alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
From: Christopher Bolduc [mailto:cabolduc@lbl.gov]

Sent: Wednesday, November 09, 2011 12:50 AM

To: Richard Parker

Cc: rick.anderson@faypwc.com; tballo@earthjustice.org; ScottB@lvmetals.com;

john.caskey@nema.org; jerry.corkran@cooperindustries.com;

john.cymbalsky@ee.doe.gov; adelaski@standardsasap.org; Teckman@nwcouncil.org;

gbf1@pge.com; carlos.gaytan@ge.com; rgreeson@federalpacific.com;

bruce.r.hirsch@bge.com; jhodge@howard.com; mhyland@appanet.org;

dave.millure@metglas.com; snadel@aceee.org; wes.patterson@us.abb.com;

Eric.Petersen@aksteel.com; Raymond.Polinski@atimetals.com;

artrosenfeld@gmail.com; srosenstock@eei.org; rroy@nrdc.org;

robert.saint@nreca.coop; chuck.simmons@pgnmail.com; BermanEconomics@gmail.com;

Daniel.Cohen@hq.doe.gov; greg.coulter405@gmail.com; Jim.creevy@nema.org;

ahofmann@publicpower.org; pkumar@publicpower.org; jmauer@standardsasap.org;

Aaron.Meyers@cooperindustries.com; jrossetti@mlgw.org; Paul.Ryan@hitmet.com;

jerry.schoen@aksteel.com; bsmith@federalpacific.com; mwal tner@nrdc.org;

kwinder @mleainc.com; cabolduc@lbl.gov; Brian Coffey; kcoughlin@lbl.gov;

brenda.edwards@ee.doe.gov; jeremiah.freeman@ee.doe.gov; Caitlin Johnson; Zhimei

Luo; emily.marchetti@ee.doe.gov; Michael Rivest; gjrosenquist@lbl.gov;

charlied@uus.org; phopkinson@hvolt.com; James.Lass@cleco.com;

maheshsampat@bellsouth.net; DYoung@energy

‐ solution.com;

chad.kennedy@us.schneider

‐ electric.com; eduardorobles@eaton.com;

vijay.tendulkar@onyxpower.com; thomas.patzner@us.schneider

‐ electric.com;

carlosgsiqueiros@eaton.com; Raba, Jim

Subject: MV Dry

‐ Type LCC and NIA Results Update

Dear Committee Members,

On review, formatting inconsistencies were found in MVDT res ults pr esentation, a

revised presentation is attached. Also attached is the ZDMH, H0, SA1 materials

exclusion sensitivity.

Thank you,

‐‐ Chris

‐‐‐‐

Chris Bolduc

Energy Efficiency Standards Group

Environmental Energy Technologies Division Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory

t. 416

‐ 535

‐ 7546 c. 647

‐ 832

‐ 4021
#### John S. Chapin *versus*Emory Taft.

The plaintiff, in order to lay a foundation for the introduction of secondary evidence of the contents of a letter written by the defendant to a third person, filed his own affidavit setting forth, that such third person told him that the letter was lost. It was resolved, that the affidavit was insufficient for that purpose, as the loss could have been proved by competent evidence, and the affidavit was mere hearsay. See *Taunton Bank*v. *Richardson,*5 Pick. 436; *Poignand*v. *Smith,*8 Pick. 278; *Parkins*v. Cobbet, 1 Carr. & Payne, 282.
United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 97-4350

___________

Joseph L. Stephens, *

 *

Appellant, *

 *

v. *

 * Appeal from the United States

State of Arkansas; John Doe, * District Court for the

Cummins Food Service Supervisor; * Eastern District of Arkansas.

Larry Norris, Director, Arkansas *

Department of Correction; Reed, * [UNPUBLISHED]

Warden, Arkansas Department of *

Correction; J. Gunnell, Officer, *

Arkansas Department of Correction, *

 *

Appellees. *

___________

 Submitted: June 5, 1998

 Filed: June 25, 1998 

___________

Before McMILLIAN, LOKEN, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.
The Honorable John F. Forster, United States Magistrate Judge for the Eastern 1

District of Arkansas, to whom the case was referred for final disposition by consent of

the parties pursuant to § 636(c).

-2-

Joseph L. Stephens, an Arkansas prisoner, appeals from the district court&s

1

adverse judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. Having carefully reviewed the

record and the parties& submissions on appeal, we conclude that judgment for

defendants was appropriate. Accordingly, we affirm. See 8th Cir. R. 47B. We deny

Stephens&s pending motion. 

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
<PAGE>
                                                          Exhibit 23
INDEPENDENT AUDITORS' CONSENT

We consent to the incorporation by reference in  Post-Effective  Amendment No. 1
to Registration  Statement No. 33-53007 on Form S-3 and  Registration  Statement
Nos. 33-61808 and 333-35767 of Kentucky Power Company on Form S-3 of our reports
dated  February 23, 1999,  appearing  in and  incorporated  by reference in this
Annual Report on Form 10-K of Kentucky Power Company for the year ended December
31, 1998.

Deloitte & Touche LLP
Columbus, Ohio
March 29, 1999
#### Baumhauer *v.*McGill.

Assumpsit.

(Decided January 9, 1917.

73 South. 753.)

1. Appeal and Error; Assignment; Waiver. — The failure to insist upon an assignment either in brief or oral argument will be treated as a waiver ■of such assignment.

2. Contract; Consideration. — A promise to pay for medical services rendered to another is sufficient consideration, although the consideration did not move to the promisor; detriment to the promisee in the performance of service and loss of time being sufficient valuable consideration.

Appeal from Monroe Law and Equity Court.

Heard before Hon. W. G. McCorvey.

Assumpsit by T. C. Baumhauer against J. I. McGill. Judgment for defendant and plaintiff appeals.

Beversed and remanded.

Hybart & Biggs, for appellant.

Barnett & Bugg, for appellee.

EVANS, J.

(1, 2) This suit is on the common counts. There are four assignments of error, but only one of them, the fourth, is noticed in appellant’s brief, which consists of a single sheet of paper, not prepared, however, in accordance with the rule. Those assignments not noticed in the brief will be treated as *waived.*— Rosenau *v. Powell,*184 Ala. 396, 63 South. 1020. The fourth assignment is addressed to the second written charge given at the instance of appellee, which reads as follows: “Gentlemen of the jury, you must be reasonably satisfied from the evidence in this case that J. I. McGill promised to pay Dr. Baumhauer for the services rendered for Austin Sims in this case, and that the promise grew out of a consideration moving to said McGill; otherwise you must find for the defendant.”

Appellant bases his right- of recovery on a contract claimed to have been made by him directly with the appellee, whereby appellee contracted for him to render medical services to one Austin Sims, the beneficiary of appellee’s bounty. In this aspect of the case, it was not, as charged, a sine qua non to recovery *434“that the promise grew out of a consideration moving to said McGill;” it was sufficient though the consideration did not '“move” or inure to the benefit of McGill, but for the benefit of a party not privy to the contract. — 9 Cyc. 316 (4); 6 R. C. L. § 274. It is thus expressed in 1 Elliott on Contracts, § 252: “While the consideration must move from the promisee at the instance of the promiser, it is not necessary that the promisor be the recipient of it. It need not pass directly to the latter, but under the prevailing rule may move from the promisee to a third person at the promisor’s request.”

The detriment to the promisee in the performance of services and loss of time was a sufficient valuable consideration.

In view of the erroneous instruction, the judgment of the trial court must be reversed, and the cause remanded for another trial.

Reversed and remanded.
No. 

-1-

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 99-20857

Conference Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

DIGOBERTO CABRERA-BARAONA, also known as Dagoberto Cabrera,

also known as Dagoberto Barahona Cabrera, also known as

Dagoberta Cabrera, also known as Wilson Ramirez Rios, also

known as Dagoberto Cabrana, also known as Osman Gutierrez,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. H-99-CR-265-1

--------------------

April 13, 2000

Before WIENER, DeMOSS, and PARKER, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Dagoberto

Cabrera-Baraona has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a

brief as required by Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). 

Cabrera-Baraona has filed a response. Our independent review of

the brief, the response, and the record discloses no nonfrivolous

issue. Accordingly, the motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED,
No. 

-2-

counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the

APPEAL IS DISMISSED.
[No. 27651-8-II.

Division Two.

November 22, 2002.]

#### Mark A. Erikson, et al., *Appellants,*v. Leroy E. Reynolds, et al., *Respondents.*

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Clark County, No. 00-2-02920-2, Robert L. Harris, J., entered July 30, 2001. *Affirmed*by unpublished opinion per Bridgewater, J., concurred in by Hunt, C.J., and Seinfeld, J.
<PAGE>

                                                             EXHIBIT 13.1


                      CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER CERTIFICATION
                       PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

     In connection with this annual report of Ultrapetrol (Bahamas) Limited (the
     "Company") on Form 20-F for the period  ending  December 31, 2005, as filed
     with  the  Securities  and  Exchange  Commission  on the date  hereof  (the
     "Report"),  the undersigned Chief Executive Officer of the Company,  hereby
     certifies pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 that:

     (1)  The Report fully  complies with the  requirements  of Section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  The  information  contained  in the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all
          material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of
          the Company.

     This  certification  is made solely for the  purposes of 18 U.S.C.  Section
     1350, and not for any other purpose.

Dated:  May 1, 2006

/s/ Felipe Menendez Ross
--------------------------------
Felipe Menendez Ross

Director, Chief Executive

Officer, and President
#### § 1979.101 Definitions.

*Act* or *AIR21* means section 519 of the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century, Public Law 106-181, April 5, 2000, 49 U.S.C. 42121.

*Air carrier* means a citizen of the United States undertaking by any means, directly or indirectly, to provide air transportation.

*Assistant Secretary* means the Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and Health or the person or persons to whom he or she delegates authority under the Act.

*Complainant* means the employee who filed a complaint under the Act or on whose behalf a complaint was filed.

*Contractor* means a company that performs safety-sensitive functions by contract for an air carrier.

*Employee* means an individual presently or formerly working for an air carrier or contractor or subcontractor of an air carrier, an individual applying to work for an air carrier or contractor or subcontractor of an air carrier, or an individual whose employment could be affected by an air carrier or contractor or subcontractor of an air carrier.

*Named person* means the person alleged to have violated the Act.

*OSHA* means the Occupational Safety and Health Administration of the United States Department of Labor.

*Person* means one or more individuals, partnerships, associations, corporations, business trusts, legal representatives, or any group of persons.

*Secretary* means the Secretary of Labor or persons to whom authority under the Act has been delegated.
#### § 61.117 Private pilot privileges and limitations: Second in command of aircraft requiring more than one pilot.

Except as provided in § 61.113 of this part, no private pilot may, for compensation or hire, act as second in command of an aircraft that is type certificated for more than one pilot, nor may that pilot act as second in command of such an aircraft that is carrying passengers or property for compensation or hire.

[Doc. No. 25910, 62 FR 16298, Apr. 4, 1997; Amdt. 61-103, 62 FR 40904, July 30, 1997]
[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 94 (Monday, May 15, 2000)]
[Notices]
[Page 30977]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-12083]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

[Project No. 2035]


City and County of Denver, CO; Notice of Authorization for 
Continued Project Operation

May 9, 2000.
    On April 29, 1998, the City and County of Denver, Colorado, 
licensee for the Gross Reservoir Project No. 2035, filed an application 
for a new or subsequent license pursuant to the Federal Power Act (FPA) 
and the Commission's regulations thereunder. Project No. 2035 is 
located on South Boulder Creek in Boulder County, Colorado.
    The license for Project No. 2035 was issued for a period ending 
April 30, 2000. Section 15(a)(1) of the FPA, 16 U.S.C. 808(a)(1), 
requires the Commission, at the expiration of a license term, to issue 
from year to year an annual license to the then licensee under the 
terms and conditions of the prior license until a new license is 
issued, or the project is otherwise disposed of as provided in section 
15 of any other applicable section of the FPA. If the project's prior 
license waived the applicability of section 15 of the FPA, then, base 
don section 9(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 558(c), 
and as set forth at 18 CFR 16.21(a), if the licensee of such project 
has filed an application for a subsequent license, the licensee may 
continue to operate the project in accordance with the terms and 
conditions of the license after the minor or minor part license 
expires, until the Commission acts on its application. If the licensee 
of such a project has not filed an application for a subsequent 
license, then it may be required, pursuant to 18 CFR 16.21(b), to 
continue project operations until the Commission issues someone else a 
license for the project or otherwise orders disposition of the project.
    If the project is subject to section 15 of the FPA, notice is 
hereby given that an annual license for Project No. 2035 is issued to 
the City and County of Denver, Colorado for a period effective May 1, 
2000, through April 30, 2001, or until the issuance of a new license 
for the project or other disposition under the FPA, whichever comes 
first. If issuance of a new license (or other disposition) does not 
take place on or before April 30, 2001, notice is hereby given that, 
pursuant to 18 CFR 16.18(c), an annual license under section 15(a)(1) 
of the FPA is renewed automatically without further order or notice by 
the Commission, unless the Commission orders otherwise.
    If the project is not subject to section 15 of the FPA, notice is 
hereby given that the City and County of Denver, Colorado is authorized 
to continue operation of the Gross Reservoir Project No. 2035 until 
such time as the Commission acts on its application for subsequent 
license.

David P. Boergers,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 00-12083 Filed 5-12-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-M
#### In the Matter of No. 17 Beekman Place, Respondent, against Edward J. Flynn, as Secretary of the State of New York, Appellant.

Argued May 17, 1937;

decided May 25, 1937.

*565
      *John J. Bennett, Jr., Attorney-General (F. B. Chant*and *Henry Epstein*of counsel), for appellant.

*Albert Stickney*and *Charles B. McGroddy*for respondent.

Order affirmed, without costs; no opinion.

Concur: Crane, Ch. J., Lehman, O’Brien, Hubbs, Lotjghran, Finch and Rippey, JJ.
#### § 18.1007 Testimony or written admission of party.

Contents of writings, recordings, or photographs may be proved by the testimony or deposition of the party against whom offered or by that party's written admission, without accounting for the nonproduction of the original.
Exhibit
32.(a)
 
 This
Certificate is being furnished and shall not be deemed “filed” for purposes of
Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, or otherwise
subject to the liability of that section. This Certification shall not be
incorporated by reference into any registration statement or other document
pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933, except as otherwise stated in such
filing.
 
 
 Certification
Pursuant to Section 1350 of Chapter 63
 Of Title
18 of the United States Code
 
 In
connection with the Annual Report of the Companies (as defined below) on Form
10-K (the “reports”) for the year ended December 31, 2004 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof, I, Michael G. Morris, the
chief executive officer of
 
 American
Electric Power Company, Inc.
 AEP
Generating Company
 AEP Texas
Central Company
 AEP Texas
North Company
 Appalachian
Power Company
 Columbus
Southern Power Company
 Indiana
Michigan Power Company
 Kentucky
Power Company
 Ohio
Power Company
 Public
Service Company of Oklahoma
 Southwestern
Electric Power Company
 
 (the
"Companies"), certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 that, based on my knowledge (i)
the Reports fully comply with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and (ii) the information contained in the
Reports fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and
results of operations of the Companies.
 
 
 
 
 /s/
Michael G. Morris
 Michael
G. Morris
 Chief
Executive Officer
 
 
 March 1,
2005
 
 
 A signed
original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to
American Electric Power Company, Inc. and will be retained by American Electric
Power Company, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or
its staff upon request.
#### Arthur BYRD, Leona JAMES and Henry STRICKLAND *v.*STATE of Arkansas

5609

471 S.W. 2d 350

Opinion delivered October 11, 1971

*Reinberger, Eilbott, Smith if Staten*and *Harold Flower,*for appellants.

*150
      *Ray Thornton,*Attorney General; *Robert H. Crank,*Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Frank Holt, Justice.

The appellants were charged with the crime of robbery. Upon a joint trial a jury found each appellant guilty and assessed James’ punishment at 3 years, Strickland 7 years, and Byrd 5 years imprisonment in the State Penitentiary. From the judgments on those verdicts comes this appeal.

For reversal it is contended that it was error for the court to admit into evidence cross-implicating, confessions and, further, the trial court erred by refusing to give appellants’ requested cautionary instructions that any reference in a confession by one codefendant to another codefendant should not be considered by the jury.

The written confessions of appellants James and Strickland, neither of whom testified, were admitted into evidence. These confessions were cross-implicating as to each declarant and, also, as to appellant Byrd who testified and denied any complicity in the alleged crime. In the case of *Mosby & Williamson*v. *State,*246 Ark. 963, 440 S. W. 2d 230 (1969), we held that it was prejudicial error to allow cross-implicating confessions in a joint trial, as in the case at bar, since this is violative of the basic right to be confronted by an adverse witness with the accompanying right of cross-examination as is guaranteed by the federal Sixth Amendment, Further, this resulting prejudice could not be removed by a cautionary instruction to the jury that the admission of one declarant could not be considered as evidence against a codefendant. There we also said that the answer to the problem of cross-implicating admissions would be to delete any of the offending portions with reference to a codefendant, if a deletion is feasible and could be done without prejudice, or to grant separate trials. See, also, *Bruton*v. *United States,*391 U. S. 123 (1968) and *Roberts*v. *Russell,*392 U. S. 293 (1968).

Reversed and remanded as to each appellant.

Harris, C. J., not participating.
#### Linda Schleicher, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Steven D. Schleicher, Deceased, Appellant, v Robert Cupelo et al., Respondents.

[698 NYS2d 177]

—Order unanimously affirmed without costs for reasons stated in decision at Supreme Court, Tormey, III, J. (Appeal from Order of Supreme Court, Onondaga County, Tormey, III, J. — Summary Judgment.) Present — Denman, P. J., Green, Scudder, Callahan and Balio, JJ. *[See,*182 Misc 2d 392.]
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Michael Hegdal, Appellant.

[699 NYS2d 73]

—Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Tomei, J.), rendered April 25, 1997, convicting him of manslaughter in the second degree and criminal possession of stolen property in the third degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant was operating a stolen car and had stopped at an intersection when police officers approached the car with their badges displayed. The defendant drove off, at 55 to 60 miles per hour, on the wrong side of the road, in a busy residential and commercial neighborhood. The defendant’s car plowed into another car and pushed it some distance up the road, ultimately forcing it into a bus shelter. The driver of the second car was badly crushed and died from his injuries minutes later. Other bystanders and drivers were also hit and suffered serious injuries.

Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the trial court properly declined to charge criminally negligent homicide (Penal Law § 125.10) as a lesser-included offense of manslaughter in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.15 [1]). There was no reasonable view of the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant *(see, People v Martin,*59 NY2d 704, 705), which would support a finding that the defendant was unaware of the substantial and unjustifiable risk of death caused by his actions *(see, People v McFadden,*246 AD2d 558; *People v Lucas,*238 AD2d 524, 525).

*473The defendant has not preserved for appellate review his contention that the court erred in its *Sandoval*ruling that his past convictions relating to automobile theft could be used to impeach his credibility, as the defendant consented to the ruling *(see,*CPL 470.05 [2]; *People v Claudio,*64 NY2d 858). In any event, the contention is without merit. Convictions involving theft are highly relevant to the issue of credibility because they demonstrate the defendant’s willingness to deliberately further his self-interest at the expense of society *(see, People v Walker,*83 NY2d 455, 459; *People v Sandoval,*34 NY2d 371; *People v Jamison,*228 AD2d 698). Any similarities between the crime charged and the prior conviction do not compel preclusion *(see, People v Mattiace,*77 NY2d 269, 275-276; *People v Pavao,*59 NY2d 282; *People v McClam,*225 AD2d 799). Moreover, the record demonstrates that the court engaged in a proper balancing between the probative value of the prior convictions and the possible prejudice to the defendant *(see, People v Sandoval, supra,*at 376; *People v Jamison, supra).*Ritter, J. P., Joy, Goldstein and McGinity, JJ., concur.