1

07- 003 7- cv Selev an v. NewYork Thruway Authority UN ITED STA

TES CO URT OF AP P EALS F OR TH E S ECO N D CI RCU IT Aug us t T er m, 200 8 (A rgue d: Sep te mb er

8, 2 008 De cid ed: Oct ob er 15, 200 9) Do cket No . 07 -0 037 -c v R O BERT S ELEVAN , individual ly and on be half of all others similarly situated, and A NNE RU B IN , in di vid ually an d o n b ehal f o f all o th er s s im ila rly s ituat ed,

Plainti ffs-Appella nts, v. N E W Y O RK T HR UWAY A UTH O RI TY , and J OHN L. B UON O , in di vid ually an d as Chi ef Exec ut ive andChai r man

of th e Ne w Yor k T hr uway

Autho r it y, Defenda nts-App ellees
. B ef or e: C AB R ANES , P OO L ER , and K A T ZMA NN , Circuit Jud

ges . App eal f r om an o r der

of th e Unit ed S tat es Di s tr

ict Cou r t f or th e No r th er n D is tr

ict of New Yor k ( Gar

y L . Sh ar pe, Judge

) entered January 18, 20 07 granting defenda nts- appell ees’ motion to dismis s for

lackof st anding a nd failure to state a cla im upon which relie f can be g ranted. Plaintiffs chall enge a toll policy of the NewYork Thruway Authority that affords a discount to residents of a particular city i n New Y ork and denies the same bene fit to all other New Yorkers and to all nonresidents of New York. W e hold that (1) plaintiffs have established standing to sue under Article III of the United States Constitution; (2) plaintiffs are proper parties to allege a violation of the dormant Com mer ce Cla us e un der

th e Su pr eme Cou r t’ s “prud ent ial s tan di ng” do ct r

in e; ( 3) def

end ant s hav e
no t e s tab lis hedth at the N ew Yo r k T hr uway Autho r it y, i n s et ti ng the t oll, a ct ed as a “m ar ket2

par ti cip ant ” an d n ot

as a go ver nm ent al en ti ty

r egulat in g in te r s tat e co mm er ce; ( 4) pl ain ti ff

s hav e stated a cla im under the dormant Commerce C lause; (5) plaintiffs have all eged a n infringement of th eir r igh t t o t r avel

invio lat io n o f the Eq

ual Pr ot ect io n Cl aus e andth e P r

ivileg es andI mm unit

ies Cla use of the Four teenth Amendme nt; (6) plaintiffs ’ “dormant Commerce C lause” a nd right-totr avel clai ms mu s t b e analyze d u nd er th e thr ee- fa ct or

te s t s et fo r thby the S up r eme Cou r t i n No rt hwe st Ai rl ine s, In c. v. Co unt

y o f K en t , 51 0 U. S. 3 55, 369 (1 994

); and(7 ) the D is tr

ict Cou r t p r op erly dismis sed a cha llenge by a U. S. citize n residing in Cana da to the toll policy under the Privileges and I mm unit ies Clau s e of

Ar ti cle I V. Affirmed in part, vacate d in part, and remande d. S ET H R. L ES S ER (A nd r ew P . B ell , on the brief ), Locks Law Firm PL LC, New Yor k, N Y, fo r Ro ber

t S el v an and A nne Rubin
. B ENJ A MI N G UTMAN (A nd r ew M . Cu om o, At to r ney Gen er al of the State of New York, Barbara D. Unde rwood, So lic it or Gen er al, Pe te r

H. Schif f, Senio r Cou ns el, Rob er t M . G ol df

ar b, As s is tan t S ol

ici to r Gen er al, on the brief ), Office of the Attorney General of the State of New Yor k, Alb any, NY, fo r N

ew Yo rkT hr uwa y Authority and J

o hn L. B uo no . J OS É A. C AB R ANES , Circuit Jud ge : I n thi s app eal w e co ns id er whe th er pl ain ti ff s , wh o ch all eng e an i nt er s tat e highw ay t oll p ol icy th at a ff or ds a di s cou nt

to r es id ent s of

a par ti cul ar

New Yor k m unici pal

it y, h ave s tat ed c lai ms un der
s ever al p r ov

is io ns of th e Unit ed S tat es Con s ti tu ti on . Plaintiffs -appella nts Robert Selevan a nd Anne R ubin (collec tively, “ plaintiffs”), who are cit izen s of th e Unit ed S tat es r es id in g inNas s au Co un ty , N ew Yo r k, a ndOn tar io , Can ada,
r es pec ti vely, ch all eng e a J anu ary 18 , 20 07 o r der of th e Di s tr ict Cou r t dis mi s s in g thei r

s ui t u nd er

42 U.S .C. § 198 3 f

or lack of s tan di ng a ndfailu r e t o s tat e a cl aim up onwhi ch r eli ef can b e gr ant ed. See3

Fe d. R. Civ . P . 12 (b )( 1) , ( 6) . P lai nt if fs ’ p ut ati ve cl as s act

io n alleg ed that

an i nt er s tat e highw ay t oll policy of defenda nts- appell ees New Y ork Thruway Authority and John Buono, Chief Exe cutive a nd Cha irman of the New York Thruway Authority (jointly, “ NYTA”), that affords a discount to residents of a particular city violated the dormant Commerce C lause in addi tion to plaintiffs ’ rights under the Equal Prot ection C lause and the Privileg es and Immunities Clause of the Fourt eenth Ame nd men t as well

as th e P r ivileg es andI mm unit

ies Clau s e of

Ar ti cle I V of

th e U. S. Co ns ti tu ti on . I n thi s app eal w e co ns id er whe th er (1 ) p lai nt if fs hav e Ar ti cle I I I s tan di ng t o ch all eng e NY TA’s to ll po lic y; ( 2) pl ain ti ff

s ar e pr op er

par ti es to br

in g s ui t u nd er

th e Su pr eme Cou r t’ s “prud ent ial s tan di ng” do ct rin e; (3 ) NYTA h a s est a bl ish ed tha t i t a ct ed a s a “m a rke t pa rti ci pa nt, ” a nd no t a s a governmental e ntity regulating inte rs tate commerce ; (4) plaintiffs have stated a cla im under the do r man t Co mm er ce Cla us e; ( 5) pl ain ti ff s hav e all egedan i nf

r in gem ent of th eir r igh t t o t r avel

in violation of the Equa l Protection Clause a nd the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; a nd (6) Rubin, a U .S. citiz en residing in Ca nada, stated a cla im under the Privileges and I mm unit ies Clau s e of

Ar ti cle I V of

th e U. S. Co ns ti tu ti on . BAC KGROUND The Grand Is land Bridges (jointly, “Grand Island Br idge” or “the Bridge”), mai ntained a nd op er ate d b y NY

TA, co mp r

is e a po r ti onof

I nt er s tat e- 190 th at s pan s Gr andI s lan d, New Yor k, a municipal ity situated in the Niag ara R iver approximately

halfwa y betwe en Niag ara Falls, New Y ork andB uf falo , N ew Yo r k. P lai nt

if fs ’ am end ed c om pl ain t alleg es th at, pu r s uan t t o N YTA po lic y, ea ch vehicl e crossing the B ridge—exc ept those driven by residents of Grand Is land—must pay a toll of 75 ce nts. R esi de nts o f Gra nd Isla nd , w ho ma y e sta bl ish the ir st a tus wit h, a mo ng oth erthi ng s,
ve hi cl e r eg

ist ra ti on do cu me nts, a re en ti tl ed to p a y a s li ttl e a s 9 c en ts pe r tri p— tha t i s, 6 6 c en ts l ess per trip than non-r esidents of G rand Is land. Prior to initiating this litigation, eac h plaintiff paid theArticle I § 11 of the NewYork Constitution provides that “[n]o person s hall be denied the 1 equ al p r ot ect

io n o f the l aws of

this s tat e or

any s ub di vis io n ther eof

.” 4 no n- r es id ent

to ll d ur in g t r ip s th r ough N ew Yo r k t o N ew J er s ey f or s ho pp in g, t ou r

is m, andother

a ctiv itie s. In March 2006, plaintiffs f iled this putative cla ss action in the U nited States Distr ict Court fo r th e No r th er n D is tr

ict of New Yor k ( Gar

y L . Sh ar pe, Judge

). In their complaint, plaintiffs alleged, pu r s uan t t o 4 2 U. S.C. § 19 83, th at N YTA’s to ll s che me v io lat ed s ever al p r ov

is io ns of th e Unit ed States Constitution: the Commerce C lause, the Privilege s and Immunities Cla uses of Article IV and of th e F ou r te enth Am end men t, andth e Equ al P r ot ect io n Cl aus e. Ad di ti on ally, p lai nt if fs all eged that NYTA’s toll policy viola ted the Equa l Protection Clause of the New Y ork Constitution. 1 NYTA moved to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims, arguing that pla intiffs lack ed standing and tha t, in any
even t, pl ain ti ff

s faile d t o s tat e a cl aim up onwhi ch r eli ef can b e gr ant ed. See Fed. R. C iv. P. 12(b)(1), (6). The Dis trict Court permitt ed plai ntiffs to file an ame nded compla int prior t o taking the motion
un der con s id er ati on . I n a J anu ary 18 , 20 07 m emo r and um -d ecis io n an d o r der , the D is tr ict Cou r t dis mi s s ed pl ain ti ff s ’ co mp lai nt

with p r eju di ce. Se e S el

ev an v . N .Y. T hr uwa y Aut h. , 47 0 F . Su pp . 2d158 , 17 8 (N .D .N .Y. 200 7) . I n a tho ugh tf ul andcar ef ul op inio n, th e Di s tr

ict Cou r t h eldth at p lai nt

if fs lack ed
s tan di ng u nd er

th e Su pr eme Cou r t’ s “prud ent ial s tan di ng” do ct r

in e be caus e thei r

clai ms di d n ot

fall withi n the “ zon e of

in te r es ts ” pr ot ect ed b y ( 1) th e Com mer ce Cla us e, see id. at 1 72, (2) the Eq ual Pr ot ect io n Cl aus e of

th e F ou r te enth Am end men t, se e i d. at 1 76, or

(3 ) the P r ivileg e andI mm unit

ies Clau s e of Ar ti cle I V, se e i

d. at 1 73- 74. T he D is tr

ict Cou r t did no t c on s id er

whe th er pl ain ti ff s had stated a cla im under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment on the bas is th at p lai nt

if fs ’ co mp lai nt

haddo ne n othi ng m or e thanr ecit e that pr ov is io n. Se e i

d. at 1 72 n .10
.5

The District Court also held that even i f plaintiffs had standing to bring their equal protection c laim, di s mi s s al was app r op r

iat e be caus e t hey

hadfaile d t o s tat e a cl aim
. Id
. at 176-77. Inasmuch as the Equ al P r ot ect

io n Cl aus es of

th e U. S. Co ns ti tu ti onandth e Ne w Yor k Co ns ti tu ti onar e co -e xt ens ive , th e Di s tr ict Cou r t’ s equ al p r ot ect

io n an alys is als o r es ul te d i n the dis mi s s al o f p lai nt if fs ’ s tat e law clai m. See To wn of Southold v. To wn of E. Ham pton , 477 F.3d 38, 52 n. 3 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Beca use the Equ al P r ot ect

io n Cl aus es of

th e f ede r al an d N ew Yo r k Co ns ti tu ti on s ar e co ext ens ive , o ur analys is
r es po nd s to [p lai nt

if f’ s ] cl aim s un der

each of th es e pr ov

is io ns .” ( cit ati onom it te d) ). B ecau s e it di smi ssed pl a in ti ffs’ a ctio n i n i ts e nti re ty , t he Di stri ctC ou rt d id no t c on sid erwh et he r c la ss
cer ti fi cat io n was app r op r

iat e. Sel evanandRub infiledthis ti mel y app eal. DISCUSSI ON Onapp eal, pl ain ti ff

s con te ndth at the D is tr

ict Cou r t e r r ed i n dis mi s s in g thei r act io n. T hey
argue th at they

hads tan di ng t o s ue an d that th ey h ad i nd eeds tat ed c lai ms un der th e Com mer ce Cla use, the Equal Prot ection C lause, and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Ame nd men t. On ly Ru bi n h as app eale d the D is tr ict Cou r t’ s ho ld in g wi thr es pec t t o the P r ivileg es andI mm unit

ies Clau s e of

Ar ti cle I V. N YTA co nt end s th at w e s ho ul d af fi r m the D is tr

ict Cou r t’ s di s mi s s al b ecau s e pl ain ti ff s lack ed A r ti cle I I I s tan di ng i nas mu ch as th ey did no t e s tab lis h that th ey had suffered injury-in- fact. Further, NYTA argues that plaintiffs failed to state a c laim under any of th e co ns ti tu ti on al p r ov

is io ns cit ed i n thei r

ame nd ed c om pl ain t. We r evi ew de novo a di s tr

ict cou r t’ s di s mi s s al o f acom pl ain t f or lack of s tan di ng, see

Fe d. R. Civ. P. 12(

b) (1 ), andfo r

failu r e t o s tat e a cl aim , see Fe d R. Civ. P. 12(

b) (6 ). See, e.g. , Klein & Co. Fu tur es , I nc. v. B d. o f T rad e , 46 4 F .3d255 , 25 9 (

2d Cir . 20 06) ; Cha mb ers v

. Time Wa rner, Inc. , 28 2 F .3d 14 7, 15 2 ( 2d C ir. 20 02 ). In c on du ctin g t hi s re vi ew , w e a ssum e a ll “w el l-p le a de d fa ct ua l a ll eg a ti on s”6

to be tr ue, and“de te r mi ne whether th ey p lau s ib ly g

ive r is e t o anent

it lem ent to r eli ef .” Ashcroft v

. Iq bal , 12 9 S. Ct. 193 7, 1 950 (2 009 ). “We co ns true p lai nt if fs ’ co mp lai nt

lib er ally, ac cep ti ng all f

act ual all egat io ns inth e co mp lai nt

as true, anddr awin g all

r eas on abl e in fe r enc es inpl ain ti ff s ’ f avo r .” Ho lme s v . Gr ubman , 56 8 F .3d329 , 33 5 ( 2d Cir . 20 09) (i nt er nal

qu ot ati onmar ks om it te d)
. We first consider whether plaintiffs have e stablished Article III standing. Second, we turn to pl ain ti ff s ’ cl aim un der

th e Com mer ce Cla us e. I n dis cus s in g thi s clai m, we ad dr es s th e Di s tr ict Cou r t’ s ho ld in g that

pl ain ti ff s ’ cl aim s ho ul d b e di s mi s s ed u nd er th e Su pr eme Cou r t’ s “prud ent ial
s tan di ng” do ct r

in e, an d we con s id er

NYT A’s argum ent

th at p lai nt

if fs ’ cl aim was pr op erly dis mi s s ed bec aus e, u nd er

th e “m ar ket

par ti cip ant ” do ct r

in e inth e Su pr eme Cou r t’ s do r man t Co mm er ce Cla use juris prudence, NY

TA was not in fact regulating i nterst ate comme rce in cha rging tolls on the Grand Is land Bridge. We then consider whether plaintiffs have stated a c laim under the dormant Commerce C lause. Third, we address plaintiffs ’ contention that they ha ve stated cla ims under the Equal Prot ection C lause and the Privileg es and Immunities Clause of the Fourt eenth Ame ndment for a violation of their right to travel. Final ly, we consider Rubin’s contention that she has stated a clai m u nd er

th e P r ivileg es andI mm unit

ies Clau s e of

Ar ti cle I V. I. Article III Standin g Under Article III of

the Constitution, the jurisdiction of f ederal c ourts is limited to the
r es ol ut io n o f “ cas es ” an d “c on tr ov er s ies .” U .S. Con s t. ar t. I I I , § 2 . “I n o r der to ens ur e that

this ‘b edr ock ’ cas e- or -c on tr ov er s y r equ ir eme nt is met , co ur ts r equ

ir e that pl ain ti ff s es tab lis h thei r ‘s tan di ng’ as ‘the p r op er

par t[ ies ] t o b r in g’ s ui t. ” W.R. H

uff As set M gmt . Co . v . Delo it te & T o uch e LLP , 549 F. 3d 100 , 10 6 (

2d Cir . 20 08) (quo ti ng Ra ines v. By rd , 52 1 U. S. 8 11, 818 (1 997 )) . Sp ecif ically, plaintiffs mus t demonstr ate “(1) injury-in-fa ct , which i s a ‘concrete a nd particularize d’ harm to a ‘lega lly protected interest’; (2) causation in the form of

a ‘fairly trace able’ connec tion betwee n the7

assert ed injury-in-fact and the a llege d actions of the defendant; a nd (3) redressability , or a nons pec ul ati ve l ike lih oo d that

th e in ju ry canbe r eme di ed b y the r equ es te d r eli ef .” Id . at 106-07 (citing Lujan v. De fe nde rs o f Wil dli fe , 50 4 U. S. 5 55, 560 -6 1 ( 199 2) ). NYTA argues that plaintiffs have not suff ered injury-in-fact beca use “a discount afforded to di ff er ent ly- s ituat ed i ndivi du als do es no t n eces s ar ily r es ul t i n a p alp abl e ‘i nj ur

y’ t o tho s e no t af

fo r ded the discount.” Appell ee’s Br. 13. In s upport of this contention, NYTA relies on the Supreme Court’s decision in Daim lerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno for the proposition that where “redress ability [of a clai medin ju ry] r equ

ir es s pec ul ati ng that

abo lis hi ng the c hallen gedcr edi t w ill r edo un d t o the b ene fi t of th e t axp ayer

bec aus e leg

is lat or s will p as s alo ng t

he s up po s ed i ncr eas ed r even ue i n the f or m o f t ax
r edu ct io ns ,” that

in ju ry is to o “c on jectur al o r hyp othet ical ” t o s ati s fy

Ar ti cle I I I . 54 7 U. S. 3 32, 344 (2 006 ). T he D is tr

ict Cou r t p r op erly r ejec te d N YTA’s argum ent th at p lai nt

if fs hadno t s uf

fe r ed an injury-in-fact. It corr ectly observed that “[p]la intiffs define their injury as the burden of paying hi ghe r to ll r ate s th an G r andI s lan d r es id ent s andth e de ni al o f t oll d is cou nt s bas ed o n thei r r es id enc y
s tatus .” Sele v

an , 47 0 F . Su pp . 2dat 1 68. T he S up r eme Cou r t h as hel d that “[ c]o ns um er s who s uf

fe r this s or t o f i nj ur

y [ i.e ., prices higher than other consumers] from r egula tion forbidden under the Com mer ce Cla us e s ati s fy

th e s tan di ng r equ

ir eme nt s of

Ar ti cle I I I .” Gen. Motor

s Corp. v. Tracy , 51 9 U.S. 278, 2 86 (1997). Unlike the plaintiffs in Daim lerChrysler , wh o we r e t axp ayer s op po s in g a t ax
cr edi t r ecei

vedby o th er s inth e ho pe that abo lis hi ng the t ax cr edi t w ould r edu ce thei r taxbu r den , see 547 U.S. a t 344-45, plaintiffs in this case conte nd that they hav e bee n charged a n inflated toll rate th at, amo ng o th er

thin gs , d is cr

im in ate s agai ns t i nt er s tat e co mm er ce. I nas mu ch as pl ain ti ff s all eged th at they hav e pai d h igh er

to lls as a r es ul t o f N YTA’s po lic y, they hav e ar ti cul ate d a “ com mer cial , economic injury that is concrete and speci fic to them,” and is ca used by NYTA’s alleg ed viola tion of8

th e Com mer ce Cla us e. Sele v an , 470 F. Supp. 2d a t 168. Because this injury would be redressed by the injunctive and monetary relie f plaintiffs seek, plai ntiffs have me t the Article III s tanding
r equ ir eme nt . II. Int er st at e Co m m er ce We no w t ur n t o the D is tr

ict Cou r t’ s di s mi s s al o f p lai nt if fs ’ cl aim un der

th e s o- call ed “do r man t” Com mer ce Cla us e. T he Co mm er ce Cla us e pr ov id es th at “ Con gr es s s hall h ave P owe r . . . [t ]o r egulat e Com mer ce wi thfo r eig n N ati on s , an d am on g the s ever al S tat es .” U .S. Con s t. ar t. I , § 8 , cl. 3. The Supreme C ourt has explained that “the [Commerce] C lause wa s designed in part to pr even t tr ade b ar r

ier s th at h ad u nd er mi nedef fo r ts of th e f led gli ng S tat es to fo r m a c oh es ive who le fo llo win g thei r

vic to ry inth e Revo lu ti on .” Hug he s v . A le xand ri a Sc rap Co rp. , 42 6 U. S. 7 94, 807 (1 976 ). In the eloquent words of J ustice Jackson, Our s ystem, fos tered by the C ommerce Cl ause, is that every farmer and eve ry cr af ts mans hall b e en cou r agedto pr od uce by t he c er tai nt

y that he w ill hav e f r ee acces s to ever

y ma r ket inth e Na ti on , that

no ho me e mb argoe s will wi th ho ld hi s exp or t, andno fo r eig

n s tat e will b y cu s to ms du ti es or r egulat io ns excl ud e them
. Likewise, ev ery consumer may look to the free compe tition fr om every producing area in the Nation to protect him fr om exploitation by any. S uch wa s the vision of th e F ou nd er s ; s uchhas bee n the d octr in e of [the S up r eme

] Co ur t whi ch h as giv en i t r eali ty . H. P. Ho o d & So ns

, I nc. v. Du Mo nd , 336 U.S. 5 25, 539 (1949). In implementing the C ommerce Cl ause, the Supreme C ourt “has adhered str ictly to the principle ‘that the right to enga ge in interstate commerce i s not the gift of a state, and that a state
cann ot r egulat e or

r es tr ainit .” Hughes, 426 U.S. a t 808. It flows f rom this principle that “[t]he neg ati ve o r do r man t i mp lic ati onof

th e Com mer ce Cla us e pr ohib it s s tat e t axat io n o r r egulat io n that discriminates against or unduly burdens inters tate commerce and thereby impe des fr ee private trade9

inth e nat io nal mar ketpl ace. ” Ge n. M

o to rs Co rp. , 5 19 U. S. a t 2 87 (i nte rna l q uo ta ti on ma rks, bra ck et s, andcit ati on s om it te d)
. T he S up r eme Cou r t h as r eco gni zed th at “ th er e is a r es id uu m o f p owe r inth e s tat e t o m ake laws gove rning matters of

local conce rn which neve rtheless in some measure affect interst ate
com mer ce o r

even , t o s om e ext ent , r egulat e it .” Kassel v . Consol. Freightways Cor

p . o f Del. , 45 0 U. S. 6 62, 669 (1 981 ) (

in te r nal qu ot ati onmar ks om it te d) . Acc or di ngl y, “ [t ]h e Com mer ce Cla us e do es no t . . . inval id ate all St ate r es tr

ict io ns oncom mer ce.” Id

. A state statute or r egula tion may viola te the dormant Commerce C lause only if it (1) “cle arly discriminates aga inst inters tate commerce in favor of intras tate commerce ,” (2) “imposes a burden on inters tate commerce incommensurate with the lo cal b ene fi ts s ecu r ed, ” or (3 ) “ has th e pr act

ical ef fe ct of ‘ex tr ate r r it or ial ’ co nt r ol

of com mer ce
occ ur r in g en ti r ely o ut s id e t he b ou nd ar ies of th e s tat e inqu es ti on .” Free dom Holdin gs Inc. v . Spitz er , 357 F. 3d 205 , 21 6 (

2d Cir . 20 04) (c it

in g, int er ali a , Wy o ming

v. Ok laho ma , 502 U.S. 4 37, 454-55 (1992); Healy v. T he Beer I nst ., 4 91 U .S. 324 , 33 6 ( 198 9) ; Pi ke v. B ru ce Chur ch, In c ., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970 )). In their amended compla int, plaintiffs alleged tha t NYTA’s toll policy at Grand Island Br idge “di scriminate[s] t o the disadvantag e of out-of- state interests and to the adva ntage of in-state in te r es ts andpl ace[ s ] b ur den s onin te r s tat e co mm er ce that exce ed any lo cal b ene fi t that all eged ly may be derived from them.” J.A. 171 (Am. C ompl. ¶ 36). After detaili ng NYTA’s toll policy a t the B r id ge an d alleg

in g that th e B r id ge was “anin s trum ent ali ty or chan nel of in te r s tat e co mm er ce,” J .A. 167 (Am. C ompl. ¶ 20), pla intiffs contended tha t “[t]he use of the Gr and Island Br idge a nd the pr ef er ent ial to lls collect ed b y [N YTA] all dir ect ly i mp lic ate in te r s tat e co mm er ce an d m on et ar ily af fe ct th e t r avel of cit izen s of th e Un it ed S tat es who wer e no t r es id ent s of th e pr ef er ent ially tr eat ed lo cat io n. ” J .A. 167 (A m. Com pl . ¶ 2 4) . P lai nt if fs add ed that

“[ t] he am ou nt s of

th e t olls discriminatorily collec ted are presently unknown a nd exclusivel y within the know ledge of [NYTA],10

bu t th e a mo un t i s, u po n i nfo rma ti on a nd be li ef , su bsta nti a l. No sub sta nti a l g ov er nm en t i nte re st
s up po r ts th e di s cr

im in ato ry t oll s tructur e, an d wh ate ver end s it s eeks to achi eve c ould be ac hi eved by alte rnatives that do not discr iminate a ccording to residence.” J.A. 168 (Am. C ompl. ¶ 24). T he D is tr ict Cou r t dis mi s s ed p lai nt

if fs ’ Co mm er ce Cla us e claim , h ol di ng that pl ain ti ff s di d
no t s ati s fy th e Su pr eme Cou r t’ s “prud ent ial s tan di ng” r equ

ir eme nt bec aus e thei r

clai ms all eged injuries that were “strictly local” and therefore, at most, “marginally within the zone of interest s pr ot ect ed b y t he Co mm er ce Cla us e.” Sele v an , 47 0 F . Su pp . 2dat 1 72. Pl ain ti ff s ur ge that th eir clai m falls within the “zone of interest s” prot ected by the Commerce Cla use because “the y we re interst ate tr avel er s inaut om ob ile s onth e in te r s tat e highw ay s ys te m an d we r e en gagi ng i n i nt er s tat e co mm er ce by the purchase of goods and tourism s ervices.” Appe llant’s Repl y Br. 12. NYTA defends the Distr ict Court’s rationale, a rguing, among other things, that plaintiffs’ claim does not implica te in te r s tat e co mm er ce b ecau s e ( 1) “99 .9% of New Yor k St ate r es id ent s ,” as well as all no n- New Yor ker s , ar e in eli gib le f

or th e lo wer to ll r ate , Ap pellee’ s B r . 21 , an d ( 2) a to ll o f 7 5 cen ts is to o t r ivi al an amount to give rise to a Commerce C lause viola tion, id. at 2 4. F ur th er , N YTA argue s th at, even if on e wer e t o as s um e arg

ue ndo that plaintiffs have standing, the toll polic y does not violate the Commerce C lause bec ause NYTA’s operation of the bridge falls under the “market participa nt”
exce pt io n t o the r equ

ir eme nt s of

th e do r man t Co mm er ce Cla us e. A. Pr udenti al Standing We f ir s t c on s id er

whe th er th e pl ain ti ff

s hav e s ati s fi ed the S up r eme Cou r t’ s “prud ent ial standing” requirements. Unlike “A rticle III standing, which e nforces the Constitution’s case-orcontroversy r equirement,” prudential standing, the second face t of the Supreme Court’s s tanding ju r is pr ud enc e, em bo di es “ju di cially s elf -i mp os ed l

im it s onth e exe r cis e of

fe der al j ur

is di ct io n. ” Elk Grove Unified Sch . Dist. v. Newdow , 542 U.S. 1 , 11 (2004) (internal quotation marks and cita tion11

om it te d) . T he S up r eme Cou r t h as hel d that “prud ent ial s tan di ng e nco mp as s es th e gen er al prohibition on a litigant’s raising another person’s legal rights, the rule barring adjudica tion of general ized g rievance s mor e appropriately addressed in the repres entative branc hes, and the
r equ ir eme nt th at apl ain ti ff

’s com pl ain t f

all withi n the z on e of

in te r es ts pr ot ect ed b y the l aw invo ked .” Id

. at 1 2 ( in te r nal qu ot ati onmar ks om it te d)
. We a gree with pla intiffs that the Distr ict Court improperly dismis sed their claim for lack of pr ud ent ial s tan di ng. Altho ughit

is of cou r s e es s ent

ial th at dis tr ict cou r ts ens ur e that

eachpl ain ti ff

is a proper party to bring a suit, we have expla ined that the zone -of- interests requirement invoked by th e Di s tr ict Cou r t i n thi s cas e is “no t a r igo r ou s on e.” Nat ’l Weathe r S er v. Empl o y ee s O rg ., B ran ch 1 -1 8 v. Bro wn , 18 F. 3d 986 , 98 9 ( 2d Cir . 19 94) ; se e al

so Clar ke v. S ec . I ndus . A ss ’n , 47 9 U. S. 3 88, 399 (1 987 ) (ho ld in g t ha t a pl a in ti ff’ s rig ht o f re vi ewma y b e d en ie d o nl y “ if t he pl a in ti ff’ s in te re sts a re so marginally related to or inconsistent with the purpos es implicit in the statute that it cannot
r eas on ably be as s um ed that Con gr es s in te nd ed t o p er mi t the s ui t. T he te st is no t meant t

o be e spe ci all y dema ndin g. ” ( emp has is add ed) ). I nd eed , the S up r eme Cou r t h as hel d that this r equ ir eme nt is s ati s fi ed wh en ev er“t he in te re st sou gh t to be pro te ct ed by [p la in ti ffs] i s arg

uably within the zone of interest s to be p r ot ect ed o r

r egulat ed b y t he s tatut e or con s ti tu ti on al gu ar ant ee inqu es ti on .” Ass’n of Data Pr o ce ss ing Se rv . Or gs ., I nc. v. Camp , 39 7 U. S. 1 50, 153 (1 970) ( emp has is add ed)
. Acc ording to the District Court, “[t]he true gravamen of plaintiffs’ complaint is that the Grand Is land toll polic y discriminates aga inst New York citize ns tr aversing a bridge within the St ate .” Sele v

an , 470 F. Supp. 2d a t 172. We disagree. First, as not ed, ea ch plai ntiff alleged tha t he or
s he p aidth e Gr andI s lan d B r id ge t oll as par t o f atr

ip to ano th er

s tat e, wh er e eacheng agedin
s ho pp in g an d o th er

com mer cial

act ivi ti es . See

J .A. 164 -6 5 (

Am. Com pl . ¶¶

5- 6) . M or eov er , that plaintiffs may not have c ros sed into another st ate immedia tely upon pa ying the toll is of no12

im po r tan ce; the c r

it ical in quir y inou r ju r is pr ud enc e is whe th er

th e t oll ins om e way affects interst ate
com mer ce. See Fr

eedom Holdings, 35 7 F .3dat 2 16. NYT A’s addit io nal argum ent s ins up po r t o f the D is tr ict Cou r t’ s ho ld in g ar e witho ut mer it
. Fir st, ev en a ssum in g t ha t th e G ra nd Isla nd tol l p ol ic y d oe s no t a pp ly to “ 99 .9 %” of N ewY ork er s, App ell ee’s B r . 21 , p lai nt

if fs ’ cl aim s till c ann ot

be dis mi s s ed o n thi s bas is . We h ave n ever s ugg es te d that a state regulation must benefit a la rge percentag e of the state’s population in order to violate the do r man t Co mm er ce Cla us e. See Fr eedom Holdings, 357 F.3d at 216-18. If it were the c ase that the do r man t Co mm er ce Cla us e di d n ot app ly t o dis cr

im in ato ry r egulat

io ns th at b ene fi t o nly a r elat ive ly
s mall s ub s et

of a s tat e’s po pulat

io n, s tat es would be ab le t o p r om ot e thei r owneco no mi c in te r es ts at the ex pe nse of o ut- of- sta te in te re sts si mp ly by im po sin g re gu la ti on s tha t be ne fitsom e sm a ll in te re st group within the state, such as manufacturers of a specific product. This would hardly serve the pu r po s e of

th e Clau s e, as inmany cas es this could di r ect ly v io lat e it s cen tr al p urpo s e. Seco nd , N YTA’s argum ent th at “ th e 75 -c ent

gen er al t oll d id no t i mp os e any cog ni zabl e bu r denonin te r s tat e co mm er ce,” App ell ee’s B r . 24 , is fo r eclo s ed b y the S up r eme Cou r t’ s dec is io n i n Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of Environmenta l Qua lity , 51 1 U. S. 9 3 ( 199 4)
. In that case, the Court rejected the a rgument that a surcharge of $2.25 per ton of solid waste generated outside of the
s tat e was to o m inim al anamo un t t o b e di s cr im in ato ry un der

th e do r man t Co mm er ce Cla us e. See id
. at 100 n.4. The C ourt r easoned that “the de gree of a differential burden or charge on interst ate
com mer ce ‘m eas ur es on ly the ex te nt of the discrimination’ and ‘is of no relevance to the det er mi nat

io n wh et her

a St ate has di s cr

im in ate d ag ain s t i nt er s tat e co mm er ce.’ ” Id . (quoting Wy o ming
v. Ok laho ma , 502 U.S. 4 37, 455 (1992)). Here too, the toll differential spea ks to the extent of the alle ged discrimination, rather than to the presence of a vi olation. Beca use this case comes before us fol lo wi ng a de ci sio n o n a mo ti on to d ism iss, we ne ed on ly co nsi de r w he the r th e c om pl a in t a ll eg es aNYTA raised this argument in its Memorandum of L aw in S upport of Defendants’ Motion 2 to Di s mi s s . See

J .A. 29- 31. Pr es um ably be caus e the D is tr ict Cou r t c on clu dedth at p lai nt if fs lack ed s tan di ng t o r ais e t hei r

Com mer ce Cla us e claim , it di d n ot r each this qu es ti on . 13 pl aus ib le cl aim th at the r egulat io n v io lat es th e Com mer ce Cla us e. See, e.g. , Iq bal , 12 9 S. Ct. at 1 950
. Whether th e 75 -c ent

to ll i s act ually a b ur denonin te r s tat e co mm er ce is a qu es ti onlef t f or lat er pr oce edi ngs . B. Market Par ticipant NYT A argue s th at, evenif

pl ain ti ff s hav e s tan di ng t o p ur s ue thei r do r man t Co mm er ce Cla use claim, the pol icy is not unconstitutional beca use of the s o-calle d “market participa nt” do ct r in e. T hi s do ct r

in e “dif fe r ent iat es bet weena St ate ’s act

in g init s di s ti nct

ive gov er nm ent al 2 capa cit y, an d a S tat e’s act

in g inth e mo r e gen er al cap acit y of a mar ket par ti cip ant ; o nly the f

or mer is
s ub ject to th e li mi tat

io ns of th e [d or man t] Com mer ce Cla us e.” New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Lim bach , 48 6 U.S. 269, 2 77 (1988). The Supreme Court has held that “[n]othing in the purposes animating the Commerce C lause prohibits a State, in the a bsence of congressional action, from participating i n the
mar ket andexer cis in g the r

igh t t o f avo r it s owncit

izen s ov er other s .” Reeves, I

nc. v. Stake , 44 7 U. S. 429, 436 (1980 ). The Court has not art icula ted a bright-line rule to discern governmental regul ation of c om me rc e f

rom ma rke t pa rti ci pa ti on ; c ou rts mu st ma ke fa ct -spe ci fic in qu iri es o n a ca se- by -c a se ba sis. “Th us, for e xa mp le , w he n a St a te ch oo ses t o m a nu fa ct ure a nd sel l c em en t, it s bu sin ess
me tho ds, in cl ud in g t ho se t ha t fa vo r it s re sid en ts, a re of n o g re a te r c on sti tutio na l c on ce rn t ha n th ose of a pr iva te bu s in es s .” New Energy Co. , 48 6 U. S. a t 2 77 ( cit

in g Reeves , 44 7 U. S. a t 4 38- 39) ; see also Hughes, 426 U.S. a t 809 (holding that a state’s program of pur chasing a bandoned ve hicles from withi n the s tat e bu t n ot

fr om other

s tat es di d n ot

bu r denin te r s tat e co mm er ce)
. But see T oomer v . Wit sell , 334 U.S. 3 85, 406 (1948) (holding tha t the Commerce C lause wa s violated whe re a state required that shr

imp boats fis hing off of its coast pack the ir shr imp and pay

state taxes before14

tr ans po r ti ng thei r

cat ch i nt er s tat e) . I n s um , a co ur t r evi ewing a cl aim th at the d or man t Co mm er ce Clau s e has bee n v

io lat ed m us t c on s id er

ineachs pec if

ic co nt ext if th e go ver nm ent

is act in g li ke a pr iva te bu s in es s or

a go ver nm ent al en ti ty . NYTA contends that “[i]n setting toll rates to r aise revenue to maintain its property and
s ati s fy it s bo nd ho ld er s , [

NYT A] i s no t r egulat

in g co mm er ce, b ut

is act in g ina pr op r

iet ary cap acit

y as a market pa rticipant in the loca l highwa y transport ation market.” A ppellee ’s B r. 9-10. However, the
s tatut e cr eat

in g N YTA pr ov

id es th at N YTA “ sh all

be r eg ard ed as pe rf o rmi ng a g o v er nme ntal func ti o n in carrying out its corporate purpos e and in e xercising the powe rs granted by this title.” N.Y. Pub. Auth. § 35 3 ( emp has is add ed) . T her e is goo d r eas onfo r this des ign ati onandfo r

ou r r epe ate d ob s er vat io n that buildin g an d m ain tai ni ng r oad s is a cor e go ver nm ent al f un ct io n. See USA Recycling, Inc. v. To wn of Babylon , 66 F.3d 1272, 12 84 (2d Cir. 1995) (“Sta te governments have turned to the pr iva te s ect or

to ‘co nt r act

ou t’ or ‘o ut s ou r ce’ n um er ou s gov er nm ent al f un ct io ns , in clu di ng . . . the

o per ati o n o f t o ll r o ads .” (emphasis added)); Murray v. City o f Milford , 38 0 F .2d468 , 47 0 (

2d Cir . 19 67) (“ T he c on s truct

io n an d m ain te nan ce o f r oad s is a ‘go ver nm ent al f un ct io n . . . . ’”) . Al th ough ther e is undoubtedly a market comprised of pr ivate e ntities competing with one a nother for government
con tr act s , we s ee n o ev

id enc e inth e r eco r d that NY TA com pet es wi th o the r e nti ti es t ha t a re a lso seeking to build a nd maintain hig hway syst ems. Unlike a private ac tor, NYTA may (1) use or po s s es s any r eal p r op er ty

or r igh ts inr eal p r op er ty

acqu ir ed b y the s tat e, see

N. Y. P ub . Au th . § 3 57, (2 ) a vo id ho ld ou ts by

re sortin g t o e mi ne nt d om a in to a ma ss the pro pe rty ne ce ssa ry to b ui ld roa ds,

see id . §§ 3 58, 358 -a , an d ( 3) is s ue b on ds th at a r e “f ully an d u nco ndit

io nally g uar ant eedby the s tat e” inor der to r ais e cap it al t o f

un d r oadcon s truct

io n an d m ain te nan ce p r oj ect s , id . § 36 6( 1) . N Y

TA may a lso “acce pt any gifts or any grant of funds or proper ty from the federal g overnment or fr om th e s tat e . . . o r

any o th er fe der al o r s tat e pu bl

ic b od y.” Id

. § 3 54( 14)
.15

NYTA’s reliance on End

sley v . City of Chi

cago , 230 F.3d 276, 28 3-85 (7th Cir. 2000), for the pr op os it io n that a s tat e may

“act [ ] ina pr op r

iet ary cap acit

y as an en tr ant

in to th e lo cal high

way transpor tation market,” Appe llee’ s B r. 17, is mis place d. In End sley , p lai nt if fs challen gin g Chi cago ’s op er ati onof

th e cit y’s Sky way t oll b r

id ge es s ent

ially “ pl ead[ed] th ems elv es ou t o f c ou r t” by n ot in g in their complaint that, “[s]ince its inception, [C hicag o] has operated [the bridge] as a proprietary
ent er pr is e, an d n ot

init s gov er nm ent al cap acit y.” 230 F. 3d at 2 84. T he S even thCir cui t’ s ob s er vat io n that “the f act s s ugg es t that

[Chicag o] was in dee d a m ar ket par ti cip ant ,” id. , w a s dicta

and, inany e ven t, no t b in di ng a utho r it y f or this Cou r t. Onthis r eco r d, we s ee n o r eas onto con clu de that th e in s tan t c as e is lik e Reeves , wh er e So uth D ako ta e nt er ed a m ar ket to pr od uce ands ell

cem ent in
com pet it io n wi thpr

iva te cem ent

s up pl ier s , see 447 U.S. a t 440, or Hughes, wh er e M arylan d en te r ed “in to th e ma r ket

as a pu r chas er , inef

fe ct , o f apo te nt

ial ar ti cle o f i nt er s tat e co mm er ce,” 426 U.S . at 808 . I n s ho r t, no thin g inthis r eco r d p er mi ts th e co ncl us io n that , inthis in s tan ce, N YTA is a mar ket par ti cip ant . We ne ed n ot

r each th e qu es ti onwhe th er , o r un der what cir cum s tan ces , a go ver nm ent al
ent it y may act as a mar ket

par ti cip ant

by b ui ld in g an d m ain tai ni ng r oad s . We h ol d s im ply that , at leas t i n thi s s tag e of

th e li tigat io n, a f in di ng that

NYT A act ed as a “m ar ket

par ti cip ant ” (

r ath er th an in its governmental ca pacity ) is not warr anted. A s we expla in below, the toll may w ell be permiss ible, but, a bsent a finding that NYTA ac ted as a market pa rticipant, it is subject to s crutiny
un der th e do r man t Co mm er ce Cla us e.

C. Dorm ant Comm erce Clause Cla im Ha vi ng co nc lu de d th a t pl a in ti ffs h ave sta nd in g t o p ursu e t he ir d orm a nt C om me rc e C la use clai m an d that

NYT A has no t e s tab lis hedth at i t ac te d as a mar ket par ti cip ant , we c on s id er

whe th er pl ain ti ff s hav e s tat ed a c lai m u nd er th e Com mer ce Cla us e. P lai nt if fs all ege that

NYT A’s to ll p ol

icy16

discriminates against interst ate comme rce and that, in the alternative , it imposes a burden on in te r s tat e co mm er ce that

is no t j us ti fi ed b y any

ben ef it s it cr eat es . D is cer ni ng whi ch, if any, Com mer ce Cla us e claim has bee n s tat ed i s s ignif ican t b ecau s e “a s tatut e that clea rly dis cr

im in ate s aga inst inters tate commerce in favor of intr astate commerce i s virtually invalid per se

andcan s ur

viv e
on ly i f the dis cr

im in ati onis dem on s tr ably ju s ti fi ed b y a val id fa ct or un r elat ed t o ec on om ic pr ot ect io ni s m. ” Free dom Holdin

gs, Inc. , 357 F.3d at 216 (internal quotation marks and citations
om it te d) . P ut

di ff er ent ly, as a th r es ho ld in quir

y we m us t d et er mi ne i f the t oll p ol icy dis cr im in ate s aga inst inters tate commerce beca use, if it does, it is “virtually inv alid per se ,” id. , an d i f i t d oes no t, it will h ave a c om par ati

vely eas ier ti me p as s in g co ns ti tu ti on al m us te r . Fi r s t, we co ns id er

if th e po lic y di s cr

im in ate s agai ns t i nt er s tat e co mm er ce. See, e.g. , id. The Supreme Court has expla ined that “[t]he ce ntral rationale for the rule aga inst dis crimination is to pro hi bi t sta te or m un ic ip a l l aws w ho se o bj ec t i s local economic protectio nism , law s that would excite th os e jealo us ies andr et ali ato ry me as ur es th e Con s ti tu ti onwas des ign ed t o p r even t. ” C& A Ca rbone, Inc. v. To wn of Cla rksto wn , 511 U.S. 3 83, 390 (1994) (empha sis added). A ccordingly , a state regula tion “discriminates” aga inst inters tate commerce only if it “impose[s] commercial barriers or di s cr im in ate [s ] ag ain s t anar ti cle o f c om mer ce b y r eas onof it s or igi n o r des ti nat io n o ut of St ate .” Id

. We hav e he ld th at, inor der to s tat e a cl aim fo r

di s cr im in ati oninvio lat

io n o f the Co mm er ce Cla us e, a pla intiff mus t “identify an[ ] in-state commercia l interest that is favored, directly or indirectly , by th e ch all eng ed s tatut es at the e xp ens e of ou t- of -s tat e co mp et

it or s .” Grand

River Enters. Six Nations, Ltd . v. Pry or , 425 F.3d 158, 16 9 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation ma rks om itted). Here, plaintiffs have fa iled to “ide ntify an[ ] in-state commercial interest that is favored,” and they do not point to a par ti cul ar “ou t- of -s tat e co mp et

it or ” that is har medby N YTA’s to ll p ol icy. Se e i d. ; see also T

own of So uth o ld , 477 F.3d at 49. Both an in-state interest and an out-of-s tate competitor are nec essary17

bec aus e “l aws th at d r aw di s ti nct io ns bet weenent it ies th at a r e no t c om pet

it or s do no t ‘ di s cr

im in ate ’ fo r pu r po s es of

th e do r man t Co mm er ce Cla us e.” T o wn o f S o uth o ld , 477 F.3d at 49. Bec ause plaintiffs hav e f ail ed t o i den ti fy

any s pec if

ic i nt er es ts , we h ol d that

pl ain ti ff s hav e no t alleg ed that

NYT A’s to ll po lic y “dis cr

im in ate s ” agai ns t i nt er s tat e co mm er ce. Al tho ug h th e D ist ric t C ou rt c orre ctly re a son ed tha t pl a in ti ffs fa il ed to a ll eg e t ha t th e N Y TA po lic y “dis cr

im in ate s ” agai ns t i nt er s tat e co mm er ce, the D is tr ict Cou r t i nco r r ect

ly f ail ed t o f ur th er in quir e if th e po lic y other

wis e vi ol ate d the Co mm er ce Cla us e. S pec if ically, th e Di s tr

ict Cou r t did not acknowledge the well -established rule that, under the so- call ed Pike test, a nondiscriminatory
r egulat io n that “r egulat es even -h and edly t o ef fe ct uat e a le git

im ate lo cal p ub lic in te r es t, ” Pike v. B ruce Chu rch, Inc. , 397 U.S. 1 37, 142 (1970), is neve rtheless unconstitutional if “‘the burden imposed on in te r s tat e co mm er ce is clea rly ex ces s ive inr elat io n t o the p ut ati

ve l ocal ben ef it s .’” United Ha ulers As s’ n, I nc. v. Oneida-He rk ime r S o lid

Wast e M gmt . Aut h. , 55 0 U. S. 3 30, 346 (2 007 ) (qu ot in g Pike , 39 7 U.S. at 142 ) (brackets omitted). As noted, plaintiffs have alle ged that NYTA’s policy of charging
non-res idents of Gr and Island tolls that are more than eight times greater than the tolls charged to Gr andI s lan d r es id ent s “pl ace[ s ] b ur den s onin te r s tat e co mm er ce that exce ed any lo cal b ene fi t that all eged ly m ay be der

ive d f r om th em. ” J .A. 171 (A m. Com pl . ¶ 3 6) . B ecau s e at this s tat e of

a s ui t w e are required to assume all “we ll-pleade d factual a llega tions” are true and assess the complai nt only to “determine whe ther [the allega tions] plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief” a t this s tage of lit igat io n, Iq bal , 12 9 S. Ct. at 1 950 , we c on clu de that pl ain ti ff s ’ alleg ati on s ar e s uf

fi cien t t o s ur

viv e a
mo ti onto di s mi s s . Despite NYTA’s arguments t o the contrary, the size of the burden on an individual pla intiff is ir r elev ant . N YTA co r r ect ly o bs er ves th at the l ead p lai nt

if fs inthis pu tat

ive clas s act

io n h ave alle ged only

a small injury to themselves inasmuch as they do not cla im to have pa id the nonresident18

toll on a regula r basis . Plaintiffs have alle ged that, during the rele vant cla ss period, eac h paid the full- pr ice t oll d ur

in g “ a tr ip th r ough the S tat e of

New J er s ey.” J .A. 164(A m. Com pl . ¶¶ 5- 6)
. Howeve r, NYTA’s obs ervation is not a basis for dismis sing plaintiff’s claim. Plaintiffs s eek to represent an entire class of “United States citizens who, since March 6, 2000[,] . . . pa id tolls at the Gr andI s lan d b r

id ges witho ut

th e be nef it of th e r es id ent

di s cou nt .” J .A. 169 (A m. Com pl . ¶ 2 7)
. Altho ughwe ar e no t aw ar e of th e pr ecis e nu mb er

of po te nt ial pl ain ti ff s , we a r e co nf

id ent th at nei th er th e nu mb er

of pr os pec ti ve cl as s mem ber s no r

th e cu mulat

ive di ff er enc e be tw eenth e t olls they pai d and those paid by Grand Island residents is neglig ible. In any

event, w e have recognize d a violation of the dormant Commerce Cla use where three individua ls, who were “rec ruited to be pl ain ti ff s ,” p aida pas s eng er

fe e of bet ween50 c ent s andtw o d ollar s , whichcom pr is ed a “ r elat

ive ly

. . . s mall p or ti onof

[a] to tal fe r ry t ick et pr ice” fo r th e us e of

s tat e- pr ov

id ed f acil it ies
. See Bridgeport & Po rt Je ffe rs o n St eamb o at Co . v

. B ri dg epo rt Po rt Aut h. , 5 67 F.3 d 7 9, 82 , 8 3 ( 2d C ir. 20 09 ). Thi s is so beca use, as the preceding discussion illustr ates, whether a state polic y viola tes the dormant Com mer ce Cla us e do es no t d epe ndonth e ext ent of it s im pact

onan i ndivi du al p lai nt

if f. Rath er , a
s tat e po lic y t hat

is challen gedun der

th e do r man t Co mm er ce Cla us e mu s t b e ju dge d b y it s ov er all economic impact on interstate commerce inr elat io n t o the p ut ati

ve l ocal ben ef it s con fe r r ed. See Pike , 397 U.S . at

142
. For t he se r ea son s, w e h ol d th a t pl a in ti ffs h ave sta te d a cl a im un de r th e C om me rc e C la use andth at the D is tr

ict Cou r t e r r ed i n dis mi s s in g thi s clai m. On remand, the District Court s hall unde rtake the inquiry prescribed by the Supreme C ourt fo r det er mi ni ng whether

a f ee im po s ed b y a go ver nm ent al en ti ty to def r ay the c os t o f f

acil it ies us ed by those engag ed in interstate commerce viol ates the dormant Commerce C lause or the right to travel, whic h we discuss below. In Evansville-Vand erburgh Airport Authority District v . Delta Airlin es,Altho ughth e Pike te s t ap pl ies on ly i n d or man t Co mm er ce Cla us e analys is andon ly wh er e a 3 s tat e po lic y “r egulat es even -h and edly t o ef fe ct uat e a le git

im ate lo cal i nt er es t, ” Pike , 39 7 U. S. a t 1 42, th e Cou r t h as us ed the Evansville/Northwes t Airlines te s t t o ev alu ate th e “r eas on abl ene s s ” of fe es in other con te xt s . See, e.g. , Northwes t Airlines, 51 0 U. S. a t 3 58 ( con s id er in g wh ether

an ai r po r t u s er

fe e vio lat ed the A nt

i- HeadT ax Ac t, 49 U .S. C. § 1 513 , an d the Co mm er ce Cla us e) ; Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Scheiner , 48 3 U. S. 2 66, 289 -9 0 ( 198 7) (ap plyin g Ev ans v ill e ’s analys is incon s id er

in g wh ether

a s tat e t ax app lie d t o anin te r s tat e mo to r car r ier vio lat ed the Co mm er ce Cla us e) ; Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S . 44 4, 4 64- 67 ( 197 8) (ap plyin g Ev ans v ill e ’s analys is to as s es s th e co ns ti tu ti on ali ty of a ta x under the intergovernmental immunity doc trine). 19 Inc. , the Co ur t e xp lai nedth at s tat es ar e alw ays ent it ledto r equ

ir e in te r s tat e t r avel er s “t o b ear a f air
s har e of th e co s ts of

pr ov id in g pu bl ic f acil it ies th at f ur th er tr avel .” 4 05 U .S. 707 , 71 2 ( 197 2) . Af te r
r evi ewin g a lo ng l

in e of it s pr eced ent s per mi tt

in g s tat es to im po s e highw ay t olls s o l on g as th ey “r ef lect a unif or m, fair andpr act ical s tan dar d r elat

in g t o p ub lic exp enditur es ,” id. at 7 16 ( in te r nal qu ota ti on ma rks o mi tte d), the C ou rt c on cl ud ed tha t a fla t fe e o f on e d ol la r pe r pa ssen ge r forthe use of s tat e airpo r ts di d n ot

abr id ge the d or man t Co mm er ce Cla us e or th e r igh t t o t r avel

whe r e it was “designed only

to make the user of st ate-provided facil ities pay a reasonable fee to help defray the
cos ts of th eir con s truct io n an d m ain te nan ce.” Id
. at 714. In No rt

hwe st Ai rl ine s, In c. v. Co unt

y o f K en t , 510 U.S . 35 5 ( 199 4) , the Co ur t f or mulat ed a thr ee- fa ct or

te s t, bas ed o n the r eas onin g of th e Cou r t i n Ev ans v ill e , t o ev alu ate th e r eas on abl ene s s of fe es char gedfo r th e us e of

s tat e- pr ov

id ed f acil it ies
. Un der this te s t, a f

ee is r eas on abl e andcon s ti tu ti on ally pe r mi s s ib le “ if it (1 ) i s bas ed o n s om e f

air approximation of use of the facilities, (2) is not excessive in relation to the benefits conferred, and (3 ) d oes no t dis cr

im in ate agai ns t i nt er s tat e co mm er ce.” 510 U.S . at 369 (c it in g Ev ans v ill e , 40 5 U. S. a t 716 -1 7)
. The Supreme Court’s analysis in Ev ans v ill e was bas ed i n l arge p ar t o n i ts exam in ati onof cas es invo lvi ng c hallen ges to hi ghw ay t olls , b ut th e Cou r t h as no t u s ed the Northwes t Airlines test to eval uat e t he c on s ti tu ti on ali ty of a hi ghw ay t oll n or

has it in di cat ed whether

th e Pike test or the Northwes t Airlines te s t s ho ul d ap ply wh en high way t olls ar e ch all eng ed. Ho weve r , we d o n ot r ead 320

Ev ans v ill e , which the Court decide d two yea rs after Pike , as s up pl ant in g Pike . Rather , Ev

ans v ill e addressed in a specific contex t the same conce rns addressed in Pike while a lso adopting the Supreme Court’s analysis of “discrimination” under the dormant Commerce Cl ause. For example, fa ctors one and two of the Northwes t Airlines te st a ch ie ve the sa me en d a s Pike —the invali dation of state policie s that impos e an undue burden on interst ate comme rce—inasmuch as they require the c ourt to con s id er

whe th er th e f ee s up pl ies a ben ef

it to us er s of

a f acil it y that is at l eas t r oughl

y
com men s ur ate with the b ur denit im po s es onth em. See, e.g. , Ev ans v ill e , 405 U.S. a t 719 (“[T]he airlines have not shown these fees t o be exc essive in relation to the costs incurr ed by the ta xing
autho r it ies .”) . J us t as th e Pike

te st w ou ld up ho ld a s co nsti tutio na l a ny sta te po li cy

tha t c on fe rs a lo cal b ene fi t an d d oes no t i mp os e a cl ear ly exce s s ive bu r denonin te r s tat e co mm er ce, see 397 U.S . at 142 , the Northwes

t Airlines te s t p er mi ts th e s tat e t o m ake “ r eas on abl e” ex cep ti on s to it s fe e s che dule, so long as the fee schedule, on the w hole, reflects at lea st “a fair, [even] if imperfect, approximation of th e us e of

fa cil it ies fo r who s e be nef

it th ey ar e im po s ed. ” Id

. at 717. C onsis tent with the rest of th e Su pr eme Cou r t’ s do r man t Co mm er ce Cla us e ju r is pr ud enc e, the thi r d f

act or inth e Northwes

t Airlines te s t— whe th er a us er fe e di s cr im in ate s agai ns t i nt er s tat e co mm er ce, see 510 U.S . at 369 —p r even ts fe es “wh os e ob ject is lo cal e con omic p r ot ect

io ni s m, ” see C&A Car

bo ne , I nc. 511 U.S
. at 3 90. Ou r

Cou r t, to o, has nev er

us ed the Northwes

t Airlines te s t o r

th e Pike test to determ ine the
con s ti tu ti on ali ty

of a hi ghw ay t oll, b ut

we r ecen tly em pl oye d the Northwes t Airlines test in considering whether a fee imposed on ferr y passengers for

the use of port

facilitie s violated the dormant Com mer ce Cla us e or

th e pas s eng er s ’ r

igh t t o t r avel
. See Br

idgeport & Port Je

fferson Steamboat C

o. , 56 7 F.3d at 83-84, 86-88 (apply ing the three-factor test announced in Northwes t Airlines ). The Fir st Circuit relied on the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Ev ans v ill e to a ssess a do rma nt C om me rc e C la use21

chal len ge t o a high

way t oll d is cou nt

pr ogr am o ff

er ed b y the M as s achu s et ts T ur np ike Autho r it y. See Doran v. Mass. Turnpike Auth ., 3 48 F .3d315 , 32 0- 21 ( 1s t Ci r . 20 03) (ap plyin g the Evansville/Northwes t Airlines test in a case involvi ng a c halle nge to interstate toll under the Commerce C lause). One Distr ict Court in our Circuit has applie d Ev ans v ill e in considering a c halle nge under the dormant Commerce C lause to a similar discount program off ered by the Port Authority of New York and New J er s ey an d the M et r op ol

it an T r ans po r tat

io n Au th or

it y t o u s er s of

th e ele ct r onic t oll s ys te m EZP as s . Se e Saunde rs

v. P o rt Aut h. o f N .Y. , 2004 W L 1077964, *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 1 3, 2004) (relying on Evansville fo r

th e pr op os it

io n that “[ t] he t olls at i s s ue c on s ti tu te us er fe es ”)
. Altho ughnei th er

th e Su pr eme Cou r t n or

ou r Cou r t h as us ed the Northwes t Airlines test to eval uate the c onstitut

ionality of a highwa y toll, we believ e that this is the appli cable test in the circumstances presented here. The challe nge to a hig hway toll here—whic h indisputably grants vehicl es acces s to a s tat e- pr ov id ed b r id ge— clo s ely r es emb les th e ch all eng e t o the ai r po r t u s er fe e at iss ue in Ev

ans v ill e , an d we con clu de that , o n r ema nd , p lai nt if fs ’ d or man t Co mm er ce Cla us e claim should be analy zed unde r the thr ee-part test s et forth in Northwes t Airlines . NYTA is entitled to charge pl aintiffs a reasonable fee for the use of the Gr and Island Br idge. How ever, it may

not im po s e onus er s of

th e B r id ge a b ur denth at i s no t c om men s ur ate with the b ene fi ts it con fe r s , an d i t may no t dis cr im in ate agai ns t i nt er s tat e co mm er ce. See No rthwest Airlines , 51 0 U. S. a t 3 69. Whether th e f ee s che dule ex cep ti onpr ov id ed t o G r andI s lan d r es id ent s vio lat es th e do r man t Co mm er ce Cla use will depe nd in part on whether the fee represents a fair approximation of that group’s us e of th e br id ge— an i nqui ry t hat

is to o f act -d epe nd ent

to be d ecid ed u po n ex ami nat io n o f the p leadin gs . Se e i d. In other words , the Distr ict Court should consider whether the NYTA policy a t iss ue reflects “r ati on al dis ti nct

io ns amo ng dif

fe r ent clas s es of ” m ot or is ts us in g the B r

id ge, s ee Ev ans v ill e , 40 5 U. S. at 718, so that eac h user, on the whole, pay s s ome approximation of his or her f air share of theAlthough Northwes t Airlines announce d this thr ee fac tor tes t, the third factor—whether the 4 policy di scriminates against interst ate comme rce—wa s a separate inquiry in Ev ans v ill e . 40 5 U. S. a t 717 (“ First

, n either fe e di s cr im in ate s agai ns t i nt er s tat e co mm er ce an d t r avel .”) We hav e alr eady hel d that plaintiffs’ Amended Compla int fails to allege that NYTA’s policy discriminates aga inst inters tate commerce. Unl ess plaintiffs are afforded a further oppor tunity to amend their compla int, the Di s tr ict Cou r t m us t as s es s on ly the r emainin g t wo f act or s onr ema nd
. As noted, “[b]eca use the Equal Protection C lauses of the federal and NewYork 5 C on sti tutio ns a re co ex te nsive , o ur a na ly sis re spo nd s to [ pl a in ti ff’ s] c la im s un de r e a ch of t he se pr ov is io ns .” T

o wn o f S o uth o ld , 47 7 F .3dat 5 2 n .3 ( cit ati onom it te d)
.

22 s tat e’s cos t f

or mai nt ainin g the B r

id ge. Cf. D o ran , 34 8 F .3dat 3 20 ( “‘S o l on g as a St ate bas es it s tax
ona r elev ant

mea s ur e of

act ual r oadus e, o bv

io us ly b oth i nt er s tat e andin tr as tat e [d r ive r s ] p ay
acc ording to the facilities in fact provided by the State,’ a nd the program place s no undue burden on in te r s tat e co mm er ce.” (quo ti ng Scheiner , 48 3 U. S. a t 2 91) (s om e br acke ts om it te d) ). T he D is tr ict Cou r t m us t al s o co ns id er

whe th er th e t oll ch argedto no n- r es id ent s of Gr andI s lan d i s exce s s ive in relation to the benefit it confers to them and whether the toll discriminates aga inst inters tate
commerce. We e mphasize “tha t there need not be a perfect fit between the use of the [Bridge] and

4 th e s up po r t o f [

th e B r id ge] by” th e t oll. Bridgeport & Por t Jeffers on Steamb oat Co. , 567 F.3d at 86. The Northwes t Airlines te s t i s no t i nf

lex ib le; it s im ply r equ

ir es “r eas on abl ene s s .” III. Th e Ri gh t t o T r ave l Plaintiffs also maintain tha t NYTA’s toll policy abridge s their r ight to travel in viola tion of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the E qual Protection Cla use of the United States Constitution, as well as the Equa l Protection Clause of the New Y ork Con s ti tu ti on , in as mu ch as NYT A ch argedth em ahi ghe r

to ll thana s ub s et

of s im ila rly s ituat ed N ew York residents. Finding that plaintiffs had not attempted to asser t a cla im under the Privileges and 5 I mm unit ies Clau s e of

th e F ou r te enth Am end men t, th e Di s tr ict Cou r t did no t ad dr es s th at
con te nt io n. I t r ejec te d p lai nt

if fs ’ equal pr ot ect io n cl aim onth e gr ou nd s th at p lai nt if fs lack edNo te tha t w e m ust e va lu a te po li ci es wit h stric t sc rutin y i f th ey ta rge t a susp ec t c la ss or 6 im pl icat e a f un dam ent al r

igh t. See, e.g. , Heller v

. Doe , 50 9 U. S. 3 12, 319 -2 0 ( 199 3)
. 23 pr ud ent ial s tan di ng b ecau s e ( 1) bas ed o n the p leadin gs , the t ol ls af fe ct ed i nt r as tat e t r avel

on ly, Sele v an , 47 0 F . Su pp . 2dat 1 76, and(2) as s um in g f or th e s ake o f a rgum ent

th at the t olls af

fe ct ed interst ate travel, “[the] burden on the right to inters tate travel he re is minimal and insufficient to
con s ti tu te a dep r

iva ti on ,” id. at 1 77. Fu r th er , the D is tr ict Cou r t h eldth at, evenif

pl ain ti ff s had standing under the Equal Prot ection C lause, dismiss al woul d be appropriate. The District Court
r eas on ed that , b ecau s e pl ain ti ff s “h[ ad] no t c lai medto be m emb er s of a s us pec t c las s ,” N YTA’s po lic y wo ul d b e s ub ject

on ly t o “ar ati on al b as is s tan dar d o f r evi ew.” Id
. T he D is tr

ict Cou r t then 6 conclude d that NYTA had a ss erted a “le gitimate purpose” for its toll program that plaintiffs did not di s pu te . Id

. We di s agr ee wi thth e Di s tr ict Cou r t’ s analys is . As an i ni ti al m att er , we d o n ot agr ee that plaintiffs f aile d to asser t a cla im for a violation of their right to travel under the Privilege s and Immunities Clause of the Four teenth Amendme nt. As noted, plaintiffs’ complaint supplied a detaile d description of NYTA’s Grand Is land Bridge toll policy . Under the hea ding “C auses of Act io n, ” the c om pl ain t alleg ed t hat NYT A’s to ll p ol

icy d epr ive d p lai nt

if fs of “thei r con s ti tu ti on al rights under

the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV a nd/or the Four teenth Amendme nt by charging them m ore fo r traveling th an [ NYT A] c har gedcer tai n N ew Yo r k St ate r es id ent s .” J .A. 171 (A m. Com pl . ¶ 3 8) (e mp has is add ed) . T akento gether , p lai nt if fs ’ alleg ati on s clea rly i mp lic ate a vio lat io n o f p lai nt

if fs ’ r igh t t o t r avel

un der th e F ou r te enth Am end men t’ s Pr ivileg es andI mm unit

ies Clau s e, whichwe d es cr

ib e infu r th er

det ail bel ow. T he Co ns ti tu ti onpr ot ect s a f un dam ent al r

igh t t o t r avel

withi n the U ni te d S tat es , whichwe hav e als o called“the r

igh t t o f r ee m ov eme nt .” Willi

am s v. T own of Gree nbu rgh , 53 5 F .3d71, 75 ( 2dPurs uant to the Fourteenth Amendment’s Pr ivileg es and Immunities Clause, “[n]o State 7 shall make or enforce a ny lawwhich shall a bridge the privilege s or immunities of citizens of the Unit ed S tat es .” 24 Cir . 20 08) (i nt er nal

qu ot ati onmar ks om it te d) ; cf. Saenz v. Roe , 52 6 U. S. 4 89, 500 (1 999 ) ( no ti ng that “[ t]h e ‘ rig ht t o tr ave l’
. . . e mb ra ce s at least three different components,” including “the right of a citize n of one State to enter and le ave a nother State, the right to be treated as a w elcome visitor rather than an unfriendly al ien whe n temporarily present in the second State, and, for travelers who elec t t o b eco me p er man ent r es id ent s , the r

igh t t o b e t r eat ed l

ike other cit izen s of th at S tat e.” (emphasis added)). Although the Supreme C ourt has s uggested that “[t]he textual sour ce of the
con s ti tu ti on al r

igh t t o t r avel , o r , m or e pr ecis ely, th e r igh t o f f r ee in te r s tat e migr ati on , . . . h as pr ov ed elu s ive ,” Att’y Gen. of N.Y. v. Soto -Lopez , 476 U.S. 8 98, 902 (1986), it ha s pr otected that right by invo kin g bo thth e P r

ivileg es andI mm unit

ies Clau s e of

th e F ou r te enth Am end men t an d the Eq ual Pr ot ect io n Cl aus e. See, e.g. , Sae nz , 52 6 U. S. a t 5 02- 03 (

no ti ng that

th e P r ivileg es andI mm unit

ies 7 Cla use of the Four teenth Amendme nt protects “the right of [a] newly arrived citize n to the same pr ivileg es andim mu ni ti es enj oye d b y other cit izen s of th e s ame St ate ”) ; Me

m’l H o sp. v. M ari co pa County , 415 U.S. 2 50, 269 (1974) (holding tha t a state durational residence requireme nt impinged the right to tr avel , absent a compe lling state interest, and therefore violated the E qual Protection Cla use); se e al

so Z o bel v. Wil liams, 457 U.S. 5 5, 67 (1982) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“As is clear from our cases, the right to travel a chieve s its most f orceful expression in the context of equal protection anal ysis.”); cf. Soto-Lopez

, 47 6 U. S. a t 9 02 ( “[

I]nlig ht of [the S up r eme Cou r t’ s ] u nques ti on ed his to r ic accep tan ce o f the p r

in cip le o f f

r ee in te r s tat e migr ati on , an d o f the i mp or tan t r ol e that pr in cip le h as pl ayedintr ans fo r mi ng m any S tat es in to a s in gle Nat io n, we h ave n ot

fe lt im pelledto lo cat e thi s right definitively in a ny particula r constitutional provision. . . . Wha tever its or igin, the right to [tr avel ] i s fi r mly es tab lis hed
. . . .”)
.T he D is tr ict Cou r t c or r ect

ly o bs er vedth at, inBr

ay v. A le xand ri a Wo men ’s Healt h Cli nic , the 8 Su pr eme Cou r t h eldth at apr op os ed d emo ns tr ati onat a n ab or ti oncli ni c am ou nt ed t o a “ pu r ely in tr as tat e r es tr

ict io n” that “[di d] no t i mp lic ate th e r

igh t o f i nt er s tat e t r avel .” 5 06 U .S. 263 , 27 7 (1993). We note that plaintiffs in Br ay simply alleg ed that they w ere prevented from entering abo r ti oncli ni cs . Se e i

d. T he Br ay cas e di d n ot

con cer n the u s e of

ou r in te r s tat e highw ay s ys te m. The holding in Br

ay is consis tent with our holding in Will iams , supra , that the right to tr avel —i nt er s tat e or

in tr as tat e—did no t af

fo r d anin di

vid ual a r igh t t o en te r

a par ti cul ar

buildin g. See Will iams , 53 5 F .3dat 7 6. I n an y eve nt , in as mu ch as pl ain ti ff s hav e all egedth at the N YTA t oll pr ogr am ac tu ally pe nal

izedth eir r igh t t o t r avel

bet weens tat es , we n eedno t ad dr es s any p os s ib le tensions between Br

ay andou r cas e law
. 25 Con tr ary t o the D is tr

ict Cou r t’ s ho ld in g inthis cas e, we hav e r eco gni zed th e Con s ti tu ti on ’s pr ot ect io n o f ar igh t t o i nt r as tat e as well

as in te r s tat e t r avel
. Will

iams , 53 5 F .3dat 7 5 ( “[

I]n di vid ual s po s s es s a f

un dam ent al r

igh t t o t r avel within a

state .” ( emp has is add ed) ); King v. New Rochelle Mun. Hous. Aut h. , 44 2 F .2d646 , 64 8 (

2d Cir . 19 71) (“ I t w ould be m eani ngl es s to des cr ib e the r igh t t o t r avel bet weens tat es as a f

un dam ent al p r ecep t o f p er s on al l ib er ty andno t t o ackno wled ge a co r r elat ive constitutional right to tr avel within a state.”); see also Ramos v. To wn of Vernon , 35 3 F .3d171 , 17 6 ( 2d Cir . 20 03) (r eco gni zin g the “ lim it [ed ] co ns ti tu ti on al r

igh t t o f r ee m ov eme nt

withi n [a] [

t] own ”)
. Even i f we had not recog nized a right of intra -st ate travel, plaintiffs have, as noted, al lege d that the
to ll a ff ect ed thei r

in te r s tat e t r avel

bet weenNew

Yor k t o N ew J er s ey. 8 “Whe n a l ocal

r egulat io n i nf r in ges up ona con s ti tu ti on ally- pr ot ect ed r igh t, we ap ply s tr

ict
s cr ut in y, r equ ir in g the m unici pal

it y t o s ho w that

th e r egulat

io n i s nar r owly t ail or ed t o s er ve a
com pel lin g go ver nm ent al i nt er es t. ” T o wn o f S o uth o ld , 477 F.3d at 53 (empha sis added). The Supreme Cou r t h as exp lai nedth at “ [a] s tat e law im pl icat es th e r

igh t t o t r avel

whe n i t ac tu all

y de te r s s uch
tr avel , wh en i mp edi ng tr avel is it s pr im ary ob ject

ive , o r whe n i t u s es any c las s if

icat io n whichs er

ves to pen ali ze the e xer cis e of th at r igh t. ” Soto-Lopez

, 47 6 U. S. a t 9 03 ( emp has is add ed) (i nt er nal qu ot ati onmar ks andcit ati on s om it te d)
.26

Pl ain ti ff s do no t ar

gue th at N YTA’s to ll p ol

icy a ct ually d et er s tr avel

or th at i t w as enac te d pri ma ril y f

or t he pu rpo se o f im pe di ng tra ve l. The y c on te nd , ra the r, t ha t th e p ol ic y i mp ose s a bu r denor pen alt y onth eir exer cis e of

th e r igh t t o t r avel , an d s ho ul d acc or di ngl y be s ub ject

to s tr ict
s cr ut in y, b ecau s e it

denies a ben ef

it to all no n- r es id ent s of

New Yor k ( andall

bu t a s ub s et

of New Yor k r es id ent s ) who exer cis e t he r igh t t o t r avel

onI nt er s tat e- 190 th r ough G r andI s lan d. We disagree. In Ev

ans v ill e the Supreme Court expla ined that “[t]he principle that burdens on the r ight to travel are c onstitut

ional only if shown to be necessary to promot e a c ompelling state interest has no app lic ati on ” wh er e t r avel er s pay afe e t o u s e a “f acil it y pr ov id ed at pu bl ic ex pen s e [that

] ai ds r ath er th an hin der s th e r

igh t t o t r avel .” Ev

ans v ill e , 405 U.S. a t 714. Indeed, the C ourt obs erved in SotoLopez that its “recent cases [concerning the right to travel] hav e dea lt with state laws that, by clas s if yin g r es id ent s acco r di ng t o the t im e they es tab lis hedr es id enc e, r es ul te d i n the u nequal di s tr ib ut io n o f r igh ts andben ef

it s amo ng o th er

wis e qu ali fi ed b on a f

id e r es id ent s .” 4 76 U .S. at 9 03. Fo r exam pl e, the S up r eme Cou r t h as s ub ject ed t o s tr ict s cr ut in y analys is s tat e law s th at i mp os ed du r ati on al r es id enc e r equ

ir eme nt s fo r

r ecei pt of welf ar e be nef it s , Shap iro v

. Thompson , 39 4 U. S. 6 18, 634(1 969 ), o v er

rule d in pa rt

o n o the r g ro unds by Edelman v . J o rda n , 415 U.S. 6 51 (1974); hea lthcare ben ef it s , Me m’l H o sp. , 41 5 U. S. a t 2 54; vo ti ng r igh ts , se e D unn v

. B lums tein , 405 U.S. 3 30, 342 (1972); and a c ivil service preference for veterans who entered the armed forces while residing in a par ti cul ar s tat e, Soto-Lopez

, 47 6 U. S. a t 9 09. But see So sna v. Iowa , 41 9 U. S. 3 93 ( 197 5) (u ph ol di ng a one-yea r res idency

requirement for m aintaini ng an a ction for divorce); Starns v. Malkerso n , 40 1 U. S. 985 (1971) (summarily affirming a one-yea r res idency requirement for in- state tuition at st ate
unive r s it ies ). Our obs ervation that “minor restr ictions on travel simply do not amount to the denial of a fu nd ame nt al r

igh t, ” T o wn o f S o uth o ld , 477 F.3d at 54 (internal quota tion marks omitt ed), is consist entPlaintiffs rely on the Supreme C ourt’s decision in Cran dall v. N ev ada , 73 U.S . ( 6 Wall.) 35 9 (1867), for the pr oposition that “res idency requirements in inters tate travel, e ven if the amount of the ‘pena lty’ is small or minimal, are odious and unconstitutional.” A ppella nt’s B r. 37. In Cran dall , the Supreme Court held unc onstitut ional a state tax of one dollar cha rged to railroad passengers leaving the state. 73 U.S. at 46. Howe ver, as the Supreme Court expla ined in Ev ans v ill e , “[t]he Nevada charge [a t iss ue in Cran dall ] was not limited . . . to travele rs asked to bear a fa ir share of the co sts of pro vi di ng pu bl ic fa ci li ti es t ha t fu rth ertra ve l. ” 4 05 U. S. a t 7 12 . C on tra ry to p la in ti ffs’ argum ent bef or e t hi s Cou r t, “[

t] her e is no s ol

id fo un dat

io n f or th e claim th at [

a] s tatut e di r ect

ly in te r fe r es with the r

igh ts of cit izen s of th e Unit ed S tat es to pas s th r ough the S tat e, an d i s consequently ba d acc ording to the doctrine announce d in Cran dall ,” id. at 7 13, s im ply be caus e it char ges a f ee t o “t o h elp def

r ay the c os ts of

r oadcon s truct

io n an d r epai r ,” id. at 7 12.
27 with the S up r eme Cou r t’ s ju r is pr ud enc e, cf. Miller v. Reed , 17 6 F .3d120 2, 1 205 (9 thCir . 19 99) (“ [M ]i no r bu r den s im pact

in g in te r s tat e t r avel , su ch as t o ll r o ads , do not constitute a violation [of the
r igh t t o t r avel

] .
. . . ” ( emp has is add ed) ). I n thi s cas e, p lai nt if fs do no t alleg e that

th ey o r other
mem ber s of

th e pu tat ive clas s r ou ti nely pay

th e f ull t oll inor der

to com mu te to wor k o r

th at the t oll has otherwise had a substantial financia l impact on them. A s noted, they alle ge that they paid the toll en route to New Jersey for s hopping and other ac tivities. These facts s uggest at most a “minor
r es tr ict io n” o n p lai nt

if fs ’ r igh t t o t r avel , r ath er

th an a “ pen alt

y.” 9 Nevertheless, plaintiffs’ allegations implica te a possible violation of the right to travel in the context discussed in Ev

ans v ill e in as mu ch as th ey co nt endth at they hav e be en c har

gedan ex ces s ive
to ll f or us e of th e Gr andI s lan d B r

id ge while r es id ent s of

New Yor k ar e ch argeds ub s tan ti ally les s . In Ev ans v ill e , t he Su pre me C ou rt re co gn iz ed a di ffe re nc e b et we en the sortof “ in vi di ou s di sti nc ti on s” th at p enal ize the r igh t t o t r avel , see Z obel

, 45 7 U. S. a t 6 0, a ndcas es inwhi ch a s tat e has s im ply lev ied “a ch arge d es ign ed o nly t o m ake the u s er of s tat e- pr ov

id ed f acil it ies pay ar eas on abl e f

ee t o h elp def r ay the c os ts of

th eir con s truct io n an d m ain te nan ce,” se e E v ans v ill e , 40 5 U. S. a t 7 14; se e al

so id. at 713 & n.6. The implic ation of the Court’s reasoning in Ev ans v ill e is th at, inth e no r mal

cou r s e, f ees des ign ed t o o ff

s et th e co s t o f m ain tai ni ng as tat e- pr ov id ed f acil it y ar e gen er ally pe r mi s s ib le i f theyAs no te d, Sel evandi d n ot app eal thi s as pec t o f the D is tr ict Cou r t’ s or der
. 10 28 “r ef lect a unif or m, fair andpr act ical s tan dar d r elat

in g t o p ub lic exp enditur es .” Id
. at 7 16 ( in te r nal quotation marks omitted). A user fee, howe ver, violate s the right t o travel unless “it (1) is based on some fair approximation of us e of the facilitie s, (2) is not excessive in relation to the be nefits
con fe r r ed, and(3 ) d oes no t dis cr im in ate agai ns t i nt er s tat e co mm er ce.” Northwes t Airlines, 51 0 U. S. a t 369 (c it in g Ev ans v ill e , 51 0 U. S. a t 7 16- 17)
. Acc ordingly, we conclude that the Distr ict Court erred in applyi ng rational ba sis review to NYT A’s to ll p ol

icy. Onr ema nd , the D is tr ict Cou r t s hall d et er mi ne whether th e t oll p ol

icy implica tes the right to travel in the c ontext discuss ed in Ev ans v ill e and , if s o, th e Di s tr

ict Cou r t s hall apply strict scrut

iny. If, howeve r, the District Court finds that the toll is merely a “minor restriction
ontr avel ” that

do es no t am ou nt

to th e de ni al o f afu nd ame nt al r igh t, T o wn o f S o uth o ld , 47 7 F .3dat 54, th en the D is tr

ict Cou r t s hal

l ap ply t he Northwes

t Airlines te s t t o d et er mi ne i f the t oll d is cr im in ate s agai ns t i nt er s tat e co mm er ce. IV. Ar ti cl e IV P r ivil eg es a nd Im m un it ie s Cl au se Rubin, a U.S. citiz en residing in Ca nada, argues that the Distr ict Court erred in dismis sing her claim tha t the NYTA policy violates her rights under the Privileges and Immunities Cla use of Article IV. In contrast

to the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 10 which provides that “[n]o State shall ma ke or enforce any law w hich shall a bridge the privilege s and im mu ni ti es of

th e citizens of the United Sta tes ,” U.S. C onst. amend. XIV, § 1 (empha sis added), the Pr ivileg es andI mm unit

ies Clau s e of

Ar ti cle I V pr ov

id es th at “ [t

]h e Citiz ens of each State

shall be
ent it ledto all Pr ivileg es andI mm unit

ies of Cit izen s inth e s ever al S tat es ,” U .S. Con s t. ar t. I V, § 2 (emphasis added). The plain la nguage of the Pr ivileg es and Immunities Clause of Article IV
man dat es a r ecip r ocal

ar r ang eme nt

amo ng the s ever al s tat es comprising the United States whereby29

residents of one state are entitled to enjoy the same rights as citizens of other states. Canada is not a party to that arrangement. Ac cordingly, the te xt of Article IV, Section 2 sugge sts that U.S. citiz ens liv in g ab r oadwho , li ke Ru bi n, ar e no t c it izen s of a par ti cul ar

s tat e ar e no t e nt

it ledto it s pr ot ect

io n. As the Supreme Court expla ined in Hicklin v. Orbeck , the purpose of the Privileges and Imm un itie s C la use of A rti cl e I V i s to pl ace the c it

izen s of each St ate up onth e s ame fo ot in g wi thcit

izen s of other States, so far as the adva ntages resulting fr om citizenship in those States are conce rned. It r eliev es them fr om the disabilities of aliena ge in other States; it inhibits di s cr im in ati ng l egi s lat

io n ag ain s t them by o th er

St ate s ; . . . it

in s ur es to th em i n o th er States the same freedom poss essed by the citize ns of those States in the acquisition andenj oym ent

of pr op er ty andinth e pu r s ui t o f h app in es s ; an d i t s ecu r es to th em i n other States the equal protection of their laws. It has been justly said that no provision in the Constitut

ion has tended so str ongly to constitute the citize ns of the Unit ed S tat es on e pe op le as this
. 437 U.S . 51 8, 5 24 ( 197 8) (quo ti ng Paul v . V ir gi nia , 75 U.S . ( 8 Wall.) 168 , 18 0 ( 186 9) (i nt er nal qu ot ati onmar ks om it te d) ). Pu t dif fe r ent ly, th e P r ivileg es andI mm unit

ies Clau s e of

Ar ti cle I V “was designed to insure to a citizen of State A who ve ntures int o State B the same privilege s which the cit izen s of St ate B enj oy” Zobel

, 45 7 U. S. a t 5 9 n .5 (qu ot

in g Too mer , 334 U.S. a t 395)). In Sae nz , a
r igh t- to -tr avel

cas e, the Co ur t i den ti fi ed the ar ti cle’ s Pr ivileg es andI mm unit

ies Clau s e as th e s ou r ce of the right of “ a citizenof one State who travels in other States, intending to return home at the end of his journey, . . . to enjoy the Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States that he visits .” 526 U.S . at 501 (empha sis added). The C ourt then dis tinguished the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV from the Privileges and Immunities Cla use of the Four teenth Amendment by noting

that the rights of

a newly arrived ci tizen of a state to enjoy the same pr ivileg es andim mu ni ti es of th e cit izen s of th e s ame s tat e was pr ot ect ed “ no t o nly by th e ne w
ar r ival’s s tatus as a s tat e cit

izen ”—ar ef

er enc e t o the P r

ivileg es andI mm unit

ies Clau s e of

Ar ti cle30

IV—“but also by her status as a citiz en of the United States”—a reference to Privileges and I mm unit ies Clau s e of

th e F ou r te enth Am end men t. 526 U.S . at 502
. As ou r di s cus s io n i n p ar t I I I , supra , of Rubin’s right-to- travel cla im under the Privileges and I mm unit ies Clau s e of

th e Fo ur te en th A men dmen t

dem on s tr ate s , the r

igh ts of U.S . ci ti zen s r es id in g in foreign countries are protected by that provision of the Constitution. Howeve r, neither the text nor th e pu r po s e of

th e P r ivileg es andI mm unit

ies Clau s e of

Ar ti cle I V—i nt egr ati ng the v ar io us s tat es in to a coh er ent

who le— would be s er

vedby e xt endin g it s pr ot ect io n t o r es id ent s of

fo r eign
cou nt r ies , ev en U .S. cit

izen s r es id in g info r eign co un tr ies
. Because foreign countries are not among the entitie s that Article IV seeks to integrate into a single nation, w e ca nnot conclude tha t the Privileges and Immunities Clause of that article e xtends
to r es id ent s of

Canad a who ar e als o U .S. cit izen s . I n s um , we h ol d that , inth e cir cum s tan ces presented here, the Distr

ict Court properly dismis sed Rubin’s clai m under the Privileges and I mm unit ies Clau s e of

Ar ti cle I V. CONCLUSI ON For r easons st ated a bove, we hold that (1 ) p lai nt if fs hav e es tab lis heds tan di ng t o s ue u nd er Ar ti cle I I I of

th e Con s ti tu ti on ; (2) p lai nt if fs ar e pr op er

par ti es to all ege a v

io lat io n o f t he d or man t Co mm er ce Cla us e un der th e Su pr eme Cou r t’ s “prud ent ial s tan di ng” do ct r

in e; (3 ) NYTA h a s no t e sta bl ish ed tha t i t a ct ed a s a “m a rke t pa rti ci pa nt” ra the r th a n a s a gov er nm ent al en ti ty

eng agedinr egulat

io n o f i nt er s tat e co mm er ce; (4 ) p lai nt if fs hav e s tat ed a c lai m u nd er th e do r man t Co mm er ce Cla us e; (5) plaintiffs have stated a clai m for inf ringement of their right to travel in viol ation of the Equ al P r ot ect

io n Cl aus e andth e P r

ivileg es andI mm unit

ies Clau s e of

th e F ou r te enth Am end men t;31

(6 ) p lai nt if fs ’ d or man t Co mm er ce Cla us e andr igh t t o t r avel

clai ms mu s t b e analyze d u nd er the three-factor test

set for th by the Supreme C ourt in No rt hwe st Ai rl ine s, In c. v. Co unt

y o f K en t , 51 0 U.S. 355, 3 69 (1994); and (7) the District Court properly dism iss ed Rubi n’s challeng e to NYTA’s toll policy unde r the Pr ivileg es andI mm unit

ies Clau s e of

Ar ti cle I V.

* * * Acc ordingly, the Janua ry 18, 2007 order of the Distr ict Court is AFFI RMED in pa rt, VACAT ED i n p ar t, andth e cau s e is REM AND ED f

or fu r th er pr oce edi ngs con s is te nt

with thi s op inio n.