UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. No. 98-4161

LAUREN ERIC WILHELM,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of North Carolina, at Statesville.

Richard L. Voorhees, Chief District Judge.

(CR-97-2)

Submitted: November 30, 1998

Decided: December 17, 1998

Before HAMILTON and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and

PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

Edmund L. Gaines, HOMESLEY, JONES, GAINES, HOMESLEY &

DUDLEY, Statesville, North Carolina, for Appellant. Mark T. Calloway, United States Attorney, Brian L. Whisler, Assistant United

States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.

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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

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OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Lauren Eric Wilhelm appeals from his conviction and sentence for

attempted possession of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)

(1994). We affirm.

Wilhelm first contends that the district court erred in denying his

motion for judgment of acquittal. We review this denial under a sufficiency of the evidence standard. See United States v. Brooks, 957

F.2d 1138, 1147 (4th Cir. 1992). To sustain the conviction, the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the government,

must be sufficient for a rational trier of fact to have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Glasser v.

United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942). In making this assessment, the

government is entitled to all reasonable inferences from the facts

established to those sought to be established. See United States v.

Tresvant, 677 F.2d 1018, 1021 (4th Cir. 1982).

To prove that a defendant is guilty of attempted possession of

cocaine, the government must show: (1) culpable intent and (2) a substantial step toward the commission of the offense that is strongly corroborative of that intent. See United States v. Pelton, 835 F.2d 1067,

1074 (4th Cir. 1987). Wilhelm contends that the evidence does not

demonstrate a substantial step towards the commission of the offense

because he did not have the money to purchase the drugs with him.

At its essence, his argument is that without the presence of the purchase price, he "[cannot] take a substantial step necessary toward possessing the cocaine."

A "substantial step" is more than mere preparation, but it is less

than the last act necessary to constitute completion of the substantive

offense. See United States v. Sutton, 961 F.2d 476, 478 (4th Cir.

1992). According to witness testimony, Wilhelm told Vargas, a per-

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son cooperating with the police, that he had the money to complete

the purchase. Taking this statement and its logical inferences in the

light most favorable to the Government, a reasonable trier of fact

could find that Wilhelm had the funds necessary to purchase the

cocaine and that the only step that remained was to physically retrieve

the money and exchange it for the drugs in question. We find that

this, together with Wilhelm's actions in arranging the transaction,

testing the cocaine for quality, indicating satisfaction with the drug,

and directing the seller to follow him to the location where the money

was waiting, satisfies the "substantial step" requirement of attempt.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court's denial of Wilhelm's

motion. We have considered the precedent proffered by Wilhelm in

his formal brief and find it distinguishable from the facts of his case.

Wilhelm next asserts that the district court erred in attributing three

extra kilograms of cocaine to him under the principles of relevant

conduct. He argues that the only evidence supporting this figure--his

statement to the government's cooperating witness that he did not

want to buy more than one kilogram of cocaine because he had just

purchased three kilograms a few weeks prior--was not sufficiently

reliable and therefore should not have been considered in calculating

his sentence.

A district court's factual finding of the relevant quantity of drugs

at sentencing is reviewed for clear error. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)

(1994); United States v. Fletcher, 74 F.3d 49, 55 (4th Cir. 1996);

United States v. Uwaeme, 975 F.2d 1016, 1018 (4th Cir. 1992). The

quantity of a drug is not a substantive element of any the crimes

involved. Rather, it is merely a sentencing factor which the Government must prove by a preponderance of the evidence. See United

States v. Goff, 907 F.2d 1441, 1444 (4th Cir. 1990). In calculating

drug amounts, the Guidelines do not require scientific or statistical

precision; rather, the court may consider any relevant information,

"`provided that the information has sufficient indicia of reliability to

support its probable accuracy.'" See Uwaeme, 975 F.2d at 1021

(emphasis in original) (quoting U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual,

§ 6A1.3(a), p.s. (1991)). Consistent with this policy, hearsay alone

can provide sufficiently reliable evidence of quantity. See id.

Reviewing the evidence presented at trial, we conclude that Wilhelm's statements, together with his actions, provide sufficient indicia

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of reliability. Accordingly, the district court's use of these three kilograms in calculating Wilhelm's sentence was not erroneous. See

United States v. Kinder, 946 F.2d 362 (5th Cir. 1991) (affirming district court's finding regarding drug quantity in a similar situation). We

therefore affirm Wilhelm's conviction and sentence. We dispense

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument

would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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