www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 273 1 

For all their power, both the United States and China are increasingly 

vulnerable. Each faces a range of strategic dangers, from nuclear weapons to disruption of critical computer networks and space links.1

 Because their relationship is at once interdependent and potentially adversarial, 

the United States and China are especially vulnerable to each other: interdependence exposes each to the other, while the potential for conflict impels each 

to improve strategic capabilities against which defenses can be futile. Strategic 

vulnerability cannot be eliminated, only mitigated.

Of the two countries, the United States is stronger in offensive strategic 

capabilities, notably in nuclear, antisatellite (ASAT), and cyber weapons. Yet it 

is also increasingly exposed to danger in these domains, confirming that power 

does not necessarily reduce vulnerability. If Americans thought before the 9/11 

terrorist attacks that being the only superpower made them safer, they think otherwise now. Even with a $600-billion-plus annual defense budget, the United 

States cannot buy its way out of strategic vulnerability.

Meanwhile, China’s stunning economic and technological development 

is enabling it to acquire all forms of power, including offensive strategic capabilities. But China’s development is also making it more vulnerable, as 

its economy becomes more integrated at home and with the world, more 

dependent on information, and thus more susceptible to disruption. While 

the Chinese have long felt, based on their history, that weakness breeds vulnerability, they are learning that greater vulnerability can also accompany 

greater strength.

This Strategic Forum, derived from our book The Paradox of Power, confronts the fact that as power grows so does vulnerability.2

 The basic reason is that 

Sino-American Strategic 

Restraint in an Age 

of Vulnerability

by David C. Gompert and Phillip C. Saunders

Strategic Forum

National Defense University

About the Authors

David C. Gompert is a Distinguished 

Research Fellow in the Center for 

Strategic Research (CSR), Institute 

for National Strategic Studies, at the 

National Defense University. Dr. Phillip 

C. Saunders is Director of Studies and 

Distinguished Research Fellow in CSR. 

He is also Director of the Center for 

the Study of Chinese Military Affairs.

Key Points

◆ Despite their vast power, the 

United States and China are 

becoming increasingly and mutually vulnerable to attack in three 

strategic domains: nuclear, space, 

and cyberspace. The futility of defense and dim prospects for arms 

control in these domains will lead 

both countries to develop strong 

offensive capabilities, at least to 

deter the other.

◆ The United States and China 

should deal with these vulnerabilities by pursuing mutual restraint 

in the use of strategic offensive 

capabilities in all three domains, 

building on a foundation of 

mutual deterrence based on the 

threat of retaliation.

◆ A strategic restraint agreement 

should include reciprocal pledges 

not to be the first to use nuclear 

or antisatellite weapons against 

the other or the first to attack the 

other’s critical computer networks. 

These pledges should be reinforced 

by regular high-level communications about capabilities, doctrines, 

and plans, as well as concrete 

confidence-building measures to 

avoid misperceptions, provide reassurance, and engender trust.

January 2012

Cent

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2 SF No. 273 www.ndu.edu/inss

the same factors that produce modern power—technological advancement and economic integration—also increase exposure to risk and to strategic attack. It is written from an American perspective, with U.S. interests 

foremost in mind. But because the United States cannot 

escape its growing vulnerability to China unilaterally, 

Chinese agreement is needed; therefore, mutual restraint 

must address Chinese interests as well. Our core idea is 

that mutual vulnerability calls for mutual restraint in the 

nuclear, space, and cyber domains. Whether Sino-American distrust will preclude agreed restraint is one of the 

questions this paper tackles. But even with distrust, selfinterest in avoiding harm—in a word, deterrence—can 

move both powers in this direction.

Vulnerability in the Nuclear, 

Space, and Cyber Domains

In becoming more vulnerable, the United States 

and China are not alone. With global economic integration and information networking, most nations 

are increasingly exposed to disturbances and damage 

caused by other nations and transnational actors. The 

300-year-old model of nation-states controlling their 

territory, vulnerable only to invasion, was shaken by the 

advent of strategic bombing and then nuclear weapons. 

On the chessboard where nations play, queens with 

stunning speed and unlimited range now endanger sovereign kings (and their realms). Against strategic offense, defense is getting more costly but not more effective, leaving fear of retaliation as the surest way to avert 

disaster. This has been the essence of nuclear deterrence, 

though neither the problem nor the remedy is confined 

any longer to the nuclear domain.

The increased vulnerability of states that began 

in the mid-20th century with strategic bombing and 

nuclear weapons has been compounded by two factors that mark passage to the 21st century: economic 

integration and information networking. The former 

has increased the exposure of states to each other’s 

products, services, data, money, ideas, surveillance, migrants, and travelers, including terrorists. Integration 

has also opened new domains in which nations interact: no longer just on land, at sea, and in the air but 

now also in space and cyberspace. While economic 

integration has brought growth to those nations that 

participate in the global economy, it has also reduced 

their ability to escape risk.

Information networking has accelerated economic 

integration not only internationally but internally as well, 

as China’s transformation from a fragmented to a national economy shows. China now has the most Internet 

users in the world; the Internet plays a growing role in 

government propaganda, burgeoning e-commerce, and 

management of the local and global supply chains of 

Chinese companies. Information networking is also demolishing the ability of sovereigns to control what their 

populations know. This heightens the potential for political upheaval, a problem of more concern to Chinese than 

to American leaders.

Information networking increases vulnerability in 

another way: improved military targeting. It has yielded 

dramatic enhancements in sensors, data processing and 

sharing, geolocation precision and coverage, navigation, 

and guidance—thus, in the ability to deliver weapons at 

any distance with great speed and accuracy, and to defeat 

defenses. Information technology has made objects—

fixed and moving, on land, at sea, and in the air—increasingly observable and vulnerable. Such advances are also 

evident in space and cyberspace, which are susceptible to 

targeting and also can serve as media for novel weapons, 

including electromagnetic and energy-based ones.

Although growing strategic risk affects weak and 

strong states alike, those that face the power-vulnerability paradox are the strong ones. Recall that the 

United States and Soviet Union were simultaneously at 

their most powerful and their most vulnerable during 

mutual vulnerability calls for mutual 

restraint in the nuclear, space, and 

cyber domains
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 273 3 

the Cold War because the capacity of each to inflict nuclear destruction made it the other’s primary target. Today, the conventional military superiority of the United 

States incentivizes adversaries, real and potential, to 

target its strategic vulnerabilities.3 For all its power, the 

United States is hard pressed to protect its territory 

from nuclear attack, its satellites from ASAT attack, 

and its computer networks from cyber attack. China 

has lived with nuclear vulnerability since the 1950s, but 

growing dependence on space and cyberspace for both 

commercial and military applications will force its leaders to confront the paradox of power and vulnerability 

in those domains as well.

All three strategic domains are “offense-dominant”—technologically, economically, and operationally. 

Defenses against nuclear, ASAT, and cyber weapons are 

difficult and yield diminishing results against the offensive capabilities of large, advanced, and determined states 

such as the United States and China.

Nuclear weapons are offense-dominant because of 

both their destructive force and the difficulty of intercepting missiles in flight, particularly if the attack is 

large and equipped with countermeasures. The figure 

on page 4 plots the cost of missile defense (based on 

the U.S. SM–3 interceptor) against the cost of offense 

(based on the U.S. Minuteman III intercontinental 

ballistic missile [ICBM]).4 If each interceptor costs 

the same as each ICBM, if each ICBM carried one 

warhead, and if it took only one interceptor to destroy 

each ICBM, the relationship of offense and defense 

would be as represented by the Equal Cost Line. But 

each interceptor (in this example) costs about $3 

million more than each ICBM, so the cost advantage of offense grows as a function of the number of 

ICBMs, represented by the line just below the Equal 

Cost Line. If ICBMs carry multiple re-entry vehicles, 

the cost gap is even worse for defense—the next line 

down. In reality, it takes more than one fired interceptor on average to destroy an incoming missile—the 

next line shows the cost gap if it takes on average two 

interceptors to destroy each incoming missile. Moreover, the odds of intercepting a missile worsen as the 

size of attack increases because missile defenses can 

be overwhelmed by the complexity of trying to locate, 

track, target, and strike large attacks. This is illustrated 

by the lowest line. Overall—even before taking into 

account countermeasures to trick defenses—we see 

sharply declining returns for investment in defense 

and rewards for investing in offense.5

It is easier and cheaper for China to improve the 

survivability of its strategic missile launchers, to multiply the number of deliverable weapons, and to penetrate 

U.S. missile defenses than it is for the United States to 

maintain a nuclear first-strike capability. Though it has 

yet to admit it officially, the United States cannot deny 

the Chinese the second-strike nuclear deterrent they are 

determined to have.

Satellites are inherently vulnerable: conspicuous, 

easy to track, and fragile. Destroying them or degrading their performance is easier than protecting them. 

ASAT interceptors are much cheaper than satellites, 

giving offense a huge potential advantage. Some degree 

of space security can be gained through redundancy, but 

replicating satellites is far more expensive than multiplying interceptors, each of which can rely on a common targeting system.

Likewise, defending computer networks becomes 

harder and more expensive as the scale and sophistication 

of the attacker increase. The woes of the cyber defender 

are compounded by integrated global markets and supply 

chains for digital components and equipment—in which 

U.S. and Chinese corporations are leading competitors—

defenses against nuclear, ASAT, and 

cyber weapons are difficult and 

yield diminishing results against 

the offensive capabilities of large, 

advanced, and determined states 

such as the United States and China
4 SF No. 273 www.ndu.edu/inss

increasing the potential for strategic degradation of network infrastructure and disruption of services. The diminishing returns on investment in cyber defense relative to 

offense are especially striking when considering the disparity between “hacking” and “patching” in complexity, cost, 

and time required: advanced network-defense software 

contains between 5 and 10 million lines of code; malware 

contains an average of 170 lines of code.6

 Protection of U.S. 

Government networks typically requires regulated public 

competition and acquisition, which can consume years before solutions are contracted for and installed; an attack can 

be designed and launched in weeks. No sooner are effective defenses finally in place than cyber weapons to defeat 

them are in the works. Strategic offense dominance gives 

each country incentives to invest in offense, which spurs 

the other to do the same to keep pace.

Apart from offense dominance, the advance of 

technology has slashed the costs in lives and treasure of 

Figure. Cost of Offense-Dominance in Missile and Intercept Systems

Cost of Defense

Cost of Offense

Equal Cost Line

Interceptors VS MRVed ICBMs

Interceptors VS Single Warhead ICBMs

Interceptors with 50 percent success rate VS MRVed ICBMs

Interceptors VS Large ICBM Attack

Key:
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 273 5 

strategic attack. Table 1 shows the decline in the costs 

and casualties of strategic attack from mass invasion 

(pre–World War II) to heavy bombing (World War II) 

to nuclear attack (post–World War II) to space and cyber attack (21st century).7

 The most striking decline is 

in direct casualties, from millions to virtually none. If 

one ignores possible deaths resulting from disruption 

of public services, ASAT and cyber war might even be 

considered “nonviolent.”

With expected casualties plummeting, world opprobrium and resulting inhibitions on decisionmakers could 

also be greatly reduced. Yet the advantage to the attacker 

comes from the potential economic and societal harm 

and resulting blow to the will of the enemy, which grow 

as vulnerabilities do. Under conditions in which strategic attack might be contemplated, such as crisis, war, or 

faulty intelligence, the calculus could shift in favor of attack. As offenses improve, thresholds for war in space 

and especially cyberspace—though not nuclear war—

could become perilously low, absent deterrence.

The Logic of Mutual 

Strategic Restraint

The United States and China are not mortal enemies, as the United States and Soviet Union were. But 

their growing capacity to inflict strategic harm, when 

combined with the possibility of conflict, motivates 

each to be capable of striking at the other’s vulnerabilities, at least for deterrence. Fortunately, there are 

enough cooperative aspects of Sino-American relations 

that the two should be able to find ways to mitigate 

their mutual vulnerabilities. After all, even the United 

States and Soviet Union, despite their animosity, were 

able to mitigate their nuclear vulnerabilities through 

mutual deterrence. But while Soviet-American strategic peace was kept by reciprocal fear, there is reason to 

think—at least to hope—that China and the United 

States can mitigate their vulnerabilities with a quotient 

of reciprocal cooperation.

Curbing the dangers of mutual strategic vulnerability through nuclear, ASAT, or cyber war disarmament is largely impractical and unverifiable. The disparity between the large U.S. and small Chinese nuclear 

arsenals makes bilateral nuclear limitations problematic, and China has been reluctant to participate in 

any multilateral negotiations until the United States 

and Russia come down to the Chinese level. Trying 

to limit or ban ASAT capabilities would founder on 

problems of definition and verification. Direct-ascent 

ASAT interceptors are not readily distinguishable from 

missiles with other missions. The problems with ASAT 

arms control are compounded by the advent of softkill ASAT weapons, whereby directed-energy and electronic attacks can degrade performance, denying use 

Table 1. Human and Economic Costs of Strategic Warfare Compared 

Invasion Heavy 

Bombing Nuclear ASAT Cyber

Own 

Deaths High Medium Low Low Low

Cost High High Medium Medium Low

Enemy 

Deaths High High High Low Low

Source: David C. Gompert and Phillip C. Saunders, The Paradox of Power: Sino-American 

Strategic Restraint in an Age of Vulnerability (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2011), 11.
6 SF No. 273 www.ndu.edu/inss

of space without physical destruction of satellites.8

 It 

is not possible to monitor and control such capabilities with any confidence. Arms control is patently impossible for cyber war capabilities, in which defensive 

and offensive technologies are interconnected, subject 

to continuous and rapid change, increasingly pervasive, 

largely in nongovernmental hands, and embodied less 

in hardware than in software.

Poor prospects for arms control, the futility of strategic defense, and the plunging costs of attack mean the 

United States and China must consider the idea of mitigating their growing vulnerabilities in the nuclear, space, 

and cyber domains by agreed restraint in the use of strategic offensive capabilities. The bedrock of such restraint 

would be mutual deterrence in each domain, based on 

the fear of devastating retaliation and the limits of defense. Preconditions for mutual deterrence—namely, 

risks of retaliation that outweigh expected gains of attacking first—exist in all three domains, although this 

may not be fully recognized by all parties in the United 

States and China.

Given the importance of the U.S.-China bilateral relationship for global and regional stability and prosperity, the 

two countries should try to move beyond mutual deterrence 

to mutual restraint. The distinction between deterrence and 

restraint is crucial: while the former rests solely on the threat 

of retaliation, the latter adds reciprocal pledges to refrain 

from initiating strategic conflict and cooperation to reinforce such pledges. While mutual restraint does not depend 

on good intentions, it can ease fears of hostile intent, thus 

reducing the danger of miscalculation and the collapse of 

restraint during crises. It also invites—indeed, requires—

earnest dialogue and understanding regarding the shared 

problem of strategic vulnerability.

To this end, Sino-U.S. mutual restraint should 

include regular high-level communications about capabilities, doctrine, and plans, along with confidencebuilding measures (CBMs) to avoid misperceptions, 

provide reassurance, and foster trust. Because China 

and the United States have both convergent and divergent interests, mutual strategic restraint is possible and 

necessary. Without convergent interests, there would be 

no hope for genuine mutual restraint; without divergent interests, conflict would be implausible, and vulnerability would not matter.

As a logical starting point, the United States should 

acknowledge the inevitability and accept the legitimacy of 

China’s nuclear retaliatory capability, endorse mutual deterrence, and be prepared in principle to explore a bilateral 

understanding not to use nuclear weapons first against the 

other or its allies. However, given its severe vulnerability 

in space and cyberspace and the growing importance of 

those domains, the United States should insist on a broad 

and integrated approach to mutual restraint.

Mutual ASAT restraint should take the form of 

agreeing not to be the first to try to deny the other country’s use of space, in peace or war. This would include 

a ban on attacks not only on satellites, but also on any 

efforts to disrupt satellite functions by interfering with 

their communications or control, whether by physical or 

other means.

Mutual restraint in cyberspace, the most complex 

domain, should entail a pledge by each country not to 

be the first to attack networks critical to the other’s wellbeing—that is, “strategic cyberspace.” This restriction 

would not encompass noncritical networks or limit intelligence collection. In the event of armed conflict, both 

Chinese and U.S. forces are likely to conduct attacks on 

military networks, the infrastructure for which may also 

support civilian networks, involving an inherent danger 

of escalation. Therefore, as a corollary of mutual restraint, 

both governments bear responsibility to exert tight 

the United States and China must 

consider the idea of mitigating 

their growing vulnerabilities in the 

nuclear, space, and cyber domains 

by agreed restraint in the use of 

strategic offensive capabilities
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 273 7 

political control, not to escalate, and to avoid harm to 

noncombatants—in effect, to create a firebreak between 

tactical cyber war, where deterrence may be weak, and 

strategic cyber war, where it ought to be strong. Only 

in this way can the utility of military cyber war and the 

imperative of avoiding general cyber war be reconciled. 

Because mutual strategic restraint does not eliminate offensive capabilities—indeed, it assumes their 

potency—there is no guarantee that it will hold in the 

event of a Sino-American crisis, much less actual hostilities. Since surprise attacks in any of these domains 

are improbable, strategic restraint that is doomed to fail 

in crises is hardly worth having. If either side suspects 

that the other intends not to exercise agreed restraint at 

a moment of tension, crises could be all the more unstable. So it is fair to raise concerns about the breaching 

of strategic restraint. Keep in mind, however, that in all 

three domains, objective conditions of mutual deterrence

are either already in place (nuclear and space) or forming 

(cyberspace). While mutual restraint is superior to simple deterrence because it includes reciprocal acknowledgment and confidence-building, it can be counted on 

in crises or conflict only if it rests squarely on mutual 

deterrence based on fear of retaliation.

Obstacles to Establishing Mutual 

Strategic Restraint

While the United States should take an integrated 

three-domain approach to mutual strategic restraint, 

doing so could be complicated and might encounter 

Chinese skepticism, raise regional concerns, and take 

patience and persistence. The main obstacles are the potential warfighting utility of different types of strategic 

weapons, the risks of weakening deterrence by pledging 

not to escalate beyond conventional combat, allied security and reactions, and asymmetric U.S. and Chinese 

motivations that might affect acceptance of the concept.

Warfighting Utility. Neither the United States 

nor China regards nuclear weapons as militarily useful, 

against each other or in general. China has a longstanding nuclear no-first-use policy, and the United States 

now seeks to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in world 

affairs and warfare. Moreover, regardless of whether the 

two sides agree on mutual restraint, U.S. nuclear attack 

will be deterred by China’s improved retaliatory capabilities, even in the unlikely event that U.S. conventional 

forces are defeated.

In contrast, ASAT weapons could play a role in 

Sino-American military combat. The Chinese know 

that U.S. Armed Forces rely critically on space-based 

command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4

ISR) for 

operations in the sprawling Pacific, just as the United States knows that the People’s Liberation Army’s 

(PLA’s) reliance on satellites will grow as it improves 

its technical capabilities and extends its military reach 

eastward. Yet because many satellites serve both military and civilian purposes (for example, communications, global positioning, and Earth observation), 

there is no clear firebreak between tactical and strategic ASAT war. The United States would be better 

off preserving its own use of space than denying China’s during a conflict and thus should rely on ASAT 

weapons only for deterrence, not warfighting. Given 

its current conventional military disadvantages and 

awareness of U.S. military dependence on space, the 

PLA may hesitate to part with the option of initiating 

ASAT attacks.

While deterrence may not apply against many 

cyber threats—in particular those from nonstate actors—it could be relevant between large and capable states. Due to the limits and costs of network 

mutual restraint is superior to 

simple deterrence but can be 

counted on in crises or conflict 

only if it rests squarely on 

mutual deterrence based on 

fear of retaliation
8 SF No. 273 www.ndu.edu/inss

defense, strategic cyber deterrence between China and 

the United States is not only necessary but also possible. Because each country relies vitally on vulnerable 

computer networks, each has reason to fear retaliation. 

Determining the source of a large cyber attack would 

be aided by circumstances—such as an ongoing crisis—and by the fact that very few actors, all of them 

states, are currently capable of large and sophisticated 

attacks. Even without certainty of an attack’s origin, 

the prospective attacker would be gambling its economic health by betting against retaliation and escalation to general cyber war.

While both the United States and China might be 

deterred and accept mutual restraint in strategic cyberspace, neither the United States nor China can or will 

exclude attacking computer networks that enable enemy 

forces and weapons performance in combat. The PLA 

knows that U.S. reliance on networked C4

ISR for waging 

expeditionary warfare and conducting precision strikes is 

a critical vulnerability. Likewise, the U.S. military knows 

that the PLA will depend increasingly on systems linked 

through cyberspace to target U.S. strike forces (for example, aircraft carriers) and so will not want to foreclose 

cyber attack options in the event of war.

A firebreak between military and civil-commercial 

cyberspace is theoretically possible. While network infrastructure used in military operations is largely dualuse, it may be possible to discriminate on the software 

level between military and strategic-civilian programs 

that use this common infrastructure. Though this would 

require exceptional network intelligence, precise targeting, and tight command and control, it could prevent 

escalation to general cyber war without requiring that 

military cyber attacks be forbidden. Civilian leaders 

on both sides will need to review military contingency 

plans carefully to ensure that attacks on military networks do not pose unacceptable risks of escalation to a 

much broader cyber war.

Maintaining Deterrence in the Region. Mutual restraint, as we propose it, means that neither China nor 

the United States will attack the other first in any of the 

three strategic domains; nor will either escalate to strategic attacks in the event of military hostilities. Although 

it is in U.S. interest to avoid strategic conflict with nuclear weapons or in space and cyberspace, there is some 

risk that deterrence of Chinese conventional aggression 

in East Asia could be weakened by easing China’s fear 

of escalation—an effect known as strategic decoupling. 

Such risks could be aggravated by trends in the Western Pacific conventional military balance favoring China, 

owing particularly to its expanding conventional missile and submarine forces—also offense-dominant—and 

its growing ability to strike U.S. aircraft carriers and air 

bases in the region.

Regardless of agreement on mutual strategic restraint, the U.S. ability to rely on the threat of nuclear 

escalation to deter Chinese attack on Taiwan is already 

slight and will decline as China improves its nuclear 

retaliatory capabilities. While U.S. threats to escalate 

to attacks on Chinese satellites and strategic computer 

networks are more credible, the risks and consequences 

of escalation argue against relying on such threats to deter Chinese conventional aggression. Instead, the United 

States should strengthen deterrence of Chinese aggression by conventional means—for example, conventional 

strikes on mainland military (but nonstrategic) targets 

and bringing U.S. worldwide general purpose forces to 

bear in a protracted conflict.

If Sino-American relations were to become fundamentally unfriendly, mutual strategic restraint might 

either break down or make aggression and conflict in 

the region more probable below the strategic level. As 

the local conventional military balance shifts in its favor, 

neither the United States nor 

China can or will exclude attacking 

computer networks that enable 

enemy forces and weapons 

performance in combat
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 273 9 

China could become more inclined to try to settle territorial disputes on its terms, including over Taiwan, by use 

or threat of force. However, joint acceptance of mutual 

strategic restraint could help prevent relations from deteriorating, reduce the likelihood of armed conflict, and 

make the shifting conventional balance less deleterious 

to regional security and U.S. interests.

Protecting and Reassuring Allies. Key regional 

states, notably Japan and South Korea, may be ambivalent about Sino-U.S. accords on mutual restraint. On 

the one hand, they do not want Sino-U.S. tensions or 

an arms race, much less conflict in any of these strategic domains. After all, they share U.S. and Chinese vulnerabilities in space and cyberspace and are part of the 

same integrated economy. Moreover, U.S. allies should 

appreciate that mitigating U.S. strategic vulnerabilities 

could help ensure American steadfastness in the event 

of any Chinese challenges. On the other hand, Japan and 

South Korea already are sensitive to signs of reduced U.S. 

commitment, and they would not want Chinese fear of 

escalation to be relieved by Sino-U.S. mutual strategic 

restraint. In the worst case, Japan could be more inclined 

either to accommodate China or to develop offensive 

strategic capabilities of its own, neither of which would 

be good for U.S. interests or regional stability.

The United States can and should assuage allied 

concerns about its strategic commitments by reaffirming 

its regional security bonds, maintaining its presence, and 

improving conventional deterrence capabilities in light 

of Chinese force enhancements. It should also insist that 

Sino-U.S. mutual strategic restraint apply to allies, which 

would mean that China is bound not to attack U.S. allies in any of these domains and, by implication, that the 

United States would be justified to retaliate in kind if it 

did. U.S. extended nuclear deterrence of Chinese nuclear 

threats to U.S. allies would thus be unaffected. Moreover, 

in ensuring that allies are covered by mutual strategic 

restraint, and thus by deterrence based on the threat of 

U.S. retaliation, the approach recommended here would 

improve allied security against Chinese strategic attack 

by extending the U.S. strategic umbrella to cover space 

and cyberspace as well as nuclear attack.

Gaining Chinese Acceptance. It is unclear how fully 

Chinese leaders comprehend that their country’s economic growth and political stability could be endangered by 

warfare with the United States in space and cyberspace. 

China, the PLA especially, might want to confine mutual 

restraint to no first use of nuclear weapons—in effect, to 

“pocket” mutual nuclear deterrence while keeping open 

options to strike first in space and cyberspace. A rising 

sense of China’s own vulnerabilities in space and cyberspace, along with the chance to obtain U.S. acceptance of 

nuclear no first use, should in time make Chinese leaders 

more receptive to mutual restraint across all three domains.

However, the PLA could see agreement not to 

initiate attacks on satellites and computer networks as 

foreclosing China’s only way to neutralize U.S. military 

advantages by degrading U.S. C4

ISR and strike capabilities—and thus, its best chance to avoid defeat. Unless 

China’s political leaders are convinced of the need for 

mutual restraint and prepared to overrule military objections, the United States may encounter Chinese civilmilitary discord, stalemate, or opposition regarding restraint in space and cyberspace. China does not yet have 

fully effective mechanisms for making unified national 

security policy, as warranted by its expanding interests 

and role in international security.

The United States can sway China toward acceptance of mutual restraint in space and cyberspace by 

a rising sense of China’s own 

vulnerabilities in space and 

cyberspace, along with the chance 

to obtain U.S. acceptance of nuclear 

no first use, should in time make 

Chinese leaders more receptive 

to mutual restraint across 

all three domains
10 SF No. 273 www.ndu.edu/inss

having effective ASAT and cyber war capabilities, by 

making clear its will to retaliate with those capabilities if attacked, and by insisting that nuclear no first use 

be accompanied by similar restraint in these other two 

domains. Still, it may be unrealistic to expect China to 

embrace agreement on mutual strategic restraint, broadly 

defined, until the reality of growing vulnerabilities fully 

registers or civilian leaders with a broader conception 

of China’s political and economic interests prevail over 

the PLA’s interest in gaining operational advantages 

over U.S. forces. One positive side effect of U.S. efforts 

to engage China on mutual strategic restraint is that it 

will force Chinese civilian leaders to confront the issue 

of growing strategic vulnerability in the space and cyber 

domains and consider whether current military thinking 

and contingency planning are compatible with China’s 

long-term national interests.9

Sooner or later, a clear and comprehensive U.S. strategic deterrent posture, coupled with China’s inescapable 

vulnerabilities, should convince Chinese leaders that 

their country is in fact deterred in space and cyberspace, 

just as the United States is in the nuclear domain. The 

PLA will not have feasible military solutions to address 

this reality. Recent U.S. policy statements stressing deterrence in these new domains are a good start.

The prospect that initial Chinese resistance will 

yield to growing interest in mutual strategic restraint argues for the United States to lay out an integrated threedomain approach early in the process. By doing so, it 

can frame the way the Chinese conceive the strategic 

vulnerability problem, futility of defense, extension of 

deterrence concepts to space and cyberspace, and wisdom of general strategic restraint with nuclear restraint 

as an element.

Building Bilateral Confidence. To buttress and sustain 

mutual restraint, the United States should propose CBMs 

in each domain: transparency in nuclear forces and doctrines, launch notification and other forms of space cooperation, and warning of and cooperation against thirdparty cyber threats. Regular high-level civilian-military 

dialogue on capabilities, plans, doctrines, and the strengthening of mutual restraint is also essential. Such exchanges 

will let U.S. policymakers sensitize Chinese counterparts 

to growing vulnerabilities, the dangers of conflict in space 

and cyberspace, and the need for effective political control of decisions that risk escalation. They may also provide 

useful means of managing competitive aspects of SinoU.S. relations.

While mutual deterrence is a sine qua non of mutual restraint, deterrence by itself may do little more 

than describe conditions of equilibrium based on presumptions of prudence in the face of retaliatory threats. 

By institutionalizing those conditions and agreeing on 

terms, mutual restraint can be more adaptable, enduring, and better for Sino-American relations than threatbased deterrence alone. Deterrence relies on reciprocal 

fear; restraint adds and fosters shared responsibility and 

trust. This is more conducive to a bilateral relationship 

that can tackle the many pressing regional and global 

issues that can only be addressed through cooperation 

between the United States and China. By embracing 

mutual restraint, China and the United States can also 

place themselves in a position to convince others (for 

example, Russia) to accept the need for caution in the 

use of offensive capabilities in all three domains.

Prospects and Recommendations

Agreement with China to exercise mutual restraint across these strategic domains would serve U.S. 

interests in mitigating critical vulnerabilities, reducing 

the importance of nuclear weapons, permitting full 

and productive exploitation of space and cyberspace, 

and unburdening Sino-American relations of the 

threat of strategic conflict. Accordingly, the United 

States should propose such restraint founded on mutual deterrence in all three domains—including reciprocal pledges not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, 

to interfere with access to space, or to attack the other 

nation’s strategic cyberspace. The United States should 

insist that these pledges also proscribe such attacks on 

allies, thus preserving its right to retaliate if an ally 

were attacked. In light of risks that China might try 
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 273 11 

to exploit bilateral strategic restraint to seek regional 

dominance, the United States should state its expectation that such restraint will strengthen prudence and 

security at all levels.

The framework for integrated mutual strategic restraint that the United States should pursue is summed 

up in table 2.

It may be neither realistic nor essential to get agreement on all terms soon. Nonetheless, the United States 

should lay out its complete framework with China, after 

first consulting with U.S. allies, and then pursue it patiently and persistently. It would be good to share U.S. 

analysis of common vulnerabilities in space and cyberspace with Chinese counterparts at an early date. The 

United States could also indicate that it is willing to discuss bilateral no first use of nuclear weapons if China 

is willing to discuss comparable ideas concerning space 

and strategic cyberspace. In parallel, the United States 

should reiterate that its purpose in all three domains is 

deterrence and that its retaliatory capabilities and resolve 

should not be doubted.

Regardless of the pace of progress in negotiating 

terms of mutual restraint, it is important to ensure strong 

political oversight of operational decisions that could 

lead to escalation in any of these strategic domains. The 

United States should update its protocols for delegating 

authority under peace and war conditions and should 

implore Chinese civilian leaders to do the same. Strict 

control is especially important for cyber war, given the 

relative lack of inhibition to attack.

A framework for mutual strategic restraint should 

be pursued not with undue urgency, but with patience, 

Table 2. Levels of Mutual Trust and Cooperation in Strategic Domains

Nuclear Space Cyber

Dialogue

Regular high-level contact to reinforce confidence-building 

measures, increase mutual understanding of these domains, and 

address new developments, concerns, and the participation of 

third parties.

Confidencebuilding 

Measures

Transparency about 

nuclear doctrine, 

capabilities, and 

programs.

Launch notification.

Consultation and 

cooperation on 

third-party threats, 

including criminal.

Mechanism for consultation on suspicious activities.

Mutual Restraint

No first use of nuclear 

weapons against 

the other.

No first interference 

with the other’s 

access to space.

No first use against 

strategic cyber targets 

(critical networks).

Agreement to exercise political control 

over military cyber 

operations.

Mutual 

Deterrence

Because both China and the United States are vulnerable and both 

have extensive offensive capabilities, this creates a situation of tacit 

mutual deterrence.

Strategic 

Vulnerability

Due to the infeasibility of defense, there is no way for either country to reasonably believe that an attack can be stopped.
12 SF No. 273 www.ndu.edu/inss

persistence, and conviction that such restraint is right for 

the United States, for the security of a vital region, and 

for putting Sino-American relations on a stable strategic footing. Because the United States and China are in 

a formative stage in what will be the world’s most important relationship for generations to come, the United 

States should not be reactive. The need for the United 

States to speak with one voice on these matters argues 

for civilian-military, executive-congressional, and bipartisan discussions. However, even with the need for more 

debate, there may be no better time than now for the 

United States and China to start together down a path 

toward greater safety for themselves and the world.

Notes 1 Other, “softer” dangers, such as environmental damage, 

disrupted energy supplies, and turmoil in financial markets, are also 

exacerbated by interdependence but lie outside the scope of this paper.

2 David C. Gompert and Phillip C. Saunders, The Paradox of 

Power: Sino-American Strategic Restraint in an Age of Vulnerability

(Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2011), available at <www.ndu.edu/press/paradox-of-power.html>.

3 Russia, for instance, is showing renewed interest in nuclear 

weapons and unabashed enthusiasm for cyber weapons as its inferiority to U.S. conventional military strength grows. In China’s case, the 

appeal of asymmetric capabilities could work against acceptance of 

restraint in space and cyberspace. 

4 The New York Times Week in Review chart, March 3, 2011. 

Each interceptor costs about $3 million more than each intercontinental ballistic missile (not including development, platforms, support 

costs, or sensors).

5 The advantages of offense over defense can be even more 

pronounced when taking into account measures to “fool” defense—

such as with decoys, deception, and computer-network interference—which are easier and cheaper to develop and field than is the 

improvement or expansion of defense required to neutralize them. 

On the whole, states that are most capable of fielding large missile 

forces—such as the United States, Russia, and China—are also most 

capable of developing and employing countermeasures. 

6 William J. Lynn III, “Defending a New Domain: The Pentagon’s Cyberstrategy,” Foreign Affairs 89, no. 5 (September–October 

2010), 97–108; William J. Lynn III, “Remarks on Space Policy,” 

U.S. Strategic Command Space Symposium, Omaha, Nebraska, 

November 2010, available at <www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.

aspx?speechid=1515>.

7 Gompert and Saunders.

8 One reason to expect growing interest in soft-kill antisatellite 

is the concern about space debris resulting from hard-kill intercept. 

Another is the potential to evade responsibility for attack.

9 Gompert and Saunders, chapter 3.

The Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs 

(CSCMA) within the Institute for National Strategic Studies 

serves as a national focal point and resource center for 

multidisciplinary research and analytic exchanges on 

the national goals and strategic posture of the People’s 

Republic of China. The center focuses on China’s ability to 

develop, field, and deploy an effective military instrument 

in support of its national strategic objectives.

The Strategic Forum series presents original research 

by members of NDU as well as other scholars and 

specialists in national security affairs from the United 

States and abroad. The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the 

contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the 

Defense Department or any other agency of the Federal 

Government. Visit NDU Press online at www.ndu.edu/press.

Francis G. Hoffman

Director

NDU Press

Institute for National Strategic Studies

Hans Binnendijk

Director

INSS

Phillip C. Saunders 

Director

CSCMA

Acknowledgments

This Strategic Forum benefited greatly from research support by 

Ross Rustici, Roxanne Bannon, and Isaac Kardon, comments by 

peer reviewers Dr. Jonathan Pollack, Dr. James Mulvenon, and 

Elaine Bunn, and editorial input from Michael Kofman.