This opinion is subject to revision before final

publication in the Pacific Reporter

2016 UT 45

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

LITTLE COTTONWOOD TANNER DITCH COMPANY;

RICHARDS IRRIGATION COMPANY; WALKER DITCH COMPANY, INC.,

Appellants,

v.

SANDY CITY; SANDY IRRIGATION COMPANY;

COHOON & MAXFIELD IRRIGATION COMPANY,

Appellees.

No. 20150305

Filed October 21, 2016

On Direct Appeal

Third District, Salt Lake Dep’t

The Honorable Richard D. McKelvie

No. 020948020

Attorneys:

J. Craig Smith, Phillip E. Lowry, Jeffry R. Gittins,

Debra K. Caldwell, Aaron M. Worthen,

Salt Lake City, for appellants

John H. Mabey Jr., David C. Wright,

Salt Lake City, for appellees

JUSTICE DURHAM authored the opinion of the Court in which

CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT, JUSTICE HIMONAS, JUSTICE PEARCE,

and Court of Appeals JUDGE CHRISTIANSEN joined.

Having been recused, ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE LEE

does not participate herein; Court of Appeals

JUDGE MICHELE CHRISTIANSEN sat.

JUSTICE DURHAM, opinion of the Court:

INTRODUCTION

¶1 In 1910, the district court issued the Little Cottonwood 

Morse Decree, which established water rights for the Little 
LITTLE COTTONWOOD v. SANDY CITY

Opinion of the Court

2

Cottonwood Creek. The decree also terminated a contract that 

conferred a right to use a portion of this water. The Morse Decree 

replaced the terminated contract with new terms that govern this 

contractual right to use the water. The decree provides that the water 

may be diverted and used so long as monthly payments of seventyfive dollars are remitted to the owners of the water rights. 

¶2 In 2013, several parties bound by the contractual provisions 

contained in the Morse Decree filed a postjudgment motion in the 

century-old case that resulted in the decree. The motion asked the 

district court to modify the decree to increase the amount of the 

monthly payment to account for inflation and the increased value of 

the water. The district court denied the motion, ruling that it did not 

have the authority to reopen the one-hundred-year-old case to 

modify the final judgment.

¶3 We affirm. The district court’s authority to reopen and 

modify a final judgment by way of a postjudgment motion is closely 

circumscribed. The movants in this case have not properly invoked 

this narrow authority. If the movants wish to pursue their contract 

reformation claim, they must file a complaint.

BACKGROUND

¶4 The facts relevant to this case date back to the mid-1800s, 

when Cahoon & Maxfield Irrigation Company, Richards Irrigation 

Company, Tanner Ditch Company, Union & East Jordan Irrigation 

Company, and Walker Ditch Company acquired water rights to 

Little Cottonwood Creek through appropriation and beneficial use. 

All of the primary water of the creek was appropriated by 1856.

¶5 In 1878, several railroad companies entered into a written 

agreement with the five canal companies to acquire water from the 

Little Cottonwood Creek. The contract gave the railroad companies a 

right to use one-tenth of the water flowing in the creek in exchange 

for a monthly payment of twenty-five dollars to the canal companies. 

The railroad companies’ rights under the contract were assigned to 

successors in interest until the Salt Lake County Water Company 

(SLCWC) acquired the contractual right to one-tenth of the water 

flowing in the creek in 1903.1

¶6 In 1902, Union & East Jordan Irrigation initiated litigation to 

establish its water rights. The case was assigned to Judge C. W. 

Morse. Over the next eight years, the litigation expanded until it 

1 It appears that when SLCWC acquired a contractual right to the 

water, it was called the Sandy Pipeline Company. It changed its 

name in 1905.
Cite as: 2016 UT 45

Opinion of the Court

3

encompassed all parties with a claim to water from the Little 

Cottonwood Creek.

¶7 During this litigation, the five canal companies sought to 

eliminate or limit SLCWC’s rights under the 1878 contract. First, they 

argued that contract was not assignable and therefore SLCWC could 

not assert any rights under the contract. Second, the companies 

argued that the contract gave SLCWC the right to only divert onetenth of the creek’s more anemic winter flow rather than one-tenth of 

the much greater spring and early summer flow.

¶8 In 1908 the district court issued a decision rejecting these 

arguments. The court ruled that the 1878 contract was assignable 

and that SLCWC had acquired rights under the contract. The court 

also ruled that although the language of the contract probably 

permitted SLCWC to divert only one-tenth of the amount of the 

winter flow, the court would construe the contract in accord with the 

parties’ long practice of consistently permitting the diversion of onetenth of the flow during “the period of primary water.”

¶9 In 1910, the district court issued a comprehensive final 

judgment that determined all rights to the water from the Little 

Cottonwood Creek. This final judgment has come to be known as the 

Little Cottonwood Morse Decree. The district court found that the 

primary flow of the creek was 94.79 second feet. It divided 2.29 

second feet among seven smaller ditches. The court split the 

remaining 92.5 second feet of primary water among the five larger 

canal companies bound by the 1878 contract. Thus the decree 

allocated all of the primary water rights that had been acquired 

through appropriation and use by 1856.

¶10 The Morse Decree also recognized SLCWC’s contractual 

right to use a portion of the five canal companies’ water rights. The 

decree terminated the 1878 contract and stated that this prior 

agreement would be superseded by the new terms laid out in the 

decree. The decree provides that:

The Salt Lake County Water Company, by 

agreement and consent, is to have perpetually and 

continually, except as hereinafter stated, turned into 

the Sandy Ditch one tenth of all the primary water 

[owned by the five canal companies]. . . . Said Water 

Company is to pay to the Treasurers of the Tanner, 

Richards, Cahoon & Maxfield, Union & Jordan and 

Walker ditches seventy-five dollars per month . . . . If 

said Water Company shall be in default hereunder for 

twenty days after written notice to make payment, then
LITTLE COTTONWOOD v. SANDY CITY

Opinion of the Court

4

it shall, at the option of any of said last five named 

ditches, at once forfeit to said [five canal companies] all 

its rights and properties hereby given to it. Said Water 

Company agrees to pay reasonable attorneys’ fees to 

[the five canal companies] for successfully enforcing in 

court their rights herein as to said payments and 

forfeiture.

The court did not state why it reformed the 1878 contract or why it 

increased the monthly payment to seventy-five dollars, and the 

record before us sheds little light on this question. 

¶11 Soon after the Morse Decree was entered, SLCWC 

transferred a portion of its rights under the decree to the Sandy 

Irrigation Company. Sandy City later acquired the other portion of 

SLCWC’s Morse Decree rights. The city also holds a majority stake in 

the Sandy Irrigation Company. It appears that the Sandy Irrigation 

Company and Sandy City (collectively, Sandy) made monthly 

payments to the five canal companies for over a century in exchange 

for water from the Little Cottonwood Creek. 

¶12 During the one hundred years that have passed since the 

Morse Decree, three of the canal companies, Richards Irrigation 

Company, Tanner Ditch Company, and Walker Ditch Company

(hereinafter, the canal companies), became dissatisfied with the 

amount of their share of the monthly payments. In 2013, the three 

canal companies sought court intervention to increase the amount of 

the payment. But the canal companies did not file a complaint to 

invoke the district court’s original jurisdiction. Instead, the canal 

companies filed a postjudgment motion in the century-old litigation 

that resulted in the Morse Decree. The motion asked the district 

court to modify the 1910 final judgment to dramatically increase the 

amount of the monthly payments to account for inflation and the

increased value of the water. Sandy opposed the motion.

¶13 The district court denied the canal companies’ motion to 

modify the Morse Decree. It concluded that rule 60(b) of the Utah 

Rules of Civil Procedure did not permit it to reopen the decree. The 

court also rejected the canal companies’ argument that it had the 

inherent, common-law authority to modify the Morse Decree by way 

of a postjudgment motion.

¶14 The canal companies appealed from the district court’s 

order denying their motion.

ANALYSIS

¶15 On appeal, the canal companies disclaim any reliance upon 

rule 60(b) to reopen and modify the 1910 Morse Decree. Nor do they 
Cite as: 2016 UT 45

Opinion of the Court

5

rely upon any other rule of civil procedure. Instead, they argue that 

the district court erred when it concluded that it did not have the 

authority to grant the postjudgment motion for two reasons. First, 

they argue that district courts have the common-law authority to 

modify a water decree at any time. Second, they argue that the 

Morse Decree itself provides for continuing jurisdiction to modify 

the decree.

¶16 The district court’s determination that it did not have the 

authority to grant the canal companies’ postjudgment motion is a 

legal determination that we review de novo. See W. Water, LLC v. Olds, 

2008 UT 18, ¶ 15, 184 P.3d 578 (“Jurisdictional questions are . . . legal 

issues that we review for correctness, affording no deference to the 

district court.”); see also Swallow v. Jessop (In re United Effort Plan 

Trust), 2013 UT 5, ¶ 18, 296 P.3d 742 (“[A]bstract legal questions” are 

reviewed de novo. (citation omitted)).

I. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT HAVE COMMON-LAW 

AUTHORITY TO MODIFY THE MORSE DECREE THROUGH A 

POSTJUDGMENT MOTION

¶17 Before a final judgment is entered, district courts have broad 

discretion to reconsider and modify interlocutory rulings. IHC Health 

Servs., Inc. v. D & K Mgmt., Inc., 2008 UT 73, ¶ 27, 196 P.3d 588. But 

after a judgment is entered, the district court’s power to modify the 

judgment is limited. See Richards v. Siddoway, 471 P.2d 143, 145 (Utah 

1970) (“After expiration of [the time limit to set aside a judgment 

under rule 60(b)], a judgment[] is no longer open to any amendment, 

revision, modification, or correction which involves the exercise of 

the judgment or discretion of the court on the merits or on matters of 

substance.” (citation omitted)). Otherwise, dissatisfied litigants could 

file endless cycles of motions for reconsideration in an attempt to 

achieve a better result. The finality of judgments rule recognizes that 

at some point, litigation must end.

¶18 The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provide a few narrow 

exceptions to the finality of judgments. Under rule 50(b), a party may 

move for a judgment notwithstanding a verdict after entry of 

judgment. Rule 59 permits motions for a new trial or to amend the

judgment. And rule 60(a) permits corrections of clerical mistakes 

found in judgments, while rule 60(b) allows a court to set aside a 

judgment under certain circumstances.

¶19 There is also at least one common-law exception. District 

courts retain the power to modify even a final injunctive decree:

There is also no dispute but that a sound judicial 

discretion may call for the modification of the terms of 
LITTLE COTTONWOOD v. SANDY CITY

Opinion of the Court

6

an injunctive decree if the circumstances, whether of 

law or fact, obtaining at the time of its issuance have 

changed, or new ones have since arisen. The source of 

the power to modify is of course the fact that an 

injunction often requires continuing supervision by the 

issuing court and always a continuing willingness to 

apply its powers and processes on behalf of the party 

who obtained that equitable relief.

Sys. Fed’n No. 91, Ry. Emps.’ Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 

647 (1961); accord Lapin v. Shulton, Inc., 333 F.2d 169, 170 (9th Cir. 

1964) (“It is clear that the issuing court has continuing jurisdiction to 

modify or revoke an injunction as changed circumstances may 

dictate.”); see also Thompson v. Liquor Control Comm’n, 52 P.2d 463, 464 

(Utah 1935) (“[T]he district court is vested with jurisdiction” to 

“quash or modify [an] injunction.”).

¶20 The canal companies argue that another common-law 

exception applies in this case. They contend that water decrees are 

different than other final judgments and that district courts retain the 

inherent authority to modify water decrees at any time. They rely 

upon two cases for this proposition: Orderville Irrigation Co. v. 

Glendale Irrigation Co., 409 P.2d 616 (Utah 1965) and Salt Lake City v. 

Salt Lake City Water & Elec. Power Co., 174 P. 1134 (Utah 1918). We 

examine each of these authorities in turn.

A. Orderville

¶21 In Orderville, Orderville Irrigation and Glendale Irrigation 

disputed the nature of their respective water rights under a decree 

issued by the district court. Orderville contended that the water 

decree required the two companies to simultaneously take water 

from the Virgin River on a “share-and-share alike basis.” Orderville, 

409 P.2d at 618. Glendale, on the other hand, asserted that the water 

decree recognized the superiority of its water right and that it was 

entitled to take the full measure of its water before Orderville could

draw any remaining water. Id. Orderville brought an action to 

enforce its interpretation of the water decree. Id.

¶22 Glendale argued that Orderville’s action was barred by the 

principle of res judicata because the court that issued the water decree 

had already resolved the issue of priority. Id. This court disagreed, 

stating:

In regard to the plea of res judicata and too long delay 

in filing this action, it is not to be doubted that 

whatever issues were litigated and adjudicated by the 

Cox Decree are now concluded and cannot be raised. 
Cite as: 2016 UT 45

Opinion of the Court

7

But it is important to keep in mind that we are not here 

concerned with the usual type of judgment. An 

adjudication as to the allocation of flowing water, the 

amount of which necessarily fluctuates from time to 

time, is a decree in equity as to the rights in their 

continuing use. It is inherent in the nature of such a 

decree that the court has continuing jurisdiction, when 

properly invoked, to see that its provisions are being 

complied with. Where disputes arise as to the manner

or amount of use; or where there are uncertainties in 

the decree which give rise to a genuine dispute as to 

the rights of the parties concerning the use of such 

waters, neither the rule of res judicata nor the statute of 

limitations prevents resort to the courts to settle such a 

controversy.

Id. at 619 (footnote omitted).

¶23 The canal companies in this case argue that Orderville gives 

district courts the authority to grant postjudgment motions to 

modify the terms of a water decree. They support this contention by 

pointing to statements in Orderville that water decrees are not “the 

usual type of judgment” and that “[i]t is inherent in the nature of 

such a decree that the court has continuing jurisdiction, when 

properly invoked, to see that its provisions are being complied 

with.” Id.

¶24 But this language only confirms the principle that district 

courts retain the jurisdiction to enforce a final judgment. If a party 

fails to comply with a specific directive of a judgment, another party 

to the judgment may move to enforce this directive. Berman v. 

Yarbrough, 2011 UT 79, ¶¶ 14–15, 267 P.3d 905. But “[a] court’s power 

to enforce a judgment is confined to the four corners of the judgment 

itself.” PacifiCorp v. Cardon, 2016 UT App 20, ¶ 6, 366 P.3d 1226 

(memorandum decision) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 

“[A] motion to enforce ‘cannot be used to take up matters beyond 

the contours of the judgment and thereby short-circuit the usual 

adjudicative processes.’” Berman, 2011 UT 79, ¶ 15 (citation omitted). 

Because the canal companies’ postjudgment motion does not seek to 

enforce “a clear directive for a party to undertake a certain action,” 

id., but rather to change the Morse Decree, the district court’s 

authority to enforce a judgment has no application here, see 

PacifiCorp, 2016 UT App 20, ¶ 6 (“[G]ranting a motion 

to enforce a judgment is procedurally proper only if the ‘unequivocal 

mandate’ which the court is enforcing is also contained in the 

judgment.” (citation omitted)).
LITTLE COTTONWOOD v. SANDY CITY

Opinion of the Court

8

¶25 Moreover, Orderville’s core holding—that a separate action 

to clarify “uncertainties in [a water] decree which give rise to a 

genuine dispute as to the rights of the parties concerning the use of 

such waters” is not barred by the doctrine of res judicata—does not 

help the canal companies. 409 P.2d at 619. First, the canal companies 

do not seek to clarify an ambiguity in the Morse Decree, but rather to 

change a clear provision of the decree. Second, there is a key 

difference between the procedural posture of Orderville and this case. 

Orderville held that a separate action to interpret uncertain terms of a 

water decree was not barred as res judicata. But the canal companies 

here did not file a separate action; they filed a postjudgment motion 

in the same case.2 Thus, Orderville does not support the proposition 

that district courts have the authority to modify a water decree 

through a postjudgment motion.

B. Salt Lake City Water

¶26 Salt Lake City Water likewise does not advance the canal 

companies’ argument. The 1901 water decree at issue in that case 

adjudicated water rights to Utah Lake and the Jordan River. Salt Lake 

City Water, 174 P. at 1134; Salt Lake City v. Utah & Salt Lake Canal Co.,

137 P. 638, 639 (Utah 1913). The decree also contained provisions that 

governed the future operation of pumps that moved water from 

Utah Lake into the Jordan River during periods when the natural 

“gravity flow” of the river was insufficient to meet the needs of 

water users. Salt Lake City Water, 174 P. at 1134-35. The decree laid 

out a detailed formula for determining how water users would split 

the cost of operating the pumps based on when individual water 

users agreed to commence pumping, or failing an agreement, when 

one of the water users requested that pumping begin. Id. 

¶27 A dispute later arose over which water users were required 

to pay for the operation of the pumps. Id. at 1135. A proceeding was 

commenced in the original action to enforce the terms of the decree. 

Id. at 1134. The district court determined that the decree required one 

of the water users, the South Jordan Canal Company, to contribute 

$1,015.65 toward the cost of operating the pumps in the 1914 

calendar year. Id. at 1135. South Jordan appealed, contending that 

the language of the water decree regarding the future operation of 

the pumps should be interpreted in a way that excused it from 

paying for the operation of the pumps. Id. at 1135-36. This court 

disagreed and held that the district court correctly applied the plain 

2 “Res judicata is more appropriately used to describe the binding 

effect of a decision in a prior case on a second case . . . .” IHC Health 

Servs., Inc. v. D & K Mgmt., Inc., 2008 UT 73, ¶ 26 n.20, 196 P.3d 588. It 

does not apply to a motion filed in the same case. See id.
Cite as: 2016 UT 45

Opinion of the Court

9

language of the water decree when it enforced that judgment. Id. at 

1136–37.

¶28 In dicta, this court also stated that the district court had the 

power to amend the portion of the water decree concerning the 

operation of the pumps:

By what we have said we do not wish to be understood 

as holding that the decree as it now stands is or is not, 

under all circumstances, fair, equitable, and just in so 

far as the apportionment of the costs and expenses of 

operating the pumps are concerned. If, however, 

conditions requiring it have arisen that can be 

established by proper evidence, the lower court has 

ample power to modify the decree so as to reflect 

equity and justice under all circumstances to all the 

water users.

Id. at 1137.

¶29 The canal companies in this appeal argue that this dictum 

supports its contention that the district court has the continuing 

authority to modify the Morse Decree. They contend that Salt Lake 

City Water stands for the broad proposition that a postjudgment 

motion is an appropriate vehicle to invoke a district court’s power to 

modify a water decree “so as to reflect equity and justice.” Id. 

¶30 The dictum from Salt Lake City Water, however, is not so farreaching. The opinion limits its statements regarding the district 

court’s continuing jurisdiction to modify the water decree to the 

portion of the decree governing “the apportionment of the costs and 

expenses of operating the pumps.” Id. In other words, the dictum in 

Salt Lake City Water deals with the part of the decree that controls the 

ongoing operation of the physical infrastructure used to deliver 

water to water right holders. 

¶31 Similar to other early twentieth-century water decrees, the 

1901 Jordan River water decree had two distinct parts. First, the 

water decree adjudicated the parties’ water rights obtained through 

prior appropriation and use. See id. at 1134. Second, the decree 

contained provisions governing the infrastructure—such as 

headgates, diversions, dams, and pumps—and personnel needed to 

measure and allocate the water in accord with these water rights. See 

id. at 1134–35; see also Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City Water & Elec. 

Power Co., 67 P. 672, 674 (Utah 1902). Salt Lake City Water’s 

pronouncement regarding continuing jurisdiction refers to this 

second part of the Jordan River decree that dealt the administration 

of the infrastructure necessary to deliver the water. 
LITTLE COTTONWOOD v. SANDY CITY

Opinion of the Court

10

¶32 A contemporaneous opinion of this court recognized this 

distinction between the adjudication of water rights and the 

administration of infrastructure to implement these rights. In Salt 

Lake City v. Utah & Salt Lake Canal Co., one of the parties to the 1901 

Jordan River water decree, the Utah & Salt Lake Canal Company, 

filed a motion requesting improvements to the infrastructure 

necessary to deliver water from the Jordan River. 137 P. at 639–40. At 

an evidentiary hearing, the district court heard evidence from water 

engineers that repairs and improvements to dams, weirs, and 

measuring devices were needed in order to fairly distribute water in 

accord with the rights adjudicated in the 1901 decree. Id. at 640, 643–

44. The court agreed with the water engineers and ordered that the 

improvements be carried out and that the costs be shared by the 

water right owners. Id. at 641. 

¶33 On appeal, one of the water users argued that the district 

court lacked the authority to issue the order because the Utah & Salt 

Lake Canal Company did not file a separate pleading to invoke the 

district court’s jurisdiction. Id. at 641–42. This court held that the 

district court did have the authority to grant the motion filed by the 

canal company because the district court has “the power to make 

such orders as may be necessary to carry out and give effect to their 

decrees.” Id. at 642. In so holding, we distinguished the adjudication 

of water rights, which cannot be modified by motion, from ancillary 

orders necessary to give effect to those rights:

[T]he [district] court retained, and still retains, 

jurisdiction “for the purpose of [making] all necessary 

supplemental orders and decrees which may be 

required to make effectual the rights awarded and 

preserved by the decree.” In this proceeding the action 

of the court was invoked, not for the purpose of 

adjudicating property rights and conflicting interests of 

the parties pertaining to the subject-matter of the 

action, but to carry into effect the provisions of the 

decree. The pleadings forming the issues and the 

judgment rendered thereon, in which the property 

rights of the respective parties to the action are 

adjudicated, were, and will continue to be, sufficient to 

authorize any of the parties to the decree to invoke the 

jurisdiction and action of the court when necessary to 

carry out and make effectual the provisions of the 

decree.

Id. (third alteration in original).
Cite as: 2016 UT 45

Opinion of the Court

11

¶34 Thus, Salt Lake City Water and Utah & Salt Lake Canal Co.

stand for the proposition that district courts retained jurisdiction to 

modify language in a water decree regarding the continued 

operation of a water system’s infrastructure and to order that 

improvements to this infrastructure be made. To the extent that early 

twentieth-century district courts assumed an administrative role 

over the continued operation of a water system in a decree, the court 

retained the authority to modify or update these portions of the 

water decree. Continuing jurisdiction was necessary because, like an 

injunctive decree, the ongoing administration of a water system may 

require adjustments to account for changing conditions. See Sys. 

Fed’n No. 91, 364 U.S. at 647; supra ¶ 19. But a court does not retain 

ongoing jurisdiction to modify the portion of a water decree that 

adjudicates the parties’ water rights. 

¶35 In this case, the canal companies argue that the district court 

has continuing jurisdiction to modify the portion of the Morse 

Decree that established Sandy’s contractual right to use water from 

the Little Cottonwood Creek in exchange for monthly payments. But 

this portion of the decree is an adjudication of a contractual right to 

use the water; it is not a directive concerning the future operation of 

a water delivery system’s infrastructure as was the case in Salt Lake 

City Water. We therefore conclude that the dictum from Salt Lake City 

Water does not support the canal companies’ contention that the 

district court retained the authority to grant a postjudgment motion 

to modify this portion of the Morse Decree.3

3 This distinction between an adjudication of rights and 

injunction-like administrative pronouncements in early water 

decrees also explains orders made by the district court after the 

Morse Decree was handed down. The decree states that “Peter Van 

Valkenburg is hereby appointed Commissioner, until further order 

of this court, to carry the decree herein into effect. The 

Commissioner’s expenses and compensation shall be paid . . . by the 

owners of such primary water and in proportion that each ditch is 

entitled to such water.” The Morse Decree further provides that 

“subject to the supervision and control” of the district court, “[t]he 

commissioner provided for herein may divide and distribute the 

water by hours or days or by constant streams, or in any other 

manner, as in his judgment seems best, so as to secure the greatest 

efficiency of the water.”

The district court has entered two orders in the case over the last 

century to exercise this continuing supervisory control over the 

court-appointed water commissioner. In 1952, Peter Van Valkenburg 
LITTLE COTTONWOOD v. SANDY CITY

Opinion of the Court

12

¶36 There may be other procedural paths that the canal 

companies can take to invoke the district court’s jurisdiction (e.g. 

proceedings under rule 60(b) or an independent action for contract 

reformation). However, no arguments concerning that possibility 

have been made in this case, and we decline to reach the question of 

the availability of other procedural options.

II. THE MORSE DECREE DOES NOT AUTHORIZE THE 

CANAL COMPANIES’ POSTJUDGMENT MOTION

¶37 The canal companies also argue that the Morse Decree itself 

provides for continuing jurisdiction in the district court to modify 

nearly all of the terms of the decree. They point to paragraph 39 of 

the decree, which describes the powers of the water commissioner 

appointed by the court to apportion the water of the Little 

Cottonwood Creek in accordance with the water user’s rights under 

the decree:

The commissioner provided for herein may divide and 

distribute the water by hours or days or by constant 

streams, or in any other manner, as in his judgment 

seems best, so as to secure the greatest efficiency of the 

water. All of the above, however, is subject to the 

supervision and control of this court.

(emphasis added). The canal companies assert that the phrase “[a]ll 

of the above” refers to all of the terms of the water decree preceding 

that sentence, including the reformation of SLCWC’s contractual 

right to use a portion of the water found in paragraphs 33 and 34 of 

the decree. Thus they contend that the court specifically retained 

“supervision and control” over the terms of the modified contract. 

¶38 We disagree. Setting aside the question of whether a district 

court may seize for itself procedural authority that it otherwise 

would not have, this language does not refer to the entire preceding 

twenty pages of the decree. Taken in context, the phrase “[a]ll of the 

 

died, and several of the parties to the Morse Decree requested that he 

be replaced by Orin Van Valkenburg. The district court granted the 

request, and later that year it issued an order increasing the 

commissioner’s annual salary from $616 to $1,000.

The canal companies argue that these postjudgment orders 

illustrate the district court’s continuing jurisdiction to alter the Morse 

Decree. But these orders merely demonstrate the court’s continuing 

administrative supervision over the court-appointed water 

commissioner. The orders do not support the canal companies’ 

contention that the district court retains the authority to modify an 

adjudication of rights through a postjudgment motion.
Cite as: 2016 UT 45

Opinion of the Court

13

above” references the previous sentence in which the court gives the 

appointed commissioner the authority to distribute the water. The 

conjunctive adverb “however” indicates that the second sentence of 

paragraph 39 is a qualification to the first sentence of the paragraph. 

We therefore conclude that the Morse Decree does not provide for 

continuing jurisdiction to modify the contractual terms contained in 

the decree.

CONCLUSION

¶39 In this appeal, we resolve the narrow question of whether 

the canal companies can modify the Morse Decree through a 

postjudgment motion. We hold that such a motion is an 

inappropriate procedural vehicle to pursue this objective. We 

therefore affirm the district court’s order denying the motion.