[Cite as Perrysburg v. Steele, 2021-Ohio-1905.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

WOOD COUNTY 

State of Ohio/City of Perrysburg Court of Appeals No. WD-20-043 

 

 Appellee Trial Court No. TRC1905386 

v. 

Karen S. Steele DECISION AND JUDGMENT

Appellant Decided: June 4, 2021 

* * * * * 

 Dan Weiss, for appellant. 

* * * * * 

PIETRYKOWSKI, J. 

{¶ 1} Appellant, Karen Steele, appeals her conviction following a jury trial in the 

Perrysburg Municipal Court of one count of operating a vehicle under the influence 

(“OVI”) in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a), a misdemeanor of the first degree, and 

one count of operating a vehicle without reasonable control in violation of R.C. 

4511.202, a minor misdemeanor. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 

 
2.

I. Facts and Procedural Background

{¶ 2} On August 18, 2019, appellant was charged with operating a vehicle under 

the influence, and operating a vehicle without reasonable control. A jury trial was held 

on the OVI charge on March 4, 2020.1

 The following testimony was presented during the 

trial. 

{¶ 3} Lake Township Police Officer Mick Lento testified that at approximately 

4:30 p.m. on August 18, 2019, he was stopped at a stop sign on Bradner Road at the 

intersection with Woodville Road in Lake Township, Wood County, Ohio. Lento 

observed appellant’s car approaching on Woodville Road when the car attempted to make 

a right turn onto Bradner Road. The car did not make it around the corner, but instead 

ran over a stop sign, went over a culvert, and proceeded down into a ditch. The car drove 

at an angle along the ditch for about 200 feet before it drove out of the ditch and onto the 

road. Lento activated his lights and sirens and followed the car. The car did not stop 

immediately, but proceeded down Woodville Road and made a left turn onto Walbridge 

Road where the car stopped in the middle of the road. 

{¶ 4} Lento approached the stopped car and asked for appellant’s driver’s license. 

Appellant asked what the problem was. Lento responded that appellant just ran over a 

stop sign and drove into a ditch. According to Lento, appellant replied that she did not 

hit anything and that she did not have any damage to her car. Lento testified that 

 

1

 Because the offense of operating a vehicle without reasonable control in violation of 

R.C. 4511.202 is a minor misdemeanor, it was not presented to the jury. 
3.

appellant was so confused that it took her approximately six to eight minutes for her to 

give him her driver’s license, explaining that every time she reached for her license she 

asked Lento why he stopped her and what was happening. Lento observed that appellant 

had slurred words, her eyes were glassy and blood shot, and she was argumentative and 

confused. Lento testified, however, that he had a head cold and thus was not able to 

detect an odor of alcohol. At that point, Lento called two other officers to see if they 

could detect any odors. 

{¶ 5} Lento also testified that appellant’s mother was in the passenger’s seat and 

appeared confused. Appellant’s mother did not make any statements. 

{¶ 6} On cross-examination, Lento acknowledged that after he convinced 

appellant that she was in an accident, appellant informed him that her mother had 

Alzheimer’s and was grabbing at the steering wheel, which is what caused appellant to 

miss the turn and get into the accident. Lento also acknowledged that his accident report 

did not include any information regarding his observations of appellant’s slurred speech 

or glassy, bloodshot eyes, nor did it mention appellant’s denial that an accident occurred. 

However, on redirect, Lento explained that the other officers pursued the OVI 

investigation, and his report was limited to the accident only.

{¶ 7} The state next called Lake Township Police Officer Jordan Grosjean, who 

was one of the officers that responded to the scene following the call from Lento. 

Grosjean testified that he spoke with appellant while she was still in the driver’s seat of 

her car. Grosjean described that appellant was hesitant in answering his questions, and 
4.

did not look at him, but instead looked down at the center console. Grosjean asked 

appellant where she was going, and she responded that she was coming from her home 

and was heading to a festival. However, appellant could not say where the festival was 

located, and Grosjean observed that she did not have a phone or GPS device to help her 

get to the location. Grosjean then asked appellant to count backwards from 36 by twos. 

Appellant was unable to count backwards by twos, and the numbers she was saying were 

out of order. Grosjean then asked appellant to step out of the vehicle. When appellant 

stepped out, Grosjean noticed a faint odor of alcohol. 

{¶ 8} Once out of the vehicle, Grosjean performed three standard field sobriety 

tests. The first was the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus test, from which Grosjean observed 

six out of six indicators that appellant was impaired. The second test was the Walk-andTurn, which appellant was unable to successfully complete. Appellant was instructed to 

take nine steps heel to toe in a line, then turn around and take nine steps back. Appellant 

took four steps before she completely stepped off of the line, and ultimately took 21 steps 

not heel to toe before turning around. The final test was the One-Legged Stand, which 

again appellant was unable to successfully complete. Appellant made five or six attempts 

to lift her foot off of the ground and gain her balance before successfully balancing on 

one foot. Based upon all of his observations, Grosjean concluded that appellant was 

under the influence of alcohol and placed her under arrest. 

{¶ 9} At the point that Grosjean placed appellant under arrest, appellant became 

highly upset and claimed that Grosjean was scaring her mother, who suffered from 
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Alzheimer’s. Grosjean noted that appellant’s mother had been sitting calmly in the 

passenger seat of appellant’s car the whole time. Nonetheless, Grosjean undid 

appellant’s handcuffs and allowed her to bring her mother with her to the back of 

Grosjean’s patrol car. Grosjean informed appellant that he would transport them to the 

police station where she would be served with notice of the charges, and then he would 

transport them home. 

{¶ 10} As they left, Grosjean began to take appellant to the Northwood Police 

Department where a breathalyzer test could be conducted. Appellant, however, stated her 

refusal to take the breathalyzer test, and maintained that refusal even when Grosjean 

informed her that her refusal would result in an administrative license suspension. 

Therefore, Grosjean transported appellant and her mother directly to the Lake Township 

Police Station, and placed them in an interview room while he filled out the OVI 

paperwork. While in the interview room for approximately 30 to 45 minutes, appellant 

attempted to coax her mother to get up and leave with her, and also tried to coax her 

mother to say that one of the officers had grabbed her by the throat during the traffic stop. 

Finally, after serving appellant with the OVI paperwork, Grosjean contacted appellant’s 

sister who transported appellant and her mother home. 

{¶ 11} The final witness to testify for the state was Lake Township Police Officer 

Ryan Kohlhofer. Kohlhofer spoke with appellant at the scene while appellant was still in 

the driver’s seat of her car. Kohlhofer testified that appellant did not seem to remember 

that she had hit a stop sign. He described appellant as a little agitated, and he detected a 
6.

faint odor of alcohol on her breath and noticed that her eyes were glassy. Kohlhofer also 

testified that he observed appellant as she performed the field sobriety tests, during which 

he noticed that appellant lacked balance and coordination. 

{¶ 12} Following the testimony from Kohlhofer, the state rested. Appellant then 

moved for an acquittal pursuant to Crim.R. 29, which the trial court denied. Appellant 

then testified in her own defense. 

{¶ 13} Appellant testified that her mother had Alzheimer’s and that she was the 

primary caretaker for her mother. On the day of August 18, 2019, appellant was driving 

her mother to pick up her aunt and go to a festival when her mother became confused and 

grabbed the steering wheel of the car, thinking that appellant had missed a turn. That is 

when appellant lost control of the car, ran over the stop sign, and went into the ditch. 

{¶ 14} Appellant testified that when she spoke with the police officers she was 

beside herself, and was upset about what had just happened to the point that it made it 

difficult for her to concentrate and follow directions. Appellant denied that she failed to 

recognize that she had just been involved in an accident. Appellant stated that her only 

concern was her mother, and she wanted to make sure that her mother was okay and 

wanted to get her home. Appellant testified that being upset also influenced her decision 

not to take the breathalyzer test, and that in hindsight she should have taken the test. 

Finally, as to the field sobriety tests, appellant explained that she was on disability for a 

back injury, which impaired her ability to perform those tests.
7.

{¶ 15} The final witness to testify was appellant’s sister, Lynn Kontak. Kontak 

testified that appellant’s mother suffers from Alzheimer’s. Kontak explained that the 

mother will sometimes act erratically. Kontak recounted one instance where Kontak’s 

oldest daughter had taken appellant’s mother to eat lunch. While the daughter was in the 

restaurant getting the food, appellant’s mother climbed into the driver’s seat and the car 

started moving forward. After Kontak’s daughter was able to stop the car, appellant’s 

mother acted calmly, as if nothing had happened. 

{¶ 16} Following the closing statements and instructions from the trial court, the 

jury retired to deliberate. Thereafter, the jury returned with a verdict of guilty on the 

count of OVI. The trial court separately found appellant guilty of operating a vehicle 

without reasonable control. The court then continued the matter for preparation of a 

presentence investigation report. 

{¶ 17} At the sentencing hearing on June 2, 2020, the trial court sentenced 

appellant to a term of 180 days in the Wood County Justice Center. The trial court 

suspended 80 of those days, and ordered that of the remaining 100 days, 90 would be 

served on electronic home monitoring. 

II. Assignments of Error

{¶ 18} Appellant has timely appealed her judgment of conviction, and now asserts 

two assignments of error for our review: 

1. The evidence was insufficient for the court to deny appellant’s 

Crim.R. 29(A) motions and the jury to find the appellant guilty. 
8.

2. The jury’s guilty decision was against the manifest weight of the 

evidence. 

III. Analysis

{¶ 19} At the outset, we note that the arguments in appellant’s brief pertain only to 

her OVI conviction, thus we will not address whether her conviction for operating a 

vehicle without reasonable control in violation of R.C. 4511.202 is based on insufficient 

evidence or is against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

{¶ 20} In her first assignment of error, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the 

evidence to support her conviction both as it relates to the trial court’s denial of her 

Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal and the jury’s guilty verdict. 

{¶ 21} “A motion for acquittal under Crim.R. 29(A) is governed by the same 

standard as the one for determining whether a verdict is supported by sufficient 

evidence.” State v. Tenace, 109 Ohio St.3d 255, 2006-Ohio-2417, 847 N.E.2d 386, ¶ 37. 

In reviewing a record for sufficiency, “[t]he relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the 

evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have 

found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. 

Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus. 

{¶ 22} Here, appellant was convicted of operating a vehicle under the influence in 

violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a), which states, “No person shall operate any vehicle, 

streetcar, or trackless trolley within this state, if, at the time of the operation, any of the 
9.

following apply: (a) The person is under the influence of alcohol, a drug of abuse, or a 

combination of them.” 

{¶ 23} In support of her assignment of error, appellant argues that she testified at 

trial consistently with what she told the officers at the scene, which was that the accident 

was caused when her mother unexpectedly grabbed the steering wheel. Appellant 

concludes that when faced with this explanation, no rational juror could have found 

beyond a reasonable doubt that alcohol was the cause of the accident. 

{¶ 24} We are not persuaded by appellant’s argument. First, appellant’s argument 

improperly obfuscates what the state is required to prove. The state was not required to 

prove the cause of the accident. Instead, the state was only required to prove that 

appellant operated the motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. Second, the 

evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient to 

support appellant’s conviction. Here, the evidence included appellant’s erratic operation 

of her vehicle, her denial that she was in an accident, her inability to produce her driver’s 

license in a timely manner, her slurred speech, her glassy eyes, the faint odor of alcohol, 

the presence of six out of six indicators on the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus test, and her 

failure to successfully complete the Walk-and-Turn test and the One-Legged Standing 

test. From this evidence, we hold that a rational trier of fact could have found her 

conviction for OVI proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 

{¶ 25} Accordingly, appellant’s first assignment of error is not well-taken. 
10.

{¶ 26} In her second assignment of error, appellant argues that her conviction is 

against the manifest weight of the evidence. A claim that a jury verdict is against the 

manifest weight of the evidence requires an appellate court to act as a “thirteenth juror.” 

State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). In so doing, the 

appellate court, 

reviewing the entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable 

inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and determines whether in 

resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created 

such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed 

and a new trial ordered. The discretionary power to grant a new trial should 

be exercised only in the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs 

heavily against the conviction. 

Id.

{¶ 27} As with her first assignment of error, appellant argues that there is 

conflicting evidence about the cause of the accident. Appellant asserts that while the 

state presented evidence that she did not pass certain field sobriety tests, it did not prove 

that her alleged impairment, and not her mother grabbing the steering wheel, caused the 

accident. Thus, appellant concludes that the jury clearly lost its way when it found 

appellant guilty despite this conflicting evidence. 

{¶ 28} Again, we note that the jury was not required to find that alcohol caused the 

accident; it was only required to find that appellant operated the vehicle while under the 
11.

influence of alcohol. Having reviewed the record, we find that this is not the exceptional 

case where the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction. As discussed in 

appellant’s first assignment of error, the officers testified to numerous physical indicia of 

impairment, and even appellant acknowledges that she did not pass the field sobriety 

tests. Therefore, we hold that the jury did not clearly lose its way when it found appellant 

guilty of OVI, and thus appellant’s conviction is not against the manifest weight of the 

evidence. 

{¶ 29} Accordingly, appellant’s second assignment of error is not well-taken. 

IV. Conclusion

{¶ 30} For the foregoing reasons we find that substantial justice has been done the 

party complaining, and the judgment of the Perrysburg Municipal Court is affirmed. 

Appellant is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to App.R. 24. 

Judgment affirmed. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. 

See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4. 

Mark L. Pietrykowski, J. _______________________________ 

JUDGE 

Thomas J. Osowik, J. 

 _______________________________ 

Myron C. Duhart, J. JUDGE 

CONCUR. 

_______________________________ 

JUDGE 
12.

This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of 

Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported 

version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at: 

http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.