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STRATEGIC

STUDIES

INSTITUTE

The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) is part of the U.S. Army War 

College and is the strategic-level study agent for issues related 

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Strategic Studies Institute

and

U.S. Army War College Press

DEVELOPMENT OF THE BALTIC 

ARMED FORCES IN LIGHT OF 

MULTINATIONAL DEPLOYMENTS

James S. Corum

August 2013

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do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the 

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ISBN 1-58487-586-0
iii

FOREWORD

The three Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia, and 

Lithuania have participated in Western multinational 

military operations since the 1990s, and the experience 

that these three nations have gained in sending troops 

abroad has played a key role in the development and 

transformation of their armed forces. The original 

intent for first deploying very small teams, and then 

later larger detachments, was to build closer military 

ties to the West. This succeeded because it brought 

the Baltic States into a close relationship with both the 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the 

United States. The initial deployments also helped to 

create an officer and noncommissioned officer (NCO) 

cadre who understand U.S. and NATO doctrine and 

methods. The cadre who took part in the first deployments went back to their countries and played a 

lead role in the training and doctrine development of 

their forces.

The Baltic States, starting virtually from scratch 

in terms of their armed forces, became full members 

of NATO only 13 years after regaining their independence upon the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. 

This was an astounding effort and one of the real success stories of NATO in recent years. The three Baltic 

States evolved from small and inexperienced militia 

forces into very effective small armed forces that have 

made significant contributions to the Coalition efforts 

in Iraq and the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) 

effort in Afghanistan. The three Baltic States have also 

shown a real talent for adapting to the requirements 

of irregular warfare by fielding specialist teams in 

Iraq and Afghanistan, fielding combat units, and even 

running a provincial reconstruction team. The expe-
iv

rience of deploying forces in multinational coalition 

operations has been a central part of the successful 

evolution and transformation of the armed forces of 

Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

As with any case study of transformation, the 

process was not without mistakes and frictions. But 

the deployment experience has been reviewed in the 

three countries and has resulted in more effective forces. However, as this monograph shows, there are still 

some lessons to be applied and improvements made 

to ready forces for likely future operations.

Working with multinational coalitions has been an 

important part of the American military experience 

of the last 2 decades, from the Balkans to Iraq to Afghanistan. It is clear that future contingency and stability operations will be conducted as multinational 

operations and will include small allies such as the 

Baltic States. Therefore, it is useful to understand the 

problems and perspectives of these small allies so that 

the U.S. military can support them effectively and efficiently incorporate these small, but very useful, forces 

into larger allied operations.

 

 DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

 Director

 Strategic Studies Institute and

 U.S. Army War College Press
v

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

JAMES S. CORUM is a retired lieutenant colonel in the 

U.S. Army Reserve and served in Iraq in 2004. Since 

2009, he has been the Dean of the Baltic Defence College in Tartu, Estonia. The Baltic Defence College is the 

military higher college of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Dr. Corum was a professor at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 

from 2005 to 2008. From 1991 to 2004, he was a professor at the U.S. Air Force School of Advanced Air and 

Spacepower Studies at Maxwell AFB, AL. In 2005, Dr. 

Corum was a visiting fellow of All Souls College at 

Oxford University. In 2006, he was one of the main 

authors of the U.S. Army/U.S. Marine Corps counterinsurgency doctrine, Field Manual 3-24. Dr. Corum is 

the author or editor of 10 books on military history 

and counterinsurgency. His books include The Roots of 

Blitzkrieg, 1992; The Luftwaffe: Creating the Operational 

Air War, 1997; Airpower and Small Wars, with Wray 

Johnson, in 2003; Fighting the War on Terror, 2006; and 

Bad Strategies: How Great Powers Fail in Counterinsurgency, 2008. He was senior editor of Brill’s Encyclopedia 

of the First World War (2 vols.), 2012. He has authored 

more than 60 book chapters and journal articles on 

military history and counterinsurgency. Dr. Corum 

holds an M.A. from Brown University, an M. Litt. 

from Oxford University, and a Ph.D. from Queen’s 

University, Canada.

vii

SUMMARY

Coalition operations have been an important part 

of U.S. warfighting in the last decade of conflict. In 

the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan coalition partners, 

especially from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nations, have played an important role. 

Given the ongoing instability in several regions of the 

world, there is a strong possibility that in the near future the U.S. Armed Forces will again have to operate with allied coalition partners to help support or 

rebuild a country devastated by internal conflict.

As the United States is likely to fight in a coalition with small allies in the future, so it is useful to 

understand the experience, capabilities, and perspectives of those allies. Since regaining independence in 

1991, the countries of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania 

have been very active in supporting NATO and U.S. 

military operations abroad. It is notable that the three 

Baltic countries have also used the deployment of a 

significant part of their forces in the last decade as a 

major part of their program to carry out a major force 

transformation.

This monograph analyzes the experience of the 

armed forces of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania (all 

NATO allies since 2004) in their participation as U.S. 

and NATO coalition partners in the Balkans, Iraq, and 

Afghanistan. The Baltic nations provide a useful model of how overseas deployments can support a nation’s 

program of force transformation and development. 

This monograph also examines the frictions that have 

occurred in coalition deployments, especially in the 

areas of planning, training, logistics, and command, 

and offers suggestions on how some of the expected 

frictions might be reduced in future operations.

1

DEVELOPMENT OF THE BALTIC 

ARMED FORCES IN LIGHT OF 

MULTINATIONAL DEPLOYMENTS

Introduction.

The issue of transformation and of national participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO) and coalition alliance operations is a very important one for the three Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Since those nations became independent of the Soviet Union in 1990-91, they have all 

had to build Western-style armed forces from scratch. 

As they were determined to become a full part of the 

West and to join NATO and the European Union (EU), 

all three nations embarked on a process of engagement with NATO and EU nation allies to create armed 

forces that were fully compatible with NATO and to 

build armed forces that would be capable of making a 

significant contribution to Western security. In their 2 

decades of independence, the three Baltic States have 

adopted a policy to commit their military forces as 

well as civilian expertise in support of the United Nations (UN), NATO, and coalition operations in peacekeeping and active combat roles. The Baltic States 

have engaged in such operations for several reasons: 

first to demonstrate their commitment as full partners 

in NATO and the EU; and second, to use their participation in overseas deployments to build up experience in their own forces in order to make them fully 

interoperable with NATO and EU allies.1

This subject is also important for the U.S. military, 

for almost all major operations conducted over the last 

3 decades, from Operation DESERT STORM in 1991, 

to Somalia (1991-94) to operations in the former Yugoslavia (1995-present) to the Iraq conflict and coun-
2

terinsurgency (2003-11) and the ongoing operations in 

Afghanistan (2001-present), have been carried out as 

coalition operations, with dozens of NATO and nonNATO allies participating. Many of the allies in the 

U.S.-led and NATO-led coalition operations have been 

from small countries such as the Baltic States. Because 

small nations can and have made valuable contributions to these Western coalition operations, it is important for the U.S. military to understand the small 

nation perspective and experience. It is also important 

for the United States that small nations develop effective force transformation processes, so that they will 

be able to be fully interoperable with NATO and allied forces in future operations.

The Baltic States make an excellent case study to 

understand the role of small nations in peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and counterinsurgency operations, because they have been active participants in 

almost all of the operations noted previously. Somalia is the only place where the Baltic States were not 

present. There is ample literature on the experience of 

the Baltic States in coalition deployments. The Baltic 

Defence College, the military staff college of the three 

Baltic States, encourages research and publication on 

this subject from officers and civilian officials who 

have taken part in the deployments. In 2010 and 2011, 

the Baltic Defence College also hosted workshops on 

the experience of small state deployments. Furthermore, the Latvian National Defence Academy’s Master of Arts (MA) program has fostered MA theses on 

the subject of the small state deployment experience. 

Finally, the three journals and official publications of 

the Baltic States have published some assessments of 

their experience in overseas deployments. This monograph is largely built upon briefings, reports, and pre-
3

sentations from company and field grade officers of 

the Latvian, Lithuanian, and Estonian armed forces 

that have experienced deployments as members of 

multinational operations during the last 15 years. 

Officers from the Baltic States have served as staff 

officers and unit commanders in NATO peacekeeping operations in Kosovo and Bosnia, in the Allied 

Coalition Forces in Iraq, and with the NATO forces 

deployed to the ongoing mission in Afghanistan. 

Most of the officers who contributed reports on their 

experience are students or fellow faculty members of 

the Baltic Defence College, which is the staff college 

and school for higher military education for the three 

Baltic States. Some of these reports were completed 

at my request. In other cases, the information comes 

from the 2010 workshop that was sponsored by the 

Baltic Defence College on the subject of the nation 

deployment experience.2

Nations such as Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania 

might be small and have small armed forces, but even 

small nations can bring useful capabilities and niche 

forces to a military operation. In Afghanistan, Iraq, 

and similar operations, conflict is not characterized 

by the division and corps operations of a conventional state-on-state war, such as the conflict against 

Iraq in 1991 and 2003. Recent operations in counterinsurgency environments are characterized by battalion, company, and and even small forces spread out 

in small towns and rural areas carrying out operations to secure the local population, to support nation 

building efforts, and to train the host nation forces. In 

such a conflict, a well-trained team or company from 

a small nation can be just as effective on the ground as 

a team or company from the United States or a larger 

NATO ally. 
4

The experience of the Baltic States is also an important part in the study of the transformation process as it applies to smaller nations. The three Baltic 

States made a policy of participation in active operations with NATO and Western coalition partners 

a central part of their program to develop, modernize, and adapt their armed forces to be fully capable 

Western forces. Transformation for smaller nations 

is vitally important because small nations such as 

the three Baltic States have no realistic options for 

national defense other than through cooperative efforts and alliance with major partners. Yet, effective 

cooperation and support from partners requires that 

the small nation understand the doctrine and tactics 

of the larger partners and be fully able to have its 

forces operate in concert with allies. One of the central goals of the Baltic States in deploying forces on 

active operations was to ensure interoperability with 

NATO and allied partners at every level and on every kind of operation. Indeed, in this respect, the three 

Baltic States can be rated as highly successful in the 

transformation process. 

In terms of transformation, NATO has also been 

transforming since the end of the Cold War and the 

re-independence of the three Baltic States. While still 

maintaining a conventional war deterrent, and with 

defense of alliance territory as the first priority, NATO 

has also transformed into an alliance with extensive 

out-of-area responsibilities and connections. Stability 

in Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Europe is of 

direct concern to Europe, so NATO has become highly 

involved in peacekeeping, military assistance, peace 

enforcement, and counterinsurgency missions outside 

the alliance area over the last 2 decades. The operations in Kosovo, in Afghanistan, and recently in Libya 
5

are examples of the “new” kind of operations NATO 

is conducting. As NATO transforms as an alliance, the 

armed forces of its members have had to transform 

as well.3 Because of NATO’s transformation, Estonia, 

Latvia, and Lithuania have had to develop expertise 

on Central Asia and other areas far outside what might 

be considered their natural area of concern.

More than 30 nations participated in the U.S.-led 

coalition in Iraq from 2003-11. Among those nations 

were hundreds of troops and specialist personnel 

from the three Baltic States. More than 30 nations 

have participated in the NATO force in Afghanistan 

since 2001. Among the forces in the NATO coalition 

in Afghanistan, the three Baltic States of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania were again present. In 2010, at the 

peak of the Baltic States’ involvement in Afghanistan, 

there were more than 750 personnel, mostly military 

and police, present in the country as part of the NATO 

force. In terms of the operation, this is not an insignificant contribution. The contributions from nations 

such as the Baltic States can be important to the overall success of a major NATO operation.

Although the Baltic States are small, they have 

supplied NATO and coalition partners with highly capable fighting units, special operations detachments, 

medical units, munitions disposal units, and special 

training for almost 20 years. In Afghanistan, Lithuania 

took a major role as the lead nation for a provincial 

reconstruction team (PRT), one of 26 in the country.

In short, small nation participation has more than a 

political significance. As this monograph will emphasize, small nations bring genuine and useful capabilities to a conflict. Because operations such as the Kosovo 

peace enforcement operation and the NATO actions 

in Afghanistan are ongoing, and there will likely be 
6

more such coalition operations in the future. Thus, it is 

important for the United States, as the senior partner 

in NATO, to have a sound understanding of the smaller allied nations and the unique operational problems 

they face when deployed to serve alongside the United 

States and NATO forces in combat operations. In the 

future, the United States will need to ensure that the 

contribution of small nation forces is used efficiently. 

For their part, smaller NATO allies such as the Baltic States should evaluate their strengths and weaknesses in the light of their recent operational experience in order to develop the most effective doctrine, 

training, forces structure, and equipment for future 

coalition operations.

The focus of this monograph is on the operational 

deployments of the three Baltic States’ armed forces 

and the operational lessons learned from these coalition deployments. The core assumption of this analysis is that peace enforcement and security operations 

such as the UN/NATO mission in Kosovo, the U.S.-led 

coalition force in Iraq, and the NATO coalition force in 

Afghanistan will be likely in the future. Therefore, it is 

important to continue to revise and develop the doctrine for such multinational operations. This monograph will not delve into the grand strategic debate as 

to whether the United States, NATO, and the West in 

general ought to take part in peacekeeping, or peace 

enforcement, or counterinsurgency operations. These 

operations, and a coalition approach to them, have 

been around for more than 6 decades, and there is no 

evidence that the need for stability and counterinsurgency operations will go away. If such operations continue, it is also a U.S. preference to conduct operations 

of this nature as part of a multinational coalition. As 

for the Baltic States, all three Baltic States have NATO 
7

membership at the core of their security policy. These 

nations are all part of the EU as well. The national governments of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania have made 

it clear in repeated statements that they will support 

all NATO operations and EU operations to the best of 

their ability.4

This analysis seeks to answer some key questions about the experience of the Baltic States’ troop 

deployments on multinational operations. What are 

the most effective contributions made by the Baltic 

States to multinational forces? What have been the 

strengths of the Baltic armed forces in multinational 

operations? What have been the major limitations of 

the Baltic forces in multinational operations? How 

can multinational command and control and planning be improved to maximize the capabilities of the 

Baltic forces?

This monograph is organized around several 

major issues central to coalition operations. These 

are pre-deployment training, force organization, operational coordination with major coalition partners, 

force equipment, logistics and doctrine development.

Background: The Development of the Baltic 

Armed Forces.

The three Baltic States regained their independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. At the time of 

independence, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were 

impoverished states that had inherited a broken Soviet economic system and little else. The armed forces 

of the three Baltic States had to be built from scratch. 

There were a few officers who had deserted from 

the old Soviet Army and made their way home, and 

there were many eager recruits who wanted to serve 
8

a new and independent nation. Otherwise, there was 

no equipment and little infrastructure, as the Soviet 

troops remained in bases in the Baltic States until 

1994. What military infrastructure that was inherited 

was in ruins.

Although the three Baltic nations lacked money 

and infrastructure in the early 1990s, they had considerable advantages in terms of human capital. The three 

Baltic nations had highly literate and well-educated 

populations, and had long been the most economically developed region of the Soviet Union in terms of 

high tech industries. This situation dates back to the 

old Russian empire to which the three Baltic nations 

had belonged, then, the Baltic nations and Finland 

were the most educated and advanced regions of the 

empire. The troops that came to the three Baltic armed 

forces were excellent human material; well-educated 

and able to handle modern technology. The three nations adapted quickly to the Western market economy 

as well.

From the beginning, the three Baltic States had 

decided upon national strategies and policies of complete integration with the West. These included immediate development of Western democratic states, 

free market economies, and full membership in the 

EU and NATO. At first, the major NATO nations were 

reluctant to become openly engaged in any military 

support to countries that had been former Soviet 

republics. Instead, the three Baltic States received 

military training and assistance from the Nordic nations (Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Finland) in 

the early 1990s. The Nordic nations provided both 

military equipment and training teams.5

 By 1994, the 

Russian Army had withdrawn from the Baltic States, 

and the three nations were well on their way to build-
9

ing regular armed forces on the Western model. Military academies were created. First battalions and then 

larger units stood up, and promising officers were 

sent to Western nations’ staff colleges, including the 

United States, France, Germany, Denmark, Finland, 

and Sweden. Through the first decade of independence, the support from the Nordic nations was especially important, as those nations were generous 

in providing equipment, instructors, training teams, 

and advisors. In Estonia, the Finnish armed forces set 

up noncommissioned officer (NCO) instruction. Thus, 

for a decade, the Baltic nations received excellent professional assistance from highly-developed Western 

armed forces that set a solid foundation for the entry of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania into NATO and 

the EU.6

In 1999, the three Baltic nations formed a staff college that would handle all higher officer education 

for the three countries—the Baltic Defence College in 

Tartu, Estonia. The college was originally staffed with 

officers from NATO and the Nordic nations as faculty, 

with all instruction conducted exclusively in English. 

Indeed, the commitment to NATO and the West was 

so strong that English was decided on as the second 

language of the armed forces, and instruction in English was stressed for all ranks and levels of the three 

Baltic armed forces. The commitment to English was 

part of the policy of the three nations to create armed 

forces that were fully interoperable with the West.7

The three Baltic nations have small armed forces, 

but with a highly trained and professional cadre. In 

the first decade of the 21st century, Lithuania and Latvia decided on professional armed forces, while Estonia retained a conscription system. On military and 

security issues, the three nations cooperated closely, 
10

not only building a joint staff college and institution of 

higher military education, but also coordinating their 

officer and NCO training and holding joint exercises, 

with all Baltic nations participating. The defense ministers and military chiefs of the three Baltic States meet 

quarterly to discuss military policy issues. 

Taking part in Western military operations as part 

of deployed peacekeeping forces was seen as a means 

of giving the Baltic armed forces operational experience. Actual deployments would not only provide 

experience for the leaders, but would also provide lessons in Western methods and doctrines for the leadership of the armed forces. The participation of Baltic 

forces in support of NATO, UN, and EU operations 

would also be a means of demonstrating the Baltic 

States’ commitment to Western collective security.8 In 

1994, Baltic active engagement with the Western nations began with the commitment of small teams of 

Baltic armed forces personnel on UN peace missions. 

The involvement grew as the Baltic armed forces 

grew, and in the 1990s, Baltic teams, and later small 

units, served in Bosnia, Kosovo, and on UN missions.9

In 2004, the three Baltic nations joined both the EU 

and NATO as full members. That the three nations 

could meet both EU and NATO standards for membership after only 13 years of independence shows the 

full commitment they had made to become members 

of the Western alliance and to participate in Western 

collective security. With NATO membership also 

came commitments to support Western operations. 

All three Baltic nations supported the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq and contributed detachments to that mission. Latvia and Lithuania contributed company-sized 

units that operated with the multinational division 

in Iraq. Baltic officers also served as part of training 
11

teams and coalition staffs. The Baltic forces’ commitment to NATO and EU missions was made with the 

understanding that the contribution of the three nations was to earn a “place at the table” in NATO and 

EU decisionmaking. The Baltic States could not expect 

to be taken seriously or listened to unless a serious 

and highly visible contribution was put forward for 

the collective security of NATO and the EU.10

The deployment of forces abroad in support of 

NATO and international coalition missions fits well 

into the Baltic national security strategies. The Lithuanian National Security Strategy of 2002 (before officially joining NATO) stated that: 

The Republic of Lithuania considers international security indivisible and seeks its own security as an indispensable part of the wider regional, European and 

global security of the community of nations.11

The Estonian Long Term Defence Development Plan 

2009-2018 published by the Estonian Defence Ministry 

restates the Estonian Parliament’s Law of 2004, which 

says that: 

Estonian defence policy is based on . . . indivisibility of 

security, solidarity and cooperation, . . . Collective security, support to European Union capabilities in the 

framework of European Security and Defence Policy.12

The Defence Ministry furthermore asserts that Estonia’s membership in NATO is one of the two pillars of national security, the other being national selfdefense.13 Since joining NATO, the three Baltic States 

have all taken their alliance responsibilities very seriously. The three states all strive to meet the NATO 

national budget goal of 2 percent of gross domestic 

product (GDP) for defense.14
12

Overview of Baltic Troop Deployments.

Estonia sent peacekeepers to Croatia (1995), Bosnia and Herzegovina (since 1996, officers), Lebanon 

(1996-97), the Middle East to support the UN Truce 

Supervision Organization (UNTSO) monitoring mission (since 1997), and Kosovo (since 1999, currently 

staff officers). 

The Estonians served in Iraq from 2003-09. At 

the peak of operations, the Estonians had 40 personnel and served under American command. In Iraq, 

Estonia lost 2 soldiers killed in action, and 18 were 

wounded in action. The Estonians have also served in 

Afghanistan since 2003 and have rotated reinforced infantry companies into the country assigned to the British-led forces. In addition, Estonia has sent additional 

staff officers and personnel to Implementation Force 

(IFOR) and civilians and military and police personnel to support teams training the Afghan forces and 

government personnel. The Estonian commitment in 

Afghanistan is ongoing. Since 2010, Estonia has participated in the EU security and anti-piracy operation in 

the Gulf of Aden, notably in the EU mission Operation 

ATALANTA. Estonia has provided a ship protection 

team for those operations.

Lithuania first sent 90 personnel overseas to serve 

as peacekeepers in Croatia from 1994 to 1996. After 

1996, the Lithuanians participated in the UN operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, and a team of Lithuanians 

also served on the Georgia observer mission. In Iraq 

from 2003 to 2007, the Lithuanian Army maintained 

a force of 120 soldiers serving under the Danish and 

Polish headquarters. Since 2002, the Lithuanians have 

had troops in Afghanistan. They have provided a 
13

highly capable special operations team as well as more 

than 180 personnel to run a PRT.15

The Latvian Army has also been active in deployments. From 2003 to 2008, Latvia committed a company-sized force of 136 soldiers to serve under U.S. 

command. Three Latvians were killed in action and 

others wounded. In Afghanistan, the Latvians have 

maintained one company element in the country under NATO’s IFOR command. 

The Iraq and Afghanistan operations have been the 

first true combat operations for the armed forces of the 

three Baltic States since they regained independence. 

The Baltic States saw operations evolve over a period 

of more than a decade. The operations evolved from 

small teams deployed on peacekeeping and observer 

missions, to platoon-sized formations operating under a larger allied partner, to deployments in Iraq and 

Afghanistan at the size of a reinforced company formation with additional support units. As well as company-sized units, the armed forces of the three Baltic 

States have also deployed a variety of specialist teams 

in support of coalition operations. These teams include improvised explosive device (IED) detachments, 

medical detachments, special forces detachments, and 

naval security teams. Baltic nations have also contributed transport aircraft and communications teams 

to active coalition operations. Civilian trainers, especially police trainers, as well as aid workers have also 

been part of the Baltic States’ commitment to coalition 

and NATO operations, especially in the case of Afghanistan, where all three Baltic States have also deployed a small number of civilian experts to support 

the coalition nation-building program.16 In 2010, the 

three Baltic States had more than 750 personnel, including civilian government specialist personnel and 
14

military personnel, serving in Afghanistan. Taken as 

a whole, this represents a significant commitment of 

personnel and resources for three small countries. To 

get some idea of the effect of the deployments on a 

small nation’s armed forces, one can take the example of Estonia, a country of 1.35 million people with 

a peacetime armed forces of 5,500 personnel and a 

wartime armed forces of 16,000 (planned to expand 

to 25,000 by 2018). In 2009 they deployed two infantry 

companies and support elements to Afghanistan—a 

total of 300 men—which constituted 5.5 percent of the 

total peacetime force.17

Due to the long period that the Baltic nations’ forces have served in Iraq and Afghanistan, the majority of 

the officers and NCOs of the armed forces of the three 

nations have now served at least one rotation period 

of 6 months in a combat zone. Many of the career cadre 

have seen multiple tours in both Iraq and Afghanistan. 

In short, the Baltic armed forces have gained considerable warfighting experience in the last decade. Baltic 

national personnel have had the opportunity to serve 

with key partner nations on deployments that include 

serving with the United States, United Kingdom (UK), 

Denmark, Italy, and Norway. 

Lessons Learned from Baltic Deployments 

Pre-deployment Training.

One of the key—but unspoken—aspects of the 

policy of the three Baltic States to deploy forces on 

overseas missions was to prove to NATO and the EU 

that the three Baltic nations, as aspiring members of 

the EU and NATO before 2004, were capable of making a genuine contribution to the military operations 

of the Western Alliance. This also meant a national 
15

commitment to see that any personnel deployed were 

carefully selected and fully prepared to carry out their 

mission. To ensure the success of this commitment, 

each national armed force had to prepare and execute 

a pre-deployment training program.

Sending even small numbers of troops to support 

an observer or peacekeeping mission pushed the Baltic 

States to ensure that all the personnel deployed were 

fully prepared to carry out the mission. In each country the armed forces coordinated with NATO nations 

that were highly experienced in such missions. In this 

regard, Denmark was especially helpful in sending 

special training teams to prepare deploying personnel. 

The Baltic nations also drew on the national universities for support in training the deploying personnel 

in the language and culture of the nation where they 

would serve. In addition, upon its founding in 1999, 

the Baltic Defence College, as the institution of higher 

military education of the three Baltic States, placed a 

strong emphasis on peacekeeping and low intensity 

conflict into the curriculum for its captains’ course, its 

joint staff course, and its colonels’ course. Exercises 

emphasizing peacekeeping and peace enforcement 

operations became a major part of the Baltic Defence 

College courses, with the expectation that the Baltic 

officers would be likely to deploy on such operations.

In general, in the period from 1991 to 2002, the Baltic States emphasized unit training of their national 

armies, which were generally composed of light infantry and mechanized infantry forces. The goal of the 

national training programs was to develop companies, 

battalions, and brigades that would be interoperable 

with NATO forces in small and large operations.

English language training has been an important 

part of the Baltic military education process. The three 
16

Baltic military academies all teach English and stress 

a high level of competence. Prior to deployment, all 

Baltic personnel are given additional English instruction to ensure that they will be able to communicate 

easily in the NATO command language. Effective operations in a multinational environment require good 

English skills.18 Since 1999, all staff courses taught at 

the Baltic Defence College require officers and civilian 

officials to meet a NATO Standardization Agreement 

(STANAG) level 3 English proficiency in order to simply enroll in the courses. English language training 

extends down to NCO and soldier level as well, to ensure that Baltic soldiers and civilian personnel will be 

able to deploy and be interoperable with no language 

barriers in dealing with NATO or Western allies.19 The 

fluency in the English language that one finds in the 

Baltic States, among the civilian society as well as in 

the military, is a symbol of the genuine transformation 

of the society, economy, and culture in the 2 decades 

since these nations regained independence. Where 

Russian was the second language only 20 years ago, 

today English is the lingua franca in all international 

dealings. For example, the quarterly joint meetings 

of the Baltic military chiefs and defense ministers are 

conducted in English—the only common language of 

the three nations (the national languages of the Baltic 

States are very different).

In general, the training programs of the Baltic 

States proved highly successful in developing effective battalions and brigades. However, the Baltic 

States have been limited by of the lack of experience 

in higher operations in general. Luckily, the Western 

nations, which included the United States, Germany, 

Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, and the Neth-
17

erlands, provided experienced instructors to the Baltic Defence College to train and educate the Baltic 

officers in operations. The operational level training 

was sound and adequate by any Western standard. 

The essential goal to provide well-trained and fully 

prepared infantry units to international operations 

was met. However, there were several problem areas 

noted in the training of specialist personnel and teams 

for active operations.

A report from an Estonian officer concerning the 

Estonian commitment to Afghanistan (to support the 

British in Helmand Province) noted that: 

Estonian and Baltic light infantry units have been able 

to contribute sets of skills that have superseded those 

of specifically designated units of allies. However, an 

overall understanding of and adopting a proactive approach to certain aspects and effects of high-intensity 

operations has been a problem area.20

Essentially, this meant that the deployed troops could 

have had a deeper understanding of counterinsurgency procedures before deploying to the area.

The problem in this case was not the training of 

the Estonian team of six intelligence personnel who 

deployed from November 2006 to March 2007. The Estonian Intelligence team had been carefully prepared 

by U.S. trainers, and an additional special course was 

conducted for the team managed by the whole Estonian Army Intelligence Battalion. Combat training of 

the small team was conducted by the Estonian Peace 

Operations Center.21 Yet, although the unit was to be 

committed to support of the UK forces in Helmand, 

there was little coordination with the British Army 

before the team’s deployment. The only training with 

UK forces was a live fire exercise and some battle drills 
18

in the UK. No human intelligence (HUMINT) specific 

training was offered or authorized by the UK respective branch. According to the Estonians, this led to 

their lack of knowledge in existing procedures, documentation, and rules within the International Security 

Assistance Force (ISAF), because these had not been 

shared with them prior to deployment. The Estonian 

team leader noted: 

According to MOU [Memorandum of Understanding] 

the unit was given OPCON under TF Helmand (UK) 

without any national caveats. In the good faith it was 

assumed that Estonian HUMINT [Estonian Human 

Intelligence] teams will be integrated into the TF respective system, but that never happened. Already the 

first unit (ESTHUMINT-1) was kept away from UK 

HUMINT and Counter Intelligence (CI) systems and 

tasks given to them were more than often just ‘something to do’ type.22

The MOU put together and agreed to by the UK and 

Estonia would not impose any restrictions or special 

conditions on the use of the team. It has been the Estonian policy, and indeed the policy of all three Baltic 

States, that their forces deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan are combat ready forces and can be employed in 

any manner deemed suitable by the task forces they 

are assigned to—including combat operations. All of 

the Baltic States had military personnel killed in Iraq 

and Afghanistan, and the “no caveats” policy of deployment is the norm. In this case, at the operational 

level it was assumed that the Estonian HUMINT team 

would be fully integrated with the UK forces. However, there was apparently a strong suspicion on the 

part of the UK commanders at the tactical level that 

the Estonian team was not to be used and any real cooperation was denied. Essentially, the UK forces were 
19

not familiar with the Estonian unit and its capabilities, 

so the unit was used very little. In fact, the HUMINT 

team could and should have been extensively used to 

support the combat units in Helmand Province. After the poorly executed deployment of the HUMINT 

team the Estonian team leader noted that: 

in the future all efforts should be done in highest level 

to enforce complete integrated training with units 

with whom the deployment will be conducted. Common awareness and understanding of existing rules, 

documents and procedures is mandatory to be introduced in pre-deployment training.23

Upon assuming the responsibility for leading a 

PRT in Afghanistan in 2005, Lithuania had to develop 

a cultural training program for its deploying personnel. The cultural material provided by the United 

States was too general and did not specifically address 

the issues of the Ghor Province, in west central Afghanistan, which had its own set of conditions. The 

Lithuanian army staff contracted the only two Dari 

speakers in Lithuania to provide basic language instruction to personnel before deployment to Afghanistan. In addition, the military staff worked with the 

national university academics to develop a cultural 

awareness training program specific to the province 

where the Lithuanians would deploy. The Lithuanian 

soldiers who deployed on the mission felt that they 

had at least a good basis to work with, but still believed that the cultural preparation could have been 

more extensive.24
20

Force Organization.

When the Baltic nations committed themselves 

to sending company-sized, and even larger, detachments to support the coalition operations in Iraq and 

Afghanistan, they underwent a commitment to adapt 

their force structure for these missions. The officers 

who deployed report that the key operational requirement for the Baltic contingents was that they were to 

be highly flexible and ready to take on more missions 

than assigned by the coalition commanders. That the 

Baltic nations could expect to take on more missions 

was a result of the “no caveat” policy of the three 

Baltic States that allow their forces to be used as the 

senior force commanders see fit. In fact, being ready 

to take on more than specifically assigned missions 

meant that Baltic States’ units deploying to Iraq and 

Afghanistan had to increase the specialists and support forces to their military detachments to create balanced units capable of fulfilling a variety of missions. 

The additional flexibility required all three countries 

to spend money on communications equipment and 

capabilities for their forces. The Estonians added a 

special signals team after it first deployed forces to 

Afghanistan. As experience was built up, the Estonians added further units to support their infantry 

company operating in Helmand Province under UK 

command. In 2008, Estonia added a sniper team to its 

forces, as well as a mortar platoon. In 2009, a fire support team was added. In 2010, an anti-IED detachment 

was deployed. 

The Lithuanians, with the experience of leading a 

PRT from 2005 to the present, have had to make several changes to the PRT support structure to accomplish their mission. In setting up the headquarters in 

the first rotation, the Lithuanians had some friction 
21

when some of the branch chiefs of the PRT staff were 

officers from other countries operating on a different 

rotation schedule than the Lithuanians. Because this 

required changing a branch chief in mid-rotation and 

other staff changes, the Lithuanians concluded that all 

staff branch chiefs should be from the lead country to 

prevent rotation conflicts such as this. The problems 

of the rotation schedule also applied to small national 

contingents working under the Lithuanians in which 

some national rotations occurred in the middle of the 

lead nation PRT rotation. The failure to coordinate 

rotations at first meant that the lead nation and new 

rotation needed “additional in theatre training, familiarization with unit procedures and so on.”25 The 

Lithuanian PRT chief of staff noted that units needed 

to follow standard operating procedures (SOPs) when 

deploying on an operation and should avoid development of additional SOPs.26

Operational Coordination with Coalition Partners.

The whole process of deploying forces on overseas 

missions was made easier in the 1990s by the Estonian, 

Latvian, and Lithuanian parliaments passing laws that 

authorized the deployment of national forces overseas 

on NATO and allied missions, and set the guidelines 

and conditions for the deployment of forces.27 Thus, 

all the deployments of the three Baltic States since 

the early 1990s have taken place in conditions of full 

transparency and with full legitimacy, backed by parliamentary law as well as the national agreements 

with NATO and allied states. Under the national laws, 

the Baltic national forces can be deployed in combat 

operations without any caveats. Operating under full 

legality is important in democratic states, so the Baltic military staffs have ensured that the deployments 
22

are transparent to the political leadership and that the 

public is well informed.

Although the Baltic States do not place caveats on 

the use of their troops by higher allied headquarters, 

other nations do have caveats. One of the principles 

of planning Baltic deployments is a complete legal 

understanding of the caveats and conditions enacted 

by allied forces and understanding how such caveats 

might affect the operations. Commanders and staffs 

from the three Baltic States all point out the importance of pre-deployment training and close coordination with the forces of their larger partner states with 

which they will deploy. Pre-deployment training 

means holding exercises together and spending time 

with the larger partner’s units. The Estonian HUMINT 

team would have been used more effectively if it had 

trained together with the British forces that it was assigned to support.

The Baltic States had to deal with a large number 

of legal issues in deploying its troops abroad. These issues included contracting services with national companies for support, as well as drawing up contracts 

and MOUs with host nation companies and governments. In Afghanistan, as leader of a PRT, the Lithuanian government had to negotiate an MOU with 

the government of Afghanistan that laid out national 

responsibilities in context of the Afghan national 

strategy.28 Setting out an agreement covering 5 years 

of operations in a counterinsurgency environment 

was a complex task, and that Lithuania could handle 

such negotiations and agreements demonstrates that 

not only have the armed forced been transformed in 

their capabilities by the experience of overseas deployments, but the Lithuanian Foreign Ministry has 

also gained considerable experience.29 In addition, 

because the Baltic States depend upon large nation 
23

support for basic logistics, including supply of food, 

fuel, ammunition, water, and laundry, the provision 

and payment for all these items and services had to be 

set out legally. In fact, the Baltic national staffs became 

competent in managing the legal and contract side of 

operations, with a mention from one Baltic defense 

ministry lawyer that, “it is sometimes not very easy 

for small nations such as ours to negotiate with large 

nations such as the US.”30

In Iraq and Afghanistan, the Baltic forces studied 

and became familiar with the U.S. and UK published 

counterinsurgency doctrines before deployment. 

NATO counterinsurgency doctrine was also studied.31

Studying doctrine and ensuring that the commanders and staff are working from the same concepts are 

key to effective operations in a coalition environment. 

Luckily, this has not been a major issue because the 

Baltic Defence College, which trains most of the Baltic 

officers above the rank of lieutenant, teaches NATO 

planning procedures and doctrine as well as U.S. and 

UK doctrine in its courses on counterinsurgency and 

stability operations. Baltic national contingents also 

stressed doctrine education in the unit preparation for 

Iraq and Afghanistan operations.

The Lithuanian experience is the most relevant as 

the Lithuanians have the most experience in multinational coordination due to their role as lead nation of a 

PRT. The Lithuanian experience provides some examples of the frictions that occur from various national 

caveats. None of the national caveats that the Lithuanians faced from their allied nations in their PRT 

was a show-stopper, but all of them required extra 

planning to make the PRT run smoothly. For example, 

the Danish mobile liaison observation team (MLOT) 

was not allowed to conduct guard duty. The Croatian 

MLOT was not allowed to conduct riot control tasks. 
24

Per IFOR directions, the Lithuanian contingent was 

not allowed to operate outside its areas of responsibility, nor to participate in counternarcotics operations. 

In order to mitigate the frictions of the national caveats and of the IFOR and Afghan imposed restrictions, the caveats were made known to the Lithuanian 

force planners well before deployment of national 

contingents. Taking this information into account, 

the necessary tasks were allotted to the contingents 

within the PRT with these caveats and restrictions 

in mind. With good prior planning, the Lithuanians 

were able to maximize the force efficiency in the Ghor 

Province operations.32

Essentially, the Baltic States all worked from the 

understanding that they can only deploy and operate while serving under a senior partner nation and 

that it is their responsibility to adapt and prepare 

themselves to work with the senior partner—be that 

partner the United States, the UK, or Denmark. There 

was considerable friction in the first major deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan simply because deployments on a larger scale (hundreds of personnel 

with equipment per rotation) were situations with 

which the Baltic military staff simply had no experience. The Baltic States had to learn to do the complex 

rotation planning, force preparation, sustainment, legal support, and allied coordination with little prior 

background. It should be noted that most of the friction and problems noted herein occurred in the earlier 

force rotation; since then, the three Baltic States have 

gained experience. 
25

Material and Logistics.

Issues of equipment interoperability and maintenance of support and supply can be some of the 

most pressing issues for small nations that participate 

in a NATO or multinational coalition operation. Small 

nations have small infrastructure, and the limited 

amount of support infrastructure that is available is 

usually not easily transported and deployed. In addition, the military staffs of small nations have very 

limited experience in sending forces overseas. 

The Baltic nations, as is the case for all small nations, do not have the force structure or resources to 

send fully equipped and self-contained units to deploy 

thousands of miles from home and then be sustained 

from home. With limited transport and support services, small nations such as the Baltic States found that 

they needed to partner with a larger nation to deploy 

and sustain forces far from home.

The Baltic States have found that interoperability 

can be a problem—communications equipment, ammunition supply, and vehicle maintenance can be 

difficult, as not all the Baltic equipment is common to 

the larger partner nations serving in Afghanistan or 

Iraq. For example, a good deal of the Baltic national 

forces equipment comes from the Nordic nations. Vehicles tend to come from Germany. Communications 

equipment comes from various nations. The Baltic 

reports note that there have been some difficulties in 

achieving technical interoperability of electronic warfare (EW) systems between the Baltic States, and the 

United States and the UK. In addition, establishing 

secure radio communications with allies has been a 

complicated issue.33

Basic supply items can be a cause of friction for a 

small nation. Due to the variety of equipment used in 
26

the Baltic forces, keeping ammunition supplied can be 

an issue. In Afghanistan, some types of ammunition 

used by Estonian units were in limited supply, and it 

was difficult for the national staff to get the required 

ammunition to Afghanistan and then down to the 

unit level.34

Arranging for equipment maintenance and supply 

of spare parts can be a major headache for small nations with very limited logistics. In 2006, early in the 

Lithuanian deployment to Ghor Province in Afghanistan, a shortage of spare parts and vehicle maintenance 

problems forced the Lithuanian forces to cut back on 

operations until the problems were sorted out.35 

A further important support issue for small nations is airlift. Small nations such as the Baltic States 

have small air forces, and of the three states only Lithuania has some transport aircraft as part of its armed 

forces. Thus, Estonia and Latvia depend completely 

upon airlift from strategic partners. In getting small 

shipments of parts, or small numbers of personnel to 

the field, Estonia and Latvia were at the mercy of the 

scheduling and airlift priorities of the larger nations. 

For the most part, the Baltic countries believe that U.S. 

support was good. However, the Lithuanians were 

very glad that they had some transport aircraft that 

could respond immediately to calls from the PRT in 

Afghanistan to bring spare parts, special teams, and 

rotate personnel home on leave.

Iraq and Afghanistan pressed the Baltic States to 

make major changes in their procurement and development policies. When the Baltic nations committed 

themselves to supporting the Iraq and Afghanistan 

coalition operations, they had to acquire appropriate 

uniforms and equipment for desert climates. The vehicles and heavy equipment of the Baltic States were 
27

suitable for northern European conventional operations, but not for an insurgency operation in which 

the main threats to personnel and vehicles were IEDs, 

mines, and small arms fire. With the largest commitment to Afghanistan, Lithuania went ahead and developed its own desert uniforms and personal soldier 

equipment. Both Lithuania and Estonia took their 

support vehicles, usually German-made trucks and 

all-terrain vehicles, and had local industries modify 

them for the conditions their forces were likely to face, 

for example, the installation of reinforced axles, spall 

protection lining, and safety seats.36

Photo provided by the Estonian Armed Forces.

Figure 1. Modified Estonian truck in Afghanistan.

Lessons Learned Process.

Learning from ongoing operations is a key part of 

the military process. In the first decade of standing up 

the brand new forces of the Baltic States, there was 

so much to do, yet so few trained commanders and 
28

staff officers to do it, that creating a coherent lessons 

learned process came in low on the list of priorities. 

The active experience of deploying troops to high risk 

operations overseas, especially to combat zones such 

as Iraq and Afghanistan, pushed the Baltic nations 

to develop a lessons learned system just for survival. 

With the first Baltic units deployed to peacekeeping 

operations in Yugoslavia in the 1990s, a regular program of reports to the national headquarters from the 

field was established. This relatively informal after action report (AAR) system was used to modify doctrine, 

equipment, and training for follow-on rotations.37

In their initial deployments, Estonia and Latvia relied on a fairly ad hoc process with a focus on collecting 

data on material and transport issues, but not on tactical lessons. Estonia deployed to high-intensity conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan without a proper lessons 

learned system. Once units or detachment deployed, 

there was constant contact with the home forces, and 

there was also ongoing contact with the next rotation 

so as to ensure a smooth turnover.38 Like Estonia, the 

Latvian approach to lessons learned has largely been 

ad hoc, with only a limited analysis of gained lessons 

and few conclusions drawn with regard to doctrine 

before 2010.39 Although Estonia and Latvia have seen 

less systematic dissemination of lessons learned, the 

smallness of their forces has allowed for an informal 

transmission of vital information and lessons as the 

outgoing rotation meets with the incoming force and 

passes information.

In contrast to Estonia and Latvia, Lithuania, with 

the largest armed forces of the three Baltic States, has a 

well-developed formal lessons learned process. Lithuania developed a special office in the national military 

headquarters to collect, analyze, and quickly dissem-
29

inate lessons learned on active operations. Lithuania 

has a developed doctrine for the AAR process, as well 

as a fairly developed doctrine on counterinsurgency operations.40 Officers from all three Baltic nations 

agree that the deployments to the Balkans and to Iraq 

and Afghanistan have pushed the Baltic nations to develop their process of collecting data and learning and 

disseminating lessons. Doctrine is now taken very seriously in the three Baltic States, and all three nations 

have published manuals and handbooks on counterinsurgency doctrine, with the Lithuanian literature on 

the subject being the most extensive. 

Lithuania and Estonia made a point of using the 

first officers deployed on operations as instructors in 

their national officer and soldier and NCO courses. 

The intent was to ensure that the latest operational lessons and experience were passed to the new soldiers 

as quickly as possible.41 Indeed, from the first deployments, the three Baltic States have all worked to see 

that the recent experience and specific lessons are disseminated to the national forces as quickly as possible. 

Lithuania, with the experience and responsibility 

of having led a PRT in Afghanistan since 2005, has 

gone the farthest in terms of developing doctrine. Afghanistan’s experience included constant liaison with 

the government of Afghanistan and negotiating an 

MOU with the Afghan government. The PRT task was 

especially complex since it required multinational coordination. This meant developing an organizational 

structure and operating concept that included civilian 

personnel from Lithuania and several other nations, as 

well as military personnel from several nations. This 

experience has led Lithuanian officers to develop a 

doctrine on how to operate a PRT and how to conduct 

counterinsurgency. The Lithuanians took established 
30

U.S. and UK counterinsurgency doctrine and added 

their own variations to best manage the PRT operation. The Lithuanians also developed their own approach to meet the unique requirements of the Ghor 

Province where they were stationed.42

Summary and Conclusion.

The three Baltic States, in their extensive deployments in support of NATO and allied coalitions operations, have proven that the armed forces of small 

states can develop and adjust rapidly and effectively. 

By NATO and U.S. standards, the three Baltic States 

have fielded personnel and units able to carry out 

complex tasks effectively in combat conditions. Since 

the 1990s, the performance of the three Baltic nations 

in support of UN, NATO, and allied deployments 

has been consistently effective. This is a remarkable 

accomplishment, considering that the three Baltic 

States started in 1991 literally from scratch—there was 

nothing that the Baltic nations wanted to retain from 

the Soviet military or its traditions. Despite the initial 

poverty of the three states, their lack of infrastructure, and few military traditions, the armed forces of 

the Baltic States developed rapidly to the point that 

they can now carry out highly complex tasks—such 

as commanding a PRT in Afghanistan. In general, the 

armed forces of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania set out 

with the goal of using the deployment experience to 

develop their forces to be interoperable with NATO. 

This is a goal they have met.

To answer the original questions posed in this 

monograph: The three Baltic States have demonstrated that small nations can commit a variety of forces 

and personnel to overseas operations. The three Bal-
31

tic States have all deployed light infantry forces to 

Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan. In addition, all three 

countries have sent training teams to train host nation personnel in several operations. Lithuania and 

Estonia have deployed special forces detachments to 

combat operations. Estonia has committed an ordnance disposal detachment to Afghanistan. Latvia and 

Lithuania have committed engineer and support detachments. Lithuania has committed the staff to man 

a PRT in Afghanistan. Just as important as the troops, 

the Baltic States have demonstrated the commitment 

and the ability to sustain those forces for many rotations. Indeed, the variety of missions that these three 

small states can carry out is fairly impressive. All the 

Baltic forces that have been deployed have been effective partners in operations. There is no single niche capability that the Baltic States have fulfilled, nor do the 

three states want to be in the position of being solely a 

niche force provider.

On the other hand, the limitations of the three Baltic States are fairly clear. The naval and air forces of the 

Baltic States are very limited. Only Lithuania has some 

air transport aircraft. All of the Baltic nations have to 

rely on partner states for airlift, and that is an issue 

that causes some problems. The logistics capability of 

the three Baltic States, at least their ability to sustain 

units outside their home countries, is minimal. This is 

also a problem area. Essentially, the Baltic States cannot deploy forces outside their home countries without linking themselves with a larger partner nation 

that can provide the airlift, logistics, and support that 

is required. In all cases, partner nations have come forward and handled these activities. It is important to 

note this, because when a small nation partners with 

a larger ally, extensive coordination, planning, and 
32

joint training is required to make things run smoothly. 

A good deal of lead time is also required to make an 

operation work. In the past, the Baltic States have developed good working relationships and joint training programs with larger partners such as the United 

States, the UK, and Denmark. For the most part, the 

partnerships and support have gone smoothly. However, it is essential to note that support cannot work 

on an ad hoc basis. If the Baltic States commit forces 

to a NATO reaction force for rapid deployment, there 

will need to be extensive pre-arrangements for logistics support from larger partners.

The deployments of the Baltic forces in the last 

20 years show that small nations need to have their 

own capability for specialized training, cultural training, and basic HUMINT. In a diverse country like 

Afghanistan, each province operates under different 

conditions, and the ethnic and cultural differences 

between regions can be enormous. In short, there is 

no such thing as a “one size fits all” doctrine or unit 

preparation. The Baltic countries all found the need to 

develop their own specialized cultural training programs to meet the specific conditions and language 

issues that their forces would meet in places such as 

Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan. All the Baltic countries used their own resources to contract for cultural, 

language, and specialist training. In every case, the 

deploying soldiers found the preparation provided by 

the national forces, often working with the national 

universities, was extremely valuable. The key lesson 

is that small nations have to be proactive and seize 

the initiative in liaising with other forces and developing the right kind of cultural and language training for 

their forces. 
33

One of the major lessons in the deployment of the 

Baltic Forces was the importance of a mutually understood doctrine. When small nations take on significant 

leadership roles, as the Lithuanians have done in Afghanistan, there is a need for detailed guidance and 

doctrine coming from the lead country and developed 

in partnership with the coalition headquarters. Doctrine is even more important in NATO and EU outof-area operations conducted today because these are 

not only military operations, but also have a large civilian component. All this meant that even a small nation such as Lithuania devoted a good deal of effort to 

creating its own doctrine and local strategy that suited 

its mission in the Ghor Province of Afghanistan. This 

was not a rejection of U.S. or UK doctrine, or an approach that went against the allied command policy in 

Afghanistan. It was simply meeting the need to adapt 

a general doctrine to the specific local requirements. 

Luckily, Lithuania and the other Baltic States have 

national staffs and well-educated field grade officers 

who could identify requirements quickly as issues 

arose during deployments and devise appropriate 

programs and training to meet the needs.

Because they lack mass and have very limited support capabilities, small nations must be able to adapt 

quickly to conditions so they can operate effectively 

with their allies. One senior UK officer said this of the 

Baltic forces:

Do I understand this word [interoperability] properly? 

It seems to me that no dedicated activities are carried 

out to achieve it. Estonians are simply brave guys who 

adapt to any situation. Good enough to adapt to interoperability as well. . . .43
34

From the initial peacekeeping experience in the 

former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, the Baltic forces have 

offered a good example for other nations to follow 

in force development and transformation. Indeed, 

money and resources have not played a major role 

in the transformation of the forces. The Baltic States 

have limited resources, yet they have used what they 

have efficiently to the point of designing and modifying equipment needed for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The success of the transformation process 

was founded on a powerful commitment of the three 

Baltic States’ governments to see their forces developed to NATO standards and to build armed forces, 

albeit small, that could still make a substantial contribution to the Western Alliance. All three armed forces 

stressed thorough training at every level. In addition, 

at every step of the Baltic deployments, starting with 

the 1990s, the three national military establishments 

carefully reviewed the lessons of each operation as 

they were ongoing and made rapid changes in their 

doctrine and forces structure and procurement with 

each operation. The three Baltic States have been 

very successful in adopting the Western military culture and ethos. Again, this was a matter of concerted 

national will and good leadership to make a 

transformation. 

The Baltic experience shows that small states are 

able to contribute highly trained units of company or 

larger size able to operate under multinational command. The development of this capability is based 

on several factors. The success of the Baltic States’ 

deployments as allied forces were possible because, 

from the start, the three states understood that they 

would have to serve under a lead nation that could 

provide the transport, command and control, and lo-
35

gistical support necessary. Knowing this, it was the 

duty of the three Baltic States to learn about and adapt 

to the lead nation for the operation. Getting this right 

required extensive planning and coordination before 

the deployment of the Baltic forces. It also required 

some training with the lead nation before deploying. 

Although this planning and coordination failed on a 

few occasions—as in the case of the Estonian HUMINT 

team sent to support the UK forces—for the most part, 

it was carried out successfully. The pre-deployment 

training and planning has been generally successful, 

and the Baltic military staffs have shown that they can 

carry out complex planning.

The high standard of officer and NCO education 

and training in the Baltic States was also key to the 

successful performance of the mission. The three 

Baltic States have formed highly effective military 

education institutions from the level of lieutenant to 

colonel. Given their limited resources, the three Baltic 

States maximized their personnel and infrastructure 

to create the Baltic Defence College, a single staff college and institute of higher military education that is 

equally owned by the three nations. The quality of the 

staff college is shown by its accreditation by the U.S. 

military, the Canadian armed forces, and by several 

other major NATO nations as being fully equivalent 

to their national staff courses. The colonels’ course 

taught by the Baltic Defence College is accredited by 

NATO. The Baltic commanders and national staffs, 

manned with officers trained in the Baltic States and 

in NATO nations, have proven equal to the task of deploying a significant number of personnel overseas. 

This required numerous adaptations, including developing desert equipment for the soldiers and modifying tactical vehicles for Middle East and Central Asian 

conditions and counterinsurgency. 
36

Although the Baltic States have been successful 

in deploying significant forces overseas, there were 

many areas of friction that occurred simply due to the 

complexity of the tasks required and the initial lack 

of experience of the Baltic States’ forces. Developing 

detailed legal agreements with other nations, creating a long-term strategy for rotation of forces, arranging for logistics and support in undeveloped nations 

thousands of miles from home, developing training 

programs, developing cultural awareness programs, 

and developing close coordination with military partners have all been points of friction for the three small 

Baltic States. These are complex tasks for large nations 

as well. Problems in all these areas were overcome because the national staffs had well-trained staff officers, 

and the three Baltic States were effective in collecting 

lessons learned from operations as they were ongoing and quickly adapting and making changes to doctrine, procedure, and equipment to meet the mission 

challenges. If the well-trained staffs and an effective 

program to learn and disseminate lessons were not in 

place, the many problems that arose would not have 

been readily overcome.

The long-term partnering programs of the Baltic 

States’ armed forces with older NATO nations has 

also been key to the successful deployments of Baltic 

national forces. Over 20 years, the Baltic States have 

built up close relationships with allies (the close relationship of the Baltic States with the Danish forces is 

a case in point), and these close relationships speeded 

the process of transformation and built up trust between the key alliance partners. Forging partnership 

on the battlefield can be done, but requires time and 

leads to less effective use of small nation forces.
37

How effective were the three Baltic States in using the numerous deployments on active operations 

as part of a program to transform their forces? By 

most standards, the effort must be judged as highly 

successful. For one thing, the overwhelming majority of officers and NCOs of the armed forces of three 

countries have now taken part in active operations as 

part of a multinational coalition force—usually operating with NATO partners. The small size of the Baltic 

forces meant that they had to work closely with allies on a daily basis. This means that for periods of 

6-month deployments, hundreds of Baltic personnel 

on every rotation worked closely with partners, using the English language and operating within an allied command system. In little more than a decade, 

the armed forces of the three Baltic States have become highly combat experienced. Working closely 

in an allied environment is now an integral part of 

the culture and standard operations of the three 

Baltic nations.

Senior American and British officers who have 

worked with the armed forces of the Baltic States on 

deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan have praised the 

performance of the Baltic forces. One has to note that, 

in both cases, the Baltic States deployed forces to hot 

areas and fought under U.S. and British commands in 

tough environments—and with no caveats. All of the 

senior American and British officers with whom the 

author has spoken have a high regard for the fighting 

competence and professionalism of the Baltic troops. 

Indeed, throughout NATO, although the Baltic States 

forces might be small, they are highly regarded. This 

is solely the result of the professionalism they have 

demonstrated on deployment operations. 
38

The experience of the Baltic nations in overseas deployments illustrates common problems and frictions 

that occur in any large multinational operation. The 

ways and means by which the Baltic States have overcome the problems should serve as a model for other 

small states in participating in future peace enforcement or stability operations in the context of a multinational environment. 

Recommendations for the U.S. Land Forces.

First of all, the good news is that now and in the 

foreseeable future, the United States can count on 

military support and participation of the three Baltic 

States in a NATO-approved and supported military 

contingency operation. The three Baltic States have 

shown the capability to deploy well-trained and wellequipped units of company and reinforced company 

size (about 200 personnel) and maintain units of this 

size in a combat zone for 6-month rotations. However, 

to do this, the three Baltic States need airlift support 

to and from the deployment area and, when in theater, need a full array of logistics support. Both NATO 

and the United States will need to take this into account when planning contingency operations in the 

NATO area.

The best way to use the well-trained Baltic forces 

and to employ the several capabilities that they can 

bring to military operations, including infantry, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), engineer, police 

training teams, medical, and HUMINT teams, would 

be as a single force that would work and train together. The Baltic States might consider a revival of an idea 

from the early 1990s when the three states created the 

BALTBAT, a battalion composed of troops from the 
39

three countries that trained together and was intended 

to support NATO or UN peace operations. In fact, the 

battalion was never deployed, but it did advance the 

training and English knowledge of the three armed 

forces, and it helped the three Baltic countries attain 

NATO levels of support in an efficient manner. The 

BALTBAT was an important and very successful project initiated by the three Baltic States for the transformation of their forces to NATO standards in the 1990s. 

Now the three Baltic States each have mature Western armed forces, so such a program today would be 

developed much more easily.

Since the early 1990s, the three Baltic countries 

have shown that they can work together with U.S. and 

NATO allies in multinational operations. The revival 

of the BALTBAT concept and the creation of a battalion-sized force for the three Baltic States with companies from each country, as well as special support 

detachments, including intelligence, military police, 

EOD, and engineer and logistics elements such as supply and medical, would not be especially difficult for 

the three countries as they already work together on 

many common military issues such as the Baltic Defence College and other joint training. This battalion 

would train and operate using the English language, 

since the Baltic States have already proven they can 

operate easily in English and be available on rapid 

notice to support a NATO contingency mission. The 

United States ought to encourage and support such a 

concept in future defense discussions within NATO.

Creation of such a force is very doable, and the 

costs would not be high. For the United States, it 

might entail some small costs in supporting training 

of a combined BALTBAT with partnered U.S. forces. 

The United States can arrange that a new BALTBAT 
40

is linked in training and planning to a U.S. brigade 

stationed in Europe or to a UK brigade, because for 

language reasons, the Baltics need to pair with an English-speaking country. Such a battalion kept at a high 

state of training and readiness, and including special 

support teams, would be a significant asset for NATO 

as NATO faces the post-Afghanistan contingencies 

that are likely to arise.

Finally, the U.S. military should consider the military and specialist civilian personnel in planning and 

standing up military advisory teams that would assist nations in NATO’s area of interest, including Africa, the Mideast, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. As 

noted, the Baltic nations have armed forces with much 

experience in counterinsurgency operations gained in 

Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kosovo. Baltic nation personnel are competent, educated to a Western standard, 

and are fluent in English. They have a well-deserved 

reputation among the U.S. and British officers who 

have worked with them as being highly professional 

and easy to work with. In short, they would be a useful 

addition to a small advisory team trying to assist the 

armed forces of a small nation. Moreover, the Baltic 

officers, NCOs, and civilian specialists can bring the 

perspective of small nations that have recently gone 

through a process of building Western and democratic 

armed forces completely from scratch, and the Baltic 

personnel would have valuable insights in this regard. 

Additionally, if an advisory mission were proposed 

in support of the broader NATO strategy of engagement, the Baltic States would be very likely to participate. The history of Baltic States’ support for NATO 

indicates that Baltic governments will be very willing 

to cooperate in such missions.
41

ENDNOTES

1. For a national view from the Baltic, see Toomas Riim, 

“Estonia and NATO: A Constructivist View on a National Interest 

and Alliance Behaviour,” Baltic Security and Defence Review, Vol. 8, 

2006, pp. 34-52.

2. In March 2010, the Baltic Defence College workshops featured presentations from the military staffs of all three Baltic nations as well as presentations of officers who had participated in 

deployments as commanders and staff officers.

3. For a Baltic view of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) transformation and its significance, see Kestutis 

Paulauskas, “NATO at 60: Lost in Transformation,” in Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review 2009-2010, Vilnius, Lithuania: Strategic Research Center, 2010, pp. 31-54; and Martynas Zapolskis, 

“NATO Transformation Scenarios” in Lithuanian Annual Strategic 

Review 2009-2010, Vilnius, Lithuania: Strategic Research Center, 

2010, pp. 55-78.

4. For background on the security policy of the Baltic nations and their attitude towards NATO, see Zaneta Ozolina, ed., 

Rethinking Security, Riga, Latvia: Zinätne, 2010. 

5. See Linas Linkevicius, Ambassador of Lithuania to NATO, 

“Participation of Lithuanian Troops in International Peace support Operations,” Baltic Defence Review, Vol. 1, 1999, on Nordic 

nation support to the early Baltic forces. See also Major Aurelijus 

Alasauskas and Major Giedrius Anglickis, Lithuanian Army, “On 

the Baltic Experiences: Lithuanian Lessons Leaned from International Operations from 1994 to 2010,” Baltic Security and Defence 

Review, Vol. 12, Issue 2, 2010, p.140, on the Swedish support to 

Baltic training.

6. Major Gunnar Havi, Estonian Army, “The Afghanistan 

Mission’s Benefits for Estonia,” Baltic Security and Defence Review, 

Vol. 12, Issue 2, 2010, p. 159.

7. General Michael Clemmeson, Danish Army, “NATO 

Interoperability and the Baltic Defence College,” Baltic Defence 

Review, Vol. 1, 1999, pp. 1-7.
42

8. Linkevicius. 

9. For a Baltic perception on the value of deployments as a 

means of developing the armed forces, see Havi. On early deployments, see pp. 159-161.

10. The importance of winning a seat at the table is a constant 

theme in the official statements and reports of the Baltic nations, 

as well as commentaries by leading political figures and academics. For Baltic attitudes and policy perceptions on NATO and the 

European Union (EU) commitment, see Margarita Seselgyte, “The 

Lithuanian Presidency of the EU Council and Common Security 

and Defense Policy: Opportunities and Challenges,” in the Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review 2011-2012, Vol. 10, Vilnius, Lithuania: 

Strategic Research Center, 2012, pp. 87-120; Paulauskas, pp. 31-54; 

Egdunas Racius, “Lithuania in the NATO Mission in Afghanistan: 

Between Idealism and Pragmatism,” Lithuanian Annual Strategic 

Review 2009-2010, Vilnius, Lithuania: Strategic Research Center, 

2010, pp. 187-207; Martynas Zapolskis, “NATO Transformation 

Scenarios,” Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review 2009-2010, Vilnius, 

Lithuania: Strategic Research Center, 2010, pp. 55-78; Zaneta Ozolina, ”Measuring the Effectiveness of NATO,” in Rethinking Security, Zaneta Ozolina, ed., Riga, Latvia: Zinätne, 2010, pp. 118-167. 

11. Cited in Grazina Miniotaite, “The Construction of the 

Model of the Army in Lithuania’s Political Discourse,” in Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review 2008, Vilnius, Lithuania: Strategic 

Research Center, 2009, p. 196. The Lithuanian National Defence 

Strategy of 2004, upon joining NATO, strongly reaffirmed the 

membership of NATO and the centrality of collective security as 

the cornerstone of Lithuanian policy. Lithuanian Annual Strategic 

Review 2011-2012, Vol. 10, pp. 196-198. 

12. Estonian Defence Ministry, Estonian Long Term Defence 

Development Plan 2009-2018, Tallinn, Estonia: Eesti Kaitsevägi, 

2009, p. 3.

13. Ibid.

14. This was the case until the financial crisis of 2008. In 2009-

11, all the Baltic budgets were cut. But in the 2012 and 2013 budgets, Estonia and Lithuania are increasing defense expenditures, 
43

and Estonia is back on track to spend 2 percent of gross domestic 

product (GDP) on defense. The increasing defense budgets of the 

three Baltic States are in contrast with most Western European nations, which continue to decrease their military budgets.

15. For an excellent overview of all Lithuanian deployments, 

see Alasauskas and Anglickis, pp. 134- 158.

16. See Lithuanian Armed Forces, ed., In Service for Peace, 

Vilnius, Lithuania: Lithuanian Armed Forces, 2011, pp. 18-21, 

which details all the Lithuanian units and personnel that have deployed on overseas operations since 1994.

17. Proceedings of the Baltic Defence College Workshop on 

Baltic States’ Deployment Experience, Tartu, Estonia, March 2010.

18. Alasauskas and Anglickis, p. 141.

19. The strong language capabilities of the Baltic armed forces 

come from the three Baltic nations’ national education systems, 

which are high quality programs at all levels. Since 1991, English 

has been the second language of the Estonian, Lithuanian, and 

Latvian school systems. Most young people are somewhat fluent 

in English. As an adjunct professor of Tartu University, the author 

of this monograph teaches a graduate course to a highly multinational group completely in English. The author has regularly 

lectured in the University of Latvia in English and found that the 

undergraduates have exceptional fluency in English. 

20. Captain Rene Toomse, Estonian Army, Report: Lessons 

Learned, ESTHUMINT-2, Kandahar, Afghanistan, November 15, 

2006-March 1, 2007, Tallinn, Estonia, May 2010.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid. 

24. See Egdunas Racius, “The ‘Cultural Awareness’ Factor 

in the Activities of the Lithuanian PRT in Afghanistan,” Baltic 

Security and Defence Review, Vol. 9, 2007, pp. 57-78.
44

25. Lieutenant Colonel Mindaugas Steponavicius, Lithuanian 

Army, “Lessons Learned for the Preparation of the ISAF Mission,” June 2012.

26. Ibid.

27. On the laws authorizing the deployment of forces abroad, 

see Linkevicius. 

28. Strategy for the Engagement of the Republic of Lithuania in 

the International Community’s Activities in the Islamic Republic of 

Afghanistan in 2009-2013, Vilnius, Lithuania: Government of the 

Republic of Lithuania, 2009.

29. Major Giedrius Anglickis, Lithuanian Army, Development 

of Local National Security forces and the Experience of Lithuania’s Provincial Reconstruction Team, PRT, Mission in Afghanistan. MA thesis 

of the Latvian National Defence Academy, Riga, Latvia, 2011 p. 8. 

30. Baltic Defence College Workshop on Baltic Deployments, 

March 2010.

31. Anglickis, MA thesis, pp. 9-13.

32. Steponavicius, “Lessons Learned for the Preparation of 

the ISAF Mission.”

33. Proceedings of the Baltic Defence College Workshop on 

Baltic States’ Deployment Experience.

34. Ibid.

35. Lieutenant Colonel Mindaugas Steponavicius, “Lessons 

Learned in the Participation in the ISAF Operation,” June 2012.

36. Proceedings of the Baltic Defence College Workshop on 

Baltic States’ Deployment Experience.

37. Report of Lieutenant Colonel Darius Vaicikauskas, “Insights from the OSCE Mission in Kosovo,” Kosovo Verification 

Mission, June 2012.
45

38. Proceedings of the Baltic Defence College Workshop on 

Baltic States’ Deployment Experience.

39. Ibid.

40. Ibid.

41. See Havi, pp. 160-162; and Alasauskas and Anglickis, 

p. 137.

42. An excellent overview of how the Lithuanian PRT operated is General Almantas Leika, Lithuanian Army, who commanded the PRT 2006-2007, “The Lithuanian-led Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan—Achievements and Challenges,” 

in Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review 2008, Vilnius, Lithuania: 

Strategic Research Center, 2009, pp. 161-182. The most extensive 

study of the doctrines the Lithuanians developed for Afghanistan 

counterinsurgency is Anglickis, MA thesis.

43. Proceedings of the Baltic Defence College Workshop on 

Baltic States’ Deployment Experience. 
46

ANNEX

Map of Afghanistan Provinces and Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). Lithuanian PRT Headquarters (HQ) was at Chaghcharan in West Central 

Afghanistan Marked by the Lithuanian Flag.

Figure 2. ISAF Provincial Reconstruction Team 

Locations.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Anthony A. Cucolo III

Commandant

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