alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
§ 1921.21 Hearing examiners. ( a ) *Who presides.* All hearings shall be presided over by a hearing examiner appointed under section 11 of the Administrative Procedure Act.
( b ) *How assigned.* The presiding hearing examiner shall be designated by the Secretary or the Chief Hearing Examiner.
( c ) *Powers.* Hearing examiners shall have all powers necessary to the conduct of fair and impartial hearings, including the following: ( 1 ) To administer oaths and affirmations;
( 2 ) To issue subpoenas upon proper applications as provided in § 1921.20;
( 3 ) To rule upon offers of proof and receive relevant evidence;
( 4 ) To take or cause to be taken depositions and to determine their scope;
( 5 ) To regulate the course of the hearing and the conduct of the parties and their counsel therein;
( 6 ) To hold conferences for the settlement or simplification of the issues by consent of the parties;
( 7 ) To consider and rule upon procedural requests;
( 8 ) To make and file decisions in conformity with this part.
( 9 ) To take any action authorized by the rules in this part or in conformance with the Administrative Procedure Act.
( d ) *Consultation.* The hearing examiner shall not consult any person or party on any fact in issue unless upon notice and opportunity for all parties to participate.
( e ) *Disqualification of hearing examiners.* ( 1 ) When a hearing examiner deems himself disqualified to preside in a particular proceeding, he shall withdraw therefrom by notice on the record directed to the Chief Hearing Examiner.
( 2 ) Whenever any party shall deem the hearing examiner for any reason to be disqualified to preside, or to continue to preside, in a particular proceeding, that party shall file with the Chief Hearing Examiner a motion to disqualify and remove such hearing examiner, such motion to be supported by affidavits setting forth the alleged grounds for disqualification. The Chief Hearing Examiner shall rule upon the motion.
( f ) *Contemptuous conduct; failure or refusal of a witness to appear or answer.* In the event of contemptuous conduct, including the failure or refusal of a witness to appear at any hearing or to answer any question which has been ruled to be proper, the hearing examiner may take any action reasonable under 41 CFR 50-203.8(l), promulgated under section 5 of the Act of June 30, 1936 (41 U.S.C. 39).
#### Jewish Hospital Association of Philadelphia, Appellant, *v.*910 West End Avenue Corporation et al., Defendants, and Straus National Bank and Trust Company of New York et al., Respondents.

Submitted March 24, 1937;

decided April 27, 1937.

*485
      *Albert Mannheimer*and *Joel Irving Friedman*for appellant.

*Woolsey A. Shepard*for respondents.

Judgment affirmed, with costs; no opinion.

Concur: Crane, Ch. J., Lehman, O’Brien, Hubbs, and Loughran, JJ. Dissenting: Finch and Rippey, JJ.
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of Justice

###### Antitrust Division

                    Notice is hereby given that, on October 19, 1999, pursuant to section 6(a) of the National Cooperative Research and Production Act of 1993, 15 U.S.C. 4301*et seq.*                     (“the Act”), United Technologies Research Center (“UTRC”) has filed written notifications simultaneously with the Attorney                           ( print page 30613)                        General and the Federal Trade Commission disclosing (1) the identities of the parties and (2) the nature and objectives of the venture. The notifications were filed for the purpose of invoking the Act's provisions limiting the recovery of antitrust plaintiffs to actual damages under specified circumstances. Pursuant to section 6(b) of the Act, the identities of the parties are United Technologies Corporation (“UTC”), Hartford, CT; and i2 Federal, Inc., Irving, TX. The nature and objectives of the venture are to engage in cooperative research and development in the area of Open Software Tools for Condition Based Maintenance pursuant to an Advanced Technology Program with the National Institute of Standards and Technology.                

Constance K. Robinson,

Director of Operations, Antitrust Division.

[FR Doc. 00-12048  Filed 5-11-00; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4410-11-M
EXHIBIT
32.1






Statement Pursuant to
Section 906 of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002






The
undersigned, Sherry Couturier, CFO of American International
Industries, Inc., a Nevada corporation, hereby makes the following certification
as required by Section 906(a) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, with respect to
the following of this report filed pursuant to Section 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934: Quarterly Report of Form 10-Q for the period ended March
31, 2009.






The
undersigned certifies that the above annual report fully complies with the
requirements of Section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and
information contained in the above quarterly report fairly presents, in all
respects, the financial condition of American International Industries, Inc. and
results of its operations.






Date:  May
11, 2009


Sherry
Couturier


CFO


/s/ Sherry
Couturier
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, *v.*Erminio Nocera, Appellant.

Argued April 28, 1937;

decided May 25, 1937.

*553
      *Samuel Rosenzweig*for appellant.

*John J. Bennett, Jr., Attorney-General (Sol I. Smithline, Joseph A. McLaughlin*and *Patrick J. Hughes*of counsel), for respondent.

Judgment affirmed; no opinion.

Concur: Crane, Ch. J., Lehman, O’Brien, Htjbbs, Loughran, Finch and Rippey, JJ.
#### Joseph H. Bell, *Plaintiff in*Error, v. The State of Florida, *Defendant in Error.*

1. Motions to quash indictments and the ruling of the court thereon from part of the record proper in a cause, and have no place in the bill of exceptions, and, when evidenced to an appellate court only by a bill of exceptions, such court cannot consider assignments of error based upon the overruling of such motions.

2. The gravamen of the offense in an indictment charging an assault with intent to rape is the *intent*with which the assault was made, and the intent in such cases must be shown by the State to have so possessed the accused that his determination was to consummate the rape regardless of resistance and want of consent.

This case was decided by Division A.

Writ of error to the Circuit Court for Columbia County.

The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court.

*A. D. Penny,*for Plaintiff in Error;

*Parlo Trammell,*Attorney General, for the State.

*7Shackleford, J.

Joseph H. Bell was convicted in the circuit court for St. Lucie county of an assault with intent to rape and sentenced to five years in the State prison.

Eighteen errors are assigned, several of which are abandoned. We shall not undertake to discuss them in detail. The first five are based upon the overruling of the motion to quash the indictment, but they are not properly before us for consideration, since such motion and the ruling of the court thereon do not appear in the record proper, but are found only in the bill of exceptions. Tip-ton v. State, 53 Fla. 69, 43 South. Rep. 684, wherein prior decisions will be found cited.

A motion for a new trial was made, which questioned the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict. The denial of this motion forms the basis of one of the assignments. A careful reading of all the testimony, which we shall not attempt to set out, or even to summarize, convinces us that the court erred in refusing to grant such motion. We held in Hunter v. State, 29 Fla. 486, 10 South. Rep. 730, that “the intent in such cases must be shown by the State to have so possessed the accused that his determination was to consummate the rape regardless of resistance and want of consent.” Also see Clark v. State, 56 Fla. 46, 47 South. Rep. 481, and Rushton v. State, 58 Fla. 94, 50 South. Rep. 486. We think that the evidence fails to come up to this requirement. For this reason the judgment must be reversed and the case remanded.

Whitfield, C. J., and Cockrell, J., concur;

Taylor, Hocker and Parkhill, J. J., concur in the opinion.
[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 12 (Wednesday, January 19, 2000)]
[Notices]
[Pages 2988-2989]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-1240]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION


Special Emphasis Panel in Chemical and Transport System; Notice 
of Meeting

    In accordance with the Federal Advisory Committee Act (Pub. L. 92-
463, as amended), the National Science Foundation announces the 
following meeting:

    Name: Special Emphasis Panel in Chemical and Transport Systems 
(1190).
    Date and Time: February 28-March 1, 2000; 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.
    Place: National Science Foundation, 4201 Wilson Boulevard, Rooms 
330, 370, 380, Arlington, VA 22230.
    Type of Meeting: Closed.
    Contract Person: Dr. Gary Poehlein, Division Director, Program 
Director, Division of Chemical and Transport Systems (CTS), Room 
525, (703) 306-1370.
    Purpose of Meeting: To provide advice and recommendations 
concerning proposals submitted to NSF for financial support.
    Agenda: To review and evaluate nominations for the FY 2000 
Committee of Visitors (COV) Panel proposals as part of the selection 
process for awards.
    Reason for Closing: The proposals being reviewed include 
information of a proprietary or confidential nature, including 
technical information; financial data, such as

[[Page 2989]]

salaries and personal information concerning individuals associated 
with the proposals. These matters are exempt under 5 U.S.C. 552b(c) 
(4) and (6) of the Government in the Sunshine Act.

    Dated: January 13, 2000.
Karen J. York,
Committee Management Officer.
[FR Doc. 00-1240 Filed 1-18-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7555-01-M
§ 1918.105 Other protective measures. ( a ) *Protective clothing.* ( 1 ) The employer shall provide and shall require the wearing of special protective clothing for each employee engaged in work where protective clothing is necessary.
( 2 ) When necessary, protective clothing shall be cleaned and disinfected before reissuance.
( b ) *Personal flotation devices (PFDs).* ( 1 ) The employer shall provide and shall require the wearing of PFDs for each employee engaged in work in which the employee might fall into the water.
( 2 ) PFDs (life preservers, life jackets, or work vests) worn by each affected employee must be United States Coast Guard (USCG) approved pursuant to 46 CFR part 160 (Type I, II, III, or V PFD) and marked for use as a work vest, for commercial use, or for use on vessels.
( 3 ) Personal flotation devices shall be maintained in safe condition and shall be considered unserviceable when damaged in a manner that affects buoyancy or fastening capability.
[62 FR 40202, July 25, 1997, as amended at 65 FR 40946, June 30, 2000]
110TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 888

AN ACT

To amend section 1091 of title 18, United States Code, 

to allow the prosecution of genocide in appropriate circumstances.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Genocide Account5 ability Act of 2007’’.
2

•S 888 ES

1 SEC. 2. GENOCIDE. 

2 Section 1091 of title 18, United States Code, is 

3 amended by striking subsection (d) and inserting the fol4 lowing: 

5 ‘‘(d) REQUIRED CIRCUMSTANCE FOR OFFENSES.—

6 The circumstance referred to in subsections (a) and (c) 

7 is that—

8 ‘‘(1) the offense is committed in whole or in 

9 part within the United States; 

10 ‘‘(2) the alleged offender is a national of the 

11 United States (as that term is defined in section 101 

12 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 

13 1101)); 

14 ‘‘(3) the alleged offender is an alien lawfully ad15 mitted for permanent residence in the United States 

16 (as that term is defined in section 101 of the Immi17 gration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101)); 

18 ‘‘(4) the alleged offender is a stateless person 

19 whose habitual residence is in the United States; or 

20 ‘‘(5) after the conduct required for the offense 

21 occurs, the alleged offender is brought into, or found 
3

•S 888 ES

1 in, the United States, even if that conduct occurred 

2 outside the United States.’’. 

Passed the Senate March 29, 2007. 

Attest:

Secretary. 
110TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 888

AN ACT

To amend section 1091 of title 18, United States 

propriate circumstances.Code, to allow the prosecution of genocide in ap-
§ 1977.5 Persons protected by section 11(c). ( a ) All employees are afforded the full protection of section 11(c). For purposes of the Act, an employee is defined as “an employee of an employer who is employed in a business of his employer which affects commerce.” The Act does not define the term “employ.” However, the broad remedial nature of this legislation demonstrates a clear congressional intent that the existence of an employment relationship, for purposes of section 11(c), is to be based upon economic realities rather than upon common law doctrines and concepts. See, *U.S.* v. *Silk,* 331 U.S. 704 (1947); *Rutherford Food Corporation* v. *McComb,* 331 U.S. 722 (1947).
( b ) For purposes of section 11(c), even an applicant for employment could be considered an employee. See, *NLRB* v. *Lamar Creamery,* 246 F. 2d 8 (5th Cir., 1957). Further, because section 11(c) speaks in terms of any employee, it is also clear that the employee need not be an employee of the discriminator. The principal consideration would be whether the person alleging discrimination was an “employee” at the time of engaging in protected activity.
( c ) In view of the definitions of “employer” and “employee” contained in the Act, employees of a State or political subdivision thereof would not ordinarily be within the contemplated coverage of section 11(c).
#### § 101.8 Complaints.

If the charge appears to have merit and efforts to dispose of it by informal adjustment are unsuccessful, the Regional Director institutes formal action by issuance of a complaint and notice of hearing. In certain types of cases, involving novel and complex issues, the Regional Director, at the discretion of the General Counsel, must submit the case for advice from the General Counsel before issuing a complaint. The complaint, which is served on all parties, sets forth the facts upon which the Board bases its jurisidiction and the facts relating to the alleged violations of law by the respondent. The respondent must file an answer to the complaint within 14 days of its receipt, setting forth a statement of its defense.
Submitted on briefs September 25,

affirmed December 18, 1928.

#### NELL BROWN *v.*ELSA O’FLYNN.

(272 Pac. 673.)

*498For appellant there was a brief over the name of *Mr. E. L. McDougal.*

For respondent there was a brief over the name of *Mr. B. A. Green.*

COSHOW, J.

 During the cross-examination of the driver of defendant’s car it developed that two other young ladies were in the seat with her. Attorney for plaintiff was of the impression that it was a violation of law to permit more than two persons to ride in the front seat. On that account when the taking of testimony was finished he asked perifiission to amend his complaint to conform to the evidence in that regard. This amendment was granted over the objection of defendant. Later as the judge was instructing the jury, his attention having been called to his omission to instruct on that matter, he discovered that the law permits three persons to ride in the front seat. Thereupon attorney for plaintiff withdrew that charge of negligence. We think no prejudice was done defendant. If prejudice resulted from the conduct bf attorney for plaintiff and the court in that regard, it was not injurious to the defendant. We think the error assigned on that account is trivial.

The other assignment of error is the exception “to the following instruction and the refusal to give an instruction bearing on the same matter requested by the defendant.

> *“*There is another principle of law which you must entertain, and that is this: That the negligence, if established, in order to entitle recovery must be the proximate- cause of the injury; that is the cause which brought about the injury, and without the interven*499tion of any other cause brought about the results. That is the proximate cause. The defendant may have been negligent, but if the negligence was not the proximate cause of the accident and resulting injury, no recovery could be had.”

• The instruction requested by defendant is as follows:

> “The proximate cause of an injury is that cause which in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.”

It must be conceded that the definition of proximate cause contained in the requested instruction is better than the definition given by the court, that is, it is more complete and comprehensive. It does not follow, however, that it was reversible error to give the instruction the learned court did and refuse to give a better definition. The instruction given by the court clearly defines proximate cause as applied to the case before the jury. There were no complications in the evidence, pleadings or surroundings. The collision was about as simple as such a thing can be and the definition of proximate cause given by the learned court was very appropriate to the case. The jury could not have been misinformed or misled.

The judgment is affirmed. Affirmed.
<PAGE>
                                                                    EXHIBIT 99.2
         KMART CORPORATION
         SARBANES-OXLEY ACT SECTION 906 CERTIFICATION

         In connection with this Annual Report on Form 10-K/A of Kmart
Corporation for the period ended January 30, 2002, I, Albert A. Koch, Chief
Financial Officer of Kmart Corporation, hereby certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
1350, as adopted pursuant to 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the
best of my knowledge:

         1. this Form 10-K/A for the period ended January 30, 2002 fully
complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934; and

         2. the information contained in this Form 10-K/A for the period ended
January 30, 2002 fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
condition and results of operations of Kmart Corporation.


         Date: January 14, 2003

    /s/ A. A. Koch
    -----------------------
    Albert A. Koch
    Chief Financial Officer
#### Miller Grain & Commission Co. *v.*Lookout Refining Company.

Assumpsit.

(Decided January 9, 1917.

73 South. 757.)

1. Parties; Amendment; Misnomer. — Where the complaint was against the corporation defendant, the adding by way of amendment of the word “incorporated” after the corporation name did not work a complete change of parties, but merely corrected an inaccuracy or misnomer.

2. Same. — There is a distinction between the amendment to a pleading which correctly describes the corporation but inaccurately names it, and the changing in the pleading to an entirely different party.

Appeal from Birmingham City Court.

Heard before Hon. John S. Miller.

Action by Lookout Refining Company against the Miller Grain & Commission Company, incorporated. Judgment for plaintiff and defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

R. B. Kelly, for appellant.

Thompson & Thompson, for appellee.

EVANS, J.

The several assignments of error relate to but a single question, to wit: Did the amendment of the complaint work a complete change of the party defendant ? The insistence of appellant in the affirmative is obviously without merit.

(1) The complaint as originally filed sued the “Miller Grain & Commission Company, a corporation, defendant.” By amend*437ment the word “Incorporated,” was added just after the word “Company” as part of the defendant’s name. The amendment merely corrected an inaccuracy or misnomer.

(2) In *Savannah, A. & M. Ry. v. Buford,*106 Ala. 303, 310, 17 South. 395, 397, Brickell, C. J., observed: “It seems to us it is quite an error to suppose that the mere change of the name of a party, natural or artificial, though such party may be a sole plaintiff or defendant, can be an entire change of parties; * * * ‘that there is a well-marked distinction between a misnomer which incorrectly names a corporation, but correctly describes it, and the statement in the pleading of an entirely different party.’ ”

See, also, *Singer Mfg. Co. v. Greenleaf,*100 Ala. 272, 14 South. 109; *King Land & Imp. Co. v. Bowen,*7 Ala. App. 462, 61 South. 22; *Decatur Lt., P. & F. Co. v. Newsom,*179 Ala. 127, 59 South. 615.

Suppose the caption of the original complaint had left out the words “a corporation,” which were merely descriptio personae, and was silent as to whether the entity sued was a corporation or a partnership name; it would have been altogether proper to have amended by showing that the entity sued was a corpo*ration.*— Stowers *Furniture Co. v. Brake,*158 Ala. 639, 48 South. 89.

We are not impressed that the contention of appellant is. meritorious, and the judgment below is accordingly affirmed.

Affirmed.