security

Issue: Master control should be able to control 

the entire facility if necessary.

Response: In the event of a disturbance, 

a fire emergency, or an equipment breakdown, master control should be able to 

secure and control the facility. For example, 

if there is a second housing control post by 

which other staff supervise or manage a 

housing area, master control should have 

the operational capability to override those 

controls if need be. 

In fulfilling the backup role, master control may 

need to release multiple cells simultaneously, 

remotely open housing unit dayroom doors, and 
120 

S e c t i o n 3 : 

F u n c t i o n a l C o m p o n e n t s 

allow egress of inmates to a safe holding area. 

As a primary function, master control must be 

able to remotely allow entrance of emergency 

personnel into all areas of the building. Master 

control should also maintain a master set of jail 

keys for manual override of locking mechanisms 

in case of a power loss (although emergency 

power generation should be a feature of all jail 

designs).

Issue: The construction of the master control 

area must be fundamentally secure to preclude 

access by inmates and the public.

Response: Because master control is the 

“nerve center” of the jail and may also contain the law enforcement communication 

center, the creation of a physically secure 

space is vital. A secure envelope must be 

created for master control; that is, the walls, 

floor, and ceiling of master control must be 

constructed of secure materials.

A secure ceiling is particularly important because many buildings have a ceiling plenum (an 

area between the ceiling and the roof or floor 

above for structural beams, ductwork, electrical 

conduit, and so forth). If inmates penetrate the 

plenum, they might gain access to master control 

through the ceiling unless the ceiling is of secure 

construction (e.g., concrete, steel decking, or cement plaster with metal lath). An alternative to 

secure ceiling construction is to extend the security walls of the space up past the ceiling to the 

floor or roof construction above.

Selection of the correct security glass product 

is also essential to creating a secure envelope. 

In selecting detention glass, remember that no 

security glass product is impenetrable or shatterproof, only penetration-resistant and shatterresistant. Penetration resistance is the primary 

need in master control because the glass must at 

least delay, if not prevent, unauthorized access. 

Shatter resistance is a lesser, though still important, issue. Glazing panels should be as wide as 

possible to maximize view without interruption 

by normally thick security framing. Panel height 

should be examined carefully where vertical view 

relationships are important.

Issue: All openings into master control must 

be secure.

Response: Besides the obvious opening 

of the entry door, other critical openings 

that must be able to be secured include 

passthroughs, air supply openings, and 

electrical openings. 

Secure entry is often handled by creating a vestibule into the master control area. The doors 

to the vestibule are normally “interlocked,” that 

is, they cannot both be opened at the same time 

unless the interlock is purposely overridden (a 

capability that should exist). Doors normally 

swing inward so the master control officer can 

barricade them shut if need be. 

A vestibule created solely for access to master 

control requires valuable square footage and can 

impede views to other areas. One approach in 

response to this issue is to allow the vestibule 

entry to the secure perimeter (which is frequently 

adjacent to and monitored by master control) to 

double as the secure entry to master control 

(exhibit 13-1).

Another important issue in a jail in which there 

is only one master control officer is to provide a 

means of access to master control in case the officer becomes incapacitated. One such means is 

a key kept in another secured area that is readily 

accessible to authorized staff.

Passthrough openings for keys, packages, walkietalkies, and paperwork serve to prevent the introduction of such dangerous items as chemical 

agents, explosives, or firearms. These openings 
121 

C h a p t e r 1 3 : 

Master Control

Exhibit 13-1. Entry to Secure Perimeter 

Doubles as Secure Entry to Master Control

Secure jail area

Nonsecure

lobby area

Master

control

Security

perimeter

entry

vestibule

with

interlocked

doors

should be designed to prohibit opening by anyone but the master control officer. Openings for 

heating and air-conditioning ducts and electrical 

openings for light fixtures and outlets should also 

be secured to prevent access.

Issue: All power, communication, and computer 

lines outside the master control space must be 

secured.

Response: It would do little good to secure 

the master control space if the sources of 

its power and capabilities were vulnerable. 

Consequently, the electrical, mechanical, 

and emergency power sources for the facility must be protected. If control center 

computers are housed in a room outside 

the master control area, they must also be 

secure.

Electrical panels that contain relays, switches, 

and wiring for control systems must also be protected, as must the electrical lines carrying power 

between master control and the locks, intercoms, 

and monitoring systems under its control.

View 

Issue: When master control is required to provide monitoring in specific areas, the design 

should allow for effective visual observation of 

those areas.

Response: If master control is to provide 

backup or principal monitoring of an area, 

a direct line of sight to that area should be 

created wherever possible in lieu of reliance 

on CCTV monitoring. Direct visual observation is more effective and has the secondary 

benefit of letting inmates know they are under observation. 

A difficulty with the master control position 

providing direct visual observation of various 

activities arises if master control is expected 

to observe too many things. When this occurs, 

master control can become an overly large and 

unwieldy space in order to be next to, or in view 

of, everything (exhibit 13-2). As the planning 

team increases the responsibilities of the master 

control position and the control space gets larger, 

they must determine the precise location of the 

master control staff and equipment. The desired 

view and the proximity of master control to different spaces may not be attained when the 

Exhibit 13-2. Master Control Position Expected 

To Observe Too Many Things 

Master control

Blind

spots from

view linked

to control

panel

location

Control

panel at which

officer controls

doors

Assumed

view per control

post shape

Actual view

from control

position
122 

S e c t i o n 3 : 

F u n c t i o n a l C o m p o n e n t s 

actual location of the staff position is established. 

Unanticipated blind spots or excessive movement 

away from the control panel may compromise 

staff’s ability to view key areas.

Issue: Views into and through master control 

should be controlled.

Response: When master control becomes 

the hub of a series of adjacent activities that 

it monitors, the prospect of view conflicts 

between spaces arises. Inmates may see 

through master control to public areas, be 

able to view control boards and computer 

screens in master control, or be able to view 

or communicate with inmates of the opposite sex in other areas.

Several approaches can be taken to prevent these 

problems:

■ Minimize the potential for view conflicts by 

minimizing the number of areas that master 

control must directly observe.

■ Use equipment or partitions in master control 

to screen views.

■ Raise the floor height of master control to 

help limit views into the control room (exhibit 

13-3). With this technique, it is important to 

ensure that the control platform is not so high 

that it eliminates a line of sight between the 

master control officer and the floor officer or 

between the master control officer and inmates 

in adjacent areas. The capability for convenient communication between master control 

and roving staff and the ability to pass logs, 

keys, and other items between them should be 

preserved. In establishing proper floor height 

and sightlines, be sure to factor in the location 

and height of control panels and television 

monitors.

■ Selectively apply reflective, one-way, or tinted 

glass to the master control area or to the inside 

of the rooms from which view conflicts arise. 

However, such glass severely limits contact 

and interaction between master control and 

inmates, the public, and other staff. Tinting or 

mirroring also affects the intensity of lighting 

required in adjacent spaces monitored by master control. If tinting is not uniformly applied 

to all master control glass panels, internal light 

reflections off the glass can erode view quality.

Another critical view conflict often arises in 

smaller jails when dispatchers operate master 

control and become uncomfortable being visible to inmates. Their response is often to screen 

themselves from view, thus defeating the location 

and design of master control. The solution may 

lie in the selection and training of staff rather 

than in the design. See chapter 9, “Criminal Justice Interface,” in section 2.

Design Efficiency 

Issue: Master control must be laid out efficiently.

Response: Control panels and/or touch 

screen monitors should be within easy reach 

of the officer (exhibit 13-4). (Note: The use 

of hard-wired control panels is not recommended in the design of any new facility, 

as such panels are not easily changed or 

expanded and can be difficult and cumbersome to use and repair.)

Corridor Dayroom

Control

Dayroom Corridor

Exhibit 13-3. Floor Height of Master Control 

Raised Above Dayroom and Corridor 
123 

C h a p t e r 1 3 : 

Master Control

Exhibit 13-4. Preferred Control Panel 

Configuration

Desirable

Not desirable

Control panels can be organized independently 

of each other by function (locks, lights, intercom) 

or together on one panel by the physical location 

in the building to which the functions correspond 

(that is, locks, light, intercom grouped together 

by space—e.g., dayroom, cell). Touch screens can 

be customized by area using separate screens on 

a single monitor.1

Grouping frequently used controls by the location to which they correspond is more efficient, 

although it can be more costly and complicated 

to install and can result in very large panels if a 

hard-wired system is used rather than a computerized touch-screen system.

It is important to the design to determine whether the staff assigned to master control will sit or 

stand. If the nature of the post requires frequent 

movement around the space, standing or sitting 

on a high stool might be preferred over a low 

seat. This decision must be coordinated with 

decisions regarding the design of the master control area and of the sill and head heights of glass 

view panels in the walls.

If control staff are constantly leaving their equipment and moving around the master control 

space to do all the jobs required and to obtain 

all the necessary views, the master control task 

may become quite frustrating and inefficient. Reducing control functions and switching duties to 

other staff might be a better solution.

Ready accessibility to such things as life safety 

annunciator panels, bulletin boards, inmate location charts, post orders, and egress plans frequently demands that some solid wall space be 

provided in master control. Thus, it is difficult 

to provide a totally efficient, fully glazed space. 

This may be beneficial, though, because it can be 

overly stressful to work in what some refer to as 

a “fish-bowl” environment.

Environment

Issue: The master control environment should 

reduce stress and fatigue and enhance control 

activities.

Response: Sound-absorbing materials such 

as carpet and acoustic ceiling tile can reduce sound reverberation (echoes) and the 

harshness of sound that could easily result 

from the incessant noise of master control 

equipment.

Temperature and ventilation are critical considerations because the equipment within master 

control frequently generates excessive heat. To 

alleviate this problem, it would help to make special or separate provisions to cool and ventilate 

the master control space and to give some control over these conditions to the staff. Separate 

provisions also aid security because they make 

master control less vulnerable to attack and help 

eliminate the transmission of unwanted sound 

1

 Hard-wired systems rely on buttons and wires for each lock, camera, intercom, etc. Touch-screen systems rely on a computer 

monitor with multiple screens and symbols representing functions, with coded signals being sent through a few wires to the lock or 

other function involved.
124 

S e c t i o n 3 : 

F u n c t i o n a l C o m p o n e n t s 

from inmate-occupied areas that can result from 

improperly designed ductwork.

Giving the master control officer the ability to 

control the intensity of direct and indirect lighting can be helpful in minimizing eyestrain by 

reducing glare and reflections from monitors and 

glazing. It also helps balance light levels between 

touch screen monitors, CCTV monitors, panel 

lights, adjacent rooms, and the master control 

area.

Even though frequent staff breaks are recommended, master control staff should be able to 

get a drink of water and use restroom facilities 

without leaving the master control space. Therefore, having such facilities accessible from within 

master control is very desirable. A place for a coffee pot may also be desirable.

Communication 

Issue: Easy communication should be provided 

throughout the facility.

Response: Master control should be linked 

by telephone or intercom to all key areas of 

the facility, including all staff control posts 

and work areas. A facilitywide public address system is not appropriate for point-topoint communication between staff where 

privacy or discretion is desired.

Continuous communication with officers not assigned to a constantly staffed post (rovers) or 

with transport officers may require the use of a 

portable radio system. An officer duress system, 

tied to alarms at master control, can be incorporated into the portable radio system to provide 

additional officer safety. Master control should 

also have some means by which to communicate 

to all housing units and major areas used by inmates in case other control posts become 

inoperative.

Communication between master control and 

adjacent spaces always seems to be a special 

problem in new jails owing to the use of security 

glass, concrete block, and other materials that 

effectively form solid walls through which sound 

does not transmit. It is advisable to use electronic 

devices or secure portals through which direct 

voice contact can be established. In either case, 

the convenience of the users should be taken into 

account.

Portals to public areas should be secure; electronic communications are preferable. Direct 

two-way visual contact between the control officer and the public visitor tends to be preferred 

by both parties.

Equipment

Issue: The sophisticated electronic control and 

communication equipment needed in modern 

jails must be accommodated.

Response: Master control has become a very 

sophisticated element of the modern jail. 

Master control observing a housing unit. 

(Photograph courtesy of Kimme & Associates.)
125 

C h a p t e r 1 3 : 

Master Control

It tends to rely heavily on computer-based 

controls, detection devices, and communications. With this technology comes the 

need to provide adequate secure space for 

the equipment needed to facilitate master 

control operations. Ideally, this equipment 

should be housed in a secure room off the 

master control area and within the secure 

envelop of the master control area.

Fire Safety 

Issue: Proper fire safety provisions are essential 

within master control.

Response: Although planners must check 

local codes for specific fire safety requirements, several general considerations for 

fire safety in master control should be 

noted:

■ Master control should use firesuppression systems that minimize 

equipment damage.

A fire extinguisher and self-contained 

breathing apparatus (air pack) should 

be available in master control.

A direct alarm link to the fire department should be available in master 

control.

Provisions for smoke evacuation or 

blocking smoke movement from other 

areas into master control should be 

considered.

Awkward mode of communication between master control and roving officer. 

(Photograph courtesy of Kimme & Associates.)

■

■

■

Expansion 

Issue: The design of master control should consider and accommodate expansion of the area.

Response: Master control is not easy to 

expand because of its nature and generally central location in the jail. Therefore, 

if workload demands are likely to increase 

to the point where two or more positions 

are needed, it would be wise to design 

master control as a multiple-position space 

from the start. Such a design must account 

for appropriate space and arrangement as 

well as consider how the extra posts might 

split or share functions, thereby requiring 

some duplication of equipment and power 

sources.

Space List 

Some of the typical spaces that might be found 

with the master control component include:

■ Master control work space.

■ Dispatch work space (if combined with master 

control in small jails).

■ Restroom.

■ Computer/electronic equipment room.
126 

S e c t i o n 3 : 

F u n c t i o n a l C o m p o n e n t s 

■ General storage/equipment storage room.

■ Interlocked security vestibule.

Local codes and ADA guidelines regarding accessibility requirements should be consulted when 

planning these spaces.

Relationships and Components

Exhibit 13-5. Master Control Component Diagram

Security

vestibule

Public lobby

Equipment

storage

Files and 

reference

Inmate locator board

Power panels

and key cabinet

Visual

barrier

Public package

passthrough

Glass-clad

polycarbonate

glazing

Staff

passthrough

Toilet

Glass-clad

polycarbonate

glazing
127

Chapter 14

Intake-Release

T

he intake-release area of a jail—often 

referred to as booking, admissions, or 

receiving—is an active, vital component 

of any jail operation (exhibit 14-1). This area is 

used for three critical jail functions:

Exhibit 14-1. Intake-Release Area

Intake

In

Out

Release

Inmate

housing

Receiving Admissions

■ Conducting all intake activities involved in 

initially receiving arrestees from the field or 

inmates from court or other facilities:

❏ Secure entry/verification of arresting 

authority.

❏ Searches.

❏ Receiving and temporarily storing selected 

arrestee property.

❏ Booking, fingerprinting, and photographing 

arrestees.

❏ Temporary holding of arrestees.

❏ Interview/visiting space or telephone access 

for bonding agents.

❏ Screening/interviewing of arrestees by law 

enforcement, parole, probation, or others.

❏ Preliminary medical and suicide screening.

❏ Providing minor first aid.

■ Conducting all intake activities involved in admitting arrestees or processing arrestees before 

they are moved to a housing unit:

❏ Exchanging personal clothing, dress-out 

into facility-issued clothing.

❏ Shower/decontamination.

❏ Searches.

❏ Storing personal and facility-issued 

clothing/property.

❏ Inmate orientation to facility services and 

rules.

❏ Indepth health and suicide screening.

❏ Initial inmate classification.

❏ Movement to housing unit.

■ Conducting all activities involved in releasing 

arrestees or inmates from either the receiving 

area or a housing unit: 

❏ Verifying identity.

❏ Executing release paperwork.

❏ Exchanging clothing, dress-out.

❏ Returning property.

❏ Providing secure exit.

Many facilities are designed with a separate release area where inmates turn in facility-issued 

items, dress in their personal clothing, receive 

other personal items that were in storage, and 
128

S e c t i o n 3 : 

Functional Components

complete release paperwork without disrupting 

the booking operations.

The intake-release area provides the arrestee with 

his/her first impression of the facility and sets 

the tone for his/her stay, much in the same way 

that the jail’s public lobby and reception areas 

influence the public’s first impression. Architecturally and operationally, the intake-release area 

sets the stage for subsequent inmate behavior by 

what is communicated verbally and nonverbally 

when the arrestee first comes into custody.

The intake-release area is used frequently because every arrestee or inmate who enters the 

facility is in this area at least once. In addition, 

at this point arrestees and inmates can be in 

various mental and physical states (e.g., angry, 

intoxicated, emotionally disturbed). Therefore, 

the planning and design of this area require special care and attention. The result should be a 

set of spaces that allow staff and inmates to 

function in a safe, secure, calm, and orderly 

way that preserves human dignity to the greatest 

extent possible.

Modern jails provide much more space for intake 

and release functions than the typical jail of the 

past. Few older jails provided secure and protected vehicle sallyports or temporary holding capabilities; instead, the inmate waited in the booking 

area or was moved directly to a cellblock. In 

many older jails, processing arrestees for housing 

occurred without a shower or a change of clothes 

and without any screening for medical and mental health problems. Booking areas in older jails 

were rarely within a fully secure perimeter and 

sometimes were combined with the dispatch 

function in an area accessible to the public. Over 

the years, litigation forced staff to squeeze many 

of these needed but neglected functions into 

whatever limited space might be available (e.g., 

hallways, storage spaces, or closets). The results 

were often far from satisfactory.

Modern intake-release areas tend to provide 

space for a full variety of intake-release functions 

and to consolidate them into one distinct complex of interrelated spaces within the jail’s main 

security perimeter.

Key Decisions

In evaluating the role of the intake-release component, the following decisions must be made 

because they have a fundamental impact on design requirements:

■ Will officers with arrestees enter the jail 

through a secured vehicle sallyport or will they 

park in, and move through, unprotected outdoor areas to gain access to the jail?

Will the arresting officer assist in the receiving 

and admitting process or can his/her involvement be limited to minimize the tension between the arrestee and officer that results from 

an arrest?

Will the arresting officer interview the inmate 

at the jail prior to booking to gather information for completing reports or will this take 

place prior to arrival at the facility? 

Will arrest procedures (such as administering 

a breathalyzer) be conducted at the jail or at 

some other location prior to arrival at the jail?

Will the facility accept intoxicated, mentally 

ill, or injured persons or can they be taken 

directly to alternative facilities? If they are accepted at the jail, will specially trained staff 

and designated areas be made available to accommodate them?

Will there be a release area separate from the 

receiving and admissions area or will release 

occur in the same area?

Will inmates housed in the facility wear clothing provided by the facility or their personal 

clothing?

■

■

■

■

■

■
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■ Will females be processed in areas separate 

from those used for males or does the design, 

supervision, and scheduling effectively eliminate any problems that may result from using 

one area?

■ Will the booking area be staffed at all times or 

will staff only be present when an intake or 

release occurs?

■ Will inmates waiting for transportation to or 

returning from court be staged in the booking 

area or another holding area?

Detail Issues

Following is a discussion of the detailed functionalarchitectural issues to be considered when developing the intake-release component. Because the 

design of the intake-release area involves many 

complex questions, the issues are divided into 

four categories: general design, receiving area, 

admission area, and release area.

General Design 

These issues pertain to the entire intake-release 

area: users, location, arrangement, environmental 

quality, and security.

Users

Issue: Identify those who will use the intakerelease area so that the space can be planned 

and designed effectively.

Response: Jail staff (including correctional 

officers, medical personnel, and support 

staff), new arrestees, and law enforcement 

officers will use the intake-release area most 

frequently. Intake-release staff must process 

all inmates for admission into the facility or 

for pretrial release via bail, recognizance, 

citation, or third-party release. Local law 

enforcement officers will use the area to 

deliver arrestees for receiving. Other law enforcement officials (e.g., federal marshals or 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement officers) might use the area for temporary detention of inmates in transit. Court officers 

or transport personnel may use the area for 

staging to prepare inmates for transport to 

and from court, appointments, or transportation to other agencies. Probation and parole officers may use the area to temporarily 

hold violators or to interview arrestees who 

may be eligible for pretrial release programs.

A variety of arrestees and inmates might use the 

receiving area and shape the space needs. Some 

of the disparate behaviors and characteristics 

typically encountered include:

■ Scared and unpredictable.

■ Violent and angry.

■ Nonviolent and passive.

■ Career criminals.

■ Average citizens.

■ Males.

■ Females.

■ Juveniles charged as an adult.

■ Intoxicated on drugs or alcohol.

■ Injured.

■ Physically or mentally disabled.

■ Suicidal.

Others who may use the area intermittently or 

frequently include medical and mental health 

personnel, bondspersons, attorneys, and pretrial 

services personnel. Because they may need work 

space in the intake-release area at the same time 

that law enforcement and jail staff require space, 

the feasibility of all users sharing the same space 

or needing several spaces must be considered.
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S e c t i o n 3 : 

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The size of the receiving area and requirements 

for separate spaces and other amenities should 

be based on actual historical booking records and 

future projections of receiving and admissions 

activity. It is critical to recognize that the number 

of arrestees or inmates in the intake-release area 

at any one time can vary greatly based on the following factors:

■ Unusually busy times (weekend nights or 

during transfer to court).

■ Length of stay in temporary holding.

■ Group arrests.

In determining the number of users, it is important to consider that an arrestee’s average length 

of stay in the receiving area of a newer jail might 

be longer than that in an older jail because most 

newer jails provide a holding capability in the 

receiving area. This allows the arrestee to spend 

several hours in the intake area while trying to 

arrange release or while waiting for others to 

make arrangements, rather than being moved to 

a housing unit shortly after booking. The admission process is completed only after it becomes 

apparent that release will not occur in a timely 

manner and that the inmate should be moved to 

a housing area. Adequate staff supervision must 

be provided for arrestees in the intake area.

Entrance into receiving area from vehicle sallyport. 

(Photograph courtesy of Jim Rowenhorst.)

Location

Issue: The location of the intake-release area is 

vital to the facility’s efficient operation.

Response: Following are the key criteria for 

the location of the intake-release area:

■ Within the secure perimeter of 

the facility.

■ Adjacent to a controlled entrance to the building such as a 

vehicle sallyport or entry vestibule. In smaller jails, it is often 

located within view of master control 

because this station will likely control 

all access to the building and provide 

visual backup for the area.

■ Near the public lobby to allow a convenient and dignified release.

■ Near visiting or interview areas to 

allow access to friends, family, attorneys, and bondspersons who are integral to inmates’ release or who help 

with personal matters.

■ Near the medical examination area to 

allow easy access to these services. It 

is often convenient to have a medical 

examination room in the booking area 

so arrestees can easily be screened 

prior to moving to a housing area or 

receive emergency medical attention if 

they need it.

■ Near cells used for mentally ill or 

intoxicated individuals, if such cells 

are not provided in the intake-release 
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area. These cells should be quickly 

accessible from the secure entry to 

minimize the difficulty of moving 

these individuals. In addition, these 

cells should be observable from a post 

that is constantly staffed.

■ Near the laundry or clothing storage 

area, if inmates will change into facilityprovided clothing prior to entering a 

housing unit.

■ Near offices of personnel involved in 

pretrial screening and near interview 

rooms they or others might use.

Exhibit 14-9 at the end of this chapter illustrates 

these relationships.

Arrangement 

Issue: The arrangement of intake-release 

spaces must facilitate inmate and staff flow and 

ensure the area’s integrity and functions.

Response: A series of primary flow sequences occurs in an intake-release area. They 

should be charted in sequence to identify 

the types of spaces needed and their fundamental arrangement.

The different types of flow that may occur in the 

intake-release area include:

■ Receiving an arrestee.

■ Receiving and admitting an inmate transferred 

from another facility.

■ Readmitting an inmate who temporarily left 

the facility.

■ Processing an arrestee for housing.

■ Releasing an arrestee prior to admission.

■ Releasing an inmate after a stay in a housing 

unit.

■ Releasing an inmate for a court appearance.

It is generally recommended that work release 

inmates enter and exit the facility through a separate access point. However, this may be impractical and unnecessary for a jail that has:

■ A very limited capacity.

■ A low arrestee receiving and release rate, 

which suggests minimal potential conflicts and 

a greater ability to concentrate on the management of contraband problems through staff 

and policy.

■ A need to use space and equipment in the 

intake-release area because duplication cannot 

be justified.

However flow is projected to work through the 

intake-release area, all spaces in the area should 

be consolidated into one distinct group of spaces 

that work together and are uninterrupted by other nearby activities and functions. That is, pieces 

of the intake-release area should not be scattered 

throughout the facility. Consolidation allows for 

smooth and effective operations and helps retain 

the arrestee’s privacy and dignity because, for 

many arrestees, contact with the jail can be successfully limited to the intake-release area alone. 

(As many as one-third of all arrestees might be 

released within the first 6 hours of stay and twothirds within 72 hours.)

In this regard, it is important to ensure that there 

is proper separation between the spaces involved 

with receiving and those involved with processing arrestees before transfer to a housing unit, 

which requires more privacy (e.g., shower, dress, 

unclothed body search (if applicable)). Particular 

attention needs to be given to privacy because 

both male and female arrestees will likely use 

the intake-release area in all but the largest jail 

systems.
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Environmental quality 

Issue: The intake-release environment should 

help reduce tensions and create a calm, orderly, 

and secure intake process.

Response: Although the creation of a calm, 

pleasant, and orderly atmosphere is in 

many ways dependent on staff attitudes, 

architecture can help considerably. Such an 

atmosphere can help reduce initial tensions 

and anxieties and thereby reduce the potential for aggressive behavior by arrestees. 

When the appearance and atmosphere of 

the intake-release area is normalized it communicates an expectation of rational behavior and often produces that result (exhibit 

14-2).

Exhibit 14-2. Detailed View of Intake-Release 

Area in a Smaller Jail

Intakerelease

staff

Secure vehicle sallyport

Reception

1 2

3

4

Vestibule

The area’s appearance and character—and how 

individuals respond to it—can be improved in 

a number of ways without sacrificing security. 

Possible techniques, which should be used selectively depending on different types of inmates 

and staff considerations, include:

■ Using more conventional construction materials, such as concrete masonry units and security glass instead of steel plate and bars.

■ Using “softer” materials that add warmth to 

the area and improve acoustics, including:

❏ Carpet.

❏ Lay-in acoustic ceiling tile.

❏ Durable but more attractive furnishings, 

such as plastic and wood, rather than concrete and metal in waiting areas.

❏ Solid-core wood doors for holding cells for 

compliant, nonviolent arrestees.

■ Using warm and bright colors rather than institutional colors and patterns.

■ Providing normalizing diversions such as 

television and magazines.

■ Providing maximum freedom in holding accommodations, such as open waiting areas for 

arrestees who do not require a more restrictive 

setting.

■ Providing easy access to telephones for arrestees to use to secure bail or make other 

arrangements.

A light, clean, and comfortable arrestee waiting area with open seating.

(Photograph courtesy of Jim Rowenhorst.)
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Overall, the intake-release area should create 

an appearance similar to that of a well-designed 

waiting area in a clinic; at the same time, the 

underlying construction approach, a well-defined 

security zone, and staff supervision can enhance 

the ability to segregate and restrain disruptive inmates when needed.

Security

Issue: Because of the sensitive and difficult nature of intake-release functions, close security 

and control are required.

Response: Given the emotional stress and 

unpredictable behavior involved in the 

receiving process and the potential for 

security problems during receiving, admissions, court transfers, etc., intake-release 

area functions need to be among the most 

secure and closely monitored in the facility.

The entry sequence to the receiving area should 

be within the direct line of sight of the intakerelease officer. Ideally, although master control 

will control the entry and exit doors, intakerelease staff must be able to directly view:

■ Entry of the vehicle into the sallyport.

■ The officer and the arrestee leaving the 

vehicle.

■ The identity and circumstances of the transporting officer prior to authorizing master control to open the vehicle sallyport door.

■ Movement to and through the door or vestibule leading to the receiving area.

■ Departure of the officer from the entry 

vestibule.

■ Departure of the officer and vehicle from the 

vehicle sallyport.

This arrangement has the following advantages: 

the intake-release officer can view the entire entrance process and respond if trouble arises; the 

arresting officer is confident that the situation is 

under control, and the arrestee is deterred from 

dangerous behavior by the intake-release officers’ 

constant and visible support; and the arrestee 

can see where he/she is going next, thereby relieving anxiety about the process.

If possible, in smaller facilities the 

same sequence should be visible from 

a constantly staffed post such as master control because it will probably 

have responsibility for operating sallyport and entry doors. Any view that cannot be 

provided to master control directly should be provided through closed-circuit television (CCTV). 

Holding cells and the booking, fingerprint, and 

photograph areas should also be visible from 

master control or a constantly staffed post. 

Receiving (“Booking”) Area Design 

The following detailed functional-architectural 

issues pertain to the areas required for the receiving or “booking” activities of the intakerelease component. The receiving areas and 

spaces are those involved when the arrestee is 

initially received, but they are not involved with 

the process of preparing inmates to be moved 

to housing, inmates returning from court, or 

inmates transferred from other facilities. The following discussion of the receiving area covers 

secure entry, arrestee processing, waiting and 

temporary holding, outside contact, and miscellaneous support.

Secure entry 

The secure entry typically consists of two primary architectural elements:

■ Vehicle sallyport.
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S e c t i o n 3 : 

Functional Components

■ Pedestrian entry vestibule, which possibly 

includes a sobriety testing area.

Booking area with large windows (at the back of the photo) that look into 

the vehicle sallyport and arresting officer staging area. 

(Photograph courtesy of Voorhis Robertson Justice Services.)

Vehicle sallyport

Issue: A secure and protected vehicle entry for 

the arrestee/inmate and the transporting officer 

is necessary.

Response: An enclosed vehicle sallyport is 

the best solution to this issue as it provides 

three key capabilities:

■ A secure environment from which the 

arrestee/inmate cannot escape or be 

aided in escape once he/she leaves the 

transport vehicle.

■ Privacy separation from adjacent facilities or land uses and the public.

■ Protection from the weather.

Exhibit 14-3. Vehicle Sallyport Showing DriveAlthough the first capability is essential, the others are highly desirable depending on location, 

climate, and economics. Some jurisdictions, for 

example, only have a fenced area to provide a 

basic degree of security (although passage of 

contraband can remain a problem). This may be 

sufficient in cases where the jail is on a remote 

site, view conflicts are negligible, and the climate minimizes the need for protection from the 

weather. In general, it is recommended that the 

facility design provide a fully enclosed and securely constructed vehicle sallyport. 

Following are some considerations for the design 

of the vehicle sallyport:

■ A drive-through design for ease of operation, 

versatility, and traffic flow. This means a vehicle enters through one door/gate and exits 

through a second door/gate (exhibit 14-3).

■ Sufficient height and width of doors/gates and 

adequate floor-to-ceiling clearance to accommodate squad cars, 4 x 4 vehicles, vans, buses, 

and/or emergency vehicles, including the 

height added by antennas, lights, and sirens 

and the width of ambulances and other emergency vehicles (including mirrors). Doors/

gates that are 10 to 12 feet high and 12 feet 

wide are usually appropriate (exhibit 14-4).

■ Sufficient floor area to accommodate:

Through Design
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C h a p t e r 1 4 : 

Intake-Release

❏ The length of the largest vehicle that will 

use the space (buses are approximately 40 

feet long, cars are 14 to 18 feet long). 

❏ The width of open car doors and arrestee/

inmate movement in the space (normally, 

a minimum of 15 feet for a sallyport that is 

the width of a single vehicle).

❏ The number of vehicles to be allowed into 

the sallyport at one time.

❏ Any parking allowed for other official vehicles in the space.

■ A location adjacent to the secure vestibule entry to the jail.

■ Separate storage space for any items associated 

with the vehicle sallyport to keep potentially 

dangerous items out of the reach of inmates.

■ An arrangement that allows the door through 

which the arrestee/inmate will leave a squad 

car to open directly at the point of secure entry 

to the intake-release area.

■ Sallyport doors/gates that are remotely 

controlled by master control to keep them 

easily operable and secure from tampering by 

inmates.

■ A pedestrian entry into the vehicle sallyport 

from the outside, also controlled by master 

control, to allow officer access after parking 

the squad car and to allow access in the event 

that overhead doors are temporarily not 

functioning.

■ An interlock for all vehicle and pedestrian 

doors to prevent escapes or unauthorized 

access.

■ A radio or intercom to master control—at the 

entrance to the sallyport and at the entrance to 

the jail—to request entry and provide a means 

of communication from within the sallyport.

■ Direct visual or CCTV monitoring inside and 

outside the sallyport by master control. (Direct 

monitoring of as much of the entry activity as 

possible is valuable even if not all of the sallyport can be seen without the help of CCTV.)

■ Weapons lockers in the vehicle sallyport to 

keep handguns, Tasers, bullets, knives, and 

other defensive equipment outside of the 

intake-release area.

■ Sufficient artificial lighting for nighttime use 

and sufficient ventilation to exhaust vehicle 

fumes.

■ Natural light (if possible) to brighten the space 

and calm the arrestee, through security-glazed 

detention windows or skylights.

■ An eyewash sink to wash out pepper spray.

■ A hose bib and sloped floor drain for easy 

cleaning.

Exhibit 14-4. Vehicle Sallyport Showing Floor 

Area Configuration

Profile of possible

transport bus

To booking

area

Pedestrian entry vestibule

Issue: A secure pedestrian entry vestibule may 

be needed to create a secure and properly controlled entry to the intake-release area.
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S e c t i o n 3 : 

Functional Components

Response: A secure pedestrian entry vestibule is essential if the following conditions 

exist (exhibit 14-5):

■

Exhibit 14-5. Pedestrian Entry Vestibule

Vehicle sallyport

doors/gates 

Security

vestibule

door 

Booking

area door 

Intake area

Sallyport

Vestibule

A variety of prebooking functions inappropriate for the vehicle sallyport 

must occur prior to allowing entry into 

the intake-release area, such as filling 

out arrest forms, securing warrants, 

sobriety testing, initial pat search, initial property receipt, and initial medical screening.

There is a desire to limit the arresting 

officer’s access to the booking area to 

decrease tensions by eliminating him/

her from the process as quickly as 

possible.

Another level of security at the point 

of entry, in addition to a vehicle sallyport, is desired (essentially creating 

three barriers between the intakerelease area and the outside).

■

■

If a secure entry vestibule is required, the following design considerations apply (exhibit 14-6):

Exhibit 14-6. Secure Pedestrian Entry Vestibule

Passthrough

Report writing

Breath test

Phone

Bench

Pat search

Intake area

Sallyport

Security

vestibule 

Toilet

■ Provide sufficient floor area to permit easy 

arrestee/officer flow, including difficult flow 

(e.g., wrestling, stumbling, fighting, two persons holding the inmate).

■ Provide sufficient floor area to accommodate 

associated functions if the entry vestibule 

serves as more than just a passageway. Some 

possibilities include:

❏ Sobriety testing (including storage for required supplies).

❏ Computer workstations for arresting officers 

for report writing and data entry.

❏ Storage for forms and property bags.

❏ Toilet facilities.

❏ Telephones.

❏ Waiting by the arrestee (consider a bench 

with restraint capability).

■ Provide visibility from the booking station 

and/or a constantly staffed post, but sufficient 

screening from holding areas to provide privacy for pat searches.

■ Consider using sliding doors to eliminate the 

need for the officer to manipulate swinging 

doors and the arrestee at the same time.

■ Interlock the vestibule doors and provide an 

interlock override for emergency ingress or 

egress.
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C h a p t e r 1 4 : 

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■ Provide a means of voice communication from 

the vestibule entry to intake-release and master control positions.

■ Provide a means by which documents and 

property can be passed securely, such as a 

secure pass-through, from the vestibule to the 

intake-release area.

■ Provide mats, nonslip surfaces, and drains to 

neutralize the effects of mud, snow, ice, and 

water brought into the area.

■ Consider how larger numbers of arrestees and 

arresting officers can be accommodated if 

space is not available in the pedestrian entry 

vestibule.

Sobriety testing 

Issue: Sobriety testing areas, if provided, should 

be affiliated with the entry sequence to limit arresting officer entry into the jail and create easy 

access to needed equipment.

Response: Some design considerations in 

regard to sobriety testing include: 

■ Sobriety testing should be done at or 

near the entry from the vehicle sallyport, preferably in an area distinct 

from the receiving area and accessible 

from the secure pedestrian entry 

vestibule.

■ The area should be large enough to 

accommodate the particular type of 

sobriety testing equipment used; 

storage of testing materials, supplies, 

and forms; and seating for both the 

arrestee and the officer. (Temporary 

seating is important because sometimes arrestees must be observed for 

a 15- to 20-minute period prior to testing and may need to sit in the sobriety 

testing area during observation.)

■ It may be desirable to make the space 

large enough to conduct motor skills 

tests.

■ Space for videotaping the sobriety and 

motor skills testing process may be 

needed.

■ Toilet facilities should be provided in 

this area if possible because arresting officers may need to take a urine 

sample or intoxicated individuals 

frequently need to urinate and often 

become nauseated.

Arrestee Processing 

Three functions generate space needs for preadmission arrestee processing in the intake-release 

area:

■ Booking.

■ Fingerprinting.

■ Photographing.

A room for breathalyzer equipment on the right that is accessible from within 

the arresting officer vestibule between the vehicle sallyport and the intake 

area. The intake area is beyond the glass on the left. 

(Photograph courtesy of Kimme & Associates.)
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S e c t i o n 3 : 

Functional Components

The following detailed functional-architectural 

issues address the design impacts of these 

functions.

Booking

Issue: The booking of an arrestee must be 

accommodated.

Response: The booking process is largely 

a paperwork and/or data entry process in 

which the following information is obtained 

about the arrestee:

■ Personal data.

■ Arrest data.

■ Criminal history.

■ Arrest authorizations.

■ Medical and mental health history.

■ Other relevant information.

The area primarily needs work surfaces and 

space around these surfaces. Smaller jails usually 

need only one or two booking stations because 

of the relatively low volume of arrests and limited staff resources. Larger jails may be designed 

with multiple booking stations to accommodate a 

larger number of bookings. Some design issues to 

consider include:

■ Decide whether the arrestee and the intakerelease officer will sit and/or stand during 

the booking process and ensure that booking 

counter surface heights correspond appropriately. Note that high chairs and stools may 

contribute to injuries of inmates who are intoxicated or otherwise impaired.

■ Locate the booking area as close to the secure 

entry as possible.

■ Create enough space on the inmates’ side of 

the area to avoid congestion when others are 

entering and using the area.

■ Identify the equipment needed and allow sufficient space for it. Equipment may include the 

following:

❏ Intercoms.

❏ Telephones.

❏ Computer terminals and printers.

❏ Typewriters.

❏ File cabinets for active inmate records.

❏ Forms and other miscellaneous supplies.

❏ Containers for temporary or secure property 

storage.

❏ A writing surface.

❏ Property receipt equipment, such as heatsealing equipment for property bags.

❏ A clock, inmate locator board, and bulletin 

board.

❏ Electronic controls for doors, lights, and 

telephones.

■ Decide whether the booking staff will be in 

an open work area or an enclosed area. Given 

that the intake-release officer will likely receive the inmate at the entry vestibule and 

move him/her through the intake-release area, 

an open booking area is more efficient and 

practical.

■ Provide storage in a safe or locked drawer or 

cabinet for the temporary holding of cash and 

other valuables.

■ Provide storage for the temporary holding of 

large property items, such as suitcases, backpacks, and attaché cases.

Photographing/Fingerprinting 

Issue: Photographing and fingerprinting functions must be accommodated.
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C h a p t e r 1 4 : 

Intake-Release

Response: Photographing and fingerprinting are routine functions of the booking 

process. The primary question in regard to 

planning space for this function is whether 

they require a separate alcove or space or 

whether they can be done from the booking 

counter. Some design considerations follow.

Photographing. Determine the method of photographing arrestees. For example:

■ Digital video imaging. (This is the preferred 

technology for all booking photos.)

■ 35 mm photographs.

■ Instant-print photographs.

■ Multiple instant photographs, as produced by 

the type of large portable machines seen in 

shopping centers.

The method selected will frequently depend on 

the needs of various law enforcement agencies 

outside of the sheriff’s office (Federal Bureau of 

Investigation, state bureaus of investigation, prosecuting attorney’s office) and the need to have 

reproducible photographs. Most new facilities 

now use digital video imaging techniques and 

equipment for routine identification purposes.

■ If photographing is done from the booking 

counter, be sure to consider the convenience 

of staff in posing the inmate and returning to 

the camera to take the pictures. 

■ Provide above- and below-counter storage for 

equipment, supplies, and forms associated 

with both photographing and fingerprinting 

inmates. These items include booking cards, 

film, and development chemicals. If chemicals 

are used, they should be stored in a locked 

cabinet and should not be used in areas that 

are accessible to inmates.

■ Provide flexibility for using a height chart 

as part of the photographing arrangement. 

(Criminal investigators may not want a height 

chart so they can use jail photographs for 

photo lineup.)

■ Provide storage for the board and identification letters used in the photographing process, 

if they are not inserted automatically by the 

photographing equipment.

■ Provide ample artificial lighting to enhance the 

quality of photographs.

■ In arranging space and equipment, consider 

how photographs might be taken. For example, 

although the usual practice is to take a single 

shot from the front and shots from both sides 

of the individual, another idea is to use a mirror system that allows one shot to provide 

front face, left face, and right face views.

Fingerprinting. Identify the method of fingerprinting to be used. Some methods use chemicals 

or heat processes instead of traditional ink pads. 

Most modern facilities use electronic fingerprinting, which links fingerprints electronically to 

statewide and national databases.

Fingerprint and photographing stations in a large booking area. 

(Photograph courtesy of Voorhis Robertson Justice Services.)
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S e c t i o n 3 : 

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Make sure there is sufficient room on either side 

of the fingerprint pad or equipment area so that 

staff can stand while working with the arrestee. 

Provide a sink for hand washing before and after 

fingerprinting, a paper towel dispenser, and a 

waste receptacle. 

Temporary waiting and holding 

Because it is not always possible to immediately 

process every arrestee who arrives at the jail and 

some facilities may choose to allow arrestees to 

wait in the intake-release area for several hours 

while bond arrangements are being made, the 

provision of temporary holding or waiting areas 

is critical to the operation of the intake-release 

area.

All holding or waiting spaces should be easily observable from a staff post. However, care must be 

taken to ensure adequate privacy when toilets are 

included in the spaces. View conflicts between 

holding spaces and between holding spaces and 

other areas of the facility must also be controlled.

Issue: Secure single-occupancy holding cells 

should be available for arrestees or inmates 

who have been violent or combative or who otherwise need temporary confinement apart from 

other arrestees.

Response: The characteristics of a secure 

holding room for violent or combative inmates might include:

■ A single cell of 50 to 70 square feet 

(check state standards for applicable 

requirements).

■ A large security-glazed window in the 

cell door and/or front wall.

■ Sufficient door width to allow two officers to place a combative inmate in 

the cell and to allow for easy entry 

of a “restraint chair” and emergency 

equipment.

■ High-security hardware. 

■ Detention plumbing fixtures behind a 

privacy screen that allows some view 

control (normally a height of about 

40 to 42 inches is adequate). Consider 

installing a remote flushing feature to 

prevent the loss of potential evidence.

■ Fixed seating (sufficiently wide and 

long so the inmate can lie down, if 

possible).

■ Natural light through secure windows, 

skylights, or clerestories, if possible.

■ Artificial lighting controlled by staff.

■ At least 9-foot ceilings, if possible, 

to minimize random assaults on the 

surface or fixtures at the ceiling (e.g., 

smoke and heat detectors, sprinkler 

heads, light fixtures).

■ Durable finishes and materials.

Issue: Multipurpose secure space is needed 

for holding arrestees who may not be appropriate for an open waiting area (e.g., arrestees 

who are under the influence of alcohol) and 

during staging for transport to court or to 

other locations.

Response: The characteristics of multipurpose holding space include:

■ Multiple-occupancy holding. The 

recommendation is for a room that 

is a minimum of 60 square feet for 

single occupancy; 12.5 square feet 

should be added for each additional 

person the cell is designed to hold 

(check state standards for applicable 

requirements).
141

C h a p t e r 1 4 : 

Intake-Release

■ Fixed seating (benches are preferred to 

allow seating for a number of people 

in the space). 

■ A detention-quality toilet and sink 

behind a privacy screen, which allows 

some view control by staff and some 

privacy for the arrestee.

■ Large windows in the door and sidewall for observation from the booking/staff station in the receiving area.

■ Medium- to high-security hardware.

■ A floor drain. 

■ Nine-foot ceilings, if possible.

■ Durable finishes and materials.

Issue: An open waiting area should be available for cooperative arrestees who are awaiting 

booking or pretrial release via bonding or other 

measures.

Response: The characteristics of open waiting areas might include:

■ Fixed durable seating (such as that 

used in airports) in the receiving area, 

allowing approximately 15 square feet 

per seat.

■ Access to a telephone.

■ Access to a toilet and sink in a 

private space.

■ Access to a drinking fountain.

■ Good visibility from the booking/staff 

station and/or master control.

■ A television and reading material, if 

desired, to keep arrestees occupied.

■ Signs that provide information about 

the receiving process, bonding, legal assistance, and basic legal rights 

(knowledge of this information reduces fear of the unknown and thereby 

has a calming effect).

■ A brochure rack to provide information about alcohol/drug problems, 

legal assistance, and other topics, as 

appropriate.

■ As much screening as possible from 

the view of individuals in holding 

cells.

■ A location out of the main circulation 

path to avoid congestion and security 

risks.

■ Natural light through secure windows, 

skylights, or clerestories, if possible.

Exhibit 14-7. Visiting Area

Arrestee Visitor

Booking

area

Continuous security

perimeter barrier

Barrier

to view

of other

arrestees

CCTV

camera

Intercom

Outside contact

Issue: Provisions must be made so arrestees 

can have contact with family, friends, lawyers, 

and bondspersons while in the receiving area.

Response: Arrestees usually have contact 

with outside persons in a visiting area (exhibit 14-7), video visitation booth, and/or 

via the telephone. In some jurisdictions it 

may be necessary for arrestees to have visits 

with family, attorneys, and/or bondspersons 

while they are in the receiving area. Unless 
142

S e c t i o n 3 : 

Functional Components

a common visiting area is located next to 

the intake area, it may be desirable to minimize the movement of arrestees by having a 

visiting area for bondspersons or lawyers as 

part of the intake-release area. If a visitation 

area is provided, it should have the following characteristics:

■ Visibility from a constantly staffed 

post or a post that is occupied during 

the visit.

■ A controlled point of entry for the 

bondsperson or lawyer. This point of 

entry should have remotely operated 

locks with status indication (locked or 

unlocked) and it should be monitored 

by CCTV unless a direct line of sight 

to the entry can be established from a 

constantly staffed post without creating view conflicts with inmate areas. 

In addition, an intercom and camera 

should be located so that either master 

control or the booking staff can make 

an initial identification by voice and 

visual contact.

■ A secure barrier between the arrestee 

and the visitor; the barrier should be 

created by using secure wall materials and security glass and framing 

(as discussed in chapter 18, “Visiting 

Areas”).

■ A means by which papers requiring an 

arrestee’s signature can be passed securely from the lawyer or bondsperson 

to the arrestee. This should be accomplished with minimum staff effort. A 

lockable paper pass is a typical option. 

■ A means by which facility staff can 

communicate to the visitor side to respond to requests for information and 

to notify individuals about the end of 

a visit.

Telephones with outside lines should be available 

throughout the intake area. The primary question 

is how arrestees can have access to telephones 

within secure single- and multiple-occupancy 

holding cells. Several options are: (1) install 

wall-mounted telephones in the holding spaces, 

(2) move the arrestee from the cell to a central 

telephone location, or (3) provide a telephone 

jack in the walls so that a telephone unit can be 

passed through a food pass or opening in the 

holding cell door for the arrestee’s use. The 

choice of method depends on the visibility of the 

cells, the behavior expected of the individuals in 

the cells, the availability of staff to move inmates, 

and how available the facility administration 

wants telephone contact to be. In cases where 

the telephones are installed, the intake officer 

should have controls available to turn the phones 

off both individually and as a group.

Booking area with open waiting (including access to a television, 

telephones, a clock, and restrooms). 

(Photograph courtesy of Liebert & Associates.)

In general, the most efficient use of staff time and 

best access for arrestees is to place telephones 

in holding cells, with the exception of those cells 
143

C h a p t e r 1 4 : 

Intake-Release

used to house very violent or suicidal arrestees. 

(If the same holding cells are used to temporarily hold inmates awaiting transport to court or 

other facilities, a means must be available to shut 

off telephone access because allowing telephone 

calls just prior to transport violates sound security procedures.)

If the telephone will be used outside the holding 

cells, some level of privacy should be provided 

for telephone calls. A small alcove with appropriate acoustic treatments is the best solution. 

Miscellaneous support 

Issue: Miscellaneous support requirements 

should be accommodated.

Response: The following elements should 

be considered in the design of the receiving 

area:

■ Staff toilet.

■ Inmate records and files.

■ General supply storage.

■ Janitor’s closet.

■ Hose bib or hose.

■ Drinking fountains.

■ Clocks.

■ Trash cans and wastebaskets.

Admissions Area Design 

The following functional-architectural issues 

pertain to the admissions activities of the intakerelease component; that is, they deal with the 

areas required for processing arrestees for housing in the facility if they cannot be released from 

the receiving area. The admissions area is often 

called the “dress in” area. These issues also pertain to the admission of inmates who are returning from court or who are being transferred from 

another facility.

Shower/change or “dress in”

Issue: Facilities should be provided so the inmate can shower and change clothing.

Response: Inmates must have a place to 

shower and change into facility-issued 

clothing before entering their assigned 

housing unit (assuming this is part of the 

facility’s operational practice). The characteristics of this area might include:

■ Privacy from the booking area and 

from the facility in general.

■ Backup audio surveillance and/or 

communication with a constantly 

staffed post.

■ Americans with Disabilities Act 

(ADA)-compliant shower, toilet, and 

sink fixtures.

■ A drying area with a nonslip surface, 

a small bench, and hooks or bars to 

place towels and clothes.

■ Excellent ventilation, especially if the 

area is also used for inmate decontamination.

■ Shelves for prepared sets of clothing, 

linen, and toiletries for incoming inmates, preferably in an alcove open 

to the area or in a securable cabinet 

within the shower/change area.

■ A modesty screen behind which an 

inmate can undress and dress when 

a strip search is not allowable. (In 

recent years considerable litigation 

has limited strip searches of certain 

arrestees, such as nonviolent felons, 

misdemeanants, and traffic offenders. 

Court rulings preclude the viewing of 

unclothed inmates of both genders 

during the search or clothing-exchange 

process.)
144

S e c t i o n 3 : 

Functional Components

■ Sufficient floor area within the space 

to allow easy movement of at least 

two people and to allow the officer to 

conduct unclothed body searches (if 

applicable).

■ A small work surface and form storage 

area to allow the officer to document 

the receipt of property and clothing 

and to obtain the inmate’s signature.

Storage/issue 

Issue: Storage, receipt, and issue of a wide variety of items must be accommodated in association with the shower and change area. 

Response: There is a need to store, receive, 

and/or issue the following types of items 

in spaces adjacent to and easily accessible 

from the shower and change area:

■ Street clothes.

■ Personal property.

■ Bulk property (e.g., suitcases, backpacks, duffel bags, attaché cases).

■ Facility-issued clothing.

■ Linens.

■ Mattresses and pillows.

■ Toiletries.

Some of these storage capabilities might be consolidated. For example, it is common to store all 

inmate property (clothing, wallets, keys, suitcases) in one area that is secured from access by 

inmates and most staff. It is also common to consolidate linen, clothing, and toiletry storage.

ADA-compliant shower with grab bars, a retractable seat 

(located behind the curtain), and dual-height shower heads.

(Photograph courtesy of Voorhis Robertson Justice Services.)

Issuing methods. The extent to which items are 

stored near the shower and change area depends 

on the method of issuing items to incoming inmates and how those items are expected to arrive at the assigned cell area. For example, some 

facilities will issue all items to the inmate at the 

shower and change area, thus expecting him/

her to carry them (including the bulky mattress) 

to the cell. Other facilities provide inmates with 

clothing and toiletries during the dress-in process 

and make sure that other essential items (i.e., a 

cleaned and disinfected mattress and linens) are 

in the cell when the inmate arrives. This distribution approach suggests that storage facilities 

should be located near the housing areas rather 

than near the admissions area.

Valuable personal property (wallets, credit cards, 

jewelry, etc.) may be stored in lockable drawers 

at the booking desk or in a space immediately 

adjacent to the booking desk that is accessible 

from the receiving area, the admissions area, 

and the point of release. Often, if the arrestee is 

housed, valuable property will be moved to a 

secure vault until the inmate is released. Special 

clothing bags with pouches that can be used for 

secure storage of property are also available. As 

noted earlier, if this approach is used, the area 

used to store street clothing must be secured and 

controlled by a few select officers to avoid loss of 

property.
145

C h a p t e r 1 4 : 

Intake-Release

Storage space factors. The amount of space 

needed for the storage of facility-issued clothing, 

linens, and toiletries will depend on the following 

factors:

■ The variety of items issued by the facility.

■ The method of exchanging soiled articles for 

clean articles. Will a full supply of linens replace those being laundered or can the same 

linens be removed, washed, and returned? 

Likewise, will all clothing need to be replaced 

while soiled clothing is being washed? 

■ The amount of additional clothing required 

means that proper sizes must be available for 

all inmates (including during periods with a 

high population) and that damaged goods can 

be taken out of circulation for repair without 

creating a shortage of needed articles. 

■ The length of time toiletry supplies are expected to last, given the facility’s booking and 

use patterns. 

Large storage room for inmate personal property in individual 

color-coded bags. 

(Photograph courtesy of Voorhis Robertson Justice Services.)

A key functional-architectural component that is 

affected by decisions regarding admissions and 

storage requirements is the laundry, which is 

closely affiliated with the linen and clothing storage areas. If these areas are affiliated with the 

intake-release area to accommodate desired operational practices, it is critical that the laundry 

area be adjacent to the linen and clothing supply 

areas.

Release Area Design 

Issue: The need for a separate release area 

should be considered.

Response: Because the receiving and admissions areas frequently serve as the release 

area in smaller jails, the following should be 

considered when developing the layout of 

the intake-release component (exhibit 14-8):

■ The need to assemble a group of inmates to be transported or released 

without interfering with intake 

operations. 

■ The need to apply restraints to a group 

of inmates who are being transported 

to court, which requires a group 

staging area and access to restraint 

equipment.

Modesty screen

Clothing/

property 

storage

Dressing One shower

compliant for

ADA wheelchair

accessibility Passthrough

Exhibit 14-8. Release Area Design
146

S e c t i o n 3 : 

Functional Components

■ The need to change into street clothes 

for release or court appearances without disrupting the receiving or admission processes. A small group dressing 

area might be provided or the facility 

might require the changing of clothes 

at the housing units.

■ The need to provide privacy for offenders when changing clothes.

Space List

Following are some typical spaces that might 

be found in the intake-release component.

Receiving Area

■ Vehicle sallyport.

■ Storage area/gun locker for the arresting 

officer’s weapons.

■ Secure entry vestibule and arresting officer 

work area.

■ Sobriety testing room.

■ Booking area storage and temporary arrestee 

property storage.

■ Records storage.

■ Booking counters for staff to process paperwork, do data entry, and interview arrestees:

❏ Photograph/fingerprint area.

❏ Inmate telephone alcove.

❏ Secure single-occupancy holding cells.

❏ Multipurpose (multiple-occupancy) holding 

cells.

❏ Open waiting area.

❏ Staff toilet.

❏ Inmate toilet.

❏ Supply storage.

❏ Janitor closet.

❏ Strip search area.

Admissions (some storage areas might be 

consolidated)

■ Shower/change area.

■ Street clothes storage.

■ Valuables storage.

■ Bulk property storage.

■ Facility clothing storage.

■ Linen storage.

■ Toiletries storage.

Local codes and ADA guidelines regarding accessibility requirements should be followed when 

planning these spaces.

Other related areas that may be added to the 

component include:

■ Visiting.

■ Laundry.

■ Interviewing/counseling.

■ Offices for pretrial personnel.
147

C h a p t e r 1 4 : 

Intake-Release

Relationships and Components

Exhibit 14-9. Relationships Between Receiving 

and Admissions Areas

Vehicle sallyport

Booking Breath.

report

Photoprint Sec.

vest.

Multi- Detox hold Hold Open

waiting

Examining

Counseling Visiting

Public 

lobby

Master Release

control

Admissions

Inmate

clothes

and

property

Bulk

Shower

change

Linen Laundry

Receiving

Toilet

Storage/

janitor

closet

Bondsman

Toilet

Barrier walls

To housing

Exhibit 14-10. Components of Booking Area

View to holding cells Low info

counter

Active

inmate

files Vehicle sallyport

Toilet

Gate

Below-counter

lockable storage Security

perimeter

entry

vestibule

High booking

counter

Bond

Hand

towels

Hand

wash

sink

Print

counter

with 

storage

below

Photo ID

camera
149

Chapter 15

General Housing

T

he general housing component of a jail consists of those areas that accommodate the 

typical or “average” inmate. This inmate 

is defined as one who does not require special 

housing accommodations because of behavior, 

condition, or unique separation requirements. 

The following types of inmates are generally 

considered inappropriate for general housing:

■ Work release/periodic-confinement inmates.

■ Inmate workers.

■ Protective custody inmates.

■ Juveniles to be adjudicated as adults.

■ Inmates requiring medical isolation.

■ Disciplinary detainees.

■ Suicidal inmates.

■ Mentally ill (non-medication-compliant) 

inmates.

■ Violent and predatory inmates.

Chapter 16, “Special Housing,” addresses the 

housing needs of the types of inmates listed 

above. Inmates with disabilities were historically 

thought to require separate special housing but 

can be accommodated within the general population. Their needs are described in this chapter.

The vast majority of the general housing inmate 

population in a facility consists of adult men 

in either pre- or posttrial status who have been 

charged with a felony, misdemeanor, municipal, 

or traffic offense. General housing can also contain adult women in similar categories (although 

in appropriately separate general housing areas). 

Security risk levels can vary within general housing, ranging from low to high.

Double-occupancy cells surrounding a dayroom in a linear jail. 

(Photograph courtesy of Jim Rowenhorst.)

Functionally, the basic mission of general housing areas is to accommodate the sleeping, modesty, personal hygiene, personal interaction, safety, 

and security needs of the typical inmate and the 

management, safety, security, personal, and professional needs of the staff working in the area. 

The general housing area is the focal point of a 

jail design and represents a substantial portion of 

the costs and square footage involved with a jail. 

General housing areas minimally include the following types of spaces:

■ Inmate cells or dormitories.

■ Dayrooms (central activity areas serving a 

group of cells or a dormitory).

■ Staff control posts.

■ Security vestibules.

■ Shower/toilet areas.
150

S e c t i o n 3 : 

F u n c t i o n a l C o m p o n e n t s 

■ Miscellaneous support spaces: multipurpose 

rooms, storage, janitor closet, and so forth.

Historically, the inadequacies of the general (and 

special) housing areas have been the target of 

lawsuits and standards. Typical shortcomings cited about cells have included multiple occupancy 

and the resulting lack of personal safety when 

staff supervision is inadequate, limited square 

footage of as little as 15 square feet per inmate, 

and a lack of personal privacy. Courts have found 

artificial lighting insufficient for reading, natural 

light frequently lacking, and general environmental conditions substandard.

The traditional arrangement of cellblocks—

principally the classic back-to-back, steelconstructed cellblocks surrounded by a barred 

officer corridor—has been judged to be ineffective in the proper supervision of the inmate 

population. Its deficiencies include limiting the 

officer’s view and control, providing inadequate 

dayroom space, offering minimal true separation capabilities, and providing severely limited 

sound, odor, or smoke containment capabilities.

In recent years, general housing areas have 

changed considerably in character. The emphasis 

has shifted to an improved environmental quality 

and improved safety. It has also shifted toward 

creation of a more normal environment that 

tends to reinforce desired behavior, express more 

respect for the inmate, and provide better working conditions for staff.

Direct and constant view into all parts of the 

housing units is increasingly emphasized. The 

use of modern technology to provide better security and control in support of staff efforts is 

increasing, and a wider variety of materials is 

being used instead of the traditional steel bar 

and plate construction. 

Key Decisions

As the role of the general housing component 

is evaluated, the following decisions should be 

made because they have a fundamental effect on 

design requirements:

■ What classifications of inmates will make up 

the general population of the jail? How will 

they be grouped and separated from each other? (More information is available in chapter 5, 

“Classification/Separation,” in section 2.)

■ What degree of flexibility in housing unit design will be required to accommodate fluctuations in the nature of the inmate population?

■ What will be the occupancy level of inmate 

sleeping areas—single occupancy, double occupancy, or multiple occupancy? (See chapter 

27, “Single Versus Multiple Occupancy,” in 

section 4.)

■ Will each housing unit have its own dayroom?

How many inmates will use it at one time? 

A direct supervision housing unit with wood cell doors and moveable 

furniture in the dayroom. 

(Photograph courtesy of Voorhis Robertson Justice Services.)
151 

C h a p t e r 1 5 : 

General Housing

How many hours per day will the dayroom be 

in use?

■ What surveillance or supervision methods 

will be used? (See chapter 6, “Surveillance/

Supervision,” in section 2.)

■ What programs and services will be brought to 

the housing areas in lieu of moving inmates to 

the programs and services?

■ How will emergency egress be made from the 

housing units?

■ How will inmates with disabilities be accommodated, and how must housing design concepts be configured to accommodate those 

with disabilities?

■ How will natural light be introduced into cells 

and dayrooms?

■ How will expansion of bed capacity be 

achieved?

Detail Issues 

The following discussion of detailed functionalarchitectural issues is limited to the general 

residential areas of the facility, including female 

housing areas. Housing for special groups is addressed in chapter 16, “Special Housing,” but 

many of the issues discussed here also apply 

to special housing areas. The general housing 

functional-architectural issues are divided into 

several discrete areas:

■ Basic design.

■ Cell design.

■ Dayroom design.

■ Staff control post design.

■ Miscellaneous design issues:

❏ Security vestibule.

❏ Showers.

❏ Storage.

❏ Janitor closet.

❏ Program or multipurpose space.

❏ Visiting area.

Basic Design Issues 

The following issues apply to the overall design 

of general housing units: activities, users, movement, arrangement, security, environment, fire 

safety, and plumbing.

Activities

Issue: Identify common housing unit activities.

Response: Many varied activities occur within a housing unit. Some of the more typical 

activities include:

■ Sleeping.

■ Attending to personal hygiene and 

grooming.

■ Dressing.

■ Storing personal articles.

■ Talking with other inmates.

■ Communicating with staff.

■ Reading and writing.

■ Recreating (passively and/or actively).

■ Cleaning and maintaining the area.

■ Eating.

■ Receiving and sending mail.

■ Watching television.

■ Telephoning attorneys, friends, and 

family.
152

S e c t i o n 3 : 

F u n c t i o n a l C o m p o n e n t s 

The design must acknowledge the potential for 

less common events, including:

■ Emergency communications between inmates 

and staff.

■ Vandalism.

■ Escape attempts.

■ Contraband passage.

■ Assaults on inmates or staff.

■ Emergency evacuation.

Note: The needs of inmates with disabilities 

(physical, visual, auditory) must be accommodated in all routine activities and atypical events.

Users

Issue: The design should accommodate changes 

in the makeup of the average daily population. 

Response: Some flexibility must be built into 

the design to accommodate changes in the 

makeup of the jail population from year to 

year, month to month, and even day to day. 

This can be achieved by:

■ Subdividing a general population 

housing area into smaller areas 

so there is enough flexibility to 

create “swing” units that can be assigned to different general residential 

populations—high security or low, 

male or female.

■ Providing security equipment and 

hardware that can accommodate any 

of the assigned groups, although this 

tends to make the unit higher in security orientation. Consequently, lower 

security populations must be distinguished from higher security populations through different management 

approaches.

More information on the issue of housing unit 

flexibility is given in chapter 5, “Classification/

Separation.”

Issue: Providing adequate housing 

capacity and environments for female 

inmates in smaller jails presents special problems because of the small 

number of female inmates. 

Response: Female inmates have historically 

represented less than 10 percent of the average daily population in a jail, although the 

percentage has increased in recent years. 

Some smaller jails do not house female inmates beyond initial booking and holding 

because of inadequate separation capabilities, reluctance to dedicate a housing unit to 

a small number of inmates, and/or the difficulties of providing same-sex staffing. Additionally, even though there are usually few 

female inmates, their impact on bed space 

needs can be significant on days when several female arrestees enter the facility.

The key to handling this population is to create 

one or more small swing housing units that can 

be used either for women or for men when not 

needed for women. Since this area could contain 

high-security inmates of either sex, it should be 

under constant surveillance. Providing constant 

surveillance also helps ensure that male staff can 

supervise female inmates without fear of modesty conflicts or accusations of sexual misconduct.

In facilities with a typically small female population, it is recommended that all female inmates—

including those on work release or inmate worker 

status—be housed in the same area, although 

not necessarily in the same housing unit. Close 

supervision and management of this area will be 

required to ensure that inmate-to-inmate conflicts 

and contraband passage do not occur.
153 

C h a p t e r 1 5 : 

General Housing

Movement 

Issue: Identify the degree of movement 

between housing units and other areas of 

the facility.

Response: Many activities occur in a jail 

besides the basic housing functions. If these 

activities occur elsewhere in the building, 

inmates and staff must move to them. Another approach is to have selected activities be part of the housing area complex or 

to actually accommodate them within the 

housing units. Consequently, the manner in 

which programs and activities are to be accessed is a critical element of housing area 

design.

It is generally beneficial to minimize the amount 

of movement that occurs in a facility. As the security level of the inmate increases, the management benefits of limited movement also increase. 

The following kinds of activities have been integrated into housing unit designs to minimize 

inmate movement:

■ Passive recreation (e.g., television (TV), table 

games).

■ Indoor exercise (e.g., basketball, volleyball, 

weightlifting).

■ Outdoor exercise.

■ Dining.

■ Counseling.

■ Programs.

■ Sick call.

■ Visiting.

■ Telephone use.

■ Video arraignments.

Issue: Movement should be controlled. 

Response: Movement within the housing 

units and to and from other areas of the facility should always be under staff control. To 

facilitate staff control of movement within 

the housing area, all cell, dayroom, and related housing area spaces into which inmates 

have access should be controlled by doors 

with remotely operated locking systems and 

keys. It is also highly desirable to have all 

doors in the housing unit under direct view, 

preferably from a constantly staffed post, as 

is characteristic of both direct supervision 

and remote surveillance designs.

Even though a remote observation or direct supervision staff post may have control over all housing 

unit doors, these doors should also be controllable 

by master control through an override function 

that neutralizes local control functions.

A housing unit with open dayroom, seating, showers, phones, and 

visiting rooms located on the mezzanine and the multipurpose room 

on the lower right. 

(Photograph courtesy of Voorhis Robertson Justice Services.)
154

S e c t i o n 3 : 

F u n c t i o n a l C o m p o n e n t s 

Movement to areas outside the housing units can 

be controlled as follows:

■ Under direct staff supervision or observation 

(preferred).

■ Under staff observation through closed-circuit 

television (CCTV) monitors supplemented, as 

appropriate, by audio communication systems.

■ By using a pass system that specifies an 

amount of time for an inmate to leave one 

point in the facility and arrive at another 

point, moving through areas not directly 

observed by staff or through areas indirectly 

observed by CCTV monitors.

Arrangement 

Issue: The arrangement of housing unit spaces 

should facilitate control and movement.

Response: Following are several general arrangement considerations that facilitate control and movement: 

■ In remote surveillance housing areas, 

all primary spaces should be observable by staff from outside the housing 

unit area. These spaces include cells, 

dayrooms, egress doors, showers, and 

associated program or support areas.

■ Nonhousing activities associated with 

the housing units must be easily accessible and within view of staff.

■ Blind spots should be avoided or minimized to the greatest extent possible.

■ In designs where two tiers of cells 

share a common dayroom:

❏ The design should provide a workable 

view angle toward second-tier spaces, 

even if this requires a raised staff position 

(exhibit 15-1).

Open housing control booth with a good view of cell fronts, dayrooms, and 

mezzanine walkways. 

(Photograph courtesy of Liebert & Associates.)

❏ Stairs providing access to the second 

tier should have risers that allow view 

through to areas behind the stair.

❏ Second-tier railings should allow view 

through to the cell faces, but be high 

enough (42 inches or more) to provide 

adequate safety for persons on the 

walkway.

❏ Walkways should be wide enough to allow easy movement where cell doors that 

swing out are used, but not so wide as to 

unduly limit view from staff positions.

❏ Midlevel dayrooms should not obscure 

views or provide hiding places at the 

lower-tier level.

Other considerations are discussed in section 2 

and in subsequent chapters in section 3.

Some designs feature “sunken” first tiers so that 

access and staff positions are essentially at a 

second-tier level.
155 

C h a p t e r 1 5 : 

General Housing

■ Access to housing units should be through 

either a security vestibule or an adjacent corridor that serves as a control corridor by effectively separating the housing area from other 

portions of the building.

■ Emergency egress routes from the housing 

areas should not only comply with fire codes 

and standards but should be easily accessible 

and controllable. An important element of 

egress that affects arrangement is the provision 

of two ways out of all housing areas where required (desirable everywhere).

A key aspect of creating an egress door between 

housing units is doing so in a manner that inhibits sound transmission and prevents contraband 

passage. Another consideration for egress is the 

possible need for, or use of, a second means of 

egress off the second tier of a two-tier housing 

unit. This implies that protected stair towers be 

integrated into the arrangement of the housing 

unit (exhibit 15-2). 

Security

Issue: Inmates must be protected from violence, 

assault, and exploitation by other inmates.

Response: Following are essential considerations in designing to protect inmates from 

each other:

■ A classification system and a range 

of separate housing units. (More information is available in chapter 16, 

“Special Housing.”)

■ Selection of a mode of supervision 

based on careful analysis of the 

relative strengths, weaknesses, and 

efficiencies of the three most common 

combinations of architectural styles/

supervision approaches (remote surveillance, direct supervision, and linear intermittent surveillance) and their 

applicability to different classifications 

and groups of inmates.

■ Adequate numbers of qualified and 

trained staff.

■ Choice of cell or dormitory occupancy 

level in conjunction with appropriate 

staffing to provide for inmate safety 

and reduce the chances of inmates being exploited, coerced, or assaulted by 

other inmates.

Issue: Differences in security and custody levels 

should be considered in the design of the physical environment.

Response: Even the general population 

of the jail consists of different behavioral 

Exhibit 15-1. Unobstructed Views of Two Tiers 

of Cells

Exhibit 15-2. Emergency Exit Stair for SecondTier Egress

Mezzanine

walkway

Cell

Cell

Housing

dayroom Corridor Control

Natural

light

Open to

below

Open to

below

Second-tier cells

and walkways

Emergency

exit stair
156

S e c t i o n 3 : 

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types, each of which poses different levels 

of security risk and custody needs. These 

can be accommodated through varying approaches to design.

The key issues that influence design revolve 

around classification, surveillance, and staff. In 

facilities that provide inadequate classification 

and separation capabilities and that are intermittently monitored, the physical plant must provide 

greater levels of security. Without constant staff 

control, however, it is difficult to decide what is 

truly “enough” physical security.

Regardless of the inmate type or the surveillance 

mode employed, the basic security envelope of 

the housing area should always be adequately 

constructed to prevent escape and control contraband passage. Consequently, major physical 

differences due to surveillance and custody level 

occur primarily within the housing units.

Exhibit 15-3 gives examples of some of the chief 

areas of difference within general population 

housing areas, assuming constant remote surveillance or direct supervision. These examples are 

not meant to describe the full range of options 

available, only to illustrate general differences in 

physical security. It is conceivable that the options under “lesser physical security” could be 

applied to high-security groups or vice versa. The 

key to security is classification, staff presence, 

and the surveillance/supervision approach.

Issue: Providing for the physical safety of staff.

Response: Physical safety of staff is an often 

overlooked element of housing area design. 

Depending on the surveillance/supervision 

approach used, some design considerations 

may include:

■ Slightly raised, open counter areas 

in the dayroom or enclosed, secured 

staff posts with solid, security-glazed 

partitions to allow visibility but prevent physical contact, coupled with 

intercoms or speaker boxes for communication.

■ Direct visual backup of staff entering 

or working around housing units.

■ Body alarms, radios, and/or panic 

alarms linked to secured, constantly 

staffed posts such as master control.

■ CCTV and audio backup from inside 

the housing area to master control.

■ Design of locking systems to minimize 

escape potential if a roving officer 

or the housing area control officer is 

assaulted by inmates (e.g., all locks 

remotely operated so that the roving 

officer has no keys, or keys only to 

immediate areas such as cells and 

closets, but no exit keys).

■ Secured openings (passthroughs) 

through which items exchanged between staff and inmates (e.g., food, 

drinks, clothing, linens, mail, packages, and paperwork such as sick call 

requests and commissary slips) can be 

passed without entry into the housing 

unit (this should only be considered 

in the highest security housing areas 

where the likelihood of staff assault is 

great).

Environment 

Issue: The need or desire for natural light in 

housing areas should be balanced against security concerns.

Response: All inmate cells and dayrooms 

should have exposure to natural light. Natural light is valuable in that it contributes to 

good physical and mental health and to a 
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C h a p t e r 1 5 : 

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Exhibit 15-3. Examples of Variations in Design Approach

Design element Greater physical security Lesser physical security

View to exterior To controlled exterior space or 

not provided

To outside

Access to adjacent program areas Controlled at all times Free movement at some or all times

Entry vestibules Yes No

Floor Concrete, terrazzo Carpet on secure base, vinyl composite 

tile

Interior cell partitions Concrete; reinforced, grouted concrete 

masonry unit, modular construction

Concrete masonry unit, cement plaster 

on metal lath

Cell ceilings Concrete Cement plaster on metal lath, acoustic 

metal

Dayroom ceilings Concrete, cement plaster on metal lath, 

steel panels

Acoustic tile or panels, two layers of 

gypsum board (assuming adequate 

ceiling height and dayroom perimeter 

secured by other means)

Interior dayroom/cell face glazing Glass-clad polycarbonate or equal Laminates of strengthened glass, 

tempered glass

Furnishings Fixed detention type Nonfixed institutional or commercial

Cell doors reinforced 12- or 14-gauge steel 14- or 16-gauge steel or solid-core 

wood

Cell locks High-security remotely operated Low-security detention or heavy-grade 

commercial remotely operated (durability is the issue)

Plumbing fixtures Stainless steel combo sink/toilet, 

stainless steel shower cabinet

Vitreous china sink and toilet, concrete 

masonry unit shower with sealer, and 

premade base

Light fixtures Detention type Detention type, some inmate control 

in cells
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more normal-appearing environment that encourages or reinforces more normal behavior. 

Providing natural light, however, also poses 

potential security or management problems:

■ Escape.

■ Passage of contraband.

■ Vandalism.

■ View conflicts with persons outside 

the facility.

■ View conflicts between housing units.

The greatest problems occur with cell windows 

to the exterior of the facility because cells are 

generally a less observable part of the housing 

area and penetration of the window can result in 

penetration of the main security envelope.

Cell window design can help mitigate escape, 

contraband passage, and vandalism problems. 

View conflicts with cells and dayrooms can be 

controlled by:

■ Orienting windows toward interior courtyards 

or screened areas.

■ Placing windows high in the wall (exhibit 

15-4).

■ Using reflective or heavily smoked glazing 

products to limit view, especially during daylight hours. Use of translucent, rather than 

transparent, glass products allows in light but 

obscures the view to the outside.

One way to minimize window security problems 

is to introduce borrowed light to the cells from 

other spaces rather than provide an exterior window in each cell. Historically, this was done by 

placing cells on the interior of the housing area 

(typically back-to-back with other cells, divided 

by a chase) and separating them from windows 

by a dayroom and a perimeter corridor. An aesthetic value to this was that the dayroom—the 

place where inmates spend the majority of their 

daytime hours—received the most natural light.

A common problem with this approach was that 

the windows were typically limited in size and 

heavily screened to minimize escape potential and 

eliminate view conflicts. Consequently, limited 

amounts of light were afforded to the occupants 

of the cells. It also tended to negate remote observation possibilities in which a full view of cell 

fronts and some portions of the cell interiors were 

provided from a point outside the housing unit.

Minimum security housing unit with open dorm sleeping areas and open 

access to outdoor recreation yard.

(Photograph courtesy of Voorhis Robertson Justice Services.)

Skylight

Da Cell yroom

High, small

window

Exhibit 15-4. Use of High, Small Windows and 

Skylights
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C h a p t e r 1 5 : 

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A variation on the borrowed light concept for remote observation housing designs is to use clerestories, skylights, and adjacent outdoor areas to 

introduce natural light in significant quantities instead of using exterior cell windows (exhibit 15-5).

Exhibit 15-5. Use of Clerestory Window To 

Introduce Light Into Interior Cells

Cell Large sidelight

or glass in door

Courtyard

Light

Dayroom

Even then, the amount of light actually entering 

the cells would still be limited; especially if modesty demands meant that the cell face (walls and 

door) was largely solid.

To introduce natural light directly into cells but 

fully eliminate view conflicts, some facilities 

employ translucent or obscured glazing, thereby 

sacrificing all view. This tends to occur most 

often with ground-level cells on restricted urban 

sites where the possibilities for controlled exterior areas are limited.

If natural light is provided in the dayroom via 

a window or clerestory, it is preferable that the 

light not shine directly toward the officer inside 

or outside the housing unit. Otherwise, the glare 

from the light source could increase eye strain, 

reduce effective view control, and cause glare, 

making it difficult to read computer screens. If 

the window or clerestory is out of the officer’s 

view, it should also be inaccessible to inmates.

Natural light brought into a housing area through a wall of windows 

to an outdoor exercise area. 

(Photograph courtesy of Voorhis Robertson Justice Services.)

Issue: Basic environmental needs should be 

accommodated.

Response: The environmental quality of 

housing areas can make them more livable 

and influence inmate behavior. Cooperative, 

calm behavior is not reinforced by noisy, 

cold, dark areas thick with unpleasant 

odors. Most state jail standards and building 

codes require basic environmental quality. 

Some special considerations for jail housing areas include sound, artificial light, and 

temperature.

Sound. Sound quality is one of the more difficult 

environmental problems, resulting from the 

typically hard surfaces and many sources of 

sound, for example:

■ Electric locks (solenoid and motorized).

■ Slamming doors, sliding doors.

■ Inmate voices.

■ Electronic communications (intercoms, 

public address).
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■ Showers.

■ Toilets.

■ TVs and radios.

These frequently combine to produce high sound 

levels and, with hard surfaces, generate reverberations (echoes) that can obscure conversation 

and be irritating to both inmates and staff.

Following are some solutions to the problem of 

sound:

■ More textured surfaces (e.g., concrete masonry 

units—versus concrete or steel plate—acoustic 

ceiling panels, carpet on floors or selected wall 

surfaces).

■ More irregular surfaces (e.g., angled walls, pan 

joist structural systems).1

■ Solid cell and dayroom faces (e.g., block, hollow metal or solid wood doors, security glazing) instead of bars or grating.

■ Quieter locks (e.g., electric motor or pneumatic versus solenoid).

■ Swing doors instead of sliding doors.

■ Showers pocketed within the walls of the dayroom rather than steel shower cabinets in and 

facing the dayroom.

■ TVs with localized speakers controlled by staff 

rather than inmates, or TVs that can be heard 

only with headsets purchased by the inmates 

or provided to indigent inmates.

■ Separate TV-watching rooms adjacent to, and 

viewable from, the dayroom.

Artificial light. Historically, artificial light has 

been a problem because of its insufficiency in 

providing adequate lighting and because of its 

constancy. The latter frequently results in vandalized fixtures when inmates get no relief from 

light at night. Some solutions:

■ Provide night lighting capabilities in cells and 

dayrooms that allow primary lighting to be 

shut off.

■ Provide selected categories of inmates some 

control over their cell lighting.

■ Avoid light sources that shine toward the jail 

officer looking into the area.

■ Avoid using lighting with unnatural light spectrums, such as high-pressure sodium fixtures 

that are energy efficient but more suitable to 

street lighting because of their yellowish color.

■ Provide staff with control of the lighting in 

their spaces, adjacent housing area corridors, 

and housing units, for good vision and reduced eye strain.

Temperature. Complaints about temperature most 

frequently relate to that in cells. This is because 

cells are often made of hard, cold surfaces; do 

not have individual temperature control; and are 

on an exterior wall. In addition, their heat source 

is normally at the front of the cell, the opposite 

of typical building practice. The design process 

should evaluate ways to get the heat to the outside wall and at the floor in a vandal-resistant 

manner.

1

 Pan joist construction refers to a one-way structural system using a ribbed slab formed with pans. The system achieves economy 

through the reuse of standard forming pans. Special design provisions for pan joists have been established through many years 

of construction experience. Standard pan forms produce dimensions of 20 or 30 inches, and depths range from 6 to 20 inches, 

although other sizes are available. Spans normally range from 15 to 50 feet, but may be extended by post-tensioning. Joists may 

have openings in the ribs to accommodate mechanical systems. Slabs between the joists can readily accommodate duct openings 

or sleeves.
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C h a p t e r 1 5 : 

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Fire safety

Issue: Fire safety is a critical consideration in 

the design of housing areas.

Response: Most injuries and deaths resulting from fire or smoke inhalation in jails occur in the housing areas. The National Fire 

Protection Association’s Life Safety Code® 

specifically addresses jail safety issues.2

 It is 

strongly recommended that planners refer to 

the Life Safety Code®, conduct a thorough review of local codes, and consult with fire inspection officials early in the design process.

There are several special issues to consider besides providing proper means of egress and proper detection, alarm, and suppression systems:

■ Using fire-retardant, nontoxic materials wherever possible and consistent with general 

design/environmental goals.

■ Providing a place to store extinguishers and 

airpacks that is easily accessible to all staff 

positions.

■ Providing backup keys in a secure area outside 

the jail perimeter.

■ Providing emergency group unlocking capabilities in all housing units, with master control 

override.

■ Developing fire zones within the facility perimeter to prevent emergency release from the 

building being the only option (exhibit 15-6). 

Creating an outdoor retention yard that might 

also serve as the outdoor exercise area is also 

worth considering.

■ Avoiding open, barred, or grilled cell and dayroom fronts, which are incapable of providing 

any fire or smoke containment.

■ Consulting local fire inspectors on the use of 

security glass and passthrough openings in 

housing unit dayroom walls, which frequently 

abut egress corridors, thereby potentially conflicting with fire ratings for those walls. Variances may have to be sought on the basis of 

security need and be justified by the provision 

of a full range of detection, alarm, suppression, and evacuation measures.

■ Creating a “no smoking” facility or limiting smoking to specified areas in jails where 

smoking is still allowed.

■ Installing built-in electric cigarette lighters for 

inmate use to eliminate the need for matches 

and lighters in inmate-occupied areas.

■ Using flame-retardant, nontoxic mattresses and 

pillows.

■ Considering how firefighters will gain access 

to various parts of the building.

Plumbing 

Issue: The need for plumbing fixtures depends 

on the operation of the housing unit.

Response: It is generally accepted, and required by most standards, that all cells and 

Exhibit 15-6. Fire Zones

Emergency

retention area

Fire partition

Housing

units

Zone 2

Zone 1

2

 National Fire Protection Association, NFPA 101®: Life Safety Code® (Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection Association, 2009).
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dayrooms have toilet and sink facilities. 

However, the key issue regarding their location is one of access.

Individual cells generally have toilet and sink 

fixtures because there is an expectation that 

inmates will be locked in their cells at night and 

have no alternative bathroom facilities. However, 

in constantly monitored areas backed up by roving officers (especially direct supervision areas), 

it is possible that inmates could use centralized 

facilities at night. This seems feasible because inmates use centralized facilities and/or cell facilities without incident during the day, when many 

more activities and distractions are occurring.

Having centralized facilities rather than in-cell 

facilities (thereby creating “dry cells”) does not 

necessarily preclude the ability to lock down 

inmates during disturbances or inspections, 

because inmates can be individually released 

through remotely controlled cell-locking mechanisms. Also, additional staff are typically assigned to the facility during disturbances and 

inspections to provide necessary security support 

and thus offset potential problems.

Toilet and sink fixtures accessible from the dayroom are required when the operation of the 

housing unit includes denying inmates access to 

their cells for significant portions of the day (or 

when there are no fixtures in the cells). If such 

an operational approach is not, and never will 

be, adopted, toilet and sink fixtures in the dayroom are merely a convenience.

Issue: The design must accommodate potential 

problems with damaged or inoperable plumbing 

fixtures.

Response: Some issues to consider follow.

■ Providing floor drains to accommodate 

accidental or purposeful spillage from 

fixtures in cells or dayrooms. Drains 

should be placed outside cells to minimize inmate attempts to block them.

■ Making pipe chases readily accessible 

to maintenance staff and sufficiently 

large to allow easy repair.

■ Locating shutoff valves strategically to 

allow staff to stop water flow in specific areas. One such location might be 

a secure space accessible from outside 

of the building to provide some level 

of control in the event that inmates 

take over the jail. This can also be 

accomplished through the use of electronic controls in master control, at 

the officer’s desk, or at the housing 

control station.

Sleeping Area Design Issues

The following functional-architectural issues apply to inmate sleeping areas, both cells and dormitories: occupancy, size, activities, equipment, 

psychological needs, and security and privacy.

Occupancy

Issue: The occupancy of sleeping areas in a 

facility is determined by the agency’s philosophy 

and approach to surveillance/supervision; by 

inmate behavior, classification, and custody levels; and by construction costs.

Response: Perhaps the most significant decision regarding the design and operation of a 

new jail is that of sleeping area occupancy. 

This choice measurably affects initial construction costs and significantly affects longterm operations and staffing. The options 

available to a jurisdiction generally include 

single-occupancy cells, double-occupancy 

cells, and multiple-occupancy cells (three or 

more inmates).
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C h a p t e r 1 5 : 

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The word “cell” has classically been applied to 

inmate sleeping areas of one to eight beds that 

are separate from an inmate dayroom in which 

showers, dining/recreation tables, and TVs are 

located. The word “dormitory” is generally applied when sleeping and dayroom functions are 

merged together or when the sleeping room occupancy reaches nine or more, even if there is an 

adjacent dayroom.

The principal argument for using double- or 

multiple-occupancy cells is construction cost 

savings. The arguments against them, as compared with single-occupancy cells, are as follows:

■ Less ability to ensure inmate safety from 

physical or sexual assault.

■ Inability to isolate inmates during fights or 

disturbances.

■ Greater demand for maintaining a constant 

staff presence during sleeping hours, whereas 

with single-occupancy cells, inmates can be 

locked down at night and checked intermittently by roving staff.

■ More difficulty in protecting inmate property 

from theft.

■ Less accountability for cell/dormitory damage 

and vandalism.

■ Elimination of an inmate’s principal source of 

privacy.

The debate over single- versus multipleoccupancy cells most typically occurs when 

making housing design decisions for the general 

inmate population. This is because most of the 

special housing populations discussed in chapter 16 are more clearly either single-occupancy 

candidates (disciplinary detention, medical isolation) or multiple-occupancy candidates (inmate 

worker, work-release inmate).

The challenge to most jurisdictions is to determine whether initial cost advantages during construction justify potentially greater operational 

and staff cost challenges over the operational 

life of the building. For more on this subject, see 

chapter 27, “Single Versus Multiple Occupancy,” 

in section 4.

Size

Issue: Sleeping area size is shaped by 

activities, equipment, and individual needs.

Response: American Correctional Association (ACA) standards and some state standards require a minimum square footage for 

sleeping areas. These requirements are not 

uniform and often vary according to the occupancy level of the sleeping area. Sleeping 

area size is also influenced by the amount 

of time an inmate is confined to the area per 

day. Cell size should be based on the activities to occur in the cell and the type of furnishings and equipment selected for use.

Activities

Activities that might influence cell size include 

the following:

■ Sleeping.

■ Reading and writing.

■ Grooming.

■ Storing personal belongings and toiletries.

■ Using the toilet.

■ Doing limited calisthenics (e.g., pushups, 

situps).

■ Eating (not recommended for general population cells).

Equipment

Equipment options that can influence cell size 

include:
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■ Bed size. Beds sufficient in length and width 

to accommodate taller, heavier people may 

dictate special designs that exceed the approximate dimensions of the standard detention 

bunk (approximately 80 by 27 inches).

■ Bed arrangement. Bunk beds used in multipleoccupancy settings demand less floor area 

than separate beds.

■ Desk surface. Minimal desk surfaces, as offered by detention equipment manufacturers, 

provide approximately 2 to 4 square feet. If 

more desk surface area is needed, a fabricated 

surface may provide more square footage and 

thus require more area in the cell. Smaller detention desks with angular wall supports are 

not recommended if the angle interferes with 

desk use.

■ Seating. Desks are frequently accompanied 

by a fixed or moveable stool or chair. If fixed, 

an established area of the floor is committed. 

Swing-out stools are available on some detention desks, and some designs allow the bunk 

to serve as the seat.

■ Storage. Storage for toiletries, books, paper, 

pens, pictures, clothing, and so forth is essential to maintaining a neat and sanitary cell 

environment. Shelves and collapsible hooks 

create no special space demand, whereas lockers or storage drawers do demand floor area.

■ Plumbing fixtures. A toilet and sink occupy 

square footage. Besides the possibility of a 

pipe chase intrusion (which is typically outside of cell square footage requirements as 

defined by standards), the key space-defining 

issue is whether a combination toilet/sink or 

more normal, but space-occupying, separate 

fixtures will be used (exhibit 15-7).

Providing a partial-height privacy wall or splash 

screen between the fixtures and the bed may also 

require slightly more space.

Showers are typically not placed in general population cells because of expense, sanitation complications, and security. Consequently, no space 

is typically needed for showers.

Psychological needs

Psychological needs involve the sense of confinement created by the cell space in particular. 

These concerns and the need for more space as 

compensation can be minimized by:

■ “Extending” the sense of space through the 

use of sizable cell windows in the face of the 

cell (without sacrificing minimum privacy or 

security).

■ Using ceiling heights moderately higher than 

the typical 8 feet, which also has the advantage of allowing ceiling sprinklers and light 

fixtures to be placed at less accessible heights, 

thus reducing the potential for vandalism.

■ Avoiding unusually narrow cells that disproportionately accentuate room length.

■ Using light colors for walls and ceiling.

Security and privacy

Issue: Regardless of the classification of inmates, all sleeping areas must be designed with 

security in mind.

Exhibit 15-7. Comparison of Space Needed for 

Combination Fixture Versus Separate Toilet and Sink

Combination

fixture

Pipe

chase

Pipe

chase

Stainless 

steel sink

Toilet

Privacy wall/splash screen

ADA-compliant

grab bars

(removeable)
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C h a p t e r 1 5 : 

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Response: Cells and dormitories are places 

where inmates spend a significant portion 

of their day. They are frequently located 

on exterior walls at points in the housing 

unit farthest from view (as in the case of 

remote observation or direct supervision) 

or even out of the view of staff standing in 

or moving through adjacent corridors (as 

in the case of traditional linear intermittent surveillance). Consequently, cells and 

dormitories provide the best opportunities 

for escape attempts, vandalism, suicide attempts, and/or contraband passage. A variety of considerations can help minimize 

these problems:

■ Paying particular attention to the 

security design of the sleeping area 

exterior window, if used. (The topic 

of security glass is addressed further 

in chapter 28, “Renovating Nonsecure 

Buildings Into Jails,” in section 4.)

■ Ensuring that the exterior wall is of 

secure construction, if the cell is on 

an exterior wall. If a concrete masonry 

unit wall is used, the wall should be 

reinforced and grouted. 

■ Using sturdy and vandal-resistant 

materials within cells. Such materials 

as concrete or vinyl tile on concrete 

floors, concrete masonry units for 

walls, and concrete or cement plaster 

for ceilings are appropriate. However, 

security in this instance does not 

imply that the space need be dark 

or grim. Modular concrete and steel 

cells are constructed of secure materials (although issues of poor acoustics 

must be considered).

■ Securely fastening in place all miscellaneous equipment and hardware 

in the cell or dormitory (e.g., outlet 

covers, intercom covers, vent grills, 

mirrors, shelves, clothing hooks, door 

stops).

■ Minimizing the size of vent grills 

and using a security grill that makes 

it difficult to tie a string or string-like 

object through the grill to attempt 

suicide. 

■ Avoiding joints and gaps that can be 

used to hide contraband in places that 

cannot be easily checked by staff.

■ Minimizing, to the greatest degree 

possible, the potential for suicide in 

the selection and design of furniture 

and equipment.

Issue: A balance must be struck between inmate privacy in the single-occupancy cell and 

the need to observe the cell.

Response: A key element of guaranteeing 

a degree of modesty is to create singleoccupancy cells. Single-occupancy cells (in 

association with a dayroom to prevent isolation) tend to enhance rather than diminish 

security, as has been noted above.

The primary conflict between privacy and security comes in deciding how much of the face of 

the cell to expose to the dayroom and thereby to 

staff in the adjacent corridor or control position 

(exhibit 15-8). The options range from precluding 

any view of the cell to opening up the entire face 

of the cell (the classic approach to cell design). 

However, if any balance between modesty and 

security is to be attained, the proper approach 

falls somewhere in between.

The main privacy concern that guides the choice 

of cell front design is exposure of the inmate 

using the toilet to both inmates and staff passing 

the cell, particularly those of the opposite sex. 
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Cell fronts with large windows. Note that the bottom half of the windows 

are frosted for privacy in the cell. 

(Photograph courtesy of Voorhis Robertson Justice Services.)

This is a special problem in cells designed with 

fixtures toward the front of the cell, where they 

cannot be internally screened. Locating the toilet 

at the rear of the cell has an advantage in this 

regard because partial-height screens (about 44 

inches high) can provide minimal privacy while 

allowing a view capability and a more liberal 

opening of the cell face.

Two other cell modesty concerns involve minimizing inmate exposure while sleeping and 

dressing. Related to those concerns is a simple 

environmental concern of minimizing the transference of light between the dayroom and cells 

during evening and sleeping hours.

Regarding security, the issue of needed exposure 

depends on the classification of the inmates involved and on the method used for observing 

and managing the inmates while they are in their 

cells. Staff should frequently enter the housing 

unit to closely examine the cells and check on 

the welfare of the inmates in the cells. In this 

Exhibit 15-8. Options for Exposure of the Face 

of the Cell

Slit vision

panel in

door

Large glazed

panels in

door and wall

case, exposure of the cell interior to remote view 

becomes far less critical.

One additional modesty concern involves the 

(indecent) exposure of inmates through exterior 

cell or housing area windows. Besides the view 

conflicts involved from the public’s side, the inmates’ modesty is infringed when the public can 

readily see into cells from the street or adjacent 

buildings. 

Issue: Some semblance of modesty should be 

achieved in multiple-occupancy settings.

Response: The very nature of multipleoccupancy housing precludes fundamental 

modesty in these settings. However, minimal levels of privacy can be obtained by 

providing:

■ A modesty or splash screen between 

toilet areas and the bed and desk areas of the cell or dorm.

■ Privacy partitioning that creates small 

groups of beds (two to four) in large 

dormitory settings.

■ Separate shelving or lockable storage 

compartments for each inmate.

■ Study or reading carrels or alcoves in 

adjacent dayrooms.
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Dayroom Design Issues 

The functional-architectural issues that apply to 

dayroom areas—the central activity areas around 

which a group of cells is clustered to create a cohesive housing unit—are location and size.

Location

Issue: Dayrooms should be located to ensure 

ease of inmate access and to preserve separation capabilities.

Response: Dayrooms should be located adjacent to and immediately accessible from 

the cells or dormitories they serve. There 

should be one dayroom for each group of 

cells. Such design minimizes inmate movement and eliminates the security problems 

posed by the shared use of a dayroom by 

different classifications of inmates and by 

dayrooms separated from the housing units.

Size

Issue: The size of dayrooms is dictated by the 

activities to occur there, functionality, and aesthetic concerns for proportion.

Response: ACA standards require that dayrooms provide certain square footages. Most 

often, these square footages are based on 

the number of beds in the housing unit 

served by the dayroom. In some standards, 

the square footage is defined by the maximum number of inmates using the dayroom 

at one time. In the latter case, decreasing 

the dayroom square footage by reducing the 

number of inmates allowed access to the 

dayroom at one time may be offset by increasing the cell size requirements, because 

inmates are confined there for a greater part 

of the day. 

In small housing units, typical dayroom square 

footage requirements can result in little more 

than a narrow 5- to 6-foot corridor along the 

front of the cells. In most cases, this is not satisfactory, given the kinds of activities desired for 

this space; the simple functionality of moving 

through, living in, and working in the space; and 

the desire for a well-proportioned room.

The actual size of a dayroom should depend on a 

variety of practical design considerations. Activities that might occur in the dayroom and therefore help define its size requirements include:

■ Eating meals and snacking.

■ Reading and writing.

■ Conversing.

■ TV watching.

■ Telephoning.

■ Exercising (e.g., calisthenics, weights).

■ Engaging in passive recreation (e.g., table 

games).

Some activities that take place as part of the 

overall housing unit should not occur in the 

dayroom unless all inmates in the housing unit 

are involved in the activity (e.g., counseling, 

religious services, and other group program activities). Some of the more personal individual 

activities, such as visiting, individual counseling, 

and medical checkups, should not occur in the 

dayroom unless the housing area has been designed with dedicated space for those functions 

(e.g., medical exam room, multipurpose room, or 

counseling office).

Tables and seating provided for inmates are another key determinant of dayroom size. Most 

standards, and good practice, require sufficient 

tables and seating to accommodate every inmate 

housed in the unit, including those who are 

wheelchair bound. This is particularly critical 

if dining occurs in the dayroom. Additionally, 
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sufficient space to move around the tables and 

seating to gain access to exits, cells, and activity 

areas is crucial. 

The question of table placement becomes more 

critical when two-tier housing units are created. 

One of the basic ideas behind two-tier units is 

to reduce the need for excess dayroom space. 

However, in a housing unit with limited capacity, 

the intrusion of the stairs to the second tier can 

unacceptably diminish the workability of the dayroom layout (exhibit 15-9). This is truer when a 

security vestibule and a shower area also intrude 

into the dayroom.

Another size consideration concerns temporary activities that occur in the dayroom. One 

example would be the extra space needed at meal 

time for food carts, trays, and meal distribution 

in each dayroom.

Pieces of equipment (e.g., TVs, telephones, service counters) and their placement also influence 

the size of the dayroom. Some of these items 

need to be separated from each other and from 

other functions in the dayroom. For example, 

telephones should be located as far as possible 

from the TV and other noise sources, and TVs 

should be positioned to provide proper viewing 

angles. To achieve this, the TV cannot be placed 

too high on the wall, and there should be some 

distance between it and the nearest table. However, TVs should not be placed so low that they 

obstruct movement or officer view of the area.

Exhibit 15-9. Configuration of Dayroom in TwoTiered Housing Unit

Control

Vestibule

Toilet/

shower

Walkway to

cells above

Cell

Cell

Cell

Cell

Stair

Miscellaneous Furniture and Equipment

Issue: Miscellaneous furniture and equipment 

should be identified for proper placement in the 

dayrooms.

Response: Besides the tables and chairs 

used by inmates and major items such as 

TVs and telephones, several other types of 

equipment must be accommodated in the 

dayroom: 

■ Officer’s work area, in direct supervision housing units.

■ Waste containers.

■ Bulletin boards for notices and 

information.

■ Intercoms for communication with 

staff in remote surveillance housing.

■ CCTV cameras, as appropriate.

■ Recreational equipment.

■ Library carts.

Inmates With Disabilities 

Issue: The needs of nonambulatory, wheelchairbound inmates must be accommodated in housing units.

Response: If the facility is to hold nonambulatory, wheelchair-bound inmates, certain 

special requirements must be met in their 

housing units and throughout the facility.

Inmates with disabilities share all of the behavioral and custodial characteristics of other 

inmates, and housing units must be designed to 

accommodate them at different custody levels. 
169 

C h a p t e r 1 5 : 

General Housing

Specially designed toilet and sink combination unit with grab bars for use 

by inmates with disabilities. 

(Photograph courtesy of Liebert & Associates.)

The law prohibits housing inmates with disabilities according to their disability alone, for example, in a housing unit designed to accommodate 

all inmates with disabilities or an isolated “disabled cell.” This is a significant consideration because it means that most, if not all, housing units 

must be designed to accommodate the needs of 

those with disabilities. This is true even if the 

number of such inmates detained in the course of 

a week, month, or even a year, is quite low.

The most common housing area design challenge comes with respect to inmates confined to 

wheelchairs. Local, state, and federal codes and 

standards in this regard must be researched prior 

to design. Special design considerations include 

the following:

■ All doors leading to the housing area and 

Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)-

compliant cells must be wide enough to allow 

the passage of a wheelchair. Additionally, sufficient room must be allowed on the latch side 

■ If staff are not in a position to assist the inmate, door closers should not be set at a tension level that makes opening by the disabled 

inmate difficult.

■ Toilet and sink fixtures in the cell should be 

separate fixtures that accommodate the needs 

of the disabled inmate or specially designed 

combination fixtures. Grab bars or a means 

by which the inmate can access toilet fixtures 

should be provided. If grab bars are used, consider making them demountable using special 

tools so they do not pose a security problem 

with inmates without disabilities who might 

use the cell. Grab bar design should preclude 

suicide attempts.

■ Central shower areas and toilet areas should 

be accessible to inmates with disabilities.

■ Cell desks and a position at the dayroom 

tables should be accessible to the inmates with 

disabilities. This implies that the use of a fixed 

stool may be inappropriate in the cell and that 

at least one position at the dayroom tables 

should be either a moveable chair or a swingout security seat (exhibit 15-10).

of doors, especially when they swing toward 

the user, to allow access, opening, and maneuvering room.

Exhibit 15-10. Dayroom Table With Swing-Out 

Seat To Accommodate Wheelchair

Wheelchair

Swingaway

seat Dining

table
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F u n c t i o n a l C o m p o n e n t s 

■ Features in the dayroom or housing area, 

such as intercoms, telephones, and 

drinking fountains, should be accessible 

to a wheelchair-bound inmate.

■ Ramps at points of entry/egress to the building 

should be considered (e.g., main entry, sallyport, exercise areas).

■ All program and service areas should be accessible to inmates with disabilities.

Issue: Forms of disability other than being nonambulatory and wheelchair bound must be 

accommodated.

Response: When most people think of inmates with disabilities, they think exclusively of people who are wheelchair bound. 

The ADA, however, identifies many other 

conditions that are considered disabilities, 

and these should be considered in the design and operation of new jail facilities. Two 

examples of disabilities with an impact on 

facility development are auditory and visual 

impairments.

Auditory impairments

Many modern jails rely on auditory-based electronic communications (intercoms, public address systems, telephone visiting, fire alarms, 

television monitors). Communication with 

hearing-impaired inmates can be lost unless 

special steps are taken in the selection of equipment and/or establishment of operational policy 

intended to provide equal access to hearingimpaired inmates. Several physical plant features 

can be incorporated that respond to daily and life 

safety needs in housing areas:

■ Telecommunications Device for the Deaf 

(TDD)-style telephones for telephone calls and 

telephone visiting, such as video visiting, in 

most, if not all, dayrooms.

■ Fire alarm systems with visual effects (e.g., 

flashing lights), as well as audio systems that 

can be “felt” through sonic vibrations.

■ TV monitors with closed caption capabilities.

■ Orientation tapes that convey facility rules 

through presenters who sign, as well as with 

closed captioning.

■ Electronic message boards within view of cells 

and dayrooms that can be used to convey routine messages (e.g., visiting hours) as well as 

information usually expressed orally.

Visual impairments

Facility development considerations with respect 

to inmates with visual impairments are:

■ Braille signage on cell doors and throughout 

the facility.

■ Posted Braille version of key facility rules and 

policies.

■ Cell and especially dayroom areas sufficiently 

spacious to allow easy, clear paths of travel 

around furniture and equipment and to emergency egress routes.

■ Issuance of canes approved by facility 

administration.

■ Location of cells designed for those with disabilities near shower/toilet areas and egress 

routes.

Staff Control Post Design 

The following issues pertain to staff posts that 

observe or supervise housing units: post size, 

staff activities, and mode of surveillance/

supervision; shape of post; security; and 

communications.

Size, activities, surveillance/supervision mode 

Issue: The size of staff control posts depends on 

staff activities and the surveillance/supervision 

mode used. 
171 

C h a p t e r 1 5 : 

General Housing

Response: Staff members in charge of observing and supervising housing units have 

a variety of responsibilities, which typically 

include the following:

■ Observing and supervising inmates.

■ Report writing.

■ Recordkeeping, activity logging.

■ Storing and maintaining manuals, 

directories, and similar materials.

■ Responding to inmate complaints and 

needs.

■ Communicating with other staff in the 

facility via intercoms or telephones.

■ Observing and controlling activities 

in and around the housing units 

(e.g., food service, laundry pickup, 

counseling, movement to court or visiting, maintenance).

■ Monitoring alarms and other security 

systems.

■ Responding to emergency situations.

■ Controlling doors, lights, heat, ventilation, communications, and/or security 

systems within the housing unit.

■ Managing the supply needs of the 

housing unit.

Direct supervision. In direct supervision, an officer workstation can vary from a desk with a 

computer and file cabinet placed in a dormitory 

to an elevated workstation with door, light, and 

other controls in a two-tiered housing unit. The 

control post work area should provide space for a 

computer, paperwork, books, manuals, and miscellaneous items needed by the officer. It should 

also have lockable drawers and files. Staff toilet 

areas will be located in a separate space.

Remote observation. The staff posts in a remote 

observation setting are frequently the largest, particularly when they are enclosed. This is because 

the staff space must function as a self-contained 

operation. Within the post must be all of the control panels used to manage locks, lights, alarm 

systems, and so forth, plus room for records and 

files, and work surfaces for report writing and 

equipment (telephones, intercoms, computers). 

When the control post is fully enclosed, it often 

has toilet facilities for staff accessible from within 

the control space.

Open-counter remote observation posts (see photograph on page 154) tend to require less square 

footage because toilet facilities are not required 

within the post itself. However, remote observation control posts are frequently more spacious 

than necessary (exhibit 15-11), given the need 

for a strategic location that provides staff with a 

view into a variety of surrounding housing units 

or activity areas. Even though the post may be 

larger than truly necessary, the additional space 

should not go unused. Within the remote surveillance space can be a variety of undercounter 

Exhibit 15-11. Remote Observation Control Post

Housing

Housing control

Toilet

Booking

Housing

Housing

Housing

Housing

Exercise Excess

area
172

S e c t i o n 3 : 

F u n c t i o n a l C o m p o n e n t s 

storage areas that help solve some of the chronic 

problems of insufficient storage in jails. 

It is important to realize that although the size of 

a remote surveillance control post may be larger 

than necessary, there is generally only one point 

in that space from which the officer typically 

works. That is, there is only one point where the 

officer’s equipment for controlling locks, lights, 

and so forth will be located. Therefore, even if 

the size and arrangement of the control post tend 

to suggest that total view control is obtained, the 

true location from which the officer will operate 

the controls must be pinpointed with regard to 

the sufficiency of the views and then considered 

from that point. 

Intermittent surveillance. With intermittently 

monitored facilities, the size of the staff post can 

be restricted to its basic needs because the design 

of the post is not, by concept, influenced by a 

need to create any specific physical or view relationship with the housing units. Its space requirements are shaped by its need for a desk surface 

for computer monitors or control panels and 

report writing, record storage, and storage 

of miscellaneous equipment, paperwork, and 

supplies.

Shape of post

Issue: Space or area size can be dictated by the 

shape of the control post. 

Response: It is recommended that the actual 

casework required for controls be shaped to 

allow convenient use from a single point. 

This tends to dictate against long, straight 

counter tops and suggests work areas that 

are more or less “in-the-round” so that staff 

can easily reach all of the equipment and 

surfaces they need without a lot of chair or 

body movement.

Security

Issue: Clear lines of responsibility must be determined between housing unit control responsibilities and interrelationships and master control 

responsibilities and interrelationships.

Response: It is important to determine the 

control responsibilities allocated to the 

housing unit officers to ensure that work 

loads are manageable. Also, it is critical to 

determine the degree to which the housing 

unit officers’ controls are duplicated and 

can be overridden by master control. 

The following types of functions may come 

under the direct control of the housing unit 

control officer:

■ Individual cell locks and door status.

■ Dayroom door locks and status.

Elevated officer’s workstation in a direct supervision housing unit. The 

elevated area allows the officer to observe both the first floor and second 

tier from the station. 

(Photograph courtesy of Liebert & Associates.)
173 

C h a p t e r 1 5 : 

General Housing

■ Doors to various program and service areas 

within a cluster of housing units or directly 

accessible from a given housing unit.

■ Cell, dayroom, associated program areas, 

corridor, and control position lights.

■ Inmate telephones.

■ Recreational TV channel and sound controls.

■ CCTV monitors within the housing areas.

■ Intercoms between the cells, dayroom, program areas, corridors, and other staff posts 

and the control position.

■ Alarm systems.

It is also critical to the design of the staff post, 

and the housing area as a whole, to decide 

whether the officer will merely observe or 

physically participate in typical housing area activities such as:

■ Distribution of meals.

■ Pickup and distribution of laundry.

■ Removal of waste and garbage.

■ Receipt of sick call and commissary slips.

■ Receipt and distribution of mail.

■ Escort of inmates to and from their cells, either 

within the perimeter of the housing area or 

throughout the jail.

■ Routine cleaning activities.

The choice of observer or participant role directly 

affects the design of remote observation control 

posts. If the officer is to be a participant, an open 

staff post would probably be needed, as opposed 

to a fully enclosed post. The officer’s role would 

not similarly affect direct supervision situations 

because the officer is a direct participant in all 

housing unit activities, does not leave the housing unit, and is not ever in an enclosed control 

post. Nor would it affect intermittent surveillance 

situations because officer movement and, thus, 

some degree of interaction with inmates is inherent in the concept.

If a remote method of observation is selected and 

the officer is to participate in activities beyond 

those that can be controlled electronically from 

within the staff post, the resulting open-counter 

position presents some security problems that 

must be addressed:

■ The officer must have the ability to turn off the 

controls when he/she leaves the station, and 

there must be master control backup override 

in the event of an emergency. This is also true 

for control posts in direct supervision, where 

the officer has control of locks, lights, and 

other equipment in the housing unit. 

■ The entire housing area (and all of its individual housing units) has to be treated as a 

perimeter, the exit from which is controlled 

by master control rather than by the housing 

Officer’s workstation in a high-security housing area. 

(Photograph courtesy of Voorhis Robertson Justice Services.)
174

S e c t i o n 3 : 

F u n c t i o n a l C o m p o n e n t s 

control officer. This is done to limit the value 

of assaulting the officer and gaining control 

over the open-counter position.

Issue: It is critical for the housing control officer 

to have a maximized view of the housing area(s).

Response: Virtually every area in a housing 

unit must be visible to the officer as he/

she either monitors the area from a fixed 

control post or moves through the housing 

area. Although this does not mean that a 

full view of the interior of every space (e.g., 

inmate cells) is necessary, it does mean that 

the officer should have a full view of at least 

the dayroom and the points of access to all 

areas within the housing unit (e.g., cells, 

shower areas, vestibules, visiting areas, exercise areas).

If a two-tier housing unit area is designed, it is 

critical to ensure that staff have a vertical view 

angle that allows adequate view of second-tier 

activities. The details of the design should accommodate view as discussed earlier in this 

chapter under “Basic Design Issues.”

The view provided through dayroom windows 

and vestibules is a key consideration. If the view 

angle is severe enough, especially between a 

fixed staff post and a housing unit, the relatively 

deep and thick framing used with security glazing may create more of an obstacle to the view 

than anticipated.

The actual view obtained through vestibules 

may also be much less than expected because of 

the interference created by the framing for glazing, the wide door frames created when jambmounted locks are used, and the width of the 

door panel, even when the upper portion of the 

door is glazed. Single-level vestibules can obscure vertical views in a two-tier housing 

unit (exhibit 15-12). When two-tier spaces are 

involved, it is also important to take into account 

the amount of visual interference created by 

sliding door mechanisms. These mechanisms 

typically are placed above the doors and can 

be relatively deep, thereby blocking view into 

second-tier areas from adjacent control positions.

The lower-level views of dayrooms are also important to consider. Many designs have concrete 

masonry construction of five courses of block (40 

inches) at the base of the dayroom walls. This 

can provide a hiding area for inmates. The designer may want to consider taking the glazing at 

the front of the dayrooms down to a one- or twocourse level.

Exhibit 15-12. Vertical View in Two-Tier 

Housing Obscured by Single-Level Vestibule

Vestibule Corridor

Blind

spot

Control

Housing

dayroom

Communications

Issue: The staff control posts must be provided 

with proper communication capabilities.

Response: In remote observation, it is important for control officers to be in a position that allows them to communicate 

properly with inmates under their control 

and with other staff in the facility. Communication with the inmate population is 

fundamental to meeting inmate needs. This 

is not a design issue in direct supervision 

because the officer is in the unit with the 

inmates.

An inmate-to-officer communication system 

should provide the inmate with the ability to 
175 

C h a p t e r 1 5 : 

General Housing

communicate at will from both individual cells 

and the dayroom to the staff in both the corridor 

and the control post. With the use of solid materials in construction (e.g., concrete masonry 

units, concrete, security glass), communication 

is typically achieved through an intercom and/or 

mechanical talk-through communication device. 

To provide privacy in dayroom-to-staff communications, a telephone might be considered in 

addition to the outside telephone lines that allow 

inmates to talk with friends and relatives.

To facilitate more normal levels of conversation 

between inmates in the dayroom and officers in 

the corridor, the designer might consider placing 

a passthrough or opening in the dayroom wall 

at approximately shoulder/mouth height. It is 

also important to provide a means by which 

staff in enclosed control posts can communicate 

with, and pass things to, officers outside the 

control post.

Miscellaneous Design Issues 

The following functional-architectural issues deal 

with miscellaneous space and design considerations relative to the general housing areas: security vestibule, showers, storage, janitor closet, 

multipurpose rooms, and visiting areas.

Security vestibule 

Issue: Identify the need for a security vestibule 

entry to housing units.

Response: The primary objectives in providing a security vestibule are to prevent unauthorized inmates from leaving the housing 

unit and to eliminate the danger of several 

inmates rushing an open dayroom door 

in an escape attempt. Also, during inmate 

disturbances, the vestibule provides added 

control and containment capabilities. However, the security vestibule also represents 

an additional barrier to manipulate, can diminish remote views, and can add construction costs to a project.

The key to determining the need for a security 

vestibule is identifying the security risk presented 

by the inmates housed in a particular housing 

area, considering the consequences to security 

if inmates escape their housing unit, and understanding the housing area’s relationship to the security perimeter and zoning concepts of the jail. 

It is typical to assume that a low-security general 

population would be less likely to require a security vestibule leading into the space. However, 

such a vestibule may be deemed essential when 

a high-risk group is involved.

The need for a security vestibule is greatly reduced when a constantly staffed, fully enclosed, 

securely constructed post is located immediately 

adjacent to the housing units. If a housing area 

or pod consisting of several housing units is 

clearly defined as a security zone in which escape from a dayroom leads only to a limited, 

sealed-off housing area corridor, the need for vestibules may be eliminated. In this case, the corridor functions as one large housing area vestibule. 

Such an approach is especially valid when the 

exit from the housing area corridor is controlled 

by staff outside the housing areas, such as master 

control. However, vestibules should still be considered for use with high-risk inmates.

When a security vestibule is provided, it is important that all vestibule doors be interlocked. 

That is, the controls of the doors must be set up 

so that when one door is opened, the other(s) 

cannot be opened. However, such an interlock 

system should have an override capability so that 

all doors or selected sets of doors can be opened 

simultaneously if emergency egress or ingress is 

required.

In sizing a security vestibule, it is important to 

ensure that it is large enough to accommodate 

both the maximum number of people to be 

moved at one time and the equipment that might 

be moved through the space (e.g., food carts; 
176

S e c t i o n 3 : 

F u n c t i o n a l C o m p o n e n t s 

laundry carts; emergency medical equipment 

such as crash carts, gurneys, and stretchers). 

The security vestibule should also be designed to 

meet access requirements for wheelchair-bound 

inmates or staff.

Sizing must take into account that interlocking 

doors limit maneuverability, especially if swinging doors are used. Swinging doors should swing 

out, away from the housing unit, to facilitate 

emergency egress and prevent inmates from barricading themselves inside the dayroom. The 

actual path of travel for equipment must also be 

considered in concert with door swings (exhibit 

15-13), especially in situations where doors are 

located in walls perpendicular to each other rather than parallel to each other.

Exhibit 15-13. Sizing of Security Vestibule To 

Allow for Door Swings and Passage of Equipment

Corridor

Stretcher

Dayroom

Security vestibule

Showers

Issue: Showers or bath areas must be provided 

in association with each housing unit.

Response: Shower areas are typically provided on the ratio of 1 shower for every 

8–12 inmates in general population areas, 

depending on applicable standards. Showers 

are typically provided instead of bath facilities. Bathtubs are most commonly found in 

medical housing and are used for treatment 

purposes.

Shower areas can be constructed of concrete masonry walls treated with special water-resistant 

and durable coatings and premanufactured 

shower pans and floors. They can also be stainless steel cabinet units as supplied by detention 

equipment manufacturers, either free standing or 

installed in a recessed alcove designed for that 

purpose. In either case, the showers should use 

detention-quality fixtures designed to take inmate 

abuse and preclude suicide attempts by eliminating protrusions from which an inmate can hang 

him/herself.

Regardless of the shower type used, it is important to include a small drying and dressing area 

or alcove just outside the shower area and ways 

to contain drips and spills from the shower area. 

A nonslip surface should be applied to the floor 

immediately adjacent to the shower area, and 

curbing can help contain excess water. (In ADAcompliant shower areas, the curbing must have a 

sufficiently low profile that wheelchairs can pass 

over it easily.)

Shower area in a housing area with both a door to the dressing area open at 

the top and bottom and a shower curtain that is clear at the top and bottom 

for the shower area. 

(Photograph courtesy of Voorhis Robertson Justice Services.)
177 

C h a p t e r 1 5 : 

General Housing

A key design problem with shower areas is striking the proper balance between the modesty 

required by the inmate and the needs of staff to 

observe the area. It is recommended that staff at 

least be able to see the entry to the shower area, 

and that the entry and shower area not be fully 

exposed to the dayroom and other inmates. Use 

of security glass block side walls can aid in developing some visibility without totally sacrificing modesty. Shower curtains, doors, or screens 

should at least allow a head-and-shoulder view 

of the inmate and, preferably, a foot-and-ankle 

view as well. It is useful to provide a capability 

for hanging towels and clothing adjacent to the 

shower area.

Proper ventilation of the shower area is also 

important to prevent moisture and odors from 

spreading to adjacent dayroom areas and to prevent mildew from building up in the shower area. 

Storage

Issue: Housing areas require adequate storage 

adjacent to or within the area.

Response: It is important that storage capabilities be provided to service the housing 

areas. These storage capabilities are not 

meant to supplant central storerooms, but 

to allow a convenient way to respond to 

the daily needs of inmates. Such localized 

storage areas might contain extra linens, 

spare mattresses, toiletries, paper products, 

forms, recreation equipment such as cards 

and games, and other commonly used supplies. In direct supervision housing units, it 

is particularly useful to have storage space 

located within the unit. 

Janitor closets

Issue: Maintenance of the housing units can 

be facilitated by providing a janitor closet in 

the area. 

Response: A small janitor closet with a floor 

sink, mops, buckets, cleaning supplies, 

floor buffers, and so forth can be a great 

benefit to the maintenance program of the 

facility. Convenient location in the housing area promotes the use of the equipment 

by inmates. The janitor closet should have 

shelves for the storage of cleaning supplies, 

a splash basin, and a hose and hose bib that 

can be used to wash down areas as necessary. It should be equipped with a smoke 

detector because of the presence of cleaning 

fluids and should be a lockable space controlled only by staff. In two-tiered housing 

areas, a janitor’s closet should be located 

on each tier so inmates are not required to 

carry heavy cleaning equipment and full 

mop buckets up a flight of stairs.

Multipurpose rooms 

Issue: To keep the movement of inmates within 

the facility to a minimum, it is desirable to provide multipurpose room(s) in general population 

housing units.

Response: The concept of bringing services 

to inmates rather than taking inmates to 

services became popular with the advent of 

direct supervision. As a result, jurisdictions 

have found it desirable to include a multipurpose space in general population housing units. These rooms are generally located 

off of the main dayroom and can be used 

for purposes such as small classes, counseling, medication distribution, and haircuts. 

Using space in the housing area to provide 

services reduces the amount of inmate 

movement within the facility and reduces 

staff time devoted to moving inmates. Small 

multipurpose rooms in the housing areas 

generally will not eliminate the need for 

larger multipurpose rooms and classrooms 

designed to hold larger groups from different housing areas.
178

S e c t i o n 3 : 

F u n c t i o n a l C o m p o n e n t s 

Visiting areas 

Issue: Visiting areas adjacent to or inside the 

housing area can reduce staff time, movement, 

and scheduling difficulties associated with centralized visiting.

Response: Providing inmates with access 

to visits with family and friends, either 

through noncontact visiting booths connected to the housing area or through the use 

of video visitation, can greatly reduce the 

number of facility staff devoted to the visiting function. The housing officer would be 

responsible for monitoring visiting as part of 

his/her regular duties, eliminating the need 

for a visiting officer or a movement officer 

to escort the inmates back and forth to the 

visiting area. Visiting areas adjacent to or 

inside housing areas can also expand the 

time allocated for visits and the number of 

visits an inmate can receive in a week because an additional officer is not required to 

supervise the activity.

Space List

Some of the typical spaces that might be found 

within the general housing component include:

■ Cells or dormitories.

■ Dayrooms (one per housing unit).

■ Security vestibules (as needed).

■ Shower area (1 per 8–12 inmates, per code).

■ Dayroom inmate toilet area.

■ Storage.

■ Janitor closet.

■ Staff control post (one per housing area 

recommended).

Video visitation area in the dayroom of a housing area.

(Photograph courtesy of Liebert & Associates.)

■ Staff toilet (one per staff post).

■ Multipurpose room.

■ Visiting area.

Local codes and ADA guidelines regarding accessibility requirements should be consulted when 

planning these spaces.

Some spaces that might be associated with general housing, depending on operational programming, movement, and surveillance concepts, 

include:

■ Indoor and/or outdoor exercise.

■ Sick call/medical exam room.

■ Video court appearance room.

■ Food reheating/distribution area.

■ Linen storage.
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C h a p t e r 1 5 : 

General Housing

Relationships and Components

Exhibit 15-14. Relationships Between Housing 

Unit Space Components

Control

Dayroom

Dayroom

Storage

Cell Cell

Cell Cell Cell Cell

Cell

Cell

Cell

Cell

Cell

Cell

Cell

Cell Dayroom

Staff

toilet

Toilet/

shower

Toilet/

shower

Janitor

closet

Toilet/

shower

Main

jail

corridor Potential

exercise or

programs

Exhibit 15-15. Component Diagram of a 

Typical Cell

Fixed desk

Fixed detention and stool

bunk or slab 

Breakaway

clothing/towel

hooks 

Combination

sink and toilet

with mirror

above

Weep hole

to drain 

Detention window

with glass-clad

polycarbonate

glazing (see local

codes for size

requirements)

Pipe chase Large hinged,

lockable

access door

Detention door

with vision panel

and remote

electronic release

lock with manual

override

Low wall

Shelf
181

Chapter 16

Special Housing

T

he special housing areas of a jail accommodate all male or female inmates who by 

behavior, condition, or unique security risk 

require spaces with special design characteristics 

and/or spaces separate from those used by the 

general population. Inmate groups for whom 

special housing is described in this functionalarchitectural component include the following:

■ Work release/periodic-sentence inmates, who 

are regularly released from and readmitted to 

the jail to go to a job or school during the time 

they are serving a sentence or being detained 

prior to trial. 

■ Inmate workers, who are given work assignments within the facility and outside of their 

housing unit (e.g., kitchen or laundry duty 

and/or general facility maintenance) or outside the facility on supervised work crews providing services to the jurisdiction (e.g., road 

cleanup, landscaping). 

■ Protective custody inmates, who need protection or separation from the rest of the inmate 

population but do not pose a threat to others 

or themselves. 

■ Juveniles detained as adults, who are typically 

16- to 18-year-olds who are to be tried as adults 

because of the nature of the crime with which 

they are charged. (Local and state laws and the 

Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention 

(JJDP) Act should be consulted to determine the 

definition of “juvenile” and criteria regarding 

assignment of “adult” status in criminal proceedings, as this varies widely from state to state.)

■ Medically isolated inmates, who must be 

separated from others because of their medical status, because they are infected with a 

communicable disease, or because they have a 

health condition that requires the supervision 

of medical staff or separation from the general 

population.

■ Inmates serving disciplinary time, who can be 

separated from the general population as punishment for serious rule violations. 

■ High-security inmates, who pose a verifiable 

threat to staff and other inmates (sometimes 

referred to as “administrative segregation”).

■ Suicidal inmates, who have already attempted 

suicide or have suicidal tendencies so apparent 

that they need special observation and protection. They do not necessarily include inmates 

who may have suicidal tendencies but can be 

detained in a general housing unit that is observed in a constant manner. 

■ Inmates with mental disabilities, who are 

known to have serious mental health problems 

or who demonstrate sufficiently abnormal 

behavior to merit special observation. This 

category can also refer to inmates with developmental disabilities who may be victimized 

in the general population.

■ Intoxicated inmates who are under the influence of alcohol or drugs. 

■ Inmates with physical disabilities who require 

special design accommodations. These inmates can be found in any of the special housing categories, but do not constitute a group 

for whom a special unit is created. Designs of 

special housing areas, therefore, must accommodate the needs of inmates with physical disabilities as well. More information on design 

considerations for these inmates is provided in 

chapter 15, “General Housing.”

These special categories of inmates 

pose separation and management 

problems in all jails, but those 
182

S e c t i o n 3 : 

F u n c t i o n a l C o m p o n e n t s 

problems are more acute in small jails. Some of 

these categories of inmates require significantly 

different types of space and/or different levels of 

separation and observation than do inmates in 

general population housing. Historically, small 

jails have had inadequate space and observation 

capabilities to satisfactorily accommodate these 

various groups, resulting in serious operational 

or legal problems.

One option in planning and design in smaller 

jails is to seek alternative housing for special inmates. Removing them from the small jail is beneficial to the efficient development of space and 

the management of operational problems facing 

the limited staff and resources of the smaller jail. 

If some or all special categories of inmates must 

be accommodated at the small jail, the emphasis 

must be on designing space flexibly so that the 

limited number of beds available can accommodate as many different types of inmates as 

possible.

Providing for the separate needs of different 

types of inmates remains perhaps the greatest 

challenge facing jail designers. A further challenge is that standards typically require that 

inmates in administrative segregation, protective 

custody, disciplinary detention, and other special 

forms of housing have the benefit of the same 

general conditions and the same access to health 

care, exercise, and other services as do general 

population inmates. In other words, occupancy 

in a special housing unit does not justify the loss 

of fundamental rights, conditions, and privileges.

In reviewing the issues addressed in this 

functional-architectural section, readers should 

refer to the concepts presented in chapter 5, 

“Classification/Separation,” and chapter 6, 

“Surveillance/Supervision,” many of which have 

a direct impact on the development of special 

housing space.

Key Decisions

The following decisions have a fundamental effect on design requirements and therefore should 

be made when evaluating the role of special 

housing:

■ Which types of special inmates must be accommodated at the jail and which can be taken directly to alternative facilities, such as work release 

centers, detoxification centers, or mental health 

facilities, or be housed in other jurisdictions?

■ What is the average daily population and 

maximum length of stay for each type of special inmate to be accommodated by the new 

jail facility? Does your facility have a large 

enough special housing population to require 

separate housing units for each type, and do 

these types of inmates stay, on average, several hours, overnight, or through adjudication? 

(Average daily population and duration of stay 

will affect the nature of the space provided 

and the nature of the management problem 

posed by the groups.)

■ To what degree can it be assumed that certain 

special housing spaces can be shared by different types of inmates because of the limited frequency with which such inmates are actually 

received at the jail?

■ Who will manage and control the activities of 

the various special inmate groups? If special 

treatment or supervision is required for any 

inmate group, who will provide that treatment 

and/or supervision? 

Detail Issues 

The functional-architectural issues discussed in 

this chapter address the development of special 

housing areas for the following populations: 

work release/periodic-sentence inmates, inmate 

workers, protective custody, juveniles, inmates 

requiring medical isolation, disciplinary 
183 

C h a p t e r 1 6 : 

Special Housing

detention/administrative segregation inmates, 

inmates with mental or developmental disabilities, those who are suicidal, and those who are 

intoxicated. Some classifications of special inmates are grouped together because the characteristics of their housing areas are similar. The 

areas could be used interchangeably by the different classifications, assuming, of course, that the 

classifications will not be mixed together in actual 

practice. Attaining such interchangeability assumes that the frequency and/or timing of a special inmate’s admission are appropriately limited.

Exhibit 16-1. Privacy Partition in Sleeping Area

Partial-height

privacy

partition

Lockable

storage

drawer

The concept of shared space and flexibility in 

housing use is explored in depth in section 2 in 

chapter 5, “Classification/Separation, and chapter 

10, “Functional Components and Relationships.” 

Many of the design considerations for the dayroom area, cells, and other aspects of the housing 

units discussed in chapter 15, “General Housing,” 

also apply to special housing. Readers are encouraged to refer to these chapters in conjunction 

with the current chapter.

Work Release/Periodic-Sentence Inmates 

Issue: The basic living needs of inmates on work 

release and those with periodic sentences1 are 

similar to those of all inmates and should be 

accommodated.

Response: The following characteristics are 

appropriate to the physical environment for 

work release and periodic-sentence inmates.

■ Sleeping areas may be dormitories, 

multiple-occupancy cells, or singleoccupancy cells. When dormitories 

are used, some provisions should be 

made for privacy and property protection. Privacy can be provided by the 

use of partial- or full-height partitions 

(exhibit 16-1). 

■ The sleeping room/area should include these items:

❏ Bed.

❏ Desk.

❏ Chair or stool.

❏ Light fixture, possibly controllable by 

the inmate.

❏ Lockable storage locker or cabinet.

■ Dayroom space should be provided. It should 

be separate from the sleeping areas, especially 

if work release/periodic-sentence inmates 

work different shifts and the acoustic privacy 

of sleeping inmates would be disturbed by inmates who may be watching television, talking 

on the telephone, showering, or conversing. 

■ Sufficient shower areas should be provided to 

allow work release inmates to expeditiously 

get ready for their work day. Showers should 

provide a high degree of privacy, although 

staff observation from outside the area should 

be accommodated through a small vision panel or through partial-height doors. The panels 

may be shuttered or screened to prevent 

unauthorized view. 

1

 Periodic-sentence inmates are most commonly those that serve weekends in jail (“weekenders”) and stay at their home during the 

work week, although there are other variations.
184

S e c t i o n 3 : 

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■ Whether or not a security vestibule is necessary as an entry to the housing unit depends 

on the agency’s philosophy about work 

release/periodic-sentence inmates, the environment, and the proximity to other areas 

of the jail. If located correctly, and if there is 

a secure vestibule from the work release/

periodic-sentence inmate housing unit into 

the jail, a security vestibule to the exterior 

of the building may not be required

■ Furniture should be durable, but need not be 

security quality or fixed in place.

■ A direct line of sight into the sleeping and dayroom areas is useful, even if observation round 

policies require staff to enter both areas periodically to observe inmates (exhibit 16-2).

■ The housing unit should have a means for inmates to communicate with staff at a constantly staffed post and, possibly, in the adjacent 

corridor. Communication between inmates in 

a housing unit and roving or medical staff may 

be accomplished without requiring entry into 

the housing unit, although the preferred option 

is to provide face-to-face contact whenever 

possible.

■ Lighting for the dayroom should be controlled 

by a switch separate from that for the lighting 

Toilet/shower area

Dormitory

sleeping area Dayroom

Control

Exhibit 16-2. Direct Line of Sight Into Sleeping 

and Dayroom Areas

for the sleeping areas because of the separation of the areas and different schedules. 

■ Natural light should be introduced to both 

sleeping and dayroom areas, but should be 

minimized and controllable in the sleeping areas if work release schedules require sleeping 

during daylight hours. 

■ Additional considerations in housing units occupied by work release or inmate workers may 

include:

❏ Ground fault outlets in the sleeping rooms 

or dayrooms for inmate workers to accommodate radios, televisions, and coffee pots, 

if those items are allowed by policy.

❏ Televisions that inmates control in the 

dayrooms.

❏ Access to washers and dryers to allow work 

release inmates to launder their work clothing and/or personal clothing.

Security 

Issue: Although work release and periodicsentence inmates are generally considered to 

be low-security classification, security is still a 

consideration.

Response: Some vital security considerations 

that must be addressed are principally directed toward the prevention of contraband 

passage and vandalism in the facility:

■ The elements of the internal security 

zone that defines the work release 

area—principally those elements that 

double as the main security envelope 

of the building—must be sufficiently 

secure to preclude the passage of contraband into the work release area by 

outside parties: secure wall construction, nonoperable windows, security 

glass, and at least two doors between 

the area and the outside. 
185 

C h a p t e r 1 6 : 

Special Housing

■ It is not uncommon in larger jail 

systems for work release/periodicsentence inmates to be housed in a 

separate facility, either on the same 

campus as the main facility or elsewhere. This separate facility mitigates 

the need for increased security beyond 

that required for minimum-security 

inmates.

■ The entry/exit used by work release/

periodic-sentence inmates should be 

separate from the entry and exit for 

the regular inmate population and the 

public, if possible (exhibit 16-3). If 

not possible, a strictly managed entry/

exit sequence should be implemented 

to minimize contact with areas normally used and occupied by the other 

inmates. (More information on the 

conditions under which the normal 

intake-release area can be used is 

Lobby for entry into work release housing separate from the main 

facility lobby. 

(Photograph courtesy of Jim Rowenhorst.)

presented in chapter 14, “IntakeRelease.”)

■ There should be an area or areas in 

which the incoming work release/

periodic-sentence inmates can be 

searched, change clothes, and store 

their work clothing (exhibit 16-4). 

This area should accommodate either 

a standing metal detection unit or 

simply a hand-held metal detector. Sobriety testing equipment is also useful 

to test incoming inmates suspected of 

intoxication.

■ Locker facilities outside the sleeping 

area and dayroom should be provided 

to secure the valuables, work tools, 

backpacks, etc. that inmates are allowed to possess when leaving the 

facility. Lockers preclude the problem 

of theft. 

■ The area should be totally separate 

from all other housing areas and from 

Exhibit 16-3. Entry/Exit for Work Release/

Periodic-Sentence Inmates

Search Housing Intake -

release 

Work

release

entry

Arresteeinmate

entry

Exhibit 16-4. Entry Sequence for Work Release/

Periodic-Sentence Inmates

Entry Housing

Store

street

clothes

Check

point Clean

clothes
186

S e c t i o n 3 : 

F u n c t i o n a l C o m p o n e n t s 

Lockers in the dayroom of a work release unit used by the inmates to store 

their valuables. 

(Photograph courtesy of Jim Rowenhorst.)

as many of the main traffic corridors 

of the facility as possible. If work 

release/periodic-sentence inmates use 

program and exercise areas used by 

the general inmate population, staff 

should take care to ensure that no 

contraband has been left by a work 

release/periodic-sentence inmate for 

other inmates. 

■ Separate laundry facilities should be 

provided to preclude the possibility 

that identifiable personal laundry becomes a vehicle for contraband 

passage.

■ Some subdivision of the housing area 

is appropriate to enhance general control and security between work release 

inmates and periodic-sentence inmates 

and/or between inmates released for 

different work shifts (e.g., if 24 beds 

are provided overall, the area could be 

divided into two 12-bed areas or three 

8-bed areas).

Bed capacity

Issue: Sufficient capacity should be provided to 

accommodate the surges in inmate population 

created by weekend sentencing.

Response: Weekend sentencing is used as 

an option in many jurisdictions so that the 

inmate can work all week at his/her job 

and spend only free weekend time in the 

jail. However, weekend sentencing typically causes problems for the jail, in that it 

tends to significantly increase the inmate 

population at a time when there is a normal 

increase in the number of arrests and jail 

bookings. This surge must be recognized in 

planning so that adequate capacity is available in the work release/periodic-sentence 

inmate housing areas and increased intake 

and release requirements can be accommodated without conflicting with other inmate 

admissions. It is common to plan an intake 

area in the work release lobby for work release intakes and weekend admissions. This 

allows these inmates to be processed into 

the facility without overwhelming the facility intake area and reduces the potential for 

contraband to enter the main jail facility.

Issue: The male work release population must 

be kept separate from the female work release 

population. 

Response: Women are also sentenced to 

work release or periodic stays. The same 

levels of separation between male and female housing areas discussed in chapter 

5, “Classification/Separation,” in section 2 

must be maintained in the work release/

periodic-sentence housing areas: physical, 
187 

C h a p t e r 1 6 : 

Special Housing

sight, and sound separation. This is particularly true if the work release/periodicsentence areas are intermittently monitored, 

as is frequently the case. 

In addition to the housing areas, search areas 

should be private, if not separate, for men and 

women. A common entry is appropriate, but a 

separate waiting area is desirable if the area cannot be directly observed and inmates are not immediately processed by staff.

If the female work release/periodic-sentence inmate population is very limited in number, the 

women might be housed in general housing or 

another unit used for sentenced female inmates. 

In this case, the contraband passage and property 

protection risks must be managed administratively rather than architecturally.

Inmate Workers 

Issue: The basic living needs of inmate workers 

must be accommodated. 

Response: The inmate worker housing area 

has the same characteristics detailed above 

for work release/periodic-sentence inmates. 

Reference should be made to that information in developing the inmate worker space. 

Issue: Inmate worker housing areas should be 

properly located.

Response: Inmate worker housing areas 

should be kept separate from the other inmate housing areas, if possible, consistent 

with surveillance needs. They should be 

near the functional areas where the inmate 

workers perform their daily duties, such 

as the laundry and food service areas. The 

inmate worker area should also be within 

the secure perimeter of the jail because inmate workers are not normally free to move 

outside of the facility unless they are on supervised work crews. Those inmate workers 

who perform tasks outside of the facility are 

often housed in work release housing, with 

the only difference being that they are picked 

up daily for supervised work crews rather 

than going to their own job.

It is critical to keep the internal inmate workers 

separate from work release/periodic-sentence 

inmates. Failure to provide this separation creates a natural chain of contraband passage from 

work release inmate to inmate worker to general 

housing inmate, because inmate workers are 

frequently in other areas of the facility as part of 

their laundry, kitchen, janitorial, or maintenance 

duties.

Protective Custody Inmates/Juveniles 

The characteristics of housing facilities for inmates in protective custody and for juveniles 

detained as adults can be quite similar. These 

two groups are dealt with jointly in this section 

because of those similarities. Additionally, in 

smaller jails, the infrequency of juveniles being 

detained as adults and of protective custody inmates being held could allow this area to be used 

interchangeably. 

As a rule, the design of the protective custody 

unit is fundamentally the same as that of a general housing unit. Consequently, the issues and responses regarding dayroom and cell space raised 

in chapter 15, “General Housing,” apply. 

In larger jail systems, one or more general 

population housing units are set aside to house 

protective custody inmates, depending on the 

population at a given time. However, in the 

smaller jail, the limited size of the protective 

custody group means the number of beds allocated for protective custody housing could be 

accommodated in the kind of “swing” or special 

management housing unit discussed in chapter 

5, “Classification/Separation.” Such a swing unit 

might be adjacent to the female housing unit or 
188

S e c t i o n 3 : 

F u n c t i o n a l C o m p o n e n t s 

another special housing unit so that it could be 

used for an overflow female or special housing 

population when not being used for protective 

custody.

Housing flexibility 

Issue: Flexibility in housing assignments should be a characteristic of 

protective custody housing in the 

smaller jail.

Response: The flexibility of small protective custody or swing housing units can be 

increased in various ways, each of which 

involves careful detailing and design:

■ Develop each individual housing unit 

with minimum capacity. Specifically, 

restricting each protective custody 

housing unit’s capacity provides an 

ability to adjust to the varying natures 

of the populations to be housed in the 

units. 

■ Provide a door in the dayroom partition that divides individual units to 

allow, for example, two 3-bed areas 

to function as one 6-bed area when 

inmates of identical classifications are 

Exhibit 16-5. Door in Dayroom Partition

Door between

dayrooms 

Control

Cell

Cell

Cell

Cell

Shaded area

out-of-bounds

to inmate 

Cell

Cell

involved (exhibit 16-5). This flexibility 

also combats the problems inherent 

in two-bed areas, namely, a one-onone inmate situation that is typically 

thought to be undesirable. It also prevents the possibility of isolation when 

only one person is in a unit, when 

immediately adjacent are two inmates 

of the same classification.

■ It is important that the door dividing 

the two housing units be acoustically 

treated and have a security threshold that limits sound transfer and 

precludes the passage of contraband 

when inmates of different classifications are in the adjacent areas. 

■ Develop a swing cell between two 

adjacent housing units that can open 

to either of them to easily change the 

capacity of either area.

■ Provide a second access to one of the 

cells so that special housing needs can 

be accommodated on those unusual 

days when there is a full variety of 

inmate types in the facility and too 

few separate areas to manage them 

(exhibit 16-6). In these circumstances, 

Remote

staff view 

Secondary

access 

Main

access 

Cell

Cell

Cell

Cell

Dayroom

Exhibit 16-6. Secondary Access to Cell
189 

C h a p t e r 1 6 : 

Special Housing

which are expected to be rare and of 

short duration, access to dayrooms 

and showers will have to be scheduled 

and managed by staff.

If this possibility is to be incorporated into the 

design to limit the overall amount of bed space 

and still cover all circumstances, the constant 

presence of staff is appropriate. Consequently, it 

is recommended for smaller facilities that when 

a housing area is developed as versatile swing, 

or special management space, protective custody 

areas be remote surveillance areas. 

Separation 

Issue: Protective custody/swing areas should 

be separated from other housing units, and the 

units within the protective custody/swing areas 

should be separated from each other.

Response: When housing protective custody 

inmates, providing the capability of full physical, sight, and sound separation from the 

other general population units is important. 

For the swing/special management concept, 

it is also important to provide separation between the various housing units within the 

area, because inmates of very different classifications might be housed in the area at the 

same time. It is imperative for protective custody areas to be separated from disciplinary 

detention and high-security areas, as inmates 

in those areas might pose a direct physical, 

visual, or verbal threat to inmates who are 

being protected. 

Issue: Housing juvenile offenders in adult jails 

can pose serious design and management 

problems.

Response: In 2004, youth younger than 18 

years of age accounted for 1 percent of jail 

inmates. Of those, 87 percent were held as 

adults.2

 Juveniles pose a major management 

and housing problem in jails of all sizes, especially if law or standards require site and 

sound separation at all times. As with protective custody inmates, designing space for 

juvenile offenders requires full separation 

from other general population or special 

housing inmates in the facility. Generally, 

juveniles make up a very small portion of 

the population in any jail, so it is important that the jurisdiction use the concept of 

swing housing, described above, when planning for juveniles. Additionally, in housing 

areas for juveniles, the availability of multipurpose space for educational programming 

for underage offenders may be important.

Medical Isolation and Medical Housing

Jail administrators should refrain from housing 

inmates who have long-term and serious medical problems for any extended period, unless the 

facility has designed a special medical housing 

unit and has full-time medical staff on duty in 

that area. Inmates with serious medical problems 

present major challenges in terms of providing 

proper care and facilities. This section discusses 

design characteristics, location, and security with 

respect to the housing of people suspected of 

having, or known to have, diseases or illnesses 

that might be contagious/infectious (e.g., serious 

flu virus, tuberculosis) and those who require 

supervision by medical staff while they are being 

treated for or are recovering from a medical condition. It is recommended that new jail facilities 

incorporate negative pressure isolation cells in 

the design of their medical units to accommodate 

inmates with contagious/infectious diseases. In 

small jails that is not always possible, and appropriate alternative facilities must be identified 

2

 Howard N. Snyder and Melissa Sickmund, Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 2006 National Report (Washington, DC: U.S. Department 

of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 2006).
190

S e c t i o n 3 : 

F u n c t i o n a l C o m p o n e n t s 

for inmates diagnosed with a serious contagious 

illness.

In circumstances where only a cold, a minor virus, or a mild influenza is involved, medical isolation needs might be accommodated by simply 

isolating the inmate in his/her regular cell. More 

information on nonhousing health care areas 

(e.g., examination areas, medication storage) is 

given in chapter 17, “Health Care.”

Characteristics 

Issue: Medical housing areas should accommodate the medical and personal needs of the 

inmate.

Response: A medical housing area should 

have the following design characteristics:

■ It should basically be of high-security 

construction because it will likely accommodate the full range of classifications served by the jail.

■ A dayroom area, which should 

accommodate a shower, is desirable 

adjacent to medical cells. If no dayroom space is available, medical isolation cells should include a shower 

if this practice complies with local 

codes. Accommodation for television 

viewing, telephone access, and a visitation area are additional considerations, especially if such amenities are 

available to other inmates.

Overhead of medical isolation cells with Americans with Disabilities Act 

(ADA)-compliant plumbing fixtures, medical bed accessible from three 

sides, and adjacent airlock vestibule. Showers are not in the cell.

■ Cells should be single occupancy.

■ Cells should be located so as to facilitate frequent observation by medical 

personnel and security staff. 

■ The size of cells should be dictated 

by the types of furniture and equipment within them. Besides a possible 

shower, it is useful for the bed to be 

accessible from more than one side. 

An appropriately designed medical 

cell frequently exceeds 100 square feet 

in size.

Acute medical cell with attached shower area on the right.

(Photograph courtesy of Voorhis Robertson Justice Services.)

■ The bed should be fixed in place and 

comfortable. The use of traditional 
191 

C h a p t e r 1 6 : 

Special Housing

hospital beds could also be considered. If hospital beds are used, the 

size of the doors should accommodate 

the bed for emergency evacuation of 

nonambulatory inmates.

■ Inmates should be able to communicate directly with staff. This capability 

should, perhaps, include a nurse call 

button or panic alarm that allows the 

inmate to easily alert staff of a need. 

■ The needs of inmates with hearing or 

vision impairments must be accommodated in the cells.

■ A detention-quality, Americans with 

Disabilities Act (ADA)-compliant, toilet and sink should be provided; separate fixtures are recommended.

■ A small, fixed-in-place, detentionquality desk and chair or stool should 

be provided.

■ A mirror and shelves with collapsible 

security hooks should be provided.

■ Cell doors should have a lockable food 

passthrough.

■ Lights should be controllable by staff, 

but an option for some inmate control 

might be desirable.

■ Natural light should be provided to 

the area through a secure means.

■ Access to power, although not necessarily inside the cell, must be considered, as it may become necessary to 

house inmates with conditions requiring medical equipment powered by 

electricity.

■ Medical isolation cells should be designed for negative pressure, where 

the air from the cell is circulated out 

of the building and not through any 

other areas of the facility.

■ A floor drain should be provided 

either in the cell or just outside it.

Location 

Issue: The location of medical cells should facilitate both delivery of medical services by health 

care staff and surveillance by security staff.

Response: The examination rooms, medication storage area, and offices for medical 

staff constitute the health care component 

of the facility and should be located conveniently in relation to medical cells, although 

adjacency is not required if surveillance 

needs are better served by some separation.

Regarding surveillance, the design should, if possible, allow for observation or surveillance from 

a constantly staffed post such as master control 

and/or an officer’s or nurse’s desk, if a nurse’s 

position is part of the facility program. Medical isolation cells should also be located so that 

other staff can easily provide additional periodic 

observation but without overexposing cells to visibility to other inmates in nearby housing units. 

Providing for this easy periodic observation is a 

must if cells are not located in direct line of sight 

of a constantly staffed post.

In considering these security-related spatial affiliations, it should be remembered that inmate 

patients can present the same potential security 

risks as any other inmate, especially if they are 

fully ambulatory (exhibit 16-7).

Security 

Issue: Medical isolation inmates may represent 

a danger to themselves or others. 

Response: The design of medical isolation 

cells and the selection of furnishings should 

take into consideration the potential for 
192

S e c t i o n 3 : 

F u n c t i o n a l C o m p o n e n t s 

Exhibit 16-7. Security-Related Spatial Affiliations in Medical Housing

Exam

Nurse

Corridor

View

Airlock

Airlock Sink

Toilet

Shower

Obscured

solid glass

block for

view and

privacy

Grab bar

Partial-height

privacy screen

Hospital

bed

Medical isolation

cell

Sink Desk

suicide or assaultive behavior and eliminate 

visual blind spots and bars, hooks, and 

other protrusions from which inmates could 

hang themselves or areas that could provide 

hiding places. Further, the design should 

minimize joints, pockets, and other places 

that could be used to hide contraband and 

weapons.

Occupants of medical isolation cells may have 

poor coordination due to illness or injury. Consequently, the design, furniture, and fixtures should 

not contribute to accidental injury. Fixtures 

should have rounded or beveled edges, there 

should be ample room to move around, and protrusions at eye/head height should be minimized. 

Disciplinary Detention/Administrative 

Segregation 

Issue: The design of housing areas used to 

house inmates who are on disciplinary detention 

or who pose a serious threat to other inmates 

and staff (administrative segregation) should 

accommodate the security risks posed by the inmate and be responsive to the punitive aspects 

of placing an inmate in that housing area.

Response: An inmate is placed in disciplinary detention because of a serious violation 

of facility rules. Disciplinary detention is 

meant not only to separate the offending 

inmate from the rest of the population, but 

to discourage future bad behavior by denying the inmate some of the privileges and 

amenities available in other areas. Inmates 

are placed in administrative segregation 

because they have proven to pose a serious 

threat to staff, other inmates, or the facility 

by virtue of the offense(s) they are charged 

with, a history of extreme violence while in 

custody, or gang affiliation. A more Spartan 

living environment is a general objective of 

disciplinary detention/administrative segregation. However, this does not include depriving the inmate of basic rights to 
193 

C h a p t e r 1 6 : 

Special Housing

well-ventilated, temperature-controlled, sanitary, well-lit, and healthful conditions.

The characteristics of a disciplinary detention or 

administrative segregation area are as follows:

■ It should be high security in general construction approach, emphasizing durable, cleanable, 

and vandal-resistant materials, furnishings, 

equipment, and hardware.

■ It is recommended that there be a small dayroom adjacent to the disciplinary detention/

administrative segregation cells. The dayroom 

could be used for talking on the phone, watching television (if allowed), and other passive 

recreation. An outdoor or indoor/outdoor exercise area should be provided for use by administrative segregation inmates. Such a space 

should be sufficient to allow the inmate to obtain required daily exercise. A dayroom shower 

facility should be easily accessible from the 

disciplinary cell(s).

■ No vestibule is needed because the dayroom 

essentially functions as a vestibule. This is 

because the inmate is routinely locked into 

the detention/administration cell for all but a 

limited time for exercise and then is generally 

alone.

■ Natural light should be provided to cells in a 

secure way.

■ Cells should be larger than normal cells, given 

the extensive time that inmates are required to 

remain in the cell.

■ Inmates should be able to communicate directly with staff, usually through an intercom 

in the cell, but audio monitoring capabilities 

should be controllable by staff.

■ The cell should have a fixed bed, a detentionquality toilet and sink fixture, a desk and chair 

A secured shower in an administrative segregation unit. Note the ports used 

to remove restraints. 

(Photograph courtesy of Voorhis Robertson Justice Services.)

An austere disciplinary detention cell with concrete bunk (the mattress was 

temporarily removed from the cell), steel desk, food pass, and stainless steel 

combination fixture.

(Photograph courtesy of Voorhis Robertson Justice Services.)
194

S e c t i o n 3 : 

F u n c t i o n a l C o m p o n e n t s 

or stool, a security mirror, security shelves, 

and collapsible hooks for clothes and towels.

■ Light fixtures should be controlled by staff. 

■ Cell doors should have a food passthrough and 

restraint port.

Security view 

Issue: Constant observation of the disciplinary 

detention/administrative segregation area is 

essential.

Response: Observation should be provided 

from a constantly staffed post for effective 

control over the disciplinary detention/

administrative segregation area. It is also 

advisable that this space be in a location that 

other staff can easily observe when passing by.

Regarding observation, it is not necessarily desirable to have total visual access to the cell by 

fully glazing or opening the cell front (door and 

front wall), especially if this exposes the inmate 

to other inmates in the facility and vice versa. A 

more limited door window and sidelight sized 

and shaped in deference to available view angles 

from nearby staff posts, and that are adequate to 

allow observation of key parts of the cell, would 

be sufficient in most cases. In general, a partial 

view of the bunk and open cell area, and a view 

above the toilet fixtures provide sufficient remote 

observation. 

Separation 

Issue: Disciplinary detention/administrative 

segregation cells should be separated from the 

other housing areas. 

Response: The disciplinary detention/

administrative segregation area might be 

observed from a staff control post that also 

provides observation of other housing areas. 

If so, the design of the area should provide 

for physical, sound, and sight separation 

from the other housing units to the greatest 

degree possible. 

Flexibility 

Issue: The disciplinary detention/administrative 

segregation area may serve other special housing needs.

Response: The high-security construction 

of the area, the presence of a dayroom and 

shower, and the visibility of the area from 

a staff post provide conditions under which 

the area could conceivably be used to house 

other classifications of inmates under certain circumstances. For example, if the 

facility were to become overcrowded and 

no one was being held in disciplinary 

detention/administrative segregation, it 

might be appropriate to use the housing 

unit, on a short-term basis, to help relieve 

the crowding. In that circumstance, the 

fundamentally hard and Spartan character 

of the disciplinary detention/administrative 

segregation housing area should be offset by 

providing amenities. It would be desirable, 

therefore, to consider installing outlets for 

television, jacks for telephones, and other 

amenities in the dayroom. A small table and 

seating in the dayroom would also add flexibility to use of the area. 

Mental Illness/Suicide Threat/Intoxication 

Inmates who appear to have significant mental 

illness, pose serious suicide threats, or are intoxicated by drugs or alcohol require spaces that 

have special characteristics that are similar to 

those of disciplinary detention/administrative 

segregation inmates. In smaller jails, the infrequency of housing some of these classifications 

creates the possibility of a shared-use area.

Because suicidal, mentally ill, or intoxicated 

inmates require special care and close observation, jurisdictions are advised to seek alternatives 
195 

C h a p t e r 1 6 : 

Special Housing

to jail for these inmates, unless the facility is 

designed to accommodate these inmates. Many 

jails have no choice but to accommodate such 

inmates, if only until other arrangements can be 

made. For example, the mentally ill must sometimes be kept for extended periods until a court 

order can be obtained to permit transfer to an 

appropriate mental health facility. Intoxicated 

inmates charged with a serious crime may also 

have to be held in special quarters while they 

recover, if outside detoxification facilities are not 

available.

The functional-architectural issues regarding 

these spaces assume only the briefest of stays for 

these inmates. However, especially in the case of 

mental illness or suicidal ideation, stays may be 

much longer if appropriate mental health facilities are not available, and the jail design should 

provide for this circumstance.

Because of the unique characteristics of these 

spaces, it is assumed that they typically will not 

be able to accommodate other classifications of 

inmates. 

Characteristics 

Issue: The special housing needs of suicidal, 

mentally ill, and intoxicated inmates must be 

accommodated.

Response: Some recommended characteristics of the spaces used for these special 

groups are as follows:

■ The area should be of high-security 

construction that is durable, easily 

maintainable, and uses vandalresistant equipment, hardware, 

and materials.

■ A dayroom or small corridor area 

should be adjacent to the cells, if possible. This space provides an alternative to confinement in the cells and a 

useful sound containment barrier. If a 

dayroom cannot be provided, consider 

placing the cells in an area that provides some sound isolation from the 

other housing areas and the program 

areas.

A shower should be easily accessible 

from, but not within, the cells. 

No vestibule is required for this area, 

but a sound containment vestibule 

might be useful.

Natural light should be provided if 

possible, but not if it precludes a good 

observable location for the cells. 

The cells should be provided with 

a detention-quality toilet and sink 

fixture. The water supply should be 

restricted to cold and warm water to 

preclude scalding possibilities. Fixtures should be easily accessible but 

out of the way to preclude injuries 

caused by stumbling. 

On occasion, especially in detoxification cells, a raised slab approximately 

8 inches above the floor should be 

provided for sitting or sleeping. However, it is important to follow state 

guidelines, some of which prohibit the 

use of raised slabs in detoxification 

cells.

Cells should be large enough to allow 

easy movement by officers who may 

have to struggle with, or restrain, inmates; fixtures and slabs should not 

be too difficult to negotiate.

No hardware or furniture should be 

in the cells (e.g., desk, stool, shelves, 

hooks, or mirror). There should, however, be sufficient room to accommodate mobile restraint chairs, if used.

■

■

■

■

■

■

■
196

S e c t i o n 3 : 

F u n c t i o n a l C o m p o n e n t s 

■ Ceiling height should be at least 9 feet 

so that light fixtures, sprinkler heads, 

and so forth are generally inaccessible 

to the inmate. 

■ Lights should be controlled by staff. 

There should be a nightlight feature 

in the cell, and the light level should 

be adjustable to accommodate the 

comfort of the inmate and the varying 

observation needs of staff. 

■ The air from the space should not be 

recirculated.

■ Openings in grills covering supply and 

return air ducts should be small, so as 

to preclude suicide attempts.

■ All edges should be rounded or beveled. Padded surfaces are desirable for 

suicidal inmates, if the padding provides adequate fire protection, satisfies local codes, and is functional and 

durable. 

■ Doors should be heavy-gauge security 

quality with a food passthrough.

An acute medical unit with mental health cells. Note the security doors and 

large windows into the individual cells. 

(Photograph courtesy of Voorhis Robertson Justice Services.)

■ A floor drain should be either in the 

space or just outside it. A remotely 

flushed drain could be beneficial.

■ A shutoff valve for cell plumbing fixtures should be readily accessible to 

staff.

Observation

Issue: Constant observation of suicidal, mentally 

ill, or intoxicated inmates is critical. 

Response: Constant observation of these 

cells requires an effective direct view of the 

space from a constantly staffed post rather 

than through electronic means. Electronic 

surveillance might provide a useful supplement to staff observation. 

In designing the cells for good view, the degree to 

which their face is opened up with windows depends on the location of the cells in relation to a 

staff post. If the cells are located directly adjacent 

to a staff post with no dayroom or other space 

separating them, a smaller window is acceptable 

because the staff can easily go to the window 

and obtain a full view of the cell interior.

If cells are at some distance from a staff post or 

at a point remote from where passing staff will 

look in, it is critical to provide enough glazing 

in the doors and the fronts of the cells to make 

them sufficiently visible. Sufficient view would 

include the ability to see the inmate when lying 

on the bed or using the toilet (while providing 

basic privacy), and to see any spaces in which 

the inmate might attempt to hide.

Location

Issue: Cells for suicidal, mentally ill, or intoxicated inmates might best be located near or in 

the receiving part of the intake-release area. 

Response: Suicidal, mentally ill, or intoxicated individuals can be quite difficult to 
197 

C h a p t e r 1 6 : 

Special Housing

manage. Consequently, it is desirable to 

minimize the amount of movement involved 

in bringing them into the facility and reaching the proper housing area. Placement of 

these cells in or very near the intake-release 

area is very desirable. The key to location, 

however, is the ability to monitor the inmate 

constantly. Periodic observation, such as 

that provided by roving staff, is helpful as a 

supplement but is not recommended as the 

sole source of staff surveillance.

Space List 

The types of inmates with special housing needs 

and the types of spaces that might be provided to 

meet those needs are as follows: 

■ Work release/periodic-sentence inmates:

❏ Vestibule from jail security envelope.

❏ Sleeping rooms.

❏ Dayroom.

❏ Shower/toilet.

❏ Search areas (male/female).

❏ Street clothes storage/change area.

❏ Clean clothes storage/change area.

❏ Laundry.

❏ Secure entry.

■ Inmate workers:

❏ Sleeping rooms/dormitory.

❏ Dayroom.

❏ Shower/toilet.

■ Protective custody inmates/juveniles:

❏ Cells (to accommodate inmates with and 

without disabilities).

❏ Dayroom.

❏ Shower/toilet.

■ Medical isolation inmates:

❏ Cells.

❏ Dayroom.

❏ Shower.

■ Disciplinary detention inmates:

❏ Cells (to accommodate inmates with and 

without disabilities).

❏ Dayroom/vestibule.

❏ Shower.

■ Suicidal/mentally ill/intoxicated inmates:

❏ Cells (to accommodate inmates with and 

without disabilities).

❏ Dayroom/vestibule.

❏ Shower.

■ Staff post.

■ Storage.

■ Janitor closet.

Local codes and ADA guidelines regarding accessibility requirements should be consulted when 

planning these spaces.
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S e c t i o n 3 : 

F u n c t i o n a l C o m p o n e n t s 

Observation from

control post

Observation

from booking

8” high

raised slab

Floor

drain

(optional

flushing) Remote

flush

Hose Washable wall bib and floor

finishes

Relationships and Components

Exhibit 16-8. Relationships Between Special 

Housing Areas and Other Jail Areas

Exhibit 16-11. Components of Suicide/Mental 

Health/Detoxification Observation Cell

Entry

and

search

Sleeping

area

Laundry

Da Security yroom vestibule area

Monitoring view

Toiletshower

Exhibit 16-10. Components of ADA-Compliant Cell

Exhibit 16-9. Components of Work Release Unit

Desk Bed

Grab bars

Areas of needed

clearance indicated

by dashed lines

Door

Toilet Shelf Lavatory hooks

Chase behind

fixtures

Based on the U.S. Department of Justice’s ADA & ABA

Accessibility Guidelines dated July 23, 2004.

Inmate

worker

housing

General

population

male housing

Entry

Work or

periodic Food and release laundry inmates services

Vestibule

Detox Intake- Protective release custody

Housing control Female Medical housing

Inmate Public Visiting programs lobby

Medical

isolation

Disciplinary

detention

Master

control
199

Chapter 17

Health Care

Adequate health-care services are essential 

to the well-being of arrestees and inmates 

and should be viewed as a basic human 

right and a basic responsibility of the jail. The 

purpose is not only to serve the individual’s 

needs, but also to prevent the spread of disease 

within the facility. The activities necessary to 

carry out a complete, yet basic, health-care 

program typically include: 

■ Medical screening at intake to identify 

illnesses or injuries prior to admission.

■ Verification of medications.

■ Suicide screening at intake to identify 

suicide risk.

■ Solicitation of inmate health complaints 

(sick call).

■ Alcohol or drug detoxification.

■ Temporary care of individuals with mental 

illness.

■ Testing for infectious diseases (tuberculosis 

is the most common).

■ Isolation of those with infectious diseases.

■ Routine health appraisal.

■ Emergency and first aid treatment.

■ Administration of medicines.

■ Infirmary care.

■ Emergency dental care.

■ Special medical diets.

■ Health education.

■ Mental health counseling.

■ Cleaning and disinfecting of medical space.

There is considerable variety in how health care 

is provided in jails; that is, some jails provide 

health care at the facility while others take the 

inmate to a clinic or emergency room. Regardless 

of the arrangement for health care, some activities must take place at the facility and require 

appropriate space.

Overall, space allocations for health care in the 

jail need not be extravagant. If local resources 

are used for more costly and extensive services, 

space for health care might range from one area 

for basic examinations, first aid, medications, 

records, and emergency equipment to a separate 

space for each of those basic functions, in addition to any special housing provided. Many larger 

facilities provide for medical examination rooms 

in each housing area in an effort to reduce the 

movement of inmates to and from a centralized 

medical area.

State standards should be reviewed carefully; 

many of them require space for health-care services in jails. These should be checked closely. 

American Correctional Association standards 

(www.aca.org/standards/) contain an extensive 

list of operational and physical plant standards 

regarding the delivery of health-care services in 

local jails. The National Commission on Correctional Health Care (www.ncchc.org/) has also 

published standards for health care in jails and 

guidelines for health-care space and basic equipment. These sources provide valuable information for planning discussions.

Historically, smaller jails have suffered from an absence of proper examination or treatment space and an 

absence of special cells in which to 

house persons who have infectious 

diseases, are intoxicated, or may have mental 

health problems. For some new facilities, the 
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S e c t i o n 3 : 

F u n c t i o n a l C o m p o n e n t s 

space and equipment provided for examinations 

have remained relatively idle because jail budgets are insufficient to pay for full-time, in-house 

health-care staff or because service providers in 

the community will not come to the jail. Many 

health-care practitioners insist that inmates be 

brought to their offices or to local health-care 

facilities. This practice poses both security and 

manpower problems for jail staff. Joint planning 

with local service providers is essential to be able 

to determine appropriate space and equipment 

allocations between the jail and the community 

and to solicit proper involvement at the jail.

Key Decisions

As the role of the health-care component is evaluated, the following decisions should be made 

because they have a fundamental impact on design requirements:

■ To what extent and how frequently will the 

required health-care services actually be 

provided?

■ How many inmates will receive these services?

■ Which of the required health-care services can 

be provided by properly trained jail employees 

(e.g., first aid, initial intake screening, cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR))?

■ Which of the required services can and/or 

should be provided at the jail by health-care 

professionals (e.g., routine examinations, tests, 

dental care, sick call)? 

■ Are doctors, nurses, and dentists available to 

come to the jail as contract service providers, or will the jail hire in-house medical staff 

or contract with a medical service company 

specializing in providing services to detention 

facilities?

■ What services and facilities are available and 

accessible in the community that do not need 

to be duplicated at the jail, and what are the 

economic and security ramifications of using 

them (e.g., transportation, jail officer escorts, 

providing security at the community facility)?

■ What level of special housing will be provided 

at the jail for detoxification, medical isolation, 

minor illnesses, or convalescence? How will 

these areas be supervised and how will proper 

medical care be provided (staff nurse, emergency medical technician)?

■ How will future growth in the jail population 

or future changes in the makeup of the population affect the methods of delivering the various types of medical services? How will space 

and equipment needs be met in the future?

Detail Issues

The following discussion about detailed 

functional-architectural issues is limited to the 

typical health-care functions or spaces common 

to jails; a review of every issue related to health 

care, such as surgery, is not necessary because 

such services are rarely, if ever, provided in a local detention facility. Issues dealing with special 

housing for inmates with infectious diseases or 

mental health problems are addressed in chapter 

16, “Special Housing.”

Examination Area 

The following information applies to examination areas: activities, number of rooms, room 

size, work surface and access, and dental 

examination.

Activities

Issue: Identify all of the activities that will occur 

in the medical area.

Response: Typical activities might include 

the following, depending on agency desires 

and the availability of community resources:
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C h a p t e r 1 7 : 

Health Care

■ Initial screening to identify medical/

mental problems and suicide risk. If 

this task is done by medical staff, it is 

often done in an examination room in 

the intake area.

■ Response to inmate health complaints.

■ Routine health assessments.

■ First aid.

■ Testing for infectious diseases.

■ Mental health screening.

■ Consultations/medical counseling.

■ Emergency equipment storage.

■ Minor treatment procedures (e.g., 

injections, topical applications, 

bandaging).

Medical screening station in the intake area of a large jail. 

(Photograph courtesy of Voorhis Robertson Justice Services.)

Other possible activities include:

■ Records storage.

■ Records preparation and review.

■ Assorted doctor/nurse office functions.

■ Storage of medications.

■ Minor laboratory work.

■ Routine dental work (examinations, fillings, 

extractions).

■ Minor x-ray work.

■ Drug testing (e.g., taking urine specimens).

It is inappropriate to merge office and recordkeeping functions with examination functions if 

it means that the privacy of examinations would 

be violated. For example, it would be inappropriate for a doctor to examine or consult with a patient while a records clerk was nearby managing 

medical files or talking on the telephone.

Number of examination rooms 

Issue: The types of examination activities and 

the projected workload must be identified to 

determine the number of examination rooms 

needed.

Response: Many smaller jails find one examination room to be sufficient. However, 

in larger jails a variety of factors dictates the 

actual number of spaces needed:

■ Significant differences in functions 

and equipment needs (e.g., dental 

versus medical examinations).

■ The variety of tasks to be performed 

in the space, which dictates levels of 

use.

■ The projected number of inmates who 

will use the space.
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F u n c t i o n a l C o m p o n e n t s 

■ The actual number of hours of operation per day or week as they relate 

to the availability of health-care 

professionals.

If more than one examination room is needed, 

preferably the rooms should connect or at least 

be adjacent to each other in a designated medical 

area in the facility.

Typical examination space and equipment.

(Photograph courtesy of Kimme & Associates.)

Room size

Issue: The size of examination rooms will vary 

with the level of care provided.

Response: A basic examination room might 

be defined as a space whose size is determined by the needs of basic first aid and 

basic physical examinations. Such a space 

would probably have the following equipment at a minimum:

■ Examination table (with stirrups).

■ Examination stool or chair, plus a 

chair for the inmate’s use.

■ Examination light.

■ Countertop with sink and gooseneck 

faucet (foot controls for the sink are 

highly recommended).

■ A small writing surface for the doctor 

or nurse.

■ Computer workstation for entering 

medical information.

■ Lockable storage cabinets and 

drawers.

■ Scale with measuring rod and support 

pillar.

■ Footstool.

■ Trash and waste cans.

■ Secure containers for biohazards and 

sharps.

■ Eye chart.

■ Refrigerator to store specimens.

Other basic medical equipment, such as blood 

pressure cuffs, may or may not be mounted 

units. It is important to work with health-care 

providers to determine their functional and 

equipment needs.

A space as small as 80 net square feet could be 

adequate to meet minimum functions and equipment requirements. A space of 100 net square 

feet would be more comfortable and more typical 

of standard expectations in the field. A space of 

180 net square feet or more might be required if 

minor emergency care and additional treatment 

procedures are performed (such as changing 

dressings or eye or ear irrigations).

Work surface and access. Two of the key variables 

used to determine the minimum space required 

for medical examinations are the need for work 
203 

C h a p t e r 1 7 : 

Health Care

surfaces and for access around the examination 

table. A work surface or desk is needed to allow 

the doctor or nurse to write a report, to hold a 

computer if inmates’ files are computerized, 

and to accommodate a sink and the temporary 

placement of equipment and supplies that are 

used during the examination.

Access around the examination table can be 

from one side to four sides. Access on two 

sides is the minimum acceptable for routine 

examinations and first aid; access on four sides 

is preferred because it allows for a full range of 

services, including emergency medical treatment 

(exhibit 17–1).

Exhibit 17-1. Access Around Examination Table

Exam Exam

Dental examinations. Many jails provide space for 

dental examinations and routine dental care in 

the facility. Dental exam spaces can range from 

90 to 150 net square feet for a single examination 

unit. The extent of services to be provided determines the size of the space (i.e., visual examinations only, or also x-rays and dental procedures 

such as extracting or filling teeth)? Sample equipment includes:

■ Dental chair (approximately 27 inches wide 

× 75 inches long reclined).

■ Dental unit (drills, lights, air line, water lines, 

tray).

■ Area for an air compressor to power the dental unit, which is outside of the examination 

room.

■ Evacuating system.

■ Lockable storage cabinets and drawers.

■ Countertop and sink.

■ Sterilizer.

■ Waste and trash cans.

■ Secure containers for biohazards and sharps.

■ Stools for the dentist and assistant.

■ X-ray viewer. 

■ X-ray machine, which also requires a protected 

area and lead-lined aprons.

Dental examination room in jail health-care area. 

(Photograph courtesy of Kimme & Associates.)

The need for examination space will increase if 

both medical and dental examinations will be 

performed in one area. All examination rooms 

should be sized to allow for the greatest access 
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S e c t i o n 3 : 

F u n c t i o n a l C o m p o n e n t s 

and use and should be able to accommodate a 

stretcher.

Location/security 

Issue: Examination rooms should be located at 

an area in the jail that accommodates safety, 

security, and service delivery needs.

Response: Examination rooms should be 

located on or near a main circulation corridor to facilitate quick, easy access by inmate patients and staff, especially from the 

intake-release area if examination space is 

not available in the intake area. Normally, 

security staff should not have a direct view 

into the examination rooms for privacy reasons, but it is important for them to monitor 

the flow of traffic in and out of the medical 

area. A window that can be screened or 

shuttered would be appropriate to provide 

selective observation. In many cases, an officer will be assigned to monitor the medical 

area when it is in use. Often that officer will 

also escort the inmates to and from the area 

as part of his/her duties.

When direct observation of the medical area is 

not possible, it might be useful to equip the doors 

with a status indicator light that signals whether 

the doors are open or closed. This alerts staff to 

tampering, particularly at times when the area 

is not in use. Closed-circuit television is also a 

useful monitoring tool, as is an intercom system 

between the area and the post responsible for 

monitoring the area. Master control is the constantly staffed post that most likely should monitor the examination area, if electronic systems are 

used to monitor the area.

Security 

Issue: The security of medical personnel in examination areas should be ensured.

Response: Health-care personnel will often 

be alone with inmate patients, creating 

the potential for exposure to violent or aggressive behavior. Although master control 

might monitor the door to the examination 

area or cameras in the medical waiting area 

and roving security staff may be posted 

outside the area, an alarm system might 

be necessary. The alarm system might consist of a body alarm, a panic button, or a 

voice-activated intercom set at decibel levels 

above normal conversation (so that private 

conversations cannot be routinely monitored). Whatever system is chosen, it is important to preserve privacy and to be able to 

prove that privacy was preserved.

Issue: Equipment and supplies in the examination area must be secured.

Response: There must be a way to securely 

store in lockable drawers or cabinets all of 

the small, detached equipment items (e.g., 

scissors, percussion hammers, syringes 

and needles) and supplies (e.g., bandages, 

tongue depressors) found in an examination 

area. 

Communication 

Issue: Two-way communications between the 

examination area and a constantly staffed post 

and to parties outside of the facility should be 

provided.

Response: A telephone or intercom allows 

the health-care provider to notify staff about 

the completion of examinations, request the 

next patient, obtain information, be alerted 

to an emergency, and relay any other necessary information. Telephone access to 

the outside allows the health-care provider 

to order medications and make referrals. 

Medical staff are often assigned a radio to 
205 

C h a p t e r 1 7 : 

Health Care

communicate with facility staff and monitor 

calls for medical assistance.

Environmental issues 

Issue: The basic environmental needs of examination areas should be accommodated.

Response: Various significant environmental 

concerns should be accommodated in an 

examination area:

■ Lighting should be sufficient to conduct required examinations, maintain 

records, and so forth. Special examination lights may not be required, 

depending on the nature of the examinations and the equipment requested 

by the health-care provider.

■ Natural light is a pleasing feature in 

an examination room, especially if 

medical staff will also use this space 

as an office (exhibit 17-2). If natural 

light is provided, care must be taken 

to provide security as well as visual 

privacy.

Exhibit 17-2. Examination Room Designed for 

Natural Light

Natural

light

Exam room

■ Acoustic privacy is required so that 

confidential discussions about health 

care remain private and a professional 

atmosphere is created. Insulating walls 

and ceiling plenums, using acoustically treated hollow metal or solidcore wood doors, prevent sound travel 

through duct systems and can help in 

this regard.

■ Temperature levels should be comfortable and, perhaps, controllable within 

the space. Ventilation should meet all 

required codes to ensure proper conditions and prevent recirculation of contaminated air.

■ If x-rays are performed in the examination area, even on a small scale, 

proper precautions must be taken 

in the design of the room to protect 

health-care personnel, staff, and 

inmates.

■ Cleanliness of the area is essential and 

can be enhanced by the proper selection of materials and finishes. A janitor’s closet should be easily accessible 

for routine cleaning and occasional 

spills.

Medication Storage 

The following functional design issues apply 

to the storage and distribution of medication: 

activities, size, location, security, and special 

characteristics.

Activities 

Issue: Medication storage and distribution 

needs should be determined.

Response: Some of the typical activities 

found at jails include: 

■ Securely storing each inmate’s 

prescription medicines.
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S e c t i o n 3 : 

F u n c t i o n a l C o m p o n e n t s 

■ Securely storing quantities of commonly used medicines.

■ Securely storing medicines that need 

refrigeration.

■ Preparing medicines for distribution.

■ Distributing medicines and storing 

trays or carts used in distribution.

■ Documenting prescription needs and 

distribution.

■ Performing an inventory of available 

supplies.

■ Keeping track of distribution 

schedules.

The actual preparation of prescriptions is a function that could, but does not typically, occur at 

most jails because a jail pharmacist’s salary 

usually cannot be justified. Most often a pharmacy or hospital will fill prescriptions issued 

by a physician. A licensed nurse is typically responsible for dispensing the medications to the 

inmates. In some small facilities, the medications 

are distributed to the inmates by correctional 

staff; however, this practice is fraught with problems, including proper training and compliance 

with state laws.

Size 

Issue: The size of the area needed for storage 

and distribution of medication will depend on the 

extent of the activities involved.

Response: Usually a single storage area is 

sufficient. The secure area used to store 

medication can be as small as a secure cabinet in an examination room or as large as 

30 to 40 net square feet, depending on the 

activities required, security and operational 

policy, and the projected number of inmates 

to be served. The area’s size also depends 

on whether it is part of the examination 

area, which would allow necessary features 

(such as sinks and work surfaces) to be 

shared rather than duplicated.

Cart Refrigerator

Work surface

with sink

Lockable

medication

cabinets above

Exhibit 17-3. Medication Storage Area

In general, this area should be well organized 

and have sufficient space for a countertop with 

a sink (exhibit 17-3). Lockable base cabinets and 

wall cabinets with undercabinet lighting are useful. A secure cabinet must be provided to store 

prescription narcotics. The medication storage 

area should also include a wall-mounted tack 

board for charts and schedules; a telephone or 

intercom; a lockable refrigerator for medicine, 

urine, and blood specimens; and a surface for 

report writing or documentation that may also 

accommodate a computer terminal.

In large jail systems, it is becoming more common to use medication dispensing machines like 

those used in hospitals. When medications are 

stored in cabinets, it may be easy to select the 

wrong medication or dose. Staff members may 

also forget to record what they select or administer. Dispensing machines often have mechanisms 

to help prevent these errors; for example, the 

machine can require that a patient identification 

number be entered before a medication will be 

dispensed. Many dispensing machines can also 

interface with medical computer systems to integrate their data with information from order 

entry systems and medication administration records. Dispensing machines can also issue alerts 
207 

C h a p t e r 1 7 : 

Health Care

and ask whether an adverse drug event has occurred whenever the machine dispenses a common reversal agent or antidote. 

Location 

Issue: The location of the medication storage 

area should accommodate frequent use and 

convenient access by authorized staff.

Response: It is important to monitor the area 

in which medication is stored, preferably 

by a direct line of sight from a constantly 

staffed post. This is especially important if 

inmates are brought to the area to receive 

their medications.

The relationship of the medications storage area 

to the inmate housing areas is important regardless of whether staff bring medications to the 

inmates or the inmates go to the medical area to 

receive their medications.

Medication storage and distribution areas generally consist of one of the following:

■ A secure cabinet within the examination room.

■ An enclosed medical storage and distribution 

space opening off the examination room.

■ An enclosed medical storage and distribution 

space adjacent to but independent of the examination room.

This decision is based in part on a potential conflict that could occur if the examination room 

is being used when access to medications is required (exhibit 17-4).

Exhibit 17-4. Possible Locations of Medication 

Storage Area

Exam Exam Exam

Medicine

cabinet

Medications

closet

Medications

closet

In cases where daily dosages are prepared in 

advance during a nurse or doctor visit, a second 

medication storage cabinet might be provided in 

a secure staff post such as master control. This 

facilitates staff distribution of medicines while 

preserving the security of the main medication 

storage area.

In medium and large facilities, more significant 

space is usually provided to facilitate medication 

storage and distribution and cart preparation.

Security 

Issue: The medications storage area is available 

to medical or security personnel only and it must 

be secure from break-in.

Response: This area should have highly 

controlled access and be separate from 

other storage areas in the jail. If possible, 

only health-care staff, or a limited number 

of health-trained security staff who are expressly authorized to distribute medications 

when health-care personnel are absent from 

the facility, should have access to this area. 

Some additional considerations include:

■ Ensure security not only through locks and 

monitored security doors accessing the medications storage area, but also through the 

construction of fully secure walls, floors, and/

or ceilings if secure walls do not extend to the 

roof or floor construction above.

■ Secure the ductwork and any other penetrations in the area through which inmates might 

gain access.

■ Create at least two locked barriers between the 

area where medications are stored and areas 

where inmates are frequently present.
208

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F u n c t i o n a l C o m p o n e n t s 

Special characteristics 

Issue: The contents of the medications storage 

area are subject to frequent inventory.

Response: Shelf design enhances the inventory process. Undercabinet and shelf lighting along with moveable (rather than rigid) 

shelving facilitates the organization and 

inventory process.

Miscellaneous Issues 

The following functional-architectural issues address other elements that might be part of an 

examination area configuration or that might 

be separate health-care spaces: record storage, 

staff work area/offices, first aid kits, emergency 

equipment, toilet facilities, inmate waiting, and 

personal protective equipment kits. All of these 

elements are appropriate and are fairly common 

in jails.

Record storage 

Issue: Secure medical record storage should be 

provided.

Response: The following considerations 

should guide the development of storage 

areas for medical records.

■ Health records are confidential and 

should be kept secure and separate 

from other inmate records and under 

the custody of medical personnel only.

■ The key to proper location of health 

records is that they must be accessible 

to health-care staff work areas and 

highly secured from casual access by 

unauthorized staff or inmates.

■ Computerized medical records should 

be stored on a secure server in either a 

secured computer equipment room or 

off site.

Staff work area 

Issue: A work area for health-care personnel 

should be provided.

Response: An area should be provided to 

write reports and prescriptions, complete 

forms, and store forms and supplies. In 

smaller jails where health-care personnel visit only periodically (once or twice 

a week), a small work area with lockable 

storage files is satisfactory. Lockable storage for equipment owned by health-care 

staff should also be accommodated. Office 

space separate from the examination area is 

desirable for full-time medical personnel in 

the jail or for community medical personnel 

who spend substantial amounts of nonexamination time at the jail. Additional considerations include:

■ Separate office space should be adjacent to, but not accessible solely 

through, the examination space.

■ If health-care personnel are available 

24 hours a day and medical isolation 

cells are also provided, consider creating a direct-view link between the two 

areas.

■ Work areas should have telephones 

with outside lines and should have an 

alarm system (e.g., a voice-activated 

intercom or panic button) if inmates 

are ever in the space alone with staff. 

Space should be provided for a computer terminal and printer to facilitate 

recordkeeping.

■ Office space should be large enough 

to accommodate private consultations 

and record storage as well as staff 

needs for work surfaces and personal 

storage. Information about private 

medical or mental health counseling 
209 

C h a p t e r 1 7 : 

Health Care

areas is provided in chapter 20, 

“Programs and Services.”

■ Work areas should have visual and 

acoustic privacy. However, if a partial 

view is desired at certain times, consider the placement of a side light in 

the wall of the area that can be covered by curtains or blinds when privacy is desired.

First aid kits 

Issue: First aid kits should be available in all 

housing areas and control rooms.

Response: First aid kits should be standard 

equipment in all jails. They should be readily accessible to staff but secured from inmate access and tampering.

Medical emergency equipment 

Issue: Storage needs for medical emergency 

equipment should be accommodated.

Response: In addition to first aid kits, the 

following medical emergency equipment is 

necessary for proper emergency response, in 

even the smallest jail: 

■ Wheelchair.

■ Nebulizer.

■ Cardiopulmonary resuscitation masks.

■ Stretcher.

■ Crutches and/or walkers.

■ Defibrillator.

■ Oxygen.

■ Splints.

These items should be stored in a secure and 

controlled space. However, unlike areas used to 

store medications and medical records, the space 

for emergency equipment must be easily accessible to staff on all shifts as well as to health-care 

personnel.

Toilet facilities 

Issue: Toilet facilities should be available in the 

health-care area.

Response: Health-care staff should have access to an accessible staff toilet that is close 

to, but not necessarily in, the health-care 

area. A private, accessible inmate toilet 

should be located close to or in the healthcare component for obtaining samples as 

well as for general use by inmates. In addition to separate detention-quality toilets and 

sink fixtures, the area should have a tamperproof mirror, soap dispenser, towel dispenser, and waste receptacle. A small shelf 

for samples should also be provided unless 

there is sufficient surface area on the sink.

Inmate waiting

Issue: The need for inmate waiting areas should 

be identified.

Response: A separate, secure inmate waiting area would be needed when groups 

of two or more inmates are brought to the 

health-care area at the same time. Waiting 

in groups by standing or sitting in adjacent 

corridors is discouraged, especially if it occurs in a high-traffic corridor or a corridor 

that serves as a primary means of egress. 

Some considerations include:

■ Appropriate seating should be provided for the inmate waiting area. This 

area should be adjacent to the examination area and, preferably, should be 

visible from a constantly staffed post.

■ Space for the inmate waiting area 

should be about 12 to 15 net square 

feet per person, which is adequate 
210

S e c t i o n 3 : 

F u n c t i o n a l C o m p o n e n t s 

for both seating and for movement 

around the seating area.

Personal protective equipment kits 

Issue: Personal protective equipment kits should 

be available.

Response: Personal protective equipment 

kits to protect staff from inmate body fluids 

should be standard equipment. These kits 

commonly contain plastic bags for waste 

that is contaminated by body fluids, disposable gloves, germicide hand cleaner, a CPR 

barrier, a gown, a surgical mask, and goggles. Equipment for the disposal of sharps 

(e.g., needles) should also be available.

Personal protective equipment kits should be 

located where they are readily accessible to staff 

but secured from inmate tampering. Lockable 

wall-mounted kits near intake-release and inmate 

housing are preferable.

Waiting area in a large jail medical clinic.

(Photograph courtesy of Voorhis Robertson Justice Services.)

Space List 

Some of the typical spaces that might be found in 

the health-care component include:

■ Examination/treatment room(s).

■ Secure medications storage and distribution.

■ Secure records storage.

■ Staff work area (offices).

■ Storage closet.

■ Emergency equipment storage.

■ Inmate toilet.

■ Inmate waiting area.

■ Dental examination room.

■ Janitor’s closet.

■ Housing (see chapter 16, “Special Housing”).

Local codes and Americans with Disabilities Act 

guidelines regarding accessibility requirements 

should be consulted when planning these spaces.

Additional health-care spaces that might be 

found in a jail include:

■ Staff lockers.

■ Treatment room (for minor surgeries or emergency treatments separate from examinations).

■ Sterile storage room.

■ Soiled linens workroom.

■ Reception/clerical.

■ X-ray room.

■ Dental operating room.

■ Laboratory.

■ Biohazard storage.

■ Clean and dirty utility storage.
211 

C h a p t e r 1 7 : 

Health Care

Relationships and Components 

Exhibit 17-5. Relationships in Health-Care Area

Examination

Medical

office and

records

Inmate

waiting

Medical

isolation

Medical

equipment

storage

Toilet

Intakerelease

area

Control

To inmate

housing

Exhibit 17-6. Component Diagram of 

Health-Care Area

Office Inmate

waiting

Work counter

with sink

Exam

table

Wallmounted

exam

light

Toilet

Medications

supply Cart

Refrigerator
213

Chapter 18

Visiting Areas

V

isiting is one of the crucial links between 

inmates and the community. It provides 

a way for inmates to communicate (other 

than by telephone or mail) with family, friends, 

and other community members, such as attorneys and clergy members from outside the 

jail. Visiting is extremely important to inmates 

because it enables them to keep in touch with 

family members, friends, business associates, 

ministers, and attorneys. Because visiting is so 

important to inmates, it is one of the jail’s most 

effective tools in managing their behavior. 

In older jails, visiting commonly occurred in the 

cellblocks rather than in areas set aside specifically for visiting. These cellblock areas were 

characterized by a complete lack of privacy; 

physical conditions dangerous for staff, visitors, 

and inmates; and poor security features. Visitors and inmates had to stand, view each other 

through tiny vision ports, and strain to speak and 

be heard through heavily meshed “voice boxes” 

in spaces with very poor acoustic qualities. The 

introduction of contraband was a significant 

problem given the visiting area’s location within 

the security envelope.

In modern jails, visits with friends and family usually occur in private, noncontact spaces 

where physical comfort and limited privacy are 

better afforded. These design improvements reflect case law that has condemned the lack of 

quality visiting space and conditions.

Recently, the use of “video” visitation has become more common—the visitor communicates 

with the inmate via a video monitor located either in the jail lobby or at another location. The 

inmate has access to visitors using a booth located most often in the housing area or at another 

location within the secure perimeter. The advantage to video visitation is that it eliminates any 

possibility of passing contraband and reduces the 

security required for inmate visitation. The cost 

of installing a video visitation system is often offset by the decrease in staff costs associated with 

visiting (i.e., screening visitors, moving inmates 

to a centrally located visiting area, supervising 

visits).

Contact visiting tends to be limited to attorneys, 

counselors, and other “professional” visitors; contact visits with family, when permitted, are usually limited to low-security inmates such as inmate 

workers or others during special occasions at the 

discretion of jail officials. In some jurisdictions, 

contact visiting is accommodated in multipurpose 

rooms and outdoor recreation yards.

A variety of spaces are needed for visiting,

including:

■ Space for both noncontact and contact visiting 

for both personal and professional visitors.

Video visitation stations for the public. 

(Photograph courtesy of Liebert & Associates.)
214

S e c t i o n 3 : 

F u n c t i o n a l C o m p o n e n t s 

■ Visiting facilities that accommodate inmates 

and visitors who have disabilities.

■ A visitor reception desk or area in or adjacent 

to the public lobby.

■ A visitor waiting area that has public restrooms, a telephone, and a drinking fountain.

■ A storage area for visitors’ personal property 

that is prohibited from visiting areas (essential 

for contact visiting).

■ An area in which to search inmates in privacy 

following their visit (essential for contact 

visiting).

■ An area for occasional searches of visitors suspected of carrying contraband. 

Courts have generally held that inmates should 

be allowed to visit with family, friends, religious 

advisers, prospective employers, and the news 

media within a reasonable jail schedule. Virtually 

all states and national agencies with jail standards require and address the provision of visiting opportunities and facilities. Planners should 

check applicable state standards for mandatory 

requirements.

Outdoor area used for family contact visits at a minimum-security facility.

(Photograph courtesy of Voorhis Robertson Justice Services.)

Key Decisions

As the role of the visiting component is evaluated, the following decisions will have a fundamental effect on design requirements:

■ How much space should be provided for visiting? How many inmates will be able to visit at 

the same time and how many visitors will be 

allowed to visit with each inmate? How long 

will visits last? How much access to visiting is 

required by standards? 

■ Will visitors move to a visiting area located 

next to inmate living areas or will inmates 

move to a central visiting area located near 

the public entry?

■ Will inmates be allowed to have contact visits 

with family or lawyers and, if so, which classifications of inmates will be allowed to do so? 

How will staff be made available for intensive 

screening of visitors and searches of inmates? 

Will space be dedicated for contact visiting or 

will some other space (such as a multipurpose 

room) be used?

■ Will inmates and visitors communicate over 

a telephone or more directly (e.g., via a sound 

port)?

■ Will video visiting technologies be used to 

either replace or supplement certain forms of 

visiting? If so, how will it work and where will 

it be done?

■ Which staff post will supervise the visiting 

area? How will inmate movement to visiting 

areas be monitored?

■ Where will visitors be received? Who will receive them? How will packages, money, and 

other items that visitors bring to inmates be 

processed?
215 

C h a p t e r 1 8 : 

Visiting Areas

Detail Issues

The following detailed functional-architectural 

issues should be considered in the development 

of the visiting component: activities, the size of 

spaces, the number of visiting stations, location/

movement, security, and quality.

Activities 

Issue: It must be determined how basic visiting 

activities will be accommodated, which staff 

member will conduct or supervise them, and 

where they will take place.

Response: The following activities usually 

pertain to visiting:

■ The visitor arrives and is registered 

and screened for security (person and 

materials) by staff. It is common to 

prohibit visitors from bringing items 

(e.g., purses, diaper bags, heavy 

coats) into visiting. Attorneys are 

often allowed to bring in legal paperwork, which must be searched. Often, 

there are limits on briefcases and the 

amount of paperwork that is allowed.

■ Staff determines which inmate the 

visitor desires to see and whether the 

visit will be allowed.

■ The visitor is directed to the waiting 

area and is informed about rules and 

length of visits.

■ The visitor stores personal property 

(e.g., coats, hats, purses) in the locker 

area. 

■ Staff determines where the inmate is 

and either communicates with other 

staff, who will escort the inmate to 

the visiting area, or escorts the inmate 

personally (assuming visiting is 

centralized).

■ The inmate and visitor are escorted 

to the visiting booth or room after the 

visitor is scanned by a metal detector 

and perhaps pat searched if it is a contact visit. 

■ Staff supervises the visit, ensuring 

that behavior is acceptable and within 

rules (especially important with contact visiting and official interviews).

■ Staff informs parties that the visit is 

over or responds to their request to 

end the visit.

■ Staff observes the inmate’s return to 

the housing area (he or she may be 

subject to some form of search) and 

the visitor returns to the waiting area.

■ The visitor is checked out and any 

stored property is returned.

Size of Spaces 

Issue: The size of visiting spaces is determined 

by the number of users and by comfort and security considerations.

Response: The size of noncontact visiting 

spaces is determined by the following 

considerations:

■ Spaces should be wide enough to comfortably 

accommodate more than one visitor and one 

inmate at the same time. If no information is 

available to determine a proportion, design at 

least half of the noncontact spaces as double 

stations to accommodate two visitors (exhibit 

18-1).

■ Spaces should be deep enough to allow 

visitors to:

❏ Sit rather than stand (chairs should be 

provided).
216

S e c t i o n 3 : 

F u n c t i o n a l C o m p o n e n t s 

❏ Have adequate privacy screening on either 

side of the space (without screening staff’s 

view).

❏ Move comfortably around and behind the 

space (especially if moveable chairs are 

used).

It is recommended that the depth of the visiting area be sufficient to accommodate a small 

counter surface for leaning or writing.

■ Determine whether each individual visiting 

station is a fully enclosed space or if it shares 

space with a series of other visiting stations. If 

an enclosed space is chosen for greater privacy 

and control, allow extra space because these 

enclosures can feel quite confining. Allow for 

movement into and out of chairs and for door 

swings (the inmate side should swing out, if 

possible).

■ The dimensions should be sufficient to allow 

access by inmates or visitors with disabilities, 

particularly those in wheelchairs. Flexibility 

in seating is important to consider as well. If 

security seating is generally preferred, consider 

detention-quality swing-out seating to allow 

wheelchair access.

Exhibit 18-1. Single and Double Visiting Stations

Single station

Double station

Contact visiting spaces should be sized based on 

the number of users and types of activities. For 

contact with professional visitors, spaces should 

be fully enclosed and private, if possible. In most 

cases, two users are involved: the inmate and the 

visitor (lawyer, bondsperson, counselor). A desk 

surface and chairs are also required.

Occasionally more than one visitor may be involved in a contact visit with an inmate. If this 

possibility exists, at least one area of sufficient 

size should be available to accommodate this 

circumstance.

The jail administration may want to consider allowing contact visits to occur in a multipurpose 

room with different visiting groups sharing the 

space at the same time. This is more common in 

minimum-security housing areas. In this case, 

the space should be large enough to allow sufficient distance between the groups to retain some 

degree of privacy. Large numbers of people generate enough sound to mask each other’s conversations (as occurs in a restaurant). 

Open-backed visiting stations within one large enclosed visiting room, all 

with good visibility and easy accessibility.

(Photograph courtesy of Liebert & Associates.)

For security reasons, primarily concerning passage of contraband, it is recommended that contact visiting not occur in inmate program and 

service areas such as a multipurpose room. (See 
217 

C h a p t e r 1 8 : 

Visiting Areas

chapter 20, “Programs and Services,” for further 

discussion on this topic.)

Issue: Visitor waiting areas must be sized 

appropriately.

Response: The size of the visitor waiting 

areas should be determined based on the 

following considerations:

■ Visitors usually wait in the public lobby. If the building serves law enforcement, courts, and other functions, 

the total lobby area should be large 

enough to accommodate waiting visitors. However, if the lobby is restricted 

to jail functions or if jail visitors wait 

in a space separate from the public 

lobby, that space should provide at 

least 15 square feet per person (preferably 20 square feet to allow for adequate circulation). 

■ The number of expected visitors must 

be determined, which largely depends 

on how visiting is administered at the 

jail. In jails that offer open visiting 

(i.e., unscheduled visiting that is done 

on a “first come, first served” basis), 

the maximum number of visitors must 

be determined and the space designed 

accordingly. Ideally, visiting is scheduled so that the number of visitors 

in the area at any one time can be 

predicted accurately. For example, if 

the jail can accommodate 10 visits at 

one time, allows half-hour visits, and 

provides 2 hours of visiting time per 

day, jail staff could expect to have no 

more than 10 to 20 people waiting at 

one time to accommodate 40 total visits in a scheduled situation (based on 

1 or 2 visitors per inmate visit). However, in an unscheduled situation, it is 

possible that 40 to 80 visitors (1 or 2 

visitors per inmate) could arrive at the 

jail at the same time, thus requiring 

substantially more square footage in 

the lobby/waiting area.

■ Waiting areas should also provide 

space for visitor lockers. The amount 

of space required for the lockers depends on the number of lockers needed, which in turn is dependent on: 

❏ The number of visitors in the facility at 

any one time who need lockers.

❏ The amount of items to be stored in the 

lockers.

❏ The size of each locker.

Lockers do not need to be in a separate space. 

They can be part of the visitor waiting area or in 

an alcove just off the waiting area. Locker size 

depends on the items to be stored (normally 

coats, hats, purses, and briefcases) and the manner in which articles of clothing are to be stored 

(folded or on hangers). Visitor lockers should 

not be confused with the secure weapons storage 

lockers required at all ingress points to the facility. (More information about lockers is given later 

in this chapter).

The inmate waiting area is another consideration. 

It may be desirable to have a waiting area for 

those inmates who are ready to move into the 

visiting space during the next visiting period. 

This area might be a separate room or a small alcove located near an access corridor. It should be 

under direct staff surveillance or supervision because inmates of different classifications may be 

waiting at the same time. If this occurs, it may be 

prudent to provide separate or segmented waiting 

areas (all observable from a single point).

Other elements related to the public lobby (such 

as toilets, telephones, and drinking fountains) 

should be accessible from the waiting area/lobby, 
218

S e c t i o n 3 : 

F u n c t i o n a l C o m p o n e n t s 

as discussed in chapter 24, “Administration and 

Public Areas.” All elements should be accessible 

to persons with disabilities.

Number of Visiting Stations

Issue: The number of separate visiting stations 

needed depends on the projected number of 

visitors and on how visitors will be scheduled.

Response: To determine the number of visiting stations, the following factors must be 

considered:

■ How many visits each inmate will 

have per week, on average.

■ How long each visit will be, on average or at minimum.

■ How many hours will be set aside 

per week for visiting (e.g., Monday, 

Wednesday, and Friday, 5 p.m. to 8 

p.m., and Saturday and Sunday, noon 

to 5 p.m., would total 19 hours per 

week).

■ Visitation needs when the jail population is at a peak (occasionally beyond 

design capacity).

Following are some assumptions regarding the 

factors that affect space needs for fully occupied 

jails. These factors are then applied to a sample 

formula that shows how to calculate the number 

of stations needed (exhibit 18-2).

The formula used to calculate the number of 

stations is:

For the 60-bed jail example above, the formula 

works out as:

These calculations should be done separately for 

both contact and noncontact visiting.

Location/Movement 

Issue: The method selected for providing inmate 

and public access to visiting areas can greatly 

influence facility design.

Response: In general, there are two basic arrangements for a noncontact visit between 

an inmate and a visitor. Each has a major 

impact on design:

Exhibit 18-2. Sample Visiting Assumptions

Assumption 60-Bed Jail 150-Bed Jail

Visits per inmate 

each week 

(average)

1.5 1.5

Total visits 

each week

90 225

Average length 

of visit (hours)

1 1

Total weekly 

visiting hours 

available

19 19

Peak factor (for 

irregularity in 

visiting patterns)

1.6 1.5

Number of 

stations = total visits × length of visit × peak factor 

total weekly visiting 

hours available

Number of 

stations = 90 × 1.0 × 1.6 = 7.57 (or 8) stations 

19 hours
219 

C h a p t e r 1 8 : 

Visiting Areas

■ Moving the inmate to the visitor (customary). This usually requires significant staff time because inmates must 

be taken from their living areas to a 

visiting area near the public lobby, unless movement can be achieved without escort by properly locating staff 

posts and/or closed-circuit television 

cameras (exhibit 18-3).

■ Moving the visitor to the inmate. This 

is done via a separate circulation corridor from the public lobby to visiting 

stations outside of, but adjacent to, 

inmate housing. Inmates enter the 

visiting booth directly from their dayroom without staff escort. In favorable 

circumstances, visitors can also move 

unescorted through separate visitor 

corridors to minimize demands on 

staff.

Accommodating visitors at the housing units 

presents problems because the visitor must move 

deep into the facility, although outside the secure 

envelop of the housing areas, to reach the housing units. There are two key considerations with 

this concept:

■ A second, totally secure visitor corridor must 

be created to ensure that the jail’s security 

envelope is not violated. This is frequently 

Corridor

Visiting Housing Master control control

To inmate

housing

Exhibit 18-3. Moving the Inmate to the Visitor 

achieved by constructing a second corridor 

above the primary inmate corridor (exhibit 

18-4). There are no penetrations in this corridor that allow access to inmate areas. Egress 

from this corridor should be down a secure, 

dedicated elevator or set of stairs or through a 

secure exit that does not involve the security 

envelope of the jail.

■ The visiting areas at the housing unit must 

provide sight and sound privacy but allow for 

the officer in the housing area to supervise the 

area.

For the small jail in particular, this 

approach to visiting must be closely 

evaluated. It could create unnecessary 

expense and complications because 

moving inmates to a central visiting 

area does not normally involve great distances 

or many people at one time. Therefore, this idea 

does not offer the time, movement, and staffsaving elements that make the concept attractive 

to medium and large jails.

Video visiting 

Visiting using video equipment (cameras and 

monitors) changes the discussion of location considerably. Installation of a video visiting system 

essentially allows the public visitor to stay in or 

near the lobby or even at a remote location and it 

Cell

Cell Dayroom

Visiting Security perimeter

Visitor corridor

outside of security

perimeter

Secure

inmate

corridor

Exhibit 18-4. Secure Visitor Corridor 

Constructed Above the Primary Inmate Corridor
220

S e c t i o n 3 : 

F u n c t i o n a l C o m p o n e n t s 

allows the inmate to stay in or near the housing 

unit. This method negates concerns about security and passage of contraband that are usually 

associated with visiting.

The use of video, however, does not negate the 

need to create private visiting stations for the 

inmate and the visitor. In addition, it creates the 

need for designs that protect the equipment at 

both locations while allowing for easy maintenance. Nonetheless, staff time and effort can be 

saved due to reduced inmate movement, security 

searches, and staff surveillance.

In assessing the appropriateness of video visiting, local laws and statutes must be taken into 

account and fears of illegal monitoring must be 

addressed, although it is often allowable to monitor or record nonprofessional visits. The quality 

of the visit must also be evaluated in terms of 

its consistency with the facility’s mission and its 

effectiveness in satisfying programmatic and behavior management goals.

Arrestee visiting 

The visiting access needs of arrestees in the 

intake-release area should also be considered. An 

arrestee may need to consult with family members or a bondsperson about release arrangements. One response might be to place a visiting 

station in the intake-release area. Such a space 

should:

■ Have a controllable access point for the visitor, 

especially if access is directly from outside.

■ Be noncontact, constructed with security partitions, security ceilings and floors, security 

glazing and framing, and a secure means of 

communication.

■ Be monitored by staff.

■ Have a secure paper pass for obtaining signatures on papers, if appropriate to the operational policy.

Visitors checking in for video visits in a large outdoor waiting area.

(Photograph courtesy of Voorhis Robertson Justice Services.)

Security 

Issue: Certain safeguards must be implemented 

to maintain security and prevent the passage of 

contraband during visitation.

Response: The following considerations help 

provide adequate security for the visiting 

component: 

■ All visitors should be required to pass 

through a metal detector to screen for 

weapons prior to entering the jail’s 

visiting area. This typically requires a 

staff member to be posted at the point 

of access to the visiting area to operate 

the machine, but this position can often double as the reception point. This 

position should be supported by direct 

visual monitoring from a constantly 

staffed post, such as master control.

■ All nonprofessional visitors who participate in contact or noncontact visiting will normally be required to place 

all personal belongings and outer garments in a locked storage space in the 
221 

C h a p t e r 1 8 : 

Visiting Areas

public lobby. Lockers might be operated using a coin, token, or key, depending on whether jail staff have control 

over them. If staff control the use of 

the lockers, planners must decide who 

will issue the token or key and how 

issuance and return will be accomplished. If coins are used to access the 

lockers, planners must decide if the 

coin will be returned or kept to offset 

the costs of maintaining the lockers.

■ An area should be designated to 

search inmates privately, particularly 

after contact visits.

■ Signs should be posted that alert visitors to the fact that they are subject to 

search if there is reasonable belief that 

they threaten staff, inmate, or public 

safety.

■ Signs should be posted in the public lobby to inform the public about 

rules and regulations for visiting (e.g., 

length of visit, acceptable behavior, 

proper attire) and the sanctions for 

violation of the rules.

■ Access to visiting should be through a 

security vestibule controlled by staff, 

rather than directly from the waiting 

area/lobby (exhibit 18-5).

■ Staff should be posted so they can 

visually monitor the visiting area and 

the security vestibule.

■ A means of communication should be 

provided for staff to speak to visitors 

and inmates in facility designs where 

the supervising officer is posted outside the visiting area. Communications 

are needed to correct misbehavior as 

well as to announce the beginning and 

end of visiting periods.

■ A means of communication by which 

visitors can voluntarily speak to supervising staff should be considered. 

It should be physically activated by 

the visitor rather than voice activated 

to avoid accusations of unauthorized 

monitoring and privacy violations.

■ The wall separating the visitor and 

the inmate should be part of a defined 

internal security zone (if not the main 

security envelope) that precludes 

penetration. This includes the vision 

panel, panel framing, and the communication device used if it forms part 

of the wall’s security. The ceiling and 

floor elements that help form the zone 

also should be constructed securely.

Quality 

Issue: The quality of the visiting area is important in responding to the needs of both the visitor and the inmate.

Response: There are a variety of ways in 

which the integrity and quality of the visit 

can be reinforced in design.

■ Communication between the visitor 

and the inmate in noncontact visiting 

must be of good quality (sufficiently 

loud and clear). The best way to 

Control

Lobby

Security

vestibule

Inmate side

Noncontact visiting

Exhibit 18-5. Security Vestibule in Visiting Area
222

S e c t i o n 3 : 

F u n c t i o n a l C o m p o n e n t s 

achieve good sound quality is to use 

telephones. Two telephones should 

be provided on the visitor side of 

two-person stations. Communication 

through the window frame (as offered by some detention equipment 

manufacturers) is also an option. Perforations in the top of the sill of the 

window frame have been used successfully for communication purposes. 

The key to this approach is to provide 

enough perforations to allow satisfactory sound transfer but to ensure that 

no contraband can be passed through 

them.

■ Acoustic treatment of the space should 

allow for sound levels that permit 

privacy and conversation without raising one’s voice. Sound transfer from 

neighboring visiting areas should be 

minimized and, if possible, excluded 

through the provision of generous 

amounts of sound-absorbing material. 

Acoustics within fully enclosed individual noncontact spaces can be of 

poor quality (sound reverberation) unless sound-absorbing materials are 

provided.

■ Noncontact visiting booths should 

provide ample space for comfort and 

include a counter surface for writing 

or leaning.

■ In noncontact visiting stations, the inmate and visitor should be able to see 

each other comfortably by means of 

a fairly large security-glazed window. 

This not only enhances the view but 

makes the otherwise small visiting 

spaces seem larger. Facilities should 

determine whether visitors will be 

seated, standing, or both, although it 

is recommended that there be a sufficient number of chairs available for 

the maximum number of visitors, excluding lap children.

■ Natural light is beneficial to the quality and openness of the visiting area.

Space List

Some of the typical spaces that might be 

found within the visiting component include: 

■ Reception desk/counter/space.

■ Public waiting area.

■ Locker storage.

■ Secure entry vestibule.

■ Public search area.

■ Inmate search area.

■ Noncontact visiting area:

❏ One-visitor station.

❏ Two-visitor station.

■ Contact visiting area:

❏ Space for one-on-one visits.

❏ Space for visits that include a number 

of people (e.g., hearings).

Local codes and Americans with Disabilities Act 

guidelines regarding accessibility requirements 

should be consulted when planning these spaces.

Other closely affiliated or space-sharing areas 

include:

■ Public lobby/night lobby.

■ Public toilet areas.

■ Intake-release area.
223 

C h a p t e r 1 8 : 

Visiting Areas

Relationships and Components

Control

Public

lockers

Metal

detector

Lobby

and

waiting

Reception

Vestibule

Public side

Inmate side

Search

Contact

visiting

To inmate

housing

Noncontact visiting

Exhibit 18-6. Relationships Between Visiting Area and Other Jail Areas

Contact

visiting

Noncontact

visiting 

Fixed stools

at inmate side 

Security glazing

Phone or

speaker 

Moveable

visitor chairs 

Interlock

doors 

Monitoring by

roving staff 

Control

monitoring

Corridor

Exhibit 18-7. Components of Visiting Areas

225

Exercise Areas

Chapter 19

Active indoor and outdoor exercise outside the housing units is important to the 

physical and mental well-being of inmates 

and to facility security because it provides a positive outlet for inmate energy. Outdoor exercise 

is thought to be especially beneficial to both 

emotional and physical well-being because of 

exposure to fresh air and sunlight and because it 

provides a temporary release from confinement 

within the building.

The most typical kinds of active exercise found in 

jails are:

■ Basketball.

■ Volleyball.

■ Handball.

■ Walking.

■ Weightlifting. 

■ Calisthenics.

In the past, many jails did not provide both indoor and outdoor exercise areas. In those that 

provided neither, exercise was limited to individual efforts to do calisthenics in cells or dayrooms. 

In older jails where crowding has become a serious issue, indoor recreation areas such as gymnasiums have been converted to housing areas with 

the addition of bunks, eliminating the use of the 

area for exercise.

The provision of indoor and outdoor exercise 

areas in new jails has generally become an expected practice. Organized recreational programs 

that involve trained recreational staff, competition, and training are becoming more common in 

larger jails, but often cannot be accommodated in 

smaller jails.

Outdoor exercise differs from indoor recreation in 

that it features very physical and vigorous activities that require special space and equipment. 

Indoor recreation is addressed in chapter 20, 

“Programs and Services.”

Jail administrators report that the availability of 

indoor and outdoor exercise areas is associated 

with fewer operational problems such as inmateon-inmate assaults, inmate assaults on staff, 

damage to jail property, and lawsuits. These benefits are in addition to the health and psychological benefits for inmates.

Key Decisions 

The following decisions should be made when 

evaluating the role of the exercise component, 

as they have a fundamental effect on design 

requirements:

■ Will both outdoor and indoor exercise space 

be provided or only one or the other? Will an 

indoor/outdoor exercise area with large windows that open for light and ventilation or a 

retractable, mesh-covered roof be provided, 

instead of two separate exercise areas?

■ Will indoor exercise areas be provided outside 

the inmate housing units, or will special exercise areas be incorporated into the housing 

units? If exercise areas are outside, will the 

areas be adjacent to the housing units or 

will there be one central exercise area for all 

male and female inmates (general and special 

housing)?

■ Will groups of inmates be mixed to some degree, or will they exercise separately according 

to housing unit group? If the former, what will 

be the makeup and size of each mixed exercise 

group?
226

S e c t i o n 3 : 

F u n c t i o n a l C o m p o n e n t s 

■ Who will monitor the exercise activity and 

how?

■ If outdoor exercise space is provided, should it 

double as emergency evacuation space?

■ Should exercise areas be sufficient in size and 

number to accommodate a future expanded 

inmate capacity?

Detail Issues 

This chapter examines the general functionalarchitectural issues that pertain to the development of exercise areas as well as specific issues 

related to combination indoor and outdoor exercise areas, indoor exercise areas, and outdoor 

exercise areas.

General Issues 

The following issues apply to both indoor and 

outdoor exercise: users, size, number of areas, 

support space, movement and control, and 

communication.

Users 

Issue: The numbers and types of people to use 

exercise areas should be determined.

Response: There are two principal types of 

potential users:

■ Inmates.

■ Law enforcement or jail officers, as 

part of their fitness or community involvement programs.

When designing centralized exercise areas it 

is important to identify the number of inmate 

groups that must exercise at separate times 

because of classification and supervision concerns. These groupings should respect the basic 

classification/separation requirements of the 

facility unless the level of staff supervision for 

exercise is sufficiently high to allow some merging of groups housed separately.

Once the number and types of groups are identified, the maximum group size should be determined, because that size will influence space 

and equipment requirements as well as staffing 

needs. The possibility for capacity expansion 

should also be identified to determine whether a 

larger group might someday need to be accommodated or whether additional exercise spaces 

should be planned.

Size 

Issue: The size of exercise areas should be 

based on activities and group sizes.

Response: Activities should be chosen on 

the basis of what is most useful and productive for the inmates and the staff alike. Different activities require different amounts of 

space. For example, a small half-court basketball area would require 1,600–2,688 net 

square feet (regulation high school dimensions) with a ceiling height of 15–20 feet, 

whereas a calisthenics area might require 

only about 300 net square feet and a 9-foot 

ceiling height for the same number of users.

Additionally, each space may have secondary areas to accommodate other activities concurrently 

(e.g., weightlifting and basketball). Seating areas 

may be provided for those who are resting between activities, awaiting an opportunity to participate, or, in the case of outdoor exercise areas, 

merely enjoying the fresh air.

The number of people to use an exercise area at 

any one time clearly affects space size. Twelve 

people playing two 3-on-3 games of basketball, 

for instance, would require two half-court areas at about 3,100–5,040 net square feet total. 

However, eight people playing one 4-on-4 game 

need only about 1,600–2,688 net square feet, not 
227 

C h a p t e r 1 9 : 

Exercise Areas

counting secondary areas for sitting, weightlifting, or other activities (exhibit 19-1).

Number of areas 

Issue: The number of separate exercise areas 

needed depends on scheduling, staffing, and the 

number of different exercise groups.

Response: While larger jails have multiple 

exercise areas, smaller jails may need only 

one indoor and one outdoor exercise area or 

one combination area. However, the number of exercise areas that will be needed 

in a given facility cannot be known with 

certainty until a variety of factors are considered. Additionally, space-sharing options 

with other functions cannot be ascertained 

until all factors about exercise area use are 

considered.

Scheduling is a major determinant regarding the 

number of areas:

■ Frequency: how often inmates will exercise 

outside the housing area—once a week? 3 days 

Exhibit 19-1. Sample Exercise Space Needs

Activity

Minimum 

Dimensions 

(square feet)

Maximum 

Number of 

Users

Basketball 

(half-court; 

high school)

48 x 56 

(15 feet high)

10

Volleyball 72 x 42 

(20 feet high)

12

Weightlifting (weight 

machine)

12 x 16 

(8 feet high)

4–6

Sitting 15/person Not applicable

a week? 5 days a week? Every day? This is 

often dependent on the organization’s philosophy regarding inmate management and standards requirements regarding exercise.

■ Duration: the length of time per exercise period, including movement time between housing and exercise areas, if the exercise area is 

not attached to the housing unit—30 minutes? 

1 hour? 2 hours?

■ Hours of operation: the number of hours per 

day the exercise area is available for use. This 

is frequently limited by other basic activities, 

such as food service and visiting, that absorb 

staff and inmate time during the day.

■ Weather conditions: the number of days per 

year that weather would typically prohibit use 

of an outdoor exercise area might influence the 

size and type of space for the indoor area.

Staffing is a major consideration, particularly 

when staff must be retained to supervise the exercise activity. The need or desire to minimize 

staffing can limit the hours available for exercise.

Indoor exercise area with weightlifting and cardiovascular equipment.

(Photograph courtesy of Jim Rowenhorst.)
228

S e c t i o n 3 : 

F u n c t i o n a l C o m p o n e n t s 

The number of different groups that need to exercise is critical because both smaller and larger 

jails can easily generate 8 to 12 different groups 

if there is a strict adherence to housing unit 

separation. 

Support space 

Issue: Space should be provided for staff who 

supervise exercise activities.

Response: Staff can be accommodated in 

several ways:

■ An enclosed or open-counter control 

post immediately adjacent to, but separate from, the exercise area. This is 

common in direct supervision housing 

where the exercise area is attached to 

the housing area, often with windows 

separating the two areas.

■ An enclosed or open-counter post in 

visual contact with, but separate from, 

the exercise area and also monitoring 

other areas such as housing.

■ An open post within the exercise area 

sufficient to allow staff to observe 

without getting in the way of activity.

In providing staff space, it is important to give 

the officer a communication link to master 

control (assuming that master control does not 

observe exercise). Backup monitoring by closedcircuit television (CCTV) may be useful to ensure 

the safety of the officer, especially when the officer is within the space directly supervising the 

inmates.

Issue: Equipment storage should be provided.

Response: A lockable area adjacent to the 

exercise area allows for the secure storage of 

exercise and maintenance equipment: basketballs, handballs, volleyballs, volleyball 

nets, weights, brooms, hoses, etc. Smaller 

items may be stored in cabinet space at the 

control post that monitors exercise.

Issue: The design should consider basic human 

needs.

Response: Depending on the duration of 

each exercise period, it may be appropriate 

to provide a drinking fountain and a restroom for centralized exercise areas. Such 

amenities in outdoor exercise areas must 

be protected against freezing conditions in 

colder locations. Restrooms should be designed to provide privacy as well as appropriate monitoring and control.

Shower and/or locker areas are typically not necessary for inmates since they can use the facilities in their housing unit. If staff are to use the 

exercise area, the location of any such facilities 

for them should be considered in light of access 

to the exercise area.

Issue: Office space for professional exercise/

recreation staff should be considered.

Response: If the jail is large enough to support formal exercise and recreation programs requiring professional staff, office 

space should be considered. Such space 

should be close to the exercise areas to allow some supervision capability.

Movement and control

Classification and separation criteria should be 

evaluated when developing the movement and 

control scheme to prevent unwanted contact 

among different inmate groups.

Issue: Determine how inmates will gain 

access to exercise areas and how they will 

be monitored. 
229 

C h a p t e r 1 9 : 

Exercise Areas

Response: Some movement and surveillance 

concepts follow.

■ Have one large central location to which all inmates are moved and subsequently monitored 

by staff assigned to that area (exhibit 19-2).

■ Have inmates move to one large location monitored by a constantly staffed post that also 

monitors other areas such as housing (e.g., 

master control or housing control) (exhibit 

19-3).

■ Create exercise areas immediately adjacent to 

each housing unit or cluster to be monitored 

by a constantly staffed post that also monitors 

other areas such as housing, thus eliminating movement of inmates through corridors to 

exercise areas and maximizing use of a fixed 

staff post (exhibit 19-4).

A benefit of placing outdoor exercise areas adjacent to housing units is that they can securely 

introduce natural light into dayrooms (and potentially cells) and serve as directly accessible 

temporary containment areas in case of an emergency. Another benefit is increased accessibility 

to the area by the inmates, thereby increasing 

the number of hours each inmate is allocated for 

exercise.

Exhibit 19-2. Centrally Located Exercise Yard

Housing Exercise Housing monitoring

staff

Exercise

yard

Exhibit 19-3. Exercise Area Monitored by Staff 

Who Monitor Other Areas

Housing

Housing

Housing

Staff Staff Exercise Exercise

Exhibit 19-4. Exercise Areas Immediately 

Adjacent to Housing Units

Exercise

Housing

unit

Staff

Housing units Exercise

Housing

unit

Communication 

Issue: There should be a means of communication between staff and inmates when they are in 

the exercise area.

Response: Roving security and/or control 

post staff must be able to communicate with 

the inmates and staff in the exercise area. 

Depending on staff location and roles, the 

following methods might be considered to 

communicate with inmates when staff are 

not present in the exercise area:
230

S e c t i o n 3 : 

F u n c t i o n a l C o m p o n e n t s 

■ Intercom.

■ Public address speaker.

■ Direct voice communication through 

an opening in the exercise wall.

Issue: Minimizing opportunities for vandalism 

and damage.

Response: Light fixtures, vent grills, drain 

covers, and other details in both indoor and 

outdoor exercise areas should be handled in 

the same secure and protected manner as 

they would be within housing units.

Combination Indoor and Outdoor Exercise 

Issue: A single space that functions as both an 

indoor and outdoor exercise area can be a prudent choice for some jurisdictions.

Response: In some jurisdictions, it is allowable to create a single, specially designed 

space that simultaneously meets standards 

for indoor and outdoor exercise. Combining these functions can be a less costly and 

more space-efficient way of providing both 

capabilities. It may also mean a greater likelihood that both capabilities will be made 

available to inmates in smaller jails, as it is 

easier to design one large space manageable 

from a fixed staff post than it is to design 

two such spaces.

Climate is also a motivator for the dual-use concept. In cold northern climates, providing a large 

outdoor exercise area, with expensive high walls, 

costly structure and screening overhead, and 

perhaps a second dedicated staff post is difficult 

to justify when periods of use are limited. In climates with long rainy seasons, an outdoor exercise area becomes useless for extended periods.

The primary method of creating the dual capability exercise area is to create a large opening 

in one or more walls of an indoor space and to 

superimpose a moveable window or rollup shutter over the opening. With this technique, fresh 

air can be provided to inmates once the window/

shutter is opened, thus satisfying the technical 

definition of “outdoor” exercise.

Other design considerations include the 

following: 

■ The openings must be covered by a protective 

screen that prevents escape and precludes contraband passage.

■ The space should be tall (15–20 feet high) so 

that openings can (1) be large enough to allow 

significant fresh air movement and (2) have 

a sill height considerably above inmate head 

height so as to minimize outside view conflicts 

with the public.

■ The openings should be oriented to allow 

the introduction of sunlight, and/or skylights 

should be provided.

Windows opening into an indoor/outdoor exercise area. Note the 

mesh covering the open windows.

(Photograph courtesy of Voorhis Robertson Justice Services.)
231 

C h a p t e r 1 9 : 

Exercise Areas

■ The walls of the indoor space must be developed as though they were exterior walls, that 

is, they must be impervious to rain and cold.

■ The floor of the space must have drains.

■ The space should be heated and cooled like 

other indoor areas; however, these systems 

might run independently to allow them to be 

turned off when the windows are opened for 

air flow.

In considering the dual-use exercise space concept, a jurisdiction should recognize that the 

chief deficiencies of this option are that exposure 

to open air and sunlight is limited and that the 

“outdoor” space is typically smaller than normally provided. Before committing to the concept, a 

jurisdiction should verify that the concept:

■ Is consistent with the facility mission and 

goals.

■ Provides adequate exposure to outdoor air 

and sunlight.

■ Is consistent with applicable codes and jail 

standards.

Indoor Exercise 

The following detailed functional-architectural 

issues apply to indoor exercise: multipurpose 

functioning and environmental considerations.

Multipurpose functioning 

Issue: If an indoor exercise area is to be used 

for more than exercise functions, the functions 

should be carefully selected and appropriately 

accommodated through design.

Response: Jails sometimes attempt to use 

the indoor exercise area for other functions 

such as library, chapel, and counseling, 

among others. For such multiple users, 

some special accommodations may be 

needed. For example, to use an indoor exercise area as a library, exercise must be 

limited to light and restricted activities, such 

as table tennis or weightlifting, and/or the 

library stacks must be in shuttered cases 

or in areas that can be partitioned off for 

protection during vigorous activity. However, the characteristics of an exercise area 

used for vigorous activities are generally 

not compatible with those desired for other 

program/service activities in terms of functions, materials, and environmental quality. 

More on the subject of multipurpose use 

can be found in chapter 20, “Programs and 

Services.”

Contact visiting areas are generally not compatible with exercise spaces because contraband 

could be hidden during visiting hours and retrieved later during exercise periods when thorough body searches are not routinely done. Aside 

from architectural compatibility, one key to determining the potential for creating a multipurpose 

exercise area is to do a realistic schedule of all 

activities and to determine the needs and numbers of persons using the activity. Future needs 

must also be considered.

Environmental considerations 

Issue: Sound quality in, and noise transmission 

from, exercise areas should be controlled.

Response: The level of sound in an indoor 

exercise area can prevent people from communicating effectively. Communication via 

intercom systems can be obscured because 

of echoes created by hard surfaces. This 

sound problem can be mitigated by using 

acoustic treatments and/or sound-absorbing 

floor surfaces. Carpet or other applied resilient floorings can be used in place of bare 

concrete.
232

S e c t i o n 3 : 

F u n c t i o n a l C o m p o n e n t s 

Given that exercise is a potentially noisy activity, 

good sound insulation between areas is particularly helpful when the exercise area is adjacent 

to housing, visiting, counseling, and control 

functions.

Outdoor Exercise 

The following detailed functional-architectural 

issues apply to outdoor exercise: activities, security, and fire safety.

Activities 

Issue: Plan to use outdoor exercise areas in 

cold and inclement weather.

Response: Damp or cold weather will not 

necessarily eliminate inmates’ desire to get 

some fresh air or sunlight. Therefore, a facility should be prepared to issue appropriate 

clothing—gloves, sweatshirts, jackets, foul 

weather footwear, and hats. Proper space 

for storage and distribution of these items 

should then be provided.

Security 

Issue: Special attention should be given to 

controlling escape attempts.

Response: Experience and research both 

show that escape risks are high with 

outdoor exercise. Using solid, securityconstructed walls and installing a sturdy, 

tightly woven screen or mesh over outdoor 

areas will help solve security problems 

while still allowing the introduction of fresh 

air and sunlight.

Blind spots should be eliminated wherever possible, and drain covers, fixtures, and other items 

that can be dislodged and used as tools to aid in 

an escape attempt should be securely fastened.

To help solve staff surveillance problems, locate 

outdoor areas where they can be seen from a 

constantly staffed post. Locating outdoor exercise 

areas adjacent to housing units and providing 

views from the staff workstation into the exercise 

area can also provide an additional level of security. CCTV monitoring in lieu of staff surveillance 

or supervision fails to provide the necessary 

ability to detect and respond to escape attempts 

and fights between inmates. To allow control and 

surveillance of the area at all times, whether or 

not it is being used, consider providing artificial 

lighting for the area. 

Issue: Special attention should be given to controlling contraband passage.

Response: The passage of weapons, drugs, 

messages, and other contraband to inmates 

by outsiders can be controlled through a 

combination of operational and architectural 

means. Operationally, staff should check the 

exercise area for contraband before, after, 

and during exercise periods. Architecturally, 

the same techniques noted as ways to control escape attempts should be considered. 

Another idea would be to surround the 

Mesh-covered outdoor exercise area. 

(Photograph courtesy of Jim Rowenhorst.)
233 

C h a p t e r 1 9 : 

Exercise Areas

exercise area by the building itself, thereby 

making it less noticeable and accessible to 

outsiders (exhibit 19-5).

A special security concern arises when work 

release and/or inmate workers use the same 

activity space as the general inmate population, 

regardless of whether that space is outdoors or 

indoors. There is a potential for contraband passage by prior arrangement that must be managed 

by searches of the space and the inmates.

Another physical detail to control is drainage. 

Openings in walls for exercise area drainage or 

snow removal can provide a natural route for 

contraband passage if they are adjacent to public 

areas and are not properly screened or protected.

Issue: Outside view and voice contact between 

the public and inmates should be controlled. 

Response: Although the use of high, solid 

walls eliminates direct public view of and 

conversation with exercising inmates, total 

isolation of sound is nearly impossible. In 

heavily populated areas, such as jails built 

in city centers, placing the outdoor area(s) 

toward the back of the facility can help control random public/inmate sound transmission. Constructing rooftop exercise areas to 

minimize contact problems is discouraged 

because additional movement problems, 

staff requirements, and snow removal and 

drainage problems can result.

Exhibit 19-5. Outdoor Exercise Area 

Surrounded by Building

Security

screen

closure

Exercise

court

Fire safety 

Issue: Outdoor exercise areas should be evaluated for their potential as a controlled emergency refuge area.

Response: All jail administrators face the 

problem of controlling inmates during emergency evacuations. In many cases, emergency evacuation needs are limited and can be 

handled by moving inmates from one fireprotected zone of the building to another. 

However, evacuation from the building itself 

may be necessary. In this case, it may be 

useful to let an outdoor exercise area double 

as a place of outdoor refuge, thus solving 

evacuation needs without releasing inmates 

to the street.

Specific requirements apply for an outdoor area 

if it is to be used as a temporary refuge. According to the National Fire Protection Association’s 

Life Safety Code®,

1

 all inmates should be able 

to attain a specified distance from the building 

at risk (see the code for current requirements) 

(exhibit 19-6). Once that distance is reached, 

there are specific requirements for the number of 

square feet required per inmate and other occupants (potentially staff) in the refuge area.

1

 National Fire Protection Association, NFPA 101®: Life Safety Code® (Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection Association, 2009).
234

S e c t i o n 3 : 

F u n c t i o n a l C o m p o n e n t s 

The refuge area should have a security exit door 

to the outside with a security lock, hardware, 

jamb, head, and threshold. A two-door vestibule 

system at the exercise wall is another possibility. 

Staff should control the keys to the refuge exit 

door(s) by keeping them locked in a secure cabinet, usually in master control, unless there is an 

emergency, with a separate set accessible to the 

fire department under controlled circumstances. 

Planners should refer to state and local fire codes 

to determine the requirements that must be met 

to use outdoor exercise areas as places of refuge 

in their specific jurisdiction.

Exhibit 19-6. Emergency Refuge Area

Main jail

building

Code-required

distance

Allowable

refuge area

Egress

Space List 

Some of the spaces that might be found within 

the exercise component include the following:

■ Indoor exercise area:

❏ Equipment storage.

❏ Restroom/search area.

❏ Exercise/recreation office.

■ Outdoor exercise area:

❏ Equipment storage.

❏ Restroom/search area.

❏ Coat/hat storage.

See local codes and the Americans with Disabilities Act regarding accessibility requirements.

Relationships and Components

Exhibit 19-7. Relationships Between Exercise 

Areas and Housing and Public Areas

Indoor

exercise

Inmate

housing Public

lobby Control

Outdoor

exercise

Barrier to outside

public contact
235 

C h a p t e r 1 9 : 

Exercise Areas

Exhibit 19-8. Components of Indoor and Outdoor Exercise Areas

Bench

Drain

Storage

Staff post

Padding

Refuge area

From

housing

units

Weight

machines

From

housing

units

Mesh over

entire area

Indoor exercise

Moderate lighting

Emergency egress

and snow/leaf

removal vestibule

Outdoor exercise

60’ x 70’ with

bright lighting

CCTV or

direct staff

supervision

237

Chapter 20

Programs and Services

Avariety of programs and services can be 

provided to enhance staff management 

capabilities and fulfill the mission of the 

facility, whether that focuses on restraint, reintegration, reform, or rehabilitation. Some programs 

and services, such as religious services and legal 

library resources, are required by state standards 

and court decisions.

This chapter addresses the functional design issues regarding the following inmate programs 

and services: counseling, religious services, legal 

and recreational library resources, education, 

recreation, self-improvement programs (e.g., 

Alcoholics Anonymous, Narcotics Anonymous, 

anger management), and jail industries, if the jail 

decides to implement such a program.

In older linear jails and smaller jails, space for 

these important inmate activities was generally 

unavailable. Consequently, the jail administration’s ability to respond to legal demands for 

programs and meet evolving concepts of inmate 

management was limited to a great extent by 

physical plant design. In response, some jurisdictions converted cellblock, office, or adjacent 

law enforcement areas (such as the sheriff’s residence) to program space. Such attempts to create 

program space frequently created security and 

movement problems for the jail.

Today, it is important to consider program and 

service space during the earliest stages of planning. A common response for jails is to create 

multipurpose areas that are sufficiently large 

and/or flexible to meet the needs of a wide variety of programs and services that might be 

provided instead of creating separate spaces for 

each. 

Key Decisions

The following decisions should be made as the 

role of the programs and services component is 

evaluated, because these decisions have a fundamental effect on design requirements:

■ Which programs and services will be provided 

(consistent with the facility’s mission and state 

standards)?

■ How frequently will they be provided, and 

to whom?

■ To what extent will outside resources be used, 

whether it is service providers coming to the 

jail or inmates going out to the services?

■ Will the nature and frequency of selected 

programs and services permit use of a multipurpose space? What programs and services 

should not occur in the same space because 

of security, functional, or environmental 

conflicts?

■ Will small-scale, passive recreational programming be provided? If so, will this recreation occur in the housing areas and will it be in lieu 

of vigorous indoor exercise or in addition to it?

Detail Issues

The detailed functional-architectural issues that 

are most crucial to the inmate programs and 

services component are discussed here. General 

issues that seem applicable to all of the programs 

and services are discussed first, including the 

multipurpose concept and the compatibility issues that surround it. Issues relevant to individual programs or services are then addressed.
238

S e c t i o n 3 : 

F u n c t i o n a l C o m p o n e n t s 

General Issues 

The following issues apply generally to the 

inmate programs and services component: 

location/users, separation/supervision, quality, 

security, and multipurpose possibilities.

Location/users 

Issue: The location of program and service components should facilitate proper surveillance 

and supervision, effective functioning, and access for service providers.

Response: A consistent characteristic of 

inmate program and service spaces is that 

outside service providers will use the spaces 

in conjunction with the inmates. This suggests several general principles about the location of inmate program and service areas:

■ They should be easily accessible 

through a secure vestibule entry 

through the security envelope of the 

jail to ensure control of all movement 

into the jail.

■ Service providers, who are not jail 

staff, should have a background investigation and be cleared through 

a metal detector before entering any 

area accessed by inmates. 

■ If possible, the inmate program and 

service areas should be observable 

from a constantly staffed post without 

violating the privacy required by the 

function, service, or program taking 

place. Minimally, officers should conduct routine security rounds in program areas.

■ Program and service areas should be 

sufficiently isolated from significant 

noise generated by movement within 

the jail or other activities (e.g., mechanical areas, indoor or outdoor exercise areas, kitchen, and laundry).

Separation/supervision 

Issue: Separation requirements and supervision 

methods for program functions will affect the 

need for space.

Response: Separation criteria for program 

and service functions may be quite different from those for the housing areas. The 

degree to which separation requirements 

are minimized depends a great deal on the 

method of supervision, the nature of the activity, and the duration of the activity. 

Depending on pertinent standards, it may be 

that both medium- and low-security adult male 

inmates, and even selected adult female inmates, 

may jointly participate in a substance abuse 

counseling program or in religious services. This 

possibility increases if program staff are present at all times during the event and the space 

is under observation by a security officer. Such 

merging of inmate groups reduces scheduling demands on the space and the possibility that more 

than one space will be needed. Conversely, if 

Multipurpose room in a smaller jail. Note the computer terminals and 

storage cupboards. 

(Photograph courtesy of Jim Rowenhorst.)
239 

C h a p t e r 2 0 : 

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an activity such as recreation were to take place 

without constant and direct supervision by staff 

or even observation from a remote post, it would 

be best to maintain the same separations used in 

housing.

Quality 

Issue: The quality of the program and service 

area environment should reinforce and complement the activities.

Response: The following considerations generally apply to inmate program and service 

areas:

■ Visual privacy from activity and movement in adjacent spaces that might 

distract program participants or detract from the activity at hand.

■ Acoustic privacy through the use of 

ceiling treatments, carpeting, insulated walls, and other techniques that 

improve sound quality and minimize 

sound transfer from other activities 

and functions. 

■ The introduction of natural light.

■ Adequate artificial light for particular 

activities, including some ability to 

control and vary light levels and focus.

■ Pleasant and comfortable surroundings in general.

Security

Issue: Inmate program and service areas should 

be provided with adequate security.

Response: Even though inmate programs 

and services are generally considered benefits that might elicit positive inmate behavior, the fundamental security of the areas 

should not be compromised in any way. In 

essence, these areas should be developed 

much like any other secured area in the jail. 

The only exception would be program, job 

training, or reentry facilities in a minimumsecurity setting. Following are some 

considerations:

■ Regardless of the interior treatment of 

the program spaces, the perimeter of 

the area—especially when it includes 

exterior walls—must be as secure as 

any other portion of the building. 

■ Windows to the exterior should have 

the same security design elements 

as any other exterior window in the 

facility, although the narrow slits of 

glazing preferred for cells may be unnecessary in directly supervised program areas. View conflicts should be 

minimized. 

■ Program and service area interiors ideally should be visible from a constantly staffed post. At a minimum, roving 

staff should be able to view interiors 

from adjacent corridors.

■ Staff and service providers working 

with inmates should be able to communicate directly with staff at a fixed 

post. A two-way intercom would be 

appropriate for this purpose. (In some 

cases, service providers are given a 

panic alarm to activate in case of an 

emergency.)

■ In cases where direct observation is 

not possible, closed-circuit television 

(CCTV) should be considered but 

never relied on as the sole means of 

surveillance.

Generally, CCTV monitoring of counseling and 

interview spaces is permissible. However, it 

should be as unobtrusive as possible and should 

not hinder communication between participants. 

Under no circumstances should staff be able to 
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monitor, either by audio or visually, privileged 

communications between inmates and legal 

counsel or clergy. In some states, inmates’ consultations with legal counsel are to be out of 

view of all staff.

Multipurpose possibilities 

Issue: Multipurpose space sharing for inmate 

programs and services is desirable as long as 

schedules do not conflict and functions are 

compatible.

Response: The relative flexibility in scheduling that is common when planning for 

programs and services provides an opportunity to save space through the creation of 

a multipurpose program space. However, it 

cannot be automatically assumed that one 

or several multipurpose spaces will meet all 

demands. Several important considerations 

must be taken into account when assessing 

the extent to which a multipurpose space 

suits the program and service needs of a 

jail, notably, schedule, flexibility, and 

compatibility.

Schedule. The schedule of activities is critical in 

assessing multipurpose potential. The planner 

must identify each program or service that will 

take place now and potentially in the future, and 

the frequency and duration of each activity. This 

information should be charted to determine the 

extent of the demand for programs and services. 

Predicting demand can be difficult if very few 

programs are available to inmates in the current 

facility; talking with staff at other facilities can 

help planners project the demand for various programs. Additionally, the schedule should reflect 

when programs and services will occur. For example, most programs and services may be in the 

evening hours for the convenience of outside service providers, thereby precluding use of a single 

multipurpose space. 

Flexibility. The flexibility of the multipurpose 

space is crucial. The space must be able to accommodate the different furniture and equipment 

needs of each of the programs or services to take 

place there. For example, tables needed for table 

tennis are not appropriate for religious services, 

so they must be moved out of the way. Moveable, 

foldable, and/or stackable furniture is essential 

for a multipurpose space. In addition, ample storage space for equipment and supplies adjacent to 

a multipurpose area is critical (exhibit 20-1). 

Flexibility also includes being able to adapt the 

fundamental character of the space. For example, 

it is valuable to provide acoustically effective 

foldable or removable partitions in a large multipurpose room to allow the size and character 

of the space to change as the functions and 

their needs change. This flexibility could allow 

for more than one group to use the space at the 

same time.

Another important flexibility consideration is 

the amount of time it takes to move furniture 

and change the character of the space to accommodate another function. Such setup time might 

be a critical factor in the scheduling of activities 

and the determination of whether a multipurpose 

space can accommodate as many functions as 

originally thought. A good example of a potential 

setup problem occurs when the dining function is 

merged with a multipurpose space function. The 

time it takes to clean the area after meals, move 

tables and chairs out of the way, and reset that 

Exhibit 20-1. Storage Space Adjacent to 

Multipurpose Area

Storage room

for chairs,

tables, and

equipment 

Multipurpose

activity room
241 

C h a p t e r 2 0 : 

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furniture three times a day creates considerable 

problems in terms of having adequate time to accommodate other functions in the multipurpose 

space. Flexibility also means providing accommodations for varied lighting needs, environmental 

needs, and equipment needs (audiovisual equipment, screens, etc.).

Compatibility. The fundamental compatibility of 

the various programs and services targeted for 

a multipurpose space must be closely assessed. 

It is possible that saving space by combining as 

many functions as possible in one or two areas 

would compromise the effectiveness or security 

of some functions. 

Library carrels/reading area. Compatibility depends on the degree to which normally cumbersome study carrels can be moved out of the 

way during other activities and on the degree to 

which they contain equipment (such as computers, CD players, and audio equipment used in 

training), which should be protected from inmates during other activities.

Court hearings. If holding court hearings at the 

facility is a common occurrence, dedicated courtroom space should be provided to accommodate 

all parties to the proceedings. However, if court 

hearings within the facility are rare, steps can be 

taken to use a multipurpose space for this activity. Compatibility depends on the proper location 

of the space so that participants from the general 

public and court personnel can gain access without penetrating the inmate-occupied areas of the 

jail. Another consideration is the need for furniture and equipment to serve court purposes, such 

as a judge’s bench, podiums, microphones and 

electronic gear, and a court reporter’s desk. 

The need for the public and legal personnel to 

move through a secure entry vestibule to court 

functions is another consideration. Such a secure entry would be required if the court hearing 

room had a multipurpose capability that involved 

inmate programs and services.

If court hearings are limited to video arraignments or first appearances, there is no incompatibility with the multipurpose room as long as 

equipment can be stored and/or secured. Equipment would include a television (TV) monitor, 

camera, and microphone setup for the inmate, 

supervising officer, and, perhaps, an attorney.

Some functions seem clearly incompatible with 

other functions and therefore should not be conducted in the same multipurpose space: dining, 

indoor exercise, individual counseling, and contact visiting.

Dining. The dining function seems minimally 

compatible with any of the other programs and 

services listed, owing to the problems of dedicating the space for dining three times a day, the 

cleanup and setup time involved, and general 

concern about odors and sanitation.

Courtroom in a large jail. A separate viewing area for the public is located 

outside the secure perimeter of the jail. 

(Photograph courtesy of Voorhis Robertson Justice Services.)
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Indoor exercise. The scale, acoustics, equipment, 

and the vigorous activity associated with indoor 

exercise spaces, particularly those that accommodate such activities as basketball and volleyball, 

are fundamentally incompatible with the characteristics and needs of other inmate programs and 

services. 

Individual counseling. Individual counseling 

spaces are intended for one-on-one counseling sessions. Spaces that are overly large, inadequately private, or subject to distraction should 

not be used as counseling rooms if at all possible. 

However, individual counseling rooms may be 

included adjacent to the multipurpose area 

(exhibit 20-2).

Contact visiting. Concern over the possibilities 

of contraband passage and the need to keep the 

general public out of the jail security envelope 

whenever possible suggests that contact visiting 

should not be merged with a multipurpose function if it can be avoided. Rather, contact visiting 

should occur in a controlled area just outside the 

Separate court viewing area for the public for a courtroom located 

inside a jail.

(Photograph courtesy of Voorhis Robertson Justice Services.)

primary inmate-occupied areas of the jail (exhibit 

20-3). More information on the location and design of visiting areas is available in chapter 18.

Counseling 

Counseling can be a valuable service to the inmate, the facility, and the community. Counseling 

services can help inmates deal with the tension 

and anxiety of their situation, aid them in adjusting to jail life, and assist them in controlling 

chronic personal problems. Counseling activities 

can include crisis intervention and help in dealing with substance abuse; family, religious, and 

educational issues; and employment. Counseling 

is also used to help orient new inmates to the 

rules and practices of the facility.

Counseling space types 

Issue: The nature of counseling activities should be 

identified to determine the type of space required.

Multipurpose

Counseling

rooms

Exhibit 20-2. Counseling Rooms Adjacent to 

Multipurpose Area

Control Shutters

Exhibit 20-3. Use of Shutters To Provide 

Privacy in a Contact Visiting/Individual Counseling 

Area Not Associated With Multipurpose Space
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C h a p t e r 2 0 : 

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Response: Two fundamentally different types 

of counseling potentially involve different 

demands for space. One is individual counseling, which is a one-on-one experience 

between the inmate and the counselor. The 

other is group counseling, which usually 

involves a counselor and two or more inmates. Group sessions are most common 

in substance abuse counseling. Ideally, 

individual counseling will occur in spaces 

separate from group counseling. Group 

counseling, by its nature, is much more 

compatible with a multipurpose space than 

is individual counseling. Individual counseling is more compatible with smaller scale 

spaces suitable for attorney-client visiting or 

contact visiting.

Counseling space size 

Issue: The size of counseling spaces depends 

on the number of participants.

Response: Spaces for individual, one-onone counseling should be a minimum of 

approximately 60 square feet to allow for 

some comfort and avoid too great a sense 

of confinement. If the space cannot be provided with natural light and the sense of 

extended space that a window tends to provide, increasing the size of the space might 

be desirable. 

The following rules of thumb might be useful for 

planning the size of group counseling spaces:

■ Three to four persons: 100 square feet.

■ Five or more persons: 100 square feet plus 

another 15 square feet for the fifth and each 

additional person.

Group counseling spaces should be properly proportioned. A nearly square space provides considerable flexibility in allowing the counselor to 

create group settings that focus activities 

appropriately. 

If a large multipurpose space that is longer and 

narrower than desirable must be used, the use of 

folding, moveable partitions may help attain the 

proper size and proportions for group counseling 

sessions. 

Number of counseling spaces 

Issue: The number of individual and group 

counseling spaces required depends on the 

frequency of use, the duration of use, and the 

scheduling of staff. 

Response: Scheduling may be the key to determining the number of counseling spaces 

needed; for example, if two or more counselors must come at the same time of day, 

more than one space needs to be available. 

The need to provide dedicated individual 

counseling spaces may be served by the use 

of attorney-client or contact visiting spaces. 

This also depends on frequency of use, 

scheduling, and other compatibility factors 

discussed earlier. 

If separate counseling space cannot be provided, 

another possibility for individual counseling is to 

use the office space provided for program staff 

within the security perimeter that can be monitored by security staff. For example, a work space 

provided for counselors could double as a counseling area if properly designed and if privacy 

can be guaranteed. Proper design involves having 

sufficient space to accommodate the counselor 

and the inmate in a proper setting separate from 

the work area. It also involves the ability to secure items that could be considered contraband 

if possessed by an inmate (for example, desk 

items). Counseling should not be planned for a 

shared office to which two or more staff need 

access at the same time.
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Characteristics of counseling spaces 

Issue: The characteristics of counseling spaces 

should complement the needs and the security 

of the activity. 

Response: Several characteristics of counseling spaces should be considered:

■ All counseling spaces should be comfortable, quiet, private, and minimally 

affected by outside distractions.

■ Counseling spaces should have comfortable seating. It is helpful if the 

furniture is moveable so it can be arranged in a fashion most conducive to 

successful counseling. 

■ Natural light is beneficial but should 

be controlled to prevent unnecessary 

distractions from outside activities. 

It should also be provided through a 

securely designed window, skylight, 

or clerestory. Natural light improves 

the quality of the area and, with a 

window, provides some spatial relief, 

which tends to relax the inmate. 

■ Counseling spaces should be observable from a constantly staffed post if 

possible, but not overexposed. Privacy 

for counseling is critical to eliciting 

proper inmate participation. Small vision panels or partially screened or 

shuttered openings are more appropriate than expansive vision panels fully 

exposing the counseling activity to 

officers or inmates outside the space. 

A two-way intercom within the space 

can be a valuable aid to ensuring the 

counselor’s safety.

■ Often in direct supervision or remote 

supervision housing units, counseling 

spaces are built off the main dayroom 

area, within the housing unit. Bringing 

services to the unit decreases the need 

to move inmates to counseling and 

allows for proper supervision.

Religious Services 

Issue: Religious services must be accommodated.

Response: Accommodation of religious 

expression by the inmate population is a 

required part of the programs and services 

offered at a jail. Providing access to religious activities may include:

■ Counseling on a one-to-one basis.

■ Small group instruction (e.g., Bible 

study) anytime during the week.

■ Weekly formal services, potentially 

interdenominational or multiple formal denominational services, depending on the composition of the inmate 

population.

In addition to these activities, there is usually a 

need to accommodate the storage of books, brochures, and paper supplies as well as the sacraments used as part of some religious services. 

Religious counseling sessions can take place in 

individual counseling spaces or attorney-client 

visiting spaces, as long as scheduling conflicts 

can be avoided. Small group instruction and 

weekly services are quite appropriate to a multipurpose space. If religious services are to be held 

in a multipurpose space, consideration might be 

given to methods of attaining a more religious 

environment during services. One idea, for example, would be to create an altar area that could be 

closed off during nonreligious activity and also 

serve as a sacristy (a room in which sacred vessels, vestments, and hangings are stored) (exhibit 

20-4). 

Consideration should be given to the design 

impact of special religious activities, such as 
245 

C h a p t e r 2 0 : 

Programs and Services

confessions or baptisms, if they are to be accommodated. Typically, confession requires private 

booths that allow a priest and the inmate to

communicate quietly, while seated, through a 

heavily veiled opening. Such a need might be accommodated by designing a confessional space 

within the facility or by creating a portable booth 

that can be stored in an adjacent multipurpose 

storage area when not in use. Raised platforms 

for an altar area may be similarly portable. 

As a rule of thumb, 15 square feet per user 

should be provided for religious services, exclusive of the area from which the cleric speaks.

Library Services 

Libraries supply inmates with needed access to 

legal materials as well as recreational reading 

that can help them prepare for vocations, enlarge 

their social and educational backgrounds, and 

support facility management. 

Library activities 

Issue: The extent of library activities must be 

determined to provide proper space.

Altar

Skylight with

security barrier

Door

swing 

Exhibit 20-4. Altar Area That Can Be Closed Off 

During Nonreligious Activities

Response: Both fundamental library activities and optional activities greatly influence 

the size of the jail library. The basic purpose 

of a library in any jail is to store books, 

periodicals, and newspapers supplied by 

the facility for inmate use. Other activities 

associated with a basic library function include keeping records of books checked out 

and distributing, sorting, maintaining, and 

shelving library items as they are returned.

Several optional library activities that might be 

part of the jail program also affect space and 

equipment needs. They include:

■ Maintaining a law library collection or computer access to one (outside sources may also 

be a viable method of providing inmates with 

access to legal materials).

■ Reading and studying.

■ Writing and preparing documents.

■ Displaying notices and information about library materials and activities.

■ Maintaining and using audiovisual equipment, 

including CDs and DVDs.

■ Providing reading and study carrels, with support audiovisual equipment.

Most of these optional activities operate on the 

basic assumption that some or all of the inmates 

will go to the library to browse through materials, use them in the library, and/or check them 

out. However, many jails maintain only sufficient 

space to store books and the carts with which 

books are delivered to inmates. In this delivery 

scenario, inmates identify the books they want 

from a list of available materials and staff later 

fill their requests, or carts are assigned to the 

housing units and stocked with new books on a 

scheduled basis. Storage of library materials in 

a multipurpose space tends to provide the jail 
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S e c t i o n 3 : 

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administration greater flexibility in terms of 

operating the jail library in either manner. 

Inmate library in a small jail. 

(Photograph courtesy of Jim Rowenhorst.)

Library size 

Issue: Space needs must be determined by library activities and storage requirements.

Response: The size of a library space depends primarily on the activities that occur 

and the types and number of books and 

materials stored. Regarding the number of 

books, it is recommended that smaller jails 

provide roughly 20 books per bed and at 

least 1 magazine and 1 local, state, or national newspaper per every 10 residents. In 

larger jails, the number and types of books 

and periodicals provided to inmates could 

be significantly larger. 

The following formula applies for calculating 

space for book storage (stack) areas:

Using this formula, a 2,000-volume library (100 

beds × 20 volumes per bed) would require approximately 125 square feet of stack area exclusive of general circulation in the larger library 

space. 

Total 

volumes = Required square footage 

for stacks

16

If provided, a reading area should be calculated 

as follows:

15% of bed capacity × 16 square feet = reading 

area square footage

By this formula, a 100-bed facility would need to 

provide 240 square feet of reading area exclusive 

of general circulation in the library.1

Additional area should be considered when fixed 

study carrels and areas for audiovisual equipment are included. Another consideration is 

space for one or more computer workstations. 

For example, complete law libraries are available 

on CD-ROM as well as via the Internet. These 

computer workstations can also be used for education courses and training purposes. Additionally, in facilities where a more elaborate library 

is required, consideration should be given to providing space for a librarian’s office, a paralegal’s 

office, a workroom, a checkout area, and a staff 

computer terminal.

Library environment 

Issue: The quality of the library environment is 

important in creating the proper library setting 

and preserving library materials. 

Response: A library space has some environmental requirements that differ from those 

of other functions, especially those that 

1

 These formulas were originally created by the American Correctional Association’s Committee on Institutional Libraries and are 

published in Library Standards for Adult Correctional Institutions 1992 (Chicago: Association of Specialized and Cooperative Library 

Agencies, 1992). 
247 

C h a p t e r 2 0 : 

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might be housed in a multipurpose space. 

These requirements are most applicable if 

the library is made accessible to inmates for 

book selection, reading, and studying.

■ Artificial light levels should preferably 

reach 50 to 70 footcandles at 30 inches 

above the floor surface.

■ Humidity levels should be controlled, 

preferably within a range of 56–70 

percent.

■ Temperature should be controlled, 

preferably within a range of 68–70 degrees Fahrenheit.

■ Acoustic privacy and low reverberation levels are important to maintaining the integrity and function of a 

library area.

■ Some visual privacy is necessary to 

reduce distractions, but the space 

should be observable from a constantly staffed post.

Computer workstations in a small jail library. 

(Photograph courtesy of Jim Rowenhorst.)

■ The space should generally be pleasant and comfortable.

Multipurpose use of library 

Issue: The library function must be compatible 

with other functions that may share a multipurpose space.

Response: The library area poses some difficulty for a multipurpose operation because 

of the inflexible nature of stacking and 

storing books. This is further complicated 

if fixed valuable equipment, such as study 

carrels and computer workstations, is also 

in the space and cannot be moved and/or 

must be protected. 

One way to prevent stacks from being damaged 

during other activities is to put lockable shutters 

over them. Another is to locate them at the back 

of the room where a moveable partition can be 

drawn in front of them during other activities. 

Stackable chairs and folding tables in reading 

areas also enhance multipurpose capabilities.

Education 

Educational programs frequently occur in 

even the smallest jails. The following detailed 

functional-architectural issues apply to educational spaces: size and characteristics.

Size 

Issue: The size of educational facilities depends 

on the types of programs offered and the number of participants.

Response: Even though jails can benefit 

from offering educational programs to inmates, it can be the case that inmates in 

jails do not stay long enough to participate 

in extended programs. Consequently, true 

need should be ascertained to determine 

whether a space as great as a dedicated 

classroom should be provided for educational programs. In larger facilities, several 
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S e c t i o n 3 : 

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classrooms may be necessary to accommodate the educational opportunities available 

to the inmates.

Many educational programs consist of tutoring 

or work toward a general equivalency diploma 

(GED) with a teacher or volunteer working 

with a small number of students. For these applications, an individual counseling space or an 

attorney-client visiting space may be an adequate 

alternative to providing a dedicated space if no 

schedule conflicts occur. However, spaces used 

for tutoring or educational programs involving 

several inmates at one time should have marker 

boards, chalkboards, and/or other implements 

that aid in the teaching process.

Special space needs may arise depending on the 

nature of the educational program offered. For 

example, some jail educational programs involve 

independent study via audiovisual equipment or 

computers for e-learning placed in fixed study 

carrels or table areas. This approach to education requires space for the carrel or table and the 

equipment as well as supervision and supplemental instruction by educational staff. Such a 

program should not only have dedicated space 

for the equipment, but should be located where 

monitoring capability is available. 

One form of educational program that is unusual 

for smaller jails but common in larger jails is 

vocational training. Programs involving cooking, 

auto repair, carpentry, or other specialized activities could have a dramatic impact on space and 

equipment needs. Many times special buildings 

are constructed specifically for these vocational 

training programs to accommodate special equipment and training space.

Educational space characteristics 

Issue: Educational spaces should be designed 

to complement the various activities that might 

take place.

Response: For educational space to function effectively, some general characteristics 

should be attained. These apply especially 

to educational spaces for teaching inmates 

in groups rather than individually: 

■ Equipment/furnishings:

❏ Moveable furnishings.

❏ Durable furnishings.

❏ Computer workstations.

❏ TV monitors for instructional digital video disks (DVDs)/tapes or broadcasts.

❏ A range of furnishings and equipment 

appropriate to the functions, such as 

student desks with writing surfaces versus chairs and tables, desk or podium 

for teachers, blackboards/whiteboards, 

screens, and clocks.

■ Environment:

❏ Proper acoustic separation from noisegenerating areas.

❏ Good ventilation and controlled 

temperature.

❏ 50–70 footcandles of artificial light 30 

inches above the floor surface.

❏ Artificial light that provides options for 

intensity to accommodate a wide range of 

activities (verbal instruction, slide shows 

with note-taking, films, etc.).

❏ Natural light, if possible.

Recreation 

Recreation differs from indoor exercise in that 

recreational activities (e.g., table tennis, crafts, 

painting) are less physical and require considerably less square footage than indoor exercise. 
249 

C h a p t e r 2 0 : 

Programs and Services

Issue: Recreational activity needs must be identified to specify space requirements.

Response: Recreational needs may greatly 

influence the size and shape of the multipurpose space if recreation is to take place 

in such an area. The dimensional requirements for an area to accommodate one 

or two table tennis games, for example, 

can greatly influence the amount of space 

needed (exhibit 20-5). Often in larger jails 

or direct supervision facilities, additional 

dayroom space is allocated to accommodate 

indoor recreation instead of creating a separate recreation space.

Recreational programs involving movies with 

screens and projectors, or DVDs and TVs, can 

generate equipment needs that affect not only the 

size of the space but also its orientation and the 

need for supplemental storage.

Jail Industries 

Although jail industries are primarily viewed as 

a large jail or prison activity, some small and, 

particularly, medium-sized jails might decide to 

implement a jail industry program. Examples of 

these programs include furniture making or repair, product packaging, and recycle sorting. The 

issue of jail industries should be fully explored 

and evaluated during the planning process to assess the activities involved and the amount and 

type of spaces required.

Space List 

Some of the typical spaces that might be found 

within the programs and services component as 

individual spaces or merged into multipurpose 

applications are:

■ Counseling:

❏ Individual.

❏ Group.

Exhibit 20-5. Area Requirements for Different 

Activities

Activity

Area 

Dimensions 

(square feet)

Number of 

Users

Table tennis

 One table

 Two tables

23 x 13 x 9

23 x 24 x 9

2–4

4–8

Foosball 

(one table)

10 x 8 2–4

■ Religious:

❏ Personal counseling.

❏ Services/instruction.

❏ Storage.

■ Library:

Recreational and legal:

❏ Stack area.

❏ Reader area.

❏ Work area.

❏ Computer workstation area.

❏ Study carrel area.

❏ Storage.

■ Education:

❏ Classroom.

❏ Storage.

■ Recreation:

❏ Recreation room.

❏ Storage.
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S e c t i o n 3 : 

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■ Staff facilities:

❏ Offices.

❏ Toilet(s).

❏ Storage.

❏ Closet.

❏ Reception/secretary.

Local codes and Americans with Disabilities Act 

guidelines regarding accessibility requirements 

should be consulted when planning these spaces. 

Depending on the overall building concepts, 

these spaces may be organized together as a 

discrete program/services component, be spread 

throughout the facility, or integrated, in part, into 

the housing units.

Male

housing

Female or

special

housing

Multipurpose

Storage

Toilet

Counseling

Counseling

Control Vestibule

Lobby

Exhibit 20-6. Relationship of Programs/

Services Area to Housing and Lobby

Library

Storage Toilet Altar

Group meeting

Counseling

Folding

partition Staff

monitoring 

Computer

room

Exhibit 20-7. Components of a Programs/

Services Area

Relationships and Components
251

Chapter 21

Inmate Commissary

An inmate commissary allows inmates to 

purchase snacks, supplies, and personal 

items not normally supplied by the jail. 

Items necessary to basic hygiene (e.g., soap, toilet paper, toothbrush) should be provided by the 

facility at no cost.

The inmate commissary is generally viewed as a 

privilege, not necessarily a right, as long as basic 

hygiene items are provided and food service is 

adequate and it is not necessary for the inmates 

to supplement facility meals from a commissary. The trend nationwide is to either provide 

commissary services at the jail or use outside 

contract sources to manage the commissary operations. This is done in lieu of allowing friends 

or family to bring items to the jail because of the 

potential for the introduction of contraband.

Providing inmates with an opportunity to purchase personal items gives them some control 

over their lives. It also provides the jail administration with an effective management tool for 

controlling inmate behavior because the commissary privilege can be withdrawn for violations of 

institutional rules. Additionally, profits from commissary operations can be used to provide for or 

supplement inmate programs or other services, 

supplies, or equipment.

Commissary operations have often been troubled 

by problems related to loss control and fiscal 

accountability. However, the commissary need 

not be a problem as long as secure storage and 

proper distribution and accounting procedures 

are followed.

To some degree, the decision as to who will manage the commissary will determine where the 

commissary should be located. Administration 

of the commissary operation can be handled in 

many ways and is often assigned to food services staff, inmate program staff, correctional 

officer(s), assigned commissary/warehouse staff, 

or contract commissary providers, depending on 

the jail’s personnel situation and management 

philosophy. 

Sound correctional practice and many state standards require that inmates with funds on account 

be provided with an opportunity to purchase discretionary items not provided by the jail. It is important to check state standards or statutes with 

regard to commissaries, as a few states prohibit 

the establishment of petty cash funds or other 

such accounts outside the usual county financial 

chain of control. Some states require that inmate 

funds and profits from commissary operations be 

held in trust accounts and used only for the benefit of the inmates.

Key Decisions 

The following decisions have a fundamental effect on design requirements for a commissary 

and should be made when the role of this component is evaluated:

■ What is the anticipated size and scope of 

operation? 

■ Will the commissary role be more broadly 

defined to include storage of all basic supplies 

for the facility as part of a warehouse area?

■ Given the size and scope of the commissary 

operation, will the jail rely on an in-house 

stock of commissary goods or on a retail outlet 

outside the jail (i.e., local stores or shops)? 

■ If the commissary is provided by a contract 

service, will the service need space to store 

goods and fill orders or will they be delivered 

prepackaged to the facility?
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■ Will commissary goods be brought to the 

inmates in their housing units or will the inmates, as an additional privilege, go to the 

commissary to pick up their goods? If the 

latter, will all inmates, including those in 

maximum security, be allowed to visit the 

commissary?

■ Who will administer the commissary function, 

and who will package the orders? Where will 

the accounting and administrative services be 

located?

Detail Issues 

The following detailed functional-architectural issues should be considered in the development of 

the commissary component: size, location, equipment, security, and communication.

Size 

Issue: The size of the commissary will depend 

on the inventory requirements, activities, and 

equipment involved in service delivery.

Response: Although commissary and warehouse activities take a considerable amount 

of space in large jail systems, due to the 

volume of goods moved through the system each day, the commissary of a small or 

medium-sized jail will typically involve a 

relatively small amount of square footage. 

However, the amount can vary significantly 

depending on the inventory involved. Inventory is affected by the:

■ Number of inmates served.

■ Range of items offered.

■ Amount of each item stocked.

■ Type of storage required (dry storage 

versus cold and/or frozen).

A minimal commissary may limit its stock to 

candy, snacks, and basic personal hygiene items, 

such as shampoo and toothpaste. Additional 

items that might be considered include:

■ Beverages (tea, coffee, soda).

■ Toiletries in addition to facility issue (deodorant, soap, hair conditioner, skin lotion).

■ Cleansing tissues, handkerchiefs.

■ Radios, batteries.

■ Greeting cards, stationery, envelopes, stamps.

■ Inmate clothing (underwear, socks, shower 

shoes).

Other factors affecting the size and design of the 

commissary relate to activities and equipment, 

including:

■ The efficiency with which items are stored.

■ A refrigerator and/or freezer for soda, ice 

cream, and other items that require cold 

storage.

■ Work surface and seating for staff administering the commissary. The work surface should 

be large enough to do paperwork on receipts, 

request slips, inventories, and order forms. If 

the facility uses a computer-based accounting 

system, additional surface area for keyboards 

and monitors will be required. A regular staff 

workstation or post could be used if the commissary is managed by regular jail staff.

■ If cash is used in transactions, a place for a 

secured cash drawer or safe. Alternatively, a 

separate commissary checking account might 

be maintained at a local bank.

■ A lockable file cabinet for storage of inmate 

commissary accounts, financial records, ordering information, and other papers.
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Inmate Commissary

■ If commissary items are brought to the inmates, space in which to store a mobile cart, 

unless a cart from the kitchen or the health 

care area can be borrowed.

■ If commissary items are distributed at the commissary area (i.e., inmates go to the commissary), a securable passthrough window. This 

can be a Dutch door or opening in the wall with 

a counter. The counter area should be securable 

with a lockable overhead rolling shutter or a 

lockable swinging window or door.

■ If inmates go to the commissary, an area for a display cabinet or shelves they can see but not touch.

Exhibit 21-1. Commissary Adjacent to 

Multipurpose Area

Multipurpose

Passthrough

Staff

Refrigerator

Commissary

Counter and

storage

Location 

Issue: The location of the commissary depends 

on the extent of service, the delivery mode, and 

accessibility.

Response: If inmates go to the commissary, which is most common in minimum 

security or work release facilities, it should 

be located in an area where a waiting line 

does not congest a circulation corridor. It is 

also preferable that the area be visible from 

a constantly staffed post, thus eliminating 

the need for additional escort staff while 

the staff member providing service is inside 

the commissary room. A view of the commissary from a staff post is not necessary if 

the service is brought to the inmates in their 

housing units. 

If inmates go to the commissary, it may be useful to consider affiliating the commissary space 

with a multipurpose area (exhibit 21-1). In this 

way, staff can consolidate two activities in one 

movement sequence and share the view control 

that would normally be integrated into the design 

of a multipurpose area. No matter the delivery 

method, the commissary area should be located 

in a secure area near the loading dock or facility 

warehouse to allow for ease in accepting deliveries.

Inmate dining hall with vending machines. 

(Photograph courtesy of Voorhis Robertson Justice Services.)

Equipment 

Issue: Determine whether vending machines 

will be used to provide commissary items.

Response: Many jails have found that, with 

proper supervision, it is possible to permit 

inmates to carry small amounts of change, 

although it is preferable to offer the ability for them to purchase debit cards with 

unique pin numbers. Therefore, it is possible to run a vending operation as part of 
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S e c t i o n 3 : 

F u n c t i o n a l C o m p o n e n t s 

the commissary or to locate machines in a 

housing area or multipurpose room as long 

as they do not interfere with other functions. It is important to evaluate the vending machine issue before design to avoid 

the placement of machines in inappropriate 

locations (e.g., in corridors or staff areas to 

which inmates must then gain access).

Security 

Issue: Access to the commissary must be strictly controlled, whether the commissary consists 

of a locked storage closet, a separate room, or a 

large warehouse.

Response: Security and inventory control 

should be attained by limiting access to the 

commissary area to essential staff and maintaining strict key control. The keys to the 

area should only be given to commissary 

staff or should be checked out from master 

control or the jail administration if there are 

not staff dedicated to working in the commissary. Locating the commissary in an 

observable location or an area with limited 

access also assists in general security.

Communication 

Issue: Communication with master control is 

essential.

Response: As with most areas within the 

jail, there should be a telephone or intercom 

link with master control. This is particularly 

true with a centralized commissary dispensing location, as the commissary staff will 

have to notify housing units when deliveries 

are coming. 

Space List

Some of the typical spaces that might be found in 

the commissary component follow.

■ Storage area.

■ Work area.

■ Inmate waiting area (for centralized 

commissary only).

■ Receipt and staging area (for contract 

deliveries).

Local codes and Americans with Disabilities Act 

guidelines regarding accessibility requirements 

should be consulted when planning these spaces.

Relationships and Components

Exhibit 21-2. Relationship of Commissary to 

Housing and Multipurpose Areas

Inmate

housing 

Multipurpose 

Commissary

Staff

movement

Optional policy for

inmate pickup of

commissary items 

Exhibit 21-3. Commissary Components

Storage shelves

Desk

and

files

Dutch door

or counter 

Cart

Refrigerator
255

Chapter 22

Food Service

F

ood service has a major impact on daily jail 

operational routines, annual operating costs, 

and initial construction costs. It presents 

many security concerns, is a regular disruption to 

other jail operations and supervision needs, and 

is a major factor affecting inmate attitudes and 

behavior. The quantity and quality of food and 

the means of preparing and serving it have often 

been at issue in inmate grievances and lawsuits. 

In these instances, inadequate documentation of 

meal planning or difficulties maintaining equipment to current standards for institutional food 

service can become very troublesome for jail 

administrators.

Constructing sufficient work space and providing 

adequate storage areas and equipment to respond 

to inmate dietary needs can be quite expensive 

and make a substantial dent in the normally limited jail construction budget. Thus, careful consideration must be given to how food service will 

be implemented.

Food service encompasses a variety of basic 

activities:

■ Menu planning and food ordering.

■ Receiving and storing foods and related 

supplies.

■ Food/beverage preparation.

■ Food/beverage delivery.

■ Inmate dining (in those facilities that wish to 

have a centralized dining area).

■ Staff dining (all facilities should provide an 

area outside the housing areas or control 

rooms in which staff members can take breaks 

and eat their meals).

■ Cleanup and dishwashing after meals.

■ Disposal of waste.

■ Record keeping.

Full service kitchen in a small jail. 

(Photograph courtesy of Jim Rowenhorst.)

The design of jail food service areas should focus 

on providing quality facilities that minimize food 

preparation time, enhance the ease of delivery 

without compromising food quality, and accommodate future capacity needs without requiring 

later expansion of food service areas. The character of the food service area and the materials 

and finishes used are similar to those used in 

conventional institutional kitchens, with the exception that perimeter and internal security must 

be provided.

American Correctional Association standards 

focus primarily on policies, procedures, and 

documentation of an inmate food service operation. Besides requiring three meals per day, these 

standards are aimed primarily toward ensuring 

the dietary and hygienic adequacy of a jail food 
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service operation. They do not attempt to dictate 

specifically how that service is to be provided.

State and local food service and public health 

requirements should be checked carefully. Most 

state and local jurisdictions have health department and sanitation codes regarding the preparation and handling of food and the disposal 

of food waste products. These state and local 

requirements define a minimum operational 

level that must be met at all local food service 

facilities. Most state jail standards also address 

requirements for jail food service.

Key Decisions 

The following decisions have a fundamental effect on design requirements and therefore should 

be made when the role of the food service component is evaluated:

■ Will food be prepared at the facility or be 

provided by outside sources such as a central 

kitchen serving several facilities, local schools, 

or hospitals? Or, will “easy” cold meals such as 

breakfast cereal or lunch sandwiches be prepared at the jail and hot meals come from an 

outside source?

■ If meals are provided by an outside source, 

what facilities and equipment will be required 

at the jail to serve the meals? Will the meals 

have to be reheated in a retherm kitchen? Will 

meals items arrive in bulk or already on trays?

■ Will inmate dining occur at a central dining 

area or within the housing units? If at a central 

dining area, will all inmates, regardless of classification, use the facilities? If at the housing 

units, what method of food delivery will be 

used to ensure that proper food temperatures 

and quality are maintained?

■ How frequently will food supplies be ordered, 

and what effect does this have on storage 

needs?

■ Will minimum-security inmate workers be 

available to assist in food service operations 

and, if so, to what extent?

■ How will food service facilities be designed 

to accommodate future expanded inmate 

capacities?

Detail Issues

The following detailed functional-architectural 

issues should be considered in the development 

of the food services component: the food service 

provider, the location of inmate dining, food 

preparation and storage, cleanup and waste handling, food delivery, staff accommodations, security, inmate workers, and the staff dining area.

Food Service Provider 

Issue: A choice must be made between providing food services in-house (either using jail staff 

or a food service vendor) or contracting for food 

service from outside sources.

Response: Some smaller jails use an outside 

food service source that will prepare meals 

at its own facilities and transport them to 

the jail. Bringing in food from the outside is 

generally not done in larger facilities due to 

the volume of meals served and issues with 

transportation and maintaining food temperatures. Bringing in food from the outside 

can be done through a private food service 

company or restaurant or a nearby institution, such as a hospital, nursing home, or 

school. Although this method poses several 

potential problems, comparing long-term 

costs and evaluating operational concerns 

could prove worthwhile.

The primary advantages of using outside sources 

include:
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C h a p t e r 2 2 : 

Food Service

■ Eliminating the floor area required for kitchen 

and food storage from construction costs.

■ Eliminating food service equipment from 

initial project costs.

■ Reducing the overall mechanical and electrical 

load requirements of the building.

■ Simplifying operational purchasing and maintenance needs.

■ Eliminating costs for cooking staff.

■ Eliminating periodic costs for repair or replacement of obsolete kitchen equipment.

■ Eliminating kitchen cutlery from the secure 

jail area.

Some potential disadvantages of using outside 

sources include:

■ Attempts to conceal contraband in food trays 

and carts brought to the jail.

■ Increased security staff time involving movement of food into and out of the jail security 

perimeter.

■ Possible inability to add efficient kitchen space 

to the building if the contracting service must 

be abandoned.

■ Lack of control over escalating contract costs.

■ Potential operational difficulties if the contract 

service temporarily shuts down (e.g., schools 

during summer vacation, facilities during 

renovations).

■ Possible need for equipment for backup cooking, warmup, or delivery.

■ Possible need for dishwashing/cleaning 

equipment.

In an ideal situation, the outside food service 

source would provide the following items to reduce staff work and facility space needs:

■ Meals that are preplated in disposable or reusable insulated trays with meal temperature 

adequately maintained in transit.

■ Cups and utensils that are either disposable or 

returned to the provider for cleaning.

■ Beverages in insulated containers that can be 

used for dispensing and returned to the provider for cleaning.

■ Delivery carts.

If any or all of these elements are missing, they 

must be provided and accommodated at the jail, 

implying the need for a fairly significant amount of 

space and equipment, although still not as much 

as a full kitchen with full storage capabilities.

It is also important to create a secure method of 

receiving the food from an outside provider. This 

point of entry should be configured and operate 

as a security vestibule because it represents a 

penetration of the security perimeter of the jail.

In-House Food Service 

If food services are to be provided in-house, the 

primary operational concerns would focus on the 

potential use of inmate workers and, therefore, 

whether food service staff would have supervision and security responsibilities in addition to 

meal preparation and cleanup.

Kitchen activities require cutlery and other equipment that could become weapons. Where inmate workers will assist in food preparation and 

cleanup, special precautions for food delivery, 

trash removal, inventory control, and the location 

of inmate worker housing must be considered. 

Also, when inmate workers are used, there is the 

question of whether food service staff must be 

trained to provide inmate supervision or whether 

intermittent or electronic monitoring by other jail 

staff will be adequate.
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Other tasks associated with food service include 

menu planning, food purchasing, and maintaining food service records. The design considerations for these tasks are discussed in the 

functional issues to follow.

Location of Inmate Dining

Issue: The location of inmate dining and the 

method of food delivery must be established.

Response: Dining can be centralized or 

decentralized.

Centralized dining 

A centralized dining area has the potential advantage of using a serving line and dining space 

adjacent to the kitchen. This location eliminates 

the need for tray assembly time and food carts, 

provides the quickest delivery of hot foods, and 

simplifies cleanup (exhibit 22-1).

Unfortunately, this method of dining creates a 

number of major operational problems, especially in facilities that house all classifications 

of inmates. Maintaining the separation of different housing classifications during mealtime can 

prolong food service times with many groups of 

inmates in the dining area at different times. If 

central dining takes place in a general multipurpose room rather than a designated dining area, 

Exhibit 22-1. Centralized Dining Area Adjacent 

to the Kitchen 

Dining

Serving

line 

Kitchen

the time needed for food service and cleanup 

would likely eliminate most other activity uses 

in that area. Moving groups of inmates to and 

from dining three times a day substantially increases staff monitoring responsibilities and 

could require more supervisory personnel. 

Inmate movement to and from dining could severely restrict other jail activities for prolonged 

periods of time while the different inmate classification groups are allowed to eat, the area is 

cleaned, and the next group brought in. Consequently, central dining in a multipurpose room is 

generally discouraged, especially when sanitation 

issues are also considered.

Decentralized dining 

Decentralized dining, which involves moving 

prepared food trays in carts to the various housing pods, is the most common method of inmate 

dining. Inmates eat at dayroom tables and are 

monitored by the housing area security staff. This 

tends to facilitate dining with minimal movement 

and security problems. 

Centralized dining hall in a minimum-security facility. 

(Photograph courtesy of Voorhis Robertson Justice Services.)
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C h a p t e r 2 2 : 

Food Service

Two classic problems with dining within housing 

units have been (l) insufficient space for rapidly 

and effectively distributing meals, including 

drinks, and (2) maintaining proper food temperature. The most common response to these issues 

is the use of thermal trays designed to maintain 

food at a proper temperature for extended 

periods of time. Thermal trays can be brought 

into the housing unit on carts and distributed. 

Planners should include a tray and beverage 

service station in each housing area to facilitate 

this process. 

Another response to these problems is to complete the tray assembly process in the housing 

units. As an example, bulk food containers are 

set up in each housing unit or general housing 

area for final tray assembly, in some cases employing a cafeteria-style serving line. In some instances, microwave heating units located in each 

housing unit or in the general housing area are 

used to reheat entrees to an optimal temperature. 

Cafeteria-style food service also requires an area 

in the housing unit to line up the bulk food containers and distribute and collect the trays.

Other alternatives to consider are to provide thermally controlled carts for the trays. These carts 

can be brought to the housing units and plugged 

in to maintain the temperature of hot and cold 

items. Some facilities use cook-chill systems and 

provide retherm units in the housing areas to 

heat the meals so there is no problem maintaining meal temperatures. With this system, food is 

prepared in advance, then trays are assembled 

and placed in a blast chiller to cool to the proper 

storage temperature. When the food is to be 

served, the trays are placed in a retherm unit and 

distributed to the inmates either from a central 

location or in the housing area.

With the conventional approach of preparing 

food trays at the food service area and delivering 

them to the inmate housing units, the following 

considerations apply:

Cook-chill cooking and bagging system. 

(Photograph courtesy of Voorhis Robertson Justice Services.)

■ Providing sufficient surface area or tray assembly equipment (such as assembly lines) to 

allow rapid tray assembly and preparation for 

insulated delivery.

Providing storage and cleaning areas for carts 

used in delivery.

Coordinating the food tray size with the size 

of food passthroughs used to serve inmates 

when they must eat in their cells (e.g., disciplinary detention).

Providing food passthroughs into the dayrooms to allow serving the meal in higher 

security units without opening the door.

Providing a means to distribute beverages 

effectively (e.g., fill cups and distribute 

through a food pass or place a large beverage 

dispenser in the housing unit for inmates to 

serve themselves).

Providing a means by which to count, distribute, collect, and recount utensils, trays, and 

cups.

■

■

■

■

■
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S e c t i o n 3 : 

F u n c t i o n a l C o m p o n e n t s 

■ Providing a means by which to collect waste 

(everything returned on the tray, or a waste 

can in housing units for later collection).

Food Preparation and Storage

Issue: Food preparation and storage area size 

and layout should be adequate to allow for the 

efficient preparation and assembly of meals.

Response: The sizes of the food preparation 

and storage areas are influenced by five primary factors:

■ Types of meals prepared.

■ Storage capacity.

■ Flow/efficiency.

■ Tray assembly approach.

■ Expansion capabilities.

Size is determined as much by the type of food 

to be prepared as by the number of meals to be 

served. Buying bulk commodities and fresh produce increases the storage requirements for 

Dry storage area in a small jail kitchen. 

(Photograph courtesy of Jim Rowenhorst.)

a kitchen and frequently requires more equipment (e.g., refrigerators, slicer, vegetable shredders, bread ovens). Retaining the services of a 

dietitian and a food service consultant during the 

facility planning stages can assist in developing 

and coordinating menus with food purchasing options and required food preparation equipment. 

The design of the kitchen should emphasize efficient production and assembly of food from 

storage to preparation, cooking, and serving. This 

production flow for food preparation should be 

reflected in the design layout and should minimize cross traffic patterns for maximum efficiency (exhibit 22-2).

Special consideration should be given to convenient tray assembly procedures, a typical problem 

in many jail kitchens. Ample work surfaces on 

which to place the trays prior to placement on a 

cart, or the provision of a conveyor belt assembly 

line for rapid tray assembly and immediate placement on a cart, are practical solutions to this 

problem. It should be noted, however, that tray 

assembly systems sometimes require numbers of 

inmate workers or staff that may not be available 

in a smaller jail.

Deciding on the size of the kitchen should also 

include consideration of future expansion of bed 

capacity. Although kitchen spaces can be located 

along an exterior wall to allow expansion, this 

Food

prep.

Tray

assembly

Carts

Cooking

Inmate

dining

area

Pot wash Dish wash

Dry

goods

storage

Refrig.

Freezer

Deliveries

in

Refuse

out

Exhibit 22-2. Production Flow for Food Preparation
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C h a p t e r 2 2 : 

Food Service

is sometimes an impractical alternative, given 

frequently limited growth needs and the disruption to existing equipment and functional space 

arrangements that must operate during renovation 

(preparation areas, cooking areas, tray assembly 

areas, dishwashing areas). Oversizing the kitchen 

and storage areas for a future expanded capacity 

usually requires only a modest increase in floor 

area and provides the operators with welcome 

initial flexibility in storage and work areas.

In determining the size of the food service area, 

consideration should be given to providing meals 

to other facilities (e.g., local juvenile detention 

and detoxification facilities). Some jurisdictions 

have consolidated the food service areas of one 

or more facilities in the new jail. Cost savings are 

realized by eliminating duplication of facilities, 

equipment, maintenance, and cooking staff and 

by reducing food purchase costs by buying larger 

quantities.

Cleanup and Waste Handling 

Issue: Adequate provisions must be made for 

cleanup and waste handling.

Response: Most health department regulations require institutional kitchens to 

provide specific wash and rinse water temperatures. These criteria are best met by 

institutional dishwashing machines. A professional food service equipment consultant 

can assist in selecting an adequately sized 

washer and coordinating related needs for 

hot water boosters, grease traps, and so 

forth.

The need to wash pots, pans, and cutlery used 

in food preparation is similar to that in kitchens 

in other facilities and should be accommodated 

accordingly. Other cleaning needs can vary widely, depending largely on whether disposable or 

reusable items are used. For reusable items, 

special cleaning equipment (e.g., special racks, 

deep sinks) may be required because of the 

special character of insulated plastic trays, plastic 

or metal cups, large insulated beverage dispensers, etc.

An adequate storage area for trays, utensils, food 

carts, and other reusable items should be readily 

available near the cleanup and food preparation 

areas.

Waste handling considerations include the 

following:

■ Gathering waste from kitchen and dining 

areas.

■ Sorting out items for recycling.

■ Disposing of food waste.

■ Disposing of boxes, cartons, cans, drums.

■ Calculating the frequency and volume of trash 

removal (perhaps integrated with trash removal for all facility waste, such as paper and 

supplies).

■ Providing a trash compactor, as appropriate.

■ Temporarily storing trash until removal can 

be securely and conveniently executed, which 

may involve (1) a separate space or area to 

contain offensive odors and maintain the 

sanitation of the food service area and/or 

(2) a waste refrigerator for meat, fat, and fish 

scraps.

Food Delivery 

Issue: The need to accommodate periodic food 

deliveries and use inmates to transfer these 

supplies to storage areas can create a weak 

point in the jail security perimeter.

Response: The jail should have a delivery 

area/loading dock that functions like a security vestibule (exhibit 22-3). Controlled by 

master control, food deliveries are unloaded 

into this area. Before the delivery person 
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F u n c t i o n a l C o m p o n e n t s 

Exhibit 22-3. Jail Delivery Vestibule/ 

Loading Dock 

Jail

supplies

and trash

removal 

Kitchen

Delivery

Dumpster

Hand

carts 

Temp.

storage 

Delivery

vestibule 

Interlock

doors

Scale

leaves, the food service staff verify the contents 

of the delivery, weigh items sold by weight, 

test the temperature of frozen and chilled 

items, and check containers for damage and 

contamination. When the exterior door is 

secured, food service staff coordinate the 

transfer of foodstuffs to storage areas by inmate workers.

In sizing and designing the delivery vestibule/

loading dock, the following issues should be 

considered:

■ The method of delivery to determine whether 

a raised dock or lift is required.

■ Temporary storage requirements during 

delivery.

■ The need to store hand trucks and pallets.

■ The type and size of access door(s) needed 

(e.g., overhead, double swinging).

It is preferable for the delivery vestibule/loading 

dock to be separate from the vehicle sallyport 

used for arrestee intake and release so that the 

security and availability of that vital area are not 

compromised.

Staff Accommodations 

Issue: The needs of food service staff should be 

accommodated.

Response: The food service director (or chief 

cook) should have a work area at which to 

prepare menus, document meals served, 

and do other paperwork. This area typically 

takes the form of an enclosed office space. 

It should include, at a minimum, a work 

surface; chair; lockable file storage; telephone; computer terminal; and shelving for 

cookbooks, reference sources, manuals, and 

catalogs.

Food service staff should be provided with a 

locker area for clothing and valuables and toilet 

facilities adjacent to the food service area. Separate toilet facilities and a break room should be 

provided for inmate workers. Storage space, 

accessible to the food service director, should 

be provided for plastic gloves, hairnets, and 

other special articles of clothing used by food 

preparers.

Security 

Issue: Security precautions must be taken if inmates work in the kitchen.

Response: Cutlery should be regularly inventoried and stored in a lockable cabinet 

or closet with the key securely retained by 

the food service director and shift commanders. Knives should be individually 

checked out as needed by kitchen staff and 

can be secured to the preparation tables by 

lockable tethers before inmates are allowed 

access to them. To avoid inmate workers being pressured by other inmates to smuggle 

contraband from the kitchen, most jails 

provide a separate housing unit for inmate 

workers, which is strongly recommended. 

Some jails totally separate that unit from the 
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C h a p t e r 2 2 : 

Food Service

other housing areas, although care must be 

taken not to sacrifice necessary supervision 

by doing so. (Inmate worker housing and 

separation issues are addressed in chapter 

16, “Special Housing,” and also in chapter 

5,“Classification/Separation,” in section 2.)

General security precautions for the kitchen 

area should include alarm and/or audio 

monitoring—and possibly closed-circuit 

television monitoring—by master control 

and/or windows at main corridors that permit 

staff observation. Kitchen staff should be able

to easily summon assistance via portable radio, 

personal alarm, or panic button.

The food preparation and cleanup areas should 

be visible from the food service director’s work 

area/office, if possible. Also, the arrangement 

of counters and equipment should minimally 

obscure the food service director’s and/or the 

security staff’s view, depending on who has the 

principal responsibility for directly monitoring 

food service area activities.

Inmate Workers 

Issue: A dining area for inmate workers may 

need to be accommodated as part of the food 

service component.

Response: When centralized dining is not 

provided, inmate workers can return to their 

housing unit to eat. However, it may be 

more convenient to provide a small dining/

break area for them, as well as for food service staff, as part of the food service component. Options for providing this capability 

are as follows:

■ Creating an adjacent, enclosed dining/

break room.

■ Creating an alcove or open area immediately adjacent to the food service 

area.

Creating an enclosed area has the benefit of securely containing the inmates, separating them 

from food service equipment, and providing more 

sanitary conditions. Depending on its location, 

however, it may place them in a setting that is 

less able to be supervised and may require more 

space than the other option.

Staff Dining Area 

Issue: A dining area for staff may need to be 

accommodated as part of the food service 

component.

Response: Space often is made available 

adjacent to the food preparation area for 

dining space for staff members. The proximity to the kitchen allows for easy service of 

meals if they are provided for staff members. If meals are not provided, it can still 

be a space with a refrigerator, microwave, 

and vending machines that staff can use for 

meal breaks.

Staff dining area in a large jail with both indoor and outdoor dining. 

(Photograph courtesy of Voorhis Robertson Justice Services.)
264

S e c t i o n 3 : 

F u n c t i o n a l C o m p o n e n t s 

Space List 

Some of the typical spaces that might be found 

within the food service component follow.

■ Receiving dock.

■ Delivery vestibule/loading dock.

■ Security vestibule.

■ Food storage:

❏ Dry.

❏ Refrigerated.

❏ Frozen.

■ Food preparation.

■ Tray assembly.

■ Secure cutlery storage.

■ Cook’s work area/office.

■ Cart storage and cleaning.

■ Cleanup (pot washing, dishwashing).

■ Tray/utensil storage.

■ Central dining.

■ Inmate worker/staff dining.

■ Staff locker area.

■ Staff toilet.

■ Inmate worker toilet.

■ Waste disposal.

■ Temporary garbage retention.

■ Recycling area.

Local codes and Americans with Disabilities Act 

guidelines regarding accessibility requirements 

should be consulted when planning these spaces.

Relationships and Components

Exhibit 22-4. Relationship of Food Service Area 

Components

Inmate

dining in

housing

Cooking

Food prep.

Pot wash Dish wash Carts

Tray assembly

Dry goods

Freezer Refrig. storage 

Trash

Toilet

Delivery

vestibule 

Cook's

office 

Trusty

or staff

dining 

Deliveries

Kitchen

Exhibit 22-5. Sample Food Service Area

Trash

Dish wash Carts

Toilet

Dry storage Freezer Refrig.

Delivery

Compactor vestibule

Inmate

dining

Pot

wash

Cook preparation

Hand-wash

sink

Locked

cutlery

drawer

Cook’s

office
265

Chapter 23

Laundry Area

T

he jail laundry should be adequate in size 

and contain equipment for the laundering 

of bedding, linen, towels, and clothing on 

a scheduled basis consistent with standards and 

good correctional practice. In addition, laundry facilities should provide for cleaning soiled 

clothes removed from arrestees at intake.

Laundry facilities in most jails tend to be staffed 

by inmate workers responsible for all clothing, 

linen, and bedding used in the system. The work 

flow typically follows this pattern: collection, 

sorting, washing, drying, folding, mending, storage, and distribution.

In older jails, laundry areas were often quite 

modest, frequently located outside of the security 

perimeter in such areas as basements, corridors, 

or the sheriff’s residence. The laundry areas 

provided little room in which to work and were 

rarely adjacent to key areas, such as the intakerelease area, or readily observable by jail security 

staff.

In newer facilities, laundries tend to be easily 

accessible, dedicated laundry spaces that are 

used—sometimes on a 24-hour basis, in large 

facilities—to provide inmates with a continuous 

supply of clean clothing and bedding. Commercial equipment tends to be preferred over residential equipment because of its larger capacity 

and longer life.

Washers in a new laundry area with enough room to store laundry

collection bins. 

(Photograph courtesy of Jim Rowenhorst.)

Key Decisions

The following decisions have a fundamental effect on design requirements and should be made 

when the role of the laundry services component 

is evaluated:

■ What range of items will be laundered, and 

how frequently?

■ Will laundry services be provided in-house or 

by outside sources?

■ Will inmates assist in laundry operations and, 

if so, to what extent?

■ How many hours a week will the laundry need 

to operate?

■ Will any inmate classifications be responsible 

for laundering some or all of their own clothing and linens (e.g., work release inmates)? 

Will this take place in a separate laundry area?

Detail Issues

The following detailed functional-architectural 

issues should be considered in the development 

of the laundry component: laundry provider, 

security/location, size, work/storage, and characteristics. Linen and clothing storage issues are 

addressed in chapter 14, “Intake-Release.”
266

S e c t i o n 3 : 

F u n c t i o n a l C o m p o n e n t s 

Laundry Provider 

Issue: A choice must be made between providing laundry services in-house or contracting 

with outside sources.

Response: Contracting for laundry services 

will slightly reduce overall construction and 

project costs. The main advantage to contracting laundry services is reduced longterm maintenance and fewer operational 

problems. To determine the best course to 

take, a local jurisdiction needs to compare 

the savings in construction, equipment, 

supplies, and staffing costs with the annual costs of outside service, the possible 

need for extra storage capacity for clothing 

and linens (potentially due to less frequent 

deliveries and less adaptability to unusual 

situations), and the possibility for introduction of contraband from outside the facility. 

Inmate workers are commonly assigned to assist with laundry services to minimize the cost 

and to help justify providing in-house laundry 

services (beyond citing the obvious convenience 

and control it provides). However, the use of inmate workers has not been without problems, for 

example, inmate use of inappropriate amounts 

of detergent or bleach, the premature need to 

replace laundry equipment and clothing due to 

misuse or vandalism, and difficulties in monitoring and supervising small groups of inmate 

workers. The problem of using incorrect amounts 

of detergent and bleach is easily addressed by 

planning for secure storage of these items and 

automated dispensing directly into the machines 

through the use of preprogrammed dispensing 

systems.

Another consideration in smaller jails 

is the possibility of the jail consistently having enough inmates who can 

be classified for inmate worker status. 

Inmate populations can vary widely, 

and there may be times when no inmate could be 

safely classified for these duties. These problems, 

when combined, may suggest that a contract 

service makes sense, especially if the jail can be 

assured that adequate clean clothing and linens 

will always be on hand and will be delivered in a 

secure fashion.

Security Location 

Issue: The laundry must be located so as to ensure adequate security and appropriate access.

Response: When inmate workers help 

with laundry services, the laundry must 

be within the security envelope of the jail, 

which is advisable in any case. Because the 

noise and residual moisture of a laundry 

operation can hamper the use of electronic 

monitoring devices, it is important to locate 

the laundry so that observation of the area 

can be maintained from a constantly staffed 

post, or at least from outside the space by a 

passing officer. Additionally, blind spots in 

the arrangement of the equipment should 

be minimized or eliminated to facilitate 

remote observation. Two-way intercoms 

should be provided in the space for communication between staff and inmate workers.

Ideally, the laundry location should be:

■ Adjacent to storage areas for clean facility clothing and linens and blankets.

■ Easily accessible from the housing 

units.

■ Near or adjacent to inmate worker 

housing.

Size 

Issue: The size and complexity of the laundry 

depend on the frequency of cleaning and the 

variety of laundry services offered.
267 

C h a p t e r 2 3 : 

Laundry Area

Response: A primary determinant of overall 

laundry area needs is the frequency with 

which items are cleaned. Most professional 

standards recommend an exchange of clean 

clothing, linen, and bedding a minimum of 

once each week. This minimum is exceeded 

by many facilities, especially for clothing 

and towel service. Frequent laundry service 

can help achieve the goal of good inmate 

hygiene and facility cleanliness.

Few older facilities launder street clothing removed from inmates during intake processing, 

although street clothing can present odor, mildew, and parasite problems. Spray disinfectants 

may partially solve these problems, but laundering is a preferable and effective solution, and its 

impact on equipment and space needs should be 

considered, even if used for only extremely soiled 

clothing.

Other laundry activities that can affect space and 

equipment needs include:

■ Dry cleaning.

■ Garment repair or mending.

■ Ironing or pressing.

■ Kitchen towel laundering.

■ Special laundering (e.g., heavily soiled work 

uniforms from vocational training or work 

programs).

■ Work release laundering.

■ Female personal laundering.

To prevent contraband passage, separate laundry facilities for work release inmates should 

be considered (exhibit 23-1). These additional 

facilities preferably would be part of the work 

release housing unit and directly accessible to the 

inmates. It is desirable to place the equipment in 

a separate room where moisture and sound can 

be better contained. The space should have good 

ventilation, a floor drain, and be observable by 

staff from a remote point.

Exhibit 23-1. Location of Separate Laundry 

Facilities for Work Release Inmates

Laundry

Work release

dayroom 

Work release

sleeping 

w.

d.

If work release inmates are not permitted to wear 

personal clothing within the security envelope, a 

laundry outside the security envelope should be 

considered for the laundering of personal clothing they wear to work. This laundry may contain 

coin-operated washers and dryers, and vending 

A separate work release laundry in the work release housing area. 

Notice that the equipment is coin operated. 

(Photograph courtesy of Jim Rowenhorst.)
268

S e c t i o n 3 : 

F u n c t i o n a l C o m p o n e n t s 

machines for soap and fabric softener. It should 

be located within the facility near the work release entrance and observable by staff from a 

remote point.

Issue: The sizes and types of washers and dryers depend on the amount and type of laundering to be done and the number of hours the 

laundry will operate.

Response: Except in very small jails, residential or lightweight commercial machines 

are inadequate and insufficiently durable to 

handle the variety and amount of laundering required. The daily use of this equipment 

and the frequent need to wash heavy loads 

such as blankets and shoes generally recommend the use of heavy-duty, commercialgrade laundry equipment. To identify actual 

equipment needs, an estimate of the amount 

of laundry to be processed each hour must 

be calculated by weight.

First, the weight of laundry to be done for each 

inmate per week is calculated. This is done by 

identifying each article issued to an inmate, its 

weight, and the frequency with which it will be 

laundered in a week. Items issued to inmates 

may include uniforms, underclothes, socks, bed 

linens, towels, washcloths, coats, and shoes. The 

weight of each item can be determined by simply 

weighing a typical item on a scale.

The weekly laundry poundage for each inmate is 

multiplied by the projected jail bed capacity, or 

peak population estimate, to determine the facility’s entire weekly laundry needs. The weekly 

laundry poundage is then adjusted to account for 

the fact that washers are not typically loaded to 

capacity. Generally, they work best at 75 percent 

of their rated capacity.

The adjusted weekly laundry poundage is then 

divided by the number of hours per week the 

laundry will operate to determine the amount of 

laundry to be processed each hour. Assume that 

inmate workers can complete one load of laundry 

per hour. Generally, the more hours the laundry 

operates, the smaller the size of the equipment 

needed. The formula for calculating washing 

capacity is as follows:

Pounds laundry per inmate × 

launderings per week × 

peak population = Pounds washing 

capacity needed Hours/week of operation × 

75% efficiency

For example:

10 pounds laundry per inmate ×

3 launderings per week × 

100 inmates

= 100 pounds 

washing 

capacity

40 hours/week operation × 

75% efficiency

After the amount of laundry to be processed each 

hour is determined, the equipment can be selected. When choosing equipment, select at least 

two sets of washers and dryers to permit laundering different types of articles at the same time 

and to provide at least one working washer or 

dryer if one breaks down. The combined capacity 

of the washers should exceed the hourly capacity needs, and the dryers should have a capacity 

slightly larger than the washers to account for 

moisture in the laundry articles.

If the number of items laundered and/or the frequency of laundering changes, a factor must be 

applied to the formula to account for the change.

The future expansion of bed capacity should also 

be considered in planning. Expansion can be accommodated by oversizing equipment, providing 

space and plumbing for additional equipment, 

or increasing the number of hours of operation. 
269 

C h a p t e r 2 3 : 

Laundry Area

Corridor and doorway widths should be coordinated to allow passage of repaired or replacement 

equipment.

Work/Storage 

Issue: Adequate area must be provided for 

washers, dryers, work space, and supply 

storage.

Response: In addition to washing and drying 

equipment, space may be required for:

■ Dry cleaning.

■ Folding tables.

■ Laundry carts (separate carts or 

compartments for soiled and clean 

laundry).

■ Laundry tubs (presoaking).

■ Supply storage.

■ Ironing or pressing.

■ Mending.

■ Laundry scale.

■ Temporary storage of clean linen and 

clothing until it can be moved to appropriate separate areas.

It may also be wise to consider providing automatic chemical dispensing equipment if inmates 

work in the laundry. This equipment helps eliminate the problem of using inappropriate amounts 

of detergent, fabric softeners, or bleach. Although 

this equipment costs more, it may be worth the 

additional expense.

Shelves for the storage of clean laundry and shoes in the laundry area. 

(Photograph courtesy of Voorhis Robertson Justice Services.)

Characteristics 

Issue: The laundry area should have special design characteristics appropriate to its needs.

Response: Some special design characteristics to consider when designing a laundry 

area include:

■ An excellent ventilation system that 

exhausts moisture and excessive heat 

directly to the outside.

■ Adequate floor drains.

■ Trough to accommodate discharge of 

water from washers.

■ Janitor’s floor sink for mopping up 

spills.

■ Nonslip floor surfaces.

■ Fire detection, suppression, and evacuation systems.

■ Moisture-resistant surfaces.

■ Small desk.

■ Water fountain.

■ Inmate worker toilet and sink.

■ Television or radio for the inmate 

workers who may spend long hours in 

the laundry area.
270

S e c t i o n 3 : 

F u n c t i o n a l C o m p o n e n t s 

Space List

Some of the typical spaces that might be found 

with the laundry component include:

■ Main laundry room:

❏ Cart staging area.

❏ Sorting and weighing area.

❏ Washing machines.

❏ Dryers.

❏ Folding tables.

■ Detergent-bleach dispenser room.

■ Linen and clothing storage room.

■ Supply storage closet.

■ Inmate worker toilet room.

■ Laundry at work release.

■ Laundry at female housing.

Local codes and Americans with Disabilities Act 

guidelines regarding accessibility requirements 

should be consulted when planning these spaces. 

Basic laundry spaces are typically closely affiliated with the intake-release area.

Relationships and Components

Exhibit 23-2. Relationship of Laundry 

Components

Street

clothes 

Linens,

blankets, and

clean clothes

storage

Intakerelease

area 

Folding

Dryer Washers

Storage

Toilet

Carts

Intermittent monitoring by

staff in movement corridor 

Exhibit 23-3. Sample Laundry Area

Laundry tubs Drain

Carts Folding table and

storage cabinets 

Dryer

Washers

Adjacent

 clean

clothing

and linens

Intermittent

staff

monitoring 

Dryer

Scales
271

Chapter 24

Administration and Public Areas

T

he jail’s administration and public reception 

areas are essential to the organization and 

management of daily business within the 

facility. They are also essential to accommodate 

the public’s need for access to the facility and 

other aspects of the jail operation. The various 

activities performed in these areas are:

■ Establishing and ensuring the execution of operational and security policies and procedures.

■ Managing the business affairs of the jail, including general accounting, ordering supplies 

and goods, and managing inmate accounts 

and bond moneys. 

■ Maintaining essential records, with the possible exception of medical and classification 

records.

■ Receiving and distributing moneys, mail, 

packages, and clothing for inmates.

■ Conducting inventories of all facility supplies 

and equipment.

■ Managing personnel, including the organization of training, daily briefings, and incidental 

meetings.

■ Dealing with the public in person and by mail 

and telephone.

■ Accommodating outside groups for tours and 

presentations.

■ Responding to requests for information and 

reports from county commissioners and other 

officials.

■ Meeting with local media personnel.

■ Storing miscellaneous supplies related to administrative functions.

■ Conferring with other criminal justice system 

officials.

Older jails usually lack work spaces for administrative staff, records functions, and for meeting 

with the public. In some jails, administrative office areas were created out of corridor space or 

niches in basement areas. Record storage was 

sometimes accommodated by using a muchneeded jail cell. The public frequently penetrated 

the security perimeter to reach law enforcement 

dispatch or jail office areas that were used for 

public reception.

With the increased emphasis on professional jail 

administration and the need to accommodate public contact, administration and public areas are 

receiving more attention when new jails are designed. However, the adequacy of administrative/

public space can still be a problem that may not get 

the attention it deserves during planning and design. This deficiency may result from oversights by 

the planning team or from an inclination to reduce 

administration and staff areas when jail budgets are 

limited.

Many diverse spaces are associated with the 

administration/public component and typically 

include:

■ Public lobby and related spaces (public toilets 

and lockers).

■ Public reception area.

■ Administrative staff offices.

■ Conference and meeting areas.

■ Administrative support areas, including space 

to maintain records and perform necessary 

work.

■ General supply storage space.

■ Staff toilets.

■ Janitor’s closet.
272

S e c t i o n 3 : 

Functional Components

Key Decisions

As the role of the administration/public component is evaluated, the following decisions should 

be made because they have a fundamental impact on design requirements:

■ Will jail administration, support staff, and 

public reception functions be merged with 

those of law enforcement? What areas will 

they share (e.g., a common lobby)?

■ How and by whom will public reception and 

outside telephone calls be handled during normal office hours and after office hours? 

■ How will mail, packages, clothing, and other 

items be received and managed? 

■ Will the administration area be within the 

main security perimeter of the jail? If so, will 

the public enter the security perimeter to meet 

with jail administrative staff?

■ Will offices for program and service staff be located in the administration area near program 

areas in the jail?

Detail Issues 

The following issues should be considered in 

the development of the administration/public 

component: location/arrangement, lobby/

reception, administrative support/work areas, 

administrator’s office, conference areas, and 

security equipment.

Location/Arrangement 

Issue: The administration component should be 

accessible to both the public and the inmateoccupied areas of the jail without creating 

security conflicts.

Response: Administrative staff interact with 

the public, salespeople, the media, and 

other official visitors on a daily basis. Therefore, access to the administration area must 

be convenient and as direct as possible. 

This essentially means that administrative 

offices, meeting rooms, and the public lobby 

must be adjacent to each other.

It is also important for the lobby area to be adjacent to the inmate visiting area or the access 

point to the visiting area. This not only facilitates 

the regular visiting process but is necessary in 

facilities where standards require immediate 

postarrest contact between inmates and family 

members, friends, attorneys, and bondspersons. 

This visiting access must be provided 24 hours a 

day, 7 days a week. 

Public access to administration areas should be 

controlled in order to protect staff and to safeguard confidential records in the area. Such control can be attained by:

■ Creating a security door between the public 

and administration areas.

■ Providing protected reception counters or 

areas.

■ If an open reception counter is used, providing 

a means by which it can be secured after office 

hours and transferring reception responsibilities to a secure space such as master control.

Separate Administration Area From 

Jail Perimeter 

Since the public should not have access to the jail 

security perimeter, a good way to provide both proper 

location and security is to locate the administration 

area outside the main security perimeter but adjacent to it (exhibit 24-1). The need for this separation 

becomes more important if jail administrative functions (e.g., administrative support services, records) 

are merged with law enforcement functions, since 

law enforcement personnel should generally be 

separated from inmate areas.
273 

C h a p t e r 2 4 : 

Administration and Public Areas

Exhibit 24-1. Administration Area in 

Relationship to Security Perimeter 

Public area

Administration 

Security

vestibule

Control

Jail

security

perimeter 

Nonpublic

secure zone

Public access

nonsecure zone

Although separating administrative 

areas from the security perimeter is a 

good principle, it may pose a logistical 

problem for the small jail administrator whose frequent presence within 

the jail is required. In smaller jails the administrator may be integrally involved in providing 

staff supervision or even security and services to 

inmates because of staff limitations. 

Placement of the small jail administrator’s office 

outside the security perimeter could cause considerable inconvenience to the jail administrator 

who must perform line-officer duties. The following concepts should be considered to address this 

problem: 

■ The jail administrator’s office might be located 

just inside the inmate-occupied part of the perimeter and adjacent to the facility’s administrative support areas located outside the perimeter. 

A secure passthrough between the two areas 

would allow the jail administrator and administrative support staff to transfer documents 

without continuously having to penetrate the 

security vestibule of the perimeter.

■ The jail administrator’s office might be situated just outside the primary jail security perimeter and a secondary desk or work area, 

with file storage, could be located within the 

perimeter.

The approach taken to this problem depends on 

the frequency of public contact with the jail administrator, the jail administrator’s need for direct contact with administrative support staff 

and access to records, and the degree to which 

the jail administrator performs fundamental 

security tasks.

Issue: The administration area should be linked 

with other functional components with which it 

frequently interacts.

Response:

■ It is desirable to locate the staff areas 

and the administration areas adjacent 

to each other for the following reasons:

❏ Convenience for attending staff briefings.

❏ Enhanced management of staff activities.

❏ A common need to be in an area secured 

from the public, yet outside the main 

security perimeter of the jail.

❏ Sharing of spaces such as multipurpose, 

training, and conference rooms.

■ All jails, regardless of size, can use a 

meeting or conference space in the 

administration area to hold meetings with the public. Administration 

areas, particularly the records area, 

should be as accessible as possible 

to master control/dispatch and the 

intake-release areas for the convenient 

transfer of records. This is especially 

true in cases where computerized data 

systems are limited or not in use and 

hardcopy records must be transferred. 

Unless so located, jail staff will be 

forced to deliver files to intake-release 
274

S e c t i o n 3 : 

Functional Components

at inopportune times or maintain active records in that area instead of in a 

central records location.

■ Administrative staff should be able to 

enter their area quickly and directly 

from their parking areas. Access can 

be gained through the public lobby 

or, preferably, through a separate staff 

entrance. 

■ Direct access from the outside into 

individual administrative offices, such 

as the administrator’s office, is discouraged because this poses additional 

security and surveillance problems. It 

should be recognized that acts of violence may be directed toward administrative staff. As a rule, the number of 

openings into any perimeter should be 

minimized. 

■ Administrative and public areas 

should be located so they can be expanded as facility operations grow, or 

the facility should be planned with 

surplus offices and space in which to 

grow.

Lobby/Reception 

Issue: A lobby and reception area should be 

provided to properly and effectively accommodate contact with the public.

Response: The public lobby is the primary 

point of contact for all public and official 

visitors to the jail. A visitor’s impression of 

the lobby and reception areas will greatly 

influence the jail’s image in the community 

and the reaction of visitors to jail staff. 

The following characteristics should be considered in developing the lobby and reception areas:

■ The lobby area should be sized to provide at 

least 15 square feet for each person expected 

to use the area at one time. A more generous 

allocation of space is encouraged to enhance 

public use and impressions of the area. To 

determine the number of individuals who will 

use the lobby area, it is important to decide 

whether the lobby will be used only for inmate 

visitors or whether it must also accommodate 

visitors waiting for general business purposes, 

attorneys waiting for visits with inmates, law 

enforcement, or other criminal justice functions associated with the jail. Allowances 

might also be made for large groups that come 

to the jail for tours or presentations about jail 

activities, such as county commissioners, citizen committees, and grand juries. 

■ Acoustic treatment should be provided to improve the quality of the space, especially when 

large groups with children are in the area. 

■ Sound separation between the lobby and adjacent jail administration and jail security areas 

is important.

A lobby area in a large county jail. Notice the open reception desk on the 

left and bench seating in the foreground.

(Photograph courtesy of Jim Rowenhorst.)
275 

C h a p t e r 2 4 : 

Administration and Public Areas

■ The lobby space should be pleasant and comfortable, with natural light if possible.

■ The reception area should be readily accessible 

and visible to the visitor. It is advantageous for 

the visitor to be able to establish eye contact 

with the reception staff immediately upon entering the jail.

■ The lobby area sets the tone for the public’s 

experience at the facility. The lobby should 

always be comfortable, clean, and well organized, and reception staff should be cordial 

and helpful.

■ View conflicts between the lobby area and the 

jail perimeter should be avoided while still 

allowing direct eye contact between the reception staff and the visitor. 

■ To facilitate contact with the public, personnel 

working in the reception area must be able to 

communicate with all staff in their offices or 

posts throughout the jail. This allows quick response to public needs that can be filled only 

by other staff in the jail.

Around-the-clock reception 

Issue: A method of accommodating contact with 

the public 24 hours a day, 7 days a week must be 

established.

Response: The public will need to have 

contact with the jail 24 hours a day, 7 days 

a week. Such contact might be made by 

inmates’ family members, bondspersons, 

attorneys, and others who need communication outside of a standard 9 a.m. to 5 p.m., 

Monday to Friday schedule. Consequently, it 

is important to determine who will perform 

reception duties for the facility at all hours 

of the day and during the weekends. The 

basic options include:

■ A full-time receptionist (support staff 

or officer) performs all reception 

functions.

■ Master control performs all reception functions (this can only be accomplished in smaller facilities where 

the master control officer has fewer 

tasks).

■ A law enforcement dispatcher performs all reception functions.

■ A receptionist or member of administrative support staff performs weekday 

reception functions, and master control and/or dispatch performs nighttime and weekend reception functions. 

Visitation presents the potential for high emotions and security problems. During visitation, 

any nonsecurity personnel at the reception post 

should have access to immediate assistance from 

a deputy or security officer.

Secure and controlled nighttime and weekend reception can be achieved by creating a night lobby 

or vestibule to which the public can gain access 

without penetrating the main lobby (exhibit 24-

2). Preferably, such a night lobby will be adjacent to a staff post such as master control, the 

dispatch area, or the records area so that public 

needs can be dealt with directly and securely. In 

the event a night lobby area cannot be directly 

viewed by master control, it will be necessary to 

install a closed-circuit television (CCTV) and audio communications link to the area. Regardless 

of location, some form of passthrough opening 

should enable those coming to the jail to transfer 

material to master control or to the dispatcher 

without having the officer leave the secure post.

If the night reception post cannot be located 

adjacent to the night lobby, the design should establish visibility between the reception area and 

the public in the night lobby, if possible. If this is 
276

S e c t i o n 3 : 

Functional Components

not possible, staff should have video monitoring 

capability of the night lobby. Staff should also 

be able to monitor the main lobby in the event 

a visitor needs to enter this area for any reason. 

Audio communications should also be provided. 

Nighttime control staff should be able to unlock 

the door that separates the main lobby from the 

night lobby by remote control. 

Receiving packages 

Issue: The means by which packages, clothing, 

money, and other items are received from the 

public should be secure and convenient.

Response: The public will bring a variety of 

items to the facility for inmates’ use. They 

may bring clothing that will be worn for 

court appearances, cash, or personal items, 

as permitted by jail rules. These materials 

can be received securely received in the following ways:

■ There may be a secure package or 

paper passthrough in the wall of a 

secure reception area. If the reception 

point is master control, the package 

passthrough raises a security concern 

about explosives, chemical and biological agents, or other items that would 

Exhibit 24-2. Secure Reception Area 

Master

control or

dispatch 

Night lobby

Lobby

Doors locked

at night 

Doors unlocked

24 hours

After-hours

passthrough

window

Regular business

hours passthrough

window 

endanger control staff and the facility 

in general.

Night lobby in a small facility. 

(Photograph courtesy of Kimme & Associates.)

■ Facility staff could leave the security 

perimeter to receive and screen the 

contents of the items before allowing 

them within the security perimeter. 

This method is inconvenient for staff 

and takes them away from other security duties. 

■ Administrative support staff or dedicated reception staff could accept 

materials only during the day. The 

security staff would then leave the perimeter at a convenient time to receive 

and check the materials prior to final 

acceptance.

A combination of these approaches might best 

satisfy reception needs. Some jails have used 

x-ray screening equipment for all packages and 

mail entering the facility.

Lobby support elements 

Issue: Proper support space and equipment 

should be provided for the lobby area.
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Receptionist’s window with a sliding opening to receive items from 

the public. 

(Photograph courtesy of Voorhis Robertson Justice Services.)

Public lockers and restroom in a small jail lobby. 

(Photograph courtesy of Voorhis Robertson Justice Services.)

Response: Several space and equipment 

considerations should be made during the 

design of the lobby area, including the 

following:

■ Public, accessible toilets for men and 

women.

■ Drinking fountains.

■ Telephone.

■ Clock.

■ A bulletin board or display case that 

communicates facility rules and practices relevant to the public.

■ Durable but comfortable furniture 

with durable finishes.

■ A locker area for the secure storage of 

coats and valuables (especially in connection with visiting—see chapter 18, 

“Visiting Areas”).

■ If space allows, it is very desirable to 

have a small children’s table for using 

crayons and coloring books or another 

type of play area for children who are 

waiting to visit inmates. 

Administrative Support Work Areas 

These are the work areas for administrative support and records staff and other miscellaneous 

functions associated with facility administration.

Issue: The basic activities of the administrative 

support staff should be determined to establish 

size and equipment requirements.

Response: The support staff area forms the 

core of the administration area. Fundamental functions are performed in this area, 

with some variations. 

A primary variation concerns whether support 

staff will be involved in contacts with the public. 

If so, their space needs to be immediately adjacent to, and accessible from, the public lobby 

area. The method by which the public will be 

received should also be determined since it can 

be done either in a secure manner (e.g., visitors 

speaking through a secure telephone, intercom, 
278

S e c t i o n 3 : 

Functional Components

or passthrough) or by having visitors approach or 

enter the administrative support area and speak 

directly with administrative support staff across a 

counter or desk.

It should also be determined whether the support staff will have the primary responsibility 

for answering telephone calls during the day. 

Answering calls for all parts of the facility can be 

time consuming and can eventually generate the 

need for additional staff. Most new facilities have 

some sort of “automated attendant” service on 

their phone line that directs calls to the appropriate person or function.

Clearly, the administrative workload must be 

carefully identified and assigned to positions 

prior to beginning design. Further discussion of 

administrative tasks and position assignments 

will occur during design to ensure an effective 

and efficient administrative component.

Administrative support staff typically perform the 

following activities:

■ Typing or entering data.

■ Maintaining files.

■ Establishing and keeping records.

■ Copying and collating reports and information.

■ Logging and sorting mail.

■ Maintaining accounts and purchasing.

■ Controlling and managing inventory of facility 

office supplies.

■ Transcribing dictated information.

Common types of equipment associated with 

typical administrative support activities include:

■ Desk and chair for each staff person.

■ Computer stand.

■ Computer and printer.

■ Copier.

■ Work surface to collate copied reports and information or to screen, sort, and log mail.

■ Postage scale.

■ Binding machine.

■ Telephone.

■ Intercom unit.

■ Transcribing machine and foot pedal.

■ File cabinets.

■ Wastebasket.

■ Fax machine.

■ Safe.

Issue: A variety of functions associated with the 

support work area may require separate space. 

Response: Such areas are either provided 

within the administrative support area, an 

adjacent alcove, or an adjacent separate 

space.

■ Supply storage. Storage space should 

be provided for pens, pencils, paper, 

copier supplies, printer cartridges, file 

folders, forms, and so forth. The size 

of this space depends on the range of 

items stored and the inventory maintained (a large file cabinet may be 

adequate in very small jails). If wholesale purchases of items such as customized forms and copier paper will 

be made from office supply distributers (because of cost considerations), 

a fairly significant amount of space 

might be needed to store office supplies. In larger jails these supplies are 

often stored in a main warehouse area 
279 

C h a p t e r 2 4 : 

Administration and Public Areas

and used to stock various areas within 

the facility.

■ Inactive records storage. A jail is frequently required to maintain files on 

inmates and general office matters, 

such as budget summaries, policy 

and procedure manuals, and so forth, 

for extended periods of time. When 

considering storage space for these 

archived records, it is important to 

choose an area accessible to the staff 

who would need those files. Generally, these sorts of files are kept in the 

administrative support area and do 

not need to be stored in the jail’s main 

security perimeter. However, access to 

these files should be controlled.

A key determinant of storage needs is the lifespan that defines “active” records (e.g., current 

and those generated in the past year) and “inactive” records (e.g., 1–40 years old). Depending 

on the time period covered and the volume of 

inactive files kept, some or all of them might 

be better stored in less valuable space outside 

the administrative area. Basement or attic space 

might be used as long as it has satisfactory environmental characteristics to preserve the integrity 

of the files (dry, well ventilated) and to allow for 

easy retrieval of the files. Many jurisdictions use 

offsite storage to maintain records in optimum 

conditions; staff assigned to the records storage 

function are able to retrieve these records as necessary. When designing space for records storage, 

it is essential to check laws regarding the retention of various types of records.

■ Other approaches to maintaining inactive 

records include digitizing the information. A 

decision to computerize can greatly reduce the 

need for space in the administrative support 

and administrative areas for keeping inactive 

records. Digitized files may need a dedicated 

server to store the information.

■ A closet area should be available to store the 

coats, purses, hats, and boots of administrative 

personnel and official visitors. 

■ Toilet facilities should be available for staff and 

should be easily accessible. 

■ Depending on whether there is a staff breakroom, a small area for a coffee machine, 

microwave, and/or refrigerator might be 

provided. 

■ To maintain the acoustic integrity of the area, 

a separate space may be developed for equipment that generates noise, such as copy machines and computer printers.

Administrator’s Office

Issue: The location of the jail administrator’s office must be convenient both to the jail and to 

administrative support areas in the facility.

Response: As previously discussed, the jail 

administrator’s office is closely related to 

the jail’s administrative areas and primary 

security areas. If the jail administrator’s office is within the jail security perimeter, it 

would be useful to be able to observe several key areas or the main circulation corridor 

from the space. Although the jail administrator’s office may have a fair amount of 

glazing to permit observation, it should also 

have curtains or blinds to afford privacy in 

dealings with staff or inmates. 

If the jail administrator’s office is outside the 

security perimeter, the office should be large 

enough to accommodate small conferences (exhibit 24-3). If it is within the security perimeter, it 

should be immediately adjacent and accessible to 

a conference area.

Issue: The jail administrator’s area should be designed to accommodate a variety of functional 

needs. 
280

S e c t i o n 3 : 

Functional Components

Exhibit 24-3. Jail Administrator’s Office

Toilet

Conference Storage

Administrator's

office 

Response: Aside from the normal desk and 

seating requirements, a number of functional and equipment considerations influence 

the design of the jail administrator’s area:

■ A private toilet is desirable unless another one is located close to this area.

■ A small, very secure storage closet is 

desirable. Security is essential because 

the closet might be used to store sensitive items such as audio tapes or evidence from disciplinary investigations.

■ If the jail administrator’s office is outside the security perimeter, it may be 

a repository for an extra set of facility 

keys that can be accessed in an emergency. If this is the case, the keys must 

be in a secure cabinet or safe, preferably in a secured space out of sight. 

A closet space within the jail administrator’s area might be an appropriate 

place for a secure key cabinet.

■ The windows of the jail administrator’s office should have a burglarresistant or detention-quality glazing 

to prevent vandalism or attacks from 

the outside.

■ The space should have lockable file 

cabinets and drawers, especially if 

other administrative staff also use the 

jail administrator’s office as a nighttime command post or meeting center. 

Sometimes the administrator’s office 

is the repository for personnel records 

(which must have restricted access).

■ The door to the jail administrator’s 

office should be lockable.

■ The jail administrator’s office must 

be equipped with both an inside telephone line or intercom system and an 

outside telephone line.

■ The jail administrator’s office must 

have the ability to provide visual and 

acoustic privacy. This is critical because the administrator often meets 

with inmates or staff about private 

matters. In providing acoustic privacy, 

be sure that sound does not transfer 

through ventilation systems or above 

the ceiling and into adjacent spaces.

■ If the jail administrator is the recipient and caretaker of bond moneys, a 

safe or lockable deposit box would be 

advisable.

■ The jail administrator may want CCTV 

monitors or the capability to accommodate them at a later date.

■ If the primary method of communication between jail staff is portable 

radio, that same capability may be 

needed in the jail administrator’s 

office.

Conference Areas 

Issue: The conference area should have characteristics conducive to meeting activities.

Response: Conference space can be provided 

in several ways, including:

■ A dedicated conference area 

(preferred).
281 

C h a p t e r 2 4 : 

Administration and Public Areas

■ A conference area within a larger staff 

briefing/training/multipurpose room.

■ An extension of the jail administrator’s area for small conferences (preferred only as an addition to other 

conference space).

The conference area should have the following 

characteristics:

■ Sufficient space to accommodate the number 

of people expected to use the area. Exhibit 

24-4 shows an example of minimum square 

footage, which depends on actual equipment 

and furnishing needs.

■ Sufficient wall surface for presentation boards, 

screens, marker boards, bulletin boards, and 

so forth.

Exhibit 24-4 . Assumptions for Size of 

Conference Area

Number of Users Room Size 

(square feet)

4–5 125

6–7 145

8–9 170

10–11 200

12–13 250

14–15 300

16–17 365

18–19 430

20–22 500

■ Controllable and variable lighting arrangements.

■ Proximity to the jail administrator’s office, if 

possible.

■ Storage area for audiovisual and other support 

equipment.

■ Telephone, cable television, and data outlets.

■ Good acoustical qualities.

■ Natural light, if possible.

Security Equipment 

Issue: Provisions must be made for storage of 

emergency response equipment.

Response: The facility will probably need to 

maintain a variety of security equipment, 

including:

■ Helmets. 

■ Batons.

■ Shields. 

■ Less-than-lethal munitions and 

ammunition.

■ Chemical agents.

This equipment should be stored in a controllable area outside the jail’s main security perimeter. There is no single best location, but common 

locations include:

■ Secure armory in the vehicle sallyport.

■ Sheriff’s law enforcement weapons armory (if 

a joint facility).

■ Secure armory in the jail’s administration area 

(if outside the security perimeter). 

Regardless of location, several characteristics of 

the security equipment storage space must be 

considered, including:
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S e c t i o n 3 : 

Functional Components

■ Secure and lockable door.

■ Security construction for the wall, floor, and 

ceiling.

■ Access limited to the jail administrator or law 

enforcement supervisors and other key jail personnel selected by the jail administrator (e.g., 

the special emergency response team).

■ Proximity briefing areas where officers might 

assemble in emergencies and be issued security equipment.

■ Detectors and alarms if chemical agents or 

ammunition are stored in the space.

■ Special ventilation if chemical agents are 

stored in the space.

■ Proper and accessible shelving and storage 

compartments for the equipment to be stored 

in the space.

Space List 

Some of the typical spaces that might be 

found in the administration/public component 

follow.

■ Administration:

❏ Administrative support.

❏ Supply storage.

❏ Copy room.

❏ Administrator’s office.

❏ Shift commander.

❏ Conference room.

❏ Other staff offices (including spare offices).

❏ Staff toilet.

❏ Coat closet.

❏ Inactive records.

❏ Jail security equipment.

❏ Technical service office.

■ Public:

❏ Public lobby.

❏ Public toilet.

❏ Public storage/locker area.

❏ Night lobby.

❏ Public reception desk.

❏ Security vestibule (may be the same as the 

vestibule used for visiting access).

❏ Parking.

Local codes and Americans with Disabilities Act 

guidelines regarding accessibility requirements 

should be consulted when planning these spaces.
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C h a p t e r 2 4 : 

Administration and Public Areas

Relationships and Components

Exhibit 24-5. Relationship of Administration Area to Jail Operations and Public Lobby

Admin. 

support

Copy/

storage Toilet

Security equipment

armory 

Spare office

Admin. Conference

office

Jail operations Security

vestibule Security

perimeter 

Administration can either be

inside or outside of the

security perimeter 

Public

lobby 

Other

sheriff’s

offices

or staff

facilities 

Exhibit 24-6. Components of Administration Area

Administrative

support

Copy/

storage Armory

Admin.

office

Reception 

window to

lobby with

shutter 

Metal cabinet

for chemical

agent storage 

Provide exhaust

to outside with

switch in corridor 

s

Copier
285

Chapter 25

Staff Areas

No one spends more time in jail than the 

jail staff. Yet jails across the country have 

consistently neglected to address the 

needs of jail staff.

Motivation and management experts state there 

is growing evidence that corporations that fail to 

address staff needs send a clear message to their 

employees: “You don’t count around here!” By 

making an architectural statement that clearly 

recognizes and accommodates the needs of its 

jail staff, a local government can make a lasting 

contribution to positive employer-employee relations, staff morale, and productivity.

In this chapter, “staff areas” are defined as those 

spaces that are specifically intended for the 

private use of jail staff. These include a lounge 

or break room, training areas, exercise rooms, 

locker/shower rooms, and toilets. They do not 

include staff control posts, which are dealt with 

in chapter 13, “Master Control,” and chapter 15, 

“General Housing.”

Newly built jails around the country have some 

or all of the staff areas identified. Some smaller 

jails have cleverly consolidated some of the 

spaces under the heading of a staff “multipurpose” or “multiuse” room. It is not necessary to 

view every staff space as having a mutually exclusive purpose. The trick is to avoid taxing any 

one area with too much staff or traffic or with 

activities that are inappropriately combined, as in 

one small jail where the coffee room and weight 

room occupied the same space.

A key space-sharing concept in smaller jails is that of creating common 

staff areas for both law enforcement 

and jail personnel. With few exceptions, there is no substantial reason 

to separate many of these areas. It is important, 

however, to consider providing equal accommodations for each to help avoid the age-old problem of perceiving law enforcement work as more 

important and desirable than jail work.

Key Decisions 

The following decisions have a fundamental effect on design requirements and should be made 

when evaluating the role of staff areas:

■ Will jail officers routinely change into uniforms at the facility? Will locker and shower 

areas be needed? Where will officers store 

coats, boots, hats, and articles that should not 

enter the security envelope (e.g., weapons, 

holsters, cell phones, pocket knives, and, perhaps, matches and lighters)?

■ Will there be physical fitness requirements and 

defensive tactics training for officers that can 

be met or encouraged by providing proper facilities at the jail? 

■ Will staff receive regular or daily briefings on 

the previous shift’s activities and their responsibilities, or for other purposes?

■ Will staff be allowed breaks away from their 

posts? Will they eat meals away from their 

posts? Does the administration want to encourage camaraderie by providing a place for staff 

to meet before or after work?

■ Where will staff receive formal training? Will 

training be done at the jail or at a separate 

training facility?

■ If the law enforcement function is in the same 

facility, which staff areas can be shared?
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S e c t i o n 3 : 

Functional Components

Detail Issues 

The following detailed functional-architectural 

issues relate to the various functions and spaces 

that make up the private staff areas of the facility: general issues, locker/shower areas, physical 

conditioning area, break room, training/

multipurpose area, toilets.

General Issues 

Issue: Staff areas should be located outside the 

secure envelope of the jail.

Response: It is not in the best interests of 

jail security and operations to place staff 

areas within the security envelope because 

off-duty jail officers, and especially law 

enforcement officers, within the envelope 

can distract the attention of on-duty staff 

and inmates. Staff areas should be near and 

easily accessible to an access point in the 

secure perimeter to avoid unnecessary delay 

in moving into the jail.

The exceptions to this rule are staff dining or 

staff break areas served by the jail kitchen (but 

off limits to off-duty staff). These areas would 

need to be inside the security perimeter.

Staff areas are not public areas. Therefore, they 

need to be separate and secured from unwanted 

public traffic. 

Issue: Staff parking and entry must be considered in the design.

Response: Providing adequate parking for 

staff is important. Doing so generally entails 

the following considerations:

■ Sufficient parking to accommodate 

shift overlap needs so that personal 

and departmental vehicles are not left 

on the street or in places other than 

the staff parking area.

■ Protected parking, or at least parking 

separate from the public and visitor 

parking areas.

Protected or separate parking recognizes the professional status of staff and guards against vandalism. It can be provided in several ways:

■ Underground garages or above-grade structures, with or without a controlled access 

point, that provide protection from the weather.

■ A fenced-in parking area behind a control gate.

■ A separate area, less visible to the public, 

possibly with access controlled by a gate.

Staff should enter the jail through a staff-only 

entrance. When determining the location of the 

staff entrance, the following should be taken into 

consideration:

■ The entry point is convenient to staff parking.

■ Entry to the staff areas is secured and entry 

requires a proximity card issued to staff, a remote unlock from a dispatch center or master 

control, or a coded electric lock with keypad.

■ There is a conveniently located place, such as 

a locker area, for staff to deposit weapons and 

personal belongings before entering the jail security envelope.

■ If staff briefing/rollcall or training rooms are 

to be included in the design, they should be 

located near the staff locker rooms outside the 

secure perimeter.

Locker/Shower Areas

All facilities need to provide locker and shower 

space for staff. The size of the space and the 

amenities offered depend on the particulars of 

a given operation. Factors that contribute to the 

use of and need for this space include:
287 

C h a p t e r 2 5 : 

Staff Areas

■ Absence of any other space to secure personal 

property or clothing during the work shift.

■ Provision of physical conditioning space and 

equipment within the facility.

■ Policies that forbid uniformed staff from wearing their uniform to and from work.

■ Need to change into civilian clothes for court.

■ Potential for contact with soiled clothing or 

laundry or bodily fluids.

■ Need for storage of extra uniforms or issued 

equipment.

■ Requirements for staff to work overtime shifts.

Activities/characteristics 

Issue: Space, equipment, hardware, and finishes should be appropriate for the activities and 

needs of the area.

Response: Locker/shower area activities 

are little different from those in conventional public facilities, such as a gym. They 

include:

■ Dressing and undressing.

■ Clothing exchange/storage of coats, 

hats, boots.

■ Storage of spare uniforms.

■ Storage of holsters, belts, and miscellaneous job-related paraphernalia, if 

not weapons.

■ Storage of policy and procedure manuals (if not automated) and other 

documents.

■ Grooming (counter, sink, and mirror 

are necessary).

■ Showering and drying.

■ Hand and face washing.

■ Toilet.

■ Temporary storage of clean and dirty 

towels.

When designing a locker/shower area, equipment, hardware, and finish considerations 

include:

■ Shower stalls, with at least one offering accessibility for staff with disabilities.

■ Drying area, preferably with seat and towel 

racks.

■ Sinks.

■ Toilets and urinals, accessible for staff with 

disabilities.

■ Shelving for storage of towels, washcloths, 

and toiletries.

■ Clothes hampers.

■ Lockers and benches.

■ Nonslip surfaces near the shower areas and 

waterproof, cleanable surfaces throughout.

■ Mirrors.

■ Mechanical ventilation sufficient for the area.

■ Electric hand and hair dryers.

■ Ample outlets at the sink/grooming area.

■ Heat lamps.

■ Bulletin board(s).

Female staff 

Issue: Separate areas for female staff should be 

included in the design.

Response: Female officers are employed at 

jails in greater numbers than ever before. 

While female staff can clearly share break 

rooms, physical fitness, and training areas 

with male staff, they should be afforded the 
288

S e c t i o n 3 : 

Functional Components

privacy of separate showers and locker areas. This area was often overlooked in older 

and smaller facilities and should be accommodated in new facilities.

Locker/shower area size 

Issue: The size of the locker/shower areas depends on the number and flow of users and their 

basic equipment needs.

Response: In calculating equipment, and 

thus space needs, a significant difference 

between locker needs and other equipment 

needs must be recognized. The number of 

lockers is determined by the total number 

of staff projected to use the area. Each staff 

member should be assigned his/her own 

locker, and additional lockers should be 

planned for increases in staffing or other users. Other equipment needs are determined 

by the number of users at any one time. The 

difference recognizes that there are considerably more total staff under employment 

than there are at work at the jail at any one 

time or who may come to exercise at any 

one time. This is also true of law enforcement officers who may share the locker/

shower area. (Chapter 7, “Staffing Impact,” 

in section 2 reviews the difference between 

staff totals and staff shift counts.)

Locker room in a smaller jail. 

(Photograph courtesy of Liebert & Associates.)

The number of lockers and other equipment provided, and thus the amount of space required, 

may increase if administrative, clerical, and reserve staff use the exercise and/or locker room 

facilities. Often civilian staff can be assigned in 

the secure perimeter of the jail and will wear a 

uniform. They should be provided locker space 

to store extra uniforms and personal items that 

are not appropriate to be taken into the security 

envelope. If the only staff exercise area is in the 

jail, it is common for law enforcement staff to 

share those facilities, and they may require spare 

lockers to use when they are in the facility. 

Sufficient space to permit generously sized staff 

lockers is recommended. This is due to the variety of articles that might be stored, including:

■ Uniforms.

■ Authorized Tasers or chemical sprays.

■ Cell phones.

■ Hats, coats, boots, shoes.

■ Extra socks, underwear.

■ Civilian clothing.

■ Equipment, such as holsters and pocket knives 

(guns and ammunition should be stored in 

designated gun lockers located outside of the 

secure envelop of the jail).

■ Toiletries, medications.

■ Books, manuals, personal papers.

■ Other items issued or required by the agency.
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C h a p t e r 2 5 : 

Staff Areas

A typical locker has:

■ Ventilation through small louvers or 

perforations.

■ A lockable latch.

■ A shelf or shelves for hats, toiletries, manuals.

■ Single-tier design for full-length garments.

■ Sufficient width and depth to accommodate 

garments on a hanger (at least 21 inches 

deep).

■ Hooks for towels or other garments.

■ Bench seating adjacent to the lockers.

To facilitate access and cleaning, lockers can be 

elevated on a base (exhibit 25-1) or continue to 

the floor with additional storage on the bottom 

of the locker.

Physical Conditioning Area

Many jurisdictions require staff to meet minimum 

physical fitness standards. A good argument can 

be made that it is reasonable for those jurisdictions to provide staff space and equipment to 

facilitate regular exercise. The key to determining 

whether such a space is needed will be an evaluation of whether the level of usage and resultant 

benefits to the staff and the organization justify 

the expenditure. Provision of an exercise area 

and equipment will further necessitate a staff 

locker room.

Space size 

Issue: The size of the area depends on the number of people using it and types of activities.

Response: The size of a physical conditioning area is influenced by the following 

factors:

■ Total number of potential exercisers at 

any one time.

Exhibit 25-1. Lockers Elevated on a Base 

Built-in

bench

■ Whether the area will be jointly used 

by both jail and law enforcement staff 

or other county employees.

■ Type of activities accommodated in 

the area: 

❏❏ Basketball.

❏❏ Weightlifting.

❏❏ Martial arts training.

❏❏ Calisthenics.

❏❏ Aerobic/cardiovascular activities.

■ Type of equipment required for the 

activities: 

❏❏ Basketball backboard, rim, and floor 

area.

❏❏ Open floor space for self-defense 

activity mat.

❏❏ Multiple-station exercise machine.

❏❏ Station for free weights, including 

bench press.

❏❏ Incline board.

❏❏ Stationary bicycle.

❏❏ Treadmill and/or elliptical machine.
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S e c t i o n 3 : 

Functional Components

Chapter 19, “Exercise Areas,” provides further 

information on some of the space needs of these 

activities.

Access 

Issue: A dedicated staff exercise area should be 

located outside of the security envelope.

Response: A dedicated staff exercise area 

should be designed so that staff can come 

and go without entering the security envelope. This is desirable because staff may 

want to exercise at odd hours and most jail 

administrators do not encourage off-duty 

staff to enter the security envelope after 

hours. Also, staff will be out of uniform and 

carrying gym bags, clothes, and other gear 

that could raise questions of contraband 

passage, as items accidentally left behind 

might be obtained by inmates. It would also 

be wise to consider placing the exercise 

area(s) as close to the point of staff access 

as possible to minimize staff movement.

Break Room/Dining Area 

Staff need a place apart from the inmate population to eat meals and take other approved breaks 

during the shift. In addition, space should be 

provided to store meals, snacks, and soft drinks. 

(Staff dining is also discussed in chapter 22, 

“Food Service.”)

Break room size 

Issue: The size of the staff break room/dining 

area depends on the activities, users, and equipment involved.

Response: Activities that typically occur in a 

break room include the following:

■ Storage of personal meals and 

foodstuffs.

■ Soft drink and snack vending. 

■ Refrigeration of perishable meals and 

snacks brought from home.

■ Eating of meals.

■ Recreational reading.

■ Conversation.

■ “Time-outs” or stress-reducing breaks.

■ Preparation of hot and cold beverages.

■ Limited meal preparation (warming, 

toasting).

Equipment and furnishings for which space may 

be needed include:

■ Tables and chairs.

■ Sink (gooseneck faucet for easy filling).

■ Countertops.

■ Drawers for utensils.

■ Storage for cleaning supplies, cups, dishes.

■ Kitchen appliances (coffeemaker, toaster, 

microwave).

■ Hot plate or countertop stove elements.

■ Under-cabinet lighting.

■ Electrical outlets near counter.

■ Refrigerated storage for food and drink.

■ Trophy cabinets, shelves.

■ Bulletin boards.

■ Telephone.

■ Intercom (if walkie-talkies are not used).

■ Television (TV).

■ Vending machines.
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C h a p t e r 2 5 : 

Staff Areas

The break room should accommodate about 75 

percent of the staff on the largest shift, including 

jail officers, administrators, and support staff. If 

the break room is shared with law enforcement 

staff, their needs must also be met.

If smoking is prohibited in the facility, an outdoor courtyard with a covered area adjacent to 

the break room would be appropriate and would 

help keep the officer who smokes in close proximity to where he/she may be needed if an emergency arises. The natural light introduced to the 

break room through an adjacent courtyard is also 

beneficial.

A nicely appointed staff break room/dining area. Note the amenities 

provided for staff, such as the salad bar, television, outdoor area, art, 

and plants. 

(Photograph courtesy of Jim Rowenhorst.)

Break room location 

Issue: The break room might be located within 

the security envelope of the jail.

Response: The break room/dining area 

might best be placed within the security envelope of the jail and near the kitchen and 

thus separate from the other staff areas if:

■ Staff meals are provided by the jail 

kitchen (already within the jail 

perimeter).

■ The break room is not intended for 

use by law enforcement personnel.

■ The space is essentially limited to the 

break room function and does not 

serve as a conference room, training 

area, or staff multipurpose room.

■ The sheriff or jail administrator 

wants to keep staff who are taking a 

scheduled break within the security 

envelope so that they can respond 

quickly to an emergency or problem 

that might arise. (This may especially 

be the case in the small jail because 

the total number of staff available per 

shift may be quite limited.)

Training/Multipurpose Area 

Training is a must for jails of any size. Although 

larger jails may have extensive training facilities, both inside and outside of the facility, a 

totally separate training area may be impractical 

for the smaller jail unless the combined training demands of jail and law enforcement are 

high enough to justify one. However, this will 

vary with organizational philosophy and training requirements. One common approach in jails 

where consolidation is feasible is a combination 

training/conference/briefing room.

The following functional issues apply to the design of an area for staff training, briefing, and 

conference rooms.

Issue: The training area in a jail can often function as a dual- or multipurpose staff space.

Response: Design and plan to furnish the 

space in such a way that its location and 

furnishings accommodate a wide range of 

activities. Carefully evaluate the activities 
292

S e c t i o n 3 : 

Functional Components

that will take place in addition to training. 

Without good planning, jails, especially 

smaller jails, often fail to detail the nature 

and type of staff areas needed and end up 

with one or more poorly defined and designed rooms.

Staff areas should never be merged with inmate 

multipurpose space. Aside from time and security 

conflicts (e.g., inmate access to staff equipment, 

information, training documents), there may be 

sufficient legitimate, staff-related activities, even 

in smaller jails, to justify provision of a separate 

staff multipurpose area. Such a space could accommodate the following compatible staff activities and functions:

■ Conferences and meetings.

■ Shift briefings/rollcall.

■ Staff training.

■ Staff defensive tactics training.

■ Staff library and training resource storage.

■ Audiovisual storage (LCD projector, laptop 

computer, video camera, VCR/DVD player, 

TV, movie screen, easel, and related training 

supplies).

■ Provision for training programs through cable 

TV or Internet broadcasts.

■ Often computer workstations are made available to staff in this or another area that allow 

staff to access logs, policies and procedures, 

e-mail, or other work-related information.

Staff training room. 

(Photograph courtesy of Jim Rowenhorst.)

Issue: Equipment, hardware, and furnishings 

should match activities and functions.

Response: The following considerations 

apply for the staff multipurpose area:

■ Size and shape should be compatible 

with classroom-style instruction.

■ Lighting should be adjustable and 

suitable for both audiovisual presentations and reading.

■ Folding tables and folding or stackable 

chairs enhance flexibility.

■ If the room is of sufficient size, a 

moveable, ceiling-suspended divider 

adds flexibility for scheduling. An access door should be provided for each 

side. 

■ Windows are desirable but are not 

as great a priority as wall space for 

shelves, marker boards, tackboards, 

and storage cabinets.

■ Finishes and furnishings should be 

suitable for activities that entail instruction, reading, writing, listening, 

concentration, group discussion, and 

even physical training. An attempt 

should be made to design, finish, 

and furnish the space in a way that 

distinguishes it from the starker 
293 

C h a p t e r 2 5 : 

Staff Areas

surroundings in other areas of the 

jail. Otherwise, part of the benefit of 

having a separate staff multipurpose 

space will be lost.

■ Lockable storage should be available 

for such equipment as projectors, tape 

recorders, video cameras, digital video 

disk players, TVs, and training documents that might include sensitive 

policies and procedures. If defensive 

tactics training is included, storage 

for mats and related equipment is appropriate, as is storage for chairs and 

tables so that the area may be cleared.

Issue: The staff training room might be merged 

into a space used for other staff functions.

Response: Since the training room might 

be used for short periods during the day 

for regularly scheduled briefings or rollcall, 

and training might occur irregularly and at 

different times, it may be wise to consider 

merging the functions into one multipurpose space. Compatible staff functions 

include:

■ Training.

■ Briefing/rollcall.

■ Library.

■ Staff mailboxes.

■ Staff conferences.

Merging physical conditioning with the training/

conference functions is not recommended. The 

physical conditioning area will have fixed equipment that is not easy to move out of the way 

when the room is used for other activities. The 

key to any merging of functions is to identify the 

nature, timing, and frequency involved and to 

ensure there are no incompatibilities or conflicts.

In very small facilities, merging the 

break area and training area may be a 

good use of space. To give some spatial definition to the break area in a 

multipurpose setting, two ideas might 

be considered, among others:

■ Creating an alcove area for the break room off 

the main multipurpose space.

■ Providing partitions to separate the food preparation and storage area from the training/

multipurpose area (exhibit 25-2).

The break area can be made to complement the 

multipurpose concept by:

■ Using stackable chairs for staff dining/breaks.

■ Using folding tables that can be moved out of 

the way.

■ Providing an adjacent storage space.

Exhibit 25-2. Use of Folding Partition in Staff 

Multipurpose Room

Storage

Staff minikitchen 

Staff

multipurpose

room

Folding

partition 

Toilets 

Issue: There is a need for staff toilet facilities 

within the security envelope.

Response: There are many options for 

providing proper toilet facilities for staff 

consistent with security and operational 

goals. Even in the smaller jail, there will undoubtedly be both male and female public 
294

S e c t i o n 3 : 

Functional Components

toilet facilities in the public reception area 

and staff toilets in locker/shower areas. If 

it is intended that these toilets be used by 

on-duty staff, consideration must be given 

to the fact that this practice may require 

staff to move outside the security envelope, 

creating security problems and considerable inconvenience. In new jails, staff toilet 

facilities should be planned in various locations inside the security envelope of the jail 

as a convenience to staff and to facilitate 

security in the facility.

Staff could use the inmate facilities located in the 

intake/booking area, although they might object 

for hygienic reasons. If the jail operates a secure 

master control or housing control, it will be necessary to locate a single unisex restroom within 

the control space. However, the use of this restroom by roving staff might violate the perimeter 

of the control center more than desired by security policy. In direct supervision facilities, there is 

usually a staff toilet in the housing area that can 

be used by the officer assigned to the unit and 

roving officers.

It may be best to provide separate unisex toilet 

facilities in other areas within the security envelope accessible to staff, such as the intake-release 

area or staff break room. These facilities should 

be in easily accessible locations and generally out 

of view of the inmates. 

Space List 

Some typical spaces that might be within the 

staff component include the following:

■ Locker/shower area:

❏ Male.

❏ Female.

■ Physical conditioning, including storage.

■ Defensive tactics training.

■ Break room (possibly including outdoor 

courtyard).

■ Training/multipurpose area, including storage.

■ Staff toilets within secure perimeter.

■ Parking.

Local codes and Americans with Disabilities Act 

guidelines regarding accessibility requirements 

should be consulted when planning these spaces.

Relationships and Components

Administration

Staff

parking 

Female

lockers 

Physical

conditioning 

Male

lockers 

Jail

Jail security

perimeter 

Break

room 

Training

Security

vestibule

Exhibit 25-3. Relationships Between Staff 

Areas and Security Perimeter

Stationary

bicycle 

6-station

exercise

machine Weight

bag 

Shower

18" x 24" full height

lockers with sloped tops 

Bench

To female

lockers 

To main

staff

corridor 

Punch

bag 

Male toilet/

shower area 

Exhibit 25-4 . Physical Conditioning and Locker/

Shower Areas
295

Chapter 26

Storage Areas

S

torage space must be provided in virtually 

every functional component of a jail. Although less prominent, it is as vital as any 

other space to attaining efficient and convenient 

operations. The presence of files, mattresses, and 

paper goods in the corridors, fire stairs, interview rooms, and staff offices of existing jails is 

testimony to the fact that storage space has been 

consistently underestimated in planning and designing new jails.

The storage needs of the various jail functionalarchitectural components are documented 

throughout section 3; this chapter addresses 

miscellaneous storage needs. Additionally, since 

storage is often an overlooked or underestimated 

aspect of jail design, this chapter summarizes 

typical storage needs for all components in a 

jail of any size and thereby focuses attention 

on them.

Key Decisions 

The following decisions have a fundamental effect on design requirements and should be made 

when the role of storage is evaluated:

■ Is there an opportunity for shared storage 

space between the jail and sheriff’s law enforcement operation?

■ What items can be stored together in a general 

purpose storage room or warehouse, and what 

items will require separate space?

■ Should certain items be stored in one central 

area, or should they be stored in satellite storage areas served by a central source for greater 

daily convenience (e.g., linens, toiletries, and/

or mattresses distributed from a small storage 

space at the housing unit but supplied from a 

larger, centralized storage area)?

■ Will the jail emphasize purchasing at wholesale and, therefore, in large quantities (e.g., 

food, toiletries, inmate clothing)?

Mattresses stored in a hallway. 

(Photograph courtesy of Jim Rowenhorst.)

Detail Issues 

The following detailed functional-architectural issues should be considered in the development of 

storage spaces: miscellaneous storage needs and 

overall facility storage concerns.

Miscellaneous Storage Needs 

Issue: There are numerous miscellaneous storage needs aside from those associated with 

specific functional-architectural components.

Response: Miscellaneous storage needs not 

yet addressed in other chapters in this section include the following:

■ Central storage/warehouse. This 

serves as the primary storage area 
296

S e c t i o n 3 : 

Functional Components

for a variety of important items, most 

of which should be identified before 

design and others after the facility is 

opened, for example:

❏ Bulk supplies (e.g., toilet paper, soaps, 

detergents, office supplies, forms).

❏ Extra mattresses, pillows, linens, inmate 

clothing.

❏ Separate, lockable storage area for items 

sold in the commissary.

❏ Items used in routine maintenance (e.g., 

air filters, fan belts, oil, car parts, grease 

guns).

■ Replacement parts. Every facility should store 

replacement parts for vital elements of facility 

operations and security. For example, it would 

be wise to provide storage for replacement 

items such as locks, hinges, security glass 

panels, toilet fixtures, food passage doors, 

door closers, and door handles as a precaution 

against damage that compromises the effective 

operation of the facility. Storage of such parts 

would avoid delays in obtaining replacement 

items, especially special detention items. In 

larger facilities, a maintenance work area is 

often designed into the facility. In this case, 

replacement parts, tools, and items used in 

routine maintenance would be stored in the 

maintenance area.

■ Outdoor equipment. Every facility needs storage space for outdoor equipment unless the 

county has another department that manages 

outdoor maintenance for the jail. Equipment 

that might be stored includes lawn mowers, 

garden hoses, ladders, yard tractors, snow 

blowers, shovels, rakes, hoes, and so forth. 

This need increases if the facility has an inmate gardening program. Outdoor equipment 

should not be stored in a vehicle sallyport, 

which has been a common practice in the 

past. Rather, it should be in a secured space in 

another location accessible directly from the 

outside, if possible.

■ Cleaning supplies and equipment. Every facility needs to maintain cleanliness. This principally involves keeping the floors, furnishings, 

Shelving in a laundry area used to store extra inmate clothing and shoes. 

(Photograph courtesy of Voorhis Robertson Justice Services.)

Sallyport used for storage creates a hazard for incoming vehicles.

(Photograph courtesy of Jim Rowenhorst.)
297 

C h a p t e r 2 6 : 

Storage Areas

and windows clean by the use of mops, buckets, cleaning fluids, cloths, floor buffers, and 

so forth. Storage space for these items should 

be provided liberally throughout the facility, preferably in each housing unit. Cleaning 

equipment is normally stored in a janitor’s 

closet that also includes a janitor’s sink or 

wash tub and a capacity for storing such items 

as cleaning fluids and dust cloths. Care should 

be taken to keep toxic, flammable, and caustic 

materials secured from unauthorized inmate 

access.

Overall Facility Storage Concerns 

This section summarizes basic storage needs in 

general and some of the characteristics of storage 

facilities.

Summary list 

Issue: All storage needs for the entire facility 

should be identified and associated with their 

proper functional-architectural component.

Response: Typical storage needs in a jail 

encompass master control, intake-release, 

general and special housing, health care, 

visiting, indoor and outdoor exercise, 

inmate programs and services, commissary, 

food service, laundry, administrative/ 

public areas, staff areas, and miscellaneous 

storage.

Master control

■❏ Restraint equipment.

■❏ Radios/battery chargers.

■❏ Keys.

■❏ Paper supplies/forms.

■❏ Manuals, directories.

■❏ First-aid kit.

■ Self-contained breathing apparatus.

■ Fire extinguisher.

Intake-release 

■ Active records.

■ Paper supplies/forms.

■ Personal property:

❏ Clothing (including suits for court 

appearances, jackets, hats, boots).

❏ Valuables.

❏ Money.

❏ Bulky items (suitcases, duffel bags, 

attaché cases).

❏ Restraint devices.

■ Jail clothing:

❏ Shirts/pants or jumpsuits.

❏ Undergarments.

❏ Footwear.

❏ Socks.

❏ Jackets.

❏ Hats.

❏ Gloves.

■ Linens/reusables:

❏ Blankets.

❏ Sheets.

❏ Pillowcases.

❏ Towels.

❏ Washcloths.

■ Mattresses.

■ Toiletries:

❏ Shaving gear.
298

S e c t i o n 3 : 

Functional Components

❏ Soap.

❏ Toothpaste and toothbrushes.

❏ Deodorant.

❏ Toilet paper.

■ Weapons (officer weapon lockers).

General and special housing (including 

control posts)

■ Cleaning supplies.

■ Linens.

■ Toiletries.

■ Clothing.

■ Records, manuals.

■ Fire extinguishers.

■ Self-contained breathing apparatus.

■ First-aid kit.

■ Board games, cards, other recreation 

equipment.

Health care

■ Supplies.

■ Instruments.

■ Equipment/carts.

■ Records.

■ Emergency equipment.

■ Medications.

■ First-aid kits.

■ Medical waste/biohazards.

Visiting

■ Visitor log.

■ Visitor property (e.g., clothes, purses, 

attaché cases, hats).

Indoor and outdoor exercise 

■ Exercise equipment (e.g., balls, nets, poles, 

weights).

Inmate programs and services

■ Records, miscellaneous equipment.

■ Stackable and foldable furnishings.

■ Paper supplies.

■ Books, brochures, magazines, newspapers.

■ Religious materials.

■ Audiovisual equipment.

■ Easel charts, marker boards, markers.

■ Recreational equipment (e.g., folding pingpong tables, balls, paddles).

Commissary

■ Commissary goods (dry, refrigerated, frozen).

■ Carts.

■ Records.

■ Writing materials and forms.

■ Containers (bags, boxes).

Food service

■ Utensils, cutlery.

■ Dishware.

■ Pots and pans.

■ Carts and trays.

■ Refrigerated, frozen, and dry foods.

■ Garbage, recyclables.

■ Records, books.

Laundry

■ Detergents, bleaches.

■ Carts and bags.
299 

C h a p t e r 2 6 : 

Storage Areas

■ Records.

■ Temporary clothing and linen.

■ Miscellaneous cleaning implements.

Administration/public areas

■ Records.

■ Paper and office supplies.

■ Manuals, directories, books.

■ Security equipment.

■ Audiovisual equipment.

■ Staff coats, hats, boots, other items.

■ Security keys.

Staff areas

■ Clothing, extra uniforms.

■ Gym bags.

■ Books, manuals, brochures, newsletters.

■ Memos, paper records.

■ Break area supplies:

❏ Coffee.

❏ Snacks.

❏ Paper cups and plates.

■ Audiovisual equipment.

Miscellaneous storage

■ Central supplies.

■ Outdoor equipment.

■ Replacement parts.

■ Maintenance equipment.

■ Cleaning supplies and equipment.

■ Recyclable items (cans, glass, plastic, paper, 

cardboard).

Security 

Issue: All storage facilities must be properly 

secured.

Response: In general, it is appropriate to 

prevent random access to all storage areas 

in the facility by securing them with locked 

doors. However, it is not necessary to provide heavy security hardware, doors, and 

construction for many of the facility’s storage needs, unless they are located in areas 

with unsupervised inmate access. 

High security is needed principally when the 

storage facility contains something valuable or 

potentially dangerous or provides a route of escape to inmates who have access to the storage 

area. However, the ability to observe the storage 

area or the access to it may lessen the need for 

security construction. For example, if a storage 

area for cleaning fluids and chemicals is directly 

across from a constantly staffed post, a hollow 

metal door with an institutional lockset or a lowsecurity detention lockset might be adequate. 

The gauge of the metal in the door might be 

selected more on the basis of durability than 

security.

In assessing security needs with respect to storage, the following types of storage require the 

highest level of security:

■ Officer weaponry.

■ Jail keys/proximity cards.

■ Medications.

■ Cutlery and utensils.

■ Personal property, especially money and 

valuables.

■ Medical instruments and equipment.

■ Cleaning fluids and detergents.

■ Restraint and riot equipment.
300

S e c t i o n 3 : 

Functional Components

■ Commissary and bond monies.

■ Other chemicals and toxic materials.

Special attention should also be paid to the security provided for the following types of storage:

■ First-aid kits.

■ Toiletries.

■ Radios and other communication devices.

■ Fire extinguishers.

■ Self-contained breathing apparatus.

■ Medical records.

■ Other records.

■ Personal clothing/bulk property.

■ Personal articles belonging to visitors.

■ Foodstuffs.

Proper security for the preceding storage 

items can be provided through a combination 

of approaches:

■ Placing certain stored items within enclosed 

security staff posts.

■ Keeping items outside areas accessible to 

inmates.

■ Directly observing access to the storage 

area(s).

■ Employing secure construction around the 

space, including walls, floors, ceilings, doors, 

and locks.

■ Forbidding inmate access and limiting staff 

access to sensitive storage areas, such as 

money, property, weapons, and key storage.

Size 

Issue: The size of storage space depends on 

many factors, including institutional policies and 

procedures.

Response: The amount of space to provide 

in any given storage situation depends 

greatly on the policies and procedures of the 

facility and the activities that it plans to undertake. Consequently, proper storage space 

planning must identify these policies, procedures, and activities. Some factors involved 

in establishing storage space requirements 

include:

■ The range of things that must be 

stored.

■ Size of inventory, which is influenced 

by ordering and replacement practices.

■ Surplus or overflow stocks.

■ Storage methods, particularly those 

that use the full height of storage 

spaces.

■ Capability of storing a wide variety of 

items in a common area or space.

■ System of distribution, which generally varies between a central storage and 

distribution capability and a smaller 

central storage area complemented by 

satellite storage spaces elsewhere in 

the building.

■ Work activities related to storage (e.g., 

inventory control, ordering, sorting).

Location 

Issue: Storage areas need to be conveniently 

located.

Response: To be used efficiently, storage 

spaces must be properly located. However, 

because many storage functions are not 

necessarily critical to the minute-by-minute 

operation of the jail, some selectivity in locating storage facilities is important. This is 

particularly true when the methods of surveillance in the facility and the movement 
301 

C h a p t e r 2 6 : 

Storage Areas

of inmates from housing to other areas dictate that higher priority be given to locating 

other functional components. Some criteria 

to consider when locating storage space 

include:

■ Security of the space and the need to 

isolate it from access.

■ Frequency of use.

■ Affiliation of the location and the 

users involved.

The different priorities in locating storage space 

are illustrated by contrasting jail clothing storage for the booking area (where routine, 24-hour 

daily access is required for the efficient flow of 

inmate arrestees) and central supply storage 

(which is commonly used only on day shift 

and typically only by staff as part of a resupply 

effort).

Mechanical/plumbing concerns 

Issue: Special mechanical requirements must 

be recognized in developing storage space.

Response: Given the nature of some of the 

items stored in a jail, special mechanical accommodations must be made for the space 

to function effectively and securely. These 

include the following:

■ Ventilation for storage spaces containing gases (security restraint storage 

area) or cleaning fluids.

■ Humidity controls for storage of paper 

products, powdered detergents, and 

similar items.

■ Temperature control for areas such as 

food service.

■ Ventilation for storage that generates 

odors, such as street clothes.

■ Chemicals and other toxics.

Space List 

Some of the miscellaneous storage spaces that 

have not been identified as part of the storage requirements for the other functional-architectural 

components include:

■❏ Central storage/warehouse.

■❏ Mattress storage/cleaning.

■❏ Replacement parts.

■❏ Maintenance equipment/supplies.

■❏ Janitor closets.

■❏ Outdoor equipment.

Local codes and Americans with Disabilities Act 

guidelines regarding accessibility requirements 

should be consulted when planning these spaces.
302

S e c t i o n 3 : 

Functional Components

Relationships and Components

Booking

area 

Inmate

housing 

Janitor

closet 

Janitor

closet

Central

supply 

Maintenance and

replacement parts 

Outdoor

equipment 

Deliveries

Jail

perimeter 

Exhibit 26-1. Relationships Between 

Miscellaneous Storage Areas and Other Jail 

Components

Work shop

Maintenance

office 

Storage for

replacement

glazing,

plumbing

fixtures, etc. 

Mattresses

Bulk supply

storage 

Exhibit 26-2. Central Storage Area
Section 4

Special Considerations

Chapter 27. Single Versus Multiple Occupancy ................................................. 305

Chapter 28. Renovating Nonsecure Buildings Into Jails ......................................311

Chapter 29. Construction and Project Costs...................................................... 317

Chapter 30. Making a Building Work ............................................................... 321
Special Considerations

Four issues deserve special consideration in the development of a jail project. 

■ Single versus multiple occupancy.

■ Renovating nonsecure buildings into jails.

■ Construction and project costs.

■ Making a building work.

These design and construction issues seem to regularly cause difficulty or controversy in jurisdictions throughout the country, and how they are resolved can substantially affect the outcome or direction of a project. Although space does not permit 

a full exploration of each issue, these issues are addressed in the hopes that they 

can be confronted and resolved more expeditiously and knowledgeably by both the 

planner and the jurisdiction.
305

Chapter 27

Single Versus Multiple Occupancy

An issue that frequently sparks debate 

within a community is whether to design 

inmate cells (sleeping rooms) with one 

bed (single occupancy) or with two or more beds 

(multiple occupancy). Local decisions in this regard have a considerable impact on the design of 

a jail, on project costs, and on the security and 

management of the jail.

Double-occupancy cell in a direct supervision facility with fixed desk and 

porcelain fixtures. 

(Photograph courtesy of Liebert & Associates.)

Two-tiered open-bay housing area in a new facility. 

(Photograph courtesy of Liebert & Associates.)

Definitions 

Multiple Occupancy 

Multiple-occupancy sleeping rooms generally 

come in three types: cell, “open bay,” and dormitory style. The cell style multiple-occupancy 

room has historically included beds, a toilet, a 

sink, and perhaps a desk, stool, and shelf. It does 

not include such things as a shower or dining 

table, which are normally provided in adjacent 

or nearby dayroom spaces. Cell style multipleoccupancy spaces typically hold two to eight 

inmates. 

Open-bay housing areas are essentially alcoves 

off a central dayroom and contain 4, 8, or 16 

bunk-style beds. The sleeping alcoves contain 

nothing but bunks, and perhaps storage bins. 

This type of housing has centralized toilet, sink, 

and shower areas adjacent to the dayroom.

The dormitory style multiple-occupancy inmate 

housing unit tends to be more self-contained. 

Everything needed to serve inmate personal 

needs is within the single space: beds, toilet, 

sink, shower, dining tables, storage, telephones, 

televisions, and so forth (exhibit 27-1). In older 

dormitory facilities, separate dayroom spaces 

were not typically included; however, dayrooms 

are often included in new jails that include 
306

S e c t i o n 4 : 

Special Considerations

dormitory housing. As few as 8 beds are frequently found in multiple-occupancy dormitories 

of smaller jails, and as many as 64 beds in those 

of large jails.

Exhibit 27-1. Sample Floorplan of DormitoryStyle Multiple-Occupancy Housing

Staff

post

8-bed dorm

Double-bunked sleeping area

Dayroom tables

TV

Partheight

partition

Toilet-shower

area

Single Occupancy 

A single-occupancy cell normally has a bed, 

desk, stool, toilet, sink, and shelf at a minimum 

and shares an adjacent dayroom with other 

single-occupancy cells (exhibit 27-2).

Exhibit 27-2. Sample Floorplan of a SingleOccupancy Cell

Stool

Bunk

Desk Shelf

Pipe

chase

‘Comby’

toilet/

lavatory

Standards and Legal Issues 

Cases of constitutionality decided in the federal 

court system have not fully resolved the question 

of occupancy. Prior to the late 1970s, numerous 

district courts condemned double celling (two 

beds per cell). These rulings led to the creation 

of single-occupancy cells in the affected jurisdictions and led many to conclude that singleoccupancy rooms were constitutional and 

multiple-occupancy rooms were not. However, 

based on a close reading of the cases, one could 

not conclude that double celling was in and of 

itself unconstitutional. Rather, double celling in 

limited cases has been found unconstitutional 

given the particular overall conditions of the 

facilities in question: lack of adequate square 

footage, unsanitary conditions, poor ventilation, 

inadequate lighting (natural and artificial), lack 

of privacy, isolation in the cell for extended 

periods, inadequate exercise opportunities outside the cell, poor surveillance, and many other 

deficiencies in and out of the cellblock area.

Later, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on two 

cases that dealt with the question of multiple 

occupancy: Bell v. Wolfish (1979) and Rhodes

v. Chapman (1981). In both cases, new facilities were the topic of the suit, and in both cases, 

the facilities were ruled fundamentally constitutional, having healthful and standards-compliant 

environments and a variety of amenities in and 

out of the cellblock areas. The Supreme Court 

essentially found no constitutional violations on 

grounds of occupancy alone in those two particular situations. Consequently, thoughts that 

multiple-occupancy housing was in and of itself 

unconstitutional began to change.

Since Bell v. Wolfish and Rhodes v. Chapman, it 

has become clear that double celling in and of 

itself is not a constitutional issue unless it can be 

shown to be the cause of other problems, such as 

violence related to “failure to protect.”
307 

C h a p t e r 2 7 : 

Single Versus Multiple Occupancy

In 1977, the American Correctional Association 

(ACA) published its Manual of Standards for 

Adult Local Detention Facilities,1

 which called 

for the exclusive use of single-occupancy cells. 

This position was also taken by the U.S. Department of Justice and had been the policy of the 

federal government in setting criteria for local 

jail construction projects funded by federal grant 

moneys. ACA continued to call for single occupancy in the second edition of the Standards.

In the third and fourth editions, ACA adopted 

a more flexible standard that does not specify 

numbers or percentages of single cells and allows 

multiple-occupancy cells or dormitories, assuming a series of standards related to square footage 

are met. ACA emphasized that each inmate have 

a minimum amount of “unencumbered” floor 

space in the cell or dormitory. Unencumbered 

floor space is floor area without an item of furniture or equipment on or above it (exhibit 27-3).

Exhibit 27-3. Sample Floorplan of a SingleOccupancy Cell Showing Unencumbered Floorspace

Bunk

Shelf

Desk

‘Comby’

toilet/

lavatory The shaded area

indicates

“unencumbered”

space

Many states have also placed heavy emphasis 

on a portion of the jail being single-occupancy 

cells. The most consistent exception to single 

occupancy has been to allow multipleoccupancy dormitories for work release/

periodic-sentence inmates or in-house inmate 

workers (trusties).

The Issue 

Central to the single-occupancy/multipleoccupancy issue is the cost of construction versus 

management and operational concerns. Rapidly 

increasing jail populations, the high costs of jail 

construction, and tight local budgets have led 

many county board and city council leaders to 

argue for multiple occupancy, while greater security and better management have led many sheriffs, police chiefs, and jail administrators to argue 

for single occupancy.

Costs 

The following benefits of multiple occupancy 

versus single occupancy do indeed lead to 

reduced construction costs:

■ Fewer cell doors, locks, and hardware sets 

per bed.

■ Fewer toilet and sink fixtures per bed.

■ Fewer interior walls.

■ Less complicated electrical and mechanical 

provisions, as well as fewer light fixtures.

■ Savings on square footage, including dayroom 

square footage.

A study done by Farbstein and Goldman, Housing Pretrial Inmates: The Costs and Benefits 

of Single Cells, Multiple Cells and Dormitories,

showed that the cost differential between single 

and multiple occupancy is significant. 2 The study 

1

 Currently, Performance-Based Standards for Adult Local Detention Facilities, Fourth Edition (Alexandria, VA: American Correctional 

Association, 2004).

2 J. Farbstein and M. Goldman, Housing Pretrial Inmates: The Costs and Benefits of Single Cells, Multiple Cells and Dormitories (Sacramento, CA: Sacramento County Board of Corrections, 1983). Available at www.ncjrs.gov/App/Publications/abstract.aspx?ID=100262.
308

S e c t i o n 4 : 

Special Considerations

found an overall facility construction cost savings 

of 11–21 percent with various forms of multipleoccupancy housing.

Operational Concerns 

Although it is difficult to argue against saving 

construction costs, jail administrators argue in 

defense of single-occupancy cells for a variety of 

reasons. Some jail officials concede that multiple 

occupancy is acceptable for persons considered 

low security, such as inmate workers or workrelease inmates, even though it results in loss of 

privacy and vulnerability. However, they argue 

that single occupancy is a must for inmates with 

special behavioral, medical, or custody needs, 

such as:

■ Disciplinary detention.

■ Medical isolation.

■ High security.

■ Protective custody.

■ Serious mental health issues.

■ Juveniles detained in adult facilities.

It is the general population between these 

extremes for which local jurisdictions must 

determine whether they want single- or multipleoccupancy housing. Following are the main arguments against multiple occupancy for the general 

population:

■ It greatly reduces the staff’s ability to prevent 

physical or sexual assaults, especially during 

nighttime lockdown or other times when staffing levels tend to be reduced. The exception 

would be in direct supervision facilities where 

staff have a continuous presence.

■ It reduces the staff’s ability to control inmates 

during disturbances because the staff cannot 

fully separate the inmates and achieve a fully 

secure lockdown until the emergency passes.

■ It increases tensions because inmates have no 

place to which to retreat to ensure personal 

safety or personal space and no place in which 

personal property can be completely protected 

from theft or vandalism.

■ It diminishes administrative control because 

acts of vandalism in the multiple-occupancy 

cell or dormitory cannot be clearly attributed 

to one individual.

■ It reduces flexibility, in that dramatic shifts 

in the composition of the jail population may 

force inmates who require single occupancy 

into multiple-occupancy spaces.

■ It causes inmates to completely forfeit personal privacy because they may openly share 

toilet fixtures in close quarters and no other 

area of the facility affords individual privacy.

Single-Occupancy Concerns 

Two frequently cited operational concerns about 

the use of single occupancy are suicide and 

isolation. The isolation issue is easily resolved, 

however, with the provision of an adjacent dayroom serving a number of single-occupancy cells. 

Such a dayroom provides ample opportunity for 

contact between inmates. Dayrooms are required 

by the ACA standards and by many state jail 

standards.

Suicide is a more difficult issue. Many people feel 

that single-occupancy cells are more conducive to 

suicide attempts and that the presence of two or 

more inmates in a multiple-occupancy setting 

reduces the likelihood of suicide. However, beyond the question of whether inmates should be 

relied on to prevent suicide by their cellmates, 

the fact is that suicide has been a problem in 

jails for years and most jails have, historically, 

consisted mainly of multiple-occupancy cells or 

dormitories. 
309 

C h a p t e r 2 7 : 

Single Versus Multiple Occupancy

The primary way to control suicide is operational 

rather than physical:

■ Realizing that most attempts occur shortly 

after intake.

■ Using suicide screening at intake to identify 

suicide risks.

■ Providing thorough staff training in recognizing signs and symptoms of suicide risk.

■ Providing adequate and frequent staff 

observation of suicidal inmates. 

■ Arranging for needed medical and/or mental 

health services for troubled inmates.

■ Increasing supervision and monitoring for 

those for whom it is determined that selfdestructive behavior is likely.

Costs of Multiple Occupancy 

On balance, it seems that certain security and 

management capabilities are compromised 

to attain the construction cost savings of 

multiple-occupancy settings. Once compromised, 

these critical capabilities may be lost for the life 

of the jail, which could exact a toll on the jail 

staff and inmates.

Given the increased operational vulnerabilities 

of multiple-occupancy housing (with the exception of direct supervision facilities), jurisdictions 

should evaluate whether initial construction cost 

savings are merely expenses deferred until a 

later date. Potentially, these savings may at some 

point be offset by higher medical bills due to 

more frequent assaults, higher repair costs due 

to increased damage to jail property, or unanticipated legal costs arising as inmates or their families sue to recover damages as a consequence 

of injuries received in the jail. Each jurisdiction 

must weigh the costs of staffing and other issues 

before committing to multiple-occupancy cells.

Double-Occupancy Single Cells 

One idea frequently considered during planning 

is to build single-occupancy cells for later use as 

double-occupancy cells. This allows a community to initially commit to single occupancy for 

standards compliance or better operations, but to 

accommodate expansion needs quickly and economically at a later date by housing two people 

in each cell. A variety of problems are inherent to 

this approach, however:

■ Safety and security benefits of single 

occupancy will be lost.

■ Compliance with state or accreditation 

occupancy standards must be maintained.

■ Compliance with cell square footage requirements may be lost. For example, if the singleoccupancy cell provides the required square 

footage for one inmate (per ACA and some 

state standards), double celling reduces space 

allocations to half of the minimum square 

footage per inmate (exhibit 27-4). This same Dormitory housing with bunks in the rear of the dayroom/dining area and 

toilet/shower areas on the right. 

(Photograph courtesy of Jim Rowenhorst.)
310

S e c t i o n 4 : 

Special Considerations

problem can occur with dayroom space 

requirements. For example, a dayroom space 

adequate in square footage to accommodate 

50 inmates would now have to accommodate 

up to 100. 

■ Designing for future double occupancy may 

result in a waste of space and money. Referring to the example below, the architect would 

have to create single-occupancy cells larger 

in size to meet the minimum required square 

footage per bed after double occupancy. If the 

need to double cell fails to materialize, space 

and money will have been wasted.

■ Other features of the housing unit and jail will 

have to be provided in excess (showers and 

dayroom toilets) or over-designed (ventilation 

systems, egress elements, plumbing lines) to 

accommodate possible future double occupancy. This could also result in waste if the 

double-occupancy option was never exercised.

■ Certain classifications are not suitable for double occupancy under any circumstances, thus 

minimizing the capacity expansion benefits.

■ The ratio of staff to inmates may become imbalanced through later double occupancy. For 

example, a 10-bed area adequately monitored 

by a master control officer may become too 

much to monitor if 20 inmates later occupy the 

area. An adequately supervised 48-bed directsupervision housing unit may become too 

much for one officer as a 96-bed unit.

Exhibit 27-4. Square Footage Requirements for 

Double and Single Cells Based on American Correctional Association Performance-Based Standards for 

Local Adult Detention Facilities

Source: Performance-Based Standards for Adult Local 

Detention Facilities, Fourth Edition (Alexandria, VA: 

American Correctional Association, 2004).

Generally, if sufficient reasons exist to initially 

adopt a single-occupancy approach to the design of a new jail, those reasons will not likely 

diminish in the future. If future growth in capacity needs is the reason for creating a doubleoccupancy option, providing an easy expansion 

alternative would seem to be the best answer.

Conclusion 

Financing a jail is difficult and costly. Therefore, 

the need to create economical solutions is important. However, each jurisdiction must carefully 

weigh the pros and cons of single- versus 

multiple-occupancy housing. Multiple occupancy 

may not be an effective way to achieve construction cost savings if fundamental security, manageability, operational efficiency, and standards 

compliance are jeopardized by such an approach.
311

Chapter 28

Renovating Nonsecure Buildings Into Jails

When confronted with the need for expensive new jail facilities, county leaders sometimes ask, “Is there an existing 

facility that could be renovated for less?” This is 

a natural question in the face of ever higher costs 

for jail construction and ever increasing demands 

for bed capacity. It seems especially logical when 

communities have existing structures available 

that are of an institutional character, such as 

hospitals, schools, large retail space, and warehouses. Some communities have even looked at 

abandoned missile sites and grain silos. Regardless of the buildings available, renovation of an 

existing structure is a possibility that demands 

serious consideration.

The quest for renovation possibilities must include an assessment of operational needs. Many 

existing buildings are eliminated as jail conversion candidates because they do not meet local 

jail operational requirements and, more specifically, fail to accommodate effective inmate 

classification, inmate supervision, and staffing 

efficiency. It is critical, therefore, for a community to clearly establish the character of its future 

jail operations before, not after, it begins a search 

for renovation candidates. It is not sufficient 

to simply find a stout old building and assume 

suitability for renovation as a jail.

A Common Renovation Example 

A hospital is an example of a building that seems 

to be a natural prospect for renovation, but that 

potential frequently breaks down under operational analysis. The appeal of hospitals tends to 

be that they are solidly built, have wings that 

suggest separate housing areas, and have nursing 

control stations. Further, they have a series of 

rooms with toilets and sinks on each wing, 

which could be envisioned as jail cells. Hospitals 

usually have food preparation space and laundry 

facilities, which can be appealing when looking 

at renovation possibilities.

The hospital’s basic arrangement, however, can 

become its greatest weakness. Specifically, most 

hospitals, including newer ones, are linear in 

design. They consist of long, narrow wings with 

rooms on either side of a wide corridor (in architectural terms, a “double-loaded corridor”). The 

hospital’s linear nature precludes the kinds of 

views and control required for the direct supervision or indirect surveillance of inmates (exhibit 

28-1). Additionally, hospitals are not designed 

with sufficient common areas that can be used 

for dayrooms, recreation, or visiting or program 

space.

The hospital’s potential further diminishes if 

inmates need to be housed in single-occupancy 

cells, the minimum size of which is only onethird to one-quarter as big as a normal hospital 

room. Placing lone inmates in rooms that are 250 

to 300 square feet in size is a clear waste of space 

that also results in low inmate densities per wing 

and per staff person.

Experience shows that hospitals and similar facilities tend to work best as low-security operations 

involving intermittently observed dormitory or 

multiple-occupancy settings. Although the 

Exhibit 28-1. Hospital Wing With Poor Views of 

Rooms and Lack of Dayroom Space

Nurse’s

station

View limited to corridor activity only
312

S e c t i o n 4 : 

Special Considerations

renovation of an existing structure to be used 

for low-security inmates can be accommodated 

in larger systems, it is rare for the smaller jail to 

have enough low-security inmates to justify the 

acquisition and renovation of a hospital, school, 

or other large industrial building.

Security Construction 

A stout, old building does not necessarily have 

acceptable security-grade construction and detailing for use as a jail. Therefore, a second hurdle 

for a renovation candidate to pass is that of security fitness.

Perimeter Issues 

Security starts with the building perimeter, or 

envelope. As outlined in chapter 8, “Security 

Perimeter,” the security envelope is three dimensional, including ceilings, roofs, floors, and walls. 

Each of these elements, if not secure, must be 

made secure to prevent escapes and contraband 

passage.

The thick masonry walls commonly found in 

older institutional or industrial facilities, which 

create so much of their appeal, generally have 

limited escape resistance. Unreinforced masonry, no matter how thick, can be penetrated by 

removing the mortar that binds the masonry 

together. Masonry walls in jails are generally 

heavily reinforced and grouted to foil such efforts 

(exhibit 28-2). Rectifying wall deficiencies in 

nonsecure facilities can be very costly, involving 

options as varied as (1) applying a new barrier, 

such as steel plate, over the walls, (2) creating 

fenced perimeters beyond the exterior walls, and 

(3) creating entirely new perimeter walls within 

the building.

Exhibit 28-2. Comparison of a Typical Hospital Wall With a Typical Jail Wall

16" high

window

6'-8"

floor

to sill 

Brick

Fixed, steel

window

anchored

to wall

Concrete block

filled with steel

rebars and grout

Typical Jail Wall

5'-0"

high

window

3'-0"

floor 

to sill 

Double-hung

(operable)

wood window

Brick

Clay tile

(brittle)

Plaster on

wood lath 

Typical Hospital Wall

Plate glass

(breakable)

Windows in older institutional buildings tend to 

be large in expanse, wood or aluminum framed, 

and of nonsecurity glass. None of these characteristics is conducive to keeping inmates confined. Therefore, major security revisions must be 

made while retaining the introduction of natural 

light required by most jail standards and building 
313 

C h a p t e r 2 8 : 

Renovating Nonsecure Buildings Into Jails

codes. Window modification options include the 

following:

■ Reglazing the entire opening with detentiongrade windows and lites (glass).

■ Filling substantial portions of the opening and 

glazing the rest with a security-grade detention 

window to reduce costs and opening size.

■ Applying dense security-mesh screens over 

the window opening.

The choice between these options may be influenced by another issue, that of minimizing view 

conflicts between inmates and the public. Such 

conflicts are a special concern at night when higher indoor light levels enhance views into the jail.

Windows in older institutional facilities may be 

operable to ensure adequate ventilation. Oper able 

windows are generally not compatible with a 

jail’s need to prevent escapes, communication 

with the outside, and contraband passage. Therefore, windows must be sealed and mechanical 

ventilation or air conditioning systems added or 

enhanced, a potentially costly activity.

Interior Issues 

Interior partitions (walls), doors, and locks of institutional facilities tend to be inadequate for jail 

security needs, thus requiring total replacement 

and redesign. Light fixtures, switches, outlets, 

and lighting controls are rarely up to the security 

and vandal-resistance requirements of a jail and 

are inappropriately located for a jail. The same is 

true of radiators, air diffusers, and thermostats. 

Toilet and sink fixtures, as well as the water 

lines, drains, and drain covers serving them, 

are typically unsuited to the rigors of jail use.

These considerations regarding materials, hardware, and equipment are essentially what distinguish jail construction from the construction of 

other institutional facilities. More importantly, 

they define the ultimate safety and security of 

the physical plant and its occupants. These notso-obvious fine points are frequently missed 

when a community is initially impressed with the 

massiveness of an existing institutional facility.

Costs 

Many people assume that renovation is less 

expensive than new construction. This explains 

renovation’s principal appeal and exceeds other 

virtues such as urban renewal and reuse of existing, otherwise abandoned buildings of value. 

However, substantial savings are frequently 

unattainable when converting a building from 

nonsecurity uses to secure jail uses. Further, the 

cost saving issue is complicated by two other 

considerations: long-term operational costs and 

acquisition costs.

Construction Costs 

If a building appears substantially constructed, 

the assumption is that the cost of any internal 

modifications is offset by the money saved by 

avoiding exterior construction. However, when 

the costs of a jail are broken down, it becomes 

clear that only a fraction of the total cost of 

building is spent on the outer shell. Exhibit 28-3 

shows a breakdown of jail costs by different components of construction, as reported in RSMeans’ 

Square Foot Costs.1

 Working from that list, the 

portions of the building listed in exhibit 28-4 

represent the shell, that is, the walls, roof, floor, 

foundation, and key structural elements involved 

in their creation.

1 Square Foot Costs, 27th Annual Edition, 2006 (Kingston, MA: RSMeans Construction Publishers & Consultants, 2006).
314

S e c t i o n 4 : 

Special Considerations

Although the shell looks impressive and gives 

the appearance of great value, it represents only 

about 28 percent of the total construction cost of 

a jail. Therefore, about three-fourths of a jail’s 

construction cost is in the interior elements.

Saving one-fourth of the cost of construction is 

certainly attractive, but renovation entails additional costs. A major cost is potentially that of 

upgrading the shell to security status, which may 

involve reinforcing walls, building walls within 

the walls, adding security windows (sometimes 

by cutting openings through solid walls), and 

securing the ceiling/roof assemblies. If the particular building being examined has walls, doors, 

ceilings, and floor finishes that must be removed 

to make way for the jail design, a demolition cost 

is added to the cost projection.

Exhibit 28-3. Jail Costs by Construction 

Component

Construction Component Percent

Substructure 1.7

Superstructure 13.0

Exterior closure 12.0

Roofing 1.0

Interior construction 6.5

Conveying (elevators, etc.) 1.9

Plumbing 17.7

HVAC 8.5

Fire protection 0.2

Electrical system 8.1

Equipment and furnishings 29.4

 All construction components 100.0

Exhibit 28-4. Jail Shell Costs

Shell Costs Percent

Substructure 1.7

Superstructure 13.0

Exterior closure 12.0

Roofing 1.0

 Total shell costs 27.7

Reconfiguring the floor plan to meet jail needs 

can require all new walls, ceilings, and floor finishes. It can involve replacing existing conduits, 

wiring, and power supplies as well as replacing 

and relocating lighting fixtures. Reconfiguring 

can also require altering the location of supply 

and return air ducts and openings. Redoing 

plumbing systems and penetrating existing flooring for new water supply and drain lines can 

be very costly. Nonsecurity suspended ceilings, 

such as lay-in ceiling tiles and drywall ceilings, 

may need complete replacement. New concrete 

block cell walls can add excessive load to the 

floor, thus requiring additional structural support. 

Depending on the building, making all of these 

changes can be a very expensive proposition. 

These sorts of cost factors can quickly erode the 

money saved on the shell, thus leading to costs 

comparable to those of new construction. 

Even if conversion is feasible and renovation 

would save 10–20 percent of the cost of new construction, the jurisdiction is once again advised 
315 

C h a p t e r 2 8 : 

Renovating Nonsecure Buildings Into Jails

to consider operational issues before committing 

to the renovation project. Given that a building designed for a different function is being 

converted, the renovation layout is frequently 

not as effective or efficient as a new design and 

may have inevitable, unacceptable functional 

compromises. Other planning concerns, such as 

the need for expansion, sufficient parking, and 

public access, may also be compromised. 

Operational Costs 

Operational costs, particularly those of staffing, 

are actually the biggest part of a jail’s economics. Over the long run, the costs of staffing 

and operating a jail will far exceed the costs of 

construction and project financing. If the price 

of cheaper construction is the addition of one or 

two more 24-hour-a-day, 7-day-a-week posts, the 

economic impact on a jail can be devastating. 

The cost analysis in exhibit 28-5 demonstrates 

the differences over a 20-year life cycle between 

a new 125-bed jail and a renovated facility of 

equal capacity. The essential differences are that 

renovation costs are assumed to be 20 percent 

less than new construction and the staffing for 

the renovated facility is greater by one officer per 

shift. An average interest rate of 6 percent and an 

inflation rate of 4 percent are used. 

Acquisition Costs 

A key factor in assessing project costs is the acquisition cost of the site and building being considered for renovation. The purchase price of the 

facility could be greater than any potential savings over new construction. Also, if private property is purchased, the cost calculation must take 

into account tax receipts that will be lost once 

the property is removed from the tax rolls.

Conclusion 

Local officials should by all means examine 

renovation options before committing to new 

construction. Construction cost savings may be 

there to find within the context of creating secure 

facilities that meet local needs.

However, experience shows that many renovation 

options either fail to offer the savings initially expected or offer measurable savings at the cost of 

functionality, safety, or staff efficiency. Before a 

jurisdiction enters into public or private commitments, it should temper its enthusiasm for 

renovation options with a reasoned analysis 

of a building’s ability to meet preestablished 

goals for inmate classification, surveillance/

supervision, safety/security, staffing efficiency, 

and true convertibility.
316

S e c t i o n 4 : 

Special Considerations

Exhibit 28-5. Cost Analysis of Renovation That Requires Addition of One Staff Post

Source: Kimme & Associates, Inc., 2006.
317

Chapter 29

Construction and Project Costs

Although jail construction costs are significant, they do not represent the total perbed cost paid by a jurisdiction to complete 

its project. Additional costs significantly increase 

the expense of the jail. When these costs are 

added to construction costs, one arrives at the 

actual project cost.

The project cost represents the true cost of building a jail and is not clearly understood by many 

jurisdictions. Failing to understand the difference 

between the project cost and construction costs 

has caused jurisdictions to plan inadequately for 

project funding or for referendums requesting 

funding. This, in turn, has led to underfinanced 

projects that provide less capacity than required, 

less support and program space than needed, 

and/or a building with less quality and durability than desired. It has also led to embarrassment 

when the public has seen that their local officials 

did not understand the costs involved in the jail 

project. This chapter clarifies the differences between construction and project costs. 

Construction Costs 

Construction costs are those costs that relate 

specifically and exclusively to the construction of 

the building. They typically include costs for:

■ Site preparation.

■ All materials required for construction.

■ All labor required to assemble the building 

materials.

■ All overhead and profit of the contractor(s).

■ All equipment and furnishings that are physically attached (fixed) to the building.

■ Basic site improvements, such as landscaping 

and on-grade parking and sidewalks associated 

with the building.

■ Signage.

■ General conditions, such as warranties, 

permits, insurance, testing, shop drawings, 

and so forth. 

Project Cost 

Even though construction costs represent the 

major part of a jail’s cost, many other costs 

must be incurred to actually build the jail. These 

“other costs,” when combined with construction 

costs, give the total project cost.

The other costs involved in producing a project 

can be quite significant. As a rule of thumb, it 

is wise to plan initially on adding 20–30 percent 

to the construction costs of the building (exhibit 

29-1). That is, if the jail is expected to cost $10 

million to construct, it would be wise initially 

to add another $2–$3 million to estimate the 

true project cost. A $10 million construction cost 

could easily result in a $13 million project cost. 

Exhibit 29-1. Total Project Cost

Other Costs

Construction

Costs
318

S e c t i o n 4 : 

Special Considerations

The ratio of project cost to construction costs will 

vary considerably from jurisdiction to jurisdiction 

because many variables are involved. It is critical, however, for a jurisdiction to conduct all 

of its financial planning, even from the earliest 

phases of the effort, with an appreciation of all 

costs involved with the project.

Project Cost Factors 

The most significant and typical cost factors that 

add to basic construction costs to create a project 

cost follow. 

■ Site acquisition. This covers the cost of any 

land and buildings needed to create the jail 

site. 

■ Demolition. If the acquired site has existing 

buildings or features such as pavement or 

retaining walls, the cost of demolishing these 

structures and disposing of the waste in preparation for future construction must be taken 

into account.

■ Utilities. Costs are associated with providing 

utilities to a site (particularly a remote site) 

or relocating existing utilities (e.g., gas lines, 

power lines) that would otherwise interfere 

with construction.

■ Professional fees. These are the fees for the 

architects and engineers who will design the 

building and develop all of the structural, 

mechanical, electrical, and civil engineering 

systems for the building and the site. Fees will 

vary depending on the size and complexity of 

the building and whether it is new construction, renovation, and/or an addition. Professional fees also include those for specialists 

such as food service consultants, interior 

designers, and construction managers. Many 

jurisdictions will retain the services of a jail 

planner early in the facility development process to conduct a needs assessment and feasibility study prior to engaging a design firm(s).

■ Reimbursables. Various expenses are incurred 

by professionals during the course of the project and are generally billed back to the owner 

as a reimbursable expense. Typical reimbursables for an architect, for example, include the 

costs of travel, report printing, courier services, and construction document reproduction.

■ Furnishings and equipment. All of the desks, 

chairs, file cabinets, copy machines, computers, 

kitchen and laundry equipment, inmate furniture, 

and other unfixed items that must be purchased 

for the operation of a building incur additional 

expenses. Also included in this cost might be 

such things as potted plants, window coverings, 

and other unattached office decorations.

■ Site survey. Before design can begin, a complete survey of the site must be completed. 

This survey will establish the location of all 

buildings, the contours of the site, the location of all utilities, and any easements and 

setbacks.

■ Special testing. A variety of special tests not 

typically included in the construction contract 

will be made before and during construction, 

such as tests of the soil conditions and selected materials.

■ Legal fees. A variety of legal fees might be 

paid during the project, for example, fees for 

condemning and acquiring properties. Legal 

fees may be incurred in developing clear title 

to land, requesting variances, obtaining zoning changes, settling disputes, and negotiating 

contracts. 

■ Project manager. Some jurisdictions think it 

is wise to hire their own project manager. This 

representative serves as a liaison between the 

county, the architect, and the contractors. The 

project manager helps ensure that the project 

is proceeding in accordance with contractual 

obligations required by the county. Such 

a person may also keep a record of design 
319 

C h a p t e r 2 9 : 

Construction and Project Costs

and construction progress for the county as 

insurance against failures to meet contract 

demands.

■ Selling bonds. If bonds must be sold to 

finance a project, a fee is generally paid to 

the firm or individual arranging for the sale.

■ Transition. To prepare for the transition into 

the new jail, jurisdictions are well advised to 

add funding for a transition team made up of 

existing staff members and, perhaps, a consultant, to focus on the significant amount 

of work to be done before opening the new 

building: writing policy, procedures, and staff 

post orders; establishing a hiring and training 

schedule; and so forth. More on this important 

subject can be found in chapter 30.

■ Moving. Professional movers are sometimes 

retained to move furniture and equipment 

from the old building to the new.

■ Telephone and radio communications equipment. Telephone and radio communications 

equipment is frequently purchased from a 

vendor or provider outside of the normal 

construction contract. For law enforcement 

portions of a jail, the cost of the E-911 radio 

equipment and computer-aided dispatch systems are generally outside the construction 

budget.

Example 

Exhibit 29-2 shows an example of a hypothetical 

project budget based on a $10 million construction cost and the typical cost factors outlined 

above. In this example, the cost factors other 

than construction costs are equal to about 22.6 

percent of the cost of construction and represent 

18.4 percent of the total project cost. These costs 

can vary considerably from project to project and 

may include other factors. This example is provided only to enhance the reader’s understanding 

of the magnitude of the project cost. 

Conclusion 

In planning the financial aspects of a proposed 

project, it is important to understand all 

operational and construction-related costs to be 

incurred. Only then can a jurisdiction make informed decisions about the size and nature of the 

project to be developed and adequately prepare 

for the expenses to come and the revenues needed to cover them.

Exhibit 29-2 . Hypothetical Project Budget

Cost factor Cost (dollars)

Construction costs $10,000,000 

Other cost factors

 Site acquisition $500,000

 Demolition and disposal $50,000

 Utility relocation $50,000

 Professional fees $700,000

 Reimbursables $60,000

 Furnishings and equipment $400,000

 Site survey $20,000

 Testing $20,000

 Legal fees $40,000

 Project manager $100,000

 Transition $100,000

 Moving $20,000

 Telephone equipment $200,000

 Total other costs $2,260,000 

 Total project cost $12,260,000 
321

Chapter 30

Making a Building Work

A common mistake made by many local government officials is to think that their role 

in the development of a new jail ends with 

the completion of the architectural phase of the 

project.

Others mistakenly feel that their role is ended 

before construction documents are complete 

because construction demands are such that the 

client frequently feels there is little he or she 

can contribute or has been convinced that the 

architect or contractor will simply turn over the 

keys when the building is complete. The jurisdiction must remember that a jail facility’s security 

and overall success depend largely on staff and 

management. In fact, attention to operational and 

transitional issues at this point will yield major 

benefits later. Failure to plan for the opening of a 

new facility has led to a number of embarrassing 

problems:

■ Delays in the opening of new facilities when it 

was discovered that the recruitment, selection, 

training, and funding of new staff had been 

overlooked.

■ Multiple system failures in the newly occupied 

jail due to lack of testing of equipment prior to 

moving the inmates into the new facility.

■ Discovery upon opening that the staff were 

not sufficiently trained in the operation of the 

more complex equipment and systems found 

in their modern, high-technology facility. In 

one instance, inmates were able to simply 

walk out the front door of a new jail because 

staff did not fully understand the door status 

indicator system.

■ Considerable damage to new facilities because 

they were seriously understaffed or staff were 

improperly trained—or not trained—in managing the inmate population. This can be a 

serious problem in direct supervision facilities 

when staff members are not adequately trained 

in inmate management.

■ Failure to implement the inmate classification system or planned services and programs 

intended to alleviate boredom and manage 

behavior because these things simply were not 

given priority in the transition process. As one 

sheriff put it, “Once you open the door, all hell 

breaks loose.”

■ Rapid overcrowding for reasons other than 

being built too small. For example, the size 

of numerous new jails has been based on 

assumptions about continuation or implementation of population-reducing alternatives to 

incarceration that either were not implemented 

after the new jail opened or were subsequently 

discontinued.

■ Considerable disruption, unrest, and verbal 

and physical confrontations among inmates in 

the housing units of newly opened facilities 

because staff had little knowledge of a classification system that was intended to separate 

the violent from the nonviolent and the “prey” 

from the “predators.”

These are all examples of facilities that did not 

“work” well. They were not all necessarily facilities that were poorly planned, designed, or constructed. Rather, they were facilities where there 

was inadequate preparation for opening or where 

key planning assumptions were never implemented or staffing and budget commitments fell short.

Detailed information about the transition process can be found in the Resource Manual for 
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S e c t i o n 4 : 

Special Considerations

 Transition to a New Jail

Transition team conducting an inspection of their new facility. 

(Photograph courtesy of Rocket Media.)

Construction Monitoring 

The transition team is often tasked with monitoring the construction process, not only to become 

familiar with the new building, but to watch for 

problems in the process. Because the transition 

team is made up of facility staff, it can prove to 

be a significant resource in identifying potential 

problems, such as gaps or improperly installed 

fixtures that result in hiding places for contraband; equipment, fixtures, or construction 

that do not meet specifications; and shoddy 

workmanship.

Policy and Procedure Development 

A comprehensive set of written operational 

policies and procedures is vital to operating a jail 

that avoids incurring unnecessary liability risks. 

Well-researched and drafted policies and procedures tailored to a particular facility serve the 

jail administration in many ways. Primarily, they 

provide an essential training tool that ensures 

consistency of performance among all jail officers 

and other staff, provides guidance for staff when 

1

 Gail Elias and John Milosovich, Resource Manual for Transition to a New Jail (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, National 

Institute of Corrections, 2005), www.nicic.gov/Library/020159, accessed February 26, 2010.
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Making a Building Work

administrative personnel are not immediately 

on the scene in an emergency, and provides 

protection for the county against liability when 

individual acts can be shown to be outside of the 

prescribed practices dictated by the policy and 

procedures manual.

No facility, particularly no new one, should operate without a well-researched and knowledgeably 

prepared set of written policies and procedures 

that are developed specifically for the facility and 

are compliant with current case law, professional 

practices, local statutes, and state and professional standards. The policy and procedure development process requires heavy involvement by 

local jail staff. The process of preparing a policy 

and procedures manual includes the following 

tasks:

■ Outline the issues and topics to be covered.

■ Review previous manuals or manuals from 

other facilities for relevancy and new ideas 

(errors, omissions, deletions, or additions).

■ Research and document applicable case law, 

state statutes and standards, and recommended professional standards.

■ Hold discussions during which key policy 

decisions are made.

■ Tailor all policies and procedures to the 

specific design solution proposed and the 

inmate management plan.

■ Draft specific scenarios for all of the procedures to be implemented in the new facility.

■ Draft the initial policy and procedures manual.

■ “Field test” the draft policies and procedures 

by walking through them on facility models or 

plans or in the facility itself.

■ Review, comment, and modify until the final 

document is complete.

■ Train all staff.

■ Develop a way to make modifications to 

procedures once training has been completed 

and the facility occupied.

Final Staffing Plan and Staff Post 

Orders 

A final staffing plan for the new facility that is 

consistent with the final facility design and the 

revised policies and procedures must be prepared. This includes documenting staff needs by 

function, number, and shift, including consideration of the impact of weekends, holidays, sick 

leave, training leave, absenteeism, and other such 

factors that affect the need for post coverage.2

Post orders detailing precise responsibilities and 

tasks for each post and position indicated in the 

final jail staffing plan and the written policies 

and procedures must be prepared and implemented in the same manner as operational policies and procedures. Whereas the policies and 

procedures provide staff direction for what is to 

be done, why it is to be done, and how it will 

be done, post orders detail which tasks are to 

be done, when they are to be done, and who

will do them.

Staff Recruitment and Selection 

Staff recruitment and selection have evolved from 

a very simple process to one that often involves 

the administration of a variety of psychological 

screening and aptitude measurement instruments 

and oral interviews. Haphazard recruitment and 

2

 See Dennis Liebert and Rod Miller, Staffing Analysis Workbook for Jails, Second Edition (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of 

Justice, National Institute of Corrections, 2001), www.nicic.gov/Library/016827, accessed February 26, 2010.
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S e c t i o n 4 : 

Special Considerations

selection can seriously jeopardize the operation 

of a new jail and expose the local government to 

tremendous liability. Jurisdictions should execute 

this process according to a plan consistent with 

formal personnel practices and state/federal laws 

governing employment.

Too many jurisdictions do not devote sufficient 

time to recruitment and selection. New staff 

should be hired well in advance of the facility’s 

scheduled opening so that they can participate 

in mandatory state (academy) training programs 

and local training specific to the new facility.

Staff Training 

New and current officers need training in the 

operation and philosophy of the new jail. Such 

training should focus on current case law, techniques of managing inmates, and, most importantly, on the application of the new policies and 

procedures that have been written and must now 

be implemented.

Training jail officers in policies and procedures for 

advanced inmate supervision and management 

techniques and for the operation of the new electronic equipment and hardware in the jail is critical. Such training should be in addition to any 

mandatory basic training required by the state. 

The training should also emphasize practical 

exercises, such as conducting emergency facility 

evacuation drills and responding to “officer 

down” situations.

Testing should be administered to ensure adequate understanding and performance of just 

how the new facility equipment and physical 

plant are intended to operate and to identify 

areas where staff have particular questions or 

problems.

Transition team meeting. 

(Photograph courtesy of Rocket Media.)

Move Logistics 

Each jurisdiction must prepare a detailed plan for 

making the actual move to the new jail and the 

sequencing steps involved. Move logistics include 

considerations such as the following: 

■ The means of transporting inmates to the 

new facility.

■ When to begin moving inmates and 

equipment.

■ How to move inmates and equipment in such 

a way that both staff and inmates can move 

gradually and smoothly while closing down 

the old jail.

■ Arrangements for enhanced security during 

transport.

■ Plans for staffing two or more facilities during 

the inmate transfer. 

■ Numerous other related matters.

The following tasks must be considered when 

developing a move logistics plan:
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C h a p t e r 3 0 : 

Making a Building Work

■ Preparing and delivering training programs for 

new staff, existing staff, supervisory staff, and 

so forth.

■ Scheduling and conducting public tours.

■ Assisting in interviewing potential staff.

■ Testing equipment and observing its installation for training of staff on its operation.

■ Preparing the overall Transition Master Plan 

and schedules.

■ Orienting other law enforcement agencies, 

vendors, and other facility users for interaction 

at the new facility.

■ Finalizing and directing the actual move.

■ Preparing orientation material for inmates who 

will be transferred to the new facility.

■ Conducting facility shakedowns and “walking 

through” all operational scenarios.

■ Coordinating with maintenance staff on the 

operation of mechanical and electrical systems.

■ Developing emergency plans for inmate 

evacuations that include inmate retention, 

emergency staff provisions, and fire drills for 

new staff.

■ Documenting that all new furniture, equipment, and forms have been ordered and 

installed.

New facility mechanical and electrical systems 

are typically far more complex than those found 

in other existing county buildings and the old 

jail. It is of critical importance that existing or 

additional county maintenance personnel who 

will be assigned to the new facility have an 

opportunity to monitor the onsite installation of 

mechanical, plumbing, and electrical systems. It 

is also important to involve local facility maintenance staff in all postdesign activities involved in 

the construction phase.

Summary 

Making the new building work will require team 

work, good communication, a cooperative spirit, 

and full commitment from all those who were 

involved in preactivation (planners, designers, 

contractors, and transition staff) as well as those 

involved in the activation and operation of the 

facility (the funding authority, management and 

line staff, support staff, maintenance personnel, 

volunteers, and the community) if the facility 

is to realize its full potential and serve the community as intended. Although this is not an easy 

proposition, failure is not an option.
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