(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2021 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is 

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. 

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been 

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

VIKING RIVER CRUISES, INC. v. MORIANA 

CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA, 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

No. 20–1573. Argued March 30, 2022—Decided June 15, 2022 

The question for decision is whether the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 

U. S. C. §1 et seq., preempts a rule of California law that invalidates

contractual waivers of the right to assert representative claims under

California’s Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004, Cal.

Lab. Code §2698 et seq. PAGA enlists employees as private attorneys 

general to enforce California labor law. By its terms, PAGA authorizes 

any “aggrieved employee” to initiate an action against a former employer “on behalf of himself or herself and other current or former employees” to obtain civil penalties that previously could have been recovered only by the State in an enforcement action brought by 

California’s Labor and Workforce Development Agency (LWDA). California precedent holds that a PAGA suit is a “ ‘representative action’ ” 

in which the employee plaintiff sues as an “ ‘agent or proxy’ ” of the 

State. Iskanian v. CLS Transp. Los Angeles, LLC, 59 Cal. 4th 348, 

380. California precedent also interprets the statute to contain what 

is effectively a rule of claim joinder—allowing a party to unite multiple

claims against an opposing party in a single action. An employee with

PAGA standing may “seek any civil penalties the state can, including 

penalties for violations involving employees other than the PAGA litigant herself.” ZB, N. A. v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 5th 175, 185. 

Respondent Angie Moriana filed a PAGA action against her former 

employer Viking River Cruises, alleging a California Labor Code violation. She also asserted a wide array of other violations allegedly sustained by other Viking employees. Moriana’s employment contract 

with Viking contained a mandatory arbitration agreement. Important 

here, that agreement contained both a “Class Action Waiver”—providing that the parties could not bring any dispute as a class, collective, 

or representative action under PAGA—and a severability clause— 
 

2 VIKING RIVER CRUISES, INC. v. MORIANA 

Syllabus 

specifying that if the waiver was found invalid, such a dispute would 

presumptively be litigated in court. Under the severability clause, any

“portion” of the waiver that remained valid would be “enforced in arbitration.” Viking moved to compel arbitration of Moriana’s individual

PAGA claim and to dismiss her other PAGA claims. Applying California’s Iskanian precedent, the California courts denied that motion,

holding that categorical waivers of PAGA standing are contrary to California policy and that PAGA claims cannot be split into arbitrable “individual” claims and nonarbitrable “representative” claims. This 

Court granted certiorari to decide whether the FAA preempts the California rule. 

Held: The FAA preempts the rule of Iskanian insofar as it precludes division of PAGA actions into individual and non-individual claims 

through an agreement to arbitrate. Pp. 7–21.

(a) Based on the principle that “[a]rbitration is strictly ‘a matter of 

consent,’ ” Granite Rock Co. v. Teamsters, 561 U. S. 287, 299, this Court 

has held that “a party may not be compelled under the FAA to submit

to class arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for concluding 

that the party agreed to do so,” Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l 

Corp., 559 U. S. 662, 684. Because class-action arbitration mandates 

procedural changes that are inconsistent with the individualized and

informal mode of bilateral arbitration contemplated by the FAA, see 

AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U. S. 333, 347, class procedures cannot be imposed by state law without presenting unwilling

parties with an unacceptable choice between being compelled to arbitrate using such procedures and forgoing arbitration all together. 

Viking contends that the Court’s FAA precedents require enforcement 

of contractual provisions waiving the right to bring PAGA actions because PAGA creates a form of class or collective proceeding. If this is 

correct, Iskanian’s prohibition on PAGA waivers presents parties with

an impermissible choice: Either arbitrate disputes using a form of class

procedures, or do not arbitrate at all. Moriana maintains that any 

conflict between Iskanian and the FAA is illusory because PAGA creates nothing more than a substantive cause of action. 

This Court disagrees with both characterizations of the statute. Moriana’s premise that PAGA creates a unitary private cause of action is

irreconcilable with the structure of the statute and the ordinary legal 

meaning of the word “claim.” A PAGA action asserting multiple violations under California’s Labor Code affecting a range of different employees does not constitute “a single claim” in even the broadest possible sense. Viking’s position, on the other hand, elides important

structural differences between PAGA actions and class actions. A 

class-action plaintiff can raise a multitude of claims because he or she 
 

 

Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 3 

Syllabus 

represents a multitude of absent individuals; a PAGA plaintiff, by contrast, represents a single principal, the LWDA, that has a multitude

of claims. As a result, PAGA suits exhibit virtually none of the procedural characteristics of class actions. 

This Court’s FAA precedents treat bilateral arbitration as the prototype of the individualized and informal form of arbitration protected 

from undue state interference by the FAA. See, e.g., Epic Systems 

Corp. v. Lewis, 584 U. S. ___, ___. Viking posits that a proceeding is 

“bilateral” only if it involves two and only two parties and “is conducted 

by and on behalf of the individual named parties only.” Wal-Mart 

Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U. S. 338, 348. Thus, Iskanian’s prohibition

on PAGA waivers is inconsistent with the FAA because PAGA creates 

an intrinsically representational form of action and Iskanian requires 

parties either to arbitrate in that format or forgo arbitration altogether.

This Court disagrees. Nothing in the FAA establishes a categorical 

rule mandating enforcement of waivers of standing to assert claims on 

behalf of absent principals. Non-class representative actions in which 

a single agent litigates on behalf of a single principal necessarily deviate from the strict ideal of bilateral dispute resolution posited by Viking, but this Court has never held that the FAA imposes a duty on

States to render all forms of representative standing waivable by contract or that such suits deviate from the norm of bilateral arbitration. 

Unlike procedures distinctive to multiparty litigation, single-principal,

single-agent representative actions are “bilateral” in two registers: 

They involve the rights of only the absent real party in interest and

the defendant, and litigation need only be conducted by the agentplaintiff and the defendant. Nothing in this Court’s precedent suggests that in enacting the FAA, Congress intended to require States to

reshape their agency law governing who can assert claims on behalf of 

whom to ensure that parties will never have to arbitrate disputes in a 

proceeding that deviates from bilateral arbitration in the strictest 

sense. Pp. 7–17.

(b) PAGA’s built-in mechanism of claim joinder is in conflict with the 

FAA. Iskanian’s prohibition on contractual division of PAGA actions 

into constituent claims unduly circumscribes the freedom of parties to 

determine “the issues subject to arbitration” and “the rules by which 

they will arbitrate,” Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 587 U. S. ____, ____, 

and does so in a way that violates the fundamental principle that “arbitration is a matter of consent,” Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U. S., at 684. For 

that reason, state law cannot condition the enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate on the availability of a procedural mechanism that

would permit a party to expand the scope of the anticipated arbitration 

by introducing claims that the parties did not jointly agree to arbitrate. 
 

 

 

4 VIKING RIVER CRUISES, INC. v. MORIANA 

Syllabus 

A state rule imposing an expansive rule of joinder in the arbitral context would defeat the ability of parties to control which claims are subject to arbitration by permitting parties to superadd new claims to the

proceeding, regardless of whether the agreement committed those 

claims to arbitration. When made compulsory by way of Iskanian, 

PAGA’s joinder rule functions in exactly this way. The effect is to coerce parties into withholding PAGA claims from arbitration. Iskanian’s indivisibility rule effectively coerces parties to opt for a judicial forum rather than “forgo[ing] the procedural rigor and appellate

review of the courts to realize the benefits of private dispute resolution.” Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U. S., at 685. Pp. 17–19. 

(c) Under this Courts holding, Iskanian’s prohibition on wholesale

waivers of PAGA claims is not preempted by the FAA. But Iskanian’s 

rule that PAGA actions cannot be divided into individual and non-individual claims is preempted, so Viking was entitled to compel arbitration of Moriana’s individual claim. PAGA provides no mechanism 

to enable a court to adjudicate non-individual PAGA claims once an 

individual claim has been committed to a separate proceeding. And 

under PAGA’s standing requirement, a plaintiff has standing to maintain non-individual PAGA claims in an action only by virtue of also 

maintaining an individual claim in that action. As a result, Moriana 

would lack statutory standing to maintain her non-individual claims

in court, and the correct course was to dismiss her remaining claims. 

Pp. 20–21. 

Reversed and remanded. 

ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, and GORSUCH, JJ., joined, in which ROBERTS, C. J., 

joined as to Parts I and III, and in which KAVANAUGH and BARRETT, JJ., 

joined as to Part III. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a concurring opinion. BARRETT, 

J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in

which KAVANAUGH, J., joined, and in which ROBERTS, C. J, joined as to 

all but the footnote. THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion. 
 

 

 

_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the 

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to 

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that 

corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 20–1573 

VIKING RIVER CRUISES, INC., PETITIONER v. 

ANGIE MORIANA 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL OF 

CALIFORNIA, SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

[June 15, 2022] 

JUSTICE ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court.* 

We granted certiorari in this case to decide whether the 

Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U. S. C. §1 et seq., 

preempts a rule of California law that invalidates contractual waivers of the right to assert representative claims under California’s Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act 

of 2004. Cal. Lab. Code Ann. §2698 et seq. (West 2022). 

I 

A 

The California Legislature enacted the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) to address a perceived 

deficit in the enforcement of the State’s Labor Code. California’s Labor and Workforce Development Agency (LWDA) 

had the authority to bring enforcement actions to impose 

civil penalties on employers for violations of many of the

code’s provisions. But the legislature believed the LWDA

did not have sufficient resources to reach the appropriate 

level of compliance, and budgetary constraints made it im-

—————— 

*THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins Parts I and III of this opinion. 
 

2 VIKING RIVER CRUISES, INC. v. MORIANA 

Opinion of the Court 

possible to achieve an adequate level of financing. The legislature thus decided to enlist employees as private attorneys general to enforce California labor law, with the understanding that labor-law enforcement agencies were to

retain primacy over private enforcement efforts. 

By its terms, PAGA authorizes any “aggrieved employee” 

to initiate an action against a former employer “on behalf of

himself or herself and other current or former employees” 

to obtain civil penalties that previously could have been recovered only by the State in an LWDA enforcement action. 

Cal. Lab. Code Ann. §2699(a). As the text of the statute 

indicates, PAGA limits statutory standing to “aggrieved 

employees”—a term defined to include “any person who was

employed by the alleged violator and against whom one or

more of the alleged violations was committed.” §2699(c). To 

bring suit, however, an employee must also exhaust administrative remedies. That entails providing notice to the employer and the LWDA of the violations alleged and the supporting facts and theories. §2699.3(a)(1)(A). If the LWDA 

fails to respond or initiate an investigation within a specified timeframe, the employee may bring suit. §2699.3(a)(2).

In any successful PAGA action, the LWDA is entitled to 75

percent of the award. §2699(i). The remaining 25 percent 

is distributed among the employees affected by the violations at issue. Ibid. 

California law characterizes PAGA as creating a “type of 

qui tam action,”1 Iskanian v. CLS Transp. Los Angeles, 

—————— 1As we have explained, “qui tam” is the short form of the Latin phrase 

“qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur”—meaning “ ‘who pursues this action on our Lord the King’s behalf as well as his 

own.’ ” Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U. S. 765, 768, n. 1(2000). Qui tam actions “appear to have

originated around the end of the 13th century, when private individuals 

who had suffered injury began bringing actions in the royal courts on

both their own and the Crown’s behalf ” and became more of a rarity as 

“royal courts began to extend jurisdiction to suits involving wholly private wrongs.” Id., at 774–775. 
 

 

Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

LLC, 59 Cal. 4th 348, 382, 327 P. 3d 129, 148 (2014). Although the statute’s language suggests that an “aggrieved 

employee” sues “on behalf of himself or herself and other 

current or former employees,” §2699(a), California precedent holds that a PAGA suit is a “‘representative action’” 

in which the employee plaintiff sues as an “‘agent or proxy’” 

of the State. Id., at 380, 327 P. 3d, at 147 (quoting Arias v. 

Superior Court, 46 Cal. 4th 969, 986, 209 P. 3d 923, 933 

(2009)).

As the California courts conceive of it, the State “is always the real party in interest in the suit.” Iskanian, 59 

Cal. 4th, at 382, 327 P. 3d, at 148.2 The primary function

of PAGA is to delegate a power to employees to assert “the 

same legal right and interest as state law enforcement 

agencies,” Arias, 46 Cal. 4th, at 986, 209 P. 3d, at 933. In 

other words, the statute gives employees a right to assert 

—————— 2The extent to which PAGA plaintiffs truly act as agents of the State

rather than complete assignees is disputed. See Magadia v. Wal-Mart 

Assocs., Inc., 999 F. 3d 668, 677 (CA9 2021) (holding that PAGA “lacks

the procedural controls necessary to ensure that California” retains “substantial authority over the case” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

Agency requires control. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U. S. 693, 713 

(2013). But apart from the exhaustion process, the statute does not feature any explicit control mechanisms, such as provisions authorizing the

State to intervene or requiring its approval of settlements. 

That said, California precedent strongly suggests that the State retains inherent authority to manage PAGA actions. There is no other obvious way to understand California precedent’s description of the State 

as the “real party in interest.” See generally 1A Cal. Jur. 3d Actions §31

(real-party-in-interest status is based on ownership and control over the 

cause of action). And a theory of total assignment appears inconsistent

with the fact that employees have no assignable interest in a PAGA 

claim. See Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1756, AFL-CIO v. Superior Court of Los Angeles Cty., 46 Cal. 4th 993, 1002, 209 P. 3d 937, 943 

(2009) (Amalgamated Transit); see also Turrieta v. Lyft, Inc., 69 Cal. 

App. 5th 955, 972, 284 Cal. Rptr. 3d 767, 780 (2021) (The employee’s 

“ability to file PAGA claims on behalf of the state does not convert the 

state’s interest into their own or render them real parties in interest”).

For purposes of this opinion, we assume that PAGA plaintiffs are agents. 
 

4 VIKING RIVER CRUISES, INC. v. MORIANA 

Opinion of the Court 

the State’s claims for civil penalties on a representative basis, but it does not create any private rights or private 

claims for relief. Iskanian, 59 Cal. 4th, at 381, 327 P. 3d, at 

148; see also Amalgamated Transit, 46 Cal. 4th 993, 1002, 

209 P. 3d 937, 943 (2009). The code provisions enforced 

through the statute establish public duties that are owed to 

the State, not private rights belonging to employees in their 

“individual capacities.” Iskanian, 59 Cal. 4th, at 381, 327 

P. 3d, at 147. Other, distinct provisions of the code create 

individual rights, and claims arising from violations of

those rights are actionable through separate private causes

of action for compensatory or statutory damages. Id., at 

381–382, 327 P. 3d, at 147–148; see also Kim v. Reins Int’l 

California, Inc., 9 Cal. 5th 73, 86, 459 P. 3d 1123, 1130 

(2020) (“[C]ivil penalties recovered on the state’s behalf are

intended to remediate present violations and deter future

ones, not to redress employees’ injuries” (internal quotation

marks omitted; emphasis deleted)). And because PAGA actions are understood to involve the assertion of the government’s claims on a derivative basis, the judgment issued in

a PAGA action is binding on anyone “who would be bound 

by a judgment in an action brought by the government.” 

Arias, 46 Cal. 4th, at 986, 209 P. 3d, at 933. 

California precedent also interprets the statute to contain what is effectively a rule of claim joinder. Rules of 

claim joinder allow a party to unite multiple claims against 

an opposing party in a single action. See 6A C. Wright, H.

Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure §1582

(3d ed. 2016) (Wright & Miller). PAGA standing has the

same function. An employee with statutory standing may

“seek any civil penalties the state can, including penalties 

for violations involving employees other than the PAGA litigant herself.” ZB, N. A. v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 5th 175, 

185, 448 P. 3d 239, 243–244 (2019). An employee who alleges he or she suffered a single violation is entitled to use 

that violation as a gateway to assert a potentially limitless 
 

Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

number of other violations as predicates for liability. This 

mechanism radically expands the scope of PAGA actions. 

The default penalties set by PAGA are $100 for each aggrieved employee per pay period for the initial violation and 

$200 for each aggrieved employee per pay period for each

subsequent violation. Cal. Lab. Code Ann. §2699(f )(2). Individually, these penalties are modest; but given PAGA’s

additive dimension, low-value claims may easily be welded 

together into high-value suits. 

B 

Petitioner Viking River Cruises, Inc. (Viking), is a company that offers ocean and river cruises around the world. 

When respondent Angie Moriana was hired by Viking as a

sales representative, she executed an agreement to arbitrate any dispute arising out of her employment. The 

agreement contained a “Class Action Waiver” providing

that in any arbitral proceeding, the parties could not bring 

any dispute as a class, collective, or representative PAGA

action. It also contained a severability clause specifying 

that if the waiver was found invalid, any class, collective, 

representative, or PAGA action would presumptively be litigated in court. But under that severability clause, if any 

“portion” of the waiver remained valid, it would be “enforced in arbitration.” 

After leaving her position with Viking, Moriana filed a 

PAGA action against Viking in California court. Her complaint contained a claim that Viking had failed to provide

her with her final wages within 72 hours, as required by 

§§101–102 of the California Labor Code. But the complaint 

also asserted a wide array of other code violations allegedly

sustained by other Viking employees, including violations

of provisions concerning the minimum wage, overtime,

meal periods, rest periods, timing of pay, and pay statements. Viking moved to compel arbitration of Moriana’s 

“individual” PAGA claim—here meaning the claim that 
 

 

6 VIKING RIVER CRUISES, INC. v. MORIANA 

Opinion of the Court 

arose from the violation she suffered—and to dismiss her 

other PAGA claims. The trial court denied that motion, and 

the California Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that categorical waivers of PAGA standing are contrary to state policy and that PAGA claims cannot be split into arbitrable 

individual claims and nonarbitrable “representative”

claims. 

This ruling was dictated by the California Supreme

Court’s decision in Iskanian. In that case, the court held 

that pre-dispute agreements to waive the right to bring

“representative” PAGA claims are invalid as a matter of 

public policy. What, precisely, this holding means requires

some explanation. PAGA’s unique features have prompted 

the development of an entire vocabulary unique to the statute, but the details, it seems, are still being worked out. An 

unfortunate feature of this lexicon is that it tends to use the 

word “representative” in two distinct ways, and each of 

those uses of the term “representative” is connected with

one of Iskanian’s rules governing contractual waiver of 

PAGA claims. 

In the first sense, PAGA actions are “representative” in

that they are brought by employees acting as representatives—that is, as agents or proxies—of the State. But 

PAGA claims are also called “representative” when they are 

predicated on code violations sustained by other employees. 

In the first sense, “‘every PAGA action is . . . representative’” and “[t]here is no individual component to a PAGA

action,” Kim, 9 Cal. 5th, at 87, 459 P. 3d, at 1131 (quoting 

Iskanian, 59 Cal. 4th, at 387, 327 P. 3d, at 151), because 

every PAGA claim is asserted in a representative capacity.

But when the word “representative” is used in the second 

way, it makes sense to distinguish “individual” PAGA 

claims, which are premised on Labor Code violations actually sustained by the plaintiff, from “representative” (or 

perhaps quasi-representative) PAGA claims arising out of 

events involving other employees. For purposes of this 
 

 

Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

opinion, we will use “individual PAGA claim” to refer to

claims based on code violations suffered by the plaintiff.

And we will endeavor to be clear about how we are using

the term “representative.” 

Iskanian’s principal rule prohibits waivers of “representative” PAGA claims in the first sense. That is, it prevents parties from waiving representative standing to bring

PAGA claims in a judicial or arbitral forum. But Iskanian 

also adopted a secondary rule that invalidates agreements

to separately arbitrate or litigate “individual PAGA claims 

for Labor Code violations that an employee suffered,” on the

theory that resolving victim-specific claims in separate arbitrations does not serve the deterrent purpose of PAGA. 

59 Cal. 4th, at 383, 327 P. 3d, at 149; see also Kim, 9 Cal. 

5th, at 88, 459 P. 3d, at 1132 (noting that based on Iskanian, California courts have uniformly “rejected efforts to

split PAGA claims into individual and representative components”).

In this case, Iskanian’s principal prohibition required the

lower courts to treat the representative-action waiver in the 

agreement between Moriana and Viking as invalid insofar 

as it was construed as a wholesale waiver of PAGA standing. The agreement’s severability clause, however, allowed

enforcement of any “portion” of the waiver that remained

valid, so the agreement still would have permitted arbitration of Moriana’s individual PAGA claim even if wholesale 

enforcement was impossible. But because California law 

prohibits division of a PAGA action into constituent claims, 

the state courts refused to compel arbitration of that claim 

as well. We granted certiorari, 595 U. S. ___ (2021), and 

now reverse. 

II 

The FAA was enacted in response to judicial hostility to

arbitration. Section 2 of the statute makes arbitration 

agreements “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon 
 

 

 

8 VIKING RIVER CRUISES, INC. v. MORIANA 

Opinion of the Court 

such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation 

of any contract.” 9 U. S. C. §2.3 As we have interpreted it,

this provision contains two clauses: An enforcement mandate, which renders agreements to arbitrate enforceable as

a matter of federal law, and a saving clause, which permits 

invalidation of arbitration clauses on grounds applicable to 

“any contract.” See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 

U. S. 333, 339–340 (2011); Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 584 

U. S. ___, ___–___ (2018) (slip op., at 5–6). These clauses 

jointly establish “an equal-treatment principle: A court may 

invalidate an arbitration agreement based on ‘generally applicable contract defenses’ like fraud or unconscionability, 

but not on legal rules that ‘apply only to arbitration or that 

derive their meaning from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue.’” Kindred Nursing Centers L. P. v. Clark, 

581 U. S. 246, 251 (2017) (quoting Concepcion, 563 U. S., at 

339). Under that principle, the FAA “preempts any state

rule discriminating on its face against arbitration—for example, a law ‘prohibit[ing] outright the arbitration of a particular type of claim.’” Kindred Nursing, 581 U. S., at 251 

(quoting Concepcion, 563 U. S., at 341). 

But under our decisions, even rules that are generally applicable as a formal matter are not immune to preemption 

—————— 3As we have noted, common-law hostility to arbitration “manifested 

itself in a great variety of devices and formulas.” AT&T Mobility LLC v. 

Concepcion, 563 U. S. 333, 342 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Two important devices were the doctrines of ouster and revocability, which, respectively, invalidated arbitration clauses as impermissible

attempts to “oust” courts of their jurisdiction and permitted parties to

revoke consent to arbitrate until the moment the arbitrator entered an 

award. See, e.g., Kill v. Hollister, 1 Wils. K. B. 129, 95 Eng. Rep. 532

(K. B. 1746); Vynior’s Case, 77 Co. Rep. 80a, 77 Eng. Rep. 597 (K. B. 

1609). Another was the rule barring specific performance as a remedy 

for breach of an arbitration clause. See 21 R. Lord, Williston on Contracts §57:2 (4th ed. 2017). Section 2 abrogated these doctrines by making arbitration agreements presumptively “valid,” “irrevocable,” and “enforceable.” 
 

 

 

 

Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 9 

Opinion of the Court 

by the FAA. See Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 587 U. S. ___, 

___ (2019) (slip op., at 6); Concepcion, 563 U. S., at 343. Section 2’s mandate protects a right to enforce arbitration 

agreements. That right would not be a right to arbitrate in 

any meaningful sense if generally applicable principles of 

state law could be used to transform “traditiona[l] individualized . . . arbitration” into the “litigation it was meant to

displace” through the imposition of procedures at odds with

arbitration’s informal nature. Epic Systems, 584 U. S., at 

___ (slip op., at 8). See also Concepcion, 563 U. S., at 351. 

And that right would not be a right to arbitrate based on an 

agreement if generally applicable law could be used to coercively impose arbitration in contravention of the “first principle” of our FAA jurisprudence: that “[a]rbitration is 

strictly ‘a matter of consent.’” Granite Rock Co. v. Teamsters, 561 U. S. 287, 299 (2010) (quoting Volt Information 

Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U. S. 468, 479 (1989)); see also Lamps Plus, 

587 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 7); Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U. S. 662, 685 (2010).

Based on these principles, we have held that “a party may 

not be compelled under the FAA to submit to class arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for concluding that 

the party agreed to do so.” Id., at 684. See also Lamps Plus, 

587 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 1); Epic Systems, 584 U. S., at 

___–___ (slip op., at 6–8); Concepcion, 563 U. S., at 347–348. 

The “‘shift from bilateral arbitration to class-action arbitration’” mandates procedural changes that are inconsistent 

with the individualized and informal mode of arbitration 

contemplated by the FAA. Id., at 347 (quoting StoltNielsen, 559 U. S., at 686). As a result, class procedures

cannot be imposed by state law without presenting unwilling parties with an unacceptable choice between being compelled to arbitrate using procedures at odds with arbitration’s traditional form and forgoing arbitration altogether.

Putting parties to that choice is inconsistent with the FAA. 
 

 

10 VIKING RIVER CRUISES, INC. v. MORIANA 

Opinion of the Court 

Viking contends that these decisions require enforcement

of contractual provisions waiving the right to bring PAGA

actions because PAGA creates a form of class or collective 

proceeding. If this is correct, Iskanian’s prohibition on

PAGA waivers presents parties with the same impermissible choice as the rules we have invalidated in our decisions 

concerning class- and collective-action waivers: Either arbitrate disputes using a form of class procedure, or do not arbitrate at all. 

Moriana offers a very different characterization of the 

statute. As she sees it, any conflict between Iskanian and 

the FAA is illusory because PAGA creates nothing more

than a substantive cause of action. The only thing that is 

distinctive about PAGA, she supposes, is that it allows employee plaintiffs to increase the available penalties that 

may be awarded in an action by proving additional predicate violations of the Labor Code. But that does not make 

a PAGA action a class action, because those violations are 

not distinct claims belonging to distinct individuals. Instead, they are predicates for expanded liability under a 

single cause of action. In Moriana’s view, that means Iskanian invalidates waivers of substantive rights, and does 

not purport to invalidate anything that can meaningfully 

be described as an “arbitration agreement.”4 

—————— 4Moriana declines to defend one of the Iskanian court’s own bases for 

holding that the FAA does not mandate enforcement of PAGA waivers. 

The Iskanian court reasoned that a PAGA action lies outside the FAA’s 

coverage entirely because §2 is limited to controversies “arising out of ” 

the contract between the parties, 9 U. S. C. §2 (emphasis added), and a 

PAGA action “is not a dispute between an employer and an employee 

arising out of their contractual relationship,” but “a dispute between an

employer and the state.” Iskanian v. CLS Transp. Los Angeles, LLC, 59 

Cal. 4th 348, 387, 327 P. 3d 129, 151 (2014). We reject this argument.

Although the terms of §2 limit the FAA’s enforcement mandate to agreements to arbitrate controversies that “arise out of ” the parties’ contractual relationship, disputes resolved in PAGA actions satisfy this requirement. The contractual relationship between the parties is a but-for cause 
 

 

 

 

Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 11 

Opinion of the Court 

We disagree with both characterizations of the statute.

Moriana is correct that the FAA does not require courts to 

enforce contractual waivers of substantive rights and remedies. The FAA’s mandate is to enforce “arbitration agreements.” Concepcion, 563 U. S., at 344 (emphasis added).

And as we have described it, an arbitration agreement is “a 

specialized kind of forum-selection clause that posits not

only the situs of suit but also the procedure to be used in 

resolving the dispute.” Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 

U. S. 506, 519 (1974); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler 

Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U. S. 614, 633 (1985). An arbitration agreement thus does not alter or abridge substantive rights; it merely changes how those rights will be processed. And so we have said that “‘[b]y agreeing to 

arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to 

their resolution in an arbitral . . . forum.’” Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U. S. 346, 359 (2008) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors 

Corp., 473 U. S., at 628).5 

—————— 

of any justiciable legal controversy between the parties under PAGA, and 

“arising out of ” language normally refers to a causal relationship. See, 

e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 592 U. S. 

___, ___ (2021) (slip op., at 8). And regardless of whether a PAGA action

is in some sense also a dispute between an employer and the State, nothing in the FAA categorically exempts claims belonging to sovereigns from 

the scope of §2. 5 In briefing before this Court, Viking argued that the principle that 

the FAA does not mandate enforcement of provisions waiving substantive rights is limited to federal statutes. This argument is erroneous. 

The basis of this principle is not anything unique about federal statutes.

It is that the FAA requires only the enforcement of “provision[s]” to settle

a controversy “by arbitration,” §2, and not any provision that happens to

appear in a contract that features an arbitration clause. That is why we 

mentioned this principle in Preston, which concerned claims arising under state law. See 552 U. S., at 360 (noting that under the agreement, a

party “relinquishe[d] no substantive rights . . . California law may accord 

him”). 
 

 

12 VIKING RIVER CRUISES, INC. v. MORIANA 

Opinion of the Court 

But Moriana’s premise that PAGA creates a unitary private cause of action is irreconcilable with the structure of 

the statute and the ordinary legal meaning of the word 

“claim.” California courts interpret PAGA to provide employees with delegated authority to assert the State’s 

claims on a representative basis, not an individual cause of 

action. See, e.g., Amalgamated Transit, 46 Cal. 4th, at 

1003, 209 P. 3d, at 943 (PAGA “is simply a procedural statute” that “does not create property rights or any other substantive rights”). And a PAGA action asserting multiple 

code violations affecting a range of different employees does 

not constitute “a single claim” in even the broadest possible 

sense, because the violations asserted need not even arise 

from a common “transaction” or “nucleus of operative facts.” 

Lucky Brand Dungarees, Inc. v. Marcel Fashions Group, 

Inc., 590 U. S. ___, ___ (2020) (slip op., at 6) (internal quotation marks omitted).6 

Viking’s position, on the other hand, elides important 

structural differences between PAGA actions and class actions that preclude any straightforward application of our 

precedents invalidating prohibitions on class-action waivers. Class-action procedure allows courts to use a representative plaintiff ’s individual claims as a basis to “adjudicate claims of multiple parties at once, instead of in 

separate suits,” Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P. A. v. 

Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U. S. 393, 408 (2010). This, of course, 

requires the certification of a class. And because class judgments bind absentees with respect to their individual 

—————— 6California courts sometimes speak as though a PAGA action involves 

the assertion of “a single representative PAGA claim,” Williams v. Superior Court, 237 Cal. App. 4th 642, 649, 188 Cal. Rptr. 3d 83, 87 (2015).

But we are not required to take the labels affixed by state courts at face

value in determining whether state law creates a scheme at odds with 

federal law. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U. S. 363, 367–368 (1930). 

And in our view, this manner of speaking is another reflection of the stillembryonic character of the language that has grown up around PAGA. 
Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 13 

Opinion of the Court 

claims for relief and are preclusive as to all claims the class

could have brought, Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U. S. 867, 874 (1984), “class representatives 

must at all times adequately represent absent class members, and absent [class] members must be afforded notice, 

an opportunity to be heard, and a right to opt out of the 

class.” Concepcion, 563 U. S., at 349. And to “ensur[e] that

the named plaintiffs are appropriate representatives of the

class whose claims they wish to litigate,” the adjudicator 

must decide questions of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 

v. Dukes, 564 U. S. 338, 349 (2011).

PAGA actions also permit the adjudication of multiple 

claims in a single suit, but their structure is entirely different. A class-action plaintiff can raise a multitude of claims

because he or she represents a multitude of absent individuals; a PAGA plaintiff, by contrast, represents a single principal, the LWDA, that has a multitude of claims. As a result 

of this structural difference, PAGA suits exhibit virtually

none of the procedural characteristics of class actions. The 

plaintiff does not represent a class of injured individuals, so

there is no need for certification. PAGA judgments are

binding only with respect to the State’s claims, and are not 

binding on nonparty employees as to any individually held 

claims. Arias, 46 Cal. 4th, at 986, 209 P. 3d, at 933–934. 

This obviates the need to consider adequacy of representation, numerosity, commonality, or typicality. And although 

the statute gives other affected employees a future interest 

in the penalties awarded in an action, that interest does not 

make those employees “parties” in any of the senses in 

which absent class members are, see Devlin v. Scardelletti, 

536 U. S. 1 (2002), or give those employees anything more 

than an inchoate interest in litigation proceeds. See Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. 

Stevens, 529 U. S. 765, 773 (2000) (The “‘right’” to a share 
 

14 VIKING RIVER CRUISES, INC. v. MORIANA 

Opinion of the Court 

of the proceeds of a qui tam action “does not even fully materialize until the litigation is completed and the relator 

prevails”).

Because PAGA actions do not adjudicate the individual

claims of multiple absent third parties, they do not present 

the problems of notice, due process, and adequacy of representation that render class arbitration inconsistent with arbitration’s traditionally individualized form. See Concepcion, 563 U. S., at 347–348. Of course, as a practical matter, 

PAGA actions do have something important in common 

with class actions. Because PAGA plaintiffs represent a

principal with a potentially vast number of claims at its disposal, PAGA suits “greatly increas[e] risks to defendants.” 

Id., at 350. But our precedents do not hold that the FAA

allows parties to contract out of anything that might amplify defense risks. Instead, our cases hold that States cannot coerce individuals into forgoing arbitration by taking

the individualized and informal procedures characteristic of 

traditional arbitration off the table. Litigation risks are relevant to that inquiry because one way in which state law 

may coerce parties into forgoing their right to arbitrate is

by conditioning that right on the use of a procedural format

that makes arbitration artificially unattractive. The question, then, is whether PAGA contains any procedural mechanism at odds with arbitration’s basic form. 

Viking suggests an answer. Our FAA precedents treat 

bilateral arbitration as the prototype of the individualized 

and informal form of arbitration protected from undue state

interference by the FAA. See Epic Systems, 584 U. S., at 

___–___ (slip op., at 8–9); see also American Express Co. v. 

Italian Colors Restaurant, 570 U. S. 228, 238 (2013); Concepcion, 563 U. S., at 347–349; Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U. S., at 

685–686. Viking posits that a proceeding is “bilateral” in

the relevant sense if—but only if—it involves two and only 

two parties and the arbitration “‘is conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties only.’” Wal-Mart, 564 
Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 15 

Opinion of the Court 

U. S., at 348 (quoting Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U. S. 682, 

700–701 (1979)). PAGA actions necessarily deviate from

this ideal because they involve litigation or arbitration on 

behalf of an absent principal. Viking thus suggests that 

Iskanian’s prohibition on PAGA waivers is inconsistent 

with the FAA because PAGA creates an intrinsically representational form of action and Iskanian requires parties either to arbitrate in that format or forgo arbitration altogether.

We disagree. Nothing in the FAA establishes a categorical rule mandating enforcement of waivers of standing to

assert claims on behalf of absent principals. Non-class representative actions in which a single agent litigates on behalf of a single principal are part of the basic architecture

of much of substantive law. Familiar examples include 

shareholder-derivative suits, wrongful-death actions, trustee actions, and suits on behalf of infants or incompetent 

persons. Single-agent, single-principal suits of this kind 

necessarily deviate from the strict ideal of bilateral dispute 

resolution posited by Viking. But we have never held that 

the FAA imposes a duty on States to render all forms of representative standing waivable by contract. Nor have we 

suggested that single-agent, single-principal representative suits are inconsistent the norm of bilateral arbitration 

as our precedents conceive of it. Instead, we have held that 

“the ‘changes brought about by the shift from bilateral arbitration to class-action arbitration’” are too fundamental 

to be imposed on parties without their consent. Concepcion, 

563 U. S., at 347–348 (quoting Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U. S., at 

686; emphasis added). And we have held that §2’s saving

clause does not preserve defenses that would allow a party 

to declare “that a contract is unenforceable just because it 

requires bilateral arbitration.” Epic Systems, 584 U. S., at 

___ (slip op., at 9). 

These principles do not mandate the enforcement of waiv-
 

 

16 VIKING RIVER CRUISES, INC. v. MORIANA 

Opinion of the Court 

ers of representative capacity as a categorical rule. Requiring parties to decide whether to arbitrate or litigate a 

single-agent, single-principal action does not produce a 

shift from a situation in which the arbitrator must “resolv[e] a single dispute between the parties to a single

agreement” to one in which he or she must “resolv[e] many

disputes between hundreds or perhaps even thousands of 

parties.” Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U. S., at 686. And a proceeding 

in which two and only two parties arbitrate exclusively in

their individual capacities is not the only thing one might

mean by “bilateral arbitration.” As we have said, “[t]he label ‘party’ does not indicate an absolute characteristic, but 

rather a conclusion about the applicability of various procedural rules that may differ based on context.” Devlin, 536 

U. S., at 10. Our precedents use the phrase “bilateral arbitration” in opposition to “class or collective” arbitration, and

the problems we have identified in mandatory class arbitration arise from procedures characteristic of multiparty representative actions. Epic Systems, 584 U. S., at ___ (slip 

op., at 24); see also Italian Colors, 570 U. S., at 238; Concepcion, 563 U. S., at 347–349; Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U. S., at 

685–686. Unlike these kinds of actions, single-principal,

single-agent representative actions are “bilateral” in two

registers: They involve the rights of only the absent real 

party in interest and the defendant, and litigation need only 

be conducted by the agent-plaintiff and the defendant. This 

degree of deviation from bilateral norms is not alien to traditional arbitral practice,7 and our precedents have never 

suggested otherwise. See, e.g., Marmet Health Care Center, 

Inc. v. Brown, 565 U. S. 530 (2012) (per curiam) (invalidating rule categorically barring arbitration of wrongful-death

actions). 

—————— 7For example, close corporations have included arbitration clauses in 

negotiated shareholder agreements for many decades. See, e.g., In re 

Carl, 263 App. Div. 887, 32 N. Y. S. 2d 410 (1942); Lumsden v. Lumsden 

Bros. & Taylor Inc., 242 App. Div. 852, 257 N. Y. S. 221 (1934). 
Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 17 

Opinion of the Court 

Nor does a rule prohibiting waiver of representative

standing declare “that a contract is unenforceable just because it requires bilateral arbitration.” Epic Systems, 584 

U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 9). Indeed, if the term “bilateral 

arbitration” is used to mean “arbitration in an individual 

capacity between precisely two parties,” a rule prohibiting 

representative-capacity waivers cannot invalidate agreements to arbitrate on a “bilateral” basis. An agreement that

explicitly provided for “arbitration on a strictly bilateral basis” would, under that definition of the term “bilateral,” categorically exclude representative-capacity claims from its 

coverage. Such claims, after all, necessarily involve the representation of an absent principal, and thus cannot be arbitrated in a strictly bilateral proceeding. A rule prohibiting 

waivers of representative standing would not invalidate 

any agreements that contracted for “bilateral arbitration”

in Viking’s sense—it would simply require parties to choose 

whether to litigate those claims or arbitrate them in a proceeding that is not bilateral in every conceivable sense. And 

while this consequence only follows because it is impossible

to decide representative claims in an arbitration that is “bilateral” in every dimension, nothing in our precedent suggests that in enacting the FAA, Congress intended to require States to reshape their agency law to ensure that 

parties will never have to arbitrate in a proceeding that deviates from “bilateral arbitration” in the strictest sense. If 

there is a conflict between California’s prohibition on PAGA

waivers and the FAA, it must derive from a different source. 

III 

We think that such a conflict between PAGA’s procedural

structure and the FAA does exist, and that it derives from 

the statute’s built-in mechanism of claim joinder. As we 

noted at the outset, that mechanism permits “aggrieved employees” to use the Labor Code violations they personally

suffered as a basis to join to the action any claims that could 
 

18 VIKING RIVER CRUISES, INC. v. MORIANA 

Opinion of the Court 

have been raised by the State in an enforcement proceeding. Iskanian’s secondary rule prohibits parties from contracting around this joinder device because it invalidates 

agreements to arbitrate only “individual PAGA claims for 

Labor Code violations that an employee suffered,” 59 Cal. 

4th, at 383, 327 P. 3d, at 149. 

This prohibition on contractual division of PAGA actions 

into constituent claims unduly circumscribes the freedom of 

parties to determine “the issues subject to arbitration” and 

“the rules by which they will arbitrate,” Lamps Plus, 587 

U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 7), and does so in a way that violates the fundamental principle that “arbitration is a matter of consent,” Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U. S., at 684. The most 

basic corollary of the principle that arbitration is a matter 

of consent is that “a party can be forced to arbitrate only 

those issues it specifically has agreed to submit to arbitration,” First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U. S. 

938, 945 (1995). This means that parties cannot be coerced 

into arbitrating a claim, issue, or dispute “absent an affirmative ‘contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed 

to do so.’” Lamps Plus, 587 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 8) (quoting Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U. S., at 684); see also Concepcion, 

563 U. S., at 347–348. 

For that reason, state law cannot condition the enforceability of an arbitration agreement on the availability of a 

procedural mechanism that would permit a party to expand

the scope of the arbitration by introducing claims that the 

parties did not jointly agree to arbitrate. Rules of claim 

joinder can function in precisely that way. Modern civil procedure dispenses with the formalities of the common-law 

approach to claim joinder in favor of almost-unqualified 

joinder. Wright & Miller §1581. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 18(a), which permits a party to “join, as independent 

or alternative claims, as many claims as it has against an 

opposing party,” is typical of the modern approach. But the 

FAA licenses contracting parties to depart from standard 
 

 

 

Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 19 

Opinion of the Court 

rules “in favor of individualized arbitration procedures of 

their own design,” so parties to an arbitration agreement

are not required to follow the same approach. Epic Systems, 

584 U. S., at ____ (slip op., at 14). And that is true even if 

bifurcated proceedings are an inevitable result. See, e.g., 

Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U. S. 213, 220–221 

(1985); Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U. S. 1, 103 (1983). 

A state rule imposing an expansive rule of joinder in the

arbitral context would defeat the ability of parties to control 

which claims are subject to arbitration. Such a rule would 

permit parties to superadd new claims to the proceeding,

regardless of whether the agreement between them committed those claims to arbitration. Requiring arbitration

procedures to include a joinder rule of that kind compels 

parties to either go along with an arbitration in which the 

range of issues under consideration is determined by coercion rather than consent, or else forgo arbitration altogether. Either way, the parties are coerced into giving up a 

right they enjoy under the FAA. See Lamps Plus, 587 U. S., 

at ___–___ (slip op., at 6–8); Epic Systems, 584 U. S., at ___– 

___ (slip op., at 5–9); Concepcion, 563 U. S., at 347–351; 

Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U. S., at 684–687. 

When made compulsory by way of Iskanian, the joinder

rule internal to PAGA functions in exactly this way. Under 

that rule, parties cannot agree to restrict the scope of an

arbitration to disputes arising out of a particular “‘“transaction”’” or “‘common nucleus of facts.’” Lucky Brand, 590 

U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 6). If the parties agree to arbitrate 

“individual” PAGA claims based on personally sustained violations, Iskanian allows the aggrieved employee to abrogate that agreement after the fact and demand either judicial proceedings or an arbitral proceeding that exceeds the

scope jointly intended by the parties. The only way for parties to agree to arbitrate one of an employee’s PAGA claims

is to also “agree” to arbitrate all other PAGA claims in the 
 

 

20 VIKING RIVER CRUISES, INC. v. MORIANA 

Opinion of the Court 

same arbitral proceeding.

The effect of Iskanian’s rule mandating this mechanism

is to coerce parties into withholding PAGA claims from arbitration. Liberal rules of claim joinder presuppose a backdrop in which litigants assert their own claims and those of

a limited class of other parties who are usually connected 

with the plaintiff by virtue of a distinctive legal relationship—such as that between shareholders and a corporation

or between a parent and a minor child. PAGA departs from

that norm by granting the power to enforce a subset of California public law to every employee in the State. This combination of standing to act on behalf of a sovereign and mandatory freeform joinder allows plaintiffs to unite a massive 

number of claims in a single-package suit. But as we have 

said, “[a]rbitration is poorly suited to the higher stakes” of 

massive-scale disputes of this kind. Concepcion, 563 U. S., 

at 350. The absence of “multilayered review” in arbitral

proceedings “makes it more likely that errors will go uncorrected.” Ibid. And suits featuring a vast number of claims

entail the same “risk of ‘in terrorem’ settlements that class 

actions entail.” Ibid. As a result, Iskanian’s indivisibility

rule effectively coerces parties to opt for a judicial forum 

rather than “forgo[ing] the procedural rigor and appellate 

review of the courts in order to realize the benefits of private dispute resolution.” Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U. S., at 685; 

see also Concepcion, 563 U. S., at 350–351. This result is 

incompatible with the FAA. 

IV 

We hold that the FAA preempts the rule of Iskanian insofar as it precludes division of PAGA actions into individual and non-individual claims through an agreement to arbitrate. This holding compels reversal in this case. The 

agreement between Viking and Moriana purported to waive

“representative” PAGA claims. Under Iskanian, this provision was invalid if construed as a wholesale waiver of PAGA 
Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 21 

Opinion of the Court 

claims. And under our holding, that aspect of Iskanian is 

not preempted by the FAA, so the agreement remains invalid insofar as it is interpreted in that manner. But the severability clause in the agreement provides that if the waiver

provision is invalid in some respect, any “portion” of the

waiver that remains valid must still be “enforced in arbitration.” Based on this clause, Viking was entitled to enforce

the agreement insofar as it mandated arbitration of Moriana’s individual PAGA claim. The lower courts refused to 

do so based on the rule that PAGA actions cannot be divided 

into individual and non-individual claims. Under our holding, that rule is preempted, so Viking is entitled to compel 

arbitration of Moriana’s individual claim. 

The remaining question is what the lower courts should

have done with Moriana’s non-individual claims. Under 

our holding in this case, those claims may not be dismissed 

simply because they are “representative.” Iskanian’s rule 

remains valid to that extent. But as we see it, PAGA provides no mechanism to enable a court to adjudicate nonindividual PAGA claims once an individual claim has been 

committed to a separate proceeding. Under PAGA’s standing requirement, a plaintiff can maintain non-individual 

PAGA claims in an action only by virtue of also maintaining 

an individual claim in that action. See Cal. Lab. Code Ann. 

§§2699(a), (c). When an employee’s own dispute is pared 

away from a PAGA action, the employee is no different from 

a member of the general public, and PAGA does not allow 

such persons to maintain suit. See Kim, 9 Cal. 5th, at 90, 

459 P. 3d, at 1133 (“PAGA’s standing requirement was 

meant to be a departure from the ‘general public’ . . . standing originally allowed” under other California statutes). As 

a result, Moriana lacks statutory standing to continue to 

maintain her non-individual claims in court, and the correct 

course is to dismiss her remaining claims. 

For these reasons, the judgment of the California Court 

of Appeal is reversed, and the case is remanded for further 
 

22 VIKING RIVER CRUISES, INC. v. MORIANA 

Opinion of the Court 

proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 

It is so ordered. 
 

_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 1 

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 20–1573 

VIKING RIVER CRUISES, INC., PETITIONER v.

ANGIE MORIANA 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL OF 

CALIFORNIA, SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

[June 15, 2022] 

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, concurring. 

I join the Court’s opinion in full. The Court faithfully applies precedent to hold that California’s anti-waiver rule for 

claims under the State’s Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) is pre-empted only “insofar as it 

precludes division of PAGA actions into individual and nonindividual claims through an agreement to arbitrate.” 

Ante, at 20. In its analysis of the parties’ contentions, the

Court also details several important limitations on the preemptive effect of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). See 

ante, at 11–17. As a whole, the Court’s opinion makes clear 

that California is not powerless to address its sovereign concern that it cannot adequately enforce its Labor Code without assistance from private attorneys general. 

The Court concludes that the FAA poses no bar to the adjudication of respondent Angie Moriana’s “non-individual” 

PAGA claims, but that PAGA itself “provides no mechanism

to enable a court to adjudicate non-individual PAGA claims 

once an individual claim has been committed to a separate 

proceeding.” Ante, at 21. Thus, the Court reasons, based 

on available guidance from California courts, that Moriana 

lacks “statutory standing” under PAGA to litigate her “nonindividual” claims separately in state court. Ibid. Of 

course, if this Court’s understanding of state law is wrong,

California courts, in an appropriate case, will have the last 
 

2 VIKING RIVER CRUISES, INC. v. MORIANA 

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring 

word. Alternatively, if this Court’s understanding is right, 

the California Legislature is free to modify the scope of statutory standing under PAGA within state and federal constitutional limits. With this understanding, I join the 

Court’s opinion. 
BARRETT, J., concurring

_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 1 

Opinion of BARRETT, J. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 20–1573 

VIKING RIVER CRUISES, INC., PETITIONER v. 

ANGIE MORIANA 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL OF 

CALIFORNIA, SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

[June 15, 2022] 

JUSTICE BARRETT, with whom JUSTICE KAVANAUGH 

joins, and with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins except as to 

the footnote, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. 

I join Part III of the Court’s opinion. I agree that reversal

is required under our precedent because PAGA’s procedure 

is akin to other aggregation devices that cannot be imposed 

on a party to an arbitration agreement. See, e.g., Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U. S. 662 (2010); 

AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U. S. 333 (2011); 

Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 584 U. S. ___ (2018); Lamps 

Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 587 U. S. ___ (2019). I would say nothing more than that. The discussion in Parts II and IV of the 

Court’s opinion is unnecessary to the result, and much of it

addresses disputed state-law questions as well as arguments not pressed or passed upon in this case.* 

—————— 

*The same is true of Part I. 
_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 1 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 20–1573 

VIKING RIVER CRUISES, INC., PETITIONER v. 

ANGIE MORIANA 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL OF 

CALIFORNIA, SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

[June 15, 2022] 

JUSTICE THOMAS, dissenting. 

I continue to adhere to the view that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U. S. C. §1 et seq., does not apply to proceedings in state courts. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. 

Dobson, 513 U. S. 265, 285–297 (1995) (THOMAS, J., dissenting); see also Kindred Nursing Centers L. P. v. Clark, 

581 U. S. 246, 257 (2017) (THOMAS, J., dissenting) (collecting cases). Accordingly, the FAA does not require California’s courts to enforce an arbitration agreement that forbids 

an employee to invoke the State’s Private Attorneys General Act. On that basis, I would affirm the judgment of the

California Court of Appeal.