CLD-129 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 19-3382

___________

ENERVA W. TROTMAN,

Appellant

v.

T. SMITH

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-17-cv-00285)

Magistrate Judge: Honorable Richard A. Lanzillo (by consent)

____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or 

Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

February 27, 2020

Before: JORDAN, KRAUSE and MATEY, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: March 12, 2020)

_________

OPINION*

_________

PER CURIAM

Appellant Enerva Trotman, proceeding pro se, filed a civil-rights action naming as 

the sole defendant T. Smith, a correctional officer employed at the federal correctional 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
2

institution where Trotman is confined. He claimed that Smith engaged in racial 

discrimination, libel, slander, defamation of character, and religious discrimination. For 

relief, he requested that Smith be transferred to another institution and suspended without 

pay. 

The parties consented to proceed before a Magistrate Judge. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(c)(1). Smith filed a motion to dismiss, or in the alternative for summary 

judgment, asserting that Trotman had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. 

Smith submitted evidence in support of this assertion. In response, Trotman submitted no 

evidence related to exhaustion, but instead expanded upon his allegations. On March 26, 

2019, the Magistrate Judge granted Smith’s motion, and dismissed Trotman’s claims for 

failure to exhaust administrative remedies, after concluding that his administrative appeal 

was properly dismissed as untimely. Trotman did not file an appeal.

Six months later, on September 26, 2019, Trotman filed a post-judgment motion to 

reopen the case based on “excusable neglect.” The motion was in the form an affidavit 

asserting that his failure to exhaust administrative remedies came as a result of prison 

officials’ “egregious misconduct” in failing to forward his B-10 and B-11 forms. On 

October 3, 2019, the Magistrate Judge denied the post-judgment motion, construing it as 

having been brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), concluding that 

Trotman had failed to carry his burden to show his entitlement to relief under Rule 60(b), 

and that his failure to provide evidence to rebut Smith’s motion for summary judgment 

did not constitute excusable neglect. Furthermore, the Magistrate Judge reasoned that, 
3

even had Trotman filed his new affidavit in response to Smith’s motion, the analysis 

would have remained unchanged and Trotman’s claims still would have been dismissed. 

Trotman timely appealed the denial of his post-judgment motion.

We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.1

 We review 

the Magistrate Judge’s order denying Trotman’s post-judgment motion for abuse of 

discretion. See Brown v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 350 F.3d 338, 342 (3d Cir. 2003). We may 

summarily affirm if the appeal fails to present a substantial question. See Murray v. 

Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam); 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 

The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires full and procedurally proper exhaustion 

of all available administrative remedies as a prerequisite to prisoner suits challenging 

prison conditions under federal law. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 

81, 90 (2006) (“Proper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines and 

other critical procedural rules.”); Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 68 (3d Cir. 2000). Under 

the administrative-remedies process established by the Bureau of Prisons, an inmate who 

is dissatisfied with the warden’s response to his written Administrative Remedy Request 

may submit an appeal on a BP–10 form to the Regional Director within 20 days of the 

date of the warden’s response. 28 C.F.R. § 542.15. If the inmate is dissatisfied with the 

1 We lack jurisdiction to review the Magistrate Judge’s March 26, 2019 order dismissing 

Trotman’s claims. Trotman’s notice of appeal, dated October 15, 2019, was untimely 

with respect to the March 26, 2019 order, see Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A), and Trotman’s 

September 26, 2019 post-judgment motion did not toll the time for filing a notice of 

appeal, see Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(vi). 
4

Regional Director’s response, the inmate may submit a final appeal on a BP–11 form to 

the General Counsel at the Central Office of Appeals within 30 calendar days of the 

Regional Director’s response. See id.

Here, the warden denied Trotman’s Administrative Remedy Request on August 

16, 2016.

2

 He had 20 days—until September 5, 2016—to file his appeal to the Regional 

Director on the BP-10 form.

3

 However, he signed his BP-10 form on September 13, 

2016, and it was marked received by the Regional Director on September 19, 2016. The

Regional Director denied the appeal as untimely, and Trotman thereafter filed his appeal 

to the Central Office on the BP-11 form, which was denied on the ground that his appeal 

to the Regional Director had been untimely.

In his post-judgment motion, Trotman asserted that prison officials failed to 

forward his BP-10 and BP-11 forms. However, even if true, this allegation is irrelevant. 

Assuming, arguendo, that the prison mailbox rule applies to the Bureau of Prisons’ 

grievance system,4 Trotman signed his BP-10 form on September 13, 2016, well after the 

September 5, 2016 deadline to submit it to the Regional Director. Accordingly, the 

2 Trotman does not allege that there was any delay in his receipt of the warden’s denial.

3 We note that September 5, 2016 was Labor Day. Regardless, even were the deadline

extended to September 6, 2016, Trotman still failed to meet it. 

4 Cf. BOP Program Statement 1300.16, Administrative Remedy Program (Jan. 6, 2014)

(stating that the deadlines provided in § 542.15 “specify the date of the Appeal’s receipt 

in the regional office or the Central Office. The deadlines have been made deliberately 

long to allow sufficient mail time.”).
5

Magistrate Judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Trotman’s post-judgment 

motion.5

Finding no substantial question raised by this appeal, we will summarily affirm the 

Magistrate Judge’s order.6

 3d Cir. LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6. 

5 We note that in the Magistrate Judge’s opinion dismissing Trotman’s claims, he 

correctly applied the 20-day deadline to file an administrative appeal to the Regional 

Director, but in his order denying Trotman’s post-judgment motion, he incorrectly 

applied a 30-day deadline. However, this error did not affect the outcome.

6 Trotman’s motion for appointment of counsel is denied. See Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 

147, 155 (3d Cir. 1993).