In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 14-2579

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ANTHONY ADAMS,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 11 CR 779-5 — Sharon Johnson Coleman, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED JUNE 5, 2015 — DECIDED JUNE 12, 2015

____________________

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and FLAUM and EASTERBROOK,

Circuit Judges.

EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. As part of a plea bargain, 

Anthony Adams pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit 

armed robbery affecting interstate commerce, 18 U.S.C. 

§1951(a), and to possessing a firearm during and in relation 

to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. §924(c)(1)(A). Sentenced to 

87 months’ imprisonment, he asks us to set aside his plea 

and remand for a trial. His argument rests on Rosemond v. 
2 No. 14-2579

United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240 (2014), which was decided after 

he entered the plea (though before he was sentenced).

Rosemond holds that a person cannot be convicted of aiding and abetting a violation of §924(c) unless he has enough 

time to drop out of joint criminal activity after learning that 

a confederate is armed. We stated in United States v. Newman, 

755 F.3d 543, 547 (7th Cir. 2014), that the rules of accountability for aiding and abetting track those of conspiracy law under Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946). Adams 

puts Newman together with Rosemond and concludes that 

there are new, and more stringent, rules for co-conspirator 

liability. But that’s not what either Rosemond or Newman

held; instead Rosemond adapted the rules of aiding-andabetting liability to make them more like the Pinkerton approach to conspiracy.

The indictment charged Adams with conspiring to rob a 

drug stash house. Thieves think them good targets because 

they may hold large supplies of drugs and cash, and victims 

cannot report the offense to the police. But Adams was 

caught in a sting, proposed by an informant working with 

federal agents. Adams was eager to participate and did not 

raise an entrapment defense. Cf. United States v. Mayfield, 771 

F.3d 417 (7th Cir. 2014) (en banc). Now, however, he rues the 

guilty plea and contends that he cannot be held accountable 

for three firearms that were in a van when he was arrested.

The plea agreement sets out the factual basis for the convictions. Adams signed this agreement and adopted its contents in open court. According to the narration, a conspirator 

(not the informant) took a toolbox from one van and moved 

it to another as part of the group’s preparation for the theft. 

The toolbox was opened after the arrest and found to con-
No. 14-2579 3

tain three firearms. Adams maintains that he was not the 

person who moved the toolbox and did not know what it 

contained. But he did acknowledge, as part of the factual basis for the §1951(a) conviction, that he and the other conspirators “agreed to rob a purported stash house of at least 

50 kilograms of cocaine, using firearms.” Being armed thus

was part of the agreement. With respect to the §924(c) conviction, Adams acknowledged that he “knowingly possessed 

a firearm” and that he had agreed with five other persons 

“to rob a purported stash house of at least 50 kilograms of 

cocaine, and to use firearms in furtherance of the robbery.” 

Finally, Adams acknowledged that “in furtherance of and as 

a foreseeable consequence of that agreement, a toolbox containing” firearms was placed in the van.

These acknowledgments suffice to hold Adams accountable for the firearms, no matter who put the toolbox in the 

van and whether or not Adams knew what was in it. He

conceded that the presence of firearms was a “foreseeable 

consequence” of his agreement to rob a stash house “using 

firearms.” Using weapons was part of the plan. Pinkerton

makes one conspirator liable for the foreseeable acts of others within the scope of the agreement. The provision of 

weapons was part of the plan, and thus within the conspiracy’s scope, and what’s part of a plan is foreseeable to the 

planners. Adams never attempted to withdraw from the 

conspiracy, so he is accountable for his confederates’ foreseeable acts.

Nothing in Rosemond alters this assessment. The Court 

dealt with a situation in which one criminal participant unexpectedly produced a gun, and Rosemond was arrested before he had an opportunity either to assist or to walk away. 
4 No. 14-2579

The Court held that “a defendant may be convicted of abetting a §924(c) violation only if his intent reaches beyond a 

simple drug sale, to an armed one.” 134 S. Ct. at 1248. And 

whether the defendant had the necessary intent, the Court 

concluded, depended in part on whether he anticipated his 

colleague’s possession of a gun. If he did, then he was culpable; if he did not, then it mattered whether he had a 

chance to stop assisting the criminal venture (i.e., to walk

away) after learning that someone else was packing.

Adams admitted planning that one or more of the conspirators would be armed. His intent thus “reache[d] beyond 

a simple drug [theft], to an armed one.” If this had been a 

prosecution for aiding and abetting, there would not have 

been a problem under Rosemond. No more is there a problem 

when the charge is conspiracy. It does not matter under 

Rosemond, Pinkerton, or Newman, whether Adams knew how 

many guns would be used, who would supply them, and

whether they would come in a toolbox, a holster, a car’s secret compartment, or a picnic basket; it is enough if the criminal agreement entailed use of a firearm. Adams is not entitled to withdraw his plea.

AFFIRMED