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i 

88–451 2014

[H.A.S.C. No. 113–106] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2015 

AND 

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, EMERGING 

THREATS AND CAPABILITIES HEARING 

ON

FISCAL YEAR 2015 BUDGET REQUEST FOR 

THE DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY 

AND THE CHEMICAL BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE 

PROGRAM: COMBATING WEAPONS OF 

MASS DESTRUCTION IN A CHANGING 

GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 

HEARING HELD 

APRIL 8, 2014 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, EMERGING THREATS 

AND CAPABILITIES 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas, Chairman 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

JOSEPH J. HECK, Nevada 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

ANDRE ́ CARSON, Indiana 

DANIEL B. MAFFEI, New York 

DEREK KILMER, Washington 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

SCOTT H. PETERS, California 

PETER VILLANO, Professional Staff Member 

TOM NELSON, Professional Staff Member 

MARK LEWIS, Professional Staff Member 

JULIE HERBERT, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2014 

Page 

HEARING: 

Tuesday, April 8, 2014, Fiscal Year 2015 Budget Request for the Defense 

Threat Reduction Agency and the Chemical Biological Defense Program: 

Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction in a Changing Global Environment ...................................................................................................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Tuesday, April 8, 2014 ............................................................................................ 23 

TUESDAY, APRIL 8, 2014 

FISCAL YEAR 2015 BUDGET REQUEST FOR THE DEFENSE THREAT 

REDUCTION AGENCY AND THE CHEMICAL BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE 

PROGRAM: COMBATING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION IN A 

CHANGING GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Langevin, Hon. James R., a Representative from Rhode Island, Ranking 

Member, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Emerging Threats and Capabilities 1 

Thornberry, Hon. Mac, a Representative from Texas, Chairman, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Emerging Threats and Capabilities .................................. 1 

WITNESSES 

Hersman, Rebecca K.C., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, Department of Defense ......................... 4 

Myers, Kenneth A., III, Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency ................. 5 

Spencer, Carmen J., Joint Program Executive Officer for Chemical and Biological Defense, Department of Defense ............................................................. 6 

Weber, Andrew C., Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, 

and Biological Defense Programs, Department of Defense .............................. 2 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Hersman, Rebecca K.C. .................................................................................... 35 

Myers, Kenneth A., III ..................................................................................... 45 

Spencer, Carmen J. .......................................................................................... 62 

Weber, Andrew C. ............................................................................................. 27 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Franks ........................................................................................................ 77 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.] 

(1) 

FISCAL YEAR 2015 BUDGET REQUEST FOR THE DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY AND THE CHEMICAL BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAM: COMBATING 

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION IN A CHANGING 

GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, EMERGING

THREATS AND CAPABILITIES, Washington, DC, Tuesday, April 8, 2014. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:04 a.m., in room 

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mac Thornberry (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MAC THORNBERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

INTELLIGENCE, EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Subcommittee will come to order. Today we 

are holding a hearing on combating weapons of mass destruction 

in a changing global environment. 

This is part of our regular series of hearings in preparation for 

the 2015 National Defense Authorization Act and we are focusing 

today primarily on the budget for the Defense Threat Reduction 

Agency [DTRA] and Chemical Biological Defense Programs. 

So I appreciate very much all of our witnesses being here. Hopefully you all understand that schedules are difficult, with four votes 

and a variety of things. 

So with that in mind, I am going to forego any further opening 

statement and yield to the distinguished gentleman from Rhode Island. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. LANGEVIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM RHODE ISLAND, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Well thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I want to thank our witnesses for being here today. 

My opening statement is going to be very brief, but the report 

of the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review [QDR], as the ones before 

it, recognized that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 

be they nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological, remains a 

great threat to our country, our allies, and our friends. Conventional strategic deterrence is a key component to our national defense, and the nuclear surety program is an important part of that. 
2 

However, keeping WMD [weapons of mass destruction] out of the 

hands of violent extremists remains a significant challenge. In an 

increasingly connected world there is real potential for those weapons-related technologies to spread and evolve, especially when you 

are dealing with dual-use technologies, which are hard to know 

what the original purposes were, whether it is going to be nefarious 

intent or for something that is necessary or positive. 

Accordingly, the QDR states that the global prevention, detection, and response efforts are essential to address dangers across 

the WMD spectrum before they confront the homeland. 

Our witnesses today represent organizations critical to those 

tasks, and I look forward to hearing about your efforts. 

However, it appears that the trends for your budget requests are 

on a downward path, and I find that concerning. Funding is decreasing as the threats we face are becoming more prolific and sophisticated, including as yet unknown pathogens or nontraditional 

chemical agents or weaponized biologics. 

Today we seek a better understanding of how these budget proposals will meet our national security requirements for countering 

WMD. Look forward to your testimony. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And with that I will yield back. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank the gentleman. 

I will just say I share his concerns. I think he is right. 

We are pleased to have Mr. Andrew Weber, Assistant Secretary 

of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs; 

Ms. Rebecca Hersman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction; Mr. Kenneth Myers, Director of Defense Threat Reduction Agency; and Mr. Carmen Spencer, Joint Program Executive Officer, Chemical and Biological Defense. 

Without objection, your complete written statements will be 

made part of the record, and you will each be recognized to summarize your comments if you can. 

Mr. Weber. 

STATEMENT OF ANDREW C. WEBER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY 

OF DEFENSE FOR NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL 

DEFENSE PROGRAMS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Mr. WEBER. Thank you. 

Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Langevin, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting us to 

testify about Department of Defense [DOD] countering weapons of 

mass destruction programs. I am pleased to be here with my esteemed colleagues. 

While my testimony for the record provides more detail, I want 

to briefly highlight two examples of what we have achieved recently through our country’s investments in countering chemical, 

biological, and nuclear threats. The first is the Department’s contribution to destroying serious chemical weapons materials, which 

the Assad regime used to kill civilians in Syria last summer and 

posed a looming threat to Israel, Jordan, and the region. 

This week a team of U.S. Army civilians arrived in Rota, Spain, 

to begin their mission of neutralizing some of Syria’s most dan-
3 

gerous chemicals. They will perform this work aboard the motor 

vessel [MV] Cape Ray using Field Deployable Hydrolysis Systems. 

Carmen, Ken, and others on our team led some of the greatest 

scientists, engineers, and managers in the Department of Defense 

to develop these systems within just 6 months based on safe, proven chemical weapons destruction technology—a true testament to 

what the Department of Defense can contribute to U.S. and international security. I hope you will join me in keeping the team 

aboard the Cape Ray in your thoughts through the coming months 

as they help to eliminate the destabilizing threat of Syria’s chemical weapons program. 

Their work follows on the heels of our success in assisting the 

Libyans in destroying the last of Gaddafi’s weapons of mass destruction. Through DOD’s Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction [CTR] program, we provided security upgrades, technical expertise, and support to the transitional council and elected government of Libya. 

This February I joined our Libyan partners, U.S. Ambassador 

Deborah Jones, the director general of the Nobel Prize-winning Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and others to 

celebrate the destruction of Libya’s last chemical weapons. In both 

Tripoli and at the destruction site near Waddan, we had the honor 

of meeting dozens of Libyan workers who have put an end to the 

threat of Gaddafi’s weapons of mass destruction. 

These are just two recent examples of our success in leading U.S. 

innovation and developing international partnerships to mitigate 

the risk of states, terrorist organizations, or rogue individuals accessing and using chemical, biological, and nuclear materials. 

The President’s fiscal year 2015 budget request allows us to continue countering the threat of weapons of mass destruction in an 

astonishing variety of ways. Our work ranges from pathogen consolidation and medical biodefense and countermeasure work, biodefense preparedness with the Republic of Korea, to nuclear 

counterterrorism and threat reduction cooperation with two of our 

closest allies—the United Kingdom and France—to our efforts to 

improve our response to a potential nuclear incident or accident 

here in the United States. 

I hope my testimony for the record highlights that we are leading 

the Department of Defense in innovation and agility, countering 

the weapons of mass destruction threats that exist today and foreseeing, preparing for, and preventing those that may emerge in the 

future. This work is critical for protecting the American people and 

promoting U.S. security interests globally. 

I appreciate the opportunity you have given us to testify today 

and would be pleased to answer your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Weber can be found in the Appendix on page 27.] 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. 

Ms. Hersman. 
4 

STATEMENT OF REBECCA K.C. HERSMAN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR COUNTERING WEAPONS OF 

MASS DESTRUCTION, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Ms. HERSMAN. Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member 

Langevin, and members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to testify today with my colleagues from the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, and the Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense about 

DOD’s ongoing efforts to counter the threats posed by weapons of 

mass destruction. 

Pursuit and potential use of WMD by actors of concern pose a 

grave threat to the security of the United States as well as that 

of our allies and partners around the world. The constant evolution 

of weapons materials, tactics, and technologies will continue to 

challenge our ability to deter, detect, and defend against these 

threats. 

At the same time, the interconnectedness of global communities 

allows WMD threats to proliferate at the speed of an airliner, a 

missile, or even the Internet. Countering such threats requires 

flexible and agile responses, capable partners, as well as whole-ofdepartment, whole-of-government, and even whole-of-internationalcommunity solutions. 

For DOD, cooperation is a force multiplier, enabling swift, comprehensive action to respond to existing and emerging WMD 

threats. The extraordinary effort to deal with serious chemical 

weapons program unprecedented in its scale, speed, and complexity, is a case in point. 

Today, thanks to our international partners and support from 

Congress, Syria’s chemical weapons program is on the path to 

elimination. The centerpiece of the U.S. contribution, the motor 

vessel Cape Ray, is outfitted with DOD’s recently developed Field 

Deployable Hydrolysis Systems and manned by the finest experts 

from our operational and technical communities. It is now ready to 

neutralize the most dangerous chemicals in the Syrian arsenal in 

a safe, secure, and environmentally sound fashion. 

This type of creative, collaborative approach to a WMD challenge 

can’t be the exception; it must be the rule. 

In addition to chemical weapons threats, other WMD concerns 

warrant similar collaborative approaches today. On the biological 

front, advancing technology, unsecured pathogen stores, and weak 

national controls create dangerous opportunities for hostile state 

and non-state actors to acquire, proliferate, or use biological agents 

with potentially catastrophic consequences. 

To protect our forces, reduce risks to our citizens, and respond 

effectively to crises, DOD must build holistic solutions across its 

bio-prevention and biodefense efforts. We will continue to prioritize 

efforts to secure pathogens worldwide, foster a strong bio-security 

culture, enhance detection and strategic warning, and integrate 

more effectively with partners. 

At the same time, we must protect our forces against a broader 

range of biological agents and preserve their ability to dominate 

the battlefield even when biological risks are present. We recognize 

that DOD’s efforts to protect our forces and our security from biological threats rely heavily on the broader public health infrastruc-
5 

ture, and accordingly, we have strengthened relationships with 

health services, academia, and industry partners. 

This need for cross-cutting collaboration is required at the international level, as well. The administration’s Global Health Security 

Agenda, which calls for accelerated international progress in improving capacities to prevent, detect, and respond to outbreaks of 

infectious disease, is fully aligned with DOD priorities and allows 

us to leverage our existing investments effectively in support of enhanced global capacities. 

Of course, nuclear threats also remain a prominent concern. Unless arrested and reversed, the nuclear ambitions of countries like 

North Korea and Iran can imperil the interests of the United 

States and our allies and partners around the world, creating instability and increasing the likelihood that other nations may seek 

to become nuclear-armed states. 

Our goal remains to prevent proliferation and prevent the loss of 

control of nuclear materials, components, or weapons themselves 

through better nuclear security and proliferation prevention efforts. 

At the same time, however, DOD will continue to work closely with 

U.S. interagency and foreign partners to enhance our planning and 

capabilities for nuclear terrorist threats or incidents. 

Looking ahead, our counter-WMD efforts must address not only 

today’s challenges but also those that may emerge in the future. In 

doing so, we must bring the full countering WMD tool kit to bear, 

leveraging partnerships and lessons learned to respond quickly and 

decisively. 

I thank you for your support for the fiscal year 2015 budget and 

look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Hersman can be found in the Appendix on page 35.] 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. 

Mr. Myers. 

STATEMENT OF KENNETH A. MYERS III, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE 

THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY 

Mr. MYERS. Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Langevin, 

members of the subcommittee, it is an honor to be here today to 

share with you the work being done to counter the threats posed 

by the proliferation and use of weapons of mass destruction. 

There are three entities co-located at our facility at Fort Belvoir: 

the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, the United States Strategic 

Command Center [SCC] for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the United States Strategic Command [USSTRATCOM] 

Standing Joint Force Headquarters for Elimination. Each one of 

these entities has different mission areas, authorities, requirements, and funding, but they are all located together and intertwined in order to leverage expertise and coordinate efforts. 

Our success is determined by what doesn’t happen—what we 

prevent, what we help to interdict, what we eliminate, what we 

mitigate, and how prepared we are to respond. 

As a combat support agency we are available 24 hours a day to 

support the combatant commands and military services to respond 

to any WMD threat. This requires us to not only address current 

needs but also to anticipate future threats to our warfighters. 
6 

At our Defense Agency role we manage a research and development portfolio to develop tools and capabilities. In fact, DTRA provides the Special Operations Command with all of their counterproliferation science and technology. 

As a USSTRATCOM Center, we support the synchronization of 

Department of Defense planning efforts to counter weapons of mass 

destruction. And the complementary Standing Joint Force Headquarters for Elimination provides operational support for U.S. military task forces in hostile environments. 

One of the best examples of the capabilities that DTRA/SCC can 

provide and the missions that we take on is our work in Syria. We 

had the expertise to evaluate the serious WMD threat; we developed the needed technology with Carmen Spencer and his team at 

Edgewood; and we provided planning support to all aspects of the 

operation. Now the Cape Ray, the ship that houses the two Field 

Deployable Hydrolysis Systems, stands ready to begin destruction 

once all the chemical materials are out of Syria. 

Another mission-critical area for us is the intersection of terrorism and the acquisition of WMD materials, particularly biological threats. This is an emerging and evolving threat and we are expanding our areas of cooperation to stay one step ahead. 

We work closely with the Centers for Disease Control [CDC] and 

we often pursue global health security projects together internationally. CDC handles public health issues but they are not 

equipped to address the security threats posed by deadly pathogens. We are. 

I am proud to announce that earlier this year we signed a memorandum of understanding and strategy for joint work with the 

CDC. These documents will maximize our effectiveness related to 

bio-threats around the world and ensure there is no duplication of 

efforts. 

Finally, DTRA/SCC recently completed the destruction of 

weaponized mustard agent in Libya. As ASD [Assistant Secretary 

of Defense] Weber mentioned, we destroyed 517 mustard-filled artillery rounds, eight 500-pound aerial bombs, and 45 launch tubes. 

I am proud of what our team has achieved and believe that we 

are good stewards of the taxpayer’s dollar. 

As we look to fiscal year 2015, I am confident that we are prepared to address future WMD threats around the world. I am hopeful that the committee will fully support our budget and allow us 

to continue our important work. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to be here today, and I 

would be pleased to respond to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Myers can be found in the Appendix on page 45.] 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. 

Mr. Spencer. 

STATEMENT OF CARMEN J. SPENCER, JOINT PROGRAM EXECUTIVE OFFICER FOR CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE, 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Mr. SPENCER. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Langevin, and 

distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on behalf of the Department of Defense Chem-
7 

ical and Biological Defense Program. I am going to provide an update regarding the program’s contribution to the mission of countering weapons of mass destruction. 

The fiscal year 2015 budget request for the program includes 

$320.5 million for procurement, $553.6 million for advanced development, and $407.2 million for science and technology efforts, for 

a total of $1.387 billion. The budget request supports the program’s 

four enduring strategic goals of equipping the force, preventing surprise, maintaining our infrastructure, and leading the enterprise. 

Continued realization of these goals is significantly impacted by 

progress in our emphasis areas of medical countermeasures, 

diagnostics, biosurveillance, and nontraditional agent defense. 

Medical countermeasures include capabilities to protect our 

warfighters against chemical, biological, and radiological threats. 

We develop both prophylaxes, such as vaccines to immunize personnel, and therapeutics to treat personnel in the event of exposure. 

To harmonize our efforts with other Federal agencies, DOD participates in a Public Health Emergency Medical Countermeasures 

Enterprise, which is led by the Department of Health and Human 

Services. Typifying coordination within this interagency body is the 

Portfolio Advisory Committee, which works to ensure that we align 

DOD and Health and Human Services resources for medical countermeasures development. 

To accelerate the fulfillment of our unique requirements we are 

establishing the DOD Medical Countermeasures Advanced Development and Manufacturing Capability. The intent is flexible and 

modular manufacturing to support DOD quantities, which are significantly less than Health and Human Services quantities for the 

overall U.S. population. We are working with our unique industrial 

base, which in this specialized area is normally small business. 

With respect to DOD diagnostics, the ability to rapidly identify 

agents of concern, we have sharpened our portfolio by increasing 

the capability of our fielded product while moving forward to develop our follow-on system. The plan is for this follow-on capability, 

known as the next-generation diagnostic system, to replace the currently fielded joint bio agent identification and diagnostic system 

beginning in 2017. 

Consistent with the National Strategy for Biosurveillance and 

Global Health Security Agenda, we are applying our expertise and 

equipment to improve situational awareness for the warfighter. A 

prime example is our ongoing Joint United States Forces Korea 

Portal and Integrated Threat Recognition advanced technology 

demonstration, also known by the acronym JUPITR. Currently underway, this effort is providing specific detection and analysis resources to address the need for biosurveillance on the Korean Peninsula. 

Regarding nontraditional agents, the fiscal year 2015 budget request supports continued evaluation of threats and the testing of 

developmental technology to enhance the capability of our current 

systems. To address the need for a near-term capability to combat 

emerging threat materials we have already provided 57 domestic 

response capability kits to the National Guard Weapons of Mass 
8 

Destruction Civil Support Teams, which include detection, personnel protection, and decontamination capabilities. 

Lastly, for the mission to destroy Syrian chemical weapons the 

DOD created the Field Deployable Hydrolysis System, a transportable, high-throughput neutralization system designed to convert 

chemical warfare material into compounds unusable as weapons. 

The DOD response in this case is an excellent example of innovation and agility. 

An acquisition effort was launched in February 2013 and the 

first system delivered less than 6 months later. The capability is 

now deployed. When the ship Cape Ray receives Syrian chemical 

warfare materials it will head out to international waters to carry 

out the process of destruction using the capability that the U.S. 

would not have had but for this rapid effort. 

As this subcommittee is well aware, a confluence of technological, 

political, economic factors are making the current security environment as challenging as any the Congress and the President have 

faced in the Nation’s history. Continued collaboration is critical to 

maintaining the technological advantage currently held by our 

forces. 

Mr. Chairman, Congressman Langevin, and members of the subcommittee, on behalf of the men and the women of the Chemical 

and Biological Defense Program, thank you again for the opportunity to testify, and thank you for your continued support. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Spencer can be found in the Appendix on page 62.] 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. 

Before we begin questioning I might just alert everyone of two 

facts. One is, it seems votes have been moved up much sooner, and 

so we are going to have votes called here in 10, 15 minutes or so. 

Secondly, Mr. Weber, by previous agreement, has to go to another subcommittee at 3:30 p.m., so if we have questions for him 

we are probably going to have to get him now because by the time 

we come back he will have been taken away from us. So I might 

just alert everybody to that. 

I will yield first 5 minutes to Mr. Franks. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Weber, I will go ahead and take advantage of that opportunity. 

In your current role you are charged to prevent and protect 

against nuclear, chemical, and biological threats, just as you have 

done throughout your many years of public service, and I know 

that you have great insight in the impact of nuclear weapon use 

or EMP [electromagnetic pulse] attack could have on our critical infrastructure, including, of course, DOD. I know that DOD has, over 

the years, spent ridiculous amounts of money hardening—in a good 

way, in my judgment—hardening our triad and our missile defense 

capabilities and things because of the potential of having to deal 

with that—having to fight through that environment. 

And after 10 years of debate in the Pentagon and the Congress 

we still are here with very little effort made to protect our national 

civilian grid upon which the military depends upon for 99 percent 

of its electricity needs, at least in CONUS [contiguous United 

States]. Can you tell me where the threat of EMP attack falls on 
9 

your priority list and what you are doing today to protect our nation from this asymmetric and potentially very dangerous threat? 

Mr. WEBER. Thank you, Congressman. 

The potential threat of electromagnetic pulse is high on our priorities. We work very closely with the services. The Defense Threat 

Reduction Agency plays a critical role in this and Director Myers 

may want to add to my response. 

It starts with building radiation hardness into our systems, having standards that are required. As we design the systems we work 

with the services to ensure that they will function in an EMP environment. 

The testing that we do at Pax River [Naval Air Station Patuxent 

River] is an important part of this and we focus on our nuclear 

command and control systems and our platforms related to the nuclear weapons enterprise, but also to the whole range of general 

purpose capabilities that the services are producing. 

And then finally, DTRA conducts survivability assessments of 

our bases around the world, and EMP and radiation hardness is 

part of those assessments. 

As far as the critical infrastructure, that is primarily, in the 

United States, the responsibility of the Department of Homeland 

Security and we work closely with them. But we also work within 

the Department to try to increase their awareness and share our 

capabilities, really, which are the best in the government of the 

United States. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well thank you, sir. 

Mr. Myers, from what I am seeing, you know, DOD considers nuclear survivability, including EMP survivability, an important factor in its credible deterrent posture, and it has given special attention to all DOD assets considered critical to ensuring our national 

security missions. And back in the 1990s the DOD implemented 

the Military Standard 188–125 to protect themselves from EMP. At 

that time I thought it was a very good standard. 

Now we have a few more decades of information. Do you believe 

that the MIL Standard 188–125 is still the best guideline for protecting critical infrastructure for our national defense against an 

EMP attack? And are you aware of any tests—I want you to be 

careful about what you have to say as far as any sensitive information—are you aware of any tests that may have found that standard inadequate, and what is DTRA doing today to defense against 

that threat? 

Mr. MYERS. Thank you, Congressman. As Assistant Secretary 

Weber mentioned, the EMP threat is something the Defense Threat 

Reduction Agency is very involved in. We work closely with our colleagues, the combatant commands, military services, as well as the 

Defense Science Board, which is also looking at this issue. 

Sir, with your warning in mind, if it is okay I would like to take 

your question for the record—— 

Mr. FRANKS. I think it is very important, Mr. Myers, and I asked 

the question for a very important reason so I hope you will do that. 

And just—— 

Mr. MYERS. I will, sir. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 77.] 
10 

Mr. FRANKS [continuing]. To reiterate, MIL Standard 188–125, 

and it might be good to—perhaps to give our office a briefing if 

there is some opportunity to get some insight as to why we think 

that is important. 

Mr. MYERS. We would be happy to do that, sir. And I know we 

have experts from the Defense Reduction Agency who have briefed 

this committee on a couple of occasions and we will continue to be 

available to do so at the committee’s request. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, sir. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. 

Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And Secretary Weber, I will start with you and then others can 

comment as well, but let me get right to it in that much of the current guidance that we have for our strategy on countering weapons 

of mass destruction quite frankly is several years old. The most recent military strategy on the subject is from 2006. 

However, the world climate has changed significantly since then. 

Have we considered updating our military strategy for countering 

WMD? 

Mr. WEBER. Yes. Absolutely. That strategy is in the process of 

being updated, and I will ask my colleague, DASD [Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense] Hersman, to elaborate since her office is 

leading that effort. 

But the strategy is being updated to reflect changes since the 

last strategy was issued, to reflect the global nature of these 

threats, and as you noted in your opening remarks, the increasing 

availability and proliferation of dual-use technologies around the 

world and an increased emphasis on prevention. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Good. Thank you. 

Secretary Hersman. 

Ms. HERSMAN. Thank you. 

Indeed, the process to develop a new Department of Defense 

strategy to counter weapons of mass destruction is well along. We 

are in the final stages of the approval and signature process, and 

that document will, upon signature, replace the National Military 

Strategy for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction from 2006. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. What is the anticipated completion date? 

Ms. HERSMAN. It is in the final stages, sir, of going through, we 

would expect in a matter of weeks to a month or two—— 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. 

Ms. HERSMAN [continuing]. For signature. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. I know we all look forward to having 

that document completed then. 

Let me turn to this then: The fiscal year 2015 request for DTRA 

is $180 million less than the fiscal year 2014 enacted, and the majority of those cuts are out of the Cooperative Threat Reduction 

program. It is my understanding that Moscow’s unwillingness last 

year to renew the old CTR umbrella agreement has reduced the 

amount of work that we can do in Russia, but this hardly seems 

to explain all of the cuts. 
11 

Are there priorities or goals that are being deferred or scrapped 

because of the budget cuts? And are there other initiatives that the 

program could be pursuing? 

Mr. WEBER. Congressman, we are accepting some risks. These 

are prevention programs, and as Director Myers noted, it is when 

we fail to prevent something, you know, that is the ultimate metric 

for these programs. 

I am comfortable that our investments in biological threat reduction on a global basis as part of the President’s Global Health Security Agenda, in cooperation with CDC, which is really at an unprecedented level, is fully adequate. 

We perhaps could do more in the area of global nuclear security 

because our partners in the Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration are also in a difficult budgetary climate, and I think there is some room—some potential opportunities for increased partnership with them, and those—our dialogue 

with our partners there is underway. 

And also in the area of all-hazards CBRN [chemical, biological, 

radiological, and nuclear] preparedness and response, I think there 

are some opportunities to work with more partners to enhance 

their capacity to prevent, plan, and prepare for, and deal with the 

consequences of a CBRN incident. So we would like to work with 

this subcommittee moving forward to identify future areas of effort. 

Thank you. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. 

Secretary Hersman, do you have something to add? 

Ms. HERSMAN. I agree fully that the budget is sufficient for the 

requirements we have identified for the upcoming year. We believe, 

in addition to the decline in resources that we had to apply to Russia, also the investments we have made in chemical weapons destruction through fiscal year 2014 we think will be completed in 

that year. 

But we do evaluate the program fully every year and are prepared to evaluate new requirements, for example in proliferation 

and prevention, as we go forward in the process. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Well, I know my time is expired but I will just 

say that I think some of these cuts—they really raise red flags with 

me, very concerning. Clearly the threats have not gone away, they 

haven’t diminished, and yet we are cutting areas that I believe that 

we are cutting off our nose to spite our face, and I am concerned 

that we are going to regret the day that we didn’t put proper investments into the programs under your responsibility. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Weber, before we lose you let me just ask a couple things. 

We held a hearing in October with outside experts on bio dangers 

and defenses. In your opinion, are the dangers to our national security from biological agents growing or shrinking? 

Mr. WEBER. The dangers from biological threats to our country 

and our friends and allies is increasing. As the ranking member 

noted in his opening remarks, technologies are increasingly available. 

And I think the threat of biological terrorism is—of the different 

weapons of mass destruction terrorism threats, is probably the 
12 

most likely because it lends itself to small, violent extremist organizations or even individuals. And therefore, it is a much harder 

problem to deal with. We are very concerned about state biological 

weapons programs—for example, the DPRK [Democratic People’s 

Republic of Korea] bio program, which is quite sophisticated. 

But when we look at non-state actors, it is really any country in 

the world could unwittingly provide the materials and the technologies needed for terrorist groups to develop a bioterrorist weapon. So this is why we are putting so much emphasis on this in our 

fiscal year 2015 budget request. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. One of the suggestions made by that outside 

group of witnesses was a coordinator in the White House would be 

of assistance in helping make sure that all of the different agencies 

of government—not only Department of Defense, but HHS [Health 

and Human Services], FDA [Food and Drug Administration], 

Homeland Security—were better coordinated in this very difficult 

area that is not just something that faces our troops; it is something that can face homeland, sir. Just generally, do you think that 

is a good idea or not? 

Mr. WEBER. The White House has played a very important leadership role. Especially in the last few years, we have increased our 

investments on our medical countermeasures capabilities. 

And the advanced development and manufacturing facility that 

Carmen Spencer mentioned that we are funding through the Department of Defense is going to give the Department an agility, an 

on-demand production capability for small batches for our forces or 

perhaps even for just special operations forces that could be exposed to threats that wouldn’t necessarily be as great a concern to 

the homeland. For example, we are the only ones that have a bot 

[botulinum] toxin and a ricin toxin vaccine program. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. And I want to get back into that probably 

after—in greater detail, but my question was, do you think it would 

be helpful to have someone at the White House coordinate across 

these different departments and agencies that otherwise basically 

are left to do so voluntarily? 

Mr. WEBER. It is always helpful, of course, and we do have coordination from the White House, from both the counterterrorism 

side, the resilience side, as well as the countering WMD side. The 

mechanism we use for day-to-day programmatic coordination of our 

portfolio is the Public Health Emergency Medical Countermeasures 

Enterprise that is chaired by the Department of Health and 

Human Services, and the Departments of Defense and Homeland 

Security are active partners in that. 

So we have good coordination day to day. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Okay. Well, I may want to talk more about 

this in just a moment. 

Let me just check. Mr. Johnson, do you have a question specifically for Mr. Weber? Because he will not be able to come back, 

probably, after votes. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, I do. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. I will yield to the gentleman. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. 
13 

Mr. Weber, what did you learn about the benefits of programmatic flexibility and anticipating of emerging threats from the 

Syria chemical weapon destruction mission? 

Mr. WEBER. The lessons from the Syrian chemical weapons destruction mission were that we need that agility and flexibility and 

close partnership with the Intelligence Community. Based on extraordinarily good intelligence on the composition of the Syrian 

chemical weapons stockpile, we were able within just 6 months to 

tailor-make a capability for that stockpile, and it is the Field 

Deployable Hydrolysis System that is now mounted on the Cape 

Ray vessel. So that was one lesson. 

Another lesson was programs like the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative 

Threat Reduction program give us the flexibility to act quickly. We 

used those program resources to help neighbors of Syria—in particular, Jordan—improve its capability to deal with CBRN incidents, to interdict at its borders CBRN proliferation. 

So the lessons are that we need that flexibility, we need that 

close cooperation with the Intelligence Community, and we need an 

expeditionary capability. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. And to what extent has budget cuts 

impacted your ability to fulfill future mission requirements? 

Mr. WEBER. Well I would say in general the budget situation— 

and fortunately we have a little bit of stability in 2014 and 2015, 

but this looming threat of sequestration coming back in fiscal year 

2016 creates uncertainty and is forcing the Department to make 

very, very, very hard choices. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. 

I will yield back. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. With that we are going to—Mr. Weber, you are 

excused because I think we are going to be pretty much an hour 

or 45 minutes or so. 

And so if you all, hopefully, can have a little flexibility in your 

schedules, Tom will buy you a bottle of water or something. And 

in the meantime, we will stand in recess and then we will come 

right back after votes. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. THORNBERRY. We will go ahead and get started as Jim is 

working his way back over here again. 

Thank you all for your patience and understanding with our 

schedule. 

Let me go back to a question I asked Mr. Weber and see if you 

all would like to comment. The point was made in our previous 

hearing, as Mr. Weber said, this is a growing problem, one of the 

more likely scenarios of terrorists using WMD would be with bio, 

but it gets complicated for all the reasons you all know very well. 

And some sort of mechanism to assist in greater coordination 

among the departments and agencies of the government they 

thought was significantly needed. 

Now, you know, I will just say, okay, I know there is coordination 

going on now. But the question is, particularly with something like 

this that goes across several different departments, civilian and 

military—I—maybe it is a little similar to cyber, where we do have 

someone in the White House who is coordinating cyber across dif-
14 

ferent agencies. Shouldn’t we have someone whose specific job responsibilities it is to coordinate in the area of biodefense? 

Ms. Hersman, we will start with you. 

Ms. HERSMAN. Mr. Chairman, I would have to reiterate, we have 

an extensive and robust interagency coordination process that includes representatives from the various elements of the White 

House, and they convene all of those departments and agencies 

that you describe across bio threats. We saw this in terms of the 

Global Health Security Agenda, where those meetings were cochaired and brought together in the development of that, along 

with the very strong interest that the President has brought to the 

overall problem of countering biological threats. 

From my personal vantage point, I don’t feel that I have observed a deficit of coordination. In terms of organizationally, how 

it would be best represented within the White House, I would need 

to defer to them. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Okay. Well I will just say, convening a meeting is not necessarily the end-all be-all in this problem. And I think 

your point is a good one: There is no substitute for Presidential interest and leadership in this or any other area. But the President 

cannot do everything and cannot follow it day to day. 

Let me move to another specific issue that came up during that 

hearing, and that is the—and several of you all referenced it in 

your opening comments—DOD’s own capability to manufacture biodefense drugs and vaccines, and whether or not it might be more 

efficient and in other ways better to have an agreement with HHS 

and their manufacturing capabilities rather than DOD having its 

own. Explain to me why DOD needs its own facilities. 

Mr. SPENCER. Mr. Chairman, I would be happy to do that. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Yes. Mr. Spencer, you mentioned that in your 

opening comments. 

Mr. SPENCER. Yes. For example, Big Pharma and Health and 

Human Services, they are concerned about diseases that will impact the entire U.S. population, so when they put their business 

case analysis together they are talking literally tens of millions of 

doses, and that is what interests Big Pharma. 

In DOD we are talking biological threats of interest that can affect our Armed Forces globally wherever they may have to deploy, 

and we are talking tens of thousands, maybe if we are lucky up to 

200,000 potential doses. Big Pharma is not interested in that. 

As a result of that, we have to deal with small business, and that 

is a good thing. And our dedicated facility that we are constructing 

now in Florida will enable us to have a facility that we can go to 

whenever we need it to develop advanced development and produce 

the vaccines that we need on very short notice, in conjunction with 

the FDA, to meet our battlefield requirements. And it will also give 

us an opportunity to mentor and work with small business to develop their capabilities. 

But it really is a partnership between DOD, small business, and 

the Food and Drug Administration to make this a success. That is 

why we need a dedicated facility for DOD. 

Now that said, we work very hard and we meet monthly with 

Health and Human Services to develop our prioritization for what 

we are both developing to ensure that there is no overlap, no waste 
15 

of resources, and we are both doing what is best for the Nation for 

both not only the Armed Forces but for the Nation as a whole. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Why do you need your own facility versus 

walling off part of one of the bigger HHS facilities dedicated for 

DOD’s use? 

Mr. SPENCER. Having the ability to go directly to a facility that 

we control, where we control the schedule, the priority of what goes 

in there, is modular, very flexible under today’s technological 

standards, and pre-FDA-approved for the types of vaccines that we 

need to develop is critical for us. 

Again, HHS in their facilities, they are not focused on developing 

weaponized biological agents that are very toxic and very deadly. 

They are more focused on endemic diseases and preparing the U.S. 

population. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Well, I hope they are prepared for a biological 

terrorist event. I think you could be a good influence on them, and 

then maybe they could be a helpful influence on you all. 

I mean, I hear your point. I think it is important. I just worry 

that we are going down two different paths—separate paths—and 

the world is not going to work that way; it is all going to be jumbled up together and it is going to be hard to pick out one versus 

another. And obviously, this sort of dual-track preparation comes 

at added cost, as well. 

I would yield to Mr. Langevin for any questions he would like. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I will echo the chairman’s concern. And I am worried that 

we are going to see duplication of effort or the investment being too 

thin across a variety of the areas because the resources aren’t just 

there, as opposed to trying to better coordinate and focus on the 

real threats that we do face—the country. 

And I would take issue with the statement that HHS may not 

be focused on weaponized biologics. I know, for example, having 

chaired the former Homeland Security Subcommittee on Emerging 

Threats and Capabilities, that HHS was, in fact, looking at biodefenses for anthrax, including weaponized anthrax. So I know 

that they do have a focus on that. It has been a while and I don’t 

know exactly what, you know, again, the progress that has been 

made. 

But I would tend, in these times of reduced resources, I think it 

makes much more sense to reassess and to see how we can better 

coordinate these activities and make sure the investments being 

made are in the right areas based upon the most likely threats or 

types of things that might be developed that would threaten our 

populations or our troops. 

So let me, on this—to give point, let me just turn to a question. 

In a recent Defense Science Board report from October of last year 

titled ‘‘Technology and Innovation Enablers for Superiority in 

2030,’’ the board concluded that the opportunity for technological 

surprise is greatest for WMDs and expressed concerns about the 

ability to detect the signatures associated with weapons of mass destruction, given the advancements of technologies that would reduce or even eliminate some of the signatures we depend upon 

today. The impacts of such technological shift would be extremely 

grave in many regards. 
16 

Could each of you respond to the board’s conclusion and assess 

whether you feel our counter-WMD efforts are posturing us appropriately to deal with future threats? And perhaps, you know, in 

that you could address my concern about not sufficient coordination 

with each—across government on WMD. 

Mr. MYERS. Ranking Member Langevin, I will take a first try at 

your question. 

First and foremost, our counter-WMD programs are based upon 

the threat. It is based upon the evaluation that we are receiving 

from the Intelligence Community. That is what is guiding us. 

So the prospect for surprise is always there. It is always a concern. But we are staying very closely tied with the information that 

we are receiving from resources and sources all over the world. And 

in a lot of cases those sources and resources that we are getting 

information from are partners that we are cooperating with in SubSaharan Africa, in the Middle East, in Southeast Asia. 

And one of the things that we have been discussing today is the 

focus on the biological threat, as you both have pointed out. And 

one of the things that has occurred during my tenure at the Defense Threat Reduction Agency is a real shift. 

I mean, 5 years ago when I was before this committee I was talking about a lot of the efforts that we had underway in Russia in 

the former Soviet Union in terms of nuclear, chemical, and biological threats. And today we are here talking to you a lot about our 

programs in Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. 

And I believe that is for two reasons: one, we have been successful in working with the states, the former Soviet Union, and addressing many of the threats that are there; but secondly, we are 

trying to stay one step ahead of the threat, and we know there are 

violent extremist organizations [VEOs] and terrorist groups that 

are seeking weapons of mass destruction in those new areas, and 

that is why you will see our budget continue to evolve, because we 

are seeking to stay one step ahead. 

We are also trying to get upstream, if you will—further to the 

left, in terms of disrupting potential VEO and terrorist efforts. I 

will tell you, I—as Assistant Secretary Weber was answering the 

question earlier, just in the last 2 weeks we have seen an Ebola 

outbreak in Guinea, and we have seen a ricin incident at Georgetown University. I mean, polar ends—polar opposite, if you will, on 

the threat spectrum, if you will—obviously one naturally occurring, 

one man-made. 

But it really shows a diversity of the threat that we are trying 

to address. 

I would also say, I have been to visit our employees working in 

these locations, and I will just share one story or one vignette. A 

health clinic in Sub-Saharan Africa—it was there because there are 

significant outbreaks of anthrax and other types of infectious diseases, and this health clinic keeps those strains on file so they can 

compare potential outbreaks against what they have there. 

And the problem that they encounter—they have a real-world 

health reason to have these things, and the concern is the safety 

and security in which they are being stored. Do people know who 

has access to it? Is the security surrounding it more than just a 

wax seal on the refrigerator? 
17 

Is there a computerized tracking mechanism so everybody knows 

who was the last person in the room? Who was the last person who 

had access to it? Why did they have access to it? What were they 

doing with it? 

And it is these types of programs or these types of projects that 

we are attempting to stay one step ahead of the threat. And I will 

tell you, every single dollar that we can spend at the source makes 

our response and makes our efforts much more effective and more 

efficient than if we try to intercept or intercede or react once the 

threat has left its source. 

So I would just say, in direct response to your question, Congressman Langevin, we are working very, very hard to stay ahead 

of the curve. We have to be perfect every single day. And so far we 

have got a pretty good track record, but the future is clearly ominous. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. But that doesn’t really go to the heart of the 

question of why shouldn’t we reassess how we are doing this and 

pull resources and have—much better coordination and collaboration? I mean, that is what science is. It is research; it is investment; it is collaboration and sharing knowledge. And wouldn’t that 

be a force multiplier in itself that would yield return on investment 

and hopefully help to speed the defenses for WMD or particularly 

advanced biologics that we would—that would threaten our populations? 

Mr. MYERS. Ms. Hersman and I were just discussing who might 

be the best person to respond to your question, Congressman. Let 

us split in two, if you would, and I will kind of take the technical 

side and Ms. Hersman will tackle the policy side. 

On the technical side, sir, I would just say that that kind of cooperation and coordination is occurring today. And I understand 

that is not the question that you are asking, but I just want to put 

your mind at ease a little bit. 

That is exactly why we developed the relationship that we did 

with the Centers for Disease Control, and that is why we are pursuing similar relationships with the other actors that you outlined. 

And it is because it is very difficult to distinguish sometimes what 

phase this threat may be in. Is it in a public health stage? Is it 

in a security stage? 

And right now what we are doing with the Centers for Disease 

Control is actually sitting down with them on a daily basis and developing country strategies. In other words, if we are going to engage in country X, the country teams that are working in that from 

the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, from OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] Policy, from elsewhere, as well as the Centers 

for Disease Control and Department of Health and Human Services 

are sitting down and identifying who is going to do what in each 

of the elements that are identified as a potential threat risk or opportunity for engagement. 

Again, I will leave the policy side to Ms. Hersman but I just 

want to assure you that that kind of coordination is happening 

right now. It is getting started, clearly could always move faster, 

could always do more countries quicker. But we are doing that 

right now and I think you are going to see a significant improvement in the days and weeks ahead on that matter. 
18 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. 

Ms. HERSMAN. Thank you. I would just add—I would agree, first 

of all, that indications and warning for WMD development programs and activities are indeed becoming harder to come by, and 

the opportunity for more strategic knowledge about how that development is occurring is, in fact, more difficult, especially as programs get smaller, are more focused on breakout capabilities within states, or smaller even laboratory or bench scale capabilities on 

behalf of potential non-state actors. 

I think as we look ahead we need to think about, are there new 

areas to look for indications and warning and how might we want 

to target our resources and our efforts overall? A couple I may suggest: First of all, we need to look carefully at following people and 

not just things and capability development, because at the end of 

the day, sometimes it is, in fact, the people who may be our indications and warning whether that represents an insider threat in a 

facility or a location or very good network tracking of potential nonstate actors. 

The other thing that we are trying to look very carefully at is, 

where do we see problems becoming co-located, whether that is the 

presence of endemic disease and potentially hostile actors and 

weak government controls in a location, or where are there just opportunities in ungoverned territories and the presence or influx of 

extremist elements where they might have freedom of action to develop capabilities? We want to turn and look carefully there so that 

we can try to identify some of those problems before they fully 

emerge. 

Mr. MYERS. Sir, if I may, I—let me make one last statement with 

regard to—if Mr. Weber were here I know he would be making this 

statement to you, so let me mention this. One of his biggest priorities over the last 12, 24, perhaps even longer is really increasing 

our ability to understand situational awareness—up-to-the-minute 

developments and changes so that we can be aware, we can serve 

and provide information and expertise to the combatant commands, 

to the military services. The situational awareness tool has been a 

high priority for him and has been for the Department. 

We are making some significant strides, and I think when you 

see—as that continues to mature and as you see that developing 

to an everyday tool, I think the comfort level will also increase significantly. 

Sorry to interrupt. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. That is okay. Thank you. 

Mr. SPENCER. One comment. Preventing technological surprise 

and trying to get to the left of an incident is critical for the 

warfighter. As a result of that, in our basic and applied research 

a significant amount of money, based upon what we know today on 

nontraditional agents and emerging threats, we are pooling the resources of academia as well as industry by giving them just enough 

data to come up with innovative approaches to very, very tough 

problems. 

Additionally, based upon what we know today on emerging 

threats and nontraditional agents, we have tested and revalidated 

the current capabilities—protective capabilities—of all of our protective gear that we provide to our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and 
19 

marines to make sure that it can withstand the threats that we 

know today. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Well, we are going to have to continue to keep 

focus on this, and I—again, I hope we are not squandering time 

and resources on a very serious problem. So thank you for your 

work. 

And I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Myers, can you just give us a brief overview of Cooperative 

Threat Reduction and what it is doing today? 

Mr. MYERS. Yes, sir. The largest area of expenditure for the program is in the biological threat reduction area, as we have just 

been discussing. And it is also—you can really watch the numbers 

over the last several years—really focused on these new areas of 

engagement—Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, Southeast 

Asia. So that would be the largest portion of the CTR program. 

Secondly, I would point out to you that the Proliferation Prevention Program is another large area of investment. And this is 

where we are seeking to engage with partner countries to help 

them become better partners with us in terms of deterring or potentially interdicting and/or detecting WMD proliferation. I will 

give you a couple of examples. 

We are working very carefully with the coast guard of the Philippines to help them develop a capability to have better maritime 

situational awareness around their islands where there is an awful 

lot of traffic. Obviously a concern is WMD proliferation, but obviously drugs, human trafficking, and things such as that. So there 

are dual-use benefits. 

Obviously this year the other major area of investment is our 

work in Syria, and the outfitting of the Cape Ray with the Field 

Deployable Hydrolysis System that Carmen Spencer’s team built 

and put together, and the operations and the security that is engaged with that. 

In addition, we still have ongoing nuclear security projects that 

we are engaged in as part of the President’s strategy and the import he has placed on the threat of nuclear terrorism. We have a 

number of projects, in terms of building centers of excellence to 

share best practices on security and safety as well as ongoing security efforts in countries around the world. 

And lastly, obviously, we are maintaining—we must maintain an 

ability—a capability to continue to respond to these unforeseen or 

unknown threats today. So Libya is a perfect example. We knew 

of the threat there for a number of years; we were able to develop, 

through our research and development, an arm of the agency, a 

technical solution to that, again, with the experts in Carmen Spencer’s shop. And when the opportunity for cooperation with the Libyan government appeared we were able to move very, very quickly. 

Lastly, I would be remiss if I didn’t tell you, while all these programs are going on we are making sure that we have the ability 

in-house to do the audits and examinations to ensure that the 

money and the assistance and the projects and the contracts that 

we are executing are actually meeting the requirements that were 

identified and serving the U.S. taxpayers wisely and appropriately. 
20 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Are there any of those CTR projects in Russia 

still? 

Mr. MYERS. Yes. There are projects that were ongoing with the 

Russian Federation at the beginning of the hostilities in Ukraine, 

and a number of them were put on pause and were put on hold. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. And so right now all of those projects are on 

hold or not all of them? 

Mr. MYERS. At the current time I believe they are—I am sorry. 

There are three projects that will be moving forward in the near 

future—continuation of them. I can run through them with you if 

you would like. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Please. 

Mr. MYERS. The first is a dismantlement of the Delta III ballistic 

missile submarine, and the view was that that was in U.S. national 

security interest to continue. Secondly was the transportation of 

nuclear fuel from an Alfa and a Papa submarine, and I think that 

that is it. Those are the only projects that are moving forward at 

this time. 

The other projects that are underway are currently delayed or on 

hold. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. And about how many of them are there that 

are on hold? 

Mr. MYERS. As far as I know, just one. 

Go ahead. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Yes. Ms. Hersman. 

Ms. HERSMAN. Those two projects actually represent the bulk of 

current activities that were identified as part of this transition 

from the traditional CTR program with Russia and that were going 

to be administered through this arrangement with DOE [Department of Energy]. Most of the other activities are fairly small-scale, 

but we have established mechanisms in cooperation with DOE so 

we can engage in joint projects and multilateral efforts with the 

Russians under CTR auspices. 

But those two are the bulk of the ongoing activity. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Okay. Other than the CTR programs we have 

just talked about, are there other efforts we still have ongoing with 

Russia in chemical or biological or nuclear areas? 

Mr. MYERS. Sir, the only thing I would add directly in a bilateral 

sense with Russia is obviously we are continuing the audits and examinations to ensure that the assistance or the cooperation we 

have had in the past continue to meet the letter of the requirements that were jointly developed by the United States and Russia, 

so that is ongoing. And obviously, this is not a bilateral CTR issue, 

but there is a level of cooperation and coordination with the situation ongoing in Syria. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Sure. Sure. 

Mr. MYERS. And they are playing a role there on the ground and 

also in support offshore with security. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Okay. On the subject of Syria—and I am not 

sure if Mr. Spencer or Ms. Hersman can answer this best, whichever one of you: Why are we waiting to get all the material out before we start to do something with it? 

Ms. HERSMAN. If I may, I will start. There is both a policy-level 

and a technical answer to that question. 
21 

First and foremost, the team that is waiting is being led by the 

Danes and the Norwegians, and the Maritime Task Force is off the 

coast of Latakia and is coming in and out to take the shipments 

onboard. It is vastly preferable to move all of those chemicals that 

will be moving onward to destruction locations for ‘‘Priority Two’’ 

chemicals or those ‘‘Priority Ones’’ that will be coming aboard the 

Cape Ray, and to make those movements all in one step. 

In the case of the Cape Ray, we need to go through a transload 

operation and have the Cape Ray join up at the Port of Gioia Tauro 

in Italy to transfer those items from the Danish vessel, the Arch 

Ventura. There is a strong preference to do that transload in one 

movement, and that will enable the technical side to make best use 

of the equipment and to destroy those chemicals most effectively. 

If we were to shuttle back and forth we would lose a lot of time 

in transition and we would have some additional significant complexities in terms of managing how we would do those transload 

operations multiple times. The Italians strongly prefer a single operation. 

Mr. SPENCER. From a technical perspective, the operators onboard the MV Cape Ray are my operators, and there are 64 brave 

volunteers going on this mission. It is a dangerous mission. Any 

time you are handling live chemical agents and going through a destruction process there is an inherent danger that is imposed. 

Transloading and handling the chemicals is the most dangerous 

part, and we would prefer to do that in one shipment, as Ms. 

Hersman stated. 

Also, once we start destroying the chemical agents themselves 

onboard the Cape Ray we would prefer to have them all there, 

start once, start slow, our primary concern being safety and protection of the environment, and get it done as quickly and as safely 

as we possibly can. And doing it in one large batch will enable us 

to accomplish that in much quicker time. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. One other thing I wanted to ask about, back 

on the subject of bio agents. Some years ago I participated in a war 

game at National Defense University, where the bio agent was 

foot-and-mouth disease in cattle. And whoever would like to describe this, can you—we talked about, obviously, the human diseases, but there is the potential for animals’ diseases to also play 

a huge role in a potential bioterrorist event, or other hostile act, 

is pretty enormous, too. 

Describe for me a little bit how we are bringing in the animal 

health part of this. 

Ms. HERSMAN. I would fully agree that veterinary and agricultural biological agents can pose a grave hazard and a substantial 

economic disruption anywhere they might materialize. I am familiar with the war game that you attended, and it was enlightening, 

I think, for many of us who participated. So it is a top priority to 

make sure that veterinary and agricultural elements are brought 

overall with the human health aspects when we look at countering 

biological threats. 

I know we account for that within our Cooperative Biological Engagement Program through the CTR program. They actively partner with both sides of that equation, on the agricultural and veteri-
22 

nary elements within countries as well as in their public health 

sector. 

For some of those details I would like to turn to Director Myers, 

however. 

Mr. MYERS. Mr. Chairman, our engagement on the agricultural 

level is as important as on the health side. In fact, it very often 

allows us to meet a whole new range of partners and individuals 

in these host countries and in these governments. 

Very often when we seek to engage a new partner, sometimes agricultural cooperation will move faster than on the health side for 

a variety of different reasons—local politics or just where our interests might align. So we approach each engagement ready to move 

forward at a brisk pace on whichever side, or both simultaneously, 

that we can. 

I would also point out to you that we are engaged on a multilateral level on the agricultural front, just as we are on the health 

side. And, you know, the FAO [U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization] is the equivalent of the World Health Organization, WHO, 

and we, again, are engaged with them, working with them. And, 

you know, as you point out, we have—when we engage on the 

health side there is an interest in our partners’ countries because 

the lives of their population may be at risk, but the same is true 

on the agricultural side as well, and there is also the additional 

benefit on their side in terms of potential impacts on their—on 

local industry and food markets. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Well with all this coordination that you all 

have talked about here domestically for domestic terrorism preparation, that would include animal health as well. 

Mr. MYERS. Yes, sir. I will use a foreign example, but we very 

often will invite the Department of Agriculture to come with us 

when we engage some of these foreign partners just because of the 

level of expertise, just because of the parallel initiatives. 

So I would suggest to you that the—again, the coordination is 

good there, and we seek out our agricultural colleagues very often. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Okay. I think that is all we have for you all. 

I think we were easy on you today. 

But I do appreciate, again, your flexibility and I think the point 

you all make is very good. This is dangerous work and this is important work, and it is kind of like, as we deal with terrorism in 

general, we need to be right 100 percent of the time because that 

one time that slips through has potentially catastrophic consequences. 

So thank you for what you and your folks do. 

And with that, the hearing stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:59 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

APRIL 8, 2014 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

APRIL 8, 2014 

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

APRIL 8, 2014 

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RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FRANKS 

Mr. MYERS. DOD MIL–STD–188–125–1 is a standard for High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) Protection for Ground-Based Command, Control, Communications, Intelligence (C4I) facilities performing critical time-urgent missions 

against a MIL–STD–2169C, DOD HEMP Environment. It provides performance criteria for hardening critical DOD fixed facilities against nuclear HEMP using an 

electromagnetic shielded barrier and electrical surge arrestors, and test protocols to 

validate HEMP hardness. The provisions of MIL–STD–188–125–1 were not developed for protecting critical civil infrastructure networks such as the electric power 

grid or telecommunications. To effectively protect a system, the standard must be 

applied in its entirety in order to achieve the strict time requirements that DOD 

demands for its C4I systems. However, MIL STD 188–125–1 allows for building size 

scalability. For example, an entire civil facility may not be critical but only certain 

systems or subsystems that provide critical functions and fit into a room. In this 

case the room can be retrofit hardened into an EMP protected asset. 

MIL–STD–188–125–1 was formally reviewed on April 7, 2005 and determined to 

be the best guideline for DOD use in acquisitions. DTRA is currently in the process 

of reviewing MIL–STD–188–125–1 again this year, and plans to re-issue an update 

in about one year. On the critical infrastructure side, there are other power grid initiatives being implemented by DHA, DOE, and FERC. 

MIL–STD 188–125–1 was designed to protect designated C4I facilities against the 

MIL–STD 2169C HEMP environment which is the Department’s nuclear high-altitude EMP threat. We are not aware of any tests that have shown that the standard 

is inadequate for the purpose for which it was developed. We are continuously reviewing the standard and ways to improve our test protocols and security. 

If requested, we are prepared to give a briefing on MIL–STD–188–125–1 to any 

Member of Congress and their staffs. [See page 9.] 

Æ