alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### STATE OF FLORIDA v BADE

Case No. 84-103 AC

Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Appellate Division, Dade County

November 17, 1986

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

Jim Smith, Attorney General, and Calianne P. Lantz, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant.

Lawrence S. Katz for appellee.

Before RIVKIND, HENDERSON, MASTOS, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT

THEODORE G. MASTOS, Judge.

*150The State of Florida, appellant herein, appeals from an Order Dismissing Charges in a D.U.I. prosecution. Said dismissal was predicated on the State’s failure to preserve the videotape made simultaneously with appellee’s arrest. The trial judge held that the failure to preserve the videotape denied appellee both proper Discovery under Rule 3.220, Fla. R. Crim. P. and due process of law under Article 1, Section 9 of the Florida Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

The trial judge conducted a pre-trial hearing during which D. O. Technician Rodgers was examined and cross-examined not only on the scope and purpose of using videotape in D.U.I. cases, but also on his inability to locate the tape on the eve of trial. It would appear that the videotape was made simultaneously with the arrest and as such would be merely cumulative to the testimony of the arresting officer and D. O. Technician. The right of the accused to cross-examine and confront these witnesses would still be preserved, with or without the videotape.

It would appear, then, that the record below fails in three separate areas to justify a Order of Dismissal. First of all, the record fails to demonstrate that the missing videotape contained evidence or material favorable to the appellee. Secondly, it fails to demonstrate that the videotape was material to the appellee’s guilt or innocence. And third, there is no showing whatsoever that the omission of the tape would be prejudicial in any way to appellee.

Accordingly, the Order Dismissing Charges is hereby reversed and the case remanded to the lower court for trial. See *State v. Smith,*342 So.2d 1094 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977); *State v. Sobel,*363 So.2d 324 (Fla. 1978); *State v. Cooper,*391 So.2d 332 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); *State v. James,*404 So.2d 1181 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981); *State v. Banks,*418 So.2d 1059 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982); *Demps v. State,*395 So.2d 501 (Fla. 1981).
EXHIBIT 32.1



CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER

PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

(18 U.S.C. 1350)



In connection with the Quarterly Report of
Wells Real Estate Fund XII, L.P. (the Registrant) on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2005, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the Report), the undersigned, Leo F. Wells, III, Chief
Executive Officer of the corporate general partner of one of the General Partners of the Registrant, and Douglas P. Williams, Chief Financial Officer of the corporate general partner of one of the General Partners of the Registrant, hereby certify,
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. 1350), that, to the best of our knowledge and belief:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Registrant.
| | --- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                          
|--------------------------
|/s/    LEO F. WELLS, III  
|Leo F. Wells, III         
|Chief Executive Officer   
|August 12, 2005           
|                          
|/s/    DOUGLAS P. WILLIAMS
|Douglas P. Williams       
|Chief Financial Officer   
|August 12, 2005
**Exhibit 32.1**

 

           Harry Lee Waterfield II and Raymond L. Carr, being the President and ChiefFinancial Officer and Vice President, respectively, of Kentucky Investors, Inc.,hereby certify as of this 12th day of March, 2009, that the Form 10-K for theyear ended December 31, 2008 fully complies with the requirements of Section13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the informationcontained in the Form 10-K fairly presents, in all material respects, thefinancial condition and results of operations of Kentucky Investors, Inc.

 

 

|   | **KENTUCKY INVESTORS, INC.**   
/s/ Harry Lee Waterfield II 
BY: 
Harry Lee Waterfield II
DATE: March 12, 2009 
President  
  
/s/ Raymond L. Carr 
BY: 
Raymond L. Carr
DATE: March 12, 2009 
Chief Financial Officer-Vice President
 

  |
|--------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
635 A.2d 394

#### ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND v. Mark Joseph ADAMS.

Misc. Docket (Subtitle BV) No. 19,

Sept. Term, 1993.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Jan. 11, 1994.

Argued by Melvin Hirshman, Bar Counsel, and Walter D. Murphy, Jr., Deputy Bar Counsel, for Atty. Grievance Commission of Maryland.

*323Argued by Mark Joseph Adams, Baltimore, for respondent.

Before MURPHY, C.J., and ELDRIDGE, RODOWSKY, CHASANOW, ROBERT M. BELL, ORTH, CHARLES E., Jr. (Retired, Specially Assigned) and McAULIFFE, JOHN F. (Retired, Specially Assigned), JJ.

ORDER

Upon consideration of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law filed in this proceeding by the Honorable Elsbeth Bothe and Respondent’s consent at oral argument before this Court on January 7, 1994 to be placed on Indefinite Suspension, it is this 11th day of January, 1994, by the Court of Appeals of Maryland,

ORDERED that Respondent, Mark Joseph Adams, be, and he is hereby suspended indefinitely from the practice of law, said suspension to commence on Friday, January 14, 1994. It is further

ORDERED, that prior to any reinstatement, Mark Joseph Adams shall pay to the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland the sum of ONE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED AND FOURTEEN DOLLARS and FIFTY CENTS ($1,514.50) with interest at 10% for which sum judgment is hereby entered in favor of the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland, and it is further

ORDERED, that Clerk of this Court shall certify the suspension of the Respondent to the Clerks of all Courts in this State and to the Trustees of the Client Security Trust Fund.
[Crim. No. 518.

Second Appellate District.

January 26, 1917.]

#### THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. FRANK HENSON, Appellant.

Criminal Law — Bobbery — Evidence — Confessions of Defendant — Proof of Corpus Delicti.—In a prosecution for the crime of robbery it is not necessary that the testimony of the prosecuting witness be corroborated in establishing the *corpus delicti,*as preliminary to the admission in evidence of testimony of confessions made by the defendant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, and from an order denying a new trial. G. W. Nicol, Judge presiding.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

C. B. Conlin, for Appellant.

U. S. Webb, Attorney-General, and Robert M. Clarke, Deputy Attorney-General, for Respondent.

CONREY, P. J.

The defendant was convicted of the crime of robbery and has been sentenced to a term in the state prison. He appeals from the judgment and from an order denying his motion for a new trial.

Appellant claims that the court erred in admitting testimony of confessions made by him, because the people had failed to establish the *corpus delicti.*This claim is manifestly wrong. The first witness at the trial was E. Lubansky, the victim of the robbery, who testified fully to the facts showing that he was held up and robbed at the time and place referred to in the information. There is no merit in the proposition of counsel for appellant that corroboration of the testimony of Lubansky was legally necessary.

It is next complained that the testimony of the witness Brown showed that he was an accomplice, and that his testimony was not corroborated. But the record shows that in so far as the testimony of the witness Brown had any tendency to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime, such testimony was amply corroborated by other evidence “which in itself, and without the aid of the testimony of the *601accomplice, tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense.” (Pen. Code, sec. 1111.) The facts admitted by the defendant in his conversations with certain police officers were sufficient to establish his guilt. A proper foundation was laid for the evidence by testimony showing that these confessions were free and voluntary. One of these statements was made by defendant in the presence of his father. The criticisms directed by counsel toward this evidence relate to the weight of the evidence, rather than to its admissibility. But it was for the jury and is not for this court to determine whether such evidence was worthy of belief.

Complaint is further made that the district attorney was guilty of misconduct in asking certain questions and in making certain statements to the jury. These matters are of such slight importance that we are not justified in entering into a discussion of them. It appears that the defendant had a fair trial, and that upon entirely sufficient evidence he was found guilty of the crime charged.

The judgment and order are affirmed.

James, J., and Shaw, J., concurred.
#### Scott and others *vs.*Standart.

Albany,

March, 1839.

Where, under the acts of 1832 and 1835, authorizing all or any of the parties to a bill or note to be included in one action, a suit is commenced against ■the maker and endorser of a note, and only one of the defendants is brought into *court, the*plaintiff may declare against him alone, the same as if the other defendant had not been named in the process.

The defendant Standart was the maker, and one David Griffith was the endorser of a promissory note on which the action was brought. The suit was commenced by capias against both maker and endorser under the act of 1832, with an *ac etiam*clause for the purpose of holding them to bail, they being non-residents of the state. Standart was arrested and held .to bail, and Griffith was returned by the sheriff *non est.*The plaintiffs thereupon declared on the note against Standart alone, who now moves to set aside the declaration.

*I. Cagger,*for defendant.

*I. Williams,*for plaintiffs.

*By the Court,*

Bronson, J.

This was not the case of a *joint*contract, and the plaintiffs could proceed only against the party who had been brought into court. If they could not declare against him alone, they had no alternative but to abandon a suit which had been properly commenced. We have already gone very far in allowing a severance, where the plaintiff proceeds under the statute authorizing the holder to include all the different parties to a note or bill in one ac*643tion. Fuller v. Van Schaick, 18 Wendell, 547. Clark v. Parker, 19 id. 125. I think a severance of the action should be allowed in this case. It forms a necessary~xception to the general rule, that in bailable actions the declaration must follow the process.

Motion denied.
#### *Ex Parte*Mancill.

Habeas Corpus.

(Decided January 9, 1917.

73 South. 756.)

Habeas Corpus; Denial of Bail. — Where the evidence was conflicting as to whether defendant was entitled to bail, this court will not disturb the finding of the trial court, denying or granting bail.

Appeal from Escambia Probate Court.

Heard before Hon. W. E. Rushing.

Being under a charge of murder and committed to jail by virtue of a warrant issued by a justice of the peace, Jesse Mancill made application by habeas corpus for bail. From an order denying the writ he appeals.

Affirmed.

Stephen A. Douglass, for appellant.

W. L. Martin, Attorney General, for the State.

PELHAM, P. J.

The tendencies of the evidence submitted by the prosecutor and petitioner, respectively, on the hearing of the application for bail, were conflicting.

Having the proper regard to the weight which should, in such case, be accorded by the revising court to the judgment of the primary tribunal, when the same is presented for review on appeal *(Ex parte Sloane,*95 Ala. 22, 11 South. 14; *Ex parte*
      *422
      *McAnally,*53 Ala. 495, 25 Am. Rep. 646; *Ex parte*Nettles, 58 Ala. 268), it cannot be held that the record presents a case where it is clear that the judge of probate was in error in denying bail.

We refrain from a discussion of the evidence, in view of the fact that the case will stand for trial. The result is that the order of the judge of probate denying bail must be affirmed.

Affirmed.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EASTERN DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

MARVIN PRICE,

Petitioner

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 289 EAL 2019

Petition for Allowance of Appeal 

from the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 11th day of December, 2019, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal

is DENIED.
#### § 1982.115 Special circumstances; waiver of rules.

In special circumstances not contemplated by the provisions of these rules, or for good cause shown, the ALJ or the ARB on review may, upon application, after three-days notice to all parties, waive any rule or issue such orders that justice or the administration of NTSSA or FRSA requires.
§ 382.125 What procedures do carriers follow when wheelchairs, other mobility aids, and other assistive devices must be stowed in the cargo compartment? ( a ) As a carrier, you must stow wheelchairs, other mobility aids, or other assistive devices in the baggage compartment if an approved stowage area is not available in the cabin or the items cannot be transported in the cabin consistent with FAA, PHMSA, TSA, or applicable foreign government requirements concerning security, safety, and hazardous materials with respect to the stowage of carry-on items.
( b ) You must give wheelchairs, other mobility aids, and other assistive devices priority for stowage in the baggage compartment over other cargo and baggage. Only items that fit into the baggage compartment and can be transported consistent with FAA, PHMSA, TSA, or applicable foreign government requirements concerning security, safety, and hazardous materials with respect to the stowage of items in the baggage compartment need be transported. Where this priority results in other passengers' baggage being unable to be carried on the flight, you must make your best efforts to ensure that the other baggage reaches the passengers' destination on the carrier's next flight to the destination.
( c ) You must provide for the checking and timely return of passengers' wheelchairs, other mobility aids, and other assistive devices as close as possible to the door of the aircraft, so that passengers may use their own equipment to the extent possible, except ( 1 ) Where this practice would be inconsistent with Federal regulations governing transportation security or the transportation of hazardous materials; or
( 2 ) When the passenger requests the return of the items at the baggage claim area instead of at the door of the aircraft.
( d ) In order to achieve the timely return of wheelchairs, you must ensure that passengers' wheelchairs, other mobility aids, and other assistive devices are among the first items retrieved from the baggage compartment.
Editorial Note on Part 1926
Editorial Notes: 1. At 44 FR 8577, Feb. 9, 1979, and corrected at 44 FR 20940, Apr. 6, 1979, OSHA reprinted without change the entire text of 29 CFR part 1926 together with certain General Industry Occupational Safety and Health Standards contained in 29 CFR part 1910, which have been identified as also applicable to construction work. This republication developed a single set of OSHA regulations for both labor and management forces within the construction industry. 2. Nomenclature changes to part 1926 appear at 84 FR 21597, May 14, 2019.

§ 1926.857 Storage. ( a ) The storage of waste material and debris on any floor shall not exceed the allowable floor loads.
( b ) In buildings having wooden floor construction, the flooring boards may be removed from not more than one floor above grade to provide storage space for debris, provided falling material is not permitted to endanger the stability of the structure.
( c ) When wood floor beams serve to brace interior walls or free-standing exterior walls, such beams shall be left in place until other equivalent support can be installed to replace them.
( d ) Floor arches, to an elevation of not more than 25 feet above grade, may be removed to provide storage area for debris: *Provided,* That such removal does not endanger the stability of the structure.
( e ) Storage space into which material is dumped shall be blocked off, except for openings necessary for the removal of material. Such openings shall be kept closed at all times when material is not being removed.
§ 65.95 Inspection authorization: Privileges and limitations. ( a ) The holder of an inspection authorization may— ( 1 ) Inspect and approve for return to service any aircraft or related part or appliance (except any aircraft maintained in accordance with a continuous airworthiness program under part 121 of this chapter) after a major repair or major alteration to it in accordance with part 43 [New] of this chapter, if the work was done in accordance with technical data approved by the Administrator; and
( 2 ) Perform an annual, or perform or supervise a progressive inspection according to §§ 43.13 and 43.15 of this chapter.
( b ) When he exercises the privileges of an inspection authorization the holder shall keep it available for inspection by the aircraft owner, the mechanic submitting the aircraft, repair, or alteration for approval (if any), and shall present it upon the request of the Administrator or an authorized representative of the National Transportation Safety Board, or of any Federal, State, or local law enforcement officer.
( c ) If the holder of an inspection authorization changes his fixed base of operation, he may not exercise the privileges of the authorization until he has notified the responsible Flight Standards office or International Field Office for the area in which the new base is located, in writing, of the change.
[Doc. No. 1179, 27 FR 7973, Aug. 10, 1962, as amended by Amdt. 65-2, 29 FR 5451, Apr. 23, 1964; Amdt. 65-4, 30 FR 3638, Mar. 14, 1965; Amdt. 65-5, 31 FR 3337, Mar. 3, 1966; Amdt. 65-9, 31 FR 13524, Oct. 20, 1966; 32 FR 5769, Apr. 11, 1967; Amdt. 65-35, 54 FR 39292, Sept. 25, 1989; Amdt. 65-41, 66 FR 21066, Apr. 27, 2001; Docket FAA-2018-0119, Amdt. 65-57A, 83 FR 9171, Mar. 5, 2018]
#### §§ 1918.107-1918.109 [Reserved]
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
The schedule  contains  summary  financial  information  extracted from Keystone
Consolidated  Industries,  Inc.'s consolidated financial statements for the year
ended  December  31, 1999 and is  qualified in its entirety by reference to such
consolidated financial statements.

</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1,000

<S>                                            <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                  12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                                 JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                   DEC-31-1999
<CASH>                                         0
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  35,116
<ALLOWANCES>                                   2,297
<INVENTORY>                                    66,083
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               117,662
<PP&E>                                         357,877
<DEPRECIATION>                                 207,721
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 410,918
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          131,582
<BONDS>                                        100,871
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       10,656
<OTHER-SE>                                     35,659
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   410,918
<SALES>                                        355,688
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               356,603
<CGS>                                          332,644
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  332,644
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               21,616
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               523
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             14,058
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (12,238)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   (4,754)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (7,484)
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (7,484)
<EPS-BASIC>                                    (.75)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  (.75)




</TABLE>
§ 1960.39 Agency responsibilities. ( a ) Agencies shall make available to committees all agency information relevant and necessary to their duties, except where prohibited by law. Examples of such information include, but are not limited to: The agency's safety and health policies and program; human and financial resources available to implement the program; accident, injury, and illness data; epidemiological data; employee exposure monitoring data; Material Safety Data Sheets; inspection reports; reprisal investigation reports; abatement plans; NIOSH hazard evaluation reports; and internal and external evaluation reports.
( b ) Agencies shall provide all committee members appropriate training as required by subpart H of this part.
<PAGE>
                                                                   EXHIBIT 10.42


                               SECOND AMENDMENT TO
                        BINDVIEW DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
                        1999 EMPLOYEE STOCK PURCHASE PLAN


         Pursuant to authority reserved to the Board of Directors of BindView
Development Corporation (the "Company") in Article IX of the BindView
Development Corporation 1999 Employee Stock Purchase Plan, as amended (the
"Plan"), and subject to approval of the Company's shareholders, the Board of
Directors of the Company hereby amends the Plan as follows effective January 1,
2003:

         The first sentence of Section 1.2 of the Plan is amended and restated
to read in its entirety as follows:

                  1.2 Share Commitment. The aggregate number of Shares
         authorized to be sold pursuant to Options granted under this Plan is
         2,000,000 Shares (taking into account the 2 for 1 stock split in
         February 2000), subject to adjustment as provided in this Section.



         Approved as of the 27th day of January, 2003.