alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
## On - Site Safety Checklist Pre - flight

* Reviewed targeted area through Google Earth for any obstructions

* Reviewed area for any FAA restricted fly zones or other areas of concern

* Walked the hover area or path of flight to check for any areas on concern 

## Flight Set - up

* Advise anyone within “Launch/Landing” area of safety and 50’ requirement * Unpack and check DJI Phantom 2 Vision+ for any visible signs of damage

* Turn on Remote Controller and observe that both power and Wi

- Fi are green

* Ensure launch zone is clear and turn on DJI Phantom 2 Vision+ battery

* Toggle S1 & S2 switches five times to set GPS recalc & failsafe landing zone

* Wait for solid GPS lights (Solid Green slow flashing)

* Spin DJI Phantom 2 Vision+ 360o both Horizontal and Vertically to ensure lock

* Review Launch Site one last time before lift off

* Engage motors and start straight horizontal lift to desired altitude 

## In Flight

* Monitor both GPS Lock (# satellites) / Battery Level every minute

* Watch for any changes to the “Launch/Landing” area of safety and advise as necessary

* Watch for any irregular craft behavior and land immediately if necessary

* Return the craft to the landing area within 20% of battery life

* Announce that the craft is returning for landing

* Visual check that the 50’ rule is observed / Otherwise hover until 50’ is observed

* Slowly bring the DJI Phantom 2 Vision+ in for a landing

## Post - Flight

* Turn off Battery on Craft first, then the Remote Controller

* Store all equipment in their cases before allowing observes to approach 

## Other Safety Factors

* We will not fly within 1 mile of FAA Restricted Zones

* We will not fly over 400’ of the current launch elevation * Will not fly past the current line of sight

* We will not fly if a 50” Launch/Landing parameter cannot be established

* We will land the craft immediately of any technical issues occur

* We will land the craft if on

- site activity occurs that presents a security concern
§ 91.529 Flight engineer requirements. ( a ) No person may operate the following airplanes without a flight crewmember holding a current flight engineer certificate: ( 1 ) An airplane for which a type certificate was issued before January 2, 1964, having a maximum certificated takeoff weight of more than 80,000 pounds.
( 2 ) An airplane type certificated after January 1, 1964, for which a flight engineer is required by the type certification requirements.
( b ) No person may serve as a required flight engineer on an airplane unless, within the preceding 6 calendar months, that person has had at least 50 hours of flight time as a flight engineer on that type airplane or has been checked by the Administrator on that type airplane and is found to be familiar and competent with all essential current information and operating procedures.
#### FLESHER v STATE

Ohio Appeals, 8th Dist, Cuyahoga Co

No 9231.

Decided April 29, 1929

Bernon, Mulligan, Keeley & Lafevre, Cleveland, for Flesher.

Ray T Miller, Cleveland, for State.

VICKERY, PJ.

The record shows that at least there was some sort of relation existing between the complaining witness and the plaintiff in error. Whether it was a business or a “nobody’s business” relation, would be difficult to determine from this record.

The record is pretty conclusive that the plaintiff in' error and the complaining witness were on very friendly terms and undoubtedly their relations were illicit. There is evidence in the record that shows that they cohabited at at least one hotel and there is much evidence to show what the relations between these parties were. The complaining witness, when upon the witness stand, denied any other relation than that of a business relation.

Now when the complaining witness was upon the witness stand, she was interrogated at length about her relations with this defendant below, whether or not they had ever :cohabited in any hotel, whether or not she had written him endearing letters, whether or not she had called him sweet and affectionate names, or whether she had written such things to him. To all of which she put in a negative answer, and some time during the course of the inquiry she was shown a letter which the defendant below testified he had received from her and that he knew her handwriting, and that this was in her handwriting. She was asked whether she had written any such letter and she denied it, whereupon it was sought to introduce this letter. It was offered to the court and it was objected to. We think that was a very material piece of evidence bearing upon her credibility and showing that a relation other than that of principal and agent existed between these parties. It contradicted the statement that she had made with respect to her not calling, this plaintiff in error endearing names and it even speaks of a hoped for meeting in Detroit or Mt. Clemens where she seemed to be sojourning at the time. The reason, I believe, why it was not admitted was because it contained the name of an official of Cuyahoga County, and that it might reflect upon this official. We know no reason why, if the letter were otherwise competent, it should not be admitted in court, even though it might reflect upon some party who is not a party to the litigation. The letter surely was important in that it both contradicted this woman, the complaining witness, and tended to show a relation betweén these two persons which might account for the' expenditures of money, even though it'was owned by the plaintiff, to the mutual benefit of the two. We think the court erred in refusing to admit this testimony and that the testimony was vital and important and might and probably would have changed the result of this verdict, and for that reason we are compelled to reverse this judgment and remand the case to the Common Pleas Court for a new trial.

Sullivan and Levine, JJ, concur.
| (1)  |   | Registration      Statement (Form S-8 No. 333-41532) pertaining to the Equity Incentive Plan      and to the Non-Employee Directors’ Stock Option Plan of Lexicon      Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,  |
|-----------|--------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| (2)  |   | Registration      Statement (Form S-8 No. 333-66380) pertaining to the Coelacanth      Corporation 1999 Stock Option Plan of Lexicon Pharmaceuticals,      Inc.,                                     |
| (3)  |   | Registration      Statement (Form S-3 No. 333-67294) of Lexicon Pharmaceuticals,      Inc.,                                                                                                          |
| (4)  |   | Registration      Statement (Form S-3 No. 333-108855) of Lexicon Pharmaceuticals,      Inc.,                                                                                                         |
| (5)  |   | Registration      Statement (Form S-3 No. 333-111821) of Lexicon Pharmaceuticals,      Inc.,                                                                                                         |
| (6)  |   | Registration      Statement (Form S-3 No. 333-144933) of Lexicon Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,      and                                                                                                     |
| (7)  |   | Registration      Statement (Form S-3 No. 333-161696) of Lexicon Pharmaceuticals,      Inc.                                                                                                          |

|   | /s/      ERNST & YOUNG LLP |
|--------|--------------------------------|
#### Mildred Klar, Respondent, v A. J. Pegno Construction Corp., Appellant.

[698 NYS2d 537]

—In an action to recover damages for personal injuries and wrongful death, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Thomas, J.), dated September 29, 1998, which denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the motion is granted, and the complaint is dismissed.

The Supreme Court erred in finding that the defendant failed to establish its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. The defendant submitted evidence, in the form of its daily work reports and the deposition testimony of its project engineer, which demonstrated that it was not performing any work in the area where the plaintiffs decedent tripped and fell *(see, Soto v City of New York,*244 AD2d 544; *Abbenante v Tyree Co.,*228 AD2d 529; *Hovi v City of New York,*226 AD2d 430). The plaintiffs opposition to the defendant’s motion did not create a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendant was working in the area where the plaintiffs decedent fell. The plaintiffs opposition was based solely upon speculation that the defendant’s construction activity was the cause of her decedent’s fall *(see, Lee v Rite Aid,*261 AD2d 368; *Gianchetta v E. B. Mar.,*258 AD2d 618). Krausman, J. P., McGinity, Feuerstein and Smith, JJ., concur.
1 

### Jordan, Ronald

From: Jordan, Ronald

Sent: Tuesday, August 25, 2015 3:56 PM

To: Jacklin, Mark J

Subject: Filter at Keystone

Hi Mark,

It was good talking with you earlier this afternoon. I miss the good old days of site visits and sampling. You folks at

Keystone were a pleasure to work with.

Thanks for checking on the polishing filters (sock filter) and confirming they’re rated for removing particulates 10 micron

and larger.

Regards,

Ron

‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐

Ron Jordan

USEPA Office of Water

Engineering & Analysis Division

Washington, DC

(202) 566

‐ 1003
1

Graham, Vanessa

From: Tracy Walters <twalters@mdaqmd.ca.gov>

Sent: Thursday, April 30, 2015 4:25 PM

To: Graham, Vanessa; Tong, Stanley

Cc: Alan De Salvio; Bret Banks

Subject: AVAQMD Rule 1130 - Graphic Arts

Good Afternoon,

The Antelope Valley Air Quality Management District would like to provide the following information in response to the

question regarding section (G) – Emission Reduction Credits.  

This section was reworded in response to a comment from EPA which inadvertently increased the ERC calculation limit

from 300 g/l to the limits in section (C)(2)(a) Table 3.  This section will be amended the next time the rule is opened to

correct the wording, but at this time, there is no reason that this provision will cause the release of additional air

contaminants or create any adverse environmental impacts.

 The AVAQMD has no flexographic printing operations in the District.  The District had one permit for a

flexographic printing press that became inactive in 1998.  

 No facility has ever used this ERC provision, and the AVAQMD cannot foresee any opportunity for a facility to

use this provision in the future.

The total TOG & VOC emissions from printing sources in the AVAQMD from 2013 totaled 3.7 tons.  These sources were

Deluxe Manufacturing and Antelope Valley Press, a check printing operation and newspaper printer, respectively.   

Please feel free to contact me with any further questions.

Thank you,

Tracy Walters, R.E.H.S.

Lead Air Quality Planner

(760) 245‐1661 x6122

www.mdaqmd.ca.gov
SCWC-14-0001298

________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________ Electronically Filed Supreme Court SCWC-14-0001298 02-DEC-2016 12:37 PM

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI  I

PATRICIA E. BREAULT OLIVEIRA, Respondent/Plaintiff -Appellee,

vs.

DARRYL J. OLIVEIRA, Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant.

CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS (CAAP-14-0001298; FC-D NO. 09 -1-000044)

ORDER REJECTING APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI (By: Recktenwald, C.J., Nakayama, McKenna, Pollack, and Wilson, JJ.)

Petitioner/Defendant- Appellant Darryl J. Oliveira’s
application for writ of certiorari filed on October 19, 2016, is
hereby rejected.

DATED: Honolulu, Hawai  i, December 2, 2016.

/s/ Mark E. Recktenwald

/s/ Paula A. Nakayama

/s/ Sabrina S. McKenna

/s/ Richard W. Pollack

/s/ Michael D. Wilson
#### Bone v. McGinley.

By the statute of this state, when the action is misconceived, it can only be taken advantage of by demurrer.

The wrong admission of a record in evidence cannot be assigned for error, unless it appears in a bill of exceptions.

It must appear from the record that the jury consisted of twelve men.

There should be a replication to a plea of *ml tiel*record.

IN ERROR from the circuit court of the county of Adams.

Sanders *So*Price for plaintiff in error.

*Per Curiam.*

This was an action of assumpsit, founded on a judgment rendered by a court of common pleas in Ohio. The defendant below pleaded non assumpsit, and *nul tiel*record, and on the trial objected to the admission of the record as evidence; but the record was admitted, and exceptions taken. As the record is not set out in the bill of exceptions, we cannot determine as to the propriety of these objections. We have repeatedly held, that nothing wii be noticed as a part of the record which ought to be placed there by bill of exceptions, and which is not so placed there, although it may be copied by the clerk and attached to the record. By the application of this rule, the bill of exceptions in this case becomes wholly useless. We must therefore decide the case on such other points as the record presents apart from the bill of exceptions; but there is enough in the record assigned as error to justify a reversal of the judgment.

It is assigned for error, that there were only eleven jurors, and this appearing to be true, is fatal to the judgment. A jury is composed of twelve men, unless in particular cases a less number is substituted by statute. It would have probably been sufficient *672if the record had stated that there was a good and lawful jury, without naming them; but as the names are given, and being only eleven in number, it was not a lawful jury.

The plea of *nul tiel record*should have been answered; but the objection taken to the form of the action, it being assumpsit instead of debt, is now unavailable, as there was no demurrer for that cause. It wás a mere misconception of the action, which is cured after verdict by the statute of jeofails.

Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
**Exhibit 32.1**

 

**Certification of the Chief Executive Officer Pursuantto Section 906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**

 

I,Herbert Lindo, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adoptedpursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the AnnualReport of Kenilworth Systems Corporation on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31,2003 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) ofthe Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that information contained in suchAnnual Report on Form 10-K fairly presents in all material respects thefinancial condition and results of operations of Kenilworth SystemsCorporation.

 
| By:    | /s/  Herbert Lindo       |   |
|--------|--------------------------|--------|
| Name:  | Herbert  Lindo           |
| Title: | Chief  Executive Officer |
| Date:  | March 24,  2009     |

 

***Remainder of page intentionallyleft blank***

 

----
#### Edwin H. Loveless, Pl’ff and Resp’t, *v.*The Manhattan Railway Company, Def’t and App’lt.

*(New York Superior Court,*

*General Term,*

*Filed May 6, 1889.)*

1. Negigence—Evidence — General opinion op ihysician not evidence.

A physician, a witness on behalf of <he defendant, was asked, on direct examination, if he had heard the testimony that there was a rupture of certain ligaments of plaintiff’s leg. The next question was: what have you to say on the testimony jmu have heard on that subject ? This question was properly excluded, for his general opinion as to the testimony was not evidence.

2. Same—Office op jury to weigh testimony.

A question was asked the same witness: Docs the testimony you have heard on that subject satisfy your mind as to the existence of any such double rupture ? The witness was here asked to weigh the testimony he had heard. This question was properly overruled, as it was the office of the jury to weigh the testimony. Besides, it did not appear from the question what evidence the witness had heard, or as to what part of the testimony the question was pointed.

Appeal from judgment entered on verdict of jury for plaintiff.

*Howard Townsend,*for app’lt; *Haley Fish,*for resp’t.

Sedgwick, J.

The action was for damages from alleged negligence of defendant’s servants.

The question that, on the trial, was asked of plaintiff, when a witness, and that defendant’s counsel objected to,. *178and that related to the declarations of Dr. Freer, was not answered, and the next question asked by the court, which was different, substantially, from the first question, was not objected to.

Dr. Stimson, a witness on behalf of the defendant, testified, on direct examination, if he had heard the testimony that there was a rupture of certain ligaments of plaintiff’s leg. The next question was : What have you to say on the testimony you have heard on that subject? This question was properly excluded, for his general opinion as to the testimony was not evidence. The next question was properly overruled. It was : Does the testimony you have heard on that subject satisfy your mind as to the existence of any such double rupture ? The witness was here asked to weigh the evidence he had heard. This was the office of the jury. Beyond this, it did not appear from the question what evidence the witness had heard, or as to what part of the testimony the question was pointed-

The learned counsel for the appellant has urged that the complaint should have been dismissed under the law of the case of *Kelly*v. *The Manhattan Railway Co.*(MSS. Ct. of Appeals). The cited case sustains the law as charged by the court below, and the facts of this case differ from the facts in the *Kelly Case*in such respects, that the judge below was correct in not dismissing the complaint.

Judgment affirmed, with costs.

Freedman and O’Gorman, JJ., concur.
(LOGO)ARTHUR ANDERSEN

REPORT OF INDEPENDENT PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS



To the Management of
Centex Credit Corporation:



We have  examined  management's  assertion  about  Centex  Credit  Corporation's
compliance  with the minimum  servicing  standards  identified  in the  Mortgage
Bankers Association of America's Uniform Single Attestation Program for Mortgage
Bankers (USAP) (except for minimum servicing  standards I.4, III.3,  III.4, V.3,
and V.4,  which apply only to those  entities  with service  contracts  covering
escrow accounts and therefore are  nonapplicable  to Centex Credit  Corporation)
and that Centex  Credit  Corporation  has in effect a fidelity bond policy and a
$3,000,000  errors and  omissions  policy as of and for the year ended March 31,
2000,  included  in  the  accompanying   management  assertion.   Management  is
responsible  for Centex  Credit  Corporation's  compliance  with  those  minimum
servicing standards and for maintaining a fidelity bond and errors and omissions
policy.  Our  responsibility is to express an opinion on management's  assertion
about the entity's compliance based on our examination.

Our  examination  was  made in  accordance  with  standards  established  by the
American  Institute of Certified Public Accountants and,  accordingly,  included
examining,   on  a  test  basis,  evidence  about  Centex  Credit  Corporation's
compliance  with the  minimum  servicing  standards  and  performing  such other
procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances.  We believe that our
examination  provides a reasonable  basis for our opinion.  Our examination does
not provide a legal determination on Centex Credit Corporation's compliance with
the minimum servicing standards.

In our opinion,  management's  assertion that Centex Credit Corporation complied
with the  aforementioned  minimum  servicing  standards  and that Centex  Credit
Corporation  had in effect a fidelity  bond policy and a  $3,000,000  errors and
omissions  policy as of and for the year ended March 31, 2000, is fairly stated,
in all material respects.



Dallas, Texas,
May 16, 20000



Arthur Andersen LLP
<PAGE>

EXHIBIT 99.1



                           CERTIFICATIONS PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Annual Report of FTS Apparel, Inc.
(the  "Company")  on  Form  10-KSB  for the period ending December 31, 2002, as
filed  with  the  Securities  and  Exchange  Commission  on the date hereof (the
"Report"),  the undersigned, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer
of  the  Company,  certifies,  pursuant  to  18  U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant  to  Section  906  of  the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act  of  2002,  that:

(1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 3(a) or 15(d) of
     the  Securities  and  Exchange  Act  of  1934;  and

(2)  The  information  contained  in the Report fairly presents, in all material
     respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



                         /s/ Scott Gallagher
                         ______________________________________
                         By: Scott Gallagher
                         Chief Executive Officer
                         April 8, 2003


                         /s/ Linda Ehlen
                         ______________________________________
                         By: Linda EHlen
                         Chief Financial Officer
                         April 11, 2003







<PAGE>