No. 3–07–0297

______________________________________________________________________________ Filed June 11, 2008 IN TH E AP PE LLATE COU RT OF ILLIN OIS THIR D DI STRICT A.D., 2008 PROGRESSI

VE PREMI

ER IN SURANCE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court COMPANY, ) for the 1 3th Judicial Circuit, Plaintiff-Appellee, ) LaSa lle County

, Illi nois ) v. ) No. 06–MR–96 ) DIANE CANNON, I

ndividually and as Mother ) Honorab le and Next Friend of Abigail Rhea Cannon, ) Eugene P. Daug herity a Minor; DENNIS CANNON, I ndividually and as ) Judge, Presiding Father of Abigail Rhea Cannon, a Minor; and ) STEPHANIE KAY and FEL ICI TY KAY, ) Defend ants-App ellants. )

____________________________________________________________________________ JUSTICE O’BRI EN delive

red the o pinion of t

he court :

______________________________________________________________________________ Plaintiff Progre ssive Pre

mier I nsuranc e Co . file d this declaratory judgment action seeking
a determination that coverage it was re qu ire d to pay under the

waterc raft poli cy

it issued to defenda nts Stephanie Kay a

nd Felicity Ka

y wa s limited to $100,000 for an accident in which the Kay s’ two jet skis collided, injuring defendant Abigail Cannon. The trial cou rt granted summary judgment in Progr essive’ s favor. Abigai l and he r parents, defendants Diane and Dennis Cannon, appeale d. We aff

irm. FACTS InJuly 2 003, Steph anie Ka y a nd Felic ity

Kay we re operating separate je

t skis on the Illinois River near the Starved R

ock Mari na. Abig ail Cannon

was a passenger

on Stephanie’s jet ski. The two jet skis collided, allegedly as the result of the negligence of Stephanie a nd Felicity. Abig ail and2

her parents filed a complaint

agains tthe Kays to re cover for the substantial injuries Abigail sustained in the collision and for reimbursement for Abigail’s medical e xpenses. At the time of the acciden

t, the Kay

s w ere covered under a boat a nd personal watercraft policy issued by Progressive for the two jet skis. The policy ’s declarations page stated, in pertinent part: “the following coverages and limits apply to each describe d vehicle as shown below. Coverages are defined in the policy a

nd are subject to the terms and conditions contained in th e p ol ic y, including amendments and endorsements.” The declar ation s page further stated, “[t]he coverage is applicable only if a premium is indicated.” It described the jet

skis as vehicle No.1 and vehicle No. 2 and set forth separ ate premiums for each jet ski. Under that listing, the policy stated the bodily injury

coverage was $100,000for each person and $300,000 for each accident. T he reverse side of the declarations pag e stated that “[t]he informa tion on the othe

r side of the Dec laration s Statemen t is critic al in that i

t identifi es th e coverages y

ou have purchased and the time period in which they are in effect.” The polic y pr ovided, in pertine nt part:

“ INSURING AGREEMENT – BODILY INJURY Subject to the L imit s of Liability , if you pay a pre mium for bodily injury liability
co verage, we will pay

damage s, other t

han puniti

ve or exem

plary damage s, fo r bodily injury for which

an insured person becomes legally responsible because of
an accident

arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of a water craft
. * * *3 LIMITS OF L IABILITY The Limit of Liability

shown on the Declarations Pageis the most we wi ll pay regardless of the number of: 1. claims made; 2. cove red water c raft ; 3. insured per sons ; 4. lawsuits brought; 5. water

craft involved in an accident ; or 6. premiums paid. If your Declarations Pageshows a sp lit limit: 1. the amount shown for ‘each person’ is the most we will pay for all dama ges due to a bodily injury to one (1) person[.]

* * * The bodily injury limit for ‘ each pe rson’ inc ludes the

total of a ll claims m ade for bodily injury and all claim of others derived from such bodily injury.” Progressive filed the

instant de clarato

ry judgmen t action to obtain a ruling that i ts cov erage
was limited to $100,000. The Cannons respon ded with a

counter claim for a declaratory

judgment intheir favor, seeking a decla ration that the applicable coverage was $200,00 0, consist

ing of $100,000 coverage for ea

ch jet ski. Progressive thereafter filed a motion for summary

judgmen t, and following arguments, the trial court grante d the summary judg ment motion, determ inin g t hat the limit of liabili ty f or the ac cident wa s $100,000 pursuant to the ter ms o f the policy. The Cannons appealed.4 ANAL YSIS The sole issue onappeal i s w hether the trial court erred when it found that cove rage was limitedto $100,000 and granted summary judgment in favor of Progressive . The Cannons argue that they are ent itle d to $ 200,0 00 in covera ge under the terms of the Kays’ wa tercraft policy . According to the Cann

ons, the proper

interpretation of the policy is that $100,000 in coverage exists for each jet ski for which separate premiums were paid. The y arg ue that the plain language o f th e policy dictates an i nterpre

tation in th eir fav or. They argue in the alte

rnative that the provisions

ar e ambiguous and

should be c onstrued

liberall y in favor of coverage . They furthe r argue that to deny them coverage under the c ircumstances would be violative of public policy
. Summary judgment is pr operl y gr

anted where the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. St. Paul Fir e & Mar in e Insurance C o. v. Smith , 337 Ill. App. 3d 1054, 1058, 787 N.E.2d 852, 855 (2003). The interpretation of an insurance policy and th e cover age prov ided are questions of law that are appropriate f or resolution through summary judgmen t . Prudential Property

& Casua lty Insu rance C o. v. Kell

y , 352 Ill. App. 3d 873, 875, 817 N.E.2d 1226, 1228 (2004). This court reviews a trial cou rt’s grant of

summary

judgmen t de novo
. IllinoisAmerica n Water Co. v. City

of Peoria , 332 Ill. App. 3d 1098, 1102, 774 N.E.2d 383, 388 (2002). Aninsuranc e policy

is a contr

act and i s subject to the general rules gove rning contract interpretation. Jones v. Coun try Mutual I nsuranc e Co ., 371 Ill. App. 3d 1096, 1098, 864 N.E.2d 793, 795 (2007). The primary objective in construing an insurance policy is to give effect to the intention of the parties as indicated in the policy language. Jones , 371 Ill. App. 3d at 1098, 864 N.E.2d at 795
. A policy should be enforc ed as written if it is unambiguous and does not violat e publi c p ol ic y.5

Illinois Farmers I

nsurance Co. v. Hall , 363 Ill. App. 3d 989, 993, 844 N.E.2d 973, 976 (2006). If the clause i s ambigu

ous, it shou

ld be cons trued in the insure d’s favor; if it is unambiguo us, it must be enforced

according to its terms. Hall , 363 Ill. App. 3d at 993, 844 N.E.2d at 976. The tr ia l court determined that the instan t policy langua ge did not crea

te an amb iguity

and that t he plain terms of the policy prohibited the stacking of coverage. The trial court pointed to the policy’s antistacking provision, which sta

tes that t h e most Prog

ressive would pay

is $100,00 0 each p erson for bodily in ju ry, regardless of the number of watercraft or premiums shown on the dec larations page and regar dless of the number of covered watercraft or insureds involved in the accide nt at issue. The trial court relied on Hobbs v. H artford Insu rance C o. of the M idwest , 214 Ill. 2d 11, 82 3 N.E.2d 561 (2005), Bruder v. Country Mutual Insurance Co. , 156 Ill. 2d 179 , 620 N.E.2d 355 (1993), and Grinnell Select Insurance Co. v. B aker , 362 F.3d 1 005 (7th Cir. 2004) , in d eterm inin g that c overage was limited to $100,000 and that Progressive was entitled to summary judgment in its favor. In Hobbs , at issue was whether the in sured could stack limits of liability for underinsure d motorist coverage where

there were multiple vehicles covered under one policy. Hobbs , 214 Ill. 2d at 14, 823 N.E.2d at 562. In Bruder , the re viewi ng cour t cons idered wheth er uni nsure d cove rage under two policies issued by County Mutual could be stacked. Bruder , 156 Ill. 2d at 181, 620 N.E.2d at 357. Similarly, in Grinnell , the issue was whether the limits on a po licy cove ring two vehicles could be stacked for double coverag e. Grinnell , 362 F.3d at 1005-06. In e ach cas e, the ins ureds’ argume nts that the policies were ambiguous and/or allowed stacking were rejected. The revie

wing courts looked to the langua ge in the policies’ limits of liability provisions and on the dec larations pages . Each court observed that the declara tions page limit of

liability was listed

only once in sp ite of multiple vehicles insured and found that when read in conjunction

with the express terms of the6

antistacking provision s, the poli c ies barred stacking of cover age. Hobbs , 214 Ill. 2d at 27, 823 N.E.2d a t 570; Bruder , 156 I ll. 2d at 19 4, 620 N.E .2d at 363 ; Grinnell , 362 F.3d at 1007-08. By contrast, in Johnson v. Da vis , 377 Ill. App . 3d 602 (2 007), the court held that the antistacking provision did not apply. The Johnson court ba sed its conclusion on the polic y’ s separa te listing of limits of

liability for each of

the four covered vehicles on the declarations page. Johnson , 377 Ill. A pp. 3d at 6 10. The c ourt note d that by listing e ach polic

y lim i t sepa rately

, an ambig

uity
arose in the polic

y in that an in sured co

uld reas o nabl y presume sepa rate limits applied to each covered vehicle. Johnson , 377 Ill. App. 3d at 609. The court further noted that the li mit of liab ility clause in the underinsured motorist endorsement stated the maximum limit of liab ility wa s that shownon the declarations page. Johnson , 377 Ill. App. 3d at 609. The court determined that based
on the endorsement language , the antistacking provision did not come into pl ay, an d i f i t d id ap pl y, its provisions were inconsistent with the declarat ion s page. Johnson , 377 Ill. App. 3d at 609. The la nguage in the instant policy is more aligne d with the policies in Hobbs , Bruder , and Grinnell than with the policy in Johnson . While the premiums and vehicles are listed indi vidually
on t he declarations page, the limits of liability language is listed only

once. The language

in t h e antistacking provision

at bar is s imilar tothe language in the policies at issue in Hobbs , Bruder , and Grinnell
. This court has previously he ld that where a separate premium appears for ea chvehicle and
covera ge limits are listed only once, there is no ambiguity created by

the declarations page lang uage. Kelly , 352 Ill. App. 3d at 876, 817 N.E.2d at 1229. As such, we det ermin e that the de clarat ions page langua ge does not c onflict with the poli cy ’s antista cking provision, which sta tes that the limits of liability apply reg ardless of the number of watercra ft or insureds involved in an accident or the number of premiums paid. Accordingly , we find the policy’s decla

rations page and antistacking7

provision consistent and unambiguous and the policy susceptible to one reasonable interpretation - that bodily injury

coverage is limited to $100,000 for each injured pe rson. We agree with th Can

nons that t

he case at bar is not a “true” antistacking ca se and does not involve underinsured (UIM) or uninsured motorist (UM) coverage as in Hobbs , Bruder

and Grinnell
. We acknowledge that

those cases involved accidents in which only one of the covered vehicles was involved. By

contras t, in the instant case, there were two covere d vehicle s involved in one ac cident, resulting in bodily injury

to one person. While distinguished on that fact, the policy lang uage in the UIM and UM an

tistackin g case s and in the

policy at issue h ere ar

e similar . When rea

d in conjunctionwith the antistacking provision, the $100,000 limit for bodily injury coverage for “e ach person” as stated

on the dec laration s page , applies regar dless of the number

of cover ed wate rcraf t, insure d, or premiums paid. Based on the plain languag e of the policy, we find the bodily injury
covera ge is limited to $100,000 for each person and that Abig ail is thus e

ntitled tothat amount as determined by the tr

ial court. The public pol icy

argume nt put forth by the Cannons does not negate the effect of the policy’sunambiguous terms. They contend that

the policy

interpretation adopted by the trial court could leave them without the coverage the Kay s contemplated they

were receiving based on the risks undertaken

and the premiums paid. Because antistacking provision s h ave been determined not violative of the state ’s pub lic po licy, th e Cann ons’ a rgumen t is u navai ling. Grzeszcza k v. I llinois Farmers Insurance Co. , 168 Ill. 2d 216, 229, 659 N.E.2d 952, 959 (1995) (antistacking provisions do not contravene the public policy of I llinois). Moreover, contrary to the Cannons’ claims, they ar e not le ft without compensation for Abigail’s injuries and neither Stephanie nor F elicity, if found negligent in the unde

rly ing law suit, is le ft uncovered a s coverage is provided up to the $100,0008

limit. We hold that the trial court did not err in granting summary

judgment in favor

of Progressive. For the foregoing r

easons, the judgment of the circuit court of LaSalle County is affirmed. Affirmed. LYTTON and H OLDRIDGE, J J., concur.