PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No: 14-9001

_____________

SEIFULLAH ABDUL-SALAAM,

Appellant

v.

SECRETARY OF PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF 

CORRECTIONS; SUPERINTENDENT OF THE STATE 

CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION AT GREENE; 

SUPERINTENDENT OF THE STATE CORRECTIONAL 

INSTITUTION AT ROCKVIEW; THE ATTORNEY 

GENERAL OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF 

PENNSYLVANIA; THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF THE 

COUNTY OF CUMBERLAND

____________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Middle District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. No. 4-02-cv-02124)

District Judge: Hon. John E. Jones, III

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

March 12, 2018
2

Before: CHAGARES, GREENAWAY, JR., and SHWARTZ, 

Circuit Judges.

(Filed: July 12, 2018)

Michael Wiseman, Esq.

Law Office of Michael Wiseman

P.O. Box 120

Swarthmore, PA 19081

Ayanna Williams, Esq.

David L. Zuckerman, Esq.

Federal Community Defender Office for the Eastern District 

of Pennsylvania

601 Walnut Street

The Curtis Center, Suite 540 West

Philadelphia, PA 19106

Counsel for Appellant

David J. Freed, Esq.

Jaime M. Keating, Esq.

Charles J. Volkert, Jr., Esq.

Cumberland County Office of District Attorney

1 Courthouse Square

2nd Floor, Suite 202

Carlisle, PA 17013

Counsel for Appellees

____________

OPINION
3

____________

CHAGARES, Circuit Judge.

A jury found petitioner Seifullah Abdul-Salaam, Jr. 

(“Abdul-Salaam”) guilty of first-degree murder, robbery, and 

conspiracy after a six-day trial in March 1995 in the Court of 

Common Pleas of Cumberland County, Pennsylvania. After a 

one-day penalty phase hearing in which Abdul-Salaam’s 

counsel presented three mitigation witnesses, the jury 

sentenced Abdul-Salaam to death. Abdul-Salaam, after 

exhausting his state remedies, filed the instant petition for a 

writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, 

challenging his sentence based on trial counsel’s provision of 

ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to investigate 

adequately and to present sufficient mitigation evidence at 

sentencing. The United States District Court for the Middle 

District of Pennsylvania denied the petition. As explained 

more fully below, because trial counsel could not have had a 

strategic reason not to investigate Abdul-Salaam’s background 

school and juvenile records, to acquire a mental health 

evaluation, or to interview more family members about his 

childhood abuse and poverty, counsel’s performance was 

deficient. Further, because there is a reasonable probability 

that the un-presented evidence would have caused at least one 

juror to vote for a sentence of life imprisonment instead of the 

death penalty, Abdul-Salaam has met the prejudice prong of 

the ineffective assistance of counsel inquiry. Accordingly, we 

will reverse in part the Order of the District Court and remand 

to grant a provisional writ of habeas corpus directed to the 

penalty phase.
4

I.

A.

At the guilt phase of Abdul-Salaam’s trial, the 

Commonwealth presented evidence showing that on the 

morning of August 19, 1994, Abdul-Salaam, with Scott 

Anderson, attempted to rob a store in New Cumberland, 

Pennsylvania. Abdul-Salaam brandished a handgun during the 

robbery, then bound and assaulted the shop’s owner. When 

Officer Willis Cole of the New Cumberland Police Department 

responded, Abdul-Salaam managed to escape but Anderson 

was caught. As Officer Cole prepared to handcuff Anderson, 

Abdul-Salaam reappeared with his gun drawn, sprinted toward 

Officer Cole, and fired at him. Officer Cole died of his gunshot 

wounds. The jury returned a guilty verdict on first-degree 

murder, robbery, and conspiracy charges. 

The penalty phase of the trial lasted one day. The jury 

was instructed about four statutory aggravating factors that the 

Commonwealth had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt.1 The 

first two factors were established by virtue of the guilt-phase 

 

1 The four aggravating factors were: (1) “that the victim 

was a peace officer who was killed in the performance of his 

duty”; (2) that Abdul-Salaam “committed the killing while in 

the perpetration of a felony”; (3) that “in the commission of the 

offense the defendant knowingly created a grave risk of death 

to another person in addition to the victim”; and (4) that AbdulSalaam had a “significant history of felony convictions 

involving the use or threat of violence to the person.” 

Appendix (“App.”) 238, 244.
5

testimony, and the Commonwealth presented eight witnesses 

to establish the last two factors. 

The defense presented three witnesses: AbdulSalaam’s mother and two of his sisters. Mahasin (“Dovetta”) 

Abdul-Salaam, Abdul-Salaam’s mother, testified that AbdulSalaam’s father, Seifullah Abdul-Salaam, Sr., was “very 

abusive” to him, but stated multiple times that “most of the 

abuse was mental,” such as by “inhibit[ing the children’s] 

worth and their consideration of themselves.” Appendix 

(“App.”) 276–77. Dovetta added that Abdul-Salaam, Sr. 

would also physically abuse the children and that to discipline 

Abdul-Salaam, the father — who abused drugs and was 

homeless at the time of trial — would punch him in the chest 

“pretty hard” “until he took the breath out of him.” App. 283–

84, 286. Dovetta added that as a child, Abdul-Salaam saw his 

father abuse her as well and often tried to protect her. 

Dovetta described the trouble that Abdul-Salaam 

experienced in school. Because he could not pay attention as 

a result of his “deficit disorder,” Abdul-Salaam was placed in 

a special school. App. 278. In addition, when he was sixteen 

or seventeen, as a result of a juvenile adjudication, he was 

placed in an Alternative Rehabilitation Communities (“ARC”) 

program. Dovetta insisted that she and her daughters love 

Abdul-Salaam and visit him in prison “every chance [they] 

get.” App. 284. 

The next witness was Karima Abdul-Salaam, one of 

Abdul-Salaam’s younger sisters. She “vaguely” remembered 

“spurts” of her father’s drug addiction and abuse. App. 295–

96. She said that their father verbally degraded all of the 

children and she recalled her father hitting Abdul-Salaam, 
6

including one instance when she saw her father take an 

aluminum baseball bat into Abdul-Salaam’s room and then 

heard her father hitting him with it. She recalled times as 

children when they could find no food in their house except for 

a can of beans. 

Safryah Abdul-Salaam, Abdul-Salaam’s youngest 

sister, briefly testified that she loved her brother and wanted to 

visit him as often as she could. Although she was young at the 

time, Safryah remembered seeing her father throwing objects 

at their mother and hearing her father hitting Abdul-Salaam 

behind closed doors. 

At the close of the penalty phase, the trial court 

instructed the jurors that it was their task to weigh the 

aggravating factors against the mitigators and that they must 

issue a sentence of death if they found that the aggravating 

factors outweighed the mitigating factors. However, each juror 

was instructed to give “whatever weight you deem reasonable 

to mitigating factors.” App. 333. The court added that a death 

sentence must be unanimous. The jury found all four charged 

aggravating factors and one mitigating factor, namely that 

“[t]he background that includes both physical and mental 

abuse does have a negative impact on a person’s development 

and therefore his future behavior.” App. 342; see also 42 Pa. 

Cons. Stat. § 9711(e)(8) (the “catchall” mitigating factor in 

Pennsylvania). The jury unanimously found that the 

aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factor and 

sentenced Abdul-Salaam to death. 

B.
7

Abdul-Salaam filed a direct appeal to the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court but did not raise an ineffectiveness claim. That 

court affirmed the conviction and sentence, Commonwealth v. 

Abdul-Salaam, 678 A.2d 342, 355 (Pa. 1996), and the United 

States Supreme Court denied certiorari, Abdul-Salaam v. 

Pennsylvania, 520 U.S. 1157 (1997). Abdul-Salaam then filed 

a petition under Pennsylvania’s Post-Conviction Relief Act 

(“PCRA”), 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 9541–46, in which he raised 

the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The PCRA court

held six days of hearings, during which Abdul-Salaam 

presented institutional records, witnesses who testified about 

Abdul-Salaam’s childhood, and mental health experts. 

1.

The most substantial corpus of new evidence consisted 

of Abdul-Salaam’s relatives’ testimony providing significantly 

greater detail on Abdul-Salaam’s difficult upbringing. At the 

PCRA hearing, Abdul-Salaam called ten such witnesses, all 

but two of whom — his sister Karima and half-brother 

Raymond Harris — had not been contacted by trial counsel 

prior to sentencing.2

Harris, Abdul-Salaam’s older half-brother by eight 

years, recalled his step-father as a “scary” figure from whom 

“anger . . . just came across.” App. 384–85. Harris described 

in detail the ways in which Abdul-Salaam, Sr. was abusive 

 

2 Harris said that Abdul-Salaam’s trial team first 

contacted him at 7 a.m. on the day of the penalty phase of the 

trial and asked him to come and testify at approximately 9 a.m. 

that day, but that he could not get to the trial on such short 

notice.
8

toward him, his mother, and Abdul-Salaam. He testified that 

he and Abdul-Salaam repeatedly witnessed Abdul-Salaam, Sr. 

physically abusing their mother by punching her in the face or 

otherwise hitting her. When Harris attempted to intervene, 

Abdul-Salaam, Sr. punched him in the stomach, knocking him 

to the floor. Harris asserted that Abdul-Salaam, Sr. physically 

abused Abdul-Salaam on many occasions, including on several 

occasions by hitting Abdul-Salaam with a leather strap. He 

described a pattern in which the father would abuse their 

mother, Abdul-Salaam would try to protect her, and the father 

would then punch him until he fell and would continue the 

assault “until [Abdul-Salaam] just broke down and cried and 

submit[ted].” App. 389–90. When asked how many times this 

occurred, Harris said he had “seen it happen pretty often.” 

App. 392. He added that the family was regularly evicted and 

that there often was no food for the children to eat in the house. 

Abey Abdul-Salaam, the petitioner’s younger brother, 

testified that as a child there were times when there was no food 

in the house and that he would sometimes eat lozenges from 

the bathroom for sustenance. He remembered one time when 

he and Abdul-Salaam were playing basketball indoors and 

their father thought they were being too loud and so beat them 

both with an aluminum bat. Josephine Hall, Abdul-Salaam’s 

maternal grandmother, testified that when she would see her 

grandchildren, they were hungry, withdrawn, and afraid of 

their father. When she visited her daughter’s home there was 

almost no food in the house and she knew that the utilities were 

frequently turned off because the bills were not paid. Eddie 

Washington, Jr., Abdul-Salaam’s first cousin on his mother’s 

side, recalled one occasion when Abdul-Salaam was seven or 

eight years old, where he and Abdul-Salaam were sitting in the 

backseat of a car while Abdul-Salaam, Sr. was driving. The 
9

children were talking and Abdul-Salaam, Sr. “snapped” at 

them “be quiet or I will kill you.” App. 521. Although he did 

not see Abdul-Salaam often, he recounted seeing him with a 

black eye on one of the numerous occasions when Dovetta 

brought the children over to Washington’s family’s house to 

get away from Abdul-Salaam, Sr. Whenever Abdul-Salaam’s 

family would come over, he added, they were “very hungry” 

and that “all they wanted to do” was eat. App. 524.

Florita Goodman, Abdul-Salaam, Sr.’s sister, testified 

vividly about the abuse:

[O]ne time I saw him take [Dovetta’s] money . . 

. . And she was crying. And she wanted her 

money back. And he was taunting at her . . . and 

took the money and just ripped it up into shreds 

. . . and then threw it at her. And she was like 

picking up the money off the floor, but she didn’t 

have any clothes on, and then . . . he beat her with 

a belt.

App. 453. She recalled seeing her brother force Abdul-Salaam 

to lick envelopes all night. 

Dana Goodman, Abdul-Salaam, Sr.’s younger brother, 

described Abdul-Salaam, Sr. as violent growing up and 

testified that as an adult his brother once tried to strangle him 

with an extension cord. Dana also said that when AbdulSalaam was a child, Abdul-Salaam, Sr. gave all of the family’s 

money to the Nation of Islam, leaving no money for food or 

rent. He said that when he saw the family together, AbdulSalaam, Sr. made Abdul-Salaam recite the rules of the Nation 

of Islam and would strike him if he made a mistake. Dana saw 
10

Abdul-Salaam, Sr. “beat up” Abdul-Salaam “between eight 

and twelve times,” including with a stick, baseball bat, and a 

pipe. App. 721–23, 729. Dana also stated that Abdul-Salaam, 

Sr. would punch Abdul-Salaam with his fist as punishment. He 

added that more than once when the Abdul-Salaam was a small 

child, he saw Abdul-Salaam, Sr. hit Abdul-Salaam until he was 

lying on the floor and bleeding, but did not intervene out of 

fear that Abdul-Salaam, Sr. would turn on him. Lawrence 

Goodman, Abdul-Salaam, Sr.’s other brother, also recounted 

fearing Abdul-Salaam, Sr. and seeing him smack AbdulSalaam with a spoon, causing him to develop lumps on his 

head. He stated that Abdul-Salaam, Sr. forced the children to 

learn the Koran late at night. 

Karima testified that she remembered seeing her father 

physically abuse her brothers and had seen her father hit 

Abdul-Salaam more than ten times. As she did at trial, Karima 

described the incident when she heard her father hit her 

brothers with a bat. She said that her father used cocaine and 

marijuana and that her mother took her and her siblings to 

battered women shelters two or three times. She also said that 

when she was a child, there were days they did not eat, that 

they were evicted several times, and that their utilities were 

often turned off. Karima explained that before the penalty 

phase of the trial, Abdul-Salaam’s trial attorney spent a total of 

10 to 15 minutes talking to her. 

Abdul-Salaam, Sr. also testified. He admitted to drug 

addiction, being verbally “very, very rough” with his children,

and hitting Abdul-Salaam, but contended that he would only 

strike him when it “was called for,” meaning when AbdulSalaam did something “really drastic,” such as making fun of 

prayers. App. 629–34, 638. He agreed that he taught Abdul-
11

Salaam “racial hatred” and that “white people were evil.” App. 

640. He denied, however, hitting Abdul-Salaam with a 

baseball bat. 

Finally, Abdul-Salaam’s trial counsel, Spero Lappas, 

testified. Lappas testified that his mitigation strategy during 

the penalty phase of the trial was to present evidence of AbdulSalaam’s difficult upbringing. Lappas stated that he had not 

identified any mental health issues at trial, although he had 

arranged to appoint a psychiatrist, Dr. Crutchley, to evaluate 

Abdul-Salaam. Lappas did not recall conducting any further 

investigation into Abdul-Salaam’s mental health. He noted

that his associate, Ann Ariano, was responsible for 

interviewing family members and that she told him “that there 

would be evidence of pretty severe child abuse,” but he did not 

recall if he knew pre-trial about Abdul-Salaam’s learning 

disabilities. App. 1301–02. Lappas added that he did not try 

to obtain Abdul-Salaam’s school or juvenile records and that 

he could not identify a strategic reason for not doing so.

Lappas explained his belief that presenting mental 

health evidence has a dangerous side to it, but agreed that there 

was no danger in investigating the matter in the first place and 

again could not say why he did not do so. He articulated his 

view that battling mental health experts create “a very bad 

impression on a jury.” App. 1314. He added cryptically that 

mental health defenses raise a risk of relitigating the crime and 

allowing the prosecutor “to not just describe the defendant’s 

acts in a factual context, but in almost a moral context.” App. 

1314. Lappas testified that he refused to have Dr. Crutchley 

evaluate Abdul-Salaam because he did not want her to explore 

events relating to the underlying charges and because Dr. 
12

Crutchley indicated that it was important to her that there 

would be expressions of remorse. 

Lappas’s associate, Ann Ariano, also testified. She 

recalled interviewing Dovetta, Karima, and Abey in preparing 

for trial, but not any other family members. She stated that all 

of the interviews were conducted shortly before the trial, but 

she could not remember exactly when. 

2.

Abdul-Salaam also introduced a large number of school 

and juvenile records at the PCRA hearings, and these records 

were reviewed by the experts who testified at the hearings. His 

school records, which trial counsel had not pursued, showed 

that Abdul-Salaam attended the Green Tree School in 

Philadelphia for children with special needs from just prior to

his seventh birthday to age twelve. During his enrollment 

there, Abdul-Salaam underwent multiple psychological and 

neurological evaluations. At age six, he was found by 

psychiatrist Katharine Goddard to be hyperactive, 

undisciplined, and paranoid and given a diagnosis of 

“Unsocialized Aggressive Reaction of Childhood Secondary to 

Phobic Reactions.” App. 1626–27. Goddard deemed his 

problems so severe that they could not be accommodated even 

in a class for emotionally disturbed children and recommended 

placement in a residential psychotherapeutic facility. Other 

evaluations recommended placement in a class for emotionally 

disturbed children on an emergency basis because he was a 

physical threat in the classroom. One neurological exam noted 

“some signs of minimal cerebral dysfunction,” while another 

assessment did not reveal such impairment but recommended 

a full neurological exam to reach a firm conclusion. App. 
13

1632–33. The school records also contained evidence 

suggesting that Abdul-Salaam experienced physical abuse at 

home. 

Abdul-Salaam’s juvenile records paint a similar picture 

of difficulty socializing, repeated adjudications of 

delinquency, psychological evaluations, brief improvements, 

and relapses. The Commonwealth used many incidents from 

his criminal history to establish aggravating factors at 

sentencing, see App. 249, 254–57, 264–65, but trial counsel 

failed to obtain the related records. They contained additional 

psychological evaluations, such as those taken in May 1986, 

after Abdul-Salaam was released from the Lehigh County 

Juvenile Detention Home and placed in the Wiley House 

Diagnostic Center. Those evaluations diagnosed AbdulSalaam with an Adjustment Reaction with Mixed Disturbance 

of Emotions and Conduct which expressed itself in terms of

conduct (stealing) and in terms of emotions (depression and 

anger related to his father and inadequate money). 

In June 1986, Abdul-Salaam was placed in the Glen 

Mills School for Boys. Abdul-Salaam initially adjusted 

poorly. Although his behavior began to improve, Dovetta 

asked for his release because she needed his help supporting 

the family. With the support of his probation officer, who was 

under the belief that Abdul-Salaam, Sr. had permanently left 

the home, Abdul-Salaam was released in September 1986. He 

was enrolled in his high school’s Socially-Emotionally 

Disturbed class but was quickly suspended for fighting. 

Abdul-Salaam found his way back into trouble. In a 

report for the court, a juvenile probation officer noted AbdulSalaam’s history of “defiant and manipulative” behavior and 
14

his “propensity to use violence as his major defense.” App. 

2095. The officer noted his unstable home environment and 

his conflict with his father due to his strict discipline and 

“conversion of the family to the Black Muslim religion.” App. 

2095. Abdul-Salaam was placed in the ARC Secure Facility 

in February 1987, when he was 16 years old. His progress was 

initially slow, but his behavior and attitude improved and he 

was discharged in April 1988. 

3.

Abdul-Salaam and the Commonwealth presented 

medical experts at the PCRA hearing, who opined on AbdulSalaam’s mental health based on his records and their 

observations. Abdul-Salaam presented the testimony of Drs. 

Patricia Fleming, Julie Kessel, Carol Armstrong, and Carolyn 

Crutchley. The Commonwealth presented Holly Evans 

Schaffer and Drs. Paul Delfin and Larry Rotenberg.

Dr. Fleming, a clinical psychologist who evaluated 

Abdul-Salaam, noted that his record and IQ scores were red 

flags warranting further neurological evaluation and that his 

academic deficits, including a third-grade reading level in the 

tenth grade, were significant. She opined that his records 

showed the dynamics of an abused child. Fleming believed 

that Abdul-Salaam was under the influence of extreme mental 

or emotional disturbance and had an impaired ability to 

appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his 

conduct to the requirements of the law at the time of the 

offense. 

Dr. Kessel, a psychiatrist, evaluated Abdul-Salaam and 

reviewed his records. Kessel concluded that Abdul-Salaam 
15

had attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”), a 

cognitive disorder suggesting an organic impairment, and 

schizotypal features to his character. Kessel disagreed with Dr. 

Rotenberg’s view that Abdul-Salaam was not brain damaged. 

She explained that his behavior was grossly abhorrent from a 

young age and he was diagnosed with minimal cerebral 

dysfunction (now known as ADHD). Kessel found 

“substantial evidence” that Abdul-Salaam had been 

“victimized as a young person, preadolescent, and in his early 

youth” by his father’s emotional and physical abuse. App. 

1070. Kessel explained that a primary caregiver’s abuse 

impairs a person’s ability to make judgments as an adult and 

that as a person “with organic brain damage,” Abdul-Salaam 

would likely be less able to come to a socially appropriate 

resolution of the anger and aggression engendered by his 

father. App. 1088–90. Like Fleming, Kessel opined that in 

1994 Abdul-Salaam suffered from an extreme mental or 

emotional disturbance and that his capacity to appreciate the 

criminality of his conduct and conform his conduct to the law 

was “[a]bsolutely” impaired. App. 1093–94. She believed that 

Abdul-Salaam had “substantial organic dysfunction” and that 

Dr. Rotenberg’s contrary diagnosis did not adequately explain 

Abdul-Salaam’s symptoms. App. 1094–95.

Dr. Armstrong, a neuropsychologist, tested AbdulSalaam and found severe impairments in his logical reasoning 

and cognitive flexibility. She stated that the severity of AbdulSalam’s abuse was moderate, partly because it was “repetitive 

and chronic,” and described the damaging effects that such 

abuse can have on a child’s brain development. App. 1216–

20. She concluded that Abdul-Salam had “some sort of brain 

damage that’s preventing his frontal lobes from functioning 

well.” App. 1177. 
16

Dr. Crutchley, the psychiatrist whom Lappas almost 

retained to evaluate Abdul-Salaam, also testified. Crutchley 

said she had asked Lappas to obtain Abdul-Salaam’s school 

and juvenile records, but that she did not receive them. She 

opined that Dr. Armstrong’s report “document[s] 

neuropsychological impairment,” which would interfere with 

Abdul-Salaam’s ability to control his behavior and noted that 

the disparity between Abdul-Salaam’s verbal and performance 

IQ raises questions concerning whether he had brain damage 

and called for further testing. App. 1031–32. 

In rebuttal, the Commonwealth presented Schaffer’s 

testimony that she administered two personality tests to AbdulSalaam, with Dr. Rotenberg present. Dr. Delphin interpreted 

the tests (but did not assess Abdul-Salaam) as well as the 

conclusions of Drs. Fleming and Armstrong, and determined 

that based on their reports, Abdul-Salaam’s 

neuropsychological test results were within normal limits and 

that there was “[n]o evidence of neuropsychological 

problems.” App. 1378–80, 1383–84, 1389. Delphin 

challenged the results of Dr. Fleming’s personality tests and 

explained that despite Abdul-Salaam’s antisocial and sadistic 

personality, he was not at the time of the murder under the 

influence of an extreme mental or emotional disturbance or 

impaired in his capacity to appreciate the criminality of his 

conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law. 

He found no evidence of organic brain damage or a schizotypal 

disorder. 

Dr. Rotenberg evaluated Abdul-Salaam and reviewed 

his school records, and opined that impulsive behavior and 

ADHD does not mean a person cannot conform their acts to 

the law. He said that based on Abdul-Salaam’s experts’ 
17

conclusions, one would have expected that he would have been 

hospitalized or treated with medication.

3

 Turning to AbdulSalaam’s juvenile record, he noted evidence of AbdulSalaam’s violent and manipulative behavior noted at the Wiley 

House, explaining that Abdul-Salaam’s description as being a 

strong leader and ridiculing others showed “sophisticated 

form[s] of interaction,” which implied that Abdul-Salaam had 

the intellectual ability to perceive right from wrong. App. 

1468–71. Rotenberg found the extent and nature of the abuse 

less clear than as described by others. He diagnosed AbdulSalaam with a personality disorder, not otherwise specified, 

with antisocial, obsessive-compulsive and narcissistic features. 

Based on his evaluation, Abdul-Salaam’s records, and “all the 

testimony” and affidavits, Rotenberg determined that AbdulSalaam did not have organic brain damage or a schizotypal 

personality, that he was not under the influence of an extreme 

mental or emotional disturbance at the time of the crime, and 

that his ability to conform his conduct to the requirements of 

the law was not substantially impaired. App. 1494–96. 

C.

The PCRA court denied Abdul-Salaam post-conviction 

relief. In its ruling on Abdul-Salaam’s ineffective assistance 

claim, the PCRA court determined that trial counsel did not 

render deficient representation in failing to investigate or 

present the above-noted mitigating evidence because he did so 

 

3 Abdul-Salaam argues reasonably that Rotenberg’s 

assessment here misconstrues the record, which includes 

numerous indications that Abdul-Salaam was, in fact, 

recommended for such interventions. See Reply Br. 12–13; 

App. 1627.
18

for a reasonable strategic purpose.4 Based on Lappas’s 

testimony that mental health testimony resulted in a battle of 

experts that was unappealing to the jury and risked relitigating 

the crime, as well as his reason for not retaining Dr. Crutchley, 

the PCRA court reasoned that “a detailed revelation of the 

defendant’s past, necessary to mount any sort of mental health 

defense, posed the very real risk of doing more harm than 

good.” App. 1580. The PCRA court also noted that it found 

the assertion that Abdul-Salaam suffered from “organic brain 

damage or any other mental illness” to be “deeply flawed” and 

“completely unpersuasive.” App. 1581, 1583. The PCRA 

court made no findings regarding prejudice. 

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed. Like the 

PCRA court, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reached its 

decision primarily on the basis that Lappas’s performance was 

not deficient because, based on the concerns he stated at the 

PCRA hearing, he “had a reasonable basis for not presenting 

the mitigating evidence [Abdul-Salaam] now claims counsel 

should have offered.” Commonwealth v. Abdul-Salaam, 808 

A.2d 558, 562 (Pa. 2001). Although not expressly reaching the 

issue of prejudice, in a footnote, the Court noted that AbdulSalaam’s claim “that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

present evidence of the abuse he suffered as a child . . . is 

specious in light of the fact that . . . counsel presented the 

testimony of several family members who described 

 

4

In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the 

United States Supreme Court provided the standard for judging 

ineffective assistance of counsel claims. To succeed, a 

petitioner must show (1) “that [his] counsel’s performance was 

deficient;” and (2) “that the deficient performance prejudiced 

the defense.” Id. at 687.
19

Appellant’s abusive upbringing” and that calling additional 

family members would “have merely been cumulative.” Id. at 

562 n.5. In another footnote, the Court agreed with the PCRA 

court that the mental health evidence did not show that AbdulSalaam suffered from “organic brain damage or any other 

mental illness.” Id. at 561 n.4.

D.

Abdul-Salaam filed a petition in federal district court 

seeking a writ of habeas corpus. As relevant on appeal, AbdulSalaam claimed that trial counsel was constitutionally 

ineffective during the penalty phase of his trial for failing to 

investigate and present testimony of (1) family members 

regarding his dysfunctional and violent childhood, (2) records 

relating to his schooling, prior criminal history, and childhood 

mental health evaluations, and (3) a mental health expert. The 

District Court denied relief. Reviewing the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court’s determination that trial counsel had a 

reasonable basis not to present mitigation evidence under the 

deferential standard of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), it found 

“no reasonable argument to sustain” this conclusion, because 

Lappas could not have — and admitted that he did not have —

any basis not to investigate the institutional records from 

Abdul-Salaam’s childhood. App. 151–53. However, assessing 

Strickland’s prejudice prong — which it reviewed de novo

given the absence of treatment at the state court level — the 

District Court concluded that Abdul-Salaam was not 

prejudiced by his counsel’s deficient performance. The 

District Court reasoned that because the jury heard testimony 

about Abdul-Salaam’s childhood abuse, learning disorders, 

and behavioral problems, and in fact applied the “catchall” 
20

mitigating factor in response to that evidence, it was not 

reasonably probable that further evidence about AbdulSalaam’s childhood abuse and mental health would have 

changed the outcome of his sentencing. 

Abdul-Salaam timely filed a notice of appeal, and this 

Court granted a Certificate of Appealability with respect to a 

single claim: whether “trial counsel rendered ineffective 

assistance during the penalty phase by failing to investigate and 

present mitigating evidence.” App. 189. We now conclude 

that he did.

II.

The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 

2241 and 2254. This Court has appellate jurisdiction under 28 

U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253. Johnson v. Folino, 705 F.3d 117, 

127 (3d Cir. 2013). Because the District Court did not hold an

evidentiary hearing, our review of the District Court’s opinion 

and order is plenary. Robinson v. Beard, 762 F.3d 316, 323 

(3d Cir. 2014). However, to the extent the Commonwealth 

courts ruled on the merits of Abdul-Salaam’s ineffectiveness 

claim, we must apply AEDPA deference to the “last reasoned 

decision” of the Commonwealth courts on that claim. Bond v. 

Beard, 539 F.3d 256, 289–90 (3d Cir. 2008).

A.

AEDPA “limits the power of a federal court to grant 

habeas relief to a person in custody pursuant to a state court 

judgment” to when the person’s custody is “in violation of the 

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” Han Tak 

Lee v. Glunt, 667 F.3d 397, 402 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting 28 
21

U.S.C. § 2254(a)). Where the Commonwealth court 

adjudicated the merits of a federal claim, a district court may 

grant habeas relief on that claim only if the Commonwealth 

court’s decision was (1) “contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or (2) 

“based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light 

of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d). If, however, the Commonwealth court did 

not address the merits of a federal claim, “‘the deferential 

standards provided by AEDPA . . . do not apply,’ and we ‘must 

conduct a de novo review over pure legal questions and mixed 

questions of law and fact, as a court would have done prior to 

the enactment of AEDPA.’” Johnson, 705 F.3d at 127 (first 

quoting Taylor v. Horn, 504 F.3d 416, 429 (3d Cir. 2007); then 

quoting Appel v. Horn, 250 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2001)). A 

state court decision is “an unreasonable application” of 

Supreme Court case law only “if the state court identifies the 

correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court’s 

decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of 

the prisoner’s case.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413 

(2000). “A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit 

precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists 

could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s 

decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011)

(quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)).

Both of the Commonwealth courts here denied AbdulSalaam’s ineffectiveness claim on the basis of the deficient 

performance prong and did not expressly reach the prejudice 

analysis. See Abdul-Salaam, 808 A.2d at 562. The 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court accordingly wrote the last 

reasoned decision on the deficiency prong, so our deference 
22

will focus on its analysis. Bond, 539 F.3d at 289. Although it 

was not the basis of its decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme 

Court determined that Abdul-Salaam’s claim concerning

counsel’s failure to investigate additional family members or 

present more evidence of his childhood abuse was “specious” 

and that calling additional family members would “have 

merely been cumulative.” Abdul-Salaam, 808 A.2d at 562 n.5. 

Such a factual determination must be reviewed under the 

deferential § 2254(d)(2) framework. See Lambert v. 

Blackwell, 387 F.3d 210, 235–36 & n.19 (3d Cir. 2004); 

Jermyn v. Horn, 266 F.3d 257, 286 (3d Cir. 2001); see also

Vega v. Ryan, 757 F.3d 960, 974 (9th Cir. 2014) (reviewing, 

under § 2254(d)(2), a “state court’s findings that [a witness’s] 

testimony would have been cumulative and would have had no 

effect on the verdict”); Mays v. Stephens, 757 F.3d 211, 216 

(5th Cir. 2014) (same); Cooper v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 646 

F.3d 1328, 1353 (11th Cir. 2011) (same); Hall v. Washington, 

106 F.3d 742, 752 (7th Cir. 1997).

5

 In addition, the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s agreement that the mental 

 

5 To the extent that this statement could be read as a 

merits determination that the omission of the additional family 

evidence did not prejudice Abdul-Salaam because it was 

merely cumulative, see Lewis v. Horn, 581 F.3d 92, 116 (3d 

Cir. 2009) (requiring the application of § 2254(d) deference 

where the state court’s “decision can be interpreted as 

concluding that [petitioner] was not prejudiced . . . just as easily 

as it can be interpreted as concluding that his counsel’s conduct 

was not unreasonable”), such a conclusion regarding the 

prejudice of a subset of evidence without considering the 

totality of the evidence is an unreasonable application of 

Supreme Court precedent and does not merit AEDPA 

deference, see Williams, 529 U.S. at 397–98.
23

health evidence did not show that Abdul-Salaam suffered from 

“organic brain damage or any other mental illness,” AbdulSalaam, 808 A.2d at 562 n.4, is a factual determination that 

binds this Court unless we conclude it was objectively 

unreasonable or unsupported by clear and convincing 

evidence, § 2254(d)(2), (e)(1). These factual findings aside, 

because the Pennsylvania courts did not address the prejudice 

prong of the ineffectiveness inquiry, we review that legal 

question de novo. See Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 39 

(2009) (applying AEDPA deference to state courts’ 

determination of the prejudice prong but de novo review to the 

deficiency prong, which the state court did not reach); 

Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 390 (2005) (applying de

novo review to prejudice prong because state court reached 

only deficiency prong).

6

 

6 The Commonwealth argues based on Richter, 562 U.S. 

at 98, that we should apply AEDPA deference to the 

Pennsylvania courts’ denial of the entire Strickland claim, 

covering both prongs, regardless of which prong those courts 

relied upon. However, in Dennis v. Sec’y, Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 

834 F.3d 263, 283–84 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc), this Court 

clarified that Richter applies only where a state court was silent 

as to which prong of a multi-part test it based its decision upon. 

Where, as here, the state court specifies that it based its ruling 

on one prong of a test, we do not apply deference to 

hypothetical theories that could support a decision based on the 

other prong, which the state court explicitly did not reach. See

id. In its Sur Reply brief, filed after the publication of Dennis, 

the Commonwealth seems to concede that Dennis clarifies that 

Richter does not apply to this case. See Sur Reply Br. 4–5. 

Instead, the Commonwealth argues that the internal logic of 

Strickland mandates that a decision that counsel was not 
24

 

deficient has embedded within it the conclusion that there was 

no prejudice, such that the determination of the former is also 

a determination of the latter. Commw. Br. 40–41; Sur Reply 

Br. 2. However, the Supreme Court in Rompilla clearly 

rejected that this logic underlies Strickland, because it 

considered de novo the prejudice prong despite the state court’s 

merits review of the deficiency prong. 545 U.S. at 390. 

Whatever effect the Commonwealth asserts Richter had on the 

application of AEDPA review to the Strickland prongs, it had 

no impact on the underlying logic of the prongs themselves, 

which Rompilla clearly understood as operating 

independently. See also Sears v. Upton, 561 U.S. 945, 954 

n.10 (2010) (“The one inquiry, deficient mitigation 

investigation, is distinct from the second, whether there was 

prejudice as a result.”)

Indeed, the Commonwealth misunderstands the 

analysis underpinning the deficiency prong. A reviewing court 

will not second guess a counsel’s contemporaneous reasonable 

and bona fide strategic decision, even though “in the harsh light 

of hindsight” it might be abundantly clear that the strategy was 

not only faulty, but damaging. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 702 

(2002); Richter, 562 U.S. at 110 (“[A]n attorney may not be 

faulted for a reasonable miscalculation or lack of foresight or 

for failing to prepare for what appear to be remote 

possibilities.”). Prejudice, on the other hand, is analyzed

taking into account everything that the reviewing court knows 

given the benefits of hindsight, whether or not it was 

reasonably ignored by trial counsel. See, e.g., Lockhart v. 

Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 372 (1993) (holding that the concerns 

underlying “the rule of contemporary assessment” do not apply 

to the prejudice prong); Meyers v. Gillis, 142 F.3d 664, 668 

(3d Cir. 1998) (explaining that the prejudice inquiry requires a 
25

B.

We have little difficulty concluding that the District 

Court correctly found that trial counsel’s representation was 

deficient and that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision 

to the contrary was an unreasonable application of clearly

established law. 

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined that 

Lappas did not perform deficiently in failing to obtain mental 

health experts because Lappas’s testimony about the dangers 

of presenting expert testimony during a capital sentencing trial 

provided a reasonable strategic basis for his decision not to 

pursue such experts. Abdul-Salaam, 808 A.2d at 562. 

Additionally, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court appeared to 

conclude that Lappas was not deficient for failing to investigate 

and call additional family witnesses to testify because such 

testimony would have been cumulative of the testimony 

presented at trial. Id. at 562 n.5. Both of these conclusions

 

“court to determine in hindsight” whether counsel’s deficient 

performance affected the outcome). It is entirely consistent

with Strickland to find that counsel’s representation was not at 

the time deficient but to recognize that, had counsel pursued a 

different (and in hindsight clearly better) approach, there is a 

“reasonable probability” that “the result of the proceeding 

would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. In 

this way, counsel’s performance can, as a matter of logic, be 

not deficient but nonetheless have prejudiced his client. Of 

course, because Strickland requires both deficiency and 

prejudice, such a circumstance would nevertheless fail to 

constitute a Sixth Amendment violation.
26

involved an objectively unreasonable application of the 

deficient performance prong of the Strickland test. 

Although “strategic choices made after thorough 

investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are 

virtually unchallengeable,” an unreasonably limited 

investigation informing those strategic choices can amount to 

deficient performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690–91. That 

is because “if counsel has failed to conduct a reasonable 

investigation to prepare for sentencing, then he cannot possibly 

be said to have made a reasonable decision as to what to present

at sentencing.” Blystone v. Horn, 664 F.3d 397, 420 (3d Cir. 

2011). Counsel can make a strategic decision to halt an avenue 

of investigation if he has completed a foundation of 

investigation to reach that decision, but decisions not to 

investigate certain types of evidence cannot be called 

“strategic” when counsel “fail[s] to seek rudimentary 

background information.” Bond, 539 F.3d at 289. This Court 

has highlighted that counsel often will need to obtain school, 

medical and other institutional records, which are “readily 

available,” to glean the background information necessary to 

direct the rest of an investigation. Id. at 288; Blystone, 664 

F.3d at 420. A failure to investigate background records can 

amount to deficient performance even where “not all of the 

additional evidence” in those records is favorable to the 

defendant, Williams, 529 U.S. at 396; Sears v. Upton, 561 U.S. 

945, 951 (2010), or where counsel had presented evidence that 

articulated the gist of the un-investigated evidence, Sears, 561 

U.S. at 954.

Because Lappas failed sufficiently to pursue expert 

testimony about Abdul-Salaam’s mental health, his proffered 

explanation that such testimony might result in warring experts 
27

or a relitigation of the trial was unreasonable, given that he had 

no basis to presume that the content of the unpursued expert 

reports would even provide fodder for disagreement. See

Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 307 (2010) (Stevens, J., 

dissenting) (“A decision cannot be fairly characterized as 

‘strategic’ unless it is a conscious choice between two 

legitimate and rational alternatives.”). But even if this decision 

could be considered strategic, Lappas’s asserted basis for not 

introducing such experts could not justify his failure to even 

obtain their views or to obtain Abdul-Salaam’s background 

educational and juvenile records for his own review. Such 

information provides the kind of “rudimentary background 

information” that there can be no strategic reason not to 

investigate, whether or not the records are ultimately 

introduced at trial. Bond, 539 F.3d at 289; Tennard v. Dretke, 

542 U.S. 274, 287 (2004) (“[I]mpaired intellectual functioning 

is inherently mitigating.”). The reasonableness of counsel’s 

performance is determined based on the “prevailing 

professional norms” at the time of the representation, Bond, 

539 F.3d at 288, and “[i]t is unquestioned that under the 

prevailing professional norms at the time of [the] trial, counsel 

had an ‘obligation to conduct a thorough investigation of the 

defendant’s background,’” Porter, 558 U.S. at 39 (quoting 

Williams, 529 U.S. at 396)). Lappas plainly failed to do so

and, regarding the school and juvenile records, admitted that 

this oversight had no strategic basis. 

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s conclusion that 

Lappas did not perform deficiently in failing to investigate and 

present more than three family witnesses about AbdulSalaam’s abusive upbringing was also unreasonable. In the 

assessment of the deficiency prong in this case, the issue is not 

whether counsel should have introduced more family witnesses 
28

in mitigation, but instead “whether the investigation . . . was 

itself reasonable.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 523 

(2003). The ABA Guidelines applicable at the time of AbdulSalaam’s 1995 trial — which courts consider to “assess 

counsel’s performance,” Saranchak v. Sec’y, Pa. Dep’t of 

Corr., 802 F.3d 579, 595 (3d Cir. 2015) — provided that in 

preparing for a capital sentencing trial, defense counsel should 

try to “discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence,” 

regardless of whether all of that evidence will ultimately be 

introduced at trial. ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and 

Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases 11.4.1(C)

(1989). Lappas could not have had a strategic reason to limit 

his investigation to interviewing only three family witnesses, 

instead of interviewing more family members and then 

deciding which of them would present the strongest mitigation 

testimony at trial. Based on Lappas’s and Ariano’s PCRA 

testimony, it seems that counsel contacted so few of AbdulSalaam’s family members due to a lack of preparation and not 

for any strategic reason. Counsel’s representation was 

deficient. 

C.

Abdul-Salaam may establish prejudice by showing “a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional 

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. “A reasonable probability is a 

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 

outcome.” Id. Because the Commonwealth courts did not 

reach the prejudice prong of the analysis, our review is de

novo.
29

The issue here is whether, but for trial counsel’s failure 

to adequately investigate mitigating evidence, there is a 

reasonable probability that the jury would have imposed life 

imprisonment instead of the death sentence. Because a 

Pennsylvania death sentence must be unanimous, a defendant 

can show prejudice “if there is a reasonable probability that the 

presentation of the specific and disturbing evidence of 

childhood abuse and neglect as a mitigating factor would have 

convinced one juror to find the mitigating factor[] to outweigh” 

the aggravating factors. Jermyn, 266 F.3d at 309. Prejudice 

may exist even if the defendant could not have established 

additional mitigating factors if he can show that but for

counsel’s errors he could have “presented evidence of an 

entirely different weight and quality” going to the same 

mitigating factor established at trial. Id. at 310. In other words, 

prejudice may exist where but for counsel’s errors, evidence 

could have been introduced “that was upgraded dramatically in 

quality and quantity,” Bond, 539 F.3d at 291, even where that 

evidence supports the same mitigating factor pursued at trial, 

see Saranchak, 802 F.3d at 600. 

To determine whether there is a reasonable probability 

that the uninvestigated mitigation evidence would have 

changed one juror’s mind, we must “evaluate the totality of the 

available mitigation evidence — both that adduced at trial, and 

the evidence adduced in the habeas proceeding” and re-weigh 

that evidence against the evidence that the Commonwealth 

produced in aggravation. Williams, 529 U.S. at 397–98. 

Although we perform this legal analysis de novo, we must 

afford AEDPA deference to factual findings by the 

Commonwealth courts regarding the weight of that evidence, 

so long as they are not unreasonable in light of the record. See

Blackwell, 387 F.3d at 235–36 & n.19; Lambert v. Blodgett, 
30

393 F.3d 943, 977–78 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[A] federal court 

reviewing a state court conclusion . . . must first separate the 

legal conclusions from the factual determinations that underlie 

it. Fact-finding underlying the state court’s decision is 

accorded the full deference of §[] 2254(d)(2) . . . .”). We 

therefore defer to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s factfinding that Abdul-Salaam did not suffer at the time of the 

crime from organic brain damage or any other mental illness 

warranting the application of either of the two mental health 

mitigators Abdul-Salaam pursues.

7

 As explained more fully 

below, however, because we conclude that the un-presented

 

7 Such deference to the factual determination that 

Abdul-Salaam does not suffer from organic brain damage does 

not, however, require us to discount Abdul-Salaam’s mental 

health testimony entirely. Although the Pennsylvania courts 

found unpersuasive the assertion that Abdul-Salaam suffered 

from organic brain damage, they made no findings concerning

other aspects of the mental health evidence, which include 

substantial findings that — although perhaps insufficient to 

independently establish additional mitigators — suggest a 

variety of mental illnesses and abuse-related disorders that 

bolster Abdul-Salaam’s mitigation defense. See Bond, 539 

F.3d at 290–91 (refusing to defer to state court’s determination 

that defendant’s un-presented mental health testimony was 

entirely refuted and could not support a finding of prejudice, 

where the Commonwealth’s expert failed to discuss all the 

findings); see also Porter, 558 U.S. at 42–43 (holding that 

where, as here, a jury may consider as mitigating “mental 

health evidence that does not rise to the level of establishing a 

statutory mitigat[or],” “it was not reasonable to discount 

entirely the effect that [rebutted expert] testimony might have 

had on the jury”).
31

family member testimony “was of a totally different quality” 

than the “meager evidence” that had been “presented on that 

issue” at trial, Jermyn, 266 F.3d at 286, we will not defer to the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s apparent factual conclusion 

that additional family member testimony would have been 

cumulative, see Abdul-Salaam, 808 A.2d at 562 n.5. For this 

same reason — the vastly upgraded quality of the un-presented 

evidence — we conclude that the District Court erred in ruling 

that because trial counsel presented general evidence of AbdulSalaam’s troubled background, Abdul-Salaam was not 

prejudiced by the failure to investigate or present the additional 

evidence established at the PCRA hearing. See Sears, 561 U.S. 

at 954 (“We have never limited the prejudice inquiry under 

Strickland to cases in which there was only ‘little or no 

mitigation evidence’ presented. . . . [W]e also have found 

deficiency and prejudice in other cases in which counsel 

presented what could be described as a superficially reasonable 

mitigation theory during the penalty phase.” (citation 

omitted)). 

Abdul-Salaam’s trial counsel presented three witnesses 

to support the mitigation case — covering just 28 pages of trial

transcript — which generally showed that Abdul-Salaam grew 

up in an abusive home and detailed one instance of severe 

abuse, when he was hit with a baseball bat. In contrast, the 

evidence elicited during the PCRA hearings gave a much more 

detailed image of the home in which Abdul-Salaam was raised

and highlighted the regularity with which Abdul-Salaam faced 

severe mental and physical abuse. Harris described AbdulSalaam, Sr. as a “scary” figure who punched their mother in 

the face in front of the children, App. 384–85, and frequently

severely abused Abdul-Salaam with a belt or balled fist. He 

also described a disturbing pattern in which Abdul-Salaam 
32

would attempt to protect his mother and then would get 

punched by his father until he fell on the ground and eventually 

“just broke down.” App. 390–92. Dana Goodman similarly 

testified with more disturbing detail than any of the witnesses 

at trial. For example, he said that more than once when 

petitioner was a small child, he saw Abdul-Salaam, Sr. hit 

petitioner until he was bruised and bleeding, and on multiple 

occasions saw Abdul-Salaam, Sr. hit petitioner with a blunt 

object. Goodman stated that he was too afraid to offer help 

because he, too, feared Abdul-Salaam, Sr. The other witnesses 

at the PCRA hearing similarly filled in the story with details of 

extreme violence that Abdul-Salaam suffered at his father’s 

hands as a child and the serious poverty he experienced, 

including regular evictions and severe instances of lack of food 

as well as electricity. See, e.g., App. 453 (Florita witnessed 

Abdul-Salaam, Sr. taking money from Dovetta, taunting her, 

and then beating her while she was nude); App. 521 

(Washington, Jr. recalling when Abdul-Salaam, Sr. threatened 

to kill Abdul-Salaam if he was not quiet); App. 749 (Lawrence 

saw Abdul-Salaam, Sr. hit Abdul-Salaam over the head); App. 

395–96 (Harris recalling lack of food and evictions); App. 

462–63 (Abey testifying about the lack of food in their 

childhood home and about when their father beat AbdulSalaam with an aluminum bat for being noisy); App. 499 (Hall 

noting that there was rarely food in the house when she visited 

and that utilities were often turned off); App. 524 (Washington, 

Jr. recounting that Abdul-Salaam’s family were extremely 

hungry when they visited); App. 720 (Goodman describing 

how Abdul-Salaam, Sr. sent all the family’s money to the 

Nation of Islam).

This testimony was supported by the school and 

juvenile records that could have been presented to buttress the 
33

family’s claims of the abusive nature of the family home and 

the problems this caused for Abdul-Salaam starting from his 

childhood. See, e.g., App. 1626, 1631, 1634 (Green Tree 

School records discussing abuse Abdul-Salaam experienced at 

home); App. 1917 (Glen Mills School report opining that 

Abdul-Salaam's relationship with his father “appeared to be a 

major force in promoting [his] acting out and subsequent 

delinquent behavior”); App. 2095 (probation officer’s view 

that Abdul-Salaam’s problems were linked to his unstable 

home environment and his conflict with his father). The 

records also showed that throughout his childhood, AbdulSalaam was described as suffering from various social and 

emotional issues, including what appeared to be significant 

anxiety and fearfulness, self-doubt, and learning disabilities, 

including ADHD. His school records further indicated that 

much of his childhood aggression and disruptive behavior was 

linked to these social, emotional, and learning issues and to his 

father’s abuse. See, e.g., App. 1601 (Green Tree School 

records from 1981); App. 1622 (psychological evaluation in 

1979 stating that Abdul-Salaam felt “‘dumb’ and ‘stupid’ and 

fe[lt] isolated from his peers because of his learning 

disability”). The evidence could have shown that, when 

removed from this detrimental environment, Abdul-Salaam’s 

behavior began to improve, but that his progress was stymied

by his premature removal from the programs and reunification 

with his father. See, e.g., App. 1788 (diagnosis from Wiley 

House that Abdul-Salaam was “salvageable” if placed in a 

supportive setting away from his father); App. 1826–27, 1849–

50 (reflecting Abdul-Salaam’s progress at ARC); App. 1917–

18 (Abdul-Salaam adjusted well at Glen Mills, was released at 

Dovetta’s request based on erroneous belief that his father had 
34

left home permanently).8 Additionally, the mental health 

experts Abdul-Salaam presented at the PCRA hearing were 

able to explain the school records in the context of a child 

raised in an abusive home and how that context could explain 

the development of his issues with impulsive decision making, 

anxiety, aggression, and anti-social behaviors. See, e.g., App. 

873 (Dr. Fleming explaining how Abdul-Salaam’s records 

showed the dynamics of an abused child); App. 1088–90 (Dr. 

Kessel explaining that a caregiver’s abuse impairs a child’s 

ability to make judgments as an adult); App. 1216–20 (Dr. 

Armstrong describing the damaging effects that abuse can have 

on a child’s brain development). None of these conclusions 

were squarely rebutted by the Commonwealth’s experts, let 

alone addressed by the Commonwealth courts.

The evidence presented at the PCRA hearings —

consisting of extensive and detailed testimony about the 

poverty and abuse that dominated Abdul-Salaam’s upbringing, 

buttressed by the school records and mental health experts 

contextualizing those records — presented a far stronger 

mitigation case than the minimal mitigation testimony 

presented at trial, which presented the severe physical abuse as 

an uncommon, instead of dominant, feature of Abdul-Salaam’s 

childhood. If this additional evidence had been presented to 

the jury, it could have changed the picture of Abdul-Salaam’s 

childhood from one that was abusive and poor in a general 

sense, with one or two more severe instances occurring over 

his entire lifetime, to one that appears to have been dominated

 

8 At the PCRA hearing, Lappas noted that in past 

mitigation cases he has found this sort of “institutional 

adjustment” evidence useful. App. 1304.
35

by severe and pervasive violence at the hands of his father and 

poverty that often rose to the level of serious deprivation.

We conclude that there is a reasonable probability that

presenting the PCRA evidence at trial would have resulted in 

at least one juror according significantly greater weight to the 

catchall mitigating factor, thereby “convinc[ing] one juror to 

find the mitigating factors to outweigh” the aggravating 

factors. Blystone, 664 F.3d at 427. Consequently, AbdulSalaam was prejudiced by trial counsel’s errors because there 

is a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s deficient 

performance in failing to adequately investigate — and 

ultimately present — this mitigation evidence, at least one 

juror would have voted against the death penalty and changed 

the outcome of the penalty proceedings. Having established 

both Strickland prongs, Abdul-Salaam is entitled to habeas 

relief. 

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse in part the 

Order of the District Court and remand to grant a provisional 

writ of habeas corpus directed to the penalty phase.