SECOND DIVISION

									March 20, 2001

1-00-0890

								)

EMMANUEL IKPOH,					)

							  	) Appeal from the

	Plaintiff-Appellant,			) Circuit Court of

								) Cook County										

		v.						)

								)

NIKKI ZOLLAR, MEDICAL DISCIPLINARY		)

BOARD, PATRICIA DANIELS and the 		) 

ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL	)	

REGULATION,						) Honorable

								) Ellis E. Reid,

	Defendants-Appellees.			) Judge Presiding.

								)

			JUSTICE GORDON delivered the opinion of the court: 

	Plaintiff Emmanuel Ikpoh (Ikpoh) appeals from the judgement

of the circuit court of Cook County upholding the administrative

action in part and remanding certain dispositive issues back to

the Illinois Department of Professional Regulation (the

Department) for further proceedings.  We dismiss this appeal for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction since the order of the

circuit court cannot be deemed final and appealable where

dispositive matters were remanded for further hearing and

consideration by the Department.

	BACKGROUND

	The following facts are not in dispute.  On July 30, 1990,

Ikpoh was found guilty in the circuit court of DuPage County of

aggravated criminal sexual abuse and a judgement of conviction on

that charge was entered on November 6, 1990.  Ikpoh's medical

license was suspended on August 2, 1990, and revoked in 1991.  On February 15, 1996, Ikpoh filed a "Petition for Restoration" with

the Department asking that his medical license be restored.  In

his petition, Ikpoh stated that he had not been arrested or

convicted since his license was revoked.  An administrative law

judge with the Department held a hearing on the petition on

October 16, 1996.

	On August 26, 1997, after the hearing on his petition, Ikpoh

was arrested in Bartlett, Illinois, for failing to register as a

sex offender as required by law.  He was indicted on this charge

on September 12, 1997.

	On September, 11, 1997, the Director of the Illinois

Department of Professional Regulation (the Director) granted the

petition for restoration, subject to several conditions.  Then on

September 19, 1997, the Chief of Prosecutions for the Department

filed with the Department a "Motion to Supplement Record and

Vacate Order" (motion to vacate).  The motion to vacate set forth

Ikpoh's arrest and indictment for failing to register as a sex

offender and consequently asked that the order of September 11,

1997, be vacated.  On that same day, the Director vacated the

order of September 11, 1997, and remanded the matter to the

administrative law judge to supplement the record with this

additional evidence.  The administrative law judge recommended

that Ikpoh's petition for restoration be denied and on August 5,

1998, the petition was denied by the Director.

	On September 9, 1998, Ikpoh filed a "Complaint for Administrative Review" with the circuit court of Cook County. 

Ikpoh asked that the orders of September 19, 1997, and August 5,

1998, be vacated and that the court find the order of September

11, 1997, to be valid.  

	On February 15, 2000, the circuit court issued an order. 

The court found that the September 11, 1997, order was not a

final administrative order, and that even if it were final, the

Department was authorized to vacate it under the Department's

rules.  The court said that it could not, however, determine if

the August 5, 1998, order was entered against the manifest weight

of the evidence.  The court thus remanded to the administrative

agency to determine how the Department's knowledge of Ikpoh's

arrest was acquired; whether the arrest was the result of any

activity attributable to the Department; whether there was

collusion surrounding the arrest and why Ikpoh was initially

arrested.  The court also remanded to determine if several

technical errors were prejudicial to Ikpoh.  These included that

an affidavit was not attached to the Department's motion to

vacate and insufficient notice to Ikpoh of the "Motion to

Supplement the Record and Vacate Order."  In its order the

circuit court made a Rule 304(a) finding that there was no just

cause to delay enforcement or appeal from the order.  On appeal,

the appellant contends that the September 11, 1997, order was a

final administrative order; that the Department was not

authorized to vacate that order; that the motion to vacate was predicated on matters which arose after the petition was filed

and therefore should have been brought as part of a new

proceeding against Ikpoh; and that the September 19, 1997, order

was improperly granted because the motion to vacate did not have

an affidavit attached and because it was granted in a manner

which violated both due process and the Administrative Procedure

Act. 

	ANALYSIS

	The Department first argues that this court lacks

jurisdiction of the subject matter over this cause by reason of

the fact that the February 15, 2000, order from which Ikpoh

appeals did not have the requisite finality.  The Department

contends that the order of February 15, 2000, is not final

because in that order the circuit court remanded this cause to

the Department for an evidentiary hearing.  Ikpoh argues that the

order is final because the circuit court made a finding pursuant

to Rule 304(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)) that it was a final and

appealable order and because there were three distinct claims

before the circuit court, two of which were resolved by the

February 15, 2000, order and are thus appealable under Rule

304(a).  We agree with the Department.

	"The law is well established that unless specifically

authorized by the rules of [the supreme] court, the appellate

court has no jurisdiction to review judgments, orders or decrees

which are not final."  Department of Central Management Services v. American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, 182 Ill. 2d 234, 238, 695 N.E.2d 444, 446 (1998).  Supreme Court

Rule 304(a) provides in part that:

	"If multiple parties or multiple claims for relief are

involved in an action, an appeal may be taken from a

final judgement as to one or more but fewer than all of

the parties or claims only if the trial court has made

an express written finding that there is no just reason

for delaying either enforcement or appeal or both."  

155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a).

"An order is final and appealable if it terminates the litigation

between the parties on the merits or disposes of the rights of

the parties, either on the entire controversy or a separate part

thereof."  R.W. Dunteman Company v. C/G Enterprises, Inc.,  181 Ill. 2d 153, 159, 692 N.E.2d 306, 310 (1998).  "The ultimate

question to be decided in each case is whether the judgement

fully and finally disposes of the rights of the parties to the

cause so that no material controverted issue remains to be

determined."  Wilkey v. Illinois Racing Board, 96 Ill. 2d 245, 249, 449 N.E.2d 843, 844 (1983).  

	Our supreme court applies the standard for finality of

decisions of the appellate court to a circuit court's review of

administrative decisions.  Wilkey, 96 Ill. 2d at 250, 449 N.E.2d at 845.  "[W]here a cause is remanded for a new trial or other

further proceedings involving disputed questions of law or fact, the judgment of the Appellate Court is not of a final character." 

Wilkey, 96 Ill. 2d at 249-51, 449 N.E.2d at 844-45.  "If, upon remandment, the trial court has only to enter a judgment or

decree in accordance with the directions of the reviewing court,

or to conduct further proceedings on uncontroverted incidental

matters, then, irrespective of the remanding clause in the

judgment order, the judgment of the Appellate Court is final and

reviewable."  Wilkey, 96 Ill. 2d 249, 449 N.E.2d 844. 

	The appellate court has thus stated that if "the court

remands the cause [to the administrative agency] for a new

hearing, the rights of the parties have not yet been fully and

finally adjudicated."  Lippert v. State Property Tax Appeal Board, 273 Ill. App. 3d 150, 153, 652 N.E.2d 461, 463 (1995); accord Page v. City of Chicago, 299 Ill. App. 3d 450, 457, 701 N.E.2d 218, 223 (1998).  As this court has noted,

	"Where the circuit court has the power to remand an

agency decision for further hearings or proceedings, we

feel that jurisdiction must necessarily remain with the

circuit court until after disposition of these further

matters.  Only after the circuit court has examined the

results of these additional proceedings will we

recognize its subsequent order as being final and

appealable."  Mitrenga v. Martin, 110 Ill. App. 3d 1006, 1008, 443 N.E.2d 268, 270 (1982). 

Accord Lippert, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 154, 652 N.E.2d 464.

	This reasoning is supported by an analysis of Supreme Court

Rule 306.  166 Ill. 2d R. 306.  Rule 306(a)(6) provides that a

party may petition for leave to appeal to the appellate court

"from an order of the circuit court which remands the proceedings

for a hearing de novo before an administrative agency."  166 Ill. 2d R. 306(a).  Under Rule 306(b) any such petition must be

accompanied by a supporting record and the opponent has the right

to file a timely answer and a supplemental supporting record. 166

Ill. 2d R. 306(b).  Thus under Rule 306(a)(6), an appeal from an

order which remands a matter back to the administrative agency is

not appealable as a matter of right from a final order, but is

interlocutory and requiring a petition for leave to appeal which

this court may grant or deny at its discretion.  Cf. In re Marriage of Leopando, 96 Ill. 2d 114, 118, 449 N.E.2d 137, 139 (1983) (custody orders not final and appealable under Rule 304(a)

where Rule 306(a), provided that such orders were interlocutory

and for such orders to be appealed upon allowance of a petition

for leave to appeal).

	In the case at bar, the circuit court remanded the cause for

further review by the Department, an administrative agency.  The

court ordered that on remand the Department conduct a hearing to

determine the circumstances surrounding Ikpoh's arrest and that

the result of that hearing would be dispositive as to the

restoration of Ikpoh's license.  Since the cause was remanded for

a hearing, the order was not final.  Lippert, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 153, 652 N.E.2d at 463;  Page, 299 Ill. App. 3d at 457, 701 N.E.2d at 223.  If Ikpoh wished to appeal from this non-final

order, his recourse was to petition this court for leave to

appeal under Rule 306(a)(6) and to comply with all of the

procedural requirements under Rule 306(b), none of which he did. 

166 Ill. 2d R. 306(a)(6), 306(b).

	Ikpoh contends that the February 15, 2000, order is final

and appealable because the circuit court made a written finding

that it was appealable pursuant to Rule 304(a).  Ikpoh clearly

misunderstands Illinois law on this point.  The presence of a

written finding of appealability pursuant to Rule 304(a) does not

in itself make an order appealable and this court is not bound by

the circuit court's finding of appealability.  Metzger v. Fitzsimmons, 175 Ill. App. 3d 674, 675, 529 N.E.2d 1179, 1180 (1988) ("The fact that an order contains *** language [stating

that there is no just reason to delay enforcement or appeal] does

not make an otherwise non-final order appealable").

	Ikpoh next contends that this appeal is cognizable under

Rule 304(a) because there were multiple claims before the circuit

court.  These include:

		"[1] Whether the Department's order of September

11, 1997, was a final administrative decision, thereby

terminating the Department's jurisdiction over the case

or in the alternative whether the Department could

vacate a final administrative decision.

		[2] Whether the Department's order of September

19, 1997, was improperly entered as the result of an ex parte proceeding.

		[3] Whether the denial of Dr. Ikpoh's petition for

Restoration by the Department's order of August 5,

1998, was against the manifest weight of the evidence."

Ikpoh argues that each of the forgoing constitutes a distinct

claim and that the circuit court found against him on the first

two of these three putative claims.  Ikpoh thus seeks to render

the findings on these two putative claims appealable under Rule

304(a) notwithstanding the provision under Rule 306(a)(6).  We

disagree.  

	 "An order is considered final if it disposes of the rights

of the parties either with respect to the entire controversy or

some definite and separate portion thereof."  Arachnid, Inc. v. Beall, 210 Ill. App. 3d 1096, 1103, 569 N.E.2d 1273, 1277 (1991).  "It is well established that the statement of a single claim in

several ways, even by multiple counts, does not warrant a

separate appeal."  Arachnid, 210 Ill. App. 3d at 1103, 569 N.E.2d at 1277 (complaint containing two counts for breach of contract

and one for torturous interference with contractual rights

contained only one claim); accord Rice v. Burnley, 230 Ill. App. 3d 987, 991, 596 N.E.2d 105, 107 (1992); Hull v. City of Chicago, 165 Ill. App. 3d 732, 733, 520 N.E.2d 720, 721 (where complaint

alleged several different negligent acts and omissions but advanced only one theory of recovery, namely negligence, the

action only involved a single claim); see also Leopando, 96 Ill. 2d at 119, 449 N.E.2d at 140 (determination of child custody is

not a separate claim in an action for dissolution of marriage). 

"[W]here the bases for recovery under the counts that are

dismissed are different than those under the counts left

standing, the dismissal is appealable because it disposes of a

distinct cause of action."  Heinrich v. Peabody International Corporation, 99 Ill. 2d 344, 348, 459 N.E.2d 935, 938 (1984).

	The three issues identified by Ikpoh do not constitute

separate claims.  Ikpoh's petition for restoration at the

administrative level only makes one claim, namely that Ikpoh's

right to practice medicine should be restored.  The three issues

which Ikpoh contends are separate claims are not claims at all

but merely arguments on appeal to the circuit court to support

reversal of the Department's single order disposing of his single

claim for restoration of his license.  On review at the circuit

court level, the court is without power to hear new evidence or

provide relief other than that appropriate to a reviewing court. 

In this respect, the relationship between the circuit court

sitting in administrative review and the administrative agency is

analogous to the relationship between a trial court in a non-

administrative review proceeding and an appellate court.  Schewig v. Schacht, 276 Ill. App. 3d 311, 315, 657 N.E.2d 1152, 1155 (1995) (duty of appellate court in "administrative review case is the same as that of the circuit court"); Biscan v. Village of Melrose Park Board of Fire and Police Commissioners, 277 Ill. App. 3d 844, 847, 661 N.E.2d 424, 427 (1996) (sole duty of

circuit court "in an administrative review action is to review

administrative record to determine whether agency's decision is

against the manifest weight of the evidence").  Thus it would be

inappropriate to attempt to characterize arguments made on

appellate review as constituting separate claims for relief other

than the claim initially raised before the administrative agency

from which the appeal was taken.  Western Casualty & Surety Company v. Brochu, 105 Ill. 2d 486, 500, 475 N.E.2d. 872, 879 (1985) (issues not raised in the trial court are waived and may

not be raised for the first time on appeal).   

	Ikpoh's reliance on Krivitskie v. Cramlett, 301 Ill. App. 3d 705, 704 N.E.2d 957 (1998), is misplaced.  In Krivitskie the court held that a count for willful and wanton misconduct was

sufficiently distinct from a count for negligence in the same

lawsuit to permit an appeal from the dismissal of the willful and

wanton count under Rule 304(a) where the negligence count was not

dismissed.  The court reasoned that while the two counts were not

separate causes of action, they required different elements to

establish a proper claim and therefore were sufficiently distinct

to allow a Rule 304(a) appeal from the dismissal of one count.

	Krivitskie is distinguishable, in that unlike the case at bar, it considers a situation where two different counts at the trial level, proposing different theories are brought.  In the

case at bar, Ikpoh simply brought before an administrative agency

a petition for restoration of his license which only contained

one claim.  He only raised multiple issues on appeal to the circuit court as reasons for reversal on appeal.  As already

discussed, these reasons on appeal do not lend themselves to be

characterized as separate claims under Rule 304(a), so as to pass

on a piecemeal basis for further review by a higher court of

review.

	Likewise, Ikpoh's reliance on Heller Financial, Inc. v. Johns-Byrne Company, 246 Ill. App. 3d 754, 617 N.E.2d 1 (1992), is similarly misplaced.  In Heller Financial the court found that where the trial court entered an order specifying the minimum

amount plaintiff was owed by defendant, that order was final and

appealable under Rule 304(a).  In the facts of Heller Financial the plaintiff sued the defendant to collect on an equipment

lease.  The trial court entered partial summary judgement for the

minimum amount which the plaintiff owed the defendant and left

the issue of the total recovery for the trier of fact.  On

appeal, the court reasoned that while 304(a) only applied to

cases with multiple claims, the case contained multiple claims

which it defined as "any right, liability or matter" raised in an

action.  The court reasoned that "a plaintiff could move for

summary judgement on 'any part of the relief sought,' and that

thus, the grant of partial summary judgement was a final order for purposes of appeal."  Heller Financial, 246 Ill. App. 3d at 758, 617 N.E.2d at 4.  The court then held that the order was

final "since it clearly disposes of the rights of the parties in

regard to some definite part of the controversy."

	We have some question as to the correctness of the analysis in Heller Financial in determining what constitutes a separate claim.  See Leopando, 96 Ill. 2d at 119, 449 N.E.2d at 140 (determination of child custody is not a separate claim in an

action for dissolution of marriage).  However, even if we were to

agree with the analysis in Heller Financial, it would not be applicable to these facts, or to this case, since here there was

no partial adjudication of plaintiff's claim which was initiated

at the administrative level.  Rather, the entire claim for the

restoration of Ikpoh's license was denied at the administrative

level and came up on appeal to the circuit court for

administrative review.  On review, the circuit court disposed of

the reasons given in support of reversal by rejecting some and

questioning and remanding on others.  There is no basis upon

which to conclude that Rule 304(a) would permit fragmentation on

further appeal of the reasons urged for review in the initial

appeal, which in this case commenced in the circuit court.

	For the forgoing reasons, the instant appeal is dismissed

for lack of jurisdiction.

	Appeal dismissed.

	COUSINS and McRBRIDE<, JJ., concur.