UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

DONNELL WRIGHT,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

WOLPOFF & ABRAMSON; LARRY

ABRAMSON, No. 99-1762

Defendants-Appellees.

and

HARRY WOLPOFF,

Defendant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.

Catherine C. Blake, District Judge.

(CA-97-4324-CCB)

Submitted: January 27, 2000

Decided: February 28, 2000

Before NIEMEYER, WILLIAMS, and MICHAEL,

Circuit Judges.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

Sherrie T. Howell-Young, LAW OFFICES OF SHERRIE T.

HOWELL-YOUNG, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Robert B.
Fitzpatrick, FITZPATRICK & ASSOCIATES, Washington, D.C., for

Appellees.

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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

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OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Donnell Wright appeals from the district court's order granting

summary judgment in favor of Defendants, and dismissing his

employment discrimination action alleging violation of Title VII of

the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3(a)

(West 1994) ("Title VII"). Specifically, he claimed that he was retaliated against with regard to a co-worker's complaints of racial discrimination and constructively discharged from his employment with

Defendants. On appeal, Wright alleges that the district court erred in

granting summary judgment on the retaliation claim.

Our review of the record and the district court's opinion discloses

that this appeal is without merit. Wright's complaint centers around

allegations of race discrimination made by Reginald Miles, a coworker, against their mutual employer, which allegations were

dropped by Miles following an internal investigation by the employer

and prior to any formal claim being made by Miles with the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). Even assuming,

arguendo, that Wright established the first part of the prima facie case

of employment discrimination, i.e., that he engaged in protected activity1

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1 Given the record evidence which includes Wright's repeated and specific denial of any involvement, knowledge, participation, or support for

Miles' complaint, or even the fact of the existence of the complaint,

together with the fact that Miles never actually filed a Title VII complaint with the EEOC, Wright's argument that he participated in a protected activity is tenuous, at best.

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pursuant to Section 704a of Title VII,2 we find that he failed to establish that the employer took adverse employment action against him.3

We find that Wright's reliance on his conclusory EEOC affidavit on

this issue is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact,

given his extensive deposition testimony to the contrary.4 Specifically, Wright offers no evidence beyond his EEOC affidavit that his

employer took any adverse action against him on account of his race.

Wright's sole contention of discrimination centers around one conversation he had with the law firm's managing partner. While he contends that, because of his association and friendship with Miles he

was told by the partner that he would no longer receive raises or promotions, that he would be excluded from management meetings, and

that he should look for other employment, he admitted in deposition,

that none of the alleged threats ever came to fruition. In deposition,

he attested that there were no management meetings from which he

was excluded, that there were no promotions he failed to receive, and

that there were no pay raises he was denied on account of his race.

Given his deposition testimony to the contrary, we find that Wright's

conclusory assertions and unsubstantiated speculation contained in his

EEOC affidavit are insufficient to stave off summary judgment.5

Accordingly, we cannot say that the district court's finding of nondiscrimination was clearly erroneous.6 

We therefore affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment

in favor of Defendants. We dispense with oral argument because the

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

before the Court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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2 See Munday v. Waste Management of N. Am., Inc., 126 F.3d 239, 242

(4th Cir. 1997); see also Ross v. Communications Satellite Corp., 759

F.2d 355, 365 (4th Cir. 1985).

3 Id.

4 See Barwick v. Celotex Corp., 736 F.2d 946, 960 (4th Cir. 1984).

5 Id.; see also Goldberg v. B. Green & Co., 836 F.2d 845, 848 (4th Cir.

1988).

6 See Anderson v. City of Bessemer , 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985).

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