alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### HICKOX v ROGERS ADMX, et.

Ohio Appeals, 6th Dist, Lucas Co

No 2069.

Decided Dec 10, 1928

P R Taylor, Fraser, Hiett, Wall & Effler and Stephen Brophy, all of Toledo, for Hickox.

Smith, Beckwith, Ohlinger & Froehlich, Toledo, and Ray D Avery, Bowling Green, for Rogers.

RICHARDS, J

During the trial of the case Mrs. Rogers was called by the plaintiff for cross-examination ¡and was asked, on cross-examination, concerning a conversation she had with Hickox during her father’s lifetime regarding the purchase of the stocks made by Hickox. In answer to questions put to her on cross-examination, she stated that Hickox mentioned the number of shares purchased but said nothing about the division of profits and nothing in regard to his compensation. Thereafter counsel for plaintiff called his client for examination and asked him in regard to the same conversation about which Mrs. Rogers had testified. The plaintiff stated in response to questions asked by his attorney, and over objections of defendant’s attorneys, in substance, that Raydure had instructed him to buy the stock and that they would split the profits fifty-fifty, and that this arrangement was made with him. We think this testimony is not competent. It is claimed to be competent because Mrs. Rogers had testified .regarding the same conversation, but this testimony from her was brought out on cross-examination by plaintiff’s counsel. It is not permissible for an attorney representing a client who is disqualified from testifying on a given matter because of the fact that the opposing party is administrator or executor, to call the administrator or executor and ask her in regard to the conversation and thus attempt to make competent the testimony of his client. The protected party may waive the protection of the statute, but the adverse party cannot create a waiver by cross-examining the representative and thus qualify his client.

> Loeb, et al. vs. Stern, Admx., 198 Ill., *371; Metz,*Exrx. vs. Metz, et al., 85 App. Div., 4; Crafton vs. Inge, 124 Ky., 89; 4 Jones on Evidence, pp. 768, 770, Ed. 1914.

While we are of opinion that this testimony is incompetent, yet, even with *125that testimony in the case, we still hold that the plaintiff has wholly failed to establish a claim to an interest of any kind in the stocks purchased by him.

A decree will therefore be rendered for defendants.

Williams and Lloyd, JJ, concur.
```

[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 814 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

110th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 S. 814

 To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to allow the deduction of 
  attorney-advanced expenses and court costs in contingency fee cases.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             March 8, 2007

  Mr. Specter introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
                  referred to the Committee on Finance

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to allow the deduction of 
  attorney-advanced expenses and court costs in contingency fee cases.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. DEDUCTION OF ATTORNEY-ADVANCED EXPENSES AND COURT COSTS IN 
              CONTINGENCY FEE CASES.

    (a) In General.--Section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 
(relating to trade or business expenses) is amended by redesignating 
subsection (q) as subsection (r) and by inserting after subsection (p) 
the following new subsection:
    ``(q) Attorney-Advanced Expenses and Court Costs in Contingency Fee 
Cases.--There shall be allowed as a deduction under this section any 
expenses and court costs paid or incurred by an attorney the repayment 
of which is contingent on a recovery by judgment or settlement in the 
action to which such expenses and costs relate. Such deduction shall be 
allowed in the taxable year in which such expenses and costs are paid 
or incurred by the taxpayer.''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section shall 
apply to expenses and costs paid or incurred after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, in taxable years beginning after such date.
                                 <all>
```
[if !vml]>[endif]>

[if !vml]>[endif]>

You have reached the FederalDepository Library Program Electronic Collection (FDLP/EC) Archive. Thisarchive assures ongoing access to publications in the FDLP/EC. Access topublications in the archive is available through GPO's suite of cataloging andlocator services, including the Catalog of U.S. Government Publications(CGP).  Archived copies of publications are retrieved in the event thatpublications are no longer available from the original publishing agency site. 
**Title:****Your insured deposits.**
 
Mobi | ePub
 
SuDoc Number:Y 3.F 31/8:44/
Item Number:1061-K-29 (online)
CGP systemNumber:000935224
 
March 28, 2018
#### § 18.102 Purpose and construction.

These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined.
Exhibit 13.1

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, the undersigned officer of Kyocera Corporation
(the Company) hereby certifies, to such officers knowledge, that the Companys annual report on Form 20-F for the year ended March 31, 2008 (the Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

Dated: June 30, 2008



/S/    MAKOTO
KAWAMURAName:

Makoto KawamuraTitle:

President and Representative Director (Principal
Executive Officer)
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of Labor

###### Employment and Training Administration

          - [TA-W-37,243] 

Pursuant to 29 CFR 90.18(C) an application for administrative reconsideration was filed with the Director of the Division of Trade Adjustment Assistance for workers at Whizard Protective Ware Corporation, Birmingham, Ohio. The application contained no new substantial information which would bear importantly on the Department's determination. Therefore, dismissal of the application was issued.

TA-W-37,243; Whizard Protective Ware Corporation, Birmingham, Ohio (May 10, 2000.

Signed at Washington, DC, this 12th day of May, 2000.

Grant D. Beale,

Program Manager, Division of Trade Adjustment Assistance.

[FR Doc. 00-12507 Filed 5-17-00; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4510-30-M
#### GRAND LODGE of the BROTHERHOOD of RAILROAD TRAINMEN v. SCOTT.

No. 19512.

Opinion Filed March 31, 1931.

Abernathy & Howell, for plaintiff in error.

E. C. Stanard, M. L. Hankins, and Leonard Cary, for defendant in error.

ANDREWS, J.

In this cause the defendant in error, hereinafter referred tó as plaintiff, instituted a suit in the superior court of -Pottawatomie county, Okla., against the plaintiff in error, hereinafter referred to as defendant, to recover a money judgment on -an insurance policy in which her husband Was the insured and in which she was the designated beneficiary. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, judgment was rendered thereon, and the cause came to this court on appeal.

Here a motion was lodged to dismiss, and finder date of January 29, 1929, this court promulgated its opinion in the cause in which it said:

> “Upon the second ground for dismissal, that the brief of plaintiff in error does not comply with rule 26 of this court, we have examined the brief of plaintiff in error and fully agree with counsel for defendant in error that the brief of plaintiff in error does not fully comply with rule 26 of this court and is not as complete as rule 26 contemplates.”

'It declined to dismiss the appeal and cautioned the defendant as follows:

> : ■ “However, we feel that, under the holding of this court in Royce Wyant v. Henry Levy and Leon Levy, Partners, No. 18,586, 134 Okla. 39, 272 Pae. at page 851, we would -be running contrary to this decision to sustain the motion to dismiss. * * *”

Since that time more than one year has elapsed and the error in the brief plainly .pointed out has not been corrected. The cause has reached its numerical order for a decision. We therefore apply the rule announced in the Wyant Oase quoted from.

' The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

LESTER, O. J., and RILEY, HEFNER, OULLISON, SWINDALL, and McNEILL, JJ., concur. CLARK, V. C. J., and KORNE-GAY, J., not participating.
### DEPARTMEN T O F iRANSPORTATiO N ' :KE TOPERATION S January 28 , 201 1 M FE B - 3 A » : U

U REF : FA A Docke t

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Roo mW12-14 0 Washington , D.C . 20590-000 1 Thi s lette r

i s t o protes t

th e widenin g an dlowerin g t o 50 0 F t MS L th e Restricte dare a aroun drestricte darea s R2906 , R2907 A & R2910 . Th e presen t

restricte darea s ar e very rarel y use da s i s s o wh y i s i t necessary t o increas e thei r siz e an dlowerin g th e floo r t o 50 0 F t MSL ? I a mal l for

astrong , properl y traine d militar y bu t

i t the y nee dmor e roo mt o practice , wh y can' t the y d o i t

ove r th e ocea n whic h i s onl y afe w mile s t o th e eas t an dwoul dtak e jus t

afew minute s t o fly there . I a mbase dat

Moun t Roya l Airpark

(3FLO ) whic h i s locate djus t t o th e Eas t

o f th e propose drestricte darea . I fly aPipe r Malibu , mostl y IFR . I t

i s nearl y impossibl e t o pic k u p an IF Rclearanc e o n th e groun dat 3 FL O s o therefor e I depar t

VF Rwhe n th e weathe r cooperate s an dpic k

u p my IF Rclearanc e i n th e air . Sinc e mos t o f m y trip s ar e Wes t

an d Northwes t

bound , I woul dnot

b e abl e t o d o thi s sinc e I caimo t reac h Jacksonvill e Approac h whe n I a mbelo w 50 0 F t an dnee dt o b e at

leas t 1,500 Ft i n th e ai r i n orde r t o tal k t o them . Flyin g VF Rbelo w 50 0 F t t o g o wes t

woul db e VER Y dangerou s du e t o th e man y tower s an dlac k o f altitud e i n cas e o f

an engin e failure . Also , th e FA Rrequir e u s t o fly at leas t 50 0 F t ove r sparsel y populate darea s an d1,000 Ft ove r populate darea s an dar e requeste d t o fly at leas t 2,00 0 F t ove r Nationa l Parks , Forest s an dPreserves . B y lowerin g an dexpandin g th e restricte dareas , ou r propert y values i n th e airpar k woul d b e adversel y affected . Than k yo u for you r consideratio n an dhel p i n thi s matter . Sincerely , Joh n Gostomski 11 9 Airport

D r Crescen t City , FL 3211 2
VACATE and REMAND; and Opinion Filed June 17 , 2015
. 

# S

In The 

## Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05

- 14

- 01437

- CV
IN RE ADVOCARE INTERNATION AL, LP
On Appeal from the 296th Judicial District Court Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 296

- 01545

- 2014



### MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Chief Justice Wright and Justices Brown and Stoddart Opinion by Justice Brown This is an appeal from an order granting AdvoCare Internationa l, LP ’ s request for a pre

suit deposition and an order denying eBay Inc.’ s motion for new trial and reconsideration. See

T EX

. R. C IV

. P. 202. Citing Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.1(a)(2), the parties move to dismiss the appeal, vacate the trial cou rt’s orders without regard to the merits, and remand this case to the trial court for rendition of judgment in accordance with the parties’ agreement. We grant the motion to the extent we vacate the trial court’s orders without regard to the merits and

re mand the case to the trial court for rendition of judgment in accordance with the agreement.

See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 42.1( a)(2)(B)

.

141437F.P05 /Ada Brown/ ADA BROWN JUSTICE– 2

– 

# S

Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT

IN RE ADVOCARE INTERNATIONAL, LP

No. 05

- 14

- 01437

- CV On Appeal from the 296th Judicial District Court, Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 296

- 01545

- 2014. Opinion delivered by Justice Brown. Chief Justice Wright and Justice Stoddart participat ing.
In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, we VACATE , without regard to the merits, the trial court’s September 16, 2014 “Order on AdvoCare’s Rule 202 Petitions” and the November 6, 2014 “Order on eBay’s Motion for New Trial and for Reco nsideration” and REMAND to the trial court for rendition of judgment in accordance with the parties’ agreement. As agreed by the parties, we ORDER that AdvoCare International, LP and eBay Inc. each bear its own costs of this appeal.

Judgment entered thi s 17th day of June, 2015.
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.
1 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 95-40731

CITY OF LONGVIEW, I. J. PATTERSON, DAVID McWHORTER, LARRY RISINGER, GAYLON BUTLER, MALCOLM PHILLIPS, and DAVID BRABHAM, Defendants-Appellants,

VERSUS

JAMES W. HUNT and TONY POWELL, Plaintiffs-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court For the Eastern District of Texas

(6:95-CV-555) July 10, 1996

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, WIENER and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *
James Hunt (“Hunt”) and Tony Powell (“Powell”), members of the2

Longview, Texas City Council, brought suit against the City of Longview and various individuals (referred to collectively in this opinion as “the City”) seeking a declaratory judgment that section 2.03(e) of the Longview City Charter is unconstitutional, as well as temporary and permanent injunctive relief barring quo warranto proceedings arisi ng out of their alleged violation of § 2.03(e). The district court, after hearing, denied the City’s motion to dismiss and granted Hunt’s and Powell’s request for a temporary injunction. On appeal, the City challenges both rulings, contending that the district court should have abstained and dismissed the action and that Hunt and Powell were not entitled to an injunction. Having considered the briefs a nd arguments of counsel, we conclude th at the challenged rulings should be affirmed for essentially the reasons stated by the district court. S ee Hunt v. City of Longview , 6:95cv555 (E.D.Tx., August 18, 1995).
#### § 1603.212 Witness fees.

Witnesses summoned under this part shall receive the same fees and mileage as witnesses in the courts of the United States. Those fees must be paid or offered to the witness by the party requesting the subpoena at the time the subpoena is served, or, if the witness appears voluntarily, at the time of appearance. A federal agency or corporation is not required to pay or offer witness fees and mileage allowances in advance.
Exhibit
32.2   Section 1350 Certification





In
connection with the Quarterly Report of Citizens First Corporation (the
"Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2008, as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report") I, Todd
Kanipe, Executive Vice President Credit Administration and Finance, of the
Company, certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:





(1) The
Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2) The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.








By:
            /s/Todd KanipeTodd
      KanipeExecutive
      Vice President, Credit Administration and Finance(Principal
      Financial Officer)Date:
            August
      14, 2008








This
certification is being furnished as required by Rule 13a-14(b) under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”) and Section 1350 of Chapter
63 of Title 18 of the United States Code, and shall not be deemed ‘filed” for
purposes of Section 18 of the Exchange Act or otherwise subject to the liability
of that section. This certification shall not be deemed to be incorporated by
reference into any filing under the Securities Act of 1933 or the Exchange Act
or otherwise subject to the liability of that
section.
<PAGE>   1
                                                                   EXHIBIT 2(1)

                          Important Announcement to all
                         Kenilworth Systems Corporation
                                  Shareholders

                                                              September 21, 1998

      In August 1998 a United States Bankruptcy Judge in the Eastern District of
New York approved the Final Reports and Accounts submitted by the Chapter 7
Trustee of the Estate of Kenilworth Systems Corporation ("Kenilworth").

      The approval finalizes the Kenilworth bankruptcy proceedings and the
Trustee paid one hundred percent (100%) of all approved claims and
administration fees and expenses out of the proceeds ($4,424,056) from the sale
of substantially all of the assets of the Kenilworth Estate. Pursuant to the
Asset Sale Agreement,, the purchaser is entitled to receive any funds remaining
from the sale after all claims are paid in full. Accordingly, approximately
$128,000 was refunded.

      Kenilworth presently has NO ASSETS and NO LIABILITIES. Paid-in Capital of
$24,379,119 which is eliminated by the deficit of $24,379,119 of which
approximately $22,000,000 is available as unexpired Net Operating Loss
Carry-Forward credits. There are 60,477,352 Common Shares issued and outstanding
owned by approximately 8,000 shareholders.

      With the Bankruptcy Court's approval all of the books and records, since
inception of Kenilworth, have been released to the undersigned, who was the
Chairman of the Board of Directors and President of Kenilworth when the Chapter
7 Trustee was appointed.

      I will shortly cause to be filed current financial reports on Form 10-K
and 10-Q with the Securities and Exchange Commission.

      I will keep you informed.

                                             Sincerely,



                                             Herbert Lindo
                                             Tel: (516) 741-1352
                                             Fax: (516) 741-7194

54 Kenilworth Road
Mineola, NY 11501
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 96-6067
WILLIE LEE GARY, JR., Plaintiff - Appellant, versus KATE CLI FTON; NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle, District Judge. (CA-95-1017-5-BO) Submitted: May 16, 1996 Decided: June 3, 1996 Before RUSSELL, LUTTIG, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Willie Lee Gary, Jr., Appellant Pro Se. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Appellant appeals from the district court's order denying relief on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) complaint. We have reviewed the record and the district court's opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. Gary v. Clifton , No. CA-95-1017-5-BO (E.D.N.C. Jan. 5, 1996). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
###### Editorial Note on [Part 1926](/current/title-29/part-1926?toc=1)

#### Editorial Notes:

1. At [44 FR 8577](https://www.federalregister.gov/citation/44-FR-8577), Feb. 9, 1979, and corrected at [44 FR 20940](https://www.federalregister.gov/citation/44-FR-20940), Apr. 6, 1979, OSHA reprinted without change the entire text of [29 CFR part 1926](/on/2024-09-19/title-29/part-1926) together with certain General Industry Occupational Safety and Health Standards contained in [29 CFR part 1910](/on/2024-09-19/title-29/part-1910), which have been identified as also applicable to construction work. This republication developed a single set of OSHA regulations for both labor and management forces within the construction industry.

2. Nomenclature changes to part 1926 appear at [84 FR 21597](https://www.federalregister.gov/citation/84-FR-21597), May 14, 2019.

#### § 1926.1080 Safe practices manual.

Note:

The requirements applicable to construction work under this section are identical to those set forth at [§ 1910.420 of this chapter](/on/2024-09-19/title-29/section-1910.420).

[[61 FR 31432](https://www.federalregister.gov/citation/61-FR-31432), June 20, 1996]