2956 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 12 / Wednesday, January 19, 2000 / Notices

suitability of habitat for the larval

recruitment objective.

The draft D.O. criteria are based

entirely on laboratory findings.

However, field observations support the

findings of laboratory studies. Field

acute effects occurred in juvenile and

adult animals at <2.0 mg/L, which

would be predicted based on the <2.3

mg/L juvenile/adult criterion. In the

field, behavioral effects generally

occurred within the range where many

of the laboratory sublethal effects

occurred. However, an important

limitation of using field observations to

describe D.O. protection is the absence

of field observations on the survival and

growth of hypoxic sensitive larvae. This

type of information is critical since two

of the three goals for protection are

derived from responses of larvae.

Implementation Overview

Implementation of draft D.O. criteria

may be slightly different from that of

chemical toxicants, but not for reasons

associated with either biological effects

or exposure. The primary reason that

D.O. might be implemented differently

from toxic compounds is because

controlling the effects of low D.O. is not

accomplished by directly regulating

D.O. Rather, hypoxia is a symptom of a

problem, not the direct problem. Thus

dissolved oxygen would be regulated

primarily through the control of

nutrients ( e.g., nitrogen and

phosphorus) and oxygen demanding

wastes. As a stressor, D.O. also differs

from most toxic compounds in that

there can be a large natural component

to the cause of hypoxic conditions in

any given water body. Dissolved oxygen

criteria may be appropriately used in a

risk assessment framework. The draft

criteria and management approach

presented in this document could be

used to compare D.O. conditions among

areas and determine if D.O. conditions

would be adequate to support aquatic

life. Environmental managers could

determine which sites need the most

attention, and what is the spatial and

temporal extent of hypoxic problems

from one year to the next. Finally,

environmental planners could use the

draft approach to evaluate how

conditions would improve under

different management scenarios, helping

them make better management

decisions.

Limitations of the Document

The geographic scope of the draft

criteria are limited to the Virginian

Province of the Atlantic coast of the

United States (i.e., southern Cape Cod,

MA, to Cape Hatteras, NC). The draft

document provides the necessary

information for environmental planners

and regulators within the Virginian

Province to address the question: are the

D.O. conditions at a given site sufficient

to protect coastal or estuarine aquatic

life? The approach outlined in the draft

document could be used to evaluate

existing localized D.O. standards or

management goals or establish new

ones. The draft criteria do not address

direct behavioral responses (i.e.,

avoidance) or the ecological

consequences of behavioral responses,

such as increased or decreased

predation rates or altered community

structure, nor do they address the issue

of spatial significance of a D.O. problem.

In addition, as with all criteria, the draft

criteria do not account for changes in

sensitivity to low D.O. that accompany

other stresses, such as high temperature,

extremes of salinity, or toxicants. Chief

among these concerns would be high

temperature because high temperature

and low D.O. often appear together. Low

D.O. would be more lethal at water

temperatures approaching the upper

thermal limit for species. The limits

provided in the draft document should

be sufficient under most conditions

where aquatic organisms are not

otherwise unduly stressed.

The draft criteria for the Virginian

Province may be over- or underprotective of aquatic life in other

regions. However, the approach used to

develop the draft criteria is considered

to be applicable to other regions with

appropriate regional modifications.

Organism adaptations to lower oxygen

requirements may have occurred in

locations where oxygen concentrations

have historically been reduced due to

high temperatures, or in systems with

non-anthropogenic high oxygen

demand. Conversely, organisms in

another region could be adapted to

colder temperature and higher dissolved

oxygen regimes than those covered in

the document, and thus may have

different sensitivity to dissolved oxygen

concentrations. In addition, effects of

hypoxia may vary latitudinally, or sitespecifically, particularly as reproductive

seasons determine exposure risks for

sensitive early life stages. For these

reasons, an environmental risk manager

would be to carefully evaluate water

quality and biological conditions within

the specific location and decide if the

Virginian Province criteria would apply

or if region- or site-specific

considerations would need to be made.

Endangered or Threatened Species

Policy Recommendations

When a threatened or endangered

species occurs at a site and sufficient

data indicate that it is sensitive at

concentrations below the recommended

criteria, it would be appropriate to

consider deriving a site-specific

criterion.

Future Addendum and Applications

In addition to publishing this

document, an addendum will be

published in the near future that will

specifically address implementation

issues. In the current draft document,

implementation issues are discussed in

a more general manner, summarizing

important issues that environmental

managers should consider in adopting

and implementation of D.O. water

quality standards. The addendum will

provide a more detailed discussion of

implementation issues by using real

world example data sets. Application of

this guidance to marine waters outside

the Virginian Province will also be

discussed. As a component of the

addendum, EPA will also publish a

computer program that will allow Sates

and other users to calculate D.O. criteria

values for coastal and estuarine animals.

The program will be based on the

models discussed in the criteria

document and will contain a graphic

user interface. EPA anticipates

publication of the Addendum and

computer model to occur sometime in

2000.

EPA believes the approach used to

develop the draft criteria can be applied,

with minor modifications and regional

specific data, to derive D.O. criteria for

other coastal and estuarine regions of

the United States. Therefore, in the

future, EPA plans to prepare similar

D.O. criteria for other provinces based

on this approach. At such time, EPA

will publish a Notice of Data

Availability and formally request

submission of data from parties

interested in the development of D.O.

criteria for other provinces.

Dated: January 10, 2000.

Geoffrey H. Grubbs,

Director, Office of Science and Technology.

[FR Doc. 00–1211 Filed 1–18–00; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6560–50–P

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS

COMMISSION

[DA 00–43]

Auction of Licenses in the 747–762 and

777–792 MHz Bands Scheduled for

May 10, 2000; Report No. AUC–99–31–

A (Auction No. 31)

AGENCY: Federal Communications

Commission.

ACTION: Notice.

Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 12 / Wednesday, January 19, 2000 / Notices 2957

1See 700 MHz First Report and Order at ¶¶ 31,

39.

2See Part 1 Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 5697–98, ¶ 16

(1997).

SUMMARY: This Public Notice announces

the auction of licenses for Fixed,

Mobile, and Broadcasting services in the

747–762 and 777–792 MHz bands

(‘‘Auction No. 31’’), scheduled to

commence on May 10, 2000 and seeks

comment on a number of auction

specific procedures. As discussed in

greater detail herein, Auction No. 31

will consist of 12 licenses in the 747–

762 and 777–792 MHz bands (‘‘700 MHz

band’’). One 20 megahertz license

(consisting of paired 10 megahertz

blocks) and one 10 megahertz license

(consisting of paired 5 megahertz

blocks) will be offered in each of six

regions to be known as the 700 MHz

band economic area groupings (‘‘700

MHz band EAGs’’).

DATES: Comments are due on or before

January 24, 2000, and reply comments

are due on or before January 31, 2000.

ADDRESSES: An original and four copies

of all pleadings must be filed with the

Commission’s Secretary, Magalie Roman

Salas, Office of the Secretary, Federal

Communications Commission, 445

Twelfth Street, SW, TW–A325,

Washington, DC 20054. In addition to

filing with the Office of the Secretary,

one copy of each pleading must be

delivered to each of the following

locations:

(1) Commission’s duplicating

contractor, International Transcription

Service, Inc. (ITS), 1231 20th Street,

NW, Washington, DC 20036;

(2) Office of Media Relations, Public

Reference Center, 445 12th Street, SW,

Suite CY–A257, Washington, DC 20554;

(3) Amy Zoslov, Chief, Auctions and

Industry Analysis Division, Wireless

Telecommunications Bureau, 445

Twelfth Street, Suite 4–A760,

Washington, DC 20554.

Comments and reply comments will

be available for public inspection during

regular business hours in the FCC

Public Reference Room, Room CY–

A257, 445 12th Street SW, Washington,

DC 20554.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Auctions and Industry Analysis

Division, Wireless Telecommunications

Bureau, Howard Davenport, Auctions

Attorney, or Craig Bomberger, Auctions

Analyst, at (202) 418–0660; or Kathy

Garland, Project Manager, at (717) 338–

2888.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a

summary of a Public Notice released

January 10, 2000. The complete text of

the public notice, including

Attachments A and B, is available for

inspection and copying during normal

business hours in the FCC Reference

Center (Room CY–A257), 445 12th

Street, SW, Washington, DC. It may also

be purchased from the Commission’s

copy contractor, International

Transcription Services, Inc. (ITS, Inc.)

1231 20th Street, NW, Washington, DC

20036, (202) 857–3800. It is also

available on the Commission’s website

at http://www.fcc.gov.

I. Introduction

1. By this public notice, the Wireless

Telecommunications Bureau (‘‘Bureau’’)

announces Auction No. 31, the auction

of licenses for Fixed, Mobile, and

Broadcasting services in the 747–762

and 777–792 MHz bands, scheduled to

commence on May 10, 2000. See Service

Rules for the 746–764 and 776–794 MHz

Bands, and Revisions to Part 27 of the

Commission’s Rules, WT Docket No.

99–168, First Report and Order, FCC

00–5 (released January 7, 2000) (‘‘700

MHz First Report and Order’’). Auction

No. 31 will consist of 12 licenses in the

747–762 and 777–792 MHz bands. One

20 megahertz license (consisting of

paired 10 megahertz blocks) and one 10

megahertz license (consisting of paired

5 megahertz blocks) will be offered in

each of six regions to be known as the

700 MHz band economic area groupings

(700 MHz band EAGs).

2. The following table contains the

Block / Frequency Band Limits Cross

Reference List for each region in

Auction No. 31:

747–762 AND 777–792 MHZ

ALLOCATIONS

License suffix Frequencies

C ............................... 747—752, 777—782

D ............................... 752—762, 782—792

The Balanced Budget Act of 1997

requires the Commission to ‘‘ensure

that, in the scheduling of any

competitive bidding under this

subsection, an adequate period is

allowed * * * before issuance of

bidding rules, to permit notice and

comment on proposed auction

procedures * * * .’’ Consistent with the

provisions of the Balanced Budget Act

and to ensure that potential bidders

have adequate time to familiarize

themselves with the specific rules that

will govern the day-to-day conduct of an

auction, the Commission directed the

Bureau, under its existing delegated

authority, (See Amendment of Part 1 of

the Commission’s Rules—Competitive

Bidding Proceeding, WT Docket No. 97–

82, Order, Memorandum Opinion and

Order, and Notice of Proposed Rule

Making, 62 FR 13540 (March 21, 1997),

12 FCC Rcd 5686, 5697, ¶ 16 (1997)

(‘‘Part 1 Order’’)) to seek comment on a

variety of auction-specific procedures

prior to the start of each auction. (See

Amendment of Part 1 of the

Commission’s Rules—Competitive

Bidding Procedures, Allocation of

Spectrum Below 5 GHz Transferred

from Federal Government Use, 4660–

4685 MHz, WT Docket No. 97–82, ET

Docket No. 94–32, Third Report and

Order and Second Further Notice of

Proposed Rule Making, 63 FR 770

(January 1, 1998), 13 FCC Rcd 374, 448,

¶124 (1998) (‘‘Part 1 Third Report and

Order’’).We therefore seek comment on

the following issues relating to Auction

No. 31.

II. Auction Structure

A. Simultaneous Multiple Round

Auction Design

3. We propose to award the licenses

in a single, simultaneous multipleround auction to allow bidders to take

advantage of any synergies that exist

among licenses. 1 We seek comment on

this proposal.

B. Upfront Payments and Initial

Maximum Eligibility

4. The Bureau has delegated authority

and discretion to determine an

appropriate upfront payment for each

license being auctioned.2 Upfront

payments related to the specific

spectrum subject to auction protect

against frivolous or insincere bidding

and provide the Commission with a

source of funds from which to collect

payments owed at the close of the

auction. See Implementation of Section

309(j) of the Communications Act—

Competitive Bidding, PP Docket No. 93–

253, Second Report and Order, 59 FR

22980 (May 4, 1994), 9 FCC Rcd 2348,

2378–79, ¶¶ 171–176 (1994). In this

case, we have information available in

the form of a congressional estimate of

the value of the spectrum. Accordingly,

we list all licenses, including the related

populations and proposed upfront

payments, in Attachment A. We seek

comment on this proposal.

5. We further propose that the amount

of the upfront payment submitted by a

bidder will determine the initial

maximum eligibility (as measured in

bidding units) for each bidder. Upfront

payments will not be attributed to

specific licenses, but instead will be

translated into bidding units to define a

bidder’s initial maximum eligibility,

which cannot be increased during the

auction. The maximum eligibility will

determine the licenses on which a

bidder may bid in each round of the

2958 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 12 / Wednesday, January 19, 2000 / Notices

3See 47 CFR 1.2104(i).

auction. Thus, in calculating its upfront

payment amount, an applicant must

determine the maximum number of

bidding units it may wish to bid on (or

hold high bids on) in any single round,

and submit an upfront payment

covering that number of bidding units.

We seek comment on this proposal.

C. Activity Rules

6. In order to ensure that the auction

closes within a reasonable period of

time, an activity rule requires bidders to

bid actively on a percentage of their

maximum bidding eligibility during

each round of the auction rather than

waiting until the end to participate. A

bidder that does not satisfy the activity

rule will either lose bidding eligibility

in the next round or use an activity rule

waiver.

7. We propose to divide the auction

into three stages: Stage One, Stage Two

and Stage Three, each characterized by

an increased activity requirement. The

auction will start in Stage One. We

propose that the auction will generally

advance to the next stage (i.e., from

Stage One to Stage Two, and from Stage

Two to Stage Three) when the auction

activity level, as measured by the

percentage of bidding units receiving

new high bids, is approximately ten

percent or below for three consecutive

rounds of bidding in each stage.

However, we further propose that the

Bureau retain the discretion to change

stages unilaterally by announcement

during the auction. In exercising this

discretion, the Bureau will consider a

variety of measures of bidder activity,

including, but not limited to, the

auction activity level, the percentage of

licenses (as measured in bidding units)

on which there are new bids, the

number of new bids, and the percentage

increase in revenue. We seek comment

on these proposals.

8. We propose that in each round of

Stage One, a bidder desiring to maintain

its current eligibility be required to be

active on licenses encompassing at least

50 percent of its current bidding

eligibility. Failure to maintain the

requisite activity level will result in a

reduction in the bidder’s bidding

eligibility in the next round of bidding

(unless an activity rule waiver is used).

During Stage One, reduced eligibility for

the next round will be calculated by

multiplying the current round activity

by two. In each round of the second

stage of the auction, a bidder desiring to

maintain its current eligibility is

required to be active on at least 80

percent of its current bidding eligibility.

During Stage Two, reduced eligibility

for the next round will be calculated by

multiplying the current round activity

by five-fourths (5⁄4). In each round of

Stage Three, a bidder desiring to

maintain its current eligibility is

required to be active on 100 percent of

its current bidding eligibility. In this

final stage, reduced eligibility for the

next round will be set at current round

activity. We seek comment on these

proposals.

D. Activity Rule Waivers and Reducing

Eligibility

9. Use of an activity rule waiver

preserves the bidder’s current bidding

eligibility despite the bidder’s activity

in the current round being below the

required minimum level. An activity

rule waiver applies to an entire round

of bidding and not to a particular

license. Activity waivers are principally

a mechanism for auction participants to

avoid the loss of auction eligibility in

the event that exigent circumstances

prevent them from placing a bid in a

particular round.

10. The FCC auction system assumes

that bidders with insufficient activity

would prefer to use an activity rule

waiver (if available) rather than lose

bidding eligibility. Therefore, the

system will automatically apply a

waiver (known as an ‘‘automatic

waiver’’) at the end of any bidding

period where a bidder’s activity level is

below the minimum required unless: (1)

There are no activity rule waivers

available; or (2) the bidder overrides the

automatic application of a waiver by

reducing eligibility, thereby meeting the

minimum requirements.

11. A bidder with insufficient activity

may wish to reduce its bidding

eligibility rather than use an activity

rule waiver. If so, the bidder must

affirmatively override the automatic

waiver mechanism during the bidding

period by using the reduce eligibility

function in the software. In this case,

the bidder’s eligibility is permanently

reduced to bring the bidder into

compliance with the activity rules as

described. Once eligibility has been

reduced, a bidder will not be permitted

to regain its lost bidding eligibility.

12. A bidder may proactively use an

activity rule waiver as a means to keep

the auction open without placing a bid.

If a bidder submits a proactive waiver

(using the proactive waiver function in

the bidding software) during a bidding

period in which no bids are submitted,

the auction will remain open and the

bidder’s eligibility will be preserved. An

automatic waiver invoked in a round in

which there are no new valid bids will

not keep the auction open.

13. We propose that each bidder in

Auction No. 31 be provided with five

activity rule waivers that may be used

at the bidder’s discretion during the

course of the auction as set forth above.

We seek comment on this proposal.

E. Information Relating to Auction

Delay, Suspension or Cancellation

14. For Auction No. 31, we propose

that, by public notice or by

announcement during the auction, the

Bureau may delay, suspend or cancel

the auction in the event of natural

disaster, technical obstacle, evidence of

an auction security breach, unlawful

bidding activity, administrative or

weather necessity, or for any other

reason that affects the fair and

competitive conduct of competitive

bidding. 3 In such cases, the Bureau, in

its sole discretion, may elect to: resume

the auction starting from the beginning

of the current round; resume the auction

starting from some previous round; or

cancel the auction in its entirety.

Network interruption may cause the

Bureau to delay or suspend the auction.

We emphasize that exercise of this

authority is solely within the discretion

of the Bureau, and its use is not

intended to be a substitute for situations

in which bidders may wish to apply

their activity rule waivers. We seek

comment on this proposal.

III. Bidding Procedures

F. Round Structure

15. The Commission will use its

Automated Auction System to conduct

the electronic simultaneous multiple

round auction format for auction No. 31.

The initial bidding schedule will be

announced in a public notice to be

released at least one week before the

start of the auction, and will be

included in the registration mailings.

The simultaneous multiple round

format will consist of sequential bidding

rounds, each followed by the release of

round results. Details regarding the

location and format of round results will

be included in the same public notice.

16. The Bureau has discretion to

change the bidding schedule in order to

foster an auction pace that reasonably

balances speed with the bidders’ need to

study round results and adjust their

bidding strategies. The Bureau may

increase or decrease the amount of time

for the bidding rounds and review

periods, or the number of rounds per

day, depending upon the bidding

activity level and other factors. We seek

comment on this proposal.

G. Reserve Price or Minimum Opening

Bid

17. The Balanced Budget Act calls

upon the Commission to prescribe

Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 12 / Wednesday, January 19, 2000 / Notices 2959

4See Balanced Budget Act, Section 3002(a). The

Commission’s authority to establish a reserve price

or minimum opening bid is set forth in 47 CFR

1.2104 (c) and (d).

5See Part 1 Third Report and Order, 13 FCC Rcd

at 454455, ¶ 141 (1998).

methods by which a reasonable reserve

price will be required or a minimum

opening bid established when FCC

licenses are subject to auction (i.e.,

because the Commission has accepted

mutually exclusive applications for

those licenses), unless the Commission

determines that a reserve price or

minimum bid is not in the public

interest.4 Consistent with this mandate,

the Commission has directed the Bureau

to seek comment on the use of a

minimum opening bid and/or reserve

price prior to the start of each auction.5

18. Normally, a reserve price is an

absolute minimum price below, which

an item will not be sold in a given

auction. Reserve prices can be either

published or unpublished. A minimum

opening bid, on the other hand, is the

minimum bid price set at the beginning

of the auction below which no bids are

accepted. It is generally used to

accelerate the competitive bidding

process. Also, in a minimum opening

bid scenario, the auctioneer generally

has the discretion to lower the amount

later in the auction. It is also possible

for the minimum opening bid and the

reserve price to be the same amount.

19. In light of the Balanced Budget

Act, the Bureau proposes to establish

minimum opening bids for Auction No.

31. The Bureau believes a minimum

opening bid, which has been utilized in

other auctions, is an effective bidding

tool. See, e.g., Auction of 800 MHz SMR

Upper 10 MHz Band, Minimum

Opening Bids or Reserve Prices, DA 97–

2147, Order, 62 FR 55251 (October 23,

1997), 12 FCC Rcd 16354 (1997);

Auction of the Phase II 220 MHz Service

Licenses, Auction Notice and Filing

Requirements for 908 Licenses

Consisting of Economic Area (EA),

Economic Area Grouping (EAG), and

Nationwide Licenses, Scheduled for

September 15, 1998, Minimum Opening

Bids and Other Procedural Issues,

Public Notice, 63 FR 35213 (June 29,

1998) 13 FCC Rcd 16445 (1998). A

minimum opening bid, rather than a

reserve price, will help to regulate the

pace of the auction and provides

flexibility.

20. For Auction No. 31, we have

information available in the form of a

Congressional estimate of the value of

the spectrum. Accordingly, we list all

licenses, including the related

populations and proposed minimum

opening bids, in Attachment A . We

seek comment on this proposal.

21. If commenters believe that these

minimum opening bids will result in

substantial numbers of unsold licenses,

or is not a reasonable amount, or should

instead operate as a reserve price, they

should explain why this is so, and

comment on the desirability of an

alternative approach. Commenters are

advised to support their claims with

valuation analyses and suggested

reserve prices or minimum opening bid

levels or formulas. In establishing the

minimum opening bids, we particularly

seek comment on such factors as, among

other things, the amount of spectrum

being auctioned, levels of incumbency,

the availability of technology to provide

service, the size of the geographic

service areas, issues of interference with

other spectrum bands and any other

relevant factors that could reasonably

have an impact on valuation of the 747–

762 and 777–792 MHz bands.

Alternatively, comment is sought on

whether, consistent with the Balanced

Budget Act, the public interest would be

served by having no minimum opening

bid or reserve price.

H. Minimum Accepted Bids and Bid

Increments

22. Once there is a, standing high bid

on a license, a bid increment will be

applied to that license to establish a

minimum acceptable bid for the

following round. For Auction No. 31,

we propose to use a smoothing

methodology to calculate bid

increments, as we have done in several

other auctions. The Bureau retains the

discretion to change the minimum bid

increment if it determines

circumstances so dictate. The Bureau

will do so by announcement in the

Automated Auction System. We seek

comment on these proposals.

23. The exponential smoothing

formula calculates the bid increment for

each license based on a weighted

average of the activity received on each

license in all previous rounds. This

methodology will tailor the bid

increment for each license based on

activity, rather than setting a global

increment for all licenses. For every

license that receives a bid, the bid

increment for the next round for that

license will be established using the

exponential smoothing formula.

24. The calculation of the percentage

bid increment for each license in a given

round is made at the end of the previous

round. The computation is based on an

activity index, which is calculated as

the weighted average of the activity in

that round and the activity index from

the prior round. The activity index at

the start of the auction (round 0) will be

set at 0. The current activity index is

equal to a weighting factor times the

number of new bids received on the

license in the most recent bidding round

plus one minus the weighting factor

times the activity index from the prior

round. The activity index is then used

to calculate a percentage increment by

multiplying a minimum percentage

increment by one plus the activity index

with that result being subject to a

maximum percentage increment. The

Commission will initially set the

weighting factor at 0.5, the minimum

percentage increment at 0.1, and the

maximum percentage increment at 0.2.

Equations

A i = (C*Bi ) + ((1¥C)*Ai¥1)

Ii∂1 = smaller of ((1 + Ai) * N) and M

where, Ai= activity index for the current

round (round i)

C = activity weight factor

Bi= number of bids in the current round

(round i)

Ai¥1= activity index from previous

round (round i¥1), A0; is 0

Ii∂1 = percentage bid increment for the

next round (round i+1)

N = minimum percentage increment or

bid increment floor

M = maximum percentage increment or

bid increment ceiling

Under the exponential smoothing

methodology, once a bid has been

received on a license, the minimum

acceptable bid for that license in the

following round will be the new high

bid plus the dollar amount associated

with the percentage increment (variable

Ii∂1 = from above times the high bid).

This result will be rounded to the

nearest thousand if it is over ten

thousand or to the nearest hundred if it

is under ten thousand.

Examples

License 1

C = 0.5, N = 0.1, M = 0.2

Round 1 (2 new bids, high bid =

$1,000,000)

i. Calculation of percentage increment

for round 2 using exponential

smoothing:

A1 = (0.5 * 2) + (0.5 * 0) = 1

The smaller of I2 = (1 + 1) * 0.1 =

0.2 or 0.2 (the maximum percentage

increment)

ii. Minimum bid increment for round

2 using the percentage increment (I2

from above)

0.2 *$1,000,000 = $200,000

iii. Minimum acceptable bid for round

2 = 1,200,000

Round 2 (3 new bids, high bid =

2,000,000)

i. Calculation of percentage increment

for round 3 using exponential

smoothing:

2960 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 12 / Wednesday, January 19, 2000 / Notices

6See 47 CFR 1.2104(g); 1,2109.

7Part 1 Third Report and Order, 13 FCC Rcd at

460, ¶ 150. 8 47 CFR 1.2104(g).

A2 = (0.5 * 3) + (0.5 * 1) = 2

The smaller of I3 =(1 + 2) * 0.1 = 0.3

or 0.2 (the maximum percentage

increment)

ii. Minimum bid increment for round

3 using the percentage increment (I3

from above)

0.2 * $2,000,000 = $400,000

iii. Minimum acceptable bid for round

3=2,400,000

Round 3 (1 new bid, high

bid=2,400,000)

i. Calculation of percentage increment

for round 4 using exponential

smoothing:

A3 = (0.5 * 3) + (0.5 * 2) = 1.5

The smaller of I4 = 1+1.5) *0.1=0.25

or 0.2 (the maximum percentage

increment)

ii. Minimum bid increment for round

4 using the percentage increment (I 4

from above)

0.2 * $2,400,000 = $480,000

iii. Minimum acceptable bid for round

4 = $2,880,000

I. Information Regarding Bid

Withdrawal and Bid Removal

a. General Bid Withdrawal Procedures

25. For Auction No. 31, we propose

the following bid removal and bid

withdrawal procedures. Before the close

of a bidding period, a bidder has the

option of removing any bids placed in

that round. By using the remove bid

function in the software, a bidder may

effectively ‘‘unsubmit’’ any bid placed

within that round. A bidder removing a

bid placed in the same round is not

subject to withdrawal payments.

26. Once a round closes, a bidder may

no longer remove a bid. However, in the

next round, a bidder may withdraw

standing high bids from previous

rounds using the withdraw bid function.

A high bidder that withdraws its

standing high bid from a previous round

is subject to the bid withdrawal

payment provisions.6 We seek comment

on these bid removal and bid

withdrawal procedures.

27. In the Part 1 Third Report and

Order, 63 FR 770 (January 1, 1998) the

Commission explained that allowing bid

withdrawals facilitates efficient

aggregation of licenses and the pursuit

of efficient backup strategies as

information becomes available during

the course of an auction. The

Commission noted, however, that, in

some instances, bidders may seek to

withdraw bids for improper reasons.

The Bureau, therefore, has discretion, in

managing the auction, to limit the

number of withdrawals to prevent any

bidding abuses. The Commission stated

that the Bureau should assertively

exercise its discretion, consider limiting

the number of rounds in which bidders

may withdraw bids, and prevent bidders

from bidding on a particular market if

the Bureau finds that a bidder is abusing

the Commission’s bid withdrawal

procedures.7

28. Applying this reasoning, we

propose to limit each bidder in Auction

No. 31 to withdraw standing high bids

in no more than two rounds during the

course of the auction. To permit a

bidder to withdraw bids in more than

two rounds would likely encourage

insincere bidding or the use of

withdrawals for anti-competitive

strategic purposes. The two rounds in

which withdrawals are utilized will be

at the bidder’s discretion; withdrawals

otherwise must be in accordance with

the Commission’s rules. There is no

limit on the number of standing high

bids that may be withdrawn in either of

the rounds in which withdrawals are

utilized. Withdrawals will remain

subject to the bid withdrawal payment

provisions specified in the

Commission’s rules. We seek comment

on this proposal.

1. Special 30 MHz Nationwide Bid

Withdrawal Procedure

a. Nationwide Bidders

29. Additionally, for the licenses

being offered in Auction No. 31, we

recognize that there may be entities

whose business plans are such that they

may not wish to acquire any licenses if

they are unable to aggregate them all.

Our current rules are designed to

facilitate the aggregation of licenses, and

we believe they are adequate to facilitate

the aggregation of all the 10 MHz or all

20 MHz licenses or any subset thereof.

The bid withdrawal provisions of our

part 1 rules could, however, potentially

discourage bidders from attempting a 30

MHz nationwide aggregation in an

auction where there are divergent

business plans. This is because, were

such an aggregation attempt ultimately

to fail, a bidder might be left with a

subset of licenses for which its bids

exceeded the value it places on that

subset absent the complete aggregation.

The bidder would then be forced to

withdraw any high bids it holds and pay

a bid withdrawal payment, or perhaps

retain licenses for which it cannot

recoup the price paid. We therefore

propose a nationwide bid withdrawal

procedure for the 747–762 MHz and

777–792 MHz bands to limit the

exposure of bidders seeking a 30 MHz

nationwide aggregation.

30. Bidders may still aggregate

licenses subject to our standard bid

withdrawal provisions.8 The following

proposed procedure would be available,

however, to limit the exposure

associated with bid withdrawal for

those seeking a 30 MHz nationwide

aggregation, while still discouraging

insincere bidding. Under this approach,

an applicant would be required to

declare on its short-form application

whether it is seeking a 30 MHz

nationwide aggregation and wishes to be

subject to the nationwide bid

withdrawal provisions. An applicant

that chooses to be such a nationwide

bidder would not be allowed to bid on

anything other than all licenses

comprising the 30 MHz nationwide

aggregation, and must win either this

nationwide aggregation or no licenses at

all. (However, in any given round, the

bidder would not be required to place

new bids on any licenses for which it is

the standing high bidder.) Thus, once

such a nationwide bidder withdraws

from a market, it must withdraw from

all markets and will be ineligible to

continue bidding for any licenses.

31. The bid withdrawal payment for

a 30 MHz nationwide bidder that

withdraws from the auction would be

calculated as the difference between the

sum of the withdrawn bids and the sum

of the subsequent high bids on the

withdrawn licenses. Calculating the

payment this way may result in a

payment that is lower than a payment

calculated on a license-by-license basis.

In addition, nationwide bid withdrawal

payments would be limited to 5 percent

of the aggregate withdrawn bids. The

withdrawn licenses would be offered in

the next round at the second highest bid

price, which may be less than, or equal

to, the amount of the withdrawn bid,

without any bid increment. The FCC

would serve as the ‘‘place holder’’ on

the license until a new acceptable bid is

submitted.

Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 12 / Wednesday, January 19, 2000 / Notices 2961

9 47 CFR 1.2104(e).

b. Eligibility Restoration

32. If a 30 MHz nationwide bidder were

to withdraw, eligibility and waivers for

all other bidders would be restored to

beginning auction levels, except for

those nationwide bidders that have

withdrawn from the auction by

withdrawing their high bids. Without

this restoration, few bidders would

likely be eligible to bid on licenses

withdrawn late in the auction. See

Allocation of Spectrum Below 5 GHz

Transferred from Federal Government

Use, ET Docket No. 94–32, Second

Report and Order, 60 FR 40712 (August

9, 1995), 11 FCC Rcd 624, 652–53,

¶¶ 71–73 (1995). Finally, if the Bureau

implements the bid withdrawal

procedure outlined here, it will suspend

the Part 1 bid withdrawal rule for those

applicants that choose to become 30

MHz nationwide bidders. We seek

comment on this proposal.

J. Stopping Rule

33. For Auction No. 31, the Bureau

proposes to employ a simultaneous

stopping rule approach. The Bureau has

discretion ‘‘to establish stopping rules

before or during multiple round

auctions in order to terminate the

auction within a reasonable time.’’9 A

simultaneous stopping rule means that

all licenses remain open until the first

round in which no new acceptable bids,

proactive waivers or withdrawals are

received. After the first such round,

bidding closes simultaneously on all

licenses. Thus, unless circumstances

dictate otherwise, bidding would

remain open on all licenses until

bidding stops on every license.

34. The Bureau seeks comment on a

modified version of the simultaneous

stopping rule. The modified stopping

rule would close the auction for all

licenses after the first round in which

no bidder submits a proactive waiver, a

withdrawal, or a new bid on any license

on which it is not the standing high

bidder. Thus, absent any other bidding

activity, a bidder placing a new bid on

a license for which it is the standing

high bidder would not keep the auction

open under this modified stopping rule.

The Bureau further seeks comment on

whether this modified stopping rule

should be used unilaterally or only in

stage three of the auction.

35. We propose that the Bureau retain

the discretion to keep an auction open

even if no new acceptable bids or

proactive waivers are submitted and no

previous high bids are withdrawn. In

this event, the effect will be the same as

if a bidder had submitted a proactive

waiver. The activity rule, therefore, will

apply as usual, and a bidder with

insufficient activity will either lose

bidding eligibility or use a remaining

activity rule waiver.

36. Finally, we propose that the

Bureau reserve the right to declare that

the auction will end after a specified

number of additional rounds (‘‘special

stopping rule’’). If the Bureau invokes

this special stopping rule, it will accept

bids in the final round(s) only for

licenses on which the high bid

increased in at least one of the

preceding specified number of rounds.

The Bureau proposes to exercise this

option only in certain circumstances,

such as, for example, where the auction

is proceeding very slowly, there is

minimal overall bidding activity, or it

appears likely that the auction will not

close within a reasonable period of time.

Before exercising this option, the

Bureau is likely to attempt to increase

the pace of the auction by, for example,

moving the auction into the next stage

(where bidders would be required to

maintain a higher level of bidding

activity), increasing the number of

bidding rounds per day, and/or

increasing the amount of the minimum

bid increments for the limited number

of licenses where there is still a high

level of bidding activity. We seek

comment on these proposals.

Federal Communications Commission.

Louis J. Sigalos,

Deputy Chief, Auctions & Industry Analysis

Division.

[FR Doc. 00–1251 Filed 1–18–00; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6712–01–P

FEDERAL EMERGENCY

MANAGEMENT AGENCY

Agency Information Collection

Activities: Proposed Collection;

Comment Request

ACTION: Notice and request for

comments.

SUMMARY: The Federal Emergency

Management Agency, as part of its

continuing effort to reduce paperwork

and respondent burden, invites the

general public and other Federal

agencies to take this opportunity to

comment on proposed revised

information collections. In accordance

with the Paperwork Reduction Act of

1995 (44 U.S.C. 3506(c)(2)(A)), this

notice seeks comments concerning the

proposed extension of an existing

information collection.

Title: Make Your Mark on the

Floodplain-High Water Mark Form.

Type of Information Collection:

Extension of a currently approved

collection.

OMB Number: 3067–0268.

FEMA Form: 81–101.

Abstract. The Federal Emergency

Management Agency (FEMA) has

entered into a partnership with the U.S.

Army Corps of Engineers (COE) in the

Portland District to assist the Agency in

providing floodplain management

assistance at the most basic and needed

level, that of local floodplain managers

and the local communities. The joint

efforts of FEMA and the COE continue

to assure safe and sound developments

near floodplains. The Make Your Mark

on the Floodplain handout and

accompanying High Water Mark Form is

used to establish uniform and consistent

methodologies for setting and

recovering high water marks following a

significant flood event. After a major

flood, anyone who has high water marks

on their property or who has observed

flood marks on public property can use

the form to record high water mark

information, including location,

measurements, and description of the

marks read. The data will be used by

FEMA in post-flood damage

assessments. The data will define a

frequency/damage relationship for the

flooding event and provide calibration

information for future analysis. The U.

S. Army Corps of Engineers will assist

FEMA in collecting and compiling high

water mark data.

Affected Public: Individuals and

households, business or other for profit,

non-profit institutions, farms, and state,

local or tribal government.

Number of Respondents: 7,500.

Estimated Time per Respondent: 20

minutes.

Estimated Total Annual Burden

Hours: 2,500 hours.

Frequency of Response: On occasion

(after each significant flood event).

Comments: Written comments are

solicited to (a) evaluate whether the

proposed data collection is necessary for

the proper performance of the agency,

including whether the information shall

have practical utility; (b) evaluate the

accuracy of the agency’s estimate of the

burden of the proposed collection of

information, including the validity of

the methodology and assumptions used;

(c) enhance the quality, utility, and

clarity of the information to be

collected; and (d) minimize the burden

of the collection of information on those

who are to respond, including through

the use of appropriate automated,

electronic, mechanical, or other

technological collection techniques or

other forms of information technology,

e.g., permitting electronic submission of