alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### John Oelerich, an Infant, etc., Resp’t, *v.*The New York Condensed Milk Co., App’lt.

*(Supreme Court, General Term, Second Department,*

*Filed June 28, 1889.)*

1. Negligence—Action for personal injuries—Liability of master.

Where, in an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the evidence tended to show that defendant’s driver drove on a quick trot in a thickly populated portion of Brooklyn, and ran over plaintiff, a child of six years of age; that the wagon was so constructed that the driver could only_ see an object some twenty feet in advance; that he had been drinking intoxicating liquors, *Held,*that the master is liable for the driver’s negligence.

2. Same—Contributory—Question for jury.

*Held,*that the question of the contributory negligence of the child was one for the jury.

Appeal from a judgment entered upon a verdict for plaintiff, in an action brought to recover damages for negligence of defendant’s servants.

The defendant owns, controls and uses wagons of different sizes in and about its business, of delivering milk to customers in Brooklyn.

On the 1st day of June, 1888, about half-past three p. M., a two horse wagon of the defendant, in charge of one of its employees, William Badger, who was at the time under the influence of liquor, was driven rapidly around the corner from Bushwick avenue into Boerum street, Brooklyn. The horses knocked the plaintiff, who was either on *700the cross-walk, or not more than three feet away, down, and one of the wheels passed over his head, to the extent of tearing the entire scalp, extending from his forehead to behind his ear, and from near the crown to the ear from the skull.

*M. L. Towns,*for resp’t; *Wm. W. Niles, Jr. (Wm. W. Niles,*of counsel), for app’lt.

Barnard, P. J.

The evidence fully sustains the verdict of the jury in this case. The defendant’s driver drove on a quick trot around a corner in a thickly populated portion of Brooklyn, and run over a boy under six years of age. The wagon was so constructed that the driver could only see an object some twenty feet or more in front of the horses heads.

The driver had been drinking intoxicating liquors. It was negligence to drive a wagon when danger could not be seen. It was especially dangerous and negligent to drive so fast when the driver could not see the ground within twenty feet of his horse, and the habit of strong drink or a loss certain by a single instance of indulgence, must be imputed to the master under the settled law in respect to master and servant while the servant is doing the master’s business. The question of the contributory negligence of the child is one for the jury. This is the general rule, and especially is the rule where the tender age of a child is. to be considered with reference to the degree of prudence and caution required of him under the circumstance. *Kunz*v. *The City of*Troy, 104 N. Y., 344; 5 N. Y. State Rep., 642.

The judgment should, therefore, be affirmed, with costs.

All concur.
§ 1915.114 Chain falls and pull-lifts. The provisions of this section shall apply to ship repairing, shipbuilding and shipbreaking. ( a ) Chain falls and pull-lifts shall be clearly marked to show the capacity and the capacity shall not be exceeded.
( b ) Chain falls shall be regularly inspected to ensure that they are safe, particular attention being given to the lift chain, pinion, sheaves and hooks for distortion and wear. Pull-lifts shall be regularly inspected to ensure that they are safe, particular attention being given to the ratchet, pawl, chain and hooks for distortion and wear.
( c ) Straps, shackles, and the beam or overhead structure to which a chain fall or pull-lift is secured shall be of adequate strength to support the weight of load plus gear. The upper hook shall be moused or otherwise secured against coming free of its support.
( d ) Scaffolding shall not be used as a point of attachment for lifting devices such as tackles, chain falls, and pull-lifts unless the scaffolding is specifically designed for that purpose.
#### WISKI v STATE

Ohio Appeals, 8th Dist, Cuyahoga Co

No 9446.

Decided Mar 11, 1929

Victor J Conrad, Cleveland, for Wiski.

J M Kovachy, Cleveland, for State.

Judges RICHARDS and WILLIAMS of the Sixth Dist sitting.

RICHARDS, J.

It is insisted that the liquid had become so contaminated by being used as medicine that it was not fit for usé for beverage purposes. While the tetsimony shows it had been theretofore used ,as a remedy, 'the evidence entirely fails to show in what manner it was so used, except at the precise time of the arrest. Mrs. Wiski testifies that she had the liquid in the kitchen at the time of the arrest and was rubbing her little girl’s .arm with cotton batting and after rubbing it a 'few times was putting the cotton in the jar containing the liquid. We are. not called on in this case to determine or define what would render the liquid unfit for use for beverage purposes as defined by the statute, for the evidence is uncontradicted that the jar containing the substance had been in the possession of the defendant and his wife for two years, and there is no evidence tending to show any contamination until just at the time when the officers were making the arrest. The affidavit charges the offence to have been committed on or about April 13, 1928, which was the date of the arrest. The burden rested upon the defendant to show that the liquid was unfit for use for beverage purposes. The conviction' w,as justified by the evidence and the judgment will be affirmed.

Williams, J, concurs. Lloyd, J, not participating.
#### § 91.1043 [Reserved]
<PAGE>

                                                                    Exhibit 10.5

                                 March 27, 2003

Avatar Holdings Inc.
201 Alhambra Circle
Coral Cables, FL 33134
Attn: Corporate Secretary

                  Reference is hereby made to that Nonqualified Stock Option
Agreement (the "Option Agreement") dated as of February 13, 1997 between Avatar
Holdings Inc. ("Avatar") and Gerald D. Kelfer. I hereby relinquish all right and
interest in the option to purchase 225,000 shares of common stock of Avatar at a
price of $34 per share granted to me pursuant to the Option Agreement. I
acknowledge that the Option Agreement is being terminated without the option
granted thereunder having been exercised.

                                           Sincerely,

                                           /s/ Gerald D. Kelfer
                                           -------------------------------------
                                               Gerald D. Kelfer
#### Mertylin Carroll, Appellant, v Octavious Williams, Respondent.

[698 NYS2d 913]

—In an action, *inter alia,*to recover damages for fraud, the plaintiff appeals from (1) an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Held, J.), dated July 13, 1998, which granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, (2) an order of the same court, dated August 11, 1998, which denied her motion to vacate the order dated July 13, 1998, and (3) an order of the same court, dated September 9, 1998, which, *inter alia,*denied her second motion to vacate the order dated July 13, 1998.

Ordered that the orders are affirmed, with costs.

The Supreme Court properly granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. The defendant made a prima facie showing of his entitlement to judgment as a matter of law *(see, Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68*NY2d 320, 324), and the plaintiff failed to produce evidentiary proof in admissible form to raise a triable issue of fact regarding the validity of the claims set forth in her complaint *(see, Zuckerman v City of New York,*49 NY2d 557, 562).

*494The plaintiffs motions to vacate were properly denied, since she failed to come forward with any proof of fraud or misconduct on the part of the defendant, or any other evidence warranting vacatur *(see,*CPLR 5015 [a]; *see generally, Offen v Offen,*249 AD2d 108).

The plaintiffs remaining contentions are without merit.

We decline to grant the injunctive relief requested by the defendant. Santucci, J. P., Sullivan, Florio and Schmidt, JJ., concur.
#### SHAEFFER-BLACK CO v HORR

Ohio Appeals, 5th Dist., Stark Co

No. 1022.

Decided October 17, 1929

Messrs. Black, McCuskey, Ruff & Souers, Canton, for Shaeffer-Black Co.

Messrs. Burt, Kinnison, Carson &-Shad-. rach, Canton, for Horr.

HOUCK, J.

We have examined the general charge of the trial Judge and find no error therein prejudicial to the rights of the defendant. The charge of the trial Judge was responsive to.the facts, as established on the trial. The trial Judge at the request of the plaintiff charged the Jury before argument as follows:

> “I charge you as a matter of law that if the defendant company, through its servants, agents and employees, allowed its truck to stand upon the paved portion of the roadway for a period of seven hours, that this does not constitute an emergency as contemplated by statute.”

This request to charge is based upon the provisions of 6310-27 GC.

It is clear to the Court that under the conceded facts, that the charge complained of by the defendant is sound iff law and clearly applies not only to the proven but the conceded fact in the case with reference to where the truck of the defendant was standing at the time of the collision and as to the time it had stood there prior to the collision. It therefore follows that we find no prejudicial error in the charge of the Court before argument.

It is urged by the defendant that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence, which in law would prevent a recovery by him. An examination of the evidence, as contained in the bill of exceptions, leads us to the unanimous conclusion that the claim of the defendant is not sound in this respect.

The law is well settled that a judgment will not be reversed unless the claimed error was material and prejudicial. If the claimed error could have made no difference in the final result, it is not sufficient ground for a new trial. Where the whole record shows that the proper judgment was rendered, it will not be reversed, although the Court mistook the law on some proposition. See Reed vs. McGrew, 5 OS., 375; Jordan vs. James, 5 OS., 88; and Harman vs. Kelley, 14 OS., 502.

We are not citing these authorities for the purpose of indicating that any doubt arises in the mind of the Court as to the soundness of the verdict, which we find is supported by the facts and the law. We simply cite these authorities in order that counsel may understand that even though a judgment may be technically wrong, yet, if substantial justice has been meted out, that a reviewing Court is not authorized to reverse the judgment.

Further comment is unnecessary. Finding no error in the record, the judgment must be affirmed.

Lemert, J. and Sherick, J., concur.
#### § 18.604 Interpreters.

An interpreter is subject to the provisions of these rules relating to qualification as an expert and the administration of an oath or affirmation to make a true translation.
§ 15.108 Who is authorized to decide an administrative claim? ( a ) The Counsel for Claims and Compensation shall have the authority to consider, ascertain, adjust, determine, compromise and settle claims pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act which involve an alleged negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee whose official duty station is the Department's national office in Washington, DC, or which involve aggregate claims in excess of $25,000, or which involve a new point of law or a question of policy.
( b ) Regional Solicitors and the Associate Regional Solicitors are authorized to consider, ascertain, adjust, determine, compromise and settle claims arising in their respective jurisdictions pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act where the aggregate claimed does not exceed $25,000 in amount and which do not involve a new point of law or a question of policy.
#### § 1915.31 Scope and application of subpart.

The standards contained in this subpart shall apply to ship repairing and shipbuilding and shall not apply to shipbreaking.
#### Aldon B. Stockwell, App’lt, *v.*James Boyce, Resp’t.

Appeal from judgment dismissing plaintiff’s complaint entered on report of referee.

*M. H. Cardozo,*for app’lt; *W. Q. Wilson,*for resp’t.

Van Brunt, P. J.

We are of the opinion that the judgment in this case should be affirmed for the reasons stated in the decision in the case of *Masterton*v. *Boyce (ante*198), handed down herewith.

Macomber and Bartlett, JJ., concur.
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

1030 

CA 11-00662 

PRESENT: CENTRA, J.P., FAHEY, SCONIERS, GREEN, AND MARTOCHE, JJ. 

 

ERICA L. NIEMANN AND DANIEL ELLIS, AS 

CO-ADMINISTRATORS OF THE ESTATE OF TIMOTHY W. 

NIEMANN, DECEASED, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS,

V ORDER

ST. JOSEPH’S HOSPITAL HEALTH CENTER, RONALD 

CAPUTO, M.D., SJH CARDIOLOGY ASSOCIATES, 

DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS, 

ET AL., DEFENDANTS.

 

GROSS, SHUMAN, BRIZDLE & GILFILLAN, P.C., BUFFALO (DAVID H. ELIBOL OF

COUNSEL), FOR PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS. 

HANCOCK ESTABROOK, LLP, SYRACUSE (MAUREEN E. MANEY OF COUNSEL), FOR

DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT ST. JOSEPH’S HOSPITAL HEALTH CENTER. 

MARTIN, GANOTIS, BROWN, MOULD & CURRIE, P.C., DEWITT (BRIAN M. GARGANO

OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS RONALD CAPUTO, M.D. AND SJH

CARDIOLOGY ASSOCIATES. 

 

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Onondaga County

(Deborah H. Karalunas, J.), entered January 11, 2011 in a wrongful

death action. The order denied the motion of plaintiffs to vacate a

stipulation of discontinuance. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is

unanimously affirmed without costs. 

Entered: September 30, 2011 Patricia L. Morgan

Clerk of the Court
United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 98-2604NE

_____________

Juneal D. Pratt, *

*

Appellant, * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the District

v. * of Nebraska.

*

Robert Houston, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Appellee. *

_____________

 Submitted: February 24, 1999

Filed: March 3, 1999

_____________

Before McMILLIAN, FAGG, and BEAM, Circuit Judges.

_____________

PER CURIAM.

Juneal D. Pratt appeals the district court's denial of Pratt's petition for writ of

habeas corpus. A review of the record shows the district court's decision is clearly

correct. Because the appeal involves the straightforward application of settled

principles of law, a discussion of the issues will serve no useful purpose. We thus

affirm the district court without an extended opinion. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
#### In the Matter of the Application of The City of New York, Appellant, Relative to Acquiring title to Real Property Required for Opening and Extending Avenue K and Flatlands Avenue, in the Borough of Brooklyn. Michael Holzman, Respondent.

Argued April 20, 1937;

decided May 25, 1937.

*Paul Windels, Corporation Counsel (Paxton*Blair, *Daniel M. Cohen*and *Reuben Levy*of counsel), for appellant. '

*Abraham L. Doris*and *Max Bloom*for respondent.

*504Order affirmed, with costs. Motion to dismiss appeal denied. No opinion.

Concur: Crane, Ch. J., Lehman, O’Brien, Hubbs, Loughran, Finch and Rippey, JJ.
```

[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 28 (Thursday, February 10, 2011)]
[Notices]
[Pages 7551-7552]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2011-3137]

=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

 ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION

Sunshine Act Meeting

AGENCY: U.S. Election Assistance Commission.

ACTION: Notice of EAC Standards Board Meeting.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DATE AND TIME: Thursday, February 24, 2011, 9 a.m.-5:15 p.m. CST and 
Friday, February 25, 2011, 9 a.m.-3 p.m. CST.

PLACE: Sheraton Oklahoma City Hotel, One North Broadway Avenue, 
Oklahoma City, OK 73102, Phone Number: (405) 235-2780.

AGENDA: The U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) Standards Board

[[Page 7552]]

will meet to discuss cost savings with regards to elections, 
implementation of the Military and Overseas Voter Empowerment Act 
(MOVE), and working with local media outlets to effectively communicate 
election information to the public. The Standards Board will also 
participate in a briefing on Commercial Off the Shelf hardware and 
software; and a discussion of election administration issues in the 
112th Congress with a bipartisan panel of Congressional staff. The 
Standards Board will hear committee reports and have an opportunity to 
formulate recommendations to the EAC regarding presentation topics, 
receive updates on EAC activities, and consider other administrative 
matters. Finally, the Standards Board will elect the Executive Board of 
the Standards Board.
    Members of the public may observe but not participate in EAC 
meetings unless this notice provides otherwise. Members of the public 
may use small electronic audio recording devices to record the 
proceedings. The use of other recording equipment and cameras requires 
advance notice to and coordination with the Commission's Communications 
Office.
    This meeting will be open to the public.

PERSON TO CONTACT FOR INFORMATION:  Bryan Whitener, Telephone: (202) 
566-3100.

Thomas R. Wilkey,
Executive Director, U.S. Election Assistance Commission.
[FR Doc. 2011-3137 Filed 2-8-11; 4:15 pm]
BILLING CODE 6820-KF-P
```
#### Mary V. Love, as Administratrix of the Estate of Timothy A. Love, Appellant, *v.*The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, Respondent.

Argued November 24, 1936;

decided December 31, 1936.

*465
      *John Van Voorhis*for appellant.

*William C. Combs*for respondent.

Judgment of the Appellate Division and that of the Trial Term reversed and new trial granted, with costs to abide the event. We are of the opinion that the evidence presented a question of fact for the jury. No opinion.

Concur: Crane, Ch. J., Lehman, O’Brien, Hubbs, Crouch, Loughran and Finch, JJ.
§ 18.201 Official notice of adjudicative facts. ( a ) *Scope of rule.* This rule governs only official notice of adjudicative facts.
( b ) *Kinds of facts.* An officially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either: ( 1 ) Generally known within the local area,
( 2 ) Capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned, or
( 3 ) Derived from a not reasonably questioned scientific, medical or other technical process, technique, principle, or explanatory theory within the administrative agency's specialized field of knowledge.
( c ) *When discretionary.* A judge may take official notice, whether requested or not.
( d ) *When mandatory.* A judge shall take official notice if requested by a party and supplied with the necessary information.
( e ) *Opportunity to be heard.* A party is entitled, upon timely request, to an opportunity to be heard as to the propriety of taking official notice and the tenor of the matter noticed. In the absence of prior notification, the request may be made after official notice has been taken.
( f ) *Time of taking notice.* Official notice may be taken at any stage of the proceeding.
( g ) *Effect of official notice.* An officially noticed fact is accepted as conclusive.
# EUR-Lex - 31999R1037 - EN

Avis juridique important

*|*

# 31999R1037

**Council Regulation (EC) No 1037/1999 of 17 May 1999 on the application of specific measures for the import of grape juice and must originating in Cyprus **

*
Official Journal L 127 , 21/05/1999 P. 0005 - 0005 *

COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 1037/1999

of 17 May 1999

on the application of specific measures for the import of grape juice and must originating in Cyprus

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in particular Article 133 thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the Commission,

(1) Whereas the agreement establishing an association between the European Economic Community and the Republic of Cyprus(1) provides for the opening of an annual Community tariff quota for certain concentrated grape juices and musts originating in Cyprus; whereas the import duty for this tariff quota is 0 %;

(2) Whereas from 1 September 1995 the old reference price system applicable to imports of grape juice and must into the Community was replaced by new import arrangements resulting from the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations; whereas the association agreement with Cyprus must take these new import arrangements into account;

(3) Whereas it is necessary to maintain the tariff preferences already granted and to permit Cyprus to continue to export its products to the Community under the tariff quota arrangements; whereas to this end and pending conclusion of a new agreement between the European Community and Cyprus, the necessary specific measures should be taken,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

The special duty listed in Annex I, Part 3, Section I, Annex 2, to the Customs Tariff of the European Communities for the import of concentrated grape juices and musts falling within CN codes 2009 60 51, 2009 60 71, ex 2009 60 90 and 2204 30 92 shall not be levied on the products in question originating in Cyprus and imported under tariff quota number 09.1421 as referred to in Annex V to Regulation (EC) No 1981/94(2).

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on the third day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Communities.

It shall apply from 1 July 1999.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 17 May 1999.

For the Council

The President

J. FISCHER

(1) OJ L 133, 21.5.1973, p. 2.

(2) OJ L 199, 2.8.1994, p. 1. Regulation as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 650/98 (OJ L 88, 24.3.1998, p. 8).
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