Department of Homeland Security
 

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Research and Development Efforts 


to Secure Rail Transit Systems
 

OIG-13-111 August 2013
 
"' 

i~ OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov 

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable John Pistole 

Administrator 

Transportation Security Administration 

The Honorable Dr. Tara O'Toole 

Under Secretary 

Science and Technology Directorate 

FROM: Charles K. Edwards /7( } ~ ~ ,--_/ 

Deputy Inspector General ~hi\·~~ 

SUBJECT: Research and Development Efforts to Secure Rail Transit 

Systems 

Attached for your action is our final report, Research and Development Efforts to Secure 

Rail Transit Systems. We incorporated the formal comments from the Transportation 

Security Administration in the final report. 

The report contains one recommendation aimed at improving TSA's Gap Analysis 

Process. Your office concurred with the recommendation. As prescribed by the 

Department of Homeland Security Directive 077-1, Follow-Up and Resolutions for the 

Office of Inspector General Report Recommendations, within 90 days of the date of this 

memorandum, please provide our office with a written response that includes your 

(1) agreement or disagreement, (2) corrective action plan, and (3) target completion 

date for our recommendation. Also, please include responsible parties and any other 

supporting documentation necessary to inform us about the current status of the 

recommendation. 

Please email a signed PDF copy of all responses and closeout requests to 

OIG I nspectionsFollowu p@oig.dhs.gov. 

Consistent with our responsibility under the Inspector General Act, we are providing 

copies of our report to appropriate congressional committees with oversight and 

appropriation responsibility over the Department of Homeland Security. We will post 

the report on our website for public dissemination. 
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Please call me with any questions, or your staff may contact Deborah Outten-Mills, 

Acting Assistant Inspector General for Inspections, at (202) 254-4015. 

Attachment 

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Table of Contents 

Executive Summary ............................................................................................................. 1 


Background ........................................................................................................................ 2 


Results of Review ................................................................................................................ 6 


S&T and TSA Reorganized Working Groups and Redesigned Their Processes for 

Identifying Capability Gaps and Prioritizing R&D Projects .................................... 7 

Recommendation ................................................................................................. 10 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis ......................................................... 10 

S&T Has Created the Necessary Framework for the Development of 

Layered IED Detection Technology ....................................................................... 11 

Appendixes 

Appendix A: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology ............................................. 12
 

Appendix B: Management Comments to the Draft Report ................................ 14
 

Appendix C: Major Contributors to This Report ................................................. 16 


Appendix D: Report Distribution ......................................................................... 17 


Abbreviations 

APTA American Public Transportation Association 

CIPAC Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council 

COTS Commercial Off-the-Shelf 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

DOT Department of Transportation 

DT&E Developmental Test and Evaluation 

EXD Explosives Division 

GCC Government Coordinating Council 

HSARPA Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency 

IED improvised explosive device 

IPT Integrated Product Team 

NIPP National Infrastructure Protection Plan 

NPPD National Protection and Programs Directorate 

OIG Office of Inspector General 

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OSC Office of Security Capabilities 

OSPIE Office of Security Policy and Industry Engagement 

OT&E Operational Test and Evaluation 

PAG Transit Policing and Security Peer Advisory Group 

RDWG Surface Transportation Research and Development Working Group 

R&D Research and Development 

S&T Science and Technology 

SCC Sector Coordinating Council 

TCLDR Transit, Commuter and Long-Distance Rail 

TRL Technology Readiness Level 

TSA Transportation Security Administration 

TSGP Transportation Security Grant Program 

TS-SSP Transportation Systems–Sector Specific Plan 

USCG United States Coast Guard 

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Executive Summary 

The National Infrastructure Protection Plan stipulates that the Transportation Security 

Administration (TSA) coordinate preparedness activities among transportation sector 

partners to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from all hazards that could 

affect U.S. transportation systems. 

TSA, with the collaboration and coordination of other Federal agencies and the surface 

transportation industry, created the Surface Transportation Research and Development 

Working Group. The group’s mission is to gather and consolidate sector-directed 

research and development efforts from all transportation security partners. It identifies 

security vulnerabilities—capability gaps—and refers them to DHS Science & Technology 

Directorate (S&T) for further review and possible initiation of research and development 

projects. 

Based on the gap analysis, S&T developed the Surface Transportation Program. The 

program provides the necessary framework to pursue TSA technologies to detect leavebehind improvised explosive device threats and to secure mass transit stations through 

layered detection technology. 

The purpose of our review was to evaluate (1) how critical gaps in detecting improvised 

explosive device threats against mass transit systems are identified and prioritized for 

research and development, and (2) how S&T coordinates research and development 

efforts with TSA to address those gaps. The scope of this review was limited to the 

transportation sector’s mass transit mode, specifically subway systems. 

S&T and TSA replaced previously established working groups and processes with 

smaller, more effective groups, such as the Surface Transportation Project Integrated 

Product Team, chartered in 2010, and the Research and Development Working Group, 

reorganized in 2011. Although these groups and their associated processes are 

relatively new, they are successful in identifying and consolidating old and new 

capability gaps. In addition, S&T and TSA are effectively collaborating in research and 

development efforts to address mass transit security needs. Although the new gap 

analysis process is based on the Transportation Sector-Specific Security Plan, TSA does 

not have written guidelines or directives to formalize the process. 

We are recommending that TSA formally document the newly implemented process for 

identifying capability gaps to ensure consistency in future gap reviews. 

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Background 

S&T is the primary component within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for 

research and development (R&D). S&T provides Federal, State, and local officials with 

the technology and capabilities to protect the homeland. S&T manages science and 

technology research from development through transition to Department components. 

TSA relies on S&T to develop technology that protects the Nation’s transportation 

systems to ensure freedom of movement for people and commerce. 

The DHS National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) was established in 2006, in 

accordance with Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7. The NIPP provides a riskbased framework for the development of strategic plans that enhance the safety of 18 

critical infrastructures.1

 It also describes the process for TSA and S&T to identify and 

prioritize critical transportation security gaps for R&D efforts. 

The Secretary of DHS designated TSA and the United States Coast Guard as the SectorSpecific Agencies for the Transportation Systems Sector, one of the 18 critical 

infrastructures.2

 TSA and the Coast Guard, in collaboration with the Department of 

Transportation (DOT), coordinate the preparedness activities among the sector’s 

partners to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from all hazards that could 

have a debilitating effect on homeland security, public health and safety, and economic 

well-being. 

The Transportation Systems Sector includes all modes of transportation (aviation, 

maritime, mass transit, highway, freight rail, and pipeline). TSA developed the 

Transportation Systems-Sector Specific Plan (TS-SSP) in 2007 to document the process 

for carrying out the national strategic priorities outlined in the NIPP. The TS-SSP 

describes strategies that protect critical infrastructure and key resources. It describes 

the security framework that enables sector stakeholders to make effective and riskbased security and resource allocation decisions based on the unique characteristics and 

conditions of their sector. 

The NIPP also requires the Transportation Systems Sector to facilitate effective 

coordination between government and the private sector. Accordingly, TSA established 

a Government Coordinating Council (GCC) and a Sector Coordinating Council (SCC). DHS 

also chartered the Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council (CIPAC), which 

1

 GAO-09-678, June 2009, Transportation Security, p. 12. 
 2

 Sector-specific agency is the Federal department or agency responsible for infrastructure protection
 

activities in a designated critical infrastructure sector or key resources category (GAO-09-678, June 2009, 


Transportation Security, p. 12). 


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established a process for consensus-based engagement between the GCC and SCC.3 

With CIPAC guidance, these councils foster development and communication of 

coordinated policies and positions on matters in transportation security and operational 

efficiency. Members of the respective councils collaborate to develop and implement 

security strategies, plans, and programs outlined in the TS-SSP. Figure 1 shows the NIPP 

framework as it relates to the Transportation Systems Sector. 

Figure 1. NIPP Framework 

NIPP CIPAC 

18 

Critical 

Infrastructures 

Requires Governs 

Transportation 

Systems Sector 

Source: OIG analysis 

Mass Transit Mode 

To address the unique aspects of each mode of transportation, TSA developed 

supporting modal implementation plans. The Mass Transit Modal Annex details TSA’s 

overall goals and objectives related to mass transit security. We focused primarily on 

the Transportation Systems Sector’s mass transit mode. 

TSA has also established GCCs and SCCs for each mode, which resemble the 

Transportation Systems Sector GCC and SCC. As required by the NIPP and the TS-SSP, 

the GCCs and SCCs communicate regarding infrastructure risk assessments, planning, 

prioritization, programming, and risk reduction measurement. For the mass transit 

mode, TSA, in coordination with its Federal partners, has established the Transit, 

Commuter and Long-Distance Rail (TCLDR) GCC to bring together Federal entities with 

responsibilities that affect mass transit security. Representatives from DOT, DHS, the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Department of Defense participate in the 

TCLDR-GCC. 

3

 CIPAC was chartered in June 2006 by Former DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff, as a requirement of 

Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 and as identified in the National Infrastructure Protection Plan. 

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The Mass Transit SCC, chaired by the Chief Executive Officer of Metrolink, and 

supported by the Director of the American Public Transportation Association (APTA), is 

composed of private sector representatives from transit agencies and business 

organizations providing support services to the public transportation industry. APTA is a 

nonprofit organization with members from public organizations engaged in bus, mass 

transit, light rail, commuter rail, subways, waterborne passenger services, and highspeed rail. 

Figure 2 shows mass transit’s structure within the Transportation Systems Sector. 

Figure 2. Transportation Systems Sector’s Mass Transit Structure

Mass Transit 

Mode 

Mass Transit 

SCC 

TSA Leads 

Transportation 

Systems Sector 

TCLDR - GCC 

 Source: OIG analysis 

The Transit Policing and Security Peer Advisory Group (PAG), which was formed under 

the auspices of the SCC, brings together the expertise of 21 transit police chiefs and 

security directors from mass transit systems across the United States. The PAG acts as 

an effective communication instrument and liaison group with the TSA and other federal 

governmental agencies. 

The TCLDR-GCC, Mass Transit SCC and the PAG serve as coordinating bodies to discuss, 

develop, and refine positions in all matters on transit security. They implement both the 

TS-SSP and the plan outlined in the Mass Transit Modal Annex. Working through the 

CIPAC, government and industry come together in efforts to reach consensus on transit 

security initiatives to include research and development efforts. 

Mass Transit Presents a Different Set of Requirements and Challenges 

Since the attack on the United States on September 11, 2001, DHS has concentrated its 

R&D efforts on technology for airline passenger screening, especially the detection of 

explosive devices. Although mass transit security commands greater importance 

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following the attacks on subway systems overseas, mass transit presents unique 

challenges for DHS not previously encountered with aviation security efforts. These 

challenges have contributed to the lack of effective technology to detect improvised 

explosive devices (IEDs) in rail systems. Specifically: 

Mass transit systems are attractive targets for terrorists because of 

vulnerabilities, such as open space architecture, restrictions on access, a lack of 

universal security screening, and multiple stops and interchanges. In addition, 

unlike the largely standardized passenger aviation system, there is no common 

blueprint for transit system stations, track layout, train designs, or fare collection 

systems. 

Although TSA has a stake in the development of technology to secure mass 

transit, the individual transit agencies are both the customers and the end-users 

for any new technology. Transit agencies’ operating budgets may or may not 

enable them to purchase and deploy new technology. The Transportation 

Security Grant Program (TSGP) provides grants for safety and security measures 

to augment transit agencies’ limited funds. However, according to DHS officials, 

congressional funding for the grants program has been drastically reduced from 

more than $400 million in 2008 to $87.5 million in 2012. With the high demand 

for grants and shrinking resources, fewer applications are funded. Transit 

agencies look for affordability and a high return on investment before spending 

grant money on new technology. 

Most explosive detection devices currently available were developed in response 

to aviation-related threats and requirements. The products have almost no 

application to mass transit. 

Funding Challenges Exist for the Mass Transit Program 

S&T and the Explosives Division (EXD) have experienced substantial budget cuts in the 

past 2 years. EXD’s budget was reduced by 28 percent in fiscal year 2012. Despite a 

$39.4 million increase in the Fiscal Year 2013 President’s Budget request (53 percent 

over fiscal year 2012), funding levels for this year are uncertain, and further cuts may be 

necessary. To assist with the budget process and to establish funding priorities, S&T 

senior managers conduct periodic project reviews. An S&T official indicated that the 

review process allows management to balance its portfolio with a primary focus on 

available funding, probability of success, and importance to the customer component. 

The official also explained that it is challenging to develop technology without the 

assurance that developed products would be commercially successful. S&T believes 

that without some commitment by a mass transit end-user to co-invest in the 

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technology, it would be difficult to justify long-term allocation of time and resources. 

One way that an S&T project “succeeds” is when S&T develops and refines a useful new 

technology to the point that a private sector company can profitably manufacture a 

product using the new technology, and DHS elements or outside stakeholders will 

choose to buy that new product. 

Results of Review 

Mass transit, which includes intercity buses, trolleybuses, subway (heavy rail) and 

commuter rail, demand response services, automated guideway transit, cable cars, and 

monorails, is an integral part of the U.S. transportation system. As the Nation’s second 

largest mode of transportation (next to the automobile), there were 10.2 billion mass 

transit passenger trips in 2009 for a total of 55.2 billion passenger miles.4 5 According to 

the 2012 Annual Progress Report for the National Strategy for Transportation Systems, 

the transportation sector’s greatest risk is an IED attack on the mass transit mode 

because of its open access and the probability of mass casualties.6

 Bombing attacks in 

Madrid (2004), London (2005), Mumbai (2006), and Moscow (2010) demonstrate the 

importance of identifying risks to mass transit and for continuing to protect the mode’s 

infrastructure. All of these attacks involved IEDs detonated in mass transit systems, 

leading to approximately 470 deaths and 3,270 injuries.7

 The need for proven counterIED technologies suitable for mass transit systems demands that key stakeholders 

coordinate efforts to pursue such technology. 

Understanding the risk profile of a particular transportation mode is critical to 

identifying and mitigating vulnerabilities and capability gaps. TSA uses a range of tools 

to determine risks to surface transportation and to assess existing mass transit security 

programs.8

 These assessments are the basis for TSA’s capability gap analysis and 

resource allocation for R&D efforts. 

4

 TSA refers to mass transit as "transportation by a conveyance that provides regular and continuing 

general or special transportation to the public, but does not include school bus, charter, or sightseeing 

transportation." For the purposes of this review, DHS OIG is discussing subways when mentioning mass 

transit. 

5 http://www.apta.com/resources/statistics/Documents/FactBook/APTA_2011_Fact_Book.pdf, page 11. 6

 The 2012 Annual Progress Report for the National Strategy for Transportation Systems was published 

November 2012 by TSA. 

7

 On March 11, 2004, 10 bombs were detonated on four different commuter trains, causing 191 deaths 

and more than 1,800 injuries in Madrid, Spain. The July 2005 London attacks resulted in 52 deaths and 

more than 770 injuries. The July 2006 attacks in Mumbai resulted in approximately 190 deaths and 600 

injuries. In Moscow, a 2010 subway bombing killed 38 people and injured 102 people. 8

 TSA conducts the Transportation Sector Security Risk Assessment, Baseline Assessment for Security 

Enhancements Review, and annual mass transit threat assessments on a regular basis. 

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We assessed the DHS processes to identify and 

prioritize critical gaps in detecting IED threats 

against mass transit systems for R&D. We also 

examined TSA and S&T’s coordination of R&D 

efforts to secure mass transit systems specifically 

against IED threats. 

The TSA and S&T processes are successful in 

identifying and prioritizing capability gaps. 

Because many of these processes are new or 

Capability Gaps 

The difference between 

current operational 

capabilities and those 

capabilities needed to perform 

mission-critical objectives that 

remain unsatisfied. 

Developing Operational Requirements, DHS, 

2008. 

were recently redesigned, we recommend that they be formally documented as policies 

or guidelines to ensure continuity in the future. 

S&T and TSA Reorganized Working Groups and Redesigned Their Processes for 

Identifying Capability Gaps and Prioritizing R&D Projects. 

As directed by the TS-SSP and the Mass Transit Modal Annex, TSA and S&T 

developed processes to identify capability gaps. The Surface R&D Working 

Group (RDWG) was originally chartered by TSA in 2007 and reorganized in 2011 

to identify surface transportation capability gaps. S&T’s Capstone Integrated 

Product Teams (IPTs), initiated in 2006 to prioritize and initiate R&D efforts, 

were dissolved in 2010 and replaced in part by the Surface Transportation 

Project IPT. As a result, the new working groups revised the processes for 

capability gap analysis and prioritizing R&D efforts. 

The Surface RDWG Was Reorganized in 2011 

The Transportation Systems Sector GCC established an RDWG to bring 

stakeholders together from across the sector to identify mission needs and 

capability gaps. Originally chartered in 2007, the objective of the RDWG is to 

improve the coordination and prioritization of sector-directed R&D efforts across 

all transportation security partners. 

At its inception, the RDWG had hundreds of members representing nearly every 

Government and surface transportation agency, and transportation-related 

organization. However, the RDWG was ineffective, and several ad hoc splinter 

groups began to work without coordination or official guidance. They were 

trying to engage individual transit agencies informally, resulting in confusion and 

frustration. 

In 2011, TSA reevaluated the RDWG, and decided to limit its membership to 

improve coordination and facilitate discussions and actions through one 

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centralized working group. The TSA Office of Security Policy and Industry 

Engagement (OSPIE), formerly known as the Office of Transportation Sector 

Network Management, invited a limited number of Federal and industry 

partners from the Transportation Sector GCC and the SCC to participate. The 74 

current members include 8 Government agencies, a freight rail, a pipeline, 2 

highway, and 21 mass transit organizations. The reorganized RDWG held its first 

formal meeting in May 2012. 

S&T’s Surface Transportation Project IPT Replaced the Transportation Security 

Capstone IPT 

In 2006, S&T formed Capstone IPTs to bring together senior managers from S&T 

and other DHS components (S&T’s “customers”) to identify the components’ 

operational needs and capability gaps and to prioritize R&D programs. The 

cross-functional Capstone IPTs were intended to reach consensus on long-term 

strategies for R&D efforts. By 2009, S&T had established 13 Capstone IPTs, each 

with its own Sub-IPTs and various Project IPTs. Initially, managers from the DHS 

components and the RDWG identified and submitted capability gaps to the 

Capstone IPT. The Capstone members merged overlapping gaps, and prioritized 

R&D projects based on available funding. Technical experts from the 

components identified project requirements. However, often experts did not 

have sufficient technical data for a complete understanding of those gaps. 

In 2009, at the project level, the EXD, now part of the Homeland Security 

Advanced Research Projects Agency (HSARPA), formed a Project IPT to 

coordinate the surface transportation’s technology development. Based on the 

collaborative relationship between S&T and TSA, the program managers decided 

to maintain the Project IPT, even after the Capstone process was determined to 

be ineffective and discontinued in 2010. 

The Surface Transportation Project IPT is co-chaired by TSA’s Office of Security 

Capabilities (OSC) and EXD, with members from OSPIE and representatives from 

other HSARPA Divisions. The IPT brings together entities developing solutions to 

fill the capability gaps through coordinated technology innovations, 

development of metrics, deliverables, and detailed schedules. 

The partnership between S&T and TSA continues to grow and mature. Although 

early attempts by S&T to work directly with mass transit agencies were criticized 

by TSA, the IPT’s efforts are currently well coordinated. According to S&T and 

TSA officials, the relationship between their components has “greatly improved.” 

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S&T and TSA Redesigned the Gap Analysis Process 

With the formation of the new RDWG, OSC Intermodal Division took the lead in 

2012 to return to an annual review of capability gaps, as shown in Figure 3.9

 Figure 3. Capability Gaps Process

 Source: TSA Office of Security Capabilities 

In May 2012, participating RDWG transportation agencies identified current gaps 

in their respective systems using the previously developed Capstone gaps as a 

sample format.10 TSA consolidated the capability gaps, while S&T provided 

comments to clarify the related operational needs. The consolidation process 

combined 14 previously identified capability gaps and 22 new gaps, for a final list 

of 10 multimodal gaps designed to be broad enough for multiple projects but 

specific enough to define overarching operational requirements. After a final 

review by the RDWG, TSA distributed the list to DOT, National Protection and 

Programs Directorate (NPPD), S&T, and TSA project managers. 

Based on our analysis, we agree with DHS officials that the new Surface RDWG 

provides an effective and appropriate venue to identify cross-modal capability 

gaps. Through the redefined gap analysis process, S&T and TSA work together 

with industry to identify more specific and refined capability gaps and feasible 

R&D projects to address them. According to DHS officials, the RDWG does not 

prioritize the identified capability gaps because it addresses multiple 

9

 The reorganized RDWG assessed capability gaps only for surface transportation modes. Previous
 

capability gaps included all TSA modes.
 

10 Although all members are invited to participate in this process, only a few transportation agencies 


submitted capability gaps. 


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transportation modes with varying consequence, vulnerability, and threat levels. 

Solutions to address how the gaps are prioritized are ultimately the product of 

S&T’s budget and funding decisions. 

The RDWG gap analysis process was redesigned and implemented by a small 

number of TSA employees. Although a TSA official indicated that the new 

capability gap analysis process is based on the steps outlined in the TS-SSP, the 

current workflow and process have not been documented. Formal guidelines or 

policies will ensure continuity in future reviews. 

Recommendation 

We recommend that the Transportation Security Administration Office of 

Security Capabilities: 

Recommendation #1: Formally document the newly implemented process for 

identifying capability gaps to ensure a standard process is established. 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

We evaluated TSA’s formal and technical comments and have made changes to 

the report where appropriate. TSA’s written response to the one 

recommendation, and our analysis, is included below. A copy of the formal 

response, in its entirety, appears in appendix B. 

Recommendation #1: Formally document the newly implemented process for 

identifying capability gaps to ensure a standard process is established. 

TSA Response: TSA concurs. TSA is documenting the Surface RDWG processes, 

including the process for identifying capability gaps, which will then be attached 

as an appendix to the formal Surface RDWG charter. The updated charter with 

appendix will be vetted by TSA and DHS with a target deadline of September 30, 

2013, for finalizing the document. 

OIG Analysis: The action proposed by TSA is responsive to the intent of this 

recommendation. We anticipate closing the recommendation when we receive 

and have reviewed the final documents. We consider the recommendation 

Resolved and Open. 

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S&T Has Created the Necessary Framework for the Development of 

Layered IED Detection Technology 

Technology to secure the mass transit environment adequately has not yet been 

developed. However, S&T, in partnership with TSA, has developed a framework 

to identify and pursue R&D projects to mitigate gaps in securing mass transit 

systems. OSC and EXD developed separate but related processes in search of 

new technology.

 Source: S&T Explosives Division and OIG analysis 

Figure 4 provides an overview of the S&T R&D approach to securing mass transit. 

It also indicates where S&T passes the development effort on to TSA for further 

review and testing. In addition, TSA tests and evaluates available off-the shelf 

equipment for use in the mass transit environment. Both approaches have 

identified operational requirements and provide guidance for DHS’ technology 

development. 

To sustain these efforts, it is important that TSA, S&T, and transit agency 

representatives continue to collaborate and communicate. Additionally, a 

management commitment to fund each stage of the R&D process fully is crucial 

to the viability of the S&T Surface Transportation Program. 

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Appendix A 

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 

The Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General (OIG) was established 


by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296) by amendment to the
 

Inspector General Act of 1978. This is one of a series of audit, inspection, and special 


reports prepared as part of our oversight responsibilities to promote economy, 


efficiency, and effectiveness within the Department.
 

This review was included in the OIG Fiscal Year 2013 Annual Performance Plan. Our 


objectives were to evaluate (1) how critical gaps in detecting improvised explosive 


threats against mass transit systems are identified and prioritized for research and 


development, and (2) how the TSA and S&T coordinate research and development 


efforts to secure mass transit systems. The scope of this review is limited to the mass
 

transit mode of the transportation sector, specifically subways. 


We conducted our fieldwork from October 2012 to March 2013. During that period, we
 

interviewed officials from— 


TSA’s Office of Security Capabilities;
 

TSA’s Office of Security Policy and Industry Enhancement; 


TSA’s Office of Security Operations;
 

TSA’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis; 


DHS Science and Technology Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects 


Agency; 


S&T’s HSARPA Explosives Division; 


The American Public Transportation Agency;
 

The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory;
 

The Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority; and, 


The Massachusetts Bay Transit Authority. 


We also attended and interviewed police chiefs at the Mass Transit/Rail Security and 


Emergency Management Roundtable in Washington, DC, as well as the February Surface 


Transportation Integrated Project Team meeting held at TSA Headquarters. 


In addition to testimonial evidence from interviews with subject matter experts, we 


requested and reviewed the following documentation from TSA, S&T, our interview 


subjects, and public sources. This included, but was not limited to:
 

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Department of Homeland Security
 

Charters, by-laws, membership lists, and minutes of the various councils and 


working groups;
 

PowerPoint presentations by S&T and OSC; 


S&T budget information;
 

NIPP, TS-SSP, Modal Annex;
 

S&T’s Surface Transportation Project Management Plan; and 


DHS Risk Assessments.
 

We conducted this review under the authority of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as 

amended, and according to the Quality Standards for Inspections issued by the Council 

of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. 

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Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

I!.S. lleportm<nt or Homdo11d Suurif¥ 

70\ Sooth 12th St=t 

Arlingtm. Vi\ 20~9&.602 I 

iT;;-,.. • '~ Transportatiou 

~ ~ Security 

Administration. 

-

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deborah L. Outten· Mills 

A<.."ting Assistant Inspecro.r General for Inspections 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

FROM: Jo.hn S. Pisto1e oJ 7" f..· 

Administrator 

SUBJECT: Resem·ch and Development E'fforts To Secure Rail Transit Systems. 

OIG Pro.ioct No. 12-040-!SP 

This memmandum constitutes the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) resp1.1nse to 

the U.S. Department of J lomeland Security's (DRS} Oflice of the lnspector General (OIG) draft. 

report titled, Research and Devcilopmcm 6/jorts 1'o Secure Rail Transit Systems, OIG Project No. 

12-040-JSP. 

Background 

DHS cuml.uckd this audit from Oetober2012 to March 2013. This review was included in 11u~ 

O!G Fiscal Year (FY) 20 !3 Annual Perfonnanc.e Plan. The objectives of the audit were to 

evaluate (1) how critical gaps in d~tocting improvised explosive devic.e threats against mass 

transit systems are identified and prioritized for research and development, and (2) how TSA and 

the DHS Science & Technology Directorate (S&T) coordinate research and development efforts 

to secure mass transit systems. The scope, of the review was limited to the mass transit mode of 

the transportation sector, spec.ifically subways. OIG interviewed numerous officials from TSA 

and DHS S&T. 01Ga1so attended and interviewed police chiefs at the Mass Transit/Rail 

Security and Emergency Management Roundtable in Washington. DC, as well as the February 

Surface Transportation Integrated Project Team meeting at TSA headquarters. 

Discussion 

During 20 ll and 2012, TSA reorganizeJ. the Surface Research and Development Working 

Group (Surface RDWG), which was originally chartered in 2007. After three formal meetings 

held from April to July 2013, TSA has refined last year's capabil.ity gaps to increase clarity and 

comprehensiveness of land-based transportation stakeholde.r needs. TSA has continued to 

receive positive feedback from the Surface RDWG participants on this outreach effort. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 14 OIG-13-111 
g . 

. 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 


Department of Homeland Security
 

The Surface RDWG processes in 2012 were considered to be a proof of concept, thereby 

allowing for the identification of necessary changes or improvements prior to definition, 

validation, and formal documentation of RDWG processes In 2013. Accordingly, TSA planned 

to update its chnrtcr during FY 2013, which coincides with the implementation of the OlG 

recommendation. TSA will attach an iippendix to the updated formal Surface RDWG charter 

providing the standardized surface transportation RDWG process. 

ReeommendatiD'n #1: Formally document the newly implemented process for identifying 

capability gaps to ensure a standard process is established. 

TSA concurs. TSA is documenting the Surface RD WG processes. including the process for 

identifying capability gaps, which will then be attached as an appendix lo the formal Surface 

RDWG chart~L The updated charter with appendix will be vet1ed by TSA and DHS wilh a 

target deadline of September 30. 20 l3, for finalizing the document. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 15 OIG-13-111 
 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 


Department of Homeland Security
 

Appendix C 

Major Contributors to This Report 

William McCarron, Chief Inspector 

Dagmar Firth, Senior Inspector 

Shawntae Hampton, Inspector 

Megan Thompson, Inspector 

Douglas Ellice, Chief Inspector 

www.oig.dhs.gov 16 OIG-13-111 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 


Department of Homeland Security
 

Appendix D 

Report Distribution 

Department of Homeland Security 

Secretary 

Deputy Secretary 

Chief of Staff 

Deputy Chief of Staff 

General Counsel 

Executive Secretary 

Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Policy 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Public Affairs 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Legislative Affairs 

Acting Chief Privacy Officer 

TSA Component Liaison 

S&T Component Liaison 

Office of Management and Budget 

Chief, Homeland Security Branch 

DHS OIG Budget Examiner 

Congress 

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees, as appropriate 

www.oig.dhs.gov 17 OIG-13-111 
 

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND COPIES 

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