Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-924 | October 30, 2020 Page 1 of 16

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Brian A. Karle

Ball Eggleston, PC

Lafayette, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Josiah Swinney

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Randall Edward Echard,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

October 30, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

20A-CR-924

Appeal from the 

Tippecanoe Superior Court

The Honorable

Steven P. Meyer, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

79D02-1910-F1-11

Kirsch, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-924 | October 30, 2020 Page 2 of 16

[1] Following a plea of guilty to child molesting1 as a Level 1 felony and to being 

an habitual offender,

2

the trial court sentenced Randall Edward Echard 

(“Echard”) to an aggregate sentence of forty-eight years with forty-three years 

executed and five years suspended to supervised probation. He raises the 

following restated issues for our review:

I. Whether the trial court erred by imposing a probation 

condition that restricts Echard’s use of the internet and 

technology; and

II. Whether Echard’s sentence is inappropriate in light of the 

nature of the offense and his character. 

[2] We affirm and remand with instructions. 

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In October of 2019, Echard, who was thirty-one years old at the time and on 

probation in another case, was living with his then-wife, Brandi Echard 

(“Brandi”), and his eight-year-old daughter from another relationship. Tr. Vol. 

2 at 14, 18, 33-35; Appellant’s Conf. App. Vol. 2 at 110. Brandi’s thirteen-year-old

cousin, A.B., was staying in Echard’s house as an overnight guest. Tr. Vol. 2 at 

18. In the early morning hours of October 27, 2019, Echard left the bedroom 

where Brandi was sleeping and walked to the living room were A.B. was 

1

See Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3(a)(1).

2

See Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8.
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sleeping on an air mattress. State’s Ex. 1 at 6. Echard’s daughter was sleeping 

in another bedroom that was about ten feet away from the living room where 

A.B. slept. Tr. Vol. 2 at 35; State’s Ex. 1 at 6, 9. Echard sat in a chair near the 

air mattress and woke A.B., telling her how he had “crack[ed]” the skulls of 

other prisoners while he was incarcerated and that he could crack additional 

skulls without being punished, which A.B. understood as an attempt by Echard 

to scare her. State’s Ex. 1 at 6, 7, 9. Echard then began to massage A.B.’s back 

and shoulders and continued to touch her despite A.B.’s statements to Echard 

that she wanted him to stop. Id. at 9. Echard removed A.B.’s pants and 

underwear, placed his hand over her mouth, used his mouth to lick her vagina, 

and at one point inserted his tongue inside of her vagina. Id. A.B. attempted to 

get up, but Echard pulled her down. Id. Brandi walked in on Echard as he was 

performing oral sex on A.B., and when he stopped, he told Brandi he was “so

sorry that you caught me.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 34; State’s Ex. 1 at 6-7. Brandi and 

Echard argued about the incident, and, at one point, Echard prevented Brandi 

from calling 911 to report what had happened. Tr. Vol. 2 at 34. After the 

argument, Echard left the house, and Brandi called the police. Id. at 34-35. 

Echard fled to Tennessee and was not taken into custody until October 30, 

2019. State’s Ex. 2 at 12. 

[4] On October 29, 2019, the State charged Echard as follows: (1) Count I, child 

molesting as a Level 1 felony; (2) Count II, criminal confinement as a Level 5 

felony; (3) Count III, interference with the reporting of a crime as a Class A 

misdemeanor; and (4) Count IV, child molesting as a Level 4 felony. Appellant’s 
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App. Vol. 2 at 9-12. That same day, the State also filed an information alleging 

that Echard was an habitual offender because of his convictions in 2015 for

intimidation as a Level 5 felony and carrying a handgun without a license as a 

Level 5 felony and his 2012 conviction for strangulation as a Class D felony. 

Id. at 13-14. On March 20, 2020, Echard pleaded guilty to Count I, child 

molesting as a Level 1 felony and admitted that he was an habitual offender. 

Id. at 51-53; Tr. Vol. 2 at 4-24. In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss the 

remaining charges along with a petition to revoke probation that had been filed 

in another case. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 52. The plea agreement also specified 

sentencing parameters, which provided that “the initial executed Department of 

Correction portion of the sentence shall be no less than thirty-five (35) years and 

no more than fifty (50) years.” Id. at 51. It also provided that “any sentence 

above thirty-five (35) years may be served in the Indiana Department of 

Corrections, and/or on Probation[,]” that “any sentence above fifty (50) years 

may be served on Probation[,]” and that Echard may be placed on Tippecanoe 

County Community Corrections. Id. 

[5] On April 15, 2020, the trial court held a sentencing hearing at which it had 

Echard’s presentence investigation report (“PSI”), his psychosexual risk 

evaluation, a victim impact statement from A.B.’s mother, and a letter from 

Echard’s grandparents. Id. at 6-7; Tr. Vol. 2 at 28. The State also moved to 

admit three police reports, dated October 27, 2019, October 30, 2019, and 

February 26, 2020, which the trial court admitted. Tr. Vol. 2 at 31. In his

psychosexual risk evaluation, Echard reported that A.B. twice requested that he 
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give her a back massage before she told him that he “owe[d]” her a massage. 

Def. Ex. 1 at 27. He claimed that while he was giving A.B. a back massage A.B.

was “moaning, sticking her ass up in the air” and that he believed she was 

interested in sexual behavior. Id. Echard reported that he asked her, “Are you 

ok with this? Are you sure?” on “several occasions[,]” and she responded 

affirmatively each time. Id. Echard also told the psychologist that he “was 

seduced,” that A.B., “look[ed] like she was 18,” and that he “knew it was 

wrong” but was “talked into it.” Id. 

[6] Echard also prepared a narrative of the events that were included in the PSI in

which he wrote that A.B. requested that he give her a back massage, that he 

was “intrigued[,]” that the situation became “heated[,]” and that A.B. told him 

“not to leave” before she “flipped on to her back.” Id. at 125. He wrote that he 

was “turned on” even though he “knew it was wrong[,]” that “she then 

removed her shorts and underwear[,]” and that he “used [his] hands on her” 

while performing oral sex for approximately a “half a minute” on A.B. until 

Brandi arrived and “shoved” his shoulder, ending the incident. Id. 

[7] A.B.’s mother submitted a letter stating that before the offense occurred, A.B. 

was “a very outgoing, fun, and interactive person” but now has “nightmares 

almost nightly” and has been in counseling and on medication for posttraumatic stress disorder, severe depression, and anxiety. Appellant’s Conf. App. 

Vol. 2 at 131. She also wrote that A.B. gets severe anxiety if she “hears anyone 

raise their voice or start to argue or if she hears a sudden loud noise.” Id. 

Echard’s grandparents submitted a letter on his behalf stating that Echard was 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-924 | October 30, 2020 Page 6 of 16

“very remorseful and would do anything to change his wrong acts” and 

requesting that Echard not be placed “in a maximum security facility.” Def. Ex. 

2 at 38. 

[8] Brandi stated at Echard’s sentencing hearing that “[t]he image of finding 

[Echard] and the I’m so sorry you caught me. I don’t believe that he’s sorry. I 

believe he’s sorry that he got caught.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 34. Echard made a 

statement in which he apologized and expressed regret, stating “I am one 

hundred percent truly sorry. I mean it was just a horrible, despicable thing. 

And it was really, I don’t expect your forgiveness. I am sorry. Truly, I am.” 

Id. at 36-37. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court stated:

And throughout this whole record, I keep seeing you’re blaming 

[A.B.] You keep saying well she wanted a back rub. She wanted 

this. She wanted that. She’s thirteen, you’re the adult! You 

can’t blame it on a little girl. And I don’t think you get that. . . . 

You may be sorry for all that. But that’s diminished in the 

Court’s view by the constant reference to blaming this little child 

for what you did to her. And I don’t think you get that.

Id. at 47-48. 

[9] The trial court then sentenced Echard to an aggregate sentence of forty-eight 

years with forty-three years executed and five years suspended to supervised 

probation. Id. at 52; Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 91-92. Echard’s aggregate 

sentence was composed of a thirty-eight-year executed sentence for his 

conviction of Level 1 felony child molesting and an additional ten years for 

being an habitual offender with five years suspended. Id. It also imposed the 
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following special probation condition: “31. You shall abide by all the terms of 

the electronic device user agreement for sex offenders (see attached)” 

(“Condition 31”). Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 103; Tr. Vol. 2 at 59. The electronic 

device user agreement incorporated by Condition 31 was not attached to the 

special probation conditions that the trial court ordered and that Echard 

initialed, but a copy of the document was submitted before sentencing. 

Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 62-67, 100-03. The trial court stated that Echard could 

“go over [the electronic device user agreement’s] terms with the probation 

officer at the appropriate time.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 59. The second paragraph of the 

electronic device user agreement incorporated by Condition 31 provides as 

follows:

Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 66. Echard now appeals. 
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Discussion and Decision

I. Probation Condition

[10] Echard first contends that Condition 31’s restriction on his use of internet 

technology pursuant to the second paragraph of the electronic device user 

agreement is overly broad and in violation of Weida v. State, 94 N.E.3d 682 

(Ind. 2018), which held that a substantially similar special sex offender 

probation condition was unreasonable as applied. Appellant’s Br. at 11-13. The 

State agrees that, pursuant to Weida, remand is appropriate to strike the second 

paragraph of the electronic device user agreement incorporated by Condition 

31. Appellee’s Br. at 12-13. We agree that remand is appropriate. 

[11] In Weida, the Indiana Supreme Court held the following condition of Weida’s 

probation unreasonable:

You shall not access the Internet or any other on-line service 

through use of a computer, cell phone, iPod, Xbox, Blackberry, 

personal digital assistant (PDA), pagers, Palm Pilots, televisions, 

or any other electronic device at any location (including your 

place of employment) without prior approval of your probation 

officer. This includes any Internet service provider, bulletin 

board system, e-mail system or any other public or private 

computer network. You shall not possess or use any data 

encryption technique or program.

94 N.E.3d at 686. The Court noted that the condition was unreasonable 

because it “did not reasonably relate to rehabilitating Weida and protecting the 

public.” Id. at 693. The second paragraph of the electronic device user 

agreement applicable to Echard’s probation through Condition 31 is 
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substantially similar to the probation condition held unreasonable in Weida. 

Therefore, in accordance with Weida, we affirm and remand with instructions 

for the trial court to strike the second paragraph of the electronic device user 

agreement.3

II. Inappropriateness of Sentence

[12] Echard next argues that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the 

offense and his character and requests that we reduce his aggregate sentence 

from forty-eight years to thirty-eight years. Pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 

7(B), this court “may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due 

consideration of the trial court’s decision, the [c]ourt finds that the sentence is

inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the 

offender.” Whether a sentence is inappropriate turns on our sense of the 

culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to 

others, and other factors that come to light in a given case. Cardwell v. State, 895 

N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008). We defer to the trial court’s decision, and our 

goal is to determine whether the appellant’s sentence is inappropriate, not 

whether some other sentence would be more appropriate. Conley v. State, 972 

N.E.2d 864, 876 (Ind. 2012). “Such deference should prevail unless overcome 

3 Because we remand for the trial court to strike the second paragraph of the electronic device user agreement 

as violative of Weida, we need not address Echard’s alternative arguments concerning overbreadth and undue 

restriction of his constitutional rights. See Appellant’s Br. at 13 (“Even assuming arguendo that Weida were not 

controlling, Condition 31 would nevertheless be unenforceable as an undue intrusion upon constitutional 

rights.”) (emphasis in original). 
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by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense 

(such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the 

defendant’s character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples 

of good character).” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015). When 

we review a sentence, we seek to leaven the outliers, not to achieve a perceived 

correct result. Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1225. On appeal, it is the defendant’s 

burden to persuade us that the sentence imposed by the trial court is 

inappropriate. Shell v. State, 927 N.E.2d 413, 422 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).

[13] The advisory sentence is the starting point the legislature has selected as an 

appropriate sentence for the crime committed. Abbott v. State, 961 N.E.2d 1016, 

1019 (Ind. 2012). Echard pleaded guilty to one count of Level 1 felony child 

molesting and an habitual offender enhancement. Echard’s Level 1 felony child 

molesting offense carries an advisory sentence of thirty years with a sentencing

range of twenty to forty years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4(b).

4

 The habitual offender 

enhancement provides for a sentencing range of six to twenty years, which is 

not suspendible. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8(i). By statute, the maximum sentence 

Echard could have received was sixty years. However, the plea agreement

specified that “the initial executed Department of Correction portion of the 

4 Echard’s commission of Level 1 felony child molesting was not subject to the fifty-year maximum sentence 

established under Indiana Code section 35-50-2-4(c) because Echard did not commit “a Level 1 felony child 

molesting offense described in: (1) IC 35-31.5-2-72(1); or (2) IC 35-31.5-2-72(2).” Those two subdivisions 

address circumstances in the commission of a Level 1 felony child molesting offense that result in a person’s 

designation as a credit restricted felon. See Tr. Vol. 2 at 11 (noting that although Echard committed a Level 1 

felony child molesting offense his offense was not credit restricted.) Credit restriction aside, the minimum 

and advisory sentences under Indiana Code section 35-50-2-4(c) are the same as those in subsection (b). 
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sentence shall be no less than thirty-five (35) years and no more than fifty (50) 

years.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 51. It also provided that “any sentence above 

thirty-five (35) years may be served in the Indiana Department of Corrections, 

and/or on Probation[,]” that “any sentence above fifty (50) years may be served 

on Probation[,]” and that Echard may be placed on Tippecanoe County 

Community Corrections. Id. Here, the trial court sentenced Echard to an 

aggregate sentence of forty-eight years with forty-three years executed and five 

years suspended to supervised probation. Id. at 91-92. Echard’s aggregate 

sentence was composed of a thirty-eight-year executed sentence for his 

conviction of Level 1 felony child molesting, which is eight years above the 

advisory sentence but within the parameters established by the plea agreement, 

and an additional ten years for being an habitual offender with five years 

suspended. Id. Thus, Echard received an enhanced, aggravated sentence that 

was less than the maximum established in the plea agreement and by statute. 

[14] As to the nature of the offense, Echard contends that his offense consisted of 

performing oral sex on A.B. for approximately thirty seconds which was the

“only instance of inappropriate sexual contact.” Appellant’s Br. at 17. He argues 

that the offense did not involve penetration, that A.B. was not of tender age, 

that he did not commit the offense by force, that the offense did not result in 

physical injury to the victim, and that the nature of his offense does not 

“warrant an aggravated and enhanced sentence eighteen (18) years greater than 

the advisory.” Id. at 18. We disagree. The nature of the offense compares the 

defendant's actions with the required showing to sustain a conviction under the 
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charged offense. Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1224. “One factor we consider when 

determining the appropriateness of a deviation from the advisory sentence is 

whether there is anything more or less egregious about the offense committed 

by the defendant that makes it different from the ‘typical’ offense accounted for 

by the legislature when it set the advisory sentence. Holloway v. State, 950 

N.E.2d 803, 806-07 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)

[15] The evidence in the record pertaining to Echard’s guilty plea is contrary to his 

claim that his offense was less egregious than the typical offense of Level 1 

felony child molesting enhanced by his accompanying admission to being a 

habitual offender. In perpetrating the offense, Echard, who was thirty-one at 

the time, approached then thirteen-year-old A.B.’s bed and told her how he had 

“crack[ed] skulls” while incarcerated and that he was never caught, which A.B. 

understood as an attempt to scare her. Tr. Vol. 2 at 14, 18; State’s Ex. 1 at 7, 9. 

Echard proceeded to massage A.B.’s back and shoulders and continued to 

touch her despite A.B.’s statements to Echard that she wanted him to stop. 

State’s Ex. 1 at 9. Echard persisted and removed A.B.’s pants and underwear, 

placed his hand over her mouth, used his mouth to lick her vagina, and, at one 

point, inserted his tongue inside of her vagina. Id. A.B. attempted to get up,

but Echard pulled her down. Id. Despite Echard’s contention that his 

performance of oral sex on A.B. lasted only thirty seconds, which appears in 

Echard’s account of the offense that he provided as part of his PSI, the record 

does not reveal the act’s precise duration. Appellant’s Conf. App Vol. 2 at 125.

Regardless of the duration, the act did not end until Brandi entered the room
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and witnessed Echard performing oral sex on A.B. Tr. Vol. 2 at 34; State’s Ex. 1 

at 6. Brandi described A.B. as appearing lifeless and in shock, and when Brandi 

confronted Echard about what she had just witnessed, Echard blamed A.B., 

stole Brandi’s phone so that she could not immediately call the police, and fled 

the State for three days. Id. at 5-7; State’s Ex. 2 at 12. As a result of the offense, 

A.B. now has frequent nightmares and suffers from post-traumatic stress 

disorder, severe depression, and anxiety. Appellant’s Conf. App. Vol. 2 at 131. In 

light of Echard’s conduct in intimidating and using fear to dominate A.B. 

before and during the offense and the resulting damage done to A.B. and her 

family, the nature of Echard’s offense is sufficiently egregious to justify his 

enhanced, aggravated sentence. See Holloway, 950 N.E.2d at 806-07.

[16] As to the character of the offender, Echard argues that his sentence is 

inappropriate and merits revision because of his prompt guilty plea, expression 

of remorse, and status as a seven and one-half year veteran of the Army 

Reserve. Appellant’s Br. at 18-19. He also contends that his criminal history 

should not have been used to support “further aggravation and execution of the 

sentence.” Id. at 19. We disagree. The analysis of the character of the offender 

involves a broader consideration of a defendant’s qualities. Anderson v. State, 

989 N.E.2d 823, 827 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. “The character of the 

offender is shown by the offender’s life and conduct.” Croy v. State, 953 N.E.2d 

660, 664 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). When considering the character of the offender, 

one relevant fact is the defendant’s criminal history. Johnson v. State, 986 

N.E.2d 852, 857 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).
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[17] Here, as to the impact of Echard’s criminal history on his sentence, the trial 

court’s sentencing order expressly stated that “most of [Echard’s] criminal 

history is encompassed in the Habitual Offender enhancement.” Appellant’s 

App. Vol. 2 at 91. Nevertheless, Echard’s remaining criminal history that is not 

encompassed by the habitual offender enhancement reflects poorly on his 

character. Echard has been previously convicted of operating a vehicle with a 

schedule I or II controlled substance or its metabolite as a Class C misdemeanor 

in 2007 and domestic battery as a Class A misdemeanor in 2016. Appellant’s 

Conf. App. Vol. 2 at 109-10. Echard violated his probation for his 2016 

conviction for domestic battery at the time he committed the present offense, 

and the State agreed to dismiss the probation violation in that case in exchange 

for Echard’s guilty plea. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 52. Other aspects of Echard’s 

life and conduct also reflect poorly on his character. Echard’s eight-year-old 

daughter, who was in the home at the time Echard committed the offense 

against A.B., was found to be a child in need of services (“CHINS”) on October 

17, 2012 due to four incidents of domestic violence occurring between Echard 

and the child’s mother; however, the child was never removed from the home 

and the CHINS case was dismissed on April 19, 2013. Tr. Vol. 2 at 34-35

Appellant’s Conf. App. Vol. 2. at 112. Although the use of illegal drugs or alcohol 

did not play a role in the offense, Echard’s PSI shows that he used marijuana

three times per day between the ages of sixteen and twenty-eight and used

mushrooms and LSD in his early twenties, which reflects a disregard for the 

law. Appellant’s Conf. App. Vol. 2 at 113. 
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[18] We acknowledge, as Echard urges, that pleading guilty and expressing remorse 

can be relevant factors in mitigation or revision of a sentence. However, we 

agree with the State that Echard’s decision to plead guilty to the offense does 

not render his sentence inappropriate as it was likely a pragmatic plea, given the 

weight of the evidence against him including his wife witnessing the crime as it 

happened and that A.B. had no doubt that Echard was the perpetrator. See 

Amalfitano v. State, 956 N.E.2d 208, 212 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (observing that a 

guilty plea based on pragmatic considerations is entitled to less mitigating 

weight), trans. denied. As to his expression of remorse, we note that while 

Echard apologized, stating he was “one hundred percent truly sorry. . . . it was 

just a horrible despicable thing” and acknowledged the impact his actions had 

on A.B. and his own family, the trial court also noted that Echard’s “constant 

reference to blaming” of A.B. for his conduct “diminished” his apology. Tr. 

Vol. 2 at 48. In fact, immediately after Brandi found Echard with A.B., Echard 

blamed A.B. telling Brandi that he was sorry she caught him, which was also 

consistent with Echard’s statement to his psychologist during his psychosexual 

evaluation that A.B.’s “moaning [and] sticking her ass up in the air” had 

“seduced” him. Id. at 34; Def. Ex. 1 at 27. Finally, while Echard served in the 

Army Reserves, he received an “other than honorable discharge,” which was a 

result of a 2015 conviction, and reflects poorly on him. Appellant’s Conf. App. 

Vol. 2 at 114; Tr. Vol. 2 at 39. Thus, in broadly considering Echard’s life and

conduct, we cannot say that his sentence is inappropriate in light of his 

character. 
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[19] Echard has not shown that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of 

the offense and the character of the offender. We, therefore, affirm the sentence 

imposed by the trial court. 

[20] Affirmed and remanded with instructions. 

Pyle, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.