____________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

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Michigan Supreme Court 

Lansing, Michigan 48909 

C hief Justice Justices 

Maura D. Corrigan	 Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

Clifford W. Taylor Opinion Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman 

FILED JULY 25, 2002
 

FEDERATED PUBLICATIONS, INC, doing business as


THE LANSING STATE JOURNAL,
 

Plaintiff-Appellee,
 

v No. 118184
 

CITY OF LANSING,
 

Defendant-Appellant,
 

and
 

CAPITOL CITY LODGE NO. 141 OF THE FRATERNAL 


ORDER OF POLICE LABOR PROGRAM, INC, and


Jane Doe, and John Doe,
 

Intervening Defendants.
 

FEDERATED PUBLICATIONS, INC, doing business as


THE LANSING STATE JOURNAL,
 

Plaintiff-Appellee,
 

v No. 118186
 

CITY OF LANSING,
 

Defendant,
 

and
 
________________________________ 

CAPITOL CITY LODGE NO. 141 OF THE FRATERNAL 


ORDER OF POLICE LABOR PROGRAM, INC,


Intervening Defendant-Appellant.
 

BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH
 

MARKMAN, J.
 

In this Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) matter, we are
 

called upon to consider whether the circuit court erred in
 

concluding that city police department records regarding
 

citizen-initiated investigations were not exempt from
 

disclosure while records regarding department-initiated
 

investigations were exempt from disclosure under MCL
 

15.243(1)(s)(ix). We take this opportunity to clarify the
 

appropriate standards of appellate review of the circuit
 

court’s determination in a FOIA dispute and the method by
 

which the circuit court is required to perform its analysis
 

under § 243(1)(s) of the FOIA.
 

First, we hold that the application of exemptions
 

requiring legal determinations are reviewed under a de novo
 

standard, while application of exemptions requiring
 

determinations of a discretionary nature, such as the one
 

presented here, are reviewed under a clearly erroneous
 

standard. Second, we hold that MCL 15.240(4) of the FOIA
 

specifically places the burden of proof on the public body to
 

show that the public record is exempt from disclosure. Third,
 

in applying the public interest balancing test, the circuit
 

2
 
court should consider the fact that records have been made
 

exemptible under § 243(1)(s). Fourth, the “particular
 

instance” language set forth in § 243(1)(s) requires the
 

circuit court to analyze the FOIA request to determine whether
 

further categorization of the requested records is required in
 

order to determine whether the public interest in disclosure
 

outweighs the public interest in nondisclosure. If further
 

categorization is required to perform the balancing test, the
 

circuit court should direct the public body to assist it in
 

reasonably categorizing the sought-after records. 


Because the city released the records regarding citizeninitiated complaints, that issue has been rendered moot.
 

Further, with regard to the department-initiated complaints,
 

we remand this matter to the Court of Appeals for
 

reconsideration in light of the principles expressed in this
 

opinion.
 

I. FOIA OVERVIEW
 

The Michigan Legislature enacted FOIA, MCL 15.231 et
 

seq., to provide for the “disclosure of ‘public records’ in
 

the possession of a ‘public body.’” Kent Co Deputy Sheriff’s
 

Assoc v Kent Co Sheriff, 463 Mich 353, 360; 616 NW2d 677
 

(2000), quoting Bradley v Saranac Comm Schs Bd of Ed, 455
 

Mich 285, 292; 565 NW2d 650 (1997). Affording such public
 

disclosure effects the state’s policy of providing “full and
 

3
 
complete information regarding the affairs of government and
 

the official acts of those who represent the people as public
 

officials.” MCL 15.231(2). 


When a party desires to inspect or receive a copy of a
 

public record, it “shall make a written request [of the public
 

body] for the public record . . . .”1 MCL 15.235(1). After
 

receiving a FOIA request, a public body may grant, deny,
 

grant in part, deny in part, or issue a notice extending (for
 

not more than ten business days) the period for responding to
 

the FOIA request. MCL 15.235(2)(a), (b), (c), (d). If a
 

public body denies the request, in full or in part, it must
 

explain the basis, under the FOIA or another statute, for its
 

denial. MCL 15.235(4)(a). A denial may be based upon a
 

record’s inclusion in one of the enumerated classes of
 

exemptible records set forth in § 243.
 

Once a public body denies a FOIA request, the requesting
 

party may either submit a written appeal to the head of that
 

public body or commence an action in circuit court. MCL
 

15.240(1)(a), (b). If the requesting party appeals the matter
 

to the head of the public body, the public body must either
 

reverse its denial of disclosure, issue a written notice
 

1 A public record is statutorily defined as a “writing


prepared, owned, used, in the possession of, or retained by a


public body in the performance of an official function, from


the time it is created.” MCL 15.232(e). 


4
 
 

upholding the denial of disclosure, reverse the denial of
 

disclosure in part and issue a written notice upholding the
 

denial of disclosure in part, or issue a notice extending the
 

period of response for a period not exceeding ten days. MCL
 

15.240(2)(a), (b), (c), (d). If the public body upholds its
 

decision to deny the request, in full or in part, the
 

requesting party may then seek judicial review. MCL
 

15.240(3). 


At issue in the instant case is the FOIA exemption
 

applicable to personnel records of a law enforcement agency,
 

§ 243(1)(s)(ix), which provides as follows:
 

(1) A public body may exempt from disclosure as


a public record under this act:
 

* * *
 

(s) Unless the public interest in disclosure


outweighs the public interest in nondisclosure in


the particular instance, public records of a law


enforcement agency, the release of which would do


any of the following:
 

* * *
 

(ix) Disclose personnel records of law


enforcement agencies.
 

II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
 

In 1998, plaintiff, Federated Publications (doing
 

business as The Lansing State Journal), submitted a FOIA
 

request to defendant, city of Lansing, requesting disclosure
 

of 


any reports or other documents regarding complaints


investigated by the Lansing Police Department
 

5 
Internal Affairs Bureau for the time period of


January 1, 1997 through December 31, 1997. To the
 

extent you believe the officers’ identities may be


subject to a privacy exemption, the names of the


officers may be concealed, though the content of


the reports and complaints themselves must be


provided.
 

The city denied plaintiff’s request, asserting that the
 

records were exempt from disclosure pursuant to §
 

243(1)(s)(ix), among other provisions of law.2 Instead, the
 

city voluntarily disclosed a “statistical summary of internal
 

affairs investigations for the year 1997.” In response to
 

the city’s denial of its FOIA request, plaintiff filed an
 

administrative appeal with the city council president. MCL
 

15.240(1)(a). Plaintiff argued that the public interest in
 

the subject matter of its request required disclosure of the
 

records that it had sought. In response, the city provided
 

a more detailed explanation of its position in opposition to
 

plaintiff’s FOIA request. 


Plaintiff subsequently sued under FOIA for disclosure,
 

and both parties unsuccessfully moved for summary disposition.
 

The circuit court observed that it must, first, determine
 

whether the records were indeed law enforcement personnel
 

2 In a letter from defendant to plaintiff, the city also


contended that the requested records were exempt pursuant to


MCL 15.243(d) (citing MCL 423.501, Employee Right to Know


Act). The circuit court and the Court of Appeals rejected


this argument below, and this Court limited its review to FOIA


issues, specifically those relating to § 243(1)(s)(ix).
 

6
 
records, and, second, weigh the public interest in disclosure
 

against the public interest in nondisclosure “in each
 

particular instance.”3
 

Upon consideration of the various interests at stake, the
 

court ordered the release of all internal affairs
 

investigation records, except those relating to departmentgenerated complaints. Shortly after the circuit court’s
 

decision, the city, as well as intervening defendant Capital
 

City Lodge, filed an emergency motion in the Court of Appeals
 

for a stay of the circuit court proceedings. After initially
 

granting the motion, the Court of Appeals vacated its order.
 

Without taking any further action, the city then released the
 

non-exempt citizen-generated complaint records to plaintiff.
 

The Court of Appeals subsequently affirmed the circuit
 

court’s decision in part and reversed in part. After
 

observing that “FOIA embodies this state’s strong public
 

policy favoring public access to government information,” the
 

Court stated that defendants failed to satisfy their statutory
 

burden of producing evidence explaining why the public
 

interest in nondisclosure of the records outweighed the public
 

interest in disclosure. Consequently, it ruled that all the
 

3 Before renewing these motions for summary disposition,


defendant Capitol City Lodge No 141 of the Fraternal Order of


Police was granted permission to intervene in the present


lawsuit. 


7
 
 

 

requested records were subject to disclosure. Unpublished
 

opinion per curiam, issued November 14, 2000 (Docket Nos.
 

218331, 218332).
 

Defendants filed separate applications for leave to
 

appeal in this Court. We granted leave, limited to “whether
 

the requested files were exempt from disclosure under
 

§ 243(1)(s)(ix) . . . .” 465 Mich 910 (2001).
 

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
 

We are required in this case to determine whether the
 

circuit court properly applied § 243(1)(s)(ix) in determining
 

that the department-initiated records were exempt and that the
 

citizen-initiated investigation records were not exempt under
 

the FOIA. This Court has not had prior occasion to enunciate
 

the specific standard of review applicable to this inquiry.4


 We conclude that a circuit court’s decision regarding the
 

applicability of exemptions to public records does not
 

automatically require de novo review.
 

Although the FOIA expressly addresses the standard that
 

governs a circuit court’s review of a public body’s own
 

4 This Court has, without elaboration, applied a de novo


standard of review in some FOIA cases. In cases applying a de


novo standard, this Court has either assumed that the
 

application of a FOIA exemption is purely an issue of


statutory interpretation, see, e.g., Bradley, supra at 293, or


has reviewed the matter in the context of a summary


disposition motion, see, e.g., Herald Co v Bay City, 463 Mich


111, 117; 614 NW2d 873 (2000).
 

8
 
determination of what public records must be disclosed,5 it is
 

silent regarding the standard that governs appellate review
 

of the circuit court’s decision. Therefore, we turn to our
 

case law to determine the appropriate standard of review. As
 

stated above, questions of law are reviewed de novo. Factual
 

findings and matters of discretion, on the other hand, are
 

generally reviewed either for clear error or an abuse of
 

discretion. See, e.g., People v Barrera, 451 Mich 261, 269;
 

547 NW2d 280 (1996). 


Several statutory exemptions exist in the FOIA.
 

Depending on the particular language of an exemption, judicial
 

determinations of its applicability may implicate different
 

standards of appellate review. We hold that the application
 

of exemptions involving legal determinations are reviewed
 

under a de novo standard. Lincoln v General Motors Corp, 461
 

Mich 483, 489-490; 607 NW2d 73 (2000). Exemptions involving
 

discretionary determinations, such as application of the
 

instant exemption requiring a circuit court to engage in a
 

5 Section 240(4) provides in relevant part:
 

In an action commenced under subsection
 

(1)(b), a court that determines a public record is


not exempt from disclosure shall order the public


body to cease withholding or to produce all or a


portion of a public record wrongfully withheld,


regardless of the location of the public record.


The circuit court . . . has venue over the action.
 

The court shall determine the matter de novo
 

. . . .
 

9
 
 

 

balancing of public interests, should be reviewed under a
 

deferential standard. We therefore hold that the clearly
 

erroneous standard of review applies to the application of
 

exemptions requiring determinations of a discretionary nature.
 

A finding is “clearly erroneous” if, after reviewing the
 

entire evidence, the reviewing court is left with the definite
 

and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. In re
 

Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989).
 

IV. DISCUSSION
 

As stated on numerous occasions by this Court, the
 

primary goal of judicial interpretation of statutes is to
 

discern and give effect to the intent of the Legislature.
 

This Court discerns that intent by examining the specific
 

language of a statute. If the language is clear, this Court
 

presumes that the Legislature intended the meaning it has
 

plainly expressed and the statute will be enforced as written.
 

Pohutski v City of Allen Park, 465 Mich 675, 683; 641 NW2d 219
 

(2002). Unless otherwise defined in the statute, or
 

understood to have a technical or peculiar meaning in the law,
 

every word or phrase of a statute will be given its plain and
 

ordinary meaning. See MCL 8.3a. 


A. BURDEN OF PROOF
 

Defendant urges this Court to embrace its position that
 

the FOIA requester carries the burden of proving that the
 

10
 
public interest in the disclosure of public records outweighs
 

the public interest in nondisclosure. Specifically, defendant
 

argues that the public body is required initially only to
 

establish that public records sought under the FOIA fall
 

within one of the exemptible categories, in this instance,
 

that the records were “personnel records of law enforcement
 

agencies.” Once established, defendant contends that the
 

burden of demonstrating that the public interest in disclosure
 

outweighs that of nondisclosure shifts to the requester. In
 

support of its view, defendant focuses on the following
 

language in § 243(1)(s): “[u]nless the public interest in
 

disclosure outweighs the public interest in nondisclosure in
 

the particular instance.” Plaintiff, in response, argues
 

that § 240(4) places the burden of proof on the public body.
 

Further, plaintiff maintains that the language in § 243(1)(s)
 

neither conflicts with nor alters the burden of proof set
 

forth in § 240(4). We agree with plaintiff.
 

First, § 240(4) provides: 


In an action [in the circuit court to compel


disclosure under the FOIA], . . . [t]he court shall


determine the matter de novo and the burden is on
 

the public body to sustain its denial. [Emphasis
 

added.] 


This language plainly states that the burden of proof is on
 

the public body to demonstrate why it is entitled to protect
 

a record from disclosure.
 

11
 
Second, the language of § 240(4) is consistent with that
 

of § 243(1)(s). The latter provision merely sets forth the
 

public interest balancing test. When read together with the
 

introductory language in § 243(1), this provision states that
 

a public body may exempt from disclosure a class of public
 

records identified in § 243(1)(s), unless the “public interest
 

in disclosure outweighs the public interest in nondisclosure”
 

in the particular instance. In light of the express language
 

of § 240(4), we do not view § 243(1)(s) as allocating the
 

burden of proof in FOIA matters; rather, it merely prescribes
 

a balancing test for determining whether a class of records
 

is exemptible.
 

In sum, in determining which party bears the burden of
 

proof regarding the applicability of a FOIA exemption, we have
 

no reason to depart from the settled principle that the burden
 

of proof is on the party asserting that a record is exempt
 

under the FOIA.6 Accordingly, we hold that the language set
 

forth in § 240(4) controls and places the burden of proof on
 

the public body to show that it is entitled to protect a
 

record from disclosure. 


B. “PUBLIC INTEREST”
 

In carrying out its public interest balancing under §
 

6See, e.g., Herald Co, supra at 119; Bradley, supra at
 

293; Evening News Ass’n v Troy, 417 Mich 481, 503; 339 NW2d
 

421 (1983). 


12
 
243(1)(s), a circuit court is confronted in each case with
 

differing public interest considerations. In undertaking this
 

balancing, however, the circuit court must consider the fact
 

that the inclusion of a record within an exemptible class
 

under § 243(1)(s) implies some degree of public interest in
 

the nondisclosure of such a record. In contrast with the
 

universe of public records that are non-exemptible, the
 

Legislature has specifically designated these classes of
 

records as exemptible. That is, some attribute of these
 

records has prompted the Legislature to designate them as
 

subject to disclosure only upon a finding that the public
 

interest in disclosure predominates. However, we emphasize
 

that these records are merely exemptible and not exempt, and
 

that exemption is not automatic. Nonetheless, in performing
 

the requisite balancing of public interests, the circuit court
 

should remain cognizant of the special consideration that the
 

Legislature has accorded an exemptible class of records . 


C. “PARTICULAR INSTANCE”


 As stated previously, a public body may exempt from
 

disclosure certain classes of records, including law
 

enforcement personnel records, “[u]nless the public interest
 

in disclosure outweighs the public interest in nondisclosure
 

in the particular instance . . . .” MCL 15.243(1)(s)
 

(emphasis added). In the emphasized phrase at issue, the
 

13
 
 

first significant word is “particular,” which means
 

“pertaining to a single or specific person, thing, group . .
 

. not general.” Random House Webster’s College Dictionary
 

(2001). Next, there is “instance,” which means “a case or
 

occurrence of something.” Id. In light of this language, we
 

believe that public records reviewed under the FOIA balancing
 

test must be organized within reasonably specific categories
 

that enable the circuit court to weigh similar competing
 

aspects of the public interest. In some cases, it may be
 

clear that the FOIA request is comprised of a sufficiently
 

precise or narrow category of records that the circuit court
 

can adequately balance the public interests at stake without
 

the need of further “particular instance” categorization.7
 

See, e.g., Kent Co, supra at 399, which involved a narrow
 

request for records on which disciplinary decisions regarding
 

two prison guards were based. 


Conversely, a FOIA request may be general and entail a
 

request for records relating to varied subjects, arguably
 

implicating several different aspects of the public interest.
 

In such cases, the circuit court may be required to conduct
 

a “particular instance” categorization of records to enable
 

it to identify and weigh similar aspects of the public
 

7
 A FOIA request must “sufficiently” describe the


sought-after records. MCL 15.233.
 

14
 
 

 

 

interest in favor of disclosure or nondisclosure.8
 

The circuit court is charged with balancing the records
 

sought by a FOIA requester. The more general or complicated
 

the request, however, the more likely the court is to require
 

the assistance of the parties, in particular that of the
 

public body because it has custody of the sought-after
 

records. Schiffer v FBI, 78 F3d 1405, 1408 (CA 9 1996). The
 

requester may be unaware of what records the public body
 

8For example, in Newark Morning Ledger Co v Saginaw Co
 

Sheriff, 204 Mich App 215, 216; 514 NW2d 213 (1994), the Court


of Appeals determined that, although an exemption may apply to


a category of records, “any category must be clearly described


and ‘drawn with sufficient precision so that all documents


within a particular category are similar in nature.’” Id. at
 

226, quoting Anderson v Dep’t of Health & Human Services, 907


F2d 936, 944 (CA 10, 1990). The Court of Appeals emphasized


that drafting categories with sufficient precision is required


because it enables the circuit court to properly balance the


competing public interests:
 

The difficulty with the court’s treatment of


the internal affairs investigatory records as a


single category is that public interest in
 

disclosure and nondisclosure may vary depending on


the circumstances of an investigation, and the


nature of the documents produced. For example, the


court’s analysis of the public interest in
 

nondisclosure is focused on the potential harm that


may result from disclosing information about
 

unfounded allegations of misconduct. That analysis


is clearly not applicable to those investigations


in which it was determined that the employee had


engaged in wrongdoing. Yet, in determining the


applicability of the exemption, the court did not


distinguish between investigations in which the


allegations were determined to be clearly


unfounded, and those that even the department found


warranted disciplinary action. [Newark, supra at
 

225.]
 

15 
 

possesses, how such records have been categorized, or the
 

precise nature of their contents. Such a disparity in
 

information suggests that the public body will often be in the
 

best position to categorize the information sought to be
 

disclosed. Vaughn v Rosen, 157 US App DC 340, 343-344; 484
 

F2d 820 (1973).9
 

Therefore, if because of the diverse nature of the
 

records sought, the circuit court is unable to apply the
 

statutory public interest balancing test, the court should
 

direct the public body to assist it in reasonably categorizing
 

the sought-after records. 


V. APPLICATION
 

A. CITIZEN-INITIATED COMPLAINTS
 

As stated above, the city released the citizen-initiated
 

complaints to plaintiff. Therefore, we must determine whether
 

a claimed exemption for those records was rendered moot by
 

their release. 


The principal duty of this Court is to decide actual
 

cases and controversies. Anway v Grand Rapids R Co, 211 Mich
 

592, 610; 179 NW 350 (1920). To that end, this Court does not
 

reach moot questions or declare principles or rules of law
 

that have no practical legal effect in the case before us
 

unless the issue is one of public significance that is likely
 

9
 See also Evening News Ass’n, supra at 503.
 

16
 
 

to recur, yet evade judicial review. Id.; see also In re
 

Midland Publishing, 420 Mich 148, 152, n 2; 362 NW2d 580
 

(1984). 


Applying these principles to the present case, we hold
 

that any existing “controversy” regarding whether the citizen
 

complaint records were properly ordered to be disclosed was
 

rendered moot by their release.10 A decision from this Court
 

regarding the released records would have no practical legal
 

effect. Defendants are advocating the nondisclosure of the
 

citizen complaint records; they want to ensure that these
 

records remain secret. Yet, because the city has already
 

publicly released these records, they are obviously no longer
 

“secret.” No decision by this Court can transform disclosed
 

records into nondisclosed records. 


Further, this case does not present an issue that is
 

likely to recur yet regularly evade judicial review. Quite
 

simply, all that the city would have had to do here to secure
 

review of this issue was to appeal the disclosure order to
 

this Court. A similar course of action is open to a public
 

body that finds itself situated in the city’s circumstances
 

in the future.
 

10See, e.g., Regional Mngt Corp Inc v Legal Services Corp,


186 F3d 457 (CA 4, 1999).
 

17
 
B. DEPARTMENT-INITIATED COMPLAINTS
 

The Court of Appeals, not having had the benefit of this
 

opinion clarifying the appropriate standards of review
 

applicable to this FOIA matter, engaged in a de novo review
 

of the circuit court’s determination that the departmentinitiated investigation records were exempt from disclosure
 

under § 243(1)(s)(ix). Because we hold today that the clearly
 

erroneous standard of review applies to exemptions involving
 

discretionary determinations, we believe that it is necessary
 

to remand this matter to the Court of Appeals for
 

reconsideration of its determination that the circuit court
 

erred in holding that the department-initiated internal
 

affairs investigation files were exempt from disclosure.
 

Should the Court of Appeals on remand find that it is not
 

“left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
 

been made,” Miller, supra at 337, it must affirm the circuit
 

court’s grant of summary disposition. 


VI. CONCLUSION
 

We hold that: (1) Depending on the language of the
 

particular FOIA exemption at issue, the circuit court may be
 

entitled to a level of deference that is not accorded to legal
 

issues. Where, as here, application of the statutory
 

exemption requires the circuit court to exercise discretion,
 

the appellate court must apply a clearly erroneous standard
 

18
 
of review. (2) The public body has the burden of establishing
 

that records are exempt from disclosure under the FOIA. (3)
 

In applying the public interest balancing test pursuant to
 

§ 243(1)(s), the circuit court should consider the fact that
 

the records have been designated as exemptible by the
 

Legislature. (4) The “particular instance” language set forth
 

in § 243(1)(s) requires the trial court to analyze the FOIA
 

request to determine whether further categorization is needed
 

to conduct the proper balancing of the public interests
 

involved.
 

We therefore remand this matter to the Court of Appeals
 

for reconsideration in light of the principles expressed in
 

this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
 

CORRIGAN, C.J., and CAVANAGH, KELLY, TAYLOR, and YOUNG, JJ.,
 

concurred with MARKMAN, J.
 

19
 
 

 

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N 


SUPREME COURT
 

FEDERATED PUBLICATIONS, INC, doing business as

THE LANSING STATE JOURNAL, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v No. 118184 

CITY OF LANSING, 

Defendant-Appellant, 

and 

CAPITOL CITY LODGE NO. 141 OF THE FRATERNAL 

ORDER OF POLICE LABOR PROGRAM, INC, and

Jane Doe, and John Doe, 

Intervening Defendants. 

________________________________ 

FEDERATED PUBLICATIONS, INC, doing business as

THE LANSING STATE JOURNAL, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v No. 118186 

CITY OF LANSING, 

Defendant, 

and 

CAPITOL CITY LODGE NO. 141 OF THE FRATERNAL 

ORDER OF POLICE LABOR PROGRAM, INC,

Intervening Defendant-Appellant. 

________________________________ 

WEAVER, J. (concurring). 
I concur in the result of the majority opinion, but write
 

separately to make clear that the inclusion of certain classes
 

of records within those exemptible under MCL 15.243(1)(s)
 

creates no presumption of exemption. 


The Legislature has not indicated that the mere inclusion
 

of a record within an exemptible class of records is to be
 

accorded weight in favor of nondisclosure where the statute
 

requires a balancing of the public interest in disclosure
 

versus the public interest in nondisclosure. The inclusion
 

of a record within an exemptible class means that the record
 

may be, under certain circumstances, exempt from disclosure.
 

It remains incumbent upon the public body to “sustain its
 

denial” of disclosure of exemptible records. MCL 15.240(4).
 

Thus, I do not agree with the majority suggestion that the
 

“circuit court must consider the fact that the inclusion of
 

a record within an exemptible class under § 243(1)(s) implies
 

some degree of public interest in the nondisclosure . . . .”
 

Slip op at 13.
 

It is the policy of the Freedom of Information Act to
 

afford the public “full and complete information regarding the
 

affairs of government . . . .” MCL 15.231(2). In light of
 

this express policy, one would assume that the Legislature
 

intended that the balancing of the public interest in
 

disclosure versus its interest in nondisclosure under MCL
 

2
 
15.243(1)(s) at least be conducted on level ground. According
 

weight to nondisclosure because of the Legislature’s mere
 

inclusion of a class of records among those that are
 

exemptible tips the scale in favor of nondisclosure and is,
 

therefore, inconsistent with a fair balancing of the public
 

interest. 


3