J-S76001-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT

OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

FREDERICK C. HARRIS, III,

Appellant No. 449 WDA 2017

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 14, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0008659-2015

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., KUNSELMAN, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED JULY 26, 2019

Appellant, Frederick C. Harris, III, appeals from the judgment of 

sentence of an aggregate term of life imprisonment without parole, imposed 

following his conviction for two counts of first-degree murder and two counts 

of abuse of a corpse. Appellant challenges the trial court’s admitting into 

evidence ten autopsy photographs of the victims’ bodies, as well as the court’s 

denying his motion to suppress evidence. After careful review, we affirm. 

Appellant was arrested for the murders of his mother, Olivia Gilbert, and 

her husband (Appellant’s stepfather), Lamar Gilbert. The trial court 

summarized the facts adduced at trial as follows:

Angela Joanne Harris, [Appellant’s sister], testified that she and 

her mother[, Olivia Gilbert,] had a very good relationship and 

talked ... every day, so when she had not heard from her mother 

in three days..., she called the Penn Hills police for a wellness 

check on December 1[6, 2014]. She stated that ... Appellant had 
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been living with her father, and her mother had told her that she 

would not allow ... Appellant to move back into [the Gilberts’]

home. She testified that she was told that the police could not 

enter the home unless someone let them in. Harris kicked the 

door in, and the police entered the home. She testified that the 

police showed her a piece of paper at some point that appeared 

to be a note from her mother to ... Appellant[,] which stated[:]

“Hello Fred. Thanks for housesitting and fixing up the place while 

we are on vacation. See you soon. Tell everyone hello. Mr. and 

Mrs. Gilbert Lamar. [sic] P.S.: Don’t open the door for anyone.”

Harris testified that the note was in ... Appellant’s handwriting. 

She also testified that she had some mental health problems and 

a history of strangling cats when she was not taking her

medication, but she had been taking her medication at the time 

of her mother and stepfather’s deaths and she had not hurt her 

mother and stepfather.

Frederick C. Harris, Jr., the father of ... Appellant, testified that ...

Appellant lived with him for over a year and took care of him after 

he had surgery, but because of the bickering, eventually ...

Appellant was going to move out and get his own place. He also 

noted that ... Appellant would visit his mother often. []Appellant 

moved out Thursday, December 11. Frederick Harris, Jr. went to 

Olivia Gilbert and Lamar Gilbert’s home with Angela Harris on 

December 13. He testified that he later told the police that Angela 

Harris was worried about her mother and ... Appellant’s car was in 

the driveway.

Dwayne Yenchik, a police officer, testified that he, Officer 

[Michael] Lape, and Officer Broadway responded to the call for a 

welfare check at 223 Suncrest Drive on December 1[6]. He was 

not present when Angela Harris kicked in the door, but he had

been told by Officer Lape that that was what happened. He 

testified that he entered the home and found a fully-dressed, black 

male, identified as ... Appellant, on the bed, underneath the 

blankets, in the master bedroom. []Appellant did not respond to 

attempted rousing, so they requested an ambulance and looked 

for identification in his pockets. He testified that he found ...

Appellant’s identification, a credit or debit card, and a note in ...

Appellant’s pockets. The officers then proceeded to look for Mr. 

and Mrs. Gilbert, but did not see them or any indication that they 

had gone on vacation.

[Officer] Lape, ... testified that he responded to a call for a welfare

check at 223 Suncrest on December 1[6]. The officers did not see 
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any broken windows or unlocked doors; no one answered the 

door, and they told Angela Harris that if she entered the home, 

she could be charged with a crime. He stated that they 

methodically looked for Mr. and Mrs. Gilbert, searching the entire 

first floor. When they found no sign of the Gilberts on the first 

floor, they proceeded to the basement and the garage. He 

testified that there were several garbage cans in the garage, and 

a short time later, the officers opened the first garbage can, which 

contained a rolled-up piece of carpet. The second garbage can 

contained what the officers believed to be a human head. At that 

point, he testified that the officers stopped what they were doing 

and contacted their superiors and the Allegheny County Police.

Patrick Kinavey, a detective with the Allegheny County Police 

Department’s Homicide Unit, responded to a call from the Penn 

Hills municipality police for assistance with a homicide 

investigation. The Mobile Crime Unit was contacted to process the 

crime scene. Once the detective was briefed by the officers who 

initially responded, [Detective] Kinavey decided that it was 

necessary to get a search warrant, so he proceeded to obtain one. 

He determined that ... Appellant owned the car that was sitting in 

the driveway. The Commonwealth, using photos, asked 

[Detective] Kinavey to describe what they found once inside the 

home. [Detective] Kinavey stated that they found a partially

constructed Christmas tree, a receipt from Home Depot for a 45-

gallon, wheeled trashcan purchased on December 16, a receipt for 

money withdrawn from a MAC machine, a MAC card issued to 

Olivia Gilbert, bleach bottles in the basement, a red-brown stain 

on the blue carpet in the basement, a block set of knives with no 

knives in it[,] a receipt from Home Depot for 3 45-gallon trashcans 

purchased [on] December 15, and several new, large trashcans in 

the garage, some open and some closed. The officers marked the 

trashcans [with numbers for] identification [purposes].

[Detective] Kinavey testified that in the trashcans, there was a 

portion of blue carpet with heavy red-brown stains, a taped-shut 

trash bag with a human head inside, other body parts, and knives 

from the empty block in the kitchen. The trashcans were removed 

to the medical examiner’s office. In the basement, there was a 

portion of carpet missing; a portion of the wall missing; red-brown 

staining on an iron board, the carpet, and the furnace; and what 

the officers suspected was human tissue. In the Gilberts’ car, the 

officers found a receipt from Lowe’s for a 14-piece knife set, 

purchased on December 16. Can 2 contained a portion of a human 

torso, with several stab wounds. Can 3 contained the lower 
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portion of a female from the waist down, cut at the knees. Can 4 

contained the lower portion of a male, the genital area and the

thigh, cut at the knees. Can 5 contained bloody clothing and

human heads. Can 6 contained the portion of the blue carpet and 

5 knives, which had bent or broken handles. Can 7 contained 

rugs, clothing, and other body parts. He also testified that ...

Appellant was wearing a white t-shirt and tan khaki pants, which

had blood stains on them.

Pamela Woods, a trace evidence examiner for the Allegheny 

County Medical Examiner’s Office, testified as an expert that the 

carpet in the garage matched the carpet in the basement. Emily 

Wilkinson, a scientist in the Medical Examiner’s Forensic 

Laboratory Division, testified as an expert, that she performed

luminal testing in the basement of the home. She testified that 

there were wiping patterns, splatter patterns, and drip patterns. 

Anthony Perry, a police officer, testified that he was assigned to 

determine who picked up the trash at 223 Suncrest Drive. He 

testified that he went to the landfill and searched for ... body parts 

but was unable to locate them.

Kevin L. McCue, a detective, testified that he interviewed ...

Appellant’s father, Frederick Harris, Jr., who told him that he told 

his son to move out of their home, figuring that he was probably 

going to stay at a shelter. Venerando Costa, a detective, testified 

that he went to Lowe’s and Home Depot and obtained evidence 

related to the receipts found in the Gilberts’ home. Mike Feeney, 

a detective, testified that he collected video evidence from various 

businesses that show[ed] the movements of the victims and ...

Appellant. Daniel McGregor Mayer, a detective, testified to two 

wounds observed on ... Appellant’s hands.

Elizabeth Wisbon, a scientist for the Allegheny County Medical 

Examiner’s Office, testified as an expert about the testing of blood 

evidence in the case. Stephanie Nickolas, a scientist with the 

Allegheny County Medical Examiner’s Office, testified as an expert 

on latent fingerprint examination. She testified that she was able 

to develop latent fingerprints on one of the trash bags, the items 

within the new knife box, plastic sleeves that came out of a trash 

bag, and the roll of packing tape. Jason Clark, a scientist for the 

Allegheny County Medical Examiner’s Office, testified as a latent 

fingerprint expert that he processed the remaining items that 

Wisbon did not test for latent fingerprints. He testified that he 

found ... Appellant’s fingerprints of value, meaning they were 

sufficient enough to be connected with someone, on 3 of the knots 
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of the trash bags. Ashley Platt, a scientist for the Allegheny 

County Medical Examiner’s Office, testified as an expert on 

forensic biology and DNA analysis about DNA swabbing from

inside the trash bags. []Appellant’s DNA did not match the

samples that were taken, except for possible bloodstaining on the

pocket of a pair of pants and a t-shirt. There was some testimony 

that there may have been a third DNA sample in a mixed sample, 

but ... Appellant’s DNA did not match it. She also testified to the 

general ability of cleaners and bleach to degrade DNA samples.

Abdulrezak Shakir, a forensic pathologist for the Allegheny County 

Medical Examiner’s Office, testified as an expert about what body 

parts were found in each trashcan. He testified about the wounds 

on the body parts of Lamar and Olivia Gilbert, opining that Lamar 

Gilbert died from stab wounds of the trunk and dismemberment 

took place after death. The manner of death was homicide. In 

his opinion, Olivia Gilbert died as a result of sharp force trauma 

with dismemberment taking place after death; the manner of 

death was homicide.

Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 3/14/18, at 4-9 (footnote and citations to the trial 

transcripts omitted).

The Commonwealth charged Appellant with two counts of first-degree 

murder, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(a);1 and two counts of abuse of a corpse, 18 

Pa.C.S. § 5510. Appellant filed a timely motion to suppress, and the trial court 

conducted a suppression hearing on May 23, 2016. On July 27, 2016, the 

court denied Appellant’s suppression motion. A jury trial followed on 

September 20-27, 2016. On the final day of trial, the jury found Appellant 

guilty on all counts. On January 3, 2017, the court sentenced Appellant to life 

imprisonment without the possibility of parole for each count of first-degree 

____________________________________________

1

In the criminal information, the Commonwealth charged Appellant generally 

with homicide, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2501, but also indicated that it was specifically 

seeking a conviction for first-degree murder. 
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murder, and to 1-2 years’ incarceration for each count of abuse of a corpse. 

The court ordered all sentences to run consecutively. 

Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion, which was denied 

immediately following a hearing held on February 14, 2017. Appellant then 

filed a timely notice of appeal and a timely, court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) 

statement. The trial court issued its Rule 1925(a) opinion on March 14, 2018. 

Appellant now presents the following questions for our review:

Did the court below err when it permitted the Commonwealth to 

introduce, over defense objection, 10 photographs of the 

decedents’ dismembered remains?

Did the court below err when it denied Appellant’s pretrial motion 

to suppress physical evidence, including but not limited to the 

body parts found in the garbage cans located in the garage of the 

residence that the police entered?

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

 Appellant’s first issue concerns the court’s admission of ten “gruesome 

photographs depicting the severed heads and body parts of the two victims in 

this case.” Id. at 13. Appellant contends that the Commonwealth could have 

“establish[ed] what it need[ed] to establish in an alternative way” and, as 

such, the probative value of the photos was outweighed by their prejudicial 

effect on the jury. Id. Appellant also argues that the prejudice that resulted 

was not alleviated by the court’s issuance of a curative instruction. Id. 
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We are constrained to deem this issue waived, as the at-issue 

photographs are not contained in the certified record.

2

It is well-settled ... that “this Court may consider only the facts 

that have been duly certified in the record when deciding an 

appeal.” PHH Mortgage Corp. v. Powell, 100 A.3d 611, 614 

(Pa. Super. 2014), citing Pa.R.A.P. 1921 Note. Moreover, “it is 

[the a]ppellant’s responsibility to ensure that this Court has the 

complete record necessary to properly review a claim.”

Commonwealth v. Tucker, 143 A.3d 955, 963 (Pa. Super. 

2016) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 151 A.3d 1117, 1127 (Pa. Super. 2016)

(holding that the appellant waived his challenge to the trial court’s admission 

of crime scene photographs where the photographs were not contained in the 

certified record on appeal). It is simply impossible for this Court to assess the 

inflammatory nature of photographs without the ability to view them. 

Next, Appellant argues that the trial court erred when it denied his pretrial motion to suppress the physical evidence seized from 223 Suncrest Drive. 

Specifically, Appellant sought to suppress evidence of the victims’ body parts 

discovered in the garbage cans, as the search discovering that evidence was 

initiated without a warrant, in the absence of an exception to the warrant 

requirement, and while Appellant was present in that home. The trial court 

held that Appellant did not reside in the home where the evidence was found 

____________________________________________

2 We note that this Court made numerous attempts to bring the omission of 

the photographs from the certified record to Appellant’s counsel’s attention. 

Despite these efforts, Appellant did not make any attempt to seek this Court’s 

assistance with obtaining the photographs from the Commonwealth and/or 

the trial court, nor did Appellant make any attempt to advise this Court of any 

progress made or not made in obtaining that evidence for our review. 
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and, thus, lacked standing to challenge the search, and/or a reasonable 

expectation of privacy in that home. TCO at 13-14. Alternatively, the trial 

court held that the search was justified under the community caretaking 

doctrine, an exception to the warrant requirement. Id. at 14-15.

Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to a trial court’s 

denial of a motion to suppress is limited to determining whether 

the factual findings are supported by the record and whether the 

legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. Because the 

prosecution prevailed in the suppression court, we may consider 

only the evidence of the prosecution and so much of the evidence 

for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the 

context of the record as a whole. Where the record supports the 

factual findings of the suppression court, we are bound by those 

facts and may reverse only if the legal conclusions drawn from 

them are in error.

Commonwealth v. Bell, 871 A.2d 267, 271 (Pa. Super. 2005) (cleaned up). 

The law of search and seizure remains focused on the delicate 

balance of protecting the right of citizens to be free from 

unreasonable searches and seizures and protecting the safety of 

our citizens and police officers by allowing police to make limited 

intrusions on citizens while investigating crime. It is well 

established that probable cause alone will not support a 

warrantless search or arrest in a residence unless some exception 

to the warrant requirement is also present. Absent consent or 

exigent circumstances, private homes may not be constitutionally 

entered to conduct a search or to effectuate an arrest without a 

warrant, even where probable cause exists. 

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 68 A.3d 930, 935 (Pa. Super. 2013) (cleaned 

up). However, even assuming a defendant has standing to challenge a search 

on Fourth Amendment grounds in a suppression motion,

3 “[i]n order to 

____________________________________________

3 Standing requires “a proprietary or possessory interest in the premises 

searched[.]” Commonwealth v. Torres, 764 A.2d 532, 542 (Pa. 2001). 
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actually prevail on such a motion, the defendant must also separately 

demonstrate that he had a subjective expectation of privacy in the premises 

at the time of the search and that such an expectation is objectively 

reasonable, i.e., that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy.” Torres,

764 A.2d at 542. 

Here, the trial court found that:

Appellant did not live in the home with the victims. []Appellant’s 

father, with whom he had been living for over a year, testified that 

he was told by ... Appellant that he was going to get his own place. 

An officer testified that ... Appellant’s father said he believed ...

Appellant was going to stay at a shelter. []Appellant’s sister 

testified that the victim, Olivia Gilbert, had told her that she would

not allow ... Appellant to move into her home. []Appellant’s 

driver’s license listed 223 Suncrest Drive as his residence, but for 

at least one year prior to the murders, ... Appellant was living with 

his father. The evidence of his license indicates that ... Appellant 

does not update his residence on his license. The evidence 

supports that ... Appellant did not live in the home....

TCO at 13-14 (citations omitted).

Appellant contends, however, that he did have a privacy interest in the 

premises at 223 Suncrest Drive: 

Appellant was the only person of record who possessed a privacy 

interest in the residence, judging by his valid license ... listing 

2[2]3 Suncrest Drive as being his residence. Additionally, he was 

inside the residence, and had not entered it by force; as both the 

responding police officers and Angela Harris reported, the house 

was secure and had no signs of forced entry. Moreover, Appellant 

was inside the residence in a locked bedroom. This evidence 

presented at the suppression hearing suggests that Appellant was 

either let into the house by its occupants or else gained entry 

through appropriate methods (such as the garage code or doors). 

Appellant’s father, it will be recall[ed], testified that Appellant 

often visited his mother and had a very close relationship with his 

mother. Appellant’s father also noted that Appellant would spend 
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... nights away and that he could have been staying with his 

mother at the Suncrest Drive address. The fact that Appellant was 

found in the secured home is evidence that he was permitted entry 

or gained lawful entry to the home. As such, these factors 

establish an expectation of privacy in the 223 Suncrest Drive 

address. Appellant was, at a minimum, an overnight guest, in the 

home of his mother and therefore, has a recognized expectation 

of privacy[.]

Appellant’s Brief at 36-37. 

We agree with the trial court. First, Appellant places undue emphasis 

on the address listed on his license. It was undisputed that Appellant had not 

resided at the residence for more than a year, as he had been living with his 

father. Thus, it was reasonable for the trial court to assign little weight to the 

license address when assessing whether Appellant had a reasonable 

expectation of privacy at 223 Suncrest Drive. 

Second, while Appellant’s counsel speculates as to how Appellant likely 

gained entry into the home, it is merely that: speculation. It is also possible 

that Appellant entered through an unlocked door without permission to do so. 

It is possible that he followed either victim into the home immediately before 

murdering them. It is possible that the victims permitted him entry, but then 

he murdered the victims when he [was] instructed to leave. Thus, there are 

multiple scenarios consistent with the lack of signs of forced entry that are 

also inconsistent, rather than consistent, with a reasonable expectation of 

privacy in the residence. Unfortunately, the best possible evidence of 
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Appellant’s objective expectation of privacy in the home—the testimony of the 

victims who owned it and resided therein—is not available.4 

Third, the trial court clearly placed greater weight on the testimony of 

Appellant’s sister, who stated that Appellant was not permitted to reside at 

223 Suncrest Drive. The trial court was free to believe this testimony, and to 

assess lesser weight to contradictory evidence. Indeed, “it is within the 

suppression court’s sole province as factfinder to pass on the credibility of 

witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. The suppression court 

is also entitled to believe all, part or none of the evidence presented.” 

Commonwealth v. Galendez, 27 A.3d 1042, 1046 (Pa. Super. 2011)

(cleaned up). 

Finally, it was Appellant’s burden at the hearing to establish a 

reasonable expectation of privacy at 223 Suncrest Drive. See 

Commonwealth v. Millner, 888 A.2d 680, 686 (Pa. 2005) (recognizing that 

a “suppression defendant” has an “obligation to demonstrate that the 

challenged police conduct implicated a reasonable expectation of privacy that 

he personally possessed”). Appellant’s presence in the home and, indeed, 

even his possession of a license bearing that address, speak only to his 

“subjective expectation of privacy in the premises at the time of the search....” 

____________________________________________

4 According to Appellant’s father’s testimony, Appellant had moved out of his 

father’s home (where he had been living for more than a year) a few days 

prior to the search. N.T. Suppression, 5/23/16, at 5-6. Appellant told his 

father that he had found an apartment. Id. at 6. Thus, immediately prior to 

the search at issue, Appellant did not claim to be living with his mother at 223 

Suncrest Drive. 
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Torres, 764 A.2d at 542. Here, Appellant may well have demonstrated a 

subjective expectation of privacy, but he failed to demonstrate that the 

expectation was “objectively reasonable” in the circumstances of this case. 

Id. 

In this regard, we find convincing the Commonwealth’s comparison of 

this case to that of Commonwealth v. Cameron, 561 A.2d 783 (Pa. Super. 

1989). In Cameron, the police entered an ostensibly abandoned house 

without a warrant and discovered the defendant in possession of narcotics

therein. The defendant sought suppression of the seized contraband and,

“[t]he suppression court granted the motion to suppress, holding that the 

presence of food, a couch, and a television set in the room indicated that the 

house had some of the attributes of a dwelling place, and therefore Cameron 

had a reasonable expectation of privacy there.” Id. at 784. This Court 

ultimately reversed that decision. 

The Cameron Court first acknowledged that the defendant had 

“manifested a subjective expectation of privacy” in the dwelling. Id. at 785. 

Nevertheless, the Court stated that it could not “be said that his expectation 

of privacy is one that society is prepared to accept as reasonable.” Id. The 

Court went on to reason:

Although the property interest involved need not amount to an 

ownership interest, there must be some legal or de facto right to 

control the area in question. Considering the record in the instant 

case, there is no evidence to indicate that Cameron had any legal 

or de facto right to control the house. The testimony of [the police 

officer] indicated that the house was abandoned, and, although 

there was some evidence to show that Cameron was “squatting”
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there, the record contains no facts which would lead us to believe 

that he had any rights as against the owner, or as against any 

other person who attempted to enter the house. He therefore 

could not expect to exclude any other person who attempted to 

enter.

Id. at 786. 

Similarly, here, Appellant’s presence in the home, the address on his 

license, and, perhaps, even his relationship to one of the home’s owners,

adequately demonstrated his subjective expectation of privacy at 223 

Suncrest Drive. However, there was no evidence presented to demonstrate 

any “legal or de facto right to control the house.” Id. Indeed, in Cameron, 

the defendant was squatting in an abandoned house, whereas here, Appellant 

was found in the Gilberts’ home. In that sense, Cameron was in a better 

position to claim an objectively reasonable privacy interest, given that there 

was no objectively superior competing interest in the abandoned dwelling. 

Here, however, it is undisputed that Appellant was discovered in the Gilberts’

home, and no credible evidence was proffered by Appellant to demonstrate 

that the Gilberts had granted him legal or de facto control of the house. To 

the contrary, the trial court received testimony that it found credible that 

Appellant’s mother had declined to grant Appellant such control. Accordingly, 

we conclude that the trial court did not err in finding that Appellant lacked an 

objectively reasonable expectation of privacy interest in the home. 

 Appellant argues, however, that even if he did not possess a 

reasonable expectation of privacy in the residence, he “at the very least”

possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy “in the interior of the 45-gallon 
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plastic garbage cans....” Appellant’s Brief at 40. Appellant did not raise this 

issue in his Rule 1925(b) statement and, consequently, the trial court did not 

address it specifically in its Rule 1925(a) opinion. Accordingly, we conclude 

that is waived. Commonwealth v. Lord, 719 A.2d 306, 309 (Pa. 1998) (“Any 

issues not raised in a 1925(b) statement will be deemed waived.”). 

In any event, had Appellant not waived this claim, we would conclude 

that he would not be entitled to relief on that basis. To support his contention 

that he possessed a distinct and objective expectation of privacy in the 

garbage cans, Appellant cites Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987). In 

Hicks, 

a bullet was fired through the floor of [Hicks]’s apartment, striking 

and injuring a man in the apartment below. Police officers arrived 

and entered [Hicks]’s apartment to search for the shooter, for 

other victims, and for weapons. They found and seized three 

weapons, including a sawed-off rifle, and in the course of their 

search also discovered a stocking-cap mask.

One of the policemen, Officer Nelson, noticed two sets of 

expensive stereo components, which seemed out of place in the 

squalid and otherwise ill-appointed four-room apartment. 

Suspecting that they were stolen, he read and recorded their serial 

numbers—moving some of the components, including a Bang and 

Olufsen turntable, in order to do so—which he then reported by 

phone to his headquarters. On being advised that the turntable 

had been taken in an armed robbery, he seized it immediately. It 

was later determined that some of the other serial numbers 

matched those on other stereo equipment taken in the same 

armed robbery, and a warrant was obtained and executed to seize 

that equipment as well. [Hicks] was subsequently indicted for the 

robbery.

Id. at 323–24. 
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The trial court granted Hicks’s motion to suppress, reasoning that 

although the warrantless search of Hicks’s apartment was justified based on 

exigent circumstances related to the shooting, Officer Nelson’s action of 

moving the stereo components to view their serial numbers constituted a 

search unrelated to the exigency. Id. at 324. The Court of Appeals of Arizona 

affirmed, and the state appealed that decision to the Supreme Court of the 

United States, which also affirmed. In doing so, the Supreme Court reasoned 

that Nelson did not discover the serial numbers in plain view during an 

otherwise lawful search. Rather, a search requiring a separate showing of 

probable cause occurred that was independent from the initial justification for 

entering and searching Hicks’s apartment.5 Id. at 326-27.

However, Hicks, unlike Appellant here, had a reasonable expectation of 

privacy in his apartment. The warrantless breach of Hicks’s privacy right was 

justified only due to the exigency created by the shooting and, therefore, that 

breach was limited to the scope of the exigency. Here, however, Appellant 

had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the home searched at all, 

including any containers found therein. This is not a search that constitutes 

an exception to the warrant requirement; rather, this was a situation where 

Appellant lacked a privacy right upon which to assert a suppression claim 

____________________________________________

5 The Court acknowledged that “[i]t would be absurd to say that an object 

could lawfully be seized and taken from the premises, but could not be moved 

for closer examination.” Id. at 326. However, the police lacked probable 

cause that the item was stolen until the serial numbers were revealed, and 

nothing about the shooting itself suggested the illegality of the stereo parts. 
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against the government at all. Thus, Hicks is inapplicable to the 

circumstances of this case and, even had Appellant not waived this aspect of 

his suppression claim, we would deem it meritless. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/26/2019