U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

88–484 PDF 2014

S. HRG. 113–326 

OVERSIGHT OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF 

INVESTIGATION 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 19, 2013 

Serial No. J–113–18 

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 

( 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont, Chairman 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

CHUCK SCHUMER, New York 

DICK DURBIN, Illinois 

SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island 

AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota 

AL FRANKEN, Minnesota 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut 

MAZIE HIRONO, Hawaii 

CHUCK GRASSLEY, Iowa, Ranking Member 

ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

JOHN CORNYN, Texas 

MICHAEL S. LEE, Utah 

TED CRUZ, Texas 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

BRUCE A. COHEN, Chief Counsel and Staff Director 

KOLAN DAVIS, Republican Chief Staff Director 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

STATEMENTS OF COMMITTEE CHAIR 

Page 

Leahy, Hon. Patrick J., a U.S. Senator from the State of Vermont .................... 1 

prepared statement .......................................................................................... 42 

Grassley, Hon. Charles E., a U.S. Senator from the State of Iowa ..................... 3 

WITNESSES 

Witness List ............................................................................................................. 41 

Mueller, Hon. Robert S. III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. 

Department of Justice, Washington, DC ............................................................ 6 

prepared statement .......................................................................................... 44 

QUESTIONS 

Questions submitted by Senator Sheldon Whitehouse for Hon. Robert S. 

Mueller III ............................................................................................................ 58 

Questions submitted by Senator Charles Grassley for Hon. Robert S. Mueller 

III ........................................................................................................................... 59 

Questions submitted by Senator Orrin Hatch for Hon. Robert S. Mueller 

III ........................................................................................................................... 71 

ANSWERS 

Responses of Hon. Robert S. Mueller III to questions submitted by Senators 

Whitehouse, Grassley, and Hatch ....................................................................... 72 

(1) 

OVERSIGHT OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF 

INVESTIGATION 

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 19, 2013 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in Room 

SD–226, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Patrick J. Leahy, 

Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Leahy, Feinstein, Durbin, Whitehouse, 

Klobuchar, Franken, Hirono, Grassley, Hatch, Sessions, Lee, Cruz, 

and Flake. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. PATRICK J. LEAHY, A U.S. 

SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF VERMONT 

Chairman LEAHY. Good morning. Today the Judiciary Committee 

welcomes Robert Mueller for what is likely to be his final appearance before this panel as Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 

As we know, Director Mueller began as head of the FBI just days 

before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. 

And, Director, I remember being down in your Intelligence Center at the FBI building right after that and going over, still sifting, 

what we knew and actually what we did not know about that attack. 

For nearly 12 years, he has led the Bureau as it has shifted its 

primary focus to national security and counterterrorism efforts 

while still carrying on the historic mission of fighting crime. And 

that transition, while important for our national security, of course, 

has had, as expected, some problems. From National Security Letters to the latest revelations about the use of the PATRIOT Act, 

I remain concerned that as a country we have yet to strike the 

right balance between the intelligence-gathering needs of the FBI 

and the civil liberties and privacy rights of Americans. I also want 

to make sure that the shift, while necessary, in the FBI’s focus 

does not unduly hamper the Bureau’s ability to investigate cases 

involving fraud and violent crime that significantly affect the everyday lives of Americans. 

These are concerns I express, but I think one thing that the Director knows and the public knows, I have never questioned the integrity, the dedication, and the consummate professionalism of Director Mueller as he has led the Bureau through very difficult 

times. He has been a steady and determined leader of the FBI. He 

has spoken forcefully about the need to protect Americans’ civil liberties, and I remember sitting there at the 100th anniversary of 

the Bureau and the Director’s very strong statement about the civil 
2 

liberties of all Americans. And it was no surprise that a committed 

public servant like Bob Mueller would agree to put his long-awaited vacation and travel plans on hold when the President asked him 

to stay on board for another two years. He has devoted his entire 

life to public service. We were just talking about how Senator Feinstein knew him during a very terrible time, at the time when she 

became mayor of San Francisco with the tragedies that led up to 

that. And we are grateful to him and his family for their continued 

sacrifice. 

I might mention in this regard, Director Mueller, your wife, Ann, 

she is—I know what she has put up with, with the absences and 

all. You have a wonderful family. I have had the privilege of meeting them. But I hope you will tell Ann also how much I and the 

others appreciate what she has done, too, to make it possible for 

you to be Director. You are going to leave enormous shoes to fill. 

As the FBI now prepares for its first change in leadership since 

the 9/11 attacks, we have to review closely the broad intelligencegathering powers that Congress granted the FBI. They face 

daunting national security challenges, but we also have to ensure— 

and this is the responsibility of not only the FBI but the oversight—that they do not violate the privacy rights and civil liberties 

of law-abiding Americans. I have long said that protecting national 

security and protecting Americans’ fundamental rights are not mutually exclusive. We can and we must do both. 

The recent public revelations about two classified data collection 

programs illustrate the need for close scrutiny by Congress of the 

government’s surveillance activities. I have been troubled for years 

by the expansive nature of the USA PATRIOT Act. These powerful 

law enforcement tools, including Section 215 orders, require careful 

monitoring. That is why I authored legislation in 2009 that would 

have improved and reformed the PATRIOT Act while also increasing its transparency. My bill was reported by this Committee on a 

bipartisan basis in 2009 and 2011. I intend to reintroduce—just so 

everybody will know, I am going to reintroduce that bill tomorrow 

and hope that Senators from both parties will join me in this effort 

to improve the PATRIOT Act. 

The American people deserve to know how broad investigative 

laws like the PATRIOT Act are being interpreted and used to conduct electronic surveillance. Americans also deserve to know 

whether these programs have proven sufficiently effective to justify 

their breadth. Right now, I have to state I remain skeptical. 

I also firmly believe that we need to maintain close oversight 

over the broad surveillance authorities contained in the FISA 

Amendments Act. I have had concerns about the scope of Section 

702, even though its statutory focus is on foreigners overseas. That 

is why I pushed for a shorter sunset, greater transparency, and 

better oversight last year when Congress considered reauthorizing 

these provisions. I regret that the Senate rejected my efforts. I 

think now there is a possibility they may in further legislation accept these commonsense improvements. 

We have to have an open debate about the efficacy of these tools, 

particularly in light of the Boston Marathon bombing in April, not 

only how we collect it but what we do with it once it is collected, 

whether intelligence obtained by the FBI had been properly relayed 
3 

through the Joint Terrorism Task Force to the Boston Police Department. There have been questions raised that it was not. And 

I know the Inspector General for the intelligence community is conducting an independent assessment. 

Finally, the FBI’s increased focus on counterterrorism cannot 

come at the expense of the regular law enforcement efforts. Preliminary data released earlier this month show that in 2012, the 

overall violent crime rate in the U.S. rose for the first time since 

2006, and I think we should look at why and is the FBI able to 

work with their State and local partners in this. I know the FBI 

has been at the forefront in using forensic science in its investigations. It has had problems in the past with its crime lab, and I look 

forward to working with the FBI to develop comprehensive legislation on forensic matters. 

So I thank the Director for being here, but when I thank you, 

Director, I also thank the hard-working men and women of the 

FBI. I know you are proud to serve with them. They are proud to 

have you leading them. And I look forward to the Director’s testimony. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Leahy appears as a submission for the record.] 

Senator Grassley. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHUCK GRASSLEY, A U.S. 

SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF IOWA 

Senator GRASSLEY. Director Mueller, thank you for your service 

as well and extending that period of time that you are willing to 

serve the people of this country. 

Thank you, Chairman Leahy, for calling the hearing, and I welcome Director Mueller back, particularly because this is likely to be 

the last hearing he will appear before the Committee. 

Over the past 12 years, Director Mueller has done a good job of 

transforming the FBI from a law enforcement agency into a national security agency. The wall between intelligence and criminal 

cases has come down, and the integration of law enforcement and 

intelligence has worked. Those fundamental changes have made 

the FBI stronger and more successful in stopping terrorist attacks 

before they occur. They have also helped strengthen the FBI when 

tragic events like the Boston bombing have occurred. 

Cooperation between the FBI, federal agencies and partners, and 

State and local law enforcement has been improved. However, 

there are still problems with the FBI that need to be addressed, 

such as retaliation against those who speak out and blow the whistle on internal problems. 

That said, for a second time I thank Director Mueller for his 

service, and I am sure that he is looking forward to much deserved 

time off. Unfortunately, we still do not know who will be replacing 

Director Mueller when he leaves. This is very concerning and, of 

course, raises questions about the upcoming transition. 

For starters, the President has not submitted a nominee to the 

Senate to fill the vacancy. There have been media reports that the 

President intends to nominate James Comey, former Deputy Attorney General in the Bush administration, but no official nomination 
4 

has been received. It is unclear what the intention of the White 

House is with the release of Mr. Comey’s possible nomination. 

Whatever the motivation, it does not change the fact that the 

President has not formally nominated anyone to succeed Mueller. 

The President needs to send a nomination to the Senate and in 

short order; otherwise, we will not have enough time to properly 

vet the nominee and ensure that the new Director is in place prior 

to Director Mueller’s departure. Given the FBI’s role in counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and criminal law enforcement, any 

delay in appointing a Director means a vast bureaucracy will be 

left to an Acting Director. 

I would like to hear from Director Mueller about the transition 

planning, how he intends to hand things over to the next Director, 

and what contingency plans are in place in the event an Acting Director is necessary. 

There are a number of other matters to discuss. 

First, there has been a lot of news following the classified leaks 

of two national security programs operated by NSA and utilized by 

the intelligence community. The leak of classified information related to the 215 business record program and the 702 foreign intelligence has started a debate about whether these programs strike 

the proper balance between civil liberties and our security. As a result of the release of information, the administration chose to release additional details explaining how the programs operate, including the facts surrounding successes in thwarting terrorist attacks. 

More importantly, the information details the various safeguards 

and programmatic oversight built into the program. I am always of 

the opinion that more oversight is needed of the Federal Government, and given the classified nature of these programs, Congress 

needs to be extra vigilant in conducting oversight of these programs. 

Yesterday’s public hearing held in the House Permanent Select 

Committee on Intelligence was a good opportunity for Congress and 

the administration to show the American people that these programs can be discussed in an open manner. More hearings should 

be held so people better understand how the 702 program and Section 215 work. This includes the necessary declassification of information to assist Congress in determining whether the law was followed. Absent some level of transparency, the American people will 

not understand how their government works. 

There is a lot of distrust in government these days, and it is certainly understandable given the scandal at the IRS, the secrecy 

surrounding the administration use of drones, subpoenas seeking 

reporters’ emails and telephone calls, along with the effort to legislate in spite of constitutional protections and civil liberties. An 

open and transparent discussion of these programs is the only way 

that the American people will have confidence in what their government is doing. 

I continue to believe that a major problem causing the leaking 

of classified information is the lack of whistleblower protection for 

members of the intelligence community. The final version of the 

Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act that was signed into law 

last year failed to include protections for the intelligence commu-
5 

nity, and I authored those. These provisions were originally included in the Senate-passed version but did not pass the House. 

Specifically, it would have provided a protected method for employees to report concerns through a protected channel within the 

intelligence community. I believe the existence of such a channel 

would help stop would-be leakers from releasing classified information. So I would like to hear from Director Mueller about whether 

he would support such a provision. 

Another critical national security issue to address is 

cybersecurity. The House has passed four separate bills addressing 

the issue. The Senate continues to address the topic in various 

committees. All the proposals recognize the need to strengthen the 

Nation’s cybersecurity defenses. Where they differ is how to do it. 

The FBI plays a front-line role in addressing and investigating 

cybersecurity, so the Director might information us about what 

barriers exist and are preventing efforts to combat cyber attacks 

against our computer systems. 

Regarding traditional criminal matters at the FBI, I remain concerned about the number of cases where individuals may have been 

convicted based on faulty FBI crime lab reports. Chairman Leahy 

and I sent a number of letters regarding the unpublished results 

of the 1996 review of the FBI crime lab. To date, we have not received a briefing on this request. The Department of Justice continues to focus only on prospective review of criminal cases and not 

provide answers to the Committee as to what happened during this 

previous review. I would like to hear what the Director says about 

the matter and what has been done to bring justice to defendants 

that may be innocent as a result of faulty crime lab work. 

I will ask the Director about the FBI’s plans for using unmanned 

aerial systems or drones. At the last oversight hearing with Attorney General Holder, I asked about the Department’s use of drones, 

and in a written response, the Attorney General indicated DEA 

and ATF had purchased drones and were exploring their use in law 

enforcement. Absent from this response was an indication of how 

the FBI was using or seeking to utilize drone technology. So I will 

ask Director Mueller whether the FBI has purchased or is considering purchasing drones, what limitations the FBI has put in place, 

and how the FBI plans to use drone technology. 

I will ask about the FBI’s investigation into Border Patrol Agent 

Brian Terry’s murder. It has now been 2–1/2 years since the murder. The FBI has cited the ongoing investigation as a reason for not 

providing information. However, at some point the FBI will have 

to answer questions about this matter, and it is a matter of courtesy and humanity to the family to do that. 

And, finally, I remain concerned that whistleblowers at the FBI 

continue to face retaliation and delay in clearing their names. So 

I will ask the Director about the final outcome of two whistleblower 

cases brought by employees at the FBI that I have been tracking 

for years. The first is that of Agent Turner, who blew the whistle 

on FBI employees removing evidence from the World Trade Center 

site following the 9/11 attack. The second is employee Robert 

Kobus, who blew the whistle on time and attendance fraud at the 

New York City Field Office FBI. The Deputy Attorney General 

found Special Agent Turner was subject to adverse personnel ac-
6 

tion. Why has the FBI appealed and fought Special Agent Turner’s 

case for nearly a decade? And what action was taken against those 

persons who participated in the retaliation? And in regard to the 

Kobus case, what is the current status of that case? And if there 

has been a ruling, why has my office not been provided a copy? 

So thank you very much, Director Mueller, for your service but 

also for helping me get to the bottom of some of these things. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you very much. 

Director Mueller, we will, of course, put your full statement in 

the record. As I said, this is probably your last appearance here, 

but you have served with distinction as only the sixth Director of 

the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which was a great career 

starting your service as a U.S. Marine in Vietnam and through to 

the present. 

We will, of course, put your full statement in the record, but the 

floor is yours. Go ahead. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT S. MUELLER III, DIRECTOR, 

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT 

OF JUSTICE, WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, thank you, Chairman Leahy, and good 

morning, and thank you for the kind comments about my wife, who 

deserves very much of the credit, I must say. Both she and I appreciate you thinking of her. And, Ranking Member Grassley, thank 

you for your comments, sir. And thank you to all for giving me the 

opportunity here to testify on behalf of the men and women of the 

FBI. And on behalf of them, let me begin by thanking you for your 

support of the institution over the last 11–1/2 years since September 11th. Any progress that we have made in that time frame 

is attributable to a number of entities, one of them being this particular Committee. 

Now we live in a time of diverse and persistent threats from terrorists, spies, cyber criminals and, at the same time, we face a wide 

range of criminal threats, from white-collar crime to child predators. And just as our national security and criminal threats constantly evolve, so, too, must we, the FBI, evolve to counter these 

threats, even during a time of constrained budgets. 

Today I would like to highlight several of the FBI’s highest-priority national security and criminal threats, starting with terrorism. As illustrated by the recent attacks in Boston, the terrorist 

threat against the United States must remain our top priority. 

As exhibited by many of our arrests over the past year, we face 

a continuing threat from homegrown violent extremists. These individuals present unique challenges because they do not share a typical profile. Their experiences and motives are often distinct, which 

makes them difficult to identify and to stop. 

And at the same time, foreign terrorists still seek to strike us at 

home and abroad. Terrorists today operate in more places and 

against a wider array of targets than they did a decade ago. We 

have seen an increase in cooperation among terrorist groups and 

an evolution in their tactics and in their communications. 

While core al Qaeda is weaker and more decentralized than it 

was 11 years ago, it remains committed to attacks against the 

West. And al Qaeda affiliates and surrogates, in particular al 
7 

Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, pose a persistent threat. And in 

light of recent attacks in North Africa, we must focus on emerging 

extremist groups capable of carrying out additional such attacks. 

Turning briefly to that which was mentioned, that is, cyber, the 

cyber threat has evolved significantly over the past decade and cuts 

across all of our FBI programs. Cyber criminals have become increasingly adept at exploiting weaknesses in our computer networks, and once inside they can exfiltrate both state secrets and 

trade secrets. And we face persistent threats from hackers for profit, organized criminal cyber syndicates, and what we call 

‘‘hacktivist groups.’’ 

As I have said in the past, I do believe that the cyber threat may 

well eclipse the terrorist threat in years to come. And in response, 

we are strengthening our cyber capabilities in the same way we enhanced our intelligence and national security capabilities in the 

wake of the September 11th attacks. 

The Cyber Division is focused on computer intrusions and network attacks. FBI special agents work side by side with federal, 

State, and local counterparts on cyber task forces in our 56 field 

offices, working together to detect and disrupt computer intrusions. 

We have increased the size of the National Cyber Investigative 

Joint Task Force, which brings together 19 law enforcement, military, and intelligence agencies to stop current attacks and prevent 

future attacks. And cyber crime requires a global approach, and 

through our 64 legal attache offices overseas, we are sharing information and coordinating investigations with our counterparts. 

Finally, on this particular point, we recognized that the private 

sector is an essential partner to protect our critical infrastructure 

and to share threat information. We have established several noteworthy outreach programs, but we must do more. We need to shift 

to a model of true collaboration, build structured partnerships 

within the government and in the private sector. 

Turning to the FBI’s criminal programs, we have a great range 

of responsibilities from complex white-collar fraud to transnational 

criminal enterprises, and from violent crime to public corruption. 

And given the limited resources, we must focus on those areas 

where we bring something unique to the table. 

For example, violent crime and gang activity continue to exact a 

high toll on our communities and through Safe Streets and Safe 

Trails Task Forces, we identify and target the most dangerous of 

these criminal enterprises. 

At the same time, the Bureau remains vigilant in its efforts to 

find and stop child predators. Our mission is threefold: first, to decrease the vulnerability of children to exploitation; second, to provide rapid, effectiveness response to crimes against children; and, 

third, to enhance the capabilities of State and local law enforcement through task force operations such as the Innocent Images 

Initiative and the Innocence Lost Initiative. 

Now, let me pause for a second and spend a moment discussing 

the recent public disclosure of highly classified national security 

programs. 

The highest priority of the intelligence community is to understand and combat threats to our national security, and we do so in 

full compliance with the law. We recognize that the American pub-
8 

lic expects the FBI and the intelligence community to protect privacy interests, even as we must conduct our national security mission. 

The FISA Court has approved both programs, and these programs have been conducted consistent with the Constitution and 

the laws of the United States. The programs, as we heard yesterday, have been carried out with extensive oversight from the 

courts, from Congress, and from independent Inspectors General. 

And these programs do remain classified, so there are significant 

limits on what we can discuss this morning in an open session. 

I do know that there have been classified briefings on these programs for Senate Members over the last couple of weeks, and I 

hope most of you, if not all of you, were able to attend. And if you 

were unable to, I would suggest and encourage you to do so. 

As to the person who has admitted to making these disclosures, 

he is the subject of an ongoing criminal investigation. These disclosures have caused significant harm to our Nation and to our safety, 

and we are taking all necessary steps to hold accountable that person responsible for these disclosures. But as this is a matter actively under investigation, I cannot comment publicly on any of the 

details of the investigation. 

Now, in closing, I would like to turn to sequestration. The impact 

of sequestration on the FBI’s ability to protect the Nation from terrorism and crime will be significant. In Fiscal Year 2013, the FBI’s 

budget was cut by more than $550 million due to sequestration. In 

Fiscal Year 2014, proposed cuts will total more than $700 million. 

The ongoing hiring freeze will result in 2,200 vacancies at the FBI 

by the end of this Fiscal Year with another 1,300 additional vacancies in 2014. 

I have said and you have said that the Bureau’s great asset are 

our people. Additional operational cuts will impact our ability as an 

organization to prevent crime and terrorism, which will impact the 

safety and the security of our Nation. 

I will say we all understand the need for budget reductions, and 

we are going through a thorough review of every dollar spent, and 

I am sure we can find savings. I would like to work with the Committee to mitigate the most significant impacts of the cuts, both 

this Fiscal Year and those we anticipate for the next fiscal year. 

Chairman Leahy, Ranking Member Grassley, and Members of 

the Committee, I again would like to thank you on behalf of the 

Bureau and all our people for your support of the FBI and its mission. Our transformation over the past decade would not have been 

possible without your cooperation. Again, thank you personally and 

on behalf of the FBI for your efforts and your contributions, and 

I look forward to answering any questions you might have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Mueller appears as a submission 

for the record.] 

Chairman LEAHY. Well, thank you very much, Director, and I 

share your concern about sequestration. The kind of meat axe approach of that has been devastating to law enforcement. It has 

been devastating to some of the critical work we do in seeking 

cures for major diseases. In a number of areas, it has put out scientific efforts behind so many other countries, and it is questionable whether it will take us decades to get caught back up. 
9 

Let me talk about the PATRIOT and FISA authorities. As you 

know, I have had concerns about Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act 

and Section 702 of the FISA Act, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, for a number of years. 

Now, the Director of National Intelligence has declassified some 

more information about the bulk collection, the huge amount of collection of phone records under Section 215, and I think the American people want to know if it has been sufficiently effective to justify what is a very expansive scope. 

Last week, I asked the Director of the National Security Agency, 

General Alexander, to provide specific information—he had been 

going in broad generalities. I asked him for specific information 

about cases where data obtained through Section 215 proved critical to thwarting a terrorist threat, even if he had to do it in a classified setting. He promised he would provide that by now, by this 

time this week, and he has not yet, but I assume that having promised publicly that he would, he will. 

Last week, we heard it was dozens of plots. Yesterday we heard 

it was 50. But then either way, it seemed clear that the majority 

of those cases were not under Section 215. They were 702, an entirely different type of program. 

So let me ask you this: Have phone records obtained through 

Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act been critical to the disruption and 

discovery of terrorist threats? And if so, how many times? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, the answer to that is yes. I would say for 

most of the occasions it has been a contributing factor, one dot 

amongst a number of dots, but there are those cases where it has 

been instrumental. The one that was mentioned yesterday is an individual out of San Diego who we had opened in 2003, based on 

an anonymous tip that this individual was involved with AlShabaab, providing support to Al-Shabaab in Somalia. We did an 

investigation. We closed the investigation down. 

Chairman LEAHY. But in that case, the initial was from a tip, not 

from something—— 

Mr. MUELLER. That was in 2003. We closed it down in 2003. In 

2007, NSA was up on a telephone line in East Africa. They had the 

number of that telephone line, but they could not tell what calls 

were made to that telephone line in East Africa. And, consequently, 

they took that number, ran it against a database, and came up 

with this number, telephone number in San Diego. All they had 

was a number. They then go through the additional legal process 

to get the subscriber information that is not included in the database, and from that went up on a FISA after they gained the requisite predication. That was a case that was solely based initially— 

the reopening of that case, that person has been convicted, I think 

pled guilty, and is about to be sentenced. But that is one case 

where you have 215 standing by itself. 

Now, the point—— 

Chairman LEAHY. Is it possible to say how many where 215 has 

been critical? Because we are talking about billions of phone numbers. How many—— 

Mr. MUELLER. Let me, if I could, say two things. You are going 

to get—I know we are working through the list of numbers—or not 

numbers, the list of cases, and of those domestically I think there 
10 

will be anywhere from 10 or 12 where 215 was important in some 

way, shape, or form. 

Chairman LEAHY. Out of the billions of phone numbers that were 

collected. 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes, but let me go back to September 11th. On 

September 11th, al-Mihdhar was one of the principal hijackers ultimately—I think he was in the plane that—one of the planes in 

New York, but I may be wrong on that. But he was a principal hijacker, and the intelligence agencies were on him, tracking him 

through the Far East. Nobody had him in the United States. Ultimately he comes to the United States in 2000. 

Sometime thereafter, the intelligence communities are on a number in Yemen that is known to be affiliated with terrorists. At that 

point in time, without this particular capability, they had no way 

of identifying whether there was somebody in San Diego calling 

this number in Yemen. The IG report afterwards indicated that 

had we had this information, we may well have been able to stop 

the attack. If we had had this program in place then, the NSA or 

the intelligence community would bring that number to us, we 

would run it against that database, and what would come up was 

Mihdhar’s number in San Diego, and we go through exactly the 

same routine we did—— 

Chairman LEAHY. I understand, but you also have a whole lot of 

other things that happened there. I mean, the 9/11 Commission 

showed that the failure of the CIA and the FBI—and I realize it 

was before your time, but the failure of the CIA and the FBI to 

share information created problems. Al-Mihdhar had been placed 

in the State Department’s tip-off watchlist. Had the CIA shared 

records with the FBI, that might have made a difference. 

Had Minnesota had the warnings—— 

Mr. MUELLER. Moussaoui. 

Chairman LEAHY. Had the warnings of the agent out there been 

followed up in Washington, that might have made a difference. We 

could look at a whole lot of things that I assume we are doing a 

lot better today. But the—and, of course, we know that the President was told in August of a serious concern about this. 

So I realize the mistakes were made before 9/11. We are trying 

to close that. I just want to make sure if we are collecting—I was 

concerned about the testimony last week by the NSA as though 

somehow—and they were conflating 215 and 702 as though this 

was critical to everything, and yet as you know, you collect several 

billion phone calls, and sometimes you do not have anything unless 

you got a tip from just good police work that makes you look back 

and find out what those—what numbers are worthwhile. 

I worry that we get so imbued with the technology that we forget 

that somehow all the technology in the world does not begin to help 

as much as just collecting the dots, connecting the dots. 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, I think what concerns me is you never know 

which dot is going to be key. What you want is as many dots as 

you can. If you close down a program like this, you are removing 

dots from the playing field. 

Now, you know, it may make that decision that it is not worth 

it, but let there be no mistake about it, there will be that fewer— 

those fewer dots out there to connect if you do not have that ability 
11 

to go back in records that retain the toll records or a database that 

retains those toll records and identify that particular person in the 

United States who is in communication with the terrorist number 

overseas. 

Chairman LEAHY. I will have further questions, but one of them 

I have again on connecting the dots, we have heard conflicting testimony that on the Boston Marathon bombing, even though the 

Boston police had four officers assigned to the Joint Terrorism 

Task Force, they were not given all the information the FBI had 

about what the Russian security service said, cryptic though it 

might be, and were not told that Tamerlan intended to travel 

abroad. Is that true? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, yes and no. Let me, if I can explain. It is 

a Boston task force. The Boston task force last year had probably 

close to 1,000 threats related to counterterrorism. You do not—everybody on that task force handles federal threats or local threats 

or what have you. It is a task force. The question, I think, from 

Ed Davis’ point of view is, should the hierarchy of the Boston Police Department have been informed? 

This, because it was resolved, it was not an immediate threat, 

did not get briefed up through the task force to the higher levels 

of the FBI, much less the other participants in the task force. So 

I do not think it is fair to criticize the task force concept for not— 

in something like this, doing the briefings higher up the chain of 

command given the number of cases that we handle in this area. 

I will tell you that if you talk to State and local law enforcement, 

I think they will say that the work that we did in the course of 

this investigation was first rate, that the relationships that we 

have developed over a period of time are extensive, and the success 

of bringing—identifying the two who were responsible for it in such 

a short period of time is attributable to that work of State and local 

law enforcement, but also contributed to by us and the relationships. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you very much. And I apologize to Senator Grassley for taking extra time on this, but please go ahead. 

Senator GRASSLEY. I just told him he does not need to apologize. 

He is Chairman of the Committee. 

During the last hearing, May 2012, Senator Hatch asked a question as to whether or not President Obama discussed potential successors with you. You responded at that time that he had not in 

the past—or he had in the past but not recently. Now, I do not expect to get any information on the content of a discussion you 

might have with the President, but I do ask this question: Since 

the hearing, May 2012, have you discussed potential successors 

with President Obama? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, yes. I generally do not like to get into conversations between myself and—— 

Senator GRASSLEY. No, and you—— 

Mr. MUELLER. But I will say yes, without any of the content. 

Senator GRASSLEY. You have answered the question. 

Mr. MUELLER. Okay. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Do you have a transition plan in place for 

your successor? And if so, how much time is needed to implement 

the plan in order to provide a seamless transition? 
12 

Mr. MUELLER. We have been preparing, as you can imagine, for 

the last two years—in fact, the last two and a half years, and we 

have already prepared the extensive materials that the successor 

will have to review. We are prepared to start the briefings as soon 

as the person is sworn in. We have been looking at personnel so 

that there can be some overlap of personnel so that the person 

comes in and has key components that are ready to support them, 

in the same way that when I came in before September 11th, the 

FBI supported me. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Approximately how much time is necessary 

for that? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, it is a learning experience, and we will get 

the briefings and the like, but it will take maybe three—I would 

say a month to really get one’s feet on the ground. But in that 

month, I can tell you something is going to happen, so whatever 

you planned in terms of sitting down and looking at something, 

something else will come up, and your attention will be diverted. 

So it is hard to say a specific time frame. 

Senator GRASSLEY. This is so important because we will have 

about four weeks in July, we will have only four days after your 

term ends to consider a nominee. 

Do you have any idea when we might expect a nominee to come 

up from the White House? 

Mr. MUELLER. I do, but I am not in a position to be able to advise the Committee. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Okay. Then let me go on to another one. This 

involves Fast and Furious. In my opening statement, I said I know 

that the FBI does not talk about ongoing investigations. However, 

eventually the FBI has to talk about the Brian Terry murder investigation, just like eventually you had to talk about the anthrax investigation. 

I am going to be submitting a detailed list of questions about the 

concern that the Terry family has that there was an attempt to 

cover up the connection between the guns and the ATF operation. 

According to the family, the indications of an attempted coverup 

have not been fully investigated. 

So all I am asking you now: Would you be able to respond to my 

written questions before you leave office? 

Mr. MUELLER. I would have to look at it and see how extensive, 

but we will make every effort to do so. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Okay. And then just one question in regard 

to this issue, so I will ask right now. On October 20, 2011, I wrote 

you to ask what time the FBI arrived in Peck Canyon where Border Patrol Agent Brian Terry was murdered. There are conspiracy 

theories out there that the FBI or an FBI informant was out in 

Peck Canyon before Agent Terry was shot. Do you believe that 

there is any truths to those theories? 

Mr. MUELLER. No, I do not believe there is any truth in those 

theories, but I would have to go back and make certain. Off the top 

of my head, I do not believe there is any truth, but I would like 

to go back and make certain that we have nothing that would be 

supportive of those theories. 

Senator GRASSLEY. okay. And then I would like to have that in 

writing. 
13 

Senator GRASSLEY. I want to go to drones. In recent responses 

to questions I asked Attorney General Holder following his last 

oversight hearing, the Department of Justice advised this Committee that both DEA and ATF have acquired unmanned aircraft 

systems. The Department indicated that those agencies were drawing up plans and procedures to use them. The responses did not indicate whether the FBI had acquired any drones and whether there 

were future plans for drone technology use by your agency. 

Does the FBI own or currently use drones? And if so, for what 

purpose? 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes, and for surveillance. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Okay. Does the FBI have any agreement with 

any other government agencies—let me suggest a couple; there 

might be others: DOD and Homeland Security—to receive assistance in the use of drones? 

Mr. MUELLER. I am not certain. I do not think so. But whenever—well, all I am saying is that one of the issues with drones, 

any use of drones by any agency, is what happens in the airspace. 

To the extent that relates to the airspace, there will be some communication back and forth. 

Senator GRASSLEY. So instead of asking you a question, I think 

I can assume, since you do use drones, that the FBI has developed 

a set of policies, procedures, and operational limits on the use of 

drones, and whether or not any privacy impact on American citizens. 

Mr. MUELLER. We are in the initial stages of doing that, and I 

will tell you that our footprint is very small. We have very few, and 

of limited use, and we are exploring not only the use but also the 

necessary guidelines for that use. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Does the FBI use drones for surveillance on 

U.S. soil? 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes. 

Senator GRASSLEY. I want to go on to a question—— 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, let me just put it in context. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Sure. 

Mr. MUELLER. In a very, very minimal way and very seldom. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Okay. Currently it is a crime to purchase material for the production of illegal passports, to forge illegal passports, to distribute illegal passports, and to engage in other criminal activity that facilitates trafficking of false passports. The immigration bill before the Senate will weaken this current law. Under 

the bill, only those who produce, issue, or distribute three or more 

passports will have committed a crime. Under the bill, only those 

who forge, alter, or possess or use three or more passports will 

have committed a crime. Even more outrageous under the bill, only 

those who use any official material to make 10 or more passports 

will have committed a crime. 

Question: Will these changes in current law have a negative impact on counterterrorism or counterintelligence efforts of the FBI? 

Mr. MUELLER. I am not familiar with the current law, and even 

less so with the proposed law, so I would have to get back to you 

on that particular question. 
14 

Senator GRASSLEY. It would be very important that you get back 

to us in two or three days, because these are issues before Congress 

right now. 

Mr. MUELLER. I will try to, but I must say I am not certain we 

have that much experience in the prosecution under those statutes. 

But let me look at it, and we will try to get back to you in short 

order. 

[The information referred to appears as a submission for the 

record.] 

Senator GRASSLEY. Would you agree with this, that the weakening of current law creates a loophole that could allow terrorist 

groups such as al Qaeda or Hezbollah or other foreign spies to 

more easily operate within the United States? 

Mr. MUELLER. Without analyzing the bill, I really am not in a 

position to opine on it. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Okay. I will yield. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you very much. 

Senator Feinstein. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

You made several remarks as to the integrity and the service of the 

man before us. I cannot help but note it is the first time I have 

seen just one person at this very long table. I think that is due deference. 

Director Mueller, I first met you when I was mayor—and I think 

it was 30 years ago—and you were United States Attorney in San 

Francisco. I have watched your progress. I have watched you serve 

two Presidents, one Republican, one Democrat. I have watched 

your extraordinary integrity. I have watched you remove the FBI 

from certain interrogation having to do with detainees when you 

did not think it was appropriate. I consider you to be a man of high 

integrity and very strong values, and I think that you have brought 

that also and strengthened it in the organization you represent. 

I for one, and I think everyone, am very sad to see you go. You 

look young and vital to me, and—— 

Mr. MUELLER. I feel that way, too, I might add. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Well, that is good. I wanted to just have a 

talk with you about these two programs, because I go front and 

center with them as Chair of the Intelligence Committee of the 

Senate. And, you know, we have looked and tried to provide the 

oversight and see that they follow law. We had a classified briefing—and I will say one thing about it—for 47 members and had 

the former chief judge of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 

Court there to explain how the Court proceeds. 

I, as you do, believe that both these programs are legal, that they 

are carefully overseen. Senator Leahy mentioned the one that collects phone record data, not the names but the data, not the content but the data. Only 22 people have access to it, and it was 

queried approximately 300 times only this past year. 

You yourself mentioned that it was responsible and helped in 10 

to 12 percent of the 50 cases where the NSA has said it is helpful. 

I am asking you now for a qualitative judgment. I have made mine. 

How do you judge the 10 to 12 percent: as highly worth it or not 

worth it? 
15 

Mr. MUELLER. I think it is very difficult to judge a program in 

that particular way, particularly a program that will give you a key 

to preventing a terrorist attack. And how that one lead you have, 

how can you differentiate that from five or six or others that may 

come up in the same place? Which of those leads is going to be the 

one to help you disrupt a plot? 

In my mind, the communications capabilities of terrorists is the 

weakest link. If we are to prevent terrorist attacks, we have to 

know and be in their communications. Having the ability to identify a person in the United States, one telephone number with a 

telephone that the intelligence community is on in Yemen or Somalia or Pakistan or what have you may prevent that one attack, that 

Boston or that 9/11. And so, on the one hand, yes, it is relevant 

evidence; yes, it is critically important that we have that link. And 

then the question is: When you legislate it and you have this vast 

volume of records, how do you appropriately give oversight at the 

Justice Department in the National Security Division, in the Inspector General’s office, through the FISA Court, and through Congress. And I think anybody who looks at these programs wants to 

make sure they are legal, that they are effective, that there is appropriate oversight because it does raise national security and civil 

liberties concerns. 

But once you look at that, once you identify it, then are you 

going to take the dots off the table, make them unavailable to you 

when you are trying to prevent the next terrorist attack? That is 

a question for Congress. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Well, the way I looked at it, particularly with 

Nazibullah Zazi, was that this was an attack which could have 

killed hundreds if not thousands of people, that he was not going 

to be the lone perpetrator, that we know there were at least two 

conspirators who were going to participate in it. We know about 

other things that showed that there were going to be more people. 

And it seems to me that if we were not able to protect it and the 

New York subway were blown up in a number of different places, 

with hundreds of people or thousands of people literally being 

killed, that there would be no question as to its value and worth. 

I have come to believe that the only way we prevent these attacks is good intelligence. How do you get good intelligence when 

likely one of the conspirators is in another country, connected with 

a terrorist group, and one is in this country prepared to carry it 

out? So to me, the value of those programs in preventing loss of life 

in this country is substantial. 

Here is the question. Because you have that 10 to 12 percent, do 

you think it would be possible not to collect the database but to be 

able to query the database if the time for keeping that database 

was extended to five years with the phone companies? 

Mr. MUELLER. I know Keith Alexander and others are looking at 

the possibility of restructuring the program in this way. In my 

mind there are two disadvantages—maybe three. 

First of all, there is no records retention requirement on telephone companies at this point, and they are all over the lot. Some 

may do it—and I throw this out—18 months, some may be less, 

some may be more. And in that database that they keep will be 

those numbers that are calling the suspect numbers overseas. 
16 

Second, if you have a number in Yemen, that would require you 

to go to three or four or five or six particular carriers with separate 

legal paper and require them to come and pick up what they have 

collected and are keeping there and get back to you—the point 

being it will take an awfully long time. And in this particular area, 

when you are trying to prevent terrorist attacks, what you want is 

that information as to whether or not that number in Yemen is in 

contact with somebody in the United States almost instantaneously 

so you can prevent that attack. You cannot wait three months, six 

months, a year, to get that information and be able to collate it and 

put it together. Those are the concerns I have about an alternative 

way of handling this. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Well, let me ask you this: Is it 10 or 12 cases 

or 10 or 12 percent? 

Mr. MUELLER. Ten or 12 cases. I should have—— 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Ten or 12 cases. 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes, and some of them are two—I am not certain 

whether all of them are 215. They are a combination or one or the 

other. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. I see. Thank you. 

One other quick question. People are concerned about privacy. I 

think the greatest threat to the privacy of Americans is the drone 

and the use of the drone and the very few regulations that are on 

it today and the booming industry of commercial drones. 

You mentioned that you use it for surveillance. What are the privacy strictures on the use of drones by your agency today? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, it is very seldom used and generally used in 

a particular incident where you need the capability. I will have to 

go back and check in terms of what we keep in terms of the images 

and the like. But it is very narrowly focused on particularized cases 

and particularized needs in particularized cases, and that is the 

principal privacy limitations we have. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. I would like to get that information. I think 

it would be helpful to us legislatively. 

Mr. MUELLER. I will be happy to do that. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much. 

Senator FEINSTEIN [presiding]. Senator Hatch, you are next. 

Senator HATCH. Well, thank you so much, Madam Chairman. 

Well, I came here today basically to thank you for your service. 

I also want to thank Senator Feinstein for her kind remarks about 

you. Senator Feinstein has done an excellent job on the Intelligence 

Committee. Up until I left a few years ago, I believe I was the longest-serving person in history on the Intelligence Committee, so I 

have been fully aware of these matters. And all I can say is I want 

to pay tribute to you, General Alexander, and others in the intelligence community and the FBI for the work that you have done 

to protect our country and to ferret out these problems that really 

could have been very disastrous had we not had the abilities that 

you have been describing here today. 

But I also want to personally thank you for the terrific service 

you have given. I have watched you very carefully. I have been 

Chairman on this Committee. I have been Ranking Member on this 

Committee. I just have to say that I do not know that we have ever 

had an FBI Director as good as you are, and, frankly, every one 
17 

of us has confidence in you and your ability and your integrity. 

That is a pretty high comment, really, because we—and that is 

meant very, very sincerely. I have watched you over the years. I 

have watched the FBI do the job that in many ways they never get 

thanked for and really are not—in many ways people do not even 

know about it. It is a thankless job in many ways, and you have 

given almost 12 years of your life to this type of work. I just want 

to personally tell you how much I personally appreciate you and 

appreciate the FBI and those who have served with you all these 

years. And I wish you the very, very best when you finally do hang 

them up here, and I think all of us—or at least I can speak for 

most all of us, we just think you are terrific. 

I will not take any more time, but I just wanted to make sure 

I let you know just how deeply I feel toward you and those at the 

FBI who have been doing such a great job all these years. 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, thank you very much, Senator. I remember 

you chaired my confirmation hearing—I will not forget that—a 

number of years ago. But I have been very lucky and fortunate to 

have the opportunity to do this job, which I have loved and enjoyed, and thank you for those comments. 

Senator HATCH. Well, you have done a great job. Thank you. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator Hatch. 

Senator Klobuchar is next. I do not see her. Senator Franken is 

not here. Senator Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, those were kind comments, Director 

Mueller, and I would echo them. You know my admiration for you 

as a professional is exceedingly high, and you came to the office 

with the kind of skills, experiences that others have noted that 

gave you an opportunity to be very, very effective in this important 

position. So I really salute you for that. Your integrity is undoubted, and your experience and love of your country is undoubted. So I wanted to join in my comments in that regard. 

There are so many things that are happening now, and I think 

the FBI needs to rise to the occasion. The FBI is such a premier 

investigative agency. I had the honor to prosecute cases brought to 

me by FBI agents for almost 15 years, and I met with them personally for hours and weekends and nights and know how meticulously they work to do everything exactly right. And when I hear 

people have doubts, great doubts sometimes, about the integrity of 

the average cases and agents that I know, I know that is just not 

right. They try to do the right thing every day. If they are involved 

in anything seriously wrong, discipline will fall swift on them. They 

can make mistakes, and Congress sometimes creates circumstances 

that puts them in difficult positions, and life is tough for agents out 

there. But, fundamentally, day after day, I have worked with FBI 

agents. They are personal friends of mine, remain so for decades, 

and I just want to share those thoughts. 

Maybe you would like to comment about the fidelity of your 

agents. 

Mr. MUELLER. You are not going to find a better group of people 

to serve with. The testimony was most firmly felt when I was a 

new person in the institution. In the wake of September 11th and 

the organization, every agent, every analyst, every professional 

support staff worked flawlessly in response to that. And that was 
18 

just indicative of the capabilities of the organization and the quality of the people. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, I agree. Director Mueller, one of the big 

matters before the Nation today is the IRS scandal involving the 

actions that have been taken to target conservatives or Tea Party 

groups. It so happens that I know Becky Gerritson of the 

Wetumpka Tea Party, who testified before the House Committee. 

And she was a normal housewife, American citizen, who got deeply 

engaged in trying to make her country better. She loves this country. Her integrity is high. She was trying to do the right thing. And 

I believe that the IRS did not perform and handle their applications for status correctly. I believe it is a very serious matter, and 

I am concerned about it. 

You were asked last week, I believe, about this as to whether or 

not the victims, the potential victims of these abuses have been 

interviewed, and I believe you said no. I believe on May 14th Attorney General Holder said that an investigation had been commenced. Is the FBI the lead agency of the IRS matter? 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes. 

Senator SESSIONS. And you have designated agents in charge of 

that investigation? 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes, I have. 

Senator SESSIONS. And you were asked before whether you knew 

the names of those. Can you tell us those names or how many have 

been assigned to it? 

Mr. MUELLER. I can say that over a dozen agents have been assigned locally. I can tell you that it falls within the purview of Valerie Parlave, who is the Assistant Director in charge of our Washington office, who is in charge of this investigation at the field 

level; but we also have people at headquarters that are monitoring 

it. 

I cannot tell you who in the course of the investigation has been 

interviewed. I will tell you that before we initiated the investigation, if—and we did get complaints, those individuals were interviewed before we even initiated an investigation. And they would 

be the victims which you mentioned. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, the FBI is the right agency, in my opinion, without question. It should not be the internal IRS IG or others. And you have the independence to do that effectively, and I believe you can do that. But I called Ms. Gerritson this morning. It 

so happens she was discussing with a lawyer, and they said they 

have been talking to other so-called potential victims, and none of 

them have been interviewed, none of them have been contacted 

about an interview, even an appointment set up with them. I think 

that is pretty slow. I think the first thing you do from my experience is you go out and interview the people and find out what conversations they had, what documents they have, what the basis parameters of the problems are, and get busy on it. 

Do you think—it seems to me that you are running behind here. 

What would you say about that? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, I am not familiar with the day-in and dayout details of the investigation. Quite obviously, given what you 

have said, I will go back and see where that is. But also in these 

investigations, one of the first things you do, as you well know, as 
19 

a prosecutor is have the records so that when you do the interviews 

you have the requisite materials so that you can do an effective 

interview. 

Now, I am hypothesizing because I do not know what is happening at the level of who in particular is being interviewed. But 

I will go back and check on that. 

Senator SESSIONS. I think you need to get that level. I think it 

is too slow. And I think you can always have agents, well, we are 

getting our records together, and we are reviewing some—— 

Mr. MUELLER. No, I understand that. 

Senator SESSIONS. Somebody needs to go out and find out what 

the problem is, talk to the people and see what the problem is first. 

Mr. MUELLER. I tell you, there is urgency with the investigation. 

It is not languishing. 

Senator SESSIONS. All right. And I would share with Senator 

Grassley deep concern that this immigration bill would say for 

passports, which you should be aware of and they need to be on 

top of, only those who produce, issue, or distribute three or more 

passports have committed a crime. Under the bill, only those who 

forge, alter, and possess three or more passports will have committed a crime. And only those who use any official material to 

make 10 or more passports will have committed a crime. 

So I hope you will look at that. We would like the FBI’s advice 

if this makes it more difficult to produce integrity in the passport 

processing business. Would you look at that? 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes, will do. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes, will do. 

Chairman LEAHY [presiding]. Senator Klobuchar. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you so much, Director Mueller. Thank you for your wonderful service for the last 12 years. Thank you for the work that you 

have done in Minnesota. And I think the Nation was riveted with 

the work that you did and your agents did with Boston, so thank 

you for that. And I also noticed there were ATF agents there, so 

I am going to start with that. 

We just had a hearing for the President’s nominee for the head 

of the ATF. Do you think it would be helpful to have a permanent 

head of the ATF? 

Mr. MUELLER. I think it is always beneficial for the agency to 

have a permanent head. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Very good. Are you aware that since the position became confirmable that this Congress has not ever confirmed anyone for the job? 

Mr. MUELLER. I understand that. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Yes. And one of the ideas put out there, if 

they are just simply not going to or are unable to get bipartisan 

support for a nominee, enough, at least, to put us over the top so 

we get a confirmed nominee, is Senator Durbin’s idea to actually 

put the ATF under the FBI if for a number of years it goes without 

getting a confirmed Director. What would you think of that idea? 

Mr. MUELLER. That is something that would require a great deal 

of study before one wanted to embark on some sort of merger. 
20 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. I understand. I just think we are at the 

point where we have 2,400 agents who deserve a permanent head, 

and just as your agents have a permanent head, and I am hopeful 

we will be able to get this done this year. But I just wanted to put 

that out there for your people to think about because we are sort 

of left with, we hope, a confirmation ahead. But if that does not 

happen, we have to think of other ways to get this done. So I appreciate that. 

The other question—there have been several questions on the 

NSA issue, and I appreciated your comments earlier, I think it was 

to Chairman Leahy, about supporting declassifying, or working to 

do that, some of the FISA opinions. Is that correct? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, I have not been asked about the FISA opinions in particular. What we were talking about was the examples 

of where either 215 or 702 had been used. My understanding, 

though, is that the ODNI is looking at declassification possibilities 

with regard to the FISA Court orders, if that is what you are—— 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Yes, that is what I meant. 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. And so do you think that could work? 

Mr. MUELLER. I leave that—there was testimony in yesterday’s 

hearing before the House with regard to that ongoing process, and 

I would have to defer to the ODNI for an answer on that. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. I appreciate that, and I also appreciate the 

information that has been put out to show the number of terrorist 

attacks that have been averted. I think that is important for the 

public to understand exactly what is going here and get the facts 

right about the numbers. 

Can you talk about—and maybe you want to defer this to another time—the various checks throughout the process for data collection and analysis that people would understand would protect 

privacy? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, certainly if you look at 215, the significant 

figures, you do have a database. It just has metadata in it, numbers, it does not have any information with regard to who. It has 

those particular numbers, no content. You have just 22 persons 

who have access to this, to run the name—not the names, but run 

the numbers against the database, 20 analysts and two supervisors. And last year, there were only 300 inquiries, approximately 

300 inquiries made into that database. 

You then have overlapping and the overlay of oversight from the 

Department of Justice, the IG’s office, the FISA Court that renews 

215 every 90 days, and then, finally, the oversight from Congress. 

So each of the three branches of government have a role in assuring that privacy interests are protected here. 

And at the other end, you have the possibility, the strong possibility and the actuality that in some cases this has been instrumental in contributing to the prevention of terrorist attacks. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Thank you very much. 

Another issue we have talked about before is the problem of synthetic drugs. We have had deaths in Minnesota as they have had 

in many other States, a huge increase in the number of calls to the 

Poison Control line and others. And as you know, we passed some 

legislation targeting certain of these synthetic drugs, but I believe 
21 

there is still more work to be done, and I am working on the socalled analog drug provision where I think that we could do more 

with that. But could you update us on the general state of synthetic drug use in the U.S. and how the provisions we passed last 

year are helpful and what more you think we could do? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, I am somewhat familiar with that, know it 

is on the increase. I am not familiar with the last part of your 

question as to what more we could do. It is really not our bailiwick. 

It is more DEA. And particularly in the time of budget constraints 

where we have to prioritize, that unfortunately drops down further 

on our list. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Right, and we have been working with—— 

Mr. MUELLER. We are sympathetic and supportive, but I wish I 

could do more. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Right. We have been working with DEA on 

this issue. It is just that I continue to see that has not gone away, 

and it obviously contributes to other crime as well. So I just want 

to put it on your radar screen. 

We are working on a bill on metal theft. We have seen a lot of 

that throughout the country with buildings and issues, and I know 

you talked about high-tech stalkings, the cyber crime issue. And 

you have said you believe the FBI must change with evolving technology to better address criminal and national security threats. 

What is the FBI currently doing to keep up with the changes in 

technology? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, internally, let me just say we understand 

that we have to have the basic knowledge of technology to conduct 

investigations in this age. Every agent, to the extent that you need 

to be refreshed on where we are in order to do our job, is getting 

greater training. 

Our specialists, we have got more than 1,000 personnel around 

the country that are specialists in this particular area. But I think 

the key for us is the NCIJTF, National Cyber Investigative Joint 

Task Force. Following the pattern of what we did after September 

11th is understanding that we cannot do it alone. Having a task 

force concept where you have all of the major players in the cyber 

arena participating so that if there is a substantial intrusion, we 

immediately have those who would be involved, whether it be DHS, 

NSA, DOD, there trying to determine how to address it is critically 

important. 

The other thing that we have done and put a great deal of focus 

on in the last six to eight months is work with private industry, 

providing information to private industry based on what we have 

found so that they can protect their networks. So growing internally, growing the NCIJTF, and then building our capacity with 

the private sector have been the three areas that we have been focused on. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Okay. Thank you very much, and thank 

you again for your service. 

Mr. MUELLER. Thank you, ma’am. 

Senator FEINSTEIN [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Klobuchar. 

Senator Cruz. 

Senator CRUZ. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Director Mueller, it is good to see you. 
22 

Mr. MUELLER. Sir. 

Senator CRUZ. Welcome. Thank you for testifying. You and I 

have known each other a long time. A dozen years ago, you were 

my boss at the Department of Justice, although let me say any 

mistakes I may make, you will be fully held harmless. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. MUELLER. You were clean. Not to worry. 

Senator CRUZ. Well, and let me also echo the comments of colleagues of mine on both sides of the aisle thanking you for your 

service and your integrity. You have spent many decades in public 

service focused on law enforcement, and indeed, I recall when we 

were working together at the Department of Justice, almost every 

day in the morning at staff meeting, the question you would ask 

was essentially: Are we locking up bad guys? And I appreciate that 

focus to protecting the innocent and to going after bad guys, and 

thank you for a lifetime of service. 

Mr. MUELLER. Thank you, sir. 

Senator CRUZ. I want to talk about two topics that are both of 

significant importance. The first is the IRS, and I want to echo 

some of the concerns that Senator Sessions raised about the groups 

that we know were targeted by the IRS that are reporting that 

they have yet to be contacted or interviewed by the FBI. 

As you know well, in any investigation that is in a highly politicized climate, that involves potentially corruption and political interference from the White House, the investigation is a perilous endeavor and an endeavor of significant importance to the populace. 

And so I want to ask: What level of priority would you characterize 

the IRS investigation at the FBI? 

Mr. MUELLER. I would say it is as high priority investigation in 

that there are—it needs to be handled with care, but it also needs 

to be pushed aggressively because it is a very important case. 

As I think you are aware—we have worked together—I will pull 

no punches in terms of where that investigation would lead. And 

we would go down any path that would lead to evidence on individuals, organizations, or otherwise, and we are in the process of 

doing that. 

We have, I think, substantial numbers in terms of those who are 

working day in and day out on the investigation, both internally in 

the FBI but also with support from the Department of Justice 

where we need legal process. 

Again, I will have to get back to you in terms of—and as I said 

to Senator Sessions, in terms of the pace and progress of the interviews, but I am aware of some of the goings-on in the investigation, 

and I do believe that we have moved it expeditiously during the period of time we have had it open, which is probably about a month 

now. 

Senator CRUZ. How many agents or other personnel have 

been—— 

Mr. MUELLER. We have approximately 12 agents here in DC that 

are working on it, but also agents designated around the country 

because of the breadth of the investigation who also will be working on it, depending on where the investigation takes us around 

the country. 
23 

Senator CRUZ. And I wanted to ask additionally if the scope of 

the investigation includes looking into whether individuals have 

been politically targeted. I can tell you that we are hearing more 

and more anecdotal reports not just of Tea Party groups or conservative groups that were delayed or targeted in (c)(4) applications, 

but donors who supported Governor Romney in the campaign, who 

supported Republicans, who found within weeks or months of their 

support becoming public suddenly they were targeted for audits. 

Now, those are very difficult questions to answer if there is a 

pattern of doing so because those audits are not generally public. 

But do you know if the scope has included whether there was targeting of individuals for political activity by the IRS? 

Mr. MUELLER. I think you can understand that because it is an 

ongoing investigation, I am leery about delving into it much more 

about what is happening in the course of the investigation. All I 

can do is I assure you—and you know me—we will push it wherever it goes. 

Senator CRUZ. Well, I would certainly urge the FBI not to narrowly circumscribe the scope, because the last time there was an 

instance of an administration trying to use the IRS to target political enemies, it was the Nixon administration, and it led to grave 

consequences. And I think the FBI is well situated to pursue a serious, impartial, fair, and yet vigorous investigation of whatever the 

scope of conduct and illegal conduct may have been. 

Mr. MUELLER. Okay. 

Senator CRUZ. I want to talk about a second topic briefly, which 

is that I am concerned that this administration’s priorities in the 

war on terror have been misallocated; that, on the one hand, the 

administration has been less than vigorous in protecting the civil 

liberties and constitutional rights of law-abiding citizens; and yet, 

on the other hand, the administration has been less than effective 

in investigating and going after real live terrorists. And a concern 

in particular I have is that your efforts and those of the FBI have 

been unduly constrained and handcuffed. And I would point to two 

instance: one, the Fort Hood shooting, where we had with Major 

Hasan considerable evidence, including his emails with Anwar alAwlaki talking about killing other service members; the FBI was 

aware of that, and yet we failed to stop that terrorist attack. 

Likewise, with the Boston bombing, we had considerable evidence with the Tsarnaev brothers of their affiliation with radical 

Islamic views, their advocacy of those views. We had reports from 

Russia, and yet we failed to stop that attack. 

In your view, why is it that law enforcement was not able to connect the dots with Fort Hood and with Boston and prevent those 

attacks beforehand? And what policies have changed under the 

Obama administration concerning the investigation of radical Islamic terrorism? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, in neither case, whether it be Fort Hood or 

the Boston case, would I say that there were policies that inhibited 

us from doing our job. I will tell you in the Fort Hood case, prior 

to the time of Fort Hood al-Awlaki was seen as a proselytizer, a 

radical imam, but was not known to have engaged in operational 

activities. Consequently, when we looked at emails, we did not look 
24 

at them through the operational prism. Had we done so, perhaps 

other steps would have been taken. 

There were judgment calls that were made in the course of that, 

for instance, whether you interview Hasan, that in retrospect could 

have gone the other way. But I do not think that there were any 

constraints, statutory or otherwise, that enabled us—or disabled us 

from doing the job. 

In the case of Boston, yes, we were alerted by the Russians to 

Tamerlan’s movement toward radicalization, and the expectation 

from the Russians was that he was being radicalized and would be 

going back to Russia to fight with perhaps the Chechens. They 

alerted us they wanted us to do what investigation we could and 

alert Tamerlan when—or alert the Russians when Tamerlan went 

back to Russia. 

We did an investigation based on what the Russians gave us. 

That investigation required going through all of the databases, 

went to the university or the college that he attended for a period 

of time, interviewed his parents, interviewed him, did, I think, a 

very rational, responsible, and thorough investigation given the information we had. 

He then goes back to Russia, and when he comes back, what we 

did not do, which we are going to do in the future, is the TECS 

alerts that come into the task force have to be identified to a particular person as opposed to just coming into a task force. 

In any event, there is nothing that constrained our investigation 

at the outset back in 2011, and in my mind, even if we had done 

the one or two things that in retrospect we could have done better, 

I do not think we would have been able to stop that particular attack. But I do not believe we were in any way constrained from 

doing the investigation that we thought necessary once we had the 

information. 

Senator CRUZ. Thank you. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE [presiding]. Senator Franken, your timing 

is perfect. You are next in order. 

Senator FRANKEN. Thank you. I apologize for—I was at a HELP 

Committee hearing, and I am sorry I missed—and I hope I do not 

ask things that have been asked before, but my staff tells me that 

my questions are still relevant. 

First of all, I just want to thank you for your service, Mr. Director, and I believe our country is a safer place because of your 

steady leadership. 

Mr. MUELLER. Thank you. 

Senator FRANKEN. You will be missed. 

I would like to turn to the subject of the surveillance programs 

that my other colleagues have been discussing. Mr. Director, I believe the government must give proper weight to both keeping 

Americans safe from terrorists and protecting Americans’ privacy, 

and part of weighing that properly is making sure that there is 

enough transparency, I believe, so that Americans understand the 

protections that are in place. 

Based on the briefings I have received, I believe these programs 

include reasonable safeguards, but I believe the government needs 

to be more transparent with the American people about these programs. And I think the American people have the right to know 
25 

what is going on, to the extent that is consistent with national security; and I believe that the government can and should provide 

that information, again, in a way that does not compromise our security. 

Director Mueller, do you think that the government could be 

more transparent to the American public about these surveillance 

programs in a way that is consistent with national security? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, there are two levels of transparency. The 

first is transparency throughout the government, and transparency 

to certainly the FISA Court—it is under the FISA Court—and also 

transparency to Congress. And given the briefings and the like, I 

think there was transparency to those elements. 

Now, when you talk about transparency to the American public, 

you are going to give up something. You are going to be giving signals to our adversaries as to what our capabilities are. And the 

more specific you get about the programs and the more specific you 

get about the oversight, the more specific you get about the capabilities and the successes, to that extent you have people sitting 

around saying, okay, now I understand what can be done with our 

numbers in Yemen and in the United States, and consequently I 

am going to find another way to communicate, and I am going to 

keep that in my mind. And so there is a price to be paid for that 

transparency. 

Now, where that line is drawn in terms of identifying what our 

capabilities are is out of our hands. You tell us to do it one way; 

we will do it that way. But there is a price to be paid for that 

transparency. 

Senator FRANKEN. And that is the question, and in order to do 

these programs, you need the trust of the people. And, of course, 

this all changes when there is a disclosure like there has been, and 

that is why we have obviously seen NSA be more forthcoming with 

that kind of transparency that I have been asking for. 

I want to ask you specifically about Section 215, the authority in 

the PATRIOT Act that authorized the collection of telephone 

metadata. Importantly, by statute, only the FBI has the authority 

to request business records under Section 215. It is not the Director 

of National Intelligence. It is not the Attorney General. It is the Director of the FBI. 

Last week, Director Clapper declassified the fact that the telephone metadata collected can be queried only when ‘‘there is a reasonable suspicion based on specific facts that the particular basis 

for the query is associated with a foreign terrorist organization.’’ 

He also declassified the fact that in 2012 this database was 

searched only 300 times. 

Mr. Director, this is the kind of information that I think the 

American public benefits from knowing and that can build further 

trust between the public and the Government. Do you think that 

that kind of information would have compromised—would be compromising before the disclosure? 

Mr. MUELLER. I certainly think it would be educating our adversaries on what our capabilities are, and the specificity that the dialogue—and you have to with the leak, because the leak looks at 

just a small sliver of information on a particular program. A leak 

does not talk about all of the oversight. A leak does not talk about 
26 

all of the legal constraints in terms of how the program operates. 

One has to respond, so there has to be responsive transparency in 

this particular instance—at this particular point in time, but, generally, no. It educates the persons, as I say, about our capabilities 

and makes it that much harder to prevent the next terrorist attack. 

And I will tell you that inevitably the communications are the soft 

underbelly of the terrorists. They have got to communicate. And to 

the extent that we can intercept those communications, to that extent we can prevent terrorist attacks. If that goes dark on us, if we 

are black, then we are going to be sitting waiting for the next one 

without the tools we need to prevent that attack. 

Senator FRANKEN. I understand your view on that. 

Let me ask a similar question. I have cosponsored bipartisan legislation to release, again, consistent with national security—and 

this is—I am asking you your judgment on this. The Court opinions 

interpreting key provisions in the PATRIOT Act and the FISA Intelligence Surveillance Act, I think what is hard here is that it is 

hard for Americans to debate the merits of a law when the law is 

kind of secret. Do you believe that the American people would gain 

trust and benefit from perhaps a redacted version of these decisions and opinions by the FISA Court on some of them? 

Mr. MUELLER. Let me start by saying I understand the frustration. You are right, the American people are frustrated. You may 

be frustrated not having access to the particular legal theories espoused in those opinions. 

I do know that the ODNI is looking at the possibility of releasing 

redacted copies. The lawyer for the ODNI spoke yesterday at the 

hearing and indicated that they are reviewing at least the key 

opinion or opinions with regard to 215 and 702 to see whether that 

can be accomplished. So I have to defer to the ODNI on that. 

Senator FRANKEN. Okay. And, again, that is in the context of 

them already being disclosed, so—— 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, the opinions, I do not think—I do not think 

the opinions—maybe—— 

Senator FRANKEN. The opinions have not been disclosed, but the 

programs being disclosed. 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes, yes. 

Senator FRANKEN. Okay. Well, thank you again, and since this 

may be the last time you testify before us, I again want to thank 

you for your steadfast leadership and your service. 

Mr. MUELLER. Thank you. 

Senator FRANKEN. Thank you. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Senator Lee. 

Senator LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Director 

Mueller, for joining us today and for your service to our country. 

With respect to Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act, is it the Bureau’s practice to request records or other tangible things related 

to Americans that themselves are not relevant to an investigation 

to obtain foreign intelligence information or to protect against 

international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities? 

Mr. MUELLER. I am not certain I understand the question. Are 

you talking—— 

Senator LEE. When you make a request—— 

Mr. MUELLER. The applicants on 215 orders, but—— 
27 

Senator LEE. I understand. You are the applicants, and when 

you make the application, is it your practice to request things that 

themselves are not relevant to the investigation? In other words, 

do you confine your requests to those things that are related to an 

investigation, or are they broader than that? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, in the 215 context, the application to the 

Court and the Court’s finding defines relevance in that particular 

context, and as we have talked about and as has been discussed 

for the last two weeks. And so I would have to direct you to the 

orders and the—I know that they are not published, but the fact 

that the FISA Court has ruled that the gathering of the metadata 

satisfies the relevance definition within the FISA statute. 

Senator LEE. Right, right. And so with that understanding that 

you necessarily do cover a lot of data that is itself not closely tied 

to an investigation, you can understand why a lot of people would 

be concerned and why they would also have additional concerns 

about the fact that we have got not only secret data-gathering activities going on but also that they are undertaken pursuant to secret law, secret orders that the American people cannot have access 

to. 

But if, as we have been told, it is necessary for the government 

to collect and store really vast quantities of information, including 

information on Americans that is itself unrelated to foreign intelligence or terrorism investigations, then—— 

Mr. MUELLER. If I may interrupt, are you talking about the 

metadata? 

Senator LEE. Yes. 

Mr. MUELLER. The telephone numbers? I want to make certain 

we are talking about that, not content. 

Senator LEE. Yes. Yes, for now we are talking about the 

metadata. A lot of people have concerns about what, if any, limiting 

principles there are that would prevent the government from ultimately storing all information about all Americans, meaning just 

collecting more and more of this metadata and holding it for very 

long periods of time or perhaps at some point in perpetuity. 

Does the Department of Justice or does the FBI have a view on 

the constitutionality of gathering information on Americans and 

storing it so long as it does not perform queries on that information? 

Mr. MUELLER. I think I understand the broader question. I would 

say that the Justice Department believes that the program in 

place, 215 program, that has been upheld by the FISA Court is certainly constitutional. I would limit it to that set of facts because 

they are a discrete set of facts that with the attendant protections 

on privacy, that I think the Department of Justice as well as the 

FISA court believe absolutely it is constitutional. 

Senator LEE. And at some point, do you sympathize with those 

who would say even if this is metadata, the fact that you can collect that quantity of metadata, store it for a long period of time, 

and the fact that it can later be searched causes—brings about a 

certain intrusion on privacy, even if it is a privacy intrusion perhaps not cognizable in court? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, as you well know better than most, in Smith 

v. Maryland it is not protected by the Fourth Amendment. So, yes, 
28 

sir, without a question about privacy concerns, but I would say 

they are de minimis privacy concerns compared to just about every 

other intrusion, as you get more predication in an investigation. In 

fact, it is at the bottom level. Do I think that it would be concerning to people to know that there is a database? Absolutely, 

which is why I do believe that it is important that this is upheld 

by not just the Department of Justice, not necessarily just by the 

Inspectors General, but also by the FISA Court and Congress. 

Senator LEE. Okay. And, you know, I think it is important to remember also that the precedent you cited is, of course, decades old 

and it did not deal with the sheer volume of metadata that we are 

now talking about. The technologies that are at issue now did not 

exist then, certainly were not even contemplated then. And the 

more you aggregate large quantities of metadata, potentially on 

every single American citizen, and you give someone within the executive branch of government the power to search all of that, you 

do give them a pretty broad view into the lives of the American 

people. The more data you get, the more you add to that metadata, 

even if any one of those data points might be itself constitutionally 

insignificant, don’t you think you start to approximate a point at 

which you start to breach a reasonable expectation of privacy? 

Mr. MUELLER. I certainly believe that there quite probably is a 

scale, yes, but it was the same dialogue we had 20, 30 years ago 

about telephone toll records which triggered the Smith v. Maryland 

case. And it is the same debate, albeit with metadata as opposed 

to telephone toll records, but you have pretty much the same piece 

of data in both cases. So I would argue that Smith, even though 

it is not exactly the same as a telephone toll record, the proposition 

that was espoused by the Supreme Court in Smith v. Maryland, is 

applicable today. The comparable—— 

Senator LEE. Did we have—— 

Mr. MUELLER. The comparable data, let me just put it that way. 

Senator LEE. Right. Did we have the capacity to gather, analyze, 

and store in perpetuity that kind of metadata on every single 

American citizen at that point? 

Mr. MUELLER. It would have been tremendously burdensome to 

do so at that point. You could do it, but it would be wholly ineffective. One of the differences today compared to 20 years ago is it 

was in the telephone company’s interest to maintain telephone toll 

data because their billing was based on telephone toll data. Today 

that is no longer the case. In fact, the telephone companies see it 

as a burden, a storage burden, and, consequently, that information 

that was there in the telephone companies 20 years ago may well 

not be there today absent 215. 

Senator LEE. Okay. Thank you very much, Director Mueller. I 

see my time has expired. Thank you. And thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Senator Hirono. 

Senator HIRONO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I join my colleagues in thanking you, Director Mueller, for your 

service, and I extend my aloha to you in your future endeavors. 

I appreciate the fact that this kind of data that is collected, particularly under Section 215, could be helpful in connecting the dots. 

And, yes, it is hard to figure out which dot might be the critical 
29 

dot that helps you to foil a plot. So I have a question about, to the 

best of your knowledge, what are the costs of collecting and storing 

data gathered under Sections 215 and 702 of both your agency as 

well as NSA? 

Mr. MUELLER. I would think you would have to turn to NSA to 

respond to that question. I am not familiar with what it costs. 

Senator HIRONO. What about to your department, to the FBI? 

Mr. MUELLER. We do not do the storage. NSA stores the 215 

data. 

Senator HIRONO. What about the collecting part? 

Mr. MUELLER. The collecting? 

Senator HIRONO. Yes, collecting of the data. 

Mr. MUELLER. It goes directly to NSA. The order directs that the 

data go to NSA. 

Senator HIRONO. So while you are the applicant for the collection 

of this data, it is NSA that I should ask about what the costs attendant to the data collection are. 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes. 

Senator HIRONO. Do you know how long the data collected under 

215 is kept? 

Mr. MUELLER. Five years. 

Senator HIRONO. Just five years? Do you think it should be 

longer? 

Mr. MUELLER. No. 

Senator HIRONO. Okay. 

Mr. MUELLER. I also do not think it should be shorter. 

Senator HIRONO. Okay. Now, part of your department—FBI’s 

purview is prosecutions in Indian country, and you talked about 

that briefly in your testimony. And the Department of Justice recently issued a report on investigations and prosecutions in Indian 

country during 2011 and 2012, and this is a report mandated by 

the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010. And it seems that while 

there has been a noticeable increase in the number of violent 

crimes prosecuted, those new figures do not reflect that one-third 

of all reported Indian country crimes were closed administratively 

by the FBI before they ever reached the formal referral stage. 

Moreover, approximately 80 percent of those investigations that 

were administratively closed were violent crime related. 

Can you shed some light on the reasons why so many FBI Indian 

country investigations are closed before referral to DOJ and specifically ways in which your department can better address and investigate violent crime in Indian country, which is still a very big 

problem? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, I think we all understand it is a very big 

problem, and I know the Department of Justice, in particular the 

Attorney General and the Deputy Attorney General, this is one of 

their substantial priorities, which is why you see an increase of 

prosecutions in Indian country. 

I will have to get back to you on the figures relating to administrative closures. I am not certain if there has been an uptick in the 

number of administrative closures, why that is there. It may be 

consistent with the fact that we have done additional prosecutions. 

With additional prosecutions, there is additional scrutiny of the underlying case which has resulted in administrative closures. But I 
30 

would be just speculating. I would have to get back to you after 

looking at the issue. 

Senator HIRONO. Yes, considering that this is a major issue in Indian country and to realize that in this report so many of these 

cases are closed, I am curious to know why. So could you provide 

that information to our Committee? 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes. 

Senator HIRONO. Senator Feinstein had a concern about the use 

of drones, and particularly with regard to the use of drones by the 

private sector. Do we have any special or specific legislation governing the use of drones by the private sector? 

Mr. MUELLER. I am not aware of any. 

Senator HIRONO. Do you think that we should be thinking about 

federal legislation to protect individuals’ privacy with regard to the 

use of drones by the private sector? 

Mr. MUELLER. I think there are a number of issues relating to 

drones that are going to have to be debated in the future as they 

become more omnipresent, not the least of which is the drones in 

airspace and the concerns you have on that, but also the threat on 

privacy. We already have to a certain extent a body of law that relates to aerial surveillance and privacy relating to helicopters and 

small aircraft and the like, which I think could well be adapted to 

the use of drones. But it is still in nascent stages, the debate, but 

it is worthy of debate and perhaps legislation down the road. 

Senator HIRONO. Especially as the hearing that we had in one 

of our committees—I think it was this one—where these drones can 

be very, very tiny but store a lot of data and there could be cameras on it. I think this is a burgeoning concern for many of us. 

With regard to the data that is collected under Section 215, in 

particular the millions and millions of pieces of information collected, NSA indicated that there were 300 queries that were made 

with regard to this data, and they have to forward those queries 

to you, and 10 to 12 cases were referred to you? 

Mr. MUELLER. They will refer them to us when they have a U.S. 

number that comes out of their query. 

Senator HIRONO. I think as a lay person, I am having some difficulty understanding what the process is, what NSA does with all 

this information, where you come in. There is some nexus between 

the NSA looking at this data, 300 queries, and then forwarding to 

you, say, 10 to 12 cases where they see some further investigation 

needs to occur. So what happens to all these other cases that— 

other numbers that were queried by NSA? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, when you are talking about 10 or 12 cases, 

these are cases where the identification of a number led to a terrorist case or corroborated other information we had in a terrorist 

case. But if you have NSA on a number in Yemen, for instance, and 

they want to know who from the United States is in contact with 

that number, you have got that number in Yemen, they take that 

number in Yemen and they run it against the database of numbers 

to see whether there is any number in the United States that is 

contacting that number in Yemen. And when that number comes 

out—we mentioned a couple of examples here—in, say, San Diego, 

they will refer it to us and say that there is a number in San Diego 

that is in contact with this number in Yemen which is terrorist re-
31 

lated. We then go get a National Security Letter or other paper to 

determine who has that number, who is the subscriber to that 

number. And once we get the subscriber to that number, then we 

will build the investigation. 

That is, in simplified form, what the process is about. But absent 

that capability, we would never identify that person in San Diego 

who is in contact with a terrorist group in Yemen, and that is what 

we did not pick up in 2001 where the intelligence community was 

on a number in Yemen and this individual, al-Mihdhar, ended up 

being in the United States, and had we had that program in place, 

we might well have picked up al-Mihdhar. 

Senator HIRONO. So, in your view, in spite of the fact that there 

are literally billions of pieces of information collected and, in your 

view, the dot-connecting possibilities justify this kind of breadth of 

data collection? 

Mr. MUELLER. Given all the precautions, given all of the constraints on the program, given the oversight of the program, yes. 

But it is the program as a whole, not just the fact of the accumulation of the records, but how it is handled and what kind of information comes from it. 

I was asked earlier today, Why did we miss Boston? Why did we 

miss Fort Hood? There can be one piece of information that comes 

out of it that would prevent the attack. People will say that we 

were not sufficiently attentive to al-Awlaki email traffic; had we 

been, we would have stopped Fort Hood. 

So to the extent that this provides dots for us to connect, it is 

very useful. You never know which dot is going to be the one that 

breaks the case. And to the extent that you remove the dots from 

the playing field, we just do not have those dots to connect. 

Senator HIRONO. I certainly understand that. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Senator Flake. 

Senator FLAKE. Thank you, and I want to echo the sentiments 

of my colleagues in thanking you for your long and dedicated service. I was fortunate to be on the Judiciary Committee in the House, 

and we had interactions there, and I have enjoyed the association 

we have had, and your candor always here, and I appreciate that. 

I feel kind of like—well, I grew up with 10 brothers and sisters, 

and when the dessert plate is passed around and you are the last 

one and all the dessert is gone, and in this case all the questions 

have been asked and, to your credit, answered. I had some questions with regard to the information being held and how long, but 

you have pretty much answered those. But there was one thing 

that I still wanted to ask. This 215 has been around since 2001 in 

some fashion? 

Mr. MUELLER. Probably 2001, 2002, but in this fashion since I 

think 2007. 

Senator FLAKE. Okay. How has the legal interpretation, internal 

interpretation—you rely on your own memos that you produce to 

interpret 215 and what you are able to ask and what kind of standard is applied. Has that changed over time since 2007 or perhaps 

before? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, prior to 2007—I am not certain what year 

it happened, but it was placed within the FISA Court, I think, be-
32 

ginning in 2007. And while, yes, the Justice Department has made 

application to the FISA Court, the FISA Court has interpreted 215 

to allow this program. So it is not just the Justice Department 

opining on what it thinks 215 means. It is the FISA Court that has 

issued opinions saying this is the appropriate interpretation of 215. 

Senator FLAKE. All right. One question on the holding of data. 

You hold it for five years, and if it has not been queried or minimized during that period, then you get rid of it. 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes. 

Senator FLAKE. But that—— 

Mr. MUELLER. NSA holds it. 

Senator FLAKE. NSA, yes. But that which has been queried and 

then duly minimized where appropriate, I assume that can be 

queried again and again during that five-year period. You say last 

year it was queried 300 times. It is the same information basically 

that—or the same database, the same metadata that is queried 

again and again. 

Mr. MUELLER. But the database is refreshed each day, so that 

which is five years old is dismissed from the database, and the 

database picks up new numbers. 

Senator FLAKE. All right. So it is just a rolling five-year period. 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes. 

Senator FLAKE. Anything older than five years—— 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes, which enables us to go back—you may have 

a number called in—for instance, al-Mihdhar out of San Diego 

made the call to the Yemen telephone number back in, I think, earlier in 2000. And so you needed that number in that database from 

a year before in order to tie in that particular number to the terrorist number in Yemen. And so it gives us that database for a period of time, which has the relevant information in it. 

If you go to one of the providers, they may keep it for six months, 

may keep the data for 12 months, 16 months or 18 months, something along those lines. And so you would not be able to get the 

same data from the telephone carriers because they have no data 

retention responsibilities as you would get when we have that fiveyear database. 

Senator FLAKE. All right. Well, thank you. Just in conclusion, 

your service will end sometime in September? 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes. 

Senator FLAKE. What advice would you give to this body in terms 

of what changes are needed moving forward in how we handle situations like this? Obviously, this came as a shock to most of the 

country that this kind of data was being collected in terms of—and 

you have concerns, and I share them, about too much information 

being out there. But what is the proper balance for this body to inform or to keep the citizens aware enough that their rights and 

their civil liberties are protected, but that we are also giving the 

appropriate federal agencies the tools that they need to thwart attacks? Is there any advice that you would give that you have not 

given before? 

Mr. MUELLER. No, I would—the only thing I would say is that 

there are levels of transparency in this particular case where it is 

not necessarily always the case, it was not only Department of Justice, not only the Inspectors General—and we have had Inspector 
33 

General reports on these particular programs—but the FISA Court 

and Congress and various committees in Congress. And to the extent that each of those entities is brought into the loop and knows 

and understands, is able to question to a certain extent assuring 

that these entities have coverage, the American public has to put 

some faith in these institutions. You are always going to have those 

areas of—classified areas where it does not make any difference 

whether it is the cyber arena or the military arena or the intelligence arena like this, that disclosing our secrets will make us 

that much more vulnerable. There is always going to be a level of 

frustration. 

The only other thing I would say is that there are going to be 

additional terrorist attacks. One of the most debilitating things for 

those of us in this particular—in our positions is to try your 

darnedest to prevent it but there be an attack, and then you are 

immediately attacked for why didn’t you do more. And we always 

believe, regardless of the attack, that it is incumbent upon us and 

others to go back and do a scrub and see what we could have done 

better. But the tone of how you do that and the way that you do 

it would be helpful to those of us who worry about this day and 

night. 

Senator FLAKE. Thank you. And thank you for your service. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Senator Durbin. 

Senator DURBIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Director Mueller, thank you so much for your service. I have enjoyed working with you over the years. I recall in particular when 

you arrived at the FBI after 9/11 and I took note of the fact that 

the computer system at the premier investigative agency for law 

enforcement in the United States of America on 9/11 was as archaic as anything anyone could imagine. The computer system you 

inherited at the FBI had no access to the Internet, had no word 

search capability, and was unable to transmit materials and documents. The photographs of the suspected terrorists on 9/11 were 

sent to the FBI offices across America by overnight mail because 

they could not be sent by the computer system that you inherited. 

We had many conversations, some attempts, some missteps. Tell 

me today, where are we 12 years later in terms of the computer 

system of your agency? 

Mr. MUELLER. One of the reasons for staying the last couple 

years was to get over the hump in terms of the computer systems. 

We have this computer system called Sentinel that has been operative for the last two years. It is cutting edge in terms of case management. Many of our other programs we are not only upgrading 

but are not incorporating in a much more effective network. But I 

will tell you, one of the most frustrating aspects of this job is trying 

to adapt new technology in an institution that has unique business 

practices and to try to modify those business practices at the same 

time—and upgrade those business practices at the same time you 

are trying to adapt to new technology, particularly with the contracting mechanisms within the Federal Government where, if you 

have a five-year contract, things are going to change, new technologies are going to come along. And the fact of the matter is 

there is very little room in those contracts for any ability to change 

to adapt to the times. 
34 

But if you had seen—I vividly remember being in our intelligence—what we call SIOC—intelligence operations room on September 11th and the paper stacked up, and in Boston we were back 

in the same place, and there is not a piece of paper to be seen. And 

also to the credit of the Bureau, the ability to identify those two 

individuals in Boston within 48 hours after it occurred, utilizing 

the various technologies in our laboratory as well as up there is, 

I think, testimony to the fact—testament to the fact that we have 

come a long way. Still a ways to go, but we have come a long way. 

Senator DURBIN. Well, let me just say for the record, in addition 

to bringing integrity to the position, which you have, in addition to 

helping keep America safe with an extraordinary degree of success, 

I think your legacy is going to include this, that the information 

technology available in your department is now meeting 21st century standards, where when you inherited it, it was, as you say, 

a creation of ‘‘unique business practices.’’ I think you are being very 

kind in that characterization. 

Mr. MUELLER. Can I just add one thing? We are okay today, but 

as you well know, technology costs money. And with sequestration, 

I will put in another plug; this is an issue that all too often gets 

overlooked and perhaps cut, and it should not be because you cannot run an institution like ours unless you stay current with the 

latest technology. 

Senator DURBIN. Sequestration, the way it has been characterized, the way it has been implemented, is a pervasive problem. I 

met yesterday with Director Clapper, and he talked about the impact of sequestration on doing checks on employees for security 

clearances. We have had to reduce the number of checks of those 

current employees when it comes to security. And now we are dealing with one former contractual employee who has disclosed things 

which were very important to our national security. 

Speaking of that issue, on Section 215, which you have been 

queried about quite a bit, I have offered an amendment over the 

years to try to limit the metadata collection in terms of specific suspicion. That was the original standard. It eventually was changed 

with FISA Act reauthorization. 

But yesterday the Department of Justice—I hope you are aware 

of—released publicly, according to reports we have, the standards 

for searching the database of phone records when there is ‘‘reasonable suspicion’’ based on specific and articulated facts that the information sought is ‘‘associated with a specific foreign terrorist organization.’’ The standard that they released yesterday, which they 

are now going to use, is actually stricter than the standard that I 

have been proposing over the years for the limitations on 215. 

Can Section 215, do you believe, be revised to require connection 

to a suspected terrorist without affecting the ability to obtain useful information? 

Mr. MUELLER. I am a little bit confused because what we call the 

‘‘selector,’’ the telephone number that is run against the database, 

has to be identified as being—how do I say it?—meeting the reasonable suspicion standard with regard to terrorist attacks, that 

particular phone number, that is an appropriate standard for that 

particular phone number, because you cannot pick a phone number 
35 

out of the blue or for some other thing. You have to have it tied 

into terrorism, and then it is pushed against the database. 

Now, I do not know whether your standard as you were supporting it is the standard you apply to collection of the records or 

the standard you apply to identifying the selector against the— 

what you are going to use—what you are going to put against the 

database. So if you—— 

Senator DURBIN. Our standard is on the collection of the records. 

Mr. MUELLER. See, I think that is a little bit different. The 

standard we are talking about here is the identification of the selector that you are going to run against that database of records. 

Senator DURBIN. So if the provider, if the telephone provider, for 

example, were to retain the records for five years and you would 

have access, through our government agencies and through our 

processes, to access those records for government purposes if there 

is a suspicion, would that meet the needs of collecting the information to keep us safe? 

Mr. MUELLER. Not in the same way the program does now for 

several reasons. First of all, you would have to go to a number of 

telephone companies. You would have to get legal process and go 

to a number of telephone companies. Then you have to hope that 

those telephone companies have some records retention capability. 

I can assure you it is not going to be five years. 

Senator DURBIN. Not today. 

Mr. MUELLER. Not today. 

Senator DURBIN. It could be required of them, though. 

Mr. MUELLER. It could be. It could be. I am not saying it could 

not be done, but you are asking me if there is a distinction between 

the program run today and how you propose to perhaps amend it. 

And there are some downsides. You know, the balance is for Congress to decide, but there are downsides in terms of the time it 

would take to serve it, the time it would take for them to get it, 

and in every one of these cases, time is of the essence. You do not 

want to have to delay six months or a year to get the information 

to prevent the next terrorist attack. 

Senator DURBIN. You have been very patient with your time, and 

I thank you for your service, Director Mueller. 

Mr. MUELLER. Thank you. 

Senator DURBIN. I wish you the best. 

Mr. MUELLER. Thank you. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. So I am last, Director. 

Mr. MUELLER. Happily so. Happily so. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Good to see you. There are three topics I 

want to touch on. 

The first has to do with the investigation into the conduct of the 

IRS. The background to this is that the tax laws allow you to form 

up as a charity under Section 501(c)(3), but if you want to lobby, 

you have got to form up under 501(c)(4). And then if you actually 

want to electioneer, you have got to form a so-called super PAC. 

The difference between a 501(c)(4) and a super PAC, as you 

know, is that a super PAC is required to disclose its donors. So 

what developed was a pattern of folks filing as a 501(c)(4) but then 

going out and electioneering as if they were a super PAC. And the 

problem with doing that is that there is a place on the form, when 
36 

you file for a 501(c)(4), that requires you to assert and aver under 

oath that you will not seek to influence elections and so forth. 

So there appears to me—we had a hearing on this in the Committee—to be almost a lay-up case for 18 U.S.C. 1001 false statement violations based on what appear on their surface—again, this 

requires investigation before you can make any final determination, but it appears on the surface that these are flagrantly false 

statements made under oath to a government agency for the purpose of misrepresenting the intentions of those forming the 

501(c)(4). 

That never comes to the FBI because there is an agreement between the Department of Justice and the IRS that unless the IRS 

has put a case together and forwarded it, we are not going to look 

at it. And I think the 501(c)(4) applicants were taking advantage 

of that, and the IRS was feeling a bit intimidated because there 

were some very powerful people in this country on both sides of the 

aisle behind the problem, behind the 501(c)(4) problem. 

So I hope that as you are looking at the IRS question, part of 

what you are looking at is whether or not something that, as you 

and I both know, is really a plain vanilla prosecution, a false statement case, is something that the FBI should turn away from because the IRS has not yet referred it when it is kind of out in the 

plain light of day. And I hope that you will consider that question 

as the IRS investigation moves forward. 

It may not be the kind of question that leads to a charge. It may 

not be purely investigative. But I think it is an important policy 

question, and I think it is important for the American people to 

know that when people are doing something that appears on its 

face—again, subject to rigorous investigation and proof, but appears on its face to be a flagrant false statement, the answer from 

the government, ‘‘Yes, but it was not referred to us in the right 

way,’’ is not a very convincing answer to what appears to be a fairly blatant criminal act—not a very major one, but a very blatant 

one. 

So I would like to ask your comment on that, if that is something 

that you will consider as part of your look at this. 

Mr. MUELLER. I am not familiar with any such agreement. I will 

have to look at that and discuss it and see what—— 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Okay. We will make that a question for 

the record, and you can get back to me later. 

Mr. MUELLER. Fine. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Now, the second is we met recently with 

some of your folks, some of the Department of Justice folks, in the 

Office of Management and Budget to try to figure out how our prosecutorial and investigative law enforcement resources should be 

structured to focus on the cyber problem. And in the time that I 

have been in the Senate, six years now, I have watched that administrative structure morph really almost every year to something 

new, something different. And I have been out to NCIJTF and 

some of your facilities, and I applaud and am impressed by how 

hard the FBI works to keep track of who is coming in the doors 

and windows attacking our country and our companies and trying 

to get those alerts out as quickly as they can to the companies that 

are being attacked and having their intellectual property stolen. 
37 

But it has not resulted in a lot of prosecutions, and as best I know, 

there is not a single case that has ever been prosecuted of a pure 

industrial espionage, cybersecurity attack from outside the country 

on an American company. 

There has always been something involved, a CD that got stuck 

in somebody’s pocket, but the pure hack, I am not aware of a case 

that has been made yet, and that is a question I ask pretty frequently. 

I think this is a boom area. I am delighted and pleased that the 

administration in a time when most other parts of the government 

are being asked to cut, is actually investing more in cybersecurity 

at the FBI, at the Department of Justice, at the NSA, at the Department of Defense, and at other places, because it is a huge vulnerability, I believe. And I know you are on your way out, but I 

hope that one of your departing messages to the Bureau will be we 

need to keep looking forward to see what our structure should be 

to take on this threat in the years ahead. I do not think we are 

there yet. I think we have made immense progress. I think we are 

in a state of constant flux as we try to adapt to the problem. But 

when you look at a problem that is described by very senior officials as us being on the losing end of the biggest transfer of wealth 

by illicit means in human history, basically because the Chinese 

are raiding our corporations and stealing our intellectual property 

in a nutshell, that is a pretty serious problem set. And it is only 

going to get worse because it has its transnational sabotage and its 

multinational criminal components as well. And I hope that you 

guys have an open mind and have somebody detailed to looking forward and saying, ‘‘What does this look like down the road? How 

should this be structured so we are really after it?’’ 

When we had the drug problem, we started a DEA to handle it. 

What is the structure this should look like down the road? And I 

know it is such a mad scramble right now and you are working so 

hard and people are doing such a great job. It is hard to kind of 

pop your head up out of the day-to-day fight and plan ahead, but 

I think that would be a good legacy for you to leave, that that was 

a look forward and let us see what this thing should be like five, 

10 years from now. 

Mr. MUELLER. I would venture to say anybody in the Bureau 

knows the focus has been over the last year on cyber in a variety 

of ways, and we have to put our own house in order first. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Yes. 

Mr. MUELLER. And we are doing that. We are not there yet, but 

we have to adapt over the next several years, an organization that 

lends itself to addressing itself with more specificity to particularized threats that have been prioritized, of which cyber will be a 

substantial one. We now have entities, counterintelligence and 

cyber, because they are like that. And our organizational structure 

has morphed into a threat-based organizational structure as opposed to a program organizational structure. And we have got to 

continue to do that. 

One of the focal points outside the FBI, though, is the NCIJTF, 

my firm belief that for us to be successful, we have to have people 

at the table right at the outset, and determine whether it is national security or criminal or what have you, but you need all of 
38 

the facts, all of the information on the table, regardless of the classification side, because there may be something up there that will 

help you on a criminal matter down below, but have everybody in— 

the relevant players in the government working at NCIJTF or 

some comparable facility. 

And then last, with the private sector. Once we have our act together administratively and have—my own belief is generally collocation with the exception of NSA because of what they have got, 

but the rest of us to be relatively collocated, then in my mind you 

need the partnerships in the private sector to come together and 

equip themselves to share information and then set up conduits between the private sector and the Federal Government that will assure privacy but also enable us to share information in ways that 

we have not been able to or had to in the past. 

So I think we are moving toward that structure, but we have a 

way to go, and I can tell you with my successor, we will have some 

discussions on this. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Good. The last point, we have addressed 

it a little bit, but I would like to make the point that I do think 

that we overclassify. It is much easier to classify than it is to declassify. There are a whole variety of reasons—some good and some 

not so good—for classifying programs and classifying materials. 

But it seems to me that a lot of the stuff that has been said about 

the NSA programs and about the FBI’s support of them could easily have been said beforehand without compromising those programs in any significant respect, particularly the multiple checks 

and balances, the number of guards at the door to the vault before 

anybody can get any kind of information, both Houses of Congress 

being briefed in on programs like this, Inspectors General being 

independently accountable to review programs like these, the internal oversight of the executive branch, apart from the independent 

Inspectors General, and the rigor and frequency of the audit that 

is done for those programs, the fact that regular line United States 

district court judges are brought in on detail to serve on the FISA 

Court, and they have to in various ways sign off on these programs. You have as strong an array of protections under our system of separated government as one could possibly create, I believe. 

I do not know that a single stone has been left unturned in terms 

of putting eyeballs onto making sure that these programs were 

carefully used and never abused. 

So that kind of story, I think, is one that does not hurt us to get 

out first. Before this incident, people knew that there were ways 

in which we were protecting ourselves, and we could have said generally that, without getting into the details of any of these programs, when we look into programs that affect Americans’ privacy, 

we go all in on making sure that there are not short cuts, making 

sure that only qualified people get it. 

And so I think the lesson from this going forward is that as much 

as there is a public interest in classification of a lot of this information, there is also a public interest in declassifying it. And in some 

cases, I would contend that declassification has exactly zero national security risks associated with it. It just kind of got swept up 

with a bunch of other stuff because the program is classified. And 

we depend on you to do this because Senators are not declassifiers. 
39 

The only way that the Senate Intelligence Committee can declassify anything is so complicated that it has never been used in the 

history of the Senate Intelligence Committee. 

So I would urge you to—I am speaking through you now, I think, 

to a whole lot of other people as well. But I do think that a more 

persistent focus on what could be declassified and what would help 

for these foreseeable events of disclosure would be a good policy to 

pursue. 

Your thoughts? 

Mr. MUELLER. I understand your sentiments. I do believe there 

is a price to be paid. We tend to think that people know and understand the Internet around the world. But you have persons who 

want to undertake terrorist attacks that do not have a full understanding of the Internet. And to the extent that you expose programs like this, we are educating them. We are educating them 

about how the Internet works actually worldwide. We are educating them as to what our capabilities are, and the brighter and 

the smarter of them will be educated and find other ways to communicate, and we will not pick up communications we want. 

Now, that is not to say that the scale should not be on the other 

side. It is much easier to explain to the public when you do not 

have the restrictions, quite obviously, of classification. All I am saying is I do think there is a price to be paid. Not always. There are 

occasions where we can declassify things. But I would not underestimate the price to be paid by a substantial—let me just put it, 

substantial disclosures. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Yes, I agree. I think we have to be very 

sensitive to that, and we have to be particularly sensitive to that 

when we are talking about the operating mechanics of a particular 

program. But when we are telling the American people—we are not 

going to raise the question of what we are doing, but we want you 

to know that when, as, and if we do anything, here are the kind 

of procedures we use. You would never tell anybody about an ongoing investigation. But we tell everybody about the warrant requirement, about minimization, about the things that protect Americans’ 

security. And that process is also classified when it comes to these 

NSA programs. 

Mr. MUELLER. Good point. I got you. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. That is where I think we can make some 

ground. 

This is, I think, the end of your last appearance before this Committee, so let me thank you very much. You have been a terrific 

Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Before that you 

were a terrific member of the Department of Justice and a terrific 

United States Attorney. You have made an awful lot of people 

proud, sir, and we are very glad to have had the chance to work 

with you. 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, thank you for that, but it is the men and 

women of the FBI that make the place run, as you and I both 

know, having been in comparable positions. But thank you. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Well said. Thank you. 

For the record, the record will remain open for a period of one 

week if anyone wants to add to the record. 

[Whereupon, at 12:22 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

(41) 

A P P E N D I X 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
42 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN PATRICK LEAHY
43 
44 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT S. MUELLER III, DIRECTOR, FEDERAL

BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, WASHINGTON, DC 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SHELDON WHITEHOUSE FOR HON. ROBERT S. 

MUELLER III 
59 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CHARLES E. GRASSLEY FOR HON. ROBERT S. 

MUELLER III 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ORRIN G. HATCH FOR HON. ROBERT S. MUELLER

III 
72 

RESPONSES OF HON. ROBERT S. MUELLER III TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATORS

WHITEHOUSE, GRASSLEY, AND HATCH
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
91 
92 
93 
94 

Æ