Filed 4/23/21 J.M. v. G.H. CA2/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

J.M.,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

G.H.,

Defendant and 

Respondent.

 B305382

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BF037073)

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles 

County, Joshua D. Wayser, Judge. Affirmed.

Hoover Law and Sarah J. Hoover for Plaintiff and 

Appellant.

No appearance for Defendant and Respondent.

_______________________________
2

J.M. appeals from an order denying his postjudgment 

request to modify custody and visitation for his then 14-year-old 

son and an order denying his request for a statement of decision. 

Finding no error, we affirm the orders.

BACKGROUND

This matter involves a custody dispute regarding a child 

named Joey, between J.M. (Joey’s father) and G.H. (Joey’s 

mother). J.M. and G.H., who never married, ended their 

relationship of more than 10 years in 2007, when Joey was two 

years old. G.H. has no other children. J.M. had been married 

three times before his relationship with G.H., and he has three 

adult children from two of the earlier marriages. In 2008, J.M. 

married M.H. (J.M. v. G.H. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 925, 928.)1 

He later adopted her son. Joey has relationships with all his half 

siblings.

I. 2012 Judgment on Custody and Visitation

In 2009, J.M. filed a petition to establish paternity of Joey 

and later requested sole legal and primary physical custody of 

Joey. In response, G.H., an Israeli citizen, requested sole legal 

and physical custody of Joey and an order allowing her to move to 

Israel with Joey, with visitation for J.M. in the United States and 

Israel. (J.M. v. G.H., supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at p. 928.)

After a 12-day trial, the trial court (Judge Robert A. 

Schnider) issued a judgment on custody and visitation on May 17, 

2012 (hereafter, the judgment), when Joey was six years old. 

(J.M. v. G.H., supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at p. 931.) Under the 

judgment, which is included in the record in the present appeal, 

the parties share joint and physical custody of Joey. Joey lives 

1 We issued a published decision in J.M.’s appeal from the 

2012 judgment on custody and visitation of Joey, described below. 
3

with G.H. in Israel during the school year, and he attends school 

in Israel.

2 Joey lives with J.M. in the United States during his 

winter, spring, and summer breaks from school. The judgment 

allows J.M. to have visitation with Joey in Israel and G.H. to 

have visitation with Joey in the United States. Over G.H.’s 

objection, the judgment requires J.M. and G.H. to communicate 

with each other using a program called OurFamilyWizard (OFW), 

notwithstanding an expert declaration G.H. presented at trial 

stating G.H. has dyslexia and attention deficit hyperactivity 

disorder, which makes it difficult for her to read communications 

on OFW. The judgment requires the parties to file any request 

for modification of the judgment in a “California court having 

jurisdiction.” J.M. appealed from the judgment, and this court 

concluded, among other things, the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in its custody determination. (Id. at pp. 935-939.)

In August 2015, Joey moved to Israel with G.H. In or 

around 2017, J.M. moved to Florida with his wife M.H. and their 

son, who is a few years older than Joey.

II. J.M.’s Current Request to Modify Custody and 

Visitation

On April 11, 2019, when Joey was 13 years old, J.M.

(through counsel) filed in Los Angeles County Superior Court the 

current request to modify custody and visitation. He requested 

the trial court swap the parties’ physical custody, so that Joey 

would live with him in Florida during the school year and with 

G.H. in Israel during school breaks. He also requested sole legal 

2 At the time of the proceedings at issue here, Joey 

attended an American International School in a suburb of Tel 

Aviv. J.M. selected Joey’s school in Israel, as allowed under the 

judgment. 
4

custody as to Joey’s mental health treatment and school 

selection, with joint legal custody remaining in all other areas.

In his memorandum of points and authorities and in his 

declaration supporting his request to modify custody and 

visitation, J.M. asserted it was in Joey’s best interest to attend 

school in the United States, beginning in August 2019, for several 

reasons. First, he informed the court that G.H. refused to 

communicate with him on OFW, as the judgment required. G.H. 

had not logged onto OFW since August 3, 2016 (more than two 

and a half years), thus failing to respond to the messages J.M. 

sent her regarding Joey’s health, activities, and education. J.M. 

asserted he learned information about Joey’s life from Joey, 

although G.H. obstructed telephone contact between Joey and 

J.M. and M.H. by interrupting the calls. On the occasions when 

G.H. communicated with J.M. in writing, she used email, text, or 

the WhatsApp application. 

Second, J.M. complained that G.H. changed the date of one 

of Joey’s Bar Mitzvah parties (the children’s party, not the family 

party) to a date that J.M. and his other children could not attend. 

She also failed to send J.M. pictures from the Bar Mitzvah party 

for more than five months and refused to provide the name of the 

photographer to J.M. 

Third, J.M. informed the trial court that Joey had mental 

health treatment in 2018, and G.H. refused to engage in joint 

conversations with J.M. and Joey’s therapist in Florida and 

refused to provide contact information for Joey’s therapist in 

Israel, which J.M. located on his own. According to J.M., Joey’s 

mental health issues arose “as a result of his having had to 

assume a parental role in [G.H.]’s home,” due to G.H.’s medical 

issues. The school contacted J.M. (and G.H.) and stated staff 
5

believed Joey needed counseling and they were concerned he 

might hurt himself.

Fourth, J.M. asserted G.H. failed to properly supervise 

Joey. According to J.M., Joey stayed up late at night and was 

permitted to be out in the streets alone at night. He viewed 

inappropriate material on the Internet and used profanity. He

was tardy to school 20 times during the current school year, 

although G.H. did not work outside the home. He was not 

completing school assignments on time and was underperforming 

at school academically due to issues with procrastination, 

organization, and focus. 

Fifth, J.M. was concerned about Joey’s safety in Israel due 

to “the current state of conflicts and unrest in the region.” 

J.M. asserted his “efforts to address these issues with 

[G.H.] have failed.” He further argued: “It is abundantly clear 

that [G.H.] has no intention of co-parenting Joey and no intention 

of communicating information about their son in writing to [J.M.]

as ordered by the Court. Under these circumstances, the Court 

should exercise its discretion to modify child custody and order 

Joey’s return to the United States without delay for the start of 

the 2019-2020 school year.” J.M. pointed out that in the 29-page 

statement of decision the trial court issued before it entered the 

judgment on custody and visitation in 2012, the court expressly 

stated that the order allowing Joey to live with G.H. in Israel 

during the school year was “made on [G.H.’s] anticipated

compliance with the orders protective of [J.M.]’s relationship. As 

this anticipated behavior is a key basis of this ruling, failure to 

meet that expectation would be a change of circumstance.” J.M. 

argued he had “shown that there has been a significant change of 

circumstances (the complete failure of [G.H.] to communicate 
6

with [J.M.] via OFW for almost three full years) and that Joey’s 

best interests require modification of the moveaway order.” 

G.H. did not respond to J.M.’s request to modify custody 

and visitation. At a hearing on June 19, 2019, at which G.H. did 

not appear, the trial court ordered the modification as J.M. 

requested. On July 17, 2019, G.H., who was now represented by 

counsel, filed an ex parte application to set aside the order 

modifying custody and visitation. After hearing the matter, the 

trial court granted the motion to set aside the order and 

appointed counsel for Joey.

On October 4, 2019, J.M. filed a notice of intent to present 

live testimony pursuant to Family Code section 2173 at an 

evidentiary hearing on his request to modify custody and 

visitation. He indicated he planned to call the following 

witnesses: himself, G.H., Dr. Jason Quintal (the mental health 

therapist who treated Joey in Florida), and David Makovsky (“an 

expert on the issue[s] of safety and security in the Middle East, 

including Israel”).4

3 Family Code section 217 provides, in pertinent part: “At a 

hearing on any order to show cause or notice of motion brought 

pursuant to this code, absent a stipulation of the parties or a 

finding of good cause pursuant to subdivision (b), the court shall 

receive any live, competent testimony that is relevant and within 

the scope of the hearing and the court may ask questions of the 

parties.” (Fam. Code, § 217, subd. (a).) 

4 J.M. did not call David Makovsky as a witness at the 

evidentiary hearing.
7

III. Evidentiary Hearing on J.M.’s Request to Modify 

Custody and Visitation

The three-day evidentiary hearing was held on October 25, 

2019, November 21, 2019, and January 22, 2020 before a 

different judge (Judge Joshua D. Wayser) than the judge who 

issued the judgment on custody and visitation in 2012. 

Before the testimony commenced, the parties stated on the 

record that Joey was no longer being treated for mental health 

issues. Joey’s counsel informed the trial court: “[W]e are in a 

very good place for this child in terms of who he is as a human 

being, and I think both parents would like this trajectory of good 

welfare to continue.” Counsel also informed the court that Joey 

preferred not to testify or take a position on the custody 

determination. 

At the evidentiary hearing, J.M. presented his case-in-chief

through the testimony of G.H., Dr. Quintal and himself. 

Throughout the hearing, the trial court questioned the witnesses 

and engaged in dialogue with counsel for J.M., G.H., and Joey 

regarding the factual and legal issues in the case. 

At the conclusion of J.M.’s case, the trial court concluded 

J.M. did not meet his burden on his request to modify custody 

and visitation. Accordingly, G.H. did not present her case, but 

she testified on adverse direct examination in J.M.’s case.

A. G.H.’s testimony

G.H. testified by telephone from her home in Israel. Her 

counsel was present in court.

J.M.’s counsel asked G.H. about her medical conditions—

autoimmune disorders which required infusion treatments and 

an extensive surgery on her Achilles tendon in 2016. G.H. 
8

testified that Joey assisted her around the house while she was 

recovering from the surgery. 

Regarding Joey’s performance in school, G.H. stated Joey 

did not make the honor roll in the first semester of the previous 

school year, but he made it in the second semester. According to 

G.H., Joey’s grades on his current progress report were an A- in 

physical education, a C in art class, and four B’s. G.H. did not 

send a copy of the progress report to J.M., although she 

acknowledged the 2012 judgment required her to do so. She also 

conceded she did not regularly provide information to J.M. 

regarding Joey’s extracurricular activities or her meetings with 

school personnel. G.H. believed that Joey was tardy to class 11 

times during the 2018-2019 school year. During a parent-teacher 

conference, G.H. was told Joey needed to improve his time 

management skills and that he sometimes had difficulty focusing. 

G.H. conceded she had not logged into the OFW program 

since 2016. She was aware that the 2012 judgment required her 

to communicate with J.M. through OFW. When the trial court 

asked her why she declined to comply, she stated that she had 

“developed a fear” of OFW because J.M. “abused it” by sending 

her “thousands of emails nonstop” over several years. According 

to G.H., in late 2015, she asked J.M. if they could communicate 

using the WhatsApp application, which was easier for her to use 

than OFW. She represented that they reached an understanding 

to use WhatsApp for their communications, and in exchange she 

agreed that J.M. could visit Joey whenever he wanted when he 

was in Israel. 

G.H. testified that in 2018, before Joey’s spring break from 

school, she did not know Joey was having any “emotional 
9

difficulties.” At no time did she believe Joey was having suicidal 

thoughts. 

In or around April 2018, G.H. received a telephone call 

from Joey’s homeroom/science teacher, who explained that during 

drama class, Joey simulated hanging himself with a noose, but he 

did it in a silly way. He also wrote a story that was published in 

the school literary journal in which he stated he felt responsible 

for his parents’ separation. After receiving the call from the 

teacher, G.H. contacted J.M. about the issue. When Joey 

returned home from school that day, she spoke with Joey about 

it, asked him if he wanted to talk to a therapist, and he said he 

did. 

According to G.H., she contacted J.M. to tell him Joey 

wanted to see a psychologist. She decided to arrange for Joey to 

see a therapist in Israel. She said that unbeknownst to her, J.M. 

planned to arrange for Joey to see a therapist in Florida during 

summer 2018. G.H. asked a counselor at Joey’s school for 

recommendations for therapists in Israel. According to G.H., 

J.M. told her he would not agree to any therapist she (G.H.)

proposed. 

G.H. testified that in spring 2018, Joey saw a therapist in 

Israel named Dr. Rubenstein, and in summer 2018, he saw a 

therapist in Florida named Dr. Quintal. G.H. stated she had 

communications with both Dr. Quintal and Dr. Rubenstein that 

did not include J.M. In communications with Dr. Rubenstein, 

G.H. acknowledged she may have referred to Dr. Quintal as a 

“quack.” G.H. continued to have communications with Dr. 

Rubenstein during the pendency of these proceedings, including 

communications regarding J.M. The trial court expressed 
10

concern about such communications between G.H. and Joey’s 

therapist. 

According to G.H., when Joey returned from Florida at the 

end of summer 2018, he told her he no longer wanted to see Dr. 

Rubenstein or any therapist in Israel because he felt fine. G.H. 

testified that at that time, Dr. Rubenstein told her he did not 

believe Joey would hurt himself. G.H. told Joey he could resume 

therapy at any time. G.H. conceded that in her communications 

with Dr. Rubenstein during the pendency of these proceedings, 

Dr. Rubenstein told her Joey was having suicidal thoughts in 

spring 2018. 

G.H. testified that Joey would have to serve in the Israeli 

army if he remained in Israel. 

J.M.’s counsel examined G.H. at length about the children’s 

Bar Mitzvah party that J.M. and his family could not attend 

because of when G.H. scheduled it. J.M. was able to attend the 

Bar Mitzvah ceremonies and the family party. 

G.H.’s counsel and Joey’s counsel reserved their 

examination of G.H. until after J.M. presented his case. As 

explained above, G.H. never presented her case.

B. Dr. Quintal’s testimony

Dr. Quintal testified that he has a bachelor’s degree in 

psychology and elementary education, a master’s degree in social 

work, and a doctoral degree (Ph.D.) in clinical sexology. Prior to 

earning his Ph.D., he worked for eight years in a public school 

district as a social worker. At the time of the hearing, he was in 

private practice.

Dr. Quintal explained that a primary care physician 

referred J.M. to Dr. Quintal. During the summer of 2018, Dr. 

Quintal met with Joey on four occasions. Prior to their first 
11

meeting, Dr. Quintal spoke with Dr. Rubenstein, the therapist 

Joey had seen in Israel during spring 2018. Describing his 

conversation with Dr. Rubenstein, Dr. Quintal testified: “[W]e 

had discussed that Joey had challenges that [his] parents don’t 

get along well. That he was experiencing depression. That he 

was somewhat sad and distraught. That he wasn’t feeling very 

good. [¶] Those were really more of adjustment challenges with 

what we had talked about at that time.” 

During his treatment of Joey, Dr. Quintal learned that Joey 

had been “having depressed thoughts.” Joey had also engaged in 

“burning [with a lighter] and cutting behaviors,” as a result of 

feeling overwhelmed and out of control. Dr. Quintal observed 

some “superficial” cuts on Joey’s wrist. Joey was stressed 

because he believed he was going to be forced to make a decision 

about who he wanted to live with, G.H. or J.M. 

On August 29, 2018, Dr. Quintal spoke with G.H. about 

Joey’s treatment. He told her Joey “was overwhelmed” and had 

mentioned to him that G.H. “had had an injury” and Joey “had to 

do a lot more caretaking because she wasn’t physically able to do 

as much.” Dr. Quintal also told her Joey was “feeling down and 

depressed” about a potential custody dispute. Dr. Quintal further 

told G.H. that Joey had been cutting himself, and G.H. said she 

was unaware of it. Dr. Quintal did not mention to her the 

burning behavior. He described to G.H. the traumatic events he 

had “unplugged or cleared” with Joey, such as the 2012 custody 

dispute, the move to Israel, and “knowing that his parents don’t 

get along very well.” He also described to G.H. Joey’s thoughts 

about “being dead,” which were not necessarily about committing 

suicide. 
12

Dr. Quintal recalled that Joey “was much lighter and much 

happier” at the end of summer of 2018, after their four sessions 

together. Joey was no longer “burdened” by the move to Israel. 

Dr. Quintal stated that he met with Joey three or four 

times during summer 2019 (a couple months before the 

evidentiary hearing). Joey was concerned about the pending 

custody dispute and whether he would be asked to decide where 

he wanted to live. Dr. Quintal testified: “He [Joey] likes being in 

Israel with the friends and relations that he already has. The 

transition the first time when he left [the United States for 

Israel] was a very difficult transition for him, so that was a big 

problem.” Joey expressed concern about how G.H. would support 

herself without child support money from J.M. if Joey were in the 

United States during the school year. He also worried that G.H. 

would not be able to visit him in the United States. 

The trial court asked Dr. Quintal what was important for 

the court to know about Joey’s situation. Dr. Quintal responded:

“So my personal take on this, I think that Joey -- Joey says 

that he does not like Sarasota [Florida, where J.M. lives]. He 

would be okay living in L.A. [Los Angeles], but does not like 

Sarasota for whatever reason.

“He likes being with mom and thinks mom is a little more 

open minded. I think that he has much more freedom to do all 

sorts of things that he wants to do, and stay up late and all that 

kind of stuff which I think as a teenager is a thing that they 

might want, but may not be necessarily best for them.

“I think that at dad’s house there is more structure. I think 

that they have an older brother who is also there. I think that 

that is a good situation for him, however, we also have to go with 
13

he had difficulty adjusting the first time [when he moved to 

Israel].

“He is in a specialized program when he is in Israel 

meaning that he lives in Israel, but attending a U.S. school, so 

that is a much smaller setting. He knows everybody there, so it’s 

just way more comfortable in Israel.

“Even if I would say, in my professional opinion, the 

household that dad has is a better household, knowing that he 

has got extended family [in Israel], a maternal grandmother, an 

uncle, and that he wants to be in Israel, I think we have to weigh 

that as a piece too, so I have a thing [sic], what is the actual best 

thing for him.

“I want him to make sure, regardless, him [sic] feel that 

mom is taken care of because I know that that is a heavy thing on 

him, and I know that he realizes that he’s like a lifeline in that 

way with mom and that he helps mom a lot at home, and whether 

that’s a burden that a child his age [14 years old] should have or 

not, it is what he does and he is willing to do that.” 

On cross-examination, Dr. Quintal conceded he never 

mentioned Joey’s burning behavior to J.M. or G.H. He also 

explained he did not believe the cutting or burning behavior 

stemmed from suicidal thoughts. He described the origins of the 

behavior as follows: 

“It was out of feeling overwhelmed and out of control, and 

what cutting does is it take[s] something that’s out of control, and 

what burning does is it takes something that’s out of control and 

makes it controlled, so now I’m in control of it.

“It localizes, it’s something that is overwhelming and it 

localizes it to a particular area that I am in control of, and with 
14

both cutting and burning, it produces endorphins that are 

released as that experience happens and it causes relief.

“So my interest with Joey wasn’t about the [cutting and 

burning] stuff per se, but was about getting him so that he was 

not so stressed and, therefore, not having to use that maladaptive 

coping skill.” 

C. J.M.’s testimony

J.M. testified about Joey’s positive relationships with him, 

his wife M.H., and his adult children. He discussed the activities 

Joey engaged in during summers in Florida, including spending 

time with his cousins and attending sports camps. 

J.M. stated that Joey wanted to attend college in the 

United States. J.M. had researched high schools in Sarasota in 

anticipation of Joey starting school there if the trial court 

modified the custody order. 

J.M. testified about spring break in 2018 when Joey told 

him he wanted to see a therapist. He did not press Joey about 

why he wanted to see a therapist, but he told Joey he would make 

arrangements as soon as possible. He immediately sent G.H. a 

message about his conversation with Joey through OFW. Then, 

he contacted a pediatrician and was referred to Dr. Quintal. He 

informed G.H. that he had found a therapist for Joey. 

J.M. stated that he and G.H. never reached an agreement 

not to use OFW, and he continued to use it to communicate with 

her, although she told him she did not want to use it. Since she

stopped logging into OFW in early 2016, he had told her to check 

it for messages from him. 

According to J.M., G.H. had not traveled to the United 

States to visit Joey when he was in J.M.’s custody, as permitted 

under the 2012 judgment. J.M. travelled to Israel to pick up Joey 
15

each time Joey visited him in the United States, and J.M. 

travelled back to Israel with Joey each time Joey returned to 

G.H. 

When J.M.’s counsel asked him to state his concerns about 

Joey’s safety, J.M. responded: “I have concerns in different areas. 

One concern I have is that he is out late at night periodically, 

often times on his own, whether he’s walking the dog or he’s 

walking home from a friend or coming home from a friend. One 

night he called me at -- I think it was about 1:30 or 2:00 in the 

morning to tell me that he’d like me to stay on the phone with 

him because he was afraid as he was walking home. It was late 

and he heard noises. And I told him of course I’ll stay on the 

phone with him. I can’t understand why he’d be out at that hour. 

But I am concerned about his safety in that respect. [¶] I’m also 

concerned about the -- you know, just the general safety factors of 

living in Israel on a regular basis. I mean I understand there are 

certain risks of visiting there, but it’s nowhere near the risk of 

living there and being there most of the time.” J.M. also testified 

about the military service requirement for Joey in Israel. 

When J.M.’s counsel asked him why he wanted to change 

the custody arrangement, J.M. responded:

“Because I believe that Joey needs guidance, Joey needs 

counseling, Joey needs help in a lot of areas. Joey’s grades would 

be better if he were with me, he would be more focused on getting 

his work done. He would be in an environment where there are 

controls, where there are limits.

“He wouldn’t be free to roam the streets at night, he 

wouldn’t be free to just do what he wants to do as is what appears 

to me to be the case now from what I know from Joey and from 

what I’ve observed.
16

“I mean -- I know that he would get prompt medical 

attention when he needed it. Dr. Quintal who is the only 

therapist that Joey has had that he [has] related to and has 

helped him is right there in Sarasota as well and can be of 

comfort to him if he ever needed or requested.”

The trial court asked J.M.: “If [Joey] is in fact stabilized I 

guess the question is wouldn’t the move then put him at a new 

risk? And that’s what I’m worried about.” Father responded: 

“No, on the contrary. I believe that one of the reasons why I 

would respectfully disagree about his being stable is the fact that 

over the past two years he’s come to me and asked me to see a 

psychologist or psychiatrist or a therapist in order to help him 

overcome the problems that he developed while he wasn’t with 

me. So if you ask me is he stable over there. I don’t think so.” 

J.M. added: “Why would he need a therapist if he’s stable over 

there? So where does he come to get therapy? He comes to 

Sarasota.” 

J.M. concluded his testimony by asserting Joey “can’t 

possibly say that he wants to move to the United States because 

[G.H.] has put so much psychological pressure on him he needed 

to see a counselor twice.” J.M. stated he wanted to remove Joey 

from that cycle.

D. Statements by Joey’s counsel

Joey’s counsel stated Joey did not want to move back to the 

United States because he did not like Sarasota and he was 

concerned about G.H.’s welfare. Joey told his counsel he was 

“way more comfortable in Israel.” Counsel believed Joey 

“remain[ed] at risk” in terms of his mental health. 
17

E. The court’s comments on the issues

The trial court repeatedly stated throughout the hearing 

that it believed Father showed a change of circumstance—G.H.’s 

violation of the 2012 judgment requiring her to communicate 

with Father through OFW, and G.H.’s poor co-parenting. But the 

court concluded J.M. did not meet his burden of showing that a

change of circumstance indicated a different custody 

arrangement would be in Joey’s best interest, based on the 

evidence presented in J.M.’s case.5

IV. Trial Court’s Order Denying J.M.’s Request to Modify 

Custody and Visitation and J.M.’s Request for 

Statement of Decision

On January 23, 2020, the trial court issued an order stating 

that, after conducting a three-day evidentiary hearing and 

considering the evidence and arguments presented, the court 

concluded J.M. “has not established that a change in custody is in 

the minor’s best interests at this time for the reasons set forth on 

the record on January 22, 2020 [the final day of the evidentiary 

hearing]. As a result, Petitioner/Father’s request for order is 

denied.” The court’s order also states: “This Court does reiterate 

the prior Court Order that Respondent/Mother is to check and 

use Our Family Wizard as the means of communication with 

Petitioner/Father pursuant to the terms and conditions of the 

prior Court Order. Respondent/Mother cannot simply choose 

which Court orders to comply with and which to ignore. Nor did 

5 We need not address whether J.M. demonstrated a 

significant change of circumstance within the meaning of the 

applicable law because we agree with the trial court’s conclusion 

that J.M. did not demonstrate a different custody arrangement 

would be in Joey’s best interest, as explained below.
18

her testimony on adverse direct establish a significant reason to 

justify not complying with the prior Court Order.” 

On January 31, 2020, J.M. requested a statement of 

decision, listing eight “principal controverted issues” he wanted 

the trial court to address. On February 7, 2020, the trial court 

denied J.M.’s request, explaining in its order that under existing 

law, a statement of decision is not required under the 

circumstances of this case—i.e., a ruling on a motion (request for 

order) after an evidentiary hearing. 

J.M. timely appealed the orders on his request to modify 

custody and visitation. G.H. has not appeared in this appeal.

DISCUSSION

I. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Concluding the 

Evidentiary Hearing

J.M. contends the trial court deprived him of due process 

and a full and fair hearing when it terminated the evidentiary 

hearing during his case-in-chief, and the error is reversible per 

se. He asserts: “On January 22, 2020, while [he] was testifying, 

the Court directed him to step down from the witness stand and 

suddenly declared an end to the evidentiary hearing.” We

disagree with J.M.’s characterization of the record.

On the third and final day of the evidentiary hearing, while 

J.M. was testifying during his case-in-chief, the trial court and 

counsel for J.M. and G.H. engaged in a discussion on the record 

regarding the legal and factual issues in the case. J.M. 

interjected and stated, “I just want to finish my testimony, if I 

may.” Addressing the court, J.M. added, “Because you asked me 

a question and I didn’t get to finish it.” The court allowed J.M. to 

complete his answer, and then the court commented on J.M.’s 

testimony. J.M. interjected again and stated, “I’m sorry. Just 
19

one more comment to make because then I’m done because I don’t 

know what else I can say.” J.M. further testified, engaging in a 

dialogue with the trial court regarding the issues in the case. 

During further discussion between the trial court and 

counsel for J.M., G.H., and Joey regarding the legal and factual 

issues in the case, the court stated to J.M.: “Hold on one second. 

[¶] Mr. M[.], why don’t you step down. You can testify if you 

need to from there,” presumably indicating counsel table. The 

discussion between the trial court and counsel continued. 

After hearing arguments from J.M.’s and G.H.’s counsel, 

the trial court stated: “I need to look at the evidence one more 

time. The tentative is to deny for the reasons that I’ve stated on 

the record. But I’ll issue a new ruling tomorrow. [¶] Does 

anyone have anything else they wish to say?” Counsel for J.M. 

and Joey made additional arguments, and the hearing concluded. 

Based on the foregoing, we reject J.M.’s contention the trial 

court deprived him of due process and a full and fair hearing 

when it concluded the evidentiary hearing. When the court asked 

J.M. to step down from the witness stand—after J.M. had 

indicated he had nothing further to say—the court explained that

J.M. could resume his testimony if need be. Neither J.M. nor his 

counsel ever informed the court they had additional evidence to 

present, including further testimony from J.M. Moreover, J.M. 

does not state on appeal what further evidence he could have 

presented. 

In the one case cited by J.M. on this issue, In re Marriage of 

Carlsson (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 281, the Court of Appeal 

concluded the error was reversible per se where the trial court 

abruptly terminated the trial in a marital dissolution proceeding, 

ignoring the husband’s statements that he not yet finished 
20

presenting the evidence in his case. (Id. at pp. 288-292.) No such 

error occurred here, as the record before us demonstrates.

At oral argument, J.M.’s counsel raised another issue 

related to the manner in which the trial court conducted the 

evidentiary hearing, an issue J.M. did not raise in his appellate 

brief: that the trial court requested that J.M. and G.H. set forth 

their respective “positions in a narrative fashion” during their 

testimony. To the extent J.M. now takes issue with the trial 

court’s request, he has forfeited the issue. When the trial court 

made the request, J.M.’s counsel responded: “Thank you, your 

honor. I very much appreciate your candor and what you’re 

looking for and I have no problem with Mr. M[.] so testifying [in a 

narrative fashion] toward the end of his testimony here today.” 

Counsel continued to examine J.M. and, at the conclusion of his 

testimony, J.M. set forth his position in a narrative fashion, as 

quoted above in the background section of this opinion. Even if 

J.M. had preserved the issue for review by objecting below, the 

manner in which the trial court asked the parties to testify could 

not have prejudiced J.M. because (1) J.M.’s counsel had a full and 

fair opportunity to examine J.M. in the manner she chose, and (2) 

G.H. did not testify after the trial court asked the parties to set 

forth their positions in a narrative fashion because she did not 

present her case, as explained above. (See Silva v. Dias (1941) 46 

Cal.App.2d 662, 664 [a trial court’s decision to allow a witness to 

testify in narrative form is “primarily addressed to the sound 

discretion of the trial court, and unless prejudice is shown, it can 

scarcely be said that such action amounted to an abuse of 

discretion”].)
21

II. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Denying J.M.’s 

Request for a Statement of Decision

J.M. contends the trial court’s denial of his request for a 

statement of decision “should be reversed” because it “deprived 

him of the ability to determine and understand the legal and 

factual bases of the Court’s decision.”

6 For the reasons explained 

below, we disagree with this contention.

J.M. cites Code of Civil Procedure section 632, which 

provides in pertinent part: “In superior courts, upon the trial of a 

question of fact by the court, written findings of fact and 

conclusions of law shall not be required. The court shall issue a 

statement of decision explaining the factual and legal basis for its 

decision as to each of the principal controverted issues at trial 

upon the request of any party appearing at the trial.” He also 

cites Family Code section 3022.3, which applies Code of Civil 

Procedure section 632’s requirements for issuance of a statement 

of decision to “the trial of a question of fact in a proceeding to 

determine the custody of a minor child.” (Fam. Code, § 3022.3.)

J.M. acknowledges, however, that courts have declined to 

require a statement of decision when requested by a party after a 

hearing on a motion or order to show cause (OSC). “This is true 

even if the motion involves an evidentiary hearing and the order 

[granting or denying the motion or OSC] is appealable.” (In re 

Marriage of Askmo (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 1032, 1040 [“Since the 

proceeding on respondent’s order to show cause [regarding 

spousal support and attorney fees in a marital dissolution 

6 In his appellate brief, J.M. does not list the eight principal 

controverted issues he asked the trial court to address in his 

request for a statement of decision. He discusses the absence of a 

statement of decision in more general terms.
22

proceeding] was not a trial and was not followed by a judgment, 

under the general rule, the trial court was not required to issue a 

statement of decision”].)7

J.M. also acknowledges there is no rule requiring a trial 

court to issue a statement of decision on a postjudgment request 

for an order modifying child custody or visitation. (See Anne H. 

v. Michael B. (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 488, 501, fn. 7 [“A statement 

of decision, however, is ordinarily available only after trial, not in 

connection with a ruling on a motion or special proceeding 

[citation], and Father cites no legal authority suggesting a 

statement of decision was available in connection with a motion 

to modify an existing custody order”].) J.M. asks this court to 

create such a rule, arguing: “When Family Code Section 217 

applies and evidentiary hearings are held in post-Judgment 

family law child custody proceedings . . . , statements of decision 

should be issued when properly requested.” (Italics omitted.) He 

asserts there are “significant public policy reasons” that favor 

such a rule, including that “child custody proceedings have 

priority over other issues in family law cases” and the 

“importance of child custody issues [has] been codified by our 

Legislature.” 

In support of his request for a new rule, J.M. cites a 

comment in a family law practice guide, stating, “it would appear 

the ‘general rule’ [that does not require a statement of decision] is 

not really appropriate” in “many family law motion/OSC 

hearings” where “the court’s decision turns on factual findings.” 

(Hogoboom & King, Cal. Practice Guide: Family Law (The Rutter 

7 Before entering the 2012 judgment on custody and 

visitation in this matter, the trial court issued a 29-page 

statement of decision. 
23

Group 2015) ¶ 15:129, p. 15-29, italics omitted.) The comment 

continues, “it is quite arguable that the tide should now turn in 

favor of applying [Code of Civil Procedure section] 632 in 

connection with family law motion and OSC hearings because, 

with few exceptions, the family court ‘shall receive’ relevant live 

testimony offered by the parties at any Family Code OSC or 

motion hearing (Fam. [Code,] § 217); i.e., when [Family Code] § 

217 applies, Family Code motion/OSC hearings are effectively 

conducted as ‘mini-trials.’ ” (Ibid., italics omitted.) In its written 

order denying J.M.’s request for a statement of decision, the trial 

court cited this comment—as well as existing law holding a 

statement of decision is not required after an evidentiary hearing 

on a motion or OSC—and explained: “While this Court 

understands the point made in the practice guide, and the 

request by [J.M.], this Court follows the existing law, which does 

not require a statement of decision under the circumstances.” 

We have no cause to reverse the trial court’s order and 

create a new rule.

III. Family Code Section 3048 Is Inapplicable Because 

the Trial Court Did Not Issue a Custody or Visitation 

Order

J.M. contends the trial court erred in failing to comply with 

Family Code section 3048, subdivision (a), which sets forth the 

information a trial court must include in “every custody or 

visitation order”: “(1) The basis for the court’s exercise of 

jurisdiction. [¶] (2) The manner in which notice and opportunity 

to be heard were given. [¶] (3) A clear description of the custody 

and visitation rights of each party. [¶] (4) A provision stating 

that a violation of the order may subject the party in violation to 

civil or criminal penalties, or both. [¶] (5) Identification of the 
24

country of habitual residence of the child or children.” He argues 

we should reverse the order and remand the matter for the trial 

court to issue an order containing the information specified in 

Family Code section 3048, subdivision (a).

J.M. cites no authority indicating Family Code section 3048 

is applicable in the present circumstances. Here, the trial court 

denied J.M.’s request to modify the custody and visitation 

arrangement set forth in the 2012 judgment, leaving the existing 

arrangement in place. The court did not issue a custody or 

visitation order. Accordingly, Family Code section 3048 is 

inapplicable to the court’s order denying J.M.’s request to modify 

custody and visitation, under the plain language of the statute 

stating it applies to a custody or visitation order, not a trial 

court’s order declining to issue a new custody or visitation order.

IV. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in 

Denying J.M.’s Request to Modify Custody and 

Visitation

J.M. contends the trial court abused its discretion in 

denying his request to modify custody and visitation. He argues: 

“No reasonable judge would have similarly conducted, concluded, 

and decided the post-Judgment trial in the manner [the trial 

court] did in this case,” and the order “should be reversed.” The

trial court did not abuse its discretion here, as explained below.

A. General legal principles applicable to 

modifications of custody and visitation

In “determining the best interests of children when making 

any orders regarding the physical or legal custody or visitation of 

children,” the “court’s primary concern” is “the health, safety, and 

welfare of children.” (Fam. Code, § 3020, subd. (a).) “Once the 

trial court has entered a final or permanent custody order 
25

reflecting that a particular custodial arrangement is in the best 

interest of the child, ‘the paramount need for continuity and 

stability in custody arrangements—and the harm that may result 

from disruption of established patterns of care and emotional 

bonds with the primary caretaker—weigh heavily in favor of 

maintaining’ that custody arrangement. [Citation.] In 

recognition of this policy concern, [our Supreme Court has] 

articulated a variation on the best interest standard, known as 

the changed circumstance rule, that the trial court must apply 

when a parent seeks modification of a final judicial custody 

determination. [Citations.] Under the changed circumstance 

rule, custody modification is appropriate only if the parent 

seeking modification demonstrates ‘a significant change of 

circumstances’ indicating that a different custody arrangement 

would be in the child’s best interest. [Citation.] Not only does 

this serve to protect the weighty interest in stable custody 

arrangements, but it also fosters judicial economy.” (In re 

Marriage of Brown & Yana (2006) 37 Cal.4th 947, 956.)

“ ‘The standard of appellate review of custody and 

visitation orders is the deferential abuse of discretion test.’ 

[Citation.] Under this test, we must uphold the trial court ‘ruling 

if it is correct on any basis, regardless of whether such basis was 

actually invoked.’ ” (Montenegro v. Diaz (2001) 26 Cal.4th 249, 

255; In re Marriage of Burgess (1996) 13 Cal.4th 25, 32.) “ ‘ “The 

reviewing court should interfere only ‘ “if [it] find[s] that under 

all the evidence, viewed most favorably in support of the trial 

court’s action, no judge could reasonably have made the order 

that he did.” ’ ” ’ ” (Rich v. Thatcher (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1176, 

1182.)
26

B. Analysis

We have no cause to disturb the trial court’s denial of J.M.’s 

request to modify custody and visitation. The trial court did not 

abuse its discretion in concluding that J.M. failed to prove a 

different custody arrangement would be in Joey’s best interest.8 

Neither Dr. Quintal (J.M.’s chosen Florida-based therapist) nor 

Joey’s counsel advocated to move Joey back to the United States. 

They both noted that the 2015 international move was very 

destabilizing and difficult for Joey; he had adjusted to his life in 

Israel and felt comfortable at his school; and he did not want to 

live in Florida. Joey was not currently receiving mental health 

treatment and the evidence demonstrated he was stable. He 

spoke up before when he wanted to go to therapy, and there was 

no reason to believe he would not do so again if he felt 

overwhelmed or depressed. There is nothing unreasonable about 

the trial court’s order.

In arguing the trial court abused its discretion in denying 

his request to modify custody and visitation, J.M. asserts the trial 

court “did not consider ‘all evidence’ available to it bearing on the 

issue of the child’s best interests” because G.H. did not testify on 

direct examination, G.H. only conducted a brief crossexamination of Dr. Quintal, and Joey did not testify. J.M. bore 

the burden of proving he was entitled to a modification of custody 

and visitation. As discussed above, he had a full and fair 

opportunity to present his case. He never stated there was 

additional evidence he wanted to present. What evidence G.H. 

8 Because we reach this conclusion, we need not review the 

trial court’s finding that J.M. established a change of 

circumstance.
27

might have presented in her case is irrelevant to whether he 

proved his case.

J.M. takes issue with comments the trial court made that it 

did not want to “punish” Joey or make him “pay” for Mother’s 

poor co-parenting and her failure to use OFW, by moving him to 

Florida. When J.M. pointed out to the trial court that its 

comments offended him, the court acknowledged they were the 

wrong choice of words. The court explained it should not move 

Joey to a place he said he did not want to be (Florida) based on 

G.H.’s violations of the terms of the 2012 judgment, if J.M. had 

not demonstrated the move would be in Joey’s best interest.

J.M. argues the trial court failed to consider the factors set 

forth in In re Marriage of LaMusga (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1072 

(LaMusga). There, our Supreme Court set forth “the factors that 

the court ordinarily should consider when deciding whether to 

modify a custody order in light of the custodial parent’s proposal 

to change the residence of the child” in a so-called move-away 

case. (Id. at p. 1101.) Here, neither parent was relocating (as 

G.H. was when the trial court issued the judgment in 2012), so 

LaMusga is inapplicable.

For the reasons set forth above, the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion in concluding J.M. failed to prove a different 

custody arrangement would be in Joey’s best interest. Although 

J.M. presented evidence indicating there would be more rules and 

structure in his home, it was not unreasonable for the trial court 

to favor the stability of the current arrangement, in light of Joey’s 

difficulty adjusting to the international move, his preference to 

remain in Israel at his current school, and the deleterious effect 

on his mental health when he becomes overwhelmed or stressed.
28

DISPOSITION

The orders are affirmed. J.M. is to bear his own costs on 

appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

CHANEY, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

FEDERMAN, J.*

* Judge of the San Luis Obispo County Superior Court, 

assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of 

the California Constitution.