No. DA 06-0150 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

 

2006 MT 321N 

MANUEL REDWOMAN, 

 Plaintiff and Appellant, 

 v. 

RICK DAY, MIKE MAHONEY, CANDICE NEUBAUER, 

MYRON BEESON, CATHY REDFERN, LORELIE 

HUGHLEY, BEN CHRISTENSON, PAUL LUCIER 

and CSC SMATHERS, 

 

 Defendants and Respondents. 

APPEAL FROM: The District Court of the Third Judicial District, 

In and For the County of Powell, Cause No. DV 00-32, 

Honorable Kurt Krueger, Presiding Judge 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

 Manuel Redwoman, pro se, Shelby, Montana 

For Respondent: 

 

 Brenda E. Thompson, Special Assistant Attorney General, 

 Helena, Montana 

 

 

 Submitted on Briefs: September 20, 2006 

 Decided: December 7, 2006 

Filed: 

__________________________________________ 

Clerk 
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Justice Jim Rice delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(d)(v), Montana Supreme Court 1996 Internal 

Operating Rules, as amended in 2003, the following memorandum decision shall not be 

cited as precedent. It shall be filed as a public document with the Clerk of the Supreme 

Court and shall be reported by case title, Supreme Court cause number and result to the 

State Reporter Publishing Company and West Group in the quarterly table of noncitable 

cases issued by this Court. 

¶2 Manuel Redwoman (Redwoman) appeals from the order of the Third Judicial 

District Court, Powell County, granting summary judgment in favor of the Respondents. 

We affirm. 

¶3 This action arises out of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim filed by Redwoman against the 

Respondents asserting that he was improperly treated while incarcerated at the Montana 

State Prison. On April 9, 1998, Redwoman entered the Montana State Prison to serve a 

twenty-year term for mitigated deliberate homicide. Redwoman brought this action, 

alleging that his constitutional rights had been violated by prison officials with regard to 

treatment he received following an assault he had allegedly perpetrated upon another 

inmate. In addition to seeking damages, Redwoman sought injunctive and declaratory 

relief. The parties each filed motions for summary judgment, and on January 27, 2006, 

the court issued an order denying Redwoman’s motion for summary judgment and 

granting defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment. 

¶4 The District Court held that Redwoman had not established the absence of conflict 

in material facts in support of his claim. The court further concluded that the defendants 
provided a proper evidentiary basis to show that no genuine issue of material fact existed, 

and demonstrated that they were entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. 

Redwoman appeals from this order. 

¶5 On appeal, Redwoman argues that he has been denied both substantive and 

procedural due process by the defendants in violation of both Montana State Prison 

policy and Article II, Section 17 of the Montana Constitution. Redwoman also argues 

that the investigation of the alleged assault was both flawed and mishandled. The 

Respondents argue that the District Court appropriately denied Redwoman’s motion for 

summary judgment and granted their motion for summary judgment because Redwoman 

failed to demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, and he failed to 

show that he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

¶6 We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Grimsrud v. Hagel, 2005 MT 

194, ¶ 14, 328 Mont. 142, ¶ 14, 119 P.3d 47, ¶ 14 (citation omitted). Our evaluation is 

the same as that of the trial court. Grimsrud, ¶ 14. “‘[T]he moving party must establish 

both the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a 

matter of law.’” Grimsrud, ¶ 14, quoting Farmers Union Mut. Ins. Co. v. Staples, 2004 

MT 108, ¶ 18, 321 Mont. 99, ¶ 18, 90 P.3d 381, ¶ 18. “If this is accomplished, ‘the 

burden then shifts to the non-moving party to prove, by more than mere denial and 

speculation, that a genuine issue does exist.’” Grimsrud, ¶ 14. If the court determines 

that no genuine issues of fact exist, the court must then determine whether the moving 

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Grimsrud, ¶ 14. 

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¶7 It is appropriate to decide this case pursuant to our Order of February 11, 2003, 

amending Section 1.3 of our 1996 Internal Operating Rules and providing for 

memorandum opinions. It is manifest on the face of the briefs and the record before us 

that the appeal is without merit; the District Court’s grant of summary judgment for the 

defendants was appropriate as they proved the absence of genuine issues of material fact 

and that they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

¶8 Affirmed. 

 /S/ JIM RICE 

We concur: 

/S/ KARLA M. GRAY 

/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART 

/S/ PATRICIA COTTER 

/S/ BRIAN MORRIS 

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