Third District Court of Appeal

State of Florida 

Opinion filed December 14, 2022.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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No. 3D21-1822

Lower Tribunal No. 15-30283

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Natalie Saunders-Pinnock,

Appellant,

vs.

Colonial Freight Systems, Inc.,

Appellee.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Mark 

Blumstein, Judge.

Law Offices of Anidjar & Levine, P.A., and Glen B. Levine (Fort 

Lauderdale), for appellant.

Traub Lieberman Straus & Shrewsberry LLP, and Scot E. Samis (St. 

Petersburg), for appellee.

Before SCALES, LINDSEY and BOKOR, JJ. 

BOKOR, J.
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Natalie Saunders-Pinnock appeals final summary judgment entered in 

favor of Colonial Freight Systems, claiming the trial court erred in concluding 

that (1) Saunders-Pinnock failed to create an issue of fact regarding Colonial 

Freight’s ownership or operation of a tractor pulling the trailer, and (2) the 

trailer, owned by Colonial Freight, was itself not a dangerous instrumentality. 

Based on the record, the applicable summary judgment standard, and the 

law regarding the dangerous instrumentality doctrine, we conclude the trial 

court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of Colonial Freight. 

On May 2, 2015, while driving on Interstate 95 near the MiamiDade/Broward county line, a tractor-trailer collided with Saunders-Pinnock’s 

vehicle. The tractor-trailer didn’t stop. Saunders-Pinnock followed and took 

pictures of the license plate of the trailer portion of the tractor-trailer. After 

some forensic work, she identified a license plate number for the trailer 

connected to Colonial Freight. She also testified that the trailer bore the 

initials of the trucking company, CFS. 

Colonial Freight moved for summary judgment, claiming that 

Saunders-Pinnock’s proffered evidence regarding the trailer fails to establish 

a triable issue of fact regarding ownership or operation of the tractor. The 

letters on the side of a trailer may create a rebuttable presumption as to 

ownership or operation of the tractor, but Colonial Freight rebutted that 
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presumption by submitting uncontroverted evidence that no Colonial Freight 

driver or tractor was in the vicinity of the accident.1 In a similar situation, the 

Second District concluded that “such presumption was rebuttable and 

‘vanished’ when uncontradicted evidence showed that the trailer did not in 

fact belong to [the defendant].” Powell v. Henry, 224 So. 2d 730, 732 (Fla. 

2d DCA 1969). With the rebuttable presumption rebutted, and no further 

evidence adduced to create an issue of fact, there’s no evidence from which 

a factfinder could conclude that Colonial Freight owned or operated the 

tractor portion of the tractor-trailer. 

Saunders-Pinnock insists that conflicting material facts exist, 

precluding entry of summary judgment. See Mercury Cab Owners’ Ass’n v. 

Jones, 79 So. 2d 782, 784 (Fla. 1955) (“The question of whether the 

1 Florida has adopted the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit that:

[W]here a defendant’s name appears on a commercial vehicle 

involved in an accident, there is a rebuttable presumption that 

the vehicle is owned by the defendant and that the operator of 

the vehicle is an employee of the defendant, and was, at the time 

of the accident, engaged in the scope of his employment and in 

the furtherance of the business of the master.

Jack Cole Co. v. Hudson, 409 F.2d 188, 192 (5th Cir. 1969); accord

Carrazana v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 375 So. 2d 345, 346 (Fla. 3d DCA 

1979). However, a rebuttable presumption is just that—rebuttable. Where, 

as here, the defendant rebuts the presumption, and no other evidence exists, 

no issue of fact remains for the jury. 
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presumption was overcome by the evidence introduced by the [defendant] 

. . . is ordinarily one of fact for the jury.”). However, in the same opinion the 

Florida Supreme Court explained: 

[A]s in the case of any presumption, it is decisive only in the 

absence of contrary evidence. When substantial evidence 

contrary to a presumption is introduced, the underlying facts that 

originally raised the presumption may or may not retain some 

degree of probative force as evidence but they no longer have 

any artificial or technical force; in other words, the presumption 

falls out of the case. It never had and cannot acquire the attribute 

of evidence in the claimant's favor. Its only office is to control the 

result where there is an entire lack of competent evidence.

Id. (citations and quotations omitted). In the face of Saunders-Pinnock’s 

inability to adduce any evidence as to the ownership of the tractor, the trial 

court appropriately granted summary judgment. See Anderson v. S. Cotton 

Oil Co., 74 So. 975, 977 (Fla. 1917) (“When the evidence adduced as to the 

material issues in a cause is not conflicting, and the evidence . . . does not 

afford a sufficient legal basis for a verdict for the plaintiff, the trial judge may 

direct a verdict for the defendant.); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 

322 (1986) (requiring that a party “make a showing sufficient to establish the 

existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that 

party will bear the burden of proof at trial”); see also In re Amends. to Fla. 

Rule of Civ. Proc. 1.510, 309 So. 3d 192, 192 (Fla. 2020) (“[T]he federal 
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summary judgment standard ‘mirrors’ the standard for a directed verdict.”)

(citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (Fla. 1986)). 

With no triable issue remaining regarding the ownership or operation 

of the dangerous instrumentality—the tractor—we reiterate the well-settled 

principle that the trailer itself isn’t a dangerous instrumentality. See Pullman 

v. Johnson, 543 So. 2d 231, 231 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987) (“The trailer portion of 

a tractor-trailer rig is not a dangerous instrumentality for the purpose of 

applying the vicarious liability policy enunciated in Southern Cotton Oil Co. 

v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441, 86 So. 629 (1920).”); see also Edwards v. ABC 

Transp. Co., 616 So. 2d 142, 144 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993) (affirming entry of 

final summary judgment in favor of owner of semi-trailer relying on Pullman); 

Ranger Nationwide, Inc. v. Cook, 519 So. 2d 1087, 1088 n.2 (Fla. 3d DCA 

1988) (citing Pullman and noting that in resolving jurisdictional questions “[i]t 

is not meant to suggest that the owner or lessee of a trailer may be 

substantively, vicariously liable for the negligent operation of the truck 

combination of which it is only a part”). In other words, unless SaundersPinnock could allege a cause of action based on the trailer alone, there’s no 

basis for Colonial Freight’s liability for the accident caused by the alleged 

negligent driving of the tractor. 

Affirmed.