1 (Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2021

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

## SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

VIKING RIVER CRUISES, INC. v . MORIANA

CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA , SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

No. 20–1573. Argued March 30, 2022—Decided June 15, 2022
The question for decision is whet her the Federal Arbitration Act, 9

U. S. C. §1 et seq. , preempts a rule of California law that invalidates contractual waivers of the right to assert representative claims under California’s Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004, Cal. Lab. Code §2698 et seq. PAGA enlists employees as private attorneys general to enforce California labor law. By its terms, PAGA authorizes any “aggrieved employee” to initiate an action against a former em

ployer “on behalf of himself or hers elf and other current or former em

ployees” to obtain civil penalties th at previously could have been re

covered only by the State in an enforcement acti on brought by California’s Labor and Workforce Development Agency (LWDA). Cal

ifornia precedent holds th at a PAGA suit is a “ ‘representative action’ ” in which the employee plaintiff sues as an “ ‘agent or proxy’ ” of the State. Iskanian v. CLS Transp. Los Angeles, LLC , 59 Cal. 4th 348, 380. California precedent also interprets the statute to contain what is effectively a rule of claim joinder—allowing a party to unite multiple claims against an opposing party in a single action. An employee with PAGA standing may “seek any civil penalties the state can, including penalties for violations involving employees other than the PAGA liti

gant herself.” ZB, N. A. v. Superior Court , 8 Cal. 5th 175, 185.

Respondent Angie Moriana filed a PAGA action against her former employer Viking River Cruises, alleging a California Labor Code vio

lation. She also asserted a wide a rray of other violations allegedly sus

tained by other Viking employees. Moriana’s employment contract with Viking contained a mandatory arbitration agreement. Important here, that agreement contained both a “Class Action Waiver”—provid

ing that the parties could not bring any dispute as a class, collective, or representative action under PAGA—and a severability clause—2 VIKING RIVER CRUISES, INC. v . MORIANA

Syllabus
specifying that if the waiver was found invalid, such a dispute would presumptively be litigated in court. Under the severability clause, any “portion” of the waiver that remained valid would be “enforced in arbi

tration.” Viking moved to compel arbitration of Moriana’s individual PAGA claim and to dismiss her othe r PAGA claims. Applying Califor

nia’s Iskanian precedent, the California co urts denied that motion, holding that categorical waivers of PAGA standing are contrary to Cal

ifornia policy and that PAGA claims cannot be split into arbitrable “in

dividual” claims and nonarbitrable “representative” claims. This Court granted certiorari to decide whether the FAA preempts the Cal

ifornia rule.
Held : The FAA preempts the rule of Iskanian insofar as it precludes di

vision of PAGA actions into indi vidual and non-individual claims through an agreement to arbitrate. Pp. 7–21. (a) Based on the principle that “[a]rbitration is strictly ‘a matter of consent,’ ” Granite Rock Co. v. Teamsters, 561 U. S. 287, 299, this Court has held that “a party may not be compelled under the FAA to submit to class arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to do so,” Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp. , 559 U. S. 662, 684. Because class-action arbitration mandates procedural changes that are inconsistent with the individualized and informal mode of bilateral arbitration contemplated by the FAA, see AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion , 563 U. S. 333, 347, class proce

dures cannot be imposed by stat e law without presenting unwilling parties with an unacceptable choice between being compelled to arbi

trate using such procedures and forg oing arbitration all together. Viking contends that the Court’s FAA precedents require enforcement of contractual provisions waiving th e right to bring PAGA actions be

cause PAGA creates a form of class or collective proceeding. If this is correct, Iskanian ’s prohibition on PAGA waiv ers presents parties with an impermissible choice: Either arbitrate disputes using a form of class procedures, or do not arbitrate at all. Moriana maintains that any conflict between Iskanian and the FAA is illusory because PAGA cre

ates nothing more than a substantive cause of action.

This Court disagrees with both char acterizations of the statute. Mo

riana’s premise that PAGA creates a unitary private cause of action is irreconcilable with the structure of the statute and the ordinary legal meaning of the word “claim.” A PA GA action asserting multiple viola

tions under California’s Labor Code affecting a range of different em

ployees does not constitute “a single claim” in even the broadest possi

ble sense. Viking’s position, on the other hand, elides important structural differences between PAGA actions and class actions. A class-action plaintiff can raise a mult itude of claims because he or she3 Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022)

Syllabus

represents a multitude of absent individuals; a PAGA plaintiff, by con

trast, represents a single principa l, the LWDA, that has a multitude of claims. As a result, PAGA suits exhibit virtually none of the proce

dural characteristics of class actions.

This Court’s FAA precedents treat bilateral arbitration as the pro

totype of the individualized and info rmal form of arbitration protected from undue state interference by the FAA. See, e.g., Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis , 584 U. S. ___, ___. Viking posits that a proceeding is “bilateral” only if it in volves two and only two parties and “is conducted by and on behalf of the indi vidual named parties only.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U. S. 338, 348. Thus, Iskanian ’s prohibition on PAGA waivers is inconsistent with the FAA because PAGA creates an intrinsically representational form of action and Iskanian requires parties either to arbitrate in that format or forgo arbitration alto

gether.

This Court disagrees. Nothing in the FAA establishes a categorical rule mandating enforcement of waivers of standing to assert claims on behalf of absent principals. Non-cl ass representative actions in which a single agent litigates on behalf of a single principal necessarily devi

ate from the strict ideal of bilatera l dispute resolution posited by Vi

king, but this Court has never held that the FAA imposes a duty on States to render all forms of repr esentative standing waivable by con

tract or that such suits deviate from the norm of bilateral arbitration. Unlike procedures distinct ive to multiparty litigat ion, single-principal, single-agent representative actions are “bilateral” in two registers: They involve the rights of only th e absent real party in interest andthe defendant, and litigation need only be conducted by the agentplaintiff and the defendant. Noth ing in this Cour t’s precedent sug

gests that in enacting the FAA, Cong ress intended to require States to reshape their agency law governing who can assert claims on behalf of whom to ensure that parties will never have to arbitrate disputes in a proceeding that deviates from bilateral arbitration in the strictest sense. Pp. 7–17.

(b) PAGA’s built-in mechanism of clai m joinder is in conflict with the FAA. Iskanian ’s prohibition on contractua l division of PAGA actions into constituent claims unduly circum scribes the freedom of parties to determine “the issues subject to ar bitration” and “the rules by which they will arbitrate,” Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela , 587 U. S. ____, ____, and does so in a way that violates the fundamental principle that “ar

bitration is a matter of consent,” Stolt-Nielsen , 559 U. S., at 684. For that reason, state law cannot condit ion the enforceability of an agree

ment to arbitrate on the availabilit y of a procedural mechanism that would permit a party to expand the scope of the anticipated arbitration by introducing claims that the parties did not jointly agree to arbitrate.4 VIKING RIVER CRUISES, INC. v . MORIANA

Syllabus
A state rule imposing an expansive ru le of joinder in the arbitral con

text would defeat the ability of parties to control which claims are sub

ject to arbitration by permitting parties to superadd new claims to the proceeding, regardless of whethe r the agreement committed those claims to arbitration. When made compulsory by way of Iskanian

, PAGA’s joinder rule functions in exactly this way. The effect is to co

erce parties into withholding PA GA claims from arbitration. Is

kanian ’s indivisibility rule effectively coerces parties to opt for a judi

cial forum rather than “forgo[ing] the procedural rigor and appellate review of the courts to realize the benefits of private dispute resolu

tion.” Stolt-Nielsen , 559 U. S., at 685. Pp. 17–19.

(c) Under this Courts holding, Iskanian ’s prohibition on wholesale waivers of PAGA claims is no t preempted by the FAA. But Iskanian ’s rule that PAGA actions cannot be di vided into individual and non-in

dividual claims is preempted, so Vi king was entitled to compel arbi

tration of Moriana’s individual claim. PAGA provides no mechanism to enable a court to adjudicate non-individual PAGA claims once an individual claim has been committed to a separate proceeding. And under PAGA’s standing requirement, a plaintiff has standing to main

tain non-individual PAGA claims in an action only by virtue of also maintaining an individual claim in that action. As a result, Moriana would lack statutory standing to maintain her non-individual claims in court, and the correct course was to dismiss her remaining claims. Pp. 20–21.
Reversed and remanded.

A LITO , J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which B REYER , S O

TOMAYOR , K AGAN , and G ORSUCH , JJ., joined, in which R OBERTS , C. J., joined as to Parts I and III, and in which K AVANAUGH and B ARRETT , JJ., joined as to Part III. S OTOMAYOR , J., filed a concurring opinion. B ARRETT , J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which K AVANAUGH , J., joined, and in which R OBERTS , C. J, joined as to all but the footnote. T HOMAS , J., filed a dissenting opinion._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022)

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash

ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other form al errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

## SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 20–1573

VIKING RIVER CRUISES, INC., PETITIONER v. ANGIE MORIANA

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA , SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
[June 15, 2022]

J USTICE A LITO delivered the opinion of the Court.* We granted certiorari in this case to decide whether the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U. S. C. §1 et seq. , preempts a rule of California law that invalidates contrac

tual waivers of the right to assert representative claims un

der California’s Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004. Cal. Lab. Code Ann. §2698 et seq. (West 2022).

I A The California Legislature enacted the Labor Code Pri

vate Attorneys General Act (P AGA) to address a perceived deficit in the enforcement of the State’s Labor Code. Cali

fornia’s Labor and Workforce Development Agency (LWDA) had the authority to bring enforcement actions to impose civil penalties on employers for violations of many of the code’s provisions. But the legislature believed the LWDA did not have sufficient resources to reach the appropriate level of compliance, and budgetary constraints made it im

-

——————

*T HE C HIEF J USTICE joins Parts I and III of this opinion.2 VIKING RIVER CRUISES, INC. v . MORIANA

Opinion of the Court possible to achieve an adequate level of financing. The leg

islature thus decided to enlist employees as private attor

neys general to enforce Calif ornia labor law, with the un

derstanding that labor-law en forcement agencies were to retain primacy over private enforcement efforts. By its terms, PAGA authorizes any “aggrieved employee” to initiate an action against a former employer “on behalf of himself or herself and other current or former employees” to obtain civil penalties that previously could have been re

covered only by the State in an LWDA enforcement action. Cal. Lab. Code Ann. §2699(a). As the text of the statute indicates, PAGA limits statutory standing to “aggrieved employees”—a term defined to include “any person who was employed by the alleged violator and against whom one or more of the alleged violations was committed.” §2699(c). To bring suit, however, an employee must also exhaust admin

istrative remedies. That entails providing notice to the em

ployer and the LWDA of the violations alleged and the sup

porting facts and theories. §2699.3(a)(1)(A). If the LWDA fails to respond or initiate an investigation within a speci

fied timeframe, the employee may bring suit. §2699.3(a)(2). In any successful PAGA action, the LWDA is entitled to 75 percent of the award. §2699(i). The remaining 25 percent is distributed among the employees affected by the viola

tions at issue. Ibid. California law characterizes PAGA as creating a “type of qui tam action,” 1 Iskanian v. CLS Transp. Los Angeles,

——————

1 As we have explained, “ qui tam ” is the short form of the Latin phrase

“ qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur” —mean

ing “ ‘who pursues this action on our Lord the King’s behalf as well as his own.’ ” Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Ste

vens , 529 U. S. 765, 768, n. 1(2000). Qui tam actions “appear to have originated around the end of the 13t h century, when private individuals who had suffered injury began bringing actions in the royal courts on both their own and the Crown’s behalf ” and became more of a rarity as “royal courts began to extend jurisd iction to suits in volving wholly pri

vate wrongs.” Id., at 774–775.3 Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022)

Opinion of the Court

LLC , 59 Cal. 4th 348, 382, 327 P. 3d 129, 148 (2014). Alt

hough the statute’s language suggests that an “aggrieved employee” sues “on behalf of himself or herself and other current or former employees,” §2699(a), California prece

dent holds that a PAGA suit is a “ ‘representative action’ ” in which the employee plaintiff sues as an “ ‘agent or proxy’ ” of the State. Id. , at 380, 327 P. 3d, at 147 (quoting Arias v. Superior Court , 46 Cal. 4th 969, 986, 209 P. 3d 923, 933 (2009)). As the California courts conceive of it, the State “is al

ways the real party in interest in the suit.” Iskanian , 59 Cal. 4th, at 382, 327 P. 3d, at 148. 2 The primary function of PAGA is to delegate a power to employees to assert “the same legal right and interest as state law enforcement agencies,” Arias , 46 Cal. 4th, at 986, 209 P. 3d, at 933. In other words, the statute gives employees a right to assert

——————

2 The extent to which PAGA plaintiffs truly act as agents of the State rather than complete assignees is disputed. See Magadia v. Wal-Mart Assocs., Inc. , 999 F. 3d 668, 677 (CA9 2021) (holding that PAGA “lacks the procedural controls necessary to ensure that California” retains “sub

stantial authority over the case” (i nternal quotation marks omitted)). Agency requires control. See Hollingsworth v. Perry , 570 U. S. 693, 713 (2013). But apart from the exhaustion process, the statute does not fea

ture any explicit control mechanisms, such as provisions authorizing the State to intervene or requirin g its approval of settlements.

That said, California precedent strongly sugge sts that the State re

tains inherent authority to manage PAGA actions. There is no other ob

vious way to understand California precedent’s description of the State as the “real party in interest.” See generally 1A Cal. Jur. 3d Actions §31 (real-party-in-interest st atus is based on ownership and control over the cause of action). And a theory of total assignment appears inconsistent with the fact that employees have no assignable interest in a PAGA claim. See Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1756, AFL-CIO v. Supe

rior Court of Los Angeles Cty. , 46 Cal. 4th 993, 1002, 209 P. 3d 937, 943 (2009) (Amalgamated Transit); see also Turrieta v. Lyft, Inc. , 69 Cal. App. 5th 955, 972, 284 Cal. Rptr. 3d 767, 780 (2021) (The employee’s “ability to file PAGA claims on behalf of the state does not convert the state’s interest into their own or rend er them real parties in interest”). For purposes of this opinion, we assu me that PAGA plaintiffs are agents.4 VIKING RIVER CRUISES, INC. v . MORIANA

Opinion of the Court the State’s claims for civil penalties on a representative ba

sis, but it does not create any private rights or private claims for relief. Iskanian , 59 Cal. 4th, at 381, 327 P. 3d, at 148; see also Amalgamated Transit , 46 Cal. 4th 993, 1002, 209 P. 3d 937, 943 (2009). The code provisions enforced through the statute establish publ ic duties that are owed to the State, not private rights belonging to employees in their “individual capacities.” Iskanian

, 59 Cal. 4th, at 381, 327 P. 3d, at 147. Other, distinct provisions of the code create individual rights, and claims arising from violations of those rights are actionable through separate private causes of action for compensatory or statutory damages. Id., at 381–382, 327 P. 3d, at 147–148; see also Kim v. Reins Int’l California, Inc. , 9 Cal. 5th 73, 86, 459 P. 3d 1123, 1130 (2020) (“[C]ivil penalties recovered on the state’s behalf are intended to remediate present violations and deter future ones, not to redress employees’ injuries” (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis deleted)). And because PAGA ac

tions are understood to involve the assertion of the govern

ment’s claims on a derivative basis, the judgment issued in a PAGA action is binding on anyone “who would be bound by a judgment in an action brought by the government.” Arias , 46 Cal. 4th, at 986, 209 P. 3d, at 933. California precedent also interprets the statute to con

tain what is effectively a rule of claim joinder. Rules of claim joinder allow a party to unite multiple claims against an opposing party in a single action. See 6A C. Wright, H. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure §1582 (3d ed. 2016) (Wright & Miller). PAGA standing has the same function. An employee with statutory standing may “seek any civil penalties the state can, including penalties for violations involving employees other than the PAGA lit

igant herself.” ZB, N. A. v. Superior Court , 8 Cal. 5th 175, 185, 448 P. 3d 239, 243–244 (2019). An employee who al

leges he or she suffered a single violation is entitled to use that violation as a gateway to assert a potentially limitless5 Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022)

Opinion of the Court number of other violations as predicates for liability. This mechanism radically expands the scope of PAGA actions. The default penalties set by PAGA are $100 for each ag

grieved employee per pay period for the initial violation and $200 for each aggrieved employee per pay period for each subsequent violation. Cal. Lab. Code Ann. §2699(f )(2). In

dividually, these penalties are modest; but given PAGA’s additive dimension, low-value claims may easily be welded together into high-value suits.

B Petitioner Viking River Crui ses, Inc. (Viking), is a com

pany that offers ocean and river cruises around the world. When respondent Angie Moriana was hired by Viking as a sales representative, she executed an agreement to arbi

trate any dispute arising out of her employment. The agreement contained a “Class Action Waiver” providing that in any arbitral proceeding, the parties could not bring any dispute as a class, collective, or representative PAGA action. It also contained a severability clause specifying that if the waiver was found invalid, any class, collective, representative, or PAGA action would presumptively be lit

igated in court. But under that severability clause, if any “portion” of the waiver remained valid, it would be “en

forced in arbitration.” After leaving her position with Viking, Moriana filed a PAGA action against Viking in California court. Her com

plaint contained a claim that Viking had failed to provide her with her final wages within 72 hours, as required by §§101–102 of the California Labor Code. But the complaint also asserted a wide array of other code violations allegedly sustained by other Viking employees, including violations of provisions concerning the minimum wage, overtime, meal periods, rest periods, timing of pay, and pay state

ments. Viking moved to compel arbitration of Moriana’s “individual” PAGA claim—here meaning the claim that6 VIKING RIVER CRUISES, INC. v . MORIANA

Opinion of the Court

arose from the violation she suffered—and to dismiss her other PAGA claims. The trial court denied that motion, and the California Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that cate

gorical waivers of PAGA standing are contrary to state pol

icy and that PAGA claims cannot be split into arbitrable individual claims and nonarbitrable “representative” claims. This ruling was dictated by the California Supreme Court’s decision in Iskanian . In that case, the court held that pre-dispute agreements to waive the right to bring “representative” PAGA claims are invalid as a matter of public policy. What, precisely, this holding means requires some explanation. PAGA’s unique features have prompted the development of an entire vocabulary unique to the stat

ute, but the details, it seems, are still being worked out. An unfortunate feature of this lexicon is that it tends to use the word “representative” in two distinct ways, and each of those uses of the term “representative” is connected with one of Iskanian ’s rules governing contractual waiver of PAGA claims. In the first sense, PAGA actions are “representative” in that they are brought by employees acting as representa

tives—that is, as agents or proxies—of the State. But PAGA claims are also called “representative” when they are predicated on code violations sustained by other employees. In the first sense, “ ‘ every PAGA action is . . . representa

tive’ ” and “[t]here is no indivi dual component to a PAGA action,” Kim , 9 Cal. 5th, at 87, 459 P. 3d, at 1131 (quoting Iskanian , 59 Cal. 4th, at 387, 327 P. 3d, at 151), because every PAGA claim is asserted in a representative capacity. But when the word “representati ve” is used in the second way, it makes sense to di stinguish “individual” PAGA claims, which are premised on Labor Code violations actu

ally sustained by the plaintiff, from “representative” (or perhaps quasi-representative) PAGA claims arising out of events involving other employees. For purposes of this7 Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022)

Opinion of the Court opinion, we will use “individual PAGA claim” to refer to claims based on code violations suffered by the plaintiff. And we will endeavor to be clear about how we are using the term “representative.” Iskanian ’s principal rule prohibits waivers of “repre

sentative” PAGA claims in the first sense. That is, it pre

vents parties from waiving representative standing to bring PAGA claims in a judicial or arbitral forum. But Iskanian also adopted a secondary rule that invalidates agreements to separately arbitrate or litigate “individual PAGA claims for Labor Code violations that an employee suffered,” on the theory that resolving victim-specific claims in separate ar

bitrations does not serve the deterrent purpose of PAGA. 59 Cal. 4th, at 383, 327 P. 3d, at 149; see also Kim , 9 Cal. 5th, at 88, 459 P. 3d, at 1132 (noting that based on Is

kanian

, California courts have uniformly “rejected efforts to split PAGA claims into individual and representative com

ponents”). In this case, Iskanian ’s principal prohibition required the lower courts to treat the repres entative-action waiver in the agreement between Moriana and Viking as invalid insofar as it was construed as a wholesale waiver of PAGA stand

ing. The agreement’s severability clause, however, allowed enforcement of any “portion” of the waiver that remained valid, so the agreement still would have permitted arbitra

tion of Moriana’s individual PAGA claim even if wholesale enforcement was impossible. But because California law prohibits division of a PAGA action into constituent claims, the state courts refused to compel arbitration of that claim as well. We granted certiorari, 595 U. S. ___ (2021), and

now reverse.
II The FAA was enacted in response to judicial hostility to arbitration. Section 2 of the statute makes arbitration agreements “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon8 VIKING RIVER CRUISES, INC. v . MORIANA

Opinion of the Court such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9 U. S. C. §2. 3 As we have interpreted it, this provision contains two clauses: An enforcement man

date, which renders agreements to arbitrate enforceable as a matter of federal law, and a saving clause, which permits invalidation of arbitration clauses on grounds applicable to “any contract.” See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion , 563 U. S. 333, 339–340 (2011); Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis , 584 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2018) (slip op., at 5–6). These clauses jointly establish “an equal-treatment principle: A court may invalidate an arbitration agreement based on ‘generally ap

plicable contract defenses’ like fraud or unconscionability, but not on legal rules that ‘apply only to arbitration or that derive their meaning from the fact that an agreement to ar

bitrate is at issue.’ ” Kindred Nursing Centers L. P. v. Clark

, 581 U. S. 246, 251 (2017) (quoting Concepcion , 563 U. S., at 339). Under that principle, the FAA “preempts any state rule discriminating on its face against arbitration—for ex

ample, a law ‘prohibit[ing] outright the arbitration of a par

ticular type of claim.’ ” Kindred Nursing , 581 U. S., at 251 (quoting Concepcion , 563 U. S., at 341). But under our decisions, even rules that are generally ap

plicable as a formal matter are not immune to preemption

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3 As we have noted, common-law hostility to arbitration “manifested itself in a great variety of devices and formulas.” AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion

, 563 U. S. 333, 342 (2011) (internal quotation marks omit

ted). Two important devices were the doctrines of ouster and revocabil

ity, which, respectively, invalidated arbitration clauses as impermissible attempts to “oust” courts of their ju risdiction and permitted parties to revoke consent to arbitrate until the moment the arbitrator entered an award. See, e.g., Kill v. Hollister , 1 Wils. K. B. 129, 95 Eng. Rep. 532 (K. B. 1746); Vynior’s Case , 77 Co. Rep. 80a, 77 Eng. Rep. 597 (K. B. 1609). Another was the rule barring specific performance as a remedy for breach of an arbitr ation clause. See 21 R. Lord, Williston on Con

tracts §57:2 (4th ed. 2017). Section 2 abrogated these doctrines by mak

ing arbitration agreements presumptively “valid,” “irrevocable,” and “en

forceable.”9 Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022)

Opinion of the Court by the FAA. See Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela , 587 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (slip op., at 6); Concepcion , 563 U. S., at 343. Sec

tion 2’s mandate protects a right to enforce arbitration agreements. That right would not be a right to arbitrate in any meaningful sense if generally applicable principles of state law could be used to tr ansform “traditiona[l] individ

ualized . . . arbitration” into the “litigation it was meant to displace” through the imposition of procedures at odds with arbitration’s informal nature. Epic Systems , 584 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 8). See also Concepcion , 563 U. S., at 351. And that right would not be a ri ght to arbitrate based on an agreement if generally applicable law could be used to coer

cively impose arbitration in contravention of the “first prin

ciple” of our FAA jurisprudence: that “[a]rbitration is strictly ‘a matter of consent.’ ” Granite Rock Co. v. Team

sters , 561 U. S. 287, 299 (2010) (quoting Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Jun

ior Univ. , 489 U. S. 468, 479 (1989)); see also Lamps Plus

, 587 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 7); Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v. Ani

malFeeds Int’l Corp. , 559 U. S. 662, 685 (2010). Based on these principles, we have held that “a party may not be compelled under the FAA to submit to class arbitra

tion unless there is a contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to do so.” Id. , at 684. See also Lamps Plus

, 587 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 1); Epic Systems , 584 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 6–8); Concepcion , 563 U. S., at 347–348. The “ ‘shift from bilateral arbitration to class-action arbitra

tion’ ” mandates procedural changes that are inconsistent with the individualized and informal mode of arbitration contemplated by the FAA. Id. , at 347 (quoting StoltNielsen , 559 U. S., at 686). As a result, class procedures cannot be imposed by state law without presenting unwill

ing parties with an unacceptable choice between being com

pelled to arbitrate using procedures at odds with arbitra

tion’s traditional form and forg oing arbitration altogether. Putting parties to that choice is inconsistent with the FAA.10 VIKING RIVER CRUISES, INC. v . MORIANA

Opinion of the Court Viking contends that these decisions require enforcement of contractual provisions waiving the right to bring PAGA actions because PAGA creates a form of class or collective proceeding. If this is correct, Iskanian ’s prohibition on PAGA waivers presents parties with the same impermissi

ble choice as the rules we have invalidated in our decisions concerning class- and collective-action waivers: Either arbi

trate disputes using a form of class procedure, or do not ar

bitrate at all. Moriana offers a very different characterization of the statute. As she sees it, any conflict between Iskanian and the FAA is illusory because PAGA creates nothing more than a substantive cause of action. The only thing that is distinctive about PAGA, she supposes, is that it allows em

ployee plaintiffs to increase the available penalties that may be awarded in an action by proving additional predi

cate violations of the Labor Co de. But that does not make a PAGA action a class action, because those violations are not distinct claims belonging to distinct individuals. In

stead, they are predicates for expanded liability under a single cause of action. In Moriana’s view, that means Is

kanian invalidates waivers of substantive rights, and does not purport to invalidate anything that can meaningfully be described as an “arbitration agreement.” 4

——————

4 Moriana declines to defend one of the Iskanian court’s own bases for holding that the FAA does not mandat e enforcement of PAGA waivers. The Iskanian court reasoned that a PAGA action lies outside the FAA’s coverage entirely because §2 is limited to controversies “ arising out of ” the contract between the parties, 9 U. S. C. §2 (emphasis added), and a PAGA action “is not a dispute betw een an employer and an employee arising out of their contractual relati onship,” but “a dispute between an employer and the state .” Iskanian v. CLS Transp. Los Angeles, LLC , 59 Cal. 4th 348, 387, 327 P. 3d 129, 151 (2014). We reject this argument. Although the terms of §2 limit the FAA’s enforcement mandate to agree

ments to arbitrate controversies that “arise out of ” the parties’ contrac

tual relationship, disputes resolved in PAGA actions satisfy this require

ment. The contractual relationship between the parties is a but-for cause11 Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022)

Opinion of the Court We disagree with both characterizations of the statute. Moriana is correct that the FAA does not require courts to enforce contractual waivers of substantive rights and rem

edies. The FAA’s mandate is to enforce “ arbitration agree

ments .” Concepcion , 563 U. S., at 344 (emphasis added). And as we have described it, an arbitration agreement is “a specialized kind of forum-selection clause that posits not only the situs of suit but also the procedure to be used in resolving the dispute.” Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. , 417 U. S. 506, 519 (1974); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. , 473 U. S. 614, 633 (1985). An ar

bitration agreement thus does not alter or abridge substan

tive rights; it merely changes how those rights will be pro

cessed. And so we have said that “ ‘[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the sub

stantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral . . . forum.’ ” Preston v. Fer

rer , 552 U. S. 346, 359 (2008) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. , 473 U. S., at 628). 5

—————— of any justiciable legal controversy between the parties under PAGA, and “arising out of ” language normally refers to a causal relationship. See,
e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial Dist. Court , 592 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (slip op., at 8). And regardless of whether a PAGA action is in some sense also a dispute betw een an employer an d the State, noth

ing in the FAA categorically exempts cl aims belonging to sovereigns from the scope of §2.

5 In briefing before this Court, Viki ng argued that th e principle that the FAA does not mandate enforcement of provisions waiving substan

tive rights is limited to federal statutes. This argument is erroneous. The basis of this principle is not anyt hing unique about federal statutes. It is that the FAA requires only the enforcement of “provision[s]” to settle a controversy “by arbitration,” §2, and not any provision that happens to appear in a contract that features an arbitration clause. That is why we mentioned this principle in Preston , which concerned claims arising un

der state law. See 552 U. S., at 360 (noting that under the agreement, a party “relinquishe[d] no substantive ri ghts . . . California law may accord him”).12 VIKING RIVER CRUISES, INC. v . MORIANA

Opinion of the Court But Moriana’s premise that PAGA creates a unitary pri

vate cause of action is irreco ncilable with the structure of the statute and the ordinary legal meaning of the word “claim.” California courts interpret PAGA to provide em

ployees with delegated autho rity to assert the State’s claims on a representative basis, not an individual cause of action. See, e.g. , Amalgamated Transit , 46 Cal. 4th, at 1003, 209 P. 3d, at 943 (PAGA “is simply a procedural stat

ute” that “does not create prop erty rights or any other sub

stantive rights”). And a PAGA action asserting multiple code violations affecting a range of different employees does not constitute “a single claim” in even the broadest possible sense, because the violations asserted need not even arise from a common “transaction” or “nucleus of operative facts.” Lucky Brand Dungarees, Inc. v. Marcel Fashions Group, Inc. , 590 U. S. ___, ___ (2020) (slip op., at 6) (internal quo

tation marks omitted). 6 Viking’s position, on the other hand, elides important structural differences between PAGA actions and class ac

tions that preclude any straig htforward application of our precedents invalidating prohibitions on class-action waiv

ers. Class-action procedure allows courts to use a repre

sentative plaintiff ’s individual claims as a basis to “adjudi

cate claims of multiple parties at once, instead of in separate suits,” Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P. A. v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 559 U. S. 393, 408 (2010). This, of course, requires the certification of a class. And because class judg

ments bind absentees with respect to their individual

——————

6 California courts sometimes speak as though a PAGA action involves the assertion of “a single representative PAGA claim,” Williams v. Supe

rior Court , 237 Cal. App. 4th 642, 649, 188 Cal. Rptr. 3d 83, 87 (2015). But we are not required to take the labels affixed by state courts at face value in determining whether state la w creates a scheme at odds with federal law. See, e.g. , Carpenter v. Shaw , 280 U. S. 363, 367–368 (1930). And in our view, this manner of speakingis another reflection of the stillembryonic character of the language that has grown up around PAGA.13 Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022)

Opinion of the Court claims for relief and are preclusive as to all claims the class could have brought, Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank of Rich

mond , 467 U. S. 867, 874 (1984), “class representatives must at all times adequately represent absent class mem

bers, and absent [class] members must be afforded notice, an opportunity to be heard, and a right to opt out of the class.” Concepcion , 563 U. S., at 349. And to “ensur[e] that the named plaintiffs are appropriate representatives of the class whose claims they wish to litigate,” the adjudicator must decide questions of numerosity, commonality, typical

ity, and adequacy of representation. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.

v. Dukes , 564 U. S. 338, 349 (2011). PAGA actions also permit the adjudication of multiple claims in a single suit, but their structure is entirely differ

ent. A class-action plaintiff can raise a multitude of claims because he or she represents a multitude of absent individ

uals; a PAGA plaintiff, by contrast, represents a single prin

cipal, the LWDA, that has a multitude of claims. As a result of this structural difference, PAGA suits exhibit virtually none of the procedural characteristics of class actions. The plaintiff does not represent a class of injured individuals, so there is no need for certification. PAGA judgments are binding only with respect to the State’s claims, and are not binding on nonparty employees as to any individually held claims. Arias , 46 Cal. 4th, at 986, 209 P. 3d, at 933–934. This obviates the need to consider adequacy of representa

tion, numerosity, commonality, or typicality. And although the statute gives other affected employees a future interest in the penalties awarded in an action, that interest does not make those employees “parties” in any of the senses in which absent class members are, see Devlin v. Scardelletti

, 536 U. S. 1 (2002), or give those employees anything more than an inchoate interest in litigation proceeds. See Ver

mont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U. S. 765, 773 (2000) (The “ ‘right ’ ” to a share14 VIKING RIVER CRUISES, INC. v . MORIANA

Opinion of the Court of the proceeds of a qui tam action “does not even fully ma

terialize until the litigation is completed and the relator prevails”). Because PAGA actions do not adjudicate the individual claims of multiple absent third parties, they do not present the problems of notice, due process, and adequacy of repre

sentation that render class arbi tration inconsistent with ar

bitration’s traditionally individualized form. See Concep

cion , 563 U. S., at 347–348. Of course, as a practical matter, PAGA actions do have something important in common with class actions. Because PAGA plaintiffs represent a principal with a potentially vast number of claims at its dis

posal, PAGA suits “greatly increas[e] risks to defendants.” Id. , at 350. But our precedents do not hold that the FAA allows parties to contract out of anything that might am

plify defense risks. Instead, our cases hold that States can

not coerce individuals into fo rgoing arbitration by taking the individualized and informal procedures characteristic of traditional arbitration off the table. Litigation risks are rel

evant to that inquiry because one way in which state law may coerce parties into forgoing their right to arbitrate is by conditioning that right on the use of a procedural format that makes arbitration artificially unattractive. The ques

tion, then, is whether PAGA contains any procedural mech

anism at odds with arbitration’s basic form. Viking suggests an answer. Our FAA precedents treat bilateral arbitration as the prototype of the individualized and informal form of arbitrati on protected from undue state interference by the FAA. See Epic Systems , 584 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 8–9); see also American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant , 570 U. S. 228, 238 (2013); Con

cepcion , 563 U. S., at 347–349; Stolt-Nielsen , 559 U. S., at 685–686. Viking posits that a proceeding is “bilateral” in the relevant sense if—but only if—it involves two and only two parties and the arbitration “‘is conducted by and on be

half of the individual named parties only.’ ” Wal-Mart , 56415 Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022)

Opinion of the Court

U. S., at 348 (quoting Califano v. Yamasaki , 442 U. S. 682, 700–701 (1979)). PAGA actions necessarily deviate from this ideal because they involve litigation or arbitration on behalf of an absent principal. Viking thus suggests that Iskanian ’s prohibition on PAGA waivers is inconsistent with the FAA because PAGA creates an intrinsically repre

sentational form of action and Iskanian requires parties ei

ther to arbitrate in that format or forgo arbitration alto

gether. We disagree. Nothing in the FAA establishes a categori

cal rule mandating enforcement of waivers of standing to assert claims on behalf of absent principals. Non-class rep

resentative actions in which a single agent litigates on be

half of a single principal are part of the basic architecture of much of substantive law. Familiar examples include shareholder-derivative suits, wrongful-death actions, trus

tee actions, and suits on behalf of infants or incompetent persons. Single-agent, single-principal suits of this kind necessarily deviate from the strict ideal of bilateral dispute resolution posited by Viking. But we have never held that the FAA imposes a duty on States to render all forms of rep

resentative standing waivable by contract. Nor have we suggested that single-agent, single-principal representa

tive suits are inconsistent the norm of bilateral arbitration as our precedents conceive of it . Instead, we have held that “the ‘changes brought about by the shift from bilateral ar

bitration to class-action arbitration ’ ” are too fundamental to be imposed on parties without their consent. Concepcion

, 563 U. S., at 347–348 (quoting Stolt-Nielsen , 559 U. S., at 686; emphasis added). And we have held that §2’s saving clause does not preserve defenses that would allow a party to declare “that a contract is unenforceable just because it requires bilateral arbitration .” Epic Systems , 584 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 9). These principles do not mandate the enforcement of waiv

-16 VIKING RIVER CRUISES, INC. v . MORIANA

Opinion of the Court ers of representative capacity as a categorical rule. Requir

ing parties to decide whether to arbitrate or litigate a single-agent, single-principal action does not produce a shift from a situation in which the arbitrator must “re

solv[e] a single dispute between the parties to a single agreement” to one in which he or she must “resolv[e] many disputes between hundreds or perhaps even thousands of parties.” Stolt-Nielsen , 559 U. S., at 686. And a proceeding in which two and only two parties arbitrate exclusively in their individual capacities is not the only thing one might mean by “bilateral arbitration.” As we have said, “[t]he la

bel ‘party’ does not indicate an absolute characteristic, but rather a conclusion about the applicability of various proce

dural rules that may differ based on context.” Devlin , 536 U. S., at 10. Our precedents use the phrase “bilateral arbi

tration” in opposition to “class or collective” arbitration, and the problems we have identified in mandatory class arbitra

tion arise from procedures char acteristic of multiparty rep

resentative actions. Epic Systems , 584 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 24); see also Italian Colors , 570 U. S., at 238; Con

cepcion , 563 U. S., at 347–349; Stolt-Nielsen , 559 U. S., at 685–686. Unlike these kinds of actions, single-principal, single-agent representative actions are “bilateral” in two registers: They involve the rights of only the absent real party in interest and the defendant, and litigation need only be conducted by the agent-plaintiff and the defendant. This degree of deviation from bilateral norms is not alien to tra

ditional arbitral practice, 7 and our precedents have never suggested otherwise. See, e.g., Marmet Health Care Center, Inc. v. Brown , 565 U. S. 530 (2012) ( per curiam ) (invalidat

ing rule categorically barring arbitration of wrongful-death actions).

——————

7 For example, close corporations have included arbitration clauses in negotiated shareholder agreemen ts for many decades. See, e.g., In re Carl , 263 App. Div. 887, 32 N. Y. S. 2d 410 (1942); Lumsden v. Lumsden Bros. & Taylor Inc ., 242 App. Div. 852, 257 N. Y. S. 221 (1934).17 Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022)

Opinion of the Court Nor does a rule prohibiting waiver of representative standing declare “that a contract is unenforceable just be

cause it requires bilateral arbitration .” Epic Systems , 584 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 9). Indeed, if the term “bilateral arbitration” is used to mean “arbitration in an individual capacity between precisely two parties,” a rule prohibiting representative-capacity waivers cannot invalidate agree

ments to arbitrate on a “bilateral” basis. An agreement that explicitly provided for “arbitration on a strictly bilateral ba

sis” would, under that definition of the term “bilateral,” cat

egorically exclude representa tive-capacity claims from its coverage. Such claims, after all, necessarily involve the rep

resentation of an absent principal, and thus cannot be arbi

trated in a strictly bilateral proceeding. A rule prohibiting waivers of representative standing would not invalidate any agreements that contracted for “bilateral arbitration” in Viking’s sense—it would simp ly require parties to choose whether to litigate those claims or arbitrate them in a pro

ceeding that is not bilateral in every conceivable sense. And while this consequence only follows because it is impossible to decide representative claims in an arbitration that is “bi

lateral” in every dimension, nothing in our precedent sug

gests that in enacting the FAA, Congress intended to re

quire States to reshape their agency law to ensure that parties will never have to arbitrate in a proceeding that de

viates from “bilateral arbitration ” in the strictest sense. If there is a conflict between California’s prohibition on PAGA waivers and the FAA, it must derive from a different source.

III We think that such a conflict between PAGA’s procedural structure and the FAA does exist, and that it derives from the statute’s built-in mechanism of claim joinder. As we noted at the outset, that mechanism permits “aggrieved em

ployees” to use the Labor Code violations they personally suffered as a basis to join to th e action any claims that could18 VIKING RIVER CRUISES, INC. v . MORIANA

Opinion of the Court have been raised by the State in an enforcement proceed

ing. Iskanian ’s secondary rule prohibits parties from con

tracting around this joinder device because it invalidates agreements to arbitrate only “individual PAGA claims for Labor Code violations that an employee suffered,” 59 Cal. 4th, at 383, 327 P. 3d, at 149. This prohibition on contract ual division of PAGA actions into constituent claims unduly circumscribes the freedom of parties to determine “the issues subject to arbitration” and “the rules by which they will arbitrate,” Lamps Plus , 587 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 7), and does so in a way that vio

lates the fundamental principle that “arbitration is a mat

ter of consent,” Stolt-Nielsen , 559 U. S., at 684. The most basic corollary of the principle that arbitration is a matter of consent is that “a party can be forced to arbitrate only those issues it specifically has agreed to submit to arbitra

tion,” First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan , 514 U. S. 938, 945 (1995). This means that parties cannot be coerced into arbitrating a claim, issue, or dispute “absent an affirm

ative ‘contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to do so.’ ” Lamps Plus , 587 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 8) (quot

ing Stolt-Nielsen , 559 U. S., at 684); see also Concepcion

, 563 U. S., at 347–348. For that reason, state law cannot condition the enforcea

bility of an arbitration agreement on the availability of a procedural mechanism that would permit a party to expand the scope of the arbitration by introducing claims that the parties did not jointly agree to arbitrate. Rules of claim joinder can function in precisely that way. Modern civil pro

cedure dispenses with the formalities of the common-law approach to claim joinder in favor of almost-unqualified joinder. Wright & Miller §1581. Federal Rule of Civil Pro

cedure 18(a), which permits a party to “join, as independent or alternative claims, as many claims as it has against an opposing party,” is typical of the modern approach. But the FAA licenses contracting parties to depart from standard19 Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022)

Opinion of the Court rules “in favor of individualized arbitration procedures of their own design,” so parties to an arbitration agreement are not required to follow the same approach. Epic Systems

, 584 U. S., at ____ (slip op., at 14). And that is true even if bifurcated proceedings are an inevitable result. See, e.g., Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd , 470 U. S. 213, 220–221 (1985); Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Con

str. Corp. , 460 U. S. 1, 103 (1983). A state rule imposing an expansive rule of joinder in the arbitral context would defeat th e ability of parties to control which claims are subject to arbitration. Such a rule would permit parties to superadd new claims to the proceeding, regardless of whether the agreement between them com

mitted those claims to arbitration. Requiring arbitration procedures to include a joinder rule of that kind compels parties to either go along with an arbitration in which the range of issues under consider ation is determined by coer

cion rather than consent, or else forgo arbitration alto

gether. Either way, the parties are coerced into giving up a right they enjoy under the FAA. See Lamps Plus , 587 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 6–8); Epic Systems , 584 U. S., at ___– ___ (slip op., at 5–9); Concepcion , 563 U. S., at 347–351; Stolt-Nielsen , 559 U. S., at 684–687. When made compulsory by way of Iskanian , the joinder rule internal to PAGA function s in exactly this way. Under that rule, parties cannot agree to restrict the scope of an arbitration to disputes arising out of a particular “ ‘ “trans

action” ’ ” or “ ‘common nucleus of facts.’ ” Lucky Brand , 590 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 6). If the parties agree to arbitrate “individual” PAGA claims based on personally sustained vi

olations, Iskanian allows the aggrieved employee to abro

gate that agreement after the fact and demand either judi

cial proceedings or an arbitra l proceeding that exceeds the scope jointly intended by the parties. The only way for par

ties to agree to arbitrate one of an employee’s PAGA claims is to also “agree” to arbitrate all other PAGA claims in the20 VIKING RIVER CRUISES, INC. v . MORIANA

Opinion of the Court same arbitral proceeding. The effect of Iskanian ’s rule mandating this mechanism is to coerce parties into withholding PAGA claims from ar

bitration. Liberal rules of cl aim joinder presuppose a back

drop in which litigants assert their own claims and those of a limited class of other parties who are usually connectedwith the plaintiff by virtue of a distinctive legal relationship—such as that between shareholders and a corporation or between a parent and a minor child. PAGA departs from that norm by granting the power to enforce a subset of Cal

ifornia public law to every employee in the State. This com

bination of standing to act on behalf of a sovereign and man

datory freeform joinder allows plaintiffs to unite a massive number of claims in a single-package suit. But as we have said, “[a]rbitration is poorly su ited to the higher stakes” of massive-scale disputes of this kind. Concepcion , 563 U. S., at 350. The absence of “multilayered review” in arbitral proceedings “makes it more lik ely that errors will go uncor

rected.” Ibid. And suits featuring a vast number of claims entail the same “risk of ‘in terrorem’ settlements that class actions entail.” Ibid. As a result, Iskanian ’s indivisibility rule effectively coerces parties to opt for a judicial forum rather than “forgo[ing] the procedural rigor and appellate review of the courts in order to realize the benefits of pri

vate dispute resolution.” Stolt-Nielsen , 559 U. S., at 685; see also Concepcion , 563 U. S., at 350–351. This result is incompatible with the FAA.

IV We hold that the FAA preempts the rule of Iskanian in

sofar as it precludes division of PAGA actions into individ

ual and non-individual claims through an agreement to ar

bitrate. This holding compels reversal in this case. The agreement between Viking and Moriana purported to waive “representative” PAGA claims. Under Iskanian , this provi

sion was invalid if construed as a wholesale waiver of PAGA21 Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022)

Opinion of the Court claims. And under our holding, that aspect of Iskanian is not preempted by the FAA, so the agreement remains inva

lid insofar as it is interpreted in that manner. But the sev

erability clause in the agreement provides that if the waiver provision is invalid in some respect, any “portion” of the waiver that remains valid must still be “enforced in arbitra

tion.” Based on this clause, Viking was entitled to enforce the agreement insofar as it mandated arbitration of Mori

ana’s individual PAGA claim. The lower courts refused to do so based on the rule that PAGA actions cannot be divided into individual and non-indivi dual claims. Under our hold

ing, that rule is preempted, so Viking is entitled to compel arbitration of Moriana’s individual claim. The remaining question is what the lower courts should have done with Moriana’s non-individual claims. Under our holding in this case, thos e claims may not be dismissed simply because they are “representative.” Iskanian ’s rule remains valid to that extent. But as we see it, PAGA pro

vides no mechanism to enable a court to adjudicate nonindividual PAGA claims once an individual claim has been committed to a separate proc eeding. Under PAGA’s stand

ing requirement, a plaintiff can maintain non-individual PAGA claims in an action only by virtue of also maintaining an individual claim in that action. See Cal. Lab. Code Ann. §§2699(a), (c). When an employee’s own dispute is pared away from a PAGA action, the employee is no different from a member of the general public, and PAGA does not allow such persons to maintain suit. See Kim , 9 Cal. 5th, at 90, 459 P. 3d, at 1133 (“PAGA’s standing requirement was meant to be a departure from the ‘general public’ . . . stand

ing originally allowed” under ot her California statutes). As a result, Moriana lacks statutory standing to continue to maintain her non-individual claims in court, and the correct course is to dismiss her remaining claims. For these reasons, the judgment of the California Court of Appeal is reversed, and the case is remanded for further22 VIKING RIVER CRUISES, INC. v . MORIANA

Opinion of the Court proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022)

S OTOMAYOR , J., concurring 

## SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 20–1573

VIKING RIVER CRUISES, INC., PETITIONER v. ANGIE MORIANA

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA , SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
[June 15, 2022]

J USTICE S OTOMAYOR , concurring. I join the Court’s opinion in full. The Court faithfully ap

plies precedent to hold that Ca lifornia’s anti-waiver rule for claims under the State’s Labor Code Private Attorneys Gen

eral Act of 2004 (PAGA) is pre-empted only “insofar as itprecludes division of PAGA actions into individual and nonindividual claims through an agreement to arbitrate.” Ante, at 20. In its analysis of the parties’ contentions, the Court also details several impo rtant limitations on the pre

emptive effect of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). See ante, at 11–17. As a whole, the Court’s opinion makes clear that California is not powerless to address its sovereign con

cern that it cannot adequately enforce its Labor Code with

out assistance from private attorneys general. The Court concludes that the FAA poses no bar to the ad

judication of respondent Angie Moriana’s “non-individual” PAGA claims, but that PAGA it self “provides no mechanism to enable a court to adjudicate non-individual PAGA claims once an individual claim has been committed to a separate proceeding.” Ante, at 21. Thus, the Court reasons, based on available guidance from California courts, that Moriana lacks “statutory standing” under PAGA to litigate her “non

individual” claims separately in state court. Ibid. Of course, if this Court’s understanding of state law is wrong, California courts, in an appropriate case, will have the last2 VIKING RIVER CRUISES, INC. v . MORIANA

S OTOMAYOR , J., concurring word. Alternatively, if this Court’s understanding is right, the California Legislature is free to modify the scope of stat

utory standing under PAGA within state and federal con

stitutional limits. With this understanding, I join the Court’s opinion.B ARRETT , J., concurring

_________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022)

Opinion of B ARRETT , J. 

## SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 20–1573

VIKING RIVER CRUISES, INC., PETITIONER v. ANGIE MORIANA

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA , SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
[June 15, 2022]

J USTICE B ARRETT , with whom J USTICE K AVANAUGH joins, and with whom T HE C HIEF J USTICE joins except as to the footnote, concurring in part and concurring in the judg

ment. I join Part III of the Court’s opinion. I agree that reversal is required under our preceden t because PAGA’s procedure is akin to other aggregation devices that cannot be imposed on a party to an arbitration agreement. See, e.g., Stolt-Niel

sen S. A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp. , 559 U. S. 662 (2010); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion , 563 U. S. 333 (2011); Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis , 584 U. S. ___ (2018); Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela , 587 U. S. ___ (2019). I would say noth

ing more than that. The discussion in Parts II and IV of the Court’s opinion is unnecessary to the result, and much of it addresses disputed state-law questions as well as argu

ments not pressed or passed upon in this case.*

——————

*The same is true of Part I._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022)

T HOMAS , J., dissenting 

## SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 20–1573

VIKING RIVER CRUISES, INC., PETITIONER v. ANGIE MORIANA

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA , SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
[June 15, 2022]

J USTICE T HOMAS , dissenting.
I continue to adhere to the view that the Federal Arbitra

tion Act (FAA), 9 U. S. C. §1 et seq. , does not apply to pro

ceedings in state courts. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson , 513 U. S. 265, 285–297 (1995) (T HOMAS , J., dis

senting); see also Kindred Nursing Centers L. P. v. Clark

, 581 U. S. 246, 257 (2017) (T HOMAS , J., dissenting) (collect

ing cases). Accordingly, the FAA does not require Califor

nia’s courts to enforce an arbitration agreement that forbids an employee to invoke the St ate’s Private Attorneys Gen

eral Act. On that basis, I would affirm the judgment of the California Court of Appeal.