In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 01-2255

Anna D. Wells,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Unisource Worldwide, Inc.,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 00 C 4540--George W. Lindberg, Judge.

Argued January 23, 2002--Decided May 10, 2002

 Before Bauer, Coffey, and Evans, Circuit

Judges.

 Coffey, Circuit Judge. Anna Wells

claimed that her former employer,

Unisource Worldwide, Inc., discriminated

against her because of her race (African

American) in transferring her job

assignment from the state of Illinois to

the state of Wisconsin. Wells also argues

that Unisource discriminated against her

when it refused to offer her other

positions within the company after she

declined to accept the transfer. Wells

further claimed that the decision to

transfer her position out of state was

made in retaliation for her filing a

discrimination claim against Unisource in

1998. Unisource presented a legitimate,

non-discriminatory reason for the

transfers--in order that it might improve

communications between its sales

departments and credit departments. The

trial court granted summary judgment in

favor of Unisource, ruling that Wells had

failed to establish that Unisource’s

proffered non-discriminatory reasons for

transferring the positions were

pretextual. We affirm.

I. Factual Background

 Unisource sells janitorial cleaning

products and communication paper products

in the states of Illinois and Wisconsin.
Anna Wells, an African American, was

initially employed by Unisource in 1993

as a data entry clerk in the state of

Illinois at its Itasca plant. Three

months later, Unisource promoted Wells to

the position of cash applications clerk

in its credit department. In 1998, Wells

filed a charge of discrimination against

her employer, alleging that it had

discriminated against her on the basis of

her race when it failed to elevate her to

the position of credit administrator.

Shortly after Wells filed the charge,

Unisource settled the discrimination

claim and agreed to promote her to the

next open credit administrator position

in the Itasca, Illinois, facility. In

March 1999 a credit administrator

position at Itasca became vacant and

Unisource promoted Wells to the position.

 At the time of Wells’s promotion,

Unisource’s credit department had a

bifurcated organizational structure for

the assignment of accounts: credit

administrators processed payments and

delivery based upon whether the products

purchased were office paper products

("fine paper") or janitorial supplies

("supply systems"). Additionally, credit

administrators generally handled only

those accounts that were located in the

same state in which they were employed.

Thus, credit administrators who handled

Wisconsin-based "fine paper" accounts

operated out of Unisource facilities in

the cities of Appleton and New Berlin,

Wisconsin. But for reasons not explained

in the record, two credit administrators

who handled Wisconsin-based "supply

systems" accounts worked at Unisource’s

Itasca, Illinois, facility. Wells was one

of the two credit administrators who

handled primarily Wisconsin-based "supply

systems" accounts (though she also had

some Illinois-based accounts), but worked

in Unisource’s Itasca, Illinois, facility

and not in its Wisconsin facility. The

other credit administrator who handled

Wisconsin-based accounts, but was

employed in Illinois, was Betsy Novinski,

a Caucasian female.

 In March 2000, Walt Welsh, Director of

Unisource’s Itasca credit department, and

Alice Gorman, Unisource’s Human Resources

Director, decided to restructure its

credit department so that credit

administrators were located in the same

facility as the sales staff that sold its
products and so that credit

administrators would handle only local

customer accounts. In other words,

Unisource determined that the credit

administrators who handled Wisconsinbased accounts should be located in its

Appleton and New Berlin, Wisconsin

facilities, and not in the Itasca,

Illinois, facility. Unisource also

believed that if the credit

administrators were in the same facility

as its sales staff, the sales staff could

meet with the credit administrators faceto-face in order that they might better

resolve customer credit problems.

Unisource further believed that

consolidation of the Wisconsin-based

credit administrators would facilitate

and improve the collection rate on

Wisconsin-based accounts. Accordingly,

Unisource relocated the two credit

administrator positions (Wells’s and

Novinski’s) handling Wisconsin accounts

from its Itasca, Illinois, facility to

its Wisconsin facilities.

 Upon being informed of Unisource’s

decision to restructure its credit

administrator positions, Novinski immedi

ately applied for and received another

position within Unisource’s Itasca

facility two months prior to the

effective date of her impending transfer.

In spite of the fact that Unisource

informed Wells that she was free to apply

for any open position in the Itasca

facility, for reasons unexplained she

failed to immediately apply for any other

positions (as Novinski had previously

done) and continued working in her soonto-be-eliminated Itasca credit

administrator position.

 Approximately one month later (April

2000), a credit administrator position in

the Itasca facility became available

after an employee resigned and Wells

submitted her application. The open

position handled "fine paper" accounts

and required three to five years

commercial credit experience as well as

the ability to handle accounts receivable

portfolios with exposures ranging from

four to six figures. Ultimately, the

company hired Lisa Jablenski, a white

female, for the position because of her

superior qualifications. Jablenski had

approximately 10 years experience in

credit and collection where Wells had a

mere thirteen months of experience in a

credit administrator’s position. In
addition, Jablenski had been responsible

for handling accounts that had exposures

in the seven-figure range, whereas

Wells’s experience was limited to

accounts with exposures in the four- to

five-figure range. According to Tom

Freske, Unisource’s Midwest Market Area

Credit Manager, the company’s decision in

hiring Jablenski rather than Wells was

based upon her lengthy experience in the

credit and collection field.

 After she failed to secure the open

credit administrator position in Itasca,

Wells attempted to persuade Unisource to

retain her in an Itasca-based credit

administrator position. In this regard,

Wells requested that Unisource create a

part-time position for her at the Itasca

facility where she would continue to

handle the Illinois accounts, but

Unisource declined to create this new,

part-time position. Wells also applied

for other positions at the Itasca

facility, but failed to be selected for

any of them. On April 14, 2000, Wells’s

position was relocated to Appleton,

Wisconsin. Because Wells refused to

accept a transfer to Appleton and also

because she had been unsuccessful in her

application for other positions at the

Itasca facility, Unisource terminated her

contemporaneous with the time her former

position was relocated. At the time Wells

was laid off, Unisource informed her that

she remained free to apply for any open

positions at the Itasca facility. Because

Wells was unqualified to fill any of the

open positions at Itasca, her

applications for re-employment continued

to be unsuccessful.

 Wells sued Unisource after her

termination, alleging discrimination

based upon race (African American)

inviolation of Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e

et seq., in transferring her position to

Appleton and in failing to hire her for

the open credit administrator position at

Itasca. Wells also claimed that Unisource

was guilty of unlawfully retaliating

against her for her filing of the 1998

discrimination charge when it decided to

transfer her position out of the state to

Appleton, Wisconsin. Because Wells had

failed to rebut any of Unisource’s nondiscriminatory reasons for implementing

its restructuring plans or for selecting

and hiring Lisa Jablenski (rather than
Wells) for an open credit administrator

position in Unisource’s Itasca facility,

the trial court granted summary judgment

in favor of Unisource. The trial court

concluded that Wells failed to establish

a causal connection between her 1998

filing of a discrimination charge and

Unisource’s employment decisions in the

year 2000. Wells appeals.

II. Issues

 On appeal, Wells raises two issues.

Initially, Wells argues that the trial

court committed error in ruling that

Wells failed to establish that

Unisource’s proffered reasons for

transferring her position were

pretextual. Second, Wells argues that the

trial court erred in ruling that she had

failed to establish a causal connection

between her 1998 filing of a

discrimination charge against Unisource

and its 2000 decision to transfer her

position.

III. Analysis

 Wells initially argues that the trial

court erred in granting summary judgment

in favor of Unisource on her claim that

it discriminated against her because of

her race by relocating her credit

administrator position to Wisconsin.

Wells had no direct evidence that

Unisource discriminated against her

because of her race and so proceeded

under the familiar burden-shifting test

set forth initially in McDonnell Douglas

Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

Under this test, Wells was initially

required to carry the burden of

establishing a prima facie case of

discrimination and demonstrate that: 1)

she was a member of a protected class; 2)

she was meeting her employer’s legitimate

expectations; 3) she suffered an adverse

employment action; and 4) other,

similarly-situated employees who were not

members of the protected class were

treated more favorably. Paluck v. Gooding

Rubber Co., 221 F.3d 1003, 1012 (7th Cir.

2000). Although we often comment that

"the prima facie case under McDonnell

Douglas must be established and not

merely incanted," Unisource conceded

before the trial court that Wells had

established a prima facie case of

discrimination. Coco v. Elmwood Care,

Inc., 128 F.3d 1177, 1179 (7th Cir.
1997)./1

 After Wells established a prima facie

case of racial discrimination, the burden

of production shifted to Unisource to

show a legitimate, non-discriminatory

reason for its employment action. See

Paluck, 221 F.3d at 1012. Once Unisource

has proffered a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its action, the

burden returns to Wells to demonstrate

that Unisource’s proffered reason was

pretextual. Id. In order to establish

pretext a plaintiff must demonstrate that

an employer’s proffered explanation for

an employment decision is a dishonest

explanation, rather than merely an error.

Kulumani v. Blue Cross Blue Shield Ass’n,

224 F.3d 681, 685 (7th Cir. 2000). "A

pretext for discrimination means more

than an unusual act; it means something

worse than a business error; pretext

means deceit used to cover one’s tracks."

Grube v. Lau Indus., Inc., 257 F.3d 723,

730 (7th Cir. 2001) (internal quotations

omitted). To demonstrate pretext, Wells

must demonstrate that Unisource’s

articulated reason for her discharge

either: (1) had no basis in fact; (2) did

not actually motivate her discharge; or

(3) was insufficient to motivate her

discharge. Velasco v. Illinois Dept. of

Human Serv., 246 F.3d 1010, 1017 (7th

Cir. 2001).

 Despite its concession that Wells had

established a prima facie case, Unisource

did come forward with two legitimate,

non-discriminatory reasons for its

action. Unisource argued that it

realigned the credit administrator

positions in order to facilitate

communication between its credit

department and its sales department

offices located in Appleton and New

Berlin, Wisconsin, and secondly to

improve customer relations and account

collection in the region being served.

 Wells argues that she successfully

carried the burden of demonstrating that

these reasons were pretextual, and thus

the trial judge erred in granting

Unisource summary judgment. Wells vaguely

contends that Unisource’s plan to

relocate two credit-administrator

positions was part of a scheme to

discriminate against her because of her

race. In support Wells points only to the

deposition testimony of a co-employee
whose personal opinion was that Welsh,

the Unisource official who decided to

relocate Wells’s position, had a "problem

with [African Americans]." Conculsory as

sertions about a decision maker’s racial

prejudice are insufficient to establish

pretext. Oest v. Illinois Dept. of Corr.,

240 F.3d 605, 614 (7th Cir. 2001);

Gonzalez v. Ingersoll Milling Machine

Co., 133 F.3d 1025, 1032-33 (7th Cir.

1998).

 Wells further asserts that Unisource’s

decision to transfer her position was

pretextual because no white credit admin

istrators were transferred and that less

senior, white employees’ positions were

not transferred. But Wells ignores the

fact that Unisource transferred the

credit administrator position occupied by

Betsy Novinski, a white female, from

Itasca, Illinois, to New Berlin,

Wisconsin. Indeed, Unisource relocated

the positions of each of the two credit

administrators in Itasca, Illinois, who

handled Wisconsin-based accounts--both

Wells’s position and Novinski’s position.

Thus, the other Itasca credit

administrators who were not transferred

were not similarly situated to Wells

because their work assignments differed

from hers in that they were exclusively

assigned to dealing with Illinois-based

accounts, and not Wisconsin-based

accounts. Under the law, Wells cannot

establish pretext by pointing to

employees who were not similarly situated

to her. Gonzalez, 133 F.3d at 1033.

 Unisource provided an unrebutted, nondiscriminatory reason for its business

decision to restructure its credit

department--to improve the efficiency of

its credit department, including but not

limited to allowing for face-to-face

interaction of its employees, its

customer relations, and its collections

rate. Wells attempts to demonstrate that

this business reason was pretextual by

suggesting that there was some type of an

elaborate conspiracy among Unisource

management. According to Wells’s

unsupported conspiracy theory Unisource

desired to discharge her in 1998 and in

order to hide its discriminatory motive

it first promoted her, then waited

approximately one year for the dust to

settle and ultimately transferred not one

but two positions to Wisconsin in order

that it might hide its discriminatory
motive and force Wells either to accept a

transfer or to resign. Because of the

lack of evidence in the record in support

of Wells’s theory, we are not convinced

and refuse to base our decision on her

mere speculation. We have typically been

wary of allegations based on nothing but

an attempt to come up with a conspiracy

theory and in particular where there is

not a scintilla of evidence in the record

before us to support Wells’s theory.

Murray v. Chicago Transit Authority, 252

F.3d 880, 888 (7th Cir. 2001).

 Wells also argues that the reasons given

by Unisource to hire Lisa Jablenski

(rather than Wells herself) for the open

credit administrator position at its

Itasca facility were pretextual.

Unisource pointed out the marked

differences in the superior

qualifications of Jablenski (10 years

experience handling credit and collection

with accounts in the seven-figure range)

over Wells (13 months handling credit and

collection with exposure to accounts in

the five-figure range) as the reason for

its decision. Wells failed to provide any

evidence to establish that Unisource did

not really believe Jablenski to be more

qualified. Instead, Wells quibbles with

Unisource’s selection criteria and argues

that it erred in determining that

Jablenski was more qualified. As we often

comment, courts do not sit as super

personnel departments to second guess an

employer’s facially legitimate business

decisions. Stewart v. Henderson, 207 F.3d

374, 378 (7th Cir. 2000). It is well

established that a desire to hire a more

experienced or better qualified applicant

is a valid non-discriminatory reason on

which to base a hiring decision. Gorence

v. Eagle Food Centers, Inc., 242 F.3d

759, 765 (7th Cir. 2001). Moreover, Wells

failed to provide us with even an iota of

evidence to suggest that Unisource’s

reasons for selecting Jablenski were

pretextual. Indeed, Wells’s entire

argument that Unisource’s reasons for

hiring Jablenski were pretextual consists

of two paragraphs without a single

citation to any facts in the record that

would lend support to her speculation,

much less any relevant case law. We

repeatedly have made clear that

perfunctory and undeveloped arguments,

and arguments that are unsupported by

pertinent authority, are waived. Clay v.

Holy Cross Hospital, 253 F.3d 1000, 1002
n.1 (7th Cir. 2001).

 Lastly, Wells argues that the trial

court erred in granting Unisource summary

judgment on her retaliation claim. In

order for a plaintiff to establish a

prima facie case of retaliation under

Title VII, Wells was required to

establish that: 1) she engaged in a

statutorily protected activity; 2) she

suffered an adverse employment action;

and 3) there is a causal link between the

protected activity and the adverse

action. Velasco, 246 F.3d at 1017 n.6.

 Wells has failed to meet the third

prong. In order to establish a causal

link between protected activity and

anadverse employment action, a plaintiff

must demonstrate that the employer would

not have taken the alleged adverse action

"but for" the plaintiff’s protected

activity. Rizzo v. Sheahan, 266 F.3d 705,

715 (7th Cir. 2001); Johnson v.

Nordstrom, Inc., 260 F.3d 727, 732 (7th

Cir. 2001). Wells has failed to even

attempt to demonstrate the causal link

between her 1998 filing of a

discrimination claim and the 2000 plan to

restructure the credit department.

Indeed, her cursory argument suggests

only that her credit administrator

position was the only position

terminated, an assertion directly

contrary to the record before us. Wells

suggests that another circuit has found

that a retaliation claim was established

despite a fourteen-month time lapse

between expression and retaliation. See

Shirley v. Chrysler First, Inc., 970 F.2d

39 (5th Cir. 1992). But, in Shirley, the

plaintiff’s direct supervisor began to

harass the plaintiff immediately after

the filing of her EEOC complaint,

"mention[ing] her EEOC complaint to her

at least twice a week and ’harass[ing]

[her] to death about it.’" Id. at 43. The

facts of this case are not as compelling,

as the plaintiff-appellant Wells makes no

allegation that any supervisor ever

mentioned her 1998 discrimination charge,

much less "harassed" her about it. Even

were we to find this precedent

compelling, it stands only for the

proposition that Wells might have been

allowed to offer evidence that her

expression caused the adverse employment

action--not that it actually did. Wells

has simply failed to point to any

evidence in the record to support her
argument that Unisource would not have

made the business decision to restructure

its credit department unless she had

(more than one year earlier) complained

it had discriminated against her. We have

held in numerous cases that a "one-year

lapse between the protected expression

and the employee’s termination, standing

alone, [is] too attenuated to raise an

inference of discrimination." Oest, 240

F.3d at 616 n.8. In other words, the hint

of causation weakens as the time between

the protected expression and the adverse

action increases and the plaintiff must

offer additional proof of a causal nexus.

Sauzek v. Exxon Coal USA, Inc., 202 F.3d

913, 919 (7th Cir. 2000). Wells has

failed to offer any such evidence.

 The decision of the trial court is

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTE

/1 Unisource argues on appeal that Wells did not

establish a prima facie case because she did not

demonstrate that other, similarly-situated employees were treated more favorably. But by

conceding before the trial judge that Wells could

establish a prima facie case, Unisource has

waived these arguments on appeal. 4901 Corp. v.

Town of Cicero, 220 F.3d 522, 529 (7th Cir.

2000).