IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 14-1598

Filed November 9, 2016

STATE OF IOWA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

STEPHEN ROBERT BLOOMER,

Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Henry W. Latham II, 

Judge.

The defendant appeals from his sentence for manufacturing a controlled 

substance (marijuana). AFFIRMED.

Lauren M. Phelps, Davenport, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Timothy M. Hau, Assistant 

Attorney General, for appellee.

Considered by Potterfield, P.J., and Doyle and Tabor, JJ.
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POTTERFIELD, Presiding Judge.

Stephen Bloomer appeals from his sentence for manufacturing a 

controlled substance (marijuana), in violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(1)(d) 

(2013). Bloomer maintains the district court abused its discretion in failing to 

consider all of the relevant factors on the record and by ordering a sentence that 

was unduly harsh. 

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

Based on a plea agreement he made with the State, in July 2014, Bloomer

entered a guilty plea for manufacturing a controlled substance (marijuana). The 

State then dismissed the charges of conspiracy to commit a non-forcible felony, 

drug tax stamp violation, and felon in possession of a firearm.

Sentencing was continued until September 2014 to permit the completion 

of a presentence investigation (PSI) report. The report stated:

Mr. Bloomer has a lengthy criminal history dating back to 

1983, when he would have been 18 years of age. His records 

include a variety of offenses including several serious traffic 

charges, a couple of [charges for operating while intoxicated,] and 

several other alcohol or drug related offenses. Mr. Bloomer is also 

a convicted sex offender . . . . He was also placed on two years 

probation in December 2004, after pleading guilty to Manufacture of 

a Schedule I controlled substance; to wit: Marijuana and Violation 

of the Drug Tax Stamp Act.

Additionally, in discussing Bloomer’s capabilities, the report stated:

He has a relatively substantial criminal history and I also get the 

impression that Mr. Bloomer tends to downplay the importance of 

his criminal behavior and criminal thinking. Mr. Bloomer has been 

given the benefit of the doubt numerous times by the judiciary and 

has been placed on supervised and unsupervised probations both. 

In spite of that, he keeps finding himself at odds with the Criminal 

Justice System. I honestly feel that Mr. Bloomer does not grasp the 

severity of his behavior and situation.
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The author of the PSI report recommended incarceration for Mr. Bloomer.

At sentencing, the court expressed:

Mr. Bloomer, I handle all of my sentencings individually, and 

as that should be. The fact is you have a substantial criminal 

history. It’s noted by the presentence investigation author of the 

report. And it’s due to the substantial criminal history noted in the 

Presentence Investigation Report, and I adopt the notations by the 

presentence investigation officer in the reasoning for my sentence, 

and the fact that it appears to him and it appears to this Court that 

you tend to downplay the importance of your criminal behavior and 

thinking. And that you have given—been given the benefit of the 

doubt numerous times by the judiciary and have been placed on 

supervised and unsupervised probation, but in spite of all of that, 

you have continued to be at odds with the criminal justice system 

and you don’t grasp the severity of your behavior in the situation. 

And you're a man of 49 years old and should know better in what 

actions are illegal and what actions are legal.

The court sentenced Bloomer to a term of incarceration not to exceed five 

years. He appeals.

II. Standard of Review.

We will not reverse the sentence imposed by the district court “absent of 

an abuse of discretion or some defect in the sentencing procedure.” See State v. 

Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002).

III. Discussion.

Bloomer maintains the district court abused its discretion in failing to 

consider all of the relevant factors on the record. He maintains the court’s stated 

reason for the sentence it imposed prevents our review because the statement 

does not indicate the court’s consideration of “the nature of the offense, the 

attending circumstances and Mr. Bloomer’s relatively minor role in the offense.” 

The sentencing court is charged with considering a number of factors in 

determining the appropriate sentence. See Iowa Code § 907.5. However, the 
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court is not required to explicitly acknowledge each factor on the record. See 

State v. Boltz, 842 N.W.2d 9, 11 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995) (“[T]he failure to 

acknowledge a particular sentencing circumstance does not necessarily mean it 

was not considered.”). Rather, “we review a sentence for an abuse of discretion 

based on the entire record, and look to see if the reasons articulated by the trial 

court are sufficient to enable us to determine if an abuse of discretion occurred.” 

Id. Here, the court expressly considered Bloomer’s criminal history—which 

included a similar charge involving marijuana, his history of recidivism after 

receiving “the benefit of the doubt numerous times by the judiciary,” his age, and 

his chances for rehabilitation. Although Bloomer complains the court did not 

respond to the factors Bloomer claimed as mitigating—that he was growing 

marijuana in an effort to prolong a sick friend’s life and “ever-changing laws” 

regarding marijuana—the court was not required to do so. See id. (“We do not 

believe . . . [the court] is required to specifically acknowledge each claim of 

mitigation urged by a defendant.”). Here, the record is sufficient to allow us to 

review the court’s exercise of discretion in sentencing Bloomer.

Bloomer also maintains the court abused its discretion in sentencing him 

to an unduly harsh sentence. First, we note that the sentence is within the 

statutory limits. See Iowa Code §§ 124.401(d) (categorizing manufacturing a 

controlled substance (marijuana) as a “D” felony), 902.9(1)(e) (stating a class “D” 

felon “shall be confined for no more than five years”). As such, the sentence “is 

cloaked with a strong presumption in its favor.” Formaro, 638 N.W.2d at 724. 

Bloomer argues his sentence is too harsh because some states have legalized 

the consumption of marijuana and some academic research has found medicinal 
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benefit to marijuana. While Bloomer was entitled to, and did, express his

argument concerning mitigating factors, the court was not required to show lenity 

as a result. The statements of Bloomer’s attorney made it clear that even if 

Bloomer believed he was justified in his actions, he knew he was engaging in an 

illegal action. Additionally, while Bloomer maintains the court should have 

imposed a reduced sentence because of his “reasonable” choice to help an ailing 

friend, it is noteworthy that Bloomer was convicted for the same illegal 

behavior—manufacturing marijuana—in 2004. 

The district court considered the proper factors and sentenced Bloomer to 

a sentence within the statutory limits. We cannot say the district court abused its 

discretion, and we affirm.

AFFIRMED.