alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### In the Matter of Suffolk County Department of Social Services, on Behalf of Jameria A., Appellant, v Nicole S. et al., Respondents. (Matter No. 1.) In the Matter of Suffolk County Department of Social Services, on Behalf of Dashawn S., Appellant, v Coretta S. et al., Respondents. (Matter No. 2.)

[699 NYS2d 126]

—In related child protective proceedings pursuant to Family Court Act article 10, the petitioner, Suffolk County Department of Social Services, appeals from an order of the Family Court, Suffolk County (Lehman, J.), entered February 24, 1999, which, after a fact-finding hearing, dismissed neglect petitions brought on behalf of Jameria A. and Dashawn S.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the facts, without costs or disbursements, and the matter is remitted to the Family Court, Suffolk County, for a dispositional hearing.

After a fact-finding hearing on petitions alleging that Jameria A. was a neglected child and Dashawn S. was a derivatively-neglected child, the Family Court dismissed the petitions and issued orders of protection prohibiting the respondents from engaging in excessive corporal punishment. The petitions were based in large part upon Jameria’s allegation that the respondents, who are her mother and grandmother, had beaten and whipped her with a wire and belt. The Family Court acknowledged that there were marks on the child, but did not find that the appellant had sufficiently established that the marks had been caused by the respondents.

Although we are mindful of the fact that considerable deference must be given to the Family Court in its appraisal of the credibility of witnesses *(see, Matter of Irene O.,*38 NY2d 776, 777; *Matter of James P.,*150 AD2d 240, 242), we find that the Family Court improperly speculated that the injuries were not the result of the beatings. There was sufficient evidence in the record to support Jameria’s claims. Additionally, although the Family Court dismissed the neglect petitions for a failure of proof, it issued, albeit improperly *(see, Matter of Tammie Z.,*66 NY2d 1, 5; *Matter of Lewis T.,*249 AD2d 646, 648; *Matter of Brandon C.,*237 AD2d 821, 822-823; *Matter of Anthony YY.,*202 AD2d 740, 741; *Matter of Commissioner of Social Servs. of City of N. Y. [Darnell N.],*195 AD2d 459, 460), orders of protection prohibiting the respondents from engaging in excessive corporal punishment against the children. This basic inconsistency suggests that the Family Court believed that Jameria A. *557was an abused child *(see, Matter of Commissioner of Social Servs. of City of N. Y. [Darnell N.], supra,*at 460; *cf., Matter of Rasha B.,*139 AD2d 962). Thompson, J. P., Joy, Krausman and Goldstein, JJ., concur.
*This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court

generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order

and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

F I L E D

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

JAN 23 2003

PATRICK FISHER

Clerk

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

CLARENCE WILLIAM HAIRSTON,

JR.,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

SUSIE MCGUIRE, RN: Nurse 111,

Delta Correctional Center,

Defendant - Appellee.

No. 02-1445

D.C. No. 02-Z-1331

(D. Colorado)

 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

Before KELLY, McKAY, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

After examining Appellant’s brief and the appellate record, this panel has

determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the

determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). 

The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
-2-

This is a pro se state prisoner 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights appeal. Mr.

Hairston seeks monetary damages on his claim that Defendant was deliberately

indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 

The district court dismissed Mr. Hairston’s complaint as legally frivolous

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Mr. Hairston appeals to this court.

Mr. Hairston suffered pain after his jaw surgery. A dentist examined him

and prescribed Motrin. Defendant Nurse subsequently told Mr. Hairston that he

could not take Motrin because he had been previously diagnosed with Hepatitis C. 

She instead recommended Tylenol. Mr. Hairston complained that he would have

to pay for Tylenol and that Tylenol was not strong enough for the pain. He also

claimed that he was embarrassed by the public announcement that he has

Hepatitis C.

We agree with the district court that Mr. Hairston’s allegations do not rise

to the level of an Eighth Amendment claim. Therefore, after a thorough review of

Appellant’s brief and the record, and for substantially the same reasons set forth

in the district court’s well-reasoned September 16, 2002, Order, we hold that no

relief is available to Mr. Hairston. 

The decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED. Appellant’s motion to

proceed without prepayment of the appellate filing fee is GRANTED. We remind 
-3-

Appellant that he must make partial payments on court fees and costs until such

have been paid in full.

Entered for the Court

Monroe G. McKay

Circuit Judge
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

594 

KA 08-00132 

PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., FAHEY, CARNI, GREEN, AND GORSKI, JJ. 

 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JERMAINE T. LESTER, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

 

TIMOTHY P. DONAHER, PUBLIC DEFENDER, ROCHESTER (TIMOTHY S. DAVIS OF

COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

MICHAEL C. GREEN, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (LESLIE E. SWIFT OF

COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT. 

 

Appeal from a judgment of the Monroe County Court (John R.

Schwartz, A.J.), rendered November 19, 2007. The judgment convicted

defendant, upon a jury verdict, of assault in the second degree. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is

unanimously affirmed. 

Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon a jury

verdict of assault in the second degree (Penal Law § 120.05 [2]),

defendant contends that County Court erred in limiting his

cross-examination of a prosecution witness. Defendant failed to

preserve that contention for our review (see People v George, 67 NY2d

817, 818-819; People v Rookey, 292 AD2d 783, lv denied 98 NY2d 701),

and in any event it is without merit. “It is well settled that [t]he

scope of cross-examination is within the sound discretion of the trial

court” (People v Bryant, 73 AD3d 1442, 1443, lv denied 15 NY3d 850

[internal quotation marks omitted]). Here, the court did not abuse

its discretion because there was no good-faith basis for the question

at issue (see People v Baker, 294 AD2d 888, 889, lv denied 98 NY2d

708) and, moreover, the court’s refusal to allow defendant to ask the

prosecution witness that single question cannot be said to have

affected the outcome of the trial (see Bryant, 73 AD3d at 1443).

We further reject defendant’s contention that the court erred in

permitting an investigating officer to testify concerning an out-ofcourt statement made by an unidentified witness. That out-of-court

statement was properly admitted because it was offered “not for [its]

truth, but for the fact [that it was] made” (People v Mastin, 261 AD2d

892, 894, lv denied 93 NY2d 1022). As the court properly explained in

its limiting instruction to the jury, the testimony of the

investigating officer that is challenged by defendant was admitted

“for the ‘nonhearsay purpose of completing the narrative of events and
-2- 594 

KA 08-00132 

explaining police actions’ ” (People v Vazquez, 28 AD3d 1100, 1101, lv

denied 9 NY3d 965; see People v Tosca, 98 NY2d 660). In any event,

any error with respect to the admission of that testimony is harmless

(see Vazquez, 28 AD3d at 1101).

Entered: April 29, 2011 Patricia L. Morgan

Clerk of the Court
#### Central Hanover Bank and Trust Company, Appellant, *v.*Frederick Kraft et al., Respondents.

Submitted April 19, 1937;

decided April 27, 1937.

Motion for reargument and to amend the remittitur denied, with ten dollars costs and necessary printing disbursements. (See 273 N. Y. 634)
October 22, 2015

Brian Greer

2200A Chavis Drive

Greenville, NC 27858

Dear Mr. Greer:

This letter is to inform you that we are unable to process your petition for an exemption from 

Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR). It explains why we can not process your 

request and what you should do in the next 30 days.

Why We Can Not Process Your Request

We received your June 22, 2015 exemption request filed in Docket No. FAA-2015-3363, but 

we are unable to process your request any further. Your petition does not comply with the 

requirements of § 11.81 (copy enclosed). For us to consider the request any further, you must 

send us all of the following:

 The specific section or sections of 14 CFR from which you seek relief, the extent of the 

relief you seek, and the reason you seek relief.

 The reasons why granting the request would be in the public interest; that is, how it would 

benefit the public as a whole.

 Any additional information, views, or arguments available to support your request.

For more detailed information relating to submitting petitions for exemption, please visit 

http://aes.faa.gov/petition/index.html. This website helps the petitioner to meet Federal 

Aviation Administration (FAA) requirement outlines in § 11.81 and helps answer any 

questions you may have.

What You Should Do

If you want us to process your request any further, you must submit the requested information 

within 30 days. Please note that § 11.63(d) requires you to send your petition for exemption at

least 120 days before the proposed effective date of the exemption. 
2

If We Do Not Hear From You

If we do not receive the information, we will close the docket without notifying you further. If

you have any questions you may call the 333 Information Line (202) 267-2999.

Sincerely,

/s/

Brittany Newton

Program Analyst, Airmen and

 Airspace Rules Division

Enclosures
3
4
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STUART LUCAS1,

 Respondent Below,

 Appellant,

 v.

DEPARTMENT OF SERVICES FOR 

CHILDREN, YOUTH AND THEIR 

FAMILIES,

Petitioner Below,

Appellee.

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

No. 148, 2021

Court Below – Family Court

of the State of Delaware

 File Nos. 20-11-01TN

 20-11-02TN

 Petition Nos. 20-23873

 20-23886

 

 Submitted: February 9, 2022

 Decided: February 21, 2022

Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; TRAYNOR and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Justices.

ORDER

On this 21st day of February, 2022, after careful consideration of all the briefs

and the record on appeal, we find it evident that the judgment of the Family Court

should be affirmed on the basis of and for the reasons stated in its April 15, 2021

order.

1 The Court previously assigned pseudonyms to the parties under Supreme Court Rule 7(d).
2

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Family Court is 

AFFIRMED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Tamika R. Montgomery-Reeves

Justice
#### § 1471.920 Civil judgment.

*Civil judgment* means the disposition of a civil action by any court of competent jurisdiction, whether by verdict, decision, settlement, stipulation, other disposition which creates a civil liability for the complained of wrongful acts, or a final determination of liability under the Program Fraud Civil Remedies Act of 1988 (31 U.S.C. 3801-3812).
§ 102.129 Communications prohibited. Except as provided in § 102.130, *ex parte* communications prohibited by § 102.126 include: ( a ) Such communications, when written, if copies are not contemporaneously served by the communicator on all parties to the proceeding in accordance with the provisions of § 102.5(g).
( b ) Such communications, when oral, unless advance notice is given by the communicator to all parties in the proceeding and adequate opportunity afforded to them to be present.
[82 FR 11778, Feb. 24, 2017]
#### A. J. Revels, *Plaintiff in Error, v.*The State of Florida, *Defendant in Error.*

1. In treating an assignment of error based, upon the overruling of the motion for a new trial, an appellate court will consider only such grounds of the motion as are argued before it.

2. In a prosecution for uttering a forged instrument, it is not required in order to warrant a conviction, that the evidence establish that injury should have resulted to any one therefrom ; the intent to defraud is the essence of the crime.

This case was decided by Division A.

Writ of error to the Criminal Court of Becord for Suwannee County.

The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court.

*L. E. Roberson,*for Plaintiff in Error;

*Parle Trammell,*Attorney General, for the State.

Shackleford, J.

— The plaintiff in error was tried and convicted of uttering a forged instrument, and seeks relief here by writ of error. The only assignment argued is the one based upon the overruling of the motion for a *84new trial, and the only grounds of such motion insisted upon are those which question the sufficiency of the evi-i dence to support the verdict. We confine ourselves to the consideration of the grounds argued. Johnson v. State, 55 Fla. 41, 46 South. Rep. 174.

It would be a profitless task to attempt to set out the evidence or even to give a synopsis of it. It is sufficient to say that we have given the- same a careful examination, and are of the opinion that it is amply sufficient to support the verdict. In fact, the plaintiff in error prác tically admits in his own testimony that he uttered a forged instrument, but it is contended that, since no one was actually defrauded thereby, the elements of the crime charged were not proven, therefore the conviction was not warranted. This contention is untenable. Hawkins v. State, 28 Fla. 363, 9 South. Rep. 652. Also see King v. State, 43 Fla. 211, 31 South. Rep. 254.

The judgment must be affirmed.

Whitfield, C. J., and Cockrell, J., concur;

Taylor, Hocker and Parkhill, J. J., concur in the opinion.
#### C. W. Thebo, Appellant, v. Luella Day McConnell, *et al., Appellees.*

Where the finding of the chancellor that an alleged indebtedness of a married woman was not incurred for and the money was not used for the benefit of her separate property, is sustained by the evidence, a decree dismissing a bill brought to subject the separate property of the married woman for the payment of the indebtedness will be affirmed.

This case was decided by Division A.

Appealed from the Circuit Court for St. Johns County.

The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court.

*W. W. Dewhurst,*for Appellant;

*579
      *Bryan &*Bryan, for Appellees.

Whitfield, C. J.

— Suit in equity was brought by appellant to charge and sell the separate property of the appellee married women for the payment of money alleged to have been loaned to her July 3rd, 1903, for the benefit of her separate property. It was specifically alleged that a portion at least of the money loaned was used to pay for land in St. Augustine, Florida, conveyed by H. H. Williams to Luella Day McConnell on January láth, 1902. The answer under oath, the oath not being waived, specifically denied these allegations, and averred that the note given by the defendant married woman was to make good a conveyance made by her to George L. Taylor under a power of attorney for another, a note and mortgage foe the borrowed purchase1 money being given by Taylor to Thebo. The note states that it was given to secure the payment of a mortgage indebtedness of George L. Taylor to C. W. Thebo “and is collateral to said note and the mortgage.” There is positive evidence that the recited purchase price of $5,500.00 for the property in St. Augustine conveyed by H. H. Williams to Mrs. Thebo was infact actually paid in money before the conveyance was made January láth, 1902; and also that a note for $8,000.00 given by Mr. and Mrs. McConnell to H. H. Williams on the same day was for money loaned to Mr. McConnell by H. H. Williams. This note was paid by Mrs. McConnell after she gave the $5,000.00 note to Thebo. Testimony was offered to show that the signature to a receipt for $5,500.00 purporting to have been given by Williams to Mrs. McConnell dated January láth, 1902, for the purchase price of property in St. Augustine, Florida, was a forgery; but other testimony was given of its genuineness. In view of the positive testimony that the al*580leged indebtedness was not incurred for and the money was not used for the benefit of the separate property of the married woman, and of the finding of the chancellor on the conflicting evidence, the decree dismissing the bill of complaint is affirmed.

Shackleford and Cockrell, J. J., concur;

Taylor, Hocker and' Parkhill, J. J., concur in the opinion.
**Final Listing of Questionnaire Files for Steam Electric Rulemaking Record**

**Plant ID 04126**  **Removed from Public**  **(Non-CBI) Docket**  **1 Copyright** 

**Flag 2**  **File Name Description**  x 04126\04126_Checklist.xls EPA Technical Review Checklist Workbook

04126\04126_Completeness_Checklist.xls EPA Completeness Review Checklist 04126\04126_HardcopyLog.doc EPA log of hardcopy documents submitted x 04126\04126_PartA.xls Plant submitted survey file x 04126\04126_PartE.xls Plant submitted survey file x 04126\04126_PartH.xls Plant submitted survey file

04126\Certification Statement Plant ID 04126.pdf Plant certification statement 04126\Supporting Documentation\04126_Question A5-2 Attachment.pdf Plant submitted supplemental files to the survey x 04126\Supporting Documentation\04126_Question A5-3 Attachment.pdf Plant submitted supplemental files to the survey

1Final reviewed survey responses are located in the Steam Electric Technical Questionnaire Database
. 2Copyright documents are available from the docket.
#### §§ 431.48-431.50 [Reserved]
# EUR-Lex - 31999D0759 - EN

Avis juridique important

*|*

# 31999D0759

**1999/759/EC: Commission Decision of 5 November 1999 concerning the importation of certain animal products from New Caledonia and amending Council Decision 79/542/EEC (notified under document number C(1999) 3585) (Text with EEA relevance) **

*
Official Journal L 300 , 23/11/1999 P. 0030 - 0034 *

COMMISSION DECISION

of 5 November 1999

concerning the importation of certain animal products from New Caledonia and amending Council Decision 79/542/EEC

(notified under document number C(1999) 3585)

(Text with EEA relevance)

(1999/759/EC)

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,

Having regard to Council Directive 72/462/EEC of 12 December 1972 on health and veterinary inspection problems on importation of bovine, ovine and caprine animals and swine, fresh meat or meat products from third countries(1), as last amended by Directive 97/79/EC(2), and in particular Article 3 thereof,

Whereas:

(1) Council Decision 79/542/EEC(3), as last amended by Commission Decision 99/301/EC(4), draws up a list of third countries from which the Member States authorise imports of bovine animals, swine, equidae, sheep and goats, fresh meat and meat products;

(2) following the information available by the European Community, it appears that New Caledonia is covered by sufficiently well-structured and organised veterinary services; whereas therefore New Caledonia can be added to the list of countries and territories from which Member States authorise imports of meat of wild animals;

(3) the measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Veterinary Committee,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

Part I of the Annex to Decision 79/542/EEC is replaced by the Annex to this Decision.

Article 2

This Decision is addressed to the Member States.

Done at Brussels, 5 November 1999.

For the Commission

David BYRNE

Member of the Commission

(1) OJ L 302, 31.12.1972, p. 28.

(2) OJ L 24, 30.1.1998, p. 31.

(3) OJ L 146, 14.6.1979, p. 15.

(4) OJ L 117, 5.5.1999, p. 52.

ANNEX

">TABLE>

Imports shall fulfil the appropriate animal and public health requirements

PART 1

>PIC FILE= "L_1999300EN.003102.EPS">

>PIC FILE= "L_1999300EN.003201.EPS">

>PIC FILE= "L_1999300EN.003301.EPS">

>PIC FILE= "L_1999300EN.003401.EPS">"
```

[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 4902 Considered and Passed Senate (CPS)]

<DOC>

116th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                S. 4902

  To designate the United States courthouse located at 351 South West 
 Temple in Salt Lake City, Utah, as the ``Orrin G. Hatch United States 
                             Courthouse''.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                           November 17, 2020

  Mr. Lee (for himself, Mr. Romney, and Mr. McConnell) introduced the 
following bill; which was read twice, considered, read the third time, 
                               and passed

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To designate the United States courthouse located at 351 South West 
 Temple in Salt Lake City, Utah, as the ``Orrin G. Hatch United States 
                             Courthouse''.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. ORRIN G. HATCH UNITED STATES COURTHOUSE.

    (a) Designation.--The United States courthouse located at 351 South 
West Temple in Salt Lake City, Utah, shall be known and designated as 
the ``Orrin G. Hatch United States Courthouse''.
    (b) References.--Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, 
paper, or other record of the United States to the United States 
courthouse referred to in subsection (a) shall be deemed to be a 
reference to the ``Orrin G. Hatch United States Courthouse''.
                                 <all>
```
§ 1915.155 Head protection. ( a ) *Use.* ( 1 ) The employer shall ensure that each affected employee wears a protective helmet when working in areas where there is a potential for injury to the head from falling objects.
( 2 ) The employer shall ensure that each affected employee wears a protective helmet designed to reduce electrical shock hazards where there is potential for electric shock or burns due to contact with exposed electrical conductors which could contact the head.
( b ) *Criteria for protective helmets.* ( 1 ) Head protection must comply with any of the following consensus standards: ( i ) American National Standards Institute (ANSI) Z89.1-2009, “American National Standard for Industrial Head Protection,” incorporated by reference in § 1915.5;
( ii ) American National Standards Institute (ANSI) Z89.1-2003, “American National Standard for Industrial Head Protection,” incorporated by reference in § 1915.5; or
( iii ) American National Standards Institute (ANSI) Z89.1-1997, “American National Standard for Personnel Protection—Protective Headwear for Industrial Workers—Requirements,” incorporated by reference in § 1915.5.
( 2 ) Head protection devices that the employer demonstrates are at least as effective as head protection devices that are constructed in accordance with one of the above consensus standards will be deemed to be in compliance with the requirements of this section.
[61 FR 26352, May 24, 1996,, as amended at 74 FR 46358, Sept. 9, 2009; 77 FR 37599, June 22, 2012]