Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 79A04-1710-CR-2473 | August 3, 2018 Page 1 of 15

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Bruce W. Graham

Graham Law Firm, P.C.

Lafayette, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Justin F. Roebel

Supervising Deputy Attorney 

General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

William P. Stickrod,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

August 3, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

79A04-1710-CR-2473

Appeal from the Tippecanoe 

Circuit Court

The Honorable Thomas H. Busch, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

79C01-1612-F5-167

Barteau, Senior Judge.
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Statement of the Case

[1] William P. Stickrod appeals his convictions of possession of methamphetamine, 

a Level 5 felony;1and possession of paraphernalia, a Class C misdemeanor.2 

We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions.

Issues

[2] Stickrod raises three issues, which we restate as:

I. Whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence the 

police found in Stickrod’s house while serving two arrest 

warrants.

II. Whether the trial court violated Stickrod’s right to present 

evidence in his defense by barring a witness’s testimony.

III. Whether Stickrod’s two convictions for possession of 

methamphetamine violate the federal constitutional 

prohibition of double jeopardy.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] At 6:50 p.m. on December 17, 2016, Officer Grant Leroux of the Lafayette 

Police Department and other officers arrived at a house in Lafayette, Indiana. 

The house belonged to Stickrod’s mother, but Officer Leroux knew that 

Stickrod lived there. The officers were there to execute warrants to arrest 

Stickrod for failing to appear at court hearings in two criminal cases.

 

1

Ind. Code § 35-48-4-6.1 (2014).

2

Ind. Code § 35-48-4-8.3 (2015).
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[4] We discuss the circumstances in more detail below, but in summary Stickrod’s 

girlfriend, Jessica Caliz,3eventually answered the door and told Officer Leroux 

that Stickrod was not at home. The officers heard a “thud” coming from the 

house’s attached garage. Caliz had previously lied to Officer Leroux about 

Stickrod’s whereabouts. In addition, Officer Leroux had arrested Stickrod at 

that house a few weeks prior to December 17, 2016, after finding Stickrod 

hiding in the garage. The officers entered the house and discovered Stickrod 

hiding in the garage once again. They handcuffed him and, during a search of 

his person, discovered a glasses case in a pants pocket. The case contained a 

glass pipe and a small plastic bag which in turn contained a white powdery 

substance. Subsequent testing revealed the presence of .8 grams of 

methamphetamine in the bag and methamphetamine residue on the pipe.

[5] The State charged Stickrod with possession of methamphetamine, a Level 6 

felony; possession of paraphernalia, a Class C misdemeanor; and possession of 

methamphetamine, a Level 5 felony. The State further alleged that Stickrod 

was an habitual offender. Stickrod filed a motion to suppress all evidence that 

the State obtained after entering his home. The trial court held a hearing and 

denied the motion.

[6] The court bifurcated the case, choosing to first submit the Level 6 felony and 

Class C misdemeanor charges to a jury. After the State rested, Stickrod’s

 

3 Caliz’s name is spelled several different ways in the record. We use the spelling set forth in the presentence 

investigation report.
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attorney informed the court outside the presence of the jury that he would not 

present testimony by Caliz because he believed Caliz would commit perjury on 

the stand. Stickrod disagreed with his attorney’s decision and told the court 

that Caliz’s testimony was “imperative for [his] defense.” Tr. Vol. 2, p. 156. 

Stickrod further asked the court to fire his attorney. The court denied Stickrod’s 

request to fire his attorney and did not allow Caliz to testify.

[7] The jury determined Stickrod was guilty of the Level 6 felony and the Class C 

misdemeanor, and the court entered a judgment of conviction. Stickrod waived

his right to a jury trial on the Level 5 felony and the habitual offender 

sentencing enhancement. During the second phase of trial, Stickrod pleaded 

guilty to the Level 5 felony and to being an habitual offender.

[8] At sentencing, the court dismissed the habitual offender enhancement and 

imposed a sentence on the Level 6 felony, the Level 5 felony, and the Class C 

misdemeanor. The court further held the Level 6 felony would merge with the 

Level 5 felony. This appeal followed.

Discussion and Decision

I. Admission of Evidence

[9] Stickrod argues the trial court should have granted his motion to suppress. 

Once a case proceeds to trial, the question of whether the trial court erred in 

denying a motion to suppress is no longer viable. Baird v. State, 854 N.E.2d

398, 403 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied. Instead, we review whether the trial 

court erred in admitting the evidence at trial. Id.
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[10] In general, rulings on the admissibility of evidence are reviewed for an abuse of 

discretion and reversed when admission is clearly against the logic and effect of 

the facts and circumstances. Thomas v. State, 81 N.E.3d 621, 624 (Ind. 2017). 

When a challenge to such a ruling is based on the constitutionality of the search 

or seizure of evidence, it raises a question of law that we review de novo. Id.

[11] Stickrod argues the officers’ entry into his home violated his Fourth 

Amendment protection against unreasonable search and seizure. He does not 

present a claim under the Indiana Constitution. The Fourth Amendment 

provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 

papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 

shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 

probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 

particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons 

or things to be seized.

The protections of the Fourth Amendment have been extended to the states 

through the Fourteenth Amendment. Ratliff v. State, 770 N.E.2d 807, 809 (Ind. 

2002).

[12] In Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1980), 

the United States Supreme Court addressed the circumstances under which an 

officer may enter a person’s dwelling to make an arrest. The Court noted that 

searches and seizures without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable, and 

“absent exigent circumstances,” officers may not enter a dwelling without a 

warrant. Id. at 590, 100 S. Ct. at 1382. By contrast, for purposes of the Fourth 
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Amendment, “an arrest warrant founded on probable cause implicitly carries 

with it the limited authority to enter a dwelling in which the suspect lives when 

there is reason to believe the suspect is within.” Id. at 603, 100 S. Ct. at 1388. 

An Indiana statute provides that an officer who is serving an arrest warrant 

“may break open any outer or inner door or window in order to execute an 

arrest warrant, if the officer is not admitted following an announcement of the 

officer’s authority and purpose.” Ind. Code § 35-33-2-3 (2011).

[13] In Duran v. State, 930 N.E.2d 10 (Ind. 2010), officers attempted to execute a

warrant to arrest Hernandez, but they mistakenly entered Duran’s apartment

rather than Hernandez’s apartment. Once inside, they saw evidence of a drug

dealing operation and arrested Duran. Duran claimed the officers’ entry

violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The Indiana Supreme Court

determined that, pursuant to the holding in Payton, officers must have a

reasonable belief that the dwelling is the residence of the subject of the warrant

and that the subject is present at the time the officers attempt to enter on

authority of an arrest warrant. The officers’ belief that Hernandez was in

Duran’s apartment was unreasonable because their belief was based entirely on

statements by an anonymous man outside the building who may not have had

any connection to the building. The officers’ entry violated Duran’s Fourth

Amendment protections.

[14] By contrast, in Carpenter v. State, 974 N.E.2d 569 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans.

denied, an officer arrived at Carpenter’s house with an arrest warrant for

Howard. Another officer had told the first officer that Howard lived at that
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address, but Howard had not lived there for several years. When the arresting 

officer and his colleagues approached Carpenter’s house, there were cars in the 

driveway and lights were on. An officer looked in a window and saw 

Carpenter placing items in a toilet. Items used to manufacture 

methamphetamine were also visible. The officers obtained a search warrant 

and arrested Carpenter.

[15] Carpenter claimed the officers had no reason to approach his house because 

Howard was not present. A panel of this Court concluded the information the 

first officer received from another officer, plus the presence of cars in the 

driveway and lights on in the house, provided a reasonable belief that the house 

was Howard’s residence and that he was home. The officers did not violate 

Carpenter’s Fourth Amendment rights by approaching the house and looking in 

the window.

[16] In Stickrod’s case, Officer Leroux and several other officers arrived at a house 

in Lafayette, Indiana on the evening of December 17, 2016. Stickrod’s mother 

owned the house, but Officer Leroux knew Stickrod lived there because he had 

arrested Stickrod at that address a few weeks prior to the incident at issue. 

Officer Leroux was there to execute warrants that had been issued by a 

magistrate in two probation revocation cases. One case involved misdemeanor 

charges and the other involved a felony and several misdemeanors. Both 

warrants commanded officers to arrest Stickrod for failure to appear in court 

and to hold him without bond.
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[17] A light was on in Stickrod’s bedroom. Officer Leroux knew which bedroom 

Stickrod used because, during the last time he arrested Stickrod, Stickrod’s 

mother had allowed Officer Leroux to enter the house and had shown him the 

room in which Stickrod slept. Officer Leroux knocked on the door repeatedly, 

but no one answered. He asked dispatch operators to call the home’s number, 

and eventually Caliz answered the door. Caliz said that Stickrod was not 

home, but she had previously lied to Officer Leroux about Stickrod’s 

whereabouts. As they talked, Officer Leroux heard a “thud” coming from the 

attached garage. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 147. During the prior arrest, Leroux had found 

Stickrod hiding in the attic of the house’s garage.

[18] Caliz agreed to allow the officers to enter the house, but the officers hesitated 

because they did not believe her consent was valid. Officer Leroux called a 

prosecutor to ask for a search warrant, but the prosecutor advised that a warrant 

was unnecessary. Several officers entered the house and found Stickrod hiding 

in a gun safe in the garage. The officers discovered contraband on Stickrod’s 

person during a search incident to arrest.

[19] We conclude the facts of this case more closely resemble the circumstances of 

Carpenter than the facts of Duran. Officer Leroux’s visit to the house only a few 

weeks prior to the incident at issue provided ample reason to believe that 

Stickrod lived there. In addition, based on Officer Leroux’s observations on the 

evening of December 17, 2016, he had ample reason to believe that Stickrod 

was present in that house on that night.
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[20] Stickrod argues the officers lacked the authority to enter the house because the 

warrants were not true arrest warrants. He compares the warrants to the writ 

that was at issue in Casselman v. State, 472 N.E.2d 1310 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985). In 

that case, Casselman was a defendant in a civil lawsuit brought by a creditor. 

He twice failed to appear for court hearings, believing that he did not need to 

attend because he had filed for bankruptcy and an automatic stay was in effect. 

No one had informed the court in the civil case about the stay, and after 

Casselman twice failed to appear the court issued a writ of attachment, ordering 

the sheriff to take him into custody.

[21] An officer arrived at Casselman’s house. Casselman answered the door, and 

the officer told him he had a body attachment “from the corporation” and that 

Casselman needed to come with him. Id. at 1312. The officer further stated 

Casselman could pay a “thousand dollars bond.” Id. Casselman refused to go 

with the officer and retreated into his house. The officer followed Casselman 

into the house and took him into custody. Casselman was convicted of 

resisting law enforcement, and he appealed.

[22] A panel of this Court concluded the writ of attachment was “not a criminal 

arrest warrant” and the officer “could not claim the right to exercise the powers 

associated with the service of such a warrant.” 472 N.E.2d at 1312. The Court 

further determined the officer “was not lawfully engaged in the execution of 

civil process when . . . he prevented Casselman from closing the door to his 

home.” Id. at 1314. Casselman had the right to close his door, and as a result 

he could not be convicted of resisting law enforcement.
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[23] The holding in Casselman does not govern here. Casselman was a defendant in 

a civil suit, but Stickrod was on probation in two criminal cases when he failed 

to appear in court. The magistrate issued two “Bench Warrants” ordering the 

sheriff of Tippecanoe County to “arrest” Stickrod and hold him without bond 

pending the resolution of the criminal cases. Tr. Ex. Vol., State’s Exhibits 11 

and 12. By contrast, in Casselman’s case the court issued a writ of attachment, 

and he had the option of paying a bond. The Bench Warrants in Stickrod’s case

were criminal arrest warrants. In addition, in Casselman the key issue was 

whether Casselman could resist the officer’s entry into his home. By contrast, 

the offense of resisting law enforcement is not at issue in Stickrod’s case. We 

conclude the officers’ entry into Stickrod’s house did not violate the Fourth 

Amendment, and the trial court did not err in admitting evidence the officers 

discovered on Stickrod’s person after entering the house.

II. Right to Present a Defense

[24] Stickrod claims the trial court deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to 

present a defense by barring Caliz from testifying. The State argues Stickrod 

has waived this claim for appellate review because: (1) he did not present the 

Sixth Amendment claim to the trial court; and (2) he did not present an offer of 

proof describing the substance of Caliz’s testimony. After reviewing the record, 

we conclude Stickrod adequately informed the trial court that his right to

present a defense was at issue, and he adequately described Caliz’s proposed 

testimony. We reject the State’s waiver claim and turn to the merits.

[25] The Sixth Amendment provides:
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In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 

speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and 

district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which 

district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 

informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be 

confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 

process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 

Assistance of Counsel for his defence.

[26] The Sixth Amendment right to present witnesses in one’s defense applies to the 

states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 

Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19, 87 S. Ct. 1920, 1923, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1019 

(1967). “Just as an accused has the right to confront the prosecution’s witnesses 

for the purpose of challenging their testimony, he has the right to present his 

own witnesses to establish a defense. This right is a fundamental element of 

due process of law.” Id. at 19, 87 S. Ct. at 1923.

[27] The right to present witnesses in one’s defense is not unlimited, but rather is 

subject to “reasonable restrictions” designed to accommodate other legitimate 

interests in the criminal trial process. U.S. v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308, 118 S. 

Ct. 1261, 1264, 140 L. Ed. 2d 413 (1998). As a result, “the accused, as is 

required of the State, must comply with established rules of procedure and 

evidence designed to ensure both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of 

guilt and innocence.” Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302, 93 S. Ct. 1038, 

1049, 35 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1973). A rule of procedure or evidence violates the 

Sixth Amendment when it infringes upon an accused’s “weighty” interests and 

is disproportionate to the purposes that it is designed to serve. Holmes v. South 
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Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324, 126 S. Ct. 1727, 1731, 164 L. Ed. 2d 503 (2006) 

(quotation omitted).

[28] An accused “does not have an unfettered right to offer testimony that is 

incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under standard rules of 

evidence.” Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410, 108 S. Ct. 646, 653, 98 L. Ed. 

2d. 798 (1988). “[T]here is no right whatever—constitutional or otherwise—for 

a defendant to use false evidence.” Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 173, 106 S. 

Ct. 988, 997, 89 L. Ed. 2d 123 (1986).

[29] In the current case, after the State rested, the trial court and the parties held a 

conference outside the presence of the jury. Stickrod’s attorney told the court:

Judge I know I approached before with the possibility of some 

ethical obligations. I just wanted to put that and make sure it 

was on the record and if Mr. Stickrod believes that it’s an 

ineffective assistance kind of argument that at least it is on the 

record for appeal purposes or PCR purpose [sic] but I think my 

ethical obligations judge is [sic] that I cannot call Mr. Stickrod’s 

girlfriend and I believe that and obviously as an officer of the 

court that I cannot support any kind of perjury or what I would 

feel possible falsehood judge so that would be my position just 

for the record in case there is an issue with ineffective judge.

Tr. Vol. 2, p. 154.

[30] Stickrod objected to his attorney’s statement, claiming Caliz’s testimony was 

“imperative for [his] defense” because she would testify that he had been asleep 

when the officers arrived and that he did not have anything on his person, such 

as contraband, at the time of his arrest. Id. at 156. Stickrod asked the court to 
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discharge his counsel, accusing counsel of raising the ethical issue for the first 

time at trial. In response, Stickrod’s attorney told the court, “I have explained 

this to him, I am not risking my law license or anything else on something that I 

think is unethical and I am not going to call her nor did I plan to call her ever 

when she came and first met with me.” Id. at 159. The court denied Stickrod’s 

request to fire his attorney and his request to present Caliz’s testimony.4

[31] We conclude that the trial court did not err in barring Caliz from testifying. 

Preventing the presentation of perjured testimony on the stand is a legitimate 

and substantial interest, and excluding Caliz’s testimony was not 

disproportionate to that interest. See Makiel v. Butler, 782 F.3d 882, 910 (7th Cir.

2015) (no error in rejection of habeas corpus petition based on claim of unfair 

exclusion of witness’s testimony; evidence indicated the testimony was false).

[32] Stickrod argues his attorney failed to explain why he thought Caliz would lie on 

the stand. The attorney’s statement to the court that he believed Caliz would 

perjure herself on the stand was a sufficient basis upon which to exclude her 

testimony. Whether counsel was incorrect in his belief, or failed to render 

effective assistance, are matters for post-conviction proceedings.

 

4 The trial court further stated while excluding Caliz’s testimony that she had violated the court’s order 

mandating separation of witnesses by remaining in the courtroom during the trial. We need not address this 

issue, but the record demonstrates that the court granted the State’s motion to separate witnesses at the 

beginning of the trial. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 59. Further, Stickrod does not challenge the trial court’s denial of his pro 

se request to discharge counsel.
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III. Double Jeopardy

[33] Stickrod argues his convictions for possession of methamphetamine as Level 5 

and Level 6 felonies violate his federal constitutional protection against double 

jeopardy, and that the court’s merger of the counts at sentencing failed to 

correct the problem. We agree.

[34] A double jeopardy violation occurs when judgments of conviction are entered 

for the same criminal act and cannot be remedied by the “practical effect” of 

concurrent sentences or by merger after conviction has been entered. West v. 

State, 22 N.E.3d 872, 875 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. A trial court’s act 

of merging, without also vacating the conviction, is not sufficient to cure a 

double jeopardy violation. Id. The State agrees that “a separate but merged 

conviction for [a] lesser included offense cannot stand.” Appellee’s Br. p. 20.

[35] The jury determined Stickrod was guilty of possession of methamphetamine as 

a Level 6 felony, and the trial court entered a “judgment of conviction” on that 

count. Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 77. Later, after Stickrod pleaded guilty to 

possession of methamphetamine as a Level 5 felony, the court entered another

judgment of conviction. The court imposed sentences for both convictions of 

possession of methamphetamine but determined that the two counts would 

“merge.” Id. at 10. The entry of judgments of convictions for both counts 

violated double jeopardy, and merely merging the two convictions at sentencing 

was insufficient to correct the violation. We reverse the conviction for 

possession of methamphetamine as a Level 6 felony and remand with 
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instructions to vacate that conviction. The conviction for possession of 

methamphetamine as a Level 5 felony remains in effect.

Conclusion

[36] For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the trial court in part, 

reverse in part, and remand with instructions.

[37] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

Bradford, J., and Pyle, J., concur.