1999 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

6-28-1999

Churchill v. Star Entr

Precedential or Non-Precedential:

Docket 98-1491,98-1632,98-1700

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Recommended Citation

"Churchill v. Star Entr" (1999). 1999 Decisions. Paper 172.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1999/172
Filed June 28, 1999 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

Nos. 98-1491, 98-1632, and 98-1700 

MARY CHURCHILL, 

 Appellant in No. 98-1491 

v. 

STAR ENTERPRISES, a/k/a STAR STAFF 

INCORPORATED; JOSEPH JANTORNO, a/k/a STAR 

STAFF INCORPORATED; DAVID SMITH, a/k/a STAR 

STAFF INCORPORATED; BERNADINE LANE, a/k/a STAR 

STAFF INCORPORATED 

MARY CHURCHILL, 

 Appellant in No. 98-1632 

v. 

STAR ENTERPRISES 

a/k/a STAR STAFF INCORPORATED; 

JOSEPH JANTORNO; DAVID SMITH 

MARY CHURCHILL, 

v. 

STAR ENTERPRISES 

a/k/a STAR STAFF INCORPORATED; 

JOSEPH JANTORNO; DAVID SMITH, 

 Appellants in No. 98-1700 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 

District Judge: Honorable Harvey Bartle, III 

(D.C. Civ. Nos. 97-03527 and 98-01751) 

Argued May 26, 1999 

BEFORE: GREENBERG and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges , 

and DOWD,* District Judge 

(Filed: June 28, 1999) 

 Thomas M. Holland (argued) 

 437 Chestnut Street 

 The Lafayette Building 

 Philadelphia, Pa. 19106 

 Attorney for Mary Churchill 

 Irving L. Hurwitz (argued) 

 Gary S. Prish 

 Carpenter, Bennett & Morrissey 

 100 Mulberry Street 

 Three Gateway Center 

 Newark, New Jersey 07102 

 Attorneys for Star Enterprises 

 a/k/a Star Staff Incorporated, 

 Joseph Jantorno, and David Smith 

_________________________________________________________________ 

*Honorable David D. Dowd, Jr., Senior Judge of the United States 

District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, sitting by designation. 

 2 
OPINION OF THE COURT 

GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 

I. INTRODUCTION 

This case involves a question of claim preclusion: what 

steps must a plaintiff take to bring about the consolidation 

of her consecutively filed cases in the district court so that 

claims in the later case are not precluded by the earlier 

action? In particular, the district court barred appellant 

Mary Churchill by a judgment on the pleadings from 

proceeding with a law suit, Churchill v. Star Enterprises, 3 

F. Supp.2d 625 (E.D. Pa. 1998) ("Churchill II"), alleging 

claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the 

Pennsylvania Human Relations Act because she already 

had brought a suit, Churchill I, based on the same facts 

and related issues against the defendants in Churchill II, 

asserting claims in Churchill I under the Family and 

Medical Leave Act. See Churchill v. Star Enters., 3 F. 

Supp.2d 622 (E.D. Pa. 1998) ("Churchill I"). 

We will affirm the district court's judgment on the

pleadings in Churchill II because the two cases involved the 

same parties and germane facts, as well as related issues, 

and for claim preclusion purposes constituted a single 

cause of action that should have been joined in a single 

case. We also will affirm the district court's order on the 

Appellees' cross-appeal from the denial of an order under 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 seeking sanctions against Churchill for 

filing Churchill II. Finally, we will affirm on Churchill's 

separate appeal from an order denying in part her 

application for attorney's fees in Churchill I. 

II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

A. Background 

The facts that we find material to our disposition of these 

appeals are not contested. Churchill began work at Star 

Enterprises, a.k.a. Star Staff Inc. ("Star Staff"), in July 

 3 
1991 managing a food mart at a Texaco station in 

Pennsylvania. In June 1996, Churchill was diagnosed with 

oral cancer. She then notified her temporary supervisor, 

Walter Schreiber, of her condition and of her need to 

undergo treatment. During the next two months she 

underwent three surgical procedures and between August 

and October 1996, she received radiation treatments. 

Churchill was limited substantially in performing major life 

activities, and thus was disabled, but nevertheless

continued to work. Churchill made numerous requests to 

Star Staff for reasonable accommodations during this time, 

communicating these requests to David Smith, her 

manager, and Joseph Jantorno, her regional manager, but 

they were unresponsive. On January 29, 1997, Churchill 

made a final request for accommodation, and put Star Staff 

on notice that due to her medical needs she qualified for 

leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 

U.S.C. SS 2601-2654 ("FMLA"). Jantorno then instructed 

Smith to evaluate Churchill and then Jantorno and Smith 

consulted with Deborah Cox of Star Staff's Human 

Resources Department regarding the case. Star Staff

terminated Churchill on February 5, 1997, because of her 

disability. Churchill I and II and these appeals followed. 

B. Procedural History 

 1. Churchill I 

Churchill initiated Churchill I on May 20, 1997, against 

Star Staff and three of its employees: Jantorno, Smith, and 

Bernadine Lane, who replaced her as the station manager. 

Churchill alleged that Star Staff, Jantorno, and Smith 

violated the FMLA when they discharged her and also were 

liable to her on common law claims for bad faith and 

wrongful discharge.1 She charged Lane with defamation, 

_________________________________________________________________ 

1. FMLA grants an "eligible employee" the right to 12 work weeks of 

leave, over any 12-month period: (1) because of the birth of the 

employee's child, in order to take care of the child; (2) because of the 

placement of a child with the employee for adoption or foster care; (3) in 

order to care for the employee's child, spouse, or parent, if the child, 

spouse or parent has a serious health condition; or (4) because of a 

serious health condition that makes the employee unable to perform the 

 4 
but dropped that count on December 19, 1997, and 

dismissed Lane as a defendant. 

The district court entered judgment on January 27, 

1998, for the three remaining defendants on the state law 

claims because FMLA preempted them. Trial began on the 

other counts on February 11, 1998, and on February 13, 

1998, the jury rendered its verdict for Churchill, holding 

the defendants jointly and severally liable for damages of 

$8,609.02, plus interest at 6.5%, or $559.59. The court 

doubled the award as liquidated damages, finding that the 

defendants' violation of FMLA was not in good faith. On 

February 17, 1998, the court entered judgment for 

$18,337.22, and ordered that Churchill be reinstated to a 

position equivalent to her prior position with equivalent 

wages and benefits. 

Churchill then sought attorney's fees of $52,018.20, as 

well as costs pursuant to 29 U.S.C. S 2617(a)(3). On April 

17, 1998, the district court issued a Memorandum and 

Order partially granting and partially denying Churchill's 

fee application and ordering the defendants to pay 

$37,062.50 for attorney's fees and $9,410.19 costs.

Churchill filed a motion for reconsideration of that order, 

which the court denied by an order entered on May 28, 

1998. On this appeal, Churchill seeks reversal of the 

portion of the order denying attorney's fees for (1) time 

spent in connection with an unemployment compensation 

hearing on March 26, 1997, on a claim Churchill brought 

after her discharge and (2) for time to prepare for and 

conduct a deposition of Lane. 

_________________________________________________________________ 

functions of the employee's position. 29 U.S.C.S 2612(a)(1). After a 

period of qualified leave, an employee is entitled to reinstatement to her 

former position or an equivalent one with the same benefits and terms. 

29 U.S.C. S 2614(a). FMLA declares it "unlawful for any employer to 

interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to 

exercise, 

any right provided" in the FMLA. 29 U.S.C. S 2615(a)(1). FMLA similarly 

declares it "unlawful for any employer to discharge or in any other 

manner discriminate against any individual for opposing any practice 

made unlawful" under the FMLA. 29 U.S.C. S 2615(a)(2). Section 2917(a) 

of FMLA authorizes civil damage actions by employees. 29 U.S.C. 

S 2617(a). 

 5 
 2. Administrative Claims 

Churchill pursued her claims against Star Staff along 

parallel courses. Thus, on February 26, 1997, Churchill 

filed an administrative complaint alleging disability 

discrimination with the Pennsylvania Human Relations 

Commission ("PHRC"), and at that time her administrative 

complaint was dual filed with the Equal Employment 

Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") asserting an American 

with Disabilities Act claim. The PHRC dismissed the

disability discrimination claim on or about November 14, 

1997, and on April 26, 1998, Churchill received a right to 

sue letter dated April 24, 1998, from the EEOC. As we will 

discuss, she had not requested a right to sue letter. 

 3. Churchill II 

On April 2, 1998, about two months after the jury 

reached its verdict in Churchill I, Churchill filed a complaint 

against the Appellees, Star Enterprises, Jantorno, and 

Smith, under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 

42 U.S.C. SS 12101 et seq. (Counts I and II); the 

Pennsylvania Human Relations Act ("PHRA"), 43 Pa. Cons. 

Stat. Ann. SS 951 et seq. (1991 & Supp. 1998) (Counts III 

and IV); and the New Jersey Family Leave Act, N.J. Stat. 

Ann. SS 34:11-B1 et seq. (West Supp. 1999) (Counts V and 

VI).2 The Appellees answered the complaint on April 23, 

1998, including as an affirmative defense the contention 

that Churchill's claims were "barred by the doctrine of res 

judicata," and that Appellees had "fully satisfied the court's 

judgment entered February 17, 1998 . . . ." There is no 

doubt that the Appellees' answer raised the res judicata 

defense in reliance on the proceedings in Churchill I and 

Churchill does not contend otherwise. 

The district court on Appellees' motion to dismiss entered 

a judgment for the Appellees on the pleadings on June 23, 

1998, on claim preclusion principles because Churchill II 

and Churchill I "involved the same cause of action." 

Churchill II, 3 F. Supp.2d at 628. On July 21, 1998, 

_________________________________________________________________ 

2. Churchill's complaint was apparently premature with respect to her 

ADA claim as she brought it before she received the right to sue letter. 

 6 
Churchill appealed in Churchill II, seeking reinstatement of 

her ADA and PHRA Counts.3 

 4. Star Staff's Rule 11 Motion 

On May 1, 1998, the Appellees served Churchill with

notice that they intended to seek sanctions against her for 

filing Churchill II and unless she withdrew that case within 

21 days they would file the motion for sanctions. Obviously, 

Churchill did not comply with their request and on May 29, 

1998, when the Appellees filed their motion to dismiss 

Churchill II on res judicata grounds, they also moved for 

sanctions in the form of reimbursement of attorneys' fees 

and costs incurred in bringing the motion. Although, as we 

have indicated, the district court granted the Appellees 

judgment on the pleadings, it denied their motion for 

sanctions "under the totality of the circumstances." 

Churchill II, 3 F. Supp.2d at 631. 

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

We exercise plenary review of the order for judgment on 

the pleadings, see Jablonski v. Pan Am. World Airways, 

Inc., 863 F.2d 289, 290 (3d Cir. 1988), and thus of the 

application of claim preclusion in Churchill II, see Rider v. 

Pennsylvania, 850 F.2d 982, 988-95 (3d Cir. 1988), and we 

review the denial of Rule 11 sanctions for abuse of

discretion, see Napier v. Thirty or More Unidentified Federal 

Agents, Employees or Officers, 855 F.2d 1080, 1091 (3d Cir. 

1988). On Churchill's appeal from the partial denial of her 

attorney's fee application in Churchill I we exercise an 

abuse of discretion standard. See EEOC v. L.B. Foster Co., 

123 F.3d 746, 750 (3d Cir. 1997). 

IV. DISCUSSION 

A. Claim Preclusion 

This case seems to present the first application in any 

_________________________________________________________________ 

3. Churchill does not appeal from the dismissal of the New Jersey Family 

Leave Act counts. She apparently brought that claim because Star 

Staff's office is in New Jersey. 

 7 
court of appeals of claim preclusion barring the assertion of 

claims following a case already litigated under FMLA.4 Yet 

while the constellation of facts in this case is new, the 

principles of the doctrine of claim preclusion are familiar. 

Moreover, the circumstance that FMLA and the interests it 

protects are involved in this case does not mean that we 

should honor Churchill's request that we depart from those 

principles. In particular, this case implicates issues 

involving Churchill's failure to seek a stay of Churchill I so 

that her claims in Churchill II could have been joined in 

that action. It also involves consideration of Churchill's 

failure to seek a right to sue letter from the EEOC so that 

she could have expedited bringing Churchill II. 

The district court decided that the fact that there are 

administrative procedures that a plaintiff must follow before 

she pursues a PHRA or ADA claim in court did not justify 

the court in refusing to apply claim preclusion principles. 

The court in reaching its decision indicated that Churchill 

could have expedited the administrative procedures and 

sought a stay of Churchill I so that the PHRA and ADA 

claims could have been included in that case. 

Churchill argues that she should not have been required 

to seek a stay of Churchill I because a stay, by delaying her 

opportunity to obtain relief under FMLA, would have

prejudiced her and frustrated public policy. She alternately 

argues that she did move for a stay in Churchill I. She 

further argues that she should not have been required to 

request that the EEOC expedite issuance of the right to sue 

letter in order to exhaust the administrative claims. For the 

reasons that follow we reject those arguments, and uphold 

the district court's application of claim preclusion 

principles. 

_________________________________________________________________ 

4. We have found only one other opinion which applied claim preclusion 

to a suit involving an FMLA allegation; however, that case involved 

preclusion of the reasserted FMLA claim itself, not allegations under 

other statutes. Solien v. Physicians Business Network, Inc. 22 F. Supp.2d 

1237 (D. Kan. 1998) (res judicata precluded plaintiff 's FMLA suit where 

defendant prevailed on motion for summary judgment). 

 8 
 1. The claims in Churchill II required administrative 

 exhaustion. 

As we have indicated the court granted Appellees' motion 

for judgment on the pleadings on Churchill's ADA and 

PHRA claims in Churchill II.5 Unlike the FMLA, both the 

ADA and the PHRA require pursuit of administrative 

remedies before a plaintiff may file a complaint in court. 

Thus, a party who brings an employment discrimination 

claim under Title I of the ADA must follow the 

administrative procedures set forth in Title VII of the Civil 

Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-5. See Bishop v. 

Okidata, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 416, 424 (D.N.J. 1994).

Accordingly, a party must wait 180 days after filing a 

charge with the EEOC for ADA violations before being able 

to forego the administrative process and file suit in court. 

See 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-5(e)(1). After 180 days, "[i]f a 

complainant is dissatisfied with the progress the EEOC is 

making on his or her charge of employment discrimination, 

he or she may elect to circumvent the EEOC procedures 

and seek relief through a private enforcement action in a 

district court." Occidental Life Ins. Co. of California v. EEOC, 

432 U.S. 355, 361, 97 S.Ct. 2447, 2451 (1977). 

_________________________________________________________________ 

5. At the oral argument before us a question was raised as to whether 

the district judge who heard Churchill I could dismiss Churchill II on the 

pleadings on the basis of the record. We are satisfied that the judge's 

review of the complaints in Churchill I and II and the answer in Churchill 

II adequately supported dismissal based on the face of the pleadings and 

that the outcome of this case did not hinge in the district court on the 

circumstance that the same judge heard Churchill I and Churchill II and 

thus had a special insight into the case. While we recognize that the 

Appellees did not attach copies of the pleadings from Churchill I to their 

answer in Churchill II as they might have pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 

10(c), still in view of the circumstance that the operative facts are 

those 

in the pleadings in the two cases which are matters of public record, we 

decline to remand the matter to the district court so that the Appellees 

can amend their answer in Churchill II to include the pleadings from 

Churchill I which then would be "part [of the answer] for all purposes." 

Id. See Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. White Consolidated Indus., Inc., 

998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993) ("To decide a motion to dismiss, 

courts generally consider only the allegations contained in the complaint, 

exhibits attached to the complaint and matters of public record.) 

(emphasis added); Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 339 n.3 (3d Cir. 1989). 

 9 
Similarly, a party must wait one year after filing charges 

with the PHRC for alleged PHRA violations before having 

the option to forego the state administrative process and file 

suit in court. PHRA provides that the PHRC shall have 

exclusive jurisdiction of an administrative claim for one 

year after its filing, unless the PHRC resolves the claim 

before the one year has elapsed. See 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. 

Ann. S 962(c)(1).6 

As we discuss below, Churchill should have moved to

consolidate Churchill I and Churchill II for they advanced 

the same cause of action. Churchill could have filed both 

the PHRA and ADA claims presented in Churchill II in time 

to join them with her FMLA claim in Churchill I. In the case 

of the PHRA claim, no special steps were needed to preserve 

that claim and join it to the FMLA action. On May 20, 

1997, the date Churchill filed Churchill I, the PHRC still 

was investigating her PHRA claim. The EEOC charge was 

held in abeyance pending the PHRC's investigation. The 

PHRC made a finding of no probable cause on the PHRA 

charge on November 14, 1997. Thus, prior to the start of 

the trial in Churchill I, Churchill knew that the PHRC had 

dismissed her PHRA complaint, and accordingly she could 

have brought an action on that claim about three months 

before Churchill I went to trial. 

_________________________________________________________________ 

6. The PHRA provides in relevant part: 

 If within one (1) year after the filing of a complaint with the 

 Commission, the Commission dismisses the complaint or has not 

 entered into a conciliation agreement to which the complainant is a 

 party, the Commission must so notify the complainant. On receipt 

 of such a notice the complainant shall be able to bring an action 

in 

 the courts of common pleas of the Commonwealth based on the 

 right to freedom from discrimination granted by this act. If the 

court 

 finds that the respondent has engaged in or is engaging in an 

 unlawful discriminatory practice charged in the complaint, the 

court 

 shall enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful 

 discriminatory practice and order affirmative action which may 

 include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of 

employees, 

 granting of back pay, or any other legal or equitable relief as the 

 court deems appropriate. 

43 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 962(c)(1). 

 10 
As for the ADA claim, Churchill could have requested a 

right to sue letter after 180 days had passed from the filing 

date of her EEOC charge. "At the end of the 180-day period 

the employee is entitled to sue, regardless of EEOC

proceedings." Waiters v. Parsons, 729 F.2d 233, 237 (3d 

Cir. 1984). Thus, on August 25, 1997, well before the 

Churchill I trial, she could have requested a right to sue letter.7 

The EEOC must issue the letter upon request. See 

McNasby v. Crown Cork and Seal Co., 888 F.2d 270, 274 

n.3 (3d Cir. 1989). Churchill did not request a right to sue 

letter, instead waiting for the EEOC to issue it. Thus, she 

"sat on her rights" when she could have attempted to join 

the ADA claim to the FMLA claim in consolidated litigation. 

While Churchill argues that in some cases the EEOC may 

not respond promptly and correctly to such requests, we 

will not address the argument because she did not attempt 

to obtain the letter. 

Moreover, the district court correctly alternatively held 

that Churchill could have requested the court to stay 

Churchill I, while she waited for the right to sue letter, and 

by that procedural step preserved the PHRA and ADA 

claims now precluded. See Churchill II, 3 F. Supp.2d at 

630. Churchill points out that the court in Churchill I was 

aware of her pending administrative claims, and asserts 

that the court improperly and unfairly put "the 

responsibility of promoting the ideas of claim preclusion 

and judicial economy solely on [her] back." We reject that 

argument summarily. Attorneys should organize litigation 

that they are pursuing to avoid claim preclusion. 

Accordingly, the mere fact that the district court was aware 

of Churchill's administrative claims and sua sponte might 

_________________________________________________________________ 

7. The district court believed that because of the application of 42 

U.S.C. 

S 2000e-5(c) the 180-day period did not begin to run until after 60 days 

following Churchill's PHRA filing. See Churchill II, 3 F. Supp.2d at 630. 

We need not explore this point further because Churchill did not request 

a right to sue letter at any time and the addition of the 60 days to the 

180-day period would not affect our result as the extended period would 

have expired several months before the trial in Churchill I. We described 

the relationship between PHRA and EEOC proceedings in Trevino-Barton 

v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 919 F.2d 874 (3d Cir. 1990). See also Berkoski 

v. Ashland Reg'l Med. Ctr., 951 F. Supp. 544 (M.D. Pa 1997). 

 11 
have stayed Churchill I did not relieve Churchill of the 

necessity to take steps to preserve her claims. See, e.g., 

Nernberg v. United States, 463 F. Supp. 752 (W.D. Pa. 

1979). 

Churchill argues that she made a motion for a stay at 

trial. In support of this assertion she refers to a side bar 

conference during Churchill I, in which the court excluded 

references to the administrative claims. The court did not 

permit reference to the PHRA and ADA claims because they 

were not being litigated along with the FMLA claim. While 

these evidentiary proceedings demonstrate that the court 

was aware of the administrative claims, they surely do not 

include a motion for a stay. In any event, if Churchill 

desired that the court stay Churchill I so that she could 

include her PHRA and ADA claims in that action, she

should have asked for the stay before the trial. 

Churchill also argues that if the court stayed Churchill I 

she would have been prejudiced because FMLA offers 

equitable relief, such as reinstatement and resumption of 

benefits, which should not be delayed for reasons of judicial 

economy. Arguing that she sought a "prompt 

determination" of her FMLA claims, she contends that she 

now has been prevented unjustly from pursuing her rights 

under the ADA and PHRA. 

In considering this argument, we address the policy

concerns behind FMLA which Congress enacted to promote 

job stability when workers confront illness or family 

emergencies. The FMLA history evinces Congress's intent to 

pass FMLA as an addition to federal labor laws establishing 

minimum standards for employment: 

 The [FMLA] accommodates the important societal 

 interest in assisting families, by establishing a 

 minimum labor standard for leave. The bill is based on 

 the same principle as the child labor laws, the 

 minimum wage, Social Security, the safety and health 

 laws, the pension and welfare benefit laws, and other 

 labor laws that establish minimum standards for 

 employment. 

S. Rep. No. 103-3 at 4, 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6-7. 

 12 
Congress stated that the purposes of FMLA include the 

following: "(1) to balance the demands of the workplace with 

the needs of families, to promote the stability and economic 

security of families, and to promote national interests in 

preserving family integrity; [and] (2) to entitle employees to 

take reasonable leave for medical reasons, for the birth or 

adoption of a child, and for the care of a child, spouse or 

parent who has a serious health condition; . . ." FMLA 

S 2(b)(1), (2), 29 U.S.C. S 2601(b)(1), (2). 

In support of its decision to enact FMLA, Congress made 

several findings, including the recognition that"the primary 

responsibility for family caretaking often falls on women, 

and such responsibility affects the working lives of women 

more than it affects the working lives of men; . . ." FMLA 

S 2(a)(2), (3), (5), 29 U.S.C. S 2601(a)(2), (3), (5). Given this 

background, it is clear that FMLA is intended to aid 

workers --especially but not exclusively working mothers 

like Churchill--maintain job stability when they must care 

for themselves or their family. Nevertheless, despite the 

substantive protection FMLA provides, we see no reason to 

hold that Congress intended in enacting FMLA that 

proceedings under the statute are not to be given preclusive 

effect in later litigation. Thus, while FMLA provides for 

equitable relief, including reinstatement, we cannotfind 

that this important legislative goal "trumps" long standing 

preclusive effect doctrines. 

Case law dealing with FMLA is limited. Churchill does not 

cite any case law to buttress her contention that an FMLA 

plaintiff is somehow due greater latitude than other 

plaintiffs with respect to the need to delay litigation in order 

to consolidate separate cases. To the contrary, federal 

courts thus far have viewed FMLA as similar to Title VII, 

the ADA, and other laws which protect employees. See, e.g., 

Holmes v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 1998 WL 564443, at *8 

(E.D. Pa. 1998) (FMLA, PHRA and ADA "protect the same 

interests and provide relief for the same violations"). 

We may look to case law under Title VII in assessing the 

situation of plaintiffs who do not seek a stay of an FMLA 

suit as they wait for an EEOC right to sue letter before 

asserting an ADA claim, or who for some other reason delay 

bringing an ADA claim. Three courts of appeals have held 

 13 
that a plaintiff in an employment discrimination case may 

have to forego administrative remedies and obtain an early 

right to sue letter. See Heyliger v. State Univ. and 

Community College Sys. of Tenn., 126 F.3d 849, 855 n.2 

(6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 1054 (1998); 

Herrmann v. Cencom Cable Assocs., Inc., 999 F.2d 223, 225 

(7th Cir. 1993); and Woods v. Dunlop Tire Corp., 972 F.2d 

36, 40 (2d Cir. 1992). We agree with these persuasive 

decisions. 

In Heyliger, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 

held that an employee's prior state court lawsuit against his 

employer under a state civil rights law prevented the 

employee from suing the employer in federal court for 

allegedly violating Title VII. The court determined that the 

state and federal claims arose out of the employer's 

decision not to renew the employee's contract, the state 

court had entered a valid and final judgment on merits of 

state claims, and the Title VII claim could have been added 

to the state claims. The court of appeals concluded that 

requiring a plaintiff in the circumstances in Heyliger to 

seek a right to sue letter and to amend his complaint to 

add the federal claim would not impose a burden on him 

beyond that of a due diligence standard. Id. at 856. 

Similarly, in Herrmann v. Cencom Cable Assoc., Inc., 999 

F.2d at 225-26, the court held that the plaintiff, in order to 

avoid claim preclusion, had been obliged to seek a right to 

sue letter and join his Title VII claim with another, 

sufficiently related, pending federal action. Finally, in 

Woods v. Dunlop Tire Corp., 972 F.2d at 40-41, the court 

precluded a Title VII action where the plaintiff could have 

sought a right to sue letter and an order to file an amended 

complaint in a pending federal case to include the Title VII 

claim. 

Thus, courts have rejected favoring "the language and 

policy of Title VII" as "against application of well-settled 

claim preclusion principles." Woods, 972 F.2d at 39. We do 

not find that the language and policy of FMLA is so

different from that of Title VII as to "trump" the claim 

preclusion principles. Title VII, like FMLA, provides for back 

pay and front pay or reinstatement. 42 U.S.C. SS 2000e et 

seq. See Marinelli v. City of Erie, 25 F. Supp.2d 674, 678 

 14 
(W.D. Pa.), appeal dismissed, 135 F.3d 765 (3d Cir. 1998). 

Accordingly, the harm to a successful plaintiff under both 

FMLA and Title VII will be mitigated in many cases by the 

accrual of back pay and prejudgment interest if she

prevails. 

We recognize the burden placed upon working, single

parents like Churchill in confronting their own serious 

illness or that of a family member, and acknowledge the 

protection offered by FMLA and the important interests it 

addresses. Yet Title VII similarly addresses injuries 

sustained by employees suffering discrimination, who 

wrongly may be forced from work and required to wait for 

redress in the form of reinstatement or back pay as they 

pursue their claims. Persons pursuing rights under these 

statutes must preserve their ability to seek redress in a 

manner compatible with longstanding principles of judicial 

economy: requesting a right to sue letter is not an onerous 

burden, and we believe that in many cases a motion to stay 

an FLMA action will preserve all legal claims without undue 

prejudice to the plaintiff. We believe that district courts are 

likely to look favorably on applications for stays of FMLA 

proceedings while plaintiffs promptly pursue administrative 

remedies under Title VII and similar state laws and we urge 

them to do so.8 

It is also important to bear in mind another point.

Churchill I and II involved statutes with fee-shifting 

provisions. See 29 U.S.C. S 2617(a)(3) (FMLA); 43 Pa. Cons. 

Stat. Ann. S 962(c.2) (PHRA); 42 U.S.C. S 12205 (ADA). 

Thus, an employer held liable in consecutive actions 

without doubt will be confronted with multiple motions for 

attorney's fees and costs. Moreover, employers defending 

consecutive actions, whether or not the actions are

successful, will incur greater attorney's fees and other 

expenses for their defenses than they would incur if 

defending only a single case. Surely it is only fair that such 

applications and expenses be avoided as the purpose of 

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8. Obviously we are not concerned here with a situation in which a court 

denied a diligent plaintiff's application for a stay in an FMLA action and 

thus precluded her from asserting her various claims in a single case. In 

those circumstances we might reach a different result. 

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statutes such as the FMLA, the PHRA, and the ADA is to 

provide protection for employees and to allow them to 

recover damages or other relief for employers' conduct if the 

employees can establish liability under the applicable 

statute. Congress did not pass the statutes for the purpose 

of generating legal fees for plaintiffs' and defendants' 

attorneys. We are not so naive that we do not recognize that 

if we reached a different result on the claim preclusion 

issue we would be encouraging knowledgeable plaintiffs' 

attorneys to bring separate cases to generate additional 

attorney's fees in situations in which a single case would 

suffice. Applying claim preclusion principles as we do will 

further the legitimate policy of avoiding unnecessary legal 

expenses. 

Overall, then, we are satisfied that in this case we should 

apply ordinary claim preclusion principles. Thus, we 

address the question of whether Churchill I and Churchill II 

involved the same cause of action so that Churchill II is 

precluded. 

 2. The cause of action. 

The purpose of claim preclusion is to avoid piecemeal 

litigation of claims arising from the same events. See Board 

of Trustees of Trucking Employees of North Jersey Welfare 

Fund, Inc. v. Centra, 983 F.2d 495, 504 (3d Cir. 1992). "[A] 

final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the 

parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or 

could have been raised in that action." Rivet v. Regions 

Bank of Louisiana, 522 U.S. 470, 473, 118 S.Ct. 921, 925 

(1998) (internal citation omitted). A determination of 

whether two lawsuits are based on the same cause of

action "turn[s] on the essential similarity of the underlying 

events giving rise to the various legal claims." Board of 

Trustees, 983 F.2d at 504, quoting U.S. v. Athlone Indus., 

Inc., 746 F.2d 977, 983 (3d Cir. 1984). Because the courts 

have not defined precisely "causes of action," for claim 

preclusion purposes, we take a broad view, focussing on 

the underlying events of the two actions. Athlone, 746 F.2d 

at 984. 

Claim preclusion gives dispositive effect to a prior 

judgment if "a particular issue, although not litigated, could 

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have been raised in the earlier proceeding. Claim preclusion 

requires: (1) a final judgment on the merits in a prior suit 

involving; (2) the same parties or their privities; and (3) a 

subsequent suit based on the same cause of action." Id. 

"Courts should not apply this conceptual test mechanically, 

but should focus on the central purpose of the doctrine, to 

require a plaintiff to present all claims arising out the same 

occurrence in a single suit." Id. 

The Appellees clearly demonstrated the presence of the 

first two requirements set forth in Athlone when they 

sought judgment in their favor in Churchill II and Churchill 

acknowledges this point. There had been a final judgment 

on the merits in Churchill I, and Churchill I and II involved 

the same parties. As for the third requirement, i.e., whether 

the cause of action was the same, the district court 

properly concluded that the case "involve[d] the same cause 

of action because the underlying events in both cases are 

the same," as the acts complained of were the same, and 

the evidence at the trial would have been the same. While 

Churchill cited different statutes to support her two cases, 

the FMLA in Churchill I and the ADA and PHRA in Churchill 

II, the court correctly observed that the fact that Churchill 

advanced different legal theories does not mean that her 

second action will not be precluded. 

Churchill contends that Churchill II differs from Churchill 

I because the Churchill II complaint introduced "new 

material facts" and "new elements of . . . damages." She 

argues in particular that the following "new material facts" 

were presented as "additional allegations" in the Churchill II 

complaint: (1) David Smith replaced temporary supervisor 

Walter Schreiber in October 1996; (2) in Churchill II she 

listed side effects including fatigue, depression, weight loss, 

loss of appetite, difficultly swallowing, dry mouth, sores in 

the mouth, and limited range of movement in the neck; 

(3) Smith informed Jantorno of her requests for 

accommodation; (4) Jantorno then scheduled an "untimely" 

evaluation of Churchill and asked Smith to conduct an 

evaluation; and (5) Smith and Jantorno consulted with 

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Deborah Cox of the Human Resources Department of Star 

Staff, as to how to deal with the situation.9 

Indeed, these were new allegations but the thrust of the 

two complaints remained practically identical. See Harding 

v. Duquesne Light Co., 1995 WL 916926 at *3 (W.D. Pa. 

1995) (no showing of different "causes of actions" where 

complaints "practically identical"). In each complaint, 

Churchill stated where, when and for whom she worked, 

that she was diagnosed for cancer in the summer of 1996, 

had three surgeries and radiation treatment, that she 

sought staff assistance as an accommodation to her 

medical condition, that several requests for accommodation 

were ignored and that she was fired as a result of her 

disability and medical needs and efforts to receive the 

accommodation she claimed was due. Moreover, in 

Churchill II she was seeking a recovery for essentially the 

same wrongful conduct for which she obtained a recovery 

in Churchill I. 

Thus, we conclude that the district court properly found 

that the claims were the same under Athlone, and that 

claim preclusion should apply. There is simply no escaping 

from the fact that Churchill has relied on different legal 

theories to seek redress from the Appellees for a single 

course of wrongful conduct. Because the claims were the 

same, Churchill asserted a single cause of action in both 

cases that the doctrine of claim preclusion required her to 

have joined in one suit. Thus, this case at bottom is simply 

a classic example of splitting a cause of action. 10 

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9. Specifically, Churchill I's complaint does not specify that Smith 

replaced Schreiber, but merely identifies Schreiber as her temporary 

supervisor, and identifies Smith as "at all times [Churchill's] Manager"; 

states that Churchill had and was treated for cancer, but does not 

specify the side effects suffered; states that on January 29, 1997, 

"[Churchill] provided sufficient notice to Defendant Smith that she had 

a serious medical need which qualified [Churchill] for Family Medical 

Leave," but otherwise does not describe how the Appellees became aware 

of her condition, and does not include information about the evaluation 

and how Cox was involved. 

10. It should not be thought that by artful pleading of unnecessary 

allegations in a second complaint a plaintiff can avoid the result we 

reach. 

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B. The Remaining issues 

As we indicated, the Appellees have filed a cross-appeal 

from the denial of sanctions under Rule 11 and Churchill 

has filed an appeal from the denial of certain attorney's fees 

and costs in Churchill I. We have reviewed these appeals 

carefully and have concluded that they are without merit. 

Thus, we will affirm on these appeals without further 

discussion. 

V. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons we will affirm the order entered 

May 28, 1998, on appeal in No. 98-1491, denying 

reconsideration of the order with respect to counsel fees 

and costs, and will affirm the order entered June 23, 1998, 

on appeal on Nos. 98-1632 and 98-1700, granting the

Appellees judgment on the pleadings but denying their 

motion for sanctions. 

A True Copy: 

Teste: 

 Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 

 for the Third Circuit 

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