United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 16-1216

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Lora D. Hamman

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

Nancy A. Berryhill, Acting Commissioner of Social Security

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lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellee

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Batesville

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 Submitted: January 10, 2017

 Filed: February 24, 2017

[Unpublished]

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Before COLLOTON, MURPHY, and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2), Nancy A. Berryhill 1

is substituted for Carolyn Colvin as the Acting Commissioner of the Social Security

Administration.
Lora Hamman applied for disability insurance benefits, asserting that she was

disabled due to a combination of physical and mental impairments. Her application

was denied by an administrative law judge (ALJ), who concluded that she suffered

fromsevere impairments but was nonetheless capable of performing some work. The

Appeals Council declined to review her case. Hamman then sought judicial review

and the district court affirmed the denial of benefits. Hamman appeals, and we 2

affirm.

Hamman applied for disability insurance benefits in March 2012, alleging that

she had been disabled since August 2008 due to fibromyalgia, irritable bowel

syndrome, gastritis, depression, anxiety, fast heart rate, and nodules on thyroid. After

a hearing at which Hamman and a vocational expert testified, the ALJ conducted the

five step sequential evaluation analysis and denied her claim. See 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1520(a)(4). The ALJ found that Hamman suffered fromthe severe impairments

of major depressive disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, somatoform disorder,

personality disorder, fibromyalgia, and possible small fiber neuropathy. See 20

C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). The ALJ determined that Hamman had the residual

functional capacity (RFC) to perform a reduced range of sedentary work. Based on

that RFC, the ALJ concluded that Hamman could perform jobs that exist in

significant numbers in the national economy and therefore was not disabled. See 20

C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v).

In assessing Hamman's RFC, the ALJ found that Hamman's statements

concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms were "not

entirely credible." The ALJ also gave "little weight" to the medical source statement

of Hamman's treating physician, Dr. Arun Varadhachary, because it was

The Honorable J. Leon Holmes, United States District Judge for the Eastern 2

District of Arkansas, adopting in part the Proposed Findings and Recommendations

of the Honorable Joe J. Volpe, United States Magistrate Judge for the Eastern District

of Arkansas. 

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"unexplained," "unsupported by reference to any positive medical findings," and

suggested that "'psychosocial' circumstances were a major factor in the assessment."

According to the vocational expert who testified at the hearing, an individual with the

limitations described by Hamman or Dr. Varadhachary would be unable to work.

Hamman appeals, arguing that the ALJ's decision was not supported by

substantial evidence. We review de novo a district court order "affirming a denial of

social security insurance benefits and affirm if the ALJ's decision is 'supported by

substantial evidence on the record as a whole.'" Smith v. Colvin, 756 F.3d 621, 625

(8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Teague v. Astrue, 638 F.3d 611, 614 (8th Cir. 2011)). 

Substantial evidence is such evidence that "a reasonable mind might accept as

adequate to support" the disability determination, even if the evidence could also

"have supported an opposite decision." Williams v. Sullivan, 960 F.2d 86, 89 (8th

Cir. 1992) (citations omitted).

Hamman first argues that the ALJ erroneously discounted the opinion of her

treating physician, Dr. Varadhachary. A treating physician's opinion should be given

controlling weight when it "is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and

laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial

evidence in the record." Krogmeier v. Barnhart, 294 F.3d 1019, 1023 (8th Cir. 2002);

see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). Here, Dr. Varadhachary noted that Hamman's

symptoms were only "partially explained" by her "small fiber neuropathy," but failed

to explain what other medical evidence may support his opinion. Further, the

majority of his assessment consisted of checked boxes and conclusory statements,

which are of limited evidentiary value. Holmstrom v. Massanari, 270 F.3d 715,

720–21 (8th Cir. 2001). The ALJ therefore did not err in declining to give Dr.

Varadhachary's opinion controlling weight, particularly given the other substantial

evidence in the record supporting the ALJ's residual functional capacity assessment. 

See Goff v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d 785, 790 (8th Cir. 2005). 

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Hamman also argues that the ALJ'sfinding thatshe was "not entirely credible"

is not supported by substantial evidence. Hamman is correct that an ALJ may not

find that a claimant with somatoform disorder lacks credibility solely because the

claimant'sself reporting ofsymptoms is not supported by objective medical data; that

disparity itself is symptomatic of somatoform disorder, which "causes [individuals]

to exaggerate [their] physical problems in [their] mind[s] beyond what the medical

data indicate[s]." Easter v. Bowen, 867 F.2d 1128, 1130 (8th Cir. 1989) (emphasis

added). Even assuming that the ALJ erred in this respect, however, reversal is not

warranted because "the remainder of the record . . . support[s] [the] ALJ's credibility

determination." Chaney v. Colvin, 812 F.3d 672, 677 (8th Cir. 2016). Here, the ALJ

also found that Hamman's conservative treatment history and daily activities were

inconsistent with her reported disabling conditions, which provides substantial

evidence to support the ALJ's credibility determination. See Turpin v. Colvin, 750

F.3d 989, 993–94 (8th Cir. 2014).

The ALJ's determinations were fully supported by the record as a whole. 

Further, the somatoform diagnosis of an evaluating psychologist was made in July

2013, four months before the ALJ's decision, and the ALJ considered that diagnosis

in his opinion. We therefore conclude that no further development of the record is

necessary and we affirm the denial of benefits. 

MELLOY, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

At the conclusion of Hamman’s hearing, the ALJ requested that Hamman

undergo a psychological evaluation. The evaluating psychologist subsequently

submitted a report diagnosing Hamman, for the first time, with somatoform disorder. 

As we recently noted, somatoform disorders “may, in fact, be debilitating even when

clinical or diagnosticmedical evidence does notfullysupport the claimed symptoms.” 

Nowling v. Colvin, 813 F.3d 1110, 1114 (8th Cir. 2016). An individual with a

somatoform disorder “actually believes herself to be experiencing symptoms at a

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greater level of severity than clinical evidence can support.” Id. Accordingly, the

majority correctly notes that an ALJ cannot make an adverse credibility finding

simply because the somatoform sufferer’s complaints are not supported by objective

medical data. See Easter v. Bowen, 867 F.2d 1128, 1131 (8th Cir. 1989). 

The record strongly suggests, however, that neither Hamman nor the ALJ

understood the significance of Hamman’s somatoform diagnosis before the ALJ’s

decision. The evaluating psychologist did not explain the diagnosis in her report. 

And the diagnosis came late in the disability determination process, after the ALJ

requested the psychological evaluation at Hamman’s hearing. Because somatoform

disorder, properly understood, places Hamman’s complaints in a different light, I

would remand for further consideration and development of the record.

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