Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 94 / Monday, May 15, 2000 / Rules and Regulations 30865

above airplanes on the U.S. Register must

comply with this AD.

(c) What problem and safety aspects does

this AD address? The actions specified by

this AD are intended to detect damage to the

insulation of the wiring within the fuel tanks

of the fuel quantity indication system. If not

detected and corrected, this damage could

result in a malfunction in the cockpit

indicators and/or electrical sparking inside

the fuel tank with consequent fire or

explosion.

(d) What actions must I accomplish to

address this problem? To address this

problem, you must accomplish the following:

Action Compliance time Procedures

Inspect the fuel quantity indication system for

damage to the insulation of the wiring within

the fuel tanks. Damage is defined as corrosion (indicated by a dark stain), cuts, or nicks.

At whichever of the following that occurs first:

—Within the next 200 hours time-in-service

(TIS) after June 23, 2000 (the effective

date of this AD); or.

—On or before August 21, 2000 (60 days

after the effective date of this AD).

Accomplish these actions in accordance with

one of the following:

—British Aerospace Jetstream Alert Service

Bulletin 28–A–JA990841, Original Issue:

September 8, 1999; or

—British Aerospace Jetstream Alert Service

Bulletin 28–A–JA990841, Original Issue:

September 8, 1999; Revision No. 1: November 12, 1999.

Replace or repair any damaged wiring .............. Prior to further flight after the inspection required by this AD.Accomplish in accordance with one of the

previously referenced service bulletins.

(e) Can I comply with this AD in any other

way?

(1) You may use an alternative method of

compliance or adjust the compliance time if:

(i) Your alternative method of compliance

provides an equivalent level of safety; and

(ii) The Manager, Small Airplane

Directorate, approves your alternative.

Submit your request through an FAA

Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may

add comments and then send it to the

Manager.

(2) This AD applies to any airplane

referenced in paragraph (a) of this AD,

regardless of whether it has been modified,

altered, or repaired in the area subject to the

requirements of this AD. For those airplanes

that have been modified, altered, or repaired

so that the performance of the requirements

of this AD is affected, the owner/operator

must request approval for an alternative

method of compliance in accordance with

paragraph (e)(1) of this AD. The request

should include an assessment of the effect of

the modification, alteration, or repair on the

unsafe condition addressed by this AD; and,

if you have not eliminated the unsafe

condition, specific actions you propose to

address it.

(f) Where can I get information about any

already-approved alternative methods of

compliance? Contact the Small Airplane

Directorate, 901 Locust, Room 301, Kansas

City, Missouri 64106; telephone: (816) 329–

4140; facsimile: (816) 329–4090.

(g) What if I need to fly the airplane to

another location to comply with this AD?

The FAA can issue a special flight permit

under §§ 21.197 and 21.199 of the Federal

Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 21.197 and

21.199) to operate your airplane to a location

where you can accomplish the requirements

of this AD.

(h) Who should I contact if I have

questions regarding the service information?

Direct all questions or technical information

related to this AD to British Aerospace

Regional Aircraft, Prestwick International

Airport, Ayrshire, KA9 2RW, Scotland;

telephone: (01292) 672345; facsimile: (01292)

671625.

(i) Are any service bulletins incorporated

into this AD by reference? You must

accomplish the actions required by this AD

in accordance with British Aerospace

Jetstream Alert Service Bulletin 28–A–

JA990841, Original Issue: September 8, 1999;

or British Aerospace Jetstream Alert Service

Bulletin 28–A–JA990841, Original Issue:

September 8, 1999; Revision No. 1:

November 12, 1999. The Director of the

Federal Register approved this incorporation

by reference under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR

part 51. You can get copies from British

Aerospace Regional Aircraft, Prestwick

International Airport, Ayrshire, KA9 2RW,

Scotland. You can look at copies at FAA,

Central Region, Office of the Regional

Counsel, 901 Locust, Room 506, Kansas City,

Missouri, or at the Office of the Federal

Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW, suite

700, Washington, DC.

(j) Has another airworthiness authority

addressed this action? The subject of this AD

is addressed in British AD 003–09–99, dated

September 13, 1999.

(k) When does this amendment become

effective? This amendment becomes effective

on June 23, 2000.

Issued in Kansas City, Missouri, on May 4,

2000.

Michael Gallagher,

Manager, Small Airplane Directorate, Aircraft

Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 00–11718 Filed 5–12–00; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 97–CE–21–AD; Amendment 39–

11724; AD 2000–09–15]

RIN 2120–AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Mitsubishi

Heavy Industries, Ltd. MU–2B Series

Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation

Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: This amendment adopts a

new airworthiness directive (AD) that

applies to all Mitsubishi Heavy

Industries, Ltd. (Mitsubishi) MU–2B

series airplanes. This AD requires

modifying the airplanes’ operating

systems. This AD results from several

icing-related incidents and accidents of

MU–2B series airplanes, and the Federal

Aviation Administration’s investigation

of the airplane design and pilot’s ability

to operate in icing conditions. The

actions specified by this AD are

intended to assist in preventing

departure from controlled flight while

operating in icing conditions.

DATES: This AD becomes effective on

July 24, 2000.

The Director of the Federal Register

approved the incorporation by reference

of certain publications listed in the

regulation as of July 24, 2000.

ADDRESSES: You may get the service

information referenced in this AD from

Mitsubishi Heavy Industries America,

Inc., 15303 Dallas Parkway, suite 685,

LB-77, Dallas, Texas 75248; telephone:

(972) 980–5001; facsimile: (972) 980–

5091. You may examine this

information at FAA, Central Region,

Office of the Regional Counsel,

Attention: Rules Docket No. 97–CE–21–

AD, 901 Locust, Room 506, Kansas City,

Missouri 64106; or at the Office of the

Federal Register, 800 North Capitol

Street, NW, suite 700, Washington, DC.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Contact one of the following for

questions or more information related to

this subject: Mr. John Dow, Aerospace

Engineer, Small Airplane Directorate,

FAA, 901 Locust, Room 301, Kansas

City, Missouri 64106, telephone: (816)

329–4121; facsimile: (816) 426–4090;

Mr. Carl Fountain, Aerospace Engineer,

Los Angeles Aircraft Certification

Office, FAA, 3960 Paramount Blvd.,

Lakewood, California 90712; telephone:

30866 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 94 / Monday, May 15, 2000 / Rules and Regulations

(562) 627–5222; facsimile: (562) 627–

5228; or Ms. Alma Ramirez-Hodge,

Aerospace Engineer, FAA, Airplane

Certification Office, 2601 Meacham

Boulevard, Fort Worth, Texas 76193–

0150; telephone: (817) 222–5147;

facsimile: (817) 222–5960.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Events Leading to the Issuance of This

AD

What caused this AD?

This AD is the result of several icingrelated incidents and accidents of MU–

2B series airplanes, and FAA’s

investigation of both the airplane design

and pilot’s ability to operate in icing

conditions.

Has FAA taken any action to this point?

We issued a proposal to amend part

39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations

(14 CFR part 39) to include an AD that

would apply to all Mitsubishi MU–2B

series airplanes. This proposal was

published in the Federal Register as a

notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM)

on May 21, 1998 (63 FR 27872). The

NPRM proposed to require you to

incorporate the following modifications

on the airplane’s operating systems:

(1) An ice detection system;

(2) A deice monitoring system;

(3) An automatic autopilot disconnect

system and a trim-in-motion alert

system;

(4) An engine continuous-duty

ignition replacement system; and

(5) An auto-ignition (re-light) system.

The NPRM also proposed to require

you to fabricate a placard (using 1⁄8-inch

letters) with the following words and

proposed to require you to install this

placard within the pilot’s clear view:

‘‘Prior to the first flight of each day,

a negative torque sensing (NTS) check

and a Propeller Feather Valve check

must be performed in accordance with

the Normal Checklist Procedures.’’

Accomplishment of the proposed

actions as specified in the NPRM would

be required in accordance with:

• Mitsubishi MU–2 Service Bulletin

(SB) No. 217, Revision B, dated

November 7, 1996;

• Mitsubishi MU–2 SB No. 226, which

incorporates the following pages:

Pages Revision level Date

2 through 11, 13 through 24, 27 through 57, and 59 through 93 .............................................................. A ....................... January 13, 1997.

1, 12, 24, 25, 26, and 58 ............................................................................................................................ B ....................... February 27, 1997.

• Mitsubishi MU–2 SB No. 231, dated

July 2, 1997, Mitsubishi MU–2 SB No.

232, dated July 2, 1997;

• Mitsubishi MU–2B SB No. 074/74–

001, dated October 9, 1991;

• Test Instrumentation, Inc.

Document No. MU2–1001, Rev. C, dated

June 15, 1997;

• Test Instrumentation, Inc.

Document No. MU2–4001, Rev. C, dated

June 30, 1997;

• Test Instrumentation, Inc.

Document No. MU2–5001, Rev. E.,

dated May 21, 1997; and

• Test Instrumentation, Inc.

Document No. MU2–6005, dated

September 28, 1997.

Was the Public Invited To Comment?

Interested persons were afforded an

opportunity to participate in the making

of this amendment through the

following avenues:

•Comments to the Docket file in

accordance with the procedures

specified in the NPRM; and

•Communications with FAA at a

public meeting held in December 1998.

Announcement of this public meeting

was published in the Federal Register

on September, 29, 1998 (63 FR 51865).

Summary of This AD Action

Several icing-related incidents and

accidents of Mitsubishi MU–2B series

airplanes caused FAA to investigate the

airplane design and pilot’s ability to

operate in icing conditions. The FAA

conducted a special certification review,

which focused on factual information

related to Mitsubishi MU–2B series

airplanes involved in icing incidents/

accidents. This review was named a

Focused Fact Finding Special

Certification Review (FFFSCR). This

review shows that several accidents and

incidents have occurred, and that

modifications to the airplane design and

additional pilot training may prevent

future accidents/incidents. The training

issues were addressed in AD 97–20–14,

Amendment 39–10150 (62 FR 51594,

October 2, 1997).

The following presents whether FAA

has included in or excluded from this

final rule each action that was proposed

in the NPRM:

Modification Included in or

excluded from AD

Ice Detection System .................................................................................................................................................................. Excluded from AD.

Deice Monitoring System ............................................................................................................................................................ Included in AD.

Automatic Autopilot Disconnect System and Trim-in-motion Alert System ................................................................................ Included in AD.

Engine Continuous-duty Ignition Replacement System .............................................................................................................. Excluded from AD.

Auto-ignition (Re-light System) ................................................................................................................................................... Included in AD.

Placard to require negative torque sensing (NTS) check and Propeller Feather Valve check as part of the Normal Checklist Procedures.Excluded from AD.

The following presents the actions we

proposed in the NPRM, but are

excluding from the final rule AD. Also

included is a brief description of why

we are excluding each one:

1. Ice detection system: The Aviation

Rulemaking Advisory Committee

(ARAC) recently established an Ice

Protection Harmonization Working

Group (IPHWG). We are waiting for this

group to conclude its study before

deciding whether to require an ice

detection system on the affected

airplanes;

2. Engine continuous-duty ignition

system: We determined that the safety

aspect of this AD only required the

incorporation of the auto-ignition (relight) system or the engine continuousduty ignition system. We chose the

auto-ignition (re-light system) because it

is independent of other pilot actions;

and

3. Placard to require negative torque

sensing (NTS) check and propeller

feather valve check as part of the

Normal Checklist Procedures: We

determined that the safety aspects of

including this information did not

outweigh the confusion that could be

Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 94 / Monday, May 15, 2000 / Rules and Regulations 30867

generated through the installation of

such a large placard on the instrument

panel. If our analysis of the continued

airworthiness of the affected airplanes

shows that this information is

necessary, we may initiate further

rulemaking to require this information

to become part of the Limitations

Section of the Airplane Flight Manual

(AFM).

The FAA has determined that the

modifications required in this AD will

correct the unsafe condition identified

in the NPRM. We considered all

comments received.

The following paragraphs present the

comments received on the NPRM and at

the public meeting. Also included is

FAA’s response to each comment,

including any changes incorporated into

the final rule based on the comments.

Comment Issue No. 1: Pilot Training

What Is the Commenters’ Concern?

Many commenters state that

inadequate pilot training is the cause of

the referenced incidents and accidents

of the Mitsubishi MU–2B series

airplanes.

What Is FAA’s Response to the Concern?

The FAA partially concurs. The FAA

has determined that both systems

modifications and pilot training are

needed to prevent future icing accidents

and incidents on the Mitsubishi MU–2B

series airplanes. Training issues were

addressed in AD 97–20–14, Amendment

39–10150 (62 FR 51594, October 2,

1997). The FAA will continue to

monitor the need for future training and

will take any appropriate action. This

AD addresses the systems

modifications.

We are not changing the AD as a

result of these comments.

Comment Issue No. 2: Ice Detection

System

What Are the Commenters’ Concerns?

Numerous commenters object to the

incorporation of an ice detection system

because:

1. Pilot training is the issue and FAA

should focus on providing the

appropriate training.

2. The ice detection system will not

solve the problem because the

Aerospatiale Model ATR–72 airplane

involved in the Roselawn accident had

an ice detection system installed and a

problem still existed.

3. The Roselawn accident with the

Aerospatiale Model ATR–72 airplane

would not have occurred if the autopilot

had remained connected; therefore, the

problem with the Mitsubishi MU–2B

series airplanes is the autopilot

disconnect.

4. The ice detection system is a bad

idea because of the excellent visual

icing cues of the MU–2B series airplanes

and the potential for unrecognized

mechanical failure.

5. Based on a commenter’s experience

in another type of airplane, the ice

detection system could provide false

positive warnings.

6. Install BF Goodrich Company

SMART BOOTS on the affected

airplanes. These boots incorporate

electronic sensors imbedded into the

surface of the vertical stabilizer deicing

system; and detect the presence of ice

on the surface of the boots, the proper

functioning of the boots, and the

presence of residual ice. The commenter

believes that this system would allow

FAA to learn more about the icing

environment as it relates to the affected

airplanes.

7. An ice detection system is

unnecessary because the pilot would

use the visual cues to detect ice and

could then activate the deicing system.

This would make the need for an ice

detection system unnecessary.

8. Since the pilot is aware of the ice

prior to the ice detection alert, the

system is unnecessary, expensive, and a

waste of money.

What Is FAA’s Response to the

Concerns?

The Aviation Rulemaking Advisory

Committee (ARAC) has established an

Ice Protection Harmonization Working

Group (IPHWG). One of the areas this

group is currently studying is the safety

impact of having ice protection systems

incorporated on aircraft. Because this

study is ongoing and the IPHWG has not

made any recommendations, we have

determined not to require the ice

detection system in this AD. We will

evaluate the information that the

IPHWG provides at the conclusion of

the study to determine whether we

should initiate rulemaking regarding

this subject. The Mitsubishi MU–2B

series airplanes would be among many

aircraft evaluated to determine whether

an ice detection system should be

incorporated. The AD requirements for

the automatic autopilot disconnect

system and trim-in-motion alert system

provide protection in the event of

undetected, dangerous ice accretions.

We determined that the modifications

required by this AD, including the

automatic autopilot disconnect system

and trim-in-motion alert system, will

provide the operators the necessary

warning and equipment to safely

operate their airplanes.

We excluded the ice detection system

requirement from the AD.

Comment Issue No. 3: Stall Recovery

What Is the Commenter’s Concern?

One commenter questions why FAA

did not give the option (as a method of

accomplishing the AD) of advancing the

power (engine torque) to as high as

possible (i.e., in excess of 150 percent,

which occurred in another type design

airplane). This idea is based on the

commenter’s operating experience in

recovering from a stall during an icingrelated incident.

What Is FAA’s Response to the Concern?

We do not concur. When the engine

torque is advanced over 100 percent, the

thrust of the propeller may be reduced

because of the flow separation of

portions of the blade. Instead of an

increase in thrust, a reduction in overall

thrust is likely. Airflow over the wing in

the propwash can be degraded. FAA

analysis of the incident that the

commenter refers to shows that the

airplane recovery occurred when the

flaps were extended from the cruise

configuration to 15 degrees and when

the angle of attack was decreased. The

flow over the wing returned, control of

the airplane was regained, and the roll

attitude stabilized.

We are not changing the AD as a

result of this comment.

Comment Issue No. 4: Misuse of the AD

Process

What Are the Commenter’s Concerns?

One commenter states that (1) AD’s

are only for defects in design or

potential equipment failures; and (2)

proceeding with the AD would be a

misuse of the AD process.

What Is FAA’s Response to the

Concerns?

We do not concur. An AD is the

vehicle that FAA uses to mandate

modifications, inspections, etc., in order

to correct an unsafe condition on

products (airplanes). That condition

could be caused by airplane usage

(fatigue), quality control, design,

maintenance problems (where the

procedures to accomplish such

maintenance are not available to the

field or the current maintenance

procedures are not meeting the

necessary safety level), or any other

problem. The FAA has determined that

an unsafe condition exists in the

Mitsubishi MU–2B series airplanes

when utilized in icing conditions, and

that the airplane modifications specified

in the AD are necessary to correct this

unsafe condition. We are not using this

30868 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 94 / Monday, May 15, 2000 / Rules and Regulations

AD to improve the level of safety or

upgrade the certification level of the

Mitsubishi MU–2B airplanes.

We are not changing the AD as a

result of these comments.

Comment Issue No. 5: Other Airplane

Designs Are More Susceptible to Icing

Problems Than the Mitusbishi MU–2B

Series Airplanes

What Is the Commenters’ Concern?

Several commenters suggest that other

airplane models (specifically Raytheon

models) are more susceptible to

problems while operating in icing

conditions than the Mitsubishi MU–2B

series airplanes. The commenters

believe FAA should withdraw the

NPRM for this reason.

What Is FAA’s Response to the Concern?

The FAA does not concur that the

NPRM should be withdrawn because of

the statement that other airplanes are

more susceptible to problems while

operating in icing conditions. The FAA

analyzes the service history and design

of each specific airplane make and

model type design before taking AD

action. Based on the service history and

design of the Mitsubishi MU–2B series

airplanes, FAA has determined that AD

action is necessary. This does not mean

that FAA will not take AD action on any

other type design airplanes or that the

Mitsubishi MU–2B series airplanes are

being singled out from other type design

airplanes. The FAA will continue to

analyze the service history and design of

each specific airplane make and model

type design, and initiate and implement

any appropriate rulemaking action.

We are not changing the AD as a

result of these comments.

Comment Issue No. 6: No Evidence That

the Affected Airplanes Are Susceptible

to Undetectable Ice Accumulation

What Is the Commenter’s Concern?

One commenter objects to the stated

purpose and provisions specified in the

NPRM. In particular, the commenter

states that there is no evidence that the

Mitsubishi MU–2B series airplanes are

susceptible to undetectable ice

accumulation.

What Is FAA’s Response to the Concern?

The FAA does not concur. In one

reported incident of undetectable ice

accumulation on one of the affected

airplanes, a pilot in 14 CFR part 135

operations experienced a 20-knot

decrease in airspeed and a change of

positive climb rate to a descent. After

examining the airplane surfaces, the

crew saw no evidence of ice and instead

only saw a shiny appearance on the

leading edge of the wing. At this time,

the crew operated the deicing boots and

witnessed approximately 1-inch of ice

shedding from the leading edge of the

wing. Airplane performance was

restored to the level that existed before

the airplane entered the icing condition

and before operation of the deicing

boots. The bulk of the ice was on the

surface of the boots and not the

unprotected areas of the fuselage or the

propellers. Transparent (clear) ice can

result from high liquid water

conditions, high airspeed, static air

temperatures just below freezing, large

droplets, or a combination of any of

these conditions. The Mitsubishi MU–

2B series airplanes have shown flight

characteristics in icing conditions with

clear ice formation that are hazardous.

These hazards may be attributed to a

decreased stall angle, suddenness and

the degree of roll upset, a subsequent

rapid increase in airspeed, the

consequent loss of control after ice

accumulation, and difficulty in

recovering from any of the above

problems. We determined that the

modifications required by this AD,

including the automatic autopilot

disconnect system and trim-in-motion

alert system, will provide the operators

the necessary warning and equipment to

safely operate their airplanes.

We are not changing the AD as a

result of this comment.

Comment Issue No. 7: High Incident/

Accident Rate for the Mitsubishi MU–

2B Series Airplanes

What Is the Commenter’s Concern?

One commenter states that, of the 700

Mitsubishi MU–2B series airplanes in

service, over 100 have been involved in

incidents/accidents.

What Is FAA’s Response to the Concern?

The FAA infers from this that the

commenter agrees with and supports the

AD.

We are not changing the AD as a

result of this comment.

Comment Issue No. 8: No AD

Justification Based on the FFFSCR

What Is the Commenters’ Concern?

Several commenters state that, since

the Mitsubishi MU–2B series airplanes

‘‘passed all the tests’’ in the FFFSCR,

issuing an AD requiring modifications

would be contrary to the FFRSCR. The

commenters do not believe FAA should

issue the AD because the airplane meets

the appropriate certification regulations.

What Is FAA’s Response to the Concern?

We do not concur. The FFFSCR

specifically addressed flight into icing

conditions. The tests were not pass/fail

situations. The FFFSCR specifies that

several accidents have occurred, and

that future accidents/incidents may be

prevented by modifications to the

airplane design and by additional

training to enhance the pilot’s ability to

manage the airplane in adverse

operating conditions.

As discussed previously, an AD is the

vehicle that FAA uses to correct unsafe

conditions in type design products. A

product that meets all certification

requirements can still be found to have

an unsafe condition that could exist or

develop; also, an unsafe condition does

not necessarily exist for products that

do not meet certification requirements.

Whether a product is in compliance

with other regulations is unrelated to

whether AD action should be taken on

that product.

We are not changing the AD as a

result of these comments.

Comment Issue No. 9: Unsafe Condition

Already Covered by Existing AD’s

What Is the Commenter’s Concern?

One commenter states that the unsafe

condition referenced in this AD is

already addressed by current AD’s that

apply to Mitsubishi MU–2B series

airplanes:

• One that requires training for the

pilots of the affected airplanes;

• One that requires incorporating a

minimum speed limitation; and

• One that addresses actions to take

when flying into severe icing.

For this reason, the commenter

requests that FAA withdraw the NPRM.

What Is FAA’s Response to the Concern?

We do not concur. The current AD’s

that address severe icing and a

minimum speed limitation contain

information that applies to many type

design airplanes, not just the Mitsubishi

MU–2B series airplanes. Pilot training

and system modifications are specific to

the type design of the Mitsubishi MU–

2B series airplanes. The FFFSCR

specifies that several accidents have

occurred, and that future accidents/

incidents may be prevented by

modifications to the airplane design and

by additional training to enhance the

pilot’s ability to manage the airplane in

adverse operating conditions. We have

determined that both systems

modifications and pilot training are

needed to prevent future icing incidents

on the Mitsubishi MU–2B series

airplanes. Training issues were

addressed in AD 97–20–14, Amendment

39–10150 (62 FR 51594, October 2,

1997). The FAA will continue to

monitor the need for future training and

Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 94 / Monday, May 15, 2000 / Rules and Regulations 30869

will take appropriate action. This AD

addresses the systems modifications.

We are not changing the AD as a

result of this comment.

Comment Issue No. 10: Trim-in-Motion

What Is the Commenters’ Concern?

Several commenters oppose the

incorporation of a trim-in-motion

system. The commenters state that the

trim-in-motion system will annunciate

during normal trim activation and the

pilot will hear the trim-in-motion alert

continuously and ‘‘tune it out.’’ The

commenters would like FAA to

eliminate the trim-in-motion system

requirement.

What Is FAA’s Response to the Concern?

We do not concur. The trim-in-motion

system for the MU–2B series airplanes

annunciates only after the trim wheel

has rotated more than 30 degrees in the

nose-up direction when the flaps are

retracted. This should eliminate

‘‘nuisance alerts’’.

We are not changing the AD as a

result of these comments.

Comment No. 11: Automatic Autopilot

Disconnect

What Are the Commenters’ Concerns?

Several commenters oppose the

incorporation of an automatic autopilot

disconnect. The commenters express the

following concerns:

1. The automatic autopilot disconnect

is dangerous in that the autopilot could

become disconnected in high workload

conditions.

2. The Mitsubishi MU–2B series

airplane is a one-pilot airplane and the

autopilot provides a useful function as

a workload reliever.

3. The automatic autopilot disconnect

is unnecessary because no accidents

have occurred since the AD was issued

that required a minimum 180 knot

indicated airspeed (KIAS). The

commenters would like FAA to

eliminate the automatic autopilot

disconnect requirement.

4. The autopilot would disconnect at

a speed slightly faster than the best rate

of climb speed for certain weight and

altitude combinations. The commenters

state that icing rarely occurs above

25,000 feet. This is the desired altitude

in certain weather conditions where the

slowest airspeeds are required for the

best rate of climb. The commenters

believe that a hazardous situation would

exist if the pilot were to hand fly the

airplane to achieve the best rate of climb

instead of utilizing the autopilot.

What Are FAA’s Responses to the

Concerns?

The following presents FAA’s

response to each of the concerns

regarding the automatic autopilot

disconnect:

1. We concur that high workload

conditions exist. However, the objective

of the automatic autopilot disconnect is

to prevent the autopilot from applying

nose-up elevator control with pitch trim

until the airplane stalls. When

implemented, the pilot will be forced to

take control of the airplane before the

autopilot applies pitch control in the

full trimmed nose-up direction. If the

autopilot controls the airplane into a

stall, then the chance of a recovery is

unlikely. The automatic autopilot

disconnect would, prior to a stall

condition, give control to the pilot and

allow detection and prevention of a

stall. The automatic autopilot

disconnects well below the cruise speed

and just above the stall speed.

2. We concur that the Mitsubishi MU–

2B series airplane is a single-pilot

airplane and the autopilot provides a

useful function as a workload reliever.

The airplane was certificated without

the autopilot and is considered optional

equipment. Any pilot of this aircraft

should be able to handle situations

without the use of the autopilot the

same as with the autopilot. As discussed

above, the automatic disconnect

function activates at a speed that

provides increased margin to

contaminated stall. This places the pilot

in situations where the continued

reliance on the autopilot may mask

natural stall warnings prior to stall and

upset.

3. We do not concur with the

commenter that no accidents have

occurred since the AD was issued to

require a minimum 180 KIAS in icing

conditions, and therefore the automatic

autopilot disconnect is unnecessary.

Since 1993 when the 180 KIAS

minimum speed was established, an

airplane upset occurred in an accident

in Malad City, Utah. Speeds were lower

than 180 KIAS.

4. We do not concur that a hazardous

situation would exist if the pilot would

hand fly the airplane at altitudes above

25,000 feet. Cumulonimbus clouds

account for the icing above 25,000 feet.

These clouds contain some of the most

severe forms of icing conditions. Icing

accrued at lower altitudes may easily

remain on the airfoil and then the

airplane could carry this ice to higher

altitudes. As discussed earlier, these

airplanes were certificated without the

autopilot and the autopilot is

considered optional equipment. Any

pilot of this aircraft should be able to

handle situations without the use of the

autopilot the same as with the autopilot.

We are not changing the AD as a

result of these comments.

Comment Issue No. 12: Require Either

an Auto-ignition (Re-light) System or an

Engine Continuous-Duty Ignition

Replacement System

What Is the Commenters’ Concern?

The commenters believe that

requiring either the engine continuousduty ignition replacement system or the

auto-ignition (re-light) system is

acceptable. The commenters state that

requiring both is redundant and FAA

has not provided justification for

requiring both.

What Is FAA’s Response to the Concern?

We concur that both of these systems

should not be required. Based upon the

operating record of other airplanes

equipped with the auto-ignition (relight) system, FAA believes that this

system is the best for restoring engine

power because:

• Manual selection of the ignition

after ice detection depends on the pilot

seeing the ice and knowing when the

airplane is no longer in a condition

conducive to flameout; and

• Use of the engine continuous-duty

ignition replacement system for

extended periods of time incurs

repetitive igniter replacement costs. The

use of the auto-ignition (re-light) system

is independent of pilot ice detection.

This system is also energized for a short

period of time so it incurs less operating

cost.

We excluded the requirement of

incorporating an engine continuousduty ignition replacement system.

Comment Issue No. 13: Experienced

MU–2B Series Airplanes Operators

Were Not Contacted

What Is the Commenters’ Concern?

Several commenters question why

FAA never contacted ‘‘experienced’’

MU–2B series airplane operators.

What Is FAA’s Response to the Concern?

We contacted several MU–2B series

airplane operators to seek information

on possible upsets or near upsets in

icing conditions. Among these were

pilots in 14 CFR part 91 and part 135

operations.

We are not changing the AD as a

result of these comments.

30870 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 94 / Monday, May 15, 2000 / Rules and Regulations

Comment Issue No. 14: Specific

Accidents Are Unrelated to This AD

What Are the Commenters’ Concerns?

Several commenters believe that most

of the MU–2B series airplane accidents

are unrelated to the subject matter of

this AD. The commenters state that FAA

should not take AD action because the

accidents were related to pilot error or

judgement. Some of the commenters

state that, when you take the pilot error

or judgement issues away, there are not

enough accidents to warrant AD action.

What Is FAA’s Response to the

Concerns?

We do not concur. We determined

that human error has not accounted for

all accidents and incidents involving

MU–2B series airplanes. The type and

severity of the icing conditions in these

accidents has resulted in fatalities to the

occupants of these MU–2B series

airplanes. This is because they were in

uncontrolled flight into terrain from

altitudes of 16,000 feet to 22,000 feet.

Accidents are not a prerequisite for

issuing an AD. The only prerequisite is

an unsafe condition that is likely to

exist or develop in other airplanes of the

same type design.

We are not changing the AD as a

result of these comments.

Comment Issue No. 15: Operation

Outside the Design Envelope

What Is the Commenter’s Concern?

One commenter states that the AD is

not justified because the pilots of the

Mitsubishi MU–2B series airplanes are

flying outside the design limits of the

airplane.

What Is FAA’s Response to the Concern?

We do not concur. The FAA does not

have evidence of the affected airplanes

being flown outside of the design limits

up to the moment of loss of control.

We are not changing the AD as a

result of this comment.

Comment Issue No. 16: The MU–2B

Passed All Tests

What Are the Commenters’ Concerns?

One commenter states that AD action

is unnecessary because the MU–2B

series airplanes passed all the tests

during the FFFSCR. Another commenter

states that the MU–2B airplanes passed

all the tests during the special

certification review (SCR) that FAA

performed in 1984.

What Is FAA’s Response to the

Concerns?

We do not concur. The purpose of the

1984 SCR was for the overall aspects of

the airplane, and was not specific to

icing-related problems. The 1996

FFFSCR specifically addressed flight

into icing conditions. The tests during

this FFFSCR were not pass/fail

situations. The final report of the

FFFSCR includes all the findings and

conclusions and makes 14 different

recommendations, including equipment

and training recommendations.

We are not changing the AD as a

result of these comments.

Comment Issue No. 17: Power is the

Key to Exiting Icing Conditions

What Is the Commenter’s Concern?

One commenter states that the one

key to exiting icing conditions is power.

The commenter requests that FAA focus

on increasing power instead of system

modifications.

What Is FAA’s Response to the Concern?

We do not concur. While power is a

key when a pilot immediately exits

icing conditions, airfoil lift and stall

aerodynamics are most significant in

icing conditions. The significant

aerodynamic characteristics for the MU2B series airplanes are the stall angle of

attack and lift coefficient with ice

accretion. These could lead to increased

drag, which may result in an

insufficient amount of engine power

(thrust) available to exit the icing

conditions. The level of thrust necessary

to overcome all icing conditions could

be more than the MU–2B series

airplanes can provide. Nominal changes

in propeller effectiveness with ice

accretion decrease propeller

performance.

We are not changing the AD as a

result of this comment.

Comment Issue No. 18: Similar Action

Necessary for Other Aircraft

What Is the Commenter’s Concern?

One commenter states that the icing

accident statistics of other airplanes are

higher than the Mitsubishi MU–2B

series airplanes. The commenter

specifically calls out the statistics for

the Cessna Model 421 airplanes.

Another commenter states that FAA

should require similar actions on the

Commander Model 114 airplanes.

What Is FAA’s Response to the Concern?

The Cessna Model 421 airplanes and

the Commander Model 114 airplanes are

a different type design to that of the

Mitsubishi MU–2B series airplanes. The

FAA looks at the service history and

design of each particular aircraft to

determine whether an unsafe condition

exists or is likely to develop, and AD

action is necessary. The FAA will issue

an AD if it determines that similar

action needs to be taken on any other

type design aircraft.

We are not changing the AD as a

result of these comments.

Comment Issue No. 19: MU–2B Attracts

Financially Weak Operators

What Is the Commenter’s Concern?

One commenter states that the MU–

2B series airplanes attract operators who

do not have the financial strength to

properly maintain their aircraft and

train their crews. The commenter

indicates that this is due to the affected

airplanes being market bargains because

of factors such as the issuance of the

NPRM and the mandatory training AD

against the MU–2B series airplanes. The

FAA infers that the commenter believes

the AD is only necessary to those

operators without proper financial

resources.

What Is FAA’s Response to the

Commenter’s Concern?

The FAA does not concur. The unsafe

condition exists when the airplane is

flying in icing conditions. The FAA

initiates AD action based only on

whether an unsafe condition exists or

could develop on type design aircraft.

The market value of the affected

airplanes or the financial status of the

owners/operators of those airplanes

does not enter into FAA’s decision.

We are not changing the AD as a

result of this comment.

Comment Issue No. 20: Severity of Ice

Testing

What Is the Commenters’ Concern?

Several commenters question the

severity of the icing problems found

during the tanker testing conducted

with the FFFSCR. The commenters state

that the AD is not necessary because

they believe this testing is the primary

justification for the AD.

What Is FAA’s Response to the Concern?

We do not concur. The tanker testing

was intended to examine only the ice

accretion aft of the active portion of the

deicing boots. This was where the ice

accretion was found on the ATR

airplane in the Roselawn accident.

During this testing, only small portions

of the airplane were exposed to the icing

cloud at any particular time because the

icing effect could not be accomplished

simultaneously on all airplane surfaces

located behind the tanker.

The entire natural icing environment

cannot be replicated using

computational fluid dynamics (CFD).

This environment also cannot be

sampled during flight testing in natural

Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 94 / Monday, May 15, 2000 / Rules and Regulations 30871

icing conditions. Each condition is

unique and variable. If you then account

for airplane design, the chances for

developing the most severe ice shape for

any one aerodynamic characteristic is

difficult.

This information reveals that neither

the testing nor other tools are able to

address all possible hazardous

conditions on the Mitsubishi MU–2B

series airplanes. The FAA has

determined that the systems

modifications required by this AD will

give the pilot the best chance of

maintaining control of the airplane in

icing conditions.

We are not changing the AD as a

result of these comments.

Comment Issue No. 21: Congressional

Pressure

What Is the Commenters’ Concern?

Several commenters believe that FAA

yielded to congressional pressures in

conducting the FFFSCR and issuing the

NPRM. These commenters state that the

FFFSCR was precipitated by a letter

from a U.S. congressman relating to an

accident in Zwingle, Iowa. The MU–2B

series airplane in this accident

experienced an uncontained propeller

blade failure and then struck a silo. The

commenters believe the AD is

unnecessary and FAA is taking action

because of politics.

What Is FAA’s Response to the Concern?

Although it was part of the

information we reviewed when deciding

to conduct the FFFSCR, the

congressional letter was not the

determining factor. The FAA was

already analyzing the service history of

the Mitsubishi MU–2B series airplanes.

The decision to issue the NPRM was

based on:

• The conclusions made from the

FFFSCR;

• The review of the affected

airplanes’ service history; and -

• The testing and approval of the

system modifications included in the

NPRM.

Our analysis of the situation does not

link the Iowa accident referenced in the

congressman’s letter to the icing

problems of the MU–2B series airplanes.

We are not changing the AD as a

result of these comments.

Comment Issue No. 22: AD is an

Economic Burden

What Are the Commenters’ Concerns?

Several commenters addresss the

economic impact caused by this AD and

recent AD’s against the MU–2B

airplanes, including:

1. The AD’s are senseless and have

gone beyond reason;

2. The apparent bending of the

regulatory rules against the MU–2B

series airplanes has resulted in higher

insurance premiums, higher parts costs,

and decreased aircraft values; and

3. The NPRM, if adopted as a final

rule, will cost each owner/operator

about $27,000.

What Are FAA’s Responses to the

Concerns?

Our response to each concern follows:

1. We do not concur. The FAA

presumes that the commenters are

referring to the NPRM and other AD’s

written against the MU–2B series

airplanes. Each AD, including the

NPRM, must be justified through the

identification of an unsafe condition.

The FAA followed all regulatory

processes for the AD’s, including the

NPRM, against the affected airplanes;

2. The FAA does not concur. As

stated above, FAA followed all

regulatory processes for the AD’s,

including the NPRM, against the

affected airplanes; and

3. The FAA concurs that the NPRM as

written would cost approximately

$27,000 per airplane. The final rule will

actually cost less than that proposed in

the NPRM since the requirement for the

ice detection system modification and

the engine continuous-duty ignition

replacement system modification are

excluded. The FAA completed a

Regulatory Flexibility Analysis on the

NPRM. This analysis included the above

modifications. The FAA has determined

that the safety problems that would

exist if this AD was not required

outweigh the negative cost impact of

this AD upon the public.

We Are not changing the AD as a

result of these comments.

Comment Issue No. 23: Product

Improvement Modifications

What Are the Commenters’ Concerns?

Several commenters state that the

installations specified in the NPRM are

product improvements and do not

address a true unsafe condition. The

commenters indicate that Mitsubishi

developed the modifications and issued

the service bulletins before the FFFSCR.

Another commenter believes that

FAA will use this AD as an example in

mandating other product improvements

in equipment such as global positioning

systems (GPS) and stormscopes.

What Is FAA’s Response to the

Concerns?

We concur that a few of the

modifications were developed prior to

the FFFSCR. Since FAA had not

mandated these modifications through

an AD, they could have been considered

product improvements at that time.

Since that time, FAA performed the

FFFSCR; determined that an unsafe

condition exists and an AD should be

issued; and analyzed the modifications

that Mitsubishi developed. Part of

addressing the unsafe condition is

incorporating the modifications that

were developed prior to the FFFSCR.

The FAA can only mandate

modifications that exist through an AD.

An unsafe condition must be

demonstrated for any AD action.

We are not changing the AD as a

result of these comments.

Comment Issue No. 24: Require a Type

Rating and Copilot for Certain

Operations

What Are the Commenter’s Concerns?

One commenter states that the

following should be required when

operating MU–2B series airplanes under

14 CFR part 135:

1. The pilot-in-charge should have a

type rating; and

2. All Mitsubishi MU–2B series

airplanes should have a copilot.

What Are FAA’s Responses to the

Concerns?

We do not concur with these concerns

for the following reasons:

1. During the special certification

review performed in 1984, FAA

determined that a type rating was not

necessary. Nothing has changed to

warrant the need for a type rating.

2. Mandating a copilot in 14 CFR part

135 operations is beyond the scope of

AD action. The FAA would need to

make a rulemaking change to the

specific regulation.

We are not changing the AD as a

result of these comments.

Comment Issue No. 25: Delete the

Requirement for Installing a Placard on

the Instrument Panel

What Is the Commenters’ Concern?

Several commenters request that the

FAA delete the requirement to install a

placard to require a negative torque

sensing (NTS) check and propeller

feather valve check as part of the

Normal Checklist Procedures. The

commenters state that confusion could

be generated through the installation of

such a large placard on the instrument

panel.

What Is FAA’s Response to the Concern?

We concur that a placard is not the

best way of accomplishing this action.

These checks are currently part of the

30872 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 94 / Monday, May 15, 2000 / Rules and Regulations

Normal Checklist Procedures Section of

the AFM. The FAA encourages

accomplishment of all actions specified

in this section. However, the only

mandatory actions in the AFM are those

included in the Limitations Section.

Mandating these checks as part of an

addition to the Limitations Section of

the AFM would impose actions that go

beyond the scope of what was already

proposed in the NPRM. If our analysis

of the continued airworthiness of the

affected airplanes shows that it is

necessary to mandate these actions, we

may initiate further rulemaking to

require this information to become part

of the Limitations Section of the AFM.

We excluded the placard requirement

from the AD.

The FAA’s Determination

What Is FAA’s Final Determination on

This Issue?

After reviewing all available

information related to the subject

presented above, we have determined

that air safety and the public interest

require the adoption of the rule as

proposed except for the changes

described above and minor editorial

corrections.

How Do These Changes and Corrections

Affect the AD?

We have determined that the addition

and minor corrections will not change

the meaning of the AD and will not add

any additional burden upon the public

than was already proposed.

Compliance Time of This AD

What Is the Compliance Time of This

AD?

The compliance time of this AD is

within the next 12 calendar months

after the effective date.

Why Is the Compliance in Calendar

Time Instead of Hours Time-in-Service?

We have determined that the

compliance time of this AD should be

specified in calendar time instead of

hours time-in-service. Although the

condition addressed by this AD is

unsafe while the airplane is in flight, the

condition is not a result of repetitive

airplane operation. The potential for the

unsafe condition occurring is the same

on the first flight as it is for subsequent

flights. The compliance time of ‘‘12

calendar months after the effective date

of this AD’’ will not inadvertently

ground airplanes and will assure that all

owners/operators of the affected

airplanes accomplish this action in a

reasonable time period.

Regulatory Flexibility Determination

and Analysis

The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980

was enacted by Congress to assure that

small entities are not unnecessarily or

disproportionately burdened by

government regulations. This Act

establishes ‘‘as principle of regulatory

issuance that agencies shall endeavor,

consistent with the objectives of the rule

and of applicable statutes, to fit

regulatory and informational

requirements to the scale of the

businesses, organizations, and

governmental jurisdictions subject to

regulation.’’ To achieve this principle,

the Act requires agencies to solicit and

consider flexible regulatory proposals

and to explain the rationale for their

actions. The Act covers a wide range of

small entities, including small

businesses, not-for-profit organizations,

and small governmental jurisdictions.

Agencies must perform a review to

determine whether a rule will have a

‘‘significant economic impact on a

substantial number of small entities.’’ If

the determination is that it will, the

agency must prepare a Regulatory

Flexibility Analysis as described in the

Act. However, if after a review for a

proposed or final rule, an agency

determines that a rule is not expected to

have a significant economic impact on

a substantial number of small entities,

section 605(b) of the Act provides that

the head of the agency may so certify

and a Regulatory Flexibility Analysis is

not required. A statement providing the

factual basis for this determination must

be included in the Docket file, and the

reasoning should be clear.

The FAA has determined that this AD

will have a significant economic impact

on a substantial number of small

entities. After a review of alternatives,

as required by section 603(c) of the Act,

this AD is the least costly alternative to

reduce the possibility of an unsafe

condition on Mitsubishi MU–2B series

airplanes when operating in icing

conditions.

The entities affected by this AD are

believed to be mostly in Standard

Industrial Classification (SIC) 4522, ‘‘Air

Transportation, Nonscheduled.’’ Under

the Small Business Administration

(SBA), Table of Size Standards, March

1, 1996, an entity in SIC 4522 would be

a small business if it has fewer than

1,500 employees.

The U.S. Registered Aircraft Database

shows approximately 200 operators of

Mitsubishi MU–2B series airplanes in

the United States, but that only 13

entities operate 2 or more of these

airplanes. Ownership of more than 1

MU–2B series airplane is believed to be

limited to 5 percent of the affected

aircraft owners. Only one of these

operators had 10 or more of these

airplanes. The total number of owners

operating MU–2B series airplanes is in

the range of 320 to 340, and the names

of the owners suggest that the majority

of these airplanes are operated by small

entities. Consequently, this AD is likely

to affect a substantial number of small

entities.

The initial cost for each owner/

operator of an MU–2B series airplane is

estimated to be approximately $25,728.

Reported usage rates of 32 to 33 hours

per month (almost 400 hours per year)

indicate that an airplane will be subject

to a total of four inspections per year.

At a nominal inspection time of 1

workhour per inspection and labor cost

of $60 per workhour, the annual

inspection costs will be approximately

$240 per airplane. These estimates

include costs for the associated record

keeping. A reasonable range of costs

arising from this AD is suggested in the

following table:

Cost of capital

Remaining life

of aircraft

(in years)

Annualized cost Present value

of total cost Initial Total

10%/year .......................................................................................................... 20 $3,022 $3,262 $27,771

15%/year .......................................................................................................... 20 4,110 4,350 27,230

10%/year .......................................................................................................... 10 4,187 4,427 27,203

15%/year .......................................................................................................... 10 5,126 5,366 26,933

The remaining life for an affected

airplane will depend on the demand for

the types of service provided (such as

cargo delivery and medical evacuation),

as well as the difference in cost between

providing this service with the MU–2B

series airplanes and the cost of using

alternative aircraft or modes of

transportation. According to the

Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 94 / Monday, May 15, 2000 / Rules and Regulations 30873

manufacturer, detailed inspections

show that deterioration of the airframes

has been quite small, so that a 20-year

life expectancy may be a reasonable

presumption. In addition, the

manufacturer acknowledged recent

instances of retired MU–2B series

airplanes being returned to service.

These considerations suggest that it is

reasonable to presume a relatively long

expected life for many of the MU–2B

series airplanes, so that the annualized

cost per affected aircraft may average

less than $5,000.

With an average annual cost per

airplane in the range of $3,200 to $5,400

(consistent with 10 to 20 years of

remaining life and capital costs of 10 to

15 percent per year), the present value

of the total cost will be approximately

$27,000 per airplane. The total

annualized cost of this AD for the U.S.

fleet will be in the range of $1 million

(320 × $3,200 = $1,024,000) to $1.8

million (340 × $5,400 = $1,836,000). The

present discounted value of total costs

imposed by this AD are in the range of

$8.6 million to $9.4 million. Market

values for the affected airplanes are

believed to be in the range of $300,000

to $800,000, depending on the

airplane’s age, condition, and installed

equipment. Therefore, the AD costs will

be about 3.5 percent to 9 percent

(($27,000 / $800,000) × 100% = 3.5% to

($27,000 / $300,000) × 100% = 9%) of

the market value of the airplane.

Because the costs imposed by this AD

will be proportionately higher for less

expensive airplanes, it is likely that they

will also be proportionately higher for

smaller, less financially strong operators

than for larger operators.

In developing the Regulatory

Flexibility Analysis, several alternatives

to this AD were considered. The

alternatives included:

Option No. 1

Take no action, including not issuing

this AD.

The FAA’s Position on Option No. 1:

Taking no action will permit the

continuation of current conditions that

could result in a repeat of icing-related

accidents similar to those that have

occurred over the past 10 years.

Option No. 2

Require additional training.

The FAA’s Position on Option No. 2:

The FAA addressed the training issue in

AD 97–20–14, Amendment 39–39–

10150 (62 FR 51594). This AD requires

periodic training for the pilots and crew

flying any Mitsubishi MU–2 series

airplane. The training provides

information relative to flight into

possible or forecast icing conditions.

This training should assist in reducing

future ice-related accidents for the

affected airplanes.

Option No. 3

Issue AD action to restrict the MU–2B

series airplanes operators from flight

into known or suspected icing

conditions.

The FAA’s Position on Option No. 3:

The FAA has determined that restricting

flight into known or suspected icing

conditions will not eliminate

inadvertent encounters with icing

conditions. Such restrictions may have

little effect on flying into unforecast

icing conditions with inoperable antiice equipment and insufficient flight

planning. Unknown forecast conditions

and insufficient flight planning

contributed to two of the accidents (and

13 of the 14 fatalities) cited. In addition,

such a restriction will impose costs on

owners/operators because the airplanes

will be prevented from making flights,

despite being outfitted with anti-ice

equipment.

Option No. 4

Require the actions in this AD.

The FAA’s Position on Option No. 4:

The FAA has determined that requiring

the modifications in this AD will help

prevent undetected failure conditions

and provide a timely warning prior to

upset. This warning will enable the

pilot to manually control the airplane

before an unsafe condition develops.

The FAA has determined that this AD

is likely to have benefits in excess of

costs and is not aware of a less costly

alternative that will be likely to address

the unsafe condition addressed in this

AD.

A copy of the complete Regulatory

Flexibility Analysis may be obtained

from FAA, Central Region, Office of the

Regional Counsel, 901 Locust, Room

506, Kansas City, Missouri .

Regulatory Impact

The regulations adopted herein will

not have a substantial direct effect on

the States, on the relationship between

the national government and the States,

or on the distribution of power and

responsibilities among the various

levels of government. Therefore, FAA

determines that this final rule does not

have federalism implications under

Executive Order 13132.

The FAA has determined that this

action:

(1) Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory

action’’ under Executive Order 12866;

(2) Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures

(44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and

(3) Could have a significant economic

impact on a substantial number of small

entities under the criteria of the

Regulatory Flexibility Act. We have

placed a copy of the draft regulatory

evaluation prepared for this action in

the Rules Docket. You may obtain a

copy of it at the Rules Docket at the

location provided under the caption

ADDRESSES.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation

safety, Incorporation by reference,

Safety.

Adoption of the Amendment

Accordingly, under the authority

delegated to me by the Administrator,

the Federal Aviation Administration

amends part 39 of the Federal Aviation

Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows:

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS

DIRECTIVES

1. The authority citation for part 39

continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

§ 39.13 [Amended]

2. FAA amends § 39.13 by adding a

new airworthiness directive (AD) to

read as follows:

2000–09–15 Mitsubishi Heavy Industries,

LTD.: Amendment 39–11724; Docket No.

97–CE–21–AD.

(a) What airplanes are affected by this AD?

This AD applies to all serial numbers of the

following Mitsubishi airplane models,

certificated in any category:

MU–2B

MU–2B–10

MU–2B–15

MU–2B–20

MU–2B–25

MU–2B–26

MU–2B–26A

MU–2B–30

MU–2B–35

MU–2B–36

MU–2B–36A

MU–2B–40

MU–2B–60

(b) Who must comply with this AD?

Anyone who wishes to operate any of the

above airplanes on the U.S. Register must

comply with this AD.

(c) What problem does this AD address?

The actions specified by this AD are intended

to assist in preventing departure from

controlled flight while operating in icing

conditions.

(d) What actions must I accomplish to

address this problem? Within the next 12

calendar months after July 24, 2000 (the

effective date of this AD), you must

incorporate the following modifications:

(1) Install a pneumatic deice monitoring

system. You must use the procedures

contained in Test Instrumentation, Inc.

Document No. MU2–5001, Rev. E., dated

30874 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 94 / Monday, May 15, 2000 / Rules and Regulations

May 21, 1997; and Mitsubishi MU–2 Service

Bulletin (SB) No. 232, dated July 2, 1997.

(2) Install a trim-in-motion alerting system

and automatic autopilot disconnect system.

Use the procedures contained in Test

Instrumentation, Inc. Document No. MU2–

1001, Rev. C, dated June 15, 1997; Test

Instrumentation, Inc. Document No. MU2–

4001, Rev. C, dated June 30, 1997; and

Mitsubishi MU–2 SB No. 231, dated July 2,

1997.

(3) Install an auto-ignition (re-light) system.

Use the procedures contained in Mitsubishi

MU–2 SB No. 226, which incorporates the

following pages:

Pages

Revision

level

Date

2 through 11, 13

through 23, 27

through 57,

and 59 through

93.

A January 13,

1997.

1, 12, 24, 25, 26,

and 58.

B October 27,

1997.

(e) Can I comply with this AD in any other

way?

(1) You may use an alternative method of

compliance or adjust the compliance time if:

(i) Your alternative method of compliance

provides an equivalent level of safety; and

(ii) The Manager of one of the following

approves your alternative. Submit your

request through an FAA Principal

Maintenance Inspector, who may add

comments and then send it to the Manager.

(A) Los Angeles Aircraft Certification

Office, FAA, 3960 Paramount Blvd.,

Lakewood, California 90712; or

(B) Fort Worth Airplane Certification

Office, FAA, 2601 Meacham Boulevard, Fort

Worth, Texas 76193–0150.

(2) This AD applies to each airplane

identified in the preceding applicability

provision, regardless of whether it has been

modified, altered, or repaired in the area

subject to the requirements of this AD. For

airplanes that have been modified, altered, or

repaired so that the performance of the

requirements of this AD is affected, the

owner/operator must request approval for an

alternative method of compliance in

accordance with paragraph (e)(1) of this AD.

The request should include an assessment of

the effect of the modification, alteration, or

repair on the unsafe condition addressed by

this AD; and, if you have not eliminated the

unsafe condition, specific actions you

propose to address it.

(f) Where can I get information about any

already-approved alternative methods of

compliance? Contact one of the following:

(1) Small Airplane Directorate, FAA, 901

Locust, Room 301, Kansas City, Missouri

64106; telephone: (816) 329–4121; facsimile:

(816) 426–4090;

(2) Los Angeles Aircraft Certification

Office, FAA, 3960 Paramount Blvd.,

Lakewood, California 90712; telephone: (562)

627–5222; facsimile: (562) 627–5228; or

(3) Fort Worth Airplane Certification

Office, FAA, 2601 Meacham Boulevard, Fort

Worth, Texas 76193–0150; telephone: (817)

222–5147; facsimile: (817) 222–5960.

(g) What if I need to fly the airplane to

another location to comply with this AD? The

FAA can issue a special flight permit under

sections 21.197 and 21.199 of the Federal

Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 21.197 and

21.199) to operate your airplane to a location

where you can accomplish the requirements

of this AD.

(h) Are any service bulletins incorporated

into this AD by reference?

(1) You must accomplish the actions

required by this AD in accordance with the

following:

(i) Mitsubishi MU–2 SB No. 226, which

incorporates the following pages:

Pages

Revision

level

Date

2 through 11, 13

through 23, 27

through 57,

and 59 through

93.

A January 13,

1997.

1, 12, 24, 25, 26,

and 58.

B October 27,

1997.

(ii) Mitsubishi MU–2 SB No. 231, dated

July 2, 1997;

(iii) Mitsubishi MU–2 SB No. 232, dated

July 2, 1997;

(iv) Test Instrumentation, Inc. Document

No. MU2–1001, Rev. C, dated June 15, 1997,

and attachments;

(v) Test Instrumentation, Inc. Document

No. MU2–4001, Rev. C, dated June 30, 1997,

and attachments; and

(vi) Test Instrumentation, Inc. Document

No. MU2–5001, Rev. E., dated May 21, 1997,

and attachments.

(2) The Director of the Federal Register

approved this incorporation by reference

under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.

(3) You can get copies from Mitsubishi

Heavy Industries America, Inc., 15303 Dallas

Parkway, suite 685, LB–77, Dallas, Texas.

You can look at copies at FAA, Central

Region, Office of the Regional Counsel, 901

Locust, Room 506, Kansas City, Missouri, or

at the Office of the Federal Register, 800

North Capitol Street, NW, suite 700,

Washington, DC.

(i) When does this amendment become

effective? This amendment becomes effective

on July 24, 2000.

Issued in Kansas City, Missouri, on May 5,

2000.

Michael Gallagher,

Manager, Small Airplane Directorate, Aircraft

Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 00–11863 Filed 5–12–00; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–13–U

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 99–NM–103–AD; Amendment

39–11726; AD 2000–10–02]

RIN 2120–AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Airbus Model

A319, A320, A321, A330, and A340

Series Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation

Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: This amendment adopts a

new airworthiness directive (AD),

applicable to all Airbus Model A319,

A320, A321, A330, and A340 series

airplanes, that requires repetitive

inspections to detect missing and

incorrectly installed parts of the footrest

actuator assembly, and replacement of

discrepant parts with new parts. This

AD also provides for optional

terminating action for the repetitive

inspections. This amendment is

prompted by issuance of mandatory

continuing airworthiness information by

a foreign civil airworthiness authority.

The actions specified by this AD are

intended to prevent detachment of the

footrest assembly actuator, which could

result in partial blockage of the rudder

pedals and reduced controllability of

the airplane.

DATES: Effective June 19, 2000.

The incorporation by reference of

certain publications listed in the

regulations is approved by the Director

of the Federal Register as of June 19,

2000.

ADDRESSES: The service information

referenced in this AD may be obtained

from Airbus Industrie, 1 Rond Point

Maurice Bellonte, 31707 Blagnac Cedex,

France. This information may be

examined at the Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA), Transport

Airplane Directorate, Rules Docket,

1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton,

Washington; or at the Office of the

Federal Register, 800 North Capitol

Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Norman B. Martenson, Manager,

International Branch, ANM–116, FAA,

Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601

Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington

98055–4056; telephone (425) 227–2110;

fax (425) 227–1149.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: A

proposal to amend part 39 of the Federal

Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) to

include an airworthiness directive (AD)