alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
§ 1917.23 Hazardous atmospheres and substances (see also § 1917.2 Hazardous cargo, material, substance or atmosphere). ( a ) *Purpose and scope.* This section covers areas in which the employer is aware that a hazardous atmosphere or substance may exist, except where one or more of the following sections apply: § 1917.22 Hazardous cargo; § 1917.24 Carbon monoxide; § 1917.25 Fumigants, pesticides, insecticides and hazardous preservatives; § 1917.73 Terminal facilities handling menhaden and similar species of fish; § 1917.152 Welding, cutting, and heating (hot work); and § 1917.153 Spray painting.
( b ) *Determination of hazard.* ( 1 ) When the employer is aware that a room, building, vehicle, railcar, or other space contains or has contained a hazardous atmosphere, a designated and appropriately equipped person shall test the atmosphere before employee entry to determine whether a hazardous atmosphere exists.
( 2 ) Records of results of any tests required by this section shall be maintained for at least thirty (30) days.
( c ) *Testing during ventilation.* When mechanical ventilation is used to maintain a safe atmosphere, tests shall be made by a designated person to ensure that the atmosphere is not hazardous.
( d ) *Entry into hazardous atmospheres.* Only designated persons shall enter hazardous atmospheres, in which case the following shall apply: ( 1 ) Persons entering a space containing a hazardous atmosphere shall be protected by respiratory and emergency protective equipment meeting the requirements of subpart E of this part;
( 2 ) Persons entering a space containing a hazardous atmosphere shall be instructed in the nature of the hazard, precautions to be taken, and the use of protective and emergency equipment. Standby observers, similarly equipped and instructed, shall continuously monitor the activity of employees within such space;
( 3 ) Except for emergency or rescue operations, employees shall not enter into any atmosphere which has been identified as flammable or oxygen deficient (less than 19.5% oxygen). Persons who may be required to enter flammable or oxygen deficient atmospheres in emergency operations shall be instructed in the dangers attendant to those atmospheres and instructed in the use of self-contained breathing apparatus, which shall be utilized.
( 4 ) To prevent inadvertent employee entry into spaces that have been identified as having hazardous, flammable or oxygen deficient atmospheres, appropriate warning signs or equivalent means shall be posted at all means of access to those spaces.
( e ) When the packaging of asbestos cargo leaks, spillage shall be cleaned up by designated employees protected from the harmful effects of asbestos as required by § 1910.1001 of this chapter.
[48 FR 30909, July 5, 1983, as amended at 49 FR 28551, July 13, 1984; 61 FR 5509, Feb. 13, 1996; 62 FR 40197, July 25, 1997; 65 FR 40938, June 30, 2000]
#### Fidelity & Deposit Company of Maryland, a Corporation, *Plaintiff in*Error, v. S. B. Aultman, *Defendant in Error.*

1. In preparing assignments of error, each error relied upon should be clearly and distinctly specified and separately assigned.

2. All the points adjudicated by an appellate court upon a writ of error or an appeal become the law of the case, and are no longer open for discussion or consideration.

This case was decided by Division A.

Writ of error to the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County.

The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court.

*J. J. Lunsford*and 17. *P.*Baya, for Plaintiff in Error;

.17. *S. Hampton,*for Defendant in Error.

Shackleford, J.

This case makes its appearance here for the second time. See 58 Fla., 228, 50 South. Rep. 991, wherein a statement of the facts will be found. Upon the former writ of error, we reversed the judgment rendered against the plaintiff in error for the reason that it did not appear that the bond sued on was produced and filed in evidence. This omission was supplied at the second trial, which trial again resulted in a verdict and judgment in favor of the plaintiff. Several errors are assigned, but they do not call for any extended discussion. We would refer to what we said in McKinnon v. Lewis, 60 Fla. 125, 53 South. Rep. 940, as to the principles which should guide in *198the preparation of assignments of error, as some of the assignments in the instant case are open to the same objections which we pointed out there. As we have repeatedly announced, all the points adjudicated by an appellate court upon a writ of error or an appeal become the law of the case, and are no longer open for discussion or consideration. McKinnon v. Johnson, 57 Fla. 120, 48 South. Rep. 910, wherein prior decisions of this court will be found cited, and Purvis v. Frink, 61 Fla. , 54 South. Rep. 62. The application of this principle disposes of several of the contentions of the plaintiff in error. After a careful consideration of the transcript of the record and the briefs of the respective parties, we are of the opinion that substantial justice has been done between the parties and that no reversible error has been made to appear to us, therefore, the judgment must be affirmed.

Whitfield, C. J., and Cockrell, J., concur;

Taylor, Hocker and Parkhill, J. J., concur in the opinion:
II 

116TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. 4921 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to allow a deduction for 

traveling expenses for Federal disaster relief workers away from home 

for more than 1 year. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

NOVEMBER 18, 2020 

Ms. HASSAN (for herself and Mr. HAWLEY) introduced the following bill; 

which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Finance 

A BILL 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to allow a 

deduction for traveling expenses for Federal disaster relief workers away from home for more than 1 year. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. TO ALLOW A DEDUCTION FOR TRAVELING EX4 PENSES FOR FEDERAL DISASTER RELIEF 

5 WORKERS AWAY FROM HOME FOR MORE 

6 THAN 1 YEAR. 

7 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 162(a) of the Internal 

8 Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by inserting ‘‘or is cer9 tified by the Administrator of the Federal Emergency 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 4921 IS

1 Management Agency as traveling on behalf of the United 

2 States in temporary duty status to respond to a federally 

3 declared disaster (as defined in section 165(i)(5)(A))’’ 

4 after ‘‘a Federal crime’’. 

5 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by 

6 this section shall apply to taxable years beginning after 

7 the date of the enactment of this Act. 

Æ 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS
1 

### Troutman, Jake (FAA)

From: Kenney, James (FAA)

Sent: Thursday, March 05, 2015 8:26 AM

To: wcampbell@balfourbeattyus.com

Cc: Troutman, Jake (FAA)

Subject: Section 333 exemption request

Mr. Campbell,

The FAA is in the process of reviewing your petition and request your assistance. We do not have any of the

attachments which you may have included with your application. Specifically, you mention a Flight Manual and Skycatch

flight manual. If you can forward these manuals to me, we will ensure that they are considered in our evaluation. We

will need any information you wish to provide by cob March 9, 2015. Any manuals which you provide will be treated as

confidential.

Thank you for your assistance.

James. Kenney

Aviation Safety Inspector
Exhibit
32.1  Certification
of the Chief Executive Officer Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002  I, Gino Scotto, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that the Annual Report of Kenilworth Systems Corporation on Form 10-K for the
year ended December 31, 2003 fully complies with the requirements of Section
13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that information
contained in such Annual Report on Form 10-K fairly presents in all material
respects the financial condition and results of operations of Kenilworth
Systems Corporation.  By:
  /s/ Gino ScottoName:
  Gino ScottoTitle:
  Chief Executive OfficerDate:
  April 12, 2005


---
#### § 300.0 Applicability.

The rules of conduct set forth in this part except as otherwise provided in this or any other DOT regulation shall govern the conduct of the parties and their representatives, and the relationships between the Office of the Secretary of Transportation, the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Aviation and International Affairs, and the Office of the General Counsel, including regular personnel, and officials, special Government employees, consultants, or experts under contract to the Department of Transportation (DOT) and administrative law judges (hereinafter referred to as “DOT employee(s)”) and all other persons in all DOT matters involving aviation economic and enforcement proceedings.

[Doc. No. 82, 50 FR 2380, Jan. 16, 1985, as amended by Amdt. 1-261, 59 FR 10061, Mar. 3, 1994; 60 FR 43528, Aug. 22, 1995]
#### § 18.92 Decision and order.

At the conclusion of the proceeding, the judge must issue a written decision and order.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-7134

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

MARK KERRY CRENSHAW,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk. John A. MacKenzie, Senior District

Judge. (CR-90-117-N, CA-96-596-2)

Submitted: January 26, 1999 Decided: March 5, 1999

Before MURNAGHAN, NIEMEYER, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Mark Kerry Crenshaw, Appellant Pro Se. Mark Anthony Exley, OFFICE

OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Mark Kerry Crenshaw seeks to appeal the district court’s order

denying his motion filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West 1994 &

Supp. 1998). We have reviewed the record and the district court’s

opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny Crenshaw’s motion for appointment of counsel, deny a certificate of

appealability, and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district court. See United States v. Crenshaw, Nos. CR-90-117-N; CA96-596-2 (E.D. Va. July 22, 1997). We dispense with oral argument

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in

the materials before the court and argument would not aid the

decisional process.

DISMISSED
```

[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 4898 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

<DOC>

116th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                S. 4898

   To amend title VI of the Social Security Act to extend the period 
   during which States, Indian Tribes, and local governments may use 
                   Coronavirus Relief Fund payments.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                           November 16, 2020

  Ms. Murkowski (for herself and Ms. Hassan) introduced the following 
  bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Finance

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To amend title VI of the Social Security Act to extend the period 
   during which States, Indian Tribes, and local governments may use 
                   Coronavirus Relief Fund payments.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. EXTENSION OF PERIOD TO USE CORONAVIRUS RELIEF FUND PAYMENTS.

    Section 601(d)(3) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 801(d)(3)) 
is amended by striking ``December 30, 2020'' and inserting ``September 
30, 2021''.
                                 <all>
```
# EUR-Lex - 31999D0492 - EN

Avis juridique important

*|*

# 31999D0492

**1999/492/EC: Council Decision of 21 June 1999 concerning the conclusion of an Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters between the European Community, of the one part, and the Republic of Iceland, of the other part, on Protocol 2 to the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Republic of Iceland **

*
Official Journal L 192 , 24/07/1999 P. 0047 - 0047 *

COUNCIL DECISION

of 21 June 1999

concerning the conclusion of an Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters between the European Community, of the one part, and the Republic of Iceland, of the other part, on Protocol 2 to the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Republic of Iceland

(1999/492/EC)

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in particular Article 133 in conjunction with the first sentence of Article 300(2) thereof;

Having regard to the proposal from the Commission,

(1) Whereas an Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters between the European Community, of the one part, and the Republic of Iceland, of the other part, on Protocol 2 to the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Republic of Iceland(1) has been negotiated in order to take into account the accession of the Republic of Austria, the Republic of Finland and the Kingdom of Sweden to the European Union and the implementation of the Uruguay Round Settlement;

(2) Whereas the Agreement should be approved,

HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS:

Article 1

The Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters between the European Community, of the one part, and the Republic of Iceland, of the other part, on Protocol 2 to the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Republic of Iceland is hereby approved on behalf of the Community.

The text of the Agreement is attached to this Decision.

Article 2

Detailed rules for the application of this Decision shall be adopted by the Commission assisted by the committee referred to in Article 15 of Regulation (EC) No 3448/93(2) in accordance with the procedure provided for in Article 16 of that Regulation.

Article 3

The President of the Council is hereby authorised to designate the person empowered to sign the Agreement referred to in Article 1 in order to bind the Community.

Done at Luxembourg, 21 June 1999.

For the Council

G. VERHEUGEN

The President

(1) OJ L 301, 31.12.1972, p. 2.

(2) OJ L 318, 20.12.1993, p. 18. Regulation as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 2491/98 (OJ L 309, 19.11.1998, p. 28).
#### OVERMYER CO v B & O Rd Co

Ohio Appeals, 6th Dist, Lucas Co

No 2188.

Decided Apr 1, 1929

Wm H McLellan, Jr, and Cotter & McFellin, of Toledo, for Overmyer Co.

Tyler, McMahon, Smith & Wilson, Toledo, for Rd Co.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The only error complained of is that the trial court directed a verdict for the defendant without warrant of law. It appears that Hirsch Bros. & Co. delivered to the defendant railroad company at Louisville for shipment to the plaintiff at Toledo a less than carload shipment of salad dressing, sauces and vinegar. The railroad company transported the cargo from Louisville to Toledo in a box car and the salad dressing and thirty cases of relish were frozen and' thereby rendered valueless. The goods were transported without delay and the only claimed ground of negligence is that the railroad company permitted them to freeze. It is stipulated in the agreed statement of facts that the carrier at the time the shipment was tendered to it for transportation, February 5, 1926, had on file with the Interstate Commerce Commission tariffs regulating its rates of charges and other tariffs setting up rules and regulations covering the transportation of various commodities, and that, as it was an interstate shipment, the rules, regulations and tariffs filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission would govern the shipment involved.

*252It is very evident from a reading of the rules of classifications and the tariffs that they did not require the defendant railroad company to heat the box car nor to furnish a refrigerator car where it had not been requested. In fact, such rules are binding, and to. furnish a refrigerator car without extra charge or heat the car, where neither regulations nor tariffs provide for it, would be discriminatory and illegal.

Carlin Co. vs. Hines, 107 Ohio St., 328.

Where an interstate shipment of perishable goods is handled and transported by the carrier in the manner and by the means prescribed in lawful and binding tariff and classification regulations relating to. refrigerator car and box car service, which regulations do not require the heating of car nor the furnishing of a refrigerator car without reasonable notice, the carrier is not liable for damages to goods by freezing resulting. solely from failure to heat car nor for those resulting solely from failure to furnish refrigerator car, where refrigerator car is not requested and reasonable notice given as required by such regulations. Blodgett Co. vs. Railroad Co., 159 N. E., 45; 55 A. L. R., 900, 905, 906.

In the instant case there was no negligent delay in transporting the shipment, nor evidence of ■ other negligence. The court therefore properly directed a verdict and the judgment will be affirmed.

Lloyd and Richards, JJ, concur.
Third District Court of Appeal

State of Florida

Opinion filed September 21, 2022.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D21-0012

Lower Tribunal Nos. 16-5009 CC, 18-137 AP

________________

Ilana Rigwan,

Appellant,

vs.

South Beach Bayside Condominium Association I, Inc.,

Appellee.

An Appeal from the County Court for Miami-Dade County, Patricia 

Marino Pedraza, Judge.

Ilana Rigwan a/k/a L Powers, in proper person.

No appearance, for appellee.

Before LOGUE, GORDO and LOBREE, JJ. 

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
<Page>

                                                                Exhibit 23.02



March 27, 2002



Kentucky Utilities Company and Subsidiary
220 West Main Street
P.O. Box 32010
Louisville, Kentucky 40232


Enclosed are our manually signed reports relating to the use in the Annual
Report on Form 10-K of our reports dated January 25, 2002 relating to the
consolidated financial statements and financial statement schedules of
Kentucky Utilities Company and Subsidiary (the "Company").

Our manually signed reports serve to authorize the use of our name on our
reports in the electronic filing of the Company's Annual Report on Form 10-K
with the SEC.

Please provide us with an exact copy of the Annual Report on Form 10-K as
electronically filed with the SEC.



Very truly yours,

/s/ PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
-------------------------------
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP


<Page>

                                                                   Exhibit 23.02

                    CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS

As independent public accountants, we hereby consent to the inclusion in this
Form 10-K of our report dated January 26, 2001. It should be noted that we
have not audited any financial statements of Kentucky Utilities Company
subsequent to December 31, 2000 or performed any audit procedures subsequent
to the date of our report.

                                             /s/ Arthur Andersen LLP
                                            -------------------------------


Louisville, Kentucky
  March 27, 2002
§ 1915.77 Working surfaces. ( a ) Paragraphs (b) through (d) of this section shall apply to ship repairing and shipbuilding operations, and shall not apply to shipbreaking. Paragraph (e) of this section shall apply to shipbuilding, ship repairing and shipbreaking operations.
( b ) When firebox floors present tripping hazards of exposed tubing or of missing or removed refractory, sufficient planking to afford safe footing shall be laid while work is being carried on within the boiler.
( c ) When employees are working aloft, or elsewhere at elevations more than 5 feet above a solid surface, either scaffolds or a sloping ladder, meeting the requirements of this subpart, shall be used to afford safe footing, or the employees shall be protected by safety belts and lifelines meeting the requirements of §§ 1915.159 and 1915.160. Employees visually restricted by blasting hoods, welding helmets, and burning goggles shall work from scaffolds, not from ladders, except for the initial and final welding or burning operation to start or complete a job, such as the erection and dismantling of hung scaffolding, or other similar, nonrepetitive jobs of brief duration.
( d ) For work performed in restricted quarters, such as behind boilers and in between congested machinery units and piping, work platforms at least 20 inches wide meeting the requirements of § 1915.71(i)(1) shall be used. Backrails may be omitted if bulkheading, boilers, machinery units, or piping afford proper protection against falling.
( e ) When employees are boarding, leaving, or working from small boats or floats, they shall be protected by personal flotation devices meeting the requirements of § 1915.158(a).
[47 FR 16986, Apr. 20, 1982, as amended at 67 FR 44543, July 3, 2002]
#### §§ 91.536-91.599 [Reserved]
#### THE STATE v. FULLER.

(Decided November 28, 1916.)

Appeal from Coosa Chancery Court.

Heard before Hon. W. W. Wi-iiteside.

W. L. Martin, Attorney General, for the State.

Geo. A. Sorrell, and Felix L. Smith, for appellee.

Brown, J. —

The findings of the Chancellor will not be reviewed in the absence of a bill of exceptions, and the record being regular, the order admitting to bail will be affirmed.

Affirmed.
#### § 18.704 Opinion on ultimate issue.

Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the judge as trier of fact.
<partyblock><br><br><div align="center"><b><font size="+1">The People of the State of New York, Respondent,<br><br>against<br><br>Genaro Garcia, Defendant-Appellant.</font></b></div><br><br><p>Defendant appeals from a judgment of the Criminal Court of the City of New York, Bronx County (Beth Beller, J., at plea and sentencing; Marc J. Whiten, J., at resentencing), rendered September 11, 2018, convicting him, upon his plea of guilty, of disorderly conduct, and imposing sentence.</p><p>Per Curiam.</p><p>Judgment of conviction (Beth Beller, J., at plea and sentencing; Marc J. Whiten, J., at resentencing), rendered September 11, 2018, affirmed.</p><p>Defendant's claim that his plea was not knowing, voluntary and intelligent is unpreserved, since he failed to move to withdraw the plea prior to the imposition of the resentence (<i>see People v Crowder</i>, 24 NY3d 1134, 1136-1137 [2015]; <a href="../2015/2015_05969.htm" target="_blank"><i>People v Ullah</i>, 130 AD3d 759</a>, 760 [2015], <i>lv denied </i>26 NY3d 1043 [2015]). We decline to review defendant's claim in the interest of justice. As an alternative holding, we find that defendant's guilty plea was entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently with the aid of counsel, and after the court sufficiently advised defendant of the constitutional rights he would be giving up by pleading guilty (<i>see People v Conceicao</i>, 26 NY3d 375 [2015]; <i>People v Sougou</i>, 26 NY3d 1052 [2015]). </p><p>In any event, the only relief defendant requests is dismissal of the accusatory instrument rather than vacatur of the plea, and he expressly requests this Court to affirm the conviction if it does not grant a dismissal. Since we do not find that dismissal would be appropriate, we affirm on this basis as well (<a href="../2016/2016_03598.htm" target="_blank"><i>see e.g. People v Teron</i>, 139 AD3d 450</a> [2016]).</p><br>All concur.<blockquote>THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.</blockquote><p></p><p>Clerk of the Court</p><br>Decision Date: April 17, 2020<br><br><div align="center"><form method="LINK" action="../../slipidx/at_1_idxtable.shtml"><input type="submit" value="Return to Decision List"></form></div></partyblock>