*Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_______________________________________

No. 96-10486

_______________________________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

LESLIE ELIJAH CAMPBELL, JR.,

Defendant - Appellant.

_________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

(7:93 CR 010 X)

_________________________________________________

April 22, 1997

Before REYNALDO G. GARZA, HIGGINBOTHAM, AND JONES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM*:

After a jury convicted Leslie Campbell of conspiring to

receive stolen United States property and possessing a machine gun,

the district court imposed a penalty of 57 months of imprisonment,

three years of supervised release, and a $10,000 fine. It left the

payment arrangements up to the probation officer. Campbell

appealed this delegation of authority, and a panel of this court

held that the law does not allow district court judges to delegate

payment-schedule decisions to probation officers.

On remand, the district court divided the $10,000 fine into 36
monthly payments due during Campbell’s three years of supervised

release. The district court did not, however, allow Campbell to

comment on the payment schedule at a sentencing hearing. Campbell

brings this appeal to assert his right to allocution.

We do not reach the merits of Campbell’s appeal because we do

not have appellate jurisdiction. The district court orally

announced the payment schedule on February 19, 1996, and entered

the amended sentence the next day. On February 27, Campbell filed

a “Motion to Correct Sentence Pursuant to Rule 35(c).” The court

never ruled on this motion. After waiting more than two months,

Campbell filed a notice of appeal on April 29. We agree with the

government that this motion was weeks too late.

Under Fed. R. App. P. 4(b), a criminal defendant must file a

notice of appeal within ten days of the entry of judgment.

Campbell did not do so. He asks us to consider his appeal none the

less because he filed a timely motion asking the district court to

correct his sentence. Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(c) permits a district

court to set straight “arithmetical, technical, or other clear”

errors within seven days of imposing a sentence. After seven days,

however, the district court loses the power to make such

corrections. United States v. Lopez, 26 F.3d 512, 518-20 (5th Cir.

1994).

We have not decided exactly how a Rule 35(c) motion affects

the ten-day window criminal defendants have to file an appeal. The

First Circuit has held that “when . . . a party to a criminal case
files a timely motion under Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(c), asking the

sentencing court to reconsider an issue in the case in a way that

will, if successful, bring about an alteration of the defendants’

substantive rights, then the filing of that motion renders the

judgment nonfinal for purposes of appeal.” United States v.

Morillo, 8 F.3d 864, 868-69 (1st Cir. 1993). But even if a Rule

35(c) motion expands the time to file an appeal, no circuit has

held that it can effect an expansion of more than seven days. Id.

at 869; United States v. Turner, 998 F.2d 534, 536 (7th Cir.) (“The

district court’s inaction had the same effect as denying the [Rule

35(c)] motion, making the judgment final on the date the district

judge’s power to alter the sentence expired.”), cert. denied, 510

U.S. 1026 (1993). A motion to correct a sentence will not create

an indefinite reprieve from Rule 4(b)’s ten-day period.

Consequently, Campbell’s notice of appeal was untimely.

DISMISSED.