Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CR-1209 | November 12, 2020 Page 1 of 5

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Andrew J. Sickmann

Boston Bever Forrest Cross & Sickmann

Richmond, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General

Caroline G. Templeton 

Deputy Attorney General 

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Michael D. Williams,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

November 12, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

20A-CR-1209

Appeal from the 

Wayne Superior Court

The Honorable

Darrin M. Dolehanty, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

89D03-1911-CM-1124

Vaidik, Judge.

Case Summary

[1] Michael D. Williams appeals his conviction for theft, which is based on him

finding and taking money left at a grocery-store self-checkout station by a 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CR-1209 | November 12, 2020 Page 2 of 5

previous customer. We reverse, concluding that Williams’s conduct does not 

constitute theft under Indiana law.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On October 30, 2019, a man at the Kroger store in Richmond used a selfcheckout station to make a purchase totaling $16.67. He paid with a $100 bill, 

resulting in change of $83.33. The $83 in cash and the coins were dispensed into 

separate trays. The man took the coins but got distracted and left the store 

without the cash. A second customer then approached the station and used a 

debit card to complete a transaction. After several minutes passed, Williams, an 

off-duty Kroger employee, approached the station and completed a transaction. 

He used a credit card, but he noticed the cash, put it in his pocket, and left the 

store. The man who left the cash behind later returned to the store to report 

what had happened. The store reviewed surveillance footage of the transactions

and saw that Williams had taken the money. The store gave the man $83

“because it was an off-duty associate that had taken the money,” Tr. p. 34, and

then reported the incident to police.

[3] The State charged Williams with Class A misdemeanor theft, alleging that he 

“did knowingly or intentionally exert unauthorized control over the property of 

Roger Stinson, to-wit: cash with the intent to deprive Roger Stinson of any part 

of the use or value of the property, contrary to Indiana law.” Appellant’s App. 

Vol. II p. 11. The case proceeded to a bench trial. While the charging 

information identified the victim as Roger Stinson, no person named Roger 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CR-1209 | November 12, 2020 Page 3 of 5

Stinson testified, and no witness or exhibit identified Roger Stinson as the man 

who left the money behind. Nonetheless, the trial court found Williams guilty 

as charged and sentenced him to 180 days in jail, all suspended to probation.

[4] Williams now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[5] Williams contends the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. When 

reviewing sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims, we neither reweigh the evidence 

nor judge the credibility of witnesses. Willis v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1065, 1066 (Ind. 

2015). We will only consider the evidence supporting the judgment and any 

reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the evidence. Id. A conviction 

will be affirmed if there is substantial evidence of probative value to support 

each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found 

the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

[6] Williams argues his conviction must be reversed because the State did not 

present evidence establishing the identity of the man who left the $83 at the selfcheckout station. The State does not dispute it failed to identify the man. 

Instead, it asserts it was not required to do so under the theft statute, which 

provides, “A person who knowingly or intentionally exerts unauthorized 

control over property of another person, with intent to deprive the other person 

of any part of its value or use, commits theft, a Class A misdemeanor.” Ind. 

Code § 35-43-4-2(a). According to the State, this language “requires only that 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CR-1209 | November 12, 2020 Page 4 of 5

the State establish that the property was ‘of another’ and does not require proof 

of the victim’s name.” Appellee’s Br. p. 8. But as Williams notes, “it is well 

settled that the name of the owner or possessor of property alleged to have been 

stolen is a material allegation which must be proven beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” Pryor v. State, 889 N.E.2d 369, 371 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (applying an 

auto-theft statute that included language similar to the theft statute). We could 

reverse Williams’s conviction for this reason alone. 

[7] But there is a more fundamental problem with Williams’s conviction. Indiana’s 

theft statute does not criminalize the taking of lost or mislaid property, unlike 

statutes in many other states. See 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law

§ 19.2(f) (3d ed. 2017). Indiana used to have such a statute, which provided:

A person who obtains control over lost or mislaid property 

commits theft when he:

(1) knows or learns the identity of the owner or knows or 

learns of a reasonable method of identifying the owner, 

and

(2) fails to take reasonable measures to restore the property 

to the owner, and

(3) intends to deprive the owner permanently of the use or 

benefit of the property.

Reasonable measures shall include, but not necessarily be limited 

to, notifying the identified owner or any peace officer.
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Ind. Code § 35-17-5-5 (1976). However, the legislature repealed that statute over 

forty years ago. Acts 1976, P.L. 148 § 24. If such conduct is to be recriminalized, that is a decision for the legislature. Under the existing theft 

statute, Williams’s conviction cannot stand.

[8] Reversed.

Bailey, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.