S. HRG. 111–858 

EVALUATING THE JUSTICE AGAINST SPONSORS 

OF TERRORISM ACT, S. 2930 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME AND DRUGS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JULY 14, 2010 

Serial No. J–111–100 

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 

( 

EVALUATING THE JUSTICE AGAINST SPONSORS OF TERRORISM ACT, 

S. 2930 

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

64–296 PDF 2011

S. HRG. 111–858 

EVALUATING THE JUSTICE AGAINST SPONSORS 

OF TERRORISM ACT, S. 2930 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME AND DRUGS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JULY 14, 2010 

Serial No. J–111–100 

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 

( 

(II) 

PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont, Chairman 

HERB KOHL, Wisconsin 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island 

AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota 

EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware 

ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania 

AL FRANKEN, Minnesota 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah 

CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa 

JON KYL, Arizona 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

JOHN CORNYN, Texas 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

BRUCE A. COHEN, Chief Counsel and Staff Director 

MATT MINER, Republican Chief Counsel 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME AND DRUGS

ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania, Chairman 

HERB KOHL, Wisconsin 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota 

EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah 

CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

HANNIBAL KEMERER, Democratic Chief Counsel 

WALT KUHN, Republican Chief Counsel 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

STATEMENTS OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS 

Page 

Specter, Hon. Arlen, a U.S. Senator from the State of Pennsylvania ................. 1 

WITNESSES 

Bellinger, John B., III, Partner, Arnold & Porter LLP, Washington, DC ........... 8 

Klingler, Richard D., Partner, Sidley Austin LLP, Washington, DC .................. 6 

Kohlman, Evan F., Senior Partner, Flashpoint Global Partners, New York, 

New York, and International Terrorism Consultant/Senior Investigator, The 

NEFA Foundation ................................................................................................ 17 

Sofaer, Abraham D., George P. Shultz Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution, 

Stanford University, Stanford, California .......................................................... 2 

Wolosky, Lee S., Partner, Boies, Schiller & Flexner LLP, New York, New 

York ....................................................................................................................... 20 

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD 

Bill S. 2930 ............................................................................................................... 25 

Bellinger, John B., III, Partner, Arnold & Porter LLP, Washington, DC, 

statement .............................................................................................................. 36 

Burlingame, Debra, Washington, DC, letter ......................................................... 42 

Klingler, Richard D., Partner, Sidley Austin LLP, Washington, DC, statement ...................................................................................................................... 46 

Kohlman, Evan F., Senior Partner, Flashpoint Global Partners, New York, 

New York, and International Terrorism Consultant/Senior Investigator, The 

NEFA Foundation, statement ............................................................................. 65 

Levitt, Matthew, Director, Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, statement ....................... 76 

Molinaro, Joan, Board Member of 9/11 Families for a Secure America and 

Mother of New York City Firefighter Carl E. Molinaro, New York, New 

York, statement .................................................................................................... 91 

9/11 Families United to Bankrupt Terrorism, Washington, DC, joint letter ...... 94 

Index of Exhibits 1-35 ...................................................................................... 99 

Exhibits 1-35 ..................................................................................................... 104 

Sofaer, Abraham D., George P. Shultz Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution, 

Stanford University, Stanford, California, statement ....................................... 318 

Voices of September 11th, New Canaan, Connecticut, letter ............................... 336 

Washington Post, Stuart Tayler Jr., July 14, 2010, article ................................. 338 

Wolosky, Lee S., Partner, Boies, Schiller & Flexner LLP, New York, New 

York ....................................................................................................................... 340

(1) 

EVALUATING THE JUSTICE AGAINST 

SPONSORS OF TERRORISM ACT, S. 2930 

WEDNESDAY, JULY 14, 2010 

U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME AND DRUGS, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m., in 

room SD–226, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Arlen Specter, 

Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding. 

Present: Senator Specter. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ARLEN SPECTER, A U.S. 

SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA 

Chairman SPECTER. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. The 

Judiciary Committee hearing will now proceed on the Justice 

Against Sponsors of Terrorism proposed legislation. This is, I think, 

an unusual bill because it involves so many big issues. The first 

issue is the justice for victims and survivors of what is, arguably, 

the most barbaric act in human history. Hard to find something 

more astounding than the incident of 9/11. It has left the country 

scarred and really the world scarred, changed the face of America 

in many ways. One is the void in the Trade Towers, a historic site 

now; scarred my own State, Pennsylvania, in rural Somerset County; and has made this city into a virtual barricade and really much 

of the world. 

The second big issue which this legislation implicates is the use 

of a critical weapon to prevent a recurrence. The evidence is very, 

very forceful about the involvement of Saudi money in promoting 

terrorism. The 9/11 Commission Staff Monograph on Terrorist Financing said, ‘‘Al Qaeda was funded to the tune of approximately 

$300 million per year by diversion of money from Islamic charities, 

confirmed that many of al Qaeda-sponsored charities enjoyed significant Saudi Government sponsorship.’’ So in a world where we 

are constantly threatened by al Qaeda and we have recurrent television appearances by bin Laden, we have really not taken a stand 

to stop that financing. 

A third very important issue—important in my mind—is to restore the balance on separation of powers. We have seen the Congress legislate on the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, and we 

have seen our legislation disregarded by the executive branch and 

then by the judicial branch. The Court of Appeals for the Second 

Circuit says that the act does not apply because the Saudis are not 

on the State Department list of state sponsors of terrorism. Well, 

as we all know, those of us who studied the bill, there are two 

2 

ways: torts are excluded from sovereign immunity as well as those 

under state—on the list of those states who sponsor terrorism. 

The Solicitor General then opposes the grant of certiorari, disagreeing with the Second Circuit, but finding another reason, saying, well, the acts occurred—the alleged Saudi acts occurred outside the United States. Well, that is a curious rationale when you 

have the consequences in the United States. 

This is one of a long line of matters where the Supreme Court 

has refused to take up issues on the executive-Congressional balance. Another notable one is the conflict between the President’s 

assertion of Article II powers as commander in chief with the Terrorist Surveillance Program and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which specifies the only way you can invade privacy on 

wiretaps is with a court order. That has come up in the Kagan 

hearings and is a matter of considerable concern as to what the 

Court will decide. 

I filed legislation to compel the Court to take the Terrorist Surveillance Program, and it is an issue in the confirmation proceedings as to the standards on taking those matters. Congress has 

the authority to mandate that the Court take certain cases, as we 

did with flag burning and McCain-Feingold, and we can do that 

here as well. 

Well, that brings us to a very, very distinguished group of witnesses: Judge Abe Sofaer, Mr. Richard Klingler, Mr. John 

Bellinger. And I would ask you gentlemen at this time to stand for 

the traditional administration of the oath. Do you affirm that the 

testimony you are about to give before this Committee will be the 

truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? 

Judge SOFAER. I do. 

Mr. KLINGLER. I do. 

Mr. BELLINGER. I do. 

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you. 

Our first witness is former Federal Judge Abraham D. Sofaer, 

now a fellow in foreign policy and national security affairs at the 

Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace at Stanford University; served as the distinguished legal adviser to the U.S. Department of State from 1985 until 1990 in the administrations of 

President Reagan and George H.W. Bush; for 6 years, from 1979 

to 1985, he was a federal judge, Southern District of New York; author of a book, ‘‘War, Foreign Affairs and Government’’; bachelor’s 

degree from Yeshiva University and law degree from New York 

University School of Law; clerked for Justice Skelly Wright on the 

D.C. Circuit and later Supreme Court Justice William Brennan. 

Thank you for coming in today, Judge Sofaer. We know you have 

a plane to catch, and we look forward to your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ABRAHAM D. SOFAER, GEORGE P. 

SHULTZ SENIOR FELLOW, THE HOOVER INSTITUTION, STANFORD UNIVERSITY, STANFORD, CALIFORNIA 

Judge SOFAER. Chairman Specter, it is a particular pleasure to 

be here with you. It has been a privilege to work with you on many 

issues over the years, and this is no less important than any of the 

others we have looked at together. And if I can be of any help, I 

am glad to do so. 

3 

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you. 

Judge SOFAER. I will go through my testimony very quickly so 

that I meet your time limit, and it can be read later on. This is 

a really important issue, and I commend you and the Committee 

for looking at it. Sponsoring killings of Americans on American soil 

should be taken extremely seriously, and we should do the best we 

can at holding people responsible who do that knowingly or recklessly. 

I agree with the premise of S. 2930 that civil actions for damages 

may deter some sponsors of acts of terrorism. But no one knows 

better than you, Senator, and the members of this Committee, that 

the effort to create viable, civil penalties against terrorists and 

their sponsors in the U.S. courts has been frustrating and largely 

ineffectual. The executive branch of our own Government, regardless of party, has opposed the effort and has sought largely successfully in the U.S. courts to limit the effectiveness of the laws Congress has adopted for this purpose. 

This difficulty in fashioning effective remedies that both compensate victims and deter people who support these acts stems not 

from any lack of ingenuity or resolve on the part of this Committee 

or the U.S. Congress—and, incidentally, I do not think it stems either from any sense of perversity or lack of sympathy by executive 

officials—but, rather, from the inherent difficulties and dangers 

that arise when one state unilaterally attempts to modify important aspects of the law relating to sovereign immunity. 

So with your permission, I will touch on some of the key aspects 

of the bill, but I would like to go on and suggest an alternative 

mechanism that might be a more satisfactory way to achieve these 

important objectives. 

The proposed bill deals with at least four major issues, and I 

think in large part very effectively. The Samantar decision has at 

least potentially taken care of the issue of whether the FSIA applies to officials, and it says no. 

Now, you, I am sure, will modify the legislation to accommodate 

that ruling of the Supreme Court, but there is a fundamental issue 

to be decided, and that is, do you want to have the State Department make all these decisions? I personally think they will fall victim to the same kind of political pressure that they fell victim to 

when they were making decisions about the immunity of states. 

And so Congress might consider creating special rules and laying 

out the standards that it thinks that the courts or, if you want the 

State Department to do it, the State Department should apply in 

deciding those very difficult questions. So I think there is really important work to do about what to do in dealing with claims by officials. 

Since I only have a minute here, Senator, let me say that in addition to my specific comments about the bill, I would recommend 

that this Committee consider creating a compensation program 

that does not turn on the type of terrorist action, the evidence of 

state involvement, and issues of that kind, and compensates all 

Americans injured in a certain set of actions, and then allows the 

Government to pay those claims, first of all, and then to take those 

claims and to seek that money from other governments. And, Senator, you will see at the end of my statement my plea for a strong 

4 

diplomacy as opposed to the kind of diplomacy we so often see 

when it comes to dealing with people who sponsor terrorist acts in 

America. 

Once it is established that certain groups—or princes, for that 

matter—have knowingly funded the killing of Americans on American soil, we need to do more than just let people pursue them in 

the courts. That is what we did with Osama bin Laden, and he 

killed Americans five times over before we finally got around to 

going after him. 

We need to go after these people. We need to use preventive 

force. And in my paper I recommend, Senator, that any bill, in setting up this funding requirement, should include an authorization 

for the President under appropriate circumstances to use force 

against the sponsors of terrorism of this kind. And I refer you to 

Security Council Resolution 1373 that lays out the criteria which 

the Security Council has said justifies a criminalization of assistance to terrorist groups and those criteria would justify far more 

serious actions than simply civil actions against people who sponsor these acts. 

Senator, just for your information, I will send you a copy of a 

book on preventive force I published about a month ago. I will be 

happy to send that if it helps with the Committee’s deliberations 

about actually fashioning something more muscular and more effective to deal with this unacceptable attitude that people who may 

happen to be princes, or whatever, can actually give money knowingly to a group that is devoted to the killing of Americans. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Judge Sofaer appears as a submission for the record.] 

Chairman SPECTER. Well, you raise some fascinating alternatives. When you mention criminalization after talking about 

using force, and you talk about the Saudi princes, are you suggesting that the United States ought to pursue criminally against 

those who are identifiable and seek their extradition? 

Judge SOFAER. Yes, I certainly am, Senator, because if you look 

at Resolution 1373, it says that state has the duty to prevent and 

repress the financing of terrorist acts. Section 1(b) says that every 

state must criminalize the willful provision of collection by any 

means, directly or indirectly, of funds by their nationals or in their 

territories with the intention that the funds should be used, or in 

the knowledge that they are to be used in order to carry out terrorist acts. And this is just one of several provisions that I think 

would justify that. 

Chairman SPECTER. And when you talk about the use of force, 

are you suggesting that the United States take military action 

against the Saudi Government? 

Judge SOFAER. I do not think that would be necessary, Senator, 

for us to take action against the Saudi Government. But I think 

as a matter of principle it is perfectly appropriate for the Congress 

to indicate to the President that a government that either refuses 

to abide by the requirements of Resolution 1373 or just simply cannot do so, forfeits its right to maintain complete sovereign integrity 

of their territory. 

5 

Chairman SPECTER. And if they do not extradite these Saudi 

princes, then what with respect to your suggestion of U.S. force? 

Judge SOFAER. Well, I mentioned, Mr. Chairman, in my written 

testimony that we should not be having more Afghanistans as a 

price for our self-defense. I do feel that we have the capacity now 

to go after individuals in countries that are killing Americans and 

to stop them. 

I am not talking about guessing about people that might kill 

Americans. As you know, Senator, there are people out there who 

have very deliberately killed Americans over and over again. And 

what the administration is doing today through the CIA by targeting individuals in various countries of the world is lawful and 

just, as far as I am concerned. 

Chairman SPECTER. Well, you have moved quite far afield on 

your testimony. 

Judge SOFAER. I am just trying to achieve the objectives of the 

Committee. 

Chairman SPECTER. When you talk about the executions which 

the United States has ordered, having identified terrorists who 

they conclude have killed Americans, it is extrajudicial, but depending upon the circumstances, I would agree with you that it is 

warranted. But that is pretty far afield. I do not think we are going 

to use drones against Saudi princes. Are you? 

Judge SOFAER. Well, I think it is a matter of principle, and if the 

Committee were to pass a comprehensive bill that, in addition to 

fixing these aspects of civil suits, set up a compensation fund and 

at the same time encourages the President to do something effective about deterring these attacks on Americans, and the funding 

of these attacks, I think that people around the world would take 

more seriously the fact that finally officials of the Government of 

the United States are fulfilling their oath, Senator, to protect and 

defend the people of the United States. 

Chairman SPECTER. Well, when you talk about the fund, that is 

really quite different from what you are suggesting with respect to 

criminalization and force. This reminds me of the debates we had 

when you were counsel to the State Department. It is surprising 

to note that we did not have extraterritorial jurisdiction when I 

was elected in the Senate, and it was only in 1984 as to kidnapping 

and hostage taking that we legislated extraterritorial jurisdiction, 

then the Terrorist Prosecution Act in 1986, following the strafing 

of the Rome and Vienna airports. Then at that time, the United 

States could not get other countries to turn over terrorist suspects. 

And we talked about a case in about 1870 where the Supreme 

Court upheld the prosecution of an Illinois matter where they had 

kidnapped somebody in Peru. The Supreme Court said it was okay. 

And we talked about using that as authority for taking people into 

custody. 

Your thinking has gone quite a bit farther in the intervening 25 

years, Judge Sofaer. 

Judge SOFAER. I think you have been a leader, Mr. Chairman, 

at sensing that the world is moving in the direction of civilized 

order, and I think that your sense of it has been correct. And if we 

even live in a civilized world, it would be one in which no Saudi 

6 

prince or any other prince could safely fund the killing of innocent 

civilians in any other country. I think you agree with that. 

Chairman SPECTER. Well, your testimony, Judge Sofaer, has gone 

quite a bit farther than the structure of this bill. You make this 

bill look very, very modest, perhaps even ineffective, the grand 

scope that you are proposing. But we will settle for a little less, at 

least so far as this hearing today is concerned. 

Judge SOFAER. Thank you. 

Chairman SPECTER. I have deviated from regular order in questioning Judge Sofaer beyond his time before the panel is finished 

because he has a plane to catch, as I mentioned earlier, and this 

is a very busy day with many, many hearings, so I do not know 

how many people will be present. We have two members of the 

Committee who are cosponsors—Senator Lindsey Graham and Senator Charles Schumer—and I know they want to be present. But 

until they arrive and we have more participants, we have the luxury of being a little more flexible than we customarily do. 

I will now turn to the testimony of Mr. Richard Klingler, partner 

at Sidley & Austin; from 2006 to 2007 was general counsel and 

legal adviser on the National Security Council staff. Two years earlier, he had been in the Office of Counsel to the President. A.B. 

from Stanford, a B.A. from Oxford, a law degree from Stanford, and 

clerked for Justice O’Connor. 

Thank you for joining us, Mr. Klingler, and the floor is yours. 

STATEMENT OF RICHARD D. KLINGLER, PARTNER, SIDLEY 

AUSTIN LLP, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. KLINGLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for inviting me to present my views regarding the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act. My written testimony elaborates these comments. 

The Act is an important counterterrorism initiative and focuses 

on redressing injuries arising within our borders. The Act is required in large part due to the Second Circuit’s unfortunate and 

clearly erroneous construction of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities 

Act and application of the Due Process Clause. The Act is also required by the administration’s recent narrow construction of the 

Immunity Act’s exception for suits addressing tortious acts, including acts of terrorism. 

The administration put forward its position in a brief filed by the 

Solicitor General that advised the U.S. Supreme Court not to review the Second Circuit’s decision or consider the September 11th 

victims’ arguments, even as the Government disagreed with each 

of the key aspects of the Second Circuit’s reasoning. 

The Second Circuit’s approach would bar suits against foreign 

sovereigns for acts of terrorism unless the sovereign was among the 

handful of formally designated state sponsors of terror, and it 

would require courts to decline jurisdiction over claims against 

non-state actors abroad who support terrorist organizations hostile 

to the United States. The administration’s interpretation of the 

current statute would bar suits against nearly all foreign states for 

supporting an act of terror against and within the United States 

whenever a portion of that state support took place outside our borders. Both approaches would bar suits against foreign governments 

7 

related to attacks such as those completed by the September 11th 

hijackers or attempted by the Christmas Day bomber or the Times 

Square bomber. 

The Second Circuit’s approach would also bar a range of claims 

by terrorism victims against nongovernmental supporters of terrorist organizations. 

The principal provisions of the Act are designed to remedy these 

gaps in our counterterrorism capabilities. The Act would ensure 

that suits could proceed against a foreign state when it acted 

abroad to support acts of terrorism directed toward the United 

States and causing injury within our borders. It would express 

Congress’ understanding that supporters of terrorist organizations 

directing their actions against the United States should expect to 

be pursued in U.S. courts, and it would confirm that civil suits can 

be pursued against those who support terrorist organizations as 

well as those who commit the terrorist act. 

The enhancements of our counterterrorism capabilities in the Act 

would advance a range of interests. The Act would increase the 

ability of victims of acts of terrorism committed on U.S. soil to secure redress and hold terrorist supporters accountable. There is 

value in permitting the victims of such acts to have their day in 

court, to prove the facts of the violence done to them and us, and 

to bring public scrutiny upon those who harmed them. This applies 

not only to the victims of past acts of terror, but also those who 

are, unfortunately, likely to join their ranks. It applies to those 

who would foster and support terrorist organizations, even if they 

are associated with a foreign government, as well as those who 

more directly commit acts of terror. To the victims of terrorism 

harmed in the United States, it does not matter whether the person who writes the check that funds the attack does so in Miami 

or in the Middle East, and it should not matter to our courts. 

The Act would also increase the Nation’s ability to deter and prevent further attacks of terrorism. Although civil litigation plays a 

relative small part in countering terrorism, its role is not unimportant. The Act would increase the scope of civil litigation directed 

against those who support terrorism. This may prove especially effective when directed against financiers of terror, conscious of their 

reputations, and by providing incentives to foreign states to ensure 

that those closely affiliated with them neither seek to harm expatriate communities within the United States nor further the effort 

of terrorist organizations. 

There are always risks to our Nation’s foreign relations and potential conflict with international legal principles when civil liability is expanded against foreign sovereigns and for acts undertaken 

abroad. But those risks must be set against the benefits of the Act 

and set in context. Here those risks are lessened because the Act 

is focused on injury occurring within this Nation’s borders where 

our sovereign interests are greatest and the tension with international legal principles reduced. Indeed, Section 1605(a)(5) supported certain terrorism-based claims against sovereigns in the decades prior to the Second Circuit’s narrow construction without 

undue harmful effects. Those risks are further reduced by additional provisions of the Act, by legal principles available to the judiciary to accommodate the interests of sovereigns, and by measures 

8 

the executive branch may take to manage risks to foreign relations 

in particular cases. 

There are, in addition, clarifications of the Act’s sovereign immunity exception that may further reduce these risks, especially in relation to limiting recovery for injuries unrelated to acts of violence 

and terrorism occurring directly in the United States. Permitting 

recovery for that unrelated injury could indeed bring unintended 

consequences or increased risks to foreign relations. Even so, that 

concern presents little difficulty for the important provisions of the 

Act addressing Federal courts’ jurisdiction over non-state actors or 

for the provisions confirming that suits can be predicated on allegations of secondary liability. And even for the Act’s revisions of sovereign immunity, that concern should not cause hesitancy but, 

rather, prompt clarification and confirmation of the Act’s core, important purpose of extending the scope of remedies for victims of 

international terrorism directed against and causing injury in the 

United States. 

Thank you for the opportunity to present the views. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Klingler appears as a submission 

for the record.] 

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you, Mr. Klingler. 

Our third witness, the final witness on this panel, is John 

Bellinger, a partner in Arnold & Porter; served as legal adviser to 

the Department of State from 2005 to 2009; had also served as 

legal adviser to the National Security Council 2001 to 2005; and 

represented the White House in dealings with the 9/11 Commission. He served as counsel for national security matters in the 

Criminal Division of the Department of Justice, was counsel to the 

Select Committee on Intelligence in 1996, the year that I chaired 

that Committee; and was special assistant to CIA Director William 

Webster; AB from Princeton, a law degree from Harvard, and a 

master’s in foreign affairs from UVA. 

Thank you for coming in, Mr. Bellinger, and we look forward to 

your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF JOHN B. BELLINGER III, PARTNER, ARNOLD & 

PORTER LLP, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. BELLINGER. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for having 

me today. I had the privilege, as you mentioned, of serving as counsel to the Senate Intelligence Committee in 1996 when you were 

the Chairman, so it is a particular honor for me to appear before 

you after the year of having served behind you. It is nice to be 

back. 

As you noted, I have served in the Justice Department, at the 

National Security Council, and most recently as the Legal Adviser 

at the State Department. It is nice to be here with my distinguished predecessor Abe Sofaer and my successor at the White 

House, Richard Klingler. 

I have spent a considerable amount of time working on the issues 

that today’s hearing is considering. I agree wholeheartedly with the 

goal of the proposed legislation, which is to hold accountable countries and certain individuals and entities who sponsor acts of terrorism. I was in the Situation Room on 9/11, and I spent much of 

my time at the White House and the State Department after 9/11 

9 

on issues relating to the 9/11 attacks. I have met with many of the 

families of the 9/11 attacks as well as of other terrorist attacks, so 

I share your goal of seeking justice for these atrocities. 

I have a longer statement for the record. I am just going to make 

a few comments right now. I am not going to take a position for 

or against the amendments, but what I would like to do is highlight a few factors for the Committee’s consideration, focusing in 

particular on the amendments to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. 

In general, I would urge Congress to be very careful in proposing 

new exceptions to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. The FSIA 

codifies very important principles of international law that protect 

not only foreign governments but, more importantly, the United 

States itself. Long before the FSIA was enacted, our courts recognized that under international law, sovereign governments are immune from suit in each other’s courts. When the terrorism exception was added to the FSIA in 1996, it reflected a very delicate 

compromise between the Congress and the executive branch limiting suits against foreign governments only to the seven, now four, 

state sponsors of terrorism designated by the executive branch. 

And even the terrorism exception is not consistent with generally 

accepted principles of international law. Because it is included in 

U.S. law, the U.S. is unable to become party to an important multilateral treaty, the U.N. Convention on State Immunities, which the 

U.S. itself was instrumental in having adopted and which protects 

the United States from suits around the world. 

The Committee needs to be very careful about unintended consequences of this legislation. In particular, the provision expanding 

the tort exception, drafted with specific countries in mind—and we 

have mentioned Saudi Arabia—could potentially be used against 

other nations, including U.S. allies, like Israel, if the tort results 

in personal injury or loss of property in the United States. Lawsuits have already been brought against Israeli officials in U.S. 

courts for alleged extrajudicial killings in Gaza, and this bill could 

potentially remove the immunity of the state of Israel itself, as well 

as of all other nations. Expanding the tort exception could open a 

Pandora’s box of litigation against foreign governments in U.S. 

courts. But even if some of these frivolous lawsuits are dismissed, 

allowing them to be brought in the first place could result in protracted litigation against our allies. 

Congress should also consider the possible reciprocal consequences for the United States itself. When the terrorism exception was added to the FSIA in 1996, Iran and Cuba removed U.S. 

sovereign immunity and allowed the U.S. to be sued in their courts 

for terrorism resulting in billions of dollars in default judgments 

against the United States. And U.S. officials have already been 

subject to legal actions in other countries for their official actions 

to combat terrorism. At a time that the United States is necessarily 

taking important but controversial actions around the world to 

fight terrorism—and Judge Sofaer has mentioned some of those 

earlier—Congress should be extremely cautious about lifting the 

immunity of foreign governments lest foreign governments remove 

the immunity of the United States in their own courts. 

10 

Finally, Congress should also consider the possible foreign policy 

friction that would result from allowing more foreign governments 

to be sued in the United States. This might require the executive 

branch to intervene to prevent our Federal courts from becoming 

embroiled in delicate foreign policy and political questions. These 

kinds of interventions by the executive branch are exactly the 

kinds of actions that the FSIA was enacted to avoid. 

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the chance to appear to discuss these 

concerns. I commend the Committee for its efforts to seek justice 

for victims of international terrorism. I look forward to discussing 

some of the alternative proposals that Judge Sofaer has suggested 

and that I have worked on when I was The Legal Adviser sitting 

in his chair, as well as the Committee’s efforts to consider these 

important principles of international law and foreign policy. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bellinger appears as a submission for the record.] 

Chairman SPECTER. Well, thank you, Mr. Bellinger. There certainly are a great many issues on the floor. I begin with the proposition that this legislation does not seek to add any additional exceptions. We are simply dealing with the ones at hand. 

And, Mr. Klingler, you testified at some length in your written 

statement—and all the written statements will be made a part of 

the record, without objection—about specifying that there are alternative remedies. The countries listed on the nations which sponsor 

terrorism is separate from the tortious conduct. And you believe, as 

I understand it, that the legislation is correct in seeking to overturn both the Second Circuit decision and the position taken by the 

State Department and urging the denial of cert.? 

Mr. KLINGLER. Yes on both points. The Second Circuit was clearly wrong in indicating that the existing statutory provision for suits 

and torts against sovereign was incapable of supporting a terrorism-related suit, and the proposed legislation would confirm and 

clarify that that position is wrong and would confirm that terrorism-related suits can be brought within the tort exception to the 

Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. Even the administration disagreed with the Second Circuit’s reasoning on that point. 

Chairman SPECTER. Mr. Bellinger, you raise a concern about 

having litigation like allegations of criminal conduct against the 

Israeli Army in Gaza. We do not really get anywhere near that 

kind of a problem with what we are proposing to do in this legislation, do we? 

Mr. BELLINGER. I am not saying, Senator, that such a suit would 

have merit, but I am afraid that by expanding the tort exception 

to apply it clearly to extraterritorial acts outside the United States, 

contrary to what the Second Circuit had said, and specifically stating that it applies to something like extrajudicial killings, that 

would allow at least a suit to be brought against Israeli, or other 

countries like Afghanistan or even Britain. Admittedly, the effect 

has to be felt inside the United States, but there are a lot of creative lawyers who I think could plead that sort of effect. 

Right now, Israel and other countries are immune from those 

kinds of suits as sovereign governments in the United States. 

There has been litigation against Israel and against its intelligence 

11 

services for directing, in fact, air attacks in Gaza because it had effects inside the United States. Those officials were ultimately held 

to be immune under principles of common law immunity. 

Chairman SPECTER. Isn’t it pretty far-fetched to analogize an attack in Gaza as having an effect in the United States contrasted 

with what we are dealing with here? 

Mr. BELLINGER. Ultimately, that case was dismissed in the U.S. 

courts against Israeli officials, but it took Israel a very long time 

to have to defend it, many, many years up through the circuit 

courts. Israel had to defend its officials previously for actions taken 

solely in Gaza that were alleged to have effects here in the United 

States. So I would be very concerned about lifting the immunity 

not only of officials but of whole states potentially to be sued here 

in the United States for their extraterritorial actions. 

Chairman SPECTER. When you talk about foreign policy functions 

and the Government would have to intervene in a lot of lawsuits, 

that is exactly what the Government has done here in a way which 

is really not known to the public. There is very little awareness as 

to what goes on in a case like this or most of the cases in the Supreme Court of the United States. It has to be a case like Bush v. 

Gore or a case like Citizens United before there is any public understanding. 

One of the collateral issues that I have been working on for a 

couple of decades has been the issue of televising the Supreme 

Court so that people will understand the far-reaching impact, but 

what you warn against is Government intervening in litigation. 

That is exactly what happened in this case. And how do you effectively deal with that? 

Mr. BELLINGER. Well, I think it depends on what side of the 

issue you are, whether you think it is a proper or improper intervention. For example, in the Israeli case that I mentioned against 

the Israeli intelligence chief. The Legal Adviser—and the United 

States, in fact, intervened in that case. We filed a brief, which I 

signed, stating that the case should not be heard in the United 

States because it was an improper political question to be heard inside the United States. And certainly the victims in that case felt 

that the United States was improperly intervening against them. 

So it depends what side of the issue you are on to determine 

whether it is an improper intervention. 

In something like this, if more cases were allowed to be brought 

against foreign governments in the United States, there would be 

pressure from both sides—both the victims, understandably, but 

also the representatives of the foreign government—saying that 

whatever the case happens to be is a delicate political question that 

should not be left to the judiciary to consider. And I am not saying 

that any future government would file a brief, but there would be 

tremendous pressure upon them—— 

Chairman SPECTER. What happened in that case? The court 

made a decision? 

Mr. BELLINGER. This was called the Dichter case, which was 

brought against the Israeli intelligence chief—— 

Chairman SPECTER. The one you are describing. Which court 

were you in? 

12 

Mr. BELLINGER. This was in New York, the New York district 

and then the court of appeals, and there was another case, I think, 

that was also in D.C. 

Chairman SPECTER. And the court decided those cases. Was 

there—— 

Mr. BELLINGER. The court decided those cases and found that the 

officials were not immune under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities 

Act because the courts held that officials are not protected under 

the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act which they said protects 

governments. 

Chairman SPECTER. Was there a cert. application? 

Mr. BELLINGER. I believe there was. I would have to check on 

that. The courts, though, held that the officials were immune under 

common law principles of immunity that protect officials in their 

official acts, which is just what the United States would expect 

overseas. If the Secretary of Defense right now were sued in a foreign country for a drone attack that killed civilians, we would assert very strongly that our Secretary of Defense was absolutely immune from those actions because he took them in his official capacity, even though the civilians in, for example, Afghanistan or Pakistan or Yemen would believe that that was actually an illegal 

extrajudicial killing. 

Chairman SPECTER. Well, coming back to this legislation and the 

case which has provided the basis for the legislation, the cases you 

cite are interesting, but the serious question as to whether they are 

really relevant here on the facts being so vastly different and what 

might be postulated with a lot of imagination could be handled in 

some other court at some other time. But it is different to say the 

court is going to decide whether the Foreign Sovereign Immunities 

Act applies in this case or the Court saying, ‘‘We will not take the 

case.’’ 

You have not taken a position on the legislation. Would you take 

a position that at least the Supreme Court should have granted 

cert. and decided whether the Second Circuit was right, whether 

the Solicitor General was right, and reached an interpretation of 

the statute? 

Mr. BELLINGER. I would have liked to have seen the Supreme 

Court take the case. It was an important case involving the interpretation of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, and I would 

have liked to have seen the Supreme Court’s views on the subject. 

I do not know how they would have come out. 

Chairman SPECTER. Well, nobody knows how they would come 

out, but if we at least take Mr. Klingler’s recommendation to take 

care of the loose ends on the Second Circuit decision and on the 

Solicitor General’s argument, then we would know. 

Judge Sofaer, how do we deal with this issue of lack of public understanding as to what is involved here and the extraordinary 

weight given to the Solicitor General’s view? The Supreme Court 

always asks for it, and the way that Congressional power has been 

so drastically curtailed by the Court, there are many other issues 

which are raised on fact finding and on other cases where the 

Court declines to intervene or overrules the Congressional action 

for what Justice Scalia called ‘‘the flabby test’’ on congruence and 

proportionality, giving up the rational basis standard. But all of 

13 

this is so far removed from the public view. How would you deal 

with that? 

Judge SOFAER. I think you are doing an admirable job, Senator. 

I was stunned when I saw what the Second Circuit held and what 

the Solicitor General said about the standard of proof that would 

be required to find that a tort had occurred in the United States 

that satisfied the requirement of the statute. The notion that you 

can have a separate tort that occurs, let us say, in Saudi Arabia 

of knowingly funding an attack in the United States and thereby 

evade the statute that governs the—— 

Chairman SPECTER. Come to the core, Judge Sofaer. In your 

judgment, is there any conceivable basis for that conclusion? 

Judge SOFAER. No, sir. I think it is a completely naive—— 

Chairman SPECTER. Mr. Klingler and Mr. Bellinger, I am going 

to ask you the same question. Any conceivable justification for 

that? 

Judge SOFAER. I think it is a completely naive view and a terrible thing to attribute to the Senate and the Congress. The notion 

that our Congress would support a law that would allow people to 

sue for killings in the United States but that would not include allowing them to sue for paying for those killings—— 

Chairman SPECTER. Well, Judge Sofaer, aside—— 

Judge SOFAER.—in Saudi Arabia—— 

Chairman SPECTER. Aside from what the Congress would intend, 

what does the statute say? Is there any basis for taking the language of that statute and saying it does not apply when some acts 

are outside the United States? 

Judge SOFAER. Well, I think they were both wrong, the Second 

Circuit and the Solicitor General. I think the Supreme Court would 

have corrected them. And I applaud the fact that your bill would 

correct that by making it clear that if it happened, if the planning 

happened in Saudi Arabia, there would still be jurisdiction to deal 

with it in the United States. 

Chairman SPECTER. Mr. Klingler, any basis for that conclusion, 

aside from providing cover for asking the Supreme Court not to 

grant cert.? 

Mr. KLINGLER. I do not think it was a reasonable view in the 

context of this case. You could imagine certain circumstances 

where there are extremely indirect effects in the United States, 

where it may be relevant that the acts took place abroad and the 

harm was abroad. But that was not this case, and that was not the 

type of injury that your bill focuses on. 

Chairman SPECTER. What do you think, Mr. Bellinger? 

Mr. BELLINGER. Well, I am afraid I am going to have to disagree 

with my distinguished colleagues. I think the Second Circuit did 

have a reasonable interpretation of the law here. It was, in fact, 

what others—— 

Chairman SPECTER. I am not asking about the Second Circuit on 

asking that they be on the terrorist list. I am asking about the Solicitor General’s conclusion that when acts occur outside the United 

States and have a direct impact, causality in the United States, if 

there is any basis for saying that that is not what the statute covers as an exception. 

14 

Mr. BELLINGER. Senator, I think the longstanding view of the 

U.S. Government—I know you would like to have witnesses from 

them and they will tell you—is that the tort exception was intended to be limited to torts inside the United States like traffic 

accidents and so forth. The concept of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act was to provide very limited jurisdiction against foreign 

sovereigns, just as we ourselves do not want to allow the United 

States to be opened to suits all around the United States. 

Chairman SPECTER. Any legislative history to support what you 

just said? 

Mr. BELLINGER. I believe there is, Senator. I think that the suggestion was that the tort exception was intended really to cover 

traffic accidents and other minor torts by a foreign government 

that occur inside the United States. I agree that it is not crystal 

clear. That is why I say I think the Second Circuit’s decision, which 

joined a number of other circuit courts, was a reasonable interpretation that the tort exception was limited to acts inside the United 

States. 

Judge SOFAER. But if I might intervene, Senator, the Solicitor 

General did not rest her position on that rationale. The Government disagreed with the Second Circuit that the tort provision was 

limited to minor torts, and they agreed with the plaintiffs that terrorist actions were included in the tort provision. 

So the issue is, where a terrorist action which is included in the 

tort provision occurs within the United States, can you rationally 

say that paying for that terrorist action in a separate tort in Saudi 

Arabia is something that Congress would not have intended to include? And I think you cannot. 

Chairman SPECTER. Well, Mr. Klingler, are you prepared to go 

as far as Judge Sofaer in criminalizing this conduct and using force 

against Federal Government nations? 

Mr. KLINGLER. I am not sure quite what the proposal on the 

table is, but I would certainly—— 

Chairman SPECTER. Well, the proposal on the table is to go after 

those Saudi princes and bring them back for criminal prosecution. 

Mr. KLINGLER. As to the Saudi princes, the proceedings before 

the Supreme Court and the state of the litigation is a set of allegations at this point. So I do not think anything has been established 

by a court regarding what the nexus is, and I am not familiar with 

the factual record enough to have confidence that the allegations 

are true or false. 

Chairman SPECTER. Enough to support an investigation by the 

Department of Justice? 

Mr. KLINGLER. I do think, though—— 

Chairman SPECTER. With a view to a criminal prosecution if 

those facts are found? 

Mr. KLINGLER. I do think that the powers that Judge Sofaer addressed are important and legitimate and largely encompassed 

today in statutes that do criminalize a range of terrorism-related 

and support of terrorism measures. I also think that there is a 

range of use of force that both this administration and the prior administration have directed that are important and grounded in law. 

Chairman SPECTER. Mr. Bellinger, would you go along with any 

of Judge Sofaer’s suggestions about criminalizing this conduct? 

15 

Mr. BELLINGER. Well, there are two questions. I think it is a good 

idea to have a broader reach of U.S. criminal laws. One of the 

things that we found after 9/11 when many of our critics said, 

‘‘Why don’t you criminally prosecute these people who did these 

things instead of putting them in military commissions? ’’ was that 

our criminal laws had very limited reach and did not actually cover 

a lot of activities that occur solely outside the United States. 

And so, on the one hand, I agree wholeheartedly that we should 

expand the reach of our criminal laws to cover certain terrorist acts 

that occur wholly outside the United States. But that is a different 

question from the immunities of either the governments or of the 

officials, and so I would not necessarily suggest that we should 

strip senior officials in foreign governments of immunities. Those 

immunities protect the United States itself. It is a difficult twoedged sword with which I sympathize completely that we would 

like to hold senior officials accountable in foreign governments. But 

if we strip them of their immunities, then we will be risking stripping the immunities of our own senior officials, of our Secretary of 

Defense, of our Director of Central Intelligence. It would be very 

easy to accuse Leon Panetta or Bob Gates of directing an 

extrajudicial killing, and if we strip their immunities, I think that 

would be a dangerous thing for all of us. 

I agree that the force that the United States has been using is 

lawful around the world, but I would be worried about stripping 

the immunities of our officials to allow them to be sued in other 

countries. 

Chairman SPECTER. Well, you have made that clear. You would 

say there is an appropriate role for criminalization or use of force, 

but not something lesser like limiting immunity, which might boomerang. 

Mr. BELLINGER. You have summarized my position very well. 

Thank you. 

Chairman SPECTER. Another comment, Judge Sofaer? 

Judge SOFAER. I just wanted to add, Senator, that this is not just 

about our criminalizing the conduct of foreign officials for sponsoring or paying for terrorist acts. The resolution of the Security 

Council, 1373—incidentally passed under Chapter 7, which relates 

to the use of force—calls on all states themselves to criminalize 

this conduct. So the Saudi Government has a duty under this resolution to criminalize the willful provision of funds, and also as subsection (d) says, to prohibit their nationals from engaging in the financial support of terrorist groups, directly or indirectly. The language is very comprehensive. 

So, you see, the system is there. The rules are there. And I would 

urge the Senate, Mr. Chairman, to take those international rules 

that are authoritative and make them a reality by putting them 

into U.S. law and reminding the world of their duties, duly adopted 

in the Security Council of the United Nations, to criminalize this 

conduct. That would be a step in the right direction to give us the 

justification, if they do not do it, for following up appropriately. 

Chairman SPECTER. Well, that would take a lot more far-reaching action than this legislation urges. 

I want to come back for just a minute, before moving on to the 

next panel, to the issue which I had raised, and I have just sent 

16 

for the article which I read in the Post this morning, and it touches 

on this issue directly and on many others. It is Stuart Taylor’s commentary about judicial usurpation contrasted with judicial review. 

And he says that the Court would be wise to leave decision to the 

elected branches as opposed to giving their own views. And why 

does the Court get away with it? Because they stop short of infuriating the public. 

And I think, if the public understood what was happening with 

the Saudi princes and with the various charitable fronts, that the 

public would be infuriated. I think if the public understood what 

happened with the warrantless wiretapping contrasted with the 

statute, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, infuriated; that 

the Court declared unconstitutional the Americans With Disabilities Act or the law protecting women against violence, infuriated; 

or understood the campaign finance—they do understand a little of 

that. The polls are very strong there. Eighty-five percent of the 

public dislikes that. 

So the answer might be a lot simpler than legislation or Judge 

Sofaer’s fancy international law postulates, but find a way to infuriate the public or let the public decide whether they are infuriated 

or not. 

Any ideas of how to do that besides taking at least a modest step 

of televising Supreme Court open arguments? 

Judge SOFAER. I try not to infuriate anyone, Senator. 

Chairman SPECTER. I should have taken your advice. 

Any comment, Mr. Klingler or Mr. Bellinger. 

Mr. KLINGLER. My only comment would go back to the prior discussion about the value or not of the executive branch expressing 

its views to the courts. I do not want to leave the impression that 

the fact that the Solicitor General filed a brief with the U.S. Supreme Court in the 9/11 case was improper. I do not think it was. 

The Court invited the views of the Solicitor General. That is a very 

traditional practice. It is a very valuable role that the Solicitor 

General’s office serves in advising the Court. I think in general 

they have done an exceptionally good job of that. I think they did 

not do an exceptionally good job in this particular brief. 

I also think that the role of the executive branch in intervening 

in suits where there may be a foreign sovereign interest or a terrorism-related interest is also very valuable, that it can dissuade 

the Court from adopting erroneous views—or at least present to 

the Court a set of executive branch issues and interests related to 

the potential effects on foreign affairs or the construction of the 

statutes before the Court. It can characterize the record, and the 

Department of Justice and the Department of State have often 

served incredibly valuable roles in buttressing our counterterrorism 

capabilities by intervening and filing briefs in just that fashion. 

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you very much, gentlemen. I appreciate your being here. 

Chairman SPECTER. We will turn now to panel two, so if our witnesses will step forward: Mr. Evan Kohlmann, Mr. Matthew 

Levitt—OK, so how many witnesses do we have? And Mr. Wolosky. 

Would you gentlemen stand, please, for the administration of the 

oath? Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to 

17 

give before this Committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and 

nothing but the truth, so help you God? 

Mr. KOHLMANN. I do. 

Mr. WOLOSKY. I do. 

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you. 

Our first witness on this panel is Mr. Evan Kohlmann, terrorism 

consultant to NEFA Foundation, a nonprofit organization to help 

expose those who plan, fund, and execute terrorism, particularly Islamic militant organizations. The research has produced one of the 

world’s largest and most extensive open-source databases of original documents, communiques, and multimedia information concerning terrorism. Mr. Kohlmann is a graduate of the Georgetown 

University Edmund Walsh School of Foreign Service and the University of Pennsylvania Law School. Thank you for joining us, Mr. 

Kohlmann, and the floor is yours. 

STATEMENT OF EVAN F. KOHLMANN, SENIOR PARTNER, 

FLASHPOINT GLOBAL PARTNERS, NEW YORK, NEW YORK, 

AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM CONSULTANT/SENIOR INVESTIGATOR, THE NEFA FOUNDATION 

Mr. KOHLMANN. Thank you very much, Senator. Thank you to 

you and your staff for extending me the invitation to testify today. 

So far today we have talked about legal approaches with regards 

to foreign sovereign immunity, and I would like to address the factual side of this issue, particularly the role of state-sponsored or 

really state-directed Saudi Arabian charitable organizations in 

funding paramilitary and terrorist organizations. And I take your 

point that we need to get the public infuriated about this, and I 

think one of the ways to get the public infuriated about this is to 

present the facts to them. 

Last October, in the midst of a business trip to Bosnia, I passed 

the imposing King Fahd mosque in central Sarajevo. The mosque 

is, arguably, the major center of pro-Wahabi activism in the region, 

and it also serves as the headquarters for the official state-sponsored Saudi High Commission for Relief in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In 

fact, the impact of the Saudi High Commission can be felt within 

only steps of its front door. 

In October of 2009, when I was there, the items for sale at the 

vendor stall outside the mosque entrance included a crudely made 

DVD labeled on one side, ‘‘Microsoft Flight Simulator: World Trade 

Center Edition,’’ and on the other, emblazoned with images of 

Osama bin Laden and the World Trade Center, along with the title 

(in Bosnian), ‘‘The Truth about September 11.’’ This is right outside 

the front door of the Saudi High Commission. 

Indeed, though it was apparently established for humanitarian 

purposes, the Saudi High Commission and its staff in the Balkans 

have routinely engaged in behavior which goes far beyond any definition of religious missionary or relief work. This is particularly 

vexing because the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has freely acknowledged that the Saudi High Commission is ‘‘an arm of the Saudi 

Government.’’ The evidence of Saudi High Commission complicity 

in providing financing, weapons, and other forms of logistical support to paramilitary and terrorist groups is quite literally overwhelming. 

18 

An internal classified memorandum for the Muslim Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina Security Service in September 1994 acknowledged 

that, ‘‘What is interesting regarding the humanitarian organization, the Saudi High Commission, in Zenica is that they actually 

employ members of the El-Mujahideen Unit, the holy warriors, foreign fighters sent to Bosnia. 

The ARBiH report added that, ‘‘the director of the High Saudi 

Commission has well-established cooperation with El-Mujahidin 

units in Middle Bosnia.’’ Upon arresting a Saudi High Commission 

staff member in January 1994 in connection with the brutal murder of a British aid worker, Asim Fazlic, the then-chief of police in 

Zenica, commented, ‘‘One of the strangest elements is that we still 

do not know the exact identity of [those] we hold in Zenica. They 

are very uncooperative and so far still insist, in spite of their car, 

their uniforms, and their weapons, that they are humanitarian aid 

workers.’’ 

The U.S. Department of Defense, the Pentagon, has concluded 

that ‘‘The Saudi High Commission for Relief has provided financial 

support to former Arab mujahidin in Bosnia, the types of financial 

support included travel to Chechnya and to Afghanistan. At least 

one high-profile Saudi High Commission staff member in BosniaHerzegovina, an Algerian national by the name of Saber Lahmar, 

has been convicted in Bosnia-Herzegovina for the armed robbery of 

an American national for bombings there, was rearrested in October of 2001, and was sent to U.S. military custody in Guantanamo 

Bay, Cuba. 

Much as the Saudi High Commission was formed by the kingdom 

in order to organize NGO and humanitarian fundraising efforts for 

Bosnia, the Saudi royal family adopted a similar approach when 

confronted with the crisis in Kosovo in 1999. Under the chairmanship of Saudi Interior Minister Prince Naif bin Abdulaziz al-Saud, 

the kingdom formed the Saudi Joint Relief Committee for Kosovo 

and Chechnya. 

One of the first decisions by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia that 

drew international scrutiny to the activities of the SJRC was the 

curious appointment of its initial director, Saudi national Wael 

Jalaidan. Jalaidan, also known as Abul-Hassan al-Madani, was one 

of the first Arab mujahideen to join the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan during the 1980’s. In an interview aired on the AlJazeerah satellite television network in June 1999, bin Laden reminisced about the early days of the jihad in Afghanistan, recalling, 

‘‘We and the shaykh [Abdullah Azzam] were in one boat, as is 

known to you, together with our brother Wa’il Jalidan.’’ 

In the spring of 2000, U.S. officials sent a confidential memorandum to U.N. police forces in Southeastern Europe titled ‘‘Secret: 

U.S. office only Release to [the U.N. administration in Kosovo].’’ According to that report, Wael Jalaidan is an associate of Osama Bin 

Laden and had directly assisted bin Laden ‘‘moving money and 

men to and from the Balkans.’’ As a result, on September 6, 2002, 

the U.S. and Saudi Governments announced an unprecedented 

joint action to freeze Jalaidan’s assets and to specially designate 

him as a supporter of international terrorism. In other words, even 

the Saudi Government recognized that the director of their own 

state-sponsored charity is an international terrorist. 

19 

One of the biggest problems with this is that there are actual terrorists now, accused terrorists who are attempting to use the state 

sovereign immunity exception that appears to apply to Saudi High 

Commission and the SJRC in order to serve as a legal shelter for 

their own involvement in terrorist activities. One Algerian national 

in Guantanamo Bay told the U.S. military interrogators that ‘‘the 

Saudi High Commission could not be bad because it was run by the 

Saudi Royal Family.’’ 

Even former staff members of quasi-private NGO’s operating 

under the umbrella of the SJRC in Kosovo—such as the AlHaramain Islamic Foundation—have attempted to use the SJRC’s 

official status with the Saudi Government to provide sovereign immunity. 

Guantanamo Bay detainee Yemeni national Jamal Mohammed 

Alawi Mar’i complained during a Pentagon ARB hearing, ‘‘The Al 

Haramayn organization is a governmental agency. How [can] it [be] 

classified as nongovernmental and the person in charge is the Minister of the [Islamic Affairs]? ’’ 

Another Guantanamo detainee—an unnamed Jordanian who has 

lived in Pakistan since 1985—was also indignant when it came to 

charges that the Al-Haramain Foundation was involved in supporting terrorist activities: ‘‘If you consider al-Haramayn as a terrorist organization you should talk to Saudi Arabia, because Saudi 

Arabia was the country that established al-Haramayn. Its president is the royal prince there. Why don’t you go over there and ask 

him? This is something you need to take up with Saudi Arabia.’’ 

These are the words of a Guantanamo Bay detainee, and these 

statements raise serious questions about the wisdom of allowing 

any form of sovereign legal immunity for employees or officials representing the Saudi High Commission, the Saudi Joint Relief Committee, or the various charitable organizations working under their 

diplomatic umbrella. This is especially the case when said class of 

employees and officials is known to include a variety of accused 

international terrorists, uncontested paramilitary combatants, 

Guantanamo Bay detainees, and, in the case of Wael Jalaidan, 

even a close friend of Osama bin Laden. 

Thank you very much, Senator. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kohlmann appears as a submission for the record.] 

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you, Mr. Kohlmann. 

We had planned to have Mr. Matthew Levitt present today. He 

is a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 

and he is testifying in New York. The trial started on Monday and 

had been expected to conclude so that he could have been here, but 

it has been carried over. But his full testimony will be made a part 

of the record. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Levitt appears as a submission 

for the record.] 

Chairman SPECTER. We turn now to Mr. Lee Wolosky, partner in 

the law firm of Boies, Schiller & Flexner; had been director for 

transnational threats on the National Security Council staff during 

the administration of both President Clinton and President George 

W. Bush; served as co-director of the Council on Foreign Relations 

20 

Task Force on Terrorism Financing; a bachelor and law degree 

from Harvard. 

Thank you for joining us, Mr. Wolosky, and we look forward to 

your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF LEE S. WOLOSKY, PARTNER, BOIES, SCHILLER 

& FLEXNER LLP, NEW YORK, NEW YORK 

Mr. WOLOSKY. Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me to testify today before you and also for your leadership on an issue of significant importance to our country: deterring financial to international terrorist organizations. I have had the opportunity to consider these issues both as a National Security Council official and 

now as a lawyer in private practice. 

Along with the threat of governmental fines and sanctions, the 

prospect of substantial civil damages can deter deep-pocketed corporations or individuals from doing business with terrorist organizations. In this way, civil litigation against financiers of terrorism 

can advance important public policy interests of the United States. 

As discussed by other panel members, S. 2930 expands exceptions available to private plaintiffs under the Foreign Sovereign 

Immunities Act. It also amends the Antiterrorism Act of 1991 by, 

among other things, expressly imposing liability on those who aid 

and abet acts of international terrorism and by making defendants 

in such suits subject to the personal jurisdiction of Federal district 

courts to the maximum extent permitted by the Constitution. In 

these ways, it expands the remedies available to victims of international terrorism seeking redress in U.S. courts. 

To illustrate why and how civil litigation can supplement the 

tools available to U.S. policymakers and governmental enforcement 

efforts in particular in deterring the financing of terrorism, I will 

focus my remarks, at the staff’s request, on two cases concerning 

with which I have had personal responsibility as a lawyer in private practice. The first cases involved Arab Bank, PLC, and the 

second involves Chiquita Brands International. 

Arab Bank is a large, international financial institution based in 

Amman, Jordan. In 2004, six families of Americans injured or 

killed in Palestinian terrorist attacks in the territories filed a lawsuit against Arab Bank in Federal court in New York, where Arab 

Bank has offices, seeking $875 million in damages. The suit alleged 

that Arab Bank had served as paymaster for a dedicated program 

providing financial support originating from a Saudi Arabian entity 

called the Saudi Committee in Support of the Intifadeh Al Quds to 

the families of Palestinian suicide bombers and other terrorists 

who committed or attempted to commit terrorist acts that killed 

American citizens (and others). Other lawsuits making similar allegations followed. 

According to these lawsuits, the funds were disbursed to Arab 

Bank accounts opened in the name of beneficiaries and available 

at local Arab Bank branches in the Palestinian territories. Such 

payments are alleged to have served as incentives to would-be terrorists who could take comfort in knowing that their families would 

receive financial support if they attempted to commit a terrorist 

act. Beneficiary families are alleged to have received over $5,000 

each. 

21 

The ongoing civil litigation against Arab Bank supplements actions taken by U.S. regulatory and enforcement authorities. In 

2005, Federal agencies levied a $24 million fine against Arab Bank. 

This amount pales in comparison to the $32 billion in assets that 

Arab Bank possessed at the time. The $24 million U.S. Government fine against Arab Bank has 

proven to be inadequate, in my judgment. Just this week, on Monday, a Federal judge sanctioned Arab Bank for refusing to turn 

over relevant bank records. Significantly, Arab Bank continues to 

do lucrative business in New York through correspondent banking 

relationships with major U.S. financial institutions, while refusing 

to provide compensation to those harmed by its conduct and while 

continuing to defy U.S. courts. 

A trial date in the civil cases against Arab Bank will likely be 

set for 2011. The bank faces the prospect of civil damages that 

could be a large multiple of the amount of U.S. Government fines 

levied against it to date. 

The Chiquita case provides another example of how civil litigation may complement U.S. Government enforcement actions. 

Chiquita has admitted to providing financial support to the United 

Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, the AUC, which the State Department designated a foreign terrorist organization in 2001. It specifically admitted to making payments of $1.7 million from 1997 to 

2004. Chiquita has also admitted providing payments to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, the FARC, which, like the 

AUC, is on the State Department’s list of foreign terrorist organizations. 

In 2007, Chiquita pleaded guilty to engaging in transactions with a specially designated global terrorist and agreed to pay $25 million in fines to the U.S. Government. That year, Chiquita had annual revenues of $4.5 billion. Soon after the guilty plea, families of 

hundreds of Colombian and American victims killed by the AUC 

and the FARC filed lawsuits against Chiquita in U.S. courts. These 

suits demonstrate the deterrent role that civil litigation can play 

against the financing of terrorism: Chiquita faces potentially significant civil damages as a result of the civil litigation—far in excess of the $25 million it agreed to pay as the result of U.S. Government enforcement actions. 

In sum, financial institutions, corporations, charitable organizations, and other large entities may continue to provide material 

support for terrorist organizations until it is financially 

unpalatable for them to do so. Although Government fines and 

sanctions are clearly an integral part of the effort to stem the flow 

of funds to terrorist groups, civil litigation can substantially enhance the financial consequences that such entities face. This proposed bill will make it easier for litigants to sue those who provide 

support to terrorists who kill or injure Americans. It will thereby 

help to deter future such conduct. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wolosky appears as a submission 

for the record.] 

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you, Mr. Wolosky. 

You say the litigation against Chiquita was an effective deterrent. Why do you think that? 

22 

Mr. WOLOSKY. Mr. Chairman, we do not yet know whether the 

litigation against Chiquita will prove to be an additional deterrent 

to the Government fines imposed against Chiquita for—— 

Chairman SPECTER. Well, is Chiquita in a situation where they 

were likely to repeat that conduct? 

Mr. WOLOSKY. I do not believe so. 

Chairman SPECTER. Very different from al Qaeda rummaging out 

there, threatening to do more and doing more. 

Mr. WOLOSKY. I think that is a fair statement. Mr. Chairman, if 

I may, I think that the deterrent effects relates not only to specific 

conduct in specific countries around the world with respect to specific terrorists, but also to the system of internal controls that a 

corporation does or does not put in place. 

Chairman SPECTER. Mr. Kohlmann, you commented about a $24 

million fine, and you talk about other litigation pending against 

Arab Bank. How many fines or judgments have there been, to your 

knowledge, against terrorists linked with al Qaeda? 

Mr. KOHLMANN. Excuse me, Senator. I think that was actually 

Mr. Wolosky who said that. Am I correct? 

Mr. WOLOSKY. Yes, I described the AB, both enforcement actions 

and the civil litigation against Arab Bank. Arab Bank is alleged to 

have provided support principally to Palestinian terrorist organizations, specifically Hamas. 

Chairman SPECTER. Well, how about as to al Qaeda? Any litigation, fines, or judgments as to al Qaeda? 

Mr. WOLOSKY. If you are asking with respect to the formal financial system, of which Arab Bank obviously is a part, al Qaeda presents a very different case. Unlike Palestinian groups which have 

raised money openly and notoriously in certain parts of the Muslim 

world, the financing for al Qaeda has been more indirect, and it 

frequently has not involved, or at least clearly involved, the flow 

of funds through the formal financial system in a way that funds 

would be clearly designated or earmarked for al Qaeda or, to draw 

a parallel to the Arab Bank case, to the beneficiaries, to family 

members of terrorist operatives. 

Chairman SPECTER. The 9/11 Commission Staff Monograph on 

Terrorist Financing found al Qaeda was funded to the tune of approximately $30 million per year by divisions of money from Islamic charities. What can be done to communicate that import with 

the imprimatur of the 9/11 Commission to the American public to 

understand what is happening? Mr. Kohlmann, any ideas? 

Mr. KOHLMANN. Senator, I think one of the ways is showing 

what this money is actually paying for. At my company up in New 

York, we have been doing research recently about how the banking 

system continues to be used by al Qaeda to fund training camps, 

and, unfortunately, the evidence is out there. We have the actual 

bank accounts in Pakistan that are being used by al Qaeda and its 

allies to fund the training camps. And if you show people the bank 

account numbers and you show video of the training camps, where 

you have people literally shooting at targets marked ‘‘USA,’’ you 

have little kids under the age of 5 years old getting dressed up in 

uniforms and being made into warriors, that has a tremendous impact on people. 

I think the point is when it is dollars and cents—— 

23 

Chairman SPECTER. Can you tell me how it is having a tremendous impact on people? 

Mr. KOHLMANN. Well, if you can actually see the images of the 

people getting trained—— 

Chairman SPECTER. Who can see the images? 

Mr. KOHLMANN. Well, the evidence is out there, unfortunately. I 

just do not think that—— 

Chairman SPECTER. Out there, but has it been displayed by the 

news media, which is the way people get information? 

Mr. KOHLMANN. That is one way, Senator, but I think that the 

State Department and other branches of the U.S. Government also 

have a role here in terms of making sure that this information is 

not only available to the news media but it is directly available to 

the public. Unfortunately, this is not secret evidence. 

Chairman SPECTER. Well, directly available does not mean they 

get it. 

Mr. KOHLMANN. No. But I think if you can present it to their— 

a lot of people do not believe this because they cannot see it, and 

a lot of this evidence that is out there is actually open-source information. It is not secret. It is not classified. There is no reason why 

the U.S. Government should not be putting money and effort into 

broadcasting those kind of facts to the public. 

I think ultimately if you are talking about bank account numbers 

alone, you are not going to get a lot of excitement from the U.S. 

public. You are not going to get a great degree of understanding. 

If you show people what this money is paying for, the murder of 

innocent people, training little kids to fight in combat, then all of 

a sudden I think it becomes much more clear, No. 1, why it is so 

important to crack down on charities or other institutions that misuse humanitarian fundraising. 

Chairman SPECTER. Let me move to some other factual findings 

here. The Saudi High Commission, according to U.S. Government 

sources, was involved in financing al Qaeda members to attack the 

U.S. embassies in Bosnia in 1997. To what extent was that publicized? 

Mr. KOHLMANN. As far as I know, Senator, it has not been publicized at all, nor has the fact that the SJRC was raided in 1999 

and 2000 for its role in attempting to assassinate—or the role of 

its staff attempting to assassinate Western diplomats. 

Chairman SPECTER. Well, you took my question and added another illustration. Has that been publicized? 

Mr. KOHLMANN. To my knowledge, Senator, it has not been publicized—not well publicized, certainly. It is available if you know 

where to look, but, you know, that would take some digging. 

Chairman SPECTER. It is available if you know where to go to 

look. People do not go to look. 

Mr. KOHLMANN. I agree, Senator. 

Chairman SPECTER. Unless it is spoon-fed on MSNBC. 

Mr. KOHLMANN. I agree, Senator. That is one of the issues and 

that is one of the reasons why I think the U.S. Government in its 

own interests should be out there publicizing this information. If 

we simply say that an organization is a terrorist group or if we 

simply say it is a front for terrorism, that is not the same thing 

24 

as saying this group provided the money and means for individuals 

to attempt to blow up the U.S. embassy in Sarajevo. 

Chairman SPECTER. OK. Let me move to another factual matter 

which is of concern. Wiretap summaries obtained from the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia revealed that 

members of al Qaeda mujahideen in Bosnia were directed to pick 

up funds for the Saudi High Commission. A UN-sponsored resolution further determined that the Saudi High Commission transferred in excess of $120 million to the Third World Relief Agency 

between 1992 and 1995. 

Any publicity on that, Mr. Wolosky, that you know about? 

Mr. WOLOSKY. Not that I am aware of, Mr. Chairman. I would 

point out that the sort of framework of financing that you have described and that Mr. Kohlmann has described with respect to socalled Saudi charities is one that has been employed in many parts 

of the world to provide support to Islamic extremist movements. 

And, in fact, as I described in my testimony, there was and may 

still be a similar Saudi entity that provided support to Palestinian 

terrorist organizations such as Hamas. In that case, unlike perhaps 

in some of these other cases, they used a bank that happened to 

have had offices in New York City and was, therefore, subject to 

the personal jurisdiction of Federal courts by civil litigants who 

chose to sue it in New York. 

One of the points that I would make about the proposed legislation is that it expands personal jurisdiction over individuals or organizations that are accused of financing terrorism to the maximum extent allowed by the Due Process Clause. So in that respect, 

it is doing a great service to the victims who in the future may not 

be so lucky as to find an entity doing business in New York. 

Chairman SPECTER. What publicity has been given, to your 

knowledge, to the International Islamic Relief Organization which 

has financed terrorist activities? 

Mr. WOLOSKY. In a narrow circle of people who follow these 

things closely, which includes me and Evan and a few others, a fair 

degree. But to your point, in the broader American public, not 

enough. 

Chairman SPECTER. So Evan and I are pretty much convinced. 

Mr. WOLOSKY. Yes. It is the rest of us that we need to—— 

Chairman SPECTER. What is that? 

Mr. WOLOSKY. To your point, it is the rest of the country that 

needs to get educated. Chairman SPECTER. Well, that is a big part of the jobs that all 

of us have, and I think if the public was aware of what is going 

on, that would pass the infuriating test which I referred to earlier, 

adopting Stuart Taylor’s approach to getting something done, getting judicial restraint, permit a case like this to go forward, and at 

least be heard extensively in a courtroom. Anything either of you gentlemen would like to add at this point? 

[No response.] 

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you very much. That concludes the 

hearing. Mr. KOHLMANN. Thank you, Senator. Mr. WOLOSKY. Thank you. [Whereupon, at 11:31 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

[Submissions for the record follow.] 

25 


64296.001
26 


64296.002
27 


64296.003
28 


64296.004
29 


64296.005
30 


64296.006
31 


64296.007
32 


64296.008
33 


64296.009
34 


64296.010
35 


64296.011
36 


64296.012
37 


64296.013
38 


64296.014
39 


64296.015
40 


64296.016
41 


64296.017
42 


64296.018
43 


64296.019
44 


64296.020
45 


64296.021
46 


64296.022
47 


64296.023
48 


64296.024
49 


64296.025
50 


64296.026
51 


64296.027
52 


64296.028
53 


64296.029
54 


64296.030
55 


64296.031
56 


64296.032
57 


64296.033
58 


64296.034
59 


64296.035
60 


64296.036
61 


64296.037
62 


64296.038
63 


64296.039
64 


64296.040
65 


64296.041
66 


64296.042
67 


64296.043
68 


64296.044
69 


64296.045
70 


64296.046
71 


64296.047
72 


64296.048
73 


64296.049
74 


64296.050
75 


64296.051
76 


64296.052
77 


64296.053
78 


64296.054
79 


64296.055
80 


64296.056
81 


64296.057
82 


64296.058
83 


64296.059
84 


64296.060
85 


64296.061
86 


64296.062
87 


64296.063
88 


64296.064
89 


64296.065
90 


64296.066
91 


64296.067
92 


64296.068
93 


64296.069
94 


64296.070
95 


64296.071
96 


64296.072
97 


64296.073
98 


64296.074
99 


64296.075
100 


64296.076
101 


64296.077
102 


64296.078
103 


64296.079
104 


64296.080
105 


64296.081
106 


64296.082
107 


64296.083
108 


64296.084
109 


64296.085
110 


64296.086
111 


64296.087
112 


64296.088
113 


64296.089
114 


64296.090
115 


64296.091
116 


64296.092
117 


64296.093
118 


64296.094
119 


64296.095
120 


64296.096
121 


64296.097
122 


64296.098
123 


64296.099
124 


64296.100
125 


64296.101
126 


64296.102
127 


64296.103
128 


64296.104
129 


64296.105
130 


64296.106
131 


64296.107
132 


64296.108
133 


64296.109
134 


64296.110
135 


64296.111
136 


64296.112
137 


64296.113
138 


64296.114
139 


64296.115
140 


64296.116
141 


64296.117
142 


64296.118
143 


64296.119
144 


64296.120
145 


64296.121
146 


64296.122
147 


64296.123
148 


64296.124
149 


64296.125
150 


64296.126
151 


64296.127
152 


64296.128
153 


64296.129
154 


64296.130
155 


64296.131
156 


64296.132
157 


64296.133
158 


64296.134
159 


64296.135
160 


64296.136
161 


64296.137
162 


64296.138
163 


64296.139
164 


64296.140
165 


64296.141
166 


64296.142
167 


64296.143
168 


64296.144
169 


64296.145
170 


64296.146
171 


64296.147
172 


64296.148
173 


64296.149
174 


64296.150
175 


64296.151
176 


64296.152
177 


64296.153
178 


64296.154
179 


64296.155
180 


64296.156
181 


64296.157
182 


64296.158
183 


64296.159
184 


64296.160
185 


64296.161
186 


64296.162
187 


64296.163
188 


64296.164
189 


64296.165
190 


64296.166
191 


64296.167
192 


64296.168
193 


64296.169
194 


64296.170
195 


64296.171
196 


64296.172
197 


64296.173
198 


64296.174
199 


64296.175
200 


64296.176
201 


64296.177
202 


64296.178
203 


64296.179
204 


64296.180
205 


64296.181
206 


64296.182
207 


64296.183
208 


64296.184
209 


64296.185
210 


64296.186
211 


64296.187
212 


64296.188
213 


64296.189
214 


64296.190
215 


64296.191
216 


64296.192
217 


64296.193
218 


64296.194
219 


64296.195
220 


64296.196
221 


64296.197
222 


64296.198
223 


64296.199
224 


64296.200
225 


64296.201
226 


64296.202
227 


64296.203
228 


64296.204
229 


64296.205
230 


64296.206
231 


64296.207
232 


64296.208
233 


64296.209
234 


64296.210
235 


64296.211
236 


64296.212
237 


64296.213
238 


64296.214
239 


64296.215
240 


64296.216
241 


64296.217
242 


64296.218
243 


64296.219
244 


64296.220
245 


64296.221
246 


64296.222
247 


64296.223
248 


64296.224
249 


64296.225
250 


64296.226
251 


64296.227
252 


64296.228
253 


64296.229
254 


64296.230
255 


64296.231
256 


64296.232
257 


64296.233
258 


64296.234
259 


64296.235
260 


64296.236
261 


64296.237
262 


64296.238
263 


64296.239
264 


64296.240
265 


64296.241
266 


64296.242
267 


64296.243
268 


64296.244
269 


64296.245
270 


64296.246
271 


64296.247
272 


64296.248
273 


64296.249
274 


64296.250
275 


64296.251
276 


64296.252
277 


64296.253
278 


64296.254
279 


64296.255
280 


64296.256
281 


64296.257
282 


64296.261
283 


64296.262
284 


64296.263
285 


64296.264
286 


64296.265
287 


64296.266
288 


64296.267
289 


64296.268
290 


64296.269
291 


64296.270
292 


64296.271
293 


64296.272
294 


64296.273
295 


64296.274
296 


64296.275
297 


64296.276
298 


64296.277
299 


64296.278
300 


64296.279
301 


64296.280
302 


64296.281
303 


64296.282
304 


64296.283
305 


64296.284
306 


64296.285
307 


64296.286
308 


64296.287
309 


64296.288
310 


64296.289
311 


64296.290
312 


64296.291
313 


64296.292
314 


64296.293
315 


64296.294
316 


64296.295
317 


64296.296
318 


64296.297
319 


64296.298
320 


64296.299
321 


64296.300
322 


64296.301
323 


64296.302
324 


64296.303
325 


64296.304
326 


64296.305
327 


64296.306
328 


64296.307
329 


64296.308
330 


64296.309
331 


64296.310
332 


64296.311
333 


64296.312
334 


64296.313
335 


64296.314
336 


64296.315
337 


64296.316
338 


64296.317
339 


64296.318
340 


64296.319
341 


64296.320
342 


64296.321
343 


64296.322
344 

Æ 


64296.323