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i 

87–618 2014

[H.A.S.C. No. 113–86] 

INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENTS OF 

THE FISCAL YEAR 2015 BUDGET 

REQUEST FOR SEAPOWER AND 

PROJECTION FORCES 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND 

PROJECTION FORCES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 12, 2014 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia, Chairman 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi 

ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

JON RUNYAN, New Jersey 

KRISTI L. NOEM, South Dakota 

PAUL COOK, California 

BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

COLLEEN W. HANABUSA, Hawaii 

DEREK KILMER, Washington 

SCOTT H. PETERS, California 

DAVID SIENICKI, Professional Staff Member 

DOUG BUSH, Professional Staff Member 

NICHOLAS RODMAN, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2014 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, March 12, 2014, Independent Assessments of the Fiscal Year 

2015 Budget Request for Seapower and Projection Forces ............................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, March 12, 2014 ................................................................................... 19 

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 12, 2014 

INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENTS OF THE FISCAL YEAR 2015 BUDGET 

REQUEST FOR SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy, a Representative from Virginia, Chairman, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces ........................................................ 1 

McIntyre, Hon. Mike, a Representative from North Carolina, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces .................................... 2 

WITNESSES 

Grant, Dr. Rebecca, President, Iris Independent Research ................................. 6 

Natter, ADM Robert J., USN (Ret.), R.J. Natter & Associates, LLC .................. 4 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Grant, Dr. Rebecca ........................................................................................... 33 

Natter, ADM Robert J. ..................................................................................... 23 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Forbes ......................................................................................................... 43 

(1) 

INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENTS OF THE FISCAL YEAR 

2015 BUDGET REQUEST FOR SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 12, 2014. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:05 p.m., in room 

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. J. Randy Forbes (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE 

ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

Mr. FORBES. Well, I want to welcome all of our members and our 

distinguished panel of experts for today’s hearing, focused on the 

fiscal year 2015 budget request. We have testifying before us retired Admiral Robert Natter, former commander of Fleet Forces 

Command; and Dr. Rebecca Grant, IRIS Independent Research. 

Thank you both for appearing today to share your unique perspectives on this important topic. 

Before I begin a specific discussion about the fiscal year 2015 

budget request I want to express my continued concern about our 

overall defense budget request and proposed defense spending 

trends. To put it bluntly, the President’s budget greatly diminishes 

our ability for responding to emerging threats and decreases our 

current readiness. 

The harm in our budget deliberations will not be measured on 

the impact to our force structure today, but rather, the greatest impact will be the debilitating impact of the continued underfunding 

of the defense strategy and our hampered ability to respond to future global security requirements and challenges. 

As for the budget request, there are multiple issues I find concerning. The most perplexing issue is the perceived indifference to 

the aircraft carrier force structure. 

The budget request supports the defueling of the USS George 

Washington but has not included required funds for the refueling. 

This $450 million deficit in fiscal year 2015 may lead to a reduction 

in the overall aircraft carrier fleet from 11 to 10. 

Equally problematic is the proposal to not support $300 million 

in advanced procurement for additional nuclear reactor cores in fiscal year 2015. 

I refuse to accept the current trajectory that reduces our aircraft 

carrier fleet to 10. This runs in contravention to the entirety of the 

global requirement set forth by our combatant commanders. When 
2 

asked about the ability to support the global presence demand, Admiral Locklear indicated that even the current aircraft carrier fleet 

was insufficient to adequately support requirements. 

I am also concerned about the national capabilities of the industrial base and the potential negative consequences that threaten to 

induce greater instability to what already exists. Considering the 

recent closure of Avondale Shipyard in Louisiana, I am concerned 

that a diminished workload will precipitate additional restructuring. 

With the truncation of the DDG 1000 program, the procurement 

reduction associated with the Littoral Combat Ship [LCS], the potential elimination of an aircraft carrier refueling and complex 

overhaul, and the indecision associated with additional amphibious 

ships after delivery of LPD–27, all of these issues will negatively 

impact the ship construction industry. Unless we are able to turn 

the overall defense trend lines in a positive direction, including the 

shipbuilding budget, I am concerned that the Navy will be unable 

to sustain the entirety of the existing industrial base. 

Regarding future Air Force capabilities, I am pleased that the 

Air Force was able to protect its new KC–46 tanker and the new 

long-range strike bomber. These two programs will be critical to 

our nation’s ability to project power for decades to come. However, 

it wasn’t without cost or consequence to other imperative Air Force 

programs and capability areas such as space, airlift, tactical fighters, and necessary modernization and upgrade programs that 

bridged the capability gap until the Air Force’s top three acquisition priorities are fielded. 

I look forward to discussing these important topics with our expert panel of witnesses. 

And with that, I turn to my good friend and colleague, the ranking member of the subcommittee, Mike McIntyre. 

STATEMENT OF MIKE MCINTYRE, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 

NORTH CAROLINA, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for this 

hearing. 

Thank you to our guests for being here with us today. 

As you may well know, our full committee has heard from the 

Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations [CNO] 

about the Navy’s budget request coming up, and with regard to the 

Air Force, we will look forward to hearing from the Secretary of the 

Air Force and the Air Force Chief of Staff on Friday. And when we 

consider the proposals before us this afternoon, I know there are 

some questions that I, too, am concerned about, just as my good 

friend, Chairman Forbes, has indicated. 

The Navy appears to have done better than other services in 

terms of protecting top budget priorities, but there are still, of 

course, many challenges over the horizon: the future of our aircraft 

carrier force, the size of the future amphibious assault ship force, 

and the Ohio submarine replacement program—something that I 

was discussing this morning in our other larger committee hearing. 

Given the Navy’s budget projections, can all of these challenges be 
3 

met—the aircraft carrier force, the amphibious assault ship force, 

and the Ohio submarine replacement program? 

For the Air Force, I am pleased it was able to protect the new 

bomber program and the KC–46 tanker. However, the Air Force is 

taking risk in other areas, including retiring more C–130s, especially those at Pope Army Airfield in North Carolina, which is located at Fort Bragg, and a large number of the older tactical fighter and reconnaissance aircraft. 

With regard to the 440th, I want to particularly cite an article 

that appeared in the statewide newspaper, the Raleigh News & Observer, just yesterday with regard to the 440th Airlift Wing’s medical training flight that they describe. And their reference is, of 

course, in this article, talking about the proposal with the Air Force 

being proposed before Congress to deactivate the 440th Airlift Wing 

at Pope Army Airfield, which would send 11 of the C–130s to other 

bases. 

As this states, the 440th has provided airlift, airdrop, and medical support from Fort Bragg in Fayetteville, and all of the airmen 

training Monday of this week had been deployed overseas at least 

once. Last year the 440th moved more than 500,000 pounds of 

cargo, 3,400 passengers, and 13,000 paratroopers, working with a 

combination of both Active Duty and Reserve personnel. 

We know that with the expansion at Fort Bragg under the last 

BRAC [Base Closure and Realignment] proceedings and the large 

investment that this Congress has made at Fort Bragg, it seems 

very, very unfortunate, and we feel like very unwise, to suddenly 

pull out the very support group with the Air Force that helps the 

mission at Fort Bragg be carried forward. 

I would hope to hear the witnesses’ thoughts on these types of 

topics. 

Also, we know that the DOD [Department of Defense] has chosen 

to focus on potential conflicts where our Navy and Air Force will 

lead in terms of providing rapid response in combat power; yet, at 

the same time there is a proposal to reduce the size of the Army 

up to 150,000 troops by 2019. When we consider sequestration and 

all the concerns that go with it, the concern is, will the savings 

that are supposed to result from those reductions in the Army— 

would they be properly reinvested in Navy and Air Force capabilities, or would it just be money to help sustain what the Navy and 

Air Force need to continue? 

The question is, are we going to be able to plan for the next-generation technologies, as well, and I would like to hear witnesses’ 

thoughts with regard to what the Navy and Air Force are pursuing 

in this budget request. Are those the right technologies for us to 

continue to focus on? 

In other words, are we correct in investing heavily in cyber, unmanned systems, directed energy, and electronic warfare programs? Are they going to be able to be sustained with the work 

that needs to be done for us to plan properly and adequately for 

the future for our national security and for helping our men and 

women in uniform do the work that they have committed to do? 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I thank you and we look forward to 

today’s testimony. 

Mr. FORBES. Mike, thank you. 
4 

And I think all the members have the biographies for both of our 

distinguished witnesses today, and we appreciate both of you being 

here. We appreciate the written testimony that you have already 

given to us, which is going to be made a part of the record, without 

objection. 

And now, Admiral, we look forward to any remarks that you 

might want to offer to the committee. 

STATEMENT OF ADM ROBERT J. NATTER, USN (RET.), 

R.J. NATTER & ASSOCIATES, LLC 

Admiral NATTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

McIntyre. 

It is my pleasure to appear before you all today. I am honored 

to be able to offer my independent assessment of the fiscal year 

2015 budget, especially as it pertains to the Navy and naval forces. 

First and foremost, I am very thankful for having had the opportunity to serve my country—36 years of commissioned service in 

the Navy and 1 year enlisted service. And my wife and I are very 

proud that our three daughters chose to serve this country as part 

of the Navy, two still serving. And I can assure you that they provide, as do their friends, a very blunt, straightforward assessment 

of their views and their generation’s perspective on our military. 

Today our country enjoys a superior military force. Thank you to 

our citizens, who have made the necessary sacrifices, and the succeeding generations to make that possible, especially on behalf of 

the representatives in succeeding administrations who have represented our people. 

The leadership and national will to invest in ensuring that this 

country has the best military possible has resulted in unparalleled 

quality shipbuilding and aircraft manufacturing. Anyone has to 

just look around the world to see the competition and know that 

that is the case. 

As a representative of dedicated and talented youth who man our 

ships and aircraft, I would be remiss if I didn’t recognize the 

undersung heroes who work in our ship repair facilities, shipyards, 

and aircraft manufacturing facilities around this great country of 

ours. 

We have been through a decade—more than a decade—of continuous war footing in Iraq and Afghanistan and elsewhere overseas. 

With the anticipated withdrawal of our forces in Afghanistan, it is 

obvious that this country and our elected representatives have chosen to retrench as a military, but not, hopefully, as a nation. 

And as this committee is well aware, the United States Navy is 

certainly not retrenching; we are continuing to operate and deploy 

around the world at the same levels as our forces had to do prior 

to OEF [Operation Enduring Freedom] and OIF [Operation Iraqi 

Freedom], and that is with a significant reduction in the numbers 

of ships, crews, and aircraft that we enjoyed during that period. 

The result is, of course, running ships, wearing our aircraft down, 

and extending deployments of our men and women on our ships at 

sea. 

Needless to say, our nation and the Joint Forces commanders 

will continue to rely on the Navy and the Marine Corps and all our 
5 

services to be able to respond to a range of military operations 

worldwide. 

Needless to say, we are an international trading community 

today—this country and a lot of other of our allies. They depend 

on freedom of the seas to move markets to and from this country 

and around the world, and without the confidence of our allies and 

trading partners in our ability to keep those sea routes open and 

free, our economy and our markets would be affected negatively. 

We obviously have to prepare for the various contingency risks 

around the world. And in that regard, I agree wholeheartedly with 

the CNO’s assessment that the Navy will be at high risk and not 

able to prevail in all warfare areas against a near peer force. 

And let me be specific about that. He is talking about China and 

Russia. Make no mistake about that: They are a near peer force 

and we would be at risk with the funding and with the forces that 

we have available to us now and in the future. 

The challenge facing the U.S. Navy is budgetary uncertainty in 

the near term and a threat of the return to the potentially disastrous sequestration funding levels after 2015. Essentially, if we go 

back to BCA [Budget Control Act] funding levels the Navy will not 

be able to provide the force levels, the readiness levels that have 

been projected and provided to you in this morning’s hearing. 

I think the CNO has made the case for that and I fully agree 

with that. 

The big elephant at the door was mentioned by Congressman 

McIntyre. That is the Ohio replacement [SSBN–X]. 

That replacement is going to require such a huge chunk of our 

SCN [Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy] funding that our industrial base and the ships that we are able to deploy in the future 

is not going to be worth the paper it is written on. Unless there 

is external funding made available for the Ohio-class replacement, 

our SCN line and the ships that we are able to project out into the 

future are not going to be in accordance with the 30-year shipbuilding plan that you have seen. 

Aircraft will also be affected if we return to the funding that we 

are talking about, with 111 fewer aircraft procured in the FYDP 

[Future Years Defense Program]. We obviously, I agree with the 

Secretary and the CNO that we are going to have to rein in the 

significant growth of medical expenses, housing stipends, and subsistence payments for our people. And retirement remuneration 

and copays ought to be part of that reassessment. 

Having said that, the military makes up 1 percent of this nation’s population today, and I believe that those kinds of adjustments need to be made across the board. There needs to be shared 

sacrifice in our society and not just sacrifice on the part of our men 

and women in uniform. 

The people with whom I have spoken on active duty today are 

willing to step up. They understand the budget constraints of this 

nation and they are willing to sacrifice. They would like to be doing 

it with the rest of our nation and not all alone. 

Lastly, let me just say that I have discussed not only with the 

junior people in the Navy but also our leadership, and I am quite 

frankly dismayed and disappointed by the repeated reports of untoward behavior, to include violent sexual assaults, and significant 
6 

shortcomings on the part of some of our military leaders. My discussion with the CNO and our other senior leaders is that they 

need to be held accountable, the letter of the law needs to be 

upheld, and the rest of our people need to know that that is not 

going to be allowed and permitted in this Navy today. 

With that, sir, I would like to conclude my remarks. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Natter can be found in the 

Appendix on page 23.] 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Admiral. 

Dr. Grant. 

STATEMENT OF DR. REBECCA GRANT, PRESIDENT, IRIS 

INDEPENDENT RESEARCH 

Dr. GRANT. Thank you, first of all, for the opportunity to testify. 

I am glad that the committee today is looking for some independent assessments because I think the committee has a special 

responsibility to look at the fiscal year 2015 defense budget in light 

of the changes in the international security environment. As we see 

daily, we are not in the world of 5 years ago, where stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan were our top concerns. What we see 

today are signals of instability ranging from the East China Sea to 

the Crimea. 

I will confine my remarks primarily to those Air Force systems 

that are key to projection of forces. And as we know, Americans 

have long counted on air superiority to make all other forms of 

military force most efficient and most effective. 

And in looking across this budget, I see that we have an opportunity to consider whether we can really take some steps to diminish risk and produce a budget that better meets our national security needs. 

Specifically for me, my number one concern is that we prepare 

and posture and equip for a strong deterrent stance in the Pacific. 

Specifically, this means being able to retain air superiority and sea 

superiority and that freedom of maneuver even if forces of China 

or another adversary—potential adversary—adopt a confrontational 

stance. China is not the only major power in the Pacific nor around 

the world, but if we prepare for a strong deterrent posture there 

then we get our capability right for most of our global needs. 

Freedom of action in the Pacific demands some highly sophisticated air forces that can operate with impunity on an arch from 

Australia to the Aleutians, and so looking across this budget I have 

a few specific concerns. 

I am glad to say, I think the Air Force has it largely right in its 

top three priorities with—of F–35, KC–46, and the long-range 

strike bomber. Although it is outside the scope of this committee, 

let me just say very briefly about F–35 that that, too, is part of 

power projection for our joint forces and is very important to continue to procure and to increase procurement rights to give us a 

solid capability with a fifth-gen system. 

KC–46 I am glad to see is proceeding on course. Without tankers 

we do not have global air power; in fact, we really do not have global military power. 

And of course, the new stealth bomber is rightly a top priority. 

Why? Because there is no other system in the inventory of our 
7 

partner services or of our allies that can provide that rapid, precise 

strike capability against some of potentially the most dangerous 

targets with the greatest possibility to threaten the international 

security system. 

We are already short in our bomber force, and it is old, as the 

committee well knows. We need to go ahead and procure. 

That said, there are three issues that I think the committee 

might want to think of going forward on the bomber. 

The first of these is, in my personal opinion, overclassification. 

And this can be a risk not only to the proper public debate about 

such a major acquisition, but overclassification of a program can 

also restrict the technical work and crossflow that the prime contractors must go through to produce an adequate system. 

We know that there will be systems on that bomber that should 

always remain highly classified, but I think the committee might 

want to reconsider the stance on whether this program should remain in the black. In my opinion, it should not. 

Second, is the technology scope right for this bomber? We want 

to keep the costs controlled but we also want to have a bomber that 

is right for a 40-year service life, a period of time in which we may 

see the addition of new electronic countermeasures, directed-energy 

weapons, hypersonic missiles, many technologies that require the 

space, power, appropriate engines, and cooling to make this possible going forward. 

Third is quantity. Even back in Desert Storm in 1991 we deployed 66 bombers, so 80 to 100 is on the short end of what we will 

need. We may want to consider going for more in the end. 

Finally, I want to make some remarks about the industrial base. 

In the 1950s we had 54 major aircraft program starts across the 

fixed-wing inventory for the Air Force and the Navy; in the decade 

of the 2000s we had just nine. What that means most of all is that 

the key of our industrial base, which is people, are finding it more 

difficult to gain the experience across multiple programs. 

Going forward, what we need in the industrial base really are 

four things: We need qualified tier-one suppliers; we need critical 

design skills preserved within the design teams—everything from 

pyrotechnics for the cockpit on to structures, et cetera; we need to 

have program managers who are experienced across a range of programs and able to execute from design right through the end of the 

lifecycle; and finally, we need to have that robust series of starts, 

and particularly, a focus on advanced engine technology, which in 

the end is what often separates our Air Force from its peer competitors. 

With that, I would like to close my opening statement and I look 

forward to your questions. Thank you again for the opportunity. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Grant can be found in the Appendix on page 33.] 

Mr. FORBES. Dr. Grant, thank you so much. 

And to both of you, if we were talking about an athletic event 

and we were walking in here today and we were talking about athletic teams we would—and this were the gymnasium, we would 

look around and we would have all these wonderful banners about 

what our military has done; we would look at the team on the floor 
8 

and we would say, Admiral, kind of as you did, ‘‘They are the best 

in the world.’’ 

But for both of you, looking at the budgets that have been set 

forth here and projecting out 5 years or 10 years down the road, 

what is the part of it that gives you the greatest heartburn as to 

what you see? 

Because, Admiral, you have had to meet those demands before. 

You know what it is like. 

And, Doctor, you are looking at that industrial base every day 

and watching it wither away. 

What concerns you most about what you are seeing? 

Admiral NATTER. Well, I think it is blatantly obvious that our investment accounts in our military are on the downslope, and nations like China and Russia, their investment accounts are on the 

upslope. So there is going to be a meeting of those slopes. 

In real terms, what that means to us is that we are deploying 

our ships more frequently than we did even before OIF and OEF, 

when the rule was essentially 6-month deployments. Today it is not 

uncommon to have 7- and 8-month deployments. And the new Fleet 

Response Plan that is presented, which I think is a good one, given 

the assets that we have, is going to result in 8- or 9-month deployments. 

But the more those assets are used and flowed forward so that 

8 and 9 months become the rule, then the exception is going to 

pretty quickly come to a year. And with that, people are not going 

to stay with us and our ships and aircraft are going to get worn 

out. 

We saw that in an era between Vietnam and between 9/11, when 

we actually had to tie up ships alongside the pier. Many of you remember that. And investments and readiness eventually turned 

that around, but we don’t want to go there again. 

So to me it is blatantly obvious what is happening here, and the 

number of force levels are going down but the demands on those 

force levels are remaining constant, and in the case of the Pacific, 

probably going up. 

Mr. FORBES. Dr. Grant. 

Dr. GRANT. I agree. And I would say there are two things that 

concern me. The number one concern is we are, certainly within 

the Air Force, developing advanced aircraft but not procuring them 

in quantities sufficient to meet the threats that are on the very 

near-term horizon. 

We are not procuring new fighters quickly enough, and although 

we have a bomber program now, you will recall this is a program 

that has started in embryonic ways, stopped, and restarted, and we 

are already late-to-need in the procurement for long-range strike. 

So I am concerned that we are not modernizing our combat air 

forces quickly enough and substantially enough. 

A secondary and related concern goes to the readiness and training. The effects of sequestration have made a dent in the training 

of the long-term force and those younger aviators who have missed 

certain training evolutions that that force simply cannot get back. 

If we continue to oscillate in our funding of flying hours we may 

impose long-term quality shortfalls on the U.S. Air Force that really would be unacceptable. 
9 

Mr. FORBES. And, Doctor, when you talk about the risk of not 

modernizing, we hear that phrase a lot but what does that mean? 

What kind of risk are we assuming? 

Dr. GRANT. We are not buying enough aircraft to face down and 

deter a potential peer adversary in the Pacific. Let me be specific: 

We are not buying enough aircraft to overmatch China in the 

Pacific. 

Mr. FORBES. So we had testimony in this subcommittee by Admiral Lehman and Gary Roughead probably a year or so ago where 

they talked about a tipping point, where the United States, as we 

continue to drop our military spending, it would actually encourage 

peer competitors to start increasing theirs to catch us. They felt we 

were already there. What do you feel about that? 

Dr. GRANT. If only we really knew. But I would have to agree, 

we are close to being—we are too close to feel comfortable with 

where we are. 

I think our—we are just now beginning to focus on preparing for 

that theater. We need to focus on it very sharply because we want 

to deter, and to deter means we cannot allow a gap to open up in 

our capabilities. 

I do not think that our competition with China is like our former 

competition with the former Soviet Union, where it was a case of 

matching forces one-for-one. China has natural advantages in geography. We need a force big enough and strong enough to make sure 

that China doesn’t feel comfortable taking risks and pushing out in 

that theater. And in that case, I think we are far too close to the 

tipping point to be comfortable. 

Mr. FORBES. Admiral, you have had to meet these needs of our 

combatant commanders before. We are hearing a lot today about 

perhaps reducing the number of carriers down from 11 to 10. 

Could you just give us your thoughts on how crucial it is to have 

those 11 carriers, or if you think it is crucial? And secondly, in the 

area of munitions, how crucial is that and where do you see us 

with this budget? 

Admiral NATTER. Yes, sir. Mr. Chairman, as you know, the commander of Pacific Command has testified on the requirement for 

carriers in his theater. I can assure you that the commander of 

Central Command will also echo that requirement. 

There are certainly not enough carriers to satisfy the demands 

of all our combatant commanders. They have all testified to that 

point. 

The issue and the quandary is, how many are enough? And unfortunately, we really can’t say the answer to that question until 

post-hostilities. 

Having said that, every one of our combatant commanders have 

testified, and certainly the Chief of Naval Operations has testified 

that 11 is just barely sufficient to satisfy the need, and it doesn’t 

fully satisfy the need of all the combatant commanders. 

So going from 11 to 10 and eliminating a capital ship like this 

halfway through its life is irresponsible on the part of our citizens. 

And I think if our citizens had the vote on this and they knew 

what the tradeoffs were that they would ensure that this national 

asset was funded. 
10 

The aircraft that go with it, the ability to project power, and the 

ability to prevent the kinds of action that Dr. Grant was referring 

to out in the Pacific theater are important. And so the fact that we 

are talking about going to 10 carriers and the ability to flow far 

fewer assets than we have been able to in the past puts us at 

greater risk. 

The CNO has testified that against a peer competitor, two mission areas are at high risk. I think the slope of that curve is obvious. 

Mr. FORBES. And if both of you could just address your worry, 

if any, on munitions? 

Admiral NATTER. On munitions, there is a requirement for more 

advanced munitions, and on the part of the Navy, a better surfaceto-surface capability. I know the commander of Pacific Command is 

well aware of that. We have had discussions about that. The Navy 

is investing in that. 

The depth of our munitions is an issue. We are okay in some 

areas. We need more in the way of more precision and more highly 

capable munitions. And of course, a lot of that is dependent upon 

the threat and the potential adversary, but I think against a highend [threat] there is no doubt that we need greater investment in 

munitions. 

Mr. FORBES. Dr. Grant, your thoughts? 

Dr. GRANT. I agree. We probably have enough Mark 83 bomb 

bodies in the inventory, but I doubt we have enough of much of 

anything else across the spectrum. 

We see in every conflict a shortage of some type of crucial munition. In the Kosovo conflict of 1999 it was a shortage of JDAMs 

[Joint Direct Attack Munition] and they had to be rushed through 

production. This happens to us every time. 

The difference in a peer conflict will be that we won’t have the 

luxury of time to spin up production lines, rush munitions, trade 

them between theaters, move them between ships, move them from 

ships to airbases and airbases to ships. We need to have in place 

in theater a wide range of munitions—the correct air-to-air munitions; we need to have, if we may count them as such, munitions 

such as THAAD [Terminal High Altitude Area Defense] and 

Patriot. 

These need to be where they need to be before the crisis starts. 

That is crucial to giving our policymakers options as we face a potential peer competitor. 

Almost part two of this is the imperative to invest in our more 

sophisticated range of munitions—JASSM [Joint Air-to-Surface 

Standoff Missile]; LRASM [Long Range Anti-Ship Missile]; the 

more sophisticated air-to-air and dual-role air-to-air, air-to-ground 

munitions that we see coming. These are expensive options to start 

with. It is painful to put them into a budget at any time, particularly now. Yet it is that munition that in the end does the job. 

It is like the tires on your car. That is the only thing that is in 

contact with the road. In the end, that munition is what is in contact with the adversary target. This is not an area that we can 

skimp. 

Mr. FORBES. And do both of you agree that in the past we have 

been short munitions but we have had the luxury, as, I think, Dr. 
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Grant, you mentioned, to ramp those up because of the adversaries 

we were facing, but in a near competitor situation we would not 

have that luxury? And if that—you do agree with that, where do 

you see this budget taking us in terms of the munitions gap? 

Admiral NATTER. Well, the focus and emphasis on the part of the 

Navy, of course, is replacing old ships and older aircraft. And with 

the BCA [Budget Control Act] and then the BBA [Bipartisan Budget Act], the funding to reach down and replace those munitions and 

restore the kinds of advanced munitions that Dr. Grant addressed 

is—the money is not there. 

They are doing it with some development areas. I will tell you, 

I have had this discussion, I know the fleet commanders have been 

straightforward about wanting to get some decent surface-tosurface missile capability on the LCS. There are some obvious missiles that can be put on that ship in the near term, and the Navy 

needs to get off the dime and get on with it. 

Hellfire is the perfect example of a missile that Navy has in its 

inventory. The Army literally has thousands of them. The Navy 

puts them on their seaborne helicopters today. 

I think that some sort of missile system and an anti-air capability on the LCS would go a long way to having the fleet commanders better embrace that ship. That can be done quickly—certainly much more quickly than it is being done today. 

Mr. FORBES. Good. 

Dr. Grant. 

Dr. GRANT. I agree. I think this budget may not have looked 

carefully enough at what we really need to prepare for a peer 

threat. It is something we are all hoping won’t happen, but we— 

this is the defense planning cycle. We must look for capacity. And 

this is true, again, with munitions. 

It is very tempting to cut or stretch or delay. A lot of early munitions work is done in basic research accounts or in classified programs, where it is hard to look at what is truly going on. 

But I think we see this temptation to stretch and skimp. We are 

all hoping not to have to use these things, but you would—but unless you have that capacity then the purchase of the platforms is— 

you know, is—why would you do it anyway? 

And this is something that is easy to get right. It is easy to get 

the munitions inventory correct. 

We hear all the time, ‘‘You don’t want to be Winchester,’’ in this 

environment, and it is easy to prevent that. So I think we need to 

continue the investment both in getting the correct inventories, positioning them correctly, and in the advanced—the suite of advanced munitions for a range of platforms and services. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you. 

And I would like to recognize Congressman McIntyre for any 

questions he might have. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you again to our witnesses. 

Admiral Natter, on pages three and four of your testimony and 

then you also just orally referred to the concern about the Air 

Force—I mean, sorry, the aircraft carrier force structure being reduced in the Navy with the current proposal. If this happens—and 

I think we are in agreement with you, we do not want it to hap-
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pen—but if it were to happen, how would we mitigate, would you 

recommend, the shortfall in our day-to-day presence overseas? I 

know it is all about force projection, and with the concern of losing 

one of our carriers such as the USS George Washington, what 

would you say we could do to mitigate that loss? 

Admiral NATTER. Well, the loss of that carrier would result primarily in the ability to flow forces beyond the two-carrier presence 

that the CNO is providing the theater commanders. 

In the case of Pacific Command, we have the forward-deployed 

carrier that is generally available on short notice. We also have one 

always deployed out in that theater or over in the Central Command theater that can flow quickly into the Pacific Command theater if required. 

The challenge will be the flow of additional carriers into the theater should a contingency erupt in North Korea, with respect to the 

islands, or with respect to any incident in the South China Sea. 

Today the Navy is able to flow three carriers in addition to the two 

in theater. 

That won’t be an option should we go down to 10 carriers. So 

that is going to be the shortcoming. 

The reality is in order to provide a carrier’s worth of aircraft, 

strike capability 24 hours a day, you need two decks to do that for 

any extended period of time because flight deck crews, pilots, ships 

need to sleep occasionally. And so with a two-carrier capability providing one 24-hour cycle of assets, that is not sufficient firepower 

with the kinds of challenges that we are talking about in the Pacific theater. 

So there is going to be an obvious and I think a negative impact 

on our ability to provide the forces necessary that this nation depends on. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Yes, sir. I agree with you. 

Now, also on page 5 of your testimony you refer to the 52-ship 

smaller surface combatant requirements, and in looking at your 

comments there you talk about the unmatched capability that we 

need to have with the LCS program, but it does not mean, you say, 

that every ship needs to possess 360-degree defense and offense supremacy. So is your recommendation that if we are under—and I 

know the DOD has given some instructions about this with regard 

to Littoral Combat Ships—that modification or making sure that 

we keep the same number if at all possible but just making modifications on the ships themselves if we do not have the financial 

wherewithal to do what we would like to do ideally on all 52 of 

them? 

Admiral NATTER. Yes, sir. As I testified just a few minutes ago, 

I think there needs to be some surface and surface-to-air capability 

on those ships yesterday. I think that can be done quickly and 

ought to be. 

These ships are necessary for the Navy to fulfill its mission in 

things like antipiracy patrols. They are going to be a far superior 

ship for the mine warfare mission. I was on a minesweeper as an 

ensign and JG [junior grade] and I can tell you that the ability to 

sustain mine warfare operations for a long period of time is going 

to be much more capable on the LCS than it ever thought of being 
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on its predecessor mine warfare ships. It also will deliver some significant ASW [anti-submarine warfare] capability. 

So for the level zero, level one contingency kinds of requirements 

of our combatant commanders today, these are good ships. And 

they are going to grow and they are going to be better as technology comes in. 

The alternative, of course, is to have even fewer ships to be able 

to deploy to the combatant commanders for things like antipiracy, 

for things like mine warfare, and ASW, and working with our allies 

and friends in the Southeast Asia theater. These are perfect ships 

for that theater. 

So I support the ship. I would like to see a little more kill power 

on them. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Right. Thank you, sir. 

Dr. Grant, just quickly in the few moments I have left, the Air 

Force, of course, as you have well cited in your testimony orally 

and written, is cutting hundreds of aircraft in the 5-year budget 

plan. In terms of future technology, do you think the Air Force is 

investing in the right things and do you think that the claim of the 

Air Force to be cutting these aircraft because it wants to protect 

its top three programs—the new F–35, the new bomber, and the 

KC–46 tanker—are the proper priorities with the limited sources 

of funding available? 

Dr. GRANT. Yes, Congressman, I think that is their intent. I 

think they are trying to cut in order to reach a force structure of 

the future. 

The question, though, is the risk of executing that plan, and I 

will be more comfortable with taking the lump of the cuts when I 

see that the funding for those top priorities is really stable in there 

and that they are procuring them in the quantities required. So I 

share a little bit of a wait-and-see concern, but I think that at this 

point in time, while there are many cuts on this map of the U.S. 

that make me cringe and where I think, ‘‘Oh, I would cut, but 

maybe I wouldn’t have cut that particular unit—’’ 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Right. Right. 

Dr. GRANT. I think overall this could be the right step as long 

as it is done carefully. 

You asked about future technology investment and mentioned 

earlier directed energy and some other things. I think these are absolutely vital. 

We have, in the past few years, have seen advances in 

hypersonics and directed energy in particular, and some other aspects of electronic warfare, that have really made breakthroughs 

that we have looked for for a long time, and I would like to see 

these continued. I applaud the Air Force’s investment in adaptive 

engine technology, which is long and complicated but absolutely essential to next-generation combat aircraft and to more rapid response through that advanced engine technology. 

I cannot stress enough, too, that it is those advanced engines 

that our U.S. companies make that truly separate us from our competitors. 

So I hope this committee will look carefully and make sure that 

we are continuing the investments. Something like directed energy, 

which, in fact, the Navy is deploying this summer on a ship, this 
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sort of thing has the potential to be quite revolutionary, both in defensive—as a defensive and as an offensive weapon system, and I 

would like to see the Air Force encouraged to continue its thoughts 

and experiments as to how directed energy and other advanced 

technologies go on both its current and its future platforms. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Courtney is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I thank the witnesses for their very powerful testimony. 

You know, I think it is important sometimes to remember the 

Budget Control Act is not like we are helpless in front of it, and 

sequestration to boot. The historical precedent of sequestration in 

the 1990s and early 2000s, when Congress came together on a bipartisan basis with a balanced package of deficit reduction, turned 

off those chainsaws that were put into place with Gramm-Rudman. 

And if you, you know, look at Gramm-Rudman’s own words at 

the time, I mean, that was exactly the intended purpose; it was not 

to actually have those mechanisms actually go into effect. But, you 

know, sometimes I think we need to be reminded of what the damage will be, and that is what certainly your very outstanding testimony today is going to hopefully point this Congress in that direction. 

Admiral, I want to first of all thank you for your comments on 

page five about the Navy’s investment in modernization of the 

cruisers and three amphibious ships. I think the chairman deserves 

some credit for sort of resisting the push to totally retire those 

cruisers in past years, and I think we have actually found a better, 

smarter way to sort of deal with this issue. And your input, I think, 

is very constructive in that score. 

Earlier in your testimony you talk, again, about the 600-pound 

gorilla that is sitting out there with SSBN–X, and again, this came 

up with Secretary Hagel last week, and this morning with the Secretary of Navy and Admiral Greenert. 

You know, it is not that far off that we are looking at the bulge 

that production is going to cause to the budget, and, I mean, you 

mentioned sort of external assistance to the Navy’s budget as a solution to it. Maybe you want to talk about that a little bit more in 

terms of whether it is a separate account or whether we just enlarge the Navy’s piece of the pie? 

Admiral NATTER. Well, I would take either option, sir, but the reality is this is a strategic national asset that is absolutely essential 

to the survival of this country. It needs to be put on a side. I know 

the Navy has said it is absolutely essential. It is the baseline of 

their sand chart that says, ‘‘You cut other things before you cut the 

Ohio replacement.’’ 

I agree with that. We can’t afford not to fund Ohio replacement. 

The reality, though, is it is about $6 billion a year for about 13 

years in the SCN budget, which today is only between $11 billion 

and $14 billion. So if the administration and the Congress insist on 

funding it out of the SCN account then you start picking shipyards 

to close down that are currently engaged in building amphibious 

ships, destroyers, cruisers, the submarine, the SSNs will go down 

in numbers. 
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Something has got to give here. My take on it is this is a national requirement and it ought to be funded in some way other 

than through the Navy’s SCN line. That is up to Congress. You are 

a lot smarter than I am on that, but that is my going in proposition, sir. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Well, thank you for the compliment. I am not 

sure all of us would regard—your testimony is very helpful and, 

you know, I think that is really, you know, an important mission 

for the Seapower Subcommittee to really start addressing now. So 

thank you for being here today. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Joe. 

And as I indicated to both witnesses beforehand, this is the time 

we would like to see if there is anything we have left out. Anything 

you need to clarify, we want to give you an opportunity to do that 

for the record. 

And, Admiral, as you begin that statement, if you could follow up 

on what Joe just mentioned about the cruisers. Tell us why the 

cruisers are important—what do they do and why it is important 

that we have those cruisers. 

Admiral NATTER. Yes, sir. I am glad you asked the question. I 

was commanding officer of one of those cruisers. Not the 11, but 

a cruiser. 

The reality is that the DDGs [guided missile destroyers] and the 

cruisers have comparable surface-to-air and anti-air capability—different capabilities, but the cruisers are older. The value of the 

cruisers, of course, is that if you update them, upgrade them, and 

ensure the HM&E [hull, mechanical, and electrical] is longlasting, 

it will go with the carrier. 

It has a much larger combat space where you can put what we 

refer to as the air defense commander, or alpha whiskey, to coordinate the air defense around the carrier and around the battle 

group. That is essential. You have got to have someone looking out 

for the entire problem rather than just the ship’s own self-defense 

and missile defense. So that is a great value of these assets. 

The challenge on the part of the Navy is the top line. They didn’t 

want to put these ships away. They need the force levels to satisfy 

the combatant commanders, and so this is not their idea. They 

have to satisfy that top line and stay within the budget constraints, 

and this is an innovative way, I think, to do that and still have 

these assets available if there is a national emergency. You can certainly bring those back into the force much faster than you can 

build a new ship. 

I would like to see something a little more gradual so that you 

are not putting them all at the end of the train, but I can understand the Navy’s rationale for doing that. This is strictly a matter 

of tradeoffs: What do you roll out in order to satisfy the top line? 

I can tell you that the cruisers may not be the last ships that 

have to go through this kind of an approach, primarily, again, because if we stay at the BCA levels all bets are off on all this—the 

cruisers, the carrier, you name it. And then you fold on top of that 

the Ohio-class replacement and the Navy as we know it today isn’t 

going to exist any longer. 
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Mr. FORBES. Admiral, could you tell us for the record exactly 

what cruisers do in terms of their muscle, and what would be the 

impact to the Navy of losing 11 cruisers? 

Admiral NATTER. Well, 11 cruisers, in addition to the significant 

air defense capability—being able to fire a good number of missiles 

out to protect not only themselves but also the amphibious ready 

group, the carrier battle group—also has the ability to launch some 

significant numbers of Tomahawk missiles. They have been used in 

prior engagements. They have been very valuable in that regard. 

If you don’t have those 11 cruisers then you are going to have 

to cycle DDGs more frequently on deployment in order to satisfy 

the requirements of those Tomahawks, of those air defense missile 

assets. 

The presence. I think we have all seen the movie, or many of us 

have seen the movie, about the SS Alabama and Captain Phillips. 

None of that is even remotely possible without ships on station— 

conventional U.S. Navy ships that the SEALs went aboard and operated from. Without some capable asset out there, none of that is 

possible. 

So we as a nation can forget about it. We can forget about putting off these pirates, getting them under control. And that will affect the sea lines; that will affect the economy; that will affect the 

markets. 

Mr. FORBES. Dr. Grant. 

Dr. GRANT. Thank you. 

Just three points. First, help hold the Air Force to its air dominance mission so that it acquires the jets and the munitions and 

funds the correct training to keep up this vitally important mission. 

Second, if I may jump into Admiral Natter’s area, perhaps, and 

make a comment quickly about carriers: It was tempting to shave 

a carrier off when we looked at them primarily for—as extra bombdroppers in permissive airspace. Carriers going forward will provide not just extra bombs on target, but air dominance, additional 

surveillance, tactical relay and communications—missions we have 

rarely tapped them for at the level we may have to in the Pacific. 

Recall that in 2001, when Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan began, four carriers were sent. Three provided air superiority; the fourth was stripped of its air wings save for a few F– 

18s and stuffed with a lot of funny-looking black Army special ops 

helicopters. 

So a carrier is an airfield of amazing flexibility. This is no time 

to be talking about getting rid of aircraft carriers. 

Third and final point, if I may say, this is about our two strategic 

programs coming up. One, of course, is the Ohio class, and the 

other is the long-range strike bomber. 

I think we ought to, as a nation, look at both of them as important strategic programs and consider whether they should not both 

be funded in a manner that is separate from the other ship-buying 

and aircraft-buying accounts of the day. This was, in fact, the case 

with both Freedom class when it was procured in the 1960s, and 

with Ohio class when it was procured in the 1980s. 
17 

So SSBN–X and LRS [long-range strike bomber] ought to both be 

looked at for what they truly are—that is, incomparable strategic 

systems which no other service nor ally can duplicate. 

Thank you. 

Mr. FORBES. We have been joined by Mr. Langevin. 

And, Jim, do you have any questions? 

If so, I would like to recognize Mr. Langevin for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will submit my questions for the record, but I thank the witnesses for their testimony 

today. 

Thank you. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you. 

And we want to thank you both for being here today. We certainly appreciate your expertise, but most importantly, your willingness to share it with this committee. 

If we have no additional questions then we are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 2:58 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 12, 2014 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MARCH 12, 2014 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MARCH 12, 2014 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES 

Mr. FORBES. Could you briefly describe what you believe the Navy’s role to be in 

the coming years and whether you believe it is being properly resourced to meet the 

expected challenges? 

Admiral NATTER. The Navy’s role for the future will continue to be what it has 

done in the past since World War II. Simply put, its role will be to ensure the security of U.S. interests in an ever-expanding global economy and world in general. 

What has changed and evolved over the years is the increase in relative economic 

and military power, technological capabilities, and influence of other world powers. 

And therefore the challenge for our Navy will be to invest in the right technologies 

and the right ships and weapon systems while keeping the costs of those investments under control. As our nation has appropriately addressed the shift of its focus 

to Asia and the rising power and influence of China, our Navy’s overall power has 

reduced in real and relative terms. We are shifting Navy forces to Asia primarily 

because of our real reduction in Navy forces overall and the knowledge that the Pacific Fleet’s historic half of the Navy is now inadequate to meet the influence and 

power of a rising China’s influence and power. 

In summary, the Navy is not being adequately resourced to meet our nation’s potential challenges around the globe. 

Mr. FORBES. What is your sense as to the adequacy of the size of the current Navy 

fleet. Do you think the current ‘‘mix’’ of ships is correct? 

Admiral NATTER. I do not think the current and projected size of the Navy fleet 

is adequate to meet the challenges of our potential adversaries without increased 

risk at prevailing in sustained high end combat operations. In reality, the number 

of counter-ship weapons and the technological capabilities of our potential adversaries have increased in real and relative terms over the past 20 years. Therefore, 

our Navy’s ability to prevail must be assessed as at a higher risk than in the past. 

Given the recent reductions in SCN and APN funding for the Navy and the potential for a devastating reduction in those accounts if the Ohio replacement ship class 

is not funded with additional Congressionally directed appropriations, the Navy’s 

ship and aircraft numbers will reduce to a potentially national military strategy altering level. If that is the case, the United States will be unable to ensure its treaty 

and alliance commitments internationally and especially in Asia. The current mix 

of Navy ships is about right given the potential for the various force employments 

against possible adversaries. Having said that, the total number of ships is marginally adequate while future numbers, given sequestration funding, is alarming. 

Mr. FORBES. Admiral Locklear provided testimony last week to the House Armed 

Services Committee and provided the following information with regards to the potential reduction of an aircraft carrier, ‘‘You have about 10 [aircraft carriers] now. 

We can’t support the global demand.’’ He went on and said ‘‘One thing for sure, in 

my experience is that—that part of the U.S. global leadership is maritime dominance, where we choose to have it. And at the front of that maritime dominance, 

which starts to become very important, particularly in the world we’re in today, are 

the capabilities that aircraft carriers bring.’’ What is your assessment about a potential reduction in aircraft carrier force structure and the impact to the supporting 

combatant commander requirements? 

Admiral NATTER. I agree with Admiral Locklear’s testimony that the demand for 

our nation’s aircraft carriers continues to be high and sustained. The demand is not 

only in his Pacific theater of operations, but his Central Command counterpart has 

also been forceful in his requests for Carrier presence, especially in the northern Indian Ocean. The simple truth is that demand for aircraft carriers exceeds today’s 

available resources. The idea of not refueling USS George Washington and eliminating that carrier and its air wing is not smart. Our nation’s investment in this 

combat capability and the sustained demand for its presence in troubled parts of 

the world in support of our treaty and alliance partners necessitate refueling it. Not 

doing so will reduce the ability of our combatant commanders to fulfill their responsibilities. 

Mr. FORBES. Admiral Locklear provided testimony last week to the House Armed 

Services Committee and provided the following information with regards to the po-
44 

tential reduction of an aircraft carrier, ‘‘You have about 10 [aircraft carriers] now. 

We can’t support the global demand.’’ He went on and said ‘‘One thing for sure, in 

my experience is that—that part of the U.S. global leadership is maritime dominance, where we choose to have it. And at the front of that maritime dominance, 

which starts to become very important, particularly in the world we’re in today, are 

the capabilities that aircraft carriers bring.’’ What is your assessment about a potential reduction in aircraft carrier force structure and the impact to the supporting 

combatant commander requirements? 

Dr. GRANT. My research indicates 11 carriers are the minimum needed. Carrier 

numbers used in major conflicts were 6 for Operation Desert Storm in 1991, 4 for 

the start of Operation Enduring Freedom over Afghanistan in 2001, and 5 for Operation Iraqi Freedom major combat operations in 2003. The Coalition Air Component 

Commander tasked carriers supporting the Army during Operation Iraqi Freedom 

to provide up to 100 strike sorties per day. 

Pacific theater scenarios could require 9 or more carriers to provide fleet defense, 

24-hour operations with carriers alternating day and night cycles, air superiority 

and strike missions against sea and land targets. It is conceivable that three task 

forces of three carriers each might have to operate in three different locations in 

a major crisis. Carriers must be prepared to participate far more actively in countering adversary air threats in future scenarios. 

If up to nine carriers may be tasked for wartime operations, a fleet of 11 is the 

minimum to allow one or two carriers in overhaul and transit. 

The carriers are only as good as the planes on their flight decks. Sufficient F– 

35Cs to support joint tasking for defense, communications, ISR and strike are essential to carrier effectiveness, as is the E–2D Advanced Hawkeye. 

Mr. FORBES. If the Air Force is required to execute fiscal resources at Budget Control Act sequestration levels, what operational risk do you believe they will incur 

by having to divest the entire KC–10 tanker aircraft fleet? In your opinion, are 

there other force structure decisions that the Air Force could consider in lieu of divesting the KC–10 fleet prior to having sufficient tanker capacity with the addition 

of the new KC–46 tanker aircraft? 

Dr. GRANT. Divestiture of the KC–10 fleet imperils global reach and power projection missions. The KC–10 is newer and carries more fuel and cargo than the KC– 

135. Also, recent operations have shown that the KC–10 is often the preferred tanker for global bomber missions, for example, where multiple refuelings are required. 

The Air Force should retire some KC–135s rather than divest the KC–10 fleet prior 

to purchase of KC–46. 

Mr. FORBES. The Air Force has articulated that the F–35 Joint Strike Fighter, the 

new KC–46 tanker, and the new Long-Range Strike Bomber are its top three acquisition priorities and vital to emerging threats and capabilities. Do you agree with 

the Air Force’s priorities and do you believe there are any other areas that are critical Air Force capabilities that should be considered high-priority? 

Dr. GRANT. I agree with the Air Force’s top three priorities. Development of advanced air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles should be regarded as of equal importance. 

Mr. FORBES. In DOD’s fiscal year 2015 budget, there are many difficult decisions 

that had to be made in regards to curtailment or discontinuation of active production lines such as F/A–18s, Tomahawk Block IV missiles, and the closure of the C– 

17 production line last year. As it relates to considerations for preserving U.S. national industrial base capabilities, what industrial base capabilities do you assess 

to be vital or extremely important to U.S. national security objectives and capabilities? 

Dr. GRANT. Top priority should be given to work on new advanced military engines capable of variable cycle efficient supersonic thrust (supercruise) for fighter 

and bomber platforms. Progress in this area is essential to air dominance and is a 

unique, export-controlled area. 

Other priorities should include adapting fiber-optic lasers for battlefield applications; design work on the next fighter aircraft; hypersonic propulsion and vehicle 

bodies; disruptive energy sources; batteries; and longer-range missiles. 

Mr. FORBES. Do you believe the force structure for the Air Force and Department 

of the Navy, as laid out in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, is sufficient to 

meet the goals and objectives of the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance? 

Dr. GRANT. The force structure for the Air Force takes considerable risk because 

the 48 fighter squadrons contain many non-stealthy, legacy aircraft. Air Force fighter squadrons carry the weight of air superiority for joint forces whether in deterrence and shaping, crisis response, or major combat operations. Delayed and derailed modernization has hurt this force. At this time the force is not enough to ensure a comfortable margin of superiority in many Pacific theater scenarios. Purchase 
45 

of the F–35A at a rate of 80 per year is the only near-term way to decrease risk 

and correct the imbalance. Also, it is worth noting that the Active Component and 

Reserve Component Balance will place high demands on the Reserve Component 

fighter forces in the event of conflict. 

Likewise, the current bomber force assumes risk because only the 16 combatcoded B–2s are survivable enough for persistent, penetrating operations. The next 

generation bomber is essential to restore America’s global strike credibility and the 

steadying effect of deterrence which it brings. 

The Air Force’s force structure is also overbalanced with more MQ–9s than are 

needed going forward. 

The Department of the Navy force structure as spelled out in QDR 2014 also assumes risk. The total number of ships is lower than the 316 in the inventory on 

September 11, 2001. The QDR force structure wisely retains 11 aircraft carriers and 

92 large surface combatants. However, the total number of ships is reliant on 43 

small surface combatants including the 25 of the Littoral combat Ship. LCS was 

conceived almost two decades ago at a time when tactical concepts for the coastal 

areas were different and before challenges from a rising China and resurgent Russia. LCS is unlikely to prove as versatile as DDGs, for example, in the many different operating conditions and missions encountered around the globe. In the Pacific, and other regions, the large surface combatants such as DDGs are consistently 

tasked with a range of missions and form the core of warfighting capability. The 

QDR 2014 force structure falls short in preparing U.S. Navy forces to meet challenges at sea over the next 30 years. 

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