AT& T’s motion also included a motion to strike Gronc ki’s demand f or punitive 1 damag es [#6 at ¶ 3]. The issue is moot, however, be cause Gronc ki has withdrawn his re quest for punitive damag es [#12 at ¶ 3]. -1- P AUL G RONCK

I, P la in t if

f,
v. AT&T MOBILIT Y LLC,

Defendan t. UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE D ISTRIC T OF CO LU M BIA

Ci vi l A cti on 08 -02 01 6 (H HK)

M EM OR

AN DU M OP IN ION Paul Groncki bring s this action under sec tion 806 of the Corporate and Criminal Fr aud Ac c ounta bil ity Ac t of 20 02 (“ Sarb ane s- Oxle y ” or “ SOX ” ), 18 U. S.C. § 1 51 4A , a lle g ingthat hi s
e mpl oye r, AT & T M ob ili ty L L C ( “ AT & T” ) u

nla wf ull y te rm inate d h im i n r e ta liatio n f or his eng ag ement in ac tivity

protec ted under

SOX. AT& T moves to dismiss this suit on the g rounds th at( 1 ) G r o n c k i ’ s c l a i mi s b ar r e d b y re s ju dic ata , or (2) Gronc ki’s complaint failed to state a claim upon which r elief c ould be g rante d [#6]
. Upon consider ation of the motion, the 1 opposition t here to, and the re cord of this case, the Court c oncludes that the motion should be g rante d. I. BACKG ROUND Gronc ki worked f

or AT& T as a site se lection spec ialist unti l his termination onB e c a us e thi s is a

mot ion to d ism iss , th e fa c ts a

re dr awn fr om t he c omp la int
. 2 -2- September 15, 2007. As a site sele ction specia list, Groncki was re sponsible for see king out ne w 2 loc atio ns fo r A T& T r e ta il s tor e s and de ve lop ingthe le a se te rm s f or tho se loc atio ns . The re levant fa cts in this case a rose while G roncki wa s involved in neg otiations reg arding a potential re tail store in Washington, D.C. Gronc ki opposed the propose d rea l estate tra nsaction
and he state s th at he vo ic e d c on c e rn s to his su pe rv iso rs that th e tr ans a c tio n amou nte d to fr a ud ule nt a c tiv ity . H e wa s su bs e qu e ntl y

te rm inate d. Gr on c ki a lle g e s th at hi s a c tio ns in t ry ingto curta il the transac tion constitut ed prote cted a ctivity under se ction 806 of Sarba nes-Oxley

and that his termination was a dire ct re sult of this protected ac tivity . After his termination, Groncki filed a complaint with the United States Oc cupational Saf ety and He alth Administration (“OSHA” ) alleg ing that he was unla

wfully terminated in re taliation for ac tivity protec ted by

SOX. As pr ov ide d b y

SOX , th e re su lti ngpr oc e e din gwa s g ov e rn e d b y the pr oc e dure s se t out in 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(4). See18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2) (A) ( “An a ction under pa ragraph ( 1)(A) shall be g overne d under the rules and pr ocedur es set for th in section 42121(b) of title 49, United States Code.”). Under this sec tion, a person who be lieves he ha s been unla wfully discharg ed may file a c omplaint with the Depar tment of L abor a

nd an administrative pr ocee ding w ill ensue. 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b). This section also provides f or judicial re view of the final administrative order in an appr opriate United States Court of Appea ls. 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(4) (“ Any person adver sely aff ecte d or ag g rieve d by

an orde r issued under

para g raph ( 3) may

obtain revie w of the
or de r i n th e Un ite d St ate s Co ur t of Ap pe a ls f

or the c ir c uit

in whic h th e vio latio n, wi th r e sp e c t to which the or der w as issued, alleg edly occur red or the circ uit in which the complainant re sided on the date of

such violation.”). SOX a lso provides that if the Secr etar y does not resolve the-3-

complaint within 180 day s, the complainant may seek r esolution of the claim(s) in fede ral district court. See18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1) (“Aperson who a lleg es dischar g e or othe r discrimination by
an y p er s o ni nv i o l at i o no f s u

b s ec t i o n(a ) m ay

s ee k re l i ef un d er s u b s ec t i o n(c ), b y

– (A ) f i l i n g a complaint with the Secre tary of L abor; or ( B) if the Secr etar y has not issued a fina l decision wi thi n 1 80 da

y s o f t he fi lin gof

the c omp la int

and the re is n o s ho wi ngthat su c h d e lay is d ue to the bad f aith of the c laimant, bring ing a n action at law

or equity for de novo revie w in the appropr iate district cour

t of the United States, which sha ll have jurisdiction over suc h an ac tion without reg ard to the a

mount in controversy”). OSHA dismissed Groncki’s c omplaint on Febr uary 20, 2008. There afte r, Gronc ki appea led the dismissal to the Depar tment of L abor O ffice of Administrative L aw Judge s and reque sted a for

mal hear ing be fore an administrative law judge as conte mplated by 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b). A f

ormal hea ringwas c onducted on June 9-10, 2008, duringwhich both par ties prese nted testimony , evidenc e, and or al ar g uments. On September 17, 2008, the administrative law judg e dismissed the complaint. The dismissal order beca me final on Oc tober 10, 2008. Gronc ki did not appeal the f inal decision to an a

ppropriate United States Court of Appea ls as permitted by

18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2) (A) a nd 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(4). Instead, on Oc tober 15, 2008, Gr oncki filed a Notice of Filingin Fede ral Court with the De pa rtme nt o f L a

bo r O ff ic e of Ad min istrativ e L aw Jud g e s in dic atin ghis int e nti on to f ile a c la im in t he Un ite d St ate s D istri c t Co ur t f or the Di str ic t of

Col umb ia . G ro nc ki f

ile d a c omp la int

in t his Court on November

21, 2008 on the basis of fe dera l question and diversity jurisdiction, and beca use OSHA did not issue a fina l decision within 180 day s of Gronc ki’s complaint. See18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1) (B ).-4- II
. AN AL YSI S “‘[W] hen rulingon a def

endant’ s motion t o dismiss , a judg e must acc ept as true all of the fac tual alleg ations contained in the c omplaint.’” Atherton v. Dist. of Columbia Offi ce of M ayor , 5 6 7 F. 3 d 6 7 2 , 6 8 1 (D
. C
. C i r. 2 0 0 9 ) ( qu o t i n g Erickson v . Pardus , 5 51 U. S. 8 9, 94 (2 00 7) ). “ ‘S o lon ga s th e ple a din g s su g g e st a “ pla us ibl e ” sc e na

ri o to “ sh o[w ] that th e ple a de r i s e nti tle d to relief ,” a c ourt may

not dismi ss.’” Id. (qu o t i n g Tooley v. Napalitano , 5 56 F .3 d 8 36 , 8 39 (D .C. Cir. 2009)). AT& T argues that Gronc ki’s claims in this C ourt are prec luded by res judicata. “Unde r the doctrine of re s judicata, or c laim prec lusion, a subsequent lawsuit will be bar red if the re ha s be e n p ri or

lit ig atio n ( 1) inv olv ingthe same c la ims or c a us e of a c tio n, (2 ) b e tw e e n th e same parties or their privies, a

nd (3) ther e has be en a f

inal, valid judgme nt on the merits, (4) by a cour t of compe tent jurisdiction.” Smalls v. United States , 471 F.3d 186, 192 ( D.C. Cir. 2006) (citing Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v . Univ. of Ill. Found. , 4 02 U. S. 3 13 , 3 23 -2 4 ( 19 71 )) . T he Sup re me Court has held that judg ments of administrative ag encie s should be g iven pre clusive ef fec t if the ag ency was a ctingin a judicial ca pacity , such as in ca ses wher e the a g ency provides a f

ull and fair oppor tunity to liti g ate the c laim. Un iv . o f Te nn . v . E lli ott , 4 78 U. S. 7 88 , 7 97 -9 8 ( 19 86 ); see also United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co. , 384 U.S. 394, 422 (1966). The que stion before the Court is whether G roncki’s c laims are ba rre d by res judicata or
w h e th e r S O X p e r m i t s h i mt o p r o c e e d

d e s p i t e th e i s s u an c e o f

th e f i n a l a dm i n i s tr at i v e o p i n i o n . It is undisputed that the Secre tary did not issue a final dec ision withi n 180 day s. Thus, Groncki would have be en within his rights to file this suit after the 180 day period, but bef

ore the final decision wa s issued. See Hanna v. W CI Cmtys, Inc. , 348 F. Supp. 2d 1322 (S.D. F la. 2004)-5-

(p la int if f p e rm itt e d to br inga

SOXwh ist le blo we r c la im i n d istri c t c ourt be c a us e the a g e nc y

did not rea ch a f

inal decision within 180 day s of the filingof the a dminist rative c omplaint and no final dec ision was rea ched by the ag ency

befor e the plaintiff br oug ht suit i n fede ral district cour t). I t is also undisput ed, howe ver, that the Secre tary did issue a final de cision befor e Gr oncki filed the instant suit. Thus, the Court mus t resolve whe ther Gr oncki is prec luded by res judicata from fi lin gsu it i n f

e de ra l di str ic t c ourt after

the ag ency

rea ched a

final dec ision, even if the f inal decision wa s issued after

the 180 per iod. AT& T contends that be cause Gronc ki rec eived a final orde r fr om the administrative proce eding , albeit more tha n 180 day s from the filingof the c omplaint, he was re quired to appe al the dec ision to t he appr opriate United States Court of Appea ls rather than instigating a

collater al attack in district cour

t. Groncki a

rgues, on the other

hand, that if the a g ency

does not resolve a complaint with a final de cision within 180 day s, the complainant may file suit in feder al district
c ourt wh e the r o r n ot t

he a g e nc y ult imate ly

iss ue s a fi na l de c isi on . Wh ile the statut or y te xt itse lf may seem to per

mit Groncki’s ac tion, the Secre tary ’s interpre tation of the statute and e nsuing
re g ulatio ns , r e s ju dic ata

pr inc ipl e s, and

the purp os e of

the SOXpr ov isi on

le a d th e Court

to conclude that Gronc ki’s suit is barred. F ir st, the Se c re tary

of L a bo r h a s inte rp re te d s e c tio n 8 06 of SOXto n ot a llo w a

n a c tio n in dis tr ic t c ourt after

the ag ency

has issued a f

inal order . In the pre amble to re g ulations issued pursuant to SOX, which e x plain how the De partment of L abor w ill handle discrimination
c omp la int s p ur su ant t o th at la w, the Se c re tary

state s, wi th r e sp e c t to the pr ov isi on a llo wi ngsu it in d istri c t c ourt :-6-

. . . the [provision allowing complaina nts to bring a

n action in district court for de novo revie w if there has bee n no final dec ision of the Secre tary within 180 day s of the filing of the c omplaint] is unique amongthe whistleblower statutes administered by

the Secr etar

y . This statutory

structure cre ates the possibility that a complaina

nt will have litigate d a cla im before the ag ency , will rece ive a de cision from an a dminist rative la w judg e, and w ill then file a complaint in Fe dera l court while the ca se is pendingon revie w by the B oard. The Act mig ht even be interpre ted to allow a c omplaint to bring a n action in Fe dera l court af ter re ceiving a f i n a l d e c i s i o nf

r o mth e B o ar d , i f

th atd e c i s i o nw a s i s s u e d

m o r e th an1 8 0 d ays a ft e r t he fi lin gof

the c omp la int . T he Se c re tary be lie ve s th at it

wo uld be a wa ste of the re so ur c e s o f t

he pa rt ie s, the De pa

rtme nt, and

the c ou rt s f or c omp la ina

nts to pursue duplicative litigation. The Sec reta ry notes that the cour

ts have re cog nized that, when a

party has had a full and fa ir opportunity

to liti g ate a

claim, an a dv e rs ary sh ou ld b e pr ote c te d f

ro m th e e xpe ns e and

ve xati on of mul tip le laws uit s and that the public inter est is served by prese rvingjudicial resour ces pr ohibiting subsequent suits involving the same parties makingthe same c laims. W hen an administrative ag ency

acts in a judicia l capa city and re solves disputed issues of fac t properly

befor e it that the par

ties have ha d an ade quate oppor tunity to liti g ate, the cour ts have not hesitated to a

pply the principles of

issue prec lusion (collatera l estoppel) or

claim pre clusion (re s judicata) on the basis of that administrative decision. Ther efor e, the Sec reta ry anticipates that Fede ral c ourts will apply such principles if a

complainant bring s a newaction in Fe dera l court following extensive lit igation before the Depa rtment that has re sulted in a dec ision by an administrative law judg e or the Secre tary . . . . Proc e du re

s fo r th e Ha nd

ling o f D isc rim ina tio n Co mp lai nts Un de r S e c tio n 8 06

of t heCor po ra te and Criminal Fraud Accountabilit y Ac t of 2002, Ti tle VIII

of the Sarbanes-Ox ley Ac t of 2002 , 68 F e d. Re g . 3 18 60 , 3 18 63 (2 00 3) (i nte rn a l c itatio ns omi tte d) . T he Se c re tary ’s int e rp re tatio n is entitled to defe renc e bec ause it amounts to the ag ency ’s construc tion of its own statute and regulations. See F

ed. Ex press Corp. v. Holoweck i, 128 S.Ct . 1147, 1155 (2008) ( “Just as we de fe r t o a n a g e nc y ’s re a so na

ble int e rp re tatio ns of

the statut e wh e n it

iss ue s r e g ulatio ns in t

he fi rs t instance, the ag ency

is entitled to further de fer ence when it adopts a r easona ble interpre tation of regulations it has put in force.” ).-7-

In addition to the Secre tary ’s interpre tation, at least one district c ourt has interpr eted SOX to prec lude ac tions in di strict court a fter the Secre tary of L abor ha s issued a final or der. See Tice v. Bristol-Mye rs Squibb Co. , 515 F. Supp. 2d 580, 599 (W.D. Pa. 2007), aff’d , No. 07-3977, 2009 WL943838 (3d Cir. April 8, 2009) (“ Congr ess has c lear ly indicated its intent that final order s of the Secr etar

y of L abor . . . f

or which r eview c ould have be en obtained by an appe al to a court of a ppeals c annot be c ollatera lly attacke d.”). While in Tice the 180-da y provision was not at issue, the cour

t’s rea soning is instructive. In Tice , the cour t concluded that the plaintiff was barr ed fr om bring ing a

Title VI Ior Ag e Discr imination in Em ploy ment Act cla im because she had alr eady

litigated the same c laim under sec tion 806 of SOX. Id . at 600. The c ourt noted that the administrative law judg e’s de cision reg ardingthe SOX claim qualifie d for pr eclusive e ffe ct beca use the plaintiff w as bring ing the same fa ctual cla im to the dist rict cour t that the administrative law judg e had c onsidered, the parties we re the same in both suits, the administrative proc eedingresulted in a f inal order , and the a dminist rative pr ocee ding pr ovided the par ties with a full and fa ir opportunity to liti g ate the pla intiff’s claim. Id. at 593-94. T h e s am e p r i n c i p l e s a

p p l y h e r e . G r o n c k i ’ s c l a i mi s b ar r e d b y re s ju dic ata beca

use the fi na l or de r o f t

he a g e nc y mus t be g ive n p re c lus ive e ff e c t. G ro nc ki d oe s n ot d isp ute that hi s c la im involves the same pa

rties and the sa

me claim that wa s resolved by a fina l order of

the administrative law judg e. F urthermor e, the a dminist rative pr ocee dings w ere judicial in nature and included a

formal he aringon Gronc ki’s claim. See id . at 594 (a n administrative proc eeding is judicial in nature if it provides a full and fa ir opportunity

to liti g ate the c laim). Indeed, Gr on c ki h a s n ot e ve n s ug g e ste d th at he wa s n ot g ive n th e op po rt un ity to f ull y and fa ir ly lit ig ate his claim duringthe administrative proc eeding s.-8-

Mo re ov e r, Gr on c ki’ s inte rp re tatio n w ou ld l e a d to a bs ur d r e su lts and

wo uld ru n c ounte r t o the purpose of

the SOX provision. I t would allow plaintiffs to wait for a final dec ision from the administrative law judg e, and the n decide whether to seek judicial re view in fe dera l district court or in the appr opriate United States Court of Appea ls. I f the a g ency rea ched the final dec ision
mor e tha n 1 80 da y s a ft e r t he fi lin gof

the c omp la int , th e pla int if f c ou ld k e e p th e fi na l de c isi on (i f it was favor able) , appea l to the appropriate United States Court of Appe als (as a nticipated and permitted by

SOX), or c ould start the proc ess over ag ain entire ly

by seekingde novo re view of the final de cision in feder al district court, whic h is otherwise not per mitted. This would allow a p l a i n t i f f m o r e av e nu e s t o a

p p e a l ana dv e r s e d e c i s i o ni f th e d e c i s i o nw a s r e a c h e d a f t e r 1 8 0 d ays tha n a pla int if f w ou ld h ave if

the de c isi on

wa s r e a c he d w ith in 1 80 da y s. F ur the rm or e , it

wo uld provide de novo revie w of the a g ency ’s re solution of the complaint in feder al district court rather than de novo r eview of

the unre solved claim. The statutory text clea rly allows de novo re view of the unre solved claim in fede ral district cour t, or revie w of the a g ency ’s entire proce ss in the appropr iate United States Court of Appe als. The purpose of 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)( 1)(B ), in allowinga plaintiff to g o to fede ral dis tr ic t c ourt

if a fi na l de c isi on

ha s n ot b e e n r e a c he d w ith in 1 80 da y s, is t o e nc oura g e a

tim e ly resolution of the c omplainant’s claim. I f the a g ency responds to the c omplaint too sl owly , the plaintiff may

seek r edre ss in dist rict cour t; if the ag ency

acts within 180 day s, the plaintiff may appea l an unfavorable decision to the applica ble United States Court of Appe als. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)( 2)(A) ; 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(4). Nowhere does the statute c ontemplate de novo revie w of a

final administrative orde r in district court, and G roncki ha s pointed to no statutory
a uth or ity or c a se law t o s up po rt

his un pe rs ua siv e statut or

y int e rp re tatio n th at he sh ou ld b e a ble to-9-

c o l l at e r a l l y at t a c k

th e a dm i n i s tr at i v e l awj u d g e ’ s f i n a l o r d e r i nth i s C o urt . A c c o r d i n g l y, Gr on c ki’ s c la im, havin gbe e n p re vio us ly a dju dic ate d b y

the De pa rtme nt o f L a

bo r, is p re c lud e d in this Court. III . C ON CL USI ON For the fore g oing r easons, AT &T ’s motion to dis miss with prejudice is g rante d. An appropr iate orde r ac companies this memora ndum opinion.
Henr y H. Kenne dy , J r. Un i t edS t at es Di s tri ctJ u d ge Dated: August 4, 2009