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OVERSIGHT OF DOE’S STRATEGY FOR THE MANAGEMENT AND DISPOSAL OF USED NUCLEAR 

FUEL AND HIGH–LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND THE 

ECONOMY 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND 

COMMERCE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JULY 31, 2013 

Serial No. 113–77 

( 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce 

energycommerce.house.gov 

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE 

FRED UPTON, Michigan 

Chairman 

RALPH M. HALL, Texas 

JOE BARTON, Texas 

Chairman Emeritus 

ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky 

JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

GREG WALDEN, Oregon 

LEE TERRY, Nebraska 

MIKE ROGERS, Michigan 

TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania 

MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas 

MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee 

Vice Chairman 

PHIL GINGREY, Georgia 

STEVE SCALISE, Louisiana 

ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio 

CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington 

GREGG HARPER, Mississippi 

LEONARD LANCE, New Jersey 

BILL CASSIDY, Louisiana 

BRETT GUTHRIE, Kentucky 

PETE OLSON, Texas 

DAVID B. MCKINLEY, West Virginia 

CORY GARDNER, Colorado 

MIKE POMPEO, Kansas 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

H. MORGAN GRIFFITH, Virginia 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

BILLY LONG, Missouri 

RENEE L. ELLMERS, North Carolina 

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California 

Ranking Member 

JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan 

FRANK PALLONE, JR., New Jersey 

BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois 

ANNA G. ESHOO, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

GENE GREEN, Texas 

DIANA DEGETTE, Colorado 

LOIS CAPPS, California 

MICHAEL F. DOYLE, Pennsylvania 

JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois 

JIM MATHESON, Utah 

G.K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina 

JOHN BARROW, Georgia 

DORIS O. MATSUI, California 

DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, Virgin Islands 

KATHY CASTOR, Florida 

JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland 

JERRY MCNERNEY, California 

BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa 

PETER WELCH, Vermont 

BEN RAY LUJAN, New Mexico 

PAUL TONKO, New York 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND THE ECONOMY

JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois 

Chairman 

PHIL GINGREY, Georgia 

Vice Chairman 

RALPH M. HALL, Texas 

ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio 

GREGG HARPER, Mississippi 

BILL CASSIDY, Louisiana 

DAVID B. MCKINLEY, West Virginia 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

JOE BARTON, Texas 

FRED UPTON, Michigan (ex officio) 

PAUL TONKO, New York 

Ranking Member 

FRANK PALLONE, JR., New Jersey 

GENE GREEN, Texas 

DIANA DEGETTE, Colorado 

LOIS CAPPS, California 

JERRY MCNERNEY, California 

JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan 

JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois 

JOHN BARROW, Georgia 

DORIS O. MATSUI, California 

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California (ex officio) 

(II) 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hon. John Shimkus, a Representative in Congress from the State of Illinois, 

opening statement ................................................................................................ 1 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 27 

Hon. Paul Tonko, a Representative in Congress from the State of New York, 

opening statement ................................................................................................ 28 

Hon. Fred Upton, a Representative in Congress from the State of Michigan, 

opening statement ................................................................................................ 29 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 30 

Hon. Henry A. Waxman, a Representative in Congress from the State of 

California, opening statement ............................................................................. 31 

WITNESSES

Ernest J. Moniz, Secretary, Department of Energy .............................................. 32 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 35 

Answers to submitted questions ...................................................................... 95 

SUBMITTED MATERIAL

Letter of June 28, 2013, from Mr. Shimkus to Mr. Moniz, submitted by 

Mr. Shimkus ......................................................................................................... 3 

Letter of July 22, 2013, from Peter B. Lyons, Assistant Secretary for Nuclear 

Energy, Department of Energy, to Mr. Shimkus, submitted by Mr. 

Shimkus ................................................................................................................ 5 

Report, ‘‘The Report to the President and the Congress by the Secretary 

of Energy on the Need for a Second Repository,’’ December 2008, Office 

of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, Department of Energy, submitted by Mr. Johnson ......................................................................................... 62 

(1) 

OVERSIGHT OF DOE’S STRATEGY FOR THE 

MANAGEMENT AND DISPOSAL OF USED NUCLEAR FUEL AND HIGH–LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE 

WEDNESDAY, JULY 31, 2013 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND THE ECONOMY, 

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:04 p.m., in room 

2123 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John Shimkus 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Members present: Representatives Shimkus, Hall, Whitfield, 

Murphy, Latta, Harper, McKinley, Bilirakis, Johnson, Barton, 

Upton (ex officio), Tonko, Green, Capps, McNerney, Dingell, Barrow, Matsui, and Waxman (ex officio). 

Staff present: Nick Abraham, Legislative Clerk; Gary Andres, 

Staff Director; Charlotte Baker, Press Secretary; David Bell, Staff 

Assistant; Sean Bonyun, Communications Director; Allison Busbee, 

Policy Coordinator, Energy and Power; Annie Caputo, Professional 

Staff Member; David McCarthy, Chief Counsel, Environment and 

the Economy; Brandon Mooney, Professional Staff Member; Chris 

Sarley, Policy Coordinator, Environment and the Economy; Peter 

Spencer, Professional Staff Member, Oversight; Tom Wilbur, Digital Media Advisor; Jeff Baran, Democratic Senior Counsel; Alison 

Cassady, Democratic Senior Professional Staff Member; and Caitlin 

Haberman, Democratic Policy Analyst. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. I would like to call this hearing to order. I want 

to thank the Secretary for coming. I would like to recognize myself 

for the 5-minute opening statement. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN SHIMKUS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS 

Today, we review the ‘‘Department of Energy’s Strategy for the 

Management and Disposal of Used Nuclear Fuel and High-level 

Radioactive Waste.’’ We are pleased to have Secretary Moniz with 

us, looking forward to hearing his testimony. 

In 2008, after decades of research, DOE filed an 8,700-page license application at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for permission to construct a repository at Yucca Mountain. In 2009, the 

administration unilaterally decided to cancel the Yucca Mountain 

program and sought to withdraw the license application. The NRC, 

which is mandated under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act to review 

2 

the license, denied DOE’s request but not before the then-NRC 

chairman directed the staff to cease its review, an affair this committee investigated at length. The matter of whether the NRC 

should resume its review, of course, has now been pending for quite 

some time before the DC Circuit Court of Appeals. 

Three weeks ago, 335 Members of the House, including more 

than half the Democrats, voted to preserve funding for the NRC’s 

Yucca Mountain license review in the Energy and Water appropriations bill. This vote showed a remarkable bipartisan agreement 

that the NRC should continue its work as an independent safety 

regulator and issue a decision on whether or not Yucca Mountain 

would be a safe repository. After over 30 years and $15 billion, the 

American people deserve to know the NRC’s independent, objective 

conclusion. 

And, Mr. Secretary, I would also just add that regardless of what 

the results are, this scientific research at the conclusion would be 

helpful for any reason, any future repository. The research developed on Yucca Mountain and finalizing the scientific research 

would be helpful as we move in other directions if we were to do 

that. So it is very important to finish the scientific report. 

In light of all this, DOE’s new waste strategy very much represents the administration’s effort to start from scratch as if the 

Nuclear Waste Policy Act doesn’t exist or at least as if most of it 

doesn’t exist. 

At the end of June, I sent a letter to the agency asking basic 

questions about the legal authority and funding for the actions 

DOE is currently undertaking. At this time, I would like to ask 

that my letter, together with DOE’s response and attachment, be 

included in the hearing record. 

Without objection, so ordered. 

[The information follows:] 

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Mr. SHIMKUS. DOE’s response cited a few convenient sections of 

the Nuclear Waste Policy Act as providing the authority for the Department to conduct certain work. But, and I want to underscore 

this, the agency did not cite Section 302(d) regarding the use of the 

Nuclear Waste Fund, which states: ‘‘No amount may be expended 

by the Secretary under this subtitle for the construction or expansion of any facility unless such construction or expansion is expressly authorized by this or subsequent legislation. The Secretary 

hereby is authorized to construct one repository and one test and 

evaluation facility,’’ which, of course, with the law is Yucca Mountain. 

DOE estimates the cost of starting over to be $5.6 billion for just 

the first 10 years. At the end of those 10 years, DOE projects to 

have only a pilot facility operating with a repository not expected 

to be operational until 2048. Ladies and gentlemen, that is 65 

years after Congress first passed the Nuclear Waste Policy Act and 

after the reactors we have operating today have most likely closed. 

DOE’s Strategy would require legislation but Secretary Moniz indicated in our hearing last month that the administration does not 

intend to propose legislation. DOE is in this situation because the 

White House decided not to follow the law that Congress has already passed. With this Strategy, DOE expects to simply write off 

$15 billion in favor of a pilot facility that might or may not get 

sited after this administration ends. I firmly believe the public deserves to know the truth about Yucca Mountain. We all need to 

know about all the money that has been spent and the science behind it not just for ourselves but for our children and our grandchildren. We deserve a permanent solution, not just the hope of a 

temporary fix. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Shimkus follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN SHIMKUS

Today we review the Department of Energy’s Strategy for the Management and 

Disposal of Used Nuclear Fuel and High-level Radioactive Waste. We are pleased 

to have Secretary Moniz with us and look forward to hearing his testimony. 

In 2008, after decades of research, DOE filed an 8,700-page license application at 

the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for permission to construct a repository at 

Yucca Mountain. In 2009, the administration unilaterally decided to cancel the 

Yucca Mountain program and sought to withdraw the license application. The NRC, 

which is mandated under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act to review the license, denied 

DOE’s request but not before the then-NRC Chairman directed the staff to cease 

its review—an affair this committee investigated at length. The matter of whether 

the NRC should resume its review, of course, has now been pending for quite some 

time before the DC Circuit Court of Appeals. 

Three weeks ago, 335 House members—including more than half our Democrats— 

voted to preserve funding for the NRC’s Yucca Mountain license review in the energy and water appropriations bill. This vote showed a remarkable bi-partisan 

agreement that the NRC should continue its work as the independent safety regulator and issue a decision on whether or not Yucca Mountain would be a safe repository. After over 30 years and $15 billion, the American people deserve to know the 

NRC’s independent, objective conclusion. 

In light of all this work, DOE’s new waste strategy very much represents the administration’s effort to start from scratch as if the Nuclear Waste Policy Act doesn’t 

exist or at least as if most of it doesn’t exist. 

At the end of June, I sent a letter to the agency asking basic questions about the 

legal authority and funding for the actions DOE is currently undertaking. At this 

time, I’d like to ask that my letter together with DOE’s response and attachment 

be included in the hearing record. DOE’s response cited a few convenient sections 

28 

of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act as providing the authority for the Department to 

conduct certain work. 

But the agency did not cite Section 302(d) regarding the use of the Nuclear Waste 

Fund, which states: 

‘‘No amount may be expended by the Secretary under this subtitle for the construction or expansion of any facility unless such construction or expansion is expressly authorized by this or subsequent legislation. The Secretary hereby is authorized to construct one repository and one test and evaluation facility.’’ 

Which is, of course, Yucca Mountain. 

DOE estimates the cost of starting over to be $5.6 billion for just the first 10 

years. At the end of those 10 years, DOE projects to have only a pilot facility operating with a repository not expected to be operational until 2048—ladies and gentlemen, that’s 65 years after Congress first passed the Nuclear Waste Policy Act and 

after the reactors we have operating today have likely closed. 

DOE’s Strategy would require legislation but Secretary Moniz indicated in our 

hearing last month that the administration does not intend to propose legislation. 

DOE is in this situation because the White House decided NOT to follow the law 

that Congress has already passed. With this Strategy, DOE expects to simply write-off $15 billion in favor of a pilot 

facility that might, or might not, get sited after this administration ends. I firmly 

believe the public deserves to know the truth about Yucca Mountain, and our children and grandchildren deserve a permanent solution not just the hope of a temporary fix. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. And with this, I would like to yield now to my colleague, Mr. Tonko, the ranking member of the subcommittee, for 

5 minutes. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL TONKO, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK 

Mr. TONKO. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And welcome, Secretary 

Moniz. Thank you for appearing before this subcommittee on a very 

important topic this afternoon. 

For decades, nuclear power plants have provided electricity 

through the fleet of reactors located across our country. Over the 

same period, we have generated substantial amounts of waste that 

have yet to be secured in a long-term storage facility. We have debated this issue. We have funded research and development. We 

have passed laws designating a storage facility and have held numerous oversight hearings over the years. There have been reports 

by the National Academy of Sciences, the Government Accountability Office, industry and nongovernmental groups, and then 

most recently, as we all know, the President’s Blue Ribbon Commission. But we still have not solved the nuclear waste problem. 

We have a long-term storage facility and yet we do not. We do 

not have interim storage facilities or a policy of establishing them, 

and yet we do. I don’t know what else you would call the storage 

facilities at each power plant site around the country. They are 

now de facto interim storage facilities. If nuclear power is going to 

continue to play a significant role in delivering baseload electrical 

power, we need a resolution to this situation. It will not be easy 

and it will be most likely expensive. But the alternative is also expensive and provides less safety, less security than a functioning, 

ordered process for dealing with spent fuel. 

I realize that many people feel this resolution is to complete the 

process to open Yucca Mountain. Well, the Yucca Mountain facility 

is not open at this time and it does not appear it will be open in 

the near future. In the meantime, spent fuel continues to accumulate and penalty fees continue to accrue. It appears to me that it 

29 

is worth examining alternatives to current law and the current situation. Partisan bickering will not solve this situation and strictly 

adhering to past or current positions will not solve this problem either. The administration’s strategy, based on the work done by the 

Blue Ribbon Commission in 2012, also has its challenges and its 

unknowns. 

If we are to pursue a system that includes both interim and longterm storage of waste, how do we proceed? How many interim sites 

will be needed? How much waste can or should be stored there? 

And what time period qualifies as interim? Where will they be located? How do we ensure the transportation to these sites is done 

and done safely? Are there States and localities willing to host repositories, either interim or permanent? What are the costs and 

can we access the necessary funds in the fund established to deal 

with this problem? 

I do not expect to hear definitive answers to all of these questions here this afternoon. Today’s hearing does, however, give us an 

opportunity to examine all options for moving forward. In any case, 

it appears congressional action is needed, and I am willing to work 

with my colleagues to address this issue. I do not see much future 

for nuclear power if we do not find a way to deal with this issue. 

Again, Mr. Secretary, I thank you for being here this afternoon 

and I thank you, Chairman Shimkus, for holding this very important hearing. 

With that, I yield back. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. The gentleman yields back his time. 

The chair now recognizes the chairman of the full committee, Mr. 

Upton, for 5 minutes. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FRED UPTON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN 

Mr. UPTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing 

and certainly for your leadership on the issue. And, Secretary 

Moniz, we certainly appreciate you being here as well this afternoon. 

During your tenure as Secretary, you and I will work together 

on a wide array of issues, and I certainly appreciate the time that 

we have spent since you have been Secretary and look forward 

down the road as well. I appreciate that dialogue on a number of 

issues. But certainly the nuclear waste disposal is a great concern 

for me and one that I sank my teeth into early on when I came 

onto this committee and myself and Mr. Towns, with Mr. Dingell’s 

help, we were able to broker a pretty good deal back in the ’90s. 

You know, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act is the law on the subject, and as Chairman Shimkus stated, that means Yucca Mountain. Shutting down the repository program, the administration did 

not elaborate on a technical or safety concern, merely that it was 

‘‘unworkable.’’ This was followed by the former Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission chairman, who unilaterally ceased the staff’s review of 

the license application one month—one month—before a key safety 

evaluation report was to be publicly released with the agency’s conclusion about the safety of Yucca. 

Electricity consumers pay for the disposal of civilian spent nuclear fuel and taxpayers pay for disposal of nuclear waste from the 

30 

Atomic Energy Defense program. In Michigan, our consumers alone 

have paid nearly $600 million into the fund. Fifteen billion was invested in this repository program and got us within just a month 

of knowing whether we have a scientifically safe and sound location. And after spending that 15 billion, the public certainly should 

have the right to know what the NRC concluded. Instead, the strategy unfortunately abandoned that investment, expecting consumers 

and taxpayers to foot the bill for another 5.6 billion for the first 10 

years to start really back at square one. 

By the end of this fiscal year, DOE will have spent nearly $80 

million in support of that strategy. And I realize that is is the result of an omnibus appropriation for fiscal year 2012 and a continuing resolution for ’13 and I strongly support the efforts of the 

House Appropriations Committee to correct this situation. 

The House Energy and Water appropriation bill did clarify that 

the Nuclear Waste Fund is only to be used for its intended purpose: 

Yucca Mountain. The bill also eliminated the burden currently 

shouldered by the taxpayer for the administration’s decision to 

start over. 

So questions also have arisen about whether the Nuclear Waste 

Fund would be adequate under DOE’s new approach. GAO doesn’t 

believe it is. Previous cost estimates indicated the fund would be 

adequate to finish building and operating Yucca, but GAO questions whether the fund would be adequate to cover the costs of pursuing an alternate repository, in addition to two interim storage facilities and multiple transportation campaigns. 

The administration touts its strategy as saving taxpayer money 

by mitigating DOE liability for failure to accept and dispose of 

spent fuel, and we have asked the GAO to analyze that. Last August, a year ago, GAO said that Yucca could be completed faster 

than a new effort to build interim storage, thus making Yucca the 

best option for mitigating taxpayer liability. 

I certainly remain committed to ensuring that consumers get the 

repository that they have paid for and that the costs to the taxpayers are minimized. And right now, it seems as though Yucca 

does remain the clear answer to both of those problems. And it is 

the law. 

So, Mr. Secretary, I look forward to our continued dialogue in the 

weeks and months ahead to solve a long-term nuclear waste disposal issue. 

I yield back my time. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Upton follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. FRED UPTON

Thank you, Chairman Shimkus, for holding this hearing and for your leadership 

on this issue. Secretary Moniz, thank you for being here. 

During your tenure as Secretary, you and I will work together on a wide array 

of issues. I also appreciate the opportunity for an ongoing dialogue on the issue of 

nuclear waste disposal, which is an issue of great concern to me, and one for which 

I do have concerns with the department’s strategy. 

First, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act is the law on this subject. As Chairman 

Shimkus stated, that means Yucca Mountain. In shutting down the repository program, the administration did not elaborate on a technical or safety concern, merely 

that it was ‘‘unworkable.’’ This was followed by the former Nuclear Regulatory Commission chairman unilaterally ceasing the staff’s review of the license application 

31 

one month—one month before a key safety evaluation report was to be publicly released with the agency’s conclusions about the safety of Yucca Mountain. 

Electricity consumers pay for the disposal of civilian spent nuclear fuel and taxpayers pay for disposal of nuclear waste from the atomic energy defense program. 

Michigan consumers alone have paid nearly $600 million into the fund. $15 billion 

was invested in the repository program and got us within one month of knowing 

whether we have a scientifically safe and sound location. After spending $15 billion, 

the public should have a right to know what the NRC concluded. Instead, DOE’s 

strategy unfortunately abandons that investment, expecting consumers and taxpayers to foot the bill for another $5.6 billion for the first 10 years to start over 

from square one. 

By the end of this fiscal year, DOE will have spent nearly 80 million taxpayer 

dollars in support of the strategy. I realize this is the result of omnibus appropriations for FY 2012 and a continuing resolution for FY 2013. I strongly support the 

efforts of the House Appropriations committee to correct this situation. The House 

Energy and Water Appropriations bill clarifies that the Nuclear Waste Fund is only 

to be used for its intended purpose: Yucca Mountain. The bill also eliminates the 

burden currently shouldered by the taxpayer for the administration’s decision to 

start over. 

Questions also have arisen about whether the Nuclear Waste Fund would be adequate under DOE’s new approach. GAO doesn’t believe it is. Previous cost estimates 

indicated the fund would be adequate to finish building and operating Yucca Mountain, but GAO questions whether the fund would be adequate to cover the costs of 

pursuing an alternate repository, in addition to two interim storage facilities and 

multiple transportation campaigns. 

The administration touts its strategy as saving taxpayer money by mitigating 

DOE liability for failure to accept and dispose of spent fuel. We’ve asked GAO to 

analyze this. Last August GAO said that Yucca Mountain could be completed faster 

than a new effort to build interim storage, thus making Yucca Mountain the best 

option for mitigating taxpayer liability. 

I remain committed to ensuring that consumers get the repository that they have 

paid for and that the costs to the taxpayers are minimized. Right now, Yucca Mountain remains the clear answer to both of those problems. And it’s the law. 

Mr. Secretary, I look forward to our continued dialogue in the weeks and months 

ahead in the effort to solve our long-term nuclear waste disposal. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. The gentleman yields back his time. The chair now 

recognizes the ranking member of the full committee, Mr. Waxman, 

for 5 minutes. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HENRY A. WAXMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Chairman, in 1982 Congress passed the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. The Act sought to establish a fair and 

science-based process for selecting two repository sites for spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. Under this approach, no 

one State or locality would bear the entire burden of the Nation’s 

nuclear waste. In the years that followed, the Department of Energy began evaluating a number of potential repository sites. 

Then, just 5 years later, in 1987, Congress made the decision to 

designate Yucca Mountain in Nevada as the sole site to be considered for a permanent geologic repository. There was no plan B. 

This decision was widely viewed as political and provoked strong 

opposition in Nevada. Ever since Congress decided to short-circuit 

the site selection process, the State of Nevada and a majority of its 

citizens have opposed the Yucca Mountain project. 

In 2002, President Bush recommended the Yucca Mountain site 

to Congress. Using the State veto procedures set forth in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, Nevada then filed an official Notice of DisVerDate Mar 15 2010 09:24 Aug 06, 2014 Jkt 037690 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\113-77 DOE NUCLEAR AWAIT SCANS\113-77 DOE NUCLEAR PENDING WAYNE
32 

approval of the site. Congress proceeded to override Nevada’s veto 

by enacting a resolution that was reported by this committee. 

Twenty-five years after the 1987 amendments to the Nuclear 

Waste Policy Act, it is clear that this Washington-knows-best approach has not worked. The Department of Energy has terminated 

its Yucca Mountain activities. 

President Obama wisely sought a new approach. He directed Secretary Chu to charter a Blue Ribbon Commission to perform a comprehensive review of U.S. policies for managing nuclear waste and 

to recommend a new strategy. 

Last year, we heard testimony from the co-chairs of the Blue Ribbon Commission on the recommendations that resulted from their 

2-year effort. Since then, the Department of Energy has released 

a strategy for implementing many of those recommendations. 

The Commission recommendations and the DOE’s strategy deserve our serious consideration. They raise a number of important 

policy questions such as whether a new organization should be established to address the nuclear waste problem, how nuclear waste 

fees should be used, and whether one or more centralized storage 

facilities should be developed in addition to one or more geologic repositories. 

These are policy questions that require a legislative response. 

Answering these questions requires an open mind and a willingness to move past a narrow obsession with Yucca Mountain. The 

Senate appears to be moving forward. Four Senators recently introduced bipartisan nuclear waste legislation. The bill may not have 

the final answer to every question, but it represents a genuine effort to get past ideology and begin grappling with these tough 

issues. We should seek a similar constructive approach in the 

House. If we pound the same old drumbeat on Yucca Mountain, all 

we will get is more gridlock, which serves no one well. 

Secretary Moniz, you do us a great service by appearing today 

before this subcommittee. It is unusual to have a Department Secretary testify before this subcommittee. We have had Cabinet officials who testify before the full committee. It is a testament to your 

commitment on this issue. 

You were on that Blue Ribbon Commission and are a true expert 

on nuclear waste disposal. We should all listen very carefully to 

what you have to tell us today. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and look forward to the testimony of 

the Secretary. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. And I thank my colleague. The gentleman yields 

back his time. 

And I just want to reiterate I agree with the ranking member 

that we do appreciate you coming here. We know it is extraordinary for a Secretary to come to a lowly subcommittee, but we are 

pleased to have you. 

And with that, I would like to recognize you for 5 minutes for 

your opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF ERNEST MONIZ, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT 

OF ENERGY 

Mr. MONIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, but I will start by disputing your characterization as lowly. I think and actually I would 

33 

say, as you both have said, it may be a bit unusual but I really 

appreciate the chance to come here and to start a dialogue on this 

important issue. As you know, I have been working on this issue, 

thinking about this issue for a long time, and I come here in a 

sense of hopefully we can pragmatically find a path forward. 

So, Chairman Shimkus and Upton and Ranking Members Tonko 

and Waxman, members of the committee, thank you again for inviting me here to discuss nuclear waste issues and the activities at 

the administration is ongoing to meet the challenge of managing 

and disposing of used nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. 

As was stated in January of this year, the administration, Department of Energy released its strategy for the management and 

disposal of used nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste based 

on the recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Commission on which, 

again, I did have the pleasure of serving under the leadership of 

Lee Hamilton and Brent Scowcroft. 

The administration clearly embraces the principles of the Commission’s core recommendations, supports the goal of establishing 

a new, workable, long-term solution for nuclear waste management. I would also like to observe, as was noted, that a bipartisan 

group of Senators has introduced a bill adopting the principles of 

the Blue Ribbon Commission. I testified before that Senate Energy 

Committee yesterday and was encouraged by the progress they had 

made towards addressing the most complex of issues. And I appear 

today before this committee to reinforce that the administration is 

ready and willing to engage with both Chambers of Congress to 

move forward. 

Any workable solution for the final disposition of used fuel and 

nuclear waste must be based not only on sound science but also on 

achieving public acceptance at the local, State, and tribal levels. 

When this administration took office, the timeline for opening 

Yucca Mountain had already been pushed back by 2 decades, 

stalled by public protest and legal opposition with no end in sight. 

It was clear the stalemate couldn’t continue indefinitely. 

Rather than continuing to spend billions of dollars more on a 

project that faces such strong opposition, the administration believes a pathway similar to that the Blue Ribbon Commission laid 

out, a consent-based solution for the long-term management of our 

used fuel and nuclear waste is one that meets the country’s national energy security needs, has the potential to gain the necessary public acceptance, and can scale to accommodate the increased needs for future that includes expanding nuclear power 

and deployment. 

The strategy lays out plans to implement with the appropriate 

authorizations from Congress—and we do need those authorizations—a long-term program that begins operations of a pilot interim storage facility, advances toward the siting and licensing of 

a larger interim storage facility, and makes demonstrable progress 

of the siting and characterization of repository sites to facilitate the 

availability of one or more geological repositories. 

Certainly, consolidated storage is a critical component of an overall used fuel and waste management system and offers a number 

of benefits such as offering an opportunity to remove fuel from 

shutdown reactors, meeting waste acceptance obligations of the 

34 

Federal Government sooner, and reducing the Government’s liabilities caused by delayed waste acceptance. 

No matter how many facilities or what specific form they take, 

we believe a consent-based approach to siting is critical to success. 

The administration supports working with Congress to develop a 

consent-based process that is transparent, adaptive, and technically 

sound, as recommended by the Commission. The Commission emphasized that flexibility, patience, responsiveness, and a heavy emphasis on consultation and cooperation will all be necessary in the 

siting process and in all aspects of implementation. 

The strategy also highlights the need for a new waste management and disposal organization to provide the stability, focus, and 

credibility to build public trust and confidence. Again, there are 

multiple models that exist along a continuum from a Government 

program to Federal corporations. But whatever form the new entity 

takes, organizational stability and appropriate level of autonomy, 

leadership continuity, oversight and accountability, and public 

credibility are all critical attributes for future success. 

Finally, the Department has also initiated the Blue Ribbon Commission recommended revisiting of the decision to co-mingle commercial used fuel and defense waste. 

So we are facing a unique opportunity to address the needs of 

the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle by setting it on a sustainable 

path and providing the flexibility needed to engage potential host 

communities and anticipated advancements in technology. We need 

to move forward with tangible progress toward used fuel acceptance initially from closed reactor sites and providing more certainty 

for the nuclear industry. This process is critical to assure the benefits of nuclear power are available to current and future generations. 

And I will be happy to answer any questions that you have, Mr. 

Chairman. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Moniz follows:] 

35 

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38 

39 

40 

41 

42 

43 

44 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Now, I would like to 

recognize myself for 5 minutes for the first round of questions. 

Mr. Secretary, DOE’s strategy is built on the premise that States 

will volunteer to host interim storage or a repository facility. Your 

testimony mentions reports that ‘‘a number of communities are exploring the possibility of hosting a consolidated storage facility.’’ So 

the question is what States have indicated interest in hosting a facility? 

Mr. MONIZ. First, I want to clarify, Mr. Chairman, that of course 

at this stage we are not engaging in any kind of negotiations or 

anything of that type. However, there have been a number of public reports, and in fact, one county has in fact passed a resolution 

expressing interest. Based also upon the experiences in Europe, we 

believe there are reasons for optimism that that can happen. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. So we don’t have States that are showing interest 

right now nor do we have Governors or U.S. Senators who are 

making a pitch for their State to be considered? 

Mr. MONIZ. Well, it is certainly premature for any so-called pitch 

because right now we don’t even have the authorities to move forward. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Well, no, it is not unlikely with the Blue Ribbon 

Commission and with the statements by this administration for 

States to have come forward and tried to organize their own political support with the Governor’s office and their sitting Senators to 

be making this pitch that we would consider it. I mean there is 

nothing in law that says they can’t start trying to mobilize public 

support in their State for following up on this proposal, is there? 

Mr. MONIZ. Well, no. And again, as I have said, there have been 

certainly reports in the media—— 

Mr. SHIMKUS. But you can’t tell us of any States which have 

done that initial work other than this one county in some State? 

Mr. MONIZ. Well, one county that is in Texas, I mean, it was in 

public. A public resolution was passed. Recently, there were media 

reports which I have not attempted in any way to confirm, but 

there were statements made in Mississippi. There have been a 

number of statements made. But again, until we have the authorities, can put out a request for proposals, then I think frankly our 

position to provide some technical support for developing the information for potential communities I think would be premature 

frankly. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Well, it seems to me that a majority of these siting 

efforts and up with local community supporting a facility, maybe 

this county, and State-level officials opposing it. In fact, if I remember, the history of Yucca Mountain was the State General Assembly passed a resolution in support of the initial siting of Yucca 

Mountain. 

We also have, you know, Nye County v. Nevada, Private Fuel 

Storage v. Utah, and your written testimony mentions consentbased areas that might be successful, i.e., Sweden and Finland, but 

you fail to mention England, a consent-based approach that the 

Commission touted, and what happened to that consent-based approach? 

Mr. MONIZ. These are tortuous paths so—— 

Mr. SHIMKUS. So it was not successful as an—— 

45 

Mr. MONIZ. Yes, we will—— 

Mr. SHIMKUS. So, I mean, my point is, what makes you believe 

that another consent-based approach somewhere in this country is 

not going to end up 30 years later and $15 billion in the hole just 

like we have right now at Yucca Mountain? 

Mr. MONIZ. Well, look, we all know all of these issues around nuclear waste take time. One example that, you know, it is not a 

high-level waste repository but—— 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Which is a lot different than what we are talking 

about. 

Mr. MONIZ. But in WIPP with the transuranic facility we did 

have a similar situation with the State and now we have a very 

successful—— 

Mr. SHIMKUS. But I have personal knowledge of a U.S. Senator 

who fought against that as the Attorney General who is now a sitting U.S. Senator from that State. So—— 

Mr. MONIZ. Yes. 

Mr. SHIMKUS [continuing]. We better be careful. I think this illusion that this consent-based approach is going to be panacea I am 

not sure is supported by the facts. 

Another thing that the Blue Ribbon Commission that you are 

also promoting is that incentives are a key to success. And the estimated cost of this effort from the beginning is 5.6 billion over 10 

years. Why not offer this money to Nevada? 

Mr. MONIZ. Again, the recommendation is around a consentbased approach. Any State and community can come forward. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Part of the problem with the State of Nevada is 

they say show me the money. We don’t believe you will follow 

through and there are not going to be any additional benefits. 

Wouldn’t $5.6 billion to a State that has a struggling economy, they 

could rebuild its roads, bring in rail lines, and probably continue 

to do what we have and the Department of Energy has done with 

UNLV, continue to support their advanced nuclear energy technology, don’t you think that would be a good lure? 

Mr. MONIZ. Again, we are advocating a consent-based approach. 

Any State can come forward, and we do believe that research, materials testing, characterization facilities are an important part of 

the storage program and it presumably would be part of a possible 

‘‘incentive’’ program. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. And I yield to Mr. 

Tonko for 5 minutes for questions. 

Mr. TONKO. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

For the last few decades, the nuclear waste problem has been intractable. I think the Blue Ribbon Commission recommendations 

and the Department of Energy strategy document are helping to 

strike up conversation about where we go from here. Congress has 

an important role to play in finding solutions along with the Departments and the Commission. 

Secretary Moniz, the Blue Ribbon Commission recommended a 

consent-based siting process for one or more centralized interim 

storage facilities and one or more permanent repositories. My understanding is that under current law the only repository site that 

can legally be considered is Yucca Mountain, and interim centralVerDate Mar 15 2010 09:24 Aug 06, 2014 Jkt 037690 PO 00000 Frm 00049 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\113-77 DOE NUCLEAR AWAIT SCANS\113-77 DOE NUCLEAR PENDING WAYNE
46 

ized storage is not an option in the absence of Yucca. Is that correct? 

Mr. MONIZ. I believe that is a correct reading of the—— 

Mr. TONKO. So legislation would be necessary to establish a new 

siting process that ensures a project has the consent of the State 

and local governments? 

Mr. MONIZ. Yes, sir. In fact, the Blue Ribbon Commission noted 

that almost all of the major steps required new statutory authorities. 

Mr. TONKO. OK. Thank you. The Blue Ribbon Commission recommended that a new organization be created to manage and dispose of the Nation’s nuclear waste. That is contemplated in the 

DOE’s strategy, too. Would congressional action be needed to establish an independent agency and transfer the necessary functions 

and resources to that agency? 

Mr. MONIZ. Yes, sir. It would be. 

Mr. TONKO. There are also tricky funding and appropriations 

issues that need to be addressed to make sure that the funds put 

aside for constructing a repository or storage facility can actually 

be used for that purpose. Congress would need to address those 

issues through legislation, I believe. Is that correct? 

Mr. MONIZ. Yes, sir. And again, if I may comment, we emphasized in the Commission and it is also true in the administration’s 

strategy, that is what is most important is that whatever form the 

organization takes, it has the proper authorities. Key among those 

is a proper access to the funds. 

Mr. TONKO. Thank you. And it sounds to me like DOE has taken 

an important step in developing a strategy, but you can’t solve this 

problem alone, can you? 

Mr. MONIZ. Correct, sir. 

Mr. TONKO. So there is a bipartisan effort in the Senate to develop legislation to begin addressing these very tough issues. We 

haven’t seen any effort on the House side, though. House Republicans seem unwilling to move past their fixation on Yucca Mountain. So my question would be while the Republicans seem to be 

waiting for a resolution to a pending lawsuit seeking to require the 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission to continue its work on its withdrawn DOE license application for Yucca, but a court opinion can’t 

fix the funding problems or establish a new organization to handle 

the waste or and the staunch opposition to Yucca in Nevada, can 

it? 

Mr. MONIZ. That is correct. And I would just add that, again, our 

view is that quite independent of the court decision, we should 

have these parallel tracks, the storage and repository development, 

and for that we will need the new authorities. 

Mr. TONKO. Mr. Secretary, what message would you share with 

members of the subcommittee and the broader committee who remain focused exclusively on Yucca Mountain? 

Mr. MONIZ. Well, again, our view is that we have obviously been 

having this stalemate over Yucca Mountain. There is a very good 

chance this may continue for some time. There are many steps 

needed. Even if the court were to rule for the NRC to proceed, 

there are still other actions of Congress, many actions in the State, 

et cetera. And again, our main message is that it will work out one 

47 

way or the other but let’s move together on taking some practical 

steps that require new authorities that will move the ball forward, 

provide more confidence to industry, and start getting the Government accepting waste in the earliest possible time. 

Mr. TONKO. What is the perceived timeline here if we are to 

move forward and with the ultimate goal of having a new repository available? Is there a certain given timeline that you can imagine would be required at a minimum? 

Mr. MONIZ. Well, again, the administration strategy noted that 

we feel that we can certainly move if we have authority, let’s say, 

this year, then we can move on the first interim storage site within 

a decade. That would allow us, for example, to move fuel away 

from the closed reactor sites, which would be, I think, an important 

step, but that a repository is likely to take decades to actually get 

functioning. 

Mr. TONKO. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. And, Mr. 

Chair, I yield back. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. I thank my colleague. I would just remind him of 

the vote on the floor, 335 voting for Yucca, 118 Democrat, so it is 

just not a Republican fixation. 

Now, I would like to yield to the chairman of the full committee, 

Mr. Upton, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. UPTON. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, again, I really appreciate, Mr. Secretary, you being here 

and sharing your comments. This is such an important issue for 

the country and you are right, we don’t want gridlock on this. I 

would note it has been bipartisan in terms of trying to move a path 

forward for a couple of decades actually. And certainly your willingness to engage and to move the ball forward is very much appreciated. 

And as Mr. Shimkus just said, and the votes we have had the 

last couple of years, not only this year but last year, the votes— 

326 to 81, 335 to 81, 337 to 87—is a pretty clear indication that 

the House at least has a very strong bipartisan majority towards 

trying to get this issue resolved. I would note that Mr. Dingell and 

myself wrote an op-ed piece about a month ago or so again urging 

the court to try and help resolve this and allow the NRC to move 

forward. 

But let me go back. When you testified before our committee in 

June, Chairman Shimkus asked if you were aware of any technical 

or scientific issues that would prevent Yucca from being a safe repository, and you responded at that time, ‘‘this is an NRC decision 

ultimately to be taken.’’ And I certainly agree. And the public debate would clearly benefit from the NRC completing the independent assessment of Yucca. 

Fortunately, we know that both the NRC and DOE do have the 

funds to support the completion of the NRC’s safety evaluation report. However, we are all waiting for that DC Circuit Court of Appeals—maybe it will be coming this afternoon; who knows—which 

seems to be taking an inordinate amount of time compared to a 

number of other cases that they have had. 

One of the issues that concerns me is what the ultimate cost of 

DOE’s new strategy would be to the consumers and the taxpayers. 

We know that in ’09, the Fee Adequacy Assessment showed that 

48 

the fee was adequate to fund Yucca Mountain. However, I am 

going to quote from DOE’s Secretarial Determination of the adequacy of the Nuclear Waste Fund fees in January of this year before you are there. It said, ‘‘the consent-based approach to facility 

siting set forth in the strategy makes it impossible to assign meaningful probabilities to any geologic medium, and by extension, any 

cost estimate.’’ Those were their words. So do you know whether 

the Nuclear Waste Fund today will be adequate to pay for all the 

facilities contained in the DOE strategy? 

Mr. MONIZ. Mr. Chairman, certainly my understanding of the revised analysis that was done in response to the court, it looked at— 

I may get this not quite—I think it was something like 42 different 

scenarios into the future and found that with continuation of the 

one-mill-per-kilowatt-hour fee, that kind of rested kind of in the 

middle of the various scenarios. And so the argument was that at 

this stage the one-mill-per-kilowatt-hour fee would seem to be an 

appropriate place to go but there is considerable uncertainty of the 

lifetime costs depending upon which of those scenarios ends up 

being followed. 

Mr. UPTON. Do you know whether the Nuclear Waste Fund could 

absorb the $9 billion write-off for abandoning Yucca? 

Mr. MONIZ. Well, if one looks at the ensemble of the scenarios 

in that Fee Adequacy Reassessment, the uncertainties of the 

spread was much, much larger than the amount that you have 

said. So that would again be in the uncertainties that we have 

today to be realized only over decades. 

Mr. UPTON. Yes. So for us in Michigan, that 1/10-of-a-mill fee has meant $600 million in essence collected from Michigan ratepayers. 

And so if you know Michigan at all, we have got one plant no 

longer operating, the Big Rock plant. I have two in my district, two 

facilities that are currently operating, and they have both run out 

of room so they are doing dry storage. I know Mr. Dingell has got 

a facility in his district as well. 

So ultimately, we really do need this to be resolved and get on 

a glide path that can assure that there will be one safe place, at 

least one safe place for the high-level nuclear waste. And I appreciate your willingness to work with us and with our committee to 

ultimately get this thing done. 

Mr. MONIZ. If I may comment, I think the situations that you 

have described are exactly what motivated the Blue Ribbon Commission discussions that we feel, and the administration has 

agreed with this, that moving to an initial kind of fast track pilot 

interim storage facility could handle the fuel from those shutdown 

reactors, and that would allow, you know, restoration of that site 

to other activities. 

And of course we know that a substantial fraction of plants are 

running out of space and that is where the consolidated storage 

site—the issue is fuel acceptance. I mean that is the key issue for 

the plants. And this would allow us to start to move the fuel and 

both alleviate the issues at the plants and lower the liabilities for 

the Government by beginning to move the fuel. So that is why I 

mean, again, we think that a parallel track of the storage and repository or repositories will give us the flexibility and the adaptability to start moving and except fuel in the next decade. 

49 

Mr. UPTON. I yield back. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. The chairman’s time is expired. 

The chair now recognizes the ranking member, Mr. Waxman, for 

5 minutes. 

Mr. WAXMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Moniz, I thank you again for being here today to discuss the administration’s strategy for managing the country’s nuclear waste. 

Over the last 2 years, this not lowly but very important subcommittee has heard testimony from a number of witnesses on the 

nuclear waste issue, including testimony from the State of Nevada 

about why many Nevadans oppose Yucca Mountain nuclear waste 

depository. Martin Malsch, testifying on behalf of the State of Nevada, told the committee ‘‘opposition to the Yucca Mountain project 

in Nevada was not always a given.’’ But Congress and Federal 

agencies took several actions that destroyed the State’s trust in the 

process and locked in opposition. 

I would like to ask you a few questions about how to move beyond the Yucca Mountain stalemate and learn from our mistakes 

in Nevada. In your testimony you say, ‘‘any workable solution for 

the final disposition of used fuel and nuclear waste must be based 

not only on sound science and also on achieving public acceptance 

at the local, State, and tribal levels.’’ Let’s start with sound science 

you say is necessary. What are the key scientific questions that 

need to be answered to satisfy concerns about the safety of nuclear 

waste disposal? 

Mr. MONIZ. Well, there are a number of scientific questions. Ultimately, it comes down to understanding the form of the waste 

package, its interaction with the host environment, and the potential for having some elements go into the environment and propagate over long periods of time. That is what is a very detailed analysis looking at both geology, hydrology, and the materials issues 

around integrity of the package. 

Mr. WAXMAN. The State of Nevada and Clark County raised particular concerns about how EPA and other Federal agencies set 

safety standards for Yucca Mountain alleging that these standards 

were tailored to make sure Yucca met them. The State of Nevada 

told our committee that these changes ‘‘utterly destroy the credibility of the program.’’ How should EPA and other Federal agencies 

approach the regulatory process to ensure that any safety standards are both sufficient and credible with concerned stakeholders? 

Mr. MONIZ. Well, again, if I go back to the Blue Ribbon Commission recommendations, the Commission emphasized that what really needs to be set first are kind of generic safety standards before 

one starts tailoring to an individual site. So again, we think that 

the way that the Yucca Mountain decision was made, A) raises this 

problem, as you have referred to many times, in terms of it was 

not a consent-based process and that in itself created conditions. It 

also had the effects of highly restricting what the Department 

could do over many years in terms of exploring different geologies 

and it basically did not have this approach, as I mentioned, where 

one such generic safety standards that one then applies to various 

characterized local sites. 

Mr. WAXMAN. So it could apply to a number of multiple sites? 

50 

Mr. MONIZ. Yes. 

Mr. WAXMAN. Having updated generic standards will also support the efficient consideration as you look at—— 

Mr. MONIZ. Yes. And then that would inform the regulatory process. And as we have all said, particularly when you look also, you 

know, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act also had a cap of 70,000 tons 

and we know very well that even if there were no nuclear reactors 

built, we would be way, way past that amount. We have to look at 

the questions of other repositories, certainly be prepared for that 

possibility. 

Mr. WAXMAN. Now, no project will ever enjoy universal support 

so how do you envision defining consent? In the case of Nevada, the 

Yucca Mountain project enjoys some local support but faces strong 

opposition from the State and key counties. What can the Federal 

Government do to win support of a whole State that is wary of 

hosting a repository or interim storage facility even if the facility 

enjoys local support? 

Mr. MONIZ. Well, again, we believe or at least I should say I believe that ultimately it is a very iterative process based upon, as 

I said in my testimony, continuous open cooperation and consultation at all levels. As we said earlier, and I think it is an example 

again—I will concede to the chairman’s point that clearly the WIPP 

facility in New Mexico is a transuranic waste facility, not high-level 

waste, but the fact is that was a case where it took many, many 

years. There was litigation involved to win the confidence and trust 

all along the chain of responsibility. And now, as a result, well, I 

think we are into now our second decade of a highly successful operation there. 

Mr. WAXMAN. So for the Congress, the take-home message should 

be that we can tackle this problem by ensuring the Federal agencies, or any new organization, has the authority it needs to implement a consent-based process that is transparent and rooted in 

science. With that—— 

Mr. MONIZ. That ultimately is the overarching, most important 

recommendation of the Commission. 

Mr. WAXMAN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. The gentleman’s time is expired. 

The chair now recognizes the chairman emeritus, Mr. Barton, for 

5 minutes. 

Mr. BARTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

You know we are having another hearing on high-level nuclear 

waste when members of the audience are already asleep. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Wake up. 

Mr. BARTON. I am not going to name names, but his initials are 

D.G. 

But, Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here. And when I was 

a young man, some members of the audience have heard me tell 

the story, but it was my job to brief the then-Secretary of Energy 

on a proposed piece of legislation at the Department of Energy that 

came to be known as the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982. And 

they felt that if an Aggie engineer could explain a bill to an oral 

surgeon, that we ought to be able to get it through the Congress. 

And we did, and who would have dreamed that in 2013 we would 

have the current Secretary of Energy debating yet again another 

51 

way to find a path forward on the storage of high-level nuclear 

waste? 

My good friend from Illinois, the subcommittee chairman, asked 

you a question about what States might compete if we adopted 

your consent-based approach or the Department’s consent-based 

approach? I would postulate that my State of Texas might actually 

offer to compete. The county in West Texas, Loving County, has already passed a resolution at the county level and has been engaged 

in Austin with the Governor and the Texas legislature. While it is 

never a given, certainly I think the State of Texas might adopt an 

approach where, on a local option basis, a county or an entity could 

compete for an interim storage facility. 

I also know that at Yucca Mountain, we have spent $15 billion 

and I think the subcommittee and the full committee chairman are 

absolutely correct in trying to get value for the taxpayer dollars 

and the ratepayer dollars that have been spent on that facility. 

Again, I would ask as a question if we were to adopt through legislation, as you have at least suggested we might, a dual-track approach of an interim storage facility while we are waiting to license 

a permanent repository, that would not preclude Yucca Mountain 

being chosen as either the interim facility and/or possibly the permanent repository. Is that not correct? 

Mr. MONIZ. Yes, I would agree. We view these as two linked but 

independent pathways. 

Mr. BARTON. OK. And I believe I am correct, too, that under current law Yucca Mountain has been legally empowered to be an interim facility for storage. Is that not correct? 

Mr. MONIZ. I would have to clarify that, Mr. Chairman Emeritus. 

Mr. BARTON. Well, I think I am correct. 

Mr. MONIZ. OK. Well, I will take, you know—— 

Mr. BARTON. I think lots of things, not all of them are correct, 

so maybe I am wrong on that. But I believe—— 

Mr. MONIZ. When you were a practicing engineer and I was a 

practicing scientist, we were always correct. 

Mr. BARTON. Yes. You have talked in your testimony about a 

pending court case, and I think it is fair to say that the majority 

of the committee is very frustrated that the court should have 

ruled, has yet to rule. Do you have any indication of when we 

might get a ruling on the legality of what the Obama administration did in shutting down the Yucca facility? 

Mr. MONIZ. No, sir. I have no insight whatsoever to as when a 

ruling would come, but I assure the committee, and as the administration has spoken, that whatever the ruling is, we will act appropriately and help to carry it out. 

Mr. BARTON. Well, Mr. Chairman, I want to say in closing that 

I am a strong supporter of Yucca. In your absence, I went to the 

floor a week before last and opposed several amendments against 

Yucca. So I am pro-Yucca. But I don’t want to have to serve as long 

as John Dingell has already served to finally find an answer to the 

high-level waste issue. And if we can adopt some sort of a dual approach were we push forward on licensing Yucca as a final repository while also letting States compete on an interim storage basis, 

I for one on the majority side would be supportive of that approach 

52 

with the appropriate safeguard and caveats about the money and 

the effort that has already been spent at Yucca Mountain. 

So I thank the Secretary and his department for their efforts, 

and I hope that since we, this morning, passed an SGR fix that nobody thought could happen, this could be two in a row if we can 

pass a high-level waste bill out of this committee. That would be 

a tremendous accomplishment on your watch and Mr. Upton’s 

watch and Mr. Tonko’s and Mr. Waxman’s watch. And with that, 

I yield back. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. The gentleman yields back his time. 

And I can assure my colleague that as long as Yucca Mountain 

is still in the mix, we can move forward. But I have no indication 

that the administration wants to move forward on Yucca Mountain. 

So now, I recognize the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Dingell, 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Chairman, thank you for your courtesy, and I 

commend you for having this hearing. 

Welcome, Mr. Secretary, to the committee. I note here in 2006 

you wrote an article supporting Yucca Mountain. In 2011 you wrote 

another article saying there needs to be an alternative. So to assist 

the committee with our judgments here, you now believe that 

Yucca Mountain is no longer an option as a permanent repository? 

Please answer yes or no. 

Mr. MONIZ. Congressman Dingell, with all due respect, it is a little bit more than yes or no. I would note that the article you referred to actually it is an op-ed, I think, in 2006, did say that DOE 

had to take a fresh look at assessing the suitability of Yucca Mountain, and it was not a complete—— 

Mr. DINGELL. What does that mean, Mr. Secretary? That you 

think it is still a viable thing—— 

Mr. MONIZ. Well, again, we—— 

Mr. DINGELL [continuing]. Or that it is not? 

Mr. MONIZ. The view is that it needs both science and public acceptance. The latter is not there and we are not seeing an end to 

the stalemate. 

Mr. DINGELL. With all respect, Mr. Secretary, you have taken both sides of this issue. We have shot about $12 billion as near as 

I can figure, maybe 13 now, and the hole is still there and people 

are digging and doing things but nothing is happening. And we 

don’t have any idea of when we are going to complete this problem 

or anything else. 

Now, Mr. Secretary, would you please provide additional information for the record regarding the viability of Yucca Mountain as 

a permanent repository? And I will let you come up with whatever 

it is you feel you should like to say on that particular matter. 

Mr. MONIZ. Yes, sir. We will. 

Mr. DINGELL. Now, Mr. Secretary, do you have any plans to reinitiate DOE’s license application to the NRC for review and final 

decision on Yucca Mountain? Yes or no? 

Mr. MONIZ. No, but again if the court reinstates the NRC licensing process, then we will support it as needed, assuming we have 

the funds to do so. 

Mr. DINGELL. Now, Mr. Secretary, the Blue Ribbon Commission 

of which you were a member was not allowed to examine Yucca 

53 

Mountain is a part of its study. Do you believe that doing a similar 

study again but including Yucca Mountain would be useful to the 

administration is a determinant of a path forward regarding nuclear waste storage? Please answer yes or no. 

Mr. MONIZ. No, sir, I don’t think that would be useful at this 

time. A commission like the Blue Ribbon Commission was very important to address the generic, nonsite-specific issues, as we discussed. For example, one of the problems is the need to get generic 

safety criteria before one starts moving into the consent—— 

Mr. DINGELL. So is the answer, Mr. Secretary, yes or no? 

Mr. MONIZ. It was no. It was no, yes. 

Mr. DINGELL. Yes or no? 

Mr. MONIZ. It was a no, yes. 

Mr. DINGELL. OK. Now, Mr. Secretary, most of BRC’s recommendation is a consent-based approach where localities across 

the country could volunteer to be the site of a new repository. 

Under the best case scenario where all the units of government 

from local to State to Federal agree that there is a site that meets 

the needs of a repository of this kind, how long approximately 

would it take to create such a repository and how much would it 

cost? 

Mr. MONIZ. Well, I think the estimate based upon the Fee Ade- quacy Assessment were approximately $3 billion for preselection, 

site evaluation for a repository, and approximately 8 to 9 for site 

characterization and licensing. So altogether in the 10 billion, $11 

billion range. 

Mr. DINGELL. Would you submit for the record your further comments on both of those two matters—— 

Mr. MONIZ. Yes, we would be pleased—— 

Mr. DINGELL [continuing]. How long and how much? 

Mr. MONIZ. We would be pleased to. 

Mr. DINGELL. Now, Mr. Secretary, the BRC report recommends, 

‘‘access to the funds nuclear utility ratepayers are providing for the 

purpose of nuclear waste management,’’ and you propose nonlegislative as well as legislative changes to achieve this goal. Can 

access to the funds be gained through nonlegislative means? Yes or 

no? 

Mr. MONIZ. I would say yes and no. We strongly feel that legislation really is the appropriate way to go. I think the principle administration’s proposal and really the Commission’s is somehow we 

need to have the funds and the expenditures either mandatory or 

discretionary but in a way that does not have these funds competing with the other Government priorities. 

Mr. DINGELL. Would you submit further comments for the 

record? 

Now, Mr. Secretary, would nonlegislative proposals recommend 

ways in which we could protect funds being deposited into the Nuclear Waste Fund? As you know, we have dissipated large sums of 

money. Can you answer yes or no to that, please? 

Mr. MONIZ. Again, we feel legislation is the appropriate route. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. The gentleman’s—— 

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Secretary, in the 2011 article I mentioned earlier, you note that you were a strong supporter of nuclear energy 

developing new nuclear technologies and investing in other energy 

54 

technologies. Based on recent appropriations and the recently 

passed Energy and Water appropriations from the House, do you 

believe that your department now has the resources to invest in 

these new technologies to prevent, as you put it, ‘‘America being 

less competitive in the global technology market?’’ Please answer 

yes or no. 

Mr. MONIZ. Well, if the President’s request is respected, then the 

Nuclear Energy Office has a very good plan in place to both support advanced reactor technology and the technology development 

for waste disposal. I would add to that, of course, beyond the appropriated amounts, the Department has made the conditional loan 

guarantee of $8 billion roughly to build ‘‘first-mover’’ new nuclear 

plants, which is a critical issue for the future of nuclear power in 

this country. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. The gentleman’s time is expired. 

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Chair, I am over my time and I thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from 

Texas, Mr. Hall, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. HALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, Mr. Secretary, I thank you for being here. Sometimes it is 

not good to have been here before like you have, the questions that 

you get put to you, but I will remember you on my Section 999. 

You were very knowledgeable on that. That is still up and you remember it was when you had energy at a certain level but we 

couldn’t get it to the top of the water and we traded for technology 

from universities and others and paid them with the energy that 

we did get to the top of the water. So we didn’t get it if they didn’t 

get it to the top. They got it to the top and it is working and they 

are still trying to kill 999. I hope you will remember your position 

on that. 

Mr. MONIZ. I remember your efforts very, very well leading that 

charge and I would say that as a fact I think the result has been 

some excellent, excellent research. 

Mr. HALL. It is still working. 

Mr. MONIZ. Especially on the environmental footprint of unconventional oil and gas production. 

Mr. HALL. Yes, and thank you. And it is a pleasure to see you. 

I have a copy of a DOE presentation here from late June that indicates the size for the ‘‘larger interim storage facility,’’ the one slated to be open in 2025 and the DOE strategy is 70,000 metric tons. 

Is that right? That is your—— 

Mr. MONIZ. Yes, sir. And that would be preceded by the pilot 

plant. 

Mr. HALL. That is the entire inventory of what the nuclear industry is currently storing and the statutory size of Yucca Mountain, right? 

Mr. MONIZ. Um-hum. 

Mr. HALL. Mr. Secretary, how hard is the administration going 

to answer or how are they going to make people believe when you 

say that that facility is going to be temporary? 

Mr. MONIZ. Well, I think this is, again, the so-called linkage 

issue and we think it is very important—— 

Mr. HALL. Right. 

55 

Mr. MONIZ [continuing]. That the action on the storage side is accompanied in parallel by adequate expenditures to establish one or 

more repositories. 

Mr. HALL. How will DOE overcome concerns that a lot of people 

are going to have on the part of communities that an interim site 

could become a de facto permanent site if no other community 

could be found to host a permanent disposal facility area? 

Mr. MONIZ. You know, again, as I have said, I think this is going 

to be a long discussion, and we also noted that there should be 

flexibility into the system so that the individual communities and 

States who are stepping forward as potential hosts can negotiate 

the linkages that they feel are appropriate to lend them confidence. 

Mr. HALL. Well, the presentation—I don’t know where it is there 

but I think we have seen it somewhere—estimates transporting the 

spent fuel to this larger interim storage facility at a rate of 3,000 

tons a year, and that means that it would take over 23 years just 

to transport the spent fuel to the site. By the time the 70,000 tons 

was all transported, it would be 2048. That is a hard figure for me 

to think about being here and being sure that it happens just that 

way. 

Mr. MONIZ. Yes, well, it is a major logistical challenge and I 

think no matter what repository, what storage sites one has, it is 

a major transportation campaign. I also served on a National Academy committee several years ago looking at transportation and a 

couple of things of note perhaps. One is that we felt that for the 

large campaign, a heavy reliance on trains would be a good thing. 

That is a big planning project. Secondly, we also noted that the 

number of used fuel movements in Europe already is approximately equal to all the movements we would need for 70,000 tons, 

and that has been handled in a pretty safe way. 

Mr. HALL. But 2048 is the projected date for opening a repository 

under DOE’s strategy. 

Mr. MONIZ. It is approximate. 

Mr. HALL. OK. Well, let me ask you, does that really make 

sense? 

Mr. MONIZ. Well, I think, you know—— 

Mr. HALL. I think you have been around a long time and you are 

very knowledgeable. 

Mr. MONIZ. To be honest, the Department has had an issue of 

perhaps too often providing optimistic dates for big projects and 

maybe to be a little more conservative is a good idea. 

Mr. HALL. It is going to be hard to explain how they are going 

to spend 23 years transporting just to turn around and ship it all 

again. Is that going to cause some problems? 

Mr. MONIZ. Well, of course, we are in no way precluding the possibility of—— 

Mr. HALL. DOE estimated—— 

Mr. SHIMKUS. The gentleman’s time is expired. 

Mr. HALL. DOE estimated the transportation costs for 70,000 

metric tons to go to Yucca at 19 billion. I am anxious to watch 

what the analyzation is going to be on that. And my time really 

is up. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. The gentleman’s time is expired. I would remind 

him that if everything would have gone upon plan, Yucca would 

56 

have been open in 1998. Had the administration not pulled the 

plug when it did, we would be under construction right now. 

The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Green, 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding the hearing. 

I want to thank Secretary Moniz for joining us. 

The subcommittee examined the issue of nuclear waste storage 

in numerous hearings for the past several years. In 2011 as ranking member of the subcommittee, I had the opportunity to visit 

Yucca Mountain with Chairman Shimkus, and I supported the use 

of Yucca Mountain in the past and still believe it is a terrible waste 

of taxpayer dollars to have this $12 billion facility sitting unused 

in the desert, although in all honesty, we are not going to sell that 

desert land for condos. And so I assume it will stay in our Federal 

land inventory. So maybe someday we have this hole underground, 

it can be used for long-term nuclear storage. 

The termination of the project, though, has postponed our Nation’s efforts and delayed efforts to permanently dispose of used nuclear fuel. It is now envisioned it will be storing these materials 

and dry casks for decades, not much longer than the original intended purpose. What is DOE doing to support the long-term storage of used nuclear fuel in these dry cask storage systems? And I 

will go forward after that. Is there any program at DOE to be able 

to deal with the amount of nuclear waste we are seeing? 

Mr. MONIZ. Yes, sir. There is work going on and also historically 

we have seen collaboration with EPRI in terms of looking at the 

dry cask storage longevity and a particular focus right now is on 

the materials issues and really whether we can confidently expect 

century-scale storage. 

Mr. GREEN. Between the 1980s and 2010 when Yucca Mountain 

was terminated, the Nation had invested billions of dollars in a scientific study at that site. The scope of this work spanned our entire 

national lab complex and many of our leading universities, a number of other respected institutions. What is the understanding and 

result of this study and what did we learn? How can we best apply 

the results of this work before going forward so that our investment is not wasted? You know, we know that at least politically 

in the foreseeable future, Yucca Mountain is not available, but we 

still need to plan for long-term storage, and I think that is what 

the Blue Ribbon Commission said. 

Mr. MONIZ. Well, may I answer? Oh, yes. So, for example, I 

would pick out a couple of areas. One, it would be that I think the 

methodology was developed for developing large-scale reservoir 

and, if you like, a water basin modeling technique that one will 

need in any geology to go forward. 

Another, I would say, is understanding how the form of waste 

package interacts with the environment. So I think the methodology for how one does characterization and waste package geochemistry interactions has been advanced. 

Mr. GREEN. So we have learned something from the effort. And, 

as you know, and you served on it—and thank you for your service—the Blue Ribbon Commission recommended a consent-based 

approach to repository siting. With respect to Yucca Mountain 

project, there appears to be a division of the opinion. And having 

57 

been out there, and I think we met with about every county official 

from around that area who very much supported it. Obviously, the 

State of Nevada and Clark County doesn’t. And that may have 

been different back years ago when it was selected. 

How can we keep from having something, because these things 

take so long, getting permission? And there may be consent but a 

decade later all of a sudden the political will is not there. And, you 

know, I know there is a proposal for Pecos of Texas and New Mexico. There may be other locations but, you know, if we make a decision and the political will then changes, which is what seemed to 

happen out in Yucca Mountain, how did the Blue Ribbon Commission address that issue if we are going to look for consent now and 

expect that contract to last for decades? 

Mr. MONIZ. Well, I think the Commission recognized that—well, 

first of all, again let me repeat that in the case, again, of a transuranic repository in New Mexico, little bit different animal, but 

that case where again it took an evolution of the community/State 

interaction. Secondly, the Commission recognized that each of these 

negotiations will be somewhat different, but in a generic sense, recommended a process that would have various steps and commitments to continue, which kind of ratcheted up at each step of the 

negotiation. 

Mr. GREEN. I know I am almost out of time and I won’t have 

time for all my questions, Mr. Chairman. I know of no country in 

the world that has long-term storage but our country is producing 

a lot of it and I would think it would be redundant to create a separate agency. I think we might need to fix the one we have so we 

don’t add that bureaucratic delay in to getting forward with it. 

But I thank you for the time. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. The gentleman’s time is expired. 

The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. 

Harper, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. HARPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, Mr. Secretary, thank you for taking your time to come visit 

with us on what is a very important and long-going issue. 

In 1980, Congress passed the Low-Level Waste Policy Act providing a framework for States to voluntarily join compacts and 

then work within the compact to site a low-level waste disposal facility. While this merely addressed low-level waste, it provides relevant experience about a consent-based process for nuclear waste 

disposal. After the Act was passed in 1980, it wasn’t until 1985 

that Congress approved the compacts and then it was 1990 before 

a disposal facility opened in Utah but only for Class A waste, the 

lowest class of low-level waste. 

Congress didn’t approve the Texas/Vermont compact until 1988, 

18 years after the Act passed, and the disposal facility in Texas 

didn’t open until 2011 after a 7-year licensing process. To date, 33 

years after Congress passed the 1980 Act, 34 States still remain 

without access to low-level waste Classes B and C disposal. 

So my question is in light of the limited success and lengthy 

process for consent-based siting for low-level waste, what gives you 

confidence that DOE will find an interim storage site for used nuclear fuel and have them operating 8 years from now? 

58 

Mr. MONIZ. Well, first, I would note that, first of all, there is 

some success, and again I go back to the WIPP example in New 

Mexico which is for transuranic waste. And again, it took a long 

time. This goes back to Mr. Hall’s question. We prefer to be conservative and set 2048 because these things take time. And I think 

we just have to start on that path. I personally remain optimistic 

that we will have communities coming forward and then provide 

technical assistance so that they can be certain that they have the 

technology base to move forward. 

Mr. HARPER. Well, given your role on the Blue Ribbon Commission, are you familiar with the private fuel storage project in Utah 

which is the only interim storage facility ever licensed? 

Mr. MONIZ. Am I familiar with it? 

Mr. HARPER. Are you familiar with that? 

Mr. MONIZ. Yes. Yes. Um-hum. 

Mr. HARPER. Do you know how long the NRC took to issue that 

license? 

Mr. MONIZ. No, I do not, sir. 

Mr. HARPER. OK. If I told you 8 years, would that surprise you? 

Mr. MONIZ. No. 

Mr. HARPER. OK. All right. Do you know the status of that license now? 

Mr. MONIZ. No, I do not. 

Mr. HARPER. OK. It is my understanding the consortium asked 

to the NRC to terminate the license late last year. 

Mr. MONIZ. I see. Um-hum. 

Mr. HARPER. So I think PFS is an example of how a local community, in this case the Goshute Indians, initially supported a 

project but State officials opposed it, just like the situation with 

Yucca Mountain. It is also an example of how licensing such a 

project is not as expedient as sometimes the DOE strategy suggests. 

So, you know, what we have here is a very serious issue. It is 

something that we have dealt with for now decades. I don’t believe 

that the formation of a new Federal agency to oversee management 

of nuclear waste is the answer. I believe that that would just create 

additional delays. So I would hope that we could continue to work 

on this issue and I certainly want to thank you for your time today 

to come share this with us. 

And with that, I yield back. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. If the gentleman would yield. 

Mr. HARPER. Yes, I will yield to the chair. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. And I would just highlight we did this when the 

Blue Ribbon Commission testified before us, and there is a map of 

Nevada. We talk about local interests. Two points of this is that 

all of the counties minus Clark have resolutions on record supporting Yucca Mountain. And then we talk about local issues and 

you use even in your testimony Finland and Sweden. A land base 

of that siting proposal which you would call local, do you know 

what would be local for Yucca Mountain? Who would be considered 

the local landowners? It would be the Federal Government. That 

is how far away and expansive the Federal property as Yucca. Who 

is local would be us. We are the local interest of concern, and if we 

59 

are not, the local communities that all have gone on resolutions in 

support of Yucca, they are on record. 

So, you know, I am kind of getting tired of this bashing of Nevadans that they are all one side when there is a strong vocal group 

of Nevadans who want this, hence going back to the $5.6 billion 

that I think you should put on the table to help convince maybe 

the other folks from Nevada. 

So with that, I would like to recognize my colleague from California, Mrs. Capps, for 5 minutes. 

Mrs. CAPPS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman for it and thank you, Secretary, for being here today and participating. 

And, as you know, like it or not, nuclear waste is a reality. Part 

of that reality is that nuclear waste is going to be around for a 

long, long time, far beyond the lifetimes of our children and our 

grandchildren. But as the creators of this waste, I believe that we 

have a responsibility to put in place a long-term plan to store it 

safely. And in the absence of such a plan, however, spent nuclear 

fuel will continue to be stored for the foreseeable future onsite 

right at nuclear power plants like Diablo Canyon, which is in my 

Congressional District. 

I have been pleased to see more spent fuel being moved out of 

high density pools and into dry cask storage at Diablo Canyon and 

also across the country. These casks are more stable and safer, but 

they are not a permanent solution for spent fuel storage in my 

opinion. Do you agree? 

Mr. MONIZ. Yes. As I said—— 

Mrs. CAPPS. They are not a permanent solution—— 

Mr. MONIZ [continuing]. Century-scale looks to be the kind of 

scale. 

Mrs. CAPPS. Pardon? 

Mr. MONIZ. We think the dry cask storage for the order of one 

century—— 

Mrs. CAPPS. One century they will work but not a permanent solution—I mean we can’t—— 

Mr. MONIZ. Not a millennium. 

Mrs. CAPPS. Not a millennium? 

Mr. MONIZ. Right. 

Mrs. CAPPS. As we all know, implementing a permanent storage 

solution has proven to be quite difficult. I commend the administration for moving the ball forward with the Blue Ribbon Commission 

report and the strategy released earlier this year, but given the serious challenges that still lie ahead, my constituents and I remain 

concerned that Diablo Canyon could become a de facto long-term 

storage site. It has already been over 30 years since Congress first 

directed the Department of Energy to remove and store spent nuclear fuel from power plants. So, Mr. Secretary, what happens if it 

takes another 30 years or even longer to implement a permanent 

storage plan? Does DOE have a contingency plan to handle longterm onsite storage of spent nuclear fuel? 

Mr. MONIZ. Well, first, I think the general technical judgment is 

that continued onsite storage moving in from pools to dry casks is 

a reasonably safe approach but it is not a system that we want at 

all. And that is exactly why we feel that the strategy put out following the Commission’s recommendations to aggressively pursue 

60 

the parallel paths of consolidated storage and repositories is the 

right one and it gives flexibility, adaptability, and it won’t be immediate. We think we have a chance to start moving some fuel in 

about 10 years but only if we start now. 

Mrs. CAPPS. Right. So I will just move ahead. One of the most 

important elements of the Blue Ribbon Commission report and the 

DOE strategy is the consent-based approach for locating the permanent storage facility. Engaging local communities in this process 

is critical, especially for the consolidated facility, but it is also crucial to engage with the communities where the fuel is currently 

being stored and could be traveling through. I am very concerned 

about the transportation. Once a permanent site is found, how do 

we move this spent fuel safely? This is a top priority for my constituents in San Luis Obispo. They have serious concerns about the 

risks involved in moving the spent fuel safely through their communities, and they want their voices heard in this process. So to 

what extent is DOE engaging with communities where there is this 

storage now occurring and so many concerned constituents who are 

worried about how that transporting is going to happen through 

their communities? 

Mr. MONIZ. So the Department has recently done a number of 

transportation studies, and again, I refer to the National Academy 

report of—6 or 7 years ago I was a member of that group as well. 

Again, I think two points, maybe one to reiterate is that the 

amount of fuel movement called for for all of the fuel we have 

today is very comparable to what Europe has already done with a 

very, very good safety record. However, clearly, we have to A) do 

it very well, but B) the report emphasized strongly the same thing 

as you have emphasized, the need to early on work with the communities along transit pathways, instruct in emergency response 

kinds of activities, communicate, know what is happening. That is 

very, very important. 

So I think as soon as we understand that we are moving towards 

a system to begin moving that fuel, we need to get very aggressive 

in that community outreach. 

Mrs. CAPPS. Well, I appreciate knowing that. I share your concerns about it and I yield back. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. The gentlelady’s time is expired. And on her point, 

though, that I think in testimony yesterday the Secretary said Plan 

B is to leave on site. That was testimony yesterday. Is the Plan B 

right now—— 

Mr. MONIZ. Well, as I—— 

Mr. SHIMKUS [continuing]. If all else fails—— 

Mr. MONIZ. When I said it, it is the ground truth. If we can’t 

move it—— 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Well, I am just trying to lay out the facts as was 

testified yesterday that Plan B would be to keep onsite. 

Mrs. CAPPS. Is it permanent? Are you—— 

Mr. SHIMKUS. That is their Plan B. 

Mr. MONIZ. If I may clarify, what I said again the ground truth 

is if we can’t move it, it stays where it is. It is a totality. That is 

why we have to have the ability to move it. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Just trying to get some transparency here, Mr. 

Secretary. 

61 

Mr. MONIZ. For that, we need the authorities from Congress. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from 

Ohio, Mr. Johnson, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, Mr. Secretary, it 

is good to talk with you again. Thank you for being here with us 

today. 

Most of DOE’s current nuclear waste management activities rely 

on taxpayer funding appropriated in 2012 and under the Continuing Resolution for 2013. This means that the taxpayer is currently funding the costs of DOE’s effort to start over, breaking the 

historic principle that the beneficiaries of the electricity, the consumers, pay the costs of disposal. For how long and for what cost 

does the administration support continuing the policy of having the 

taxpayer foot the bill? 

Mr. MONIZ. Well, sir, I think, first of all, let me refer to the letter 

to Mr. Shimkus that he had read into the record looking at all of 

the activities and the authorities, et cetera. This, by the way, has 

been reviewed by our general counsel and by the Department of 

Justice to make sure all the authorities were proper in terms of 

what was used for appropriated funds and what was used by waste 

fund. 

But I think, as you referred it, to the 2012 Consolidated Appropriations Act, there was explicit language to look at fuel management and disposal activities. In my view, those are very generic activities. Frankly, those are some of the activities that the Department was proscribed from doing by the 1987 action, and my view, 

to be honest, very mistakenly, that this research on the back end 

of the fuel cycle was always important and it is very important 

that we continue to do it now. 

Mr. JOHNSON. OK. Changing subjects a little bit, there have been 

inaccurate statements how Yucca Mountain can only hold 70,000 

metric tons, so even if we build Yucca, we will still need more than 

one repository. I would like to clarify for the record that is a statutory not a scientific limit. 

Mr. MONIZ. Um-hum. 

Mr. JOHNSON. In the Yucca Mountain EIS, DOE analyzed, ‘‘the 

total projected inventory of commercial spent nuclear fuel and 

high-level radioactive waste plus the inventories of commercial 

greater than Class C waste and DOE special performance assessment required waste.’’ In DOE’s 2008 report to Congress on the 

need for a second repository, DOE referenced studies of repository 

designs three times the area of the design used to accommodate the 

70,000 metric tons and an independent study that concluded Yucca 

Mountain could accommodate from 4 to 9 times the statutory limit. 

Mr. Chairman, I would like to insert DOE’s 2008 report to the 

hearing record. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Is there objection? Hearing none, so ordered. 

[The information follows:] 

62 

63 

64 

65 

66 

67 

68 

69 

70 

71 

72 

73 

74 

75 

76 

77 

78 

79 

80 

Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. Chairman, DOE’s July 22 response to Chairman Shimkus, I think, as you indicated, indicates that ongoing 

transportation activities are authorized under Section 180 of the 

Nuclear Waste Policy Act and eligible to be paid for from the Nuclear Waste Fund. However, Section 302 of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act regarding use of the Nuclear Waste Fund stipulates ‘‘no 

amount may be expended by the Secretary under this subtitle for 

the construction or expansion of any facility unless such construction or expansion is expressly authorized by this or subsequent legislation. The Secretary is hereby authorized to construct one repository and one test-and-evaluation facility.’’ Which, of course, as we 

know, is Yucca Mountain. So my question is how does the Department justify Nuclear Waste Fund expenditures on transportation 

for destinations other than Yucca Mountain? 

Mr. MONIZ. Well, sir, first of all, I am not a lawyer and I think 

I may have to get back to you for the recommendation. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Neither am I so—— 

Mr. MONIZ. OK. We talk the same language. 

Mr. JOHNSON. We do. 

Mr. MONIZ. But I think again all of the entries in those three tables that was sent were reviewed by general counsel at DOE. Secondly, I would note that it was my understanding those transportation studies were very generic. They would be applicable anywhere, and they certainly are not applied to the construction or expansion of any facility. So I can check on that with the lawyers but 

that would be my first reaction. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, I would ask you to go back and check, Mr. 

Secretary—— 

Mr. MONIZ. OK. 

Mr. JOHNSON [continuing]. Because as I understand Section 302, 

it seems pretty emphatic and pretty specific what the shalls and 

the shall nots pertain to. 

Mr. MONIZ. OK. 

Mr. JOHNSON. OK. With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. The gentleman yields back the time. 

The chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. 

McNerney, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. MCNERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, first, I want to thank you for bringing your technical expertise and your human communication skills to this difficult problem. 

My first question would be do you believe in your opinion that 

the technology exists for safe transportation and long-term storage 

of high-level nuclear waste? 

Mr. MONIZ. In the National Academy study that I referred to earlier certainly concluded that one has to execute but, yes, that it 

could be safe. 

Mr. MCNERNEY. So what you have said is that we need both the 

science and we need the public acceptance for a local—so clearly, 

in Yucca Mountain, the public acceptance part of this has failed. 

Would you be a critic and tell me what you think went wrong in 

that process in getting that project to be acceptable in Nevada at 

Yucca Mountain? 

81 

Mr. MONIZ. Well, I am neither a lawyer nor a psychologist but 

I think, as was said earlier, I think the very prescriptive nature 

and frankly the change of process that led to the singling out of 

Yucca Mountain I think just inherently raised some opposition. 

Mr. MCNERNEY. Do you think that that can be repaired, the 

damage that was done? 

Mr. MONIZ. Well, we feel that consent-based process has a very 

good chance of being successful with the time taken to communicate, cooperate, and assistant technical analysis. 

Mr. MCNERNEY. But at the very least, the Department has 

learned from that experience and probably won’t make those same 

mistakes again? 

Mr. MONIZ. I think we have all learned a hard lesson, yes. 

Mr. MCNERNEY. Thank you. I have another question. Do you believe that high-level waste has enough potential future value to design repositories that the waste could be retrieved in the future if 

appropriate? 

Mr. MONIZ. Well, if I may just kind of make sure we have our 

definitions in the same line, we are using high-level waste generally to apply to things like the defense waste where the things 

like plutonium have already been removed so they do not have energy value. But in the spent fuel or used fuel, as it is sometimes 

called from the commercial power reactors, they still contain plutonium, which certainly could be used for power production here and 

that is what is done in France, for example. I want to make very 

clear I am not advocating that, but technically, that is correct. 

Retrievability, however, independent of that, is probably something that will be important for public acceptance, at least over 

some time period. 

Mr. MCNERNEY. Well, if you look at what is happening at the 

NIF program in Livermore, in order to use the NIF as a gateway 

to hybrid fusion reaction or commercial reactor, they would use 

spent fuel and use neutrons created in little fusion explosions to accelerate a heat-driven process. Do you know what I am talking 

about? 

Mr. MONIZ. Yes, there are many—— 

Mr. MCNERNEY. There are values in this material. 

Mr. MONIZ. Yes, there are many alternatives. You are referring 

to a process called spallation typically—— 

Mr. MCNERNEY. I didn’t know the word. 

Mr. MONIZ [continuing]. To make—well, to make neutrons and 

that you then do something else with. There is fusion, there is conventional fusion, there is inertial-confined fusion. These are all, 

shall we say, well into the future as possible energy sources but 

they are being researched. 

Another thing I just maybe mention is that there is a concept 

that is interesting potentially which one uses fusion for the purpose 

of making neutrons that then makes more nuclear fuel—— 

Mr. MCNERNEY. Right. 

Mr. MONIZ [continuing]. Using depleted fuel, and I think that is 

the thing that you are probably referring to. 

Mr. MCNERNEY. So the other question I have has to do with the 

concern about comingling of military versus civilian nuclear waste. 

82 

What is the issue there? I don’t understand why that is a concern 

or an issue. 

Mr. MONIZ. Oh, well, in the 1980s that decision was made to 

combine them. That wasn’t made in the context of the 1998 date, 

and so it was viewed that the defense programs could then be relieved of the need to independently develop a repository. Well, now, 

it is a different world. 1998 is past as far as I can recall. Also, since 

then, we have developed specific agreements with States like 

Idaho, for example, in terms of removal of not only spent fuel but 

of high-level waste. 

And so the Blue Ribbon Commission was not saying that technically one could not combine them but it does note that there are 

very different issues, different agreements. Also, the high-level 

waste for the defense waste so-called, as I said earlier, does not 

have energy value. Number two, it has different packaging. Number three, it typically was very low burn-up fuel. So it is typically 

much cooler than commercial waste and so, there is no judgment 

made, but we are going to reopen that, relook at the decision, and 

see if it would make more sense to keep them separate or keep 

them on the same track. 

Mr. MCNERNEY. Thank you. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. The gentleman’s time is expired. I would ask him 

to talk to me about Hanford on background. We can talk about it. 

The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Latta, 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LATTA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And, Mr. Secretary, again thank you very much for being with us this afternoon. 

And if I could go back to Chairman Shimkus’ June 28 letter that 

he had written to the Department of Energy, the chairman raised 

questions about the legal authority under which DOE is conducting 

the various nuclear waste activities. It looks to me that DOE is 

picking and choosing which laws are convenient to follow. In the 

nuclear fuel storage and transportation section of DOE’s response, 

I noticed that DOE sites the Nuclear Waste Policy Act Monitored 

Retrieval Storage, the MRS, provisions as the authority for pursuing interim storage activities. However, DOE’s 2008 report to 

Congress on the demonstration of the interim storage of spent nuclear fuel from decommissioned nuclear power reactor sites state, 

‘‘in Section 141 of the NWPA authorized the Department to site, 

construct, and operate a Monitored Retrievable Storage, MRS, facility but restricted the ability of the Department to pursue this option by linking any activity under the section to milestones tied to 

progress in the development of the Yucca Mountain repository.’’ 

I guess the question I have is, given that the DOE has shut down 

the Yucca mountain program, how can DOE justify its activities on 

interim storage under the MRS provision? It is kind of a long question. 

Mr. MONIZ. Well, again, sir, ultimately I am relying on the judgment of our general counsel in the Department of Justice and the 

spelling out the authorities that were in there. And I am also 

happy to respond more fully upon further research there. But 

again, in my view, the issues of researching for the whole back end 

of the fuel cycle, no matter what we pursue in terms of storage and 

repository program, we need to do that work that frankly was susVerDate Mar 15 2010 09:24 Aug 06, 2014 Jkt 037690 PO 00000 Frm 00086 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\113-77 DOE NUCLEAR AWAIT SCANS\113-77 DOE NUCLEAR PENDING WAYNE
83 

pended for so long because of the 1987 decision. But I will get a 

response—— 

Mr. LATTA. If I could ask if you could respond to the committee 

in writing on that, I would greatly appreciate it—— 

Mr. MONIZ. Yes. 

Mr. LATTA [continuing]. Because I think it is very important 

point out there that needs to be—— 

Mr. MONIZ. I would be happy to. 

Mr. LATTA [continuing]. Considered and responded to. 

Now, if I could follow up on another point in regard to the chairman’s letter, DOE also indicated that the used fuel research and 

development activities are authorized under the Atomic Energy Act 

of 1954. And it is clear, however, that in the Nuclear Waste Policy 

Act and amendments enacted into the 1987 law, Congress directed 

DOE not to conduct further repository research on sites other than 

Yucca Mountain. 

In its decision in the United States v. Estate of Romani, the 

United States Supreme Court stated, ‘‘a specific policy embodied in 

a later statute should control our construction of the earlier statute 

even though it has not been expressly amended.’’ And then the 

question I have then, Mr. Secretary, is how do you and the DOE 

justify ignoring the sections of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act while 

claiming to follow the others and then falling back to the Atomic 

Energy Act which so clearly has been superseded by the Nuclear 

Waste Policy Act? 

Mr. MONIZ. Again, sir, I will include that in the detailed response 

because I am just not the person—— 

Mr. LATTA. Well, and again, you know, in reading your testimony, you know, I think it is very important because especially as 

we have known that we are looking at about $15 billion have been 

spent at Yucca and, you know, I think if I remember right in your 

testimony, we are talking that it is looking like maybe another $19 

billion is going to have to be expended because of having to find 

other places to deposit the nuclear waste. So if I am reading that 

correctly, is that 15 billion and then another 19 billion on top of 

that? 

Mr. MONIZ. Certainly north of 10, that is for sure. 

Mr. LATTA. So we are talking $34 billion out there that is going 

to be expended when we already had a site Yucca, is that correct? 

Mr. MONIZ. Well, again, going back to the waste fee adequacy 

analysis, it is consistent that a mill per kilowatt hour would cover 

all of these costs. So it is essentially nuclear power, you know, payas-you-go. And I think the exact cost will become sharper only as 

the future trajectory becomes more clear. But the one mill per kilowatt hour in the revised assessment is certainly consistent with 

covering the costs. 

Mr. LATTA. Mr. Chairman, if I could ask for indulgence to ask 

one more question? 

Mr. SHIMKUS. It depends on how long. 

Mr. LATTA. Short. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. I have got colleagues who would like to ask—— 

Mr. LATTA. When you say when it becomes sharper in looking at 

that, could I just ask what your definition of sharper when it comes 

to—you said when those numbers become sharper? 

84 

Mr. MONIZ. First of all, the trajectory of nuclear power, which 

clearly is an unknown today, will it grow substantially? Will it not? 

Are we going to have multiple repositories? Are going to have multiple storage sites and repositories at the same time? I think those 

are all the issues that that will have to be resolved to get the full 

lifecycle cost understood. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. The gentleman’s time is expired. The chair now 

recognizes—— 

Mr. LATTA. I yield back. Thank you very much. 

Mr. SHIMKUS [continuing]. The gentleman from Georgia. Your 

time is expired, no time to yield back. 

The chair recognizes the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Barrow, 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BARROW. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, thank you for joining us today. And I can’t help 

but feel like you have been put in an incredibly difficult position. 

You didn’t really get us here but it is good to have a friend in nuclear in your position even though you have got an impossible set 

of circumstances to deal with. I just want to ask you, explain it so 

an old county commissioner can understand it. What is it going to 

take, what is going to have to happen, and who is going to have 

to do what before we decide whether to go forward with Yucca or 

not? 

Mr. MONIZ. Well, I think the initial issue will be the results of 

the current litigation with the NRC. 

Mr. BARROW. That has got to be decided. 

Mr. MONIZ. That has to be decided and, as we have said, we 

will—— 

Mr. BARROW. And you need some legislative authority to do anything different than what is being litigated in the lawsuit right 

now. 

Mr. MONIZ. Again, we feel we should be pursuing these dual 

tracks in any event and that will require new authorities. Should 

the licensing go forward, the evaluation go forward at the NRC, 

again, a caution that there are still many, many other steps that 

need to be taken by the Congress and the State to move that 

project forward. 

Mr. BARROW. So what should those steps look like to mark what 

should we be doing? 

Mr. MONIZ. Well, the first thing that I am really asking for and 

the administration asks for us to have the authorities to move forward on this parallel track. 

Mr. BARROW. Here is a concern I have got with that because I 

am representing a whole lot of taxpayers who gave their consent 

to this overall structure when they have been paying their utility 

bills and paying into a fund that was supposed to get them something. I remember it was the generators who gave their consent to 

this process when they gave their political assent to the laws that 

impose this burden on them and they also entered into these contracts. When they turn all this ratepayer money over to you all, 

they were supposed to get something in return. 

Now, my point is you talk about this is a pay-as-you-go system. 

We have been going pretty far down the road and we haven’t gotten anywhere yet. So one question I would ask along those lines 

85 

what do we do to reimburse those folks who paid a sum if we decide to abandon Yucca? What do we do to the ratepayers and the 

generators that extracted the money for that solution? What is 

going to happen to those ratepayers? How are they going to be 

made whole if we decide to go in another direction? 

Mr. MONIZ. The one mill per kilowatt hour is to remove fuel from 

those sites, put it into Federal control where then the Federal Government has the responsibility—— 

Mr. BARROW. That is for money that hasn’t been collected yet. 

Mr. MONIZ. But I am saying—— 

Mr. BARROW. What about the money that has already been collected? 

Mr. MONIZ. And, yes, sure, but the—— 

Mr. BARROW. You say sure, but. It is—— 

Mr. MONIZ. Each kilowatt hour will ultimately bear a cost which 

is currently best estimate of a mill to manage disposal. There is no 

backing away from the Federal commitment to manage that process. 

Mr. BARROW. My question: What about the stranded asset of the 

investment that ratepayers have paid for years now if it is determined that that asset is going to be upended? How about covering 

their loss? 

Mr. MONIZ. The Federal Government, the administration remains committed to moving that fuel as soon as possible. That is 

why we believe that this dual track strategy is the fastest way—— 

Mr. BARROW. But if you move it to someplace other than what 

has been bought and paid for, you are going to add the cost of this 

other repository system, either this intermediate and permanent or 

this new permanent. My point is how do we compensate the folks 

who have paid for the facility that we are going to be walking away 

from if that is what we decide to do? 

Mr. MONIZ. The estimate remains that the one mill per kilowatt 

hour is a very credible expectation for the cost of getting that fuel 

accepted and moved. 

Mr. BARROW. That is future revenues for future projects. I am 

talking about what you want to do about the issue—— 

Mr. MONIZ. All the way from the beginning, the current waste 

fund with its nearly $30 billion sitting in there—— 

Mr. BARROW. How about money that has been collected that 

hasn’t been spent yet? What are we going to do about that? 

Mr. MONIZ. Well, I mean currently it is collecting interest and it 

is sitting there to be deployed. In fact, then the request for legislation would be to determine how a new waste organization has access to whatever combination of discretionary and mandatory funds 

required. But that $30 billion or almost $30 billion is there for this 

purpose. 

Mr. BARROW. Well, I can speak for every county commissioner 

and city councilman who has got any zoning authority anywhere in 

the country that there is a problem here that I recognize a mile 

away, and again, you didn’t invent this problem, but if you have 

got to zone a socially necessary use into an area that has got some 

controversy or some undesirable effects, you are going to have some 

problems with folks who don’t want it in their back yard. 

86 

And the problem with a consent-based basis that we are talking 

about here, one challenge that I see just as an old county commissioner is you have got folks who have got different ideas about 

what their back yard is. You might have a local government, the 

local community that is just dying to get the jobs and the infrastructure and the opportunities. You have got a State government 

that doesn’t want it in their back yard. Or you might have a State 

government that wants it but a local government that doesn’t want 

it in their back yard. Or you might have the State and local government on the same page and you have got some interest group 

somewhere that says it regards the whole country is their back 

yard or the planet as their back yard. 

So I don’t want us to be looking to something that has never 

been found and it won’t be found. I don’t want to be looking for a 

unicorn in this picture. Thank you for your—— 

Mr. SHIMKUS. I thank my colleague from Georgia and I would 

like to yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. 

Murphy, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Secretary, great to see you again, and thanks 

for coming to Pittsburgh this week. 

Mr. MONIZ. Thank you. 

Mr. MURPHY. One of the comments that was made in that roundtable you had was an energy company leader said it was important 

to have regulations that were science-based and enforced consistently so that they could predict our future. I worry about a consentbased approach because I am not always sure that it is based in 

science. I believe that pure science is best done without politics, 

and unfortunately, politics is often done without science. 

And we had some hearings prior to today where we learned the 

story of what happened when a new director of NRC came in, basically shut down the facility, got rid of employees, disposed of 

records, and sent us back in time. And it concerns me that that 

was politically driven and not scientifically driven. 

Now, help us, as I appreciate your commitment to wanting to 

move forward in this, but in March, Nye County, California, last 

year they notified DOE of their consent to have repository Yucca 

Mountain. DOE responded saying that Nevada doesn’t consent. 

And, Mr. Secretary, your testimony refers to reports that a number 

of communities are exploring the possibility of hosting a consolidated storage facility and NRC staff has indicated four industries 

have expressed some level of interest. Has DOE or the representatives met with these entities? Can you give me a yes or no on that? 

Mr. MONIZ. No, we are not and we don’t have the authorities to 

begin any kind of a negotiation with these communities. 

Mr. MURPHY. So isn’t it fair that DOE meet with representatives 

from Nye County, Pennsylvania, or somewhere else if you are going 

to use a consent-based approach? 

Mr. MONIZ. Oh, I am sorry. I believe some other officials have 

met with people from Nye County—— 

Mr. MURPHY. But people within DOE are not? 

Mr. MONIZ. I am sorry? 

Mr. MURPHY. But people from DOE are not meeting with folks 

in these other communities? 

87 

Mr. MONIZ. No, no, again, it is my understanding—I can clarify 

this later. It is my understanding that certainly some members of 

the Nuclear Energy Office have had discussions but nothing that 

I would call certainly a negotiation. We have no authorities to do 

that. 

Mr. MURPHY. Well, regarding the interested entities, these four 

that were mentioned, have the Senators and Governors in the 

States where they are located endorsed hosting a consolidated interim storage facility? 

Mr. MONIZ. No, sir, as far as my knowledge goes. But earlier, as 

Mr. Barton said, there is an example where a county in Texas has 

a public resolution—— 

Mr. MURPHY. Sure. 

Mr. MONIZ [continuing]. Of interest and he said are engaged in 

discussions with the Governor and the State legislature. So that is 

an example where it is beginning and that is all—I think until we 

have a process in place—— 

Mr. MURPHY. Well, let me ask about this process. Have you done 

any analysis on the adequacy of the Nuclear Waste Fund to pay 

for both interim storage and final disposal facilities assuming the 

fund could be used for both purposes? 

Mr. MONIZ. Again, the waste adequacy assessment looks at multiple scenarios and finds that there is a very, very wide range of 

lifecycle costs. The one mill per kilowatt hour—— 

Mr. MURPHY. But my point is, are you using the Nuclear Waste 

Fund to pay for interim and final disposal facilities? 

Mr. MONIZ. That is again something that will have to be decided 

in Congress. 

Mr. MURPHY. But is that something you would support? 

Mr. MONIZ. The Blue Ribbon Commission supported it. 

Mr. MURPHY. OK. And most of DOE’s current nuclear waste 

management activities rely on taxpayer-funded appropriations in 

2012 and under the Continuing Resolution 2013. This means that 

taxpayers are currently funding the costs of DOE’s efforts to start 

over, breaking the historic principle that the beneficiaries of electricity, the consumers, pay the cost of disposal. So for how long and 

for what cost does the administration support continuing the policy 

of having the taxpayers foot the bill? Is that part of your discussion? 

Mr. MONIZ. Again, that is a very important part of Congress’ discussion in terms of how it has chosen to do appropriations, discretionary appropriations or waste fund allocations. 

Mr. MURPHY. Sure. Well, in that context, though, our concern is 

we have already spent 15 billion that we appropriated and then 

someone, for consent reasons or political reasons, decided to pull 

the plug on that. So our concern is if we put more money into this, 

we want to know there is a commitment from you and the Department of Energy to move forward. 

I was impressed with the article you wrote in Foreign Affairs 

2011 where you talk about the importance of nuclear power and 

you also acknowledge the sensitivity you have to the Government 

paying billions of dollars in damages to energy companies and that 

the uncertainty of cost is a big problem with building more nuclear 

power plants. So in this context, you see the uncertainty of cost reVerDate Mar 15 2010 09:24 Aug 06, 2014 Jkt 037690 PO 00000 Frm 00091 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\113-77 DOE NUCLEAR AWAIT SCANS\113-77 DOE NUCLEAR PENDING WAYNE
88 

mains if we are ambiguous of where we are moving forward. So 

your commitment to move forward is so important. 

You mentioned the Blue Ribbon Commission with regard to moving forward, and you also said that we are in a stalemate and we 

have to be moving the ball forward. You said that today. So help 

this committee understand or build confidence in DOE’s commitment to move forward on using Yucca Mountain as a permanent 

storage facility or, and what you have also talked about, a temporary one made for the next 100 years. There is land out there 

to do that as well. Are you committed to continue to move forward 

personally on this? Is the Department? Or are we going to see more 

holdups in this process? 

Mr. MONIZ. Certainly I am committed. In fact, that is why I am 

here today. The administration is committed. The Department is 

committed. Of course, there is this recommendation about a new 

organization to be formed, and if that is done, then presumably a 

lot of those responsibilities would move to this new organization. 

But I think the point is the administration and the Government 

must be committed to executing this responsibility. 

Mr. MURPHY. Well, we have been committed to a plan so far and 

it is frustrating to have the rug pulled out from under us. Thank 

you. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. The gentleman’s time is expired. 

The chair now recognizes the gentlelady from California, Ms. 

Matsui, for 5 minutes. 

Ms. MATSUI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for holding a hearing on this important issue. And thank you, Mr. Secretary, for joining us once again. I commend your work with the 

Blue Ribbon Commission and I appreciate the Department of Energy’s continued work on this matter. 

The administration’s strategy for the management and disposal 

of used nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste makes significant contributions to this debate and I look forward to continuing 

this open dialogue with you on how best to address the safe deposit 

of our country’s nuclear waste. 

My district of Sacramento, the Sacramento Municipal Utility District, otherwise known as SMUD, owns the decommissioned Rancho 

Seco nuclear power plant, so I have had an interest in issues with 

spent fuel management posed by permanently shutdown reactors 

for some time. I was heartened to see that the administration’s 

strategy includes a pilot interim storage facility with an initial 

focus on moving fuel from shutdown reactors. Shutdown reactors 

represent a unique component in overall nuclear waste policy. As 

is the case with SMUD, removal of the spent fuel is many times 

the last major hurdle in the way of putting the land to a more beneficial use. 

The Blue Ribbon Commission and the administration both advocate that it should be a priority to move spent fuel from sites with 

permanently shutdown reactors and without an operating nuclear 

generating station. Do you agree that spent fuel from these sites 

should be prioritized? 

Mr. MONIZ. That is certainly the administration’s strategy’s position. 

89 

Ms. MATSUI. I strongly support a pilot interim storage facility 

that removes all spent fuel from permanently shutdown sites. It 

seems to me that a successful pilot project could help repair public 

confidence in the Government’s ability to manage the Nation’s public waste. 

Mr. MONIZ. Yes. 

Ms. MATSUI. And what other benefits would a pilot project 

achieve? 

Mr. MONIZ. Well, again, first and foremost, it would of course remove the fuel from those sites. I think it would have, as you have 

indicated, an enormous impact on saying that there is this commitment to accepting fuel by the Federal Government. We are accepting fuel. We are moving fuel. We are moving it safely and I think 

that would really add a big jolt of confidence to getting this whole 

program moving, not talking about it, but moving, moving fuel. 

That is the issue. 

Ms. MATSUI. Now, in your testimony, you mentioned that DOE 

would conduct an analysis of initial used fuel shipments from shutdown reactors sites. Can you elaborate on what specific aspects this 

analysis will consider? 

Mr. MONIZ. Well, I think the analysis at this stage, it has to be 

quite generic because of course what the geography would be of 

such a pilot facility will determine specific travel routes, et cetera, 

but I would say—and this is now my own personal speculation if 

you would like—I think for a first pilot facility in terms of modal 

issues, we probably will be talking, you know, trucking of casks on 

the highway. As the Academy report many years ago suggested, 

once we get into a very, very large-scale transportation of thousands of tons per year, then using trains as a major mode will be 

important. 

Ms. MATSUI. So it is my understanding that the Federal Government has been transporting this nuclear waste and spent nuclear 

fuel in this country for some time now? 

Mr. MONIZ. Um-hum. 

Ms. MATSUI. That is right? 

Mr. MONIZ. Yes, we have had thousands of shipments. 

Ms. MATSUI. Yes. So can you tell us about that record and 

whether you are satisfied with the level of safety that has been 

achieved? 

Mr. MONIZ. Certainly my understanding is that there has been 

a very, very safe record, and as I said, the similar record in Europe 

where more than 10 times as many movements have occurred has 

also been very good, at least that was the case a few years ago 

when I was on that Academy committee. To be honest, I haven’t 

looked personally in the last 5 or 6 years. 

Ms. MATSUI. OK. Well, I believe moving spent nuclear fuel from 

decommissioned sites first should be a priority and that a pilot interim storage facility is a necessary step in the right direction in 

the overall management of our Nation’s nuclear waste. And I do 

look forward to working with you, Mr. Secretary, and my colleagues on this committee to make real progress in this area. And 

I thank you very much—— 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Can I have your last 35 seconds? 

Ms. MATSUI. Yes, you may. 

90 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Mr. Secretary, what is a crystalline formation, cutting the rock? 

Mr. MONIZ. Granite, for example. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. And wasn’t that exempted under the ’87 amendments to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act? 

Mr. MONIZ. As I recall, I believe that—— 

Mr. SHIMKUS. And there are 25 States that have this formation? 

Mr. MONIZ. I don’t—— 

Mr. SHIMKUS. So if we go to obviously a second repository, those 

sites, based upon your testimony, or those States would still be 

then open and accessible for granite formations during high-level 

nuclear waste? Wouldn’t that be correct? 

Mr. MONIZ. Well, I think again that would be—— 

Mr. SHIMKUS. States like Washington, Massachusetts, New 

Hampshire, Vermont, New York, Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, 

and Virginia all could be considered—— 

Mr. MONIZ. I mean, again, as has been demonstrated internationally, there is a wide range of geologies that can be suitable 

for a repository. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

I now recognize the gentleman from West Virginia, Mr. McKinley, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. MCKINLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, Mr. Secretary, 

thank you for going to Morgantown to visit the—— 

Mr. MONIZ. It was fun. 

Mr. MCKINLEY [continuing]. National Energy Technology Laboratory. 

I wasn’t here in Congress in ’08 or ’09. I didn’t come until ’11 so 

I am trying to get up to speed with all of this debate that is taking 

place, but I do have a fact finding from the Nuclear Energy Institute that indicates that in 2008 there were some 3,000 scientists 

across five laboratories and various major universities were involved in filing this application with the DOE for the permit. And 

then within a year’s time, that permit was reversed. The application was reversed. Mr. Secretary, other than an election being 

taken place during that period of time, what happened? Was there 

a change in science or technology that DOE hadn’t taken into consideration or was this decision to cancel the application merely political? 

Mr. MONIZ. Well, in a similar vein, of course I was not here as 

well. However, I would note that, as we have stressed, that there 

are two essential conditions in our view. I mean one is good science 

and number two is consent. 

Mr. MCKINLEY. Well, Mr. Secretary, what I am saying is what 

science changed between ’08 and ’09? 

Mr. MONIZ. And there are two issues, science and consent, and 

the administration felt that on the consent basis this was simply 

not a workable project. 

Mr. MCKINLEY. Was consent part of the law in ’08? 

Mr. MONIZ. It is a question of the ground truth, and the reality 

is the project moving forward? Does the project have the ability to 

capture all of the permits that it needs, which includes State permits? And so the project was deemed and declared not workable. 

91 

Mr. MCKINLEY. Engineers or contractors, it feels political. It 

doesn’t feel like it has anything to do with science or technology. 

So the question you were asked several times now, the gentleman 

from Georgia was asking it; I heard Chairman Upton from Michigan raise the same question and using his numbers because I don’t 

know what they are for West Virginia, but when he said Michigan 

again has taken away from the taxpayers and businesses, everyone 

using the power, they have extracted $600 million from the residents of Michigan to pay for this facility. What have they gotten 

for that $600 million? 

Mr. MONIZ. Well, first of all, the question—— 

Mr. MCKINLEY. And I heard your answer, well, the amount that 

is being extracted is fair. It will pay for the facility, but that is not 

the question they we are asking. What did we get for it? If we wind 

up ultimately abandoning the facility, what did they get for $600 

million in Michigan? 

Mr. MONIZ. The one mill per kilowatt hour has been paid in the 

rate base for all nuclear utilities for the Federal Government commitment to accept the fuel and move it from those sites. That commitment remains. 

Mr. MCKINLEY. But they have spent 600 million and it hasn’t 

happened yet, so what happens with the amount of money that has 

already been expended? Are we going to refund it to the individuals 

if we abandon and go to a different site? 

Mr. MONIZ. As I think—— 

Mr. MCKINLEY. Because I believe you are trying to answer—if I 

can put words into your mouth—that whenever the site is determined, that mill per kilowatt hour will be adequate to be able to 

facilitate this, but that is not the question. The question is what 

happens to the $600 million in Michigan that has already been expended? They don’t have anything. There is nothing to show for it. 

Mr. MONIZ. Again, the one mill per kilowatt hour is not to buy 

a facility. It is to buy a service. The service, as far as the utility 

concerned, is spent fuel removal. The failure to begin removing 

that fuel on February 1, 1998, has led to the payment of damages. 

Those damages are currently projected to go north of $20 billion 

back to the utilities because the service is not being provided. The 

service will be provided. That remains the commitment. And the 

funds in the meantime are, as I said earlier, accruing interest. In 

fact, I think in the current waste fund—I maybe not quite right on 

this—but I think something like $6 billion of it is interest that has 

accrued over the time. So it is a service being purchased. There 

was a decision a long time ago by this Congress in terms of how 

nuclear waste disposal would be paid for. The commitment remains. It is no different. 

Mr. MCKINLEY. In closing, I know my time is almost up. Are you 

telling me that if this decision goes in our favor or it goes in the 

favor of Yucca Mountain, all of the investment we have made, will 

the President uphold that or is this going to be another DOMA, Immigration, and the Employer Mandate? Will he enforce this or 

would he waive this—— 

Mr. MONIZ. We have made very clear we follow the law. If the 

court directs—— 

92 

Mr. MCKINLEY. He hasn’t followed the law. That is the problem. 

He hasn’t followed the law in other—— 

Mr. MONIZ. The law will be determined by this court decision 

that we are all awaiting, and if it directs the NRC to pick up the 

license, we will do our job to support that, given appropriations. It 

will be up to the funds to be supplied from discretionary or mandatory by this body and there will be many other conditions that have 

to be met, including by the Government, land withdrawals, there 

will be State permits, many, many issues. And again the judgment 

remains. When we put all of this together, it doesn’t seem very 

workable. 

Mr. MCKINLEY. Mr. Chairman, I apologize for running over. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. No, you did fine. Thank you. The gentleman yields 

back his time. 

And, Secretary, you have been great. We have got one more 

member here who is actually the chairman of the Energy and Air 

Quality Committee, so he does have part of the big nuclear portfolio up here and I am glad that he stayed around. And I would 

like to recognize him for 5 minutes. 

Mr. MONIZ. I am aware of his portfolio. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. Well, thank you, Chairman Shimkus. 

Mr. Secretary, we appreciate your being with us today and I just 

have to say honestly that I don’t envy you trying to defend the administration on this issue. 

I was reading the testimony and it said ‘‘the administration supports working with Congress to develop the consent-based process 

that is transparent, adaptive, and technically sound.’’ And it is my 

argument that we already have the law on the books, the Nuclear 

Waste Policy Act, 1982, 1987. Democrats and Republicans made 

the decision to do it. And now this administration in 2009 made the 

decision to pull the plug after the Department of Energy had submitted its application in 2008 at the NRC. 

And then Mr. Jaczko, who—so in my view, Harry Reid, President 

Barack Obama, and the chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission basically made the decision they don’t care what the Congress thinks, they don’t care what the American people think, they 

are not going to abide by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. And, as a 

result, we have spent—I have heard different figures—Mr. Barton 

said around 15 billion, 13 billion, 14 billion for Yucca Mountain 

and no one talked about the judgments against the Federal Government as a result of the lawsuits because the Federal Government had breached its contract because it didn’t have the ability 

to take possession of the waste, so that is another 12 or $13 billion. 

And then the President decides, well, OK, we are going to pull the 

plug but we will establish a Blue Ribbon Commission, and now you 

all are asking for 1.3 billion and pay-as-you-go another 5.6 billion 

over 10 years. 

And, you know, maybe I am biased but when I go to the Rotary 

Club and I talk about this kind of waste, it is really upsetting to 

people when you talk about a $16 trillion Federal debt that is 

growing every day and this judgment is growing every day. And so 

you really do wonder what is the President thinking about? We 

have a Federal law that has not been invalidated. The only reason 

we are now waiting for a decision of the courts is because the adVerDate Mar 15 2010 09:24 Aug 06, 2014 Jkt 037690 PO 00000 Frm 00096 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\113-77 DOE NUCLEAR AWAIT SCANS\113-77 DOE NUCLEAR PENDING WAYNE
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ministration didn’t act, so a lawsuit was filed. And so here we are. 

And I mean I have great admiration for you and your intellectual 

ability and your understanding of the issue, but I tell you, I think 

that Barack Obama is flat wrong on this issue and that the American people are going to suffer. 

Now, maybe that is my opening statement and I would be happy 

to give you an opportunity to respond if you want to. I am certainly 

not frustrated in any way but if you would like to respond, fine. 

If you—— 

Mr. MONIZ. Well, again, it would just be repetitive that Secretary 

Chu felt that the project would be unworkable and that is again 

based on the issue of public acceptance, which we consider to be 

equally important as the scientific criteria. So, again, as I said earlier, when the judgment is made in the litigation with the NRC, I 

think we will have a path forward there, whichever it is. But, 

again, I think I have come here today especially to try to, you 

know, present my perspective. It is the one of the Blue Ribbon 

Commission that we need to pursue these two tracks in any event. 

It will be our fastest approach to move fuel, to accept fuel, and we 

believe that is needed no matter what the repository pathway is. 

And I hope that we can work together to move the ball. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. And I would just say that, I mean, the President 

is out there every day talking about all-of-the-above, and the nuclear energy is really being stagnant right now because of this 

waste issue. And if he is genuinely concerned about carbon emission, he should get off the dime and take some action to expedite 

this waste issue, taking care of this waste issue or we are going 

to have a pretty stagnant nuclear energy in the U.S., in my view. 

Mr. MONIZ. If I may respond to that, I think the administration’s 

actions are very consistent on nuclear power with the all-of-theabove strategy. The fact is after many years of talk, this administration moved out with the conditional $8 billion loan guarantee for 

first-mover nuclear plant construction in Georgia, AP 1000s. This 

administration launched the program and already decided on one 

license for a new small modular reactor to be constructed, and the 

administration feels that it is putting forward in fact the proposal 

for the most effective way to address waste management in a consent-based approach. So I think the ground truth, the ground facts 

speak for themselves. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. Well, Mr. Secretary, I may make one final comment. Every day the President, when he talks about energy, he 

talks about all-of-the-above and yet America is the only country in 

the world where you cannot build a new coal-power plant. So I 

don’t see how he can say all-of-the-above. 

Mr. MONIZ. Well, I would like to respond to that as well in a 

similar vein. I think, first of all, of course, the President has stated 

and I have stated and thousands and thousands of scientists have 

stated that it would be imprudent not to start addressing the 

greenhouse gas emission issue. So that is kind of a given in the administration’s position. Now, given that, what does all-of-the-above 

mean? What it means in this case is—and I am going to go back 

and say there was a lot of talking the talk for many years. This 

administration put $6 billion on the table for clean coal projects, 

eight major sequestration projects, one has started, two will start 

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next year, five are in construction. ARPA–E has invested in more 

than 20 projects for novel capture technologies. So if we are going 

to establish carbon capture utilization—and I might add six of 

those eight projects have enhanced oil recovery as part of it. If we 

are going to establish the competitiveness of all of our resources in 

a low-carbon world, this is exactly what we need to do and the 

President moved out on these programs. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. Well, if I may make one final comment, I do 

hope that you ought to consider things other than just carbon capture and sequestration because there are a lot of other technologies 

out there that can be just as beneficial. 

Mr. MONIZ. Well, in fact, if I may add—I am sorry, Mr. Chairman, one last thing—— 

Mr. SHIMKUS. You have been very kind on all this time we have 

given, so of course you can continue. 

Mr. MONIZ. So another example of this case was a week after the 

President’s climate plan announcement in Georgetown, our department put out a draft solicitation for an $8 billion loan guarantee 

program for advanced fossil technologies across the board. We are 

waiting for input in September but we said, as examples, it could 

be dry fracking. It could be new carbon utilization technologies. It 

could be advanced fossil combined heat and power. So we are putting out the programs to establish fossil fuels as part of the lowcarbon future. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. And reclaiming my time. And I want to thank the 

Secretary for your time. And it was good for some of my nuclear 

friends to hear some fossil fuel stuff, so that is why I definitely am 

all-of-the-above in my Congressional District, so it was probably 

good for them to hear some of that. 

In conclusion, again, I would like to thank you. You spent a wonderful amount of time in a subcommittee setting, which it is fairly 

unique in this process. I want to thank my Members on both sides 

who participated in today’s hearing, and I want to remind Members that they have 10 business days to submit questions for the 

record, and I ask you, Mr. Secretary, to respond to those as 

promptly as you can. 

Mr. MONIZ. Yes. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. And with that, the hearing is now adjourned. 

Mr. MONIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Tonko. 

[Whereupon, at 4:14 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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