1 

### STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

In re R.W.

- 1

No. 2 1

- 098 3 ( Cabell County 19

- JA

- 252 )



### MEMORANDUM DECISION

Petitioner Father R.W.

- 2

, by counsel Randall D. Wall

, and Petitioner Mother D.C., by counsel Jason Goad, appeal t he Circui t Co urt o f Cabell County’s November 9

, 20 2 1 , order terminating their par ental

, guardianship, and c ustodial rights to R.W.

- 1

. 1 The West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources ( “DHHR”), by counsel Pat ri ck M o rrisey and Mindy M. Pa r sley , f iled a resp on s e in suppo rt of t he c irc ui t co urt’s o rde r

. The guardian ad li te m ( “ guardian ” )

, Ryan Turner

, filed a response on the chil d ’ s behalf in support of the circuit court’s orde r

. On appeal, petition er s argue that they were not provid ed a mea n ingful improvement perio d and that the c ircuit court erred in terminatin g the ir par ental rights upon insufficient evidence and without imposing a less

- restrictive dispositional alter native.

Thi s Cou r t has consi dered the parties’ bri efs and t he r ecor d on appeal. The facts and legal

a rguments are adequately pre s ent ed, and the de ci si onal proce s s would no t be si gni fican tly aid ed b y oral arg u ment. Upon consideratio n of the standa rd of review, th e bri e fs, a nd the reco rd present ed, the Cour t finds n o su bsta ntia l question of law and no preju dicial error. For these

rea s ons , a memorand um d ec ision affi r m ing th e c ir cuit cou rt’s order i s ap propriate u nder Rule 21 of the Rul es of Appellate Procedure.

R.W.

- 1 w as b orn in Febr uary of 201 8. A t the time of his birth, bot h parents were minors and in volved in youth services and were placed in residential programs . P etit ioner D.C. had been

1 Con sis tent w ith our l o ng

- st a n d ing practice in cases wi th sens i t ive facts, we us e i nitials wh ere neces sary to prot e c t t he ident i ti e s o f those inv o l ved in this cas e

. See In re K. H.

, 2 3 5 W

. V a

. 2 54, 773 S .E. 2d 2 0 (2015); Mel ind a H. v. Wi lliam R. II , 230 W. V a . 7 31, 742 S .E.2d 419 (2013 ) ; State v. Brandon B. , 2 18 W. Va. 3 24, 624 S.E.2 d 7 61 (2005); St ate v. Ed ward Ch arles L

. , 183 W. V a

. 6 41

, 3 98 S.E .2d 1 23 (1990). Additionally, as the child an d petitioner fat her share the same initials, we refer to them as R.W.

- 1 and R.W.

- 2, res pectively, throughout this memorandum decision. 

### FILED May 12, 2022

EDYTHE NASH GAISER , C LERK
SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
OF WEST VIRGINIA2 placed in Florence Crittent on 2 on two separ ate occasions and absconded from that facility to give birth to R. W.

- 1

. Following his birth, R

. W

. - 1 was determined to be drug exposed and suffering f rom several ab normal ities. T he child was diagnosed with “ parietal encephalocele , feeding difficulties , Dandy Walker Malformation, holopros encepha ly, gray mat t er heterotopia, and aqueduct st enosis with v e n tricular ru pture
, ” observed to have “ re curring seizures

, ” and required a shunt placed in his brain

. Accord ing to the DHHR, R.W.

- 1 was treated at the Cincinnati Children ’ s Hospital u ntil April 22, 2018 , at w hich point he was released to D.C.

In May of 2 0 18, the DHHR re ceived a referral that R.W.

- 1 lost weight while in D.C. ’s

care and D.C. was not bringing the child to regularly scheduled wel l checks with a local physic ian in Cabell County. The DHHR investi gated the referral and opened services to assis t i n R.W

. - 1 ’s medial needs. The DHHR received a nother referral in F e b ruary of 2019 , alle ging that petitioners continued to miss medical appointments for R.W.

- 1 and the child was admitt ed to the hospital for in creased seizures. The DHHR found that petitione r s presented the child f or only two of ten appointments from August of 2018 through March of 2019 and a n unde termined number of speciali st ap pointments at the Cincinnati Childre n ’s Hos pital. The DHHR provide d

t he parents with adult life skills and parentin g c lasses, as well as in

- home super vision and safety services and Bir th to Three services for R.W.

- 1 . The DHHR also required petitioners to attend random drug screening and required D. C. to participate in me nt al health services to treat her bipolar dis orde r

.
In October of 2019, t he DHHR received a nother referral alleg ing t hat petitioner s di d not parti cipate in services and continued to miss medical appoint ments for the child

. The DHHR noted difficulty locatin g petitioners because they changed residence s a n d would not respond to

a ttempte d contact from service providers or the child ’s medical professionals. Finally, in December of 2019

, the family was located

, and the DHHR took emergency custody of R.W.

- 1

. Upon removing the child, the DHHR discovered tha t th e f amil y had not refilled R.W.

- 1 ’s s eizure medication. The DHHR filed a child abuse and neglect petition , all eging the foregoing, and

assert ed that petitioners had medically neglected R.W.

- 1 and failed to prov ide the child with suitable housing. The circui t c ourt later ratified t h e em er gency removal of the chil d from petitioners ’ care.

In February of 2020, petitioners sti pulated that they missed medical appointments for the child and h ad medically neglected hi m

. The circuit court accepted their stipulat ion a n d adjudicated them as a busing parents. Petitioners then moved for a po st

- adjudicatory improvement period, which the circuit court granted. The part ies agreed to a family case pla n t hat included the followin g terms: maintaining a stable home; maintai ning e m ployment or stable income; attending medical appointments for R .W.

- 1; completing parenting and adult life skills classes; random drug screening; and completi ng a parent al fitness ev aluation and following th e recommendations of the eval u ator

.

2 According to the record, Flor ence Critt enton is a residential prog ram for pregn ant and post

- partum mo thers.3 The circui t c ourt held a review hearing in May of 2020 and found that the parents were

“ making some efforts toward their case plans

. ” The court also found tha t due to the pandemic, the child ’s m edical care required a tr ansfer from Cincinnati Childr en ’s Ho spital to M o r g antown
, West V irginia , and it approved the transfer. The circuit cour t also noted that peti tioners ’ forensic evaluations were p ending. P etitioners ’ parental f itness evaluations were completed in December of 20 20. D.C. ’s eval uator found that D.C. exhibit e d symptoms of depression

, anxiety, trauma, difficulty thinking, and problematic personality traits (such as “cold and unfeeling; har sh an d punitive, and distant in interpersona l re lat ion ships ”). Additionally, D.C. had been prev iously diagnosed with bipola r d isorder and attention deficit hype ractivity disorder. D.C. admitted to past suicidal ideation and anger problems, but she did not e xpress a strong d esire for treatment. The evaluato r stated that D.C. ’s co gn itive assessment indicated she was “impaired ” a n d in the “low to very low range ” of cognitive ability. The evaluator concluded that D.C. ’s prognosis for reliable attainment of min imally adequate parenting was poor

. The evaluator recomm ended that D.C. participate in psychotherapy to treat her diagnosis

.

R .W.

- 2 ’s evaluator opined that R .W.

- 2 had the cognitive ability to parent a child and maintain a household, but she believed he lac ked insight and did not hold re alist i c plans for the future. R .W.

- 2 d enied substan ce abuse iss ues but admitted that he int e n d ed to use he roin and Xan ax on his birthday . The evaluator n oted that R .W.

- 2 was arrested in April of 2020 when he was foun d in possession of he roin and Xan a x

. The eval uator suggested that R .W.

- 2 state d that the substances were for personal use in order t o “save face in light of his pending charges

, ” as he
pos sessed a “large a mount of heroin for a new use r. ” The evaluator also reported that R

. W.

- 2 “did not take personal responsibility for his [Child Pro tect ive Services] invo lvement and was dismissive of [ t h e DHHR ’s ] con cerns. ” Finally, the evaluator opined that R .W.

- 2 had a “ guarded to poor ” progn osis for achieving minimally adequate parenting.

The record provides that the circuit cour t held a nother re view hearing in May of 2021

. At the hearing, the DHHR r e commended termination of peti tioners ’ par ental rights to the child . The
p arents argued for additional time, stating that the foster par ents were able to learn how to c are for R.W.

- 1 ’s special needs an d that they could also learn. Notably, R.W.

- 2 w as on p r o bation for his criminal charges and therefore was not incarcerated at t he time of this hearing. The guardian recommended terminati ng the parents ’ parental rights. T he guardian stated that the foster p arents created a “Day in the Li fe ” video that depicte d R .W.

- 1 ’s daily required care. The guardian explained that he had doubts the parents would be able to effect ively care for the child due to the severity of h is medical c onditions, which required “ twenty

- fo ur hours a day, seven days a week ”

c are

. The court o r dered a multidisciplinary team ( “ MDT ” ) meeting be held and that the parties be provide d the “ Day in the Life ” video.

The circuit court held dispositional hearings in August and September of 20 21, and is sued a final d is positional order in November of 20 2 1

, detailing the testimony provided from the parents and a DHHR worker. In its order, the circuit court re counted R .W.

- 1 ’s medical diagnos es, which, in addition to those set for th above, included that the child required a “ G

- tube placed for feeding ” and “ o t h er serious medi cal interventio ns to keep hi m alive

. ” Testimony showed tha t t he child had been in special ized foster care since February of 202 0 , with fo ster parents wh o had prior medi cal training and wer e retired, providing them an opportunity to care4 f o r the child twenty

- four hours per day. At age three, R .W.

- 1 was unable to walk, r oll, c rawl, or speak. The child could not be left alone and coul d not be taken outside d ue to his medical conditions. Eviden ce showed that R .W.

- 1 required a “sterile and clea n ” e nvironment

, that caregivers cou ld not leave the home and then interact with R .W.

- 1 and that visitors “must be totally cl ean. ”

During their testimony, petitioners as serted that they wer e not provided a chance to demonstrate an ability to care for R .W.

- 1

. Due to COVID

- 19 precautions, the parents wer e not permitted to attend R .W.

- 1 ’s m edical appointments or any in

- person visitation with the child. D.C. testified that sh e received some medical training dur ing the proceedings and was empl oyed

as a licensed c e r tified nursing assistant for nine

- and

- one

- hal f months . She explained tha t her l icense was no longer valid after she left that employment

. D.C. also stated that she ne ver failed to transport R .W.

- 1 to “i mportant medical appointments ” and had only missed “ s cheduled c heck

ups ” for the child. Both petitioners asse rted that they would m ove to Ohio to be closer to specialized care for R .W.

- 1. D.C. testified that she did not watch the “ Day in the Life ” v ideo th at the fos ter parents created , but R .W.

- 2 testifie d t hat he had.

The DHH R worker testified that R .W

. - 2 was “mi nimally compliant ” with portions of his case plan , such as parenting and adult li fe skill s classes, but was n on compliant with random drug screeni ng. The worker further testified that R .W.

- 2 had o n l y “sporadically par ticipated ” in video visitation with the child, stating “many times ” that he was too s ick to answer th e phone. The worker also testi fied that R .W.

- 2 d id not have independent housing

. R e g arding D .C., the worke r testified that she was min i m a lly compliant with her improvement period . She agreed that D.C. demonstrated improvement in the last few months ; the court found “ however

, throughout the entirety of the case, her b e havior ha [d] been so erratic that [Child P r otective Serv ices] was not

a

b l e to work with her on skills to regain her child. ” Additionally, D.C. completed ten drug screens throughout the proceedings, which were positive for marijua na, “missed many [other ] drug screens, ” and she had not s ubmitted a drug screen sample since May o f 2 021. The DHHR worker opined that , although D.C. addressed her mental health issues close in time to the dispositional hearing, she needed “more stability and consiste n cy regarding employmen t, housing, an d marijuana use. ” The worker also testified that p e t i tioners had an ac tive Child Protective Ser vices case for twenty

- two months prior to the filing of the instant petition, and neither parent was compliant with s ervice s during that time.

T he DHHR worker opined that petitioners “still do not seem to u nde r s t and why th is case was brought against them [ which was the parents ’] refu sal to se e and properly ad dress the [medical ] issues ” of R.W.

- 1. She explained that the DHHR e xperienced sign ificant barriers in ed ucating the parents due to D.C. ’s uncooperative

, “ e r r atic and out of co ntrol ” attitude early in the proceedings and R.W

. - 2 ’s criminal charges

. Even as recently as the July of 2021 MDT meeting, D.C. had an inappropriate outburst of emotions directed at the MDT members. The worker further explained that , wh i l e the DHHR d oes not provide medical trai ning to parents, if petitioners had c o mplied with their case plans , then “transitional home care would have been provided to pu t [R.W.

- 1] ba ck in their home, which would includ e necessary medical assistance. ”5 Ulti m a t ely, t he c ourt found that petitioners had been “ dismissive, argumentative, and incons istent ” during the proceedings. The court fo und that petitioners failed to follow th e recommendations of the family ca se plans and the parental fitness evaluations and d e m onstrated

a “ general lack of cooperat ion with the [DHHR]. ” The cou rt considered that D.C. had made “some recent improvements in behavior

, ” but

, relying on D.C. ’s pare ntal fitness evaluation

, found that t he “concerns regarding competency to support and c a r e for [ R .W.

- 1] would have been insurmountable hinderances to reunification

. ” Regarding R .W.

- 2, the court noted that he had been arrested and charged with pos session of a c ontrolled substance, po ssession w ith intent to deliver, and carrying a conce aled we a p o n. R .W.

- 2 entered into “a def erred adjudication agreement ” for his criminal charges, but he had violated the terms by committing further criminal acts, which again in volved controlled substances. The c ir cuit court foun d that R .W.

- 2

w as incarcerated pend i n g sentencing for the first set of criminal acts. T he court considered that

e ven if R .W.

- 2 was not incarcerated

, his “issues of anger management and co mpetency to
suppo rt and care for [ R .W.

- 1 ] would have l ikewise been insurmounta ble hindrances to reunific a t i on. ” Finally, the court concluded that there was no reasonable li kelihood tha t the conditions of neglect and abuse could be subst antially corrected in the near future and that it was necessary for the we lfare of the child to terminate petitioners ’ paren t a l

, gu ardians hip, and custodial rights. The circuit court memorialized its decision by its November 9, 2021, order

, which petitioners now appeal. 3

T he Co urt ha s pre vi ou sl y he ld :

“Al though conclusions of l aw re ached by a circ u i t cou r t ar e subject to de

novo rev ie w, wh en an ac tion, suc h as an a buse a nd negle ct c ase , i s tried upo n the f ac ts w ith o ut a j ur y, th e c ircu it c ourt shall m a ke a determ i n a t io n b a se d u pon th e evi de nc e an d shall ma ke fin dings of fact and conc lusions of law a s t o w h e t he r such ch ild is abused o r negle cte d. Th ese fi ndi n g s shall not b e set as id e by a

r ev iewing co u rt un l es s cl ear l y er r o ne ous. A f indi ng i s clearly e r r on eous when

, a l th o ug h t her e is e viden ce t o su pp ort the findin g, the reviewing court on the entire

e v id enc e i s left with the de finite a nd firm co nv i ct ion th at a mi stake has b een

comm it t e d. Ho w ev er, a rev i ewing co ur t may not o v er turn a f indi ng s imply becau s e i t would h a v e de c id e d the case diffe re nt ly

, an d it mus t affi rm a finding if

t he ci rcuit court’s a c c ou nt o f th e evidenc e is pl ausible in ligh t o f t he recor d

v i e we d in its en tirety.” S y l . P t. 1, In In ter e st of Ti ff

an y M a rie S

. , 196 W .Va . 22 3, 4 70 S.E.2d 1 7 7 ( 1996).

S y l

. P t

. 1

, In re Cec il T

. , 22 8 W. V a. 89, 7 17 S.E .2d 873 (2011).

On appeal, petitioner s a r g u e that they were not provided a meaningful opportunity to
prove that they cou ld care for their infant son. In petitioners ’ view, th e “ conditions giving rise to the fil ing of the petition was the parents [ ’ ] age and lack of resource s and things ‘ beyond the i r

3 According to the parties, the permanenc y plan for the child is adoption in his current f oster placement.6 control. ’ ” Petitioner s acknowledge that they needed an oppor tunity to show they c ould care for R.W.

- 1 but a rgue that the DHHR ’ s “ cookie cutter ” case p lan was not tail ored t o the conditions of neglect. A c cording to petitio ners, the family case plan provi d e d the common services of abuse and neglect cases

, such as p arent ing c lasses, supervised visitation, and random drug screening

, but did not address issues with transpor tation or instruction on how to care for medically fragile R .W.

- 1. In sum, petitioner s a r g ue that they were not provided an opportunity to care for R .W.

- 1.

This Court has held that “ [ i] n making the final disposition in a child abuse and neglect
pr oceedi ng, the level of a parent’ s complianc e with the terms and conditions of an improvement
pe r i o d is just one f actor to be considered. The controlling standard that governs any dispositional decision remains the best interests of the child. ” Syl. Pt. 4, In re B.H. , 233 W. Va. 57, 754 S.E.2d 743 (2014). Further

, petitioners were provided the maximu m p eriod of time allowed by statute to improve, which must be considered in this Court ’ s analysis. A t the time of the dispositional hearing, the record provide s that the c hild was in specialized foster c are from D e cember of 2019 through September of 2021, w h i ch was when the final dispositional hearing was held. West Virginia Code § 49

- 4

- 610(9) provides that

no combination of any improvement periods or extensions the reto may cause a child to be in foster care more than fifteen months of the most recent twe n t y

- two months, unless the court finds compelling circumstances by clear and convincing evidence that it i s in the child ’ s best interests to extend the time limits c ontained in this paragraph.

Th is time limit was exceeded in March of 2021 , and petitio ners r e ceived the benefit of fi ve additional months to demons trate improvement

. Indeed, this Court has direct ed that

[a] lthough it is sometimes a difficult t ask, the trial court must accept the fact that the statutory limits on improvement periods (as well as o u r case law limiting the right to im provement periods) dictate that there comes a time for decision, because a child deserves resolution and permanency in his or her life, and because part of that pe rmanency must include at minimum a right to rely on his o r her caretakers to be there to prov ide the basic nurturance of life.

State ex rel. Amy M. v. Kaufman , 196 W. Va. 251, 260, 470 S.E.2d 205, 214 (1996)

.
Here, it is clear from the record th at pet itioners wer e not amenable to instruction from the DHHR d u e to th eir individual barriers. While they argue that th e DHHR did not provide them an opportunity to care for the child, they d o not acknowle dge on ap peal that they w ere onl y minimally compliant wi t h the other conditions of their e xtensive im provement p e r iods. Neither
p arent drug screened consistently throughout the proceedings, despit e admitting to the use of controlled substances . The c ircuit court fo und that petitioners were generally uncooperati ve with the DHHR and the ser vices that the agency offer e d

, even before the instant petition was filed. A n improvement period is “ a period in which the [DHHR] and the court should attempt to facilitate the pare nt ’ s s uccess, but wherein the parent must under stand that he [or she] bears a responsibility to demons t r a te sufficient progress and improvement to justify return to him [or her] of the child

. ” In re Renae Ebony W. , 192 W. Va. 421, 427, 452 S.E.2d 737 , 743 (1994)7 ( cita tion omitted ) (e mphasis added)

. While we recognize that petitioners wer e not able to atten d

t he medical appointments for the child due to COVID -1 9, a circumstance that wa s out of their control, it is also clear from th e record that pet itioners did not otherwise de monstrate a level of stability and cooperation with the DHHR that could justi fy re turnin g R.W.

- 1, who is incredibly medically fragile, to their care. According to the DHHR worker ’ s testimony, the DHHR could have provided ne cessary training to petitioners with the transition of R.W.

- 1 into their care. Yet, petitioners failed to demo nstra te overall compliance with the ca se plan, such that reunification could not be c onsidered. R.W.

- 2 was incarcerated during the proceedings due to his own crimin al actions and could not care for the child as of the dispositional hearing

. D.C

. demonstrat ed ex plo sive outbursts as recently as Jul y of 2021 and admitted that she had not view ed the “Da y in the Life ” video that depicted the care R.W.

- 1 requ ired. Simply put, petitioners ’ noncompliance was such that the DHHR did not have an opportunity to provide hands o n instruction i n the care of the chi ld until late in the proce edings. W hile D .C. made some improvement in her cooperation near the end of the proceedings, the circuit court was statutorily required to determine permanency fo r the child , and the evi dence sh owed that neither parent was prepared to care for R.W. -1. Accordingly, w e fi nd no error in the circuit court ’ s decision not to grant petitioners additional time to improve.

Petitioner s also argue tha t the circuit court e rred in finding that ther e was no reasonable li keliho od that the conditions of neglect or abuse could be subs tantially corrected in the near future. According to petitioners, the DHHR failed to present evidence that fits one of the six circumstances presented in West V irginia Code § 49 -4-604(d). P etitioners assert that the evidence below demonstrated th at there was a reasonable likelihood that the conditions of neglect and abuse could be subst antially corrected and emphasize the DHHR worker’ s testimony “that she had no evidence tha t [pe titioners] could not learn the skills to take care” of R.W. -1.

Pur suant to Wes t Vi r ginia Code § 49-4-604( c)(6)

, a circuit court ma y ter minat e a parent ’ s pare n ta l, guardianship, and custodial rights upon fi nd ing t ha t “ th e re is no re as onable likelihood th at th e conditions of neglect or abuse c an be substant iall y c orrect ed in th e nea r future” and th at
t ermination is n e cessary for t h e welfa re of the child. Contrary to petitioners ’ argument , there was significant evidence presented related to one of the ci rcums tan ces , found in West Virg in i a Code § 49 -4-604(d) (3) , which provides that there is no reasonable likelihood that the cond itions of neglect a nd ab use can be substantially corrected when

[t] he

. . . parents have not responded to or followed through wit h a r easonable family case plan or other rehab ilitative efforts of social, medical, mental health, or other rehabilitative agencies designed to reduce or prevent the abuse or neglect of the child, as evidenced by the continuation or insubstantial diminution of conditions which threatened the health, w elfare, or life of the child

.

As s et forth above, petitioner s failed to fully participate in thei r family case plans. The circuit cour t found that they were generally not cooperative with the DHHR

, and the ev idence

s hows that they only “ mi nimally complied ” with the ir case plan. Neither parent complied with rando m drug scre enings, and both tested positive for controlled substances throughout the proceedings. R.W. -2’s progress was substantially blocked by his recurri ng criminal act s , and8 D.C

. demonstrated emotion al instability throughout the proceedings. Critically, w e have held that

“[ c ]ou rts are not r equired to exhaust every speculative possibi lity of parental improvement . . . where it a ppe ars that the welfa r e of t h e child will be seriously threatened, and t his is particularly applicab le to children under the age of three years who are mo re susceptibl e to illness, need consistent close interaction with fully committed adults, and are like ly to have their emot i onal a n d physical development retarded by numero us placements.” Syl. Pt. 1, in part, In re R.J.M., 164 W.Va . 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (19 80)

.

Cecil T

. , 228 W. Va. at 91 , 717 S.E.2d at 875, S yl. P t. 4. I t is difficult to con ceive of a child more susceptible to illne s s and requiring more consistent and close intera ction than R.W.

- 1. While over the age of three, the cour t heard evidence that R.W.

- 1 was compl etely dependent on his caregivers and his welfare could be seriously threatened by a lapse in attention from thos e

c are givers. After extensive proceedings, both prior to an d subsequent t o the filing of the child abuse and neglect petition, the circuit cour t remained concerned that petitioners did not have the
compe tency to support or care for R.W.

- 1. Upon our re view, w e find no err or in the circuit

court ’ s determination that there was no reasonable likelihood tha t petitioners could correct the conditions of neglect and abuse in the near future.

Finally, petitioners ar gue that the circuit cour t erred in termina ting t h e ir parental rights rather than imposing a less

- r estri ctive d isposition al alternative . However , having held that the circuit court did not er r in finding that there was no reasonable lik eli hood that the conditions of neglect and abuse could be sub st antia l l y corrected in the near future, the circuit court did not abuse its dis cretion in terminating their parental r ights. T his Court h as held that

“ [t] ermination of parental right s, the most drastic remed y u nder the statutory provision covering the disp osi ti o n of negl ected childr en , [ We st Vi r ginia Code § 49

- 4

- 604]

. . . m ay b e em plo yed without the use o f inte rvening less

res trictive alternatives wh en it is found that there is no reaso na ble likelihood under [ W est Virginia Code § 49

- 4

- 604( d ) ] . . . th at co ndi ti o n s of neg lect or abus e can b e sub s tantially corrected.” S y llabus p oi nt 2

, I n re R.J.M. , 164 W.Va . 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (1980).

Syl. Pt. 5, In re Kristin Y. , 227 W. Va. 558, 712 S. E.2d 55 (2011). A ccordingly, we find no error in the cir cuit court ’ s fi nal d i s p osition. Petitioners are entitled to no relief on appeal.

Fo r t he for ego ing reas on s , we f ind no erro r in t he de c isi on o f the cir cu it c ourt
, and its November 9

, 2 0 2 1

, o r der is h e reby affirmed.

Affirme d.

ISSUED : May 12, 20229 CONCUR RE D IN BY :

Chief J u sti ce John A

. Hutchison Justi ce Eli zabeth D. W al ker Jus tice Tim Armstead Jus ti ce Wil liam R. Wooton Justice C. Haley Bunn