RENDERED: AUGUST 22, 2024

 TO BE PUBLISHED

Supreme Court of Kentucky

2024-SC-0215-DGE

NIRUPAMA KULKARNI APPELLANT 

V. 

ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS

NO. 2024-CA-0495

JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT NO. 24-CI-001903

DENNIS HORLANDER; BOBBIE 

HOLSCLAW, AS CHAIR OF THE 

JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF 

ELECTIONS; KENTUCKY BOARD OF 

ELECTIONS; AND MICHAEL ADAMS, 

KENTUCKY SECRETARY OF STATE 

APPELLEES 

OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE NICKELL

AFFIRMING

For a candidate’s name to appear on a partisan primary ballot, KRS1

118.125(2) requires the timely filing of a notification and declaration2

containing the signatures of “not less than two (2) registered voters of the same 

party from the district or jurisdiction from which the candidate seeks 

1 Kentucky Revised Statutes.

2 Although KRS 118.125 specifically denominates this document as a 

“notification and declaration,” the term “nomination papers” appears elsewhere 

throughout KRS Chapter 118. Because the meaning of these terms is identical, we 

use them interchangeably. See Opinion of the Attorney General (OAG) 05-008 (“The 

context implies that ‘notification and declaration’ and ‘nomination papers’ are 

interchangeable.”). We further note “[a]n attorney general’s opinion is highly 

persuasive, but not binding on the recipient.” York v. Commonwealth, 815 S.W.2d 

415, 417 (Ky. App. 1991). 
2

nomination.” Former state Representative Dennis Horlander3 alleged 

incumbent Representative Nirupama Kulkarni failed to satisfy this requirement 

and filed a petition in Jefferson Circuit Court, pursuant to KRS 118.176, 

challenging her qualifications to appear on the Democratic primary ballot for 

the office of State Representative for the 40th House District. The trial court 

denied the petition and allowed Representative Kulkarni to remain on the 

ballot. The Court of Appeals reversed holding Representative Kulkarni was 

disqualified for failure to obtain the requisite number of signatures. We 

granted discretionary review. 

Recognizing the necessity for an expeditious ruling, this Court entered an 

order on June 6, 2024, announcing that a majority voted to affirm the decision 

of the Court of Appeals. We now render this opinion to explain the reasoning 

pertinent to that order and limit our consideration to the issues presented in 

Representative Kulkarni’s motion for discretionary review: (1) whether 

Horlander had the right to appeal the denial of his petition by the trial court; 

and (2) whether the 1990 Amendments to KRS 118.125 superseded our 

decision in Morris v. Jefferson Cnty. Clerk, 729 S.W.2d 444 (Ky. 1987). 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The underlying facts are not in dispute. On December 22, 2023, 

Representative Kulkarni signed her notification and declaration seeking the 

3 As determined by the trial court, Horlander’s standing to challenge 

Representative Kulkarni’s qualifications is predicated on his status as a qualified 

voter. See KRS 118.176(2).
3

Democratic Party nomination for the 40th House District. The text of the 

notification and declaration appears on a preprinted form issued by the 

Kentucky State Board of Elections which consists of a single sheet containing 

two sections. The first section pertains to the candidate’s qualifications 

followed by a jurat.4 The second section concerns the voters’ qualifications 

followed by a jurat. 

Sharon D. LaRue and Catherine Morton Ward signed the nomination 

papers under oath as registered voters of the Democratic party. Their 

signatures were affixed beneath the statement, “we solemnly swear that we are 

registered voters and members of the same Party and are from the district or 

jurisdiction from which the candidate seeks nomination[.]” LaRue, however, 

was a registered Republican at the time she signed the document.5 

Representative Kulkarni filed her nomination papers with the Secretary 

of State on January 2, 2024, three days before the filing deadline expired on 

January 5, 2024. On January 8, 2024, Democratic Party leadership brought 

the issue of LaRue’s party affiliation to Representative Kulkarni’s attention. 

LaRue changed her party affiliation to Democrat on the same day and her 

registration was officially processed on January 10, 2024. On January 17, 

4 “[A] jurat is a simple statement that an instrument is subscribed and sworn to 

or affirmed before a proper officer without the further statement that it is the act or 

deed of the person making it.” Matthews v. Commonwealth, 163 S.W.3d 11, 25 (Ky. 

2005) (quoting 1A C.J.S. Acknowledgements § 2 (June 2004)). 

5 As to whether this mishap occurred through ignorance, accident, mistake or 

otherwise, we cannot speculate. The present record provides no insight into LaRue’s 

state of mind at the time she signed the nomination papers and we express no opinion 

in connection therewith. 
4

2024, the Kentucky Secretary of State certified Representative Kulkarni’s name 

for inclusion on the ballot.

On March 18, 2024, Horlander filed a petition seeking to disqualify 

Representative Kulkarni because she did not comply with the requirement that 

two registered voters of the Democratic Party sign her nomination papers. The 

trial court declined to disqualify Representative Kulkarni in an opinion and 

order entered on April 25, 2024. In reaching its conclusion, the trial court 

applied a standard of substantial compliance after interpreting the 1990 

amendments to KRS 118.125 to have effectively superseded the decision of this 

Court in Morris. 

On direct appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded with 

instructions for the trial court to disqualify Representative Kulkarni. The Court 

of Appeals rejected Representative Kulkarni’s argument that it lacked 

jurisdiction to consider Horlander’s appeal and further determined Morris was 

still good law. Thus, it concluded the trial court erred by applying a standard 

of substantial compliance.

This Court granted discretionary review and allowed the Democratic 

primary election to occur as scheduled on May 21, 2024. We further enjoined 

the Jefferson County Board of Elections, the Kentucky Board of Elections, and 

the Kentucky Secretary of State from certifying the results of the election 

pending further orders of this Court. Representative Kulkarni overwhelmingly 

won the primary election garnering seventy-eight percent of the vote.
5

LAW AND ANALYSIS

I. COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY EXERCISED JURISDICTION

As a threshold jurisdictional matter, Representative Kulkarni argues 

Horlander had no right to appeal the trial court’s determination that she was a 

bona fide candidate.6 We disagree. 

Citing Gibson v. Thompson, 336 S.W.3d 81 (Ky. 2011), Representative 

Kulkarni contends KRS 118.176(4) limits the right to appeal to situations 

where the trial court disqualifies a candidate. We do not read the statute or 

Gibson so narrowly. 

KRS 118.176(4) provides:

If the court finds the candidate is not a bona fide candidate it shall 

so order, and certify the fact to the board of elections, and the 

candidate’s name shall be stricken from the written designation of 

election officers filed with the board of elections or the court may 

refuse recognition or relief in a mandatory or injunctive way. The 

order of the Circuit Court shall be entered on the order book of the 

court and shall be subject to a motion to set aside in the Court of 

Appeals. The motion shall be heard by the Court of Appeals or a 

judge thereof in the manner provided for dissolving or granting 

injunctions, except that the motion shall be made before the court 

or judge within five (5) days after the entry of the order in the 

Circuit Court, and may be heard and tried upon the original 

papers, and the order of the Court of Appeals or judge thereof shall 

be final.

Gibson merely held that an unsuccessful challenger to a candidate’s 

bona fides cannot obtain expedited appellate review via the special motion 

procedure outlined in KRS 118.176(4). Id. at 83. Moreover, we explicitly 

6 “A ‘bona fide’ candidate means one who is seeking nomination in a primary or 

election in a special or regular election according to law.” KRS 118.176(1). 
6

recognized an order dismissing a bona fides challenge for lack of standing “is a 

final and appealable order.” Id. We view the reasoning of Gibson to apply 

equally to situations where, as here, the trial court denies a challenge on the 

merits. 

In the present matter, Hollander timely filed a notice of appeal from the 

trial court’s order denying his petition. We deem this procedure to have 

adequately invoked the Court of Appeals’ jurisdiction. 

II. REPRESENTATIVE KULKARNI IS DISQUALIFIED FOR FAILURE TO 

COMPLY WITH KRS 118.125(2)

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

At the outset, it must be recognized that the present appeal concerns a 

pre-election challenge to a candidate’s qualifications to appear on the ballot as 

opposed to an election contest which “obviously is a post-election procedure, 

involving an election that has been held[.]” Stephenson v. Woodward, 182 

S.W.3d 162, 168 (Ky. 2005) (quoting Fletcher v. Wilson, 495 S.W.2d 787, 791 

(Ky. 1973)). Thus, “[c]ases dealing with election contests—that is, disputes 

involving not the qualifications of a candidate but the validity of the election 

itself—are inapplicable to this matter.” Id. (citing Taylor v. Beckham, 108 Ky. 

278, 56 S.W. 177 (1900)). 

We further emphasize that Kentucky law has long empowered the 

legislature “to impose such reasonable conditions and tests as to party 

membership or affiliation, as shall entitle those seeking party nominations to 

get their names upon their party ballots as candidates.” Hager v. Robinson, 
7

154 Ky. 489, 157 S.W. 1138, 1142 (1913). The constitutional validity of the 

requirements contained in KRS 118.125 have not been questioned here. This 

appeal presents an issue of statutory interpretation, which is purely a matter of 

law subject to de novo review. Commonwealth v. Love, 334 S.W.3d 92, 93 (Ky. 

2011). Thus, “the [legal] conclusions reached by the lower courts are entitled 

to no deference.” Id. 

When this Court is called upon to interpret the meaning of a statute, our 

foremost duty “is to determine and effectuate legislative intent[.]” Kindred 

Healthcare v. Harper, 642 S.W.3d 672, 680 (Ky. 2022) (quoting Sweasy v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 295 S.W.3d 835, 838 (Ky. 2009)). Indeed, “[a]ll statutes of 

this state shall be liberally construed with a view to promote their objects and 

carry out the intent of the legislature[.]” KRS 446.080(1). We must ascertain 

“that intent, if at all possible, from the language the General Assembly chose, 

either as defined by the General Assembly or as generally understood in the 

context of the matter under consideration.” Kindred, 642 S.W.3d at 680 

(quoting Wilson v. Commonwealth, 628 S.W.3d 132, 140 (Ky. 2021)). 

However, “the principle that the statute is to be liberally construed does not 

mean that its provisions can be ignored.” Middletown Engineering Co. v. Main 

Street Realty, Inc., 839 S.W.2d 274, 277 (Ky. 1992). 

As a general matter of interpretation, courts demand strict compliance 

with mandatory statutory provisions while directory provisions are subject to 

substantial compliance. Knox Cnty. v. Hammons, 129 S.W.3d 839, 843 (Ky. 

2004). To determine “whether [a] provision is mandatory or directory, we 
8

depend ‘not on form, but on the legislative intent, which is to be ascertained by 

interpretation from consideration of the entire act, its nature and object, and 

the consequence of construction one way or the other.’” Id. (quoting Skaggs v. 

Fyffe, 266 Ky. 337, 98 S.W.2d 884, 886 (1936)). “In other words, ‘if the 

directions given by the statute to accomplish a given end are violated, but the 

given end is in fact accomplished, without affecting the real merits of the case, 

then the statute is to be regarded as directory merely.’” Id. 

We recognize the longstanding principle that uncertainty or doubt in 

statutory language “should be resolved in favor of allowing the candidacy to 

continue.” Heleringer v. Brown, 104 S.W.3d 397, 403 (Ky. 2003). However,

where ballot access provisions are unambiguous and clear, this Court has 

consistently “require[d] strict compliance with election statutes.” Barnard v. 

Stone, 933 S.W.2d 394, 395 (Ky. 1996); Morris, 729 S.W.2d at 444; Thomas v. 

Lyons, 586 S.W.2d 711, 716 (Ky. 1979). Moreover, we will not apply the 

doctrine of substantial compliance to excuse noncompliance with the governing 

statutory requirements. Fletcher v. Wilson, 500 S.W.2d 601, 606 (Ky. 1973). 

B. THE CURRENT PROVISIONS KRS 118.125(2) ARE UNAMBIGUOUS AND 

MANDATORY

Representative Kulkarni’s primary argument centers on the effect of the 

1990 Amendments to KRS 118.125 following our decision in Morris. Before 

addressing the import of these amendments, however, our review must 

commence with the present version of the statute because “[t]he starting point 

in discerning [legislative] intent is the existing statutory text and not the 
9

predecessor statutes.” Lamie v. United States Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 534 

(2004) (internal citation omitted). 

As currently enacted, KRS 118.125 sets forth the procedure and form 

which a candidate must complete to have his or her name appear on a primary 

ballot:

(1) Except as provided in KRS 118.155, any person who is qualified 

under the provisions of KRS 116.055 to vote in any primary for the 

candidates for nomination by the party at whose hands he or she 

seeks the nomination, shall have his or her name printed on the 

official ballot of his or her party for an office to which he or she is 

eligible in that primary, upon filing, with the Secretary of State or 

county clerk, as appropriate, at the proper time, a notification and 

declaration.

(2) The notification and declaration shall be in the form prescribed 

by the State Board of Elections. It shall be signed by the candidate 

and by not less than two (2) registered voters of the same party 

from the district or jurisdiction from which the candidate seeks 

nomination. Signatures for nomination papers shall not be affixed 

on the document to be filed prior to the first Wednesday after the 

first Monday in November of the year preceding the year in which 

the office will appear on the ballot. The notification and 

declaration for a candidate shall include the following oath:

“For the purpose of having my name placed on the 

official primary election ballot as a candidate for 

nomination by the –––––– Party, I, –––––– (name in full 

as desired on the ballot as provided in KRS 118.129), 

do solemnly swear that my residence address is –––––

(street, route, highway, city if applicable, county, state, 

and zip code), that my mailing address, if different, is –

–––– (post office address), and that I am a registered ––

–––– (party) voter; that I believe in the principles of the 

–––––– Party, and intend to support its principles and 

policies; that I meet all the statutory and 

constitutional qualifications for the office which I am 

seeking; that if nominated as a candidate of such party 

at the ensuing election I will accept the nomination 

and not withdraw for reasons other than those stated 

in KRS 118.105(3); that I will not knowingly violate 

any election law or any law relating to corrupt and 
10

fraudulent practice in campaigns or elections in this 

state, and if finally elected I will qualify for the office.”

The declaration shall be subscribed and sworn to before an officer 

authorized to administer an oath by the candidate and by the two 

(2) voters making the declaration and signing the candidate’s 

petition for office.

(3) When the notice and declaration has been filed with the 

Secretary of State or county clerk, as appropriate, and certified 

according to KRS 118.165, the Secretary of State or county clerk, 

as appropriate, shall have the candidate’s name printed on the 

ballot according to the provisions of this chapter, except as 

provided in KRS 118.185.

(4) Titles, ranks, or spurious phrases shall not be accepted on the 

filing papers and shall not be printed on the ballots as part of the 

candidate’s name; however, nicknames, initials, and contractions 

of given names may be acceptable as the candidate’s name. 

The provisions of KRS 118.125(2) are plain and unambiguous. The 

requirement is clear: a notification and declaration “shall be signed by the 

candidate and by not less than two (2) registered voters of the same party from 

the district or jurisdiction from which the candidate seeks nomination.” This 

Court has generally interpreted the word “shall” to connote a mandatory sense 

unless the context of a statute requires otherwise. KRS 446.010(39); Cabinet 

for Health & Fam. Servs. ex rel. Child Support Enforcement v. B.N.T., 651 S.W.3d 

745, 750 (Ky. 2022). We have previously explained that “[i]n common or 

ordinary parlance, and in its ordinary signification, the term ‘shall’ is a word of 

command and . . . must be given a compulsory meaning.” Bevin v. 

Commonwealth ex rel. Beshear, 563 S.W.3d 74, 89 (Ky. 2018) (quoting 

Vandertoll v. Commonwealth, 110 S.W.3d 789, 795-96 (Ky. 2003)). In short, 

“[s]hall means shall.” Id.
11

Moreover, the phrase “[i]t shall be signed by . . . voters of the same party”

necessarily contemplates that the two registered voters must be members of 

the same party as the candidate at the time they sign the notification and 

declaration; not that they will become members of the same party at some 

indeterminate point in the future. In interpretating an analogous signature 

requirement contained in KRS 118.315(2), this Court construed the language 

“[i]t shall be signed . . . by registered voters from the district or jurisdiction 

from which the candidate seeks nomination” to be “sufficiently explicit and 

unambiguous to require its literal application.” Barnard, 933 S.W.2d at 395. 

We perceive the reasoning of Barnard to be sound and equally applicable to the 

present appeal.

Our interpretation that a voter must be qualified at the time of signing a 

notification and declaration under KRS 118.125(2) finds additional support in

the requirement that “[t]he declaration shall be subscribed and sworn to before 

an officer authorized to administer an oath by the candidate and by the two (2) 

voters making the declaration and signing the candidate’s petition for office.” 

When an election statute contains an oath requirement, “[t]he purpose . . . is to 

bind the conscience and secure the truth of the statement under the influence 

of the sanctity of a religious obligation or calling upon God to witness what is 

avowed to be the truth.”7 Asher v. Sizemore, 261 S.W.2d 665, 666 (Ky. 1953). 

7 We observe the law does not require an oath or affirmation to take any

particular form so long as the “witness shall first undertake a solemn obligation to tell 

the truth.” Gaines v. Commonwealth, 728 S.W.2d 525, 526 (Ky. 1987); see also KRS 

454.170.
12

Such a sworn statement pertains to objective facts whose verity or falsehood 

must perforce be determined in reference to the circumstances existing at the 

time the statement was made. Indeed, Kentucky law embodies “the policy of 

discouraging all . . . falsehoods made under oath, even where there has been 

no substantial impairment of the administration of justice.” Commonwealth v. 

Stallard, 958 S.W.2d 21, 25 (Ky. 1997) (quoting Official Commentary to KRS 

523.040)). 

Further, this Court cannot disregard the failure to comply with the 

signature requirement as a technical irregularity or mere error in form. A 

primary purpose of ballot access statutes is to preserve the integrity of the 

nomination process. See Barnard, 933 S.W.2d at 395. Mandatory signature 

requirements “ensure that the voters who sign a petition are eligible to vote for 

that candidate.”8 Stoecklin v. Fennell, 526 S.W.3d 104, 107 (Ky. App. 2017) 

(quoting Hoffman v. Waterman, 141 S.W.3d 16, 18 (Ky. App. 2004)). Moreover, 

legislative “tests of party loyalty and party membership appl[y] with equal force 

to electors voting in and candidates voted for in primary elections; and, 

whether applied by legislative enactment to the one class or the other, they are 

8 Representative Kulkarni also argues a signing voter need not necessarily be 

eligible to vote for the candidate in the primary election for which the candidate is 

proposed so long as the voter is a member of the same of the party as the candidate 

and otherwise satisfies the residency requirement. Curiously, under KRS 116.055, the 

last day to change party affiliation to vote in the 2024 primary was December 31, 

2023, yet the filing deadline for the candidate’s nomination papers was January 5, 

2024. Thus, it is arguable whether the requirements of KRS 118.125(2) could be 

satisfied where a voter changed his or her party affiliation after the deadline for 

switching parties to vote in the upcoming primary but before the candidate’s filing 

deadline. But those are not the facts of this case, and we leave this question for 

another day. 
13

equally reasonable.” Hager, 157 S.W. at 1146. Our predecessor Court 

observed the purpose of Kentucky’s original primary election law was “to purify 

the politics of the state, by preventing frauds and wrongdoing in making 

nominations[.]” Id. We believe this reasoning continues to illuminate the 

substantive public purpose underlying KRS Chapter 118 as a whole and 

forecloses the application of substantial compliance to KRS 118.125(2) in 

particular. 

Thus, we hold there is no defense of substantial compliance for the 

failure to strictly adhere to the clear and firm legislatively-enacted filing 

requirements entitling Kentucky candidates to ballot access. Continued strict 

judicial enforcement of such legislative enactments serves as an indispensable 

foundation for continued election integrity, partisan accountability, and public 

trust. Absent judicial imposition of a strict compliance standard, the intended 

meaning and protective impact of the legislature’s statutory language would be 

diluted, becoming meaningless and ineffectual. Transforming such welldefined statutory requirements into mere suggestions by judicial fiat would 

blur election transparency, invite irregular enforcement, and damage public 

trust.

C. 1990 AMENDMENTS TO KRS 118.125 DID NOT SUPERSEDE MORRIS

Representative Kulkarni seeks to avoid a strict interpretation of the 

signature requirements contained in KRS 118.125 by arguing that the 1990 

amendments effectively superseded Morris. Specifically, she contends these 
14

amendments compel the conclusion that the signature requirement is now a 

directory provision subject to substantial compliance. We disagree.

As acknowledged by the parties and lower courts, our decision in Morris

involved strikingly similar facts. In Morris, the candidate sought the 

Democratic Party nomination for the office of Commonwealth’s Attorney. 729 

S.W.2d at 444. At the time the candidate’s nomination papers were filed, one 

of the two required voters was not a registered member of the Democratic 

Party. Id. at 445. After the filing deadline had passed, the voter properly

registered. Id. 

A challenge to the candidate’s qualifications followed. Id. The trial court 

denied the challenge and ruled the candidate had substantially complied with 

the statutory requirements. Id. The Court of Appeals “reversed the trial court 

and ordered [the candidate’s] name stricken from the ballot.” Id. On 

discretionary review, this Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. Id.

We rejected the argument that a candidate’s qualifications are 

determined as of the date of the primary election as opposed to the filing 

deadline and explained:

The affidavit required by K.R.S. 118.125(3) must be signed by two 

electors who are (not who may thereafter become) members of the 

party to which the candidate belongs. We interpret this to mean 

that at the time the affidavit is signed and the nomination papers 

filed, the affiant must be a voter registered to vote as a member of 

the party to which the candidate belongs. In effect, [the candidate] 

filed his nomination papers and attached thereto only one valid 

affidavit of an elector who was a member of the party to which he 

belonged. He did not comply with the statute.
15

Id. at 445-46. This Court further refused to excuse non-compliance with the 

statutory requirements under the guise of substantial compliance:

It is true that a candidate would be hard pressed to determine the 

truth of some of the allegations in the required affidavit, but the 

question of whether [the signing voter] was a registered voter could 

easily have been checked in the office of the county court clerk 

when the nomination papers were filed. The law places the duty 

upon the candidate to support his nomination papers with the 

affidavits of two electors. On a matter which can be so easily 

determined as whether or not an individual is registered to vote, 

there is no excuse for the candidate to claim that the affiant 

claimed to be registered to vote.

The statute, with regard to the supporting affidavits of electors, is 

plain. It requires two affiants, and it is easy to comply with. An 

affidavit of only one elector is not a substantial compliance with 

the statute.

Id. at 446. 

Representative Kulkarni emphasizes the result in Morris hinged on this 

Court’s interpretation of the phrase “at the time of filing” and the present tense 

of the word “are” in the sentence “[a]t the time of filing his notification and 

declaration, the candidate shall file therewith an affidavit of two (2) reputable 

electors who are members of the party to which the candidate belongs[,]” which 

was contained in the 1987 version of KRS 118.125(3). She further asserts the 

removal of this specific language by the 1990 Amendments manifestly reflects 

the legislature’s intent to remove the timing component and that the 

requirements of KRS 118.125 otherwise be interpreted as directory, rather than 

mandatory. Representative Kulkarni maintains any contrary interpretation 

would render the 1990 Amendments meaningless in violation of the wellestablished rule that “[w]here a clause in an old enactment is omitted from the 
16

new one, it is to be inferred that the Legislature intended that the omitted 

clause should no longer be the law.” Inland Steel Co. v. Hall, 245 S.W.2d 437, 

438 (Ky. 1952).

We are unconvinced the legislature intended to supersede Morris through 

the 1990 Amendments to KRS 118.125. To be sure, the amendments must be 

accounted for and given effect. However, Representative Kulkarni’s reading is 

untenable because it requires this Court to focus on certain words and phrases 

in isolation without consideration of the legislative changes in the context of 

the amended statute as a whole. See Kindred Healthcare, 642 S.W.3d at 680 

(applying rule that the entire statute must be interpreted “in context without 

distorting its intended meaning by focusing on a single sentence, clause, or 

phrase.”). 

At the time Morris was decided in 1987, KRS 118.125 contained two 

separate filing requirements. The first requirement pertained only to the 

notification and declaration of the candidate under KRS 118.125(2) and 

specifically prescribed the necessary form. The second requirement related to 

the affidavit of electors under KRS 118.125(3) which provided in pertinent part, 

“[a]t the time of filing his notification and declaration, the candidate shall file 

therewith an affidavit of two (2) reputable electors who are members of the 

party to which the candidate belongs.” Under KRS 118.125(4), the notification 

and declaration and the accompanying affidavits were permitted to “be on the 

same or separate sheets, but shall be filed together.” 
17

In 1990, three years after the Morris decision, the General Assembly 

continued a comprehensive overhaul of Kentucky’s election laws.9 1990 Ky. 

Acts. ch. 48 (S.B. 47). By this Act, the legislature created KRS 116.037 and 

KRS 118.775; repealed KRS 116.049, KRS 116.075, and KRS 119.135; and 

amended numerous other existing statutes. 

Pertinent to KRS 118.125, the legislature reenacted Subsection (1) 

without change. 1990 Ky. Acts. ch. 48 at § 39. Additionally, the separate 

affidavit requirement under Subsection (3) was eliminated and merged into the 

amended Subsection (2), which created a single notification and declaration 

form:

The notification and declaration shall be in the form prescribed 

by the State Board of Elections. It shall be signed by the 

candidate and by not less than two (2) registered voters of the 

same party from the district or jurisdiction from which the 

candidate seeks nomination. The notification and declaration 

shall include the following oath [form]:

. . . 

The declaration shall be subscribed and sworn to by the person 

making it [,] before an officer authorized to administer an oath. 

9 We note the prior legislative session of 1988 also resulted in wide-ranging 

changes to Kentucky’s election laws. 1988 Ky. Acts ch. 341 (S.B. 268). Indeed, the 

year 1987 was a time of “election reform fervor[.]” John W. Hays, PACS in Kentucky: 

Regulating the Permanent Committees, 76 Ky. L.J. 1011, 1012 (1988). The reformminded sentiment of the day was largely attributed to public outcry following “[a]n 

eight-day series of articles relative to election fraud [that] appeared in the Louisville 

Courier-Journal in October of 1987.” Legis. Rsch. Comm’n., Foreword to Final Rep. of 

the Special Comm’n. on Election Reform, Rsch. Rpt. No. 240 (Ky. Dec. 1988). “The 

articles documented abuses in the areas of vote buying and selling; campaign 

contributors who subsequently received state jobs; appointments or contracts; the 

increasing influence of political action committees; illegal cash contributions; the 

enforcement role of the Registry of Election Finance; and the rapidly increasing cost of 

campaigns.” Id.
18

Id. Subsection (4) was also amended to remove the phrase “[t]he nomination 

and declaration and the accompanying affidavits may be on the same or 

separate sheets, but shall be filed together,” and was otherwise reenacted as 

the new Subsection (3) to provide:

When the nomination and declaration has been [so] filed with 

the proper officer, and certified according to KRS 118.165, the 

officer shall have the candidate’s name printed on the ballot 

according to the provisions of this chapter, except as provided in 

KRS 118.185.

Id. 

In context, it is evident that the 1990 Amendments to KRS 118.125 

involved more than the mere reenactment of the former affidavit requirements 

without the phrase “at the time of filing” and the single word “are.” Instead, 

the notification and declaration and the affidavit requirements were merged 

into a unified form whose timing was governed by Subsection (1) which 

conditioned a candidate’s entitlement to ballot access “upon filing, with the 

proper officer at the proper time, a notification and declaration.” 1990 Ky. 

Acts. ch. 48 at § 39. The combination of these separate requirements obviated 

the need to specify the time for filing the voters’ signatures in relation to the 

candidate’s filing because both requirements are satisfied simultaneously by 

the placement of each of the signatures onto a single form. Based on a plain 

language reading, we construe the 1990 amendments to KRS 118.125 to reflect 
19

the legislature’s intent to retain the essential, substantive requirements of the 

prior law while simplifying the administrative procedure.10 

Moreover, we perceive the semantic changes in the amended statute to 

have resulted from the dictates of logic and grammar as opposed to the 

conversion of a mandatory requirement into a directory provision. In this light, 

the retention of the phrase “at the time of filing” and the word “are” in the 

amended version of KRS 118.125(2) would have amounted to mere surplusage. 

Thus, we conclude the 1990 amendments are consistent with the reasoning of 

our decision in Morris. 

D. MATERIAL DEFECTS CANNOT BE CORRECTED OR AMENDED AFTER 

THE FILING DEADLINE

Representative Kulkarni further contends disqualification is improper 

because LaRue changed her party affiliation prior to the certification of 

Representative Kulkarni’s name to the ballot by the Secretary of State. We 

disagree and hold material defects in a candidate’s nomination papers cannot 

be corrected or amended after the filing deadline.

Entitlement to ballot access depends “upon filing, with the Secretary of 

State or county clerk, as appropriate, at the proper time, a notification and 

declaration.” KRS 118.125(1) (emphasis added). As relevant here, the proper 

10 While the parties dispute the extent to which a post-enactment statement 

made by a co-sponsor of the 1990 Amendments sheds light on the proper 

interpretation of KRS 118.125, we need not consider this issue because our holding is 

based on a plain language reading of the statute. Shawnee Telecom Resources, Inc. v. 

Brown, 354 S.W.3d 542, 551 (Ky. 2011) (“Only if the statute is ambiguous or 

otherwise frustrates a plain reading, do we resort to extrinsic aids such as the 

statute’s legislative history [and] the canons of construction[.]”). 
20

time for filing refers to KRS 118.165(2) which sets forth the deadline for the 

filing of nomination papers:

Candidates for offices to be voted for by the electors of more than 

one (1) county, and for members of Congress and members of the 

General Assembly, shall file their nomination papers with the 

Secretary of State not earlier than the first Wednesday after the 

first Monday in November of the year preceding the year the office 

will appear on the ballot and not later than the first Friday 

following the first Monday in January preceding the day fixed by 

law for holding the primary. Signatures for nomination papers 

shall not be affixed on the document to be filed prior to the first 

Wednesday after the first Monday in November of the year 

preceding the year in which the office will appear on the ballot. All 

nomination papers shall be filed no later than 4 p.m. local time at 

the place of filing when filed on the last date on which the papers 

may be filed.

(Emphases added). 

Kentucky law has long regarded the deadline for the filing of nomination 

papers as mandatory. Hallon v. Center, 102 Ky. 119, 43 S.W. 174, 175-76 

(1897), overruled on other grounds by Fannin v. Cassell, 487 S.W.2d 919 (Ky. 

1972). In view of the legislature’s repeated use of the word “shall” in 

connection with the time of filing, we perceive no basis to interpret the current 

version of KRS 118.165(2) otherwise.

Concomitant with the mandatory filing deadline, the traditional rule is 

that material defects in nomination papers cannot be corrected or amended 

after the deadline has expired. Fletcher, 500 S.W.2d at 606-07 (rejecting 

argument “that ‘supplemental’ nomination papers filed . . . in correct form, six 

days after the deadline for filing, may be accepted as curing the defects in his 

original papers.”); Bd. of Ed. v. Fiscal Court, 485 S.W.2d 752, 753 (Ky. 1972) 
21

(“The insufficient petitions could not be made sufficient by such late action (not 

only after the time for filing had expired but after the matter had been appealed 

to the circuit court).”); Evans v. Hill, 314 Ky. 61, 234 S.W.2d 297, 298 (1950) 

(rejecting candidate’s attempt to correct nomination papers where fatal error 

discovered after filing deadline); OAG 85-67 (“[O]nce the deadline for filing has 

lapsed, under KRS 118.365, the filing papers of the candidate cannot be 

changed or corrected.”); 26 Am. Jur. 2d Elections § 217 (2024) (“Where the 

defect in a [nomination] petition is fatal, and the time for filing has expired, 

amendment of the petition is properly refused.”); 29 C.J.S. Elections § 243 (“A 

nomination petition which is invalid cannot be amended after the time for filing 

it has passed as by correcting a defective acknowledgment, supplying an 

omission from the jurat of a designating petition, adding names to the petition, 

or correcting the name of the district for which the nomination was made.”).

A material defect results from the failure to comply with a mandatory 

requirement in contrast to a mere technical defect arising from the failure to 

observe a directory requirement. Skaggs, at 98 S.W.2d 886 (“A proceeding not 

following a mandatory provision of a statute is rendered illegal and void, while 

an omission to observe or failure to conform to a directory provision is not.”). 

Mere technical defects may generally be cured by amendment, “but material 

errors or omissions cannot be corrected, particularly after the time for filing 

has expired.” 29 C.J.S. Elections § 243. We discern nothing in the applicable 

statutes to justify a departure from the well-established law on this subject. 
22

Compliance with the signature requirement under KRS 118.125(2) is 

mandatory and, therefore, material. It is undisputed that Representative 

Kulkarni’s nominating papers were insufficient at the expiration of the filing 

deadline. Consequently, we cannot deem her subsequent efforts to have cured 

this material defect.

CONCLUSION

Kentucky law places the burden on the candidate to ensure the statutory 

requirements to gain access to the ballot have been satisfied. Morris, 729 

S.W.2d at 446. It is not unreasonable or unduly harsh to demand strict 

compliance with clearly enacted legislative mandates for ballot access. 

Assuring one’s required election filings are compliant is among the first duties 

of anyone intent upon seeking public office. Where, as here, one’s own political 

party was capable of expeditiously ascertaining the inaccuracy of a voter’s

claimed affiliation by reference to readily available public records after the 

passing of a filing deadline, a vigilant office-seeker could have similarly 

confirmed the veracity of a voter’s representation prior to filing, thereby 

avoiding any challenge or disqualification.

In discharging our fundamental duty to declare what the law is, we 

remain mindful of the impact on the rights of the voters and reiterate the 

sentiments aptly expressed by the Stephenson majority:

This Court is deeply respectful of the electoral process and its very 

fundamental role in the functioning of a true democracy. We are 

equally sympathetic to those citizens who voted in the election 

herein disputed. However, we cannot ignore that an election may 

only be considered legitimate when the statutory procedures 
23

governing the process are followed and constitutional mandates 

are respected.

182 S.W.3d at 173. “[T]he legislature has delegated authority to the judiciary 

to determine the qualifications of a candidate for public office; that alone is the 

issue to which we have confined our decision.” Id. at 174.

Because LaRue was not a member of the same party as the candidate at 

the time she signed the nomination papers, Representative Kulkarni did not 

comply with the signature requirement under KRS 118.125(2), and we must 

conclude the failure to do so is fatal to her candidacy. Thus, we need not 

address Horlander’s alternative arguments for disqualification. Consequently, 

“the effect of the disqualification of a candidate subsequent to the election is 

that no election has occurred and the true and legitimate will of the people has 

not yet been expressed.” Stephenson, 182 S.W.3d at 173. Furthermore, when

a nomination is invalidated and it is impractical to strike the candidate’s name 

from the ballot, the provisions of KRS 118.212 shall be observed. Barnard, 933 

S.W.2d at 396.

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby 

affirmed.

All sitting. VanMeter, C.J.; Conley, Keller, Lambert and Nickell, JJ., 

concur. Thompson, J., concurs in part and dissents in part by separate 

opinion in which Bisig, J., joins. Bisig, J., dissents by separate opinion in 

which Thompson, J., joins.

THOMPSON, J., CONCURRING IN PART, DISSENTING IN PART: I 

concur with the majority opinion that the Court of Appeals could properly 
24

exercise its jurisdiction to decide whether Representative Kulkarni was a bona 

fide candidate. However, I disagree with its ultimate resolution of that issue. 

Whether the disqualification of one of Representative Kulkarni’s 

signatories renders her unqualified to stand for election is a very close issue. I 

have great respect for the majority opinion’s reasoning that she is unqualified. 

The majority opinion dutifully interprets Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 

118.125(2) in accordance with our established precedent, determining that the 

1990 amendments did not make any substantive change to these 

requirements. This is our law. However, I have been persuaded by Justice Bisig 

that the 1990 amendments present sufficient ambiguity that they should be 

interpreted as intending to change to this law. I write separately to criticize the 

hypertechnical requirements of KRS 118.125(2) which is a trap for unwary 

candidates who file for office, and to suggest ways to ameliorate this trap so 

that the will of the voters will be respected. 

I doubt most candidates give much thought to who will sign the required 

form for them to become candidates for office, much less feel the need to 

proactively check the party registration status of the persons signing. As our 

past precedent shows, this is a mistake, and races can be lost when it comes to 

overlooking strict compliance with the technical requirements of this statute.

In filling out this form, only two signature lines are included. I suggest that, 

since only two appropriate signatures are required but additional signatures 

can properly be included, the Secretary of State revise the required form which 
25

is issued by the Kentucky State Board of Elections to provide for additional 

signature lines. 

I also urge our General Assembly to amend the law to specifically relax 

such requirements. Over five decades I have observed numerous election 

controversies because of this law. In the meantime, the General Assembly has 

liberalized many other provisions of election statutes. I believe it is past time 

for it to clearly do the same with these requirements. 

Bisig, J., joins.

BISIG, J., DISSENTING: I respectfully dissent from the majority’s well 

written decision affirming the Kentucky Court of Appeals and disqualifying 

Representative Nirupama Kulkarni from the Democratic primary ballot for the 

office of State Representative for the 40th House District. I would instead 

affirm the trial court and allow Representative Kulkarni to remain on the ballot. 

In its opinion, the majority puts forth a well-reasoned argument for 

disqualifying Representative Kulkarni for failure to comply with KRS 

118.125(2). The majority opinion gives a plausible interpretation of the effect of 

the 1990 Amendment removing the time component from KRS 118.125 

following this Court’s decision in Morris v. Jefferson County Clerk, 729 S.W.2d 

444 (Ky. 1987). The majority finds the change was intended to avoid 

redundancies and streamline the substantive election requirements. In fact, 

another explanation for the 1990 Amendment is suggested by the timing of the 

amendment itself, which removed the phrase “at the time of filing” from the 
26

statute after the Morris decision which relied on that very language. It is also 

plausible the amendment was to ameliorate the harsh outcome of Morris. 

Given the two possible interpretations of the amendment to the filing 

requirements statute, I would recognize the long-standing principle that 

uncertainty or doubt in statutory language “should be resolved in favor of 

allowing the candidacy to continue.” Heleringer v. Brown, 104 S.W.3d 397, 403 

(Ky. 2003). The idea of liberal construction of election statutes that favors the 

goal of broad voter participation is deeply embedded in Kentucky law. Id. The 

Heleringer Court notes language from Napier v. Roberts, 172 Ky. 227, 189 S.W. 

206, 209 (1916) finding a rule of public importance that the individual voter 

should not be deprived of the opportunity of choosing a public servant from 

among those who seek the position, unless the plain or manifest purpose of the

law demands it. As far back as Baker v. Marcum, 216 Ky. 210, 287 S.W. 696, 

697 (1926), courts have called for the interpretation of election laws to register 

public will and “be along sound and reasonable lines, and not so ultra 

technical as either to defeat the will of the public or place an unnecessary 

burden upon the electors.”

Representative Kulkarni filed her papers on January 2, 2024, three days 

before the expiration of the filing deadline. By January 8, 2024, the signing 

voter filed to switch her registration. On January 17, 2024, the Secretary of 

State certified Representative Kulkarni’s name for the ballot. Accordingly, by 

the time she was placed on the ballot, Representative Kulkarni had the bona 
27

fides to serve as a representative and two registered Democrats supported her 

candidacy. For these reasons, I would affirm the trial court.

Thompson, J., joins.

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

James Craig

Tyler Larson

Craig Henry PLC

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

Steven J. Megerle

Megerle Law

COUNSEL FOR SECRETARY OF STATE

Jennifer Schwartz Scutchfield

COUNSEL FOR JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS

Natalie Suzanne Johnson

Kathryn Delaine Meador

COUNSEL FOR KENTUCKY BOARD OF ELECTIONS

Taylor Austin Brown

COUNSEL FOR AMICUS CURIAE ROBERT STIVERS, IN HIS OFFICIAL 

CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF THE KENTUCKY SENATE AND DAVID W.

OSBORNE, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SPEAKER

OF THE KENTUCKY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES :

D. Eric Lycan

Joseph A. Bilby

Office of the Speaker

David E. Fleenor

Office of the Senate President