UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.  No. 00-4260

EMORY CLASH JONES,

Defendant-Appellant. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.  No. 00-4291

CLEVON TYRONE JOHNSON, a/k/a Big

Ty,

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.

J. Frederick Motz, Chief District Judge.

(CR-97-309-L)

Submitted: December 21, 2000

Decided: January 9, 2001

Before Before LUTTIG and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and

HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 
COUNSEL

David R. Solomon, Baltimore, Maryland; Arcangelo M. Tuminelli,

Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellants. Lynne A. Battaglia, United

States Attorney, Angela R. White, Assistant United States Attorney,

Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c). 

OPINION

PER CURIAM: 

Emory Clash Jones and Clevon Tyrone Johnson pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute cocaine hydrochloride and cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1994). They were sentenced to 188 months

and 210 months, respectively. On appeal, Jones claims that the district

court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Johnson

maintains that the district court erred in increasing his base offense

level by two levels under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual

§ 2D1.1(b)(1) (1998) for possessing a dangerous weapon. 

We first address Jones’ claim that the district court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. A defendant has no absolute right to withdraw a plea of guilty. United States v. Ewing, 957

F.2d 115, 118 (4th Cir. 1992). This Court reviews the district court’s

refusal to allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea under Fed. R.

Crim. P. 32 for abuse of discretion. United States v. Wilson, 81 F.3d

1300, 1305 (4th Cir. 1996). Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal

Procedure permits withdrawal of a guilty plea if the "defendant shows

any fair and just reason." Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(e). 

A trial court, when considering whether to allow a defendant to

withdraw a guilty plea, must apply the six-factor analysis announced

by this Court in United States v. Moore, 931 F.2d 245, 248 (4th Cir.

2 UNITED STATES v. JONES
1991). Under Moore, a district court considers: (1) whether the defendant has offered credible evidence that his plea was not knowing and

voluntary; (2) whether the defendant has credibly asserted his legal

innocence; (3) whether there has been a delay between the entry of

the plea and the filing of the motion; (4) whether the defendant had

close assistance of competent counsel; (5) whether withdrawal will

cause prejudice to the government; and (6) whether withdrawal will

inconvenience the court and waste judicial resources. Id. Although all

the factors in Moore must be given appropriate weight, the key to

determining whether a Rule 32(e) motion should be granted is

whether the Rule 11 hearing was properly conducted. United States

v. Puckett, 61 F.3d 1092, 1099 (4th Cir. 1995). This Court closely

scrutinizes the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 colloquy and attaches a strong presumption that the plea is final and binding if the Rule 11 proceeding

is adequate. United States v. Lambey, 974 F.2d 1389, 1394 (4th Cir.

1992). 

In this case, the district court heard argument on Jones’ motion and

concluded that Jones did not present a "fair and just reason" warranting withdrawal of his guilty plea. Having reviewed the transcript of

the hearing in light of Jones’ argument on appeal, we find no abuse

of discretion in the court’s denial of Jones’ motion. 

With respect to Johnson, we have reviewed the district court’s

application of the two-level enhancement under USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1)

and USSG § 1B1.3 for possession of a dangerous weapon and find no

clear error. See United States v. Rusher, 966 F.2d 868, 880 (4th Cir.

1992) (setting standard). 

Accordingly, we affirm Jones’ and Johnson’s respective convictions and sentences. We dispense with oral argument because the

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

UNITED STATES v. JONES 3