No. 86-297 

IN THE SIJPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1986 

RUTH E. REISER, 

Plaintiff and Appellant, 

DR. WILLIAM S. PRUNTY, M.D., and 

BOZEMAN DEACONESS FOUNDATION, d/b/a 

BOZEMAN DEACONESS HOSPITAL, 

Defendants and Respondents. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Gallatin, 

The Honorable Thomas A Olson, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEI, OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Paul B. Smith, Boulder, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Crowley Law Firm; Bruce R. Toole, Billings, Montana 

Berg, Coil, Stokes & Tollfesen; Ben Berg, Jr., 

Bozeman, Montana 

Submitted on Briefs: Sept. 18, 1986 

Decided: October 30, 1986 

*# 

Clerk 
Mr. Justice John C. Sheehy delivered the Opinion of the 

Court. 

Plaintiff Ruth Reiser appeals an order issued by the 

District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District, Gallatin 

County, granting defendants Bozeman Deaconess Hospital and 

Dr. William Prunty's motions for summary judgment and denying 

Ruth Reiser's motion for partial summary judgment on the 

issue of liability for violations of Montana's mental health 

code, § 53-21-101, et seq., MCA (1979). We affirm. 

The issue raised on appeal is whether the District Court 

erred in granting Dr. William Prunty's and Bozeman Deaconess 

Hospital's motions for summary judgment and denying Ruth 

Reiser's motion for partial summary judgment. 

Mrs. Reiser's action against the hospital and Dr. Prunty 

arises out of involuntary commitment proceedings initiated by 

her family and the county attorney after Mrs. Reiser 

threatened to commit suicide. The facts indicate that in the 

early morning hours of November 3, around 3:00 a.m., and 

after drinking a bottle of wine, Mrs. Reiser telephoned Dr. 

Fred Bahnson, a physician who had been treating Mrs. Reiser 

for ear problems, and told him that she was drunk, unable to 

face the pain of her ear condition, and considering killing 

herself. Dr. Bahnson called Phyllis Rigg, Reiser's daughter, 

who called the Gallatin County Sheriff's office. Dr. Bahnson 

also contacted Mrs. Reiser's family physician, Dr. Hathaway, 

whom Mrs. Reiser had called prior to calling Dr. Bahnson. 

Dr. Hathaway told Dr. Bahnson that he knew little about Mrs. 

Reiser's mental condition, but suspected that she was very 

disturbed. 
Prior to taking action the sheriff's office personnel 

spoke to Dr. Hathaway and confirmed that he had stated he 

felt Mrs. Reiser was disturbed. In that conversation, Dr. 

Hathaway suggested a call to Dr. William Prunty, a 

psychiatrist who had at one time treated Mrs. Reiser. Dr. 

Prunty reported that he had not seen Mrs. Reiser in over five 

years and could not form an opinion about her current mental 

condition. 

Acting on this information, Deputy Cashell, who had come 

to the Reiser residence a month before for an earlier suicide 

attempt, met Mrs. Reiser's son, Ken Reiser, and daughter, 

Phyllis Rigg, at Mrs. Reiser's home. Before her brother 

arrived, Phyllis Rigg explained to Deputy Cashell and another 

officer on the scene that her mother had been very depressed, 

barricaded in her house for a week and that she had a loaded 

shotgun under her bed. When Ken Reiser arrived with a key to 

the house, Deputy Cashell telephoned Mrs. Reiser through the 

dispatcher in an attempt to get her to come out and talk to 

the officers. Although the telephone was answered, no one 

was thought to be on the receiver. Deputy Cashell then rang 

the doorbell to have Mrs. Reiser answer the front door. Mrs. 

Reiser did not answer. Using Ken Reiser's house key the 

officers entered the house where they met and identified 

themselves to Mrs. Reiser, who became very angry, yelling 

that she had not called anyone for help, that it was her life 

and she could do what she wanted with it and that she had a 

loaded gun and would shoot the officers if they entered her 

home. Deputy Cashell then asked Ken Reiser to come into the 

home and see if he could talk to his mother. When he was 

unable to talk to her, he requested that his sister be 

hrought in. The police report indicates that as Ken and 
Phyllis talked to their mother the mother became very abusive 

toward her children and stated several times that she wanted 

everyone to leave and that if she wanted to die, it was her 

privilege. She also repeatedly stated that she had a shotgun 

in the house and would kill everyone in the house. During 

the balance of the confrontation, Mrs. Reiser was across t-he 

living room, approximately 30 feet from the entryway where 

the officers stood. When Ken and Phyllis entered, they 

approached their mother, and Ken attempted to get behind her 

to block her way to the bedroom, where he knew she kept the 

shotgun. Before he was able to do so, she bolted. Deputy 

Cashell caught her, and with the assistance of the other 

officer was able to place her in a living room chair. While 

the officers were scuffling with his mother, Ken Reiser went 

into the bedroom to retrieve and unload the shotgun, which he 

placed on the floor in the hallway. Mrs. Reiser was then 

taken to Rozeman Deaconess Hospital by ambulance. She was 

admitted to the hospital at 4:30 a.m. on November 3 by Dr. 

Hathaway, Ruth Reiser's general physician. 

Dr. Prunty testified that around 4:00 a.m. on November 

3, he received a call from Dr. Hathaway informing him that 

Ruth Reiser was suicidal, was being admitted to the hospital, 

and that Dr. Hathaway was placing her in a "secure" room for 

her own safety. Dr. Hathaway indicated that he wanted Dr. 

Prunty to take over caring for Mrs. Reiser. Dr. Prunty then 

called the nurses on duty and arrived at the hospital around 

5:30 a.m. He attempted to meet with Mrs. Reiser, but she was 

very uncooperative and refused to talk to him. Dr. Prunty 

then called Phyllis Rigg, who told him that her mother, Mrs. 

Reiser, had suffered depression and had on separate occasions 

threatened and attempted to commit suicide. Phyllis also 
shared a long list of other troubles her mother had been 

experiencing. 

Dr. Prunty explained the involuntary commitment 

procedure and was told that the daughter would see the county 

attorney without delay. Based on all of the information he 

had received and Mrs. Reiser's upset state, Dr. Prunty 

continued her confinement in the secure room and prescribed a 

sedative for her. Later in the afternoon of November 3, Dr. 

Prunty confirmed the daughter had requested the county 

attorney to initiate involuntary commitment proceedings. 

Dr. Prunty saw Mrs. Reiser again that afternoon and 

found her more controlled, though angry at her confinement. 

She denied much of her daughter's information and requested 

medical care for other ailments, which was arranged. At that 

time, Dr. Prunty told her that her daughter was planning to 

institute commitment proceedings. By 5:00 p.m. on November 

3, Dr. Prunty was able to confirm that deputy county attorney 

Robert Throssell had filed a petition for involuntary 

commitment and an order had been signed by the District Court 

judge finding probable cause that Mrs. Reiser was seriously 

mentally ill. 

Although the district judge signed the order on November 

3, the initial hearing on the commitment proceedings was set 

for Wednesday, November 5. This was because Tuesday, 

November 4, was a national and state election day. The next 

regular business day was the 5th. 

Once the commitment proceeding was underway, the county 

attorney's office notified Dr. Prunty and the hospital that 

Mrs. Reiser should be held at the hospital pending further 

notice. Sheriff's deputies arrived at the hospital at about 

13: 30 p.m. on Wednesday, November 5, to take Mrs. Reiser to 
the commitment hearing. Mrs. Reiser did not return to the 

hospital. She was released by the court on November 5 to the 

care of a friend. The order releasing Mrs. Reiser also 

appointed Dr. Frank Seitz, a psychologist, as the 

court-appointed professional required to examine Mrs. Reiser 

and report to the court on her condition. Dr. Seitz 

evaluated Mrs. Reiser and found that., at the time of his 

evaluation, Mrs. Reiser was not suicidal. Based on Dr. 

Seitz's report, the county attorney's office decided to 

dismiss the petition for involuntary commitment, and filed a 

motion to that effect on November 7. The motion was granted 

by the District Court that same day. 

Mrs. Reiser brought this action in Gallatin County 

District Court seeking damages against Dr. Prunty and the 

Bozeman Deaconess Hospital for alleged violations of 

Montana's mental health code. She also sought recovery on 

the basis of the common law theories of assault, battery and 

false imprisonment. 

Following discovery, the issue of liability for the 

mental health code violations was submitted to the District 

Court for adjudication on cross-motions for summary judgment. 

The motions of Dr. Prunty and the hospital were granted, and 

the plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment was 

denied. 

The issue raised by Mrs. Reiser on appeal encompasses an 

array of subissues. Each will be addressed in turn. 

The first subissue involves appellant's contention that 

the District Court's order made a number of factual 

assumptions in the hospital's and Dr. Prunty's favor that 

require resolution by a trier of fact, hence summary judgment 

was improper. Mrs. Reiser's first contention is that she 
never threatened suicide in her 3:00 a.m. telephone call to 

Dr. Bahnson. She argues that the District Court erred in 

assuming that the call was a threat. The District Court 

erred, she contends, because it failed to apply the rule 

established in Cereck v. Albertsons, Inc. (1981) that "all 

reasonable inferences drawn from the offered proof are to be 

drawn in favor of the party opposing summary judgment." 195 

Mont. 409, 413, 637 P.2d 508, 511. Mrs. Reiser maintains 

that the reasonable inference to be drawn from her 3:00 a.m. 

call was that she was in pain and depressed, not that she was 

intending to kill herself. This Court cannot accept this 

contention as "reasonable" in light of the facts. It would 

not be "reasonable" to assume that a person in pain, who had 

been drinking, who had been very depressed for a week prior 

to the threat and who had a history of attempted suicide, 

including an attempt less than two months before the Novemher 

3 threat, was not threatening suicide. Mrs. Reiser admits 

that she made several calls at 3:00 a.m. and that she told 

Dr. Bahnson ". . . I might as well kill myself." Dr. Bahnson 

was aware of the above-mentioned facts. The sheriff's office 

knew of Mrs. Reiser's September 25, 1980 attempt at suicide. 

The only "reasonable" inference the District Court could draw 

is that Mrs. Reiser threatened suicide. The District of 

Columbia Circuit Court in addressing an issue where there was 

conflict concerning interpretation of the facts and the 

ultimate conclusion to be drawn from them but there was none 

as to the facts themselves, stated: 

Conflict concerning the ultimate and decisive 

conclusion to be drawn from undisputed facts does 

not prevent rendition of a summary judgment, when 

that conclusion is one to be drawn by the court. 

The court had before it all the facts which formal 

trial would have produced. Going through the 

motions of trial would have been futile. 
Fox v. Johnson & Wimsatt (D.C. Cir. 1942), 127 F.2d 729, 737. 

Further support for our ruling that there was no genuine 

issue of material fact precluding the District Court's order 

of summary judgment comes from the language of First National 

Bank Co. v. Insurance Company (19791, 606 F.2d 760, 767, 

where it is stated: 

Rule 56 does not provide a method by which the 

presence of an issue of fact can be determined; 

therefore, each case depends on the facts peculiar 

to it. A district court under the rule is not 

authorized to try issues of fact, but has the power 

to penetrate the pleadings and look at any 

evidential source to determine whether there is an 

issue of fact to be tried. 

Mrs. Reiser's assertion that there is a genuine issue of 

fact as to whether her 3:00 a.m. call was a suicide threat is 

entirely without support in the record. The only 

interpretation and conclusion that could be drawn from the 

facts is that Mrs. Reiser was threatening suicide. Hence 

there was no genuine issue of material fa.ct to preclude the 

District Court's order of summary judgment. 

The next subissues appealed are whether Dr. Prunty and 

the hospital fulfilled their statutory obligations under 55 

53-21-115, 53-21-120, 53-21-129 and 53-21-146, MCA. 

Mrs. Reiser's confinement in Rozeman Deaconess Hospital 

from November 3 to November 5 took place under the provisions 

of 53-21-129, MCA, Montana's emergency detention statute. 

In November, 1980, the statute read as follows: 

(1) When an emergency situation exists, a peace 

officer may take any person who appears to be 

seriously mentally ill and as a result of serious 

mental illness to be a danger to others or to 

himself into custody only for sufficient time to 

contact a professional person for emergency 

evaluation. If possible, a professional person 

should be called prior to taking the person into 

custody. 

(2) If the professional person agrees that the 

person detained. appears to be seriously mentally 
ill and that an emergency situation exists, then 

the person may be detained and treated until the 

next regular business day. At that time, the 

professional person shall release the detained 

person or file his findings with the county 

attorney who, if he determines probable cause to 

exist, shall file the petition provided for in 

53-21-121 through 53-21-126 in the county of the 

respondent's residence. In either case, the 

professional person shall file a report with the 

court explaining his actions. 

Sections 53-21-129 (1) and (2) , MCA. 

Subsection (2) of the statute is most relevant to the 

facts before this Court. It sets forth four criteria guiding 

the conduct of a "professional person" in the care and 

evaluation of the seriously mentally ill: 

1. Once a person is brought into custody, that 

person may not be detained unless a professional 

person concludes that the person appears to be 

seriously mentally ill and that an emergency 

situation exists with respect to that person's 

condition. 

2. If the professional person concl-udes that these 

factors are present, then the person may be 

detained and treated until the next regular 

business day following this determination. 

3. On the next regular business day, the 

professional person is obliged to either release 

the detained person or file appropriate findings 

with the county attorney, who may then seek 

involuntary commitment of the detainee pursuant to 

other provisions of the Mental Health Code. 

4. Whether the professional person reports his 

findings to the county attorney or releases the 

detainee, the professional person is required to 

file a report with the district court explaining 

his actions with respect to the detainee. 

None of the parties dispute this basic characterization 

of the legislative standards guiding the conduct of a 

professional person in the care and evaluation of a seriously 

1 A "professional person" is defined as a medical doctor 

or a State Department of Institutions certified 

practitioner in the mental health field; e.g., a 

psychiatrist or clinical. psychologist. Section 

53-21-102 (lo), MCA (1979) . 
mentally ill person. Mrs. Reiser's claim is that Dr. Prunty 

did not satisfy any of these statutory duties, and in 

particular that he did not determine an "emergency situation" 

existed warranting her confinement. 

Section 53-21-102 (4) , MCA, defines an emergency 

situation as "a situation in which any person is in imminent 

danger of death or serious bodily harm from the activity of a 

person who appears to be seriously mentally ill." Seriously 

mentally ill means "suffering from a mental disorder which 

has resulted in self-inflicted injury or injury to others or 

the imminent threat thereof or which has deprived the person 

afflicted of the ability to protect his life or health." 

Section 53-21-102 (14), MCA. 

An emergency situation clearly existed in this case, and 

the information necessary for Dr. Prunty to draw this 

conclusion was available when he made the decision to detain 

Mrs. Reiser. The ambulance brought Mrs. Reiser to the 

hospital around 4:30 a.m. on the morning of November 3. By 

6:00 a.m. that same morning, Dr. Prunty had talked to Dr. 

Hathaway and the sheriff's office personnel and had learned 

that Mrs. Reiser had not only threatened to kill herself, but 

others as well. He had tried to talk with Mrs. Reiser and 

found her to be angry and uncommunicative. He had been 

informed that she had been abusive toward the nurses. Before 

8:00 a.m. he had talked with Phyllis Rigg and learned that 

Mrs. Reiser had made a suicide attempt within the last two 

months and that she had been very depressed for the week 

before November 3. 

It is also clear from these facts that the District 

Court did not err in supporting Dr. Prunty's conclusion that 

Mrs. Reiser was seriously mentally ill and. was a threat to 
her own life. Dr. Prunty said his medical judgment was not 

based on a single fact or observation: "There's no one thing 

in most medical situations that point to a specific diagnosis 

and treatment. It's a qroup of bits of information and you 

put them together." Mrs. Reiser takes issue with how Dr. 

Prunty reached his conclusion that she had been suicidal, in 

that she never made an attempt or threat while under his 

care. 

It must be noted that Dr. Prunty's alleged violation of 

accepted medical practice becomes a jury question only if 

Mrs. Reiser presents an expert witness who has a contrary 

medical view of the same facts. Mrs. Reiser presented no 

such witness. Under the law as expressed in Llera v. Wisner 

(1976) 171 Mont. 254, 557 P.2d 805, and Collins v. Itoh 

(1972), 160 Mont. 461, 503 P.2d 36 summary judgment was 

properly granted to Dr. Prunty on the question of his medical 

judgment. 

Further, In The Matter of F.R. (1980), - Mont. - I 

615 P.2d 867, 869 interprets the statutory language "imminent 

threat of self-inflicted injury or injury to others" to mean: 

Threat is not a certainty. The law requires only 

proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the threat of 

future injury presently exists and that the threat 

is imminent, that is, impending, likely to occur at 

any moment. If beyond a reasonable doubt there is 

a present indication of probable physical injury 

which is likely to occur at any moment or in the 

immediate future, and if this injury would be a 

result of a mental disorder, then the person 

suffering from such mental disorder i.s seriously 

mentally ill within the meaning of the act. 

In describing the behavior of a mentally ill person this 

Court explained that the behavior need not be a completed 

act. "An attempt or threat, or even a failure to act may 

suffice. " Id. "Most certainly the legislature never 

intended that the blood of innocent people must first be shed. 
before the statutory definition of 'overt act' has been 

satisfied." In the Matter of J.B. (1985), - Mont. - , 705 

P.2d 598. In the instant case it is clear from the 

chronology of events that there was sufficient evidence to 

support both the hospital's and Dr. Prunty's decision to 

detain Mrs. Reiser as a threat to herself and others. Mrs. 

Reiser contends that: 

Dr. Prunty was detaining Ruth Reiser not because he 

felt that she continued to pose an imminent threat 

of death or serious bodily injury to herself or to 

others but merely because he felt she - had posed a 

suicide threat to herself before she came to the 

hospital and he simply would hold and treat her 

while Phyllis Rigg, her daughter, and the county 

attorney proceeded with an involuntary commitment 

proceeding. 

Mrs. Reiser also contends that the definition of emergency 

situation requires that an imminent danger of death or 

serious bodily harm be continuous for the emergency situation 

to exist, citing In the Matter of Alan Ray Shennum (Mont. 

1984), 684 P.2d 1073, 41 St.Rep. 1148. In Shennum, Missoula 

officers briefly detained and disarmed a man who attended a 

Missoula City Council meeting with a loaded and cocked 

pistol. He was released without his weapon but arrested the 

next day when he went to the City Police headquarters to 

reclaim his gun. He was seen by a psychiatrist and moved to 

a hospital room where the door was kept open, leaving him 

free to wander about in an open area nearby. This Court held 

that there was no emergency on the day Shennum was arrested 

and detained, and the professional person made no finding 

that an emergency situation existed. These faults do not 

exist in this case. Mrs. Reiser was detained at the scene of 

her threatened suicide. She was seen by a psychiatrist 

within two hours who found she was seriously mentally ill and 

a threat to her own life. Involuntary commitment proceedings 
were instituted at 8:00 a.m. that same morning. An emergency 

situation existed, although Dr. Prunty never stated so in so 

many words. There is no statutory requirement that in an 

emergency situation the imminent danger of death or injury 

continue beyond detention. In any event, Mrs. Reiser's 

behavior after detention, insofar as she was abusive toward 

Dr. Prunty and the nurses on admittance, suggests that she 

remained in a destructive mood once detained, if only for a 

portion of the day. 

In sum, the requirements of S 53-21-129(2), MCA were 

substantially met. Dr. Prunty, a professional, concluded 

that Mrs. Reiser was seriously mentally ill and that an 

emergency situation existed. His conclusion permitted the 

lawful detention until the next regular business day. In 

this case, the next regular business day was November 5, as 

November 4 was a 1ega.l holiday. The District Court judge was 

advised of Mrs. Reiser's detention status on November 3, when 

he found probable cause for holding a commitment hearing. 

The hearing was held on November 5, and Mrs. Reiser was 

released to the care of friends at her initial appearance. 

By 3:00 p.m. on November 3, Dr. Prunty had shared his 

findings with the assistant county attorney and stated that 

he felt an evaluation for commitment was in order and that he 

felt she was seriously mentally ill and a danger to herself. 

Perhaps the only material shortcoming in following the 

statutory guidelines of S 53-21-129 (2), MCA is Dr. Prunty's 

failure to file his findings with the District Court. 

However, there is no basis for liability on these grounds. 

The failure to file a report does not make Mrs. Reiser's 

detention unlawful, hence there are no grounds for reversal. 
Mrs. Reiser next asserts that Dr. Prunty and the 

hospital violated duties owed to her to follow the prescribed 

statutory standards for mental health facilities set forth 

under 55 53-21-146, -115 and -120, MCA. 

Section 53-21-146 states: 

Right to -- free from physical restraint - and 

isolation. Patients have a right to be free from 

physical restraint and isolation. Except for 

emergency situations in which it is likely that 

patients could harm themselves or others and in 

which less restrictive means of restraint are not 

feasible, patients may be physically restrained or 

placed in isolation only on a professional person's 

written order which explains the rationale for such 

action. 

This section provides a rather significant exception 

making it inapplicable to the detention of Mrs. Reiser. 

Section 53-21-146 is not intended to afford protections to 

people held under the emergency detention statutes. Rather 

it is intended to protect patients, people who are "committed 

by the court for treatment for any period of time. . ." 

Section 53-21-102(8), MCA. Mrs. Reiser was detained prior to 

a court determination that she was seriously mentally ill, 

hence the statutory restrictions do not apply. 

Mrs. Reiser next maintains that Dr. Prunty violated her 

rights under 5 53-21-120. This section provides that a 

person detained under the emergency detention statute be 

detained in the least restrictive environment required to 

protect that person's life and physical safety. By its very 

nature this concept involves medical connotations outside the 

scope of knowledge of the layperson. What constitutes a 

"least restrictive environment" is a judgment that can only 

be made by an expert with the opportunity to consider all the 

facts of the case in light of what would be reasonable in 

similar circumstances. There is no evidence in the record to 
suggest that Mrs. Reiser was placed in other than the least 

restrictive environment. Her own lay observations are 

insufficient to defeat the District Court's award of summary 

judgment to Dr. Prunty and the hospital. 

Mrs. Reiser also argues that the hospital was negligent 

for failing to agree in writing to her detainment. This 

claim is based on $ 53-21-120(2), MCA, which states in 

part: "No person may be detained in any hospital or other 

medical facility which is not a mental health facility unless 

such hospital or facility has agreed in writing to admit such 

persons." The parties agree that the hospital is not a 

mental health facility under the statutory definition. Mrs. 

Reiser, however, failed to provide evidence to support a 

prima facie case of negligence on this allegation. This 

provision of the statutes is not to create a basis of 

liability, but to aid in proof that the hospital did in fact 

admit the patient. Here the hospital does not deny admitting 

the patient, and the purpose of the statutory provision is 

not thereby thwarted. Liability in this case cannot be based 

on the provisions of 5 53-21-120(2), MCA. 

Mrs. Reiser next raises the argument that the District 

Court erred because it failed to find Dr. Prunty and the 

hospital in violation of SS 53-21-114 and -115(10) because 

they did not inform her she had the right to refuse the 

sedative administered on November 4. A close examination of 

the record reveals that the medication referred to was in 

fact administered at Mrs. Reiser's request. The nurse's 

notes for November 4 at 1600 to 2300 hours (4:00 p.m. to 

11:OO p.m.) state "rambling speech, requesting medication to 

slow thoughts down." Dr. Prunty ordered the sedative at 2200 
hours (10:OO p.m.), apparently in response to Mrs. Reiser's 

request. 

There is no evidence in the record that Mrs. Reiser 

objected to the medication. Further, the language of § 

53-21-119, MCA provides that a person may waive her rights 

under the mental health code. It must be presumed from the 

evidence that when she requested a sedative, or at least did 

not refuse one, she waived her right to refuse the medication 

administered. Further, Mrs. Reiser offers no evidence that 

failure to notify her of her right to refuse the medication 

resulted in any actionable injury to her. 

Finally, Mrs. Reiser contends that the hospital and Dr. 

Prunty had a responsibility, under the terms of § 53-21-115, 

to protect her constitutional right to vote. This right, she 

maintains, was unconstitutionally denied because of her 

unlawful detention. We find that this argument has no merit 

in light of our finding that her detention was lawfully 

justified under the emergency detention statutes. 

In its opinion granting summary judgment to the hospital 

and Dr. Prunty and denying Mrs. Reiser's motion, the District 

Court wrote "while we must be ever vigilant of the rights and 

protections afforded to the seriously mentally ill, we must 

also guard against turning the mental health laws into a trap 

for the well intentioned persons who are doing their best to 

help the afflicted in an emergency situatj-on. Perhaps Ruth 

Reiser is alive today because of the quick actions of the 

deputy sheriff, her daughter, Drs. Bahnson, Hathaway and 

Prunty, the hospital staff, and deputy county attorney 

Throssell. There is no basis, under the facts of this case, 

to turn the statutes against them." We agree with the logic 
of the District Court's conclusion. Therefore, we affirm the 

District Court's actions. 

We Concur: 

/f' &lczhv,L Chief Justice