IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Judy McCarraher, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 1983 C.D. 2014

:

Workers' Compensation Appeal Board :

(Eagleville Hospital), :

Respondent :

Eagleville Hospital, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 1991 C.D. 2014

: Submitted: August 7, 2015

Workers' Compensation Appeal Board :

(McCarraher), :

Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Judge

HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge

HONORABLE JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BY JUDGE SIMPSON FILED: November 3, 2015

Before this Court are the cross appeals of Judy McCarraher

(Claimant) and Eagleville Hospital (Employer) from a decision of the Workers’ 

Compensation Appeal Board (Board) that affirmed in part, and reversed in part, the 

order of a Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ). Specifically, the Board affirmed 

the WCJ’s grant of Claimant’s claim petition and the denial of Employer’s 

modification/suspension and review petitions, and it reversed the WCJ’s grant of

Claimant’s penalty petition.
2

In its appeal, Employer argues the WCJ erred in denying its 

modification/suspension petition where the uncontroverted medical evidence 

showed Claimant was capable of returning to sedentary work after her work injury, 

which Employer offered her. It also contends the WCJ erred in determining that 

Claimant’s work injury included a lumbar disc herniation and right knee fracture.

In her appeal, Claimant contends the Board erred in reversing the 

WCJ’s grant of her penalty petition where Employer misused Bureau of Workers’ 

Compensation (Bureau) documents in order to negate its de facto acceptance of 

Claimant’s work injury. Upon review, we affirm the Board’s order.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Beginning in 2004, Claimant, a registered nurse, worked for Employer 

as an admissions nurse. In December 2010, Claimant sustained an injury when she 

slipped and fell on black ice in Employer’s parking lot.

In January 2011, Employer issued a notice of temporary compensation

payable (NTCP) for a date of injury of December 27, 2010. The NTCP indicated

Claimant fell on ice in Employer’s parking lot, hitting her left rib cage and right 

knee. The affected body parts were described as “lower back and right knee” and 

the type of injury as “contusion.” Pet’r’s Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 22.

Thereafter, in April 2011, Employer issued a notice stopping 

temporary compensation and a notice of workers’ compensation denial (NCD),

which indicated that although a work injury occurred, Claimant did not suffer any 

disability as a result of the injury.
3

Shortly thereafter, Claimant filed a claim petition alleging workrelated injuries to her right knee and low back with an L4-5 disc herniation. She

sought total disability benefits from December 27, 2010 and ongoing. Claimant 

subsequently amended her claim petition seeking to add radiculopathy and a nondisplaced lateral tibial plateau fracture of her right knee as recognized injuries.

Claimant also filed a penalty petition alleging Employer violated the Workers’ 

Compensation Act1(Act) by “illegally pulling the [NTCP]” and by disregarding 

the medical evidence in issuing a “medical-only” NCD. Pet’r’s R.R. at 2.

Employer filed an answer to the claim petition in which it admitted a 

moderate left disc herniation at L4-5 and a right knee contusion. In so doing, 

Employer specifically referenced its NCD in which it acknowledged that an injury 

occurred but denied Claimant suffered any disability as a result of the injury.

Employer paid Claimant indemnity benefits in accordance with the NTCP it 

issued. It denied the material averments of the penalty petition.

In April 2011, Employer filed a modification/suspension petition 

based on Claimant’s alleged failure to respond to offers of part-time work as of 

March 30, 2011 and full-time work at no loss of earnings as of April 25, 2011.

In May 2011, Employer forwarded Claimant a proposed agreement 

for compensation in which it agreed to pay partial disability benefits of $454.76 

per week from March 30, 2011 through April 24, 2011, representing the difference 

between Claimant’s total disability benefit rate and the available earnings from a 

 

1 Act of June 2, 1915 P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. §§1–1041.4; 2501–2708.
4

part-time job Claimant did not accept. Employer also enclosed a check for 

$1,689.11 with the agreement. In the proposed agreement, Employer specifically 

indicated it would not abrogate the challenge it made through the issuance of its 

“medical-only” NCD. Claimant cashed the check, but she did not execute the 

agreement.

Thereafter, Employer filed a second suspension petition alleging 

Claimant did not respond to an offer of modified work at no loss of earnings as of 

November 29, 2011. Employer also filed a petition to review compensation 

benefits in which it alleged that, based on the further analysis of its medical expert, 

Claimant’s work injury did not involve a disc herniation at L4-5 or any apparent 

low back injury. Employer also stated it was continuing its investigation of 

Claimant’s alleged work-related right knee injury. Hearings on the parties’ various 

petitions ensued before a WCJ.

Before the WCJ, Claimant testified she sustained injuries while 

working for Employer when she slipped and fell on black ice, causing her to land 

on both knees and roll over onto her back. Claimant treated with Dr. Ari Greis, 

D.O. (Claimant’s Physician), who continues to treat her. Claimant testified her

low back is very painful, and she experiences pain on the left side with radiating

pain down her left leg. Claimant testified she cannot return to work in any 

capacity because she cannot drive on a consistent basis, cannot take care of

patients, cannot work while taking her prescribed narcotic pain medication and 

cannot respond to emergency situations. Claimant also explained that in 

November 2010, she sought treatment from Dr. Kenan Aksu for low back pain and
5

pain radiating down her leg. Dr. Aksu gave Claimant an injection that resolved her 

symptoms in that she was able to return to work without difficulty. Claimant 

further testified that in April 2011, she fell at home as a result of weakness in her

left leg, suffering a right knee fracture, which fully resolved.

Claimant also testified on cross-examination by deposition. She 

explained that she is able to perform some cleaning activities, some cooking and 

some care for her two cats. Although Claimant has a driver’s license, she does not 

drive because of her use of narcotic pain medication. At some point in the last five 

years, she developed pain in both knees, greater in her right knee than her left

knee, which caused her to seek medical treatment. After her work injury, Claimant

underwent an independent medical examination (IME) with Dr. Neil Kahanovitz

(Employer’s Spine Specialist). Claimant received notices of ability to return to 

work as well as job offer letters from Employer, but she did not respond to the job 

offer letters because Claimant’s Physician did not release her to return to work.

Claimant also presented the deposition testimony of her Physician, 

who is board-certified in physical medicine and rehabilitation. Claimant’s 

Physician testified he began treating Claimant in January 2011, at which time 

Claimant presented with a left-sided limp, pain in the lumbosacral junction and 

pain in the left lateral hip area. Claimant’s Physician’s examination revealed 

evidence of L-4 nerve irritation, and his findings were consistent with the results of 

a January 2011 lumbar MRI, which revealed an extruded disc herniation at L4-5. 

Claimant’s Physician prescribed physical therapy, Flexeril, Percocet, Oxycodone 

and an epidural steroid injection that did not relieve Claimant’s symptoms. 
6

Claimant’s Physician opined that Claimant’s lumbar radiculopathy is attributable 

to her work injury. He also explained that in April 2011, Claimant suffered a fall 

at home when she experienced weakness in her left leg, resulting in a fracture 

injury to her right knee. Claimant’s Physician opined that the fact that Claimant 

suffers ongoing leg symptoms as a result of her work-related lumbar radiculopathy 

“definitely contributed to her right knee injury and the fracture.” Pet’r’s R.R. at 

44. He further opined that Claimant is incapable of returning to work in her preinjury position or the modified position Employer offered her after the work 

incident.

2

In response, Employer presented the deposition testimony of its Spine 

Specialist, who is board certified in orthopedic surgery. Based on his physical 

examination, his review of medical records and Claimant’s history, Employer’s 

Spine Specialist opined that Claimant’s L4-5 disc herniation was not caused by the 

December 2010 work incident. Employer’s Spine Specialist further opined that 

Claimant’s April 2011 fall at home was not attributable to the December 2010 

work incident because there was no clinical evidence of any motor strength deficit 

in her left lower extremity. Employer’s Spine Specialist opined that he was unable 

to find any evidence that Claimant suffered a back injury in December 2010. He 

further opined Claimant was capable of performing the modified duty position that 

Employer offered Claimant.

 

2 Claimant also presented the cross-examination testimony of Leslie Krosnowski, a 

claims adjuster, regarding the handling of Claimant’s workers’ compensation claim.
7

Employer also presented the deposition testimony of Dr. Kevin B. 

Freedman (Employer’s Knee Specialist), who is also board-certified in orthopedic 

surgery and who was engaged to evaluate Claimant’s knee condition. Employer’s 

Knee Specialist conducted a physical examination, which revealed a severely 

limited range of motion in Claimant’s knees consistent with significant 

osteoarthritis. He opined Claimant sustained bilateral knee contusions as a result 

of the December 2010 work incident, which fully resolved by the time of his 

examination. Employer’s Knee Specialist opined that Claimant’s April 2011 fall at 

home bore no relationship to the December 2010 work incident because there was 

no evidence of muscle weakness in her left leg before the fall occurred. He opined 

that Claimant requires no further treatment for her work-related knee contusions or 

her April 2011 right knee fracture, which healed. Employer’s Knee Specialist

opined Claimant is capable of returning to work in the modified position that 

Employer offered Claimant.

3

Ultimately, the WCJ credited the testimony of Claimant and 

Claimant’s Physician. The WCJ found that Claimant sustained a disc

herniation/extrusion and resultant radiculopathy at L4-5 as well as a right knee 

contusion, caused by her fall in December 2010. The WCJ further found Claimant 

sustained a right knee lateral tibial plateau fracture in a fall at home in April 2011, 

which was also causally connected to her fall in December 2010. However, the 

WCJ credited the testimony of Employer’s Knee Specialist that Claimant fully

 

3

In addition, Employer presented the testimony of David Herold, its Director of 

Admissions, regarding his observations of Claimant at work. It also presented the deposition 

testimony of Barbara Berger, R.N., its Health Services Manager, who testified regarding 

Employer’s offers of modified duty work to Claimant.
8

recovered from the contusion and the fracture as of the date of Employer’s Knee 

Specialist’s examination in January 2012. Further, based on the credited testimony 

of Claimant and her Physician, the WCJ found Claimant rejected Employer’s 

offers of modified duty work in good faith. Thus, the WCJ granted Claimant’s

claim petition and denied Employer’s modification/suspension and review 

petitions.

As to Claimant’s penalty petition, the WCJ determined that, after 

issuing a notice stopping temporary compensation and a “medical-only” NCD, 

Employer, through its actions and admissions, including its answer to Claimant’s 

claim petition, the proposed agreement for compensation, statements made by its 

counsel at hearing, and the filing of a review petition to remove the disc herniation

from the description of injury, effectively nullified the notice stopping temporary 

compensation. The WCJ determined these actions and admissions created a “de 

facto” notice of compensation payable (NCP) as to Claimant’s L4-5 disc herniation 

and right knee contusion. WCJ’s Op., 6/27/13, Finding of Fact (F.F.) No. 16. The 

WCJ further determined Employer’s failure to pay indemnity benefits pursuant to 

the de facto NCP constituted a violation of the Act warranting imposition of a 50% 

penalty on indemnity benefits due through December 18, 2011, the date Employer 

filed its review petition seeking to abrogate liability for Claimant’s lumbar disc 

herniation. Employer appealed to the Board.

On appeal, the Board affirmed the WCJ’s grant of Claimant’s claim 

petition and the denial of Employer’s modification/suspension and review petitions

in light of the WCJ’s decision to credit the testimony of Claimant and her 
9

Physician over the testimony of Employer’s medical experts. The Board also 

rejected Employer’s arguments that the WCJ did not issue a “reasoned decision” as 

required by Section 422(a) of the Act, 77 P.S. §834, that the WCJ capriciously 

disregarded evidence, and that Claimant’s Physician’s testimony was incompetent 

to support the WCJ’s decision. The Board also noted that, in lieu of providing an 

extensive summary of the testimony presented, the WCJ appended to his decision a

proposed summary of the evidence submitted by Employer. The Board rejected 

Employer’s various assertions that the WCJ’s decision to do so was in error.

As to Claimant’s penalty petition, however, the Board reversed the 

WCJ on the ground that Claimant did not establish a violation of the Act. 

Specifically, the Board explained that Employer was permitted to use an NTCP 

while it continued its investigation of Claimant’s claim. Employer subsequently 

issued a notice stopping temporary compensation and a “medical-only” NCD, 

which was also permissible, and it properly answered the claim petition by 

admitting the alleged injuries occurred but denying disability. Further, the Board 

stated, Employer contested disability based on an IME conducted about three 

months after the injury, and it offered Claimant work within the restrictions set 

forth by its medical experts. The Board rejected the WCJ’s determination that 

Employer misused Bureau documents. As such, the Board determined that no 

penalty was warranted. These cross-petitions for review followed.
10

II. Issues

In its appeal,4 Employer argues the WCJ erred in denying its 

modification/suspension petition where the uncontroverted medical evidence 

showed Claimant was capable of returning to sedentary work after her work injury, 

which Employer offered her. It also contends that the WCJ erred in determining 

Claimant’s work injury included a lumbar disc herniation and right knee fracture. 

Additionally, Employer asserts the Board properly reversed the WCJ’s grant of 

Claimant’s penalty petition in the absence of any proven violation of the Act.

In her appeal, Claimant contends the Board erred in reversing the 

WCJ’s grant of her penalty petition where Employer misused Bureau documents in 

order to negate its de facto acceptance of liability for Claimant’s work injury. 

Claimant also refutes Employer’s arguments that the WCJ erred in denying its

modification/suspension petition, and that the WCJ erred in determining 

Claimant’s lumbar disc herniation and right knee fracture were caused by the work 

incident.

III. Discussion

Initially, we note, as the ultimate fact-finder in workers’ compensation 

cases, the WCJ “has exclusive province over questions of credibility and 

evidentiary weight ....” A & J Builders, Inc. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. 

 

4 Our review is limited to determining whether the WCJ’s findings of fact were supported 

by substantial evidence, whether an error of law was committed or whether constitutional rights 

were violated. Dep’t of Transp. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Clippinger), 38 A.3d 1037 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2011).
11

(Verdi), 78 A.3d 1233, 1238 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013). The WCJ may accept or reject 

the testimony of any witness, including an expert witness, in whole or in part. Id.

Moreover, “[i]t is irrelevant whether the record contains evidence to 

support findings other than those made by the WCJ; the critical inquiry is whether 

there is evidence to support the findings actually made.” Furnari v. Workers’ 

Comp. Appeal Bd. (Temple Inland), 90 A.3d 53, 60 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014) (citation 

omitted). We examine the entire record to see if it contains evidence a reasonable 

person might find sufficient to support the WCJ’s findings. Id. If the record 

contains such evidence, the findings must be upheld, even though the record may 

contain conflicting evidence. Id. Additionally, we must view the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the prevailing party and give it the benefit of all inferences 

reasonably deduced from the evidence. Id.

A. WCJ’s Denial of Employer’s Modification/Suspension Petition

Employer first contends the WCJ erred in denying its

modification/suspension petitions where the uncontroverted medical evidence 

established that Claimant was capable of returning to work in the modified duty

position that Employer offered her on three occasions after the 2010 work incident. 

Citing the “Summary of the Evidence” that the WCJ referred to and appended to 

his decision, see F.F. No. 5, Employer argues it is uncontroverted that after the 

work incident, Claimant was released to return to modified duty work within her 

restrictions, and Employer offered her the opportunity to do so. Because the 

evidence is uncontroverted, Employer asserts, the WCJ had no choice but to rule 

that Claimant was capable of returning to work in the modified duty position
12

Employer offered her, in accordance with the releases issued by Claimant’s 

Physician and Employer’s two medical experts.

“[A]n employer seeking a suspension of benefits bears the burden of 

proving that, although a claimant continues to have residual physical impairment 

due to the work injury, employment is available to the claimant within [her]

restrictions which would result in no loss of wages to the claimant.” Turner v. 

Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (City of Pittsburgh), 78 A.3d 1224, 1227 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2013). “To establish that such employment is available, the employer 

needs to present evidence of available positions within the claimant’s restrictions.” 

Id. Obviously, to justify a suspension, the employer’s evidence of a job offer 

within the claimant’s medical restrictions must be accepted as credible. 

Channellock v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Reynolds), 72 A.3d 731 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2013).

Here, in denying Employer’s modification/suspension petitions, the 

WCJ found:

8. The testimony and opinions of [Claimant’s Physician] 

are found credible as they support Claimant’s rejection of 

the employment referrals made to her by ... Employer. 

In this connection, he reviewed a job description as 

submitted to ... Claimant, and testified: ‘I mean, I have 

concerns about a few items on the job description. I 

mean, I think that she’s again, very limited from a 

functional standpoint. I don’t think that she could really 

respond to stat orders to administer medications or in an 

emergency setting.’ (Dr. Greis [Dep., 8/30/11, Notes of 

Testimony (N.T.) at] 18 ... While the lay witnesses

presented by [Employer] - both on the employment 

referrals and otherwise were sincere — and there was a 
13

showing of willingness to accommodate ... Claimant, the 

combined testimony of ... Claimant and her treating 

doctor, [Claimant’s Physician], support a good faith 

rejection of the referrals of duties as an admissions nurse 

(with modifications) at ... Employer’s Hospital (a 

subacute hospital and rehabilitation center treating 

addictions to drugs and alcohol, with an acute psych unit 

and geriatric psych unit; [Barbara Berger Dep., 11/29/11, 

N.T. at] 6-7). In this regard, as presented, it is noted (but

not determinative) that a number of relevant details were 

omitted from the written offers.

F.F. No. 8 (emphasis added). The WCJ also credited Claimant’s testimony, 

stating:

The testimony of ... Claimant is found credible as it 

supports the occurrence of her work injuries and resulting 

disability, and the opinions of [Claimant’s Physician]. ...

Due to her work injuries, namely, the L4-5 disc 

herniation, and related radiculopathy as found and 

explained by [Claimant’s Physician], Claimant has 

remained disabled, with concomitant wage loss since she 

last worked ....

F.F. No. 10.

The WCJ’s findings that Claimant was incapable of performing the 

duties required by the modified positions offered by Employer are directly 

supported by the credited testimony of Claimant and her Physician. Pet’r’s R.R. at 

42, 46, 64-66 (Claimant’s Physician’s testimony); Resp’t’s R.R. at 91-94

(Claimant’s testimony). Employer’s arguments to the contrary, which essentially 
14

invite this Court to reweigh the evidence and revisit the WCJ’s credibility 

determinations, fail.

5

Further, while the WCJ referred to the proposed “Summary of the 

Evidence” submitted by Employer’s counsel, which summarized the testimony of

each witness, see F.F. No. 5, rather than summarizing that testimony himself, the 

WCJ then rendered several “hard” findings that resolved the evidentiary conflicts 

and issues of credibility, and he thoroughly explained his reasons for doing so. See

F.F. Nos. 6-11. This Court holds that “a WCJ may adopt, verbatim, findings of 

 

5 We also reject Employer’s very brief arguments that the WCJ’s denial of its 

modification/suspension petitions was not “reasoned” as contemplated by Section 422(a) of the 

Act, 77 P.S. §834, and that the WCJ capriciously disregarded evidence in denying Employer’s 

modification/suspension petitions.

To satisfy the reasoned decision requirements of Section 422(a) of the Act, a WCJ must 

set forth the rationale for the decision by specifying the evidence relied upon and reasons for 

accepting it. Daniels v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Tristate Transp.), 828 A.2d 1043 (Pa. 

2003); Dorsey v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Crossing Constr. Co.), 893 A.2d 191 (Pa.

Cmwlth. 2006). When conflicting evidence is presented, a WCJ must adequately explain the 

reasons for rejecting or discrediting competent evidence. Daniels. “[T]he purpose of a reasoned 

decision is to spare the reviewing court from having to imagine why the WCJ believed one 

witness over another.” Dorsey, 893 A.2d at 196 (citation omitted). “However, Section 422(a) 

does not permit a party to challenge or second-guess the WCJ's reasons for credibility 

determinations.” Id. at 195. “Unless made arbitrarily or capriciously, a WCJ's credibility 

determinations will be upheld on appeal.” Id. Contrary to Employer’s assertion, the WCJ here

issued a reasoned decision in accordance with Section 422(a) of the Act. Specifically, the WCJ 

properly considered the evidence before him, made all necessary findings and conclusions, and 

clearly articulated his reasons for accepting and rejecting testimony.

As to Employer’s capricious disregard argument, our Supreme Court explains, “where 

there is substantial evidence to support an agency’s factual findings, and those findings in turn 

support the conclusions, it should remain a rare instance in which an appellate court would 

disturb an adjudication based upon capricious disregard.” Leon E. Wintermyer, Inc. v. Workers’ 

Comp. Appeal Bd. (Marlowe), 812 A.2d 478, 487 n.14 (Pa. 2002); see also McCool v. Workers’ 

Comp. Appeal Bd. (Sunoco, Inc.), 78 A.3d 1250 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013). Here, because the WCJ’s 

findings that Claimant was incapable of performing the modified duty positions offered by 

Employer are supported by substantial evidence and those findings in turn support the WCJ’s 

denial of Employer’s modification/suspension petitions, we discern no capricious disregard of 

evidence by the WCJ.
15

fact submitted by a party so long as substantial evidence in the record supports the 

findings.” Dillon v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (City of Phila), 853 A.2d 413, 

421 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004) (en banc) (citing Cnty. of Delaware v. Workmen’s Comp.

Appeal Bd. (Thomas), 649 A.2d 491, 495 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994)). Here, we discern 

no error in the WCJ’s decision to reference and append to his decision Employer’s 

summary of the evidence, and then render “hard” findings that fully resolved the 

petitions before him.

In the treatise Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Law and 

Practice, the authors observe:

A consistent issue under Pennsylvania practice, for 

appellate judges, is difficulty in interpreting WCJ 

decisions that do not segregate ‘summary findings’ from 

actual credibility resolutions or ‘hard findings.’ Most 

WCJ’s [sic] very properly, and even necessarily, will 

reiterate at the outset of an opinion summaries of what 

the evidence has been and what the parties have said. 

Findings of fact must ultimately reveal, however, 

credibility determinations and resolutions of all essential 

factual disputes. Findings will be inadequate if they 

merely summarize or recite the evidence.

David B. Torrey and Andrew E. Greenberg, 7 WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW 

AND PRACTICE §13:137 (3rd ed.). Here, the WCJ properly segregated the summary 

of evidence from his “hard findings” in which he made the necessary credibility 

determinations and resolved the relevant factual disputes in disposing of the 

petitions before him. Compare F.F. No. 5 (referencing the “Summary of 

Evidence” submitted by Employer, which the WCJ appended to his decision) with

F.F. Nos. 6-11 (resolving issues of credibility and conflicts in the evidence in 

deciding the parties’ various petitions). Thus, no error is apparent in this regard.
16

B. WCJ’s Grant of Claimant’s Claim Petition

Employer next contends the record lacks substantial, competent 

medical evidence that supports the WCJ’s determinations that Claimant suffered a 

lumbar disc herniation at L4-5 or a right knee fracture that were caused by the 

December 2010 work incident. Thus, Employer argues the WCJ erred in granting 

Claimant’s claim petition as to these alleged injuries.

In a claim petition proceeding, the burden of proving all necessary 

elements to support an award rests with the claimant. Inglis House v. Workmen’s 

Comp. Appeal Bd. (Reedy), 634 A.2d 592 (Pa. 1993). The claimant must establish 

her injury was sustained during the course and scope of employment and is 

causally related thereto. McCabe v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Dep’t of 

Revenue), 806 A.2d 512 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002). Where the causal connection 

between employment and injury is not obvious, the claimant must present 

unequivocal medical testimony to establish that connection.6 Rife v. Workers’ 

Comp. Appeal Bd. (Whitetail Ski Co.), 812 A.2d 750 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002). 

Further, where there is no obvious causal relationship between an injury and a 

disability, the claimant must establish such a causal connection with unequivocal 

 

6 Medical testimony will be found unequivocal if the medical expert, after providing a 

foundation, testifies that, in his professional opinion, he believes or thinks a certain fact or 

condition exists. Amandeo v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Conagra Foods), 37 A.3d 72 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2012). “The question of whether expert medical testimony is unequivocal, and, thus, 

competent evidence to support factual determinations is a question of law subject to our review.” 

Id. at 80. In making such a determination, we must review the medical expert’s testimony as a 

whole. Id. Further, even if the witness admits to uncertainty, reservation, doubt or lack of 

information with respect to scientific or medical details, as long as the witness does not recant 

the opinion first expressed, the evidence is unequivocal. Cerro Metal Prods. v. Workers’ Comp. 

Appeal Bd. (PLEWA), 855 A.2d 932 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004).
17

medical testimony. Budd Trailer Co., Inc. v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. 

(Behney), 524 A.2d 525 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987).

An expert’s medical opinion regarding causation may be based on a 

history obtained from the claimant, assumed facts of record, and/or medical reports 

submitted into evidence. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd.

(Herder), 765 A.2d 414 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000). Further, “when delivering a causation 

opinion in a workers’ compensation case, a doctor ... is not required to use magic 

words such as ‘substantial contributing factor,’ ‘materially contributed,’ or ... 

‘cause in fact.’ Rather, [i]t is only necessary that the doctor’s testimony permit a 

valid inference that such causation was present.” Pa. State Univ. v. Workers’ 

Comp. Appeal Bd. (Rabin), 53 A.3d 126 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012) (quoting Thomas 

Lindstrom Co. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Braun), 992 A.2d 961, 967 (Pa.

Cmwlth. 2010)).

In addition, injuries unrelated to a claimant’s job are compensable, if 

they are the proximate or the natural and probable result of a prior work-related 

injury. GTE Sylvania v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (Lydon), 458 A.2d 1050 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 1983). Thus, “[w]here an employer is liable for an injury which 

impairs the physical condition of the claimant’s body [it] is also liable for 

compensation of injury received in a subsequent accident which would not have 

occurred if the claimant’s bodily efficiency had not been impaired in the first 

[work-related] accident.” Id. at 1051. As such, where an injury is caused by a 

non-work-related event, the injury may, nevertheless, be compensable where the 

claimant establishes that “but for” a prior work injury, the eventual off-premises 
18

injury would not have occurred. David B. Torrey and Andrew E. Greenberg, 8

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW AND PRACTICE §20:89 (3rd ed.).

Here, the WCJ found (with emphasis added):

6. On review, it is found that Claimant sustained 

work injuries on December 27, 2010, when she fell on 

ice while exiting the Employer/Hospital. The testimony 

and opinions of [Claimant’s Physician] are found 

credible and persuasive as they support, and it is here 

found, that the work incident of December 27, 2010 

resulted in a L4-5 disc herniation/extrusion; this work 

injury has likewise resulted in lumbar radiculopathy (left 

leg): ‘I definitely think that she has a work-related 

lumbar radiculopathy as a result of her fall and a disc 

extrusion at L4-5.’ (Dr. Greis [Dep.], NT 10) 

[Claimant’s Physician] further reported/explained (in 

dealing with a MRI study in January 2011) that to the

extent there was a small disc herniation present prior to 

the work injury, it got significantly worse after the fall at 

work. (Dr. Greis [Dep.], NT 48-50) [Claimant’s 

Physician] testified: ‘But I believe that given her new 

onset [of] L-4 radicular symptoms that that herniation 

changed in some degree.’ (Dr. Greis [Dep.], NT 50).

7. Moreover, the opinions of [Claimant’s Physician] 

are accepted as credible as he supports, and it is here 

found, that the lateral tibial plateau fracture (right knee), 

sustained when Claimant fell at home on April [2011], is 

compensable. While clearly not directly resulting from 

the relevant work injury, her ensuing leg symptoms 

(stemming from the work related L4-5 radiculopathy) 

‘definitely contributed’ to the right knee injury/fracture, 

and causation was ‘indirect.’ (Dr. Greis [Dep.], NT 16; 

See, NT 15: ‘It’s the left leg with the radiculopathy. And 

she explained that she put her weight on her right side 

and twisted her right knee.’). His testimony in that 

regard, as related to causation, is accepted over 

[Employer’s] medical experts who did not find a causal 

relationship given Claimant’s pre-injury long standing 
19

bilateral knee problems. [Claimant’s Physician] noted 

pre-existing problems also: e.g., when questioned about 

Claimant’s pre-existing valgus deformity, he noted it can 

affect gait, but that Claimant had ‘adapted’ to the 

problem; Dr. Greis [Dep.], NT 43. ...

* * * *

9. In accepting the testimony and opinions of 

[Claimant’s Physician] (who is associated with The 

Rothman Institute) as credible and persuasive, it is 

initially observed that he is a treating physician with 

experience following the Claimant over time on a regular 

basis. Moreover, and of some significance, Claimant was 

referred to him by [Employer’s] Carrier. (Dr. Greis

[Dep.], NT 7). His opinions were cogent; his testimony 

provides examples of well reasoned explanations for his 

opinions. His testimony and opinions are accepted over 

[Employer’s] medical experts as noted in this [d]ecision 

... The undersigned is mindful of the pre-existing 

medical history as advanced by [Employer]. Further, it is 

noted that in part, the testimony of [Employer’s Spine 

Specialist] supports the opinions of Dr. Greis: While he 

changed his initial opinion that the work related injury 

had resulted in a L4-5 disc herniation, he did not reject 

the reality of the condition itself: ‘I have not changed my 

opinions that, in fact, her symptoms are related to an L4-

5 herniation, based on what she presented with that day.’ 

(Dr. Kahanovitz [Dep.], NT 31). While in the end 

[Employer’s Spine Specialist] rejected the disc herniation 

as causally related to the fall at work (essentially based 

on his review of prior medical documentation), his initial 

acceptance of the disc injury in measure lends support to 

a finding that the nature/mechanism of the work incident 

(the fall) was sufficient to have resulted in the disc 

herniation.

10. The testimony of ... Claimant is found credible as 

it supports the occurrence of her work injuries and 

resulting disability, and the opinions of [Claimant’s 

Physician]. Despite her prior medical history and any 

ambulatory problems ... immediately prior to the work 

injury she was performing her duties without restrictions;
20

thereafter she could not. Due to her work injuries, 

namely, the L4-5 disc herniation, and related 

radiculopathy as found and explained by [Claimant’s 

Physician], Claimant has remained disabled, with 

concomitant wage loss since she last worked ... She has 

remained under medical care, and has not fully 

recovered.

11. The above determinations, made on the merits of 

the claim ... warrant the grant of the instant Claim 

Petition (treated as well as a Review Petition in reference 

to the right knee fracture) ... and a denial of ... 

Employer’s Review Petition (filed to abrogate 

responsibility for the L4-5 disc herniation aspects of the 

case).

F.F. Nos. 6-7, 9-11. As is clear from the record citations and excerpts of testimony 

that accompany the WCJ’s findings, Claimant’s Physician’s opinion testimony

adequately supports the WCJ’s findings that Claimant proved her L4-5 disc 

herniation and right knee lateral tibial plateau fracture were causally related to the 

December 2010 work incident. Pet’r’s R.R. at 37-38, 44. Again, Employer’s 

arguments to the contrary invite a reweighing of the expert medical testimony 

presented to the fact-finder and a revisiting of the fact-finder’s credibility 

determinations, which we cannot do.7

 

7 We also reject Employer’s very brief arguments that the WCJ’s grant of Claimant’s 

claim petition was not “reasoned” as contemplated by Section 422(a) of the Act, and that the 

WCJ’s decision constituted a capricious disregard of the evidence.

As set forth above, competent medical testimony supports the WCJ’s findings that 

Claimant’s L4-5 disc herniation and right knee lateral tibial plateau fracture were causally related 

to the December 2010 work incident; thus, no error is apparent in the WCJ’s grant of Claimant’s 

claim petition. Further, as is apparent from F.F. No. 9, the WCJ more than adequately explained 

his reasons for crediting Claimant’s Physician’s opinions over those expressed by Employer’s 

medical experts. Further, the WCJ properly considered the evidence before him, made all 

necessary findings and conclusions, and clearly articulated his reasons for accepting and 

rejecting the testimony. Thus, the WCJ’s decision satisfies the reasoned decision requirement. 

See, e.g., Dorsey. Additionally, because the WCJ’s findings are supported by substantial 

(Footnote continued on next page...)
21

Nevertheless, Employer challenges the competency of Claimant’s 

Physician’s opinion regarding Claimant’s right knee lateral tibial plateau fracture 

on the ground that Claimant’s Physician lacked a sufficient foundation upon which 

to render such an opinion. Contrary to Employer’s assertions, our review of 

Claimant’s Physician’s testimony reveals that Claimant’s Physician based his 

opinion as to causation of the right knee lateral tibial plateau fracture on his 

observations and treatment of Claimant, the history Claimant provided him 

regarding the injury and the medical records of Dr. Aksu.

8

 Pet’r’s R.R. at 14-17.

Further, Claimant’s Physician’s testimony is consistent with Claimant’s testimony 

regarding the manner in which the knee injury occurred. Pet’r’s R.R. at 174-75. In 

short, Claimant’s Physician’s testimony constitutes competent evidence to support 

the WCJ’s finding that Claimant’s right knee lateral tibial plateau fracture was 

causally related to her work injury.

C. WCJ’s Grant of Claimant’s Penalty Petition

As a final issue, Claimant argues the Board erred in reversing the 

WCJ’s award of a 50% penalty against Employer. She contends that Employer’s 

obligation to pay wage loss benefits pursuant to the NTCP that it issued was not

 

(continued...)

evidence and those findings in turn support the WCJ’s grant of Claimant’s claim petition, we 

discern no capricious disregard by the WCJ. See Wintermyer; McCool.

8 An expert may base his opinion in part on the medical records of others even if those 

records were not introduced into evidence so long as they are the kind of records upon which the 

medical professional customarily relies in the practice of his profession. Westinghouse Elec.

Corp./CBS v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Burger), 838 A.2d 831 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003); Empire 

Steel Castings, Inc. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Cruceta), 749 A.2d 1021 (Pa. Cmwlth.

2000).
22

nullified by its subsequent issuance of a notice stopping temporary compensation

because Employer’s subsequent actions amounted to a de facto NCP. To that end, 

Claimant argues that evidence of Employer’s acceptance of liability is 

memorialized in the record by: (1) Employer’s admissions in its answer to 

Claimant’s claim petition; (2) the proposed agreement for compensation that 

Employer forwarded to Claimant; (3) Employer’s payment of indemnity benefits 

after challenging Claimant’s disability through an NCD; and, (4) Employer’s 

counsel’s admissions and stipulations at the November 2011 WCJ hearing. 

Claimant asserts Employer’s failure to pay benefits pursuant to the de facto NCP, 

which its own words and actions confirmed, and its unilateral stoppage of benefits,

constituted a dual violation of the Act and the Board thus erred in reversing the

WCJ’s award of penalties.

Employer counters that the Board properly reversed the WCJ’s grant

of Claimant’s penalty petition based on its determination that Employer did not 

violate any provision of the Act. Employer asserts the Board’s ruling is sound. 

Employer argues it sought to fairly and with extraordinary transparency, administer 

Claimant’s workers’ compensation claim. Indeed, Employer asserts, it 

administered the claim in accordance with the requirements of Section 406.1(d) of 

the Act9(stating that in any instance where an employer is uncertain whether a 

claim is compensable or is uncertain of the extent of its liability, an employer may 

initiate compensation payments without prejudice and without admitting liability 

through a NTCP), and controlling case law. Moreover, Employer maintains, at all 

 

9

Section 406.1(d) of the Act was added by the Act of February 8, 1972, P.L. 25, as

amended, 77 P.S. §717.1(d).
23

times below, it advised both Claimant and the WCJ as to the manner in which it 

investigated and administered Claimant’s claim. Employer contends the WCJ’s

justification for imposition of a penalty is unsupported by both the facts and the

law.

With regard to the imposition of penalties, Section 435(d) of the Act 

provides, in relevant part:

The department, the board, or any court which may hear 

any proceedings brought under this act shall have the 

power to impose penalties as provided herein for 

violations of the provisions of this act or such rules and 

regulations or rules of procedure:

(i) Employers and insurers may be penalized a sum not 

exceeding ten per centum of the amount awarded and 

interest accrued and payable: Provided, however, That 

such penalty may be increased to fifty per centum in 

cases of unreasonable or excessive delays. Such penalty 

shall be payable to the same persons to whom the 

compensation is payable.

77 P.S. §991(d).10 “The assessment of penalties, and the amount of penalties 

imposed are matters within the WCJ’s discretion.” Gumm v. Workers' Comp. 

Appeal Bd. (Steel), 942 A.2d 222, 232 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008).

“However, ‘a violation of the Act or its regulations must appear in the 

record for a penalty to be appropriate.’” Id. (quoting Shuster v. Workers' Comp. 

Appeal Bd. (Pa. Human Relations Comm’n), 745 A.2d 1282, 1288 (Pa. Cmwlth.

2000)). Thus, “[n]o penalty may be imposed under [Section 435] [of the Act] 

 

10 This Section was added by Section 3 of Act of February 8, 1972, P.L. 25.
24

absent proof of a violation of the Act or the rules of the department or board.” Id.

(quoting Spangler v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (Ford), 602 A.2d 446, 448 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 1992)). “Further, a claimant who files a penalty petition bears the 

burden of proving a violation of the Act occurred. If the claimant meets ... her 

initial burden of proving a violation, the burden then shifts to the employer to 

prove it did not violate the Act.” Id. (citation omitted).

Here, through her penalty petition, Claimant alleged: “[Employer] 

violated the terms of the [Act] by illegally pulling the [NTCP]. Furthermore, the 

Act was violated by a blatant disregard for the medical evidence in describing the 

injury on the box 4 [(“medical-only”)] NCD].” Pet’r’s R.R. at 2.

In granting Claimant’s penalty petition, the WCJ found:

12. ... [I]t is initially observed that [in] the [NCD] 

issued when the [NTCP] was stopped ... Employer 

acknowledged an injury took place, but challenged 

disability (so-called Box 4 denial). Thereafter ...

Employer’s Answer ... to the Claim Petition ‘admitted 

that on December 27, 2010, [C]laimant suffered a 

moderate left disc herniation at L4-5 and a right knee 

contusion.’ Thereafter ... [Employer] forwarded to ... 

Claimant an Agreement for Compensation to sign, stating 

it had to notify the Bureau ‘of your change in work and 

medical status.’ (Exhibit C-3). While there was no such 

change (Claimant is found to have acted in good faith in 

refusing the job offer as noted above), Claimant was 

asked to sign the Agreement (a check for partial benefits 

based upon the Employer’s job referral was also 

enclosed). Claimant did not accept the terms indicated, 

and did not sign. Significantly, however, as applied here, 

the Agreement as presented to ... Claimant 

acknowledged the compensability of the 12/27/10 work 
25

injury as referenced in the [NCD] that had been issued 

several days before.

13. Further, and importantly, the Answer of 

[Employer] to the instant Claim Petition admitted the 

date of injury, the description of the injury, and notice of 

the injury, and went on to state: ‘[Employer] has 

accepted [C]laimant’s December 27, 2010 work injury as 

compensable pursuant to a [NCD] issued on April 1, 

2011, acknowledging the compensability of her 

December 27, 2010 work injury.’ The Answer also 

alleged Claimant’s absence from work is not attributable 

to the 12/27/10 work incident, and that it had provided an 

opportunity for Claimant to return to work (and at best 

partial benefits were due).

14. Thereafter, at hearing ... Employer again agreed 

... Claimant had sustained the L4-5 disc herniation and 

right knee contusion/sprain (Hearing, 11/16/11, NT 62-

63); at the same time, it was noted that a Review Petition 

might be filed in the future, depending upon continuing 

investigation of the claim.

15. Within the above context, Claimant asserts there 

has been an improper use of the NTCP; there was no 

valid basis for stopping it under the circumstances. ... 

[I]t appears that the admissions made by [Employer] after 

stopping the NTCP, both in its [NCD], proposed 

Agreement, and Answer to the Claim Petition, all 

confirmed at hearing on November 16, 2011 (almost a 

year after the injury), effectively nullified the notice 

stopping the [NTCP] in this case.

16. Essentially, by action and deed, it appears ...

Employer accepted responsibility with the equal force of 

a [NCP] as to the disc herniation and right knee 

contusion/strain .... [Employer’s] filing of its Review 

Petition is implicit, if not express, recognition of a 

binding acceptance of responsibility as if a NCP had been 

in fact issued. Why file the Review Petition to eliminate 

L4-5 disc herniation compensation responsibility unless 

by force of law such liability exists? Why not just rely 

on the stoppage notice relating to the NTCP? ... Here, 
26

failure to pay in the face of a de facto NCP violated the 

Act and warrants a penalty. Upon consideration of the

circumstances, and in the exercise of discretion, a penalty 

of 50% will be assessed on the disability compensation 

due under this Decision through December 18, 2011, (the 

date the Bureau received the [Employer’s] Review 

Petition seeking to abrogate liability for Claimant’s disc 

herniation at L4-5), with interest as provided by the Act.

F.F. Nos. 12-16.

In reversing the WCJ’s grant of the penalty petition, the Board

determined Claimant did not establish a violation of the Act on the record. The 

Board determined Employer was permitted to issue an NTCP while it continued to 

investigate the claim. Employer then issued a timely notice stopping temporary 

compensation and a “medical-only” NCD, which was also permissible, and it 

answered the claim petition properly by admitting the injuries occurred but 

denying disability. The Board explained Employer contested disability based on 

an IME conducted about three months after the work incident, and its offers of

employment that it alleged were within Claimant’s capacity. While the WCJ 

awarded a 50% penalty for a violation of the Act described as a misuse of Bureau 

documents by issuing a timely “medical-only” NCD and continuing to contest

disability, the Board disagreed that Employer misused Bureau documents. Thus, it 

reversed the WCJ’s finding of a violation of the Act and the corresponding grant of 

Claimant’s penalty petition.

Upon review, we agree with the Board that Claimant did not establish 

a violation of the Act. More particularly, following Claimant’s December 27, 2010 

work incident, Employer issued an NTCP, and it paid Claimant total disability 
27

benefits for a 90-day period beginning January 4, 2011. Pet’r’s R.R. at 22. Prior 

to the expiration of the required 90-day period, Employer issued a notice stopping 

temporary compensation as required by Section 406.1(d)(6) of the Act. Pet’r’s 

R.R. at 23. On the same date, Employer issued an NCD in which it alleged that, 

although an injury occurred, Claimant was not disabled as a result of the injury 

within the meaning of the Act. Certified Record (C.R.), Ex. C-2. As the Board 

indicated, the filing of a “medical-only” NCD was permissible. See Zuchelli v. 

Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Indiana Univ. of Pa.), 35 A.3d 801 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2011). To that end, an employer may properly file an NCD when it disputes a 

claimant’s disability, even though it does not dispute a work-related injury 

occurred. Potere v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Kemcorp), 21 A.3d 684 (Pa.

Cmwlth. 2011). In fact, the NCD form provides an employer with the option of 

acknowledging the occurrence of a work-related injury but declining to pay 

compensation benefits on the basis that the claimant is not disabled as a result of 

the work injury. Employer exercised that option here. Id.11

In addition, in its answer to Claimant’s subsequently filed claim 

petition, although Employer admitted Claimant sustained a moderate left disc 

herniation at L4-5 and a right knee contusion on the date of the work incident, it

 

11 In Zuchelli v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Indiana University of 

Pennsylvania), 35 A.3d 801 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011), we noted that, “in 2011, the Bureau of 

Workers’ Compensation revised the NCD form. Employers are now instructed not to accept 

medical only cases by use of the NCD form. The form employers should use is the medical-only 

NCP.” Id. at 806 n.4. (citation omitted). Here, when Employer filed its “medical-only” NCD 

form in April 2011 (prior to our decision in Zuchelli), it used the 2009 version of the form.
28

specifically referenced its prior, “medical-only” NCD in which it acknowledged 

the occurrence of the work injuries, but disputed disability. Pet’r’s R.R. at 9.

Shortly after issuing its notice stopping temporary compensation and 

its “medical-only” NCD, Employer forwarded Claimant a proposed agreement for 

compensation, covering the limited period of March 30 through April 24, 2011, a 

period in which it made part-time, modified duty work available to Claimant. 

C.R., Ex. C-3. Employer included a check for $1,689.11, which represented partial 

disability benefits for this period. Id. The proposed agreement also stated that, as 

of April 25, 2011, Employer’s medical expert opined Claimant could return to fulltime modified duty work, which was made available to Claimant with no loss of 

earnings. Id. Significantly, the proposed agreement also expressly stated that “this 

Agreement for Compensation shall not abrogate the challenge that [Employer] 

made pursuant to its [NCD] form,” which, as noted above admitted an injury 

occurred but denied disability under the Act. Id. (emphasis added). Although 

Claimant cashed the check, she did not execute the proposed agreement. Pet’r’s 

R.R. at 171.

Further, contrary to the WCJ’s findings, at the WCJ’s November 2011 

hearing, Employer’s counsel did not definitively indicate that Employer accepted

liability for indemnity benefits for Claimant’s L4-5 disc herniation. Rather, 

Employer’s counsel expressly stated that Employer had not completed its 

investigation regarding the extent of the compensable injuries, including the L4-5 

disc herniation, because Employer did not yet have all of the necessary medical 

records. In short, we do not believe Employer’s counsel’s statements were
29

inconsistent with the “medical-only” NCD it issued in which it acknowledged the 

injuries occurred but denied disability. See C.R., WCJ’s Hearing, N.T., 11/16/11,

at 56-67.

Finally, in granting Claimant’s penalty petition, the WCJ found it 

significant that Employer filed a review petition, stating that filing was “implicit, if 

not express, recognition of a binding acceptance of responsibility as if a NCP had 

in fact been issued.” Id. We disagree with the WCJ’s assessment. Through its 

review petition, Employer sought to correct the description of the injury set forth in 

the NTCP Employer issued. Employer alleged, based on the further analysis of its

Spine Specialist, Claimant’s work injury did not include a disc herniation at L4-5 

or any apparent low back injury. It also indicated that its investigation of 

Claimant’s alleged work-related right knee injury was continuing. While 

Employer’s filing of a review petition certainly appears unorthodox in these 

circumstances, we do not believe it supports the WCJ’s determination that the 

filing shows Employer’s acknowledgment that it previously accepted liability for 

indemnity benefits for Claimant’s L4-5 disc herniation as if it had filed an NCP. 

This is particularly true given Employer’s consistent actions, set forth above, of 

acknowledging the occurrence of a work injury, but denying Claimant suffered any 

resulting disability.

For these reasons, and contrary to the WCJ’s determination, we 

discern no inconsistency between Employer’s filings and its subsequent alleged 

admissions or actions. Thus, we agree with the Board that Claimant did not 
30

establish a violation of the Act on the record. As a result, we affirm the Board’s 

reversal of the WCJ’s grant of Claimant’s penalty petition.12

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the order of the Board.

 

ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge

 

12 We also reject Claimant’s reliance on Kelly v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal 

Board (DePalma Roofing), 669 A.2d 1023 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995), and Mosgo v. Workmen’s 

Compensation Appeal Board (Tri-Area Beverage, Inc.), 480 A.2d 1285 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1984) for 

the proposition that Employer’s inclusion of a check for partial disability benefits with its 

proposed agreement for compensation estopped Employer from challenging Claimant’s right to 

ongoing disability benefits, which essentially created a de facto NCP. These cases are 

distinguishable.

More particularly, in both Kelly and Mosgo, the employers made compensation payments 

to the claimants, while also failing to issue timely notices of compensation payable or denial. As 

set forth above, Employer here timely issued the appropriate documents. Additionally, the 

relevant timeframes in both Kelly and Mosgo predated the 1993 creation of the NTCP procedure, 

which expressly allows an employer to initiate compensation payments without prejudice and 

without admitting liability pursuant to an NTCP where an employer is uncertain whether a claim

is compensable or is uncertain of the extent of its liability. Employer availed itself of that 

procedure here. See Aldridge v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Kmart Corp.), 113 A.3d 861 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2015) (distinguishing Mosgo, in part, because it predated 1993 amendments to the Act). 

Further, although Employer here sent Claimant a payment for three weeks of partial disability 

benefits with the proposed agreement for compensation, Claimant did not execute the agreement. 

Pet’r’s R.R. at 53. And, as stated above, the agreement expressly indicated that Employer would

not abrogate its challenge pursuant to its “medical-only” NCD. C.R., Ex. C-3.
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Judy McCarraher, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 1983 C.D. 2014

:

Workers' Compensation Appeal Board :

(Eagleville Hospital), :

Respondent :

Eagleville Hospital, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 1991 C.D. 2014

:

Workers' Compensation Appeal Board :

(McCarraher), :

Respondent :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 3

rd day of November, 2015, the order of the 

Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board is AFFIRMED.

 

ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge