alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 31.1

Certification of Daniel Dror,
CEO, President and Chairman of American International Industries, Inc., pursuant to 18
U.S.C. ss.1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.

I, Daniel Dror, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this amended quarterly report
on Form 10-QSB of American International Industries, Inc.;

2. Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report
does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact
necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such
statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this quarterly
report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial
statements, and other financial information included in this quarterly report, fairly
present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash
flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this quarterly report;

4. As the registrant's certifying officer, 
I am responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as
defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-14 and 15d-14) for the registrant and have:

a) designed such disclosure controls and
procedures to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its
consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to the undersigned by others within those
entities, particularly during the period in which this quarterly report is being prepared;
b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and procedures as
of a date within 90 days prior to the filing date of this quarterly report (the
"Evaluation Date"); and
c) presented in this quarterly report management's conclusions about the effectiveness of
the disclosure controls and procedures based on my evaluation as of the Evaluation Date;

5.  I have disclosed, based on my most
recent evaluation, to the registrant's auditors:

a) all significant deficiencies in the design or
operation of internal controls which could adversely affect the registrant's ability to
record, process, summarize and report financial data and have identified for the
registrant's auditors any material weaknesses in internal controls; and 
b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management who have a significant
role in the registrant's internal controls; and

6.  I have indicated in this quarterly
report whether there were significant changes in internal controls or in other factors
that could significantly affect internal controls subsequent to the date of our most
recent evaluation, including any corrective actions with regard to significant
deficiencies and material weaknesses.

Date: February 14, 2006, 
Daniel Dror, CEO, 
President and Chairman/s/ Daniel Dror
#### [577] Gomez *vs.*Gam.

*'Security for costs*cannot be required of a plaintiff on the ground’that his person has been *exonerated from imprisonment,*where the discharge was granted long since ; to entitle a defendant to succeed on such motion, he should show the *present-inability*of the plaintiff to pay-costs.

Besides, it is questionable whether the statute applies to suits commenced previous to its enact ment.

On an affidavit of the defendant that the person of the plaintiff had been *exonerated from imprisonment*pursuant to law, and that the defendant had not since contracted any debt to him, *Judge Edwards*made an order that the plaintiff file security for costs within twenty days, or show cause at the next special term of this *court;*and in the mean time -the plaintiff’s proceedings were stayed.

The plaintiff now shows for cause, that the suit was commenced before the passing of the statute requiring security for costs, (2 *R. S.*620, § 1;) and that the discharge of the plaintiff from imprisonment, mentioned by the defendant, was granted in October, 1826.

*By the Court,*

Bronson, J.

The language of the statute is prospective, “ when a suit shall be commenced,” and there may be some doubt whether it will apply to an action commenced before the year 1830. But there is another objection to requiring security in this case. The plaintiff was exonerated from-imprisonment *nearly ten years ago ;*and there is no proof that he still continues insolvent. The statute provides that the defendant may require security for costs, when a suit shall be brought in the name of any person *being insolvent,*who shall *304have been discharged from his debts, of whose person shall have- been exonerated from imprisonment. If the discharge had been recent, no further evidence of insolvency would have been necessary: but after the lapse of nine or ten years the party should furnish some further proof of the present inability of the plaintiff to pay his debts. The order requiring security and staying the plaintiff’s proceedings must be discharged.
13297

#### GRAY v. THOMAS *ET AL.*

(161 S. E., 743)

*437
      *Messrs. Padgett & Moorer*and *J. Heyward*Jenkins,• attorneys for Estate of Edwin Denby, appellants,

*Mr. W. Brantley*Harvey, for respondent.

December 10, 1931.

The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Mr. Chief Justice Brease.

It is the opinion of this Court that the decree of his Honor, Circuit Judge Bonham, which will be reported, correctly disposed of the issues involved in the cause. Accordingly, the exceptions of the appellant are overruled, and the decree is affirmed.

Messrs. Justices Stabrer and Carter and C. C. Featherstone, Circuit Judge, concur.

Mr. Justice Cothran did not participate on account of illness.
#### § 39.13 Are airworthiness directives part of the Code of Federal Regulations?

Yes, airworthiness directives are part of the Code of Federal Regulations, but they are not codified in the annual edition. FAA publishes airworthiness directives in full in the Federal Register as amendments to § 39.13.

###### Editorial Note

#### Editorial Note:

For a complete list of citations to airworthiness directives published in the Federal Register, consult the following publications: For airworthiness directives published in the Federal Register since 2001, see the entries for 14 CFR 39.13 in the List of CFR Sections Affected, which appears in the “Finding Aids” section of the printed volume and at *www.govinfo.gov.* For citations to prior amendments, see the entries for 14 CFR 39.13 in the separate publications List of CFR Sections Affected, 1973-1985, List of CFR Sections Affected, 1964-1972, and List of CFR Sections Affected, 1986-2000, and the entries for 14 CFR 507.10 in the List of Sections Affected, 1949-1963. See also the annual editions of the Federal Register Index for subject matter references and citations to FAA airworthiness directives.
#### DuBose *v.*The State.

Crime.

(Decided November 28, 1916.

73 South. 121.)

1. Judgment; Record; Impeachment. — Judgment entries which appear correctly transcribed cannot be varied or impeached by evidence aliunde.

2. Criminal Law; Sentence. — Where the sentence was for four months hard labor, but it is not shown whether it is for the payment of fine and costs, or additional punishment for the offense, the sentence is irregular.

3. Same; Remand. — Where the sentence, is irregular, but no other error appears, the cause will be affirmed as to the conviction, but remanded for proper sentence.

Appeal from Chilton Circuit Court.

Heard before Hon. W. W. Pearson.

J. M. DuBose was convicted of a misdemeanor and he appeals.

Affirmed as to the conviction but reversed and remanded for proper sentence.

J. B. Adkinson, for appellant.

W. L. Martin, Attorney General, and Harwell G. Davis, Assistant Attorney General, for the-State.

BROWN, J.

(1) The appellant seeks to show by ex parte affidavits that he was not in court when the sentence of the court *234was pronounced against him. The judgment entry in the record recites: “The defendant, being in open court, is sentenced to four months’ hard labor for the county of Chilton, imposed by the court.”

There is no contention that the judgment of the court as it appears on the record in the court below is not correctly transcribed. It is well settled that such.records cannot be varied or impeached by evidence *aliunde.*— Edinburgh *L. & M. Co. v. Canterbury,*169 Ala. 444, 53 South. 823.

(2) . The sentence, however, is not regular, as it does not appear whether the sentence to four months’ hard labor wás for the payment of the fine and costs, or was additional punishment for the offense. Whether the one or the other, of necessity, it was “imposed by the court.”

(3) The judgment of conviction is affirmed, but the sentence is vacated, and the cause remanded, that the defendant may be *sentenced.*— Bryant *v. State,*13 Ala. App. 206, 68 South. 704.

Affirmed in part, and in part reversed and remanded.
#### § 1620.6 Coverage is not based on amount of covered activity.

The FLSA makes no distinction as to the percentage, volume, or amount of activities of either the employee or the employer which constitute engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce. Every employee whose activities in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, even though small in amount, are regular and recurring, is considered “engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce”.
#### § 18.610 Religious beliefs or opinions.

Evidence of the beliefs or opinions of a witness on matters of religion is not admissible for the purpose of showing that by reason of their nature the witness' credibility is impaired or enhanced.
#### Gertrude K. Lampert, as Executrix of Laurence L. Lampert, Deceased, et al., Appellants, v Ambassador Factors Corporation, Doing Business as Ambassador Factors, a Division of Finova Capital Corporation, et al., Defendants, and Mahoney Cohen Rashba & Pokart, P. C., Formerly Known as Mahoney Cohen & Company, et al., Respondents.

[698 NYS2d 234]

—Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Carol Huff, J.), entered August 10, 1998, which, in an action seeking, as relevant to this appeal, damages for fraud against an accounting firm and its principal, granted such defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint as against them on the ground of res judicata, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

We agree with the IAS Court that this Court’s dismissal, pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) and 3016 (b), of plaintiffs’ decedent’s prior action for fraud and accounting malpractice against the moving defendants *(Lampert*v *Mahoney, Cohen & Co.,*218 AD2d 580) constitutes res judicata barring the instant action. The two actions are based on the same transactions, and the dismissal of the prior action, to the extent based on the absence of any allegation in the prior complaint that the plaintiff had “undertake [n] an independent appraisal of the risk he was assuming” in the subject transactions *(supra,*at 582), was not merely for a technical pleading defect, but manifestly on the merits, based on a finding that plaintiff’s failure to exercise such due diligence precluded him from prevailing on his fraud cause of action against such defendants, regardless of what other facts he might allege *(see, Bluebird Partners v First Fid. Bank,*259 AD2d 273, 274, citing *Feigen v**125*Advance Capital Mgt. Corp.,*146 AD2d 556, 558-559). Even if this Court’s dismissal of the prior action might not be deemed to have precluded plaintiffs’ decedent from filing a second complaint alleging that he had conducted a due diligence investigation, the current complaint, in this respect, “fails to correct the defect or supply the omission determined to exist in the earlier complaint” *(175 E. 74th Corp. v Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co.,*51 NY2d 585, 590, n 1), and is therefore barred *(see, Papa v Burrows,*186 AD2d 375, *lv denied*81 NY2d 707, citing *Flynn v Sinclair Oil Corp.,*20 AD2d 636, 637, *affd*14 NY2d 853; 10 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, NY Civ Prac 5011.11). Since the doctrine of res judicata requires dismissal of the instant action, we have no occasion to address the branch of defendants’ motion seeking dismissal of the current complaint for legal insufficiency. Concur — Sullivan, J. P., Wallach, Rubin, Saxe and Friedman, JJ.
§ 65.47 Maximum hours. Except in an emergency, a certificated air traffic control tower operator must be relieved of all duties for at least 24 consecutive hours at least once during each 7 consecutive days. Such an operator may not serve or be required to serve— ( a ) For more than 10 consecutive hours; or
( b ) For more than 10 hours during a period of 24 consecutive hours, unless he has had a rest period of at least 8 hours at or before the end of the 10 hours of duty.
#### THE PEOPLE, etc., OF NEW YORK v. VALENTINE KETTERLE and HENRY GOETZE.

*J. B. Fellows,*for pl’fE; *Purdy & McLaughlin,*for def’ts.

Motion to vacate.

Judgment entered on forfeited recognizance.

The defendant Goetze has made a case for the discharge of the judgment, •and it is ordered that this judgment he vacated and canceled of record.
[No. 20979-2-III.

Division Three.

December 17, 2002.]

#### The State of Washington, *Respondent,*v. Bret James Ketchum, *Appellant.*

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Spokane County, No. 02-1-00058-5, Robert D. Austin, J., entered March 11, 2002. *Affirmed*by unpublished opinion per Kato, A.C.J., concurred in by Sweeney and Schultheis, JJ.
#### § 1912.4 Avoidance of duplication.

No standards advisory committee shall be created if its duties are being, or could be, performed by an existing advisory committee established under section 7(b) of the Act.
§ 18.83 Stipulations. ( a ) The parties may stipulate to any facts in writing at any stage of the proceeding or orally on the record at a deposition or at a hearing. These stipulations bind the parties unless the judge disapproves them.
( b ) Every stipulation that requests or requires a judge's action must be written and signed by all affected parties or their representatives. Any stipulation to extend time must state the reason for the date change.
( c ) A proposed form of order may be submitted with the stipulation; it may consist of an endorsement on the stipulation of the words, “Pursuant to stipulation, it is so ordered,” with spaces designated for the date and the signature of the judge.
§ 1636.8 Severability. ( a ) The Commission intends that, if any provision of the PWFA or the application of that provision to particular persons or circumstances is held invalid or found to be unconstitutional, the remainder of the statute and the application of that provision to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected.
( b ) The Commission intends that, if any provision of this part that uses the same language as the statute, or the application of that provision to particular persons or circumstances, is held invalid or found to be unconstitutional, the remainder of this part and the application of that provision to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected.
( c ) The Commission intends that, if any provision of this part or the interpretive guidance in appendix A to this part that provides additional guidance to implement the PWFA, including examples of reasonable accommodations, or the application of that provision to particular persons or circumstances, is held invalid or found to be unconstitutional, the remainder of this part or the interpretive guidance and the application of that provision to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected.
§ 101.22 Initiation and investigation of a case under section 8(b)(7). ( a ) The investigation of an alleged violation of section 8(b)(7) of the Act is initiated by the filing of a charge. The manner of filing such charge and the contents thereof are the same as described in § 101.2. In some cases, at the time of the investigation of the charge, there may be pending a representation petition involving the employees of the employer named in the charge. In those cases, the results of the investigation of the charge will determine the cause of the petition.
( b ) The investigation of the charge is conducted in accordance with the provisions of § 101.4, insofar as they are applicable. If the investigation reveals that there is merit in the charge, a complaint is issued as described in § 101.8, and an application is made for an injunction under section 10(1) of the Act, as described in § 101.37. If the investigation reveals that there is no merit in the charge, the Regional Director, absent a withdrawal of the charge, dismisses it, subject to appeal to the General Counsel. However, if the investigation reveals that issuance of a complaint may be warranted but for the pendency of a representation petition involving the employees of the employer named in the charge, action on the charge is suspended pending the investigation of the petition as provided in § 101.23.
Materials Not Included in

Airworthiness Directive (AD) Docket

Docket Number: FAA- 2012-0329

Directorate Identifier: 2011NM139AD

A320-53-1218 --- 2/8/10

Name/Description of Item(s) Not Included in FDMS Docket and Maintained in the 

Supplemental AD Docket

MAY BE VIEWED AT: Federal Aviation Administration

Transport Airplane Directorate

Rules Docket

1601 Lind Ave. SW.,

Renton, WA 98057

425.227.1221

DURING THE HOURS OF: 9 a.m. and 3 p.m., Monday through Friday,

except Federal holidays.

Form Date: 03/05/2008
11 TH COURT OF APPEALS

EASTLAND

, TEXAS

JUDGMENT

Ernesto Reyes, * From the 441st District Court

of Midland County

Trial Court No. CR46345

.

Vs. No. 11

- 1 7

- 00 100

- CR * April 11, 2019

The Sta te of Texas, * Memorandum Opinion by Bailey , C.J.

(Panel consists of: Bailey

, C. J.,

Stretcher , J. , and Wright, S.C.J., sitting

by assignment )

(Willson, J., not participating)

This court has inspected the record in this cause and concludes that there

is no error in the judgment below. Therefore, in accordance with this court ’ s

opinion, the judgment of the trial court is in all things affirmed.
#### Jerome A. Goode, Appellant, v Drew Building Supply, Inc., et al., Respondents.

[697 NYS2d 417]

—Order unanimously affirmed without costs. Memorandum: Supreme Court properly granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the amended complaint and denied plaintiffs cross motion for summary judgment. The causes of action alleging age discrimination in violation of Executive Law § 296 are barred by the release executed by plaintiff upon termination of his employment. We reject the contention that the validity of that release is to be determined in accordance with the standards set forth in the Older Worker Benefit Protection Act (29 USC § 626 [f]; *see, Dewey v PTT Telecom Netherlands, U. S.,*1995 WL 542447, 1995 US Dist LEXIS 13134 [SD NY, Sept. 12, 1995, Baer, J.], *affd*101 F3d 1392) or the totality of the circumstances standard applicable to Federal discrimination claims *(see, Lambertson v Kerry Ingredients,*50 F Supp 2d 163, 168; *Nicholas v NYNEX, Inc.,*929 F Supp 727, 733; *see also, Skluth v United Merchants & Mfrs.,*163 AD2d 104, 106). Rather, the release is a contract “whose interpretation is governed by principles of contract law” *(Metz v Metz,*175 AD2d 938, 939; *see, Stone v National Bank & Trust Co.,*188 AD2d 865, 867). ‘Where the language of the release is clear, effect must be given to the intent of the parties as indicated by the language employed *(see, Stone v National Bank & Trust Co.** * * *[supra]; Metz v Metz** * * *[supra]; see also, Mangini v McClurg,*24 NY2d 556, 562)” *(Cramer v Newburgh Molded Prods., 228*AD2d 541, *lv denied*89 NY2d 803). The release of defendants from all causes of action arising out of or related to plaintiffs employment, including any arising from the Executive Law, bars the causes of action alleging age discrimination under the Executive Law *(see, Cramer v Newburgh Molded Prods., supra; Stone v National Bank & Trust Co., supra,*at 867-868). Plaintiff cannot avoid the effect of this “plain and unambiguous” release on the ground that he did not understand its terms *(Koster v Ketchum Communications,*204 AD2d 280, *lv dismissed*85 NY2d 857) or that he failed to consult an attorney before signing it *(see, Skluth v United Merchants & Mfrs., supra,*at 107). Nor is the alleged breach of defendants’ obligation to provide outplacement services under the terms of the release a ground for invalidating the release *(see, Post v Thomas,*212 NY 264, 274, *rearg denied*212 NY 585; *Elson v Delaney,*47 AD2d 708, 709). (Appeal from Order of Supreme Court, Onondaga County, Nicholson, J. — Dismiss *926Pleading.) Present — Green, J. P., Lawton, Pigott, Jr., Hurlbutt and Callahan, JJ.
#### In the Matter of the Claim of Frances Dingfeldt, Respondent, against Albee Godfrey Whale Creek Company, Inc., et al., Appellants. State Industrial Board, Respondent.

Submitted March 1, 1937;

decided March 2, 1937.

*528
      *“*This Court held that the Workmen’s Compensation Law of the State of New York applied, that the Federal Courts did not have exclusive jurisdiction to afford relief and that the accident did arise out of and in the course of the decedent’s employment.” (See 272 N. Y. 623.)
#### §§ 100.571-100.599 [Reserved]
#### Miller *vs.*Adsit.

*Costs*in the court for the correction of errors.

Costs in the court for the correction of errors. A motion was made for the re-taxation of a bill of costs on a writ of error decided in the court for the correction of errors. Various items were objected to which had been allowed by the *346taxing officer. Mr. Justice Bronson, who presided at this term, pronounced the following items to be correct, viz.: Drawing case, fol. 4, at 25 cts.; engrossing same, including writ of error, return, assignment, and rejoinder, at 121⁄2 cts. per fol.; copy for printer at 10 cts. per fol.; and copy for counsel at 6 cts. per fol. The motion was then withdrawn, the parties agreeing to a re-taxation. (a)

(a)

 In the case of the Ætna Insurance Company v. Tyler, reported in 16 Wendell, 385, the above items were allowed ; the costs being taxed by Mr. Justice Bronson, and the items strictly scrutinized by counsel. Besides the above items, the defendant (Tyler) was allowed a charge for drawing up a roll of the judgment in the court for the correction of errors, and en grossing the same with the writ of error, return, assignment, rejoinder, entries after issue joined arid judgment in that court—the draft at 25 cts. ; engrossing at 121⁄2 cts. It was also conceded by counsel, that the drawing of *points*and a copy for each member of the court was a taxable tern.
§ 18.706 Judge appointed experts. ( a ) *Appointment.* The judge may on the judge's own motion or on the motion of any party enter an order to show cause why expert witnesses should not be appointed, and may request the parties to submit nominations. The judge may appoint any expert witnesses agreed upon by the parties, and may appoint expert witnesses of the judge's own selection. An expert witness shall not be appointed by the judge unless the witness consents to act. A witness so appointed shall be informed of the witness' duties by the judge in writing, a copy of which shall be filed with the clerk, or at a conference in which the parties shall have an opportunity to participate. A witness so appointed shall advise the parties of the witness' findings, if any; the witness' deposition may be taken by any party; and the witness may be called to testify by the judge or any party. The witness shall be subject to cross-examination by each party, including a party calling the witness.
( b ) *Compensation.* Expert witnesses so appointed are entitled to reasonable compensation in whatever sum the judge may allow. The compensation thus fixed is payable from funds which may be provided by law in hearings involving just compensation under the fifth amendment. In other hearings the compensation shall be paid by the parties in such proportion and at such time as the judge directs, and thereafter charged in like manner as other costs.
( c ) *Parties' experts of own selection.* Nothing in this rule limits the parties in calling expert witnesses of their own selection.