In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________

No. 06-2030

JOSEPH CATENCAMP,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CENDANT TIMESHARE RESORT

GROUP—CONSUMER FINANCE, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee.

____________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 05-C-0318(E)—C.N. Clevert, Jr., Judge.

____________

ARGUED OCTOBER 20, 2006—DECIDED DECEMBER 14, 2006

____________

Before EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge, and BAUER and

EVANS, Circuit Judges.

EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge. Every “debt collector” must

comply with the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15

U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692o. That term includes anyone who

regularly collects debts. See Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S.

291 (1995); Thomas v. Simpson & Cybak, 392 F.3d 914

(7th Cir. 2004) (en banc). But a “debt collector” is defined

as a third party that assists or acts as an agent for the

creditor; the term does not include the creditor itself.

15 U.S.C. §1692a(6). To this exception for a creditor acting on its own behalf, §1692a(6) attaches a proviso: the

term “debt collector” nonetheless “includes any creditor
2 No. 06-2030

who, in the process of collecting his own debts, uses

any name other than his own which would indicate that a

third person is collecting or attempting to collect such

debts.”

Joseph Catencamp contends in this suit under the

FDCPA that his lender used such a ruse and therefore had

to comply with the Act. Catencamp purchased from

Fairfield Resorts, Inc., a timeshare interest in one of

Fairfield’s resorts. Shortly after Catencamp signed the

contract, Fairfield Resorts assigned his account to Cendant

Timeshare Resort Group—Consumer Finance, Inc., though

Catencamp did not learn this till later. When he fell

behind in payments, he received a dunning letter from

“Resort Financial Services” (which small type declared

to be “A Division of CTRG—Consumer Finance”). CTRG

Consumer Finance is itself not a distinct legal entity; it

is a division of Cendant, a fact that the letter did not

mention; one reason why the letter does not comply

with the Act (if the Act applies in the first place) is that

real names were not used. 15 U.S.C. §1692e(14). The letter

said that “Fairfield Communities, Inc. has referred your

account to us for collection.” The letter added that, if

Catencamp disputed the amount due, “the validity of

this debt will be verified in writing with the creditor and

a copy of such verification promptly mailed to you.” When

a letter proclaims, as this one did, that it is coming from

someone other than the creditor—the letter identified

Fairfield Communities as the creditor and promised to

obtain verification from Fairfield on demand—a debtor

naturally supposes himself to be in contact with a debt

collector. Yet the district court granted summary judgment to Cendant, because the letter came from it—and

Cendant is, after all, Catencamp’s creditor.

If the communication had been on the letterhead of

“Cendant Timeshare Resort Group—Consumer Finance,

Inc.”, then the district court would have a point. On the
No. 06-2030 3

one hand, it would be from the creditor in its own name.

On the other, it would falsely identify someone else

(Fairfield) as the creditor and promise to verify the debt

with Fairfield. That would confuse a reasonable recipient,

but the Act’s anti-confusion rule applies only to debt

collectors, which Cendant is not. Cendant did not, however, communicate with Catencamp in its own name. It

used a trade name, Resort Financial Services, that

Catencamp had never encountered before, and appended

another name, CTRG—Consumer Finance, that also was

novel to Catencamp. It is hard to see why recipients

should be expected to know that “Resort Financial Services” and “CTRG—Consumer Finance” are the same as

“Cendant Timeshare Resort Group—Consumer Finance,

Inc.” when the word “Cendant” does not appear in the

letter and the document loudly proclaims that Fairfield

Communities is the creditor.

Maybe a sophisticated person could have guessed that

“CTRG” is an acronym for “Cendant Timeshare Resort

Group”. The Act does not require, however, either sophistication or guesswork. Courts must analyze debt-collection

communications from the perspective of unsophisticated

recipients. See Gammon v. GC Services Limited Partnership, 27 F.3d 1254 (7th Cir. 1994). The effect of a potentially misleading acronym is the subject of Maguire v.

Citicorp Retail Services, Inc., 147 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1998).

Citicorp Retail Services, the creditor, sent a dunning letter

in the name of “Debtor Assistance, A unit of CRS”; the

word “Citicorp” did not appear in the letter. The second

circuit held that, because an unsophisticated debtor

would think “CRS” to be distinct from “Citicorp,” the falsename exception in §1692a(6) applied.

Catencamp’s situation likewise is governed by the

norm that unsophisticated readers do not see through

acronyms when the creditor’s full name is missing. Even

when that norm does not apply—for some acronyms, such
4 No. 06-2030

as AT&T and IBM, are so famous that even an unsophisticated consumer must appreciate the source, see Gutierrez

v. AT&T Broadband, LLC, 382 F.3d 725 (7th Cir. 2004)—a

letter from an acronym that is self-proclaimed not to be

the creditor must be treated as one from a “debt collector.” Cendant’s letter stated that it was from a debt

collector rather than the creditor (identified as Fairfield

Communities). Having trumpeted Resort Financial Services as a debt collector, Cendant had to comply with all

obligations that the Act places on debt collectors.

Cendant observes that the letter from Resort Financial

Services attached a copy of the original contract, showing

Fairfield Resorts as the creditor. But how does this help?

That certainly does not imply that Resort Financial

Services or CTRG was the creditor; it reinforces the point

that this dunning letter appeared to be from a third party.

Cendant, as the letter’s true author, must be treated as a

“debt collector” under §1692a(6).

Catencamp had advanced a second claim for relief. He

invokes 12 U.S.C. §2605(a), part of the Real Estate

Settlement Procedures Act, which provides that anyone

who makes a federally related mortgage loan (as Fairfield

did) must “disclose to each person who applies for the loan,

at the time of the application for the loan, whether the

servicing of the loan may be assigned, sold, or transferred

to any other person at any time while the loan is outstanding.” In other words, the lender must reveal (in terms that

lay borrowers can understand) whether the note is negotiable. Catencamp maintains that he did not receive this

notice, though he then signed negotiable paper (which

was indeed transferred to Cendant).

The district court blocked Catencamp from amending

his complaint to frame a claim under RESPA, writing

that an amendment would be futile because Fairfield

notified Catencamp about the loan’s transfer to Cendant.
No. 06-2030 5

Apparently the district judge misunderstood the nature

of this claim, which has nothing to do with notice of

transfers after loans have closed. Section 2605(a) deals

with notice about negotiability, and that notice must be

given before a loan closes. The regulations make this

pellucid, in case the statute were not enough. See 24

C.F.R. §3500.21. One may doubt that drowning borrowers

in oceans of paper (RESPA disclosures can exceed 100

pages) gives them effective notice of anything: the verbiage

blurs together, and the details are forgotten. Whether

short and simple would be preferable to complex and

complete is, however, a matter for the legislature.

Catencamp is entitled to litigate his claim that Fairfield

failed to comply with §2605(a).

REVERSED AND REMANDED

A true Copy:

Teste: 

 ________________________________

Clerk of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 

USCA-02-C-0072—12-14-06