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i

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iii

Strategic Studies Institute

and

U.S. Army War College Press

EUROPEAN MISSILE DEFENSE AND RUSSIA

Keir Giles

with

Andrew Monaghan

July 2014

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and 

do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the 

Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. 

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public release; distribution is unlimited.

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Sections 101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not be 

copyrighted.
iv

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Army War College Press, U.S. Army War College, 47 Ashburn 

Drive, Carlisle, PA 17013-5010. 

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ISBN 1-58487-635-2
v

FOREWORD

The recent history of the conversation with Russia over plans for European missile defense has been 

one of repeated and unsuccessful attempts to allay 

strongly worded Russian concerns. None of these attempts has mitigated Russia’s trenchant opposition to 

U.S. plans. At times, this opposition can appear based 

on grounds which are spurious or incomprehensible. 

In this monograph, Mr. Keir Giles, a British academic and long-term scholar of Russia, examines the 

history of missile defense, and the current dialogue, 

from a Russian perspective in order to explain the root 

causes of Russian alarm. He presents specific recommendations for managing the Russia relationship in 

the context of missile defense. Important conclusions 

are also drawn for the purpose of managing the dialogue over missile defense plans not only with Russia 

as an opponent, but also with European North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies as partners and hosts. 

The latter are especially significant in the light of these 

partners’ heightened hard security concerns following 

Russian annexation of Crimea and continuing hostile 

moves against Ukraine. 

This monograph was completed before the start 

of Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014, but 

already warned of the prospect of direct military action by Russia in Europe to protect Moscow’s selfperceived interests. Given the continuing hostility of 

Russian messaging over U.S. missile defense plans, 

the Strategic Studies Institute strongly recommends 

this monograph to policymakers contributing not only 
to missile defense planning, but also to any aspect of 

policy affecting the defense of Europe.

 

 DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

 Director

 Strategic Studies Institute and

 U.S. Army War College Press

vi
vii

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

KEIR GILES is the director of the Conflict Studies Research Centre (CSRC), a group of deep subject matter 

experts on Eurasian security formerly attached to the 

United Kingdom (UK) Ministry of Defence. Now operating in the private sector, CSRC provides in-depth 

analysis on a wide range of security issues affecting 

Russia and its relations with overseas partners. After 

beginning his career working with paramilitary aviation in Russia and Ukraine immediately following 

the fall of the Soviet Union, Mr. Giles joined the BBC 

Monitoring Service (BBCM) to report on political and 

military affairs in the former Soviet space. While attached from BBCM to CSRC at the UK Defence Academy, he wrote and briefed for UK and North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization (NATO) government agencies on 

a wide range of Russian defense and security issues. 

Uniquely, he is a double Associate Fellow of the Royal 

Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) in 

London, UK, as well as a regular contributor to research projects on Russian security issues in both the 

UK and Europe. Mr. Giles’s work has appeared in 

a wide range of academic and military publications 

across Europe and in the United States.

ANDREW MONAGHAN is a Research Fellow in the 

Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House 

and an Academic Visitor at St. Antony’s College, Oxford, UK. Additionally, he is the Founder and Director 

of the Russia Research Network, an independent organization for the generation of information and expertise on Russian politics, security, and economic issues 

based in London. In this capacity, he has served as an 

expert witness to the House of Commons Foreign Af-
fairs Select Committee. Until late-2012, Dr. Monaghan 

directed Russian related research in the Research Division of the NATO Defense College in Rome, Italy. In 

this role, he was also the senior researcher on energy 

security matters. Prior to that, he held positions as a 

Senior Research Associate at the Advanced Research 

and Assessment Group, part of the Defence Academy 

of the UK, and a Visiting Lecturer in the Defence Studies Department of King’s College, London, the civilian academic arm of the Joint Services Command and 

Staff College at the Defence Academy. Dr. Monaghan 

holds an M.A. in war studies and a Ph.D. in Russian 

foreign policy (Russian perspectives of Russia-European Union security relations) from the Department 

of War Studies, King’s College.

viii
ix

SUMMARY

When U.S. President Barack Obama cancelled a 

scheduled September 2013 summit meeting with his 

Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, “lack of progress on issues such as missile defense” was cited as the 

primary justification. Despite widespread and wellfounded assumption that the real trigger for the cancellation was the Russian decision to offer temporary 

asylum to Edward Snowden, the citing of missile defense was indicative. The comment marked one of the 

periodic plateaus of mutual frustration between the 

United States and Russia over U.S. attitudes to missile 

defense capability, stemming from a continued failure 

to achieve meaningful dialogue over U.S. plans and 

Russian fears. 

Russia’s vehement objections to U.S. plans for missile defense installations in Europe, and the range of 

unfriendly actions promised in response, are often 

portrayed as irrational, the arguments technically 

flawed, the behavior deliberately obstructive, and the 

underlying threat perception hopelessly out of date. 

Yet an examination of the missile defense relationship between Russia and the United States over time 

shows that the fundamental Russian concerns stem 

from ideas of state security which, while discounted 

elsewhere, remain valid in the Russian security calculus. The fundamentally different weight and importance attached by Russia to nuclear weapons as both 

a guarantee and a symbol of statehood can be challenging for U.S. observers to grasp, but it is critical to 

understanding those Russian statements that do not, 

at first sight, make rational sense to U.S. policymakers. Furthermore, while the current Russian proposals 

for compromise—at least those stated in public—are 
x

wholly unrealistic, bear in mind that some of the security considerations behind them, at various times, have 

been both shared and voiced by the United States.

This monograph will examine the historical precedents for the current missile defense impasse, in order 

to explain the Russian attitude, and draw conclusions 

about both the most recent developments in the conversation between the United States and Russia and 

its likely further progress and prospects, if any, for a 

resolution.
1

EUROPEAN MISSILE DEFENSE AND RUSSIA

Keir Giles 

with 

Andrew Monaghan

INTRODUCTION

When U.S. President Barack Obama cancelled a 

scheduled September 2013 summit meeting with his 

Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, “lack of progress on issues such as missile defense” was cited as the 

primary justification.1

 Despite widespread and wellfounded assumption that the real trigger for the cancellation was the Russian decision to offer temporary 

asylum to Edward Snowden, the citing of missile defense was indicative. The comment marked one of the 

periodic plateaus of mutual frustration between the 

United States and Russia over U.S. attitudes to missile 

defense capability, stemming from a continued failure 

to achieve meaningful dialogue over U.S. plans and 

Russian fears. 

Russia’s vehement objections to U.S. plans for missile defense installations in Europe, and the range of 

unfriendly actions promised in response, are often 

portrayed as irrational, the arguments technically 

flawed, the behavior deliberately obstructive, and the 

underlying threat perception hopelessly out of date.2

Yet, an examination of the missile defense relationship between Russia and the United States over time 

shows that the fundamental Russian concerns stem 

from ideas of state security which, while discounted 

elsewhere, remain valid in the Russian security calculus. The fundamentally different weight and importance attached by Russia to nuclear weapons as both 
2

a guarantee and a symbol of statehood can be challenging for U.S. observers to grasp, but it is critical to 

understanding those Russian statements that do not, 

at first sight, make rational sense to U.S. policymakers. Furthermore, while the current Russian proposals 

for compromise—at least those stated in public—are 

wholly unrealistic, bear in mind that some of the security considerations behind them, at various times, have 

been both shared and voiced by the United States.

This monograph will examine the historical precedents for the current missile defense impasse in order 

to explain the Russian attitude and draw conclusions 

about both the most recent developments in the conversation between the United States and Russia, and 

its likely further progress and prospects, if any, for a 

resolution. 

DÉJÀ VU ALL OVER AGAIN: MISSILE DEFENSE 

IN THIS CENTURY AND THE LAST 

Topical reporting on missile defense discussions 

between Russia and the United States often gives the 

impression that the issue is a new one, and has only 

been a significant factor in the bilateral relationship 

since the late-2000s and the announcement of the first 

round of plans for U.S. ballistic missile defense installations in Poland and the Czech Republic.3

 In fact, the 

problem has a long history through various cycles of 

missile defense initiatives by both the United States 

and the Soviet Union over previous decades. Examining the history of missile defense systems on both 

sides is instructive, since many arguments over their 

strategic implications are repeated decades apart, and 

there are precedents from Soviet times which reveal 

an entirely consistent Russian approach to the prob-
3

lem over time—as well as an inconsistent and unpredictable U.S. approach. 

As expressed by Dmitry Medvedev during his 

term as Russian president: “Russia’s relations with 

the USA and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO) in the missile defense area have a long and 

complicated history.”4

 This history needs to be considered from both the U.S. and Soviet sides, because 

it helps provide a framework for understanding the 

current Russian objections and points to likely future 

developments in the Russian stance. It will also show 

that some of the Russian objections to U.S. plans, 

which are perceived as irrational by the current U.S. 

leadership, in fact, precisely mirror U.S. statements 

and attitudes from previous decades. 

Early Days. 

Interest in development of a ballistic missile defense (BMD) system first arose in the United States during World War II, when observing the British experience of being subjected to ballistic missile attack from 

Germany and considering the future implications for 

the United States.5

 BMD development accelerated in 

the late-1950s, when successful Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launches, combined with 

aggressive Soviet expansionism, accentuated U.S. vulnerability. The Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962 

highlighted the lack of available defensive measures 

against missile attack—but the outcome of the crisis, and the resulting partial strategic setback for the 

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), caused the 

Soviet Union to put greater emphasis on its own antimissile systems. Reports of the planned Soviet BMD 

system, in turn, caused then-U.S. President Lyndon 
4

Johnson to authorize the Sentinel system, designed to 

defend the U.S. homeland against a light missile attack, in September 1967.6

 Thus the pattern was set for 

the reactive, interdependent nature that U.S. and Russian missile defense plans have retained ever since. 

President Richard Nixon refocused U.S. missile 

defense so the Sentinel system would protect U.S. deterrent forces as opposed to the general population, 

and the concept was developed into a layered defense 

system and renamed Safeguard. At the same time, recognition on both sides of the destabilizing potential 

of missile defense systems led to agreement that the 

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), beginning 

in 1969, would include discussions on limiting missile defense. The result was the signing of the AntiBallistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 1972 by President 

Nixon and General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Leonid Brezhnev, simultaneously with an Interim Agreement on strategic offensive arms limitations.7

 The 

implication that the offensive and the defensive are 

inseparable in strategic stability is a theme that is still 

relevant to Russian objections to U.S. missile defense 

plans today, and will be discussed further. 

The ABM Treaty limited the number of BMD sites 

that each side could maintain; a 1974 protocol to the 

treaty further reduced the sites on each side from two 

to one.8

 Of these two possible sites, only the Soviet 

one was fully implemented. The U.S. Safeguard system was cancelled by Congress in 1975, because of 

doubts over its effectiveness, vulnerability, and cost. 

In addition, the state of interception technology at the 

time dictated that the interceptor missiles should be 

nuclear armed to ensure a kill. As explained by Finn-
5

ish physicist and prominent defense researcher Stefan 

Forss, this was to some extent self-defeating: 

Exploding a nuclear-tipped interceptor in the upper 

atmosphere creates plasma that radar waves are not 

able to penetrate. Accordingly, the battle management 

radar is likely to go ‘blind’ after the first interceptor 

is used, and follow-on missiles cannot be engaged. 

The BMD system is essentially reduced to a single 

shot system.9

In addition, the implications of detonating friendly 

nuclear missiles over U.S. population centers gave rise 

to a degree of concern.10 The Soviet leadership, meanwhile, was unencumbered by democratic oversight 

of its defense planning, and the USSR continued development and implementation of its nuclear-armed 

A-35 BMD installations around Moscow, descendents 

of which continue in service today. Thus, it can be argued that, although the aim of the ABM Treaty was to 

maintain strategic stability, this aim was not achieved 

due to the resulting imbalance of only one side, the 

USSR, implementing BMD capability.11 The Soviet 

Union, therefore, had cause to be entirely satisfied with 

the ABM Treaty. This is significant when considering 

both Russian objections to its eventual cancellation in 

2002 and earlier Soviet responses to the next cycle in 

the BMD game: Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). 

Strategic Defense Initiative. 

By the early-1980s, the United States had begun to 

worry that the Soviets had achieved a first strike capability that would allow them to cripple U.S. strategic 

forces and still maintain enough nuclear weapons to 

destroy America’s cities. This situation led President 
6

Ronald Reagan to place greater emphasis on developing missile defenses. In March 1983, Reagan gave 

a speech that launched SDI and promised what was 

widely quoted as “Star Wars” technology. Despite the 

careful wording of the speech, and mention of consistency with U.S. obligations under the ABM Treaty, it 

contained phrases that were deeply alarming to the 

Soviet leadership, since the promise to “eliminate the 

threat posed by nuclear weapons” by rendering them 

“impotent and obsolete” implied that the Soviet deterrent threat would be neutralized, destroying the foundations of strategic stability as understood by both 

sides at the time, and leaving the USSR vulnerable to 

nuclear attack without the possibility of retaliation.12

According to then Soviet leader Yuri Andropov, who, 

like his successor Vladimir Putin, had moved into a 

leadership position from a role as head of the country’s intelligence organization, this deliberate destabilization was “not just irresponsible, [but] insane.”13

The Soviet response to SDI needs to be considered, 

because it is a direct precursor to Russian responses to 

current U.S. BMD plans. Three issues of serious concern to the Russian leadership today directly echo the 

situation 30 years ago. First, the concern over the development of technology that eventually may limit the 

effectiveness of the Russian nuclear deterrent, or indeed render it useless—as in 1983, the technology and 

level of implementation is not currently a threat to the 

Russian deterrent, but extensive future development 

is promised by the U.S. side, with no stated limit on 

the planned capability. Second, and related, nuclear 

weapons held and still hold a very different place in 

the security calculus, and indeed in the national identity, of the Soviet Union and Russia, rendering their 

devaluation a much less desirable end result than it is 
7

for the United States and many other states. Finally, 

Soviet efforts to ensure the maintenance of strategic 

stability by investing even more heavily in defense 

are widely credited with accelerating the economic 

collapse of the Soviet Union and its subsequent disappearance as a state—an existential threat of which the 

Russian leadership is acutely conscious, and keen not 

to repeat.14 All these issues remain current and will 

be considered further in subsequent discussion of the 

current Russian stance on U.S. BMD plans. 

Exit the USSR.

In late-1989, the administration of President George 

H. Bush initiated a review of the SDI program as part 

of a broader examination of U.S. strategic requirements for the “new world order” that was thought to 

be emerging. Responding to the change in the nature 

of the ballistic missile threat that was highlighted by 

missile attacks on Israel during the Gulf war in 1990, 

President Bush announced in 1991 that the Defense 

Department was refocusing the SDI program from defense against a massive Soviet missile attack to greater 

emphasis on intercepting limited strikes. 

The collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of that 

year appeared to vindicate this shift in U.S. policy. 

The United States and its allies pursued an energetic 

program in the early-1990s to ensure that former Soviet nuclear capabilities were concentrated in Russian 

hands rather than scattered across several newly independent republics. But thereafter, throughout the 

rest of that decade and into the new millennium, in its 

public statements, the United States largely ignored 

the possibility of deliberate targeting by Russian nuclear capability and focused instead on proliferation of 
ballistic missiles to rogue nations and, potentially, terrorist organizations. U.S. missile defense technologies 

and concepts were adapted to meet a new and growing threat: a possible limited conventional or nuclear 

attack on U.S. territory by ballistic missiles from rogue 

states or even nonstate actors. Guarding against this 

eventuality continues to shape much of U.S. policy on 

BMD today; but, crucially, it does so to a degree that 

Moscow does not fully understand, since Russia does 

not fully share this threat assessment. 

Accompanying this shift in emphasis was the development of new interceptor technology, for the first 

time making kinetic hit-to-kill capability a realistic 

prospect instead of relying on warheads with either 

nuclear or conventional explosives to achieve destruction by an explosion in proximity to the incoming missile. With this new capability, mid-flight interceptions 

became possible, with much reduced concern over 

collateral damage or environmental effects. While the 

perceived benefits from the U.S. side were clear, the 

development of more ecologically friendly interceptors was of limited comfort to Russia: the same technological improvements removed the nuclear singleshot problem and made BMD a credible option for the 

United States. 

During the same period, Russia moved almost 

overnight from a comfortable position of strong conventional deterrence through the massive superiority 

of troop numbers of the Soviet Army to a reliance on 

nuclear missiles as the only effective deterrent, at strategic or other levels, which was available to the newly 

emergent Russian Federation. According to President 

Putin, speaking in 2006, the entire Russian army had to 

be stripped of its combat-capable units and personnel 

in order to mount the limited campaign in Chechnya 

8
9

at the end of 1994.15 Throughout the following decade, 

Russian defense budgets continued a relative decline, 

with funding priority going to the nuclear forces. 

While perceived as being of limited relevance by the 

United States and its allies, none of whom intended to 

attack Russia, the Russian leadership believed these 

nuclear forces constituted the last-ditch guarantee of 

Russian sovereignty and protection of its fundamental interests. Furthermore, throughout the worst period of budgetary meltdown and economic implosion, 

Russia continued investment in development of its 

own anti-missile capabilities—albeit with apparently 

limited results. These capabilities were seen as critical 

to maintaining nuclear parity, and nuclear parity in 

turn was seen as critical to guaranteeing Russian state 

interests and, indeed, the continued existence of the 

state itself. 

Thus the situation throughout the late-1990s provides another example pertinent today. Russia not 

only perceives itself to be vulnerable to military attack 

from the United States due to a severe conventional 

capability gap, but it also proceeds from an assessment 

of this capability to include in its security planning the 

possibility of such an attack taking place. This consideration can be either imperfectly understood or disregarded by sections of the U.S. policymaking community—and therefore Russian concerns are heightened 

by U.S. actions that are, in fact, unrelated to Russia. 

The pattern continues today that deterrent messages 

from the United States, which are intended for a specific audience far away from Russia, are treated by the 

Russians as “to whom it may concern,” triggering a 

reaction that occasionally surprises the United States, 

and particularly those sections of its leadership that 

had forgotten Russia was there. 
10

The United States Pulls Out of the ABM Treaty. 

From the Russian perspective, the situation after 

2001 deteriorated still further. On December 13, 2001, 

President George W. Bush gave Russia a 6-month notice of U.S. intent to withdraw from the ABM Treaty 

so that the United States could pursue development 

of the program at that time known as National Missile Defense (NMD)— already under way, in potential 

violation of U.S. treaty obligations. But despite the 

significance of the withdrawal, which undermined 

Russia’s entire concept of strategic stability, the official response from Russia was measured and muted, 

in sharp contrast to the heated rhetoric that greeted 

subsequent U.S. BMD initiatives. President Putin restricted himself to calling the withdrawal “mistaken” 

and referred to Russian capabilities for overcoming 

BMD systems in an almost conciliatory manner rather 

than the threatening tone that similar statements took 

on subsequently.16

The reasons behind this contrast need to be examined, as they may suggest means of attenuating hostile Russian reactions, and the transactional costs they 

entail, in the future. First, this occurred at the peak of 

strategic cooperation between the United States and 

Russia following the September 11, 2011 (9/11) attacks: 

cooperation that Bush referred to as “a new strategic 

relationship that will last long beyond our individual 

administrations, providing a foundation for peace 

for the years to come.”17 Indeed, the U.S. withdrawal 

from the treaty was one of the first indications to Putin that his faith in ongoing strategic partnership as 

equals was misplaced. Second, Russia was involved in 

high-level discussions with the United States over the 

future of the treaty from the earliest stages, avoiding 

the complaints heard later from Moscow that, instead 
11

of consulting beforehand, the United States developed 

the habit of presenting faits accomplis.

18 Finally, this 

culminated in personal bilateral negotiations at the 

presidential level: according to Bush, the issues were 

“discussed with my friend, President Vladimir Putin, 

over the course of many meetings, many months.”19

This direct engagement at the most senior level—the 

only one that matters in Russian decisionmaking culture—is also of significance today and will also be referred to later in this monograph. 

Subsequently, Bush re-emphasized a strong commitment to missile defense deployment. The missile 

defense program was reoriented to focus on an integrated, layered defense that would be capable of attacking warheads and missiles in all phases of flight 

and, eventually, of providing global defenses against 

missiles of all ranges. As part of this program, the Bush 

administration started planning for a European missile defense site to intercept ballistic missiles launched 

from the Middle East. 

Poland and Czech Republic—Round One. 

Russian alarm at U.S. BMD plans mounted steadily from the mid-2000s20 as the United States moved 

closer to implementing a Third Site for missile defense 

in Europe, eventually intended to comprise a groundbased interceptor (GBI) anti-missile system in Poland 

and a radar installation in the Czech Republic.

A growing realization of what U.S. renunciation 

of the ABM Treaty meant in practice led to strenuous 

and heated Russian opposition to these plans. U.S. efforts to address Russian arguments were not recognized by Moscow as engaging with the fundamental 

Russian concerns, leading to a spiral of rhetoric from 

Russian commentators and leaders describing the 
12

Third Site in terms which were barely recognizable to 

its planners—but that all remain, 6 or more years later, 

current Russian objections to U.S. BMD plans overall. 

The themes highlighted in the following text have 

remained consistent in Russian discourse since 2007, 

regardless of developments in U.S. plans since then. 

Russian Views on the Third Site.21

BMD is aimed against no other target than Russia.

It is already clear that a new phase in the arms race is unfolding in the world. Unfortunately, it does not depend 

on us, it is not us who are starting it.

 President Putin, 

February 8, 2008

The problem with possible deployment of ABM elements 

in Poland and the Czech Republic is that it will not, in 

our specialists’ opinion, have any other goal but monitoring Russia’s strategic potential. That is where our harsh 

response stems from.

Head of Foreign Ministry 

Department for Pan-European

Cooperation, Sergey Ryabkov, 

January 23, 2008

At the same time, if the third positioning area is created, 

a radar in the Czech Republic will be monitoring Russian 

territory up to the Urals and interceptor missiles which 

are planned to be stationed in Poland will be capable of 

posing a threat to Russian deterrent arsenal. Therefore, 

this area—when we are told that it is not aimed at Russia, 

we should proceed not from intentions, but from facts, 

real potentials.

Russian Foreign Minister 

Sergey Lavrov, 

February 12, 2008 
13

All this is being done solely in order to deprive Russia 

of a guaranteed retaliatory strike capability in the event 

of a nuclear conflict. A guaranteed retaliatory strike has 

formed the basis of our security strategy since Soviet 

times, and ensuring this security represents the main and 

unconditional priority of our military doctrine.

With minimal outlays. the Americans have succeeded 

not only in ensuring their military presence in Central 

and Eastern Europe but also in compelling Russia to proceed with its own rearmament at a faster pace than anticipated. Once again, we have been drawn into an arms 

race via a re-enactment of the scenario of the late-1980s, 

that brought success for the Americans and constituted 

one of the reasons for the collapse of the USSR.

 Maksim Agarkov, military commentator, 

 October 22, 2007

The priorities of military threats . . . appear to stem above 

all from US military policy, particularly the National Security Strategy it is implementing, which represents the 

chief danger to world and Russian security. 

 Colonel Vladimir Lutovinov, 

 Academy of Military Sciences,

 June 13, 2007 

Dangerous Destabilization. 

They decided to deploy defence infrastructure right on 

our borders. . . . I recall how things went in a similar 

situation in the mid-1960s. Similar actions by the Soviet 

Union, when it put missiles in Cuba, precipitated the Cuban Missile Crisis. For us, the technical aspects of the situation are very similar. We have removed the remnants 

of our bases from Vietnam and dismantled them in Cuba, 

yet threats of this kind to our own country are today being created right on our borders.

 President Putin, 

October 26, 2007
14

We will be forced to take appropriate measures of counteraction. . . . Notice that we are being forced into it. And 

the new round of the arms race instigated by the USA 

will hardly strengthen the security of the world, including the security of Europe.

 Chief of General Staff 

Yuriy Baluyevskiy, 

July 17, 2007

It is most likely that in the foreseeable future, we will 

hear talk about hundreds and even thousands of interceptor missiles in various parts of the world, including 

Europe. Poland is just the thin end of the wedge. . . . Just 

look at the map and you can see clearly that all this is being done along the perimeter of our borders. 

One needs to be very naive to believe that the U.S. missile 

defence base in Europe is directed away from Russia. 

 

 Russian Foreign Minister 

Sergey Lavrov, 

February 8, 2008 

The initiatives of fresh NATO members, like Poland and 

the Czech Republic, to host elements of the global U.S. 

missile and air defence system will give the Pentagon a 

potential to defeat our strategic nuclear forces. . . . This 

means a serious threat to the military [security], and as a 

result to the national security of Russia, and could lead to 

the disruption of strategic stability in the world.

Colonel-General Boris Cheltsov, 

Chief of Staff of the RussianAir Force, 

March 14, 2007 

Need for Legal Guarantees. 

We are forced to take relevant steps which will under no 

circumstances allow for the Russian nuclear deterrent 

potential to be devalued. . . . 
15

Had the Americans signed a treaty with us under which 

they would only deploy 10 antimissiles in Poland and 

one radar in the Czech Republic and would never deploy 

anything else there, one could agree to that. But they do 

not sign anything and only make unsubstantiated statements to the effect that they do not threaten us... Russia 

has already been cheated like that once before.

 Strategic Missile Troops (RVSN) 

CommanderColonel-General 

Nikolay Solovtsov, December 17, 2007 

When US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and US Defence Secretary Robert Gates were in Moscow [in October 

2007], they spoke about a whole range of possible steps 

on the part of the United States which were proposed as a 

sort of a guarantee that the US ABM system is not aimed 

against Russian interests. . . . 

We asked to have those ‘intentions’ in writing, that is in 

the form of a simple and clear proposal which the USA 

would be prepared to put forward in practical terms. We 

waited for almost 6 weeks. That must have been how 

long it takes inside the US administration to agree a specific wording and, possibly, to hold additional talks with 

partners. However, what we saw as a result was devoid 

of those elements.

Deputy Foreign Minister 

 Sergey Kislyak, 

February 5, 2008 

Accepting the [Rice-Gates] offer would be like digging 

our own grave.

Vremya Novostey newspaper, 

 April 24, 2007
16

We Will Respond. 

A potential threat in this regard does exist for us. And 

of course, we, as our President and other officials of the 

Russian Federation have already said more than once, 

will be forced to take appropriate action to neutralise 

these threats.

Foreign Minister 

Sergey Lavrov, 

October 15, 2007 

Our General Staff and experts believe that this system 

threatens our national security, and if it does appear, we 

will be forced to respond in an appropriate manner. We 

will then probably be forced to retarget some of our missile systems at these systems, which threaten us. . . . We 

are warning them in advance that if you take this step, 

we will be forced to respond in a particular way . . . I 

believe that I am obliged to say this today directly and 

honestly, so that later they do not blame themselves for 

events they themselves will be responsible for.

President Putin,

February 14, 2008 

I would like to remind my Polish colleagues of their 

recent history, which indicates that attempts to situate 

Poland on the line of confrontation have always led to 

tragedy. In that way Poland lost nearly one-third of its 

population during WWII.

Russia’s representative to NATO, 

Dmitry Rogozin, 

February 3, 2008

The responses might be many, and they will all be less 

expensive than the US actions.

Chief of General Staff 

Yuriy Baluyevskiy, 

May 8, 2007 
17

Meanwhile, the governments of both Poland and 

the Czech Republic invested considerable political 

capital in agreeing to host the U.S. sites in the face of 

domestic opposition encouraged by vociferous and 

threatening Russian campaigning. During a tense 

period immediately following the armed conflict in 

Georgia in August 2008, then U.S. Secretary of State 

Condoleezza Rice travelled to Warsaw to sign an 

agreement on construction of the interceptor site, 

leading to comment in U.S. media at the time that: 

For many Poles—whose country has been a staunch 

U.S. ally—the accord represented what they believed 

would be a guarantee of safety for themselves in the 

face of a newly assertive Russia.22

In July 2009, a group of Central Europe’s most 

recognized former leaders and public figures wrote 

an open letter to President Barack Obama highlighting missile defense as a symbol of U.S. commitment 

to Europe and resistance to Russian hostile pressure.23

Thus when plans for the Third Site BMD installations 

were cancelled, the immediate reaction was excited 

relief in Russia and dismay in Central Europe. The announcement of a planned alternative capability was 

entirely overshadowed by news of the cancellation 

of the planned radar and GBI site. This was therefore 

presented by some media as a strategic retreat, or a 

concession to Russia,24 which put pressure on relations with both Poland and the Czech Republic.25 In 

the case of Poland, an initial sense of betrayal to Russia was heightened by peculiarly insensitive timing; 

the announcement was made on September 17, 2009, 

precisely the 70th anniversary of the 1939 invasion of 

Poland by the Soviet Union.
18

Russia briefly celebrated a perceived victory over 

the cancellation of plans for installations in Poland 

and the Czech Republic—and, by implication, the 

surrender of those countries’ interests by the U.S. as 

a result of Russian pressure.26 The subsequent realization that cancellation of the Third Site was merely in 

favor of deployment of different capabilities under the 

European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) inadvertently reinforced a number of key U.S. messages 

to Russia: first, announcement of a “cancellation” of 

an undesirable program is not always good news; 

second, U.S. plans are subject to radical, sudden and 

unpredictable change, and not always for the better; 

and third, as a result, it pays to wait and see before 

welcoming any new U.S. initiative. These changes fuel 

Russian distrust in U.S. promises and reinforce Russian arguments that U.S. missile defense capabilities 

in the future can have very different capabilities than 

what is currently claimed. 

The Current State of EPAA.

Background.

On September 17, 2009, the same day as the Third 

Site cancellation was made public, President Barack 

Obama quietly announced a new plan for missile 

defense, creating the EPAA. The new phased adaptive approach deploys U.S. upper tier sea- and landbased missile defenses in Europe in four phases 

to supplement NATO lower tier systems as shortand longer-range missile threats from the Middle 

East proliferate.

The “adaptive” part of the program’s title is not an 

accident, but rather used to show that the missile de-
19

fense program moving forward will adapt to the ever 

increasing ballistic missile threat capability but still be 

able to protect U.S. forces abroad and NATO allies. 

President Obama stated: 

To put it simply, our new missile defense architecture 

in Europe will provide stronger, smarter, and swifter 

defenses of American forces and America’s Allies. It 

is more comprehensive than the previous program; it 

deploys capabilities that are proven and cost-effective; 

and it sustains and builds upon our commitment to 

protect the U.S. homeland against long-range ballistic 

missile threats; and it ensures and enhances the protection of all our NATO Allies.27

This plan calls for the establishment of a fully operational ballistic missile defense system in Europe 

by 2018, which involved four phases at the time. The 

first phase consisted of an early warning radar established in Turkey, and BMD-capable AEGIS cruisers, 

complete with the Standard Missile (SM) 3 Block IA 

medium-range ballistic missile interceptor. U.S. and 

NATO allies announced initial capability of European 

missile defense at the May 2012 NATO Summit, much 

to Russia’s chagrin and frustration. 

Phase II involves establishment of a land-based 

SM-3 ballistic missile interceptor site in Romania by 

2015, equipped with the more capable SM-3 Block IB 

able to engage short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. According to Missile Defense Agency’s (MDA) 

Director for International Affairs Nancy Morgan, 

Phase II broke ground in Romania in September 2013 

and will be the first land-based site in Europe. Phase 

III involves the second and last land-based SM-3 ballistic missile interceptor site in Europe, slated to be 

operational in Redizkowo, Poland, by 2018, equipped 

with the SM-3 Block IIA interceptor.
20

In March 2013, the United States announced the 

cancellation of EPAA Phase IV, which hinged on introduction of the SM-3 IIB, the technology for which 

has not yet developed. The SM-3 IIB program was 

experiencing extended delays, in part due to underfunding and over-ambitious technical aspirations, so 

the United States decided to place additional interceptors in Fort Greely, Alaska, home of an existing missile 

defense site in order to protect the U.S. homeland. U.S. 

Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel also announced the 

number of interceptors will increase from 30 to 44.

Hagel also announced plans for extending missile 

defense plans into Asia, deploying an additional AN/

TPY-2 radar in Japan, and called for a possible additional missile defense site in the United States, though 

he was clear that the decision on deploying the additional site has not been made officially by the Obama 

administration, but only that studies exploring an additional GBI site would expedite deploying the site, 

should the decision be made.

Russia’s Sectoral Defence Proposal. 

Once the planned development phases of EPAA 

became clear, the Russian objections to BMD resurfaced in full force. The third and fourth stages, intended to counteract longer-range ballistic missiles, 

were described as a threat to Russian deterrence potential.28 Meanwhile, the area of coverage of the defensive systems was perceived as threatening to Russia. According to then Russian ambassador to NATO 

Dmitry Rogozin: 

When the U.S. missile defence map in Europe is drawn 

for us as an illustration, it turns out that towards the 
21

third and the fourth phases, that is towards 2018 and 

2020, the U.S. missile defence sector almost reaches 

Russia’s Urals. This is not what we have agreed on.29

Rogozin went on to say that: 

Our partners need to understand that if they want 

to guarantee their own security, they have their own 

zone of responsibility. They can do anything they 

want there, but they should not creep towards us. 

They should not have the opportunity for their missile 

defence weapons to shoot down any ballistic targets 

over our territory, or over third countries.30

The solution proposed by Russia was so-called 

“sectoral defense,” or the “sectoral approach,” where 

Russia would ensure protection against missile 

threats over its own territory, while the United States 

provided protection for NATO nations. This option, 

while consistently put forward by Russia as a credible 

solution that provides for the workable defense of Europe against missiles while addressing Russia’s core 

objections to U.S. plans, was patently unrealistic for 

several reasons. 

• The objection to missiles being shot down by

the United States over Russia—“We’ve already 

had Chernobyl and that was enough for us”31—

would seem to rule out the whole basis of the 

Russian proposal, where Russia shoots down 

those missiles with the nuclear-based missile 

defense system currently in place in the Russian Federation.32

• Progress in discussing the division of responsibility would never have been possible without much greater Russian transparency over 

precisely what the Russian Federation could 
22

contribute in terms of future missile defense 

capability to make its own contribution viable. 

Despite the pains taken by the United States to 

explain its plans to the Russian side, including 

by means of direct briefings, this effort has not 

at any time been reciprocated in a meaningful 

manner. This may simply be because Russia 

does not have the capability to meet its commitments implied in the proposals. According 

to one informed view, “generally, there is a lack 

of information and transparency from the Russian side about its missile defense plans (either 

the Russians don’t have plans or they are unwilling to share them).”33

• Finally, the basic principle of the sectoral approach —that Russia on the one side and the 

U.S./NATO nations on the other do not provide missile defense coverage for the other’s 

territory—is unworkable because of simple 

geographical facts. Russian and NATO territory not only fail to follow neat and straight 

dividing lines, but in fact overlap thanks to Kaliningrad Oblast sitting on the far side of Latvia 

and Lithuania from the Russian mainland. 

The implication of the last point was that Russia 

should take missile defense responsibility for some 

NATO member states. Russia was therefore proposing that NATO should outsource part of its protection 

to Russia, while at the same time refusing to consider 

a reciprocal arrangement.34 The Russian proposal for 

sectoral missile defense was officially abandoned in 

mid-July 2011,35 and yet, it still occasionally reappears 

in Russian official statements.36
23

Lisbon and Afterwards.

NATO presented its Lisbon Summit in November 2010 as a breakthrough in strategic cooperation 

between Russia and NATO. In fact, however, this 

marked the beginning of even greater disappointments for Russia over the progress of BMD provision 

for Europe. At Lisbon, the United States and NATO 

agreed to integrate existing NATO member BMD capabilities, with EPAA forming the U.S. contribution.37

Meanwhile, the concurrent NATO-Russia Council 

Summit capitalized on the slow stabilization of relations between Russia and NATO after the Georgia 

war by declaring “a new stage of cooperation towards 

a true strategic partnership,” including exploring cooperation on missile defense.38

Moscow remained optimistic during the period 

immediately following Lisbon for a breakthrough in 

the United States, or indeed NATO, recognizing and 

taking into account Russian interests—since this was 

the Russian understanding of what had been promised at the summit.39 But this optimism faded rapidly, 

as Russia saw the United States pushing ahead with 

plans for EPAA, apparently untroubled by Russian 

concerns, and with no options for cooperation emerging from the summit. As a result, Russian objections 

to missile defense plans once again increased in both 

volume and pitch ahead of a meeting of permanent 

representatives on the NATO-Russia Council in early 

July 2011, held in Sochi, Russia, with senior Russian 

officials, including Foreign Minister Lavrov and Medvedev in attendance.40 The Sochi meeting was seen in 

advance as: 
24

a good opportunity to take stock of the implementation of decisions taken in Lisbon—where we are in 

contributing to the implementation of a single space 

of peace, security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic 

area—where we are, what the state of play is, what 

should be done.41

Predictably enough, assessments of whether or not 

this stocktaking was at all productive for BMD discussions varied widely. There was a marked contrast in 

the tone of the headlines of reports from the meeting—

from Russian, “NATO and Russia in deadlock over 

missile defense,”42 to German, “Russia warns NATO 

over missile defense shield plans,”43 to independent, 

“Russia-NATO Relations Stuck on Missile Defense,”44

to NATO’s own very distinctive headline—“NATORussia Council makes progress in Sochi.”45 It should 

be no surprise that open source reporting on such a 

contentious issue as BMD is in effect unrecognizable 

between different sources and countries, reinforcing 

the need to examine Russian coverage in detail in order to achieve an accurate understanding of both sides 

of the conversation. 

Thus, by the end of 2011, despite what Russia 

had understood as commitments from Lisbon a year 

earlier, Moscow saw the United States and NATO 

ready to declare Phase I of EPAA operational and on 

schedule and hope for any agreement on cooperation 

on missile defense receded rapidly.46 Moscow’s disillusionment in negotiations with the United States and 

NATO over BMD was made clear in a speech by thenPresident Medvedev on November 23, 2011, where 

he stated, “We find ourselves facing a fait accompli.”47

Offers of cooperation by the United States and NATO 

were deemed insufficient. For example, according to 

NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, 
25

NATO had attempted to allay Russian concerns by 

offering transparency on missile defense programs 

through exchanges at the NATO-Russia Council and 

issued “a standing invitation to Russian experts to observe and analyze missile defense tests.” Rasmussen 

wrote that NATO also proposed holding joint NATORussian theater missile defense exercises and suggested establishing two joint missile defense centers, one 

for sharing data and the other for supporting planning.48 Russia rejected these proposals as insufficient.49

Nevertheless, NATO officials stated as recently as 

June 2013 that “these options are still on the table.”50

“LEGAL GUARANTEES” AND TECHNICAL 

ARGUMENTS 

When the entire history of U.S. BMD plans is reviewed from the Russian perspective, some consistent 

themes emerge. The history is one of change, inconsistency, and unpredictability, where the United States 

does not act as a reliable interlocutor. Even when 

changes are made that appear at first sight to fall in 

with Russian demands, such as Third Site cancellation, this can mask the development of even more 

undesirable plans. This sheds light on Russia’s discounting of assurances that U.S. BMD plans will not, 

and are not intended to, challenge Russia’s deterrent 

potential and Russia’s consequent repeated demands 

for “legally binding guarantees” that this is the case. 

There is no shortage of statements on record by 

both U.S. and NATO officials that Russia is not the target of European BMD plans and that the intention is 

not to undermine strategic stability.51 Unfortunately, 

saying so does not make it so in Russian eyes. Washington and NATO have offered political guarantees of 
26

good faith to Moscow during several rounds of negotiations, but history has shown Moscow that with every U.S. presidential administration, the focus, goals, 

and momentum of the U.S. missile defense system 

change. In this light, it becomes less of a surprise that 

Moscow gives little weight to U.S. assurances over 

BMD—since it sees the United States doing the same. 

Russia therefore asks for a more binding commitment 

from the United States.

Speaking in 2011, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey 

Lavrov explained this as follows: 

We propose agreeing on guarantees that the future 

[EPAA] system will not be aimed against Russia. . . .

we propose agreeing on criteria to verify in practice 

that the stated purpose of the project—namely, to 

ward off missile threats from outside the Euro-Atlantic region—will actually be observed. The Americans 

are not yet ready for that; they give assurances that 

there are no plans to aim this system against Russia. 

But they refer to the fact that the Senate has forbade 

the administration to limit the future development 

of missile defence in any way—in other words, there 

may be a fifth, sixth, seventh, etc. phase, which also 

does not add much to predictability.

Our position is simple: if you say that the system is not 

aimed against Russia, why not put it on paper?52

The U.S. refusal (and indeed political inability) to 

give binding commitments on limitations to the capability of BMD systems is accompanied by a wealth 

of expert opinion pointing out that the “legal guarantees” would be inappropriate and unworkable. Samuel Charap of the International Institute of Strategic 

Studies (IISS) notes that the United States is, in effect, 

being called on to give guarantees that Russia should 
27

be allowed to annihilate it at will,53 while leading disarmament and arms control specialist Paul Schulte 

notes the probable ineffectiveness of legal agreements 

constraining “a state interested in the thermo-nuclear 

incineration of millions of your citizens.”54 Informed 

commentary within Russia also notes difficulties with 

the demand. According to Aleksey Arbatov, leading 

commentator and head of the Centre for International 

Security of the Institute for International Economy and 

International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences, “Russia is demanding some sort of legal guarantees, but is not saying exactly what type of guarantees. If Russia wants a new treaty limiting missile 

defence, the USA and NATO will not do it.” Furthermore, Arbatov writes, the guarantees are entirely onesided: Russia has no intention of giving anyone any 

guarantees regarding its own planned air and space 

defence system; “on the contrary, we openly say that 

this system is aimed against the USA and NATO.”55

As noted by Aleksandr Stukalin in the respected Moscow Defense Brief quarterly: 

the notion of unilateral ‘legally binding guarantees’ 

seems to be a curious new invention by the Russian 

negotiators, since there are no historical precedents of 

such guarantees . . . how exactly are the ‘guarantees’ 

demanded by Russia supposed to work?56

The impossibility for the U.S. side of subscribing 

to any restriction on missile defense plans that would 

require Senate ratification57 is an obstacle fully recognized and understood by Russia. Finally, even legal 

guarantees are suspect—treaty obligations, like those 

contained in the ABM Treaty, can be, and indeed have 

been, renounced. But the fact that Russia’s demands 

are unworkable does nothing to reduce the “intensity 
28

and repetitiveness” of Russian insistence on its understanding of international law and on the necessity 

for “legally-binding agreements.”58 This is entirely 

consistent with calls for treaty arrangements in other 

and broader areas of concern to Moscow, such as the 

persistent Russian push for a new “European Security Treaty,” and it should be expected to remain an 

underlying theme of Russian demands in future. 

Technical Issues. 

Russia’s objections to U.S. missile defense systems 

in Europe hinge on the assumption that, at some future stage in their development, they will be capable 

of reducing the effectiveness of strategic missiles 

launched from Russia. The technological capabilities 

of currently deployed systems are less alarming than 

what was promised for the future under Phases III 

and IV of EPAA, and it is against threatening future 

developments that Russia has consistently sought 

protective guarantees. 

Independent critics claim BMD technologies overall remain mostly unproven to date, often run behind 

schedule, have significant cost overruns, and would 

have limited ability to defend against an actual ballistic missile attack.59 But Russian officials note that 

once any technology is fielded, the United States can 

decide at any time to increase the number of deployed 

interceptors or modify existing equipment with more 

advanced software and hardware. 

Despite the unified and dogmatic position officially presented by Russia that EPAA poses a threat to 

Russian deterrence, technical debates do take place in 

Russia between responsible and informed individuals, 

arriving at a range of different conclusions about the 
29

real implications for Russia of missile defense plans.60

Highly qualified Russian experts do disagree with the 

official Russian line. Colonel-General (Retired) Viktor Yesin, formerly Chief of Staff of Russia’s Strategic 

Missile Forces, does so regularly in Russian sources, 

including in those media that would normally imply 

official blessing.61 Similarly, Major-General (Retired) 

Vladimir Dvorkin, also formerly of the Russian Strategic Missile Forces and credited with significant contributions to formulating Soviet and Russian positions at 

strategic arms control negotiations, consistently puts 

forward reasoned arguments that cast doubt on Russian official claims for the efficacy and intended target 

of EPAA.62 According to Yury Solomonov, chief designer of the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology 

(Russia’s premier strategic missile design bureau), “In 

most cases—and I’m saying this absolutely officially 

and taking responsibility—the threat to our strategic 

potential has simply been invented.”63

Knowledgeable individuals from both the United 

States and Russia have put forward technical arguments outlining precisely at which point U.S. missiles 

would, in theory, be capable of intercepting Russian 

ICBMs. As might be expected, given that the arguments rest on commonly accepted laws of physics, 

there is a degree of congruence between independent 

assessments from Russia and from the United States. 

For example, the conclusions reached by Yesin, cited 

earlier, with Major-General Yevgeniy Savostyanov in 

April 201264 are broadly similar to those of Yousaf Butt 

and Theodore Postol in a Federation of American Scientists report in September 2011.65 Both agree that, on a 

purely technical basis, U.S. BMD plans pose little or no 

threat to Russia’s nuclear deterrent capability—especially given the location of fixed Russian missile bases 
30

and the Russian ability to use countermeasures—and 

this assessment has only been strengthened by the 

cancellation of the SM3 Block IIB missile, whose likely 

capabilities were used for the worst case assessments. 

On this basis, it could reasonably be hoped that 

Russia and the United States could reach baseline 

agreements on the precise point in BMD technology 

development at which Russia has legitimate cause for 

concern—especially given repeated bilateral expert 

consultations, including at the Moscow conference on 

missile defense in May 2012.66 But even if technical discussion behind closed doors can reach agreement on 

immutable physical realities, Russia apparently does 

not find this possible in public debate, even at those 

presentations where Russia is seeking through graphics and modeling to demonstrate the exact impact of 

BMD on Russian deterrence. At one such demonstration held at the Russian Embassy in London in June 

2012, the technical assumptions behind the modeled 

successful intercepts of Russian missiles were questioned from the audience; rather than defending or 

explaining the simulation, the Russian response was 

simply that the “probability of interception depends 

on factors we will not discuss here.”67 Similarly, when 

asked to reconcile Russia’s official position with the 

views of acknowledged Russian subject matter experts 

such as Dvorkin, Russia’s Deputy Head of Mission to 

NATO was brusque: 

There are a lot of experts expressing their personal 

views on things. Every expert has the right to express 

his own views. . . . That is an opinion of a man [Dvorkin] who as far as I know retired some time ago.68

This failure to engage with challenges to Russian 

statements strongly reinforces the view that the Rus-
31

sian objections to BMD are, in fact, insubstantial and 

have no basis in any realistic technical capability to 

challenge Russian deterrence. However, the majority of the experts cited earlier also agreed that strict 

technical capabilities are not the only criterion for determining whether the planned EPAA Phase IV was 

destabilizing and a threat to Russia, and a range of political, historical, and other factors are in play. This became abundantly clear when Phase IV was cancelled 

in March 2013. 

EPAA PHASE IV CANCELLED 

There was widespread expectation in the United 

States and its allies that the decision to cancel EPAA 

Phase IV would be welcomed with appreciation by 

Russia, as at first sight this removed many of the Russian objections to the planned development of EPAA. 

As put by Yesin, “The decision not to place SM-3 missiles with increased combat capabilities [Block IIB] in 

Europe . . . will eliminate the main irritant for Russia.”69 Instead, the initial reaction from Moscow was a 

studied silence. 

Following the 2009 experience of Third Site cancellation, Russia no doubt wished to avoid premature 

expressions of enthusiasm. But there were other, more 

significant reasons for the subdued response. In private discussions, Russian officials noted that the reaction to cancellation of EPAA Phase 4 was skeptical 

because of the overall situation and broader context in 

which it was made: the stated reasons for the cancellation were nothing to do with Russia, the decision was 

presented by the United States as the program being 

“restructured” on technical grounds, rather than cancelled, giving no guarantee that it would not return 
32

at a later date; and crucially, the development suggested that other future changes of plan and direction 

are likely.70

As noted earlier, “adaptive” is a key word in the 

title of the EPAA program. But according to First Secretary of Russia’s Mission to NATO Sergei Malyugin, 

speaking at the 2013 Royal United Services Institute 

(RUSI) Missile Defence Conference, “The adaptive approach is a little too adaptive.” What from the U.S. side 

looks like flexibility to develop in accordance with an 

evolving threat seems inconsistent, unpredictable, and 

therefore destabilizing to Russia. Changes like these 

do not instill confidence in U.S. assurances and lend 

weight to Russia’s perceived need for legally binding 

guarantees, such as a formal treaty. Thus while the 

eventual Russian response to Hagel’s announcement 

was “cautiously optimistic,” it was also careful to 

state that while the move is appreciated, the cancellation does not change Russian concerns that European 

BMD systems may eventually target Russia.71

What the U.S. cancellation of phase IV has seemed 

to accelerate was Russian interest in returning to negotiations with the United States over missile defense 

in Europe. Only now, Russia no longer views missile 

defense as only a European security issue—now Russia views missile defense as worldwide and is increasingly concerned about U.S. expansion—primarily U.S. 

missile defense sites surrounding Russia from both the 

East and West. In the same vein, Moscow increasingly 

relays to Washington that Moscow is growing less interested in bilateral missile defense talks and wants 

to include other nations with missile defense interests 

into the fold of discussions—namely China. This will 

undoubtedly make future missile defense discussions 

difficult for U.S. policymakers.72
33

This issue appears closely aligned with the U.S. 

“pivot” to the East and how Russia is accounting for 

that pivot in its own security calculus, including potentially becoming more involved in Asia and aligning more closely with China on missile defense. It is at 

present unclear to what extent Russia recognizes that 

the need for missile defense capability is more pressing in Northeast Asia than in Europe,73 but Asia features much less prominently in Moscow’s anti-BMD 

campaign, arguably in part because Russian influence 

on and interest in countries threatened by North Korean weapons is much less than in Central Europe. 

A further complicating factor for future negotiation 

is the Russian desire to fold missile defense dialogue 

into all areas of arms control discussion, including 

on conventional arms control in Europe and further 

nuclear reductions. According to Nikolai Korchunov: 

Missile defence is only one element of security which 

is more and more intertwined, and is being influenced 

by a number of inter-related and interconnected factors. It is really difficult to analyse security only from 

the stand-point of missile defence without taking into 

account conventional arms, the Prompt Global Strike 

concept and the threat of the weaponisation of outer 

space. The failure to reach a compromise on missile 

defence could also complicate the future prospects of 

the disarmament process.74

Thus the missile defense issue is being raised in 

response to a number of different topics, including the 

proposal to Russia by the Obama administration for 

negotiations on both conventional weapons control 

and further reductions in nuclear arms beyond New 

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START).75 The re-
34

sult, according to one senior British official, is “strategic constipation,” as the interlinking of all issues 

makes it impossible to resolve any single one. 

RUSSIA—OTHER FACTORS 

As noted earlier, the pure technical capabilities of 

U.S. missile defense systems are not the only means 

by which they pose a challenge to Russia. There are 

a number of other historical and geopolitical considerations affecting Russian decisionmaking on BMD 

that may not be intuitively obvious when the issue is 

viewed from a U.S. perspective. 

Self-Perception and Geopolitical Perspective. 

Russian objections to BMD plans refer consistently 

to threats to strategic stability. The shared understanding of this term as applied to deterrence during 

the Cold War is no longer in force: to Western policymakers, it now has entirely different implications, 

whereas in Russia, as with so much else, the definition 

of the term has not moved on—leading to yet more 

misunderstanding in bilateral discussion.76

One implication of this is that defensive systems 

that could theoretically counter even a small part of 

Russia’s nuclear deterrence potential have strategic 

implications for Russia out of all proportion to their 

actual degrading effect. As Paul Schulte notes in a 2013 

paper, whether or not Russia’s deterrence can, in fact, 

be neutralized by BMD, the fact that it is undermined 

and called into question is in itself destabilizing.77

Allied to this is the Russian perception of nuclear 

weapons as a guarantee, and indeed a symbol, of national status. In the first decade after the end of the 
35

Soviet Union, the old quip comparing the country 

with “Upper Volta with nuclear weapons” resurfaced 

regularly among Russia-watchers.78 If nuclear weapons were all that stood between Russia and Third 

World status, the implications of taking the weapons 

away were clear enough. Regardless that Russia today is a very different country from that of the 1990s, 

the status of nuclear weapons in the national psyche 

remains the same. According to former U.S. diplomat 

Wayne Merry: 

Anything like BMD which contains the potential—or 

even the perception of the potential—to compromise 

the integrity or stature of the Russian nuclear arsenal 

is seen by policymakers in Moscow as a danger not 

only to the country’s security but to its historic identity as a great state.79

This contrasts with the approach taken in the United States and other states, which would happily renounce nuclear weapons altogether were such a thing 

possible. Merry continues: 

If all nuclear weapons were by magic to disappear 

from the earth overnight, American security would 

be enhanced due to our dominance in non-nuclear 

military technologies and forces; by contrast, Russia 

would face a fundamental crisis of national identity. 

. . . Thus, American talk of global “nuclear zero” is 

viewed in Moscow as inspired by the goal of U.S. nonnuclear hegemony, rather than to free the world from 

nuclear fear.80

Another related issue is the inalienable Russian 

perception that Russia matters in everything and 

is constantly at the forefront of U.S. policymakers’ 

minds. While Rogozin may state that “European mis-
36

sile defence . . . can be created only with Russia’s participation. Without Russia, there will be no missile 

defence,”81 this is hard to reconcile with the progress 

of missile defense plans—without Russian participation—to date. In fact, Russia has very few levers with 

which to influence U.S. decisionmaking. Nevertheless, the Russian urge to maintain a self-perceived superpower status, despite all economic, technical, and 

military evidence to the contrary, leads it to seek to 

use political constraints on the United States to compensate for its long-term relative decline. In essence, 

diplomatic power is the only lever that Russia retains 

to project power beyond its immediate neighbors.

Meanwhile, Russia believes that it can manage 

through political relations those countries that the 

United States perceives as a potential missile threat, 

including Iran. Furthermore, Russia does not share the 

U.S. threat perception; it does not believe Iran has the 

intent, nor the capability, to engage the United States 

with ballistic missiles. 

Moscow questions U.S. published assessments of 

Iranian missile technology but also points out that 

since the United States clearly will not allow Iran 

to develop a nuclear capability, it cannot logically 

be concerned about a nuclear threat to Europe from 

Iran. Therefore, the political effort and capital going 

into EPAA must be designed for a more established 

missile threat: Russia.

But even if Russia were to accept that a threat from 

Iran exists, it is reluctant to legitimize U.S. efforts to 

counter it today because of concerns—validated by 

recent U.S. statements and actions—over how the 

countermeasures will develop in the medium to long 

term. In addition, domestic Russian politics need to 

be considered. The current Russian leadership would 
37

find it challenging to emphasize the peaceable nature 

of U.S. BMD plans after so much effort has been expended on portraying them as an existential threat 

to Russia. A precedent for this challenge exists: Russian approval of Ulyanovsk as a site for a transit hub 

on the Northern Distribution Network to facilitate 

U.S., NATO, and allied drawdown from Afghanistan caused a severe domestic political backlash after 

years of the Russian public absorbing largely hostile 

messaging about NATO.82

One additional factor that is particularly unhelpful 

in this context is the internal tension within the United 

States, between the desire to present BMD as a credible system that will, in fact, deter its target audience, 

and playing down its current and potential capabilities in order not to lend substance to Russian objections. The balance is not always well maintained: at 

the same time Russia was being assured publicly that 

ground-based interceptors to be sited in Poland could 

not possibly challenge the Russian nuclear deterrent 

because of their very limited number, statements were 

also being made that “We will be able to put hundreds 

of interceptors in the air at a given time . . . within the 

next several years.”83

As put by Brigadier-General Lauri Kiianlinna, 

“like beauty, a credible defence posture is in the eye of 

the beholder.”84 It remains the case that both adversaries and unrelated third parties, including Russia, may 

have more faith in the deterrent potential of missile 

defense than its creators in the United States. Russia’s 

military doctrine emphasizes the threat of hostile military infrastructure “approaching Russia’s borders,” 

and it is easy, if desired, to read planned installations 

in Poland and Romania, and Aegis BMD capabilities 

afloat off the Russian coastline, as a case in point.85
38

The perception is stronger in Russian minds than 

in Western ones that missile defense is a reversal of 

the post-Cold-War processes of the last 20 years: instead of disarming, withdrawing, and closing down, 

this is an introduction of new capabilities. This is why 

Russia points to a reversal of a security trend and a 

shift in strategic balance.86 This exacerbates the Russian perception of the United States as an irresponsible actor that has not learned strategic lessons from 

intervention in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, and may 

in the future be tempted to meddle in Russia. EPAA, 

and expanded BMD capabilities in the Pacific, give rise 

to a Russian sensation of encirclement by U.S. interceptor missiles and U.S.-sponsored forces in Europe, 

the Middle East, and the Asia Pacific. In fact, a slide 

repeatedly shown by Morgan showing global missile 

defense deployments is eerily reminiscent of Soviet 

propaganda images from the Cold War, showing Russia surrounded on all sides and across the Arctic by 

missiles and troops fielded by the United States and 

its imperialist proxies. 

Economic Issues. 

The suggestion that Russia’s strategic response 

to SDI in the 1980s hastened the demise of the Soviet 

Union has already been discussed. Thirty years later, 

just as in the case of discussion of technical capabilities, informed Russian experts are perfectly prepared 

to voice opinions that do not fall in with official policy, 

warning of similar consequences that might ensue for 

Russia from heavy investment in countermeasures to 

defeat U.S. BMD plans: 
39

In principle, Russia is capable of taking these steps, 

but it must consider the economic and political price 

of doing so. This would mean huge spending on a 

new arms race. In the case of the hypotonic Russian 

economy, this is akin to a person with acute anaemia 

donating blood. It is unlikely that we could cope with 

this in the long run.87

This consideration is given extra weight by the 

perception with hindsight that the Soviet response 

to SDI was entirely unnecessary because SDI’s technological basis was, in fact, illusory. As put by Solomonov, speaking directly to Putin in February 2012, 

“[SDI] tied up huge intellectual, material and financial 

resources. . . . it was a complete fraud.” Speaking at 

the same round table with Putin, Sergey Rogov, Director of the Russian Academy of Sciences’ Institute for 

U.S. and Canadian Studies, continued that: 

We are repeating the mistakes of 29 years ago. When 

Reagan came up with “Star Wars,” some people in our 

country decided that that was it, it was the end of the 

world. . . . But now, in my opinion, there is a real opportunity to avoid past mistakes.88

Russia thus finds itself faced with a choice of existential threats: the U.S. BMD plans have the theoretical 

potential either to devalue Russia’s nuclear deterrent, 

its last-ditch guarantee of statehood and protection 

of its interests, or to draw Russia into an arms race 

whose previous iteration contributed to the downfall 

of the state in which the current generation of Russian 

leaders were born and raised—with all the dire consequences they observed at first-hand in the 1990s. 
40

Russia’s Proposed Responses. 

Current Russian statements carry yet another echo 

of past debates, only with the roles of the United States 

and USSR reversed: when told that it is inconceivable 

that the United States would consider a nuclear attack 

on Russia, the Russian response is the same as that of 

the United States during the Cold War—that a nation 

cannot gamble its security on another state’s stated 

intentions, but only on its developing capabilities.89

To Western ears, this sounds like Cold-War era thinking; but it needs to be placed in the context of Russia’s 

perception of being both encircled and threatened by 

the capability gap between the United States and Russia—perceptions that helped shape Soviet Cold War 

thinking. This in turn provides context for the hostility of Russian statements and outright threats over 

missile defense. 

One of the most significant considerations informing Russian attitudes to BMD is the dramatic gap that 

remains between Russian and U.S. military capability. 

Russia’s perception of strategic vulnerability has led 

to an emphasis on aerospace defense and strategic offensive weapons in the ongoing program of military 

transformation and re-investment in defense in an attempt to close the gap—in spite of the warnings over 

the consequences for Russia of a new arms race, and a 

plethora of expert analysis observing that the real military threat to Russia is an entirely different one.90 The 

detailed status and goals of the transformation effort 

lie outside the scope of this monograph,91 but some of 

the most recent adjustments at the time of this writing 

place even greater weight on strategic weapons systems and relegate the ground forces still further in the 

queue for funding.92 As put by Putin: 
41

We must take into account the realities of the day, we 

cannot allow the strategic deterrence system to be upset or the effectiveness of our nuclear forces to be decreased. For this reason the creation of the aerospace 

defense system will continue to be one of the key 

priorities in military development.93

The new aerospace defense command (Voyennokosmicheskaya oborona or VKO) is being prioritized for 

funding not only in response to the nuclear threat, but 

also to a perception of vulnerability to U.S. conventional precision strike capabilities. Also, according to 

Putin in June 2013, following the Presidential Summit 

on the sidelines of the G8 Summit in the UK: 

We see that work is active around the world on developing high-precision conventional weapons systems 

that in their strike capabilities come close to strategic 

nuclear weapons. Countries that have such weapons 

substantially increase their offensive capability.94

But Russian reporting also suggests prioritization 

of countermeasures specifically intended to overcome 

U.S. BMD capabilities. According to Russian researcher Dr. Igor Sutyagin, Russia is investing heavily in a 

range of means of both counteracting and defeating 

U.S. BMD systems, which are “based on mature Soviet technology, just updating the electronics by two 

generations.” These include penetration aids; advanced decoys; maneuverable and gliding re-entry 

vehicles (RVs); concealment measures for RVs; means 

for blinding infrared and radar seekers; nuclear force 

protection measures, including road and rail mobile 

ICBMs; seabed laid ballistic missile systems; and multilayered missile defense systems for Russia’s own 
42

fixed installations.95 As in other fields, Russian actions and statements now mirror those of the United 

States in previous decades, in this case with the U.S. 

response to the Moscow ABM site: it was reported to 

the House Armed Services Committee in 1987 that the 

Soviet ABM system could be penetrated by ICBMs 

equipped with highly effective chaff and decoys, 

and furthermore that “if the Soviets should deploy 

more advanced or proliferated defenses we have new 

penetration aids as counters.”96

As part of the response to EPAA, Russia’s engagement with the new START has repeatedly been questioned. According to Rogozin, “At a certain stage a 

situation could arise when we will have to leave the 

START-3 treaty.”97 There is skepticism as to how realistic this threat may be. It had already been threatened 

before the Sochi summit in 2011 that failure to fall in 

with Russian requests for sectoral defense could lead 

to Russia withdrawing from START98—a stipulation 

that was then quietly dropped. 

Official Russian statements send mixed messages 

on where, and when, precisely Russia’s red lines lie. 

On the one hand, Lavrov states that there are no deadlines for agreement,99 and Rogozin confirms that “in 

general, we do not use the language of ultimatums. 

One should learn to talk to the West with dignity and 

from a position of confidence in our own powers.”100

On the other, there are plentiful statements and comments hinting at the unfortunate consequences of failure to reach an agreement satisfactory to Russia. In 

2011, for example, Korchunov suggested: 

I think in the case when we disagree and Russian concerns are not assuaged it could have unfortunate consequences for European security. These things should 
43

be regarded and perceived in a much broader context 

of our relationship with the US—the interrelationship 

between offensive and defensive arms is spelled out 

in the Russia-US START Treaty. Of course if such an 

unfortunate scenario develops it will force us to take 

measures. The logic is simple and clear: if one side increases anti-ballistic capabilities it forces the other side 

to build up its offensive arms.101

Finally, Russia has repeatedly threatened as a last 

resort to take direct military action against U.S. facilities if its concerns are not heeded. As expressed in 

one commentary in July 2011, if no legal guarantee is 

received from the United States, Russia: 

will deploy our missile grouping on the Western borders and aim our missiles at the European missile defence installations. . . . That will be the answer in any 

case if they try to deprive us of the dearest thing that 

any Russian has, our nuclear shield.102

The same threat has been repeated on numerous 

occasions by Putin and Medvedev: as put by Medvedev in November 2011, Russia may “deploy modern 

offensive weapon systems in the west and south of the 

country, ensuring our ability to take out any part of 

the US missile defence system in Europe.”103

OUTLOOK AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 

The recent history of the missile defense conversation with Russia has been one of repeated and unsuccessful attempts by the United States and NATO to 

find an accommodation to allay Russian concerns. A 

variety of approaches have been attempted in order 

to convince Moscow that EPAA—as well as the larger 
44

concept of BMD overall—is not designed against or 

intended to target Russia, nor its strategic deterrent. 

Several initiatives were under way in 2012 alone, including a joint missile defense exercise in Germany, 

and a report by the multinational Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative group.104 Yet none of these attempts 

have mitigated Russia’s trenchant opposition to the 

U.S. plans. 

The ineluctable block to progress in discussions 

of BMD between the United States and Russia is that 

the two nations’ fundamental interests simply do not 

align, and there is, therefore, no overlap at all between 

the desired end states of each side. The United States 

sees BMD capability as an essential means of protection for the United States and its allies; Russia sees the 

exact reverse, and requires an absence of BMD systems from Europe to ensure its own security. There is 

simply no room for compromise between these two 

polar opposites. The best that U.S. policymakers can 

do, therefore, is engage with the Russian fears in open 

dialogue, in a continued attempt to assuage Russian 

concerns and thereby avoid a political miscalculation 

that could ultimately lead to a real military problem.

In the meantime, the United States should also 

consider the messaging that is directed at its European 

allies, as well as at Russia. It was widely recognized 

that the 2013 news of cancellation of EPAA Phase IV, 

while still unwelcome for Europe, was delivered in 

a greatly more competent manner than the 2009 announcement of cancellation of earlier plans for installations in Poland and the Czech Republic. Yet, private 

diplomatic work with allied governments does not 

always translate into European media treatment, or 

public opinion, or expert commentary that is sympathetic to U.S. changes of plan. Even independent ex-
45

perts from third countries may agree that the current 

U.S. BMD plans are no challenge to Russia’s deterrent, 

but at the same time remain highly critical of the handling of EPAA and its effects on U.S. allies. According 

to Stefan Forss, “The U.S. did its allies a big disservice 

putting so much political weight into SM-3 IIB. The 

Poles and others feel betrayed. . . . Politics should be 

based on facts, not technical illusions.”105

The experience of 2009 showed the importance 

of public opinion in Central Europe and the amount 

of political capital that allies potentially have to expend in order to be able to support U.S. plans. In this 

area, the United States would benefit from enhanced 

efforts to convince European publics that changes 

of plan over EPAA do not mean a reduced commitment by the United States to European security. As 

put by the Center for European Policy Analysis, a U.S. 

think tank: 

[The U.S.] Administration must now deal with the very 

real fear among Europeans that last week’s EPAA cancellation was just the first in a series of “salami slices” 

that, deliberately or not, will ultimately result in the 

eventual, de facto death of the U.S. missile defense program in Europe. Rightly or wrongly, this has been the 

suspicion of many Polish and American observers since 

the onset of the Administration’s planning for EPAA. 

. . . [By] removing the one component of America’s 

BMD program in Europe that is directly relevant to the 

defense of the continental United States, the cancellation is likely to create an irresistible opening for voices 

on Capitol Hill to argue against the program entirely. 

Under this logic, a system that only defends Europe 

should no longer be America’s financial responsibility. Some allies are not irrational in their growing, if 

politely muted, suspicion that greater “flexibility” on 

BMD could indeed eventually enter into the cards in 

strategic nuclear talks with Moscow.106
46

Perception of U.S. commitment to Europe becomes 

an even more acute issue in the light of U.S. statements 

on a “pivot” to Asia. The subsequent rebranding of the 

“pivot” to a “rebalancing,” among a number of other 

soothing synonyms adopted by the U.S. leadership, 

does little to address concerns over a possible reduction of the relative weight of the United States in European security107—which is, after all, a long-standing 

Russian aim.108

The hostile messaging emanating from Russia is 

an undeniable factor in Central European public opinion. But at the political level, working with Russia as 

a dialogue partner in large part consists of the art of 

filtering out angry noises and bluster in order to determine where the real concerns, red lines, and threats 

of consequences actually lie. At the same time, just 

because a Russian threat of direct military action in 

Europe seems inconceivable to us does not mean that 

it should be ruled out. Russian perception of military 

action as a valid foreign policy tool was reinforced by 

the results of the armed conflict in Georgia in 2008. 

Although widely portrayed in foreign media and 

analysis as self-defeating, and despite the fact that it 

highlighted severe deficiencies in Russian military 

capability, the conflict with Georgia, in fact, resolved 

a number of key doctrinal challenges for Russia and 

demonstrated that when Russia says often and loud 

enough that it will do something, something does occasionally happen.109 It should be recalled that just as 

in 2008, Russia would weigh the advantages and disadvantages of direct military intervention abroad to 

protect its perceived security interests by very different criteria than would the United States.110
47

One of the Russian responses to EPAA that has attracted the most attention overseas has been the threat 

of deploying Russia’s own offensive missile systems, 

specifically SS-26 Iskander missiles, to the Kaliningrad Region, thereby greatly extending their reach 

into NATO territory.111 But it is misleading to link this 

promise solely to EPAA. The threat of forward deployment of Iskanders has been a staple of Russian rhetoric 

since long before 2009 and is reliably wheeled out in 

many other cases when Russia feels it needs to make 

a point because its interests are being neglected—for 

example, ahead of the accession to NATO of Estonia, 

Latvia, and Lithuania in 2004. Previous instances even 

pre-date the availability of Iskander systems; analogous threats of forward deployment of the Tochka-U 

system date back at least to 2001. 

Throughout this period, Russia has seen that its attention-seeking behavior has been richly rewarded by 

strong reactions from European media and from those 

policymaking establishments in partner countries that 

have failed to retain the institutional memory to realize that the threat cannot in any way be described as 

a new development. This confirms for Russia that repeated threats of deployments of advanced systems to 

Kaliningrad are profitable and worthwhile, and they 

should be expected to continue for as long as they 

provoke the desired response. Nevertheless, as with 

the case of deployment of S-400 Triumf systems to Kaliningrad, which was similarly preceded by a lengthy 

series of threatening statements, they should also be 

considered as indicative of a long-term rollout plan 

by the Russian armed forces that eventually will be 

implemented anyway.112

The United States can therefore expect Russia to 

deploy weapons systems to counter U.S. missile de-
48

fense, but the timing of this deployment, and the systems used, will most probably depend on the progress 

of implementation of EPAA. Key dates in this respect 

are the beginning of construction at the Romanian site 

in September 2013 and at the Polish site in 2018. In addition, given the history of U.S. changes of plan linked 

to changes in presidential administration, Russia may 

be less inclined to seek a conclusive resolution before 

the next U.S. presidential election in 2016. 

Russia is faced with a choice between an early 

agreement with the current U.S. President, that they 

hope will be honored by the next incumbent, or the 

much more realistic prospect of waiting for the 2016-

18 window between the next U.S. election and the 

beginning of construction at the Polish site. Ahead of 

this time, Russia can wait to see what is offered by the 

United States and then cherry-pick its preferred option; but after the start of construction in Poland, Russia loses political leverage, reducing the number of 

alternative courses of action available by Russia other 

than a purely military response. In this period, Russia could either accept U.S. or NATO offers of transparency and cooperation or make its own counteroffer of cooperation in an area that is important to the 

United States. 

As noted previously, Russian withdrawal from 

the START appears unlikely. It is also questionable 

whether renewed discussion by Russia of withdrawal 

from the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty 

would lead to action, given the extent to which the 

treaty serves Russian interests by restraining an area 

of U.S. conventional superiority.113 The Russian demands for “legally binding guarantees,” up to and 

including a new treaty agreement, should be expected 

to continue. But despite the lack of realism of the cur-
49

rent phrasing of the Russian demands, another underlying factor that provides the United States with leverage is the validation a bilateral treaty with the United 

States would provide for Russia’s self-perception as 

a great power and the nominal equal of the United 

States. The prospect of a treaty arrangement that recognizes the special role of the Russian Federation may 

well provide a meaningful incentive in further discussions with Moscow, regardless of the actual eventual 

content of any agreement reached. 

Take It To The Top. 

In an unscripted moment picked up by news cameras on March 26, 2012, President Obama told outgoing Russian President Medvedev that there is a better 

chance of dealing with the sensitive issue of missile 

defense after the U.S. presidential elections the following November. “This is my last election,” Obama 

said. “After my election, I have more flexibility.” As 

noted previously with the example of U.S. withdrawal 

from the ABM Treaty, this direct leader engagement 

on a personal level carries weight in discussions 

with Russia. 

Discussions on missile defense between Lavrov 

and Rasmussen in April 2013 decided publicly to 

“leave such a fundamental issue to the Presidents of 

the Russian Federation and the United States.”114 Accordingly, the most recent initiative at the time of this 

writing is a round of negotiations directly between 

Obama and Putin, commencing with a letter from 

Obama to Putin suggesting another way forward 

on missile defense cooperation focused on transparency between the United States and Russia on BMD 

technical capabilities.115 If any agreement at all can be 
50

reached with Russia on BMD, it is likely to be through 

this bilateral presidential route; in any case, on the 

Russian side, progress on a decision of this magnitude could not be made without authorization from 

the very highest level. According to Foreign Minister 

Lavrov, speaking ahead of the 2011 Sochi summit: 

The subject of missile defence for obvious reasons can 

hardly be tackled by the ambassadors. Deliberation on 

it proceeds at the summit and high levels. There are 

special arrangements, especially between Russia and 

the United States.116

These “special arrangements” at present constitute 

the only visible prospect for a resolution with Russia 

before the next U.S. election cycle. 

CONCLUSION

Viewed from Moscow, the history of U.S. BMD 

development is one of inconsistency, unpredictability, 

and doubtful assurances. Russia can have little confidence that this pattern will not continue. As put by 

one NATO official, “US plans have changed twice in 4 

years, and there are still 5 years to go till 2018.”117

According to a Russian official who requested anonymity, Russia’s key problem with EPAA is that the 

United States says it is “a limited capability against a 

limited threat, but then will not accept any limitations 

on this so-called limited capability.”118 Indeed, at the 

RUSI Missile Defence Conference in London, United 

Kingdom (UK), in June 2013, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Frank Rose felt the need to repeat three 

times that the United States “cannot and will not” accept limitations on the capabilities of BMD systems. 
51

Thus, uncertainty over U.S. planning combines 

with uncertainty over the ultimate technological capabilities of BMD systems to introduce a fundamental 

element of unpredictability to Russia’s assessments 

of its own security. A primary Russian concern, as repeatedly emphasized in the most recent iteration of 

its Foreign Policy Concept, is the maintenance of “stability”;119 U.S. missile defense plans mount a direct 

challenge to this aim.

Finally, any assessment of Russia’s future responses to further BMD developments must take into account the very different Russian perception of two 

key issues: first, the role nuclear weapons play for the 

state; and second, the role Russia plays in the world. 

As put by Wayne Merry: 

Ultimately, for Russia the issue is not Iran, nor NATO, 

nor the US, nor specific systems. American progress 

toward balancing ballistic missiles with credible defenses erodes the status quo essential to Moscow’s assertion of great power status. Far from seeing nuclear 

weapons as a necessary evil of the modern world, 

Russia’s elites perceive them as the bedrock of its state 

power and global identity for the foreseeable future. 

That is the starting point for any U.S. dialogue, let 

alone negotiation, with Russia on BMD.120

ENDNOTES

1. “Statement by the Press Secretary on the President’s Travel to Russia,” Washington, DC: White House Office of the Press 

Secretary, August 7, 2013, available from www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/2013/08/07/statement-press-secretary-president-s-travelrussia.

2. As noted in exasperated tone by Ambassador Alexander 

Vershbow in June 2013, “Every time we remove a perceived hurdle, the Russians erect another.”
3. “Europe Diary: Missile Defence,” BBC News, June 1, 2007, 

available from news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/6704669.stm.

4. Dmitry Medvedev, “Statement in connection with the situation concerning the NATO countries’ missile defence system in 

Europe,” Russian presidential website, November 23, 2011, available from eng.kremlin.ru/news/3115.

5. “Missile Defense: The First 60 Years,” Missile Defense 

Agency (MDA).

6. MDA website: www.mda.mil/news/history_resources.html.

7. “Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty),” Nuclear Threat Initiative, available from 

www.nti.org/treaties-and-regimes/treaty-limitation-anti-ballisticmissile-systems-abm-treaty/.

8. “Backgrounder: U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense,” Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations, available from www.cfr.

org/missile-defense/us-ballistic-missile-defense/p30607.

9. Email exchange with author, July 2013. 

10. “Safeguard,” Washington, DC: Federation of American Scientists, available from www.fas.org/spp/starwars/program/

safeguard.htm. See also “Sprint,” Nuclear ABMS of the USA, available from www.nuclearabms.info/Sprint.html.

11. This remains the case despite doubts over the Soviet system’s capability. See “History of Russia’s ABM System,” Cambridge, MA: Union of Concerned Scientists, available from www.

ucsusa.org/nuclear_weapons_and_global_security/missile_defense/

policy_issues/history-of-russias.html.

12. For video of the speech, see “Reagan Announces SDI,” 

PBS Video, available from video.pbs.org/video/1781119310/.

13. Andropov interview in Pravda, March 26, 1983, quoted in 

Reuters, “Excerpts From The Interview With Andropov,” March 

27, 1983. 

52
53

14. In 1993, the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization was 

renamed the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization. Then-Secretary of Defense Les Aspin “gave credit to SDI for helping to end 

the Cold War.” See MDA website, available from www.mda.mil/

news/history_resources.html.

15. Vladimir Putin, “Poslaniye Federalnomu Sobraniyu Rossiyskoy Federatsii” (“Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian 

Federation”), May 10, 2006, available from archive.kremlin.ru/text/

appears/2006/05/105546.shtml.

16. “A Statement Made By Russian President Vladimir Putin 

on December 13, 2001, Regarding the Decision of the Administration of the United States of America To Withdraw from the Antiballistic Missile Treaty of 1972,” December 13, 2001, available 

from www.acq.osd.mil/tc/treaties/abm/PutinDec13.htm.

17. “Remarks By the President on National Missile Defense, 

ABM Withdrawal,” December 13, 2001, available from www.acq.

osd.mil/tc/treaties/abm/remarks.htm.

18. Toby Harnden, “Secret US deal with Putin over ABM 

treaty,” Daily Telegraph, December 14, 2001, available from www.

telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/1365326/SecretUS-deal-with-Putin-over-ABM-treaty.html.

19. “Remarks By The President On National Missile Defense, 

ABM Withdrawal.

20. “U.S. Eyes Missile Defense Site in Europe,” Washington, 

DC: Arms Control Association, July 8, 2004, available from www.

armscontrol.org/act/2004_07-08/MDSite.

21. Quotations in this section are derived from Keir Giles, 

“Russian Views on Ballistic Missile Defence in Europe,” Shrivenham, Swindon, Wiltshire, UK: Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, Advanced Research and Assessment Group, 

February 2008.

22. Vanessa Gera And Monika Scislowska, “US, Poland OK 

Missile Defense Base, Riling Moscow,” Huffington Post, August 
54

20, 2008, available from www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/08/20/ricesigns-missile-defens_n_120028.html.

23. “Central Europe’s Leaders Ask Barack Obama to Take 

Strong Line with Russia,” Daily Telegraph, July 16, 2009. “An Open 

Letter to the Obama Administration from Central and Eastern 

Europe,” Gazeta Wyborcza, July 16, 2009, available from wyborcza.pl/1,76842,6825987,An_Open_Letter_to_the_Obama_Administration_from_Central.html.

24. Peter Baker, “White House Scraps Bush’s Approach to 

Missile Shield,” New York Times, September 17, 2009, available 

from www.nytimes.com/2009/09/18/world/europe/18shield.html?_r=

2&hp&.

25. “Biden Heads To Poland To Mend Relations,” CBS News, 

October 20, 2009, available from www.cbsnews.com/2100-250_162-

5400952.html.

26. See, for example, “Yesterday Moscow Was Contentedly 

Rubbing Its Hands, Warsaw and Prague, on the Contrary, Were 

Wringing Them in Despair,” Moskovskiy Komsomolets, September 

18, 2009.

27. U.S. Department of State website, available from www.

state.gov/t/avc/rls/162447.htm.

28. BBC Monitoring (BBCM) composite report: “NATO 

Should Be First to Offer Compromise on Missile Defence—Russian Envoy,” July 1, 2011.

29. BBCM: “Russian NATO Envoy Backs Semi-Integrated, 

Semi-Separate Missile Defence,” RIA-Novosti, July 1, 2011.

30. BBCM: “Russia’s NATO Envoy Accuses Obama’s Team 

of Scuppering ABM Talks,” Rossiya 24 news channel, July 6, 2011. 

31. BBCM: “Russian NATO Envoy Backs Semi-Integrated, 

Semi-Separate Missile Defence.”

32. For a review of the A-135 missile defense system, see 

missilethreat.com/defense-systems/a-135-abm-3-gazelle/.
55

33. Private interview, September 2011. 

34. BBCM: “Russia Not to Listen to NATO Head’s Advice on 

Nuclear Weapons—Envoy,” Interfax, June 16, 2011. 

35. “Russia, NATO End Talks on Sectoral Missile Defense—

Source,” RIA-Novosti, July 15, 2011, available from en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20110715/165215647.html.

36. As voiced, for example, by then Russian Chief of General 

Staff Nikolai Makarov when threatening Finland over its relationship with NATO in June 2012. See “Kenraali Makarovin puhe 

kokonaisuudessaan” (“General Makarov’s Speech In Full”), Yle 

news, June 7, 2012, available from yle.fi/uutiset/kenraali_makarovin_

puhe_kokonaisuudessaan/6169951.

37. Stephen A. Hildreth and Carl Ek, “Missile Defense and 

NATO’s Lisbon Summit,” Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, January 11, 2011, p. 5 onwards, available from 

www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41549.pdf.

38. “Breaking the ‘cold spell’ in Russia-NATO Relations,” 

Russia Today, November 22, 2010, available from rt.com/politics/

nato-russia-lisbon-summit/.

39. Keir Giles, “The State of the NATO-Russia Reset,” Oxford, UK: Conflict Studies Research Centre, September 2011, 

p. 20 onwards. 

40. RIA Novosti’s roundup of reportage from the meeting is 

available from en.rian.ru/.

41. Interview with then Deputy Head of Mission of the Russian Mission to NATO Nikolai Korchunov, June 2011.

42. Russia Today, July 4, 2011, available from rt.com/news/

russia-nato-sochi-summit/. 

43. Deutsche Welle, July 4, 2011, available from www.dw.de/

russia-warns-nato-over-missile-defense-shield-plans/a-15210166.
56

44. Global Security Newswire, July 5, 2011, available from www.

nti.org/gsn/article/russia-nato-relations-stuck-on-missile-defense/.

45. “NATO-Russia Council Makes Progress in Sochi,” NATO 

website, July 4, 2011, available from www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/

news_76039.htm. 

46. Tom Collina, “U.S.-Russia Missile Defense Talks Deadlock,” Washington, DC: Arms Control Association, January/February 2012, available from www.armscontrol.org/act/2012_01-02/

US_Russia_Missile_Defense_Talks_Deadlock.

47. Dmitry Medvedev, “Statement in Connection with the 

Situation Concerning the NATO Countries’ Missile Defence System in Europe,” Russian presidential website, November 23, 2011, 

available from eng.kremlin.ru/news/3115.

48. Anders Fogh Rasmussen, “NATO and Russia Can Defend 

Together,” The New York Times, December 5, 2011, available from 

www.nytimes.com/2011/12/06/opinion/nato-and-russia-can-defendtogether.html?_r=0.

49. Collina.

50. As stated by Deputy Secretary-General Alexander Vershbow at the RUSI Missile Defence Conference, London, UK, June 

12, 2013. 

51. For example, most recently at the time of writing, as stated 

on record by Frank Rose (Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for 

Space and Defense Policy, U.S. Department of State), Nancy Morgan (Director for International Affairs, U.S. Missile Defense Agency), Alexander Vershbow (Deputy Secretary General, NATO) 

and others at the RUSI Missile Defence Conference, London, UK, 

June 2013. 

52. “Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov Interview to 

the Vesti 24 Television Channel, Moscow, July 7, 2011” Russian 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, available from www.mid.ru/

bdomp//brp_4.nsf/english/2FA3CA1205302976C32578C70051B17B.
57

53. Remarks at IISS briefing on “US-Russia Relations in 

Obama’s Second Term: Implications for Europe,” February 6, 2012, 

available from www.iiss.org/en/events/events/archive/2013-5126/

february-677e/us-russia-relations-in-obamas-second-term-implications-for-europe-9b92.

54. Interview, June 2013. 

55. BBCM composite report, “Russian Ambassador Says Talks 

with NATO Didn’t Resolve Single Dispute,” July 5, 2011.

56. Aleksandr Stukalin, “Missile Defense: Old Problem, No 

New Solution,” Moscow Defense Brief, February 2011, available 

from mdb.cast.ru/mdb/2-2011/item4/article1/. 

57. Steven Pifer, “Obama, Medvedev and Missile Defense,” 

Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, May 20, 2011, available from www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0521_arms_control_pifer.aspx. 

58. Lauri Mälksoo, “International Law in Foreign Policy Documents of the Russian Federation: A Deconstruction,” Diplomaatia, May 2011.

59. See, for example, “Backgrounder: U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense,” Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations, available 

from www.cfr.org/missile-defense/us-ballistic-missile-defense/p30607.

60. See, for instance, Stanislav Kozlov, “ЕвроПРО—PRО

И КONTRA—Не все так просто, как это может показаться” 

(“European Missile Defence, Pro and Contra—Not Everything 

Is As Simple As It Seems”), Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, 

July 1, 2011, available from nvo.ng.ru/concepts/2011-07-01/11_

europro.html. 

61. As, for instance, highlighting the “extremely low effectiveness” of the GBI program in commentary published by the 

Russian International Affairs Council. See Kuznetzov, Yesin, Zolotarev, and Rogov, “Rossiya i SShA na razvilke: initsiativy Obamy 

i reaktsii Moskvy” (“Russia and the USA at a Fork in the Road: 

Obama’s Initiatives and Moscow’s Reactions”), July 26, 2013, 

available from russiancouncil.ru/inner/?id_4=2156.
58

62. For representative commentary by Dvorkin in May 2011, 

available from www.youtube.com/watch?v=5jO4ukVzTFs.

63. Transcript in Russian of meeting between then Prime 

Minister Putin and defence experts in Sarov, Russia, February

24, 2012. 

64. Viktor Yesin and Yevgeniy Savostyanov, “YevroPRO bez 

mifof i politiki” (“European Missile Defence Without Myths or Politics”), Nezavismoye voyennoye obozreniye, April 13, 2012. 

65. Yousaf Butt and Theodore Postol, “Upsetting the Reset: 

The Technical Basis of Russian Concern Over NATO Missile Defense,” FAS Special Report No. 1, Washington, DC: Federation of 

American Scientists, September 2011. 

66. For presentations given publicly by the United States and 

Russia at this event, see www.state.gov/t/avc/c52028.htm and www.

slideshare.net/rusemblon/russian-mod-views-on-nato-missile-defencein-europe, respectively. 

67. Briefing by Russian Deputy Defence Minister Anatoliy 

Ivanovich Antonov, Russian Embassy, London, UK, June 20, 2012.

68. Korchunov interview, June 2011.

69. Colonel-General Viktor Yesin, quoted in “Russia’s Main 

Concerns in Talks with U.S., NATO on Missile Defense Systems 

Have Been Eliminated—Expert,” Interfax, March 19, 2013. 

70. Anonymous interview, June 2013. 

71. See Deputy Defence Minister Antonov quoted in “Russian 

Defense Ministry Cautiously Optimistic on US Refusal from Missile Shield in Europe” [sic], Interfax, April 5, 2013. 

72. “Talks on Further Nuke Cuts Have to Involve Not Only 

Russia and U.S.—Lavrov,” Interfax, June 22, 2013. 

73. For a review of the regional threat, see Bruce Klingner, 

“Missile Defence Requirements of the Asia Pivot,” Defense Dossier, 

American Foreign Policy Council, January 2013. 
59

74. Korchunov interview, June 2011.

75. “Russia, USA Cannot Discuss Nuclear Disarmament in 

Isolation—Official,” Interfax, July 25, 2013. 

76. For an exploration of how apparently common security 

terminology in fact masks significant differences in interpretation, see Andrew Monaghan, “The Indivisibility of Security: Russia and Euro-Atlantic Security,” Rome, Italy: NATO Defense College, January 2010, available from www.ndc.nato.int/research/series.

php?icode=2.

77. See the section entitled “A Predictive Case Study: How 

President Vladimir Putin and His Successors Might Reasonably 

Expect Nuclear Devaluation to Endanger Their Strategic Future,” Paul Schulte, “The Strategic Risks of Devaluing Nuclear 

Weapons,” Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 34, No. 1, 2013, 

pp. 195-220.

78. The comment is widely attributed to German Chancellor 

Helmut Schmidt in the late-1980s. 

79. E. Wayne Merry, “Ballistic Missile Defense Through Russian Eyes,” Defense Dossier, American Foreign Policy Council, 

January 2013.

80. Ibid.

81. BBCM: “Russian Envoy Still Hopes to “Persuade” NATO 

on Missile Defence,” Rossiya 1 TV, July 9, 2011. 

82. Heidi Reisinger, “A NATO transit hub in Ulyanovsk—

What’s behind the Russian debate?” Rome, Italy: NATO Defense 

College, April 2012, available from www.ndc.nato.int/research/

series.php?icode=3.

83. Conference proceedings, “The Changing Nature of Ballistic Missile Defense,” Washington, DC: National Defense University, June 3-4, 2009.
60

84. As quoted in “Waking the Neighbour: Finland, NATO 

and Russia,” Shrivenham, Swindon, Wiltshire, UK: UK Defence 

Academy, September 2009. 

85. See Keir Giles, “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation 2010,” Rome, Italy: NATO Defense College, February 

2010, available from www.academia.edu/343489/The_Military_Doctrine_of_the_Russian_Federation_2010.

86. I. Yu. Yurgens and S. A. Kulik, eds., “O perspektivakh razvitiya otnosheniy Rossii i NATO” (“On prospects for development of 

relations between Russia and NATO”), Institut sovremennogo razvitiya (INSOR), October 2010, pp. 38-41.

87. Andrei Fedyashin, “Russia and NATO Agree to Wait until Chicago,” RIA-Novosti, July 5, 2011, available from en.rian.ru/

analysis/20110705/165028339.html. 

88. Sarov meeting transcript, February 24, 2012. 

89. As echoed, in fact, by Postol and Butt, p. 30. 

90. See for example, most recently, Aleksey Arbatov and 

Vladimir Dvorkin, “Voyennaya reforma Rossii: sostoyaniye i perspektivy” (“Russia’s Military Reform: Status and Prospects”), Moscow, Russia: Carnegie Moscow Centre, 2013. 

91. Keir Giles, Russian Military Transformation: Goal in 

Sight? Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. 

Army War College, May 5, 2014.

92. As detailed in briefings to NATO by the Russian General 

Staff Academy, November 2012. 

93. CCTN News in English, available from english.cntv.cn/

program/newsupdate/20130621/102936.shtml.

94. “Putin: Be Aware of Plans for First Strike Capability,” 

LarouchePAC, June 21, 2013, available from larouchepac.com/

node/27054.

95. Speaking at the RUSI Missile Defence Conference, 

June 2013.
61

96. Matthew Bunn, “Foundation for the Future: The ABM 

Treaty and National Security,” Washington, DC: Arms Control 

Association, 1990, p. 87.

97. BBCM: “Russia’s NATO Envoy Accuses Obama’s Team of 

Scuppering ABM Talks.”

98. “Russia Hardens Its Position on Plans to Build AntiMissile Shield,” Eastweek, May 18, 2011, available from www.osw.

waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2011-05-18/russia-hardens-its-positionplans-to-build-anti-missile-shield.

99. BBCM: “Russia Sets No Deadlines to Resolve US Missile 

Defence Disagreements—Minister,” RIA-Novosti, July 12, 2011. 

100. BBCM: “Russian Envoy Still Hopes to “Persuade” NATO 

on Missile Defence.” 

101. Korchunov interview, June 2011.

102. Aleksandr Gabuyev, “Ваш сектор возле Russia” [sic] 

(“Your Sector Opposite Russia”), Kommersant, July 16, 2011, available from www.kommersant.ru/doc/1680689/print.

103. Medvedev, “Statement in Connection with the Situation Concerning the NATO Countries’ Missile Defence System in 

Europe.”

104. “Missile Defense: Toward a New Paradigm,” EASI 

Working Group on Missile Defense, Washington, DC: Carnegie 

Endowment for International Peace, February 2012, available 

from carnegieendowment.org/2012/02/03/missile-defense-toward-newparadigm/9cvz.

105. Private interview, May 2013. 

106. Peter B. Doran, “EPAA Phase Four: Avoiding Death by 

a Thousand Cuts,” Washington, DC: Center for European Policy 

Analysis, March 20, 2013, available from www.cepa.org/sites/default/

files/documents/CEPA%20Op-ed,%20EPAA%20Phase%20Four.pdf.
62

107. “US-Russia Relations and the Asia-Pacific,” London, 

UK: IISS, July 26, 2013, available from www.iiss.org/en/events/

events/archive/2013-5126/july-bdc1/us-russia-relations-and-the-asiapacific-7097.

108. “European Security: Russian Proposals,” Shrivenham, 

Swindon, Wiltshire, UK: Advanced Research and Assessment 

Group, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, January 2009. 

109. Keir Giles, “The Nature of the Georgian Ceasefire,” 

Shrivenham, Swindon, Wiltshire, UK: Advanced Research and 

Assessment Group, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, 

August 13, 2008. 

110. See Morten Langsholdt, “Russia and the Use of Force: 

Theory and Practice,”, Report 2005/02504, Kjeller, Norway: Norwegian Defence Research Establishment November 2005, available from www.ffi.no/no/Rapporter/05-02504.pdf.

111. For a detailed examination of the Iskander system, including its role in the BMD debate, see Stefan Forss, “The Russian 

Operational-Tactical Iskander Missile System,” Working Papers 

No. 42, Helsinki, Finland: Finnish National Defence University 

Department of Strategic and Defence Studies, 2012. 

112. “Russia Deploys S-400 Missile Defense in Kaliningrad,” 

Novinite, April 7, 2012, available from www.novinite.com/view_

news.php?id=138312.

113. Aleksey Arbatov, “Look Before You Leap,” Nezavisimoye 

Voyennoye Obozreniye, August 2, 2013. 

114. Pavel Tarasenko, “Rossiya i NATO soshlis na vertoletakh i borbe s terrorismom” (“Russia and NATO Come Together 

on Helicopters and Counter-Terrorism”), Kommersant, April 24, 

2013, p. 7. 

115. “Putin Letter to Obama to Address Missile Defense, 

Security,” RIA-Novosti, May 15, 2013, available from en.rian.ru/

russia/20130515/181170446.html.
63

116. “Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov Interview to 

the Vesti 24 Television Channel, Moscow, July 7, 2011” Russian 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, available from www.mid.ru/

brp_4.nsf/0/2FA3CA1205302976C32578C70051B17B. 

117. Anonymous interview, July 2013.

118. Anonymous interview, June 2013. 

119. “Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation,” approved February 12, 2013, available in English from 

www.mid.ru/bdomp/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/7

6389fec168189ed44257b2e0039b16d!OpenDocument.

120. Merry. 
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