alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# EUR-Lex - 31998D0473 - EN

Avis juridique important

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# 31998D0473

**98/473/EC: Commission Decision of 15 July 1998 amending Decision 87/257/EEC on the list of establishments in the United States of America approved for the purpose of importing fresh meat into the Community (notified under document number C(1998) 1995) (Text with EEA relevance) **

*
Official Journal L 209 , 25/07/1998 P. 0054 - 0058 *

COMMISSION DECISION of 15 July 1998 amending Decision 87/257/EEC on the list of establishments in the United States of America approved for the purpose of importing fresh meat into the Community (notified under document number C(1998) 1995) (Text with EEA relevance) (98/473/EC)

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,

Having regard to Council Directive 72/462/EEC of 12 December 1972 on health and veterinary inspection problems on importation of bovine, ovine and caprine animals and swine, fresh meat or meat products from third countries (1), as last amended by Directive 97/79/EC (2), and in particular Articles 4(1) and 18(1) thereof,

Whereas a list of establishments in the United States of America, approved for the purpose of importing fresh meat into the Community, was drawn up initially by Commission Decision 87/257/EEC (3) as last amended by Decision 98/113/EC (4); whereas that list may be amended at any time in the light of the results of Community inspections carried out in the United States of America;

Whereas negotiations are under way to conclude an agreement with the United States on health measures to protect public health and animal health in the context of trade in livestock and products of animal origin;

Whereas this situation, progress already achieved, and the need to avoid distortion of trade justify the postponement of the deadline established for the landing of certain fresh meat, from 31 July 1998 to 31 January 1999; whereas the fixing of this date is without prejudice either to the date of conclusion or to the content of the abovementioned agreement;

Whereas the list of establishments must be amended accordingly;

Whereas the measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Veterinary Committee,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The Annex to Decision 87/257/EEC is hereby replaced by the Annex hereto.

Article 2

This Decision is addressed to the Member States.

Done at Brussels, 15 July 1998.

For the Commission

Franz FISCHLER

Member of the Commission

(1) OJ L 302, 31. 12. 1972, p. 28.

(2) OJ L 24, 30. 1. 1998, p. 31.

(3) OJ L 121, 9. 5. 1987, p. 46.

(4) OJ L 31, 6. 2. 1998, p. 18.

ANNEX

>TABLE>
§ 1905.13 Modification, revocation, and renewal of rules or orders. ( a ) *Modification or revocation.* ( 1 ) An affected employer or an affected employee may apply in writing to the Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and Health for a modification or revocation of a rule or order issued under section 6(b) (6) (A), 6(d), or 16 of the Act. The application shall contain: ( i ) The name and address of the applicant;
( ii ) A description of the relief which is sought;
( iii ) A statement setting forth with particularity the grounds for relief;
( iv ) If the applicant is an employer, a certification that the applicant has informed his affected employees of the application by: ( a ) Giving a copy thereof to their authorized representative;
( b ) Posting at the place or places where notices to employees are normally posted, a statement giving a summary of the application and specifying where a copy of the full application may be examined (or, in lieu of the summary, posting the application itself); and
( c ) Other appropriate means.
( v ) If the applicant is an affected employee, a certification that a copy of the application has been furnished to the employer; and
( vi ) Any request for a hearing, as provided in this part.
( 2 ) The Assistant Secretary may on his own motion proceed to modify or revoke a rule or order issued under section 6(b) (6) (A), 6(d), or 16 of the Act. In such event, the Assistant Secretary shall cause to be published in the Federal Register a notice of his intention, affording interested persons an opportunity to submit written data, views, or arguments regarding the proposal and informing the affected employer and employees of their right to request a hearing, and shall take such other action as may be appropriate to give actual notice to affected employees. Any request for a hearing shall include a short and plain statement of: ( i ) How the proposed modification or revocation would affect the requesting party; and
( ii ) What the requesting party would seek to show on the subjects or issues involved.
( b ) *Renewal.* Any final rule or order issued under section 6(b) (6) (A) or 16 of the Act may be renewed or extended as permitted by the applicable section and in the manner prescribed for its issuance.
( c ) *Multi-state variances.* Where a Federal variance has been granted with multi-state applicability, including applicability in a State operating under a State plan approved under section 18 of the Act, from a standard, or portion thereof, identical to a State standard, or portion thereof, without filing the information required in § 1905.10(b)(11) or § 1905.11(b)(8) of this chapter, such variance shall likewise be deemed an authoritative interpretation of the employer(s)' compliance obligations with regard to the State standard, or portion thereof, upon filing the information required under § 1905.10(b)(11) or § 1905.11(b)(8) of this chapter, provided no objections of substance are found to be interposed by the State authority under § 1905.14 of this chapter.
[36 FR 12290, June 30, 1971, as amended at 40 FR 25449, June 16, 1975]
#### Trice *v.*The State.

Violating Prohibition Law.

(Decided August 1, 1916.

72 South. 601.)

Appeal and Error; New Trial; Ground. — Section 2846, Code 1907, as amended by Acts 1911, p. 198, did not authorize appeals in criminal cases from judgment overruling motions for new trial, and where the appeal was perfected before the enactment' of Acts 1915, p. 722, the court will not review an appeal where the record contained the bill of exceptions only as to denial of a new trial, and the record showed no error.

Appeal from Autauga Circuit Court.

Heard before Hon. W. W. Pearson.

Howard Trice was convicted of violating the prohibition law and he appeals.

Affirmed.

Guy Rice, for appellant.

W. L. Martin, Attorney General, and Harwell G. Davis, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.

EVANS, J.

Appellant was convicted of a violation of the prohibition statute. He was tried before a jury on March 29, 1915, and on that day, as shown by the judgment entry, gave notice of appeal. On May 17, 1915, he presented to the trial judge, who then signed, what purports to be a bill of exceptions containing a sole and only exception to the action of the trial court in overruling appellant’s motion for a new trial. At the time of the trial, section 2846, Code 1907, as amended by Acts 1911, p. 198, did not authorize an appeal in criminal cases from a judgment overruling a motion for a new *trial.*— Bean *v. State,*10 Ala. App. 660, 64 South. 471. Subsequently, by an act approved September 22, 1915, section 2846 was so amended as to allow an appeal in criminal cases from a judgment denying such a motion.

There is no error in the record, and the judgment is accordingly affirmed.

Affirmed.
§ 1611.4 Times, places, and requirements for identification of individuals making requests. ( a ) If a person submitting a request for access under § 1611.3 has asked that the Commission authorize a personal inspection of records pertaining to that person, and the appropriate Commission official has granted that request the requester shall present himself or herself at the time and place specified in the Commission's response or arrange another, mutually convenient time with the appropriate Commission official.
( b ) Prior to inspection of the records, the requester shall present sufficient personal identification (e.g., driver's license, employee identification card, social security card, credit cards). If the requester is unable to provide such identification, the requester shall complete and sign in the presence of a Commission official a signed statement asserting his or her identity and stipulating that he or she understands that knowingly or willfully seeking or obtaining access to records about another individual under false pretenses is a misdemeanor punishable by fine up to $5,000.
( c ) Any person who has requested access under § 1611.3 to records through personal inspection, and who wishes to be accompanied by another person or persons during this inspection, shall submit a written statement authorizing disclosure of the record in such person's or person's presence.
( d ) If an individual submitting a request by mail under § 1611.3 wishes to have copies furnished by mail, he or she must include with the request a signed and notarized statement asserting his or her identity and stipulating that he or she understands that knowlingly or willfully seeking or obtaining access to records about another individual under false pretenses is a misdemeanor punishable by fine up to $5,000.
( e ) A request filed by the parent of any minor or the legal guardian of any incompetent person shall: state the relationship of the requester to the individual to whom the record pertains; present sufficient identification; and, if not evident from information already available to the Commission, present appropriate proof of the relationship or guardianship.
( f ) A person making a request pursuant to a power of attorney must possess a specific power of attorney to make that request.
( g ) No verification of identity will be required where the records sought are publicly available under the Freedom of Information Act.
§ 1620.27 Relationship to the Equal Pay Act of title VII of the Civil Rights Act. ( a ) In situations where the jurisdictional prerequisites of both the EPA and title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 200e *et seq.*, are satisfied, any violation of the Equal Pay Act is also a violation of title VII. However, title VII covers types of wage discrimination not actionable under the EPA. Therefore, an act or practice of an employer or labor organization that is not a violation of the EPA may nevertheless be a violation of title VII.
( b ) Recovery for the same period of time may be had under both the EPA and title VII so long as the same individual does not receive duplicative relief for the same wrong. Relief is computed to give each individual the highest benefit which entitlement under either statute would provide. (e.g., liquidated damages may be available under the EPA but not under title VII.) Relief for the same individual may be computed under one statute for one or more periods of the violation and under the other statute for other periods of the violation.
( c ) The right to equal pay under the Equal Pay Act has no relationship to whether the employee is in the lower paying job as a result of discrimination in violation of title VII. Under the EPA a prima facie violation is established upon a showing that an employer pays different wages to employees of opposite sexes for equal work on jobs requiring equal skill, effort and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions. Thus, the availability of a remedy under title VII which would entitle the lower paid employee to be hired into, or to transfer to, the higher paid job does not defeat the right of each person employed on the lower paid job to the same wages as are paid to a member of the opposite sex who receives higher pay for equal work.
#### NATIONAL SURETY CO v GRIFFIN

Ohio Appeals, 8th Dist, Cuyahoga Co

Decided June 24, 1929

Messrs. Tolies, Hogsett & Ginn and Geo. D. Bonebrake, Esq., Cleveland, for Surety Co.

Messrs. Howell, Roberts & Duncan, Cleveland, for Griffin.

*603KUNKLE. PJ.

The principal controversy in this case relates to the charge of the court in reference to the nature of the misrepresentation which must be made in order to create a liability under the bond.

In brief, the court charged the jury as follows:

> “And I say to you as a matter of law that if you find that such a misrepresentation was made upon the part of The George W. Stone Company or its agents at that time to this plaintiff, and that those statements were false and untrue, whether they were made wilfully or whether they were made carelessly or recklessly, if she relied upon them and parted with her property and they were misrepresentations, then this plaintiff should recover from any and all defendants as principals who took part in any of those misrepresentations, whether those principals knew them to be true or not.”

It is contended by counsel for plaintiff in error that the misrepresentations, in order to be actionable, must have been fraudulently made, that is, that they were known to be false.

We have considered the section of the statute carefully and have also examined the authorities cited by counsel in their respective briefs upon this phase of the case. Without discussing the authorities in detail, we are of opinion that the charge of the court in this respect contained a correct interpretation of the section of the statute involved.

Objection is also made to the form of the verdict which was returned by the jury.

The copy of the docket and journal entries as filed contains the following:

> “Parties by their attorneys come and a jury is duly impanelled and sworn, who after due trial do find for the plaintiff in the sum of $3425.83 against The George W. Stone Gompany, Virginia Broden and Louis A. Wald, and the jury further finds for the plaintiff against the National Surety Company for $3425.83 as surety on the bond of The George W. Stone Company, and the jury further finds for the plaintiff against the National Surety Company for the sum of $2500 as surety on the bonds of Virginia Broden and Louis A. Wald respectively.”

It is suggested by counsel for plaintiff in error that a double recovery might be had under the verdict so returned. The verdict as returned by the jury is in somewhat unusual form, but we do not see how the plaintiff in error can be prejudiced thereby.

There can be but one recovery and counsel for defendant in error in open court so- concede.

The judgment entry of the lower court may, if so desired, be modified to show that the full amount of recovery upon the judgment shall be limited to $3425.83 plus interest.

We have considered all of the .errors urged by counsel for plaintiff in error and finding no error in the record which we consider prejudicial to plaintiff in error, the judgment of the lower court will be .affirmed.

Allread and Hornbeck, JJ, concur.
<TABLE>
<CAPTION>

   Schedule of Year-To-Date Principal and Interest Distributions
                           to
                  Certificateholders

                                                                    Ending
Class            Interest             Principal    Losses           Balance
<S>               <C>                  <C>            <C>           <C>
A1              19160832.29      80590560.68                0       368290439.32
A2               1932356.95       7187200.73                0        37812799.29
A3               2506815.03                0                0           55707000
A4               2347841.44                0                0           52174255
A5                  3150000                0                0           70000000
APO                       0          9837.18                0          548807.73
AR                   163.58              100                0                  0
B1                471444.69         65466.87                0         10439533.1
B2                408570.45         56735.91                0          9047264.1
B3                141455.84         19643.18                0         3132356.82
B4                 94288.93         13093.37                0         2087906.62
B5                 62874.26          8730.99                0            1392269
B6                 78576.78          4850.53          6060.98          1739981.5


</TABLE>
§ 1903.18 Failure to correct a violation for which a citation has been issued. ( a ) If an inspection discloses that an employer has failed to correct an alleged violation for which a citation has been issued within the period permitted for its correction, the Area Director shall, if appropriate, consult with the Regional Solicitor, and he shall notify the employer by certified mail or by personal service by the Compliance Safety and Health Officer of such failure and of the additional penalty proposed under § 1903.15(d)(5) by reason of such failure. The period for the correction of a violation for which a citation has been issued shall not begin to run until the entry of a final order of the Review Commission in the case of any review proceedings initiated by the employer in good faith and not solely for delay or avoidance of penalties.
( b ) Any employer receiving a notification of failure to correct a violation and of proposed additional penalty may, under section 10(b) of the Act, notify the Area Director in writing that he intends to contest such notification or proposed additional penalty before the Review Commission. Such notice of intention to contest shall be postmarked within 15 working days of the receipt by the employer of the notification of failure to correct a violation and of proposed additional penalty. The Area Director shall immediately transmit such notice to the Review Commission in accordance with the rules of procedure prescribed by the Commission.
( c ) Each notification of failure to correct a violation and of proposed additional penalty shall state that it shall be deemed to be the final order of the Review Commission and not subject to review by any court or agency unless, within 15 working days from the date of receipt of such notification, the employer notifies the Area Director in writing that he intends to contest the notification or the proposed additional penalty before the Review Commission.
[36 FR 17850, Sept. 4, 1971, as amended at 81 FR 43453, July 1, 2016]
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                         DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                              JUN-30-1999
<CASH>                                         11,359
<SECURITIES>                                        0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  26,749
<ALLOWANCES>                                    8,487
<INVENTORY>                                         0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               41,068
<PP&E>                                        129,542
<DEPRECIATION>                                      0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                255,997
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          48,668
<BONDS>                                       243,915
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                               0
<PREFERRED>                                         0
<COMMON>                                          105
<OTHER-SE>                                   (14,432)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                  255,997
<SALES>                                             0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               93,520
<CGS>                                               0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  98,202
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                    0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                    0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             11,377
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (15,888)
<INCOME-TAX>                                        0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (15,888)
<DISCONTINUED>                                      0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                     0
<CHANGES>                                           0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (15,888)
<EPS-BASIC>                                    (1.52)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  (1.52)


</TABLE>
M14004 – Chemical 4

CAS Name



## CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION REMOVED
#### In the Matter of Johnny Aaron B. and Others, Infants. Sylvia Williams B. et al., Appellants; Abbott House et al., Respondents.

[698 NYS2d 462]

—Orders, Family Court, Bronx County (Cira Martinez, J.), entered on or about December 2, 1997, unanimously affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

Application by appellants’ assigned counsel to withdraw is granted *(see, Matter of Louise Wise Servs.,*131 AD2d 306). We have reviewed this record and agree with appellants’ assigned counsel that there are no non-frivolous points which could be raised on this appeal. Concur — Williams, J. P., Rubin, Saxe and Friedman, JJ.
#### UNIFAC CORPORATION v FIRESTONE, etc.

Case No. AP87-22 (County Court Case No. SO86-10,926)

Ninth Judicial Circuit, Orange County

September 17, 1987

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

Benjamin T. Shuman for appellant.

David Kerben for appellee.

OPINION OF THE COURT

LAWRENCE R. KIRKWOOD, Circuit Judge.

Appellant appeals from a Final Judgment requiring a return of a cash deposit paid on the contract. The issue is whether Appellee had a right to cancel a contract that was to be completed “as soon as possible” if an *unreasonable*time had elapsed.

The facts show that Appellee entered into a written contract requir*136ing performance “as soon as possible” on February 6, 1986, for construction of an aluminum pan roof shed. Several times during the next few weeks, Appellee attempted to get Appellant to begin work with no success, but with a number of excuses given.

Finally on the morning of February 26, 1986, Appellee cancelled the contract over the telephone. Appellant argues that later, on that very day, work would have begun, that delay was caused by failure of City to issue building permit and materials were on order but not received promptly. The Appellant contends that the Appellee’s cancellation and refusal to allow performance of the contract, entitled Appellant to a judgment for liquidated damages and attorneys fees as provided in the contract.

The parties agree that “as soon as possible” means “within a reasonable time” under current construction industry standards. At a non-jury trial, the trial judge found that Appellant did not perform the contract in a timely fashion, i.e., within a reasonable time.

The issue as to what is “a reasonable time” is an *issue of fact*to be determined by the trier of fact and will not be overturned on appeal. It is clear that from all of the facts and circumstances of this case, the trial judge found that the Appellant did not perform the contract within a reasonable time and that Appellee had sufficient justification for rescinding the contract.

AFFIRMED.