UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR VE TER AN S CL AI M S

N O . 00-2382
M I CH A EL D. C OTANT , A PP EL L ANT ,

V
. ANTHONY J. P RI NCI PI , S EC RE T A RY O F V ET ER A N S A FF A I RS , A PPEL L EE
.

On Ap pe a l f ro m th e B oa

rd of Ve te ra ns ' Ap pe a ls
(De cided June 6, 2003 )

Ro na ld L . S

mi th , o f Wa sh ing ton , D .C. , w a s o n th e ple a din g s f or the a pp e lla nt.
Tim S. Mc Cla in , G e ne ra l Co un se l; R. Ra nd all Cam pb e ll , Ac tin g As sis tant G e ne ra l Co un se l; Mi c ha e l A . Le on ar

d , Deputy Assistant G ener al Counsel; and Kate Gorney , all of Washington, D.C., wer e on plea dings f

or the a ppellee.
Be fore FARL EY, I VERS, and STEI NB ERG, Judges

.
STEI NB ERG, Judge : The appe llant, Michael D. Cotant, throug h counsel, seeks revie w of

a n Aug u s t2 1 , 2 0 0 0 , d e c i s i o no f t h e B o ar d

o f V e t e r an s ' A p p e a l s ( B o ar d o r B V A ) t h a td e n i e d

h is

c la im f or De pa rtme nt o f V e te ra

ns Af fa ir s ( VA ) s e rv ic e c on ne c tio n f or de generat iv e joi nt d ise a se (DJD) o f th e r ig h t h ip

. Re c o r d ( R. ) a t 1

- 9

. T h e a p p e ll an t f il e d a b r ie f an d a r e p ly b r ief, a nd the Secre tary filed a br ief. In response to a Fe bruar y 2002 Court order, the appellant f ile d a

s u p p l e m e n t a l b r i e f

an d a s u p p l e m e n t a l r e p l y b r i e f

, an d t h e S e c r e t ar

y f i l e d a s u p p l e m e n t a l b r i e f

. In J anuar y 2003, the parties filed a joint response to a Decembe r 2002 Court order . For the re asons set fo rt h b e low , the Court wi ll re ve rs e the B oa rd de c isi on

and re mand the ma tte r f

or fu rt he r p ro c e e din g s.2 I. Re le va nt Bac kgr ound The ve tera

n serve d on active duty in the U.S

. Navy from May 1980 to September 1992, when he wa s h on or a

bly dis c ha rg e d. R. at 11 -1 7. F or

his se rv ic e , h is a

wa rd s in c lud e d the Natio na l D e fe ns e Service Medal a

nd the Navy

Ex peditionary

Medal. R. at 11, 13, 15. His May 1980 Navy

entra nce medical e x amination repor t noted t hat t he veteran previously had been m edica lly discharg ed fr om the U. S. A rm y

Natio na l G ua

rd be c a us e of a " br uis e d h ip" . R. a t 23

. Othe rw ise , e xce pt fo r a re qu e st to examine the veter an for hig h blood pressure , this May 1980 repor

t indicated that " [a] ll significa nt defe cts, if any , have be en eva luated and have been determined to be non-disqualify ing." R. at 27. On September

21, 1992, the veter an filed a n application for VA service connec tion f or, inter alia, " deg ener ative/cy stic chang es of the [rig ht] femora l head." R. at 363-66. A January 1993 VA

re gi o n al o ff

i ce (R O) d ec i s i o nd ef

erre d co n s i d er at i o n o f h i s cl ai m u n t i l i t h ad gat h er edt h e v et er an 's p r e s e r v i c e m e d i c a l r e c o r d s f

r o m h i s p r i v a t e p h y s i c i an , D r
. D o n a l d M

. G e n t r

y
. R

. a t3 9 3

- 9 5

. In April 1993, the VARO re ceive d the veter an' s private medic al re cords, dated betwe en 1959 and 1974. R. at 3 9 7 -4 11. A Fe bruar y 1962 entry

noted that the vete ran ha d "pa in and limp in right hip" and noted a " history

of injury on bicy cle last fa ll." R. at 399. The re cords a lso indicated that the ve tera n
wa s fitted for a

leg brac e in 1963. Ib id

. A Ja n u ar y 1 9 9 3 V A c o mp e n s a t i o n an d p e n s i o n ( C& P) examination report stated: " Right hip. Patient does have a ver y signific ant limp and does note that he ha s c on sta

nt p a in t he re . I wi ll d e fe r t

he x-r ay s to the ra dio log ist , b ut w ou ld i ma g ine that he wi ll beg in ha ving problems in his other joints i ncluding his knees and othe r hip seconda ry to the limp." R. at 557. There is no subsequent radiolog ical re port in the rec ord on appea l (ROA). See R. at 1-624. I n a M ay 19 93 deci si on , t he R O de ni ed t he v ete ran's cla im for VA s ervi ce con nect io n fo r "a rig ht[ -]hip condition" beca use the e vidence showed that "this condition pree x isted mili tary duty and was not per

manently ag g ravated during active duty ." R. a t 5 1 9

. T h e vete ran a ppeale d that deter mination to the Boar d in October 1993 (R. at 534); howeve r, t he procedura l history following t he vete ran' s appea l is unclear f rom the ROA ( see R. at 1-624). In September 1996, the veter an 's repr esentative forwa

rded to a n RO a letter f

rom Dr. Ge ntry

that stated: " Ihave r eviewe d Mike Cotant's medic al re cord w hich dates back to w hen he was a child. I t reve als he ha d L eg g [-] Perthes dis e a se of

the ri g ht h ip b e fo re he joi ne d th e mil ita ry se rv ic e , th e re su lt o f w hic h le ft him wi th3

signific ant deg ener ative joint chang es of the hip[,] which in my opinion wa s ag g ravated by the

ac t i v i t i es h e d i d

i nt h e s er v i ce
. " R

. at 5 7 8

. I nDe ce m b er 1 9 9 7 , t h e B o ar d

re m an d edt h e v et er an 's claim to the RO in order to obtain pertinent medical rec ords and c onduct an a dditional VA examination. R . at 588-93. I n Ap ri l 19 98 , the RO re c e ive d fr om Dr

. Ge ntr y ' s of fi c e a dd iti on a l pr ivate me dic a l r e c or ds , dat ed b etw een 19 80 and19 98 . R . at 59 5-6 02 , 6 13 . Dr . M ark R . R angit sch con du cte d a V A C &P

e xami na tio n in June 19 98 ; he dia g no se d the ve te ra n a s havin g " Pe rt

he s dis e a se of the ri g ht h ip w ith de g e ne rativ e art

hr iti s o f t he ri g ht h ip" and

c on c lud e d: The nature of the leg calf Perthes dis ease this patient has is consist ent with the problems he is cur rently having . The patient[ ' s] developing Perthes at 8 y ear s of ag e and [being] treate d with brac ing a nd casting has likely develope d deg ener ative ar thritis in h i s h i p as time g oes along

. As to whether

the pre -existi ng disease w ould have manif ested arthritic c hang es, this is im possible t o entirely say , but it is very common for a patient who is diag nosed with Perthes at a late a g e of 8 y e ar s to d e v e lo p s ig n if

ic an t d e g e n e r a ti v e arthr it is

. A s to w h e ther t h i s i s a c c e l e r a t e d

b y h i s m i l i t ar

y s e r v i c e , i t i s i m p o s s i b l e t o s ay. Ce rt a inl y , th e a c tiv iti e s h e pe rf or me d c ou ld h a ve a c c e le rate d th e hip disease. Howev e r, it i s mo st l ike ly tha t th e natur a l pr oc e ss o f h is disease w ould have resulted in him developing this hip problem eve n at this early

ag e. This is not uncommon, and Iwould fee l it is more likely that the hi p disease w as due to unde rlying Per thes disease and the natural proce sses of ag ing a s the disease would prog ress ve rsus be inga g g ra

vate d o r s ig nif

ic antl y inc re a se d b y

his se rv ic e a c tiv iti e s.
R. at 605. The examinatio n re port noted that the e x aminer did not initially have a cce ss to the veter an' s medical re cords ( R. at 604), but in J anuar y 2000, afte r re v i ew i n g t wo vol umes of the veter an' s medical re cords, Dr . Rang itsch submitt ed a supplementary letter in which he c oncluded:

[I ] fee l the deg ener ative arthritis of the rig ht hip, which is due to preexis ting P er t h es disease, w ould likely have oc curr ed eve n in the absenc e of a ctive military service . Ifee l it is mos t l i k ely that the un de rl y ing dis e a se ha d we nt [sic ] t hr ou g h a natur a l a g ing proc e ss, which is commonl y s ee n in patients who deve lop Perthes disease , specific ally at a later ag e such as 8, as the patient states was the c ase. Th e re fo re , I

wo uld have to c on tin

ue my op ini on that th is w a s a natur a l pr oc e ss o f a g ingand wa s n ot s ig nif

ic antl y a g g ra vate d b y his service -re lated ac tiviti es.4

(R. at 609). I n the Augus t 2 000 BV A dec ision here on a ppeal de ny ing the veter an' s claim for se rvice

connec tion for DJD of the rig ht hip, the Boa rd dete rmined that the ve tera n' s claim for V A servic e
c on ne c tio n for DJD of the ri g ht hip wa s w e ll g ro un de d w ith in t he me anin g of

se c tio n 5 10 7( a ) a s in eff ect at that time. R. at 3. The B oard f ound, pursuant to 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(b) ( 1999), that cle ar and unmistakable evide nce de monstrated that the ve tera n' s "r ight hip ar

thritis" pre exis ted servic e, even thoug h that disability was not n o t e d d

u r i n g h i s M ay 1 9 8 0 e n t r an c e e x a m i n a t i o n
. R

. a t 3 , 6

. In maki n g th a t f

in d in g , th e B o ar d r e li e d o n a M ar c h 1 9 8 0 me d ic a l r e c o r d ( n o t in c lu d e d in th e ROA) from the ve tera

n' s private phy sician t hat refer red to "x-ray evidenc e of arthritis chang es at the he ad of the rig ht femur." R. at 6. The Boa rd further found, by virtue of the application of the bene fit-of-the -doubt rule unde r 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b), that the " positive evidence was in a state of e quipoise with the neg ative evidenc e on th e qu e s ti o no f w h e th e r o r n o t t h e r e w a s anin c r e a s e in

s e v e r it y o f th e p r e e xis ti ng dis or de r d ur ingse rv ic e " and thu s con c lud e d tha t the ve te ra n' s hip co nd iti on ha d in c re a se d in se ve ri ty during service . R. at 7. The Boar d then determined that, pursuant to 38 C.F.R. § 3.306 (1999), the ag g ravation of his disabili ty was due to the natura l prog ression of the dise ase: A p re su mpt ion

of a g g ra vatio n a ri se s w he n th e re is a

fi nd ingtha

t a pr e e xistin g dis a

bil ity inc re a se d in s e ve ri ty

duri ngse rv ic e . 3 8 C. F .R. § 3

. 3 0 6

. A l t h o u g h t h e v e t e r a n ' s p r i v a t e p h ys i c i an , D r
. G e n t r y, indicated in a statement that the vete ran' s condi t i o n was a g g ravated b y t h e a ct i v i t i e s i n s er v i ce , t h er e i s n o i n d i ca t i o nt h at t h e v et er an 's claims file wa s review ed[,] to include servic e m ed i cal recor ds [(SM Rs)]

. I n addition, Dr. Ge ntry g ave no r ationale or

explanation for his op i n ion. I n contra st, the VA examiner' s opinion concluded that th e hip dis e a se wa s d ue to t he un de rl y in g L egg -P e rt

he s d ise a se and th e natur a l pr og re sse s o f a g ing a s th e dis e a se wo uld

pr og re ss versus being ag g ravated or signific antly incre ased by his service activities. The B oard g i v es m o re w eig ht to the J une 1998 VA examiner' s opinion, beca u se, unlike the private phy sician' s opinion, it was prec eded by

a thorough c linical examination, which is of re c or d, a nd

a re vie w o f t

he c la ims fi le[,] to inc lud e [SMR]s. Moreove r, the VAexaminer' s review of t he entire medical r ecor d and the detailed rationale for the conclusion that the rig ht[ -]hip dis order underw ent a natura l pr og ression of the underly ing disease, the B oard finds that the opinions offer ed by the VA e x aminer r ise to the hig her5 level of c lear

and unmistakable e vidence sufficie nt to rebut the presumption of ag g ravation.
R. at 7.

II. Contentions of the P artie s and P roce dural Hi story I n his J une 2001 brie f, the a ppellant ar g ues that the August 2000 BVA d ecision should be

reve rsed a

nd the matter r emande d t o t he B oard " with an instruction that Mr. Cotant be aw arde d service conne ct i o n
. " Br ief (B r.) at 11-37. The a ppellant contends that (1) " the B oard c ommitt ed leg al er ror by finding that the equivocal statements of Dr. Rangitsch we re le g ally sufficie nt to satisfy the clea r and unmistakable evidenc e standa rd of [38 U.S.C. §] 1111" and (2) "the Boa rd fur ther e rre d by applying [section] 1153 in a case wher e the ve tera n had the be nefit of the [section] 1111 pr e su mpt ion

of a g g ra vatio n a nd the VAha d th e burd e n to pr ov e [by c le ar a nd un mis taka

ble

e vid e nc e ] that any

dis e a se or

inj ur y fo un d to have pr e e xisted ser vi ce had no t be e n a g g ra vate d in

se rv ic e ." B r. a t 11 -2 1. I n r e sp on se to a Ma rc h 2 00 1 o rd e r o f t

his Co urt di rectingthe pa rt ie s to addre ss whether

an appe llant should be permitted t o waive c onsideration on appe al of a ny rig hts he had under the Vete rans Claims Assistance Act of 2000, Pub. L . No. 106-475, 114 Stat. 2096 (Nov. 9, 20 00 ) ( VC AA ), the a

pp e lla nt m a int a ins that su c h a

wa ive r i s p e rm iss ibl e and that th e Court

sh ou ld

acc ept his waiver

of the c onsideration of the VCAA in his appea l. Br. a t 21-37. I n his brief, the Sec reta

ry argues that t he C ourt should aff irm the Boa

rd dec ision; he contends that th e B oa

rd c or re c tly a pp lie d th e se c tio n 1 15 3 p re su mpt ion of a g g ra vatio n to the a

pp e lla nt' s c la im afte r it determined that the appellant ha d a pre exis ting hip condition. Br . at 18. The Sec reta ry argues that th e statut or

y sc he me sh ou ld b e int e rp re te d a s f oll ow s: Where a veter an enr olls fo r s ervice, he is take n to be in sound condition [ except] for disorders noted or found upon examination, or wher e clea

r and unmistakable e vidence demonstrates that the injury or disease exis ted befor e enrollment and was not ag g ravated by such service . (38 U.S.C. § 1 111). B ut where there is a pree x isting condition , i t wi ll be considere d to be ag g ravated by service when the re is an inc re a se in d isa bil ity du ri ngsu c h s e rv ic e , unle ss t he re is a specific finding that the incre ase i n d isability is due to the natura l prog ress of the disease. ( 38 U.S.C. § 1153).6

Br . at 17-18. On the issue of wa iver of V CAA consider ation on appea l, the Secre tary "a g ree s that waiver is appropriate in this case." Br . at 8. I n his reply

brief, the appellant c ontests the S ecr etar y ' s interpre tation of the interpla y betwee n
se c tio ns 11 11 and

11 53 . H e argue s a s f

oll ow s: Although both statut es ref er to " ag g ravation" of a pree x isting c on dit ion , [se c tio n] 11 11 , b y it s ex pr e ss t e rm s is a pp lic a ble on ly in one cir cumstance , i.e., when a veter an has c laimed servic e conne ction fo r a me nta l or

ph y sic a l dis a

bil ity wh ic h wa s no t " no te d" a t th e tim e of examination, acc eptanc e, and e nrollment for ser vice. I f the veter an' s entranc e examination "notes" the disability for whic h he or she i s claiming service connec tion, [section] 1111 has no application and VA a djudicators must then turn to [section] 1153 to determine whe th er t he d is abi li ty

no ted at i nduct io n wa s "aggravat ed. " Reply Br . at 3. I n F e br ua ry 20 02 , th e Court

iss ue d a su pp le me nta l br ie fi ngor de r d ir e c tin g the pa rt ie s to

a dd re ss the imp a c t on this ca se of the op ini on of the U. S. Cour t of App e a ls f

or the F e de ra l Cir c uit (F eder al Circuit) in Davis ( John F.) v. Principi , 276 F.3d 1341 ( Fe d. Cir. 2002). Cotant v. Principi , 15 Vet.App. 431, 431- 32 (2002) ( per c uriam orde r). In that opinion, t h e Fe dera l Circuit applied, wi tho ut a na ly sis , s e c tio n 1 15 3 in

a c a se wh e re the pr e e xistin g c on dit ion wa s not not e d at e ntr

y bu t, as provided for in section 1111, had be en found to be pree x isting by the B oard ba sed on cle ar a nd unmistakable evide nce, the reby rebutting the pre sumption of sound condi t i o n es t ablished by section 1111. Davis (

John F.) , 276 F.3d at 1343-44. Th e a pp e lla nt f ile d a su pp le men tal bri ef in M arc h 2 00 2; h e argue s th a t Davis ( John F.) is irrele vant to this appeal be cause the dec ision did not "a ddress t h e mutual exclusi vity of [section] 1111 and [section] 1153 or construe, in application or otherwise, their r elationship to one another ." Supplemental (Suppl.) Br . at 2. The Secre tary filed a supplemental brief in April 2002; he ar g ues that the Fe dera l Circuit's opinion in Davis ( John F.) is instructive in clarify ing ( 1) that sec tion 1111 contains only

the pre s u m p t i o n o f soundness, and not a n additional presumption of ag g ravation as urg ed by the appe llant and (2) that section 1153 establishes and de fines t h e p re s u mption of

a g g ra vatio n. Sup pl. B r. a t 6- 9. Mo re ov e r, the Se c re tary c on te nd s th a t Da vi s (Jo h n F

. ) and seve ral op ini on s o f t

his Court e xemp lif y tha t se c tio ns 11 11 and

11 53 have bo th b e e n ap pl ied to a sin g le7

claim and a

re not " mutually

exclusive." Suppl. Br . at 11. The a ppellant filed a

reply brief dis a g re e ingwi th t

he Se c re tary ' s p os iti on

and arguin g that Da vi

s (Jo h n F

. ) held only

that "' evidenc e of tempora

ry flare -ups sy

mptomatic of an unde rlying pr eexisti ng condition, alone, is not sufficient for a non-combat vetera

n to show increa sed disability under [section 1153] unless the underlying

co n d i t i o ni s wo rs en ed

. '" S u p p l

. R ep l y

Br

. at 1 -2 (q u o t i n g Davis ( John F.) , 276 F.3d at 1346-47). On J uly 30, 2002, the Court issued, sua sponte, an or der stay ing this m at t er pe nding the outcome of Jordan (

Timothy) v. Principi , U.S. Vet. App. No. 00- 206 (Notice of Appe al (NO A) filed J an. 9, 2000) [here inafter Jordan ] or further order of the Court, bec ause the issues involved in the two case s – reg ardingproper interpre tation of 38 U.S.C. §§ 311 and 353 (1979) ( now sec tions 1111 and 1153, re spectively

) and the validity of 38 C .F.R. § 3.304(b) (1982) ( now 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(b) (2002)) – are substantially simil ar. Moreove r, the same counsel repr esents the appe llants in the two

case s. I n a September 2 6 , 2002, opinion, the Court in Jordan aff irmed a N ovember

1999 Boa

rd decision that had de termined that ther e wa s no clea r and unmistakable er

ror ( CUE) in an Apr il 1983 Boa rd dec ision that had denied the a ppellant' s claim for V A servic e conne ction for a rig ht-knee disorder based on a theory of ag g ravation of a pree x isting injury or disease. Jordan v. Principi , No. 00-206, 2002 WL 31163854 (Ve t. App. Sept. 26, 2002), withdraw n, 2002 WL 31445159 (Ve t. App. No v. 1, 20 02 ). Th e Court re je c te d the a

pp e lla nt' s statut or

y -i nte rp re ta tio n argum ent that , notwithstanding 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(b) (1982), the provisions of 38 U.S.C. § 3 5 3 (1 9 7 9 ) were inapplicable to a

n ag gra v at i o n cl aim (1) whe re the Boa rd had f ound (in a B VA dec ision under collater al attac k) t hat a veter an' s condition that had not been noted at entry was pre exis ting on the g round that the pre sumption of sound condition, pur s u an t t o 3 8 U.S.C. § 311 (1979), had be en rebutted by

clea r and unmistakable evidenc e showing that the condition had pre exis ted servic e, and (2) where the Board had denied se rvice connec tion because it found that the evidenc e did not support a finding that the disability had incr ease d in severity during service

. Jordan, 2002 WL 31163854, at *12-14. On October 17, 2002, the p ar t i es in Jordan filed a joint motion for pane l rec onsideration based on ne wly

discovere d leg islative and re g ulatory history and re commended that the Court invalidate 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(b ) t o the extent that it provides that "the pr esumption of sound condition may

be re butted solely

by clea r and unmistakable evidence that a disease or injury exis ted8

pr io r t o s e r v i c e " – t h a ti s , w i t h o u ta l s o r e qu i r i n gc l e ar an d u n m i s t a k a

b l e e v i d e n c e t h a tt h e d ise a se
or inj ur y wa s not ag g ravated in service

. Jordan J oint Motion (Mot.) at 11. On Novembe r 1, 2002, the Court g rante d that joint motion a nd withdrew its S eptember 26, 2002, opinion. Jordan , 2 0 0 2 WL 3 1 4 4 5 1 5 9 , at * 2 (q u o t i n g Jordan Joint Mo t. at 11 ). Th e Court di rect ed th e pa rt ie s to pr ov ide fu ll copies of all pertinent materia ls r eg arding cong ressional intent in connec tion with 38 U.S.C . §§ 311

and 35 3 ( 19 79 ) a

nd th e mea ni ng of

the langua g e " and

wa s n ot a g g ra

vate d b y su c h s e rv ic e " in section 311. Jordan , 2002 WL 31445159, at *3. The parties responde d on November 18, 2002. On De c e mbe r 30 , 20 02 , the Court iss ue d a su pp le me nta l br ie fi ng or de r in the ins tant c a se direc ting the pa

rties (1) to show c ause w hy t h e C o u rt s h o uld not take judicial notice of the Oc t ober 17 a

nd November

18, 2002, pleading s filed in Jordan an d p r o c e e d to d e c id e the section 311/§ 3.304(b) issue in the instant c ase; and (2) to include in their re sponses their views on the re medy in this case if the Court wer e to invalidate § 3.304( b) to the extent recommende d by the parties in Jordan

. Th e pa rt ie s f ile d a joi nt r e sp on se on

Janu ary 10 , 2 00 3. I n that re sp on se , the pa rt ie s r e qu e st that th e Court

take jud ic ia l no tic e of

the Oc tob e r 1 7 a

nd No ve mbe r 18, 20 02 , ple a din g s f ile d in Jordan . Join t Re sp on se (R e sp .) a t 3. Th e joi nt r e sp on se state s:

The plea dings discuss the le g islative history behind that s t atut e and state th a t th e la

w p r o v id e s f

o r a tw o - s te p p r o c e s s to r e but the presumption of sound condition, in that, not only must . . . [VA] find by c le ar and un mis taka

ble e vid e nc e that the c on dit ion e xiste d p ri or

to service , but also, by

clea r and unmistakable evidenc e, find that the condition was not ag g ravated there in.
Id. a t 4. Th e joi nt r e sp on se fu rt he r u rg e s: I n acc ordanc e with the pleading s filed in Jordan , the par ties ask[] that the Court invalidate 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(b), to the extent that it is not consistent with [ section] 1111. The parties submit that invalidation of 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(b) to the extent re quested woul d b ear signifi c an tl y

o nth e in s ta

n t c a s e , a s th e B o ar d

d e c is io no na

p p eal made spe cific f

indings re ly ing on 38 C.F .R. § 3. 3 0 4 (b ), and made finding s reg ardingclea

r and unmistak able evidence on the issue of ag g ravation.9

Ib id . The parties reque st that the Court r emand the case for "pr oper application of the corr ect law ." Ibid.

III . A nal ys is A. V CAA Waiver The VCAA, inter

alia, am ended 38 U .S.C. § 5103 ("Notice to claimants of re quired information and ev i d en ce" ) and a dded 38 U.S.C. § 5103A (" Duty to assist claimants") . VCAA § 3(a) , 114 Stat. at 2096- 98. The Court subseque ntly issued its opini on in the Holliday c a se , w he re in the Court held " that all provisions of the VCAA are potentially applicable to c laims pending on the dat e of t he V CA A's en act men t. " Holliday v. Principi , 14 Vet.App. 280, 286 ( 2001), mo t. f or re c on s. denied , 14 Vet.App. 327 ( per c uriam orde r), mot. for full Court review denied , 1 5 V e t. A p p. 21 (2001) ( en banc order ). Subsequent to the VCAA’s e nactment a nd this Court’s decision in Holliday, supra, the Fe dera l Circuit issued two opinions addre ssing r etroa ctive application of t he noti ce a nd assistance require ments set forth in VCAA sec tion 3(a). As to c ases pe nding be for e the F eder al Cir c uit a t th e tim e of

the VC AA ' s e na c tme nt, that c ourt he ld that sec tio n 3 (a ) ( a me nd ing38 U. S.C. §§ 5102, 5103, and 5103A) is not applicable. Bernklau v. Principi , 291 F.3d 795, 803- 06 (F ed. Cir. 2002); Dyme nt v. Principi , 2 8 7 F. 3 d 1 3 7 7 , 1 3 8 5 (F ed

. C i r. 2 0 0 2 ). T h i s C o u rt ap p l i edt h o s e h o l d i n gs to case s that were pending bef ore it on the VCAA' s enac tment date. See Ste phens v. Princ ipi , 16 Ve t.A pp
. 19 1, 19 3 ( 20 02 ) ( pe r c ur iam or de r) ; Shoffner v. Principi , 16 Vet.App. 208, 215 ( 2002). I n this case, the a

ppellant filed his NOA on D ece mber 18, 2000, see k i n g re v i ew of the Aug ust 21, 2000, BVA de cision. Pur s u an t t o t h e C ourt' s holding in Juarez v . Principi , th e c la im d en i edb y t h e A u gu s t2 0 0 0 BV A d ec i s i o n wa s s t i l l p en d i n g b ef o re VA as o f t h e d at e o f t h e V C AA 's

enac tment a

nd, thus, the VCAA is applicable to the appellant' s claim. Juarez, 16 Vet.App. 518, 521 (2002) (re manding claim pursuan t to Holliday , su pra , "[b]ecause , as of the N ovember 9, 2000,

enac tment of the VCAA, the 120- day judicial-appe al per iod had not y et expired and the a ppellant had not filed a

n NOA, [and, t here fore ,] the claims denie d by the September

2000 BV A dec ision were still pending befor e VA" ). As noted a bov e, t he par

ties ag ree that the appe llant, repre sented by

c ouns e l he re , s ho uld

be pe rm itt e d to wa ive thi s Cour t' s con sid e ratio n on ap pe a l of an y VC AAri g hts th a t h e mi g ht have. See Janssen v . Principi , 15 Vet.App. 370, 374 ( 2001) (holding that claimant10

re pr e se nte d b y

c ouns e l ma

y wa ive Court c on sid e ratio n on a pp e a l of VC AA pr ote c tio ns " if that is his or her clea rly stated, informe d, and voluntary desire" ). B eca

use we will rever se the B oard de cision, howeve r, we need not a ddress that issue. B. Appli cable Law and Regulati on The following are the principal statutory and reg ulatory provisions involved in the issues on

a pp e a l. S e c tio n 1 11 1 o f t itl e 38 of the U. S. Co de pr ov ide s: § 1111. P resum ption of soun d condi tion
For the purposes of

section 1 1 1 0 o f this ti tle, ever y veter an shall be take n to have be en in sound condition when e x amined, acc epted, a

nd enrolled f

or ser vice, e x cept as to defe cts, infirmities, or disorders noted at t he time of the e x amination, acc eptanc e, and enrollment, or wher e clea r and unmistakable evidenc e demonstra tes that the injury

or disease exis ted bef

ore a cce ptance and enr ollment and wa s not ag g ravated by such ser vice.

38 U. S.C. § 1 11 1. Se c tio n 1 15 3 o f t itl e 38 of the U. S. Co de pr ov ide s: § 1153 Aggravat ion A pre ex i sting injury

or disease will be considere d to have been a g g ravated by

active milit ary , naval, or air service , wher e ther e is a n in c re a se in di sabi lity

duri ngsu c h s e rv ic e , unle ss t he re is a specific finding that the incre ase in disa bility is due to th e n atura l prog ress of the disease.

38 U. S.C. § 1 15 3. Re g ulator y § 3 .3 04 (b ) p ro vid e s: § 3.304 Direc t Servic e Connect ion; w artim e and peacetim e.

. . . . (b) Pr esu mp tio n of So un dn ess . The ve tera n will be considere d to ha

ve been in sound condition when examined, acc epted and enr olled for service, except as t o defe cts, infirmities, or disorders no te d at e ntrance int o s e rv ic e , o r w he re c le ar a nd un mis taka

ble (o bv iou s o r m anif

e st) e vid e nc e de mon str a te s that an inj ur y or dis e a se e xi s t e d p r i o r t h e r e t o
. O n l y s u c h c o n d i t i o n s a s ar e r e c o r d e d in examination reports are to be consider ed as note d.11

38 C.F .R. 3. 30 4( b) (2 00 2) . Re g ulator y §3 .3 06 (b ) p ro vid e s: § 3.306 Direc t Servic e Connect ion; w artim e and peacetim e. (a) Ge ne ra l. A pre exis ting injury o r di sease will be c on sid e re d to have be e n a g g ra vate d b y a c tiv e mi li tary , n a va l, o r a ir service , wher e ther e is an i n cre ase in disability during such ser

vice, unless there is a specific finding t hat t he increase in disabilit y is due to the natura l prog ress of the disease. (b) W artime servic e; pe acetimeservice af ter Dec embe r 31, 1946. Cle ar a

nd un mis taka

ble e vid e nc e (o bv iou s o r m anif e st) is require d to rebut the pr esumption of ag g ravation where the pre service dis ability un de rw e nt a

n in c re a se in s e ve ri ty

duri ngse rv ic e . T his inc lud e s me dic a l f

a c ts a nd pr inciple s w hic h ma

y be c on sid e re d to det er m ine whethe r the incr ease is due to the natura l prog ress of the c on dit ion . Ag g ra

vatio n ma

y no t be c on c e de d w he re the dis a bil ity un de rw e nt n o in c re a se in s e ve ri ty du ri ng se rv ic e on the ba sis of

a ll the evidenc e of r ecor d perta ining to the manif estations of the disability prior to, during and subseque nt to service. 38 C.F.R. 3.306(a) , (b) ( 2002). C. Section 1111 an d Regulatory § 3.304(b) 1. Judicial Notice of Jordan Pl e ad ing s T he par ties urg e the Court to take judicia l notice of the O ctober 17, 2002, Jordan joint motion and November

18, 2002, subsequent plea dings. Joint R esp. at 3

. The Court may take ju di cia l not ice of "' wha tev er is g ener all y kn own wi th in [ it s] ju ri sd ict io n[ ] .'" Brannon v. De rwinski , 1 Ve t.A pp . 3 14 , 3 16 (1 99 1) ; see She phard v. Gobe r , 10 Vet.App. 486, 487 ( 1997) (takingjudicial

no tic e of RO A a nd ple a din g s f

ile d in c on c ur re nt c a se s) ; see ge nerally Ma cMill an Bloedel Ltd. v. Flintkote Co. , 760 F.2d 580, 587 (5th Cir. 1985) (upholding decision of district cour t to take " judicial

no tic e of re la te d pro c e e din g s and re c or ds in ca se s b e fo re the same c ourt " ); St. Louis Baptist T emple, I n c
. v
. F e d

. D e p o s it I n s
. Co r p. , 6 0 5 F. 2 d 1169, 1171-72 (10th Cir. 1979) (upholdingdecision of dis tr ic t c ourt

to t ake jud ic ia l not ic e of pr ior lit ig a tio n b e fo re it b e c a us e " [j]ud ic ia l no tic e is particula rly applicable to the court' s own rec ords of prior li tigation closely related t o the ca se bef ore i t ")

. I n this case, we will take judicial notice of the Octobe r 17, 2002, Jordan jo in t mo ti on and November

18, 2002, subsequent plea dings be cause both case s ra i s e the question of the proper12

interpre tation of sections 1111 and 1153 and the va lidity of the pe rtinent part of

38 C.F.R. § 3.304(b) under that interpretation. I n th e pa rt ie s' Janu ary

20 03 joi nt r e sp on se , th e Se c re tary joi ne d with the a

pp e lla nt, a s h e a lso

u l t imately

did in Jordan , Jordan Jo i n tM o t

. a t1 1 , i nu r g i n g t h a tt h e C o u rt" i n v a l i d a te 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(b), to the e x tent that it is not consistent wit h [ s ec t i o n ] 1 1 1 1

. " Joint R esp. at 4. For the re asons set for

th below, howeve r, the Court will decline the Secre tary ' s highly un usual invitation to i nvalidate in par t his own reg ulation in § 3.304(b).

2. Section 1111 I n the Jordan joi nt m oti on fo r r e c on sid e ra

tion, the pa

rt ie s a dv ise d th e Court

of ne wl y discovere d leg islative history in connec tion with the 1943 e nactment of section 9 of Public L aw 78- 144, as we ll as of a 1944 op i nion of the chie f leg al offic er of the Vete rans' Administration, then called the S olicitor, interpre ting that pr ovision. J oint Mot. at 2. The Jordan joint mot ion and the Secre tary ' s November 18, 2002, response to the Court's N ovember 1, 2002, order

in Jordan include materia l from a 1943 Senate committee re port and a floor debate in the House of R ep re s entatives not made ava ilable to the Court befor e submission of the Jordan joint mot ion. J oint Mot. at 3-10; Se c ' y No v. 18 , 2 00 2, Re sp . at E xhibi t ( Ex.) B (S

. R EP
. N O
. 403-78 (1943) [hereina ft er 1 9 43 S. R EP .]). At that time, the applicable statutory provision, V eter ans Reg ulation No. 1(a) (Reg . 1(a) ),

se t f or th t he pr e su mpt ion

of so un dn e ss: That f o r th e p u r p o s e s o f p ar a g r a

p h I ( a ) h e r e o f e v e r

y p e rson employ ed in the active milit ary or naval service for 90 day s or more, shall be t aken to have bee n in sound condition when examined, acc epted a

nd enrolled f

or ser vice ex cept as to defe cts, infirmities or dis or de rs n ot e d at ti me of e xami natio n, a c c e pta

nc e and e nr oll me nt, or wh e re e vid e nc e , o r m e dic a l ju dgmen t is su c h a s to wa rr ant a finding that the injury

or disease exis ted prior t o acceptanc e and e nr oll me nt.
Reg . 1(a) , Part I , para . I (b), 38 U.S.C.A. app. c h. 12. The Senate commi t t ee re p ort containe d an analy sis of the b il l a s it h a d b e e n p a s s e d b y th e H o u s e
. T h a t r e p o rt in d ic a te d th a t th e H o u s e had made the presumption of sound condition irrebuttable (as it had appare ntly been in se ction 200 of the Wor ld War V e te r an s ' A c t, 1 9 2 4 , a s a me n d e d ) b y r e mo v in g th e p r o v is io n f o r r e b u tt a l o f that presumption by

evidenc e or me dical judg ment. 1943 S. R EP
. at 2, 9. That re port also containe d the13

following statement by

the Administrator of Ve tera ns' Affa irs (the predec essor of the Secre tary of Ve te ra ns Af fa ir s) a s to the Ho us e -p a sse d ame ndme nt: [I ]t is t he vie w o f t

he Ve te ra ns ' Ad min istra tio n th a t e lim inatio n of

a ll pr ov isi on s f

or re bu tta l of

the pr e su mpt ion of

so un dn e ss e xce pt a s to defe cts, infirmities, or disorders note d at time of ex ami nation, acc eptanc e, and e nrollment, is too far-r ea ch i ng and ca nnot be justified. Even with the g reatest of ca re, me dical off

icer s in the arme d forc es ca

nnot possibly

discover a ll ex istin g d i s ease s or disabiliti es and since compens at i o n or pension is pay able f or ag g ravation of pree x isting disabilities unde r Ve tera ns Reg ulation No. 1(a) , as ame nded, it seems o n ly fair that the Gover

nment should be proper ly safe g uarde d so that pay

ment of compe nsation or pension will be made only

for disabilities incurre d in service , or ag g ravation of disabilities which the per son had whe n he ente red the service , even though suc h d i s abilities may not have be en noted at the time of e xami natio n, a c c e pta

nc e , o r e nr oll me nt.
19 43 S. R EP . at 6. Th e Ad min istrator

the n re c omm e nd e d to th e Se nate c omm itt e e the ins e rt ion int o the statut e of

" or wh e re c le ar a

nd un mis takable e vid e nc e de mon str a te s th a t th e inj ur y or dis e a se
ex is ted pri or t o acce pt ance a n d e n r o l l m e n t ." Ib id . The c ommitt ee not only added this lang uag e, there by making the pre sumption of soundness "r ebuttable" , but also added "' and wa s not ag g ravated by su c h a c t i v e m i l i t ar

y o r n a v a l s e r

v i c e ' t o m a k e c l e ar t h e i n t e n t i o n t o p r e s e r v e t h e ri g ht i n agg rava ti on case s. " Id. at 2. When the Senate- amende d bill returned to the House for consideration, the "not ag g ravated" lang uag e wa s a spec ific focus of debate . The followingexchang e occ urre d betwee n Represe ntative Judd and Re pr e se ntativ e Rank in, the n th e Cha ir man o f t he Ho us e Com mit te e on Ve te ra ns ' Af fa ir s: Mr. J UDD. I think it is muc h better as it is ex cept f or one w ord, and I a d m i t I d o n o t kn o w h o w t o c o r r e c t i t

. T h a t w o r d " a g g ra va te " is administratively impossibl e. How can a doctor prove that a thing has no t be e n ag g ra

vate d by the man' s se rv ic e , o r h owmany ve te ra ns wi ll ever admit t h at it was not ag g ravated? "A g g ravate" is a matter of deg ree , and usually

impossibl e to measur e. Mr. RANKI

N. I understand.
Mr

. JU D D

. I d o n o t kn o w h o w a n y d o c t o r i s g o i n g t o b e a b l e to prove one way

or the other

.14 Mr. RANKI

N. I will say to the gentleman that the word " ag g ravate" is now sanctified by time and usage

. I t has been in the veter ans' law ever since the la st W orld War. I f a ma n went into the servic e in the la st w ar w itha

dis a bil ity and that di sa bil ity wa s a g g ra

vate d b y his service his disabilit y

was he ld to be service -conne cted. For instance, we will t ake a

case in the prese nt war. Aman comes in with a ne rv ou s te nd e nc y

tha t is no t pr on ounc e d e nough to c a us e the Ar

my to rejec t him, or the Navy to rejec t him, but he goe s throug h Pearl Ha rb or or he is o n a

ve sse l th a t is bo mbe d and men ar e kil le d a ll around him and the ship is blown to pie ces[;] it mig ht ag g ravate that dis a bil ity wi tho ut tou c hin g him . I t mi g ht a g g ra vate his c on dit ion

to such an e x tent that he would be a total nerv o u s wrec k. Then he should be en t i t l ed to hospital care and such othe r bene fits as are provided for

service -conne cted disabilities.
Mr . JUD D. Ithi nk

the g e ntl e me n is ri g ht i n a g re e ingto m a ke thi s b ill provide t h e b urden of

proof sha ll be upon the Gover nment to show that the condition did exi st previous to entry into service, r ather

than havin g the burd e n of pr oo f on the ve te ra

n to sh owthat it

did no t e xist be fo re he e nte re d the se rv ic e
. Th a t is the fa ir thi ng to d o, jus t li ke in ba se ba ll w he re a

tie is d e c ide d in

fa vo r o f t he ru nn e r. Th e re ou g ht t o be a pr e su mpt ion

in f a vo r o f t he ve te ra n in thi s c a se a s w e ll.
B ut, wi th the wo rd

a g g ra vate d in the re it i s g oin g to b e a lmo st imp os sib le e ve r to ke e p some fr om g e tti ng pe ns ion s th a t ou g ht n ot t o g e t th e m.
Mr . RA NK I N. So f ar a s th e wor d agg rav a te d is c on c e rn e d, a s a prac ticable pr oposition, i t is not subj ect to a doc tor['s] technical diag nosis or doctor['s] medical ter mino l og y , as used by

an e xpe ri e nc e d p hy sic ian suc h a s th e g e ntl e man f ro m Mi nn e so ta

wo uld g ive it in writing up his re port on a spec ial case involving a te chnica l dia g no sis

. Mr. J UDD. I

understand.

Sec' y Nov. 18, 2002, Resp., Ex. C (1943 C ONG
. R EC
. 7165 (1943))

. Subsequent ly , o nF e b r

u ar y 7 , 1 9 4 4 , th e V A So li c it o r is s u e d ano p in io nc o n te mp o r an e o us with the enac tment of t he new lang uag e in section 9 of t he new Public L aw. That opinion int erpr eted the ne w s e c tio n, in p e rt ine nt p art , a s f oll ow s:15 As to noted disabilities the section i s silent as to how the question of ag g ravation shall be adjudicate d. Ho wever, as to those de fec ts or dis or de rs wh ic h w e re no t no te d b ut w he re c le ar a nd un mis taka

ble evidenc e demonstrates that they exis ted prior t o acc eptanc e and enrollment the sec tion, as amende d, require s that any fi n d i n g t o the eff ect suc h pree x isting def

ect or disorder was not ag g ravated must be demonstrated by

clea r and unmistakable evide nce. I n other wor ds, as far as the spec ific lang uag e of the amendme nt is concer ned, the onl y c as es in w hic h ag

grav ation must b ere butted by c le ar and unm istak able ev idence are

those in whi ch the defe ct or disorder was not n oted . A s to no te d d isa bil iti e s a sp e c if ic fi nd ingthat th e inc re a se is due to the natura l prog ress of the disease a s provided in 1 ( a), Par t I , V e te ra ns Re g ulatio n 1 (a ), is s uf fi c ie nt t o d e ny

the c la im.

. . . . The m an d

a te of the statute as to th e man ner in w hich aggravation mu st be refuted in those cases where there was a preexisting inju ry or disease not noted at tim e or en l i s tm ent m ay be s a id t o c r e a t ea r e b u t

t a b l ep r es u mp t

i o n o f s o u n d n es s w ith a pr ov ision t

hat e v e n whe re

re but te d b y c le ar an d unmist

akab le e v ide nc e , th e re is a pr esumption o

f a gg ra v ation wh ic h its e lf

is rebuttable but

only by clear and unm istakable evidence
. To this e xten t c le arl y [,] Para g ra

ph1 ( d) re la tin g to a g g ra

vatio n o f a

dis e a se or injury pre- exis ting at enlistment or induction is m odified.

. . . . . . . The matter

rea lly resolves itself into pre scribing administratively

what proof

is acc ept ab le and I c an s e e n no v ali d reason, le

ga l or oth e rwi se , f or the Adminis tra tor

att e mpting to differe ntiat

e as b et w een 1(d) [now section 1153] and 9(b) [now section 1111] , e

sp e c ial ly whe n as has be en re prese nted, unless such p r a c ti c e is a d o p t e d [, ] the adm inis trative difficulties presented will be so c onf ound ing as to i mped eand for est all

an e ff e c tiv eand expeditious adm inis tration of the law . Fur ther, since the principles relied upon f

ormerly in both section 1(b) and (d) [now section 1153] we re lim ite d, if

no t e lim inate d, by

the a me ndme nt t o ( b) , it wo uld se e m the [be tte r] pa

rt of wi sd om –

e ve n th ou g h li te ra lly

no t r e qu isi te under a cce pted rules of

construction – to appr ox imate the per missive proce dures unde r (d) [now section 1153] to those require d by (b) a s a m e n d e d

. If

t h e r e w e r e an y d o u

b ta s t o t h i s , t h e l e g i s l a t i v e h i s t o r y, both written and otherwise, leaves no doubt as to the purpose of the leg islators t o est ablish service connec tion by way of ag g ravation of16 a pre -existi ng disability , noted or not note d, if the Gover nment later d i s ch arge d the per son for such disa bility . The lawshould be a dmi nis te re d in l ig ht o f s uc h p ur po se , e ve n th ou g h o ne may inn a te ly harbor rese rvations as to the soundness of the under ly ing r easons. Subject to the above obse rvations, it seems to me that y o ur qu e sti on may be ans we re d in

the a ff ir ma tiv e , n a me ly , th a t whe re the r e q u i s it ep r o o f i s a v a i l a b l ea [ s i c ] s h o w i n g t h a t t h epe rso n's con d i t i o n on discharge was t

he sam e as at tim e of e nlis tm ent or ind uc tio n, s uc h sho wing

woul d c ons tit ute c le ar and

unmista ka ble e v ide nc etha t the re

was no a gg ra v ation o f h is d isa bil ity . This woul

d be true e ither u nder 1 (d) [n o w s e c ti o n1 1 5 3 ] or 9 (b) [now section 1111]
.
Sec' y Nov. 18, 2002 Resp., Ex. F (72 Op. Sol. 298, 300-02 (1944)) (empha sis added). Th e fo re g oin g ma te ri a ls p ro vid e jus tif ic a tio n f or the pa rt ie s' po sit ion

that § 3 .3 04 (b ) c on fl ic ts with the section 1111 pre sumption of sou n d co n d i t i on. The re g ulatory history of § 3.304(b) , howeve r, is not quite so persuasive. 3. 38 C.F.R . § 3.304(b) There are numerous fa ctors that have led the Court to the conc lusion that, rather tha n i n v al i d at e § 3

. 3 0 4 (b ), we s h o u l d i n s t ea d s en d t h i s i s s u e ba ckt o t h e S ec re t ary t o re s o l v e. Al t h o u gh the leg islative history

of sec tion 1111 is well documented, see part I I I .B.2., a bove, the r eg ulatory his tor y of § 3 .3 04 (b ) i s mo re e nli g hte nin g fo r w hat it do e s not provide than f

or what it does provide. The implementing regulation for the forer unner of section 1111 was found in VA Reg ulation 10 63 (1 94 6) . Pa

ra g ra ph(B ) o f t

hat r e g ulatio n s pe c if

ic a lly in clu ded the " no t a g g ra

vate d" c la

us e
c on sis te nt w iththe 19 43 Pub lic L aw:

(B ) F or the pu rp o s es o f par ag raph 1( a), Par t I , Veter ans Reg ulatio n

No. 1(a ), as amended July 4, 1943, ever

y person e mploy ed in active se rvice shall be take n to have be en in sound condition when e xami ne d, a c c e pte d a

nd e nr oll ed for se rv ic e e xce pt a s to de fe c ts, infirmities or disorders noted at the t ime of t he examination or wher e clea r and u n m i stakable e vidence demonstrates that the injury or dis e a se e xiste d p ri or

to a c c e pta

nc e and enr oll me nt and was n ot aggravated by

such service

.17

Sec' y Nov. 18, 2002, Resp. at Ex. G (emphasis adde d). The cruc ial "not ag g ravated" lang uag e wa s
re pe a te d in

pa ra g ra ph(D ), wh ic h p ro vid e d in fu ll: (D ) " C l e ar

an d u n m i s t a k a

b l e " m e an s o b v i o u s o r

m an i f e s t. Acc ording ly , evidenc e which makes it obvious or manifest, [ sic] that the injury or disease under c onsideration existed prior to acc eptanc e and enr ollment for service will satisfy the re quirements of the statute. The re quirement of the law is that claims to which the a bove cited presumptions apply may be denied only on the basi s o f e v i dence which cle arly and unmi stakably demonstrates that the disease did not orig inate in servic e, or, if increased i n service, was not aggravated thereby

. Ibid. (empha sis a dded). Fur ther clouding the picture reg arding the closing ref ere nce i n t h e a b ove quotation to "incr e a s ed in servic e" was pa rag raph ( I ), which pr ovided, in pertinent pa rt, the following as to " incre ase in ser

vice" , a fa ctor that ha d not been a ddresse d at all in the 1943 Public L aw: (I ) Unde r Reg ulation I (a) , Part I , para g raphs 1(a), (b) and (d), as ame nded Jul y

13, 1943, injury or disease, a part fr om misconduct dis e a se , n ote d p ri or

to s e rv ic e or

sh ow n b y

c le ar a nd un mis taka

ble evidenc e, including medical f acts a nd princip l es, to have had inc e ption prior

to e nli stm e nt will

be conce ded to have be en ag grav ate d whe re

suc h di sa bil ity unde rwe nt a n inc re as ein se v e rit y during service unless such incre ase in se verity is shown by clea r and un mis taka

ble e vid e nc e , in c lud ingme dic a l f a c ts a nd pr inc ipl e s, to have be en due to the natural prog ress of the disease. A g g ravation of a dis a bil ity no te d pri or

to s e rv ic e or

sh ow n b y c le ar a nd un mis taka

ble evidenc e, inclu d ing me dical fa cts and princ iples, to have ha d inc e ption pr ior to e nli stm e nt may no t be c onc e de d whe re

the disabili ty underwent n o increase in seve rity during service on the basis of all the evidenc e of rec ord perta ining to the manifestations of such disability

prior to, during and subseque nt to service. . . .

Ibid. (e mph a sis a dd e d) . As the ana ly sis be low wi ll s ho w, the ita lic ize d la ngua g e a s to " inc re a se in

se rv ic e " do e s n ot m e shwi th t he se c tio ns 11 11 /11 53 iss ue s r a ise d b y the pa rt ie s. I n 1949, VA Regulation 1063 was codified into 38 C.F.R. § 3.63; para g raphs ( B) , (D), a nd (I ) in that regulation were identical to the 1946 provisions quote d above. 38 C.F .R. § 3.63 (1949). Although the re w ere interveningchang es to these § 3.63 para g raphs betwee n 1949 and 1956, none of the c hang es we re pe rtinent to the lang uag e of c on ce rn at this point. I n Fe bruar y 1961, VA18

promulg ated a

mammoth recodific ation of title 3 8 o f t h e C.F.R. I nexpli cably , the lang uag e " and was not ag g ravated by

service " disa

ppear ed fr om the t hen-ne w § 3.304 and mos t of what had bee n para g raph ( D) wa s dropped. 38 C.F .R. § 3.304 (Supp. 1962). The F ede ra l R egi s t er contains no explanation for the languag e dele tions; i t contains only th e re codified tit le 38, without any explanation as t o the reason for the recodification. See 26 Fe d. Reg

. 1561 (F eb. 24, 1961). I n what

a pp e ars to b e a

VAint e rn a l do c ume nt, the the n- ne w § 3. 30 4( b) and § 3 .3 06 (b ) w e re de sc ri be d a s a "Re statement of VAReg ulation 1063 (B) , (D), a nd (E)" and as a "R est atement of VA Regulation 1063 (I )" , respe ctively ; also, § 3.306(a) was e x plained as a "Re statement of VA R eg ulation 1063 (I )." Sec' y Nov. 18, 2002, Resp. at Ex. K (VA C & P Transmittal Shee t 209). Reg ulation § 3.304(b) and § 3.306(b) have not bee n signific antly revised sinc e 1961. Henc e, the initial VA re g ulations adopted to implement the 1943 Public L aw c arr ied the " not

a g g r a v a te d " a d d

- o n a s p art o f th e f o r e r u n n e r o f § 3

. 3 0 4 ( b) for 15 years u n t i l t h at l an gu age
m y steriously

disappea red in what was denominate d a tec hnical re codification. S e e Ki lp a tr ic k

v. Principi , 3 27 F .3 d 1 37 5, 13 82 (F e d. Cir

. 20 03 ) ( re ite ra tin g wi th c itatio ns " the ve ne ra ble pr inc ipl e that it is improper to interpre t a codification as m aking substantive chang es i n the l aw absent a c lear indication in the leg islative history ")

. The parties failed to call this langua g e disappe ara nce to the C o u rt 's at tention in either the Jordan or Cotant p le a d in g s
. ( T h e Co u rt n o te s th a t t h e Se c r e ta

ry
mere ly stated: " The provisions in §§ 3.304, 3.306 have not underg one any signific ant cha ng e since 1961." Sec ' y

Nov. 18, 2002, Jordan Resp. at 5 (e mphasis added) ). Ad d i t ionally , the sentenc e beg inning "Ag g ravation may not be concede d" in § 3.306(b), to which reg ulation that lang uag e wa s transfe rre d in the 1961 rec odificati o n o f t itle 38 of the C.F.R., appe ars totally superf luous in the prese nt te x t of the re g ulation, give n the pre cedingsentenc e re qui ring an "incre ase in sever ity "; the sentenc e made sense only in the context of the "a

nd was not ag g ravated" lang uag e that wa s part of the 19 49 wa

rt ime pr e su mpt ion

of s ound c on dit ion . Y e t, t

he pa rt ie s, a lth ou g h c a lli nga tte nti on to wh a t th e y pe rc e ive d a s " an a

pp are nt c on fl ic t" be tw e e n th e 19 44 Sol ic ito r' s o pin ion and the " inc re a se in se verity lang uag e" , Sec' y Nov. 18, 2002, Jordan Resp. at 5, also fa iled to expl ain how the Court

c ou ld i nv a lid a te on ly § 3. 30 4( b) wi tho ut a lso a dd re ssi ng the re qu ir e me nt of an in c re a se in s e ve ri ty that § 3. 30 6( b) a

pp e ars to re qu ir e in wa

rt ime (a nd po st- 19 47 ) c a se s and the a pp are nt c on fl ic t w ith wh at t h e p ar t i es as s er ts ec t i o n1 1 1 1 m ea n s (c o n ce i v ab l y t h e l as tt wo p ar agr ap h s o f t h e S o l i ci t o r's19

1944 opinion quoted in part I I I ., C.2., above, provide some enlig htenment on this perce ived disconnec t). I n addition, the Court notes t h at we re it to have applied sec tion 1111 as the parties ha ve urg ed, it would appea

r that the re sult would not be a finding of ag g ravation but rathe r a finding that the veteran entered service in sound condition by virtue of the pr esumption of sound condition not hav i n g b een r ebutted. That is li tera lly what sec tion 1111 appear s to provide for, not a finding of ag g ravation. This in t urn would lead to some what anomalous re sults as betwee n noted-at-entry and not-noted-at-entry

pree x isting conditions. As a result of 38 C.F.R. § 3.322(a ) and § 4.22, the rating

o f a co n d i t i o nfo u n d

t o b e s er v i ce co n n ec t ed o nt h e b as i s o f a ggra v at i o ni s d er i v edb y "d edu ct [ i n g] from the pr esent de g ree of disability the deg ree , if

as c e rta ina ble , of the dis a bil ity e xistin g a t th e tim e of entra nce into ac tive service ." 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.322(a) , 4.22 (2002). I n a ca se whe re, f or example, a pre exis tin g condition was noted a nd rate d at 20% at entry , only a 50% r ating would be aw arde d if that c on dit ion

we re la te r d e te rm ine d to have inc reased in se ve ri ty to a 70 % r a tin g . H ow e ve r, if the pre exis tence wer e not noted at entry , then a 70% r ating would be aw arde d unle ss the rating at

e ntr y we re a sc e rt a ina

ble – s ome thi ngthat w ou ld a pp e ar t o b e a

re la tiv e ly ra

re ph e no ne no m f

or a no tnoted-at-entry

condition. See 38 C.F .R. §§ 3. 32 2( a ), 4. 22 . U nd e r § § 3 .3 22 (a ) a nd 4. 22 , h ow e ve r, in the ca se of a

100% cur rent disability

rating , no deduction would be made; so, for example, a veter an wi th a c on dit ion

tha t w a s 5 0% dis a

bli nga t e ntr

y and is r a te d 1 00 % n owwo ul d get a 10 0% (n ot a 50%) r ating

. B e c a us e the se po te nti a l di sp ari tie s mi g ht b e c on sid e re d " absu rd " re su lts , th e y

pr ov ide sti ll further rea son why

the Court is presently not inc lined to make a firm holding a s to the interpre tation

o f s e c ti o n 1 1 1 1 a

n d th e inv a li d a ti o n o f § 3

. 3 0 4 ( b ) u r g e d b y th e parties. See United States v. XCitement Video, Inc

. , 513 U. S. 64, 68 -6 9 (19 94 ) (" Som e a pp lic a tio ns of

re sp on de nts ' po sit ion

[as to the prope r construction of Protection of Children Ag ainst Sex ual Expl oitation Act] would produce

re su lts that were no t mer e ly od d, bu t po sit ive ly

a bs ur d.

. . . We do no t a ssume that Co ng re ss, in pa ssi ng laws , int e nd e d s uc h r e su lts ." ); Gree n v. Boc k Laundry Mac h. Co. , 490 U.S. 504, 509 (1989); United States v. Am. Truck ing Ass' ns, Inc ., 31 0 U .S. 53 4, 54 3 ( 19 40 ); Allen ( W illiam) v . Principi , 23 7 F .3 d 1 36 8, 13 75 -7 6 (F e d. Cir . 2 00 1) ; Timex V.I., I nc. v. U nited States , 157 F.3d 879, 886 ( Fe d. Cir. 1998); Thayer v. Princ ipi , 1 5 V e t.A pp . 2 04 , 2 10 (2 00 1) ; Holliday , 14 Vet.App. at 285 (citing20

pr e c e de nt re g ard ing ne e d to a vo id a bs ur d re su lt wh e n int e rp ret in g s ta tut e ); Cottl e v. Principi , 14 Ve t.A pp . 3 29 , 3 34 (2 00 1) ; Fa us t v . W est , 1 3 Vet. App . 342 , 3 50 (2 00 0) ; Tril le s v . W est , 13 Ve t.A pp . 3 14 , 3 24 (2 00 0) (e n b anc ); Da v e np ort v . B ro wn , 7 Vet.App. 476, 483- 84 (1995); Gardner v. D erwinski , 1 Vet.App. 584, 587 ( 1991). Acc ording ly , the Court has determined t hat t he problems with the S ecr etar y ' s regulations run far deepe r than the limit ed § 3.304(b) reme dy soug ht by the par ties. Be cause , as conc luded in part I I I .D., below, the Court ne ed not dea l with § 3.304(b) in order to revie w t he BVA decision on appea l and provide the re medy

soug ht by

the appe llant, the Court will not address definitively the sec tion 11 11 /11 53 iss ue s r a ise d b y the pa rt ie s and the e xten t to wh ic h § 3. 30 4( b) ma y no t be c on sis te nt w ith the statutory

scheme . I nstead, the ta sk of st ra i gh t en i n g out this ex traordina rily complicated a

nd t an g l e d w e b o f a p p ar e n t l y c o n f

l i c t i n g s t a tu t o r

y an d r e g u l a t o r y p r o v i s i o n s w i l l b e l e f

t t o t h e S e c r e t a r

y. See Zang v. D erwinski , 8 Vet.App. 246, 255 ( 1995) (Steinber g , J ., separ ate view s) (c iting, inter a lia, Talley v. De rwinski , 2 Vet.App. 282, 285- 86, 288 (1992), a nd Hattlestad v. Derwinski , 1 Vet.App. 164, 167 (1991), r efe rringto "' confusingtapestry ' of VA r eg ulations which should be the subjec t of

re vie w a nd re e va luatio n b y

the Se c re tary " ); se e als o M ag git t v . W est , 202 F.3d 1370, 1377 (F ed. Cir. 20 00 ) ( ho ldi ng th at alt houg h th is C ourt " may he ar l e g a l argume nts ra ise d f or the fi rs t ti me wi th reg ard to a

claim that is pr operly befor e the Court, it is not compelled to do so in every instance" );

c f. 57 Fe d. Reg . 59, 296 (De c. 15, 1992) ( issuing final regulation in order to c onform § 3.306 to 1974 statutory amendment r eg ardingservice afte r De cembe r 31, 1946). D. The Boa rd 's A

pp lic ation o

f § 3. 30 6 to the

App e lla nt's Cla im As set forth in par

t I I I .B.2., a

bove, re g ulatory

§ 3.306(b) pr ovides, inter alia, that clear and unmistakable evide nce is requ i re d t o rebut the pr esumption of ag g ravation where the pre service disability underw ent an incr ease in severity during service . 38 C.F.R. § 3.306(b). The deter mination whether the re cord c ontained cle ar a nd unmistakable evide nce of sufficie nt weig ht to rebut the presumption of agg ravation under § 3.306(b) is subject t o de novo revie w by this Court. Se e Cro we v. Brown, 7 Ve t

. Ap p
. 2 3 8 , 2 4 7 (1 9 9 4 ) ( ci t i n g Bagby v . Derwinski , 1 Ve t.A pp . 2 25 , 2 27 (1 99 1) ; see als o Mi lle r v . W

est , 1 1 Ve t

. Ap p
. 3 4 5 , 3 4 7 (1 9 9 8 ) ( ci t i n g Ba gb y , s up ra , and apply

ing de novo revie w to r e vie w o f r e bu tta l of

se c tio n 1 11 1 p re su mpt ion of soun d con di tio n b y

c le ar a nd un mis taka

ble

e vid e nc e ); J

un str om v . B ro wn , 6 Ve t.A pp . 2 64 , 2 66 (1 99 4) ; Kinnaman v. Principi , 4 Vet.App. 20,21

27 (1 99 3) ; c

f. D oran v . B ro wn , 6 Vet.App. 283, 286 ( 1994) (concluding that 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)(4) "c lear ly err oneous" standard of revie w is applicable to Boa rd dete rmination under 38 U.S.C. § 1153 and 38 C.F.R. § 3.306(a ) that pre exis ting c ondition had not increa sed in sever ity d u ring service ). T h e cl ear -and- unmistakable-e vidence standard is a n "one rous" one, Laposky v. Brown, 4 Ve t

. Ap p
. 3 3 1 , 3 3 4 (1 9 9 3 ) ( ci t i n g Akins v. De rwinski , 1 Vet.App. 228, 232 ( 1991)), a nd require s that the no-a g g ravation result be " undebata ble" , V a n e r s o n v
. W est , 1 2 Vet.App. 254, 258, 261 (1 99 9) ; id. at 263 (Ne beker , C.J ., concur ring in part and dissenting in part). I n this case, the B oard f

irst found that the appe llant's pr eexisti ng hip condition had incr ease d in sever ity during service , there by trig g ering a pre sumption of ag g ravation under § 3.306. R. at 6-7. The B oard deter

mined that more " weig ht" should be g iven to the opinion of the VA e x aminer, Dr

. R an gi t s ch , t h an t h at o f t h e v et er an 's p ri v at e p h y s i ci an , Dr

. Ge n t ry , b ec au s e t h at VA ex am i n er 's opinion "wa s prec eded by a thoroug h clinical examination" and a re view of the veter an' s SMR s, and t h e B o ar d t h u s fo u n d

t h at t h e p re s u mp t i o no f a ggra v at i o nh adb ee nre b u t t edb ec au s e D r. R an gi t s ch 's opinion "[rose] to the h i gh er le vel of c lear and unmistakable e vidence " ne cessa ry to rebut the presumption of ag g ravation. R. at 7. The Court conclude s that this deter mination of t he B oard w as
e rr on e ou s. Fi rs t , t h e B o ar d

d i d n o tre j ec tas l ac k i n g i ncr ed i b i l i t y Dr

. Ge n t ry 's o p i n i o nt h at t h e v et er an 's condition was ag g rava

ted by his a ctivities in service

. Rather, it g ave " more weig ht to the J une 1998 VA ex am i n er 's o p i n i o n ", t h at o f D r. R an gi t s ch

. R

. at 7 (e mp h as i s ad d ed ). S ec o n d , Dr

. R an gi t s ch 's rathe r equivoc al opinion, even standingalone, wa s fa r fr o m the kind of unconditional evidenc e
n ecessary to meet the ver

y demandingclea

r-a nd-unmistakable- evidenc e standa rd. See V anerson , su pra ; se e als o H

arris v . W est , 11 Vet.App. 456, 462 (1998) (holding that phy sician' s unequivoca l

and un c on tr a dic te d o pin ion re g ard ing the a pp e lla nt' s dis a bil ity c on sti tut e d c le ar a

nd un mis taka

ble evidenc e that rebutted presumptions of soundness and agg ravation). I ndeed, Dr. Rang itsch stated his op ini on

with fi ve di st inct

qu a lif ic a tio ns : ( 1) " As to w he the r t his [DJD o f t

he ri g ht h ip] i s acceler ated by

his mil itary

service , it is im

possible to say " ; ( 2 ) " [c ]e rta in ly th e a c ti v it ie s he perf ormed could have acc elerated his hip dis e a se " ; ( 3) " it i s most li ke ly that the natura l proce ss [ sic] of t he d is ease wou ldhav e res ul ted in hi [ s] dev elo pi ng th is hi p p rob lem even at a n ear ly age"; (4) "I

w o u l d f e e l i tis m or e li kely

that the hip disease w as due to the unde rlying Per thes disease and the22

natura l proce sses of ag ing a s the disease would prog ress" ; and (5) the DJ D of the right hip was "not sig nif ic ant ly ag g ravated by his se rvice -re lated activities"

. R. at 605 (emphasis adde d). More over, Dr. Ra ng its c h r e ite rate d tw o o f t he a bo ve qu a lif

ic a tio ns in h is Janu ary

20 00 su pp le me nta l r e po rt

. R. at 609 (" most li kely " a nd "not sig nificantly

ag g ravated" ). Third, Dr . Gentry opined: "Mike Cotant's medic al re cords . . . r evea l [ that] he had L eg g [-] Perthes disea se of the rig ht hip before he joined the military

service , the re sult of which left him with signific ant deg ener ative joint chang es of the hip which in my opinion was ag g ravated by the activiti es he did in the servic e." R. at 578. Reviewing the evidenc e de novo unde r Bagby , su pra , the Court holds that the rec ord does

no t pr ov ide c le ar a

nd un mis taka

ble e vid e nc e tha

t the a pp e lla nt' s inc re a se in h is r ig ht- hip dis a bil ity was due to the natura l prog ression of his DJ D of the rig ht hip. See 38 C.F .R. § 3 .3 06 (b ); Crowe and B agby, both supra. A c c o r d in g ly , b e c a u s e th e B o ar d

f o u n d th a t c le ar

an d u n mi s ta k a b le e v ide nce demonstra t ed t h at the appe llant's r ight- hip disabilit y pree x isted service and found a lso that that dis a bil ity ha d in c re a se d in se ve ri ty duri ngse rv ic e (R . at 3, 6, 7) , f ind ing s n ot c ha lle ng e d o n a pp e a l,

we ho ld t hat th e e vid e nc e a s to nat

ur a l pro g re ss of that pre e xistin g c on dit ion do e s n ot s ho w c le a rl y and unmistakab l y t h at t h at i ncre ase f ound by the B oard w as " due to the natur al prog ress of the dis e a se " , 3 8 C.F .R. § 3 .3 06 (a ), and , th e re fo re , th a t th a t pr e e xistin g dis a bil ity mus t be c on sid e re d to h a v e b e en aggravat ed "by

. . . s ervi ce." Ibid. W e m u s tt h u s r e v e r s e t h e B o ar d c o n c l u s i o na s to

a g g ra vatio n an d dir e c t th a t a

fi nd ingof

a g g ra vatio n b e e nte re d. 38 C.F .R. § 3 .3 06 (b ); se e Cro we and Bagby , both su

pra . I n rea ching the above decision to reve rse a s to ag g ravation in thi s case , we are mindful of the principles so cog ently

set forth by

our re cently

retire d colleague, Judge H oldaway , in Vanerson : Pursuant to the duty

to assist, the Secreta ry i s require d to assist the c la ima nt " in d e ve lo pi ng the fa c ts p e rt ine nt t o th e c la im" ; th a t duty mus t be pe rf

or me d w ith ou t r e g ard

to w he the r the e vid e nc e su pp or ts or detra cts from the c laim. Once the claim has be en deve loped, the Secre tary is require d to make an impar t i al decision affordingthe claimant the be nefit of the doubt whe re the evidenc e is in equipoise. Th e ty pic a l pa rl e y of " ba sic fa c ts" and " c ounte r pr oo f" inv olv e d w ith presumptions in an adve rsar ial pro ceeding does not fit the VA a dju dic a tio n s y ste m w he re the ve ry a dju dic a tor , w ho is c ha rg e d w ith assisting in the de velopment of the c laim, would a lso be ar the burden of re butting the pr esumption. . . .23 Additionally , the standa rd of proof for r ebutting the presumption of soundness is not mere ly evidenc e that is cog ent and compelling , i.e., a sufficie nt showing , but evidenc e that is clea r and unmistakable, i .e., undebatable. . . . [and] the question is not whether the Secr etar

y has sustained a

burden o f p roducing e vidence , but wh e the r t

he e vid e nc e a s a

wh ole , clearl y

and un mis taka

bly demonstrates that the injury or disease exis ted prior to ser vice.
Vanerson , 12 Vet.App. at 261. Here , the same standa rd of pr oof applies to the e vidence as to natura l prog ression of the conditi on for purposes of assessing ag g ravation, and we have no doubt that the

e vid e nc e fa ils to de mon str a te c le arl y and un mis taka bly – tha t is, und e bata

bly – tha t th e inc re a se in

sever ity duri n g s e r

v ic e o f th e v e te r an ' s p r e e xis ti n g r ig h t h ip c o n d it io nw a s n o t d u e to th e n a tu

ral prog ress of the disease. See 38 C.F. R. § 3. 30 6( b) ; Cro we and Bagby , both su pra . A c c o r d i n g l y, having conclude d that the appellant is entitled to the § 3.306 presumption of agg ravation, we turn to the issue of ser

vice c onnection. E. Service Connection I n order for a pree x isting condition ag g ravated i n service to be found to be se rvice connec ted, the three so-ca lled Cal uz a elements must be satisfied. See R ose v. Princ ipi , 11 Vet.App. 169, 172 ( 1 9 9 8 ) ( a pp lyingthr e e e le me nts fo r s e rv ic e -c on ne c tio n c la im f ro m Cal uz a v . B ro wn , 7 Ve t .App. 498, 506 (1995) ( holding that c laim require d "c ompetent evidence [ (1)] of current disabili ty (a me dical diag nosis)[,]

. . . [(2)] of i ncurr ence or ag g ravation of a disease or injury in service (lay

or medica l evidenc e)[,] . . . and [ (3)] o f a n exus between the in-se rvice injury or disease and the c urre nt disability (medica l ev i dence )" ), aff' d per curiam , 78 F.3d 604 ( Fe d. Cir. 1996) (table) ). The de te rm inatio n o f s e rv ic e c on ne c tio n is a fi nd in g o f fa c t de te rm ine d und e r t he " c le arl y

e rr on e ou s" standard of

revie w set for

th in 38 U

. S

. C

. § 7 2 6 1 (a )(4)

. Se e Ro se , 1 1 V e t.A pp . at 17 2; Russo v. Br own , 9 Ve t.A

pp . 4 6, 53 (1 99 6) . T he la st Cal uz a e le me nt, ne xus, may be sh ow n und e r 3 8 C. F .R. § 3.303(b), a s discussed below, by chronic ity

or continuity

of sy mptomotol og y
. S

e e Ro se , 11 Ve t.A pp . at 17 1. Un de r § 3. 30 3( b) , if " c hr on ic dis e a se [is] sh ow n a s su c h in se rv ic e (o r w ith in the presumpt[ion] period under § 3.307) so as to pe rmit a finding of service con n ec t i o n , [ t h en] subsequent manife stations of the same c hronic disease at any later date, howe ver r emote, ar e ser vice

connec ted, unless clea

rly attribu t able to interc urre nt cause s"; the r eg ulation further decla res that "[w]hen the di sease identity is established . . . , there is no require ment of [an] evidentiary showing24

of c on tin uit y ." 38 C.F .R. § 3 .3 03 (b ) ( 20 02 ); see Savage v. Go b er, 10 Vet.App. 488, 494- 95, 498 (1997). The B oard a ddres s ed two of the Caluza e le me nts of se rv ic e c on ne c tio n. As to t he fi rs t Caluza el ement, the Boar d found suffic ient evidenc e of a curr ent disability

to conclude that the

se rv ic e -c on ne c tio n c la im w a s w e ll g ro un de d und e r t he n- se c tio n 5 10 7( a ) ( the re qu ir e me nt o f a we llg ro un de d c la im p re vio us ly se t f or th i n 3 8 U .S. C. § 51 07 (a ) w a s r e pe a le d b y VC AA§ 4 , 1 14 Stat. at 2098). R. at 3 (f

inding " a cur

rent medic al diag nosis of [right-hip] disabili ty ") . Although the re appea rs to be no evide nce a fter January 2000 perta ining to cur

rent disability , this Boa

rd finding and the medica l evidence of a disability relatively contempora

neous with the BV A decision (R. at 605, 609) would satisfy

the Caluza require m en t of curr ent disability , espec ially beca use there is no medical e vidence of re cord t o t h e co n t ra ry and no dispute that the ve tera n had the disea se at that time. Se e Caf

fre yv . B ro wn , 6 Vet.App. 377, 381 ( 1994) (a ssessing c ontemporane ousness of medica l diag nosis in terms of date of B VA dec ision and concluding that medical e x amination conducte d 23 months prior was not contempor aneous w ith BVA de cision). As to the second Cal uz a e le me nt, our holding here provides the finding of in-ser vice a g g ravation of a pre exis ting r ight- hip condition, which the B oard c hara cter ized as "r ight[-]hip arthritis". R. at 6. As to the third Caluz a element of nexus, however , ev en t houg h the veter an applied f or service connec tion on Septe m b er 2 1, 1992, one month afte r his separ ation examination, there appea rs to be no medica l evidence in the rec ord linking the curr en t d i s ab i lity to the in-servic e ag g ravation of his condition. Cf. Hampton v. Gober , 1 0 V e t.A pp . 4 81 (1 99 7) (h old ingthat Cal uz a nexus requirement wa s met by evidenc e of r ecor d regarding separ ation examination and VA examination tw o m o n t h s l ater, both of which re fer ence d bilatera l knee c ondition). I n this case, a medical ne x us opinion is lacking ; that lack of me dical evide nce of nexus, however, is not fata l to the appellant' s service -conne ction claim. Reg ulation § 3.303(b), re lating to c hronicity or continui ty of sy mptomatology , "pr ovides an alternati ve

met ho d o f dem on st rat in g enti tl eme nt to ser vi ce con nect io n. " Ro se , 11 Vet.App. at 171 (citing Savage , 1 0 Vet.App. at 495-96 (conc luding that § 3.303( b) provides a "substitute way

of showing in

- s e r

v ic e in c u r

r e n c e an d me d ic a l n e xu s f

o r p u r p o s e s o f w e ll g r o u n d in g
. . . a

c laim") ; 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(a) (2002) ("[a]rthritis" denominated as "chronic disease" for pur poses of one -y ear25

presumption of ser

vice c onnection esta

blished by

38 C.F.R. § 3

. 3 0 7 (a) (2) f or chr onic disease s). Be cause the question of continuity of sy mptomatology

or chr oni ci t y

for pur poses of de termining service connec tion of the veter an' s curr ently diag nosed " deg ener ative ar thritis of the rig ht hip" (R. at 605) ha s not been a ddresse d by th e Bo ar d , t h e C o urt will remand the que stion of service

connec ti o n t o the B oard f or it to address in the f irst instance. See, e .g., Mye rs v. Principi , 16 Vet.App. 228, 236 ( 2002) (r emandingeff ective- date issue to B oard beca use of possibilit y

that "not a ll of the materia l that may bear on this question was included in the ROA" ).

IV. Conclusion Upon consider ation of the fore g oing analy sis, the ROA , and the submissions of the parties he re and tho se fr om Jordan of which w e h av e t aken judicial notice, the Court re verse s the Aug ust 21, 2000, BVA de cision on the question of agg ravation and rema nds the matter f

or the e ntry of a fi nd ingof

a g g ra vation a nd a de te rm inatio n ( 1) of

the iss ue of

se rv ic e c on ne c tio n a

nd (2 ) i f service connec tion is awarde d, of the appropriate rating and effec tive date, in a decision supported b y an ad eq u at e st atement of rea sons or bases, see 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1111, 5100-5103, 5103A, 51 06 , 5 10 7, 51 10 (a ), 71 04 (a ), (d )( 1) ; 38 C.F .R. § 3 .3 06 (b ); Fletche r v. De rwinski , 1 Vet.App. 394, 39 7 ( 19 91 ) –

a ll c on sis te nt w iththi s o pin ion and in ac c or da

nc e wi th s e c tio n 3 02 of

the Ve te ra

ns ' Be nefits I mprovements Ac t of 1994, Pub. L . No. 103-446, § 302, 108 Stat. 4645, 4658 (1994) ( found

a t 38 U. S.C. § 5 10 1 n ote ) ( re qu ir ingSe c re tary to p ro vid e fo r " e x peditio us tr e a tme nt" fo r c la ims

rema nded by BV A or the Court). Se e Al lda yv . B ro wn , 7 Vet.App. 517, 533-34 (1995). On re mand, the a pp e lla nt w ill be fr e e to s ub mit

a dd it iona l e vid e nc e and

argume nt o n th e re mand e d c la im i n
acc ordanc e with Kut

sc he ro us k yv . W est , 12 Vet.App. 369, 372- 73 (1999) ( per c uriam ord er) (c on c lud ingthat an a

pp e lla nt i s e nti tle d, un til 90 da y s a ft er Board ma ils po str e mand no tic e to appellant , t o s u b m i t additional evidenc e and a rg ument or to reque st hearingon appea l at which appellant may

s u b mi t n e w e v id e n c e ) , an d s u c h e v id e n c e an d

ar g u me n t m

u s t b e c o n s id e r e d

on
rema nd. See Kay

v. Principi, 16 Ve t.A

pp
. 52 9, 53 4 (2 00 2)

. Th e Court no te s th a t a

re mand by thi s Court an d b y t he B oard c onfer s on an appe llant the rig ht to VA compliance with the terms of the remand or de r a

nd imp os e s o n th e Se c re tary a c on c omi tant d

uty to e ns ur e c omp lia

nc e wi th t

ho se terms. Se e Ste

ga ll v. W est , 11 Vet.App. 268, 271 ( 1998). A fina l decision by the B oard f

ollowing26

the re mand

he re in o rde re d w ill c on sti tut e a ne w d e c isi on

that, i f a dv e rs e , ma

y be a pp e a le d to thi s Court only

upon the filing of a n ew NOA with the Court not later than 120 day s after

the date on which notice of

the new B oard f

inal decision is mailed to the appe llant. Se e Ma rsh v. W est , 11 Vet.App. 468, 472 ( 1998). REVERSED AND REMANDED

.