U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

88–287PDF 2014

EXAMINING U.S. RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS IN

AFGHANISTAN

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JUNE 10, 2014

Serial No. 113–164

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

SEAN DUFFY, Wisconsin 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

SEAN DUFFY, Wisconsin 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable John F. Sopko, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 

Reconstruction ...................................................................................................... 7

Mr. Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., Director, International Security & 

Counterterrorism Issues, International Affairs & Trade Team, U.S. Government Accountability Office .................................................................................. 52

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable John F. Sopko: Prepared statement ............................................. 9

Mr. Charles Michael Johnson, Jr.: Prepared statement ....................................... 54

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 84

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 85

(1)

EXAMINING U.S. RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS 

IN AFGHANISTAN 

TUESDAY, JUNE 10, 2014

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 o’clock p.m., in room 

2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. The subcommittee will come to order. After 

recognizing myself and Ranking Member Deutch for 5 minutes 

each for our opening statements, we will then recognize other 

members seeking recognition, for 1 minute each. We will then hear 

from our witnesses, and we thank them, first of all, for their patience and understanding, and that goes for the audience as well. 

We had 16 votes, so we thank you for the time. 

And the witness’ prepared statements will be made a part of the 

record, and members may have 5 days to insert statements and 

questions for the record subject to the length limitation in the 

rules. 

Before we begin, I would like to express my most sincere condolences to the family and friends of the five American troops who 

were killed in Afghanistan just yesterday. No words can adequately 

express the debt of gratitude that we owe to those brave troops, 

and our thoughts and our prayers are certainly with them and 

their families at this troubling time. 

The Chair now recognizes herself for 5 minutes. Last year, this 

subcommittee convened a hearing with Special Inspector General 

for Iraq Reconstruction, SIGIR, Stuart Bowen, on the lessons 

learned from the United States’ stabilization, relief and reconstruction operations in Iraq. The purpose of that hearing was to examine SIGIR’s final report to get a better understanding of how the 

U.S. approaches reconstruction efforts, and where we can improve 

so that we won’t be confronted with the same problems and repeat 

the same mistakes. 

The major takeaway from that hearing, in addition to the billions 

of dollars in wasted taxpayer money, was that the United States 

Government was unable to adequately plan, execute and oversee 

such large scale operations. So have we learned any lessons from 

Iraq? And have we learned to use our assistance more effectively 

and more efficiently? 

2

While we may have implemented a few reforms as a result of the 

recommendations from these oversight entities in front of us, sadly 

it seems that we still have a long way to go to be good shepherds 

of taxpayer dollars. Having seen previous GAO and SIGAR reports 

related to oversight and accountability of U.S. assistance in Afghanistan, several things are strikingly obvious. 

One is that GAO and SIGAR have undertaken an important task 

keeping Congress informed on that status of our operations there, 

but now with the troop presence winding down their abilities will 

be severely restricted due to the security situation and lack of access. This will make it difficult for them, and subsequently for us 

in Congress, to keep proper tabs on all of the U.S. funded projects 

in Afghanistan. Another is that for all of our effort and desire to 

do good in Afghanistan, we have some very glaring deficiencies 

that must be addressed. 

The U.S. has allocated over $103 billion to Afghanistan relief and 

reconstruction. However, the Afghan Government is still not capable of handling such a large infusion of money, of goods and of 

equipment, and it is incapable of achieving long term sustainability. 

This is particularly telling with many of our infrastructure 

projects, like in the health sector, where often times USAID would 

fund projects that are way too large and way too ambitious, and 

it leaves the Afghans with facilities that are larger and more expensive to operate, like the Gardez and the Khair Khot hospitals. 

And then these hospitals go unused and unstaffed because the Afghans can’t find the funds nor the staff to operate them. 

These efforts are not economical and are not practical. As a result, it is a waste of taxpayer dollars. The result of this large infusion of money to an incapable Afghan system is twofold. A report 

released this year commissioned by General Dunford and conducted 

by the Joint Coalition Operational Analysis, JCOA, determined 

that the vast influx of money overwhelmed the Afghan Government’s capacity. This helped foster an environment of corruption 

that has worked against our interests from the start, and as General Allen once said, corruption is the existential, strategic threat 

to Afghanistan. 

The other result is that it created an environment in which we 

are not tackling the root cause of the issue. The only way for Afghanistan to maintain and sustain the progress it has made under 

these relief and reconstruction efforts is to continue to rely on 

donor contributions to fill the revenue gaps. And that is not sustainable for Afghanistan nor is it sustainable for us in the United 

States, or we risk losing all of those gains. 

In 2009, the administration decided it was going to pledge to provide 50 percent of the developmental aid to Afghanistan in direct 

assistance. In fact, GAO reports that we went from $470 million in 

2009 to over $1.4 billion in 2010. However, that same year several 

reports, including one commissioned directly by USAID, cited how 

decidedly ill equipped the Afghan ministries were to receive direct 

assistance. 

Both GAO and SIGAR raised the warning flags and recommended that USAID identify and assess the risks associated 

with direct assistance, but SIGAR is now reporting that USAID 

3

had ignored these recommendations and may have approved direct 

assistance without mitigating these risks. 

So how are we to conduct proper oversight of State, of USAID, 

of DoD, to ensure that they are fully complying with the recommendations of SIGAR and GAO and the rules and regulations 

laid out by Congress to ensure U.S. taxpayer dollars are put to 

their best use? SIGIR identified several major lessons that should 

have been learned in Iraq that should be applied in Afghanistan, 

and included the need to implement better interagency coordination and use our funds wiser, more efficiently and more effectively. 

If we are still running into the same problems in Afghanistan as 

we did in Iraq now that we are transitioning, is it time for Congress to reexamine how we conduct these operations and consider 

implementing some much needed reform? The obvious answer is 

yes. Of course, yes. 

And with that I am pleased to yield to the ranking member, my 

good friend Mr. Deutch of Florida. 

Mr. DEUTCH. I thank you, Madam Chairman. I also would like 

to extend my condolences to the five troops who were killed yesterday in Afghanistan. We spend a lot of time here talking about what 

our Government does, but it is ultimately the men and women who 

serve our Government in tough places like this that we need to 

keep in mind. And on this day we keep in mind the families of the 

five. 

Today’s hearing comes on the heels of the President’s announcement that 9,600 American troops will remain in Afghanistan until 

2016. After almost 13 years, trillions of dollars and thousands of 

American lives lost, this news was met with the mixed reactions 

that we have come to expect when we talk about Afghanistan, from 

those who cannot bear the thought of even one more American life 

sacrificed to those who believe that it is our responsibility to remain and protect our national security interests. 

A recent Gallup poll found that for the first time since the war 

in Afghanistan began, more Americans now view the war as a mistake. After the United States has given so much in blood and treasure, what do we have to show for it? Have our resources been wisely spent? Have we strengthened U.S. security at home and abroad? 

The Department of Defense and State Department and USAID 

all continue to have significant civilian presence and projects 

throughout Afghanistan. These agencies have done tremendous 

work in an extremely challenging environment. And the civilians 

on the ground working to rebuild and reform put their lives in danger every day and they deserve to be commended for the work that 

they are doing. 

But as our presence in Afghanistan draws down, are we putting 

the necessary measures in place to ensure that the programs that 

we have instituted and the infrastructure that we have built to 

strengthen Afghanistan’s security capability, governance and civil 

society are sustainable and will remain in place long after we 

leave? 

Accounting for billions of dollars across multiple agencies is no 

easy task. I believe that the good folks at State and USAID have 

taken significant steps to deal with corruption in the Afghan Government and to combat any potential uses. An additional indeVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:05 Jul 23, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\061014\88287 SHIRL
4

pendent oversight of these efforts is necessary and welcome to create programs that run as efficiently as possible. 

In 2008, Congress established the Special Inspector General for 

Afghanistan Reconstruction with a goal of not just tracking waste, 

fraud and abuse, but to recommend more efficient and effective 

methods for completing the enormous task of reconstruction in Afghanistan. Thanks to the work of SIGAR as well as oversight investigations conducted by GAO, they have identified a number of 

key challenges to U.S. reconstruction efforts such as the limited capacity of the Afghan Government and the many persistent security 

challenges. 

And it is clear that evidence of these challenges can be seen 

throughout our footprint in Afghanistan. GAO identified numerous 

weaknesses in interagency coordination and overlap of funding accounts between DoD, State and USAID, creating the potential for 

duplication of projects and programs. 

While GAO recommended the creation of a shared interagency 

database in 2010, it appears that little progress to advance that 

recommendation has been made. In 2012, GAO went so far as to 

recommend that Congress take legislative action to require that 

U.S. agencies report information on their development related activities in a shared database. While USAID agreed with this recommendation, DoD did not. 

SIGAR has also raised serious concerns over State and USAID’s 

ability to terminate contracts when contractors are found to have 

ties to insurgent or opposition forces. The agencies lack the authorities to swiftly terminate, restrict or avoid a contract awarded 

to a person or an entity identified as supporting the enemy or opposing U.S. forces, and under existing law the agencies will likely 

have to pay up to the full cost of any contract to complete a termination. 

Implementation of these broad reforms and other recommendations will help maximize our assistance and achieve greater results. 

Unfortunately, on a micro level SIGAR has also found numerous 

examples of wasted funds, like the $12.8 million utility equipment 

purchased to meet urgent needs in support of the 

counterinsurgency strategy that sat unused in storage controlled by 

the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. 

I know that our witnesses today will highlight other examples of 

concern, but I would like to use the remainder of my time to focus 

on how we can better our coordination, transparency and accountability going forward. 

Our development work in Afghanistan will not end when the last 

American troop leaves in 2016. Many of our ongoing programs have 

been tremendously successful. We have made great strides in building the capacity of the Afghan justice sector, instituting desperately 

needed health programs and dramatically increasing access to education, especially for women. 

How can we sustain these programs going forward with the ultimate goal of course being to one day transition them to complete 

Afghan control? With the decreased footprint on the ground, will 

we be able to provide needed oversight to make sure that our 

projects stay on track? 

5

USAID has developed an extensive remote monitoring process 

that has been used successfully in a number of other challenging 

environments. I hope that our witnesses will address today critical 

components required for these monitoring programs and when they 

believe this type of remote monitoring can be successful in Afghanistan. 

Any development work of this scale will face its fair share of failures and successes, but I believe we are doing important work that 

directly impacts the security of this country. It is my hope that today’s hearing will shed light on how we can continue to ensure that 

Congress, State, DoD, and USAID are working together to ensure 

that aid is provided in the most effective and efficient way possible. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Deutch. 

So pleased to yield to Mr. Chabot, our subcommittee chairman. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much, Madam Chair, and thank 

you for calling this hearing to continue this subcommittee’s oversight of U.S. reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. Many of us have 

ongoing concerns about the future of Afghanistan. 

President Obama’s recent announcement that he was pulling all 

but 9,800 U.S. troops out by year’s end and then halving that in 

2015, and then pulling all our troops out by the end of 2016 is troubling. Announcing a departure date no matter what the conditions 

on the ground just tells the Taliban how long they have to wait for 

us to leave before they can then, at least in their mind, take over 

the country. 

This announcement puts at risk, I am afraid, the sacrifice that 

our men and women in uniform have made in that country, not to 

mention the billions of dollars the U.S. has invested in stabilization 

or even reconstruction efforts. I fear that we may see something 

similar to what we saw in Iraq when we all thought that there 

would be a number of troops that would remain there. They were 

all pulled out. Fallujah, we see it fall to Al Qaeda. We now see 

rather than a U.S. ally there, we have extreme Iranian influence, 

and I would hate to see a repeat of that. 

So thank you very much for holding this. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. 

Mr. Higgins of New York. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

And obviously, this situation relative to Afghan reconstruction is sobering at best, $103-billion commitment over the past 12 years. 

And you look at the condition of that country, you have the Afghan 

economy is about $20 billion. In 1 year we spent 75 percent of that, 

some $15 billion in reconstruction, $75 billion for a turbine in the 

southwest, a $230-million highway project in the east, $4 billion in 

training and equipping Afghan security forces. 

And I think any assessment of the condition of all of those 

projects is one that requires a lot of explanation when we consider 

that Congress last year approved $53 billion to rebuild the roads 

and bridges of America, a nation of 300 million, and yet we spent 

$89 billion over a 12-year period rebuilding the roads and bridges 

of Afghanistan, a nation of some 31 million. 

So at the very least, the corrupt nature of the government, the 

inadequacy of the Afghan security forces does not justify the comVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:05 Jul 23, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\061014\88287 SHIRL
6

mitment that we have made. So I look forward to listening to the 

work of the Inspector General and the rest of the panel in exploring these issues more deeply. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Higgins. 

Mr. Weber of Texas. 

Mr. WEBER. Thank you, Madam Chair. I am going to be short. 

Let us go. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Cicilline? 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Madam Chairman and Ranking Member Deutch, for holding today’s hearing. I too want to extend my 

sympathies to the families of the five soldiers who were killed yesterday in Afghanistan. 

As we begin drawing down combat operations in Afghanistan, I 

think it is important to say again that the responsibility rests with 

the Afghan people to operate, build and maintain their own civilian 

and military capacity. And the United States has built an important foundation for Afghanistan’s future, but long term security 

and sustainable peace in the region can only be accomplished when 

the people of Afghanistan take on these responsibilities. 

Some have argued that helping to rebuild Afghanistan’s schools, 

bridges, roads and hospitals has been important to our mission, 

and some like me believe that it is time for us to return our focus 

to supporting our own schools, bridges, roads and hospitals. But I 

hope that all would agree that we need to be sure that whatever 

funds have been used and will be used are used wisely and that 

they are building programs that are sustainable and institutions 

that are sustainable. 

But as Mr. Higgins just said, I think there is a lot of explanation 

that needs to be provided when you look at the magnitude of the 

resources that have been invested when we have urgent needs here 

in our own country. So I look forward to hearing the two witnesses 

today, and I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Cicilline. 

Ms. Meng? 

Ms. MENG. Thank you, Chairwoman Ros-Lehtinen and Ranking 

Member Deutch for calling this important hearing. It is important 

that we conduct this oversight in order to ensure that American 

taxpayer dollars are being used appropriately and to ensure that 

our various agencies and departments are working efficiently here 

and making use of best practices. Without appropriate oversight, 

money will go to waste in Afghanistan. 

I also look forward to a discussion of how we can discuss with 

the American people the issues that are the subject of this hearing. 

Afghanistan is an emotional issue for the American people as we 

have seen this past week with the case of Sergeant Bergdahl. As 

we finally leave Afghanistan, we need to make sure we are communicating effectively and honestly with the American people about 

our departure and what will come next. Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Ms. Meng. 

And so now we are pleased to introduce our witnesses. First, we 

are pleased to welcome Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 

Reconstruction, John Sopko. Mr. Sopko has more than 30 years of 

experience as a prosecutor, congressional counsel and senior FedVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:05 Jul 23, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\061014\88287 SHIRL
7

eral Government advisor. He spent over 20 years on the Hill—poor 

thing—serving in the Senate and House of Representatives including on a House Select Committee on Homeland Security and in the 

Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. Mr. Sopko was 

sworn in as the Special Inspector General on July 2nd, 2012. 

Secondly, we welcome Mr. Michael Johnson who is a senior executive and director of International Affairs and Trade at the U.S. 

Government Accountability Office, GAO. In his role, he assesses 

U.S. counterterrorism and security efforts focusing on Afghanistan, 

Pakistan and other terrorist safe havens. Prior to this position, Mr. 

Johnson was an assistant director in GAO’s Homeland Security 

and Justice team and he also spent the year detailed to the House 

of Representatives Homeland Security Committee. 

We thank you, gentlemen, for your patience, for your expertise, 

for waiting around, and we are so pleased to yield to you now. And 

we will start with Mr. Sopko. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHN F. SOPKO, SPECIAL 

INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION 

Mr. SOPKO. Thank you very much. Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, 

Ranking Member Deutch, members of the subcommittee, it is a 

pleasure to be here today to discuss my agency’s oversight of reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. Today’s hearing as you have noted 

is very timely. As you are well aware, we are in the midst of a pivotal transitional year in Afghanistan. 

The ongoing military, political and economic transition will undoubtedly shape Afghanistan’s future for many years to come. For 

instance, this week’s Presidential run-off election could result in 

the first peaceful democratic transition of Presidential power in Afghanistan’s history. Likewise, just a few weeks ago, the President 

announced his plan to reduce our military presence to approximately 10,000 troops by the end of 2014, and by the end of 2016 

the U.S. presence in Afghanistan will be reduced to a normal Embassy operation in Kabul with a small security assistance office. 

These events may lead many to incorrectly assume that the reconstruction effort is also coming to an end, when in fact it is likely 

to continue for the foreseeable future. This is largely due to previous commitments made by the United States and international 

community at the Chicago and Tokyo conferences, in addition to 

the weak state of Afghanistan’s economy and the limited capability 

of the Afghan Government to collect revenue. Since 2002, Congress has appropriated roughly $103 billion for 

relief and reconstruction in Afghanistan. This is more than the 

United States has ever spent to rebuild any single country in our 

history. To give this number some context, by the end of this year 

we will have spent more money on Afghanistan reconstruction than 

we did to rebuild Europe under the Marshall Plan after World War 

II. And this year alone, we plan to spend more money on Afghanistan reconstruction than we spend on the next four countries, that 

is Israel, Egypt, Pakistan and Iraq, combined. 

Now an unforeseen consequence of this historic investment by 

the United States and our allies has been that we have built infrastructure and a security force and a national government that the 

Afghans cannot currently sustain on their own. For example, the 

8

Afghan Government generates roughly $2 billion a year in annual 

revenue while it needs as much as $10 billion annually to cover all 

government operations including the important Afghan National 

Security Forces. 

As a result, for many years to come the Afghan Government will 

depend on external assistance from the United States and the 

international community to meet this budget shortfall. Accordingly, 

it is critical that effective management and oversight remain a top 

priority for all U.S. agencies as we prepare to enter a post-2014 reality in Afghanistan. This is extremely important given that roughly $18 billion in authorized and appropriated reconstruction funds 

remain to be spent by U.S. agencies as of March 31st, 2014, including approximately $7 billion by the State Department and USAID. 

Today, SIGAR and our oversight comrades at GAO and the other 

IGs are already contending with a restricted oversight access. In 

fact, based on our best estimate it is likely that far less than 20 

percent of Afghanistan will be accessible to civilian U.S. oversight 

personnel by December of this year. That is more than a 50-percent 

decrease since 2009. 

Despite these challenges, SIGAR is committed to its oversight 

mission and is developing innovative methods to adapt to the evolving security environment. Given what is at stake for the United 

States, the international community and the Afghan people, SIGAR 

believes oversight must be, to use a military term, mission-critical. 

If it is not, the historic investment we have made to date and the 

billions more yet to be spent on reconstruction will be significantly 

vulnerable to possible waste, fraud and abuse. 

Thank you very much for the opportunity to testify, and I look 

forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sopko follows:]

9


88287a-1.eps
10


88287a-2.eps
11


88287a-3.eps
12


88287a-4.eps
13


88287a-5.eps
14


88287a-6.eps
15


88287a-7.eps
16


88287a-8.eps
17


88287a-9.eps
18


88287a-10.eps
19


88287a-11.eps
20


88287a-12.eps
21


88287a-13.eps
22


88287a-14.eps
23


88287a-15.eps
24


88287a-16.eps
25


88287a-17.eps
26


88287a-18.eps
27


88287a-19.eps
28


88287a-20.eps
29


88287a-21.eps
30


88287a-22.eps
31


88287a-23.eps
32


88287a-24.eps
33


88287a-25.eps
34


88287a-26.eps
35


88287a-27.eps
36


88287a-28.eps
37


88287a-29.eps
38


88287a-30.eps
39


88287a-31.eps
40


88287a-32.eps
41


88287a-33.eps
42


88287a-34.eps
43


88287a-35.eps
44


88287a-36.eps
45


88287a-37.eps
46


88287a-38.eps
47


88287a-39.eps
48


88287a-40.eps
49


88287a-41.eps
50


88287a-42.eps
51


88287a-43.eps
52

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Sopko. 

Mr. Johnson? 

STATEMENT OF MR. CHARLES MICHAEL JOHNSON, JR., DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY & COUNTERTERRORISM 

ISSUES, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS & TRADE TEAM, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Madam Chair, Ranking Member Deutch and members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to be here to discuss key issues relating 

to U.S. efforts and Afghanistan. Since 2003, GAO has issued over 

70 products including a special publication in 2003 highlighting 

key issues for oversight. We have also just been to numerous congressional hearings and briefings on U.S. efforts in Afghanistan. 

During the course of our work we have made over 150 recommendations on a range of actions that should be taken to improve program planning, implementation, management and oversight. 

Today I would like to highlight a few key issues. Among them 

are the need to mitigate against the risk of providing direct assistance to the Afghan Government, the oversight and accountability 

of U.S. development projects, and as the chair noted, the need for 

a comprehensive database and the need for contingency planning 

as the U.S. transitions to a predominately civilian-led presence. 

Regarding direct assistance to the Afghan Government, in 2010, 

the U.S., along with other international donors pledged to provide 

at least 50 percent of its development assistance support through 

direct assistance. This was contingent on certain controls being in 

place, and as the chair has noted, we reported in 2011 that the 

U.S. fulfilled its pledge by nearly tripling its awards during the 

first year. We went from about $470 million in Fiscal Year 2009 

to about $1.4 billion in Fiscal Year 2010. 

We also reported that while USAID had established and generally complied with various financial and other internal controls, 

it did not always assess the risk of providing direct assistance. Although USAID took steps in response to our recommendations, we 

have since learned of SIGAR’s follow-on findings that USAID may 

have again approved direct assistance to some Afghan ministries 

without mitigating against all identified risks. 

Regarding oversight and accountability of the USAID development projects with respect to Afghanistan, since 2002 U.S. agencies 

have allocated over $23 billion for governance and development related projects. While USAID is taking some steps in response to 

our prior reviews to improve its monitoring and evaluation efforts, 

USAID continues to inconsistently apply performance management 

procedures. 

USAID has also fallen short in maintaining institutional knowledge in some areas and still needs to strengthen its oversight of its 

contractors. Additionally, as the ranking member noted in his opening statement, to avoid the potential overlap and duplication and 

to ensure a full accounting of USAID, DoD and State funded development projects, GAO has made multiple recommendations and, 

actually, dating back to 2008, including suggested congressional action leading to establishment of a comprehensive shared database 

53

to account for U.S. funded projects. Although State and USAID 

have taken some steps to designate a database, nearly 6 years later 

we continue to report on the need for a database. This is due in 

part to the lack of DoD action. 

Regarding the need for contingency planning, in February 2013 

we reported that while circumstances in Iraq are somewhat different from those in Afghanistan, potential lessons could be learned 

from that transition and when you transition from a military to civilian-led presence. 

As we have reported, program implementation, oversight and accountability in Afghanistan have and are very likely to continue to 

be challenged by multiple factors, including a dangerous security 

environment, the prevalence of corruption and the limited capacity 

of the Afghan Government. 

As we have also highlighted, contingency planning is critical to 

the successful transition and to ensuring that the environment is 

conducive to carry out operations and to also carry out oversight. 

The plans to invest billions more in Afghanistan, the challenging 

working environment and uncertainties of the bilateral security 

agreement underscore the continued need for contingency planning 

and continued oversight of U.S. efforts. 

In closing, Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member Deutch 

and members of the subcommittee, I would like to personally thank 

the dedicated GAO staff who have put their lives on the line in carrying out oversight. I also thank the Congress and members of the 

subcommittee for their support and for calling this hearing on key 

issues, and note that GAO stands ready to assist the Congress and 

the administration in ensuring that there is oversight and accountability of the U.S. partnership in Afghanistan. 

I thank you for the opportunity again to testify. This concludes 

my statement and I would be happy to answer any questions you 

may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Johnson follows:]

54


88287b-1.eps
55


88287b-2.eps
56


88287b-3.eps
57


88287b-4.eps
58


88287b-5.eps
59


88287b-6.eps
60


88287b-7.eps
61


88287b-8.eps
62


88287b-9.eps
63


88287b-10.eps
64


88287b-11.eps
65


88287b-12.eps
66


88287b-13.eps
67


88287b-14.eps
68


88287b-15.eps
69


88287b-16.eps
70

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you to you both for excellent testimony, and I will begin with the question and answer segment of 

our hearing. 

Corruption is so systemic, it is so pervasive in Afghanistan that 

it only serves to exacerbate the already difficult obstacles facing 

the government’s ability to govern effectively. Not only that but it 

undermines the security of both the international forces and the 

Afghan people. It erodes the people’s confidence in their government, and it leads them to distrust us and it leads to the waste 

of billions, billions of taxpayer dollars. 

Yet for all of these warnings and all of the reports we have had 

about corruption in Afghanistan, we have yet to develop an anticorruption policy. Even Karzai, Karzai, if you can believe it, acknowledged that this is a major obstacle to progress. How is it even 

possible that we still don’t have an anti-corruption policy even as 

we are sending billions of dollars in direct assistance to Afghan 

ministries despite all the warnings, and do we have any insight 

into updated amounts of direct assistance? 

And sticking with the direct assistance issue, after the assessment that the Afghan ministries were not ready, were not capable 

of receiving direct assistance, and after recommendations from 

GAO to mitigate all identified risk before proceeding with direct assistance, USAID apparently continued anyway without regard to 

these warnings. Why did USAID continue to provide direct assistance despite the warnings, and are there any other instances 

where USAID has ignored recommendations? Also, how would you 

characterize your relationship with USAID, and what does Congress need to do to ensure that USAID is in full compliance before 

going forward with these high risk programs? 

I am also greatly concerned about the duplication of efforts 

where we see overlaps between State and DoD on infrastructure 

projects because there is no central and comprehensive database. 

I know that is one thing you both would say is seriously lacking 

and something that we need to address. What else would you say 

the Congress needs to do to ensure that USAID, State, DoD are all 

accountable for these billions of dollars that we are spending in Afghanistan and what tools do you need us to give to you to ensure 

that you have everything you need to continue to do your work? 

I know it will be extremely difficult for you with the troop drawdown and the uncertainty over the BSA, but we want to help you 

to keep you safe while you continue to perform your duties. Thank 

you. 

Mr. SOPKO. Madam Chair, starting with your last point and that 

is on assistance that we can need, I think it would be useful for 

Congress to respond with the very valid recommendation that GAO 

has made about a centralized database. And I don’t know if that 

is authorization language or appropriations language. One of the 

hardest problems we have, and I am certain GAO and I know my 

colleagues in the other IGs have, is we don’t even know where the 

money has been spent. So you start with that problem. And by requiring the agencies to put together that database that would be 

extremely useful. 

We are starting to do that ourselves. I think in some of the background material we gave you, we are actually trying to collect this 

71

information. But it really isn’t the role of the Inspector General to 

be the first one to collect this. This is something that should be 

done. 

As for the issue about direct assistance, I think a serious problem here was that USAID had finally done some really good assessments, and we praised them in our audit that came out earlier this 

year about the direct assistance. They assessed the Afghan ministries, and what we had hoped they would have done would have 

been to actually use that as leverage to bargain on conditionality, 

to get in place particularly in the future, where it is going to be 

more difficult to go out there and kick the tires of the programs. 

But unfortunately they waived it, and we don’t really have an answer on why they waived it. 

Mr. JOHNSON. I can actually chime in with some updated numbers, and first to your point about corruption. Corruption, as we all 

had said in the beginning, will remain a challenge and has been 

one of the biggest challenges we have had of the U.S. and of the 

space in operating in Afghanistan. 

With regards to direct assistance funding, the latest figures we 

have is roughly the amount is $800 million for 2012 and approximately $900 million in 2013 in direct assistance. That shows a 

drop-off from the 1.4 and it is closer to their target of 50 percent 

but not quite has that met that goal. So it has come down somewhat but it is still pretty significant. 

In terms of what more Congress can do, I would definitely agree, 

as we sort of suggested, that you consider mandating that there be 

a shared database or a comprehensive database that has the entire 

inventory of development projects, especially given over $23 billion 

has been invested of the taxpayers’ money and that as I mentioned 

earlier, USAID has taken action. Afghan Info has been designated 

as the official database. 

However, the Department of Defense, despite various briefings 

with USAID and others, have basically not agreed to routinely put 

their stuff in that database automatically and share that database 

and use that database or any other database for that matter. And 

so we basically would suggest that Congress now may need to mandate that given the CERP funding, given the AIF funding of the 

task force and business operations, all the potential funding that 

exists there. 

And we looked at this a little more in-depth comparing those 

three programs to the USAID funded efforts under ESF or development assistance, and we didn’t necessarily find exact duplication, 

but we found 53 cases of potential duplication and overlap between 

the agencies. 

And the reason why we can definitively say that is because the 

data that DoD was maintaining did not go down to the level it 

needed to go down to of capturing data on the villages that were 

receiving the assistance. So we think a shared database would encompass all that sort of information. I think also continuing holding hearings like you are doing today on key oversight issues would 

put the attention of the Congress on the agency requesting money 

every year, additional funding. 

With respect to USAID’s cooperation with GAO and probably the 

oversight community as well, I would say that over the last 2 years 

72

or 18 months there have been some significant challenges in terms 

of our normal operation with USAID. They have been one of the 

more cooperative agencies, but we have run into major challenges 

in trying to carry out our mission for the Congress. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

Yes, Mr. Sopko? 

Mr. SOPKO. Chairman, if I could just add, I echo the statement 

by my colleague from GAO in that although we have had very good 

support from DoD on cooperation, particularly under General 

Dunford, General Cole and a number of those colleagues over 

there, we have had some problems with USAID in getting access 

particularly through over classification and, we think, improper 

classification of some material as unclassified, sensitive but unclassified. 

But can I just add to my colleague’s numbers? I think he was focusing on the State and USAID direct assistance, but we have to 

keep in mind the biggest player in all of this is DoD. And so to direct assistance, DoD is giving approximately $4.2 billion right now 

in direct assistance, and that is going directly to the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense and also going through some of the 

trust funds. So that is the biggest player. And although we are focusing on the USAID ministerial assessments, there still has never 

been a ministerial assessment on the Ministry of Interior and the 

Ministry of Defense by DoD and we have highlighted that as a potential problem. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

Our ranking member, Mr. Deutch, is recognized. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Mr. Sopko, did I understand you said that more money is spent 

on Afghanistan reconstruction than the Marshall Plan? 

Mr. SOPKO. By the end of this year taking into consideration inflation, et cetera. 

Mr. DEUTCH. So what is the total amount? As you analyze it 

today, what is the total amount spent by this country on Afghanistan? 

Mr. SOPKO. The appropriations on the Afghanistan reconstruc- tion is $103 billion, I believe. 

Mr. DEUTCH. And for both of you, as you analyze what you refer 

to as waste, fraud and abuse, but fraud and abuse ultimately is 

waste as well, from all of the responses and all of the good reports 

that you have put out, is there a total amount? Of that $103 billion 

is there a total amount that has been wasted? 

Mr. JOHNSON. I am not in a position to give you an exact figure 

on that. That is something we haven’t looked in-depth at in terms 

of a range of figures. But we do know that there has been some 

various inefficiencies. There are some concerns about whether 

there is really an inventory of everything. The biggest problem is 

that many of the agencies weren’t keeping good performance 

metrics for us to look at whether or not the money had been used 

for its intended purpose or met its goals. 

Mr. SOPKO. I agree. We can’t come up with an estimate. We 

would be spending all of our time trying to figure out what was lost 

in the past. We are looking forward. I think it is safe to say a lot 

of money has been wasted. Probably more wasted than actually stoVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:05 Jul 23, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00076 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\061014\88287 SHIRL
73

len, and that is the problem. And I think going back, if we don’t 

even know where the money was spent it is hard for us to come 

up and quantify particularly GAGAS standards, which is a generally accepted auditing standards, how much money was really 

spent. 

Mr. DEUTCH. And explain it again. We don’t know where the money was spent and how much of that $103 billion, do you think 

we don’t know where it was spent? 

Mr. SOPKO. Well, first of all, you have to take, out of the $103 billion that is authorized and appropriated, as I mentioned, $18 billion is still in the pipeline. So that money is still safe. It hasn’t 

gone out and been obligated yet. The vast majority of the money, 

over 60 percent, I believe, was spent by DoD. So that could be on 

CERP programs, it could be on numerous programs. I am not saying that is wasted, but I am just saying that is where the money 

is, mainly DoD. DoD is the big player in Afghanistan reconstruction. 

Mr. DEUTCH. And so I also want to move forward, but for everything that you have looked at, Mr. Johnson, for all your reports, 

there are plenty of examples that you pointed to, right, where because of the lack of systems in place, because of lack of oversight, 

because the contract, all the myriad of reasons that we have discussed there has been some significant amount of waste, it would 

be helpful if there were some range, even of the reports that you 

have got, of the review that you have done, where you know there 

is—here is my point. I want to look forward too. 

But as we deal with this issue of a shared database, it is a whole 

lot easier to convince all of our colleagues here and those who may 

not be inclined to support a shared database, why it is important, 

if beyond speaking generally about the types of problems that exist, 

we can point out that of $103 billion taxpayer dollars that X percent has been wasted. So I am not asking you to recreate the 

wheel, but based on all the analysis that you have done you must 

have some sense. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, I think we can speak in broader terms and 

give specific examples, but I think it gets back to the point that Mr. 

Sopko noted that a lot of stuff wasn’t done efficiently or it cost a 

lot more than it probably would have cost in other contingency 

areas as well. 

I would note the ANSF, for example, where the biggest amount 

of the U.S. contribution has been on the security side, and obviously that goal was supposed to have been accomplished back in 

2008 where the Afghan Security Forces were supposed to be fully 

capable and competent and independent operations. Well, what 

happened over time and over the many years that we put billions 

of dollars and enormous amounts of money, the benchmarks continue to be reset every single year. We have lowered the standards 

of their capability ratings. 

Initially, we had been trying to do it the U.S. way in trying to 

get these guys to operate the way our security forces operate. Well, 

that wasn’t deemed to be ultimately Afghan right or Afghan first. 

So we wasted a lot of money in the beginning buying U.S. type 

equipment, training on those equipment that they couldn’t maintain or sustain. We built a force that obviously the Afghan GovernVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:05 Jul 23, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00077 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\061014\88287 SHIRL
74

ment cannot sustain, but they are going to continue to be relying 

on donors to support. 

The U.S. contributed 90 percent of the Afghan public expenditures related to security issues. The United States has paid for 

that. So we are the largest contributor on the security side. And 

in terms of waste and efficiencies there, it could have been done 

more efficiently, is what I would say would really be the message 

there. 

And we could give you some examples where USAID was going 

to go in and build a road that perhaps DoD had already done. That 

is why you need a shared database. So USAID, as they noted to 

us, would like to know what DoD is going to be leaving behind so 

they will have some indication of what is already there as they 

move forward with their planning. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Okay. And what is the biggest impediment to your 

shared database since it has now been years since you proposed it? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, we don’t really see a major impediment. 

DoD’s position is that they are concerned about the security of the 

database itself, whether there are sufficient firewalls to prevent 

others from getting in. USAID is showing us that that would not 

be a problem. I honestly think it is a reluctance on the part of DoD 

to engage with USAID in completing this database that has been 

put in place. 

They actually send, they give them a disc, I think it is every 

month or so, every 2 or 3 months for USAID to upload. So the data 

is getting in there eventually but it is not readily available. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Finally, does the hesitancy on the part of DoD stem 

in any way from concern about what we see going forward? Since 

60 percent of the $103 billion is DoD funded, and we are not in the 

position to identify the total amount of waste, is there a concern 

in going forward? Some of what you described, Mr. Johnson, I 

would suspect our friends at DoD would view differently than the 

way you have described it in terms of change of standards and why 

those standards were changed. Concerns for security. 

What do we do to help convince them that this is ultimately necessary, and again I just go back to where I started. I would really 

urge you, for all of the analysis that has been done it would be immensely helpful for us to have a conversation not just about going 

forward, but if we can’t acknowledge that we have spent $100 billion and we know billions have been wasted but we can’t even really identify some ballpark of what that is and where that comes 

from, then it makes it even harder to support. Forget the creation 

of a shared database, it makes it harder to support continued funding if we are not even going to identify where the problems were 

to start with. And with that I yield back, Madam Chairman. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Deutch. And now I 

am so pleased to yield to a real war hero of both Iraq and Afghanistan, fighter pilot Mr. Kinzinger. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you, Madam Chair, you are too nice. And 

thank you all for being here. The important thing to do at the very 

top of this is for everybody to remember why we are in Afghanistan 

in the first place, and that is it was a beautiful day in September 

and we were attacked right in the United States of America when 

75

we thought we were completely defensible by two oceans, and thousands of Americans lost their lives. 

And since that day on September 11th, thousands of Americans 

have lost their lives in carrying freedom for the Afghan people, and 

I think importantly too, thousands of Afghans have lost their lives. 

And we see today in the, I guess, kind of the post war mission of 

Afghanistan, the Afghan people and the Afghan security forces are 

really stepping up to secure their country. 

There are going to be a lot of challenges. In fact, 2 weeks ago 

the President announced his plan to withdraw nearly all American 

service members from Afghanistan at the beginning of 2014, combat mission ending at the end of 2014. He is going to leave in place 

approximately 9,800 service members, and the following year those 

numbers will be reduced to the amount necessary to provide security at our Embassy in Kabul. 

I would bring, and I notice that this is the purpose of the hearing, to memory, the parallels between what has happened in Iraq 

and I think what the President has outlined for Afghanistan. In 

fact, today I read the news and found out that Mosul, the place 

where I had been multiple times in the war on Iraq, has just fallen 

to extremists, and they see what happens in a post American situation. 

With that said, the reduction of force is going to place a significant demand on the Afghan National Security Forces. As the GAO 

has reported, between Fiscal Years 2002 and 2013, nearly 65 percent of the agency funding went toward supporting Afghanistan security in areas such as developing the security forces and counternarcotics effort. Questions are, with the looming U.S. troop drawdown more of the onus is going to be placed on the Afghan National Security Forces to maintain the stability in the country. A 

large portion of the $103 billion we have invested has gone to them 

in the security. Are they now prepared to take the lead and can 

they help sustain an environment in which development of infrastructure projects which we put in place will succeed? 

And this is important, because for 13 years we fought to create 

an environment that they can take over. And I want to make sure 

that at the end of the day we are not in a hurry that just to fulfill 

a campaign promise so that 13 years of efforts by the American 

people and by the Afghan people don’t go to waste. Because I think 

in 20 years, history books will judge us very harshly if that is the 

case. 

So Mr. Sopko, I will go with you first. Is there an environment 

where in a post America era they can succeed? 

Mr. SOPKO. The answer to that question is a couple of points. 

Yes, of course they can succeed. There have been great successes 

with the military. You have seen the Afghan military hold their 

own over the last fighting season, and I think everyone is hopeful 

that they will continue in that robust fashion. 

There are concerns. And the major concerns that we have highlighted and I believe General Dunford has highlighted is that you 

need the BSA. If there is no BSA there is every likelihood there 

will be failure. 

Mr. KINZINGER. But we can assume it will be. It seems like it is 

on track to, so——

76

Mr. SOPKO. We are very hopeful. I have no inside information, 

but that is what I have read in the press that it is very hopeful 

that both candidates have said they would sign it. 

But the second issue which, I think, again, I can’t speak for General Dunford there, he is really the expert on the military capabilities. But it is basically the back end, it is the tail of the ANSF, the 

salaries, the support, the buildings, the getting the fuel, the getting 

them to understand and how to do that which is what he is working on, and I think the vast majority of the assistance going forward will be trying to make the military capable to do that. 

We are looking at, we have looked at spare parts, we have looked 

at fuel, we have looked at literacy, and in all those areas there are 

serious problems. So we have to make certain we get those right. 

Mr. KINZINGER. And I understand you are not a policymaker so 

I am not putting this on you, but I think my big concern in this 

is in 2016 the President has put out an outline that says counterterrorism is a good mission in 2016, advising and supporting the 

Afghan Government is a good mission in 2016, but in 2017 it is not 

a good mission because we are going to pull all of our troops out, 

only for Embassy security. 

So my question is, assuming now that we have basically 2 years 

in which to miraculously bring the Afghans to where they can operate without American assistance, there is a lot of progress that has 

to be made in 2 years. If all troops happened to be out today, if 

we happened to pull them all out today, what do you think would 

happen to the future of Afghanistan and those reconstruction 

projects if that were to happen today? And that gives us a benchmark for where we need to be in 2 years so that it doesn’t fall 

apart. 

Mr. SOPKO. I would have to refer to the testimony, I think, of 

General Dunford. I think it was over here in the House Armed 

Services Committee, or maybe it was the Senate Armed Services 

Committee, just last month where he said if we pulled out today 

there would be a collapse. I have to rely on his expertise. We have 

not done a study on that. I don’t have any audits on that. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Okay, thank you, and I think the point there is 

if all troops were out today we would see another collapse. Instead 

of having a mission for the next couple of years we want to focus 

on withdrawal and we are focused on pulling out. It might be 

smart to actually have a mission past 2016 in which we can have 

a long term gain when we get Afghanistan where they need to be. 

Gentlemen, thank you for being here and I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. 

Mr. Connolly of Virginia is recognized. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

I know you want to look forward, but I think before we do that 

we need to glance backward and see what we have learned or not 

learned. Reading your reports, Mr. Sopko, and press stories and including press stories with IGA and listening to your testimony and 

now Mr. Johnson’s today, I have got to tell you one has the awful 

sense of deja vu all over again. 

We have been in Vietnam, for example, lots of aid money thrown 

at Vietnam. Biggest aid mission in the world was in Vietnam. 

There was no aspect of life in South Vietnam we weren’t having 

77

to finance. And the waste, the fraud, the abuse, the inefficiency, 

the lack of metrics to show what we did or didn’t do positively has 

an eerie echo in your testimony today. 

When I, as the chairwoman knows, used to be a staff member of 

the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, we used to have a chart 

of what aid would produce every year that was very helpful, and 

it was called the all-spigots chart. The all-spigots chart, showing all 

sources of assistance from the United States, from IMET and ESF 

to a map to development systems and other spigots. When you 

refer to $103 billion total reconstruction funding, is that all spigots? Does that include all of the DoD money? 

Mr. SOPKO. No, it does not include war funding. Straight Title 

10. This is just reconstruction. So $103 billion. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. For the entirety, for the duration of this war? 

Mr. SOPKO. And only U.S. funding. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Only U.S. funding. And would that include 

CERP? 

Mr. SOPKO. Yes, it would, sir. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. All right, let us take that as our universe. I know 

you are reluctant to say how much got wasted. Tell me how much 

you are comfortable with in looking at it that you think actually 

performed fairly well by some metric. We have got to have some 

metrics here. 

Mr. SOPKO. Congressman, I would love to tell you 50 percent, 60 

percent, 70 percent or whatever, but I live in unfortunately in the 

world of GAGAS, Generally Accepted Government Accounting 

Standards, and I can’t say that. And I know my good colleague over 

in Iraq reconstruction once came up with a number and it was 

later shown to be wrong or nothing supporting it. 

I can’t say that. I look at specific programs and the specific program we can say that succeeded or didn’t succeed or they want to 

risk. A lot of times we are going in and alerting people that you 

run a risk of fraud or waste or abuse, so I assume my colleague 

in GAO has the same. We can’t come in and say they have lost X 

amount or they have succeeded. Now we have identified some successes. 

And actually I asked, and I think the last time I testified before 

another committee I said I sent a letter to the Secretary of State, 

the Secretary of Defense, and the head of the USAID said give me 

your success stories and why. And I thought that would be used, 

that we could use that in our analysis of lessons learned. But I just 

can’t answer that question because I don’t have a basis for saying 

what percentage. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Okay, let me just tell you the consequence of not 

being able to answer that question. 

I am picking up where you left off. 

It says to the public, by implication, that all of it was wasted. 

If you can’t cite metrics, not anecdotes but metrics, 30 percent absolutely went to the purpose intended and is performing well, another 20 percent sort of in a little grayer category and then 50 percent is wasted, or whatever the metrics may be. But if the answer 

is I can’t answer that question at all, then it suggests to the United 

States taxpayer $103 billion in reconstruction went down the drain 

in Afghanistan, 100 percent. 

78

Mr. SOPKO. Congressman, with all due respect, I think every inspector general you asked, whether it is the Department of Energy 

IG, VA IG, HHS IG, could not answer that question. So I don’t 

know if the American people merely jump at the response or the 

answer that then all of the money is being wasted. I don’t think 

anyone, any IG, you cannot give us enough money to answer that 

question. We would be spending all of our time trying to highlight 

what worked. 

And if you actually look at our legislation, we look at the ’78 Act 

and my act, it is not to find out what has worked. My brief is given 

to me by you and it is to highlight problems, not successes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes, but you also demurred in the answer to my 

colleague’s question, Mr. Deutch, all right, how much is wasted? So 

we can’t put a metric on how successful we have been and neither 

can we apparently have enough, to Mr. Deutch’s question, about 

how much do we feel confident was wasted in retrospect. 

Mr. Johnson? 

Mr. JOHNSON. If I can testify, the biggest problem that we both 

face as an oversight entity is that there is poor data being collected. And when data is collected—I will give an example of 

USAID when we looked at the alternative development program or 

the agriculture program. Enormous amount of data was coming in 

to USAID from the implementing partners. Well, USAID didn’t use 

the data. They didn’t assess the data and actually their ADS requires them to approve their implementing partners’ indicators and 

targets. They weren’t even approving it. So they were giving money 

to the implementing partners and they were carrying out missions 

and reporting results, and USAID was not using it. So for us to 

come in, we can look at——

Mr. CONNOLLY. Okay. Well, Mr. Johnson, I appreciate your answer. This is 2014. We have been running bilateral and multilateral aid programs since immediately after World War II. This is 

not a new subject. What do you mean we are just throwing money 

and USAID has no records to be able to evaluate the efficacy of the 

program? How is that possible? Let alone $103 billion? 

Mr. JOHNSON. That is a good question and it is something, with 

the recommendations we have made and the oversight community 

and congressional action, perhaps USAID and others in State Department will be more accountable on terms of when they come up 

and ask you guys for money and they don’t have metrics. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Would the chair indulge me just one last—

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Absolutely. Please continue. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank the chair. 

Mr. Sopko and Mr. Johnson, but something that bothered me 

when I was in Afghanistan and Iraq was CERP. Because it is in 

a category of, in a sense it was well intentioned walking around 

money so a military officer, commander, could see a problem and 

fix it on the spot. I see your bridge is out. Let me help repair it. 

That program, however, became an enormous equivalent bilateral aid program run by the military who are not experts in economic development. And it is all cash and so one worries, in a category of what could go wrong with that I wonder if you could just 

share with us your observation and the vicissitudes of a CERP program. 

79

Mr. SOPKO. Congressman, you are highlighting an issue that we 

have serious concerns with, I think many Members of Congress 

had serious concerns with, and I think that if I can make a comment, probably a little bit out of my league, I think it was a wise 

decision that in your consolidated appropriations bill of 2014, I 

think CERP funding was pretty well cut. 

But there was nearly $2.29 billion obligated of which $2.26 billion has been disbursed. In January of this year we sent an inquiry 

letter to DoD and ISAF regarding all the unobligated funds, all the 

performance metrics, and any assessments that had been done. We 

are still in the process of doing that and once it is done I am happy 

to report back to you and the other committees on what we are 

finding. 

I think there are serious concerns. It was a good intention. But 

if I can answer, use that question to try to answer your question 

and Mr. Deutch’s question is, okay, even taking that CERP money, 

some of it actually worked. It is going to be so difficult to focus and 

try to do that. And you are just taking the CERP. That is only $2 

billion. To do that for everyone of these programs, it is going to be 

very difficult to say what percentage worked and what percentage 

didn’t. 

We have to get the metrics. We have to buy their metrics. What 

my colleague and I are saying is we are not given the metrics or 

they don’t use the metrics. So how do we determine whether CERP 

works or not? I mean I have been berated by DoD for even questioning the CERP proposal, because it saved lives. Now I don’t 

know what that means. Maybe it did save lives and maybe that 

was the metrics that they wanted to use. 

But it is hard for me to then take that thing, saving lives, and 

saying the $2.2 billion was wisely spent. That is where you see the 

predicament we are in, and I think Mr. Johnson is probably in the 

same predicament over in GAO. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. Thank you, Mr. 

Connolly. And while some of us can say, well, when I was in Iraq 

or when I was in Afghanistan, here is a man who was really in 

Iraq. An Iraq vet who is still serving our country valiantly in the 

Air Force Reserve, Mr. Collins is recognized. 

Mr. COLLINS. Madam Chairman, I do appreciate that. And Mr. 

Connolly you might want to stay here for just a moment because 

as much as we disagree, my good friend, we are getting ready to 

agree wholeheartedly right here. 

But this is, look, you all have pointed out some things. I came 

for some other questions and I am going to get to those in a 

minute, but let me just say if anybody from USAID is here, DoD 

is here or you are watching by camera, the only way is if these who 

are supposed to oversight what is being spent tell me that they are 

not getting the metrics to spend money, they are not getting the 

metrics on how to even evaluate these programs, then maybe it is 

time to cut the money off. Maybe it is just time to say let us stop. 

If you can’t handle it because there is, this is the problem that 

I have seen so far and I am for, being in the military we have got 

to rebuild, we have got to help the country out. I have got no problem with that. But I have a huge problem with no accountability. 

80

And the people in the Ninth District of Georgia do not get it. We 

are not spending Monopoly money here. We are not spending 

money that just pops out of the air and somebody says it is free 

health care, free this. It is not that. It comes out of my back pocket 

and your back pocket. It is tax dollars. We have got a VA system 

that has problems and issues. We have got other issues in this 

country, and we have got this problem where we are just blowing 

money and we don’t even get the metrics where Mr. Johnson and 

Mr. Sopko can’t even do their job? Are you kidding me? 

We even have this commit? I mean, Madam Chair, this is amazing to me. I feel for you that you are trying to do a job with no 

metrics. You are trying to do a job in which they are given money 

and say go spend it, be happy, see if it works or not. But we are 

not going to provide you the metrics. And if DoD gets upset at your 

question, Mr. Sopko, so what? Send them to me. I will ask the 

same questions. They can get mad at me. This is ridiculous. 

I submitted language in the State and Foreign Ops Appropriations bill forcing USAID and State Department to take a closer 

look at the funds it is allocating to various reconstruction projects 

it has got over in Afghanistan. Frankly, as we have just said, over 

$100 billion between DoD, USAID, the others, what promise do we 

have if we continue this? 

And I agree with my friend, Mr. Kinzinger. There are some 

things that we need to do to hopefully keep this country stable and 

not have to send our sons and daughters back there in the matter 

of a few years or send others there. But how can we take it seriously if USAID and others can’t even provide metrics because they 

don’t want to? How can we have any effect? Would either one of 

you would like to answer that? 

Mr. JOHNSON. It is definitely difficult, and that is part of the way 

we do our work. We need to measure the U.S. progress against the 

U.S. identifies strategic goals and objectives. And in order to do 

that we absolutely need metrics. Those metrics need to be collected 

routinely and not every so many years. 

But they should be collecting those depending on the type of program it is throughout the lifetime of the program and making those 

available to us. They should be approving those metrics that they 

are asking their implementing partners to carry out in some of the 

projects. And quite frankly we did find several deficiencies in that 

area. 

I think later on it probably came up, how do you gather and collect information in a war zone or in an environment like this? Well, 

they have done it in other locations. They have done it in the tribal 

area in Pakistan where that is that they have collected data using 

other alternative means to get that data and to have those metrics 

and report on progress. So I don’t think it is something that can’t 

be done in Afghanistan. They just need to commit to doing it. 

Mr. SOPKO. Congressman, can I add something to my colleague, 

and it is something that Congressman Connolly alluded to. And 

that is, lessons learned from Iraq, lessons learned from Vietnam. 

I cited a report done by USAID in 1988, and it is a lessons learned 

report on USAID’s operations in Afghanistan from 1950 to 1979. I 

couldn’t find anybody in our Embassy or anybody at USAID who 

had ever read it. This is 12 years. If I was being assigned to 

81

USAID, I think I would want to read my lessons learned report 

from 1950 to 1979. 

I spoke to a very prominent general, a wise general who says, I 

am in the Army. We do lessons learned report by going to the bathroom and pulling paper. We write them like crazy. The problem is 

they are not applied. 

And I think one of the things you can do and Congress can do 

is mandate that each of the services do these lessons learned reports, but more importantly that USAID and State do them, and 

in the future, as we all know, this will be an all-government approach to a problem. And that means we need to mandate that 

USAID, State and DoD, and any other agencies involved, probably 

the intel community, do combined lessons learned reports on contingencies. 

Remember, under Goldwater-Nichols, you created purple in the 

military. You have not created purple in contingencies. You are not 

requiring State and USAID to do the same in-depth analyses and 

lessons learned like all of the various—I know, sir, you have served 

in the military so you understand the lessons learned reports. The 

TRADOC produces doctrine. You are not seeing combined doctrine 

coming out on the next contingency. So I throw that out. If you 

want to make certain we succeed, maybe not for Afghanistan but 

at least we have learned from our mistakes before we do it again. 

That is something you may want to consider, sir. 

Mr. COLLINS. Madam Chair, if you will just indulge me for just 

one moment. I think the thing, and I understand what you are saying here. What bothers me is just simply looking at this as a simple business plan. You don’t get money for just, I have an idea, let 

us throw money at it. Is there a way that maybe we could metric 

that, say, the metrics have to be applied first before the money is 

ever transferred? Because once the money is gone it doesn’t matter. 

They don’t care. Once the money is gone it doesn’t matter. 

I think the problem we have here, and I will go back to Mr. 

Connolly’s statement. And where there is good about it, I think, I 

come from a background where neither or. I am a male. So if you 

tell me nothing has happened and everything has happened I will 

discount it immediately and I will show you where it is wrong. 

So something in the middle has gone well and a lot of things are 

done wrong, but when we look at this repeatedly, the people of 

America, Ninth District, they want the truth. They want the honesty of what is going on, and they will accept the truth even if it 

is hard, but they will not accept incompetence. And this is simply 

incompetence that you have unveiled. Now it may be veiled in community service. USAID may call it whatever they want to call it. 

DoD may call it whatever they want to call it. Anybody else may 

call it what they want. It is incompetence. Plain and simple, fallible incompetence. 

And I don’t understand how we continue to do this, and it just, 

frankly, disturbs me. I don’t think we have learned a lesson. You 

just stated it. We have not learned anything. We have to do hot 

washes. When I transferred out of Iraq I had to do lessons learned. 

And I had to actually tell the person coming in who took my job, 

here is the lessons learned. And it didn’t just involve where is the 

82

latrine and where is the DFAC. It had to do with what we found 

on the ground and how you worked it out. 

I applaud your work, but in some ways I feel for you. You are 

in a no-win situation. And this country ought to be ashamed of 

what we are doing in this area because we can do better. We can 

do better. If we truly want to fix it, we truly want to work it, we 

can do better. The agencies that I am talking to today, my office 

is 513 Cannon, come and explain your incompetence to me. 

Madam Chair, I yield. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. And just in conclusion, as our memo points out as of March 31, 2014, cumulative appropriations for relief and reconstruction in Afghanistan total approximately $103.17 billion in Fiscal Year 2002. This is more than 

the United States has ever spent to rebuild a single country. 

SIGAR findings financial audits were not conducted for 99 of those 

140 assistance awards, and USAID did not meet their strategies 

objective to use performance indicators to measure and evaluate its 

performance toward meeting the strategies goal. 

And GAO has previously reported on systematic weakness in 

USAID’s monitoring and evaluation of programs carried out by its 

implementing partners in Afghanistan, GAO and other oversight 

agencies, however, have highlighted gaps that show USAID continued to inconsistently apply performance management procedures, 

falls short in maintaining institutional knowledge and needs to improve oversight of contractors. 

The subcommittee will continue to do its work. And we thank 

you, gentlemen, for appearing before us. With that the subcommittee is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:21 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(83)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

84

f


88287n.eps
85

Æ


88287m.eps