COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Frank, Clements and Haley 

BRANDY WIMMER 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

v. Record No. 2424-05-3 PER CURIAM 

 JANUARY 17, 2006 

ROANOKE CITY DEPARTMENT OF 

 SOCIAL SERVICES 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ROANOKE 

 Charles N. Dorsey, Judge 

 (Eric Roland Spencer, on brief), for appellant. Appellant submitting 

on brief. 

 (William M. Hackworth, City Attorney; Heather P. Ferguson, 

Assistant City Attorney, on brief), for appellee. Appellee 

submitting on brief. 

 (Diana M. Perkinson; Perkinson and Perkinson, on brief), 

Guardian ad litem for the infant children. Guardian ad litem

submitting on brief. 

 Brandy Wimmer contends the trial court erred in terminating her parental rights to her 

two minor children. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the trial court’s decision. 

Background

 We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below and grant 

to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom. See Logan v. Fairfax County Dep’t of 

Human Dev., 13 Va. App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 462 (1991). So viewed, the evidence 

proved that on November 13, 2002, the Roanoke City Department of Social Services received a 

complaint from a local hospital in connection with ML, then four months old. ML had come to 

 *

 Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication. 
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the hospital suffering from neurological problems, seizures, retinal hemorrhages, and respiratory 

difficulty. The attending physician diagnosed her with shaken baby syndrome. As a result, the 

Department obtained an emergency removal order, and Wimmer was charged with and convicted 

of felony child abuse. 

 ML has remained in the same foster home since her removal, but continues to suffer from 

numerous disabilities as a result of her injuries. These disabilities include cortical blindness, 

developmental delays, and cerebral palsy. Due to her limitations, she requires physical and 

occupational therapy on a weekly basis. 

 While ML was in foster care, Wimmer became pregnant. She had a second daughter 

named MN, on October 28, 2003. MN was removed immediately from the hospital and placed 

with her sister’s foster parents. Both girls are doing “extremely well” in foster care and are 

bonded to each other. 

 After ML was placed in foster care, the Department set goals for Wimmer in the initial 

foster care plan to achieve the goal of return home. Among these goals, Wimmer was to 

complete parenting classes, maintain employment, and obtain safe, suitable housing. The target 

date for the completion of these goals was July 2003. 

Although Wimmer completed the parenting class, her instructor noted that her mother 

attended the classes with her and that Wimmer made no attempt to “participate independently 

from her mother.” Because Wimmer’s mother answered all questions directed to Wimmer, the 

instructor questioned whether Wimmer “gained anything” from the class. 

Wimmer remained unemployed from the time ML was removed through December 2003, 

at which time she faced trial on the felony child abuse charge. During this time period, she also 

failed to find independent housing, and discontinued the psychological counseling sessions 

which had been recommended by the Department. After Wimmer was convicted of felony child 
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abuse, she was immediately incarcerated. Shortly thereafter, the juvenile and domestic relations 

district court approved the Department’s request for a change in goal to adoption. 

Upon Wimmer’s release from jail in October 2004, she obtained employment with a 

fast-food restaurant for approximately seven months; however, she lost this job shortly before the 

termination hearing in June 2005. Furthermore, she did not secure independent housing until late 

April 2005. 

 The trial court terminated Wimmer’s parental rights on two grounds. First, it based its 

decision on Code § 16.1-283(E), finding that termination was in the best interests of the children 

and that Wimmer had subjected ML to “aggravated circumstances” under subsection (iv). In the 

alternative, it concluded termination was appropriate under Code § 16.1-283(C)(2) because 

Wimmer had “failed to remedy substantially the conditions which led to and required the 

continuation of [foster] care for a period in excess of twelve months notwithstanding the 

reasonable and appropriate efforts of social, medical, mental health and other rehabilitative 

agencies.” 

Analysis

 Wimmer argues the trial court erred in terminating her parental rights pursuant to Code 

§ 16.1-283(C)(2) because she did not fail to correct the circumstances which led to her children 

being placed in foster care. However, because we find no error in the trial court’s termination of 

Wimmer’s parental rights under Code § 16.1-283(E), it is not necessary to address Wimmer’s 

argument. 

Code § 16.1-283(E)(iv) provides as follows: 

The residual rights of a parent or parents of a child who is in the 

custody of a local board or licensed child-placing agency may be 

terminated by the court if the court finds, based upon clear and 

convincing evidence, that it is in the best interests of the child and 

that . . . the parent has subjected any child to aggravated 

circumstances. 
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 As used in this section: 

“Aggravated circumstances” means torture, chronic or severe 

abuse, or chronic or severe sexual abuse, if the victim of such 

conduct was a child of the parent or a child with whom the parent 

resided at the time such conduct occurred, including the failure to 

protect such a child from such conduct, which conduct or failure to 

protect: (i) evinces a wanton or depraved indifference to human 

life, or (ii) has resulted in the death of such a child or in serious 

bodily injury to such a child. 

* * * * * * * 

“Serious bodily injury” means bodily injury that involves 

substantial risk of death, extreme physical pain, protracted and 

obvious disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the 

function of a bodily member, organ or mental faculty. 

“Severe abuse” or “severe sexual abuse” may include an act or 

omission that occurred only once, but otherwise meets the 

definition of “aggravated circumstances.” 

Wimmer concedes that she was convicted of felony child abuse and that her appeal of 

this conviction has been denied. The underlying factual basis for her conviction clearly 

constituted “aggravated circumstances” under Code § 16.1-283(E)(iv). In addition, the trial 

court found that the Department presented clear and convincing evidence that termination of 

Wimmer’s parental rights was in the best interests of the children. The voluminous evidence 

contained in the record, including the testimony of the numerous lay and expert witnesses, amply 

supports that ruling.1

 Accordingly, we will not disturb it on appeal. 

We also reject Wimmer’s argument that the trial court erred in terminating her parental 

rights to MN because the evidence relating to the felony abuse conviction pertained solely to 

ML. By its express language, Code § 16.1-283(E) does not limit the authority of the trial court 

to terminate parental rights only to children who are the direct victims of the parent’s felonious 

 1

 Indeed, Wimmer offers no argument on appeal that termination is not in the best 

interests of the children. 
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assault. The express language of the statute permits the termination of parental rights of other 

children who would be endangered where a parent has feloniously assaulted one of his or her 

children. The obvious purpose of the statute is to allow the court to terminate a parent’s rights 

when the parent’s conduct poses a serious endangerment to a child’s well-being without 

requiring that the court wait until the child is harmed before terminating the parent’s rights. 

In this instance, the trial court terminated Wimmer’s parental rights to both children 

“pursuant to Virginia Code Section 16.1-283(E) and Virginia Code Section 16.1-283(C)(2), in 

the alternative, either ground sufficient on its own.” Because we hold that the trial court’s 

termination of Wimmer’s parental rights under Code § 16.1-283(E)(iv) was amply supported by 

the record, we need not address Wimmer’s argument that the trial court erred in terminating her 

rights under under Code § 16.1-283(C)(2). Where a trial court’s judgment is made on alternative 

grounds, we need only consider whether any one of the alternatives is sufficient to sustain the 

judgment of the trial court and, if we so find, we need not address the other grounds. See Boone 

v. C. Arthur Weaver Co., 235 Va. 157, 161, 365 S.E.2d 764, 766 (1988). 

Accordingly, for the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the trial court’s decision 

terminating Wimmer’s residual parental rights to both children. 

 Affirmed.